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 H'U , ,,,^,,,3 ^^ PH.LOSOPHV 
 
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ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 COMPRISING 
 
 LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY, 
 
 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 BY 
 
 Rev. WALTER H. HILL, S. J, 
 
 Professor of Philosophy in the St. Louis University. 
 
 FIFTH REVISED EDITION. 
 
 BALTIMORE: 
 
 Published by John Murphy & Co. 
 
 Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 
 
 London: Washbourne, i 8 Paternoster PvOW. 
 
 1879. 
 
PUBLISHERS' PREFACE 
 To THE Second Revised Edition. 
 
 It is not yet one month since we issued the first Edition of 
 *' Hill's Philosophy," and such has been the demand for the work, 
 that a second Edition is required. Very favorable notices have 
 already been given of the work by several periodicals, and able 
 judges, whose verdict we know to be of the highest authority, have 
 pronounced the book a true and trusty friend through the intrica- 
 cies of Philosophy. 
 
 We rejoice at this success, because it ensures the completion of 
 the whole work, including Ethics, and gives us every reason to 
 believe that we shall soon have, in our language, a Manual of 
 Philosophy, for students and for the general reader, equal to the 
 admirable Latin works, which have hitherto been almost the only 
 pure sources of Philosophical knowledge. 
 
 The Author has taken^ advantage of the opportunity offered by 
 the preparation of this Edition, to revise his work and thus render 
 it more acceptable to the student. 
 
 The Publishers. 
 Baltimore, Maj^ 19, 1873. 
 
 Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by 
 
 John Murphy, 
 
 in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 
 
^ PREFACE. 
 
 So 
 
 The following elementary work, though primarily intended 
 for learners, will, it is believed, be found by the general reader 
 of philosophy to contain things which are new, as regards 
 
 '^^ works of the kind published in the English language. 
 
 ^ In order to render the Logic more easy and more practical, 
 J*'irs^, the author has omitted the perplexed, undiscussed and in- 
 determinate Greek derivatives, which give vagueness or obscu- 
 rity to the matter contained in many popular text books on 
 Logic; and he has aimed to use in their stead the most plain 
 and simple terminology. This perpetual multiplication of in- 
 J, definite and unintelligible technicalities, which are devised as 
 
 ^ Y if to embody new forms of thought, helps much to render the 
 study of Logic and Philosophy discouraging, and their very 
 names repulsive, even to the most ambitious and the most in- 
 telligent young minds that attempt to master the established 
 ^ elementary principles of these all-important branches of a good 
 
 f^ education. The introduction of a new term into a book on 
 
 'H ■. 
 
 U) Philosophy, does not necessarily imply the actual discovery of 
 
 -^ 
 
 a new truth. It is a significant fact that, while eccentric 
 
 iii 
 
IV PKEFACE. 
 
 thought and novel phraseology possess a peculiar charm foi 
 ill-educated, rambling and superficial minds ; yet, the lan- 
 guage which remains in prevailing use, is the embodiment 
 of deep and true philosophy ; and the words as well as the con- 
 clusions, which convey what is absurd or preposterous, it must 
 necessarily repudiate, by the general law of human thought. 
 
 Second: It was judged best, also, for the interests of learn- 
 ers in general, to omit the discussion of the modes and figures 
 of the syllogism; for, in practice they are not attended to, 
 even by those who actually argue in form, the simple rules of 
 demonstration sufficing for all practical purposes, and being all 
 that is even really useful in the strictest argumentation. On 
 the other hand, it was deemed expedient to introduce some 
 matters that pertain to branches of Philosophy, whose full 
 treatment is appropriate to another volume ; e. g., certain sub- 
 jects which strictly belong to Psychology, Cosmology and 
 Natural Theology. 
 
 The author derived much help from notes taken in private 
 study years ago, but which were prepared with no thought of 
 ever employing them for any other purpose than his own in- 
 struction. It is hoped that the acknowledgment of having 
 made a free use of what was then obtained from the best 
 works within his reach, will excuse the omission .of more fre- 
 quent reference to them in the margin. 
 
 In disposing the matter, the method employed in the most 
 approved text books used in the schools of Philosophy is 
 generally followed. In such works the definitions of terms, 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 many important propositions of Logic and Metaphysics, 
 even with the chief arguments for them, are treated as com- 
 mon property; as happens, for example, with certain defini- 
 tions" and theorems of geometry, originally from Euclid, but 
 which are now the recognized property of all geometricians. 
 
 In order to secure brevity, after having indicated succinctly, 
 but, as he trusts, clearly and comprehensively, the theories and 
 the salient points of the matters treated, he has been com- 
 pelled, in many instances, to leave their development to the 
 instructor, or to the reader for himself. 
 
 The writer flatters himself that the treatises on certainty, 
 and its motives and principles; on sensible and intellectual cog- 
 nition ; the objective reality of ideas ; the principle of causa- 
 tion ; will, perhaps, be found to possess special value, more, 
 particularly for those who are not familiar with the language 
 of the schools. 
 
 It was deemed expedient to insert on the margin, here and 
 there, some suggestive axioms, brief distinctions and explana- 
 tions, taken from the Latin authors, among whom they pass for 
 established doctrine, and are usually enunciated nearly in the 
 same terms. The Lati?i of the schools, besides being brief, is 
 also peculiarly capable of expressing precisely, clearly, and com- 
 prehensively, matters which it is difficult to utter through the 
 less accurate vernacular, in terms that are neither obscure nor 
 ambiguous. Though they are not essential to the text of the 
 work, yet, for the convenience of the reader who is not famiUar 
 with the Latin language, the translation is subjoined to these 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 citations. It was, however, found no easy task, in some in« 
 otances, to reproduce them with fidehty in EngHsh phraseology, 
 as the classic scholar will readily see from the result, and know 
 how to judge benignantly. 
 
 If the offering which is herewith respectfully made to the 
 cause of education meet with public favor, it is designed to 
 complete the philosophical course by adding to the present 
 work treatises on Cosmology, Psychology, Theodicea, and 
 Ethics or Moral Philosophy. Whether this part of the under- 
 taking be well or ill done — and, doubtless, many errors and 
 imperfections have escaped notice — it may, nevertheless, fairly 
 be taken as a specimen of what the whole is likely to be ; and, 
 even if it prove to possess but indifferent merit, still it is the 
 fruit of much toil, and the result of the writer's best possible 
 effort, done, as it was, during intervals between various daily 
 duties. With this candid statement, the work is sent forth 
 with the hope that kind suggestions and ingenuous criticism 
 may contribute to improve, and perfect it for the object in- 
 tended; i. e., an aid for the study of Philosophy. 
 
 St. L0UI6 University, 
 Febiuary 10th, 1873. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY; ITS OBJECT. 
 
 The word Philosophy, according to the sense in which Pytha- 
 goras applied it to his school, means the love, desire and pur- 
 suit of wisdom. Philosophy, as a science, is the knowledge 
 of things in their highest and most universal causes, so far as 
 such knowledge is attainable by the light of natural reason. 
 Its object, therefore, includes the world or universe, man, God, 
 in their most essential relations to each other.* 
 
 It is not without propriety, then, that Philosophy, when 
 compared to the whole collection of human sciences, is pro- 
 nounced to be, "as the sun in the planetary system, the light 
 of all." 'Without some adequate acquaintance, , at least with 
 the body of its established doctrine, even a liberal education 
 is incomplete or partial, if, indeed, it be not superficial or un- 
 sound. 
 
 The knowledge of a thing, even when it is scientific, stops 
 with the immediate or proximate causes of that thing; but 
 wisdom, which is philosophical knowledge, refers the same thing 
 
 * " Rerum divinarum atque humanarum causarumque quibus continentur cognitio." 
 The knowledge of human and divine things, and of the causes by which they are related 
 to each other. — Cicero de Offic. lib. 
 
 2. C. II. 
 
VIII INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to its still higher and more universal causes; that is, it seeks 
 to understand and explain it in its essence as it absolutely is, 
 and must be. Other science acquaints us with things as they 
 are directly and extrinsically known through the senses, or 
 other powers of cognition; but philosophy, by means of 
 higher scientific knowledge, proceeds further, and explains the 
 intrinsic nature ot those things, and their relation to still more 
 universal truths. For example: Physiology, as a science, ex- 
 plains the whole economy of the living human body, its 
 organism, the functions of its tissues, the relations and con- 
 nexions of its members, and the like ; and that science is 
 wholly limited to this positive object, to this view of organic 
 beings. Philosophy proceeds much farther; it explains the 
 nature of man as a rational animal, or as consisting of an or- 
 ganized body and a living soul in union by composition ; and 
 it answers the questions, "what is life? what is the nature of 
 the soul? what essentially constitutes the union of the soul 
 and body? can materiaV organs, by any possibility, elicit acts 
 of intelligence ? " etc. 
 
 It is manifest, therefore, that Philosophy is superior in its 
 aim and objects to all other human sciences. It treats of its 
 matter on metaphysical principles; that is, it explains objects in 
 their essence, employing for that purpose ftecessary, inwiutable 
 and absolute truths; which preserve the understanding from 
 error, not only in these elevated matters, but also in the study 
 of facts, no less than the conclusions from those facts. 
 
 The subjects that are now usually treated in a course of 
 
INTRODUCTION. IX 
 
 Philosophy, are Logic, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, 
 Natural Theology, and Moral Philosophy or Ethics. 
 
 Logic explains the laws of right reasoning ; it is, when con- 
 sidered under different respects, both a natural gift, and the 
 result of art. Artificial Logic derives its value from the natu- 
 ral, whose principles it aims to express in a few clear and inva- 
 .riable formulae. Logic, considered as practically directing the 
 mind in reasoning, is an art; but inasmuch as it explains and 
 proves the precepts of correct argument by their reasons, fur- 
 nishes the means and the criteria of certainty, or propounds 
 the truth of cognition, it is a science. 
 
 Ontology, or General Metaphysics, has for its object the 
 essential predicates of all things ; and it, therefore, deals with 
 truths which are strictly absolute and universal. It is the most 
 completely generalized system of knowledge which it is possi- 
 ble for the human intellect to form by its highest power of 
 analysis. 
 
 Cosmology treats of the visible world; its origin by creation, 
 the nature of the material substance of which it is made, of 
 what constitutes the essence of inorganic, organic, and living 
 forms of material substance. 
 
 Psychology has for its end to explain the human soul, con- 
 sidered both as the vital principle in the human compound, 
 and as a spiritual substance capable of existing /<?r se^ or separ- 
 ate from the body, together with its nature, operations, its essen- 
 tial immateriality, and indestructibility. 
 
 Natural Theology treats of God as the first and unproduced 
 
X INTRODUCTION. 
 
 cause of all that exists out of him; his nature, attributes or 
 perfections, so far as they can be known by mere reason. 
 
 Moral Philosophy or Ethics has for its object moral good; 
 and man as a moral being, his relation to the natural law of 
 right and wrong, the ultimate end of his being, what consti- 
 tutes his chief good, summiim bonum. When limited rigor- 
 ously to its sphere, Moral Philosophy prescinds from Revela- 
 tion ; or, in other words, it presents its subject matter only in 
 a philosophical light. But, because there can be no disagree- 
 ment between natural and supernatural truth, God being the 
 author of both ;* and, also, since the light of revelation perfects 
 even the knowledge which is acquired by the Hght of natural 
 reason, it is not wonderful that much of the matter which is 
 usually contained in works on Moral Philosophy should really 
 be derived, directly or indirectly, from revelation ; for, indeed, 
 all human science has been benefited, in one respect or an- 
 other, by supernatural truth. 
 
 * ' ' Principiorum naturaliter notoriim cognitio nobis divinitus indita est, 
 cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostrse natiu-ae. Quidquid igitur principiis hiijusmodi 
 conti-ariiun est, divinag sapientiae conti-arium est, non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea 
 igitur quae ex revelatioae divina per fidera tenentur, non possunt natnrali cog- 
 nitioni esse contraria." (Div. Th., contr. gent. lib. I. c. 7.) The knowledge 
 of principles known naturally is divinelj' put into us, since God himself is the 
 author of our nature. Wliatever, therefore, is contrary to 'these principles, ia 
 contrary to the Divine wisdom, and on that account cannot be from God. Thosie 
 things, therefore, from Divine revehition, which are held by faith, cannot be 
 contrary to natural knowledge. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 LOGIC: FIEST PAKT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Article I : Simple Apprehension i6 
 
 — - Article 2 : Definition of Terms ; Comprehension and Extension l8 
 
 "^"^^-Article 3 : Ideas or Concepts ; Their Objects 19 
 
 Article 4 : Genus, Species, Difference, Attribute, Accident 22 
 
 Article 5 : Division; Rules of 26 
 
 Article 6: Definition; Rules of. 28 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Article I : Judgment 30 
 
 Article 2 : Propositions 31 
 
 Article 3 : Opposition 33 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Article I : Reasoning; Specific Act of 35 
 
 Article 2: The Syllogism ; Its Canons Explained 36 
 
 Article 3 : Hypothetical Syllogisms ; Rule of 43 
 
 Article 4: Other Forms of Argument; The Dilemma 45 
 
 CHAPTERIV. 
 Article i : Scientific Method ; Analysis and Synthesis in their Rela- 
 tion both to Particular Scientific Cognitions, and to Systems of such 
 
 Cognitions 48 
 
 Article 2 : Demonstration; Kinds of 50 
 
 Article 3: Induction; Essentially Syllogistic 52 
 
 Article 4: Probable Argument 53 
 
 Article 5 : Fallacies or Sophisms 55 
 
 LOGIC: SECOND PAET; OE, LOGIC APPLIED. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Article i : Truth, Error, Falsehood 6l 
 
 Article 2 : States of the Mind in Relation to Truth 65 
 
 Article 3: Certainty; Evidence 67 
 
 Article 4: Criterion of Certainty 78 
 
 Article 5 : Primitive Truths not Demonstrable 80 
 
 xi 
 
XII CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MEANS OR SOURCES OF CERTAINTY. 
 
 PAOE, 
 
 Article I : Consciousness 82 
 
 Article 2: The Senses, Internal and External; Their Objects ; Brute 
 Soul Material; Human Soul Immaterial ; Imagmation an Organic 
 
 Power .* 85 
 
 A.rticle 3 : Apprehension, Judgment, Reasoning ; Connatural Object 
 
 of Intellect 103 
 
 Article 4: Objective Reality of Ideas 112 
 
 Articles: Universals; Their Objects 115 
 
 Article 6: Memory, Organic and Intellectual; When it Affords Cer- 
 tainty 125 
 
 Article 7 : Testimony Affords Certainty 1 29 
 
 Article 8: Scientific Knowledge ; In What it Specifically Consists 132 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Disputation, or Practical Exercise in Reasoning ; The Foi-m or Man- 
 ner of Conducting it ; Its Advantages 141 
 
 ONTOLOGY; OE, GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Introduction 149 
 
 CHAPTER!. 
 
 Article I: Notion of Being; What it Includes 151 
 
 Article 2 : Truth, Metaphysical Truth 164 
 
 Article 3 : Good and Evil 165 
 
 Article 4: Beauty; In What it consists 173 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Article i : Substance and Accident Defined 1 78 
 
 Article 2: Quantity, Quality, Habit; Relation 184 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Article i : Principle of Causation 199 
 
 Article 2 : ' Different Kinds of Causes ; Efficient, Final 200 
 
 Article 3 : Material Cause ; Formal Cause Explained 206 
 
 Article 4: Perfection of Beings ; The Finite and Infinite ; The Knowl- 
 edge of the Infinite is Logically Derived from that of the Finite.. 212 
 
 Articles: The Necessary; The Contingent; Order 222 
 
 Alphabetical Index 229 
 
LOGIC: FIRST PART 
 
 OR 
 
 DIALECTICS. 
 
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 
 
 THEORETICAL AND APPLIED. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 As the end of Logic is to direct the mind in reasoning, it 
 has for its object: ist. To explain the operations of the mind 
 so far as they are directly related to that end; 2d. The rules 
 and precepts that govern these operations. 
 
 Some of its principles prevertt error in the process of reason- 
 ing, that is, in the for?n of argument ; others guard against 
 deception in the subject ??iafler, that is, in the truths or facts 
 that are compared. 
 
 Hence, Logic may be conveniently divided into two parts : 
 into Theoretical Logic or Dialectics, and AppUed Logic. 
 
 In the first, the operations of the mind in right reasoning are 
 described, and the rules are given which direct it in \\\^form of 
 reasoning. In the second part of Logic, those principles are 
 considered in their practical application to the objects of rea- 
 soning, that is, to tlie matter or the logical truth of propositions. 
 
 Observe, then, that Logic is not limited in its scope or gen- 
 eral aim to the mere form of arguments ; for this is, in fact, 
 only a part of its proper object. It teaches also the means of 
 attaining truth of cognition, since it lays down principles that 
 preserve the mind from error in judging and assenting to the 
 motives of certainty. By explaining and prescribing the rules 
 of definition, division and ratiocination, it gives light and 
 method to all the sciences; and, because its true and proper 
 end is to expound and direct the acts of reason, it is itself 
 correctiy styled by philosophers the science of reasoft. 
 
 IS 
 
16 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 
 
 There are three acts or operations of the mind which are to 
 be treated in the first part of Logic, namely, simple app7-ehen' 
 sion, judgment^ and reasoning. 
 
 Apprehe?ision, fi-om the Latin word, apprehendere, to take 
 hold of, as with the hand, in its widest sense, includes all those 
 acts of cognition which precede Judgment. Hence, even the 
 se?ises may be said to apprehend \\\t\x objects; the fancy appre- 
 hends by means of its images; the intellect apprehends the 
 intelligible esse?tce, after the concrete or singular realities of the 
 objects which are presented by the sensible organs are dropped. 
 The intellect expresses what it thus apprehends or conceives in 
 the verbiim mentis, or coiicept, or by these acts it forms its idea 
 of the object. All these acts of simple hiowledge are included 
 under the general name, simple apprehension. We may regard 
 the idea, or concept, as the term of all these apprehensive acts, 
 since it is their last immediate result. It is manifest that the 
 object conceived or apprehended may be either co??iplex or 
 incomplex; v. g., "learned man, man," "stone house, stone;" 
 but so long as there is^no judgment affirmed by the mind, the 
 acts all pertain to apprehensive k?iowledge, or they are acts of 
 simple apprehension. When the mind actually co77ipoujids or 
 divides two concepts, as predicate and subject, \t Judges or form- 
 ally and explicitly affirms truth, and this judgment or explicit 
 affirmation, being enunciated or expressed in language, is a 
 propositioti. The truth contained in this judgment is implicitly 
 contained in the acts of simple apprehension, but it is explicitly 
 in the judgment alone, for, as is manifest, it is only judgment 
 that can properly be said to affirm truth. 
 
 Simple apprehension, in the more special sense in which the 
 expression is generally used, is an act of the intellect, by which 
 it takes notice of an object and acquires some knowledge of 
 it, but without any judgment or explicit affirmation; or, in other 
 words, by this act it merely perceives or sees the object, with- 
 out proceeding to form a judgment. 
 
LOGIC : FIEST PART. 17 
 
 The object of the apprehension may be either a singular anc? 
 individual thing, or a relation between two or more things. 
 
 The knowledge or cognition acquired by this act is called, 
 indiscriminately, a coiuept or an idea^ and it is the result or 
 fruit of the simple apprehension. The concept is so called on 
 account of its being, as it were, the offspri?ig of the intellect 
 and the object. Take care not to confound idea^ which is men- 
 tal, with the image or phantas7na in the imagination, which is 
 organic, and which we have in common with the brute. The 
 thing apprehended, as it is in itself, with its qualities and attri- 
 butes, is the 7naterial object;"^ the object, with its constituent 
 marks or properties as expressed ifi the mind, is the formal object 
 of the apprehension ; this formal object is also called the mental 
 term of the apprehension, and verbu7?i mentis, or mental word. 
 The oral term is the word which is employed in language to 
 express orally the name of the 7?tental ter7n, co7icept, or idea. 
 
 A little attention to what is daily occurring in the formation 
 of ideas or concepts by the mind, will render this subject clear; 
 V. g., we see an object; now, the act of seeing that object 
 puts an idea of it into the mind, though we may not at the 
 time form any judgment concerning it; the act of the mind 
 by which it merely perceives the object, is a simple apprehen- 
 sion. The idea or concept of the object resulting in the mind 
 from the apprehension, may be reflected on, even for a con- 
 siderable time, before the mind positively affirms or denies 
 anything in regard to the object. Reflection serves to perfect 
 the idea or concept which is the result of the simple appre- 
 hension; but the operation of the mind does not become a 
 judgment till an affirmation is really made. 
 
 * " Objectum est determinans; intellectus, determinabile adconcipiendum." 
 The object is that which determines; and the intellect is that which can b« 
 determined to conceive an object. 
 
18 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 terms; comprehension and extension of terms; defini 
 tion of other terms. 
 
 Oral terms are the names in language for ideas or concepts, 
 and, therefore, represent them, or stand for them. 
 
 A term may be considered in connexion with the constituent 
 marks or properties contained in its object; v. g., 7na7i, as ex- 
 pressing intelHgence, mortahty, stature, complexion, etc.; in this 
 case the comprehe?ision of the term ina?i is attended to. The 
 comprehension of a term, therefore, expresses all the marks or 
 constituent properties of the object for which that term stands. 
 
 If we consider the number of individuals to which the term 
 may be applied, we then regard the exfensio?i of that term ; v. 
 g., i?itelligence, extends to more individuals than the term jnan^ 
 for it belongs, also, to angels. Hence, the extension of a term 
 expresses the greater or less number of individuals to which it 
 applies. 
 
 The comprehe7ision of a term decreases as its extension in- 
 creases ; and, vice versa, the co7nprehe?ision increases as the ex- 
 te?tsio?i decreases; v. g., the term substance expresses but one 
 mark or attribute of beings, for its comprehension; but its ex- 
 tension is very great. Now, if another property or mark be 
 added to it its comprehension is increased, but its exteiision is 
 diminished; v. g., corporeal substance has greater cojnprehensiony 
 but less extension, than substafice without any mark or property 
 added to it. 
 
 Attention is an act of the mind by which it is directed to 
 some object or objects, to which it adheres, for a time. This 
 act is either vohmtary or spontaneous. There is some degree 
 of spontaneous attention in every act of cognition which the 
 understanding elicits. Voluntary attention may last for a greater 
 or a less time, and may consist of one or more acts. 
 
 Absti'actioft is a species of Attention by which the mind 
 separates (withdraws) one thing from others with which it is 
 connected, and contemplates that, to the exclusion of the 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 19 
 
 Others; v. g., to think of the eye without attending to the other 
 parts of man.* 
 
 Reflexion is also an exercise of attention, by which the mind 
 contemplates its own acts, or considers its concepts or ideas of 
 objects. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 THE OBJECTS OF IDEAS OR CONCEPTS; DEFINITION OF OTHER 
 
 TERMS. 
 
 In reference to their objects, ideas are divided into concrete 
 diXi^ abstract^ universal 2,XiA particular, ^tc. Concrete ideas are 
 those whose objects are conceived as actually or physically 
 existing ; as Peter, those books, etc. The abstract idea has for 
 its object a form or quality separated from its subject; as white- 
 ness^ roundness^ wisdom, etc. A universal idea is one whose 
 object is a mark or property which is common to a whole class 
 of objects and can be affirmed of each one; as "man, animal," 
 etc. The objects included under it are called its subjects or 
 inferiors, A particular idea has for its object only a part of 
 the objects to which a universal is applicable, or it is a com- 
 mon or universal limited to a part only of its extension; as ''a 
 soldier, some men, some trees," etc. 
 
 A term is singular when it applies to but one concrete and 
 actual individual; as "Caesar, this apple," etc. A term is co77i' 
 mon when it may be applied to many; as "father, substance, 
 just," etc. 
 
 * " Abstrahentium non est mendaciiim. ' ' Absti-action is not falsehood. 
 
 ** Id cognoscitur abstractive quod non cognoscitur proven*; intuitive, quando 
 cognoscitur praesens. Sen coguitio abstractiva est coguitio rei in alio tanquam 
 in itiedio prius cognito lit quod seu in quo: e. gr. Videre partem in toto; parie- 
 tern in domo, objectum repr^esentatiim in speciilo, causara in effectu, etc. Cog- 
 nitio intuitiva est coguitio i»»werfia<a seu a tali medio independens." That is 
 known abstractly which is not known as present ; it is known intuitively when 
 known as present ; or, abstract knowledge is the knowledge of one thing in an- 
 other as in a medium previously known; v. g. , to see a part in the whole, a wall 
 in the house, an object imaged in the mirror, cause in the effect, etc. Intuitivi 
 knowledge is immediate knowledge, or it is independent of such medium. 
 
20 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 Transcendental ideas are those whose objects transcend all 
 classification of genus and species, being^the common attributes 
 of all things; as ^^ being, essence, ofie, true, goodT 
 
 The idea, considered as expressing its object, is either ade- 
 quate or i7iadequate ; the adequate includes not only all that 
 is of the essence, but all accidents and relations of its object; 
 it is inadequate when it does not include all, absolutely, that 
 is true of its object. 
 
 A real term, or as it is also called, a term of \\\^ first inten- 
 tion, stands for a concept which is formed in the mind when it 
 first comes to know what an object is, by its real predicates ; 
 V. g., ^' man is mortal;" '' Socrates is wise." The terms 
 *^man" and ^' Socrates" are here terms oi i\\Q first intention. 
 A logical term, or a term of the second intention, stands for 
 another concept, which the reason forms by a second and 
 reflex view of the first concept and its object, founding on 
 them a second concept, which expresses something that is not 
 really in the object; v. g., ''man is a species; Socrates is 
 the minor term." In these examples "man " and '' Socrates" 
 have an artificial and second meaning devised by reason, 
 according to which they express only a logical sense, and 
 receive a new order of predicates. Similarly when it is said 
 in grammar, '' man is a noun ;" '' Socrates is the nominative 
 case ;" the terms " man " and '* Socrates " are again subject 
 to the second intention ; they do not here express what is real 
 in '* man " and '* Socrates," as subject to the first intention, 
 but something capable of predicates that are altogether differ- 
 ent in species from the real ones. 
 
 A term is absolute when there is not directly implied in the 
 idea of its object any depe?idence on, or relation to, another 
 object; e. g., such substaiitives as gold, apples, etc.; also, adjec- 
 tives used absolutely; as the good, the true, etc. 
 
 The connotative term stands for an object, in the very idea 
 of which is directly implied an adjacent object on which it 
 depends or to which it is related; as white, heavy, living, rapid ^ 
 and all adjectives and adjunctives, as also such substantives as 
 professor, musiciaii, artist, etc. 
 
 Signs are either natural, as sighs, grdans, laughter ; or sup' 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 21 
 
 positive^ as articulate sounds forming words or terms, which 
 are conventional signs for things. Siippositio7i here mean& 
 merely the conventional use of a ter?n or sign for a thing. Aris- 
 totle observes (Elench. lib. i., c: i.), that since we cannot have 
 all objects physically in our presence when arguing, we employ 
 in their stead ?iames as signs for them. In the well known 
 saying, " words are the counters of wise men; they are the fno?tey 
 of fools," it is meant that words suppose or stand for different 
 objects with two classes of men. 
 
 Terms are u?iivocal or equivocal; a term is univocal which, 
 being applied to different objects, has the same signification or 
 expresses the same quality or essence; thus, atiimal is univocal 
 when applied to man and brute^ because, in each case, its 
 meaning is the same. 
 
 A term is equivocal when, being applied to different objects, 
 it does not express the same quality or essence in each ; thus 
 '■^ light is the opposite of darkness; feathers are light'' Equiv- 
 ocal terms often subserve the designs of sophistry; they are 
 also frequently employed for comparison and metaphor, giving 
 to style one of its chief ornaments. 
 
 A term is used in a ^naterial sense, or the supposition is 
 material, when the word is used merely as a word; as ^^ Cicero 
 is a word of three syllables." It has a formal supposition, or 
 is used in its formal sense, when it is employed to express the 
 object for which it staiids, as ^^ Cicero was an orator." 
 
 Analogy is a certain agreement or remote relation that one 
 object bears to another. Analogy is either that of attribution^ 
 or that oi proportion. 
 
 In the afialogy of attribution a predicate that belongs pri- 
 marily 3ind properly to one object is attributed to another, owing 
 to some relation between them or aptitude of one for the other; 
 thus healthy '\s primarily ^nd properly a predicate of the animal 
 body ; but we say healthy food, healthy complexion, healthy cli- 
 mate, from the relation which these things have to health in 
 its primary meaning. 
 
 Analogy of proportion is founded on a resemblance of pro- 
 portion which is in the substance or in a quality of objects that 
 
22 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 are of a different specjes. It imports a certain agreement iii 
 the effects produced by causes which are otherwise quite dis- 
 similar, or it is a certain agreement in the manner in which 
 objects are related to or referred to other objects. Owing to 
 this agreement, the term that expresses the relation in one set 
 of objects is applied to the other related objects; v. g., "bread 
 is the staff of life ;" " the Scipios were thunderbolts of war." 
 The terms "staff" and "thunderbolts" here have an analogical 
 sense; they are not used either in a tmivocal or an equivocal 
 sense, but in a sense that is between them as extremes. This 
 analogy of proportion is the basis of tropes and metaphors ; 
 " Cicero was a pillar of the state ; " " voice of the waters ; " 
 " music of the spheres," etc. 
 
 Analogy must not be confounded with parity or equality of 
 ratios in proportion; v, g., " a mile is the third part of a league," 
 " four months are the third part of a year;" in real parity of the 
 kind the terms expressing it are used univocally ; ^^ third part ^* 
 is univocal in the examples given. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 GENUS, SPECIES, DIFFERENCE, ATTRIBUTE, ACCIDENT. 
 
 Species includes all that is necessary to constitute the essence* of 
 many individuals ; but the essence includes the intrinsic requisites 
 for a thing to exist ; those without which it cannot be conceived 
 
 ♦"Est essentia in ordine art esse; 7iatura, }^vo\\t principium operaiionis." 
 What we term essence in respect to nxUtence is called nature, when it is regarded 
 as operative. 
 
 " Species immediate subjicitiir generi, individuum, mediante specie; genus de 
 specie immediate praedicatur, et ea mediante de individuo. ' ' Species is imme- 
 diately subject to genus; the individual is subject to genus through the medium 
 of species; genus is predicated immediately of species, and mediately through 
 species of the individual. 
 
 ' ' Est differentia per quam species excedit suum genus. Plus continetur aciu 
 in specie quam in genere; plus autem continetur potentia in gouere quam in 
 specie, quia genus potentia omnem continet iuferiorcm diflerentiam. " Differ' 
 ence is that by which the species exceeds its genus; more is actually contained 
 in species than in genus; but more is potentially in genus than in species, foj 
 genus potentially contains every inferior difference in its extension. 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 23 
 
 by the mind. Now, that cannot be conceived by the mi?id which 
 is absolutely false, absurd, or impossible, and the mind can 
 really and properly conceive nothing but truth, or that which 
 is, and it can form some concept of any real object that is 
 presented to it. Therefore, that which cannot be conceived 
 by the mind is, more strictly, nothing. Hence, essence is all 
 that^ without which a thing cannot exist, cannot be the object 
 of a concept* or is nothing. The species is the answer to the 
 question, " what is it ? " " what is man ? " " Man is a rational 
 animal ; " this is an answer which assigns the species of man by 
 its essential constituents. 
 
 Genus expresses an attribute or essential property which is 
 common to many species ; v. g., material^ animal, which are 
 common to many species of bodies and living things. Genus 
 does not express determinately the whole essence of its inferiors ; 
 while species does express the whole essence of its individuals. 
 
 Difference is an attribute or essential property which, when 
 added to the genus, along with it constitutes a species ; v. g., 
 ratiofial, being added to animal, constitutes the species man. 
 It is here properly called difference, because aiiimal in general, 
 and maji in particular, differ by the essential constituent, 
 rational. 
 
 The extension of an idea increases as we ascend from indi- 
 viduals to their species, or from species to its genus ; while the 
 comprehension decreases; but the cofnpre /tension increases as we 
 pass from genus to species, or species to individuals; while the 
 extension decreases. A genus has more extension than any of 
 its species, but the species have more comprehension; that is, 
 more essential properties. 
 
 In respect to genera, the species may be treated as individ- 
 uals; and similarly genera for still higher genera. 
 
 Aristotle's ten categories, or ten highest genera, that include 
 all real things, are "substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, 
 passion (action received), place, time, posture, habihment (cov- 
 
 *Do not confound concept in the understanding with image in the imagination j 
 there are many concepts in the intellect of whose objects no real images can be 
 formed by the fancy. 
 
24 
 
 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 ering or clothing, ornament, armor, etc.)" The categories are 
 the classification into genera and species of all things, accord- 
 ing to their mode of existence; "sunt modi existendi."* 
 
 The five universals or predicables, genus, "difference, species, 
 property or attribute, and accident, are capable of being 
 aflBrmed, or predicated, of individual inferiors, in all those 
 supreme genera. 
 
 The following table, figured as the Porphyrian Tree, exhibits 
 to the eye, genus, species and individuals, as they are respect- 
 ively related to each other. 
 
 THE PORPHYRIAN TREE. 
 
 * " Categoriae seu prjedicamenta sunt ordo seu series generum, specierum et 
 maividuorum." "Res pra3dicamentales seu pra;dicamenta considerantur a 
 Logico, in-oiit secundis intentionibus subiiicent; spectantur aMetaphysico, quatenus 
 reales. ' ' Tlie categories or predicaments are the order or series of the genera, 
 species and individuals. The things in those categories are considered by the 
 Logician as subject to the second intention: by th^ Metaphysician they are re- 
 garded as rer,Z , (Vid. p. 20.) 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 25 
 
 In like manner, each of the ten genera may be resolved into 
 its subjects by adding the respective specific differe7ices ; v. g., 
 
 QUANTITY. 
 
 DISCRETE CONTINUOUS. 
 
 CONTINUOUS. 
 
 SURFACE ■«. LINE. 
 
 SURFACE. 
 
 CURVED PLANE. 
 
 ETC. 
 
 Attributes or properties, and accidents, are found in all the 
 species which are formed out of the genera ; and hence, since 
 the five universals are predicables of all the categories, they are 
 properly denominated universals ; and, as^there is no other 
 predicable that applies univocally to all the categories, they 
 are the only U7iiversals. 
 
 Siipre?ne, ov ultiniate genera^ are those which are the highest, 
 and, therefore, cannot be made the species of other genera ; 
 V. g., sul?sta?ice, which has no superior genus. Being [ens) is a 
 transcendental; it is not a genus, but it is common to every 
 genus, species, and difference; it is, therefore, a common 
 predicate of all things, and for that reason can have no sub- 
 species, for it is not univocally predicated of its inferiors, as is 
 required for gefius or species. 
 
 As above indicated, the ultimate genera are usually called the 
 categories^ or predica7nents. 
 
 The proximate^ or lowest genus .^ is that which contains species 
 whose subjects or inferiors are individuals ; v. g., animal in 
 respect to man, for fnan is one species, whose subjects or in- 
 feriors are individtml men. 
 
 Attribute* is a property that necessarily results from the 
 essence of the object to which it belongs; as "the power of 
 rational speech, laughter;" or, what is still more intrinsic, "intel- 
 ligence, liberty," etc. 
 
 *'*Proprinm est quod prasdicatur de pluvibus in quale quid seu in quale 
 necessario. ' ' Property is tliat whith is predicated of many in what is essential. 
 
 " Proprium seu attributiun est quod convenit speciei omui, soli et semper." 
 Property or attribute is what pertains always and exclusively to the inferiors ol 
 the whole species. 
 
26 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 Esse7itial attributei,^ or such as necessarily and always follow 
 the essence of every individual belonging to the species of 
 objects, are absolutely inseparable from the objects to whose 
 essence they belong. All other properties or quahties, though 
 they may be necessary in different degrees for the integrity or 
 perfection of the objects in which they inhere or to which they 
 pertain, are absolutely separable from them, as will be explained 
 in another part of this work. 
 
 Accident* is anything whose presence in the object, or absence 
 from, it, does not destroy, or even change the essence of the 
 object ; as learning in man, roundness in marble : the essence 
 of man is not intrinsically changed by the possession or the 
 want of learm?ig, nor that of marble by any particular shape 
 of it. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 DIVISION. 
 
 Division t and Definition are employed to facilitate clear- 
 ness of matter and distinctness of thought, by preventing all 
 confusion arising from multiplicity in the objects of thought 
 and ambiguity in the use of terms. 
 
 Division is the separation of a whole into its component parts ; 
 a whole is that which is one, and yet is capable of this resolu- 
 tion into parts. A ivhole is either actual or logical; in the first, 
 the parts are physical or real; as " man's soul and body; " in the 
 second, they are metaphysical ; v. g., the species and differe7ice 
 of objects are only metaphysically distinct. 
 
 Again, parts are essential; as body and soul in man; or 
 integral; as hands and feet in man. All ujiiversals, in respect 
 
 *' ^Acc^dem estquod prjedicatur de pluribus in quale contingenter. Quod adest 
 et abest sine interitu subject!. ' ' Accident is that which is jjredicated of many in 
 what is contingent ; it is what may be present or absent without destroying its 
 subject. 
 
 t " Bene docet qui bene distinguit." He teaches well, who distinguishes 
 Well, 
 
 . * ' Per id res constituitur per quod et distinguitur. ' ' That which constitutwi 
 a thing, is that by which it is also distinguished. 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 27 
 
 to their extension, may be regarded as logical wholes; as v, g. 
 gefit/s in respect to the species, which it includes ; and species 
 in respect to its individuals. Hence, division is also either 
 physical or jnetaphysical. 
 
 Logical divisions are, first, of genus into its species; as 
 animal into rational and irrational; second, species into its 
 individuals; as Peter, John, Greeks, Romans, etc.; third, of 
 substance into essential constituents, attributes, accidents; or 
 into essential properties, and qualities which are not essential. 
 
 An attribute, as already observed, is a property or power 
 that flows immediately from the essence of a thing ; as, intelli- 
 gence in man, freedom, risibility ; an accident is that which 
 may or may not exist in the subject, and whose presence or 
 absence does not change the essence of its subject, as this 
 color, size, etc. 
 
 RULES OF DIVISION. 
 
 First — The division must be adequate, that is, the sum of the 
 members or parts must be equal to the whole. This rule may 
 be violated by excess, or by defect; by excess, as, v. g., when the 
 ancient philosophers divided souls into *' rational, irrational and 
 vegetable ; " by defect, v, g., if we divide the motives of human 
 action into " love of glory and love of money." 
 
 Second — No member of a division must equal the whole; 
 still less must it exceed the whole ; for example, to divide ani- 
 mals into '■'■ those endowed with reason, and those endowed 
 with senses," is a violation of this rule ; and still more faulty 
 would be a division of trees into " fruit-bearing, and those that 
 are not fruit-bearing, and trees that vegetate." 
 
 Third — One member of the division must not include an- 
 other ; as, to divide animals into " rational, irrational and mor- 
 tal," which is also a violation of the preceding rule. 
 
 Fourth — Division should be made, first, into the proximate 
 or immediate members ; then, if necessary, into others by sub- 
 division; as in the " porphyrian tree," viz., substance into cor- 
 poreal and incorporeal ; then corporeal into organic and inor- 
 ganic ; organic into vegetable and animal, etc. Any other 
 method would produce confusion rather than clearness. 
 
28. LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 DEFINITION. 
 
 Division gives the extension of an idea ; definition its com- 
 prehension. Definition, then, is a true and complete notion of 
 a thing expressed in words. But definition is. twofold — first, 
 nomifial, that is, of a word ; second, real, that is, of a thing. 
 Definition of a word is either by its synonym, or by its deri- 
 vatives or components, or by a periphrasis of its import. Gen- 
 eral usage determines the signification of words ; but when 
 they are equivocal a distinct meaning may be attributed to 
 them arbitrarily. 
 
 A definition is real, first, when it is essential, that is, when it 
 expresses the essence or nature of tlie thing defined ; this is 
 done by enumerating the attributes or essential properties of 
 the thing. The essential parts of a thing are €\\S\&[ physical or 
 metaphysical; v. g., man may be defined by his physical essence 
 " a beifig composed of a rational soul a?id an orga7iized body; " 
 and, again, he may be defined by his essence, metaphysically 
 considered, to be a rational animal. A logical definition is 
 one in which the proximate or nearest genus and the specific 
 difference are given ; v. g., « brute is an irratiojial animal. 
 Here brute is the thing defined ; animal is the proximate or 
 immediate genus ; and irrational is the specific difference. 
 
 A descriptive definition is one in which no genus or species is 
 assigned, but only some accidental circumstances with a gene- 
 ral term as a quasi genus ; this is resorted to when the object 
 defined transcends all the genera or categories; v. g., being, 
 goodness, unity; etc. 
 
 A genetic definition is one in which an effect is explained by 
 its cause ; v. g., " a hmar eclipse is an occupation of the moon, 
 which is caused by the earth directly intervening between the 
 moon and the sun ; " '- brass is a metal produced by the fusion 
 of copper and zinc together." 
 
 RULES OF A GOOD DEFINITION.* 
 
 First — It must not be more nor less extensive than the thing 
 
 • ' ' Una unias definitio est. ' ' — Of one thing ^.iiere is but one dejlnition. 
 
logic: first paet. 29 
 
 defined; v. g., if man be defined, "an intelligent being;" the 
 definition is too general, for it includes angel; if he be defined, 
 *' a rational being who knows how to read," the definition is 
 faulty, for it is applicable to some men onl)\ 
 
 Second: The definition must be clearer than the thing 
 defined ; hence, the definition must contain no vague, obscure 
 or equivocal words; v. g., "logwood is a species of wood; 
 life is vitality," are offenses against this rule. 
 
 Third: A definition must not be negative ; for in such a 
 case the definition would not declare what the thing defined 
 is, but only what it is not; v. g., "a bird is a creature that is 
 not rational." But if two contraries, between which there is 
 no medium, are to be defined, when one is positively defined 
 the other may be given as its negative or opposite; v. g., "a 
 compound is that which consists of parts; a simple substance 
 is that which does not consist of parts." 
 
 • Fourth: A substance must be defined in itself; accidents 
 may be defined by the substance in which they adhere ; v. g., 
 " man is a rational animal ; motion is change of place by a 
 body." 
 
 Fifth : Habits and powers must be defined by their acts, or 
 by the objects of those acts ; v. g., " Meekness is the virtue by 
 which we restrain the motions of anger; the will is the power 
 of choosing between things that are judged to be good; sight, 
 the power of distinguishing objects by figure and color." 
 
 Sixth : A species must be defined by its proximate genus 
 and the specific difference. Observe, that no i?idividuating 
 principle, nor accident, falls within the definition of a species ; 
 V. g., " man is a rational being, having a determinate stature 
 and complexion," is a faulty definition.* 
 
 • "Materia individual is cum accidentibus earn individuantibus non cadit in 
 defiuitione speciei; unde, in definitione hominis, non cadunt hse cai-nes et haec 
 ossa." (1 p., qu. 3, a 3 inC.) Individual matter, with the accidents that indi- 
 viduate it, does not fall within the definition of a species; hence, this iiesb, 
 these bones, and the like, do not fall within the definition of man. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 ARTICLE I . 
 
 JUDGMENT. 
 
 Judgment is an act of the mind, by which it affirms the 
 agreement or disagreement of two concepts or ideas. .When 
 they are affirmed to agree, the judgment is affif77iative; when they 
 are affirmed to disagree, the judgment is fiegative; v. g., " The 
 soul is a spirit ; God is not a creature." 
 
 These two judgments by which the mind affirms the identity 
 or diversity of two ideas by conjoining or separating them are 
 termed respectively compositio?i and division iri respect to the 
 ideas, which are the matter or elements ; and they are also 
 affirmation or ?iegation, in respect to the identity or diversity of 
 the things compared. 
 
 When the identity or diversity of the ideas is self-evident, or 
 one is seen to be necessarily included in the other, it is 2.judg- 
 7fie?i/ a priori; v. g., " the sum of the parts is equal to the 
 whole ; a part is not equal to the whole." Such judgments 
 are also often termed necessary^ 7neiaphysical, pure or analytical 
 judgments. But when the identity or diversity in the objects 
 of those ideas is learned solely by experience, then it is a 
 judgment a posteriori; v. g., "fire gives pain when it burns." 
 These judgments are also termed contingent, physical, empyrical 
 or synthetical. 
 
 Judgments, both a priori and a posteriori, are sometimes 
 7nediate, sometimes i77i7nediate, according as they are formed 
 with or without the medium of reasoning. ^/rz>n judgments 
 suppose a necessary identity or diversity in the objects com- 
 pared; a posteriori judgments suppose a mere contingent rela- 
 tion or connexion, learned only by expenence. 
 30 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 31 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 A proposition is a judgment expressed in words; v. g., "man 
 is mortal; prudence is a virtue." A proposition consists of 
 three parts : the subject^ copula^ and predicate or attribute. The 
 subject is that of which something is affirmed ; the predicate is 
 that which is affirmed ; and the copula is the term that con- 
 nects or couples the subject and predicate. For example, in the 
 proposition, ''diligence is praiseworthy^'' the subject is '' diligence '^ 
 the copula is the verb "/.f," and the predicate is '' praiseworthy T 
 
 Logic recognizes but one verb, and but one mood and tense, 
 viz. : the verb to be in the indicative mood and in the present 
 tense. The reason of this is, the affirmation is always indica- 
 tive and present; v, g., "Caesar conquered; James writes," 
 are equivalent to the affirmation ; that which is expressed by 
 '•' conquered'' is predicated of Caesar, etc. All that is not ex- 
 pressed by this verb belongs to the predicate, for it is attributed 
 to the subject. 
 
 Propositions may be considered in respect to their quality 
 and their quantity or extension. The two concepts com- 
 pared to each other are the matter; the perceivifig of their 
 agreement or disagreement is the form of the proposition; 
 since the copula either affirms or denies agreement, the quality 
 and fon?t of a proposition are indeed the same. 
 
 Propositions as to their /^rw or quality are ^\\ki^x affirmative ox 
 negative. In an affirmative proposition the predicate is declared 
 to agree with the subject. In the negative proposition the pre- 
 dicate is denied or declared not to agree with the subject. 
 
 In an affirmative proposition the predicate is taken accord- 
 ing to the whole of its comprehension ; but not according to 
 the whole of its extension. In the proposition, "-air is a body,'' 
 the predicate " body " is taken according to the whole of its 
 comprehension ; that is, all the attributes or essential properties 
 included in body, as such, are predicated of ctir, or said to be 
 verified in air; but, as there are many objects besides air 
 which are body the predicate, body, is not taken in its whole 
 
82 LOGIC : FIEST PART. 
 
 extension; and it is, therefore, said to be particular in affirma« 
 tive propositions. 
 
 In such propositions as this, " man is a rational animal," the 
 predicate is commensurate in its extension with the subject; 
 not, however, in virtue of the form, but by accidental coin- 
 cidence. Good definitions are thus convertible and true. 
 
 In a negative proposition the predicate is taken according 
 to the whcile of its extension; v. g., "matter is not intelligent;" 
 that is, matter is not one of those objects of which ijitelligence 
 can ever be predicated. 
 
 When any term is thus taken, according to the whole of its 
 extension, or universally, it is said to be distributed. Therefore, 
 in a negative proposition the predicate is always distributed; 
 that is, is taken as universal, or in all its extent. 
 
 In an affirmative proposition, the predicate is particular^ as 
 already observed. The subject of a proposition is distributed 
 if taken as a universal ; as " every man is mortal ; " " no metal 
 has sensation." 
 
 Quantity or extension of propositions : quantity or exten- 
 sion regards the extent of the propositions; that is, as being 
 universal or particular ; when universal, the subject of the 
 proposition is taken according to its entire extension; v. g., 
 "all men are mortal." It is particular when the subject is 
 taken according to a part only of its extension; v. g., "some 
 men are learned." 
 
 Universality, in reference to the matter of the proposition, 
 may be, first, metaphysical^ as when the proposition expresses 
 a judgment a priori; v. g., "a part is less than the whole;" 
 second, it may he physical, as when it is according to the laws 
 of nature, which, however, are contingent; v. g, "the dead 
 do not return to life ; " third, it may be a j?wral universality, 
 that is, when it is taken according to the ordinary action of 
 moral causes; v. g., "a mother loves her child." In respect 
 to the last two, exception is not absolutely impossible. 
 
 A proposition is either categorical or hypothetical. It is caie' 
 gorical when it positively and unconditionally affirms the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of the predicate with the subject. 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PAET. 33 
 
 A hypothetical proposition affirms conditionally ; v. g., "if you 
 are virtuous, you will be rewarded." This species of enunciation 
 implies an argtimeiit; and under that respect it may be regarded 
 as pertaining to the third operation of the intellect; i. e., to 
 reasoning. It consists of two propositions ; the first, or ante- 
 cedent^ which affirms the condition; the second is the co7ise- 
 quent, whose truth depends on the verification of the antecedent. 
 A hypothetical proposition is true, if the connexion between the 
 antecedent and consequent be true. It is- sometimes disjunc- 
 tive in form; "every body is either in motion, or at rest." 
 Such a disjunctive is not true when there is a medium; v. g., 
 "John must either write or come to see me." It is possible 
 that he may do neither. 
 
 A term, or a proposition, is taken reduplicatively, or by 
 reduplication, when any particles or clauses are annexed to it 
 which have the effect 6{ doubling or repeating \\., in order "that 
 the sense in which it is used may be rigorously defined; v. g., 
 "all substance as substance, is good;" "a being, so far forth 
 as it is free, is necessarily intelligent;" "water, as such, is 
 composed of eight parts of oxygen with one part of hydrogen." 
 When a term is used reduplicatively, it is restricted to a precise 
 signification ; the limiting words and phrases are, as such, as^ 
 so far forth, precisely taken, and the like. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 OPPOSITION. 
 
 For opposition* between two. propositions, first, they must 
 have the same subject; secondly, they must have the same 
 predicate; thirdly, one must, in some sense of the terms, affirm 
 what the other denies. Hence, opposition is a mutual repug- 
 nance between two propositions, arising from the affirmation 
 and negation of the same thing in the same respect. 
 
 * ' ' Oppositio est affirmatio et negatio ejusdem de eodem. ' ' Opposition is the 
 affirmation and negation of the same thing in regard to the same object. 
 
 3 
 
34 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 This opposition is twofold, first, of cojitradiction; second, of 
 contrariety; in contradictory propositions, one simply denies 
 the other; v. g., "all souls are substance;" the contradictory, 
 " not all souls are substance." A negative prefixed to any 
 affirmative proposition forms its contradictory, because any 
 particular and negative proposition is the contradictory of the 
 opposite universal proposition. 
 
 Contrary * propositions are both of them extreme ; that is, 
 what one of them affirms as universal, the other denies with 
 equal universality; v. g., "«^ miser is happy;" the contrary, 
 " all misers are happy." 
 
 Hence, a contradictory merely denies its opposite, while the 
 contrary goes further, and affirms its equally general opposite. 
 
 Of two contradictories, one is necessarily true and the other 
 false ; two contraries cannot, at the same time, be true ; but 
 both of them may be false; v. g., "all good men are prosper- 
 ous in this world; no good man is prosperous in this world;" 
 these propositions are both false. 
 
 Subcontrary propositions are hoi\\ particular, and they differ 
 in quality; that is, one is affirmative and the other negative ; 
 as, "some men are honored;" "some men are not honored." 
 Subcontraries may both be true, but they cannot both be false; 
 for, if both were false, they would make two contradictories 
 to be both false, which cannot be; v. g., "some men are 
 learned;" "some men are not learned." It is evident that 
 both of these propositions cannot be false. 
 
 Locke, and they who accept his authority in philosophy, 
 deny that the syllogism is a means of discovering truth ; but a 
 careful analysis of the act of reasoning, will show this denial 
 to be erroneous. Reasoning will be explained with sufficient 
 minuteness in the following chapter. 
 
 * "Contraria juxta se posita magis lucescunt." When contraries are jnit 
 near to each other they become clearer. 
 
 ♦ 'Contraria vcrsantur circa idem. ' ' Contraries legard the same thing. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 ARTI C L E I. 
 
 REASONING. 
 
 The power in the soul by which it perceives^ Judges, reasons.; 
 is termed the understanding, i\\Q judg?ne?it, the reason, accord- 
 ing to the act which it performs ; yet, it is one and the same 
 power that understands, judges and reasons. All the powers 
 of the soul that are concerned in the acts of knowing, when 
 taken collectively, constitute the 7nind; hence, the soul is the 
 spiritual substance with its perfections; the 7nind \s the aggre- 
 gate of its powers or faculties, the understanding, conscious- 
 ness, will and memory ; but 7?iind, more particularly, stands for 
 the power in the soul of knowi?ig. 
 
 Every process of reasoning is reducible to an act of the 
 mind by which it determines the agreement or disagreement, 
 the identity or diversity of two things, by comparing them to 
 a third; v. g., "that which is designed is the work of an intelH- 
 gent cause ; the world shows design ; therefore, the world is 
 the work of an intelligent cause." The two things here com- 
 pared to a third, are the "world" and " the work of an intelli- 
 gent cause ; " and the third thing to which they are compared 
 is that which is " designed^' with which they both agree, and, 
 therefore, they agree with each other. 
 
 All reasoning or argument rests on this self-evident princi 
 pie : " when two things are each equal to a third thing, they 
 are equal to each other ; " " when one of two things is equal, and 
 the other unequal to a third thing, they are unequal to each 
 other." Take care to observe, however, that when the two 
 things are both unequal to a third, it does not follow that they 
 are either equal or unequal to each other. 
 
36 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 The truth of this agreement or disagreement of two things, 
 following from their relation to a third, is termed the conse- 
 quence or sequence; and the proposition which expresses that 
 agreement or disagreement, as following from the comparison, 
 is called the co?icIusion or consequent. 
 
 Hence, an act of reasoning, or an argument expressed in 
 full, consists of three judgments or propositions ; the first two 
 are a comparison ; and the third, or conclusion, affirms the 
 consequent which follows from this comparison ; v. g., 
 
 "All virtue is commendable ; 
 Diligence is a virtue; 
 Therefore, diligence is commendable." 
 
 Here " diligence " and " commendable " are both compared to 
 "virtue," and judged to agree with it; the agreement of "dili- 
 gence " and " commendable " is perceived to follow from their 
 agreement with " virtue " ; and the truth of that agreement 
 thus following, is the sequence or consequence which is declared 
 in the third proposition or conclusion, " diligence is commend- 
 able." Seque?ice, therefore, expresses the dependoice of the 
 conclusion on the premises; and is truly there when the con- 
 clusion or consequent really follows from the premises. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS LAWS. 
 
 An argument expressed in the preceding form is termed a 
 syllogism; hence, a syllogism is defined to be " an argument 
 consisting of three propositions so related to each other that, 
 the first two being granted, the third necessarily follows from 
 them." The first two propositions are sometimes termed the 
 antecedent; also, the premises; and the conclusion is sometimes 
 termed the co?isequent; which, however, must not be con- 
 founded with consequence or sequence. 
 
 The peculiar and specific act of reasoji, by which its nature 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 37 
 
 is defined, is, the kiicnving of one thing fi'om another; i. e., 
 reason is the power of deriving the knowledge of one thing 
 from the knowledge of another by means of the relation be- 
 tween the two. [Vide rule fifth for a good definition.) 
 
 The syllogism is the formula for the act of deriving the 
 knowledge of one thing from that of another by means of 
 their relation to each other. There is no other mode of learn- 
 ing truth proper to reason as such ; tor, it belongs only to in- 
 telligence to perceive truth directly in itself, and not by means 
 of its relation to other truth. To reject the syllogism, there- 
 fore, as a mode of acquiring truth, is to reject reason itself. 
 Nor, in fact, is it possible to state an argument against the 
 syllogism without virtually employing that very form itself; 
 for the argument itself would be an exercise of reason, inas- 
 much as it would be a formal effort to derive the knowledge 
 of one thing from that of another to which it was assumed to 
 be related. 
 
 When the propositions of a syllogism are categorical, the 
 syllogism is categorical; and when they are hypothetical, it also 
 is hypothetical. 
 
 A syllogism consists of three propositions, each containing 
 two terms, and each one of these terms is named twice in the 
 syllogism : these terms are the subjects and predicates of the 
 propositions. 
 
 The subject and predicate of the conclusion are the ex- 
 tremes, the former being the mi?ior extreme or t€r7n, and the 
 latter the major extre?ne or term. 
 
 The 7najor premise is strictly the one which contains the 
 major extreme; and the minor premise the one which contains 
 the minor extreme. But in practice, the premise which comes 
 first is generally termed the 7?iajor, and the other the 7?iinor 
 premise. 
 
 The term twice named in i\\e prej7iises to which the extre>7ies 
 are compared is called the 7niddle ter7n: in the preceding syllo- 
 gism " diligence " is the minor extreme, because it is the sub- 
 ject of the conclusion; "commendable" is the major extreme, 
 because it is the predicate of the conclusion ; and " virtue " is 
 
38 LOGIC: FIRST PART. 
 
 the middle term, because it is the one to which the two others 
 are compared, and it is twice named in the premises. 
 
 The rectitude of the conclusion, as already obser^■ed, de- 
 pends on its seque7ice; that is, on its following from the pre- 
 mises ; its truth depends on the nature of the matter. 
 
 Observe, that in the following syllogism — 
 
 "Every virtue is hateful; 
 Patience is a virtue; 
 Therefore, patience is hateful ; " 
 
 There is rectitude of conclusion, but it has not truths because 
 one premise is false in matter. 
 
 The conclusion may express truth, and yet not follow from 
 the premises; v. g., 
 
 **A11 virtue is good; 
 Health is not a virtue; 
 Therefore, health is good." 
 
 Here there is truth of matter, but not rectitude or sequence of 
 conclusion. 
 
 The requisites ot a correct, simple or categorical syllogism 
 are expressed in the following rules or canons : 
 
 Rule First: The syllogism must contain three, and only 
 three, terms. 
 
 Rule Second: No term can have greater extejision in the 
 conclusion than it had in the premises. 
 
 Rule Third : The conclusion must never contain the middle 
 term. 
 
 Rule Fourth : The middle term must be, at least once, dis- 
 tributed ; that is, it must be, at least once, taken according to 
 the whole of its extensioti. 
 
 Rule Fifth : A negative conclusion cannot follow from two 
 affirmative premises. 
 
 Rule Sixth : No conclusion follows from two negative pre- 
 mises. 
 
 Rule Seventh : The conclusion follows the less worthy pre- 
 mise. 
 
 Rule Eighth.' No conclusion follows from two particular 
 premises. 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PAET. 39 
 
 First Rule : The reason of this rule is obvious, if we 
 reflect that a syllogism is founded on a comparison of two 
 terms with a third ; and, hence, if there were four terms, it 
 would not be a syllogism, but several comparisons from which 
 there could follow no certain conclusion ; since the terms might 
 agree in pairs, or disagree, without any relation to a thb-d term. 
 There may be four terms explicitly or implicitly; v. g., 
 "Diligence is commendable; 
 
 But anger is not a virtue ; 
 
 Therefore, anger is not commendable." 
 
 This syllogism contains four terms explicitly. But when four 
 terms are used, it is generally done by employing the middle 
 term in two senses: 
 
 * Ctesar is a word of two syllables ; 
 But Brutus killed Ccesar; 
 Therefore, Brutus killed a word of two syllables." 
 
 In this syllogism Ccesar is used in two senses — as a word and 
 for di person; hence, when the middle term is ambiguous, it is 
 equivalent to two terms. 
 
 Second Rule : If a term have greater extent in the con- 
 clusion than it had in the premises, there would then be in- 
 ferred from the premises what is not contained in them ; but 
 the conclusion, from its nature, is that which follows from 
 the premises; v. g., 
 
 "Every animal is a substance; 
 No tree is an animal ; 
 Therefore, a tree is not a substance." 
 
 In this syllogism "substance" is a particular term in the pre- 
 mises, while it is universal in the conclusion ; that is, in the 
 premises " substance " is compared to the middle term only as 
 to a part of its extent; while in the conclusion it is denied of 
 " tree," according to its whole extension. 
 
 Hence the conclusion, as such, can have no greater exten- 
 sion than its premises. 
 
 The fact that we frequently derive the knowledge of that 
 which is greater from the knowledge of that which is less, as, 
 for example, when from their relation we infer a cause from an 
 
40 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 effect, which, as such, is inferior to it,* is not adverse to this 
 rule when rightly understood. The conclusion must not have 
 greater extension than the premises ; but it may have more 
 comprehe?ision; nay, its terms, in some sense, itiust have 
 greater comprehension ; for the conclusion is the synthesis of 
 a subject and predicate which is not made in the premises. 
 
 Third Rule : If the middle term be used in the conclu- 
 sion, nothing would be inferred; since the conclusion in that 
 case would be but a repetition, in some shape, of one premise, 
 and, therefore, it would not express a sequence; v. g., 
 
 "All virtue is commendable; 
 Kindness is a virtue ; 
 Therefore, virtue is commendable." 
 
 Fourth Rule : If the middle term be not, at least once, 
 distributed ; that is, be not at least once a universal, it would 
 be equivalent to two terms ; for it might be taken, according 
 to one part of its extent, in one premise, and according to an- 
 other part in the other; whence the major and minor terms 
 would not necessarily be compared to the same thing; v. g., 
 
 ** Every man is an animal; 
 Every bird is an animal; 
 Therefore, every man is a bird." 
 
 In this syllogism "man" is compared to "animal," taken ac- 
 cording to one part of its extension, and " bird," according to 
 another part; whence, as the two extremes are not compared 
 to the same term, no conclusion legitimately follows. 
 
 The subject of every universal proposition is distributed, and 
 it is not distributed in any other than a universal proposition; 
 the predicate of every negative proposition is distributed, and 
 it is not distributed in any but a negative proposition. 
 
 Fifth Rule : A negative conclusion cannot follow from 
 two affirmative premises ; for, when they affirm the agreement 
 of the major and minor terms with the middle, the conclusion 
 must affirm the consequent agreement of the major and minor; 
 V. g., "a substance whose action, or mode of operation, exceeds 
 
 ♦ "Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu." — Div. Th. 1, 2, p. q. 66, a. 1. 
 The cause is always superior, in some respect, to its eflfect. 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 41 
 
 the powers of matter, is above matter ; the actions of the human 
 soul transcend the powers of matter; therefore, the human soul 
 is a substance which is superior to matter," is a correct syllog- 
 ism by this rule. 
 
 Sixth Rule : When the premises deny the agreement of 
 both the major and minor terms with the middle term, then 
 nothing is affirmed as to the identity or diversity of the major 
 and minor; it is only declared that they do not agree with the 
 middle term; hence, when both extremes disagree with the 
 middle term, they may either agree or disagree with each 
 
 other; v. g., 
 
 * ' A reptile is not a bird ; 
 A snake is not a bird ; 
 Therefore, a snake is not a reptile." 
 
 This conclusion, though false in matter, derives neither truth 
 nor falsehood from the premises. 
 
 ** A bird is hot a reptile ; 
 A tree is not a reptile ; 
 Therefore, a tree is not a bird." 
 
 This conclusion is true in matter, but it does not follow from 
 the premises. 
 
 Seventh Rule : The unworthy premise is that which is 
 negative^ in respect to that which is affirmative; and that which 
 is particular^ in respect to that which is universal. The reason 
 of the rule will become obvious if it be observed that when 
 one premise affirms the agreement of its extreme term with 
 the middle term, and the agreement of the other term with the 
 middle is denied in the remaining premise, it follows that the 
 extremes disagree with each other; v. g., 
 
 Or 
 
 If A is equal to B, 
 
 And C is not equal to B ; 
 
 Then C is not equal to A. 
 
 ** None but organized, living, corporeal beings are mortal; 
 Angels are not corporeal beings ; 
 Therefore, angels are not mortal." 
 
 Again, if a term which is particular in the premises, be made 
 universal in the conclusion, in such case, an agreement will be 
 
42 logic: first part. 
 
 affirmed in the conclusion which is not implied in the prem- 
 ises; V. g, "All virtue is commendable; some parsimony 
 is a virtue; therefore, all parsimony is commendable." Here 
 the conclusion affirms that all parsimony agrees with " com- 
 mendable," though in the premises it is only said that some 
 parsimony agrees with " virtue," the middle term. Hence, this 
 is, at the same time, a fault against the second rule. 
 
 Eighth Rule : When both premises are particular, and at 
 the same time affirmative, then the middle term is not distrib- 
 uted, which is wrong by rule the fourth; v. g., " Some Cretans 
 were liars; some Romans were liars; therefore, some Cretans 
 were Romans." This is a vicious syllogism; for the major and 
 minor terms agree with " liars " in different parts of its extension. 
 
 If both premises be particular and negative, nothing follows 
 from them, by rule the sixth ; but if one of the particular prem- 
 ises be affirmative and the other negative, and the middle term 
 be distributed in the negative premise, then, since the conclu- 
 sion must be negative, one extreme will have more extension 
 in the conclusion than it had in the premises, which is contrary to 
 rule second; v. g., "Some men are prudent; some merchants 
 are not prudent; therefore, some merchants are not men." 
 
 Yet, even when the terms are all singular, the conclusion 
 may be valid; v. g., "Romulus was the founder of Rome; the 
 first kmg of Rome was Romulus; therefore, the first king of 
 Rome was the founder of Rome." Here the conclusion is 
 really consequent, for the middle term, "Romulus," may be 
 considered as virtually a common term taken according to its 
 whole extent and including " founder of Rome," and " first 
 king of Rome;" this is termed by the old philosophers, an 
 expository syllogism. It is an apparent exception to the eighth 
 rule. When the three terms are really singular^ they may be iden- 
 tical as to their object; and then it is not a real argument, but a 
 sort of definition, by synonyms ; v. g.. " Man is a rational animal ; 
 man consists of soul and body; therefore, a rational animal 
 consists of soul and body." This also is an expository syllogism. 
 
LOGIC : FIKST PART. 43 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL OR CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS ; THE DIS- 
 JUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 A hypothetical syllogism is one in which a categorical con- 
 clusion is deduced from a hypothetical premise. In a hypo- 
 thetical proposition, the conclusion or consequent is verified 
 when the condition is verified ; hence, when the major propo- 
 sition is conditional, i. e., has a condition which is expressed 
 by " if," or its equivalent, in the minor the truth of the condi- 
 tion is affirmed as a categorical proposition, from which the 
 truth of the conclusion follows; or the truth of the consequent 
 is denied; whence the falsity of the condition will result; v. g., 
 
 ** If Brutus killed Ceesar, then Caesar is dead; 
 But Brutus did kill Csesar ; 
 Therefore, Caesar is dead." 
 
 In such syllogisms, then, the minor premise may either affirm 
 the truth of the condition, or deny the truth of the conclusion; 
 in the first case, the consequent will be the conclusion of the 
 syllogism; v. g., '• Caesar is dead;" in the second, the denial 
 of the condition will be the conclusion of the syllogism; v. g., 
 " Brutus did not kill Caesar ; " and in both cases, the argument 
 will be in form ^ that is, consequent. 
 
 But, as regards the ^natter, it does not follow that if the con- 
 dition be false, the consequent is therefore false; for it may be 
 true for some other reason; v. g., even if Brutus did not kill 
 Caesar, still Caesar may be dead from some other cause. 
 
 Again, it does not follow that if the consequent be true the 
 condition is therefore true, for the consequent might be verified 
 by a different condition ; v. g., though it may be granted that 
 Caesar is dead, it does not therefore follow that he was killed. 
 
 In such hypothetical enunciations as the following, "if man is 
 a mineral, he does not feel; " the consequent has not real, but 
 only siippositive truth, for the antecedent is merely an arbitrary 
 supposition. 
 
 Hence, when, in a conditional proposition, the truth of the 
 
44 ' LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 affirmative consequent is really dependent on that of the affirni« 
 ative antecedent; or, also, when the afitecedent is so included 
 in the consequent^ that the denial of the consequent necessarily 
 implies the denial of the afitecedent^ we have for the conditional 
 argument the following 
 
 Rule : First, In the affirmative conditional, the minor pre- 
 mise must affirm the antecedent^ and the conclusion must affirm 
 the consequent ; v. g., " if the soul reasons, it is a simple sub- 
 stance; but the soul does reason; therefore the soul is a simple 
 substance." Seqond, In the negative co?iditional, the minor 
 premise must deny the consequent^ and the conclusion must 
 deny the antecedent^ observing that two negatives in English 
 are equivalent to an affirmative; v. g., "if the soul perishes 
 when the body dies, then the soul is not a spiritual substance; 
 but the soul is {is not not) a spiritual substance ; therefore, the 
 soul does not perish when the body dies." 
 
 As regards Xh^form of the hypothetical or conditional argu- 
 ment the preceding rule is absolute, or it admits no exception. 
 But it may happen by accident, or in virtue of the matter, that 
 the conclusion is true, even when these rules are inverted ; as, 
 for example, when the antecede?it is the sufficient reason of the 
 C07isequent; if the antecedent is defiied, the consequent may also 
 be denied; v. g., " if the sun is at the meridian, it is noon; but 
 the sun is ?tot at the meridian; therefore, it is not noon'' This 
 conclusion is true, not in virtue of the form, but on account 
 of the matter; in other words, it is not logically consequetit, 
 though it is materially true. 
 
 Also, when the co?idition and consequetit are in matter iden- 
 tical and co-extensive, by accident, and not in virtue of the 
 form, the falsity of the condition infers the falsity of the conclu- 
 sion ; v. g., " if Apollo was not a man, then he was not a 
 rational animal; but he was a man; therefore, he was a rational 
 animal" : " if man is immortal, he will not die; but he is not 
 immortal ; therefore, he will die." As the condition and con- 
 ditionate are identical, the falsity of one always infers, neces 
 sarily, the falsity of the other, on account cf that identity. This 
 .species of argument, for its brevity, is used in practice ; and 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 45 
 
 when the matter is true, the proof of the condition is the proof, 
 also, of the conditionaie; or vice versa. The same thing which 
 is misunderstood or denied under one forrfl of expression, may 
 be seen and admitted under another; hence, this mode of proof 
 is legitimate, and may be useful in some cases. 
 
 A syllogism is disjunctive when it proceeds from a disjunc- 
 tive proposition. The disjunction of the antecedent and con- 
 sequent is perfect when they divide the whole matter so as to 
 admit no medium; v. g., "man is either mortal, or not mortal;" 
 in man there can be no medium between mortality and immor- 
 tality. The truth or rectitude of the disjunction is determined 
 by the matter. In the completely disjunctive syllogism, the 
 admission of one member of the disjunction requires the denial 
 of the other; v. g., "either man is mortal, or he is immortal; 
 but he is mortal ; therefore, he is not immortal ; " " the honor 
 of first discovering America belongs either to Americus or to 
 Columbus ; it belongs to Columbus ; therefore, it does not 
 belong to Americus." When one member of a disjunctive 
 premise is merely the contradictory of the other, if the affirm- 
 ative one be granted, the negative one has a double negation, 
 which is really an afhrmative; v. g., " either it rains, or it does 
 not rain ; it does rain ; therefore, it does not not rain ; " i. e., it 
 does rain. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 OTHER FORMS OF ARGUMENT WHICH MAY BE REDUCED TO THE 
 SYLLOGISTIC FORM. 
 
 The enthymeme is a syllogism, one of whose premises is not 
 expressed; v. g., "the poor are men; therefore, they are not 
 to be contemned." The sorites is a series of propositions in 
 which the predicate of the first is the subject of the second, the 
 predicate of the second is the subject of the third, and so on 
 till the last or conclusion, in which the predicate of the last 
 proposition is conjoined to the subject of the first proposition ; 
 
46 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 V. g.j " he who does not restrain his passions, has many violent 
 desires; he that has many violent desires, is unquiet; he that 
 is unquiet, is miserable ; therefore, he that does not restrain his 
 passions is miserable." Both these forms of argument consist 
 of abridged syllogisms. 
 
 The epycherema is a syllogism in which one or both of the 
 premises are proved, each by its reason ; or it has its reason 
 annexed to it in the syllogism; v. g., "every spiritual substance 
 is incorruptible, since it neither has parts nor depends on matter; 
 but the human soul is a spiritual substance, since it is intel- 
 ligent; therefore, the human soul is incorruptible." 
 
 The dilemma is a compound argument which consists of two 
 members proposed disjunctively, and so related that the legiti- 
 mate conclusion from either member, or horn, is a refutation 
 of the adversary; v. g., " the skeptic's denial of all certainty is 
 either true or false ; if true, then that is certain ; if false, still 
 more is there certainty ; therefore, in either supposition, scep- 
 ticism is false." 
 
 This argument is called a dilemma, because it consists of but 
 two meinbers. The trile7?wia and quadrile7nma are too compli- 
 cated to be ordinarily useful in reasoning. 
 
 A dilemma is faulty; ist. If the division of the matter made 
 by the disjunctive be not co?nplete; in other words, if there be 
 a medium of escape from it. The dilemma put into the mouth 
 of Socrates when dying, has this fault: " Death is either a sweet 
 sleep, or it is a transition to the happy companionship of 
 Orpheus and Ulysses; in either case, therefore, it is good to 
 die." Between " sleep " and the " society of Ulysses," there is 
 a wide medium. But when the early Christians said to the 
 Roman tyrant, " either we are innocent, or we are guilty; if 
 innocent, why condemn us ? if guilty, why refuse us a lawful 
 trial ? " between men's infwcence and guilt, and also between 
 the corresponding provisions of the law, there is no medium. 
 2d, The conclusion derived from one, or each member of the 
 dilemma, may not be les^iiimaie; in this case, it not only proves 
 nothing, but it may be retorted ; v. g., it was said to a judge, 
 who was about to enter into office, " you will administer the 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 47 
 
 laws either well or ill; rf well, you will displease the people; if 
 ill, you will displease the gods;" he retorted, "I will adminis- 
 ter the laws justly or unjustly; if justly, I shall not displease 
 the gods; if unjustly, I shall not displease the people." 
 
 Another example of the dilemma which may be retorted : 
 Protagoras bargained to educate Euathlus for the law, half of 
 the money to be paid when his studies were finished, the rest 
 when Euathlus gained his first suit; after some time Protago- 
 ras sued Euathlus, and this was the first case for Euathlus. 
 Protagoras thus argued : " Either Euathlus will lose or gain 
 this case; if he lose it, then the money is to be paid me by 
 the decision of the court; if he gain it, then he must pay me 
 by our cojitract." Euathlus retorted : " If the decision is in 
 my favor, then I will pay nothing by the sentence of the court; 
 if agamst me, I will pay nothing according to the contract, 
 since I will not have gained my first case. ^' The fallacy really 
 arises from Protagoras having, by the contract, no right to bring 
 the suit, as he was to wait till Euathlus gaified his first case; 
 hence, the disjunction did not include the who/e matter. 
 Euathlus' dilemma was at fault, because he assumed that the 
 judge's decision would annul the contract, or exempt him 
 from paying, if he gained the suit; and Protagoras was wrong 
 for assuming the cancelling of the contract, in case the decision 
 of the judge was adverse to his disciple. 
 
 A sophist argued : "You say that you tie; and if you speak 
 the truth, then you do tie; if you ssij falsely that you lie, then 
 also you lie; therefore, whether you speak truly or falsely, you 
 lie." He does "lie" in either case, but not about the same 
 thing, and under the same respect. 
 
 " The logical axiom that ' the premises contain the conclu- 
 sion,' is either true, or it is not; if true, then the spiritual czxi- 
 not be deduced from the fnaterial,'^ etc. It may be answered 
 that the "premises contain the conclusion" in respect to ex- 
 tension, as a universal contains its inferiors, or also as one term 
 of a relation includes the other ; but they do not necessarily 
 contain the conclusion in any sense really different from this. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 SCIENTIFIC METHOD : ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS, IN THHIF 
 RELATION BOTH TO PARTICULAR SCIENTIFIC COGNITIONS, 
 AND TO SYSTEMS OF SUCH COGNITIONS. 
 
 There are two methods which the mind follows in acquiring 
 or imparting knowledge by reasoning; namely, A?ialysis and 
 Synthesis. In analysis the mind proceeds from the compound 
 to its simple components, from the particular object to the 
 general truth ; but in synthesis this order is inverted, and the 
 mind proceeds from the simple to the compound, from the 
 general to the particular. 
 
 The particular, as this man, this rose, is compound, or has 
 many component marks or properties, while the universal has 
 but one mark; hence, the process of going from a particular 
 object or truth to the general or universal, is atialysis. When 
 we say that the particular is compound, we regard the co7npre' 
 hension of the term. The more general the term is, the greater 
 its extension, but the less its comprehension; v. g., the term man 
 includes many marks, as, " substance," " animal," " rational " ; 
 the term being includes but one mark, but, as to its extension, 
 it is applicable to all things. 
 
 When by argument we proceed from a subject to a predicate, 
 the method of reasoning is a7ialytical ; when the reasoning is 
 from the predicate to the subject, the method is synthetical. A 
 simple syllogism is synthetical ; a sorites may combine in it 
 both synthesis and analysis. But analysis and synthesis may 
 also regard the general method by which a series of cognitions, 
 a particular system of knowledge or a particular science is ac- 
 quired or taught ; however, they are alvvays distinguished from 
 
 48 
 
LOGIC : FIKST PAET. 49 
 
 each other in the same manner. By a?ialysis we resolve what 
 is complex into its simple constituents; hy synthesis viQ form 
 one whole out of many constituents. By analysis we find the 
 extension of terms, ideas or propositions ; by synthesis we find 
 their coniprehev.sion* 
 
 In all lengthy trains of reasoning both synthesis and analysis 
 may occur, whether the general method be conducted according 
 to the one or the other. Induction, as a method of acquiring 
 science, is analysis; regarded as a syllogism, it is sy?ithesis; for, 
 as a general method of scientific reasoning, it deduces univer- 
 sal principles from particular facts, and this is analysis. Wlien 
 its conclusions are Jinally established, it is by one argument 
 concerning iho. 7iihole class in which a law or property is pre- 
 dicated oi them ; this is synthesis, and' yet it pertains to the in- 
 duction. When a property is deduced from a substance ; 
 when algebraic formulce are resolved by transformation into 
 more general formulae ; the process in each case is analysis ; 
 for, in these instances, the universal is deduced from the par- 
 ticular. When we predicate the effect of the cause, or pass 
 from the general truth to the particular object, the process is 
 synthesis. Analysis is called, also, the method of ifivention; 
 synthesis the method of discipline, or instruction. 
 
 Observe, however, that in educatio?i, considered as to its 
 general scope and progress, knowledge advances by analysis; 
 for the progress of the mind in education thus generally un- 
 derstood, is from the particular to the universal ; from what is 
 less universal to what is more universal ; but yet the particular 
 steps or acts of cognition by which the mind proceeds, are, as 
 already remarked, both those of synthesis and those of analysis. 
 This will be easily understood if it be kept in mind that t«> 
 deduce a general property from its subject is analysis; to p7-edi, 
 eate is synthesis. The mind, by the law of its nature, begins 
 with the knowledge of physical and sensible objects, reasons 
 to the-.r general properties ; it passes from quantity to its gene- 
 ral properties, and finally attains to strictly metaphysical truth : 
 
 * " Multa ex uno analysis, unura ex multis eflicit synthesis." Anaiysis 
 m ikes many out of one; synthesis makes one out of many. 
 4 
 
50 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 /'. e , to the most absolute and universal truth. This progress 
 of the intellect, considered as to its general method and final 
 result, is analytical. But the particular arguments or acts of 
 reasoning in this advance of the intellect towards what is most 
 universal, are sometimes synthetical, sometimes analytical, in 
 their method; v. g., when the universal axioms of geometry 
 are proved to be verified in particular figures, or parts of quan- 
 tity, this is synthesis; but when, by comparing the parts or 
 divisions of particular figures, general conclusions are deduced 
 from them, this is analysis. 
 
 If we conceive gemis as composed of species, and species as 
 co7nposed of individuals, then to resolve genus into its species 
 thus assumed to be its components, and resolve species into 
 individuals, is analysis. But this, however, would not be a 
 strictly correct mode of conceiving the nniversals, genus and 
 species. Since analysis is the resolution of that which is cofn- 
 poimded into its constituents, it properly regards the comprehen- 
 sion of its object, not the extensio?7. Yet, it may sometimes be 
 convenient to conceive extension as consisting of component 
 parts of quantity; in which case it is to be regarded as capa- 
 ble of analysis, in a wider sense of the term. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 DEMONSTRATION. 
 
 Demonstration is a legitimate argument in which an evident 
 conclusion necessarily follows from evident premises. Its pre- 
 mises are either immediately evident in themselves; or they are 
 mediately evident as necessary conclusions from other premises, 
 which are evident. Such demonstration is simple when it con- 
 tains but one argument, or syllogism ; it is complex when it 
 contains two or more arguments. The premises are prior to 
 the conclusion ; they are the cause of the conclusion ; they are 
 better hiown than the conclusion. 
 
 A demonstration is direct when the conclusion is evident 
 from the agreement of the subject and predicate; v. g., "the 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 51 
 
 first cause must be independent of any preceding cause ; now, 
 God is the first cause; therefore, God is independent of all 
 preceding cause." 
 
 The demonstration is i?idirect when it is shown that the con- 
 tradictory of a proposition necessaftly leads to an absurdity; 
 V. g., " God is either eternal, or he is not ; " to say that " God 
 is not eternal," is to affirm a proposition that leads to absurdity; 
 for that which is not eternal is produced by some cause ; but 
 by the hypothesis, " God is not eternal ; " therefore God, the 
 first cause, is produced by some cause; which is absurd. 
 
 A demonstration may be either a priori or a posteriori. When 
 the truth of the conclusion depends upon, and proceeds from, 
 the truth of its evident premises, as its necessary cause, the argu- 
 ment is a priori; but when the truth of the premises logically 
 depends upon the truth of the conclusion, then the argument 
 is a posterioii; in the first case the reasoning is from principles 
 to their results, or this is to reason a pj'iori; but in a posteriori 
 reasoning, the process is from the results to the principles or 
 causes. 
 
 It is to be observed that the a priori method of argument 
 regards truths taken in their ontologieal oidQX) \ki^ ontolvgical 
 order proceeds according to the real relation which they bear to 
 each other as cause and effect, in themselves considered ; and 
 in this respect the cause is prior to the eff'eci. The logical or 
 psychological order regards the relation to each other in which 
 we first ktiow or learn them; which, in many cases, is in the 
 reverse order ; that is, by passing from the knowledge of the 
 effects to the knowledge of their causes: taking truths in this 
 order, is to learn or reason a posteriori. 
 
 A thing may be prior to another, either physically or meta- 
 physically; a thing \% physically prior to another, when it is the 
 real cause of the other ; it is metaphysically prior., when it is an 
 essence from which attributes*' are conceived as emanating ; or 
 in which they are conceived as inhering; for essence is 7neta- 
 physically prior to attribute or quality of any kind. 
 
 * " Propriura sen atti-ibutum est quod fluit ab essentia ratione formse." 
 Property or atti'ibute is what flows from essence in virtue of the formal princi 
 l)!e in that essence. 
 
52 logic: first part. 
 
 A R T I C L E I I I . 
 
 INDUCTION. 
 
 Liduction is an argument in which we conclude that, because 
 some property or law is true of each individual of a class, or, 
 at least, of a large number of them, it is a property or law of 
 the whole class. The force of the conclusion depends on the 
 uniformity and universality of the facts observed ; it affords cer- 
 tainty for many physical laws of material objects ; because the 
 action of such agents is physically necessary, and is, circum- 
 stances being the same, constant and uniform. But as regards 
 the laws of still more strictly contingent beings; that is, things 
 that really depend on mutable free age/icy for their existence, or, 
 as to whether they w^ill happen or not, the conclusion is sel- 
 dom more than probable or conjectural, as to its logical value. 
 There are i^w classes of real objects in respect to which one 
 mind, or even several minds, can actually make a complete 
 induction. But the general observation of mankind, extending 
 through a great length of time, aiifords proof that is, in many 
 cases, perfectly conclusive, both as to facts and their obvious 
 causes. The induction from facts universally attested, is some- 
 times first formally made by one superior mind ; as, when 
 Newton inferred the law of gravitation, the general induction 
 being suggested by the falling of an apple from the tree. All 
 bodies near the earth's surface do gravitate towards its centre, 
 whatever may be the hypothesis employed to explain the cause. 
 
 Induction has for its proper object contingent matter, and it 
 is not concerned about necessary matter, as such; scientific 
 demonstration can regard contingent matter as an object, only 
 under those respects in which it is necessary; and since all 
 contingent matter is necessary, under some or other respect, 
 it may all form a proper object of scientific knowledge. In- 
 duction, when regarded as demonstration, is- reducible to a 
 simple syllogism whose conclusion is proved, if the minor pre- 
 mise be verified as a universal. Observe that induction is not 
 identical with the process by which the intellect forms rejiex 
 
logic: first part. 53 
 
 un'wersah : by induction, a universal is formed from many ; 
 the reflex universal is deduced from one^ and referred to many 
 as essentially true of them. {See page ii8.) 
 
 Induction affords a prudent rule for the observation and 
 study of natural phenomena ; but it is not a new method of 
 acquiring or imparting science, since man has observed facts 
 and drawn conclusions from his observations ever since the 
 days of Adam. Though Lord Bacon gave no new discovery 
 in Logic or Philosophy when he wrote of induction, and in- 
 sisted so much on the extensive and accurate observation of 
 facts, before laying down their principles; yet his writings 
 stimulated scientific research and helped much to the advance- 
 ment of the material sciences. 
 
 Both Bacon and Locke failed to perceive that induction, as a 
 distinct mental process, is nothing else than proving by experi- 
 ment the minor premise of a simple syllogism, and that, as an 
 argument, it is valid only in so far as it is a syllogism. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 PROBABLE ARGUMENT. 
 
 Probability in objects of cognition is an appearance of truth, 
 coming from a greater force of argument on one side, which 
 inclines the mind to assent to that side as true, but yet leaving 
 room for doubt or fear that the opposite may be true. Both 
 sides of a proposition may, in respect to our knowledge, be 
 truly probable. 
 
 An argument is va^x^iy probable when one of its premises is 
 onXy probable; for a still greater reason, is it xneveXy probable 
 when both premises are only probable. A proposition is pro- 
 bable only, when there are strong reasons for assenting to it, 
 and yet there is di possibility that its opposite may be true. For 
 probability, as such, is essentially different from certainty, which 
 excludes the possibility of error. 
 
 It is manifest that truth, when considered in itself objectively 
 
54 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 ox a parte rei^ is incapable of mere probability, which, by its 
 nature, pertains to finite cognition only. 
 
 The conclusion follows the weaker premise, according to the 
 seventh lule of the syllogism; hence, while evident premises 
 give a certain and evident conclusion, one probable premise 
 renders the conchision ojily probable. 
 
 The argume?it is p?'obable ; ist, when we reason from remote 
 and imperfect ajialogy or indeterminate resemblajice; 2d, when 
 the reasoning is upon some hypothesis. Analogy is a likeness, 
 or a certain agreement of relation or proportion, between ob- 
 jects of different species, on account of which the one suggests 
 the other, and hence, from one similarity, another one is in- 
 ferred. [Vide Chap. i. Art. 3.) 
 
 Identity includes all that likeness, or sameness of attributes 
 or qualities, found in objects of the same species. Similarity 
 implies an identical quality, or some identical qualities, in ob- 
 jects that are otherwise different; v. g., same c^lor, shape, etc 
 
 The force of argument founded on analogy., or resemblances, 
 depends upon such general principles as the following: " similar 
 causes produce similar effects ; things that are seen to be similar 
 in nearly every respect, are wholly similar," etc. 
 
 Analogy can found strict demonstration or give a conclusion 
 which is scientific; v. g., when we demonstrate the existence 
 of God from the creation. The extremes agree with the medium^ 
 in this case, by analogy only. 
 
 The hypothesis., or supposition, is a ^^proposition, which, though 
 not yet demonstrated, is assimied to be true, because it affords a 
 satisfactory explanation of 7na7iy fads." For example, to assert 
 that " there is a subtile fluid diffused throughout the universe 
 whose undulations explain the phenomena of light." To this 
 class niay be referred many of the theories adopted for the ex- 
 planation of natural phenomena. An hypothesis is more or 
 less probable, according to the number of -facts or phenomena 
 which it satisfactorily explains. Its logical value never excee.ds 
 probability ; or it remains only an opinion until truly demon- 
 strated. An opinion is a judgment which is assented to, but 
 with some hesitancy or fear, as to its objective certainty. Ar 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 55 
 
 hypothesis that is demonstrated, is thereby changed into a the- 
 sis^ and ceases to be an hypothesis. 
 
 Between the extremes of attaching too much importance to 
 analogical reasoning and hypothetical theories on the one 
 hand and pronouncing them valueless on the other, is the 
 wiser middle course of estimating them according to the 
 degree of probability which their arguments furnish. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 SOPHISMS OR FALLACTE3. 
 
 A sophism, or fallacy, is an apparent argument, which, under 
 the specious form of truth, leads to a false or absurd conclusion. 
 The following are the fallacies which most frequently occur: 
 ist, the equivocation, or ambiguous middle; 2d, the fallacy of 
 composition and division; 3d, of the accident; 4th, dictum sim- 
 pliciter et secundum quid; or, confounding what can be said abso- 
 lutely with what can be said under a particular respect only; 5 th, 
 the igjioratio elenchi, or ignoring the questiofi; 6th, the petitio 
 principii, begging the question, or, the vicious circle ; 7th, nan 
 causa ut causa: no cause at all for a cause, or the fictitious cause. 
 
 The equivocation, or ambiguous middle, is a fallacy arising 
 from the use of a term of more meanings than one ; attribut- 
 ing to it a different signification in each premise, but drawing 
 a conclusion that supposes the two meanings to be identical; 
 V. g., the Romans equivocated, when, after Antiochus had 
 stipulated to surrender half his navy, they compelled him to 
 divide each vessel into halves, and then deliver up the half of 
 his navy by giving them the half of each ship. 
 
 Ambiguity arises, then, from the fact that a proposition is 
 capable of having two meanings; for example, when the 
 priestess of Apollo said to Pyrrhus, who consulted her when 
 he was about to invade Rome : " I say, Pyrrhus, you the 
 Romans will conquer;" her credit was saved in either eve it; 
 whether Pyrrhus or the Romans were victorious. 
 
56 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 This fallacy, or the double middle term, is of the most fre- 
 quent occurrence, perhaps, of all the errors in reasoning. 
 
 Composition and division: this fallacy is committed if, when 
 two predicates, taken separately or one at a time, agree with the 
 same subject, it is inferred that they agree with it when they are 
 taken conjointly ; v. g., '' Peter can walk and Peter can lie 
 down ; therefore, Peter can at the same time lie down and 
 walk." Peter can walk, and lie down by division, is true ; 
 otherwise, it is not true. Or, vice versa, if they agree when 
 taken conjointly, and it be inferred that they agree when taken 
 separately; v. g., "man has a body and soul, or is a rational 
 animal; therefore, matter is man, and spirit is man;" which is 
 incorrect. 
 
 Fallacia accidentis : the fallacy of the accident arises from 
 confounding those predicates that esse?itially belong to the 
 subject with those that accidentally belong to it ; or, in other 
 words, from not distinguishing between what is essential, and 
 what is accidental to the subject; v. g., "that is bad from 
 which evil comes ; but evil comes from the study of philoso- 
 phy, medicine, the physical sciences, etc.; therefore, the study 
 of those things is bad." " Evil " comes by accident, to this or 
 that person, owing to intellectual or moral defects, and erro- 
 neous reasoning ; but it does not thence follow that the well 
 directed study of those sciences is bad. Again, " the €xact 
 site of an ancient city is not surely known ; therefore, that city 
 never existed." 
 
 The fallacy termed dictum simpliciter et secundum quid (of 
 confounding what is simply true with what is true in a certaiii 
 respect only) : a predicate is affirmed simpliciter, i. e., simply or 
 absolutely, when it is affirmed without any limiting word or 
 phrase joined to it ; as, " Plato is learned." Here the predi- 
 cate, "learned," is not restricted to any particular object; 
 but when the predicate is affirmed secundum quid, or, in a cer- 
 tain respect, there is a Hmiting adjunct to it; v. g., "Peter is 
 learned in Botany/' here, " learned," is restricted to a par- 
 ticular object, " Botany." The fallacy arises from arguing that, 
 because the predicate agrees with the subject in one of the 
 
LOGIC : FIRST PART. 57 
 
 senses, it therefore agrees with it in the other; v. g., "he that 
 throws goods into the sea, wills the destruction of them ; 
 but the master of a vessel, in a storm, throws goods into the 
 sea; therefore, \\q wills the destructiou of them." He wills 
 the destruction of them in a certain respect, as a means to an 
 end necessary, and not otherwise to be attained, it is true ; 
 that he wishes to destroy them simply^ or absolutely and 
 directly, is not true. The fallacy termed, dictiun simpUciter ei 
 secundum quid, or, of what is said simply and absolutely, or 
 relatively and under a certain respect, is like to that termed, 
 accidentis. "A man eats what he buys in the market; he buys 
 raw meat in the market ; therefore, a man eats raw meat." 
 
 Ignoratio clenchi, or ignoring the question; in familiar lan- 
 guage, often termed '•'■ evading the question/^ or, ^' changing the 
 question.^' 
 
 Ignoratio elenchi, or ignoring the question, is an evasion of 
 the real question in dispute, and attempting to prove some- 
 thing else that apparently includes the thing in dispute; v. g., 
 if a certain meajis to an end were denied to be just, one should 
 prove that the end is good, and thereby seem to justify the 
 means ; or, if the immortality of the soul were proved, and one 
 should answer as if the eternity of the soul, or its having no 
 beginniiig, were the question. The ignoratio elenchi, or ig?ioring 
 the question, is sometimes from real, not smiulated ignorance 
 of the state of the question; it may also come from obtuseness 
 of the understanding; but it is often the artifice of a crafty and 
 sophistical mind, which is wanting in moral rectitude. This 
 fallacy occurs frequently in the harangues of demagogues; as 
 does also the assertion by means of interrogatory. 
 
 To the "ignoratio elenchi" may be referred the error which 
 consists in " proving too much ; " of which it is justly said, " he 
 that proves too much, proves nothmg;" v. g., if one should 
 attempt to demonstrate that the human soul \'s, a substance, and 
 his arguments went to show that i?ian's soul has the properties 
 of matter, he would then commit the error of ^^ proving too 
 muchy 
 
 Petitio principii, or begging the question, under which may be 
 
58 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 
 
 included the vicious circle* and the false siipposiiioii, is the as^ 
 'sumption of what is in question ; v. g., if it be the question in 
 dispute as to whether a particular substance have 7veight, and 
 it be answered, " that has weight which is ponderable, the sub- 
 stance in question is ponderable; therefore, it has weigJit;''' this 
 would be the petitio principii, or begging the question. If it 
 should be argued that " the earth turns on its axis because the 
 sun is statio?ia?y; and, on the other hand, the sun is statio?mry, 
 because the earth turns on its axis; " tliis would be to reason in a 
 vicious circle, or to prove two propositions, the one by the other, 
 as a reason. Tf it be said, " Pompey did not return to Kome after 
 the death of Caesar," this would be d, false supposition, or 2^ false 
 assumption; Damdy, falsely assuming it to be a fact that Pompey 
 was alive at Caesar's death. The argument may falsely sup- 
 pose or assume either a fact or a principle; the fallacy is the 
 same in all these cases, and consists in assuming in the argu- 
 ment something that is in question. 
 
 This fallacy is sometimes concealed under a proverb ; v. g., 
 "the exception confirms the rule;"" i. e,, \\\q. formal exception, or 
 one properly so-called, proves the existence of its co-related 
 rule. For instance, if an old charter were found, exempting a 
 certain family, for special reasons, from military tax, this ex- 
 emption or exception in their favor, would prove the existence 
 of a general law imposing such tax. But this axiom is some- 
 times misapplied; as v. g., when counter facts or contrary in- 
 stances are adduced to prove the non-existence of a rule, then 
 in answer, they are preposterously assumed to be exceptions 
 which prove the existence of the rule. This is false assump- 
 tion; and, when viewed under another respect, it is also the 
 fallacy of the double middle. 
 
 Non causa pro causa, no cause at all as a cause, is a fallacy, 
 in which that, which is no cause at all, is assumed to produce an 
 effect, simply because the two are contiguous in time and place; 
 or from some other mere coincidence or circumstance. The 
 Pagans ascribed " the downfall of the Roman Empire to the 
 
 * " Circulus non est vitiosus in relativis." Illation ft-ora one co-relative to 
 another is not a vicious circle. 
 
LOGIC : FIEST PAKT. 59 
 
 iise of Christianity," when, perhaps, the converse was more 
 nearly true. " Comets cause wars, plagues and other calam- 
 ities." Or this fallacy may be committed by attributing effects 
 to vague and fanciful agents; d.s fate, hick, fortune, or other 
 superstitious causes. They are all the same fallacy, and from 
 such delusions even educated minds are not all exempt. The 
 origin of such errors is ignorance, along with an instinctive 
 desire to know the cause of strange or terrible events. 
 
 " Post hoc ergo propter hoc; " or, " ^ thing happened after 
 another, therefore, it was caused by ///"is obviously false, and 
 is a form of expression which, on that account, is often em- 
 ployed in answer to the fallacy, " non causa pro causal 
 
 Of the seven fallacies above described, the first two are verbal 
 fallacies ; the remaining five, are material fallacies ; or, they 
 arise from the matter or truth of the propositions being at fault. 
 
 Mere sophistry is unworthy of a candid mind ; but even 
 vigorous and truthful intellects may, by mistake, employ incon- 
 sequent argument. The most ordinary fallacy that leads to 
 unintentional error in reasoning, is the complex or ambiguous 
 middle term, which is not accurately distinguished, so that 
 what is false may be rejected, while that which is true is ad- 
 mitted. 
 
 Examples of inconsequent argument : " as the body is com- 
 posed of many members, so the soul is composed of many 
 powers ; therefore, since the former can be divided into its 
 component parts, so can the latter." Here distinguish between 
 compoujid objects which possess nxembers that are really disti?ict, 
 and, therefore, separable; and objects that are simple, having 
 powers not really distinct from them as parts ; and which are, 
 therefore, indivisible substances. 
 
 " Whatever is opposed to reason must be rejected ; but faith 
 in mysteries is opposed to reason; therefore, faith in mysteries 
 must be rejected ; " or, '■' Jaith in mysteries is against reason^ 
 Distinguish what is abot^e reason from what is against reason; 
 i3i\s,o, faith that presupposes prudent motives of credibility; and 
 faith that rests on insufficie?it grounds or 710 grounds at all; and 
 is, therefore, unreasonable. To believe what is aboi^e reason, 
 
60 LOGIC : FIKST PART. 
 
 when we have valid authority for its truth, is not beHef which 
 is aodi/is/ reason, though the object is a//07'e reason ; but to 
 beHeve pretended mysteries, that directly contradict the evi- 
 dent principles of reason, would surely be against reasbn. 
 
 It will be found that complex or double middle terms gen- 
 erally contain both truth and error; they must, therefore, be 
 carefully distinguished ; the one to be admitted, the other to 
 be rejected. 
 
 An ancient sophist puzzled some less acute contemporary 
 logicians with the following objection against the possibility of 
 motion : "A thing cannot move where it is 7iot; nor can it move 
 where // is; but that which can neither rnove where it is, nor 
 where it is not, cannot move at all ; therefore, a thing cannot 
 move at all." 
 
 The ingenious reader will readily see that the clause, " where 
 it is," is equivocal; in one sense it means, " where it is at rest; " 
 in another it signifies, " where it is not at ?'est;" i. e., where // is 
 moving. In this second sense of the words, it may be said 
 that "a thing moves where it is'' It surely cannot move 
 where it is ?iot, in the direct and proper sense of the expression. 
 
 This sophism, which under a somewhat diiOferent form is at- 
 tributed to Zeno; as also the one devised by him to prove that 
 Achilles could not overtake the turtle which had a given dis- 
 tance the start of him ; both rested, in reality, on the false as- 
 sumption that a period of time consists of an infinite number 
 of moments, and that a given distance consists of an infinite 
 number of points; whereas, in truth, time, distance, and simple 
 motion, as such, do not consist of distinct parts, for they are 
 continuous, and not, as number is, discrete. 
 
 Observe that an argument is /// logical fonn, when it violates 
 no canon of the syllogism; but an argument which is /// logi- 
 cal form, may still be fallacious or inconsequent reasoning, 
 from error in its matter. 'Any intentional error in the form 
 of an argument, may be styled a sophism; an error in the 
 viatter which leads to a false conclusion, is a fallacy. 
 
LOGIC SECOND PART. 
 LOGIC APPLIED. 
 
 Since Logic is chiefly concerned with the acts of the intellect 
 in discourse of reason, or right argumentation, it is manifest 
 that it must include in its object the truth of cognitions, and 
 the means of knowing with certainty ; without which all mere 
 forms of argument are unmeaning, or nugatory. 
 
 Hence, the second part of Logic treats of logical truth and 
 certainty; and the means of attaining them. Its object is, 
 therefore, the extrinsic norma of right reasoning; that is, its 
 matter. 
 
 A genuine or truly valid argument must not only be inform, 
 but its judgments must possess logical truth. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 A RTI C L E .1. 
 
 TRUTH, ERROR AND FALSEHOOD DESCRIBED. 
 
 Truth* may be divided into ?netaphysical, logical and moral 
 truth. Metaphysical truth is the agreement of the essential 
 properties of a being among themselves, and with their essen- 
 tial concept or prototype, whether that being be actual or only 
 possible ; for, whatever exists, or is only possible, has, in the 
 
 * "Veritas estrerum, cognitionis, et sermonis." Truth is of things, of cognition, 
 of language. 
 
 01 
 
62 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 essential and eternal archetype of it, the constituents by which 
 it is what it is, and can be nothing else; and it is such inde- 
 pendently of our knowledge, though not independently of 
 divine intelligence. But ifietaphysical truth, as such, and truth 
 considered as transcendejital, pertain to gefieral metaphysics^ and 
 will be treated in another place. 
 
 Logical truth* is the conformity of the understanding know- 
 ing to the thing or object known. The concept or idea may 
 be conceived to be the medium between the object and the 
 intellect, "est medium quo incognito. "t Moral truth, \^ the 
 conformity of the language, or signs of thought, to the inter- 
 nal judgment of the person uttering the affirmation of that 
 judgment ; or, it is moral truth, when the internal judgment 
 is truly expressed. The language or sign expressing the inter- 
 nal judgment may be termed, the enunciation. But we must 
 distinguish between the logical truth of an enunciation, and its 
 moral truth ; the enunciation is logically true, when the judg- 
 ment which it declares is right; that is, when the judgment is 
 objectively true; or, expresses a real conformity of the mirid to 
 the object known.j: The enunciation is morally true, when it 
 declares correctly the internal, judgment, such as it is in the 
 mind. When this conformity of the e?iunciatio?i and the internal 
 judgmcTit is wanting, then the enunciation is erro/ieous. Logi- 
 cal truth of enunciations regards the rectitude or the correct- 
 ness of the judgment objectively; moral t-ith pertains to the 
 language of the subject uttering the judgment. It is termed 
 moral truth, because its right expression, or enunciation, is 
 generally subject to the will, which, being free, attributes to it 
 a moral character. 
 
 As concrete truth always implies both an object known, as 
 
 * ' ' Veritas est adaequatio intellectus, et rei. ' ' Truth is the equation of intel- 
 lect and object; 1. e., it is the conformity of the power as knowing with the 
 object as known. 
 
 t " Species intelligibilis (concep^^us) est medium quo et incognitum ut quod.' 
 The idea in the mind is the medium of knowledge, though it is not seen itself ai 
 an object, in the act of perceiving. 
 
 X ' ' Ex eo quod res est vel non est, vera est oratio. " According as the object 
 is, or is not, the proposition that enunciates it is true. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 63 
 
 one term, and the intellect knowing, as the other term of the 
 relation, truth is sometimes denominated by the objects^ and is 
 then called truth of the metaphysical, physical and moral order, 
 according to the objects. In this sense we may apply the 
 definition of truth by St. Augustin : " Veritas est quae ostendit 
 id quod est : " Truth makes known that which is.* 
 
 Error is assent to what is false, or dissent from what is true ; 
 it is an act of the mind by which we affirm two things to 
 agree, which do not, in themselves, agree ; or, we deny the 
 agreement of two things, which, in themselves, do really agree. 
 As assent, in matters whose evidence does not force the under- 
 standing, is a free act of the mind, error may be attributed to 
 the will as its formal or actuating cause ; yet the action of the 
 will, in error, is not always deliberate. 
 
 Falsity : Falsity is the opposite of truth; and is, therefore, a 
 want of conformity in the mind to the object of cognition. 
 This want of conformity is either negative or positive; negative^ 
 when the concept expresses the object only partially or ob- 
 scurely ; V. g, should it contain nothing more about the moon 
 
 * Truth is, by its nature, for the intellect, and is its proper object; as good is 
 the object of the will, as color and figure constitute the object of sight, or as 
 sound is the object of hearing. Truth, then, is of the intelligible order, or is 
 ordained for the intellect, by its nature; trxith and iiitellect are connotative, so 
 that the one supposes the other. Truth, in itself, is a relation, and is threefold: 
 1st. The relation of agreement between a real being and its concept, or its essen- 
 tial-prototype, according to which it is constituted; like to that, lor example, 
 which is between the idea of a house in the mind of the architect, and the real 
 house, which he forms exactly according to that idea in his mind; or the idea in 
 the painter's mind, and the ^ic^ure on canvass, which accurately expresses it. 
 2d. The relation of agreement between the mind knoAving an object, and the 
 object itself; v. g., the exact conformity of the mind knowing an orange to the 
 real orange itself. 3d. The relation of agreement between the words or signs by 
 which we express or manifest the cognitions in our minds, and those cogrnZ/ions as 
 they really are in the mind ; v. g. , " virtue is amiable, ' ' are words that express 
 truly a real judgment of your mind, and, therefore, your words agree with the 
 mind, and the relation is real between the cognition and its enunciation. 
 
 Truth, then, in its formal entity, is a relation; it is threefold, as said above, 
 and it is totally comprehended in this threefold division: 1st. The agreement or 
 relation between a thing and the prototype in the concept of its essence or nature, 
 is metaphysical truth; 2d. The conformity of the mind knowing, to the object 
 knoAvn, is a relation of agreement between them, and is called logical truth, or 
 intellectual trifth; 3d. The conformity ov relation of agx-eement between words 
 and signs, used to enunciate or manifest cognitions, and the cognitions as they 
 actually are in the mind, ie called moral truth. 
 
64 logic: secot^d paet. 
 
 than, that it is a luminary. This is false hy privation^ and is, 
 perhaps, more properly, ignorance. Positive falsity, is a disa* 
 greement of the cognition and its proper object ; for, in that 
 case, the mind attributes to the object what does not belong 
 to it, or denies what does belong to it ; this is a want of con- 
 formity in the understanding, to the proper object of its cogni- 
 tion ; V. g., " God is a body; the human soul is material." 
 
 It may be said, therefore, that falsity in the mind, when 
 positive, is the effect of error in judgment : for, how else can 
 positive falsity be in the mind, or get access thereto ? 
 
 Simple apprehension cannot, per se, i. e., of itself, or of 
 its own proper action, induce error, or cause falsity in 
 the mind. A simple apprehension, or perception, is an 
 act of the mind by which it acquires an inchoate cognition ; 
 by which it takes hold of the object, as it were; or perceives 
 it, and forms for itself an idea or similitude ot it. In this, 
 nothing is explicitly affirmed or denied by the mind ; and 
 its conformity to the object is limited to the mere perception; 
 as it does not express a judgment. Hence, the apprehension 
 is a necessary effect of a necessary law, and, therefore, cannot 
 be false. The judg??ient, or the understanding judging, is never 
 per se false ; but assejit can be false, by precipitancy, or, by 
 impulse of the will ; and, therefore, positive falsity in the mind 
 is produced only by error in judgment. 
 
 If it be objected that many ideas of rude and uncultivated 
 people are not conformable to their objects ; as, v. g., they may 
 conceive " the sun to be a round plane a few feet in diameter ^^ 
 etc. ; and, since all languages declare the sun to rise, and set, 
 it would appear that the minds of all men were long i?i error 
 in regard to a sensible fact. 
 
 We should distinguish : that these ideas may not be con- 
 formable to their objects, negatively, i. e., hy privation, is true; 
 but if it be meant that they are not conformable to their ob- 
 jects, /(?i///V.?/v ; then we should subdistitiguish ; they may not 
 be really conformable after a judgment is formed; but it is not 
 true to say that before the judgment there is a positive falsity^ 
 or want of conformity in the mind to the object. Language 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 65 
 
 expresses the sensible fact of the sun's risi7ig and setlifig, though 
 the philosophical hypothesis formerly employed to explain its 
 cause is now known to be untenable; or, in other words, the 
 minds of men did not err in affirming the fact, but philosophers 
 erred in giving its explanation. 
 
 Mere apprehensions or ideas are true, so far as they express 
 their objects positively; since they are produced by the mind 
 and object, operating both naturally and necessarily. Even 
 the intellect cannot be forced to assent to what is false, as 
 false; but it can, under the command of the will, assent to 
 what is false, in those cases in which the evidence of the truth 
 does not necessitate its decision. Truth, properly so-called, is 
 only in the understanding which judges ; and it is only by a cer- 
 tain imitation or analogy, and, therefore, improperly and incom- 
 pletely, in sensation and simple apprehension, which are means 
 of knowing truth. Truth is fully and properly only in that 
 act by which the mind is fully conformable to its known 
 object ; but the min'd is fully and properly conformable to its 
 object only when it affirms what the object is; /. e., when 
 it judges. Any preceding act of knowing is prehminary and 
 preparatory to full knowledge, or truth, properly so-called. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 DIFFERENT STATES OF THE MIND IN RESPECT TO TRUTH. 
 
 As the mind attains truth by acquiring ideas conformable to 
 their objects, and by comparing these ideas or concepts to their 
 objects, or among themselves ; it is manifest that the mind 
 may by these efforts approach more or less nearly to complete 
 knowledge of things. Hence, the different states of the mind 
 vn respect to truth. 
 
 The following classification of those states is sufficiently 
 ':omprehensive : ist, Ignorance; 2d, Doubt; 3d, Suspicion; 
 4th, Opinion; 5th, Certainty. They comprehend the differ- 
 5 
 
66 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 ent relations the mind may have to the objects of its knowl- 
 edge, either as ignorant of those objects, or as knowing them 
 in different degrees of perfection, i. e.,more or less completely. 
 
 Ignorance is the state of the mind when it has no knowledge 
 of an object; v. g., we are ignorant as to whether the number 
 of the stars be odd or even ; or what was the precise number 
 of angels created; or how long the present world will endure. 
 
 Doicbt is the state of the mind when the judgment is sus- 
 pended between the two parts of a contradictory ; or when 
 the assent of the understanding cannot be determined to either 
 of two contradictory propositions or judgments. 
 
 Doiibi is either positive or negative; doubt is positive when 
 there are reasons that persuade in favor of each proposition ; 
 which, however, do not determine the intellect to assent to 
 either, but leave it, now drawn to one side, now to the other, 
 still hesitating in uncertainty between them. 
 
 The doubt is negative when there are either no reasons at all 
 in lavor of either side, or such as are of very litde moment. 
 
 Suspicion is a propensity or i?iclination to judge on slight 
 grounds; in it, the judgment is often prompted or impelled by 
 passion or affection in the will ; and it is apt to tend rather to 
 the unfavorable side. 
 
 Opinion* is an assent of the understanding to one of two 
 contradictory or opposite propositions; not, however, without 
 fear of the other being true. 
 
 For an opinion to be prudent, the following conditions muet 
 be fulfilled: ist, a careful examination of the reasons in favor 
 of each contradictory, must precede the assent of the under- 
 standing ; 2d, the side embraced must have in its favor a grave 
 motive; and the objections against it, as well as the reasons in 
 favor of the opposite proposition, must be suitably answered; 
 3d, the assent in favor of the opinion formed must not be more 
 firm than the motive or decisive reason in its favor justifies. 
 
 * ' ' Opinio est actus intellectus quo fertur in uncam partem contradictionis cum 
 formidine alterius. Assensus probabilis est idem ac opiniativns. ' '—(Vide Div 
 Thorn. P. I. ; Qii. 79; Art. 9; Ad. 4.) Opinion is an act of the intellect by which 
 it is borne to one side of a contradictory, but with fear lest the opposite be true. 
 Assent to what is probable is the same as opinion. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 67 
 
 An opinion may h^ probable, more probable, most probable ) but 
 an opinion, as such, cannot transcend the hmits of probability; 
 for. if what was an opinion be made afterwards positively certai?i, 
 it thereby ceases to be an opinion, and becomes a thesis or a 
 certain truth. Probability and certainty differ essentially, since 
 they are of different species; and therefore no degree* of prob- 
 ability can constitute certainty. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 certainty; evidence; species of certainty; they differ 
 
 AS TO intensity. 
 
 Certainty is a state of the mind in which it adheres firmly 
 to the truth on account of motives which exclude all doubt, 
 and all fear of the opposite being true. 
 
 Certainty, primarily and properly, is in cognition, and is 
 therefore subjective ;t but it is attributed by translation to the 
 object. For the sake of greater clearness, therefore, certainty 
 may be considered both as objective and subjective. 
 
 Objective certainty is the necessary truth of the object known, 
 or cognoscible ; its " necessitas seujirmitas essendi. ' ' The neces- 
 sity here meant is, in the case of facts, consequent ; and it is, 
 therefore, common to all accomplish d and actual truth, or to 
 every actual object. Subjective certainty is a firm adhesion of 
 the mind to the object as true, which excludes all doubt and 
 all fear of the opposite being true. 
 
 * " Gradus non mutat essentiam rei." The degree, \. e.,more or less, does 
 not change the essence of a thing. 
 
 t * ' Certitudo subjectiva est firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cpgnoscitiva; ad siuira 
 c©gnoscil)ile." Subjective certainty is firmness of adhesion in the power 
 knowing to the object known. 
 
 " Objectiva est firma et invariabilis object! determinatio in suo esse." — (Bil- 
 liiart.) Objective certainty is the firm and invariable determination of the ob- 
 ject in being; or, its existence as actual, and, under that respect, both necessary 
 an<l unchangeable. 
 
 ' ' Nihil est adeo contingons, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. ' ' — (Div. 
 Thorn. P. I. ; Qu. 86; Art. 4.) Nothing is so absolutely contingent as to be, un- 
 der no respect; necessary. 
 
68 LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 
 
 Toe causes of certainty, or the motives that lead to it, may 
 be reduced to two classes; namely, evidence^ and authority or 
 testimony. 
 
 Certainty which is produced by evidence* may be distin- 
 guished, according to its objects, into three kinds, which differ 
 in the degree of intensity or force with which they necessitate 
 the assent of the intellect: ist.. Certainty, whose object is truth 
 which is known per se; i. e., which is self-evident., or is seen to 
 be truth, and assented to, so soon as the terms which express 
 it are understood; v. g., "two things which are equal to the 
 same thing, are equal to each other; the shortest distance be- 
 tween two given points is a straight line," etc. 2d., A second 
 kind of the certainty which comes from evidence., is furnished 
 by conclusions which follow necessarily from evident first prin- 
 ciples; this kind is often termed scientific certainty. It will be 
 explained more fully in Article VIII of Chapter II. 3d., A 
 third species of certainty is furnished by the objects of internal 
 and external or sensible experience; or, that which is possessed 
 when the power of consciousness and the organs of sense are 
 directly cognizant of their proper objects. 
 
 Certainty, whose medium or formal niotive is authority or 
 testimony, is either from evident signs or marks, or from wit- 
 nesses that evidently testify to what they know directly and in 
 its objective evidence — ex evidentia in attestante — as eye-wit' 
 nesses, ear-witnesses, and the like ; or, it is the certainty which 
 is afforded by super tiatiiral faith., in which neither the testimony, 
 nor the object, is evident to the mind assenting ; t v. g., when we 
 believe that "^' that there are three Persons and but one Nature 
 in God, because God revealed it." Here, neither the fact of 
 
 *' ' Omnis certitude naturalis postulat evidentiam vel in re vel in attestante. ' ' 
 All natural certainty requires evidence, either in the object or in the witness; 
 i. e., evidence of the testimony that mediates between the mind and the object or 
 truth. But, for the act of supernatural faith, this evident nxcdhvm, witness or 
 testimony {evidentia in attestante) is not required, except as a preceding condi- 
 tion. 
 
 t" Fides omnis est essentialiter obscura quia nititur medio rei extrinseco, 
 ideoque res manet secundum se ignota, sicut antea. "— (Billuart.) All faith is 
 essentially obscure, because it depends on a medium Avhich is extrinsic to the 
 object, and, therefore, the thing remains unknown in itself, even after it is be- 
 lieved. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 69 
 
 the revelation having been made, nor the Trinity itself, is evident 
 to us;* though the revelation itself was, doubtless, evident to 
 many; v. g., to Prophets, Evangelists, etc. In this case, the 
 principles that supply for evidence, are the light of faith in the 
 understanding and an impulse of grace in the will; hence, actual 
 fliith IS free, and it is thereby capable of meriting. But, for 
 supernatural faith, it is an essential condition, or prerequisite, 
 that its articles be evidently credible.] " Non crederet (quis) 
 nisi videret ea esse credenda, vel propter evidentiam signorum 
 vel aliquid hujusmodi : " /. e., no one can believe without evi- 
 dence as to the credibility of the truths assented to. (Div. 
 Th. 2, 2, qu. I, a. 4, ad. 2,) But matters pertaining to super- 
 natural Faith, and the resolution of its act,J pertain to the 
 scope of Theology; it is here proposed directly to treat only of 
 natural or philosophical certainty, and its principles or causes. 
 But from what has been said it may be concluded as beyond 
 doubt, that the individual reason can prudently assent to no 
 truth except it either know that truth in its own objective evi- 
 dence, or have for its assent to the truth a certain and infallible 
 motive. While certainty, as already observed, is primarily in 
 cognition, or is subjective, evidence, on the contrary, is primarily 
 in the object; or, it is most properly the object that is evident; 
 but the light of the object as seen§ or perceived by the cog- 
 noscive power, is termed subjective evidence. 
 
 Evidence is either immediate, or ?nediate; truths are imme- 
 
 *" Motiva credibilitatis pra^stant evidentiam consequentice, sed non consequen- 
 tis : probant quod revelatio debet credi sed non dant evidentiam rei revelataB 
 sen veritatis creditaj." Motives of credibility afford evidence of the consequence, 
 but not of the consequent: they prove that revelation ought to be believed, but 
 they do not give evidence of the thing I'evealed, or the truth believed. 
 
 tSuarez, De Virt. Theolog., Disp. 4, Sect. 6, says that the intellect does not 
 doubt in matters of faith without rejecting their credibility as not evident. 
 
 J The "resolution of the act of faith," is its analysis, which is made in order 
 to distinguish clearly all that is necessary to the act, whether as conditio sine 
 qua non, as directive of it, a,s> formal motive, as material object, etc. 
 
 § ' ' nia dicuntur videri qrne per seipsa movent intellectum vel sensum ad sui 
 cognitionem, ut sunt prima principia et conclusiones ex ipsis evidenter deduc- 
 tae, vel sensibilia sensibus debite proposita."— (Billuart, De Fide; Disp. I; Art 
 4.) Those things are said to be seen which of themselves move the intellect 01 
 the sense to know them ; such are first principles and the conclusions evidently 
 deduced from (hem, or sensible objects duly proposed to the senses. 
 
70 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 diaiely evident when they are known per se, t. e., are self-evi- 
 dent. The objects of the senses and those of consciousness 
 may also be regarded, when actually observed, as immediately 
 evident to these cognoscive powers. Truths are mediately 
 evident^ when the mind comes to the certain knowledge of 
 them only through the medium of reasoning; or, when it 
 knows them only as evident deductions from their principles. 
 
 Evidence may also be considered as either intrifisic, or extrin- 
 sic. It is intrinsic^ in self-evident truths, in the demonstrated 
 conclusions from evident premises, and in the proper objects of 
 the senses and consciousness. Evidence is (fJc/nVzj-/^: when it is 
 not derived immediately from the object or truth, but passes 
 through the medium of testimony, and is thereby indirect and 
 and reflected light of the objective truth. Objects thus known 
 are not said to be evident, but believed, or they are objects of 
 faith. A preceding and evident judgment of their credibility 
 gives just grounds from which is inferred, or may be in- 
 ferred, the necessary truth of the objects in themselves. 
 Hence, distinguish between what is evidently true, and what 
 is only evidejitly credible; in the first, the object is evident; in 
 the second, the object is obscure. 
 
 A high degree o^ probability is sometimes termed moral cer 
 tainty. ^wt probability and certainty differ in species or essence; 
 and, therefore, in strictness, no degree of probability can equal 
 real certainty; or, no number of probabilities can constitute 
 certainty. 
 
 The main theory of evidence and the certainty which is 
 founded upon it may be briefly summed up as follows : 
 
 Evidence, in its general sense, includes not only the capa- 
 bility in the object of being seen, or clearly known, i. e., its 
 cognoscibility ; but, also, the capability* in an agent of 
 seeing it, together with the exhibition of the object to the 
 mind, or the act of seeing it to be what it is, and that it cannot 
 
 *"Evidcntia objecti est capacitas in objecto apparendi iiosti'o intellectui si 
 eidem objiciatur; apparentia objecti in inteUectu est evidentia subjectiva." 
 Objective evidence is the capability in the object of being seen bj^ the intellect if 
 presented to it; the manifestation of the object in the intellect is subjective evi- 
 dence. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 71 
 
 be otherwise than it is seen. It is manifest, then, that evidenct 
 inay be considered as both objective and subjective. 
 
 The cognoscibility of the object, or objective evidence, pre- 
 6upposes objective certainty, and is caused by it. Hence, it 
 may be said that objective certainty is the origin of objective 
 evidence; objective evidence is the proximate cause of subjec- 
 tive evidence, and the subjective evidence produces subjective 
 certainty. Therefore, in the order of cause and effect, objec- 
 .ia certainty is first, subjective certainty is last, and evidettce is 
 the medium between them. 
 
 Certainty^ when considered according to its objects, and the 
 medium by which they produce certainty in the mind, is tneta- 
 physical, physical or vioral. The three kinds of certainty thus 
 denominated differ in their species or essence ; because their 
 objects differ specifically. These kinds of certainty differ in 
 species ; for, acts are specified by their objects, and the objects 
 give determinate species not only to the acts, but to those 
 things that are consequent upon acts, as the states produced 
 by those acts. The acts of knowing metaphysical Xxw\S\, physi- 
 cal \xw\\i, and ?pioral truth, have objective prmciples, which, it is 
 clear, differ essentially; for the metaphysical is purely of intel- 
 lect, the physical \m^\\QS the sensible, and the object of moral 
 certainty is inevident, or essentially obscure. Hence, meta- 
 physical, physical and moral certainty all differ specifically, be- 
 cause their objects differ in species. 
 
 In order to perceive the conclusiveness of the preceding 
 reasoning, it is necessary to understand the force, and to see 
 the truth of the philosophical axiom, " acts* are specified by their 
 objects." It means about the same thing as saying, " effects 
 derive their species or essence from their causes; or, effects 
 depend for their species or essence on their causes ; or, effects 
 really proceed from their causes;" which is evidently true. 
 Now, regarding the act as an <?^<;/, the object of the ai.t is one 
 of its causes, as well as the agent that puts that act Hence, 
 
 * " Actus sijecificantur ab objectis." Acts are specified by their objects; or, 
 »cts derive their species from their objects. 
 
72 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 when it is said, "action* is specified by the agent; passion is 
 specified by the term ; " or, " operations, and habits, and pow- 
 ers, are specified by their objects ; " or, " all operation is speci- 
 fied by the form [by the specific nature)^ which is the principle 
 of the operation ; " all these expressions really convey the 
 same truth, though they present it under different respects. 
 An agent specifies its acts, because it gives to the acts which it 
 puts, their determinate nature; powers, habits, etc., are speci- 
 fied by their objects ; for, since their objects determine them 
 to act, the objects are also principles or causes of action, and, 
 on that acccount, attribute to the acts something which is 
 essential to them as effects produced by the objects. Colors 
 cannot be heard; sounds cannot«be seeii; but color and figure 
 determine or specify vision, or the act of seeing; sounds deter- 
 mine the specific acts of hearing. Hence, because objects are 
 principles that determine acts in the agents to which those ob- 
 jects are connatural, they also specify those acts. 
 
 Intensity, or force of the assent : The assefit of the mind 
 differs in its inte?isify, according to the different species of cer- 
 tainty ; or, according to the objects which, through their 
 proper mediums, produce certainty in the mind. 
 
 Observe that assefit is an act of the intellect, as co7isent is an 
 act of the ivill. The intellect assents to truth ; /. ^., agrees to, 
 admits, takes the truth: ist, through the ifnmediate evidence of 
 the truth, as in matters which are self evident, or known 
 per se; 2d, through mediate evidence, or on account of some- 
 thing else, as, when it assents to a demonstrated conclusion on 
 account of the certain premises from which it necessarily fol- 
 lows; 3d, on account of evident testimony to the inevident 
 truth, and also in voluntary obedience to the motives of super- 
 natural faith ; 4th, when the motives furnish only probability ; 
 in which case the assent is voluntary, and the judgment 
 assented to is only an opinion. 
 
 That the assent of the intellect, as thus described, should 
 
 * ' ' Actio specKicatur ab agente; passio a termino. ' ' 
 " Operationes, et habitus et potentiie specificantur ex objectis." (Div. Th, 
 Mem. Lect. 1, Sect. 2.) 
 
 ' ' Omni.s operatio specilicatur per formam, quae est principium operationis. * 
 
LOGIC : SKCOXD PART. 78 
 
 have different degrees of intensity or strength, according to its 
 motives, and the principles that produce it, is both natural, and 
 just to truth itself: ist, because the objects which produce 
 different kinds and degrees of assent differ in their nature ; 2d, 
 because truth in the mind is in conformity with the objects. 
 
 As to intensity in assent, there are three principal degrees of 
 the siibjective certainty that is merely human or natural ; cor- 
 responding to the three species of objective certainty, or three 
 species of objects: ist, itietaphysical certainty, whose object is 
 necessary and immutable, i. e., metaphysical Xxm\\\\ 2d, physical 
 certainty, whose object is physical truth, i. e., the existence and 
 the positive laws of created or contingent beings; 3d, moral 
 certainty, whose object is truth known by the testimony of wit- 
 nesses, or the moral laws that universally govern man. 
 
 Metaphysical certainty has for its object, either truth that is 
 a priori, and absolutely necessary; or truth that is derived 
 from it by demonstrative reasoning ; the certainty in us caused 
 by the latter is less intense than that which is caused by the 
 former. 
 
 We h2i\t physical CQX\.3\i\iY, when the object known is 2i fact, 
 or is something actually and physically existing, and is evident 
 to our cognoscive powers; v. g., we have physical certainty 
 that the sun now shines, or does not ; or other facts of sense, 
 and consciousness. 
 
 Certainty is styled moral when its medium is that testimony 
 which depends for its significance and truth on the knowledge 
 and veracity of an intelligent and/r<f<? witness. This testimony 
 may be manifested either by words, modes of action, or any 
 other signs of conscious thought or affection. Hence, any 
 manifestation of truth by means of signs, which are intelligent 
 zxiAfree in their cause, pertains to that testimony which is the 
 medium of moral cej'tainty. 
 
 We have moral certainty when a sufficient number of reliable 
 witnesses all concur in testifying to a sensible fact; v. g,, 
 " London exists." We have moral certainty, in a less strict 
 sense of the words, moral certainty, that " all mothers love their 
 children ; " in this latter case, exception is absolutely possible. 
 
74 logic: second part. 
 
 When we possess juetapJiysical, or physical certainty, we are 
 said to know the truth that causes it, or is its object; but when 
 our knowledge comes through the testimony of others, we are 
 said to believe the truth of which we thus become certain. 
 
 In moral certainty we must distinguish between the object 
 or truth testified to, and the testimony itself: the object is 
 essentially inevident or obscure ; but the testimony,- at least as 
 a natural medium of certainty,* must be evident. 
 
 The manner in which natural faith and supernatural or divine 
 faith are respectively related to their mediums or motives of 
 assent, will be rendered more clear by means of an example : 
 " Hannibal defeated the Romans in the battle of Cannae," is a 
 historical fact which is believed on its testimony. Those to 
 whom the fact of the defeat was evident in itself, were the first 
 witnesses, and they knew the fact in its own objective evidence. 
 Through them as eye-witnesses it became generally credited or 
 believed as made certain by their testimony; through writings 
 and other means of tradition it has come down to the present 
 time. All the testimony, from that of the eye-witnesses, as 
 descending to the present time, constitutes, when it is all taken 
 together, the medium which in some manner unites our minds 
 with the fact, and this medium is evident in itself to us ; fur, we 
 actually know it in existing history and tradition. Our assent 
 to the fact, " Hannibal defeated the Romans in the battle of 
 Cannae," is on account of this evident medium as extending 
 from the present time to the period when it occurred. 
 
 The proposition, " God is Triune," is believed as an article 
 of divine faith. There is likewise in this case an evident tradi- 
 tion or medium of testimony, clearly traceable back to the 
 days of the Messias himself, that this Messias explicitly aflfirmed 
 and taught " God to be Triune." This medium, as in the other 
 case, connects us in some manner with the Messias revealing 
 that article of faith ; but our assent, as an act oi divine faith^ is 
 not on account of that medium or tradition which is evident 
 to us and certain, for such a medium constitutes only a natural 
 
 *"Evidentia in attestante: quando eviclouter constat <le dUscnte," It is evl- 
 4ence in the witness, \vl)en the wituess is evidently known as suoh, 
 
logic: second part. 75 
 
 principle of assent ; our assent, as an act of supernatural faith, 
 is on.y and exclusively because God revealed it. The existence 
 of the evident medium is an essential prerequisite for this act of 
 faith, and is a demonstrative proof that it is prudent to elicit 
 it; but it is not itself any part of the formal motive for the act, 
 that formal motive being, God said it, or God revealed it; in 
 such manner, however, that both the motive and the assent are 
 alike supernatural, and totally distinct from the natural medium. 
 
 The further explanation and proof of this, we remit to the 
 theologian. 
 
 What is here said suffices, it is believed, for a correct under- 
 standing of philosophical certainty as related to that of super- 
 natural faith, and as distinguished from it in its principles ; and 
 this much was also judged necessary for the adequate treat- 
 ment of the matter proper to the present article. 
 
 As a mode of knowing truth, the intellectual vision, or the 
 distinct, evident perception of truth in its own objective evi- 
 dence, is more perfect than knowing it by the medium of 
 faith; but yet, divine faith* is more noble in respect to its 
 object, which is the truth of God himself, than any natural 
 knowledge, whose medium is evidence or the testimony of 
 creatures. 
 
 The intensest natural certainty is that which is caused by 
 metaphysical truth, because the object is necessary and immu- 
 table. Physical certainty is next in the degree of its intensity 
 or force ; though its object is contingent truth, yet, it is made 
 evident to us, and the certainty in the mind corresponds to 
 the principles that produce it. A coutingejit being is one that 
 can exist, or cease to exist, according to the free choice of its 
 cause ; or, it is one that depends on a free agent for its exist- 
 ence. Moral certainty is the least intense : ist, because its 
 
 *" Fides est nobilior quam scientia ex parte objecti; quia ejus objeetum est 
 verit4is prima; sed seientia habet perfectiorem niodum cognoscendi, qui non 
 repugnat perfectioni beatitudiuis, scilicet visioni, siciit ei repuguat modus 
 fidei." (Div. Thom. I, 2 P. ; Qu. 67; Art. 3; ad. 1.) Faith is more noble than 
 knowledge as regai-ds its object, because its object is the First Truth; but knowl- 
 edge is a more perfect mode of cognition, because it is not repugnant to beati- 
 tude, namely, to vision; to which, however, the mode of knowing by faith i? 
 repugnant. 
 
76 logic: second part. 
 
 object is obscure or is known indirectly and mediately only ; 
 2d, because the morals and actions of men are more mutable, 
 and more purely contingent, than are the laws of physical 
 nature, or the acts of natural agents, and the truth in the mind 
 is in conformity to the objects. 
 
 Both metaphysical and physical evidence always necessitate 
 assent. Testimony, also, when fortified with certain condi- 
 tions, V. g., as when it refers to a sensible fact, when many 
 witnesses agree, and collusion is impossible, in such adjuncts 
 necessitates assent; yet, in many cases, it is possible to dissent, 
 even when this refusal of assent to the testimony is most im 
 prudent ; in other words, the assent of the understanding to 
 the truth is, in such instances, under the control of the will. 
 This happens more especially when the object is wholly ob- 
 scure; or, when both the object and the testimony are inevi- 
 dent. 
 
 Though certainty is perfect in its species when its motive is 
 the evidence that the object is what it is, and that it can be 
 nothing else; yet, within its species, the evidence can be of a 
 higher or lower degree in different minds, or in the same mind 
 under dififerent circumstances. Hence, the certainty with regard 
 to the same truths may be 7nore or less intense, according to 
 those conditions. 
 
 Supernatural Faith* is, in itself, simply and absolutely more 
 certain than any natural cognition; bui it is not thus as 
 regards us. 
 
 The certainty here meant is the firmness with which the cog- 
 noscive power adheres to its cognoscible object. This firm 
 adhesion of the mind may arise from the action of the 
 
 *" Nihil prohibet id, qnod est certius secundum naturam, esse quoad nos 
 jiiinus certum propter debilitatem intellectus iiosti'i : qui se habet ad mauifes- 
 tissima naturae sicut oculus noctuai ad lumen solis. Unde dubitatio qua; aceidit 
 in aliqiiibus circa articulos fidei, non est propter inccrtitudinem rei, feed prop- 
 ter debilitatem intellectus humani. " (Div. Thorn. , 1 P. , Qu. 1 ; Ai-t. 5, ad 1 : et 
 I, 2; Qu. 4; Art. 8.) Nothing prevents that which is more cei-tain accordiug to 
 its nature from being less so in regard to us, owing to the weakness of our intel- 
 lects, wnich, in regard to things the most manifest in themselves, are like the eye 
 of the owl in the light of the sun. Hence, the doubts which come to some per- 
 sons about articles of faith are not owing to uncertainty in the object, but to th« 
 weakness of the human intellect. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 77 
 
 will determining the intellect to adhere, independently ol any 
 legitimate motive of assent, to its object; this actually happens 
 in obstinate error. But tenacious adhesion of the mind from 
 such a motive cannot be properly termed certainty ; more cor- 
 rectly, it is pertinacity. Again, this firm adhesion may arise 
 from a true medium of certainty, and yet derive its efficacy both 
 from the intellect and the will. Now, divine faith derives its 
 certainty from the divine veracity, the First Truth, which in- 
 finitely exceeds all created mediums of certainty or truth, as is 
 self-evident. Hence, faith, in respect to its cause, is the 
 highest and most perfect motive of certainty which the human 
 mind has in our present state of existence. 
 
 As regards our minds, or considered subjectively: that is 
 more certain, in respect to us, which the intellect can more 
 fully possess, which is more connatural and proportioned to it, 
 which more completely satisfies and quiets it; though, in other 
 respects its assent through a connatural motive be, in itself, not 
 the most certain. This is what actually happens in that cer- 
 tainty which we posess concerning objects which are evident to 
 us, as compared to the certainty which we have through the 
 medium of divine faith.* Hence, although faith, in respect 
 to its motive, gives the highest and intensest certainty ; yet, in 
 the subject, i. e.^ in our minds, there may spring up indeliber- 
 ate doubt ; for, the debilitated intellect, like the owl at noon- 
 day, " sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis," is unable to see by 
 light so superior as that of divine faith. This faith is in itself 
 absolutely the most certain ; but the disposition of the subject 
 renders doubt possible ; it may be less intense subjectively. 
 
 * " Ipsura testimonium primje veritatis se habet in Me, ut principium in sci- 
 entiis demonstrativis . ' ' The testimony of the First Truth is, in matters of faith, 
 like the principle^ in scientific demonstration. 
 
78 LOGIC : sp:cond part. 
 
 A R T I C L E I V. 
 
 ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTH ; OR, ULTIMATE MOTIVE OF 
 CERTAINTY. 
 
 A criterion of truth is a rule or standard by which truth is 
 unerringly known and distinguished from falsehood and error. 
 Also, because certainty in the mind is the legitimate result of 
 truth thus known, it follows that the criterion of truth is, at the 
 same time, the criterion of certainty. This criterion, in its last 
 reason or motive, is evidence in concrete. In other words, 
 all certainty supposes evidence, either as its formal motive, or 
 as a preceding conditio si?ie qua non, an indispensable conditioji, 
 to which the mind finally reverts in order to dismiss all doubt* 
 Hence, it will be seen why the sounder philosophers so uni- 
 versally insist on the truth of the proposition, " Evidence is 
 the ultimate criterion of truth, or is the ultimate motive of 
 certainty." 
 
 Evidence is said to be the ultimate criterion of certainty or 
 truth ; because, when the motives and principles of certainty 
 are examined rejlexively, or by their analysis, evidence is the 
 last reason or principle which is dwelt on by the mind, in 
 determining the admissibility, or the validity of all the motives 
 for Its assent furnished by any object. In the direct acquisition 
 of certainty, evide?ice may be considered as, under some respect, 
 the first principle or motive of assent. Hence, then, evidence 
 is termed, under different respects, both the Jirst principle and 
 ultimate motive of certainty. 
 
 The following are essential requisites for the ultimate criterion 
 of truth: ist. It should not require demo?istration ; for, all 
 demonstration supposes something more known, from which 
 another truth is deduced, and which thereby becomes also 
 known; hence, if this principle or criterion were demonstrable, 
 the truth from which it is deduced, would be the ultimate 
 standard in question ; or, if it were not self-evident or known 
 per se, the medium through which it is known, would be that 
 
 * * ' Evidentia est ultimiim in quo quiescit intellectiis noster . ' ' (Billaart, T. 1 ; 
 Proem. Dissert. 1; Art. 7.) In evidence the intellect finally rests quiet. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 79 
 
 Standard. 2d. This ultimate standard must be internal, not an 
 external rule; or, it must be intrinsic to the mind. An extrinsic 
 standard of truth can be known only by its medium; or, it 
 must be recognized by the individual reason, "/<?r lumen ra- 
 tionis 7uiturale" through the evidence, that it is a medium of 
 certainty. In other words, in order to follow any external 
 criterion of truth, or assent to it with certainty, an evident 
 judgment of its reliability is an essential prerequisite; i. e., 
 dltimately this external standard must be tested as a medium 
 or law of certainty by evidence in concrete, or formal evidence, 
 which is an internal principle. The mind must first be certain 
 that this external criterion exists; that it is true; and it can 
 know this truth, which is external to itself, only by the evidence 
 of it in the mind. 
 
 This standard cannot be divine faith : for faith presupposes 
 the knowledge that there is a God, who is true ; and it is an 
 essential prerequisite that Revelation, or the truths proposed 
 for belief be evidently credible; otherwise there could be no 
 rational assent. Hence, divine faith cannot be either the Jirst 
 or the only motive of certainty; since it has essential prerequi- 
 sites to it, wliich must be known by their evidence. 
 
 The criterion of certamty cannot be the common consent of 
 men, as some authors erroneously maintain ; for the admission 
 of such a standard of truth, which, like divine faith, is external^ 
 presupposes the evident knowledge that men exist, attest, 
 attach a definite meaning to their words ; that they agree, etc.; 
 all these truths suppose an internal principle of the mind which 
 is their criterion, or is the standard by which they are ulti- 
 mately tested; i. e., evidence in the concrete is the ultimate 
 criterion of all truth, or the ultimate motive of certainty.* 
 
 It follows from what has been said, that error in a sane mind 
 is never physically necessary; for assent is necessitated only 
 by perfect evidence, and, in all other cases, it is caused by the 
 will, to which, therefore, must be referred assent or dissent, 
 when the understanding is not compelled by the evidence. 
 
 * In metaphysical and physical' certainty this criterion is evidence from tho 
 object ; in moral certainty it is evidence that the testimony is credible. 
 
80 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 PRIMITIVE Truths; they are not demonstrable. 
 
 Primitive truths are such as neither require nor admit of 
 proof, either because they are per se* known, i. e., hiown of 
 themselves^ without the aid of other truths from which they are 
 deduced, or by which they are proved; or, because they are 
 facts of experience, known directly through our cognoscive 
 powers. 
 
 To begin reasoning or philosophising with universal doubt, 
 is simply absurd; for doubt, as such, can give neither evidence 
 nor certainty of anything deduced from it, since the conclusion 
 has the nature of the premises. It is but httle less absurd, to 
 begin with admitting the testimony of consciousness {cogUo ergo 
 sum, I think, or a?n thinking, therefore, I exist, which is a 
 petitio principii), and doubting that of other powers, the ex- 
 ternal senses, etc.; for all these powers, taken together, con- 
 stitute our only natural means of knowing; and it is as legiti- 
 mate and reasonable'to deny or doubt the truth of one natural 
 faculty or power in respect to its own proper objects as that of 
 another. 
 
 From consciousness, which is purely subjective, to the ob- 
 jective, is not a valid illation, since no power or faculty can 
 transcend its own order of objects, and pass without a medium, 
 to a class specifically different, or really separated from it. 
 
 But sound philosophy must begin with, as admitted, because 
 undeniable, the truths or principles that are known to reason, 
 without argument, of themselves, and which need no proof, 
 and admit none, and require no other reason for an assent, than 
 
 * '* Propositio perse nota est, quando ea est connexio praedicati cum subjecto, 
 ut penetrari subjectum nequeat, quin ea connexio deprehendatur in ipsa ratione 
 subjecti. Seu propositio per se nota dicitur cujus Veritas per se et sine medio a 
 se distincto innotescit: sic lux dicitur per sevisibilis, quia eaipsa et non per 
 medium magis lucidimi videtur. ' ' A proposition is per se known, or is self-evi- 
 dent, when the connexion of the predicate with the subject is such, that the 
 fubject cannot be understood, without the connexion being perceived in the very 
 nature of the subject. Or, a proposition is said to be per se knoAvn, or self-evi- 
 dent, whose truth is known in itself and without any medium which is distinct 
 from it: thus light is per se visible, for it is seen in itself, and not by means of 
 another medium more distinct than itself. 
 
logic: second part. 81 
 
 iheir own self-evidence. With regard to empirical knowledge, 
 or that acquired by experience, we must al^o admit, without 
 other proof, the evident perceptions of the mind, through the 
 senses and consciousness ; since these, too, are direct cogni- 
 tions of evidefit truth : nature, of itself, cannot err.* Nor do 
 we thereby assume truth on faith in natural law. No; we assent 
 to it, because it is evident ; and it is evident because it is truth, 
 or that which is, and we know it to be such as we see it to be. 
 
 Hence, then, our own existence, our perceptions of external 
 objects, the acts of consciousness, truths known /<fr j-^, as, "it 
 cannot be that the same thing exists, and does not exist, at the 
 same time;" and the like, are truths that are admitted as abso- 
 lutely certain, and incapable of logical proof; since that alone is 
 capable of proof which can be made more evident by another 
 truth still more evident, from which it is evidently deduced. 
 
 Therefore, genuine philosophy begins, not with doubt or 
 negation ; but with certain first truth, immediately evident 
 without demonsfative proof, and the affirmation of it. 
 
 This question, as to primitive truths, should not be con- 
 founded with the question, as to the origin of ideas; this latter 
 subject pertains to psychology, or the philosophy of the mind, 
 but yet it will be briefly treated in a subsequent part of this 
 work. 
 
 The importance of the foregoing doctrine will be appreciated 
 if it be remembered that, as said by an illustrious author {D. 
 Th. de veritate, a. i). "the certainty of knowledge comes 
 from the certainty of its principles ; for, the certainty of infer- 
 ences or conclusions is known only when they are resolved 
 into their principles." 
 
 Observe, also, that inferences or conclusions, as such, partake 
 in some mode of the nature of their premises; for they are 
 caused by them. Hence, principles or premises that are evi- 
 dent and absolute, furnish conclusions which are necessary and 
 evident in virtue of those premises. I ^ T^l ^ 
 
 *"Natuva non deficit in necessariis." Nature is not deficient in what ii 
 necessary . 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 MEANS OF ATTAINING TRUTH WITH CERTAINTY. 
 
 The means of attaining truth may be classified under the 
 following heads, viz. : ist, the faculty of consciousness ; 2d, 
 the internal senses and the external senses ; 3d, the ideas 
 which the mind has acquired, and which it compares among 
 themselves, or, simple Apprehension, Judgment and Reason- 
 ing; 4th, Testimony or Authority, which exacts rational assent. 
 
 AR T I C L E I. 
 
 THE POWER OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 The word consciousness is here used to signify the power or 
 faculty of the mind to reflect on its own modifications or oper- 
 ations, together with the act of thus reflexively seeing what 
 is within itself In this sense it corresponds to the Latin 
 phrases, sensus i?itimus, conscieiitia rejlexa, and is, therefore, not 
 only the power, but includes the act of the mind by which it 
 sees and recognizes what happens within itself, as its own. 
 Hence, it has for its immediate object internal facts; i. <?., ist, 
 the modifications of the mind alone, as ideas, judgments, acts 
 of volition; 2d, modifications of the human compound, as 
 grief, gladness, cold, hunger. The act or modification of the 
 mind is not anything really distinct from the mind itself ; it is 
 the mnid acting within itself as subject and object. In an act 
 of consciousness two things are always seen, at least con- 
 fusedly, viz., the impression, and the subject of it; for the im- 
 82 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 83 
 
 pression is always perceived in concrete, as it is ; therefore, it 
 is seen not as abstract or separate from the mind, but in the 
 mind itself. For the mind knows itself as a living principle of 
 action, by its own operations ; /. <f., it knows its acts, as its own. 
 The faculty or power of consciousness does not attain physi- 
 cally and immediately to external objects; but it becomes cog- 
 nizant of them only as they are presented through the action 
 of the senses, the imagination, and as seen through the ideas 
 or concepts in the intellect, but without directly perceiving 
 the internal ;;/^^«/;;/. (Vide page 62, ;/<?/<?.) Without this power 
 of the mind we could have no reflex knowledge of anything; 
 even evidence itself can only become a motive of philosophical 
 certainty when it is an object of consciousness; or is reflexively 
 seen as such. The action of consciousness is implied in all 
 judgments; for it is the directing and controlling influence in 
 all the mind's completely rational action. 
 
 Consciousness, therefore, affords an unerring motive of cer- 
 tainty, as to the truth of its objects; that is, both of our ex- 
 istence and the mind's own modifications. 
 
 This proposition cannot be logically demonstrated, since the 
 formal argument would explicitly assume what is in question ; 
 but, on the other hand, we cannot conceive or declare a doubt 
 of it, except on its own testimony. All demonstration presup- 
 poses some truths that are known per se, that is, evident in 
 themselves without proof ; or, such as are known through our 
 cognoscive powers by their own objective evidence, as facts 
 which neither require nor admit any demonstration ; what we 
 know by the direct and immediate act of consciousness is an 
 evident fact of this kind. It neither admits nor requires 
 demonstration ; for, the understanding clearly perceives the 
 truth in the objects of its own acts, as self-evident; and it is 
 absurd either to doubt or to attempt the a priori proof of what 
 is self-evident. To deny the absolute certainty of its testi- 
 mony is to reject all certainty, and the right use of reason, and 
 logic itself; which would be either intellectual blindness or 
 moral perversity. 
 
 The fact that persons who are delirious, or dream, do not 
 
84 logic: second part. 
 
 have normal action of consciousness, and do not thereby 
 either perceive or acquire truth, does not mihtate against the 
 thesis, tliat consciousness affords an infallible motive of cer- 
 tainty as to its own objects. In such conditions the mind per- 
 ceives and judges by the phantoms of a disturbed imagination. 
 This organ, in those states, has none but disordered action ; 
 for, when diseased or disturbed, the imagination cannot coop- 
 erate in rational thought, as will be more fully explained in an- 
 other place. As disturbed water reflects images in distorted 
 fragments ; so, when the fancy is in an abnormal state, its action 
 is morbid and disorderly, and its imagery is in undistinguisha- 
 ble confusion. 
 
 When this organ is so diseased or disordered as not to have 
 normal action, the intellect is thereby more or less completely 
 shut off, according to the extent and nature of the affection, 
 from the entire world of realities, with which the fancy, as will 
 be again remarked m the next article, is its essential medium 
 of communication; and, in this state of seclusion, it is either 
 wholly or partially unable to distinguish what is merely of the 
 sickly fancy, from what is objectively real. In such case, this 
 organ either forms no image at all of objects acting on the 
 external senses, or those images are distorted and confused. 
 Even in dreams, the action of the external senses being sus- 
 pended, and those senses thereby ceasing to present real ob- 
 jects to the imagination, it is not then a medium of rational 
 communication for the soul with real or actual objects; which 
 strikingly shows how entirely dependent the intellect is on the 
 imagination, for all the objects of its action. 
 
 By the power of consciousness it is sometimes difficult to 
 distinguish in impressions that are even but recently pas^, 
 whether they were acts of the will, or acts of the soul as not 
 free; especially since the "acts and affections of the will are, 
 by their nature, more obscure than are the acts of direct per- 
 ception or judgment. But even in this and analogous cases, 
 in which truth may be difficult of attainment, close observa- 
 tion of what actually occurs in the mind, with careful reflec- 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 85 
 
 tion, secures the judgment from error, especially if the mind 
 merely affirms what it perceives, and as it perceives it. 
 
 Abnormal action of the faculties proc-eeds from a disturbed 
 condition of the bodily organs, and is an exceptional case, that 
 properly has nothing to do with the thesis; for it has reference 
 to the operations of the mind only in its sound condition. The 
 causes of diseased mental action properly pertain to another 
 science for their analysis. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 THE senses; the nature and function of organic 
 
 POWERS. 
 
 The senses, sensation, the nature of organic action, also the 
 nature and specific objects of intellectual action, are explained 
 somewhat diffiisely in this article and the succeeding one; be- 
 cause a clear distinction between organic action and intellectual 
 action is of the utmost importance, even for the very beginning 
 of philosophic study. That distinction is ignored in some 
 popular works on philosophy, and is directly denied in others, 
 either because their authors had made no careful and con- 
 siderate examination of the subject, or because it was their 
 pleasure to teach an hypothesis which identifies matter and 
 intellect. 
 
 The old philosophers classified the senses as internal and 
 external. The ijiternal senses are, imaginatio7i; sensile mem- 
 ory; potentia cestimativa^ox power of estimating material things, 
 as good or evil for sensible appetite; seiisus cotnmiinis, "com- 
 mon sense," an organic power, by which the impressions made 
 on the external senses are sensibly distinguished from each 
 other. 
 
 A sensible organ, or an organic power, is a member of the 
 living animal compound, i, e., compound of a substantial vital 
 principle, and matter; it is capable of vital action in respect to 
 its proper objects, and is ordained by its nature to sustain and 
 perfect the living organism to which it pertains. Hence, sen- 
 
86 logic; second part. 
 
 sible power essentially belongs to animal nature, and is, there- 
 fore, living, and corporeal or inaterial. 
 
 Imagination, and fancy, are two names for the same organic 
 power, or internal sense, and are used in this work indiscrimi- 
 nately; the former word is derived from the Latin language; 
 the latter, from the Greek. Imagination is the power of form- 
 ing and reproducing sensible images made out of the impres- 
 sions received by the senses from external objects. Sensile* 
 memory is the organic power by which these impressions are 
 retained, and recognized when they are reproduced ; or, more 
 explicitly, sensile memory, which is an organic power, is the 
 faculty of retaining the quasi concepts or ifite?itio?ts of those im- 
 pressions and images in the fancy, and sensibly recognizing 
 them when they are reproduced. 
 
 If the reproduction of the past impression- be understood to 
 include the recalling of it, then, the reproduction of an impres- 
 sion may be referred, under different respects, both to the 
 imagination and the memory. 
 
 The intellectual memory is not an organic power, but is a 
 faculty of the soul itself, having no more direct dependence 
 on the organs of the body than the understanding or will has. 
 
 THE CONNEXION OF THE INTERNAL SENSES, AND THEIR 
 DEPENDENCE ON EACH OTHER. 
 
 T\\Q potentia CRst.itnativa is the power of duly estimati?ig, i. e., 
 sensibly appreciating the fitness or unfitness of an object to 
 satisfy the wants of animal nature, or, as good or harmful for 
 it. The sensus conununis, which is analogous to the potentia 
 cestimativa, is the basis of all the external senses, and is thus 
 comnio7i to them, somewhat as the sense of touch, under an- 
 other respect, may be regarded as the basis of all the senses;! 
 but it moreover distinguishes the impressions made on the five 
 external senses from one another. It was argued thus : even 
 
 *It is manifest that sensile is here a more proper term than sensible, sensitive or 
 *entient, any one of which would be equivocal in this connexion. 
 
 t " Omnes alii sensus fundantur supra factum. " (Div. Th. , 1 p. , qu. 76, a. 
 B.) All the other senses are founded on that of touch. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 87 
 
 the brute animal feels that it sees, feels that it hears, feels that 
 It smells, etc. ; but the eye cannot distinguish between color 
 and sound, the ear cannot distinguish between sound and smell, 
 etc. ; there-lore, there must be an organic power which receives, 
 feels, and distinguishes all these impressions made upon the 
 external organs. To do this, is the function of the sensus com- 
 7?iu?iis, or "common sense," so called, because, as already ob- 
 served, it is the common basis and principle of unity for all the 
 five external senses. The imagination^ which is also an internal 
 sense, forms its images or phafitasmata from the impressions 
 made through the external senses on the sensus conwmnis; the 
 potentia cestijnativa, i. e., the power of estimating or valuing 
 objects as good or hurtful for appetite, makes its appreciation 
 or estimate of its objects as presented to it by images i?i the 
 fancy; and in this act the potetitia cestimativa forms for itself 
 qitasi concepts expressing the nses, ^^ intentions" of sensible 
 objects, and these quasi concepts are retained by the sensile 
 memory. All these powers are purely organic, and are situated 
 in the brain. They are possessed by all the perfect animals : 
 i. e., all animals that havey?z'<? external senses. 
 
 They discriminate, in certain instances, between the prop- 
 erties of objects presented to them through the external senses; 
 not, however, by way of a formal judgment; but by a true, 
 though sensible, appreciation of them.* 
 
 But the potentia cestimativa, as it is in man, is far more per- 
 fect than it is in irrational animals. In man it is not limited 
 in its action to merely appreciating a sensible object as useful 
 or hurtful for appetite : but it can co?npare particular and sin- 
 gular objects of the kind among themselves, in a manner not 
 unhke to that in which the intellect compares universals, and it 
 
 * ''Opinio passionem facit in appetitu, non autem imaginatio; si enim prae- 
 cise imagine7nur liostes, non statim timemus aut riigimus; secus vero si opine- 
 mur prseseutes. Ratio est, quod sola apprehensio qualis est in phantasia, non 
 movet appetitum nisi accedat jestimativae operatio."— Musajum Philos. de 
 Anima. Opinion produces passion in the appetite, imagination does not; if 
 we merely imagine enemies, we do not at once flee away or fear; it is otherwise 
 though, if we have the opinion that they are present. The reason is, that the sole 
 apprehension as it is in the fancy cannot move appetite, unless there accede to 
 it the operation of the potentia cestimativa, which reputes the object to be real . - 
 
88 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 thus approaches to a nearer resemblance of intellectual action 
 Hence, this power in man, was termed vis. co^itativa^ or cogita 
 tive power; or, s\?,o, ratio partial laris, or particular rea soft; and 
 it was described by the old philosophers as the connecting link 
 in man between sense and reason. It is, therefore, under differ- 
 ent respects, boih the highest power of sense, and, in some 
 manner, the lowest power or act of reason : yet this power is, 
 in itself, merely organic. 
 
 The human soul, by the power of consciousness, can reflect 
 on its own acts and what affects it, and see these operations as 
 its own; but no sense or organic power, whether internal or 
 external, can reflect on itself or its own act ; this power of 
 reflex action pertains to simple intellectual substance only. 
 
 It is, perhaps, not too much to aftirm that no other theory 
 as yet proposed by philosophers, so consistently or so satis- 
 factorily explains the phenomena of what may be termed by 
 ^^nalogy, the brnte mind, or which accounts equally well for all 
 that which is merely sensible or organic operation, in man also. 
 
 THIS THEORY FOR THE EXPLANATION OF SENSE COGNITION, 
 ACCOUNTS CONSISTENTLY FOR ALL ITS PHENOMENA. 
 
 In order that the limits of purely sensible knowledge may 
 be more distinctly traced, and be more clearly seen, it will be 
 useful to consider this truth, namely, that the doctrine of in- 
 ternal sense, or internal organs of sensible cognition, i-; in itself 
 not rei)ugnant to the nature of organic power. For since the 
 fact IS undeniable that the senses have many virtues or perfec- 
 tions of various species and degrees, we can easily conceive 
 internal ones capable, without at all transcending the specific 
 nature of organic power, of receiving and acting on the impres- 
 sions conveyed to them by the external senses, as their conna- 
 tural objects; analogously to the manner in which the external 
 senses receive and act on impressions from their objects. 
 
 Since the sense has no reflex action, the impression which is 
 actually in it must be immediately produced by the object and 
 the organ, and as the object is singular, concrete and material, 
 the impression as in the organ, though vitally received by it, 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 89 
 
 must be a material effect. Both the organ, and the object 
 are material ; therefore, the effect of their combined action is 
 material. The material nature or character of the impression 
 in the external sense, is all that is/<fr se or necessarily required 
 to constitute it the connatural object of another organic power 
 that is sui)erior to the external sense. That the fancy is an 
 internal organic power of this kind, i. e., that its proper oi 
 connatural object is an impression furnished by the external 
 sense, will be rendered more manifest by what is to be shown 
 a little further on. 
 
 They who deny or fail to recognize the existence of internal 
 senses, attribute all sensible operation, whose principle is not 
 obvious, or which cannot be explained by the action of exter- 
 nal sense alone, either to instinct or to intellect. Instinct, in 
 such theory, is a vague and indeterminate power which is 
 'made to account f)r all cognoscive operation which transcends 
 the capacity of external sense. But this is to evade the diffi- 
 culty, n^t to explain it. Instinct,* more precisely and accu- 
 rately understood, is a natural impulse and positive tendency 
 to some vital action which is useful or necessary for the indi- 
 vidual agent or its species, that utility of the action not being 
 apprehended or known by it as an e?id to be attained. Thus 
 we explain some actions of beavers, ants, migratory birds, etc. 
 They apprehend certain sensible objects, and are moved by 
 them to action ; but the design or intention of the end in their 
 action, we ascribe, through the law of their nature, to the 
 Author of their being. 
 
 Considered in itself, instinct appears to be a virtue or prin- 
 ciple of action superadded to nature as operative, over and 
 above appetite and cognition ; subserved by them, and direc- 
 tive of them and the subject to which they belong, in certain 
 matters in which those powers are not sufficient for the end to 
 be attained. 
 
 In order not to confound merely organic action with intel- 
 lectual action, we must not lose sight of the truth that their 
 
 »Div. Th. 1, 2, p. on 40, a. 3. 
 
90 logic: second part. 
 
 objects are essentially distinct ;* the formal, proper, connatural 
 object of organic power or sense, is the sin.o^ular, or concrete 
 and material XQ'aXw.y \ that of the intellect, is the abstract, uni- 
 versal or intelligible, which is, of its nature, absolutely super- 
 sensible^ and is therefore immaterial. 
 
 THE BRUTE SOUL, ANIMA BELLUINA, IS MATERIAL. 
 
 Brutes evidently have those cognitions that are perfected in 
 sense alone; though they show no signs whatever that they 
 possess intellect or free will. Their action is physically neces- 
 sary and uniform, quid detentmiatmn ad tmum, " what is deter- 
 mined to one mode of action." An agent which is thus limited 
 to that action which is physically necessary has, of course, no 
 rational empire over its own operation, and, therefore, has no 
 intelligent principle of action. 
 
 It cannot be legitimately denied that an agent which depends 
 on matter in all its action, also depends on matter in existing, 
 according to the metaphysical principle, " modus agendi sequi- 
 tur modum essendi," "action is according to the essence of the 
 agent:" or, that which is material in its action is also material 
 in its essence; and hence, knowing the action, we may justly 
 conclude a posteriori to the essence or nature of the agent that 
 puts it. This axiom holds true, whether the agent is the uni- 
 vocal, or the equivocal cause of the effect produced by means 
 of its act. 
 
 The argument may be stated more strictly in form, thus: all 
 organic action is material action, because both the organ is 
 material, and its object is per se material ; the brute mind has 
 none but organic action, and, therefore, it has none but mate- 
 rial action.! But that which wholly depends on matter in its 
 
 * " Sentire, et consequentes operationes animas sensitivas, accidunt cum ali- 
 qua corporis immutatioue . . intelligere exercetur sine organo corporeo. ' ' 
 (Vide DiT. Thorn. Sum., 1 p., qu. 75, a. 3.) To feel sensibly, and the coaise- 
 quent operations of the sensitive soul, happen Avith some change in the body 
 . . . to understand, is exercised Avitlaout a bodily organ. 
 
 t ' * Cum animse brutorura animalium non per se operentur, non sunt subsis- 
 tentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem. ' ' (Div. Th. 1 p. 
 qu. 78, a 3.) Since the souls of brute animals do not operate per se, they do not 
 subsist, (or exist alone or apart from matter) , for every thing exists and acta iu 
 a similar manner. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 91 
 
 action, also depends- wholly on matter in existing; now, the 
 brute soul is affixed to matter and Hmited to matter in all its 
 action ; it is, therefore, similarly dependent on matter in exist- 
 ing ; i. e., it can not exist per se, or a/o/ie and aj>ar^ from 
 matter, but only dependently on it. 
 
 The torce of this reasoning will be still more clearly perceived, 
 if it be borne in mind that we not only know an agent by its 
 action, and know it only by its action; but its action is, in 
 some proper sense of the words, the 7neasure of its essence ; 
 "unumquodque agit in quantum est actu, i. e., in quantum 
 forma actuatum ; " " every thing has action^ in proportion as it 
 has actual essence T 
 
 THE HUxMAN SOUL A SPIRITUAL OR IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE. 
 
 By similar reasoning it follows that since the acts of the 
 human soul, intellection and volition, are wholly inorganic, for 
 their objects are wholly immaterial, and the intellect and will 
 elicit their acts alojie^ i. e., without any other second cause as 
 a concurrent principle, the soul is therefore inimaterial; or, 
 since the human soul operates /<fr ^(f, or without direct depend- 
 ence on matter, it also can exist per se, or is an immaterial 
 substance. 
 
 The intellect knows material or sensible things by their intel- 
 ligible essence;* i. e., by real intellectual types or simihtudes of 
 them expressed in concepts of their essence ; hence, it knows 
 material things in an immaterial manner, which it is not possi- 
 ble for organic power to do. 
 
 The human soul, when existing separate from the body, is 
 said to subsist incompletely ; because, by its very nature, it is 
 ordained to substantial union with the body. But, considered 
 as a substance, it can be said to exist completely when in that 
 state, because it exists per se; i. e., it, as it were, stands alone, 
 or exists without leaning or depending on another thing, by in- 
 hering in it. 
 
 ♦"Essentiae rerum mater ialium sunt in intellectu hominis, vel an^eli, ut 
 intellectum est in intelligente, et uon secundum suum esse reale. ' ' (Sum. , 1 P. , 
 Qu. 57, Art. 1, Ad. 2.) The essences of material things are in the intellect of 
 man, or the angel, as that which is understood is in that which understands, 
 and not as to their real existence. 
 
955 logic: second part. 
 
 It would seem necessarily to follow from what is said above 
 that the brute soul, anima bel/iiina, is a substantial and living 
 principle, or, as expressed by the old philosophers, forma sub- 
 staiitialis et priiicipium vivens; and, in fact, such it evidently 
 must be. Yet, its total dependence on matter in operating 
 proves that it is totally of matter also in existing ; it can exist 
 only in union by composition with matter, and it is, therefore, 
 only incomplete^ and, at the same time, partial substance. 
 
 Besides, even if we conceived it absolutely possible for the 
 brute soul to exist separate from matter, to which it must 
 naturally be affixed in existing, as shown above ; then it could 
 have no sensible action, for it would be destitute of an organ ; 
 it could have no spiritual action, for it would have no intellect; 
 therefore, its state would be that of mere potentiality, or exist- 
 ence without action ; i. e., the supposition is absurd. 
 
 IS THE IMAGINATION AN ORGANIC POWER; OR, IS THE SUBJECT 
 IN WHICH IT RESIDES, THE SOUL; I. E., THE SPIRITUAL 
 SUBSTANCE AS ESSENTIALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM MATTER ? 
 
 The imagination or fancy is organic ; or, its subject is the 
 living compound, and not the soul or spiritual substance alone; 
 its peculiar function in man is to serve the intellect, or to pre- 
 sent objects to it by means of true images of those objects.* 
 
 It is an organic power, for the brute animal possesses no 
 higher principle of action than that of sense or organic power, 
 as already seen ; but the brute has imagination, and even sen- 
 sible memory also; for the arguments which prove the exist- 
 ence of fancy in them, at the same time conclusively show 
 them to possess organic or sensible memory. For the perfect 
 animal, imagination is physically necessary, since it must know 
 sensible things not only as present and acting on its external 
 organs ; but it must know them when they are absent so that 
 ,it may tend to such objects as are necessary for sustenance, 
 
 * * 'Anima rationalis, licet quamdiu corpus informat, supponat operationera 
 phantasiae quas per organiim operatur, tamen oi-gano non elicit suam intcllec- 
 tionem." (Irenaeus Cai-mclit, et philosophi passim.) The rational soul, though 
 so long as it informs the Ijody it suppose the operation of fimcy which act* 
 through an organ, does not elicit its intellection by an organ. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 93 
 
 preservation, etc. But to form and preserve the images of 
 sensible things, to reproduce and recognize them, are respect- 
 ively the functions of fancy and sensible memory. Since brutes 
 have no intellect, this power must be merely organic in them ; 
 it follows, therefore, that the faculty, imagination, is, at least, 
 not pe7' se, or necessarily intellectual. 
 
 But even in man this power can form the image of no ob- 
 ject except one that is either sensible in itself, or which it can 
 represent as invested with sensible forms or qualities. Now, 
 a power that can have no object of action but that which is 
 sefisibk, and, therefore, material, must itself be material; for 
 the 7iatiire of a power is known by the specific objects of its 
 action, since action follows the nature, or agrees with the nature 
 of the agent. The imagination in man is, therefore, an organic 
 power, or its subject is the living compound of soul and body. 
 Or, in fewer words, the imagination is not an intellectual prin- 
 ciple, because its connatural object is only the sensible or 
 material ; and, hence, it is per se, or essentially material or 
 organic. 
 
 The imagination in man is sometimes termed ''the medium 
 between the senses and the intellect;" ''phantasia est media 
 inter sensum et intellectum." Hence, without the action of 
 the external senses, the fancy could form no images of sensible 
 objects; without the action of the fancy, the intellect could 
 not naturally have any communication whatever with any real 
 object, or any sensible power of cognition, and hence it would 
 be totally insulated from all the proper objects of its action. 
 The fandy, therefore, is for the intellect the essential medium 
 of conununicatiori with the entire order of reality. As we are 
 now constituted, the intellect cannot contemplate or even per- 
 ceive any object, except as in some manner embodied and 
 I'ejlected in that ??iinor* 
 
 The fancy can form no image every real component of 
 which was not originally acquired by the actual observation 
 
 ♦"Corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicnt organum quo talis 
 actio exerceatur, sed ratioue objecti . ' ' (Div. Th. 1 p, qu. 75, a. 2, ad. 3.) ' 'The 
 body is required for the action of the intellect, not as an organ by which such 
 action is exercised, but on account oj the object. 
 
94 logic: second part. 
 
 of sensible things : a man blind from his birth can have in his 
 fancy no real image of color; " quibus deficit unus sensus, 
 deficit una scientia; " "they who never pofisessed any one 
 sense, are destitute of one species of cognition." 
 
 WHAT, IN REGARD TO MENTAL THOUGHT, IS THE SPECIAL 
 FUNCTION OR ACT OF THE IMAGINATION, WHOSE CONNA- 
 TURAL OBJECT, AS ALREADY SHOWN, IS PER SE MATERIAL. 
 
 Imagination is generically the same in man and brute; in man 
 it forms and presents images to the intellect, which the intellect 
 contemplates, and by abstraction forms from them its intel- 
 ligible concepts or ideas of things.* In the brute its images 
 serve as objects for the faculty of sense, termed potentia cesti- 
 mativa, or power of sensibly discerning objects as good or 
 noxious for the animal : t called by what name soever, unde- 
 niable facts prove that brute animals possess this faailiy of 
 distinguishing such uses or intentions of sensible objects, no 
 less than facts also prove demonstratively that they have no 
 intellectual act. 
 
 That no brute faculty can apprehend the abstract or universal, 
 or can judge, is strictly demonstrated by induction only ; but 
 this induction, it cannot be questioned, has long since actually 
 been made by mankind, logically, over and over again, and in 
 the most general manner; and each one's daily observation 
 verifies the conclusion which is known, as a fact, to have been 
 reached by mankind. Whence it logically suffices here merely 
 to affirm the impossibility of any duly attested law or fact of 
 brute action being adduced, which cannot be fully accounted 
 for, by the operation of sensible or organic powers, as they are 
 above described. 
 
 * With strange confusion, both of thought and of language, this action of the 
 intellect is, by certain writers, called imagination. Wherefore, since this volume 
 contains no treatise on the science of Psychology, it was judged advisable to 
 explain, more fully and explicitly in this place the specific and distinguishing 
 acts of fancy and intellect, than is strictly pertinent to a work on Logic and 
 General Metaphysics. 
 
 t "Ad apprehendendimi intenliones quae per sensimiuon accipiuntur ordinatur 
 vis aBStimativa." (Div. Th., 1 p., qu. 78, a. 4.) The vis cBStimativa, or power 
 of sensibly appreciating, is ordained for apprehending the uses or intentions 
 Which are not received through the external sense. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 95 
 
 THE NATURE AND THE CONNATURAL OBJECT OF THE EXTER- 
 NAL senses; they do not err per SE, L E., they CAN- 
 NOT PHYSICALLY CAUSE ERROR. 
 
 The external senses are the five organs through which the 
 mind becomes cognizant of various exterior* objects, by- 
 means of the properties of those objects. The organs are in 
 themselves capable of being acted on, and of conveying to 
 the mind the impressions received, but are indifferent as to 
 their particular object; their action is determined in species 
 by the connatural and singular object, which is duly present 
 to them. The external senses are, sight, hearing, touch, taste, 
 smell. 
 
 Senset is an organic power of the soul, and is cognoscive 
 only of those thmgs that are singular and material; i. e., ist, 
 it is an active principle, whose subject is ma?i, or the compound 
 of soul and body, and not a part only of man, as is the case 
 with the intellect, whose subject is the spiritual substance of the 
 soul alone, not the compound ; 2d, sense is termed organic, be- 
 cause it is affixed to an orga?i, which, as already observed, is a 
 compound of soul and matter; and hence, under this respect, 
 sejtse could also be denominated a power of the body, or a cor- 
 poreal power; 3d, it perceives or apprehends only the sijigu- 
 lar; i. e., the concrete, determinate individual; while the in- 
 tellect, on the contrary, has for its object the univeisal; 4th, 
 it cannot attain in its action to every species of si?tgular thing; 
 V. g., it cannot perceive an angel, but its object is only the sin- 
 gular which is at the same time material.\ The sensible, there- 
 fore, or the object of se?ise, may be defined to be "any material, 
 
 * ' ' Sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum; 
 similiter neque imaginatio." (Div. Ttiom. 1 P., Qu. 57, Art. 1, ad. 2.) Sense 
 does not apprehend the essences of things, but only exterior accidents; like- 
 wise, the imagination does not apprehend the essences of things. 
 
 t " Sensus est facultas animae organica, singularium materialium cognosci- 
 tiva." Sense is an organic power of tlie soul, capable of knowing singulax 
 material objects. 
 
 \ ' ' Omne sensibile est materiale. ' ' Whatever is sensible is material. 
 
96 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 extended, and singular object or being, which is perfective of 
 sense or organic power, by intimate conjunction with it."* 
 
 An object is sensible^ either per se,\ ox per accidens; an object 
 is sensible per se or of itself, which has, of its own nature, the 
 power of perceptibly affecting, or producing an impression on 
 the sense; v. g., light has of itself, and by its own nature, the 
 power of physically producing such impression on the eye; heat, 
 on the touch, etc. 
 
 An object is said to be se?isible per accidens, when, without 
 having any power in itself to act on the sense, yet it has con- 
 joined with it some property or accide?it by means of which it 
 does become known as present. In this case, while it does 
 not itself physically act on the sense, yet it becomes known to 
 tlie sense in some manner, by means of another thing in con- 
 junction with it, that does thus act; v. g., Soci'ates has cotn- 
 plexion, animal heat, etc.; the color can be seen per se, the heat 
 can be felt per se ; but it is not Socrates the person that thus 
 acts per se on the sefises, for se7ise is immediately acted on, not 
 by substajice, but by accidents only; hence, Socrates is an object 
 that is sensible per accidens; or, more generally, substa?ice, as 
 such, is sensible only per accidens ; i. e., substance, as such, is 
 not properly a sensible object at all. 
 
 For an object to become seiisible per accidens, the following 
 conditions must be fulfilled ; ist, it must be susceptible of a 
 property or accident which x^perse, or of itself, capable of acting 
 on the sense, and also actually have such property or accident; 
 2d, it must be an object which can be known /^r se or in itself, 
 either by the intellect, or by some sense or organic power; 
 V. g , the senses perceive or know material substance per acci- 
 dens, the intellect alone can know liper se; i. e., as its proper 
 object; a colored object may be known per accidens by the 
 touch, but it is known per se, or as its proper object only by 
 
 *" Sensibile est ens materiale extensum, singulare, perfectiviim sensus per 
 intimani cum eo conjunctiouem." The sensible is a material being, extended; 
 singular, and perfective of sense by intimate conjxiuction with it. 
 
 t * ' Sensus externus non fertur in priBteritum nee futurum. ' ' External sense 
 does not attain to that which is past, or future. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 97 
 
 the Slight. If both the foregoing conditions be not verified, 
 an object cannot, indeed, be known by the senses at all. 
 
 I'he sensible per se is either proper, or common; the prope)^ 
 sensible is what can be perceived by one sense and only by 
 one sense; v. g,, color, as such, is the proper object of sight 
 only, and therefore it cannot be perceived, as such, by any 
 other sense. 
 
 The common se?isible, f is what can be perceived by more 
 senses than one, and it is on that account said to be common 
 to them, or their common object. Under the name, common 
 sensible, five classes of sensible objects are enumerated as in- 
 cluding all things to which the term is applicable; viz.: " motion, 
 rest, number, figure and size." These are all objects both of 
 sight and touch, and they may, also, in certain cases, fall under 
 the other senses, as a little reflection will show. All the qual- 
 ities or accidents of material objects which can be perceived 
 by more senses than one, can be reduced to one or other of 
 the preceding five genera of common sensibles. Size, as per- 
 ceived by the eye, is modified and corrected when perceived 
 by the touch ; and vice versa. Distance seen by the eye, and 
 distance attested by the touch, serve to correct and perfect the 
 judgment of it in the mind. 
 
 It may be said, then; ist, that the common sensible modifies 
 i\\Q proper; 2d, that the sensible per accidens is known only by 
 means of \.\\q proper, but it does not in any manner modify the 
 action of \\-\q proper sensible \ on its own particular organ; 3d, 
 
 *"Proprium sensibile uno solo sensu sentitur: commune, pluribus." The 
 proper sensible is apprehemled by one sense only : the common, by more than one. 
 
 t " Communia non sunt sensibilia per accidens; quia hujusmodi sensibilia 
 aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatioue sensus ' ' (alterius) . (Div. Thorn. 
 Ip., qu. 7S, art. 4, ad. .2.) The common sensible is not sensible merely per 
 accidens^ for it really causes an efl'ect on the sense. 
 
 X ' ' Sensibile per accidens nuUam vim habet ex se movendi vel immutandi sen 
 sum. * ' The sensibile per accidens has no power, of itself , of moving or immedi 
 ately aQecting sense. 
 
 " Pro;n-mm est quod ita uno sensu percipitur, ut alio percipi nonpossit; et 
 circa quod sensus errare non potest. Commune est, quod pluribus sensibus 
 potest percipi, et circa quod sensus potest falli.'^ 'Hhe proper sensible is, xn^v- 
 ceived by one sense only, and it cannot be apprehended by another : in regard 
 to it, the sense cannot err. The common sensible can be perceived by move 
 senses than one, unu in respect to it, the sense can err. 
 
98 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 in the common sensible, the same property may be perceived 
 through different organs, but it is done by specifically different 
 action in them. 
 
 The mind is invincibly impelled to refer the impressions 
 received through the senses to the external objects acting on 
 them, and thereby manifesting themselves to it as their cause; 
 not, however, by blind impulse, but by the evidence. The 
 mind thus refers the impressions received, even before any 
 reflex judgment, because it thereby actually perceives through 
 the senses the properties or objects that produce them. This 
 inborn and resistless propensity to refer our sensations, or the 
 impressions made on the senses, to corporeal or physically 
 existing beings, as their actual cause ; or, in other words, this 
 sensation thus received and referred, is the testimony afforded 
 by the senses. 
 
 Sensible objects act through their properties on the organs ; 
 these properties are, ist, primary or absolute properties; that 
 is, such as, in some manner, flow from their essence, and with- 
 out which they cannot naturally exist; as, etctension, figure, 
 motion, or rest ; 2d, relative or seco?idary properties ; as, color, 
 taste, particular size, etc. But as the senses do not of them- 
 selves judge, and are incapable of reflex action, it is only the 
 mind that perceives the nature of objects, or that of their prop- 
 erties. It is true that there is an implicit or imitated judg- 
 ment in every sensation as such, since it may be regarded 
 as an affirmation, in a wide sense of the term ; but, because 
 the action of sense is in itself entirely subject to physical and 
 natural law, this implicit or imitated judgment must be referred 
 through the law of their nature, in obedience to which they 
 act necessarily and truly, to the Creator of the senses.* Ex- 
 
 * " Veritas aliqiia rppcritiir in simplici mentis conceptione,neqiie solum men- 
 tis, sed etiam sensiuim . . constat quae et qualis sit hjcc Veritas qnai in sim- 
 plici mentis notitia reperitur: nihil enim alind est quam Veritas ipsa transcend- 
 entalis, his entibus accommodata." (Suarez Metaph., Disp. 8, Sect. 3.) There 
 Is a kind of truth found in the simple conception of the mind, and not only in 
 the conceptions of the mind, but in those also of the senses. . . . It is clear 
 of what nature this truth is, Avhich is found in the simple knowledge of the 
 mind: it is indeed nothing else than transcendental truth, accommodated to 
 those things 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 99 
 
 ternal objects, as remarked, act through their properties on the 
 senses ; the senses are, therefore, said to know per accidens, or 
 accidentally, the substance; it being invariably conjoined with 
 those properties. But, substance is per se known, i. e., can 
 be smd formally 3.nd property to be known by the intellect only. 
 
 DOES THE MIND, THEN, ATTAIN TO THE CERTAIN KNOWL- 
 EDGE OF OUTWARD OR SENSIBLE OBJECTS BY MEANS OF 
 THE SENSES? 
 
 The soul informs* each organ of sense ; and on that account 
 the soul is the principle through which the organ feels, or acts 
 vitally ; and hence, by some, consciousness, or the soul as con- 
 scious, is termed the basis of sensation. Yet, the soul being 
 affixed to an organ, its natural action through that organ is 
 subject to necessary law ; i. e., the organs of sense, in actually 
 perceiving the impressions from external objects, are governed 
 by physical laws of nature which are immutable, except by 
 miracle. When an organ is in its normal condition, the object 
 and concurrent circumstances being the same, the organic 
 action will always be the same ; but a change in the normal 
 state of the organ will, in obedience to physical law, modify 
 the impression received from those objects, according to the 
 nature and extent of that change.! 
 
 But it will help to the clearer intelligence of the matter, if 
 we consider these sensible impressions : ist, as they affect the 
 organ, and are modifications of it; 2d, as representative of the 
 objects from which they are received. These imprcAsions, con- 
 sidered as modifications of the organ, are always true, whether 
 the mind errs in its judgment or not ; for, whether the organ 
 be well or ill disposed, it conveys the impression just as it 
 receives it. There is in it that necessary action which belongs 
 to all agents, which operate in obedience to natural law ; and, 
 therefore, if the organ be disordered, the impression received 
 
 *^' Forma est prineipium agendi in unoquoque. ' ' The form is the prlnciplt 
 of action in every objeet. 
 
 t *' Quidqiiid recipitiir, secundum modura recipientis r«cipitur. ' ' Whatever 
 in received, is received according to the nature of the recipient. 
 
100 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 is modified by die disease, according to the nature and extent 
 of the affection ; but it still conveys what it receives, no more, 
 no less. Therefore, the senses /<fr j^, or of themselves, do not 
 deceive, since they act by the necessary laws of nature itself, 
 and these laws are true and uniform; i. e., they always act \n 
 ♦he same manner, under the same circumstances. 
 
 But when we consider sensible impressions as repj-eseutafive 
 of the objects from which they are received, the senses, being 
 ill-disposed, or right means not being employed to use them 
 prudently in judging, may become the occasion, but not strictly 
 the efficient cause, of error. Thus, when the palate is disor- 
 dered, that may seem to the mind to taste bitter which is in 
 itself sweet ; to a diseased eye, that may seem yellow which is 
 really white ; but, in these cases, the qualities tasted and seen 
 are not really, or a parte rei, the sweet or white in the objects; 
 but these qualities as modified or overpowered by other causes. 
 It is not the function ot the sense to judge, or distinguish 
 cause and effect ; this is the function of the mind ; the only 
 proper office of the organ is to receive the impression as given 
 and convey it to the mind as received. Hence, the senses, by 
 accident, not per se, may be the cause, or rather the occasion^ 
 of erroneous judgment. 
 
 For the testimony of the senses to afford an infallible motive 
 of certainty, the following conditions must be fulfilled : ist, 
 the object must be duly present ; otherwise, a steeple, for 
 example, that is square may be judged to be round; 2d, the 
 organs of sensation must be in a healthy or 7iormal condition; 
 v. g., a jaundiced eye makes all objects appear with a yellow 
 tinge; 3d, there must be agreement in the sensations received, 
 both through the same organ, and different organs, according 
 to the nature of the object ; and they should be compared by 
 the mind ; in default of this condition, a staff that is partly in 
 the water will be judged to be crooked, when in reality it is 
 straight, the different refracting powers of air and water not 
 being attended to by the mind. 
 
 Thus we have certainty as to external objects, because they 
 afford the mind, through the organs of sense, the evidence of 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 101 
 
 their existence, qualities, etc. ; and, therefore, the mind is cer- 
 tain of their truth, because it sees that truth. From this it fol- 
 lows that the certainty which we have through the testimony of 
 the senses is founded on eindence, the ultimate motive of all 
 genuine certainty ; lor we see the essential connection between 
 the testimony of the senses, and the reality of their objects, on 
 the one hand ; and on the other, the divine veracity ; and this 
 is evidence. 
 
 To affirm that the objects of sense can per se cause error ; 
 i. e., by their own real action produce error ^ is to compromise 
 divine veracity; because the physical laws of nature depend 
 for their force and whole efficacy on God ; and natural falsity^ 
 either in them or in the objects subject to them, would be refer- 
 able to God as its cause. 
 
 As the imagination, or power of forming and reproducing 
 images of things, is organic; that is, the soul in intimate union 
 by real composition with, and acting through, a material organ 
 as its instrument ; it is liable, as already remarked, to disease 
 and disordered action, inasmuch as it is material. Hence, this 
 organ, above all others, may interrupt or disturb the normal 
 action of the mind ; since the mind, as we are actually consti- 
 tuted, can have no normal action without it; in other words, 
 the imagination truly co-operates in all thought, by presenting 
 or exhibiting its images, or the objects of thought in which the 
 intellect sees the intelligible. Whence it follows that the human 
 mind, while in connection with the body on earth, cannot 
 naturally have completely independent, or, in every respect, 
 purely spiritual action; i. e., it requires the aid of the imagina- 
 tion,* Yet, this aid is merely extrinsic ; for the acts of the 
 understanding are immanent, and are elicited by the faculty 
 alone, as their immediate or proximate principle. But, even 
 in the concepts of objects the most abstract, the imagination 
 co-operates with the action of the mind, by presenting terms 
 and various related objects under their quasi images or their 
 names. A striking proof of this necessary co-operation of 
 
 * VideS. Th. 1 p., qu. 84, a. 7. " Principinm nostrae cognitionis est a sensii." 
 The beginninsc of our knowledge is from the senses. 
 
102 logic: second part. 
 
 the imagination in all our intellectual action, as noticed iu 
 another place, may be drawn from the facts learned by obser- 
 vation of insane minds. The mind,- as such, or the soul, being 
 immaterial and simple, is incapable of dissolution or decom- 
 position, and, therefore, it cannot be diseased in its substance ; 
 but the imagination, being an organ, is material, and it is, 
 therefore, susceptible of disease. 
 
 To recapitulate what has been said : The action of external 
 objects (^n the sensible organs is modified by various causes, 
 which may all, however, be reduced to two classes; ist, the 
 medium through which the object acts may be more or less 
 changed by the agency of other mediums which intervene and 
 combine or mingle with it; v. g., the appearance of an object 
 seen at a distance is, in some instances, subject to many muta- 
 tions of color, figure and size, arising from vapors, by which 
 the refraction and transmission of light are changed. A second 
 class of causes which affect the sensation as actually received, 
 are such as influence the natural action of the organ itself; v. 
 g., disease, excitement, diminished activity, etc. Although the 
 external senses do not err per se, since they convey only the 
 impressions which they actually receive from physical and real 
 objects, even when these impressions happen to be modified 
 either in the medium or in the organ ; yet, it is conceded that 
 they may err per accide?is, or accideiitally* By this it is meant 
 that, under special conditions, their impressions are conjoined 
 with e7'ror in the cognition or judgment, which these impres- 
 sions do not physically produce, but to which, however, they 
 give occasioti. This is an exceptional case, is accidental, and 
 affords matter for exercising the intellectual virtues, art and 
 prudence,] 
 
 While this contingent and occasional error does not destroy 
 the essence of certainty in sensible cognitions, yet it cannot be 
 
 * " Qui occasione sensimm in errorem incidit, non ideo fallitur ob malum 
 mintium, sed quia ipse mains est judex. ' ' (S. Aug. de vera Relig., C. 33.) He 
 that by occasion of- the senses falls into error, is not therefore deceived because 
 of a bad witness, but because he himself is a bad judge. 
 
 t " Ars et prudentia circa contingentia versantur." Art and prudence re 
 gard contingent things as their proper objects. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 103 
 
 denied th:^t it weakens the force of such certainty in its whole 
 species.* 
 
 It should, perhaps, be said here, also, for the fuller explana- 
 tion of the whole subject, that the imagination^ when in an 
 abnormal state, as it is in the demented, errs per se, or, truly 
 causes error; for, in such condition of that organ, true judg- 
 ment is physically impossible^ at least in reference to some 
 matter; or, in other words, error is then physically necessary. 
 When the imagination is diseased, then by its own physical 
 action, or ex se, it obtrudes images or phantasmata before the 
 mind, which are objectively false, and which, nevertheless, the 
 intellect necessarily apprehends as being really true. Hence, 
 then, it may be argued thus: that organic t^owqx per se deceives, 
 which physically necessitates error in the judgment or cogni- 
 tion; but the insane fancy does this; therefore, the insane fancy 
 per se deceives. Hence it is that such agent becomes irre- 
 sponsible. 
 
 But obser/e that, on the contrary, the image furnished by a 
 disordered external sense, as a jaundiced eye, is not, in strict 
 language, objectively false; for, its object is real, not purely fic- 
 titious, as are the phantasms of an insane imagination ; and, 
 moreover, in the event, of abnormal sensations, correct knowl- 
 edge and true judgment are still attainable, which is not the 
 case in reference to the objects presented by the fancy when it 
 is organically diseased, so as to be incapable of normal action. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 SIMPLE APPREHENSION, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, ALL FUR- 
 NISH INFALLIBLE MOTIVES OF CERTAINTY, AS TO THEIR 
 PROPER OBJECTS. 
 
 The understanding, or intellect, is an inorganic faculty ; or, 
 
 * " Sensus fallitiu* circa proprium objectum; sed solum ;jer acciden-s, etrarius: 
 inde nihilominus naturalis cognitionis certitudinem minui, nemo negaverit." 
 (IveiuBus, De An., c. 2, sect. 2, §. 3.) The sense is deceived about its proper 
 object, but only per acddens , or by accident, and very rarely; hence, neverthe- 
 less, no one will deny that the certainty of natural cognition is thereby some- 
 what diminished. 
 
104 logic: second paet. 
 
 in other words, it is not affixed to any organ of the human 
 compound; but its acts are proximately from itself, and are, in 
 themselves, purely super-sensible ; and it resides in the soul, 
 as its only subject. 
 
 The formal, adequate and connatural object of the human 
 intellect, i. e., the intellect of man, who essentially consists of 
 soul and body united, by substantial composition^ is the quiddity^ 
 or essence^ of sensible things.* Its cognitions begin with the 
 sensible ; by means of the sensible it proceeds to the abstract 
 or super-sensible, which it understands by comparing it to cor- 
 poreal things, or the objects of sense, t The formal object of 
 cognition should be proportioned to, or commensurate with, 
 the power which knows; it, therefore, should possess a corres- 
 ponding degree of immateriality with it. In other words, the 
 object should be, in some proper sense of the terms, as far 
 removed from matter as the power; for, as cognoscive power 
 rises in perfection, so must its formal object rise also ; and as 
 the power approximates or recedes from matter, according to 
 the greater or less degree of its perfection, so also must its 
 object. 
 
 According to this principle, the uncreated essence of God, 
 is the commensurate or adequate object of the divine intellect; 
 spiritual or Angelic essence, i. e., created immaterial essence, 
 is the proportioned object of Angelic intellect; the essence of 
 the human soul, is the connatural and proportioned object of 
 the cognoscive soul when existing separated from the body ; 
 the essence of sensible things, is the primary and conwie?tsurate 
 object of the human intellect, when the soul is affixed to matter 
 
 * ' ' Omnia quae in prsesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per cora- 
 parationem ad res sensibiles et naturales. ' ' (Div. Thorn. , 1 p. , qu. 87, art. 7.) 
 All things which we understand in our present state, are known to us through 
 comparison to things that are sensible and natural, (that act by necessary phys- 
 ical laws, or are sensible and physical agents.) 
 
 t " Intellectus humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est 
 quidditas, sive natura in materia corporali existens, et per hujusmodi naturas 
 rerum visibilium, etiam in invisibilium rerum aliquam cognitionem ascendit.'- 
 (Div. Thom. , 1 p. , qu. 84, art. 7 in C.) The object of the human intellect which 
 is conjoined to the body, is the essence or nature existing in corporeal matter; 
 and by means of such natures of visible things, it aL^o ascends to some knowl- 
 edge of invisible things. 
 
logic: second part. 105 
 
 by union with the body; the singular concrete, and material, 
 as having color, taste, smell, or as affecting the living organ, is 
 the proper object of sensible or organic power.* Hence, it 
 will be readily seen why man is often termed, " the link that 
 binds together the material and spiritual orders."t 
 
 It would be an error, however, to infer from the preceding 
 doctrine that the human intellect is organic; for it by no means 
 follows that because its primary and adequate formal object is 
 the essence of the sensible, the intellect is therefore the subject 
 of sensible and organic mutations, or that it has organic action. 
 
 But it does logically follow that man's intellect knows God, 
 and other superior substances of the spiritual order, only by 
 comparison with what he immediately knows in the sensible 
 order; and that he rises by reflexion on sensible things, and 
 by abstraction, to the conception of those substances which are 
 of another order. | 
 
 It would be equally erroneous to infer from what is above 
 stated, that the human intellect knows only the sensible and 
 material; for it also reasons of God and angels. § The mean- 
 
 * " Sensus non fertuv perse uisi in singuliiria et accidentia materialia." Sense;?er 
 se, i. e.,ot'itso\vn action, attainsonly to singular objects and material accidents. 
 
 t" Natura hiimana rationalis ab Angelica degenerat, quod sit ordinata ad in- 
 foi-mandum corpus, cui propterea alligatur; attamen cum Angelica convenit, 
 quod sit spiritualis; et in eo sensitivam superat cum qua similiter convenit, 
 quod sit materialis; unde homo dicitur a nonnulli3j?6i(/rt spiritualis et material's 
 ordinis, eo quod inter utrumipie medius, ntrumque in se copulat." Ilatioral 
 human nature falls below the angelic nature in that it is ordained to inform a 
 body, to which it is, therefore, bound; however, it agrees Avith the angelic 
 nature, in tlutt it is spiritual. In this respect, also, it rises above sensitive na- 
 ture, though it agrees with it in that it is material. Whence man is called by 
 some the link between the spiritual and material or<lers, for he stands between 
 both, and miites both in himself. 
 
 J ** Invisibilia Dei per ea quai facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur." (Rom. 
 i. 20.) The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the 
 things that are made. 
 
 § ' ' Mens seipsam per se novit, quia tandem in suiipsius cognitionem pervenit, 
 licet per suum actum." (Sum. 1 p., qu. 87, art. 1, ad. 1.) The mind know.'' 
 itself by itself, because it does come to the knowledge of itself, althougli by its 
 own act. The soul knows itself only by its acts : it does not immediately or 
 intuitively perceive its own real essence. 
 
 " Quamdiu anima est corpori imita, intelligit convertendo se ad phantasmata. 
 Sed cum fuerit a corpoi-e separata, intelligit, non convertendo se ad phantas- 
 mata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibiliiL: nnde seipsam per seipsam 
 intelligit. Est autem commune Dnmi substantise separatae, quod intelligat id 
 
106 logic: second part. 
 
 ing which is intended to be conveyed in defining the adequate 
 or commensurate object of man's intellect is, that the human 
 understanding primarily and forinaUy knows as its first and 
 proper object, material essence ; and that all its knowledge of 
 higher things it acquires by aid of the material or sensible, 
 through which it apprehends what transcends the senses, and, 
 by comparison and abstraction, forms ior itself concepts or 
 notions of superior essences. 
 
 The intellect of man first conceives God, angels, spirits, under 
 imaginary corporeal forms; which imperfect ideas of super- 
 sensible substances, it corrects by reasoning; v. g., not unlike 
 what takes place when we observe the staff which is partly in 
 the water ; it may be first conceived to be really bent, but by 
 reflexion and further knowledge of truths not immediately 
 presented in what the senses manifest, we come to know that 
 the staff is not bent, but is really straight. 
 
 Similarly, due proportion being allowed for intellects that 
 know by simple intelligence, and not by the less perfect way of 
 reason, in order for the angels ot one order, or hierarchy, to 
 conceive those of another, they must compare and measure 
 them by the primary and formal object of their own intellect, 
 which is their own essence;* for, as every sense has its own 
 adequate or commensurate object to which it is limited ; v. g., 
 the eye has figure and color, the ear has sound for its proper 
 
 quod est supra se pel* modiim sute substimtiai. Sic euini intelligitur aliquid 
 secuiuUim quod est iu intflligente. Est autem aliquid in ultero per niodum ejus 
 in quo est." (1 j)., qu. 8!), art. 2 iu C.) So long as the soul is united to the 
 body, it understands by converting itself to the images in the fancy. But when 
 it is sei)arated from the, body, it understands without converting itself to the 
 images of the ftmcy, but it converts itself to those things which are in themselves 
 intelligible; hence, it then understands iiseU by itself . It is likewise common 
 to every substance separated from matter, to understand that which is above 
 itself, by means of its OAvn substance. For, a thing is understood, according 
 to the manner in which it is in the one understanding it; and a thing is in an- 
 other, according to the nature of that other in which it is. 
 
 *" Modus intelligendi est proportionatus modo essendi: sen modus cogno- 
 Bcendi non sequitur modum rei cognitie, sed modum essendi potentire cogno- 
 scitiviB." The mode of understanding is proportioned to the mode of being: or, 
 the mode of knowing does not follow the mode of the thing known, but the mode 
 of being which is in the cognoscive power. 
 
 " Sensus est singnlarium; intellectus universalium. " The sense is of sia- 
 gtilars; the intellect, of universals. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 107 
 
 object; so must every created intellect have its connatural and 
 determinate object, beyond which, or apart from which, it can- 
 not operate ; that of the divine intellect must be the uncreated 
 and infinite. 
 
 The adequate or commensurate object of the human intel- 
 lect should be so stated and understood as to be clearly distin- 
 guished from that of sense, and trom the respective objects of 
 the purely spiritual or angelic, and the Divine intellect. .For this 
 end, it should be observed that every agent must act or oper- 
 ate according to its essential mode of existing;* or, it must act 
 according to its nature. Nor can its action ever exceed its 
 essence ; t for, powers are the appendices of essence, and are 
 measured and limited by it ; as no accidents can exceed their sub- 
 ject, so no properties or essential attributes can exceed the essence 
 from which they flow or result. It is manifest, also, that pow- 
 ers must have objects of their action which are proportioned 
 to them, and which, therefore, must be proportioned in perfec- 
 tion to the essence which is the subject of those powers, since 
 the power follows the essence, and is limited by it. 
 
 In man, the soul is bound to the body, with which it is 
 united by substantial composition; in that condition it is 
 dependent on the external and internal senses for its intelligent 
 action, though the cooperation of these organic powers is only 
 objective; i. e., they efficiently cooperate in so much as they 
 present the object, whose intelligible essence the intellect 
 comes to know from the sensible impressions, by means of 
 abstraction ; and, in fact, man, as he is now actually consti- 
 tuted, cannot immediately perceive any other being than one 
 which is, in some respect, material. Hence, the primary and 
 proper object of man's intellect must be the essence of sensible 
 
 * ' ' Uunumquotlque operatur ad modum sui esse. ' ' Every thing acts, accord- 
 ing to the mode of its existence. 
 
 t " llnaqiiaeque potentia in operando limitatur per essentiara cujus est polen- 
 tia. " Every power is limited in its operation, by the essence of which it is a 
 )iowe. . 
 
 " Corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actic 
 exerceatur, sed ratioue objecti." (Div. Thom.,1 p.,qu. 75, art. 2, ad. 3.) 
 The body is required for the action of the intellect, not as an organ by which 
 euch action is exercised, but on account of the object. 
 
108 logic: second part. 
 
 and material things ; and it is only by reasoning upon sensible 
 things that he rises to notions of immaterial or spiritual beings. 
 Careful reflexion upon the facts of one's own experience and 
 intellectual operations, strikingly confirms the truth of the fore- 
 going statements. 
 
 The three principal acts or operations of the understanding in 
 cognition are, Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning 
 or Ratiocination. A judgment consists of concepts or ideas that 
 are compared ; and reasoning consists of judgments compared 
 to each other. The principal and characteristic function, or 
 act of the understanding, is, to perceive truth, to distinguish 
 the true and false ; the good and evil, as true and false. In 
 the ideas or concepts of things, by means of abstraction or 
 remotion, it perceives the universal and the intelligible essence 
 of the objects presented to it by the organs of sensation. 
 These it compares, and, by means of analysis and synthesis, it 
 forms a multitude of new concepts and judgments. 
 
 Simple Apprehersion is the mere perception of the object, 
 without any explicit affirmation or negation. The apprehen- 
 sion, to repeat here briefly an explanation already given, 
 when the term is used to express the concrete result or 
 product of the act of apprehending, is also called an idea^ a 
 concept^ a notion. The word idea is more generally used ; and 
 it was selected because the mind, by the act of apprehending, 
 forms a sort of similitude of the object perceived ; and the 
 term idea means a visible appearance^ or a likeness. This idea, 
 by means of which the mind expresses the object of its cogni- 
 tion, is also termed the mental word., verbum mentis, since the 
 mind is conceived to speak it, as it were. But this 7ne?ital word, 
 or idea, in the mind perceiving, must not be confounded, as 
 already remarked, with sensation, or with the image, in the 
 imagination ; both of which present only sensible qualities, and 
 are effects of organic action, which are common to us and the 
 brutes. Of the concept whose object is entirely abstract, as 
 the infinite, the imagination forms no image ; but, when we 
 think of such objects, it strives to form its image of theiii, and 
 it always presents, at least, the terms for them. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 109 
 
 The object which the mind perceives, considered in itself 
 <vith its ma?'ks or determinations^ by which it is what it is, and 
 nothing else, is tl;ve fuaterial object of perception; but the 
 object, as actually manifested to the mind, is the Johnal 
 •object of perception. 
 
 The distinction between an apprehension, a judgment and 
 reasoning, may be aptly illustrated by an example. If we 
 conceive an idea of worlds the mere act of perceiving or see- 
 ing that idea of world without affirming or denying any pre- 
 dicate, is a simple appreliension; but in uttering the proposi- 
 tion, ''''the world is a contingent being" there is 2i judgment 
 formed ; since it affirms the agreement of a predicate and sub- 
 ject. If we compare several judgments, and deduce h^om them 
 another, or new judgment, on account of its nexus with them, 
 this operation of the mind is reasoning; v, g., " The world is 
 a contingent being; therefore, its cause is a free being; but 
 this cause being free^ is also intelligent, since freedom and in- 
 telligence connote each other." This is reasoning, or deducing 
 one judgment from others. 
 
 All these acts of the intellect are immanent; that is, they 
 remain in the mind; or do not, as such, pass out of it to an 
 exterior term, or object of efficient action. 
 
 Immediate or simple judgments are those that are formed by 
 the mind seeing directly and immediately the agreement of the 
 subject and predicate, without any reasoning. The material 
 object of this immediate judgment may be either ideas or facts; 
 and these /^r/^ may be either ijiternal ox external. We form a 
 judgment of ideas ^ when we consider their objects in their 
 essence, apart from their actual existence. We judge oi facts 
 when we think of objects in the concrete, and actual order of 
 physical existence, and make any affirmation concerning them ; 
 whether they be facts of ifiter?ial consciousness, or of external 
 objects. 
 
 The objects of thought may be divided : ist, into those that 
 pertain to the order of reason, or to necessary matter; 2d, into 
 those that belong to the experimental or empirical order. Judg- 
 ments whose objects are wholly of the sphere or order of 
 
110 logic: second part. 
 
 reason^ are necessary and wiiversal; for their objects are not 
 limited to iho. pa?iki/lar, as are, these trees, these men. 
 
 But when the objects of the judgment are in the order of 
 experience or of the experimental order the judgment is particu- 
 lar and contingent; because its objects are particular and co7i- 
 tingent. But in the judgments formed upon both these 
 classes of objects, the evidence is immediate; in the sense that 
 it is not derived from a comparison of other judgments, but is 
 furnished by the simple comparative apprehension of the ideas, 
 which are affirmed to agree or disagree. 
 
 Mediate judgments are such as are formed by discursive 
 reasoning; i. e., by comparing several judgments, and per- 
 ceiving that the tiexus of the premises and conclusion is such 
 that we cannot assent to the premises without assenting to the 
 conclusion ; in other words, it is by the medium of reasofiing 
 that such judgments are formed. 
 
 Reasoning which proceeds from certain and evident prin- 
 ciples, is termed demonstrative, or apodictic. This reasoning 
 which is termed demonstrative, or apodictic, is of four kinds : 
 ist, reasoni?ig a priori; as when we conclude from the cause to 
 the effect, or from the principle to its application; v. g., "that 
 which has life has motion ; an animal has life; therefore, an 
 animal has motion;" 2d, reasoning a posteriori; as, when we 
 deduce the cause from the effect; e. g., "order exists in all the 
 works of the universe ; therefore, all the works of the universe 
 have an intelligent cause ; " or, as in the proverb, " ex pede 
 Herculem," from the footprints, I conclude it was Hercules ; 
 3d, the-reasoning is direct, when from one notion of the subject 
 we infer another; e. g., "man is free; therefore, he is intelli- 
 gent ; " 4th, reasoning is indirect or apagogic, when we show that 
 its contradictory or contrary leads to an absurdity, called, also, 
 reductio ad absurdum; e. g., "If God is not eternal, then He 
 had a beginning; if He had a beginning. He had a cause; 
 and if He had a cause, then He is not God at all; which is 
 absurd." 
 
 Of these forms of demonstration, the one a priori excels 
 the rest ; that is, it is the most satisfactory to the mind ; for in 
 
logic: second paet. Ill- 
 
 it the mind reposes at ease, with no desire to know more of 
 the conclusion thus demonstrated to it, or made evident in its 
 causes; in the others, the certainty is perfect in species, since 
 all doubt is excluded ; but the mind's repose is not so com- 
 plete, it may desire more, and, when the nature of the matter 
 permits, it will strive to know a prioi'i the truth which it thus 
 attains by reasoning a posteriori. 
 
 Knowledge acquired by reasoning a posteriori^ in itself is not 
 scientific knowledge; as will be shown in a subsequent article. 
 
 Reasoning is also divided into pure^ empirical d.w'X mixed. The 
 pure is that in which the premises are both necessary^ or are of 
 the order of reason; v. g., " None but a straight line is the 
 shortest distance between any two points; a curved hne is not 
 straight ; therefore, a curved line is not the shortest distance 
 between two given points." 
 
 The empirical argument has both premises experime?ital 
 truths; "the rose bush that is set out in May will grow; this 
 rose bush was set out in May ; therefore, it will grow." The 
 mixed reasoning is that in which one premise is absolute truth, 
 and the other empirical; v. g., "a contingent being cannot ex- 
 ist unless there is a 7iecessary being ; but there exist contingent 
 beings; therefore, there is a necessary being.^^ 
 
 In all these species of ratiocination, the conclusion has the 
 nature of the premises in some mode, and it follows the less 
 worthy premise in quality and quantity. 
 
 The intellect, by iis perceptions or in forming concepts, passes 
 from the particular to the universal; but, in I'easoning, this 
 process is reversed; and the progress is from what is more 
 general to that which is less so; for the middle term is always 
 general, in respect to the conclusion. Under this point ot 
 view, reasoning is synthetical. 
 
 The conclusion is implicitly in the premises ; it is first expli- 
 citly seen, as such, only when the middle term is found ; the 
 nexns with the premises then becomes evident. This truth 
 solves the objections against the syUogism, whether it be con- 
 sidered as a means of discovering or of proving truth. 
 
 By means of these acts of cognition, namely, simple apprc' 
 
112 logic: second part. 
 
 liens ion, Jndi^^mcfif and reasoning, the mind acquires genuine 
 certainty of their objects ; for, there is truth in all of them. 
 As already shown, truth is the conformity of the mind know- 
 ing to the object known ; and, in apprehensions and judg- 
 ments, there is this conformity in different degrees, to be sure ; 
 but each is perfect, according to its kind. 
 
 The specific perfection of every cognition, is the truth that 
 is in it. In a simple apprehension, an object is perceived, 
 though no explicit judgment is formed; this is conformity of 
 the mind to the object, perfect in its species and degree. In 
 judgment, and reasoning, this conformity is more perfect in 
 degree, because they affirm explicitly ; and while in apprehen- 
 sions there is only that implicit affirmation, or transcendental 
 truth participated in by them, and referable ultimately to the 
 first truth; in our judgments, truth is explicitly affirmed by the 
 mind, giving to reason and intelligence their specific nature, 
 and their highest value. 
 
 If the judgment faithfully affirms only what the ideas are 
 immediately seen to include, or exclude, it is clear that no 
 erroneous judgment can be assented to. All our cognoscive 
 powers are determined to their acts of cognition by the evidence 
 in their objects; and when truth is seen to be such, it is known 
 to be such ; and their acts are as true, as they are necessary, 
 f^ariaking of the truth of tJieir first cause. 
 
 This doctrine cannot be denied, unless by that systematic 
 scepticism, in which the human mind is morally false to itself, 
 and is, therefore, perverse in its own enunciations. For the 
 ailment of those minds that can sincerely doubt evident first 
 principles, philosophy cai\ furnish no remedy. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 OBJECTIVE REALITY OF IDEAS. 
 
 The ideas here meant are those that express or represent in 
 the mind the essences or natures of objects, and which the 
 intellect forms by reflecting on its concepts, and abstracting or 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 113 
 
 removing from them the conditions of individuality, i. e., the 
 concrete accidents. They are not the same then as the ideas 
 which the mind acquires immediately, by simple . apprehen- 
 sion and by the senses, whose objective truth was sufficiently 
 evmced in the preceding: articles. 
 
 The ideas whose objective truth is here to be shown, are 
 those reflex ideas, or notions, that are general, or, that include 
 many objects; v. g., substajice, cause, effect, the possible, etc. The 
 question is, then, do such ideas really and truly express or repre- 
 sent the objects for which they stand, or is there through them 
 a conformity of the mind to the objects of its cognitions ? Have 
 these ideas any objective value, or have they true agreement 
 with their objects outside of the mind, as perceiving or knowing 
 them ? or, are they merely certain subjective and innate /^r/z/j-, 
 or types in the intellect, according to which the mind forms for 
 itself its objects which it calls substance, cause, effect, etc. ? Is 
 that which is expressed in these general and primary ideas, in 
 any respect, in the objects for which the ideas stand ; or is it 
 merely subjective? Is the conclusion from the idea to its ob- 
 ject, valid illation, as the conclusion from the photograph like- 
 ness to the person represented by it, is valid illation ? Has. 
 for example, that which is called substance, really in itself what 
 the mind attributes to it in its idea of it ; or, does it exist only 
 in the idea or form in the mind, the idea having no extrinsic 
 object truly corresponding to it ? 
 
 In the foregoing interrogatories the same thing is variously 
 expressed, the same notion is presented under different phases, 
 purposely in order that the real state of the question may be 
 more clearly apprehended by the youthful inquirer. 
 
 It is affirmed, then, that ideas are truly and really the repre- 
 sentatives, and exponents of their objects, as they are; that the 
 objects of cognition are truly expressed in the mind, by those 
 ideas or final and general mental words. This is no more, 
 indeed, than affirming that the mind is capable of acquiring 
 true ideas of the objects which it perceives. 
 
 That which is understood in the mind is the same as what 
 is in the object; but in the one it exists in concrete, while in 
 8 
 
114 logic: SECOND PART. 
 
 the other it is in the abstract, yet, the relation between them is 
 that of truth, or it is the mind conformable to its object of cog- 
 nition. We must assign to objects actually perceived concur- 
 rent causality, direct or indirect, in the formation of all our 
 ideas,* of every kind. In other words, we find a verification 
 of all that we know or can positively conceive even as possible, 
 in what we have actually perceived in the order of reality. The 
 idea in the mind then must truly represent the object, so far as 
 that object efficiently concurred in its production, else it would 
 be an effect that has no real resemblance to its cause. 
 
 The objective verity of our ideas, is one of those truths that 
 cannot be formally demonstrated, nor does it require such 
 proof Nor can it be denied, either, without implicidy affirm- 
 ing what is in question. For he that denies it, i. e., that ideas 
 are truly representative of their extrinsic objects, thereby as- 
 sumes that his idea of an idea is truly conformable to, and 
 representative of, its object, for logical truth is the conformity 
 of the mind to its object; otherwise, he asserts nothing. There 
 fore, to deny the objective truth of ideas, is an implicit as- 
 sumption of the truth that is in question. 
 
 It is evident that if the ideas by which the mind expresses 
 the objects of cognition, do not truly present those objects j 
 then, the mind is not capable of attaining truth, or of con- 
 forming itself to objects known. But, just as it must be ad- 
 mitted that the mind can and does know, through the medium 
 of the senses, the existence and distinction of singular and 
 concrete objects truly as they are ; so, it is equally evident, 
 that its farther notions of their essence and nature, formed by 
 abstraction and generalization, by reflexion and right reason- 
 ing, are really verified in those objects. He that can doubt 
 the objective value of his ideas, and the share that their ob- 
 jects have in efficiently helping to their origin and formation, 
 should also doubt all first principles, and even internal facts 
 themselves ; nay, he would be incapable of forming a certain 
 judgment, and, consequently, incapable of any reasoning. For 
 
 * " Ex objecto et poteiitia oritur notitia." Knowledge proceeds from tho 
 object and the power. 
 
logic: second paet. 115 
 
 the evidence is not more clear for the certainty of first princi- 
 ples, internal facts, or for any judgment, than that which the 
 mind has for the agreement of its ideas with their objects ; in 
 other words, for the objective truth of its own notions or 
 ideas. They are all evident, and, therefore, all true. 
 
 Hence, the doctrine that the general or common ideas 
 in the mind do not express or declare real objective truth, 
 but are only a kind oi subjective forms by which the intellect is 
 directed in thinkmg ; is purely an assumption, directly against 
 what we see and know by the facts of experience ; is destruc- 
 tive of all certainty, and has no argument m its favor, except 
 those purely fanciful analogies which are the only basis of 
 every merely arbitrary hypothesis. This hypothesis does not ex- 
 plain or account for the evident facts of experience, for instead 
 of being founded on those facts, or being itself a conclusion 
 deduced from them as premises, these facts must be distorted 
 and our concept of their nature be changed, in order that they 
 may be adapted to explain and prove the theory. 
 
 The manner in which our general or universal ideas are 
 formed, and the mode in which they are verified in their ob- 
 jects, will be rendered more clear by the fuller explanation of 
 the whole subject, which is given in the following article. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 UNIVERSALS; THEIR OBJECTS; UNIVERSAL IDEAS, HOW FORMED. 
 
 There was long a dispute in the schools as to the nature 
 and object of what are termed universals; the disputants w^ere 
 divided into three celebrated parties: the Jio mi fta lists, exagger- 
 ated realists and moderate realists. 
 
 The nominalists maintained that imiversals are mere names, 
 that express indeji?iitely and confusedly a collection of individ* 
 uals; some thinking they neither existed in objects nor in con- 
 cepts ; while others of the same school contended that they 
 exist in the concept, but have no real relation to the objects 
 
116 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 
 
 included. The exaggerated realists contended that the univer- 
 sal is in *he concept, and in the object cutside of the mind, in 
 the same mafiner that it is conceived in the mind ; that there 
 is, in objects of the same species, one and the -same real 
 essence, really common to all the individuals included in it. 
 By their theory, individuals of the same species, being essen- 
 tially identical, differ only in their accidents ; there is one com- 
 mon /mman essence which is actually in all men, as there is one 
 common e7itity in all beings. For example, the human nature 
 which actually exists in Peter, is really identical with the human 
 nature that is affirmed o{ man in general; and, therefore, Peter 
 is both universal and particular^ as regards his human nature 
 or actual essence. 
 
 It is clear that this doctrine does not differ materially 
 from the theory of Pantheism, or the system which identifies 
 every real being with God. 
 
 The ?noderate realists taught that there is in objects of the 
 same class a nature or essetice which is apprehended by the 
 mind in a universal idea ; but it does not exist in the mind and 
 in the object, or a parte rei, in the same manner; it is concrete, 
 in the one ; and abstract, in the other. 
 
 Now, as a fact, there are in our minds universal ideas, and 
 there are najnes or ter?ns in language that stand as signs for 
 Uiem. 
 
 General or universal truths constitute the elements of all the 
 sciences ; nearly all the names, or nouns, of language, except 
 the proper names of individuals, are co7nmon or universal for 
 their classes of objects. Genus, species, difference, attribute, 
 accident, express real generalizations in the mind, and, when 
 actually applied to objects, are by no means vague, indefinite 
 names, expressing nothing but mere concepts which are really 
 unfounded in objects outside of the ideas. 
 
 Common or universal names do not stand for a collection of 
 particular individuals ; as a family, a people, a thousand; for, 
 these terms or names cannot be affirmed of each individual o^ 
 the collection singly : but are applied to many copulatively. 
 But, on the contrary, the common names, animal, spirit, vege- 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 117 
 
 table, are predicated of many taken singly, but not of many 
 taken copulatively. 
 
 The perception of similarity in individuals gives rise to uni- 
 versal ideas in the mind; and even the idea of a mere collection 
 of particular individuals, presupposes the wiiversal idea. 
 
 Common terms, then, express a concept which presents to 
 the intellect something that is found equally in many individ- 
 uals ; and, therefore, these terms express real ideas in the 
 mind, as even the faculty of consciousness directly testifies. 
 
 There is nothing in the objects outside of the intellect which, 
 of itself and anterior to any operation of the mind, is universal. 
 
 For, what is universal cannot become singular, since the 
 universal and the singular are opposites ; and opposites cannot 
 become identical ; v. g., one and 7nany, white and black, com- 
 municable and incommunicable, cannot as such become identical. 
 No real object, i. e., 7io actual imture, can of itself be univer- 
 sal ; so as to be the same in the many really, that it is in the 
 individual. If it were universal, would its specific, or its ^<?;z- 
 mt- nature be universal, or both? Clearly, \hQ Universal, as 
 such, does not exist, a parte rei. 
 
 Every universal, as such, is formed by the intellect ; but it 
 is truly founded \n the realities which it includes. 
 
 Two things are verified in a universal ; or it has two con- 
 stituents : ist, that which it expresses, is one; 2d, it is commu- 
 nicable to many; i. e., it is really multip:ied in many individ- 
 uals, so that they are numbered, as individuals are numbered. 
 
 If a universal be not one, then the individuals in which it is 
 multiplied would form only a collection of different things; and 
 at the same time, if it were not communicable to many, it would 
 not be wiiversal, but singular. The universal is, therefore, 
 logically verified in objects, though not really or a parte rei ex- 
 isting in them as otie, and many. 
 
 A collectioji, as already observed, is constituted by many sin- 
 gular things, which are considered as o?ie; the term collectio7t, 
 and wiiversal, both include the idea of many, but the tmiversa^ 
 is affirmed of that many, so that it is applied both to the 
 whole, and is distributively applied to its inferiors or subjects; 
 
118 logic: second part. 
 
 'vhile collection is affirmed only of the whole number of its in- 
 feriors or std'j'ects; and its individuals are only parts of it, of 
 which collection cannot be affirmed. 
 
 A thing, while an object of sensation, is singular; when an 
 object of intelligence, it is, in some manner, universal; or, as 
 the old axiom has it, "singulare dum sentitur, universale dum 
 intelligitur;" it is singular, as it is in the sense; it is universal, 
 as it is in the intellect. 
 
 This subject will be more easily understood, if we analyse 
 the operation by which the intellect passes from the singular, 
 in the simple apprehension, to the universal idea. The opera- 
 tion of the intellect, in forming the universal idea, is precisive 
 and comparative; i. e., it perfects the universal by the acts of 
 prescindi/is[, or abstracting^; and by comparing the inferiors or 
 subjects of the ideas thus formed. When an individual object 
 is presented by means of sensation to the intellect, it abstracts 
 for itself the essence from the sensible representation ; and 
 thereby forms the concept in which that essence is separated 
 from all individual conditions, or concrete accidents. 
 
 This is 7X. precisive cognition, and is the proper and charac- 
 teristic act of the intellect ; and it furnishes the comprehensio?i 
 of the universal, and common terms. TX-vvi precisive cognition 
 of the essence thus known, may be called a direct imiversal; 
 because it is formed by a direct cognition; yet, it does not ex- 
 plicitly affirm universality, until, by comparison, its relation to 
 all actual or possible inferiors or subjects is perceived and 
 affirmed by the intellect. 
 
 Thus, by \\\\'i precisive act of the mind, and by comparison, 
 the intellect forms the idea of unity of nature, from the indi- 
 vidual objects presented to it; a tuiity, that is not real, but 
 logical. The essence which is thus one, becomes the species 
 and genus, and is called the reflex universal. It is by thus 
 operating, then, that the mind forms the concept of the uni- 
 versal nature or essence. 
 
 The basis on which all universals are founded, or the inatter 
 of them, is the similar nature that is in the things that consti- 
 tute its inferiors or subjects; the generalized idea of that nature 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 119 
 
 constitutes the formal universal, or the universal properly so- 
 called. By abstraction the mind can generalize the natu7'e 
 known in one thing, so as to extend it to all possible things of 
 the kind. 
 
 Hence, then, to state still more precisely, and sum up the 
 preceding doctrine, the specific and distinguishing properties 
 of the reflex universal, are, ist, its unity, or it is 07ie ; 2d, its 
 aptitude or adaptability, to be predicated of many, or exist in 
 majiy, whether as essence, property, or accident. In this wide 
 sense of the word, all coinmon terms stand for imiversals. The 
 five utiiversals, or universal predicables, namely, genus, species, 
 difference, property or attribute, and accident, are the only 
 universals tliat can be predicated univocally of all the ten cate- 
 gories, or highest genera. Other common terms do not apply 
 to all the categories, but are confined to special ones ; also, the 
 tra?iscendental predicables, as " being,* something, one, true, 
 good, etc.," cannot be applied in any univocal sense to all the 
 ten categories, but yet they are applied a?ialogically to all the 
 categories. When, therefore, it is said by logicians that there 
 diYQflve u?iiversals a?id only five, the meaning is that there are 
 just five universals that can be predicated univocally, through 
 all the ten categories or ultimate genera. 
 
 That the five universals, genus, species, difference, property 
 or attribute, and accident, include all that is univocally pred 
 icable of the ten categories may be thus shown : genus,\ which 
 includes species under it, is not whole or entire essence, as 
 essence exists in the individuals of a species; but it may be 
 regarded as the matter of whole essence. The specific difference 
 is the forma, or formal principle, which, by uniting with the 
 7?iatter, constitutes the quasi co?npound, species, which expresses 
 
 * " Sex transcendentalia sunt : res, ens, verum, boniim, aliquid, umini; quae 
 barbara voce amplexa sunt per initiales litteras reubau. ' ' There are six trans- 
 cendentals : thing, being, true, good, something, one. To assist the memory, tlie 
 initials of the corresponding Latin words are formed into the barbarous word, 
 reubau. 
 
 t ' ' Genus est quod praedicatnr de pluribus specie differentibus in quid incom- 
 ftletum, sen in quid tanquam pars maferialis." Genus is what is predicated as 
 something incomplete, or as a viaterial part, of many things differmg in their 
 species. 
 
120 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 whole or perfect essence ; i. e., essence as it actually is in indi- 
 viduals. Also, this essence as in individuals has properties 
 that are per se connected with it, i. e., properties that 7ieces- 
 sarily be/oug to it, resulting necessarily from the essence as it is 
 in itself intrinsically; and again^ the individuals of the species 
 may have accidents that zx^ purely contingent, i. e., which may 
 ht prese?it, or abse?it^ without affecting the esseficein any manner. 
 
 Now, whatever can be predicated at all of any object, must 
 be either within the essence of that object, or outside of its 
 essence; if it be within the essence, it must be either its mate- 
 rial principle, in which case it will be genus that is predicated; 
 or, it must be its formal principle, in which case it will be the 
 difference that is predicated ; or, finally, it must be the union 
 or compound of the two, and in this case, it will be species 
 that is predicated.. Again, if that which is predicated be some- 
 thing that is outside of the essence, either it is something that 
 necessarily belongs to the object, then it will be property oi 
 attribute; or, it is something that continge?itly belongs to it, and 
 then it will be accident. There is no univocal predicable ap- 
 plying to all the ten categories that cannot be referred to one 
 or other of these five. 
 
 The five universals which Logicians enumerate as the only 
 ones that are strictly or univocally such, are, then, as already 
 observed, genus, species, difference, attribute, and accident, and 
 they differ essentially from each other. 
 
 Species and genera differ among themselves essentially* that 
 is essential without which a thmg cannot exist. Things may 
 have some essential attributes common to them, and yet differ 
 by other essential constituents which determine them to wholly 
 diverse natures. For example, brute and 7?ian, have in com- 
 mon all that is included in the generical concept, animal ; but 
 man has, in addition, intellect that judges, reasons, knows the 
 universal or the super-sensible. This is an essential difference 
 
 * " Omne (juod de pluribus univoce prajtlicatur vel est genus, vel est species; 
 vel ditterentia, vel proprium, vel accidens." Whatever is predicated univo- 
 cally of many things, is either a genus, or a species, or a diflerence, or a prop- 
 erty, or an accident. 
 
LOGIC* SECOND PART. 121 
 
 by which man is constituted of a wholly different species from 
 brute. 
 
 In the direct univej'sal, w^hich the mind has whenever it 
 forms its first concept of any intelligible essence or nature, the 
 intellect does not positively refer the intelligible essence con- 
 ceived by it to its inferiors ; for, when the concept of any 
 essence becomes actually related* in the mind to its inferiors, 
 it is then the re/lex universal. 
 
 Hence, the direct concept of an essence makes it only nega- 
 tively or inadequately imiversal;\ but the rejlex and comparative^ 
 which presents the essence as actually referred to ma?iy, is posi- 
 tively and adequately universal. We may, therefore, consider 
 the essence or nature in different states : ist, as it is in singular 
 or concrete individual objects, in which, while it is truly and 
 formally singular, yet it is materially and remotely universal, 
 in as much as it is capable of founding the universal; 2d, the 
 essence may be considered in abstract, as first conceived by 
 the mind, but not actually referred to many ; 3d, it may be 
 considered as one, and yet positively referred to many ; this 
 last is the universal, properly so called. | 
 
 When it is said, " the more universal knowledge is, the more 
 iinperfect it is;" and that, "philosophy treats of the highest and 
 most universal causes of all things ; " the term universal is em- 
 ployed in two different senses : in the first case, it is the direct 
 tiniversal, which is always more or less vague, and indetermi- 
 nate; in the second, it is the reflex, which refers to its inferiors 
 positively, and determinately; and it constitutes man's most 
 perfect mode of knowing. 
 
 ♦"Universale secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis." 
 (Div. Thorn. I p., qvi. 85, art. 5, ad. 4.) Universal, according as it is taken 
 with the intention of universality. 
 
 t " Cum enim universale sit ens rationis cujus totum esse est, ut cognoscatur 
 hand dubie, non est ■wmversfl/e quod ut tale non cognoscitur. " For since the 
 universal is an ens rationis, a creation of the mind, whose whole essence is that 
 it should be known ; there is no doubt that what is not known as such is not a 
 universal. 
 
 t"Natura non dicitur adctquate universalis, priusquam concipitur uti una 
 apta inesse multis. ' ' A nature is not said to be adequately universal before it is 
 conceived as ' ' one fit to be in many. " 
 
122 LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 
 
 Hence, it must be evident that the tmiversal proceeds both 
 from things, and from the inielleci. The nature actually exists 
 in the material basis of the universal, individual and 7eal, in 
 each singular thing; while, in the mind, it possesses only an 
 ideal existence, and is acquired by reflex and comparative cog- 
 nition. 
 
 As the mind, by means of the idea, is conformed to its ob- 
 ject ; and because the idea is formed by the combined agency 
 of the object and mind, the idea expresses the relation between 
 the mind and object; therefore, the idea is objectively true, i. e., 
 it is truly representative of the object. 
 
 When we say, " the mind as knowing is conformable to the 
 object known," we affirm a relatioJi between the mind and the 
 object of its cognition ; and this relation is logical truth, strictly 
 so called. Now, a tmiversal idea expresses an actual relation 
 of mind and object; for the idea proceeds from both. Though 
 the ufiiversal nature does not exist really, but only logically, yet 
 it is founded in realities, and is verified in those realities; as the 
 ride or measure is verified, as such, in the objects conformable 
 to which it is made, and to which it is applied. 
 
 The tmiversal, then, as referred both to the object and the 
 idea, does not possess a real imity and idetitity; but it is logical 
 unity only; for that which is really common to many, is not 
 universal, but singular. 
 
 The conclusion follows, then, that every universal, as such, 
 is constituted by the intellect ; but it is truly founded in the 
 realities which it includes as its inferiors or subjects. 
 
 It may not be far amiss to observe in this place, that, as to 
 the theory that one species of substance may be developed by 
 natural agencies into another one; and which its defenders 
 carry so far as to assert that man even was actually developed 
 from rude matter, through various intermediate species of 
 plant, animal, to the ape, and finally to man ; the following 
 propositions should be carefully considered: 
 
 First: As a fact, there appears to be no instance really 
 known of a new species of organism beijig developed, either 
 
LOGIC : SECOXD PART. 123 
 
 from purely inorganic matter, or from another organism of a 
 totally different species. 
 
 Second: All the reasoning employed in favor of this so- 
 called '-genesis of species," is based upon remote analo- 
 gies, which, of course, cannot afford demonstration; for no 
 mere indeterminate analogy can ever found a real demonstra- 
 tion. 
 
 Third: So far as facts are known, they all, without excep- 
 tion, go to prove that there is no development by nature of 
 any organic being except from a germ, or from a principle 
 which is the equivalent of a germ. 
 
 Fourth: It is repugnant to reason to affirm that a being 
 can, in its action, go beyond the limits of its own essence or 
 nature,* or that it can transcend its own species, so as to pro- 
 duce, of its own efficiency, an object not only of an essentially 
 different species, but which is intrinsically superior to it. 
 
 Fifth : As a fact, also, there are many species of substances 
 actually existing; each of these species having its own essen- 
 tial constituents, by which it is identical with each individual 
 of its species, and by which it differs, intrinsically and essen- 
 tially, from the individuals of every other species. 
 
 Sixth: To affirm that all m^tQxidX and spiritual substance is 
 only force, or a collection of co-related forces, is to assert a 
 mere hypothesis, for which no real proof is adduced, or can be 
 adduced- 
 
 Force presupposes an agent or substantial principle from 
 which it proceeds ; and it is as intelligible to say that every 
 thing is motion or time, as it is to say that every thing is 
 force; for we can as easily conceive motion apart from some- 
 
 * ' ' Eflfectus noil superat causam. ' ' An effect is not above its cause. 
 
 ' ' Modus agenrli sequitur raodum essendi. ' ' Manner of acting must agree 
 with the manner of existing. 
 
 ' ' Materia non potest producere eflfectum immaterialem. (Vide Div. Thorn. 1 
 I*. , qu. 118.) Matter cannot produce an immaterial effect. 
 
 "Forma est principium speciei; et ab una forma non proveniunt diversae 
 species. (Sum. 1 p. , qu. 76, art. 5.) The form determines a thing in its species 
 or essence; and from this form, other forms of different essence or species can- 
 not proceed. 
 
124 logic: second part. 
 
 thing moving, as we can conceive force without some agent 
 exerting it.* 
 
 " But," it may be said, ^^ force is here the same thing that 
 act is when it is understood as \\\q fojinal principle in every 
 thing that actually exists^ 
 
 God is called in true philosophy, actus purissimus, or the 
 absolutely pure act. In this sense of the word, to exist substan- 
 tially, is act (actus), and actus purissimus includes not only exist- 
 ing substa/itially, but existing in a manner that implies infinite 
 perfection, and absolute independence of a cause. By the 
 terms, " actus purissimus," besides the positive perfection 
 affirmed, there is excluded from the concept of God all 
 pote7itiaUty ; i. e., all perfectibility in him by any sort ot 
 7nutation, from non-action into action. Created act perfects 
 the creature; for, by action, it acquires what it had not be- 
 fore. The human soul, and, likewise, all other created sub- 
 stantial for?ns, are also said to be acts; i. e., are substantial 
 and active principles; but they are perfected by, successive ac- 
 tion; or, their existence or their action is not simultaneous ; i. 
 e., their existence is by successive acts of existing; but infinite 
 and eternal act is simultaneous; i. e., free from all succession, 
 or all successive action. 
 
 It is evident, then, that the concept oi pure act, and the con- 
 cept which we have of a substantial principle which is in poten- 
 tia first, and then \>qc.o\'\\q's, actual, exclude each other as com- 
 pletely as do those of the fi7iite and the Infinite. These things 
 being true, it may be affirmed that, any theory which resolves 
 all actual things into co-related forces, so as to ignore or deny 
 the preceding distinctions, must be false ; for, it must, in some 
 sense, identify beings which are totally and absolutely distinct, 
 or make no distinction between beings which have nothing 
 that is, in any nnivocal sense, common to them, and which are, 
 therefore, totally distinct. 
 
 The ambiguity of the term force, which is used one while to 
 
 * ' ' Prius est esse quam ag-ere." " Nulla substantia creata potest fieri immedi- 
 ate operativa." Existence is presupposed to operation. No created sub- 
 Btance is immediately opei'ative; i. e., it must possess powers. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 125 
 
 express the degree of power exercised; another while for the 
 concrete ag^nt itself; and then for what is purely phcnomeiial^ 
 gives rise to much equivocal and fallacious reasoning. 
 
 Not a few recent writers on philosophical subjects confound, 
 and even identify, certain organic effects which precede or 
 accompany ifitellectual thought^ with the action of the intellect 
 itself; thus they perplex and darken for their readers some 
 truths that are in themselves clear, w^ith language that is in 
 reality either superficial or eccentric. Such authors will speak 
 of the acts of fancy, or even those of the external senses, as if 
 they were really intellectual operations. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 MEMORY. 
 
 Memory* is the power of recalling to the mind, recognizing 
 and distinguishing things formerly known. 
 
 The memory^ therefore, performs four principal functions : 
 namely, retentioji of the object or idea; its reproduction^ with 
 the help of the fancy ; its recognition^ and the distificiio?t of its 
 time. 
 
 There is a sensile or organic memory; and there is the intel- 
 lectual memory. The sensile or organic memory recalls to the 
 imaginationt objects of the senses formerly known through 
 them, and recognizes them by means of the sensible conditions 
 or properties with which they are invested. This memory, 
 being purely organic, is possessed even by brutes; v. g., the 
 dog recognizes his master ; the cattle return at the same time 
 and to the same place for food ; and numberless other facts 
 will readily occur, which put the the truth beyond a doubt. 
 
 * ' ' Memoria prseteritoriun est : Sen est ipsa ratio prczteriti quam attendit me- 
 moria." (S. Thorn. 1 p., qu. 78, art. 4.) Memory is of past things; or, it is 
 precisely th.&past as such that memory regards. 
 
 t " Imaginatio est qnasi thesanrns formariira per sensnm acceptarnm. (Siun. 
 1 p., qu. 78, art. 4.) The imagination is, as it were, a treasury of imiigea 
 acquired through sensible power . 
 
126 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 
 
 Since the seiisile memory is organic, it is subject to' all the 
 contingencies of disease and decay, which, in the present order 
 of Providence, are common to all living organs. 
 
 The se/isik or organic memory, therefore, has for its object 
 sensible facts, reproduced with some of their sensible conditions, 
 and distinguished by their intentions, i. e., as pleasing, hurtfnl, 
 etc. ; and known as past.* 
 
 The action of the intellectual ??iemory has a higher order of 
 cognition in it ; this faculty may be defined : the power of 
 reproducing, and recognizing concepts or ideas and judgments 
 formerly had. Memory may act sporitaneously ; or it may be 
 made by the will to exert itself, and, along with the under- 
 standing, or rather by means of it, to pass through interme- 
 diate or associated ideas to ideas more remote. 
 
 This exercise of the memory, in which the understanding is 
 applied to various reproduced ideas in order to recall forgotten 
 things by means of comparison and reasoning on their relation 
 to something which is remembered, is called reminiscence. \ 
 Such mode of remembering is proper only to ratio?ial beings. 
 
 Why is it that among the ideas with which we are per- 
 petually occupied, some are remembered; and others entirely 
 vanish from the memory ? In memories which are in a normal 
 state, the difference depends, in a great degree, upon the atten- 
 tion; and on the association of ideas. 
 
 The attention is the direction of the mind to an object to 
 which it adheres for a time. The attention, in such case, is 
 either spontaiieous, or voluntary and reflex. There is sponta- 
 neous attention in all thought; even when the mind takes no 
 reflex notice of its own operations. It is violently arrested, 
 and long kept, by objects that are strange or marvelous; and 
 often returns to them. 
 
 * " Sensus (hominis) est deficiens qucedam participatio intellectus." (Sum. 1 p., 
 qu. 77, art. 7.) Sensible power is a certain imperfect participation of intellect. 
 
 t ' ' Reminiscentia est inqiiisitio alicujus, quod a memoria excidit; sen, memo- 
 riae amissie instauratio ex aliquo interno principio, quod oblivione deletum non 
 est. ' ' Reminiscence is seeking for something which has escaped from memory ; 
 or, is the bringing back of a forgotten object, by means of some internal prin- 
 ciple which is not lost in oblivion. 
 
logic: skcond part. 127 
 
 Attention is voluntary, when the will directs the mind to an 
 object to which it adheres for a time; and this it does either by 
 one, or many repeated acts. These repeated acts of the atten- 
 tion, by which the powers of the mind are often directed to an 
 object, constitute meditation* 
 
 A good memory is susceptible, retentive and ready. Its sus- 
 ceptibility much depends upon a happy constitution of mind 
 and body. Retentiveness and readiness, depend in part upon 
 the same cause ; but also upon that degree of attention which 
 enables the understanding to form clear and distinct ideas of 
 its objects. Prudent exercise of the memory greatly improves 
 it in all these perfections. Habitual moral truth and the virtue 
 of temperance are requisites for perfecting in it healthful and 
 vigorous action. 
 
 The association of ideas is also a great aid both for retentive- 
 ness and readiness of me?nory. Ideas may be associated, or 
 united, with other ideas which are distinctly remembered, by 
 any circumstances of time, place, number, mode, quality, anal- 
 ogy, resemblance; or even by any arbitrary law. But it is 
 advisable, when it can be done, to associate truths in the mem- 
 ory by some principle of logical connexion. In any of these 
 cases, when one idea occurs to the mind, it readily recalls those 
 that are associated with it. 
 
 The correctness of intellectual acts, much depends on the 
 fidelity of memory : and even the greater or less capacity of 
 the intellect, indirectly proceeds, in no small degree, from 
 greater or less perfection in the organic powers, sensile mem- 
 ory and imagination,! owing to its peculiar dependence on 
 these organs. 
 
 The memory, though naturally it is so susceptible of direct 
 
 * " Plurilnis intenhis, minor est ad singula sensus." If the mind be intent 
 on many objects, its attention is less to single ones. 
 
 ' * Meditatio est frequens et iterata mentis attentio olyecto voluntarie adhibita." 
 Meditation is the exercise of frequent and repeated acts of attention in the mind, 
 Toluntarily directed to an object. 
 
 t ' ' Illi in quibus virtus imaginativa, memorativa, et cogitativaest melius dis- 
 posita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum." (Div. Thorn.) They in whom 
 the internal senses, imagination, memory, and the cogitative power are best 
 disposed, are best fitted to understand. 
 
128 logic: second part. 
 
 improvement, is often debilitated by disease, is impaired by 
 indolence and sensuality, and it grows dull and feeble in old 
 age. But, in its ordinary and normal state, it may 'be affirmed, 
 
 First. That memory never deceives per se, i. e., of itself, or by 
 its own efficient action. 
 
 Second. // affords certainty as to the objects which it recalls 
 and distinctly recognizes. 
 
 The memory never deceives per se; for, either we distinctly 
 remember the past thing, or we do not; if we do not distinctly 
 remember it, no error is committed, provided we do not judge 
 it to be different from what it is remembered to be 5 and we 
 judge it only as it is remembered. It follows, then, that the 
 memory, of itself, does not deceive, but that error in its case, 
 as in all others, proceeds from the will urging the understand- 
 ing to affirm precipitately or imprudendy more or less than the 
 mind sees. But if we distinctly remember the past thing, w^e 
 are perfectly sure of it, and are not deceived. 
 
 This perfect and unerring certainty of memory is implied in 
 all the important affairs of individual life and civil society ; it is 
 implied also in all our reasoning; for, without memory, there 
 could be no process of reasoning. Hence, it is false to affirm 
 that memory can afford the mind only pjvbability; it gives per- 
 fect certainty, as to the most important things. Who can doubt 
 that he often heard of London, Paris, Rome, and that he re- 
 members with perfect certainty numberless past things? Nay, 
 we are as certain as to the objects of that faculty, as we are of 
 those of external sense, or any other power, through which the 
 understanding comes to know truth.* Memory will seldom 
 prove to be even an occasion of error, provided we affirm pre- 
 cisely, and only, what the memory recognizes in its comparative 
 apprehension, and as it recognizes it. 
 
 * ' ' Unusquisque judical prout affectus est. " " One judges according as he 
 is affected. " Feeling and passion greatly influence the judgment, and they are 
 frequently the cause of error. 
 
logic: second part. 129 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 testimony;* doth it afford a means of philosophical 
 certainty in some important matters. 
 
 Fhilosophical certainty is the re^ex certainty which is derived 
 from a critical examination or scrutiny of the motives and the 
 principles that afford ordinary direct certainty, whether it rest 
 on the evidence of the object, or on authority. 
 
 Our senses enable us to know by experience only present ob- 
 jects that express themselves in our minds through the organs. 
 But objects not known through our own senses, and which are 
 distant in time or place, we can know only through witnesses, 
 or by faith in testimony. 
 
 A witness is one who assures another of a fact or truth which 
 he either knows of his own knowledge, or on due authority. 
 An immediate^ or eye-ivitncss^ is one who testifies to a fact or 
 object which he perceived in its own evidence to him; a medi- 
 ate^ or, an ear-witness, is one who gives testimony of a fact 
 
 ♦In the phraseology of the Legal Profession, or in our civil jurispruilence, the 
 consistent testimony of asiitlicient number of competent witnesses, is said to 
 furnish evidence to the court or jury, or to constitute evidence, of the fact to be 
 proved; and in some connexions, the terms evidence and testimony, are employed 
 by jurists as synonymous; v. g., "the witness gives evidence," and "the 
 witness gives testimony," are expressions Avhich are frequently used by them, 
 indiscriminatelj^ or as being identical in meaning. 
 
 It is perfectly legitimate for lawyers, in order to secure simplicity, clearness 
 and precision, to restrict or extend the application of terms employed by them 
 in a technical, and, therefore, an arbitrary sense. ButitAvould be erroneous, 
 and not scholarly, to found a philosophical explanation of evidence and testimony 
 as motives of certainty, on this confined and special view of the subject, and 
 this particular use of those terms in civil courts of justice; this is actually done, 
 however, in some books of Logic. It is manifest that to treat the motives of 
 certainty philosophically, greater scope must be given to their explanation. It 
 should be based, it would also seem, on that signification of those terms which 
 is atti'ibuted to them by prevailing use among the learned in general. 
 
 The object or truth Avhich is evident to us, we see; that Mhich Ave know only 
 by testimony, we believe, but do not see; for that which is seen, is evident, and, 
 vice versa, that which is evident, is seen. This exemplifies the proper meaning 
 of the words, according to approved general usage; as the observant reader 
 will, doubtless, have noticed for himself. 
 
 In fact, there is seldom a case actually occurring, in Avhich the testimony 
 elicited before a civil court possesses all the requisites to constitute it a motive 
 that furnishes philosophical certainty; or, in other words, the certainty which 
 there suffices, because the best Avhich is practically attainable in juridical mat- 
 ters, can rarely fulfill the requirements of philosophical certainty, which ex- 
 cludes even the possibility oj error. 
 
 9 
 
130 logic: second part. 
 
 which he heard from others ; whether these others were them- 
 selves immediate, or mediate witnesses. 
 
 Proposition : The testimony of witnesses can furnish infalli- 
 ble certainty in regard to sensible facts or events. 
 
 The testimony of the witnesses for its credibility depends, 
 first, upon their knowledge of the fact or event to which they 
 testify; and, second, upon their veracity. Now, if we sup- 
 pose the witnesses to be numerous; of different interests, 
 habits, education, age, character, etc.; and that they unani- 
 mously and constantly testify to the same substantial state- 
 ment of the fact, such, v. g., as is the case with regard to the 
 existence of such cities as Paris, London, Rome, etc., or any 
 other public and notorious fact, to which many bear testimony: 
 it is perfecdy evident that many persons, under the conditions 
 thus described, can neither coiispii-e to deceive in regard to a 
 sensible fact, nor could they themselves be deceived.* 
 
 In regard to the facts or events in question, we should sup- 
 pose that they are public, sensible, and striking or important. 
 
 When the testimony of witnesses has all the preceding condi- 
 tions verified, it vs, physically impossible for them to be deceived; 
 and it is morally impossible for them to deceive ; or, assuming 
 \\\Q physical d.x\6. 7no7'al\2,\vs>\\\ the case supposed, it is 7neta' 
 physically impossible for their testimony to be false; i. e., it 
 affords pJiilosophical certainty. 
 
 If error or falsehood could originate from such testimony, it 
 must be either because the witnesses are deceived themselves, 
 or because they are not truthful, and deceive us; but neither 
 can happen in a case such as that above supposed. For, we 
 cannot even conceive the possibility of error or deception un- 
 der such conditions without referring it to the Author of the 
 physical and moral laws by which human nature is governed 
 in its operations, and thereby compromising Divine wisdom 
 
 * * ' Conditiones quae necessaviae sunt lit testimonium prjebeat certitudincm, 
 Eunt pi-Eecipue haeti-es: 1. Ut sit circa factum possibile et seusibile; 2. Ut testes 
 communiter sint pliires; 3. Ut evidenter appareat testes non esse in collusione." 
 (Philos. passim.) The conditions requisite for the testimony of witnesses to 
 furnisii certainty are chiefly these three: 1st, that it regard a fact which is pos- 
 Bible, and sensible; 2d, that the witnesses ordinarily be numerous; 3d, that tbc 
 witnesses be evidently not in collusion. 
 
logic: second pakt. 131 
 
 and Providence. Hence, it is evident on every side, that the 
 testimony of witnesses can, and does, furnish unerring cer- 
 tainty as to many sensible tacts or events. 
 
 Against the truth thus proved it is sometimes objected, as in 
 the following specious argument: "The testimony of one wit- 
 ness to an extraordinary object affords only probability of its 
 truth; therefore, the testimony of many witnesses gives only a 
 sum of probabilities ; but no number of probabihties can pro- 
 duce certainty, which is of a different species." Answer : the 
 testimony of one witness, in se, or ifi i/self, is often both phy- 
 sically aijd morally certain as to the witness himself; but, in case 
 of a solitary witness to a fact, owing to special contingencies, 
 which have no existence when the witnesses are many, his tes- 
 timony to the certainty which he has himself cannot be ac- 
 cepted as such by us. These extrinsic and special reasons or 
 contingencies which afford cause for doubt or fear, are : ist, 
 he may have deceived himself by haste, imprudence, or other 
 cause ; 2d, he may intend to deceive us purposely. But these 
 special grounds for apprehending deception are entirely removed 
 when the witnesses, besides being ?iu)fierous, have the other con- 
 ditions above specified ; for, the fulfillment of all these condi- 
 tions entirely removes any and twQry possibility of deception. 
 
 Hence, the testimony of many concurrent witnesses is not a 
 sujn of probabilities, in the case supposed; there is the sum, if 
 you choose, of as many physical and moral certaitities, as there 
 are witnesses; but without any one of the special reasons for 
 doubt, which we have when there is but a single witness. Yet, 
 the truth, as such, in its objective entity, is as perfectly such 
 in one eye-witness as it is in all; for the objective truth in such 
 case is really o?ie, though seen by many. The fact that many 
 see an eclipse of the sun at the same time does not multiply 
 the truth in itself that there was an eclipse of the sun; the 
 multiplicity and the diversity of the witnesses may and do take 
 away extrinsic reasons for doubt, as regards persons who learn 
 that fact on their authority. 
 
 The assetit which the mind yields to the testimony of wit- 
 nesses is faith or belief. 
 
132 logic: sp:cond part. 
 
 T\\Q dogmatic or doctrinal te^.ch'mgs of scientific men,* phil* 
 osophers, etc., which depend upon the Hght of natural reason 
 for their evidence, are worth no more than are the reasons or 
 proofs which can be adduced for them. Hence, such authority 
 of itself, or per se, does not always afford certainty, properly 
 so-called. 
 
 The judgments of mankind which are based upon good 
 common sense, and which regard evident and practical mat- 
 ters, are true; v. g., when those judgments regard first princi- 
 ples, or the immediate deductions from them. These judg- 
 ments, when constant and general, are a certain argument for 
 truth; but they are by no means the general criterion of truth, 
 as some authors have erroneously maintamed; nor are they an 
 ultimate jnotive for certainty. 
 
 It is obviously in accordance with the preceding doctrine 
 that the documents and monuments of authentic history, under 
 proper conditions, afford complete certainty as to the substance 
 ot important facts of past times. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 SCIENTIFIC knowledge; in what it consists; the sci- 
 ences; THEIR species, WITH THEIR CO-ORDINATION AND 
 PRINCIPL.E OF UNITY. 
 
 Knowledge^ in its general acceptation, includes every species 
 of cognition, how perfect or imperfect soever it may be. But 
 scientific knowledge, or science, is the evident and certaiii knowl- 
 edge of a necessary tlmig by its proximate and real cause. The 
 object of scientific knowledge is a 7iecessary thing in the sense, 
 
 *" Alii sancti hoc tradiderunt, non quasi asserentes, sed sicut utentes his 
 qu£e in philosophia didicerunt; unde non sunt majoris auctoritatis quam dicta 
 philosophorum quos sequuntur, nisi in hoc quod sint ab omni iufidelitatis suspici- 
 one separati." (Div. Thorn, in 2 sent. disp. 14, art. 2, ad. 1.) Other holy 
 authors taught this, not as asserting it positively, but as using what they learned 
 in philosophy; hence, they have no more authority than the sayings of the phil- 
 osophers wliom they follow, unless in this that they are free from all suspicior 
 »f infidelity. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 133 
 
 that it is a conclusion which necessarily follows from its pre- 
 mises, or an effect which proceeds necessarily from its cause. 
 We truly know a thing only when we know it in its principles, 
 or cause; not the cause as a fact only; but the cause as pro- 
 ducing it or giving to it its being or existence as an effect. 
 
 Science has for its object, then, the ontological causes of 
 things, their causce essendi. 
 
 A demonstration* is a legitimate argument that gives an evi- 
 dent truth which necessarily follows from evident premises : 
 such conclusion is, therefore, scientific knowledge^ since it is an 
 effect known to follow necessarily and immediately from the 
 premises by which it is produced. 
 
 But distinguish between the ontological order, and the logical 
 order; or, the order in which effects are produced by their 
 causes, and the order in which reason knows them, or learns 
 them. In a priori arguments, we reason from cause to effect; 
 that is, the argument proceeds in the ontological order; and in 
 this case, the logical order agrees with the ontological order. 
 In a posteriori recisoning, the ontological order is inverted, since 
 we argue from effect to cause. When we conclude from effect 
 to cause, and then reflexly see the effect as truly and neces- 
 sarily produced by its cause, such knowledge of that effect is 
 scientific ; for it is the knowledge of an effect as produced by 
 Its proximate and true cause, i. e., its ontological cause, {causa 
 essendi. ) 
 
 When we say an effect necessarily follows from its cause, the 
 necessity referred to is either that which arises absolutely from 
 the essence of things; or that which is consequent upoji suppos- 
 ing physical or moral laws, according to the nature of the 
 matter which furnishes the premises and conclusion. 
 
 T\\Q proxi/nate cause is that nearest cause which directly and 
 immediately produces the effect; it is real, because it is distin- 
 guished from an apparent, or accide?ital cause. 
 
 * " Demonstratio ea est ratiociuatio qu£e scientiam eflicit: et scientia est de- 
 monstrationis conclusio sen eff'ectus." Demonsti'ation is reasoning which pro 
 duces scientific knowledge; the scientific knowledge, then, is the conclusion or 
 the effect of demonstration. 
 
 ' Scientia est syllogismus/aden* scire." 
 
134 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 A reasoning mind does not rest quiet in the mere facts ot 
 experience, or in causes which are known merely as facts, or 
 in remote causes; but it seeks to know why the thing is so, 
 why it exists as seen : this it finally learns in its causa essendi, 
 its dependence on its ontological or real and immediate cause ;* 
 and this the inquiring mind seeks for in all the objects of cog- 
 nition. 
 
 Here it might be objected that a cause is extrinsic to its effect ; 
 whereas, perfect knowledge should represent the intrijisic or 
 <fi-^^;;//^/ constituents of a thing; and, therefore, the knowledge 
 of a thing by its cause, is not rightly called scientific knowl- 
 edge. 
 
 Before answering this objection it is proper to observe that 
 by cause we mean a principle on which a being depends for its 
 existence. 
 
 Also, it must be borne in mind that all causes are reduced 
 to four principal kinds; namely, the finals efficient, formal ^Xi^ 
 7naterial. ThQ final cause and efficient cause are really extrinsic 
 to the effect ; the formal and material causes are intrinsic to 
 the effect, and by their union constitute the effect. 
 
 The efficient cause is that which produces the effect; v. g., 
 the builder who fnakes a house, is its efficient cause ; the final 
 cause is that end, or purpose, on account of which the efficient 
 cause produces its effect, or operates : v. g., the house, y^r the 
 sake of a home ; or, as regards the builder, for the price ; the 
 material cause, is that thing out of which the effect is made; 
 V. g., the stone, brick, wood and other niaterial, out of which 
 the house is made; i\\Q formal cause is that by which the 
 essence or particular nature of the effect is determined to be 
 what it is; as, v. g., the plan, design, or for?n of the house is 
 that which determines or constitutes the material, a house, in 
 the example supposed. The marble is the material cause; and 
 the shape the formal csiuse, of the statue or bust. 
 
 Now, for knowledge to be perfect and adequate, all the 
 
 * * ' Cognitio rei perfecta iu causis est nobilior quam coguitio in effectu. Ordo 
 causarum est uobillor quam ordo effectiium. ' ' The perfect knowledge of a thing 
 in its causes, is nobler than the knowledge of it in its effect; for the order of 
 eauses is more noble than the order of effects. 
 
logic: second part. 135 
 
 causes on which an effect depends should be known; which, 
 however, it is not possible for man to know, with completeness 
 at least ; yet, though our knowledge be not adequate, we may 
 approximate perfect knowledge within degrees which satisfy 
 rational longing. For this object, any one of the four causes 
 may suffice, according to the nature of the effect contemplated. 
 
 The definition * which gives the formal and material cause 
 of an object is usually selected, when possible, to enunciate 
 scientific truth ; as the scientific definition aims to assign the 
 formal and material causes of the object defined, whenever the 
 nature of the matter permits it. 
 
 A definition which assigns the matter and form is preferable, 
 when it is possible ; because they are the intrinsic constituents 
 of an object: genus and specific difference, assign the quasi 
 viatier a.ndfi9rm. 
 
 We may define by all the four causes, either all given, or 
 some only. Their proper order is : ist, by the mattery 2d, by 
 the form,\ which is the principal, as the form determines and 
 perfects the matter; 3d, the efficient cause, or agent; 4th, the 
 fitial cause, which though last in the execution, is the first in 
 the intention. The final cause is not demonstrable a priori ; 
 because it is first, there is none prior to it, and it is the cause 
 of the other causes. The/t^/v;/, is the cause why the matter is 
 perfect ; the agent or efficient cause, is the cause why the form 
 perfects the matter; and theyf;//>, or eiid, is the cause why the 
 agent produces thQ form in the matter; no further cause can be 
 a9signed why the finis, or end,^ moves the agent or efficient 
 cause. 
 
 A collection or system .of demonstrated or scientific conclu- 
 sions, regarding many objects of the same species, constitutes a 
 science; v. g., the body of demonstrated conclusions in regard 
 
 * ' ' Definitio est oratio explicans rei naturam. ' ' The definition is a discourse 
 
 which explains the nature of a thing. 
 * 
 t ' • Forma est principium agendi in unoquoque. Seu iinuniquodque ageus agit 
 per suam formam." The form is tlie principle of action in everything, or, 
 every agent acts by virtue of its, form. 
 
 X " Finis est prima et altlsslma causarura." The end is the first and the 
 highest of causes. 
 
136 logic: second part. 
 
 to the stars and planets, constitutes the science of Astronomy ; 
 and similarly for other classes of scientific objects. 
 
 It is evident that the sciences have their species determined, 
 and are to be classified, according to their objects ; or, it is 
 their objects that specify them. 
 
 But it would serve the uses of philosophy to coordinate them 
 according to some clear law or principle of unity. 
 
 Philosophers in all ages regarded the reducing of all sciences 
 to unity as a matter of importance; though, in striving to ac- 
 complish this object, they did not agree upon a principle of uni- 
 fication Some sought for this principle of unity in the genera 
 of objects; others looked for it in the powers of cognition; 
 but they discovered no principle by which they could unify the 
 sciences, without destroying their specific differences; they 
 failed to make them one, and yet preserve their species. 
 
 Some make a general classification of the sciences, accord- 
 ing to the degree of abstraction which the intellect employs 
 when contemplating and determining the objects of those 
 sciences. There are three principal degrees of this abstrac- 
 tion : ist, we may know se/nible objects, as such; as trees, 
 crystals, animals, etc.; 2d, we may prescind from all sensible 
 qualities, except quantity ; continuous quantity, as lines, sur- 
 faces, etc.; or discrete quantity, as numbers ; 3d, we may ab- 
 stract from all sensible conditions, and go to the super-sensible; 
 V. g., to the essential prototypes of objects, to spirits, to God. 
 
 These grades of abstraction correspond to physics, mathe- 
 matics and metaphysics. The principle of unity is abstraction ; 
 and the sciences are divided into classes by the different ^<f^'r^?<f.y 
 of abstraction required to know scientifically the different classes 
 of objects about which each science is conversant. 
 
 The general principles on which this theory rests are these : 
 ist,* sensible things taken as singular and in concrete are the 
 objects of the senses ; their essence is the object of the intel- 
 lect, and this object it attains by means of abstraction ; 2d, 
 science has for its object universals; the singular belongs to 
 history, to the testimony of the senses; history is not a science, 
 because its subject matter is contingent truth, or facts; it 
 
logic: second part. 137 
 
 pertains to science^ however, to assign the proximate and neces- 
 sary causes of facts, when this is possible; 3d, Ufiiversals are 
 the work or product of abstraction ; and the more perfect this 
 abstraction, the higher is the science. 
 
 In the sciences which depend merely upon the natural light 
 of reason, metaphysics is supreme, or it rules all other sciences; 
 for it furnishes the ultimate principles by which they are finally 
 judged, and from which they receive their last decisive proof. 
 Therefore all mere human science is subject to metaphysics. 
 
 " No science proves* its own first principles." For, as science 
 is from demonstration, either those first principles are known 
 per se, i. e., are self-evident, in which case they cannot be dem- 
 onstrated; or they are demonstrated conclusiofis from another 
 science; in which case their demonst?'ation pertains to the 
 science in which they are conclusions from first principles ; so 
 in either case they are assumed. 
 
 It suffices for scientific demonstration that the medium be 
 analogical unity\ only. The medium of demonstration for the 
 existence of God, i. e., creatures^ as effects^ has only analogical 
 unity ; for God and creatures, when included under the gen- 
 eral concepts, cause, being, etc., ag?'ee only by analogy. If this 
 unity of analogy did not suffice for demonstration, then the 
 existence of God could not be demonstrated a posteiiori. 
 
 It will not be out of place here to distinguish between the 
 different species of intellectual cognition, or the perfections in 
 the understanding, usually termed, intelligence, science, i. e., sci- 
 entific knowledge, and wisdom, or philosophical knowledge; 
 they are also called, intellectual virtues. These different species 
 of cognition in the understanding have speculative matter only 
 for their object ; or, in other words, they do not directly re- 
 gard the merely cortingent and practical at all, as such, but 
 they directly consider truth only as it necessarily is in itself, 
 apart from its practical application to the feasible, and to fnoral 
 ends. Art d^nA prudence have for their object \\\^ practical, not 
 
 ♦"Nulla scientia sua probat principia." No science proves its own first 
 principles. 
 
 t" Ad scientiam suflicit unitas analogica." (Div. Thorn. 4 met ; lect. 1.) 
 Analogical unity suffices for scientific knowledge. 
 
138 logic: second part. 
 
 the speculative. A7't enables its possessor to accomplish 
 what is feasible., or physically capable of being effected; pru- 
 dence enables one to choose that which is morally best, in re- 
 spect both to means and end ; or, as it is briefly said in 
 an axiom, " ars est factibiliuni; prudentia^ agtbilium'' Art is 
 of that which can be done physically ; prudence, of what can 
 be done morally. 
 
 Intelligence is not the intellect itself, but it is a perfection of 
 this faculty, by which it is strengthened, and directed in assent- 
 ing to the true, and dissenting from the false. It is sometimes 
 termed lumen intellectuale, the light of the understanding ; it 
 was called by the old philosophers, a habit, "intellectus est 
 habitus primorum principiorum." The understanding, as thus 
 empowered by the habit or perfection termed intelligence, has 
 for its object only self evident truth, "verum per se notum;" 
 or, intelligence has for its object, evident first principles. Sci- 
 ence, or scientific knowledge, as already explained, has for its 
 object the necessary conclusions derived from evident first 
 principles, " verum per aliud notum ; " or, it has for its object, 
 demonstrated conclusions from evident first principles. It is 
 manifest, then, that scientific knowledge is essentially the pro- 
 duct or fruit of reason, smce it attains its object, not immedi- 
 ately, but through the medium of demonstration. 
 
 But principles may be first either in a particular genus of 
 cognitions only, as v. g., the first prificiples of Geometry, of 
 Astronomy, of Logic, of Physiology, etc. ; or, they may be 
 first in respect to the whole sphere of man's knowledge. Now, 
 the principles that are first in the particular genera of man's 
 cognitions classified according to their objects, together with 
 the necessary conclusions deduced from them, constitute the 
 objects of the sciences,* and the knowledge of them is science or 
 scientific knowledge. But the knowledge of particular genera 
 of first principles as compared among themselves, and also 
 their conclusions, all as tested and judged by the highest prin- 
 ciples of man's knowledge, is philosophical knowledge, or wis- 
 
 * " Secuudum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiavunj; aa^ 
 plentia non est nisi una. ' ' 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 139 
 
 dom* Hence, wisdom considers both all scientific knowledge, 
 and its principles; and, therefore, its conclusions are the highest 
 and most universal of all that reason can attain to. Although 
 its principles are the last which the mind comes to know, they 
 are absolutely yfr^-// or are objectively first. t 
 
 Hence, philosophical knondedge, or wisdom, has for its object 
 the highest and most universal causes. They possess the 
 greatest of all objective certainty, "necessitatem essendi:" they 
 are not only necessary and immutable, but they are presup- 
 posed objectively to all scientific truth, though they are the 
 last learned by human reason, which attains to them only by 
 rising from that which is lower. 
 
 Philosophical knowledge, or wisdom, is at the same time 
 sciejitific knowledge, in as much as it demonstrates conclusions 
 by their principles; but it has this in addition to mere science, 
 and peculiar to itself, that it judges of all, not only the conclu- 
 sions, but the principles also ; and this is the respect in which 
 it goes higher than science does, strictly as such. Hence, it 
 may be said that philosophy begins where the sciences end ; 
 and it is, therefore, jusdy styled the science of the sciences 
 whose principles are furnished by natural reason. 
 
 An example will help to make the preceding distinctions 
 clear to the mind; the axioms of geometry may be regarded 
 as Jirst principles; for, they are self-evident ; they are, there- 
 fore, an object of intelligence. 
 
 The following thesis, "the solid contents or geometrical 
 quantity of any cube is equal to the product of its three dimen- 
 
 * " Sapientia est habitus intellectualis circa altissima occupata." Wisdom 
 is a habit of the intellect which is concerned about the highest things. 
 
 t " Ea qiise sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et magis nota secundum 
 naturam; ideo, id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitiouis human.-e, est id 
 quod est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam; circa hiijusmodi 
 est sapientia, quas considerat altissimas causas." (Div. Thom. 1, 2, p., qu. 57., art. 
 2.) Those things that are last known as regards us, are according to their 
 nature first, and they possess most of what makes knowledge, or most to be 
 kuo^vn; therefore, what is last in respect to the Avhole of human knowledge, is 
 what is first and greatly the most capable of causing knowledge, according to 
 its nature: wisdom, which considers the highest causes, regards such objects. 
 That which is in itself the highest and greatest truth, is the last known to us, 
 because the medium of knowing is extrinsic to it, and obscm-e. 
 
140 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 
 
 sions," is a demonstrated conclusion^ and is, on that account, an 
 object of scientific knowledge* The question, " is qua?itity, as 
 extended in space, absolutely separable from material sub- 
 stance ? " proposes philosophical matter. For a determinate 
 answer to this question, we must consider quantity as geome- 
 trical, quantity as material, and also the essential and metaphysi- 
 cal conditions which are prerequisite for matter to exist at all : 
 the conclusion which logically follows, is philosophical truths 
 or, is an object of that virtue m the intellect which we termed 
 tvisdom. 
 
 It may be affirmed, then, that Philosophy, which embodies 
 and explains the teachings ot wisdom, is entitled to the rank 
 assigned it, as " Queen and Moderatrix of the Sciences." The 
 name, Philosophy, is directly and appropriately due to Meta- 
 physics alone, since Metaphysics alone has for \\.'?> proper object 
 the most universal truths and principles. 
 
 * The terms science and philosophy, arc employed by many popular Avriters 
 in a vague and indeterminate sense, for whatever pertains to any species of 
 superior learning. Even with not a few well educated authors, these words 
 seem to have no fixed or precise signification, but are made to include a number 
 of undefined and undistinguished generalities; by them, the terms appear to be 
 used indiscriminately, so that all philosophy is science, and convei'sely, all 
 science is philosophy. 
 
 But the discerning student of philosophy will quickly discover for himself the 
 fact that, among exact writers on these subjects, the distinction between science 
 and philosophy , which is based on their Avholly distinct objects, is clearly made 
 and is strictly maintained. As defined by their proper objects, philosophy seeks 
 for the highest and the most universal causes of things; science has for its ob- 
 ject, the necessary and proximate or immediate causes of things. Their objects 
 are, therefore, determinate, and it is clear that they are specifically distinct 
 kinds of knowledge. 
 
 Hence, it is an inept use of language, and a confusion of things that should 
 be kept distinct, to give the name philosophy to physics, or the collective branches 
 of physical science which explain the causes of natural phenomena. The philo- 
 sophical study of physical and material nature, is properly, and in accordance 
 with long established usage, named cosmology, in a course of philosophy. 
 
 It was believed that these remarks should be here made, in the interests of 
 learners: since precision of language, correctness of cognitions, and accuracy 
 of judgment, mutually aid each other in the work of mental discipline. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 disputation; or practical exercise in reasoning. 
 
 In many colleges and higher institutions of learning, the stu- 
 dents of Logic and Metaphysics, or the class of Philosophy, 
 have regularly some practical exercises in argumentation, last- 
 ing for half an hour at a time, or longer, and occurring two or 
 three times a week, and even oftener, when the class is suffi- 
 ciendy numerous. These disputations usually begin soon after 
 the class has reached the second part of Logic, or Logic 
 Applied. So important is this practice judged to be by many 
 instructors of youth, that, in a large number of well-couducted 
 institutions of learning it is never dispensed with. 
 
 The form or manner of conducting this useful exercise, 
 which, in familiar language, is usually styled the " Circle," is 
 here briefly described, for the information of those readers who 
 are unacquainted with it. 
 
 A day or more in advance of the exercise, one proposition, 
 or even two propositions, the proofs of which may be gathered 
 from what was already seen in the text book, or was ex- 
 plained in class, are assigned to a student, to be proved and 
 defended in class by him. In some cases several propositions 
 are divided for this purpose between two students ; and occa- 
 sionally the disputation takes place in presence of a select 
 audience of educated persons, in addition to the class. Also, 
 two or three other students are selected beforehand to prepare 
 objections to be brought by them against the assigned theses. 
 These objections are required to be brief, and in correct logical 
 
 for?n; ioT, an objection which is not ifi logical fonn, is not 
 
 141 
 
142 LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 
 
 regarded as legitimate in the "circle," and, therefore, care 
 should be taken never to offer in argument a syllogism which 
 is not in form. (See p. 60, at the end.) 
 
 On the appointed day the exercise begins by one of the ob- 
 jectors or opponents denying the proposition which he intends 
 to assail, which is equivalent to asking for the proofs of it. 
 The defender then enunciates the thesis or proposition, dis- 
 tincdy, and somewhat deliberately. He may begin either by 
 explaining briefly the precise meaning and scope of his thesis, 
 or, if that be judged unnecessary for it, by stating his princi- 
 pal argument in the form of a syllogism, or in any of the 
 legitimate forms of argument which are recognized in Logic; 
 though the simple categorical syllogism is generally preferable. 
 In such case, his further proofs and explanations, in which he 
 should have some latitude to dispense with strict syllogistic 
 iorms, will generally regard the minor or second premise. In 
 order not to perplex the attention with matters of only sec- 
 ondary importance, it is a sufficiendy approved practice always 
 to call the first premise of a regular syllogism the viajor^ and 
 the second the jninor premise, without regard to its technical 
 propriety. 
 
 After the brief proof, or proofs by which the truth of his 
 thesis is demonstrated, the objections against it immediately 
 begin. In answering them he should suppress excitement or 
 anxiety, avoid precipitancy, and strive to avail himself of the 
 advice given to him who defends the truth, by the well-known 
 axioms of the "circle;" "raro affirma, soepe nega, semper dis- 
 tingue;" rarely affirm, often deny, always distinguish. A 
 plausible objection to the truth, besides being in logical form ^ 
 will generally contain both somethmg that is true, and some- 
 thing that is false. 
 
 The defender always begins his answer by repeating the 
 argument of the adversary, just as it was stated by him; it is 
 then repeated a second time, the answer being given to each 
 proposition as soon as it is enunciated. In the solution of the 
 objection, either some one, or more terms., will be distinguished, 
 so as to grant what is true, and to deny what is falsely affirmed 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 143 
 
 by them ; or else one or both premises will be denied. The 
 objector, in his next argument, having in his preparation before- 
 hand anticipated the answer given to his first objection, will be 
 ready to bring an argument to prove what is denied ; and thus 
 the contest may be continued at pleasure. Practice will speedily 
 render the disputants skillful in finding arguments, extempora- 
 neously, or "at the spur of the moment." 
 
 Either the teacher, or some one else who is competent for 
 the task, presides as moderator at these exercises, and sees both 
 that the objections are rightly put, and that they are accurately 
 and satisfactorily solved ; it is also his duty to see that the 
 whole exercise is conducted with decorum, and that the dispu- 
 tation be not uselessly or unduly protracted. 
 
 When both parties prepare diligently beforehand for their 
 contest, it is found by experience that the " circle " always 
 proves to be both a highly interesting exercise for advanced 
 students, and a profitable one. 
 
 An example will help to render the fonn of conducting this 
 exercise more clear to the mind : suppose the thesis to be de- 
 fended is the following ; " The external senses furnish to the 
 mind an unerring motive of certainty, as to their proper ob- 
 jects." 
 
 The defender might here first explain the scope and mean- 
 ing of the thesis; v. g., ist, that it supposes the senses to be 
 in a healthful or normal state; 2d, he might mention some 
 conditions to be complied with for prudently using the senses ; 
 3d, he might distinguish between inducing error, /<?/- j-<f, i. e., 
 causi?ig, or physically effecti?ig error ; and erring accidentally, in 
 which latter case, error happens through precipitancy in judg- 
 ing, etc. He may then state in form one of his principal argu- 
 ments; V. g., " No agent that acts only by natural or necessary 
 physical law, can be false; but the external senses act only by 
 natural or necessary physical law; therefore, the external senses 
 cannot be false." In explaining and proving the premises, he 
 may employ the syllogism, the enthymeme, the sorites, or any 
 legitimate form of argument, that may occur to him; and 
 it would be appropriate to the argument, as above giveii. 
 
144 logic: second paet. 
 
 to show how false actio7i in natural or physical agents, if con 
 ceived to be at all possible, would be referable to God, etc. 
 His proofs may proceed till finished ; or they may be sus- 
 pended, at the discretion of the moderator, in order that the 
 objections may be given. 
 
 The objector, when the proofs are finished, begins at once; 
 V. g., " Those organs cannot be said to furnish unerring cer- 
 tainty, which mislead the judgment; but the external senses 
 mislead the judgment ; therefore, the external senses do not 
 furnish the mind unerring certainty." 
 
 The objection having been repeated, in order to prevent 
 misunderstanding as to its precise meaning, is then answered 
 by parts ; v. g., " Those organs cannot be said to furnish cer- 
 tainty which per se mislead the judgment, or by their own 
 action necessitate error in the mind, I grant; but that their 
 accidental connexion with error, really and properly causes 
 that error, I deny ; similarly I distinguish the minor, and, 
 therefore, I deny the consequence and consequent — or, I deny 
 the conclusion." 
 
 Objector insists, "To cause error even accidentally, is really 
 and truly to cause error; but, as you admit, the senses cause 
 trrox accidentally ; therefore, the senses really and truly cause 
 error." 
 
 Answer, after repeating the objection ; " I distinguish ; that 
 to cause tnor per se, that is, physically and efficiently to cause 
 it, is really and truly to cause it, I grant; that to cause error 
 accidetitally, is really and properly to cause error, I deny, and, 
 therefore, I deny the conclusion." 
 
 Objector insists, " Whatever has the nature of a cause, has its 
 own proper effect, which it brings about; the accidental cause 
 has the nature of a cause; therefore, it has its own proper 
 effect which proceeds from it." 
 
 Answer, after repeating the objection, "That the cause per 
 se, or cause that really and positively influences action, has its 
 own proper effect, which it positively brings about, I grant; 
 that the accidental cause really and positively influences in the 
 production of any effect, I deny ; " etc. 
 
LOGIC : SECOND PART. 145 
 
 Here the defender might be required to explain more pre- 
 cisely what this accidental cause is, and under what respect it 
 is termed a cause at all. 
 
 The foregoing example is by no means offered as a model of 
 argumentation ; but, though imperfect, it may serve to illustrate 
 by something visible, the form or uiajiner of conducting logical 
 and metaphysical disputations in the class-room, or the college 
 hall. It is hoped that even this oudine description of the 
 exercise will suggest reasons to prove its importance and value 
 for cultivating the reasoning power, and as a means of acquir- 
 ing precise notions and judgments. When a proposition stands 
 either as a premise or the conclusion of a well conceived syllo- 
 gism, to which, by the nature of its matter, it belongs, its full 
 meaning and value are then distinctly appreciated. 
 
 It was said above that in the regular disputation, no objec- 
 tion was regarded as valid or legitimate, unless it be in logical 
 form : the reason for thus absolutely excluding these vicious 
 or spurious arguments, is manifest. For, if the disputation 
 were permitted to turn merely upon fallacies in the form of 
 argument, it would thereby become degraded to the rank of 
 sophistry; which, considered as an exercise of reason, possesses 
 little more value or dignity than the trivial practice of punning. 
 
 Logic, which is the means of ascertaining and imparting 
 truth by discourse of reason, would thus be rendered practi- 
 cally aimless ; for its natural tendency as a study would then 
 rather be to make the mind astute and disingenuous, than to 
 develop and cultivate in the understanding healthful and nor- 
 mal habits of thought, or give it facility in demonstrating and 
 maintaining truth by its reasons. 
 
 It would be erroneous, however, to infer from what is said, 
 that all exercises in the fallacies or sophistical methods of rea- 
 sonmg, which are adapted to give readiness in detecting and 
 refuting errors in the form of arguments, are to be condemned, 
 or are intended thereby to be censured. The " circle," which 
 may be considered an exercise that is, under some respect, 
 public, is designed to represent the contest for truth, so far as 
 practicable, just as it is conducted by sincere and upright op- 
 
 lO 
 
146 logic: second part. 
 
 ponents. Hence, the objections offered to the proposed thesis, 
 which thesis may perchance happen to be really untrue, should 
 by no means be limited to feigned difficulties against the doc- 
 trine defended: but if valid arguments can be adduced which 
 refute it, they are not to be withheld ; for truth should prevail, 
 even if the defender of the assigned proposition be discomfited. 
 
 But the practice of giving exaggerated, and even exclusive 
 attention to the mere forms of argument, or of making all exer- 
 cise in Logic consist in the various transformations or conver- 
 sions which are possible in these forms, employing for the pur- 
 pose only abstract, algebraic formulae, or the related parts of 
 certain diagrams, is, perhaps, as much a mechanical, as it is 
 an intellectual operation; and while the limited use of such 
 methods is not without its advantage, yet excessive attention 
 to these extrinsic devices has not a beneficial effect upon the 
 mind. The rules of correct argument are, for the mind that is 
 loyal to truth, few and simple. It is the ignoble office of per- 
 sistent error to employ subterfuge, obscurity, equivocation, and 
 all the vices of false reasoning. 
 
 It cannot be justly doubted that the direct proofs of truth, 
 and its positive criteria, as explained in Applied Logic, and 
 the principles of General and Special Metaphysics, furnish the 
 most profitable subject matter, for exercising the young mind 
 in Practical Logic. 
 
 End of Logic. 
 
ONTOLOGY 
 
 OR. 
 
 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 147 
 
ONTOLOGY; 
 
 OR, 
 
 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The metaphysical* transcends the conditions of material and 
 sensible existence, as the term metaphysical^ i. e,, beyond the 
 physical, implies. It considers truths and principles in the pro- 
 totypes of things; or, as they are contained or implied in the 
 essential concepts of things, abstractedly from the existence of 
 those things, or, also, as verified in their existence. Hence, it 
 has for its object the most universal attributes of beings ; and 
 the laws and axioms of all the sciences are subject to it, and 
 are tested by its principles ; since error is refuted, and truth 
 demonstrated, only by means of principles that are known per 
 se, i. e., are self-evident, necessary and immutable. In a more 
 special sense, it also includes whatever is immaterial, as spirits, 
 God; since we naturally know spirit only by metaphysical 
 principles and reasoning. 
 
 As ontology or general metaphysics, which is the science of 
 
 * ' * Metaphysicus considerat reriun essentias et modos essendi ; Logicus con- 
 siderat pra^dicationes seu modos praedicandi." The Metaphysician considers 
 the essence of things, and their necessary modes of existing; the Logician con- 
 siders predicables, or modes of predicating. 
 
 * ' Metaphysica in objecto suo includit ens universalissimiira et ejus attributa 
 essentialia. " Metaphysics includes for its object, being as most universal, and 
 its essential atti'ibulea or properties. 
 
 149 
 
150 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 being in the most general sense of the term being* furnishes to 
 the mind the fundamental and ultimate principles on which all 
 philosophy rests, and by which all science must be finally 
 tested, its importance is very great. Its neglect cannot but 
 prove disastrous to all sound method of philosophizing, and 
 thus result in vague hypotheses and dark theories, instead of 
 certain and genuine science. By a careful study of it, the 
 educated mind comes finally to rest quiet in its conclusions; 
 for it sees them as they flow from their first and necessary 
 principles. 
 
 Just as no one can erect a perfect arch, span the broad river 
 with a bridge, or construct a building that is at the same time 
 safe, well-proportioned and massive, unless, besides knowing 
 the contingent physical laws of matter, he know also the 
 metaphysical laws of mathematical quantity ; so, he that would 
 comprehend the real thiftgs of any species or category, must 
 know the determinate, necessary and immutable first princi- 
 ples to which those things are subject; because, these meta- 
 physical principles are the measure for the nature or essence of 
 those objects. Every real being is subject to its own essential 
 truths and laws, in the light of which it must be seen in order 
 to be clearly understood. 
 
 There is a class of writers who affect to doubt, and even to 
 deny, all first principles and metaphysical truths, except those 
 that directly regard mathematical quantity. Since the meta- 
 physics of quantity has constant application in the daily affairs 
 of life, its principles can neither be doubted nor ignored with 
 impunity ; but vulgar ridicule is not incurred by the denial of 
 equally evident and necessary principles, when they regard 
 objects having fewer practical relations to man's material 
 wants ; yet, in itself, it is not more absurd to deny one neces- 
 sary and self-evident truth than another. 
 
 ♦ " Metaphysica speculatur universalia entis attributa; quaj videlicet enti per 
 Be insiint, et qujecunque spectant ad eadom ilia, sive per oppositionem sive per 
 connexionem: Ex. gr. in ente, unum, verum, bonum, essentiam, existentiam," etc. 
 Metaphysics regards the most univei'sal attributes of being; namely, whatever 
 is essentially in being, or pertains to its essential attributes, whether by opposi- 
 tion or connexion; v. g., its unity, truth, goodness, essence, existence, etc. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 WHAT THE NOTION BEING IN ITS GENERAL SENSE^ INCLUDES 
 ESSENCE OF THINGS; EXISTENCE; UNITY; IDENTITY; DIS- 
 TINCTION. 
 
 Beings in its most general sense, includes in its concept what 
 actually exists, and what has any sort of entity, whether it be 
 substance or accident. Creator or creature. Beifig, thus un- 
 derstood, is the material object of ontology. Beings in this 
 general sense, is not generical in its meaning when applied to 
 different objects, v. g,, mineral^ animal, substance, accident; 
 here its signification is not tmivocal, but analogical. For, genus 
 requires the term which stands for its essence to be nnivocally 
 applied to its inferiors or subjects; v. g., "the horse is ajii??ial; 
 the lion is animal; man is animal^ In these examples, ajiimal 
 expresses precisely the same concept in all the objects termed 
 animal. But in the examples, " accident is being, substance is 
 being, matter is being, spirit is being; " the word beifig has not 
 the same, univocal significance in its application to these ob- 
 jects; for, accident as compared to substance, or matter to 
 spirit, is being, only by analogy, since they are in their real en- 
 tity generically diiferent, therefore essentially and wholly differ- 
 ent, and we cannot say that the one is the other, except by 
 some relation of analogy. 
 
 The word being, which stands for the simplest and most 
 universal of our ideas, cannot be defined, nor does it require a 
 definition. It cannot be defined, for, genus and specific differ- 
 ence are both being, and even every synonym of the term is 
 
 151 
 
152 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 also being; hence, behig^ when thus understood, cannot be sub 
 jected to definition. 
 
 The general concept of being {e?itis)^ does not expressly say 
 for its object, either substance or accident, Creator or creature; 
 but all of them, as in some manner one, i. e., as being; of 
 course, they are one, or are being only by a sort of analogy. 
 As observes Suarez, "To the formal concept* of beings corres- 
 ponds one objective concept, adequate and immediate, which 
 does not expressly say either substance or accident, either God 
 or creature, but says them all as one : namely, as being similar 
 in some respect, and as agreeing in this, that they are all 
 beings ''\ 
 
 Hence, it may be inferred that being is not predicated equi- 
 vocally of God and creature, for then nothing could be demon- 
 strated concerning God from creature, since the 7nedium, or 
 middle term, would be equivocal; it is neither predicated uni- 
 vocally, for in this case God and creature would be of the same 
 species ; it is predicated of them only analogically, owing to a 
 certain similarity by which they are, in some sense, united in 
 the same concept of being. 
 
 The word nothing, taken absolutely, expresses the exclusion 
 of all being or entity; yet the mind can make of nothing a quasi 
 object, by its relation to something, which it excludes. But, con- 
 sidered as an object, it is merely a creature of the mind, efis 
 rationis, whose only foundation in reality is the relation referred 
 to. 
 
 When, by a reflexive judgment, the mind affirms, "whatever 
 exists, is ; what does not exist, is not," it thereby employs the 
 principle of identity, for the purpose of giving more reflex cer- 
 tainty to the proposition. 
 
 When, for the same purpose, we affirm that " it is impossible 
 for the same thing to exist, and not exist at the same time ; " 
 we thereby employ the principle of contradiction. When we 
 
 ♦See Article I, Log., I Part, p. 16. 
 
 t " Conceptui formali entis, respondet iinus conceptus objectivus, adaequatus 
 et immediatus, qui expresse non dicit substantiam neque accidens, neque Deum 
 Deque creaturam; sed ha;c omnia per modum unius; Tiz. , quatenus sunt inter se 
 aliquo modo similia, et conveniunt in essendo." (Metaphys. Disp. 2, Sect. 2.) 
 
GENEEAL METAPHYSICS. 153 
 
 put the affirmation under this disjunctive form, namely, "either 
 the thing is, or it is not," it is called \\\^ principle of the excluded 
 middle; since no fnediiim is possible between being, and not 
 being; or, as applied under the same respect, and to the same 
 thing, all middle or medium is excluded, in a complete disjunc- 
 tion. 
 
 The essefice of a thing includes all that by ivhich the thing 
 is what it is, and without which it could not possibly exist at all; 
 V. g., a triangle is constituted such by having three angles, 
 and three sides. Its constituent elements are the three angles, 
 and three sides, and if any one of these essential constituents 
 be wanting, its essence is thereby destroyed, and it ceases to be 
 a triangle, for they are all and each necessary for the very con- 
 cept of it. The essence, therefore, is that without which a 
 thing can neither exist, nor be conceived, and which makes 
 it what it is, when it exists. Essence of a thing, is the real 
 answer to the question : " What is it ? " 
 
 When the essence* of a thing is considered as active, or as a 
 principle, capable either of eliciting or putting acts, it is in that 
 sense the same as the nature of that thing; the essence consti- 
 tutes the being what it is ; its nature is the essence viewed in 
 reference to its operations, or as e?npowered to act. That which 
 constitutes a being immediately operative or able to act, may 
 be considered as the compleme?it of essence. t This compleme/it 
 of essence consists of all the powers, or active and passive vir- 
 tues, that belong to that essence. 
 
 Hence, since the nature % of a thing is its <?j-j'<?;z^:<? as empowered 
 
 ♦"Essentia est in ordine ad esse, natara, principium agendi." "What is 
 essence, in respect to existence, is nature, when regarded as a principle of ac- 
 tion. (See p. 29, rule sixth.) 
 
 t " Nulla substantia creata est immediate operativa." No created sub- 
 stance is immediately operative. 
 
 X * * Potentia definitur per actum. ' ' Power is defined by its act. 
 
 '* Definitio est oratio explicans reinaturam." Definition is a discourse ex- 
 plaining the nature of a thing. 
 
 ' ' Actus specificantur ab objectis. " Acts are specified by their objects. 
 
 "Substantia rei cognoscitur ex operatione; operatio vero ex objecto circa 
 quod versatur." (Lessius opuscul . de immort. animse,. Lib. 2, No. 55.) The 
 substance of a thing is known by its operation; the operation is known by the 
 object which it regards. 
 
 " Praeterea nulla forma materiae immersain essendo et operando, potest re* 
 
154 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 to act ; and, also, since powers, i. e., nature as operative, are 
 defined by their acts, and acts are specified by their connatural 
 objects, it fi.Uovvs that we know the species of any thing from 
 knowing the species of its acts, and this vve know from the 
 connatural objects of these acts; when, therefore, two acts are 
 specifically different, the powers or natures that put these acts 
 are also specifically difterent. 
 
 The following demonstrative argument exemplifies both the 
 force and the application of this undeniable principle, namely, 
 that by knowing the species of the acts, we thereby know the 
 species or kind of the nature that puts those acts : " the human 
 intellect has for the connatural objects of its acts the true, the 
 ufiiversal, the abstract, the super-sensible; but these objects of 
 its acts are absolutely hnniaterial ; therefore, the intellect or 
 intelligent nature which by its acts attains to them, is absolutely 
 immaterial also." Or, in fewer words, that is immaterial, the 
 connatural objects of whose action are immaterial. 
 
 The essence may be considered as physical, or 7netaphysical. 
 The genus and specific difiference, assign the metaphysical essence 
 of an object ; as v. g., material ajid inorganic substance. These 
 terms, substance, material, inorga7iic, give the nietaphysical con- 
 stituents of the object. The physical essence includes the con- 
 stituent attributes, or elements, as they are actually and con- 
 cretely, in the object. 
 
 The human mind may understand and quite clearly com- 
 prehend the essence which it constitutes for itself out of genus 
 and specific difference, which it founds on the realities of objects 
 as known to it; but the physical essence of objects, as they are 
 actually existing, it can know, not immediately and intimately; 
 but only i?iediately or through their extrinsic action and effects. 
 
 This is evident, when we reflect that we depend for our 
 
 flcctere supra suara operationem; v. g. , oculus non videt suam visionem, etc. , 
 anima autem rationalis reflectit supra propriam operationem. Ergo anima 
 ratioiialis est superior omni materise in essendo etoperando." (Philosophi. 
 passim.) No form whicli is dependent on matter, both in existing and in opera' 
 ting, can reflect on its own act; v. g. , the eye cannot see itself seeing, etc. ; but 
 the rational soul can reflect on its own act. Therefore, the rational soul is 
 superior to matter, both in its essence and its action. 
 
 "Actus et potentia sunt ejusdem generis." Act and the power are of th« 
 Bame genus. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 155 
 
 knowledge of the objects around us, upon the senses, which 
 are acted on by those objects through their quaHties; and, 
 therefore, the mind does not perceive their essence imme- 
 diately, but by experience, comparison, reflexion and abstrac- 
 tion, it forms its concept of that essence, as the nature of the 
 object. But, on the other hand, it is very erroneous to assert, 
 as Locke does, that we know notJwig of the physical essence 
 of things ; for we do know physical essences, at least so far as 
 they manifest themselves in their properties and operations. 
 
 The essence of an actual being is true because it is conform- 
 able to the type of that being, as it exists in the Divine Mind. 
 The essential prototypes, or essences of things, as in the Divine 
 Mind, are eternal, indivisible, and immutable. For if they 
 could be divided, or diminished, and thus changed, they would 
 thereby become something else ; some other essence, or cease 
 to be what they are, which, in reality, would be to conceive 
 other essences, not to change these. (Vide page 6i et seq. and 
 note page ^t^.) 
 
 IN WHAT REAL MUTATION CONSISTS. 
 
 It will help towards a fuller comprehension of this whole 
 matter, if we distinguish the different senses in which the ex- 
 pressions "mutation," and "change of one thing into another," 
 are understood by philosophers; v. g., as, conversiott, transnb- 
 stantiatioft, alteration, a7inihilatio?i and creation, all of which 
 operations imply some sort of chajige in the terms, or objects 
 of them. 
 
 For the cojiversion of one thing into another, the fulfillment 
 of the following rules and conditions is essential : 
 
 First: There must be two terms, both of which zx^ positive; 
 i. e., not mere privations or negations, but some positive and 
 real substance. The first one of these terms is called the ter- 
 minus a quo, or conversus; i. e., the term, object or thing that 
 is changed ; the other term of the conversion is called the 
 terminus ad que tn, or convertens; i. e., the term or thing into 
 which the first one is changed, or which, in some manner, 
 replaces the first one. 
 
156 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Second.' There must be a subject either in which, or in 
 respect to which, the change is made, this subject in itself 
 remaining unchanged; i. e., what is intrinsical to one term is 
 changed into what is intrinsically of another term, something 
 receiving that change as a subject, or at least as a quasi sub- 
 ject, this subject thereby passing from the one to the other 
 without being itself otherwise changed. 
 
 Third : The terminus a quo must cease to exist in the sub- 
 ject, and be succeeded by the ternwius ad quetn, the cessation 
 of the one and the succession of the other having some rela- 
 tion of dependence on each other; this ceasing of the one 
 term and beginning of the other can be effected only by some 
 real physical action. 
 
 Fourth: Hence, there must be a double mutation : one by 
 which the terminus a quo passes from existence to non-exist- 
 ence; and the other, by which the terminus ad quem passes 
 from non-existence to existence, a subject receiving the one, 
 after giving up the other; this subject is the inatter, or quasi 
 matter. 
 
 An example, though it does not perfectly embody these con- 
 ditions, yet may help to illustrate for the young mind what is 
 thus far said : suppose an orange and an apple be placed near 
 to each other on the table. Now, if all that specifically or 
 essentially constitutes the orange what it is, were caused to 
 pass into the apple, in such a manner as to force all that spe- 
 cifically or essentially constitutes the apple to give way, or 
 cease to remain in the matter in which it dwelt, and thus be 
 succeeded therein by the corresponding constituents of the 
 orange, thereby making that which was an apple become an 
 orange, such change would be the conversion of one thing into 
 another, and, in this instance, it would be the conversion of an 
 apple into an orange. The apple would be the termi?ius a 
 quo, and the orange would be the terminwi ad quem. The 
 matter in which the essence of the apple ceased to be, and into 
 which the essence or specific nature of the orange subsequently 
 came, is the subject of the conversion. 
 
 As to whether there is any conversion, as thus described, of 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 157 
 
 one material substance into another, by natural laws and 
 agency, is a question which, in the opinion of some great 
 minds, is not yet demonstratively and definitively settled by 
 philosophers and physicists. 
 
 The misfortune of the Alchemists was the assuming as a 
 general principle, such conversion of material substance to be 
 naturally possible ; and hence their many futile and disastrous 
 attempts actually to convert base metals into gold. But all 
 agree that absolutely and intrinsically the conversion of one 
 substance supposed to consist of a dual principle, as implied 
 in the idea of conversion, into another, is not impossible to 
 Infinite Power; still more evidently is there no repugnance 
 when that change of one thing into another is a transubsta?i- 
 tiation. 
 
 In this case it is not alone the formal, or specific principle 
 of the dual constituents of material substance that is converted 
 into another, the material principle remaining in itself un- 
 changed as the subject of two successive substantial forms; but 
 in tra7isubsta)itiation the whole substance, both as to matter 
 and substantial form, ceases, and a complete new substance 
 succeeds it, the accidents which are se?isible, or the sensible 
 species alone remaimng unchanged, except as to their relation 
 to the substance. 
 
 In the case of Eucharistic transubstantiation, the sensible 
 species exist without a subject of inhesion. This transubstan- 
 tiation is not effected by natural, but by supernatural agency. 
 There seems to be no proof, however, that such transubstantia- 
 tion can be effected by any merely natural agency. 
 
 Alteration expresses change of one quality into another ; the 
 terminus ad quern, in alteration, is quality; in conversion, the 
 ■terminus ad quern, is substance, as already said. 
 
 There is alteration in the most strict sense, only when some 
 quality of a given substance is changed into a contrary; v. g. 
 when black is changed into white, they being conceived as 
 contraries. In this case, the whole substance, which is the 
 subject of alteration, passes from a positive quality which ceases, 
 "to a n^w and contrary quality, which succeeds it. Accidents 
 
158 gp:neral metaphysics. 
 
 that perfect their subject, are not said to alter it, since it is not 
 consistent to say that a thing is altered^ or becomes, in any 
 proper sense, another* by being perfected. 
 
 In creation^ a thing is produced from nothing; i. e., it is not 
 educed in any sense from a preexisting subject, but derives its 
 whole being from a purely efficient cause. By aimihilation^ a 
 being is totally reduced to non-existence, so that nothing of it 
 that is either substantial or accidental, is remaining. 
 
 Since the essence of a thing includes precisely those constit- 
 uents that are necessary to make it what it is individually, and 
 which, at the same time, render it conformable to its archetype 
 in the divine mind, it '\s per se evident that neither this type of 
 it in the divine mind, nor the truthful copy of it in the actual 
 being, can be intrinsically changed. 
 
 The mutations above described as co?iversian, alteration, etc., 
 include all real changes in a being that are possible, or con- 
 ceivable ; but in no one of them is there change of intrinsic 
 essence. Even existence, and non-existe?ice, are only different 
 states or conditions of a being or essence, which include no 
 intrinsic change of essejice in itself. Hence, all mutation is 
 limited to the existence or non-existence, and to the real rela- 
 tions, of its terms ; and, therefore, essences are intrinsically 
 immutable. 
 
 Essence is eternal: Essence, in the possible or intelligible 
 order, could have had no beginning ; for it was always true 
 that if 'alhing of a given or determinate essence ever existed 
 afterwards, it must have such or such essential constituents; 
 since this eternal possibility depends on God, who is eternal, is 
 the cause of truth, and knows in His own essence the essential 
 prototype of every possible creature, from eternity; therefore, 
 essence, regarded as a concept of the divine intellect, must be 
 eternal. 
 
 Existence is affirmed of those essences that are actual, or 
 that have passed from possibility into the order of real things ; 
 and they are then said to exist. It is manifest that existence 
 
 *"Conversio terminatur ad aliud; alteratio ad alterum." The term of con* 
 pfrsior^ is another substance; that of alteration, another quality. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 159 
 
 cannot be strictly defined ; and yet nothing is more clear to 
 the mind than it is. 
 
 Essence, as possible, being logically presupposed to its 
 actual existence in the real order of things, metaphysicians 
 amuse themselves with the subtle question, " Is actually exist- 
 ifig essetice truly different from its real existence ? " Though 
 the question is not practically important, and perhaps turns 
 partly on an equivocal use of terms, it may, however, exercise 
 mental acumen in the inquisitive student of philosophy, to 
 state it briefly in this place. 
 
 One side, interpreting in their favor the expressions often 
 employed by the "Angel of the Schools," St. Thomas of 
 Aquin, v. g., "essentia entis perfectissimi, absoluti, necessarii, 
 etc., est suum esse;" the essence of absolutely perfect being 
 includes its existence ; " essentia entis contingentis non est 
 suum esse;" the essence of contingent being does not postu- 
 late in its concept actual existence; "in creatis, est compositio 
 inter essentiam et esse ; " in created things, there is composition 
 between essence and existence, etc., argue that the two are 
 different ; that is, that real essence and its actual existence are 
 different objectively. They hold that the term of every creative 
 act must be actually received by a subject^ since all created essence 
 is participated or derived. Hence, in this theory, existence is 
 the actuality, and essence is the subject that receives it ; some 
 saying that the existence is a substantial form educed from the 
 essence; others, that it is 7nodal only. It thence follows, there- 
 fore, that essence and its existence constitute a dual principle, 
 like to that of matter and for?n, in corporeal substance, the 
 essence being the potentia, or quasi matter^ and existence being 
 the form. 
 
 The other side, who maintain that it is a distinction without a 
 difference, answer that this theory, thus applied, presents a less 
 simple and perfect concept both of the creative act, and the 
 nature of uncompounded or simple substance ; that, for the 
 existence of corporeal substance, it necessitates the admission 
 of a double dual principle ; namely, matter and form, essence 
 and existe7ue. They argue, moreover, that their adversaries' 
 
160 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 theory being true, namely, that all actual being must be received^ 
 no sufficient reason can be given why the series of dual prin- 
 ciples should be limited at all ; that this hypothesis is obscure, 
 and difficult to be comprehended ; that it is susceptible of no 
 positive or' conclusive proof ; that it is a multiplicatioji of eniia, 
 which rather perplexes than simplifies philosophic thought, and 
 that it, therefore, is introduced without logical necessity.* 
 
 From this imperfect outline of a few arguments adduced by 
 each side, some idea may be formed, at least, of the poitii on 
 which the dispute turns. 
 
 Possibility : Whatever creature exists is capable of existing, 
 and was capable of existing before it existed at all. A thing is 
 intrinsically possible, when its essential constituents have no re- 
 pugnance or contradiction among themselves; as v. g., it is 
 possible to construct a locomotive that is impelled at a given 
 velocity by steam. Extrinsic possibility, besides presupposing 
 the intrinsic possibility, implies also that there is a sufficient 
 cause that can actually produce the effect; v. g., the builders, 
 material, etc., of the locomotive, in the example supposed. 
 
 Possibility, taken simply or adequately, includes both the 
 extri7isic and the i?itrinsic possibility. 
 
 Corresponding to this double respect of possibility there is a 
 twofold impossibility ; intrinsic and extrinsic impossibility. All 
 things that are intrinsically possible, :xxe,m respect to the power 
 of God, also extrifisically possible. In respect to the power of 
 creatures, many things which are intrinsically, and, therefore, 
 extrinsically possible to God, are for them physically impossible/ 
 V. g., it \s physically impossible for men to stop the motion of the 
 earth, and still more is it physically impossible for a creature to 
 create from nothing. A thing is morally impossible which, con- 
 sidering the moral nature of man, cannot be done by him ; v. 
 g., all parents cannot hate their offspring; all men cannot unite 
 in a lie. 
 
 Intrinsic possibility does not primarily proceed either from 
 
 * This question is argued acutely and at gi'eat length by Suarez (Metaphysics, 
 Disput., 31) ; where he defends the latter opinion, and denies that there is any 
 real difference between actual essence and Us existence. 
 
GENEEAL METAPIIYSICS. 161 
 
 the power or the will of God; but from the essences of things 
 as seen by the Divine InteUigence; or, in other words, they 
 have their origin in the Divine Essence itself 
 
 It is obvious that both power and will presuppose the possi- 
 bility of the thing to be done or effected, since intelligence 
 must logically precede both volition* and the power that fol- 
 lows, or obeys volition. Otherwise, one might say, " God can 
 make a circle that is not round, if its possibility depends formally 
 on his will^ or his /^7£'<?ry " whereas, the supposition is absurd; 
 for contradictions mutually destroy themselves, and, in the 
 case supposed, leave no term of action. It would be the same 
 as saying, God can make a circle and not make a circle at the 
 same time and under the same respect ; which is actually say- 
 ing nothing at all, as an object of thought or real term of ac- 
 tion. 
 
 Hence, it is easily seen that, as before stated, ifitrinsic possi- 
 bilities, or, what is virtually the same, the essences of things, 
 are i??imutable, and are, therefore, incapable either, of increase 
 or dmiinution. 
 
 Every beifig is one. Unity is the negation of division in a 
 being.f For, every being is either simple, or it is compound ; 
 if it is simple, it is indivisible ; if it is compound, it ceases to 
 be a being when divided, and becomes not a being, but be- 
 ings. Yet, a thing may be one in some respect, and many m 
 another respect; v. g., the essence of a thing is one; but its 
 integral parts may be many. The universal is actually one, but 
 capable of becoming many, under a certain respect.| 
 
 Identity^ is founded on unity, and signifies the agreement of 
 
 * * * Nihil volitum nisi prsecognitum. ' ' That which is wished must have been 
 previously known ; or, more litterally, nothing is wished unless what is fore- 
 knoAvn. 
 
 f * * Omne principium est unum. ' ' Every principle is one. 
 
 * * Ab uuo non nisi unum. ' ' 
 
 t '* Universale, «?*«?» est actu; mw/Za in potentia." The universal is one ac-: 
 tually, but many, potentially. 
 
 § * * Unum in substantia facit idem ; unum m qualitate facit simile; unum in 
 qantitate facit csquale, seu aaqualitas fundatur in imitate quantitatis, servata dis- 
 tinctione extremorum. " To be one in substance, makes identity; one in quality, 
 makes similarity; one in quantity, makes equality; or, equality is founded on 
 unity of quantity, keeping the distinction of the extremes. 
 II 
 
162 GEJ^ERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 a thing with itself. Identity may be ge?ie7'k, as. ajiimal^ in 
 man and brute ; or specific, as man, when applied to different 
 men ; or numerical, as a man compared with himself. 
 
 Similarity* is connected with identity and unity, since it is 
 founded on unity or identity under some respect. 
 
 Similarity is an agreement of distiiict things. This agree- 
 ment is in some quality or perfection, and it may exist in ob- 
 jects of different species; "the child resembles its mother; 
 the color of the evening sky is like to that of gold ; " " vices 
 in the evening of life, like shadows at the decline of day, grow 
 great a?id monstrous^ The resemblance between the objects 
 in the last example is properly that of analogy, though the 
 comparison be termed simile. Agreement in all respects is 
 peculiar to objects of the same species, as, Peter is like Paul ; 
 this is specific identity. 
 
 Leibnitz and Clark disputed as to whether two objects of the 
 same species could be so completely alike as to differ only 
 numerically; Leibnitz denied the possibility of it ; Clark main- 
 tained it to be intrinsically possible; and in this he was correct. 
 
 Distinguish between similarity and analogy; similarity is 
 founded on the specific identity of some one or more qualities 
 or properties in objects which are otherwise different, and which 
 are, therefore, predicated of the objects univocally. These ob- 
 jects, or the subjects of the like quaHties, may be either of the 
 same or different species. Analogy, on the contrary, properly 
 supposes its objects or the terms of it, to be of different species. 
 
 Analogy is not founded on specifically identical quality in its 
 objects or terms ; but on a certain proportion between its ob- 
 jects, or their proper effects, by which the one becomes related 
 in the mind to the other. 
 
 This proportion is not that which is in parity, which is reduc- 
 ible to mathematical quantity, and which, being of the same 
 species, is predicated univocally of its terms ; but the propor- 
 tion which makes analogy is not reducible to mathematical 
 
 * " Ut duo dicantur perfecte similia, debent habere secundum eamdem ratio- 
 nem id in quo conveniunt. ' ' For two things f,o be called perfectly similar, thej 
 must possess that in which they agree, in the same manner. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 163 
 
 quantity ; it is a relation or agreement which has no proper 
 unit of measure, is neither uni vocally nor equivocally predi- 
 cated of its objects or terms, and yet they have that basis of 
 somewhat indeterminate resemblance which founds for the 
 mind a relation of the one to the other. 
 
 Both similarity and analogy, therefore, are founded on like- 
 ness of objects, and hence, they may be considered as agreeing 
 generically, though they differ specifically. 
 
 Distinctioji* is opposed to ide7itity. Real distinction is either 
 substantial or accidental: the distinction between an apple and 
 a pebble is substantial; also, that between the body and soul in 
 man, though constituents of the same compound. The dis- 
 tinction between substance and its accidents^ or among the acci- 
 dents themselves, is, under different respects, either accidental 
 distinction, or substantial distinction. 
 
 The distinctioji of reason f is so called, because it is made by 
 the reason, and exists only in the reasoning which the mind 
 employs in its efforts to comprehend or explain certain difficult 
 objects in which, being unable to use the real, it helps itself by 
 this artificial distinction. 
 
 This distinction of reason is two-fold ; it is either virtually 
 founded in the object; or, it is purely mental. The distinction 
 of the attributes in God, as all-wise, all-powerful, free, mer- 
 ciful, just, etc., since his absolute perfection contains in a cer- 
 tain pre-eminent manner what we thus denominate, is a dis- 
 tinction of reason founded m'\X.^ object; though God and his 
 attributes are really ide?itical. 
 
 The distinction between man and rational animal, or Cicero 
 a?id Tully, is purely mental, or of reason; one being the other 
 differently expressed. The mind employs these distinctions of 
 reason in its operations that regard objects, whose unity and 
 simplicity, or greatness, it is unable to express by one direct 
 and adequate concept of those objects. 
 
 * ' ' Distinctio est carentia identitatis. ' ' Distinction is a want ol identity. 
 
 t ' * Distinctio ratiouis est duplex: distinctio rationis ratiocinates, quae fit cum 
 ftindamento in re; et distinctio rationis ratiocinantis, quae est sine fundamento in 
 re. " The distinction of reason is twofold: the one is founded in the object; the 
 other is not founded in the object. 
 
164 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 To this head we may likewise refer various mere figments 
 of the imagination: "ens imaginabile latius ampliat quam 
 ens possibile ; " the fancy extends its action even beyond the 
 possible object, to the impossible or absurd. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 TRUTH. 
 
 Iruth* is a predicate of every being ; and is, therefore, enu- 
 merated among the transcendentals, or the transce?idental pre- 
 dicates : it consists in this, that every being agrees with the 
 essential type, or concept of itself. Truth, thus understood, is 
 now more commonly called, metaphysical truth. 
 
 All truth, as already declared in speaking of logical truth, is 
 a relation of agreement between intellect and object. t When 
 Leibnitz defines it to be, order in the constituents of beins^, his 
 definition pertains rather to the goodness or perfection of being. 
 
 Absolutely speaking, things are true because they agree with 
 the intellect that constitutes them ; that is, when they agree 
 with the archetypes, or essential ideas according to whose 
 exemplar they are made. Thus all actual things agree with 
 their exemplars in the Divine Mind; and, similarly, artificial 
 things made by man are true, as agreeing with the precon- 
 ceived idea of them in the mind of him who devises and makes 
 them. Hence, it is easily seen that falsity % in beings, or real 
 things, is nothing; but falsity, or not being, is predicated of them 
 by a concept of reason, which attributes to them what is really 
 in the judgment, or in the mind only. 
 
 A statue is said to h^ false, which fails to express the intended 
 likeness ; a deceiver is called a false friend ; objects are called 
 false, which give occasion for false judgment, as " fools' gold," 
 etc. But falsity, formally taken, is the negation of truth, and 
 
 * ' ' Omne ens est verum. ' ' Every being is true. 
 
 t * * Veritas est adsequatio intellectus et rei. " Truth is the equation of intel- 
 lect and object. 
 X ' ' Falsitas in rebus nihil est. ' ' There is no falsity in real things. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 165 
 
 in its primary or radical sense, is to be referred to tvill and 
 judgineni, or, to finite cognition, but not to things or beings, 
 as positive. 
 
 After a little attention to the preceding considerations, the 
 following propositions will be readily admitted : 
 
 First : There is truth in all real things, and that independeiitly 
 of our knowledge of them For they are conformable to their 
 archetypes in the Divine Intellect; and this relation of agree- 
 ment is metaphysical truth. Also things are principally or 
 primarily true by their relation to the Divine Intelligence, to 
 which must be referred the origin of all essences. 
 
 Second : No object is false, in respect to the Divine Jntellect. 
 For God is infinite in intelligence in which they originate, and 
 freedom which wills to create, and power which actually effects 
 them, or gives them their real being; therefore, all thmgs that 
 exist must agree with their essential exemplars, as they are in 
 His intelligence : this is truth in those things; since they must 
 be what they are seeji, willed and made to be, by Him. 
 
 Third: Eveiy being is true: {omne ens est verum.) For so 
 far as any thing is being at all, so far forth is it true ; since we 
 can predicate 7iot true only of that which is not. 
 
 Fourth : In respect to the Diinne Intellect, created things are 
 as the measured to the measure ; but in respect to the human 
 intellect, on the contrary, creatures are as the 7neasure to the 
 measured. I'hat is, Divine Intelligence is the cause of created 
 things ; but these created things are the cause of the human 
 intellect knowing them ; for, as objects, they specify the acts of 
 human knowledge which they cause ; and without their active 
 concurrence, the human intellect could not know them. 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 GOOD AND EVIL. 
 
 Every thing that exists may be conceived as having for its 
 object a certain good which is connatural to it, and to which 
 it tends, therefore, by the law of its nature. This propensity 
 
166 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 or positive tendency to that good which is an end for each 
 being, is often called, under different respects, its appetite^ or 
 its power of appetitio7i. 
 
 Appetite, then, is the propensity or positive tendency of a 
 being to its connatural good. Elicited appetition is this pro- 
 pensity or tendency to a knowji good; and since knowledge may 
 be either sensible or rafiofial, it is obvious that appetite may also 
 be either sensible or rational. Rational appetite, which is the 
 will, tends to a good which is apprehended by the intellect, as 
 the sensible appetite tends to good which is known through the 
 organs of sense. 
 
 An act IS elicited by a power when it proceeds immediately 
 and physically from that power ; or, when that power is the 
 active principle that gives origin to it. Thus, the will elicits 
 its own acts, or they are immediately and physically from the 
 will. Owing to the authority of the will over our faculties 
 and members, their acts which are put, in obedience to the 
 will, are cominanded or ordered acts. Objects which have not 
 a z'//^/ principle of action in them do not elicit acts; but are 
 moved to action only by an efficient and extrinsic cause. 
 
 IN WHAT THE LIBERTY OR FREEDOM OF THE RATIONAL 
 APPETITE, OR THE HUMAN WILL, CONSISTS. 
 
 That power is free, which, all things being put which are 
 required for its action, can either act, or not act.* Hence, 
 when the objects which are subject to the will's free choice are 
 actually presented to it by the intellect, it is truly indifferejit in 
 respect to them ; i. e., its election or choice is not determined 
 by the objects proposed to it, but is determined by the will 
 itself, by its own proper act. 
 
 *" Potentia libera ilia est, quae, positis omnibus requisitis ad operandum, 
 potest operari et non operari. ' ' 
 
 "Omnia bonum appetunt; malum est praeter intentionem." All things 
 desire their good; evil is beside intention. 
 
 " Voluntas est appetitus intellectus, seu est inclinatio ad bonum per intel- 
 lectum apprehensum. ' ' 
 
 * ' Appetitus boni cum ratione. ' ' 
 
 The will is the appetite of the intellect, or it is inclination to good which is ap- 
 prehended by the intellect; it is the appetite of good with reason. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 167 
 
 As there are two distinct classes of objects which the action 
 of the will regards, the liberty or freedom of the will may be 
 considered under two corresponding respects: ist, it maybe 
 considered as exempt from force, or forced action, but not 
 exempt from necessity, or necessitated 2iQX\0Vi\ 2d, the action of 
 the will may be considered as exempt, both from force and 
 necessity. It is liberty or freedom of action in this second 
 sense alone, that is specified in the preceding definition of lib- 
 erty. In this case, therefore, even all things being supposed 
 which are required for its action, the will can either act, or not 
 act, the final choice being strictly its own act. 
 
 Distinguish, therefore, between the will's action as thus free, 
 and its necessitated action. Beings that see God intuitively 
 are necessitated by that vision oi perfect good, to love God 
 supremely ; but they are not forced to do so, since force im- 
 plies violent and compulsory action. For, it is manifest that 
 force, or forced action, comes from an extrinsic principle, and 
 the subject which is compelled by it is entirely /-^^i^zV^, and, 
 therefore, does not positively or efficiently contribute to the 
 forced action. 
 
 It is essential to the very concept of appetite, or power of 
 appetition, and above all to a rational appetite, that it tend by 
 its natural action only to what is apprehended as the good of 
 its subject ; and that it avert from evil, when it is apprehended 
 precisely as such. For, if the appetite could tend to evil, as 
 evil, it would itselt be physically and essentially evil, for, in 
 such supposition, it would tend to evil as its connatural object, 
 and, therefore, its evil action would be in obedience to the neces- 
 sary physical law of its nature. The appetite would, in such 
 case, be intrinsically evil, as is evident ; but this would dis- 
 honor God. Therefore, an appetite must, of its very nature, 
 tend to what is, at least in some respect, the good of its sub- 
 ject. 
 
 Hence, it must follow that the will can, by its natural action, 
 tend to no object which is not apprehended as, under some 
 respect, good for its subject. And this is, at the same time, 
 as a little observation and reflexion will verify, an obvious fact 
 
168 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 of experience, as regards the operation of all those agents 
 which have natural to them these principles of action termed 
 appetites, or powers of appetition. 
 
 The will, when considered as exempt from force or compul- 
 sory action, but yet as iiecessarily tending, in all its action, to 
 good^ is often termed a natural agent; in the sense that, like 
 all physical and second causes, its action is spontaneous^ i. e., 
 springs from itself, or its own nature as operative : its action is 
 still vohmtary, or of the will, but it is not f7'ee. 
 
 The term spontaneous, is used in several distinct senses : ist, 
 the action even of inanimate beings, as minerals, stones, etc., 
 is said to be spontajieous, in the sense that their action is their 
 owfi, or really proceeds from them, as a principle that puts or 
 produces it ; 2d, that species of choice, in a wide and analogi- 
 cal sense of the term, which irrational animals make by virtue 
 of sensible power in them, among the objects of their appetites, 
 is often termed spontaneous action in them : 3d, the action of 
 the will as necessitated to desire good, is termed spotitaneous 
 action ; and, in the same sense, it is often called voluntary ac- 
 tion, as opposed to free action, inasmuch as the will is its 
 principle, or it is elicited by the will ; 4th, the free action of 
 the will is also termed spontaneous, as opposed both to forced 
 and necessitated action. 
 
 Hence, sponta7ieous action, in the primary sense of the word 
 from which its other meanings are derived, is opposed io forced 
 action ; or, spontafieous action is that action which is not forced, 
 but is put by the agent as its principle. 
 
 The will is properly termed free, as already observed, only 
 when it is exempt both from force and necessity or necessitated 
 action. As subject only to necessity, it is still the formal prin- 
 ciple of its own action, or it elicits its volitions : but it does so, 
 in obedience to physical and necessary law. Every agent, 
 truly such ; the intellect, the senses, irrational animals, inani- 
 mate substances, can all act, and do act, with some sort of 
 spontaneity, or without being forced to operate, as above ex- 
 plained; but yet, they are never exempt from tiecessity; or, all 
 their actions are necessitated, for they are determined by their 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 169 
 
 objects. The intellect in its three principal acts of simple 
 apprehension, judgment of composition, and judgment of illa- 
 tion, and every other cognoscive power, all depend for action 
 on the objects, for the objects must determine them to act ; 
 and when their objects actually influence them, they must 
 necessarily act. 
 
 But no object, in regard to which the will is free, ever deter- 
 mines its action ; it determines its own free action for itself. 
 Over its election between those objects which are subject to its 
 choice, it has complete empire ; but no other power ever has any 
 such control over its own action. (Div.Th. i,2,p. qu. lo, a. 2.) 
 
 In respect to the relation which the will may have to the 
 different objects which are subject to its choice, its liberty or 
 freedom is distinguished into that of contrariety or specifica- 
 tion, and that of contradiction or exercise. 
 
 Liberty of contrariety or specification implies capability in the 
 will of selecting between species of objects which are subject 
 to its choice; v. g., if the matter or objects which are pro- 
 posed to it be, " will I write a letter now, or go into the grove, 
 or visit my friends ? " The actual choice between these objects 
 may be considered the exercise of liberty as to the contrariety 
 or specificatiojt of its action. But when the terms are employed 
 more strictly and precisely ; liberty of coiitrariety regards ob- 
 jects which are contraj-y^ as good or bad; liberty of specification, 
 regards merely the species of the objects. 
 
 But if the question be, " will I answer the letter, or not answer 
 it?" This is to determine between acting, and not acting; 
 which is exercising liberty of contradiction. In virtue of its 
 liberty of contradiction or exercise, then, the will can either 
 positively choose, or not choose, a certain good object pro- 
 posed to it. 
 
 Liberty thus to choose between species of acts, and between 
 acting and not acting, or liberty of exercise, necessarily requires 
 indifi^erence in the will; i. e., that it be undetermined to one 
 side or another, whether by the object proposed, or by any 
 other prirciple which is extrinsic to itself, thus leaving it so 
 disposed that the choice actually made will come from itself. 
 
170 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The powers which act only when determined by their objects, 
 are not indtfferoit to action, nor to the species of their acts ; but 
 when the objects are sufficiently presented to them, and actually 
 influence them, their action is necessitated, and, at the same 
 time, their acts are specified by those objects. 
 
 THE WILL, WHEN FREELY CHOOSING, IS NOT DETERMINED BY 
 THE GREATEST MOTIVE. 
 
 It must not be supposed that the will, in choosing among 
 objects that are subject to election, is determified by the greatest 
 motive, as some authors erroneously affirm. In such a suppo- 
 sition, the will would really not be free at all ; for, in that case, 
 its action would be necessitated by the motive or object, just 
 as it always happens in respect to the powers of cognition. 
 Hence, the theory which teaches that among the objects which 
 fall under election, the one which furnishes the greatest motive 
 to the will is thereby predominant and ?iecessarily determines 
 the will to choose it, is repugnant to the very concept of liberty 
 and destroys its essential character. In truth, the will can, in 
 such cases, yield to the less motive; nay, it can abstain from 
 any positive action at all in respect to the proffered objects. 
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IS KNOWN TO ALL, AS AN 
 EVIDENT FACT. 
 
 The freedom of the will is known to be a fact, in its own 
 immediate or objective evidence, to every rational man, on 
 the direct testimony of his own consciousness, just as every 
 sane man knows that he perceives, reasons, remembers, etc. 
 The liberty of the will is, therefore, a primitive fact, in the 
 same sense in which the direct acts of cognition, of conscious- 
 ness, of judgment, of sensation, etc., are primitive facts. 
 
 Facts are not inaptly denominated " stubborn things ; " for 
 they are independent of man's trustless words, they overturn 
 his most specious theories, and they defy his keenest sophistry. 
 
 Any difficulty of reconciling the evident fact of man's free- 
 dom with other truths, which are sometimes artfully made to 
 appear as contradicting it, can proceed only from ignorance of 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 171 
 
 those other truths, or else from failure to detect a logical fallacy. 
 But a full treatise on the will, properly pertains to Psychology. 
 
 As figure and color constitute the object of vision, sound 
 that of hearing, truth the object of the understanding, so, the 
 good* forms the object of the will. As man has many appe- 
 tites by which he is drawn to various objects presented to him 
 under the form or respect of good, sub ratione boni; in a simi- 
 lar manner, his highest appetite, that is, his rational appetite, 
 or will, loves the good which is of a corresponding and supe- 
 rior order ; and, in one respect or another, his will tends neces- 
 sarily to that good. 
 
 The good?iess of a thing is founded on that required and 
 befitting perfection which renders that thing desirable to the 
 power of appetition, whose connatural object it is. Sensible 
 good is the connatural object of sensible appetite, and is perfect in 
 its species when the sensible appetite is satisfied by it, and rests 
 quiet in its enjoyment. A similar proportion exists between 
 the superior or rational appetite, the unll, and its connatural 
 objects. 
 
 The good is presupposed to the appetition of it, and it acts 
 on the mind by way of a final cause. When good is thus un- 
 derstood ; that is, absolutely, as ih.& formal and essential object 
 of the will or rational appetite, without which it cannot act 
 at all, under this respect it is not subject to choice or election ; 
 but the will tends to it necessarily, as to its only end. The 
 vieans to that end, however, does fall under the election or 
 choice of the will. The will cannot love evil as evil, malum 
 uib ratione 7nali ; its only object, therefore, is good. 
 
 When all objects are regarded as subordinate to this end ; 
 that is, as giving connatural exercise to the powers of appeti- 
 tion, the good that is in those objects may be divided, relatively 
 to that end, into the becomiyig, the useful., the pleasant. The 
 good that is becoming, or fit, is good that is in accordance with 
 
 *" Bonitas est prior nativva quam appetibilitas; agit per modum causae fina- 
 lis." " Finis nott eadit sub electione; quia electio versatur circa media, non 
 autem circa ipsum finem. ' ' Goodness is by nature prior to appetibility; it acts 
 by way of final cause. The end does not fall under election ; for election regards 
 the means, not the end itsell. 
 
172 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 right reason, and it includes, therefore, moral good; good z.% 
 pleasant supposes cognition and power of fruition ; the useful, 
 which is loved, not for itself, but for something ulterior to it, 
 is a means to that end. As to what constitutes the summufn 
 boniim* or chief good which is the ultimate end of man as a 
 rational being, it pertains to another treatise to investigate. 
 
 Hence, it follows, \hdXgood\s absolute, or relative/ physical 
 or moral. Every being is good; both in itself and in respect to 
 other being tha?t itself^ Good is diffusive of itself , for its ejid is 
 to be possessed and loved. All good is from GodX 
 
 Evil is the privation of good; or, it is the want of some due 
 perfection in a being. Evil is physical or moral; or, it is the 
 absence of some due physical or moral perfection. 
 
 Physical evil \?, the privation of some natural good; as sick- 
 ness, blindness, ignorance, etc. 
 
 Moral evil \s, the privation of moral good, and, as is mani- 
 fest, can be found only in agents that are intelligent and free. 
 It consists in a defection of the free will from what is morally 
 right or good. 
 
 According to Leibnitz, there is also metaphysical evil ; which 
 is finiteness, or limitation of perfection. But this is not pro- 
 perly an evil ; for, when a created being is perfect in its spe- 
 cies, it possesses all due perfection ; and it is confusion of lan- 
 guage to say that finiteness, or not being identical with God, 
 is evil, when viewed under such a respect. 
 
 There is no evil, except in a subject that is good ; and, as 
 already seen, every being, as such, is good. Since evil con- 
 sists in privation of good, what has no being, can have no evil; 
 that is, it must be nothing; which, properly, is neither good nor 
 evil. The efficient cause of evil is good,§ as a being; and no 
 will can wish evil purely as such, or purely for itself; but it 
 may wish evil which is presented to it as good ; v. g., as gain 
 or pleasure. 
 
 •AldeDiv. Th. IP., Qu. 5, Art. G. 
 
 t ' ' Boiium est diffusivum sui . ' ' Good is diffusive of itself. 
 \ ' ' Deus est omnis boni bonura. ' ' God is the good of every good. 
 § '* Malum non agit nisi virtute boni. " Evil does not act except in virtue of 
 good. 
 
CJENERAL METAPHYSICS. 173 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 BEAUTY. 
 
 As the goodness of an object depends on its having all the 
 perfections of its species or essence, together with all the qual- 
 ities that complete and adorn it; so, the beauty of that object 
 depends on the same conditions. The object o{ love, and co?t- 
 templation, therefore, is the same, though it respects different 
 powers of the soul ; good being the object of appetition, and 
 beauty that of contemplative, or cognoscive power.* 
 
 Beauty is intellectual, moral and sensible. Philosophers have 
 found it difficult to give a definition of beauty, which clearly 
 and satisfactorily includes all its species. Some have defined 
 it to be, "unity with multitude and variety." But we can con- 
 ceive an object to possess " unity with multitude and variety," 
 which is yet misshapen or deformed. 
 
 Unity, multitude and variety may be necessary conditions 
 of beauty in most cases; but they are not its only constituents. 
 Nor are " order and utility " its specific characteristics, as some 
 allege ; since " order and utility " refer to perfection and good- 
 tie ss.\ 
 
 Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his admirable lecture before the 
 Royal Academy, December 14, 1770, said, that in each of the 
 various species of God's works, there is a perfect '■'- central form 
 which nature most frequently produces, and always seems to 
 intend in her productions; and from it, every deviation is 
 deformity." This central form is more or less beautiful, accord- 
 ing to the perfection of its species. 
 
 His observation is acute and suggestive of happy thoughts 
 as to the nature of beauty. But the question may be asked, 
 what constitutes the beauty of this central form ? In accord- 
 ance with his theory, his answer should be, its perfection is its 
 beauty. 
 
 *' * Pulchrum ad visum, bonum ad appetitum spectatur; seu quae visa placent. ' ' 
 Beauty pertains to vision, the good to appetite; what is seen gives pleasure. 
 
 t ' ' Pulchrum et bonum in subjecto sunt idem; quia super eamdem rem funclan- 
 tur, viz. : super /or7rta?ft." (Summa 1 p., qu. 5, art. 4.) The beautiful and the 
 good, in the subject, are the same thing; for tliey are founded upon the same 
 thing, namely, the form. 
 
174 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Beauty does suppose perfection in its object, and hence, it 
 is obvious that different species of objects have, in themselves 
 considered, greater or less beauty, according to their degrees 
 of essential and accidental perfection ; v. g., man has more 
 specific beauty, and that, too, of a higher order, than the brute 
 has; and similarly for animals in comparison with inferior 
 forms in material nature. 
 
 Since beauty pertains to cognoscive potver, and, therefore, to 
 contemplation, and not, as such, to appetition, we may, per- 
 haps, with some appropriateness, define beauty to be '■'■propor- 
 tiofi, that is perceived ;'' i. e., proportion and light. 
 
 Proportio7i, in its proper concept, includes unity, together 
 with the order and variety of parts, appropriate to each par- 
 ticular object, and its light or evidence makes it an object of 
 contemplation ; since a thing is perceived by its light or evi- 
 dence. 
 
 Moreover, since deformity and incompleteness in an object 
 are incompatible with perfect proportion ; and since beauty has 
 that clearness or brightness which is essential to it, when the 
 proportion from which it emanates is evident ; it follows that 
 the pleasing effect which we attribute to the beauty of an ob 
 ject, proceeds immediately from the contemplation of its lights 
 2i\\d proportion. 
 
 Intellectual beauty exists in objects of the intelligible order. 
 
 Plato defines beauty to be the "splendor of truth;" ^'- splendor 
 veri;"" or, as Boileau interprets it, ^'-the beautiful is the true^ 
 
 Truth, as a relation or proportion between mind and object, 
 and between object and its essential prototype, is beautiful. 
 Truth also in its similitude and proportion to another truth is 
 beautiful ; this proportion of truth to another truth is expressed 
 in metaphors and similes, and it attributes to them their exqui- 
 site beauty ; there is still higher beauty also, in the more exact 
 proportions of the necessary and universal truths to which the 
 sciences and philosophy lead the mind. 
 
 If the decision made by authority, in matters of taste, forbids 
 the denial of the aesthetic principle, according to which obscurity 
 may become an element of genuine beauty in painting, music, 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 175 
 
 poetry, and other works of fancy ; it must, however, be borne 
 in mind that the concurrence of obscurity in the production of 
 the beautiful is merely negative; i. e., it terminates or hmits, 
 and thereby diversifies the shades or the proportion of hght 
 and color as to quantity and intensity. But it would be wholly 
 absurd to apply this principle to truth^ in which any obscurity 
 which lessens certainty, is essentially, or by its very nature, 
 imperfection, and is, therefore, deformity. 
 
 Beauty, in the works of art, as such, depends upon their 
 verishnilitude ; that is, their truth to nature, which they imitate 
 or reproduce. 
 
 Sensible beauty * 2,% visible, hdiS for it? vadXl^x. figure and color; 
 their proportion made clear to the vision, justly renders the 
 object to which they belong, beautiful. In this proportion, 
 are included symmetry, unity, variety. 
 
 Proportion in melody and harmony constitutes the beautiful in 
 music. A particular note or sound has its pitch, quality, and 
 intensity \ and when in a certain proportion, they cause even 
 that single sound or note to be musical in its undulations or 
 vibrations; a succession of such notes, of various pitch, intensity, 
 quality and motion, all of which preserve a certain proportion 
 to the key note or tonica, forms a beautiful melody ; beautiful 
 harmojty is added to the melody by accompanying notes, whose 
 differences of pitch, quality, etc., are always according to some 
 determined proportion which they bear to the melody. Hence, 
 beauty in music consists in proportion of sounds which have 
 various pitch, quality, and intensity. 
 
 The other senses being farther removed from intelligence, or 
 being less perfectly cognoscive, their objects are not said to be 
 beautiful ; a beautiful taste, beautiful smell, beautiful feeling, are 
 expressions that are not used. Sensible impressions which are 
 so gross, are less fitted to furnish the mind suitable objects of 
 contemplative knowledge, than are the impressions received 
 through the sight and hearing. 
 
 * " Sensus est quaedam ratio; cognoscit ordinata, quae visaplacent." (Sum. 
 1 p. , qu. 5, a. 4.) The sense is a sort of reason; it knows ordered things, which 
 being seen, please. 
 
176 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Moral beauty is in virtue^ or moral goodness. The law com- 
 manding some things, and forbidding others; the great diffi- 
 culties to be surmounted; the noble soul, the heroic will, the 
 pure intention, are all harmonized in the acts of persevering 
 virtue, and constitute an object justly considered to be of the 
 highest order of finite beauty which can be contemplated in 
 this world. 
 
 The eloquent and philosophic Cicero, pronounced the heroic 
 acts of the noble virtues to be divine^ in their beauty and gran- 
 deur: "Animum vincere, iracundiam cohibere, victoriam tempC' 
 rare, adversariuin nobilitate, ingenio, virtute praestantem non 
 modo extollere jacentem, sed etiam amplificare ejus pristinam 
 dignitatem, hsec qui facit, non ego eum cum summis viris com- 
 parOjSed simillimum deo judico." (Oration for Marcus Marcel- 
 lus.) " The man who conquers his own soul, who suppresses 
 resentment, who is moderate in victory, who not only raises 
 from a fallen estate an adversary illustrious for his birth, his talent 
 and his bravery, but even amplifies his former dignity: I do not 
 compare the man who does these things to the greatest of 
 human beings, but I judge him to be most like to a god." 
 
 The science of the beautiful is termed (Esthetics ; and the 
 power of rightly discriminating and appreciating beauty, is 
 called taste, from its analogy to the palate in distinguishing 
 objects as sweet, bitter, etc. 
 
 The sublime is akin to the beautiful) the objects that possess 
 it are grafid, or such as, by their greatness and power, which it 
 exceeds the capacity of the mind to comprehend, excite the 
 strongest emotions; for instance, wonder, astonishment or awe. 
 
 Obscurity, in objects which are fancied to be great, mighty 
 or awtul, helps to intensify the strong feelings naturally caused 
 by what is thus conceived to be grand, wonderful or terrible ; 
 ig7iotum pro inagiiifico; " the unknown is viagnifiedr But ob- 
 serve, however, that emotions which arise merely from obscur- 
 ity in the object, or ignorance of its nature, are ignoble in 
 their species, and, therefore, it is only evident grandeur of the 
 object, at least as manifested in the effects, or action of the 
 object, that constitutes sublimity, properly so-called. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 177 
 
 Here it might be asked, what definitively constitutes that 
 proportion which renders an object beautiful? It is, perhaps, 
 not possible to assign more precisely, in a general proposition, 
 the degrees and relations that constitute it, than is done by the 
 term as above explained ; for its combinations are too numer- 
 ous and various. But the proportion in which beauty consists, 
 is that which supposes a high degree of perfection in the beau- 
 tiful object; and yet, variation in that degree of perfection 
 may make the same object, under different respects, better 
 fitted to the capacity of different tastes. Perfect proportion 
 requires unity, variety, order and fitness, which are according 
 to the nature or S[)ecies of the object. 
 
 No definition of the beautiful has yet been given, which 
 reduces its constituents to unity; or, in other words, no gen- 
 eralization of Its properties has ever been made, which enables 
 us to define its essence by one distinctive mark or attribute. 
 Some great minds have concluded that such generalization is, 
 therefore, not possible. But the proof of this conclusion is 
 negative only; and hence, it is perhaps too much to affirm 
 absolutely that a specific definition of beauty is simply impos- 
 sible, or is a work, the ullunate accomplishment of which, has 
 been demonstratively proved to transcend the natural power 
 of human reason. 
 
 12 
 
CHAPTER 11. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 substance; accidents; substance as opposed to 
 accident. 
 
 Substance is a being that exists /<fr se^ i. e., by itself^ ox alone. 
 without inhering in another being as a subject that sustains it. 
 Sub-staiis^ here expresses that which stands lender all the qual- 
 ities or accidents which the mind perceives through the differ- 
 ent powers of cognition, in various concrete beings, and which 
 is constant, though its accidents are mutable. The notion of 
 substance, which is acquired by experience, is first learned at 
 the dawn of reason. A child in its earliest exercise of judg- 
 ment can practically and truly distinguish between substance 
 and accidents, in familiar objects; v. g., that apples of different 
 sizes, taste, smell, ripeness, are still apples. 
 
 The concrete nouns, and adjectives, which are essential to the 
 framework of human language, show how universal and invin- 
 cible this judgment is, that accidents exist dependently upon 
 their subject, and that substance, as it were, stands a/one* or 
 does not depend on a subject to support it. The testimony of 
 
 * ' ' Substantia est ens quod per se est, seu quod non indiget alio entetanquam 
 subjecto cui inhaereat." Per se, has four distinct senses; but when applied to 
 existence, or when it defines a mode of existing, it means alone; or, without a 
 companion. 
 
 " Res est per se, quaj sedet solitarie; id est; qu£e non eget alterius consortio, 
 cui inexistat. Per se, in aliis modis/)ersej7ft/js, respicit modum pviedicandi, vel 
 causandi; sed per se in hoc casu, respicit modum existendi." 
 
 To exist ase, means to exist independently of all cause: this, of course, is 
 verified only in Infinite Being, in God; hence distinguish between <'xistencejoer 
 se, and existence a se. To vxist per se is to exist without inhering in a subject, 
 to exist a se, is to exist independently of any cause. 
 178 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 179 
 
 consciousness affords us complete certainty that the mutations 
 which occur in ourselves, i. e., of thoughts, feelings, difterent 
 states of the body, etc., are extrinsic to essence, and are acci- 
 dental ; and that they depend for their existence on something, 
 as a subject, which exists independently of them, and is in 
 itself immutable or constant under them. Nay, the line of 
 distinction between substance and accident is clearly traced by 
 the mind, and it does not confound one with the other. As 
 we are now constituted, the mind does not immediately per- 
 ceive any substance at all, but sees it only through its opera- 
 tions or accidents. Yet, the mmd perceives that this substance 
 is essentially distinct from its accidents, and is presupposed to 
 them. Locke errs when he says, that, in our idea, substance is a 
 mere ''collection of qualities perceived by the senses, the mode 
 of their existence being entirely unknown to us."* The distinc- 
 tions between substance and accident are the clearest cogni- 
 tions which the mind has of singular and sensible objects. 
 
 Substance is simple or compound ; complete or incomplete. Simple 
 substance does not consist of parts annexed to parts, and is, 
 therefore, indivisible and unextended. 
 
 The compoujid substance consists of parts joined to parts, 
 which, by their union, form a whole; and, as each part is in 
 itself a whole, the compound can be .resolved or divided into 
 its component parts. 
 
 A complete substance is one whose nature does not require 
 union with another substance, but contains all m itself which 
 is necessary for its natural action ; as tree, man, angel. 
 
 Incomplete substance is one which connotes, and requires 
 another substance in order to complete it for natural existence 
 and normal action; v. g., the members of the body; the 
 branches of the tree ; the soul and the body in man. 
 
 It is evident that it is not naturally possible for the sensible 
 qualities or accidents of material substance to exist apart from 
 their subject, which is the substance in which they physically 
 inhere. But, is their separate existence intrinsically impossible, 
 so that even Divine Omnipotence could not effect it ? 
 
 It is by no means impossible for God to preserve accidents, 
 * Locke, Bk. XL, ch. 23, No. 37. 
 
180 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 at least such as are in themselves positive realities^ in existence 
 separate from the substance to which they belong. Because, 
 what a second and dependent cause can do, for a still greater 
 reason can tlie first cause effect ; if substance, which depends 
 both for its existence and for its efficiency on God, can sustain 
 the accidents, it is still more obvious that God can do it by a 
 direct and immediate exercise of his power. To deny this 
 reasoning in respect to that class of accidents that have a spe- 
 cific reality of their own, would be absurd. 
 
 With regard to those accidents that are purely modal, and, 
 therefore, have no positive and distinct entity, as rest, relation, 
 motion; as also those attributes or properties that flow imme- 
 diately from the essence, as their principle; v. g., vital power, 
 intellect, etc., there is no question ; they cannot exist apart 
 from the subject on which they intrinsically depend, and they, 
 therefore, have no real entity apart from the subject to which 
 they belong. The positive effects, or actual impressions and 
 immutation, produced upon the senses, by corporeal substance, 
 are proximately from real and distinct accidents, or, such as 
 have distinct and positive reality; v. g., color, taste, smell, 
 quantity, etc. These properties, at least with the exception 
 of quantity, have a peculiar activity, which affords proof con- 
 clusive that they have real and distinct entity, apart from the 
 substance in which they naturally inhere; and that they are, 
 therefore, really added to substance. 
 
 It may be said, consequently, that there are two classes of 
 accidents which are distinguishable in reference to the preced- 
 ing questions: ist, there are certain accidents which have no 
 entity apart from a subject — " sunt entitates adeo debiles " — and 
 cannot exist, therefore, unless in a substance, or in another 
 accident as ^w^j-/ subject; v. g., motion, union, relation, etc. 
 Also, vital powers and other essential attributes are inseparably 
 affixed to their subject, and could have no existence or entity 
 apart from it. 2d, Those accidents which naturally inhere, 
 but which, by infinite power, can exist apart from their sub- 
 ject : quantity, qualities such as color, taste, smell, etc. 
 • From the preceding observations it is manifest that substance 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 181 
 
 and accident differ essentially or specifically. Therefore, being 
 cannot be predicated of them iinivocally ; but only atiahy^i- 
 cally; v. g., as being is predicated only by analogy of spirit and 
 matter. 
 
 PROPERTY IS AN ACCIDENT; BUT IT DIFFERS FROM COMMON 
 ACCIDENT. 
 
 Property is an aecide?it that is proper; or, it belongs to its 
 subject ; hence its name, property. It differs from accident 
 that is com7non, in this : property belongs to the species of the 
 object; i. e., agrees with an object on account of its specific 
 nature or form; the common accident agrees with an object or 
 individual in virtue of its matter, or quasi matter; v. g., '■^ Man 
 limps, because Feter is lame; Peter laughs, because man is a 
 laughing being'' Lameness is an accident that is conwion to 
 individuals of many species of animals that walk; laughter, 
 strictly so-called, is peculiar ox proper only to man. 
 
 Property is said to fiow from the essence or form ; as do the 
 powers of intelligence, sensation, volition ; in this, it differs 
 from conunon accident, which accedes from without or extrinsi- 
 cally, and is common to many species on account of their 
 matter; v. g., quantity, in man, wood, mineral, etc. 
 
 '^kviO.^ property necessarily flows from the essence of its sub- 
 ject, wherever the essence is, there is the property ; " convenit 
 omni, soli, semper." It is, on that account, regarded as con- 
 vertible with essence, and may be employed to define essence 
 or species. 
 
 Property, thus explained, is found only in the proximate or 
 lowest species of things ; for, only in the individuals of a spe- 
 cies is found the form or specific principle which really consti- 
 tutes substantial and actual essence; yet, by a certain analogy, 
 higher genera are said to have properties; v. g., one, true, good, 
 are termed //'<'^/<?;'//<?j' ol being* 
 
 * ' ' Juxta aliquam analogiam, unum, boniun, verum, dicuntur entis proprie- 
 tates; suscipere contraria, est substantiaj proprium; progressio, animalis per- 
 fecti: motus ab infrinseco, viventis; quantitas, corporis," etc. By a certair 
 analogy, one, good, true, are ternaed properties of being; to receive contraries 
 is a property of substance; progressive motion, a property of the perfect ani- 
 mal; quantity is a property of bodies, etc. 
 
182 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Though, in strictness, /r^/<?;'/y stands for an attribute that is 
 always found in every individual of the whole species, yet the 
 term is often applied to one that is more purely accidenialj v. 
 g., to be an orator, in respect to vian, which is proper to tnaii, 
 but not to all men; to be biped^ which is proper not only to all 
 men, but to some other animals, etc. 
 
 But \.\\Q proper and the cofnmon accidents agree in this, that 
 they are both extrinsic to essence; " sunt extra essentiam rei ; " 
 hence it is that they both agree in being accidents. 
 
 Although property or the proper accidejit is sometimes made 
 convertible with essence^ is necessarily and intimately con- 
 nected with it, and defines it; yet it is only adjacent to essence, 
 not its cofistitueftt. 
 
 The common accident can never define an object, from the 
 fact that it is commo?i to many species of things on account of 
 their matter. 
 
 Properties, which, as already observed, flow from, or result 
 immediately, from the essence of objects, are the same in fact 
 as the specific difference* of those objects; they most inti- 
 mately inhere in their objects, and are inseparable from them. 
 Hence, properties are said to be predicated per se of their sub- 
 jects; i. e., they fiecessarily, or of their ?iature, inhere in their 
 subjects, and are not in them per accide?ts, or accidentally, as 
 happens in the common accident, which is a predicate of this or 
 that subject, not per se, 2.^ flowing fro7n its essence, but per acci- 
 dens, or accidentally. 
 
 COMMON ACCIDENT THE SAME AS THE FIFTH UNIVERSAL PRE- 
 DICABLE, CALLED ACCIDENT; ACCIDENT AS OPPOSED TO 
 SUBSTANCE, IS PREDICAMENTAL ACCIDENT. 
 
 The word accident is used not only as expressing one of the 
 five universals, in which sense it means common accidefit, and 
 is distinguished from property or proper accide?it; but it is em- 
 ployed also to express all that is not substance, or as opposed 
 to substance. In this sense, it not only includes all property, 
 
 *" Differentia esseiitiae et propi'ietas, sunt idem re." (S. Thorn. Metaph. 61, 
 lect. 2, lit. c.) Essential difference, and property or attribute, are really the 
 game thing. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 183 
 
 but it likewise comprehends ni7ie out of the ten categories^ or 
 ultimate genera, substance alone being excepted.* 
 
 Therefore substance and accident, as thus opposed to each 
 other, reduce all the ten categories or predicaments, i. e., all 
 real things, to two categories; namely, to substance, and the 
 category or predicament accident, which in this division includes 
 under it, as just said, nine out of the ten categories or ultimate 
 genera.t 
 
 Actual inhering in a subject is essential to the existence of 
 properties which diVQ predicated per se, and which are, therefore, 
 convertible with specific differe7ice; but aptitude for inhering in 
 a subject is all that is absolutely essential for other accidents, as 
 such; for they can absolutely be sustained in existence without 
 their actually inhering in their subject, at least such of them as 
 have positive entity or reality of their own; i. e., those accidejtts 
 that are not purely 7?iodal. 
 
 In further elucidation of this doctrine it may be said, that 
 the subject of properties is for them really d. priticiple ; from it 
 they result, or take their origin; on it they depend for begin- 
 ning, and continuing to exist. 
 
 But, since the common accidents accede extrinsically to their 
 subject, the subject is not, in the same sense, \\\€\r principle ; 
 and hence their connexion with it, and dependence on it, are 
 not intrinsic, but extrinsic, and they are, therefore, more purely 
 contingent J i. e., they are more immediately and completely 
 dependent on the free cause of their subject. 
 
 * " Accidens est yel prcedicabile, vel prcedicamentale; accidens praedicabile per- 
 tiuet ad om7ie prmdicamentum ; accidens praedicamentale, pertinet ad uniun 
 aliumve novera pried icamentorum. ' ' 
 
 t When it is said, " substantia categorica est univoca, respectu inferioriim;" 
 "accidens est analogum;" "substance is univocal throughout its category; 
 accident is analogical^" this holds of accident as distinguished from substance, 
 or as predicamental, not of accident as one of the live universals, or as a prct 
 dicable, for as the universal it is predicated univocally of its inferiors. 
 
184 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 ARTI CLE II. 
 
 quantity; quality. 
 
 All the ten categories, or predicaments, except substance^ 
 have only accidents as their inferiors; for every real being that 
 is not substance^ is accident. 
 
 Quantity, as extended, consists of parts adjoined to parts, in 
 which case it is called contimwus quantity, or extension. The 
 parts are either actually such, or potentially such; i. e., parts 
 into which the object having quantity can, absolutely, be 
 divided. 
 
 The old philosophers maintained that quantity* is the nearest 
 or most adjacent accident to matter; that it is, in some sense, 
 presupposed to the other accidents, which pertain to \\sforni, 
 or that which perfects the matter in its species, and determines 
 its nature. 
 
 EXTENSION. 
 
 Perfect extension consists of length, breadth, and thickness, 
 or has three dimensions; but length, or length and breadth, 
 also form quantity. The termini, or limits of continuous quan- 
 tity, are not positive, but privative being. Extension in space, 
 is a property of matter, but it is not so essential to it, that the 
 separation of material substance trom it in existence is intrin- 
 sically impossible. 
 
 In other words, it is not repugnant to reason that material 
 substance should exist in a more simple and perfect species of 
 relation to space, than bodies possess, as they now actually 
 exist, subject to our senses. But the full explanation of this 
 subject belongs to another treatise. 
 
 Extension is of two species, circumscriptive and definitive ; 
 in the circufnscriptive extension the extended object occupies the 
 whole place included within its boundary, and each part of the 
 object fills a proportionate part ot the whole place; v. g., a 
 
 * " In matcrialibus, quantitas sequitur niateriam; qnnlitas sequitur formam." 
 "In viventibus quantitas sequitur /or?nrtni, saltern quoad tevminum magnitu- 
 dinis seu parvitatis. " (Suarez Metaph. ; Disp. 42, sect. 1.) In material things 
 quantity follows the matter, qualitij follows the form. In living things quantity 
 follows the form, at least as to the limit of its size, as great or small. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 185 
 
 cubic block of marble occupies a cubic space of the same size 
 or extension, and a fourth part of it fills a fourth part of that 
 extent, a half occupies a half, etc. 
 
 In definitive extensio7i^ the substance is complete in the whole, 
 and is whole in each part of its extension ; v. g., the soul is 
 whole in the entire body, and whole in each part of it. 
 
 Quantity is either conti?iuous, as above defined, or it is dis- 
 crete; if extension be divided into parts, the number which 
 expresses or includes the whole collection of those parts, is 
 discrete quantity. But abstract number, or that which does not 
 express actual parts of a divided quantity numerically, does not 
 belong to the category or predicament that is called quantity ; 
 but is transcendental, i. e., may enter any of the categories, ex- 
 press their units, or unities, or be applied to any beings. 
 
 To say with Zeno of old, that lines consist of indivisible 
 points; surfaces are formed by lines, and solids by surfaces, 
 would be erroneous; continuous extension cannot be thus gen- 
 erated. 
 
 IS QUANTITY INFINITELY DIVISIBLE ? 
 
 Quantity is infinitely divisible in potentia, or potentially. To 
 this proposition the objection will at once occur: "what is 
 infinitely divisible, can be thus divided actually, at least by 
 infinite power; and thereby it can be resolved into an infinite 
 number of parts." 
 
 But if its divisibility were thus exhausted, then it was not 
 infi?iitely divisible by hypothesis ; since that which is finished 
 is not ifififiite potentially. Similarly, quantity may be increased 
 infinitely in potentia or potentially, by addition or multiplica- 
 tion ; but yet infinite extension, or infinite number, cannot be 
 actually generated by successive increments ; for that which 
 begins and ends, is not actually infinite, but may receive further 
 increase. 
 
 Hence, to conclude from the potential infinite, to the actual 
 infinite, is not valid illation ; for the infinite i7i potentia cannot 
 pass to the infinite in actu, and thus become completed ; as that 
 
186 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 would destroy the hypothesis ; i. e., the supposition that it may 
 be increased sine fine ^ or without end of increase* 
 
 The actual infinite is all^ without the possibility of more ; or, 
 as the axiom expresses it, tot ut ?io7i pliira; the potential infinite 
 does not actually contain all^ without the possibility of more; 
 it is 710 n tot quill plura. 
 
 QUALITY. 
 
 Qualities are accidents which are superadded to created sub- 
 stance in order to perfect it, both in its existence, and its action; 
 or, qualities intrinsically ornament and perfect actually existing 
 substance. Quantity pertains rather to the matter^ as such ; 
 quality follows the specific essence^ of the matter, its form. It 
 is the specific essence of a rose which makes it different from 
 a pi?tk^ as it is also the specific essence of the pink that makes 
 it what it is, and not some other form of matter. 
 
 It may be said, then, that qualities follow the species of sub- 
 stantial objects. It is on this account that substances are often 
 defined by their qualities, which is legitimate, when the genus 
 and specific difference are not known, or cannot be assigned. 
 
 Figure\ pertains to quality when it is considered as determin- 
 ing an object as to its proper and specific form, or shape ; but 
 considered as extended, it is quantity. Material objects depend 
 much for their specific nature, on their figure or shape ; it 
 beautifies them, and perfects them also in action as well as in 
 strength. Hence, figure or shape is intimately connected with 
 
 * " Ab infinito syncategorimattce, sen in potentia, ad infinitum cntegorima' 
 tice, seu actu, non valet illatio." " Infinitum actu est, tot ut non plura; inlrni- 
 tum in potentia est, non tot quin plura." From the infinite syncategorimatic- 
 ally, or the potential infinite, to the infinite categorimatically, or the actual 
 infinite, illation is not valid. The actual infinite is all without more; the poten- 
 tial infinite, is not all loithoutmore. 
 
 t " Qualitas sequitur formani, quia forma complet et perficit essentiara rei et 
 confert principalem vimagenui." (Suiirez Met., Disp. 42.) Quality follows 
 the form, because the form completes, and perfects the essence of a thing, and 
 cif)nlers on it its principal power of action. 
 
 |"Figura, quatenus materialiter extensa, pertinet ad quantitatem; sed qua 
 tenus ornamentum substantia?, et quatenus dcserviens ad actiones et naturales 
 motus, pertinet ad formam. ' ' (Suarez Met. Disp. 42, sect. 1 .) Figure, as mate- 
 rially extended, pertains to quantity; but as ornament of substance, and assist- 
 ing action and natural motion, it pertains to form; i. e. , to the formal principle 
 of the substance. 
 
GENEEAL METAPHYSICS. 187 
 
 specific nature, and results from that specific nature, as one of 
 its distinctive qualities; v. g., organic beings, also crystals, all 
 have their peculiar and determinate figures or shapes. 
 
 Sensible qualities are either permanent or transient ; the ruddy 
 hue of the cheeks, when lasting, is ordinarily a sign of health, 
 and is, in that case, 2, permanent quality; a blush, from sudden 
 emotion, is ira?isient. A happy combination of the sensible 
 qualities, figure and color, makes visible beauty. 
 
 NATURAL POWDERS OF SUBSTANCE; THEIR ACTS. 
 
 Natural powers are qualities that perfect a substance for 
 action. Power is either active, ox passive; as active, it can cause 
 a mutation in another object, as when you move your book. 
 Ks passive, the power receives an action; v. g., the senses, which, 
 under different respects, are both active and passive, receive the 
 impressions which external objects make on them.* 
 
 Immanent acts, are such as remain in, and perfect their sub- 
 ject; V. g., acts of the understanding, as perceiving, judging, 
 reasoning; these acts do not, as such, pass out oi the mind, 
 but physically \\\^y remain in the powers that ^'//r// them. None 
 but living agents are capable of immanent action ; the action 
 of lifeless objects is transient; i. e., \t passes from them to the 
 extrinsic object which is its term ; and they must be moved to 
 action by an efficient cause which is really distinct from them ; 
 for, having no immanent action, they are absolutely inert, or, 
 are incapable of self-motion. 
 
 Hence, it may be said : all im?nanent action is vital, and all 
 vital action is immaneftt; or, the distinctive characteristic of vital 
 action is that it is immanent. But observe that the term, life, t is 
 
 * •' Actio aliquando dicta effectus, quatenus est ab agente, tamen magis pi'o- 
 prie, est via ad eflfectum. " Action is sometimes termed an eflfect, inasmuch as 
 it is from an agent; yet, more properly, it is the way to the effect. 
 
 t " Vita aut sumitur in acta secundo, et sic dicit operatiouem; aut in actu 
 i»rimo principal! et radicali, et sic est ipsa natura sen substantia rei viventis 
 Nos non aliter possumus intelligere rem viventem, nisi in ordine ad efRcien- 
 fiam, quatenus scilicet potest sese movere aut agere aliquo modo; et censemus 
 rem aliquam antea viventem amisisse vitam, quando omnem intrinsecam motio- 
 nem amisit." (Suarez Metaph. disp. 30, sect. 34.) Life is either taken as 
 something actual, and thus it says operation; or, it is taken as something pri- 
 mary and radical, and in this sense it is the nature or substance of the living 
 
188 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 understood in two senses : ist, as expressing the living sub- 
 stance itself; 2d, as expressing vital act or operation. We 
 usually conceive life as the living act, and when we actually 
 form a concept of it as a substance, it is always by the relation 
 of that substance to its living operation or action. Life, there- 
 fore, which is directly known to us only as action, pertains exclu- 
 sively to those agents that can move themselves;* and capability 
 of being moved only by an extrinsic efficieiit cause, is peculiar 
 to non-living agents. Motion is here used in its widest sense, 
 and includes all imjnanent operation of any principle which is 
 intrinsically active, i. e., which can proximately or immediately 
 move itself to act.j 
 
 The principal acts of life f are, ist, self-movement; 2d, fititri- 
 tion by the intus-susception of food; 3d, sensation; 4th, intel- 
 lection. The first named may be regarded as generic, and, 
 therefore, as including all tital action ; vegetable life is limited 
 in its sphere of operation to nutrition, growth by assimilation 
 of food received, and reproduction; animal life, in addition to 
 these operations, is capable of acts of sensation ; man, besides 
 all these operations, has acts of intelligence, which absolutely 
 transcend the sphere of sensible or orga?iic action, as is proved 
 in Article I of the preceding chapter. 
 
 It may be said, therefore, ist, power of action is common to 
 all substance; 2d, vital ox i?nmafie?it action is common to all 
 //W;/^ substance, and is limited to the powers of living ageiits ; 
 3d, the im7nane?it or vital action merely sufficient for knowing 
 
 thing. We understand a living thing only, by its having order to efficiency: 
 namely, as capable of moving or actuating itself in some manner; and we judge 
 a thing that once lived, to have lost life, when it has lost intrinsic motion. 
 
 * " Ilia proprie sunt viventia qu£e seipsa, secundum aliquam speciem motus, 
 movent." (Div. Thom. I p., qu. 18, art. 3.) Those things are properly living 
 things, which, according to some species of motion, move themselves. 
 
 t * * Vivens efficit suam operationera per veram causalitatem et motionem, qua 
 seipsum movet." (Suarez Disp. 30, sect. 14.) A living thing eflfects its own 
 operation by a ti-ue causality and motion, for it moves itself. 
 
 X ' ' Vita dicitur et substantia vitalis, ut est anima, et natura angelica; et opera- 
 tio vitalis, quae nimirum in operante, a qiio emanat, manet; quaiis est intelligere, 
 amare, sentire, etc." (Lessius de Perfect. Divin.) Life means both vital sub- 
 stance, as the soul, angelic nature; and also vital operation; namely that opera, 
 tion that remains in the agent which elicits it; as, to understand, love, feel, et«. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 189 
 
 singular, concrete and material things is proper, as such, to 
 Animals only ; 4th, the power which elicits the immanent acts 
 of knowing universal or abstract t?'uth, distinguishes intellectual 
 substances from all the rest. 
 
 The posver of action which is common to lifeless substance, 
 is pure potentiality; i. e., it has no power of motion except that 
 which is implied in a mere capability of being efficiently deter- 
 mined or moved to act by an extrinsic cause, the state of rest, or 
 inaction, being cojinaturaljao it. On the contrary, in respect to 
 iiviftg beings, actuality, or immanent action positively going on, 
 and which, therefore, excludes complete rest or non-action, is 
 essential to their life, so that its total absence is evidence of 
 death. Power is defined by its act; the act is known by 
 means of its object. 
 
 HABIT. 
 
 Habit, in its general sense, pertains to operative nature,* and 
 it gives facility of action to the power in which it resides. In 
 its species, it is a quality which is stable, or which cannot be 
 removed from its subject without difficulty, f Because all 
 created substance acts only through the powers of that sub- 
 stance, it is justly inferred that the proper subjects of all opera- 
 tive habit are only the powers of substance. J 
 
 *" Alia; qiialitutes, v. g., sanitas, piilchritiulo. etc., disponimt subjectum ad 
 bene esse; sed virtutes animi sen habitus operativi disponunt ad bene operari. " 
 (Gotti. torn, vii.) Othei* qualities, v. g., health, beauty, etc., dispose their 
 subject for existing well ; but the virtues of the soul or the operative habits, dis- 
 pose it for operating well. 
 
 \ Disposition, in its general signification, imports order in objects which, in 
 some respect or other, consist of parts. When active power is its subject, 
 it also gives facility of action. But it differs from habit in this, that it is easily 
 removed from its subject, for it is per se, or in itself, unstable, or, it is never 
 firmly radicated in a power. In the acquisition of a habit by repeated acts, it 
 may be said that the first acts, with the accompanying preparation, dispose tho 
 subject for the subsequent permanent effect; i. e. , for the habit. (Div. Thorn. , 
 1, 2, qu. 49.) 
 
 X " Subjectum habitus operativi, est potentia operativa." (Philos. passim.) 
 "In ipsa essentia auimre immediate nullus est habitus ad naturamnaturaliter 
 ordinatiis, quia substantia non est immediate operativa; sed tamen est in ea 
 habitus supernaturalis, nerape gratia sanctiflcans. " (Div. Thom.) The subject 
 of operative habit, is operative power. There is no habit naturally designed 
 for nature which is immediately in the essence itself of the soul, because sub- 
 stance is not immediately operative; but yet there is in the essence of the soul a 
 supernatural habit; namely, sanctifying gi-ace. 
 
190 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The powers which are most susceptible of the superadded 
 perfections termed habits^ are the imdersiajiding, the will^ and, 
 in an inferior degree, the imaginaHon, the sensile memory, and 
 also the senses in general, at least for that action in them which 
 is under the direct control of reason. 
 
 Habits are either infused, or acquired. The knowledge which 
 Adam received immediately after his creation, was infused into 
 his mind; Christian Faith, Hope and Charity are infused habits. 
 
 Intelligence, regarded as a natural ability in the understand- 
 ing to see clearly and promptly the truths that are known per 
 se, or are self evident, was termed by the old philosophers, a 
 7iatural habit; a much higher degree of which may be acquired 
 by prudent exercise of the intellect. But this is less properly 
 termed habit; for the capability of immediate action pertains 
 to the very essence and entity of a natural power.* 
 
 Yet, on the other hand, the intellect is capable of receiving 
 superadded perfection which gives it increased facility of action, 
 and this increased facility of action has the nature of the virtue 
 which is termed habit, whether it be acquired by exercise, or 
 be in itself the gift of nature. 
 
 Acquired habits are permanent effects usually produced in a 
 power by repeated acts or continued exercise of that power. 
 
 * " Omnis naturalis propensio et incliiiatio potentiaj ad actum, est pel- ipsam- 
 met naturam et entitatem potentiae: et noii per habitiim distiuctum, et ill! a 
 natiira iuditum." (Suarez Met., Disp. 41, sect. 13.) All natural propensity 
 and inclination of a power to action, is of the very nature and entity of the 
 power, and not by a distinct habit which is given to it by nature. 
 
 " Intelligentia (seu intellectus) est habitus primorum principiorum." In- 
 telligence (or intellect) is the habit of first principles. 
 
 " Prudentia etarssunt in operativa parte aninaa), et circa contingens alitcr 
 sehabent; sapientia, scientiaet intellectus sunt habitus speculativi, et conside- 
 rant necessaria quae impossibile est aliter se habere." (Div. Thorn., I, 2, qu. 
 57.) Prudence and art pertain to the operative part of the soul, and they have 
 for their object the contingent, AVhich they consider under different respects; 
 wisdom, scientific knowledge, and intelligence, are speculative habits, and they 
 consider necessary things, or those which cannot be otherwise than they are. 
 
 ' ' Prudentia, magistra virtutum, est agibilium; ars, factibilium. " Prudence, 
 the ruler of virtues, concerns those things which can be done, morally; art, what 
 can be done, physically. 
 
 ' ' Habitus alii dant simpliciter posse, alii dant facilius posse. ' ' Some habits 
 are essential for acting at all; others, give facility of action. 
 
 * ' Inluitio primorum principiorum est intellectus. ' ' Intelligence is the intui- 
 tion of first principles. Intuition is the actual exercise of intelligence. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 191 
 
 In the understanding, intelligence, kfioivledge, wisdom, M'hich 
 are speculative; prudence and art, which are practical in their 
 objects, are all habits or intellectual virtues which may be ac- 
 quired in a greater or less degree of perfection. In the will, 
 all the moral virtues, and also their opposite vices, may exist as 
 acquired habits, but not simultaneously ; for, moral virtue and 
 vice are opposites, or are contraries, and, therefore, the one ex- 
 cludes the other. 
 
 Habit, on account of its stability, or the difficulty of eradi- 
 cating it from its subject, is sometimes called " a second nature." 
 The capability of the natural powers of cognition, and superior 
 appetite, to acquire these habits, or superadded qualities by exer- 
 cise, is one of the peculiar perfections of those powers as they 
 exist in rational natures. 
 
 Though brutes are not capable of habits, in the sense in 
 which habits are conceived to pertain necessarily to rational 
 powers, or, at least, to powers which are immediately subject 
 to the enipire of reason, as expressed by the old philosophical 
 axiom, "habitus est quo utimur cum volumus," "habit is some- 
 thing which we use at will ; " yet, the perfect brute animals, 
 or such as have memory, and are capable of learning some 
 things by experience, can be made, at least when under the 
 tuition and control of man, to acquire what seems to possess 
 the physical requisites of habit. 
 
 The axiom in respect to habits, "habitus quo utimur cum 
 volumus," appears, as Suarez remarks, to regard rather the 
 moral character which habits may have, than to express their 
 physical nature. (Metaphysics, disp. 44, sect. 3.) 
 
 It will be useful for better understanding the nature and 
 function of habits, to distinguish more precisely between the 
 subjects capable of them, and those which are not susceptible 
 of habit at all. 
 
 God cannot receive habit; for, being infinitely perfect, he 
 cannot be the subject of additional perfection; and h^mgpure 
 act, he cannot be in a state of potentiality, i. e., he cannot pass 
 from the condition of non-action to action, as is possible to 
 
192 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 beings that are perfectible, or which can pass from the state 
 oi poteiitiality into that of action. 
 
 Habits can be acquired by those agents only which are per- 
 fectible by imma?ient action; i. e., agents which intrinsically 
 elicit their own action, it remaining in them, and perfecting 
 them. The powers of such agents are not only the proximate 
 and active principle of their own operation ; but they are, at 
 the same \ax^^* passive in respect to this same operation; i. e., 
 their immanent action affects them, for it perfects them. Hence, 
 it is quite natural that, in powers whose action is immafioit^ the 
 repetition of acts having the same or similar objects for their 
 term, should gradually produce and complete for them the 
 permanent effect, which we call habit, whose peculiar virtue is 
 to give strength, promptness, and facility of action. 
 
 Those objects whose action is wholly transient, or which 
 have no immane?it action, do not receive any increase of perfec- 
 tion from their own acts, but they rather give it to the exterior 
 object which is the term of their operation. Hence, such 
 agents are not susceptible of that influence of immanent action, 
 which causes the acquisition of habit. 
 
 * " It is necessary that the power in which habit resides, be both active and 
 passive; for, it cannot be the proximate principle of eliciting acts, nnless it be 
 active; nor can it receive into itself habits, nnless it be passive. Bnt only that 
 power is at the same time active and passive, which is able to elicit immanent 
 acts: hence the snbject of habit, mnst be capable of immanent action. This is 
 confirmed by the fact that the act leaves the habit in that power in which the act 
 is; because, it renders that very power, and not another one, prompt to operate. 
 But, the habit remains in that power which is the proximate principle of such 
 act; and, therefore, the act remains in the same also; hence, both the act itself 
 is immanent, and tlie power, which is its principle, elicits immanent action. 
 Whence it follows that the acts by which habits are produced, are such as, strictly 
 speaking, have no eflfectoutside of their own powers ; which is proper to immanent 
 acts." 
 
 * ' In brutes there are not habits distinct from the images in their fancy or their 
 Bensil)le impressions. The general reason of this is, that in all their acts they 
 are determined toone thing (i. e., are necessitated to one, imiform mode of action, 
 over which they have no real choice, or rational empire,) by force of theobjects, 
 just according as those objects are presented to them. But it seems more i)ro- 
 bable that the i«?crftflZ sc/ise of man, cogitative power, (see page 87 of Applied 
 Logic,) can acquire habit distinct from sensible ideas, giving facility, and in- 
 clining the power detei-minately to some acts. The reason is, because this sense 
 in man is not absolutely determined to one thing, like fancy in the brute; for, it 
 can be made, obediently to reason, to operate, or can be moved to determinate 
 action." (Suarez Metaph., Disp. 44, sees. 1 and 3.) 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. ] 93 
 
 It must be observed, however, that not all beings which 
 have vital or immanent action, are susceptible of habits, in any ■ 
 univocal sense of the term. It is a fact well proved by general 
 experience that the capability of acquiring habit, necessarily 
 implies also the capability of experimental knoivledge ni the 
 subject. Hence, since man has intellectual cognition, and 
 brutes have that of sense alone, it is manifest that acquired 
 habits in them can resemble only by analogy; or, these habits 
 m them are proportioned in perfection to the respective cog- 
 noscive powers of man and brute. 
 
 It is manifest that when we consider the different powers in 
 man as subject to his will,, or to the empire of his rational 
 nature, even his senses, under that respect, are less determijied 
 to one mode of action, or are less limited in the sphere of their 
 action, and less subject in regard to their objects, than are the 
 corresponding sensible powers of those agents, which have 
 not this rational empire over their own acts. On this account, 
 men's sensible powers are more susceptible of the acquired vir- 
 tues, termed habits, than are those powers as they are in irra- 
 tional animals. 
 
 INTENSITY OF QUALITIES, ACTS, ETC. 
 
 Compound sensible qualities, i. e., such as beauty or orna?ne?tts, 
 which consist of several qualities, as color, figure, order, etc., 
 coalescing into one; or, quality which is composed of them; 
 also, habits and acts are all capable of degrees, or of more or 
 less intensity * 
 
 The intensity] or intension of a quality is said to be increased 
 in degree when it is augmented or becomes more deeply radi- 
 
 * ' ' Intensio actus fit per additionem gvadus ad gradum. ' ' Action is intensi- 
 fied by the addition of degree to degree. It is convenient thus to conceive in- 
 tensity to be increased, though it does not take place by degrees of increment 
 which are actually distinct. 
 
 t ' ' Intensio accipitur, prius et raaxime iisitato, pro mutatione ilia per quanti 
 eadem qualitas magis ac magis in eodem subjecto secundum eamdem partem seu 
 entitatem perticitur." (Snarez Metaph. Disp. 46.) Intensity, in its primary 
 and most usual sense, stands for that mutation by which the same quality is 
 more and more perfected in the same subject, according to the same part or entity 
 of that subject. 
 13 
 
194 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 cated in the same subject, or in the same part of the subject; 
 as when heat is increased in a part only of the hand. But it 
 iS remission of the quaHty when the quahty is correspondingly 
 diminished m the same subject. There is increased extension 
 of a quahty, when, without leaving the former part of its subject, 
 it passes or spreads to other parts; v. g., when heat spreads 
 from the hand to the arm, without, however, leaving the hand; 
 if it leave the hand, and go to the arm, this would not be ex- 
 tension, but transmigratiofi of quality; if the quality leave 
 some part, or parts of a subject, without leaving the whole 
 subject, it would be restrictio?i of quality. Hence, color, sound, 
 etc., may be more or less inte?ise, or remiss, may extend, 7?iigrate, 
 etc. 
 
 General experience attests the fact as evident to all minds, 
 that the vital acts whose direction is immediately under the 
 will's control, are susceptible of a higher or lower degree as 
 to intensity; and that their intensity or remissness much 
 depends, in general at least, on the free action of the will 
 itself. But since, as before observed, the action of the will is, 
 by its nature, less evident to the understanding, cceteris pari- 
 bus, than are the acts of cognition, it may often happen that, 
 even when we know the species of its act, we are unable to 
 see precisely and determinately the degree of its intensity; 
 this does not occur in the same manner as regards the acts of 
 cognition, which, being more evident, are more fully and accu- 
 rately perceived. Yet, whenever the will's act is positively 
 put, although remiss in degree, the nature or species of the act 
 is completely determined, as is also its essential moral charac- 
 ter, according to the nature of the objects. It is Hkewise im- 
 possible, in many cases, to decide with certainty as to whether 
 the will has positively consented or acted at all, even when the 
 objects proposed to its choice are evident before the mind. In 
 important and practical matters, however, obscurity or rational 
 doubt as to the will's fully deliberate choice, is scarcely possible. 
 
 The study of these obscure operations of the will is fre- 
 quently called the study of the heart; and it is the chief means 
 of becoming proficient in the knowledge of human nature. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 195 
 
 Figure^ as such, is incapable of degree; it may be larger or 
 smaller ; but this is difference of quantity, not a change in the 
 degree of the figure as such. It requires no proof that habits 
 and acts may be more or less intense ; or, more or less exten- 
 sive, in respect to their objects. 
 
 Substance^ as such, is incapable of degree, but it may be 
 greater or less in quantity;* and is capable of receiving suc- 
 cessively contrary qualities; this, however, does not imply a 
 difference of degree in the matter or essence of the object 
 extended. 
 
 Difference of degree f does not change or destroy the essence 
 of the quality of which it is predicated, or in which it obtains ; 
 no more than difference of quantity destroys or changes the 
 essence of matter, \ 
 
 * " Substantia non suscipit magis et minus ; est substantive suscipere contraria." 
 Substance is not, as such, susceptible of more or less, but it is capable of receiv- 
 ing, contraries . 
 
 t ' ' Gradus non mutat essentiam rei. ' ' The degree does not change the essence 
 of a thing. 
 
 "Magis et minus, secundum quod causantur ex intensione et reniissione 
 unius formas, non diversilicant speciem. Sed secundum quod causantur ex 
 formis diversorum graduum, sic diversiticant speciem." (Div. Thom. Sum. I 
 p., qu. 50, a. 4, ad. 2.) More a?id less, when caused by the intension and remis- 
 sion of one and the same form (quality or property) , do not change the species of 
 the object. But when they are caused by forms in dillerent grades (different 
 species) of being, they do diversify the species. As for example, the different 
 degrees of density in air and Avater arise from the specific difference of air and 
 water; so, in other words, the same quality may, in different objects, have dif- 
 ferent degrees of intensity, arising from the essential or specific difference of 
 those objects, and thus furnish a means of distinguishing the species of those 
 objects. But greater or less degree of the same color, v. g. , iu the same object, 
 does not imply a change of the subject of that color iu its specific nature; greater 
 or less density of air under different degrees of pressure, does not imply a 
 change in the nature of air; the same .habit is not changed in its nature or spe- 
 cies by being more or less deeply radicated in its subject, etc. 
 
 JMr. Darwin, in his "Descent of Man," part 1, chap. 2, says: " We must 
 iidmit that there is a much wider interval of mental power between one of the 
 lowest fishes, as a lamprey, or a lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than 
 between an ape and man. ' ' In this he assumes the power of sensation and that 
 of intelligence to be different degrees of the same power ; whereas, in fact, they 
 have a spec (/I c difference. Tlie organis material in its functions, y^hxle intelli- 
 gence is absolutely immaterial, and entirely super-sensible. A more rational 
 contrast, and one founded on plain facts, could be made between a metallic toy 
 monkey, and a real one, on the one hand ; and a real monkey and a man on the 
 other; in both cases the contrast would be very wide; but it would prove nothing 
 in favor of his hypothesis. This is not the only instance in which Mr. Darwin 
 is at fault in elementary first principles. 
 
196 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The doctrine of quantity and quality may here be summed 
 up in terms that will now be readily comprehended : quantity, 
 in the primary and general acceptation of the word, is an acci- 
 dent which is extensive of the substance wHich is its subject, 
 giving it parts placed outside of parts, whence result greater or 
 less size, and equality or inequality. As thus understood, it 
 can properly be said to exist only in bodies which have dimen- 
 sion, or in material substance; from it there results real and 
 substantial size, " quantitas molis," in these bodies, as greater 
 or smaller. By translation, however, quantity is attributed to 
 other objects, as virtue, habit, act, power, etc.; it is then qiiaji- 
 iity of perfection^ "quantitas virtutis;" v. g., "Aristotle's genius 
 was greater than that of Pyrrho." 
 
 But in the explanation here given, quantity is defined and 
 described rather by its properties or accidents, than by its 
 intrinsic essence. Quantity, stricdy as such, or quantity, con- 
 sidered as to its essence, requires for the precise concept of it, 
 only extension of parts, or parts outside of parts, in respect to 
 themselves, not as circiimscriptively occupying actual extension 
 in space, though this circumscriptive extension in space is 
 requisite for it to become subject to our senses : " quantitas, in 
 essentia sua, est extensio partium in ordine ad se, non in 
 ordine ad locum." 
 
 Quality includes under it all the positive accidents which 
 are superadded to created substance, the effect of which is to 
 give to it, when constituted in being, perfection and complete- 
 ness in its mode, both of existing and operating. Powers, vir- 
 tues, habits, and the like, which, it is evident, are necessary 
 appendices of the substances to which they are connatural, are 
 nevertheless extrinsic to the essence of the substance in which 
 they reside, and are qualities, or they pertain to the category 
 of quality. Quality, is by some defined to be; a certain abso- 
 lute accident, adjoined to created substance, as the comple- 
 ment of its perfection, both in existing and acting: " qualitas 
 est accidens quoddam absolutum, adjunctum substantias creatae 
 ad complementum perfectionis ejus, tam in essendo, quam in 
 agendo." 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 197 
 
 Hence, qiiatiiity may be aptly termed the measure of sub- 
 stance ; quality^ the disposition of substance.* Quality is the 
 disposition of substance, in that it disposes or constitutes it in 
 such condition, that it is thereby perfected both in existing 
 and operating. 
 
 RELATION, 
 
 Relation is the respect which one thing has to another; or, 
 it is the order in which one thing is referred to another.t A 
 relatio7i impHes a subject which is related or referred to another, 
 the term to which the subject is related; and xh^ foundation or 
 basis of the relation ; from it the relation really results ; v. g., 
 suppose two different bodies that have the same shape or figure; 
 then the two bodies are respectively the subject^ and the term 
 of the relation; and the same figure or shape is i\\Q foundation 
 or basis of the relation; v. g., "this orange has the shape of 
 that lemon;" orange is the subject, lemon the term and shape, 
 the foundation or basis of the relation, and the relation con- 
 sists in the two being alike. 
 
 Relation is either real or logical. Real relation is that which 
 objects have to each other independently of any knowledge or 
 judgment we may have of it; as the relation of cause and its 
 effect. The order, connexion, and mutual dependence, which 
 exist among the works of creation are real relations, which 
 exist independently of our knowing or understanding them. 
 
 Logical relation is one which the mind devises; as when it 
 compares; v. g., a real thing to itself; or, conceives a thing as 
 related to itself In this case, the mind apprehends one object 
 twice, and refers it to itself, as if it were two. 
 
 When the relation is real and identical in the subject and the 
 terjn, it is mutual; v. g., "this lily and this rose are alike, since 
 both are white;'' " white," is really in both, and, therefore, the 
 relation is mutual, and is said likewise to be of the sa?ne denom 
 (nation. The mutual relation between cause and effect, father 
 
 * " Quautitas est mensura substantise ; qualitas est dispositio substantiae." 
 (Div. Th., 1 p., qu. 28, a. 2.) 
 
 t ' ' Esse relativi est ad aliiid se habere. ' ' The essence of the relative is that 
 it is referred to another. 
 
198 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 and son, which are also said to be co-related, is not of the same 
 denomination. 
 
 Relation as predicamental, or as one of the ten categories, 
 includes only those relations which are between real objects. 
 All the relations, likenesses, or respects of one real thing to 
 another, which properly pertain to this category, are reduced 
 by metaphysicians to three principal classes: ist, relation of 
 unity and number ; 2d, of action and passion ; 3d, of measure 
 and measured. 
 
 Observe that all the ten categories or ultimate genera, in- 
 clude none but real entities; and hence, from among their 
 proper subjects are excluded all entia rationis, or those entities 
 that are merely creatures of the mind, though they be virtually 
 founded in real objects; also such as have only objective being, 
 i. e., which exist only in the intelligible concepts. Whence it 
 follows that the relations that are devised by the mind, but 
 which have no real being, as that between genus and species, 
 between a thing and itself, and all the transcendental relations, 
 are to be regarded as not properly pertaining to the category 
 of relation. 
 
 Transcendental relations regard terms that transcend actual 
 existence, or they are nietaphysical; and, therefore, they run 
 through all the categories. The relation between scientific 
 knowledge and its objects, is transcendental; and by some it is 
 also termed a /<?^/V^/ relation ; but the rektion between a power 
 apprehending, and the real object that determines its act, is 
 real. 
 
 Much of our most valuable, as well as most interesting 
 knowledge, regards these different species of relation. One 
 of the most important of all these relations which furnish the 
 mind objects for congenial exercise, is that of cause and effect, 
 under the head of action and passion ; it will be explained at 
 some length, in the following chapter. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 PRINCIPLE OF CAUSATION ; OR, CAUSE IN GENERAL. 
 
 Whatever influences efficaciously in the production of a being, 
 or a mutation in being, is a cause;* and the result which is 
 brought about by its agency or concurrence, is its effect. 
 
 The relation of cause and effect is not that of mere succes- 
 sion in time, or place, but it is that of dependence of the one 
 on the other. The fact that the simplest minds can distinguish 
 between mere seque?ice in time, or order, and the dependence of 
 one thing upon another as its cause, shows how obvious to the 
 human understanding is that distinction. It is not only evi- 
 dent that an effect cannot exist without a cause, effect and 
 cause are co-relatives ; but it is also evident to the mind that 
 many things which are perpetually under our observation, 
 actually have that relation of dependence. 
 
 Hume and other sceptics have denied all causation, and 
 affirmed that what is thus understood is mere succession with- 
 out any agency in what precedes, or any dependence in what 
 follows after it. 
 
 The Occasionalists deny all efficiency in second causes, or 
 creatures; and maintain that the reason or necessity for the 
 existence of the effect, gives the occasion for God to produce 
 that effect. 
 
 We know, however, on the testimony of consciousness, that 
 we can act so as to produce results, or mutations, that really 
 proceed from us; our senses receive influences that produce 
 
 * ' ' Causa est principiiun per se iiifluens esse in aliud. ' ' Cause is a principle 
 which per *e, i.e., by its own real operation, influences the existence of another 
 thing. 
 
 199 
 
200 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 changes or effects in them, and they give testimony to similar 
 action and change in objects distinct from us. Since these 
 facts are so manifest, and the conclusion so immediate, it is 
 not wonderful that even a child understands clearly what is 
 meant by ^^ 7nake" ^^do,'' or ^^ caused 
 
 While we have so distinct a notion of cause and effect as to 
 their relation, we do not know in what the causality intrin- 
 sically consists. As substance and its powers are hidden from 
 us, except so far as they are manifested by their operations, we 
 can perceive their efficiency or causality in results only. We 
 clearly distinguish between the two facts, " this comes after 
 that," and " this comes from that," without being able to see 
 how the action intrinsically proceeds from the power that pro- 
 duces it. But to deny this principle of causality, which is so 
 clearly known under other respects, is to upset not only all 
 science, but all our knowledge of anything. 
 
 Experience and the exercise of reason give among their first 
 conclusions, the notion of dependence of one thing on an- 
 other ; and this relation is that of cause and effect. But limited 
 reflexion suffices for coming to the general conclusion, " nothing 
 is done without a cause ; whatever has a beginning, must have 
 had a cause." For, the mind readily perceives that whatever 
 begins to exist, thereby acquires what it had not before; and 
 this thing that it had not before, and which it acquires, must 
 come to it from some agent that is distinct from itself; i. e., it 
 comes from a cause. The peculiar and distinctive action of a 
 catise, therefore, is, that it gives to another being what that be- 
 ing had not in itself, and which it thereby receives from with- 
 out itself 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 DIFFERENT SPECIES OF CAUSES. 
 
 Since the influence of causality is exerted in very diflterent 
 manners ; or, because the objects of its influence are specifi 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 201 
 
 cally different, cause is divided into four distinct species, cor 
 responding to the modes in which it produces its effect : 
 namely, the efficient cause, the final cause, the formal cause, 
 the material cause. They all agree in the general concept of 
 causality, inasmuch as they all concur or infiuence in the pro- 
 duction of effect ; but, as said, their modes of influencing are 
 specifically different. 
 
 The general distinction between the four causes will be best 
 understood by an example in which their different modes of 
 effecting or influencing will clearly appear; we shall, therefore, 
 repeat a little more expliciuy an illustration already given : A 
 man makes a statue; ist, he has an end in view which causes 
 him to make the statue ; 2d, he must have material out of 
 which to make the statue, and that i?iaterial or marble helps 
 in its way to the making of the statue : it is the material cause 
 of the statue; 3d, there must be an agent \\\\o can make or 
 produce this statue out of the matter; this agent, or artist, is 
 \.\\t efficient cause; 4th, the agent must put into that marble 
 the perfect form which ??iakes of it a statue; or, in other 
 words, which determines its specific nature^ as statue ; and it is 
 obvious that this form infiuences^ in its way and degree, 
 towards the making of the statue ; it thereby becomes the for- 
 mal cause of the statue. Hence, the end intended, the agent^ 
 the matter, and the form, all effectually help to produce the 
 statue ; but as their modes of concurring in the production of 
 the effect are quite different, this gives rise to a division of 
 cause in general into the four species above named. The statue 
 is made by the agent, of the marble, through {by means of) 
 the form, for the end intended or proposed. 
 
 The efficient cause is extrinsic to the effect ; it is the first one 
 that xnoYQS physically; for the e?id acts only ??torally, and the 
 matter and form are dependent on the action of the efficient 
 cause for their union ; that is, for the effect. Hence, :"n mate- 
 rial action, the efficient cause is that agent whose physical ac- 
 tion begins the mutation in the object extrinsic to itself, which 
 we term the effect. The subsequent union of the formal and 
 material causes is dependent on this action of the efficient 
 
202 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 cause ; therefore, as said, it begins the physical action, whose 
 final term is the effect mtended. 
 
 Hence, in material action, all four causes always unite, the 
 final, efficient, formal and material. 
 
 In the action of simple or immaterial substance, only two 
 causes may concur: namely, i\\Q final, and efficient; but an effect 
 can not be produced by one cause alone. 
 
 The efficient cause must be either immediately, or mediately 
 and virtually present to the object on which it acts, for nothing 
 acts at a distance, " nihil agit in distans." It is evident that 
 an agent cannot act where it is not, any more than it can act 
 whe?i it is not ; for in either case it is really non-existent in 
 respect to that object as a term of action Hence, since nothing 
 can act when and where it absolutely is not, a cause must be 
 either immediately or mediately and virtually present both in 
 time and place to the object on which it efficiently acts.* 
 
 Substantial mailer Sin^form cannot really compose the effect 
 of man's spiritual or intellectual action; i. e., the mind cannot 
 per se, by its own physical action, transform material substance. 
 Judgment and reasoning have for the object of their action 
 truth, which by analogy is called matter, and the understand- 
 ing attributes to it logical form by action which is analogous to 
 that by which an agent produces effects upon substantial sub- 
 ject matter. 
 
 A created agent cannot produce t new being, or cause a real 
 
 * * ' Motum et inoA'ens sunt simul. ' ' That -which moves, and the agent moving 
 it, are, as such, simultaneous. 
 
 " Agens et i)atiens sunt Immediata, i. e., immediatione vel suppositi vel vir- 
 tutis." That wliich acts, and that which receives the action, QX*i immediate , 
 either substantiall}' or virtually. 
 
 t " Deus solus causat gradum essendi; quia primus omnium cffcctus est esse 
 quod supponitur a ca3teris tanquam lundamentum : sed Deus solus producit esse; 
 sen illud esse quod diffusum est per omnes omnino perfectiones debet procedere 
 ab altiori principio quam creatura. Agens particulare fiicit hoc ex non hoc, sed 
 non tacit ens a non-ente." (Div. Thom., Summ. 1 p., qu. 105, art. 5.) God 
 alone causes a degree of being ; for the lirst of all eflVcts is being, which is pre- 
 supposed as the Ibundation of all else: God alone produces being; or, that being 
 ■which is diffused throughout all perfections whatever, must proceed from a 
 higher principle than a creature. A dependent ageht can make this out of non 
 this; (or transform one thing into another); but it cannot produce 6ein</ /row 
 non-being. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 203 
 
 grade or degree of essence ; for this is, in its strict sense, crea- 
 tion^ which is pure efficiency^ or the action of the first cause, i. 
 e., God. Second causes, i. e., created causes, being dependent^ 
 are not purely efficie7it; they can only change or transform sub- 
 ject matter; in other words, they require an object whicli 
 actually determines and specifies their acts or efficiency. 
 
 The various manners in which the efficient cause acts will 
 be readily and clearly understood if they be contrasted ; for 
 this purpose consider the following opposite modes in which it 
 may operate : ist, as principal, and as instrumental cause, which 
 acts in virtue of its principal; 2d, as 7iecessa7y and f7'ee ; 3d, 
 physical 2ir\di 77ioral; 4th, re77iote 2,r\A p7'oximate ; 5th, total and 
 partial; 6th, adequate and i7iadequate; 7th, first* and second; 
 8th, tmivocal; i. e., whose effect is of its own species, as father 
 and son ; equivocal, i. e., whose effect differs from it in species, 
 as architect and the house which he builds; 9th, cause /<?r j<f, 
 i. e., which directly, and of its own real action, p7'oduces its 
 effect; v. g., "a vocalist sings;"" ''a penman W7'ites;'' accide7ital 
 cause, or cause per accidens ; as when a vocalist paints ; he 
 does not directly as vocalist paint, for vocalist is only accidental 
 to one 2iS painti7ig, and has no influence at all on the effect. 
 
 The cause per se, t which really i7ifiuences in the production 
 of an eff'ect is 07ie; but the C2iuse per accidens or accidental cause, 
 which does not 7rally i7iflue7ice the effect, is said to be infinite; 
 the meaning of which will be readily understood by an example 
 of it : if one should go from home for the pu7pose of buying 
 something in the market, and on his way be attacked by robbers, 
 his i7ttention 0/ buying could not be considered as the 07ie, cause 
 per se, of his falli7ig i7ito the ha7ids of robbers; for, a7iy 7iu77iber 
 
 * " Causa ^rimff, quae nulli subordinatur; secunda, quaeprimiesuboi-dinatur." 
 The first cause is subordinate to no cause; a second cause is subordinate to the 
 first. 
 
 t * ' Causa per se est una, etproprie dicta causa; causa per accidens uec est una, 
 sed infi7iita, sed nee propria dicta causa, sed secundum quid, seu per accidens : 
 non est proprie dicta causa, quia cff'ectus per accidens non habet esse pi'oprie dic- 
 tum." (Philos. passim.) The cause j3cr se is one, and is properly termed a 
 cause; the cause per accidens is not one, but infinite, nor is it properhj called a 
 vause, but is such only under some respect, or by accident ; it is not properly 
 termed a cause, lor the accidental effect has not any existence properly so-called. 
 
204 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 of reasons could have induced him to go to the market at that 
 time ; i. e., the cause per accidens of his being then attacked 
 by robbers is not liinitcd to this or that motive for his going 
 from home. 
 
 It is in this sense that an occasion is sometimes rightly called 
 an accidental cause* But it not unfrequendy happens that an 
 occasion or opportunity approaches more nearly to the nature 
 of a cause per se, yet, however, without actually becoming a 
 complete cause ; in this case it is said to be an imperfect cause, 
 since it induces, or persuades to action ; but it is not a perfect 
 cause, for it does not produce the effect. (D. Th., 2. 2., qu 
 43, a. I, ad. 3.) 
 
 The only reason why cause per accide?is is denominated 
 cause at all is that, whenever it occurs, it is in such case always 
 conjoined with the thing which is really 2.w A properly \\\^ cause, 
 and is then not separable from it. But neither the cause per 
 accidens, as such, nor the effect per accidens, as such, has any 
 real entity; f it is more correctly a certain respect only, of that 
 which lias reality and is a cause properly so-called. 
 
 The fiJial cause, or e7id inteiided.\ which is objective good, ap- 
 prehended as such, acts first as a cause on the will, or rational 
 appetite ; for the etid is an object of appetition, on account of 
 its goodness, or it is a good which is desired and sought for, 
 •when it becomes an object of cognition. § The e)id intended 
 for irrational or necessary agents, mifst be referred to the author 
 
 * " Omne quod est per se, habet caiisam ; quod antem est per accidens, noii 
 hubet caiisain, quia uon est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim 
 causum habet, similiter et musicum; album musicum non habet causam, quia non 
 est vere ens, neque vere unum." (Div. Thom., I p., qu. 115, art. 6.) What- 
 ever truly is, has a cause; what is, only as accidental, has no cause, for it is not 
 truly being, since it is not truly one. White, has a cause, and mrmc has a cause; 
 but white music has no cause, for it is neither truly being, nor truly one. 
 
 t * ' Effectus Y>°r accidens proiu'ie non generantur, nee corrumpuntur , nee sunt 
 Bimpliciter, sed secundum quid. ' ' Effects per accidens, are not, proi)erly speak- 
 ing, produced, nor destroyed, nor do they simply exist, but only under a certain 
 i-espect. 
 
 X " Finis est potissimum in unoquoque; i. e., finis est id quod principaliter 
 intenditur in unoquoque." The end is chief in every thing; i. e., the end is 
 What is principally intended in every thing. 
 
 § ' ' Nikil volitum nisi prsecognitum. ' ' Nothing is wished, unless first known 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 205 
 
 of their nature, by whom // is determined for them. The end 
 or the final cause is the first of the four to act, and it causes 
 the others to concur and to execute, the efficient cause being 
 the second to operate. The end is the first"^ in the intention; 
 but it is the last in the execution ; i. e., it is the efifect intended, 
 and the effect intended is the end which is last attained, and 
 in which all rest. 
 
 The end, when considered as to the different relations it may 
 have to the intention, \s proximate or remote; mediate or imme- 
 diate; and ultimate or not ultimate. These opposite relations 
 will be easily understood, if it be borne in mind, that an end 
 may be desired either for its ow?i sake ; or, on account of some- 
 thing else, that is desired; in the first case, it is strictly and 
 properly an end ; in the second, it is really a means to an end. 
 
 As the will by its own spontaneous natural action can wish 
 good only, since good, as such, is its essential object ; it is not 
 free to wish evil, as such ; or, in other words, by its nature it is 
 necessarily determined to desire good; and, as regards the de- 
 sire of this good in general, it is not free, but obeys the neces- 
 sary law of its nature.t Hence, it is evident that this good as 
 absolute, or good in ge/ieral, is strictly an ultimate end, which is 
 presupposed to all other ends, which can be intended or 
 desired by the will. These truths being understood, it will be 
 easy to perceive the consequent truth, that there can be no 
 choice or election as to this ultimate end, since the will is pre- 
 determined to it by the necessary law of its nature as a power 
 of appetitio:!. The will is physically unable to love evil for 
 itself or as evil; it can love evil only when apprehended and 
 presented to it, as good, under some respect. In respect to this 
 ultimate end, all other ends are mediate, or have the nature of 
 means in reference to it. In regard to certain intermediate ends, 
 the will can dehberate, suspend or change. Hence, man's 
 responsibility for his actions depends upon the use he makes 
 
 * " Primura in intentione, est ultimum in executione." What is first itt the 
 intention, is hist in the exectition. 
 
 t " Minus mahim, est iiliquod bonum. ' ' Less evil, is some good. 
 ' Muhim sub riitione boni, potest tieri objectum volitionis." Evil, undei 
 the respect of good, can be the object of volition. 
 
206 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 of his power freely to choose the mearis of good; and he 
 becomes morally good, or bad, accordirg as there is, or is 
 not, real rectitude in his intention as regards those means 
 which he employs for the attainment of this good. Hence, 
 the obligation arises also for him to know what is good, and 
 what is evil, in all the objects thus subject to election or 
 choice. 
 
 Distinguish between the e?id of the act or work, and the e?id 
 intended, or the good to be gained by the work. 
 
 Distinguish, also, between the end which necessitates action 
 in the will, and the end which it can freely elect or choose. It 
 is good which causes, as an end ; but its apprehension is. an in- 
 dispensable co7idition.* 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 MATERIAL CAUSE; FORMAL CAUSE. 
 
 As the terms, matter and fortn, material cause and formal 
 cause, are much used in philosophy, law and ethics, for the 
 most subtle, as well as for the most important distinctions, it 
 is necessary that they should be clearly understood. For this 
 object, it is deemed useful briefly to state in this place the 
 philosophical theory that gives origin and meaning to these 
 terms. 
 
 According to the Aristotelian ox peripatetic philosophy, which 
 has had much to do in moulding both the thougl\t and the 
 higher language of all civilized nations, material substance, of 
 which the earth is made, consists essentially of two principles, 
 matter and farm. Matter^ without the form, could have no 
 determinate existence at all; it would be a mere potentiality 
 for actual existence; but could not, as such, really exist. The 
 form, which is the principle of activity, and of all specific 
 fiature or essence, unites by composition with matter, and actu- 
 ates it into real existence ; and, at the same time, gives to it 
 
 * " Bomim ut apprehonsiim est objectum appetitus." Good as apprehended 
 is the object of appetition. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 207 
 
 its determined dA\^ specific essence; i. e., makes, by union with 
 it, material substance.* 
 
 At the beginning of the world matter and form- were con- 
 created; i. e., passed from their causes into existence at the 
 same time. Taken separately, they are both incomplete being; 
 they are for each other, and, when they have the essential 
 conditions for actual existence, they necessarily unite ; and, 
 being united, they remain in union, unless separated by force. 
 Some forms are more deeply radicated in matter than others 
 are. 
 
 Matter, as such, therefore, has no species; it is i\\Q form 
 that determines species, and constitutes it such. Hence, since 
 there exist many species of inaterial substance, there must be 
 many species oi forms, that are actually existing. To under- 
 stand this, it must be observed that, when the world was first 
 created, material substance was diversified with many species 
 or forms, and made to possess within itself at the same time 
 many other \orn\s potefitially ,\ which may be educed from it by 
 a competent efficient cause. 
 
 Matter, therefore, is the subject in which are contained /^/^/z- 
 tially,\ like an effect is precontained in its actually existing cause, 
 many substantial forms, which may be educed from it by an 
 efficient cause; and these forms that are educed from the mat- 
 ter, where they existed potetitially, take the place of, or displace 
 actual forms; which actual forms are not thereby simply anni- 
 hilated, but are re-immersed in the matter, or they revert to the 
 state of potential being, in matter. 
 
 The vital principle in organic beings, is a substantial form; 
 V. g., the vegetative princ'ple in plants, the brute soul, atiima 
 
 * ' ' Materia, quatenus est primum subjectiim, est una et eadem in omnibus 
 rebus." (Suarez Metaph.) MaUer as the first subject in material substance, 
 is one and the same in all things. 
 
 t ' ' Materia est infinita in potentia ad formas. ' ' (Summ. I p. , qu. 7, art. 2.) 
 Matter is infinitely capable of receiving its forms. 
 
 J ' ' Esse in potentia, hie non est ea mera possibilitas, qms est potentia ohjectiva ; 
 Bed esse in potentia involvit subjection aliquod reale, cujus sinn res sit contenta, 
 qute dicitnr esse in potentia." To exist poteiitiallij, is not that mere possibility, 
 which is only objective, (exists only in the concept of it) ; but to be potentially, 
 involves a real subject, in which it is actually contained. 
 
208 GENERAL METAPHYSICS^ 
 
 belluina in brutes, or animals of every species, man excepted, 
 are substantial forms educed fro?n n'lafter: as also the principle 
 that gives to crystals their specific nature, is substantial form. 
 They return to matter, or are re-immersed in it, when dissolu- 
 tion, or death takes place. This eduction of new forms from 
 matter, and the re-immersion of old ones into it, always sup- 
 pose the agency of an efficient cause. 
 
 Since the operations of the brute soul, a?iima belluifia, are 
 purely orgastic * brute actions do not transcend the power of 
 purely material substance ; and, therefore, they are entirely 
 from matter, and wholly for matter ; and hence, brute souls 
 cannot exist separate from matter. But the actions of intel- 
 ligence and volition in the human soul, are from a principle 
 that is not organic; they are inorganic or entirely super'Sensible\ 
 in their species, or transcend the powers of material nature; and, 
 therefore, the substance that possesses intellect and will, is 
 essentially and specifically immaterial. Hence, though the 
 human soul does inform or actuate matter by entering into 
 composition with it, yet it is not educed f-om matter, and 
 at death by dissolution, it is not re-immersed into matter ; but 
 it is a substantial form that can and does exist separate from 
 matter, or, then exists /<fr ^<fy or, to use the term by which this 
 mode of existing is expressed, it subsists ; it is not said, how- 
 ever, in that state of existence, to be a person, because it does 
 not completely subsist, being by its nature ordained to union 
 with the body. 
 
 The human soul is by its nature fitted and ordained to unite 
 in composition with matter; but yet it does not, like inferior 
 substantial forms, completely depend for its existence on matter. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that there Sixe forms which are complete, 
 
 * ' ' Natura iiniuscujusque rei ex ejus operatione ostenditur . ' ' (Phil, passim.) 
 The nature of a thing is known by its action. 
 
 t" Anima humana nou est forma in materia immersa, vel ab ea totaliter 
 comprehensa, propter suam i)erfectioiiem. Ideo nihil prohibet aliquam ejus 
 virlutem non esse corporis actum. ' ' (Div. Thorn. , 1 part, qu. 76, art 1, ad. 4.) 
 The human soul is not a form that is immersed in matter, or that is totally com- 
 prehended by it, on account of its perfection. Therefore, nothing prevents 
 some of its virtue from being no act of the body; i.e., some of its action is not 
 action of tlie body , or the body has no share in it. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 2C9 
 
 q.nd subsist, but do not inform matter, and, therefore, have no 
 relation to, or dependence on, matter; as, angels. For, if there 
 are incomplete fcrrms, a fortiori, complete ones should actually 
 exist; and there are forms that are incomplete, d^wA yet can sub- 
 sist, but they inform matter, and are by their nature or essence 
 ordained for union with matter; as, the human soul; it can 
 exist separate from matter, but its only connatural and normal 
 state is that of union with matter. 
 
 All accidents whose presence in, or absence from, material 
 substance does not change the species of their subject, are 
 accidental forms; as, quality, greater or less extension, figure, 
 features, etc. 
 
 From this brief and incomplete outline of the peripatetic 
 theory of material substance, it must appear evident that matter, 
 as a cause,* is receptive, and passively retentive; or it sustains, 
 as a subject; and that/^;7;/,t causes by giving determinate exist- 
 ence, nature and action to the compound which it constitutes 
 by union with matter; and thence it is, that all specific nature, 
 and all action, are attributed to \h^ form. 
 
 Hence, the ??iaterial cause, is the subject upon which the 
 efficient cause acts, to produce its intended effect. 
 
 "WiQ formal cause, is that reality, of whatever kind it may be, 
 which the efficient cause by its action induces, or brings into 
 actual being in that subject matter. 
 
 The change produced in the subject by the efficient cause, 
 may be either substantial or accidental, i. e., the form induced, 
 may be either substantial or accidental. 
 
 By analogy, other objects, as metaphysical and logical truth, 
 
 ♦ " Quemadmodum materia est in toto (composito) principium patiendi; itaet 
 forma est principium agendi ; sen totum, ratione materiie, patitur, et ratione 
 forma} agit, sen totum agit ut quod, forma ut quo. Est totum quod existit, est, 
 subsistit. etc. " As matter is the principle that receives action, in the compound; 
 so, the form is tlie principle of action; or, the whole object, acts, iu virtue of 
 the foi m, suffers action in virtue of its. matter; or the whole is that which acts, 
 the form that by "which it acts; the whole is Avhat exists, subsists, etc. 
 
 t * ' Omnisratio boni. pulchri, ordinis, perfectique a forma venit; quia eo ipso 
 quod est actus substantialis hajc omnia ipsi conceduntur. ' ' (Div. Thom. , 1 p. , 
 qu. 76, art. 1.) The whole nature of the good, beautiful, order, perfection, 
 somes from the /orm; for, since it is the substantial act, these are all attributed 
 to it. 
 
 14 
 
210 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 genus, species, etc., are termed 7?iattej', and, therefore, are con* 
 ceived as susceptible oiform; v. g., "rational animal," may be 
 regarded as having ajiimal as matter, and rational as form; 
 since " rational " constitutes with animal as quasi matter, fnan. 
 Hence, matter and form are regarded by analogy as likewise 
 having causal influence in objects of the intelligible order. 
 
 These terms, therefore, have extensive application; but the 
 mode in which the ^natter and form cause, is always the same; 
 i. e., by composing the effect; the form giving its denomination 
 or specific name to the effect, and the ?natter receiving and 
 sustaining the form. 
 
 An example will illustrate the analogical use of these terms : 
 a man, who is unintentioftally unjust to another person, does 
 material injustice, but i\otfor?7ial injustice; for, it is the inten- 
 tion, as right or wrong, that gives to actions their specific moral 
 or formal nature. 
 
 From the preceding observations, it is manifest that the 
 definition of cause has its most proper application to the efficie7it 
 cause. It was, perhaps, on this account that the ancient stoics 
 contended that the efficient cause is the only one which is 
 truly and properly a cause at all. But it is undeniable that, as 
 already shown, there are more causes than one, truly distinct 
 from each other, and which have, in their mode and degree, 
 real influence in producing many effects. 
 
 There cannot be an actual effect* which is produced by only 
 one cause ; for there can be no effixient cause, without tht final 
 cause ; and vice versa, there can be no fjial cause without the 
 efficient to which it is presupposed, as the first of all causes ; 
 and hence, for the production of an actual effect, both must 
 concur. 
 
 The cause, by its nature, is prior to its effect ;t but as to the 
 
 • " Nullus est effectus in rerura nalura qui unicam tantum liabet causam, for- 
 maliter loquendo." (Suarez Met. disp. 26, sect. 3, no. 3.) There is no effect 
 ■vrhich strictly has but one cause. 
 
 t " Causa est prior effectu prioritate a quo, sen ratione dependentiae." The 
 cause is prior to the effect, in the relation of dependence. 
 
 ' ' Causa in actu, et effectus actu, sunt simul. ' ' The cause and effect as actual, 
 are simultaneous. 
 
 • ' Posito fundamento et termino , cousurgit relatio . ' ' When the basis and terro 
 are put, the relation simultaneously regards them. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 211 
 
 relation actually existing between them, they are simultaneous ; 
 or they begin to exist formally as such at the same time ; for, 
 when the basis and term of a relation are put, it simultaneously 
 relates the two to each other ; or, it arises at the same time for 
 both the actual cause and its actual effect. 
 
 Every effect has withm it some degree of perfection, which 
 gives to it a certain similitude to its cause ; but the resemblance 
 may be only that of analogy, as when the cause is equivocal; 
 V. g., the architect and the house which he builds with its 
 design; the perfection which is in the house^ resembles the intel- 
 ligent mind, by analogy only. 
 
 The effect is either virtually or fonnally precontained in its 
 cause ; and, therefore, it is really from the cause. In the first 
 case, the cause is equivocal, i. e., of a different species from the 
 effect ; in the second case, the cause is univocal,* i. e., of the 
 same species as the effect. 
 
 An effect that has the material cause, requires the three others 
 also. But we may actually know one or two causes, and yet 
 be ignorant of the remaining ones. Since no being can act at 
 a distance, " nihil agit in distans," it is an essential conditio?i, or 
 a conditio sifte qua no?i, that the agent and object acted on, be 
 either fnediately or immediately connected. But, take care to 
 observe that a conditioti, how essential soever it may be for the 
 action of a cause, has not itself any real causality; and, there- 
 fore, it is an error to confound a conditio?i with the cause that 
 depends on it ; or to attribute to it any real age?icy in produc- 
 ing the effect. 
 
 The exemplary cause, or the ideal or type in the mind, by 
 which an intelligent efficient cause is directed in producing an 
 effect, may be referred, under different respects, to the efficient 
 
 * ' * Causa univoca, aeqnalis est eflTectui in essendo, nobilior ratione dependen- 
 tiaj; causa tequivoca, est vel 'principalis, vel instrumentalist principalis superat 
 effectum in essendo; instrumentalis superatur ab eflfectu, nisi suraatur ut condi- 
 visa principali, tune enim influit per virtutera inferioris ordinis. ' ' (Suarez Met. 
 Disp. 17, sec. 2, no. 19.) The univocal cause is equal to its eflfect in essence, 
 but more noble as regards dependence; the equivocal cause is either principal, 
 OY instrumental; the principal, exceeds its effect in essence; the instrumental is 
 inferior to its effect, unless as precisehj distinguished from the principal, for, 
 thus taken, it influences by virtue of an inferior order, and is a partial cause 
 only. It is more noble than its ovfn proper effect. 
 
212 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 and to the formal cause; namely, either as perfecting the agent 
 for action ; or as, in some manner, extrimically forming the 
 effect.* 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 PERFECTION OF BEINGS; THE FINITE AND INFINITE; THE 
 KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE IS LOGICALLY DERIVED 
 FROM THAT OF THE FINITE. 
 
 A thing is perfect, when nothing is wanting to complete it in 
 fulfilling the proper endt of its being ; due respect being had 
 as to whether that endhQ temporary, i, e., byway of transition 
 to another; or, fixed, and unchangeable, as a state. T\\q per- 
 fection, and the goodness of a thing, are rea/ly the same ; yet, 
 m the concept, or logically, the perfect is presupposed to the 
 good-; for, in thought, we found the idea of a thing as being 
 good, upon its perfection. 
 
 Perfection is absolute or relative; absolute perfection includes 
 all realities that can enter into the concept of ififi?iite perfec- 
 tion; relative perfection includes all those realities that are re- 
 quired to constitute any particular species of complete finite 
 perfection. 
 
 Simple perfection is that, from the very concept of which 
 is excluded all positive imperfection; as "justice," "intelli- 
 gence," etc. The mixed perfection includes in its essential con- 
 cept the idea of perfection which is mixed with imperfection; 
 as, V. g., reasoni7ig, which implies the absence of simple intel- 
 ligence. Hence, reasoning is, under different respects both a 
 perfection and an imperfection. Reason can come to the 
 evident knowledge of truth, not known as self-evident, only by 
 demonstration, or by discourse of reason; simple intelHgence per- 
 ceives the same truth intuitively, i. e , without the less perfect 
 
 * " Dispositio concurrit in genere causae materialis: subjectum facit magis 
 receptivum." Disposition concurs by way of the material cause: it makes tlie 
 subject move receptive. 
 
 t " Ultima perfectio rei est in consecutione finis." The ultimate perfeclioc 
 of a thing, is in the attainment of its end, or reaching its destined end. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 213 
 
 process of reasoning''^ to it ; by the simple apprehension of an 
 essence it acquires a knowledge of all that can be affirmed, or 
 denied, by way of real property, in respect to the object. In 
 other words, simple intelligence does not know truth by com- 
 position and division, as reason does ; or, what is the same, by 
 synthesis and analysis, for it does not know predicate and subject 
 first as separate, but sees the one in the other. Distinguish, 
 therefore, between knowing a thing after another, in another, 
 and/;w// another; the first is common to finite intelligence and 
 reason ; the second, pertains to simple intelligence ; the third, 
 is the peculiar and distinctive operation of reason. 
 
 The fi/iite is what has limits; the infinite, is what has no 
 limits. 
 
 The infinite is either actual, or it is potential infinite. The 
 actual infinite actually has all perfection without ///;///. This is 
 possible only in o?ie God. The infinite potentially, is actually 
 fi?iite, but can be increased without limit. The infinite actually, 
 cannot be increased, and cannot be subjected to measure, or 
 number. 
 
 Finite added to finite cannot produce infinite ; and, therefore, 
 the actual infinite does not consist of extension or multitude. 
 
 No finite being can be conceived so great, but that a greater 
 one may be conceived as possible. 
 
 Creation actually infinite is impossible: ist, because that 
 which begins cannot become infinite; 2d, because potential in- 
 finite cannot become actual infinite; or, neither that which 
 can \>Q finished, nor that which cannot h^ finished, can become 
 infinite. 
 
 * ' 'Ad discursum intellectualem propriiim, et formalem, requiritur quodunum 
 cognoscatur ex alio; id est, quod ex alio prius noto deveniatur in cognitionera 
 alterius posteriusiioti quod erat prius iguotum; sicquequod una prior eognitio 
 sit causa posterioris, sive quod ex priori unius cognitioue pariatur coguitio alte- 
 rius, prajcedatque prior eognitio posteriorem, si non in tempore, saltern natura 
 et causalitate." (Billuart de Angelis, Tract. 3, art. 3, sect. 3.) For discourse 
 of reason, properly and formally such, it is required that one thing should be 
 known from another; i. e., from one thing previously known we com^ to the 
 knowledge of another thing afterwards known, but Avhich was previously un- 
 known; and thus that a prior cognition is the cause of an after one, or that from 
 the prior knowledge of one thing is born the knowledge of another, and that the 
 prior cognition precede the posterior one, if not in time, at least by nature and 
 causality. 
 
214 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The philosophers, who teach that the human mind has natu- 
 rally a more or less immediate intuition of God, deny the possi- 
 bility of knowing the infinite through the finite. 
 
 The chief reason a priori which. they allege for this impossi- 
 bility of concluding the infinite from the finite, is that " the 
 conclusion cannot be greater than the premises from which it 
 follows as a consequent." 
 
 But their proof of the hypothesis that the human mind natu- 
 rally has an immediate intuition of God, seems to rest mainly 
 on two erroneous arguments : ist, the misapplication of a canon 
 of logic; 2d, a misconception of the fact of actual experience. 
 They argue, that since the idea of an infinite being cannot be 
 derived a posteriori, for the conclusion cannot exceed the pre- 
 mises, therefore, because as a fact, we have that notion, we 
 must have it as an a priori intuition. 
 
 But the canon of logic referred to, forbids a greater exten- 
 sion as to quantity in the conclusion than was in the premises ; 
 but not greater comprehensio7i. If the prohibition held true of 
 both, then there could be no reasoning at all from truth known, 
 to truth unknown. Since the conclusion attributes to a subject 
 a predicate which is .not attributed in the premises, the subject 
 of the conclusion has greater compreheiision in the conclusion, 
 than it had in the premises, especially when the predicate affirms 
 perfection, or denies imperfection. 
 
 Also, when we reason a posteriori, or from effect to cause, 
 the eftect may have been either virtually, or formally precon- 
 tained in the cause ; in the case in which we reason from an 
 effect to its equivocal, or super-eminent cause, we pass from what 
 is inferior in species, to what is enmiently superior in species ; v. 
 g., when we reason from the house to the architect, from the 
 painting X.0 the artist, which is legitimate reasoning, we always 
 conclude from an inferior to a superior species of being. 
 
 Hence, conclusion from t\\e finite to the infinite, as its stiper- 
 
 eminent c^wsQ, gives a conclusion oi grediitr comprehension, though 
 
 of less logical extension, than the premises explicitly and directly 
 
 expressed, but yet, it is both consequent and legitimate illation. 
 
 It is to be assumed that no sane philosopher denies that the 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 215 
 
 human mind, as a fact, does reason a posteriori, or from effect 
 to cause, by means of the real relation between cause and 
 effect. 
 
 There is no object of cognition which the mind perceives 
 with more facility, or which is more connatural to human in- 
 tellect, than the real relation of cause and effect. Evidences 
 of dependence lead us daily to refer numberless effects to their 
 causes, and this we have done from the earliest exercise of 
 reason. In the same manner, the mind can see evidences in 
 the visible world around us, of its dependent and contingent 
 existence ; and, as the idea of limitation or finiteness is most 
 simple, its object being so immediate and so obvious to the 
 mind, it is clearly within the powers of human reason, to prove 
 to itself the finiteness of the visible world, in the same manner 
 in which it proves any object to be limited or finite. 
 
 Hence, the mind of man, by its native power of reasoning, 
 and without any intuition of God, can argue from what it 
 knows and sees for itself: "There is ro effect* which is not 
 produced by a sufficient cause ; the visible world is an effect, and, 
 therefore, the visible world is produced by an adequate cause." 
 
 The intellect, then, is naturally competent to perceive by 
 its own light, both that the visible world vs, finite, and that it is 
 an effect ; for it is mutable, therefore, contingent, and, conse- 
 quently, may lose or acquire being, which are distinctive marks 
 of the finite. It may ask itself, what is a "sufficient cause" 
 for such an effect. 
 
 Reason would lead the mind to attribute to that " sufficient 
 cause " t perfections pre-eminently superior to those of the 
 
 *"Nondatur effectus sine causa: nihil est quod rationem sufficientem cur 
 sit non habeat; haecaxiomatanonconfnndendasunt. Juxtaprimum, nihil ellici- 
 tur sine causa; juxta secundum, nihil est, sen existit sine ratione sufticiente: pri- 
 muin non pertinet ad Deum, cum Deus non habeat causam; secundum pertinet 
 ad Deum, cum sit ratio sufliciens cur debeat admitti quod Deus existit." There 
 is not given an effect without a cause; there is nothing which has not a sufficient 
 reason why it exists; these axioms should not be confounded. By the lirst, no- 
 thing is effected without a cause; by the second, nothing is, or exists without a 
 a sufficient reason: the first does not apply to God, since God has no cause; the 
 second does pertain to God, since the^e must be a sufficient reason why it ought 
 to be admitted that God exists. 
 
 t " Si objiciatur, 'effectus tinitos, quales sunt cx-eaturse, non exigere causam 
 '.nflnitam;' id conceditur deeorum Ciiusa secundaria, sed non de causa primaria. 
 
216 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 effect argued from; v. ^.^ priority to all other causes, therefore, 
 existence a se, and the infinite perfections of all kinds, which 
 flow logically from admitting d. first cause that is indepe)ident or 
 absolute. 
 
 The very words, infinite^ immense, and all the names of God 
 which are negative in form, indicate the natural process by 
 which the human mind forms its concept of absolute perfec- 
 tion, as expressed in the very structure of language ; for, the 
 negative names of God, show that the positive, out of wdiich 
 they are formed, was presupposed as affirming the finite prem- 
 ises of which they express the conclusion. 
 
 Suarez* observes the fact that, " in all things pertaining to 
 God, it is more difficult to know the manner in which they are 
 in him, than it is to know the manner in which they cannot be 
 in him; " i. e., it is easier to know what God is not, than i-t is 
 to know what he is. This is the reason why it not unfrequently 
 happens that negative terms are employed to enunciate the 
 divine perfections. 
 
 The accepted significance of these negative names, shows 
 also, that the concepts for which they stand, were formed in 
 the mind by the removing of imperfection, and the consequent 
 additio7i of perfection. This concept of infiiiite perfection in 
 God, as the first cause, we actually make more and more com- 
 prehensive by study, reflexion, and meditation, as we grow in 
 years. 
 
 As a matter of experience, we have not that primitive intui- 
 tion of the infinite, or immediate intuition of God. 
 
 Had the human mind naturally any such intuition of ens 
 creans existefitias, as the first great thought, which is the foun- 
 dation of all other thoughts, it should have, it would seem, its 
 own proper name in every language, which would be known to 
 
 quae sit omnium causa a nulla causata ; hanc enim esse infinitaninecesse est." 
 Distinguish the effects in visible nature as proceeding/rom second causes, from 
 that respect of them which exacts for them, moreover, a Jirst and unproduced 
 cause. No effect absolutely depends on a second cause, for the second cause is 
 itself dependent on the first cause. 
 
 * " In omnibus divinis rebus, difllcilius est cognoscere quomodo sint, quam 
 quoraodo nou sint. " (Suarez, 2 opuscul, l]b . 1, cap. 8.) 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 217 
 
 all, and understood by all; for it would necessarily and most 
 distinctly be seen as constituting the basis of all human thought, 
 of perception, judgment and reasoning. But, as a fact, it has 
 no such name^ commonly recognized as pertaining to it, in 
 languages, and it fulfills no such function in human thought ; 
 on the contrary, the terms employed to enunciate it, which are 
 not agreed upon, even in philosophy, offer to us an hypothesis 
 which is obscure and difficult to be comprehended, because 
 not only it does not declare, but it even contradicts, the facts 
 of experience. 
 
 Whatever may be the best philosophical explanation, the 
 fact of experie7ice is, that the progress of the mind is from the 
 singular and concrete objects that through the senses determine 
 its action, to the intelligible^ expressed to it by the idea or con- 
 cept; from the indeterminate idea of essence* and being in general 
 to the indefinitely great; and, by re??iotion of all limit, and the 
 addition of all positive perfection, to the infinite, or to absolute 
 being, as the only sufficient cause of all else. 
 
 Hence, to affirm that the human mind cannot naturally infer 
 the infinite from ih^ finite, is not logically cori'ect; and to affirm 
 that the human mind has naturally and originally the immediate 
 intuition of God, or, of absolute beitig, or, ens creans existetitias, 
 is not true as a matter of fact. 
 
 In the conclusion of a syllogism, the terms may have more 
 cojnprehensio7i, or their concepts include more essential perfec- 
 tion, than they expressed in the premises. The infnite, as a 
 conclusion from the fijiite, expresses less logical extension, but 
 more compreheiision, ox pe7fection, than is explicitly in the prem- 
 ises: for, whether the predicate attribute something positive, 
 or deny some imperfection, the conclusion is the synthesis of a 
 subject and predicate not made in the premises ; and its sub- 
 
 * ' * Intellectus noster ; dura de potentia in actiun reducitar, pertingit prius ad 
 cognitionem imiversalem et confusam de rebus quam ad propriam et specialem 
 rerum cogiiitionem : sed perfectus modus cognoscendi, non prius attingit uni- 
 versal em quam specialem cognitionem. ' ' (Vide Div. Thom. , 1 p. , qu. 14, art. 
 6.) Cm' intellect, when it goes into action, attains to a imiversal and confused 
 knowledge of things before it does to proper and special knowledge; but the 
 perfect method of knowing does not first attain to universal, and then to special 
 cognition. 
 
218 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 ject is thereby increased in comprehension. The absolute 
 infinite is not such by extension; i. e.,by continuous or discrete 
 or logical qua?iiity ; but it is such by compreJmision of all per- 
 fection. 
 
 A desire to effect a unification of knowledge, or a coordina 
 tion of all cognitions, by a simple principle, has led many t(' 
 adopt a theory that identifies the o?itological and the psycho 
 logical orders; but, as a fact, they are not identical in th<; 
 actual* nature of things; i. e., the order of our cognitions i;- 
 not from the first Being, to the works of that being; but it v.^ 
 naturally just in the reverse order ; that is, it proceeds fron 
 his works to Him. 
 
 The argument by which the existence of absolutely perfeci 
 and real bei?ig, entis realissimi, is claimed to be validly deducec 
 from the idea of such a being, involves a double middle term 
 V. g., "he that has a true idea of absolutely perfect and rea 
 being, thereby knows that being to exist ; but there is in ever; 
 mind, which comprehends the expression, absolutely perfect am 
 real beings the true idea of such a being; therefore, from thi 
 very idea of such a being, it follows that the mind may an( 1 
 does know it as really existing." 
 
 The phrase, '-true idea," is here ambiguous; and, in fact, i. 
 has two objects in the premises ;* in the first, or in one mint" 
 the idea^ it must be supposed, formally connotes its object a 
 actual or real; in the second, or in the other mind, it legiti 
 mately expresses only the concept of an intelligible object^ \\ 
 which actual existence is neither affirmed nor denied; i. e., i 
 exists in the second mind only objectively^ as it is termed; oi 
 for one mind, the existence is real ; in the other, it is idea. 
 only : it needs not to be said that, if the existence of the ob 
 ject were merely ideal in both minds, then the argumen 
 would be simply nugatory. 
 
 * " Ex hoc (ex idea Entis quo majus et melius cogitari nequit) , non sequitu 
 quod intelligat, id quod signilicatur per hoc noraen, esseinreru7n natura, seu 
 ut dicunt, existere in actu exercito; sed existere dumtaxat in apprehensione intel 
 lectus, seu, ut dicunt, in actu signato." (Billuart, 1 p., qu. 1, art. 1.) Fron 
 this idea it does not follow that the intellect perceives its object as real, or a 
 actually existing; but it exists only in the apprehension of the intellect, or onb 
 in its sign, the concept. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 219 
 
 Since the conclusion must follow the weaker part of the 
 argument, it can affirm nothing more, in this case, than the 
 concept of an intelligible object, whose objective truths or esse 
 in reriim natura, actual being, remains to be proved. Illation 
 from the />ure/y idea/, as such, to the /'ea/, is not valid; if it 
 were, then any absurdity could be logically demonstrated a 
 priori, or from the idea of it, to be truth. 
 
 An object in the mind is purely ideal, when the notion of it 
 Vv'hich the mind has is merely a concept of what is not known 
 by it as real; the mind acquires this idea by simply appre- 
 hending the term or terms by which the object is expressed in 
 language, and its idea is, therefore, not derived from the object, 
 as it is in itself really and extrinsically to the intellect, whether 
 by means of evidence or testimony. 
 
 If, in the syllogism given above, we suppose the idea to con- 
 note the object as in acta exercito, or real in each mind, then, 
 considered as reasoning, the argumoit is still more absurd; 
 for, it is a vicious circle in which the same thing, though 
 assumed to be self-evidejit, is proved by itself as reason, 
 idem per idem, and it would be equivalent to this : " He that 
 knows God to exist, knows God to exist; but Peter knows God 
 to exist, therefore, Peter knows God to exist." In fact, truth 
 which is intuitively evident, neither requires nor admits proof; 
 nor, therefore, can it be directly subject to rational discussion. 
 
 " But," it is further said, " he that has the idea of absolutely 
 perfect being, in which the existence, in acta exercito, actual 
 existence, of such a being, is not affirmed, but it is included only, 
 in actu sig?iato, i. e., only ideally, has a false idea; and thus 
 the mind would err per se^ The idea in the case supposed, 
 would be false hy privation, or negatively; but it would not be 
 {dXsQ positively; therefore, the mind would not err perse; for, 
 it would simply be ignorant of a truth which is not yet mani- 
 fested to it by the evidence of that truth ; this would be igno- 
 ratice, but not error. From this it would merely follow that 
 the existence of God is not, as regards us, per se known, or 
 self-evident, but requires proof 
 
 The old philosophers acutely and precisely enunciate the 
 
220 GENEPwAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 distinction between that necessity of actual existence, as it is ir* 
 absolutely perfect being, in ente realissimo, i. e., in God ; and 
 as it actually is in relation to our intellects or our cognition of it, 
 in the following terms : " propositio, Deus est, per se nota est 
 quoad se, sed non quoad nos; "* the proposition, God exists, is 
 per se known, as regards itself, but not as regards us. 
 
 A proposition \s per se known as regards itself, but not per se 
 known as regards us, when it has no medium of proof a priori, 
 nor is its truth directly and immediately evident to us on first 
 apprehending the terms. Such proposition is also said to be 
 immediate, in the sense that its predicate is immediately of the 
 subject, or there is no medium between it and the subject, 
 through which it agrees with the subject ; but the predicate is 
 included in the very nature of the subject, as its definition, or 
 as a part of its definition. In case, however, that it is not self- 
 evident to us, or per se known as regards us, the essence or 
 quiddity of the object does not become known to us, by the 
 mere first apprehension of the terms that enunciate it; but it 
 must be demonstrated to us by means of something extrinsic to it, 
 which is better known to us. // evidences itself, though our 
 minds are not capable of i?n?nediately and directly receiving 
 that evidence, but it must be conveyed to them through a 
 medium which is extrinsic and a posteriori by which this evi- 
 dence is. in some respect, reflected upon our minds. 
 
 That which \s per se known, as regards us, or is self-evident 
 
 * " Propositio, Deus est, est per senota quoad se, sed nonquoad nos: ilia pro- 
 positio non est per se nota quoad nos, in qua quidditas subjecti ex prima et com- 
 muni appreheusione termiuornm nobis non innotescit, sed indiget discursu ut 
 nobis inuotescat, quia tunc non potest statira nobis innotescere an prxdicatum 
 conveniat subjecto ; atqui quidditas Dei nobis non notescit nisi per discursum. ' ' 
 (Billuart 1 p, qu. 1, art. I; vide page 139.) 
 
 ' ' Cum ergo propositio per se nota et immediata idem sint, dubitari nou 
 potest quin niulta sint per se nota in se, qua? non sunt per se nota nobis. . . Sunt 
 quajdam veritates in se immediatas; i. e., sine ullo medio inter praedicatum et 
 subjectum, quas non nisi per aliquod medium (extrinsecuni) intelligere vale- 
 mns: v. g., quantitas est entitas accidental is." (Suarez Met. Disp. 29, set. 3, 
 no. 32.) Since a proposition which is per se known, and a proposition which is 
 immediate, are the same thing, it cannot be doubted that tliere are many things 
 per se known, as regards themselves, but which are not per se known as regards 
 us; there are certain truths which are immediate in themselves, i. e., without 
 .iny medium between the subject and the predicate, which we are not able to 
 understand unless through some medium; v. g., quantity is accidental entity 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 221 
 
 to us, is seen and assented to by our minds, on first appre- 
 hending the terms, and without any reasoning, whether a priori 
 or a posteriori; v. g., "A whole is greater than its part." But 
 while the proposition which is per se known as regards itself 
 but not as regards us, possesses, in itself, the most perfect of 
 all objective evidence^ and the most absolutely necessary truth, 
 in itself; yet, our imperfect intellects do not attain to it imme- 
 diately, but do so only by reflex knowledge from other things, 
 which are connected with it logically. Of this kind is the pro- 
 position, "God exists;" and of this kind, also, are many of 
 the highest and most universal truths, as remarked in respect 
 to the proper object of wisdom or philosophy, on page 139. 
 
 Hence, to sum up what was said in regard to the argument 
 by which the existence of God is claimed to be proved from 
 the mere idea of absolutely perfect being, cfitis realissimi; 
 either this idea connotes its object as actually existing, i7i actu 
 exercito, or it does not ; if it does, the argument in proof of it 
 is useless, and is nothing more than a vicious circle. If the 
 idea does not thus connote the object in both minds, then 
 either it thus connotes the object in neither, or in one mind 
 only ; in the first case, the argument is simply nugatory ; in 
 the second, it is merely an equivocation, as is every argument 
 which concludes from the ideal, as such, to the real. 
 
 The existe?ice of absolutely perfect being, or of the infinite, 
 must be learned otherwise than from the 7nere idea of it, 
 or by the equally preposterous argument from the possibility 
 of such a being; and, in fact, it is strictly demonstrable only a 
 posteriori, or by reasoning from effect to cause.* The existence 
 of absolutely perfect, ?iecessary or infi?iite being, cannot be demon- 
 strated a priori; for, there is no principle prior to such being 
 from which it comes, it being the first of all principles. 
 
 All the demonstrative proofs of God's existence by natural 
 reason are a posteriori ;* and they are all reducible to the argu- 
 
 * " Deum esse est demonstrabile non a priori, seu per causas, sed a posteriori 
 Beu per effectus: prima demonstratio dicitur propter quid; secunda, demonstratio 
 quia. (Philos. passim.) The existence of God is not demonstrable a priori, 01 
 throiigli causes, but a posteriori, or by eSfects; the first, is called demonstration 
 propter quid; the second, demonstration quia. 
 
222 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 ment for the necessity of a first and independent cause. The 
 proof derived from 7notio?t, the argument for the necessity of 
 unproduced beings for absolute bei?ig, etc., are, in reahty, but dif- 
 ferent modes of showing the necessity of a first cause that ex- 
 ists a se. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT BEING; OF ORDER; IT CAN BE 
 INTENDED BY NONE BUT AN INTELLIGENT BEING. 
 
 A thing is absolutely necessary* whose non-existence is in- 
 trinsically impossible ; a thing is co?itingent, whose non-exist- 
 ence is possible. 
 
 God alone is absolutely necessary, in the strictest sense of 
 the words; all other necessary being or truth, the eternal 
 essences of things, metaphysical truth, as, v. g., "a part is 
 less than the whole," etc., must be conceived as, in some 
 manner, driving their necessity, or depending for it on a 
 presupposed Being whose necessity is still more strictly abso- 
 lute, as it is under all respects underived and independent ; 
 and, therefore, their necessity, immutability, etc., are less 
 stricdy absolute. The necessity which is predicated of them 
 is by some appropriately styled, metaphysical necessity. 
 
 Hence, metaphysical necessity belongs to objects, which, in 
 their very nature, could not be otherwise than they are ; v. g., 
 the triangle) the circle; or necessary truths in general. It is an- 
 tecedently and absolutely required that, if they really exist, they 
 be conformable to their essential concept; but their actual ex- 
 istence as real things, "in rerum natura," is co?iti?igent ; i. e., 
 depends on a free cause. 
 
 Physical 7tecessity, is that which is cottsequent upon physical 
 law; and is, therefore, conti7igent 2\^o^ in some respect; v. g., 
 
 * " Necessarium est quod ita existit ut deficeve non possit. Contingens est 
 quod pote.st esse et non esse. ' ' A thing is neccsf.ary, which so exists that it can- 
 not cease to exist. A thing is contingent, VA'hich so exists that it can ceaf o to 
 exist. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 223 
 
 it is physically necessary that fire burn, that the sun rise to- 
 morrow, if the stabiUty of their physical laws be not suspended 
 oy Divine intervention. It is a physical fact that the sun rose 
 yesterday morning ; and, as it now has consequent necessity, and 
 is no longer actually contingent being, the truth of that fact 
 is really metaphysical, under this respect of it. 
 
 Absolutely necessary being, can neither have abeginnmgnor 
 an end. For, what begins to exist, depends upon some condi- 
 tion for its existence ; and, therefore, its being was not abso- 
 lutely necessary) and also, if it cease to exist, its being is not 
 absolutely necessary either; for, what comes to an end, could 
 have only conditional or dependent being. Hence, being that 
 is absolutely necessary, cannot be conceived as actually in a 
 state of possibility, and it is, therefore, eternal. But all contin- 
 gent being was in a state of possibility before it began to exist. 
 
 Necessity is either a?itecedent or co?tsequent; v. g., it is antece- 
 dent necessity for every circle to be round ; every rectilinear tri- 
 angle to have three angles, whose sum is equal to the sum of 
 two right angles ; it is consequent necessity that the sun rose this 
 morning, and, under another respect, it is also necessary that 
 it will rise to-morrow; the necessity, in the latter case, is conse- 
 quent upon the hypothesis that the law of the world's motion 
 will not be changed before that time. The circle and triajigle 
 are contifigent, in respect to their actually existing, as real 
 beings. 
 
 No contingent being can exist, unless brought into existence 
 by some cause, i. e., some being distinct from itself. The effi- 
 cient cause of its beginning to exist, must be extrinsic to itself; 
 for, if the sufficient reason of its existence were within itself, 
 or intrinsic to it, then its existence would not be coritijigent, but 
 absolutely necessary \ or, in other words, the supposition can be 
 made only of unproduced being. 
 
 A thing may \)Q produced m two ways: ist, by c?'eation from 
 nothing;* 2d, by being formed or made put of something else. 
 
 ♦ " Creatio est rei prorluctio ex uihilo *'?«, et subjecti." Creation is the pro- 
 duction of a thing from nothing absolutely; i. e., from nothing that is presup- 
 posed as subject matter out of which it is formed, or educed. 
 
224 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 A being is made or produced out of something else, when 
 it is made by the efficient cause, out of some subject matter 
 which is extrinsic to the cause; v. g., an oak produces another 
 oak ; an architect builds a house, etc. 
 
 A being may be destroyed also in two ways : ist, by ajinihi- 
 latioft or absolute reduction to nothing; and 2^^ by dissolution 
 into the elements out of which it is made, by which the whole, 
 as such, perishes. 
 
 Simple substance, or a being that does not consist of parts, 
 and that exists per se, i. e., alone, or not as inhering, cannot 
 be produced out of pre-existing substance. For, by reason 
 of its simple essence, it cannot be formed out of pre-existing 
 parts, since parts are incompatible with its simple nature ; it 
 cannot be produced from material substance ; for that would 
 not be its production, since its existence per se in that substance 
 must be presupposed to its eduction from it ; and in which, not 
 being an accident, it did not inhere ; and on which, not being 
 a constituent part, it did not depend for being. Finally, it can- 
 not be educed from another si?7iple substafice; for since a simple 
 substance is not compounded, it cannot separate a substantial 
 part from itself. Hence, simple substance that exists per se, 
 can begin to exist only by creation from nothing. 
 
 Order* is a perfection, by which multitude is reduced to 
 complete unity ; it so disposes of its hke and unlike constit- 
 uents, that each has its appropriate place in respect both to 
 the parts and to the whole. When the proportion of relations, 
 on which order is founded, is perfect, according to the specific 
 nature of the object thereby formed; then that object is, under 
 different respects, perfect, good, or beautiful in its own species. 
 
 Order is referable to the relations of time, place, material 
 substance; to things moral, social, and intelligible; and, in 
 general, to any object in which we conceive relations of parts 
 among themselves, and to the whole. 
 
 *"Ordo pariiira dispariumque, sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio." (S. 
 August.) Order is the dispositiou oflike and uulike things, giving to each ita 
 oroper place. 
 
 " Compositio rerum aptis et deterrainatis locis." (Cicero.) Order is the 
 nrraagemeut of things in apt and determinate places. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 225 
 
 Any order in action, proves the author of it to be mtelHgent; 
 because th'e intention and production of it require the exercise 
 ol judgment. By the order in men's actions and conversation 
 we perceive daily the evidences of judgment exercised by 
 them ; of e7ids dehberately intended^ and of means compared, 
 selected, and coordinated for their accomplishment. 
 
 To mte?td, is properly an act of the will ; it is an efficacious 
 desire of an end, which is, therefore, formally sought for by 
 appropriate means ; or, it is an act by which the mind tends 
 to an end wished for. The selection and arrangement of the 
 means to that end, require practical judgment. 
 
 The ape can warm himself at the fire which is made for 
 him ; the dog can mount upon the chair that is already near 
 the window, and thence jump to the window ; but neither can 
 the one select means to keep the fire alive ; nor can the other 
 combine separated and absent objects, so as to put them in the 
 relation to each other of stiles ; for both acts would require a 
 comparison of abstract and concrete relations; i. e., judgment. 
 
 Instinct deals with certain actually established and conci'eie 
 relations of things, and when those relations cease to exist, or 
 are essentially changed, it is pow^erless to devise entirely differ- 
 ent means from its determined ones, or to combine and employ 
 a new species of means. 
 
 To select and combine means, to establish new relations, to 
 devise means to an end which were not employed before, are 
 acts of judgment that are proper only to rational natures. 
 Hence, order or design gives complete evidence that its proper 
 cause was an mtelligent agent. 
 
 There is order also in the works of the beaver, the bee, etc.; 
 but they give no evidence whatever of intending it, which is an 
 act of intelligence ; or that they exercise judgment in the selec- 
 tion and use of the means. 
 
 Cognition which is purely of sense, or organic, and limited 
 to singular objects, and concrete relations ; action, which, in 
 respect to the production of order, as such, is merely mechan* 
 ical; fully explain their causality, and are all that can be attri- 
 buted to. them as agents. The intelligence and judgment, 
 15 
 
226 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 clearly discernible in their work, we must refer, through the 
 law of their nature, to the author of that nature. They can 
 accomplish an end determined for them, by determined means;* 
 but they cannot substitute means of different species ; or, as 
 their action is determined to one thing by natural law, they can- 
 not seled another end, or other means, equally good, or better, 
 but must, circumstances being the same, always do the same 
 thing, in tTie same specific manner and degree, and by the same 
 means; for they can know only the sifigular, and can appre- 
 hend and retain only concrete relations ; they are not capab'ie 
 of transmitting improvement as a species, are not perfectible, 
 either in their knowledge, or their mode of action. 
 
 " Determinatum\ ad unum^'' means limited or deternwied to 
 one mode of acting, without any real choice or rational empire 
 over the agent's own action ; when the object is actually pre- 
 sented, it cannot remain really indifferent as to action or non- 
 action, or be free to choose the object, or choose the contrary, 
 but is necessitated by the object to do what it does. 
 
 There is, indeed, order in the action of all natural agents ; 
 
 * " Cognitio et appetitio animcz rationalis, sunt illimitatae ; dum, e contra, 
 ma/eria determinata est ad unum; anima autem belluina est materialis." Ra- 
 tional cognition and appetite, are unlimited; but matter is determined to one 
 thing; its capacity to receive and contain, is determinate and limited; of sucli 
 is the brute soul, which is material. 
 
 t ' ' Natura determinata est ad unum ; sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. 
 Voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam, quaidam enim 
 Bunt naturaliter, qusedam voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius 
 voluntati quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui couvenit naturte, quae 
 est determinata ad unum. Semper naturaj respondet unicin, proportiouatum 
 naturae: naturae enim in gcnere respondet aliquid unum in genere, et natm-« in 
 specie acceptoa respondet unum in specie ; naturae autem individuatJB respondet 
 aliquid unum individuale. Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt 
 sic, vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium 
 natura est." (Div. Th., 1 p., qu. 12, a. 1, et 1, 2 p., qu. 10, a. 1, ad. 3.) 
 Nature is determined to one thing; the will is capable of opposites. The will is 
 the opposite of nature, as one cause is the opposite of another, for, some things 
 are natural, some things are voluntary. There is also one mode of causing, 
 proper to the will as supreme over its act; a different one agrees with nature 
 which is determined to one thing. There is always one object corresponding to 
 nature, proportioned to nature: to nature in general, corresponds some one 
 thing in general; to nature taken as a species, answers a species of object; to 
 individual nature, corresponds an individual thing. The will, therefore, is the 
 principle of those things that can be either one way, or another nature is the 
 orinciple of those things that can be only one way. 
 
GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 227 
 
 the intention of it, however, is not referable to them, but to an 
 intelHgent cause which is above them, and anterior to them.* 
 Order and unity, attained by appropriate means, are manifest 
 in the crystal, the mineral, the vegetable, the brute animal, in 
 all objects around us ; but the true cause and design of it, we 
 cannot ascribe to those objects. For order, as such, can be 
 intended diiid formally effected oxAy by an intelHgent cause; and 
 the concurrence of irrational agents in producing it, is only 
 instrumental and mechanical. 
 
 Hence, none but an intelligent cause can per se produce 
 order; for order essentially impHes judgment; man, by the 
 exercise of reason, produces order in thought, word, and 
 work ; but the order that is in his physical nature as a sub- 
 stance, is from God : " Ordo rectae rationis est ab homine, 
 ordo naturae est a Deo." 
 
 To investigate this order with the design which it evinces, 
 as manifested in the works of creation, in the means appor- 
 tioned and directed to ends which are discernible in all of 
 them, constitutes what is termed the study oi fi7ial causes. As 
 before remarked, the final cause is the highest and the most 
 noble of the causes ; for, it bespeaks the intelligent principle 
 that gives motion, direction and efficacy to all the other causes, 
 since they are subordinate and subject to it, and are, there- 
 fore, dependent on it in operating. Hence, its objects fur- 
 nish the mind congenial and elevated knowledge, since they 
 acquaint it with the ends for which the different works of cre- 
 ation are destined, as shown by their action ; and, by conse- 
 quence, no study depending on the mere light of reason, can 
 give us more perfect views of the author of their existence. 
 
 When Bacon and others say that the study oi fifial causes^ 
 according to the manner in which they are discernible in the 
 nature of things around us, is arrogant, and tends to atheism, 
 their fear and warning come, perhaps, from misguided reverence 
 
 * ' ' Ovis fugit lupum ex quodam arbitrio quo existiraat eum sibi noxium ; sed 
 hoc judicium non est sibi liberum sed a natura mditiun." (Div. Thorn. 1 p., 
 qu. 59, art. 3.) The sheep flees from the wolf by a certain choice in which i 
 esteems the wolf hurtful ; but this judgment is not free, but is implanted in it by 
 nature. 
 
228 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 to God ; " aemulationem Dei habent, sed non secundum scien- 
 tiam."* All things are parts of the volume which creation 
 forms, and it is open before us that we may read, and learn to 
 know the existence and the perfections of its Author, as shown 
 in his works. As the bees of Mount Hybla sip honey from 
 the very flowers that give to reptiles deadly venom, so, that 
 which teaches wisdom to the well meaning, may be turned to 
 evil aims by the ill-disposed. 
 
 In the operations of natural law, there is never mere acci- 
 dent, or purely fortuitous event ; for, irrational agents have no 
 action except in obedience to the law of their nature, imposed 
 on them by the author of their being. Their action, though 
 various, is orderly; their mechanism, though complex, has 
 unity, and nature never fails either in the coordination of her 
 means or in the attainment of her ends; "natura nunquam 
 deficit in necessariis." Hence, such study of the creatures 
 around us not only tends to knowledge that is true, and high, 
 and wise, but at the same time gives us conclusions that are 
 mfallibly certain. 
 
 * ' ' They have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. * * (Rom. x.) 
 See page 56. 
 
 END OF ONTOLOGY, OR GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Absolute 20 
 
 Abstract and Concrete 18, 19 
 
 Accident 26, 182 
 
 Accident, Proper and Common 181 
 
 Accident, Fallacy of 56 
 
 Accident, Separable from Subject 180, 183, 196 
 
 Accidental Cause 204 
 
 Act, the Pure 124 
 
 Action, Immanent, Transient 187 
 
 Actio in Distans 211 
 
 Acts Specified by Objects 71, 154 
 
 JEstimativa Potentia 86 
 
 Analogy 21, 162 
 
 Analogy Can Found Demonstration 54,137, 162 
 
 Analogy not Parity 22 
 
 Analysis 48 
 
 Appetite, Appetition. 166 
 
 Appodictic Demonstration no 
 
 Apprehension 16, 64, 108 
 
 A se. Per se {7iote) 178 
 
 Assent, Consent 72 
 
 Attention „ 18, 126 
 
 Attribute or Property 25 
 
 Authority of Learned Men 132 
 
 Being, Notion of 151 
 
 Being, Degree or Grade of 202 
 
 Beauty 173 
 
 Begging the Question 57 
 
 229 
 
230 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 PAGB. 
 
 Brute Soul : 90 
 
 Categories, the Ten 23 
 
 Causation, Principle of 199 
 
 Cause, Kinds of. 200 
 
 Cause, Efficient, Final 200 
 
 Cause, Material, Formal 206 
 
 Cause per se, per accidens 204 
 
 Cause, Exemplary 211 
 
 Cause, Univocal, Equivocal 211 
 
 Certainty 67 (et seqq.) 
 
 Certainty, Criterion of 78 
 
 Circle, the Vicious 58 
 
 Comprehension of Terms 18 
 
 Comprehension in Conclusion of Syllogism 40, 214 
 
 Composition and Division 56 
 
 Conceived, What Cannot be is Nothing 22 
 
 Concept 16 
 
 Conclusion of Syllogism a Synthesis 40, 217 
 
 Concrete 19 
 
 Condition, not a Cause 2H 
 
 Connotative 20 
 
 Consciousness 82 
 
 Consequence, Consequent, Sequence 2>^ 
 
 Contingent 52, 75, 222 
 
 Contrary, Contradictory 34 
 
 Conversion, Mutation 155 
 
 Creation, Act of 158 
 
 Definition 28, 135 
 
 Demonstration 50 
 
 Determinatum Ad Unum 226 
 
 Difference, the Specific 24 
 
 Dilemma, the 46 
 
 Disposition 189, 212 
 
 Disputation 141 
 
 Distinction of Reason 163 
 
 Divisibility, How Infinite 185 
 
 Division, Rules of 27 
 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 231 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Double Middle Term 54, 59 
 
 Doubt 66 
 
 Election, End not Subject to 187, 205 
 
 Elicited Acts 166 
 
 End 204 
 
 Enthymeme, the 45 
 
 Ens Rationis 163 
 
 Equivocal 21 
 
 Equivocal, Univocal Cause 211 
 
 Error 63 
 
 Essence, Nature 22, 153, 158 
 
 Evidence 69 
 
 Evidence, in Civil Courts {iiote) , 129 
 
 Evil 165, 172 
 
 Existence 158 
 
 Extension of Terms 18 
 
 Extension, Definitive and Circumscriptive 184 
 
 Faith, ijelief. 70, 74 
 
 Fallacy 55 
 
 Fancy, Same as Imagination 86 
 
 False, Falsehood 63 
 
 Figure 186, 195 
 
 Final Causes, Study of 227 
 
 Finite 213 
 
 Finite Founds Knowledge of the Infinite 213 
 
 Form and Matter, Theory of 206 
 
 Genus 24 
 
 Good 165, 171 
 
 Habit 189 
 
 Hypothesis, only Probable 54 
 
 Hypothetical Argument 43 
 
 Hypothetical Proposition., t^t^ 
 
 Idea, not Image of the Fancy 17, 108 
 
 Ideal to Real, not Valid Illation 219 
 
 Ideas, Objective Reality of 112 
 
 Ideas, Universal, Founded on Objects 115 
 
 Identity 54, 161 
 
232 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 PACK, 
 
 Ignorance 64, 66 
 
 Imagination, an Organic Power 92 
 
 Imagination, How it is Essential for the Intellect 84, loi 
 
 Immanent Acts, Transient Acts 187 
 
 Impossibility 1 60 
 
 Induction 52 
 
 Infinite (et seqq.) 213 
 
 Infinite, Known fi-om the Finite 214 
 
 Infinite /;/ Fotentia, cannot become Actual Infinite 185 
 
 Instinct 89, 225 
 
 Instrumental Cause 211 
 
 Intellect, not an Organic Power 103 
 
 Intellect, Adequate or Connatural Object of 104 
 
 Intelligence a Virtue or Perfection of the Intellect. . 138, 190 
 
 Intend, Intention 225 
 
 Intensity, Greater or Less, Objects Capable of 193, 195 
 
 Intention, First and Second, Terms of. 20 
 
 Intuition of the Absolute, not Natural 214 
 
 Judgment 30, 109 
 
 Known Per se, What it Signifies 220 
 
 Life 187, 188 
 
 Material Cause 206 
 
 Matter and Form 206 
 
 Meditation, What Constitutes it 127 
 
 Memory, Sensile, Intellectual 125 
 
 Mental Term, Verbiim Me?ifis 16 
 
 Metaphysical, the 149 
 
 Metaphysical Truth 61, 164 
 
 Method, Scientific 48 
 
 Mind, Powers of 35 
 
 Mixed Perfection 212 
 
 Motion, of Self, is Life 187 
 
 Mutation 155 
 
 Natural Agent 168 
 
 Nature, Essence 22, 153 
 
 Necessary, Necessity 222 
 
 Nominalists, Realists 115 
 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 233 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Objects, how they Specify Acts 71 
 
 Ontological, Psychological 51 
 
 Opinion 54., 66 
 
 Opposition ;^-^ 
 
 Order 224 
 
 Organ, Organic Power 85, 95 
 
 Parity 22 
 
 Particular and Universal 19 
 
 Passion Specified 72 
 
 Perfection, Simple and Mixed 212 
 
 J^er se, has Different Meanings [no^e] 178 
 
 Fer se Known, or Self-Evident 220 
 
 Philosophical Knowledge 138, 140 
 
 Possibility 160 
 
 Potential Existence 207 
 
 Powers Pertain to Essential Quality 154, 186 
 
 Premises, of Argument 37 
 
 Probability , . 53 
 
 Probability, in Cognition only 53 
 
 Probability Essentially different from Certainty 53? ^7 
 
 Property or Attribute - • 25, 181 
 
 Property an Accident 181 
 
 Proportion, Analogy of 21, 162 
 
 Proportion Essential to Beauty 174 
 
 Proposition 31 
 
 Psychological, Ontological 51 
 
 Quality, as a Category iS6 
 
 Quality Follows the Forin^ Quantity the Matter 184 
 
 Quantity 184 
 
 Reasoning, Specific Act of 35, iii, 213, {fiote) 
 
 RedupHcation, Reduplicative, Effect of. 2>Zi ^53 
 
 Realists 115 
 
 Reflexion 19 
 
 Reflex Act, Organic Power Incapable of 88 
 
 Relation 197 
 
 Science, Scientific Knowledge 132, 140 
 
 Senses, Internal and External 85, 95 
 
234 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Sensible, the 95 
 
 Sequence 36 
 
 Similarity 162 
 
 Singular ig 
 
 Soul, Immaterial 91 
 
 Species 22 
 
 Species, "Genesis of" 122, 195 
 
 Spontaneous Act, Spontaneity 168 
 
 Subcontrary 34 
 
 Sublime 179 
 
 Subsist 208 
 
 Substance 178 
 
 Substance, Complete, Incomplete 179, 208 
 
 Supposition of Terms 21 
 
 Suspicion. 66 
 
 Syllogism, Canons of ^6 
 
 Syllogism, Expository the 42 
 
 Synthesis 48 
 
 Testimony of Witnesses 129 
 
 Transcendentals 20, 119 
 
 Transubstantiation 157 
 
 Truth, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral 61, 164 
 
 Truths, the Primitive 80 
 
 Unity, One 161 
 
 Univocal 21 
 
 Universal 19 
 
 Universal Ideas, How Less Perfect 121 
 
 Will, the Rational Appetite ' 166 
 
 Will is Free 166 
 
 Will not Free to Wish Evil, as such 167, 205 
 
 Will, its Act Less Evident than that of Intellect 84, 194 
 
 Wisdom 138 
 
 Witness 129 
 
JTuly, 1878 
 
 STANDARD SCHOOL BOOKS, 
 
 Published by MURPHY & CO., Baltimore. 
 
 j^*A liberal discount to Booksellers, Schools, Teachers, &c., when purchased in quantities. 
 
 Fredet's Ancient and Modern Histories. 
 
 New Revised and Enlarged Editions, Continued up to 18G7. 
 Ancient History ; from the Dispersion of the Sons of Nee, to the 
 
 Buttie of Actiuvi, and the Change of the Roman Republic into an 
 Empire. By Petkr Fredet, D. D , Professor of History, in St. 
 Mary's College, Bait. 32d revised edition. 12o., half arab. 1 60 
 Modern History ; from the Cuming of Christ, and the Chanqe of 
 the Roman Republic into an Empire, to the Year of our Lord, 1867. 
 By Petkr Fredet, U. D , Professor of History in St. Mary's Col- 
 loge, B:ilt. 34th revised and enlarged edition. 12o , half arab, 1 50 
 Introduced into many of the principal Li'erary Institutions of the United 
 States, adopted as Text Books in the I i>h University, Duhlin and many In.sti- 
 tu'ions in England and the Provinces, Fredet's Hi.stories have acquired a wide- 
 spread reputation, and their excellence i.s too well established, at this day, to be 
 dwelt upon. The publishers have the pleasure of announcing, that, ia oVder to 
 malve the Modern History moi-e complete and deserving of the liberal patronage 
 hitherto extended to it, they hav •, with the valuable assistance of tlie late Dr. 
 Fredet's reverend collaboiators, added several Chapters embracing the Hi.-.tori- 
 cai Events t'lat have taken place in thi-; and other countries from i8.54 to 18C7. 
 
 The Modern History has been thoroughly revise 1 and considerably enlargea. 
 The additional matter, carefully prepared, will be found worthy of the distin- 
 enished Historian's original work. The history of the Recent Civil War i;i the 
 Uni:ed States, particularly, has been compiled \viih a truthful impartiali(y which 
 makes it the best Synopsis of this Memorable Event yet published for the use 
 of Educational Institutions. It is a correct record of facts, faithfully told with- 
 out political comment. 
 
 The student will therefore find in Dr. Fredet's two books, the "Ancient" and 
 " Blodern " Histories, the most Complete, Authentic, and reliable History of the 
 World, from its Creation to the Year of our Lord, 18G7. 
 
 ^^Pro-n a large number of Ccmviendatorr/ Notices of Professor PredeCs Ancient and 
 Modern Histories, we select the following, as embodying the spirit of all. 
 
 College of William k Mart, Williainxhurg, Va., October, 1867. 
 Gentlemen:— The demand for Fredet s Ancient and Jlodern Histories and Kerney's Com- 
 pendium of History, showi tliat these most excellent books are appreciaied as thev ought to be. 
 'I'hu imMrovements and uddi ions to tlie editions of 1867 just issued from vour press, make them 
 all that could be reasonably desired. Immediately a'ter the reopening ofthe College ot Willi. >m 
 and Mary, in 186.5, Fr- defs Histories were, after a carelul examination ofthe Text Books ( f the 
 day. adopted in ihe Institution. A more intimate acquaintance soon justified the wisdom of the 
 selection. They evidently were written in a conscientious ami Chri^ti.-.n spirit, with a manifest 
 intent lo teach historical truths. They constitute an honorable monument to the memory of the 
 late Reverend Author, 
 
 Kerney's Compendium was subsequently introduced into the College Grammar School; and 
 gave entire satisfaction. In style and system and the intere-t it excites, it is a imirablv adapted, 
 to beginners and junior s udents, while it wax be read and cousulted with profit bv the more ad- 
 vanced. Trustina: that jovr public spirit an'd tnterprise in putting su h standard works withia 
 reach may meet with a liberal encouragement. I remain yours, very respeetlully, 
 
 aiessrs. J. MURPHT k Co. "' Benj S. Ewell, President, College W. dc Mary. 
 
 The Metropolian says:— "The style Is veritablv charming by its simplicity, and by the quiet 
 love of his subject which the author displays. It is the language of a talented and successful 
 teacher, who relates to his class the great'evenis of time, sm^einctly but graphically, yet in a. 
 lively and picturesque manner. It is thiis that history should be written for youth." 
 
 The London Standard says:—" Th^SQ two excellent manuals of History have a wide and in- 
 creasing circulation in America, and are everywhere held in tiie highe t esteem. The compiler, 
 Dr Fredet, has achis;7ed a task of no ordinary difBeulty, in compressing so much recondite mat- 
 ter into so small a spa^e; in leaving u^itohi nothing that was of note of the iu.mense and varied 
 annals of the world. No college, school, or library ought to be w ithout these excellent works." 
 
 The Dublin Telegraph says:— " Fredet's Histories have been adopted, as a class book, by the 
 Irish University; and we entertain no doubt, that they will supersede, even in other establish- 
 ments, those miserable compi ations which wilful perverters of truth have long palmed upon th« 
 publij as histories and abridgments of histories." 
 
 The Dublin Tablet 8:iys:— "These two volumes are plain, copious, and useful eummaries of 
 histcrj-, and the number of editions through which they have passed attest their popularity." 
 
 The Philadelphia Instructor says :— " We hope these histories will find their way into literary 
 Institutions in order that the young may learn the past from pure and uncorrupted sources." 
 
 Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, BaUimm'e. 
 1 ' 
 
School Edition Lingard's England. 
 
 JLinff'TrfVs TJisfory of Jiiiff^and, By Johx Linqard, D. D. 
 With ft Continuation from 1G88, to the rci<rn of Queen Victoria. 
 Abridged by James Buuke, Esq , A. B. With an Appendix to 
 1873. li)/ ike Editor of the First Ciass Book of llUtory. To which 
 ore added, ^rarginal Notes and Questions, adapted the use of 
 Schools. 17th Edition 1 CO 
 
 The Student will find that the ipsissima verba of the great Historian 
 of England has been religiously preserved in the Abridgment. 
 The Continuation has been witten by an auihor who has been long and 
 
 favorably known in literature. 
 
 NOTICES OF THE PRESS. 
 
 Tlit ifetropolitan, in noticing this work, says:—" We are glad to see this excellent abridgment 
 adapted to the use of Bchools. It will do much to remove tliose many false impressions, which 
 English historians have hitherto made \ipon the readers of history by their word-painting of 
 imaginary events. In no nation perhaps was history more ' a conspiracy asainst truth,' than in 
 that of England, and in none did the mind of American youth need a more particular antidote to 
 its poisoning influence. It was a good thought then to give a sound, reliable first book to the 
 youthful student, and we are happy to find that Mr. Burke and his able American collaborator, 
 have succeeded in producing a te.'it-book which we can with the utmost confidence commend to 
 the favorable consideration of the instructors of youth. 
 
 The Cambridge (Mass.) Chronicle says;—" We have often called the attention of our readers 
 to the great value of Lingard's History. The learning, ability, and general impartiality of tha 
 author are well known An abridgment of the work was very desirable, and it appears to have 
 been very well done by the present editor. No person can be said to be thoroughly acquainted 
 with English History who is not familiar with Lingard. The volume is well printed, in a clear 
 type, and convenient form, and furnishes a valuable contribution to the h'storical literature of 
 the country 
 
 The London Critic says: — " The author has carefully and successfully produced a volume that 
 must be very acceptable to those for whose use it was designed." 
 
 The Dtiblin Revieio says:— "Mr. Burke's Abridgment is completely successful. Wo do not 
 hesitate to pronounce the work, as a whole, one of tiie most Taluable additions to our scanty 
 school literature which we have met with for many years.' 
 
 The London edition oi Broicnson' s Reviete says: -"Mr. Burke appears to have entered on his 
 task with an enthusiasm equal to the ability which he has displayed in executing it. He has 
 formed a Manual of British History, not merely the best for the object aimed at — the instruction 
 of youth— but a volume of safe reference to those of riper years." 
 
 The Dublin F-eemnn's Journal says:— "Mr. Burke has performed his la' orions task well, 
 compressing into a comparatively small space the substance of such a large work in the autlior's 
 own language, adding a clear and rapid abstract of the national history down to the present 
 J ear." 
 
 .A Sistorjl of the Catholic Cliurchffrom the Cjmmencement 
 of the Christian Era to the Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. Compiled and 
 Translated from the best Authors. By Rev. Tueodore Noethen. With Ques- 
 tions, adapted to the use of Schools...4th Edition ...Re(;ently Published, 1.25 
 
 The utility and importance of a Compendium of Church History for the use 
 of College.", Academies and Schools, are so great and so evident, that the Com- 
 piler of the present volume deems it unnecessary to make more than a pasting 
 allusion to this subject. The knowledge of the History of the Catholic Church 
 is essential to every Catholic. As the age we live in demands the greatest w.itoh- 
 fulness on the part of parents, teachers and pastors, in regard to the moral and 
 religious culture of youth, we have omitted nothing that can make thi.s History 
 a most complete and perfect text-book tor students, trusting thereby to etfect a 
 great and lasting good lor the present and future time. In order to facilitate the 
 use of this work for both teachers and scholars, Questions have been added at 
 the end of the book. 
 
 Opinions op the Press. 
 
 "This Compendium has long been needed. We call the attention of all instructors to the 
 work, and recommend its introduction into the Catholic schools. Besides being a good text-book 
 for the class, it will bo found to conta.n verj' ins'.ructing reading for the family circle. The facts 
 are racorded succinctly, and the few reflections made are to the point." Av« ilaria. 
 
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 MuRPHT & Co., Publishers and BooksellerSf Baltimore. 
 .2. 
 
KlUITEY'S COMPENDIUM OF HISTOI^Y. 
 
 A Coinpendiiim of Ancient and 3Iodern History , from 
 
 the Creation to tJio year 18G7, with Questions adapted to the use of Schools; 
 also an Appendix, containing the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu- 
 tion of the U. S., a Biographical Sketch of Eminent Personages, with a Chro- 
 nological Table of Remarkable Events. Discoveries, Improvements, etc. By 
 M. J. K:.n,XET, A. M. 46th Revised and Enlarged Edition, continued up to 1867. 
 
 12o., half arabesque. 1.23 
 In presenting a Revised and Enlarged Edition of this Popular History to the 
 public, the publishers deem it unnecessary to dwell upon its merits. Exten- 
 Bively introduced into tlie Schools of this (Jountry, and in many Institutions of 
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 where with the greatest Civor, and thirty-one editions rapidly exhausted are 
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 The Compendium has been brought down to the Present Time, and this Edi- 
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 Recommendations, Notices, &c. 
 
 Uiis Book, has been Introduced into the Female High Schools of Baltimore, 
 
 by the following Resolutions, January 10, 1871. 
 
 Resolved, That the Committee ou Female High Schools be authorized to purchase for, and in- 
 troduce into said Schools as a Text-book on general History, Kerney's Compendium of History. 
 
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 High Schools shall be forbidden and the book adopted under the authority of the foregoing reso- 
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 Baltimore City College, Baltimore, May Zlst, 1871. 
 
 Messrs. Mukpht & Co. In accordance with your request, I have carefully examined Ker- 
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 that t;.e work is uniformly pervaded by a clear, candid, and discriminating narration of leading 
 historical events, which admirably adapts it to the purposes of instruct on in our Schools and 
 Academies. A second and a more diligent perusal of the book, has only served to confirm my 
 first impressions of its excellence, and I commend it to all who are interested in elevating the 
 standard of instruction in this most important department of our educational system. 
 
 Hexry E. Shepherd, Pro/. Histonj and Literature. 
 Eastern Female High School, Baltimore, June2<i, 1871. 
 
 Gkntle.me:!! : I have r.o cause to change the favorable opinion I expressed of "Kerney's Com- 
 pendium of Aneient and Modern History" ou its introduction into this School. In the hand of 
 the true educator it has, I think, no superior. Nath. H. Thayer. 
 
 Kerney's Co . pendium has been introduced into the College Grammar School, and gives entire 
 satisfaction. In st-le and sjstem, and the interest it excites, it is admirably adapted to begin- 
 ners and junior students, while it may be read and consulted with profit by the more advanced. 
 
 Benj. S Ewell, President. 
 
 Williamsburg, Va., October, 1SG7. Colkge William and Jfory. 
 
 The Compendium of History, by M. J. Kerney, has been in my possession several months, and, 
 after a careful reading, I believe it to be a very useful book in the department of study to whieb 
 it belongs. I take pleasure ia recommending it to teachers. 
 
 J. N. M'JiLTOX, Chairman Central High School of Bait. 
 
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 dulge." Nutiotial InttlUgencer. 
 
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 S 
 
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 The appearance of thirty-two large editions of Kerney's First Class Book of 
 History within Iwadij years, is a sufficient evidence of its popularity as an ele- 
 mentary class book. As a book for study, and a book for reading, in place of the 
 disjointed matter found in ordinary "Readers," the publishers have endeavored 
 to make it every way worthy of continued patronage. 
 
 The importance of the particular changes introduced in this edition, renders 
 it desirable to call the attention of teachers and parents to its e ihanced value. 
 Errors and inaccuracies of whatever kind have been carefully rectified. If any 
 have found in it heretofore defects worthy of notice, it is to be hoped that the 
 emendations supplied, — suggested as they have been, by teachers of experi- 
 ence, — will recommend this new edition to their hearty approval. 
 
 In order to make this book correspond in character with the Author's larger 
 work, the "Compendium of Ancient and Modern History," the last edition was 
 enlarged by the introduction of a short synopsis of Sacred and Ancient History. 
 In Modern History, several chapters were added, embracing the most important 
 recent events that had transpired in the civilized countries of the world, includ- 
 ing the late " American Civil War." 
 
 The form of " Questions " at the foot of each page has been improved. Super- 
 fluities have been retrenched, and facts equally as important to be known as 
 those already stated, introduced. Where the narrative embraces events, which, 
 from their religious or political bearing, gives rise to a diversity of opinion' 
 among men, care has been taken to avoid a method of statement likely to prove 
 offensive to either extreme. Truth is the object aimed at, not partizunship: in 
 the interests of which it is notorious that the most of what is called History, is 
 written. The publishers trust that this little book will now find its way into a 
 still wider circle of institutions, than those in which it has been heretofore 
 known and appreciated. 
 
 No pains have been spared in the revision and preparation of this Edition, 
 with the hope of rendering it worthy, in every respect, of the high commenda- 
 tion and liberal patronage enjoyed by Mr. Kerney's Popular Class Books. 
 
 From a large number of Recommendations, we select the following : 
 
 From Professor Joynks, o/ n^ashington and Lee University, Va. 
 
 Messrs. Joay Murphy k Co , Dear Sirs :— I have used K-mey'a First Lessons in History tor 
 some time past, in teaching my own children, and have had occasion at the same time to compare 
 it with other books for the first study of History. I consider Kern) y's much the best book for this 
 purpose that I have seen. It is the most comprehensive, and at the same time the simplest in its 
 style— while it is fuU of facts, it is :ilso suiaciently enlivened by anecdote and incident, to keep 
 up the interest of children. It seems moreo er to be just and truthful, and contains nothing 
 that cou d be offensive to any portion of our people— a quality that in these da)S, when school 
 books seem to be regarded as proper instruments for political teaching, should commend it es- 
 peci-illy to the peo le of the South. I trust it may have a wide circulation in our Southern 
 Schools. Very truly. EDWARD S. JOYxVES. 
 
 Easterx Female IIigh School, Baltimore, June 25, 1371. 
 
 Gentlemen':— The true province of the Uistorian is to givo facts without comment. This is a 
 distingaislu:.g quality of Kerney's " First Book of History," which renders it not only a model 
 for all compilers, but an unobjeotional work for all schools. Nathaniel H. Thayer, 
 
 Board School Com.missionkr3 of Talbot Co., Boston, April 29, 1878. 
 J MORPHT k Co., .Sr»>8:— We find no books so well adaiit?d to the wants of our Public School* 
 as "Kerney's First Class Book of History" and "Kerney's Compendium of History." The 
 Sotjool Board of Talbot county adopted the^e books unanimously. A. CBArLAiN, Sec y. 
 
 Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore, 
 4 
 
ONDERDONK'S HISTORY OF MARYLAND, 
 
 From Its Settlement, to 1 8 7 7. With the Constitution of the State, for the Use of Schools. 
 
 Fifth Revised and Enlarged Edition, with Fine Engravings, 376 pages, 75 cts. 
 
 Adopted as a Text-Book in the Public Schools of Baltimore, 
 
 AND SEVERAL COUNTIES OF THE StATK. 
 
 From the Preface.— The former editions of this History having met with such 
 favor from the public that a new edition is demanded, opportunity has been 
 given to make further additions. Biographical sketches of some of Maryland's 
 prominent men have been added. New illustrations have been made, and it 
 has been more thoroughly adapted to the use of the class room. The portion 
 that relates to the period of the civil war has been re-written, and care has been 
 taken to make it a History of the State during that war. No attempt has been 
 made, and it would be out of place if it were made, to give a history of the war; 
 Viat belongs to the History of the United States. ^ 
 
 The History of the Proprietary government, under which Maryland was es- 
 tablished and grew, is full, for it is in that government that we find the germs 
 of those principles of popular liberty that resulted In the Revolution ; and it is 
 in the free institutions founded under it that we recognize the school in which 
 our fathers learned both the true objects of government, and their own rights 
 as individuals. 
 
 There is perhaps no stimulus to worthy deeds, or at least to the preservation 
 of self-respect, equal to that which is furnished in the legacy of a good name. 
 That our youth should know how rich the History of Maryland is in all that can 
 inspire noble emulation, is not only desirable in itself, but is the surest pledge 
 that they will be animated to deeds worthy of their sires, and that, by "imitat- 
 ing the virtue, the valor, and the liberality of their forefathers," they will hand 
 down the State to posterity with untarnished lustre. 
 
 In the former editions, the hope was expressed that this little book might be 
 instrumental in promoting this knowledge among the rising generation of the 
 State. TTie ad-option of this History as a text-hook by the Public Schools of the eity of 
 Baltimore, and the subsequent adoption by the State Board of Education, and their 
 recommendation of its use by all the Schools of the State, justify the hope expressed, 
 and give assurance that it supplies the want so long felt. 
 
 With the view of meeting the requirements of the School Law of 1S7S, the Constituttoh 
 of the State has been added. The importance of making this a subject of study 
 in the common schools cannot be over estimated. As it is the duty of every 
 man to take a part in the political movements ot the day, we trust, that our 
 youth, will be thoroughly instructed therein, so that when they come to act 
 their part on the stage of life, they may be amply prepared to discharge the 
 high and holy duties that necessarily devolve upon every freeman. 
 
 The authorities consulted in this work are McMahon, McSherry, Irving, Ban- 
 croft, Bozman, and papers of Maryland Historical Society. 
 
 College St. James, Sept. 1877. HENRY ONDERDONK. 
 
 OrncE SuPEBiirrENDEiiT or Pfblio Insteuction, 
 
 Baltimore, April 3Qth, 1877. 
 This 13 to certify that the Third Revised Edition of Onderdonk's History of Maryland, pub- 
 lished by John Murphy & Co., Baltimore, vras on the 24th of April, in accordance with a unani- 
 mous resolution of the Committee on Books, adopted by the Board of School Commissioners of 
 Baltimore, for use in the Grammar Schools. HENRY E. SHEPHERD, 
 
 Superintendent of Public Schoola, 
 
 4®" At a meeting of the State Boarp of Education, held on the 29th of May, 1872, Onder- 
 donk's School History of Maryland, with the Constitution of the State Appended, was unani- 
 moQsly recommenaed for adoption in all the Public Schools of the State. 
 
 Murphy & Co. Publishers arid Booksellers, Baltimore. 
 5 
 
Kerney*s Aritlinietics. 
 
 The Columhian Arithmetic, designed for the Use of Acade- 
 mies and Schools. By M. J. KtRNKr, A. M 2Glh Edition. 50 
 
 The oim has been, ia the compilation and arrangement of this work, to make it a book of 
 prnriirnl inHtruclion ; ono in ■vvhuh the pcienco of figures is thorouprlily explained and clearly 
 elucidated. The examples for practice are generally euch as the pupil Trill meet in the various 
 busincs< transactions of life. The arrangement is progressive, all questions being solved by 
 rule j previously explained. This le w editi^iu has been carefully revised and enlarged. Several 
 useful tables oa the subject of Ii>iere<,l have been introOuced, and numerous miacellHueous 
 examples added. The e improvements reader the 'work still more deserving of the extensive 
 patiouageit has heretufore enj<iyed. 
 
 Krj/ to Kft^rifiys Columbian Arithmetic, containing the 
 
 Solution of tho principal Questions 40 
 
 Introduction to the Columhian Arithmetic, for the Use of 
 
 Schools. By M. J. Kerney, A. M 30th Revised Edition. 20 
 
 This little work is designed aa an introduction to the former, and is intended for children 
 abo\it to commence the study of Arithmetic. The first principles of the science are familiarly 
 explained in the form of question and answer, and the pupils are conducted in the study as far 
 as the end of compound numbers. It is roplete wiih practical example", adaped to the capacity 
 of that class of learners for which it is designed, and it also contains all the Tablef. a. 
 
 Mr. Kerney's Arithmetics have already acquired a wide-spread popularity, as attested oy th« 
 ■ale of large editions in a few years. They are books of practical instruction, arranged by a 
 practical teacher of many years' experience. The present editions have been carefully revised, 
 and neither pains nor expense will be spared to render them at all times worthy the high 
 reputaiiua already acquired. 
 
 The Publishers have the pleasure of announcing that this Series of Arithmetics havennder- 
 gono a carffal and thorough, rtrision, by a Brother or the SociEir or the Holy Ckoss, an 
 experienced practical teacher and arithmetician. 
 
 Kerney's Murray's Grammar* — An Abridgment of Murray^ s 
 
 Grammar and Exercises, designed for the Use of Academies and Schoola; with 
 
 an Appendix, containing Rules for Writing with Perspicuity and Accuracy; 
 
 also a Treatise on Epistolary Composition. By M. J. Kerney, A. .M. 
 
 46th Edition. 18o. half bound, 25 
 
 This Grammar is used in the Public fichools of Baltimore; in the Schools of the Christian 
 Brothers; and in many of the principal Schools and Academies throughout the country. 
 
 In point of arrangement, this work is superior to any other Abridgment of Murray's Gram- 
 mar that has yet appeared before the public. It combines the Grammar and Exercise, by adapt- 
 ing Exercises to every chapter and section throughout the work, so that the pupil may have, at 
 every stage of his progress, a practical illustration of the portion under his immediate study. 
 The present edition has been carefully revised by the author, and many valuable improvements 
 made in the work, A Treatise on Epistolary Composition has b>.en added, containing direc- 
 tions for writing Letters, Notes, Cards, Ac, with a variety of examples of the same. 
 
 A Catechism of Scripture History , compiled by the Sisters 
 
 of Mercy for the children attending their schools. Revised by M. J. Kernby, 
 
 A. M ., 31st Edition. 75 
 
 "This excellent work is extensively tised in nearly all Catholic Institutions throughout 
 England, Ireland, Canada, and the United States. 
 
 " The. object of the Catechism, * is to render children early acquainted with the truthful and 
 interesting events recorded in the Sacred Scriptures; to familiarize them with the prophecies 
 relating to tbe coming of the .Messiah, and lead them to rega; d the Old Testament as a figure 
 and a forshadowing ot the New.' 
 
 "The present edition has been much improved, the questions to the answers being made 
 more concise, so as to admit of their being easily committed to memory. An Appendix has also 
 been add.-d, containing extracts from the Prophets, Scripture texts, and short sketches of the 
 lives of the Apostles and Evangelists. The Chronological Table, which has been carefully re- 
 vised and considerably enlarged, fixes the dates rf the most remarkable events recorded in the 
 Sacred Writings." 
 
 Catechism of Ecclesiastcal History, Abridged for the Use 
 of Schools. By a Friend of Youth. Enlarged Edition. IGo. flexible cloth, .30 
 This little work has been carefully revised and enlarged, the text being brought down to the 
 present time. Ttieso improvements it is hoped will render it still more popular with tlifi in- 
 structors of youth. 
 
 Muri ay\s English Gramtnar, adapted to the different classes 
 
 o! learneVs; with an Appendix, containing rules and observations for assis-ting 
 the more advanced students to write with perspicuity and accuracy. By 
 
 LlNDLUY MUURW 12o. 40 
 
 In presenting a new edition of Mt'-rray's Gnaromar, which is wnivetaally considered the best 
 extant, we deem ic 8uffl..ient to state, th.it die present edition is printed from an entirely new 
 set of plates, and that it has been c.irefully revised, and free from many of the inaccuracies and 
 iilemishes which are to be found in other oaitious, printed from old stereotype plates. This^ 
 together with the very low price affixed to it, are thi only claims urged in favor of this edition] 
 
 Murray's English Reader 18o. 35 
 
 Murphy & Co. Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore 
 G 
 
HILL'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 HILL'S rniLOSOrST, comprising Ethics and 
 Moral Philosophy, By Kev. Walter H. Hill, S. J., Pro- 
 fessor of Philosophy in the St. Louis University ^ Mo. Just PuhlisJieil, 
 
 in 1 vol. 12o. 342 pages, half arabesque $1 60 
 
 We have the pleasure of announcing the second volume of Hill's Philosophy, 
 comprising the very important subject of Ethics, or Moral Philosophy. The 
 Author has taken time to perfect his work by reflection, revision and frequent 
 correction, so that his Readers will be repaid for their long waiting by tho ex- 
 cellence of the work. 
 
 Ethics is a subject on which we have thus far had no safe text-book in our 
 language; and yet its importance is such, that no other subject, besides those 
 intimately connected with faith and religion, needs more wise and discrimi- 
 nating treatment. 
 
 , In a country like ours, where every citizen wields power for the weal or woe 
 of his fellow-citizens and his country, what can be of more vital consequence 
 than that every citizen should have true and sound notions and principles 
 about the great questions of which Moral Philosophy treats, such as the nature 
 and origin of authority, dominion and government; the relation of man. to 
 himself, to society and to his Maker; the family, education, Ac? 
 
 The volume here presented is one in which all may read with profit, and whose 
 doctrine they can safely adopt and follow in practice. To the student and pro- 
 fessional man it is simply indispensable. It advances nothing that is not war- 
 ranted by the greatest and wisest of the men of past ages, St. Thomas, St. 
 Augustine, Suarez, Becanus, &c , whose authority is quoted on every page. The 
 Author's own long experience in teaching this branch of science, in one of the 
 principal colleges of the Society of Jesus in this country, is another motive for 
 confidence in the fruit of the patient labor he has bestowed on his work. 
 
 We send it forth on its mission, in the assured hope that it will be received 
 with at least as much favor as was shown to the volume on Logic and General 
 Metaphysics from the same pen. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY, Comprising Logic 
 
 and General Principles of JtTetaphi/sics. By Rev. Walter H. Hill, S.J., 
 Professor of Philosophy in the St. Louis University, Mo. Uth Revised Edition, $1 60 
 From the Publishers' Preface to the Second Revised Edition. — It is not yet 
 one month since we issued the First Edition of Hill's Philosophy, and such 
 has been the demand for the work, that a second Editon is required. Very 
 favorable notices have already been given of the work by several periodicals, 
 and able judges, whose verdict we know to be of the highest authority, have pro- 
 nounced the book a true and trusty guide through the intricacies of philosophy. 
 •' We rejoice at this success, because it ensures the completion of the whole 
 work, including Ethics, and gives us every reason to believe that we shall soon 
 have, in our language, a Manual of Philosophy, for students and for the general 
 reader, equal to the admirable Latin works, which have hitherto been almost 
 the only pure sources of Philosophical knowledge.' 
 
 "The Author has taken advantage of the opportunity offerpd by the prepara- 
 tion of this Edition, to revise his work and tlius render it more acceptable to 
 the student." 
 
 This Work is from the pen of one who has devoted many years to the f5tady 
 and teaching of philosophy. Th-xt it is sound in principle, is guaranteed by the 
 well known character of the studies in the Society to which the author belongs, 
 whilst his experience as a Teacher leaves no room for doubt that his book ha« 
 been written in clear and correct language. It is elementary and must be con- 
 cise; yet it treats the important points of philosophy so clearljs and contains so 
 many principles of wide application, that it cannot fail to be especially useful in 
 a country where sound philosophical doctrine is perhaps more needed than 
 in any other. 
 
 i*^Specimen copies of either Work, will be sent by Mail prepaid, to Teachers 
 and others, with a view to Introduction, only on receipt of one-half the retail 
 price, iS^These two volumes arc ipeciaL 
 
 Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
 
 I 
 
Sestini's Mathematical Works. 
 
 Elementary Afgebra* By B. Sestint, S J., Author of Analyti- 
 cal Geometry, &c,, &c. Professor of Natural Philosophy and 
 Astronomy in Georgetown College. 12o. half arabesque, 75 
 
 The main object of this treatise is to render the science of Algebra intelligi- 
 ble to pupils whose minds are yet unaccustomed to such studies. Tlic beginner 
 will here be ftuni<hed with sue h proofs as are suited to his capacity; examples 
 will afford new light to what might be otherwise obscured with regaid to the 
 operations founded on higher principles; he will, for the present, content him- 
 self with merely practical rules, exemplified in the same manner. Wiih a mind 
 thus gradually led on to strict mathematical discussion, he may then resume 
 his course with ]>rofit, by the aid of a treatise now in preparation, which is in- 
 tendt d as a sequel to this, and, by more exact and thorough investigatiop, com- 
 plete his Ltudy of Algebra. 
 
 A Treaiiso on Algebra. By B. Sestini, S. J., Author of 
 " Elementary Algebra," "Analytical Geometry, &c. 12o. 1 00 
 The treatise is divided into two p-^rts, the first of which contains Algebraical 
 operations, with several questions and doctrines connected with them, so that 
 each section may prove complete in its own subject, and the inconvenience of 
 turning elsewhere to speak of matter left unfinished before, may be avoided. . . . 
 The second contains the most indispensable theories of equations, proportions, 
 and progressions, logarithms, and some, few principles on the series. The doe- 
 trine of equations has been treated more copiously than the others, not so much 
 on account of its importance as because it is well adapted to give an idea of 
 algebraic analysis, and thus prepare the mind of the student, who would after- 
 wards apply himself to higher studies. It is as clear and concise as the nature 
 of such works permits, and seems to embrace everything necessary to a full 
 knowledge of Algebra. 
 
 Elements of Geometry and Trigonometry, by B. Sestini, 
 
 S.J., Author of "Analytical Geometry," " Elementary Algebra," &c. 8o. half cl. $2 
 •'The author has succeeded in combining two qua'ities rarely united,— great 
 perspicuity and extreme conciseness. It has evidently been the result of great 
 thought and long experience in teaching. The student passes gradually from 
 the .simpler to the more complex truths of the science. The work cannot be too 
 warmly commended as an admirable introduction to the science it professes to 
 teach, and we would advise teachers and parents not to select a text-book until 
 they have given this volume a careful and candid examination." — Metropolitan, 
 
 Manual of Geometrical and Infinitesimal Analysis, by 
 
 B. Sestini, S. J. 8o., half roan (Recently Published,) 1 60 
 
 Extract from the Preface. — "This manual, prepared with the view of its serving 
 as an introduction to the study of Physical Science, was onlv intended f<^r a 
 class of students intrusted to the care of the compiler. The suggestion of 
 friends that the work might prove advantageous to others induces liim to oflPer 
 it to t!ie public. 
 
 "Works of analysis — some of theiA voluminous — are not wanting; nor does 
 our little book pretend to give a complete development of its subject. For this 
 reason we call it a manual, which excludes all discussions the results of which 
 are seldom or never called into use in the applications. It is hoped, however, 
 thrt it will sufficiently serve the purpose intended." 
 
 The North American Spelling Book, Designed for 
 Elementary Introduction in Schools. A New Enlarged Edition. 
 Being an improvement upon all others 20 
 
 The aim in this compilation has been to present a gradation of leesonB necoesary to 
 impart a knowledge of the spelling, division, pronunciation, and accentuation of the 
 Tarious sounds and syllables that compose the English language. In pronouncing 
 and accenting words, good usage and the best lexicographers have been followed. 
 The rules laid down are few, but simple and concise; and the progress from what is 
 easy to what is diflScult, is gentle and gradual. It is universally conceded to be on« 
 of the 4iBBT, as it is nnquestionably the Cheapeit Spelling Book published. 
 
 MuRPHT & Co, Publishers and Bookfiellers, Baliimoi-e. 
 8 
 
^^^ THE BEST AND CHEAPEST 
 
 "Wilson's Progressive Speller. 
 
 Wilson's Progressive Speller, containing upwards of Twelve 
 
 Thousand Words, with Reading and Dictation Exercises annexed to each Les- 
 son, arranged so as to be best adapted to Aid the Memory, and obviate the 
 difficulties in this Branch of Elementary Education. Compiled by William J. 
 
 Wilson, of North Carolina Fifth Revised Edition, 190 pages, ISo. 25 
 
 This booK has been prepared with great care by a gentleman eminently quali- 
 fied, both by education and experience. Its characteristic is the simplicity of 
 its arrangement. Being strictly a Spelling Book, no attempt is made to combine 
 with it subjects of study coming, properly, after the child has learned to spell 
 and read. Each lesson is accompanied by a Reading and Dictation Exercise, 
 designed to cultivate the eye, the eir, and the hand. The object of a Speller 
 being to teach the mechanica' structure and pronunciation of words, the lessons 
 and exercises are arranged primarily and solely to this end. The orthography 
 and orthcBpy are according to the standards recognized as highest authorities in 
 this country. Especial care has been taken to keep it free from provincialisms^ 
 and it is, therefore, recommended as a Text-Book suitable alike for all sections 
 of the country. The completeness of its vocabulary may be known from tha 
 feet of its containing upwards of twelve Thousand English words. 
 
 Recommendations, Notices, &o. 
 State or North Carolina, OrncE Superintendent of Public iNSTRuurioif, 
 
 Raleigh, May 20th, 1871. 
 Messrs. John Murphy & Co., Gents— 1 have the houor to inform you that, by viitue of a vot« 
 passed by the Board of Education of this State, on the 25th of March last, " Wilson's Progres- 
 Bive Speller" is recommended for use in ihe Public Schools of this State. 
 
 Yours truly S. S. ASULE Y, Sec'y of Board. 
 
 From R E v. C. H. W I l E Y, Superintendent of Common Schools of N. Carolina. 
 Mr.W. J. Wilson : Dear Sir — I have examined with care your Spelling Book, and regard it ai 
 ft book of decided merit. You have manifested in its preparation taste, judgment and learning, 
 and I consider it worthy of iatroduction into our schools. I am truly yours, C. II. WILEY. 
 
 From Rev. B. Craven, D. D., President of Trinity College, N. C. 
 Mr. Wilson: Dear Sir — I have examined your Spelling Book, and believe it in many respect* 
 •uperior to any with which I am acquainted. It is full of important improvements. I should b« 
 glad to Bee it introduced into all our schools. B. CRAVEN. 
 
 From Rev. Dr. Deems, of N. Carolina. 
 
 Dear Sir — The pressure of my engagements has not allowed time for a very careful examina- 
 tion of the MS of yonr Spelling Book, the many good points of which have made themselves ap- 
 parent to the Rev. Dr. Craven and the Rev. Mr. Wiley, whose judgment of such a work I am free 
 to endorse. I hope it will meet with deserved success. Very respectfully yours, 
 
 W.J.Wilson, Esq. CUARLES F. DEEMS. 
 
 From Professor Joynes, o/ Washington and Lee Unioersity, Va. 
 
 Messrs. John Murphy & Co., Dear Sirs— I regard Wilson's Progressive Speller, published by 
 yoR, as the best Spelling Book that I have ever seen. In simplicity, in fullness, in well dis- 
 tributed and well graded classification, and in practical convenience for use, I think it supeWor 
 toother books. The Dictation Exercises that aceompany the spelling lessons, afford a useful 
 praxis lor the pupil. I like the book most of all on account of its simplicity and easy progrtS' 
 aioeness. It recognizes the old truth — almost forgitten now-a-daj's— that spelling is something 
 not only worth learning, but very hard to learn, and therefore needed to be taught by systematic, 
 constant, and well-graded practice; :.nd of this, it furnishes more, and furnishes it more judi- 
 ciously, than any other book that I have seen. I wish it may obtain a very wide use. 
 
 EDWARD S. JOYNES. 
 
 " The work is systematic, devoid of provincialisms, arranged with strict regard to gradation 
 with a uniformity of all the leading vowel sounds in all the words of each lesson. The classifi- 
 cation is admirable, and we believe the work will be approved by teachers everywhere." 
 
 Memphis Public Ledytr. 
 
 Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellerst Baltimore, 
 9 
 
To Catholic Educational Institutions, 
 
 In soliciting attention to the following, the Publishers have the 
 pleasure of announcing that most of these Works have been intro- 
 duced, and are extensively used in tnany of the leading Colleges^ 
 Academies, and Schools in the U. S., Canada, ^c. 
 
 Prom a large number of Recommendations, Sec, we select the following : 
 Professor Jonx O Kane Murray, B. S., of Brooklyn, N. T., in his Literary Correspond- 
 ence to the Toronto Tribune, under the head of "American Literary Notes," says: 
 A. lELlslory of the Catholic Church — "how many who think themselves 
 very intelligent, never read one, in fact, never saw any such work? Without 
 wishing to press the point too closely, how many, even of our Catholic College 
 graduates, know quite as much about the history of Mohametanism as they do 
 about the history of Catholicity— perhaps more? And is this something to be 
 proud of— something concerning which every one who is not a college president, 
 or a Cardinal, should be silent? But why write a catechism? The plain, blunt 
 truth is, this is a matter of shame in many of our higher institutions. Algebra, 
 mythology — the tag-ends of nearly every 'ology' and 'ometry,' are freely 
 thrown to students while they are left to hunger for even a glance at any book 
 containing the history of what is dearest to us on earth — our sublime Old 
 Church] Who hears of a student's getting a prize for excellence in Church 
 Eistory? Frankly, I have not. We talk about religious instruction; with clarion 
 voice, we urge the necessity of making our Catholic youth familiar with the 
 Church and her doctrines. This is well. But let every Catholic College hang 
 its head in shame, 'as a traitor to its high mission,' if it neglects placing 
 Church History on its programme of necessary studies. 
 
 "On this subject we have now some excellent text-books, about one of the 
 very best of which, I desire to make a few remarks. The 'History of the Catho- 
 lic Church,' by Rev. Father Noethen, is a handsomely bound volume of 650 
 pages. It is published at a very low price by the enterprising house of John 
 Murphy & Co., Baltimore. As a well written and meritorious text-book on 
 Church History, it has no rival in our language. 'Full without overflowing,' 
 it strikes the golden mean between too much and too little. The arrangement, 
 the skillful presentation of salient points, the omission of trivialities commands 
 hearty praise— in short, the whole book bears the impress of a master hand. 
 This is just the volume for our students— not to be ignorant of, but to master. 
 It would be interesting to know how many of oi:r Catholic Colleges in the 
 United States and the Dominion of Canada, use a text-book on Church History. 
 Nov/, I desire it to be well understood, that this is written with all due respect 
 to everybody, by one who does not wish to be numbered with the croakers, and 
 who is neither indifferent to the good name of our Catholic Colleges, nor ignor- 
 ant of the grand work they are doing for the sound education, true progress, 
 and civilization in America." 
 
 JLingard's England, by Burke, (720 pagt^s.) is a most felicitous and success- 
 ful attempt at giving the world an abridgment of the greutef-t history of Eng- 
 land ever written. The fifteenth revised and enlarged edition lies before me. 
 It brings the story of England, down to 1873. As an excellent treatise for the 
 etudeiA, or general reader, it is unequalled in beauty of style, treatment of sub- 
 ject, Catholic tone, and richness of illustration. The "make up" of the book 
 is also highly creditable to the publishers. 
 
 "The rapid progress made by American Catholic literature, during the last 
 few years, is a subject ixit by any means as well known as it should be. This 
 is especially noticeable in the line of sound, suitable text-books for Catholic 
 schools and colleges. Among the enterprising publishing houses that have 
 
 Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers^ Baltimore, 
 10 
 
Recommendations, &c Continued. 
 
 been conspicuous in bringing about this laudable improvement, stands the well 
 known firm of John Murphy & Co., of Baltimore. In the department of general 
 history they publish the best text-books in the English language. This may 
 sound like hyperbole; but it is not said at random, nor without knowing that 
 •whereof we speak.* 
 
 FredeVs Ancient and Modem Histary, in two volumes, are used in the 
 best Catholic Colleges in the United States, Canada, Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 As an excellent general history in one volume, JK^emej/^s Compendium of 
 Ancient and Modern JSintori/ stands alone, while his 
 
 First Class Book of History is an inimitable little volume to familiarize 
 youth with the great story of the past. 
 
 Besides the foregoing, the following are a few of the excellent text-books 
 which can bo warmly commended to Catholic educators and Catholic parents. 
 They are published by Messrs. Murphy & Co., to whose courtesy we are in- 
 debted for copies of the latest revised editions : 
 
 Hill's Philosophy. — The Elements of Philosophy, by Father Hill, S. J., is 
 another new work, which will prove of rare value to our Catholic students. It 
 is a well bound volume of some 234 pages, and contains a thorough discussion 
 of Logic and General Metaphysics. In our language, we know of but one other 
 such work, (Louage's) written from a Catholic stand point, and of the two we 
 much prefer Father Hill's book. Sound in doctrine, and written in a clear, terse 
 stylo, this is a much needed and truly welcome text-book. 
 
 A glance at another work, and w^ must finish. 
 
 WettenhalVs Greek Grammar.— Rudiments of the Greek Language,* by a 
 learned Jesuit Father, is an admirable little grammar of that classic tongue 
 which was immortalized by Homer, Pindar and Sophocles. In 112 pages are 
 condensed, simplified and arranged with a niasterhand, the principal points of 
 Greek grammar. For accuracy, clearness, brevity and neatness, we have seen 
 nothing to surpass this small volume." 
 
 School and Classical Books, Paper, Stationery, &c. 
 
 Their stock of School Books embraces, in addition to their own, 
 nearly all the Publications of the leading Publishers in the United 
 States, comprising every variety of Primers, Spellers, Readers, 
 Grammars, Arithmetics, Geographies, Histories, Dictionaries, etc.; 
 also, Works on Elocution, Afgebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, As- 
 tronomy, Botany, Chemistry, Geology, and Mineralogy, Philoso- 
 phy, Rhetoric, and Logic, Book-Kecping, Penmanship, etc., etc., 
 together with all the leading Text-Books in Latin, Greek, French, 
 Spanish and German — nearly all of which they are prepared to 
 supply at Fuhlishers^ wholesale prices. 
 
 TheirStockofPaper, Stationery, and School Requisites generally, 
 comprises every variety, all of which they are prepared to sell at the 
 lowest current rates 
 
 Jl^^Orders, which will receive the same careful and prompt atten- 
 tion, as if selected in person, are respectfully solicited. 
 
 JI^^The various Railroad, Transportation, Express and Steamship 
 Companies running from our city, afford every facility for trans- 
 portation at the Loive-^t Rates, to all parts of the country — North 
 and South, East and West. 
 
 Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
 11 
 
Jenkins' English Literature. 
 
 JosT PcBUSHED, in a handsome volume of 56U pages, 12o. price in doth, $2. 
 Library style, half morocco, $3. 
 
 The Student's Handbook of British and American Literature, 
 
 Containing JSketchks iiiooRAPHiCAL and Ckitical of the Most 
 Distinguished English Authors, from the Earliest Times to the 
 Present Day, with Selections from their Writings, and Questions 
 adapted to the Use of Schools. By Rev. O. L. Jenkins, A. M., 
 Late President of St. Charles, and formerly President of St. Mary^s 
 College, Baltimore. (Special.) 
 
 -Tnis is an Elemehtaiit History of the English Language and Literature, espe- 
 cially intended for Schools, Academies and Colleges. 'J he period which it 
 embraces, d ites back as early as the time when the Saxons under Hengist and 
 Horsa landed in Britain, and reaches to our own day through the following 
 Ptages: the Anglo-Saxon Period, 549-1005; the Semi-Saxon Ptrwd, 10')5-1250; the 
 Old English Period, 1250-1350; the Middle English Period, i:i50-1580; and tlie Modern 
 Period, from 1580 to our time. Each of these periods is a point of departure in 
 the history of English Literature, and each c<instiiutes in itself a well-defined 
 epoch in the growth of the language. In the fifth, or last period, falls tlie Liter- 
 art HiSTORT OP America. This is divided inio three parts; the Culonial Era, 
 the Revolutionary Period, and the Present Century. 
 
 The EXTRACTS have been carefully selected, with a view to serve not only as 
 fair specimens of the style of the writers, but also as an illustrative history in 
 themselves of English ijiterature. Various Tables chronological and linguistte, 
 as well as a copious Index, accompany the work In fine, Questioxs have beea 
 introduced, for the special convenience of teachers and siudeuts. 
 
 Brief Extracts from n>rotices of tlio I*ross,«fcc. 
 
 Brooklyn, N. Y., March 6, 1876. 
 John Murphy, Esq., Publisher, Baltimore, 
 
 Dear Sir: — " I beg of you to excuse my delay 
 in giving what you so kiudly ask— Day humblo 
 opinion of Rev. Father Jenkins' text-book ou 
 onr language and literature. I liave given it a 
 few hours examination, and my impressions 
 are: The plan is good, the execution is excel- 
 lent. The learned author handles his subject 
 with ability, clearness, wisdom, and a calm 
 impartiality, as rare as it is admirable. The 
 critical remarks, both original and borrowed, 
 are happy and to the point. Much good tasto 
 and 8ound, cultivated Judgment are exhibited 
 in the selection of the specimens. As a wholf, 
 the work has so many merits, that it will — it 
 must take its place as the text-book in Euglisii 
 literature in all our high Catholic instit tious 
 Of learning." J. O'KaNE MURRAY. 
 
 Baltimore, Jaly VJth, 1876. 
 Mr. John MtrRPHv, 
 
 /)«;»r *■;> ;— Be pleased to accept my grateful 
 anknowlndgments for a copy of Dr. Jenkins* 
 Handbook of British and Aiierican Literature. 
 I road the work wifi great interest and plea- 
 Bure. It impressed me as a sound and scholarly 
 book, carefully constructed, and containing 
 much valuable information in regard to many 
 authors, whose works and whose history, are 
 little known to the American pnhlio. I trust 
 th.at its success may be commensurate with its 
 merits. I am, dear sir, yours very trulv, 
 IlKNRY E. SHEPnERD, 
 Sup't Public Instruction, Baltimore 
 
 ''ThftTTistory of the English language i^ well 
 and ii.sefiilly illustrated iu ttie work beftire us I 
 hy niimerons extracts from Saxon and Anglo- ] 
 Saxon writers of various periods, accompanied 
 hy trinslations into modern English. The 
 stndy of this book alone would go far towards 
 enabling any one to understand and enjoy the 
 Anglo Saxon writers." London Tablet. 
 
 "It is without exception, the best student's 
 handbook we have yet had under perusal." 
 Nevoark Daily Journal. 
 
 " The author shows himsel f thoroughly versed 
 in his subject. He writes w'th elegance, occa- 
 sionally with force, ns in tne remarks on th* 
 influence of the Prot'j^stant Reformation on lit- 
 erature. His taste is true and his judgment 
 sound." (.alhuUc World. 
 
 "We find much in it to praise ; the biographi- 
 cal sketches are ex client, and the selections 
 have been made with good taste. Wo like the 
 arrangement of the work, which is clear and 
 methodical." Aoe Maria. 
 
 "It embraces specimens of the styles of 
 writers, from the Anglo-Saxon period to the 
 present time. These extracts are preceded by 
 ample biographical and critical sketches of 
 their authors, with interesting historical de- 
 tails relative to thepr "gress of leitera during 
 the different periods. Various tables, chronolo- 
 gical and linguistic, as well as a copious index, 
 accompany the work." PabUshem' Weekly. 
 
 " The work is well written, and to CaCholio 
 students of Eaijli-ih literature, we cordially 
 recommend it. The style is excellent; it is 
 the safest and most appreciative text-book 
 that has so far appeared in America." 
 
 The Salehianum. 
 
 "The present volume is very full, compre- 
 hensive and complete, oraiting no literary name 
 of any note." St. Louis Globe Democrat. 
 
 "We think that it cannot be excelled, and 
 cnnnot fail to become one of the most accep- 
 table text-books thit has yt't been presented to 
 our educational institutions."— Pi<t»6urj/ Cath. 
 
 "This book is not only adapted to literary 
 classes in schools, but well adapted to home 
 reading by all who wish to be posted on the 
 growth and cultivators of our veinaciilar." 
 N.braxkt W<ttchnian. 
 
 " No student or professional man should be 
 without this excellent work, as to many it will 
 prove exceedingly useful, and to all a most in- 
 structive and interesting acquisition. It is a 
 condensed library, and is worth ten times its 
 price." Baltimore Sunday N«vn. 
 
 MuRrHY & Co. Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
 12 
 

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