i; k 1 the university of Connecticut libraries 1^5.C55 V.17, 1966 hbl, stx Caribbean; jllHM»«„^.^31^j3 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from LYRASIS members and Sloan Foundation http://www.archive.org/details/caribbeanitshemiOOconf The CARIBBEAN: ITS HEMISPHERIC ROLE SERIES ONE VOLUME XVII A publication of the CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES which contains the papers delivered at the seventeenth conference on the Caribbean held at the University of Florida, December 1, 2, and 3, 1966 The CARIBBEAN: V V ITS HEMISPHERIC ROLE edited hy A. Curtis Wilgus 1967 L/NIVERSITT OF FLORIDA PRESS Gainesville A University of Florida Press Book Copyright © 1967 by the Board of Commissioners of State Institutions OF Florida All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 51-12532 Printed by Storter Printing Company, Inc. Gainesville, Florida Contributors German Arciniegas, Professor, Instituto Caro y Cuervo, Bogota, Colombia Margot Boulton de Bottome, former Venezuelan Delegate to U.N. Assembly, Caracas David D. Burks, Associate Professor of History, Indiana University, Bloomington Jacob Canter, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. John Edw^in Fagg, Chairman, Department of History, Washington Square College, New York University Roland H. del Mar, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.) former Director, Inter-American Defense College, Washington, D.C. Frederick E. Kidder, Director of the Department of Social Sciences, Mayagiiez Campus, University of Puerto Rico Margarita Macaya, Chairman, Inter-American Commission of Women, San Jose, Costa Rica Thomas Mathev^s, Director of the Institute of Caribbean Studies and Professor, Social Science Faculty, University of Puerto Rico Ofelia Mendoza, Field Director, International Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere Region, Washington, D.C. Jose A. Mora, Secretary-General, Organization of American States, Washington, D.C. Matio Mory, Executive-Director, Banco Inmobiliario, S.A., Guate- mala Irving E. Muskat, Chairman, Interama, Miami, Florida Alfonso Ocampo-Londono, Rector, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia John N. Plank, Director, Political Development Studies, The Brook- ings Institution, Washington, D.C. Joseph W. REmY, Consultant on Latin America, Washington, D.C. J. Wayne Reitz, President, University of Florida, Gainesville Juan D. Sanchez, Senior Vice President in charge of Supervision of Caribbean Area, First National City Bank, New^ York City vi The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Cablos Sanz de Santamaeia, Chairman, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Washington, D.C. A. Curtis Wilgus, Director, Caribbean Conferences, University of Florida, Gainesville Robert Wool, President, Inter-American Foundation for the Arts, New York City Rafael A. Zuniga, Chief of Area III, Loan Division-North, Inter- American Development Bank, Washington, D.C. Foreword a EGINNING in 1950, the University of Florida has sponsored a series of conferences on the Caribbean area generally with the cooperation of business organizations, and with a gathering of ex- perts from the Hemisphere and overseas, including scholars, busi- nessmen, and government oflBcials. This volume is an account of the seventeenth and final conference held in the series. The suc- cess and significance of these conferences can be attributed in large measure to the capable leadership of Professor A. Curtis Wilgus, who for thirteen years served as Director of the University of Florida's School of Inter- American Studies. The selection of a wide variety of topics for discussion and the invitations to speak- ers have been under his supervision and direction. Beginning with the first meeting, the Caribbean area has been considered to include Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Vene- zuela, and the independent islands. This definition has made possible the wide description and comparison of the many factors influencing the region. Indeed, the Caribbean was originally selected as a conference topic because most problems found else- where in Latin America may also be found in this area, and since Florida is virtually a part of the Caribbean geographically, it seemed logical to select this portion of the Hemisphere as our province for consideration. This series of conferences has reflected the interest of the Uni- versity of Florida in Latin America and the University's leader- ship in examining the problems of the Caribbean area. Each year a volume of proceedings, containing the papers delivered at the meetings, has been published in an attractive format by the Uni- versity of Florida Press and advertised all over the world. The University of Florida feels proud that it has been able to play a prominent part by means of these conferences in promoting a better understanding of the countries to the South while at the same time developing a superb faculty with extensive course offerings in the field of Latin American affairs. J. Wayne Reitz, President University of Florida vu The Carihhean Conference Series Volume I ( 1951 ) : The Caribbean at Mid-Century Volume II ( 1952 ) : The Caribbean: Peoples, Problems, and Prospects Volimie III ( 1953 ) : The Caribbean: Contemporary Trends Volume IV ( 1954 ) : The Caribbean: Its Economy Volume V ( 1955 ) : The Caribbean: Its Culture Volume VI (1956): The Caribbean: Its Political Problems Volume VII (1957): The Caribbean: Contemporary International Relations Volume VIII ( 1958 ) : The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French, United States Volume IX ( 1959 ) : The Caribbean: Natural Resources Volume X (1960): The Caribbean: Contemporary Education Volume XI ( 1961 ) : The Caribbean: The Central American Area Volume XII ( 1962 ) : The Caribbean: Contemporary Colombia Volume XIII ( 1963 ) : The Caribbean: Venezuelan Development, A Case History Volume XrV (1964): The Caribbean: Mexico Today Volume XV (1965): The Caribbean: Its Health Problems Volume XVI (1966): The Caribbean: Current United States Relations Volimie XVII ( 1967 ) : The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Contents Map of Caribbean Area Frontispiece List of Contributors v Foreword — J. Wayne Reitz vii Introduction: the Caribbean today and tomoeeow — A. Curtis Wilgus xi Part I— POLITICAL CAPACITY 1. John Edwin Fagg: handicaps and liabilities of the CARIBBEAN 3 2. Joseph W. Reidy: growth and possible change in CARIBBEAN AMERICA'S POLITICAL CAPACITY 13 3. Thomas Mathews : problems and leaders in the <- CARIBBEAN \. 28 Part II— ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 4. Juan D. Sanchez: resources of the Caribbean .... 43 5. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria: opportunities for development in the CARIBBEAN ......... 54 6. Matio Mory: education and development planning IN THE CARIBBEAN 59 7. Rafael A. Zufiiga: integration, the inter- American DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND THE CARIBBEAN 70 Part III—SOCIAL PATTERNS 8. David D. Burks: strategies of social change in the CARIBBEAN 83 9. Ofelia Mendoza: changing forces in the Caribbean . . 94 10. Margarita Macaya: women — their role, present and POTENTIAL, IN THE CARIBBEAN 103 11. Margot Boulton de Bottome: Venezuela and the CARIBBEAN 114 Part IV— CULTURAL INFLUENCES 12. Alfonso Ocampo-Londono: education — a look ahead in the CARIBBEAN 127 13. Jose A. Mora: the young Caribbean meets a new CHALLENGE 138 14. Robert Wool: notes on the cultural underground in the CARIBBEAN TODAY 145 ix X The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Part V— INTERNATIONAL POSITION 15. Roland H. del Mar: strategic chakacteristics of THE CARIBBEAN 155 16. John N. Plank: neighborly relations in the Caribbean . 161 17. Jacob Canter: an inter- American education: CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN OBJECTIVES 171 18. Irving E. Muskat: interama and our Caribbean and LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS 181 19. German Arciniegas : the immediate future of the CARIBBEAN 187 Part VI— BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES 20. Frederick E. Kidder: hemispheric role of the CARIBBEAN POLITICAL LEADERS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 193 Introduction THE CARIBBEAN TODAY AND TOMORROW JLN this series o£ conferences during the past seventeen years, an attempt has been made to examine carefully and fully the many details and aspects of the culture, life, and history of the Carib- bean area. Experts from the Americas and elsewhere have brought their special knowledge to bear on many aspects of Caribbean affairs. Virtually no phase of knowledge relating to this area has been omitted. In consequence, the volume of proceedings result- ing from each conference has made a contribution to the better understanding of the region. Not all of the papers have been of equal value or significance, but each in itself has presented a point of view of the author which has served a variety of pur- poses for the reader. Although the volumes have never been intended as textbooks, several of them have been used in classes. Others have been assigned as up-to-date references, which no teacher of the Caribbean area should omit from his list of readings. The University of Florida owes a debt of gratitude to the more than 360 different speakers in these seventeen conferences who helped make this Institution an outstanding academic leader in Caribbean interests. This appreciation is here recognized by the many persons connected with the conferences over the years, and as Director and organizer of these meetings, I wish personally to record my feelings of satisfaction and gratification. In planning this final conference in the series, I thought it wise to select a topic which would evaluate the various facets and factors in Caribbean life today in order to catch a glimpse of the immediate future and, without predicting what may happen, to consider possible trends. This attempt seems all the more reason- XI xii The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role able now because the first conference in 1950 tried to summarize the various factors and conditions in the Caribbean at mid-century, when in some respects the area was on the threshold of a great leap forward. For the purposes of these conferences, we have considered the Caribbean in its broadest sense to include Mexico, Central Amer- ica, Venezuela, Colombia and the islands; but we cannot and should not make any generalized conclusions regarding the area as a whole. This region has a vast storehouse of historical infor- mation which extends back several thousand years. But like facts in other areas of history, possibly nine-tenths of these have disap- peared. Unlike research in certain scientific fields, we cannot press any computer buttons in the Caribbean to retrieve this lost knowl- edge. A student of this area therefore works with what informa- tion he has, with what knowledge he can find, and with what conclusions he can reach. Before 1800 the area presented a great many similarities, and its history was more uniform than in later years. But the nine- teenth century saw upheavals, some a backwash from Europe, which brought independence to many of the countries and in- numerable attendant disorders. If the colonial period was one of childhood, the nineteenth century was one of adolescence and was marked by growing pains of every type: political, economic, so- cial, cultural, and environmental. The twentieth century brought new responsibilities and consequent disorders. The two world wars permanently affected life in all of its ramifications in the Carib- bean area. But not all of these countries have proceeded along the path of progress with equal rapidity. Indeed, some like Haiti have taken backward steps, while new forward-looking govern- ments -have been born in the former colonies of Great Britain. National advancement in many countries has been limited and determined by what is appropriately called nationalism. This in- cludes the development of a national personality for each coun- try in political, economic, social, cultural, and other areas. In many instances, nationalism has prevented international cooper- ation and has cut across lines of contact with the United States. On the other hand, for example, nationalism has not prevented the development of the Central American Common Market. Whenever boundary disputes have arisen, and boundary problems still remain, nationalism again expresses itself, quite often in bel- EDITORS INTRODUCTION Xlll ligerent attitudes. But no one will criticize nationalism for its many weaknesses since the practice of nationalism has been the key to and the cause of wide and progressive development in most of the countries of the Caribbean. Viewing the Caribbean area as a whole, we see that it contains a collection of civilizations and cultures similar to one another in many ways but differing radically in others. For example, there are a number of different political philosophies found in the sev- eral governments which result in political constitutions reflecting local history, philosophies, prejudices, and aspirations. Despite the inroads and influences of foreign political ideologies, the con- cept of the nation-state in the Caribbean has been steadily grow- ing. Yet in all political development, theory and practice have usually been poles apart. In each of the countries, political factions have first tended to multiply and then to coalesce and combine, only to fracture once again. The franchise in the Caribbean has been broadening dur- ing the last three decades. Women now enjoy political rights in all of the countries except Haiti. Frequently the widening of the franchise has given rise to pressure groups, and in every country, with the possible exception of Costa Rica, the army and other branches of the military may at any time constitute a powerful pres- sure group. Military coups d'etat are of frequent occurrence, for the armed services constitute a continuous threat to every govern- ment in the Caribbean. On the other hand, various non-violent methods of changing the government are now practiced in the area. Dictators have existed in all of the countries, and constitutions are frequently refurbished or replaced by new political instru- ments which sometimes are more literary than politically prac- tical. In all countries, the use and abuse of executive power has occured. The caudillo psychosis is still present in many of the countries, and while personal ambitions are often denied, the ac- tions taken by egocentric politicians to win power are anything but modest. In some countries, conflicts of interest between the central gov- ernment and local governments result not only from constitutional provisions, or the lack of them, but also from the selfish ambitions of military or church leaders or of local politicians with national and international ambitions. Unfortunately, both local and na- tional governments are subject to the machinations of dishonest oflBcials, and corruption in everyday political life is observable in many localities. xiv The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role No one would be so bold as to predict the political future of any country in the Caribbean. The problems facing democratic institutions in all of them are innumerable and appear in some instances to be insoluble. This condition is aggregated frequently because of the political control of the press which can be both a benefit and a threat to the party in power. Perhaps the most general and persistent criticism leveled at the governments of Latin America has come from the Inter-American Press Associa- tion, which each year evaluates the degree of press freedom or control in each Latin American country. Theoretically, such criti- cism is beneficial, but it often leads to unhappy results, especially for editors and newspapers. In looking at the political prospects of these countries, one may conclude that, until detrimental traditions and conditions have been overcome and logical practical politics can be adopted, per- manent political improvement in many of these Caribbean coun- tries is still on the far horizon. II Political factors and characteristics are so related to environ- ment that national advancement cannot be considered without full reference to economic factors. In early days the colonies in the Caribbean were widely separated by water, but in the past half century these countries have been closely connected by water. Likewise, rivers, once effective barriers, are now convenient means of transportation, as are railroads, highways, and air routes. Internally, moreover, each country has had a problem of water supply. Some areas, Mexico for example, are arid and need water obtained through irrigation. In other regions, especially along the Pacific coast of Central America, rainfall is much too abundant and constitutes a handicap to economic development. In several countries the building of dams has helped to solve related prob- lems of economic life, while in some of the Lesser Antilles rain- water must be stored for drinking. Many of the countries are without first-class natural harbors, although some have been arti- ficially improved. Even though the countries have had a Catho- lic background, the fishing industries have not been developed in a number of them to the ultimate potential. At any time the warm waters of the Caribbean may breed storms of a dangerous nature, and several of the countries have suflFered from time to time economic disaster from these "acts of God." All of the countries of the Caribbean area have depended in large part upon agriculture. But when this has not been developed EDITORS INTRODUCTION XV to its fullest extent, numerous products have had to be imported, especially those which are consumed by a majority of the people such as corn and rice. On the other hand, there are surpluses of certain products, for example sugar, coffee, and bananas, and while these have had to compete in the international market, the United States, being nearby, has absorbed many of these exports. Another important factor a£Fecting agriculture is soil, and various specialized studies are being conducted, such as those supervised by the University of Florida, in selected Central American areas. Mineral resources are also of great importance, especially in Venezuela and Mexico. Petroleum and natural gas have provided large revenues for further national development. Mexico and Vene- zuela also produce an abundance and variety of minerals in use in the world markets as well as in the United States. Industrialization has developed unevenly in various countries, and assistance from the United States and elsewhere has been needed. In recent years, the Inter-American Bank, the Interna- tional Bank, and the Alliance for Progress have stimulated eco- nomic development in all of the countries of the Caribbean. Un- fortunately, many of these area governments cannot contribute their share to this mutual undertaking, nor can they, as in the case of Puerto Rico, pull themselves up by their economic boot- straps. But economic progress is encouraging in most of these Carib- bean countries, and even though Cuba is outside of the economic sphere of the Alliance for Progress, it has attempted with assist- ance from other sources to solve a number of critical economic problems. The economic future of the Caribbean is still somewhat clouded, but if the United States can continue to render assistance through financial gifts, loans, and technical cooperation, the whole area should become a region of increasing economic prosperity. In this connection, however, one must always keep in mind the possibility of national expropriation of land and industries and of various other economic tinkering by national governments in their prac- tice of nationalism. Besides, one must remember also that the labor factor, like that in, the United States, often becomes a dis- rupting influence in local industries and in various sensitive oc- cupations. in In some respects, the Achilles' heel crippling national develop- ment in the Caribbean is found in the realm of education. Illiter- acy has been a key factor in all of the countries although Costa xvi The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Rica, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba have the lowest percentages. One of the most illiterate countries in the world is Haiti, but no one has suggested an effective cure for this condition. All coun- tries recognize the problems connected with illiteracy because they affect everyday aspects of life. In several of the countries nearly a half or more of the population is of school age, yet there are not enough schools for them to attend and not enough teachers to supply the schools that exist. Adequate financing in education is a problem in each Caribbean country. About the best that can be done in most of them is to afford as many people as possible an elementary education, sometimes through the sixth grade or even the eighth grade. In several instances, private in- struction supported by funds from the Catholic Church or from Protestant missionary organizations has helped develop schools and courses far ahead of those in the public state-supported schools. In some countries, non-denominational schools are avail- able for students but these are used chiefly by children of foreign parents or by upper-class nationals. Technical vocational schools are needed everywhere in addition to schools for the training of teachers. At the college and university level, many current educational methods and procedures are antiquated, and some date back to colonial days. Even the educational reform movement which began in Cordoba, Argentina in 1918, and reached Mexico in 1921, has failed to bring about serious improvement in many of the national educational systems. Generally, students in Latin American uni- versities take a greater interest in politics than do those in the United States — at least until recently. Student influence in Latin American universities, especially in administration and manage- ment, has always been greater than in the United States. Because of student and faculty participation in political activities, many universities in Latin America have frequently been closed by the governments for long periods of time. This disruption of the edu- cation of college students has been a nationwide problem in the Caribbean countries. For a century and a half, young men and more recently some women, have sought training in law and other professions includ- ing medicine, dentistry, engineering, and architecture. In some countries large numbers of students educated in the professions have gone first to Europe and more recently to the United States for further training in their specialties. The Catholic Church for almost a century and a half has attracted large numbers of men and women seeking careers in its activities. Currently, however, EDITORS INTRODUCTION XVll fewer and fewer have been attracted to the church by its minis- terial and propaganda branches. Since the Second World War an increasing number of students from Latin America have come to the United States, while stu- dents from the United States have gone to Latin America, although in fewer numbers. Many young men and women from these countries have come as exchange students to particular univer- sities in the United States. Under the Fulbright-Hays Act a grow- ing number of teachers and students have benefited professionally from such educational travel. At the present time, many univer- sities in the United States have "adopted" universities in the Caribbean area. Sometimes this results in the financing of special activities in the Latin American institutions, but in most cases it includes the exchange of students and teachers for special pro- fessional purposes. All signs point to the future growth of this important activity in the improvement of inter-American under- standing. 7V Closely connected with educational problems are those relating to health. Here again the environment is all important, with me- teorological factors often being crucial and critical in various re- gions of individual countries. Everyone who has gone to the Caribbean has experienced adverse effects from food and water, despite the fact that many natives seem to have become immune to both. Pollution of water is much worse than pollution of air in the Caribbean countries. The problem of sewage disposal is im- portant in every country of the Caribbean, including Puerto Rico, although it is possible to drink water out of any spigot in any locality without serious effects. In all of the Caribbean countries, diseases are related to the environment. Some of these are endemic and some are epidemic. Diseases causing high mortality in the Caribbean are gastritis, enteritis, and related infections. Malaria, yellow fever, smallpox, tuberculosis, and diarrheal diseases are endemic in some areas. The death rate varies in different countries in the Caribbean, but Guatemala, for example, has 233.2 deaths per 100,000 as com- pared with the death rate of the United States of 4,4 per 100,000. Life expectancy varies from 42 years in Haiti and 43.6 years in Guatemala to 65.8 years in Venezuala and 66 in Mexico, with 70.2 the figure for the United States. Everywhere in the Caribbean the current population explosion appears to be continuing. xviii The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role An increasing proportion of government income must be de- voted to solving health problems in the different republics than is now available. Fortunately, these countries have assistance from the Pan American Health Organization which is a subdivision for the Western Hemisphere of the World Health Organization. In many instances, health problems have been difficult to solve be- cause of a lack of health experts and administrators within each government. In all countries hospitals are not numerous enough, and doctors and nurses, tending to go to urban areas, have left vast regions in the rural communities unstaffed. Moreover, good medical schools are not available to adequately provide instruc- tion of a specialized nature for persons wishing to become physi- cians and surgeons. In recent years some of the governments have been complaining of the "brain drain" in which their most prom- ising young men go to regions outside the area for further training and practice. The United States has attracted many of these, and since Castro took over Cuba, large numbers of physicians and surgeons from that island have come to the United States where they eventually engage in medical practice. There appears to be no reason why these trends should not continue, at least for a few years. V No discussion of present and future conditions in the Caribbean is complete without looking at the many varieties of culture which exist there, including the culture of poverty and the culture of frustration. Culture provides the backbone for Caribbean society even though the social order is progressively plagued by political practices, the frequent disruption of economic life, and the rapid rise of an ambitious middle class. Religion as an aspect of culture plays a vital part in the lives of the people of the Caribbean. At one time most persons were considered Catholic, having been born into the church or baptized by it. Rut the Caribbean area is one of immigration, and religions were brought in from Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world; some remained and grew and some lost their influence. Religion everywhere, even atheism, has affected the thoughts and actions of the people of the Caribbean and consequently has had im- mense repercussions on Caribbean culture. Many aspects of art, for example, have been influenced by religious ideas and practices. Even superstition has had a wide influence, especially on painting in Haiti. From earliest days, painting and sculpture have been EDITORS INTRODUCTION XIX handmaidens of the church in the Caribbean area. But the exer- cise of artistic individuahsm and the example set by foreign art- ists have also been influential in the development of distinctive paintings and sculpture, especially in Mexico. Throughout the Caribbean, various schools of painting have been founded, while many individual artists have gone off on individual tangents, fre- quently producing remarkable and surprising results. Sculpture in the Caribbean has never developed to the extent that painting has, although busts and statues of heroes abound in all of the countries. In music and the drama, religion and especially the Catholic Church has played an important part. However, because of for- eign influence, music has gotten out of hand, so to speak, and all of the modern characteristics of the United States dances and popular themes have been adopted and sometimes modified in the countries of the Caribbean. Because of Negro and Asiatic in- fluences, music in several of the countries has assumed special erotic characteristics. In the Indian countries of Mexico and Cen- tral America, the themes and characteristics of the music are largely native. However, the Spanish influence has found its way into all parts of the Caribbean and can easily be recognized wherever it is heard. Drama has often been connected with church activities. But, in recent years Latin American dramatists have branched out into individual fields of experimentation, resulting in forms sometimes entirely dissimilar from those found in other parts of the world. In literature, the essay has long been of importance in Latin America, treating themes of every type. Especially since the Second World War, novelists in all Latin American countries have been writing feverishly, each trying to outdo the other in modern- type literature. The new freedom in morals and sex attitudes has spread throughout Latin America as it has in other parts of the world. This has given rise to a new literature not only in novels but in candid biographies and autobiographies. Poetry also has been affected by this erotic tendency and along with novels and essays has been increasingly translated into English and other languages. In connection with these types of literature, the writing of history and special scholarly studies is being pursued more frequently in the Caribbean area. Technical works and scientific treatises are also growing in importance, and a number of these have been translated into other languages. Perhaps through its culture the Caribbean area will exercise its greatest influence on the future of Latin America. Its art and its XX The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role literature are being exported in all directions. Art exhibits, musi- cal concerts, and translated literature are spreading over the hemisphere. It is conceivable that in the near future this cultural influence may also have an observable eflFect on the culture of the United States, and as more and more of these artists and musicians are invited to world university centers, frequently to teach courses, their individual and collective influence may have far-reaching results. One of these results undoubtedly will be that more people from the United States will visit the Caribbean as tourists or as re- search scholars or simply as observers. Increasing numbers are"^ attending schools as students or visiting universities as temporary lecturers. Men, women, and children of the United States are finally getting to know better the peoples and cultures of the Caribbean and the future of tourism is brighter than in the past. VI In the international field, the Caribbean area is playing a more important part than ever before. It was once said in the United States that the Caribbean was at our back door. Now we say that it is on our front doorstep. The Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico constitute, indeed, an "American Mediterranean," a great hemis- phere lake. The whole region, once looking exclusively toward Europe, is now oriented toward the United States. Hence, our relations with the Caribbean are crucial and paramount. The United States' concern over Cuba has given rise in some areas of the Caribbean to suspicions regarding our national mo- tives both political and economic. Our Alliance for Progress has been called by some in the Carribean the new "Dollar Diplo- macy." But fortunately, a majority of these governments do not feel this way about the United States. They all, however, seem to have decided that they will not remain exclusively under the thumb of their big neighbor but will widen their world horizons politically, economically, and diplomatically. They are aided in this objective because international communications have brought all of these countries closer to other parts of the world with the result that these areas are more interested now in the Caribbean than ever before. The diplomatic relations of the Caribbean area have been re- markably varied. In the last few years, communism as a doctrine and as a political force has been introduced into the region. Rus- sian communism, and more recently Chinese communism, have EDITORS INTRODUCTION XXI been factors to be reckoned with in several of the Caribbean countries. Cuba has tried to promote its own brand of communism in several of the Latin American countries but with little success. Foreign ideologies undoubtedly have affected the practices of diplomacy throughout the Caribbean. Generally, the relations of these countries with each other have become closer and more friendly, and with their rising aspirations (a better term than rising expectations) have been drawn closer into the sphere of United States influence. The British, French, and Dutch have modified to a varying extent their relationships with their territories and former colonies in the Caribbean. Changing relations between Britain and her former colonies have brought about some interesting results and no doubt will present some critical problems in the future. Gen- erally the Dutch and the French have liberalized their associations with their Caribbean possessions, and these peoples will probably be drawn more and more into the orbit of the United States, es- pecially through the Alliance for Progress and other economic projects; their needs are becoming more American than European in the broader sense. Now that the Caribbean Organization, for- merly called the Caribbean Commission, has ceased to exist, these governments have increasing incentives to join the American sys- tem, or at least to be associated with it. Diplomatic relations between the United States and the Carib- bean area have come a long way in the past century. Manifest Destiny, which dominated our relationships from 1846 to about 1870, and the practice of Dollar Diplomacy and the Big Stick policy under Theodore Roosevelt gave way to a friendly Pan Americanism and finally to the Good Neighbor Policy. Because the United States has not always appeared sincere and honest in its dealings with the Caribbean countries, suspicions still remain in some areas today. But two world wars and the need for each other through mutual hemispheric assistance have brought us all closer together. Although many of the people of the Caribbean have never heard of the Alliance for Progress, or even of some of the other policies which the United States has practiced in the past, the general suspicion toward the United States which long existed seems to be gradually subsiding. Government leaders, through enlightened and friendly policies, have taken it upon themselves to promote closer inter-American cooperation in the broad sense. And by cooperating more closely with each other, they feel that they are taking the edge off some of the detrimental influences which the United xxii The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role States has exercised in the past. By practicing more self-assurance, by putting their political-economic houses in order, and by main- taining friendly cooperation with the United States, the Caribbean people should move into the future with greater confidence and self-respect, swept along on the wave of history. A. Curtis Wilgus, Director Caribbean Conferences Note: No specific references have been used in preparing the above obser- vations, but the reader is referred to particular chapters in the previous volumes of proceedings of the Caribbean Conferences for the elaboration of all the topics so briefly mentioned here. Parti POLITICAL CAPACITY John Edwin Fagg: handicaps and liabilities OF THE CARIBBEAN In opening the first of these Caribbean Conferences in 1950, Professor A. Curtis Wilgus observed that "in no other portion of the globe are there at present more numerous or more interesting problems than in this area."*i His statement is as valid today as it was sixteen years ago. Probably nothing has done more to produce information and penetrating analysis of these problems than these annual Caribbean Conferences. Since most of us are committed to the belief out of knowledge come progress and hope, we can only hail the previous participants in these gatherings and those who sponsored them. A historian who treats the subject of handicaps and liabilities that bear upon the political capacity of the Caribbean people to play a worthy role in this hemisphere can find a significant theme going all the way back to Columbus: the often unfortunate and tragic effect of the activities of outsiders on this beautiful part of the world that might support a paradise. Of course, many of these influences have also been constructive and benevolent. For nearly half a millenium, however, intrusion by foreigners has been ran- dom and exploitative, so much so that much of this area offers a shocking contrast between nature's bounty and the "wickedness of society," of the splendor of landscapes and the destitution of human beings. ^ "Notes to this chapter begin on p. 11 4 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Columbus himself initiated this theme, when he seized inter- preters during his first voyage and carried them away, when he clashed with Caribs on the second expedition, and in his pathetic efiForts in Hispaniola to adapt the natives to Spain's purposes through the tribute and encomienda. The conquest of Puerto Rico by Ponce de Leon, of Jamaica by Esquivel, and of Cuba by Velazquez, together with the activities of assorted slave-catchers and such enterprisers as Ojeda and Nicuesa on the mainland brought ruin to the primitive societies of the Caribbean. Montejo in Yucatan, Pedrarias, Cortes, and Alvarado in Central America, and the numerous Spanish and even German conquistadors who overran present-day Colombia and Venezuela continued the work of disorganization that European expansion signified. What the military conquest and forced labor did not accomplish in the way of depopulation, germs brought by the Europeans did. Within a generation after the Discovery, the Indian element had been re- duced in most localities to demographic insignificance. Sadly enough, this devastation did not clear the way for a wholesome reconstruction of any kind of society for ages. The more energetic Spaniards moved on into Mexico and Peru, or into the present-day United States and lower South America. The path of empire passed quickly through the Caribbean, accom- plishing little but destruction. It was at least a century before any of the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean enjoyed an orderly and civilized pace of life. And the function of some Caribbean settle- ments as forts and sites for fairs implanted a tradition of vice, crime, and brutality that has long degraded Havana and other cities. The deep roots of Caribbean corruption that Ronald Hilton once noted also trace to the intrusion of Spain's rivals. ^ Except for John Hawkins in his first voyages, the foreign adventurers who came into the area, however much they have been glamorized by their respective nationals in Europe, were likely to be thieves, murderers, kidnappers, and swindlers. The Caribbean's role as a center for piracy intensified an already powerful tendency toward violence and inhumanity. Occasional efforts at European settle- ment introduced fewer sturdy builders than lawless characters unwanted at home. Furthermore, the vast forcible importation of Africans brought the curse of slavery to nearly every section, as well as disoriented, embittered individuals. In times when plain outlawry gave way to the more dignified practice of declared international wars, the Caribbean was the scene of battles, sieges, occupations, and almost continuous fear. By 1700 Spain had acknowledged the loss of Jamaica, Haiti, POLITICAL CAPACITY 5 Cura9ao, and most of the Lesser Antilles. Her own Caribbean provinces, conditioned for two centuries by disorders and cruelty, endured a political system that later generations would regard as handicapping them for modern progress. These liabilities would include autocracy, with a minimum of participation of the ruled in the processes of law-making and government; a rigid caste system based largely on race; a dilapidated commercial establish- ment that encouraged corruption, extortion, and hypocrisy; priv- ilege and intolerance. To be sure, conditions were scarcely better in the eighteenth-century colonies of Britain, France, the Nether- lands, and Denmark, even if thev were usually administered more efficiently, for slavery and the degradation that goes with it were more deeply rooted. And the frequent wars among European powers caused terror and destruction in most of the Caribbean area. Not even the Age of Revolution brought unmixed benefits to Caribbean society. Haiti, the first to become free, expelled or killed the Europeans, only to wallow in poverty for long periods, and to drag Santo Domingo down with her. Yucatan probably endured more depression and oppression in the nineteenth-cen- tury Mexican nation than it had under Spain. The Central Ameri- can nations gyrated wildly between tyranny and anarchy. These were also buffeted by self-seeking foreigners and repeatedly failed through "adolescent political attitudes" and exaggerated nationalism to federate,'* setting a discouraging example of man's inability to get along with his fellows.^ In Colombia true issues and men of admirable idealism at times appeared, but the protracted civil wars prevented the growth of a viable republic for most of the nineteenth century. Venezuela's early promise was spoiled by the destructive wars of liberation and the long periods of strife and dictatorship that came afterward. The remaining European colo- nies sank into stagnation as the Caribbean sugar industry lost ground in the world economy. Not even the liberation of the slaves compensated for the dreadful social, economic, and intel- lectual degradation that prevailed. And the mother countries either took comparatively little interest in improving them, or achieved much when they undertook uplifting projects on occasion. The massive intrusion of the United States into the Caribbean in 1898 and after has certainly resulted in fewer political benefits than optimists predicted. True, the Panama Canal and the mighty increase of American investment, as well as trade in sugar, oil, and fruit, energized economic life, but their long-range effects have been uneven and sometimes harmful. Puerto Rico felt compara- 6 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role tively few political benefits until World War II when spectacular progress began. The transformation of Cuba within sixty years from a United States protectorate, supposedly grateful and fa- vored, into an outright enemy is a development too well known to need sketching. American interventions in Hispaniola and Cen- tral America may well have retarded the development of whole- some political attitudes and sound government practices. In these and in other lands, the overwhelming might of the United States, even when wielded with the best of intentions or not brandished at all, has somehow inspired only frail emulation of the political institutions of the big neighbor, and has often served as an excuse for failure. Meanwhile, the colonies of the European powers were largely neglected until the Second World War and did little on their own to prepare themselves for nationhood. II These burdens of history have lightened somewhat during the last generation. Handicaps and liabilities imposed by past events have not prevented a remarkable movement toward political ma- turity by Puerto Rico, honest elections at crucial times in Venezuela and recently in the Dominican Republic, and some improvement in democratic practices in Colombia and parts of Central America. The Netherlands and France have in recent years extended to the Caribbean many of the liberties they enjoy, and while the failure of the British West Indies to federate may be disappoint- ing, the experiment was not altogether a loss, even if they appar- ently have to postpone the idea until the present generation of leaders has gone.^ Yet the legacy of the past still hangs heavy. It has left the Caribbean nations with no true models. The national experience of the United States seems to have little relevance to most of these countries in finding their own political style. Nor does that of the former European colonial powers, though some admirable practices have been implanted. It would appear presently that Cuba is not flourishing or even showing promise as a Communist state. The recent return to militarism by Brazil and Argentina re- moves what might have been two important models for orderly, representative government. Apparently some Mexican intellec- tuals think that Mexico has not offered sufficient guidance and has even lost the initiative even though her modern political evolution usually is admired.'^ Perhaps models are not what the Caribbean lands need. It may well be that Latin America has POLITICAL CAPACITY / lived too long already under alien institutions.^ Maybe western- style democracy, or even communism, cannot and should not be imported.^ These countries should find their own identities and develop systems that accord with their methods and needs. Most of them have not done so. Nearly everywhere we note a lack of strong consensus and an absence of true patriotism — not nationalistic bombast but the sober citizenship that produces sound planning, persistence, and cooperative effort. So often we discern that there is no institutional way to transform basic aspirations into realistic action, and that victims of evils cannot channel their demands effectively. So frequently we see defeatism and timidity on the part of governments. As Harry Bernstein observed, the obsession with the hero-caudillo obstructs the growth of construc- tive nationalism and idealism, i*' as does the tendency to swing between caudillos and pensadores, as Russell Fitzgibbon put it.^^ In a previous conference of this series Jose Figueres bluntly asserted that those of Spanish descent have not been very successful in handling their own affairs and that they are not adept at self- government.12 Yet the United States, which has not effectively promoted democratic governments for long, is often made the scapegoat for the shortcomings of other peoples. This has not, as J. Fred Rippy stated, kept the Caribbean lands from expecting too much from the United States, ^^ nor of remaining unaware of the serious problems, including poverty, with which Americans must contend. The persistence of conservatism has often been identified as a force in the way of development,^^ even though in most cases conservatives now have to be covert and disguise their purposes by infiltrating supposedly liberal groups. ^^ Seldom do we find a solid and long-lived middle way in Caribbean politics. Radicals are often inclined to make demands that are beyond realistic attainment and to deceive themselves with words. The immatu- rity and incapacity of so many leaders of the left, as well as their intolerance, demagoguery, and fractiousness, frequently shred their own organizations and lead to self-defeat. The Church, as Jerome Fischman has demonstrated in the case of Puerto Rico,^^ has lost much of its power to constrain radicalism. But it cannot be counted inevitably as a force for conservatism. Much has been done to improve public education. Everyone knows how frightening the rate of illiteracy in most of the Carib- bean is and that it embraces perhaps half the total population. Such education as there is, as S. S. Steinberg,!'^ Ronald Hilton,^^ and Gordon Lewis ^^ have brought out in a previous conference, 8 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role tends to be too theoretical or classical and to inflate raw students with the notion that they are intellectuals simply because they are enrolled in schools. While the cult of youth flourishes nearly everywhere, the very youthfulness of a high proportion of the Caribbean populations poses dangers. 20 Young people are a great reservoir of idealism and energy if conditions are stable, but even in the United States the youthful character of the citizenry is seen as productive of violence and agitation and must be so to a much greater degree in the Caribbean. Here, as elsewhere in Latin America, as Daniel Cosio Villegas has stated in despondent accents, one finds true insularity and isolation. 21 People of one community are detached from the others, and, if they are not indifferent to each other, see one another as a threat.22 A lack of human fellowship impedes advance toward political stability. And this stability — or merely good government, any workable system — is and has long been the fundamental need of the Caribbean area. More than a year ago, before the recent elections, Selden Rodman said: "In the longest history of any country in this hemisphere, the history of the Dominican Republic, a history stretching back almost five hundred years, there has never been a single government, competent, efficient, honest, ideal- istic, that represented the Dominican people."^^ His statement cannot be applied to the entire Caribbean region and may well be too inclusive for the Dominican Republic, but its fundamental implication must be acknowledged as sound. 777 The reasons for the absence of political stability lie partly in the historical experiences and psychological attitudes we have touched upon. Yet every serious student knows that economic and social conditions have decisively retarded the thrust of these lands toward effective government. Participants in earlier con- ferences have explored these factors in abundant detail. First of all one confronts the population explosion. Those who predict a world-wide famine by 1985 may not be altogether hysterical alarm- ists. Certainly, the problem of runaway human reproduction in the Caribbean is acute and threatening to an extreme degree. It is sad to note that poor health, malnutrition, and short life spans go side by side with this outburst of procreation. Poor sanitation prevails widely, almost everywhere. "Horror housing" and unstable family life have easily understood political effects. ^^ The legacy of slavery and of monoculture in so much of the Caribbean spells POLITICAL CAPACITY bJ long periods of idleness for many workers, and this idleness is seldom utilized for constructive purposes. ^^ Most workers toil for others often apathetically and inefficiently and certainly for small wages. Low production has long characterized the Caribbean econ- omy. ^^ There is little for the lands of this area to exchange with each other. Even if there were, transportation is notoriously awk- ward and expensive. The Industrial Revolution, which caught Lat- in America by surprise in any event,^^ has ameliorated economic conditions sporadically in the Caribbean but too often has re- sulted in artificial, rigged enterprises existing at the mercy of shocks from the outside and stimulating premature efforts at dis- tribution. Technical backwardness on the part of the general population is matched by managerial ineptitude or indifference on the part of native elite groups. Hence we have the prominent role of the outsider. The out- sider, however, is not necessarily determined to risk his effort and capital even when he is encouraged by local authorities. Political conditions such as those that led to expropriation in Cuba brought fresh American investment in Latin America al- most to zero in a few months during 1962.^8 The brutal fact may well be, as Peter Nehemkis stated here, that "United States invest- ment capital does not need Latin America."^^ It can do better elsewhere. Thus production lags, and when it flourishes in some localities, the benefits often fail to reach the masses. The Carib- bean area, along with Latin America in general, falls farther and farther behind the rest of the world, or most of it, in technology, commerce, and economic growth. ^o IV What a dreary picture we have of misery and discouragement! How could one expect peoples so burdened with handicaps to exhibit political capacity? Are most of the Caribbean lands doomed to eternal punishment because of the past? Is there no way to develop good government so that these appalling problems can be dealt with, or that conditions can improve so that good govern- ment will be possible? Certainly no formula can be offered with confidence. There is hope, however, because there is life. Further, as Wendell Gor- don has written, "The world now possesses the technical knowl- edge necessary to provide every man, woman, and child with enough food, clothing, and shelter so that all may live in decent comfort."^^ A distinguished Argentine recently said, "Countries 10 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role which are economically and socially underdeveloped could bridge the gap that separates them from the advanced countries within a surprisingly short time if they made use of the potentialities of modern science and technology."^ ^ Sudden and almost miraculous development has occurred in the course of history. One thinks of as badly endowed a land as Denmark where poor grain farmers transformed themselves into prosperous and cultured producers of butter, bacon, and eggs.^^ The Netherlands offers another ex- ample. In our own time we have witnessed the spectacular rise of Japan, the Philippines, and Germany literally from the ashes. Israel's recent career may be the most encouraging example of all. Undoubtedly, striking increases in agricultural production and industrialization have sometimes occurred in Latin America, in- cluding the Caribbean. 34 We have seen the Caribbean Commission during World War II and after kindle hope and ferment.^^ It is clear that the recent record of Britain, France, and the Nether- lands in the Caribbean has been honorable, more so than it has usually been credited. ^^ Puerto Rico has experienced not only an economic improvement that has amazed the world but has also exhibited a remarkable growth of political capacity. ^^ It seems that statesmanship in Central America is producing economic union and with it, betterment. There are many signs of vigor in Colombia and Venezuela, political as well as economic. The human race is not so helpless that it must accept perpetual frustration in the Caribbean. Populations can be stabilized through birth control, and they probably will be when the need is faced squarely. Even emigration, so often regarded as a mere palliative, could redistribute Caribbean peoples and lead to stabilization. ^^ Ancient problems of water and soil are not hopeless. ^^ Health can be improved. The lumber ^^^ and fishing^^ industries could be greatly expanded. Transportation, with the development of pas- senger missiles and hydrofoils, may well link the Caribbean in a way impossible for present-day ships and airplanes. Above all, tourism beckons as the possibility with the most immediate and lucrative rewards. If significant economic amelioration occurred, why should we remain defeatist about ancient problems of land tenure and monoculture or of inadequate political systems? The barriers to betterment are essentially human f actors. ^^ Man can change his environment if he wants to badly enough. '^^ In this area, technology, managerial proficiency, and favorable attitudes — a "can do" philosophy — are needed more than capital. ^^ However, capital is likely to be forthcoming if there is any reason to suppose that it will help. Pride in craftmanship and manual labor can be POLITICAL CAPACITY 11 inculcated. ^^ Books and other communication even more vivid than the printed word have in some cases brought about a spectacular upgrading of civilization; this surely could be the case here. Educators are perhaps the most receptive of all groups to new methods and ideals, and they could exert the most influence in changing the psychological climate.*^ The problem is ultimately one of will and of spirit. One may dwell interminably on the liabilities and handicaps of the Caribbean peoples. The burdens of history can be chroni- cled and lamented to the point of despair, yet a humanist must address himself to what could be done to inspire potential Carib- bean leaders to conquer their problems. They will surely have help if they try. NOTES 1. The Caribbean at Mid-Century (Gainesville, Fla., 1951), p. xiv. This and all the other volumes in the series are edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. 2. Daniel Guerin, The West Indies and Their Future (London, 1961), p. 19. 3. The Caribbean: Contemporary Education (1960), p. 37, citing Luis Alberto Sanchez. 4. Carl C. Moses in American Political Science Review (June, 1962), pp. 480-81. 5. Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960 (Chapel Hill, 1961), p. 3. 6. Thomas Mathews, "The West Indies After the Federation," Current His- tory (January, 1966), p. 52. 7. Daniel Cosio Villegas, Change in Latin America: The Mexican and Cuban Revolutions (Lincoln, Neb., 1961), p. 42. 8. Wendell C. Gordon, The Political Economy of Latin America (Nevi^ York, 1965), p. 2. 9. Harry Hoetink, "Cuba and the New Experts," Caribbean Studies (July, 1961), p. 18. 10. The Caribbean: Its Political Problems (1956), p. 3. 11. Ibid., p. 33. 12. The Caribbean: The Central American Area (1961), p. 313. 13. The Caribbean: Natural Resources (1959), pp. 287-88. 14. Claudio Veliz, Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London, New York, Toronto, 1965), Introduction; W. Arthur Lewis, in Inflation and Growth in Latin America, edited by Werner Baer and Isaac Kerstenetzky (Harewood, 111., 1964), p. 25. 15. Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self-Govern- ment (London, 1960), p. 54. 16. "The Church in Politics: The 1960 Election in Puerto Rico," The Western Political Quarterly (Dec, 1965), p. 839. 17. The Caribbean: Its Culture (1955), p. 143. 18. The Caribbean: Contemporary Education, p. 45. 19. The Caribbean: Natural Resources, p. 220. 20. Arturo Uslar Pietri in The Caribbean: Venezuelan Development, A Case History (1963), p. 31. 21. Cosio Villegas, p. 20. 12 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role 22. J. J. Ochse, in The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French, United States (1958), p. 93. 23. "The Reason Why," The Caribbean in Crisis: Report of the W Institute, Caribbean Institute and Study Center for Latin America, p. 14. 24. Guerin, p. 22; Charles Wagley in The Caribbean: Natural Resources, p. 203. 25. Lowry Nelson in The Caribbean at Mid-Century, p. 145. 26. James G. Maddox in The Caribbean: Peoples, Problems, and Prospects (1952), p. 29; Gilberto Loyo and Raiil Ortiz Mena in The Caribbean: Contem- porary Trends, p. 34; Raymond E. Crist in The Caribbean at Mid-Century, pp. 42-50. 27. Cosio Villegas, p. 18. 28. Peter Nehemkis in The Caribbean: Venezuelan Development, A Case History, p. 133. 29. Ibid., p. 141. 30. Ibid., p. 145; Lewis, pp. 27-28. 31. Gordon, p. 386. 32. Rolando V. Garcia, "Organizing Scientific Research," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sept., 1966), p. 12. 33. Ralph H. AUee in The Caribbean: Natural Resources, p. 5. 34. Erich O. Kraemer, ibid., pp. 47-49. 35. Frances McReynolds Smith in The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French, United States, pp. 290-91; see also the Caribbean Commission Reports for 1942 through 1948, published in Washington. 36. Sir Harold Mitchell, Europe in the Caribbean (London, 1963), p. 176. 37. Petroamerica Pagan de Colon in The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French, United States, p. 186. 38. Carl S. Lokke, ibid., p. 132. 39. E. A. Norton in The Caribbean: Contemporary Trends, p. 5. 40. Monroe Bush in The Caribbean: Natural Resources, p. 64. 41. William Saenz, ibid., pp. 187-88. 42. Charles Wagley, ibid., p. 193. 43. Ross E. Moore in The Caribbean: Peoples, Problems, and Prospects, pp. 44-45. 44. Maynard Phelps in The Caribbean at Mid-Century, p. 61. 45. Richard M. Morse in The Caribbean: Contemporary Education, pp. 172-73. 46. A. Curtis Wilgus in The Caribbean: Its Culture, p. xvi. 2 IT Joseph W. Reidy: growth and possible CHANGE IN CARIBBEAN AMERICA'S POLITICAL CAPACITY The political dynamics of Caribbean America is both a challenging and an important subject. It is challenging because of the human environmental diversity of the region, and it is impor- tant because the future peace and security of the Americas will in- evitably be affected by the course of political developments within this vital area. Consider for a moment the vast spatial extension of Caribbean America. A line passing from the city of Tijuana in northwestern Mexico to Cayenne in French Guiana bisects the region, con- nects its most distant points, and covers a distance of 5,000 miles. The physical environment of Caribbean America is marked by sharp contrasts. The human mosaic of the area is characterized by diverse ethnic and cultural groups with varied traditions, atti- tudes, values, and institutions. The diversity of the region sug- gests that some introductory caveats are clearly in order. While there are threads of unity in the political development of Caribbean America, generalizations are difficult and predictions of future trends are hazardous. Many of the comments which follow could not be qualified as much or as often — due to limita- tions of space — as would seem prudent in view of the diversity of the region. Furthermore, while it may suit our convenience to discuss the political, economic, social, and cultural components of Caribbean America's development separately, it is well to recog- nize that in so doing we are considering pieces of an integrated whole. 13 14 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role With these caveats in mind, the commentary which follows attempts to follow the main currents rather than the minor eddies of political change and growth in Caribbean America. The objec- tive is one of presenting an overview in which the ambiente of political development is stressed rather than the details concern- ing leading personalities, individual political parties, or specific issues. There is an effort to glance backward briefly into the past since the region's history lends weight to the old adage that asserts "what is past is prologue." Subsequent comments are pri- marily concerned, however, with projecting into the future basic political trends which can now be identified. Growth and possible change in the political capacity of Carib- bean America can perhaps best be judged by assessing progress made in achieving three basic political tasks: (1) the building of nations; (2) the development of democratic institutions; and (3) the formulation of national policy regarding Caribbean integra- tion and international alignment. It is to these three topics that we now turn. 7. The Building of Nations The history of Caribbean America, just as that of other world areas, demonstrates that the building of nations is often an ar- duous and prolonged process. Today, no less than in the past, the winning of independence is but a prelude to the challenging task of forging more closely integrated societies. Even the establish- ment of peace and order — a prerequisite to national integration — has been a difficult task for much of Caribbean America. A divisive physical environment often combines with the ethno- cultural diversity of the Caribbean to impede the formulation of national consciousness. The cultural mosaic of Caribbean peoples is reflected in their varied — and at times conflicting — goals, values, traditions, and institutions. The weak social fabric of many Carib- bean peoples does not lend itself to formation of a closely knit national community. The predominant Iberian stamp of the region has contributed as much to fragmentation as it has to unity of the area. Exaggerated Spanish pride and individualism, combined with Iberian resistance to change and mutual accommodation, lend support to Salvador de Madariaga's observation that anarchy is the natural state of the Spanish mind.*^ In short, Iberian cultural values have exerted a centrifugal effect. Lack of administrative talent and political experience in self- rule is a legacy of Spanish colonial rule. In all the Spanish colonies *Notes and appendix to this chapter are on pp. 26-27. POLITICAL CAPACITY 15 of America, only four of 170 appointed viceroys were American- born. ^ The development of able leadership remains a major task in the pursuit of national unity. The barriers to national integration are not confined to areas heavily influenced by a Spanish heritage. As a case in point, witness the present state of flux within the newly created "na- tions" that formerly comprised the British Caribbean. Guyana is racked by racial tension and has yet to prove that it is a viable nation. The West Indies, a confederation of widely dispersed islands given their independence by Great Britain in 1958, has since disintegrated. A number of British dependencies within the Windward and Leeward chain are soon to become "associated states" and eligible for independence; they may unite in a con- federation with other areas of the British Caribbean or go their separate ways. There is a lingering sense that common interests favor the creation of an Anglo-Antillean "nation," but the eventual outcome of the current flux through which former British depend- encies are passing is most uncertain. To cite another non-Iberian case, the heavy Amerindian influence in certain areas of Carib- bean America can hardly be said to contribute to the building of integrated nations. In Guatemala, for example, one estimate indi- cates that only 125,000 of this country's three million people can be counted as "effective actors in reaching political decisions at a national level. "^ It is not surprising that the consolidation of national power in many areas of the Caribbean has been achieved more often by force than by consent. Military intervention and rise of the caudi- llo could in many instances be traced to civic irresponsibility and administrative chaos. In more recent times, insurrectionary efforts inspired by Communist Cuba's open support of "wars of national liberation" have posed still another threat to national integration in certain countries. Castro's disruptive efforts have been effective- ly blunted to date. Rural insurgency and urban terrorism in Venezuela are now under effective control, and la violencia suf- fered by Colombia through many years appears to have been con- tained. Insurrectionary efforts by the radical left in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala have also been stymied. Consequently, the role of force in maintaining internal security and strengthen- ing the control of the central government has diminished. Several military establishments have fortunately turned to more construc- tive tasks of "civic action" and "nation-building." A number of changes are in process which are overcoming past obstacles to national integration within individual Caribbean states. 16 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Technology exerts a unifying influence. Expanding air and high- way hnks combine with astounding advances in the field of elec- tronic communications to facilitate the consolidation of central government control and administration. An increasingly complex economic structure and growing industrialization provide still oth- er integrative influences. Social changes accompanying the mod- ernization process have increased the number of politically aware and their participation in national affairs. The growth and im- provement of educational institutions have expanded the horizons of millions and served as vehicles for introducing the dynamic values of the modern West. Nationalism provides an emotional bond to overcome parochial political allegiances. Except for newly emerging nations whose boundaries are in dispute, and the con- tinuing state of flux in the British Caribbean with regard to na- tional amalgamation, the nation-state structure of Caribbean Amer- ica has become relatively firmly established. Looking toward the future, the prospects of individual Carib- bean countries becoming more closely integrated political units are decidedly favorable. Unifying trends of modernization are well established. Separatist tendencies of the past seem to have lost appeal. To the degree that the present and emerging nation- state structure of Caribbean America is altered, it is most likely to change in favor of confederate movements which join existing political units in a broader association. But of more immediate concern is Caribbean America's progress in creating democratic institutions which, in themselves, serve an integrative function in the process of building nations. It is to this subject which we now turn. II. Development of Democratic Institutions Authoritarian past. — A Latin American writer once commented that independence from Spain was achieved on "the last day of despotism and the first day of the same thing."^ Power was trans- ferred to new hands but an authoritarian heritage hampered for many decades the development of democratic institutions. While there is something essentially democratic in Spanish individualism, it produced men who were more inclined to govern than to be governed. The attitude of personalismo has been well expressed by the Ecuadorian writer, Alfredo Perez Guerrero who described it as "an exaltation of the I, which does not perceive itself as a unit in the group, but as the whole group itself. Pride and dignidad are exaggerated, and the group serves as a pedestal for the self."^ Other Iberian attitudes and traditions combined with POLITICAL CAPACITY 17 environmental obstacles and ethnocultural diversity to complicate the transplanting of democratic institutions to Spanish America. Simon Bolivar, v^^ith great insight and realism, was reported to have said that the "new states of America, once Spanish, need kings with the title of President."^ Despite the unfavorable soil for democratic institutions, Creole political leaders borrowed heavily from the political theory of the French philosophes and from the constitutional pattern adopted by the United States. As might have been expected, political theory and constitutional law gave way to governments of men. It could hardly have been otherwise. Strong rulers were needed to bring peace and order. The political history of Caribbean America has been marked by numerous golpes and caudillos. Democratic rule has more often been the ideal than the practice. Constitu- tional forms ill-suited to the realities of Caribbean politics have more often served as useful statements of democratic intent rather than rigid strictures governing political conduct in the here and now. Over 200 constitutions have been adopted throughout Span- ish America's history — many of them having their origin in Carib- bean America. For example, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti have had at least 24, 22, and 18 constitutions respec- tively.'^ Chronic political instability in many areas of Caribbean America has given rise to doubts as to the region's political capac- ity, and to pessimism concerning the future of democratic in- stitutions in the region. Before passing judgment on the future of democracy in Caribbean America, it would be well to muster as much empathy as possible and view political realities within the region as they are rather than as one might wish them to be. The current reality. — Strong Latin American rulers who bring peace, prosperity, and eiBcient administration to their country will receive general support — as long as they do not deny unduly basic human freedoms. While the tyrant is despised, the firm and eflS- cient political leader is admired even if he operates with fewer executive restraints than the North American concept of "checks and balances" would permit. Latin American presidents must rule if they are to be effective administrators and avoid devoting most of their time to a struggle simply to remain in power. Even the strong executive must answer ultimately to the people. Democracy cannot be equated with exercise of the ballot. Military golpes, with the passage of time, have been less power-motivated and more designed to end the abuse of power or other instances of misrule. Moreover, even popularly elected presidents have been ousted frequently for good reasons and with public approval. In 18 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role increasingly complex societies in which power is ever more widely distributed among a growing number of interest groups, the days of the old-style caudillo are over. It would be rash, however, to predict the early end of dictatorships in Caribbean America. Nev- ertheless, it seems certain they will be fewer and shorter in dura- tion. The modernization of the region — through education, im- provements in transportation and communications, the impact of new ideas from abroad, political and economic pressures from within the Organization of American States (oas) — favors an evo- lutionary trend toward greater democracy. In one way or another, Latin Americans have been exposed in increasing numbers for over two centuries to the ideals and merits of democracy. They do not require further lectures on the subject, and they have accepted democratic institutions as their goal. What is required is patient cultivation of the soil in which democracy can grow. This will take time. Revolutionary changes — in the sense of fundamental changes, whether political or otherwise — have been rare in Latin America. Democracy, involving as it does ac- ceptance of social values foreign to most of Caribbean America, cannot be imposed; a product of human development, it can only come about slowly. Advocates of "instant democracy" would do well to be content in the knowledge that the pace of change is quickening through Latin America, and popular participation in political decisions — whether by exercise of the rights of suffrage or otherwise — has grown at a rapid rate. Quest for indigenous solutions. — One of the criticisms most often levied against Latin American democracy is that foreign models have been copied too slavishly, with few indigenous contributions to political philosophy and few creative solutions to problems peculiar to the local ambiente. The criticism is sound, but it ap- plies more to the past than to the present. Unfortunately, Latin American political innovations have not been recognized as such because they have been regarded as "distortions" of North Ameri- can or European "models." Foreign critics cannot expect to have it both ways. They should examine what they have labelled as "distortions" to see if they are not, in fact, practical adaptations suited to Latin America's environment and intended to provide creative solutions to real problems which the foreign critic has neither experienced nor adequately understood. For example, these are Latin American constitutional provisions which fre- quently draw criticism: (1) suspension of individual guarantees during times of national emergency; (2) exceptional federal pow- ers to intervene in state affairs; (3) rights of presidential initia- POLITICAL CAPACITY 19 tive and decree-making power (which, it is asserted, grant the executive quasi-legislative functions), usually providing for sub- sequent congressional ratification; (4) assigning the military a role of "guaranteeing constitutional powers" (which, say the critics, invites military intervention in political matters ) .^ There is little question that provisions such as these can lead to "constitutional dictatorships" within the terms, if not the spirit, of the constitution. Examined with more empathy, however, there is also little question that they provide the Latin American execu- tive with powers needed to deal with separatism, insurrection, or chaos caused by irresponsible political opponents. How to grant the president the powers he requires, yet prevent his abuse of provisions intended for true emergencies? There are, of course, many ways of measuring public opinion other than submitting issues to one or another form of popular vote. Therein lies the basis for the assertion made previously that even the strong execu- tive must answer ultimately to the people. Professor William S. Stokes has posed a key question: "Is it possible that Latin Ameri- can political culture has developed procedures for measuring and representing opinion different from but as valid as the techniques of election, initiative, referendum, and plebiscite of the Anglo- American and Western European states?"^ This question suggests others. How can the Latin American executive who has assumed emergency powers demonstrate convincingly that his actions en- joy popular consent? Times of crisis do not normally permit the exercise of popular suffrage. Can the absence of public resistance and a return to "normalcy" be interpreted as "popular consent"? Can new techniques — perhaps a combination of modern communi- cations, scientific polling methods, and automated tabulation — pro- vide still other evidence of popular consent without the formality of voting? These questions suggest a new area in which innova- tions might be devised so as to demonstrate that Latin Americans can develop not only the substance of democratic government but also unique procedures well-suited to their environment for measuring popular will. A challenging field for research is clearly open for the student of Latin American political dynamics. Area contrasts. — As might be expected in an area of great diver- sity, the progress of democracy has been, and is likely to remain, very uneven. To bring general commentary down to concrete cases, a brief look at individual situations is in order. Respect for parliamentary government has taken root in those countries (or countries-to-be) which compose what was formerly the British Caribbean. But it is difficult to predict how firmly the 20 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role roots have been planted. Independence has been a brief experi- ence and within former British areas the prospects of democratic government differ greatly. Jamaica would appear to have a better chance for internal stability and gaining experience with the functions of a loyal opposition than, for example, would Guyana. Troubled as it is by racial strife which takes on political lines, Guyana must give priority to the task of achieving national sur- vival in an environment which may curtail full exercise of demo- cratic freedoms. French and Dutch areas of the Caribbean have achieved greater autonomy but not independence. French Guiana is without a doubt the most dependent of European-administered areas in the Caribbean. Established as a department in 1947, it is legally a part of metropolitan France. Its prospects for the future are dim on all counts — especially with respect to developing self-reliance and indigenous democratic institutions. French-administered is- lands of the Antilles, principally Martinique and Guadeloupe, have the same legal status as French Guiana but a better prospect of exercising real autonomy and developing democratic institu- tions. The Netherlands Antilles and Surinam present a brighter picture than French-administered areas since they possess good physical and human resources and a populace fast becoming equipped for self-government and eventual independence, should this eventually be their wish. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a Latin American com- munity of United States citizens, enjoys complete local autonomy and has had ample experience with democratic institutions and processes. While it favors its present association with the United States over complete independence, Puerto Rico appears well equipped to govern itself democratically in the future, whether as a commonwealth or a sovereign state. Haiti is the land of the classic tyrant — gripped by terror and handicapped by poverty, ignorance, and political apathy. There is no political dialogue in Haiti and little likelihood that one will soon develop. Opposition elements in exile are divided and, in the event they were to come to power, do not offer much promise of developing democratic institutions. Spanish Caribbean states occupy positions throughout the spec- trum of democratic development. Efforts at a systematic ranking of nations according to their democratic progress inevitably pro- duce highly perishable listings subject to much debate. Nonethe- less, in a separate appendix, the eleven countries of the Spanish Caribbean have been placed in one or another of six categories POLITICAL CAPACITY 21 with the principal objective of conveying graphically varying rates of democratic progress and different institutional patterns. The essential observation which emerges from this categorization is that the governments of the Spanish Caribbean range from es- tablished democracies to outright dictatorships with intermediate types which can be described as "functioning democracies," gov- ernments with "fragile democratic institutions," "guided demo- cracies" featuring one-party rule, and "limited democracies," which present essentially a single option to the popular electorate. Once again, to repeat a familiar theme, the diversity of Spanish America is apparent. The conclusions to be drawn are: Future rates of progress in achieving advanced norms of political democracy are certain to be unequal; and, the institutions established to carry out the functions of democratic government will differ consider- ably from country to country in their effectiveness as well as their form. Current trends. — Discernible trends in the development of politi- cal parties in Caribbean America can only be generalized. Few political parties of Caribbean America possess either the ideologi- cal drive or the broad popular base to exercise an integrative function although many have gained in strength and maturity. The function of a loyal opposition is better understood and increasingly adopted. Broader popular participation has definitely restrained the force of personolismo in party affairs. Traditional conservative parties are fighting a rear-guard and losing action. Centrist parties are growing most rapidly of all, including in their ranks many who have recently become active participants in the political process. Leftist groups have had ups and downs and now stand essentially at dead center despite their dramatic take-over in Cuba. Ideological drive has appeared only in the Partido Revolu- cionario Institucional (pri) of Mexico (where it is more of an historic than a living force), the Christian Democratic groups of Venezuela and Central America (where it is a developing and important phenomenon), and among the Communists of Cuba (where it has been the source of truly revolutionary change and catastrophic errors). Political leadership will be drawn increasingly from an emerg- ing group which may be called Caribbean America's "new elite." The Church, military, intellectual and student groups, labor union- ists, businessmen, and/or miscellaneous professionals have all failed — considering each individually as a special interest group — to provide effective national leadership. But among their mem- bers are found intelligent men of vision who are willing to work 22 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role for constructive change to speed Caribbean America's moderni- zation. They are prepared to place national interests above nar- row group concerns. Unfortunately, the "new elite" remains dif- fused and has not yet created a sufficient number of associations capable of exercising effective leadership. This lack defines the principal task of democratic political action in Caribbean America. It is useful to distinguish between the substance of democratic government and the procedures by which popular will can be expressed. Substantive democracy as a concept has long taken root in Caribbean America. With some obvious exceptions, basic human rights are generally upheld. The will of the majority pre- vails in the long run. Rights of the opposing minority are by and large protected. Procedural democracy in Caribbean America would be found wanting if judged by the standards of demo- cratic systems of the modern West. Judged within the ambiente of Caribbean America, however, procedural "shortcomings" in the practice of democracy appear more as realistic adaptations than perverse distortions of democratic ways as they are generally understood in the United States and most of Western Europe. In summary, Latin America is wedded to democratic ideals but is still in pursuit of workable procedures which can reconcile the need for a strong executive with the goal of subjecting such political leadership to a test of popular will. Measured by Anglo- American and most Western European standards, Latin American democracy has fallen short and faces an up-hill struggle. Meas- ured against the physical and human obstacles to democracy which Latin Americans confront, however, progress has been encouraging. In balance, it is safe to say that in the decades ahead democracy in Caribbean America will flourish in a few countries, continue to evolve slowly in most, and languish in some backward and un- stable areas. The hard truth is that the road to democracy for all peoples throughout history has been a long and a difficult one, and it is unlikely that Latin Americans will find shortcuts. 777. The Formulation of National Policy Regarding Caribbean Integration and International Alignment The building of integrated nations and democratic institutions has posed enormous challenges to the people of Caribbean Amer- ica. Confronted by such tasks, they — not surprisingly — have de- voted little thought and less action to more ambitious goals such as that of creating a Pan Caribbean Federation. The idea of a region-wide political union has never been taken seriously by POLITICAL CAPACITY 23 practical politicians. Homo caribiensis remains an abstraction. Di- versity defeats idyllic notions of Caribbean unity. Technological breakthroughs which vault physical obstacles have much less im- pact on overcoming human differences, the emotional appeal of nationalism, trade competition, and other sources of conflict. While the region-wide political integration of Caribbean Ameri- ca is generally regarded as impractical, sub-regional political inte- gration may in a few cases prove feasible. The three most frequent- ly discussed sub-regional groupings are, in a decreasing order of probability: (1) A federation comprising some of the currently fragmented segments of what was formerly the British Caribbean; (2) A Central American Confederation composed of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica; (3) A resur- rection of Gran Colombia (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama), or at least integration of some portion of that historic grouping. With the guidance and encouragement of the British, the West Indies, a federation of former Caribbean dependencies, was es- tablished in January, 1958. (Guyana and British Honduras were not incorporated.) The experiment was unsuccessful and the fed- eration disbanded a few years later. However, the federate idea persists. Economic self-interest may discourage Jamaica's re-entry but favor Guyana's adhesion to a new effort at federation. British Honduras, when it becomes the independent state of Belize, is likely to go it alone for geographic and other reasons. In short, some form of federation centered in the Antilles (possibly in Trinidad) may evolve if for no other reasons than common lan- guage (English), the logic of economic union, common experience with parliamentary government, and realization that separate ex- istence offers no attraction except the dubious one of absorption by aggressive neighbors or extra-Caribbean powers. Straws in the wind are Guyanan President Burnham's advocacy of his country's federation with Trinidad — Tobago and Barbados, and his success in forming the Caribbean Free Trade Association (carifa) now linking Guyana with Antigua and Barbados. A confederation of Central American states is favored by geo- graphic propinquity, common language, a history of past union, and progress in the formation of a Central American Common Market (cacm) with its demonstrated economic advantages. The Organization of Central American States (odeca), founded in 1952, provides an existing nucleus around which closer political union may be' developed. But many obstacles remain. Despite unifying factors, Central American states differ in many respects. 24 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Divergent poHtical traditions (contrast democratic Costa Rica, for example, with some of its neighbors who have had little experi- ence with democratic institutions) pose a barrier to effective political union. This is one among several reasons why political unification has been greeted with differing degrees of enthusiasm among the countries of Central America. On the other hand, the unifying effect of improved communications and transportation may well reduce existing obstacles to confederation, especially if such a union not only preserves but also increases material bene- fits such as those already realized through the cacm. Turning to the prospect of a resurrected Gran Colombia, analy- sis quickly gives way to speculation. The rationale favoring some form of political union (i.e., the evident advantages of greater leverage in regional affairs and closer economic integration) is well known. But the disparate segments that were once united only briefly under the genius of Bolivar have developed with the passage of time great differences in their mode and rate of de- velopment. Moreover, geography still tends to fragment and to counter the unifying influences of modern technology. Closer pol- icy coordination among the nations of the former Gran Colombia is a much more likely outcome than political integration per se. If the prospect for region-wide integration is dim, and the like- lihood of sub-regional political unions limited and heavily condi- tioned, what extra-regional alignments are the countries of Carib- bean America likely to choose in the decades ahead? There are at least six alternative extra-regional alignments open to Carib- bean America — some of them admittedly highly theoretical options. First, the quest for broader political and economic integration of Latin American states is a major contemporary current. A lingering desire for regional unity has been described as a feeling of "emotional commonwealth" or "continental nationalism" and is sometimes expressed by Latin Americans in terms of patria grande and latinamericanismo . Environmental differences and disparate rates of progress, however, have combined over the course of time to magnify differences between individual Latin American coun- tries. Certainly if Caribbean political unity confronts enormous obstacles, the far more ambitious goal of unifying all of Latin America becomes little more than a nebulous political ideal and sentimental goal — at least for this the twentieth century. Second, gravitation toward the United States is a less-discussed but nevertheless possible alternative — ^particularly for some areas which formerly composed the Britisli Caribbean. The advantages of a commonwealth association with the United States similar to POLITICAL CAPACITY 25 that of Puerto Rico may have appeal over the longer run, es- pecially for fragmented remnants of the Caribbean which fail either to form individual national entities or a broader association with their neighbors. Within the Caribbean psychological bar- riers to closer association with the United States, combined with reluctance of the United States to assume added responsibilities in the area, may stymie the growth of commonwealth relation- ships. i*^ However, considerations of defense, trade, and investments are countervailing influences which favor closer ties between the United States and the more amorphous geographic fragments within the Caribbean. Third, Pan Americanism will probably continue to be the pre- vailing international alignment of Caribbean America, for it will accommodate (even if under strain) either of the foregoing two alternatives and is the logical status quo to the extent that neither of these alternatives proves to be feasible or attractive. With the creation of new nations in Caribbean America, membership in the OAS family may be expanded considerably. One obstacle to the admission of some prospective applicants is the Act of Washington (1964) which bars states having border disputes with current OAS members. This proviso would deny oas membership to Guy- ana and the future Belize. Moreover, Venezuela may oppose Jamaica's admission because of the latter's advocacy of an English- speaking commonwealth bloc within the oas.^i Despite these prob- lems and other weaknesses of the oas system. Pan Americanism appears assured of continued life — ^particularly in the absence of feasible alternatives. Fourth, continued and closer ties between Caribbean America and Western European states with the traditional interest in the area (Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands) is still another option. This orientation may continue to be the preference of Dutch and French administered areas. The likelihood of increased ties between Caribbean America and European nations in other than the political field appears favorable and inevitably carries a political connotation, since such links may be motivated, in at least some instances, by a desire to offset the overwhelming power of the United States. Fifth, an orientation toward the Soviet Union — following the course of Castro's Cuba — is an alternative that may appeal to revo- lutionaries of the radical left should they succeed "in toppling a Western-oriented nation of Caribbean America. But United States opposition to such an alignment would have to be reckoned with, and Cuba's experience under Castro has lessened the appeal of 26 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role "wars of national liberation" and the illusory benefits of member- ship in the socialist camp. The Soviet Union itself may be reluc- tant to encourage such a development for it would almost cer- tainly lead to still another confrontation with the United States in an area far removed from the base of Soviet power. Sixth, a highly theoretical alternative is that of alignment of Caribbean America (along with the remainder of Latin America) with Afro-Asian nations in a third-world bloc. This option has proven to be more of an empty notion than a practical alternative — even in the economic field not to mention the more tenuous political ties that link such diverse (and frequently competitive) world regions. Of the six alternatives, only the first three — all of which are hemispheric orientations — appear to be realistic over the next few decades. Narrowing the field still further, it is the third option — Pan Americanism — which seems to "fit" Caribbean America most closely. In geopolitical terms, Caribbean America forms a "crush zone" where many political interests meet. A major challenge confronting Caribbean leaders is that of exercising wisely the options available to them so as to chart an international course which best serves the hopes and aspirations of their people. NOTES 1. Sax Bradford, Spain in the World (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 56. 2. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 83. 3. Kalman H. Silvert, "A Proposed Framework for Latin American Politics," in John D. Martz (ed.), The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics (Englewood Chffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 9. 4. Pio Jaramillo Alvarado, El regimen totalitario en America (Guayaquil: Editora Noticia, 1940), pp. 24, 71. 5. Alfredo Perez Guerrero, Ecuador (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1948), p. 74. 6. Rosendo A. Gomez, "Latin American Executives: Essence and Variations," in Martz, p. 47. 7. J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real," in Martz, p. 35. The author's essay was originally published in May, 1959. The figures have not been up-dated since the essential point is clear, and — in any case — there is a great deal of disagreement concerning the number of Latin American constitutions, since many revised constitutions were promulgated as new instruments. 8. Ihid., pp. 36-39. 9. William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Poli- tics," in Martz, p. 149. 10. As an alternative, former British dependencies in the Caribbean may attempt to forge a closer political link with Canada. 11. Latin American opposition to admission into the oas of former British areas may spur the latter to develop a special relationship with Canada (see fn. 10). Alternatively, admission of former British Caribbean areas into the POLITICAL CAPACITY 27 OAS would tend to encourage Canada to join the Pan American family — a move long considered by Ottawa. APPENDIX Democratic Progress in the Spanish Caribbean Established Democracies — Costa Rica. This country — well-integrated, highly literate, dedicated to democratic processes and possessing a non-political civil service — clearly stands in a category all its own. Yet recent tension between the administration of President Trejos and his political opponents who conjtrol the legislature points up the fact that no country of Caribbean America is im- mune to political upheaval. Functioning Democracies — Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. Venezuela, despite its authoritarian past, has made rapid progress toward becoming an established democracy. Colombia, a two-party state with each party alternating in power, is attempting to break out of a period of political stagnation. Colom- bian President Lleras Restrepo is seeking congressional authorization to rule by decree on issues involving economic development and administrative reorgani- zation, but his motive is one of pushing reforms rather than seeking authoritar- ian power. Panama's volatile political atmosphere is such that it could, with a serious outbreak of violence, drop from the ranks of functioning democracies. Fragile Democratic Institutions — Dominican Republic and Guatemala. The Dominican Republic has experienced four coups and seven governments since Trujillo's assassination in 1961. Democratically elected President Belaguer must steer a course between a military establishment on the right and opposition parties on the left. This is a delicate task in a country which has exhibited little tolerance for debate and has had practically no experience with demo- cratic processes. Guatemalan President Mendez Montenegro is confined by tacit understanding to a centrist position which avoids radical changes but simultaneously advocates reforms. Mendez Montenegro's assumption of office in July, 1966, was in itself an advance for democracy since the military did not favor him. His basic problem is clearly one of survival. Guided Democracy: One-Party Rule — Mexico. Mexico's pri since 1929 has always been assured of victory in a system of "guided democracy" in which presidential elections are a formality. Political opposition is nominal. The Presi- dent, with concurrence of the PRi-controlled Senate, can replace any elected official. Hand-picked party favorites are frequently appointed to high govern- ment posts without benefit of popular election, pri deliberations are essentially democratic, however, and the President is expected to follow party policies. More designed for carrying out the Revolution — which ended over two decades ago — than for reconciling the divergent interests evident in the increasing com- plex society of a rapidly modernizing Mexico, pri is showing serious strains. Limited Democracies — El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. In El Salva- dor it is widely accepted that the pcn nominee chosen by contesting military factions will be elected in March, 1967. There is even less doubt that Anastasio Somoza Debayle will be elected Nicaragua's President in February, 1967. Honduras is ruled by General Lopez Arellano whose successful golpe in Oc- tober, 1963, was followed by his election to a six-year term as President by a constituent assembly in the spring of 1965. Outright Dictatorship — Cuba. Cuba is still passing through the throes of a revolution headed by el maxima lider, Fidel Castro. During the course of 1966, the revolution experienced many setbacks: defection of long-time revolutionaries, purges of party officials considered untrustworthy or ineffective, arrest of labor leaders, student demonstrations, and continued economic woes. Such difficulties will be countered by Castro's authoritarian hand. Predictions of Castro's fall appear born more of wishful thinking than hard fact. At the moment, at least, the hope for democracy in Cuba is a forlorn one. 3 IT Thomas Mathews: problems and leaders IN THE CARIBBEAN For the purpose of this paper the Caribbean that we will be concerned with is that composed of the Antilles, both greater and lesser, and the three Guianas on the northeast coast of South America. Limited time and the lack of direct knowledge of the problems and leaders of the greater Caribbean, which includes Central America, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela, have forced me to exclude these areas from my observations. Economic problems which plague the Caribbean have been passed over in order to give more attention to the political ones. Of course, these problems cannot be completely ignored since there is a relationship between politics and such phenomena as a growing percentage of unemployed as in Trinidad and Jamaica, the problems besetting the production of sugar as in Jamaica and Guyana, the problems brought about by an abnormal influx of foreign capital for industrial development and tourist programs as in Puerto Rico, and the adverse balance of payments which is putting strains on newly independent nations such as Trinidad. Finally, since this is primarily a political analysis, it would be wise to state in the beginning that although I am not so blindly committed to the principles of a democratic political system that I do not comprehend the dangers which this system entails and the sometimes impressive advantages of alternative political systems, I am nevertheless willing to make my position clear as backing these principles (free speech, the right to organize politically, free elections, respect for the rights of the minority, and so forth), 28 POLITICAL CAPACITY 29 and my analysis will presume their acceptance, a presumption which may not be shared by the leaders in every country in the Caribbean. After the Second World War, the break-up of the colonial em- pires has nowhere been carried out with such a peaceful transition as in the Caribbean. The decade of the fifties saw complete or nearly complete political autonomy, but not independence, given to the Netherlands Antilles, Surinam, the French Antilles, and Puerto Rico. In the sixties the former British colonies of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, British Guiana, and Barbados achieved com- plete independence as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Finally, if we add the freedom found by the Dominican Republic after thirty years of terror and that new style of inde- pendence produced in Cuba by the Castro revolution, then the emerging peoples of the Caribbean present an attractive labora- tory for political scientists concerned with the problems of nation building. *i Assuming — with the reservation indicated — that democracy is the goal of these newly independent people, what then are the politi- cal problems faced by their leaders and how are they going about solving them?2 The Caribbean, although freed from the legalistic bondage of imperial powers, has yet to free itself psychologically from the colonial past which hangs heavily over the political patterns now developing in the new countries. In some cases such as Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, theoretically enjoying complete political freedom as integral parts of France, the control of the European power is all too real. The French Antilleans, beguiled for a few passing years by the deceiving doctrine of assimilation into the French political system, are now waking up to the fact that their status as overseas departments of France is only a euphemistic disguise which perpetuates the colonial control of previous centuries. The sentiment for autonomy (a status quite incompatible with the existing highly centralized French political system) is growing within the two islands which together have a population of over a half a million. Aimee Cesaire, now serving his eighth term as the mayor of Fort-de-France, since his famous break from the French Communist Party in 1956, has defended the autonomist point of view and has more recently been joined by Dr. Henri Bangou, newly elected mayor of Pointe-a-Pitre, *Notes to this chapter begin on p. 39. 30 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Guadeloupe, in opposition to the existing political relationship with France.^ In spite of the fact that these two political leaders com- mand the support of the majority of the citizens in the two largest cities of the French West Indies, the power and attraction of General deGaulle combined with the pride of being French is too strong to allow any overwhelming rejection of assimilation. The post-deGaulle period will undoubtedly produce a change in the political relationship between the Antilles and France, but prob- ably not in French Guyana where the population is so small that economic and administrative aid from France will be necessary for several decades to come. While the French areas may present an exceptional case, else- where the heritage of colonialism tends to warp the political development in a manner all out of proportion to the real or more meaningful problems being faced by the newly autonomous peo- ple. In Surinam, which is one of the three members of the tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands (the other two being the Netherlands Antilles and Holland), Prime Minister Pengle would prefer to hide his government's inefficiency and corruption by an appeal for a revision of the Charter of the Kingdom to allow Surinam to apply to other nations for financial support for her development program.^ Holland, which has underwritten the impressive eco- nomic development of this small country, has been increasingly reluctant to close her eyes to the extravagance and waste which has come to characterize the government in power. By raising the comparatively irrelevant issue of colonialism, Pengle smothers the cries for reform and carries on a nationalistic political cam- paign which will undoubtedly see him returned to office as the outspokep defender of Surinamese interests. Thus disguised by means of a political subterfuge, the economic situation in Surinam will continue to deteriorate while the blame is erroneously placed on nonexistent interference from Holland. Unfortunately the only opposition party which could serve to clarify the issue is so strong- ly committed to independence that it is reluctant to emphasize its agreement with charges made by the Dutch government. Although less autonomous than Surinam, Puerto Rico's political picture is beclouded by the same problem. In spite of the success of the Popular Democratic Party in almost all phases of public life in Puerto Rico, except perhaps that particular way of life studied by Oscar Lewis,^ the political debate on the island has never been weaned away from the seemingly unending discus- sion of status. Certainly for the nationalistic elements of the political spectrum, Puerto Rico's limited autonomy leaves much to POLITICAL CAPACITY 31 be desired. Puerto Ricans are dying in Viet Nam in a war which even if it were subjected to a vote in Congress could not be voted on by representatives of the Puerto Rican people.^ Other sources of irritation include the inability to vote for the president J the restrictive shipping laws which hamper a freer participation in Caribbean trade by Puerto Rican producers, and the lack of rep- resentation in international organizations even though some of its smaller and less fortunate neighbors are full fledged members of the Organization of American States and the United Nations. These are only a few of the more frequently mentioned areas of possible change in the relationship with the United States. The question of status looms large in the political drama of the island. All issues from education to social welfare to industrial development are seen not in the light of their relationship to the welfare of the Puerto Rican but rather how they will further this or that particular status. Luis Mufloz Marin, the founder of the Popular Democratic Party and the architect of the present com- monwealth status, has achieved great success in devising a political relationship which allows a maximum degree of local political autonomy combined with a permanent and integrated economic relationship with the United States. He has failed, however, to lay to rest the ghost of colonialism, but more damaging is the fact that he has failed to secure any significant ardent defenders among the population for the Estado Libre Asociado. Too often it is looked upon as a half-way station which allows the island to prosper without the need for any final decision as to independence or statehood. As such it does not alienate either group and even the majority party itself is split into two recognizable factions each backing the commonwealth status but each reserving its final preference, be it independence or statehood. The coming year (1967) will see a plebiscite in Puerto Rico in which well over 50 per cent of the participants will vote for the commonwealth status. The remaining votes will be divided between independence and statehood, whose advocates have af- firmed their intentions of boycotting the plebiscite. This plebi- scite, far from settling the issue of status, will only serve to add fuel to the already hot fire of debate which keeps the island's political pot boiling. In these two cases, Surinam and Puerto Rico, the minor ties to greater powers are real but are exaggerated beyond the actual significance of their political importance. One final example of the heritage of colonialism might be drawn from one of the newly independent countries such as Trinidad or Guyana where the 32 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role poHtical dialogue has yet to develop into the post-colonial stage. The issue of independence is still being debated in the legislature, or the party in power is being accused in the press of selling out to this or that foreign interest. The hard task of day-to-day governing, the solving of insatiable demand for employment, the raising of capital for the exploitation of natural resources, all of these responsibilities are somewhat less satisfying than the exciting and rewarding activity of teasing the imperial lion. Criticism tends to be personal rather than policy based, destructive rather than positive or constructive, chauvinistic or narrowly nationalistic rather than statesmanlike. For example, Guyana's free trade ar- rangement with Barbados and Antigua is more an anti-Trinidad maneuver than a positive effort for Caribbean cooperation. Trini- dad in turn flirts with the Windward Islands more to irritate Barbados or Guyana than to seek ways of mutual support and closer cooperation.^ The pangs of birth of a new nation evolving out of a colonial past are still being felt in some of the Caribbean countries and this has determined the tone and direction of the political debate to an abnormal degree thus delaying the identification of pressing issues around which normal political discussion would revolve. // The most potentially explosive problem which three of the new nations of the Caribbean face is the racial problem. The com- parative racial homogeneity of the Antilles contrasts markedly with the multi-racial heterogeneity of Trinidad and the Guianas, particularly Surinam and Guyana. The East Indians are in the majority in Guyana, which has been torn by racial violence in previous years, but in Trinidad the Negro has a tenuous hold on the majority position. In Surinam a third group, the Javanese, holds an enviable position of balance between the plurality of the Negro and a rapidly increasing East Indian minority. In the three countries the major political parties are divided along racial lines. This has not always been so. In Surinam, for example, there existed both a Catholic and a conservative party which were able to appeal for support from all racial blocs, al- though the Hindus and Moslems were naturally reluctant to vote for leaders of another religion. These two parties still exist and, although it is highly unlikely, could possibly recover their former positions of power. One small party, which has been referred to above as being in favor of immediate independence, does make POLITICAL CAPACITY 33 an intense effort to appeal to all racial groups in the name of Surinam nationalism. The radical posture of its founder and leader, the brilliant lawyer Edward Bruma, unfortunately prevents any considerable support from the more conservative East Indians and Javanese, but he does receive some votes from the Bush Negroes, the more sophisticated Creoles, and the young East Indian intel- lectuals who refuse to follow the dictates of their pandits. Racially divided Guyana would probably prefer to return to the early years of the decade of the fifties when its two outstand- ing political leaders, Mr. Forbes Burnham and Dr. Cheddi Jagan, were working together in a rather uneasy harmony. Too much vio- lence and racial hatred has been experienced by the people of Guyana to allow this to come about even if the leaders were willing to sacrifice their own ambitions. After about ten years of chaos under Dr. Cheddi Jagan, who was prevented from ruling by racial disturbances mostly stimulated by outside influences,^ by resulting intervention by British authorities, and by the lack of financial support necessary to carry out the most elementary re- sponsibilities, the opposition coalition formed by Forbes Burnham and the reactionary Peter d'Aguiar came into power. Racial dis- turbances have ceased. Great Britain has granted independence, and the United States which had allowed a mere $6 million dol- lars in loans over a ten-year period has now flooded the country with $225 million in authorized grants and loans in scarcely two and a half years.^*^ With all of this, Forbes Burnham has failed to crack the East Indian solidarity behind Dr. Cheddi Jagan. Dr. Jagan and his East Indian followers know that time is on their side. The East Indian majority, if free elections are to be held in 1967 or 1968, cannot be blocked from taking over the govern- ment no matter how much manipulation there is of the so-called proportional representation voting system implanted by the Brit- ish before their withdrawal. In an effort to bolster his dwindling support Burnham has decreed that all Guyanese, whether resi- dents or not, are eligible to vote in elections. Also the next two years will see efforts to secure immigrants spilling out of the over- populated islands of Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and perhaps even Jamaica. There are those pessimists who argue that even these methods are not enough and the only thing which will prevent Dr. Jagan from taking over will be the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the indefinite postponement of elec- tions. Trinidad's East Indians, who expect to be in the majority by 1970, have failed to produce a leader who could compete success- 34 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role fully with the erudite and dynamic Dr. Eric Williams. As the results of the recent elections clearly show,^^ Dr. Williams and his People's National Movement have failed to win the support of the East Indian of the rural areas. As in Guyana the two races are gravitating into two political blocs. Splinter parties or small politi- cal groups formed around the personality of an important com- munity leader all fared badly in the election, leaving the reins of government in the hands of the Negro majority and the opposition in the hands of the leaders of the dominant East Indian party. Time and the natural increase of the East Indian over the Negro will eventually reverse the existing power structure. As yet Trini- dad has not seen the violence of Guyana but the slums of Port of Spain, while not as bad as West Kingston in Jamaica, are worse than any slum area in Guyana and will produce serious problems for a racially divided nation. The problem of a racially divided society can be aggravated by pressures caused by a growing population inadequately absorbed by slow economic growth. The solution to the problem lies in the creation of a feeling of nationhood which transcends racial or re- ligious loyalties or at least which manipulates such loyalties for the benefit of the country as a whole. When the Surinamese thinks of himself as a Surinamese and not Javanese, then these young nations will have solved one of their most pressing problems. Unfortunately, the politicians at this point seem to be more con- cerned with building up a racial base for their political power than with creating a united nation. Ill The problem of the passing of political power from one gener- ation to the next is being faced in Jamaica and Puerto Rico. The old leaders who battled the colonial system, whether British or American, in the decade of the thirties are being hard pressed by an impatient and younger group of politicans anxious to take over the party and government leadership. The Prime Minister of Jamaica, Sir Alexander Bustamante, is over 83 years of age, par- tially blind, and disabled by a stroke about two years ago. Mr. Norman Manley is a decade younger but still well beyond the normal retirement age. A number of able cabinet members of the present government in Jamaica are willing to take over the leadership of the Bustamante political machine, but as yet the struggle for power has not occurred because the "old man," as he is affectionately called, refuses to retire and because the opposi- POLITICAL CAPACITY 35 tion would strive to take advantage of any potential split in the Jamaica Labour Party. As yet there is no clear-cut heir to the power of Bustamante who undoubtedly will endeavor to select his own successor. The People's National Party is in a much worse position because it does not have the number of able second lieutenants in positions of responsibility gaining experience for the eventual day when the reins of government will be available to them. 12 In Puerto Rico Luis Munoz Marin has picked his successor, who has been governing the island with considerable ability since 1964. Roberto Sanchez Vilella is not a politician although he has tried very hard to secure popular support. The lesser leaders in the Popular Democratic Party have rallied behind another leader, Senator Luis Negron Lopez, whose experience of many years in elected office in the legislature is in contrast to the experience of Governor Sanchez in appointed positions of the executive branch of the government. The recent split (September, 1966) became so public and open that only the direct intervention of former governor, now Senator, Luis Munoz Marin prevented the Popular Democratic Party from having a public row. The division is very real and will break out in 1968 when Governor Sanchez is ex- pected to seek reelection. As long as Luis Mufioz Marin continues to be active in the Puerto Rican political arena the party will not divide, but this form of forced unification between the conserva- tive and liberal factions of the party is temporary. ^^ The division indicates that the party has still to develop its program and prin- ciples beyond the dictates and influence of its founder. Until this is done, to talk of the Popular Democratic Party as an institutional party which will survive the passing of power from one generation of leaders to another is quite misleading. The same problem is faced by the opposition party, the State- hood Republican Party, whose leaders have been active in the party since the late 1920's. In this party such a suffocating hold has been exercised over the decision-making power that there are no leaders on hand to take over from the passing generation. Those able figures who are sympathetic to the party have been forced into the background or out of the party altogether by the arbitrary action of the autocratic leader. Senator Miguel Angel Garcia Mendez. Only the independence movement gives evidence of strong young leaders who unfortunately show no ability to accept party discipline. In fact the aspect of an independent Puerto Rico under the guidance of the current wave of leaders in the inde- 36 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role pendence movement is almost alarming and dismal. Just recently one leader of the minor independence groups, the Nationalist Party, challenged the leader of the Pro-Independence Movement to a duel in order to settle personal and party diflFerences. The importance of the position of Fidel Castro in Cuba would seem to be another example of the same type of political prob- lem. The Cuban Revolution has been defined and carried out al- most single-handedly by the powerful charismatic personality of Castro. 1* Still young and very much in control, only an unexpected and unfortunate event could remove Castro from his position of leadership; thus the problem of transmission of the position of power is not an urgent one in Cuba today. The Cuban revolution and all that it stands for to the thousands of enthusiastic support- ers would falter and fail should the centralizing figure of the leader disappear. If Castro can outwit his adversaries for another decade or two, then the revolution will have had time to implant solidly its principles and purpose on a whole generation who may be able to carry on its effectiveness beyond the limitation of the lives of its founders and current leaders. The Mexicans were able to do precisely this, but that revolution did not have the dubious bene- fit of one outstanding and all-powerful leader and did have the massive support which rarely needed the intellectual orientation provided by the doctrinaire dialecticians who currently seem to be in vogue in Cuba. Of all of the political leaders of the Caribbean the ones who are faced with the most impossible situations live on the island of Santo Domingo. Since the Haitian problem seems devoid of a possible!^ solution, I will limit my observation to the Dominican Republic where President Joaquin Balaguer until recently had a degree of support for his highly untenable position in the nature of a democratically oriented and loyal opposition led by Juan Bosch, Now this is gone and Balaguer, a lonely man by choice and nature, faces an incredible set of circumstances, any one of which would be enough to defeat the most dedicated democrat. The heritage of Trujillo which can hardly be summed up in a page or paragraphia — the military machine which has no under- standing of, let alone interest in, political democracy; the utter absence of any technological or bureaucratic administrative staff; ^'^ the chaotic influence of anarchistic elements pouring out of the misery of urban and rural slums; the corruption of a whole gener- ation of public officials; the bankruptcy of a deplorable educa- tion and public health program; the suffocating burden of almost a whole nation accustomed to living off of the benevolent hand- POLITICAL CAPACITY 37 outs of a paternalistic government — these are just some of the reasons why the task of governing the Dominican Repubhc would be next to impossible for a man dedicated to the democratic process. Rather than pick up each of these areas for further study, one particular point upon which there seems to be general agreement by most observers of the Dominican Republic is sufficient to sum- marize the impossible task before Joaquin Balaguer. Robert Crass- weller has expressed it in this fashion in his dramatic biography of Trujillo. In the Dominican Republic there is "the tendency to react more understandingly and tolerantly ... to the very firm exercise of political power. During the Era of Trujillo many able men of the highest character believed simultaneously both that the regime was in many respects barbarous and that only with a strong hand could the country be governed."^ ^ This basic lack of faith in democracy is prevalent in the minds of the most dedi- cated servants of the Dominican people. It may go a long way to explain why Juan Bosch felt that his continued presence in the country could only aggravate and complicate unnecessarily the task of the president, who perhaps for the good of the country should be free to act with force and decision. There are those who would applaud this as applied to the case of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic but would deplore its application to the ex- ample of Fidel Castro in Cuba which in reality is very much the same except that it is political power being exercised by the left instead of the right. To pursue this further would lead us to a more expansive topic which has been explored by more able minds elsewhere. I refer to the questions of the heritage of Hispanic culture and the role of the military in political life of the Latin American countries. ^^ IV Before terminating this brief account of problems and leaders in the Caribbean, I would mention one final problem: foreign inter- vention. Intervention can take many difi^erent forms, the most obvious being the direct military intervention in the Dominican Republic by the United States armed forces. Similarly interven- tion would also be the term to be applied to the missies supplied to the Cubans by the Soviet Union, since it could hardly be conceived that this hardware would be under complete Cuban control. Also one would be inclined to look with a questioning eye at the immodest display of United States capital in the last 38 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role year in Guyana. Concern is being expressed by non-Jaganite Guy- anese^o over the willingness of the Burnham government to pros- titute itself and its principles for the American dollar. Not all foreign influence is from the colossus to the North. In Surinam Edward Bruma strongly feels that Dutch capital has deprived the Surinamese of complete exercise of their supposed autonomy. The weak cry of the opposition in Trinidad through the voice of C. L. R. James is against the tendency to allow the public debt to skyrocket while loans are secured — particularly in this case and that of Jamaica — from Canada. These are scattered examples, but to sharpen the problem at- tention should be focused on two cases: Cuba and Guyana. Both countries are plagued by the fact that they are used as pawns in the game of cold war power politics. In each case Jagan and Castro invite this problem by their understandable refusal to re- linquish their independence by getting caught up in the suffocat- ing embrace of the American market. Certainly Guyana under Jagan and Cuba under the current economic blockade have suf- fered severely for their posture of defiance. Neutrality within the Caribbean is apparently not a position al- lowed by the masterminds of our State and Military Departments. We seem to be unable to understand the lessons to be learned from our relations in this century with Mexico. We take the child- ish attitude that if you are not with us then you are obviously against us. Normal relations should be renewed with Cuba and Castro's problem would then become a much more difficult one of trying to outbid the pervading influence of American capitalism. As matters stand now we are contributing to an easing of the position of Castro, which is extremely difficult in an island unac- customed to austerity, by providing a scapegoat and explanation for the hardships the Cuban people are experiencing. In the case of Guyana we are even blinder still since our policy has failed up to this point to take advantage of the friendly elements within the East Indian racial groups. By punishing them for having chosen as their spokesman the charming and affable Dr. Jagan because he is an East Indian and not because he is a Marxist-Leninist, we have cut off our contact from a group whose eventual takeover of the government is inevitable. Again we have provided a political leader with a facile and for the most part false explanation for his inability to solve pressing administrative problems. The result is a confused picture which can be clarified only when foreign intervention ceases to be used as a political tool POLITICAL CAPACITY 39 both by the power intervening and the leader who has invited the intervention, even though such intervention may be of a nega- tive nature as in the case of Cuba and Guyana. V In summary, I have tried to pinpoint some of the more pressing poHtical, as contrasted to economic, problems which are facing the current leaders of the island nations of the Caribbean. I have tried to use as my guideline those problems which must be solved in order to create a climate of political freedom and responsi- bility which will allow the development of a stable democratic political progress and tradition. The leader who successfully solves these problems will become a builder of nations. Many decades ago a young man admiringly wrote an apprecia- tion of the political genius of his father.^i He likened him to a sculptor who exercised his God-given power to mold the shapeless clay into a work of art. The leader was Luis Munoz Rivera, one of the outstanding Puerto Rican patriots, who brought his people a long way toward nationhood. Leaders of today, including Luis Mufioz Marin, are in the process of creating new nations in the Caribbean out of personality-less colonial entities. The quality of their work of art will be judged by future generations. NOTES 1. Fred R. Van der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1964). 2. Lucien W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Particularly helpful were Chapters 1-3. 3. T. Mathews et al.. Politics and Economics in the Caribbean, Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1966. See the section on the politics of the French Antilles by Gerard Latortue. 4. Ibid., section on Surinam. 5. La Vida (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966). 6. San Juan Star of October 27, 1966, carried an article by an editorial staff writer protesting this injustice. 7. El Dia, October 26, 1966. See the statement of Luis Ferre, one of the two leaders of the Statehood Republican Party. 8. Sir Arthur Lewis, "The Agony of the Eight," The Advocate (Barbados: Commercial Printing, n.d. but probably 1965), pp. 36-38. 9. Peter Simms, Trouble in British Guiana (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1966). 10. T. Mathews, "The Three Guianas," Current History (December, 1966). 11. See report on the November elections in the Caribbean Monthly Bulletin (December, 1966). 40 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role 12. Spotlight, Vol. 27, No. 4 (April, 1966), 11. See the report of Sir Arthur Lewis' speech at the University of the West Indies on the occasion of the granting of honorary degrees to Dr. Eric Williams and Sir Alexander Busta- mante. 13. T. Mathews, "La Proxima Decada en la Politica Puertorriqueila," Re- vista de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. IX, No. 3 (September, 1965). This complete number is dedicated to an analysis of Puerto Rico's political picture. 14. Hugh Thomas, "Paradoxes of Castro's Cuba," New Statesman, LXXII, (August 26, 1966), 283-85. 15. Gerard Latortue, "Haiti, Its Problems and Future Prospects," Current History (December, 1966). 16. Franklin J. Franco, Republica Dominicana, Classes, Crisis y Com- mandos (Habana: Casa de Americas, 1966). 17. There are some notable exceptions to this broad statement. See the work being done by the Santiago-based Associacion para el DesarroUo: for example, Bernardo Vega, La Republica Dom.inicana ante el proceso de integracion eco- nomica en Latinoamerica (Santo Domingo: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, 1966). 18. Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: Mac- millan Company, 1966), p. 350. 19. Lyle McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Mili- tary in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, Vol. II, No. 1. 20. ISlew World, No. 47 (Georgetown, Guyana, September 5, 1966), p. 6. 21. Luis Muiioz Marin, "Luis Munoz Rivera — como artista," La Democracia (Noviembre 15, 1918), cited in Thomas Mathews, Luis Munoz Marin, a Con- cise Biography (New York: American R. D. M. Corporation, 1967). Part II ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 4 I? Juan D. Sanchez: resources OF the Caribbean The CARIBBEAN AREA for the purposes of this paper has been defined to include Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia as well as Central America, Guyana, Surinam, French Guiana, and the Caribbean islands. Few generalizations can be made about so diverse a group of countries which includes Mexico and Puerto Rico, both of which are advancing rapidly into modern industrial economies, as well as tropical palm-sprinkled island paradises with natural air-conditioning provided by the trade winds. I shall confine this paper chiefly to the Spanish-speaking countries and Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana, 7 All the countries in the Caribbean area have certain basic re- sources. Perhaps the most important is manpower and youth. As we all know, this area has one of the highest birth rates in the world, and in much of the region some 60-70 per cent of the population is under 20 years of age. The Caribbean region is one of the world's great melting pots. Dutch and English, Spanish and Portuguese, Africans and Asians have all left their stamp on the native Indian way of life. The overall result is a pleasing political and cultural mixture. Experience has shown that, given the tools and the training, workers in these countries are quick to acquire the mechanical skills needed to run modern agricultural or industrial machinery. 43 44 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role The experience of Mexico, for example, offers more than adequate evidence of this. In addition, as these countries approach economic maturity, the growing middle class is providing increasing num- bers of management and entrepreneurial personnel. In all of these countries. United States firms have gradually and successfully been replacing United States nationals with local personnel in managerial positions. The most recent available figures indicate that literacy rates in this area range from some 20 per cent in Haiti to about 85 per cent in Costa Rica, Guyana, and Puerto Rico. A major target of the Alliance for Progress is the improvement and expansion of educational facilities, and many of the countries with which we are concerned here today are making noteworthy strides in raising literacy rates. Vocational and professional schools are serving more and more people. In Venezuela alone, in 1957-58, there were only 608,000 students enrolled in public primary schools, 30,000 in public sec- ondary schools, and 17,000 in public technical schools. By 1965, these totals had increased to 1.2 million, 118,000, and 75,000 re- spectively. These countries lie in an area between the equator and 28° north — roughly comparable to the situation of African countries north of the Congo, or of southeast Asia. Middle America is a meeting ground of mountains and men. The rugged spines of the South American Andes and the North American Rockies make large sections uninhabitable. Except for Honduras and Cuba, many of these nations suffer from lack of cultivable plains. The mainland mountains lift the cities above the steamy coastal lowlands. Thus there is, for example, a year- round springlike temperature in Mexico City and San Jose. Volcanic eruptions like those in El Salvador have enriched the soil, which is ideal for growing crops of bananas, sugar cane, and so forth. Corn, now a universal staple, was originally cultivated in this area by the Indians; lima beans, peppers, and many other familiar food plants also had their beginnings here. This area is also rich in natural resources. Mexico alone, with less than 1.5 per cent of the world's population, produces 7.5 per cent of the world's antimony, over a quarter of world arsenic output, almost 15 per cent of the bismuth production, some 4.5 per cent of cotton and cottonseed, over 90 per cent of henequen, more than 15 per cent of silver, and 11 per cent of the world's sulphur output. Jamaica, Guyana, and Surinam produce each year over 40 per ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 45 cent of the world's bauxite; Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela account for almost 15 per cent of world petroleum output; the Caribbean region accounts for over a fifth of world coffee produc- tion. In addition, it is generally agreed that untold wealth in as yet undiscovered resources lies waiting to be discovered and de- veloped in the hinterlands of several of these countries, notably in Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Central America. It was only in recent years that the mineral-rich Guyana region of Venezuela was opened up; it is now believed that the iron ore reserves there are sufficient to meet Venezuela's requirements for the next century. All of these resources are not only useful in the domestic econo- mies of the countries in which they are located, but they also offer to each of them the means with which to trade for other commodities not available locally — in particular for the machinery and equipment needed for building industrial economies and for modernizing agriculture production techniques. The fact that the Caribbean region contains all of these natural resources — and to those already mentioned must be added many other agricultural products, lumber, and fish — enables the countries in this area to trade needed raw materials with the United States and other industrial countries in exchange for the capital equip- ment required to build local industry and for many manufactures not yet produced locally. In 1965 Mexico alone supplied a third of United States imports of graphite, three-quarters of imports of fluorspar, a quarter of imports of barium, and two-thirds of imports of sulphur. The Caribbean region as a whole supplied half of United States sodi- um chloride imports, 22 per cent of iron ore and concentrates, practically all bauxite imports, 27 per cent of zinc ores, 38 per cent of crude petroleum, 77 per cent of naphtha, all jet-fuel im- ports, 85 per cent of other fuel-oil imports, and 42 per cent of coffee imports. This is a very impressive list. In return for these and other products from this area valued at $3.0 billion, the United States shipped some $2.9 billion worth of goods, chiefly machinery, transport equipment, and other manu- factured products. In addition to labor and raw materials, the third major need of any economy, whatever its stage of development, is capital. While it is generally agreed that large infusions of foreign capital have been and will be needed to accelerate the development of many of these countries, it is often forgotten that local capital is playing an increasing and in most countries a dominant role in the process. 46 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Of total investment in Mexico, for example, at least 90 per cent has come from domestic sources. While the percentage may not be that high in some of the other countries with which we are con- cerned, it is clear that considerably larger amounts of domestic resources are now going into capital formation than was the case even a half decade ago. In some countries these funds are being channeled, according to plan, into the segments of the economy where they are most needed through local development banks. In all of Central America, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela, domestic investment has far exceeded the inflow of funds from foreign private and institutional sources in recent years; indeed, while there has been a consistent, though diminishing, net out- flow of foreign funds from Venezuela in the sixties owing to special circumstances, annual gross capital formation in that country has risen from $1.3 billion in 1960 to almost $1.5 billion at present. The figures appear to indicate that even in such relatively under- developed countries as Nicaragua, political and economic stability offer strong inducements to local as well as foreign investors. The attached tables give some indication of the funds that have been committed to the Caribbean area by some of the larger international institutions and by the United States Govern- ment. These funds constitute yet another resource upon which the various countries of the region can draw for education, hous- ing, improving agricultural techniques, road building, feasibility studies, industrial projects, and so forth. From the end of the war through June, 1965, all the countries in the area received some $1,730 million in the form of loans and grants from international organizations. An additional $3.4 billion has been made available by the United States through various aid programs, the Export- Import Bank, and so on. Of this, over $1.1 billion consisted of outright grants. 17 To develop their resources with maximum benefit to themselves, many of these countries whose local markets are too small to gain the advantages that come with large-scale industrial production are joining in larger groups. Thus Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela have joined with seven South American countries in the Latin American Free Trade As- sociation (lafta), and five Central American countries have banded together in a common market. Antigua, Barbados, and Guyana signed an agreement in December, 1965 looking toward ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 47 a Caribbean free trade area, and there has been talk of a larger trading association including many of the smaller Caribbean islands and Puerto Rico. Of these existing and projected arrangements, the Central American Common Market (cacm) has thus far been the most successful. Its members have removed tariffs on some 95 per cent of the items they trade among themselves. Indeed, although the remaining twenty-seven items include cotton, coffee, sugar, and tobacco on which it will be hardest to drop restrictions since they provide substantial revenues to the governments concerned, the substantial achievement of this group of nations is well worth noting. Intra-regional trade has increased more than fourfold since 1960. Other organs, of which the Central American Bank for Economic Integration is perhaps the most outstanding, have been established and are in business. The success of this region's inte- gration has been largely responsible for bringing in increasing amounts of foreign investment and expediting the development of an efficient industrial base in the area. Mexico, a member of lafta, has expressed more than passing interest in cacm and may some day provide the bridge to unifying that group with lafta in an overall Latin American regional association. 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I— i l-H Tf oq i> 05 CO 05 oq in 05 l-H 05 oq CO O CO_ !> ^_ oi ^ o CO i> c4 i> i> o CO o in 00 in CDCOCOi— li-Hr-H 1— llOi-Hi— I oq oq in oqo5i-Ht-;t~^ininocqTfTti-Hi-; i-HOi-HOJodco'TfirJiriooinodi^co -<* CO l-H CO 00 l-H oq 3 '^ 3 SOWffi2UpL,UffiQpL, CD oq CD oq oq co xt< COi-HOOi-HOOO oodoodcDf-i oooooooo oqooooooco rHOOOOoooq oq o o oq o l-H ^Ji S <^,^ .S c SP 2 ^ ^ 3 -S C :3 03 re a Q, re *j -■^ 2 "o .^ .2 y C O ;3 y o .^ .2 y C O M g -g .-t; .ti § M H C tn jr' 1-1 tH ^H 3 H fe Q m 05 IJL, 3 I C/D m O m t3 - a a-r; re o3 1^ 'ra 3 „ re '^ j_» 2'-S« I — ,i<=c c/:) C 13 oi a CULTURAL INFLUENCES 133 number of instructors teaching on the university level without making any distinction between full-time and part-time personnel. If this number were changed to indicate full-time employment or its equivalent, it would mean a greater economic burden. Besides, primary-school teachers educated in the normal schools of our countries receive approximately six years of education above the primary grades; secondary school teachers, ten years; univer- sity instructors, twelve or fifteen. It is urgent, therefore, that a campaign be started immediately in all areas to adequately pre- pare teachers and instructors on all levels so as to be able to guarantee the coming generation of students an education limited only by their intellectual capacity. This is the very essence of what we may call the democratization of education. 777 When we elaborate any program or plan for the future, we first ask ourselves if it is feasible, and if we find that all the elements necessary to its success are not at the moment available, we should establish certain priorities that will in time make our plan practicable. I firmly believe that the primary need of any country is education, but I also understand that it is not possible, in the face of other urgent needs, to dedicate to it the entire resources of a country, for I am aware of the fact that while education is the multiplier of progress, it cannot flourish in a vacuum. But one thing is evident: in many of our countries, education does not receive special attention and it is still aban- doned to a secondary position. As we study programs for education, we must be aware of that fact that it is not possible to put them all into practice at the same time. We must, therefore, establish certain priorities. The greatest endeavor of many governments is to establish a universal primary education and to undertake massive campaigns destined to this end, without taking into consideration two basic facts, first, that there exists a lack of competent teachers and, second, that those who are being trained are anxious to go to higher levels of education. Besides, there is a strong natural tend- ency for those who finish the primary grades to continue their education; those who are unable to do so feel frustrated. There is no other solution, therefore, than to put into effect carefully integrated plans of educational development in which quantity and quality are each given the place that corresponds to their relative importance in that particular country. We must con- 134 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role centrate our efforts on the preparation of teaching personnel keyed to all levels of education. The main problems we face in getting the necessary instruc- tional personnel are the lack of social prestige so common to the teaching profession in our countries and the low salaries that are oflFered. These two factors, therefore, become fundamental points of transformation upon which we must concentrate our efforts if we expect to get the teaching personnel we need for the future. Social prestige for the teaching profession can be achieved only if both government and community recognize the social impor- tance of the teacher or instructor and give him the position in society he so rightly deserves. And this position is equal, if not higher, to that of almost any other profession. Salaries are, to a certain extent, intimately related to social prestige, but in the case of teaching personnel, it is important to recognize the fact that it is necessary, to overcome a deeply im- ^ bedded traditional concept which has assigned to this profession | a lower position on the social structure. And this erroneous tra- ditional concept must be broken if we wish to make the teaching ^ profession, so vital to the development of a country or region, I more attractive and thus offer to future generations new incen- I tives. It is important to emphasize the fact that in order to bring ^ about certain fundamental changes, it is necessary to bring about a change in concepts and to break traditional molds which like this one are hindering progress. It is indeed sad to think that we worry more about the technical specifications of highways and about our own personal comfort than we do about the personal and educational qualifications of those who are to be entrusted with the nation's greatest asset — men. And while we are making an effort to bring about the improve- ment of the teacher's social position and financial remuneration, we must find a way to achieve greater efficiency in our systems of education so as to avoid unnecessary or wasteful expenses and at the same time give the best use to the scant educational per- sonnel and facilities available. In order to make efficient use of all available resources, it is necessary to achieve the integration of the potentials of space and of manpower, the concentration of students, especially those of the secondary and higher levels, into large groups for theory classes, with of course subdivision into smaller units to facilitate discussion, and the grouping together of students of both sexes, not allowed in many countries. Besides, it is of fundamental importance that we update our instructors, both present and future, by preparing them to use the CULTURAL INFLUENCES 135 new methodological techniques in the teaching of even larger numbers of students. Countries that are more developed have a tendency to reduce their student-teacher ratio by increasing their potential for education and decreasing their educational deficits. However, I do not think this is going to be feasible in the Carib- bean area and in Latin America, as we are still far from reaching our basic needs. In fact, I fear we are losing ground due to our tremendous population explosion. I do not believe it will be possible under present conditions to train a sufficient number of teachers to cover both the deficit that now exists and that caused by the growth in population. I believe our only salvation lies in the preparation of a teaching staff capable of giving instruction to a larger number of students, and this can only be achieved by utilizing every technique of modern educational methodology and the tools that make the use of this methodology practicable. I give special emphasis on hav- ing texts of programmed instruction that will permit more exten- sive independent study, and also laws that will stimulate or permit a student's educational progress through his own initiative. In connection with this I have mentioned the in-service prepara- tion of the present teaching personnel, and I wish to stress the fact that it is of vital importance that they take an active part in the development of any educational program for the future. It has been proven that the improvement or education of adults gives greater and immediate results and therefore training in service becomes a most important factor in any project for educa- tional development. IV After considering all these factors, it would be well to review and summarize some of the thoughts that passed through my mind as I wrote this article. The main point is that the future progress of a nation is intimately related to its educational devel- opment, for its citizens are not only the motivating factor in its progress but also its only guarantee of stability. In turn, educa- tional development is not possible if we do not provide the necessary teaching personnel to bring it about, and this means the adequate preparation of teachers and professors present and future, on all educational levels, increasing social' and economic incentives through a breaking of the traditional standards of appreciation and remuneration. I also firmly believe that if we do not take adequate measures to attract more and better elements 136 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role to the teaching profession, we shall not achieve the social, cultural, economic, and political progress that our countries need and that our people demand. The quality of education depends on the quality of teachers we have. We do not have another alternative — we pay them or we do not have them. I also believe that an instructor in our countries, whether they are called developing or underdeveloped, urgently needs all the modern aids that are available to enable him to teach larger groups of students and thus help to cover the present deficit and that created by the rapidly increasing population. I believe this is even more important for our countries than for those that have already achieved a high degree of development. An increased efficiency in the use of the funds destined to education is also mandatory, as is the efficient use of teaching personnel through the better use of space, concentration of students, the application of modern methods of teaching, and the encouragement of in- dependent study. Perhaps it would have been more attractive to have drawn a picture of the enormous progress that is expected to take place in certain localities in the future, but I have preferred to analyze a few facts and concepts that are key to this development and play a decisive role in the future. Any look into the future must start in the present. I have always been intrigued by the question, "When is the future?" And the answer in my mind has always been confused with the concept of the present. NOTES ON TABLES 1. The statistical information presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 was taken from the article "Population of the Non-Spanish Speaking Caribbean" by S. W. Roberts, in Population Dilemma in Latin America, pp. 61-85, presented by the author at the meeting of the Asamblea Panamericana which met in Cali in August, 1965. The tabular presentation of the population of countries that form the Caribbean area, its subdivision into age groups, and the study of teaching personnel were done by the Statistician Adonay Moreno of the Oficina de Planeacion y Desarrollo of the Universidad del Valle. 2. Due to the lack of information concerning the population of the Caribbean for 1965, particularly the Lesser Antilles and the Guianas, the increase in the population of these areas was calculated on the basis of that of the population of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico. The total population for 1965 was estimated by increasing the 1960 figure by 12.8 per cent. For 1980, the increase was 44 per cent. The 7- to 14-year-old population for 1965 was calculated as 17.5 per cent of the total population, while the 1980 figure was set at 18.5 per cent. The 15- to 19-year-old figures for both years were based on an estimated 10 per cent. The primary-school population was calculated on the basis of 12.8 per cent of the total population for both 1965 and 1980; the secondary, 7.5 per cent of CULTURAL INFLUENCES 137 the primary, while the university student population was calculated as 8 per cent of the secondary for 1965 and 8.5 per cent for 1980. For 1965 and 1980, a teacher-student ratio of 1:40 for the primary level, 1:20 for the secondary, and 1:6.5 for the university level for 1965 and 1:6 for 1980 was taken as a basis for the teaching population. It should be re- membered, however, that, on the university level, no distinction has been made between full-time and part-time personnel. 3. Finally, let me say that I do not claim that the figures presented in these tables are absolutely free from error, but I do believe that they represent very clear tendencies that reveal to us the enormous task that lies ahead. REFERENCES Stycos, J. M. and J. Aria. The American Assembly Columhia University Held at Cali, Colombia. August, 1965. Pontiac Books Inc., 1966. Harbism, F. "La politica de recursos humanos en las economias en via de modernizacion," El desarrollo economico y las inversiones en educacion (Conferencia de Washington, 16-20 de Octubre de 1961). Washington: OCDE. Pp. 111-45. Lewis, W. Arthur. "Las prioridades en el desarroUo de la ensefianza," El desa- rrollo economico y las inversiones en educacion ( Conferencia de Washington, 16-20 de Octubre de 1961). Washington: ocde. Pp. 133-45. Vaizey, John. "Algunos de los principales problemas del desarrollo de la en- sefianza," El desarrollo economico y las inversiones en educacion (Confer- encia de Washington, 16-20 de Octubre de 1961). Washington: ocde. Pp. 147-61. Chambers, M. M. "The Shape of Things to Come in Higher Education," The Journal of Higher Education, 33 (December, 1962), 479-86. Ruml, Beardsley. Memo to a College Trustee. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. 94. Stinnet, T. M. "The Revolution and Teacher Education," Journal of Teacher Education, 17 (1966), 279. Jose A. Mora: the young Caribbean meets A NEW CHALLENGE JL HAVE just come from a celebration marking the independence of Barbados, the Caribbean's newest nation. The gay and inspir- ing ceremonies were a tribute not only to a young nation but also to the promise of youth in the area. Therefore I would like to discuss the challenge facing the Caribbean's younger generation. As you know, the younger generation has a special prominence in the Caribbean where half the population is under twenty years of age. Over 40 per cent of the people are less than fifteen years of age, which means that a very high percentage of the Caribbean's pop- ulation is reaching the threshold when education could provide the wherewithal of a useful, meaningful life. It also means that the burden of paying for education must be borne by a smaller number of productive workers than in most world areas. Will these Caribbean men and women of tomorrow become productive citi- zens in a vital society? Or will they become members of explosive political elements in a modem world for which they are not prepared? To a large extent the answers to these questions depend on what is done now through education to provide opportunities for national and individual self-realization. Before discussing how this need of the coming generation might be filled, I would like to draw a subjective portrait of the Carib- bean's younger peoples, based on personal experience. 138 CULTURAL INFLUENCES 139 The young man of the Caribbean is exemphfied by a Venezuelan student at the famous College of Agriculture in Trinidad. There, in the classroom and on the shelves of the library, he is taking advantage of one of the world's oldest research efforts in tropical agriculture. He is learning something about his newly independ- ent English-speaking neighbors and they are learning something about him, about their geographical proximity to the South Amer- ican continent, which is bound to exercise an important influence over their country's future. A second young man, from Costa Rica, is studying business administration at the University of Puerto Rico, thanks to a fellowship from the Organization of American States. In the last nine years more than ten thousand young men and women from Caribbean nations have studied at institutions throughout the Americas as part of this oas program. In the last three years nearly five hundred young people from the Caribbean have studied in Europe, Israel, and the Far East thanks to a Special Training Program of the oas, made possible by contributions from non member states. Another typical young Caribbean, a Guatemalan for example, finds himself working on the staff of the new Confederation of Central American Laborers, which has its headquarters in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. There, he is taking part in one facet of the exciting movement toward Central American integration which has created a regional-mindedness in many fields. On campuses at Central American universities, one can feel regionalism. Even since 1948, when the council of rectors of Central American uni- versities was established, there has been a steadily rising volume of educational interchange. Today a Costa Rican student might be studying at El Salvador's national university or a Nicaraguan on a Guatemalan campus. The objective of this regional effort is to provide for quality instruction in all fields of study at one or more of the universities of Central America through the combination and consolidation of regional university resources. There are other innovations in higher edu- cation, which I might mention. For example, the University of the Oriente in Venezuela has developed in its short six-year life a decentralized experimental program. Centers of instruction are located in each of the capitals of five states. The University program is highly original in that it is closely geared to the needs of the people within the community served by each uni- versity center. Young people, far removed from the Venezuelan capital, can not only study in formal classrooms, but the univer- 140 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role sity comes to them through educational and cultural extension programs suited to their special and practical needs. In Colombia, more than half a million primary-age school chil- dren are reaping the rewards of one of the world's finest educa- tional television and radio systems. The Colombian program re- minds us of how much more we can do to bring modern technology to bear on the problem of education. All of these activities are what I might broadly call expressions of a regional inclination. They indicate that individually and collectively the Caribbean nations are determined not to be bound by the formulas of the past — that the Caribbean is pre- pared to take a leading role, appropriate to its heritage, in meeting the challenge of change. Think back for a moment. Ever since Columbus dropped anchor, the Caribbean has been one of the main arenas in the confron- tation of new and old values. Youth played a decisive role even in colonial times. Hernan Cortes was barely thirty when he set out to conquer an empire whose existence had been discovered when he was a boy of seven. In the nineteenth century, the Caribbean nations were a base of operations of the wars of independence. They were in the fore- front of the struggle of new nations to achieve their freedom. Nine of the eleven Organization of American States nations represented at the Congress of Panama in 1826 were Caribbean nations. In the twentieth century, the Caribbean was once again thrust into a prominent role in the defense of the hemisphere. Owing to their strategic location the Caribbean nations became leaders in the defense of freedom when the defense of the Panama canal was of decisive importance for hemisphere security during the First and Second World Wars. Time does not permit me to review so many other epic moments played out in the Caribbean: the Mexican Revolution and the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962, to name only two. With each new threat, each new major change, and each new development, the Caribbean has faced a fresh challenge. And today it is no different from yesterday. 77 Change and danger once more summon the Caribbean to its historic role. By 1975 demographers estimate that there will be fifty per cent more people between the ages of twenty-five and CULTURAL INFLU^ENCES 141 forty in the Caribbean than there are in the United States or Canada. What kind of people will they be? Will they be as lucky as those young people I mentioned earlier, who are preparing themselves for useful careers? Will they be carrying briefcases or bombs? To a large extent the answers to these questions depend upon what we can do between now and 1975 in the field of education. In my opinion, the problems of education highlight an important difference between the problems of our day and those of the past. Today there is a greater degree of identity of interest than ever before between the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America. At this moment all of us are searching for answers to commonly shared problems like those raised by education. The Organization of American States, for example, is consid- ering new responses to the mounting challenges which will fall on the next generation. Throughout the Americas, I sense a preoccupation with what must be done to enable the next gen- eration to compete in a world which is becoming increasingly divided up into huge trading blocs. To some extent the aspirations of young people have been sys- tematized in the machinery of the Alliance for Progress. Within the Alliance, diverse nations have agreed on common objectives. In Central America, for example, a vibrant new regionalism has given birth to the Central American Common Market. The young Costa Rican student of business, studying at the University of Puerto Rico, will return home to find that his business oppor- tunities are greatly expanded. He will be able to participate in a community of nations which has created, through far-sighted statesmanship, the institutional mechanisms to nurture economic integration. He will find that the red-tape his father knew — the trade restrictions and the frontier barriers — has been reduced. He will find that his business horizons have been expanded to include a five-nation area of twelve million people, instead of a one-nation area of less than two million. He will have experienced in Puerto Rico the sensations of a throbbing, already industrial- ized economy which is the result of twenty years of great collec- tive effort. He will have become himself a distinct contrast to the young man I saw on the streets of Santo Domingo during the height of the crisis in April, 1965, who was trying to create oppor- tunity with his rifle. 142 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role 771 The OAS is giving its full support to eflForts at regional inte- gration in the Caribbean, and special concern to young people. Consider, for example what we have been doing in the Dominican Republic, since the period when we helped the transitional Do- minican regime hold free elections. We have fielded technical missions in the fields of agriculture and education. We are help- ing to carry on in the Dominican Republic one of the most comprehensive studies of natural resources ever undertaken in a Latin American country. We are helping to rebuild a nation torn by civil strife. What we are doing is symbolized by a young man who had just returned from a three-month tour of study in Italy on an oas grant at the time of the recent elections. The young man, in a sense, was the new man, bursting with new knowledge — ready to roll up his sleeves and get his country going again. The oas mission is also symbolized by what I saw recently in Israel. There, in classes conducted in Spanish, young people from the Caribbean were learning about what it means to be members of a nation dedicated to development. One cannot adequately describe the reaction of Latin American young people to the achievement of the Israelis in converting their arid lands into productive agricul- tural plots. In Israel oas grantees can see tangible results of what it means to be members of a developing society. The Israel-OAS collaboration is just one example of the kind of alternative — the peaceful response to change — which the oas is fostering. In Israel oas is keenly aware that from 1965 onward about three million young people will reach voting age each year in Latin America. Within a few years, the electorate of all the na- tions of the Caribbean will incorporate new ideas and value judgments based on vivid alternatives. That's why social and economic integration is of such over- riding importance to the oas. The oas is watching with interest the beginning made by Barbados and Antigua in establishing a new common market with Guyana. The surging trade between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic is another promising sign that regional integration is on the move. This year Mexico signed a Charter of Economic Cooperation with the Central Amer- ican nations, providing for a joint standing committee to strengthen mutual ties. The OAS vigorously supports these eflForts at achieving regional CULTURAL INFLUENCES 143 integration. The oas would welcome even more formal forms of regional Caribbean integration within the near future. IV The importance of success in achieving integration cannot be emphasized too much. Our struggle for economic integration is important not only to us but also to all the other nations of the Free World. We are being watched to see if we take the path of greater unity, or fall prey to disunity and narrow nationalism. I myself have faith that we will take the path of integration, though it will be a diflBcult one. The fulfillment of the promise of integra- tion will be one of the chief works of the coming generation. Consequently, the education of young men and women should be given the highest priority within our plans. Though there is considerable progress to report in providing more and better edu- cation in the Caribbean this effort still falls woefully short of the need. We must build faster. We must build educational fa- cilities at the primary, secondary, and university levels which take into account the changes that are occuring in the Caribbean and in Latin America generally. In education, as in politics, the formulas of the past must be adapted to meet the needs of people living in the age of com- puters and nuclear arms. This lesson is brought home forcefully to me each time that I read a report with statistical tables on the need for education. This lesson was brought home to me forcefully at the time of the missiles crisis of 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear devastation. V As one means of girding ourselves for the struggle ahead, I have repeatedly stressed that the matter of admitting new nations to the Organization of American States is of special urgency. I wish to repeat the invitation I made in Ottawa a few months ago: the hand of friendship is extended to all those hemisphere na- tions which do not now belong to the oas. When I was in Barbados, I felt strongly the existence of two reasons why the new nations of the Caribbean should respond to this offer. First, I believe they belong in the hemispheric organization because of their historical experience and their geographical location. Second, at this mo- ment an economically and socially integrated hemisphere is taking 144 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role shape. It would seem to be of great importance to the nations in this area to participate in the formulation of hemispheric integration. A short time ago, the distinguished Chairman of the Inter- American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria was asked: "What do you think of the current emphasis on integration within the inter-American system?" He said, "Doubtless, the process of integration will be long and difHcult and filled with setbacks. But of one thing I am certain — the process is irreversible." In this context, oas participation in the Dominican crisis and other short-range crises in the Caribbean and Latin America should not obscure our announced long-term objective within the hemisphere: the preservation and extension of freedom. At the moment, the struggle toward that objective is concentrated on achieving economic integration. Today's Caribbean is characteristically in the eye of the hurri- cane of change. From this vantage point one or another of the nations or territories have been forcibly propelled from time to time by centrifugal force. But the violence of the storm has not ever, nor can it ever, totally destroy the hurricane's eye which represents the Caribbean's deep and abiding faith in freedom and democracy. The nature of the storms which have blown across the Carib- bean has changed over centuries. Whether the wind blows hard and the seas swell, there always remains that sustaining faith in freedom — and when the storm is over, the promise of clear skies and a calm sea. I Robert Wool: notes on the cultural UNDERGROUND IN THE CARIBBEAN TODAY lo MAKE SENSE of any broad view of the arts in the Carib- bean and Latin America, one has first to remember that there, as everywhere, the arts are a reflection of the times and conditions that produce them. They don't ever exist in a vacuum. Viewed in that manner, I think one first reahzes and has to admit that we must have a very distorted view of what contemporary Latin America is Hke. / As a writer and an editor, I know first hand of the minute interest on the part of newspapers, magazines, and television in developing anything approaching reasonably adequate coverage of the area. Unless, of course, there is some juicy disaster — an earth- quake destroying an entire city is always good copy or a bloody revolution. The reason for this is very simple: irresponsibility on the part of editors and publishers. Latin America, they say quite frankly, doesn't sell tickets. That they might have a responsibility, nonetheless, to cover the area, is beyond their general compre- hension. That they might develop an audience for news in Latin America, an audience which in the future will indeed buy tick- ets, surpasses their business acumen. The cycle is endless and vicious. It is a case of mean irony that we are indebted to Fidel Castro for the slightly increased coverage of Latin America we have received since 1960. But the increase is hardly suflBcient to give a full picture of what is happening, and we are all losers for it, 145 146 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Not only are we deprived of news, but our ignorance is thick- ened, enriched by the promulgation of myths and fantasies in the popular arts. Latin America doesn't really exist: it is a make- believe world created by Hollywood, Carmen Miranda and talking ducks, endless lines of peasants in white pajamas, cartridge belts strapped across their chests, Viva Zapata and all those other generals with enormous moustaches and insane brown eyes. . . . 77 The true picture in the Caribbean and Latin America today is one of vast and constant change. In many ways, Latin America joined the twentieth century some twenty years ago, and its race and effort to catch up is awesome. Surely one of the most significant developments — and one to be seen throughout the artistic world — is urbanization. Every major city in Latin America receives, every day, hundreds of new im- migrants from its countryside. And every major city has on its outskirts the ever-spreading slums of these immigrants. They con- sist of miles of shacks made of packing crates and cardboard boxes that wash away with the heavy rains — jungles of man-made filth and misery, without water, lights, or very much hope. These cities are also now centers of industrialization. And with the industrialization, there has developed a broader middle class — a middle class which is not revolutionary, which emulates the upper class, and which to some degree has broadened the art world. It is within immediate memory, for example, that the arts in Latin America were almost exclusively the province of the very rich, the patrons. If one spoke of a painter, one usually meant a man who romanticized the families of the oligarchy with sac- charine court portraits or did the same for the government on the walls of state buildings. Today, as a certain amount of educa- tion and wealth become part of the middle-class estate, their participation in the arts, their patronage, and their numbers bol- ster the still limited but growing market for painters, writers, playwrights, filmmakers, and architects. More and more, the cre- ative people, who are largely middle class themselves, are being accepted as part of their society, and in some cases even looked upon as a valuable element. Part of the development and change since 1945 is clearly linked to the obvious: for the first time ever, something approaching a flow of news and information from the rest of the world is enter- ing the incredibly isolated orbit of the continent. There are books CULTURAL INFLUENCES 147 and magazines, films and television — and though there are still huge problems in the dissemination of knowledge and material, especially between one Latin American country and another — the situation is improving and the potential is being recognized. Most importantly, of course, it is now one jet flight from any major point in Latin America to any place in the world. This increased contact with the outer world is important to the arts. If one looks at the works of a group of painters from Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, one might be hard put to distinguish them from painters of New York, London, or Paris. Not that they are copies, but they are the results of men who have had an opportunity to see new styles and new techniques, to learn about new materials, and who then apply what they have seen and re- cently experienced to their own lives and perceptions. The dis- tinction is a sharp and important one and it is missed by most United States critics. Over the last four years, the Inter-American Foundation for the Arts has organized several shows of paintings, mostly in Latin America, and taken the exhibitions to museums and galleries throughout the United States. On the whole, the critical reaction to the shows has been quite favorable. The most painful criticism the Foundation has received at times is that the work is "deriva- tive." Of course, there is painting in Latin America that is "deriva- tive." But what the critics are really saying is that the work in these particular shows does not conform to their preconceptions of what so-called "Latin American painting" ought to be. Instead, they say, it reminds them too much of Fifty-Seventh Street. The truth is that the critics are ignorant of Latin America and the variety of influences, past and present, aflFecting the thinking and expression of its artists. 177 In addition to recognizing the profound impact of urbanization and increased international contact on the arts of Latin America, I think we have to consider the meaning of some local conditions, some pertinent and characteristic qualities of society that deeply affect the artistic milieu in the Caribbean and Latin America. First, the artist there is a political figure. There is no such thing as the artist disengage in that world. His world is evolving and changing, and he is expected, and usually naturally desires, to con- tribute to it. He is after all part of an Aristotelian elite, a minority that has had the advantage of education, perhaps travel. In a 148 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role country where half the population is illiterate, the citizen who has been blessed with such opportunities has a special responsi- bility to his state. He is expected to contribute to the actual plan- ning and development of his country. In some cases, the demands made on the man are really beyond his true competence: it is a case of the one-eyed man being king in the land of the blind. But nonetheless, in the Caribbean and Latin America, as in other developing areas, it is from the ranks of the artists and intellectuals that leaders are often chosen. Beyond oflBcial positions, artists and intellectuals in Latin Amer- ica are daily concerned with social and political problems in their countries and daily make themselves heard on these matters, as- suming they are living in countries where that sort of thing is permitted. In articles, pamphlets, through petitions, rallies, speeches, in cafes and classrooms, they take positions on the major issues of their countries and beyond. And they have vast influence, far beyond their numbers, on the thinking of their countrymen, especially on the thinking of the young. As might be expected, almost all the intellectual community of Latin America is on the political left, where it ought to be, ahead of its country and its times. Much has been made of the communist threat, as it is called, in Latin America, especially in connection with intellectuals. There is good basis in many cases for this, but it is not a simple matter. We have all lived through the McCarthy period in this country, and one result I think is that we are extremely careful, as we should be, of political labels we slap on others. I think we are also properly suspicious of anyone who publicly or privately throws these labels around. But the fact is, of course, that com- munism is an operating force in Latin America and it takes many forms. Most obvious are the proclaimed guerrilla movements. These are limited affairs, steadily being wiped out by counter- guerrilla military actions. It seems to me that among dissident intellectual circles in Latin America, such guerrilla activities are considered today impractical, romantic methods to an end. Sup- port for the guerrilla action of Fidel Castro was spread through Latin America, and his triumph will always be respected there. But disillusionment with Castro today is just as widespread among intellectuals as support formally was. The communists are active in certain Latin American univer- sities. We all know now about the forty-year-old students who take control of the National University in Bogota or the Central University in Caracas. And these student leaders do influence, to CULTURAL INFLUENCES 149 a certain degree, the thinking of other students; they do organize strikes and demonstrations. But I happen to be one who beheves that their toll and menace are far less threatening to the body politic of any Latin American nation than to the educational sys- tem of a nation. What happens to a student at the National University when his school is closed half a year because of a student strike? What happens to a university where students are granted authority to the extent of faculty appointments, and the student leaders have political rather than educational ends in mind when they exercise their authority? IV Being an artist or intellectual engage aflFects the individual further. It can, of course, a£Fect the content of a man's creative work. But less and less is this acceptable: pamphleteering does not substitute for fiction, and social realism is cartoons, caricatures, and posters, not art. It is diflBcult to think of anything more boring than Siquieros, the aging Mexican muralist, painting yet another set of social realist panels, as he is doing today, these to comprise supposedly the largest mural in the entire world for a convention hall in Cuernavaca, Mexico. This kind of thing really has no rela- tion to young Mexico or young anything. I recall one meeting our Foundation had a couple of years ago, when a rather distinguished United States historian rose to inform the young Mexican writers in the room how lucky they were. They had, he told them, all of those immense, splendid murals all around them, covering the walls of their university, to remind them everyday of their great heritage and the great triumph of the Revolution. In reply, a Mexi- can novelist, who at that time was also working at the university, rose to inform the distinguished American professor that every morning he passed those murals and every morning they made him sick — first because as works of art they are dreadful, and second because they were total lies. The Mexican Revolution, he felt, had been sold out years ago, and it was a crime against the people of Mexico to continue the deception, which, he main- tained, was futile anyway since all Mexicans knew the truth of their betrayal. More than affecting the content of a man's work, the politiciza- tion of artists and intellectuals affects the form of the artist's life. It is always a point of great interest and envy at meetings we have had for the Latin American writer to hear a United States novelist tell how he spends his days, working through the morn- 150 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role ings in his converted barn up in Connecticut, or his study on the edges of a CaHfornia campus — a Ufa that is essentially devoted to writing books, with teaching, journalism, criticism, and all else secondary. For the Latin American, this simply is not possible — at least not if he is living in his native country. There he must participate. He must be a public figure, attacking and defending. In fact, this becomes extremely debilitating and enervating for serious artists and drives many of them into periods of self- imposed exile, where they hope they will be free to do their creative work. As might be imagined, making a decision between one's responsibility to one's work and one's responsibility to one's political movement, especially when one's influence appears sig- nificant, is profoundly difficult. The artist's life is also affected by his group. This is true every- where, of course, and a vivid and awesome example is found in the vogues, camps, and camp followers resident in thirty East- side New York blocks of art galleries, thirty blocks that influence the painting of the entire world. The kinds of pressures developed in Caribbean and Latin American intellectual communities are even greater, because the communities themselves are smaller. This makes independence that much more difficult. If this year's rage is hard-edge, it takes a strong and exceptionally talented man to stick with his experiments in neo-figurative. This is the pres- sure of a village, of a province, even though it might be applied in the city. The new urbanization I spoke of, the growth of the populations of cities, has not brought a comparable increase in the number of artists and intellectuals. These are still a limited number of souls who quite naturally band together for preservation. And they do, in a sense, spiritually and intellectually bolster each other. But these little groups can become very protective of their work. They can become very frightened and defensive. They have reached the top of their local mountain and they fear to venture to other ranges. It takes courage for the best playwright in Vene- zuela or the best painter in Colombia or the best novelist in Mexico to leave his local peak, to leave his country and move to the international scene, to put his work against the best. Only the best have the courage and the knowledge that they must do that in order to grow. Sadly, many of the others stick close to their local cafe, wallowing in the adulation of the village and stultifying. Not long ago, talking with a painter in Mexico, I suggested to him that perhaps he might like to spend some time in New York, CULTURAL INFLUENCES 151 that a large number of painters had told me time spent in New York gave them a chance to see work and ideas that would stimulate them for long, long periods once they returned to their own countries. The young man suddenly got angry. "New York," he said, "What the hell's in New York? What've I got to go to New York for?" We had been drinking, so I figured he was tight and changed the subject. I had not, at that point, seen his work, but several Mexicans had touted him very highly to me. A week or so later, I went to the opening of his new exhibition at the most "in" avant-garde gallery in Mexico City. All the gang was there: the two best theatre directors, actors, actresses, the leading liter- ary figures, two world-famous architects, the most important cul- tural journalists. The painter was part of the group and their obligation was to turn out for the occasion. What was on the walls was unbelievable, •especially in view of what the painter had declared to me a few nights earlier: the man was painting with mediocre technique, and at the end of 1964 was just dis- covering abstract expressionism. The reviews of the show from critics in the gang were of course raves. The reviews from critics outside the gang were pans. This critical reaction to the show was typical and further indica- tive of influences on the artistic world in Latin America. There is almost no criticism in Latin America, there are only friends and enemies. We know that all over the world, critics use their power in terrifying, personal ways. But in Latin America I do believe this condition is extraordinary. If a man is your friend, you give him a good review. If he is not, you attack his work, his mother, his sexual potency, and, of course, his politics. This approach to criticism is also a product of the province. But in the Caribbean and Latin America it is more a reflection of a deep condition called "personalismo." Absolutely nothing happens in Latin America without the personal element. Men do not do business until there is some personal contact and rapport. Judgments are made, often very quickly, on one man's reactions to the personal qualities of another; personal warmth, humor, style, heart, grace — some of the qualities that go into making an individual "simpatico" — register immediately, and acceptance or rejection can be established just as fast. This can be exhilarating, captivating, and charming, and it can make for some long and divine friendships. Unfortunately, one's delightful friend can also be a dreadful playwright, and if one is a drama critic, this can present painful problems. But, as I noted earlier, in Latin America this sort of problem rarely exists. The 152 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role lack of high and dispassionate critical standards, as might be imagined, often makes for temporary comfort. But it also creates a false sense of achievement, and ultimately is very destructive. V One begins to see the web that is cast around the artist and intellectual and he expands and strengthens it. He has political obligations which he wants to meet but which can get in the way of his creative work. He belongs to a group of peers, fellow ar- tists, which nourishes him, but which can also isolate him. He must contend with "personalismo" in order to have his play pro- duced, his paintings exhibited, his book published, but the re- ciprocal requirement is that he conform to the demands of the group of friends. And, if he doesn't enter into the process, the cycle, he has almost no chance whatsoever of professional recog- nition. What does happen, and one sees several living examples of this in the scores of Caribbean and Latin American writers and painters who are presently living in New York and Paris, is that the man with real talent goes through the system, goes along with the system until he reaches the top. Often, this means until his work begins to gain recognition outside of his own country. And then, taking a very deep breath, he leaps. He gets a fellow- ship or takes his savings or does whatever he has to do, and leaves. He always tries to leave on a friendly basis. He always says he is just going for a few months, maybe a year, just to look around. Nobody believes him of course. He has a series of feverish good- bye parties, with all the same people at each, everyone wishing him well, everyone secretly envying him, everyone knowing that if he can do it, he may never come back. And then once he leaves, everyone attacks him — publicly in magazines, newspapers, panels, television and lectures, privately in the cafes. He has, after all, left the tribe. He has also reminded them that they don't have the courage to try what he is trying. He is striking at the whole structure of their small world and thereby striking at them in their secure cocoons. A difficult and somewhat sad situation; but I do not mean to say impossible. Rather, more credit should be given to those who can transcend these conditions and who are producing work in fiction, the visual arts, theatre, architecture and films — that is re- ceiving more and more international attention and acclaim today. Part V INTERNATIONAL POSITION Roland H. del Mar: strategic characteristics OF THE CARIBBEAN The strategic importance of the Caribbean to the world, to Latin America, and to the United States continues un- abated both in total peace and in total war. The control of the Caribbean and of the Panama Canal remains of paramount im- portance to the United States. Control is particularly vital during war when the logistical support of our own and allied forces pre-empts the Canal's use. Increasingly the Caribbean and the Canal are playing a dynamic role in the economic development of the Latin American countries as ships of commerce ply from their west coast to our east coast and Europe, from Latin Amer- ica's east coast to her west coast. The oil of Venezuela and other strategic materials are vital to industry and would be especially to the United States in time of war. The Caribbean remains a crossroad of the world and a lifeline for all of Latin America. In this brief paper, I will not extend my remarks on air power and air use in the Caribbean, but confine my subject mainly to the commerce, strategic materials, and sea routes of the Carib- bean. The bulk of the world's commerce, the logistical supplies in war, go by sea as I have noted in studies of the Mediterranean as well as the Caribbean. In addition, during war, air power must emphasize combat and combat support roles while nations must reckon with the commodities for their populations, with the raw materials of strategic production, with shipments in the thousands of tons per vessel. 155 156 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role World War II saw the German submarine fleet operating not only off the east coasts of North and South America, but par- ticularly in the Caribbean. Several hundred ships carrying vital military supplies went to the bottom, as well as the ships loaded with the commodities for daily living destined for Puerto Rico and the other Antilles Islands. Several of the islands were near starvation because of the depredations on commerce and military shipping. Our planes and ships patrolled the sea lines of com- munication with limited resources. We established naval and air bases around the perimeter of the Caribbean and stationed troops on nearly every island. We recognized that we had to protect our "back door" even with major commitments on other conti- nents. The Greater and Lesser Antilles form a gigantic arc covering the entrance to the Caribbean and have figured in the history of commerce and military operations through the centuries since Columbus' arrival. From the days of Spanish treasure fleets and Mexican gold shipments to the oil and aviation fuel of Maracaibo and Aruba of World War II, the Caribbean has been sailed by ships of the whole world. Naval control of the Windward Passage, the Mona Passage, and the Panama Canal means control of the passage of supplies, troops, munitions, and strategic materials to the rest of Latin America, to Europe and Asia, and between North and South America. (The sailing distance from New York to San Francisco via the Straits of Magellan is approximately 13,126 miles compared to 5,263 miles via the Panama Canal and the Caribbean — 36 days compared to 15 days. ) One out of sixteen barrels of aviation fuel for the allies in World War II was shipped out of Aruba. Forty per cent of all East to West coast shipping in the United States in World War II had to be ship-carried through the Caribbean rather than by rail, truck, or air. Since then, over twenty years ago, strategic mate- rials have been discovered in the Guianas, Venezuela, and Colom- bia, of vital concern to us and the Free World. The population explosion since World War II necessitates even greater attention to the daily shipment of commodities from coast to coast. It was because of our inability to break the submarine menace for so long that Latin American countries like Brazil, in particular, real- ized that they could not rely upon the United States to supply their economic needs in time of war. Immediately after the war, they began to industrialize to become self-sufiicient. In both World INTERNATIONAL POSITION 157 Wars the United States was the "Arsenal of Democracy" for our alHes. Should there be a World Wat III, with the United States an immediate target, this industrialization of the Southern Hemis- phere could well become our "Arsenal of Democracy" as well as of the Free World. In such an unfortunate event, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean would become vitally important to the re-supply of the United States. II One must realize that the countries bordering on the Carib- bean depend upon it for their strategic existence. In the case of the Guianas, Venezuela, and Colombia, the jungles and moun- tains in the interior are not conducive to rapid communication overland to the countries to the South. In Central America, similar conditions prevail which stress the importance of sea commerce and communications. The Andes create an East- West barrier. No great progress has been made in terrestial communications (such as rail and truck routes) among the countries of South and Central America since the days of Bolivar. Air routes have defi- nitely changed the communications pattern between countries, especially for passengers and mail, and for limited air freight, but the bulk of the commodities still must go by ship from coast to coast and country to country, which means, to an increasing and almost incredible extent, the use of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. Even within countries, transportation from the coast to the interior, from the lowlands to the cities on or between the high sierras is still difficult and time consuming. With the excep- tion of one country in this hemisphere, the sea is life and the open highway. With the above in mind, the crucial role that Cuba plays in the future of the Caribbean becomes ever more evident. In a way, the control of the Caribbean and the role of Cuba lends more meaningful intent to the origin of the Monroe Doctrine and its current application. For now, with Cuba as a forward sub- marine base as well as an island aircraft carrier and missile launch- ing site, the sea lanes of the Caribbean are far more vulnerable to our enemies than in World War II. Our concern then is not only with the transmission of an ideology among the islands of the Caribbean and the countries around it, but with the role Cuba could play in disrupting our lines of communications through the Caribbean, as well as lines to Europe and Asia through the sea passages and the Panama Canal — the disrupting of our support to and from Latin America. 158 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role III A few statistics are worthy of mention to stress the importance of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal in world commerce, in Latin American development, and in the strategic importance of the area. In 1965, 12,909 ships carrying 78,899,012 long tons of cargo transited the Panama Canal. These figures compare with earlier dates as follows: Fiscal Year Total Transits Total Long Tons of Cargo 1915 1,108 4,937,340 1939 7,449 27,523,907 1950 7,690 30,364,982 1965 12,909 78,899,012 In 1965, imports of petroleum and petroleum products from Venezuelan fields and Caribbean refineries to the west coast of the United States increased by 1.7 million tons. An increase of over 1 million tons in iron and steel manufactures occurred be- tween Japan and the east coast of the United States in 1965. An increase of over 700,000 tons in the movement of phosphates occurred between Florida and Australia and New Zealand. All this increase in movement involved the Caribbean and the Pana- ma Canal. To the east coast of the United States from the west coast of South America in 1965, shipments of ores and metals amounted to 4,196,000 long tons. The flow of cargo from the west coast of South America to Europe increased by 89,000 long tons. Move- ment of bananas from Ecuador and fishmeal and fish oil from Peru increased by 434,000 tons. Between the east coast of the United States and the west coast of South America, 1,655,000 long tons moved. Ninety per cent of Chile's waterborne imports and 80 per cent of her exports pass through the Canal. Eighty-eight per cent of Ecuador's waterborne imports and 85 per cent of her exports also transit the Canal. Five million tons of iron ore transit the Canal annually from the west coast of South America to the east coast of the United States. In 1959, it was determined that 95 per cent of the cargo transiting the Canal originated in or was destined for the Western Hemisphere which emphasizes the importance of the Canal in peace or war for the sustenance of this hemisphere — thus, the strategic importance of the Caribbean to Latin America, the United States, Europe, and Asia. INTERNATIONAL POSITION 159 The new refineries in both El Salvador and Nicaragua are dependent on the Canal for their supplies of crude oil and for competitive marketing possibilities in the Atlantic. Colombia has ports on both sides of the Canal and thus has to use the Canal for intercoastal trade. In 1963, this intercoastal trade amounted to 1.8 million long tons. Brazil moved 106,000 tons of iron ore to Japan through the Canal in 1963, but the trade agreement between them, effective this year, calls for an average of 2.8 million tons of iron ore per year shipped to Japan between 1966 and 1984. Projections updated as of 1964 by the Stanford Research Insti- tute indicate that the commodity tonnage through the Canal will increase almost two and a half times by 2,000 over averages of 1961-63. The common increase of population figures used by demographers, economists, and political scientists indicates growth in Latin America from about 280,000,000 now to 600 million in the year 2,000, with resulting needs for commodities as well as greater shipments of industrial products. The new nations and islands within the Caribbean show their dependence upon it as a crossroads of the world and upon the Panama Canal. A few statistics will indicate their use of the Caribbean and the Canal in 1965. West Indies to West Coast U. S. 1,615,000 long tons West Indies to West Coast Canada 425,000 long tons West Indies to West Coast Central America/Mexico 292,000 long tons West Indies to Balboa, C. Z. 221,000 long tons West Indies to West Coast South America 952,000 long tons West Coast to Hawaiian Islands 142,000 long tons West Indies to Oceania 194,000 long tons West Indies to Asia 1,376,000 long tons West Indies to U.S.S.R. 98,000 long tons West Coast U.S. to West Indies 295,000 long tons West Coast Canada to West Indies 122,000 long tons West Coast Central America/Mexico to West Indies 11,000 long tons West Coast South America to West Indies 33,000 long tons Oceania to West Indies 72,000 long tons Asia to West Indies 210,000 long tons During World War II, over 5,000 combat vessels and about 8,500 other ships serving military requirements passed through 160 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role the Canal — and thus through the Caribbean. During the Korean War, 2,974 government vessels used the Canal. To support the United Nations forces in Korea, the United States moved 54 million tons of cargo and 22 million tons of petroleum products by the Canal route. Since World War II, harbors throughout the Caribbean have been improved. Airfields of varying size and capacities are prev- alent almost everywhere and some have been improved for jets. The search for a new Canal location to augment or replace the existing Canal has not been completed. A minimum of 57 to 70 ships a day is forecast for the year 2000 as compared to approxi- mately 42 now. This search is required also to provide a Canal capable of handling over 300 ships which are too wide in the beam to use the present Canal. IV In summary, the Caribbean and the Canal are lifelines of com- merce for the world and especially for this hemisphere. The population explosion will place increasing demands on shipping in the Caribbean. It is important that this strategic area remain in the hands of the Free World as North, South, and Central America depend so much upon it. The exploitation of the hinter- lands of all South America and its increasing industrialization will find ever-increasing use of the Caribbean, and the populations of the Caribbean depend on its sea routes for their sustenance. The history of almost five centuries has filled its bays and harbors with stories, its islands with the tongues of many nations. May the Caribbean continue to serve mankind in his best interests. John N. Plank: neighborly relations IN THE CARIBBEAN X HE CARIBBEAN has always complicated hemispheric rela- tions. Its location has made it an area of peculiar importance to the United States; and because it comprises small states not his- torically noteworthy for their political stability or economic re- silience, the United States has, in pursuit of its own national interest, recognized a strategic requirement to oversee the region and occasionally to intervene quite directly. As seen from most of the rest of Latin America, the United States is a collection of states only remotely related to them; its problems are not seen to be their problems, and its interests are not always their interests — except, of course, in the matter of intervention. That matter of intervention, however, is crucial. For the fear of intervention has conditioned the development of inter-Ameri- can relations and has, in important ways, soured it. I do not propose to review the history of United States rela- tions with the countries of the Caribbean or to trace the eflFects of our behavior there upon our relations with other Latin Ameri- can states. Nor do I propose to review the record of the Organi- zation of American States ( oas ) . Rather, at the risk of infringing upon Dr. Arciniegas' theme, I should like to talk about the problems of the Caribbean from a 161 162 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role hemispheric perspective and then to consider, in a very specula- tive way, what options are open to us in the face of those prob- lems. I depart from two premises. The first of these is that the Caribbean is a very special area, and that we in the United States, the citizens of the Caribbean states themselves, and the peoples of other Latin American countries err — as for many years we have erred — in trying formally, juridically, and in our literature to bracket the region with the rest of the hemisphere. It is a special area in part because of its geographic location and its geographic nature; increasingly it is a special area because of cultural and political features of it that distinguish it from the rest of Latin America. My second premise is that the problems of the area — problems to which abundant reference has been made in earlier meetings of this conference — are inevitably going to get worse in the short run and may get worse in the long run unless we, all of us in this hemisphere, begin to think and plan boldly and imaginatively to ameliorate or resolve them. Let me say at once that my interest is primarily in the non- mainland states of the region, only Guyana and British Honduras of the mainland territories falling within the area of my immedi- ate concern. I think that the states of Central America and Panama are fully aware of the perilous future that awaits them in the absence of prompt and effective action, and are taking steps — constructive steps with the support of the rest of the hemisphere — to improve their situation. But the option of economic integration with its correlative of truly meaningful political and other forms of joint action that is open to Central America is not open in anything like the same way to the rest of the Caribbean region. In part this is a function of geography: these are not contiguous units, and while seaways are in some respects highways, they are not in respect to real integration. In part also — and fully as im- portant — this is a function of great disparities in culture, race, language, and history. 77 The countries that should particularly preoccupy us, as I think, are Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, British Hondu- ras, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba. Each of these en- tities has its own set of problems, but one problem they all share: none of them is in a position as an autonomous entity to meet the present and emerging demands of its population. Even Cuba, INTERNATIONAL POSITION 163 the largest and best endowed of them, found true independence and autonomy impossible and exchanged a galling dependence upon the United States for an awkward and galling dependence upon the Soviet Union. One need do no more than mention the development problems that confront these countries. Jamaica has an appalling rate of unemployment, as does the Dominican Republic; Barbados is one of the most densely populated bits of territory on the face of the earth — and nothing in the very short term can sharply reduce population growth. The countries are all producers of primary commodities and, if one excepts Trinidad with its petroleum, Jamaica and Guyana with their bauxite, the commodities that are produced are ones that command less than preferred positions in world trade: sugar, tropical fruits, and fibers. Politically we know that the countries embrace an impressive spectrum: Castro, Du- valier, Balaguer, Bustamante, Williams, Barrow, Burnham, Price; Creole Communism, naked despotism, shaky democracy, stable democracy, incipient race war, fledgling self-government. Even if the facts of geography permitted easy trade among these states, they are not in a strong position to exchange with one another. What are they to exchange? Even if they were dis- posed to form a larger political association, what cultural, histori- cal, or political bases do they have for such a union? I do not want to dwell on these problems, not only because they are well known but also because if one dwells on the problems the pros- pects look bleak to the point of despair. I want rather to accept the problems and then ask, What can be done? What, under the rubric of "neighborly relations," can we as a hemisphere do? It should be said at once that our — speaking now of those of us who are not ourselves citizens of Caribbean countries — tradi- tional (and even current) reaction to the problems of the Carib- bean has been to turn away from them. Washington has not had a Caribbean policy that has gone much beyond a concern for "stability" — defined under a quite narrow interpretation of the United States national interest — and a related concern to estop Com- munist activity and potential success. I think it fair to say that Washington was not altogether delighted to see the winds of change waft the British West Indies effectively into the Western Hemisphere or to see British Guiana achieve its independence. I think it also fair to say that the other Latin Americans have preferred not to worry about the island territories of the Caribbean. Castro forced their attention to Cuba and the threat it repre- sented, but that was a negative, not a constructive interest. The 164 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Organization of American States was prepared to sanction an in- tervention in the Dominican Repubhc — as it had been prepared earher to censure the Dominican dictator Trujillo; the oas was not prepared really to think through what the long-term prospects for the Dominican Republic were or how the Organization might operate most effectively to secure a wholesome future for the unfortunate republic. As for Haiti, both we in the United States and our other friends in the oas fret about what portends for that country but devote little systematic attention to planning for its future. And in respect to the former British dependencies, I think it really needs to be asked whether the larger Latin Ameri- can states, particularly those of South America, are prepared to accept them into the hemisphere. The official rhetoric runs the other way, I knoM^; but this is a question that must be taken at other than a rhetorical level. Now we need no crystal ball to tell us that the United States will not continue to subvene the Dominican Republic at the rate it has been doing since May of 1965 — reportedly $140,000,000 of public funds have gone into the island. But what alternative policy does the United States have? Is it, after having inter- vened massively for the professed purpose of keeping the political and economic future constructively open for the Dominicans, going to phase out and let the Dominicans fend for themselves? Aside from any question of morality (although the moral dimension cannot be lightly dismissed), the result, if the United States does so, is clearly foreseeable — stagnation and decline. These in turn will almost inevitably lead to social and political unrest and the prospect of still another massive intervention. Nor do we need a crystal ball to tell us that one day Haiti is going to confront a succession crisis and that that republic is going to have to be rebuilt with precious little in the way of indigenous resources — human or material — with which to work. I do not speak with authority about this, but I do believe there are many in Washington who simply dread the prospect of Duvalier's depar- ture, for all that they regard him as being a particularly oppres- sive and repugnant dictator. I must say, too, that I am unaware of any great stirrings among the other member states of the oas in respect to a post-Duvalier policy for Haiti. To be sure, they have their own problems at home; to be sure, they know that they can count on the United States not to let any Haitian situation get completely out of hand. But may there not be also present an element of preferring not to focus on such an unpleasant dilemma? INTERNATIONAL POSITION 165 There is Cuba. United States policy and oas policy are directed toward isolating Castro's government — for reasons that are deemed good and sufficient by most in this hemisphere. Ultimately the objective is to see Cuba reintegrated into the hemisphere. It is almost inconceivable, however, that that reintegration could occur while Castro was still in command on the island. So it can be said that the objective of present hemispheric policy is the over- throw of Castro. But then what is to happen after Castro is overthrown or disappears or is forced to a subordinate role or whatever? Where is the systematic, the forward-looking planning for post-Castro Cuba? If it is going on in the councils of the gas, I am unaware of it. Perhaps in certain parts of the United States government far-reaching and constructive plans for Cuba are be- ing devised, but I am unaware of them. That is as it should be, perhaps, although I should have thought that if we really wanted to hasten the day of Castro's demise, we might let the Cuban people know with some specificity the kind of post-Castro future that awaits them. That is, if in fact we do know — if in fact we have thought through how we as a hemisphere are going to deal with Cuba, how we are going to handle claims, how we are going to handle the sugar quota, how we are going to sort out the various radical reforms that have been instituted in Cuba under the Castro dispensation, preserving those that were needful and helpful, undoing those that were pernicious. The attitude toward Haiti and Cuba seems to me to be, how- ever, one of wait-and-see: Let us wait until it happens, then we'll see how to respond. I would suggest that that is not good enough — not good enough for Haiti and Cuba, nor, for that mat- ter, good enough for the Dominican Republic or for the former British dependencies — not good enough by far. It is, of course, clearly open to us to respond in that fashion: to react to the pressure of events, to react to emergencies, to react in an ad hoc, temporary, and temporizing way. The states of the region are juridically sovereign states — their destinies are their own to determine. So we can say, and so we and many in the little countries want to believe. Acting in accordance with these pronouncements, we will give some developmental assistance, we will give disaster relief, we will clearly intervene to prevent any of these territories succumbing to Communist control. But if we do behave in this fashion, what I foresee for the region is a slower or more rapid spiralling down into grinding poverty, disaffection, and turmoil — I do not see either indigenous resources or external assistance adequate to prevent this outcome. 166 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role UI What can prevent such an outcome? As I see it, only a radical re-evaluation and re-institutionalization of interstate relations among Caribbean countries and between them and other powers with major Caribbean interests, namely the United States and Canada. It is not easy to say what I am about to say. Like most of us, whether Latin American or North American, I have been long committed to the principles of effective self-determination, of the juridical and sovereign equality of states. Like most of us, in season and out, I have urged that the societies of the Western Hemisphere south of the Tropic of Cancer be allowed to find their own ways, establish their own identities, make their own destinies. As often as anyone, I suspect, I have quoted Jose Marti: "The wine is bitter, but it is ours." Moreover, who can be un- aware of the unhappy record of the past, characterized as it has been by much too much in the way of North American insensitiv- ity, unilateral action, lack of coherent, truly constructive, truly cooperative design? Today, though, I do find myself obliged to reconsider. The events of the Dominican crisis of April and May of 1965 precipi- tated this reconsideration: If the United States is going to arro- gate to itself responsibility for setting the political limits within which the development of the Dominican Republic can proceed, is it not also bound to assume a long-range, positive responsi- bility toward the country also? If the United States for strategic reasons claims that the Caribbean is of special interest to it, should not that interest embrace a special — and favored — ^position for the countries of the Caribbean vis-a-vis the United States? But the matter goes beyond this. We are today past the mid- point of the twentieth century. What can constitute a viable, in- dependent society today is quite different from what could con- stitute one a century or fifty years ago. Demands and pressures play upon these little Caribbean states — domestic demands and pressures as well as international ones — that did not play earlier. We who find ourselves in more favorable situations are conscious, moreover, as our forefathers could not have been, of conditions in these coun- tries, and we cannot remain comfortable in our knowledge of what we know their situations to be. Let us recall that it was only a generation ago when the crying scandal that was Puerto Rico — a dependency of the United States — was brought to our attention. All of us are aware of what then happened: We — the Puerto Ricans and we North American main- INTERNATIONAL POSITION 167 landers — got to work on a bold program of political, economic, even social innovation and invention. Is it altogether presump- tuous to suggest that the time has now come for us in this hemisphere — Canadians, United States citizens, and Latin Ameri- cans — to take a very hard, a very fresh look at the Caribbean and to consider innovation and invention with regard to that region? Undoubtedly I shall rue by ever having said these things publicly, for they are easily misunderstood or maliciously mis- interpreted. But a private citizen has not only the privilege but the obligation to say things that appear outrageous, if only for the purpose of broadening the range of discourse and of discussible questions. First, then, I see no viable nation-state by relevant twentieth- century standards in the Caribbean today. I do not deny the presence there of robust cultural nations, but I see no state that can play a meaningfully autonomous role, either economically or with respect to international politics. I think that in a profound moral sense to regard these little entities as full-fledged nation- states is unjust. Anatole France spoke of the "majestic equality" of French law which prohibited the rich equally with the poor from sleeping under bridges and begging bread in the streets. Analogies need not be forced, but I see one here that I think should be explored and its implications faced up to. I know that these states — their leaders and publics — are proud of their independence; I know that nationalism is a dominant force in the area. I know, too, that we in the Western Hemisphere are sensitive about in- fringing upon that independence, about trammelling that nation- alism. But I think basic facts have to be faced, by us and by them, and we had best move rapidly to order our thinking and action to accommodate both meaningful independence and sig- nificant economic and other advances. It cannot be a question of keeping the United States out of the affairs of the Caribbean states; it can only be a question of how to involve the United States in those affairs in ways that best serve the interests of all parties. Second, I do not see the answer to the problems of the Carib- bean in federation, or at least not in federation alone. The West Indies Federation foundered almost immediately. How much more ephemeral — if indeed it could even be contemplated at this time — would be a federation embracing all the diverse entities of the Caribbean! Nor is a common market the solution. There is a third matter. All of these states (except Cuba today) are increasingly dependent upon the United States and Canada 168 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role for whatever economic well-being they can achieve and for what- ever social and political benefits they can derive from that eco- nomic well-being. North America is their market; increasingly North America is their provider. This is not a situation to be either applauded or condemned — it is simply a fact. Last, the United States has a paramount strategic interest in this region. Strategically if in no other sense the Caribbean is mare nostrum. We can if we wish speak of it as mare hemi- sphericum, but let us be aware of the flimsiness of that categori- zation. Argentina and Chile have vital strategic interests in this hemisphere, but their interests in the Caribbean are not of the same order as ours. IV Now let me tie all these things together into — I won't call it a proposal — a notion that is perhaps worth intensive investigation. If we in the United States and Canada are really interested in the survival and welfare of these Caribbean states, let us con- sider some radical approaches. Let us, for example, consider giv- ing these states preferred access to our markets, preferred access on very carefully conceived and judiciously employed bases. What I am advocating is the conscious use of trade policy as an instru- ment of regional development. Through the careful, coordinated, intelligent employment of preferences and investment, an inte- grated and optimally productive Caribbean economy could emerge. With differential access to the North American market, the countries of the Caribbean could diversify their agricultural production in complementary ways. They could move toward effective industrialization (without v/hich, over the longer term, there is little hope for them). Implementing a program of this kind would require great sensitivity, abundant information, scru- pulous weighing of alternatives and of costs and benefits. It would require patience, skill, and confidence on the part of all coun- tries concerned. It would require short-term sacrifice in pursuit of long-term gain. It would also require, evidently, a sharp departure from what is now regarded as desirable international trade practice. It would violate our non-discrimination policy vis-a-vis Latin American countries; it would violate our standing commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It would arouse in- tense opposition, both here at home and, presumably, in other Latin American states. INTERNATIONAL POSITION 169 I am not unmindful of the difficulties and obstacles, but I advance the notion because I see literally no other way out for these Caribbean lands. And of the other Latin Americans who object to this approach I would ask, do any of them, as they project their future development, find that future as bleak as the one they can foresee for the islands of the Caribbean? Moreover, I would point out that this special relationship with the United States and Canada would involve a price. It would involve, at least in the short term, an economic price in the sense that pro- duction would be geared specifically and consciously to North American markets. It would involve a political price in the sense that the paramountcy of the United States in the Caribbean would be recognized. Is this "imperialism" in a new guise? That charge is certain to be raised. And yet, what are the alternatives? In respect of global strategy, the United States is not under any circumstances going to permit these states to align themselves with elements openly hostile to this country in the cold war, it is not going to allow situations to develop or perpetuate themselves in which there is a realistic possibility of Communist domination. It simply is not. The Latin Americans know this. The fact does not change be- cause, as seen from some perspectives, it is a disagreeable one, implying violation of the traditionally sanctioned attributes of national sovereignty. One often hears the assertion that it is better to leave some things unsaid. But it is precisely that assertion that I am ques- tioning here. Basically what I am saying is that the Caribbean is not Latin America, it is a special case, and for a century it has been. That fact should be recognized, faced for what it is, and adjustment made thereto in a constructive, positive fashion. V The Caribbean states do not deal extensively with one another. They do not deal extensively with the other states of Latin Amer- ica. They do deal extensively with the United States and Canada, and the volume of those dealings is increasing. Through chan- nels at once more constricting and more liberating in their deal- ings with the United States and Canada, they may be brought into more effective dealings with one another in patterns of trade and communication. Ultimately, perhaps, even something ap- proaching viable political community may emerge in consequence of this integrating process. 170 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role All of this needs much more study and research, a careful ex- ploration of hazards and opportunities, of hemispheric and global implications. But I confess that I see no way but downward for the Caribbean unless steps something like the one I have ad- umbrated are taken. All that can be done is to ask the Latin Americans and us North Americans to think the problems through, to examine them coldly. What is suggested here cannot happen soon — not tomorrow, not next year. It may never happen. But all of us — the Caribbeans, the Latin Americans, and we North Amer- icans — desperately need hard thinking, bold thinking, and innova- tive thinking about the problems of the Caribbean region. And if we cannot meet those problems through intelligence, planning, peaceful change, compassionate understanding, are we not then condemned to meet them — as meet them we will in one form or another at one time or another — through violence, through uni- lateral (however veiled) intervention, through acts of contingent charity? There is nothing sacrosanct about the present Caribbean dispensation. In its present contours it did not exist a few years ago. It lies with us to change it, for the better, through our conscious, carefully conceived, and judiciously implemented action. 17 IT Jacob Canter: an inter-american education: CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN OBJECTIVES JVxY PAPER will concern itself, not siirprisingly, with educa- tional and cultural affairs — most particularly, those of education, and educational relations in this hemisphere. In 1966 there were so many developments in the United States in the broad area of international education that one can truly refer to the period as an "International Education Year." There was President Johnson's speech at the Smithsonian Institution in September of 1965, followed by his Message to Congress on in- ternational education in February, 1966, and the passage by the Congress of the International Education Act in October. It was the twentieth anniversary of the Fulbright Act which launched the United States on a program of educational exchanges on a world-wide basis, and the thirtieth anniversary of the signing in Buenos Aires of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-Amer- ican Cultural Relations. Throughout the year nothing engaged the attention of educators of this country more, no one subject was debated with more intensity and concern, than international edu- cation — at special meetings like that at Columbia University in September commemorating the Fulbright program anniversary; at regular annual meetings of associations of colleges and univer- sities; at seminars, symposia, and workshops conducted by indi- vidual sectors of our academic community. And all of this has 171 172 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role been a reflection of the need that we have come to reahze for preparing ourselves for living in the international environment of which we — and all peoples — are now irrevocably a part. At the same time, a number of important developments oc- curred in education within the inter-American framework in roughly the same time span — so much so that it would not be amiss to look upon this period as a kind of "Inter-American Education Year." In this period, concepts, principles, a new fo- cus, a new emphasis, emerged that lay the groundwork for sig- nificant progress for education in Latin America. On the side of the United States the base was established, by Presidential directive and Congressional action, for strengthening the international dimension of our educational institutions, for raising the competence of our people to deal with understanding and insight with peoples beyond our borders, including the peo- ples of Latin America. In the inter-American context, the base was established for a heightened attention to education in the Alliance for Progress, for greater dialogue between economic planners and educational plan- ners, for a restructured Organization of American States (oas) with greater capability in educational, scientific, and cultural af- fairs. II For the United States the key statement of purpose was Presi- dent Johnson's address to scholars from eighty nations who gath- ered together in 1965 in Washington at the Smithsonian Institution for the bicentennial commemoration of James Smithson's birth. On that occasion the President committed the Administration to five goals in international education: "First, to assist the education effort of the developing nations and the developing regions. "Second, to help our schools and universities increase their knowledge of the world and the people who inhabit it. "Third, to advance the exchange of students and teachers who travel and work outside their native lands. "Fourth, to increase the free flow of books and ideas and art, of works of science and imagination. And "Fifth, to assemble meetings of men and women from every discipline and every culture to ponder the common prob- lems of mankind." Previous legislation, with some amendments, plus the Inter- INTERNATIONAL POSITION 173 national Education Act of 1966 approved last October, provide the legislative basis for United States government programs designed to carry out this broad mandate. In the study stage careful con- sultation with representatives of the academic community took place, especially on the need for strengthening our own institu- tions as a prerequisite for successful involvement in overseas re- lationships and undertakings. In his message to Congress on February 2, 1966, the President translated his five-point platform into action goals for this fiscal year, setting a level of over $500,000,000 world-wide, for the combined education and health programs of the Agency for In- ternational Development (aid), the Department of Health, Edu- cation, and Welfare (hew), the Peace Corps, and the Depart- ment of State. The Congress did not authorize all the requested funds. Fortunately for this hemisphere, however, funds for the Alliance for Progress emerged relatively unscathed although there was a heavy cut in the request for development loans. The edu- cational and cultural exchange funds were also reduced below the 1965 world-wide level, but the Department of State, aid, and the other agencies are realigning their program priorities in order to give as much emphasis to education as possible within these limitations. The result of this realignment will be visible, of course, in the bilateral programs carried out by these agencies with the Latin American countries. Certainly, the International Education Act will, in coming years, bring a new competence to the people of the United States to deal with Latin American affairs, a deeper understanding of Latin American culture and civilization, of the "Latin American reality" as the Latin Americans them- selves call it. The organizational changes within the United States govern- ment can go forward as planned. They do not require new legis- lation. Thus, the President has directed Dr. John Gardner, Sec- retary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to proceed with the establishment of a Center for Educational Cooperation within his Department. After allowance for the necessary planning and staff work involved in an undertaking of this size, it is probable that by the middle of 1967 the Center will be underway. The Inter-American System has been able over the past seventy- six years to adapt itself to very profound and far-reaching changes. You will recall that the most comprehensive organizational change resulted from the adoption of the present Charter in 1948 at Bogota. Now the need for further reorganization has asserted itself in order that new and additional responsibilities which have 174 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role been laid on the oas structure over the last eighteen years, in particular those deriving from the Charter of Punta del Este, may be accommodated. With respect to education, the changes now being proposed in the OAS Charter build upon certain measures which the oas took in 1962, in particular the establishment of a Department of Edu- cational Affairs grouped together with the Departments of Sci- entific Affairs and Cultural Affairs under an Assistant Secretary who also serves as Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Cultural Council. The proposed Charter change of greatest interest, one which will elevate education in the Inter-American System, is the con- version of the present Inter-American Cultural Council into the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture. As one of three proposed Councils of the oas, it will concern itself with the whole spectrum of educational, scientific, and cultural affairs, giving particular support to Alliance for Progress endeav- ors, in close cooperation with the Inter-American Economic-Social Council and related agencies. Education stands much higher in the Alliance for Progress itself. The higher priority now accorded education within the Alliance is the outgrowth of extensive evaluation of progress and problems of the Alliance at its mid-decade. An early indication of trends and conclusions was the letter addressed to American Presidents in August last year by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress ( ciap ) . ciap pointed out that the social side was lagging seriously behind the economic, and urged greater effort during the second half of the Alliance decade in the sectors of rural modernization, housing, health and popula- tion, and education. In education ciap called, as a first objective, for the development of more first-rate institutions, especially the universities, which should make greater contributions to the de- velopment process, ciap proposed that the curriculum of at least one university in each country be directly related to the national planning effort, thus assuring that the needs of the individual country could be met at both the graduate and the undergraduate levels by Latin Americans themselves. The CIAP Country Review process, launched in 1964, is nearing the end of its third annual cycle. Social factors now command much more attention than in the past, and a number of the 1966 country reports for the ciap review contain detailed analyses of the education sector, together with plans for educational develop- ment as an integral part of the comprehensive national plan. INTERNATIONAL POSITION 175 It was the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in March that established new Alliance goals by adopting what was set forth as an "Immediate Action Program" which called for major and accelerated effort on the part of the twenty member countries in critical sectors, including education and tech- nology. The Council recognized that, in relative terms, an enor- mous growth had taken place in educational services between 1960 and 1965, and this was demonstrated by a 23 per cent increase in primary level enrollment, a 50 per cent increase at the secondary level in most countries, and a 39 per cent increase in enrollment in higher education. Nevertheless, there remained large educational infrastructure deficits, a substantial portion of the population still without educational benefits, and a school system of very low productivity which permitted a dropout rate of 75 per cent at the primary level. The United States delegate to the Council meeting, Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon, spoke on the urgent need for the coun- tries to develop "workable plans for educational modernization and expansion" so that both national and external resources could be brought to bear on sound projects. He emphasized that "edu- cation is not a social welfare luxury to be assigned marginal resources left over from more important objectives . . . [but] a highly productive investment in human capital and a vital in- gredient of development . . . indispensable to social mobility . . . [and] a cardinal prerequisite of effective political democracy." Secretary Gordon's remarks, which were directed to the very able economists who guide the Alliance effort in their countries, served as a challenge to greater dialogue between educational planners and economic development planners and as a firm re- minder that this dialogue was vital to the achievement of Alli- ance goals. In its letter to the Presidents ciap had stated that "the country review process should be used to encourage this essential communication and linkage." Of course, central to the Alliance concept is the Inter-American Development Bank which has long recognized the educational challenge facing the hemisphere. It has carried forward a special program of assistance to higher education designed to promote excellence in universities, to build competence in science and technology, and to encourage leadership in the larger task of educational modernization. During 1966 its able President and spokesman, Dr. Felipe Herrera, made clear to Ministers of Edu- cation and to Ministers of Finance and of Economic Planning the desire of the Bank to move ahead and rapidly on the educational 176 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role front. For this to occur, however, the Bank, hke aid and similar agencies, can make an effective contribution only on the basis of well-conceived action plans. Good intentions and broad general- ities are not enough. As a matter of fact, the real obstacle to educational develop- ment is often not the lack of funds but rather the lack of imagina- tive plans based upon careful analysis of the actual situation. Planning in turn is often frustrated by the lack of basic data, and judgment is reduced largely to guesswork. These twin problems of insufficient information and inadequate planning have received increasing attention generally within the Alliance, especially with respect to education through various surveys and technical meet- ings organized by the major agencies. For example, November 28, 1966, marked the opening of a Technical Meeting on Educational Statistics, organized by the oas Department of Education to ex- amine present deficiencies in educational data and to try to establish standards and procedures that would help overcome these deficiencies. Two ministerial-level conferences stimulated the widening rec- ognition of the basic principle that there must be investment in people as well as in things. The Ministers of Education at the Fourth Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council in Wash- ington in January, 1966, described the job to be done as "a con- structive task of extraordinary magnitude" and pointed to the "body of doctrine" evolved over the years from the increasing attention being given to educational, scientific, and cultural needs in the Americas. This conference provided the opportunity for an assessment of progress and problems. The gap between goals and achievements — rather narrow in some few countries and al- most impossibly wide in others — was again clear evidence that even in the most favorable circumstances the size of the educa- tional task continued to be much larger than the resources being applied. In June the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (unesco) and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ecla) made a special effort to encourage joint action by inviting both educators and economists to the first regional UNESCO meeting in this area since 1962. Although only one Minister for Economic Affairs attended in contrast to fifteen Ministers of Education, the delegations were generally prepared to discuss education in relation to economic development, and one of the two committees of the meeting concentrated on the subject. This UNESCO conference covered familiar ground but over a INTERNATIONAL POSITION 177 different time period. Instead of the Alliance decade of 1961- 1970, the conference reviewed the decade 1957-1966, which was the period of unesco's major project for the extension and im- provement of primary education in Latin America. In the ten-year period unesco recorded an increase in total en- rollment from 24 million in 1956 to 40 million in 1965, an overall rate of 67 per cent, or more than twice the cumulative population increase, varying from 58 per cent at the primary level to 110 per cent at the secondary and over 90 per cent in higher educa- tion. At the same time, however, as of 1965-66, unesco recorded, among other things, over 50 million illiterate adults. The meeting re-emphasized the need for greater integration of educational planning in general economic and social development policy and planning, and called on the universities to involve themselves more in national planning of education and of development as a whole. Indeed, a UNESCO-sponsored technical meeting on higher education in Latin America held in San Jose, Costa Rica, in March, had already urged the universities to play such a role and to carry out structural and other reforms which would equip them to respond to the needs of their countries in the remaining decades of the twentieth century. The pressing task of development, of course, is not our sole concern. Equally important in the long run is the task of broad- ening and deepening communication across national and cultural lines, between us and our neighbors. At this conference and later at the Fourth Cultural Council meeting, Assistant Secretary Charles Frankel stressed the fundamental importance of strength- ening communication and understanding, along with the most immediate and tangible problems of development. This course of action is both old and new — old in the years of educational ex- change and technical assistance programs, both public and private, which have opened doors and established a multitude of contacts in all parts of the world; new in the broader context of the Smithsonian address and the International Education Act. President Johnson, speaking at the East-West Center enroute to the recent Manila conference, called for a World Conference on Education to be held in 1967. Our colleagues in hew in collab- oration with the State Department are making preparations for this major event which, it is our hope, will bring forth new ideas and a new impetus in the whole range of international education. As part of this process of disciplined communication our educa- tional exchange resources are being increasingly shaped so as to give new emphasis to meetings and seminars designed to en- 178 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role courage debate on the common problems that affect humanity as a whole. This certainly will bring together teachers, intellectuals, and leaders in the arts from the hemisphere in an effort to throw light on those penumbral areas which have made understanding between them less than complete where discourse has existed at all. The combined effect of these interrelated actions and ideas has been to move education front and center in the conduct of our foreign relations generally, and with our Latin American neighbors in particular. No longer is the business of international relations only commerce and politics — it is also education. And within the inter-American framework the past year saw a new focusing on education as one of the cornerstones of development and the greater realization that progress in education was a key to pro- gress on all other fronts. Development is not solely a matter for the economist but also for the educator, and the one must com- municate and work with the other, giving attention to the human side of the development equation as well as to material infra- structure. As educators we may say that this is the year when the economists "got the word" — and the word is education. At the same time, educators of the hemisphere are more readily taking into account the economics of development and the need to relate education policies and programs to estimates of manpower re- quirements. Ill Now a brief glance to the future. In the immediate future we see that the subject receiving the most sustained attention is the proposed Summit meeting of the presidents of the twenty member countries of the Alliance for Progress. The Latin America which the Presidents will discuss is not the Latin America of 1961 and the Charter of Punta del Este. Rapid change has brought both advances and new prob- lems. Expectations are higher and in some areas frustrations are more intense, but there is forward motion in many quarters. A central problem, greater today than five years ago, is the com- bination of population increase, lagging food production, and migration to the cities. When the Presidents meet, education will undoubtedly rank high on the Summit agenda. The United States concern in this regard was made quite explicit by the President in his speech on August 17, 1966, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Al- INTERNATIONAL POSITION 179 liance, when he said "Education must become the passion of us all." He spoke particularly of the need to develop multi-national institutions in science and technology. By any yardstick the education problem in Latin America is vast and complex, even in rapidly advancing countries like Mexico and Venezuela, or in countries which achieved relatively high educational levels years ago like Argentina and Uruguay. It is the population factor that must be put into perspective in order to see clearly the physical size of the education problem over the next decades. If the present rate of increase continues, the population of Latin America will rise to 650 million by the year 2000, and the school-age segment will most likely be around 250 million, three times the present level. Consequently, a three- fold increase in educational capacity over the next thirty-four years would only keep pace with the expanding population. It would not represent a net gain in relative capacity or standards. An increase in enrollments from the present 40 million to 120 million would not change today's ratio of only half the school-age population actually entering primary, secondary, or higher level schools, nor would the expansion as such necessarily reduce the current drop-out rate of 75 per cent at the primary level. Trebling the teaching staff to 4 million, or raising public expenditures to 7 or 8 billion dollars a year, are simply other dimensions of the enormous physical expansion which becomes a first call on the energies and resources so urgently needed in the complex task of modernization and economic-social advancement. The education crisis in Latin America has become more critical not only because of the pressure of more people but because more people want more education now, and because people are leaving the countryside for the cities. The combination of these factors quickly brings matters to the acute stage, especially in the urban areas. This hemisphere, like the rest of the world, is very rapidly becoming a hemisphere of cities, with all the urgent and complex problems that cities around the world have in common. An inevitable corollary is the growing food crisis. Twenty years ago Latin America was a net exporter of food; today it is a net importer. The United Nations is predicting famine in the less developed areas within 24 to 28 years unless there is a miraculous increase in food production and a significant leveling off in rate of population growth. Food production can be increased dramatically provided mod- ern methods are adopted. In this age it is no longer feasible to leave agriculture in the hands of untrained rural labor. The mod- 180 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role ernization of agriculture, however, cannot be accomplished easily even under the pressure of severe food shortages. It is a matter of education and cultural values. "Time is not our ally." The essential action today is increasing the size of the effort, improving the quality, and seeking higher goals. The relatively unhurried pace of the nineteenth century, the little red schoolhouse and the three R's, are not the answer today. New techniques in teaching methods, including radio, tele- vision, and audio-visuals, must be introduced. We must make innovation the order of the day. Planning, of course, is vitally essential, but even more important is the creation of new opportunities for education. Creative poli- cies and actions, even if not tidily organized, are the only means to generate high motivation and self-help initiative upon which lasting progress depends. The United States did not draw up a master plan for the opening of the frontier, but it did launch new ideas like the land-grant college system which gave higher educa- tion a major role in the development of this country. The results of the first five years of the Alliance for Progress in general permit what has been called "a sober optimism," but less so in education where the pressures for change continue to mount and each country faces its own set of increasingly urgent problems. The United States academic community has made many invaluable, often decisive, contributions to Alliance educational endeavors thus far. It has now both the opportunity and the challenge to participate more fully in the much larger effort al- ready in progress but requiring a new intensification and a new speed if it is to achieve the ends that this century and this hemisphere so urgently demand. Irving E. Muskat: interama and our Caribbean AND LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS L HE THEME of this Conference — "The Hemispheric Role of the Caribbean" — is highly significant to us at the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Miami. It is significant because it is our purpose to bring the countries, industries, and peoples of the Western Hemisphere together at Interama in programs of cooperation and mutual understanding within the framework of free government and free enterprise. The Inter-American Center Authority is an agency of the State of Florida and is responsible for creating, building, and operating Interama under the theme: "The American Way of Life — Progress with Freedom." Interama will be the world's first living, perma- nent international exposition where an estimated 15 million visi- tors a year will be able to see and take part in working demon- strations of government, industry, culture, sports, and lesiure ac- tivities of the Western Hemisphere. Interama will show what the Americas have achieved without the sacrifice of civil liberties and individual freedom — all within the framework of democratic in- stitutions and free enterprise. These principles will be illustrated by dynamic exhibits, events, and living performances that will be constantly updated, provid- ing for a continuous exchange of cultures, ideas, and peoples. In 181 182 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role spirit and substance, Interama's goals will also parallel and support the economic and social goals of the Organization of American States (oAs) and the Alliance for Progress. Although many fine accomplishments have been achieved since the Alliance program was inaugurated five years ago, there are still large and complex tasks that lie ahead. President Johnson recently stated that he hoped to see the nations of the Western Hemisphere gradually drop trade and commercial barriers in order to form a type of common market for the republics of North, Central, and South America as well as the countries of the Caribbean. Interama will support this objective by pooling the resources of the Americas in a great common meeting ground where people and ideas will meet and products will be exchanged. This will help speed the goals of the Alliance. The Alliance charter has recommended that the oas "spread among the peoples of America, knowledge of each other and of the solutions they are finding to their problems." Interama will help achieve this objective. II Let us take a moment to see how Interama will accomplish these things. First, there is the firm moral and financial support of inter- national organizations. United States, state and local governments as well as many major industries. As an example, Interama has been endorsed and supported by the OAS, the Chamber of Commerce of the Americas, and the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production. The federal government has approved a $22 million loan for the design and construction of the pavilions to house the nations of the Western Hemisphere. President Johnson has signed a bill authorizing the United States to spend up to $9.5 million for a United States exhibit and two years of maintenance, and Congress appropriated funds for the United States exhibit on October 22, 1966. The Florida State Road Department has agreed to construct, at no cost to Interama, ten miles of interior roads and approximately eight miles of access roads. The City of Miami contributed on a deferred-payment basis the 1,700-acre site of Interama. Dade County made $325,000 available for the preliminary planning. The City of North Miami has contracted to provide water and INTERNATIONAL POSITION 183 sewage facilities throughout the site at no capital outlay to Inter- ama. Florida Power and Light Co. and Southern Bell Telephone Co. have agreed to provide underground electrical and telephone cables throughout the Interama grounds at no cost to the Author- ity, and Goodbody & Co. of New York, has underwritten a $21 million Interama bond issue which is backed by the value of the land. Through this support, Interama has accomplished several things: The 680-acre core site has been cleared, filled and dredged, with waterways and road beds completed. Schematic designs for the national pavilions of the Western Hemisphere have been com- pleted by six of the leading architects of the United States. Con- struction is scheduled to start shortly early in 1967. Of nineteen Latin American countries contacted, seventeen have agreed to participate and two are making studies which we expect to be favorable. More than forty major American industries surveyed by the United States Department of Commerce have expressed in- terest in participating in Interama. These are but a few of the major accomplishments made by Interama. in When Interama opens its doors on July 4, 1968, it will represent an investment of many millions of dollars as well as an invest- ment of the best talents of the Americas. It will represent a partnership in progress between the peoples and governments of Latin America and the United States. Though we are an agency of the State of Florida, let me em- phasize that Interama is not a local or state project. It is inter- national in scope and will be built to serve the United States, Latin American and Caribbean nations, and other foreign coun- tries. In order to accomplish this, we have based all our activities on the achievement of excellence in every phase of our work. For example, we have retained the best financial, engineering, eco- nomic, auditing, and architectural talent in the United States to help plan, finance, and maintain Interama's high goal of excellence. We have been unremitting in our efforts to create stronger links of trade and friendship between the republics of the Americas. Interama will further this goal by making possible new and better communication through the exchanges of economic, technical, educational, cultural, and governmental talents. 184 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role IV Interama has created four exhibition areas — separate but inter- woven in concept. These have been designated as the International, Industrial, Cultural, and Leisure-Sports-Festival Areas. The pavilions of the nations of the Western Hemisphere will be located in the International Area. These have been designed by six of the outstanding architects of the United States: Edward Durell Stone, Marcel Breuer, Louis I. Kahn, Dean Jose Luis Sert, Paul Rudolph, and Harry M. Weese. These pavilions will house exhibits expressing the history, culture, accomplishments, and as- pirations of each participating nation. In the initial planning stage, Interama became aware that many of the nations of the Americas would be unable to provide the necessary capital to finance construction of permanent pavilions to house their exhibits. Therefore, the Authority requested a $22 million loan from the United States government for the design and construction of pavilions for these nations, as well as the United States government pavilion. President Johnson and mem- bers of his cabinet recognized the importance and vitality of Interama's concept and principles and approved the loan. In addition to their regular facilities, all Interama participants will have at their disposal in the International Area a Parliamen- tary House for meetings and conferences; a Ceremonial Plaza where open air festivals and ceremonies related primarily to the Western Hemisphere may be held; special projection theaters; and an International Bazaar where visitors may observe skilled artisans at work and purchase handicrafts native to the participating na- tions. Interama will have a great impact on the relations between the nations of this Hemisphere, but perhaps one of the greatest con- tributions it will make will be the student-guide program. Each nation will provide a rotating corps of student guides to aid in the operation of the individual pavilions. These guides — mostly young university students who may be the leaders of their coun- tries in years to come — will tell the story of their nations' history, culture, industry, and aspirations. Only part of the time spent by the students will be to act as guides and lecture about their nations and exhibits. The remainder of their time may be spent attending United States universities to further their education and learn more about life and culture in the United States. The student-guides will be provided housing on the grounds in the International Area in attractive dormitories INTERNATIONAL POSITION 185 within or near each national pavihon. This is one of the many methods that Interama has developed to help speed the process of exchanging understanding and knowledge between the peoples of the Western Hemisphere. Participating countries will be encouraged to maintain the high- est quality in their exhibits and to constantly revise and upgrade these displays to reflect new achievements of their countries and provide variety for the visitor. The Cultural Area will contain special types of audience fa- cilities for programs of events which will cover the entire spec- trum of human activity. These activities range from domestic and international trade meetings, seminars, conventions, musical events, theatrical performances, sculpture, painting, and exhibits of the treasures of the ancient civilizations of this Hemisphere. Drama, ballet, opera, concerts, and all of the performing arts will be represented in this area as well as art galleries and museums. National and industrial participants will be able to initiate or supplement programs for vast audiences in the Cultural Area. The American business community has increasingly supported and stimulated the arts in recent years. It has contributed liberally toward the construction of cultural facilities and the promotion of culture on a national scale. This brings us to our Leisure-Sports-Festival Area. Leisure, sports, and recreation have become an integral part of life. This area will be the center of all such activity in the Hemisphere, providing recreation and entertainment for the entire family and capturing the lighthearted spirit of the peoples of the Americas. For the children, it is a world that brings to life their storybook heroes and legends — a world in which they may actually parti- cipate — a world of make-believe come true. For adults, it is a world of sophisticated entertainment and events. It is a place to mingle with their hemispheric neighbors and share the cultural events of many nations. The fourth area has been set aside for Industry. It will be here that Interama will become an important forum for private enter- prise to generate improved understanding of its role in bettering the Hemisphere's economic and cultural life. Industry and business will be provided the opportunity to show how it has and is creat- ing a better world for tomorrow. Major industries will construct buildings to house exhibits to portray their role in the American Way of Life and tell the story of today's tremendous scientific and productive capabilities which stem from the meeting of men's minds and men meeting to do 186 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role business. These exhibits will show how our free enterprise system has stimulated scientific, and industrial accomplishments in trans- portation, communication, medical science, and public health, the development of natural resources, and international trade. This provides us with an increasing abundance of the necessities and luxuries of life. It will be here that visitors will be able to see what a free and democratic society can contribute to the coming world of tomorrow. In addition to various industrial ex- hibits, there will be a multi-storied trade mart to provide the facilities for developing new markets in this hemisphere. V This is just part of the story of Interama. What I have presented are mostly facts and intent. All of these things, and many more, go into the making of the dream of Interama — a dream that is coming true. In concluding, I would like to say that Interama's concept and principles are consistent with the objectives of the Alliance for Progress and the American free enterprise system. Interama oflFers a great opportunity for the United States and the peoples of Latin America to work together to stimulate on a scale of the greatest magnitude the trade and cultural programs which will lead to the building of a better hemisphere for all of us. Certainly the Caribbean countries will play a prominent part in these activities. German Arciniegas: the immediate future OF THE CARIBBEAN In discussing the Caribbean, the first statement which must be made appears obvious: the Caribbean is an archipelago. We must begin with this most simple and elementary fact which, nevertheless, delineates a certain difference from the rest of Latin America, although the latter has not always been free from iso- lation. The continent had unity in the colonial period, or at least formed two well-united blocks: the Spanish and the Portuguese. In the independence movement these two Americas conducted them- selves as two physically and politically integrated units. But when they separated from the Iberian monarchies, they fell into the completest disintegration. Each small sovereign republic withdrew into its own shell, so much so that European-style international wars never occurred among them. From five vice-royalties emerged twenty tenaciously separated republics that preferred dialogue with France rather than with their neighbors. Within that isola- tion we were unexpectedly faced by two world wars. Now, the more we find ourselves divided, the smaller we appear to the United States. From this fact the Latin American theme of our time has been born, which is integration or reintegration — the return to forming a continent. We are beginning to have a clear consciousness of the continent idea which lost a century as an 187 188 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role archipelago. From this late discovery we derive the idea of cre- ating something like a united states of the south, united by the common market and by a certain political interdependence. The same does not occur in the Caribbean with respect to the islands. The Lesser Antilles do not integrate or disintegrate at will. Geography and oceanography have favored political isola- tion because of the physical archipelago. Besides, this chain of islands represents surfacing crests of a cordillera, submerged in geological epochs because of earthquakes. The islands maintain a seismic character. Following the Antilles map is like passing over a chart of volcanoes. This region has remained outside the immediate influences of the rest of Latin America. II Certainly, not all of the Caribbean region consists of islands. Here the continent and the archipelago are face-to-face. On the continent some of the developments which promise most for the immediate future of the hemisphere have occurred. Mexico and Venezuela have already emerged, favored by a brilliant solution to economic problems. Central America has accomplished financial integration, a successful example which can be sighted today as indicating the future of the greater common market of Latin America. Colombia has recovered from the rude blow of dictator- ships, and the vigorous push given it by Lleras Restrepo syn- chronizes with the advance of a project which could be the model of transformation for all this area. I refer to the vast plan of the Choco, one of the most ambitious, which will be converted into an immense zone of agriculture and industrial production, with great electrical resources and new communication by water between the Caribbean and the Pacific through a jungle region that up to the present has posed an impenetrable barrier to the Pan American Highway. It can now be affirmed that our America is going to take a great unexpected leap forward which will erase from its image the word underdeveloped, through works like the dam constructed by Mexico in the Infiernillo of Yucatan, the development of Caroni in Venezuela, and of the Choco in Colom- bia. These will form the framework of resurgence on the old map of the Caribbean. The future of the archipelago of the Antilles cannot be seen with the same clarity as the future of the neighboring areas. To compare today nations highly diverse in their identity, their or- ientation, and their conduct, such as Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, INTERNATIONAL POSITION 189 and Puerto Rico, is impossible. In the same way that each island has its own rum, each has its own language and accent. Some speak French and others English, Spanish, Dutch, or papiamento. Everything is formed in its own way and in its own style. To increase even more this explosion of languages, which is not seen in any other section of Latin America, Fidel Castro is preparing a new generation who will speak Russian! I do not wish to overemphasize the picture of contrasts, but neither do I wish to refrain from pointing out the differences that exist between an island situated within the orbit of the United States, like Puerto Rico, and another that has entered the Com- munist orbit, like Cuba. From the standpoint of the functioning of liberty and democracy, or of elementary or university life, we find ourselves confronted by two different systems. Puerto Rico is a country without troops or generals, and Cuba, of all Latin Amer- ica, is the most militarized country, with the largest and most acutely disgusting army. The Caribbean nations, which possess a certain degree of political stability, have learned to apply more of the practices of Puerto Rico than those of Cuba, but there is still a problem of a general nature which affects the whole con- tinent, and in particular those countries closest to Cuba: they have been placed in a position in which it is impossible to dis- arm. The increase of war budgets, to the detriment of those of health, schools, or roads, has been a fatal consequence of the speeches and maneuverings of Fidel Castro and of his new con- cept of the right to intervene in the internal affairs of others. in If the process of integration in the continent accelerates, it is probable that the currents of influence will move opposite from what many anticipate. Inspiration, instead of coming to the archipelago from the Communist island, will come from mainland democracy. Rut it must not be forgotten that the relationship between the unity of the Latin American continent and the closed redoubts of the islands has always been difficult. Spanish America emerged completely emancipated by roughly 1824 and Brazil became independent in 1822. By contrast, Santo Domingo — the first place in the new world settled by the Spaniards — only took the form of a republic in 1926 and then upon such a feeble basis that it went from a protectorate of the United States to the feudal regime of General Trujillo. Its political structure has so deterio- rated that we are still witnessing the results of a most lamentable 190 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role intervention by President Johnson, the rudest blow ever inflicted upon the Organization of American States. Cuba was another ter- ritory which the war of Bolivar was unable to reach. The cries for independence were uttered on the mainland in 1809 but that of Yara in Cuba not until 1868. This was the only place where the Spanish flag was still flying in 1889, but the Cuban star was somewhat eclipsed by those of the United States' constellation. The same thing happened in Puerto Rico. As for the English colonies, England irrevocably recognized the independence of those on the mainland in 1783, but that of Jamaica was delayed until 1962. A nation like Colombia looks back 147 years to see the fading figure of the last viceroy. Jamaica is only celebrating the fourth anniversary of its independence this year. Perhaps, deep inside, we are all alike, and for us the words of Jose Marti weigh as heavily as Bolivar's. But the experiences that have shaped our nationalities and have contributed to molding a style of expression and an international behavior, are diverse. We all move toward the same reintegrated Latin America, this time under principles of liberty closer to the justice that every man who lives in our lands deserves, but it must be recognized that the process has to be accomplished at different paces. There is only one certainty: our ultimate destiny will have to conform to these ideas or the political archipelagos will ultimately disappear below the rising tide of democracy. War has been declared on democratic America. This is evident. But it is also evident that democratic America shall win — and, sooner than is expected. Part VI BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES Frederick E. Kidder: hemispheric role OF THE CARIBBEAN POLITICAL LEADERS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT BIOGRAPHY r\.T THIS CONFERENCE when we are considering the hemi- spheric influence of the Caribbean area, it seems to me most appropriate to give attention to the contemporary local statesmen whose influence in some way extends from Alaska to Patagonia and in some cases even beyond to the far corners of the earth. Previous conferences have devoted relatively little attention to the personalities of the playwrights, stage managers, and leading actors in the drama of the twentieth-century Caribbean. *i Even the librarians and bibliographers who have preceded me over the years as speakers at these meetings have generally emphasized the facts and figures of politics, economics, social institutions, and culture rather than the importance of biography. ^ German Arciniegas has described the Caribbean as "world hur- ricane center."^ Jose Marti wrote, "The pivot of America lies in the Antilles."* Waldemar Westergaard declared that "we may say that the Antilles was the cockpit where the struggle for the domin- ion of the seas was fought out."^ To call the Caribbean the "Med- iterranean of the New World" is to imply its catalytic force in the development of the cultures bordering it.^ In Latin American Leaders, Harold E. Davis wrote some para- graphs which apply as aptly to Caribbean leaders: "Behind every great historical movement stand great men. To *Notes to this chapter begin on p. 199. 193 194 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role say this is not to endorse the fallacy that great men, through sheer exercise of will, or through some mystic link with deity or with destiny make history. So naive a concept will find few seri- ous advocates today. Nor is leadership an automatic product of the working of social forces, in the sense that the situation always produces the man. If that were true the history of human civil- ization would not be, as it has been, full of great frustrations, tragedies, the decline of great cultures, the breakup of societies. Indeed, man lives constantly under the threat of the collapse of his civilization, erected at such great pains over the centuries, and only a series of miracles keeps this civilization alive. At the heart of such miracles a great leader will frequently be found. "Nor is mankind in the large entirely passive itself in this pro- cess, mechanically obeying certain social 'laws.' At times it shows greater and at times less dynamic force than circumstances would lead the investigator to expect. Hence it is, that in the study of historical developments, a little area of mystery frequently re- mains to defy the curiosity of the student who attempts to de- termine why a certain people is capable of great action at one moment in history, less capable at another. It is at this point that leadership plays an important part. The man who senses the meaning of his times is the extraordinary man in any age, and he may exercise great influence. This influence derives not so much from him, probably, as from the currents of social change which he represents and expresses. When, however, by a fortunate juncture of circumstances, such a person is placed in a position to have a decisive voice in the turn of events, and displays in his personality the qualities of winning confidence, commanding re- spect, and even compelling the action of others by the force of his will — then his leadership may have profound effect. Call him the instrument of history if you will, but he is an active, not a passive instrument. Say his power is not in himself but in those who accept his leadership. All this is true, but in spite of all this, the leader is in a real sense a man of judgment and intelli- gence, exercising real freedom of choice and will in accordance with these unusual gifts and attainments.'"^ "There is a perennial interest in heroes," says Sidney Hook, "even when we outgrow the hero worship of youth."^ "Whether men are heroes for a day or forever does not always matter," adds Charles F. Mullett. "What does matter is that in times of crisis or decision, the human personality is first. . . . No more than quintessences of dust are men merely political or social or econo- mic animals: they think, they feel, they even play dirty tricks but BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES 195 they also give their Hves to causes greater than themselves. They make history. . . ."^ Arthur Salter continues in this vein, "Personal characteristics have a twofold historical significance. They help to explain both why those holding political power exercised it on great occasions as in fact they did, and also how they came to acquire that power. The reader who, in studying a particular historic decision, has a clear picture in his mind of the personality of the protagonists, will better understand the decision itself and the sequence of following events. "^° Considering biography as a literary form, John A. Garraty con- cludes, "In sum, biography is the reconstruction of a human life. It attempts to describe and evaluate one individual's career, and also to reproduce the image of his living personality, analyzing its impact upon his actions and the world in which he lived. All biographies must be historical and scientific in that they must be imaginative and artistic, because insight and felicity of expression are essental if the full three-dimensional truth is to be transferred to the flat surface of a printed page. The biographer's responsi- bility is large. He assays the role of a god, for in his hand the dead can be brought to life and granted a measure of immortality. He should, at least, then, seek to emulate the more reliable divinities in his zeal for truth, his tolerance of human frailty, and his love for mankind."^^ Mullet goes on to assess the problems involved, saying, "First and last history is about people, what they do, what they think, what happens to them, and how they influence the world in which they live. No matter the attention to deeds, institutions, and ideas, the historian comes back to the men who performed the deeds, ran the institutions, and conceived the ideas. Without people history is inconceivable; the history of a country, an idea, a policy means the men who built it, or thought it, or carried it through. To describe these men is enormously dilficult."^^ // It is good that Dr. Thomas Mathews' topic on political leaders found a place in the agenda of this conference, and I like to think that this bibliographical paper supports the area he analyzed. Two books, quite by accident, happened to provide the seeds which germinated and brought forth the fruit of this topic. One, Caribbean Power by Colin Rickards, is a collective biography of the leading political figures of the contemporary Caribbean (Mex- 196 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role ico excluded ).i^ Many of Rickards' biographies are little known outside their homelands, while others are of world renown. This book suggests the question, "Who are the contemporary Carib- bean leaders that the world outside the Caribbean deems impor- tant enough to publish biographical data about them?" Or, "What contemporary Caribbean leaders are found in collective biogra- phies published outside the Caribbean?" In this category, in addi- tion to Rickards, we would have to mention numerous biogra- phical sources, such as Current Biography Yearbook, Interna- tional Year Book and Statesmen s Who's Who, Who's Who, Who's Who in America, New Century Cyclopedia of Names, Columbia Encyclopedia, Almanaque Mundial, Who's Who in the United Nations, Who's Who in Latin America, International Who's Who, and a good number of other, more specialized works. ^^ Ry cross-checking these biographical sources, I have come up with a list of leaders, the details of whose careers are of interest or importance to readers outside the Caribbean. This is found in the notes to this paper, more than a hundred individuals, mostly related to politics and/or education. How useful it would be to have a "bibliography of the collective biography of Caribbean America" to be able to complete the life-histories of these pro- ceres from sources published within the area.^^ Then we could write "the rise of the Caribbean Republics as told in the lives of their leaders."!^ The other book which was germinal in shaping this paper was Trujillo, the Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator by Robert D. Crassweller.i'^ Even though you may have read his preface, it is worth hearing a second time, and I quote a few paragraphs: "In the little city of San Cristobal in the Dominican Republic, at 80 Constitution Avenue, there is a modest green house built in the Spanish-American manner, without front yard or setback from the street. In the doorway of the living room, which opens directly onto the narrow sidewalk, an old man in his pajamas sits in a rocking chair observing the children playing in the street, the occasional car or horse and buggy that passes quietly, and the neighbors walking by who pause to shake his hand in familiar greeting. It is his distinction that almost seventy years ago he was the schoolmaster who taught Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. His name is Don Pablo Rarinas, and he is ninety-seven years old. "This merry old man embodies to the biographer the problem of timing that must be faced by anyone who wishes to write the life of Trujillo. It is certain that full-scale biographies will be written eventually. The Caribbean dictator was too important, too BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES 197 complex, and too colorful a man, and his influence on the life of the hemisphere was too great, for such books not to be undertaken. But when? "At a later date the judgment of history will perhaps be sharp- ened to a greater precision than is now possible. Documents will become available from time to time, from among those that have escaped looting, tampering, and destruction. Letters will come to light. Memoirs may appear, possibly self-serving, and treating of one aspect or another. "But the strange life of Trujillo and the essence of the regime which came to be known as the Era of Trujillo are not to be found in documents. Trujillo's was not an existence relected in correspondence, nor was the truth of it conveyed accurately in aide memoires, memorandums, or departmental reports. The life of Trujillo and of the government were intensely personal, inti- mate rather than official, and the invisible portions bear about the same ratio to the visible areas as they do in an iceberg. It is in the memory of those who lived and worked with this unusual man — the people who shared moments with him in his office, at his dining table, aboard his yachts, or at his country estate, Es- tancia Fundacion — that the essence of things is to be found. The tone and color of the Era of Trujillo could not have been com- municated to the files even if anyone had wanted to attempt such a thing, and no one did. "But Trujillo would be five years past the Biblical span if he were living today, and few remain of those who knew him as a young man. Of those who remember him as a child in a small village, Don Pablo Barinas, rocking quietly in his doorway, is al- most the sole survivor. Within a few more years it will be im- possible to recreate large areas of Trujillo's life from the accounts of those who recall the story accurately. When that time comes, much that is myth and fantasy and silly rumor will harden into the semblance of fact, and a great opportunity will have been lost. Even now several aspects of Trujillo's life are so confused by conflicting reports, including the circumstances surrounding his assassination only a few years ago, that disentangling the strands of truth and fiction is a heavy undertaking. "I have therefore determined to write the life of Trujillo at this time, using not only such official records as are available but also, and as much as possible, the personal recollections of those who supported him, those who opposed him, and those who ob- served with curiosity, wonder, or apprehension from some neutral observation point. 198 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role "The reader who is only superficially familiar with Caribbean affairs may find the materials of this volume strange. The extent to which violence, both open and covert, is a constant factor in the life of the region may cause surprise. The incongruous and rather unreal quality of many events, whether fanciful or farcial in ap- pearance, may also prove unexpected. If the reader is inclined to doubt the authenticity of certain events, viewing them as too implausible to be true, he may be assured that many more things even more strange, which are possibly and even probably true, have been omitted because their accuracy could not be satis- factorily established. Nothing is included that has not been sub- jected to every possible verification. "The reader may also remark the relatively small scale of events in the Caribbean. The number of men and amounts of money involved are generally not large. This phenomenon should not be equated with unimportance. The Caribbean has exerted a profound impact on the United States and on the hemisphere and the world. Four Caribbean countries — Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Venezuela — have had, singly and in com- bination, true international significance, although they happen to possess together a population only about 10 per cent of that of the United States."^^ It is further suggested that as a complement to a catalog of contemporary Caribbean leaders of international renown, and to a list of sources of biographical information about contemporary Caribbean leaders, we also need a study entitled "Biographies and Biographers of Contemporary Caribbean America."^^ I can only begin such a list by mentioning, in addition to Crassweller's Trujillo, studies such as the following: The Venezuelan Demo- cratic Revolution: A Profile of Romulo Betancourt by Robert J. Alexander; Poet in the Fortress; The Story of Luis Munoz Marin by Thomas Aitken; and The Remon Era; An Analysis of a Decade of Events in Panama, 1947-57 by Larry La Rue Pippin. ^o A quick check of the cumulation for 1960-64 of the Library of Congress Catalog — Books: Subjects disclosed one or more biographies of Pedro Albizu-Campos, Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, Arnulfo Arias Madrid, Fulgencio Batista, Romulo Betancourt, Lazaro Cardenas, Fidel Castro, Osvaldo Dorticos, Fran9ois Duvalier, Romulo Gal- legos, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Ralph Paiewonsky, Marcos Perez Himenez, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Rafael Trujillo, and Miguel Ydi- goras Fuentes. Clearly, of course, a real biography is much more than an as- sembling of facts about the career of an individual. It is an BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES 199 interpretation of the outreach of his personaHty. To locate con- temporary biographies and autobiographies, as well as collective biographies, one would naturally consult: The Biography Index, Current Caribbean Bibliography, Caribbean Acquisitions of the University of Florida Library, the Handbook of Latin American Studies, and other reference works and bibliographies. ^^ in What, then, are the conclusions of this paper? 1. The hemispheric influence of the Caribbean area must be evaluated in terms of personalities of international impact, stud- ied through biographies, as well as in terms of constitutions, trade statistics, and the history of the flow of ideas. 2. Teachers in the social sciences should include biographical materials whenever relevant and available to round out the in- terpretation of current events in the Caribbean area. 3. Libraries, both public and academic, should acquire many published sources of biographical information as well as those full- scale, authentic biographies which are valuable both as history and as liteature. 4. You and I have something to gain professionally and per- sonally from reading biography, writing biography, collecting bio- graphy, and regarding the social sciences as the sum total of the biographies of mankind, leaders and followers, living and dead. May this paper stimulate the study and the collection and the propagation of biography.22 NOTES 1. Exceptions are: Muna Lee, "Some Early Cultural Relations in the Carib- bean" (1951:117-22); the section on presidents and dictators in the 1955 volume as well as A. Curtis Wilgus' introduction to that volume; and Dr. Wil- gus' biographical memoir of Esteban Gil Borges in the introduction to the 1962 volume. 2. Lewis Hanke said, "How are bibliographies produced? The two funda- mental ingredients have been heroes and/or institutions" (1950:205). Edward M. Heiliger stated, "In the study of political situations, people are important, and one should know the biographical materials available" (1955:306). In her bibliographical paper on Venezuela, Dr. Nettie Lee Benson included bibli- ography and reference sources for biography (1962:251-53, 273-75). 3. The State of Latin America (New York: Knopf, 1952), Chaps. XIV-XV. 4. As quoted ibid., p. 285. 5. As quoted in Arciniegas, Caribbean, Sea of the New World (New York: Knopf, 1946), p. 3. 6. Ibid., pp. 6-11. 7. New York, Wilson, 1949, p. 11. 8. The Hero in History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943), p. 3. 200 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role 9. Biography as History (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 21. 10. Personality in Politics (London: Faber & Faber, 1947), p. 239. 11. The Nature of Biography (New York: Knopf, 1957), p. 28. 12. Page 3. 13. (London: D. Dobson, 1963), 247 pages, including bibliography and index. The local biographical directory covering the British, Dutch, and United States Caribbean is Personalities in the Caribbean, 2nd ed. (Kingston, Jamaica: Personalities Limited, 1965). 14. Robert J. Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1962); Brooks Atkinson, Tuesdays ir Fridays (New York: Random House, 1963); Vera M. Dean, Builders of Emerging Nations (New York: Holt, 1961); The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.); Neiv Frontiersmen (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961); Leonard S. Kenworthy, Leaders of New Nations (New York: Doubleday, 1959); Teofilo Maldonado, Hombres de primera plana (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Campos, 1958); Robert H. Phelps (ed.). Men in the News, 1958-59 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1959-60), 2 vols.; Ted Szulc, Twilight of the Tyrants (New York: Holt, 1959). 15. This would be comparable to the thesis of Josefina Del Toro, Bibliography of the Collective Biography of Spanish America (Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1938). 16. Cf. William Spence Robertson, Rise of the Spanish- American Republics as Told in the Lives of Their Liberators (New York: Appleton, 1918). 17. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 18. Ibid., pp. ix-xi. 19. Cf. A. Curtis Wilgus, Histories and Historians of Hispanic America, 2nd ed. (New York: Wilson, 1942). 20. Alexander (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964); Aitken (New York: New American Library, 1964); Pippin (Stanford, Calif.: Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1964). 21. The Americana Annual, Britannica Book of the Year, Colliers Encyclo- pedia Yearbook, Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, The Statesman's Year-Book, The West Indies ir Caribbean Year Book, Worldmark Encyclo- pedia of the Nations; the H. W. Wilson Company periodical indexes; Antiono Matos, Guia a las Resehas de Libros de y sobre Hispanomerica, Rio Piedras, Biblioteca de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1965; Frederick E. Kidder, Theses on Pan American Topics (Washington: Pan American Union, 1962); Disserta- tion Abstracts (Ann Arbor, Mich., University Microfilms, 1938—); Survey of Investigations in Progress in the Field of Latin American Studies, triennial (Washington: Pan American Union, 1953—); U.S. Dept. of State, Office of In- telligence Research, Unpublished Research on American Republics {Excluding the United States) Completed and in Progress (Washington, 1952—); "Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science ... in Preparation . . . and Completed," an- nually in the September issue of the American Political Science Review since 1911. 22. The following are the personalities of the sixties in the Caribbean area as revealed by an analysis of biographical information available outside the Caribbean Area: Adams, Sir Grantley Herbert, 1898— (Barbados) Albizu-Campos, Pedro, 1891P-1965 (Puerto Rico) Alfaro, Ricardo Joaquin, 1882— (Panama) Arciniegas, German, 1900— (Colombia) Arevalo Bermejo, Juan Jose, 1904— (Guatemala) Arevalo Martinez, Rafael, 1884— (Guatemala) Arias, Harmodio, 1886-1962 (Panama) Arias Madrid, Arnulfo, 1897-(Panama) Arias, Roberto Emiho, 1918— (Panama) Arias Robledo, Eduardo, 1918— (Colombia) Armendariz, Antonio, 1905— (Mexico) BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES 201 Balaguer, Joaquin, 1906— (Dominican Republic) Barrow, Errol Walton, 1920-(Barbados) Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio, 1901— (Cuba) Bellegarde, Dantes, 1877-1965 (Haiti) Benitez-Rexach, Jaime, 1908— (Puerto Rico) Betancourt, Romulo, 1908— (Venezuela) Bird, Vere Cornwall, 1909-(Antigua) Blaize, Herbert A., 1918-(Grenada) Bonnelly, Rafael, 1904— (Dominican Republic) Bosch, Juan, 1909— (Dominican Republic) | Bramble, William, 1901— (Monserrat) Burnham, Linden Forbes Sampson, 1923— (British Guiana) Bustamente, Sir William Alexander Clarke, 1884— (Jamaica) Cardenas, Lazaro, 1895— (Mexico) Caso y Andrade, Alfonso, 1896— (Mexico) Castro Ruz, Raul, 1916?- (Cuba) Castro Ruz, Fidel, 1927- (Cuba) Charles, George Frederick Lawrence, 1916— (St. Lucia) Chiari, Roberto Francisco, 1905— (Panama) Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 1911— (Mexico) Dorticos Torradio, Osvaldo, 1919— (Cuba) _ _ Duque, Tomas Gabriel, 1890-1965 (Panama) Duvalier, Frangois, 1907— (Haiti) Facio Segreda, Gonzalo J., 1918— (Costa Rica) Figueres Ferrer, Jose, 1908— (Costa Rica) Gallegos, Romulo, 1884— (Venezuela) Garcia-Godoy, Hector, 1921?— (Dominican Republic) Guerrero, Lorenzo, 1900-(Nicaragua) Guevara, Ernesto, 1928-(Cuba) Guizado, Jose Ramon, 1899-1964 (Panama) Henriquez Urena, Max, 1885— (Dominican Republic) Hochoy, Sir Solomon, 1905— (Trinidad) Invader, Lord (pseud, of Rupert Westmore Grant), 1914?-61 (Trinidad) Jagan, Cheddi, 1918— (British Guiana) Joshua, Ebenezer Theodore, 1907— (St. Vincent) Le Blanc, Edward Oliver (Dominica) Leoni, Raiil, 1905— (Venezuela) Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 1909— (Colombia) Lleras Restrepo, Carlos, 1908— (Colombia) Lopez Arellano, Oswaldo, 1921— (Honduras) Lopez Mateos, Adolfo, 1910— ( Mexico) Manley, Norman Washington, 1893— (Jamaica) Midence, Adolfo V., 1896-(Honduras) Miro Cardona, Jose, 1903-(Cuba) Morales Carrion, Arturo, 1913— (Puerto Rico) Moscoso, Teodoro, 1910~(Puerto Rico) Mufioz Marin, Luis, 1898— (Puerto Rico) Obando Lombana, Jorge, 1890— (Colombia) Onis, Federico de, 1885-1966 (Puerto Rico) Orlich Bolmarick, Francisco Jose, 1908— (Costa Rica) Ortiz Fernandez, Fernando, 1881— (Cuba) Ortiz Rubio, Pascual, 1877-1963 (Mexico) Padilla Nervo, Luis, 1898-(Mexico) Paiewonsky, Ralph M., 1907— (Virgin Islands) Peralta Azurdia, Enrique, 1908— (Guatemala) Perez Jimenez, Marcos, 1914— (Venezuela) Picon Salas, Mariano, 1901-65 (Venezuela) Portell Vila, Herminio, 1901-(Cuba) 202 The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role Price, George Cadle, 1919— (British Honduras) Price-Mars, Jean, 1876-(Haiti) Quintanilla, Luis, 1900— (Mexico) Rincon de Gautier, Felisa, 1897— (Puerto Rico) Rivera Carballo, Julio Adalberto, 1921— (El Salvador) Roberts, Walter Adolphe, 1886-1962 (Jamaica) Robles, Marco Aurelio, 1905?— (Panama) Rodriguez Jimenez, Carlos, 1899— (Venezuela) Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo, 1900— (Colombia) Ruiz Galindo, Antonio, 1897— (Mexico) Sanchez Vilella, Roberto, 1913-(Puerto Rico) Santos, Eduardo, 1888— (Colombia) Schick Gutierrez, Rene, 1909— (Nicaragua) Somoza Debayle, Luis Anastasio, 1922— (Nicaragua) Sosa-Rodriguez, Carlos, 1912— (Venezuela) Southwell, Caleb Azariah Paul, 1913-(St. Kitts) Torres Bodet, Jaime, 1902— (Mexico) Trejos Fernandez, Jose Joaquin (Costa Rica) Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leonidas, 1891-1961 (Dominican Republic) Uslar Pietri, Arturo, 1906— (Venezuela) Valencia, Guillermo Leon, 1909— (Colombia) Valle, Rafael HeUodoro, 1891-1959 (Honduras) Villeda Morales, Jose Ramon, 1908— (Honduras) Williams, Eric Eustace, 1911— (Trinidad) Ydigoras Fuentes, Miguel, 1895— (Guatemala) Zavala, Silvio, 1909— (Mexico) University of Connecticut Libraries T