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1920. 
 
 THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. 
 
 REPORT 
 
 ROYAL COMMISSION 
 
 OK 
 
 PUBLIC SERVICE ADMINISTRATION 
 
 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. 
 
 Presented by Command ; ordered to be printed, 28ih Jvly, 1920. 
 
 (Corf of Paper ' — Preparutlon, not (fiven ; 1,300 copies; approximate cost of printing and publishing, £90.] 
 
 l^rinled and Published for the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia by Albert J. Mtjllbtt, 
 
 Government Printer for the State of Victoria. 
 
 No. 49.— F.l 8352.— Price 23. 3d, 
 
4r 
 
 v«>vr 
 
 
 GEORGE THE FIFTH, by the Grace of Ocd, of the United Kingdom of Great Britaii and Ireland and of the 
 British Dominionn beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India. 
 
 TO our trusty and well-beloved Duncan Clakk MoLachlatt, C.M.G., I.S.O. 
 
 GREETrNO : 
 
 KNOW YE that we do by these our Lflters Patent, issued in our name by our Cfovemor-Oeneral of our Commonwealth of 
 Autlriilia, acting with the advice of our Federal Executive Council, and in pursuance of the Constitution of our said Common, 
 wealth, the " Euyal ComminKions Act 1902-1912," and all other powers him thereunto enailiny, appoint you to be a 
 Commissioner In inquire into and report upon the various Acts relating to the administration of the Public Service of the 
 Commonwealth, and particularly in relation to the iffcct of such Acts upyn the management and ucrkitig of the Departments, 
 and the slep" necru ny to o^ljuit the position that has arisen by reason of the various authorities in existence for the regulation 
 and worl'ing of the Public Service. 
 
 AND WE require you, with as Utile delay as possible, to report to our Governor-General i% and over our taid 
 Commonwealth, the result of your inquiries into the matters intrusted to you by these our Letters Patent, 
 
 IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF we have caused these our Letters to be made Patent, and the Seal of our said 
 Commonwealth to be thereunto affixed. 
 
 WITNESS our right trusty and well-beloved ?rR Bonai.d CRArmrRn MtmRO FERGrsoN-, a Member 
 
 of His Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross-of the Most Distinguished 
 
 (I..S.) Order of Saint Michael and Saini George, Governor -General and Commander-in-Chief of th* 
 
 Commonuealth of Australia, this second day of October, in the ijear of our Lord One 
 
 thousand nine hundred and eighteen, and in the ninth year of Our Reign. 
 
 B. M. FERGUSON, 
 
 OovemoT-Oenercil. 
 
 By His Excellency's Command, 
 W. A. WATT, 
 Acting Prime Minister. 
 
 Entered nn record by me in the Heglsler of Patents, No. 6, pa^e 356, iMt tUventh day of October, One thousand nine 
 
 hundred and e ghleen. 
 
 M. L. SHEPHERD, 
 
IC' 
 
 ROYAL COMMISSION ON PUBLIC :. SERVICE 
 
 ADMINISTRATION. - - ; ;. \ 
 
 To His Excellency the Right Honorable Sir Ronald Craufukd Munro 
 Ferguson, a Member of His Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, 
 Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael 
 and Saint George, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the 
 Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
 May it please Your Excellency : 
 
 In pursuance of the Commission intrusted to me by Your Excellency directing 
 me to inquire into and report upon the various Acts relating to the administration of 
 the Public Service of the Commonwealth, and particularly in relation to the effect of 
 such Acts upon the management and working of the Departments, and the steps 
 necessary to adjust the position that has arisen by reason of the various authorities in 
 existence for the regulation and working of the Public Service, I have the honour to 
 furnish Your Excellency with the following Report : — 
 
 SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 In commencing my investigation into the matters remitted to me for considera- 
 tion and 'report, it was realized that the task involved a wide survey of Public 
 Service administration, covering not only the organization and management of the 
 various Departments constituted under the provisions of the Public Service Act, but 
 also the numerous governmental activities for which legislative authority had 
 from time to time been granted under special Acts of Parliament dealing with 
 territorial services and services established in connexion with Defence measures or 
 matters arising out of the war. In addition, it was seen that, in reporting upon the 
 action necessary to secure a proper co-ordination of Public Service powers and 
 authorities, consideration must necessarily be given to the effect of legislative recognition 
 of Public Service Associations and the issue of awards under the Arbitration (Public 
 Service) Act upon the efficiency of the public departments and the conservation of the 
 public interests. The Acts of the Commonwealth Parliament which have been brought 
 under review in the course of my inquiries are : — 
 
 Public Service Act 1902-17. 
 Arbitration {Public Service) Act 1911. 
 Northern Territory {Administration) Act 1910. 
 Papua Act 1905. 
 Defence Act 1903-17. 
 Naval Defence Act 1910. 
 Commonwealth Railways Act 1917. 
 Repatriation Act 1917-18. 
 
 esesis 
 
For the purposes of this Report the particular services requiring consideration 
 have been grouped under the following headings : — 
 
 (A) The Federal Service, covering the Departments, including the Officers 
 of Parliament, at present administered under the Public Service 
 Act ; the Commonwealth Railways Service ; and the Naval and MiUtary 
 . ■ , • , • • Defesice Services. 
 
 ' '''(B)^The Territorial Service, comprising the services of Papua, the Northern 
 -'A '• T'-'t/'H''' Territory, and Norfolk Island. 
 
 (C) The Provisional Service, including services specially established in 
 connexion with the war, or to be provisionally maintained after the 
 
 war. 
 
 These three Services under conditions to be prescribed should, it is considered, 
 form the future Commonwealth Public Service. 
 
 (A.) THE FEDERAL SERVICE, 
 
 COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE ACT. 
 Prior to dealing with the matters upon which I have been particularly directed 
 to report, it is desirable that brief reference be made to the history of the administration 
 of the Commonwealth Public Service Act. Concurrently with the establishment of the 
 Commonwealth on 1st January, 1901, the following Departments of the Commonwealth 
 Public Service came into being :— The Department of External Affairs, the Attorney- 
 General's Department, the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of the 
 Treasury, the Department of Defence, and the Postmaster-General's Department. 
 On the same date the States Departments of Trade and Customs were trar.sferrei to 
 the Commonwealth, and on Ist March following the Postal and Defence Departments 
 of the Stat:s were also transferred. 
 
 Pending legislation to regulate the Public Service of the Commonwealth, all 
 appointments of officers were made by the Governor-General in Council under the 
 authority of section 67 of the Constitution, and continued to be so made until the 31st 
 Decem.ber, 1902. The Commonwealth Public Service Act of 1902 came into operation 
 by proclamation on the 1st January, 1903. In anticipation of the proclamation of the 
 Act, and in order that the preliminary work of drafting regulatior.s and setting up the 
 machinery for organization and classification of the Public Service might be initiated, 
 steps were taken by the Federal Government to appoint a Commissioner and 
 I; spectors. My appointment as Public Service Commissioner therefore took effect as 
 from 5th May, 1902, while Inspectors were appointed some months later. With the 
 proclam.ation of the Act on 1st January, 1903, came tlie full exercise of the powers, 
 duties, and authorities vested in mys:lf as Commissioner, and m.y tenure of office 
 continued until the expiration of my s:cond term of appointment on 4th May, 1916, 
 when I retired from the Commonwealth Public Service after a period of administrative 
 activity therein covering fourteen years. 
 
 In 1904 the clanoification of the Commonwealth Public Service was completed by 
 myself with the aos^otp.nce of the Inspectors appointed in the several States, and 
 subsequently appefis were heard by Boards of Appefi and finally adjudicated upon, 
 and tne whole seheme received the Governor-General's approval in October, 1905. 
 The work of classifying the Commonwealth Service with its ramifications over a 
 continent, a service including, in addition to the new departments, the transferred 
 departments of six States, formed a s-^upendous task, particularly when it is borne in 
 mind that the Stat.o aystem.s of Public Service management differed very considerably, 
 and that the conflicting interests and claims of officers as to so-called constitutional rights 
 were many and varied. It was only by the loyal assistance of Inspectors and the 
 members of my staff that the saccess achieved in welding together the scattered 
 elements of Pubhc Service departments was possible. Following upon the adoption 
 of the classification, the work of building up and recruiting the service and the solution 
 of the many problems of Public Service management engrossed the attention of myself 
 and Inspectors, in addition to which the gradually developing service required 
 considerable initiative and resource in deahng with promotions, transfers, and the 
 general minutiae of administration. During the period 1905-1912 inspection and 
 reorganization of departm.ents, the consideration and adoption of systems of grading, 
 the revisions of salary scales, and other important matters affecting the well-being 
 and economical administration of the service occupied much of the time of myself and 
 those associated with me. 
 
With the advent of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act of 1911, the responsi- 
 bilities of the Commissioner and his st£.fi, aheady very heavy, became intensified, as, 
 while the functions of fixing rates of payment and determining hours of labour and other 
 conditions of employment were remitted to the Arbitration Court, the responsibility 
 of classification and organization of the sjrvice still rested with the Commissioner, who 
 was called upon from the date of the first award made by the Court in 1913 to fit into 
 the working machinery of the S3rvice the special conditions prescribed by the Court. 
 The difficulties of management were S3riously increasid by the issue of awards by an 
 Arbitration Court which had no final responsibility as to the interpretation or 
 administration of those awards, and with the multiphcation of awards, as the S3veral 
 associations approached the Court, the burden of Public Service administration grew 
 gradually heavier and heavier, while the problems arising which required solution 
 became increasingly difficult. With the outbreak of the war in 1914, and the enlistment 
 of many officers from the permanent service of the Commonwealth and the restrictions 
 placed upon the permanent appointment of persons of military age, it became 
 necessary to carry on departmental activities with the assistance of temporary 
 employees to a greater extent than under normal conditions. It will be readily 
 recognised that during the trying years following the introduction of the Arbitration 
 (Public Service) Act and the commencement of the war, the difficulties of adminis- 
 tration were greatly accentuated. Although in the early years of the Commonwealth 
 the work was heavy and of a complex nature, it was not comparable with the 
 experience of the years 1913-1916, when the obHgation fell upon me of reconcihng the 
 administration of the Public Service Act with tiie awards of the Arbitration Court 
 and at the same time carrying on the management of a widely-spread and rapidly 
 expanding Pubhc Service. 
 
 In May, 1916, upon the completion of my second term of office as Pubhc Service 
 Commissioner, the Government consented to my retirement from office, and action 
 was taken to make a temporary appointment pending selection of my successor. It 
 was anticipated at the time that the temporary appointment would be of short duration, 
 but it was eventually considered desirable, for reasons of policy, to defer selection of a 
 permanent Commissioner, and legislative authority was obtained for appointment 
 of an acting Commissioner for an indefinite period. Subsequent to my retirement 
 from the service, the term of office of three of the six Public Service Inspectors expired 
 by effluxion of time, but they were requested to continue in office pending determination 
 of the future policy of the Government as to Public Service management. The Victorian 
 Inspector was appointed as Acting Commissioner, thus leaving two Inspectors only 
 with a definite tenure. It is hardly necessary to say that the present provisional 
 arrangements, which have operated in part for nearly three years, under which the 
 positions of Commissioner and four of the six Inspectors are occupied by persons with 
 only temporary status, are unwise and unsatisfactory from the stand-point of efficient 
 Public Service administration. It necessarily follows that officers acting temporarily, 
 even although discharging the immediate duties of their offices in a proper and 
 satisfactory manner, cannot be expected to prepare schemes of organization and make 
 arrangements likely to extend over years, when they themselves are unlikely to take part 
 in the future control of the service, by reason of the fact that in certain cases they have 
 already reached the statutory age for retirement, and will retire upon permanent 
 appointments being made to the respective positions. The continuance of the 
 present unsatisfactory arrangement of acting appointments of Commissioner and 
 Inspectors is prejudicial to the public interest, and is certainly opposed to the ideals 
 aimed at in the legislation dealing with the Public Service. The delay in placing the 
 matter of future administration of the service on a sound footing appears to me to be 
 indefensible. The Public Service cannot stand still ; it must either make a progressive 
 or retrogressive movement, and the interests of good government derrand prompt 
 action to arrest what is certainly a backward tendency in Pubhc Service morale. 
 
 The Commonwealth Public Service Act, as brought into operation in 1902, was 
 largely based upon the experience of pubhc service legislation in the several States, 
 and the framers of the Act, eliminating much that was undesirable and inappropriate 
 to Commonwealth conditions in the State laws, were able to devise a code of 
 legislation suitable for the control of the new Public Service, and one which the test 
 of time has proved to have been based on sound principles. Any deficiencies in the 
 law of 1902 as applied to present conditions are largely due to the unforeseen development 
 
of the Public Service, rather than to any inherent defects in the scheme adopted for 
 control of the service. Looking backward over the sixteen years which have elapsed 
 since the inauguration of the Public Service Act, one notes with satisfaction the absence 
 of any well-founded complaint against the manner in which the Act has been 
 administered, or against the main governing principles upon which it was based. While 
 in some quarters there may have been criticism of the restrictions imposed by the Act 
 in dealing with the ^personnel of the service in relation to appointments, promotions, 
 and temporary employment, when a comparison is made with pre-Federal methods 
 of Public Service organization and management much can be said in favour of the 
 Commonwealth methods ; and the fact cannot be gainsaid that any abandonment of the 
 system of control by an independent Commissioner, and the exclusion of the present 
 safeguards against political, official, or social influence, would rapidly react against the 
 efficiency of the service and against fearless and impartial administration. 
 
 In pursuing my inquiries under the terms of the Commission intrusted to me— 
 inquiries made from the stand-point of an indepc nde it investigator — the opportunity 
 afforded me of renewing my acquaintance with service conditions, after an absence of 
 nearly three years from official life, has resulted in strong confirmation of the views 
 held after 40 years of public service in State and Commonwealth, that successful 
 management of the Public Service is dependent upon adherence to well-established 
 principles, and upon control by one authority in whom is vested wide and independent 
 powers of adjudication and administration. The evidence elicited during my inquiries 
 has been most marked in the consensus of opinion against any departure from these 
 principles,or from the system of control by a Commissioner. The opinions expressed 
 by responsible officers of Departments, and by certain Public Service organizations, have 
 been definitely in favour, not only of retention of the present methods of management, 
 but of extension of the Commissioner's authority in certain directions. 
 
 AMENDMENTS IN PUBLIC SERVICE ACT SINCE 1902. 
 
 From time to time since the passage of the principal Act in 1902, it has become 
 necessary to secure amendments dealing with certain phases of Public Service adminis- 
 tration, but, with the notable exception of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, which 
 seriously interfered with the cardinal principles adopted by the Parliament in 1902, 
 none of these amendments has resulted in departure from those principles. 
 
 Between the years 1902 and 1909 no amendment was found necessary beyond 
 a minor alteration extending the period of eligibility for appointment of persons 
 qualified by examination. In 1909, amendments covered an increase in the maximum 
 salaries of Clerical Division officers of the Fifth Class, and the retirement of messenger 
 boys at the age of 18 years for whom there was no prospect of advancement. 
 
 In 1911 an amendment was made in the scale of salaries for officers of the Clerical 
 Division, the only division for which salaries were fixed by statute. Provision was 
 made to permit Chief Officers to allow an officer charged with an offence to continue 
 on duty pending determination of the charge. Previously when the offence was of such 
 a nature as not likely to result in termination of the officer's employment, unnecessary 
 hardships were imposed on officers by suspension, as well as inconvenience to the 
 Department. A new provision was adopted for the granting to officers of payment in 
 lieu of furlough upon their retirement, and, in the case of death of an officer who had 
 been entitled to furlough, for payment to his dependants. In computing the service for 
 certain purposes of officers who had had previous service in the Naval or Military 
 Forces, the latter service had not been credited under the original Act to such officers. 
 An amendment rectified this disability. 
 
 By an amending Act passed in 1913, eligibility for appointment to the Common- 
 wealth Service was conferred on officers in corresponding divisions of the Pubhc or 
 Railway Service of a State. The power thus given proved of advantage in obtaining 
 officers of special qualifications in cases where it was in the interests of the Commonwealth 
 to recruit from the sister services. 
 
 In 1915 preference for appointment as the result of examination was accorded 
 returned soldiers. The maximum age for appointment by examination to the Clerical 
 Division was raised from 21 to 25 years, as the former limitation was found to have a 
 
deterrent effect upon the recruitment of the service by suitable appointees. Provision 
 was made to admit of the transfer of officers of the Territorial Services to the Common- 
 wealth Public Service where the public interest would be served by such transfer. 
 Persons who. had served in the permanent Naval Forces of the Commonwealth were 
 granted eligibility for appointment to the General Division in the Department of Trade 
 and Customs where the experience and training of such persons could be used to 
 advantage. The procedure in regard to officers convicted of criminal offences was 
 simplified. Previously, where an officer had been convicted otherwise than on indictment 
 or presentment, it was necessary to proceed further against the officer under the Public 
 Service Act in order to terminate his public service ; but the amendment gave power of 
 dismissal following upon conviction. Provision was made for the granting of payment 
 to officers for duty performed on public holidays. The previous practice of granting 
 officers time off in lieu of holiday duty was inconvenient to departments, and inability 
 to release officers for the equivalent time made it necessary to adopt payment as the 
 most satisfactory and equitable method of meeting claims for holiday compensation. 
 Enlistment of officers for active service necessitated provision for granting leave of 
 absence to such officers, and for recognition of their ser^'ice with the Expeditionary 
 Forces as service under the Public Service Act. Instances having occurred of impersonation 
 at Public Service examinations and of irregular dealing with examination papers, 
 penalties were prescribed for such offences. 
 
 By the amending Act of 1916, the Chief Officer of a department in a State Was 
 given power to exercise the functions of a Chief Officer over portion of an adjoining 
 State or Territory where the geographical conditions made the exercise of such power 
 desirable in the interests of the department. A number of amendments were made 
 by the Act of 1917, principally in the interests of officers serving in the Expeditionary 
 Forces. In addition, provision was made to extend to members of the Army Medical 
 Corps, Nursing Service, and members of the Naval Forces the conditions applicable to 
 persons who had served in the Expeditionary Forces, and to extend the age at which 
 returned soldiers could be appointed to the Clerical Division. Provision was also made 
 for the holding of examinations confined to returned soldiers, and for the recognition 
 of certain prescribed examinations, other than the Public Service examination, as a 
 sufficient qualification for appointment of returned soldiers to the Public Service. The 
 retention of returned soldiers in temporary employment beyond the prescribed period 
 was provided for, and special conditions were adopted as to leave of absence to officers 
 serving as munition workers or on active service in Australia or in the Naval Forces. 
 
 GROWTH OF THE COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
 SINCE 1902. 
 
 As a preliminary to consideration of existing conditions of the Public Service, 
 it is essential that a comparison be made between the service as at the inception of the 
 Act and at the present day, and that some idea be afforded of the expansion of the service 
 consequent upon increased population and business, and upon the assumption by the 
 Commonwealth of functions of government provided for by the Federal Constitution, 
 other than those taken over at the inception of Commonwealth administration. 
 
 The following tables show — (A) the Departments of the Comm.onwealth, the 
 number of permanent officers employed in each under the Public Service Act, and {he 
 annual salary expenditure as at the date of proclamation of the Public Service Act, 
 1st January, 1903 ; and (B) the position as at 30th June, 1918 : — 
 
 (A) 
 1st January,. 1903. 
 
 Department. 
 
 External Affairs 
 
 Attorney- General 
 
 Home Affairs . . 
 
 Treasury 
 
 Trade and Customs 
 
 Defence 
 
 Postmaster-General 
 
 Total 
 
 
 Annual Salary 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Expenditure. 
 
 
 £ 
 
 17 
 
 4,095 
 
 4 
 
 1,520 
 
 38 
 
 8,823 
 
 34 
 
 7,473 
 
 1,136 
 
 212,099 
 
 123 
 
 20,728 
 
 10,022 
 
 1,266,313 
 
 11,374 
 
 1,521,051 
 

 (B) 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 SOth June, 1918. 
 
 
 Department. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Annual Salary 
 Expenditure. 
 
 n 
 
 Prime Minister 
 
 286 . 
 
 64,3^0 
 
 Home and Territories 
 
 
 386 
 
 94,875 
 
 Attorney- General 
 
 
 138 
 
 34,823 
 
 Works and Railways 
 
 
 173 
 
 42,800 
 
 Treasury 
 
 
 1,127 
 
 169,879 
 
 Trade and Customs 
 
 
 . 1,528 
 
 350,810 
 
 Defence 
 
 
 210 
 
 47,855 
 
 Postmaster-General 
 
 
 . 19,576 
 
 . 3,137,682 
 
 Total 
 
 .. 
 
 . 23,424 
 
 3,943,084 
 
 From the above it will be seen that during a period of fifteen and a half years 
 the staff of permanent officers employed under the provisions of the Public Service- Act 
 has slightly more than doubled, while the annual salary expenditure is now approxi- 
 mately two and a half times as great as it was in 1903. 
 
 The following statement shows the strength of, and total amount of salaries paid 
 to, the permanent staff of the Service for each year from the first year of operation of 
 the Public Service Act : — 
 
 Year. 
 
 1903 
 1904 
 1905 
 1906 
 1907 
 1908 
 1909 
 1910 
 1911 
 1912 
 1913 
 1914 
 1915 
 1916 
 1917 
 1918 
 
 Total OflScers. 
 
 Salaries. 
 
 n 
 
 11,374 
 
 1,521,051 
 
 11,661 
 
 1,578,861 
 
 11,493 
 
 1,630,435 
 
 11,585 
 
 1,659,834 
 
 11,763 
 
 1,694,641 
 
 12,452 
 
 1,761,143 
 
 13,530 
 
 1,862,461 
 
 13,987 
 
 1,935,797 
 
 15,120 
 
 2,098,530 
 
 17,050 
 
 2,434,051 
 
 19,845 
 
 2,719,360 
 
 21,056 
 
 3,146,815 
 
 22,194 
 
 3,381,349 
 
 22,686 
 
 3,593,609 
 
 23,028 ■ . 
 
 3,819,119 
 
 23,424 
 
 3,943,084 
 
 An analysis of the figures in tables (A) and (B) shows that the increase of 12,053 
 officers is divided amongst departments as under : — 
 
 Home and Territories (formerly External Affairs) . 
 
 369 
 
 Attorney- General 
 
 134 
 
 Works and Railways (formerly Home Affairs) 
 
 135 
 
 Treasury 
 
 1,093 
 
 Trade and Customs . . 
 
 392 
 
 Defence 
 
 87 
 
 Postmaster-General . . . . 
 
 9,554 
 
 The balance is attributable to the formation of the Prime Minister's Department, 
 which, in addition to the administrative staff of the department, includes the staff of 
 the Public Service Commissioner and of the Auditor-General, transferred upon the 
 creation of the new department from the Home Affairs Department and Treasury 
 Department respectively. 
 
The increase in staff in the several departments has been to a large extent due to 
 the creation of new branches of departments to carry out functions of the Government 
 taken over or accepted since the proclamation of the Public Service Act. These branches 
 are shown hereunder against the departments with which they are now associated :— 
 
 Prime Minister's Department — 
 High Commissioner's Office. 
 
 Home and Territories — 
 Electoral. 
 
 Northern Territory (excluding Northern Territory local service). 
 Statistical. 
 Meteorological. 
 Lands and Survey. 
 
 Attorney-General — 
 High Court. 
 Arbitration Court. 
 Patents, Trade Marks, and Copyright. 
 
 Works and Railways — 
 Federal Capital. 
 
 Treasury — 
 Taxation. 
 Pensions. 
 
 Note Printing and Issue. 
 Printing. 
 Stamp Printing. 
 Loans. 
 
 Trade and Customs — 
 Quarantine. 
 
 Commonwealth Analyst. 
 Lighthouses. 
 Inter-State Commission. 
 Commerce. 
 Navigation. 
 
 For the carrying out of the additional functions, upon the importance of which 
 it is unnecessary to dwell, officers to the total of 1,700 are now provided. This number 
 does not include any increased staff which woijld be necessitated in the head offices of the 
 departments to meet the added administrative responsibilities cast upon permanent 
 heads. 
 
 If from the total increase in permanent staff (12,053) be deducted the 1,700 
 officers provided for the new branches, a balance is left of 10,353, which is almost wholly 
 accounted for by the increase (9,556) shown as having occurred in the Postmaster- 
 General's Department. Justification for this apparently large augmentation of staff 
 may be mainly found in the important development of business which has occurred 
 in that department, other factors having operated in a minor degree. 
 
 In illustration of this statement, the following figures relative to the revenue of 
 the department under the principal headings of business are cited : — 
 
 Year. 
 
 Private Boxes and 
 B»K8. 
 
 Commission on Money Orders 
 and Postal Notes. 
 
 TeJcitraiihs. 
 
 Telephones. 
 
 1902-3 
 1917-18 
 
 £ 
 16,517 
 
 34,920 
 
 £ 
 
 78,624 
 
 128,407 
 
 £ 
 
 £358, 
 
 1,031,885 • 
 
 £ 
 
 505 
 
 1,731,278 
 
 Year. 
 
 Postajje. 
 
 lli-scellaneoiis. 
 
 Total. 
 
 1902-3 ... 
 
 1917-18 ... 
 
 £ 
 
 1,905,457 
 
 2,624,034 
 
 £ 
 45,327 
 
 205,198 
 
 £ 
 
 2,404,730 
 
 5,755,722 
 
10 
 
 These figures indicate a growth in business, which it will be readily admitted 
 could only be met by substantial increase in staff ; but as they relate only to revenue, 
 an increase in which may be due to some extent to such causes as alteration of rates, &c., 
 a better indication of the increase in work can be obtained from the subjoiued 
 statement : — 
 
 Tear. 
 
 Letters, &c., posted. 
 
 Parcels. 
 
 Telegrams transmitted. 
 
 Telephones in use. 
 
 1906 
 1917 
 
 290,000,000 
 480,000,000 
 
 2,100,000 
 4,300,000 
 
 10,200,000 
 14,100,000 
 
 24,000 
 179,000 
 
 The years 1906 and 1917 have been taken as the staff at 1906 was practically the 
 same as in 1903, and the years 1906 and 1917 are those upon which comparison is made 
 in the last report of the Postmaster-General upon the operations of his department. 
 The most striking instance of development is seen in the telephones in use, the figures 
 showing that there are now seven and a half times more telephones in operation than were 
 used in 1906. The staff requirements to meet the enormous expanse must necessarily 
 be large, and that they account for a substantial portion of the general increase in officers 
 of the Postmaster-General's Department will be recognised by comparing the number 
 of telephonists and mechanics, sections of officers directly associated with the telephone 
 service, in 1906 with the number required to-day. The relative figures are : — 
 
 1906. 1918. 
 
 Telephonists 
 Mechanics 
 
 976 
 314 
 
 1,290 
 
 2,175 
 1,925 
 
 4,100 
 
 This shows that 2,810 more officers are at present required than were necessary 
 in 1906 to meet the indoor requirements of the telephone service, but in addition the out- 
 door work of telephone line construction and maintenance, both serial and underground, 
 has necessitated the employment of a large staff of engineers and linemen. 
 
 The statistics of revenue derived from telegraphs and telephones are also worthy 
 of consideration. The annual revenue from telegraphs and telephones combined 
 for the financial year 1902-3 was only- £358,805, whilst for 1917-18 the separated 
 figures show : — 
 
 Telegraphs £1,031,885 
 
 Telephones .. .. .. ' 1,731,278 
 
 giving a total of 
 
 £2,763,163 
 
 or nearly eight times the amount received in 1902-3. It will be recognised that a staff 
 required to earn a revenue in 1902-3 of £358,805 would need to be very materially 
 increased to earn the revenue of £2,763,163 received in 1S17 18. If consideration is given 
 to the increased business of the department in other directions, it will be noted that 
 the telegraph revenue alone of 1917-18 wasthree times the amount received from telegraphs 
 and telephones combined in 1902-3, that the parcels handled in post-offices and mail 
 branches had doubled, and that 190,000,000 more letters, &c., were handled by the postal 
 staff in 1918 than in 1906, portion of this increase being, of course, due to war conditions. 
 
 There is, however, another important factor which should be considered in 
 connexion with the increase of permanent staff in the Postmaster- General's Department, 
 i.e., its relation to temporary and exempt employment, and for this purpose the figures 
 regarding temporary and exempt employment for the year 1912 may be compared 
 with those for the past year : — 
 
 Persons employed under the temporary employment provisions 
 of the Public Service Act and employed under exemption 
 from the Act — 
 
 30th June, 1912 
 
 30th June, 1917 . . • 
 
 11,463 
 11,507 
 
11 
 
 These figures are significant as indicating that in the past five years the number 
 of persons employed under other than permanent tenure has shown practically no 
 increase. It should be remembered that this has occurred at a time when an mcrease 
 of temporary employment might have been expected, owing to the enlistment of 
 permanent officers in the A.I.F. and their replacement in a large proportion of cases 
 by the employment of temporary hands. Up to the 30th September, 1917, 3,341 officers 
 of the Postmaster-General's Department had joined the Expeditionary Forces. It is 
 not claimed that the absence of increase in the number of temporary and exempt 
 employees is wholly due to the efforts of the Commissioner and the department in 
 replacing temporary employees by permanent officers wherever the work is of a 
 permanent nature, but it is so to a large extent. Apart from this factor, the 
 slackening of departmental activities by reason of the completion of line construction 
 work, or the postponement of such work through conditions arising from the war, 
 accounts in some measure for the diminution in temporary and exempted employment. 
 
 While the number of persons other than permanent officers (11,507) still 
 employed may appear large, it should be noted that this includes the large number 
 of persons who act as postmasters at semi-official and allowance post-offices, where 
 the intermittent business and general conditions are such as may be met by the payment 
 of a small annual sum, and do not warrant the employment of a permanent staff at heavy 
 cost to the Commonwealth. The business of the department at these offices is, as a 
 rule, carried on by the postmaster in conjunction with some other occupation, e.g., 
 storekeeper, &c. The persons employed at such offices throughout the Commonwealth 
 number 7,800, and when this is substracted from the total number of exempted and 
 temporary employees, the balance is not unreasonable, keeping in view the absence 
 of permanent officers at the war, and the conditions continually arising, necessitating 
 the employment of casual assistance. 
 
 In the Trade and Customs Department, the increase in staff since 1903 has been 
 bhown as 393, this number being accounted for by the transferred services of Quarantine, 
 Lighthouses, &c., taken over from the States, and which employ 398 officers. If the 
 functions of the Trade and Customs Department were confined to those existing at 
 the date of proclamation of the Public Service Act, an appreciable reduction would 
 have been effected, owing to the abolition of border stations following on Inter-State 
 free trade and other reasons. In four of the States this reduction has actually occurred. 
 
 In the Department of the Treasury the permanent staff has increased from 34 
 in 1903 to 1,127 in 1918, but the creation of branches such as Taxation, Pensions, 
 Note Issue and Printing, requiring the services of over 1,000 permanent officers, accounts 
 entirely for the increase. The explanation of increases in other departments may be 
 similarly found in the particulars previously furnished of new activities. 
 
 It will be gathered from the facts thus presented as to development of business 
 and widening of the scope of Commonwealth activities, that considerable warrant 
 exists for the increased permanent staff, despite the criticism sometimes levelled at 
 controlling authorities — criticism which fails to take into account the continuously 
 changing circumstances of Australia, and the tendency to extend the functions of 
 government. Judged by business standards, the development of the Federal Service 
 may reasonably be justified, although economies may be possible in certain directions 
 without prejudice to departmental efficiency. 
 
 ARBITRATION (PUBLIC SERVICE) ACT. 
 
 Under the provisions of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, which was passed 
 by Parliament in 1911, authority was given for the formation of Public Service 
 organizations, and their registration in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
 Arbitration, following upon which they are entitled to present to the Court by plaint 
 any claims relating to salaries or wages or terms or conditions of employment. During 
 the past five years awards have been made by the Arbitration Court embracing probably 
 90 per cent, of the officers in the Commonwealth Public Service, but the making of awards 
 has not resulted in finality, as applications are continually being filed for variations 
 of the awards, either by claimant organizations pressing for further concessions or 
 privileges, or by the Public Service Commissioner for the purpose of elucidating 
 difficulties or remedying abuses. 
 
12 
 
 It was anticipated in. some quarters that by the passage of the Arbitration (Public 
 Service) Act, the Public Service Commissioner and his Inspectors would be relieved 
 of much responsibility, and that the volume of work in administering the Public Service 
 Act would be appreciably reduced, it being assumed that if the functions of prescribing 
 salaries and allowances, fixing hours of duty, and determining questions affecting the 
 conditions of employment were transferred from the Commissioner to the Arbitration 
 Court, the burden of the Commissioner's responsibility must necessarily be lightened. 
 This has proved a fallacy, for, as a matter of actual experience, the reverse has been 
 the case. While the expansion of the Service has in natural course increased the work 
 of the Commissioner and his staff, a no less important factor in this increase has been 
 the operation of the Arbitration Act. Representation of the Commissioner in the Court 
 has entailed a vast amount of work in the preparation of detailed informiation, and of 
 evidence which involves labour of the most strenuous character by the Commissioner's 
 staff. The issue of awards has brought no finality to the Commissioner's work. 
 Detailed instructions have then to be issued for the guidance of departments in 
 carrying out the terms of the award, and consequent questions arise as to interpretation 
 and as to the application of the award to circumstances unforeseen. The Commissioner 
 and Inspectors, already overtaxed by the development of the Public Service, found 
 their burdens increased to an extent intolerable, except at the sacrifice of other 
 important features of their work. There is not the slightest doubt thr.t the settlement 
 of difficulties arising from awards has made the administration of the Service infinitely 
 more complex, and responsible departmental officials, who have been required to carry 
 out the provisions of these awards, have become bewildered and perplexed, and have 
 been compelled to fall back upon the Commissioner for direction and advice. Added 
 to all these difficulties, the Public Service Associations in numerous instances have, 
 through the columns of the press and the service journals, charged the Commissioner 
 with having committed breaches of awards, and as a consequence frequent references 
 to the Court as to alleged braaches have been made. 
 
 In placing the responsibility upon the Arbitration Court of deahng with cliims 
 of public sarvants for increassd pay and privileges, it was apparently never realized by 
 the framers of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act that the Court was being set an 
 almost impossible task. However skilled the Judges of the Arbitration Court may be 
 in analyzing evidence bearing upon industrial problems, however pair, staking and 
 conscientious they may be in the discharge of their onerous duties, the fact remains 
 that they have been required to deal with questions which can only be satisfactorily 
 compasssd by men with long experience in the management of the Public Service. 
 Generally speaking, the Court has found the greatest difficulty in following the intricacies 
 of Public Service organization, with the result that the awards have increased the 
 troubles of administration of the Service, and have produced crop after crop of anomaUes 
 and inconsistencies, rendering the work of control a most exacting and unsatisfactory 
 business. 
 
 Many of the disturbing features have arisen from the fact that the Court, under 
 a system of registration of separate organizations representing separate interests in the 
 Public Service, had perforce to deal with individual sections, irstead of being able to 
 adjudicate on the Public Service as a composite whole, as had hitherto been done by the 
 Public Service Commissioner. It was clearly not recoguissd by the framers of the 
 Arbitration (Public Service) Act that the Public Service is not a series of watertight 
 compartments, but is inter-dependent in its several parts, and that in any system of 
 salary allocation the relation of one class of positions to another must be considered, 
 otherwise friction and irregularity must inevitably result. This defect in arbitration 
 procedure has hampered departments by restricting the interchange of officers between 
 certain positions, and has involved unnecessary expenditure. The Court has been 
 unable to view the Public Service as a whole, and the result has been a loss of elasticity 
 of working, and consequent embarrassment to those responsible for the management of 
 the Service. A further cause of anomaly and. dissatisfaction is that awards of the Court 
 affecting the Public Service have been m.ade by two separate authorities (the President 
 and Deputy President) holding divergent views in many directions. 
 
 It would be tedious to recount all the inconsistencies which appear in the awards 
 of the Court, but it may suffice to say that in such a matter as payment for holiday 
 duty three different systems have been adopted by the Court, that the matter of granting 
 allowances to officers acting in higher classified positions is dealt with in four separate 
 
13 
 
 ways, while some awards provide for granting of increments when so acting, while others 
 do not. Overtime is determined in a multiplicity of ways, and this applies also to 
 relieving allowances. Under some awards travelUng time is conceded, while in others 
 it is not granted, although the circumstances are similar. Increments are granted 
 from the actual due date, or from the first day of the month, or from the first day of the 
 pay period, this being dependent upon the particular award governing the matter. 
 In the same clause of one award provision is made that officers of the Clerical Division 
 shall receive the adult minimum wage from the first day of the month following the 
 twenty-first birthday, while those in the General Division are to receive it from the 
 actual birthday. In one award the stretch of shift allowance is Is. per hour, while in 
 another award it is time and a half. Increments are granted on different bases for no 
 apparent reason. The inconsistencies of arbitration awards are puzzling in the 
 extreme, and this feature alone has greatly intensified the difficulties of working the 
 Pubhc Service. 
 
 Public Service arbitration has proved a most costly matter. In brder to obviate 
 legal exper.sss, it is provided by the Act that neither party to a plaint shall be represented 
 by counsel in the hearing of cases by the Court, but representation of the Commissioner 
 and departments has involved heavy expenditure because of the necessity for bringing 
 witnesses from other States to give evidence, and in paying the salaries of those witnesses 
 and of other officers in attendance at the Court. On the side of the Pubhc Service 
 Associatiors, the cost of prosecuting their claims has also been heavy, as although legal 
 repres3ntation in the Court is prohibited by the Act, legal assistance outside the Court 
 is availed of in many cases. In addition, the salaries of numerous witnesses as well as 
 their travelling and living expenses have to be recouped by associations. The salaries 
 and expenses of executive members of associations appearing in the Court also form a 
 serious item of expenditure. 
 
 The expenditure on salaries and allowances of public servants has under the 
 arbitration system increased by leaps and bounds. Since 1913, when the first award 
 was made, the salaries granted to members of associations have been advanced until 
 at the present time the increase represents nearly half a million pounds sterling 
 per annum, while the provisions of awards in respect to extraneous payments such as 
 Sunday and holiday pay, overtime and travelling time, allowances for special duties, 
 &c., have necessitated considerable additional expenditure. In one award the 
 extravagant overtime provisions resulted in the doubling of extra payments during a 
 given period. It is safe to sa,y that, dm'ing the past five years, the additional expenditure 
 directly attributable to the awards of the Court has aggregated well over a milhon 
 pounds sterling. It should be stated, however, that a proportion of this expenditure 
 was justifiable, and would have been provided for by the Commissioner in the absence 
 of any system of arbitration. But even after making due allowance for this, the fact 
 remains that m.any of the provisions of awards, both as to salaries and extraneous 
 payments, have been upon an extravagant scale and quite unjustifiable. 
 
 The expenditure necessitated by the provisions of awards relating to extraneous 
 payments does not end with the actual payments to officers. Under the conflicting, 
 differing, and generally liberal practices prescribed by the awards, a large staff of officers 
 is required to deal with the claims made by officers for payment of allowances in addition 
 to salary. In the Accounts Branch of one department only— the PostmasteF-'2Ciierars 
 Department of Victoria — no less than eight clerks are required^ ^O'^Aiiae the claims 
 made by officers of the department for these allowances. When this is multiplied by 
 the number of officers required for the purpose in other sections of the Postmaster- 
 General's Department, and in other departments, the additional expenditure for staff 
 alone due to the operation of awards must amount to a considerable annual sum. There 
 would not be the slightest exaggeration in saying that, for one officer formerly required 
 by departments to deal with such claims, three are now necessary under the complex 
 conditions introduced by awards. 
 
 A remarkable example of the conflicting character of awards made by the 
 Arbitration Court in Public Service cases is afforded by the recent judgments ismed 
 on the question of a basic wage. The Deputy President of the Court, after hearing 
 voluminous evidence submitted on behalf of eight Public Service associations, issued a 
 lengthy judgment and award, and fixed the basic wage at £162 per annum. On the 
 same day, the President of the Court, also after hearing evidence from two Public Service 
 unions, issued a separate judgment and award, and increased salaries after adopting a 
 basic wage of £156. Manifestly both judgments cannot be right. 
 
u 
 
 Tiie conflicting nature of awards has induced a spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction 
 throughout the Public Service, as associations of officers not so fortunate as other 
 associations have felt keenly the granting of liberal awards in which they have not shared, 
 owing to their cases having been heard by another Judge, and the result has been 
 agitation and attempts to secure better conditions at the hands of the Court. A notable 
 instance of this occurred in the case of the Professional Officers' Association, which 
 secured an award startling in its effects, no less a sum than £15,303 having been granted 
 in immediate increases to 274 officers, or an average of £56 per officer, while the increased 
 salary to individual officers was such as to exceed even the most sanguine anticipations 
 of those concerned. In a time of serious financial stress due to war conditions, these 
 officers, already receiving high salaries, were granted individual increases of £100, £84, 
 £72, £66, and lesser arnounts, and provision was made by the Court that the officers 
 awarded such extravagant increases should further benefit by the payment of automatic 
 annual increments of £18 per annum. I am led to believe the whole Pubhc Service 
 was astounded by the munificence of the award, and that meetings were immediately 
 convened in most of the States of the heads of branches of departments — men carrying 
 higher responsibilities than the fortunate professional officers — for the purpose of 
 considering their positions, and deciding what action they should take to safeguard 
 their interests and secure recognition of their claims for increased remuneration. It is 
 evident the effect of this award was to create a strong feeling of discontent amongst 
 the heads of branches, and generally throughout the Public Service. 
 
 A further illustration of the extravagance of arbitration awards is furnished in 
 the cases of the Postal Electricians' and Linemen's unions, which on an application for 
 increased salaries to meet abnormal cost of living conditions were in 1916 awarded a 
 sum of £55,932 per annum, thus bringing their benefits in salaries alone, without con- 
 sidering allowances, up to an aggregate of £101,036 per annum under awards. One 
 could well understand any action taken by the Court to revise the salaries of employees 
 receiving the basic wage, who must necessarily be seriously affected by the undoubted 
 advance in cost of living ; but when officers in these two unions drawing salaries up to 
 £400 per annum, who had already considerably benefited by the awards of 1913 and 
 1914, were allowed to participate in cost of living increases, under the plea that the 
 marginal wage for skill must be maintained, one begins to wonder whether the Court 
 was cognisant of the fact that the British Empire \?as in a state of war and that the 
 finances of Australia are being strained to the uttermost. In his reasons for judgment in 
 the Professional Officers' case, the Pres'.dent of the Court naively remarked: — " The state 
 of the country's finances has not even been put before me for investigation, as a ground 
 for lower salaries." As regards the theory that the marginal wage for skill must be 
 maintained in any adjustment of salaries on cost of living, the action of the Court in 
 this respect is in marked contrast with that of the New South Wales Industrial Court, 
 which has repeatedly laid it down that in abnormal times such as the present, the higher 
 classes of worker can no longer claim as a right the same proportion above the living 
 wage as prevailed before the war. It is certainly difficult to justify the granting of 
 such increased salaries to men working in the sheltered haven of Government employment, 
 who lose no time, enjoy exceptional privileges, and already receive high salaries. The 
 graiitjjig of these increased salaries was the immediate signal for claims from a number 
 of Public Service associations for similar tTeatwe.v'^-'^rtn*ri-f ■■'■^'- '-^'^ xo^ >/j^^ ^v^auu^ <s 
 finances these claims dv^," noi receive the same liberal treatment as those of the Postal 
 Electricians' and Linemen's unions, and the increases awarded were reasonable and 
 beyond criticism. 
 
 Despite the increased salaries granted by the Arbitration Court in 1913, 1914, 
 and 1916 to the two unions already mentioned (the Postal Electricians' and Linemen's 
 unions), the Court only recently (in October last) again granted further increases of 
 salary because of cost of living conditions, and again granted increases to the higher 
 paid officers of the permanent service in order to maintain the margin between the basic 
 wage and the wage for skill. This further variation of award wui involve an additional 
 payment in salaries to the members of the two organizations of £53,900. It is estimated 
 that the benefits in augmented salaries granted by the Arbitration Court to the Postal 
 Electricians' union from 1913 to 1918, and to the Linemen's union from 1914 to 1918, 
 taking into consideration the original awards and the increases of 1916 and 1918, amount 
 in the aggregate to well over £400,000. The practical effect of these decisions of the 
 Court was that the pubhc servants concerned should not be required to share at all in the 
 
15 
 
 general hardship arising out of the war, and should be sheltered from its effects ; in other 
 words, they were to be treated so that financially they would be oblivious of the 
 exist ance of war. 
 
 In the actual proceedings of the Court in connexion with the hearing of evidence, 
 the interests of justice have been sariously prejudiced by the fact that while the 
 claimant organizations were able to make a free salection of witnesses from the whole 
 field of employees, on the side of the respondents (the Commissioner and department 
 concerned) it has been.a matter of the utmost difficulty to obtain witnesses from within 
 the departments, owing to the strong aversion of branch heads agair.st appearing in 
 the Court and subjecting themsalves to be cross-examined and pilloried by their 
 subordinate officers. One notable case, which was brought before the Court, occurred 
 where a manager of a Telegraph Branch, who had submitted evidence on behalf of the 
 department, was the subject of an ir suiting resolution carried by the association, and 
 was made the recipient of an iron cross with an opprobrious epithet engraved thereon. 
 The Commissioner and departments have always been at a disadvantage in arbitration 
 proceedings because of this aversion by heads of branches, and becausa of the evidence 
 submitted by organizations represanting exceptional cases rather than the generality 
 of cases. Tne work of departments is of such a nature that evidence from outside the 
 Public Service is but rarely applicable, hence departm.ental heads constitute the only 
 source of supply of witnesses in the interests of departments. Frequently, however, 
 heads of branches were members of the organization before the Court, and were directly 
 interested in the success of the plaint, and in such cases the Commissioner was 
 precluded from calling them as witnesses, while in other cases the heads of important 
 branches appealed in Court as witnesses in support of the association claims. It may 
 readily be understood how difficult was the position of the Commissioner in such 
 circumstances, when resporsible officers who might reasonably have been relied upon 
 for loyal assistance to the department went over to the opposition and made common 
 cause with their subordinates against the Government. 
 
 It is provided in the Arbitration (Public Service) Act that awards of the Court 
 shall not take effect u.itil they have been pres3nted to Parliament, and that either 
 House of Parliament m_ay during a period of 30 days after such presentation pass a 
 resolution of disapproval of any award. The Arbitration Court has frequently sheltered 
 itself behind this provision, relying on the fact that the final responsibility rests with 
 Parliament. In one award the Court stated — " Parliament can reject the award, or 
 it can pass a new Act, or it can refuse the necessary appropriation." And because 
 Parliament has not seen fit to disapprove of some one provision of an award, possibly 
 owing to the fact that such disapproval would have involved condemnation of the whole 
 award, the Court has accepted this as a justification for repeating an unsatisfactory 
 provision in later awards. While the Court has thus made use of this provision, it is 
 recognised on the other hand that Parliament cannot consistently veto any Public 
 Service awaid, seeing that outside employers of labour are required to accept and abide 
 by the awards of the same Court. It thus follows that no matter how injudicious or 
 extravagant or inconsistent the provisions of any award may be, the safeguard of the 
 public finances imposjd by the Arbitration (Public Service) Act appears to have been 
 inoperative in its results. 
 
 In discussing the operation of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, consideration 
 must be given to the effect of legal recognition of associations of public servants on the 
 efficiency and discipline of the service. The recognition of Public Service organizations 
 under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act involved adoption of the principle of preference 
 to unionists, as awards granted by the Court to these organizations are applicable only 
 to the members thereof. In the year 1913, when holding the office of Public Service 
 Commissioner, the opinion was expressed in my annual report to Parliament that in the 
 public departments of the Commonwealth, and particularly in the Postmaster-General's 
 Department, there had been a development of general efficiency which was most grati- 
 fying, and that the departments were year by year gaining strength, and consequently 
 giving better service to the public. This was the statement of a well-considered opinion, 
 based on information at my command, covering the Public Service in every department 
 and State, and related to the period 1904-1912. The years 1913-1918 represent the 
 period of operation of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, and reviewing this period 
 from the stand-point of departmental efficiency, I would say that the evidence is over- 
 whelming as to a decided retrogression in efficiency and in the state of discipline that 
 
16 
 
 underlies efficiency. In the Postmaster-General's Department, in which the greater 
 number of PubHc Service associations has been formed, the insidiously weakening 
 effect of organizations on the morale of the Public Service has been most marked. It 
 is not too much to say that a pronounced effort has been made by some of the more 
 militant associations to usurp the management of the Department by a system of 
 pressure and agitation directed against the controlling heads of branches. It is certainly 
 believed by the prominent members of these organizations that the Department exists 
 for the benefit of the public servants, and that the public interest is merely secondary. 
 Administration and efficiency have been interfered with by the action of the associations 
 in influencing officers who are members of these associations against carrying out the 
 requirements of the Department. For example, in the Sydney Mail Branch, when the 
 primary division of mail matter became the function of assistants, the Sorters' Union 
 placed a notice on their notice-board, erected in the Mail Branch, intimating that, in 
 accordance with a resolution unanimously adopted at a meeting, members must refrain 
 from imparting a knowledge of sorting to assistants and postmen. Another union advised 
 its members not to submit themselves for examination for final increment, provision 
 for which was expressly inserted in an award of the Arbitration Court in order to stimulate 
 increased efficiency. The action of the union in this respect has had a serious effect on 
 the working of the Department, which has been hampered by the absence of trained men 
 with the Expeditionary Forces. The unions have not only taken action from time to 
 time which has militated against the proper administration of the Post Office Department, 
 and has been directly prejudical to efficiency, but in more than one State they have acted 
 in a most arbitrary manner against their own members. In Queensland, two members 
 of a public service union elected to remain on duty for a short while after the regular 
 hours in order to gain a better knowledge of the duties intrusted to them. As this 
 action was taken of their own volition, and without any instruction from the Department, 
 they naturally did not claim overtime payment. The union, becoming aware of this, 
 expelled the officers from membership, thus subjecting them to loss of the benefits under 
 the arbitration award. As an indication of the extent to which unions will go in 
 terrorizing their own members, it is reported that in one branch the employees have been 
 prohibited by their union from " clocking " on until the exact moment for commencing 
 work. Thus at 10 a.m. a long queue of employees is awaiting the stroke of the hour, 
 and while the first employee records his attendance at 10 a.m., the last man in the line 
 is not recorded on duty until some time after the hour. This union demands much in 
 the way of departmental concessions, but is so bitterly hostile towards the Department 
 that it is obsessed with the fear of giving a few moments' service beyond the regulation 
 hours. In another instance, certain postmen who, because of an awkward train service 
 arrived at their office a few minutes before starting time, were warned by the union 
 not to enter the office, and this union had the consummate effrontery to protest to the 
 Minister against the action of the postmen concerned. Numerous instances have 
 occurred where responsible officers who have joined the same union as their subordinate 
 officers, and who have in the ordinary course of their duty found it necessary to report, 
 employees for wrong-doing, have been summoned before a imion meeting to justify their 
 action, and to produce the departmental papers. Much could be said as to the inter- 
 ferences with discipline by the executive members of unions, and as to the terrorism 
 exercised by these members over the rank and file of the unions. It might have been 
 anticipated that the controlling officers of an association such as that of Professional 
 Division officers would not descend to such tactics, yet it was found that a leading officer 
 of the Engineer's Branch was brought to task by his union for having submitted to the 
 Department certain suggestions as to reorganization of the branch without first referring 
 the matter to the union for its opinion, and was threatened with expulsion. 
 
 Although registration under the Commonwealth ConciHation and Arbitration 
 Act was accorded Public Service organizations under the Arbitration (Public Service) 
 Act of 1911, and strikes are made illegal by the provisions of the first-named Act, instances 
 are not lacking where these organizations have set aside their obligations to the Court 
 and to the community they are serving, and have seriously considered the question of 
 striking against the Commonwealth Government. A meeting of telegraphists was 
 held at Sydney to consider the question of going out on strike, and it was only by the 
 most fortuitous circumstances that a strike was averted. In Queensland, owing to the 
 refusal of the Postmaster-General to accede to the request of the Letter Carriers' 
 Association to grant a close holiday on Eight Hours Day in 1916, a ballot was taken 
 of members of the association on a stop-work motion, and the result of the ballot showed 
 
17 
 
 a majority in favour of no work. A meeting was held at the Trades Hall on 25th April, 
 1916, to consider the attitude of the Postmaster-General, and a motion was carried 
 unanimously as follows : — 
 
 " That this association condemns the autocratic action of the Postmaster- 
 General in his decision in refusing to grant us a close holiday on Eight 
 Hours Day as not becoming the action of a true labour representative." 
 
 In view of the publication of this resolution in the press, the Deputy Postmaster- 
 General saw the president of the Letter Carriers' Association, and pointed out that the 
 officers concerned were pursuing a dangerous course so far as their official positions 
 and future prospects in the Department were concerned. He mentioned the fact that 
 the policy of the Commonwealth Government was to discountenance strikes in every 
 shape and form, in connexion with which' policy suitable machinery has been provided 
 in the Arbitration Court to enable officers to ventilate and obtain redress of any alleged 
 grievance. The Deputy Postmaster-General further pointed out that the attitude 
 adopted by the Letter Carriers' Association was utterly indefensible, inasmuch as they 
 were officials of the Department, employed and paid for the express purpose of carrying 
 out the work allotted to them under departmental regulations. The peculiar coincidence 
 was mentioned that this extraordinary action on the part of the association followed 
 upon its affiliation with the local Industrial Council, the members of which, if occupying 
 the position of letter-carrier, would hesitate to adopt the course which they were so 
 solicitous in advising the letter-carriers to follow. The Deputy Postmaster-General 
 urged the president of the association to exercise any influence he might have with the 
 letter-carriers to refrain from adopting the threatened course of action, otherwise he 
 (the Deputy Postmaster-General) would have no alternative but to suspend every officer 
 who failed to take up duty on Eight Hours Day, and recommend his dismissal from the 
 Service. He also intimated that, as public convenience would be so seriously interfered 
 with, he would probably also have to consider the question of instituting a prosecution 
 against the strikers for breach of the provisions of the Post and Telegraph Act. There 
 was no strike. 
 
 In New South Wales, threats of strike by members of Public Service organizations 
 have been frequent, and on one occasion a stop-work meeting was actually held at the 
 Trades Hall, presumably with the object of intimidating the Department, and forcing 
 the will of the organization upon the authorities. This action was taken by a Public 
 Service union, working under an award of the Arbitration Court. 
 
 The conscription issue has involved serious differences amongst the members 
 of Public Service associations, owing to levies being imposed on members to assist the 
 anti-conscription campaign. In one instance, the president of a union was compelled 
 by his union to tender his resignation owing to his views in favour of conscription. The 
 report of the meeting as published in the press showed that the view was held by the 
 association that " it would be against the best interests of the association to have a 
 rank conscriptionist at the head of affairs, that conscription meant a death-blow to 
 the democracy of Australia, and it would be good-bye to unionism, and mean establishing 
 a system of Prussian militarism in Australia instead of killing it in Germany." 
 Returned soldiers who are officers of the Commonwealth Service have been prevented 
 from joining certain Public Service associations, because of the strong attitude of these 
 associations against conscription, and have thereby been debarred from the financial 
 benefits of arbitration awards. It should be clearly understood that in this reference 
 the merits or otherwise of conscription is not the point at issue. The object of the 
 reference is to show that under existing conditions an officer, holding an opinion upon 
 some question of interest not connected in any way with his position or duties as a public 
 servant, may be debarred from membership of an association of public servants formed 
 under the provisions of a Public Service Act, and be deprived because of such opinion 
 of the privileges awarded by the Arbitration Court, and reserved under award solely 
 to the members of the Association. 
 
 The fact that controlling officers have by the provisions of the Arbitration (Public 
 Service) Act, and the constitution and rules of registered organizations, been allowed 
 to join the same union as their subordinate officers, must be highly subversive of discipline. 
 Leading officers of the Service whose duty it is to protect the interests of departments 
 and the public have not scrupled to ally themselves with their subordinates, and as a 
 result efficiency has rapidly deteriorated. The whole position in this respect has become 
 F.18352— 2 
 
18 
 
 intolerable. Only recently an officer occupying an inspectorial position journeyed 
 from Sydney to Melbourne to give evidence in the Arbitration Court in favour of the 
 claims of subordinate employees for payments which the department did not consider 
 justifiable. This inspector's duty is to check, examine, and criticise the work of 
 subordinates, yet he is an executive officer of their union, and openly supports their 
 claims for concessions. Apparently this officer believes he can serve two masters. 
 In another case, professional officers occuppng the highest positions in the Public 
 Service joined the same union as their subordinates, and gave evidence in the 
 Arbitration Court in support of their claims. That such officers could be so oblivious 
 of the proper fitness of things, and so lost to the sense of dignity, is almost unbelievable. 
 The baneful effects of Public Service arbitration under present conditions are incalculable. 
 
 A serious defect in the Arbitration (Public Service) Act is the absence of any 
 provision governing the registration of associations by which officers of any given class 
 shall combine in one organization. Under existing conditions, postmasters are members 
 of two separate Public Service associations — the Commonwealth Postmasters' 
 Association, and the Post and Telegraph Association. Assistants are members of three 
 separate organizations, while the Post and Telegraph Association, by reason of the wide 
 terms of its constitution, may take into membership any officer of the Postmaster- 
 General's Department from the telegraph messenger to the Deputy Postmaster-General. 
 All this makes for delay in dealing with claims, as every organization interested in any 
 class of officers must be allowed to submit representations to the Court, and separate 
 awards must be made in favour of each such organization, although covering the same 
 class of officers. Furthermore, the Commissioner and the Department are bound to deal 
 with applications and complaints from several associations affecting one class of officers, 
 thus involving unnecessary work. Apart from this phase of the question, each union, 
 in addition to having a Federal executive committee, is divided into State branches, 
 each branch electing a branch executive. The State branches are permitted to make 
 representations to the departments, and the Federal executives also submit their views, 
 the result being that the unions are given a predominance which is unjustified and which 
 seriously hampers the departmental machinery. Moreover, in many instances the 
 Federal executives have no controlling power over the branches of the unions, and 
 discipline within the unions is practically non-existent. The branches of the unions 
 in some cases publish journals in the interests of their members, and in certain other 
 cases the Federal executives issue a monthly jom-nal. While some of these journals 
 are temperate in tone and express the views of the unions in a reasonable way, one 
 journal in particular has been most scurrilous in its attacks upon the Postmaster-General 
 and upon leading officers of the department, while the attitude adopted in its articles 
 is one of defiance and ridicule of those responsible for the administration of the 
 departmental service. 
 
 Although the Public Service organizations are registered under the Arbitration 
 (Public Service) Act, and have no legal standing under the principal Arbitration Act, 
 except as to procedure respecting registration, some of these organizations have 
 affiliated themselves with Trades Hall Councils in the several States, and have accepted 
 the obligations of such affiliation. This has already led to serious trouble even within 
 the ranks of the Public Service associations, and has resulted in public servants being 
 compelled to withdraw from membership, and thus suffer the loss of benefits under 
 arbitration awards. In Victoria, a number of officers in one section were precluded 
 from joining a Public Service association because of their objection to affiliation with 
 outside labour bodies, while in another State the attitude of an affihated Public Service 
 imion on the question of conscription was such as to force certain members who held 
 strong views in a contrary direction to sever their connexion with the union and thus 
 suffer the penalty of reduced salaries. The affiHation of the service organizations 
 with outside labour unions has had a most pernicious effect on the morale of the Public 
 Service, and I do not hesitate to say that any future recognition of associations should 
 be based on a condition that there shall be no direct or indirect affiliation with 
 such unions. The public interest demands that servants of the Crown shall not be 
 rendered liable to participate in labour disputes outside the Government emplpyment. 
 The experience of other countries in this respect definitely points to the need for firm 
 action on the part of the Commonwealth Government as to prohibition against any 
 combination of public servants vnth labour organizations outside the departmental 
 service. 
 
19 
 
 As an illustration of the danger of the present unsatisfactory conditions, an 
 instance may be mentioned of -a recent occurrence. The permanent employees in the 
 Lighthouse service of the Commonwealth submitted claims under the Arbitration 
 (Public Service) Act for increased salaries and improved conditions of employment. 
 These claims were heard by the Court in May last, and an award was made granting 
 certain increases. In June last, the following communication was addressed by a head 
 lightkeeper, permanently employed by the Commonwealth, to his fellow-employees in 
 the lighthouse service : — 
 
 " In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the award made by Mr. Justice Powers, I beg to call 
 your attention to the remedy, which is for all lightkeepers to resign from the General Division Trade and 
 Customs Union by giving tliree months' notice, and at the end, of that period each lightkeeper to send in 
 a request to the Seamen's Union asking to be'allowed to join that body, which request, I understand from 
 tlie secretary, will be at once granted. Any further information you may require can be procured from 
 the Secretary of the Seamen's Union, Brisbane. I have sent a copy of this letter to each Light Station 
 in Queensland. I shall be glad to have your views on this matter. Please show this letter to your 
 assistants." 
 
 It was apparently not seen by the writer of this communication that membership 
 of lightkeepers in the Seamen's Union would involve participation in any industrial 
 crisis that might occur, and that the lightkeepers on the Queensland coast might at any 
 time have to choose between loyalty to the Commonwealth Government and loyalty 
 to the Seamen's Union, with a possibility of the whole coast remaining unlighted, with 
 consequent danger to the lives of many people (including members of the Seamen's 
 Union following their vocation), and loss of valuable shipping. 
 
 From the foregoing remarks it will be gathered that departmental control has been 
 most seriously prejudiced by the operation of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act and 
 by the encouragement of militant unionism in the Public Service. During the war period, 
 the Federal departments have been thwarted and hampered in every conceivable way 
 by the action of Public Service unions, and by a system of terrorism levelled against the 
 controlling officers of the Service and against the rank and file of the unions. The efficiency 
 of the Service has suffered a severe blow, and the aim of the majority of the unions has 
 been to establish a dead level of mediocrity, with a maximum reward by way of salaries, 
 rather than to encourage their members to secure promotion by demonstrating their 
 qualifications for higher duties. And this is the result of six years of Public Service 
 arbitration — disloyalty, extravagant salaries, and reduced efficiency. 
 
 PROPOSED REPEAL OF ARBITRATION (PUBLIC SERVICE) ACT. 
 
 In the foregoing analysis of the results of Public Service legislation dealing with 
 arbitration, it has been shown that a gradual process of disintegration has operated 
 throughout the Service, combined with the weakening of constituted -authority, the 
 reduction of efficiency, and the general disorganization of departmental management. 
 The advantages which were expected from such legislation have failed to materalize, 
 while the disadvantages have been such as to make one almost despair of the future 
 of the Public Service. It is certain that the experience of the Commonwealth, in regard to 
 settlement of Public Service claims and grievances through the medium of an Arbitration 
 Court, has been of such a disappointing and unsatisfactory nature as to serve as a salutary 
 warning to all State Governments, and to the Public Service authorities of other countries. 
 When one reflects that the arduous work of a period of more than ten years, prior to the 
 introduction of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, in building up and strengthening 
 the departmental administration, in endeavouring to establish the highest standards 
 of efficiency, and in insuring a maximum of service to the general public, has been to a 
 considerable extent neutralized by the iconoclastic operation of the Arbitration (Public 
 Service) Act, the only conclusion to be arrived at is that the experiment of arbitration 
 has been a sad and costly failure. From a careful and unbiased study of the whole 
 position, I am convinced that the continuance of this Act upon the statute-book is likely 
 to be fraught with the most serious and disastrous consequences to the future Public 
 Service management as regards discipline and efficiency, while the cost to the country 
 will be such as to inflict an unjustifiable and grievous burden upon the taxpaying 
 community. 
 
 The repeal of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, and of all awards made under 
 its provisions, will involve an enormous amount of work in placing the Service once more 
 upon a sound foundation, and in rectifying the many anomalies which have been created 
 
20 
 
 by the unsatisfactory and incongruous conditions prescribed by those awards. It, 
 therefore, becomes a matter for grave consideration as to what action is essential in 
 order to remedy the mistakes of the past, to weld the Public Service into a proper co- 
 ordination, and adequately protect the interests of employees. It may be accepted as 
 axiomatic that, under existing conditions throughout the industrial world, the right of 
 the employee to submit representations when the conditions of his employment are 
 being determined must be vouchsafed, and this principle must apply equally to Govern- 
 ment as to private industrial vmdertakings. In dealing with the Commonwealth Public 
 Service, therefore, it appears not only desirable but imperative that the employees shall 
 be afforded an effective method of adjustment of their grievances by means of represen- 
 tations to some constituted authority outside Parliament. It will, I think, be generally 
 admitted that Parliament is not a suitable or satisfactory medium for the discussion 
 and settlement of Public Service grievances, and it was no doubt due to the recognition 
 of this fact that the experiment of a Public Service Arbitration Act was adopted. For 
 the same reason that Parliament is unable to cope with service problems, the Arbitration 
 Court has failed ; experience and knowledge of the internal administration of the Public 
 Service are essential to successfiil adjudication and the solving of difficulties and 
 disputes. 
 
 It is obvious that, in dealing with the many questions bearing upon the rates of 
 payment and conditions of employment of pubhc servants, proper consideration of 
 representations submitted can only be given by an authority with an intimate knowledge 
 of the working conditions of departments and lengthy experience of Public Service 
 administration. The problems arising from time to time for solution on a basis equally 
 fair to employer and employee in a vast Public Service are intricate and far-reaching, 
 while the duty of holding the balance equitably between contending, sides — the public 
 department and its employees — is one which demands experience and training of a special 
 nature. This all points to the necessity for arbitral functions as regards the Public Service 
 being removed from the Commonwealth Arbitration Court and vested in an authority 
 with undoubted knowledge of the organization and management of the departmental 
 service, an authority capable of dealing with and determining the claims both of 
 departments and the employees of those departments. This authority should be the 
 Public Service Commissioner, who, under the system of management outlined and 
 recommended in this Report, would occupy a neutral and independent position as between 
 departments on the one hand and employees on the other, and would be free to 
 adjudicate on matters submitted for his decision by either party. In this connexion, 
 provision would be necessary for submission to the Parliament of any determination 
 arising from the exercise of arbitral functions by the Public Service Commissioner 
 which the Government found itself unable to accept for reasons of policy or otherwise. 
 
 In thus providing for the submission of representations to a Pubhc Service 
 Commissioner by employees of the Commonwealth Government, the question of official 
 recognition of Public Service associations requires to be considered, as well as the 
 conditions under which such recognition should be accorded both by the Commissioner 
 and by the Department concerned. The experience of the past six years as to the 
 internal management and control of Public Service associations or unions has been, 
 generally speaking, of an unsatisfactory nature, due to reasons which have already 
 been indicated — affiliation with outside organizations, lack of proper control by the 
 leaders of associations, and the tendency to subordinate the public interests to those 
 of the service organizations. With this experience in retrospect, it becomes essential 
 to provide for the establishment of conditions of official recognition of associations 
 which shall eliminate the undesirable features of Public Service unionism while affording 
 a means of frank discussion and consideration of giievances. In my opinion the con- 
 ditions essential to the placing of Public Service associations upon a proper basis under 
 the scheme outhned in this report are as follows : — 
 
 (1) The rules of the association should be submitted to and be subject to 
 
 approval by the Commissioner. 
 
 (2) Associations should be representative of community of interest, and no 
 
 class of employees should be represented by more than one 
 organization. For example, postmasters should be represented by 
 one association, not by two separate associations as at present. 
 
21 
 
 (3) The rules should clearly show that the association is formed for the 
 
 promotion of Service interests and Service interests only. 
 
 (4) The annual membership fee prescribed by the rules should not exceed 
 
 an approved amount. Any association wishing to exceed that 
 amount must satisfy the Commissioner that the excess is necessary 
 to meet the legitimate needs of the association. 
 
 (5) Associations formed on such bases should be entitled to demand that 
 
 every officer of the class of employees represented by the association 
 shall become a member of the association. 
 
 (6) If any officer refuse to join the association, there should be deducted 
 
 from his salary, at the usual due dates, the amount of membership 
 fees of the association, and the amount so deducted should be paid 
 to the association. 
 
 (7) If any member fails to pay his membership fee at the due date, or after 
 
 fourteen days of notice of default, the secretary of the association 
 should advise the Chief Officer, who will deal with the defaulting 
 officer. 
 
 (8) No officer controlling other officers should join an association to which 
 
 his subordinates belong. 
 
 (9) Although associations may find it necessary for convenience of 
 
 organization to establish branches in the several States, official 
 recognition (both Commissioner's and departmental) should be 
 extended only to the federal executives of such organizations, these 
 executives to act as the association channels for all communications 
 and representations. 
 
 (10) Affiliation of federal executives or the branches of associations with 
 
 any organization outside the Commonwealth Public Service should 
 be prohibited. 
 
 (11) Executive officers of recognised associations should be members of 
 
 the Permanent Service of the Commonwealth, elected by their 
 fellow employees in such associations. 
 
 (12) The publication of journals by Public Service associations should be 
 
 subject to approval of the Public Service Commissioner, such approval 
 to be suspended or withdrawn by the Commissioner for good and 
 sufficient reasons. 
 
 (13) The annual balance-sheets, showing receipts and expenditure of 
 
 associations, duly certified and audited, should be submitted for the 
 information of the Public Service Commissioner. 
 
 (14) Membership of associations should be confined to permanent officers 
 
 of the Public SerAdce. 
 
 (15) Associations, through their federal executives, should be entitled to 
 
 lodge with the Public Service Commissioner applications for variation 
 of any Public Service regulation as to rates of pay or conditions of 
 employment, and to be heard in support thereof, or to submit 
 communications or verbal representations to the Public Service 
 Commissioner or departments, as the case may be, on matters of 
 general principle affecting the interests of members of the 
 organization, but no representations on behalf of an individual officer 
 should be permitted except where he has first submitted his case 
 for consideration by the Commissioner or department, and has 
 failed to obtain redress of his grievance. 
 
 In thus indicating the conditions which, in my opinion, should govern the 
 official recognition of Public Service associations, it is desirable to point out that the 
 rules governing the constitution and operations of an association should show clearly 
 that its objects are purely the promotion of Service interests ; that the activities of the 
 association or its funds are not to be utilized in other directions ; hence the rules should 
 first be submitted to the Commissioner for approval. The amalgamation of separate 
 sections of officers in one association is not only prejudicial to the interests of the officers 
 
22 
 
 themselves, but is disadvantageous to departmental management in relation to the 
 consideration of conflicting views and interests. The organization of the Public Service 
 is such as to readily^ lend itself to the formation of associations representative of separate 
 classes; thus, clerks should comprise one association, and telegraphists, postmen, &c., 
 should each be represented by their separate organization dealing with the special 
 interests of the particular class of officers. 
 
 Pubhc Service associations should confine themselves strictly to Service matters, 
 and if any officer desires to associate himself with persons holding views with which 
 he is in sympathy upon matters outside the Public Service, he is at liberty to join any 
 outside association formed for the purpose of supporting such views. He should not 
 carry them into a Public Service association. Having shut out all outside objects 
 which may be the cause of controversy, every officer of the class concerned shovild join 
 his representative association. In the formation and maintenance of an association, 
 expense is incurred which should be met by the members conjointly. It would be unfair 
 to the members of an association, which by its efforts gained some advantage, that 
 persons who through indifference refused to join the association should share in the 
 benefits and not in the incidental expenditure. Isolated cases have occurred of officers 
 who, through some question of conscience, resolutely refused to ally themselves with 
 others in an association, no matter what its object. Compulsion should not be exercised 
 in such cases, but it is reasonable to demand that by deduction from his salary he should . 
 bear his fair share of the expense incxirred by others in gaining advantages in which 
 he will participate. 
 
 The membership fee must be reasonable. Under the proposed procedure the 
 associations will be freed from much of the expense they have had to incur under past 
 practice, and a fee which can be paid without any hardship should be adequate to meet 
 all future legitimate requirements of the associations. The amount of fee should be 
 limited to that necessary to maintain an association for its proper function — that of 
 protecting the Service interests of its members. It should exercise no other. Officers 
 who are members should not be permitted to escape their reasonable obligations, and 
 under the conditions proposed for official recognition the executive officers of associations 
 may reasonably ask for official assistance in collection of fees from members who fail to 
 pay their subscription. 
 
 The policy adopted in the past of granting recognition to branches of associations 
 bas not worked satisfactorily, as each branch has been permitted to act independently 
 of other branches and of the federal executive of their union, and in many cases there 
 has been an absence of effective control by the federal executive. This has all made 
 for confusion in departmental administration, and has, moreover, resulted in investing 
 the individual branches with an importance not justified by the circumstances. All 
 branches should be subordinate to the federal executive, and this body should be the 
 only channel of communication between the employees and the administration in 
 submitting representations from associations. 
 
 Affiliation of Public Service associations with bodies outside the Service cannot 
 be justified from any stand-point if proper consideration is to be given to the public 
 interest. In 1908, when reporting upon this question to the Federal Government, the 
 view was expressed by me that public servants who are employed and paid under the 
 provisions of parliamentary legislation are not justified in combining with trade 
 organizations working under entirely different conditions, or in identifying themselves 
 with industrial disputes which may occur in these outside organizations. It was pointed 
 out by me that if such a course were permitted, the Public Service associations were bound 
 sooner or later to become involved in matters which, while not directly affecting their 
 ofi&cial positions, might seriously affect the conduct of public business. It was further 
 shown that affiliation with outside trades unions was also likely to lead to pressure 
 being brought to bear upon the Government of the day by means of these organizations 
 to secirre concessions and privileges to the Public Service which Parliament in its wisdom 
 did not consider to be fair and reasonable ; and that, while sound reason may exist for 
 trades unions and for Public Service associations, each working independently of the other, 
 and each within its own sphere discharging certain functions, there could be no affiliation 
 between these bodies without serious detriment to the public .interest and weakening 
 of the powers of parliamentary control. The history of the past six years of Public 
 Service management has fully justified the opinions thus expressed in 1908. 
 
23 
 
 In 1914 a Royal Commission which reported on the Public Service of Great Britain 
 dealt with the question of afhliation in somewhat similar terms when it stated :-— " Another 
 question that arises under this head is that of the position of associations of civil servants 
 formed for the purpose of formulating and advocating their professional claims. We do 
 not suppose that in the present day there can be any question of restraining public 
 servants from combining together for that purpose. When combined within legitimate 
 limits, such combination is unobjectionable and even advantageous, as insuring the full 
 discussion of claims and the presentation of them in appropriate form. But a 
 development has, we understand, taken place within recent times, which raises the 
 question whether associations of the kind may legitimately affiliate themselves to similar 
 bodies outside the Public Service. To this, we should unhesitatingly reply in the 
 negative. Without examining closely what the precise meaning and purpose of 
 affiliation may be, it seems to us obvious that it must at least mean this: that the 
 affiliating body sacrifices something of its independence, and may under certain 
 circumstances be under an obligation to take action dictated, not by its own needs and 
 interests, but by those of the body or bodies to which it has affiliated itself. That at 
 once condemns ' affiliation ' for associations of public servants with others in the nature 
 of ' trades unions.' We therefore recommend that affiliation with bodies outside the 
 Service be forbidden, under pain of non-recognition, to associations having for their 
 object the promotion of Service interests." 
 
 The same principle was clearly recognised by the French Government in a 
 communication addressed by the President of the Council and Minister for Home 
 Affairs, France, to the Teachers' Union, in which the following passage occurred : — 
 
 " No Government will ever accept the combination of members of the Public Service with 
 workmen employed in private enterprises, besause tha combination is neither legitimate nor reasonable." 
 
 In 1911 action was taken by the French Government against an association of 
 postal servants for a breach of the law in constituting an association of employees of 
 the Post Office administration, and judgment was issued by the Court proclaiming the 
 dissolution of the association and inflicting penalties on certain members thereof. It 
 was pointed out by the Court that the law permitting the formation of associations of 
 employees was clearly intended to apply to private interests, and not to interests of the 
 State, and that the Legislature had not extended the benefit of this law to officials of the 
 Government. The opinion was expressed in the judgment issued by the Court that, 
 while the right of striking might be admitted in connexion with workmen who treat 
 independently with their employer, who may concede or refuse what is asked of him, it 
 cannot be admitted on the part of employees of the State charged with a public function 
 or with functions representing public interest. The Court added that the State employer 
 cannot be likened to an ordinary employer,. as the State does not seek any personal 
 benefit, and its employees receive a salary independent of the fluctuations of labour, 
 therefore comparison is not possible with the employer seeking in commerce or in industry 
 only his own personal interest. 
 
 Mr. A. B. Piddington, who in 1913 was intrusted with a commission to report 
 on Industrial Arbitration in the State of New South Wales, discussed in his report to 
 the Government the subject of strikes of State servants, his remarks being as follows :— 
 
 "Whatever may be said in extenuation of strikes in businesses carried on for the individual 
 profit of their owners, there can be no escape from the position that strikes by Government employees are 
 in the arena of civil duties of service exactly what mutiny is in the arena of military duties. A strike in 
 the Government Service, and in any of those greater services which rank amongst public utilities, is no 
 more defensible than a mutiny amongst our military or naval forces or a strike amongst policemen would be, 
 and it is suggested that by positive statutory enactment all accruing or accrued privileges (of which there 
 are a great many in most branches of Government employment) to persons in the Government Service 
 who strike, with the possible exception of the right to superannuation benefits, should, ipso facto, be 
 terminated." 
 
 In the Annual Report of the Postmaster-General of the United States of America 
 for the year 1917, attention is called to the activities of certain organizations of postal 
 employees in attempting to influence legislative and administrative action on behalf 
 of their members. It is stated that, through the efforts of Government employees, a 
 provision was included in the Act of 24th August, 1912, which permitted them to become 
 members of associations or organizations so long as membership did not impose an 
 obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike or to assist in any strike against 
 the United States ; and to present, either individually, by groups, or by associations, 
 any grievances to the Congress or any member thereof. The report goes on to say that 
 
24 
 
 some of these organizations maintain representatives in Washington for the purpose 
 of influencing legislation and presenting grievances, many of which are imaginary, and 
 that by distorting and misrepresenting the facts ■ they encourage disrespect for 
 administrative officers, disloyalty to the Service, and make the maintenance of discipline 
 extremely difficult. 
 
 The Postmaster-General of the United States, in discussing the question of 
 affiHation, remarks that an outside organization has during the past several years 
 attempted to unionize Government employees, including those in the postal service, 
 and a large number of postal employees are now affihated with it, and others soon will 
 be, notwithstanding the fact that such affiliation is believed to be contrary to the Act 
 of 24th August, 1912. He adds that the advisability of permitting Government 
 employees to affiliate with an outside organization, and use the strike and boycott as 
 a last resort to enforce their demands, is seriously questioned by those interested in the 
 pubhc welfare. It is stated in the report that postal employees have become bold 
 because of this affiliation, and have within recent years threatened to strike, and in 
 one case actually did so by tendering their resignations and leaving the Service in a 
 body. In this case they were promptly indicted and prosecuted in the Federal Courts. 
 In commenting on these facts, the Postmaster-General remarks that, while strikes in 
 the postal service of the United States may be averted for the time being, yet they 
 will inevitably come ; and the public will then be brought face to face -with a most 
 serious situation, one that will be a menace to the Government. 
 
 In concluding his report on this subject, the Postmaster-General states that the 
 conduct of these organizations at the present time is incompatible with the principles 
 of civil service and with good administration of the postal service, that they are fast 
 becoming a menace to public welfare, and should be no longer tolerated or condoned. 
 He earnestly recommends that the provision in the Act of 24th August, 1912, referred 
 to, be repealed, and adds that, in making this recommendation, it is not an expression 
 unfavorable to organizations where employees are obliged to protect themselves against 
 the selfishness of private employers — organizations in those circumstances being 
 necessary ; but that in the case of Government employees the situation is entirely 
 different. They are not working for private employers, but for the Government, whose 
 officers are merely executing the will of the people, therefore the relations between 
 the employee and the Government are always matters of public information, and the 
 interests of the employee will always be protected by public sentiment. The reasons 
 for justifying organizations among other employees under other circumstances, and for 
 the purposes for which such organizations are approved, do not therefore exist in the 
 case of Government employees, who can always depend upon public opinion and insure 
 their enjoyment of their full rights under their employment. 
 
 In the same report he points out that the difficulty experienced with the 
 organizations of postal employees in that country is that of other countries, and remarks 
 that some years ago in France, when those in executive authority refused to acquiesce 
 in their demands, the Government employees went on strike ; and then, with the 
 helplessness of the Government, the destruction of all authority, and the choking of 
 Government activities, it was seen that to allow Government employees to organize 
 and use the strike as a weapon to enforce their demands was to recognise revolution 
 as a lawful means of securing an increase in salaries for one class, and that a privileged 
 dass, at the expense of the whole. 
 
 The experience of the United States postal administration has been to a 
 considerable extent duplicated during the past six years in the administration of the 
 postal service of Australia, and much that has been said in the report from which 
 quotations have been made might readily have been written of the Commonwealth 
 Public Service. It is essential in the pubhc interest that limitations should be imposed 
 on the activities of associations, while granting full consideration to representations 
 submitted in a reasonable manner by these bodies. In framing amending Public Service 
 legislation it is requisite, in my view, that specific provision be made for the treatnient 
 of strikes amongst pubhc servants, whether members of officially recognised 
 associations or otherwise, as illegal actions against the peace and good order of the 
 Commonwealth; and providing for the definite penalty of dismissal from the Public 
 Service of any person or persons adjudged to be guilty of aiding or fomenting a strike 
 against the Federal Government, or of co-operating or taking part in any strike. This 
 punishment of offenders against the proposed law should be placed outside the scope 
 of political action, and should be vested in the Public Service Commissioner. 
 
25 
 
 In any amending legislation governing the administration of the Public Service, 
 it is necessary, keeping in view the proposal for exercise of arbitral functions by the 
 Public Service Commissioner, that provision be made excepting the Commonwealth 
 Government, in relation to its employees, from the operation of the Conciliation and 
 Arbitration Act (generally known as the Principal Act). At the present time, while 
 outside unions have no right of access to the Court under the Arbitration (PubUc Service) 
 Act, it is competent for such unions to cite any Minister of a department, or the 
 Commissioner, under the provisions of the Principal Act, and to obtain an order of the 
 Court in respect to rates of payment of any employees whose salaries or wages are not 
 specifically fixed by statute or regulation. It is desirable that all questions relating 
 to rates of payment and general conditions of employment shall be disposed of by the 
 one authority — the Public Service Commissioner. 
 
 It will be gathered from the foregoing resume of the position as regards the 
 Arbitration (PubUc Service) Act that the pubUc interest demands an early repeal of this 
 measure, and the substitution of some provision which will enable the intention of 
 Parliament to be more effectively carried out. From the stand-point of the Court, the 
 administration of the Arbitration Act has been siu-rounded with difficulties, while the 
 effect on the management of the Public Service has been disastrous as regards the 
 maintenance of discipline and efficiency. Remedial measures are absolutely essential 
 in order that the present anomalous and confused conditions of assessment of work 
 values, and determination of general questions affecting the Service, may be superseded 
 by a well-ordered and consistent policy in keeping with the importance and magnitude 
 of the interests involved. It has been shown that the continuance of a system of Public 
 Service administration by separate and independent authorities would be fraught with 
 serious consequences to the future management of the Service, and to the interests of 
 the general community. 
 
 In recommending that provision be made by amending legislation for the vesting 
 of arbitral powers in the Public Service Commissioner, I have kept steadily in view 
 the necessity for affording adequate recognition to associations of public servants, and 
 full consideration of their claims, while at the same time conserving the departmental 
 interests. Adjudication by the Public Service Commissioner will result in a much 
 more expeditious settlement of difficulties between departments and their employees, 
 will obviate much of the existing expense entailed in the preparation and presentation 
 of evidence to the Arbitration Court, and will provide a less laboured and less formal 
 method of arriving at the facts material to the determination of issues. The associations 
 and departments will be enabled to present their respective views without all the tedious 
 formality of sworn evidence, without the legal atmosphere of a Court; and all the parties 
 to a dispute, as well as the Commissioner, will be able to discuss matters from the 
 viewpoint of intimate knowledge of service conditions, much in the same manner as 
 Wages Boards constituted under industrial legislation are enabled to deal with the 
 difficulties and intricacies of trade matters. The Public Service Commissioner should 
 be constituted the sole authority for settlement of all questions relating to salaries 
 and wages, hours of labour, and the conditions of service of permanent and temporary 
 employees, as well as of employees exempted from the provisions of the Public Service 
 Act, and his decisions should be final and conclusive. 
 
 PUBLIC SERVICE ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 While the Public Service Act passed in 1902 covered the then existing depart- 
 ments, the objects of the Act as regards the independent control of all branches of the 
 Public Service have to some extent been neutralized by subsequent legislation dealing 
 with new services, which vested in Ministers the power to make appointments and dispose 
 of matters which should more properly have come within the jurisdiction of the Public 
 Service Commissioner. It is now generally recognised that a wise co-ordination of 
 these several branches of Public Service is essential if economical administration is to 
 be secured ; that there shall be one authority responsible for classification and valuation 
 of duties and for the fixing of rates of payment, and that the obligations and privileges 
 of employees of the Commonwealth shall be subject to determination under a clearly 
 defined and uniform system of Public Service management. It has likewise been seen 
 by those interested in departmental control that the machinery designed by those 
 responsible for the Public Service Act of 1902, however appropriate to the conditions 
 of the early years of Federation, with all the conflicting interests and jealousies associated 
 
26 
 
 with the union of separate State Services, is far from adequate to cope with the altered 
 conditions of the present day. It is obvious that the pubUc departments cannot be held 
 in leading strings for all time, and the question has arisen whether a stage has not been 
 reached when the responsible heads of those departments should be required to assume 
 wider powers in respect to the fersonnel of their staffs, and be invested with greater 
 freedom of decision in dealing with the internal management of the service. The evidence 
 at my command all points to the need for a definite recasting of the relative functions 
 of the Public Service Commissioner and the departmental heads, involving a shedding 
 of the Commissioner's responsibility for detailed management in certain directions, 
 and the creation of new and broader responsibilities in other directions. It likewise 
 indicates that the future administration of the Public Service should lie in the direction 
 of intrusting the Commissioner with full powers of adjudication in respect to the assessment 
 of work values, and in relation to the general conditions of employment under the 
 Commonwealth Government — functions which, for the reasons already set forth, have been 
 imperfectly discharged by the Commonwealth Arbitration Court. 
 
 — ' Consideration has been given to the question whether, in view of the ramifications 
 of the Commonwealth Public Service, and the magnitude of the interests to be conserved, 
 any advantage would accrue from the establishment of a Public Service Board of three^ 
 nxembers in place of the present system of control by one Commissioner. The New 
 South Wales State Service Act is administered by a Board of three members. In 
 /{/' Queensland, Public Service matters are dealt with by a Committee of the Cabinet, while 
 in Victoria, South Australia, and Western Australia the Public Service is managed by one 
 Commissioner. In new legislation now before the Tasmanian Parliament, provision is made 
 for appointment of a Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner. The New Zealand 
 Public Service is controlled by a Commissioner and two Assistant Commissioners. 
 In Great Britain the Civil Service Commission comprises two members, but the 
 functions of this Commission relate mainly to the holding of examinations, and are not 
 administrative. The Victorian Royal Commission on the State Public Service, reporting 
 in 1917, discussed th'e'ggneral TnanageJttient of that Service, and after full consideration 
 of the arguments for and against the constitution of a Public Service Board, stated that, 
 although a good deal might be said in favoiu: of the appointment of a Board of three 
 Commissioners, they (the Royal Commission) were not prepared to recommend any 
 change in that regard. It may be mentioned that for many years the Victorian Public 
 Service was controlled by a Public Service Board of three members, and that this arrange- 
 ment was eventually superseded by the present system of control by one Commissioner. 
 ^ . In my opinion there are strong reasons against alteration of the present system of 
 
 //management of the Commonwealth Public Servfce. Control by a Board of three 
 members necessarily involves a more cmnbrous procedure than by a single Commissioner, 
 and consequent delays in settlement of questions of administration. In addition, the 
 important factor of direct and personal responsibility would be sacrificed by the 
 appointment of a Board. Moreover, the circumstances suiTounding the Commonwealth 
 Service differ very materially from those of a State Public Service, seeing that the former 
 service is spread over all the States forming the Commonwealth, necessitating the location 
 of a Public Service Inspector in each State, exercising delegated powers of the 
 Commissioner. In providing for the future administration of the Public Service Act, 
 it \^ould be disadvantageous to establish a Public Service Board, with the consequent 
 inelasticity of control and the diminution of personal responsibility. The existing 
 system of management by one Commissioner will undoubtedly better meet the require- 
 ments of the Commonwealth Public Service, provided that the necessary assistance is 
 given him to carry out the duties and extended functions to be conferred upon him. 
 
 From the inception of the Act, the work of the Commissioner and Inspectors has 
 been of the most onerous character, and has been carried out only at considerable 
 self-sacrifice and the devotion of much private time to the interests of the Commonwealth. 
 In the larger States the pressure upon Public Service Inspectors has been particularly 
 heavy, and much of the inspection work has necessarily been sacrificed to the more 
 urgent requirements of the administration in dealing with staff changes involving 
 appointments, transfers, and promotions, and in reporting upon the many questions 
 continually requiring settlement by the Commissioner. In Victoria, where seven 
 central departments and three transferred departments are located, the duties of the 
 Inspector, if confined only to staff changes in those departments, and to the preparation 
 of reports on questions referred by permanent heads for the decision of the Commissioner, 
 are in themselves of no light character ; but added to these are the proper control of 
 
27 
 
 temporary employment, with the necessity for close supervision of selection of employees 
 and the fixing of rates of-payment appropriate to the work to be performed, and the general 
 inspection of departments, together with the preparation of reports upon organization 
 and classification. Despite the exacting conditions under which Inspectors have been 
 compelled to labour by reason of the accumulation of work imposed upon them, marked 
 economies have been effected as the result of inspections and consequent action to reduce 
 staffs by rearrangement of duties and abolition of unnecessary positions. It has, 
 however, become evident that an inspection staff, which might have been numerically 
 sufficient in the earlier years of Federation has, with the large increase in departmental 
 staffs and the greater complexity of Public Service questions, proved to be now inadequate. 
 The pressure of official duties upon the Public Service Inspectors has reacted upon the 
 Commissioner, who must of necessity pass in review much of the work of his Inspectors 
 and accept the final responsibility for all administrative action. 
 
 After a careful analysis of the position, and keeping in view the necessity for 
 bringing the whole of the Commonwealth services under one general authority, I am 
 satisfied that full justification exists for reheving the Commissioner and Inspectors of 
 some of the detailed work at present required of them, and in particular that connected 
 with promotions, transfers, and increments to salaries. 
 
 Later sections of this Report dealing with the classification of the Service and 
 promotions and transfers of officers will disclose the burdensome requkements of the 
 present procedure in relation to promotions, transfers, and increments ; and from these 
 it will be evident that if these requirements are to be still demanded of the Commissioner 
 and Inspectors, they can only be met either at the continued sacrifice of other important 
 functions — a sacrifice which would be detrimental to the economical and efficient working 
 of departments — or else by making provision for an increase to the inspectorial staff to 
 a far greater extent than will be required if the proposed new plan of organization be 
 adopted. 
 
 It is mainly in the direction of largely transferring to heads of departments existing 
 responsibilities of the Commissioner and Inspectors in relation to promotions, transfers, 
 and increments that the new plan of organization will operate. The responsible officers 
 of departments have now the advantage of many years of experience of public service 
 methods in dealing with staff conditions. They recognise, and are generally in full 
 sympathy with, the basic principle of the Public Service Act, which makes efficiency 
 the first essential of promotion ; they realize the importance of careful administration 
 in the matter of transfers involving in many cases heavy expenditure in the removal 
 from one station to another of officers and their families ; and, under the altered conditions 
 which will be suggested, they will be placed in a position to deal with increments with 
 an essential uniformity of action unattainable if they were vested with such authority 
 under existing conditions. The exercise by departmental heads of these proposed 
 responsibilities should be subject to the right of appeal being extended to officers under 
 conditions to be prescribed, and the Commissioner being the final authority for determina- 
 tion of appeals. Under this rearrangement the Commissioner and his staff will be relieved 
 from much of the mimitiae-of- detail, and will be free to deal with the wider questions of 
 policy and organization of departments, and with measures for greater economy of 
 administration. 
 
 For the proper discharge of the duties proposed to be carried out under the new 
 arrangements relating to Public Service management, provision should be made as 
 follows : — 
 
 Public Service Commissioner. 
 
 Assistant Public Service Commissioner. 
 
 Public Service Inspectors (7), viz. : — 
 Central Staffs. 
 New South Wales. 
 Victoria and Tasmania. 
 Queensland. 
 South Australia. 
 Western Australia. 
 Special Service. 
 
28 
 
 Under the proposed reorganization the Commissioner should be required to 
 exercise the functions at present discharged by the Arbitration Court under the 
 Arbitration (Public Service) Act in respect to the fixing of rates of payment and hours 
 of duty of officers, and determination of the general conditions of their employment. 
 In addition, he should act as a court of appeal in all matters prescribed as coming 
 within his jurisdiction in relation to appeals against classification, promotion, &c. 
 He should be responsible for the making of all regulations under the Public Service 
 Act, and for the general poHcy of the management of the Service, and in addition should 
 fmally deal with such cases of discipline as involve dismissal from the Service. The 
 Assistant Commissioner should be responsible for the carrying out of the details of 
 administration as prescribed by regulations, subject to decision by the Commissioner 
 as to policy matters ; he should direct and check the work of Public Service Inspectors 
 as well as that of the head office staff, and in the absence of the Commissioner on official 
 duties or during recreation or other leave he should discharge the functions of the 
 Commissioner. The Commissioner should be empowered to delegate to the Assistant 
 Commissioner any of his duties or powers considered necessary from time to time, but 
 only in his absence should his arbitral or appellant functions be exercised by the 
 Assistant Commissioner. 
 
 The duties of Public Service Inspectors should be primarily to inspect departments 
 and report as to improved methods of organization and possible economies ; they 
 should be responsible for the control of temporary employment, and generally act as 
 representatives of the Commissioner in their respective States in all matters affecting 
 the administration of the Act. It should be their duty to report on appeals lodged by 
 officers, and to submit necessary information for the guidance of the Commissioner, 
 and to report and make recommendations on the classification of positions and officers. 
 The Special Service Inspector shoiild not be attached to any particular State, but 
 should be intrusted with special investigations on behalf of the Commissioner in any 
 part of the Commonwealth or in the Territories. Preferably, he should possess 
 recognised accountancy qualifications, and have had good general departmental 
 experience. The proposed provision will involve the creation of two more officers 
 than were provided in the Act of 1902, viz., one of Assistant Commissioner and one of 
 Inspector. Taking into consideration the immense growth of the Service since 1902, 
 the nature of the functions to be exercised by the Commissioner, particularly in his 
 arbitral capacity, and the generally more complex and difficult questions which have 
 to be faced under the vastly differing conditions of the present day, it is considered that 
 the proposed increase has been too long delayed, and that the staff recommended is the 
 irreducible minimum, if justice is to be done to the officers charged with such important 
 responsibilities and to the Service with which it will be their province to deal. With 
 any less assistance no Public Service Commissioner could discharge his onerous duties 
 with satisfaction to himself and to the community whose interests he will be required 
 to protect. 
 
 In addition to the proposed provision for appointment of a Commissioner, Assistant 
 Commissioner, and staff of Public Service Inspectors to be continuously occupied in the 
 duties described, power should be given to the Commissioner to utilize the services 
 of persons either within or without the Public Service with special knowledge of some 
 particular class of work in the Public Service to act in the capacity of assessor. The 
 Commonwealth Government has taken up a number of new and important functions 
 of far reaching effect in the welfare of the commimity, having commercial, technical, 
 or other aspects differing from the ordinary routine of Public Service matters. The 
 extent and variety of these new functions vnll materially affect the responsibilities 
 of the Commissioner and make great demands upon his versatility. Although he may 
 be acquainted with general business principles and the details of Government practices 
 and procedure, neither he nor his Inspectors can be expected to have an expert 
 knowledge of the technical and professional features of work which may require to be 
 considered as the Commonwealth Public Service develops. 
 
 It will be of obvious advantage to the Commissioner to have the assistance of 
 a professional expert in a particular section of the work of a department. At present, 
 the Commissioner is at a disadvantage in combating the views of officers whose interests 
 may lie in the continuance of existing methods and whose professional knowledge of 
 the subject might carry weight when expressed in opposition to the views of a layman. 
 
29 
 
 In such cases the Commissioner should have power to call upon the serrices of a 
 Commonwealth officer with special qualifications in the direction in question, or make 
 arrangements for securing an officer of a State Service, or some recognised authority 
 on the subject outside the Public Service. The engagement of such person should 
 operate only for the particular matter in hand, and where it is necessary to go 
 outside the Commonwealth Public Service, the terms and conditions of engagement 
 should be subject to the approval of the Governor-General. 
 
 Under the provisions of the Public Service Act of 1902, the tenure of office of 
 the Commissioner and Inspectors is limited to a period of seven years, and power is given 
 to re-appoint these officers for a further term or terms. It is difficult to understand 
 the reason for such a condition of tenure when it is remembered that no statutory 
 limitation is imposed in the case of the Judges of the High Court or of the Auditor- 
 General of the Commonwealth. While it is questionable whether any advantage accrues 
 from the existing provisions of the Act, I am convinced that serious disadvantage results 
 from the fact that experienced officers of the Federal and State Services, or men of high 
 standing outside the service, will hesitate to accept appointments involving a limited 
 tenure. It is within my recollection that in 1902 a prominent officer of the Post Office 
 service withdrew his application for appointment as Public Service Inspector because 
 of the condition imposed by the Act as to a seven years' tenure. The limitation of the 
 period of appointment is particularly unwise from the stand-point of independent 
 administration, and although my own experience in this respect when holding office as 
 Commissioner was satisfactory and such as to give no cause for complaint, it may readily 
 be understood that the possibility of non-renewal of appointment is likely to affect the 
 independence of a Commissioner or Inspector and to prove detrimental to the public 
 interests. The Royal Commission on the Victorian Statw Public Service^, reporting on 
 this subject last year, stated : — 
 
 The Coniiiiissioncr should in our opinion have real power and should be„really-4«dependentr- 
 Nominally he is independent, but as he cannot be appointed for more than seven years at a time it will 
 be seen that he is not really independent. He cannot help feeling that if he. does not endeavour to 
 please the powers that be, he may not get a renewal of his position when his term expires. And he should 
 be paid a salary befitting his important office. There is no good reason, so far as we can see, why he 
 should not be appointed to hold office during good behaviour, as the Auditor-General is. Of course, we 
 do not suggest that the administration of the present Commissioner or any of his predecessors has been 
 influenced in the slighte.st degree by their insecurity of tenure, but we feel that the office should be 
 placed in such a position of strength that there would be absolutely no colour for the suggestion that in 
 some particular case or cases the Commissioner's action was not altogether disinterested. 
 
 In the report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service of Great Britain 
 (1914), it is pointed out that the members of the Civil Service Commission (two in number) 
 hold their appointments direct from the Crown, and that like other members of the 
 permanent Civil Service, these officers hold office during his Majesty's pleasure, this 
 meaning in practice until they are retired owing to age or invalidity. 
 
 A Royal Commissioner was appointed by the T^^w Sp uth Wales Gove rnment 
 to report on the administration of the Public Service of that State, and in an interim y -)^ 
 report recently issued, the Commissioner (Mr. G. M. Allard) referred to the question Ccs-^^ 
 of tenure of office of members of the Public Service Board in the following terms : — 
 
 Tlie present limited tenure makes it possible for periodical pressure to be applied to the members 
 of the Board, especially when the terra of office is approaching completion. I consider it imperative that 
 the tenure of office should be such as to make the Board independent in spirit as well as in letter, and 
 that, subject to removal by a vote of both Houses of Parliament, the tenure of office shonld be from the 
 date of appointment until the date upon which each Commissioner shall attain the age of 65 years. 
 
 So far as the future administration of the Commonwealth Public Service is 
 concerned, I am in entire agreement with these views, and consider that in the provision 
 for appointment of a Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, and Inspectors, the 
 restricted tenure as prescribed by the present law should be abandoned in favour of the 
 tenure as suggested for the members of the New South Wales Public Service Board 
 and the Victorian Public Service Commissioner. 
 
 Under the existing Public Service Act the salary of the Public Service 
 Commissioner is fixed at £1,500, and of each of the Public Service Inspectors at £700 
 per annum. In view of the fact that the system of Public Service management proposed 
 herein will involve the new appointments of a Public Service Commissioner, an Assistant 
 
m 
 
 Commissioner and four Inspectors (two positions of Inspector being already 
 occupied — Central Staff and Queensland — while the Victorian Inspector holds 
 office as Acting Commissioner), it is essential that consideration be given 
 to the question of salary or remuneration of these officers. This, in my 
 opinion, should largely be governed by the salaries to be paid to officers 
 of the Administrative Division — permanent heads and chief officers of 
 departments. It is proposed in a later section of this report to discuss the matter of 
 remuneration of administrative officers, and at this stage it will suffice to say that in 
 determining what legislative provision should be made for the salaries of the Public 
 Service Commissioner and his staff, the necessity should be recognised of placing the 
 Commissioner and Inspectors in a proper relation to permanent heads and chief officers 
 in the several States. After giving full consideration to the powers and responsibilities 
 proposed to be centered in these officials, and to the remuneration granted by the States 
 Governments, and Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions generally for the 
 discharge of functions of a similar but less important character, I have formed the 
 opinion that the salaries which should be appropriated for the positions recommended 
 under the re-organized system of Public Service administration, should be — 
 
 £ 
 Public Service Commissioner . . . . , . . . 1,750 
 
 Assistant Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . 1,200 
 
 Public Service Inspectors (seven) — 
 
 Two at .. .. .. .. .. .. 900 
 
 Three at .. .. .. .. .. .. 800 
 
 Two at .... . . . . . . . . . 700 
 
 It is in the highest degree essential that the importance of the duties to be performed 
 shall be properly recognised in the granting of adequate remuneration, otherwise the 
 administration will suffer by the appointment of men inferior in cahbre, experience, 
 and training. A false economy in the matter of fixing salaries of officers to be intrusted 
 with the administration of the Public Service Act would react seriously against the 
 best interests of the Commonwealth. 
 
 Before leaving the question of the future administration of the Public Service, 
 it is desirable to set forth seriatim the duties which should be delegated to (a) the 
 Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, and Inspectors, and (6) the Permanent Heads 
 and Chief Officers of departments. The functions of Commissioner, Assistant 
 Commissioner, and Inspectors should embrace the following : — 
 
 (1) To recruit the staffs of all departments, and to be responsible for meeting 
 
 the demands of departments for the requisite officers to fill vacancies, 
 where such cannot be filled by promotion or transfer within the 
 departments. 
 
 (2) To determine the rates of payment and general conditions of employment 
 
 in the Public Service according to the nature of occupation and the 
 classes into which the officials may be divided for the purpose of 
 relative valuation of work. 
 
 (3) To separate according to relative value of work the officers of departments 
 
 into classes and to determine as in (2) the limits of pay within such 
 classes. 
 
 (4) To recommend the appointment of officers to the First Division of the 
 
 service. 
 
 (5) To deal with representations by associations of officers regarding rates 
 
 of pay and general conditions of employment, and to determine appeals 
 by officers against deprivation of prescribed increases of salary or loss 
 of promotion. 
 
 (6) To determine the necessity for the creation of additional offices or the 
 
 abolition of existing offices upon reports by Inspectors and Heads of 
 departments. 
 
 (7) To take steps by inspection and report to insure that the staff employed 
 
 for the work of a department is carrying out its duties under methods 
 most conducive to economy, expedition, and efficiency, and to provide 
 for the proper disposal of redundant officers. To personally suggest 
 to heads of departments minor improvements in working. 
 
31 
 
 (8) To keep records of the staff of the Commonwealth Public Service, and to 
 
 publish necessary particulars of staff. 
 
 (9) To advise Parliament once each year as to the general condition of the 
 
 Public Service and as to action taken in the preceding year relative 
 thereto, together with any suggestions as to improvements in the 
 conduct of the service deemed necessary, and to report any breaches 
 or evasions of the provisions of the Public Service Act which may 
 have come under notice. 
 
 (10) To select under prescribed methods persons for appointment to the 
 
 PubHc Service on probation or otherwise, and where appointment is 
 dependent upon examination to make all necessary arrangements 
 for the holding of examinations preliminary to appointment. 
 
 (11) To confirm or annul appointments after expiration of probationary 
 
 period upon reports furnished by Chief Officers of departments, and to 
 insure that officers appointed have effected life assurance as prescribed. 
 
 (12) To provide proper methods of registering applicants for temporary 
 
 employment, to select and supply the temporary assistance required, 
 to guard against unnecessary retention of temporary employees, or 
 utilization of temporary assistance where permanent appointments 
 should be made. 
 
 (13) To determine conditions imder which ofiicers may be transferred from 
 
 one division to another division, and conditions under which in 
 special cases officers may be promoted from class to class. 
 
 (14) To determine the punishment of officers found guilty of offences 
 
 where the offence is considered by the Chief Officer sufficiently serious 
 to warrant dismissal. 
 
 (15) To determine the rent to be charged officers for occupancy of Common- 
 
 wealth buildings for the purpose of residence. 
 
 (16) To determine upon report by Chief Officer and Inspector the retirement 
 
 or transfer of inefficient or incompetent officers. 
 
 (17) To determine the conditions upon which officers may be granted leave 
 
 of absence for reasons of ill-health. 
 
 (18) To determine the granting of leave of absence for extended periods for 
 
 reasons other than ill-health or prescribed recreation leave. 
 
 (19) To determine after report from Permanent Head the granting of 
 
 furlough, or pay in lieu of furlough, to officers or their dependants. 
 
 (20) To determine retirement of officers who have reached the prescribed 
 
 age, or to recommend their retention in any case thought necessary 
 in the interests of the service. 
 
 (21) To invite applications when necessary to fill vacant positions. 
 
 (22) To make regulations for the carrying out of any of the provisions of th 
 
 Public Service Act. 
 
 The functions of permanent heads and chief officers of departments, so far as 
 relates to the administration of the Public Service Act, should be as shown hereunder, 
 subject to the condition that ■ provision should be made by Regulation for a definite 
 demarcation between the functions of permanent heads and chief officers : — 
 
 (1) To report to the Commissioner any vacancy which, in the opinion of 
 
 the Chief Officer, should be filled by the appointment of a person 
 from outside the Service. 
 
 (2) To report where required upon the qualifications of persons, other than 
 
 those who have qualified by examination, for appointment to the 
 Service. 
 
 (3) To report the existence of redundant officers. 
 
 (4) To report upon the conduct, diligence, and efficiency of all persons 
 
 appointed on probation, and make recommendation as to confirmation, 
 extension of probation, or annulment of appointment. 
 
32 
 
 (5) To approve or disapprove of increments within the prescribed limits 
 
 of salaries of officers. 
 
 (6) To report to Commissioner upon the appeal of any officer against 
 
 deprivation of increment or loss of promotion. 
 
 (7) To approve, under prescribed conditions, of promotions or transfers of 
 
 officers within their respective divisions. 
 
 (8) To report to the Inspector any requirements for temporary assistance, 
 
 to dispense with the services of temporary employees when services 
 not further required, or for reasons of inefficiency, lack of diligence, or 
 any other condition of unsatisfactory service. In any case where 
 retention is desired beyond prescribed period, to report to Inspector 
 with supporting reasons. 
 
 (9) To deal with officers charged with the commission of offences, under the 
 
 conditions prescribed. 
 
 (10) To direct appointees to comply with the life assurance provisions, 
 
 and advise Commissioner when assurance effected. To insure the 
 continuance of assurance by officers, and the effecting of increased 
 assurance as required. 
 
 (11) To report to Commissioner any case of occupancy by an officer of quarters 
 
 for the purpose of residence. 
 
 (12) To report all cases of inefficient or incompetent officers. 
 
 (13) To report the case of any officer charged with commission of a criminal 
 
 offence, and the result of such charge. 
 
 (14) To report insolvency of any officer, with any necessary recommendation. 
 
 (15) To grant recreation and sick leave to officers under prescribed conditions. 
 
 (16) To report upon any application for furlough or pay in lieu, and upon 
 
 claims of dependants of deceased officers, in relation to pay in lieu of 
 furlough. 
 
 (17) To report on officers who have attained the age of 60 years, with 
 
 recommendation for retention or retirement. 
 
 (18) To approve of payment of travelling, relieving, and other allowances, 
 
 transfer expenses, overtime, holiday pay, Simday pay, &c., under 
 prescribed conditions. 
 
 (19) Generally to exercise such powers and authorities necessary for the 
 
 efficient control of the Department other than those prescribed for 
 exercise by the Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Inspector, or 
 other authority. 
 
 In later sections of this Eeport the proposed rearrangement of "the functions 
 of the Commissioner and staff with those of permanent heads and chief officers is dealt 
 with in greater detail, but in concluding this portion it is desired to refer briefly to those 
 which should be exercised by the Commissioner as distinct from those of the Assistant 
 Commissioner. 
 
 The arbitral functions which it is proposed shall be exercised by the Commissioner 
 should be exercised by him alone. It may be contended that the proposition is one 
 which would simply mean the restoration of the conditions in operation before the 
 passing of the Arbitration Act, when officers dissatisfied with their conditions could 
 only appeal to the authority who had determined the conditions, and who, it may be 
 said, would be averse to revoking his determinations or admitting they needed revision. 
 However mistaken such belief may be, its possible existence must be recognised. It 
 is therefore desirable to show how material are the differences between the proposed 
 system and that of the past. An important feature of former conditions was that, 
 despite opinions to the contrary, the Public Service Commissioner had not a free hand 
 in determining rates of payment and conditions of employment. He had no voice 
 in determining the salaries of administrative officers, whose remuneration had an 
 important bearing on the salaries of other members of the service ; he had no authority 
 over the scales of pay of the large section of officers embraced in the Clerical Division, 
 which were fixed by the Act, and could only be altered by the cumbrous procedure 
 
33 
 
 involved in amending the Act, and this applies also to many of the conditions of 
 employment. Even in the cases of scales of pay for officers of the Professional and 
 General Divisions, the Commissioner had only power to recommend. The approval 
 of the Government was a necessary condition, and the Commissioner was fettered with 
 restrictions which do not apply to the Arbitration Court. Under the free hand given 
 by the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, the President or Deputy President of the Court 
 can vary at will any provision of the Act or Regulations, subject only to submission to 
 Parhament with its power to disapprove, a power which, as previously mentioned, has 
 never been exercised. If the Commissioner were given the same powers as those enjoyed 
 by the Arbitration Court— and this is proposed—it would place him in a far better position 
 than under past conditions to meet the just claims of officers. 
 
 The second and most important difference between the proposed new conditions 
 and those of the past lies in the distinction between the functions of the Commissioner 
 and Assistant Commissioner in regard to arbitral and appellate functions. It is proposed 
 that all regulations affecting rates of payment and general conditions of employment 
 of officers shall be framed by the Assistant Commissioner and his staff, with the assistance 
 of Inspectors. Before submission to the Commissioner for adoption, the intention to 
 make such regulations, the scope of such regulations, and the date on which they will 
 be considered by the Commissioner, should be notified in the Gazette. Copies of the 
 proposed regulations should be available for interested parties, i.e., heads of departments 
 and associations concerned, who may lodge objections in prescribed form against the 
 regulation or any part thereof. 
 
 Upon the date fix;ed, representatives of the department and associations concerned 
 would appear before the Commissioner, practically in the form of a conference, Avith the 
 Commissioner as Presiding Officer, when the regulation would be discussed. The Commis- 
 sioner, after hearing all parties, would determine the form of the regulation. All 
 reasonable facilities should be given representative officers to attend such conferences. 
 The regulation having been brought into operation, it would be open to the Assistant 
 Commissioner, the departments, or the associations at any subsequent time to apply 
 for a variation in the light of altered circumstances, and the apphcation for variation 
 would be dealt with in a similar manner. 
 
 In the case of promotions, &c., which may be the subject of appeal by officers, 
 the appeal will not in future be to the Commissioner against a decision of the 
 Commissioner, but to the Commissioner against a decision of the chief officer or permanent; 
 head, a decision of which the Commissioner has had no previous knowledge. Similarly 
 in any reclassification of the Service, necessary under an alteration of the arrangement 
 of divisions into classes, the preliminary classification on lines of policy laid down by the 
 Commissioner should be intrusted to the Assistant Commissioner and Inspectors, 
 and any appeal against the classification will be made to the Commissioner. While 
 also any question of interpretation of regulations or general rulings will be the function 
 in the first instance of the Assistant Commissioner, it should be open to any department 
 or association dissatisfied with the interpretation to appeal to the Commissioner, as may 
 now be done to the Arbitration Court or Board of Interpretation, but in a more expeditious, 
 economical, and practical manner than is at present possible. 
 
 Generally speaking, the Commissioner is to occupy, as already mentioned, a 
 neutral and independent position between departments on the one hand and employees 
 on the other, and also between the Assistant Commissioner and departments and 
 employees. Under the conditions outlined, the Commissioner will be so placed as to 
 hold evenly the scales of justice between the public employee and the public which he 
 serves. 
 
 EXEMPTIONS FROM PUBLIC SERVICE ACT. 
 
 In ail Public Service legislation it is found essential to provide for the exemption 
 of persons or classes of employees from the operation of the law governing the 
 administration of the departmental service. The general practice is to separate 
 employees in the service of a Government into three categories— (1 ) permanent employees 
 in classified positions ; (2) temporary employees engaged to meet special exigencies 
 of the service ; and (3) exempted employees who are excluded from the operation of the 
 Public Service Act by reason of the provisions uf some other Act, or of their whole time 
 not being devoted to the Public Service, or because their employment is of such a nature 
 F.18352.— 3 
 
34 
 
 as not to warrant appointment to the permanent service. A further terni is frequently 
 used in connexion with Public Service employment, viz., casual employment. Casual 
 employees are usually pro^^ded for by the exemption provisions of the Act, and therefore 
 come within the third category mentioned above. The definition of " casual employee " 
 varies in accordance with the circumstances ; thus a telegraph messenger employed 
 for not more than two weeks in any month is a casual employee, while a person employed 
 not more than three days in any week is also designated a casual employee. 
 
 Under Section 3 of the Public Service Act, power is taken to exempt from the 
 provisions of the Act the occupants of specified positions such as the Justices of the 
 High Court, members of the Inter-State Commission, the Auditor-General, examiners 
 under the Public Service Act who are not officers of the Service, and so on. iTn addition 
 the Governor-General may for special reasons assigned by the Commissioner exempt 
 from the Act any officer or class of officers or any employee or class of employees. Under 
 this latter provision artisans and labourers engaged on public works, linemen employed 
 on construction or maintenance work" of a temporary or casual character, meat 
 inspectors, female office cleaners, semi-official postmasters, and many other employees 
 whom it would not be expedient or convenient to bring mthin the temporary 
 employment provisions of the law, are exempted, the exemptions being reviewed 
 annually by the Commissioner. 
 
 The existing provisions of th6 law in respect to exemptions have operated satis- 
 factorily, and the only suggestion T desire to make in relation thereto is that in future 
 Orders-in Council dealing with exemptions, a provision should be inserted that 
 departure from Industrial Court or Wages Boards determinations in regard to rates 
 of payment or conditions of employment should only be made with the sanction of the 
 Public Service Commissioner in the exercise of his arbitral functions. This is necessary 
 in order that a satisfactory check may be imposed on questions of remuneration, and 
 so that differential practices as to hours of labour and holidays shall, where considered 
 necessary, be brought into agreement with recognised Public Service conditions. 
 
 APPOINTMENTS TO THE SERVICE. 
 
 Appointments to the Public Service following upon competitive examination 
 are made by the Commissioner, and after expiration of the probationary period, are 
 confirmed or annulled by the Governor-General. Appointments without examinations 
 —(a) to the Administrative or Professional Division of persons not already in the 
 service, and (b) of persons who are eligible by reason of employment in the Public, 
 Railway, or other Service of a State, or in the service of a Territory, are made by the 
 Governor-General on the recommendation of the Commissioner, and generally without 
 probation. 
 
 The provisions of the Act as to confirmation of appointments by the Governor- 
 General involve considerable clerical labour as well as delay in the final making of 
 appointments, and the circumlocution inseparable from the present practice serves no 
 good purpose. For example, the appointment of a messenger boy is made by the 
 Commissioner upon probation for a period of six months, at the end of which period 
 the head of the department reports to the Commissioner the satisfactory performance 
 or otherwise of the duties carried out by the appointee. Upon this report the 
 Commissioner prepares a recommendation to the Governor-General for confirmation 
 or annulment of the appointment, as the case may be, and this recommendation is 
 forwarded through the usual departmental channels to the permanent head of the 
 department concerned, in whose office is prepared an Executive minute which is placed 
 before the ]\Iinister, is transmitted thence to the Executive Council, receives the 
 indorsement of the Governor-General, and finally the appointee is informed that the 
 appointment is confirmed or annulled, and notification published in the Commonwealth 
 Gazette. The work and delay involved in this circuitous course is unnecessary, and to 
 obviate the present circumlocution, the power of direct appointment, except in certain 
 special cases which may be prescribed, should be vested in the Commissioner. In two 
 of the most recent Civil Service Acts, those of the Dominions of Canada and New Zealand, 
 the power of appointment is intrusted to the Public Service Commissioners, and there 
 is the strongest reason for adoption of a similar arrangement in the Commonwealth. 
 
 The Act directs that all new appointments to the Clerical Division, except in the 
 case of returned soldiers, shall be made to the lowest subdivision of the Fifth Class at a 
 commencing salary of £60 per annum, no provision being made for the recognition of 
 
35 
 
 educational qualifications of an advanced character by the payment of a higher 
 commencing salary than the minimum. This, in my opinion, constitutes a serious 
 defect in the present law. A boy ruay, under the regulations, enter the Clerical 
 Division of the service at sixteen years of age. If at that age he has attained an 
 educational standard sufficient to enable liim to pass the entrance examination, an 
 inducemej'it is offered him by the prospect of early appointment and consequent 
 seniority to join the service at the sacrifice of further education. The entrance 
 examination is equivalent in standard to the University Junior Public (Intermediate) 
 Examination. The youth who contirmes his studies for a further two years, say, until 
 he has reached eighteen years of age, and then seeks to enter the Public Service, is 
 handicapped by reason of the fact thnt he is bound to commence at the mimmum 
 salary of £6v, as in the case of the boy of sixteen years of age, and has lost two years of 
 seniority in the service. This difficulty should be met by a provision that a youth who 
 thus continues his studios and qualifies by passing the University Senior Public 
 (Leaving) Examination, or any other prescribed examination, can be appointed to the 
 service at a salary above the minimum and with corresponding seniority. There is no 
 doubt that the services of many brilliant youths are lost to the Government owing 
 to the shortsighted policy of failing to provide for entrance at a later age and -with 
 advanced educational qualifications. 
 
 Except in certain special cases covered by the provisions of the Act all appoint- 
 ments to the General Division are made as the result of competitive examination, the 
 educational examination being of a rudimentary character. Experience has shown that 
 in many appointments to this divisioji considerable advantage would be gained by 
 dispensing with the obligation to hold examinations. For example, if a vacancy occurs 
 for a carpenter, a competitive examination is necessary. An elementary educational 
 examination is of no value in testing the efficiency of applicants, and to preserve the 
 competitive element each applicant is tested by performance of actual work required 
 to be done in his trade. This is a cumbrous and costly procedure, productive of delays, 
 and involving the employment of officers as examiners at a loss to their departments of 
 their services. In the course required to be followed of notifying examinations, making 
 all necessary preparations, and in passing the candidates through the requisite tests, 
 it m^y happen that months will elapse in the selection of one person to fill, say, a 
 carpenter's vacancy in the Post Office Department. 
 
 The holding of examinations as a prehminary to appointment has been particu- 
 larly detrimental to the securing of boys for the work of telegraph messenger in certain 
 localities in the Commonwealth where there is an insistent demand for boy labour. 
 Boys of the class desired for telegraph messengers' positions find no difficulty in these 
 localities in securing positions without any of the troublesome features connected with 
 examinations, i.e., lodging formal applications, paying entrance fees, attending the 
 examination, waiting until the results are available, and, finally, their turn for appoint- 
 ment. In such circumstances the boys take the jobs first at hand, and the Department 
 suffers from the poor field left for its selection. These remarks apply particularly to 
 Sydney and Brisbane. In Victoria, where the supply of suitable boys generally exceeds 
 the demand, the system of competitive examination is the most suitable, and should be 
 continued ; but a more direct system should be substituted in the localities where the 
 difficulties mentioned are being experienced. While it is practicable and desirable 
 to continue the system of competitive examinations in the majority of positions in the 
 General Division, power should be given to the Commissioner to dispense with examina- 
 tions in cases such as those of artisans, labourers, and, in certain localities, telegraph 
 messengers. A method of selection with suitable safeguards can readily be substituted in 
 these cases for the present cumbrous and unsatisfactory method of holding examinations. 
 
 Under the existing law no person ca.n be appointed to the Clerical Division of 
 the Public Service unless he has passed the entrance examination, or unless he is an 
 officer or ex-officer of a corresponding division in a State or Territorial Service. 
 Appointments may, however, be made to the Administrative and Professional Divisions 
 without examination, subject to the Commissioner's certificate that there is no person 
 available in the Public Service who is as capable of filling the position to which the 
 appointment is to be made. The interests of the service have benefited by this provision, 
 and in the eveiit of adoption of a proposal made later in this Report to amalgamate the 
 present Professional and Clerical Divisions as the "Third Di\asion," it should be 
 continued as one of the conditions for entrance to that division. A much wider field will 
 
36 
 
 be afforded the Government for the recraitment of the service by the appointment of 
 persons vath special and distinctive qualifications. The provision should be utilized 
 only in such exceptional cases, and in no instance where the vacancy can be adeqaately 
 filled by an ofl&cer from within the service. Any appointment made under it should be 
 subject to the approval of the Governor-General and report to Parliament. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE. 
 
 In any proposals for reorganization of Public Service administration, the 
 (!lassification of the service must necessarily form an important part as involving equitable 
 recognition of the value of duties performed by every class of officer, from the adminis- 
 trative head to the junior messenger, by the granting of adequate salaries for services 
 rendered. It is of the first importance in dealing with an army of public servants engaged 
 in a variety of occupations requiring the possession of attainments varied in character, 
 or performing duties of a similar nature but differing in importance and responsibility, 
 that a precise m.ethod of grouping should be adopted in order that comparisons may be 
 made between the relative values of offices. A system of classification has therefore 
 to be evolved whicJi will enable these conditions to be met. 
 
 Under the existing Public Service Act provision is made for separating the service 
 into divisions, classes, and grades, the divisions being constituted in the fol1o^\ing 
 manner : — 
 
 The Administrative Division includes all Permanent Heads and Chief 
 Officers, and all persons whose offices the Governor-General on the 
 recommendation of the Commissioner directs to be included in the 
 division. 
 
 The Professional Division, in which the prescribed conditions for inclusion 
 require special skill or technical Icnowledge usually acquired only in some 
 profession or calling different from the ordinary routine of the Public 
 Service. 
 
 The Clerical Division, which is prescribed as including all officers whose 
 offices are directed by the Governor General on the recommendation of 
 the Commissioner to be included in such division. 
 
 The General Division includes all officers not in other divisions. 
 
 It will be observed that, while some guidance is given for determining inclusion 
 in the Administration and Professional Divisions,the officers to be placed in the Clerical 
 and General Divisions are left to the discretion of the Commissioner. While under the 
 provisions of the Act admission to the Clerical and General Divisions can be obtained 
 only as the result of competitive examination except in certain special cases, in the 
 Administrative and Professional Divisions appointments may be made withoat 
 examination, the essential conditions being that the interests of the service require the 
 appointment, and that there is no officer already in the service as capable of filling the 
 position as the proposed appointee. It is no doubt due to the differing conditions of 
 entrance to the service that the practice of separation into Professional and Clerical 
 Divisions had its origin in several of the State services, and later on in the Commonwealth 
 service. The existing arrangement of the Pubhc Service into diviSions, combined with 
 the prescribed methods of admission to the service, has resulted in the creation of 
 numerous anomalies amongst which has been the appointment of persons to the 
 Professional Division whose duties could not .even under a most liberal interpretation 
 be considered as professional in character, but who by reason of the examination 
 barrier, or because of age, could not be appointed to the Clerical Division. In certain 
 instances, in order to overcome the difficulties arising from the present faulty division 
 of the service, officers have been placed in the Professional Division so that salaries 
 might be granted at rates higher than are prescribed in the Clerical Division, or possibly 
 because it was considered injudicious to classify such officers in the Administrative 
 Division. No question is raised as to the necessity for such appointments, which were 
 essentially in the public interest and in agreement with the spirit of the Public Service 
 Act ; but the fact remains that certain officers are included in the Professional Division 
 the nature of whose duties and qualifications cannot be deemed to be professional in 
 the ordinary acceptation of the term. On the other hand, officers may be found in the 
 Clerical Division whose functions and qualifications are as distinctive as those of many 
 
37 
 
 professional officers, their skill and knowledge in many instances being partly due to 
 training outside the Public Service, as for example in connexion with courses of study 
 for admission to the recognised Institutes of Accountants. 
 
 In the Public Service legislation of other countries, and of some of the Australian 
 States, although the Professional and Clerical Divisions are separately classified, the 
 same scale of salaries is applicable to each, and this is particularly noticeable in the 
 State of New South Wales, where the regulations prescribe one scale of salaries for both 
 divisions ; hence it may reasonably be assumed that the only justification for a separate 
 nomenclature is that the conditions of entrance to the two divisions of the service being 
 different it was found desirable to create an arbitrary distinction. In my opinion this 
 does not furnish sufficient ground for maintaining these distinctions in the Common- 
 wealth, seeing that the methods of appointment to the Professional or Clerical ranks 
 should be similar in e\ery respect, and be determined by competitive examination in 
 either case, excepting where the position to be filled is of such a nature as to require the 
 exercise of skill and training not possessed by any officer of the service, when the 
 appointment, whether professional or clerical, should be made without examination. 
 Classification of the service does not require an arbitrary distinction between so-called 
 professional and clerical positions, and there is no sound justification for such a distinction. 
 Classification should be dependent upon the value of the duties, whether performed by 
 an engineer or a clerk. It will follow, as a matter of course, that the proportion of officers 
 with professional qualifications in the higher classes will be far larger than of those 
 with ordinary clerical qualifications. 
 
 The distinguishing of divisions by names which are not invariably appropriate 
 to the qualifications and work of the officers included in such divisions should, in my 
 opinion, be abandoned in favour of a numerical separation to secure a more desirable 
 uniformity in classification and scales of pay, and remove claims for preferential 
 treatment and an irritating distinction of " caste " based only upon nomenclature. 
 A rectification of anomalies and a desirable elasticity will be secured by the adoption 
 of new divisions on the following lines : — 
 
 The Public Service should consist of four divisions, designated as — 
 
 First Division. 
 
 Second Division. 
 
 Third Division. 
 
 Fourth Division. 
 
 The First Division should be confined to Permanent Heads and Chief Officers 
 of departments, i.e., the officers who are responsible for the general administration of 
 departments throughout the Commonwealth, or responsible for the general working 
 and business of a department within a State. The Second Division should include 
 officers who under Permanent Heads or Chief Officers are required to exercise executive 
 functions in directing the work of the more important and distinctive branches of the 
 Service. The Third Division should include all officers now in the Professional and 
 Clerical Divisions (excepting such as may be placed in the Second Division), and all 
 officers who may be subsequently appointed, under the prescribed conditions, to the 
 Third Division. The Fourth Division should include all persons in the Public Service 
 not included in the other Divisions. 
 
 Classification ivitliin Divisions.- — Having separated the Public Service into suitable 
 Divisions, it becomes necessary to consider the further separation of these Divisions 
 into classes appropriate to the value and class of work to be performed, with scales of 
 salary for each class. At present there is no classification of the Administrative 
 Division, the salaries of administrative officers being determined by the amounts provided 
 in the annual Appropriation Act. The Professional Division is divided into classes 
 under regulation ; the Clerical Division is also divided into classes, but the subdivision 
 is made by the Act ; the General Division is divided into grades under regulation. In 
 considering the method of classification within the proposed Divisions, the continuance 
 of the present conditions under which two divisions are dealt mth by regulation, one 
 by the Act, and the fourth is not controlled by regulation or Act, cannot be recommended. 
 It is proposed that the classification of the four Divisions shall be prescribed by regulation. 
 The classes for the First and Second Divisions should be common to both, the Third 
 Division should have its separate group of classes, and the Fourth Division should be 
 
38 
 
 classified under occupations, or designations of positions, with a scale of salary appropriate 
 to such occupation or designation, and not by a system of grading as prescribed in 
 the Act of 1902. 
 
 First Division. — In prescribing by regulation the range of salary for each class in this 
 Division, action Avill be required which, in nly opinion, has too long been postponed. The 
 First Division is to replace the present Administrative Division. The Public Service Act 
 provides that officers of the Administrative Division, except in the case of officers paid 
 at a specified rate by virtue of any Act, shall be paid such salaries as may be voted by 
 Parliament. At the initial classification of the Public Service in 1904, recommendation was 
 made setting out the salary to be paid in respect to each office classified in the Administra- 
 tive Division. The Attorney-General was asked, however, whether the Commissioner was 
 empowered to name the salary to be paid officers of the Administrative Division, and 
 advice was given that he was not so empowered, and could only recommend that the 
 officers be placed in the Administrative Division, leaving it to PaJiament to fix their 
 salaries. The provision for salaries in this Division was, therefore, deleted from the 
 classification of 1904, and there is little doubt that, as a result, administrative officers 
 have been prejudiced by the fact that their remuneration has never been reviewed l)y 
 the Commissioner. 
 
 The advantage to the Government and to Parliament of giving the Conunissioner 
 authority to determine the salaries of administrative officers is obvious. Relative 
 values of services can only be properly arrived at by comparison, and the Commissiojier, 
 with his knowledge of administrative conditions in every department, is the most suitable 
 person to make such a comparison. Under existing arrangements, advancement in 
 salary of an a,dministrative officer is practically dependent upon whether a Minister, 
 with or without the solicitation of his Permanent Head, decides to include provision 
 for advancement in the departmental estimates, that this provision is permitted to remain 
 undisturbed in the final draft of the estimates, and that it is indorsed by Parliament. 
 The unsatisfactory features of such procedure are self-evident. It is in the highest 
 degree humiliating for administrative officers who think they merit promotion to have 
 to make personal appeals to their Minister to ask Parliament to grant them higher pay. 
 An officer of high ideals is at once prejudiced by the possession of such attributes. If, 
 however, the Minister is prepared to withstand the attacks certain to be made upon 
 him for recommending a highly paid officer for advancement, he is faced Avith the difficulty 
 of convincing his colleagues in Cabinet and members of hi^ party who know that no 
 political gain — rather the reverse — -will be obtained by promoting officers of high grade, 
 and are consequently un\^al]ing to sanction what cannot bring them advantage, but will 
 almost certainly bring them blame from some section of the public. It has also to be 
 recognised that provision by one Minister for advancement m salary to his particular 
 administrative officers, and omission by other Ministers of similar pro\nsion for their 
 officers, establish grounds for complaint as to invidious treatment. The final authorities 
 in the preparation of the estimates are placed in a difficult position in determining 
 whether the provision should stand, and whether other officers have not equal claims 
 for consideration. There is little doubt that the present conditions have operated 
 unfavorably to many administrative officers, and have resulted in tlie adoption of a 
 negative policy towards them. Salaries which at the inception of Federation may have 
 been fairly adequate for the officers charged with responsibility for the administration 
 of Departments, as then constituted, are not conmiensurate with the importance of their 
 present functions, and the limitation placed upon the powers of the Commissioner in 
 respect to such officers has had, in my opinion, a prejudicial effect in this direction. 
 
 In a preceding section of this Eeport evidence has been given as to the growth 
 of Departments, and a comparison may be made — selecting for purposes of illustration 
 the Attorney-General's Department, the Department of the Treasury, and the Postmaster- 
 General's Department- of the manner in which the grooving responsibilities of Permanent 
 Heads have failed to be reflected in their salaries — 
 
 Salaries paid in 
 
 1906. 1918. 
 
 £ £ 
 
 Secretary , Attorney-General's Department . . .. 800 .. 1,000 
 
 Secretary to the Treasury . . . . . . 800 . . 1,000 
 
 Secretary, Postmaster-General's Department . , 1,000 . . 1,000 
 
39 
 
 If consideration be given to the administrative and professional qualifioations 
 of the Permanent Head of the Attorney-General's Department and to the important 
 responsibilities of his position, both as Permanent Head and as Solicitor-General, it 
 ■will be recognised that the present salary attached to the office is far from adequate to 
 meet existing conditions. In the Department of the Treasury, a comparatively small 
 department in the early years of the Commonwealth, the responsibilities of the position 
 have considerably increased. The addition of Loans, Pensions, Taxation, Note and 
 Stamp Printing, and Note Issue Branches to the Department has now made it one of 
 the most important Departments of the Commonwealth Service. It is unnecessary to 
 dwell on the immense development of the financial activities of the Commonwealth 
 with which the Treasury is so vitally connected, and the conclusion is obvious that the 
 remuneration of the permanent head is not in keeping with the value of the services 
 rendered to the community, nor in parity with that paid to managing heads of large 
 financial institutions. It will be observed that in the Postmaster-General's Department 
 no alteration has been made in the salary of the permanent head, a condition which is 
 open to comment in the hght of the changed circumstances of that department, with 
 its largely increased responsibilities. These instances have been cited by way of 
 illustration, but it may be stated generally that in any new system of classification the 
 salaries of administrative officers require to be revised in consonance with the importance 
 of their relative responsibilities. For the purposes of the proposed revision a 
 regulation should be made prescribing classes suitable to the relative importance of 
 the positions occupied by Permanent Heads and Chief Officers, into which the First 
 Division should be divided with an appropriate scale of salary for each class. 
 
 References to the salaries paid to administrative officers are made in a report 
 by the Royal Commission appointed in connexion with the administration of the Navy 
 and Defence Departments, and also by a .Royal Commission which inquired into the 
 working of departments of the Public Service of the State of Victoria, in the following 
 terms : — 
 
 Page 33 — paragraph 53. — Royal Commission — Navy and Defence Defartments. 
 
 We consider the department will have great difficulty in getting competent officers to fill the 
 higher positions unless some re-arrangement be made of the rates of pay to senior Government officers. 
 In this connexion, we instance the cases of the Auditor-General of the Commonwealth, the Secretary to 
 the Defence Department, and the Secretary to the Commonwealth Treasury, all of whom are performing 
 work of a highly responsible nature, and are in receipt of salaries absolutely inadequate for the duties 
 pertaining to their offices. 
 
 Page 20 — Royal Commission — State Public Service of Victoria (1917). 
 
 Some interesting facts may be gleaned from this table. (Table comparing rates of payment in 
 the Public Service and outside the Service.) The results are favourable to the Public Service up to the 
 salary of £624. From that division onwards they suffer by the comparison. We may say that we were 
 not surprised with the last-named result, for when going through the departments, noting the responsi- 
 bilities of the senior officers, we were impressed by the fact that their salaries were distinctly below those 
 paid for corresponding .services in commercial establishments. 
 
 The remarks thus made by the Victorian Royal Commission apply with equal 
 if not greater force to the Commonwealth Service. Out of over 2.3,000 positions in 
 the Service there are only 40 carrying salary in excess of £600 per annum. WTien one 
 considers these figures it will be recognised that the prizes to which ambitious officers 
 may aspire are very few. In the interests of good government it is essential that the 
 remuneration of officials exercising important administrative or financial functions 
 should be dealt with in no parsimonious spirit. 
 
 The salaries of all officers of the Public Service should be governed by regulation 
 in order that the changing conditions of the country and the service may from time to 
 time be met by appropriate action in the adjustment of salaries, the powers of Parliament 
 in respect to the voting of funds being retained. In the proposed First Division 
 (administrative officers) the classes to be adopted must necessarily cover a vnde range 
 of salaries, as, between an executive position which may be properly recognised by a 
 minimum salary of, say, £550 per annum, and the highest administrative position which 
 may carry a salary of £1,500 per annum, are an appreciable number of offices varying 
 in importance and value. Classification is, therefore, essential in order that the 
 assessment of values shall lie on a sound comparative basis. The First and Second 
 Divisions should be subdivided into nine classes, with a minimum salary of £550 in the 
 
40 
 
 lowest and a maximum of £1,500 in the highest class. It has akeady been indicated 
 that the Second Division, which is to include officers who under the permanent heads 
 and chief officers are to exercise administrative functions in directing the work of the 
 more important and distinctive branches of the service, should be classified under the 
 same groiiping of salaries as the First Division, but it will not necessarily follow that 
 any officer of the Second Division will receive the maximum salary prescribed for the 
 First Division, but this may be possible in the case of an officer who, although not a 
 permanent head, is required to possess high professional qualifications and to exercise 
 important administrative functions. The conditions as to classification of the Second 
 Division will be fully met by the provision made as to classes in the First Division under 
 a desirable elasticity of application. 
 
 The Third Division, which will comprise officers at present in the Professional 
 and Clerical Divisions, excluding those to be placed in the Second Division, will also 
 require to be brought under a definite system of classification, and in this connexion it 
 is desirable to examine the provisions of the existing law in respect to the Professional 
 and Clerical Divisions. The Professional Division is divided by regulation into six 
 classes with subdivisions in each class, these subdivisions representing the stages of 
 salary through which an officer passes in advancing from the minimum to the maximum 
 of the class. The Public Service Act divides the Clerical Division into five classes, with 
 subdivisions on a similar principle to those in the classes in the Professional 
 Division. 
 
 Until the issue of recent awards by the Arbitration Court the range of salary 
 in each class was as follows : — 
 
 Pkofessional Division. 
 
 
 Clu«. 
 
 Minimum. 
 
 Maximum. 
 
 Incremente. 
 
 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 
 r 
 
 72 
 
 204 
 
 24 and 18 * 
 
 
 E 
 
 216 
 
 312 
 
 24 t 
 
 
 I) 
 
 336 
 
 408 
 
 24 t 
 
 
 c 
 
 432 
 
 504 
 
 24 t 
 
 
 B 
 
 528 
 
 600 
 
 24 t 
 
 
 Jl 
 
 624 
 
 1,250 
 
 ... t 
 
 Clerical Division. 
 
 
 5 
 
 60 
 
 200 
 
 12 and 18 * 
 
 • 
 
 4 ■ ... 
 
 210 
 
 300 
 
 25 and 20 f 
 
 
 3 
 
 310 
 
 400 
 
 20 t 
 
 
 2 
 
 420 
 
 500 
 
 20 t 
 
 
 1 
 
 520 
 
 600 
 
 20 t 
 
 
 Special 
 
 
 700 
 
 ... X 
 
 • Annual, and subject only to satisfactort' semce. 
 
 t Discjetionary with Commissioner. 
 
 t Salary paid accordinfir to fixed value of office. 
 
 The principles governing advancement in both divisions were similar, and the 
 following remarks upon the Clerical Division may be read, mutatis mutandis, as also 
 applying to the Professional Division. "\Miile the Act prescribes for the lowest (fifth) 
 class of the Clerical Division that advancement through the class shall be annual, 
 subject to satisfactory service, no officer may be advanced within a class in the fourth 
 and higher classes of the Clerical Division except by promotion from one subdivision 
 to th e next liigher subdivision. The Act further provides that an officer may be promoted 
 from one subdivision to another although there may not be a vacancy in the latter 
 subdivision, and a further condition of advancement is that the officer must have served 
 at least twelve months in the subdivision of class from which he is to be advanced. The 
 Act undoubtedly does not contemplate the advancement as a matter of course of an officer 
 in the fourth or higher classes from the minimum salary to the maximum salary of his 
 class; and in administering the Act advancement has been granted by the Commissioner 
 only in cases where, upon the report of his Inspectors and the opinions of the responsible 
 officers of departments, he has been satisfied that the value and importance of the 
 officer's work and the efficiency and dihgence displayed in its performance have warranted 
 the advancement. Despite the provisions of the Act, however, an officer upon entering 
 
41 
 
 one of the higher classes in the Clerical Division expects to be advanced from the 
 niininmm salary of his class to the maximum in the least time legally possible. If, for 
 example, he is placed in the Third Class (with its four subdivisions above the first) with 
 salary of £310, he considers that he should not be reqiiired to spend more than one year 
 in each subdivision, and that after four "years' service in the class he should be in receipt of 
 £400 per annum. ITiese expectations are in many cases not realized. In dealing with 
 the advancement of officers through the class the Commissioner requires to be satisfied 
 that the officer is not being paid the full value of his services by the salary he is receiving, 
 and, while the value and importance of the work of one officer and the diligence and 
 efficiency he displays would warrant the Commissioner in considering that £400 would 
 not be an excessive salary return for his services, in another case the circumstances would 
 be adequately met by payment at £360 per annum. 
 
 In this provision of the Act for subdivisional promotion of officers in the fourth 
 and higher classses lies one of the most difficult and troublesome problems confronting 
 the Commissioner. The matter is complicated by the dissimilar nature of duties in 
 the several departments, and by the divergent views held by permanent heads, chief 
 officers, and heads of branches, not only as to their obligations to the Commonwealth 
 in making recommendations for public expenditure, but also as to the importance and 
 value of officers' duties. Experience has proved that one chief officer, taking a liberal 
 view of the importance of an officer's work, or being unduly influenced by relative 
 seniority, or by the desire to stand well with the officer concerned, favours rapid 
 advancement to the maximum salary of a class ; while another chief officer adopts 
 differeiit views as to value of services rendered, and is not swayed by seniority or 
 personal considerations. Notwithstanding the varying views and personal idiosyncrasies 
 of chief officers, it has been the aim of the Commissioner and his Inspectors to secure 
 uniformity of treatment and of valuation of work, and in carrying out this policy the 
 recommendations of chief officers have frequently had to be departed from, either 
 in the direction of advancing officers who have been passed over or in not approving of 
 advancement which has been recommended by chief officers. From this fact arises one 
 of the most fruitful causes of discontent in a large section of the service. It is only in 
 exceptional cases that an officer will admit that his work is relatively less important than 
 that of another, or that he is relatively less efficient. As a rule, when an officer finds 
 that he has not been advanced, and another officer in the same class has received an 
 increment, he complains to the head of his branch, the result being in many cases that the 
 officer is informed that it is not understood why he has not been advanced, that he was 
 recommended, but the Inspector or Commissioner has not indorsed the recommendation. 
 Even when the officer has not been departmentally recommended, he is left in ignorance 
 of the departmental view. There is reason to believe that in many instances pringipal 
 officers thus endeavour to escape the unpleasant features of their responsibilities, and 
 throw the onus for refusal upon the Commissioner. The responsibility for refusal based 
 upon a frank, open, and unbiased report by a chief officer can fairly be accepted by the 
 Commissioner; but the unsatisfactory feature of the present procedure is that 
 it establishes a sense of gi-ievance in a fairly large section of officers, as it is 
 inevitable that, in discriminating by efficiency and value of work, at one time or 
 another many officers will be denied one or more increments which rightly or wrongly 
 they think they should have obtained. This unsettling effect upon officers is frequently 
 reflected in their work, and has a still more undesirable result in fostering a spirit of 
 antagonism to the authorities administering the Public Service Act, which cannot conduce 
 to efficiency and contentment in the service. 
 
 Complaints against controlling officers of personal predilection or of antipathy 
 are inseparable from the operation of any system, no matter how conscientiously and 
 capably administered, where the. personal equation looms so largely. While I am 
 satisfied that in the Commonwealth there has been little or no ground for such grievance, 
 it is impossible to avoid complaints from officers who have an exaggerated idea of 
 their abilities and are disappointed when those responsible for their work make a 
 different assessment. These have been used as a basis of a general attack on the 
 system of advancement of officers in the higher classes of the Public Service, and to such 
 effect that, in the recent award of the Arbitration Court relating to officers of the 
 Professional Division, increments to officers of corresponding classes to those of the 
 Clerical Division have been made practically annual and automatic. There are 
 many positions which must necessarily be classified in a particular class as being 
 worth the niiuimum salary, although not worth the maximum salary, of the 
 
42 
 
 class. The object aimed at in tlie Commissioner's administration has been to grant 
 an appropriate rate of salary, and in this connexion the following extract from 
 the report presented in 1917 by the Royal Commission on the State Public Service of 
 Victoria is of interest : — 
 
 The neglect to give proper effect to an important {irovision of the law enacted for the first time 
 in the Act of 1883, whicli enabled salaries to be fixed at a limit within a class, is another instance of 
 faulty admiiiiatration. \Vhen the Act referred to was passed. Parliament very properly recognised that 
 the duties tif a particular officer might not be worth anything like the maximum salary of his class, and 
 therefoie gave power to fix a limit in that case below the maximum. But, except in a few cases — and 
 it is hard to say why these particular cases have been singled out for special treatment — the will of 
 Piirliament has been set aside. Let us take an example. An officer in the 4th class — minimum salary 
 £216, maximum £3.'5C — may be engaged in work that is not worth more than £250 per annum at the 
 outside ; yet, so long as he behaves himself and attends to his duties, he gets regular increments until he 
 reaches the maxinnim of £336. In all the different clas.ses the position is similar. We are satisfied that 
 the neglect to administer the provision under notice in accordance with the intention of the framers of 
 the law has greatly increased the cost of administration. Instead of fixing salaries as has been done in 
 a few cases only, the great majority should, in our opinion, have been so dealt with, as the duties of 
 a very large number of the positions in the various classes are more or less routine. No commercial 
 institution run on business lines would dream of paying its servants as the State does. 
 
 The provisions of the State Public Service Act in relation to the advancement 
 of officers within a class are similar to those of the Commonwealth Pubhc Ser\ace Act, 
 and the opinion expressed by the State Royal Commission upon the practice of regularly 
 advancing an officer by increments through his class is in consonance with the attitude 
 adopted by the Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner, who, whatever the defects 
 of the system, has conscientiously carried out the expressed directions of the Parliament 
 as embodied in the Public Service Act. It should be mentioned that the method of 
 classification and the conditions of subdivisional advancement within the several classes 
 of the Professional and Clerical Divisions have been the subject of awards by the 
 Arbitration Court, which have differed in their provisions. While in the award for 
 the Clerical Division the system of advancement by subdivisional promotion in the 
 higher classes as laid down by the Act has been followed by the Court, in the Professional 
 Division award (made by another Judge) the principle has been abandoned in favour 
 of automatic and annual increments in the three lower classes, and of discretionary 
 increments at the will of the permanent head in the higher classes. 
 
 In summarizing the conclusions arrived at, it appears to me that the present 
 system is defective in the following respects : — ■ 
 
 (1) The existing provision for classes and scales of salaries as made by the 
 
 Act is too rigid. 
 
 (2) The classes in the Clerical and Professional Divisions are insufficient in 
 
 number, and do not readily permit of classification based on relative 
 values of offices. 
 
 (3) The increments prescribed for the several classes above the lowest class 
 
 are unnecessarily high, and the range of salary too wide. 
 
 (4) The present system of discretionary increments imposes a heavy burden 
 
 on administrative officers in making inquiries into individual claims, 
 and is a serious tax on the time of the Commissioner and Inspectors 
 in adjudicating upon such claims without commensurate results. 
 
 The remedial measures which should be taken involve — (1) the fixing of classes 
 and salaries by regulation, (2) the increase in the number of classes Avith a lesser range 
 between the minimum and maximum salaries of each class, (3) reduction in the amount 
 of increments, which should be annual, (4) increments to be granted, subject to satis- 
 factory service, by the Permanent Head or Chief Officer, with the right of appeal to the 
 Commissioner by aggrieved officers where increments have been deferred or refused. 
 
 While the details of the proposed classification of the Third Division should be 
 covered by regulations, some indication may be given of the general lines which should 
 be followed. These are set forth in the tentative scale hereunder : — 
 
 
 Third Division. 
 
 
 
 Class. 
 
 Minimum. 
 
 Maximum. 
 
 Increments. 
 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 
 9 
 
 66 
 
 210 
 
 18 
 
 
 8 
 
 222 
 
 252 
 
 15 
 
 
 7 
 
 2G4 
 
 312 
 
 12 
 
 
 6 
 
 324 
 
 372 
 
 12 
 
 
 5 
 
 384 
 
 432 
 
 12 
 
 
 4 
 
 . 444 
 
 492 
 
 12 
 
 
 3 ... ..? 
 
 504 
 
 552 
 
 12 
 
 
 2 
 
 564 
 
 612 
 
 12 
 
 
 1 
 
 624 
 
 672 
 
 12 
 
 
43 
 
 Provision should be made for some elasticity in the classification. For example, 
 although the minimum salary of the proposed Class 9 is shown as £66, it does not 
 necessarily follow that all new appointments to the class should be made at that salary. 
 In mating appointments to positions where professional training will be necessary, the 
 possession by the appointee of educational quahfications of higher than the minimum 
 standard for entrance to the Division should be prescribed as warranting appointment 
 at a salary in advance of the minimum. The same principle should be applicable in 
 appointing probationers for clerical duties ; thus while a candidate who has passed the 
 University Intermediate Examination or its equivalent may properly be appointed 
 to the service at the minimum rate, a candidate two years older, who has passed the 
 University Leaving Examination, should commence at a higher salary than the rainimum 
 of the lowest class. The acquirement by an officer of some official qualification, e.g., 
 accountancy diploma, shorthand certificate, might be recognised by the granting of, 
 say, a double increment. It may also be desirable to provide that an officer having 
 reached the maximum of Class 9, or even before attaining the maximum, may secure 
 promotion to Class .8 on passing a prescribed examination or otherwise demonstrating 
 qualifications of a special character, e.g., an officer in Class 9 of the Attorney-General's 
 Department who obtains an LL.B. degree, and similarly a junior engineer or some 
 other officer engaged in professional duties who acquires a corresponding quahfication 
 in some other department. 
 
 This provision might with advantage be extended even further to permit 
 officers, occupying positions to be specified, to advance through two or even three 
 classes irrespective of the occurrence of vacancies and without formal reclassification 
 of office. While in the majority of cases it is pi'acticab'le to definitely classify an 
 office Avithin the limits of salary of one class which would fairly represent the 
 minimum and maximum value of the work in that particular office ; in other cases 
 the assessment of a particular office should cover a wider range to represent the, 
 difference between the value of an officer when he first takes up the duties of the 
 office and that to which his experience and training in the office would eventually 
 entitle him. The positions occupied by Examining Officers in the Trade and 
 Customs Department may be selected for illustration. Differentiation in these cases 
 is largely one of training, experience, and individual efficiency, and not generally 
 of nature of duties ; and provision should be made for advancement in this position, 
 subject to prescribed conditions *as to efficiency, through certain specified classes 
 until the maximum value of an Examining Officer's work is reached. In order to 
 satisfactorily deal with such cases it should be provided that, in the event of a 
 promotion or retirement of an officer who has reached the highest class permissible 
 under the suggested method of progression, the vacancy should be filled in the lowest 
 of the combined classes and not in the class of the promoted or retired officer. Such 
 latter class should only be reached by progression as in the case of the retired 
 officer. Solely for purposes of example, and without expressing an opinion as to 
 the minimum or maximum value of the work of an Examining Officer, it may be 
 supposed that an officer has entered the Trade and Customs Department as a 
 Customs Assistant, which is in the lowest class, maximum value, say, £2iO. He is 
 promoted as an Examining Officer (Class 8), minimum £222. An Examining Officer's 
 position may be prescribed as covering three classes, the maximum of the highest 
 (6) being £372. The officer having progressed through these three classes may be 
 promoted out of the Examining Officer's class, and it becomes necessary to appoint 
 another Examining Officer. That officer would not be appointed to the class (6) of 
 the promoted officer but to the class (8) in which the promoted officer commenced 
 his work as Examining Officer. 
 
 The method of classification outhned herein will, I am satisfied, prove advantageous 
 to the service and wll give greater satisfaction to the officers concerned because of the 
 fact that their advancement is certain, provided their service is satisfactory. The 
 annual amount now applied to the payment of increments in the higher classes will 
 suffice for double the number of officers it has hitherto been possible to advance, while 
 administration of the Act will be freed from many of its present difficulties. 
 
 Fourth Division. — In this Division, at present known as the General Division, 
 it is proposed that rates of payment shall be fixed from time to time by regulation, as 
 at present, and officers classified in accordance with their several occupations. Under 
 the present arrangement a system of grading is imposed by the Act which is complicated 
 
u 
 
 and unnecessary. The suggested classification will secure simplicity of method and enable 
 scales of salary or fixed salaries, as the case may be, to be adopted in respect to 
 each designation of position without reference to other positions differently 
 designated. 
 
 There now remains to be considered the question of a reclassification of the 
 Public Service following new legislation in the direction herein recommended. With 
 the establishment of an altered system of divisions and classes, and the consequent 
 provision under regulation of scales of salaries with accruing increments for each of such 
 classes, it will be necessary to pass imder review the whole of the positions occupied 
 by officers in every department of the Commonwealth, and to assign values to these 
 positions, indicating such values by the appropriate division and class, thus formulating 
 what is usually termed a " classification " of the Public Service. This classification 
 will require to be carried out by the Assistant Commissioner and Inspectors, under the 
 general direction of the Commissioner, and when finally adopted will form the foundation 
 of the future administration of the Public Service Act. It is desirable that 
 provision be made for the classification being issued in divisions, or in relation 
 to particular sections of officers, instead of as a complete whole. Thus the Fourth 
 Division may be dealt with separately from the remainder of the Service, then possibly 
 the First and Second Divisions, while separate sections of the classification might be 
 issued in relation to large groups of officers with particular functions, such as for instance 
 postmasters and telegraphists. The classification should be subject to the right of 
 appeal by officers concerned. The existing provision for a Board of Appeal should be 
 eliminated as being too cumbersome and productive of delays in final adjudication. 
 Appeals should be filed with the Public Service Inspectors in the several States, and 
 be determined by the Commissioner. Following upon the settlement of all appeals 
 against the classification, and the approval of the Governor-General to the final 
 classification as modified by decisions on appeal, the matter should be presented to 
 Parliament. In order that any anomalies revealed by the classification may be rectified, 
 provision should be made in the Public Service Act that officers found to be in receipt 
 of salaries above the maximum salary prescribed for the classification of their offices 
 shall be transferred as opportunity presents itself to positions corresponding wth their 
 salaries ; but if such transfers have not been affected within a period of twelve months 
 from the date of Governor-General's approval of the classification, the salaries of such 
 officers shall be adjusted in agreement with the classified value of their offices. 
 Provision should likewise be made that from the date of proclamation of the new Public 
 Service Act, and pending approval of the classification, increments shall be suspended, 
 except in the- case of officers whose salary does not exceed £210 per annum. It should, 
 however, be stipulated that the sui^pension of increments beyond that salary shall 
 be taken into consideration in fixing the salary under the new classification, and the 
 date from which the classification will take efiect. 
 
 Officers of the Parliament. — It is provided by Section 14 of the Public Service Act 
 that appointments and promotions of officers of the Senate or House of Representatives 
 or of both Houses of Parliament, and all regulations affecting such officers, shall be made 
 by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the President of the Senate and/or 
 the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and that any functions exercised by the 
 Public Service Commissioner in respect to the Public Service generally shall, so far as 
 officers of the Parliament are concerned, be exercised by the President and/or Speaker. 
 It is further provided that the powers of a permanent head or chief officer shall in relation 
 to officers of Parliament be exercised by the Clerk of the Senate, the Clerk of the House 
 of Representatives, the Librarian, the Chief Parliamentary Reporter, or the Clerk of 
 the Joint House Committee, as the case may be. 
 
 Although these provisions have been in operation since the proclamation of the 
 Public Service Act in 1903, and notwithstanding that the Act prescribes inter alia that 
 the Service shall be divided into four Divisions, and that officers shall be classified 
 according to division, class, subdivision of class, or grade, no action has been taken to 
 effect a classification of the officers employed on the staffs of Parliament, or to make 
 regulations affecting such officers. The salaries of these officers are voted from year 
 to year in the Appropriation Act, but the determination as to amounts of salaries and 
 granting of increments does not appear to have been based on any settled principles. 
 It is difficult to understand the reason for placing officers of Parliament outside the 
 general provisions of the Public Service Act, and thus subjecting them to disadvantages 
 
45 
 
 in many respects, unless it be that the framers of the Act were guided by established 
 precedent as followed in the Public Scr\ace legislation of the several Stt:,tcs. In my 
 opinion, there is no real justification for separating tlie Parliamentary Service from 
 other departmental services, in so far as the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
 Commissioner is concerned. Officers of the Parliament are servants of the Common- 
 wealth precisely as are officers of the departments generally, and, making due 
 provision for the special conditions of employment of officers of the Parliament, one 
 system of administration should embrace all sections of- the service. 
 
 Under the proposals submitted in this Keport for the future management of the 
 Public Service, it is recommended that the Commissioner shall be responsible for 
 appointments to the Service, for classification of offices, for fixing the rates of payment 
 appropriate thereto, and for the determination of appeals relating to classification, 
 promotion, and refusal or deferment of increments. The permanent head or 
 chief officer is to have the responsibility of deahng with promotions, and granting 
 or deferment of increments, subject to the right of appeal by officers to the. 
 Commissioner. There is no good reason why these provisions should not be made 
 applicable to the- Parliamentary Service m common with all other branches of the service. 
 The Commissioner would thus deal with the classification of the Parliamentary service, 
 leaving it to the heads of the departments of Parliament to carry out the administration 
 of the Act so far as internal management is concerned. In dealing with offences, 
 however, the President and the Speaker should be the determining authority in place 
 of the Commissioner. It is probable the officers of Parliament would themselves welcome 
 the proposed alteration as placing them on the same footing as officers of the Service 
 outside Parliament, and insuring the adoption of a definite classification with provision for 
 regular advancement under the general scheme for classification. It is anomalous that 
 one section of the Public Service (the Parliamentary service) should be dealt with under 
 exclusive conditions ; a defective arrangement which should be remedied in the 
 proposed new legislation. I am unable to see any justification for slavish adherence 
 to precedent in a matter affecting the efficiency and well-being of a section of the 
 Public Service, and therefore recommend that the officers of Parliament be brought 
 into the general system of administration to govern the whole Service. 
 
 PROMOTION AND TRANSFER OF OFFICERS. 
 
 The principles which should govern the classification of the Service having been 
 discussed, it is necessary to consider a further important phase of Public Service adminis- 
 tration in relation to promotion and transfer of officers to fill vacancies occurring in the 
 departments. The efficiency of the Service depends very largely upon the methods 
 adopted in effecting promotions from class to class, -jnd any defects in the system of 
 carrying out staff changes in this direction would react with telling force against the 
 proper and economical management of public business. Fortunately for all concerned, 
 the old evils of political, official, or social influence in the advancement of officers of a 
 Public Service have given place to recognition of fitness for the discharge of the duties 
 to be performed, the Parliament in the Act of 1902 having cleaily defined the methods 
 to be adopted in the Commonwealth Public Service to insure a fair field and no favour. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to dwell upon the defects of any system of promotion 
 wherein seniority is regarded as the determining factor, as in all modern legislation 
 dealing with Public Service administration provision is made for the subordination of 
 seniority to other more important considerations. As far back as 1888 a British Royal 
 Commission, reporting on Civil Establishments, remarked, " We think that promotion 
 by seniority is the great evil of the service, and that it is indispensable to proceed 
 throughout every branch of it strictly on the principle of promotion by merit — that is 
 to say, by selecting always the fittest man instead of considering claims in the order of 
 seniority and rejecting only the ur.fit." Similar views have been expressed by Royal 
 Commisrions dealing with Pubhc Service matters in various parts of the British Dominions. 
 In framing the Commonwealth PubHc Service Act those responsible were not unmindful 
 of the experience of the Austrahan States in earher years, where promotion on the rigid 
 lines of seniority resulted in serious consequences to departments, when the trained 
 Customs officer, because of his seniority, was promoted to a position in the Crown Lands 
 Department, and when attempts were frequently made to fit the round peg into the 
 square hole. It was enacted by the Federal Parliament that efficiency should be the 
 fir'st consideration in the promotion of officers, and that seniority should only be a factor 
 in the event of an equality of efficiency. My experience from 1902 to 1916 in the 
 
46 
 
 admiDistration of the Act justifies me in the definite expression of opinion that not only 
 has the system of promotion by efficiency operated in a most satisfactory manner, but 
 any departure therefrom in new legislation would result prejudicially to the interests of 
 departments and of the public. In connexion with the suggestions submitted in this 
 Report for reorganization of the system of Pubhc Service control, it should be clearly 
 understood, therefore, that existing principles of promotion should be maintained. 
 
 The Pubhc Service extends over six States, with a Public Service Inspector and 
 Chief Officers in each State, consequently in order that a uniform practice might be 
 followed in the filhng of vacancies by promotion it was necessary to deal with the matter 
 by regulation. Briefly stated, the regidations provide for the following procedme : — 
 Vacancies are divided into two classes — (1) those for which it is desirable to invite 
 applications by notification in the Gazette, and (2) those which may be filled without 
 advertising. In the case of an advertised vacancy two weeks' notice is usually given, 
 and upon receipt of apphcations the Pubhc Service Inspector confers with the Chief 
 Officer. After conference, the Inspector and Chief Officer submit separate reports to 
 the Commissioner, the Chief Officer forwarding his report through the Permanent Head. 
 Upon these reports the Commissioner makes his recommendation to the Governor- 
 General, such recommendation being transmitted through the Minister of the department 
 concerned. The Governor-General's approval is conveyed through the customary 
 channels back to the department, when the promotion is gazetted. In regard to 
 non-advertised vacancies the procedure is similar, excepting that consideration is not 
 limited to the claims of applicants as in the other case. The time and labour involved 
 in this complicated and circuitous procedure is evident, and, although efforts have been 
 made to shorten the process by delegation of authority in certain classes of cases to 
 Inspectors and Chief Officers, nothing less than an amendment of the law will suffice to 
 place the matter on a proper footing. 
 
 The provisions of the law requiring a report from the Permanent Head or Chief 
 Officer, recommendation by the Commissioner, and approval by the Governor-General, 
 were designed no doubt as safeguards against unfair discrimination in the selection of 
 officers for promotion, but in the c-pplication of these provisions excessive delays have 
 occurred in filling vacant positions and consequent expense and inconvenience to 
 departments because of the necessity of making temporary arrangements pending the 
 permanent promotion of officers. It is not unusual for months to elapse between the 
 notification of a vacancy and the filling of the position, and in cases where the vacant 
 office is in the higher grades of the Service, the consequential changes following upon the 
 initial promotion can only be made long after the occurrence of the original vacancy, 
 with hampering effects upon departments which call for rectification. The time and 
 attention of Public Service Inspectors, especially in the larger States, are absorbed in 
 dealing with piomotions and transfers of officers to such an extent as to militate 
 seriously against their usefulness in other directions, particularly in regard to the 
 general organization of departments and the disposition of offices and officers to insure 
 efficient and economical management. If Inspectors were relieved of the responsibihty 
 of advising on staff changes involving promotions and transfers, more beneficial results 
 would accrue from the exercise of their inspectorial functions, which are highly 
 important and far-reaching in relation to successfid administration of the Public Service 
 Act. 
 
 Transfers are distinguished from promotions by the fact that no advancement 
 in salary follows the filling of a vacancy by transfer. It frequently happens that, while 
 the original vacancy requires to be filled by the promotion of an officer, consequential 
 vacancies may be filled by transfers without promotion. In determining transfers, 
 however, the question of fitness also arises, and care requires to be taken to so arrange 
 transfers that the minimum of inconvenience to the officer and his family, and of expense 
 to the department by way of removal expenses, shall be incurred. 
 
 Careful consideration has been given by me to the question of transferring the 
 authority for making promotions and transfers from the Public Service Commissioner 
 to the Permanent Heads and Chief Officers of departments. Responsible heads of 
 departments who are charged with the duty of internal administration have now a clear 
 conception of the principles that should govern the advancement of officers, and it 
 appears to me that, keeping in view the educative influences of the past sixteen years 
 under the Federal regime, the time has arrived when, subject to certain safeguards, the 
 departmental heads may be intrusted with authority as to staff changes. It is imperative 
 
47 
 
 that action be taken to obviate the present unseemly delays and to provide more business- 
 like methods, insuring at the same time that the claims of every officer are accorded 
 proper consideration. The transfer of these functions to Permanent Heads and Chief 
 Officers would mean the elimination of action by Inspectors and the Commissioner, as 
 well as reference to the Governor-General. To further expedite action. Chief Officers 
 should exercise authority in respect to promotions and transfers other than those to the 
 more important positions ; this would enable staff changes in the several States to be 
 carried out promptly, and with considerable savings in the present cost of making 
 temporary arrangements due to payment of traveUing expenses and relieving allowances. 
 Proper safeguards should, however, be provided against any possibility of outside 
 influence being used in determining promotions. 
 
 The following procedure should govern the making of promotions : — 
 
 (1) Promotions other than to the First Division to be made by the Permanent 
 
 Head or the Chief Officer. 
 
 (2) The principles governing promotion as at present defined in the Act to 
 
 remain unaltered, i.e., first and foremost, efficiency ; in the event of 
 equality of efficiency, then seniority. 
 
 (3) Promotions to be made provisionally, subject to the right of appeal by 
 
 aggrieved officers. 
 
 (4) Provisional promotions to be notified in the Commonwealth Gazette, or, 
 
 in the case of the Postmaster-General's Department, in the weekly 
 departmental list. 
 
 (5) A prescribed time to be fixed within which officers may lodge appeals 
 
 against proposed promotions. 
 
 (6) The grounds for appeal must be (a) that the appellant is more efficient 
 
 than the officer proposed to be promoted, or (6) that the appellant is 
 as efficient for the discharge of the duties of the vacant office as the 
 officer proposed to be promoted, and is the senior. 
 
 (7) Appeals to be addressed to the Permanent Head or Chief Officer, as the 
 
 case may be, and forwarded with accompanying report to the Public 
 Service Inspector for transmission to the Commissioner. 
 
 (8) The Inspector to make full inquiry into the claims of the officer proposed 
 
 to be promoted and of the appellant officer, and on completion of his 
 inquiries to forward the appeal with his report to the Commissioner, 
 who will, on the information furnished by the Permanent Head or 
 Chief Officer and the Inspector, determine the appeal. 
 
 (9) Where an appeal is disallowed by the Commissioner the department to 
 
 be notified accordingly. 
 
 (10) Where an appeal is upheld by the Commissioner, he will issue approval 
 
 for the promotion of the appellant officer, and for the cancellation of 
 the provisional promotion: Provided that in the case of promotions 
 in or to the Second Division the Minister may, if he think fit, refer 
 the matter to the Governor-General, who may confirm or disallow 
 the determination of the Commissioner, but, in the latter case, a 
 statement of the reasons for disallowance shall be laid before 
 Parliament. 
 
 I (11) Where no appeal has been lodged within the prescribed time, or 
 where an appeal has been disallowed by the Commissioner, the pro- 
 visional promotion to be confirmed by the Permanent Head or 
 Chief Officer, as the case may be, and to be gazetted as finally 
 approved. 
 
 By the adoption of these arrangements for promotion of officers, prominence will 
 be given to the efficiency provision of the law, and the Hmitation of appeals as suggested 
 will prevent officers who rely upon their seniority in the service from lodging unjustifiable 
 appeals, while heads of branches will be deterred from recommending relatively inefficient 
 senior officers for advancement. In addition, the safeguards of the right of appeal and of 
 independent inquiry by the Public Service Inspector should effectually prevent irregular 
 exercise of the power proposed to be conferred on heads of departments. 
 
48 
 
 It may possibly be urged that, instead of the proposed procedure for investigation 
 of appeals, provision should be made for the constitution of Boards of Appeal, with a 
 representative of the officers acting as a member of the Board ; but there are 
 stiong reasons why such a course should not be followed. If promotions are to 
 be effected with a minimum of delay, expeditious methods must be adopted. Investiga- 
 tion by Boards of Appeal would involve intolerable delays, a negation of responsibility, 
 and the withdrawal of administrative or other senior officers from their regular duties 
 to act as members of these Boards. The atmosphere inseparable from such a tribunal 
 is not conducive to informal investigation, and sources of information which are readily 
 made available to an Inspector in the course of his inquiries are not so available to a 
 Board of Appeal. The view cannot be expressed too strongly that the remission of 
 appeals to a formal Board of Appeal would involve a distinctly retrogressive step, and 
 the retention of the present system, with all its manifest defects, would be preferable 
 to the constitution of Boards of Appeal carrying no responsibility as to the ultimate 
 outcome of their recommendations. The future administration of the Public Service is 
 too important and serious a matter to be prejudiced by endeavoiirs to obtain theoretical 
 justice. 
 
 This matter is aptly dealt with by the Royal Commission on the New Zealand 
 PubHc Service, which reported as follows : — 
 
 " We are very strongly of opinion that an outside Appeal Board that can override the 
 management is a decided mistake. Positions like the following often arise : — A vacancj^ may occur in 
 the Service, and the management may have the right of promotion by merit. The management may look 
 down the list of officers next in the order of seniority and- think that No. 1.5, say, is far and away the 
 best man available for the position, and that he should get it. But they know that if they give him the 
 position, Nos. 1 to 14 can all appeal against it ; and if they do, the management has to appear before the 
 Board in the position of defendant and prove its case. Most men do not care to put up with this 
 annoyance and trouble, and, unless No. 1 is a ' rank duffer,' will give him the position regardless of 
 results to the Service. The result in most cases where Appeal Boards exist is that, although in theory 
 the system is promotioji by merit, in practice it is promotion l)y seniority, and the introduction of 
 promotion by .seniority instead of promotion by merit i.s the introduction into the Service of a dry rot 
 that will ultimately destroy its working efficiency. If there is no Appeal Board it is possible that an 
 occasional injustice may be done, but it is far better to risk this than to do a permanent injustice to the 
 Service as a whole and all the men of energy and ability in it." 
 
 Staff Committees. — ^A cognate subject to which it is necessary to make some 
 reference is the appointment within departments of what are generally known as staff 
 committees, formed to act as adyisory bodies to Chief Officers in the selection 
 of officers for transfer or promotion to vacant positions. In my opinion, not only are 
 such committees unnecessary, but their constitution would tend to a devolution of 
 responsibility of Chief Officers which would be most undesirable and pregnant with 
 unsatisfactory results in the working of departments. The Permanent Head or Chief 
 Officer should shoulder his burden of responsibihty, and carry out his obligations to the 
 Government without the aid or intervention of staff committees. Existence of such 
 committees affords heads of branches means of escape from the responsibility of reporting 
 freely and unreservedly upon the capacity of officers under their control, while the Chief 
 Officer would be enabled to evade his responsibility of exercising independent judgment. 
 It is not assumed that a Chief Ofl&cer will be in a position to make individual inquiry 
 into the merits and claims of every officer ; but he should require from branch heads such 
 information as will enable him to weigh the relative claims of officers. By the adoption 
 of a system of report by staff committees, the responsibility of heads of branches. Chief 
 Officers, and Permanent Heads would in practice be delegated to the committees, while 
 the individual members of these committees would have no personal responsibility ; 
 thus the department and its officers would suffer because of the impossibihty of fixing 
 the onus of any action upon the proper person. The appointment of staff committees 
 in each department and in each State would moreover necessitate the withdrawal of 
 many officers of high rank from their regular duties to the detriment of efficient working 
 of the departments, and at serious cost to the administration. The success of the new 
 system governing transfers and promotions must depend very largely on the assumption 
 of personal responsibility by Permanent Heads and Chief Oflftcers, a responsibihty which 
 should be reflected m their salaries, and there can be no doubt that the appointment 
 of staff committees would in most cases result in the perfunctory discharge of the powers 
 proposed to be vested in the administrative heads. 
 
 Inter-departmental Promotions and Transfers. — The proposals oufchned in this 
 section have covered the question of promotions and transfers within a department. 
 The Act provides that, in the filling of vacancies by promotion, priority of consideration 
 
49 
 
 shall be given to officers of the department in which the vacancy occiirs, and it is only 
 where it is considered that the duties of the vacant office can be more efficiently 
 performed by the promotion of an officer from some other department that recourse is 
 had to another department. This is sound policy, it being obvious that in ordinary 
 circumstances officers trained in the department, with all the knowledge and experience 
 of precedents and practices, are likely to render better service than those drawn from 
 other departments. In the majority of cases, therefore, promotions are made within 
 the ranks of the department, but it becomes necessary from time to time to introduce 
 new blood, and certain positions can be better filled by the promotion of officers from other 
 departments. The Royal Commission on the New Zealand Public Service reported 
 that one of the causes of dissatisfaction amongst officers and of dry rot in departments 
 was the slavish adherence to the principle that each department should be self-contained, 
 and no exchange of officers should be permitted amongst departments. This evil has 
 since been remedied by legislation governing the Dominion Service. .,:,.- 
 
 It is obvious that, while Permanent Heads and Chief Officers should have full 
 jurisdiction in effecting staff changes within their respective departments, no permanent 
 head can issue a direction for the filling of a vacancy in his department by the transfer 
 or promotion of an officer from another department. While the Permanent Head of the 
 other department might acquiesce in any such arrangement, there would sometimes be 
 a strong tendency to prevent the transfer of a valuable officer to meet the convenience 
 of some other department. It may readily be understood that the interchange of officers 
 between departments might result in friction between responsible heads, unless some 
 provision were made to obviate this possibility. Provision shoidd therefore be made, 
 in connexion with the general proposals for the future control of staff movements, for 
 inter-departmental transfers and promotions being effected by the Commissioner after 
 report by the Permanent Heads or Chief Officers of the two departments concerned — 
 the department in which the vacancy exists and the department from which it is sought 
 to transfer the officer. All promotions thus made of an inter-departmental nature 
 should be provisional in the same manner as departmental promotions, and the Commis- 
 sioner should be required to notify such promotions, in order that aggrieved officers may 
 be afforded an opportunity to appeal. 
 
 The adoption of the proposed alterations of practice as outlined in this portion 
 of the Report should go far to remove many of the difficulties inherent in the present 
 methods, and while it is realized that no system will secure the attainment of ideal 
 justice to the officers concerned and to the general community, it is believed that the 
 proposed new arrangements will give a greater measure of satisfaction to the Service, 
 and strengthen tlie hands of administrative officers. Many anomalies and harassing 
 restrictions will be removed with considerable saving of time and labour, and the 
 Commissioner and his Inspectors will be relieved of a mass of detailed work, enabling 
 other work of an importaxit character to be covered. 
 
 APPOIOT'MENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEADS. 
 
 The administrative heads of departments are the Permanent Heads and Chief 
 Officers. In explanation of the relationship between the Permanent Head and the 
 Chief Officer, it should be stated that in the Postmaster-General's Department, for 
 instance, the Permanent Hea,d is the secretary located at the office of the Central 
 Administration, while under his control and direction are six Chief Officers located at 
 the capital cities of the six States, known by the title of Deputy Postmaster-General, 
 each supervising the general management of the Department in his particular State,' 
 and discharging certain recognised functions as well as functions specifically delegated 
 to him by the Permanent Head. The Department of Trade and Customs is similarly 
 represented by a ■ Chief Officer— the Collector of Customs. The remaining six 
 departments are controlled by Permanent Heads, located at the seat of government 
 (Melbourne), and have no chief officers located in the States, although some of them 
 are represented by branch offices at the State capitals. The Permanent Heads and 
 Chief Officers now included in the Admimstrative Division would, under the proposals 
 ■ made in this Report, be classified as officers of the First Division. 
 
 As a general rule, vacancies which may occur in the Administrative Division 
 
 are filled by the promotion of officers from within the Service, although the law permits 
 
 of appointments from outside, should the circumstances justifv such a course, always 
 
 provided there is no officer in the Service as capable of filling the vacant position. In 
 
 F.18352.— 4 
 
60 
 
 such an event the appointment from outside the Service must be made the subject of a 
 report to ParHament. As already indicated, it is proposed that, under the new system 
 of PubUc Service management, existing functions of the Commissioner in dealing with 
 staff changes shall be transferred to the Permanent Heads and Chief Officers, but it is 
 not intended that this arrangement should go so far as to include promotions in or to 
 the First Division. While the Permanent Head or Chief Officer should be given authority 
 to decide upon promotions in the Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions, it is considered 
 that promotions in or to the First Division should be made by the Governor-General 
 on the recommendation of the Commissioner, and that where the Governor-General is 
 unable to accept any such recommendation, the matter should be made the subject of a 
 report to Parliament. It is obvious that on a vacancy occurring for a Permanent Head, 
 the nomination of an officer to fill such vacancy cannot be allowed to rest with any 
 departmental officer. 
 
 In this connexion a curious position arose some time since in relation to a vacancy 
 for the permanent head of a Commonwealth Department. It was decided by legal 
 authority that in this case an appointment could be made to the vacancy without reference 
 to the Ccmmissioner, as under Section 44 of the Act a necessary precedent to the filling 
 of a vacancy in the Administrative Divi.sion by the Governor-General upon the 
 recommendation of the Commissioner was a report from the permanent head, but as 
 there was no peimanent head to furnish a report, the Commissioner had no power to 
 make a recommendation in the absence of such a report. In the case under notice, 
 the appointment was made by the Governor-General without reference to the Com- 
 missioner. On its merits, this particular appointment was justified, and would no 
 doubt have been recommended by the Acting Commissioner, but the course pursued 
 indicates a defect in the Act which should be remedied. In all previous cases of 
 promotion to the position of permanent head, the recommendation of the Commissioner 
 was sought and acted upon, and this is as it should be, seeing that the filling of the 
 highest positions in the service should, above all others, be free from any suspicion of 
 outside influence. Provision should, therefore, be made in any amendment of the Act 
 placing this matter beyond doubt by directing that in all appointments or promotions 
 to or in the First Division the Commissioner shall submit a recommendation to the 
 Governor-General. 
 
 DISCIPLINE. 
 
 An indispensable feature in any system of PubUc Service management is that 
 suitable j)rovision be made for the maintenance of discipline, and in this connexion 
 adequate machinery must be available for dealing with offences under conditions which, 
 while safeguarding officers against unjust or capricious treatment, should not hamper 
 the administrative heads of departments in exercising proper discipUne, or involve 
 procedure of such a formal, costly, and cumbrous nature as really to defeat the intentions 
 of the Act. 
 
 In the procedure laid down by the Public Service Act for deahng with officers 
 charged with the commission of offences, meticulous care is taken to protect the interests 
 of the officer so as to avoid any injustice ; but the interests of the department are to a 
 considerable extent prejudiced by the excessive delays involved in settlement of cases, 
 the general circumlocution rendered necessary by the provisions of the law, and the 
 unsatisfactory composition of Boards of Inquiry. The main principles governing 
 action under the PubHc Seivice Act against an officer for an alleged offence are (a) the 
 oflG.cer is to be furnished in writing with particulars of the offence with which he is charged, 
 (6) he is required to admit or deny the truth of the charge and to give any explanation 
 he desires, and (c) where the charge is denied, but the Chief Officer is satisfied that the 
 offence has been committed, no punishment other than a caution or reprimand or a fine 
 up to £10 may be inflicted until the charge has been investigated by a Board of Inquiry. 
 This Board includes in its personnel an elected representative of the division to which 
 the offending officer belongs, and, in addition, the officer may be represented by counsel. 
 
 Disciplinary action may be taken in any one of the following directions : — 
 Caution. Reduction in salary and status. 
 
 Reprimand. Enforced resignation. 
 
 Fine up to £50. Dismissal. 
 
 Deprivation of leave of absence. 
 
51 
 
 Cautions or reprimands are administered by ofl&cers prescribed as having 
 authority to take such action, including Chief Officers, while a fine up to £10 may be 
 inflicted by a Chief Officer. Any fine exceeding £10 can only be imposed by the Permanent 
 Head, who also has power to order deprivation of leave of absence. Reduction in salary 
 and status is, on the recommendation of the Chief Officer, determined by the Commis- 
 sioner. Enforced resignation or dismissal can only be authorized by the Governor- 
 General, on the recommendation of the Commissioner. No punishment exceeding in 
 severity the imposition of a fine of £10 can be inflicted except on the recommendation 
 of the Chief Officer, and while the Permanent Head or the Commissioner may vary the 
 Chief Officer's recommendation by deciding upon a lower penalty, he is powerless to 
 increase the extent of the pimishment so recommended. 
 
 A serious defect in the present procedure is that the Chief Officer is burdened 
 with the responsibihty of decision in cases of minor offences, instead of power being 
 given to the heads of branches to detei'mine such matters. As a general rule, matters 
 ■which should be summarily disposed of are made the subject of formal procedure, 
 involving the framing of official charges, furnishing the officer with a copy of the cliarges, 
 &c., and after all this circumlocution the eventual result is a formal caution or reprimand, 
 or an insignificant fine. In any amendment of the Act, it is highly essential that a dis- 
 tinction should be made between offences which should be left to heads of branches for 
 adjudication, and those which should be dealt with by Chief Officers and higher 
 authorities. Supervisory officers should be empowered to caution or reprimand or fine 
 an officer any sum not exceeding Five shillings, the punishment to be reported to the 
 Chief Officer, and, so far as relates to fines, to be subject to the right of appeal by the 
 offending officer to the Chief Officer, who should be empowered to vary, annul, or confirm 
 the action of the branch head. Supervisory officers, who should be prescribed by 
 regulation, should include generally the heads of important branches of departments 
 and other leading officers, who should be specifically designated. It is my intention 
 at a later stage in this Report to deal in fuller detail with the question of punishment for 
 minor offences. 
 
 It is necessary now to discuss the matter of adjudication in offences of a more 
 serious character, which are punishable by heavy fine, reduction in salary, or dismissal. 
 The defects in the existing mode of procedure as prescribed by the Act may be stated 
 to be — 
 
 (a) Excessive delays, involving expense and inconvenience to departments 
 as well as hardships to suspended officers. 
 
 (6) Evasion of responsibility. 
 
 (c) Varying personnel of Boards of Inquiry. 
 
 {d) Lack of uniformity as to decisions. 
 
 (e) Unjustifiable circumlocution. 
 
 The time necessarily occupied in adherence to the present method of procedure 
 will be evident from perusal of the foUowing statement, which outhaes the course to be 
 taken in the case of an officer who has committed an offence which cannot suitably be 
 met by reprimand or caution : — ■ 
 
 (1) The Chief Officer is advised of the circumstances leading up to the 
 
 charge. 
 
 (2) The charge, which must be carefully drawn, somewhat in the form of 
 
 an indictment, is prepared and signed by the Chief Officer, who may 
 or may not, according to the nature of the offence, suspend the officer 
 from duty. 
 
 (3) The charge is forwarded to the officer. 
 
 (4) The officer makes a written reply to the charge. 
 
 (5) The Chief Officer considers the reply, and, if in his opinion the offence 
 
 has been committed, may fine fche officer a sum not exceeding £10, or, 
 if the offence is of too serious a nature to be met by a fine and has 
 not been admitted, he refers the charge to a Board of Inquiry. In 
 the latter case — 
 
 (6) The officer is further suspended, and action is taken to appoint the Board 
 , of three officers, one of whom is the elected representative for the 
 
52 
 
 division to which the accused belongs, one is invariably an officer of 
 the department in which the accused is employed, and the third may 
 be an officer of the same or another department, generally the latter. 
 
 (7) The Board having been appointed by the Chief Officer, with the concur- 
 
 rence of a PubHc Service Inspector, the Chairman arranges for the 
 sitting of the Board. 
 
 (8) The officer is given due notice of the sitting of the Board, and at least 
 
 seven days before the date fixed the officer is supplied with copies of all 
 documents intended to be used at the inquiry. 
 
 (9) The Board makes an exhaustive investigation, all evidence being reported 
 
 verbatim. The officer may be represented by counsel, who may 
 examine and cross-examine witnesses and may address the Board. 
 
 (10) The Board forwards the evidence to the Chief Officer with a report of 
 
 proceedings and its opinion thereon. 
 
 (11) If the charge is found to be not proved, the suspension is removed ; 
 
 but, if proved, the Chief Officer must submit through the Permanent 
 Head a recommendation for (a) penalty not exceeding £50, or (b) 
 deprivation of leave of absence for a specified period, or (c) reduction 
 in salary or status, or {d) enforced resignation or dismissal. 
 
 (12) If the punishment recommended be either (c) or {d), the Permanent 
 
 Head submits the matter to the Commissioner, who may confirm the 
 recommendation for (c) — ^reduction in status or salary — or may impose 
 a lesser punishment ; or if (d) be recommended by the Chief Officer, 
 may impose a lesser punishment, or may recommend to the Governor- 
 General enforced resignation or dismissal. 
 
 (13) The decision of the Governor-General is conveyed to the officer through 
 
 the Permanent Head and Chief Officer of his Department and is 
 subsequently gazetted. 
 
 From this statement of procedure it will be recognised that promptness of 
 decision in these cases is impracticable, and that, particularly in the cases of 
 officers stationed away from the capital cities, it may easily happen that a period of 
 three months will intervene between the laying of the charge and the final decision. 
 During the whole of this time the officer may be under suspension, and the Department 
 be compelled to pay the cost of relieving him, as well as the heavy expense involved in 
 the proceedings of the Board. The cost of investigations by Boards of Inquiry, coupled 
 with expenses in connexion with suspension of officers, is a very serious matter. In the 
 interests of the suspended officer it is important that his case should have prompt 
 attention, as while the charge is hanging over him he is subjected to continued mental 
 anxiety, and is either receiving no salary for the maintenance of himself and dependants, 
 or, as an act of grace, is being paid by the department a reduced salary for a portion 
 only of the period during which he is under suspension. 
 
 There is good reason to believe that, in cases where the offence would be met by 
 a penalty not exceeding £10, Chief Officers evade the responsibility placed upon them 
 by the Act, and, instead of determining upon the reports of their inspecting officers that 
 an accused officer is guilty, they prefer to remit the case for investigation by a Board of 
 Inquiry rather than inflict an appropriate penalty. I am strongly of opinion that Chief 
 Officers should be required to take full responsibility in such matters, in the same manner 
 as the manager of a private undertaking would deal with an employee found guilty of 
 misconduct. 
 
 That this responsibility is accepted in other administrations may be gathered from 
 the attached extract of a recent report by the Postmaster-General of the United States 
 of America : — 
 
 Reductions and removals are not made by the department until after the most searching 
 investigation and careful consideration of all the facts. When charges are preferred against an 
 employee they are referred to the field for a thorough investigation, which is made by a post-office 
 inspector or other person in whom the department has the utmost confidence. If the inquiry develops 
 that there is basis for the charges, the employee is furnished in writing with the substance of the charges 
 and afforded every opportunity to submit his defence. The investigating officer represents the employee 
 
53 
 
 as well as the department, and it is his duty to see that the person against whom the charges are pending 
 is given every opportunity to submit his defence. When forwarding the case to the department the 
 action recommended must be based solely upon the facts disclosed by the investigation. Upon receipt of 
 the papers at the department they are reviewed with extreme care. If, after careful consideration of the 
 facts disclosed, doubt still exists in the mind of the administrative officer, the papers are again referred to 
 the field for further inquiry to ascertain if additional facts can be discovered. 
 
 It will be observed from this report that in the U.S.A. Postal Service the procedure 
 does not provide for inquiry by a Board, the decision being left in the hands of an 
 administrative officer, who bases his finding upon an investigation by an individual 
 officer, not by a Board of Inquiry as in Australia. It is obvious that if the Australian 
 system were applied to an immense service, such as that of the U.S.A., successful or 
 businessHke management would be impossible. 
 
 The Boards of Inquiry as at present constituted have never been entirely satis- 
 factory, owing to the constantly changing personnel. The personality of the Chairman 
 and the other members of the Board, and their experience in the investigation of charges 
 against officers, are factors which must have an important bearing on the findings, and 
 an officer may be found guilty by one Board, who might have escaped had the Board 
 been differently constituted. There has been a serious lack of consistency in the findings 
 of these Boards, and of uniformity in procedure, due to the conditions under which the 
 Boards are constituted. It is clear that the divisional representative in many cases 
 is not sitting in a judicial capacity, but fills the role purely of an advocate. He is not 
 there to maintain a just and impartial attitude, and to deal with the facts of the case 
 on their merits, but undoubtedly as an avowed advocate of the interests of the accused 
 officer. Parliament did not intend this should be so, but in practice it is so ; this is not 
 to be wondered at, from the fact that the divisional representative is elected by the 
 officers, and is generally desirous of re-election at the close of his three years' tenure. 
 While an accused officer and his friends would hesitate to interview the Chairman and 
 the second member of the Board, in order to influence their finding, no such compunction 
 would exist in regard to interviewing the third member of the Board, for is he not the 
 divisional representative elected to safeguard the interests of his fellow officers ? The 
 divisional representative sits on all Boards affecting officers of his division, while the 
 other members are not permanent, hence the permanent member of the Board, if an officer 
 of strong personality, may have a marked influence in the deliberations of the Board and 
 on its findings. It is recognised, however, that any proposal to abolish the system of 
 appointment of divisional representatives on Boards of Inquiry would be viewed with 
 disfavour, if only for sentimental reasons ; but it is believed that the constitution of 
 the Boards can be placed on a better footing. 
 
 Much of the delay in reaching finality in discipline cases is attributable to the 
 circumlocution necessitated by the law, and this is particularly the case where dismissal 
 is involved. As already shown, after a charge has been investigated by a Board of 
 Inquiry and found proven, and the Chief Officer has recommended dismissal, the 
 recommendation and relative papers must be conveyed through the Permanent Head 
 to the Commissioner, who, after considering the matter, forwards his recommendation 
 to the Minister for transmission to the Governor-General. If the Chief Officer 
 is satisfied that the offence warrants dismissal, and the Commissioner after consideration 
 of the papers and the evidence in the case agrees with this view, no good reason exists 
 why the action of dismissal should not be carried out by the Commissioner, and save 
 the delays, formalities, and labour involved in submission for approval by the Governor- 
 General. In another part of this Keport it has been recommended that appointments 
 to the Public Service should be made by the Commissioner, instead of as at present by 
 the Governor-General, and, following the recognised theory that the appointing authority 
 should likewise be the dismissing authority, any new legislation should provide for 
 dismissal by the Commissioner. 
 
 Before leaving this phase of the question of dealing with punishment cases, it is 
 necessary to express the opinion that the present provision in the law for enforced 
 resignation as an alternative to dismissal should be expunged from the statute-book. 
 If an officer be guilty of an offence which justifies enforced resignation, then it obviously 
 justifies dismissal, and it is only a subterfuge to allow an officer to resign from the service 
 when he should have been dismissed. An officer guilty of embezzlement may be allowed 
 to resign instead of being dismissed, and may on the strength of his " resignation " from 
 the Public Service secure employment outside the service in a position of financial 
 responsibility, and repeat his act of embezzlement. In such a case, the Commonwealth 
 
54 
 
 Government would be morally responsible for the loss sufiered by the private employer. 
 The provision in the law as to deprivation of leave of absence, which has practically 
 been a dead letter, should likewise be deleted from the Public Service Act. 
 
 As to future legislation dealing with offences against the Public Service Act 
 and regulations, the experience of the past sixteen years has demonstrated that the 
 present provisions of the law are unsatisfactory from many standpoints. Some change 
 in procedure is urgently necessary, and the following arrangements should result in a 
 marked improvement. The Chief Officer of the Department should be required to deal 
 with cases of misconduct, other than minor offences, on the reports of responsible officers 
 and the explanation tendered by the accused officer, and should thereupon determine 
 the punishment adequate to the offence — fine, transfer, reduction in salary and status, 
 or dismissal — and notify the officer of his decision. The officer should have the right 
 of appeal within a specified period against the proposed punishment, if it involves 
 transfer or reduction or dismissal, the ground of the appeal to be either innocence of the 
 charge or the excessive nature of the punishment decided upon. If the officer fail 
 within the specified period to submit an appeal, the decision as to punishment should 
 be confirmed and the matter brought to finality ; but should the officer elect to lodge 
 an appeal, it should be referred to a Board of Appeal, constituted in the following 
 manner : — 
 
 (a) A permanent Chairman, who should possess the qualifications of a 
 
 Stipendiary or Police Magistrate, and be attached for official purposes 
 
 to the staff of the Public Service Commissioner. 
 
 (6) An officer of the department in which the accused officer is employed, 
 nominated by the Chief Officer, such member of the Board not to be 
 the person who laid the charge against the accused officer. 
 
 (c) The elected representative of the (\ivision of the service to which the 
 accused officer belongs. 
 
 The Board of Appeal thus constituted would replace the existing Board of Inquiry 
 under section 46 of the Act, and should be empowered to investigate the charge and to 
 annul, vary, or confirm the decision of the Chief Officer. The accused officer should be 
 informed by the Board of its decision, which should be final, except that in any case 
 where dismissal is involved the Board should report its finding direct to the Commissioner, 
 who may confirm the dismissal or inflict a lesser punishment. In all other cases, the 
 Board of Appeal should advise the Chief Officer of its decision, and it should be at once 
 carried into efiect by the Chief Officer. The accused officer should, as under the existing 
 law, be allowed representation by counsel, attorney, or agent, and similar representation 
 should be provided for in regard to the department. At present no power is given by 
 the Act to allow a department to be so represented at any inquiry into offences, and 
 this lack of provision should be remedied in any new legislation. 
 
 Where in the opinion of the Board the officer lodging the appeal had no 
 reasonable ground for its submission, and the appeal is adjudged to be frivolous or 
 vexatious, provision should be made that such officer should be made to pay the costs of 
 the hearing to an amount to be fixed by the Board, the payment to be deducted from 
 any sum due to the officer by the department, or be recoverable by the department in 
 any court of competent jurisdiction. Such a provision is necessary to safeguard 
 departments against unwarranted appeals. A case within my recollection occurred in 
 Queensland, where an officer stationed at Thursday Island having denied certain 
 charges, a Board of Inquiry was appointed to take evidence at that, place. On 
 the proceedings being opened the officer amended his reply and admitted the truth of 
 the principal charge. The three members of the Board had a useless journey to 
 Thursday Island, at heavy expense to the Department, incurred whol'y through the 
 vexatious action of the offending officer, who was reduced in salary and transferred to 
 another position. 
 
 Considerable advantages will accrue from the appointment of an officer with 
 the qualifications proposed as a permanent Chairman of Boards of Appeal, as the 
 presence of such an officer with his legal training in relation to the hearing and 
 analyzing of evidence, added to the experience which he will gain in dealing with 
 offences under the Public Service Act, will secure greater uniformity of treatment 
 and more effective consideration than is obtainable under the present constitution 
 of Boards of Inquiry. In addition, any suspicion which now exists as to unconscious 
 
55 
 
 bias on the part of the Chairman of a Board, who is a departmental officer, would be 
 removed by the appointment of an impartial and independent Chairman. The time 
 now lost in reference to the Permanent Head, and through him to the Commissioner, 
 and from the Commissioner through the Minister to the Governor-General, would under 
 the proposed arrangements be saved, as well as a vast amount of clerical and other 
 work. It may possibly be found necessary to appoint two officers to act as Chairmen 
 of Boards of Appeal, one of whom would deal ordinarily with cases arising in New South 
 Wales and Queensland, and the other v/ith cases requiring to be decided in the remaining 
 four States. When not engaged on work connected with Boards of Appeal, their services 
 would be fully utiUzed in other directions. 
 
 In arriving at the foregoing conclusions, careful consideration has been devoted 
 by me to the practices in other administrations, and, having in view the scattered and 
 distant locations of many of the officers and the ramifications of the Commonwealth 
 Public Service, I am satisfied that the adoption of the proposals bearing on the treatment 
 of disciplinary cases would greatly add to the efficient management of departmerits, 
 and at the same time secure to officers an assurance of impartial and disinterested hearing 
 of their appeals. 
 
 In connexion with the election of divisional representatives to sit on Boards of 
 Appeal, provision should be made that representatives may be elected for any part 
 of a State, as defined by the Public Service Commissioner. At present, in States such 
 as Queensland and Western Australia, a divisional representative is elected for the 
 whole State, consequently he must sit on all Boards, and thus be compelled to travel 
 thousands of miles to carry out his duties. If the State of Queensland, for instance, 
 were divided into three electoral districts, separate representatives could be elected for 
 the northern, central, and southern districts, and much travelling and public expense 
 be obviated. In order to remove any difficulty which might arise through the transfer 
 of a divisional representative from the district for which he was elected, provision should 
 be made for the election of a deputy representative to act in the absence of the repre- 
 sentative, and, in the event of transfer of the latter from the district, to take his place 
 as the representative of the district. 
 
 Where the accused officer is stationed in a remote locahty, which the Board 
 could only visit in circumstances involving unreasonable expense or inconvenience 
 or delay,' the Board should be empowered to direct that evidence be taken on 
 commission by some fit and proper person. The evidence taken shguld be considered 
 by the Board, and its decision thereon should be final. 
 
 Minor Offences — Cautions, Reprimands, Fines. — In pursuance of my investigations, 
 attention has been directed to the question of improved methods of securing disciphne 
 in the departments by adoption of an alternative to the present practice of dealing with 
 minor offences by cautions, reprimands, or fines. In the Commonwealth Public 
 Service, some difference of opinion exists amongst administrative officers as to 
 the effectiveness of the present system of recording cautions and reprimands against 
 employees, and of infhcting fines for minor breaches of discipline or careless discharge 
 of duties ; but it is generally admitted that the existing methods of enforcing 
 disciphne are cumbrous and productive of much personal friction. In many 
 instances the effect of a caution or reprimand is evanescent, especially with the younger 
 sections of the service, and the fact that such action on the part of heads of branches 
 rarely prejudices advancement of the employees robs it of the desired effect. It is 
 doubtful whether the imposition of fines has either a deterrent or reformative effect, 
 as the general feehng of employees subjected to fines is that the payment of the fine 
 cancels the offence. In other cases a feehng is engendered that as a set off against the 
 fine the employee is justified in " going slow," or negleciing the interests of the 
 department ; in other words, there is a tendency to " get even " with the department. 
 An officer who has been fined for repeated late attendance may readily tnke advantage 
 of any laxity of supervision in a spirit of revenge against his department. Furthermore, 
 the infUction of fines frequently does not affect the officer himself so much as it 
 does his dependants. Cases undoubtedly occur where the family of an officer, already 
 impoverished by his bad habits, must suffer additional hardship through the loss of 
 the money represented by the amount of fines. 
 
 The governing principles in connexion with advancement of officers, whether by 
 increment of salary or promotion, are satisfactory conduct, diligence, and efficiency, 
 and it is frequently urged by interested officers, when the Chief Officer is considering 
 
56 
 
 the question of increments, that the fact of punishments having been imposed dvu-ing the 
 year should be ignored, it being plausibly contended that the officer, having expiated 
 his offences by the payment of fines, should not be again punished for the same offences 
 by withholding of the increment. This view has been placed before the Arbitration 
 Court on several occasions by representatives appearing on behalf of Public Service 
 Associations. The fact is overlooked by those advancing such an unsound argument 
 that an officer who commits an offence does so with full knowledge of the possible 
 consequences, and that he is risking not only an immediate punishment by fine, but a 
 future loss by stoppage or deferment of increment. 
 
 Information available from several sources shows that the problem of dealing with 
 minor breaches of discipline has engaged the attention of executive officers of various 
 administrations who, having at heart the general welfare of their employees, have 
 sought methods which, without impairing discipline, would be free from the objectionable 
 conditions of the old systems, of which reprimands and fines formed an integral part. 
 With this object in view there has been introduced in many railway services in America, 
 and more. recently in the Railway Department of New South Wales, what is known as 
 the "merit and demerit record " system. Apersonal record card is kept for each employee 
 for the notation during a particular period of all offences formerly dealt with by caution, 
 reprimand, or fine, the practice being to record agamst the officer on the debit side the 
 number of demerit marks considered to be proportionate to the nature of the offence. 
 On the credit side are noted the marks awarded for satisfactory service during the period.. 
 The accumulation by an officer of a certain debit balance of marks within the period is 
 brought directly under the notice of the officer concerned, wdth an intimation that a 
 continuance of the unsatisfactory service, as shown by his record, will result in serious 
 action, either in the direction of reduction or dismissal, whereas a creditable record for 
 the ensuing period will result in the officer earning sufficient merit marks to cancel the 
 previously existing demerit marks. The officer is exhorted to tiirn over a new leaf and 
 endeavour to rehabilitate himself. If after this warning the officer's service continues 
 to be unsatisfactory during the ensuing period, action is taken to reduce him to lower 
 rank and salary, or, if the circumstances justify it, to dismiss him from the Service. 
 
 Under the system of demerit and merit marks thus outlined, the officer knows that 
 without any immediate correction by fine or otherwise for an offence, it is noted against 
 him as a black mark, and that an accumulation of black marks on the debit side of hia 
 account without balancing credit marks on the other side will eventually land him 
 outside the ranks of the Service. He knows that the commission of an offence is not 
 forgotten, but that the record of such offence remains a blot on his departmental history, 
 only to be wiped out by satisfactory service, and in this knowledge lies the efficiency 
 of the system as a deterrent. From a reformative stand-point, the system induces an 
 officer to behave so as to clear his record, and appeals to his instincts of self-preservation, 
 and every opportunity is afforded him to mend his ways, thus avoiding the imposition 
 of further demerit marks, and what to him is of the utmost consequence, cancelling his 
 old record of unsatisfactory service. 
 
 Amongst the results sought to be attained by the originator of the " merit and 
 demerit " system in America (Mr. George R. Brown, Vice-president of the New York 
 Central Railway) are stated to be the following : — 
 
 To secure a higher scale of efficiency, strict discipline is essential to successful 
 operation ; no continuous service performed by man can be perfect, 
 ... . . but a high state of discipline and a careful selection of men will produce 
 
 a high class of service, and successful operation will be the result. 
 
 To remove the false but too common impression in the minds of employees 
 who have served actual suspensions {i.e., fined by stoppage of work and 
 
 f)ay) that the amount lost by them is a payment to the employer for the 
 OSS and trouble caused him, and that in future settlements can be 
 similarly made. 
 
 To establish in the service a feeling of certainty that reward and promotion 
 will not follow indifferent service. 
 
 It would appear from the available information that, while doubt was expressed 
 in many circles associated with American railways as to the practical results of the 
 BrowTi system, in the majority of railway services it has established itself firmly as a 
 
57 
 
 permanent adjunct of administration, while in the isolated instances where after its 
 introduction it was abandoned there is good reason to believe that the cause of the 
 failure was not in the system but in the methods of its application. 
 
 The adoption of such a system as that described would be of marked benefit in 
 the administration of the Commonwealth Public Service, more particularly in the 
 Postmaster-General's Department, in which the conditions of employment are in many 
 respects similar to those of a railways service ; but, in applying it to Post Office employees, 
 care should be taken that it is devised in such a manner as to be easily understood, 
 practicable, and having for its objective deterrent and reformative influences. In 
 addition, uniform administration throughout the States would be essential, and its 
 success would largely be dependent upon sympathetic and efficient co-operation between 
 controlling officers. The new system would take the place of the present punishments 
 of caution, reprimand, and fine by the Chief Officer, but would not be applicable to 
 serious offences at present punishable by reduction or dismissal, which would still 
 require to be dealt vnih in the manner already indicated. It should, however, be clearly 
 understood that an accumulation of demerit marks for minor offences would lead to the 
 same ultimate result as a single offence of serious magnitude. 
 
 In the Commonwealth Public Service cases occur of officers whose record is one 
 long series of minor offences, indicating that punishment by means of reprimand or 
 fine has had no corrective influence. While such an officer has never committed an 
 offence which standing by itself Avould justify his dismissal from the Service, the 
 combination of minor offences would undoubtedly warrant such action being taken. 
 His retention in the Service is attributable to unreasonable laxity on the part of 
 administrative officers who have dealt with his sins of commission or omission. Under 
 the Brown system of record such officers could not be continued in the Service. 
 
 It is vmnecessary to enter fully into details, these being matters for inclusion in 
 regulations under the Act ; but it may be stated briefly that the application of the 
 system as a tentative measure to the department suggested would involve adoption of 
 scales of merit and demerit marks. The officers to be held responsible in their respective 
 branches for the working of the system should be prescribed by regulation, and district 
 inspectors should be included in the list of officers. Officers offending against discipline 
 should be furnished with the reports made against them, and be afforded an opportunity 
 oi making an explanation. They should be advised of the demerit marks recorded, 
 and be allowed to appeal to the Chief Officer against such record, his decision to be 
 final. At the end of each half-year officers who have accumulated a stated number of 
 demerits should be advised of their record, and informed that if it is unsatisfactory 
 during the ensuing half-year serious action will be taken either by reduction in rank and 
 salary or by dismissal. Wherever practicable, this intimation should be conveyed 
 verbally by the Chief Officer at a personal interview, when he should use his influence 
 by kindly advice and suggestion to lead the officer into better ways. Apart from the 
 personal interview, the officer concerned should be notified by written memorandum. 
 In country districts the admonition should where practicable be given by the District 
 Inspector. If after such a warning and advice has been given the record for 
 the ensuing period shows no definite improvement, action should be taken to reduce 
 the officer or terminate his services. Any laxity or mistaken sympathy at this stage 
 would be prejudicial to the success of the system, and the punishment should be certain 
 and irrevocable. Nothing would be so fatal as the establishment, through weakness in 
 administration, of a belief in the minds of officers that a mere bogey is being set up. 
 Officers thus dealt with should be afforded an opportunity, before the reduction or 
 dismissal takes effect, to appeal to the Commissioner if they so desire. 
 
 In any amendment of the Public Service Act, I would strongly recommend that 
 provision be made for adoption of the merit and demerit system on an experimental 
 basis, and as an alternative system to that of cautions, reprimands, and fines. Provision 
 should be made for both systems, and power be given to make regulations having a 
 tentative or permanent operation, as may be warranted by results. 
 
 INCAPACITY OF OFFICERS. 
 One of the most serious problems of Public Service administration as affecting the 
 efficiency of the Service is that of dealing with officers who by reason of physical or 
 mental incapacity, or because of manifest incompetency, are unfit to discharge in an 
 
58 
 
 efficient manner the duties intnisted to them, and the difficulties experienced in this 
 connexion are accentuated by the absence of any provision for pensions or superannuation 
 allowances. 
 
 The Public Service Act directs that before an officer can be removed from a 
 position which the Commissioner, after obtaining a report from the Permanent Head or 
 an Inspector, considers he is not competent to fill efficiently, the matter must first be 
 remitted to a Board, and unless the Board finds the officer to be unfit to discharge or 
 incapable of discharging his duties, he cannot be transferred to another position or 
 removed from the Service. It is found that, as a general rule, members of Boards are 
 most reluctant to declare an officer incompetent, and it is only in cases where the evidence 
 discloses absolute physical or mental incapacity that a decision is given adverse to the 
 officer. In many cases sentimental considerations are allowed to outweigh a sense of 
 duty, and in the rare cases where an officer is found by the Board to be incompetent in 
 his present position, not infrequently a recommendation is made that he be transferred 
 to other duties, where he will in all probability prove equally incapable of performing 
 duties commensurate with his salary. From my experience of the operation of the 
 Public Service Act, I am convinced that the Service will never be relieved of 
 the incubus of incompetent and inefficient officers so long as the present provision on the 
 Btatute-book remains unaltered — a provision which casts the onus of decision upon a 
 Board not directly responsible for the efficiency of a department or of the Service 
 generally, and which almost invariably ^\ill be swayed by feelings of compassion for 
 or sympathy with a fellow officer whose livelihood or remuneration is in the balance. 
 In such cases the public interest is subordinated to the interests of the individual, 
 and the object aimed at by the Legislature has been largely stultified. 
 
 It may perhaps be argued that, if a Board of Inquiry may suitably determine 
 whether an officer is guilty of an offence, surely such a Board is equally suitable 
 to deal with a charge of incompetency ; but in the former case the Board is 
 required to adjudicate on definite evidence as to facts relating to some act of commission 
 or omission, while in the latter case, where the issue is one of general incompetency, the 
 difficulties of convincing a Board are almost insuperable. Excepting where the 
 incompetency arises from physical or mental disabilities upon which definite medical 
 testimony is forthcoming, a Chief Officer or Inspector is faced with a well-nigh 
 impossible task in procixring evidence sufficient to convince a Board. Generally 
 such evidence can be tendered only by those connected with the officer in his work, 
 who from long association with him and appreciation of his personal qualities, or other 
 reasons of sentiment, feel a natural revulsion towards publicly testifying against a 
 fellow officer whose position in the Service is at stake. Even the heads of branches, 
 who are directly responsible for the output of work and the efficiency of the service 
 rendered by officers, will not hesitate to shield men who are " decent duffers/' and have 
 been known to overburden themselves with work, or transfer duties to a smart junior 
 which ought to have been performed by the incompetent senior who is paid to do the 
 work. It is obvious that such heads of branches, who in their mistaken attitude of 
 loyalty to subordinate officers are failing to discharge their responsibilities towards the 
 department, cannot be relied upon for satisfactory evidence before a Board of Inquiry. 
 Thus the departments continue to retain the services of officers overpaid for the work 
 performed by them, or so manifestly incompetent through lack of physical or mental 
 capacity that their maintenance in the Service is unjustified. Shielded and aided by 
 their fellow officers, they continue ostensibly to fiJl the positions, while the general 
 efficiency of the Service suffers. 
 
 If this unsatisfactory condition of affairs is to be rectified, it can only be by a 
 radical departure from the present provisions of the Act. The Commissioner and his 
 Inspectors, and the Permanent Heads and Chief Officers of departments are conjointly 
 responsible for the efficiency of the Public Service, and the only rational method, 
 therefore, is that authority should be vested in these officers to deal with and determine 
 all cases of alleged incompetency. The Board of Inquiry established by the Act has 
 been weighed in the balance and found wanting. The obvious defects in the present 
 practice would be remedied by the following : — - 
 
 Where a Permanent Head or Chief Officer has reason to believe that any 
 officer under his control is incompetent, from whatever cause, he should 
 so report to the Commissioner, who may thereupon direct an Inspector 
 
59 
 
 to make pers(mal inquiry. If the Inspector, after full investigation, 
 is in agreement^ with the Chief Officer, then upon the reports furnished 
 by them the Commissioner should determine the matter either by 
 transferring the officer to a lower position or salary or by terminating 
 his services. To meet a case where the Permanent Head or. Chief 
 Officer does not initiate action, it should be the duty of an Inspector, 
 if he considers an officer to be incompetent, to report accordingly to the 
 Commissioner. The Permanent Head or Chief Officer should thereupon 
 be required by the Commissioner to furnish him with a report on the 
 case, on the receipt of which the matter would be determined. Under 
 this 'proposed arrangement, either the departmental head or the Pubhc 
 Service Inspector may take the initial action to bring any case under 
 the notice of the Commissioner, and any possibility of injustice would be 
 guarded against by the provision for agreement in the views of the 
 Chief Officer and Inspector reporting separately and independently. 
 
 A brief survey of the provisions of State Public Service Acts relative to this 
 vexed question will be of interest : — 
 
 New South Wales.— li in the opinion of the Public Service Board an officer 
 is not competent to perform work equivalent to his salary, his salary 
 may be reduced to the maximum appropriate to the class of work 
 performed by or assigned to him. The officer is given the option of 
 accepting the reduced salary or retiring. Further, if an officer is at any 
 time found to be incapable of discharging his duties, and the unfitness 
 appears likely to be permanent, the retirement of the officer may be 
 efiected on the recommendation of the Public Service Board. 
 
 Victoria.— HhQ services of any officer found to be inefficient to discharge or 
 incapable of discharging the duties of his office, or to be inefficient in 
 the prompt and effective discharge of his duties, may be dispensed with 
 on the recommendation of the Commissioner. 
 
 Queensland. — An incompetent officer may be transferred to other duties 
 with reduction in salary equivalent to the value of the lower duties on 
 the recommendation of the Pubhc Service Board. 
 
 South Australia. — An officer who appears to the Commissioner, after report 
 from the Permanent Head or otherwise, to be incompetent may be 
 retired or transferred to some other office upon the recommendation 
 of the Commissioner. 
 
 Western Australia. — If an officer appears to the Commissioner, after report 
 from the Permanent Head, to be incompetent, the Commissioner 
 inquires into the case, and upon the recommendation of the Commis- 
 sioner the officer may be transferred to some other position or retired. 
 
 It will be observed that the provisions of the State laws are uniform in requiring 
 no reference to a Board of Inquiry, and in providing for action upon the determination 
 of the Commissioner, after, in some cases, a report from the Permanent Head, but these 
 provisions appear to be defective in that they are not sufficiently specific in respect to 
 the initiative to be taken in removing incompetent officers, and thus allow room for 
 evading the unpleasant duty of reporting cases of inefficiency or incompetency. 
 
 If the problem of dealing with incompetent officers in the Commonwealth Public 
 Service is to be faced with an earnest desire to remove the evil, the responsibility of 
 determining an officer's fitness for the discharge of his duties should be placed definitely 
 in the hands of the Commissioner, and the specific duty should be imposed on Permanent 
 Heads, Chief Officers, and Inspectors of reporting all such cases under the proposed 
 conditions, which will afford some guarantee that their action in so reporting will not 
 be rendered futile. Invariably the existence of incompetent officers forms the basis of 
 criticism against the administration of the Public Service, and unless responsible heads 
 are enabled to cope with the question under the authority of new legislation their efforts 
 to deal with cases of incapacity will continue to be inefiective and unsatisfactory. 
 
«0 
 
 FURLOUGH, RECREATION LEAVE, AND SICK LEAVE. 
 
 The furlougli provisions of tlie Act require to be considered from the stand -point 
 of equity to public servants, as anomalies have arisen during the past few years which 
 in any amending Public Service legislation will need to be rectified. It is provided by 
 the Act that any officer who has served for at least twenty years, and whose conduct 
 has been satisfactory, may be granted leave for six months on full pay or twelve months 
 on half pay. By an amendment of the Act made in 1911, the provisions as to furlough 
 were extended, so as to enable payment equivalent to the monetary value of the furlough 
 to be granted an officer on his retirement, assuming he had not availed himself of the 
 opportunity of taking the furlough during his service, and further, that in the event of 
 the death of an officer who had qualified by length of service and satisfactory conduct 
 for furlough, and had not availed himself of it, the monetary value of the furlough 
 could be paid to the dependants of the deceased ofl&cer. 
 
 Apart from the general provisions of the law as to furlough thus outlined, questions 
 have arisen as to whether an officer who at the completion of twenty years' service in 
 State or Commonwealth had enjoyed the privilege of furlough, was entitled to further 
 furlough after serving a second period of twenty years. The Crown Law authorities 
 of the Commonwealth expressed the opinion that such an officer was in the circumstances 
 eligible for a second period of furlough, or, as an alternative, for payment of the monetary 
 value of the furlough upon his retirement, or payment could be made to his dependants 
 in case of his death. At the same time, however, it was held that an officer who 
 had completed 40 years' service, and who had not availed himself of furlough at the 
 expiration of twenty years, was not entitled to double the furlough, or to monetary 
 compensation in lieu of double furlough. Thus an officer with, say, 46 years' service 
 granted six months' furlough in 1907 was not eligible for a further period of furlough in 
 1908, as the granting of the second period of furlough would be dependent upon the 
 officer completing a second period of twenty years' service subsequent to his enjoyment 
 of the first period of furlough. It was pointed out to the Crown Law authorities that 
 this decision would operate inequitably, as in many cases officers who on completing 
 twenty years' service had applied for furlough were refused the privilege, owing to the 
 exigencies of public business, and such officers would, as compared with those who were 
 allowed the furlough, be penalized in respect to the second grant of furlough, or its 
 monetary equivalent, upon retirement. 
 
 Special provision is made by Public Service Regulation 89a to meet the cases of 
 officers who may retire from the Public Service at 60 years of age, but have not served 
 the full period of twenty years entitling them to furlough, such officers being granted a 
 reduced period of furlough, or its monetary equivalent, in accordance with the actual 
 period of service. Thus an officer with sixteen years, but less than twenty years' service, 
 is granted five months' furlough, with twelve years and under sixteen years' service 
 four months' furlough, and so on. It was ruled by the Crown Law advisers that this 
 Regulation was applicable to officers who had been granted furlough on account of their 
 first twenty years' service, and had served a further period of years on resuming duty after 
 furlough. 
 
 Thus an officer who was granted furlough at the completion of twenty years* 
 service, and after resumption of duty had served an additional twelve years, would, on 
 retirement at 60 years of age or later, be entitled to four months' pay as the equivalent 
 of furlough earned under Regulation 89a. Here again the inequitable operation of the 
 law is apparent, as the officer who can be spared for the first period of furlough gets the 
 benefit of an additional four months' furlough, or ten months in all, while the officer 
 who carried such responsibilities that he could not be conveniently spared for furlough 
 is penalized, and on his retirement is granted six months instead of ten months' 
 furlough. 
 
 It will be seen that the present provisions of the law operate unjustly against 
 officers who by long and satisfactory service are equitably entitled to the benefits of 
 furlough. Already much dissatisfaction has been evinced by officers who are and will be 
 prejudiced by the unequal incidence of the law. It is understood that the Government 
 has for some time past contemplated an amendment of the Public Service Act in order 
 to place the matter upon a proper basis, and in my opinion there is a full justification for 
 the rectification of anomalies which have arisen. This rectification should take one 
 of two forms. Either the furlough provisions of the Act should be so amended as 
 
61 
 
 to make it clear that every officer shall be granted furlough on his retirement or the 
 monetary equivalent of such furlough corresponding with his full period of service, 
 but not to exceed twelve months on full pay, or twelve months' pay in lieu. Any 
 furlough already granted under Commonwealth or State law should be taken into 
 account and the grant of furlough or pay in Ueu should be conditional on the officer 
 having given satisfactory service to the Government. As an alternative, the present 
 provisions of the law should be continued, with the exception that it should be 
 clearly indicated that for an officer's whole period of service, whether twenty years 
 or more, he should not be entitled to more than six months' furlough or a monetary 
 equivalent of six months' pay, thus restoring the situation which existed prior to 
 the receipt of the opinion of the Crown Law authorities previously mentioned. In 
 my opinion the latter course should be taken. During my tenure of office as 
 Commissioner the view was held and frequently expressed that it was the intention 
 of Parliament that an officer who had served for twenty years or more should be 
 granted at some time, subsequent to his attaining twenty years of service, the 
 privilege of six months' leave on full pay, and that any officer who exercised this 
 privilege, no matter what his later service may be, would exhaust all his rights to 
 furlough or monetary equivalent. 
 
 This view was also set forth in the Thirteenth Eeport made by the Acting 
 Public Service Commissioner in the following terms : — 
 
 I would like at this stage to emphasize the fact that I have strongly and consistently opposed the 
 granting of more than one period of furlough, and consider that, in view of the liberal provisions in the 
 Public Service law as to sick leave, annual recreation leave, and holidays, officers were fairly treated in 
 being granted that concession. Even after the legal opinions referred to were made available I 
 endeavoured to .secure a continuance of the practice that had hitherto obtained limiting furlough to six 
 months on full pay or twelve months on half-pay, and pointed out the anomalies that would arise should a 
 departure from that custom be sanctioned. In fact, it was only because of the explicit direction of the 
 Government as to the course to be followed in dealing with applications for second periods of furlough or 
 their monetary equivalent that T agreed to recommend the claims of officers for what to nie seemed an 
 unreasonable privilege. 
 
 Taking all the circumstances into consideration, I am unable to see sufficient 
 justification for the expense to be incurred by granting every officer who has 
 completed over twenty years' service more than is involved in allowing six months' 
 leave with full pay, which, in my opinion, was the maximum contemplated by the 
 framers of the original Act. I would, therefore, recommend that no furlough 
 exceeding six months on full pay, or no more than six months' pay in lieu, should 
 be granted officers, and that the following should be the conditions of granting such 
 leave or pay in lieu : — 
 
 (a) That the officer has rendered satisfactory service ; 
 
 (6) That the officer is returning to duty after expiration of furlough ; or 
 
 (c) If retiring from the service that such retirement is due to his having 
 
 reached 60 years of age, or is due to infirmity ; 
 
 (d) That the officer has completed at least twenty years' service, except 
 
 that in the case of officers who are retired because of having 
 reached 60 years of age, and who have not served for twenty 
 years, that furlough or pay in lieu be granted in the proportion 
 that their service bears to twenty years ; 
 
 (e) That the previous granting of furlough under either Commonwealth 
 
 or State should exhaust any right to furlough or pay in lieu. 
 
 It is held to be a condition of the law that the furlough or its monetary value under 
 Regulation 89a must be granted ptior to, and not after, the retirement of the officer. 
 Officers, therefore, who retired from the Service prior to the ruling mentioned as having 
 been given by the Crown Law authorities relative to the operation of this regulation, 
 have been precluded from receiving the payment in lieu of furlough to which under that 
 ruling they were equitably entitled upon retirement. If the granting of furlough is to 
 be continued on the lines at present being followed, it is a matter for the consideration 
 of the Government whether, in any amendment of the law, provision should not also be 
 made to rectify this injustice to deserving officers. 
 
62 
 
 Recreation Leave. — Officers are at present permitted to accumulate recreation leave 
 for not more than two years, thus an officer desiring to take a lengthy journey may be 
 granted 36 days' leave. Special provisions are made as to accumulation of leave in 
 remote districts. In my experience, many attempts were made to secure an 
 accumulation of recreation leave for three or more years on the ostensible plea that 
 the exigencies of public business were such that officers could not be spared, therefore 
 they should not be compelled to suffer deprivation of the leave. It had apparently been 
 overlooked by these officers that recreation leave is granted as much in the interests of 
 the department as of the individual, in order that the highest efficiency of working may 
 be secured through the recuperation each year of the officer. It is only in exceptional 
 cases and for satisfactory reasons that recreation leave should be allowed to accumulate 
 even for two years, as the public interest demands that the leave shall be taken annually, 
 iji order that the best advantage shall accrue to departments. The rule as to the granting 
 of recreation leave annually should be rarely departed from except in remote districts, 
 and heads of branches should encourage the general observance of this rule. No officer 
 is so indispensable that he cannot be spared for eighteen days. 
 
 Reference may be made to the cases of officers who are required to serve 
 in remote or isolated localities throughout the Commonwealth, and more parti- 
 cularly in the western parts of Queensland and the north-west district of Western 
 Australia, where the climatic conditions are severe, and frequently detrimental to 
 the health of officers, their wives, and families. In these cases special provision is 
 made by regulation to grant up to 24 days' recreation leave for each year, and to permit 
 the accumulation of leave for two and, in certain cases, three years. In addition to this 
 amount of leave, officers in exceptionally remote places are allowed a reasonable time 
 for travelling, not exceeding two weeks. While these concessions as to leave are liberal, 
 and justifiably so in the circumstances, many officers are debarred from taking advantage 
 of them because of the prohibitive cost of the journey to the coast or to the capital city. 
 In illustration, it is desirable to mention one or two cases. An officer stationed at 
 Cloncurry who desires to spend his recreation leave at Brisbane would require to pay an 
 amount of £20 lOs. 6d. as railway and steamboat fares, and the cost of fares for himself, 
 wife, and two children (the last-named travelhng at half-fare) would amount to £61 lls.6d. 
 An officer stationed at Camooweal in the same circumstances would require to spend 
 £94 lis. 6d. in travelhng in order to enjoy a hohday at Brisbane. An officer stationed 
 at Fitzroy (W.A.) would be required to spend £90 in travelling to and from Perth in 
 order to obtain a holiday for himself, wife, and two children. In many cases full 
 fares would have to be paid for children, and the cost of the holiday in such cases would 
 be proportionately greater than the amounts stated. 
 
 The matter of affording some relief to officers stationed out-back in order that they 
 and their families may enjoy the benefits of a periodical holiday has already received 
 some consideration by those responsible for Public Service administration, and reference 
 has also been made by the Arbitration Court to the desirableness of making provision 
 for reimbursement or partial reimbursement of railway and other fares. From reports 
 which have been obtained by the Acting Commissioner, and estimates of cost which 
 have been framed, it would appear that the expense of a comprehensive scheme of 
 assistance to officers in defraying their cost of travelling whilst on recreation leave 
 would be heavy, but, notwithstanding this, I consider that the matter is one which 
 should not be overlooked, and that some scheme should be devised which would 
 appreciably benefit officers in the more isolated districts. In any amending Act pro- 
 vision might reasonably be included so that regulations may from time to time be 
 made, giving power to pay part cost of conveyance on recreation leave of officers 
 compelled to live, with their families, in localities far removed from the centres of 
 civilization and where the climatic conditions are severe. 
 
 Sick Leave. — ^The yearly expenditure on salaries of officers absent on sick leave, 
 and on the provision of staff to afford the necessary relief, has assumed consider- 
 able proportions. In 1910, when discussing the subject of sick leave in my 
 annual report, it was pointed out that in each year nearly one-third of the total number 
 of permanent officers in the Postmaster-General's Department were absent from duty 
 for long or short periods through sickness, that the Department thus lost the services 
 of an equivalent of 198 officers throughout the whole of the year, and that the amount 
 
63 
 
 thus expended in salaries for which no return was rendered in services was over £22,000 
 per annum. It was further shown that the statistics as to sick leave enabled accurate 
 comparison to be drawn as to the relative efficiency of male and female employment, 
 and incidentally opened up the question as to the soundness of a principle frequently 
 enunciated, that equal pay should be granted irrespective of sex distinctions. Still 
 dealing with the Postmaster-General's Department, the largest of the Federal Depart- 
 ments, it was found that 43 per cent, of female officers were absent each year through 
 sickness, against 29 per cent, of male officers ; while the average absence per annum of 
 female officers was 12-5 days., as compared with 5-8 days for males. Comparing classes 
 where males and females are engaged upon the same work, the proportion of post- 
 mistresses absent through sickness was 28 per cent., and of postmasters 17 per cent., 
 and of female telephonists 46 per cent., as against 28 per cent, of male telephonists, 
 although the latter are largely engaged on night duty, which is recognised to be more 
 unhealthy than day duty. In these cases the average periods of absence of female 
 officers were considerably greater than those of males. The experience of the Common- 
 wealth in this respect is borne out by that of other Government institutions employing 
 large bodies of women. Since the date of the report referred to the amount of sick leave 
 has increased in keeping with the expansion of staffs, and if all departments of the Service 
 be considered, the cost to the community of granting sick leave to public servants forms 
 a serious item of expenditure. 
 
 Under the Public Service Act and regulations sick leave is granted officers on the 
 following scale, the amount of sick leave mentioned being applicable to a triennial 
 period, commencing from the date of the first absence on sick leave. On the expiration 
 of the triennial period, the officer is allowed to commence afresh on the scale of such 
 leave, and to continue on that scale until the end of the next trieimial period, and so 
 
 on 
 
 SCALE OF SICK LEAVE. 
 
 L( ngth of Service. 
 
 Full Pay. 
 
 Half Pay. 
 
 Third Pay. 
 
 Without Pay. 
 
 Under -5 years ... 
 
 Over 5 years and under 10 
 
 Over 10 years .... 
 
 Month«. 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 Months. 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 6 
 
 Months, 
 
 6 
 6 
 3 
 
 Months. 
 8 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 Although these periods of sick leave are prescribed as maximum periods which 
 may be granted, in practice they are fixed periods, as no discrimination is exercised on 
 the merits of cases, and the illness of an officer which may be indirectly attributable to 
 causes within his own control is treated precisely on the same basis as that of an officer 
 whose illness is due to misfortune. It is a matter for grave consideration whether steps 
 should not be taken, apart altogether from the question of discrimination between 
 officers, to reduce the maximum periods of sick leave which may be granted under 
 regulations. The present scale is unduly liberal, and in many cases offers an incentive 
 to unscrupulous officers to absent themselves from duty without sufficient reason. 
 If all sick leave were grantable only on half -pay (although I do not suggest such a course), 
 I am satisfied that the total absences on account of alleged illness would be reduced by 
 a large percentage. Generally speaking, the medical check on unlawful absences and 
 on malingering is but slight, as the certificates of private medical practitioners must be 
 accepted by departments, except at Sydney, where a permanent medical officer is attached 
 to the staff of the Postmaster-General's Department. This appointment has thoroughly 
 justified itself, and there is no doubt that the creation of a similar office in Victoria 
 would well repay departments by the restriction of absences and the check on malingering. 
 Many officers regard sick leave as a vested right, which they are justified in exercising, 
 whether necessary or not. The history of malingering in the Service includes many 
 remarkable instances of the ingenuity of officers in defrauding their departments. It 
 should be understood that these remarks do not apply to a large proportion of the Service, 
 comprising honorable men and women who would scorn to take advantage of the depart- 
 ments, but unfortunately there is a proportion who do not hesitate to avail themselves 
 of the liberality of the regulations, which were solely designed to help unfortunate and 
 deserving officers. 
 
64 
 
 la the reorganization of the Service, early opportunity should be taken to 
 revise the conclitious under which sick leave is granted, in the direction of 
 exercising greater differentiation in the scale of sick leave bet\yeen officers 
 according to their relative service, and extending the period within which the 
 prescribed scale will operate. It will be noted that an officer of only twelve 
 months' service is entitled to the same privileges as an officer of four years' service, 
 and he may absent himself through illness for ten months and receive pay. No 
 distinction is made between officers with five and nine years' service respectively. 
 An officer of over ten years' service may in successive periods of three years be 
 absent for twelve months in each period with pay. 
 
 These conditions are unduly liberal to officers with the shorter periods of 
 service, and to officers generally in that they may be exercised in every period of 
 three years. In my opinion the best interests of the Public Service require a 
 variation of the existing conditions, and for consideration in any proposed 
 amendment, it is suggested that for the present triennial period be substituted a 
 period of five years, during which deserving officers should be eligible for sick leave 
 on the following lines : — 
 
 Full Pay. — One week for every year of service with a minimum of 
 two weeks and a maximum of thirteen weeks. 
 
 Half Pay. — Two weeks for each year of service with a minimum of 
 three weeks and a maximum of twenty-six weeks. 
 
 Third Pay. — Four weeks for each year of service with a minimum of 
 four weeks and a maximum of twenty-six weeks. 
 
 The maximum amount of sick leave obtainable on full, half, and third 
 pay, in any period of five years should be 52 weeks. 
 
 Under these conditions an officer who has completed four years' service 
 before being compelled to absent himself from duty may in the ensuing five years 
 receive according to his service from four to eight weeks' leave on full pay, from 
 eight to sixteen weeks on half pay and from twelve to twenty-four weeks' leave on 
 third pay. An officer who has completed thirteen years' service may in any period 
 of five years following absence on sick leave receive thirteen weeks on full pay, 
 twenty-six weeks on half pay, and thirteen weeks on third pay. If still unable to 
 return to duty he could be granted six months' leave without pay. These terms 
 should be regarded as sufficiently liberal and should ett'ect improved conditions in 
 the operation of the sick leave provisions. 
 
 At the present time, sick leave up to a period of three months may be provisionally 
 granted by the Chief Officer, subsequently approved by the Minister ; but any extension 
 is provisionally granted by the Public Service Inspector, and subsequently approved 
 by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Commissioner. Much time and 
 labour would be saved by dispensing with the reference to the Minister, the Commissioner, 
 and the Governor-General, and empowering the Chief Officer to grant all sick leave, 
 . subject to the concurrence of the Public Service Inspector, where the period of leave 
 exceeds three months in any period of five years. Provision should also be made 
 that where any officer has been absent on sick leave for a period of eighteen 
 months, and is then unable to resume duty, he shall be deemed to have 
 forfeited Lis office, subject to eligibility for reappointment if he eventually recover 
 his health. \\Tiile the present Act directs that an officer shall not be granted 
 leave beyond eighteen months, it is silent as to the action then to be taken if the officer 
 is unable to resume duty, and definite provision should be made for his retirement from 
 the Service. 
 
 In any amending legislation, power should be taken authorizing a Chief Officer, 
 upon medical report, to direct any officer to cease duty where, although he may be capable 
 of performing his work, he is in such a state of health as may constitute him a source of 
 danger to his fellow-employees or the pubUc. The absence of such officer should be 
 dealt with under the regulations relating to sick leave, which should apply as if the officer 
 had applied for leave of absence through illness. 
 
65 
 
 OBSERVANCE OF PUBLIC HOLIDAYS. 
 
 Under the provisions of the Act certain holidays are prescribed for observance in 
 the pubhc offices of the Commonwealth, and these holidays (eight in number) include the 
 generally recognised days, such as New Year's Day, Christmas Day, King's Birthday, &c. 
 Any duty performed on these days must be paid for at double rate— i.e., single rate in 
 addition to salary. In addition, the Act provides that any day or part of a day pro- 
 claimed as a public holiday throughout a State, or in any locality, shall be observed in 
 the Commonwealth offices in the State or locality ; but the Minister or Permanent Head 
 or Chief Officer may require such offices to be kept open for public business, and, unless 
 the Minister directs that extra payment shall be made for attendance of officers, no 
 payment is to be made. In any case, payment can only be granted iii respect of duty 
 on a holiday which operates throughout a State. 
 
 Under Arbitration awards, provision is made for exercising the Minister's dis- 
 cretion in respect to the observance of holidays other than the prescribed eight (8) days, 
 but it has been ruled by the Court that if the Minister decides to allow as many of the 
 staff off duty as can be spared on any such hohday, this amounts to an exercise of 
 discretion on his part, and all officers who remain on duty must be compensated by pay- 
 ment of double time, just as in the case of the prescribed eight days. This interpretation 
 by the Court has given rise to many difficulties and anomaUes, and if strictly foUowed 
 would result in serious embarrassment to departments. For example, St. David's Day 
 is one of the whole State holidays fixed by the HoUdays Act of Queensland, although 
 it is rarely observed outside the State Public Departments. It may happen that this 
 day is selected at Thursday Island for a local sports gathering, and the Minister consents 
 to the closing of the post-office for that day in order that the officials may take part in 
 the gathering. Although the holiday is observed in no other locality throughout 
 Queensland, according to the ruhng of the Court, the Minister, having exercised his 
 discretion in respect to Thursday Island, must gxant holiday pay at double rates for 
 St. David's Day to every employee in the State. These days, outside the regular eight 
 (8) hohdays prescribed by the Act, are generally known as concession days, and the 
 question of recognising these holidays for the purpose of payment of holiday rates has 
 given rise to considerable discussion. The practice usually followed is to allow as many 
 officers as can conveniently be spared to go off duty, and to permit those retained in the 
 Department to share in a concession holiday on some other occasion. In 1916 it was 
 decided by the Government that while hohday payment should be allowed for duty 
 on the eight (8) prescribed days, on other holidays (concession days) no such extra 
 payment should be made. This practice was continued until September, 1917, 
 when the Arbitration Court issued a ruling that payments must be made even for these 
 concession days, and this ruling has since been observed. Proceedings have recently 
 been taken in the High Court by an interested union and in the Arbitration Court by the 
 Acting Commissioner to determine the question whether the ruling of the Court is to 
 operate retrospectively as at the dates of the original awards. 
 
 There is no doubt that the law and practice in regard to the observance of pubhc 
 holidays, and the granting of additional payment for hohday duty, are unsatisfactory 
 and anomalous, and that urgent need exists for revision of existing conditions. Con- 
 siderable difficulties exist between the States as to the number and nature of the public 
 holidays observed, whether throughout the whole of a State or in the various localties, 
 and further anomahes arise from the fact that while a public holiday may be observed 
 in a capital city, officers employed in the country districts do not enjoy this hohday, 
 as it is proclaimed only for the city. Thus the complaint is made as to differential 
 treatment between city and country. Consideration has been given by Public Service 
 authorities to the question of how far holiday privileges, including payment for duty 
 performed, are to be extended, for obviously there must be some hmitation to the number 
 of holidays to be observed in the Federal departments short of the actual number of 
 hohdays proclaimed by the State Governments, as operating throughout the whole of 
 a State, otherwise Queensland officers would enjoy or be paid for sixteen pubhc hohdays 
 each year, Western Australia fourteen. New South Wales eight, and so on. 
 
 It is observed, from a perusal of the report of the Premiers' Conference heki in 
 May last, at which a Commonwealth Minister was in attendance, that the matter of 
 securing uniform holidays as between the States was discussed, and an arrangement 
 made that the matter would be further dealt with by correspondence. Any decision 
 which may be arrived at by the Governments of the States as to observance of uniform 
 F.18.352.— 5 
 
66 
 
 public holidays would be advantageous to the Commonwealth administration. In 
 connexion with such a holiday as Eight Hours Day, while this is observed as a whole 
 State hoUday in three States, in the remaining three States it is observed only in certain 
 localities, and not throughout the State. Many hohdays are recognised by States 
 Governments which have long since outlived their significance, and it is difficult to 
 understand why in Queensland the four Saints — St. George, St. Andrew, St. Patrick, 
 and St. David — are particularly honored by closing the public offices, while in other 
 States the necessity for this course is not recognised. There should be reasonable 
 possibility of agreement between the States as to a hmitation of public holidays, thus 
 securing increased production industrially and saving expense to the States and the 
 Commonwealth . 
 
 From the information placed at my disposal, it is gathered that tentative 
 arrangements have been agreed to by the Government as to limiting the number of 
 pubUc holidays to be observed in the Federal department each year, and that it is 
 proposed to validate these arrangements by amending the law at an early opportunity. 
 Under the Public Service Act all officers are entitled to eighteen days' recreation leave 
 annually. In addition, there are eight public hohdays prescribed, thus giving a total of 
 26 days' leave for each officer of the Public Service. It was considered by the Govern- 
 ment that if four concession days were added, making in all 30 days, members of the 
 Pubhc Service would have no reasonable ground of complaint as to inequitable treatment. 
 Officers of the Service are allowed liberal concessions in the matter of sick leave and 
 furlough, apart from the public holiday and recreation leave privileges. It was decided, 
 therefore, that in each locality of the Commonwealth, four concession days should be 
 selected for observance, and that no Federal public office in any locality should close 
 for more than twelve days in any calendar year, employees required to remain on duty 
 on any of these days to be compensated by the granting of holiday payment, this 
 number being made up by the eight prescribed holidays and the four concession days. 
 It was arranged that these four days should be selected by the heads of departments 
 so that uniform action might be secured as to closing the public offices, and that the days 
 might differ as between various localities in the one State. Thus in Victoria, while 
 Cup Day might be selected as one of the four days for Melbourne, at Bendigo Easter 
 Tuesday might be chosen, and so on. This arrangement, although not yet given the 
 force of law, has worked satisfactorily dm-ing the past year, and in considering revision 
 of the hohdays scheme for 1919, it is found that but few alterations are likely to be 
 required. The danger exists, however, that so long as the matter is not placed on a proper 
 legal basis, pressure is bound to be exerted by outside bodies for the recognition by the 
 Federal Government of extra hohdays, which would result in increasing the total number 
 beyond twelve per annum. This actually happened recently in connexion with the 
 observance of Melbourne Show Day, with the result that Melbourne officers gained an 
 •advantage over those stationed elsewhere by securing thirteen holidays during the 
 year instead of the number fixed by the Government, 
 
 It is important that action should be taken in connexion with any proposed 
 amending legislation to place the matter of observance of and payment for public 
 hohdays upon a sound footing, this being necessary from the stand-point of equitable 
 treatment of public servants, of convenience to the general pubhc in the matter of the 
 closing of departments, and of economical administration. 
 
 EENT FOR QUARTERS. 
 
 Where an officer occupies, for the pmrpose of residence, the whole or part of a 
 Government building, the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the 
 Commissioner, may direct that rent shall be paid by the officer not exceeding 10 per 
 cent, of the officer's salary. This provision of the Act necessitates a recommendation 
 being made to the Governor-General as to payment of rent in every case where an 
 officer is transferred to an office at which he will occupy quarters, and, as frequent 
 changes occur in the occupancy of quarters, particularly those attached to post-offices, 
 this involves considerable work in the submission of each individual case to the 
 Governor-General and the publication of orders in the Commonwealth Gazette. This 
 uimecessary circumlocution should be obviated by prescribing that the Commissioner 
 shall determine the amount of rent to be charged, subject to such limitations as may 
 be imposed by the Act. In addition, an amendment of the law should be secured, 
 empowering the Commissioner to direct that rent shaU be chargeable in respect of the 
 
67 
 
 occupancy of any particular quarters without specifying the officer or officers who may 
 from time to time occupy such quarters, thus avoiding the frequent submission by 
 departments to the Commissioner which is necessary under the present law. 
 
 Where the occupancy of quarters may be regarded as incidental to the duties 
 of the office, as in the case of postmasters, whose residence on post-office premises is 
 conducive to the better carrying out of departmental duties, the rental charge of 10 
 per cent, on salary, although generally inadequate as a return for capital expenditure, 
 may be justified because of the advantages to the Department. There are, however, 
 other cases where these conditions do not obtain, and, keeping in view the possible 
 future activities of the Government in erecting buildings altogether dissociated from 
 public offices, solely to meet the demand for housing accommodation for employees, 
 it is considered that in such cases the rental charges should approach more closely to 
 the ordinary basis as between landlord and tenant. In any amending legislation 
 provision should, in my opinion, be made that the Commissioner may, to meet such 
 cases, fix a fair and reasonable sum to be charged as rent. The rental should be 
 fixed to provide for reasonable interest on the capital cost and for expenses of 
 maintenance. A general rule might be made that the rent to be charged in such cases 
 shall not exceed 6 per cent, of the capital value of the premises occupied by any officer. 
 
 Under the present practice, a postmaster appointed to an office at the minimum 
 salary for that office is required to pay 10 per cent, of his salary as rent, and as each 
 increment accrues in his advancement to the maximum salary of his office the rental 
 charge is increased in order to maintain the payment of 10 per cent., thus an officer 
 awarded an increment of £10 actually receives only £9, the difference being applied to 
 rent. While this practice is in agreement with the law, it is productive of much irritation 
 and establishes a grievance against the Department. In the British Postal Service 
 the position has been met by providing that the rental, which, similarly to the 
 Commonwealth, is on the basis of a percentage of salary, shall not be increased because 
 of any incremental advance in salary. The rental, once fixed on the basis of the minimum 
 salary of the office, remains unalterable, no matter what increments may be granted 
 the occupant of the quarters. This practice should, I consider, be adopted in the 
 Commonwealth Public Service, and, under the power proposed to be vested in the 
 Commissioner to fix rental charges, he will be enabled to direct that at all post-offices 
 and other buildings, where quarters are occupied by public servants, and rent is charged 
 for such occupancy, the amount of rent shall not exceed 10 per cent, of the minimum 
 salary attached to the particular position. Where an officer for whom official quarters 
 are provided, can furnish satisfactory reasons for relief from the obligation of 
 occupancy, he should be permitted to sublet such quarters to another officer, but he 
 should be held responsible to his department for the amount of rent chargeable on 
 the classified value of the office, and any arrangement between himself and the 
 sub-lessee should be a personal matter between the two officers, subject to a 
 safeguard against any possible exploitation. The adoption of the foregoing proposals 
 as to rent will considerably simplify the present methods, and result in greater 
 contentment amongst an important section of the PubUc Service. 
 
 Allowances in lieu of Quarters. — Under an award of the Arbitration Court, 
 postmasters who are compelled to rent a private residence, owing to Government 
 quarters not being available, are entitled to allowances varying from 2^ to 
 5 per cent, on salary. The view apparently taken by the Court is that, if postmasters 
 who occupy Government quarters are charged merely a rental of 10 per cent, 
 on their salary, other postmasters, not so fortunately situated, required to 
 provide their own housing accommodation by renting premises should be paid 
 an allowance to partly compensate them for the outlay thus incurred. It must, however, 
 not be overlooked that, while the postmaster occupying quarters in a Government 
 building is required to pay only a comparatively small rent, by the fact of his residence 
 therein he is called upon to act as caretaker of the building, and to render services to the 
 public outside the ordinary business horas. The equity of the arrangement made by 
 the Court in granting allowances to officers not in residence at post offices is somewhat 
 doubtful, and, while provision may perhaps be made in any amendment of the Act 
 enabHng such allowances to be paid, the question should be left open for further 
 consideration in connexion with the framing of regulations under the Public Service 
 Act. 
 
68 
 
 LIFE ASSURANCE OF OFFICERS. 
 
 Pending the adoption of a system of pensions or superannuation allowances for 
 officers of the Public Service, the existing provisions of the Act as to compulsory life 
 assurance must necessarily remain in operation. Under the present law an arrangement 
 is made by which any officer who is unable to effect an assurance upon his life, excepting 
 with a loading on his age of five years or more, or whose proposal for life assurance wiU 
 not be accepted by any company, is required to submit to a prescribed deduction from 
 his salary in Heu of assurance, and the amount so deducted is accumulated, with interest, 
 for his benefit upon retirement or the benefit of his dependants in the event of his 
 death. 
 
 It is foimd that the existing provisions of the Act as to compulsory assin-ance 
 involve some hardship in the cases of officers who, entering the Service late in life, are 
 required, because of their advanced age, to pay heavy premiaims on life assurance 
 policies. For example, an officer appointed as an artisan at a salary of £186 was required 
 to effect an assurance necessitating the payment of a yearly premium of £22. The 
 difficulty does not end here, as on promotion such officers are reqiiired to effect fiu-ther 
 assurance, and the payment of premiums for the additional assm'ance would largely 
 absorb any advance in salary secured by' promotion. In order to ease the financial 
 strain upon officers appointed in such circumstances, the Commissioner shouli be 
 empowered to waive the provision as to compulsory life assurance where an officer is 
 appointed over a stipulated age, and to permit him to take advantage of the provisions 
 quoted above as to deductions from salary in lieu of assurance. 
 
 RETIREMENT OF OFFICERS FROM THE SERVICE. 
 
 Every officer upon attaining the age of 60 years is entitled to retire from the 
 Pubhc Service should he elect to do so, or, if the circumstances justify it, he may be 
 compelled to retire. If, however, he is desirous of continuing in the Service, and is 
 capable of performing his duties satisfactorily, and continues to be capable, he may be 
 retained until he reaches his sixty-fifth year, when his services are terminated. Provision 
 is made in the Act for retention even beyond 65 years of age in cases where the Commis- 
 sioner certifies that it is in the interests of the Service to so retain an officer, but this 
 has been interpreted to mean that the officer's services should not be retained if his p]ac3- 
 can conveniently be filled, and, with the wide field of selection always available, this is 
 a most mJikely contingency. As a matter of practice, no officer lemains in the Service 
 after attaining the age of 65 years. Similar provisions are contained in the Public 
 Service Acts of some of the Australian States, and it is probable that, in prescribing in 
 the Commonwealth Act an age at which retirement should be compulsory, the object of 
 the Legislature was to obviate the creation of conditions which had arisen in some of the 
 States under which officers were retained far beyond the period of official usefulness. 
 On the transfer of State Departments to the Commonwealth in 1901, it ■was foimd in 
 one State that many transferred officers were between 65 and 70 years, and a few even 
 over 80 years of age. There is no doubt that in the original legislation dealing with the 
 age for retirement of public servants the States Parliaments had in view the fact that 
 provision existed for the granting of superannuation allowances, or some form of com- 
 pensation, upon retirement, and this is borne out by the terms of the Commonwealth 
 Constitution which provides (Section 84) that an officer shall be entitled to retire from 
 office at the time, and on the pension or retiring allowance, which would be permitted 
 by the law of the State. 
 
 While the provision as to retirement of officers on reaching the statutory age 
 has much to commend it, keeping in view the need for active and vigorous discharge of 
 public duties, and for providing avenues of advancement for ambitious youth, at the 
 same time there is an element of hardship in the enforced retirement of officers who have 
 grown grey in the Service and who have not the consolation of a superannuation 
 allowance. In a separate section of this Report reference has been made to the urgent 
 -necessity for the introduction of some scheme of superannuation. During the past 
 seventeen years a considerable proportion of the retirements on account of age from ihe 
 Federal Service have, because of accruing State rights as to pensions, been unaccompanied 
 with hardship, but even during this period numerous cases have arisen, -particularly in 
 the New South Wales and Queensland sections of the Federal Service, where the retired 
 officers possessed no such rights. It will not be long before all officers of the Federal 
 
Service who were transferred from the larger States in 1901 with pension rights will have 
 disappeared, as the majority of the transferred officers were appointed to the State 
 Services subsequent to the abolition of pensions. In Victoria, for instance, pensions 
 were abolished in 1883, thus officers now in the Federal Service who were appointed to 
 the Victorian Service 35 years ago are not entitled to pension upon retirement. 
 
 Under the Commonwealth Public Service Act, as also under some of the State 
 Acts, compulsory life assurance is prescribed, in order that some endowment provision 
 may be available for officers on reaching the retiring age. While this provision has, 
 no doubt, been beneficial, it can hardly be considered as more than a palliative, as the 
 majority of public servants are not required to effect an assurance beyond £200, 
 and in no case for an amount greater than a year's salary, which amount capitalized 
 would not assist to any material extent in meeting the wants of the retired officer and 
 his dependants. As indicating how few are the possibilities of the great majority of 
 public servants being able to make appreciable savings for their maintenance after 
 leaving the Service, the following figures are extracted from the Thirteenth Report of 
 the Public Service Commissioner as to the permanent stafi of the Service at June, 
 1917. Of the 23,058 officers of the Federal Service, 16,583 are in the General Division, 
 a proportion of approximately 70 per cent., and of this proportion- there are only thirteen 
 officers receiving a salary in excess of £300 per annum. Of the remainder, 1,891 are 
 paid more than £200 a year, while the balance are paid at rates below £200. In the 
 Clerical Division there are 6,042 officers, of whom only one-sixth (1,078 officers) receive 
 a greater salary than £300 per annum. 
 
 It is necessary to bear in mind that the public servant occupies a peculiar position 
 in relation to his life's work when compared mth persons employed outside the Service. 
 Except in comparatively rare instances where engaged in the practice of a profession 
 or trade, a public servant is trained for and occupied in duties which have no parallel in 
 outside commercial or industrial life, consequently, on the termination of his career 
 in the Public Service, there is no avenue open to Lim where his services may be profitalily 
 utilized. The class of work in which he has been engaged is the monopoly of the 
 Government, and generally his qualifications are of value only in the direction of 
 departmental employment. The employee in outside industries has a wider scope, 
 and may continue to obtain employment in the later years of life, although possibly 
 at a reduction in wage compared with his earnings in earlier years. 
 
 The problem of dealing with retired sexagenarians can only be thoroughly solved 
 by a system of superannuation allowances, but, pending the adoption of such a system, 
 action should be taken to make some provision for the employment of men who, having 
 reached the age at which they might reasonably be expected to vacate positions they 
 are now occupying, are still capable of giving useful service in minor positions. With 
 this object in view, it is considered that the Act should confer authority on the 
 Commissioner to determine that, upon an officer reaching 65 years of age, he shall vacate 
 his position, but if such officer is not entitled to pension or superannuation allowance, 
 and, in the opinion of the Commissioner, is capable of giving satisfactory service in a 
 lower position, with corresponding salary, he may sanction transfer of the officer to 
 such lower position. The positions to which such officers may be transferred should 
 be defined by regulation, and the transfers should be of such a nature as would not 
 interfere with the advancement of other officers. For example — If applied under 
 existing conditions the officer, if in the Clerical or Professional Divisions, would be 
 transferred to an office in the lowest class of such Divisions, with salary 
 appropriate to such office, and if an officer of the General Division to an office 
 in a junior grade in that Division where he should be paid the minimum wage payable 
 to adults employed in the duties of such grade. The retention of an officer in the 
 Service after reaching 65 years of age should be subject to report by a Public Service 
 Inspector at least once a year that the officer is capable of rendering, and is rendering, 
 service commensurate with the lower rate of payment granted him In no case, 
 however, should an officer be kept in the Public Service, even under the foregoing 
 conditions, after reaching 70 years of age. By the adoption of the proposed arrangement 
 many cases of extreme hardship would be ameliorated, while the avenues of promotion 
 would be kept open for deserving officers by the vacation of positions at 65 years of 
 age, and the transfer of their occupants to minor posts, carrying a lower salary, but 
 fitill a salary sufficiently adequate to provide some measure of comfort in their declining 
 years. From a humanitarian stand-point there is much to be said for the suggested 
 
70 
 
 provision in relation to men who have rendered faithful service, and whose misfortune 
 it is that they have grown old ; and, with the safeguard as to inspection and report, it 
 is free from objection from an ordinary business point of view. 
 
 Retirement of Telegraph Messengers. — The section of the Act dealing with the 
 emplojonent of telegraph messengers enacts that every messenger, on reaching eighteen 
 years of age, shall cease to be employed unless he has passed the prescribed examination 
 before attaining that age. The examination thus referred to means the examination 
 for appointment as telegraph messenger, the practice being to allow boys to enter the 
 Service on passing in two of the three subjects prescribed for the entrance examination, 
 and to require them to complete their qualification by passing in the third subject prior 
 to reaching eighteen years of age. Under section 10 of the Post and Telegraph Act of 
 1901 it was provided that every telegraph messenger should immediately, on attaining 
 the age of eighteen years cease to be employed by the Department, but, if eligible, he 
 could be appointed to some other position in the Public Service. This provision was 
 repealed by the Public Service Act Amendment Act of 1909, it being anticipated that 
 sufficient vacancies would be available to absorb the whole of the telegi-aph messengers 
 eligible for promotion to other positions in the General Division upon their reaching 
 eighteen years of age. For some years these anticipations were realized, but it has recently 
 been found that difficulty is experienced in finding positions for these boys as they reach 
 the age mentioned. It is now essential, in my opinion, that some provision be made to 
 meet the present position, and it is recommended, therefore, that the law be amended 
 to provide that retirement of telegraph messengers, excluding returned soldiers, shall 
 be efiected at eighteen years of age where no positions are available which can be 
 fiUed by their promotion. Power should be given by an amendment of the Act to 
 appoint telegraph messengers without examination, where deemed expedient by the 
 Commissioner, so as to provide for filling positions in certain localities where a supply 
 of suitable lads is not available under the ordinary procedure of appointment after 
 competitive examination, and for the holding of examinations enabling them to 
 qualify for promotion prior to their reaching their eighteenth birthday. 
 
 SUPERANNUATION. 
 
 It is a matter for regret that the Commonwealth Public Service Act of 1902 did 
 not include some provision for the estabhshment of a system of superannuation of 
 employees, instead of following the methods adopted in the more recent Public Service 
 legislation of the larger States in prescribing a system of compulsory life assurance. While 
 the Federal law was to some extent based on the Public Service Acts of the Australian 
 States, important departures were made from those Acts, and it is strange that the neces- 
 sity for providing a pension scheme was not realized by those concerned in the framing of 
 the new Act. It is evident that some attention was concentrated on the subject during the 
 discussions in Parliament, as proposals were made for the creation of a Commonwealth 
 Insurance Department for the purpose of dealing with life assurance of all employees 
 of the Government. These proposals were, however, not accepted, and the existing 
 arrangement as to life assurance with recognised public companies was adopted. It 
 is clear that any provision for life assurance of public servants, no matter how liberal, 
 cannot take the place of a properly devised system of superannuation allowances, . and 
 this fact has been recognised by many Governments, and by banking and commercial 
 institutions throughout the world. While the superannuation systems adopted many 
 years ago by some of the Australian States have for a variety of reasons proved unsatis- 
 factory in their operation, much evidence is available as to the success of other systems 
 adopted by commercial institutions where adequate safeguards have been introduced, 
 and the contributions by employer and employee have been fixed on a sound actuarial 
 basis. 
 
 In the Commonwealth Public Service there is no doubt that many cases of hard- 
 ship have occurred through the operation of the law as to compulsory retirement of officers 
 upon reaching the statutory age, hardships which would have been obviated or mitigated 
 by the existence of a superannuation fund. Officers who have devoted their lives to 
 the Public Service, and who are approaching the age for retirement, regard their future 
 with deep concern and anxiety, and the maintenance of themselves and families at an 
 age when it is difl&cult to enter new walks of life is a serious problem. Public servants 
 generally are not in receipt of such salaries as will enable them, while rearing their 
 families and discharging liieir duties as useful citizens, to lay by sufl&cient means to 
 
71 
 
 secure a reasonable standard of comfort in their old age. They are rightly prevented 
 from entering into competition with the outside public, and consequently have not 
 the same opportunity of supplementing their incomes and providing for their declining 
 years as is possessed by persons outside the Service. It is certain that nothing would 
 be more calculated to insure the maintenance of a contented Service than the knowledge 
 that some measure oi provision had been made by the combined action of the Govern- 
 ment and its employees for the well-being of the officer and his dependants in the closing 
 years of his life. 
 
 From the stand-point of the public interest, experience has shown that the provi- 
 sion of a superannuation fund is a wise policy, as insuring loyal service and the retention 
 of men in the Public Service whose training and experience are of much value, and which 
 otherwise might be lost to the Government because of the inducements offered them to 
 join undertakings outside the Service. Moreover, there is much to be said for the theory 
 that the possession of superannuation rights establishes a strong, although not an 
 absolute, safeguard against the participation of employees in industrial troubles, and 
 insures their loyalty to the interests of the Government. 
 
 The Public Service Commissioners of the United States of America have devoted 
 considerable attention to the subject of superannuation, the members of the Board beirg 
 strong advocates of pensions for long service officers, and their views are epitomized as 
 follows : — 
 
 " The establishment of pension rights benefits the employer as well as the 
 employee. 
 
 " The prospect of a pension at the end of an employee's useful service attaches 
 him more closely to the firm or service than anything else can do. The 
 one great concern of a man when he reaches middle life is as to bis 
 future provision, especially in the event of his breaking down in health 
 towards the close of a useful career. The subject is always before him, 
 and constantly worries him, and interferes with his efficiency and the 
 produce of his day's work ; but with a pension scheme before him he 
 is relieved of this anxiety, and can more thoroughly and cheerfully 
 carry out his duties. 
 
 " It is a direct incentive to the employee to render good service, because he 
 recognises that unsatisfactory conduct or perfunctory work may result 
 in loss of the valuable asset accruing to him at the close of his working 
 career, or when unforeseen disaster may overtake him in the way of 
 sickness. 
 
 " It means that the employee keeps to his work, and when he reaches the 
 age, say, of 50 years, and has become a valuable asset to the Government 
 by reason of his experience, he is ( ontent to remain and not be induced 
 to enter other walks of life. Ihis continuous service is of great 
 importance in conducting the work of a public department whose business 
 is entirely distinct from anything outside. Ihe officer who really 
 becomes valuable to a department is the one who has had long service, 
 and is acquainted with the methods and precedents existing in his 
 business." 
 
 The British Civil Service has earned a high reputation for fidelity, zeal, and 
 independence, and it has been claimed that this is due to the fact that these employed 
 in it are aware that provision has been made for thtm by the pension system against 
 ultimate want. The continuance in the Public Service of men with waning powers often 
 acts as a barrier to reform, because they are unequal to the strain of introducing new 
 methods, and such men cannot be expected to initiate new systems involving strenuous 
 work in their establishment and in opposition to preconceived ideas, whereas a younger 
 officer will be constantly striving to effect improvements, and thus enhance his official 
 reputation. The efficiency of a Public Service can only be maintained or increased 
 where there is continuous movement upwards and a regular retirement of the super- 
 annuated, with the consequent influx of the young, strong, and ambitious. Effective 
 provision for those who are too old to render satisfactory service does not rest upon 
 sentimental considerations, but upon solid grounds of economy and efficient 
 administration. 
 
72 
 
 As regards the adoption of a scheme of superannuation allowances in theComnion- 
 wealth Public Service, the question is too wide and far-reaching for elucidation in the 
 time at my disposal for the preparation and submission of this Report. The matter is 
 one involving most careful and prolonged study of existing conditions, and the 
 consideration of questions of a technical and complex nature. Any system to be adopted 
 will require to be framed, not on speculative or problematical resultS; but on ascertained 
 facts reduced as nearly as practicable to a mathematical basis by a thoroughly competent 
 actuary or actuaries. The necessity for the establishment of such a scheme appeals 
 strongly to me. and it is therefore urged that some authority should, as early as possible, 
 be empowered to investigate fully the proposals which have been made from time to 
 time by those interested in the matter,, and to submit recommendations for the 
 consideration of the Government. 
 
 The details of the scheme must necessarily be left for the suggestion of such an 
 authority, but, in my opinion, certain general principles should be followed to insure 
 that the scheme adopted should be free from the extravagant features of past State 
 systems, which have resulted either in their breaking down, or in being canied on at 
 an expense to the community which has operated as the most potent argument against 
 the introduction of a superannuation scheme into the existing Services. It must be 
 recognised that any scheme which will make an appreciable demand upon the public 
 treasury, either in the direction of a heavy preliminary or permanent subsidy, is unlikely 
 to meet with acceptance, and, therefore, it must be founded mainly on a basis of 
 contribution by the employees of the Service, and, if such contributions are not to be ' 
 of a crushing character, the benefits must be less liberal than those under past State 
 legislation. 
 
 Under the system of salary payments now in operation in the Commonwealth 
 Service, it would seem that officers generally could contribute an adequate sum for 
 the main support of a reasonable superannuation scheme without appreciable hardship. 
 Payments of salary are now made fortnightly, and, assuming that a contribution equal 
 to 4 per cent, of salary were thought necessary, the fortnightly quota of an officer 
 receiving, say, £200 per annum, would be approximately 6s., or not twice the amount 
 he is at present required to pay in life assurance premium to meet the minimum 
 requirements of the compulsory life assurance provisions of the Act. 
 
 For the object desired officers might reasonably be required to contribute up to 
 4 per cent, of salary, and, taking into consideration the advantages to be gained by 
 the Government through the effect of a pension system upon the Public Service, it might 
 also reasonably contribute a sum equal to 1 per cent, of the salaries of contributing 
 officers ; or, in other words, officers should contribute four-fifths of the annual payments 
 to the Superannuation Fund, and the Government provide the remaining one-fifth. 
 The incidence of pension payments should be such as to be adequately met by an annual 
 contribution equal to 5 per cent, of the salaries of the contributors. The present annual 
 salary expenditure upon officers to whom the pensions scheme would be applicable, 
 i.e., excluding persons already entitled to pensions, can be accepted as not more than 
 ■ £3,500,000, and the contribution by the Government would not for many years to come 
 exceed £35,000 per annum. 
 
 It should be possible, with expert assistance, to introduce a scheme which, without 
 imposing any serious burden on officers, or any unreasonable demand upon the public 
 purse, would place the public servant in a position where he could view the futm-e with 
 more equanimity than under present conditions. Such a scheme should embrace the 
 following features : — 
 
 (1) That the funds necessary, apart from any expense of management, 
 
 should be obtained by contributions on a basis of one-fifth to be 
 provided by the Government, and four-fifths by the officers by 
 deduction from salary. 
 
 (2) That all details of management should be conducted by a staff of public 
 
 servants forming a branch of the Commonwealth Treasury, the 
 salaries of such staff, and all expenditiu"e incidental to the management, 
 to be provided by the Government. 
 
 (3) That pensions granted should accord with contributions, i.e., if pension 
 
 is computed on salary received by the officer it should be the average 
 
73. 
 
 salary received by him dui'ing his period of contribution, and not, 
 as generally the case under State systems, on the salary received by 
 him in the three closing years of his service. 
 
 (4) That provision should be made for payment on a reduced scale to widows 
 
 of deceased pensioners or, in the event of the death or remarriage of 
 a widow, to the children of the deceased pensioner under a prescribed 
 age. 
 
 (5) That contribution to the fund should be compulsory upon all officers 
 
 excepting those entitled to pension or superannuation allowance under 
 the laws of the State from which they were transferred. This is 
 contingent upon the management taking over the compulsory life 
 assurance obligations of officers already in the Service. 
 
 A recommendation was recently made by the Royal Commission dealing with the 
 Naval Administration of the Commonwealth for the adoption of some scheme of 
 superannuation in the Navy and Defence Departments. In my opinion, any action 
 in this direction should be extended to embrace the whole of the departments of the 
 Commonwealth. 
 
 EXTRANEOUS PAYMENTS. 
 
 In any scheme of Public Service reorganization attention will require to be given 
 to the large expenditure involved in granting payments to officers other than by way 
 of annual salary in relation to such matters as Sunday and hoHday pay, overtime and 
 meal allowances, travelling and reheAdng allowances, district allowances, payment 
 for excess travelling timC; stretch of shift allowances, allowances for performance of 
 higher duties, &c. In no direction is there a greater tendency to inflate the public 
 expenditure than in connexion with these extraneous payments, and in many instances 
 allowances of various kinds are looked upon by officers as legitimate perquisites which 
 should not be interfered with or challenged. The annual expenditure incurred in thia 
 manner has reached considerable proportions, and would well repay close investigation. 
 
 In a separate section of this Report reference is made to the need for amending 
 legislation as to observance of public holidays and payment for duty performed on 
 these holidays, where considerable scope exists for retrenchment in expenditm-e. Much 
 of the expenditure for Sunday and holiday duty is unjustifiable if considered from the 
 stand-point of interference with the privileges of officers; e.g., an officer who has enjoyed 
 his Sunday or holiday, and in the regular course of his duty is required to commence 
 a night shift at 10 p.m. or 11 p.m. on the Sunday or holiday should not be granted 
 extra payment ; yet in this direction a considerable sum has been paid to officers as 
 compensation for loss of Sunday and hohday privileges. Payments for overtime and 
 meal allowances require to be carefully safeguarded. The public expenditure on 
 reheving allowances is a serious item, and some provision is necessary for securing 
 adequate reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses without enabling officers to make 
 a regular and substantial profit. An instance has come under my notice where, in 
 order to relieve an officer who had enlisted for service abroad, an officer was sent to 
 take his place temporarily, and was paid a relieving allowance of 27s. 6d. a week. 
 After the officer had drawn this allowance for some nine months, it suddenly dawned 
 upon the department that the officer might have been permanently appointed to the 
 position and the relieving allowance be saved. This should have been done at the outset, 
 and some other position found for the enlisted employee on his return from the war. 
 It is obvious that many savings can be made in relieving allowances by intelligent 
 administration. 
 
 As a result of a visit by me to Western AustraUa in 1911, and a recommendation 
 to the Government, a special district allowance of 5 per cent, on salaries was granted 
 officers stationed in Perth and at all localities outside those where a special allowance 
 had always been paid, such as the gold-fields and northern district areas. The 5 per 
 cent, allowance was intended to equalize cost of living conditions between Perth and the 
 eastern capital cities, and was justified by the circumstances then existing. In the 
 course of tim.e, however, the cost of living at Sydney and Melbourne rapidly advanced, 
 while at Perth the upward movement was slower, with the result that the disparity 
 between Perth, Sydney, and Melbourne, which originally justified the payment of the 
 allowance, disappeared, and there was no longer any sound reason why the extra payment 
 
74 
 
 should be continued. The statistician's figures as to purchasing power of money for the 
 quarter ended September last show that the cost of living at Perth was lower than at 
 any other capital city in Australia. Although a recommendation was made by the 
 Acting Commissioner to the Government some two years ago for abolition of bhe 
 allowance, no action has been taken in this direction, and the payment is still made. 
 Many thousands of pounds are being unjustifiably expended on this special allowance 
 of 5 per cent., and the officers who have thus benefited have been placed in a more 
 favorable position than those in the eastern States, where the cost of living is higher 
 than in Western Australia. 
 
 The payments for excess travelling time granted by Arbitration awards are 
 unwarranted in many respects. " Travelling time " is paid for time spent in 
 travelling outside the ordinary hours of duty, and is granted in addition to the 
 ordinary day's pay. While there is some justification for granting travelhng 
 time to linemen, mechanics, and artisans who are required to travel in their own time 
 on departmental business, and where such travelling does not form a regular part of their 
 ordinary duties, there is no sufficient reason why travelling time should be allowed officers 
 such as engineers, line inspectors, telephone inspectors, and others whose regular duty 
 is to travel, and who could not perform their work without travelling. In the 
 award granted by the Arbitration Court to the Professional Officers' Association, the 
 provision as to payment of travelling time gives rise to serious abuses, and involves 
 much expenditure which is absolutely without precedent and without justification. 
 For example, an engineer is required in the course of his duty to journey from 
 Melbourne to Sydney. He has completed his day's work in Melbourne by 4.30 p.m., 
 and leaves for Sydney by the 5 p.m. express, arriving at Sydney at 10.45 a.m. next 
 day. The department provides him with railway ticket, reserved seat, and sleeping berth, 
 and grants him a travelling allowance on a scale according to his salary to defray any 
 expenses en route. In addition to this, under the Arbitration Court award he is entitled 
 to be paid up to an extra day's pay for time spent in travelling outside official hom-s. 
 Thus, because in the course of his duty he journeys from Melbourne to Sydney,- 
 he is paid an extra day's pay, in addition to the travelling allowance to cover all 
 expenses incvurred during the journey. Another case may be cited in illustration of 
 the extravagance involved in these allowances. An officer of the Professional Division 
 is required to journey to Dai win on official business. He travels by rail from Melbourne 
 to Sydney, and the steam-boat journey thence to the Northern Territory occupies 
 eight days. The officer draws travelling time for sixteen days, representing the journey 
 both ways, equal to 16 days' extra pay, and, in addition, travelling allowance to meet 
 all expenses. During the sixteen days practically spent in comfortably lounging on 
 the steam-boat he draws two days' pay each day, free of all expense. The justification 
 for repeal of such provisions should require little argument. 
 
 The allowances paid under Arbitration Court awards to officers who are required 
 temporarily to perform duties of a higher class vary in accordance with the award. In 
 many cases the allowance is paid after one month's temporary occupancy, in another 
 case it is granted after three months, and in yet another after six months. There is 
 no adequate reason for these differences in practice, hence the whole question requires 
 reconsideration, and adjustment on an equitable basis. 
 
 Sufficient has been said to indicate that some action is necessary to place the 
 matter of extraneous payments upon a sounder basis. This, of course, is only possible 
 upon repeal of the existing arbitration awards, when a material saving could be made 
 of expenditure for which there is no present justification. 
 
 Hours of Duty. — The expenditure in overtime payments is governed largely by 
 the hours of attendance prescribed by arbitration awards and Public Service regulations. 
 In the General Division necessity exists for the revision of the present hours of duty, 
 in order that manifest inconsistencies may be removed. For example, it was decided 
 by the Arbitration Court that the hours of duty of post-office mechanics should be 
 reduced from 46| to 44 hours a week, while other artisans are still required to work 
 the former hours. This decision was based on an undertaking by the union that as 
 much work would be performed in 44 hours as was previously done in 46| hours. There 
 is no evidence that this result has been achieved, but, in any case, there is no justification 
 for differential treatment. In the Clerical Division the hours of duty of telegraphists 
 have, by an award of the Arbitration Coixrt, been fixed in such a manner as to widely 
 extend the opportunities for claiming overtime, the practice in operation for many 
 
75 
 
 years of computing overtime on a weekly basis having been altered by the Court, which 
 substituted a daily basis. The conditions of the Telegraph Branches are similar to those 
 of Mail Branches in respect to the fluctuation of business from day to day, yet while 
 employees in the former branches are paid, by award, overtime on a daily basis, those 
 in the latter are paid, also by award, on a weekly basis. There is no satisfactory reason 
 for this inconsistency, from which the public funds suffer by unjustifiable overtime 
 payments. 
 
 As a general rule the hours of duty of officers engaged in clerical or professional 
 work, and also those of many General Division officers, are from 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m., 
 with three-quarters of an horn* interval for the mid-day meal. In two States these 
 officers are allowed a meal interval of an hour, and remain on duty until 4.45 p.m. The 
 actual working hours of these officers are six and three-quarter hours a day, Monday 
 to Friday, and three hours on Saturday, or a total of 36J hours in a week. In four of 
 the six States the practice in the public departments controlled by the States 
 Governments is to employ clerical staffs from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Monday to Friday 
 in each week, and from 9 a.m. to 12 noon on Saturday. Eeasonable warrant exists 
 for amending the present arrangement, and providing that the ordinary working hours 
 for such classes of officers in the Commonwealth Service shall in future be from 9 a.m. 
 to 5 p.m., with an allowance of one hour instead of three-quarters of an hour for a meal, 
 and that on Satm'days the hours should be from 9 a.m. to 12 noon. The present 
 provision as to meal interval is more honoured in the breach than the observance, as 
 many officers actually take a full hour instead of the three-quarters prescribed, and 
 the actual effect of the suggested alteration would be to obtain from such officers half- 
 an-hour's daily extra service. It is recommended that in any amendment of Public 
 Service regulations, following upon the passage of new legislation, the question of 
 revision of hours of duty on the lines indicated should be given consideration. 
 
 EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN. 
 
 Some reference should be made to the conditions governing the admission of 
 women into the Public Service and their employment therein. It has been urged from 
 time to time that there should be no discrimination between men and women as regards 
 appointment to the Service, nor as to their rates of payment for services rendered, and 
 in this connexion it is desirable to review the existing practice and to consider whether 
 any alteration is advisable in the public interests. The Public Service Act gives power 
 to make regulations for prescribmg the salaries or wages for women employed otherwise 
 than in the Clerical Division, and prohibits the employment of any married woman 
 except upon the certificate of the Commissioner that such employment is desirable. 
 Beyond these provisions the Act is silent as to the employment of women, and there is 
 DO legal bar to the appointment of women to any division of the Service. While the 
 Act empowers the fixing of special rates for women in the General Division, no regulations 
 have been framed for this purpose, consequently women employed in the same occupations 
 as men in this division are similarly remunerated. In the Clerical Division no distinction 
 is made between men and women in rates of payment. No women are employed in the 
 Professional Division. 
 
 It has been the practice to restrict the appointment of women to positions for 
 which, generally speaking, they are particularly suitable, such as those of typist, 
 telephonist, female sorter, in which their utilization is of advantage to the Service. 
 Males are likewise employed as telephonists, and in some few cases as typists, and no 
 differentiation is made between the rates of payment of male and female employees ; 
 but the principle has been established that no male telephonist shall continue to be 
 employed in that position after he reaches 21 years of age, and steps are taken to promote 
 him to some other position on attaining that age. In the departments transferred from 
 the States at the inception of Federation a number of female officers occupied positions 
 corresponding to the present positions of clerk, telegraphist, and postmistress, and these 
 officers on classification were placed in the Clerical Division. With few exceptions, 
 the whole of the female officers now in the Clerical Division obtained their eligibility for 
 employment in that division under State law prior to Federation. Apart from these 
 transferred officers, the majority of the female officers now employed occupy positions 
 which may appropriately be filled by them, and in which they do not enter into competition 
 to any marked extent with male officers. The total number of female officers employed 
 in the Service is 2,645, of whom 2,419 are in the General Division. The balance (226) 
 
w 
 
 are classified in the Clerical Diyision, and of these one-half are employed in the 
 Postmaster- General's Department in Victoria, in which State, before Federation, 
 facilities were afforded women to enter the Clerical Division, but only in certain defined 
 positions, and at special rates of payment substantially lower than those granted to male 
 entrants to the Service. 
 
 In any discussion as to amendment of the Act, the question may possibly be 
 raised as to widening the avenue for employment of women by throwing open positions 
 for unrestricted competition between male and female candidates. The examinations 
 for appointments to the Service which have in the past be^n confined to males have 
 been principally for nomination to the Clerical Division in the position of clerk ; and to 
 the General Division in such positions as lineman or mechanic, for which women are 
 obviously unsuitable. As regards appointment to positions of clerk, the unrestricted 
 admission of women to these positions would certainly mean the complete transformation 
 of a Service now comprised for the most part of men, and a radical change of this nature 
 could only be justified by the fact of some advaatage accruing to the Public Service. 
 If the future efficiency of the Service be kept in view, such a change would be a serious 
 disadvantage. Young men enter the Service of the Commonwealth with the intenaon 
 of devoting their lives to the work, and with the ambition to qualify for higher positions 
 and assume greater responsibihties. Experience has shown that in the case of women 
 employees the same incentives do not as a rule exist ; the knowledge of departmental 
 working gained by them is lost in an appreciable number of cases owmg to marriage, 
 and even when they continue in the Service it is found that they reach their limit of 
 usefulness at a comparatively early age if placed in positions ordinarily filled by men. 
 "While they may stand the strain and pressure of work for a time, usually reacti<m follows 
 with the accompanying nervous break-down, and, as a general rule, it is shown that 
 women are physiologically unfitted to carry responsibility at an age when men are 
 improving and developing their capacity in this respect. Any action to materially 
 increase the present proportion of female officers in the Clerical Division would result 
 in lessening the supply of trained officers capable of filling future executive positions in 
 the Service, and this would undoubtedly prove a serious matter as affecting the efficiency 
 of departments. All the evidence is strongly against any alteration in the present 
 practice of restricting Clerical Division appointments to male candidates, particularly in 
 view of the endeavours now being made to provide, in this Division, an avenue of 
 employment for returned soldiers. 
 
 The positions at present occupied by female officers in the Service include the 
 following : — 
 
 Clerical Division. 
 
 Clerk, Telegraphist, 
 
 Postmistress, Clerical Assistant. 
 
 General Division. 
 
 Assistant, Checker, Female, 
 
 Postal Assistant, Reader, Female, 
 
 Typist, Sorter, Female, 
 
 Telephonist, Senior Sorter, Female, 
 
 Monitor, Assistant, Printing, Female. 
 Supervisor, 
 
 The last five positions named are reserved for females, while the remaining 
 positions may be filled by appointment of males or females, although in the case of 
 telephonists and typists females largely preponderate, 
 
 As regards the question of remuneration, there is, in my opinion, justification 
 for adopting differential rates as between male and female officers in certain cases. 
 The cry of " equal pay for equal work," irrespective of sex, has been an insistent one ; 
 but it should not be overlooked that an important consideration in fixing wages, apart 
 from the actual value of 'the work performed, is that a wage shall be granted sufficient 
 to meet the reasonable requirements of a man and his family, or to enable him to make 
 provision for marriage and his future responsibilities as a citizen. No such consideration 
 enters into the fixing of wages for female labour. Moreover, even where similar duties 
 are performed by men and women, whether it be in the Public Service or in the teaching 
 profession, or elsewhere, the experience throughout the world is that equal services are 
 not rendered, owng to the fact that constitutionally women are unable to give such 
 
77 
 
 eontinuouB effort as men, and are absent from duty for health reasons to a far greatei' 
 extent. The more frequent absences of women, through ilhiess, necessarily restrict 
 their utility as workers. In the British Post Office a differentiation to the extent of 
 10 per cent, is made in the salaries of men and women. 
 
 In such positions as those of typist and telephonist, taking all the conditions 
 into consideration, women render service equal to that of men, and there should be 
 no necessity to discriminate between the sexes in the matter of salary. There 
 are, however, in the Service positions of a clerical character specially suitable for 
 women, where the work is not of sufficient value to justify the maximum rates at 
 present payable in such positions, and in these cases the Commissioner should be 
 empowered to exercise some discrimination, keeping in view the nature of the 
 occupation. In this connexion the work of record clerks may be mentioned. While 
 the employment of a junior male clerk on the duties of recording and indexing papers 
 for a period of one or two years is desirable from the stand-point of training in office 
 routine and procedure, his further retention on the work is unwise, as limiting his 
 training for other positions requiring initiative, and resulting in a loss of ambition, 
 combined with a feeling of dissatisfaction with his environment. The routine nature 
 of this work renders it peculiarly suitable for women, and, where the experiment has 
 been tried, it is found that female clerks discharge the duties in a satisfactory manner. 
 I would suggest that the junior positions in the records branches of departments 
 be filled largely by female officers, and that, for this purpose, a limited number of 
 clerical positions be thrown open to females already employed in the Service, subject 
 to a special scale of payment being adopted, the maximum of which being less than 
 that prescribed for the junior class of the Clerical Division. The adoption of this 
 proposal would be advantageous to the Service, and would release promising youths 
 from duties which are mainly routine, thus widening their scope for training and 
 improving their prospects of advancement, while at the same time making for a more 
 contented Service. 
 
 RETURNED SOLDIERS. 
 
 Any report dealing with PubUc Service administration under existing oonditiors 
 would be incomplete wdthout reference to the employment of returned soldiers. Not 
 only the Commoiiwealth Government, but the Governments of all the States, have 
 devoted attention to recognition of the services of our brave men in the cause of their 
 country and tlie Empire, by affording them the fullest opportimity of now serving their 
 country in a civil capacity. The policy of the Commonwealth Government in respect 
 of their employment is reflected in the several amendments of the Public Service Act 
 which have been made sinoe the outbreak of war, and which place the returned soldief 
 who seeks entrance to the Service in a more advantageous position than other classes 
 of candidates. Returned soldiers who pass an examination for appointment to the 
 Federal Ser^'ioe are given priority over all other candidates at the same examination, 
 and, in addition, exartiinations may be restricted to returned soldiers, who upon passing 
 may be appointed to the Clerical Division at any age up to 50 years, while the maximum 
 age for other candidates is 25 years. Apart from the examinations thus prescribed to 
 enable returned soldiers to qualify for appointment to the permanent Service, the Act 
 provides for appointment on evidence of educational quahfications, and without any 
 further examination. For instance, a lad who passed the Junior Public Examination 
 prior to the war, and who enlisted for service, may on his return to Australia secure 
 permanent appointment to the Service on the strength of his University pass, and without 
 again submitting himself to an educational examination. Provision is also made that a 
 returned soldier may be appointed to any class or subdivision of the Clerical Division 
 with corresponding salary ; while the outside candidate must, under the law, be appointed 
 to the lowest subdivision of the lowest class, and at a minimum salary of the class. The 
 regulations governing temporary employment confer priority on the returned soldier 
 if he is qualified to perform the work required to be done, and no limitation is placed on 
 the period of employment as is the case with ordinary applicants for temporary work.- 
 The returned soldier may be continued in a temporary position so long as temporary 
 assistance is required, and he does the work satisfactorily. I am satisfied from inquiries 
 that the provisions of the Act in relation to employment of returned soldiers are being 
 administered in a sympathetic maimer, and every reasonable allowance is made for 
 infirmities resulting from service at the war. 
 
78 
 
 It will be seen that tlie preference given to returned soldiers has been of a 
 substantial nature, and the efiects of the Government's policy in this connexion are 
 already apparent in the public departments in the number of retarned men serving in a 
 permanent or temporary capacity. It should be stated, however, that the granting of 
 preference to returned soldiers carries with it certain results which should be cheerfully 
 accepted as inseparable from the aftermath of warfare, but which, in justice to officers 
 responsible for the control of departments, should be fully recognised. The appointment 
 of returned soldiers of adult age instead of youths fresh from school must necessarily 
 render the process of training more difficult, and this is bound to be reflected to some extent 
 in the efficiency of the Service. Seme indication of the difficulties experienced by 
 controlling officers of departments may be gathered from a recent quarterly report 
 relative to the temporary employment of returned soldiers in one branch of the Service 
 which shows that, in order to obtain the desired assistance, it was necessary to 
 communicate with 171 returned soldiers, of whom 84 failed to acknowledge the 
 communications. Of the 87 men engaged during the quarter, 30 left their occupation 
 before the expiration of the quarter, 10 left their work without giving any notice, 
 12 resigned, 4 left through illness, and 4 were dismissed for reasons to their discredit. 
 And, despite all this, the public business of the department had to be carried on. While 
 such conditions must be anticipated in the circumstances, they add materially to the 
 burdens of responsible officers, but I am satisfied they are being faced with the desire to 
 give whole-hearted support to the policy of the Government in offering avenues of 
 employment to the returned soldier. 
 
 Some consideration has been given to the question of whether the preference 
 already provided for in legislation should be extended in any other direction. The 
 provisions already mentioned relate to the returned soldier who desires to enter the 
 Public Service, but many officers have left their positions in the Service to fight for their 
 country. Should preference for promotion be given to these officers on their return from 
 the war over senior fellow-officers who have stayed at home ? No officer should be 
 prejudiced in his prospects of advancement by reason of absence on active service, 
 and apparently this principle has been kept well in view, as the practice has been 
 adopted of giving full consideration to the claims of absent officers in the making of all 
 promotions, as a result of which a large number of men now serving abroad have been 
 promoted during their absence to higher positions in the Service, the duties of which 
 they will take up on their retvirn to Australia. With the continued recognition of this 
 principle it is considered that full justice will be done. Claims have been advanced 
 that the returned soldier should be given preference for promotion as against other 
 members of the Service, senior and equally efficient, and it has been contended in 
 thus advocating preference to returned soldiers that it is desired to reward those who 
 have served the nation rather than to penalize those who have not enlisted. It must 
 not, however, be overlooked that the prior advancement of the returned soldier must 
 necessarily have a punitive effect on the officer superseded, whose failure to enlist will 
 have resulted in the forfeiture for an indefinite period of a right to promotion which as 
 an equally qualified and senior officer he formerly possessed. The adoption of a poUcy 
 of preference for promotion would also mean that the permanent officer who endeavoured 
 to enlist, but was medically rejected, the officer who was over the age for enlistment, 
 and the officer whose home ties and obUgations rendered his enhstment out of the 
 question, are all to be penalized for no causes of their own. The old experienced 
 officer, who could not enlist, but who has perhaps sacrificed his only son on the 
 altar of his country, is to be superseded in the Service by a younger officer whose age 
 and absence of family ties have enabled him to enter the conflict. No one would gainsay 
 the fact that the officers who enlisted are deserving of commendation and reward, but 
 I cannot believe that these officers would seek to be rewarded at the expense of their 
 fellow-officers, particularly at such heavy expense as would be involved by the loss of 
 promotion, the efiect of which would be felt throughout their official career. 
 
 It is apparently not realized by those advocating the promotion of returned 
 soldiers over the heads of other officers how inequitable such a preference would be, 
 as, not only would it operate adversely against non-soldiers in respect to irameiiate 
 promotions, but would enable the returned soldier to claim preference throughout every 
 class of his division, and, if this preference be multiphed over and over again, it would 
 mean that the non-soldier would find himself continually being passed over by returned 
 men, many years junior to himself, both in age and service, and with less experience, a,nd 
 no superior capacity. To any person having a knowledge of PubHc Service organization 
 
79 
 
 the adoption of such a system of preference is unthinkable if the pubUc interests are to 
 be considered. The effects of preference to returned soldiers would be far-reaching in 
 the destruction of incentive and the creation and continuance of bitter feeling between 
 soldiers and non-soldiers which would seriously affect the es-prit de corps of the Public 
 Service. The senior officer, if not surpassed in efficiency, has the right, conferred by 
 law, and enjoyed since the inception of the Public Service Act, to preference for 
 promotion. It is now sought to destroy this right. It is difficult to believe that the 
 agitation in this direction arises from the returned soldiers who are officers of the Public 
 Service, or that it would be countenanced by such men, who, having served their 
 country in the interests of right and justice, have returned, or are returning to their 
 positions in the departments. 
 
 The provisions already made by the law in the interests of returned soldiers 
 seeking entrance to the Pubhc Service, if ^dsely and sympathetically administered, 
 should, in my opinion, adequately meet all reasonable claims, and I believe that once 
 having secured admission to the Service, returned soldiers will not seek to trade on their 
 patriotism, but will be ready to stake their future advancement upon their qualifications 
 and capacity in competition with their fellow-officers under the regular conditions of 
 promotion prescribed by the Public Service Act, and .not by means of undue preference 
 accorded them by reason of their war service. 
 
 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 Under the provisions of the Act temporary assistance may be engaged by a 
 department whenever in the opinion of the Minister it is necessary, and the selection of 
 the person to be employed is to be made by the Permanent Head or Chief Officer. It 
 is provided that the persons selected shall be those who appear to be best quahfied for 
 the work to be performed. While the Act thus confers authority on the departmental 
 head as to selection of temporary employees, the order of preference in selection is 
 prescribed by Pubhc Service regulations as follows : — Returned soldiers, relatives of 
 soldiers, persons qualified for and awaiting permanent appointment, members of trades 
 unions, and so on. It will be seen, therefore, that decision as to the necessity for 
 temporary assistance nominally rests with the Minister, and the power of selection with 
 the Permanent Head or Chief Officer, while the Commissioner or Public Service Inspector 
 has no expressed direct power in the matter. In practice, the Minister's decision is 
 usually an indorsement of authority for temporary assistance, and the actual selection 
 of the temporary employees is not made by the Permanent Head or Chief Officer, but 
 by some subordinate officer under instructions. The Commissioner or Inspector may 
 question the selection of any temporary employee upon the ground that the provisions 
 of the law governing selection have not been observed, and it has frequently been 
 necessary to take this course. In addition, cases have occurred where persons who have 
 not been registered for temporary employment have been engaged, and others where 
 the conditions of selection in order of registration have been ignored. 
 
 The following extract from the Seventh Report issued by me as Public Service 
 Commissioner indicates the view taken by me in the matter : — 
 
 Glancing at the provisions of the Public Service Act in respect to the employment of temporary 
 hands in the public departments, it must be recognised that it was never contemplated that such assistance 
 should be utilized except to meet the exigencies of those departments during periods of pressure, or to 
 cope with conditions where the appointment of permanent officers would be unwise and unjustifiable ; and 
 it is certain that Parliament never intended that temporary hands should be employed in a wholesale 
 manner for the performance of duties which, by no effort of imagination, could be considered as temporary 
 in character. While the provisions of the law are as indicated, a regrettable omission occurred in the 
 failure to provide for a system of selection for employment which would remove any possibility of undue 
 influence, and enable temporary or casual work to be distributeil on fair grounds without favour to any 
 person. It must be acknowledged that where opportunities occur for the exercise of patronage, they are 
 liable to be availed of, and in the absence of restriction as to the method of engaging temporary assistance, 
 the greatest temptation exists to find work for solicitous applicants, irrespective of the requirements of 
 departments or of the claims of otiier applicants for prior consideration. And the danger does not end 
 at this stage, as once having secured temporary engagement by means of undue influence, the .same 
 influence is brought into play to prevent the service of temporary hands being dispensed with. Viewing 
 the matter not only from an economical stand-point, but also from that of efiiciency, the present system 
 is detrimental to departmental interf'sts ; and nothing but demoralization of the permanent Service can 
 result from a wasteful introduction of temporary hands. 
 
 Although every effort has been made within the restricted power of the Commis- 
 sioner and Inspectors to eliminate the undesirable features of temporary employment, 
 and generally with satisfactory results, an amendment of the law is urgently necessary 
 to prevent the continuance or recurrence of these conditions. While no permanent 
 
80 
 
 office €an be created in the Service except upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, 
 a temporary position may be established in which the Commi-ssioner has no voice. 
 Similarly, while an appointment to the permanent Service can only be made under 
 conditions which render impossible the exercise of influence' or favoritism, the present 
 method of appointing temporary employees furnishes inadequate safeguards against 
 irregular methods of selection. The Permanent Head of a Commonwealth depart- 
 ment, in discussing this matter recently, expressed his views in the following 
 ternis : — 
 
 As regards increases of staff, it may be pointed out that, even under existing legislation, it is 
 possible for the department to employ temporary assistance in a position which the Public Service 
 Commissioner has deemed to be unnecessary. This serves to indicate that the present provision of the 
 Act in this connexion may be rendered ineffective from the Commi.ssioner's point of view, while the 
 department is able to secure the assistance which it requires, but not in the manner most to he desired, 
 as generally speaking a permanent officer would render more efficient service than a temporary employee. 
 
 For the purpose of indicating the importance of this phase of Public Service 
 administration from a financial stand-point, the following figures are quoted : — 
 
 . 
 
 Number of Temporary 
 Employees on 30th J une. 
 
 Annual Expenditure. 
 
 1912 ... 
 1914 ... 
 1918 ... 
 
 1,533 
 1,648 
 3,622 
 
 £215,467 
 197,690 
 508,052 
 
 The marked advance in 1918 as compared with 1914 (th« pre-war period) may be 
 attributed to the engagement of temporary assistance in the absence of permanent 
 officers with the Expeditionary Forces, and the conditions may to that extent be regarded 
 ae abnormal. 
 
 In any amendment of the Public Service Act it is highly necessary that alterations 
 be made which will remove any possibility of unfair discrimination, and secure some 
 guarantee that temporary assistance shall only be utihzed where justified by the require- 
 ments of departments. In addition, it is desirable that provision should be made to 
 obviate the continuance of temporary employment where the conditions are such as to 
 warrant the establishment of permanent positions. The amendment of the law should be 
 in the direction of providing that when temporary assistance is considered necessary the 
 Permanent Head or Chief Officer should notify the Public Service Inspector, who, if 
 satisfied that the assistance is required, should make the selection of a suitable person 
 from the employment register. The effect of this arrangenient would be to erect a 
 barrier against the creation of a temporary position for the purpose of providing employ- 
 ment for some favoured person, and also to insure the careful examination of the 
 available resources of the department and the possible temporary rearrangement of 
 duties, so as to obviate the necessity for temporary assistance. The Victorian Public 
 Service Act provides that temporary assistance shall be engaged only when in the 
 opinion of the Commissioner such assistance is necessary, and the selection of the 
 employees rests with the Commissioner. 
 
 COMMONWEALTH RAILWAYS. 
 
 Under the terms of the Commission intrusted to me, it is required that report 
 be made as to the steps necessary to adjust the position that has arisen by reason of the 
 various authorities in existence for the regulation and working of the Public Service. 
 It is therefore necessary to consider the position with regard to the admimstration 
 of the Commonwealth Railways in relation to staff management. Under the provisions 
 of the Kalgoorlie to Port Augusta Railway Act, the Minister was empowered to appoint 
 such officers as he considered necessary for the purposes of construction or working of 
 the Railway for any period not extending beyond six months after the date the line was 
 declared open for traffic. This Act, so far as it concerns the powers of appointment, 
 together with the Pine Creek to Katherine River Railway Act, has now been repealed 
 by the Commonwealth Railways Act of 1917, under which the power of appointment, 
 and the fixing of salaries, wages, and allowances is vested in the Commission erof Railways, 
 excepting appointments of persons at a salary of more than £500 per annum, which 
 require the approval of the Oovernor-General. Any determination of the Commissioner 
 
81 
 
 of Railways as to salaries, wages, and general conditions of employment may be varied 
 by an award of the Arbitration Court under the provisions of the Arbitration (Public 
 Service) Act in the same manner as the Public Service of the Commonwealth. The 
 Commissioner of Railways is empowered to dismiss, reduce, or otherwise deal with 
 employees for incapacity or misconduct, but employees are granted the right of appeal 
 against any decision as to reduction in status or pay, or as to dismissal. The Appeal 
 Board includes a Police or Stipendiary Magistrate appointed from time to time by the 
 Minister, an employee of the Railway Service appointed by the Commissioner, and an 
 elected representative of the employees. The Board is empowered to vary any 
 punishment imposed, and its decision is final. The Commissioner of Railways may make 
 by-laws prescribing inter alia the terms and conditions of appointment, retirement, and 
 dismissal, and such by-laws must be approved by the Governor-General, be published 
 in the Gazette, and be laid before Parliament within a specified time. 
 
 In a preceding section of this Report, a recommendation has been made for tha 
 repeal of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act, and the adoption of this recommendation 
 will involve the necessity for providing some other arbitral authority to deal with claims 
 of Railways employees. Under the proposals for re-organization of the Service, provision 
 is made for the Public Service Commissioner being vested with arbitral functions in 
 relation to the Federal and Territorial Services, and there appears to be no sound reason 
 why the employees of the Commonwealth Railways should not be brought within his 
 jurisdiction in this respect, and provision made for investigation and determination by 
 him of Railway claims as to rates of pay and general conditions of employment. 
 
 It is a matter for consideration whether, in respect to the administrative section 
 of the Commonwealth Railways, the officers should be brought into line with the Federal 
 Service proper as to methods of appointments, classification, and scales of payments, 
 and jurisdiction as to appeals against promotions, and deprivation of increments, 
 these matters being within the proposed functions of the Public Service Commis- 
 sioner. It is recognised that appointments of professional and clerical officers in the 
 Railway Service are usually made on a different basis from that adopted in the Public 
 Service, and that it is frequently found necessary to make such appointments from the 
 services of the State Railways Departments, but this is not an insuperable difficulty, 
 as appointments from these services are often made to the Public Service under conditions 
 which may easily be applied to the Railway Service. It may possibly be urged that 
 salary scales appficable to the conditions of the Public Service proper are not suitable 
 for employees of a Railway Service, where the duties and functions differ in many respects 
 from those of an ordinary Government. Whatever ground there may be for such a 
 contention in relation to conditions under the present Public Service Act, it would not 
 apply to the more elastic provisions proposed in this Report for future conditions. 
 
 In my opinion the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commissioner should extend 
 to the matters mentioned, so far as they relate to salaried officers of the Commonwealth 
 Railways, but not to daily-paid employees. The latter should continue to be wholly 
 controlled by the Commissioner of Railways, subject to the exercise of arbitral powers 
 by the Public Service Commissioner, who would take the place of the Arbitration Court 
 in this respect. 
 
 NAVY AND DEFENCE DEPARTMENTS. 
 Prior to the year 1909, persons employed in the Department of Defence, other 
 than members of the Naval and Military Forces, were subject to the provisions of the 
 Public Service Act and Regulations, but in that year an amendment of the Defence 
 Act was adopted by the Parhament authorizing the Governor-General to employ persons 
 in a civil capacity for any purpose in connexion with the Defence Force, or in any factory 
 established under the Defence Act, and persons so employed were to be excepted from 
 the operation of the Commonwealth Public Service Act. It was further enacted that 
 all appointments to the Department of Defence, other than such clerical appointments 
 to the Central Administrative staff as in the opinion of the Governor-General should be 
 under the PubHc Service Act, should be appointments to the Naval or Military Defence 
 Forces. In 1910 a further amendment of the Defence Act provided that the appointments 
 which might be made under the Public Service Act, if the Governor-General saw fit, 
 should include not only those to the Central Administrative staff as prescribed by the 
 Act of 1909, but also appointments to the Pay and Ordnance branches. In 1917 the 
 Defence (Civil Employment) Act was passed, providing for removal of all officers employed 
 in the Department of Defence from the operation of the Public Service Act until the 
 expuration of a period of twelve months after the close of the war, when the original 
 F.18352.-6 . 
 
82 
 
 position is to be resumed and former public servants are again to become subject to 
 the Public Service Act. It is provided, in addition, that all offices created in the 
 interim which in the opinion of the Governor-Greneral would have been created under 
 the Pubhc Service Act but for the operation of the Defence (Civil Employment) Act, 
 and all persons occupying such offices, are to become offices and officers under the 
 Pubhc Service Act after the lapse of the period specified, and that salaries paid under 
 the Defence Act to officers becoming subject to the Public Service Act are not to be 
 reduced. 
 
 Naval Defence. — The Naval Defence Act of 1910-11 authorizes employment of 
 persons in a civil capacity in the Department of the Navy under the conditions prescribed 
 in section 63 of the Defence Act, and as a result of this provision no officers of this 
 department are subject to the Public Service Act. 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that since 1909 the Public Service Commissioner has 
 had no jurisdiction in the matter of creation of offices or the appointment of persons 
 to any civil office in the Defence Department except in regard to a clerical office in the 
 Central Administration or in the Pay and Ordnance branches, and even then only when 
 in the opinion of the Governor-General the office should be under the Public Service 
 Act. The conditions of management thus established formed the subject of comment 
 in the following terms in the Twelfth Report of the Public Service Commissioner :— 
 
 A system of dual control which is open to grave objection obtains in some sections of the 
 Department of Defence. In the Central Administration, and in the Pay and Ordnance Branches of the 
 several States, civil positions are occupied in some instances by officers appointed under the Public Service 
 Act, and in others by appointees under the Defence Act, the discretion resting with the departments as to 
 which statute is to govern an appointment to a vacancy. The result is that officers in a particular branch 
 performing duties of a similar character demanding like qualifications are working under differing 
 conditions as to salary, promotion, and terms of employment, and such a state of affairs is not only 
 anomalous but exceedingly undesirable from an administrative standpoint. In my view, officers attached 
 to the branches particularly mentioned in capacities of a civil nature should be appointed under the Public 
 Service Act, but if good and sufficient reasons can be advanced in opposition to that opinion the remaining 
 course for terminating the present unsatisfactory situation should be followed, i.e., to place all positions of 
 the nature referred to under the Defence Act. 
 
 Similar views as to the present anomalous conditions were expressed by the 
 Royal Commission on Naval and Defence Administration, which in its Third Progress 
 Report made the following reference to the matter : — 
 
 "We are fully seized of the pressing necessity for the abolition of divided control and varying 
 conditions of employment. We consider that uniformity in methods of staff control, discipline, and 
 advancement is essential in order to secure that contentment of service without which there can be no real 
 efficiency. We have conferred with the Acting Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner, the Crown Law 
 authorities, and the responsible officers — both civil and military^-of the Defence Department, and the 
 recommendations contained herein are calculated to bring about the desired unification of staff management. 
 The course of bringing all officers of the department under the Defence Act presents itself as the only 
 practical solution of the difficulty, inasmuch as the great majority of those employed by the department 
 in a clerical capacity are already subject to the provisions of the Defence Act. Moreover, it would be 
 impracticable to attach the whole of the staff to the corps of military staff clerks or to absorb them 
 under the Public Service Act. We intend that our proposals in the matter shall be operative for the 
 period of the war and for twelve months thereafter. 
 
 These proposals were adopted and carried into effect by the passage of the 
 Defence [Civil Employment) Act 1917 aheady mentioned. For the present, therefore, 
 the objectionable system of dual control has ceased to operate, but on the expiration of 
 the twelve months period after the war, faiHng any corrective legislation in the mean- 
 time, the former position will be resumed with all its undesirable features possibly 
 accentuated by any action taken by the department during the interregnum^. The Pubhc 
 Service Commissioner must then take over all previous " Public Service " offices, and 
 also all offices created under the Defence {Civil Employment) Act which the Governor- 
 General (or, in other words, the Administration) considers should be offices in the 
 classified Public Service, and all officers occupying these offices are to come within the 
 scope of the Public Service Act, irrespective of the method of their appointment to the 
 Defence Department. The opinion of the Commissioner is apparently not to be sought, 
 and there is nothing to prevent the re-estabhshment of the former anomalous position 
 under which officers working side by side and performing similar duties will be subject 
 to the varying provisions of the Public Service Act and the Defence Act, and heads of 
 sections may be classified under the Defence Act, while their subordinates may be 
 employed under either Act. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner will extend only to 
 that portion of the stafi brought within the scope of the Pubhc Service Act, and differences 
 of classification and rates of payment as between Pubhc Service and Defence officers 
 
will create heartburnings and dissatisfaction. In such circumstances, no Commissioner 
 can reasonably be expected to accept responsibility for the organization of any particular 
 section of the department or for any failure to meet public requirements. 
 
 Under existing conditions there are manifest possibiUties for introduction into the 
 Defence Department of irregular practices connected with the appointment of officers 
 against which the Public Service Act was designed as a safeguard, it having been the 
 intention of Parliament that any element of patronage should be eliminated. While 
 regulations have been framed under the Defence Act which prescribe, inter alia, 
 examination and other conditions of appointment, an open door is left for making 
 appointments under a separate regulation which reads : — • 
 
 If at. any time it appears expedient or desirable in the interests of the department to appoint as 
 an officer some person who is not an officer in the service of tlie department under these Regulations, 
 the Governor-General may, on the recommendation of the Secretary, appoint such person accordingly 
 without either examination or probation, and without regard to age. 
 
 At the present time there is attached to the Works and Railways Department a 
 staff of 115 officers, designated a Naval Works Staff, which embraces engineers, draughts- 
 men, surveyors, clerks, typists, messengers, &c., with a total salary bill of over £22,000 
 per annum. This staff was previously controlled by tl^e Navy Department, but under 
 an alteration of departmental organization was transferred to the Works and Railways 
 Department. Although this department is administered under the provisions of the 
 Public Service Act, the position has been taken up that the Commissioner has no control 
 whatever over these employees as they were appointed to their present positions under- 
 section 41 of the Naval Defence Act. 
 
 I am aware of nothing more likely to furnish ground for bitter grievance and 
 dissatisfaction than the establishment of conditions of appointment which will engender 
 feehng that the old-time poUtical and other influences are being asserted. While 
 recognising fully that both in the Navy and the Defence Departments exceptional 
 conditions require exceptional methods, I am of opinion that the vesting of power wholly 
 in these departments to make appointments to the civil staffs is wrong in principle and 
 constitutes a danger to the public interests ; the earliest opportunity should be taken 
 to bring these departments within the aegis of the Public Service Act in respect to all 
 sections of civil employment. If the interests of the C(?mmonwealth and of the Public 
 Service are to be considered, the staffing of each branch other than the purely Naval 
 and Mihtary sections of the Departments should be controlled by the Commissioner 
 under the conditions recotmnended in this Report for adoption throughout the Service. 
 These conditions will permit of greater elasticity in the selection of persons for permanent 
 appointment, and keeping in view the wider powers proposed to be intrusted to depart- 
 mental administrative officers, no logical reason can apparently be advanced for 
 differentiating between the civil branches of the Navy and Defence Departments and 
 those in other departments of the Commonwealth Public Service. 
 
 As a basis for consideration, it is suggested that in the Department of Defence 
 all offices and officers of the Central Administrative staff, embracing the Secretary's 
 Office, Finance Branch, and Contracts and Supphes Section, as also of the District Pay 
 Offices, Ordnance Branches, and Rifle Club Offices in the several States should be wholly 
 under the PubUc Service Act. It must, however, be strongly emphasized that, if one 
 or more positions in these branches are to remain subject to departmental control, 
 all should be, as no system of dual control can ever be satisfactory ; the re-estabhshment 
 of a system under which the conditions of employment of one particular officer, or of a 
 group of officers, can be played off against the coiiditions of others under different 
 control would prove intolerable and be subversive of the pubhc interest. There should, 
 generally speaking, be a clear line of demarcation between those branches of the Navy 
 and Defence Departments which may be regarded as civil branches and those which should 
 be filled by members of the Naval and Military Forces. Provisions should be made 
 for the specific naming of the civil branches in each of the two departments, and despite 
 any existing powers conferred by the Naval and Defence Acts, all offices and officers 
 in such branches should be brought within the operation of the Public Service Act. 
 The arrangements thus recommended should come into force at the expiration of the 
 period fixed by the Defence (Civil Employment) Act, both in respect to the Navy and 
 Defence Departments, and in the meantime conferences should be held between repre- 
 sentatives of the Public Service Commissioner and of the two departments concerned 
 in order to determine the branches to be transferred and the conditions of such transfer, 
 
84 
 
 subject to the provisions of any new legislation dealing with the management of the Public 
 Service. Included in the matters for consideration by such conferences should be the 
 question whether the executive and clerical stafis of the factories estabUshed imder the 
 Defence Act should also be brought within the provisions of the Pubhc Service Act. 
 The employees, other than the executive and clerical staffs, should as at present be 
 exempted from the operation of the Public Service Act ; but provision should be made 
 in respect to such employees for exercise by the Commissioner of arbitral powers in the 
 event of any dispute as to wages or general conditions of employment between the 
 employees and the management. 
 
 (B.) THE TERRITORIAL SERVICE. 
 
 In any amendment of the Public Service Act provision should be made for the 
 future management of the Public Service of the Territories of the Commonwealth, 
 including the existing Territories and those which may hereafter, possibly as a result 
 of the war, be administered by the Federal Government. The existing Territories to which 
 it is proposed that reference be made are (a) the Northern Territory ; (b) Papua ; and 
 (c) Norfolk Island. It appears anomalous that the territorial services should be recruited 
 and controlled by separate authorities from those dealing with the general Service of 
 the Commonwealth, and it is important in the public interests that expenditure on 
 salaries of officers employed in those services should be subject to the same checks and 
 supervision as those of employees in the Federal Service, so far as concerns the 
 classification of positions and a proper assessment of work values. No sufficient reason 
 apparently exists for exempting the territorial services from a general system of 
 administration by a Public Service Commissioner under special conditions appropriate 
 to the several Territories, and the powers proposed to be vested in the Commissioner 
 in relation to the Federal Service should be equally applicable to the territorial services, 
 reserving to the responsible administrators the functions relating to interna) 
 management. 
 
 The existing legislative provisions affecting the Public Services of the Territories 
 may be summarized as follows :— The Northern Territory Administration Act of 1910 
 provides for the appointment of an Administrator by the Governor-General, and that 
 the Governor-General may appoint, or may delegate to the Minister or the Administrator 
 power to appoint, such officers as are necessary for the administration of the Territory. 
 In addition, the Governor-General may make ordinances having the force of law in the 
 Territory. Under the Papua Act 1905, covering the acceptance of British New Guinea 
 as a Territory under the authority of the Commonwealth, provision is made for appoint- 
 ment of a Lieutenant-Governor by the Governor-General, and the Lieutenant-Governor 
 is empowered to appoint all necessary judges, magistrates, and other officers of the 
 Territory who shall, unless otherwise provided by the law, hold their offices during the 
 pleasure of the Governor-General. The Act further provides that the Lieutenant- 
 Governor may suspend from duty any officer of the Territory and report such suspension 
 to the Governor-General. The Legislative Council of Papua is empowered to naake 
 ordinances for the peace, order, and good government of the Territory. Power is given 
 by the Act to transfer any officer from the Papuan Service to the Clerical Division of the 
 Commonwealth Public Service. Under the Norfolk Island Act of 1913 the Governor- 
 General may constitute and appoint judges, magistrates, and officers for the government 
 of Norfolk Island, and such appointments are to be held during the pleasure of the 
 Governor-General. By the amending PubUc Service Act of 1915, special provision is 
 made for the appointment of any officer from the Service of a Territory to an office in the 
 corresponding Division of the Commonwealth Public Service, subject to a certificate 
 by the Pubfic Service Commissioner that the appointment is in the interests of the 
 Commonwealth. 
 
 The number of permanent officers at present employed in the Public Services of 
 the Territories is as follows : — 
 
 Northern Territory . . • • 114 
 
 Papua . . • . • • ^0 
 
 Norfolk Island . . . . • • 13 (mainly part time) 
 
 The Public Service of the Northern Territory is organized and controlled under 
 the provisions of the PubUc Service Ordinance 1913, which empowers the Adimmstrator 
 to make regulations for the administration of departments, and rates of payment and 
 general conditions of employment are as prescribed from time to time by these 
 
86 
 
 regulations, which follow closely on the lines of the Federal Public Service Regulations 
 while providing for special conditions associated with the Territory. Scales of salaries 
 are provided to meet local conditions at higher rates than those ruling in the Federal 
 Service, the rates being inclusive of district allowances. In the Papuan and Norfolk 
 Island Services practically nothing has been done in the direction of making regulations 
 governing the management of the staffs employed by the respective administrations. 
 
 It is considered that the Territorial Services should be brought into the general 
 scheme of administration by a Public Service Commissioner as recommended in this 
 Report, and that all regulations dealing with the respective Territorial Services should 
 be made by the Commissioner under the proposed provisions of the Public Service Act 
 relating to the Territorial Service. The Commissioner should be responsible for the 
 creation and abolition of offices, and for the selection and appointment of all persons 
 for Service in the Territories, thus relieving the Minister, or the Administrator of the 
 Northern Territory, or the Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, as the case may be, of his 
 present responsibility. All appointments should be made during pleasure. The 
 classification of offices in the Territorial Service and the determination of appropriate 
 rates of payment for the duties performed should be the functions of the Commissioner, 
 and officers affected by any such classification should be granted the right 
 of appeal. The positions of Administrator of the Northern Territory, Judge of 
 the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, 
 Deputy Chief Judicial Officer of Papua, and such other positions as may from time 
 to time be determined by the Governor-General should be exempted from the operation 
 of the Public Service Act. The local administrative head in control of each of the 
 Territories should be intrusted with authority to make promotions and transfers and to 
 grant or refuse increments of salary, subject always to the right of appeal by an aggrieved 
 officer to the Public Service Commissioner. The local administrative head should 
 likewise be empowered to inflict punishments, and the procedure recommended 
 in respect to the Federal Service should be followed in dealing with matters 
 of discipline in the Territorial Service, subject to such variations as are necessary to meet 
 the special needs of the Territories. The present Board of Inquiry constituted under 
 Part IV. of the Public Service Ordinance of the Northern Territory should be converted 
 to a Board of Appeal under discipHne regulations. The Administrator, after consideration 
 of an offence and all the relevant facts, should determine the punishment, and the accused 
 officer should be permitted, within a prescribed period, to appeal against the decision, 
 whereupon the matter should be remitted to the Board of Appeal whose decision should 
 be final, and should be carried into effect by the Administrator. Similar procedure 
 should be followed in respect to other Territories. ' A judicial officer in each of the 
 Territories should act as Chairman of the Board of Appeal. 
 
 It is difficult to understand why the Public Service of Papua has not hitherto 
 been brought under a definite scheme of classification of work and officers. Although 
 taken over by the Commonwealth at a later date than Papua, the service of the Northern 
 Territory appears to be on a better foundation, as eAridenced by the adoption of working 
 regulations for the management of the Service. It is manifestly undesirable that the 
 Service of one Territory should be placed in a more advantageous position than that of 
 another in respect of salaries and privileges, assuming that difference of location or 
 climatic conditions do not justify any disparity of treatment. Under the Papua Act, 
 the Legislative Council is given power to make ordinances, but seeing that this body is 
 comprised mainly of officials of the Territory, it would certainly place them in a difficult 
 position to expect them to legislate as to the general management of the Public Service, 
 a matter in which they personally are so vitally concerned. The classification of the 
 Papuan Service should be free from any possibility of local influences, and should be 
 intrusted to the Pubhc Service Commissioner, who would be responsible for the adequate 
 remuneration of officers, and for the proper recognition of work values. 
 
 The adoption of these proposals would no doubt afford considerable relief to the 
 administrative heads of the Territories, as they would have the decided advantage of 
 securing a classification of their respective Services by an outside authority conversant 
 with Public Service practice. The internal management of the Services should not be 
 interfered with by the Commissioner once a determination has been arrived at as to 
 the working staffs necessary for the administration of the Territories ; but the 
 Cmomissioner would be available for advice on any matter which, in the opinion of the 
 administrative heads, affected the interests or proper working of the respective Services. 
 It is recommended that provision be included in the proposed amending Public Service 
 
w 
 
 Act on the lines indicated herein, and that power be given to the Public Service 
 Cominissioner to make regulations dealing with the administration of the Territorial 
 Services. 
 
 (C.) THE PROVISIONAL SERVICE. 
 
 Under this heading it is proposed to deal with branches of Public Service which, 
 without the creation of offices under the Public Service Act, have been established to 
 nieet conditions arising from the war, and which after having served their purpose will 
 disappear either at the termination of hostilities, or, with possible exceptions, shortly 
 afterwards. From the beginning of the war, the creation of special branches of public 
 service became inevitable, as the machinery designed to meet normal conditions of 
 administration was clearly inadequate to cope with new and far-reaching issues which 
 developed with the progress of the war. While some effort was made to comply with the 
 requirements of the Public Service Act in the staffing of these new branches, the 
 inadequacy of that Act effectually to meet the situation appears to have been soon 
 recognised, and there is no doubt that the limitations of existing Public Service legislation 
 have largely been responsible for certain unsatisfactory features connected with 
 employment in these new and special branches of the Commonwealth Service. 
 
 As an indication of the widely varying functions dealt with by these branches, 
 it may be mentioned that, since the outbreak of war, the following branches or 
 departments have been constituted : — 
 
 Repatriation, 
 
 Ship Construction, 
 
 Commonwealth Line of Steamers, 
 
 Commonwealth Shipping Board, . 
 
 Price Fixing, 
 
 Central Wool Committee, 
 
 Australian Wheat Board, 
 
 Wheat Storage Commission, 
 
 Barrier Wharf, Port Pirie, 
 
 Institute of Science and Industry, 
 
 together with a number of other Boards or Committees formed to deal with some 
 particular phase of public policy. The work of these various institutions is being carried 
 out under differing conditions of management, but, generally speaking, the administration 
 is in the hands of persons not officers of the Public Service, and whether remunerated by 
 the Commonwealth for their services or acting in an honorary capacity, they have been 
 selected for their positions without reference to the provisions of the Pubhc Service 
 Act. In the filling of these administrative positions the circumstances were such as 
 could not be satisfactorily met by the creation of offices and by appointments under the 
 Public Service Act. The exceptional conditions necessitated exceptional action, and 
 legislative restriction may have had a hampering effect upon the Government in its 
 selection of persons for the purpose of directing these national activities during the 
 abnormal period covered by the war. 
 
 The appointment of subordinate officials to carry out the work under the direction 
 of administrative heads must, however, be viewed differently, and some measure of 
 control by a constituted authority, under conditions more facile than those afforded by 
 the present Public Service Act, is needed if the public interest is to be safeguarded. Under 
 the Public Service Act, three classes of employees are recognised — (1) permanent officers ; 
 (2) temporary employees ; and (3) exempted employees ; but employees in the special 
 branches referred to could not properly be brought within any one of these classes, 
 although the services rendered are generally more or less of a temporary nature. The 
 period of employment in these cases may be prolonged or may possibly develop into 
 permanency, but the conditions of appointment were not such as would have warranted 
 the creation of permanent positions under the Public Service Act, and the consequent 
 appointment of permanent officers. Had the provisions of the Public Service Act been 
 strictly compUed with, the officials required for the work of these special branches should 
 have been engaged as temporary employees under the Act. In some cases this was 
 done, but in the circumstances as to the formation of the branches and the quahfications 
 required in the persons engaged, it was found to be practically impossible to apply the 
 conditions of the existing law, hence in the majority of instances the provisions of the 
 
87 
 
 Public Service Act were ignored and appointments were made which under normftl 
 conditions could only be characterized as irregular. In the exceptional circumstance* 
 the persons so employed were formally exempted from the operation of the Public Service 
 Act. The continuance of such a practice would, however, render nugatory the intentioa 
 of Parliament as to adequate control and supervision of the Service by the Public Service 
 Commissioner, and in order to obviate any such irregularities in future the inelasticity 
 of the existing provisions of the law should be remedied. 
 
 To satisfactorily meet the altering conditions of Public Service administration 
 an amendment of the Public Service Act is turgently needed for the establishment of a 
 provisional Service, as distinguished from the present permanent Service of the 
 Commonwealth, and quite apart from the existing provisions for temporary and exempted 
 employees. Permanent appointments should be made as at present to offices of a 
 permanent nature created under the Act. Provisional appointments should be made to 
 departments or branches of the Public Service formed to meet the temporary needs of 
 government, but which will not be, or may not be, of a permanent nature. Temporary 
 appointments should be made to meet conditions such as the temporary absence of a 
 permanent officer, or fluctuations of work not justifying permanent appointments. 
 Exempt employment should apply only to cases specially exempted by the Act itself, 
 or where it is considered for good and sufficient [reasons that the provisions of the law 
 as to permanent, provisional, or temporary appointments should not operate. 
 
 The establishment of a provisional Service should have for its objects : — 
 
 (a) To secure officials with suitable qualifications for the work of any branch 
 
 of Public Service formed for the discharge of£some specific but 
 apparently temporary function of government. 
 
 (b) To provide for continuity of employment of such officials so long ai 
 
 their services are required. 
 
 (c) To insure that appointments are made upon proper principles of selection, 
 
 with due regard to requirements, and at rates of payment commensurate 
 with the value of the work. 
 
 (d) To safeguard the pubUc interests by checking unnecessary appointments 
 
 and excessive salaries. 
 
 It is desirable, in order to obviate any possible misconception as to the establish- 
 ment of a provisional Service, that some indication should be given as to the general policy 
 which should be followed in the management of such a Service. The provisional Service 
 should be one of three branches of the Commonwealth Public Service, namely, the 
 Federal Service, the Territorial Service, and the Provisional Service, in respect of which 
 the Public Service Commissioner should exercise certain defined functions. The Provisional 
 Service should be prescribed as including certain specified departments or branches, 
 and generally any other department or brr>,nch of a provisional or temporary character 
 which may be added upon proclamation of the Governor-General. These departments 
 or branches would be constituted for the purpose of carrying out some function of 
 government which is not clearly of a permanent nature, and the employees would be 
 engaged on a provisional tenure only. It is not proposed, except where the Government 
 may see fit to obtain the advice of the Commissioner, that he should exercise any 
 authority in relation to the appointment of the persons selected to control these specified 
 Departments or branches, who should be exempted from the operation of the Public 
 Service Act, and this should also apply to employees other than those attached to the 
 administrative or executive branches. With these exceptions, the appointments of 
 officials should be made by the Commissioner either upon report of the administrative 
 officers or after conference between representatives of the Commissioner and the branch- 
 concerned. The only conditions of appointment would be relative fitness for performance 
 of the required duties, together with reputableness, with preference to returned soldiers 
 when possessed of the necessary qualifications. Appointments shoidd be during pleasure 
 only, and in no case should appointment to the Provisional Servicejconfer eUgibility for 
 transfer to the Federal or the Territorial Service. Officers of the Federal Service should 
 be selected where practicable or advisable for positions in the Provisional Service,\,but 
 the classification and salaries paid in the Provisional Service should only operate during 
 the officer's employment therein, and upon re-transfer to his former [department the 
 classification and salary of the officer should be such as is considered fair and equitable 
 by the Commissioner, having regard to the position to be filled upon re-transfer. 
 
98 
 
 The Public Service Commissioner, after consultation with the departmental heads; 
 should be responsible for the classification of offices and for fixing the salaries or scales 
 of salaries, vnth. increments, payable to officers in the Provisional Service. All 
 promotions, transfers, and granting or withholding of increments on the prescribed 
 scales would be left to the determination of the head of the department or branch. 
 Incompetent or otherwise unsatisfactory officers would be retired either directly by 
 the departmental head or by the Commissioner upon reports from the departmental 
 head and a Public Service Inspector. It is not intended that the general manage- 
 ment should be interfered with by the Commissioner, but he should be empowered 
 at any time to authorize inspection by a Pubhc Service Inspector, and if it be found 
 that any person is overpaid or underpaid for the work performed, or that the staff 
 employed is excessive, the Commissioner should advise the responsible Minister and 
 submit recommendations for the necessary alterations. Provision should be made that 
 if the Minister is unable to adppt the recommendations thus made, they shall be laid 
 before Parliament with a statement of the reasons for disagreement. 
 
 Repatriation Department. — The largest department which would come within the 
 category of the Provisional Service is the Department of Repatriation, established under 
 the provisions of the Repatriation Act, which confers power on the Minister to make 
 appointments for the purposes of the Act. The number of employees of this 
 ^ department is 512. It is believed that advantage would accrue to the depart- 
 ment if the responsibility of making appointinents (subject always to preference 
 to returned soldiers), classification, fixing rates of payment, and dealing with 
 inefficient, incompetent, or unsatisfactory employees were vested in the Public Service 
 Commissioner in the manner proposed. This Department is still in its initial stages, 
 and with the development of repatriation activities will come added administrative 
 responsibihties which will render it highly desirable that the Minister, the Comptroller 
 of Repatriation, and the Deputy Comptrollers in the several States shall be relieved of 
 the burden of work inseparable from questions of personnel of staffs, and be given full 
 freedom to deal with the problems of repatriation. The Public Service Commissioner, 
 with the machinery at his command, should be better able to deal with the details 
 connected with appointments and the other matters indicated than the responsible 
 officers of the Department, whose time and attention must necessarily be largely 
 concentrated upon the important duties intrusted to them in carrying out the provisions 
 of the Repatriation Act. Internal management should, as at present, be a matter for 
 the administrative officers, and there should be a clear line of demarcation between 
 their functions and those of the Comnaissioner in dealing with staff matters. The immense 
 difficulties connected with the problems of repatriation and the initiation and extension 
 of staff organization are recognised, and it is considered the application of the general 
 proposals made as to the Provisional Service will be of material advantage in the future 
 administration of the department. 
 
 Institute of Science and Industry. — The constitution of this Institute is at the 
 time of writing being considered in connexion with a Bill before Parliament, and it is 
 interesting to observe from the discussion which has taken place that some doubt appears 
 to exist as to the expediency of appointments being vested in the Pubhc Service 
 Commissioner. Keeping in view the functions proposed to be exercised by the Institute, 
 it would seem that the intentions of the Government would best be met by its estabhsh- 
 ment as a branch of the proposed Provisional Service, leaving it to the future to 
 determine whether justification exists for placing it definitely amongst the permanent 
 branches of the Public Service. In the debates in Parhament, the arguments advanced 
 against the Public Service Commissioner having jurisdiction over appointments to the 
 Institute were principally as follows :— - 
 
 (1) That speciahsts will be required, and these are not available within the 
 
 Pubhc Service. 
 
 (2) That if the power of appointment were vested in the Commissioner, he 
 
 would be bound to select scientists from within the Service. 
 
 (3) That the appointments of employees will be largely of a temporary 
 
 character. 
 
 (4) That if appointed by the Commissioner under temporary employnient 
 
 regulations, persons would have to leave at the end of a prescribed 
 period and at the time of their greatest usefulness. 
 
89 
 
 (5) That the Minister will look for a man who can efficiently fill the office 
 
 whereas the Commissioner would seek for an office to place the man. 
 
 (6) That the Director should be able to secure the services of the best-trained 
 
 individuals for the special work to be undertaken. 
 
 In reply to these statements it may be pointed out : — 
 
 (1) That the Public Service Act provides for appointments being freely made 
 
 from outside the Service in such cases. 
 
 (2) The Commissioner would not be bound to select scientists from within 
 
 the Service. If a better man is available from outside, the Com- 
 missioner is bound to go outside. 
 
 (3) If the work is temporary in character, the position can be met under the 
 
 present Act, but still better under the proposed establishment of a 
 Provisional Service. 
 
 (4) Under the present Act, where the work performed is of a special character, 
 
 power is given the Commissioner to extend employment beyond the 
 prescribed period, and this is exercised in all such cases. If a 
 Provisional Service be constituted, the point raised will be still more 
 adequately met. 
 
 (5) It is not the Commissioner's function to seek an office for a man ; on the 
 
 contrary, it is his duty to oppose the creation of unnecessary offices. 
 
 (6) There is nothing in the present Act to prevent the Director seeking the 
 
 best qualified men for the objects desired, and the proposal contained 
 in this Report for Commissioner's responsibility as to all appointments 
 is a means to that end. It will be the Commissioner's duty to assist 
 in securing the best qualified men, and to prevent the appointment of 
 any person except upon his relative qualifications. The Director 
 would be fully consulted before any appointment was made. 
 
 My experience in the Public Service leads me to view with trepidation any legisla- 
 tion which will result in placing a branch of the Service such as this outside the 
 controlling power considered necessary for other branches of the Service, seeing that the 
 exercise of influence both direct and indirect is bound to be attempted in regard to 
 appointments, fixing of salaries, and tenure of office, which will be most prejudicial to 
 the interests of the Commonwealth. 
 
 As a case in point, and one that will illustrate the situation, attention is invited 
 to the establishment of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratory. The scientists engaged 
 for the work of the laboratory were in all cases secured from outside the Public Service, 
 but under the supervision of the Public Service Commissioner, practically under the 
 conditions proposed to be applied to the Provisional Service, with results that have 
 proved satisfactory to the management. Similarly the non-technical positions have 
 been filled under the provisions of the Public Service Act with advantage to the 
 Department. If this is practicable in the establishment of such an institution as the 
 Serum Laboratory, it should be equally so in that of the Institute of Science and Industry, 
 and there is apparently no sound reason why principles adopted by the Parliament in 
 the Public Service Act should be departed from in this case. Before leaving the question 
 of establishment of a Provisional Service, some reference should be made to the 
 constitution of such bodies as the Central Wool Committee. The officials employed by 
 that Committee are not paid for their services by the Commonwealth Government, 
 but are remunerated from funds derived from the operations of the Committee, the 
 salaries being charged against such operations and not against the Commonwealth 
 revenue. It may be urged in these circumstances that the management should have an 
 entirely free hand in regard to its officials, but in my opinion the obligation rests with the 
 Government to insure that, in the expenditure of funds derived from the public under 
 any system of control initiated by the Government, the interests of the general community 
 shall be safeguarded. It is therefore highly essential that employees of such bodies as 
 the Central Wool Committee should come within the category of the Provisional 
 Service, and be subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commissioner in 
 respect to selection for appointment, valuation of work, and determination of 
 salaries. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
 
 The following summarises the findings and recommendations included in tilii 
 Report which I have the honour to submit for consideration : — 
 
 Constitution of Commomvealth Public Service. 
 
 (1) The Public Service of the Commonwealth should be widened, so as t« 
 
 embrace the present Public Service (to be known as the Federal 
 Service), the Territorial Services (Papua, Northern Territory, and 
 Norfolk Island), and a Provisional Service, covering the Services 
 specially established for purposes arising out of the war, or to be 
 provisionally maintained after the war ; these three Services should 
 form the future Commonwealth Public Service (p. 4). 
 
 (2) The increase in permanent staff since 1902 is reviewed, and it is shown 
 
 that this is due to the large expansion of public business, and th« 
 widening of scope of Commonwealth activities (p. 7). 
 
 Arbitration {Public Service) Act. 
 
 (3) The operations of the Arbitration (Public Service) Act have greatly 
 
 increased the work and respousibihties of the Public Service 
 Commissioner and Inspectors, and rendered departmental working 
 more difficult and complex (p. 12). 
 
 (4) The Arbitration Court has found the greatest difficulty in following the 
 
 intricacies of Public Service organization, with the result that awards 
 have been productive of many anomalies and inconsistencies (p. 12). 
 
 (5) While a proportion of the expenditure under arbitration awards would 
 
 have been provided for by the Commissioner in the absence of any 
 system of arbitration, many of the provisions of awards, both as to 
 salaries and extraneous payments, have been upon an extravagant 
 scale, and unjustifiable (p. 13). 
 
 (6) Recognition of Public Service Associations, without a defined method of 
 
 regulating their scope and activities, has resulted in reduced efficiency 
 and a slackening of discipline in Departments ; these conditions have 
 been accentuated by controlling officers joining the same imions ai 
 their subordinates (p. 15). 
 
 (7) Affiliation of Public Service Associations with outside labour unions has 
 
 had a pernicious effect on the morale of the Service. Future 
 recognition of associations should be conditional on there being no 
 such affiliation (p. 18). 
 
 (8) Departments have been thwarted and hampered by the action of Public 
 
 Service Associations, and by a system of terrorism levelled against 
 controlling officers of Departments, and against the rank and file of 
 associations by executive officials of these associations (p. 19). 
 
 (9) Results of six years of Public Service arbitration have been disloyalty, 
 
 extravagance, and reduced efficiency (p. 19). 
 
 Eepeal of Arbitration {Public Service) Act. 
 
 (10) Continuance of' the Arbitration (PubUc Service) Act upon the statute- 
 
 book will have serious and disastrous effects as regards discipline 
 and efficiency of the Service, and inflict an unjustifiable and grievous 
 burden upon the taxpaying community (p. 19). 
 
 (11) Repeal of this Act will involve the substitution of some authority other 
 
 than Parliament for discussion and settlement of Public Service 
 grievances. Lengthy experience in Public Service administration is 
 essential to successful adjudication and the solving of difficulties. 
 This authority should be the Public Service Commissioner, who should 
 be vested with arbitral powers, andjdeal with claims by Departments 
 and employees (p. 20). 
 
 (12) Recognition of PubHc Service Associations should be governed by 
 
 regulations, the main conditions of which are set forth in 
 recommendations (p. 20). 
 
 (13) The Commissioner should be constituted the sole authority for 
 
 settlement of salaries and wages, hours of labour, and conditions of 
 service of permanent, temporary, and exempted employees, and his 
 decisions, subject to disallowance by Parliament, should be final and 
 conclusive (p. 25). 
 
91 
 
 Public Service Administration. 
 Establishment of a Public Service Board of three members would b« 
 unwise, owing to inelasticity of control and diminution of personal 
 responsibility. The existing system of management by one 
 Commissioner would better meet the requirements of the 
 Commonwealth, provided adequate assistance is afforded him (p. 26). 
 
 (15) Since 1902 the work of the Commissioner and Inspectors has been most 
 
 onerous and exacting ; with the development of the Service, and the 
 increased duties following on arbitration, their duties have only been 
 carried out with considerable self-sacrifice and devotion of private 
 time. The present inspection staff is inadequate (p. 26). 
 
 (16) The whole of the Commonwealth Services should be brought under one 
 
 authority (the Commissioner), and, while arbitral and appellate 
 functions should be vested in him, much of the present detailed work 
 of Commissioner and Inspectors should be transferred to Heads of 
 Departments (p. 27). 
 
 (17) The administration of the Pubhc Service Act should be intrusted to a 
 
 Commissioner, and provision should be made for appointment of an 
 Assistant Commissioner and seven (7) Public Service Inspectors, the 
 staff being thus increased by an Assistant Commissioner and one 
 additional Inspector (p. 27). 
 
 (18) Appointments of the Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, and 
 
 Inspectors should not be limited to a seven years tenure, as under the 
 present Act, but should be terminable at 65 years of age (p. 29). 
 
 (19) The salaries to be appropriated for positions under the re-organized 
 
 system of Public Service administration should be — Commissioner, 
 £1,750 ; Assistant Commissioner, £1,200 ; Public Service Inspectors — 
 two at £900 ; three at £800 ; and two at £700 per annum (p. 30). 
 
 (20) The proposed functions of the Commissioner and staff and of 
 
 Permanent Heads and Chief Officers are set out in detail (p. 30). 
 
 (21) The general lines on which the Commissioner should exercise arbitral 
 and appellate functions are indicated (p. 32). 
 
 Exemption from Public Service Act. 
 
 (22) In connexion with employment of persons exempted from the Public 
 
 Service Act, any departure from Industrial Court or Wages Boards 
 determinations as to rates of payftient or conditions of employment 
 should be made only with the sanction of the Commissioner, in the 
 exercise of his arbitral functions (p. 34). 
 
 Appointments to the Service. 
 
 (23) The power of direct appointment, except in certain special cases, should 
 
 be vested in the Commissioner, thus obviating the circumlocution 
 and delay at present involved in submission to the Governor-General 
 (P-34). 
 
 (24) Provision should be made to recognise educational qualifications of an 
 
 advanced character by paying a higher commencing salary than the 
 minimum. The services of many brilliant youths are lost to the 
 Government by failure to provide for entrance at a late age and with 
 advanced educational qualifications (p. 35). 
 
 (25) Competitive examinations should be dispensed with in certain cases, 
 
 e.g., artisans and labourers, and, in special circumstances, telegraph 
 messengers, subject to prescribed conditions as to method of 
 selection (p. 35). 
 
 (26) Power should be given to make appointments from outside the Service 
 
 in special cases without competitive examination, subject to 
 Commissioner's certificate that there is no person available in the 
 Public Service who is as capable of filling the position. This power 
 at present exists as regards administrative and professional 
 appointments, and the interests of the Service have benefited thereby 
 (p. 35). 
 
Classification of the Service. 
 
 i^l) The Public Service at present comprises the Administrative, Professional, 
 Clerical, and General Divisions. A rectification of anomalies and a 
 desirable elasticity will be secured by adoption of numerical divisions 
 — First Di\'ision, Second Division, Third Division, and Fourth 
 Division (p. 37). 
 
 (28) The salaries of officers in all four Divisions should be governed by 
 
 regulation, the powers of Parliament as to the voting of funds being 
 retained, and not, as at present (Clerical Division), by the Public 
 Service Act, or without (Administrative Division) any .statutory 
 scale (p. 39). 
 
 (29) The present provisions of the law as to classes and scales of salaries are 
 
 too rigid, the classes are insufficient in number, increments above the 
 lowest classes are unnecessarily high, and the range of salary too 
 Avide. The granting of discretionary increments in the classes above 
 the lowest class imposes a heavy burden of work in inquiry and 
 adjudication witliout commensurate results (p. 42). 
 
 (30) There should be a range of salary fixed for each class, and annual 
 
 increments should be granted .in all classes, subject to satisfactory 
 service, by the Permanent Head or Chief Officer, with the right of 
 appeal to the Commissioner by aggrieved officers whose increments 
 have been deferred or refused (p. 42). 
 
 (31) Reclassification of the Service will require to be carried out by the. 
 
 Assistant Commissioner and Lispectors, under general direction of 
 the Commissioner, and provision should be made for the right of 
 appeal to the Commissioner against the classification (p. 44). 
 
 (32) Officers of the Parliament should be brought into the general system 
 
 of administration of the Public Service as regards classification, fixing 
 of salaries, and determuiation of appeals other than in relation to 
 punishments, the internal administration being left to the Heads of 
 Departments of Parliament (p. 45). 
 
 Promotions and Transfers. 
 
 (33) In the future administration of the PubUc Service, the principle 
 
 of promotion by efficiency sliould be maintained ; seniority should 
 only be a factor in the event of equality of efficiency (p. 46). 
 
 (34) Promotions and transfers should be made by the Permanent Head or 
 
 Chief Officer, ex(?ept to positions in the First Division, subject to right 
 of appeal in cases of promotion (p. 47). 
 
 (35) Promotions thus effected should be provisional, pending settlement of 
 
 any appeals made to the Commissioner. The appointment of Boards 
 to deal with such matters is strongly opposed, it being desired to 
 abohsh circumlocution, and secure prompt action in relation to staff 
 changes (pp. 47, 48). 
 
 (36) The appointment of Staff Committees within Departments to deal with 
 
 promotions and transfers would be mischievous in its effect, wholly 
 unwarranted, and would involve a devolution of Chief Officers' 
 responsibility, with a possible perfunctory discharge of the powers 
 proposed to "be vested in Administrative Heads (p. 48). 
 
 (37) Promotions and transfers from one Department to another should be 
 
 dealt with by the Commissioner, and officers concerned should have 
 the right of appeal in cases of promotion (p. 49). 
 
 (38) The alteration of practice as to promotions and transfers will result in 
 
 removal of many harassing restrictions, and reUeve the Comniissioner 
 and Inspectors of a mass of detailed work, besides saving considerable 
 time and labour, and preserving at the same time adequate safeguards 
 against the use of improper influences (p. 49). 
 
 Appointment of Administrative Heads. 
 
 (39) All appointments or promotions to or in the First (Administrative) 
 
 Division should be made on the recommendation of the Commissioner 
 by the Governor-General (p. 50). 
 
93 
 
 Disci'jiline. 
 
 (40) Power should be delegated to Heads of Branches to deal directly 
 
 with minor offences (p. 51). 
 
 (41) As regards treatment of offences, the present law is unsatisfactory, and 
 
 results in serious delays and circumlocution (p. 53). 
 
 (42) The present provisioii for Boards of Inquiry should be abolished, and 
 
 Chief Officers should be required to deal with cases of misconduct, 
 and determine the punishment. Officers should, however, have the 
 right of appeal against proposed punishment where it involves 
 transfer, reduction, or dismissal, and a Board of Appeal should be 
 constituted to hear and determine such appeals (p. 54). 
 
 (43) The Board of Appeal should comprise — 
 
 (a) a permanent Chairman with the qualifications of a Stipendiary 
 
 or Police Magistrate ; 
 (6) a representative of the Department concerned ; and 
 (c) the elected representative of the division of the Service to 
 
 which the accused belongs (p. 54). 
 
 (44) Where appeals are considered by the Board to be frivolous or vexatious, 
 
 the accused officer should be charged with the cost of the hearing, 
 or such proportion of it as is recommended by the Board (p. 54). 
 
 (45) Provision should be made for election of divisional representatives for 
 
 any part of a State instead of as at present for the whole of a State 
 (p. 55). 
 
 (46) Provision should he made for the adoption of a " merit and demerit 
 
 record system," as an alternative to that of cautions, fines, and 
 reprimands (p. 57). 
 
 Incapacity of Officers. 
 
 (47) The present provisions of the law as to dealing with incompetent officers 
 
 or officers physically or mentally incapable are unsatisfactory, and 
 should be repealed (p. 58). 
 
 (48) Boards of Inquiry, as established by the Act to deal with such cases 
 
 are ineffective, and should be abolished (p. 58). 
 (40) The responsibility of determining an officer's fitness for the discharge 
 of his duties should be placed definitely in the hands of the Commis- 
 sioner, and the specific duty should be imposed on Permanent Heads, 
 Chief Officers, and Inspectors of reporting all cases of incompetency 
 or unfitness (p. 59) 
 
 Furlough, Recreation Leave, and Sick Iicave. 
 
 (50) Furlough should be restricted to six months' leave on full pay or twelve 
 
 months' leave on half pay, or to a monetary equivalent, upon 
 retirement, not exceeding six months' pay (p. 61). 
 
 (51 ) If not so restricted, every officer should be granted furlough, or its 
 
 monetary equivalent upon retirement, proportionate to his period of 
 service, not to exceed twelve months on full pay (p. 61). 
 
 (52) The accumulation of recreation leave for two or more years, except in 
 
 remote districts, should be prohibited other than in very special 
 cases. It is in the public interest that every officer should avail 
 himself of leave annually (p. 62). 
 
 (53) Relief should be afforded officers compelled to live, with their families, 
 
 in localities far removed from centres of civilization, and where cHmatic 
 conditions are severe, by defraying part of the cost of travelling while 
 on recreation leave (p. 62). 
 
 (54) Time and labour should be saved by authorizing Chief Officers to grant 
 
 sick leave, subject to the concurrence of the Public Service Inspector 
 where the leave exceeds three months in any period of five years, 
 instead of as at present referring such matters to the Minister, the 
 Commissioner, and the Governor-General (p. 64). 
 
94 
 
 Observance of Public Holidays. 
 
 (55) Action should be taken to place the observance of public holidays, 
 
 and payments for duty on holidays, upon a proper footing, this being 
 necessary to secure equitable treatment of public servants, conveni- 
 ence to the general public, and economical administration (p. 66). 
 
 Rent for Quarters. 
 
 (56) Circumlocution should be obviated by empowering the Commissioner 
 
 to determine rent chargeable for quarters instead of submitting 
 recommendations to the Governor- General (p. 66). 
 
 (57) Rents should be based on the minimum salary attached to ofl&ces, and 
 
 not be increased because of the granting of increments to officers 
 (p. 67). 
 
 Life Assurance of Officers. 
 
 (58) Power should be given to the Commissioner to waive the present 
 
 provisiofis of the law as to compulsory life assurance in any case 
 where the officer enters the Service over a stipulated age. In such 
 cases a prescribed deduction should be made from salary in lieu of 
 assurance (p. 68). 
 
 Retirement of Officers from the Service. 
 
 (59) Provision should be made to permit of the retention in the Service of 
 
 officers who have reached the prescribed age for retirement, and who 
 are not entitled to pension or superannuation allowance. Retention 
 should be subject to such officers being placed in minor positions, 
 their competency to perform the duties of such positions, and payment 
 of salaries corresponding to such duties. The efficiency of such 
 officers should be reported upon annually by the Public Service 
 Inspector, and in no case should retention extend beyond 70 years 
 of age (p. 69). 
 
 (60) Telegraph messengers who reach eighteen years of age should be retired 
 
 from the Service if no positions are available to which they can be 
 promoted prior to reaching that age (p. 70). 
 
 Superannuation. 
 
 (61) The introduction of a system of superannuation allowances in the 
 
 Commonwealth Public Service imder conditions of fair contribution 
 by officers, reasonable support by the Government, and ehmination 
 of extravagant benefits, is recommended. Any inquiry in the direction 
 of the application of a pensions scheme to the Navy and Defence 
 Departments should be extended to embrace the remaining Depart- 
 ments in the Commonwealth Public Service (p. 72). 
 
 Extraneous Payments. 
 
 (62) Payments to officers by way of allowances of various kinds which 
 
 involve a considerable and in many cases unjustifiable expenditure, 
 due to the operation of the Arbitration (Pubhc Service) Act, should 
 be reviewed (p. 74). 
 
 (63) The present hours of attendance (9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m.) of a large section 
 
 of the Pubhc Service should be altered by extending the hour of 
 ceasing duty to 5 p.m., and by substituting an hour for lunch for 
 thr*- quarters of an hour at present allowed for that purpose. The 
 incidence of overtime payments as prescribed by Arbitration awards 
 should be altered by adoptmg a weekly basis of hours instead of the 
 present daily basis in certain circumstances (p. 74). 
 
 Employment of Women. 
 
 (64) Provision should be made empowering the fixing of scales of payment 
 
 for women engaged in certain prescribed positions, and subject 
 thereto the employment of women should be extended in certain 
 directions ([). 77). 
 
96 
 
 Returned Soldiers. 
 
 (65) The existing conditions giving preference to returned soldiers with 
 
 regard to appointment to the Service, age of entry into the Service, 
 and retention in temporary employment, should be maintained. 
 It is not, however, considered that in the making of promotions 
 within the Service preference should be given to returned soldiers 
 over other officers who are senior and equally efficient for the 
 performance of tlie duties (p. 77). 
 
 Temporary Employment. 
 
 (66) The existing law should be amended so that when a Chief Ofiicer of a 
 
 Department requires temporary assistance he shall advise the Public 
 Service Inspector, who, if satisfied that the assistance is required, 
 shall select under prescribed conditions the persons to be employed 
 (p. 80). 
 
 Commonwealth Railways. 
 
 (67) As a permanent branch of the Public Service attached to the Bepartment 
 
 of Works and Railways, the Commonwealth Railways should be 
 brought within the provisions of the Pubhc Service Act in so far as 
 salaried officers are concerned ; and appointments, promotions, 
 transfers, classification, and general conditions of employment of 
 such officers should be dealt with in the same manner as will apply 
 to other officers of the Pubhc Service. Daily paid employees should be 
 exempted from the provisions of the Pubhc Service Act, and controlled 
 entirely by the Commissioner of Railways, subject to the exercise 
 by the Public Service Commissioner of arbitral powers in the event 
 of any dispute between the Commissioner of Railways and the 
 employees in regard to rates of pay or conditions of employment 
 (p. 80). 
 
 Navy and Defence Departments. 
 
 (68) Upon the expiration of the Defence (Civil Employment) Act (twelve 
 
 months after the war) the civil branches of the Navy and Defence 
 Departments and all offices in such branches should become subject 
 to the Pubhc Service Act. Prior to the expiration of the Act, and 
 after conference between representatives of the Public Service 
 Commissioner and the Departments concerned, the branches to be 
 transferred should be determined, so that the transfer may be 
 effected simultaneously with the expiration of the Defence (Civil 
 Employment) Act. It should also be determined whether the 
 executive and clerical staffs of the factories estabhshed under the 
 Defence Act should at the same time be brought within the provisions 
 of the Public Service Act. All other employees should remain, as at 
 present, exempted from the Pubhc Service Act, subject to the Pubhc 
 Service Commissioner exercising arbitral functions in the event of 
 any dispute between the Department and its employees as to wages 
 or general conditions of employment (p. 83). 
 
 The Territorial Service. 
 
 (69) The Pubhc Services of the Northern Territory and the Territories of 
 
 Papua and Norfolk Island should, as a " Territorial Service," form a 
 portion of the Commonwealth Public Service, and should be controlled 
 by the Public Service Commissioner to the extent and under conditions 
 to be prescribed. The Commissioner should make appointments to 
 these Services, and have the same powers in regard to classification, 
 rates of pay, and appeals against promotion as he will exercise in 
 respect to the Federal Service (p. 84). 
 
 (70) Such positions as those of Administrator of the Northern Territory and 
 
 the Judge of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, and the 
 Lieutenant-Governor and the Deputy Chief Judicial Officer of Papua 
 should be exempted from the operation of the Public Service Act. All 
 regulations affecting the rates of pay and general conditions of 
 employment of officers of the Territorial Service should be made by 
 the Public Service Commissioner with due regard to local circumstances, 
 and, subject to the proposed conditions, the internal administration 
 should be left in the hands of the local administrative officers (p. 85). 
 
96 
 
 The Provisional Service. 
 
 (71) The establishment of a Provisional Service is proposed, to embrace all 
 
 branches of the Public Service constituted for the purpose of carrying 
 out some function of Government which is not clearly of a permanent 
 nature, and in which the employees should be engaged upon provisional 
 tenure only. A number of branches of this description have been 
 created since the outbreak of War, and, in the circumstances attendant 
 upon their creation, were excluded from the operation of the Public 
 Service Act. While the existence of a number of these branches will 
 terminate with the proclamation of peace, or shortly after, others 
 will be continued indefinitely, but under such conditions as make it 
 advisable to constitute them branches of the Public Service (p. 86). 
 
 (72) The Public Service Commissioner should be given the requisite powers 
 
 to insure satisfactory conditions of appointment of officials (such 
 appointments to be of a provisional nature), proper rates of pay for 
 such officials having regard to their qualifications and the services 
 rendered, to safeguard the public interest by checking unnecessary 
 appointments and the retention of incompetent persons, and to make 
 any regulations considered desirable for the proper management of 
 the Provisional Service. The internal management of Departments 
 or branches should be vested in the Administrative Heads (p. 88.) 
 
 (73) Keeping in view the existing and probable future responsibilities of 
 
 the Department of Eepatriation, it is strongly recommended that 
 this Department in particular should be placed under the jurisdiction 
 of the Public Service Commissioner to the extent suggested (p. 88). 
 
 In concluding this Report, it should be stated that the recommendations submitted 
 for the consideration of Your Excellency deal only with matters of general principle 
 affecting the administration of the Public Service of the Coiiimonwealth ; no attempt 
 has been made to enter into the detailed working of the Service, this being outside the 
 scope of the Commission intrusted to me. 
 
 An invitation was given responsible heads of departments, and to the several 
 organizations of the Service, to submit any suggestions they had to make in the 
 direction of effecting improvements in the conditions governing the management and 
 working of the Service. In preparing this Report every consideration was given to 
 the representations received from these sources. 
 
 It will have been gathered from the opinions expressed herein, and the recommen- 
 dations made, that urgent necessity exists for legislative action, in order that serious 
 anomahes may be dealt Avith and the present condition of drift arrested. The tentative 
 arrangemeiits for administration of the Service, w^hich have operated for nearly three 
 years, should be terminated at the earhest possible moment by placing the control and 
 maiiagement of the Service upon a sound and permanent basis. 
 
 Following upon the passage of new legislation, much important work will require 
 to be done in the direction of reclassifying the Service, restoring conditions of efficiency 
 and economy, and securing improved organization of departmental activities, work 
 which will demand the highest capacity from those intrusted with the administration 
 of the suggested new legislation. 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 
 Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 
 
 D. C. McLACHLAN, 
 
 Commissioner. 
 Melbourne, 6th January, 1919. 
 
 Printed and Published for the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia by Albert J. Mullett, 
 
 Government Printer for the State of Victoria.