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AN ANALYSIS 
 
 OF 
 
 SIR Wm. HAMILTON’S, 
 
 Lectures on Metaphysics. 
 
 WITH NOTES EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL. 
 BY 
 
 THE Key. EGBERT JAEDINE, B.D., D.Sa 
 
 PRINCIPAL OP THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S INSTITUTION CALCUTTA. 
 
 I 
 
 Author of “ The Elements op the Phychology of Cognition 
 and ‘‘What to Believe.” 
 
 For sale at the General Assembly’s Institution, Calcutta 
 by Babu Raj Kumar Chandra, 
 
 Printed by K. C. Doss, at the University Book Press, 
 127, Manicktolah Street, Calcutta. 
 
 1877 , 
 
 \ 
 
 Price Ps. 1-4* 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 This little work is intended to be an aid to 
 students in the study of Sir W. Hamilton’s Lec- 
 tures on Metaphysics. The Analysis is almost the 
 same as I have given during the past six years in 
 the lecture-room of the General Assembly’s Insti- 
 ^ tution and the notes v ill I trust be of service in 
 
 or 
 
 § enabling students the better to understand import- 
 ant philosophical doctrines. 
 
 ir I have endeavoured to make the Analysis as 
 as possible, and would warn students against 
 the adoption, in their ordinary writings, of the forms 
 of expression which I have employed. The mathe- 
 matical symbols ( + and =) which I have made use 
 of are intended to aid in securing brevity and clear- 
 ness by avoiding periphrases and connecting par- 
 ticles and by bringing together as closely as possible 
 related ideas. A little study and practice will soon 
 enable the student to see the meaning of these sym- 
 bols in different cases. I trust that both the Ana- 
 lysis and the Notes may be of service to those who 
 make use of them. 
 
 V 
 
 R. J. 
 
 The General Assembly’s 
 
 
 Institution, 
 
 Calcutta^ IQth February 1877 . 
 
 \ 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 General Analysis . . . . 1 
 
 Special Analysis of Parts 
 
 Part I — 
 
 ■Introduction 
 
 2 
 
 ,, II Philosophy in General 
 
 5 
 
 „ III 
 
 Introduction to Psychology 
 
 11 
 
 ,y IV The Consciousness 
 
 . 15 
 
 „ V The Cognitive Faculties 
 
 30 
 
 y, VI The Feelings 
 
 . 63 
 
 Notes Expository and Critical 
 
 
 Note A. 
 
 The Pelativity of knowledge 
 
 . 77 
 
 „ B. 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton s Doctrine 
 
 
 
 of Consciousness 
 
 86 
 
 „ C. 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton’s Classification 
 
 
 
 of mental Faculties . . 
 
 . 104 
 
 „ D. 
 
 Reid’s Doctrine of Perception . 
 
 106 
 
 „ E. 
 
 Natural Realism 
 
 . Ill 
 
 » E. 
 
 Classification 
 
 121 
 
 „ G. 
 
 The Logical Doctrine of 
 
 
 
 the Proposition 
 
 . 131 
 
 „ H. 
 
 Implied Predications 
 
 151 
 
 » I. 
 
 A Priori Regulative Principles 
 
 . 158 
 
GENERAL ANALYSIS. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton’s Lectures upon Meta- 
 physics may, in general, be divided into the following 
 parts : — 
 
 Part 1. — Introduction : — in which is studied 
 the Absolute Utility of Philosophy Subjective and 
 Objective. Lectures I., 11. 
 
 Part II. — Philosophy in General : — compre- 
 hending a discussion of the Nature of Philosophy 
 and the manner in which it should be studied. 
 
 Lect. III.— VIL 
 
 Part III. — Introduction to Psychology : — 
 being an explication of the most important 
 philosophical terms. Lect. VIII. — X. 
 
 Part IV. — Consciousness : — classification of its 
 contents, its special conditions, its authority, and 
 general questions connected with it. Lect. XI, — XX. . 
 
 Part V. — The Cognitive Faculties : — compre- 
 hending the Presentative, the Conservative, the 
 Reproductive, the Representative, the Elaborative, 
 and the Regulative. ... ... Lect. XX — XL. 
 
 Part VI. — The Feelings : — their Character, 
 Explanation and Classes. ... Lect. XLI. — XL VI. 
 
SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF PARTS. 
 PART I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The Utility of any branch of knowledge is its 
 value as a means towards an end + is of two kinds 
 Relative and Absolute. Relative Utility = value 
 of any study in relation to other studies ; Absolute 
 Utility = its value in itself. We study here only 
 the latter. The Absoluute Utility of Philosophy 
 of two kinds ; — 
 
 A, Subjective, as it cultivates the mind or knowing 
 subject by calling its faculties into exercise 
 + The Useful=a mean towards an end + a mean 
 towards a higher end constitutes a higher utility 
 than a mean towards a lower end + there prevail 
 two errors with reference to the comparative 
 utility of different studies. 
 
 I. The first consists in supposing that man is 
 not an end to himself but a mean to some- 
 thing out of himself 
 
 A. By nature man is an end to himself=his own 
 perfection and happiness constitute the goal of 
 his activity -{- by attaining these he chiefly glori- 
 fies God. 
 
 B. In the actual conditions of society men are divert 
 ed from their chief end to serve the purposes 
 of others. 
 
 
SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF PARTS. 
 
 S 
 
 G. Hence the distinction between a liberal education 
 desiofned to cultivate man's faculties, and a 
 professional education designed to fit him for 
 the service of society. 
 
 II, The second consists in subordinating intel- 
 lectual cultivation to the acquisition of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 A. The mere acquisition of knowledge is not iden- 
 
 tical with intellectual cultivation = it does not 
 necessarily or always involve a high kind of 
 mental exercise which is the condition of mental 
 culture. 
 
 B. Knowledge is subordinate to mental culture. 
 
 I. In practical knowledge ex liypothesi not truth but 
 practice is the end. 
 
 II. In speculative knowledge the pleasure of mental acti- 
 vity and not the possession of truth is the motive 
 vfhich stimulates activity. 
 
 III. Hence we conclude that Philosophy, being 
 the best gymnastic of the mind, is the best 
 entitled to be called useful. 
 
 >• Objective, as it supplies the mind with know- 
 ledge = the knowledge of the human mind is the 
 most important and noble of all kinds of know- 
 ledge -p the phenomena of mind alone afford the 
 basis of an argument for God’s existence. 
 
 1. Idea of God=that of a First Cause + Intelli- 
 gence -f Virtue=a First Cause without intelli- 
 gence and virtue is blind Fate -f- an Intelligent 
 and virtuous Being without original and infin- 
 ite power is dependent and limited = the pecu- 
 liar attributes of Deity are Intelligence and 
 Virtue. 
 
4 
 
 SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF PARTS. 
 
 II, That intelligence stands first in the absolute 
 order of existence -p that the universe is govern- 
 ed by moral laws, rest exclusively on the 
 phenomena of mind = phenomena of matter 
 governed by immutable laws + the phenomena 
 of mind which are independent of the ph3^sical 
 organization are free = in man, as a free intelli- 
 gence, we can see the possibility and the ground 
 of believing in a God. 
 
 A. Intelligince first in the order of existence = if in 
 man intelligence be a free power independent of 
 the physical organism we ma^" conclude by analogy 
 that intelligence is first and independent in the 
 universe. 
 
 B. The universe is governed not merely by physical 
 but by moral laws=this depends upon the existence 
 of a moral world -f- this upon our own moral agency 
 + this upon human liberty + this is established in 
 three ways : — 
 
 I. A careful study of mind is necessary to attain a clear 
 consiousness of the fact of freedom. 
 
 II. A profound philosophy is necessary to obviate the diffi- 
 culties in the way of explaining the possibility of this 
 fact = by showing that freedom though inconceivable 
 may not therefore be impossible. 
 
 III. The study of mind counteracts the influence of the 
 study of matter, which last (1) diverts us from all notice 
 of the phenomena of moral liberty and (2) habituates us 
 to the contempletion of blind necessity. 
 
 C. These uses of philosophy not superseded under the 
 Christian dispensation since revelation supposes 
 a genuine philosophy of mind as the condition 
 of its truth. 
 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 
 
 5 
 
 PAET IT. 
 
 Philosophy in General. 
 
 A. Nature and Comprehension of Philosophy = Lee. Iii. 
 can now be not completely but only provisionally 
 explained as a guide to study = may be described 
 from two points of view : — 
 
 I. With reference to the nmne philosophy is 
 etymologically a love of wisdom = the term 
 philosopher supposed to have been first as- 
 sumed by Pythagoras, but probably first 
 rendered familiar by Socrates in opposition 
 to the Sophists. 
 
 II. With reference to the thing ^ — 
 
 A. Philosophy has been variously defined 
 according to the view taken by differ- 
 ent philosophers of its nature + in Greek 
 antiquity there were six famous definitions. 
 
 I. The knowledge of things existent as exist- 
 ent’’ = Pythagoras. 
 
 II. “ The knowledge of thing divine and hu- 
 man” = Pythagoras. 
 
 III. A meditation of death” = Plato. 
 
 IV. A resembling of the Deity in so far as that 
 is competent to man” = Plato. 
 
 V. “ The art of arts, and science of sciences” = 
 
 Aristotle. 
 
 VI. The love of wisdom” = Pythagoras. 
 
 B. Philosophy is a kind of knowledge distin- 
 guished from empirical knowledge = em- 
 pirical or historical knowledge is the knoTY- 
 
6 
 
 PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 
 
 ledge that something is, while philosophi- 
 cal knowledge is the knowledge why or 
 how it is = a knowledge of things in their 
 causes = it aims at the discovery of a first 
 cause, but vainly in consequence of the 
 limitation of our faculties. 
 
 I. Thus in a wide sense all sciences occupied in 
 the search after causes are philosophical. 
 
 II. In a special sense the study of mind is pro- 
 perly called philosophy. 
 
 A. Because all kuowledge depends, for its possibility, 
 upon certain conditions found only in the mind. 
 
 B. Because, philosophy being concerned about causes 
 and the mind giving the principal constituents of 
 every act of knowledge, it demands special study. 
 
 Lee. IV. B, The causes of philosophy are implied in man's 
 very capacity for knowledge and are of two 
 kinds : — 
 
 I. Essential and necessary causes. 
 
 A. Principle of cause and effect = the felt 
 necessity to connect objects of knowledge 
 with others which may explain them = it 
 is impossible to believe in the absolute 
 commencement of anything. 
 
 B. The love of unity = a desire to perceive 
 unity or harmony amidst variety of ob- 
 jects = exhibited in perception, imagina- 
 tion, generalization, judgment and rea- 
 soning. 
 
 I. This desire to discover unity, leading us to 
 expect uniformity in nature, is the efficient 
 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 
 
 cause and guiding principle of scientific dis- 
 covery. 
 
 II. It is also a source of error = leads to the 
 supposition of unity where it does not exist = 
 has led to the majority of false theories -f is 
 identical with pre-conceived opinion or pre- 
 judice. 
 
 II. Auxilary cause = Wonder or Curiosity = 
 does not account for the rise of philosopy 
 but explains why one class of objects is 
 studied in preference to another = e. g. in 
 early times external objects excited wonder 
 and study before the human mind. 
 
 A The subjective conditions of the successful study Lee. Y. 
 
 of philosophy. 
 
 I. The renunciation of prejudice = the mind 
 must be free from prepossession and open to 
 conviction = the power of prejudice and cus- 
 tom prepetuates error and leads to sceptical 
 conclusions regarding the existence of truth 
 and goodness. 
 
 II. Doubt is necessary = if people do not doubt 
 their previous opinions they will not search 
 for truth. 
 
 A. Philosophical doubt is indulged as a mean 
 to the discovery of truth. 
 
 B. Scepticism is doubt which rests in itself 
 and seeks not for truth = shallow and 
 week. 
 
 HI. The subjugation of the passions, especially, — 
 
 A. Sloth. 
 
 B* Pride. 
 
B PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 
 
 Lee, VI. B. The method of philosophy = the procedure by 
 which the ends of philosophy may be reached. 
 
 I. Method explained in relation to the ends_^of 
 
 philosophy. 
 
 A. First end of philosophy, — the discovery 
 of causes — can be attained, 
 
 I. by decomposing the effects into their causes 
 or elements. 
 
 II. by reconstructing these into their products or 
 effects -f- these two processes, called analysis 
 and synthesis, are the correlative parts of the 
 one method and each is imperfect without the 
 other. 
 
 B. The second end of philosophy, — the re- 
 duction of our knowledge to unity — is 
 reached by the same two-fold method, e. g. 
 
 I. In perception we comprehend great or multi- 
 form objects by first attending to the parts 
 (analysis), and then taking a comprehensive 
 view of the whole (synthesis). 
 
 II. In classification and induction we proceed 
 
 first to compare resemblances (analysis), and 
 then to bring together resembling pheno- 
 mena under some class or law (synthesis). 
 
 II. Method illustrated by the history of philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 A. Ancient philosophy began by applying 
 analysis and synthesis to the objects 
 of their knowledge, but in a very uncriti- 
 cal and imperfect manner. 
 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 
 
 9 
 
 I. Thales and the Ionic school studied external 
 
 nature to find the first principle or cause of 
 
 all thiuors -L found it in some material element 
 * 
 
 as water, air, or fire. 
 
 II. Pythagoras and the Italic school discovered 
 the cause of things in their form or harmony 
 or number, as distinguished from the matter 
 or substance. 
 
 III. The Eleatic school referred all things to The 
 One or Pure Being, as therir principle or cause. 
 
 IV. Socrates diverted the attention of men from 
 the universe to the mind, but did not change 
 the method. 
 
 V. Plato and Aristotle studied, — the former — 
 the higher faculties of intelliirence, — the 
 latter — the ordinary understanding, laying the 
 basis respectively of transcendental idealism 
 and phenomenal psychology, but both employ- 
 inor the same method. 
 
 O 
 
 VI. The Alexandrian school of Heo-Platonists was 
 eclectic and comprehensive. 
 
 Vil. Bacon and Descartes used the same method 
 of analysis and synthesis but insisted upon 
 a more careful and thorough analysis and a 
 more cautious synthesis. 
 
 The Divisions of philosophy. 
 
 I. The most ancient division, instituted by Aris- 
 totle and adopted by the Stoics, Epicureans 
 and others, is into Theoretical and Practical = 
 Theoretical philosophy is knowledge for the 
 sake of knowing H- practical philosophy is 
 knowledge for the sake of its practical appli- 
 cation. 
 
 Lee. 
 
 2 
 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENEKAL. 
 
 A. Since all philosophy is properly theoretical 
 or speculative it is illogical' to divide it by 
 a principle foreign to its nature. 
 
 B. Since all philosophy, with reference to its 
 final end, is practical, this principle does not 
 accurately divide the different branches of 
 philosophy. 
 
 I. Among the ancients great differences of 
 opinion existed regarding the position of 
 Logic in relation to philosopy in general. 
 
 II. The distinction between Arts and Sciences does , 
 not correspond to that between sciences practU 
 cal and sciences speculative = this explained 
 by Aristotle’s use of the ierm^ praxis andpm^- 
 tihos. Praxis in a generic sense was opposed to 
 speculation -f praxis in a specific sense was 
 co-ordinate with poiesis or production, both 
 comprehended by the generic praxis, thus : — 
 
 praxis j57i6ona= speculative 
 
 ( ■ ,t.i - philosophy 
 
 praxis or poiesis, or 
 
 science practical science productive, 
 
 as Ethics, Politics. as Logic, Rhetoric. 
 
 = an art, being defined as a science productive, 
 may not be identical with a practical science. 
 
 II Bacon divides philosophy with reference to 
 its object-matter as concerned about Diety, 
 Nature, and Man. 
 
 II. The Cartesians and Kant divide into theore- 
 tical and practical with various sudivisions. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 II 
 
 IV. Hamilton proposes the following division : — 
 
 Cognitions, 
 
 Feeling, Co- 
 nativePowers 
 (will and De- 
 sire.) 
 
 Cognitions, — 
 
 Logic. 
 
 Feeling, — 
 
 AaBsthetics. 
 
 Conation, — 
 
 Ethics, Poli- 
 tics. 
 
 Results, — Ontology 'I Being of God. 
 Inferential Psy- Immortality of 
 chology J soul. Matter. 
 
 Note. Sir W, Hamilton has nowhere sys- 
 tematically followed this division. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY r 
 
 being an explication of the most important terms : — Lee. VIIL 
 
 A, General Definition =; Psychology is the science 
 conversant about the phenomena or modifications 
 or states of the mind or conscious-subject, or soul 
 or spirit, or self or ego. 
 
 I. Use of Psychology vindicated againstthe objec- 
 tion that it is an exotic or technical name. 
 
 A. Philosophy itself and the most of itsbrarfeh- 
 es have received Greek technical names. 
 
 B. Psychology is now naturalized in Europe. 
 
 C. Its use avoids frequent periphrases. 
 
 I 
 
 Facts, — phenomeno- | 
 logy. Empirical } 
 Psychology j 
 
 M i n d o r <! Laws, — Nomology 
 consciousness | or Rations! Psy- ( 
 affords . , . chology 
 
12 
 
 INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 D. It affords a distinctive adjective for express- 
 ing contrast with other branches of science. 
 
 E. It is not open to the objection applicable to 
 such terras as Physiology of mind = 
 and terras in other languages applied to the 
 mind have lost their original material mean- 
 ing. 
 
 II. General explanation regarding the correla- 
 tive terms phenomenon, subject etc. = all know- 
 ledge is only of the known or what is rela- 
 tive to our minds = mind and matter as 
 known are two series oj phenomena + mind 
 and matter as unknown and unknowable are 
 two substances inferred to account for pheno- 
 mena - admitted by all philosophers that 
 absolute existence is unknown + this princi- 
 ple has two branches : — ■ 
 
 A* The number of the classes of qualities may be 
 greater than of our powers of perception = things 
 may have qualities which we can not perceive as 
 we perceive colours, smells etc. 
 
 B. The modes or qualities known to us may not be 
 known as they actually exist = in perception the 
 complete phenomenon as known is composed of 
 elements contributed by {P) the perceiving facul- 
 ties (h) the medium, and (c) the external quality 
 or power as it exists independent of perception. 
 
 B, Particular explication of terms. 
 
 I. Of the correlative terms. 
 
 A. Those which relate to the absolute and un- 
 known. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 13 
 
 I. Subject=tlie unknown basis of phenomena chiefly 
 mental. 
 
 II. Substance = that which exists absolutely and in 
 itself,' — in this sense derived from suhsisto + that 
 which exists as the base of attributes, — in this 
 sense derived from substo. Philosophers have 
 fallen into three errors, — (a) in denying the exist- 
 ence of substance, {b) in speculating about subs- 
 tance apart from phenomena, (c) in considering 
 one of the phenomena as the substance of the 
 others, 
 
 B. Those which denote the relative and un- 
 known. 
 
 I. Mode = manner of existence of anything. 
 
 II. Modification = bringing into a certain mode. 
 
 III. State = similar to mode but more extensive in 
 application. 
 
 IV. Quality =(1) essential, — that which a thing 
 cannot lose without ceasing to exist + (2) ac- 
 cidental, — that which a thing may have at one 
 time and not at another. 
 
 V. Attribute = quality used in an exalted sense. 
 
 VI. Property = peculiar quality or quality. 
 
 VII. Phenomenon = that which appears = a general 
 term for every quality or mode of existence 
 which can be known to us. 
 
 II. Of the terms applied to the mental subject. 
 
 A. Mind = analogous to Lat. mens + probably 
 derived from the root to know = the 
 subject of our conscious phenomena = can 
 be defined only a Posteriori, that ivhicli per* 
 ceives, thinks, feels, ivills, etc. 
 
 B. Conscious-subject = that which is concious 
 of all its phenomena = the mind. 
 
14 
 
 INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 C. Subject and Object = these terms of import- 
 ance 
 
 I. because they afford a convenient adjective 
 
 II. because they express clearlyan important con- 
 trast. 
 
 D. Self, ego = that within us which is to be dis- 
 tinguished both from our physical organs 
 and mental phenomena = the conscious- 
 subject. 
 
 III. Of certain other frequently used terms. 
 
 A. Hypothesis = the provisional explanation 
 of a dithculty. 
 
 I. An hypothesis is legitimate, (1) when the 
 alleged phenomenon to be explained has been 
 ascertained actually to exist, (2) when it 
 can not be explained otherwise than by an 
 hypothesis. 
 
 II. An hypothesis is to be preferred to others 
 according as, (a) it involves nothing con- 
 tradictary, (h) it more completely explains the 
 phenomena, (c) it is more independent of 
 subsidiary hypotheses 
 
 B. mere knowledge, or knowledge for 
 its own sake + practice = the exercise of 
 an art or the application of a science. 
 
 C. Power = active or passive = that which 
 is able to produce or able to suffer a change 
 = Reid incorrect in his criticism of Locke. 
 
 D. Faculty = active power. 
 
 E. Capacity = passive power. 
 
 F. Disposition = a natural + habit = an ac- 
 quired tendency to action* 
 
CONCIOUSNESS. 
 
 15 
 
 G. Act operation energy = distinguished from 
 potentiality = a power exists potentially 
 {a ) when it is not actually in operation 
 (b) when'it lies latent or undeveloped. 
 
 H. Function = the specific character or mode 
 of operation of a power or organ. 
 
 PAET IV. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 . General description of consciousness. 
 
 I. Consciousness = the most essential element 
 of mental life = a simple indivisible pheno- 
 menon embracing all other mental phenomena. 
 
 II. All mental phenomena comprehended in 
 consciousness are divisible into three classes 
 
 A. Knowledsfe or cognition. 
 
 B. Feeling or the phenomena of pleasure and pain 
 
 C. Conation or the phenomena of will and desire. 
 
 III. The nomenclature of the classes is imperfect 
 in English. 
 
 O 
 
 A. The terms knowledge and cognition are 
 sufficient. 
 
 The term feeling is ambiguous, being appli- 
 cable to the sense of touch as well as to 
 pleasures and pains. 
 
 C. No English term expresses what is com- 
 mon to will and desire = tendency is 
 vague + means only desire + orec- 
 
 tic is open to the same objection + activity 
 ov active'll applicable to all faculties ^co- 
 nation is actually adopted by Hamilton. 
 
 Lee. XI 
 
16 
 
 CONCIOUSNESS. 
 
 IV. This classification of the phenomena of cons- 
 ciousness, first instituted by Kant, has been 
 objected to on the ground that the classes 
 are not coordinate, the phenomenon of know- 
 ledge being involved in all the others. 
 
 A. In feeling and conation an element is pre- 
 sent which is not involved in knowledge. 
 
 B. Knowledge is conceivable without feeling 
 and conation, but not feeling and conation 
 without knowledge. 
 
 C. Knowledge and feeling are conceivable 
 without conation but not conation without 
 feeling = while those three classes may be 
 logically distinguished they are all coexis- 
 tent and inseparable. 
 
 V. Consciousness is to be first studied. 
 
 A. Consciousness cannot be defined = it lies 
 at the root of all knowledge and is the 
 most general of mental phenomena = can- 
 not be brought under a higher genus. 
 
 B. It may be philosophically annalyzed = all 
 mental phenomena are possible only under 
 the condition of being known in cons- 
 ciousness = consciousness is not different 
 from the particular phenomena of cogni- 
 tion, feeling, and conation but is the gene- 
 ral condition of their existence + cons- 
 ciousness involves three things, — (a) a 
 recognising or knowing subject; (h) a 
 known modification ; (c) a recognition by 
 the subject of the modification. 
 
 C. This analysis does not imply actual sepa- 
 ration of consciousness from particular 
 phenomena = like the parts of a triangle 
 they are inseparable but may be attended 
 to separately + conciousness and know- 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 17 
 
 ledge are only the same thing but viewed 
 in different relations = in consciousness the 
 relation of the object to the ego is the pro- 
 minent point. 
 
 D. Previous to Descartes the term conscientia 
 was used in an ethical sense + Descartes 
 gave it its psychological meaning + in 
 Greek there is no precisely similar term. 
 
 B. Special conditions of Consciousness. 
 
 I. Those generally admitted. 
 
 A. Consciousness is an actual not a potential 
 knowledge. 
 
 B. It is immediate not mediate knowledge. 
 
 0. It involves contrast or discrimination . 
 
 I. Between self and not self, mind and matter. 
 
 II. Between different phenomena of self. 
 
 III. Between the parts and qualities of the outer 
 world. 
 
 D. It involves judgment. 
 
 E, It implies memory. 
 
 II. A condition not generally admitted = our Lee. XII. 
 consciousness coextensive with our knowledge 
 = coextensive with our cognitive faculties = 
 not a special faculty = comprehends both 
 mental operations and their objects = this 
 condition not recognised by Eeid and 
 Stewart who make consciousness a special 
 faculty. 
 
 A. This condition vindicated generally = the 
 knowledge of relatives being one, and 
 the act of knowledge being the correlative 
 of the object, we cannot be conscious of 
 the one without the other. 
 
 3 
 
18 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 B. This condition vindicated by an examina- 
 tion of the special faculties contrasted by 
 Eeid and Stewart, with consciousness. 
 
 I. Imagination according to Eeid and Stewart == 
 the act of conceiving an object which may 
 have no actual objective existence = then, says 
 Hamilton, the object must be in the mind, a 
 mental modification, and therefore the object 
 of consciousness. 
 
 II. Memory according to Eeid = an immediate 
 knowledge of the past as consciousness is an 
 immediate knowledge of the present. 
 
 A. Conditions of immediate knowledge = the object 
 must be known in itself + it must be actually in 
 existence and in immediate relation to our faculties 
 of knowing. 
 
 B. These conditions applied to memory = the object 
 of memory being past cannot be known in itself, + 
 cannot be in immediote relation to our knowing 
 faculties = in memory we only helieve the past exist- 
 ence of the object + we are conscious of the present 
 representation and belief of that object = the con- 
 tents of memory are within the sphere of cons- 
 ciousness. 
 
 Lee. XIIL III. Perception = Eeid^s principal merit as a philo- 
 
 sopher consists in asserting, against the idea- 
 lists, our immediate hioioledge of material ob- 
 jects -f- he inconsistently denied a consciousness 
 of material objects and in doing so, erred. 
 
 A. Because the knowledge of opposites is one = the 
 ego and non-ego, mind and matter, being opposites 
 or correlatives, must be known together in the same 
 indivisible act of consciousness. 
 
 B. Because his denial is inconsistent with his doctrine 
 of immediate perception. 
 
 !. Since it asserts that we can know what we are not consci us 
 of knowing. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 19 
 
 ii. Since it deetroya the distinction of consciousness itself = it is 
 the external quality which determines the special phenome- 
 non of consciousness and the fact that we are conscious of 
 a particular mental modification implies that we are con- 
 scious of the external quality which gave rise to and deter- 
 mined it. 
 
 C. Because, if Eeid avoids inconsistency by holding 
 that we are consious immediately only of a mental 
 representation of external qualities, then he is still 
 an idealist and his attack upon other idealists is a 
 blunder — this supposition is untenable, 
 
 IV. Attention and reflection. 
 
 A. Certain collateral errors noticed = Eeid holds that 
 attention and reflection are identical + Stewart 
 maintains that reflection is properly attention 
 directed to the phenomena of mind ; observation, 
 attention directed to the phenomena of matter. 
 
 B. Is attention a faculty distinct from consciousness 
 as Eeid and Stewart hold ? = it is not, but only 
 consciousness applied to objects under the special 
 law of intelligence that, the greater the number of 
 objects to which our consciousness is simultaneously 
 extended the smaller is the intensity loith which it is 
 able to consider each. 
 
 Attention as a general phenomenon of cons- 
 ciousness. 
 
 I. Can we attend to more than one object at 
 once ? 
 
 A. Stewart’s doctrine = we can attend to only 
 one, e. g. 
 
 I. In the case of the equilibrist different succes- 
 sive mental acts are executed so rapidly as 
 to appear simultaneous. 
 
 II. In a concert of music the mind passes from 
 one sound to another so rapidly as to show 
 no interval of time. 
 
20 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, 
 
 III, In perception objects apparently perceived 
 simultaneously are really perceived succes- 
 sively = in these three cases Stewart’s opi- 
 nion is avowedly deduced from his principle. 
 
 B. Criticised. 
 
 I. In a concert many sounds are simultaneous = 
 if heard at all they must be attended to at 
 once ; but they are heard ; more than one 
 must be attended to at once -f- on Stewart’s 
 hypothesis the sense of harmony would be 
 impossible. 
 
 II. In vision we could not see an object as a 
 whole without attending to several parts at 
 once either in perception or imagination. 
 
 Lee. XIV. C. Brown’s doctrine = the mind cannot exist 
 
 in two ditferent states at once = supported 
 by Locke and opposed by Leibnitz and 
 Aristotle = if Brown s doctrine were cor- 
 rect all comparison and discrimination 
 would be impossible = the possibility of 
 the latter proves the fallacy of the former. 
 
 II, The extent and value of attention. 
 
 A. Philosophers hold variously ^that we can 
 attend to from four to six objects at once. 
 
 B. Attention to a new subject is at first diffi- 
 cult + by time and custom distractions 
 diminish and the subject becomes a part 
 of the intellectual life = this result is pro- 
 duced by continued attention. 
 
 C. Newton, Socrates, Descartes and many 
 others concur in attributing to attention 
 a high degree of importance . 
 
 Lee. XY. D. Consciousness, — its evidence and authority = 
 as consciousness is the only source of philoso- 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 21 
 
 phical knowledge the possibility of philosophy 
 depends upon the veracity of consciousness = 
 this admitted by all + the cause of variation 
 in philosophical doctrine is that philosophers 
 proceed to the study of consciousness with pre- 
 conceived opinions which they desire to support 
 = it is necessary to institute rules for the inter- 
 pretation of consciousness^ 
 
 I. The law of Parcimony = That no fact be 
 assumed as a fact of consciousness but what 
 is ultimate and simple. 
 
 A. Criteria of facts of consciousness. 
 
 I. A fact of consciousness is simple and the ulti- 
 mate result of analysis or the primary prin- 
 ciple of mental activity. 
 
 II. It is necessary = impossible not to think it. 
 
 III. It is self-evident = given with a mere belief 
 of its reality. 
 
 B. Two phases of facts of consciousness = 
 they may be considered either as testify- 
 ing to their own phenomenal existence 
 or to the existence of something else be- 
 yond them = in the former case they are 
 indubitable, in the latter they may be 
 
 $ doubted. 
 
 I. In perception the phenomenon^given in cons- 
 ciousness is self perceiving and not-self per- 
 ceived = this duality of consciousness cannot 
 be doubted + the object testified to by the 
 act of consciousness, — the external reality — 
 may not exist and the not-self perceived 
 may be only a mental representation. 
 
22 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 11. In memory we are compelled to believe the 
 mental phenomenon given in consciousness, — 
 the mental representation + we may doubt 
 the truthfulness of our memory, — the past 
 event believed to be represented = Stewart 
 was in error in giving equal credit to these 
 two kinds of testimony. 
 
 11. The law of Integrity = That the whole facts 
 of consciousness he taken, without reserve 
 or hesitation whether given as constituent 
 or as regulative data, — as phenomena or as 
 la’vvs. 
 
 III. The law of Harmony = That nothing but 
 the facts of consciousness be taken, or if 
 inferences of reasoning be admitted, that 
 these be recognised as legitimate only as 
 deduced from and in subordination to the 
 immediate data of consciousness. 
 
 A. In his doctrine of external perception 
 Brown violates the second and third of 
 these laws = he denies the fact of pheno- 
 menal duality given in consciousness + 
 then inconsistently appeals to universal 
 beliefs, that is to consciousness, to estab- 
 lish external reality. . 
 
 B. Dr. Brown establishes his doctrine of Per- 
 sonal Identity upon intuitive and uni- 
 versal beliefs, that is facts of consciousness 
 = since he denied the veracity of cons- 
 ciousness in perception he has no right 
 to appeal to consciousness in regard to 
 anything else. 
 
 C. In his doctrine of mental individuality he 
 holds the same belief and makes the same 
 inconsistent appeal. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 23 
 
 E* Violations of the authority of consciousness Lee. XVI. 
 = denials of the fact that in consciousness we 
 are immediately aware of an ego and a mon-ego, 
 known together and in contrast to one another 
 = the sceptics, Berkeley and Hume, admit that 
 men believe in the immediate perception of 
 external realities. 
 
 I. Classification of theories of perception with 
 reference to the admission or denial of the 
 duality of consciousness. 
 
 A. Those who, holding the phenomenal dua- 
 lity of consciousness, trust also the vera- 
 city of consciousness in testifying to a dua- 
 lity mental and material, of substantial 
 existence = Natural Eealists. 
 
 B. Those who, admitting the phenomenal dua- 
 lity of consciousness, surrender its vera- 
 city in testifying to our immediate know- 
 ledge of material phenomena and of the 
 existence c5f matter, but endeavour in 
 other ways to establish duality of exist- 
 ence = Cosmothetic Idealists or Kepre- 
 sentationists. 
 
 I. Some of these hold that the representative 
 object of which we are conscious is not a 
 mere mental modification = cruder form. 
 
 II. Some hold that the conscious representation 
 is only a modification of the mind itself, = 
 finer form. 
 
 C. Those who, admitting the phenomenal dua- 
 lity of consciousness, surrender its vera- 
 city in testifying to a duality of existence 
 
24 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 and hold the unity of all existence == 
 monists. 
 
 I. Some, admitting the testimony of conscious- 
 ness to the equipoise of mind and matter, 
 derive both from one common substance = 
 Absolute Identity. 
 
 II. Others, denying the testimony of conscious- 
 ness to the equipoise of mind and matter 
 derive the one from the other either : — 
 
 A. matter from mind = idealism, or 
 
 B. mind from matter = materialism. 
 
 II. Hypotheses regarding intercourse between 
 mind and body = belong only to dualism 
 since monists deny the real duality of mind 
 and body. 
 
 A. Occasional causes = mind and matter can 
 have no direct intercourse + material pheno- 
 mena the occasion upon which Deity pro- 
 duces the corresponding mental pheno- 
 mena, and vice versa = Cartesian doctrine. 
 
 B. Pre-established harmony = God has from 
 the begining established a harmony be- 
 tween the two series of mental and mate- 
 rial phenomena so that the proper events 
 in each series, without any causal relation, 
 always correspond with one another = 
 Leibnitz. 
 
 C. Plastic medium = between mind and mat- 
 ter there is a medium interposed through 
 which the one can operate upon the^other 
 = traced to Plato. 
 
 D. Physical influence = the external object, 
 through the nerves and the brain, directly 
 acts upon the mind and produces an im- 
 pression + the mind similarly exercises 
 
 A 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 25 
 
 a real influence upon the body = Aristo- 
 telian doctrine. 
 
 F. The activity and passivity of mind = activity 
 and passivity always conjoined + we are cons- 
 cious only of activity + in relation to this gener- 
 al fact there arise some important questions : — 
 
 I. Are we always consciously active ? Lee. XVII. 
 
 A. Opinions of philosophers. 
 
 I. Plato and Platonists=mmd continually 
 energetic. 
 
 II. Aristotle and Aristotelians = doubtful 
 and inharmonious. 
 
 III. Cicero and St. Augustine = mind al- 
 ways active. 
 
 IV. Descartes and Malebranche = since the 
 soul consists in actual thought it must 
 always be active or cease to be = con- 
 tinual activity assumed a priori, 
 
 V. Locke = thought not the essence of the 
 soul but one of its operations -f- not 
 necessary for the soul to be always active -f- 
 not a fact that we are always conscious 
 of activity + if we do not remember our 
 activity in sleep we were probably not 
 active = Descartes^ doctrine is doultful and 
 his method of establishing it by a priori 
 assumption instead of an appeal to facts 
 is unphilosophical. 
 
 VI. Leibnitz = in conscious activity there are 
 many phenomena pass through the mind 
 to which we do not attend and which we 
 soon forget + in sleep we may be active 
 
 . . 4 
 
26 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 nlthough we have forgotten our activity 
 + in sleep and sudden awakening there 
 are many confused perceptions = probably 
 the mind is always active. 
 
 VII. Kant=mind always and necessarily active. 
 
 B. Hamilton’s discussion of question. 
 
 I. Somnambulism = mental faculties unusually 
 exalted + forgetfulness of normal state + 
 remembrance of past somnambulic states. 
 
 II. Dreaming = possibly not accompanied by 
 memoiy as shewn by anthor^s experience = 
 when roused from incipient slumber there is a 
 dim consiousness of thinking when roused 
 from sleep there is a recollection of dreaming 
 = heiice probable that mind is always cons- 
 ciously active. 
 
 C. Supported by Mr. Jouffroy. 
 
 I. General argument = mind sometimes awake 
 
 when senses asleep + uot proved that it ever 
 
 sleeps with them = probable that it is always 
 
 awake. 
 
 II. Corroborating facts. 
 
 A. A stranger in Paris at first disturbed by noise, 
 afterwards not = mind at first attends to external 
 noise afterwards not. 
 
 B. In sleep sometimes a faint noise awakens when a 
 great one does not according as the mind judges of 
 its meaning, of which illustrations are given. 
 
 III. General conclusions. 
 
 A. In sleeps senses torpid, mind awake. 
 
 B. Certain senses continue active. 
 
 C. Mind judges the meaning of these sensations. 
 
 D. Reason of minds awakening senses = disquiet or 
 a sense of duty. 
 
 I. Does so by its activity overcoming torpor of senses. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 Sir 
 
 II. Is the mind ever unconsciously modified ? Lee. XVIII. 
 
 A. The greater part of our knowledge lies 
 out of consciousness, in a latent state, 
 except when called up by our directing 
 special attention to it. 
 
 B. In certain abnormal states, such as mad” 
 ness and fever, long-forgotten knowledge 
 is reproduced and wonderful powers exhi- 
 bited, = there may be latent knowledge 
 and powers in the mind not observable 
 in a normal state but capable of being 
 called out in peculiar conditions. 
 
 C. There are, in ordinary, mental modifica- 
 tions of which we are unconscious but 
 which manifest their existence by effects 
 of wdiich we are consious. To this pro- 
 position there are two objections : — 
 
 I. We cannot know what is beyond the condi- 
 tion of all knowledge viz., consciousness. 
 
 Answer : — there are many things which we 
 can know only through their effects -h cons- 
 ciousness supposes some special modification 
 which must have arisen by transition from 
 some previous modification = the transition 
 between the two not consciously known. 
 
 II. Knowledge cannot rise out of ignorance 
 consciousness out of unconsciousness. Ans- 
 wered by the study of instances taken 
 from : — 
 
 A. External Perception = In sight, the minimum 
 visibile = the smallest expanse we can he cons- 
 cious of seeing = this may be divided = each 
 part produces no conscious sensation = .'. must 
 produce a mental modification of which we are 
 unconscious + in hearing, sound is made up of 
 parts of which separately we are unconscious = 
 
28 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 each part must produce a mental effect beneath 
 consciousness. 
 
 B. Association of ideas = suppose a thought, A 
 suggests another G which can be related to it 
 only through B, — B must be in the mind but 
 latent + Stewart holds that the intermediate 
 link comes before consciousness but is forgotten 
 = refuted by considering : — 
 
 5. this hypothesis as inconceivable as the other, 
 
 ii. it violates the analogy of consciousness which supposes 
 memory, 
 
 iii. it is disproved by the analogy of perception, and 
 
 iv. no memory of conscious phenomena = no consciousness 
 
 A. Acq^uired dexterities and habits = explained by 
 three theories : — 
 
 i. Mechanical theo’’y = series of actions, at first voluntary 
 come to be performed without will or attention by a kind 
 of mechanical or physical association _ held by Reid and 
 Hartley. 
 
 ii, Stewart’s theory = mechanical theory absurd because it 
 postulates an unknown power = in a series of actions each 
 one is caused by a volition which is immediately forgotten. 
 Objection = theory inconceivable since in certain acquired 
 dexterities the mind could not attend to each action 
 separately. 
 
 ili. Theory of mental latency _ bodily movements caused by 
 unconscious mental activities = this application of the 
 theory supported by the analogy of its application to 
 perception. 
 
 Gr, Three Principal Facts of consciousness. 
 
 I, Self-Existence or the feeling that I. the 
 thinking subject, exist = a simple and ulti- 
 mate fact of consciousness = Cartesian cogito 
 ego sum as an argument is tautological and 
 false = not an argument but a simple asser- 
 tion of the impossibility of doubting self- 
 existence. 
 
 . II. Mental Unity or the belief that ive are not 
 a mere series of phenomena but a self-sub- 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 29 
 
 sis tent entity - a datum of consciousnes 
 = Hume and Kant in denying this deny the 
 veracity of consciousness and subvert philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 III. Mental Identity or the conscious assurance 
 that ive are always the same = held by 
 Locke, Leibnitz, Butler and Reid to prove 
 the substantial permanence of self + the vali- 
 dity of the proof denied by Kant. 
 
30 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 PAET V. 
 
 Lee. XIX. 
 
 Lee. XX. 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 A. Introduction^ comprehending an account of the 
 difficulties and facicilities of psychological study. 
 I. Difficulties of psychological investigation. 
 
 A. Conscious mind at once observing subject 
 and object observed = state of mind observ- 
 ed and act of mind observing tend to anni- 
 hilate each other. 
 
 B. Want of mutual co-operation = in this res- 
 pect psychology different from the study of 
 nature. 
 
 C. Facts of consciousness must be personally 
 observed, not accepted at second hand. 
 
 D. They can be studied only through memory 
 = can be but imperfectly observed, 
 
 E. Can only be presented in succession, 
 
 F. Mental phenomena cannot be separated + 
 can be discriminated only by abstraction. 
 
 G. Self-observation painful and not exercised 
 till maturity. 
 
 II. Facicilities of psychological study = depends 
 upon no external conditions except language. 
 
 3. Distribution of the cognitive faculties. 
 
 I. General explication = mental faculties are not 
 different parts or organs of the mind but 
 classes of similar mental actions and passions 
 + psychological division is important for the 
 study of the phenomena since they are pre- 
 sent in consciousness in great complexity. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 31 
 
 II. Evolution of special faculties. 
 
 A. The Presentative Faculty is necessary as a 
 condition of our possessing knowledge = 
 divided into external perception and self- 
 consciousness. 
 
 B. The Conservative or Retentive Faculty is 
 required for the preservation of the know- 
 ledge acquired. 
 
 C. The Reproductive Faculty is necessary as 
 a condition of bringing forgotten know- 
 ledge before consciousness = may act either 
 voluntarily or involuntarily. 
 
 D. The Representative Faculty is needed to 
 hold up reproduced knowledge before the 
 mind. 
 
 E. The Elaborative Faculty, in the way of 
 analysis and synthesis, compares pheno- 
 mena, and upon the comparison founds 
 generalization, judgment and reasoning. 
 
 F. The Regulative Faculty, though not pro- 
 perly called a faculty, furnishes principles 
 for the government of the mind in all its 
 operations = these principles are native and 
 necessary laws and, together, make up 
 common sense or a priori knowledge. 
 
 Detailed study of special faculties. 
 
 I. The Presentative Faculty. 
 
 A. External perception = the principal point 
 at issue refers to the question, — is our per- 
 ception of external objects mediate or im- 
 mediate ? 
 
 If immediate = fact of consciousness ; if 
 mediate there are two hypotheses ^ (a) 
 representative object different from mind 
 + (h) representative object indentical with 
 
32 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 mind = Reid ignorant of this distinction 
 = confused perception with imagination 
 and memory + misunderstood other philo- 
 sophers. 
 
 I. Reid’s historical review. 
 
 A. Plato. 
 
 I. Reid supposss his doctrine to be that we per- 
 ceive only the shadows of things not the things 
 themselves. 
 
 II. Plato held that a percipoint power of the soul 
 sallies out towards the object + his simile of 
 the cave, which Reid supposed to teach a theory 
 of perception, is used to illustrate the relation 
 bet^veen the phenomenal and the real or arch- 
 etypal worlds. 
 
 B. Aristotle. 
 
 I. Reid’s interpretation = our senses receive sen- 
 sible forms or species of objects + bodies 
 send forth different kinds of forms. 
 
 II. True account = Aristotle was probably a 
 natural realist + only his followers — the 
 schoolmen — held the doctrine of species. 
 
 C. Descartes. 
 
 I. Reid’s account = Descartes inconsistent = 
 sometimes held that there are images of 
 material objects perceived in the brain + 
 sometimes that these images are not perceived 
 but merely occasions of mental ideas. 
 
 II. True account == between mind and matter 
 intercourse is possible only by supernatural 
 aid + Descartes applies the term idea both 
 to the organic occasion of sensation and to 
 the mental representation = hence Reid’s mis- 
 understanding. 
 
 D. Arnauld. 
 
 I. Reid’s interpretation = Arnauld inconsistent 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 33 
 
 = first maintains material reality to be imme- 
 diate object of perception + again that ideas 
 are immediate objects of perception. 
 
 II. True account = Arnauld held finer form of 
 mediate theory which Reid did not under- 
 stand = therefore appeared to Reid to main- 
 tain immediate perception. 
 
 E. Locke. 
 
 I. Reid’s interpretation = images conveyed to 
 the brain + either there perceived by the 
 mind or imprinted on the mind itself = this 
 interpretation pronounced by Brown, Priestly 
 and others to be incorrect. 
 
 II. True account = Locke’s language vacillating 
 and confused + in “ Examination of Male- 
 branche’s Opinion” he denies that secondary 
 qualities can be mere mental modifications 
 - 4 - a fortiori denies this of primary = holds 
 the cruder form of representation. 
 
 F. Hobbes. 
 
 I. Reid’s interpretation = attributes to him 
 doctrine of representative ideas. 
 
 II. True account = Hobbes was a material idea- 
 list = holds that all that we know is the 
 phantasm within ourselves determined by 
 some unknown motions which constitute the 
 world without. 
 
 G. Le Clerc. 
 
 I. Brown’s interpretation = Le Clerc held finer 
 form of hypothesis + Brown charges Reid 
 with adding nothing to it + says that it had 
 prevailed in the schools. 
 
 II. True account = Reid exploded this doctrine 
 + it had not prevailed in the schools but the 
 passage in Le Clerc adduced by Brown was 
 an extract from Arnauld + Le Clerc himself 
 opposed it. 
 
 5 
 
Lee, XXIII. 
 
 34 THE COGI^ITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 II. Reid’s own doctrine = whether did he hold 
 natural Realism or the finer form of representa- 
 tionism as Brown supposes ? = if the latter 
 his protest against idealism was futile and his 
 philosophy a blunder. 
 
 A, Distinction between intuitive and represen- 
 tative knowledge = this distinction impor- 
 tent + Reid, by his ignorance of it was led 
 into confusion, 
 
 I. As acts ; — 
 
 Immediate knowledge simple and consciousness 
 simply contemplative + representative know- 
 ledge complex and consciousness representative 
 and contemplative of the representation. 
 
 II. In relation to their objects : — 
 
 In immediate knowledge, object is single and 
 term uneqivocal + in mediate knowledge ob- 
 ject two-fold and term equivocal = subject 
 object + object-object. 
 
 III. As judgments: — 
 
 In immediate knowledge, cognition is assertory 
 and existence of object unconditional + in me- 
 diate knowledge cognition problematical and 
 reality of object a possibility. 
 
 IV. In relation to their sphere : — 
 
 Mediate knowledge exclusively subjective + 
 immediate, either subjective or objective, men- 
 tal or material. 
 
 V. In reference to their perfection : — 
 
 In immediate knowledge, the act is complete and 
 absolute and the object real + in mediate, the 
 act is incomplete and relative and the object 
 ideal. 
 
 B. Grounds for holding Reid a representa- 
 tionist. 
 
 I. Reason adduced by Brown = Immediate per- 
 ception implies identity of matter and mind ; 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES, 
 
 35 
 
 but Reid denied identity of these ; therefore did 
 not hold immediate perception = refuted by 
 shewing that major premiss is not valid, because 
 
 a. Reid accepts fact that consciousness gives im- 
 mediate knowledge of mind and matter. 
 
 b. The denial of this fact leads to monism = 
 immediate knowledge of two series of incom- 
 patible qualities the only ground of assuming 
 two substances ; but there is no such im- 
 mediate knowledge ; therefore there is only 
 one substance = this conclusion repudiated 
 by Reid, therefore he must repudiate the 
 premiss. 
 
 II. Reid equalized perception and imagination = 
 either holds simpler form of representative per- 
 ception, or overlooked the distinction between. 
 immediate cognition or perception and mediate 
 cognition or imagination. 
 
 C. Eeason for holding Eeid a natural realist = 
 be maintained the following positions : — 
 
 I. That the knowledge of external things is con- 
 vertible with their reality = tho reality must be 
 
 knonw in itself. 
 
 II. That the external reality is immediately known 
 by the mind in the same way as the idea is in 
 the representative theory. 
 
 III. That mankind at large believe external object 
 to be immediately known with which Reid 
 agrees. 
 
 IV. That perception gives equal evidence of the 
 existence of external phenomena which consci- 
 ousness does of internal = absolute certainly. 
 
 III. The distinction between perception and sensa Lee. XXIV, 
 tion. 
 
 A. Historical account. 
 
 I. In Descartes, Malebranche, Locke and Leibnitz 
 Perception = Consciousness. 
 
 II. In Reid, Perception = some notion or concep- 
 tion of object perceived + conviction of its pre- 
 
30 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 sent existence + this conviction immediate and 
 not the result of reasoning ; sensation = accom- 
 panies perception + a purely subjective feeling. 
 
 B. Distinction and law. 
 
 I. Perception and sensation = special kinds of 
 knowledge and feeling + always coexistent but 
 distinct + knowledge objective and feeling snb- 
 jective : perception = consciousness of an object 
 different from self + sensation = consciousness 
 of a subjective affection of pleasure or pain. 
 
 ii. Law — Knowledge and feeling, perception and 
 sensation though coexistent are always in the 
 inverse ratio of each other. 
 
 c. Proof of the law. 
 
 I. From comparison of the several senses. 
 
 A. In sight the objective element is at the maxi- 
 mum + the subjective at the minimum. 
 
 B. In hearing there is less extensive objective 
 sphere + a more intensive subjective affection. 
 
 C. In taste and smell the pleasure and pain are 
 great as objective information is small. 
 
 D. In touch, where sensation predominates percep- 
 tion is feeble + perception lively, sensation 
 obtuse. 
 
 II. From comparing the several impressions of the 
 same sense. 
 
 A. Difference in degree = above a certain limit per- 
 ception declines as sensation rises + a certain 
 quantum of sensation necessary to perception. 
 
 B. Difference in kind = in sight : — more sensation 
 in colour ; more perception in figure + pleasure 
 from colour more gross and vivid ; from figure 
 more refined and permanent. 
 
 D. Importance of the distinction = seen only- 
 in natural realism -Hin representative theory- 
 perception is only apparently objective. 
 
 IV. Distinction between primary and secondary 
 qualities. 
 
 A. History of distinction. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 37 
 
 I. Democritus denied any knowledge of the real 
 qualities of body except through touch. 
 
 II. Descartes = Primary qualities more clearly and 
 distinctly known then secondary. 
 
 III. Locke = Primary qualities are inseparable from 
 body + like our ideas of them ; secondary are 
 only powers to produce sensations in us + have 
 no resemblance to our ideas. 
 
 IV. Reid = Primary qualities more clearly known 
 + in primary, perception is direct ; in secondary 
 only relative. 
 
 V. Stewart divides qualities into. 
 
 A. Mathematical affections, — extension and figure 
 
 B. Primary qualities involving the notion of 
 extension, as hardness, softness &c. 
 
 C. Secondary qualities, — the unknown causes 
 of known sensations 4- these are all reducible 
 to extension and solidity. 
 
 B. Distinction fully stated (by Hamilton in his 
 edition of Reid.) 
 
 I. Foundation of distinction = space known a 
 
 'priori + a necessary form of thought ; exten- 
 sion or empirical + objective. 
 
 II. Division of qualities. 
 
 (A.) Primary = with reference to sense objec- 
 tive not subjective + with reference to 
 understanding essential to conception of 
 body + may be deduced a 'priori from 
 space. 
 
 (i.) Body as occupying space gives rise to (1) 
 Trinal Extension explicated into number, 
 size and figure + (2) Ultimate Incompres- 
 sibility. 
 
 (II.) Body as contained in space gives rise to 
 (1) mobility -p (2) situation. 
 
 (B.) Secundo-Primary = with reference to 
 sense objective and subjective ; with refer- 
 
38 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 ence to understanding accidental + con- 
 ceivable in their own nature + must be 
 induced a posteriori + are modes of re- 
 sistance or pressure. 
 
 (i.) Considered physically they are derived 
 from ; — 
 
 (a.) Co-attraction = heavy or light, hard or soft, 
 firm or fluid &e. 
 
 (b.) Repulsion = compressible and incompressible 
 elastic and inelastic &c. 
 
 (c.) Inertia = movable and immovable. 
 
 (il.) Considered psychologically they are divid- 
 ed : — 
 
 (a.) according to degree of resisting force 
 
 (b.) according to made of affecting the sentient 
 organism. 
 
 (C.) Secondary Qualities = purely subjective 
 + occult and inconceivable in their nature 
 + a posteriori = colour, sound flavour 
 &c. heat, electricity &c. sneezing shudder- 
 ing &c. 
 
 Lee. XXV. . V. Reasons for rejecting natural realism. 
 
 A, Perception as a cognition is immanent ; but 
 the immediate perception of external objects 
 implies a transeiint act ; therefore the mind 
 must act, that is exist out of itself, which 
 is absurd = refuted by three considera- 
 tions : — 
 
 I. Immediate perception as a fact of consciousness 
 cannot be explained. 
 
 II. The argument proves the impossibility of mus- 
 cular movement. 
 
 III. Cosmothetic idealists must attribute to matter 
 the same transeimt efficacy which they deny 
 to mindj in order to explain perception. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 a9 
 
 B. That which immediatelj knows must be 
 of the same nature as that which is known ; 
 but mind is not of the same nature as mat- 
 ter; therefore does not immediately know 
 it = this has ^iven rise to all the theories 
 of representation. 
 
 Kefutation = this argument arbitrary and 
 unphilosophical -f we can know nothing 
 a priori concerning mind + experience con- 
 tradicts it. 
 
 c. The mind can know only that to which it is 
 immediately present ; but it is not imme- 
 diately present to external objects ; therefore 
 can only mediately know them. 
 
 I. This has been redargued in three ways : — 
 
 A. External reality comes into the mind = Ser- 
 geant. 
 
 B. Mind goes out to external reality = Em- 
 pedocles Platonists, Stoics &c. 
 
 C. The mind through divine agency, immediate- 
 ly knows external objects = doctrine of occa- 
 sional causes = this is hypothetical^ mystical 
 hyperphysical and frustrates doctrine of in- 
 tuitive perception. 
 
 II. The difRculty explained. 
 
 A. We must not locate the mind at any parti- 
 cular place = it is present wherever we are 
 conscious that it acts. 
 
 B. The material reality perceived = external 
 reality under relation to our sense and faculty 
 of cognition + in immediate contact with 
 organ. 
 
 D, The appearance size &c. of external objects 
 change according to our distance and posi- 
 tion ; but the real object does not change ; 
 therefore we do not perceive the real 
 objects, but only their images = Hume’s 
 objection. 
 
 Refutation = Real object of perception is 
 in immediate contact with organ and does 
 not change. 
 
 E. The ego is endowed with will which tends 
 towards objects of perception ; these there- 
 
40 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 fore must lie within the ego ; but the exter- 
 nal reality cannot be within the ego ; there- 
 fore the objects of immediate knowledge 
 must be representations=Fichte^s objection. 
 Refutation. 
 
 I. Cognition of objects external to ego is suffi- 
 cient to excite and direct the will. 
 
 II. The will is directed to the future which is me- 
 diately known = does not prove that present 
 perception is mediate. 
 
 Lee. XXVI. VI. Reasons for rejecting the representative theory 
 
 A. It is uncessary = fact of consciousness not 
 proved impossible + as ultimate must be 
 inexplicable + hypothesis not clearer than 
 fact= supposes that mind can represent that 
 of which it is ignorant. 
 
 B. Hypothesis subverts what it endeavours to 
 explain — belies the testimony of consci- 
 ousness. 
 
 c. The fact proposed to be explained is render- 
 ed problematical by the explanation = hypo- 
 thesis assumes the facts of the external 
 world existing and mind knowing and then 
 attempts to explain their correlation — 
 reasoning in a circle = proves reality of 
 external world from representation + sup- 
 poses existence of world to account for re- 
 presentation. 
 
 D. The hypothesis subverts the phenomenon to 
 be explained = divides the fact of consci- 
 ousness into two parts : — the immediate 
 knowledge by the ego ; and the existence 
 distinct from the ego = this involves the 
 destruction of the phenomenon. 
 
 E. The fact to be explained, — the external 
 world is beyond the sphere of experience. 
 
 F. The hypothesis depends upon subsidiary 
 hypothesis and miracles. 
 
 VII. General questions connected with perception. 
 
 A. Do we first know whole or parts ? 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 41 
 
 I. Latter alternative supported by 
 
 A. Stewart = involved in his doctrine that we 
 can attend to only one^thing at a time. 
 
 B. James Mill = perception of wholes explain- 
 ed by the association of particular sensations. 
 
 II. Former alternative true = we know the wholes 
 better than the parts. 
 
 B. May all the senses be analyzed into touch Leo. XXYIL 
 = affirmative held by Democritus = cor- 
 rect, if by touch is meant contact of exter- 
 nal object with organ of sense. 
 
 c. Does touch comprehend a plurality of senses? 
 
 I. Themistius — touch comprehends a plurality of 
 senses = followed by many schoolmen, who 
 did not agree as to the number of special senses. 
 
 II. Cardan distinguishes four senses of tou«h or 
 feeling. 
 
 III. Kant = a vital sense, comprehending heat, cold, 
 shuddering &c. + an organic sense including 
 the ordinary five senses. 
 
 IV. Hamilton, adopts Kant’s division and supports 
 it by showing, 
 
 A. That the distinction between touch and sen-' 
 sible feeling is founded upon the former 
 being more objective and the latter more 
 subjective. 
 
 B. That there is nothing similar in the two 
 except their having no special organ. 
 
 D. Does sight give an original knowledge of 
 extension ? 
 
 I. Aristotle = colour the proper object of sight 
 + extension involved in the perception of colour. 
 
 6 
 
42 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 II. Berkeley = colour and extension are not na- 
 turally connected, but only by association = 
 
 ^ followed by Condillac Stewart and the Hartleian 
 school. 
 
 HI. Brown = the mere fact of a sensation cover- 
 ing the extended retina does not necessarily in- 
 volve the notion of extension + that notion 
 cannot arise unless it is already known that 
 the colour is dijffused over part of our extended 
 body + nothing but muscular effort can give 
 idea of external body at all. 
 
 IV. Hamilton = all agree that we see colour + this 
 involves difference of colours + colours dis 
 criminated are placed side by side + the con- 
 trasted colours will thus form a line or figure 
 = vision gives us an original notion of exten- 
 sion. 
 
 V. D’Alambert = sight alone, independently of 
 touch, gives the notion of extension. 
 
 Lcc.XXVIII, E. Does touch alone give an original know- 
 
 ledge of extension. 
 
 1. Platner = not touch but sight alone = in a 
 person born blind there is no notion of exten- 
 sion + time serves Instead of space + difference 
 of feeling not difference of position serves to 
 distinguish objects. 
 
 ii. Hamilton supports Platner’s doctrine. 
 
 A. A blind-folded person is unable to form a cor- 
 rect idea by touch of the figures and positions 
 of objects. 
 
 B. The young man couched by Dr. Cheselden 
 could not recognise objects by sight which 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 43 
 
 he had formerly known by touch + by sight 
 he could not perc&ive externality of objects, 
 which he ought to have done if by touch 
 he had formerly aquired an idea of exten- 
 sion. 
 
 F. How do we obtain our knowledge of visual 
 ditance ? 
 
 I. Berkeley = it is acquired by experience and 
 association. 
 
 A. Moderate distances require adjustment of 
 eyes = corresponding sensations are asso- 
 ciated with particular distances. 
 
 B. In the case of great distances the axes of 
 the eyes are parallel = distances associated 
 with size of objects, clearness or obscurity, 
 number of intervening objects &c. 
 
 II. Apparent objection = the young of lower 
 animals appear to have instinctive perception 
 of distances. 
 
 VIII. Difference between author’s doctrine andReid’s. 
 
 A. Reid holds distant objects to be perceived -h 
 Hamilton maintains that in all the senses> 
 the object of perception is in immediate 
 contact with organ. 
 
 B. Reid and other philosophers hold that an 
 organic action must precede the intellec- 
 tual action in perception -{- Hamilton = 
 if this were so the immediate perception 
 of an extra' organic object would be im- 
 possible + corporeal movement and mental 
 perception simultaneous -f mind connected 
 with the whole nervous system. 
 
 c. Reid^ and Stewart = sensation proper al- 
 ways precedes perception proper = if soj. 
 
44 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 Lee. XXIX. 
 
 perception is only an instinctive belief, 
 consequent on sensation, that there is some 
 unknown quality, the cause of the sensa- 
 tion -k Hamilton = perception proper and 
 sensation proper coexist, 
 
 B. Self-Consciousness. 
 
 I. Its character and forms, 
 
 A. Contrasted with perception = perception 
 embraces the phenomena of external world 
 4- its forms are space and time ; Self-cons- 
 ciousness comprehends the phenomena of 
 internal world -k its forms are time and 
 self, 
 
 B. Forms = the frame or the a priori condi- 
 tions apart from which no objects can 
 be known = necessary and native to 
 the mind = time, space and self = the 
 fact of space being a form of perception 
 does not involve the extension of the 
 mind. 
 
 II. Modes of studying self-consciousness. 
 
 A. Described. 
 
 I. Induction alone = comparison and classifica- 
 tion of mental phenomena = results in the 
 general not the necessary. 
 
 II. Induction + analysis = besides comparing 
 and classifying phenomena, analyses them 
 into necessary and contingent elements = this 
 necessity governs thought only not things. 
 
 B, Illustrated from the history of philosophy. 
 
 I, Doctrines of philosophers. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 45 
 
 A. Locke used induction alone = discovered 
 nothing necessary = all axioms are 
 generalisations from experience. 
 
 B. Leibnitz = there is necessary truth not 
 obtained by empirical induction but in- 
 volved in the structure of the mind. 
 
 c. Kant = first clearly showed the 
 character of necessary truth. 
 
 II. Has Locke been misrepresented ? 
 
 A. Stewart = Gassendi, Condillac, Diderot 
 and Horne Tooke held all our knowledge 
 to be derived from sense + Locke held 
 reflection also to be an original source 
 of ideas = Locke misrepresented by his 
 French followers. 
 
 B. Hamilton = Locke’s reflection concerned 
 only about contingent objects of sense 
 = similar to doctrine of Gassendi who 
 assigned to reflection a higher function 
 than Locke giving it more spiritual objects 
 = Locke not misrepresented 
 
 II. The Conservative Faculty. 
 
 A. Introduction = conservation necessary to 
 the possession of knowledge + conserva- 
 tion of knowledge would be useless with- 
 out the power of reproducing and repre- 
 senting it in consciousness = these faculties 
 though mutually dependent are distinct 
 = in the language of philosophers the 
 conservative faculty proper is called 
 Mew^ory, the reproductive faculty, EecoU 
 lection or Reminiscence, 
 
 B. The fact of retention explained. 
 
 I-. Illustrative similes. 
 
 Lee. 
 
46 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 A. Cicero call memory a storehouse provided with 
 cells. 
 
 B. Gassendi compares it to the folds in a peice of 
 paper or cloth. 
 
 II. Psychological explanation = memory the 
 necessary result of the self-activity of the 
 mind. 
 
 A. Real problem = not how a mental activity endures 
 but how it ever vanishes. 
 
 B. Forgetfulness explained by distribution of men- 
 tal force = the greater the number of mental 
 activities, the less the proportion of force in each 
 = some activities thus become delitescent or latent 
 
 c. Distraction and attention explained by same 
 principle = the want of attention causes different 
 degrees of obscuration. 
 
 D. Results of preceding theory. 
 
 I. Memory extends to cognitions, feelings cona- 
 tions and all mental states or activities. 
 
 II. Physiological hypotheses useless = betray ignor- 
 ance of true nature of thinking principle c» 
 self-activity of mind independent of bodily re- 
 lations, 
 
 C. Concluding remarks. 
 
 I. Conditions of a good memory = capacity of 
 
 retention + faculty of reproduction. 
 
 II. Two incorrect opinions. 
 
 A. Great memory incompatible with great intelli- 
 gence = proved false by history = Scaliger and 
 others had great memory and great philosophical 
 power. 
 
 B. Great intelligence incompatible with great me- 
 mory =?= refuted by common sense, 
 
 Lee. XXXI. Ill- The Eeproductive Faculty. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 47 
 
 A. Historical introduction = all admit that 
 mental phenomena are reproduced accord- 
 ing to the laws of Association = thoughts 
 retained in memory are excited by their 
 connection with other thoughts according 
 to certain laws. 
 
 I. The Laws of Association are seven in all : — 
 
 A. Thoughts originally coexistent or immediately suc- 
 cessive suggest one another. 
 
 B. Things contiguons in space suggest one another. 
 
 C. The cause suggests the effect, the whole the part. 
 
 D. Things contrasted or similar become associated. 
 
 E. Operations of the same power or of different 
 powers about the same object are associated. 
 
 F. The sign suggests the things signified. 
 
 o. Things denoted by the same sound are mutually 
 suggestive. 
 
 II. Aristotle reduced all laws to three = conti- 
 quity in time and space 4-resemblance+ con- 
 trariety. 
 
 III. St. Augustine reduced all to one = thoughts 
 which have coexisted in the mind are after- 
 wards associated, 
 
 IV. Hume admitted three = resemblance -f conti- 
 quity in time and space -f cause and effect. 
 
 V. Stewart classified the laws into : — 
 
 A. Relations perfectly obvious = resemblance and 
 analogy, contrariety, and vicinity in time and 
 place. 
 
 B. Relations not obvious = cause and effect, means 
 and end, premisses and conclusion. 
 
 VI. Brown distinguished. 
 
48 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 A. Primary laws of suggestion = resemblance, con- 
 trast aud contiquity. 
 
 B. Secondary laws = vicinity, recentness &c. 
 
 B. Reduction of all laws to one. 
 
 I. All laws reducible to simultaneity and affi- 
 nity. 
 
 A. Simutlancity = coexistence or immediate succes- 
 sion. 
 
 B. Affinity is a compreliensive expression for all the 
 others. 
 
 I. Resembling or analogous objects have a natu- 
 ral affinity. 
 
 II. Contrasted objects have affinity because the 
 knowledge of contraries is one. 
 
 III. Local contiquity gives unity to unconnected 
 objects. 
 
 IV. In the case of whole and parts, sign and 
 thing signified, a thing and its properties 
 there is a connection both of affinity and 
 simultaneity. 
 
 V. Cause and effect stand in the closest affinity. 
 
 II. Simultaneity and affinity both reducible to 
 one grand law of Redingtegration,= Those 
 thought suggest one another which had 
 previously constituted parts of the same 
 entire or total act of cognition = the parts 
 of a total act of thought consist of simul- 
 taneous thoughts and those having mutul 
 affinity. 
 
 Ill, Apparent exception 'to laws = thoughts 
 apparently unconnected sometimes succeed 
 one another = explained by mental latency 
 + canot be explained by forgetfulness of 
 intermediate link. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACCLTIES. 
 
 49 
 
 C. Reminiscence = laws of reproduction + Lee. XXXII. 
 voluntary effort = implies that the 
 mind recognise the identity of the repro- 
 duced immediate and the original pheno- 
 menon + that the mind be conscious of 
 the second being something different from 
 the first = the common explanation of 
 reminiscence recognises only the conse- 
 cutive order of thought + the following 
 points constitute the true explanation. 
 
 I. The mind goes backward and forward over a 
 great variety of thoughts in every order. 
 
 II. Conditions of reminiscence, 
 
 A. Momentary circumstances are the causes which 
 awaken our activity. 
 
 B. The determining circumstances as constituting a 
 want tend to awaken associated thoughts which 
 may satisfy that want. 
 
 III. Consciousness of a want awakens the idea of 
 its object together with many accessory 
 notions + accessory ideas not so vivid as that 
 of object sought and therefore soon disappear 
 from consciousness, 
 
 IV. These accessory notions whether conscious or 
 not call up others and so help to bring before 
 consciousness the object wanted. 
 
 V. Relations of our thoughts as suggesting one 
 another. 
 
 A. Some thoughts reciprocally connected by mutual 
 
 relations and therefore excite one another. 
 
 7 
 
60 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 B. Some are connected with a greater number of 
 determining circumstances than others = these 
 are more frequently called up. 
 
 c. Thoughts connected with circumstances which 
 most vividly affect us predominate over the 
 others. 
 
 Lee. XXXIII. IV. The Eepresentative Faculty^ — Imagination. 
 A. It character and conditions. 
 
 I, Erroneous view = imagination divided into 
 the reproductive and productive. 
 
 A. Reproductive = called conception -i- simply re- 
 presentative of objects of perception = term con- 
 ception improperly applied + the faculty not 
 simple, comprehending representation proper and 
 reproduction. 
 
 B. Productive = ordinary imagination or Fancy = 
 produces nothing new, — only rearranges and 
 modifies the old. 
 
 II. Correct view = imagination a complex pro- 
 cess, comprehending representation 4- its 
 determining powers. 
 
 A. Representation == energy of mind in holding up 
 to its own contemplation mental phenomena. 
 
 B. Determing powers = reproductive faculty,— the 
 immediate source of materials + faculty of rela- 
 tions, — analysis and synthesis of phenomena 
 Hence . — 
 
 c. Representation = condition of the possibility of 
 an act of comparison + realizes or holds up 
 results of comparison. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 51 
 
 B. Its objects = imagination is concerned not: 
 merely with objects of sense but also with 
 the objects of abstraction, of wit, of judg- 
 ment, of reason, of feeling, of volitions 
 and of the passions. 
 
 C. Its order, — is three-fold. 
 
 I. Natural order = that in which objects spon- 
 taneously present themselves. 
 
 II. Logical order = order of scientific study = 
 from universal to particular or vice versa = 
 deductive or inductive. 
 
 III. Poetical order = grouping with a view to 
 effect. 
 
 D. Its modes. 
 
 I. Ordinary modes = the mode of imagination 
 determined by different associations in differ- 
 ent circumstances = education, habits, reli- 
 gion, age, and sex determine the kind and 
 order of imagination. 
 
 II. Extraordinary modes. 
 
 A. Dreaming == exercise of imagination during 
 sleep = can sometimes scarcely be distinguished 
 from sensible perceptions or waking thoughts. 
 
 B. Somnambulism = extraordinary exaltation of 
 powers during sleep + subsequent forgetfulness 
 of what was done. 
 
 C. Reverie = waking dreams governed by the 
 involuntary associations of imagination. 
 
 E. Its effects = it is the principal source of 
 the happiness and misery of human life. 
 
 UBRAirr 
 
 UHlVERSlPf OF ILLINOf? 
 
52 
 
 THE COGISITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 F. Its organs = the different organs of sense 
 or muscular activity are employed by 
 imagination. 
 
 Lee. XXXIv. V. The Elaborative Faculty. This faculty 
 proceeds exclusively by the method of com- 
 parison as may be seen by examining its 
 principal processes. 
 
 A. Primary acts of comparison. 
 
 I. Comparison of ego or non-ego with notion of 
 existence. 
 
 II. Discrimination of eofo from non-eofo* 
 
 III. Observing the resemblance or difference of 
 phenomena. 
 
 IV. Comparison of phenomena with native notion 
 of substance. 
 
 V. Comparison of phenomena with notion of cau- 
 sality. 
 
 B. Classification or Generalization = grouping 
 together resembling phenomena as the 
 result of comparison. 
 
 I. Products of classification. 
 
 A. Complex notions = repetition of the constituent 
 notion so as to form a group as army, forest = 
 aided by language which gives unity to the col- 
 lections of objects. 
 
 B. Notions formed by decomposition. 
 
 I. A Poetical analysis and synthesis = separation 
 and recomposition of integral parts for the 
 sake of pleasure. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 53 
 
 ii. Scientific analysis and synthesis = abstraction 
 and combination of constituent qualities for 
 the sake of accurate knowledge. 
 
 A. Abstraction c= withdrawal of attention from some qualities to 
 fix it upon others = may be performed by the senses upon 
 physical qualities or by the mind upon reproduced cognitions. 
 
 B. Abstract individual ideas = particular qualities of individual 
 objects separated from tbe others. 
 
 c. Abstract general notions = produced by attending to and 
 naming points of resemblance in a number of objects, and thus 
 forming a class, and successively higher classes. 
 
 I. Quantity of general notions two-fold = exten- 
 sion, — the classes or objects contained under 
 them + comprehension, — the atributes involv- 
 ed in them = extension and comprehension are 
 in the inverse ratio of one another. 
 
 II. Resolution of quantity is two-fold = generaliza- 
 tion or rejection of differentiae and attention to 
 resemblances, the process rising from indivi- 
 duals to higher and higher classes + determi- 
 nation^ or attention to differences and abstrac- 
 tion from resemblances, the process descending 
 from higher classes to lower or to individuals. 
 
 II. Wherein does g^enerality consist ? =the ans- Lee' XXXV. 
 wer to this question involves an account of 
 the nominalist controversy. 
 
 A. Nominalism = every act and object of thought 
 singular + the name only is general = held by 
 Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Adam Smith, Campbell 
 and Stewart = mind can abstract from 'particular 
 qualities of objects + cannot conceive a general 
 notion apart from particular qualities. 
 
 B. Conceptualism held by 
 
 I. Locke =x the general notion of an object with- 
 out special peculiarities may be formed, but it 
 is imperfect. 
 
54 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 II. Brown == generalizing process consists of (1) 
 perception or conception of two or more objects 
 + (2) relative feeling *of their resemblance + 
 (3) naming these circumstances of resemblance 
 => nominalism excludes the relative feeling of 
 resemblance. Brown incorrect, for, 
 
 A. Nominalists do not exclude resemblance in 
 generalization, as e. g. 
 
 t. Hobbes = name .imposed for Bimilitnde in some 
 quality or accident. 
 
 II. Berkeley = words become general by being applied to 
 particular ideas which resemble one another. 
 
 III. Hume =: perceived resemblance is the foundation of 
 classification. 
 
 IV. Adam [Smith2=^ resemblance the reason of giving 
 a common name. 
 
 B. Notion of similitude not general. 
 
 I. Axioms. 
 
 a. Resemblance is a relation = inconceivable apart 
 from resembling objects. 
 
 b. Resemblance] exists 'in some particular mode or 
 accident. 
 
 c. Resemlance not nsoessarily universal = not morn 
 general tlian resembling objects. 
 
 II. Brown’s theory tested by axioms. 
 
 a. Universality of feeling cannot arise from univer- 
 sality of resembling objects. 
 
 b. >'or can it arise from the universality of the notion 
 of the common quality. 
 
 c. Hence it must be supposed by Brown to rest in tho 
 feeling of resemblance itself in opposition to the 
 third axiom -i* there are four conceivable reasons 
 in support of this 
 
 2. The feeling of resemblance may be general because 
 it is a relation = not asserted by Brown. 
 
 2. The particular relation called similarity may be 
 more general than other relations = it is the same 
 as that of difference which is not general. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 55 
 
 3. The feeling of Eimilarity may be g?neral because 
 we have a capacity of feeling similarity =then 
 every act of every power weuki be general. 
 
 4 . If universality be not in sensible representations 
 it may be found in the intellectual notion which 
 connects two particular qualities by the bond of 
 similarity = the only supposition which accounts 
 for Browms doctrine [but which he was not war- 
 ranted in assuming. 
 
 Wliat kind of idea and terms first arise ? Lee. XXXVI, 
 
 = the question of the Primnm Co^nitiim, 
 
 A. That first ideas and names are of • particular 
 
 things is held by — 
 
 I. Vives = the order of learning is from simple 
 to complex, from particulars to universals. 
 
 II. Adam Smith = assignation of particular 
 names to particular objects is the commence- 
 ment of language + these names are after- 
 wards extended to other resembling objects 
 and thus become general. 
 
 B. That general ideas and terms first arise is held 
 
 by— 
 
 I. Leibnitz = it would be impossible to speak 
 without appellatives, ^. e. names which may be 
 applied to eeveral objects + general name 
 usually most easily formed + proper name 
 originally appellative or general. 
 
 II. M. Turgot = our first ideas are general and 
 afterwards become more particular. 
 
 C. That first ideas and terms are vague and confused 
 
 is held by 
 
 I. Hamilton = language at first expresses the 
 the vague and confused + out of this the 
 universal and particular are elaborated = par- 
 ception commences with masses, and proceeds 
 by analyses from the vague to the definite + 
 general attributes are formed by comparison 
 
66 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 and attention + individuals distinguished by 
 discrimination of differences. 
 
 II. Degerando = a child first uses nouns , and 
 verbs absolutely and afterwards compares and 
 distinguishes. 
 
 HI. Aristotle = we proceed from the better 
 known to the less known = from the complex 
 or confused to the singular and clear. 
 
 Lee, XXXVIL C. Judgment and Reasoning = rendered 
 necessary by tlie imperfection of our na- 
 ture ; higher intelligences know by in- 
 tuition. 
 
 I. Judgment = an act of comparison = of a 
 total conception with a partial -f- recognition 
 that the latter constitutes part of the former 
 = consists of subject, predicate and copula 
 + expressed in words is called a proposition. 
 
 II. Reasoning = complex or mediate judgment 
 = recognition of the relation of one notion 
 to another through a third = proceeds either 
 from the whole to its parts, or from all the 
 parts to the whole collectively = deductive 
 and inductive. 
 
 A. Deductive reasoning = depends upon the 
 axiom, — Whatever is the part of a part is a part 
 of the whole = the subject may be the whole 
 and predicate part, or predicate whole and sub- 
 ject part = comprehension + extension. 
 
 I. Reasoning in comprehension = subject whole 
 and predicate part = subject may be either a 
 physical or a mathematical whole = depends 
 upon principle that, — all that belongs to the 
 predicate must belong to the subject. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 67 
 
 II. Reasoning in extension = predicate whole and 
 subject part = what was subject in compre- 
 hensive reasoning becomes predicate in exten- 
 sive. 
 
 III. In both deductive and inductive reasoning 
 the inference is necessary = usual account of 
 induction as probable reasoning erroneous + 
 in deduction and induction, the analysis of 
 comprehension is exactly the reverse of the 
 analysis of extension = in deduction the 
 analysis of comprehension corresponds to 
 the synthesis of extension and vice versa -1- 
 inductive synthesis on a comprehensive 
 whole the reverse of that on an extensiv 
 whole. 
 
 VI. The Eegulative Faculty. 
 
 A. Introductory discussion. 
 
 I. General character of the faculty = it is the Lecture 
 
 XXXVTTT 
 
 power possessed by the mind of modifying 
 or regulating the knowledge it receives = 
 the complement of a priori principles belong- 
 ing to the mind. 
 
 IL Its nomenclature = it corresponds to the 
 Greek, nous or Reason -f- has been called 
 common sense by many authorities which is 
 ambiguous = it usually means a sound un- 
 derstanding. 
 
 A. The faculty may be called the noetic to distinguish 
 it from the Elaborative faculty or dianoetic. 
 
 B. The cognitions are called first principles, prin- 
 ciples of common sense, intuitive truths &c. 
 
 III. Its criteria enounced by : — 
 
 A. Descartes and Spinoza = Descartes distinguished 
 8 
 
58 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 universal from particular notions 4- Spinoza 
 pointed out that our clear and dLtinct ideas fol- 
 low from the sole necessity of our nature = these 
 philosophers were not explicit. 
 
 c. Leibnitz = native distinguished from adventi- 
 tious knowledge by the circumstance that wo 
 cannot but think the one, but may easily annihi- 
 late the other in thought f the intellect is the 
 source of necessary truths while contingent truths 
 come from experience + experience apart from 
 reason never leads to absolute universality. 
 
 ,C. Reid illustrates his doctrine by the principle of 
 causality which cannot be acquired or proved by 
 experience because 
 
 I . The cansal judgment expresses not a contingent 
 but a necessary truth. 
 
 II. Maxims grounded on experience have a pro- 
 bability only proportioned to the extent of our 
 experience. 
 
 III. Limited experience inadequate to the establish- 
 ment of a universal principle. 
 
 IV. The number of primary truths = still sub- 
 ject of dispute -h B,eid and Stewart charged 
 with admitting too many 4- metaphysics 
 like chemistry, — apparently simple elements 
 may be analyzed. 
 
 B. Systematic deduction of necessary prin 2. 
 
 I. The quality of necessity distinguishes native 
 from adventitious elements of knowledge -f 
 necessity may arise from two causes = may 
 be the result of a power or of a power- 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 59 
 
 lessness of thinking principle = positive or 
 negative. 
 
 II. Positive necessity = an act power = e.g, 
 affirmation of existence, personal identity, the 
 laws of contradiction, excluded middle &c. 
 
 III. Negative necessity = result of a powerless- 
 ness of mind. 
 
 A. Principles on which it depends. 
 
 I. Law of contradiction = a thing cannot be 
 and not-be at the same time. 
 
 II. Law of excluded middle = a thing either is 
 or is not. 
 
 B. Law of the Conditioned = all that is conceiv- 
 able in thought lies between two inconceivable 
 extremes which, as contradictory of each other, 
 cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual 
 contradictories, one must. 
 
 C. Illustrations of this law. 
 
 I. Space as a maximum = space must be either 
 finite or infinite -t- we cannot conceive space 
 
 as positively limited since this would be con- 
 tradictory of our idea of space + we cannot 
 conceive space as without limits, since this 
 surpasses our power of conception + therefore 
 our power of conception lies between the two 
 unconditioned extremes. 
 
 II. Space as a minimum = we can neither con- 
 ceive an absolute minimum of spase nor its 
 infinite divisibility. 
 
 III. Time as a maximum = past or future time is 
 bounded by the present= a bounded infinite 
 is a contradiction + we cannot conceive past 
 time as either infinitely not-beginning or 
 absolutely beginning, nor future time as either 
 infinitely not-ending or absolutely ending. 
 
60 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 Lec.XXXIX. 
 
 IV. Time as a minimum = we can neither con- 
 ceive an absoute minimum of time nor its 
 infiinite divisibility. 
 
 D. General Summary = the conditioned is the 
 mean between two exclusive extremes neither 
 of which can be conceived as possible, but of 
 which, on the principles of contradiction and 
 excluded middle, one must be admitted as 
 necessary = the two extremes are the abso- 
 lutely unconditioned or absolute + the infi- 
 nitely unconditioned or infinite = the condi- 
 tionally limited is the only possible object of 
 knowledge or of positive thought + this law 
 consistent with the orthodox doctrine that we 
 cannot know God. 
 
 C. Application of the Law of the Conditioned 
 to the explanation of the principle of cau- 
 sality. 
 
 I. The phenomenon of causality. 
 
 A. General account of it — we cannot conceive any 
 new existence to commence -I- all that now exists 
 had a previous existence under a prior form + 
 the causes contain all that is contained in the 
 effect + effect contains nothing which was not 
 contained in the causes. 
 
 B. Brown’s account of it = the causal judgment 
 asserts present immediate priority + past and 
 future invariable sequence of one event upon 
 another. To this account Prof. Wilson objects 
 that it omits two ideas ; — one of necessity and 
 the other of a constitution of things in which 
 that necessity is established. 
 
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 61 
 
 II. Theories in explanation of the causal judg- 
 ment. 
 
 A. A posteriori tlieories = those which consider 
 this principle to be derived from experience. 
 
 I. Original or primitive. 
 
 a. We have a direct perception of causai agency in exter 
 nal phenomena. To this it is objected ; — 
 
 1. We have no perception of the connection of cause 
 and effect in the external world = this objection 
 first urged by Algazel in the 12th cent, and now 
 generally accepted. 
 
 2. If we had this could not account for the qualities 
 of necessity and universality. 
 
 b. We have a direct perception oi causai efficiency in 
 
 the consciousness of our physical operations as in 
 fluenced by the will = in effort there is , — (IJ the cons- 
 ciousness of an act of will (2) the consciousness of a 
 motion produced (3) a reiation of the motion to the 
 volition = Locke and M.de Biran objected that we have 
 no consciousness of the connection between the voli~ 
 tion and the limb moving, as proved by paralysis 
 where there may be a volition without movement •}* 
 empirical consciousness would still fail to account for 
 necessity. 
 
 II. Derivative or secondary. 
 
 c. The causal judgment the result of induction and gener- 
 
 alization = this would never engender the irresistable 
 belief that every event must have a cause. 
 
 d. The causal judgment derived from subjective custom or 
 association == the customary can never become the 
 necessary. 
 
 B. A priori theories = those which consider the 
 causal judgment a condition of intelligence it- 
 self. 
 
 I. Original or primitive. 
 
62 
 
 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 e. The causal judgment is a simple primary datum,- =*a 
 positive revelation of intelligence = Descartes, Lei~ 
 bnitz, Reid, Stewart, Kant, Fichte, Cousin &c. = can 
 not be held it the causal judgment may be explained”’ 
 without postulating a special principle, 
 
 f. The causal judgment may be reso Ived into the the ins- 
 tinctive inclination to believe in the constancy of nature 
 = held by brown but does not account for element of 
 necessity. 
 
 II. Derivative or secondary. 
 
 g. The Causal judgment proved by the principle of 
 contradiction = whatever is produced without a 
 cause is produced by nothing; but nothing can no 
 more be a cause than it can be something; there 
 fore everything must have a real cause for its exis- 
 tence = held by the Leibuityo— Wolflan school but 
 guilty of the fallacy petltio principu == if all causes 
 are excluded ‘nothing’ should be excluded also. 
 
 Lee. XL. The causal judgment evolved from the law of :h© 
 
 conditioned. 
 
 3, Manner of evolution explained— all thought Implies 
 — the thought of existence + the thought of time 
 + that of existence conditioned in time — we must 
 think an object which exists now as having existed 
 in past time and as continuing to exist ic future time 
 = we cannot conceive either abso'ute creation or 
 absolute annihilation = the inability of annihiiat ng 
 in thought an existence in t'me past expliins the 
 whole phenomenon of of ciusiiity + the judgment 
 is simply the assertion ih it ev=‘ry thing must have 
 existed previously in a fferent forms. 
 
 2. Reasons for preferring this explanation, 
 
 i. It postulates no new principle. 
 
 ii. It averts scepticism = avoids the contradictory 
 assertions, that existence cannot absolutely com_ 
 meiice and cannot intlnicely not-eommence by 
 showing thu both of these assertions are the result 
 of the liiiiitxtion of cur faculties, 
 
 iii. It avoides fata ism or inconsistency = the denial 
 of free causation in volition leads to fatalism or 
 atheism + tho admission of free consation in volii 
 tion is inconsistent with the casual judgment + 
 
THE FEELINGS. 
 
 63 
 
 the law of the conditioned obviates this contradic- 
 tion by showing that both positions are unthink- 
 able while in favour of fteedom we may ihen ap- 
 peal to consciousness. 
 
 PAET VI. 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 
 A. Preliminary questions. 
 
 I. Are the Feelings really distinct from the 
 other phenomena of the mind ? 
 
 A. Historical notice of question. 
 
 I. Ill ancient pliilosojdiy mental phenomena 
 were divided into Gnostic or Cognitive -p 
 Orectic or Appetent = the modem division 
 into understanding and will. 
 
 II. Previous to Kant, German psychologists had 
 distinguished the Feelings as a separate class 
 but Kant first established the distinction, 
 
 B, Determination of question. 
 
 I. Preliminary difficulty = language applied to 
 mental phenomena not so clear and distinct 
 as that applied to external objects this led to 
 confusion in the analysis of mental pheno- 
 mena = the word feeling in many languages 
 means first tactual sensations and afterwards 
 pleasure and pain -{- this ambiquity leads to 
 the secondary meaning of the word being 
 supposed the same as the primary. . 
 
 II. By an appeal to experience we can easily dis- 
 tinguish the feelings of pleasure and pain 
 from any cognition or conation. 
 
 Lee. XLI, 
 
64 
 
 THE FEELING. 
 
 C. Krug s objection. 
 
 I. Stated = all activity of mind is directed 
 either inward or outward -f- if feeling be 
 distinct from these two activities it mast have 
 cither both directions at once or none at all — • 
 must have either be a combination of the other 
 two powers or nothing at all, 
 
 II. Answered. 
 
 A. There may be three mental energies = ineunfc 
 or cognitions + immanent or feelings + tran- 
 seunt or conations. 
 
 B. It is not proper to ascribe any direction to purely 
 mental powers, direction and position being 
 attributes of external objects. 
 
 C. The objection rests on the analogy between the 
 mental and material worlds which does not 
 ajfford ground for the argument. 
 
 II. What is the position of the Feelings in a 
 scientific classification of the faculties? 
 
 A. The Feelings are to be placed after the 
 cognitions = without cognition no feeling 
 is possible. 
 
 B. The Feelings precede and determine the 
 conations = if cognition alone were suffi- 
 cient to arouse conation, then : — 
 
 I. We should strive after all objects alike with- 
 out distinction. 
 
 II. All persons would seek with equal eagerness 
 after the same objects = the distinction 
 which each person and several persons make 
 
THE FEELINGS. 
 
 (5 
 
 in seeking after objects of desire is explained 
 by the feelings, 
 
 III. Into what classes should the Feelings be 
 distributed ? 
 
 A. Kant divides the Feelings into two great 
 classes. 
 
 I. The sensuous feelings = through the senses 
 + through the imagination. 
 
 II. The intellectual feelings = connected with 
 notions of the understanding -f ideas of the 
 reason. 
 
 B. Schulze, into corporeal, spiritual, and 
 mixed. 
 
 C. Hildebrand, into feelings of states, condi- 
 tions, and appetency. 
 
 D. Herbert, into objective, subjective, and 
 mixed in origin. 
 
 E. Carus, into intellectual, aesthetic, moral 
 and religious. 
 
 F. Hamilton, into sentiments and sensations. 
 
 B, Theory of Pleasure and Pain, 
 
 I. Feelings distinguished from other pheno- 
 mena. 
 
 A. Cognition =»■ object known distinguished 
 in consciousness from subject knowing + 
 object may be different from ego,— object- 
 object, or a modification of ego, — sub- 
 9 
 
 Lee. XLII 
 
THE FEELINGS. 
 
 ject-object = objectification is the essen- 
 tial pecularity of cognition. 
 
 B. Feeling = does not objectify mental modi- 
 fication or state = is nothing but what is 
 subjectively subjective. 
 
 C. Conation = related to an external object 
 like cognition + relation implies a want 
 and a tendency resulting in an endeavour 
 + conation has reference to the future, 
 feeling to the present. 
 
 II, Law by which the Feelings are governed. 
 
 A. Stated in detail. 
 
 I. The life of man corresponds to his conscious 
 energy. 
 
 Ii. Conscious energy is determined through spe- 
 cial modes without which it cannot be exerted. 
 
 III. Pleasure and pain accompany exertion in 
 these modes. 
 
 IV. Since pleasure or pain cannot arise except as 
 the concomitant of some conscious energy 
 the question arises as to the law of their 
 connection. 
 
 V. The Law is, — The more perfect, the more 
 pleasurable the energy ; the more imperfect 
 the more painful. 
 
 VI. The perfection of an energy is. 
 
 A. A relation to the power. 
 ‘ B. A relation to the object. 
 
THE FEELINGS. 
 
 67 
 
 vll. In relation to the power. 
 
 A. A perfect energy = the full and not more than 
 full complement of free and spontaneous energy 
 of the power in regard to degree and duration. 
 
 B. An imperfect energy = the restrained or the; 
 over-stimulated exertion of a power. 
 
 VIII. In relation to the object. 
 
 A. A perfect energy = object elicits the full and not 
 more than full amount of energy. 
 
 B. An imperfect energy = object stimulates'energy 
 unduly in degree or time + unduly restrains it. 
 
 IX. Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and 
 unimpeded exertion of a power of whose 
 * energy we are conscious + pain is a reflex 
 of the over-strained or repressed exertion 
 of Such a poweiv 
 
 B. Explained. 
 
 I. Pleasure as reflex of energy = distinguished 
 from energy which may not be pleasurable -{- 
 from perfection of energy. 
 
 II. Spontaneous = every power should put forth 
 freely and naturally its proper amount of 
 energy -f unimpeded — all obstacles should 
 be removed. 
 
 Ill, Consciousness a condition of feelinor = no 
 
 o 
 
 feeling out of consciousness -f- pleasure and 
 pain may be either negative or positive. 
 
 History of Theories of Pleasure and Pain. 
 
 Lee. 
 
 I. Plato was the first to generalize a theory 
 of the Feelings = a state of pleasure always 
 
€8 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 
 preceded by a state of pain + pain arises 
 from a breacli in the harmony of our consti- 
 tution + pleasure follows when the harmony 
 is restored = pleasure is a thing always in 
 generation never actually existing, — a mere 
 relation to and negation of pain + pain is 
 the root the antecedent of pleasure. 
 
 II. Aristotle refutes the Platonic theory of plea- 
 sure being a mere negation by showing that 
 this theory explains only bodily wants and 
 pleasures + intellectual pleasures are posi- 
 tive and not accompanied by pain = pleasure 
 is the concomitant of a perfect energy of 
 health or intellect exercised upon an object 
 suited to call forth the power into unim- 
 peded activity + pleasure is not some- 
 thing that arises from moment to moment 
 but is a real positive existence. Hamil- 
 ton in comparing the above theories ob- 
 serves Plato is right in holding that 
 every state of pleasure and free energy is 
 the escape from an alternative state of 
 pain and compulsory inaction + Aristotle 
 is right in holding that pleasure is more 
 than freedom from pain = pleasure and 
 pain are both absolute in being both posi- 
 
THE FEELINGS. 
 
 69 
 
 tive + both relative in being increased by 
 contrast with one another. 
 
 Ill Cardan = All changes proceed from one 
 countrary to another, from good to bad or 
 from bad to good = the latter pleasurable 
 = a state of pain must always precede one 
 of pleasure = this theory excludes intermedi- 
 ate gradations of feeling. 
 
 IV. Descartes = Pleasure is the consciousness 
 of some one of our perfections = supposed 
 by his followers to have been original but 
 really a vague version of Aristotle’s theory. 
 
 V. Wolf = Pleasure is the intuitive cognition 
 of any perfection whatever either true or ap- 
 parent = this theory is erroneous because ; — 
 
 A. Pleasure is a subjective state not a cogni- 
 tion of an attribute. 
 
 B. Pleasure belongs not only to the intuitive 
 faculty but also to the understanding or 
 faculty of relations. 
 
 VI. Du Bos and Pouilly = Pleasure subjectively 
 is the result of the gratification of a want 
 + the chief want is mental occupation + men- 
 tal activity when over stimualted or res- 
 trained is painful + the stronger and easier 
 the activity the more agreeable. 
 
70 
 
 THE FEELINGS'. 
 
 VII. Sulzer = The feelings aie grounded in the 
 natural activity of the soul + this activity 
 is pleasurable when called forth by objects 
 in which diversity may be reduced to 
 unity + bea uty consists in the unity of the 
 manifold = to this theory it may be ob- 
 jected. 
 
 A, This theory excludes the pleasure of recep- 
 tivity or passivity. 
 
 B. Pleasure is not a consciousness of unim- 
 peted activity but a consciusness of feel- 
 ing. 
 
 VII. Kant = Pleasure is the feeling of the fur- 
 therance, pain of the hinderance of life + 
 former must pre-suppose the latter + man is 
 always dissatisfied with the present and seeks 
 to better his condition = man is always 
 seeking to escape from a state of* pain to 
 one of pleasure + pleasure is nothing posi- 
 tive, only a negation of pain, and nothing 
 enduring, only a transition. 
 
 Lee. XLIV. Do Application of Theory to phenomena. 
 
 I. As causes states of feeling may be either 
 pleasures or pains = pleasure is felt in pro- 
 portion as our powers are exercised but not 
 over-exercised + pain, in proportion as they 
 
THE FEELINGS. 
 
 71 
 
 ^re compelled either not to operate or to 
 operate too much. 
 
 A. Testimony showing that activity is plea- 
 surable. 
 
 I. The love of idleness or learned leisure is nofc 
 idleness, but bodily inactivity accompanied 
 by mental activity -H ennui is painful. 
 
 II. Many writers — as Johnson Ferguson, Paley 
 have shown the pleasure of activity + all 
 young animals delight in the activity of their 
 powers wiiile the old are pleased with ease. 
 
 III. Even the affections which are of a painful 
 kind are accompained with a certain amount 
 of pleasure, as e. g, grief, fear, pity. 
 
 B. General causes determining the degree 
 of pleasure and pain. 
 
 I. JSTovelty is a cause of a higher feeling of plea- 
 sure. 
 
 A. Subjectively, as it determines the mind to a new 
 mode of action eithei from inactivity or from ano- 
 ther state of energy. 
 
 B. Objectively, as it affords gratification to our de- 
 sire of knowledge. 
 
 II. Contrast enhances the real as well as the 
 apparent intensity of a feeling. 
 
 A. Unkindness from a person from whom we expect 
 kindness increases the real pain. 
 
 B. Recollection of past suffering or past happiness 
 increases present feelings + comparison of our 
 condition with that of others increases our feeling 
 of pleasure or pain. 
 
72 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 
 III. Harmony = when different feelings are Iiar- 
 monions. they enhance i^ileasiire + when 
 they are discordant they produce pain. 
 
 IV. Association pre-supposes, does not create feel- 
 ing -f by connecting ideas with objects makes 
 them appear pleasurable or painful although 
 they would not otherwise be so. 
 
 Lee. XLV. II. As effects states of feeling may be connected 
 with every kind of activity. 
 
 A. Sensations have certain feelings connected 
 with them. 
 
 I. The five senses or sensus Jixus^we must dis- 
 tinguish the organic pleasure or pain con- 
 nected with these senses from the higher 
 pleasures resulting from the imagination 
 working upon the objects of the senses = the 
 degree of organic feeling determined by the 
 general law of perception and sensation. — 
 Pleasure or pain varies directly as the sensa- 
 tion and inversely as the perception = in 
 sight and hearing there is little suscepti- 
 bility of organic feeling, in taste and smell - 
 great +no law can explain the causes of par- 
 ticular feelings. 
 
 II. The vital sense sensus vagus = Hamilton 
 thinks the general law applies to it but does 
 not enter into details. 
 
 B. Sentiments, connected with the higher fa- 
 culties. 
 
 I. Contemplative = concomitants of our cogni- 
 tive powers. 
 
THE FEELINGS. 
 
 V3 
 
 A. Sentiments attending self-consciousness = plea- 
 surable when there is vigorous and unimpeded 
 energy + painful when there is no cause for one 
 present state of activity to pass into another, as 
 in tedium or ennui = a repressed tendency to ac- 
 tion felt chiefly by the educated + cured by 
 pastimes or occupation + too rapid change of our 
 activity is accompanied by dizziness or nausea. 
 
 B. Sentiments connected with imagination. 
 
 I. Reproductive imagination, when its object is 
 clearly and vividly brought before consciousness 
 gives pleasure, and vice versa + an external ob- 
 ject which gives full play to imagination by pre- 
 senting variety ' combined with unity is beautiful 
 and gives pleasure. 
 
 ir. Creative imagination = reconstructs old materials 
 into new forms either in one or a series of re- 
 presentations = pleasure arises from a varied and 
 harmonious image -t- from the logical depend- 
 ance of representations upon one another = plea- 
 sure comes from extending our knowledge + 
 from clearness and distinctness in our cognitions 
 + from the conviction of the truth of our opi- 
 nions 4 - from ease in detecting unity in variety 
 of objects from induction of general laws and 
 deduction from first principles + from the per- 
 ception of the adaptation of means to ends. 
 
 C. Sentiments arising from the union of the under- 
 standing and imagination. 
 
 I. The Beautiful *= Kant distinguishes beauty into 
 absolute and relative = that which is beautiful 
 in itself, as a flower + that which is judged beau- 
 tiful by reference to a certain end =a relative 
 beauty is nothing but utility,— a beautiful utili- 
 ty or a utilized beauty. 
 
 A. Absolute beauty gives pleasure in proportion 
 as it affords to the imaginatoinand the under- 
 
 Lee. XLVI. 
 
74 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 
 standing the opportunity of exerting fully 
 and freely their respective energies =» the 
 understanding gathers up into a unity the ob - 
 jects of the imagination =» pleasure is in 
 proportion to the ease with which the under- 
 standing performs its functions + there is no 
 pleasure in sundering a whole into its parts 
 + there is pleasure in dividing a whole 
 into its lesser wholes. 
 
 B. Relative beauty gives a double pleasure =* 
 that which arises from the absolute beauty of 
 the object + that which arises from the 
 notion of conformity to an end = the heauti- 
 ful is that which occupies the imagination and 
 understanding in a free, full and agreeable 
 activity. 
 
 II. The Sublime =s rouses strong emotion + partly 
 repels =■ is mingled pleasure and pain + re- 
 quires magnitude as its condition. 
 
 a. Of extension and protension, or of space and 
 time = comprises so great a multitude of 
 parts that the imagination sinks under the 
 attempt to represent it in an image, and the 
 understanding, to estimate it. 
 
 b. Of intension = power so great that’imagina- 
 tion cannot represent and understanding can- 
 not measure it. 
 
 III. The Picturesque = variety which allows the 
 mind to expatiate freely aiid easily without at- 
 tempting painfully to reduce it to unity. 
 
 11. Practical Sentiment relate to 
 
 A. Self-preservation. 
 
 B. Enjoyment of existence. 
 
 C. Preservation of the species. 
 
 D. Tendency to developement or perfection. 
 
 E. The moral law. 
 
NOTES 
 
 EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL 
 
NOTE A. 
 
 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Tpie doctrine of the Kelativity of knowledge, or more 
 properly the relativity of the objects of our knowledge, 
 holds a prominent position in Sir William Hamilton'’s 
 Lectures upon Metaphysics. In this Note three things are 
 proposed : — 1st, To examine the subject of relativity, not- 
 ing a certain impropriety of the language generally em- 
 ployed to describe it, and indicating what is properly meant 
 by the doctrine ; 2nd, To discuss Sir William Hamilton's 
 statement of the doctrine ; and 3rd, To compare his doc- 
 trine of relativity with another of his doctrines alleged to 
 be inconsistent with it. 
 
 I. All the objects of our conscious knowledge exist iu 
 certain relations, and a study of these relations is needful 
 for a clear understanding of the doctrine of relativity. 
 From the sphere of consciousness we must manifestly ex- 
 clude the Distant and the Past or Future. It is only men- 
 tal phenomena Now and Here which consciousness com- 
 prehends. This principle follows immediately from the na- 
 ture of consciousness. The inner light by which the work- 
 ings of our mind are revealed to us comprehends nothing 
 but its own constituent elements, of whatever nature these 
 elements may be ; but the Distant and the Past or Future 
 cannot, except by proxy, be included in these elements. 
 We do, however think of the distant in space and time, 
 and therefore by proxy, it must be present in our con- 
 scious life. The contents of consciousness appear therefore 
 to divide themselves into two classes those which are 
 
 11 
 
78 
 
 THE KELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 primitively now and here ; and those whicli are the proxies 
 of the distant either in space or time. These two classes 
 we shall cdX\ Presentations 2i,ndL Representations, These two 
 classes of mental phenomena are sometimes not easily dis- 
 ting'uishable, and are frequently quite inseparable in their 
 union the one with the q^her. Presentations however may, 
 generally, be thus characterised : they are accompanied or 
 preceded by some organic or objective conditions, and have 
 not a necessary reference to any other phenomenon past 
 or present or future. Hepresentations, on the other hand, 
 involve of necessity a reference to some presentation either 
 past or future, or usually some presentation actual in the 
 past and possible in the future. All the contents of con- 
 sciousness must necessarily belong to one or the other of 
 these two classes, as every phenomenon must either be 
 absolute and complete in itself, or must involve a reference 
 to some other possible phenomenon. 
 
 The presentations and representations of our conscious 
 life appear in consciousness in a state of great complexity, 
 arising from their great number and variety, as well as from 
 the intricate manner in which they are united together. 
 But there are four great Relations in which all the objects 
 of consciousness must stand to one another. These relations 
 are Pifference and Resemhlance, Coexistence and Succession, 
 If objects of consciousness do not differ we cannot discri- 
 minate the one from the other, that is, cannot know them 
 at all. If a representation do not resemble its original pre- 
 sentation and also differ from it, we cannot recognise it 
 as a representation and consequently can have no founda- 
 tion for the belief in the continuity of our own conscious 
 life. The necessary condition of comparing resembling 
 or differing objects is Coexistence ; if they do not coexist 
 with one another they cannot be compared. The Succession 
 of phenomena is necessary as the condition of our own 
 continuous existence and as the basis of the relation be- 
 tween presentations and representations. Thus all pre- 
 sentative and representative phenomena must be related 
 
THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 7 ^ 
 
 to one another in one or more of these four ways, — Differ- 
 ence, Resemblance, Coexistence and Succession. And 
 the existence of these relations may be considered as one 
 of the a priori conditions of our being* permanent cognitive 
 beings. 
 
 With reference to these relations, although it may be 
 said that the objects of our knowledge must be mutually 
 relative, it is not correct to say that knowledge itself 
 is relative. Knowledge may be described as a relation ; 
 but to say that that relation is itself relative appears to 
 be unmeaning. Our knowledge of any presentation is 
 surely absolute and complete, provided that presentation is 
 duly distinguished from other phenomena. Our knowledge 
 of any representation, the same condition being fulfilled, 
 appears equally absolute and complete, provided in addi- 
 tion that we clearly recognise the representative character 
 of the phenomenon and clearly conceive the presentation 
 which it represents. As far therefore as simple presenta- 
 tions and representations are concerned, it appears to be 
 incorrect to say that knowledge is relative, although it is 
 quite true that knowledge is a relation and that the pheno- 
 mena of knowledge must be mutually related in order to be 
 known. 
 
 There is another kind of relativity to which we must 
 turn our attention. Representations are relative to some 
 previous actual or some future possible presentation, and it 
 has been said that our knowledge of that presentation is 
 relative. The chief objection to this statement is that the 
 term relative does not here seem appropriate or suitable to 
 describe what is meant. Our knowledge of the represen- 
 tation is, as we have said already, absolute ; but, in the pro- 
 per sense of the term, we cannot be said to know the origi- 
 nal presentation at all. We believe that it was actually 
 presented in the past, or we believe that it may possi- 
 bly or will certainly be presented in the future, but we do 
 not noio and here know it. If the term knowledge is to be 
 iised in describing our intellectual relation to the past ac- 
 
80 
 
 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGK 
 
 tual or future possible presentations represented in consci- 
 ousness, we should say that that knowledge is mediate or 
 representative not relative. 
 
 Still another question of greater difficulty has to be 
 considered in connection with this subject. The presen- 
 tations of consciousness are undoubtedly related to one 
 another and to representations ia our conscious life. But 
 it is held by many that they are related also to something 
 else not phenomenal ^ that is, which has never been and can 
 never be presented in consciousness. This non-phenomenal 
 thing is sometimes called the thing -in-it self , and is be- 
 lieved to have an existence independent of our minds, and 
 to be the objective cause of those presentations of which 
 we are conscious. Being inferred for the purpose of ac- 
 counting ‘for the presentations which appear in conscious- 
 ness independently of any voluntary effort of our own, it 
 can never be directly known by us. And, since in this 
 discussion, we ought to understand by knowledge imme- 
 diate direct knowledge, we must exclude this non-pheno- 
 menal inferred entity from the sphere of knowledge alto- 
 gether. We believe in its existence as an inference from 
 the presentations of our consciousness, we may hold differ- 
 ent views regarding its nature and relations to phenomena, 
 but we certainly cannot say that we know it and conse- 
 qu^'iitly cannot say that our knowledge of it is relative. 
 
 What we appear now to have made out is; — that know- 
 ledge itself is a relation, which however requires further 
 examination; that the objects of knowledge are related to 
 one another in terms of difference, resemblance, co-existence 
 and succession, but that our knowledge of them cannot be 
 properly called relative , that those phenomena which are 
 representations are related not only to other phenomena 
 presently in consciousness but also to other past actual or 
 future possible presentations which are believed in but not 
 known and of which they are the proxies ; and that pre- 
 sentations also are related not only to other contiguous 
 phenomena, but also to certain inferred or hypothetical 
 
THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 81 
 
 realities believed in, it may be, but not known, and there- 
 fore not known relatively. 
 
 II. We now proceed to the examination of Sir W. 
 Hamilton’s statement of the doctrine, which is contained in 
 his eighth lecture. According to him knowledge is relative, 
 lst,^‘ Because existence is not cognizable absolutely and- in 
 itself, but only in special modes; 2ud, Because these modes 
 can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our 
 faculties ; and 3rd, Because the modes, thus relative to 
 our faculties, are presented to and known by the mind 
 only under modifications determined by these faculties 
 themselves.’^ 
 
 There is much in the phraseology of this statement open 
 to unfavourable criticism. When Hamilton speaks of ab- 
 solute and in-itself existence it does not appear very clear 
 what he means. Existence is an abstract idea taken from 
 things or phenomena which exist. And, according to the 
 laws of representation, it is impossible to conceive existence 
 apart from particular existing things, just as it is impossible 
 to represent extension apart from something extended. 
 Moreover existence apart from existing things is not only 
 unrepresentable but also, as an actual fact, unbelievable. 
 Existence is only an idea abstracted from particular existing 
 objects, and which has no reality apart from these objects. 
 If this is what Hamilton means by absolute existence it 
 appears superfluous to tell us that it cannot be known. 
 
 But there is reason to believe that by absolute existence 
 Hamilton does not mean the abstract idea above described, 
 but that he means the inferred objective causes of pheno- 
 mena. In summing up his review of philosophers’ doc- 
 trines regarding the relativity of knowledge he says We 
 know mind and matter not in themselves, but in their 
 accidents or phenomena.” And here mind and matter, 
 the unknown bases of phenomena, are evidently synony- 
 mous with absolute existence. By absolute existence then 
 he means the objective cause or causes which co-operate 
 with our activity in giving rise to the phenomena of our 
 
S2 
 
 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 knowledge. But these objective inferred causes are not 
 known to us at all ; we infer we are compelled to infer 
 that some objective causes exist, but the nature of these 
 causes is only a matter of uncertain speculation. And it 
 is not correct to say even that these objective causes are 
 known modes, as Hamilton appears to say in his 
 second proposition. The modes of existence, Hamilton 
 appears to consider different from the 'phenomena of our 
 'knowledge, as well as from alsoluie existence. Now, we 
 know nothing but phenomena ; modes of existence which 
 are not phenomena we do not know. Perhaps, however, by 
 modes of existence, Hamilton means the particular objective 
 causes, such as vibration, heat, light, and so on, which along 
 with our activity, produce phenomena. But these causes are 
 only inferred and speculated about, they are not known. If 
 this be Hamilton’s meaning, then his doctrine that the modes 
 of existence may he greater than the number of our facul- 
 ties of apprehension appears to amount to this, — that if 
 we were endowed with other senses we might have other 
 sensations. There may be objective causes in existence 
 which would give rise to hitherto unknown phenomena if 
 we had only faculties of apprehension adapted to them. 
 This is a statement which cannot be denied. The third 
 point of Hamilton’s statement is, — that the modes thus 
 relative to our faculties are presented to and known by 
 the mind only under modifications determined by these fa- 
 culties themselves.” In examining this we shall take for 
 granted that by “ modes” Hamilton means the inferred ob- 
 jective causes of particular phenomena. And it appears 
 quite plain that these are not presented to and known by 
 the mind” at all ; they are inferred merely to account for 
 the phenomena which are known. Still it may he truly 
 said that these phenomena are the result partly of the ob- 
 jective modes” and partly of the subjective modifica- 
 tions” of which Hamilton speaks. The character of our 
 sensive organism undoubtedly determines the character of 
 the phenomena of which we are conscious. If we had not 
 
! 
 
 I 
 
 ) 
 
 • 1 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 83 
 
 j eyes and optic nerves of a particular construction we could 
 not be conscious of colours as we now are. If we bad not 
 \ a system of nerves radiating' outwards from tbe centre at 
 the extremities of which sensations are located we could 
 ; not have a knowledge of these sensations as at a particular 
 place or extended over a part of our bodies. The organic 
 A structure of our sense -apparatus is adapted to the objec- 
 Btive modes'’^ or forces so that when the latter come into 
 ■ contact with the former certain phenomena such as colours, 
 ^■sounds, smells, touches and so on arise in consciousness. 
 ^BBut it must be borne in mind that the sensive organism of 
 ^»ur bodies is itself objective with reference to consciousness. 
 ^■Vnd the relation between our organic system and the extra- 
 ^Wrganic forces of nature has for its result the presentation 
 of phenomena such as the above in consciousness. Hence 
 when Hamilton speaks of modifications determined by 
 these faculties themselves^^ we can scarcely interpret him 
 as referring to the part which the sensive organism plays 
 in the production of phenomena. Fie would be the last per- 
 son to predicate any modifying power of the organic senses ; 
 and he doubtless refers to something purely mental. 
 From other parts of his writings we know that he holds 
 that there are certain principles in the mind itself which 
 regulate and determine the character of our knowledge. 
 These principles are called a 'priori or regulating prin^ 
 ciples and, taken together, constitute what he calls the 
 Regulative Faculty. They are not derived from sensa- 
 tions or phenomena ; they are the subjective elements 
 introduced by the mind into phenomena. There can be 
 little doubt but that, by the modifications determined 
 by the faculties/^ Hamilton means the a priori elements 
 of knowledge contributed by the mind. But as he does 
 not here explain himself fully regarding this matter we 
 shall defer the discussion of it to a subsequent Note. 
 Meantime we may sum up in our own language HamiltoiFs 
 doctrine of relativity, and, in doing so, we prefer to invert 
 the order in which he has stated it. 
 
 12 
 
84 
 
 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 All that we can directly know is phenomenal ; to 
 suppose that we can know things as they exist anterior 
 to and independent of our knowledge is contradictory 
 and absurd. But the phenomena which we immediately 
 know are not purely objective; they comprehend also 
 subjective elements contributed by our own minds. These 
 subjective elements are inherent in our intellectual nature 
 as cognitive beings, and they unite themselves to the 
 objective elements furnished by the organism and th 
 extra-organic forces, this union constituting thephenoraer 
 of consciousness. These phenomena are what we hm 
 but we are constrained to infer from them certain object] 
 modes^^ which existed in the outside universe anterioi 
 the rise of the phenomena ; and there may be mod . 
 now in existence which are not adapted to our organism 
 and which therefore do not give rise to conscious pheno- 
 mena. From the various inferred modes of existence, and 
 from other possible modes which we have not been led to 
 infer, we can generalize existence itself, abstract or abso- 
 lute existence. But since the special modes of existence, 
 the particular kinds of objective agents or causes, cannot 
 be directly known, but are only inferred, it follows a for- 
 tiori that abstract existence must also be unknown. Hence 
 we may say generally,— all that we immediately know 
 consists of phenomena^ and that these phenomena are not 
 purely objective^ hut consist of certain elements contributed 
 from our cognitive nature and certain elements contributed 
 by our sensive organism in co-operation with the extra- 
 organic agents of nature. 
 
 III. The third point to which we shall turn our atten- 
 tion refers to the consistency or inconsistency of HamiltoiFs 
 doctrine of relativity with his doctrine of the immediate 
 knowledge of the non-ego. It is alleged by Mr. J. S. Mill 
 that the two doctrines are inconsistent, and there can be 
 no doubt but that Hamilton’s phraseology sometimes lays 
 him open to the charge. In his account of Natural Realism 
 he tells us over and over again that we are immediately con- 
 
THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 85 
 
 scious of the thing itself , the material reality, the material 
 non-ego. And Mr. Mill charges him with asserting in his 
 exposition of Natural Realism, an immediate knowledge of 
 that which, in his statement of the doctrine of relativity, he 
 had said we cannot know. In making this charge Mr. 
 Mill has of course to assume that the absolute existence, the 
 thing -in-itself of the doctrine of relativity, is identical with 
 the thing -in^itself, the material reality of the doctrine of 
 natural realism. If we were to judge simply from the 
 phraseology which Sir W. Hamilton employs we might ad- 
 mit the correctness of Mr. MilFs charge. But it is surely 
 inconceivable that Sir W. Hamilton should be so obtuse as 
 not to see and avoid such an obvious contradiction. And 
 a generous critic ought to seek to reconcile apparent in- 
 consistencies rather than to press upon them the character 
 of absolute contradictions. Moreover we think that the 
 apparently inconsistent statements of Sir W. Hamilton 
 may be accounted for by considering the different objects 
 which he had in view in the exposition of the two doctrines. 
 In his exposition of the doctrine of relativity he was oppos- 
 ing himself to these transcendental philosophers who held 
 that the Absolute, or the Thing-in-itself can be known ; in 
 his exposition of natural realism he was opposing the re- 
 presentationists who held that we do not immediately 
 know the objects of the material universe, but only through 
 a representation. Against the former he maintained that 
 we can know only phenomena; against the latter, that the 
 phenomena which we do know are not representatives of 
 other and more real objects, but that they have themselves 
 a real objective existence, that they constitute the real 
 world of our knowledge. Thus he uses the term thing-in^ 
 itself in two different senses; in the one case it is opposed, 
 as unknown, to the phenomenon which we know ; in the 
 other case, it is opposed, as a reality known to us, to the 
 representative idea, a hypothetical fiction which does not 
 exist ; in both cases it may be maintained that Hamilton's 
 object of knowledge is a phenomenon only, but composed 
 
 12 2 
 
86 
 
 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 of the subjective and objective elements which we before 
 pointed out. Hence we conclude that Hamilton's doctrine 
 of relativity is not really inconsistent with his doctrine of 
 our immediate knowledge of the material non-ego. 
 
 NOTE B. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S DOCTRINE OF CON. 
 
 SCIOUSNESS. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton’s doctrine of consciousness will be 
 almost exhaustively examined by studying what he teach- 
 es regarding (1) the character and elements of conscious- 
 ness, (2) the sphere of consciousness, and (3) the interpre- 
 tation of consciousness. 
 
 I.— THE CHARACTER AND ELEMENTS OF CON- 
 SCIOUSNESS. 
 
 According to Sir William Hamilton, and indeed every 
 other psychologist, consciousness is the most general phe- 
 nomena of the human mind, and all particular phenomena 
 are but its states or modifications. No mental phenome- 
 non can take place which is not, as it were, a link in the 
 general train of our conscious life, a particular form of 
 consciousness. Hence it is impossible to define conscious- 
 ness in the proper sense of the term, that is, to refer it to 
 a higher class of phenomena of which it is a species. Every 
 particular mental phenomenon involves consciousness ; and, 
 on the other hand, there can be no general consciousness 
 which is not some particular phenomenon. Consciousness 
 may be compared to an inner light which reveals to us all 
 that takes place in our minds, and is considered by Ha- 
 milton to be synonymous with immediate knowledge. 
 There are three elements into which Hamilton analyzes 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 87 
 
 consciousness^ viz. ; — A recognising or knowing subject ; 
 a recognised or known modification; and a recognition or 
 knowledge by the subject of the modification. Thus con- 
 sciousness, or immediate knowledge is, in reality, a rela- 
 tion between two things, — the knowing subject and the 
 known modification or phenomenon. This relation and the 
 terms of it are worthy of very close examination. 
 
 The first term of this relation is the knowing subject, 
 the self or ego ; the second term consists of the presenta- 
 tions and representations which are known. With refer- 
 ence to the first of these terms it is manifest that it can- 
 not be itself a phenomenon ; we could never say that one 
 sensation knows another, or that a thought is aware of a 
 volition, or that any single mental phenomenon cognises 
 any other. It would seem equally absurd to say that the 
 whole collection of phenomena which constitutes our 
 consciousness at any one time knows any particular phe- 
 nomenon of the series ; or that the whole of our past 
 and present conscious life consisting of all past and all 
 present phenomena cognises any phenomenon now in con- 
 sciousness. Every single phenomenon is knowi^ is an object 
 of knowledge ; and it is impossible to invest the whole ag- 
 gregate of phenomena with a power the elements of which 
 are not possessed by them separately. Still further 
 we cannot, by generalization, from all the past and pre- 
 sent aggregate of mental phenomena, obtain an element 
 whicb^^e^ji be considered identical with the first term of 
 the relation we are examining. Suppose that, from all past 
 and present mental phenomena, we abstract and genera- 
 lize Feeling itself, we^ may have here the highest mental 
 abstraction we can reach, but it is not the self. Thus we 
 set aside three doctrines which may be held regarding the 
 character of the first term of the relation of knowledofe, 
 the knowing subject : — ( 1 ) That the subject of conscious- 
 ness is some particular phenomenon of consciousness ; (2) 
 that it is the whole aggregate of mental phenomena past 
 as well as present j (3) that it is some element or charac- 
 
88 
 
 SIR \V. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE 
 
 teristic of the mental phenomena, abstracted from particu- 
 lars, such as Thought or Feeling. All of these proposi- 
 tions we reject because it is inherently absurd that a 
 single phenomenon or an aggregate of phenomena or an 
 abstraction from phenomena should exercise the function 
 of knowing which we are conscious of possessing. There is 
 an element in the relation of immediate knowledge which 
 makes it impossible to explain that relation as existing 
 between mental phenomena simply, or between any com- 
 binations of mental phenomena or any abstractions from 
 them. 
 
 A common man speaking of his mind or feelings 
 would say my mindj^ or my feelings^ He would 
 say I thought so-and-so,^^ or felt such a sensa- 
 tion/^ or I was conscious of this smell or that sound.^^ 
 In short every one thinks and speaks of himself as a 
 person not to be identified with his body, or the series 
 of phenomena which make up what he calls his mind. 
 This reference of all one^s feelings and thoughts to self 
 is called self-consciousness. The idea of self-hood in- 
 volves the, belief that who am conscious of feelings 
 at the present moment am the same identical being 
 who was conscious at a past time of those feelings 
 which F’ remember. This permanence of self in the 
 midst of successive and diverse sensations is the essential 
 element of personality. The idea of self is not of the sum 
 of the series of feelings which constitute our general con- 
 sciousness, because it is absurd to speak of the aggregate 
 of a series of feelings being conscious of any one of them- 
 selves. Nor is it that of Feeling in general abstracted 
 from particular feelings, because it is absurd to attribute 
 to this or any other abstraction the function of conscious 
 knowledge. In the relation of knowledge there is implied 
 a kind of opposition between self and the sensations of 
 which self is conscious. Sensations past, present and ex- 
 pected are all referred to self as their possessor and subject 
 Self is thought to be the unity in the midst of diverse 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 89 
 
 kinds of sensations, the permanent element in the midst of 
 transient and successive sensations, the one conscious subject 
 in the midst of many known objects. 
 
 In ‘‘selP therefore we have the subjective term of the 
 relation of knowledge, but this term of the relation is so 
 peculiar and remarkable that we must bestow some more 
 attention upon it. We have said that it is not a pheno- 
 menon, and it cannot, in any way, be phenomenized so as 
 to become known. The function of self is to know, and 
 although, in the very act of knowing, a phenomenon arises, 
 yet it is impossible for that which knoivs to set itself over 
 against itself as object and thus become known. Self is 
 the universal relative of all objects, — a something separat- 
 ing itself, as it were, from the phenomena of general con- 
 sciousness and converting them into objects, but incapable 
 itself of becoming an object. This peculiarity of self makes 
 it the most intractable and puzzling element of our con- 
 scious existence. Unknown, but all-knowing, it emerges, 
 as it were, from the midst of the endless variety of phe- 
 nomenal consciousness, asserting its freedom from phe- 
 nomenal law, and offering the great miracle of the life 
 with which we are endowed. It is absurd to attempt 
 a scientific definition or exposition of the unknown ; but 
 we have the power of studying its function conscious 
 activity, and through the study of this function alone 
 can we learn anything about the nature of that which 
 is conscious. 
 
 About the beginning of this Note it was said that 
 knowledge was the relation between the knowing subject 
 and the known modification. In the former Note we ex- 
 amined the a priori relations existing between the known 
 modifications and we have now turned our attention to 
 the first term of the relation. It remains to examine the 
 relation itself which Hamilton describes as the recognU 
 iion by the subject of the modification j’ and which is de- 
 scribed above as conscious activity directed towards ob- 
 jects. For the function of the subject is really the same 
 
SIR W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE 
 
 Dt) 
 
 as the relation between the subject and the objects of 
 knowledge. And it is manifest tha1»this relation must be 
 different from other relations with which we are acquaint- 
 ed, since the subjective term of it is different from any ob- 
 ject of our knowledge. Moreover the terms of the rela- 
 tion, under present conditions, are inseparable, because the 
 phenomena which we know are themselves comprehended 
 in and to a certain extent identical with the act of know- 
 ing. When we feel a smell, the act of feeling and the 
 smell itself appear to be, as it were, different sides of the 
 same phenomenon. When we attempt, therefore, an 
 examination of conscious activity as seen in cognition we 
 cannot very well separate that activity from its objects. 
 We describe the function of self in cognition as conscious 
 activity in order to distinguish it from the ohjectwe or 
 passive element in phenomena. Knowledge is not the 
 reception of images or impressions from without ; it is 
 essentially an activity of self in relation to things which 
 are not self. This activity is perhaps best described or 
 rather indicated by such terms as assertion, judgment, 
 or predication. We are conscious of a loud noise j in the 
 act of consciousness there is involved the asse rtion of the' 
 existence of the sound. We are conscious of two varying 
 sensations; assert that they differ from one another. 
 We are conscious of a particular smell, colour, figure, and 
 taste ; we assert — this is a rose. Now without this men- 
 tal assertion there is no knowledge ; the mere appearance 
 in consciousness of some phenomenon which does not call 
 forth a responsive activity is t^ot knowledge. We have 
 therefore in this assertion — this conscious activity indi- 
 cated by the term assertion — the essential element of that 
 relation existing between subject and object in cognition. ‘ 
 There is a particular feature of this relation of great 
 importance which we may indicate by the term objeciifica- 
 iion. It is essential to knowledge that the object should 
 be put over against the subject, — that the phenomenal 
 activity should be discriminated into subjective and ob- 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 n 
 
 jective elements. This creation of an opposition or anti- 
 thesis between subject and object, called objectification, is 
 perhaps a result of the conscious activity before described as 
 assertion, or is perhaps identical with it ; but it is at least 
 essential to every act of cognition. 
 
 Conscious activity is, as we saw before, further dis- 
 criminated into the assertion, in general, of the four great 
 relations between objects, — diflPerence, resemblance co- 
 existence and succession, and the various combinations of 
 these which make up our phenomenal knowledge. But 
 this we do not now need to discuss. We shall proceed to 
 the consideration of our second point — the sphere of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 II.— THE SPHERE OP CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 The doctrine which Hamilton maintains regarding the 
 sphere of consciousness is that consciousness is co-extensive 
 with all our knowledge — with all our faculties of knowing 
 as well as with the objects of those faculties. And he sup- 
 ports this proposition in detail by showing that in imagina- 
 tion, in memory, and in perception, the objects of these 
 mental acts are objects of consciousness also. But it is 
 manifest that consciousness is cognisant only of what is 
 now and here present to the mind ; and hence if conscious- 
 ness is to comprehend the objects of imagination, memory, 
 and perception, these objects must be shown to be now 
 and here present. This is what Hamilton does. He does 
 not extend the sphere of consciousness to the past or the 
 distant ; but he contracts the spheres of imagination, 
 memory and perception to that which is present in time 
 and space. The object of imagination, for instance, is not 
 the distant or the past or the future thing or event which 
 is thought about j it is the present mental representation 
 of that thing or event, and that is plainly the object of 
 consciousness. So the object of memory is not the past 
 event which occurred, but the present representation of it. 
 
 13 
 
02 
 
 SIR W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE 
 
 And, in perception, the thing which we see or hear is not 
 the distant object from which the light or sound proceeds, 
 but the organic impression of which we are conscious. 
 Thus Hamilton makes consciousness co-extensive with all 
 knowledge, by restricting the particular forms of know- 
 ledge so as to bring their objects into immediate relations 
 y/ith the conscious-subject. 
 
 Notwithstanding the importance which Hamilton attri- 
 butes to this doctrine and his laborious eflPorts to support 
 it, we cannot admit its accuracy. Memory, imagination, 
 and perception have certain universally recognised and 
 appropriate meanings, which the psychologist has no right 
 to alter. When the psychologist adopts a term in common 
 use into his system he ought to employ it in its common 
 and understood meaning. And certainly the common and 
 universally understood meaning of memory, imagination and 
 perception is not that which Hamilton gives to them. When 
 we speak of remembering an event, as, for example, the visit 
 of the Prince of Wales to Calcutta, the object of memory 
 is not a present idea or representation but the past occur- 
 rence. It is unavailing to say that the past event does 
 not now exist and therefore cannot be an object of memory. 
 The act of memory in reality reproduces the past event, by 
 projecting backwards into past time our present mental re- 
 presentation of it, and asserting a belief that it actually 
 occurred as we represent it. In this act the object of con- 
 sciousness .is only the mental representation ; the object of 
 memory is the mental representation projected backwards 
 in time and invested with that reality of objective exis- 
 tence which v»re assert when we say that we believe it actu- 
 ally occurred. Thus the object of consciousness is only 
 partially identical with the object of memory ; the latter 
 involves elements which are not contained in the former. 
 
 Similar remarks might be made with reference to imagi- 
 nation. 
 
 In perception it may be made equally manifest that 
 Hamilton's identification of the sphere of consciousness and 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 93 
 
 perception cannot be held. Accordin;^ to the universal 
 use of the term perception, we are said to perceive distant 
 objects ; and when we adopt this term into psychology 
 we have no right to change its meaning. We may quite 
 properly analyze the act or the process of perception into 
 its elements, but in doing so we must take care and nob 
 destroy it. According to Hamilton, perception, as far as 
 sight is concerned, is the consciousness of the impi'ession 
 of light upon the retina of the eye. And it is perfectly 
 certain that this is not the ordinary and proper meaning 
 of sight. The ordinary man sees distant objects. His 
 seeing of distant objects is a phenomenon which he cannot 
 explain ; the psychologist undertakes to explain the pheno- 
 menon; but in doing so he has no right to mutilate or 
 destroy it. This Hamilton does by bringing the object of 
 perception into immediate contact with the organism. 
 The object of consciousness is, no doubt, partially identical 
 with the object of perception ; but, as in memory, the latter 
 involves elements which are not contained in the former. 
 The analysis of the process and the object of perception 
 would be out of place here; and, having stated our objec- 
 tions to Hamilton's doctrine regarding the sphere of con- 
 sciousness, we shall now proceed to our third point, the in- 
 terpretation of consciousness. 
 
 III.— THE INTERPRETATION OF CONSCIOUS- 
 NESS. 
 
 According to Sir William Hamilton there are two methods 
 of interpreting consciousness, which he calls the inductive 
 and the critical methods respectively. By the former 
 method particular phenomena of consciousness are subject- 
 ed to study and classified according to their resemblances 
 or differences, and from them general laws of thought are 
 reached by induction. Many cases of caudal connection, 
 for example, are observed, and from them there is general- 
 ized the great principle that every event has a cause. Simi- 
 
 13 2 
 
94 
 
 SIR W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE 
 
 larly, many material objects are perceived to be extended, 
 and it is concluded by induction that all material things 
 are extended, or are perceived as occupying space. But 
 Sir William Hamilton objects to this method that it is in- 
 capable of explaining the element of necessity which is in- 
 volved in many mental products or laws. Induction alone 
 can only lead to a principle which is generally and probably 
 true ; but there are principles in the human mind which are 
 universally and necessarily true. For example all men not 
 only believe, but must believe that every event has a cause ; 
 all men not only perceive but must perceive phenomena 
 under the relations of time and space. Now this element 
 of necessity, it is alleged, does not and cannot arise from 
 an induction from experience. And hence Hamilton rejects 
 the inductive method as inadequate, and makes use of an- 
 other method which he calls the Critical, In studying 
 the phenomena of consciousness, he employs criticism^ that 
 is, he discriminates the phenomena of consciousness into 
 two classes : — those which are contingent, the results of 
 mere experience ; and those which are necessary, and 
 therefore not the results of experience but rather the a 
 priori conditions of experience. By this critical examina- 
 tion of the simple facts of consciousness he is able to ac- 
 count for the elements of necessity and universality in the 
 more complex products of conscious life ; and he is able 
 also to make use of the method of induction wherever it 
 may be applicable. 
 
 Mr. J. S. Mill, in his examination of Sir William 
 Hamilton's method, chooses to call it the Introspective 
 Method, instead of adopting the name which Hamilton 
 himself applies to it. Whatever may have been his motive 
 for changing the name, we do not think that the one 
 which he has chosen is so suitable as the proper one. All 
 methods of interpreting consciousness must employ intros- 
 pection, since introspection is the only possible means by 
 which we can become acquainted with the contents of our 
 minds. In fact introspection appears to be almost synony- 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS, 
 
 95 
 
 mous with consciousness itself. The term introspective 
 therefore does not distinguish Hamilton's method from 
 others, and we prefer to employ the term which Hamilton 
 himself used, and call his method the Critical. 
 
 The term Inductive by which Hamilton designates the 
 method which he rejects, is rejected by Mr. Mill also, al- 
 though the method itself is essentially that which he em- 
 ploys. He calls it by a new name, the Psychological 
 Method, and although this name is not without objections, 
 yet we shall employ it, since it is that by which Mill de- 
 signates his own method. We have then, to be examined, 
 two important methods of studying the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness, viz. the Critical and the Psychological. We 
 have seen that the first of these discriminates between two 
 classes of conscious phenomena, the contingent and the 
 necessary. These facts which are necessary and simple 
 and universal are held to be the primary and original 
 elements of our conscious existence and to be the « priori 
 conditions of all experience. All contingent phenomena 
 of experience are based upon them and have them as es- 
 sential constituent elements. 
 
 The objection urged by Mr. Mill against this method is 
 that necessity and universality do not of themselves render 
 it certain that a mental fact is original; complex and 
 derived facts or phenomena may also be characterized by 
 necessity. Hence, according to him, before we accept 
 any fact or phenomenon as an original and simple datum 
 of consciousness we must examine into the character and 
 source of its necessity. There is a necessity which re- 
 sults from experience, and which consists simply of an in- 
 separable association ; and in fact all necessity may result 
 from the application of the laws of association to pheno- 
 mena. Mr. Mill holds in particular that extension and 
 space are the results of experience and association. And 
 the proposed object of all those who make use of the psy- 
 chological method is to show that all mental products are 
 the results of experience and association. 
 
96 
 
 SIR W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE 
 
 Now there can be no doubt but the laws of association 
 play a most important part in the formation of the complex 
 contents of our consciousness. Phenomena do not appear 
 in consciousness in an accidental or random order, but there 
 is a mutual connection between them of such a nature that 
 they serve to bring* one another before consciousness. When 
 two mental phenomena have been experienced at or about 
 the same time^ a bond of connection is formed between 
 them, so that afterwards if one of them is repeated the other 
 is likely to be represented. This link of association 
 between mental phenomena appears to be altogether inde- 
 pendent of volition ; the associated idea of any particular 
 phenomenon appears in consciousness without any effort 
 of ours, or even in spite of efforts to avoid thinking about 
 it. Illustrations of this association of mental phenomena 
 will readily occur to any one. W^e have once visited a 
 house, and at the time of our visit something of particular 
 interest to us has occurred. If we ever again visit the 
 house or even have our thoughts directed to it, the idea of 
 the interesting fact obtrudes itself upon our attention. 
 The various laws by which phenomena are associated to- 
 gether have been sufficiently investigated and are well- 
 known. We need not therefore refer to them, but shall 
 proceed to point out a distinction of importance with re- 
 ference to our present study. 
 
 We have to distinguish between what is properly a mental 
 association and an objective connection. When two or more 
 phenomena have been once or frequently presented together 
 in consciousness, they become connected in representation. 
 But there are two different cases to be considered. Two 
 different phenomena may be, upon one or more occa- 
 sions, connected together in presentation, but may 
 afterwards become objects of consciousness separately. 
 This we may call the case of the association of separable 
 phenomena. On the other hand two or more phenomena 
 may be so connected together ^ that the one is never pre- 
 sented except in connection with the other, and the as- 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS, 
 
 97 
 
 pociation in this case is an association of inseparahJe 
 phenomena. And we must be careful to discriminate 
 between the distinction which we have here drawn be- 
 tween separable and inseparable phenomena and another 
 distinction which is considered of great importance by 
 psychologists, — the distinction, viz. between separable and 
 inseparable associations. There may be an inseparable 
 association of separable phenomena ; but as a matter of 
 course, when the phenomena are inseparable in presenta- 
 tion, the association of the representations is inseparable 
 also. There are many familiar instances of an inseparable 
 association of separable phenomena; a book, a watch, a 
 trinket of any kind, which has been presented to us by a 
 dear friend becomes, in our mind, inseparably associated 
 with the idea of that friend. But quite different from this 
 is the inseparable association of phenomena which are in- 
 separable. Let us study a case. 
 
 In our experience we have never been conscious of colour 
 except in connection with extension. No matter how far 
 back in our lives we attempt to reach by the aid of memory 
 we are incapable of discovering the slightest trace of the 
 possibility of a separation between the two phenomena. 
 We do not remember ever to have seen a colour which 
 was not extended or an extended figure which was not, in 
 some way coloured. Nor is there any indication in history 
 or in language of the existence of any race of human 
 beings in whose minds there was ever conceived the possi- 
 bility of such a separation. And since the presentation 
 of colour is always combined in our experience with that 
 of extension it follows as a matter of course that the re- 
 presentations also are always combined. 
 
 This distinction between an inseparable subjective as- 
 sociation and an association of objectively inseparable phe- 
 nomena is one of great importance. When phenomena 
 which are only occasionally presented together have an 
 affinity for one another sp as to cling together in repre- 
 sentation, the association is truly and only mental. The 
 
98 
 
 SIB W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINL 
 
 possibility of tbeir being separated in presentation shows 
 that their synthesis in association is only a mental one_, or 
 at least that the objective union is only accidental. But, 
 on the other hand, when phenomena are always united in 
 presentation and can never by any means be separated, 
 their synthesis is not only or even chiefly mental. The ob- 
 jective inseparable connection is that upon which the sub- 
 jective association depends. It constitutes a different kind 
 of connection from that which is simply subjective. There 
 is such a decided difference both in degree and in kind be- 
 tween the mental synthesis which we form between two 
 phenomena which have accidentally been brought into 
 contiguity, and that synthesis which exists between two 
 such inseparable phenomena as extension and colour, that 
 no person who has not a particular theory to support, 
 would ever place them in the same category. The in- 
 separability of phenomena in presentation leads no doubt 
 to their inseparability in representation ; but it also leads 
 to something else, and that is, to the conclusion that the 
 synthesis which binds them together is not a subjective one 
 at all. 
 
 Another phase of the same distinction is found in the 
 distinction between associations which are peculiar to in- 
 dividuals and those which are common to all mankind. 
 All mental associations depend upon the experience of the 
 individual in whose mind they have been formed. Peculiar 
 experiences will therefore produce peculiar associations. 
 Experiences common to all will result in associations com- 
 mon to all. In different zones of the earth^s surface and 
 in difiPerent countries there are many differences of climate, 
 landscape, means of living, habits and customs which give 
 rise to very varied mental associations. The character of 
 the seasons in India, in Britain, and in Canada presents 
 strikinsT differences, and, in the minds of the inhabitants 
 of these countries respectively, there are consequently very 
 different ideas connected with each of them. The word 
 “ water/^ for example, in the torrid zone, is always asso- 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 99 
 
 dated with fluidity as one of the characteristic qualities 
 constituting the denoted object. But in the temperate and 
 frigid zones, where water frequently assumes a solid form, 
 fluidity is not uniformly associated with the word. Many 
 other examples of variable associations might be given. 
 On the other hand, with the word air^^ there are always, 
 associated the peculiar sensations or ideas connected with 
 respiration. The air which we breathe^'' is a phrase 
 which may be universally employed to express the ex- 
 perience of mankind, the reason of course being that, in 
 our present state of existence and with our present physi- 
 cal constitution, the breathing of air is an essential con- 
 dition of life. This association of the word air^^ with 
 the idea of breathing is just as inseparable as any asso- 
 ciation which we could name. It is moreover an asso- 
 ciation formed in the minds of all men without excep- 
 tion ; but there are important difierences which we shall 
 note between this and other inseparable associations. 
 
 We have just considered two associations, one of them 
 variable and the other invariable and universal, but both 
 being associations connected with particular objects of 
 our knowledge. The qualities or ideas associated are 
 relative to or representative of particular complex sensa- 
 tions depending upon our present physical constitution. But 
 if we consider the connection between extension and colour 
 we shall be able to note an important difference. The quali- 
 ties to which we referred as associated with air and water 
 were simply a combination of complex sensations objectified ; 
 but here we have a sensation “ colour’^ associated with some- 
 thing which is not a sensation. Extension is neither a 
 sensation nor any combination of sensations, but a certain 
 relation which is seen to exist between objectified sensa- 
 tions, or a form which is perceived in connection with a 
 single sensation. And although the mental association 
 between air and hreatJiing may be just as inseparable and 
 universal to the human mind as that between colour and 
 extension^ yet we would never place the objective con- 
 
 U 
 
100 
 
 SIR W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE 
 
 nection between the first pair in the same category as that 
 between the second pair. The connection between air and 
 breathing is determined to our minds hy the peculiar cir- 
 cumstances in which we are placed as physical heings^ and 
 we can easily imagine other circumstances in which this 
 gonnection would not exist. But the relation between 
 extension and colour, although neither more objective nor 
 more necessary than the former is determined hj the consti- 
 tution of our minds with reference to external objects^ or 
 the constitution of external objects loith reference to our 
 minds. Hence, since we are unacquainted with any other 
 forms or laws of knowledge except our own, it is impossible 
 for us to conceive that any intelligence could be cognisant 
 of colour without extension ; or to state the same thing 
 more abstractly, it is impossible for us to conceive that 
 any intelligence could be cognisant of phenomena except 
 in the relation of difference and co-existence. Thus the 
 connection between extension and colour is characterized 
 by an absolute Universality with reference to all intelligence 
 as far as intelligence can be understood by us ; while that 
 between air and breathing has only a contingent universa- 
 lity with reference to beings who may possess bodies con- 
 stituted as ours are. 
 
 We have endeavoured to show that the connection be- 
 tween extension and colour is not a case of mental asso- 
 ciation and cannot be resolved into association. Objectively 
 the two things are absolutely inseparable ; and subjectively 
 the relation of extension depends upon the primary relation 
 of co-existence which we have seen is an a priori condition 
 of our constitution as capable of knowing. But if this 
 doctrine be correct we have here an original fact of our 
 consciousness which the psychological method of Mr. Mill 
 fails to interpret. And until this method explains satis- 
 factorily the inseparability of colour and extension both 
 objectively and subjectively we cannot admit that it is 
 adequate to the interpretation of all the facts of our con- 
 ciousness. This case of inseparability is only one of those 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 101 
 
 wbicli miglit be adduced as being insoluble by tbe psycbo- 
 logical metbod. We have cbosen to examine it thus fully 
 because it is perhaps tbe most important. And as, until 
 tbe above doctrines are overthrown, tbe psychological 
 metbod must be considered unsatisfactory, we shall now 
 proceed to tbe consideration of other methods. 
 
 Tbe critical metbod of Sir W. Hamilton, which however 
 is to be assigned to Kant as its author, has already been 
 referred to, but before examining it further we desire to 
 point out and describe another metbod, which has arisen 
 out of tbe psychological, and which may be considered a 
 kind of compromise between the psychological and the 
 critical. We allude to that which has been called the 
 Fsychogeneiical Method. 
 
 Those who adopt this method admit that there are men- 
 tal facts and products which cannot be explained by the 
 principles of association. Neither the form nor the matter 
 of our knowledge is the result of our individual experience 
 merel}^ We are born with a certain constitution, mental 
 and physical, and the nature and extent of our subsequent 
 acquirements in knowledge and practical ability depend 
 upon our inherited constitution. In other words it is ad- 
 mitted that individuals possess certain « jorim principles 
 and tendencies by which the phenomena of their conscious- 
 ness are determined and governed. This admission, made 
 by such psychologists as Herbert Spencer and G. H, 
 Lewes, is a tacit acknowledgment of the essential truthful- 
 ness of the position held by those who have adopted the 
 critical method. But, while admitting this, the Psycho- 
 genetical method attempts to trace the origin of the a 
 priori conditions and principles of our nature to a very 
 remote source. The accumulated experience of the past 
 ages of human history, as well as of the past ages, count- 
 less in length and impenetrable to human knowledge, of 
 brute history, is called upon for an explanation of the ori- 
 gin of that physical, intellectual, and social nature with 
 which we are born into the world. It is assumed that lower 
 
 14 2 
 
102 
 
 SIR W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE 
 
 living forms develop themselves into higher, tliat the ex- 
 perience of individuals and races gradually produces organic 
 changes which are transmitted to successors, and that thus, 
 by the natural transmission of organic structures produced 
 or modified by incessant experience all the higher forms of 
 life and mind have been produced. An adequate examina- 
 tion of this ambitious method would carry us far be 3 mnd 
 our allotted space and our object; but we oflTer the follow- 
 ing observations with reference to it. 
 
 1. The problem attempted by this method is practically 
 an - impossible one. We are not able to trace the series of 
 changes asserted to have taken place. It cannot be esta- 
 blished that experience gives rise to the structural changes 
 in the organism said to be the result of it. The pheno- 
 mena requiring to be studied in a satisfactory employment 
 of the method are too remote from possible observation to 
 be used as the foundation of a science. Even if we at- 
 tempt to study the organic changes produced by experi- 
 ence in human beings now living we cannot succeed ; and 
 any dogmatic assertions made regarding them must be 
 rash and vain. Much more must this be the case with re- 
 ference to races of men and animals which existed in a 
 remote past antiquity. Consequently the researches car- 
 ried on in accordance with this method are nothing better 
 than ambitious and perfectly uncertain speculations. 
 
 2. Against the fundamental assumptions of this method 
 it may be alleged that mental phenomena do not, in some 
 cases at least, correspond to organic structure. It is now 
 universally admitted that the brain and nervous system of 
 the anthropoid ape is exceedingly similar to that of man, 
 whereas the mental functions of the latter are almost infi- 
 nitely in advance of those of the former. This fact is quite 
 inconsistent with the fundamental assumption of the psy- 
 chogenetical method. 
 
 3. If experience in past ages has given rise to necessary 
 truths and a priori conditions of thought and knowledge, we 
 might reasonably expect that these a priori principles should 
 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 103 
 
 continue to be produced in our own age. While it may- 
 be admitted that some particular tendencies and abilities 
 may be acquired and transmitted, it has not been shown 
 that the essential and universal laws of human intelligence 
 have suffered the slightest change since man came into 
 being. 
 
 From these considerations we should be inclined to re- 
 ject the psychogenetical method as impracticable, possibly 
 false, and quite incompatible with that desire to attain 
 certain conclusions which ought to characterize men of 
 science. And we are now driven back to the critical me- 
 thod of Kant and Hamilton which we adopt as correct and 
 adequate, with the following reservations : 
 
 1. The adoption of this method does not commit us to 
 all the results of criticism which those who have hitherto 
 employed the method have reached. It may be that mis- 
 takes have been made in discriminating between facts of 
 consciousness as original and acquired, simple and com- 
 plex, that some phenomena have been regarded as origi- 
 nal and simple which are really derived and complex. But 
 this admission does not detract from the value of the me- 
 thod. 
 
 2. The adoption of the critical method does not pre- 
 vent us from making use of the principles of association 
 as far as they are applicable. It is not an essential princi- 
 ple of this method that anything which is now found to 
 be necessary must be an original necessity of intelligence. 
 And if any necessity of thought or knowledge can be ex- 
 plained by the laws of association or any other principles 
 of experience it ought unquestionably so to be explained. 
 But the critical method insists upon distinguishing be- 
 tween such explicable necessities of thought, and an inex- 
 plicable residue of necessities which, from their nature, 
 must be taken as a priori and founded in the constitution 
 of our intelligence. 
 
 3. The critical method, while it looks principally to 
 the phenomena of consciousness as the materials with 
 
104 SIR W. HAMILTON’S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 which it has to deal, is not inconsistent with a careful 
 study of the organism and cosmic forces and laws in so far 
 as these way throw light upon the problems to be solved. 
 
 NOTE C. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON’S CLASSIFICATION 
 OF MENTAL FACULTIES. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton divides the operations of the mind 
 into six classes which he calls Faculties. These are — the 
 Presentative, the Retentive, the Reproductive, the Re- 
 presentative, the Elaborative, and the Regulative. We 
 might criticise unfavourably the use of the term faculty to 
 express a class of mental operations, were it not that 
 Hamilton himself guards against an improper use of it. 
 Faculty, with him is not a part or organ of the mind, but 
 simply a class of similar mental activities. But the parti- 
 cular classification of operations which he adopts is open 
 to serious objections. We must bear in mind that one of 
 Hamilton's most important doctrines is that all particular 
 mental operations are but particular modes of conscious- 
 ness, and that consciousness comprehends or is co-exten- 
 sive with all its own particular modes or activities. Now 
 the second and third of Hamilton's Faculties are admit- 
 tedly exercised out of consciousness. The so-called Reten- 
 tive Faculty or memory is the retention, somewhere or in 
 some way not very well understood but certainly out of or 
 beneath consciousness, of knowledge once presented so that 
 it may afterwards be represented. This retention may be 
 explained as resulting from a certain constitution of the 
 mind, as Hamilton explains it ; or it may be explained as 
 resulting from a certain constitution of the nervous sys- 
 tern as certain physiologists explain it. But however it 
 may be explained, it certainly is not mental activity ; it is 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL FACULTIES. 
 
 105 
 
 not exercised in consciousness ; it is not a mode of con- 
 scious life ; and therefore it should not be called a mental 
 faculty, if by faculty we mean a conscious mental opera- 
 tion, as Hamilton does. As for the Reproductive Faculty, 
 it also is exercised beneath consciousness. The act of re- 
 production has been finished as soon as the phenomenon 
 appears in consciousness, and therefore it cannot be called 
 a conscious mental activity. Still further the so-called 
 Reproductive Faculty is simply a name given to the laws 
 of association which express the order in which phenomena 
 usually appear in consciousness. The laws which deter- 
 mine the order in which one mental phenomenon follows 
 another are certainly of importance but they are not pro- 
 perly called a faculty, they are not a conscious mental 
 activity. 
 
 The sixth of Hamilton's Faculties — the Regulative— he 
 himself admits to be improperly called a Faculty. It is 
 simply a name given to the sum of a priori principles 
 which govern our mental operations. We are so consti- 
 tuted that we must know and think in certain ways and 
 according to certain principles. And it is of great impor- 
 tance for us to be able to analyze this original constitution 
 of our nature so as to ascertain the general laws which 
 must govern our conscious mental life. But these laws 
 are certainly not classes of mental activities or phenomena, 
 are not properly in consciousness, and should not therefore 
 be collected into a class called by the name of Faculty. 
 The result of our criticism is that we reject three of Hamil- 
 ton’s list of Faculties. 
 
 The remaining three, — the Presentative, Representative, 
 and Elaborative must be retained. Knowledge is present- 
 ed, represented, and elaborated, all these acts taking place 
 in consciousness. 
 
 The preceding criticism of Hamilton’s classification is 
 founded upon the principle which Hamilton maintains, that 
 consciousness is co-extensive with all mental activities, 
 the latter being but particular modes of consciousness. It 
 
lOG 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL FACULTIES. 
 
 is however open to the psychologist to maintain that there 
 is a kind of mental activity going on beneath the sphere 
 of consciousness ; but if we admit this we must give up 
 the doctrine of the co-extensiveness of consciousness and 
 mental activity. There are certain obscure problems con- 
 nected with what goes on beneath the sphere of conscious- 
 ness which should not be hastily solved. Knowledge is 
 somehow retained so that it may be subsequently repre- 
 sented in consciousness, but whether the conditions of its 
 retention are mental or cerebral it is not very easy to de- 
 termine. Thought are sometimes suggested to the mind 
 in such very extraordinary ways that we find it difficult 
 to explain their origin. Sometimes a strange sympathy 
 is excited between one mind and another so that the one 
 can control the other without any apparent physical com- 
 munication. There are many obscure phenomena which 
 appear to indicate that there is a sphere of spiritual acti- 
 vity and life unilluminated by the light of consciousness 
 and beyond the region of direct study. While therefore, 
 if we admit Hamilton‘’s own great principle of conscious- 
 ness, we must reject his classification of mental faculties, 
 it is perhaps better to leave the character of sub-conscious 
 life and activity undetermined until more of the obscurities 
 connected with it are cleared up. 
 
 NOTE D. 
 
 REID’S DOCTRINE OE PERCEPTION. 
 
 It is an unfortunate thing that Sir W. Hamilton, in his 
 Lectures, has made it a matter of so great importance to 
 show that Reid held the doctrine of Natural Realism. 
 The truth or falsehood of Natural Realism does not, in the 
 slightest degree, depend upon the doctrine of perception 
 held by Reid ; and although the character of Reid^s philo- 
 
REID’S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION. 107 
 
 sopby niay Lave been of importance to those who listened 
 to his lectures it does not seem now to be of the slightest 
 consec[uence whether he was a Natural Realist or not. 
 It seems therefore extraordiuaiy that Hamilton should 
 have devoted three lectures to the examination of Reid's 
 historical review of theories of perception and of his own 
 theory. And it is quite bewildering to follow Hamilton 
 in his examination of the errors of the philosophers whom 
 Reid criticises, Reid's errors in criticising them and 
 Rrown's errors in criticising Reid's criticism. Without 
 attempting to follow Hamilton through this bewildering 
 maze, we shall turn our attention to the principal point 
 which he endeavours to maintain, — that Reid was a 
 Natural Realist. In his twenty- third lecture, Hamilton 
 sums up his examination of Reid's doctrine 'by pointing 
 out four suppositions upon which Reid must be held to bie 
 a Natural Realist. These are : — (1) If he maintain that 
 his immediate perception of external things is convertible 
 with their reality; (2) if he assert that^ in his doctrine of 
 perception, the external reality stands to the percipient 
 mind face to face, in the same immediacy of relation which 
 the idea holds in the representative theory of the philor 
 sophers ; (3) if he declare the identity of his own opinion 
 with the vulgar belief, as thus expounded by himself and 
 the philosophers ; or (4) if he declare that his perception 
 affords us equal evidence of the existence of external phe- 
 nomena, as his consciousness affords us of the existence of 
 internal. And Hamilton adduces quotations, which we 
 shall examine, to show that all these suppositions are ful- 
 filled in Reid's doctrine. In support of the first and second 
 he adduces the following; — "We have before examined 
 the reasons given by philosophers to prove that ideas, 
 and not external objects, are the immediate objects of 
 perception. We shall only here observe, that if exter- 
 nal objects be perceived immediately we have the same 
 reason to believe their existence as philosophers have 
 to believe the existence of ideas, while they hold them 
 
 15 
 
108 
 
 REID’S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 to be the immediate objects of perception/^ (Works, 
 p. 446), 
 
 From this quotation, according* to Hamilton, we are to 
 conclude that Reid holds that to be perceived means the 
 same as to exist, and that, in perception, the external rea- 
 lity stands face to face to the percipient mind in the same 
 immediacy of relation as the ideas of the philosophers 
 stand to consciousness, 
 
 . A fair reading of the quotation should lead us, we think, 
 to this conclusion that the immediate perception of ex- 
 ternal objects is as sure a guarantee of their existence as 
 the consciousness of ideas is of their existence. It is one 
 thing to say that perception is a guarantee of existence or 
 reality ; it is another thing to say that perception is con~ 
 nertible with existence or reality. The latter was said by 
 Berkeley, but Reid did not understand the doctrine and 
 never expressed it. All that Reid meant to say was that 
 we should place as implicit confidence in our perception 
 of external objects as philosophers do in their conscious- 
 ness of ideas. And none but madmen or fools have ever 
 doubted this. But in saying this he asserts nothing 
 whatever regarding the character of perception. He 
 tells us, however, that external objects are the immediate 
 objects of perception, and here we appear to have 
 something said regarding the nature of perception. 
 But the question arises, — what does Reid mean by 
 immediate? There are two meanings of this term 
 which it is of importance for us to discriminate. The first 
 of these may be called the psychological meaning, and in 
 this sense the term is used by Hamilton. In this sense 
 immediate knowledge means knowledge in which the object 
 is present to consciousness itself and not through the medium 
 of any representation. The second of these may be called 
 the logical meaning, and in this sense immediate know- 
 ledge means knowledge which is obtained directly without 
 the intervention of a process of proof or inference. Now 
 when Read says that the objects of the external world are 
 
REID’S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 109 
 
 tbe immediate objects of perception, we cannot decide 
 whether he is a Natural Realist, until we have determined 
 whether be uses the term in its psychological or in its logi- 
 cal significance. He might use the term in its latter sense 
 without having the most remote idea of the meaning of 
 that immediate knowledge which is asserted in Natural 
 Realism. A few quotations from his writings will show 
 in what sense be uses it. 
 
 In the meantime, I beg leave to think with the 
 vulgar, that when I remember the smell of the tuberose, 
 that very sensation which I had yesterday and which has 
 now no more any existence, is the immediate object of my 
 memory.” (Works, p. 106.) It is simply impossible that 
 immediate can be used here in the 'psychological sense, since 
 the so-called immediate object now no longer exists. And 
 immediately below this passage he explains himself in such 
 a way that we must conclude that he had the logical 
 meaning of the word in his mind. If you ask me,” he 
 says, “ why I believe that the smell exists, I can give no 
 other reason, nor shall ever be able to give any other than 
 that I smell it. If you ask me why I believe that it existed 
 yesterday, I can give no other reason but that I remember 
 it.” Manifestly immediate^ of the first quotation, is 
 identical in meaning with I can give no other reason^ of the 
 second. That is, it is used in its logical sense. Again, 
 in his essays upon the Intellectual Powers, Reid says — 
 If, therefore, we attend to that act of our mind which 
 we call the perception of an external object of sense, we 
 shall find in it these three things : — First, some con- 
 ception or notion of the object perceived ; Secondly, a 
 strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its 
 present existence ; and, Thirdly, that this conviction 
 and belief are immediate and not the effect of reasoning P 
 (Works, p. 258). Here Reid himself indicates as clearly as 
 possible that the term imm.ediate is used in its logical sense. 
 And in explaining the third of the above points he en- 
 larges upon the fact that no process of reasoning is in» 
 
 15 2 
 
no 
 
 REID’S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 volved in perception. But throughout his flfitlngs we 
 have ‘ nowhere been able to discover the idea of psychologi- 
 cal immediacy which is involved in the doctrine of Natural 
 Kealism. 
 
 Hamilton’s third point is that Reid declares the identi- 
 ty of his own opinion with the vulgar belief. What can 
 be established by this it is difficult to see. Berkeley de- 
 clared the identity of his opinion with the vulgar belief; 
 and yet Reid is very far way from the position of Berke- 
 ley. Reid declared the identity of his opinion with the 
 vulgar belief, and yet he maintained, contrary to vulgar 
 belief, that the appearance or idea of colour is in the eye 
 (Works, p. 137) and that the colour of an external object 
 
 something unseen and unknown (W'orks, p. 138). Hamil- 
 ton declared the identity of his opinion with the vulgar 
 belief, and yet he held that the immediate object of per- 
 ception is in all cases in immediate contact with the or- 
 ganism, a proposition which the vulgar can neither un- 
 derstand nor believe. An appeal to uncritical unenlight- 
 ened vulgar belief is surely unworthy of a philosopher. 
 
 In the fourth place, Hamilton tells us that if Reid de- 
 clare that his Perception affords us equal evidence of the 
 existence of external phenomena, as his consciousness 
 affords us of the existence of internal” he must be a na- 
 tural realist. But surely it is possible to hold that we 
 can place implicit confidence in the truth of perception 
 without holding that the object of perception is imme- 
 diately present to the mind. The essential point of natural 
 realism is that the non- ego is immediately present to and 
 Jcnoivn by the ego ; but this point is not involved in 
 the assertion that perception gives us certain evidence 
 of the existence of its object. The longest train of ma- 
 thematical reasoning gives us certain evidence of the 
 truth of its conclusion, but this fact vouches nothing as 
 to the character of the reasoning process. Neither does the 
 certainty of perception vouch anything as to the character 
 
 perception. The fact is that Reid knew no more about 
 
REID'S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Ill 
 
 tRe doctrine of natural realism than Berkeley knew about 
 Kaiit^s doctrine of the subjectivity of space. Although 
 Berkeley came very close to the doctrine of natural realism, 
 Beid did not even understand him, and it appears to be a 
 foolish anachronism to attribute to Read a doctrine which 
 bad then scarcely dawned upon the minds of psychologists. 
 
 Reid^s doctrine of perception was a slight advance upon 
 that of preceding representationists. He held that sensa- 
 iionsy hy a natural and irresistible principle of our consti- 
 tution, suggest to our minds the conception and create the 
 belief of external objects, and that this suggestion is imme- 
 diate and not the effect of reasoning. How this can possi- 
 bly be interpreted as a form of natural realism, and why 
 the attempt should be made thus to interpret it, transcend 
 the present writer’s power of imagination to conceive. 
 
 NOTE E. 
 
 NATURAL REALISiM. 
 
 This is the name which Sir W. Hamilton gives to the 
 doctrine which may be considered the most important that 
 has been enunciated by him. We shall first quote, from 
 bis sixteenth lecture, Hamilton’s statement of the doctrine. 
 
 We may therefore lay it down as an undisputed truth, 
 that consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive 
 duality ; — a knowledge of the ego in relation and contrast 
 to the non-ego ; and a knowledge of the non-ego in rela- 
 •tion and contrast to the ego. The ego and non-ego are, 
 thus, given in an original synthesis, as conjoined in the 
 unity of knowledge, and, in an original antithesis, as op- 
 posed in the contrariety of existence. In other words, we 
 are conscious of them in an indivisible act of knowledge 
 together and at once,- — but we are conscious of them as, 
 in themselves, different and exclusive of each other. Again, 
 
112 
 
 NATURAL REALIS.VI. 
 
 consciousness not only gives us a duality, but it gives its 
 elements in equal counterpoise and independence. The 
 ego and non-ego, — mind and matter — are not only given 
 together, but in absolute co-equality. The one does not 
 precede, the other does not follow ; and, in their mutual 
 relations, each is equally dependent, equally independent. 
 Such is the fact as given in and by consciousness.’^ The 
 grand psychological doctrine here enunciated is probably 
 the most valuable contribution which Sir W. Hamilton 
 has given to the philosophy of his country and the world. 
 And this doctrine has already been incorporated into the 
 systems of eminent psychologists who are not always ready 
 to acknowledge whence it comes. Before proceeding to 
 the examination of Natural Realism we propose first to 
 criticise what appears to be an inaccuracy in the above ex- 
 pression of it. 
 
 Hamilton says that consciousness gives a knowledge 
 of the ego in relation and contrast to the non-ego ; and a 
 knowledge of the non-ego in relation and contrast to the 
 ego.’^ In Note B above, when examining the character 
 and elements of consciousness’^ we pointed out that the 
 ego is not a phenomenon, and cannot in any way be 
 phenomenized so as to become known. The function of 
 self is to know, and although in the very act of knowing, 
 a phenomenon arises, yet it is impossible for that which 
 knows to set itself over against itself as object and thus 
 become known."’^ From this point of view the reader will 
 at once see that the expression ^‘a knowledge of the ego'' 
 cannot be considered correct. The ego is the subject of 
 consciousness, — that which is conscious — but cannot be 
 known. The objects of consciousness are known. There 
 is a relation between the ego and the non* ego; from the 
 subjective side the relation is one of knowing ; from the 
 objective side, it is one of being known. Hence it would 
 be more correct to say that an examination of conscious- 
 ness gives as an ultimate fact a relation between the ego 
 as the permanent and universally-present conscious-subject, 
 
NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 113 
 
 on the one hand, and a multiplicity of different and tran- 
 sient objects constituting the non-ego on the other. The 
 subjective term of this relation is itself unknown, but our 
 knowledge of its character and reality is the result of the 
 analysis of consciousness which leads necessarily to a belief 
 in the existence of something which is conscious. The 
 objective term — the non- ego — is known, not as an activity 
 or modification of the ego, but as a real object appearing 
 in consciousness independent of subjective determination 
 and having an existence and laws quite uncontrolled by the 
 conscious-subject. 
 
 Thus we appear to have, as the most essential principle 
 of natural realism, the fact that the ego is immediately cou'^ 
 scions of the non-ego^ or that consciousness is the relation 
 between the ego and the non-ego^ or the illuminating tight 
 which mahes hiotvn the non- ego to the ego. A fact of such 
 great psj^ch'blogieal importance as this is perhaps not to be 
 fully expressed by any single mode of statement, but we 
 hope that the above explanation will make clear its mean- 
 ing. 
 
 The doctrine which is directly opposite to this principle 
 of natural realism is that in consciousness there is no 
 knowledge of the non-ego, but only of the states or acti- 
 vities of the ego. This doctrine is usually known as ideal- 
 ism, and of it there are many forms. The one grand 
 objection to conjidering the objects of consciousness mere 
 states or activities of the ego is that they are manifestly 
 not so 'they appear in consciousness independent of and 
 frequently in spite of voluntary subjective effort ; the order 
 in which they appear is, as a rule, entirely independent of 
 subjective control ^ they are collected into groups consti- 
 tuting complex objects quite independent of any subjective 
 synthesis. Hence to speak of these objects as states or 
 activities of the ego is entirely to ignore their manifest 
 character. Perhaps the prevalent errors regarding them 
 have arisen from their being called ideas of the mind ; if so, 
 the sooner the terms ideas and mind^ in such a loose in- 
 
114 
 
 NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 accurate application, are banished from psychology, the 
 better. 
 
 We return then to Hamilton's fundamental and, we 
 think, unassailable, position, that in consciousness the ego 
 stands in the relation of immediate knowledge to a great 
 variety of objects constituting the non-ego. And we must 
 now enquire regarding the character and conditions of this 
 non-ego. In answering the third objection to natural 
 realism in lecture twenty-fifth, Hamilton explains what is 
 the total and real object of perception or rather, as it 
 should be, of consciousness. Perceiving the material rea- 
 lity, he tells us, does not mean that we perceive the 
 material reality absolutely and in itself, that is, out of 
 relation to our organs and faculties ; on the contrary the 
 total and real object of perception is the external object 
 under relation to our sense and faculty of cognition. 
 
 We perceive, through no sense, aught external but 
 what is in immediate relation and in immediate contact 
 with its organ ; and that is true which Democritus of old 
 asserted, that ail our senses are only modifications of 
 touch. Through the eye we perceive nothing but the rays 
 of light in relation to, and in contact with, the retina.-’"’ 
 
 The determination of the particular character and con- 
 ditions of the non-ego of consciousness is not of so great 
 consequence as the establishment of the fundamental posi- 
 tion of natural realism that a non-ego of some kind is the 
 object of consciousness. But, this fundamental position 
 having been established, the point next in importance is 
 to determine something more definite regarding the imme- 
 diate and primary objects of consciousness. In the above 
 quotation Hamilton tells us that the objects of perception 
 are certain external realities in immediate contact with 
 our bodily organs at the different points of sense. We 
 have already criticised the use by Hamilton of the term 
 perception as synonymous with consciousness or immediate 
 knowledge ; and in examining this doctrine regarding the 
 immediately-known non-ego we shall adopt a phraseology 
 
NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 115 
 
 which we think correct. The question then is, — does the 
 primary non -ego of consciousness consist of external reali- 
 ties in immediate contact with our organs of sense ? 
 
 This question must be answered in the negative if it can 
 be shown (1) that a knowledge of our bodily organs in- 
 cluding the organs of sense is itself not primary but ac- 
 quired, and (2) that it takes a certain determinate time 
 for an impression made upon an organ of sense to be 
 followed by an act of conscious knowledge. 
 
 1. If we are not primarily acquainted with our bodily 
 organism, it cannot be said that we are conscious of the 
 external reality in contact with our bodily organism. No 
 matter what theory we hold as to the relation between 
 consciousness and the organism, a knowledge of an exter- 
 nal reality as in contact with the organism implies a 
 knowledge of the organism as in contact with the external 
 reality. And if we have not a primary knowledge of the 
 organism, neither can we have a primary knowledge of the 
 extra-organic reality. And we think that any one who 
 watches the progress of the acquisition of knowledge in 
 the case of a child must conclude that the child is not born 
 with any definite knowledge of its own physical system. 
 A considerable experience has to be passed through before 
 the infant intelligence obtains any tolerable acquaintance 
 with its own organic abode, and the same experience is ne- 
 cessary to enable it to become acquainted with external 
 realities as in relation to its organism. Hence we should say 
 that tbe knowledge of these external realities is not prima- 
 rily given in consciousness. 
 
 2. But further the most distinguished modern physio- 
 logists tell us that a certain appreciable time elapses be- 
 tween contact of an external reality^^ with the organ and 
 the conscious sensation or perception. The existence of 
 this interval appears to indicate that a nervous process 
 must take place between the organic contact and the act of 
 consciousness. And this is fatal to the supposition that 
 
 16 
 
m 
 
 NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 we are primarily and immediately conscious of the exter- 
 nal reality at the point of sense. 
 
 What then are the primary contents of consciousness ? 
 We have seen that consciousness is the illuminating* lio-ht 
 in which the ego becomes aware of the non-ego, and in a 
 previous Note we indicated the relations which must pri- 
 marily exist between the constituent elements of the non- 
 ego. These relations are Difference, Resemblance, Co- 
 existence and Succession. The crude phenomense which 
 appear in consciousness in these relations may be designat- 
 ed by the general term Feelings, In the course of ex- 
 perience, by an objective law, a law of the organism, these 
 Reelings locate themselves in different parts of the or- 
 ganism. This location of the Feelings, we know, depends 
 upon the nervous and muscular structure of the organism. 
 And it is a most important step in the acquisition of the 
 child^s knowledge of his abode. Thus the immediate 
 primary non-ego of consciousness consists of crude Feelings 
 known in certain relations to one another; and the first 
 step in the acquisition of knowledge consists in the location 
 of these Feelings — the assigning to them of the position 
 determined for them by their objective conditions. 
 
 This location of the Feelings is the foundation of our 
 knowledge both of the organism and of extra-organic rea- 
 lities. The knowledge of external things may indeed be 
 supposed to advance with the knowledge of the 
 
 organism itself. Both are objective with reference to the 
 ego ; and it is their mutual contact and interaction, in an 
 infinity of ways, which give rise to the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness. The progress of the knowledge of the organism 
 and of extra- organic realities is the acquisition of the power 
 of Ferception, The knowledge given in perception is very 
 complex and is made up of many simple elements which it 
 has taken a considerable time to bring together. We shall 
 describe briefly the process by which our acquired power of 
 perception is built up. 
 
 The most primitive act of thought consists in the intui- 
 
NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 117 
 
 tion of one of the relations of difference^ resemblance, si- 
 multaneity or succession which we have described. And 
 next in rank is the synthetic act by which objects or ele- 
 ments thus related are connected together into unity. 
 These primitive acts of thought, carried on involuntarily, 
 result in certain products which constitute the simple ob- 
 j'ects of common knowledge ; and we now propose to study 
 these products. We consider first the perception of differ- 
 ence and simultaneity. 
 
 We have already seen that there can be no cognition of 
 simultaneous objects without a perception of difference. 
 That which enables the child to distinguish between colours 
 and sounds, and tastes, and smells is a certain difference 
 in the manner in which his senses are affected. But along 
 with this difference of sensation there is a co-existence of 
 them. Sensations differing from one another in quality 
 are frequently experienced in regularly combined groups. 
 A connection is thus formed between them, so that when 
 one of the sensations is experienced the others are expected. 
 This combination of a real with expected sensations con- 
 stitutes an object. The formation of natural objects is 
 therefore one of the most primitive products of thought. 
 
 All objects of knowledge are composed of a certain uni- 
 form group of sensations and expected sensations. But 
 it takes a considerable amount of experience to determine 
 accurately the exact constituents of objects. A child, for 
 example, has been accustomed to take some disagreeable 
 medicine from a spoon ; this experience has been repeated 
 so frequently that a firm connection has been formed be- 
 tween the appearance of the spoon in the hand of the nurse 
 and the disagreeable taste of the medicine. To the mind 
 of the child the hand of the nurse holding the spoon 
 and the expected taste constitute an object ; and the 
 child^s mistake is corrected only when some pleasant food 
 is given to it by the spoon ; then it learns that the 
 taste of the medicine is not an invariable element of that 
 cluster of sensations introduced by the sight of the spoon, 
 
 16 2 
 
118 
 
 NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 The most important of the sensations connected to- 
 gether in the formation of objects are those of sight and 
 touch. The sense of sight gives only colours differing 
 from one another in quality and occupying a certain 
 hounded space. The sense of touch combined with the 
 muscular sense of effort leads to the inference of hard or 
 soft, rough or smooth resisting bodies existing outside 
 of us. The motion of our limbs in contact with ex- 
 ternal bodies gives us the idea of distance. But it takes 
 a considerable time for the child to connect the figured 
 colour which it sees with the resisting body which it 
 touches. The same sensations of colour and the same 
 sensations of touch and muscular effort havinsr been fre- 
 quently experienced together the child learns to believe 
 that the object which it sees^ is the same as the object 
 which it touches. Other sensations, as of smell, taste or 
 sound are soon added to the group, and thus is produced 
 the full conception of a natural object. 
 
 The distance of an object from the body is first measur- 
 ed by the motion of the hand towards it ; the greater 
 time and effort required to reach an object the farther 
 it ps believed to be away from us. But it is observed 
 also that the greater time and effort taken by the hand 
 to reach an object, the dimmer does the colour of the 
 object appear to the eye ; and the difference between clear- 
 ness of colouring is still more observable when the process 
 of walking is combined with the stretch of the arm. Other 
 differences of appearance also are observed by the eye, as 
 a greater or less size, a greater or less clearness in the ap- 
 pearance of the minute parts of objects and so on. These 
 differences of appearance become gradually connected with 
 the longer or shorter time and the greater or less effort 
 required to reach objects with the hand, and thus we learn 
 to see the distance of objects, or, properly speaking, to in- 
 fer from visible appearances, what are the distances from 
 us of the objects of touch. Hence we see that the percep- 
 tion of the objects of the external world is a combination 
 
NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 119 
 
 of iotuition and inference. We perceive intuitively actual 
 sensations ; we expect, by an involuntary inference the 
 other sensations of the group. We intuite sensations of 
 muscular resistance ; we infer some resisting external ob- 
 ject. We intuite particular sensations of colour ; we infer 
 the distance to be passed over before particular sensations 
 of touch can be reached. 
 
 The products of thought just described are founded 
 mainly but not exclusively upon the relations of difference 
 and simultaneity ; other products of a primitive kind are 
 founded mainly but not exclusively upon the relations of 
 resemblance and succession. The child is conscious of the 
 same sensation or the same group of sensations at succes- 
 sive times; the regular recurrence of the group of sensa- 
 tions leads to a belief in the identity of the object. Thus 
 our belief in the permanence and independence of natural 
 objects is the result of seeing that a present group of sen- 
 sations resembles a group of sensations which we remem- 
 ber to have experienced some time ago. This recognition 
 of similarity between present experienced sensations and 
 past represented sensations is of the greatest importance 
 as it is the foundation of our belief not only in the perma- 
 nence of objects but also in the permanence and identity 
 of ourselves. We have in this also the only means we 
 possess of comparing all kinds of relations as well as ob- 
 jects with one another. Past periods of time, figures and 
 dimensions of space, forthputtings of energy, experiences 
 of pleasure and pain, are recalled and compared with pre- 
 sent experiences ; and thus our lives are enriched by being 
 able to bring together the past and the present. 
 
 When the present group of sensations do not exactly re- 
 semble the representation of a past group we get the idea 
 of sameness of kind but difference of individual object. 
 The child at first is unable to distinguish between its 
 mother and other ladies ; but, soon differences are recog- 
 nized and individuals distinguished. The ability to per- 
 ceive minute differences in the midst of a general resem- 
 
120 
 
 NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 blance is necessary in order to enable us to distinguish one 
 object from another; as the ability to assert with confi- 
 dence the exact resemblance of a present object and a re- 
 presentation is necessary to enable us to identify an indivi- 
 dual. 
 
 The uniform connection between succeeding events con- 
 stitutes what we know of the causal relation. When a 
 certain phenomenon is uniformly followed by another phe- 
 nomenon^ the two become so connected that when the one 
 appears the other is expected. Uniformity of succession 
 is thus an essential, though not the only essential element 
 in the causal relation. 
 
 We thus see that the objects and relations of our com- 
 mon knowledge are produced by the exercise of involun- 
 tary and to a great extent unconscious thought. When 
 we first waken up to conscious life we find ourselves in tlie 
 midst of a world of objects regarding which we know a 
 good deal. This primitive knowledge is the result, no 
 doubt, of an almost unconscious process which has gone on 
 during the dreaming sleep of infancy, as our bodies and 
 minds were being gradually adapted to our surroundings. 
 
 Having discussed at length the doctrine of natural real- 
 ism and the process of perception based upon it, we shall 
 now refer to what we think an important mistake in Ha- 
 milton's elassification of theories of perception. Natural 
 realism as we take it, is a psychological doctrine which 
 asserts phenomenal duality of consciousness. But there 
 is asserted by Hamilton an ontological duality or duality 
 of siibstance, not as actually given in consciousness, but as 
 testified to by consciousness. Hamilton appears to assume 
 that the phenomenal duality of consciousness cannot be and 
 has never been denied, whereas the ontological duality 
 testified to, as he thinks, by consciousness, has very ge- 
 nerally been denied. And bis classification of theories is 
 based partly upon a psychological and partly upon an onto- 
 logical principle. The result of this is considerable con- 
 fusion and inaccuracy. For example, Berkeley is put down 
 
NATURAL REALISM. 
 
 121 
 
 as a Cosmothetic Idealist of the cruder form ^ wbereas lie 
 was undoubtedly a presentationist^ and, according to our 
 view, a natural realist. It is greatly to be regretted that 
 Sir W. Hamilton’s great learning is so often accompanied 
 by a want of simplicity and accuracy. 
 
 We shall conclude our Note upon Natural Realism by 
 proposing a classification of the elements into which objects 
 of perception may be resolved. 
 
 All Objects of Perception consist of : — 
 
 A. Quantity founded upon co-existence and succession ; 
 such as Trinal Extension, Figure, Position, Distance, &c. 
 
 B. Quality founded upon the difference and association 
 of sensations, and divided into particular qualities accord- 
 ing as 
 
 I. They require for their percep- 
 tion tactual contact or resistance. 
 
 1. Sardness, roughness, ^c. known 
 by the tactual sensation and mus- 
 cular effort in pressure or motion. 
 
 2. Taste, known by the tactual 
 sensation and a chemical solution 
 of particles in the mouth. 
 
 II. They do not involve contact 
 
 with the object. 
 
 1. Colour, in which the sensation 
 is perfectly projected so that there 
 is no conscious inference connect- 
 ing it with the object. 
 
 2. Sound, in which the sensation is 
 imperfectly projected requiring a 
 conscious inference to connect it 
 with the object. 
 
 3. Smell, in which the sensation is 
 scarcely if at all projected re- 
 quiring the assistance of other 
 senses to lead to the inference of 
 its connection with the object. 
 
 NOTE F. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 The reason wby we classify objects and relations is that 
 we may thereby systematize our knowledge. The know- 
 ledge of an infinite number of individual things, without 
 bringing together resembling things and separating differ- 
 ing things, would simply be confusion — a class of images 
 without order. We arrange the objects of our knowledge 
 into classes in order the more clearly to understand them. 
 
 The most general principle of classification may be thus 
 
122 
 
 CLxVSSIFIC.mON. 
 
 expressed ; — Things which resemhle one another are to le 
 united into one class ; things which differ from one another 
 are to he arranged in separate classes. For example, if we 
 have before us on a black-board a large number of differ- 
 ent mathematical figures, we should select from them 
 figures having three sides and put them into one class ; 
 figures having four sides or more we should arrange in 
 other classes. The class of three-sided figures being con- 
 stituted by their general resemblance we should denomi- 
 nate triangles. But a study of these triangles would re- 
 veal that there are differences amongst them, some have 
 all their sides equal ; some have two of their sides equal ; 
 some have all their sides unequal. Why is it then that 
 we arrange these differing figures in the one class, triangle ? 
 Manifestly because the general resemblance in having 
 three sides and three angles is of greater importance than 
 the minor differences in the lengths of the sides or the 
 sizes of the angles. Hence we arrive at a modification of 
 our general principle : — Points of resemblance should he m- 
 ffloyed to constitute a class when they are more general and 
 more important than points of difference between individuals. 
 And when we have constituted a class by means of certain 
 general resembling qualities, we may make use of minor 
 points of difference for the purpose of constituting sub- 
 classes or varieties. As e. g. triangles may be equilateral 
 isosceles, scalene and so on. 
 
 The name by which we designate a class is called a com- 
 mon term; although there are certain modified forms of 
 classification whose names we do not call common terms. 
 We frequently classify objects for the purpose of counting 
 them without reference to other important principles of 
 classification ; and we get the classes of numeration, — tens, 
 hundreds and so on. We classify objects from some su- 
 perficial or arbitrary point of view ; as trees into ^forest, 
 soldiers into a regiment y geese into flock and so on. Here 
 the classification is founded upon the principle of general 
 resemblance and contiguity in space, and we call the terra 
 
CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 123 
 
 by which such classes are distinguished a collective term. 
 Again when we study inorganic substances as gold, silver, 
 lead, we observe that the character of these metals does 
 not depend upon the size or figure of the pieces. A mi- 
 nute particle of gold possesses the same qualities as a large 
 nugget, and thus the mechanical or chemical properties of 
 metals are taken into account in their classification, other 
 points of resemblance or difference being neglected. The 
 names by which we indicate these inorganic substances are 
 called substantial terms. And as these substances are. not 
 divided into individual objects, but simply into greater or 
 smaller pieces, the term cannot be said to denote indivi- 
 duals, but only an object of indefinite shape and size pos- 
 sessing certain qualities. Ascending higher in the scale 
 of existence, we reach organic objects, in which we have a 
 certain unity produced by nature which we cannot divide 
 without destroying the object. This impossibility of phy- 
 sical separation without the destruction of life has caused 
 these objects to be called individuals. And it is with re- 
 ference to them that the most important problems of classi- 
 fication arise. 
 
 If we wish to examine, for the purpose of accurate 
 knowledge, all the organized individuals discoverable, we 
 must first adopt some criterion by which we can distinguish 
 them from inorganic elements. This criterion must be 
 found in all the individuals ; and it must form a clear dis- 
 tinguishing line separating them from things inorganic. 
 An accurate description of what is common to all organic 
 beings constitutes a definition of the class. And the name, 
 organized beings, organized individuals, or whatever it may 
 be is said to connote these common qualities. Examining 
 more minutely into the character of organic beings, we 
 observe some of them possessed of powers of locomotion 
 while others are not. Four-footed animals, birds, fishes, 
 insects and so on wander about in search of food ; while 
 trees and smaller plants are rooted to the soil. This and 
 other differences serve to distinguish organized beings into 
 
 17 
 
124 
 
 CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 two great classes ; those which we call animal ; and those 
 called vegetable. The connotation of animal organized 
 leings and vegetable organized beings comprehends both the 
 qualities common to them all, and the qualities in the one 
 case, possessed by all animals, and, in the other case, pos- 
 sessed by all vegetables. Thus, as we sub-divide a class, 
 the concept becomes richer, but the number of individual 
 to w'bich the name is applicable is smaller. If now 
 we confine our attention to animal organized beings we 
 observe important differences amongst the individuals in- 
 cluded in the whole class. Some of them possess a back- 
 bone or vertebra which serves as the foundation or support 
 of the other parts of the body ; some of them have hard 
 rings going round the body and protecting the softer 
 parts within ; some of them have solid shells within which 
 they live ; while some attach themselves after the manner 
 of plants to some more solid foreign body. Thus we have four 
 sub-divisions of the animal kingdom : — vertebrated animals^ 
 articulated animals ^ mollusca, and zoophytes. Now, as be- 
 fore, if we add to the concept of organized animal beings 
 the qualities indicated by the names vertebrated^ articidaU 
 ed, mollusc^ and zoophyte we enrich the concept with a fuller 
 meaning ; but we restrict the application of the name. 
 We might again take the class vertebrated animals, and 
 observe the distinctions belonging to individuals of it ; and 
 by adding these distinctions to the general concept, we 
 would at the same time enrich the concept and constitute 
 a number of smaller classes. In this way we might go on 
 enriching the concept and sub-dividing the classes until 
 we reached a class which could not be farther divided. The 
 concept of this lowest species would comprehend all the 
 qualities of the concepts of the larger classes to which it 
 belonged ; but it would exclude many qualities belonging 
 to individuals of the species. Thus no matter how far we 
 go in the process of sub-division we never reach a class so 
 small that its concept comprehends all the qualities of an 
 images It is absolutely essential to classification that some 
 
CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 125 
 
 of the peculiarities of individuals should be struck olf in 
 forming the concept, unless indeed we can realize the 
 impossible supposition that there might be a number 
 of organized individuals found exactly alike in every quali- 
 ty. Moreover the determination of the lowest species is, 
 to a certain extent, arbitrary, as there may often be a 
 doubt whether a quality common to a number of indivi- 
 duals is to be considered a mark of a species, or merely of 
 a subordinate variety. 
 
 Now, it must be remembered that this process of classifi- 
 cation is purely a mental arrangement of individual objects 
 of knowledge, although it is founded upon actual distinc- 
 tions and resemblances observed amongst them. And hence 
 the concept of any class is only a mental object composed 
 of represented qualities separated from the images of the 
 individuals belonging to the class. This concept as repre- 
 sented in the mind is an indwidual object of consciousness; 
 but its peculiarity is that a presentation of it may be ob- 
 tained from a great number of objects. And hence some 
 have said, although erroneousnessly, that the concept of a 
 class is general. It is bat a single object of consciousness, 
 hut it symbolizes a large number of objects, just as a com- 
 mon name is applicable to a large number of objects. The 
 only difference between a concept and a name is, that the 
 former is a collection of qualities abstracted from indivi- 
 duals, according to some principle, while the latter is a 
 sound more or less arbitrarily associated with the indivi- 
 duals .which agree in the possession of the qualities of the 
 concept. 
 
 In considering the doctrine of classification we must 
 study it also as applied to actions^ or modes of action, or 
 complex relations of things. In the phenomena of the mind, 
 for example, there are important difference. All mental 
 phenomena agree in this, that we are conscious of them. 
 But some of our mental phenomena have no external ob- 
 ject corresponding to them and revealed by them, — they 
 are purely subjective in their character ; these are feelings. 
 
 17 2 
 
126 
 
 CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 Some agaia have a special object either present or past 
 these are cognitions. While others have an object expect- 
 ed and lead to some action ; these are volitions. Thus we 
 can classify mental actions ; but the principal difficulty 
 here, which we do not meet with in the case of organic 
 individuals, is that we do not actually find these mental 
 actions distinct and separate from one another. There is 
 a complexity and intermingling of them which renders 
 their classification difficult. Again we distinguish differ- 
 ent men from one another by their different modes of ac- 
 tion, One man is very energetic and regular in the per- 
 formance of his duties ; we classify him with energetic or 
 industrious men. Another man is noted for his want of 
 sympathy with suffering or for the cruel actions which he 
 performs ; we name and classify him a cruel man. Thus 
 every adjective which we apply to an individual implies a 
 conscious or possible classification, because it denotes a 
 quality which may be found in other individuals and may 
 therefore be the basis of forming them into a class. 
 
 There are also complex united systems of things which 
 are to be classified. Such are a steam-engine, a threshing- 
 machine, a family, a tribe, a government, a system of 
 planets, a combination of forces, and so on. The same prin- 
 ciples of classification as we have already explained apply 
 to these complex unities, the only difference being that 
 the relations constituting the unity are frequently not ob- 
 jects of sense-knowledge, but are apprehended only by the 
 intellect. The relations of persons, for example, constitut- 
 ing a government cannot be perceived by the senses j they 
 are so complex and remote from sense that we think of 
 them as entirely different from ordinary things known 
 through sense. And yet they are all ultimately reducible 
 to objects of sense-perception. The essential feature of 
 government consists in the relation between one person 
 who issues a command and a number of other persons who, 
 for fear of punishment, are led to obey the command. 
 But this simple relation is usually combined along with 
 
CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 127 
 
 many others into a system of great complexity constituting 
 what we understand by the word government. 
 
 Having explained and illustrated the general principles 
 of classification we now proceed to study the process of 
 assigning any particular object of our knowledge or thought 
 to its appropriate class. To be able to do this correctly is 
 a matter of great importance^ as we do not know an object 
 accurately until we know what classes it belongs to. Be- 
 fore we can classify any individual it is manifestly necessary 
 for us to know that it possesses the essential qualities of 
 some class ; having ascertained this we immediately assign 
 it to that class. We see, for example, an object rooted to 
 the soil, evidently organic, and having a stem, branches, 
 and leaves. Knowing that these qualities are possessed 
 by many vegetables we assign our individual to that class. 
 A further examination reveals the fact that the object has 
 flowers growing upon it, that the leaves are netted instead 
 of parallel veined, that it has a woody stem composed of a 
 number of circular layers around a central pith. Knowing 
 something of botanical classification w^.call our plant an 
 exogenous fiowering plant. Pursuing our examination into 
 minute characteristics of the flower and the leaves and 
 the seeds we succeed in determining the Order, the Genus, 
 and the Species of the plant. 
 
 Thus it appears that all that is necessary in classifying 
 an object is a knowledge of the characteristics of the class 
 to which it is problematically to be referred, and a know- 
 ledge derived from examination that the object in hand 
 presents these characteristic qualities. Having discovered 
 the important qualities of an object we look about, unless 
 we already know, for some class whose concept compre- 
 hends these qualities ; and having found it we unite by a 
 synthetic act the individual with the other individuals of 
 the class. 
 
 As long as we are dealing with inorganic elements or 
 organic material bodies there are no great difficulties in 
 the w^ay of classifying individuals. We are now able to 
 
128 
 
 CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 apply cLemlcal tests with definite* and precise results to all 
 inorganic elements ; and the microscope and dissecting 
 knife enable us to examine the minute parts of organized 
 objects with great accuracy. And consequently it only 
 requires a certain amount of practical training and skill to 
 refer any object with precision to its proper class. But 
 when we come to the more complex relations of human 
 life and action much greater difficulties present themselves. 
 These difficulties arise from the greater complexity of the 
 phenomena with which we are dealing, from the want of 
 such a precise system of classification as we have with re- 
 ference to material objects, from the impossibility of ob- 
 serving such clear distinctions as are seen between organic 
 things, and from other causes. The following are some of 
 the objects of thought in connection with human life and 
 action which present themselves for study and classifica- 
 tion : — The phenomena of consciousness ; mental modes of 
 action constituting character ; bodily habits ; languages ; 
 general forms of body and countenance ; national customs 
 and superstitions ; family institutions ; tribal habits and 
 laws ; forms and characteristics of governments ; and other 
 features connected with social life which will readily sug- 
 gest themselves. A few illustrations will show the diffi- 
 culty of reducing these things to scientific system. 
 
 When we observe an action done by some person, we 
 often experience a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, of 
 approbation or disapprobation, and we judge that the ac- 
 tion is either right or wrong. Now students of the human 
 mind cannot ag-ree as to what is the true nature of this 
 moral feeling or judgment, as to whether it is primarily a 
 feeling or primarily a cognition, as to whether it is a 
 simple and original phenomenon of human consciousness, 
 or a complex and derived phenomenon found only in human 
 minds which have attained a certain degree of advancement. 
 
 Again when we try to estimate the character of the men 
 whom we meet there is room for great doubt and uncer- 
 tainty, We sometimes observe men giving large sums in 
 
CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 129 
 
 cLarity to the poor or otherwise trying to ameliorate their 
 condition ; and we should probably think that these were 
 benevolent men. But it is possible^ and many times true, 
 that men perform apparently benevolent actions from some 
 selfish motive, and the discovery of this fact makes it im- 
 possible for us to classify them as benevolent. The motive 
 by which an action is inspired constitutes the most essential 
 element of the action, and the difficulty of ascertaining its 
 character renders it difficult to characterize the action. 
 
 Suppose again that we wish to determine whether a certain 
 writer is a poet, or a philosopher it is not in all cases easy 
 to do so. There are versifiers who are not poets ; and there 
 are many who write about philosophy but are not philoso- 
 phers. And critics are not by any means agreed as to what it 
 is that constitutes a man a poet or a philosopher. Thus we 
 have here a two-fold difficulty; the essential qualities of 
 the classes are not determined with precision; and even if 
 they were determined it is no easy matter to say in any 
 particular case whether a person possesses them. It requires 
 a certain amount of poetical or philosophical genius to 
 estimate the quality of poetical or philosophical writings. 
 Students of language also find great difficulty in classify- 
 ing the diffPerent languages of mankind. Leading distinc- 
 tions have no doubt been observed and form the basis of a 
 provisional classification, but the science is yet in its in- 
 fancy and much has to be done in the way of determining 
 the characteristics of diflPerent languages and arranging 
 them into a system. Similar remarks might be made with 
 reference to most of the problems of classification which 
 arise in connection with the intellectual, moral, and social 
 life of man. And we may now point out a few leading er- 
 rors which we are apt to make in our study of the pheno- 
 mena in question. (1) Errors are often made in failing to 
 distinguish the essential or predominating character of that 
 which we are examining. A man may conceal under a 
 harsh and forbidding exterior a really kind and generous 
 heart j the manner of a man is most frequently that by 
 
130 
 
 CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 which he is at first judged ; and thus people frequently form 
 an erroneous judgment by not looking through the manner 
 at the more essential qualities of mind and conscience. 
 
 (2) Errors in classification arise from supposing things 
 to differ which in reality are the same or similar. For 
 example Sir W. Hamilton supposed that Dr. Heidi’s theory 
 of perception was quite different from and inconsistent 
 with the representative theory held by Dr. Thos. Brown 
 and others of Heidis predecessors. In truth, although there 
 were minor differences, the essential doctrines of Reid^s 
 theory are not what Hamilton supposed and are not so dif- 
 ferent from the doctrines of Brown as to entitle them to 
 be put into a different class. Real resemblances are often 
 concealed under a difference of phraseology, and it is an 
 important function of thought to penetrate beneath the 
 verbal expression of doctrines to the ideas taught. 
 
 (3) Errors in classification arise from supposing things 
 to resemble one another which are in reality different. 
 Things indicated by the same word, for example, especially 
 if the things indicated are mental in their character, are at 
 first sight supposed to be the same, but in reality they are 
 frequently found to be very different. Names, in the course 
 of time, often change their meaning, and it is frequently 
 very difficult to observe and discriminate the different 
 meanings which, at successive times and as used by different 
 persons, they carry with them. The philosophical name 
 idea presents us with a good example of a word which 
 means very different things as used by different writers or 
 even by the same writer. Not only may single words 
 mean different things but also similar forms of expression 
 may be very ambiguous in meaning ; of this good speci- 
 mens are given in many of the ancient oracles which were 
 usually susceptible of quite different interpretations. And 
 tlie writings of sophistical reasoners are usual 1}^ filled with 
 forms of expression which convey one meaning to the mind 
 of the reader, but are used to express quite a different idea 
 of the writer’s mind. 
 
CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 131 
 
 TLe above are the principal sources of error in classifica- 
 tion ; and thus it appears that there are three important 
 conditions of making an accurate classification. These 
 are ; — to be able to distinguish, for the purpose of com- 
 parison, the essential from the subordinate qualities of the 
 things with which we are dealing ; to be able to detect 
 resemblances even when concealed under manifest differ- 
 ences ; and to be able to detect differences although con- 
 cealed by apparent resemblances. Having selected essen- 
 tial qualities of things and observed resemblances and 
 differences the process of classification is obvious, — things 
 which resemble one another are to be classified together, 
 and things which differ from one another are to be arranged 
 in different classes. Thus the most important and the most 
 difficult part of the process of classification consists in the 
 analysis and comparison v/hich must precede the synthetic 
 act in order that it may be of any value. The synthetic 
 act of classifying is obvious and necessary as soon as the 
 preceding analysis and comparison are completed. 
 
 NOTE G. 
 
 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OP THE PROPOSI- 
 TION. 
 
 In a preceding Note we pointed out that there are four 
 great relations in which the phenomena of our conscious- 
 ness must stand to one another, — the relations vijn* of 
 Difference, Resemblance, Simultaneity and Succession. 
 
 If now, we consider the objects of our knowledge we 
 shall reach another division of relations subordinate to the 
 above. All objects which are related to one another may 
 be distinguished into quantities and qualities^ The latter 
 correspond to the sensations of which we are or may be 
 conscious ; the former consist of the Form of sensations or 
 objects, namely, the space, time, motion and so on, by 
 
 18 
 
132 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 which sense objects are conditioned. Ag-ain the relations 
 of all objects or classes which ma)^ be predicated are either 
 internal or external ; the former being* the relations of ob- 
 jects or classes to internal constituent qualities or parts, 
 the latter to other external objects or classes. Internal 
 and external relations may be both quantitative and quali- 
 tative, and thus we have a four-fold division of relations 
 into: — I., Internal Quantitative ; II., Internal Qualitative ; 
 
 III., External Quantitative ; IV., External Qualitative. 
 This classification is founded upon and not exclusive of our 
 former division of the four primary relations, as will be 
 seen from the following table : — 
 
 I. Internal 
 Quantitative Re- 
 lations compre- 
 hend : — 
 Relations of fi* 
 gure, size, shape, 
 motion, number, 
 and so on, of the 
 constituent parts 
 or elements of 
 objects, classes or 
 systems. These 
 relations may be 
 any of the four 
 primary relations 
 or any combina- 
 tions of them. 
 
 II. Internal 
 Qualitative Re- 
 lations compre- 
 hend : — 
 Relations be- 
 tween the qua- 
 lities of objects 
 of our know- 
 ledge, or classes 
 of objects, these 
 qualities being 
 made known to 
 us by the sen- 
 sations or ideas 
 which they pro- 
 duce in our 
 minds. 
 
 III. External Quan 
 titative Relations 
 comprehend : — 
 Relations of any 
 of the four pri- 
 mary kinds orany 
 combinations of 
 them between the 
 figure, size, shape, 
 motion, duration, 
 number, and so on, 
 of objects, clas.='es 
 or systems which 
 are external to 
 one another. 
 
 I 
 
 IV. External Qua- 
 litative Relations 
 comprehend : — 
 R.dations be- 
 tsveen external 
 objects or systems 
 with reference to 
 qualities made 
 known by sense, 
 moral or aestheti- 
 oal qualities, char- 
 acters, habits, con- 
 ditions and any 
 other character- 
 istics of objects of 
 knowledge which 
 may be appropri- 
 ately called quali- 
 tative. 
 
 We shall give illustrations of these great classes of re- 
 lations. 
 
 I. Internal Quantitative Relations. 
 
 When we construct a geometrical figure, as that- of the 
 fifth or the forty- seventh proposition of the first book of 
 Euclid, we constitute a unity, and the subsequent demon- 
 stration is a comparison of the different internal i^arts in 
 respect of their magnitude, and the inferences which result 
 from that comparison. Similarly, many of the proposi- 
 tions of geometry consist of a combination of predications 
 regarding the internal quantitative relations of different 
 kinds of figures. 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 133 
 
 The astroDomer who studies the motions of the different 
 bodies beloni^ing' to the solar system is engaged with in- 
 ternal quantitative relations. The solar system as a whole 
 constitutes a unity^ the elements of which are the sizes, 
 masses, distances, orbits, velocities, and so on, of the vari- 
 ous bodies which revolve around the sun or the primary 
 planets, and of the central luminary. 
 
 The mechanical engineer is similarly occupied when he 
 arranges the figure, strength, motion, position, and so on, 
 of mechanical structures, as houses, bridges, or machines. 
 Comparative anatomists are able to complete the skeletons 
 of animals, having given them certain of the bones. This 
 ability is the result of careful study of the internal quanti- 
 tative relations of the bodies of animals, 
 
 II. Internal (Qualitative Relations. 
 
 The qualities of single objects of sense often require to 
 be studied and compared in the interests of science. The 
 chemist in his analysis of the various organic and inorganic 
 substances which come under his notice is engaged in the 
 study of internal qualitative relations. The process of 
 classification involves a careful examination and compari- 
 son of the internal qualities of bodies or things classified. 
 The composition and criticism of the productions of the 
 poet, musici ill, statuary, and painter, consist chiefly of the 
 arrangement and examination of internal qualitative rela- 
 tions. The same relations are the objects of study when 
 we examine the characteristics of a man, of a nation, of 
 a government, of a religious system, of a systematic body 
 of doctrine of any kind, of an oration, in short of any of 
 the vast variety of things known to us which are cha- 
 racterised by internal differences of quality or powers of 
 exciting ideas. 
 
 III. External (Quantitative Relations. 
 
 In classification, when the extension or quantity of one 
 class is compared with that of another, we are dealing 
 with external quantitative relations. Many geometrical 
 propositions are concerned with these relations. Compari- 
 
 18 2 
 
134 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 sons of the weights, masses, figures, proportions, velocities, 
 numbers, and so on, of distinct bodies not forming parts 
 of a connected system, have for their objects external 
 quantitative relations. 
 
 IV . External Qualiiaiice Relations. 
 
 The botanist, zoologist, and chemist, in comparing the 
 different specimens of objects which comes within their 
 respective spheres to study are concerned about external 
 qualitative relations. So is the ethnologist in comparing 
 the characteristics of different races of men, the philologist 
 in comparing the principles of different languages, the 
 mythologist in bringing together the myths, legends, and 
 folk-lore of different countries, and the comparative econo- 
 mist in studying together the different social and political 
 institutions which have sprung up in different countries at 
 different times. This study of the qualitative relations of 
 things and systems has sprung into importance chiefly in 
 modern times and is a very powerful method of scientific 
 discovery. In the comparative study of physical charac- 
 teristics, of moral and social habits, of myths, of religious 
 beliefs, of languages, of institutions, of laws, and of his- 
 torical events, consists the only available effectual method 
 of discovering the beginnings and the principles of human 
 progress. 
 
 Now all thought is concerned about some, or all or 
 various combinations of the relations which we have just 
 now classified ; and the result of every comparison as well 
 as the expression of every relation, is 2 l predication ox 2^ 'pro • 
 position. In the exposition of our own views, we shall use 
 the former term ; in the criticism of current logical doctrine 
 we shall use the latter. Predication^ we may thus define 
 as the assertion that one object or element of our knowledge 
 or conception stands, or does not stand, in some relation to 
 one or more other objects or elements of knowledge or concep- 
 tion, In order that we may clearly understand the nature 
 and forms of predication we shall study a few examples of 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 135 
 
 it. Aud we shall begin with the study of examples of the 
 predication of internal relations. 
 
 When we sa}^, this rose is red, we affirm an internal rela- 
 tion of simultaneity or co-existenee. The redness is a 
 quality found co-existing with all the other qualities which 
 make up our knotvledge of the flower. The uniform and 
 inseparable co-existence of these qualities causes us to think 
 of them ail as making one object ; and when we say this 
 rose, we mean by it the one object made up of all the qua- 
 lities. The first term of the above predication calls up an 
 image before consciousness ; the second term is one of the 
 elements of the image singled out for the moment for 
 particular attention ; the predication affirms that the ele- 
 ment forms a part of the whole object, or co-exists with 
 the other element of it uniformly and inseparably. 
 
 The horse has four legs. This predication also affirms a 
 certain internal relation of the object horse. The first term 
 of the relation denotes a particular object composed of 
 many parts and ^qualities. The second term of the relation 
 expresses particular elements or parts of the whole object. 
 The predication affirms a relation of co»existence of that 
 regular and inseparable kind which constitutes the co- 
 existing qualities an individual. 
 
 All predications which we make regarding the internal 
 constitution of objects are of the same nature as the above, 
 and have about the same significance. The form of the 
 predication is a matter of comparative indifference, as we 
 are now engaged in the study of thoughts not of words. 
 The same relation is expressed by all the following forms : — 
 The rose is red ; the horse has four legs ; the house consists 
 of six rooms ; England contains Middlesex ; the lion is 
 possessed of a shaggy mane ; the solar system comprehends 
 the sun, planets and satellites, iknd in all these cases the 
 first term of the predication denotes a whole object, and 
 the second term expresses some quality, part, or element of 
 the object. 
 
 Not only may we predicate internal relations of material 
 
136 THE LOGICAL DOCTRIKE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 objects and systems of objects, but also oj mental and social 
 pbenomeua. The following’ are examples of such predica- 
 tions : — A moral judgment consists of intellectual and 
 sentimental elements ; the family is composed of a husband, 
 wife, and children ; the Government of England includes 
 the Sovereign, the House of Lords,* and the House of 
 Commons. The meaning of the predication in ail these 
 cases is the same as before. 
 
 There are other predications of relations which may, 
 perhaps, be called internal, but which should be distin- 
 guished from the above. These are predications of 
 sUive actions. We may give as examples of these : — The 
 dog barks; fire burns; the sun shines ; the river runs; 
 the wheel turns, and so on. In all these predications, and 
 such as these, there is involved the idea of some thing pro^ 
 eeeding from the first term of the relation. The dog barks, 
 means a certain sound proceeds from the dog. Fire burns, 
 means that a certain sensation is experienced after contact 
 with fire. The river runs, means that a body of water 
 occupies different places at successive times. The ivlieel 
 turns, means that the different parts of the wheel succes- 
 sively occupy different positions. The first term of each of 
 these predications denotes some object ; the second term 
 implies some sensation or action ; and the predication 
 affirms a relation of succession between the co-existing 
 qualities of the object and the sensation or action predicat- 
 ed. 
 
 We now proceed to the examination of external relations 
 of objects as affirmed or denied in predications, and, for 
 the sake of convenience, shall consider indiscriminately 
 quantitative and qualitative relations. And first amongst 
 these we have relations of difference. A relation of differ- 
 ence, we have seen, is absolutely necessary to enable us to 
 distinguish one object from another. If two objects are 
 exactly alike in quality they must, at least, have different 
 spatial positions to be distinguishable. Relations of differ- 
 ence are usually expressed by the comparative degree of 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 137 
 
 the adjective which expresses the quality with reference to 
 which two objects are compared. The following* are ex- 
 amples : — Red is brighter than green. Lead is heavier than 
 wood. The sun is larger than any of its planets. The 
 conceptions of Paradise LosP^ are more sublime than 
 those of The Deserted Village.'’^ A child is not so strong 
 as a man. A greyhound can run faster than a bull- dog. 
 The scenes of heaven are more glorious than can be ex- 
 pressed by language. The fruit of the pine-apple is not 
 the same as that of the orange tree. In all these cases, 
 .and in others which might be adduced, we see that the 
 two terms of the predication are the two objects compared ; 
 and the predication asserts that a relation of difference, 
 in some particular respect, exists between them. The 
 words which we have italicised in the above examples ex^ 
 press the relation predicated between the two terms \ and it 
 is manifest that it is of no consequence which term of the 
 relation comes first in the predication. The substitution 
 of the second term for the first would simply involve a 
 slight change in the expression, but no change in the 
 thought. Red is brighter than green, is in thought the 
 same as green is not so bright as red. And so of all the 
 others. Frequently we have to express a difference be- 
 tween two objects which consists in the fact that, along 
 with a certain resemblance, the one possess(;s qualities 
 W'hich the other does not. For example, the bat differs from 
 the mouse in that the former has membranous appendages 
 answering the purpose of wings, while the latter has not. 
 The zebra differs from the horse in having a regularly 
 striped shin. The whale differs from the most of the 
 mammals in being an aquatic animal. In such compari- 
 sons as these it is not easy to adopt such an expression as 
 will show the difference predicated so clearly as in the for- 
 mer cases ; but the thought is equally simple. There are 
 two objects compared ; they are found to differ in a cer- 
 tain respect ; and the predication affirms that they do thus 
 differ. And, as before, it is of no consequence which term 
 
138 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 of tbe relation comes first in tlie predication ; the thought 
 is the same whatever he the particular mode of expression. 
 
 Amongst the external relations of objects, both in res- 
 pect of quantity and quality^ that of resemblance is of 
 great importance. It is in consequence of resemblance in 
 certain respects that we classify objects together and con- 
 stitute them a unity. It is in consequence of resemblance 
 between objects that we draw inferences regarding them. 
 We are not now concerned^ however, with these uses of re- 
 semblance, but only with the nature and expression of the 
 predication of resemblance. Let us study some examples: — 
 
 This line is of the same length as that. These triangles 
 are all equal-sided. This piece of lead weighs two pounds. 
 In the first and third of these examples there is a compa- 
 rison of two objects, and a predication that they resemble 
 one another ; in the second the predication of resemblance 
 has reference to several objects. When the terms related to 
 one another in a predication of resemblance are common 
 names, there is always involved a comparison of several 
 objects. For example, horses have four feet ^ 
 
 we mean that all objects known by the term horse resem- 
 ble one another in having four feet ; here we predicate a 
 relation of resemblance between all known or conceived in- 
 dividuals. And, as we said before, we imply that each 
 horse has four feet — an internal relation of co-existence. 
 
 We often predicate resemblance between things which 
 are not exactly alike, but yet sufficiently alike to be classi- 
 fied together. When we say crimson is like scarlet., we 
 mean not that they are exactly alike, but that they are the 
 same hind of colour, and thus distinguishable from blue or 
 green. When we say that the sheep resembles the deer^ we 
 mean to predicate resemblance only in certain respects, 
 and if we state our meaning fully we will particularise the 
 points of resemblance. The most of the resemblances 
 which are affirmed in predication are only partial ; when 
 we affirm a complete resemblance we call it an identity, an 
 equality or some such name. 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OP THE PROPOSITION. 139 
 
 Although mental phenomena and material phenomena 
 are thought to be entirely different in kind, yet they are 
 frequently employed to illustrate one another. We speak 
 of a lofty thought^ thus implying a resemblance between 
 the excellence of the thought and the altitude of some ma- 
 terial object. We use light as a symbol of truth, or we say 
 that light resembles truths although there is in reality no 
 resemblance whatever between them in themselves ; but in 
 their results there is a resemblance since the appearance 
 of light and the imparting of truth are both productive of 
 knowledge in the mind. The relation between a symbol 
 and that which is symbolized, between a sign and that 
 which is signified, is usually either a direct resemblance 
 between the two things, or is .accompanied by a resem- 
 blance amongst some of the circumstances or results con- 
 nected with the two things. Sometimes, of course, this 
 is not so, as in the case of the relation of a word to that 
 which is denoted by it, where there is now often no re- 
 semblance, although there is reason to believe that origi- 
 nally the application of names was founded upon resem- 
 blance. 
 
 The relations of simultaneity and succession between 
 mutually external objects are often the subjects of predica- 
 tion. As when we say: — Milton was a contemporary of 
 Cromwell ; John and James were class-fellows ; soldiers on 
 parade keep step with one another. Or when we say : — • 
 Chaucher preceded Spenser ; after the ffash of lightning a 
 loud peal of thunder was heard ; a cause is always followed 
 by its effect. It will be observed that the same relation of 
 simultaneity or succession may be expressed in many dif- 
 ferent waj^s ; and so far as thought is concerned, it is of no 
 consequence by what words the relation is indicated, pro- 
 vided only it be indicated clearly. It will be observed, too, 
 that the order in which the objects said to be related occur 
 in the predication is immaterial. The sentence, Chaucer 
 preceded Spenser is the same as Spenser followed Chaucer, 
 The predication consists in asserting that a relation of 
 
 19 
 
140 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 succession exists between the two individuals^ specifying 
 which comes first. And, with reference to all the other 
 examples, it will be admitted that the form of predication 
 is unimportant, provided only that it be clearly expressed 
 what objects are related to one another and what is the 
 relation between them. 
 
 We have hitherto confined ourselves as closely as possible 
 to simple relations of difference, resemblance, simultaneity 
 and succession ; but in the great majority of predications 
 the relations predicated are more or less complex ; and often 
 the relations implied in a predication are more numerous 
 than those which are expressed. We may give examples 
 of such complex relations. 
 
 The judges in session, having tried the prisoner, agreed 
 to find him guilty. In this complex predication many re- 
 lations are expressed and implied. The judges sit simul- 
 taneously upon the bench, — a double relation of simultaneity 
 (1) amongst the judges (2) between the judges and the 
 bench. Having tried the prisoner, expresses a continuous 
 process and implies a multitude of relations it also indi- 
 /Cates that the action next asserted followed the trial. 
 Agreed lo find him guilty ; here is expressed a relation of 
 agreement amongst the legal opinions of the judges, and 
 a relation of difference between the action of the prisoner 
 and some law. 
 
 John struck the table. In this short sentence there are 
 implied several relations. John and the table are in point 
 of time simultaneous, in point of space contiguous ; and 
 contiguity is itself the result of the combination of several 
 relations. The stroke of John is an action, and therefore 
 involves succession, viz., first the arm is raised; then it is 
 gradually lowered, occupying successively different posi- 
 tions ; and then it comes into contact with the table pro- 
 ducing, probably, a sensation of sound and certainly one of 
 touch. Thus this simple sentence predicates a complex 
 series of relations between two objects, John and the table. 
 
 Many other examples might be given of complex rela- 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 1^1 
 
 tious being* predicated between two or more objects ; and 
 it would be a useful exercise in the analysis of thought for 
 the student to examine and separate the relations express- 
 ed or implied in the sentences which he reads. We think 
 it will be found that all relations may ultimately be re- 
 duced to the four simple ones which we have described ; 
 and that all predications may be shown to consist of an 
 assertion or denial^ that one or more of these relations ex- 
 ists between two or more objects or elements of knowledge 
 or conception. 
 
 We have now given and illustrated what we believe is a 
 correct exposition of that most important act of thought 
 which we call predication. It now remains for us, from 
 the stand'point which we have endeavoured to establish^ to 
 take a view of the current logical doctrines regarding the 
 proposition. These doctrines are found in all the smaller 
 text-books of logic j and they find a place also in many of 
 the more elaborate expositions of logical science. Not, 
 however in all, for we observe decided tendencies towards 
 a departure from the traditional doctrine of the proposition 
 in some modern writers of distinction. The leading fea- 
 tures of the traditional doctrine are the following : — 
 
 Every proposition consists of two terms and the copula. 
 The terms represent either concepts classes or individual 
 things ; and the copula serves as the connecting link be- 
 tween them. The words which constitute the copula are 
 is and is 7iot, according as the one term is to be affirmed 
 or denied of the other. The first of the two terms, that 
 about which the assertion is made, is called the subject ; 
 the second, that which is asserted or denied of the first, is 
 called the predicate. The subject of universal propositions 
 is said to be distributed, or applied to all the things de- 
 noted by it; that of particular propositions is not. The 
 predicate of negative propositions, being altogether denied 
 of all the individuals denoted by the subject, is distributed ; 
 that of affirmative propositions is not. The copula is sim- 
 ply the sign of the relation of the two terms to one another ; 
 
 Id 2 
 
14 ^ THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 it must not indicate the actual objective existence of the 
 relation or the things related, nor the time when the rela- 
 tion existed, nor the degree of certainty with which the 
 assertion is made. All these accidental things must be 
 included in the predicate. It is always possible, after limi- 
 tations and changes in the predicate or copula, to convert 
 propositions, that is, to put the predicate in place of the 
 subject, and the subject in place of the predicate ; and this 
 conversion, being rendered necessary by the laws of the 
 syllogism^ is an essential part of the doctrine of the propo- 
 sition. These are the principal points in the doctrine of 
 the proposition regarding which writers upon logic are 
 agreed ; but there are some points about which they are 
 not agreed. They are not agreed as to the character of the 
 predicate, some maintaining that it may be either deno- 
 tative or connotative, others that it is connotative only. 
 Those who believe that it may be denotative are not agreed 
 as to its quantification y some holding that its extent should be 
 explicitly stated in the proposition, others that its quantity 
 should be determined by the ordinary rules. They are not 
 agreed as to the meaning of the predication y some holding 
 that the subject and predicate are simply asserted to be 
 two different names of the same thing ; some that the pre- 
 dicate consists of attributes asserted of the subject; and 
 some that a relation of mutual co-existence or mutual in- 
 clusion or exclusion or congruence or confliction between 
 the two terms is asserted. These differing views may be 
 referred to in the following criticism ; but we shall give 
 the most of our attention to the foregoing doctrines which 
 are generally agreed upon. For the sake of clearness we 
 divide the subject of our criticism into the following 
 parts : — 1, The terms of the proposition ; 2. The relation 
 between these terms as expressed by the copula; 3. The 
 doctrine of distribution ; 4. The doctrine of conversion. 
 
 (1). In examining the terms of the proposition our 
 principal aim will be to ascertain whether they correspond 
 with the terms of predication, All predications; we have 
 
THE LOGICAL LOCTBINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 143 
 
 already shown, consist of the assertion or denial that one 
 or more objects or elements of knowledge or conception 
 holds some specified relation to one or more other objects 
 or elements of knowledge or conception. All predications 
 have, therefore, two terms related to one another, and the 
 assertion of some relation existing between them. And 
 we have to enquire whether the terms of the proposition, as 
 described by logicians, are the same as the terms of the 
 predications which we consciously make. In every propo- 
 sition, put into logical form, the predicate must com- 
 prehend all the elements of time, mode and action, 
 which are usually expressed by verbs and adjectives or ad- 
 verbs. A few examples of propositions may form a good 
 basis for our criticism. 
 
 Horses are vertehrated. In this predication we affirm 
 that each of a class of individual things possesses a certain 
 quality or rather a certain part called a vertebra. Two 
 objects of thought are before consciousness, the image of 
 a horse or horses and that of a vertebra ; and we affirm 
 that the latter constitutes a part of the former. Thus we 
 here assert an internal relation between the two terms ; 
 and this internal relation is correctly expressed by the word 
 are. Neither can there be any doubt that the terms of 
 the proposition correspond to the terms of the conscious 
 predication. But, suppose we modify the proposition, and 
 assert that* horses belo^ig to the class of vertebrata^ it ap- 
 pears manifest that the predication which we make is 
 quite different from the former one. Instead of predicat- 
 ing an internal relation we now predicate an external one; 
 we assert that the class of horses are included in a much 
 larger class of vertebrated animals. In the former propo- 
 sition we do not think of any other animals except horses ; 
 in this proposition we must think of other animals consti- 
 tuting a large class which includes horses. Now the 
 scholastic doctrine of the proposition teaches that the pre- 
 dicate vertebrated is either connotative or denotative, and 
 thus fails to distinguish between the two important kinds 
 
144 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 of predications above illustrated. This arabig^uity in tlie 
 meaning* of the predicate in such propositions should not 
 be recognised either in psychology or logic ; a predicate ' 
 should mean either one thing or another, and the mode of 
 expressing it should indicate which meaning is intended 
 to be conveyed. 
 
 Again, the sun illnminates the earth. In this predica- 
 tion we have in thought tv^ro objects which are the terms 
 of the predication, and a certain relation existing between 
 them, namely, that light proceeds from the first to the 
 second and thus makes its surface visible to our eyes. 
 This proposition when put into logical form becomes, the 
 sun is a-hody which-illuminates-the^earth. There the sub- 
 ject is the sun, and the predicate is a-hody-which-ilhmi- 
 nates- the- earth, i. e., the sun again, along with its relation 
 to the earth. Now we think that an appeal to conscious- 
 ness will show clearly that the terms of this proposition, 
 after being put into the logical mould, do not correspond 
 to the terms of the predication which we consciously make. 
 The two objects which we think of as related are, plainly, 
 the sun and the earth, not the sun and a-body-which-illu- 
 minates-the-earth. And it should, therefore, appear that 
 the so-called logical form of this proposition has no founda- 
 tion in the facts of consciousness. Gold is heavier than 
 iron. Here we have the image of two substances before 
 consciousness, and we assert a certain relation between 
 them, namely, that the one substance is heavier than the 
 other. But according to scholastic doctrine, the predi- 
 cate of the proposition is not iron, but heavier~than-iron. 
 In this case also an appeal to consciousness will show that 
 the second term of the predication, said to be in a certain 
 relation to the first, does not correspond to the predicate of 
 the logical proposition. 
 
 Many other propositions might be adduced which would 
 show that in the majority of cases the terms of the logi- 
 cally-formed proposition do not correspond to the terms of 
 predication which are thought of in consciousness as related 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 145 
 
 to one another. We have seen and admitted that, when a 
 proposition expresses an internal relation of an object or 
 class to some of its constituent parts or elements, the scho- 
 lastic proposition may be correct and adequate. But, when 
 external relations are predicated between objects, the logi- 
 cal proposition is quite inadequate to their expression ; the 
 terms of the proposition do not correspond to the terms of 
 the predicated relation. 
 
 (2.) We now consider the relation itself predicated be- 
 tween the objects or elements compared. Is this relation 
 accurately expressed by the logical copula ? According 
 to logical doctrine the relations expressed by the copula 
 are those of genus, species, difference, property, and ac- 
 cident ; the predicate of a proposition may stand to the 
 subject in any one of these relations. The two first of 
 these are external relations ; the remaining three are in- 
 ternal. Now it is manifest that these relations have all 
 reference to the process of classification ; and it appears 
 equally manifest that there are a multitude of other rela- 
 tions which form the subjects of predication that have no 
 reference to classification whatever. When we say, for 
 example, lightning precedes thtmder, we do not mean to 
 classify either lightning or thunder with any other pheno- 
 mena whatever, nor have we in our mind any fact or pro- 
 cess involved in classification. We do not mean that the 
 fact of preceding thunder is a differentia or a property or 
 an accident of lightning, or that that fact distinguishes 
 lightning from any other phenomenon. We mean simply 
 to assert that a certain phenomenon, lightning, usually or 
 always, is observed, before another phenomenon, thunder, 
 is heard. And this relation of antecedence or succession 
 is certainly not expressed by the copula. Again, when we 
 say, elephants are quadrupeds^ these words properly express 
 an internal relation between the animals spoken of, and 
 the quality indicated by the predicate, the possession of 
 four feet. But if this proposition is made to mean, ele^ 
 phants belong to the class of four-footed animals^ we have 
 
146 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 an external relation asserted^ and the copula is not adequate 
 to its nnanabig'uous expression. In the same wav it might 
 he shown that all the other external relations of difference, 
 resemblance, co-existence and succession, and their various 
 combinations, cannot be expressed by the copula. In fact, 
 logicians do not pretend that they can, because they al- 
 ways consign the expression of these relations to the pre- 
 dicate, thus playing false with the phenomena of conscious- 
 ness and producing monstrous forms of language. It ap- 
 pears then, that psychology offers no foundation for the 
 doctrine that the copula is the only proper expression of 
 the relation between the terms of predication ; and it might 
 also be shown that there is no foundation in language. 
 In many languages which are unquestionably expressive 
 of thought there is found no such abstract verb as our is. 
 And, even in our language, the substantive verb requires 
 to be divested of all its meaning before it is fitted for logical 
 use. Thus, it comes to be but an empty symbol, which 
 differs from the symbols of mathematics, in that while each 
 one of them has a definite meaning and represents a rela- 
 tion in thought, it is introduced for the purpose of putting 
 aside the relations thought of which it cannot express. 
 
 (3.) The doctrine of distribution is manifestly founded 
 upon facts connected with classification. In the classes 
 which we construct of organized individuals there are some 
 qualities which are found in all the individuals denoted by 
 the class-name; there are other qualities, called accidental, 
 found in some individuals but not in others. We are able, 
 then, to predicate that all the individuals of the class 
 possess the former kind of qualities, but only that some of 
 them possess the latter kind of qualities. Again, when 
 we predicate an external relation of certain objects, as when 
 we say “ birds belong to the class of oviparous animals,"’^ it 
 is evident that we speak of all birds, but only of some ovi- 
 parous animals ; and in this case the first term of the pre- 
 dication is distributed, the second not. But if we say 
 birds do not belong to the class of quadrupeds/^ we speak 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 147 
 
 of all birds and all quadrupeds, and assert that the one 
 class is altogether excluded from the other. In this ease 
 both the terms of predication are distributed. Thus, when 
 the first term of the relation denotes a class, we indicate 
 its distribution by prefixing the words all or some. When 
 the second term denotes a class of greater extent than the 
 first, we naturally indicate by the form of the predication 
 whether we speak of all or some of the individuals belong- 
 ing to it ; and at least the accurate expression of thought 
 demands that the distribution of both the terms of the re- 
 lation should be unambiguously expressed. 
 
 These principles of distribution, properly applicable only 
 to terms which denote classes, are applied by logicians to 
 all kinds of terms and all kinds of propositions. All uni- 
 versal propositions distribute their subject, while particu- 
 lars do not. All negative propositions distribute their 
 predicate, while affirmatives do not. Now, if we had not 
 a particular system to maintain, it might appear plain to 
 us that the principles of distribution cannot be, without 
 absurdity, applied to anything which does not admit of 
 distribution or non distribution. If we say, for example, 
 *^the Duke of Wellington is a man,^^ neither the first nor 
 the second term of the predication is a class name as here 
 used ; and were it not that we import from the process of 
 classification, ideas foreign to the subject in hand, we 
 should never think of the distribution either of the Duke 
 of Wellington^^ or a man.^^ Logicians, however, must 
 reduce every proposition to the normal form, and so they 
 make this a universal affirmation and write it all of the 
 Duke of Wellington is one of the class — man.^^ 
 
 Again, if we take a proposition expressive of an internal 
 relation, we shall see that the rules of distribution are not 
 applicable. In the proposition roses are sweet- smelling,” 
 the first term of the predication may denote either all or 
 some roses according to our opinion of their odour. But 
 the second term sweet-smelling” expresses a quality pos- 
 essed by roses, and when we speak of a quality, we surely 
 
 20 
 
148 THE LOGICAL DOCTKINE OF THE PROPOSITIOIs; 
 
 mean the whole of the quality, and it seems absurd to 
 say that the name of the quality is either distributed or 
 not distributed ; if we do so we apply a distinction to it 
 which is plainly not applicable. 
 
 This objection, however, is got over by changing the 
 predicate and thus forming another proposition, thus : — 
 
 Hoses are sweet-smelling flowers,^'’ meaning “ roses belong 
 to the class of sweet-smelling powers.” But it is surely 
 objectionable, in order to get' a proposition into such a 
 form that the rules of distribution may be applied to it, 
 to change the relation predicated in it. This proposition in 
 its first form asserts an internal relation to the second 
 term of which the principles of distribution do not apply ; 
 and in order to bring it into such a form that the second 
 term may be tested by the laws of distribution, it is changed 
 so as to express an external relation. Surely a correct 
 psychology offers no foundation for such a procedure. 
 
 It could be easily shown that the laws of distribution 
 are inapplicable to many other kinds of propositions, of 
 which \ve may give the following as examples : — The line 
 A is equal to B ; the sun is brighter than the moon ; the 
 dawn precedes the day ; silver is not so valuable as gold ; 
 the Prince of Wales shot an elephant ; stars bespangle the 
 sky. In all these propositions relations are predicated 
 between two or more objects, the relation being expressed 
 with perfect clearness, and in none of them can we say, 
 with any degree of appropriateness, that either term of'the 
 relation is distributed or non-distributed ; the distinction 
 is inapplicable and foreign to the subject. 
 
 Our conclusion, founded upon an examination of the 
 meaning of propositions, may be thus stated. Only those 
 terms which denote classes of things can be properly 
 spoken of as being totally or partially distributed ; the 
 names of single qualities or objects should not be quanti- 
 fied ; but wherever a class-name, admitting of quantifica- 
 tion, should, for the sake of clearness have its quantity 
 made knowH; we have a right to insist that its quantity 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 149 
 
 should be explicitly stated. This conclusion is founded 
 upon the great law of expression, — whatever is contained 
 in thought should be accurately expressed in words ; 
 whatever is not contained in though should not be express- 
 ed in words. We do not thinh of the quality affirmed in 
 the predicate of a proposition as being applicable to many 
 or few objects; we should not therefore quantify it. But 
 where the subject or predicate is a class-name, wholly or 
 partially distributed in thought^ its distribution should be 
 expressed in language. 
 
 (4.) We now come to the doctrine of conversion. For 
 the sake of the transposition of terms required by the 
 syllogism, it is considered by logicians of importance, that 
 all propositions should be convertible ; and there are cer- 
 tain well-known laws laid down for their conversion. The 
 laws of distribution receive their full importance only in 
 connection with conversion ; as the importance of the laws 
 of conversion is seen only in relation to the syllogism. 
 The great law of conversion is, — that no term should be 
 distributed in the converted proposition, which was un- 
 distributed in the original one. And by the application 
 of this law it is found that universal negative and parti- 
 cular negative propositions may be converted without any 
 change of quantity or quality, that the universal affirma- 
 tive can be converted by limiting the quantity of the pre- 
 dicate, and that the particular negative may be simply 
 converted after changing its quality, that is, changing it 
 into a particular affirmative by transferring the sign of 
 negation from the copula to the predicate. 
 
 Now, if we examine predications as they are naturally 
 expressed, there does not seem to be any objection to the 
 order of the term being changed provided there is a suffi- 
 cient reason for the change. If we say whales are in- 
 cluded in the class mammals,^^ we mean the same as the 
 class mammals includes whales.-’^ If we say ^Hhunder 
 succeeds lightning,^^ we are understood no better than if we 
 say lightning precedes thunder.^^ The predication gold 
 
 20 2 
 
150 THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 
 
 is heavier than silver,” expresses the same relations as 
 
 silver is lighter than gold.” The sentence “ John strikes 
 the table,” is, as far as thought is concerned, exactly the 
 same as the table is struck by John.” In short, if we 
 express any relation in a predication, the laws of thought 
 and language require nothing more than clearness and ac- 
 curacy in the expression ; and it is a matter of indifference 
 which term of the relation comes first. 
 
 But, if we examine the conversions of logically formed 
 propositions 3 we cannot so easily admit their legitimacy. 
 The proposition roses are red,” becomes, in the hands of 
 logicians, when converted, some red things are roses.” 
 The simple sentence thunder succeeds lightning” is me- 
 tamorphosed into a* class of things succeeding lightning 
 is thunder.” The monstrous forms of language which re- 
 quire to he introduced for the purpose or converting the 
 majority of logically moulded propositions appear to afford 
 a strong reason for doubting the legitimacy of the process. 
 But, as we have seen, the principal objection does not lie 
 against transposing the terms of a predication, but rather 
 against the changes to which naturally expressed predica- 
 tions must be subjected, in order to bring them into the 
 so-called logical form. 
 
 Having examined the principal features of the scholastic 
 doctrine of the proposition, we may sum up our results. 
 Propositions concerned about classification, are wrongly 
 taken to he the type of all propositions ; and all other kinds 
 of propositions are forced into the form naturally assumed 
 by them. The terms of the logical proposition do not, in 
 the majority of cases, correspond with the objects whose 
 relation is predicated in thought. The copula is incapable 
 of expressing the most of relations, and consequently the 
 words expressive of relations are usually relegated to the 
 predicate, this being inconsistent with the facts of thought. 
 The laws of distribution, founded upon facts of classifica- 
 tion, are applied where there is no reference to classifica- 
 tion, and where they are consequently inapplicable. And 
 
THE LOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PROPOSITION. 151 
 
 finally the simple process of changing the order of the 
 terms of a relation, when applied to the terms of a propo- 
 sition forced into the logical form, produces results quite 
 opposed to the facts of thought and the forms of language. 
 
 In the preceding exposition and criticism, we have taken 
 our stand upon the position that the psychologist and the 
 logician ought to occupy themselves with the analysis and 
 study of thought rather than of expression. The scholastic 
 logicians concerned themselves too much with words, mere 
 words \ hence the word quibbling, the logomachies of me- 
 diaeval times. We have inherited their logical system and 
 still teach it in our colleges ; and a useless system it is, 
 interesting chiefly as a specimen of the ingenuity of men, 
 who had nothing better to do than to'invent puzzles. We 
 hope that the time may soon come when a logic will be 
 generally taught which will attempt to be a real and ac- 
 curate analysis of thought worthy of the study of men, 
 who wish to understand the working of their own minds 
 in its higher operations, and who desire a method by which 
 their practical researches after truth may be systematically 
 guided. 
 
 NOTE H. 
 
 IMPLIED PREDICATIONS. 
 
 There is such a connection and complication between 
 truths that, generally speaking, when we know and ex- 
 press one truth there are many other truths implicitly 
 known and ready to be expressed. In the predications 
 which we make regarding the objects of our knowledge we 
 give prominence to some particular feature which it suits 
 our purpose to express, but there may be many other rela- 
 tions connected with the same objects which we know, 
 which we imply in our predications, but which we do not 
 care to state explicitly. Almost every explicit predication 
 
152 
 
 IMPLIED PREDICATIONS. 
 
 is connected with other implicit predications ; in beini» 
 distinctly conscious of the former we know the latter also, 
 although they may not be so distinctly before conscious- 
 ness. The explicit predication stands out clearly from 
 amidst the surrounding implicit ones, but they are in the 
 immediate neighbourhood and simply require the atten- 
 tion to be directed to them in order to make them as dis- 
 tinct as that which we have chosen to express. And it is 
 frequently as important to know what is implied in our 
 predications as to have a clear apprehension of what we 
 distinctly state. 
 
 A few illustrations will bring the subject more clearly 
 before us. 
 
 When we make 'the general predication. — All men are 
 mortal, we have in our mind the class of men as a whole 
 wherever they are to be found, and we predicate regarding 
 them that they are, without exception, liable to death. 
 But in the very act of making this assertion there is in- 
 volved the knowledge or belief that some particular men 
 will die. In asserting a universal predication we imply 
 its truth with reference to any particular number. The 
 same kind of implication is involved of course in negative 
 predications. The Law of Contradiction is the expression 
 of another fact regarding the relations of predications. 
 An explicit predication not only implies other predication, 
 but may also exclude other predications. The proposition 
 above referred to excludes the corresponding negative. — All 
 men, or some men, are not mortal. And in the same way 
 the predication of a universal or particular negative excludes 
 the corresponding affirmatives. To know what a particular 
 predication implies and what it excludes is the most im- 
 portant condition of consistency in our knowledge. 
 
 An important class of implicit predications is involved 
 in the predication of the internal relations of an object or 
 class of objects and its constituent qualities. Whenever 
 we predicate a quality of any object we thereby implicitly 
 classify that object with others possessing the same quality. 
 
IMPLIED PREDICATIONS. 
 
 165 
 
 When we say for example that birds are oviparous we do 
 not say anything* about other oviparous things and we do 
 not even mean anything about them, but if we examine 
 the thoughts which cluster about the explicit predication 
 We shall find amongst them that birds may be classified 
 with other oviparous beings, if such exist. Were we to 
 examine all other cases of internal predication we should 
 find that each of them implies an external predication ; 
 whenever we predicate a quality of any object or class of 
 objects we implicitly predicate that that object or class of 
 objects may be included in a larger class p-ll of whose 
 members are marked by the possession of that quality. 
 This implied predication has also its corresponding exclude 
 ed predication. If we can assert that objects, in conse- 
 quence of possessing a certain quality, may be classified 
 with all other objects possessing the same quality, we are 
 precluded from making this predication with reference to 
 objects which do not possess the quality. And, generally 
 speaking, where two predications are inconsistent with 
 one another, if the one is either explicitly stated or im- 
 plied the other is thereby excluded. 
 
 For the sake of illustration we offer the following ex- 
 amples of explicit, implied, and excluded predications : — 
 
 EXPLICIT 
 
 Predication. 
 
 All fishes oxL 
 dize their blood 
 from water. 
 
 All planets 
 move in elliptic 
 orbits. 
 
 IMPLIED 
 
 Predications. 
 
 Some fishes, or these fishes, 
 oxidize &c. Fishes belong to 
 the class of animals oxidizing 
 &c. 
 
 Any particular planet moves 
 in an elliptic orbit. 
 
 The class of bodies moving 
 in elliptic orbits comprehends 
 planets. 
 
 EXCLUDED 
 
 Predications. 
 
 No fishes oxidize &c. 
 Animals which do not oxi- 
 dize &e. are fishes. 
 
 All or some planets move 
 in an orbit not elliptic. 
 
 Bodies moving in a pa- 
 rabolic or other non-ellip- 
 tic orbit are planets. 
 
 Whales belong 
 to the class mam- 
 mats. 
 
 Some mammals are whales. 
 Some of the qualities pos*- 
 sessed by all mammals are 
 possessed by whales. 
 
 N o mammals are whales. 
 Mammals possess no 
 qualities in common with 
 whales. 
 
 Alfred Tenny- 
 son is a poet. 
 
 Alfred Tennyson possesses Alfred Tennyson is 
 the genius and other qualities wanting in poetical genh 
 which constitute a poet. ' us, 
 
154 
 
 IMPLIED PIIEDICATIONS. 
 
 EXPLICIT 
 Predication. 
 The angles of 
 a plane triangle 
 are either equal 
 to two right an- 
 gles or unequal. 
 
 IMPLIED 
 
 Predications. 
 
 If they are equal to two 
 I right angles they cannot be 
 unequal, and vice versd. 
 
 John Smith is 
 a drunkard. 
 
 J ohn Smith cannot control 
 his appetite for strong drink. 
 
 The line A is 
 double of B. 
 
 The line B is half of A . 
 
 The sun illumi* The sun is luminous. The 
 nates the earth. sun and earth are so related 
 in space that light from the 
 former can fall upon the lat- 
 ter. 
 
 EXCLUDED 
 
 Predications. 
 
 They may be both equal 
 and unequal. 
 
 John Smith can choose 
 either to drink or not to 
 dring strong liquor when 
 he pleases. 
 
 The lines A and B are 
 equal. 
 
 The line B is greater 
 than half of A. 
 
 The sun is neither a self- 
 luminous nor a light-re- 
 flecting body. The earth 
 is so situated that rays of 
 light from the sun cannot 
 fall upon it. 
 
 Having illustrated the relations between explicit and 
 implied and excluded predications we may sum up our re- 
 sults in the following canons 
 
 1. Whatever relation is predicated of a class of objects 
 may be predicated of any individuals belonging to the 
 class ; the denial of this relation with reference to any or 
 all of these individuals is excluded. 
 
 2. The predication of an internal relation of any class 
 of objects implies an external relation, viz. that these ob- 
 jects belong to a larger class of things possessing the qua- 
 lity predicated. The denial of this and the assertion that 
 objects not possessing the quality belong to the class are 
 excluded. 
 
 3. The predication that an individual belongs to a class 
 implies the possession of the qualities constituting the 
 class. The contrary is excluded. 
 
 4. The predication of any external relation between 
 two or more objects implies the existence of all the condi- 
 tions which renders that relation possible. The denial of 
 these conditions is excluded. 
 
 5. Generally, the predication of any relation excludes 
 the predication of all other relations which are inconsistent 
 
IMPLIED PREDICATIONS. 
 
 155 
 
 witli it, and implies the predication of all relations which 
 are its necessary conditions or consequences. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that these principles regulat- 
 ing the implication and exclusion of predications are clear 
 and certain, there are actually found many inconsistencies 
 and inaccuracies amongst the thoughts of men. Predica- 
 tions are frequently thought to be implied which are not 
 really implied, and thought to be exclude which are not 
 really inconsistent with admitted truth. And it is the 
 great duty of the instructors of mankind to spread abroad 
 accurate and consistent knowledge, that is, knowledge in 
 which established principles and facts are accompanied by 
 everything implied in them and from which all inconsis- 
 tent opinions are excluded. We may refer, by way of illus- 
 tration, to -some mistakes which are frequently made or 
 have been made in determining the implication or exclu- 
 sion of predications. 
 
 In judging of the national characteristics of foreign 
 peoples, striking features are often erroneously supposed to 
 be universal, and false judgments are consequently pro- 
 nounced in particular cases. Englishmen are of the opi- 
 nion that the Germans are a musical people, and it might 
 be supposed that every particular German is a musician 
 either actually or potentially. But such would be doubt- 
 less a mistake. 
 
 Europeans are of opinion that Bengalis are an untruthful 
 people, and many of them in Bengal act upon the belief 
 that the word of no Bengali is to be trusted. This is un- 
 questionably an error. Bengalis on the other hand are of 
 opinion that Englishmen are harsh and overbearing, and 
 frequently apply this judgment indiscriminately. This is 
 equally erroneous. 
 
 Defenders of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures main- 
 tain their accuracy and truth, and many of them think that 
 it is implied that every statement must be accepted as li 
 terally true, and they will not admit any hostile criticism 
 
 21 
 
156 
 
 IMPLIED PREDICATIONS. 
 
 •which results in disclosing- any inaccuracies or inconsis- 
 tencies. Believing that the Scriptures are true they thinli 
 that if anything in them is shown to be inaccurate there 
 is nothing worth preserving. They do not see that the 
 presence of most important religious truth in the Scriptures 
 is quite consistent with the presence of many scientific and 
 historical inaccuracies and many inconsistencies amongst 
 details. Consequently when they learn that inaccuracies 
 or inconsistencies have been pointed out they fear that the 
 citadel of their faith has been taken and that they can have 
 no confidence in any religious truth whatever. The same 
 foolish position is frequently assumed by the enemies of 
 Christianity. Some of them appear to think that, if they 
 have shown statements in the Scriptures to be scientifical- 
 ly or historically inaccurate or mutually inconsistent, they 
 have demonstrated the falsity of Christianity, whereas in 
 reality they have not approached the foundations of the 
 Christian faith in their attacks. 
 
 Similarly, in former times, it was usual for the followers 
 of rival creeds to attack with virulence subordinate details 
 in the religious systems or Scriptures of their antagonists, 
 thinking that by so doing they were aiding their over- 
 throw. And generally speaking sectarians are those who 
 are unable to see that there may be possessed great and 
 important religious truth quite consistently along with 
 many minor points of form or doctrine which they cannot 
 agree with. 
 
 In philosophical doctrines there may often be an ap- 
 pearance of inconsistence between two predications when 
 in reality they are quite consistent. For example Mr. J. 
 S. Mill has endeavoured to show that Sir W. Hamilton’s 
 Doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge is inconsistent 
 with his Doctrine of Immediate Perception. In the former 
 doctrine Hamilton maintains that we do not know things- 
 in-themselves ; in the latter doctrine, that we have an 
 immediate knowledge of real things. Mr, Mill assumes 
 
IMPLIED PREDICATIONS. 
 
 157 
 
 that the thinors spoken of in the former doctrine are the 
 same as the things said to be known in the latter, and upon 
 that assumption rig*ht]y concludes that the one statement 
 is inconsistent with the other. Now it appears to us that 
 a careful examination of Hamilton's writings will show 
 that Mr. Mill is incorrect in his criticism, and that Ha- 
 milton in the two doctrines is speaking of two quite dif- 
 ferent things in the Doctrine of the Relativity of Know- 
 ledge he teaches that the cause or substratum which under, 
 lies the objects of our senses is unknown ; in the Doctrine 
 of Immediate Perception he teaches that the objects of our 
 senses are directly known ; and between these statements 
 there is certainly no inconsistency. 
 
 Again, there are many in the world who believe that 
 God^s will is sovereign, or that all events in their lives are 
 controlled by Fate ; and frequently they think that this 
 implies that their own efforts in adverse circumstances are 
 unavailing. They cannot reconcile the sovereignty of God 
 with the importance of exercising all their own power and 
 wisdom at all times as if they were sovereigns of their 
 own lives. In consequence of permitting the idea of an 
 over-ruling sovereignty to fill their minds to the exclusion 
 of the idea of their own personal responsibility, when 
 temptation or adverse circumstances come upon them they 
 5ield without an effort and prove how helpless and worth- 
 less man is if he have not a lively sense of his own dignity 
 and responsibility. 
 
 Sophistical reasoners in their attempts to mislead the 
 people usually etideavour to show that opposing statements 
 are quite consistent or that really consistent statements 
 are incongruous. And generally speaking it is of the 
 greatest importance for seekers after truth to watch care- 
 fully appearances of consistency and appearances of incon- 
 gruity ; falsehood frequently comes .veiled under the one 
 and truth is frequently concealed by the other. Doctrines 
 apparently conflicting may frequently be comprehended 
 
 21 2 
 
158 
 
 IMPLIED PREDICATIONS. 
 
 harmoniously under a higher truth ; and doctrines joined 
 together in some human system may be as inconsistent as 
 light and darkness. 
 
 NOTE I. 
 
 A PRIORI REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 That there are a priori principles which regulate our intel- 
 lectual activity is admitted by all psychologists. We say 
 all psychologists, because even the most extreme advocates of 
 
 the experiential school must and do admit that the charac- 
 
 ter of our knowledge and our thought depends, at least to 
 some extent, upon the constitution of the nature with 
 which we are born into the world. And in so far as the 
 nature which we inherit from our parents determines our 
 experience in so far we are under the government of a 
 priori principles. There are some who hold that our men- 
 tal experience depends upon the character of the physical 
 organism with w^hich we are born. Even in this case our 
 mental activity is governed by a priori laws. It is main- 
 tained also that the physical organism which we inherit 
 is itself the result of the indefinite past experience of our 
 ancestors ; but manifestly the past experience of our ances- 
 tors at every stage must have been regulated by something 
 a priori, something in the condition of things immediately 
 preceding. So that, even upon this theory, all past ex- 
 perience must have been under the government of a priori 
 principles, and the accumulated results of that experience 
 admittedly involve the a priori principles which govern 
 present experience. Whether therefore the a priori prin- 
 ciples which regulate our mental activity are established in 
 connection with our physical organism or our mental na- 
 ture it must necessarily be admitted that there are such 
 
A PRIORI REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 159 
 
 a priori principles, both in tbe present condition of human 
 nature, and at every past stai^e of prog'ress by which 
 human and inferior races have advanced. We shall 
 therefore assume the existence of a priori reg’ulative prin- 
 ciples as indisputable, and proceed to discuss the account 
 which Hamilton gives of them. 
 
 After dividing necessity or necessary principles into two 
 kinds — Positive and Negative, — and briefly describing the 
 former, Hamilton proceeds to the exposition of the doctrine, 
 peculiar to himself, of Negative necessity. This doctrine he 
 denominates the Law of the Conditioned, which he enun- 
 ciates in the following terms : — All that is conceivable in 
 thought lies between two inconceivable extremes which, as 
 contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of 
 which, as mutual contradictories, one must.^^ The two 
 inconceivable extremes are called respectively the Abso- 
 lutely Unconditioned or the Absolute, and the Infinitely 
 Unconditioned or the Infinite, and the conceivable middle 
 sphere is called the Conditioned. Thus the Conditioned is 
 the mean between two exclusive extremes neither of which 
 can be conceived as possible, but of which on the principles 
 of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, one must be ad- 
 mitted as neccessary. This Law of the Conditioned is 
 illustrated by being applied to Space and Time. Space 
 must be either Absolutely Limited or Infinitelv Unlimit- 
 ed ; upon the principle of Excluded Middle space can 
 have no intermediate predicate applied to it ; but it is im- 
 possible for us to think of "pace as either Absolutely 
 Limited or Infinitely Unlimited, — we can think of Space 
 only as Conditioned or Conditionally Limited. Such is 
 Hamilton's famous Law of the Conditioned. 
 
 Without entering into an exhaustive examination of this 
 Law we offer the following critical remarks : — 
 
 1. One of the inconceivable extremes, — the Absolutely 
 Limited — appears to involve contradictory elements. That 
 which is limited cannot be absolute in any sense of that 
 
160 
 
 A PRIORI REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 term. The idea of limitation necessarily implies two 
 things — something’ which is limited and something which 
 limits — and these two things are mutually relative. The 
 ideas of the Absolute and the Limited are mutually incon- 
 sistent. On the other hand the ideas of the Infinite and 
 the Unlimited are not inconsistent, and there is no difficul- 
 ty in conceiving the Infinite except that which arises from 
 the weakness of the human mind. Again, when we apply 
 this Law to space, for example, the two extremes do not 
 present the same difficulty. Absolute space, that is space 
 absolutely limited is inconceivable, not from the weakness 
 of OUT minds hut because the attributing of a limit to space 
 is inconsistent with our idea of ivhat space is. Infinite space 
 is inconceivable from the weakness of our minds. Thus we 
 see that the two apparently contradictory extremes do not 
 arise naturally in our thoughts ; they have an appearance 
 of being manufactured for the purpose of satisfying the re- 
 quirements of the Law, and one of them is inconceivable 
 because it is so constructed by its author as to be incon- 
 ceivable. 
 
 2. What is the meaning of saying that all that is 
 conceivable lies between two inconceivable extremes?’^ Ac- 
 cording to the conditions of the case there is no middle 
 sphere between the two contradictory extremes , all that 
 is between them is excluded by the well-known Law of 
 Excluded Middle; how then can thought be concerned 
 about that which, by one of the necessary Laws of Thought, 
 cannot be thought about ? Thus the Law of the Condi- 
 tioned appears to be inconsistent with the Law of Excluded 
 Middle ; both of them are Laws governing our thoughts ; 
 and that which is made the sole object of our thought by 
 the former is absolutely excluded by the latter. 
 
 3. The object which Hamilton had in view in institut- 
 ing this Law— the limitation of thought to its proper 
 sphere — may be equally well accomplished by an appeal to 
 the universally recognised conditions of thought. All 
 
A PRIORI REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 161 
 
 human thought is concerned about phenomena under the 
 relations of Difference, Kesemhlance, Simultaneity and 
 Succession and is governed by the great Laws of Identity, 
 Contradiction, and Excluded Middle j or if thought endea- 
 vours to reach beyond phenomena, the nou-phenomenal 
 objects must be draped in phenomenal clothing. These 
 restrictions imposed upon thought, if observed, are quite 
 sufficient to keep us from the transcendental metaphysics 
 against which Hamilton directed his Law of the Condition. 
 
 Tiia END. 
 
 Printed by B. M. Sen, “ Tomohur” Press, Serampore. 
 
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