s 
 
RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS 
 
 INDIAN POLICY- 
 
 EVANS BELL, 
 
 LATE OP THE MADRAS STAFF CORPS. 
 AUTHOR OF "THE EMPIRE IN INDIA," "THE MYSORE REVERSION," ETC. 
 
 " No eye could be too sound 
 
 To observe a world so vast, 
 No patience too profound 
 
 To sort what 's here amass'd ; 
 How man may here best live no care too great to explore. 
 
 " But we as some rude guest 
 
 Would change, where'er he roam, 
 The manners there profess'd 
 
 To those he brings from home 
 
 We mark not the world's course, but would have it take ours. 
 
 MATTHEW ARNOLD. 
 
 LONDON : 
 TRUBNER & Co. 60 PATERNOSTER ROW. 
 
 1868. 
 
 The Right of Translation reserved. 
 
US 44 7 
 
 k IN the minor arts of life it is generally recognised that principles 
 should be investigated and taught by thinkers who are not concerned 
 in applying them. In the art of Social Life, so far more difficult and 
 important than. a.y other, the separation of theory from practice is of 
 far grj&Wr*.m*6mefit." AUGUSTE COMTE. 
 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY Government has been reviled on the 
 ground of its introducing an element of uncertainty and 
 vacillation into the action of the Executive. I am inclined 
 to think that this is one of its great merits. I have a 
 profound disbelief in the administrative infallibility of 
 individuals or of parties. Too long a tenure of office 
 inoculates statesmen with the constitutional defects of 
 the permanent Civil Service. 
 
 The favourable change that has undoubtedly come over 
 the aspect of Indian affairs since the present Ministry 
 came into power, is not to be attributed to Conservative 
 principles, but simply to the healthy and vigorous action 
 of fresher and younger minds. All honour is due to Lord 
 Cranborne and Sir Stafford Northcote for having checked 
 the revival of annexation, and saved the Native State of 
 Mysore ; but no special credit is due to their party. The 
 same may be said of Sir Stafford Northcote's recent de- 
 spatches and promised legislation, recognising the eligibility 
 of Natives to a more important, dignified and lucrative 
 sphere of employment in the public service of India. 
 
 These measures, and the general policy on which they 
 are based, have been from time to time advocated by 
 Members on both sides of the House of Commons, by 
 Liberal as well as by Conservative Peers. Since the 
 
 5 13 J 92 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 defeat of Fox's Indian Bill in 1783, and that was more 
 of a Court intrigue than a party struggle, India may be 
 said to have been always an open question. Whether this 
 state of affairs has been beneficial or not, whether it has 
 betokened impartiality or indifference, may be considered 
 doubtful. 
 
 If the extreme crisis, so often predicted and dreaded, 
 were to arrive, and India were to become the battle-field 
 of the two great Parliamentary parties, I am not of 
 opinion that any very awful consequences would ensue. 
 It would at least put an end to the impatience and apathy 
 with which Indian affairs are now usually treated, and 
 would make them a subject of universal attention and 
 discussion. 
 
 This volume is not written to flatter the pride or pro- 
 mote the personal objects of any individual or set of men, 
 in place, or in opposition, at home or in India. I address 
 myself to the people of Great Britain, by whose awakened 
 convictions, and not by such concessions as can be expected 
 from official sources, harmonious relations can be esta- 
 blished between the Imperial Power and the people of 
 India, and the progress of civilisation be made compatible 
 with the equality of races before the Law and in the 
 Government, and with the corporate rights of the allied 
 and protected States. 
 
 The high mission of Great Britain in the East can 
 never be fulfilled by an uninstructed nation and an offi- 
 cially instructed Government. The real wants of India, 
 the dangers, failings and temptations of Great Britain, 
 can be more clearly perceived and more fairly appreciated 
 by an independent observer in these cooler regions, than 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 by a professional functionary or a mercantile adventurer 
 in the atmosphere of Calcutta. The lesson of Indian 
 politics involves no transcendent mystery ; it is easily 
 learned by Englishmen, and the necessity for their learning 
 it becomes more pressing every day. 
 
 I regret very much to have been compelled to differ 
 widely from a nobleman whose sympathies, opinions and 
 active exertions, from the outset of his public career, have 
 generally been found on the side of freedom and human- 
 ity. The Duke of Argyll, so far as I can recollect, has 
 invariably maintained in every department of politics, 
 home, foreign and colonial, India excepted, the broadest 
 and most liberal views. We owe him a debt of gratitude, 
 not, perhaps, to be as yet fully estimated, for the strenuous 
 efforts, to a great extent unseen, by which he helped to 
 save this country from complicity and concert with the 
 revolt of the slaveholders in the United States. While I 
 have endeavoured to perform the duty of showing that 
 the Imperial policy towards India, which he has defended, 
 is not only unjust in the abstract, but narrow and retro- 
 gressive in its- practical results, I am convinced that the 
 Duke has been betrayed by a conscientious desire to pro- 
 mote the good of the people. He believes that it would 
 lead to the elevation and enlightenment of the vast popu- 
 lation subject to our supremacy, if they were all placed 
 'under the direct rule and tutelage of highly educated and 
 selected Englishmen. Unfortunately for this benevolent 
 theory, the facts of human nature are against it. Neither 
 the ideal Hindoo nor the ideal Briton exists. Neither the 
 average Hindoo nor the average Briton is a being of pure 
 intellect. The Natives of India, of every caste and creed, 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 are men of like powers and passions with ourselves ; and 
 in obedience to the universal law, as true in social science 
 as in physiology, the healthy development of their civi- 
 lisation cannot proceed without space and range for the 
 exercise of all their facilities. Too much constraint, too 
 much assistance, however benevolently intended will 
 but distort the phenomena of progress, disturb its steady 
 course, and drive the stream into dangerous channels. 
 
 Although so many of these pages are occupied with dis- 
 putation, I trust the struggle has not been one for a merely 
 barren victory. If old discussions are revived, and new 
 points of difference raised, I still believe that we shall 
 have lost no time by the way. I venture to hope that 
 this book will assist, in however small a degree, in making 
 an end of controversy and a beginning of construction. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 I'AUK 
 
 I. The Right and Duty of Rejoinder ... 1 
 
 II. Sham Precedent and Prerogative . . .10 
 
 III. A Rejoinder as to Jhansi . . . .21 
 
 IV. A Rejoinder as to Nagpore . . . . .27 
 Y. Oude ... .... 46 
 
 VI. The Punjaub . . . . . . 97 
 
 VII. Annexation, its Authors and Apologists . . 180 
 
 VIII. The Test of Prevision . . .211 
 
 IX. Merits and Motives . . . . . . 247 
 
 X. Reform or Destroy ?...... 282 
 
 XI. An Imperial Policy ... . 298 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A. Coffee-Planters in Mysore and English Gentlemen 
 
 in India 336 
 
 B. Earl Canning's last Letter to General Sir Mark 
 
 Cubbcm 342 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 P. 148, line 11, for " so far as" read " so far from' 
 P. 214, line 3, for "directly" read u directed". 
 
RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS OF 
 INDIAN POLICY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF REJOINDER. 
 
 THE most painful incident in political criticism is when 
 we are compelled to refuse to the memory of some deceased 
 statesman that meed of fame and honour which his friends 
 and followers demand. But if admiring coadjutors and 
 disciples propose the canonisation of a false saint, the apo- 
 theosis of a false hero, it surely becomes one of the highest 
 religious or social duties to deny the pretended achieve- 
 ments, and to protest against the posthumous honours. 
 
 We believe the British Empire to be threatened by cer- 
 tain difficulties and dangers arising from a certain false 
 policy in India. The defence of that policy in the past, 
 
 T T 
 
 persistence in all its existing results, and its occasional re- 
 vival in future contingencies, depend on the maintenance 
 of a certain false reputation. The policy of annexation 
 and the fame of Lord Dalhousie are indissolubly combined, 
 and must stand or fall together. The false policy cannot 
 be attacked or defended, without attacking or defending 
 the false reputation. 
 
 It may be alleged that there is no possibility of that 
 policy of annexation being revived which statesmen of all 
 parties have agreed in abjuring. But any such hopeful 
 presumption is decidedly premature. Within two years, 
 a distinguished Peer, while occupying a seat in the Cabinet, 
 has distinctly approved every tenet and every deed of 
 Lord Dalhousie's administration ; he has reiterated the 
 retrograde notion of personal sovereignty, instead of re- 
 cognising the corporate nature of a State; he has declared 
 the allied and protected Principalities of India to be irica- 
 
 B 
 
2 .-. . ; .; ", . : ..CHAPTER I. 
 
 pable of improvement ; and he, consequently, advises that 
 whenever the Buler of one of them is found to be "in- 
 competent," the separate State should be destroyed, and 
 the territory annexed to the British dominions. He thus 
 renews his assent to the doctrine and procedure by which 
 the Kingdom of Oude was extinguished, and promises, so 
 far as his power and influence can go, an indefinite series 
 of similar confiscations. 
 
 Open, thorough-going adhesion to the principles and 
 practice of Lord Dalhousie's viceroyalty has indeed ceased. 
 His warmest partisans are somewhat vague and reticent, 
 when they come to speak of the future. With the excep- 
 tion of the Duke of Argyll, no public man of any eminence, 
 Liberal or Conservative, has ever said, in or out of Par- 
 liament, since 1857, one word in favour of Lord Dal- 
 housie's conduct, beyond the most commonplace generali- 
 ties, such as were demanded by the decencies of office, or 
 the exigencies of common responsibility. It is a well-known 
 and easily ascertained fact that even in the occasional ar- 
 ticles or allusions of anonymous periodicals, the measures 
 and fame of Lord Dalhousie are upheld at the present 
 day, either by his personal friends, or by those who par- 
 ticipated in his work, and are jointly answerable for its 
 evil results. 
 
 Until those evil results are fuUy understood and generally 
 acknowledged, until the doctrines and the processes by 
 which Oude, Nagpore, Jhansi and Sattara were annexed 
 have been publicly and authoritatively reprobated and re- 
 jected, there can be no absolute security that they may not 
 again be called into play, either in the pride of our own ad- 
 ministrative success, in indignation at some disgraceful 
 scandal, or in the specious temptation of a lucrative " lapse." 
 
 The prevalent indifference to Indian politics disappeared 
 in the alarm and agony of the Rebellion; and attention 
 was kept up for a few years by the process of transferring 
 the government from the Company to the Crown, by the 
 conflicting interests of military and judicial amalgamations, 
 and by several appeals for redress from Native Princes, 
 brought before Parliament during the brief period of con- 
 ciliatory and restorative measures, when the Home Govern- 
 ment seemed going on too fast and too much in earnest 
 
THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF REJOINDER. 3 
 
 even for Lord Canning.* So long as public observation 
 was directed towards India, so long as controversy was 
 likely to arise and to be listened to, so long the friends 
 and partisans of Lord Dalhousie remained silent. When, 
 in the words of the Duke of Argyll himself, "the violent 
 reactions of feeling and opinion which arose out of the 
 Great Indian Mutiny were beginning to subside,"j* the 
 vindicators and eulogists commenced their operations. 
 
 By the ties of family, early association and service, Lord 
 Dalhousie was closely allied with both the great ruling 
 parties, and had given cause of offence to neither of them ; 
 after his long tenure of the most splendid and lucrative 
 office in the world, it would have been strange if he had not 
 left behind him powerful friends and obliged adherents. 
 Their deficiency in numbers was amply compensated by 
 their advantages of position, giving them access to the 
 most conspicuous strongholds of the press, and securing 
 them a well-disposed audience. When the time was fa- 
 vourable they chose their own ground for the display. 
 
 It never has been anything but a display. No close 
 fighting has ever been attempted. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll, in the first of his two essays 
 from the Edinburgh Review of January and April 1863, 
 reprinted with additions under his own name in 1865, ex- 
 plains that "during the two years, or more, when every 
 fifth-rate writer and speaker thought it necessary to have 
 his say against something which he called ' Lord Dal- 
 housie's policy/ Lord Dalhousie himself maintained a 
 silence which must have been painful, but which was sup- 
 
 * Lord Canning protested vehemently against the increased grant to Tippoo 
 Sultan's family ; he objected to the restoration of the Dhar territories and the 
 Tanjore treasures; and when the Tanjore Rajah's property was at last returned 
 to his widows, he never seems to have thought of making restitution of the 
 Nagpore Rajah's moveable property, though the circumstances of its sequestra- 
 tion were identical with those of the Tanjore case. The aocestral estates were, 
 indeed, given up to Janojee Bhonsla, the grand-nephew and heir of the Rajah 
 of Nagpore, and he was recognised as the head of the family by Lord Canning, 
 but those measures had been already suggested by Lord Stanley. In fact all 
 these tardy acts of justice originated with the Secretaries of State at home, 
 contrary to the counsels of Calcutta, as likewise quite recently in the cases of 
 the installation of the Dhar Rajah as ruler of his Principality, the imperfect 
 recognition of Prince Azeem Jah of the Carnatic, and the prospective resto- 
 ration of Mysore to a native Sovereign. 
 
 f India Under Dalhousie and Canning, (Preface) Longman, 1865. 
 
 B2 
 
4 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ported by a proud sense of what was due both to others 
 and to himself."* The same silence, supported no doubt 
 by the same "proud sense," was maintained up to 1863 
 by the Duke of Argyll. 
 
 It was natural and not unbecoming that the Duke of 
 Argyll should come forward to defend Lord Dalhousie's 
 policy and reputation. Lord Dalhousie was his friend and 
 colleague. The Duke as a Cabinet Minister had approved 
 of the annexations of Nagpore and Jhansi, had insisted 
 upon the annexation of Oude, and, when these Edinburgh 
 Review articles appeared, was doing his best to promote 
 the prospective annexation of Mysore, which Lord Dal- 
 housie had been the first to propose, j" In vindicating the 
 acts and upholding the credit of his deceased friend, he 
 was in fact vindicating the acts and upholding the credit 
 of himself and his own party. He had a perfect right 
 to undertake that task. Whether he had a perfect right 
 to pursue that undertaking by the exact course he has 
 chosen, is a very different thing. Whether it was natural 
 and becoming for the Lord Privy Seal, one of Her Majesty's 
 Ministers, to avow the most alarming principles under the 
 most ambiguous and undefined conditions, is another ques- 
 tion altogether. " Noblesse oblige." Heavy responsibili- 
 ties attach to high office. 
 
 If in January 1863, or in June 1865, the Duke of 
 Argyll had risen in the House of Lords, and had stated that 
 our supposed Treaties with the Native Sovereigns of India 
 were hardly worthy of the name ; that it would be much 
 better always to write and print the word derisively be- 
 tween inverted commas, to show that they were nothing 
 but so-called Treaties, for really they "expressed nothing 
 but the will of a Superior imposing on his Vassal so much 
 as for the time it was thought expedient to require ;" J if he 
 had reiterated his approval of all Lord Dalhousie's annexa- 
 tions, both as to their general policy and as to the several 
 pleadings and procedure ; if he had declared that "the vices 
 of Native Governments were systematic and their virtues 
 casual," and that "the dependent position to which they 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, (Longman, 1865), p. 68. 
 t The Mysore Reversion, (2nd Edition) p. 41. 
 j India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 11. 
 
THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF REJOINDER. 5 
 
 are reduced by our power in India did not contribute to 
 make them better,"'* if he had announced his unaltered 
 opinion that the " only security for good government" lay 
 in the absorption of every mismanaged Native State, t he 
 must either have spoken with the consent of the Cabinet, 
 or he would have exposed himself to be disavowed by his 
 associates and answered by his opponents. He would then 
 have been speaking in his right place and under the right 
 conditions. Instead of doing so, he preserved silence for 
 five years at least, and then published two anonymous 
 articles on the subject in the Edinburgh Review, thus 
 withdrawing at once from Parliamentary discussion and 
 from official accountability. The authorship of these arti- 
 cles having been from the first no secret, they were as- 
 sumed to convey the sentiments of a section, if not a 
 majority, of the Liberal Ministry ; while none of the 
 opposite party were able to challenge, none of his col- 
 leagues were able to contradict that mischievous notion. In 
 India the effect was most alarming. J After the lapse of 
 two years these articles were republished in a separate 
 form with the author's name. The effect of this publicity 
 was even more alarming in India than that of the original 
 articles, and has by no means subsided yet. 
 
 Not even on the platform which he has chosen for him- 
 self, neither in the anonymous form of 1863, nor in the 
 enlarged republication of 1865, does the noble apologist 
 deign to meet the arguments or to traverse the indictments 
 of the assailants of Lord Dalhousie's policy. He contemp- 
 tuously dismisses them in the last page of his article as 
 4 'fifth-rate writers" quite unworthy of notice. If he had 
 ventured to mention any names, perhaps some of his 
 readers might have been tempted to inquire for one or 
 two of these fifth-rate productions, to form a judg- 
 ment for themselves. The Duke will not help them in 
 the search. He sticks to the printed official records, and 
 insists, as the only sound principle of political criticism, 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. oO. 
 
 t Ibid. p. 38, 121 and 122. 
 
 J To this I can testify from rny own personal observations. I at once re- 
 plied in the Bombay Times of India to the reassertion of the right of forbidding 
 the adoption of heirs, v. Empire in India, p. 154. See also The Mysore Rever- 
 sion, Appendix II. 
 
6 CHAPTER I. 
 
 that Lord Dalhousie's reasoning must be accepted as con- 
 clusive, and his statements of fact regarded as irrefragable. 
 Such at least is the only interpretation I can put upon his 
 complaints of the "ignorant injustice" with which certain 
 measures have been assailed. " All the facts," he says, 
 " have been accessible to the public for years. Blue Books 
 may not be light reading ; but those at least who under- 
 take to pass judgment on the conduct of public men are 
 bound to know something of the authentic documents in 
 which that conduct, with the reasons which determined 
 it, are recorded. In the case of the Indian Government 
 this duty is the more easy, and the neglect of it the less 
 excusable, since it is the custom of that Government to 
 record its decisions, with the dissents of every individual 
 member, in elaborate Minutes, often very able, and always 
 exhausting every fact and every argument on either side" 
 In short, .after a discussion in the Calcutta Council, there 
 can be nothing more to be said ! " The following pages," 
 continues the Duke, " have been written, so far as regards 
 the narrative of political transactions, mainly from those 
 materials."* 
 
 If every narrative of political transactions is to be 
 compiled exclusively from the papers carefully sifted and 
 selected for publication by the accountable persons them- 
 selves, national and historical judgments will be lenient 
 truly ! If the Minutes of a close and secret conclave are 
 to be humbly accepted as an exhaustive discussion ; if 
 plenary inspiration is claimed for Blue Books, and pro- 
 phetic infallibility for the decrees of a Council of five, 
 there will be small scope for political criticism. 
 
 Again, in his remarks on Mr. Edwin Arnold's work, 
 Dalhousies Administration of British India, the Duke 
 urges, " If Historians of any class are specially bound to 
 an impartial treatment of their subject, it is that class 
 whose works partake largely of the character of Biography. 
 At least it may be expected of them that they will state the 
 facts in the light in which they were seen by those whose 
 conduct they have undertaken to record, and whose memory 
 is for a time in their keeping, "f It is not easy to compre- 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, Preface, p. vi. 
 f Ibid., Preface, p. vii. The italics are mine. 
 
THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF REJOINDER. 7 
 
 hend how a writer can be expected to state the facts in 
 the light in which Lord Dalhousie viewed them, when his 
 great object in writing is to put those facts in a very 
 different light, and to show that Lord Dalhousie mis- 
 stated, misrepresented, or misunderstood them. 
 
 We wiU, however, reduce the Duke's claims to the 
 most moderate proportions, and entertain his last com- 
 plaint against "the omission of any adequate attempt 
 even to set forth Lord Dalhousie's reasoning."* This 
 charge is expressly aimed against Mr. Arnold, while 
 to Mr. Kaye, as the author of The Sepoy War,^ 
 " preconceived theories," and " narratives woven so as 
 to bring out a certain pattern," are imputed. J Were I 
 concerned or warranted to undertake the defence of these 
 two authors, I should be at a loss to deal with such loose 
 declamation. If the Duke had exposed and refuted one 
 specimen in each case of the faults he professes to detect, 
 we could better appreciate the justice of his complaint. 
 Neither of these gentlemen is, in my opinion, chargeable 
 with any exaggeration or suppression. If they are unjust, 
 they are certainly not ignorant. Mr. Kaye's work espe- 
 cially proves his research not only into the Blue Books, 
 but into a vast mass of less accessible materials ; and 
 affords ample means to its readers to judge in Lord Dal- 
 housie's own words the grounds on which he based his 
 principal annexations. 
 
 It is a sufficiently remarkable circumstance, that these 
 two historical works should be singled out for notice. 
 Elaborate arguments and long quotations from official 
 documents are not to be expected in a narrative, which, 
 indeed, they would only confuse and encumber. The 
 Duke of Argyll, republishing with additions his two arti- 
 cles from a critical and controversial Review, with the 
 avowed object of vindicating Lord Dalhousie's measures, 
 carefully avoids all the critical and controversial works in 
 which those measures are assailed, while he complains of 
 a want of argumentative matter in two purely historical 
 works. If the Duke had really wished to deal with argu- 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, Preface, p. vii. 
 
 t Vol. i, published by W. H. Allen, 1865. 
 
 j India under Dalhousie and Canning, Preface, p. viii. 
 
8 CHAPTER I. 
 
 inentative matter, he knew very well where to find it. 
 Indignantly conscious of a host of " fifth-rate writers'" who 
 had attacked Lord Dalhousie, he cannot have been igno- 
 rant of the existence of the pamphlets by the late Mr. John 
 Sullivan,* of such works as The Rebellion in India, and 
 Topics for Indian Statesmen, by Mr. J. B. Norton ;t 
 British India, its Races and its History,^ or Thoughts 
 on the Policy of the Crown towards India, by Mr. 
 J. M. Ludlow, or even my own work, The Empire 
 in India. \\ This was published more than a year be- 
 fore the Duke's reprint ; and although the sixteen 
 interpolated pages in his first Essay cannot be called 
 a reply to my Chapters on Sattara, Jhansi and Nag- 
 pore, for they never travel out of the Blue Books, the 
 time and circumstances of the republication make them 
 look very like a retort. 
 
 In the Preface to the republication of 1865, tw^o volumes 
 by Mr. J. W. Kaye and Mr. Edwin Arnold, published in 
 that year, are, as I have mentioned, honoured with a 
 few words of censure. The titles of some Blue Books 
 were alone prefixed to the second article as it originally 
 appeared in the Edin b u rgh Re view of April, 1863. Besides 
 some Parliamentary Papers, the Essays of Sir Henry Law- 
 rence served as a heading to the first article in the Review 
 for January of the same year. The plan of thus contemp- 
 tuously evading his antagonists, denouncing them collec- 
 tively as remarkable only for "ignorance and injustice," 
 and doggedly reiterating the fallacies they have assailed, 
 giving full play to his great advantages not only as an oc- 
 casional Edinburgh Reviewer, but as a Peer and occasional 
 Cabinet Minister, was probably the best for the Duke's 
 immediate purpose. The Duke can be accused of no un- 
 fair design in thus declining to meet his adversaries, 
 his "proud sense" of what is due to himself was doubtless 
 insurmountable, but the result is decidedly unfair. His 
 
 * Formerly a member of Council at Madras. 
 
 f The first -was published in 1857, the other in 1858, by Richardson Brothers, 
 Cornhill. Mr. Norton is now Advocate General and a member of the Legisla- 
 tive Council at Madras. 
 
 J Macmillan and Co.. 1858. 
 
 Ridgway, 1859. 
 
 || Triibner, 1864. 
 
THE EIGHT AND DUTY OF EE JOINDER. 9 
 
 readers are virtually told that no argument worth noticing 
 has ever been urged against Lord Dalhousie's policy ; and 
 that a complete and conclusive answer to the empty cavils 
 that have gone forth, is to be found in those official docu- 
 ments which his enemies have never taken the trouble to 
 examine. 
 
 I have said that the Duke of Argyll, declining to notice 
 any statements or arguments except those contained in 
 the Blue Books, has reiterated the fallacies which his an- 
 tagonists have assailed. I must bring the same charge 
 against another personal friend of Lord Dalhousie, Sir 
 Charles Jackson, whose Vindication* appeared in June 
 1865, within a few days of the Duke's pamphlet. Sir 
 Charles Jackson deserves the fullest credit for disinterested 
 generosity in having volunteered for the defence, but 
 his advocacy is not more cogent than that of the Cabinet 
 Minister. As a practised lawyer and judge he cannot but be 
 fully aware that a precedent must be produced and identified 
 before it can be accepted as a principle of law, and made 
 the groundwork for a series of decisions. Yet in common 
 
 O 
 
 with the Duke of Argyll, in justification of the annexa- 
 tions of Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi, he parades the 
 usurped prerogative of forbidding successions by adoption 
 as " the settled public law of India "^ and talks of " these 
 lapses having occurred by operation of law, '^ as if it had 
 never been proved by Mr. Norton, by Mr. Ludlow,|| and 
 by myself, 51 that no such law had ever been asserted in 
 India, until the confiscation of Sattara by Lord Dalhousie 
 in 1848, and that the pretended array of precedents for 
 the enforcement of such a law was perfectly imaginary. 
 
 * A Vindication of the Marquis of Dalhousie s Indian A dministration,(Smith 
 and Elder), 1865. Sir Charles Jackson was successively Advocate General and 
 a Judge of the Supreme Court at Calcutta, and for some time a Vice-President 
 of the Legislative Council, during Lord Dalhousie's government. 
 
 t A Vindication, p. 9. India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 27. 
 
 J A Vindication, p. 16 and 42. 
 
 The Rebellion, p. 67, 72. 
 
 || British India its Races and its Hutory, vol. ii, p. 259. 
 
 1 The Empire in India, p. 132 to 152, and 165 to 172. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 SHAM PRECEDENT AND PREROGATIVE. 
 
 IN all the Minutes and despatches penned in 1848 to jus- 
 tify the annexation of Sattara, no one ever professed to 
 refer by name or date to a single old precedent, either 
 of our own or of any previous Government, for forbidding 
 the adoption of a successor by a Hindoo Prince ; but the 
 existence of such precedents was presumed and pronounced 
 with an audacious confidence that is quite surprising. Two 
 very recent cases, however, brought forward at that 
 time as precedents, are now offered for acceptance by 
 the Duke of Argyll* and Sir Charles Jackson,f those of 
 Colaba and Mandavee, both of which, singularly alike in 
 circumstances, were finally decided in 1844. 
 
 The Rajah of Mandavee was a petty tributary with 
 whom no Treaty had ever been made.J The last Chief, 
 a posthumous child not two years old, died in 1839. The 
 widow of this child's father wished to adopt a successor. 
 
 The last Rajah of Colaba, a posthumous child, died in 
 1841 at the age of fifteen months. The widow of his pre- 
 decessor wished to adopt one of her husband's illegitimate 
 sons. A Treaty had been concluded in 1 822 with Raghojee 
 Angria, Rajah of Colaba, promising "protection" to him, 
 " his heirs and successors," while "the entire supremacy," 
 and " the right of conferring investiture on any vacancy," 
 were reserved to the British Government. 
 
 In 1844 it was finally decided to treat these two 
 States as having lapsed to the British Government, 
 mainly on the grounds of there being no one entitled 
 to inheritance by legitimate relationship, and of permission 
 being required to enable an adopted heir to succeed. || 
 
 * India under Da'housie and Canning, p. 28. 
 t A Vindication, p. 11, 12. 
 
 j Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 1864, (Longman aiid Co.) vol. vi, p. 254. 
 Ibid., vol. vi, p. 183. 
 . || Papers as to Succession by Adoption, 1850, p. 214. 
 
SHAM PRECEDENT AND PREROGATIVE. 11. 
 
 Both of these cases appear to me to have been decided 
 erroneously and unjustly. That of Colaba was the 
 worse, because the Principality was guaranteed by a 
 Treaty ; and the right of conferring investiture is not in 
 India, any more than in Europe, the right of divesting a 
 family on the failure of lineal male heirs.* But bad as 
 they were, these cases cannot be compared with that 
 of Sattara. The infancy of the deceased Princes ; the 
 consequent recurrence to the questionable adoption by 
 their widowed mothers ; the absence of any Treaty in 
 the one instance, and the position of a protected inferior 
 imposed on the other ; all these incidents would nullify 
 them as precedents for rejecting the adopted son of a 
 Sovereign with whom we were allied by a Treaty of "per- 
 petual friendship" securing the Principality to his " heirs 
 and successors" in "perpetual sovereignty," and containing 
 no restriction whatever on the regular operation of the 
 Hindoo law of inheritance. The cases of Mandavee and 
 Colaba were bad indeed; they were ominous and critical 
 cases, and marked, as Mr. St. George Tucker and others 
 foresaw, the commencement of an era of acquisitive en- 
 croachments; but even viewed as imperfect precedents, 
 they were in 1848 quite new and of our own creation ; 
 whereas the advocates for annexation then, as now, alleged 
 "the universal and immemorial custom oj :. India ," " the 
 undoubted prerogative exercised by the Imperial House of 
 Delhi ""\ the ordinary and invariable practice" the power 
 acquired by the British Government as successors to the 
 Emperor and the Peishwa,J and " the right universally 
 exercised by all paramount authorities throughout India ." 
 Incredible as it may seem, all these allegations were totally 
 unfounded. Not a particle, not a vestige of documentary 
 evidence of such a prerogative having ever been exercised, 
 or asserted, by the Emperor, or by the Peishwa, not a 
 
 * The Governor of Bombay and one Councillor were in favour of permitting 
 the adoption, but were over-ruled by the Governor- General and the Home 
 Government. Mr. Henry St. George Tucker recorded an admirable Protest in 
 the Court of Directors against the confiscation of Colaba. {Selections from the 
 Papers of PL St. George Tucker, p. 27 and 1QO.) 
 
 t Mr. Willoughby, Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 67, 71. 
 
 j Lord Dalhousie, Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 81, 82. 
 
 Mr. R. D. Mangles, Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 147. 
 
12 CHAPTER II. 
 
 historical fact bearing upon it, not a single precedent 
 for annulling an adoption, has ever been or can be ad- 
 duced from the records of any of the Governments that 
 preceded us. 
 
 The British Government has never possessed the right 
 of disallowing adoptions for its own purposes ; even where 
 it has retained from its predecessors, or asserted in a treaty 
 or grant, the prerogative of investiture over minor Princi- 
 palities, it has no more right to forbid the succession of an 
 adopted son than of a lineal male descendant. The pre- 
 rogative of investiture gives jurisdiction in disputed suc- 
 cessions, asserts supremacy, and enforces subordination, 
 but does not justify the refusal of investiture to a lawful 
 heir. In the case of a Hindoo Prince, with whom a treaty 
 of perpetual friendship and alliance has been contracted, 
 not even the prerogative of investiture exists. Nothing 
 but the moral duty of protection and pacification autho- 
 rises any intervention to control and regulate the course 
 of inheritance. 
 
 Next to the supposititious precedents, of which more will 
 be said shortly, admissions, perverted or illusory, attributed 
 to the doomed Princes or their advocates, formed the 
 favourite process of proof throughout the annexing mania. 
 The apologists of the present day avail themselves largely 
 of the same method. The dying request of the Rajah of Sat- 
 tara that his adopted son might be recognised as his suc- 
 cessor, was eagerly snatched at as a full admission that the 
 British Government had a right to forbid the succession.* 
 Of course it proved nothing but his consciousness of our 
 overwhelming power, and a suspicion, too well-founded, 
 of our sinister intentions. The Duke of Argyll, however, 
 thinks it worth his while to urge that the Hajah asked 
 " for this consent as one which he knew to be requisite for 
 his own purpose, "t We also know by the result that this 
 consent was requisite, but we no more admit the right of 
 withholding it from a duly adopted successor than the 
 Rajah did. 
 
 Perhaps the most singular instances on record of what 
 
 * See Mr. Willoughby's Minute, para. 20 ; Lord Falkland's, para. 5, and 
 Lord Dalhousie's, para. 18 ; Satt-ara Papers, 1849, p. 71, 78 and 81. 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 26. 
 
SHAM PRECEDENT AND PREROGATIVE. 13 
 
 can be twisted into admissions, are claimed by the Duke of 
 Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson from one of the greatest 
 living authorities on such subjects, Sir George Clerk, who 
 during a long and distinguished career has ever consist- 
 ently opposed the violation of treaties, and the destruction 
 of friendly Principalities, The Duke first states that Sir 
 George Clerk, in his Minute on the Sattara succession, " not 
 only admitted, but specially dwelt upon the distinction" 
 between the right of adoption as conveying Sovereignty 
 to an heir, and as conveying private property only, and 
 that after declaring the regularity of the deceased Rajah's 
 adoption according to Hindoo usage, he added: "The 
 question, however, remains whether he" the adopted son, 
 " is entitled to the Sovereignty of the Sattara Rajahs." 
 Sir George Clerk knew this distinction had been drawn 
 by others, and that the question had been raised and 
 remained. He gave no assent to the distinction ; and he 
 answered the question in the Rajah's favour. 
 
 Now comes the most valuable admission of all. "So 
 far from affirming," says the Duke, " that the refusal to 
 acknowledge this title would be any violation of an estab- 
 lished rule, or the beginning of a new policy, Sir George 
 Clerk admitted that no such rule had been established, 
 and that ' our views of practice in India in regard to adop- 
 tions to Chiefships had been inconsistent and capricious.'"* 
 Sir George Clerk " admitted," that our views and practice 
 had been inconsistent and capricious ! The Duke is wel- 
 come to make the most of that admission, and to reconcile 
 it, if he can, with that theory of a " settled law and custom 
 of India" in which he professes to believe. Lord Canning, 
 in his Adoption Despatch of 1860, quoted even stronger 
 language from one of Sir George Clerk's letters, declaring 
 it to be his opinion " that it is the inconsistency, caprice, 
 and mutability of our opinions regarding all great princi- 
 ples that is the bane of our supremacy in India." To this 
 the Viceroy adds the following brief comment ; " I fear 
 that as regards the matter now under consideration, this 
 is too true." The matter under consideration being that 
 of successions by adoption, Lord Dalhousie's defenders may 
 perhaps find solace in this "admission" also. 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 25. 
 
14 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson most inaccurately cites me twice in 
 support of the fictitious prerogative of annulling adop- 
 tions, without venturing to quote my words. He says : 
 " Major Bell in his work admits that such permission/' to 
 adopt an heir, " was sometimes refused by the Native 
 Governments in the case of Jaghires."* In the passage 
 to which he refers I admitted, that in the sole case of " ser- 
 vice Jaghires" assigned for the payment of troops, and 
 held, according to the terms of the grant, at the Sove- 
 reign's pleasure, a resumption " could be effected during 
 the lifetime of a Jaghiredar, but, more often, as might be 
 expected, after his demise." These are the Jaghiredars of 
 whom Sir John Malcolm thus wrote : "Adoptions which 
 are universally recognised as legal among Hindoos are not 
 a strict right (any more than direct heirs) where grants 
 of land are for service."^ And, I added, "undoubtedly 
 an irregular or unauthorised adoption did from time to 
 time afford a just occasion, or a convenient pretext, for 
 resuming a service Jaghire."J I made what Sir Charles 
 Jackson calls this " admission/' expressly to show that the 
 resumption of lands assigned for a certain service, when- 
 ever the service was no longer required, far from consti- 
 tuting a precedent or an analogy for the extinction of a 
 State allied to us by a Treaty, was not even applicable to 
 petty Chiefships and hereditary landed estates. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson accepts the statement of this coun- 
 terfeit law, as he says himself, "in an unqualified way." 
 Lord Dalhousie, according to him, had very little to do 
 with the doctrine of lapse. " He merely happened to be 
 the Governor of a country in which these lapses occurred 
 by operation of law."\\ " If Lord Dalhousie is open to 
 censure, it cannot be for lapses of territory which were 
 effected by operation of law, but it must be because he did 
 not waive the rights which the law gave him/'^f It is 
 strange, indeed, that his legal practice and experience 
 did not enable Sir Charles Jackson to detect what has 
 
 * A Vindication,}). 13, and at p. 9 he puts me as an authority in a foot- note, 
 t Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm, November 14th, 1829, 
 quoted by Lord Canning in the Adoption Despatch. 
 
 t Empire in India, p. 147. A Vindication, p. 13. 
 
 || Ditto, p. 16. 1 Ditto, p. 17. 
 
SHAM PRECEDENT AND PREROGATIVE. 15 
 
 been effectuaHy exposed by the authors already men- 
 tioned, and by myself, in a book which he quotes if he 
 has not read, that the mere semblance of law and custom 
 was fabricated only by confounding sinecure offices,* 
 hereditary pensions,")* military holdings, J and landed es- 
 tates, with Sovereignties ; by boldly turning treaties of 
 "perpetual friendship and defensive alliance" into " grants 
 from a Sovereign to a subject," or " agreements" between 
 a King and a stipendiary, || and then by assuming as the 
 ordinary and regular course of law some rare vindictive 
 act of a despotic Prince. Even in the case of private landed 
 estates, no right of escheat in default of lineal male heirs 
 was ever made out. The ruling sanction, in its applica- 
 tion to the descent of landed property, never, until Lord 
 Dalhousie's time, extended to the right of appropriation. ^[ 
 Sir Charles Jackson cites Steele's Summary of Hindoo 
 Laws and Customs (p. 185), without quoting it, in sup- 
 port of the position that " Enamdars and Wuttundars,"- 
 i.e. freeholders, not allied Sovereigns, should have the 
 consent of the Government for adoption.** But he omits 
 to tell us what is expounded in the pages following, that 
 " an adoption concluded agreeably to the Shdstras is not 
 annullable" and that the so-called consent being required 
 simply to secure regularity and good order, is not essen- 
 tial to the validity of an adoption, especially when the 
 adopted heir is of the same gotra or clan. Nor has he 
 quoted from p. 58 or 235 the declaration that "the Go- 
 vernment cannot succeed while any relations, or persons 
 connected by gotra with the deceased, can be found. "ft 
 It is difficult to suppose Sir Charles Jackson to have been 
 ignorant of the decision in the important case of Bhasker 
 Buchajee v. Naroo Rugonath, (Bombay Select Reports, 24, 
 
 * Called in the Mahratta Provinces and other parts of Central and Western 
 India, nemnooks, see Empire in India, p. 172. 
 
 t Wurshasun or yoomiah. 
 
 % Surinjamfouj or tunkwah jagheer, see Empire in India, p. 147 and 261. 
 
 Called Inams, surinjam zatee, khass jagheer, wuttun, etc., according to the 
 tenure and locality. Sometimes these holdings, as well as those mentioned in 
 the preceding note, conferred a customary jurisdiction over the tenants, but 
 they were always distinguishable from Sovereignties. 
 
 || Empire in India, p. 132 to 173. 
 
 1 Empire in India, p. 144 to 149. See also the Inam Commission Un- 
 masked, by Robert Knight, (Effingham Wilson) 1859. 
 ** A Vindication, p. 9. ft Inam Commission Unmasked, p. 26. 
 
16 CHAPTER II. 
 
 approved in Perry's Oriental Cases, 151,) " that want of 
 the permission of the ruling authorities, is an insufficient 
 ground for setting aside an adoption once made with the 
 proper ceremonies/' or of the following passage from a great 
 authority, Sir Thomas Strange, who, after detailing the 
 various forms and ceremonies required to constitute a valid 
 adoption, appends the following remark : " Most of these 
 rules are general : they are not all imperative. The notice 
 to the King may be dispensed with"* 
 
 In consequence of the mass of misrepresentation that 
 has been thrown over the whole subj ect, the right of adop- 
 tion is too often treated as if it w^ere the extraordinary 
 privilege of introducing a stranger into the family to pre- 
 vent its extinction ; and the Duke of Argyll, employing 
 the very words used on several occasions by Lord Dal- 
 housie, speaks of an adoption taking place on " the failure 
 of heirs natural"^ The truth is that the refusal to re- 
 cognise adoptions in a Hindoo family, amounts to pro- 
 hibiting the succession of any one but a son or a grandson 
 in the male line, entirely excluding uncles, brothers, ne- 
 phews and cousins, though these are "natural heirs" all 
 the world over, and all descendants through females, 
 however near in blood. By Hindoo law no collateral can 
 be the heir, until by an adoption he has become the 
 son of his predecessor. It is manifest at once how brief 
 would be the existence of a dynasty and a State, if it 
 were dependent upon strictly lineal male descent. On this 
 point the words of Mr. (now Sir Bartle) Frere,J who in 
 1848, said and did everything that was compatible with 
 his subordinate position as Resident at Sattara to prevent 
 the annexation, may be usefully quoted : 
 
 " I much doubt if a single Mahratta family of any consequence 
 could be found in which the succession has continued for a century 
 and a half without having recourse to adoption. Indeed, a mo- 
 ment's consideration will show that there is a natural impossibility 
 in such uninterrupted succession, so long as the custom remains 
 as at present. Direct male succession, without once passing from 
 an elder to a younger brother, or to a paternal uncle, nephew, or 
 
 * Elements of Hindu Law, vol. ii, p. 64. 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 28. 
 
 j Late Governor of Bombay, and recently appointed to a seat in the Indian 
 Council. 
 
SHAM PRECEDENT AND PREROGATIVE. 17 
 
 cousin, is obviously impossible for many generations together, in 
 any country ; and among the Mahrattas whenever a man of pro- 
 perty feels his end approaching, he endeavours to adopt a son, 
 sometimes the child of a younger brother, or other near relation 
 who would naturally be his heir ; sometimes, where there has been 
 a family quarrel, a far distant relation."* 
 
 It is not now open to the apologists of annexation to 
 say that they acknowledge "the ruling sanction, "with re- 
 ference to hereditary landed estates, to have been pro- 
 tective and regulative, not acquisitive, but that no ana- 
 logy can be drawn between an estate and a State, and that 
 an adoption, though good for conveying property, may 
 not be good for transmitting a Sovereignty. They have 
 shut themselves out from that line of defence ; but if it 
 were open to them, their position would not be improved. 
 It is true there is no analogy between an estate and 
 a State, but they endeavoured to make out their case 
 by setting up such an analogy. They argued that where 
 private landed estates were concerned, the Paramount 
 Power had the prerogative of preventing successions 
 by adoption, and thus barring all but lineal male de- 
 scendants ; and then they endeavoured by an illicit and 
 stealthy process to include dependent Principalities, con- 
 stituted or confirmed by Treaties, in the same category 
 with private estates held by grants. Even if their major 
 premiss were right, their conclusion would be wrong, 
 because their minor premiss is false. States are not 
 estates. But the major premiss is false also. Estates 
 do not lapse for want of lineal male heirs. No Para- 
 mount Power in India has ever possessed the right 
 to exclude, even from a private heritable estate, any 
 heir entitled under Hindoo law ; d fortiori the law- 
 ful heir cannot be excluded from succession to a dependent 
 Principality. If the Imperial Power cannot limit or muti- 
 late for its own benefit the Hindoo law of inheritance in 
 the case of a subject, still less can it do so in the case of 
 an ally. 
 
 Both the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson re- 
 present Sir George Clerk as " compelled to admit that 
 the sanction of the Paramount Power is by custom required 
 
 * Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 111. 
 
18 CHAPTER II. 
 
 to render an adoption to a Principality valid."* He does 
 indeed admit that custom requires the sanction of the 
 Paramount PoAver, but he explains that "we require the 
 observance of this sanction for the purpose of averting the 
 dissensions and bloodshed that would otherwise ensue 
 from the vindication of rival pretensions ;" and he does not 
 admit that we can " exercise that right of sanction to the 
 extent of prohibiting adoption", j" 
 
 The Duke of Argyll, who is no lawyer, may be par- 
 doned for not duly appreciating this distinction. No 
 such allowance can be made for Sir Charles Jackson. He 
 says " the fact that permission must be obtained implies 
 that it may be refused ; otherwise the permission is un- 
 necessary and a farce."+ This enormous fallacy was dis- 
 pelled by me in the book which Sir Charles Jackson cites. 
 In the very page to which Sir Charles Jackson refers for 
 my supposed admission, it was urged that even the right of 
 investiture and supremacy, when clearly reserved by treaty, 
 " simply entitled the British Government, as Suzerain, to 
 exercise supervision and control over each succession, 
 whether by natural descent or by adoption, until satis- 
 fied that everything had been done conformably with 
 law, with local custom, and with an equitable regard to 
 the general interests of the family, and to the indi- 
 vidual rights of each of its members. This alone is the 
 meaning and scope of the ruling sanction. " This alone 
 was the doctrine of Sir George Clerk and Sir Henry 
 Lawrence. The latest expression of these views by the 
 former will be found in the following extract : 
 
 " The confirmation has never been refused. Hence it is that 
 I never found an instance on the old records at Delhi, and that I 
 never knew one occurring within my experience of our own times, 
 of any Chiefship, either Eaj or Surdarree, great or small, being 
 held to have escheated, excepting for felony, to the Paramount 
 State. At length the Calcutta Government led off with that 
 flagrant instance of the barefaced appropriation of Sattara."|| 
 
 The Duke and the Judge may very justly object 
 
 * A Vindication, p. 10. India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 24, 25. 
 t Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 62. % A Vindication, p. 13, 14. 
 
 Empire in India, p. 147. Ludlow^s British India and its Races, vol. ii, 
 p. 258, 259. || Mysore Papers, 1866, p. 71, 72. 
 
SHAM PRECEDENT AND PREROGATIVE. 19 
 
 that this paper, printed in 1866, was not known to 
 them when their respective works were published. 
 They may both decline to be bound by Sir George 
 Clerk's opinions, notoriously adverse to those of Lord 
 Dalhousie. Sir Charles Jackson may claim the right 
 of picking any bit of bad rhetoric or apparent ad- 
 mission out of my book that he can find, while repudia- 
 ting any obligation to read it, or to deal with its ar- 
 guments. The Duke of Argyll may discard me altogether 
 from his consideration. But they cannot so easily get rid 
 of Lord Canning's celebrated Adoption Despatch of April 
 30th, 1860, published in the same year, which contains 
 (paragraphs 17, 19) the following passages. 
 
 " We have not shown, so far as I can find, a single instance in 
 which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a 
 refusal of assent from the Paramount Power. I venture to think 
 that no such instance can be adduced, and that the practice which 
 has prevailed is truly described by Sir Henry Lawrence, where he 
 says : ( The confirmation of the Suzerain is necessary in all cases. 
 He is the arbitrator of all contested adoptions ; he can set aside 
 one or other for informality, irregularity, or for misconduct ; but 
 it does not appear, by the rules or practices of any of the Sovereign- 
 ties, or by our own practice with the Istumrardars of Ajmere, that 
 the Paramount State can refuse confirmation to one or other 
 claimant, and confiscate the estate, however small/ I believe that 
 there is no example of any Hindoo State, whether in Rajpoota-na 
 or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power, by reason of that 
 Power withholding its assent to an adoption. It has been argued 
 that the right to grant sanction implies the right to withhold it. 
 This, however sound logically, is neither sound nor safe practi- 
 cally. The histories of feudal Governments furnish abundant ex- 
 amples of long-established privileges habitually renewed as acts 
 of grace from the Paramount Powers, but which those Powers 
 have never thought of refusing for purposes of their own, or upon 
 their own judgment alone." 
 
 Thus to make a plausible show of defence for Lord 
 Dalhousie's doctrine of " lapse/' his vindicators proceed to 
 reoccupy all those false positions which Lord Canning ad- 
 visedly and deliberately abandoned as untenable. 
 
 In order to transform the novel claim of forbidding 
 successions by adoption into " the settled public law 
 of India," a series of precedents was required. Lord 
 Dalhousie asserted that there was such a series. Lord 
 
20 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Canning, after a careful search, reluctantly acknowledged 
 in 1860 that no such precedents could be found. His 
 two defenders persist in 1865 that the imaginary prece- 
 dents are intact ; they are quite silent as to Lord Can- 
 ning's all-important admissions. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll complains of " ignorant injustice," 
 of " a policy misrepresented and misunderstood."* I 
 would rather attribute ignorance and misunderstanding to 
 the advocates for the defence, than charge them with in- 
 justice and misrepresentation. But it is difficult to sup- 
 pose them ignorant of the acknowledgment which has just 
 been quoted from the Adoption Despatch, or of its effect, 
 upsetting entirely, as it does, the pretended prerogative 
 for which they still ostensibly contend. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll also complains of " special circum- 
 stances having been carefully concealed by the opponents of 
 Lord Dalhousie."j' Some special circumstances have been 
 concealed by Lord Dalhousie's friends, and the actual posi- 
 tion of the controversy has thus been completely hidden. It 
 is in a peculiar sense, perhaps, that the Duke and Sir Charles 
 Jackson interpret the text that "Charity covereth a multi- 
 tude of sins." Their object is charitable ; ours is malignant. 
 In them, therefore, inaccuracy is venial ; in us it is crimi- 
 nal. It may be so : their venial offences, however, shall, 
 as in this first instance, be proved. It remains for them 
 to justify their vague accusations. 
 
 * India under Dalkousie and Canning, Preface, p. 1 and p. 68. 
 t Ibid., p. 38. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 A REJOINDER AS TO JHANSI. 
 
 HAVING explained how on the general question of 
 adoptions, Lord Dalhousie's defenders have suppressed 
 not only all adverse arguments, but the conclusive 
 acknowledgments of their own side, we may proceed 
 to a particular question, that of the Jhansi succession, 
 in which the same tactics are pursued in a still more re- 
 markable manner. 
 
 The Jhansi case was very fully discussed in The 
 Empire in India, which Sir Charles Jackson quotes, 
 and which has not, perhaps, entirely escaped the Duke 
 of Argyll's observation. In the Edinburgh Review 
 article of 1863 the annexation of Jhansi is dismissed 
 in two lines. In the reprint of 1865, my book having 
 been published in the interval, these two lines are ex- 
 panded into two pages. In these newly interpolated 
 comments on this very bad case, the Duke of Argyll, 
 while engaged in concealing its worst points, charges " the 
 opponents of Lord Dalhousie" with " carefully concealing 
 some special circumstances affecting it."* 
 
 The first concealment of which the Duke of Argyll 
 complains is of the alleged circumstance that " Jhansi had 
 been erected into a Principality by ourselves, and was not 
 one of the old Independent States of India, "f Nobody ever 
 said it was an old Independent State. It was a dependent 
 and protected State ; it stood in a relation to us which 
 made its destruction especially disgraceful ; but it was 
 not " erected into a Principality by ourselves. Far from 
 concealing what had been said on this point, I fully ex- 
 posed Lord Dalhousie's unfounded assertion that Jhansi 
 " was held by a Chief under a very recent grant from the 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 31. t Hid., p. 31. 
 
22 CHAPTER III. 
 
 British Government as Sovereign/' and "under a grant 
 such as is issued from a Sovereign to a subject."* I did 
 not conceal what had been said. I showed that it was 
 not true. I showed that Jhansi w^as not held by a grant, but 
 by the Treaty of 1 8 1 7, renewing and confirming a Treaty of 
 "defensive alliance" made in 1804, when the Soobadar 
 was still under the nominal supremacy of the Peishwa. 
 The supremacy being transferred to the British Govern- 
 ment in 1817, was to be made real and definite. By the 
 new Treaty the possessions of the Soobadar are secured 
 "in perpetuity" to him, "his heirs and successors;" no 
 article or expression in it pretends to make a gift or a 
 grant to the actual ruler, the third of his family, who had 
 succeeded his grandfather in 1815, three years before the 
 new Treaty was proposed. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll adds that the Chief of Jhansi "was 
 not recognised as having a hereditary right before 1817." 
 This also is a mistake. He was the actual ruler of his 
 territories ; the Treaty made thirteen years before with 
 his predecessor was in full force ; no one had ever doubted 
 or disputed the hereditary nature of that power and dig- 
 nity which we had neither bestowed upon him nor upon 
 his ancestor, but which we acknowledged and confirmed 
 in the new Treaty. Perhaps the Marquis of Hastings, by 
 whom the Treaty of 1817 was negotiated, may be heard 
 on this subject. 
 
 ' ' I remained in the same camp, and received the young Sooba- 
 dar of Jhansi. As the title implies, the Chiefs of that territory 
 were only officers entrusted by the Peishwas with the temporary 
 command of the district ; but one of them, who was a man of 
 head as well as of courage, succeeded in making the Soobadar ship 
 hereditary in his family, maintaining in other respects towards the 
 Peishwa relations of fealty with some pecuniary payments. The 
 Soobadar is now our feudatory ."j- 
 
 * Jhansi Blue Book, p. 20, and 22 ; Empire in India, p. 205, 209. Lord 
 Dalhousie most unwarrantably took these words from a Minute by Lord Met- 
 calfe, who would have been the first to protest against such a gross misapplica- 
 tion of them. 
 
 t Lord Hastings' Private Journal, vol. ii, p. 235. This passage is quoted 
 by Mr. J. M. Ludlow, (Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India, p. 
 125) who has fully refuted all the sophisms repeated by the Duke of Argyll. 
 I suppose Mr. Ludlow is one of those " fifth-rate writers" whom his Grace has 
 never consulted. One would like to know the names of those " fifth-rate 
 writers" whose works the Duke has read. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO JHANSI. 23 
 
 The special circumstances recapitulated by the Duke 
 of Argyll, are the identical quibbles demolished by me 
 in detail. Mine was a deed of exposure not of conceal- 
 ment. All my information was derived from those Blue 
 Books upon which the Duke of Argyll professes to rely. 
 I certainly did not " state the facts," as the Duke re- 
 commends, " in the light in which they appeared" to 
 Lord Dalhousie, because I believed him to have viewed 
 them in a false light. 
 
 We now come to what the Duke of Argyll evidently 
 considers the worst of these acts of concealment. I agree 
 with him as to the offence, but I differ with him as to the 
 guilty party. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll asserts that in the dealings of the 
 British Government with Jhansi, " the right of adoption 
 had been set aside in practice ;" that in 1835, " the day 
 before he died, the Rajah adopted a son ; but the boy was 
 not recognised as his successor, being set aside in favour 
 of an uncle." He quotes, as a true description of the 
 events of 1835, Lord Dalhousie's words that " the previous 
 Rajah did adopt a boy, but the British Government did 
 not acknowledge the boy as successor, and it nomi- 
 nated another person to be Rajah."* He complains that 
 these important circumstances are carefully concealed by 
 the opponents of Lord Dalhousie. If they were true they 
 certainly would be important. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson makes the same statement in equally 
 positive terms. 
 
 " In 1835, Eao Earn Chund, the dependent Rajah of Jhansi, 
 died, leaving two uncles, and a boy adopted the day before his 
 death, without the permission of the British Government. The 
 Government of India, without inquiry into the fact of adoption, 
 and treating it as an immaterial circumstance, appointed the elder 
 of the two uncles Rajah."t 
 
 Following Lord Dalhousie, but not following the nar- 
 rative of facts contained in the Parliamentary Papers, 
 the two vindicators assume that in 1835 the Rajah of 
 Jhansi did undoubtedly adopt a son, and that on this 
 occasion the British Government refused to recognise the 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 31-2. 
 t A Vindication, p. 11. 
 
2-1 CHAPTER III. 
 
 adoption, and nominated another member of the family as 
 Rajah. The facts are really very different. 
 
 We have seen how eagerly Lord Dalhousie accepted an 
 imaginary chain of precedents offered to him for general 
 use. Sattara and Nagpore were annexed on the strength 
 of those precedents. To aid in the particular destruction 
 of the petty State of Jhansi he tried to extract a direct 
 precedent from its own annals. There was no such prece- 
 dent ; and he could only create the phantom by a perver- 
 sion of the facts before him. Even the Blue Book, which 
 the Duke of Argyll exhorts us to study, contains full 
 proof of that perversion ; and an ample demonstration of 
 it was given in my book, which, if he has not read, Sir 
 Charles Jackson quotes and censures. 
 
 After refuting the alleged constitution of the Principal- 
 ity under "a grant" from our Government, I remarked on 
 another part of Lord Dalhousie's Minute. 
 
 " The second error is of very much greater importance, and is 
 four times repeated : in the last sentence of paragraph 7 it is 
 said, ' In 1835 Rao Ramchund died. Although he had adopted 
 a boy as his successor the day before his death, the adoption was 
 not recognised ; and his uncle, Ragonath Rao, was declared 
 Rajah :'* again in paragraph 11, 'There is no need of and no 
 room for argument on this head. The historical facts on record 
 negative the Ranee's assertion conclusively ; for Rao Ramchund 
 did adopt a boy, but the British Government did not acknowledge 
 the boy as successor, and it nominated another person to be Rajah. 'f 
 In paragraph 12 it is stated that { previous adoption by a Rajah 
 whom the British Government constituted hereditary Chief of 
 Jhansi. was not acknowledged by the British Government. 3 And 
 in the last sentence of the same paragraph f the existence of a pre- 
 cedent' for refusing to sanction adoption, is asserted/'' J 
 
 Even if this representation were perfectly accurate, there 
 would be a precedent for preventing the succession of an 
 adopted son to the exclusion of collateral heirs, but 
 none for rejecting an adopted son to the exclusion of all 
 heirs, and with the object of fabricating a lapse. There 
 would be a precedent for protection and regulation, not 
 for appropriation. 
 
 Heally there was no precedent in the succession of 
 1835 for any action or interference whatever. It was 
 
 * Jhansi Blue Book, 1855, t /., p. 22. 
 % Empire in India, p. 211. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO JHANSI. 25 
 
 a precedent of inaction and non-interference. No adop- 
 tion was rejected, no nomination was made by our Govern- 
 ment. What occurred was as follows : 
 
 " There was a disputed succession in 1835 ; there were four 
 claimants. The fact of the adoption was denied by the adverse par- 
 ties. In the Note on Jhansi by the Secretary to Government, 
 the decision in 1835 is thus described.* ' On this occasion the 
 lawful heir by blood, descended of the body of Sheo Ram Bhow, 
 was recognised as successor to the Raj, to the disallowance of a 
 boy alleged to have been adopted, or nominated as successor by the 
 late Rajah the day before his death, who, if adopted, would have 
 been unquestionably the heir to any property of his adoptive 
 father to the exclusion of the uncle ; and this was done without 
 inquiry into the fact of adoption or nomination (which was doubt- 
 ful) as though it was an immaterial circumstance/ 
 
 " It is to be observed, therefore, that in 1835 the adoption or 
 nomination was doubtful ; in 1853 the adoption was not doubtful, 
 or in the slightest degree irregular or suspicious, but was effected 
 in strict accordance with Hindoo law, and in the presence of 
 British officers, and was officially reported to Government in 
 writing by the dying Rajah. There is no parallel here ; no pre- 
 cedent can be founded on the decision of 1835."f 
 
 Whatever were the merits of that decision, our Govern- 
 ment had no right to boast of it, or to profit by it in any way. 
 te The fact is, that the settlement of 1835 was not a decision of 
 our Government at all, but that of a certain party in the Jhansi 
 Durbar. The only decision at which our Government arrived was 
 the decision of not deciding, interposing, or even advising in the 
 dispute. The Political Agent was authorised to recognise Rago- 
 nath Rao, the deceased Rajah's uncle, who was in actual posses- 
 sion, but no opinion was given as to his right : and these qualifying 
 expressions were added, ' It being presumed that he is able to 
 establish his authority, and that his succession will be acknow- 
 ledged by disinterested parties at Jhansi. "J 
 
 I then pointed out that the successions to Jhansi in 1835, 
 and in the family of Holkar to the Indore State in 1834 
 both of them under Lord William Bentinck's adminis- 
 tration were sad instances of the neglect of our moral 
 duty as the de facto great protecting and pacificating 
 Power, and proved the truth of Sir George Clerk's reproach 
 that " the inconsistency, caprice, and mutability of our 
 opinions regarding all great principles, is the bane of our 
 
 * Jhansi Blue Book, p. 18. f Empire in India, p. 212. 
 
 t Jhansi Blue Book, p. 17. Empire in India, p. 213. 
 
26 CHAPTER III. 
 
 supremacy in India."* Our refusal to interfere in the 
 Holkar succession, which Lord William Bentinck declared 
 must be settled by " the general wish/' and " the voice of 
 the country/ 7 led to scenes of bloodshed and disorder that 
 at last compelled our armed intervention, but only for the 
 support of the party which had the upper hand for the 
 moment, and was in possession of the capital and Palace, f 
 
 There was another disputed succession at Jhansi in 1 838, 
 briefly mentioned in Lord Dalhousie's Minute, which ap- 
 peared to me to call for no special notice when I was dis- 
 cussing the subject. The Duke of Argyll does not refer to 
 it. Sir Charles Jackson brings it forward as another ex- 
 ample of the "ruling sanction" negatively enforced to ex- 
 clude an adopted son. He says : "On his" (Rajah Eago- 
 nath Rao's) "death without issue, in 1838, they" (the 
 British Government) "placed the younger uncle on the 
 throne, although the adopted son was still living, and as- 
 serted his claim. "J 
 
 Here at last we have an intervention, but it does not 
 help Sir Charles Jackson in the least. Warned in all 
 probability by the evil effects of its passive attitude to- 
 wards the struggle for succession in the Holkar family 
 at Indore in 1834, the British Government took upon it- 
 self to settle the second disputed inheritance at Jhansi in 
 1838, when there were again four claimants, after a 
 judicial inquiry conducted by a Commission. This settle- 
 ment was a legitimate assertion of the British preroga- 
 tive as the Paramount Power over its feudatory. The 
 same functions might most properly have been exercised 
 at Indore in 1834, and ought to be exercised on any 
 future occasion by the Imperial Power of India, where the 
 right of succession is doubtful or disputed, even though 
 the State concerned may not stand towards the British 
 Government in the position of a feudal dependent or tribu- 
 tary. Such an intervention is regulative and protective, 
 but involves no right or claim of confiscation. 
 
 The non-intervention of 1 835 was a neglect of protective 
 power; the intervention of 1838 was the rightful exer- 
 cise of protective power ; the intervention of 1853 was a 
 gross and greedy abuse of protective power. 
 
 * Empire in India, p. 217. 
 
 t Papers, Succession by Adoption, 1850, p. 70, 71, 75. % A Vindication,^. 11. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 A EEJ01NDER AS TO NAGPORE. 
 
 THE annexation of Nagpore was treated very fully by me 
 in the Empire in India. Neither of the two vindicators 
 venture to meet or to mention any of my arguments. 
 Yet Sir Charles Jackson professes to have seen my book, 
 and cites it more than once. In the original Edinburgh 
 Review article of 1863 the subject of Nagpore was dis- 
 missed in ten lines, as " a case which involved no disputed 
 question."* In the republication of 1865, my book having 
 appeared early in the previous year, these words are 
 omitted, and the brief paragraph is expanded into six 
 pages. How did the Duke of Argyll ascertain between 
 January 1863 and June 1865, that his first impression was 
 a mistaken one, and that the Nagpore question was open 
 to dispute after all ? Whose disputations induced these 
 after-thoughts ? Surely not mine, for the Duke calmly 
 reiterates the fictions and fallacies, blindly imbibed from 
 the Blue-Books, which I endeavoured to explode. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, pursuing, if he did not originate, the 
 unworthy and unstatesmanlike practice of depreciating our 
 own method and our own settlement, and turning British 
 protection into a precarious toleration, tried to degrade 
 the Nagpore State by representing it as the mere creature 
 of our free will and pleasure. He said that the Marquis 
 of Hastings, who was Governor General in 1818, had " set 
 up a boy whom he selected to be Rajah " that the British 
 Government had " bestowed the sovereignty upon the per- 
 son whom it thought best;" and that " the simple question 
 of determination was whether the sovereignty of Nagpore, 
 which ivas bestowed as a gift on a Goojur in 1818, shall 
 now be conferred upon somebody else, as a gift a second 
 time;" and he objected to " the gratuitous alienation a 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, January 1863, p. 17. 
 
28 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 second time of the State of Nay-pore"* I showed that the 
 late Rajah was the nearest of kin, when he was placed 
 on the throne in 1818; that it was a doubtful question 
 whether he was not the rightful heir in 1816, instead of 
 Appa Sahib, whose party we supported but whom we 
 afterwards deposed ; and it was therefore inaccurate to 
 speak lightly of him as " a boy selected to be Rajah," or 
 as "a person" upon whom" the sovereignty was bestowed.." 
 
 I quoted the words of Lord Hastings himself, who in a 
 letter addressed to the Court of Directors briefly describes 
 Appa Sahib's treachery and deposition, and observes that 
 the disturbed state of the country " made it expedient for 
 us to lose no time in establishing a new Government. 
 The members of the reigning family, and the principal 
 persons of the State, were consulted. They unanimously 
 recommended the nearest of blood in the Bhonsla (the 
 Rajah's) family, for the succession, and he was raised to 
 the musnud in the room of Appa Sahib, "j" I pointed out 
 that this was a great contrast to Lord Dalhousie's con- 
 temptuous assertions that Lord Hastings " set up a boy 
 whom he selected" and that he " conferred the gift under 
 the influence of no consideration whatever but his own free 
 will and pleasure! 'J 
 
 I also proved that whatever phrases as to the rights of 
 conquestacquired undoubtedly in Nagpore, but which 
 we chose, from motives of policy, to waive, and as to 
 "conferring" the territory on the young Rajah, might 
 have been used in despatches from and to the Governor 
 General in 1818, no process of gift, or transfer, was gone 
 through ; nor were any such terms introduced into the 
 Treaty of 1826, in the Preamble of which, on the contrary, 
 after referring to his predecessor's hostility and deposition, 
 the Rajah is declared to have "succeeded to the throne by 
 the favour of the British Government," and is required, 
 under Article Y, to confirm former cessions, which of 
 course could not have been required or permitted had he 
 received the Principality as a gift or new grant from the 
 
 * Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 23, 30. 
 
 f Report of Select Committee of House of Commons on the East India Com- 
 pany, 1833, Appendix, pp. 10-1. 
 
 \ Papers, Rajah of Berar, p. 28 ; Empire in India, p. 188. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORE. 29 
 
 conquerors. Sir Richard Jenkins, who was Resident during 
 the late Rajah's minority, quoting the Marquis of Hast- 
 ings' own words, had spoken of " the restoration of the 
 State of Nagpore to its rank as one of the substantive 
 Powers of India/' I proved, in short, from all the records 
 of the time, that the State of Nagpore was not conferred 
 as a grant or gift on the late Rajah, that no new Princi- 
 pality was created in his favour by the British Govern- 
 ment, but that by its forbearance and favour he succeeded 
 to the throne of his ancestors. 
 
 Yet the Duke of Argyll feels himself justified in repeat- 
 ing that the British Government in 1818 "selected an 
 infant boy who was son of a daughter of the second Rajah;" 
 and quotes with approval Lord Dalhousie's protest against 
 " the gratuitous alienation of the State of Nagpore, for 
 the second time."* 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson also quotes the assertion that " the 
 sovereignty of Nagpore was bestowed as a gift upon a 
 Goojur by the British Government in 1818."t 
 
 Lord Dalhousie thus describes the Nagpore annexation, 
 in his Farewell Minute of 1856, reviewing his own admi- 
 nistration : 
 
 " The Kingdom of Nagpore became British territory by simple 
 lapse, in the absence of all legal heirs. The Kingdom which had 
 been granted to the reigning Kajah by the British Government, 
 when it had become forfeited by the treachery of Appah Sahib, 
 was left without a claimant when the Rajah died. No son had 
 been born to his Highness ; none was adopted by him ; none, as 
 they have themselves admitted, was adopted at the Rajah's death, 
 by the Ranees his widows. "J 
 
 In the ten lines allotted to this case in the Review ar- 
 ticle of 1863, the Duke of Argyll quotes this passage, 
 omitting, however, the important words which I have 
 placed in italics. It would have been well if they had 
 been omitted from the original document. The passage 
 disappears altogether from the enlarged and revised pub- 
 lication of 1865. It was well discarded. 
 
 " The Kingdom of Nagpore," it is said, " was left with- 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 34 and 37. 
 t A Vindication, p. 17. 
 
 t Papers, Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, dated February 28th, 1856, 
 No. 245 of 1856. 
 
30 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 out a claimant" When these words were penned by 
 Lord Dalhousie, a very little reflection and research would 
 have reminded him that Mr. Mansel, the Resident at 
 Nagpore, in a despatch dated 14th December, 1853, three 
 days after the Rajah's death, gave his opinion upon the 
 respective standing and qualifications of each one of the 
 late Sovereign's family who might be considered as "a 
 pretender to the throne"* I cannot see much difference 
 between a "pretender" and a "claimant." The Rajah's 
 nearest male relatives, according to Mr. Mansel's report, 
 were two grand nephews, one grand nephew of his prede- 
 cessor, Raghojee the Second descendants in the female 
 line, but all eligible for adoption, according to Hindoo law 
 and family custom and a nephew, sister's son, who was 
 married, and therefore incapable of being adopted. From 
 among these Mr. Mansel recommended the elder of the 
 deceased Rajah's own grand nephews, as "the most favour- 
 able selection" for the throne, describing him as well edu- 
 cated in the Mahratta style, " amiable in disposition, and 
 sensible, not apparently possessing brilliant talent, but 
 tractable, "f 
 
 Yet Lord Dalhousie did not hesitate to say that " the 
 Kingdom of Nagpore was left without a claimant "; and, 
 in spite of the evident contradictions to it contained in 
 those Blue Books which the Duke of Argyll professes to 
 have studied, his Grace did not hesitate to repeat that 
 statement in the Edinburgh Review. Having pointedly 
 referred to the principal claimant in his revised reprint of 
 1865, the Duke could hardly retain in the text this abso- 
 lute denial of his existence, and the whole passage is there- 
 fore judiciously left out. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's apologists may now say on his behalf, 
 that though, strictly speaking, it may have been a slight 
 overstatement to declare that there was no claimant of the 
 throne, there actually was no person entitled to the throne, 
 until duly adopted ; and that no adoption was effected or 
 even proposed. This, in fact, was asserted by Lord Dal- 
 housie in the passage from his Farewell Minute now under 
 consideration. " No son," he says, " had been born to his 
 
 * Paragraphs 33, 34, 36 of the despatch ; Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1864, p. 20. 
 t Ibid., 1854, p. 20. 
 

 A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORE. 31 
 
 Highness ; none was adopted by him ; none, as they have 
 themselves admitted, was adopted at the Rajah's death by 
 the Ranees, his widows." These words "as they have 
 themselves admitted" seem to have been a little too 
 strong for the Duke's digestion, even in 1863, for they are 
 expunged from the extract as given in the Edinburgh Re- 
 view. The statement is, indeed, almost unparalleled for 
 heedless inaccuracy. 
 
 Instead of the Ranees having "admitted" that no adop- 
 tion had taken place, they never ceased, up to the hour of 
 Lord Dalhousie's departure from Calcutta, to urge upon 
 the British authorities, so far as they dared, and to the 
 best of their means and ability, the claims of their adopted 
 son. 
 
 In his demi-official letter, written a few hours after the 
 Rajah's death, on the llth December, 1853, Mr. Mansel, 
 the Resident, wrote, "The immediate people of the Court, 
 and officials of Government, of course desire adoption, but 
 I have given no special encouragement to the wish."* 
 
 In his formal despatch of three days later, while de- 
 scribing the several "pretenders to the throne," as quoted 
 above, he said that " Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao, the son of 
 Nana Aher Rao, and grandson of the late Rajah's sister, 
 would decidedly be preferred by the mass of the courtiers 
 to any other youth for the Musnud, whether given to him 
 by adoption, or by grant from the Company."-)' I may 
 here mention that this grandnephew of the late Rajah, 
 Yeshwunt Rao, then more usually called Appa Sahib, is 
 the same Janojee Bhonsla, so named by virtue of his 
 adoption, who is now recognised by our Government as 
 the head of the family, to whom the ancestral landed 
 property was restored, with the titles of Rajah and Baha- 
 door, by Lord Canning in 1860, " in recognition of the 
 loyal conduct of the family during the rebellion, and of 
 the faithful attachment of the late Banka Baee to the 
 British Government." J 
 
 In a subsequent letter, dated the 14th April, 1854, Mr. 
 Mansel explained that "the family of the late Rajah would 
 
 * Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 56. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 1854, p. 20. 
 
 % Calcutta GazeMe, April 14th, 1860. 
 
32 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 prefer to retain the actual musrmd in the hands of some 
 heir selected by adoption/'* 
 
 The Duke of Argyll expresses some surprise that "since, 
 as a matter of fact, not even the plea of adoption could be 
 urged in this case, Lord Dalhousie entered into a long 
 and perhaps needless argument on the petition of the 
 ividoivs""\ 
 
 That long argument, to which he frequently reverted, 
 was needless indeed and utterly futile as the Duke him- 
 self perceives if the Ranees had no right to adopt. Why 
 did the Governor General, in the face of Mr. Mansel's 
 assurances that all the Court desired an adoption, and his 
 indication of the exact person they would prefer, resort to 
 unfounded surmises as to jealousies among the Ranees 
 disinclining them to adopt a successor to the throne ? Of 
 what consequence were these imaginary jealousies, except 
 for the purpose of silencing Lord Dalhousie's own misgiv- 
 ings ? It is as plain as possible that Lord Dalhousie was 
 very doubtful of his right to prevent the succession of an 
 adopted heir, and therefore tried very hard to persuade 
 himself that the Ranees were so blind to their own inte- 
 rests as not to wish to maintain the sovereignty. 
 
 "It is unnecessary," he says, "to enter into any discus- 
 sion," whether the widow is authorised to adopt. " There 
 is no ground for any such discussion. The widow has made 
 no attempt nor any proposal to adopt." J And then he 
 proceeds to build up his theory as to the widows' jealousies 
 and aversion to adopt an heir. 
 
 No reasons whatever can be gathered from the Blue 
 Books, or from any other sources, to lead us to suppose 
 that there ever was the slightest difference of opinion 
 or jealousy among the Ranees ; that there ever was 
 the least doubt or question among them as to their right 
 to adopt, as to the advisability of adoption, or as to 
 the person to be adopted. Their only doubt was whether 
 the Rajah's elder grandnephew, whom they considered best 
 entitled to the throne, would be the candidate most accept- 
 able to the British Government, with whose overwhelming 
 
 * Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 5. 
 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 37. 
 
 j Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 24. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORE. 33 
 
 power they were well acquainted, and whose protecting 
 and regulating prerogative they cheerfully acknowledged. 
 They expected some communication to be made to them 
 by the Governor-General. Fully aware of all the details 
 of recent claims to succession, the Bhonsla family knew 
 that in 1838 an adopted son had been set aside at Jhansi 
 in favour of an elder relative ; they knew that at Indore 
 in 1844 one adopted son had been rejected in favour of 
 another. They determined therefore not to endanger the 
 succession of the rightful heir by any precipitate step. 
 This appears clearly enough from Mr. Hansel's despatches. 
 In that one written three days after the Rajah's death, 
 dated 14th December, 1853, he reports having paid a visit 
 of condolence to the Ranees, when the senior lady, the 
 Banka Baee, let fall " occasional expressions of hope that 
 the interests of the Bhonsla family would continue to be 
 interwoven with the Berar Kingdom."* 
 
 In the letter of the 14th April, 1854, containing his 
 remarks on the several "pretenders to the throne," Mr. 
 Mansel writes as follows : 
 
 " In my communications with the late Durbar Vakeel, I was 
 led to suppose at first that I should receive a formal representa- 
 tion from the Banka Baee and the eldest widow of the late Rajah, 
 Anpoorna Baee, on the subject of their claims to adopt an heir to the 
 musnud, they and their immediate advisers treating it as hard that 
 their case should be finally disposed of without further formal 
 communication with them. Partly, I apprehend, from their own 
 helplessness, sand partly from the disinclination of the most intelli- 
 gent parties about the Court to engage in a course that might be 
 deemed hostile or held offensive to the British representative, the 
 ladies and other near relatives of the late Eajah have not taken, 
 so far as I can learn, any effective step to appeal in Calcutta or 
 England against the orders executed by me, nor has any formal 
 representation on paper been submitted to myself."f 
 
 Helpless they were indeed ! The Resident, we may be 
 sure, did not overestimate their dread of evincing hostility 
 and giving offence. Colonel Low (now General Sir John 
 Low, K.C.B.), the only Member of the Supreme Council 
 who at that time had any experience of characters and 
 customs at Native Courts, and who firmly opposed the 
 annexation, with singular accuracy divined and described 
 
 * Tapers, ttajah of Berar, 1854, p. 14. f Further Papers, Berar, 1850. p. 5. 
 
 D 
 
34 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 the state of affairs and of feeling at Nagpore on the sub- 
 ject of adoption. The Ranees and their advisers, having 
 signified their wishes to the British Resident, waited 
 patiently for some inquiry or reference from the Supreme 
 Government. 
 
 "They were naturally deterred," wrote Sir John Low, 
 "from making any attempt of the kind" openly adopt- 
 ing a son " when they saw the British Resident at once 
 take possession of the Government, and order the British 
 troops to be in readiness for any emergency that might 
 occur."* At the same time, while these measures, taken 
 by the Resident, in pursuance of strict orders from Cal- 
 cutta, overawed the ladies at the very time when prompt 
 action was all important, his kind, considerate, and con- 
 solatory manner and expressions, and his evident desire to 
 maintain their dignity, to preserve their wealth, and to 
 secure them a splendid income, "perfectly well surmised 
 by the Bhonsla family," as Lord Dalhousie complained, t 
 still more tended to confirm the Ranees as to the prudence 
 and propriety of trusting to his good offices, and to the 
 friendship of the Honourable Company. 
 
 Not until Mr. Mansel was removed from Nagpore, 
 notoriously in consequence of his representations in their 
 favour, did the Ranees suddenly awake to the exigen- 
 cies of their position, and enter upon a course of appeal 
 and remonstrance. 
 
 Almost driven to despair, they began to suspect that 
 Mr. Mansel had betrayed them into the loss of so much 
 valuable time. In the first memorial directly addressed 
 to the Governor-General, the Ba.nka Baee states that on 
 the Rajah's death she had made many " communications 
 both in person and by agents to Mr. Mansel, the Resident, 
 with respect to the treaties of friendship and alliance, 
 whereupon that officer gave us, according to the powers 
 vested in him by the Honourable Company, every assu- 
 rance of the realisation of our wish." She explains that 
 she had remonstrated against the letter from Government, 
 read to the Ranees by the Resident on March 14th, 1854, 
 declaring that "as there was no heir to succeed to the 
 
 * Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 48. f Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 9. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORE. 35 
 
 guddee" (throne) " Government had annexed the State to 
 the British territories." Upon this, she proceeds, " with 
 reference to the powers vested in the Resident by your 
 Lordship, I communicated to him a second time through 
 my officers, all my sentiments, whereupon he set my mind 
 at ease by assuring me that he would in the course of 
 three months, procure me favourable orders from your 
 Lordship." Instead of any favourable orders, on July 
 15th, 1854, two days before this memorial was written, 
 the Resident's Assistant had come to the Palace and in- 
 formed the Ranees that they were to be pensioned, and 
 that, with the exception of " a small portion of the gems 
 and other articles," all the family property would be "seized 
 on behalf of Government." Against these proceedings the 
 aged Ranee protests, especially against "a departure from 
 treaties," and concludes by begging the Governor-General, 
 "with reference to the ties of friendship subsisting from 
 of old between the two Governments, to continue the 
 guddee of this State in this family."* 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, in his Minute on this first direct com- 
 munication from the Ranees, exults over " the marked 
 absence of any allegation that an heir was appointed to 
 the guddee of Nagpore." "She does not," he adds, " so 
 much as attempt to name, or even to affirm the existence 
 of any heir to the guddee ""\ 
 
 This exultation was not very well founded, considering 
 that the letter in question contains a protest against the 
 decree "that there was no heir to succeed to the guddee" 
 appeals to the treaties, and requests that the guddee may 
 be continued "in the family." Still it is true that the heir 
 is not named, but obviously from the same motives that 
 had actuated the Bhonsla family from the first. She wishes 
 some inquiry or proposal to be made by the Governor- 
 General. Had the Ranees been amenable to the advice 
 and influence of any person of strong character and courage, 
 and great courage would have been required to brave 
 the British representative, they would have publicly in- 
 stalled their adopted son at a very early period, and then 
 have applied for the sanction and recognition of the Gover- 
 
 * Farther Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 14. f Ibid., 1856, p. 15. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 CHAPTER IV 
 
 nor-General. But they were ignorant and timid women ; 
 there was more than one pretender; and any contumacious 
 conduct on their part might, according to their apprehen- 
 sions, destroy the chance of their candidate, perhaps ensure 
 his banishment. Immediately on Mr. Mansel's departure 
 from Nagpore, however, they had concluded their plans 
 for delegating agents, both to Calcutta and to London, to 
 appeal against the extinction of the family and Princi- 
 pality ; and within two or three days of Lord Dalhousie's 
 unfavourable reply to this first memorial being despatched, 
 after nearly four months' delay, he must have received 
 another, from Hunwunt Rao, the accredited agent of the 
 Ranees, dated 16th September, 1854, declaring that "there 
 are rightful heirs to the guddee and territory of Nagpore" 
 that "there are rightful heirs of the late Maharaja, and 
 successors to the Raj or Kingdom, entitled to succeed 
 thereto, both according to the customs of the family and 
 the Hindoo law" and that "the Maharanee has always 
 been and expressed herself to be willing and prepared to 
 take into adoption any one of such heirs and successors as 
 may be agreeable to her, on such just and reasonable terms 
 and stipulations as she may be advised to do by your Lord- 
 ship" The agent concluded by stating that he was "fur- 
 nished with full information regarding the affairs that 
 have been transacted, and the events that have transpired 
 subsequent to the demise of the late Maharaja," and that 
 he was prepared "to submit such information, either per- 
 sonally or by letter," as might be directed.* 
 
 The Governor-General wanted no further information. 
 He had satisfied himself, in spite of Mr. Mansel's letters, 
 that there was not even a "claimant" of the throne, and 
 that the Ranees were absolutely averse to an adoption. 
 He refused to receive any appeal from an agent, and in a 
 letter dated 29th September, 1854, referred the Ranees to 
 the Commissioner, "to whom they can address themselves, 
 and personally communicate with him at all times, "t But 
 on the 6th October the Commissioner, after reporting the 
 departure of several agents deputed by the Ranees to in- 
 tercede on their behalf, declares that he has refused to be 
 
 * Further Papers, Bemr, 1856, p. 17. t Ibid., 1856, p. 22. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORK 37 
 
 "the medium of communication on the subject," and that 
 he has "distinctly explained on every occasion that no 
 officer in the service of the British Government could pre- 
 sume to address the Governor-General on a matter which 
 had been finally disposed of after the most mature con- 
 sideration."* 
 
 Another agent having been sent to Calcutta to complain 
 of this total denial of a hearing, the Commissioner was de- 
 sired on the 8th December, 1854, to forward any petitions 
 the Ranees might wish to address to Government, f This 
 gives a glimpse behind the scenes into the system of ob- 
 struction and intimidation by which the Ranees' natural 
 disabilities and apprehensions were enhanced, and the full 
 statement of their case kept back from the Government 
 for an entire year. 
 
 Unfortunately Mr. Mansel, though well-disposed to- 
 wards Native States in general, so far succumbed to the 
 political heresy of the day, recently enforced at Sattara, 
 as to disparage the rights of an adopted heir ; he recom- 
 mended that the State of Nagpore should for the present 
 be "preserved in feudal chieftainship" under the Banka 
 Baee, the grandmother of the deceased Rajah, (who had 
 been Regent during her grandson's minority, and who for 
 upwards of fifty years had exercised a dominant influence 
 both in domestic and public affairs), and that Yeshwunt 
 Rao Aher Rao, now Janojee Bhonsla, should be "trained 
 up to succeed her."J And he seems to have been at first 
 animated with some confidence that this middle course 
 would be cordially accepted at Calcutta. Thus fixing his 
 mind on what he caUed "a new form to be given to native 
 power," "an experiment for reconciling the interests of 
 the people, the claims of the Bhonsla family, and the duties 
 of Great Britain," he lost sight of the inherent right of 
 Janojee Bhonsla to be adopted. His right was not absolute 
 against all other claimants eligible for adoption, but it was 
 absolute against the claim of "lapse" in default of all heirs, 
 set up by Lord Dalhousie ; it was infinitely stronger than 
 that of any other relative of the deceased Rajah ; and 
 
 * Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 27. f Hid., 1856, p. 24. 
 % Papers, liajah of Berar, 1854, p. 20. 
 
38 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 the adoption of some one of those relatives was obligatory 
 on the widow, both by Hindoo law and family custom. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson says : "The Rajah of Nagpore left 
 no heir in the male line, and no other heir could inherit;" 
 and in a note to this passage refers us to "Sir Richard 
 Jenkins' Report on Nagpore, in which he states the prin- 
 ciples regulating the succession to the throne. He says, 
 'It is hereditary in the entire male line from the common 
 ancestor or first founder of the dynasty, to the exclusion 
 of females or their issue.'"* 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson is quite right in his quotation so 
 far as he goes. Why does he not go a little farther and 
 quote a little more ? Sir Richard Jenkins gives the 
 above as "the fundamental maxim," but he adds, " Another 
 maxim generally acknowledged is, that on the death of a 
 Rajah leaving no male heir, it is the privilege of his prin- 
 cipal widow to adopt a child from the relations of her hus- 
 band to succeed him, and herself to govern in his name."f 
 Wherever Sir Charles Jackson found the words which 
 form his garbled quotation he could have found the re- 
 maining words, and I can imagine no excuse for their sup- 
 pression. Lord Dalhousie gave the whole passage fairly 
 enough, J but then his argument was, as we have seen, 
 that the widow was averse to an adoption. 
 
 The most remarkable part of Sir Richard Jenkins' tes- 
 timony is that after laying down these fundamental 
 maxims he proceeds to declare the rule that had been ob- 
 served in seating the Rajah, then a minor, on the throne, 
 and that should be observed in choosing his successor from 
 the female line, in case he should die without leaving a son. 
 That rule was "to choose the nearest male descendant of 
 the last Rajah who had any." According to that rule the 
 late Rajah's grand-nephew, the great-grandson of Rughojee 
 the Second's daughter, and that Rajah's "nearest male de- 
 scendant," was actually adopted as a son, on the death of 
 his grand-uncle. 
 
 Partly owing to the Ranees' overstrained submission, 
 partly to Mr. Hansel's imperfect appreciation of his natural 
 
 * A Vindication, p. 15. f During the minority only. 
 
 Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 23. Report on Nagpore, 1827, p. 146. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPOKE. 39 
 
 and acquired rights by birth and expectations, no serious 
 discussion of Janojee Bhonsla's claim took place in the 
 Supreme Council before the annexation. In order fully 
 to supply deficiencies, we must now for the first time in this 
 critical inquiry travel out of the Blue Books, which, how- 
 ever, contain ample information on this subject, already 
 quoted, to prove to the Duke of Argyll, who professes to 
 have studied them, that the Rajah's elder grand-nephew, 
 the principal "pretender to the throne," was not ade- 
 quately or ingenuously described by Lord Dalhousie as 
 "a Mahratta youth," or as "a stranger." The facts re- 
 lated in the following extract were not derived from any 
 occult source, nor from unpublished official records, but 
 are such as might have been gathered by any one in ordi- 
 nary conversation from well-informed people at Nagpore ; 
 and their truth can still be confirmed by hundreds of living 
 persons, including many English officers. 
 
 " According to a family custom, applicable only to the lineal des- 
 cendants of the Rajahs, his" (Janojee Bhonsla's) (f mother, Myna 
 Baee, the late Rajah's niece, and great-granddaughter of Raghojee 
 the 2nd, came to reside in the Palace a short time before her con- 
 finement, and was there delivered of a son on August 14th, 1834. On 
 his birth being announced, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired in 
 the public square of the Palace, and a feu de joie was fired by the 
 Rajah's Artillery and Infantry. And on the 25th of the same month 
 the principal Chiefs and Ministers of the Court visited the Resident 
 on the part of the Rajah, for the purpose of distributing sugar on 
 the occasion.* At the birth of no other person now living in 
 Nagpore were such honours paid, or such a communication made 
 to the British Resident. This boy was brought up entirely as a 
 child of the Palace, in which he much more usually resided than 
 in his own father's house. Wherever he went, ten or twelve of 
 the Mahratta and Mussulman Maunkurrees (hereditary officers of 
 rank and family) were appointed to attend upon him ; spearmen 
 and other servants, horses and elephants from the Rajah's estab- 
 lishment, were detailed for his service and retinue. Directions 
 regarding his education and companions were always given by the 
 Rajah himself. As he grew older, he accompanied the Rajah on 
 all his progresses through the country, and sat by his side on pub- 
 lic occasions in durbar and on his visits to the 'Resident. The 
 
 * Sugar is sent to relatives and intimate friends by a Hindoo father when a 
 son is born in his house. On this occasion it clearly signified the birth of an 
 heir-presumptive to the Rajah, whose health was frequently very delicate at 
 this period, and who had been married for three years without issue. 
 
40 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Raj all would not permit his marriage to take place, a ceremony 
 which among the Nagpore Mahrattas is usually celebrated at a 
 very early age, but the conclusion of which precludes subsequent 
 adoption, in a few words, as year by year the prospects of the 
 Rajah having legitimate offspring appeared to diminish, all the 
 family and followers of the Court became accustomed to look 
 upon Appa Sahib as the destined successor to the nmsnud."* 
 
 The real circumstances that followed the death of the 
 late Maharajah were thus described by me : 
 
 " Appa Sahib was at once summoned by the Banka Baee and 
 by Anpoorna Baee, the senior widow ; and at the request of both 
 these Ranees, his father Nana Aher Rao, and his mother Myna 
 Baee, formally, and in presence of all the assembled relatives, 
 consented to resign him to Anpoorna Baee. The Banka Baee 
 proposed that until the orders of the Supreme Government were 
 received, the public ceremony of giving a new name to the young 
 Rajah, and the usual procession and installation, should not take 
 place ; and while this question was being debated in the family 
 circle, the information that the Resident had ordered seals to be 
 put on the Treasury and Jewel Office, and had otherwise taken 
 measures for exercising all authority in his own person, decided 
 it in favour of the Banka Baee's consistently submissive policy. 
 The Baee said at that time, and on many subsequent occasions, 
 that she had already seen the affairs of the Nagpore State settled 
 several times by orders from Calcutta, and that she had no doubt 
 they would be settled once more on the old terms. "f 
 
 tf The ceremonies of adoption were then duly performed in the 
 Palace, and the funeral rites were celebrated by Appa Sahib, who 
 subsequently received the name of Janojee Bhonsla/'J 
 
 The name of the person who had officiated as a son at 
 the Rajah's cremation, and at the solemn filial obsequies 
 called kriya karm, was of course known to the Resident, 
 as it was to all Nagpore ; but he considered it sufficient 
 to report in his first demi-official letter to the Governor- 
 General that "the funeral pile was to be fired by the 
 ordinary relations of the deceased. " Even this not very 
 explicit account is absent from the subsequent formal 
 despatches. We have already seen why the Ranees them- 
 selves made no direct notification. 
 
 But, it may be asked, if the Bhonsla family really wished 
 and expected instructions to be sent by the British 
 
 * Empire in India, p. 176, 178. f Hid., p. 178. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 175. Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 56. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAG POKE. 41 
 
 Government as to the vacant throne, why did they take 
 the irrevocable step of adopting their own candidate ? 
 The adoption was effected on the grounds of religion and 
 custom, though no doubt it was supposed to strengthen 
 the claim of the heir whom all preferred, and whom 
 the Rajah was known to have chosen. It would be the 
 greatest mistake to imagine, I have always disputed the 
 notion, that, either in the Hindoo or the Mussulman 
 States of India, a rigorous, well-defined rule of succession 
 has ever been so clearly laid down, and so universally 
 accepted that there never was any ground for doubt or 
 contention. There are no real precedents for the lapse or 
 escheat of a Hindoo sovereignty, but there are many 
 precedents for every variety of irregular succession, even 
 for that of females. Adopted sons had been recently set 
 aside, and, as we have seen, apparently with the approval 
 of the British Government, at Jhansi and Indore. For 
 all that the Ranees and their advisers knew, the Governor- 
 General might prefer on this occasion to enthrone the 
 Rajah's nephew, on the ground of his consanguinity and 
 mature age ; or the plan might be carried out, which they 
 knew had been recommended by the Resident,* whose 
 influence always seemed to them unbounded of entrust- 
 ing the government for some years to the venerable Banka 
 Baee, whom all regarded as the good genius of the family 
 and State. 
 
 And although when the Minute of the 28th January, 
 1854, was recorded, the adoption of Janojee Bhonsla was 
 still a private affair, Lord Dalhousie knew at that time 
 from Mr. Mansel's despatches that an adoption was desired 
 by the family, and that the Rajah's elder grand-nephew was 
 a " pretender to the throne/' and would be " decidedly pre- 
 ferred" for the musnud. Notwithstanding all this, his 
 Lordship devotes two lengthy paragraphs, occupying two 
 Blue Book folio pages, to an array of contradictory infer- 
 ences and unfounded surmises proving that the Ranees 
 must be averse to adoption ; repeatedly declares that the 
 Rajah has left "no heir whatever;""^ and in his second 
 
 * A secret of this sort, if it was intended to be a secret, is never kept from 
 those interested. t Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 22, 23, 26. 
 
42 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Minute, in reply to Colonel Low, asserts that there is 
 "no natural heir"* And three times in the same words 
 he objects to "the gratuitous alienation of the State of 
 Nagpore in favour of a Mahratta youth"^ 
 
 But when in his Farewell Minute of 2 8th February, 1856, 
 Lord Dalhousie improved upon these phrases of studied 
 disparagement, and tried to force down Janojee Bhonsla 
 into deeper oblivion, by saying that the throne was " left 
 without a claimant" and that " the British Government 
 refused to bestow the territory in free gift upon a stranger "+ 
 I am afraid he knew all about Janojee Bhonsla's claim, 
 and his alleged position by birth and adoption. He had 
 then received from the Ranees, and had answered, at 
 least one letter in which Appa Sahib was named as their 
 adopted son and lawful heir of the deceased Rajah. One 
 small point of verbal exculpation may be reserved in his 
 favour. He may, perhaps, have doubted whether Appa 
 Sahib was adopted on the very day of the Rajah's death. 
 But with this minute exception, scarcely rising above a 
 quibble, I can see no possible excuse for those rash and 
 extravagant assertions that there was " no claimant" and 
 that "no son, as they have themselves admitted, was 
 adopted at the Rajah's death by the Ranees his widows. " 
 Far from having admitted that negative proposition, they 
 were, that very moment, pressing its contradictory affirm- 
 ative upon the attention of Government by all the means 
 in their power. Many months before Lord Dalhousie's 
 departure, the Ranees had gained courage from despair ; 
 and when that Farewell Minute of the 28th February, 
 1856, was written, their agents in London had been 
 
 * Ibid., p. 55. In the same way, referring to the Carnatic succession, 
 where, the family being Mahometan, no adoption was necessary he says, 
 "the Nawab left no male heir" (Minute of February 28th, 1856, para. 43, p. 
 11) when all that ought to have been said was that he left no lineal male de- 
 scendant ; for he left a paternal uncle, (the son and brother of successive reign- 
 ing Princes,) a male heir both according to Mahomedan and English law. Mr. 
 J. M. Ludlow has well shown how in the Sattara and Jhansi cases also, Lord 
 Dalhousie fell into this blunder, turning "heirs and successors" into "lineal 
 heirs," or " heirs of the body," treating the words " successors" as surplusage, 
 and construing " heirs" as "issue." (Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown, p. 
 120, 140, to 144.) 
 
 t Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 23, 26, 30. 
 
 % Minute of the Marquis of Dalhousie, 1856, p. 7. 
 
 Ibid., 1856, para. 14, p. 7. 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORE. 43 
 
 engaged for nearly a year in addressing petitions to the 
 Court of Directors and the Board of Control.* Copies of 
 these petitions must of course have been immediately 
 furnished to the Governor-General for his information. 
 The agents also write to the Ranees on the 1 Oth October, 
 1855, that being desired by the home authorities to 
 transmit what they have to say through the proper 
 channel, they have already forwarded three petitions 
 through the Commissioner of Nagpore to Lord Dalhousie.t 
 What the contents of these petitions were we learn from 
 Mr. Ludlow, who had seen them at the office of the India 
 Reform Society. In the first of these, dated the 18th 
 April, 1855, it is asserted that "the late Prince had long 
 intended to adopt one of his near kinsmen, by name 
 Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao," otherwise called Appa Sahib, 
 and now Janojee Bhonsla. It is asserted that " imme- 
 diately on the Maharajah's decease the Maharanees made 
 known their lord's wishes to Mr. Mansel, the Resident, 
 and that gentleman assured the Maharanees that he would 
 make known their wishes to the Governor-General for the 
 aforesaid Yeshwunt Rao being placed on the throne." 
 And, as we have seen, this is exactly what Mr. Mansel 
 did.J It is said that the ladies, satisfied with this assu- 
 rance, " were content to postpone the completion of such 
 ceremony," and " with the concurrence of the Resident 
 allowed Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao to perform the necessary- 
 funeral solemnities. " 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson expresses his belief that the Ranees 
 did not adopt Appa Sahib until " after the decision of 
 Government in favour of annexation," and that they then 
 " antedated his adoption."j| If it were so, Janojee Bhonsla's 
 right to the succession under the Treaty, as the " heir 
 and successor" of the Rajah would not be weakened. 
 Neither Hindoo law, nor the customs and precedents of 
 the Bhonsla family, prescribe any limited number of days, 
 after which an adoption would not be valid or effective. 
 If it were as Sir Charles Jackson believes, all that could 
 
 * Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 54 ; Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown, 
 by J. M. Ludlow, Esq., p. 151, 153. f Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 54. 
 t Ante, p. 31, 37. Thoughts onthe Policy of the Crown, p. 152. 
 
 || A Vindication, p. 23, note. 
 
44 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 be said would be that the Ranees having waited a reason- 
 able time, under the instructions of the British Resident, 
 for the initiative to be taken by the Protecting Power, 
 adopted the Rajah's natural and intended heir, when 
 the bad intentions of the Protecting Power could be no 
 longer mistaken. 
 
 In the book which Sir Charles Jackson has quoted, I 
 related the story of the Bhonsla's ancestral estates, situ- 
 ated beyond the limits of the Nagpore territory, their 
 hasty sequestration on the Rajah's death, their subsequent 
 restoration to the widow, and their ultimate assignment 
 to the adopted son. 
 
 " The estates remained in the -widow's possession until 1860, 
 when Lord Canning having, as a partial and very imperfect re- 
 paration to the Bhonslas, recognised Janojee Bhonsla as the head 
 of the family, the lands were transferred to him, with the rem- 
 nants of the private moveable property that had escaped Lord 
 Dalhousie's auctions."* 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson, alluding obscurely to this trans- 
 action, says : " The report of the Resident, who was in 
 communication with the Ranees after the Rajah's death, 
 and a petition of the Banka Baee's, were conclusive, and 
 Lord Canning refused to acknowledge Appa Sahib as the 
 adopted son of the Raj all" "\ This point was met and 
 fully treated by me, but Sir Charles Jackson makes no 
 reference to the following remarks. 
 
 " In the notification of his title of Rajah Bahadur of Deoor, in 
 the Calcutta Gazette, Lord Canning, certainly with no intention 
 of insult, described the grandnephew and adopted son of our 
 faithful Ally as ( the adopted son of the widow of the late Ruler 
 of Nagpore,' an impossible relationship according to the Hindoo 
 law, a solecism in legal phraseology, and colloquially in India a 
 contemptuous and offensive designation. J Of course the object 
 was to avoid the appearance of acknowledging Janojee Bhonsla's 
 direct heirship to the late Rajah. But the evasion is as ineffectual 
 as the mode of expression was ungracious. The Government 
 
 * Empire in India,p. 244. f A Vindication, p. 23 (note.) 
 
 J The notification runs as follows : " No. 1.115 : Camp Hoshiarpoor, March 
 30th, 1860: His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has been 
 pleased to confer on Janojee Bhonsla, the adopted son of the widow of the late 
 Ruler of Nagpore, the title of ' Raja Bahadur of Deoor,' in the district of Sat- 
 tara, in recognition of the loyal conduct of the family during the rebellion, and 
 of the faithful attachment of the late Banka Baee to the British Government." 
 
A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORE. 45 
 
 having recognised this young Prince as the head of the Bhonsla 
 family, and having at last permitted him to succeed to the ancient 
 estates, it was useless to call him ' the widow's son' with no os- 
 tensible father. If he be correctly described as f the adopted son 
 of the widow of the late Euler of Nagpore,' then he is the son of 
 the late Euler also, unless we are to assail the honour of this lady, 
 and that without any great refinement or subtlety of allusion. By 
 the Hindoo law the ceremony of adoption severs the relationship 
 between Janojee and his ' natural father,' the widow's late hus- 
 band taking the place of the latter. An unmarried woman can- 
 not adopt a son, nor can any woman but a widow ; and the child 
 is not adopted to remove the reproach of barrenness from her, but 
 its spiritual evils from her deceased husband. Vasishtha says : 
 ' A son given is the child not of his adoptive mother, but of his 
 adoptive father.' (Colebrooke's Digest, vol. iii, p. 254.) The 
 adopted son of the Rajah's widow is, by Hindoo law, either the 
 Rajah's son and heir, or else he represents the most degrading 
 species of illegitimacy, which would completely disqualify him 
 from succeeding to the family estates, and which most certainly 
 Lord Canning never intended to impute to Rajah Janojee Bhonsla. 
 There stands the dilemma, quite unassailable by any weapon in 
 the Calcutta Foreign Office, or in any store-house of Hindoo law ; 
 and there it will remain a moral, legal and political paradox 
 until, as I hope, obliterated for ever by a royal restitution.* 
 
 * Empire in India, p. 225, 226. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 
 OUDB. 
 
 THE Duke of Argyll, "having been a member of the 
 Cabinet which decided on the Annexation of Oude, and 
 decided, too, not only on the doing of it, but substantially 
 on the manner in which it shall be done," expresses 
 astonishment at "the ignorant injustice with which, on 
 account of this transaction, the memory of Lord Dalhousie 
 has been assailed."* He complains of that "popular im- 
 pression which ascribes the annexation of Oude to the 
 special policy of Lord Dalhousie," who, according to him, 
 " not only deprecated annexation, but deprecated even 
 the direct or forcible assumption of the Government of 
 
 Oude."f 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson in the same manner declares that 
 " Lord Dalhousie's advice with respect to Oude was not 
 followed ;" that "he is not, in fact, responsible for the 
 annexation of that Province;"} that "he was, in fact, 
 opposed to the annexation of Oude ;" and " that his part 
 in the transaction was the last sacrifice which he made on 
 the altar of duty." 
 
 So lately as the 28th of December, 1867, an article in 
 the Spectator, on "the Lucknow Durbar," written, if I 
 am not much mistaken, by a former Editor of the Calcutta 
 Friend of India, asserts that the Cabinet of which Lord 
 Canning was a member, " decided on overriding Lord 
 Dalhousie's proposal to sequestrate Oude, and carrying 
 out the annexation;" and that "Lord Canning was the 
 statesman really responsible for the annexation of Oude." 
 
 And Mr. J. C. Marshman, another former Editor of the 
 Friend of India, in his"recently published History, speaks 
 of " the Court of Directors, the Board of Control, and the 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, Preface, f Ibid., p. 15. 
 t A Vindication, p. 117. Ibid.,p. 157. 
 
OUDE. 47 
 
 Cabinet, having come to the unanimous determination to 
 overrule the advice of Lord Dalhousie."* 
 
 Lord Dalhousie is represented as acting in this instance 
 under orders which he loyally and submissively carried 
 out, against his own expressed opinion. This is a very 
 inadequate and inaccurate representation of what really 
 occurred. The Cabinet and the Court of Directors, who 
 were certainly not " unanimous," did not " overrule Lord 
 Dalhousie's advice," nor " override his proposal." He was 
 left at full liberty to carry out his own project, if he chose. 
 Lord Dalhousie's repugnance to the absolute annexation 
 of Oude, and to the immediate and forcible assumption of 
 its Government, a repugnance which he managed to 
 overcome, was directed merely against certain forms and 
 phrases, and cannot relieve him of the least responsibility 
 for a measure which he prompted and brought to pass, 
 and which is justly ascribed to his " special policy." 
 
 The difference of opinion between Lord Dalhousie and 
 his Councillors can be very briefly described. Down to 
 the despatch from the Governor-General to the Court of 
 Directors, dated the 22nd August, 1855, the only plan 
 for the reform of Oude which had been recommended in 
 India and approved by the Home authorities, was that of 
 temporary management, with a view to the ultimate re- 
 storation of purely native rule.f During Lord Dalhousie's 
 tenure of office the ideas of the Supreme Council under- 
 went a complete change. In 1855, Sattara, Jhansi, and 
 Nagpore having been annexed, the mediatised Principalities 
 of Tanjore and the Carnatic having been extinguished, 
 the Governor-General and his advisers unanimously agreed 
 that the evils of Oude were incurable by any other means 
 than the permanent assumption by the British Govern- 
 ment of the entire administration of that country. They 
 differed only as to the ostensible process for attaining 
 that necessary consummation. J 
 
 The Members of Council, Mr. Dorin, Mr. Grant, 
 General Low, and Mr. Peacock,|| all suggested, with 
 
 * History of India, (Longman and Co.) vol. iii, p. 427. 
 t See paragraph 29 of Mr. Grant's Minute, Oude Papers, 1856, p. 210, and 
 p. 191 and 233. % Oude Papers, 1856, p. 233. 
 
 Now Sir J. P. Grant, K.C.B., Governor of Jamaica. 
 || Now Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice of the High Court of Bengal. 
 
48 CHAPTER V. 
 
 slight variance in their pleadings and in the details of the 
 settlement proposed, that a new treaty should be sub- 
 mitted for the King of Glide's acceptance, vesting all 
 administrative powers in the hands of the British Govern- 
 ment, reserving a certain income for the royal family ; and 
 that in the event of the King's refusal to consent to these 
 terms, the former Treaties should be declared at an end, 
 and the territories of Gude at once forcibly incorporated 
 with the dominions of the Honourable Company. 
 
 The Governor-General desired to take a less direct 
 course, one that would be " more in conformity to inter- 
 national law," as he understood it, and " therefore, less 
 liable to criticism or cavil, and less open to the attack of 
 those who might be expected to condemn and oppose the 
 measure."* He recommended that a Treaty such as was 
 proposed by his colleagues, should be placed before the 
 King ; that if he rejected it, no coercive steps should be 
 taken, but all relations with the Court of Oude should be 
 broken off, the Resident and troops be withdrawn from Luck- 
 now, the Treaties proclaimed to be null and void and British 
 protection to have ceased. He believed that the King 
 would shrink from the consequences of being left face to 
 face with his turbulent vassals and subjects ; but that if 
 he resolved on braving them, the capital would be pillaged 
 within a month, and the King, " to save himself, would be 
 glad to agree to whatever engagements might be offered 
 him by the British Government, "t 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, in advising the withdrawal of British 
 protection, had his eye on another possible solution of the 
 problem. Although the King might choose to trust to 
 his own resources, and might even succeed in maintaining 
 his personal safety amid scenes of anarchy and confusion, 
 " the security of British territories and the interests of 
 their inhabitants might be put in danger by the state of 
 the neighbouring Province of Oude" In that case the 
 British Government would be compelled to "interpose in 
 His Majesty's affairs" and, of course, entitled to exact 
 and enforce its own inevitable conditions. J In the Duke 
 of Argyll's words, " It was by our troops that the Native 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, p. 299. t Ibid., p. 300. 
 I Ibid., 1856, p. 188, and p. 221, 222. 
 
CUBE. 49 
 
 Government was maintained. Experience had proved 
 that it could not stand without them. If the troops were 
 withdrawn the Government would fall, or would be com- 
 pelled to seek for our help again, in which case we could 
 impose our own terms."* 
 
 The Duke pronounces also that " the veriest formalist 
 must admit our right to do what Lord Dalhousie recom- 
 mended, which was simply to withdraw our troops, 
 declaring the treaty of 1801 to be at an end. He was 
 induced to recommend this, because he thought the result 
 would be the same."f 
 
 From Lord Dalhousie's language it might be sup- 
 posed that the principles of action for which he and 
 Mr. J. P. Grant respectively contended, were perfectly 
 irreconcileable. " So entirely," he writes, " did I dissent 
 from the view taken by my honourable colleague, and so 
 erroneous did it seem to me, that if unfortunately it had 
 found favour with the Honourable Court, I must have 
 declined to take part in the establishment or enforcement 
 of any policy which might have been founded upon it."J 
 Yet after a few paragraphs he adds : " I have never 
 affected to conceal my conviction that this measure" his 
 own plan of withdrawing our protection, " would lead to 
 precisely the same result as the more peremptory course 
 advised by others, but with some intervening delay. " 
 
 Thus the formal moderation of the procedure designed 
 by Lord Dalhousie, and contrasted by him with " the un- 
 necessarily harsh" measures of the Councillors, || amounted 
 to nothing more than the polite invitation addressed by 
 the landlord to the barn-door fowls, when he asked them 
 whether they would prefer being boiled or roasted. The 
 only dispute between the Governor-General and his col- 
 leagues was as to the particular sauce with w^hich the fat 
 capon of Oude was to be cooked. And after a little more 
 unmeaning prudery, the Governor-General ended by using 
 the very sauce compounded by his colleagues, against 
 which he had expressed such insuperable objections. He 
 thus concludes that part of his Minute of 13th February, 
 1856 : " Having regard, therefore, to the several opinions 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 19. f Ibid., p. 19. 
 
 $ Oude Papers, 1856, p. 298, 299. Ibid., p. 299. || Ibid., p. 298. 
 
 E 
 
50 CHAPTER V. 
 
 and circumstances which have just been mentioned, I 
 resolved to forego my own preferences, and in dealing 
 with Oude, to adopt the more peremptory course which 
 had been advocated by my colleagues, and which was 
 manifestly more acceptable to the Honourable Court." 4 
 
 The Duke of Argyll's comment on this passage is remark- 
 ably just : " Without prolonging controversy on points 
 of principle, but protesting against the doctrine laid down 
 by Mr. Grant, lie yet agreed to a course which was logically 
 defensible on no other principle than that which Mr. Grant 
 main tamed, "*j" 
 
 The Duke of Argyll says : " It is a curious fact that 
 Lord Dalhousie alone had scruples even in respect to any 
 forcible seizure of the Government. "J The result shows 
 what those scruples were worth. His own words prove 
 that his real anxiety was to avert " criticism and cavil," 
 and " the attacks of those who might be expected to con- 
 demn and oppose the measure. " He objected to " a line 
 of political action which was likely to create a keener 
 opposition, and to call forth severer comment. "|| All he 
 wanted was a plausible pretext for "the forcible seizure" 
 of Oude. In order to obtain such a plausible pretext as 
 he thought would suffice, he did not scruple to advise 
 the withdrawal of that protection which was promised to 
 the Kings of Oude by a series of treaties, and for which 
 they had "paid such a price," as General Low said, "as 
 no other native ruler ever did.'^f I may be more be- 
 nighted than the " veriest formalist" despised by the Duke 
 of Argyll, but this policy seems to me to have been detest- 
 able. Lord Dalhousie did not scruple to recommend a 
 course which, according to his own expectations, would 
 have led to an immediate insurrection, would have en- 
 dangered the King's life, and would have given up the 
 great city of Lucknow to pillage.** Then, when the anti- 
 cipated rebellion and anarchy had either induced the 
 King to beg for our armed intervention, or had " threat- 
 ened the peace of our own provinces," he would no longer 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, p. 300. f India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 21. 
 J India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 19. Ante, p. 
 
 Oude Papers, 1856, p. 299. f Ibid., 1858, p. 19. 
 
 ** Ibid., 1856, p. 299, 300. 
 
OUDE. 51 
 
 have any objection to the forcible seizure of the country, 
 to " a very prompt and summary settlement of the Oude 
 question."* Such were Lord Dalhousie's scruples ! 
 
 That Lord Dalhousie had scruples and misgivings as to 
 the annexation of Oude, and as to several other annex- 
 ations, cannot be doubted. That he so easily overcame 
 those scruples, and smothered those misgivings, is his 
 great opprobrium as a statesman. Sir Charles Jackson 
 says : " He always entertained a great distaste for the 
 subject. I remember a conversation with him in 1852, 
 in which he stated he had been pressed to take the 
 country (by whom he did not say), and that he felt averse 
 to such a measure. I cannot trust my memory to state 
 the precise nature of his objections at that time."t 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson erroneously states, and the same 
 strange mistake is made by the other apologists, that 
 Lord Dalhousie's scheme of withdrawal from Oude, was 
 " disallowed""^ and that he was " obliged to abandon" it, 
 by the Court of Directors' despatch of the 21st November, 
 1855. It was not so. In this despatch, characterised by 
 Sir Charles Jackson as "a specimen of the art of writing 
 important instructions so as to avoid responsibility," || and 
 by the Duke as " nominally from the Court of Directors, 
 really from the Ministers of the Crown,"^[ some appre- 
 hension was indicated that the scheme might fail, but the 
 Directors declined to " express any opinion on the prin- 
 ciples laid down by the several Members of Council," and 
 authorised the Governor-General to "carry out his first 
 suggestion," if he " should feel warranted in doing so." 
 They were decided as to the necessity of assuming the 
 government of Oude ; but they left " all questions of 
 detail to the wisdom of the Governor-General," abstaining 
 "from fettering his Lordship's discretion by any further 
 instructions," " whichever mode of attaining the indis- 
 pensable result may be resolved on."** 
 
 Lord Dalhousie was left completely at liberty to adhere 
 to his original plan, if he thought it likely to be success- 
 ful. The Directors themselves considered the Governor- 
 
 * Oude Papers, 300. t A Vindication, p. 130, note. J Ibid., p. 153. 
 Ibid., p. 150. || Ibid., p. 144. IF India under Dalhousie and 
 
 Canning, p. 21. ** Oude Papers, 1856, p. 235, 236. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 CHAPTER V. 
 
 General's plan to have " an advantage over the others," 
 inasmuch as it " included the King as a consenting party 
 to the measure," and was " intended to show more tender- 
 ness to the feelings of a family, who, whatever may have 
 been their offences towards their own subjects, have not 
 been unfaithful to the British Government."* 
 
 After the exposition already given of the true nature and 
 object of this measure, I need hardly say that I can see no 
 traces of any such tenderness. Indeed, since under the 
 more "harsh" and "peremptory" course that was actually 
 pursued, the King was offered the option of signing a 
 Treaty, if he chose, and thus becoming " a consenting 
 party," there was really no distinction between the two 
 measures. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's so-called scruples, really more un- 
 scrupulous than the open violence ultimately adopted, 
 receive the severest condemnation from the Duke of 
 Argyll, in spite of himself, when he terms the plan of 
 withdrawal "an indirect measure of compulsion ;"t and 
 when he says that "Lord Dalhousie probably overstated 
 his own opinion" in saying that " it would not be right to 
 endeavour to extract" the King's " consent by means of 
 menace or compulsion. "J Lord Dalhousie certainly over- 
 stated his own opinion ; his whole plan of action was based 
 on menace and compulsion under the flimsiest disguise ; 
 even this disguise was to be thrown off, if he could pro- 
 voke anything like a plausible pretext for forcible inter- 
 position ; and it was thrown off as soon as he had secured 
 the support of the Cabinet and the Board of Directors. 
 These scruples never operated beyond the walls of the 
 Council chamber ; produced nothing but a few incon- 
 sistent and contradictory paragraphs ; and avowedly aimed 
 at nothing but disarming hostile criticism. Yet on the 
 strength of these ephemeral scruples, Sir Charles Jackson 
 denies Lord Dalhousie's responsibility ; and the Duke of 
 Argyll charges with "ignorant injustice" all those who 
 ascribe the annexation of Oude to the Governor-General 
 who compassed it, who planned it, and who carried it out. 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, p. 235. 
 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 21. J Ibid., p. 20. 
 
OUDE. 53 
 
 That Lord Dalhousie from the first compassed and 
 planned the annexation of Oude as his special policy, 
 "though with some intervening delay,"* is manifest from 
 two main expedients in the process originally designed by 
 him, to both of which he adhered throughout. The first 
 of these was the imposition of a new Treaty, restricting 
 the inheritance to the lineal male descendants of the 
 reigning King, " born in lawful wedlock""^ a restriction 
 hitherto unheard of, and unwarranted by Mahomedan 
 law. This novel restriction was deliberately introduced 
 by Lord Dalhousie. "It will be seen," he writes, "that 
 the succession was limited to the children born in lawful 
 wedlock, and was not extended to collateral heirs. "J By 
 thus excluding collateral heirs, many living persons and 
 their offspring, the King's brother and all descendants 
 of former Sovereigns, were cut out of the line of succes- 
 sion, and the probabilities of what would be called " a 
 lapse," when merely the title and a stipend were left, 
 multiplied enormously. 
 
 The second expedient was the repudiation of the Treaty 
 of 1837, a Treaty regularly concluded and ratified, 
 brought into operation, never called in question before 
 Lord Dalhousie's time, and actually quoted as a valid 
 Treaty in 1847 by his immediate predecessor, Lord Har- 
 dinge, who threatened the King of Oude that its provi- 
 sions should be enforced. 
 
 Full powers of management and reform were given by 
 the Treaty of 1837. But when the assumption of the 
 Government of Oude began to be a practical and urgent 
 question in 1854, it was perceived by the Governor- 
 General that two Articles (VII and VIII) in this Treaty, 
 providing for the ultimate restoration of native rule, and 
 for the intermediate payment of all surplus receipts into 
 the King's Treasury, would deprive the British manage- 
 ment of a permanent and profitable character. Therefore 
 Lord Dalhousie (of course without alluding to these strong 
 Inducements), proposed that this Treaty, although officially 
 published as a valid engagement, should be declared null 
 and void by the perverted interpretation of a secret letter 
 from the Court of Directors in 1838. 
 
 * Ante, p. 49. t Oude Papers, 1858, p. 252. t Ibid., 1856, 302. 
 
54 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll says : " It is not true that we 
 derived advantage from the non-ratification of the Treaty 
 of 1837. On the contrary, Lord Dalhousie would have 
 been delighted to proceed under it, if it had been in force. 
 It gave him all he wanted, a right to seize the govern- 
 ment. The King, however, was offered a better position 
 than that Treaty would have secured to him/'* All this 
 is very erroneous. The Treaty of 1837 did not give Lord 
 Dalhousie " all he wanted." It did not give him the sur- 
 plus revenues of Oude, to be disposed of, as he pleased, 
 for Imperial purposes, but compelled him to account for 
 them to the State of Oude. It did, indeed, give him " a 
 right to seize the government," but only for a temporary 
 object, and bound him "to maintain the native institu- 
 tions and forms of administration, so as to facilitate the 
 restoration of those territories to the Sovereign of Oude."t 
 Lord Dalhousie would certainly not "have been delighted 
 to proceed" under those conditions. 
 
 The King was not " offered a better position than that 
 Treaty would have secured to him." He was offered a 
 fixed stipend, and an empty title, hampered as an inherit- 
 ance by novel restrictions, with no prospect for him or his 
 descendants, of reinstatement in the functions of royalty. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's plea for not assuming the management 
 under the Treaty of 1837, was that the Treaty had been 
 " cancelled" by the Home Authorities. The fact is, that 
 the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors disapproved 
 of the increased burden of providing an Auxiliary Force, 
 imposed upon Oude by the new Treaty, and desired that 
 the King should be " exonerated from these obligations." 
 But they added in their despatch to Lord Auckland, 
 " Although we thus convey to you our directions for the 
 abrogation of the Treaty, we leave it discretional with 
 your Lordship to adapt your measures to the state of cir- 
 cumstances as may be found to exist when you receive this 
 letter" and they recommend that the communication to 
 the King should be made, "as an act of grace from your 
 Lordship hi Council, rather than as the consequence of 
 the receipt of a public and unconditional instruction from 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 110 (foot-note.) 
 t Collection of Treaties, 1864, Calcutta, vol. ii, p. 177. 
 
OUDE. 55 
 
 England." They continue thus : " Your Lordship in 
 Council, therefore, is authorised to exercise the largest 
 discretion as to the mode of carrying our wishes into effect 
 in respect to the Treaty; but" here is the important 
 point, " the order of the Court of Directors is positive, 
 and strictly to be enforced, to discontinue the preparations 
 which may have been made for the organisation of the 
 Auxiliary Force"* Their only positive objection, their 
 only strict order, was directed against the new Force im- 
 posed as a burden on the Finances of Oude. But they 
 used the word " abrogation" and Lord Dalhousie fastened 
 upon that. 
 
 Lord Auckland, with the advice of his Councillors, 
 General Morrison and Mr. Robertson, decided on merely 
 signifying to the King of Oude that he was relieved from 
 the military expenses imposed by the Treaty of 1837 ; and 
 they came to this decision on the express grounds of the 
 difficulty under the Treaty of 1801 "of enforcing its con- 
 ditions," of the " solemn, recorded, and effectual warning 
 contained" in the new Treaty of 1837, and of the power 
 obtained by it to " assume the administration as a remedy 
 for gross misrule, "t The last words of Lord Auckland's 
 Minute of the 2nd of May, 1839, the last that he penned 
 before addressing the King on the subject, contain an 
 expression of his entire agreement in the opinion of his 
 colleague Mr. Robertson, that "if the independence of 
 Oude endure much longer, it will be mainly in consequence 
 of this very provision," for the assumption of the adminis- 
 tration in case of misrule. "J The Government of India 
 in 1839, did not consider or intend the new Treaty to be 
 annulled, but simply, as they told the King, that the 
 Articles imposing a pecuniary charge upon him would not 
 be any longer enforced, that he would have to pay no 
 more for the military force which, in Lord Auckland's 
 words, had been "partly raised under that Treaty" and 
 that the British Government would " defray the expense 
 of the portion of it already organised. " 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 37, 38. 
 
 t Minutes by Lord Auckland, Colonel Morrison, and Mr. Robertson : Oude 
 Papers, 1858, p. 38, 43, 59. 
 J Oude Papers, 1858, p. 59. Ibid , 1858, p. CO. 
 
56 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, in laying the train for the meditated 
 annexation of Oude, said that "pledges upon the non- 
 ratification of the Treaty were given to Parliament."* I 
 know not to what Lord Dalhousie, or Lord Auckland, 
 whom he is quoting, can allude, except to the conversa- 
 tion that took place in the House of Lords on the 6th of 
 August, 1838, in the course of which 
 
 " Lord Ellenborough said that to assert that there was no 
 Treaty in existence because it had not been ratified at home, was 
 not a correct representation of the fact. The Treaty was ratified 
 by the Governor- General, and certainly might be acted on." 
 
 " The Marquis of Lansdowne said that he had now distinctly 
 to state that not only did his noble friend at the head of the 
 Government of India, immediately on being informed of this 
 Treaty, express his disapprobation of the manner in which the 
 promise had been drawn from the Sovereign of Oude, but he also 
 caused it to be intimated in the most explicit manner to that 
 Prince, that he was in no degree bound by the promise to sign 
 such a Treaty, and entirely relieved from any stipulations or con- 
 ditions it imposed."t 
 
 Whether Lord Lansdowne's statement constituted a 
 " pledge" or not, matters very little ; for it was founded 
 on an error. No such intimation had then been made, or 
 was ever made, to the Sovereign of Oude, as Lord Lans- 
 downe supposed. The noble Lord at the head of the 
 Government of India, Lord Auckland, did indeed express 
 some slight disapprobation of the " superfluous" promise 
 extracted from the King,J but he did not disapprove of 
 the Treaty; it was entirely his own idea and his own work; 
 he framed its conditions himself; he persistently argued 
 with the Court of Directors for the maintenance of every 
 item. The King was not told " in the most explicit man- 
 ner," or in any manner, that he was " entirely relieved 
 from its conditions," but merely that he was relieved from 
 the additional Subsidy for troops. Lord Auckland attri- 
 buted no efficacy to the so-called Parliamentary pledge ; 
 he spoke of it as an awkward difficulty, but still pursued 
 his own course ; and his letter to the King of Oude, speak- 
 ing of the Treaty as still in existence, was written a year 
 later than Lord Lansdowne's speech. 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, pp. 65 & 51. t Hansard, 3rd series, vol. xliv, p. 1006. 
 I Oude Papers, 1858, pp. 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 22, 23. 
 
OUDE. 57 
 
 Lord Ellenborougli was, of course, perfectly correct in 
 his view of the situation. The Treaty concluded in 1837 
 was not, and could not be cancelled by a " secret letter" 
 in 1838, or by any amount of conversation in the House 
 of Lords. 
 
 The Treaty of 1837 was officially published in a volume 
 of Treaties, by authority of the Court of Directors in 1845, 
 and reprinted as a return to the House of Lords in 1853. 
 
 There is a note appended to the Treaty of 1837 in this 
 printed Volume, which tells us what was thought of this 
 Treaty at the India House so late as the 24th June 1853. 
 It is as follows : 
 
 " The Home Government disapproved of that part of the Treaty 
 which imposed on the Oude State the expense of the Auxiliary 
 Force, and on July 8th, 1839, the King was informed that he was 
 relieved from the cost of maintaining the Auxiliary Force,, which 
 the British Government had taken upon itself."* 
 
 Mr. Kaye, in the first volume of his excellent History 
 of the Sepoy War, puts forth, once more, the official version 
 of these transactions, and calls the Treaty of 1837 "an 
 abortion." He also mentions that the following Return 
 was made to Parliament under the signature of the Secre- 
 tary to the Board of Control : 
 
 " There has been no Treaty concluded with the present King 
 of Oude which has been ratified by the Court of Directors, with 
 the approbation of the Commissioners for the affairs of India." 
 
 " India Board, July 3rd, 1838. (Signed) R. GORDON." 
 
 It must have been on the strength of this document, 
 fortified by some overstated verbal information, that the 
 Marquis of Lansdowne made his erroneous statement. 
 The literal purport of the Return true, so far as it goes, 
 by no means amounts to a declaration that the Treaty, 
 which it does not name, is null and void ; nor, had it con- 
 tained such a declaration, could it have had the effect of 
 annulling the Treaty, any more than the "secret letter" of 
 the Court of Directors, or the erroneous "pledge" given by 
 Lord Lansdowne, neither of which was communicated to 
 the King of Oude. The King was expressly informed in 
 Lord Auckland's letter of the 8th of July, 1839, -just a 
 
 * Return to the House of Lords, No. 251, 1853, p. 91. 
 
58 CHAPTER V. 
 
 year after the Return to Parliament on which Mr. Kaye 
 relies, that "the Court of Directors " n\ consideration of 
 the " embarrassments which might be occasioned to the 
 State of Oude by the annual payment of sixteen lakhs of 
 rupees to the support of the military force," had empowered 
 the Governor-General "to relieve the State of Oude from 
 all that is onerous in the conditions respecting this force."* 
 This notification, that the King was relieved by the Court 
 of Directors from some of the conditions, is equivalent to 
 a confirmation by the Court of Directors, of the remaining 
 conditions, had any such confirmation been required. Bat 
 immemorial custom, and innumerable precedents, and the 
 terms of this particular Treaty, do not give a hint or show 
 a trace of the necessity for such confirmation. The Gover- 
 nor-General had at least the powers of a Plenipotentiary. 
 He had full power to conclude Treaties, and the final ex- 
 change of ratified copies made the Treaty binding upon 
 both parties. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson says: "The Court of Directors re- 
 fused to ratify this Treaty, "j" They were never asked or 
 expected to do so. They have never ratified any Treaties. 
 In the six Volumes of Treaties published by authority 
 at Calcutta in 1864', there is not one Treaty bearing 
 the ratification of the Court of Directors. This Treaty of 
 1837 is attested in exactly the same style as all the pre- 
 ceding Treaties with the Government of Oude : 
 
 " Ratified by the Governor General of India in Council,, at Fort 
 William in Bengal, this eighteenth day of September, One Thou- 
 sand, Eight Hundred and Thirty Seven. 
 
 (Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN, 
 
 Secretary to the Government of India." J 
 
 Even in the case, which clearly did not occur, of a timely 
 and open rejection of this Treaty by the Court of Directors, 
 such a Treaty, concluded with every formality between the 
 Governor- General of India and the Sovereign of Oude 
 signed, and sealed, and ratified, could not have been can- 
 celled by the Home Authorities without the knowledge 
 and consent of the Sovereign of Oude ; without, in fact, a 
 fresh negotiation with that express object. 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 60. t A Vindication, p. 124. 
 
 I Collection of Treaties, 1864, vol. ii, p. 177. 
 
OUDE. 59 
 
 Such a fresh negotiation could have been opened with- 
 out any difficulty or embarrassment by the Governor- 
 General, if the Home Authorities had insisted on their or- 
 ders being fully carried out. But there is nothing in the 
 Papers of 1 858 to show that they adhered to their original 
 resolution after Lord Auckland's last remonstrance. The 
 latest paper in that part of the collection is the Governor- 
 General's letter to the Secret Committee dated July 1 5th, 
 1839, in which he forwards copies of his letter, of the 8th 
 idem, to the King of Oude, apprising him simply of his 
 being relieved from the military charges recently imposed.* 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's Minute of the 14th August, 1854, con- 
 taining a precis of the correspondence in this matter, is so 
 unfortunately arranged that no one could gather from it 
 that Lord Auckland's letter of the 15th July, 1839, for- 
 warding a copy of his letter to the King, was later in date 
 than any of the other documents quoted, and a year later 
 than the supposed "pledge" in the House of Lords. He 
 has thrown it back, without any date, to a place in his 
 narrative immediately after the Secret Committee's first 
 letter of disapproval, dated April 10th, 1838. Then, on 
 the top of these, he piles extracts from the despatches of 
 the Secret Committee down to llth July, 1839, in order 
 to prove that they " did not recede from these sentiments," 
 thus conveying an impression that they had repeatedly 
 disapproved of the letter to the King of Oude, which they 
 had not seen when those dispatches were written, and 
 which was never disapproved at all. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie vainly endeavours also to show that 
 Lord Auckland knew the treaty was null and void. 
 
 "In pursuance of the discretion thus left to him, the Governor 
 General in Council intimated to the King of Oude the abandon- 
 ment of only a part of the Treaty, but in his recorded Minute he 
 recognised the full abrogation of the entire instrument. He said, 
 f the Court has disapproved the Treaty. We are ordered to ex- 
 onerate the King of Oude from its obligations/ And in the same 
 Minute the Governor General stated that the disallowance of the 
 Treaty had been made known to Parliament. He said, f l find the 
 view taken by the Court to be publicly declared. I find pledges 
 upon the non-ratification of Treaty given to Parliament .'"f 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 60. f Oude Papers, 1858, p. 66. 
 
60 CHAPTER V. 
 
 There is nothing in these words to show that Lord 
 Auckland " recognised the full abrogation" of the Treaty. 
 He mentions the Court's disapproval, and the public decla- 
 ration in Parliament, as constituting "a situation of much 
 difficulty," but far from considering the Directors' orders 
 as final and irrevocable, he determines again to bring this 
 "question of such extended and vital interest, in all its 
 bearings, under the deliberate review of the Home Autho- 
 rities"* His Council coincided with him. Mr. Robert- 
 son, in a Minute dated 9th January, 1839, is "disposed 
 to hope that by a relaxation of the terms of the existing 
 Treaty with Oude, the authorities in England may be 
 reconciled to a measure which cannot now be cancelled 
 without the most serious inconvenience."^ General Morri- 
 son, on the 28th January, 1839, writes : " Notwithstand- 
 ing the public avowal made in England of dissatisfaction 
 with the Treaty of September 1837, I would yet main- 
 tain its provisions, in the hope that the orders for abandon- 
 ing the Treaty may be revoked." + 
 
 How then could Lord Dalhousie persuade himself that 
 the Governor-General in Council at this time "recognised 
 the full abrogation of the entire document" ? He was 
 exerting himself to the utmost to uphold it ; and four 
 months later, although another adverse dispatch had 
 arrived in the interval, Lord Auckland professes " his un- 
 altered adherence to the principles on which the Treaty 
 of September 1837 was originally negotiated," and again 
 " leaves the case for the further directions of the Home 
 Government."^ 
 
 After that Minute had been sent off, but before it could 
 have been considered at home, another letter arrived from 
 the Court of Directors, dated 15th April, 1839, repeating 
 their " disallowance of the Treaty," and desiring "the 
 restoration of our relations with the State of Oude to the 
 footing on which they previously stood." At the same 
 time all their specific objections were aimed against the 
 Auxiliary Force being made a charge upon the revenues 
 of Oude ; and they permit their decision to be announced 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 51, 52. t Ibid., 1858, p. 53. 
 t Ibid., 1858, p. 56. ' Ibid., 1858, p. 58, 59. 
 
OUDE. 61 
 
 to the King, " in such manner as the Governor-General 
 may think fa."* 
 
 As it was now impossible any longer to delay informing 
 the Oude Government that it was relieved from the new 
 pecuniary burden, Lord Auckland immediately wrote his 
 letter of the 8th July, 1839, to the King of Oude. This 
 letter was carefully worded so as to avoid suggesting to 
 the King of Oude that he might hope to escape from that 
 liability to the direct management of his country, for 
 which the new Treaty provided. It was written entirely 
 in the spirit of that part of Lord Auckland's last Minute 
 on the subject, dated 2nd May, 1839, to which no reply 
 had then been received from the Court of Directors, in 
 which he refers to the unanimous support of the Members 
 of Council " in regard to the second branch of the Treaty, 
 that which provides for the assumption of the administra- 
 tion as a remedy for gross misrule""^ 
 
 How Lord Auckland's letter and enclosure of the 15th 
 July, 1839, were treated by the Home Authorities, we 
 have no means of learning from the printed Papers. If 
 their comments were quite condemnatory, I think we 
 should have found them among the Papers of 1858. No 
 condemnation behind the scenes, however, could, as al- 
 ready shown, have cancelled the Treaty. If, on the other 
 hand, the receipt of the despatch and the copy of the 
 letter to the King, was acknowledged with a simple ex- 
 pression of approval, or was silently passed over with no 
 renewal of their adverse orders, then the proceedings of 
 the Government of India were, expressly or tacitly, 
 approved and confirmed. 
 
 From no mention being made in any of Lord Dalhousie's 
 Minutes or despatches of any reply by the Court of Direc- 
 tors, to Lord Auckland's last letter, we have the right to 
 presume that no fault was found with it. In such a case, 
 according to common sense as well as official custom, 
 silence gives consent. His proceedings were allowed to 
 stand. 
 
 Thus, while it is quite clear and certain that the Home 
 Authorities did not openly reject the Treaty of 1837, it is 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 57. f Ibid., 1858, p. 59. 
 
62 CHAPTER V. 
 
 almost equally clear and certain that, after the relaxation 
 of certain conditions, they finally accepted and approved 
 it. Whether they did or did not, the notion of the 
 Treaty having been annulled or made of no effect, by 
 virtue of their confidential strictures, is utterly vain and 
 totally inadmissible. 
 
 Lord Broughton, who as Sir John Cam Hobhouse had 
 been President of the Board of Control when the Treaty 
 of 1837 was concluded, when the supposed pledges were 
 given in the House of Lords, and when the Return cited 
 by Mr. Kaye was made to Parliament,* gives his testi- 
 mony in the following words : " My impression certainly 
 is that the Treaty of 1837 was ratified by Government at 
 home, after the disallowance referred to : the whole Treaty 
 was not disallowed, but only one portion of it."f 
 
 No one in India, at Lucknow, or at Calcutta, ever 
 doubted the validity and binding force of this Treaty, 
 until Lord Dalhousie found that it stood in the way of 
 his scheme of appropriating all the revenues of Oude. 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, writing in the Calcutta Review in 
 1845, describes the conclusion of the Treaty of 1837, 
 observes that the Court of Directors " very properly dis- 
 approved" of the measure by which the King was to have 
 been saddled with the expense of an Auxiliary Force, and 
 that, in reliance on his Majesty's good intentions, "Govern- 
 ment overlooked the glaring mismanagement still existing 
 in parts of Oude, and did not act on the permission given 
 ~by the new Treaty '."J And he adds subsequently: "No 
 one can deny that we are now authorised by Treaty to as- 
 sume the management." 
 
 General Sir William Sleeman, who was for six years Re- 
 sident at Lucknow, alludes, in two letters written in 1852 
 and 1854, to the "ample authority" conferred by "the 
 Treaty of 1837."|| The Blue Book of 1856 contains an ex- 
 tract from one of Sir William Sleeman's despatches, quoted 
 in one of Lord Dalhousie's Minutes, in which he gives it as 
 his opinion that "our Government cannot any longer for- 
 
 * Ante, p. 57. 
 
 t Beveridge's History of India, (Blackie, 1866) vol. iii, p. 548. 
 % Essays, (published by Allen) 1859, p. 126. Ibid., p. 131. 
 || Sleemarfs Journey through Oude, vol. ii, p. 377, and 419. 
 
OUDE. 63 
 
 bear to exercise to the fullest extent the powers which the 
 Treaty of 1837 confers upon it." * 
 
 And in a long Memorandum of advice and remonstrance 
 addressed by Lord Hardinge to the King of Oude in 1847, 
 his Lordship distinctly threatens to enforce the stipulations 
 of the Treaty of 1837.1 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, in the 1st, 18th, and 71st paragraphs 
 of his principal Minute on the Oude question, refers to 
 the solemn warning offered to the King by his immediate 
 predecessor, Lord Hardinge, in 1847, that if the abuses 
 of his Majesty's administration were not reformed "he 
 would force the British Government to interfere by assum- 
 ing the government of Oude,"J but he nowhere gives the 
 slightest hint that this warning and this threat were based 
 upon the Treaty of 1837. 
 
 Even in his later Minute of January 15th, 1856, although 
 he anticipated the probability of great "embarrassment," 
 if the King should appeal to the Treaty of 1837, and de- 
 sired the Resident to "meet it full in the face" by declaring 
 that Treaty nuh 1 and void, he does not seem to have con- 
 templated the greatest possible embarrassment of all, that 
 of the King producing Lord Hardinge's recognition of that 
 Treaty. The Duke of Argyll, adhering to his avowed 
 principles of political criticism, following Lord Dalhousie, 
 and viewing the facts in the light in which his friend stated 
 them, 1 1 relates Lord Hardinge's warning, but knows 
 nothing of his threat to enforce the Treaty of 1837.^1 Sir 
 Charles Jackson says that Lord Hardinge "cited the Treaty 
 of 1837 as if it were still in force,"** but seems to consider 
 this quite an insignificant circumstance, deserving no com- 
 ment and calling for no explanation. 
 
 Yet Lord Hardinge's citation was full and his intention 
 not open to doubt. He quotes the whole of Article vii of 
 the Treaty, providing for the assumption of the manage- 
 ment of Oude in the event of "gross and systematic mis- 
 rule," and he adds : 
 
 "I allude to the Treaty of 1837 as confirming the original Treaty 
 of 1801, and not only giving the British Government the right to 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, p. 166. f H>id., 1858, p. 62. 
 
 t Ibid., 1856, p. 148, 156, and 187. Ibid., 1856, p. 239. || Ante, p. 6. 
 
 1 India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 13. ** A Vindication, p. 126. 
 
64 CHAPTER V. 
 
 interfere, but declaring it to be the intention of the Government 
 to interfere, if necessary, for the purpose of securing good govern- 
 ment in Oude."* 
 
 Lord Hardinge's plan was precisely that recommended 
 by Sir William Sleeman and Sir Henry Lawrence, which 
 the Duke of Argyll has entirely misunderstood. It was 
 the same plan that Lord William Bentinck proposed, and 
 was authorised by the Court of Directors to undertake, 
 that of temporary management, with a view to effectual 
 reform of the native institutions and the ultimate resto- 
 ration of a purely native government. 
 
 Lord William Bentinck, in his Report of 1 1th July, 1831, 
 says : 
 
 " I thought it right to declare to his Majesty, that the opinion 
 v I should offer to the Home Authorities would be that, unless a de- 
 cided reform in the administration should take place, there would 
 be no remedy left except in the direct assumption of the manage- 
 ment of the Oude territories by the British Government." 
 
 "It may be asked of me, and when you have assumed the 
 management, how is it to be conducted, and how long retained ? 
 I should answer, that acting in the character of guardian and 
 trustee, we ought to frame an administration entirely native, an 
 administration so composed as to individuals, and so established 
 upon the best principles, revenue and judicial, as should best serve 
 for immediate improvement, and as a model for future imitation : 
 the only European part of it should be the functionary by whom 
 it should be superintended, and it should only be retained till a 
 complete reform might be brought about, and a guarantee for its 
 continuance obtained, either in the improved character of the 
 reigning Prince, or, if incorrigible, in the substitution of his im- 
 mediate heir, or in default of such substitute from nonage or in- 
 capacity, by the nomination of one of the family as Regent, the 
 whole of the revenue being paid into the Oude treasury."! 
 
 Lord Hardinge, in his Memorandum of 1847, reminds 
 the King of Lord William Bentinck's conferences with his 
 Majesty's predecessor, and informs him that in the year 
 1834 the Court of Directors had sanctioned the adminis- 
 tration of Oude being assumed by Lord William Bentinck. 
 He exhorts the King to procrastinate no longer in com- 
 
 * Sleemari's Journey through Oude, vol. ii, p. 202 ; Oude Papers, 1856, p. 
 62. The version of Lord Hardinge's Memorandum in the Blue Book is not so 
 intelligible as that given by Sir William Sleeman, and contains some manifest 
 inaccuracies. I quote, therefore, from the latter. 
 
 f Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays, p. 123 ; see also Oude Papers, 1856, p. 155. 
 
OUDE. 65 
 
 mencing decisive reforms, so as to avoid the necessity of 
 direct and open interference. He declares that the British 
 Government desires to "perform its obligations to the 
 people without setting the sovereign authority aside, or 
 changing the native institutions of the State."* And as 
 an example of what had been done, and a pledge of our 
 disinterested objects, he adduces the precedent of Nagpore. 
 
 " The Nagpore State, after having been restored to order by a 
 British administration of the land revenue, is now carried on 
 under native management, with due regard to the rights of the 
 Prince, and the contentment of the people." f 
 
 " If European agency should be required, in the first instance 
 in assisting your Majesty's officers in making a just settlement, 
 and in the next for securing the conditions made, by frequent 
 visits throughout the districts to check abuses by personal in- 
 quiries, such assistance will be afforded by the British Govern- 
 ment, with your Majesty's concurrence. "J 
 
 During the first six years of the vice-royalty of Lord 
 Hardinge's successor, Lord Dalhousie, the two successive 
 Residents at Lucknow, Colonel Richmond and Colonel 
 (afterwards General Sir William) Sleeman, looked in vain 
 to Calcutta for guidance and support in carrying out pro- 
 jects of reform. 
 
 Whatever may be said in the published Papers as to 
 "admonitions" and "remonstrances/' it is a positive fact 
 that no plan for improving the administration of Oude 
 was ever countenanced. Some extensive reforms proposed 
 in concert by the native Minister and the British Resident 
 at Lucknow, Colonel Richmond, and approved by Mr. 
 Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, whose advice 
 was asked in 1848, were absolutely discouraged and de- 
 feated by the Calcutta Foreign Office. The Bengal 
 Civilians did not want to give assistance, they wanted to 
 take possession ; they conscientiously disbelieved in the 
 efficacy of native efforts, and looked upon partial inno- 
 vations as mere waste of time, delaying the harvest of 
 patronage and deteriorating the crop. Oude, therefore, 
 having been spared and neglected for twenty years, was 
 at last absorbed by Lord Dalhousie, on the pretext of dis- 
 orders in its government, which were all removable, and 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 63. f nid , 1858, pp. 63, 64. % Ibid., 1858, p. 64. 
 Dacoitee in Excelsis (Taylor, 54 Chancery Lane, 1856), p. 102 to 108. 
 
 F 
 
66 CHAPTER V. 
 
 which might have been easily remedied without aimex- 
 'ation, if there had been any wish to preserve the separate 
 existence of that friendly and faithful State. But there 
 was no such wish. 
 
 Sir William Sleeman incessantly urged decisive action, 
 at first recommending that all the authority and influence 
 of the British Government should be used to promote the 
 formation of a strong native administration ; and latterly 
 advising that the Treaty of 1 837 should be openly enforced. 
 During the year 1849, just as the two years of probation 
 allowed by Lord Hardinge were expired, he forwarded 
 to the Governor-General his plan for a Board of Regency, 
 undertook to direct and superintend their operations with 
 one additional Assistant and three clerks, and pledged his 
 great reputation for the success of the experiment. 
 
 "Things would go on like marriage bells.* The judicial courts 
 would be well conducted while the presiding officers felt secure in 
 their tenure of office." " The police would soon become efficient 
 under the supervision and control of respectable revenue officers." 
 t( Oude ought to be, and would be under such a system a garden ; 
 the soil is the finest in India, so are the men ; and there is no 
 want of an educated class for civil office : on the contrary, they 
 abound almost as much as the class of soldiers/'f " The Board, 
 composed of the first members of the Lucknow aristocracy, would 
 be, I think, both popular and efficient; and with the aid of a few 
 of the ablest of the native judicial and revenue officers of our own 
 districts, invited to Oude by the prospect of higher pay and secu- 
 rity in the tenure of office, would soon have at work a machinery 
 capable of securing to all their rights, and enforcing from all their 
 duties, in every part of this at present distracted country. We 
 should soon have good roads throughout the Kingdom ; and both 
 they and the rivers would soon be as secure as in our own pro- 
 vinces. I think, too, that I might venture to promise that all 
 would be effected without violence or disturbance ; all would see 
 that everything was done for the benefit of an oppressed people, 
 and in good faith towards the reigning family." J " I think the 
 King will consent without much difficulty or reluctance to dele- 
 gate his powers to a Eegency, but I am somewhat afraid that he 
 will object to its being composed of members of his own family. 
 I shall, I daresay, be able to get over this difficulty ; and it will 
 be desirable to employ the best members of the family in order to 
 show the people of Oude, and of India generally, that the object 
 
 * Sleemarfs Oude, vol. i, p. Iviii. f Ibid., vol. i, p. Ixiv. 
 % Ibid., vol. i., p. Ixxvi. 
 
OUDE. 67 
 
 of our Government is an honest and benevolent one."* " I have 
 mentioned in my private letter to Sir H. M. Elliot,, three persons 
 of high character for the Regency. Two of them are brothers of 
 the King's father. The third, and best, may be considered as in 
 all respects the first man in Oude. Mohsin-ood-Dowlah is the 
 grandson of King Ghazee-ood-Deen ; his wife is the sister of the 
 King's father ; and his only son has been lately united in marriage 
 to the present King's daughter. He and his wife have large 
 hereditary incomes, under the guaranty of our Government, and 
 his character for good sense, prudence and integrity, stands 
 higher, I believe, than that of any other man in Oude."t 
 
 ' ' The members of such a Board as I propose, invested with full 
 powers, and secured in office under our guaranty during good con- 
 duct, would go fearlessly to work/'J 
 
 ' ' I should persuade the members to draw from the elite of their 
 own creed in our service to aid in forming and carrying out the 
 new system in their several departments. We can give them- ex- 
 cellent men in the revenue and judicial branches. "The whole 
 family are most anxious that the King should resign the reins 
 into abler hands, and would, I feel assured, hail the arrangement 
 I have proposed as a blessing to them and the country. All seems 
 ripe for the change, and I hope the Governor- General will consent 
 to its being proposed soon."|| 
 
 Before September and October 1849, when these letters 
 were written to the Governor-General and the Foreign 
 Secretary, the Punjaub had been annexed ; all were busily 
 engaged in organising the new Province. Sattara, the first 
 taste of blood in the previous year, only whetted the pro- 
 fessional appetite ; it had now become insatiable. The 
 last idea likely to find favour at Calcutta was the recon- 
 struction of a Native State. Nothing, therefore, was 
 done, or authorised to be done, in consequence of General 
 Sleeman's repeated applications, continued up to 1854. 
 His correspondence proves that he latterly began to doubt 
 the upright intentions of those who ruled the hour. At 
 last he wrote as follows in a private letter to a friend : 
 
 ' ' Lord Dalhousie and I have different views, I fear. If he wishes 
 anything that I do not think right and honest, I resign, and leave 
 it to be done by others. I desire a strict adherence to solemn 
 engagements, whether made with white faces or black. We have 
 no right to annex or confiscate Oude ; we have a right under the 
 Treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appro- 
 
 * Sleeman's Oude, vol. i, p. Ixxvi. t Hid., vol. i, p. Ixvii. 
 
 % Ibid., vol. i, pp. Ixi, Ixii. Ibid., p. Ixxv. || Ibid., p. Ixxiv. 
 
 F 2 
 
68 CHAPTER V. 
 
 priate its revenues to ourselves. We can do this with honour to 
 our Government and benefit to the people. To confiscate would 
 be dishonest and dishonourable. To annex would be to give the 
 people a Government almost as bad as their own, if we put our 
 screw upon them/''* 
 
 There is a touch of respectful yet reproachful irony in 
 the following passage from what seems to have been his 
 last letter to Lord Dalhousie, it is dated llth September, 
 1854, gravely reminding him that when now about to 
 leave the Residency, after representing the Government of 
 India at Lucknow for six years, he was still unfurnished 
 with instructions, still unacquainted with the Govemor- 
 General's plans or wishes. 
 
 " Proofs enough of bad government and neglected duties were 
 given in my Diary. The duty of remedying the evils, and carry- 
 ing out your Lordship' s views in Oude, whatever they may be, 
 must now devolve on another ."f 
 
 Thus up to the period of Lord Dalhousie's arrival in 
 India, no scheme had been proposed for the reform of 
 Oude except that of temporary management. Lord Dal- 
 housie's immediate predecessor repeated that same pro- 
 posal, and held out, as an extreme measure, the enforce- 
 ment of the Treaty of 1837, under which all surplus 
 revenues were to be paid into the local treasury, existing 
 institutions maintained, and the restoration of native 
 government facilitated, with such modifications and im- 
 provements as might be considered advisable. J 
 
 Lord Dalhousie protested against temporary manage- 
 ment ; insisted on appropriating the surplus revenues for 
 British purposes ; in order to secure these two points, re- 
 pudiated the Treaty of 1837, so recently invoked by his 
 predecessor; and deliberately planned to bring about a 
 scene of insurrection and pillage as a pretext for sweeping 
 away every vestige of native government. The Duke of 
 Argyll, however, declaims against "the ignorant injustice" 
 of those who ascribe the annexation of Oude to "the 
 special policy of Lord Dalhousie." 
 
 It was in every point of view his special policy. It was 
 in the pursuance of a systematic and settled object, in 
 
 * Sleeman's Oude, vol. i, pp. xxi, xxii. f Ibid., vol. ii, p. 423. 
 \ Articles vii and viii of the Treaty, Oude Papers, 1858, p. 33. 
 
OUDE. 69 
 
 obedience to a principle, such as it was, that Lord Dal- 
 housie avoided the temporary management of Oude. That 
 principle was that if the British Government undertook 
 "the responsibility, the labour, and the risk," of recon- 
 structing and reforming a native State, it ought, " after 
 providing for the pensioned dynasty, for the administra- 
 tion of the Province, and for its progressive improvement," 
 to be allowed to appropriate the surplus revenue to Impe- 
 rial purposes.* The double delusion, false morally, and 
 practically falsified, that the British Government was 
 not bound to interfere for the reform of a protected State, 
 unless the interference could be made financially profitable 
 to itself ; and that the conversion of protected States into 
 British Provinces would be financially profitable, runs 
 through all the arguments for the successive annexations, 
 from Sattara to Oude. 
 
 No doubt Lord Dalhousie had persuaded himself that 
 the temporary management of Oude was not attainable, 
 and, if attainable, would not be effectual for permanent 
 reform. With the fixed purpose of absolute acquisition 
 before him, he was very easily persuaded, and attacked 
 the plan of temporary management by arguments and 
 illustrations of transparent futility. He adduced the two 
 experiments of Hyderabad, under Sir Charles Metcalfe, 
 and of Nagpore, under Sir Richard Jenkins, as instances of 
 the total failure of temporary management ; t whereas, if* 
 properly examined, they are seen to be instances of marked 
 success, checked only by the sudden relaxation and sub- 
 sequent neglect, for which our Government was solely 
 responsible. After detailing the good results of the re- 
 forming measures in the Hyderabad country, he says : 
 " But the arrangement was temporary : its fruits, there- 
 fore, were transitory and disappointing. No sooner had 
 the present Sovereign assumed the reins of government, 
 than he set aside the system introduced by Sir Charles 
 Metcalfe, and caused everything to revert to its former 
 course. "J Did then Lord Dalhousie, who had so recently 
 put forth the vast influence of the British Government, to 
 coerce the Nizam of Hyderabad into consigning his most 
 fertile Provinces, yielding a quarter of his revenue, to 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, p. 190. t Ibid., pp. 186, 187. I Ibid., 1856, p. 186. 
 
70 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 British management, really think that the same vast in- 
 fluence would have been uselessly or unjustly put forth, 
 to maintain British management, and pursue the incom- 
 plete reforms, at the commencement of the same Prince's 
 reign ? The promptitude with which the Government of 
 India in 1829 acceded to the request of the Nizam that 
 the English Superintendents should be withdrawn from 
 his districts, is, as I observed in a previous publication, 
 " but one instance of the utter indifference of the Calcutta 
 officials to the internal and independent reforms of a 
 Native Principality."* 
 
 Another objection to temporary management seemed, 
 in Lord Dalhousie's eyes, to be final and fatal. It was 
 provided in the Treaty of 1801 that the King's adminis- 
 tration should be " carried on by his own officers. " j" Lord 
 Dalhousie professed to see in this provision of the Treaty 
 " an insurmountable barrier to the employment of British 
 officers, " J without whose aid a thorough reformation was 
 impracticable. 
 
 This barrier to the employment of British officers, was 
 never, before Lord Dalhousie's time, felt or supposed to 
 be insurmountable, or anything more than a difficulty to 
 be overcome. Lord William Bentinck in 1831 was pre- 
 pared to enter on the task of reforming Oude, under the 
 Treaty of 1801, and the Court of Directors sanctioned its 
 commencement. 
 
 Colonel Low, the Resident at Lucknow, writes as fol- 
 lows to the Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, while the 
 Treaty of 1837 was under consideration : " In the whole 
 of the correspondence, both from the Home authorities 
 and in this country, all parties seemed formerly to have 
 agreed that not one rupee of the revenues of Oude ought 
 to be appropriated by the British Government beyond the 
 expenses of managing the territory, if we should conceive 
 it necessary to undertake its management by British 
 
 /y JJM 
 
 officers. II 
 
 Lord Auckland, in a letter to the Court of Directors of 
 the 9th February, 1839, refers to "the strong orders 
 
 * The Mysore Reversion, (2nd Edition) p. 219, and see also pp. 232, 233. 
 
 t Article vi, Collection of Treaties, 1864, vol. ii, p. 125. 
 
 t Oude Papers, 1854, p. 183. Ibid., 1856, p. 155. || Ibid., 1858, p. 18. 
 
OUDE. 71 
 
 already received from the Honourable Court, and still un- 
 executed, which would have warranted a temporary occu- 
 pation of the country l>y British officers, for correction of 
 the crying abuses that existed."* 
 
 Lord Hardinge in 1847, exhorting the King to initiate 
 an improved system, without delay, so as to save himself 
 from the penalties of the Treaty of 1837 at the end of 
 two years of probation, offered, as we have seen, to lend 
 him the services of English officers to superintend the 
 good work.f 
 
 Above all, at the very time when Lord Dalhousie was 
 professing to see in the Treaty of 1801 "an insurmount- 
 able barrier" to the employment of British officers in the 
 administration of Oude, several British officers were actu- 
 ally so employed, appointed by the Governor-General 
 himself, and directed by the Resident, though paid by the 
 Oude Government. "After such a lamentable picture of 
 the internal Police of Oude," writes Colonel Outram, the 
 Resident, to Lord Dalhousie, " it is satisfactory to turn 
 to the Frontier Police, the only efficient public establish- 
 ment maintained under the Oude Government ; but that 
 it is so efficiently maintained is to be attributed to its 
 being placed under British officers independent of the 
 Durbar, and under the immediate control of the Resident. 
 The Oude Frontier Police was originally established in 
 January, 1845, to the extent of 500 Sepoys and 100 
 horsemen, which force was subsequently augmented by 
 his present Majesty to the total strength of 750 Sepoys 
 and 150 horsemen." He adds, " it has been most efficient 
 and successful. "J 
 
 The same means would have made all the other public 
 establishments equally efficient. If there had been any 
 difficulty in the terms of the Treaty of 1801, the King's 
 consent would have removed it ; and Lord Dalhousie, who 
 had already seen that difficulty overcome in the case of 
 the Frontier Police, and who hoped to obtain the King's 
 consent to a Treaty of mediatisation, could hardly have 
 doubted that his Majesty's consent would be more easily 
 procured to the employment of a few more English officers. 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 42. t Ante, p. 65. % Oude Papers, 1856, pp. 31, 32. 
 
72 CHAPTER V. 
 
 But this was one of Lord Dalhousie's "scruples"; this 
 was one of his "misgivings" ; this was one of his tender 
 mercies. He could not "compel the fulfilment of the 
 Treaty of 1801 by force of arms," on account of " its pecu- 
 liar provisions."* But he had no objection to declare the 
 Treaty null and void, that is to say, to violate it him- 
 self by withdrawing the troops stationed in Oude in 
 accordance with that Treaty, to abandon the country to 
 anarchy and the capital to pillage, and to re-enter with a 
 large army, to dethrone the King and annex his dominions. 
 
 O t/ * O 
 
 Nor is it so difficult as might be supposed, to account for 
 these inconsistencies and contradictions. Lord Dalhousie 
 did not wish to reform Oude ; it was his special policy to 
 annex it. Reform, whether enforced by the Treaty of 
 1801 or that of 1837, whether carried out by the Resident 
 and his Assistants with a native agency, or by a larger 
 number of British officers, would have spoiled every chance 
 of annexing Oude. Therefore the Treaty of 1837 was 
 repudiated; therefore Sir William Sleeman's proposals were 
 coldly and silently received. 
 
 It was in obedience, as I said before, to a sort of prin- 
 ciple that Lord Dalhousie objected to projects of reform, 
 and aimed steadily at annexation. This principle was 
 made applicable by him not only to the case of Oude, but 
 to every case of a Native State that seemed to provoke 
 interference, or to He at his mercy. One of his avowed 
 reasons for deciding to annex the Punjaub, after the re- 
 bellion of 1849, instead of continuing to give the promised 
 " aid and assistance in the administration of the Lahore 
 State during the minority of the Maharajah Dhuleep 
 Sing,"f was that "we should have all the labour, all the 
 anxiety, all the responsibility, which would attach to the 
 territories if they were actually made our own ; while we 
 should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of 
 revenue, and acknowledged possession." J 
 
 In the same manner he recommended the annexation 
 of the Rajpoot State of Kerowlee by refusing to recognise 
 an adoption, because we should otherwise " for many years 
 to come have to bear the labour of governing this State, 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, pp. 183, and 299. t Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 
 1864, vol. ii, p. 267. j Punjaub Papers, 1849, p. 663. 
 
OUDE. 7:> 
 
 employing, always at inconvenience, a British officer for 
 the purpose/' and at the end of the young Prince's minor- 
 ity have to " hand over the country with its revenue of 
 four lacks of rupees."* 
 
 And' when in 1851 he was urged by General J. S. Fraser, 
 the able and accomplished Resident at Hyderabad, with 
 all the weight of many years' experience in that important 
 post, to undertake effectual measures for reforming the 
 administration of the Nizam's Dominions, Lord Dalhousie 
 positively declined. The Resident had suggested this 
 policy " on many recent occasions/' for the first time, as 
 we learn from another source, in February 1850,f a year 
 before the Governor-General took any notice of it. General 
 Fraser pointed out that the assignment of several Provinces 
 for the payment of the Contingent Force, demanded at 
 that time by our Government, would augment the Nizam's 
 financial difficulties, and was a measure " providing for our 
 own interests only, not for those of the country at large, 
 either as regards its Sovereign or its inhabitants. " J Lord 
 Dalhousie recorded his entire disapproval of the Resident's 
 policy. " If," he said, " provision be made for carrying it 
 actively and practically into operation, all the toil of a 
 laborious task, and all its real responsibility, must ever fall 
 on the British agent, l>y whom the native ministry is con- 
 trolled. The agent, on his part, while he reaps no ad- 
 vantage from his labours for his own State, must feel 
 himself to be without undivided authority." 
 
 It is true that Lord Dalhousie, on this occasion, pro- 
 nounced a general reprobation upon suggestions such as 
 those made by General Fraser, declaring them to proceed, 
 " in too many instances, not from sentiments of enlarged 
 benevolence, but from the promptings of ambitious greed." 
 " Quis tulerit Gracclios de seditione querentes V 
 
 He advanced as his first and main objection to the 
 proposal, that it was unauthorised by Treaty, that the 
 Nizam's " consent would never be voluntarily given, and 
 that, if obtained at all, it would be extorted only by the 
 open exercise of a power which he feels he could not resist, 
 
 * Papers, Kerowlee, 1855, p. 9. f Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam, by Cap- 
 tain Hastings Eraser, (Smith and Elder, 1865,) p. 268. 
 % Papers, the Nizam, 1854, p. 15. Ibid., 1854, p. 38. 
 
74 CHAPTER V. 
 
 or by the fear that we should proceed to some such 
 extreme."* 
 
 What respect can we pay to these scruples, these 
 tender mercies, when at this very time the Governor- 
 General was engaged in extorting from the Nizam by the 
 fear of the military power which he felt he could not 
 resist, the surrender of his fairest Provinces to British 
 management ? In the very Minute containing these pre- 
 cious misgivings, the Resident is instructed to demand 
 the transfer of the Provinces, and " to meet any remon- 
 strances or solicitations which his Highness may make for 
 another reference," by declaring that the Governor-Gene- 
 ral's " determination is fixed irrevocably." If his High- 
 ness " should refuse compliance, or should fail to complete 
 the arrangements which are requisite," the Resident will 
 then state " whether he will require any troops, in addi- 
 tion to the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces, for the 
 purpose of enforcing the determination that has been an- 
 nounced." j" 
 
 Thus Lord Dalhousie's scrupulosity prevented him from 
 using the enormous influence of the British Government 
 to introduce improvements into the Nizam's administra- 
 tion, because what he called "a system of subversive 
 interference" was "unwelcome alike to people and to 
 Prince," and because the Treaty declared his Highness to 
 be " absolute. "J But at this very time he was endeavouring 
 to introduce, and eventually carried out, by menace and 
 coercion, " a system of subversive interference" over one 
 quarter of that Prince's dominions. He would not employ 
 judicious pressure for the benefit of the State and people 
 of Hyderabad ; but he would use any amount of pressure 
 to extort payment and security for a most questionable 
 balance of debt. He would not take effectual steps for 
 correcting the administrative abuses of Oude, out of regard 
 for the "peculiar provisions" of a Treaty; but he was 
 
 * Papers, the Nizam, 1854, p. 38 t Ibid., 1854, pp. 34, 35. 
 
 I Ibid., 1854, pp. 38 and 36. 
 
 Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad in 1860, writes to the Govern- 
 ment of India : " Had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been 
 impartially dealt with, we had no just claim against the Nizam," "In 1853 
 we had little or no pecuniary claim against the Nizam." Papers, the Decca?i, 
 338 of 1887, p. 27. 
 
OUDE. 75 
 
 prepared to annul all Treaties, and to make a general 
 clearance of all ties and obligations by the withdrawal of 
 our troops and Resident, with the certainty, as he believed, 
 of insurrection and anarchy, and the consequently acquired 
 right of invasion and conquest. 
 
 It is true that in the Oude case he would have been 
 satisfied for the present with the exclusive administration 
 and entire possession of the revenues, after paying the 
 King's stipend, with the prospect of an early annexation 
 by " lapse," under the new Treaty restricting the succes- 
 sion to the lineal male descendants of the Prince actually 
 on the throne.* But he evidently preferred his own plan, 
 and worked himself into the strange notion that it was 
 more in accordance with " established law and custom," 
 and less open to hostile criticism, than " the more peremp- 
 tory course," as he called it, favoured by his colleagues, to 
 which he had, nevertheless, consented. Even in his last 
 Minute, written after possession had been taken, he recurs 
 with regret to his original scheme, and " finds no weight 
 in the objections" made to it. j" 
 
 In dealing with the alleged debt and disorganisation 
 of the Nizam's Government, Lord Dalhousie's aim and 
 object can be shewn to be identical with those which he 
 set before himself in the case of Oude. When repelling 
 General Eraser's suggestions that he should interpose as 
 Guide, Teacher, and Protector, he evidently looked for- 
 ward to some future opportunity of interposing as Dictator 
 and Master. He fixed his eyes on that same delightful 
 vision of disorder, bloodshed and anarchy in the dependent 
 State, inviting its total absorption, a vision which, equally 
 in both cases, would be dispelled for ever by " unwelcome" 
 measures of reform. The following passages from Lord 
 Dalhousie's Minute on Hyderabad affairs, dated May 27th, 
 1851, in which he repudiates General Eraser's policy, will 
 show his own intentions and wishes with sufficient clear- 
 ness. 
 
 " Whatever may be the tenor of his Highnesses administration, 
 it cannot be said as yet to have materially affected the security of 
 any portion of British territory, or to have damaged the interests 
 of British subjects." 
 
 * Ante, p. 53. t Oude Papers, 1856, pp. 290, 300. 
 
76 CHAPTER V. 
 
 (f So long as the alleged evils of his Highnesses Government 
 are confined within his own limits, and affect only his own subjects, 
 the Government of India must observe religiously the obligations 
 of its own good faith."* 
 
 " If, indeed, the effect of his Highnesses misgovernment should 
 be felt beyond his own bounds ; if the safety of our territory should 
 be placed in doubt, or the interests of our subjects in jeopardy 
 
 if recent insults to British subjects and soldiers within his 
 
 Highnesses territory should occur with increasing frequency, I 
 shall not be satisfied, as on some past occasions, with the punish- 
 ment of individual offenders ; I shall probably feel myself called 
 upon in such case to require the adoption of such stronger mea- 
 sures as shall effectually put a stop to outrages which, unless they 
 are repressed, cannot fail to lower the estimation in which our 
 power is held by Native States, and in some degree to tarnish 
 the honour of our name." 
 
 " It may be that every effort we can make will be insufficient to 
 avert the crash which the recklessness and apathy and obstinacy of 
 the Nizam are all tending to produce ; it may be that the Govern- 
 ment of India may, after all, be compelled to that direct interference 
 in his Highnesses affairs which it still most earnest]y desires to 
 avoid. If ever that time should come, the officer who may then 
 be entrusted with the charge of the Indian Empire, will doubtless 
 be prepared to act as the circumstances of the times, and as his 
 duty to his country may seem to him to require. But he will 
 then be enabled to act with confidence, strengthened by the con- 
 sciousness that the Government of India has long laboured to the 
 utmost, though in vain, to avert from the Nizam the fate which will 
 then have overtaken him"-\ 
 
 There can be little doubt as to what that fate was in- 
 tended to be, and would have been, if anything like the 
 expected " crash" had occurred while Lord Dalhousie pre- 
 sided over India. Nor can any one fail to see that Lord 
 Dalhousie's special policy towards the Nizam in spite of 
 all the intolerable verbiage with which, as usual, he wrapped 
 it up, was simply that of his giving his Highness " rope 
 enough" Just as he declared the " consent" of the King 
 of Oude to be " indispensable to the transfer of any part 
 of his sovereign authority, J and that he was entitled to 
 carry on his administration by "his own officers, "the 
 " peculiar provisions" of the Treaty of 1801 forming " an in 
 
 * This is an unfortunate specimen of Lord Dalhousie's style. The " obliga- 
 tions of good faith" are, apparently, not to be observed when the evils of the 
 Nizam's misgovernment pass beyond his own limits. 
 
 t Papers, the Nizam,,\9>b, pp. 38-40. % Para. 70, p. 187, Oude Papers, 1856. 
 
OUDE. 77 
 
 surmountable barrier" to the introduction of an improved 
 system,* so, for the nonce, the Nizam was exalted into " an 
 independent Power,"*)" " absolute," and exempt by Treaty 
 from " interference in his internal affairs. "J And these 
 scruples arose, with regard to Hyderabad, while he was en- 
 deavouring to deprive the Nizam of a large portion of his 
 dominions. It is quite clear that he would force no " un- 
 welcome measure of reform" upon either of those States, 
 when such measures were suggested by Sir William Slee- 
 man and General Fraser, because he did not wish for their 
 reform, but rather for some catastrophe that might lead to 
 their fall or screen their extirpation. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll completely misconceives the policy 
 of those who, like Lord William Bentinck, Lord Hardinge, 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, and Sir William Sleeman, were op- 
 posed to annexation but bent upon reform. He endeavours 
 to show that their doctrines were quite as arbitrary as 
 those approved by him, less consistent and less efficacious 
 amounting, in his words, to "annexation without the 
 avowal of the name." The acquisitive process of his school 
 requiring, as we have seen, that all Treaties should, by 
 hook or by crook inverted commas or fabricated lapse- 
 be annihilated, he completely overlooks the vast power of 
 interference and supervision placed in our hands by these 
 Treaties, which, if firmly exercised in good time, could 
 have prevented or cured all misgovernment without des- 
 troying the Native State. Lord Dalhousie, in order to 
 shake off the obligations of guidance and protection, dearly 
 bought by the dependent Principality of Oude, declared 
 the Treaty of 1837 to be an abortion, and the Treaty of 
 1801 to have been violated and made null and void by 
 the King's misrule. Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William 
 Sleeman upheld both those Treaties, and censured the 
 neglect of our Government in not enforcing them for the 
 good of the people of Oude. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll believes that the best authorities 
 on International Law, would give " some name harsher 
 than annexation" to the course in respect to Oude favoured 
 
 * Ante, p. 70. t Para. 34, p. 37, Papers, the Nizam, 1854 
 
 t Para. 27 and 36, p. 36 and 38, Papers, the Nizam, 1854. 
 India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 18. 
 
78 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 by Sir Henry Lawrence. " The notion," says the Duke, 
 "that the Rulers of Oudehad any sovereign rights, on ac- 
 count of Which we were bound not to interfere with their 
 authority, is scouted by Sir Henry Lawrence with indig- 
 nation."* Of course that notion was scouted by Sir Henry 
 Lawrence, who recognised the Treaty of 1837, and 
 wished to see it brought into operation. Even under the 
 Treaty of 1801 we were entitled to interfere with the 
 King's authority, since he was bound by Article VI, "al- 
 ways to advise with and act in conformity to the counsel of 
 the Honourable Company's officers."^ This was quite suffi- 
 cient warrant for the effectual reformation of Oude, if we 
 had determined to undertake it. Sir Henry Lawrence's 
 indignation was directed against our neglect and delay in 
 fulfilling our bounden duty. He certainly recognised the 
 sovereign rights of the Rulers of Oude, but not as rights 
 of irresponsible and uncontrollable despotism. On the con- 
 trary, he saw that the sovereignty and authority of the 
 King were most effectually and beneficially controlled and 
 limited by the Treaties, if we only chose to apply them 
 properly. 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence recommended that if the personal 
 reformation of a Prince were rendered hopeless by a "career 
 of vice and contumacy," he should " be set aside and re- 
 placed by the nearest of kin who gives better promise." 
 This passage seems to shock the Duke terribly : it implies, 
 according to him, " that the British Government has abso- 
 lute power, not only over the administration, but over the 
 succession to the throne of Native States. "J And who 
 doubts that absolute power ? Does the Duke of Argyll 
 doubt it ? Certainly I do not. " The consciousness of our 
 own responsibility for the maladministration maintained by 
 our bayonets," of which the Duke speaks in another part 
 of his Essay, has undoubtedly weighed more or less upon 
 all Englishmen engaged in the government of India, as it 
 has upon his Grace. He is quite right so far. We cannot 
 get rid of that responsibility. Having undertaken by our 
 system of military protection, paid for by subsidies or ces- 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 16. t Collection of Treaties, 
 1864, vol. ii, p. 125. J India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 17. 
 
 Ibid., p. 12. 
 
OUDE. 79 
 
 sions, to forbid rivalry and to suppress rebellion, despotism 
 in India is no longer "tempered by assassination." Not 
 even a palace revolution is allowed without our concur- 
 rence. Time and circumstances have, in fact, reserved for 
 us the revolutionary power as an Imperial prerogative, 
 and we must not hesitate to use it on an emergency. The 
 often recurring problem, never, I believe, insoluble, 
 is how to use it with discretion and impartiality, whether 
 we interfere to settle a disputed or doubtful inheritance, or 
 to depose a contumacious or incompetent Prince. No ques- 
 tion of this sort should ever be decided, no irrevocable 
 step taken, without consulting those most conversant with 
 local affairs, those most nearly interested in the welfare of 
 the reigning family, and the stability of the commonwealth. 
 
 There is no reason why anyone holding the opinions of 
 Sir Henry Lawrence or Sir William Sleeman, should shrink 
 from altering a succession, or deposing a reigning Sove- 
 reign. The deposition of a King, however rare an inci- 
 dent, is not always to be stigmatised as revolutionary, or 
 even as irregular. A Sovereign's abdication is seldom the 
 result of his own free will. But there is nothing in it re- 
 pugnant to the constitutional law of any country. Indeed 
 the voluntary or forced abdication of a reigning Prince, the 
 renunciation or exclusion of an heir apparent, have been, 
 and obviously must be sometimes, essential conditions of 
 prosperity and success under a monarchical form of govern- 
 ment. And such a necessity is more likely to arise, the 
 more the nature of the Government approaches a despotism, 
 the more it depends for its working on the personal cha- 
 racter and abilities of the Sovereign. 
 
 The misrule of Oude was so flagrant as to call for our 
 intervention. General Sleeman thought the King should 
 be removed from the throne on account of mental incapacity. 
 
 " His Majesty is hypochondriac,, and frequently under the in- 
 fluence of the absurd delusions common to such persons ; but he 
 is quite sane during long intervals, and on all subjects not con- 
 nected with such delusions."* " The King cannot be considered 
 to be in a sound state of mind."t 
 
 " The members of the family, who have its interests most at 
 heart, are becoming anxious for some change." f 
 
 * Sleeman 's Oude, vol. i, p. liv. t Ibid-, vol. i, p. Ixix. J Ibid., vol. i, p. Ixxii. 
 
80 CHAPTER V. 
 
 " No part of the people of Oude are more anxious for the inter- 
 position of our Government than the members of the royal family. 
 * * * The King is a crazy imbecile/'* 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence had arrived at the same opinion. 
 There was a crying necessity for the King's removal. In 
 consequence of our military protection and acknowledged 
 supremacy, this could only be performed by our hands. 
 
 It is at this point that the views of Lord Dalhousie and 
 the Duke of Argyll on the one hand, and those of Sir Wil- 
 liam Sleeman and Sir Henry Lawrence on the other, com- 
 pletely diverge. All are agreed that an incompetent Prince 
 is the great obstacle to good government. All are agreed 
 that his removal is necessary. They differ as to the ob- 
 ject and effect of his removal. The school of annexation 
 would sweep away with the King the whole fabric of local 
 self-government, dismiss the whole tribe of native digni- 
 taries and superior officials, and replace them by English 
 gentlemen. The reforming school would maintain all ex- 
 isting arrangements as far as possible intact ; would intro- 
 duce very few English officers ; and even if the King's 
 executive power were to be entirely suspended for a time, 
 would uphold his sovereignty as the best pledge and safe- 
 guard for the separate integrity of the State and the ulti- 
 mate reconstruction of a purely native administration. 
 
 The Treaty of 1837, under which Sir Henry Lawrence 
 and Sir William Sleeman proposed to act, expressly pro- 
 mised "to maintain, with such improvements as they may 
 admit of, the native institutions and forms of administra- 
 tion within the assumed territories, so as to facilitate the 
 restoration of those territories to the Sovereign of Oude, 
 when the proper period for such restoration shall arrive, "f 
 
 Lord William Bentinck in 1831 proposed to form "an 
 administration entirely native, the only European part of 
 which should be the functionary by whom it should be 
 superintended. " J 
 
 In 1847 Lord Hardinge assured the King that the 
 British Government desired u to perform its obligations to 
 the people without setting the sovereign authority aside, 
 or changing the native institutions of the State. " 
 
 * Sleeman s Oude, vol. ii, p. 369. 
 
 t Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 1864, vol. ii, p. 177. 
 
 % Ante, p. 64. Ante, p. fir>. 
 
OUDE. 81 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence attributes the misgovernment of 
 Oude in a great measure to that crying evil, "the want of 
 any recognised system of policy in our negotiations with 
 the Lucknow Court," so that everything was "mere guess- 
 work and experiment," and there was no possibility of 
 harmony between the King, the Minister, and the Resi- 
 dent. "Our great error," he says, "has been our inter- 
 ference in trifles, while we stood aloof when important 
 questions were at issue."* " This interference has been more 
 in favour of men than of measures, "t 
 
 " If an able Minister was appointed or encouraged by the 
 British Government, he was, as a matter of course, suspected and 
 thwarted by his master ; if the King did happen to employ an 
 honest servant, the power of the latter was null unless he had the 
 Resident's support ."J 
 
 " Among her Ministers have been as able individuals as are 
 usually to be found in the East." 
 
 " The result is before our eyes ; the remedy is also in our 
 hands. Let the management be assumed under some such rules 
 as those which were laid down by Lord W. Bentinck. Let the 
 administration of the country, as far as possible, be native. Let 
 not a rupee come into the Company's coffers." \\ 
 
 In the explanation of his plan he provided for only five 
 English Superintendents, under the Resident "as Minister, 
 not only in fact but in name."^! 
 
 " Our plan involves the employment of every present Oude offi- 
 cial, willing to remain, and able to perform the duties that would 
 be required of him." 
 
 " It would be desirable to retain the services of one or two 
 respectable men, to assist the Resident, and form with him a Court 
 of Appeal from the Superintendent's decrees."** 
 
 Nor did he ever deviate from these opinions. Five years 
 after the annexation of the Punjaub, in June, 1854, he 
 wrote as foUows, in a private letter to Mr. Kaye : 
 
 " Our remedy for gross misgovernment was given in my article 
 on Oude in the Calcutta Review nine years ago, to take the man- 
 agement temporarily or permanently. We have no right to rob 
 a man because he spends his money badly, or even because he ill- 
 treats his peasantry. We may protect and help the latter without 
 putting the rents into our own pockets."ff 
 
 * Essays, p. 129. f Ibid., p. 63. J Ibid., p. 129. Ibid., p. 128. 
 || Ibid., pp. 131, 132. 1 Ibid., 132. ** Ibid., p. 135. 
 ft Kaye's Lives of Indian Officers, vol. ii, p. 310. 
 
 G 
 
82 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Above all it is worthy of remark that Sir Henry Law- 
 rence, no mere theorist, but one of the ablest administrators 
 in India, who would willingly have undertaken the task 
 he was then sketching out, proposed that the assessment 
 of the land-tax should be fixed for the whole country, and 
 distributed among the five districts, " as far as possible 
 by the people themselves," " in a great assembly of the 
 people."* 
 
 Sir William Sleeman declared that in Oude there was 
 " no want of an educated class for civil office ; on the con- 
 trary they abound almost as much as the class of soldiers. " j" 
 By their means, " with the aid of a few of the ablest of 
 the native judicial and revenue officers of our own districts, 
 invited to Oude by the prospect of higher pay," J he in- 
 tended to carry out his projects of reform, if Lord Dal- 
 housie would have sanctioned and supported them. 
 
 The administrative abuses of Oude and the demoralisa- 
 tion of all its establishments were greatly aggravated 
 during the six years of Lord Dalhousie's masterly neglect, 
 which, following immediately on Lord Hardinge's two 
 years of probation, seemed to hold out a prolonged lease 
 of power to the vile advisers of an imbecile King. Before 
 Sir William Sleeman left Lucknow, he had become con- 
 vinced that the correction of abuses and inauguration of 
 a new system were no longer within the capacity of a 
 Board of Regency, and that stronger measures must be 
 taken. " Our Government," he wrote on the 5th March, 
 1854, to Colonel Low, who as Resident had negotiated 
 the Treaty of 1837, "would be fully authorised at any 
 time to enforce the penalty prescribed in your Treaty of 
 1837, and it incurs great odium and obloquy for not en- 
 forcing it." 1 1 He found that he would require the aid of 
 some English officers. He wrote to Lord Dalhousie, " I 
 shall not propose any native gentlemen for the higher 
 offices," meaning, no doubt, those originally intended for 
 the Board of Regency, " but it will be necessary to have 
 a great many in the subordinate ones, to show that your 
 Lordship wishes to open employment in ah 1 branches of 
 the new administration to educated native gentlemen."^} 
 
 * Essays, pp. 132, 133. f Ante, p. 66. J Ante, p. 66. Now General Sir John 
 Low, K.C.B. || Sleeman's Oude, vol. ii, p. 419. 1" Ibid., vol. ii, p. 355. 
 
OUDE. 83 
 
 He recommended that "all establishments, military, 
 civil, and fiscal, be kept entirely separate from those of 
 our own Government, that there may be no mistake as to 
 the disinterestedness of our intentions towards Oude."* 
 He declared that " by adopting a simple system of admi- 
 nistration, to meet the wishes of a simple people, we should 
 secure the goodwill of all classes of society."f And in 
 his last letter to Lord Dalhousie, he said, "There are 
 many honest men at Lucknow. But no honest man can 
 obtain or retain office under Government with the present 
 Minister and heads of departments. "J 
 
 Yet the Duke of Argyll declares that Sir William Slee- 
 man's plan was " annexation without the avowal of the 
 name"; and that to Sir Henry Lawrence's plan "some 
 name harsher than annexation," ought to be applied. || 
 
 On another point the Duke completely misunderstands, 
 and consequently misrepresents, Sir William Sleeman and 
 Sir Henry Lawrence. He says, " they had a strange 
 theory that though the King had no indefeasible title to 
 any part of the Kingly power, he had an indefeasible title 
 to the whole of the Kingly revenues, that the whole 
 revenue over and above the costs of administration was 
 absolutely due to the King of Oude : that is to say, it 
 was legitimate to seize the Government in the interests 
 of the people, but it was not legitimate to administer for 
 the benefit of the people the revenues of the State, "^f 
 And he complains that, according to their doctrine, " the 
 whole surplus was to go where it had gone before, to be 
 spent on the pageants and buffooneries and dancing-girls 
 of Lucknow !"** 
 
 This is a very great mistake. Neither Sir Henry Law- 
 rence nor Sir William Sleeman ever proposed that the 
 surplus revenue should be paid to the King. Both of 
 them intended that the King should receive an annual 
 income fixed at the discretion of the British trustee. 
 
 In order to prove that in Sir Henry Lawrence's opinion 
 " it was not legitimate to administer for the benefit of the 
 people the revenues of the State," and that all the surplus, 
 
 * Sleeman '* Oude, vol. ii, p. 380. f IMd-, vol. ii, p. 381. J Ibid., vol. ii, p. 423. 
 India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 18. || Ibid., p. 16. 
 1 Ihid., p. 18. ** Ibid., p. 19. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 CHAPTER V. 
 
 after defraying the actual costs of administration, should 
 be handed over to the King, the Duke quotes a sentence 
 from Sir Henry Lawrence's Essay on Oude : " Let not a 
 rupee come into the Company's coffers."* Sir Henry 
 Lawrence's real meaning will be easily understood when 
 the sentence is restored to its place between two other short 
 sentences not quoted by the Duke of Argyll. The whole 
 passage will then stand as follows : " Let the administra- 
 tion of the country, as far as possible, be native. Let not 
 a rupee come into the Company's coffers. Let Oude be 
 at last governed, not for one man, the King, but for 
 him and his people"^ that is to say, for the State of 
 Oude. In another place he says, "We have not been 
 guiltless : in repenting of the past, let us look honestly 
 to the future. For once let us remember the people, the 
 gentles, the nobles, the royal family ; and not legislate 
 merely for the King/' J 
 
 It is strange that the Duke of Argyll should have also 
 completely misunderstood Sir William Sleeman. "We 
 have a right," the latter said, "under the Treaty of 1837, 
 to take the management of Oude, but not to appropriate 
 its revenues to ourselves." As late as September, 1852, 
 he tried, but in vain, to sound Lord Dalhousie on this 
 very point. 
 
 " I believe that it is your Lordship' s wish that the whole of the 
 revenues of Oude should be expended for the benefit of the royal 
 family and people of Oude, and that the British Government 
 should disclaim any wish to derive any pecuniary advantages from 
 assuming to itself the administration." || 
 
 " Were we to take advantage of the occasion to annex or con- 
 fiscate Oude, or any part of it, our good name in India would in- 
 evitably suffer ; and that good name is more valuable to us than 
 a dozen of Oudes." 
 
 ' ' Annexation or confiscation is not compatible with our relations 
 with this little dependent State. We must show ourselves high- 
 minded, and above taking advantage of its prostrate weakness, by 
 appropriating its revenues exclusively to the benefit of the people 
 and royal family of Oude. "If 
 
 When Lord William Bentinck said that " the whole of 
 the revenue should be paid into the Oude Treasury,"** he 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 19. t Sir Henry Lawrences 
 Essays, p. 132. % Ibid., p. 136. Ante, p. || Sleemarfs Oude, vol. ii, p. 372. 
 f Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 378, 379. ** Ante, p. 64. 
 
OUDE. 85 
 
 did not say that it should be paid into the King's Privy 
 Purse. Nor can "the King's Treasury/' mentioned in 
 Article VIII of the Treaty of 1837, be held to signify the 
 King's Privy Purse. The distinction between the two 
 Treasuries ^ is quite well understood all over India; and 
 wherever it has been imperfectly observed in practice, 
 could be established by our influence in any Native State 
 on the first convenient opportunity. Far from wishing to 
 give all the surplus to the King, or to provide him with 
 the means of unlimited extravagance, Sir William Slee- 
 man suggested an annual sum for the Eoyal Household 
 of fifteen lakhs of rupees (150,000),* three lakhs less 
 than that offered to the King by Lord Dalhousie, eighteen 
 lakhs (180,000), besides one lakh (10,000) to the Queen 
 Mother, on* condition of his signing the draft treaty 
 of 1856. t 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, indeed, proposed to give the King 
 a larger income. " Twenty, thirty, or even fifty lakhs 
 per annum might, as the revenues increased, be allowed. 
 He should be furnished to his heart's content with silver 
 sticks, "J and so forth. The magnitude of the highest 
 sum here mentioned, fifty lakhs, 500,000, more than a 
 third of the gross revenue, is sufficient to show that it 
 is not to be taken literally, but only to express forcibly 
 his opinion that if matters could be smoothed and simpli- 
 fied by a liberal allowance to the King, the exact sum 
 ought to form no difficulty in the settlement. Sir Henry 
 Lawrence was merely writing an article in the Calcutta 
 Review, with no official responsibility to give precision to 
 his language. Had he been Resident at Lucknow he 
 would certainly not have recommended a larger income 
 for the King than Sir William Sleeman did. 
 
 These two distinguished officers had no weak tenderness 
 for the King's "pageants and buffooneries." They com- 
 plained that in consequence of our neglect the country 
 was governed too much " for one man, the King," and in- 
 sisted that for the future it should be governed "for the 
 
 * Sleeman' s Oude, vol. ii, p. 381. t Oude Papers, 1856, pp. 242, 291. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie observed that, according to Sir William Sleeman, about twelve 
 lakhs, (120,000) was all that the King " was usually able to obtain" for his 
 own Household. Oude Papers, p. 302. J Essays, p. 136. 
 
86 CHAPTER V. 
 
 people, the nobles, the gentles, and the royal family, and 
 not merely for the King."* The Duke of Argyll says 
 they considered it " not legitimate to administer the reve- 
 nues of the State for the benefit of the people, "t That 
 would have been " a strange theory" indeed ; but the 
 Duke alone is responsible for its conception. Nothing of 
 the sort can be found in the writings of Sir William Slee- 
 man or Sir Henry Lawrence. They evinced no reluctance 
 to expend the revenues of Oude for the benefit of the 
 people. They sketched out schemes of roads and other 
 public works that would have transformed the face of the 
 country. Sir Henry Lawrence proposed to commence 
 operations with a loan of a million sterling, to be paid off 
 in ten or fifteen years, J so that there would have been 
 little or no surplus for anyone during that period. 
 
 But the Duke of Argyll may still object that although 
 these two eminent men did not, perhaps, exactly intend 
 to throw all the surplus revenues into the King's hands, 
 "to be spent on the pageants, buffooneries, and dancing- 
 girls of Lucknow," they certainly intended that all the 
 revenues of Oude should be spent within its limits, that 
 the surplus should not belong to the British Government 
 of India. If his Grace had restrained his rhetoric within 
 those bounds, his statement would have been perfectly 
 accurate, and several pages of my rejoinder might have 
 been spared. When Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William 
 Sleeman said that " the administration should, as far as 
 possible, be native"; that "not a rupee" should " come 
 into the Company's coffers"; that we had no right "to 
 appropriate its revenues to ourselves," and that they 
 "should be expended for the benefit of the royal family 
 and people of Oude," they undoubtedly intended to ex- 
 clude our Government from any claim upon the surplus 
 revenues, and to restrain the nepotism of Calcutta within 
 moderate bounds. Until the growing mania for territorial 
 extension arrived at its climax under the fostering care 
 and encouragement of Lord Dalhousie, it was generally 
 acknowledged that the resources of Oude had already 
 been sufficiently drained by monstrous subsidies, extorted 
 
 * Ante, p. 84. f Ante, p. 83. % Essays, p. 135. 
 
OUDE. 87 
 
 cessions, and forced loans,* and that no further demands 
 for Imperial purposes ought to be made upon its Treasury. 
 When the Treaty of 1837 was under consideration, the 
 Articles imposing an annual burden of sixteen lakhs of 
 rupees upon Oude for a new Auxiliary Force, were opposed 
 upon these grounds by two members of the Supreme 
 Council, Mr. Ross and Mr. Shakespear. Both of them 
 observed that in return for the great cession of territory 
 in 1801, we had declared in the 1st Article of the Treaty 
 of that year that the Nawab was " relieved from the obli- 
 gation of defraying the expenses of any additional troops 
 which at any time may be required for the protection of 
 Oude." And Mr. Shakespear added that before exacting 
 any new subsidy, it would be necessary "to cancel the 
 5th Article" of the Treaty of 1801, " which engages that 
 no demand whatever shall be made upon the territory of 
 his Excellency, on account of expenses which the Honour- 
 able Company may incur for the suppression of disorders 
 within his territories. "t This was the main objection of 
 the Court of Directors to the Treaty of 1837. This was 
 the objection of Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William 
 Sleeman to the surplus revenues of Oude being appropri- 
 ated by the Honourable Company. On a mere debtor 
 and creditor account, as well as by innumerable and un- 
 remitting friendly services, the State of Oude had paid 
 in advance for all the protection, guidance, and instruction 
 we could give. Against Oude we had no pecuniary claim. 
 Even Lord Auckland, when pressing his plan for a new 
 Auxiliary Force, felt himself compelled in common decency 
 to urge that it would be "a measure of real economy" for 
 Oude.J All our efforts for "the tranquillity and good 
 government" of Oude, should be, he said, " without the 
 taint which schemes of acquisition in money or land might 
 give them." Any such scheme he declared to be " as re- 
 pugnant to my own designs and feelings as they have 
 ever been disavowed by the Honourable Court, and by 
 
 * With regard to some of these Sir Henry Lawrence says : " The friends of 
 Lord Hastings have asserted that these loans were voluntary, but Colonel Bail- 
 lie has shewn the transaction in a very different light. The money was extorted 
 from the Nawab by the importunity of the Resident, who acted on repeated 
 and urgent instructions from the Governor-General." Essays, p. 118. 
 
 t Oude Papers, 1858, p. 28. $ Ibid., p. 50. 
 
88 CHAPTER V. 
 
 each successive Governor-General, in discussing the grave 
 question of the position in which events have placed us, 
 both towards the Oude ruler and people."* 
 
 Sir Barnes Peacock, f who was Legal Member of Council 
 when the annexation of Oude was discussed, " could not 
 recommend that any part of the revenues of Oude should 
 be applied to the payment of the military administration 
 of the Province." After referring to the cessions and pro- 
 mises of 1801, he says : " For the same reason I would 
 not place the residue of the revenue at the disposal of the 
 East India Company, but would leave it to be disposed 
 of entirely for the benefit of the people of the Province." J 
 " If the Honourable Court of Directors should resolve to 
 adopt that measure, I think that no pecuniary benefit 
 should be derived by the East India Company. " 
 
 So that Sir Barnes Peacock, one of Lord Dalhousie's 
 colleagues, an acute and clear-headed lawyer, propounded 
 that same theory which seems to the Duke of Argyll a 
 strange delusion when it comes from Sir Henry Lawrence 
 and Sir William Sleeman. Yet Sir Barnes Peacock had 
 no great sympathy for the King of Oude. He speaks on 
 behalf of " the people of that State "\\ 
 
 The source of the Duke of Argyll's error is evident 
 enough. He can think of no "people" but the people of 
 all India. He can think of no " State" but that which is 
 centralised at Calcutta. Like Lord Dalhousie and his 
 best contemporary interpreter, Mr. George Campbell, he 
 looks upon the revenue of a native Principality as a very 
 inconvenient alienation from the Imperial assets, to be 
 called into the common stock as soon as may be.^j He 
 cannot understand how Oude could have any right to be 
 a State at all. The school of annexation has always 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1858, p. 8. f Now Chief Justice of the High Court at 
 
 Calcutta. Oude Papers, 1856, p. 232. Ibid., 1856, p. 231. 
 
 |j Ibid., 1856, p. 232. f " It is indeed only in this way" by rejecting 
 adopted heirs " that we can hope gradually to extinguish the native States, 
 which consume so large a portion of the revenues of the country, and so prevent 
 us from lightening the burdens and improving the condition of the mass of the 
 people." (Campbell's Modern India, p. 169.) This book was published in 
 1852, just in the nick of time, as if to serve as an exponent and defence of Lord 
 Dalhousie's policy. It represents very fairly the ordinary views held by the 
 Bengal Civil Service, of which Mr. Campbell, late a Judge of the High Court 
 of Calcutta, now Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, is a very able 
 and distinguished member. 
 
OUDE. 89 
 
 ignored entirely the corporate rights of the Native State. 
 They seem to argue and to act upon an incoherent and 
 inconsistent doctrine, oscillating between Oriental despot- 
 ism and revolutionary violence, by which the reigning 
 Prince, for the time being, is made the sole representative 
 and personal embodiment of the State. So long as he 
 remains on the throne, his absolute power must not be 
 limited, or he would have "virtually no sovereignty at 
 all ;"* he would be " in leading strings," " a mere puppet," 
 and "a sham Sovereign. "f He alone is responsible for 
 any disorder or misrule in his dominions, whether injurious 
 only to his own subjects, or affecting his relations with 
 the British Government. Whether he be a criminal or 
 an imbecile, he is fully empowered to transfer by his sig- 
 nature all his possessions, and may justly and legally be 
 terrified or coerced into doing so. But with or without 
 his extorted consent, the removal of the reigning Prince 
 extinguishes the rights of his family, annuls all treaties, 
 and terminates the separate existence of the Principality, 
 which naturally and necessarily merges in the Paramount 
 Empire as an ordinary Province. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll, in common with the school of an- 
 nexation which he admires and defends, persists in seeing 
 nothing but the King's person between the British Govern- 
 ment and the desired acquisition of territory. Sir William 
 Sleeman and Sir Henry Lawrence saw a great deal more. 
 With them the King was not the State. They knew 
 that Oude had, since the cessions of 1801, paid for our 
 military protection over and over again, not only by con- 
 tributions and advances in the hour of our financial need, 
 not only by supplies and means of transport in several 
 campaigns, but by the inestimable aid of her friendly 
 countenance and faithful influence in days of great mili- 
 tary and political emergency. They knew that these ser- 
 vices had not been rendered by the King alone ; that we 
 had been indebted as much or more, in proportion to their 
 respective importance and ability, to the ministers, the 
 officials, to some of the great landholders, to many of "the 
 nobles, gentles, and people," whom Sir Henry Lawrence 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, pp. 34 and 37. 
 t Mysore Papers, 1866, pp. 84, 85, 86. 
 
90 CHAPTER V. 
 
 exhorted our Government to "remember." They knew 
 that many persons belonging to these classes had been the 
 greatest sufferers from our neglect, our exclusive attention 
 to our own immediate interests, and, when those were 
 secured, our uniform support of the King's personal autho- 
 rity throughout his own dominions.* They knew that 
 these classes, the most sensitive, the most reflective, the 
 best informed, the most influential, and the most improv- 
 able members of the community, although anxious for 
 our corrective intervention, would see their own inevitable 
 ruin and degradation in the extinction of the Kingdom. 
 Hear Sir William Sleeman in 1853. 
 
 " In 1801, when the Oude territory was divided, and half taken 
 by us and half left to Oude, the landed aristocracy of each was 
 about equal. Now, hardly a family of this class remains in our 
 half, while in Oude it remains unimpaired. Everybody in Oude 
 believes those families to have been systematically crushed. "t 
 
 " The members of the landed aristocracy of Oude always speak 
 with respect of the administration in our territories, but generally 
 end with remarking on the cost and uncertainty of the law in 
 civil cases, and the gradual decay, under its operation, of all the 
 ancient families. A less and less proportion of the annual produce 
 of their lands is left to them in our periodical settlements of the 
 land revenue.^! 
 
 There was not in Oude even such a semblance of a party 
 in favour of British appropriation, as there was in Mexico 
 in favour of the unfortunate Emperor Maximilian. Every 
 one supposed whether rightly or wrongly it matters not, 
 that after absorption within the Honourable Company's 
 territories, all avenues to promotion and distinction would 
 be closed, that the manufacture and import of many 
 articles of ornament and luxury would be very much 
 diminished, that all encouragement to native art and 
 learning would cease, and that the wealth of the country 
 would be drained away to Calcutta and London. Even 
 the "pageants and buffooneries of Lucknow," did not 
 excite much horror in the minds of this ignorant popula- 
 tion. Such sights are run after by the simple inhabitants 
 of India almost as eagerly as the more serious and intel- 
 lectual attractions of a review, a royal procession, or a 
 
 * * Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays, pp. 75, 109, 131. 
 t Sleeman' s Oude, vol. ii, p. 415. J Ibid., vol. i, p. 168. 
 
OUDE. 9 1 
 
 Lord Mayor's Show, are in enlightened England. The 
 people are well aware of their Prince's lavish expenditure, 
 but they are rather proud of it than otherwise. The 
 money is spent among themselves, and they all benefit by 
 it, more or less, if only by a little occasional entertain- 
 ment and excitement. As General Sir John Low re- 
 marked, when discussing the question of the stipend to 
 be allotted t<j. the Ex-King of Oude, "these Princes" do 
 not " hoard up their money in large sums, and bury it," 
 nor do they " dispose of their lakhs, as most European 
 gentlemen do with their thousands, that is to say, save 
 more than they expend, and send their savings off to a 
 distant country."* 
 
 Nor was the aversion to lose all their local privileges 
 and customs amid the cold uniformity of British rule, con- 
 fined to the great landlords, the courtiers and the higher 
 officials, the traders and artisans of the capital and large 
 towns. There was literally no class in the country that 
 desired the downfall of the native State. 
 
 " It might have been expected," said Lord Canning, in 
 his despatch of the 17th June, 1858, "that when insur- 
 rection first arose in Oude, and before it had grown to a 
 formidable head, the village occupants who had been so 
 highly favoured by the British Government, and in justice 
 to whom it had initiated a policy distasteful to the most 
 powerful class in the province, would have come forward 
 in support of the Government. Such, however, was not 
 the case. So far as I am as yet informed, not an indivi- 
 dual dared to be loyal to the Government which had be- 
 friended him. The village occupants, as a body, relapsed 
 into their former subjection to the Talookdar," or great 
 landlord, " owned and obeyed his authority as if he had 
 been their lawful Suzerain, and joined the ranks of those 
 who rose up in arms against the British Government. 
 The endeavour to neutralize the usurped and largely 
 abused power of the Talookdars by recognising the sup- 
 posed proprietary rights of the people, and thus arousing 
 their feelings of self-interest arid evoking their gratitude, 
 had failed utterly." **##* Those whom we 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, p. 224. 
 
92 CHAPTER V. 
 
 had desired to benefit, and had to our thinking benefited, 
 did not value the rights which we had restored to them, 
 and far from standing up in defence of those rights, and 
 in support of the Government which had been the means 
 of reviving them, they had acted in complete subordina- 
 tion to the Talookdars, and had been no less forward than 
 these latter in their efforts to subvert the authority of 
 that Government and expel its officers."* * 
 
 The village occupants knew much more of the British 
 revenue system than Lord Canning imagined. They per- 
 fectly understood that tjie " supposed proprietary right" 
 enjoyed by the villagers of our adjacent districts, was 
 nothing more than the right to pay their quota directly 
 to the Government instead of to the Talookdar. They 
 knew quite well that any intermediate profit-rent which 
 was lost by the Talookdar would be no gain to them, but 
 would fall into the coffers of Government; while they 
 would lose the protection and countenance of their here- 
 ditary Chief, and would be transferred to the covenanted 
 and uncovenanted mercies of a Collector and his under- 
 lings. They knew that in the neighbouring British dis- 
 tricts the assessment of the land tax had been systema- 
 tically and progressively enhanced, and that the ryots, for 
 want of substantial and influential landlords, were exposed 
 to the illicit exactions of subordinate officials. 
 
 The alleged prevalence of oppression and extortion in 
 Oude is utterly irreconcileable with the fact that the 
 population showed no inclination to emigrate into the con- 
 tiguous territories of the Company, open to them on three 
 sides, f The mal-administration of Oude did not drive 
 the people to rebellion, nor even to remonstrance. The 
 King was utterly incompetent, but not cruel. The great 
 fault of his Government was not tyranny but weakness. 
 
 Whatever may have been the errors of the last reigning 
 King of Oude, however much he may have neglected and 
 mismanaged the internal affairs of his Kingdom, he was 
 neither a cruel tyrant nor a faithless Ally. " In all those 
 measures," said General Low, in 1855, "which relate ex- 
 clusively to the interest of the Paramount State, such as 
 
 * Papers, Oude Proclamation, 1859, pp. 5, 6. f Oude Papers, 1856,pp. 52, 57. 
 
OUDE. 93 
 
 searching for and giving up criminals who have escaped 
 into Oude from our provinces, supplying our troops when 
 marching through Oude, protecting our mails, etc., etc., 
 the Government of Oude has always been, and is up to 
 this day, unusually attentive and efficient. I can further 
 truly remark that the Kings of Oude have co-operated 
 most actively and efficiently with us in capturing Thugs 
 and Dacoits." 
 
 ( ' In regard to their external relations with us, t their conduct 
 has been remarkably irreproachable."* 
 
 " It is not only that the Kings of Oude have never been hostile 
 to us in their proceedings, and never intrigued against us in any 
 way; they have abstained from every kind of communication 
 with other native potentates, except openly, and through the 
 medium of the British Resident ; and during our wars against 
 our enemies, they have constantly proved to be really active and 
 most useful allies-^ to us ; they have, again and again, forwarded 
 large supplies of grain and cattle, etc., to our armies, with an 
 alacrity that could not be exceeded by our own British Chiefs of 
 Provinces ; and during our wars against the Nepaulese and Bur- 
 mese, the King of Oude lent us very large sums of money, no 
 less than three crores of rupees" (three millions sterling) " when 
 we were extremely in want of it, and could not procure it else- 
 where; and even so late as 1842, the grandfather of the present 
 King supplied us with fourteen lakhs of rupees," (140,000) 
 " and his son, the father of the present King, supplied us with 
 thirty-two lakhs of rupees," (320,000) "which were of very 
 great use indeed to Lord Ellenborough/s Government, in enabling 
 him to push on and equip General Pollock's army, to retrieve our 
 disasters in Affghanistan." 
 
 " During the Nepaul war, the King of Oude lent us, free of all 
 cost, nearly 300 elephants. The aid thus obtained for conveying 
 our artillery and ammunition, and tents, etc., in our mountain 
 warfare, was of immense value to us, and of a kind which it was 
 totally out of our power to obtain in any other manner, or from 
 any other quarter." % 
 
 In every respect, and at all times, the State of Oude 
 fulfilled the duties of a good neighbour, and in time of 
 war surpassed them. There were, unquestionably, dis- 
 orders in the King's Government, but neither the Honour- 
 able Company nor its subjects were offended or injured 
 by them. Our frontiers were not disturbed ; our com- 
 
 Papers, 1856, p. 226. f Italics in the original. 
 Oude Papers, 1856, pp. 225, 226. 
 
94 CHAPTER V. 
 
 munications and commerce were not interrupted or im- 
 peded. The State of Oude paid its way, and had con- 
 tracted no debt. There was no desperate disease ; it was 
 simply a case of irregular functions, which the protecting 
 Power could have cured at any time. The weakness and 
 looseness of the Oude administration, were due in a great 
 measure to our own derelictions and neglect. 
 
 Far from its being true that the Oude Government was 
 enabled to be oppressive with impunity in consequence of 
 British military support, Sir William Sleeman declares 
 that its inability to control the more powerful feudatories 
 arose from that support not being given to which the 
 Government was justly entitled. From time to time, he 
 tells us, Regiments had been withdrawn from several points, 
 which " to do our duty honestly by Oude" we ought 
 to restore.* 
 
 " The British, force in Otide is much less than it was when the 
 Treaty of the llth September, 1837, was made, and assuredly 
 less than it should be with a due regard to our engagements and 
 the Oude requirements. Our Government, instead of taking 
 upon itself the additional burden of sixteen lakhs of rupees a year 
 to render the Oude Government more efficient, has relieved itself 
 of a good deal of that which it bore before the new Treaty" of 
 1837 l( was entered into ; and this is certainly not what the Court 
 of Directors contemplated, or the Oude Government expected." 
 
 " Our exigencies became great with the Affghan war, and have 
 continued to be so from those wars which grew out of it with 
 Gwalior, Scinde, and the Punjaub ; but they have all now passed 
 away, and those of our humble Ally should be no longer forgotten 
 or disregarded. Though we seldom give him the use of troops 
 in the support of the authority of his local officers, still the 
 prestige of having them at hand, in support of a just cause, is 
 unquestionably of great advantage to him and to his people, and 
 this advantage we cannot withhold from him with a due regard to 
 the obligations of solemn treaties."f 
 
 Notwithstanding all these difficulties and discourage- 
 ments, the weak Mussulman Government of Oude suc- 
 ceeded, a few months before the annexation, in putting 
 down effectually a determined religious conflict between 
 the Hindoo priests and votaries of a shrine called the 
 Hanooman Ghurree, near Fyzabad, and a formidable band 
 
 * Sleeman's Oude, vol. i, p. 186. See also vol. i, p. Ixiv., Ixv. 
 t Ibid., vol. ii, p. 200. 
 
OUDE. 95 
 
 of Mussulman fanatics, under a popular saint named Ameer 
 Alee. The Mahomedan aggressors were attacked and dis- 
 persed, and many of them killed, including their leader, 
 by the King's troops, without any assistance from the 
 British Force at Lucknow. Lord Dalhousie plainly inti- 
 mates that the failure of the Oude Government in sup- 
 pressing this dangerous outburst of Moslem bigotry would 
 have led to " a very prompt and summary settlement of 
 the Oude question by the hands of the Governor-General."* 
 The unexpected success of the Oude Government, how- 
 ever, was not allowed to delay that prompt and summary 
 settlement very long, and, strangely enough, seems to be 
 adduced by Lord Dalhousie as an additional reason for 
 hurrying it on. 
 
 The Treaty of 1801 imposed upon the British Govern- 
 ment, in return for immense advantages, the obligations of 
 guiding the State of Oude by its authoritative counsels, 
 and preserving good order and subordination throughout 
 the country by its military support. It neglected the first 
 duty ; the latter duty, as Sir William tells us, was not 
 performed effectually or " honestly." And then the pro- 
 tecting Power denounced the evil results of its own negli- 
 gence, as if they were insults and infidelities perpetrated 
 by its friend and pupil. Lord Dalhousie complained of 
 "the systematic and continuous violation of the Treaty,"f 
 by the misrule of Oude. That misrule arose much more 
 from our default than from that of the Princes and Minis- 
 ters of Oude. We were always negligent ; they were never 
 contumacious. If any provisions of the Treaty were unful- 
 filled, we had the full right and ample means of enforcing 
 them. But our counsels were indefinite and intermittent, 
 and we never tried to enforce them. At last Lord Dal- 
 housie took advantage of our own wrong, and founded his 
 claim to confiscate Oude upon that very weakness and 
 looseness of administration which the British Government, 
 more especially during his vice-royalty, had deliberately 
 refrained from correcting. 
 
 With all their shortcomings and self-seekings the British 
 authorities, both at home and in India, had never failed, 
 
 * Oude Papers, 1856, p. 300. f Oude Papers, 1856, pp. 190, 255. 
 
96 CHAPTER V. 
 
 until Lord Dalhousie's advent to power, to recognise their 
 obligations to the State of Oude, the integrity and sepa- 
 rate existence of which they were bound in honour to 
 maintain. Those who advocated the reform and depreca- 
 ted the annexation of Oude, cared less for the Prince than 
 for the Principality. They looked upon a Native State 
 as a social and political aggregation of divers individuali- 
 ties and complicated interests, which would be thrown 
 into confusion, and doomed to rapid decay, on the intro- 
 duction of our ordinary system of government. They con- 
 sidered the higher classes of Oude to be undeserving of 
 this doom. And although they entertained no exaggera- 
 ted notions of the King's divine right to power, still less, 
 as the Duke of Argyll most erroneously imagines, of his 
 divine" right to the revenues, they considered a Monarchy, 
 however limited and restricted, as the only practicable 
 form of native government ; they looked upon the Royal 
 title and the hereditary throne as the only effectual pre- 
 servative for the framework of a Native Principality. They 
 looked upon the Prince as the chief Ruler, but not as the 
 master or owner of the State and its inhabitants. They 
 considered that Treaties were made and maintained by a 
 reigning Prince as the representative for life of a dynasty 
 and a State, which are established institutions with a per- 
 petual succession. 
 
 Of course a State is not absolutely inviolable and sacred ; 
 its territorial limits and independence may be justly modi- 
 fied or even nullified, as a consequence of war or utter 
 disorganisation ; but so long as friendly relations subsist, 
 the State is a definite political community, not to be broken 
 up or destroyed for the faults or deficiencies of its chief 
 Ruler, or for any remediable defects in its constitution. 
 The incompetence, misconduct or contumacy of a reigning 
 Prince, though it may justify or necessitate his deposition, 
 does not annul a Treaty, or annihilate the State. A re- 
 volutionary crisis may justly be made an occasion for re- 
 form, but not, as Lord Dalhousie planned it, a pretext for 
 rapacity. The reign of a bad Prince may afford a fair 
 opportunity for improving, but not for appropriating a 
 friendly State. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 THE PUNJAUB. 
 
 THE Duke of Argyll says of the annexation of the Punjaub 
 that "there is no need to defend it in point of right, and 
 as little need now to support it in respect to policy."* Sir 
 Charles Jackson considers that acquisition to be so com- 
 pletely removed from the sphere of controversy, that at 
 the outset of the Vindication he declares his intention of 
 " passing it over in silence, "t 
 
 Mr. J. C. Marshman, formerly Editor of the Friend of 
 India in his recently published History, declares, that 
 " to offer any vindication of a measure which even the 
 most prejudiced of Lord Dalhousie's opponents have not 
 ventured to impugn, would be altogether redundant," 
 Those " fifth-rate writers" are more " prejudiced" than Mr. 
 Marshman supposes ; and he is not so well acquainted 
 with them as the Duke of Argyll. The annexation of the 
 Punjaub was promptly impugned by Mr. John Sullivan, 
 who had been a Member of Council at Madras, in a 
 pamphlet, entitled " The Koh-i-Noor, to whom does it 
 belong ?"\\ to which I am indebted for several suggestions ; 
 and by Mr. J. M. Ludlow, in his "British India, its Races 
 and its History ."* But, while I, also, must dispute both 
 the right and the policy of that so-called conquest, I freely 
 admit that, mainly because it looked like a conquest, 
 it has never excited the same disgust as the annexations 
 of Nagpore, Jhansi, and Oude. The iniquity of the trans- 
 action was shrouded by the smoke of battle ; and its im- 
 )licy, graduaUy becoming apparent, was hidden once 
 tore, for a time, when the Punjaub poured forth to our 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 4. f A Vindication, p. 3. 
 t A weekly paper, published at Serampore near Calcutta, and conducted 
 with great ability, which steadily supported all Lord Dalhousie's measures. 
 History of India, by John Clark Marshman, (Longmans, 1867,) vol. iii, p. 
 || London, 1850. f Vol. ii, pp. 166, 167. 
 
 H 
 
98 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 assistance, in the crisis of the rebellion, the troops that 
 we had previously poured into it. 
 
 The same may be said of a still more iniquitous affair, 
 the conquest of Scinde. There was a fight for it. Although 
 the Ameers were goaded to resistance by a series of in- 
 creasing demands, intolerable provocations, and a menacing 
 advance upon their capital, the mere fact of their resist- 
 ance made their violent expulsion from Scinde less inju- 
 rious to our fame than the quiet spoliation of a friendly 
 family. Public opinion in India, even in royal palaces, is 
 not educated to the pitch of examining into the diplomatic 
 details of a rupture, unless the scene of action be very 
 close at hand. The sword was drawn ; blood was shed ; 
 no further justification was required. 
 
 The impolicy of Lord Dalhousie's peaceful annexations 
 consisted, in a great measure, in the moral aspect which 
 they presented to the world of India. The moral objec- 
 tions to annexing the Punjaub were, doubtless, much less 
 manifest. The impolicy was, therefore, less obvious. And 
 I can well understand that Lord Dalhousie himself, when 
 he decided on converting the Punjaub into a British Pro- 
 vince, may have had few or none of those compunctious 
 visitings, those " doubts and scruples," by which he was 
 disturbed, according to the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles 
 Jackson, during the process of annexing Oude. * 
 
 In a despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of 
 Directors, dated the 7th April, 1849, he endeavoured 
 to prove that we could justly take advantage of our mili- 
 tary force to make the Punjaub " a profitable possession "t 
 for ourselves ; but the endeavour seems to me to be all in 
 vain. No justification is made out at all. 
 
 Dhuleep Sing was the Ward of the British Government. 
 Of this there can be no question. By the Articles of 
 Agreement of the 16th December, 1846, the British Go- 
 vernment undertook " the maintenance of an administra- 
 tion, and the protection of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing 
 during the minority of his Highness. "J This engagement 
 was to "cease and terminate on his Highness attaining 
 
 * Ante, p. 51, and India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 69. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 665. 
 
 j Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Durbar, 1847, p. 49. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 99 
 
 the fiill age of sixteen years, or on the 4th September, 
 1854." The Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, wished 
 that "the new terms of agreement entered into for pro- 
 tecting the Maharajah during his minority, should be made 
 as public as possible. It has therefore," he wrote to the 
 Secret Committee, "been determined, in communication 
 with the Sirdars, that his Highness shall come to my camp 
 on this side of the Beas on the 26th instant ; and I pro- 
 pose afterwards, when the Agreement will be formally 
 ratified, to pay his Highness a friendly return visit at 
 Lahore, "t In the General Proclamation of the 20th Au- 
 gust, 1847, the Governor-General announced that he felt 
 " the interest of a father in the education and guardian- 
 ship of the young Prince," and that " he had at heart the 
 peace and security of this country," the Punjaub, " the 
 firm establishment of the State, and the honour of the 
 Maharajah and his Ministers." J 
 
 In order " to maintain the administration of the Lahore 
 State during the minority of the Maharajah," the Governor- 
 General was armed with supreme and plenary power, and 
 was " at liberty to occupy with British soldiers such posi- 
 tions as he may think fit, for the security of the capital, 
 for the protection of the Maharajah, and the preservation 
 of the peace of the country." The British Resident was 
 placed at the head of the administration, with " full autho- 
 rity to direct and control all matters in every depart- 
 ment of the State." Subject to the instructions of the 
 Governor-General, "unlimited powers "were given to the 
 Resident. 1 1 
 
 Lord Dalhousie declares that the British Government 
 " maintained the Government of the State in the Council 
 of Regency."^} That Council was merely one part of the 
 machinery instituted by the Governor-General, and kept 
 in perfect subordination to British authority. 
 
 Lord Hardinge thus describes the new arrangement in 
 a despatch to the Secret Committee of the 21st December, 
 1846. 
 
 * Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Durbar, 1847, p. 51. * 
 t Hid., 1847, p. 25. J Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 53. 
 
 Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Durbar, 1847, p. 50. 
 || Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 35 and 48. f Ibid., 1849, p. 659. 
 
 H 2 
 
100 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 " A Council of Regency, composed of leading Chiefs, will act 
 under the control and guidance of the British Resident." 
 
 " The power of the Resident extends over every department, 
 and to any extent." 
 
 " Those terms give the British Resident unlimited authority in 
 all matters of internal administration, and external relations, 
 during the Maharajah's minority."* 
 
 And in a letter dated the 3rd July, 1847, the Governor- 
 General reminds the Resident that the Articles of Agree- 
 ment 
 
 " give to the Government of India, represented at Lahore by its 
 Resident, full power to direct and control all matters in every de- 
 partment of the State." 
 
 " It is politic that the Resident should carry the native Council 
 with him, the members of which are however entirely under his 
 control and guidance ; he can change them and appoint others, 
 and in military affairs his power is as unlimited as in the civil ad- 
 ministration ; he can withdraw Sikh garrisons, replacing them by 
 British troops, in any and every part of the Punjab. "f 
 
 The Resident himself, a month later, thus describes the 
 working of the machine. 
 
 " On the whole, the Durbar" (the Council of Regency) " give 
 me as much support as I can reasonably expect ; there has been 
 a quiet struggle for mastery, but as, though I am polite to all, I 
 allow nothing that appears to me wrong to pass unnoticed, the 
 members of the Council are gradually falling into the proper train, 
 and refer most questions to me, and in words at least allow, more 
 fully even than I wish, that they are only executive officers, to 
 do as they are bid."J 
 
 Thus the Council of Regency never was " the Govern- 
 ment of the State," as Lord Dalhousie calls it, without 
 the British Resident at its head, to whom its members 
 were strictly subordinate. 
 
 One important count in the indictment brought by 
 Lord Dalhousie against " the Sikhs," is that whereas " they 
 had bound themselves to submit to the full authority of 
 the British Resident directing and controlling all matters 
 in every department of the State, the Government of 
 Lahore, in reply to the orders of the Resident, neither 
 punished" the rebel Moolraj, when two British officers 
 had been murdered at Mooltan, " nor gave reparation for 
 
 * Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Durbar, 1847, p. 24. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 18. % Ibid., 1849, p. 32. Ante, p. 99. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 101 
 
 the offence, but declared that their troops were not to be 
 depended upon."* This attempt to separate the Resident 
 from the Government of Lahore, and to use the latter 
 term as synonymous with "the Sikhs," is quite unwarrant- 
 able. The Resident was at the head of the Government 
 of Lahore ; and the Councillors of Regency were, as we 
 have seen, merely executive officers, "to do as they were 
 bid," "under his control and guidance."t "The Sikhs," 
 however rebellious, were subjects, not responsible rulers. 
 The Resident's "power" was "unlimited in military affairs." 
 He could "withdraw Sikh garrisons, replacing them by 
 British troops, in any and every part of the Punjaub."J 
 And when the military emergency arose, he pursued his 
 own course by the tenor and spirit of these instructions, 
 ordering the troops backwards and forwards, occasionally 
 consulting the Durbar or informing them of his determi- 
 nations, but never allowing them to act independently, or 
 to adopt their own plans for restoring the peace of the 
 country. The Resident was the Government of Lahore. 
 When the news arrived of the outbreak at Mooltan, the 
 Resident transferred none of his authority to the Council- 
 lors ; he gave all the orders himself. "I have put in 
 motion upon Mooltan," he reports on the 22nd, " from 
 different points, seven Battalions of Infantry, two of Regu- 
 lar Cavalry, three troops and batteries of Artillery, and 
 twelve hundred Irregular Horse. " 
 
 The first intelligence from Mooltan left the fate of the 
 two British officers uncertain, and gave no particulars of 
 what had passed. The Resident had decided on the 24th 
 of April, 1848, to support the Maharajah's force with a 
 brigade of British troops. But when assured of the bar- 
 barous murder of the English officers, and the defection 
 of their Sikh escort, the Resident countermanded the 
 march of our brigade, because the Durbar troops might 
 prove faithless.|| After several false starts, and much 
 vacillation, the British troops did not arrive before Mooltan 
 until the 18th of August.^" 
 
 During the continuance of this dangerous delay, several 
 occurrences took place, eminently calculated to terrify, 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 660. t Ante, p. 100. Ante, p. 100. 
 
 Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 133. || Ibid., 1849, p. 139. f Ibid., 1849, p. 291. 
 
102 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 provoke, and exasperate the Sikh chieftains and army, 
 and to drive them headlong into the rebellion of Dewan 
 Moolraj, just when the splendid exploits of Lieutenant 
 Edwardes (now Colonel Sir Herbert Edwardes, K.C.B.) 
 had made it appear almost hopeless. By the middle of 
 July, Edwardes, with the Maharajah's troops, supported 
 by the army of the Nawab of Bhawulpore, had defeated 
 Moolraj in two pitched battles, and had forced the rebel 
 leader to take refuge in his fortress. He had no army in 
 the field ; he was " hemmed in, disheartened by defeats, 
 and weakened by desertions."* The news was spread 
 throughout the Punjaub that a British force, with heavy 
 guns, was on its way to destroy the great stronghold of 
 revolt. The Resident was expecting to hear of Moolraj 
 doing some " act of desperation" that would " close the 
 rebellion, "j~ when a fresh insurrection broke out, headed by 
 Sirdar Ghuttur Sing, the Nazim, or Governor, of the Hazara 
 Province. On the 14th of September, Sirdar Chuttur 
 Sing's son, Rajah Shere Sing, who was in command of a 
 body of Durbar troops, co-operating with General Whish 
 in the siege of Mooltan, yielded at last to " his father's 
 awful maledictions/'^ and the general disaffection of his 
 Sikh officers and soldiers, and moved over to the enemy 
 with his whole camp. Being much distrusted by the Dewan 
 Moolraj, Shere Sing soon left Mooltan, and became the 
 leader in a new rebellion, which assumed the most formid- 
 able dimensions. How can we account for this strange 
 infatuation, reviving fanaticism in the breasts of those 
 most interested in the preservation of peace and good 
 order, and inciting them to revolt at the most inopportune 
 moment, when their chance of success was desperate ? 
 
 Three incidents mainly contributed to stimulate the 
 second Sikh war, the exile of the Maharanee, the refusal 
 to fix a day for the Maharajah's marriage, and the treat- 
 ment of Sirdar Chuttur Sing. The equity and expediency 
 of all these measures may have been very defensible at 
 the time, and may even now be fairly entertained by those 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, p. 243, 250. f Ibid., 1849, p. 258. "My expectation 
 is that the rebel will either destroy himself or be destroyed by his troops, be- 
 fore the next mail goes out." (June 22nd, 1848.) Punjaub Papers, 1849, 
 p. 220. 
 
 t A Tear on the Punjaub Frontier, by Major Edwardes, C.B., vol. ii, p. 446. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 103 
 
 who took a part in them ; but the question we have to 
 consider is not so much whether each or all of these mea- 
 sures were wise and justifiable, as whether they were the 
 work of the British Government, acting, under Treaty, as 
 the Guardian and Trustee of the infant Sovereign. If 
 the rebellion was aggravated and extended by the policy 
 of British officers, approved and confirmed by the Gover- 
 nor-General, opposed and deprecated by the Council of 
 Begency, the pretence of separating the Resident from 
 the Government of Lahore, and throwing off all respon- 
 sibility from the autocratic head upon the consultative 
 members, can no longer be maintained. 
 
 Of the Maharanee's bad intentions and incessant intrigues 
 against the Council of Begency, there can be no doubt. 
 But in her compulsory retirement at the country palace 
 of Sheikhopoor, her evil influence was almost extinguished ; 
 and in May, 1848, one of the most mischievous plots 
 carried on in her name having been exposed and defeated, 
 and the chief conspirators publicly executed, she would 
 have been powerless, if left to her own devices. Two 
 years after the annexation, Major Edwardes, who played 
 such a brilliant part in these events, and had the best 
 means of becoming acquainted with the facts, and with 
 the weightiest opinions bearing upon them, writes that 
 "the Banee Jhunda, who had more wit and daring than 
 any man of her nation, was weary of scattering 'ambiguous 
 voices,' and of writing incendiary epistles from Sheikho- 
 poora to quondam mauvais sujets, who treated them as if 
 they came from Joseph Ady. Her memory survived, for 
 she was not a woman to be forgotten ; but her influence 
 had followed her power, and there was no longer a man 
 found in the Punjaub who would shoulder a musket at 
 her bidding."* 
 
 It is perfectly clear that the strong measure of sending 
 the Maharanee into banishment, in fact imprisonment 
 in exile, was taken by the Besident, on his own judg- 
 ment and authority, supported by the previously commu- 
 nicated permission of the Governor-General, but contrary 
 to the advice of the Council of Begency. The Besident, 
 
 * A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 412. 
 
104 CHAPTER VT. 
 
 in a despatch dated the 16th May, 1848, reports what had 
 taken place on the preceding day. 
 
 " Maharanee Jhunda Khore, the mother of Maharajah Dhuleep 
 Sing, was removed from the fort of Sheikhopoor, by my orders, 
 yesterday afternoon ; and is now on her way, under charge of an 
 escort, to Ferozepore." 
 
 " Her summary banishment from the Punjaub, and residence 
 at Benares, under the surveillance of the Governor- Generals 
 Agent, subject to such custody as will prevent all intrigue and 
 correspondence for the future, seems to me the best course which 
 we could adopt."* 
 
 There is not a word in the despatch to lead us to suppose 
 that this step was approved by the Cabinet of Regency, or 
 that they did anything more than act as "executive officers," 
 and "do as they were bid."")" When relating any decision 
 of importance, the Resident generally states that the 
 Council "unanimously" agreed with him, or that they 
 "yielded"; but in this case there is a significant silence 
 on the subject of any discussion in Council. 
 
 We know that in August, 1847, the Chiefs were "de- 
 cidedly averse to incur what they considered the odium 
 of participating in effecting the banishment of the Maha- 
 ranee," and in consequence of their objections to sending 
 her out of the country, her new residence was fixed at 
 Sheikhopoor, only twenty miles from Lahore. J 
 
 The order for the Maharanee's removal and banishment 
 is signed by only three of the Council of Regency, and of 
 these only one, Rajah Tej Sing, the Ranee's bitter personal 
 enemy, is a Sikh. The signature of Golab Sing, a mere 
 youth, is also attached, on behalf of his absent brother, 
 Rajah Shere Sing, as if no means could be spared to fortify 
 this document with the apparent concurrence of the Durbar. 
 
 And although it is signed by three members of the 
 Council, and by the brother of a fourth, it only purports 
 to be issued, " according to the advice of Sir Frederick 
 Currie, Bart., and Fakeer Noor-ood-deen" a Mussulman 
 Councillor, who, accompanied by two English officers, 
 personally saw to the order being carried out. 
 
 The Resident himself seems to have had some notion of 
 the dangerous excitement that might be caused by this 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 168 f Ante, p. 100. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 35 and 51. Hid., 1849, p. 228. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 105 
 
 strong and severe measure. " A formal trial," he writes, 
 " of Maharajah Runjeet Sing's widow would be most un- 
 popular and hurtful to the feelings of the people."* Can 
 he have really supposed that " the summary banishment" 
 of Runjeet Sing's widow from her son's dominions, would 
 be less unpopular ? But was there no alternative but a 
 formal trial ? Why should the Ranee not have been put 
 on her defence, as she repeatedly demanded, in a private 
 investigation ? There may have been another reason for 
 avoiding a formal or informal trial. The Resident says 
 there is no doubt in his mind that the Maharanee was 
 "deeply implicated" in "conspiracies for tampering with 
 the sepoys, and making revolt and insurrection." But he 
 adds : " Legal proof of the delinquency of the Maharanee 
 would not, perhaps, be obtainable, "f She might have 
 been acquitted. 
 
 The Resident, however, declares that " this is not a time 
 for us to hesitate about doing what may appear necessary 
 to punish state offenders, whatever may be their rank and 
 station, and to vindicate the honour and position of the 
 British Government." 
 
 "But," he continues, "while doing what we deem an 
 act of justice and policy, it is not necessary or desirable 
 to do it in a way to exasperate the feelings of the soldiery, 
 and the Chiefs or people. We must bear in mind that 
 the Maharanee is the mother of their Sovereign, and the 
 widow of our Ally, Maharajah Runjeet Sing : and we must 
 respect the feelings which they entertain regarding the 
 violation of the seclusion of females of high rank." 
 
 " I propose, therefore,^ that the Maharanee be sent to 
 Benares under a strong guard ; that she be allowed to take 
 with her her jewels, and such of her property as she may 
 immediately require, and her domestic servants ; and that 
 she be accompanied by the venerable Fakeer Noor-ood- 
 deen," a Mahomedan, " the personal friend and adviser of 
 the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and a person greatly 
 respected by the Sikhs generally." 
 
 " At Benares," the Resident suggests, "she should be 
 subject to such surveillance and custody," as will"pre- 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 168. f Ibid., 1849, p. 168. % Therefore! 
 
106 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 vent her having intercourse with parties beyond her own 
 domestic establishment, and holding correspondence with 
 any person, except through" the Governor-General's agent, 
 Major Macgregor.* 
 
 Not a hint was given to the Maharanee or her attend- 
 ants, either in the Resident's note to her, or in the order 
 from the Durbar, as to her destination. The deputation 
 were expressly forbidden to "use any deceit" to induce 
 her to come away quietly, but they were " to tell the 
 Maharanee no more than was entered in the purwanna" 
 or order, j" In obedience to these instructions, Lieutenant 
 Lumsden refused to satisfy her request for information as 
 to "whither she was to be escorted."! 
 
 " Happily," reports the Resident, " there was not the 
 slightest opposition ; all was acquiescence and civility, from 
 the Maharanee downwards, very probably somewhat in- 
 duced by the executions which took place a few days ago" 
 
 In a subsequent letter, the Resident observes that he 
 had anticipated " she would probably think she was doomed 
 to the same fate as her confidential vakeel Moonshee Gunga 
 Ram" who had been hanged a few days before. There- 
 fore, by the Resident's permission, Lieutenant Lumsden 
 assured her Highness, "as the party left the fort" that 
 " she would be subjected to no injury or indignity." || 
 
 Thus was the mother of the Sovereign, arid widow of 
 our Ally, hurried away into exile, under imminent terror 
 of immediate execution, in charge of two English officers 
 and a Mahomedan Chief, escorted by a strong guard. 
 This was the plan adopted by the British authorities to 
 avoid exasperating the feelings of the Sikh soldiery and 
 people, or offending the feelings which they entertain as 
 to the violation of the seclusion of females of high rank ! 
 
 By the 1 Oth Article of the Treaty of 1 6th December, 
 1846, the Maharanee was to receive an allowance of a lakh 
 and a half of rupees (15,000) per annum. On her first 
 removal from Lahore to Sheikhopoor, in August, 1847, 
 this stipend was reduced to forty-eight thousand rupees 
 (4,800), and after her deportation to Benares to twelve 
 thousand rupees (1,200) a year. This second reduction 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 169. t Ibid., 1849, p. 229. 
 
 t Ibid., 1849, p. 229. Ibid., 1849, p. 169. || Ibid., 1849, p. 229. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 107 
 
 was made in consideration of the fact that the Ranee was 
 " taking with her a very large amount of private property 
 and jewels."* 
 
 She was not allowed to remain in possession of her 
 jewels and other property very long. On the 30th June, 
 1848, before her arrival at Benares, the Resident writes 
 that a seizure has been made of important correspondence 
 which, " if genuine, and it seems impossible it should be 
 otherwise," proves, "beyond a shadow of doubt," the com- 
 plicity of the Maharanee Jhunda Khore "in the late con- 
 spiracy, and in other intrigues and machinations." Among 
 the important correspondence seized at Lahore were " some 
 original letters intended for the Maharanee, which were 
 not delivered, owing to her sudden removal," very con- 
 clusive evidence ! and also " some copies of letters ad- 
 dressed to her" still more conclusive ! In order "to get 
 hold of the originals of those last described," the Resident 
 requests that " the greatest care may be taken to secure 
 all her property and papers ;" and that " the Maharanee 
 should even be subjected to have her person, and those of 
 her confidential slave women, searched by respectable 
 females, appointed for that purpose by the Governor- 
 General's agent, "f 
 
 The news of these little amenities, so eminently calcu- 
 lated to soothe the exasperated feelings of the Sikh Chief- 
 tains and soldiery, so congenial to their uncivilised notions 
 of the respect due to the seclusion of ladies of high rank, 
 may possibly have created somewhat of a sensation when 
 spread through the Punjaub. 
 
 The Resident further suggested that " the confinement 
 of the Maharanee, on reaching Benares, should be much 
 more stringent than was at first intended," and that " as 
 a state prisoner, she should not be allowed to have the 
 command of wealth, of which she has, hitherto, not 
 scrupled to make use to accomplish purposes the most 
 treasonable, and to procure open violence and murder, 
 and secret assassination. "J 
 
 The Resident's suggestions were carried out; the Ranee's 
 papers were all secured, but nothing treasonable, or of any 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 179 and 577. f Rid., 1849, p. 235. 
 t Ibid., 1849, pp. 235, 236. 
 
108 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 importance, was found.* She was also deprived of all her 
 jewels and valuables. t 
 
 The effect of the Maharanee's deportation upon the 
 Sikh soldiery was instantaneous. The Resident himself 
 writes as follows to the Governor-General on the 25th 
 May, 1848. 
 
 " The reports from Rajah Shere Sing's camp are, that the 
 Khalsa soldiery, on hearing of the removal of the Maharanee, 
 were much disturbed; they said that she was the mother of the 
 Khalsa, and that, as she was gone, and the young Dhuleep Sing 
 in our hands, they had no longer any one to fight for or uphold ; 
 that they had no inducement to oppose Moolraj : and if he came 
 to attack them, would seize the Sirdars and their officers, and go 
 over to 
 
 A prominent place is given to this cause of general dis- 
 gust and indignation in Shere Sing's Manifesto. 
 
 " It is well known to all the inhabitants of the Punjaub, to the 
 whole of the Sikhs, and in fact to the world at large, with what 
 oppression, tyranny and undue violence, the Feringees have treated 
 the widow of the great Maharajah Runjeet Sing, now in bliss." 
 
 " They have broken the Treaty by imprisoning, and sending 
 away to Hindostan, the Maharanee, the mother of her people. " 
 
 Dost Mahomed, the Ruler of Cabool, in his letter to 
 Captain Abbott, alleges this grievance as the chief cause 
 of disaffection in the Punjaub. 
 
 " There can be no doubt that the Sikhs are daily becoming 
 more and more discontented. Some have been dismissed from 
 service, while others have been banished to Hindostan, in parti- 
 cular the mother of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, who has been im- 
 prisoned and ill-treated. Such treatment is considered objection- 
 able by all creeds, and both high and low prefer death." || 
 
 There can be little doubt as to the Maharanee's inces- 
 sant and malicious intrigues after her first removal to 
 Sheikhpoor, and the reduction of the income guaranteed 
 to her by the Treaty. That she would have had no scruple 
 in getting her great enemy Rajah Tej Sing's throat cut 
 if she could, and in damaging or disgracing one or two 
 other members of the Regency, may well be believed. It 
 was only to be expected that every one who engaged in 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 263, 266. t Ibid., 1849, pp. 263, 575. 
 
 J Ibid., 1849, p. 179. Ibid., 1849, p. 362. || Ibid., 1849, p. 512. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 109 
 
 rebellion or conspiracy, should make a free use of her 
 name, and profess to act on her behalf, and with her sanc- 
 tion. But she is represented on all hands as a remarkably 
 clever woman, and it appears highly improbable that she 
 should have been so blind to British power, so forgetful of 
 recent lessons, so regardless of her son's interests, upon 
 which her own future position entirely depended, as to 
 provoke, with a divided country and diminished resources, 
 another struggle between the Khalsa and the Company. 
 It is utterly incredible. Not only is there no "legal 
 proof," as the Resident admits, but there is nothing to be 
 found in the Blue Book which amounts to substantial evi- 
 dence, or affords any moral grounds for concluding that she 
 ever compassed or countenanced such a renewed struggle, 
 before her removal to Benares. In exile and degradation, 
 stripped of her jewels, cash and other property, deprived 
 of her papers, forbidden to have an interview with any one, 
 even with an English attorney, except in the presence of 
 the Governor-General's Agent,* she may very probably 
 have plunged into desperate plots of revenge, and opened 
 a secret communication with the leading insurgents. 
 
 The deportation and imprisonment of the Maharanee, 
 declared by Lord Dalhousie to have been intended not 
 only as a " precaution," but as a " punishment, "f appears 
 to me to have been a measure as inexpedient and impolitic 
 as it was unjudicial. Whatever that lady's crimes and 
 conspiracies may have been, and we have nothing to 
 prove them but a mass of vituperative assertions, it might 
 have been foreseen, and, doubtless, was foreseen and pre- 
 dicted by the Council of Regency, that her persecution 
 would be ten times more provocative to the Sikhs, and 
 more injurious to British honour and authority, than her 
 continued intrigues could possibly have been. 
 
 The Ranee's banishment was looked upon by all who 
 were attached to Runjeet Sing's Kingdom, at once as a 
 national insult, and as a preliminary step to the dethrone- 
 ment of her son, and the destruction of the State. 
 
 Rajah Shere Sing was one of those "Chiefs of the greatest 
 note," whom, having first despatched towards Mooltan with 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 575. f Ibid., 1849, pp. 575, 578. 
 
110 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 all the disposable troops of the Sikh Army, the Resident 
 recalled to receive the ominous injunction and warning that 
 they must " put down the rebellion by their own means, 
 as the only hope of saving their Government."* It was in 
 his camp, as we have just seen, that the alarm and ex- 
 citement first arose, when the Maharanee's deportation 
 from the Punjaub became known, j" 
 
 But Shere Sing had not only the disaffection of his own 
 troops to contend with. A storm was brewing in another 
 quarter. His father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Nazim or 
 Governor of the Hazara Province, began to be involved, 
 in the month of July, in certain personal difficulties, to be 
 described hereafter, which led him to fear that his own 
 ruin, and that of Runjeet Sing's Kingdom, were objects pre- 
 determined by the British authorities. The old Sirdar 
 kept up a regular correspondence with his son, Rajah 
 Shere Sing, in the camp at Mooltan, and with his younger 
 son, Golab Sing, at Lahore. He was probably, in common 
 with the Sikhs in general, somewhat alarmed and disgusted 
 by the Maharanee's exile, and other menacing incidents 
 and rumours ; and when his anxieties were redoubled by 
 the dangers impending over himself, he thought of apply- 
 ing a test to the secret intentions of the British Govern- 
 ment, to ascertain whether the Treaty was to be broken, 
 whether the outrages and rebellion of Mooltan were to be 
 visited on the innocent Dhuleep Sing. The youthful Ma- 
 harajah was betrothed to Sirdar Chuttur Sing's daughter, 
 Rajah Shere Sing's sister. The Resident should be 
 asked to fix a day for the marriage to take place. If he 
 consented, it would be a sign of continued friendship and 
 good faith : if there were any evasion or hesitation, it 
 would be a proof of some sinister purpose. Major Edwardes 
 writes as follows to the Resident on the 28th July, 1848: 
 
 " Yesterday evening Kajah Shere Sing Attareewalla begged me 
 to grant him a private interview, at which he laid before me the 
 wishes of his father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing. 
 
 " If it is not your intention that the nuptials of the Maharajah 
 should be celebrated some time within the next twelve months, 
 the Sirdar would wish to be allowed to lay aside the duties of his 
 Hazara Government, and proceed on pilgrimage for two years ; if, 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 137, 140. f Ante, p. 108. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. Ill 
 
 on the contrary, the marriage is to take place this year, the Sir- 
 dar would suggest that, with your sanction, the Durbar should 
 appoint astrologers, on the part of the Maharajah, to fix an 
 auspicious month and day, in conjunction with other astrologers 
 on the part of the bride. 
 
 " The above is the substance of the Rajah's conversation ; and 
 he earnestly requested me to procure him an answer from you 
 within ten days. The request seems strange at the present 
 moment. The secret motives of men are difficult to divine ; but 
 there can be no question that an opinion has gone very prevalently 
 abroad, and been carefully disseminated by the evil disposed, that 
 the British meditate declaring the Punjaub forfeited by the recent 
 troubles and misconduct of the troops ; and whether the Attaree- 
 walla family have any doubts, or not, upon this point themselves, 
 it would, I think, be a wise and timely measure to give such 
 public assurance of British good faith, and intention to adhere to 
 the Treaty, as would be involved in authoritative preparations 
 for providing the young Maharajah with a Queen. It would, no 
 doubt, settle men's minds greatly/'* 
 
 The Resident returned a very stiff official reply to this 
 application, carefully avoiding any such " assurance," public 
 or private, as Rajah Shere Sing wished to elicit, though 
 endeavouring to satisfy him with common-place courtesies. 
 He observes that "all the ceremonies for affiancing being 
 complete, it would, in common usage, rest with the family 
 of the bride to determine the time when the actual cere- 
 mony of marriage should take place ;" but that " of course, 
 with reference to the position of the Maharajah, nothing 
 can be done in this case without the concurrence and 
 approbation of the Resident." He will "consult, con- 
 fidentially, the members of the Durbar now at Lahore on 
 the subject of the time at which the marriage should be 
 celebrated," and Rajah Shere Sing may be assured that 
 the British Government will only interfere "to secure 
 that all is done which may be best calculated to promote 
 the honour and happiness of the Maharajah, and of the 
 bride and her family." 
 
 And then come these portentous words : " I do not 
 see how the proceeding with the ceremonies for the Maha- 
 rajah's nuptials can be considered as indicative of any line 
 of policy which the Government may consider it right to 
 pursue now, or at any future time, in respect to the 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 270, 271. 
 
112 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 administration of the Punjaub, and it is, on that account, 
 that I see no objection to the marriage being celebrated 
 at such time, and in such manner, as may be most satis- 
 factory to the parties themselves, and the Durbar."* 
 
 Major Edwardes can now have had no doubt as to the 
 views in favour at Head-quarters ; and, however cautiously 
 he may have communicated to Shere Sing the substance 
 of the Resident's answer, the Rajah and his father must 
 have felt henceforth but little hope that the Sovereignty 
 of Dhuleep Sing would be allowed to survive the suppres- 
 sion of the actual revolt. The less Major Edwardes said 
 on the subject, the more they must have been alarmed. 
 
 Major Edwardes says: " Unhappily the full meaning of 
 the application did not appear, "f It must have appeared 
 clearly enough to the Resident by the light of Major 
 Edwardes's own lucid explanation, which we have just 
 quoted. The cold and studied reply indicates that the 
 question was fully understood. And by the aid of their 
 other informants at Lahore, where Rajah Shere Sing's 
 brother, Golab Sing, had access to the Resident, we may 
 be sure that the full meaning of the reply to their urgent 
 application was understood by the two Sikh Chieftains. 
 The Resident would not admit that the Maharajah's mar- 
 riage was a matter of political significance, or public con- 
 sequence ; and he would not promise to take any imme- 
 diate steps to 'have a day fixed for its celebration. " Of 
 course, nothing can be done without the concurrence and 
 approbation of the Resident," but " he will consult the 
 Durbar confidentially." 
 
 Just at the time when Sirdar Chuttur Sing must have 
 received the news from his sons of the negative result of 
 his test, he was himself falling into great straits. 
 
 Sirdar Chuttur Sing was the Nazim, or Governor, of 
 the Hazara Province, inhabited by an armed Mahomedan 
 population, "warlike and difficult of control," J who 
 entertained a bitter and bigoted hostility of all who bore 
 the name of Sikh. Under Runjeet Sing's Government 
 the Province had never been effectually settled, and the 
 revenues were only occasionally collected by a military 
 
 * Papers, Punjaul, 1849, pp. 272, 273. f ^ Year on the Punjaub Frontier, 
 vol. ii, p. 448. j Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 18. 
 

 THE PUNJAUB. Ill] 
 
 expedition. Captain James Abbott, one of the Resident's 
 Assistants,* was appointed to aid and advise the Sikh 
 Governor, in the execution, of his duties. Very soon after 
 the outbreak under Dewan Moolraj at Mooltan, Captain 
 Abbott became impressed with the belief that Chuttur 
 Sing was " at the head of a conspiracy for the expulsion 
 of the English from the Punjaub, and was about to head 
 a crusade against the British forces at Lahore, "t From 
 that time Captain Abbott took up his abode at a place 
 thirty-five miles distant from Chuttur Sing's residence, J 
 and "shut himself out from all personal communication" 
 with his colleague. "The constant suspicion," writes 
 the Resident, "with which Captain Abbott regarded Sirdar 
 Chuttur Sing, seems to have, not unnaturally, estranged 
 that Chief from him." 
 
 "This state of feeling seems to have been taken advan- 
 tage of, by persons interested in widening the breach be- 
 tween the two ; till Captain Abbott looks upon Sirdar 
 Chuttur Sing as a sort of incarnation of treason, and the 
 Sirdar has been led to believe that Captain Abbott is bent 
 upon the annihilation of himself and the Khalsa army in 
 Hazara, on the first opportunity. "|| 
 
 The Blue Book affords ample materials for balancing 
 the antecedent probabilities in this case. Nearly a year 
 before his differences with Chuttur Sing commenced, the 
 Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, had written of Captain 
 Abbott to the Governor-General in these terms : " Cap- 
 tain Abbott is an excellent officer ; but he is too apt to 
 take gloomy views of questions. I think he has unwit- 
 tingly done Dewan Jowala Sahaee injustice." Of this 
 Dewan Jowala Sahaee Sir Henry Lawrence adds, "I only 
 know one better native. According to the light he has 
 enjoyed, the times he has lived in, and the school in which 
 
 up, " 
 assuredly an able, man."^j 
 
 On a later occasion, the succeeding Resident, Sir Fred- 
 erick Currie, shows us Captain Abbott falling into the 
 
 * Distinguished before that period for his enterprising journey to Khiva, 
 well described by his own pen. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 279. t Ibid., 1849, p. 279. 
 
 Ibid., 1849, p. 285. || Ibid., 1849, p. 279. f Ibid., 1849, p. 30. 
 
 I 
 
 V^JJL I \J J \J\JL* \J1.JL\S UJ.J.AiV'kJ JLAVy J.J.d)O J~L V \^V4- -LJ.J.. UfcUVt \JJ-JL\-/ kJV^AXV/V/X JLJ-X VT AJ.J.VJL 
 
 he has been brought up, he is a respectable, as he is 
 
114 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 same hasty and unfounded suspicions of another Sikh 
 Chief, Jhunda Sing. 
 
 " Soon after the defection of a portion of the Churrunjeet Eegi- 
 ment of Horse, which formed a part of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's 
 Brigade, (on which occasion the Sirdar's conduct was open to no 
 sort of suspicion,) Captain Abbott wrote of Jhunda Sing as one 
 connected with the extensive band of conspirators whom he con- 
 sidered as leagued to aid the Mooltan rebellion. 
 
 (< Upon that occasion I explained to Captain Abbott, that if 
 his opinion of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's disaffection rested on the 
 facts he had mentioned, it was without due foundation ; for that 
 the Sirdar had closely and scrupulously obeyed my orders in every 
 step he had taken."* 
 
 Besides these two particular instances of Captain 
 Abbott's special infirmity, we find in the Blue Book the 
 Resident's judgment on that officer's general capacity as a 
 political detective, professing to observe the obscure 
 symptoms of a nascent insurrection. 
 
 " His Lordship will have observed a very ready disposition on 
 the part of Captain Abbott to believe the reports that are brought 
 to him of conspiracies, treasons, and plots, suspicion of everybody, 
 far and near, even of his own servants, and a conviction of the in- 
 fallibility of his own conclusions, which is not shaken by finding 
 time after time that they are not verified. "f 
 
 Who, on the other hand, was Sirdar Chuttur Sing, so 
 unfortunately associated with this perverse coadjutor ? 
 The Resident tells us that he was " an old and infirm man, 
 the father-in-law of the Maharajah, with more at stake 
 than almost any man in the Punjaub."J 
 
 " Sirdar Chuttur Sing is a wily old Chief of Eunjeet Sing's 
 time, who has been concerned in his day in many treacherous pro- 
 ceedings, and is the confidential friend of Maharajah Golab Sing ; 
 but he is now infirm and in ill health, and has obtained much 
 wealth, and an honourable position in the present administration, 
 while his daughter is the betrothed wife of the young Maharajah 
 of Lahore." 
 
 " Mr. John Lawrence, in a private letter received yesterday, 
 writing of him, says, ' I cannot, in any way, account for Chuttur 
 Sing's conduct ; I always looked on him as a harmless old fool. 
 He is, moreover, now very infirm, and suffers much from chronic 
 disease." || 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 328. . t Ibid., p. 285. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 279. Ibid., 1849, p. 286. || Ibid., p. 334. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 115 
 
 In another despatch he observes : " Sirdar Chuttur 
 Sing and his sons were raised to their present position by 
 the arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, with 
 the approbation of the British Government. The family 
 is unpopular with the Chiefs, and the old adherents of 
 Runjeet Sing, as being upstarts, and the creatures of the 
 British Government. They are unpopular with the army, 
 * * * and they have no weight with the people."* 
 
 In the midst of the agitation caused throughout the 
 Punjaub by the delay and uncertainty following the first 
 successes of Major Edwardes against the Dewan Moolraj, 
 Captain Abbott received intelligence, upon which he placed 
 reliance, that the Brigade of Durbar troops stationed at 
 Pukli, near the residence of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, had 
 determined on marching either to Mooltan or to Lahore, 
 to join in the insurrection. So far as can be gathered from 
 the Blue Book, his information showed that a portion of 
 the force was in an excited and disaffected state ; but 
 Captain Abbott himself reports that the officers " did 
 not countenance the men in the move," that they " made 
 a show of putting down the mutiny," and that they fired 
 " two successive salutes," in honour of the " two victories 
 of Lieutenant Edwardes." He also states that the Golun- 
 dauz or Artillerymen, and the Zumboorchees, or camel- 
 gunners, were " disinclined to the move."t Thus the dis- 
 affection, by his own account, was by no means general or 
 decided. Nothing whatever appears to prove that Sirdar 
 Chuttur Sing promoted or approved the misconduct of the 
 evil-disposed among the Sikh troops. 
 
 Captain Abbott, however, had satisfied himself that 
 Chuttur Sing was at the head of a vast conspiracy, and 
 was about to march upon Lahore at the head of all the 
 Durbar troops in Hazara. During the first week of August, 
 1848, without any warning, without any communication 
 with the Governor of the Province, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, 
 Captain Abbott roused the armed Mahomedan peasantry, 
 over whom he had obtained great influence, and closed 
 the passes by which the Brigade stationed at Pukli could 
 descend into the plains. On the 6th of August "the 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 380. f Ibid., p. 310. 
 
 I 2 
 
116 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 mountaineers assembled in great numbers, and surrounded 
 the town of Hurripore," where Sirdar Chuttur Sing was 
 residing. The Sirdar was induced, as a natural movement 
 of self-defence, to order the detachment of troops, which 
 was stationed for the protection of the town, to encamp 
 on the esplanade under the guns of the fort.* Colonel 
 Canora, an American, who had been for some years in the 
 Sikh service, refused to move out of the city to the new 
 position with the battery of Artillery under his command, 
 unless by Captain Abbott's permission. Sirdar Chuttur 
 Sing " repeated his orders, saying that Captain Abbott 
 could not know the peril they were in from the threatened 
 attack of the armed population, who could easily seize the 
 guns where they were."f Canora not only refused to 
 obey these orders, but loaded two of his guns with double 
 charges of grape, and " standing between them with a 
 lighted portfire in his hand, said he would fire upon the 
 first man who came near."J Sirdar Chuttur Sing sent 
 two companies of Sikh Infantry to take possession of the 
 .guns. Colonel Canora first cut down one of his own 
 Havildars, or Sergeants, who had refused to fire upon the 
 Infantry, and then applied the match himself to one of 
 the guns, which missed fire. At that moment he was 
 struck down by musket shots from two of the Infantry 
 soldiers. After his fall, and before he expired, he is said 
 to have killed two Sikh officers with his double barrelled 
 pistol. 
 
 Captain Abbott calls this most justifiable and unavoid- 
 able homicide, "an atrocious deed," "a cold-blooded murder, 
 as base and cowardly as that of Peshora Sing,"|| and talks 
 about Chuttur Sing having "determined upon the murder" 
 of Colonel Canora. ^f 
 
 The Resident, in several letters to Captain Abbott, having 
 
 * Papers, Punjaul), 1849, p. 279. f Ibid., p. 280. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 287 and 303. 
 
 Ibid:, pp. 280, 301, 303. 
 
 Ibid., p. 302. Peshora Sing, one of several pretenders to the throne of 
 the Punjaub, was in open rebellion against the Lahore Government in March 
 1845, when he was captured by the troops under Chuttur Sing, and put to 
 death in prison by order of the Minister, Jowahir Sing, the Maharanee's 
 brother. Chuttur Sing does not seem to have been to blame. Trotter's 
 History of India from 1844 to 1862, vol. i, p. 42. 
 ^T Idem. p. 311. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 11 / 
 
 received both his account of the affair and that of Sirdar 
 Chuttur Sing, makes the following sound and sensible 
 observations : 
 
 " The death of Cornmedan Canora is stated, botli by the Sirdar 
 and yourself, to have been occasioned in consequence of his dis- 
 obedience of the reiterated orders of the Nazim, and his having 
 offered violent opposition to those whom the Governor, after many 
 remonstrances with the Commedan, sent to enforce his orders. 
 
 " I cannot at all agree with you as to the character you assign 
 to this transaction. Sirdar Chuttur Sing was the Governor of 
 the province, military and civil, and the officers of the Sikh army 
 were bound to obey him, the responsibility for his orders resting 
 with him. Taking the worst possible view of the case, I know 
 not how you can characterise it as ' a cold-blooded murder, as base 
 and cowardly as that of Peshora Sing/ * 
 
 " Your statement of the disturbance in Hazara, does not materi- 
 ally differ from that received from other quarters ; nor does it dif- 
 fer in facts, making allowance for different statements of motives 
 and intentions, from that given by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in his 
 representations to the Durbar, and letters to me. 
 
 " It is clear that whatever may have been the intention of the 
 Pukli Brigade, no overt act of rebellion was committed by them 
 till the initiative was taken by you, by calling out the armed 
 peasantry and surrounding the Brigade in its cantonment. It 
 seems, also, that the armed peasants were threatening Hurripore, 
 before the Nazini ordered the guns out of the town, to the open 
 space between the fort and the city. 
 
 " The Sirdar states that this was merely a precautionary mea- 
 sure, in consequence of the rising of the population, the cause of 
 which he did not know ; while you state that it was for the pur- 
 pose of bringing off the Pukli Brigade, which was surrounded and 
 hemmed in by your orders ; of which orders the Governor had had 
 no notice. f 
 
 " I have given you no authority to raise levies, and organise 
 paid bands of soldiers, to meet an emergency, of the occurrence 
 of which I have always been somewhat sceptical. 
 
 " I cannot approve of your having abstained from communica- 
 tion with the Nazini on the state of his administration, for the pur- 
 pose of making his silence or otherwise on the subject, a test 
 whereby his guilt or innocence was to be determined by you. 
 You had already withdrawn your office from the seat of Govern- 
 ment, and had ceased all personal communication with the Nazim, 
 and had told the Nazim's Yakeel that you had no confidence in 
 his master. It is not to be wondered at that, under such circum- 
 stances, a weak, proud Chief should feel offended, and become 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 313. f Ibid., p. 313. 
 
118 OHAPTEK VI. 
 
 sullen, and be silent as to the disaffected state of the troops under 
 his Government, if he was really aware of the fact. 
 
 " It is much, I think, to be lamented that you have kept the 
 Nazim at a distance from you ; have resisted his offers and sug- 
 gestions to be allowed himself to reside near you, or to have his 
 son, Ootar Sing, to represent him at Shirwan ; and that you have 
 judged of the purposes, and feelings and fidelity of the Nazim 
 and the troops, from the reports of spies and informers, very pro- 
 bably interested in misrepresenting the real state of affairs. 
 
 " None of the accounts that have yet been made, justifies you 
 in calling the death of Commedan Canora a murder, nor in assert- 
 ing that it was premeditated by Sirdar Chuttur Sing. That mat- 
 ter has yet to be investigated."* 
 
 Chuttur Sing was eventually goaded into open rebellion. 
 Captain Abbott having predicted his treason, took, with 
 perfect good faith, the best measures to prove his predic- 
 tion true. Having played an aggressive part, and forced 
 Chuttur Sing " to take his line/'t Captain Abbott acted 
 with consummate ability and energy ; and though he 
 could not accomplish the task he had assigned himself, 
 that of destroying the Sikh troops by means of the 
 Mahomedan mountaineers, he maintained a position in 
 Hazara till the end of the war. When Chuttur Sing had 
 committed himself beyond retreat by a series of acts of 
 contumacy and hostility, and when Captain Abbott was 
 proving himself fully equal to the occasion, that officer's 
 provocative policy was glossed over and consigned to 
 oblivion. But there is nothing whatever in the Blue 
 Book to show that the Resident ever saw reason to with- 
 draw or modify his opinion that " the initiative was taken" 
 by Captain Abbott. The insurrection in Hazara was, in 
 fact, originally an insurrection of the Mahomedan peasantry, 
 with the object of exterminating the Sikh troops and 
 Governor, instigated and promoted by a British officer. J 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 316. t Ibid., p. 323. 
 
 J It is worthy of note that, at the end of the campaign, " Abbott alone, who 
 had held his lonely post at Kara from first to last, was unfairly stinted of the 
 honours due to his acknowledged worth," when Edwardes, Lake, Taylor and 
 Herbert were decorated and promoted. Trotters History of India from 1844 
 to 1862, vol. i, p. 212. " The gallant Abbott, who had defended the fortress 
 of Nara against fearful odds, down to the close of the campaign, was invidi- 
 ously refused the honour due to his distinguished efforts and success." Marsh- 
 man's History of India, (Longmans, 1867) vol. iii, p. 350. Somebody appreci- 
 ated his services justly, if Lord Dalhousie did not. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 119 
 
 It is interesting to observe the spirit in which Captain 
 Abbott devised and prosecuted his offensive operations. 
 It goes very far to explain the powerful influence which 
 he obtained over the fanatical Mahomedans of the Hazara 
 Hills. Besides money, he gave them what they most 
 coveted, an opportunity of revenge and triumph over the 
 idolatrous Sikhs, the obstinate persecutors of the Mussul- 
 man faith. I quote from Captain Abbott's own despatches. 
 
 " I assembled the Chiefs of Hazara ; explained what had hap- 
 pened, and called upon them by the memory of their murdered 
 parents, friends and relatives, to rise, and aid me in destroying 
 the Sikh forces in detail. I issued purwannas to this effect 
 throughout the land, and marched to a strong position."* 
 
 " I have placed a force in the Margulla Pass to destroy Pertaub 
 Sing's Kegiment, should it refuse to turn back at my reiterated 
 orders, "f 
 
 " I have ordered out the armed peasantry, and will do my best 
 to destroy the Sikh army.";]; 
 
 " The Sirdar sent me no intelligence of this cold-blooded 
 murder, as base and cowardly as his murder of Peshora Sing ; but 
 on finding it confirmed by eye-witnesses, and that the Sirdar had 
 thus identified himself with the mutineers in Pukli, I ordered all 
 the Chiefs of Hazara to rise, and, in every way, harass and molest 
 those who should support him." 
 
 It must be remembered that there were no " mutineers 
 in Pukli"; Captain Abbott had no information of anything 
 like a mutiny ; he was acting merely on the rumours of a 
 secret conspiracy, brought or written to him, from a dis- 
 tance of thirty-five miles, by spies and informers. No 
 overt act had been committed before his own hostile move- 
 ments. His own letters prove that before the unfortunate 
 Canora's death, there was nothing apparent or even alleged 
 against Sirdar Chuttur Sing, that required investigation. 
 He presses matters on to a climax. 
 
 " I left Shirwan for a position nearer the new theatre of opera- 
 tions, the foot of the Gundgurk mountains, terrible to the Sikhs 
 for three most bloody and disastrous defeats, from numbers not 
 one-fourth of their own. It is within sight of Hurripore, and may 
 be called the throne of Hazara, as here I have at my back the 
 bravest and most loyal of the population, and my orders are better 
 obeyed than from any other locality.")) 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 311. f Ibid., p. 306. 
 
 % Ibid., p. 301. Ibid., p. 302. || Ibid., p. 303. 
 
120 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 From this "throne," he sent to Hurripore, and summoned 
 Chutter Sing to give up "the murderers, "as he called them, of 
 Colonel Canora, and to comply with "a schedule of demands." 
 
 " I have given him until to-morrow morning for decision. If 
 he then refuse the terms, I shall be satisfied that it is not mere 
 alarm about himself from the population of Hazara, but a sense 
 of detected guilt, and consequent desperation, which has led to 
 this rebellious conduct. If he comply, the country need not be 
 ravaged, nor the army destroyed, and his conduct may be made the 
 subject of legal investigation. 
 
 " The Pukli Brigade is still in limbo. It is unfortunate that 
 the Pukli Brigade got intelligence of my possession of that pass 
 in time, as, in all probability it would have been destroyed. As it 
 never actually marched, I am reluctant to order it to be destroyed, 
 until in motion."* 
 
 Here is another distinct admission, out of his own mouth, 
 that no overt act had been committed. It was, in his 
 opinion, "unfortunate," that these obstinate Sikhs would 
 not mutiny, or march to Lahore, in time. He was "re- 
 luctant" to have them "destroyed" in their quarters, 
 because they had not moved. Yet he had already ordered 
 the armed peasantry to " destroy the Sikh army," and "to 
 harass and molest, in every way," those who supported 
 the Governor of the Province. 
 
 In another place Captain Abbott declares that the 
 " murder" of Canora " formed the break in the ice of deep 
 and silent treachery, so long carried on with a smiling 
 face"^ acknowledging, in fact, that, before that unhappy 
 event, he had nothing to bring against Chuttur Sing ex- 
 cept rumours of a conspiracy gathered from spies and in- 
 formers. As the Resident wrote to him : " There is no 
 proof of misconduct before the raising of the armed popu- 
 lation, and his plea is, that all that he has done since, has 
 been of a defensive character. "J 
 
 More than once Captain Abbott betrays his conscious- 
 ness that he had given Chuttur Sing good cause for alarm, 
 and for the precautionary measures which were bringing 
 them into collision. "I wrote to the Sirdar," he says, 
 " insisting upon the instant surrender of the murderers of 
 this loyal and gallant officer, and the return of the troops 
 
 * Papers, Punjabi, 1849, p. 303. f Ibid., p. 311. 
 
 f Ibid., p. 313. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 121 
 
 to their cantonments, promising, upon these conditions, to 
 settle all disturbances in the country."* 
 
 " He" (Chuttur Sing) " says that Canora was engaged to join 
 the peasants in plundering Hurripore. He" evidently Canora 
 " knew nothing whatever of what was passing amongst the people 
 of the country, and more than once expressed anxiety lest the town 
 should be plundered, j- 
 
 " If the murderers of Colonel Canora are surrendered to me 
 for judgment, and the troops sent back to their several canton- 
 ments, I will, instantly, reduce the country to its former profound 
 tranquillity.'^ 
 
 There is an occasional inconsistency, amounting almost, 
 to incoherence, running through Captain Abbott's reports, 
 in spite of his bold and confident doings. For instance, 
 after declaring his intention of "destroying the Sikh army 
 in detail," and " harassing and molesting" everyone who 
 should support the Governor, he complains of that person- 
 age having expressed alarm at the rising of the armed 
 peasantry, and having written in "a tone of virtuous 
 indignation," under a "pretence of extreme peril from a 
 people whom two of my chuprassees" (messengers) "would 
 settle in three days." As if it were very likely that 
 either the Mahomedan population on the one side, roused 
 by appeals to their "murdered parents," and to the "bloody 
 defeats" they had formerly inflicted on the Sikhs ; || or the 
 Sikh Governor and troops, on the other, alarmed by the 
 sudden insurrection, would interpret Captain Abbott's ex- 
 terminating orders and proclamations with all that moder- 
 ation and reluctance, and all those conditions and quali- 
 fications, with which he professes to have tempered them ! 
 
 The Resident had too much good sense and experience 
 to look upon the calling up of these fanatical mountaineers 
 as a mere demonstration, which Captain Abbott could 
 easily keep in hand, and settle at any moment with two 
 of his chuprassees. He very properly calls it "a momentous 
 business," and tells the Governor-General, "I have pointed 
 out to him how much easier it is to raise, than to allay a 
 power thus brought into action, and impelled by religious 
 antipathies, and feelings of long cherished hatred."^ 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 302. ' f Ibid., p. 303. 
 
 Ibid., p. 304. Ibid., p. 304. || Ante, p. 119. 
 
 1" Papers, Punjaub, p. 279. 
 
122 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 The Resident writes to Captain Abbott that both of 
 Sirdar Chuttur Sing's sons, Rajah Shere Sing, at Mooltan, 
 and Golab Sing, at Lahore, complain that their father has 
 been " betrayed into misconduct by mistrust, engendered 
 by your withdrawal of your confidence from him, and 
 declared suspicions of his fidelity, and by fear at the 
 Mahomedan population having been raised, as he believed, 
 for his destruction and that of the Sikh army/'* 
 
 What Chuttur Sing believed, was the exact truth. 
 Captain Abbott himself tells us so repeatedly. He speaks 
 of " arousing a high-spirited people to the work of destruc- 
 tion, "f The Mahomedan population was raised by him 
 " to destroy the Sikh army," and to " harass and molest" 
 everyone who should support the Sikh Governor. 
 
 The Resident on the 19th August, 1848, writes to 
 Captain Nicholson, who, under his instructions, was en- 
 deavouring to arrange matters, and bring all parties to 
 their bearings, as follows : 
 
 ' ' We must bear in mind that, whatever may have been supposed 
 to have been the purpose of the Pukli Brigade and the Sirdar, no 
 over tact was committed by either, until the Brigade was sur- 
 rounded in Gahundia, and Hurripore was threatened by the 
 Mahomedan tribes, of whose purpose no notice had been given 
 by Captain Abbott to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Governor of the 
 Province. The initiative was clearly taken by Captain Abbott, 
 I do not say unnecessarily, but it was so taken ; and the Nazim 
 now pleads that he was acting for the protection of himself and 
 the troops committed to him, and also of the country under his 
 government, in calling the Regiments from Hassan Abdal and the 
 other cantonments. "J 
 
 Captain Nicholson writes to much the same effect : 
 " From all that I can learn, Sirdar Chuttur Sing's conduct, at 
 the commencement, was owing as much to nervousness and sus- 
 picion as any other feeling, and but for the murder of the unfor- 
 tunate Commandant of Artillery, I should have had hopes of an 
 amicable adjustment. As it is, the dislike to surrender the 
 perpetrators would alone, I believe, prove an insurmountable 
 obstacle."! 
 
 " I have already mentioned, that I attribute Sirdar Chuttur 
 Sing's behaviour, in the first instance, to his distrust of Captain 
 Abbott's intentions, which was excited by the assemblage, by that 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 296. t Ibid., p, 309. 
 
 I Ibid., p. 312. Ibid., p. 283. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 123 
 
 officer, of a body of Moolkias," (the armed mountaineers,) "to 
 overawe the Sikh troops in Pukli, who, he had reason to believe, 
 meditated marching on Lahore. This distrust was further, un- 
 fortunately, increased by the reports of designing parties on both 
 sides, who, for the furtherance of their own interests, endeavoured 
 to create disunion between Captain Abbott and the Sirdar, who 
 has since, I fear, committed himself past forgiveness. 
 
 ce That he will never accede to any terms in which a free pardon 
 for all this is not included, I feel certain. 
 
 1 ' I would beg to solicit that instructions be, at once, sent to 
 Mr. Cocks, who, I suppose, will be here in the interim, as to 
 whether he is authorised to promise a full pardon to the Sirdar 
 for all that has occurred. If he be, there is no difficulty what- 
 ever."* 
 
 At this time, and even on previous dates, Captain Ab- 
 bott's inflammatory language exaggerates and misrepre- 
 sents what he calls the "crimes" of Chuttur Sing. He 
 writes to the Resident, on the 13th August, that Chuttur 
 Sing is " exciting to mutiny the bulk of the Sikh army, 
 and calling upon the Jummoo Prince" (the Rajah of Cash- 
 mere) " to invade the country." " Last night I intercepted 
 letters from Sirdar Chuttur Sing to Maharajah Golab 
 Sing," (of Cashmere) " the Rajahs Jowahir Sing and Run- 
 beer Sing," (Golab Sing's nephew and son,) "and others, 
 entreating, the aid of four Jummoo Regiments. "f 
 
 What he calls " exciting the Sikh army to mutiny," 
 was sending for the Regiments from the neighbouring 
 cantonments for the protection of himself and the troops 
 from the insurgent Mahomedans. As for the intercepted 
 letters, they are, in fact, the best evidence of the Sirdar's 
 innocence at that period, for, containing no treasonable 
 matter, or Captain Abbott would have been sure to men- 
 tion it, and being couched, as he says, "in a tone of 
 virtuous indignation," they, also, were simply appeals for 
 aid, written under the influence, as Captain Nicholson 
 said, of "terror and anxiety. "J 
 
 When the news of Chuttur Sing's movements first 
 reached Mooltan, his son, Rajah Shere Sing "discussed 
 the matter with me," said Major Edwardes, to whom Shere 
 Sing showed the letters received from his father, " with 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 308, 309. f Ibid., p. 304 
 
 t Ibid., p. 308. 
 
124 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 great good sense, and put it to me, whether all that his 
 father had done to oppose the Moolkias" (the insurgent 
 peasantry) "was not perfectly natural and excusable, on 
 the supposition that he was innocent of the plots suspected 
 by Captain Abbott. ' No man,' he said, ' will allow him- 
 self to be killed without a struggle.'""* 
 
 The insurmountable obstacle, as Captain Nicholson at 
 once perceived, was the death of Colonel Canora, and the 
 requisition for the men who shot him. Chuttur Sing had 
 rewarded these men on the spot, a very natural proceeding 
 in his position and with his notions, but which, he felt, 
 fixed upon him the stigma of the murder, if such it was to 
 be considered by the English authorities. " He has identi- 
 fied himself with the murderers in paying them for their 
 bloody work," wrote Captain Abbott to the Resident, f 
 It is perfectly obvious that if Chuttur Sing had taken a 
 step towards giving up those men to what they and their 
 comrades would have supposed to be certain death, -he 
 would not merely have sacrificed his own honour use- 
 lessly, for there was no secret about his having rewarded 
 them, but it would in all probability have brought on an 
 immediate mutiny, to which he would himself have fallen 
 the first victim. 
 
 The Resident seems to have had a general idea that the 
 principal difficulty of the case was concentrated on this 
 point. " After the death of Canora," he writes to the 
 Government, " the Sirdar thought himself compromised 
 irretrievably, it would appear, with us."J 
 
 Major George Lawrence, also, writes : " He" (Chuttur 
 Sing) " is anxious to come to terms, but fears he has com- 
 mitted himself too far to admit of his obtaining them." 
 
 We are not surprised to find that he could obtain no 
 terms from Captain Abbott. That officer refused to see 
 Chuttur Sing, who offered to wait upon him, if assured of 
 a free pardon. " I declined this ; thought it quite impos- 
 sible that we should meet amicably, until I knew the sen- 
 timents of Government upon his conduct."]] 
 
 " I gave him yesterday," writes Captain Abbott to the 
 Resident, " a statement of my demands, viz., the surrender 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 294. f Ibid., p. 311. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 289. Ibid., p. 291. || Ibid., p. 311. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 125 
 
 of the murderers for judgment, and an order to the several 
 Regiments to return to their duty."* 
 
 But from the Resident we might have expected a more 
 even-handed procedure, and a more impartial arbitrament. 
 Satisfied that the death of Canora, even according to Cap- 
 tain Abbott's version, was not a murder, he might surely 
 have dealt more judiciously with that " insurmountable 
 obstacle," the peremptory demand for the surrender of 
 "the murderers" into Captain Abbott's hands. Perceiving 
 " clearly" that " the initiative" had been taken by Captain 
 Abbott, he might surely have offered Sirdar Chuttur Sing 
 a full pardon, conditional on his proving the plea that he 
 had resorted to none but defensive measures, and had acted 
 only" for the protection of himself and the troops," when 
 they were hemmed in by the insurgent mountaineers. 
 
 No such offer was made to Chuttur Sing. No such 
 offer was proposed or sanctioned by the Resident. No 
 one told the Sikh Governor that the Resident had by no 
 means decided hastily, like Captain Abbott, that Canora 
 had been foully murdered. No hint was given that any 
 question or dispute between him and Captain Abbott 
 could possibly be open to investigation. No promise was 
 made to Chuttur Sing but that of his life ; no terms were 
 offered him but those of implicit submission to Captain 
 Abbott, against whose aggression he complained, and with 
 these terms was coupled the intimation that he was dis- 
 missed from his Government, and that his landed property 
 would be confiscated ! 
 
 Captain Nicholson declared that Sirdar Chuttur Sing's 
 conduct was the result of "terror and anxiety, "f and he 
 never deviated from that opinion. He told the Resident 
 that the demand for the men who killed the unfortunate 
 Commandant of Artillery would prove "an insurmountable 
 obstacle," and that Chuttur Sing would "never accede to 
 any terms" but "a free pardon." Yet on receiving over- 
 tures from Chuttur Sing, he "insisted, as a preliminary, 
 on the Artillery Commandant's murderers being given 
 up."J And on the 20th August he wrote to the Resident 
 as follows : 
 
 * Papers, Punjaul, 1849, p. 306. f Ibid., 308. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 284. 
 
126 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ' ' Considering how extremely desirable it is that matters should, 
 if possible,, be peaceably arranged,, believing, also, that the Sirdar's 
 conduct, of late, though heinous in many respects, had its or!</in 
 in fear, I have taken upon myself the responsibility of offering 
 him the following terms, which, whether he accept (as Jhunda 
 Sing seems to think he will) or not, I hope will meet your 
 approval, viz. That if the Sirdar, immediately, come in to me, 
 and send back the troops to their posts, I guarantee his life and 
 izzut" (honour) " being spared ; lut I neither guarantee his JY 
 ship nor his Jagheer, which, indeed, I have intimated to him he 
 cannot expect to be allowed to retain. 
 
 " All things considered, I trust you will agree with me, that the 
 loss of the Nizamut and of his Jagheer will be a sufficient punish- 
 ment, and that I have acted rightly in offering these terms."* 
 
 This severe sentence, without trial and without judg- 
 ment, was instantly, by return of post, " entirely approved, 
 confirmed and ratified" by the Resident, in a letter dated 
 the 23rd August, to Captain Nicholson, f 
 
 Yet on the very day, the 23rd August, on which the 
 Resident "confirmed and ratified" the degradation of 
 Chuttur Sing and the resumption of his estates, he wrote 
 as foUows to Major Edwardes : " Lieutenant Nicholson 
 and Major Lawrence, with the best opportunities of judg- 
 ing, entirely concur with me that the Sirdar's conduct is 
 owing more to his distrust and fear of Captain Abbott's 
 feelings and intentions towards himself and the troops, 
 than to any other cause. "+ He had previously remarked 
 in a letter to the Commander in Chief: "Lieutenant 
 Nicholson does not seem to know the manner of Comin.n- 
 dant Canoras death; he calls it a murder, and says that 
 he understands Sirdar Chuttur Sing headed the party that 
 killed him." And on the 24th August, the day after he 
 had approved and confirmed the hard terms proposed by 
 Captain Nicholson, the Resident wrote to Captain Abbott, 
 disapproving of much of his conduct, pronouncing it to 
 have been " far from judicious," and that he was not jus- 
 tified " in calling the death of Commedan Canora a 
 murder. "|| 
 
 On the 5th September the Resident writes to Govern- 
 ment : "I have promised him" (Chuttur Sing) "merely 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 295. t Ibid., p. 297. 
 
 J Ibid., p. 297. Ibid., p. 286. || Ibid., p. 316. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 127 
 
 life, and an honourable investigation into his conduct."* 
 How could that be "an honourable investigation," which 
 was preceded by the infliction of heavy penalties ? The 
 Sirdar was not even told that, if he succeeded in clearing 
 himself, these penalties would be remitted. 
 
 When Chuttur Sing found that his appeal to the Resi- 
 dent and the Durbar was fruitless ; that Captain Abbott's 
 proceedings were not disavowed, or, to his knowledge, dis- 
 approved ; and that no terms were offered to him but bare 
 life, what could he think but that he had been marked 
 down as the first victim in the general ruin of the Punjaub 
 State ? Already alarmed and disgusted by the Mahara- 
 nee's removal and ill-treatment, and by the evasive answer 
 as to the Maharajah's marriage, his head may probably 
 have been full of plots and projects, and he may have been in- 
 tently watching the course of events, when Captain Abbott's 
 initiative threw him into an equivocal position. When that 
 officer was permitted to pursue what he himself called 
 " the work of destruction," unreproved, so far as Chuttur 
 Sing knew, when the plan of setting up the Mahomedans 
 against Sikhs, and reviving old blood feuds, was adopted 
 and sanctioned by the highest British authorities, the old 
 Sirdar's disaffection was confirmed. He was driven to des- 
 peration ; he no longer resisted the importunities of the 
 fanatic Sikhs among his followers and the troops. He 
 plunged into open rebellion, and devoted himself to one 
 last struggle for his religion and the Khalsa Raj. 
 
 And from the manner in which Chuttur Sing with the 
 Sikh troops, and Captain Abbott with his Mahomedan 
 peasants, were left by the Resident to fight it out by 
 themselves, the Sikhs at other stations were soon persuaded 
 that such was the settled plan of the British Government. 
 Major George Lawrence writes from Peshawar on the 5th 
 of September : " Colonel Ootar Sing declared that men 
 from different Regiments had called on all to march on my 
 quarters, as it was my intention to destroy all the Sikhs, 
 1)y raising the Mahomedan population"* He adds : "I 
 keep all the Mahomedans as much out of sight as possible, 
 and will do everything in my power to preserve the peace, 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 329. 
 
128 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 but it is utterly impossible to suppose that this state of 
 things can last."* 
 
 When Sirdar Chuttur Sing was fully committed beyond 
 all possibility of retreat or redemption, when redress was 
 refused, and he was sentenced without judgment, his 
 sons, of course, threw in their lot with their father, and 
 the second Sikh war began. Until they took that step, the 
 Mooltan rebellion was isolated, confined, indeed, within 
 the walls of the fortress ; although its importance was en- 
 hanced and the dangers attending it were aggravated by 
 the Maharanee's removal, by our military vacillation and 
 delay, and by the rumours of impending annexation. Up 
 to the middle of September, 1848, no Chief of note or 
 distinction had j oined in the insurrection. Captain Abbott's 
 notion of a general conspiracy throughout the Punjaub, 
 in which all the members of the Durbar and Maharajah 
 Golab Sing of Cashmere were implicated, as well as his 
 charge against Chuttur Sing, of having been accessory be- 
 fore the fact to the Mooltan outbreak, are conclusively dis- 
 proved by the dates and incidents of each successive con- 
 vulsion. "As yet," writes the Resident, on the 8th Sep- 
 tember, "no Chief has, openly, joined Sirdar Chuttur 
 Sing." " Neither the army beyond Hazara, nor the Chiefs 
 generally, appear to have been prepared for this move of 
 Sirdar Chuttur Sing." 
 
 " If Rajah Shere Sing should not join his father, sup- 
 posing the rebellion to gain head, it will be very sur- 
 prising ; and it is equally surpising that the Sirdar should 
 have taken his decided line, without having secured the 
 concurrence of his son."f 
 
 Two facts, in particular, show that Chuttur Sing had 
 not secured the concurrence of his son, and that neither 
 of them had any complicity with Dewan Moolraj of Mool- 
 tan, firstly, the good conduct of Rajah Shere Sing until 
 the middle of September, and, secondly, the surprise and 
 mistrust of the Dewan Moolraj at Shere Sing's tardy de- 
 fection. 
 
 Major Edwardes tells us, on the 4th September, that 
 "since the Rajah's" (Shere Sing's) "arrival before Mooltan, 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 340. t Ibid., p. 333. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 129 
 
 he lias omitted neither persuasion, threats, nor punish- 
 ments, to keep his troops to their duty."* 
 
 Major Edwardes, who had the best opportunities of 
 judging, believes that Rajah Shere Sing undertook his 
 share in the task of suppressing the rebellion of Dewan 
 Moolraj, with the best intentions. A large proportion of 
 his Sikh troops were unquestionably disaffected ; but on 
 the march from Lahore " the Rajah made severe examples 
 of one or two soldiers in his camp who gave licence to 
 their tongues, "f So determined did Rajah Shere Sing 
 appear, up to the end of August, 1848, to check the dis- 
 loyalty of his men, that he was reviled as a Mussulman, 
 the greatest reproach that can be cast upon a Sikh, J and 
 a conspiracy was detected to put him to death by poison. 
 When this crime was fully brought home to the ringleader, 
 Shoqjan Sing, "a Sikh jagheerdar horseman of some con- 
 sideration and still greater notoriety," the Rajah " carried 
 the extreme sentence of the law into effect, and caused 
 the traitor to be blown from one of his own guns," in his 
 own camp. "The act," Major Edwardes adds, "was ex- 
 tremely unpopular in the Rajah's force, and I rather think 
 that he himself expected resistance. " 
 
 As Major Edwardes remarks, this was " a sufficient 
 proof, that up to the end of August, Rajah Shere Sing 
 was still loyal, and determined to go any lengths to check 
 the disloyalty of his men."|| 
 
 Reviewing all these transactions two years later, Major 
 Edwardes says : " The question with which I am con- 
 cerned in this event is, ' When did Shere Sing resolve to 
 join his father ?' I have no hesitation whatever in stating 
 that it is now as certain as anything in this world can be, 
 that it was on the 12th or 13th of September, certainly 
 within forty-eight hours of the fatal step being taken. "^[ 
 
 Moolraj was quite unprepared for the desertion of 
 Rajah Shere Sing. He had done his best to corrupt the 
 Sikh soldiers in Shere Sing's camp, but the Rajah himself 
 had rejected all his overtures. The consequence was that 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 329. 
 
 t Ibid., 1849, p. 244 ; A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, pp. 420, 425. 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 330, and 344. Ibid., pp. 329, 330. 
 || A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 433. f Ibid., vol. ii, p. 503. 
 
 K 
 
130 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 " Moolraj could not believe that Shere Sing had come 
 over in good faith," "withdrew all his own soldiers 
 within the walls of Mooltan," and made the Rajah's army 
 " take their places in the British front," under the walls of 
 the Fort.* In a few days Shere Sing was disgusted with 
 Moolraj's suspicions, and went off to join his father. 
 
 The Resident writes to Government on the 23rd of 
 September : "Rajah Shere Sing's conduct has been very 
 extraordinary, and is almost inexplicable, "f It was indeed 
 inexplicable, except upon the very obvious presumption 
 that he had decided to come forward, at all hazards, to 
 the assistance of his injured father, and for the independ- 
 ence of the Sikh sovereignty, which he began to see was 
 doomed. Still, but for his father's wrongs, he would 
 rather have trusted to the good faith and generosity of 
 what he knew to be the stronger side. On or about 
 the 10th of September, Shere Sing received letters from 
 his father,! in which the old Chief, without doubt, in- 
 formed him of the heavy penalties to which he had been 
 sentenced ; and on the 14th, in a "fit of desperation and 
 confusion," the son consented to espouse the cause of his 
 father, and to make it the cause of the nation. And in 
 the private and secret letter to his brother, Golab Sing, 
 at Lahore, Rajah Shere Sing expressly declares that he 
 has taken this step in consequence of Captain Abbott's 
 conduct to his father. " The Sing Sahib" (Sirdar Chuttur 
 Sing) " has several times written to me, stating that he 
 constantly obeyed Captain Abbott's directions, but that 
 officer, acting according to the suggestions of the people 
 of Hazara," (the Mahomedans) " has treated him most un- 
 justly, and caused him much grief and trouble ; and that 
 he has also exerted himself to destroy and disperse the 
 Khalsa troops." He adds, " I resolved, therefore, yester- 
 day, to join the Sing Sahib, and devote myself to the cause 
 of our religion."| | 
 
 All idea, therefore, of a deep conspiracy on the part of 
 either Rajah Shere Sing or Sirdar Chuttur Sing, is com- 
 pletely negatived. The general insurrection of 1848 was 
 
 * A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 515. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 360. % Ibid., p. 343 Ibid., p. 358. 
 
 || Ibid., p. 359 ; A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 505. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 131 
 
 unpremeditated. Chuttur Sing was goaded into hostilities 
 by Captain Abbott's aggression, and his son was driven 
 to join him in what they both felt to be a desperate rebel- 
 lion, by the refusal of redress, and the multiplied rumours 
 and symptoms of the Raj having been doomed to de- 
 struction. 
 
 But everything tends to prove that the original out- 
 break at Mooltan was equally unpremeditated. The Dewan 
 Moolraj was rich, in infirm health and without children, 
 timid, unpopular with the army and people ; and the 
 Resident reports that immediately before the catastrophe 
 he had " only five or six field guns,"* and " had discharged 
 almost all his regular troops, preparatory to resigning his 
 government."']' From all the accounts, it appears certain 
 that Moolraj , though disaffected at the changes which had 
 compelled him to resign, and at the prospect, as he feared, 
 of having to account for the revenue collections of past 
 years, was involved in rebellion against his will. The 
 attack on the two British officers sent to relieve him of 
 his post, was caused by a sudden impulse of discontent 
 and fanaticism, in the results of which, after a vain attempt 
 to quell it, Moolraj felt himself irretrievably compromised. 
 With hope of scant mercy from the British Government, 
 and certain of death from the mutinous soldiery, if he 
 trusted to that mercy, he yielded to circumstances, and 
 accepted the lot that fate had cast before him.J 
 
 Before the murderous outbreak at Mooltan, the Dewan, 
 as we have just remarked, had discharged almost all his 
 regular troops. That had been the order of the day for 
 more than a year all over the Punjaub. Between 10,000 
 and 20,000 soldiers had been disbanded before April, 
 1847 ; and towards the close of that month the Resident 
 speaks of gradually reducing the Infantry " from 20,000 
 to 15,000 men, and the Sowars" (Cavalry) "from 12,000 
 to 10,000."|| The reports from every province describe 
 the same process of reduction. Mr. Agnew, who was sent 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 133. Lord Dalhousie's final opinion is that 
 "the first outbreak was unpremeditated, and, in a manner, accidental." 
 Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 585. t Mid., p. 371. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 151 ; A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 165. 
 
 Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 2. || Ibid., p. 6. 
 
 K2 
 
132 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 in company with a Sikh Governor to take over charge from 
 Dewan Moolraj, is instructed to give his " early attention" 
 to "reducing all unnecessary Irregulars"; the best men 
 from the Regular Regiments serving at Mooltan are to be 
 picked out and sent to Lahore ; "the remaining men may 
 be paid up and discharged."* Thus the military class at 
 Mooltan, not, be it observed, conscripts, but soldiers by 
 hereditary profession, not only knew what was in store 
 for them under the new administration, but actually had 
 a foretaste of it before the British officers arrived. Moolraj, 
 not well pleased with his forced retirement, must have 
 felt a malicious satisfaction, when dismissing his troops, 
 in explaining to them the cause of that unpopular measure. 
 We cannot, therefore, be surprised to learn that the man 
 who led the attack on the British officers, as they passed 
 over the drawbridge of Mooltan, was a soldier, " brooding, 
 perchance," as Major Edwardes wrote, " over his own long 
 services and probable dismissal, "t nor that the subsequent 
 acts, by which Moolraj was effectually involved in rebel- 
 lion, and " the crowning crime of assassination/' were per- 
 petrated by the Sikh troops. J 
 
 For some years before the Sutlej campaign, all the 
 power of the Punjaub State had been wielded by the Sikh 
 soldiery, through their Punchayuts, or elected committees. 
 They had raised and deposed a succession of Princes and 
 ministers ; in every political conjuncture their favour had 
 to be propitiated by largesses and augmented pay. The 
 Sikh army claimed the privilege of representing, as a 
 corporate body, the Khalsa, the elect and holy race of 
 true believers. Lord Hardinge, writing to the Court of 
 Directors on the 30th September, 1845, says that "the 
 most influential and leading Chiefs" feel "their personal 
 interests" to be " endangered by the democratic revolution 
 so successfully accomplished by the Sikh army." Even 
 the Maharanee saw her own brother, Jowahir Sing, shot 
 down before her own eyes, by the sentence of this armed 
 Inquisition. 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, in an article published in 1847, 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 126. 
 
 t A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 51. J Ibid., vol. ii, p. 161. 
 
 Papers respecting the Late Hostilities, etc., 1846, p. 6. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 133 
 
 in the Calcutta Review, when he was Resident at Lahore, 
 thus describes what took place after the murder of the 
 Maharanee's brother : 
 
 " No man dared to seize the helm. Rajah Lai Sing was not 
 wanting in courage ; and Maharajah Golab Sing has abundance ; 
 but neither coveted the Viziership, which involved responsibility 
 to a thousand exacting masters. Intoxicated with success at 
 home, where no man's honour was safe from their violence, where 
 they had emptied the coffers of the State, and plundered those of 
 Jummu, the unsated soldiery now sought to help themselves from 
 the Bazars and treasuries of Delhi. This madness of the Sikh 
 army was the true cause of invasion, and not either the acts of 
 the British Government, or its agents.* 
 
 " The majority of voices was for an immediate march. The 
 Eani and her advisers, who felt that all authority was lost, urged 
 them to be gone at once ; but this very impatience roused the 
 suspicions of the soldiers. Thus doubtful did matters remain for 
 more than twenty days : the whole Sikh army, it is true, at last 
 left Lahore, but, as on former occasions, they still hesitated to 
 ' cross the Rubicon,'' and finally commit themselves. The great 
 delay, however, was in persuading the Sirdars. They had pro- 
 perty to lose. The rabble had only property to gain. Sirdar 
 Tej Sing, who ultimately was Commander-in-Chief of the invading 
 force, consented only when openly and loudly taxed with cowardice, 
 and even threatened with death. "f 
 
 In the Duke of Argyll's own words : " It was the 
 Khalsa army, not the Lahore Government, which began 
 the Sikh war. The great force which Runjeet had brought 
 together, and had disciplined with admirable efficiency 
 for the purposes of war, was an army whose fierce fanati- 
 cism, inflamed by concentration and by the sense of power, 
 had become incapable of control. "J 
 
 The victories of Lord Gough, and the occupation of 
 Lahore, put an end to this Pra3torian Parliament. The 
 Punchayuts were no longer recognised or allowed to as- 
 semble. Discipline was restored and enforced. Military 
 license was restrained. The political influence of the army 
 was annihilated. 
 
 The Sirdars, who for years had trembled under the 
 thraldom of the Sikh Punchayuts, rejoiced at their sub- 
 jugation. But the unruly fanatics who had organised and 
 
 * Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays, p. 264. f Ibid., pp. 277, 278. 
 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. ">.">. 
 
134 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 guided those short-lived democratic institutions, were, of 
 course, furious at their downfall, and, though somewhat 
 dejected and discouraged by the recent crushing disaster, 
 only waited for an opportunity to claim their representa- 
 tive functions, and to regain their former ascendency. 
 
 One of the Resident's ablest Assistants, Lieutenant 
 Reynell Taylor, writes to him to that effect on the 15th 
 of July, 1848 : " It is the recollection of the past glories 
 of the Khalsa, and of the honoured and lucrative position 
 of a soldier in those days, and in those of anarchy and con- 
 fusion that followed them, mixed with a good deal of 
 military pride and confidence in their union and strength 
 in the field, that makes, and will make the Sikh soldiery 
 disposed to sedition and rebellion." In the same letter 
 he says : " I believe that a large proportion of the Sikhs 
 would be well pleased to see the matter" (Moolraj's rebel- 
 lion) " settled in favour of Government/'* 
 
 In every scene throughout the insurrectionary crisis 
 the same incidents repeat themselves. The Sikh soldiers 
 try to force on a rebellion, opposed and resisted by the 
 nobles and landholders, and even by their regimental 
 officers. It was so, even by Captain Abbott's account, 
 with the Sikh Brigade which he suspected and surrounded 
 in Hazara. "The officers," he writes, "received his" 
 (Chuttur Sing's) " orders with distrust, demurred, delayed, 
 but were finally borne along by the men."t According 
 to him, Sirdar Chuttur Sing "ordered them" (the troops) 
 to destroy an innocent and loyal man, and to mutiny 
 against my authority, and that of their officers.'^ 
 
 Captain Nicholson writes to the Resident : " If the 
 Sikh troops in Hazara were under the control of their 
 officers, there would be no difficulty ; but, as usual in the 
 Sikh army, few or none of the officers have any influence 
 with the men." 
 
 Major Lawrence writes from Peshawur : " I really 
 believe that most of the officers are very desirous to keep 
 their troops to their allegiance ; but, with a people so 
 easily worked on by designing: men, their task is most 
 
 difficuit."|| 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 257. f Ibid., p. 303. 
 
 % Ibid., p. 311. Ibid., p. 307. || Ibid., p. 340. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 135 
 
 The Resident, shortly after the bad news from Mooltan, 
 writes : "The Sikh Sirdars whom I have sent may be 
 implicitly relied upon, and the influence which they have 
 with the soldiery they will make the best use of. But 
 the soldiery themselves are not equally trustworthy ; they 
 are dispirited ; not satisfied with their Sirdars ; and have, 
 as may be supposed, no very kindly feeling for us."* On 
 the 22nd of June, he wrote again : " The Sirdars are true, 
 I believe ; the soldiers are all false I know."f 
 
 On the 13th of July, Major Edwardes reported thus to 
 the Resident : " With respect to the Sirdars, I believe 
 them to be heart and soul on our side, which is the side 
 of jaghires, titles, employments, and whole throats. But 
 their force, with equal confidence, I report to be against 
 us to a man.' ? J 
 
 The Resident writes to Government to the same effect 
 on the 17th June, 1848 : 
 
 " The Sikh troops are far worse than useless ; even in this re- 
 bellion against their own Government, they are not only not to be 
 depended on, but they are certain in the event of an opportunity 
 for successful collision, to take part with the rebel interest. This 
 is felt and acknowledged by every Sirdar in the country." 
 
 " On the night of the 8th instant, the Churunjeet Regiment of 
 Cavalry broke into open mutiny : the Sirdars succeeded, with 
 some difficulty, in preventing the Artillery and the Infantry Eegi- 
 ment from joining them/' 
 
 Many of the Sirdars were by degrees drawn into the 
 tide, particularly after the Maharanee's exile, and the 
 defection of Chuttur Sing and his sons, but they went 
 reluctantly and doubtfully, and in some cases were evi- 
 dently dragged into it by the troops. The Sirdars, in 
 fact, had something to lose. The Sikh soldiers had lost 
 nearly everything ; and they saw that if a reformed system 
 were firmly established in the Punjaub, their occupation 
 was gone. As the British administration was more com- 
 pletely introduced, they found their organisation broken 
 up, their special privileges abolished, their pay lowered, || and 
 their numbers reduced. Of course they were ripe for revolt. 
 
 On the 4th of August, 1848, Major Edwardes, describing 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 137. t Rid-, P- 220. 
 
 I Ibid., p. 254. Ibid., p. 217. 
 
 || Papers respecting the Late Hostilities, etc., 1846, pp. 95 and 99. 
 
136 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 to the Resident the abortive mutiny of a Sikh Regiment, 
 which the officers succeeded in suppressing, says : 
 
 " The whole affair is eminently characteristic of the treacherous, 
 avaricious, and intriguing Sikh soldier, another proof, added to 
 the many afforded by the Mooltan rebellion, of the imperative 
 necessity of remodelling the Khalsa army, if we wish for security 
 in the Punjaub. Lieutenant Lumsden is, I believe, engaged in 
 revising the internal economy of that army, but paramount to 
 this is the necessity of totally altering its constitution, which is 
 rotten to the core."* 
 
 And the Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, writes as follows 
 on the 27th September, 1848 : " The Sikh soldiers of the 
 old regime can never again be trusted ; and I must say 
 that, to my knowledge, Rajah Tej Sing said, two years 
 ago, and lias always adhered to the opinion, that it was 
 less dangerous, and would prove less embarrassing, to 
 disband them all, and raise a new army, than to continue 
 a man of them in service"^ 
 
 We did not take Rajah Tej Sing's advice ; but, on the 
 contrary, as the Resident said, kept up the old Sikh troops, 
 as " the disciplined army of the country, and left in their 
 hands all the artillery and munitions of war."$ 
 
 Chronic mutiny had existed in the Sikh army for six 
 years, sustained by religious fanaticism, and swelled by 
 continued success to the dimensions of a democratic revo- 
 lution. The warlike population of the dominant faith, 
 connected by innumerable ties of family and fellowship 
 with the Sikh soldiery, sympathised heartily with their 
 representative pretentious. We knew it ; we were warned 
 of it. Nothing occurred in 1848 that was not contem- 
 plated and expressly provided for, when the British 
 Government undertook, in December, 1846, the office of 
 Guardian during the minority of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing. 
 The several extensions of the British protective occupation 
 were conceded by Lord Hardinge, at the urgent request 
 of the Durbar, with special reference to "the reorganisa- 
 tion of the army." That was recognised on all sides, 
 throughout the negotiations, as the great requirement and 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 273. f Ibid., p. 377. 
 
 % Ibid., p. 217. 
 
 Further Papers respecting the late Hostilities, etc., 1846, pp. 95 and 103. 
 Papers, Articles of Agreement, etc., 1847, p. 5. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 137 
 
 the great peril. Lord Hardinge, writing to the Resident 
 on the 7th of December, 1846, declares that he "cannot 
 permit the renewal of a state of anarchy and military 
 despotism, similar to that which existed last year," and 
 that he "cannot, after the experience of the last eight 
 months, consent to leave a British force beyond the stipu- 
 lated period, for the purpose of supporting a Government 
 which, in its present state of weakness, can give no assu- 
 rance of its power to govern justly as regards its people, 
 and no guaranty for the performance of its obligations 
 towards its neighbours."* Within ten days of this de- 
 spatch being written, the Articles of Agreement were 
 signed at Lahore, on the 16th December, 1846, embody- 
 ing the only terms on which the Governor-General would 
 consent to the continuance of a British force at Lahore, 
 and by which "unlimited authority in all matters, during 
 the Maharajah's minority/' were conferred upon the British 
 Resident. t His object, Lord Hardinge announces, will 
 be "to counteract the disorder and anarchy which have 
 disturbed the Punjaub during the last five years, chiefly 
 owing to a numerous Sikh army, kept up in the vicinity 
 of the capital, by whose republican system of discipline 
 the soldiery had usurped all the functions of the State." 
 
 " The immediate effect," he says, " of depriving a 
 numerous body of military adventurers of employment, 
 (there being still many to be disbanded to reduce the 
 numbers to the limits of the Treaty of Lahore,) may be 
 troublesome, and a source of some uneasiness. No policy 
 can at once get rid of an evil which has been the growth 
 
 r> j74- 
 
 oi years. If 
 
 " I see around me," writes the Resident, Sir Henry 
 Lawrence, in April, 1847, "and hear of, so many men, 
 who, having been Generals and Colonels in the Sikh army, 
 are now struggling for existence ; and, at the same time, 
 know that so little justice has been done even in recent 
 reductions, that my great wonder has been the good con- 
 duct of the Sikh army during the last twelvemonth." 
 
 " I am well aware that neither independent feelings, 
 nor lawless habits, are easily eradicated : and I am quite 
 
 * Papers, Articles of Agreement, 1847, p. 42. f Hid., p. 24. 
 
 % Hid., p. 25. 
 
138 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 satisfied that there is nothing too foolish, nothing too 
 desperate, for Asiatic zealots or desperadoes to attempt. 
 I endeavour therefore to be on the alert/'* 
 
 In June, 1847, he writes as follows: "It is wise to 
 keep before our eyes the fact that the animus of unrest 
 and insurrection slumbers, but is not yet dead, in the 
 Punjaub. It would be a miracle if it were otherwise ; for 
 assuredly the habits acquired during six years of anarchy 
 are not to be laid aside in a month or a year."f 
 
 It is clear, then, that neither Lord Hardinge, nor Sir 
 Henry Lawrence, the Resident whom he appointed, ex- 
 pected to be immediately free from all danger of military 
 mutiny or rebellion. It was in anticipation of such possi- 
 bilities, that the Governor-General assumed, with the 
 consent of the Lahore Durbar, " unlimited powers," under 
 the Articles of Agreement, of December, 1846, and, in 
 particular, acquired the right of stationing a British force, 
 of such strength as he might think fit, in any position, 
 " any fort or military post in the Lahore territories, for 
 the protection of the Maharajah, for the security of the 
 capital, and for maintaining the peace of the country/' J 
 
 The following extract is taken from the recently pub- 
 lished History of India, by Mr. J. C. Marshman. 
 
 ' ' The precautionary measures adopted by Lord Hardinge mani- 
 fested equal foresight and vigour. He did not expect that a 
 country teeming with disbanded soldiers, the bravest and most 
 haughty in India, who had been nurtured in victory and conquest, 
 and pampered with seven years of military licence, would be as 
 free from disturbance as a district in Bengal. To provide for the 
 prompt suppression of any insurrectionary movements which 
 might arise, he organised three moveable Brigades, complete in 
 carriage and equipment, each of which consisted of one European 
 corps, three Regiments of Native Infantry and one of Cavalry, with 
 twelve guns, chiefly of European Horse Artillery. These were 
 held in readiness at Lahore, Jullunder and Ferozepore, to take the 
 field at the shortest notice." 
 
 Yet on the very first occasion of the peace of the country 
 being disturbed, the Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, writes 
 to Lord Dalhousie : " Dewan Moolraj is an officer of the 
 Sikh Government ; he is in rebellion, if rebellion at all, to 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 6, 7. t Ibid. 
 
 \ Papers, Articles of Agreement, 1847, p. 50. 
 
 Marshman 's History of India, 1867. vol. iii, p. 305. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 139 
 
 the Sikh Durbar, and the orders of that Government. 
 The coercion must come from the Sikh Government, unaided 
 by British troops, if possible. If it should be necessary to 
 move a British soldier, the affair will be a serious one for 
 the Durbar"* 
 
 " I could not consent, under any circumstances, to send a British 
 force on such an expedition, whatever may be the result and conse- 
 quence of the state of things which will follow, to the continuance of 
 the Sikh Government.^ 
 
 " After what has happened, I feel that if the question were one 
 merely affecting the maintenance of the Sikh Government, and 
 the preserving the tranquillity of their provinces, we should be 
 scarcely justified in expending more British blood, and British 
 treasure in such service." J 
 
 And this, although the British troops were there, under 
 treaty, and were subsidised, for that very service of main- 
 taining the Sikh Government, and preserving " the peace 
 of the country/ 7 
 
 " The principal Sirdars started this morning, under the impres- 
 sion that the British column would follow. I have sent for them 
 back, to explain to them that they must, by their own resources, put 
 down the rebellion of their own Governor, aided by their own troops 
 and their officers, and bring the perpetrators to punishment.")) 
 
 So soon was the menacing note of annexation sounded 
 in the ears of the Sikh Sirdars ! And this language, 
 natural and excusable in the first excitement, indignation 
 and perplexity of a sudden and alarming crisis, pervades, 
 with some intermittence and inconsistency, all the Resi- 
 dent's correspondence, and is at last deliberately adopted 
 by the Governor-General in pronouncing his final judgment. 
 
 On the 27th April, the Resident continues his narrative. 
 
 " The Chiefs returned yesterday morning, and having heard 
 what I had to say regarding the necessity of their putting down 
 the rebellion, and bringing the offenders to justice, by their own 
 means, as the only hope of saving their Government, they retired 
 to consult and concert measures. 
 
 " After much discussion they declared themselves unable, with- 
 out British aid, to coerce Dewan Moolraj in Mooltan, and bring 
 the perpetrators of the outrage to justice. They admitted that 
 their troops were not to be depended on to act against Moolraj, 
 especially the regular army of the State, and they recommended 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 133. t Mid., p. 139. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 140. Papers, Articles of Agreement, 1847, pp. 49, 50, 51. 
 
 || Papers, Punjaub, p. 140. 
 
140 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 that these corps should be kept in their former positions, to main- 
 tain the peace, and prevent, as far as possible, the spread of the 
 rebellion. This service they thought the Sikh troops might be 
 depended on to perform, under the arrangements they proposed 
 for the Chiefs, with their personal followers, going out themselves 
 into the Provinces, more especially if speedy measures were 
 taken by the British Government for the occupation of Mooltan. "* 
 
 There can be no question that this advice was the best 
 possible for the time. If it had been taken, the rebellion 
 would have been speedily crushed. It was not taken. 
 This discussion took place on April 26th, 1848. But it 
 was not until August 1 8th that the British troops, under 
 General Whish, arrived before Mooltan.f The siege was 
 raised on September 1 4th, in consequence of the defection 
 of Rajah Shere Sing.J It was not until December 26th, 
 1848, that the Force under General Whish, having been 
 strengthened by a Division from Bombay, resumed its old 
 position before Mooltan, after three months and a half of 
 inaction, during which period the Commander-in-Chief had 
 made no military movement to arrest Chuttur Sing's opera- 
 tions, or to support the British officers in the more distant 
 posts. Mooltan was taken in a week after the renewal of 
 the siege ; the Dewan Moolraj surrendered himself uncon- 
 ditionally on January 22nd, 1849. But, in the meanwhile, 
 the mischief was done ; these long delays, these retrogres- 
 sive and suspensive manoeuvres, had given double force to 
 all other provocations and temptations. The Punjaub was 
 in a blaze. Rajah Shere Sing was now at the head of 
 30,000 men, with 60 guns. The battle of Chillianwalla 
 was fought on January 13th, 1849. On February 21st, 
 Lord Gough, reinforced by the whole of General Whish's 
 army, gained the crowning victory of Goojerat; and on 
 March 14th, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Rajah Shere Sing, and 
 other Chiefs, gave up their swords ; and the remains of the 
 Sikh army, to the number of 16,000 men, laid down their 
 arms. So ended the second Punjaub war, eleven months 
 having elapsed since the first outbreak at Mooltan. Not 
 a British soldier was moved for the first three months. 
 After the first failure to take Mooltan, there was a total 
 cessation of active efforts in the field for three months 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 140. t Ibid., p. 291. % Hid., p. 355. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 141 
 
 more, from the middle of September to the middle of De- 
 cember, 1848. 
 
 Every one had foreseen the inevitable effect of these 
 dilatory measures. Throughout the Blue Book are scat- 
 tered innumerable expressions of opinion by the Resident 
 and his Assistants, that any long delay in punishing the 
 mutinous outrage at Mooltan, would act as an irresistible 
 encouragement to military ambition, and an incitement to 
 Sikh fanaticism. Major Edwardes says : " It was my 
 own belief at the time, that had the Mooltan rebellion 
 been put down at once, the Sikh insurrection would never 
 have grown out of it ; it was a belief shared, moreover, 
 (as well as I remember,) by every political officer in the 
 Punjaub, and I for one still think so now/'* 
 
 On June 22nd, 1848, Major Edwardes, having, with the 
 troops of the Nawab of Bhawulpoor, a force of 18,000 
 men and 30 guns under his command, ah 1 weU-disposed, 
 and in high spirits at their two recent victories, proposed 
 to the Resident to commence the siege af Mooltan forth- 
 with, asking only for a few heavy guns, and an Engineer 
 officer with a detachment of Sappers, f And two years 
 later he writes : 
 
 "In June and up to the end of July, I am quite sure that 
 Lieutenant Lake's force and my own could have taken the city of 
 Mooltan with the utmost facility ; for it was surrounded by no- 
 thing stronger than a venerable brick wall, and the rebel army 
 was dispirited by its losses at Kineyree and Suddoosam. On this 
 point neither Lieutenant Lake nor myself, nor General Cortlandt, 
 (who was an older, and therefore a steadier soldier than either of 
 us,) had ever any doubt. "J 
 
 Major Napier of the Engineers, writing from Mooltan 
 on September 14th, just as General Whish was compelled 
 to raise the siege, explains the effect of the long delay on 
 the personnel of the rebel army. " Moolraj's forces are 
 now very different from what they were when Edwardes 
 met them. Except a few, the Irregulars have been ex- 
 changed for the old Sikh soldiers. "|| 
 
 * A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 145. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 223. 
 
 t A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 403. 
 
 Now Sir Robert Napier, G.C.B., Commander-in- Chief at Bombay. 
 
 || Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 356. 
 
142 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 But the veteran Chief of the Indian army could not 
 " consent to an insufficient force, such as one Brigade of 
 any strength, being sent," and preferred to wait " until the 
 proper season for military operations" (the cold season) 
 " should arrive."* 
 
 If these dilatory measures were adopted in perfect good 
 faith, and I have no doubt that they were by the mili- 
 tary authorities, I should not hesitate to condemn them 
 as unstatesmanlike and blundering. 
 
 If they were not adopted in perfect good faith, "if," as 
 has often been hinted, "the delay in crushing the rebel- 
 lion sprang in part from a secret hope of its spreading far 
 enough to furnish Government with a fair excuse for annex- 
 ing the whole dominions of Runjeet Sing,"t such a policy 
 can only be characterised as unprincipled and unjustifiable. 
 
 But whether the dilatory plan was unstatesmanlike or 
 unprincipled, whether it was a blunder or a crime, nay, 
 even if it was the wisest possible, and in every respect 
 justifiable, my position is unaffected. It was emphati- 
 cally our work. It was a plan deliberately adopted by the 
 Resident and the Governor-General, contrary to the ad- 
 vice of the Council of Regency. It was the plan of Lord 
 Dalhousie, administering, " with unlimited powers," under 
 treaty, the government of the Punjaub. It was the plan 
 of the Guardian, managing the affairs of his Ward. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's procedure in settling the future rela- 
 tions of the Punjaub with British India after the cam- 
 paign of 1849, just amounts to this : a Guardian, having 
 undertaken, for a valuable consideration, J a troublesome 
 and dangerous trust, declares, on the first occurrence of 
 those troubles and dangers, of which he had full knowledge 
 and fore- warning, that, as a compensation for his exertions 
 and a protection for the future, he shall appropriate his 
 Ward's estate and personal property to his own purposes. 
 And this, although the Guardian holds ample security in 
 his own hands for the repayment of any outlay, and the 
 satisfaction of any damages he might have incurred, in 
 executing the conditions of the trust. 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 238, 239. 
 
 t Trotter's History of India from 1844ta 1862, (Allen, 1866,) vol. i, p. 134. 
 
 j Valuable, even if inadequate, which I think it was not. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 143 
 
 Immediately on hearing of the outbreak at Mooltan, 
 and even before the distressing news had arrived of two 
 English officers having been murdered by the mutinous 
 soldiery, the Resident assumed that tone and attitude 
 towards his colleagues in the Council of Regency, which 
 seem to have suggested and fomented Lord Dalhousie's 
 retrospective demands. "The Sikh Government" must 
 act for themselves, "unaided by British troops. If it 
 should be necessary to move a British soldier, the affair 
 will be a serious one for the Durbar/'* There was no 
 "Sikh Government," apart from the Resident, who was at 
 the head of the Punjaub administration with "unlimited 
 powers." The Durbar could only "act under the control 
 and guidance of the Resident, "t The British troops were 
 stationed, under treaty, in the Punjaub, and subsidised 
 from its revenues, expressly to afford that aid in preserv- 
 ing the peace of the country which the Resident refused 
 to afford. He did afford it at last, but only after a long 
 delay, and then, as he avowed, from a regard to British 
 interests, IJI and with a menace of that penalty of extinction 
 which was ultimately inflicted, against the protected 
 dynasty and State. 
 
 Both the delay and the menace mainly contributed to 
 kindle the general conflagration. How fuel was added to 
 the flame by several measures for which the British autho- 
 rities were solely responsible, we have already seen. 
 
 We have quoted the Resident's refusal to send a British 
 force to Mooltan, "whatever may be the consequences of 
 the state of things which will follow to the continuance 
 of the Sikh Government. "|| In the same dispatch he writes 
 to Lord Dalhousie as follows : 
 
 "Your Lordship will, I fear, have to consider how far it is in- 
 cumbent upon us, how far it is possible for us, to maintain an 
 engagement with a Government,, which, in the persons of its Chiefs, 
 its soldiers, and its people, repays our endeavours for its main- 
 tenance by perfidy and outrage, and is powerless to afford us 
 redress. 
 
 "Doubtless we have reduced it to its state of weakness, but we 
 are not responsible for its treachery and violation of -trust ."IT 
 
 * Ante, p. 139. f Ante, pp. 99, 100 J Papers, Puniaul, 1849, p. 141. 
 Ante, pp. 102 to 130. |j Ante, p. 139. f Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 140. 
 
144 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 At this time no "''Chiefs/' except the Dewan Moolraj of 
 Mooltan, had committed any offence ; no "soldiers/' except 
 those at Mooltan, had taken part in any perfidy or outrage ; 
 and "the people" had not moved in the matter at all. 
 
 Dewan Moolraj was not a Sikh : he and his father had 
 governed Mooltan for thirty years, with almost indepen- 
 dent sway ; they had fortified the city with the scarcely 
 disguised object of holding their own against the Sikh 
 Government, whose power they had repeatedly defied, 
 once during the British occupation of Lahore, before the 
 transfer of authority to the Resident.* In April, 1847, 
 the Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, sent one of his As- 
 sistants to Mooltan, and makes the following remarks on 
 the subject in a despatch to the Governor-General : 
 " Lieutenant Nicholson has returned from Mooltan, arid, 
 on the whole, gives a favourable report of Dewan Moolraj. 
 He has, evidently, been in the practice of acting as if he 
 were the Sovereign of the country, and was, in the first 
 instance, inclined to resent Lieutenant Nicholson's visit, "f 
 
 If Moolraj, therefore, rebelled again, it was nothing to 
 be surprised at, nothing but what ought to have been, 
 and must have been, contemplated and prepared for, when 
 we assumed the administration of the Punjaub. Yet the 
 Resident speaks of this occurrence as something prodigious 
 and unheard of; and denounces the Sikh Government, 
 over which he was presiding, with unlimited powers, as 
 guilty of "perfidy and outrage, in the persons " of the re- 
 fractory vassal, and turbulent soldiery, whom the Durbar, 
 by imploring British assistance, had confessed themselves 
 unable to coerce. 
 
 This inability, also, is made a charge against the Dur- 
 bar by the Resident, and a pretext for no longer main- 
 taining our engagement with it ; although its inability to 
 control the Chiefs and the army, was the main cause of 
 that engagement being made. It is " powerless," he com- 
 plains, " to afford us redress." He adds : " Doubtless 
 we have reduced it to its state of weakness." The Go- 
 vernment of the Punjaub was not powerless ; but all its 
 power was concentrated in the hands of the British Re- 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 117. t Ibid., p. 5. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 145 
 
 sident. Its power mainly consisted in the British troops, 
 subsidised from the revenues of the country, which the 
 Resident hesitated to employ. Without the aid of the 
 British troops, to which it was entitled by treaty, it was, 
 of course, in "a state of weakness," and to that state of 
 weakness, as the Resident admits, we had depressed it. 
 The very fact of the British occupation and transfer of 
 power to the Resident, tended to destroy the personal 
 influence of the Sirdars. Both the physical and moral 
 force at the disposal of the Durbar, apart from the Resi- 
 dent's support, was greatly diminished. 
 
 The scheme for the reduction and reorganisation of the 
 army seems to have been most judicious, though, perhaps, 
 the more sweeping measure proposed by Rajah Tej Sing 
 would have been safer and more effectual,* and it appears 
 to have been carried out with great consideration, and 
 with many countervailing advantages for the humbler and 
 less ambitious soldiers, especially for those who were not 
 Sikhs. But it was a most critical and delicate operation, 
 and it was emphatically our work. 
 
 By the unlimited authority entrusted to the Resident, 
 the numerical strength of the Sikh army had been lowered, 
 until every town and village was filled with the disbanded 
 and discontented brethren of those who were still retained 
 in the ranks, whose disaffection was at the same time en- 
 hanced by a stricter discipline, curtailed privileges, and 
 the downfall of their political and religious preponderance. 
 
 It could not be expected, we have seen that it was not 
 expected by Lord Hardinge and Sir Henry Lawrence, 
 that this transition stage would be passed through in per- 
 fect tranquillity. Yet the Resident declaims against "the 
 perfidy and outrage," "treachery and violation of t/ust," 
 "spoliation and crime, "J" committed at Mooltan, as 
 unprecedented and unimaginable, and imputes it all to 
 the Sikh Government, "in the persons" of the mutinous 
 soldiery, who, during six years had domineered over all 
 authority, who had murdered three Prime Ministers and 
 several Princes, and whose subjection was the special task 
 we had engaged to perform. 
 
 * Ante, p. 136. t Papers, Pnnjaub, 18-19, p. 141. 
 
 L 
 
146 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 We knew what we were about when we assumed the 
 Guardianship of a Prince whose dominions had suffered 
 from six years of anarchy. We undertook the obligations 
 of suppressing military mutiny and civil war, "of pre- 
 serving the peace of the country," with British troops sub- 
 sidised for the purpose. Furthermore, we obtained by the 
 Treaty unlimited military powers throughout the Punjaub, 
 
 the right of holding all the strong places and positions, 
 the right of disbanding and enlisting troops. It may 
 have been hoped, but it can never have been expected, 
 that everything would go on smoothly, that our troops 
 would never be actively employed, that none of those 
 scenes of violence and bloodshed, which had compelled 
 the Durbar to entreat our aid, would recur during the 
 British occupation. For the term of our Guardianship, 
 
 the minority of Dhuleep Sing, we demanded full 
 powers, we accepted full responsibility. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie admits his full responsibility, as the 
 Guardian of British interests, for the inordinate military 
 delays which swelled the Mooltan rebellion into a war, 
 but does not seem to feel any responsibility at all, as the 
 trustee and administrator of the Punjaub State, and the 
 Guardian of its infant Maharajah. "On the one hand," 
 he writes, "it was impossible to doubt that, if there existed 
 in the minds of the people of the Punjaub any inclination 
 to rise against the British power, a delay in visiting the 
 outrage committed at Mooltan, and the apparent impunity 
 of the offender, would give strong encouragement to an 
 outbreak which might spread over the whole Punjaub. 
 On the other hand, it was equally clear that there would 
 be serious danger to the health and to the very existence 
 of European troops," if they were to carry on "military 
 operations in the hot and rainy months."* 
 
 It might have occurred to the Governor-General and 
 the Commander-in-Chief that the loss of life among the 
 European and native troops of our army, and the general 
 destruction of life and property in the Punjaub, would be 
 much greater in the event of a general rebellion, than 
 could possibly be caused by the march of one Brigade of 
 
 * Papers, Punj<mb, 1849, p. C5G. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 147 
 
 British troops in the hot and rainy months. And as it 
 might have been anticipated, so it proved. "Strange to 
 say," writes Mr. J. C. Marshman, "it was found that 
 General Whish's troops were more healthy during their 
 progress to Mooltan than they had been in cantonments, 
 and it was manifest that the unsuitableness of the season, 
 which was urged as a ground of objection to an early and 
 prompt movement, was a mere bugbear/'* 
 
 These were Sir Henry Lawrence's reflections on the 
 military plans of 1848 : "We cannot afford in India to 
 shilly-shally and talk of weather and seasons. If we are 
 not ready to take the field at all seasons, we have no 
 business here."f 
 
 On the whole, however, Lord Dalhousie concludes that 
 "it can never now be determined whether the immediate 
 commencement at that time" (the hot season) "of the siege 
 of Mooltan would or would not have averted the war. 
 But this, at least," he adds, "is certain, that if the short 
 delay which took place in punishing the murder of two 
 British officers at Mooltan," a short delay of nine months !J 
 ' 'could produce an universal rising against us through- 
 out all the Punjaub, the very fact itself betokens the ex- 
 istence of a deep and widespread feeling of hostility against 
 us, which could not long have been repressed." 
 
 We shall see that the "rising" was by no means " uni- 
 versal," and that Lord Dalhousie's denunciations of the 
 Sirdars and the people of the Punjaub were highly ex- 
 aggerated. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie continues his argument as follows : 
 "The worst that can be alleged, therefore, against the 
 delay is, that it precipitated the crisis ; and opened, some- 
 what earlier, to the Sikhs that opportunity for renewal of 
 war, which, sooner or later, so bitter a spirit of hostility 
 must have created for itself." 
 
 Major Edwardes agrees with Lord Dalhousie on this 
 point ; he, also, thinks the struggle was inevitable, sooner 
 
 * History of India, vol. iii, p. 319. 
 
 f KayJs Indian Officers, (Allen, 1867) vol. ii, pp. 397, 298. 
 
 j Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson were murdered on the 20th 
 April, 1848 ; the citadel of Mooltan was surrendered by the Dewan Moolraj on 
 January 22nd, 1849. Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 657. 
 
 L 2 
 
148 CHAPTER VT. 
 
 or later. He expresses his belief, in passages already 
 quoted, that "had the Mooltan rebellion been put down, 
 the Sikh insurrection would never have grown out of it," 
 and that, with very moderate assistance from Lahore, he 
 could have taken Mooltan in June.* He indicates as 
 plainly as is consistent with modesty, and a decent respect 
 for seniors and official superiors, his opinion that the delay 
 was, both in a military and political point of view, an 
 error of judgment. But he says, in his table of Contents 
 to the volume : "The Author shows that it was provi- 
 dential." In the text he observes : "So far as regarding 
 this as matter for regret, I see in it only the strongest 
 example that ever came within my own experience, of 
 human judgment overruled by Providence for good."t 
 
 The "good," according to Major Edwardes, was that 
 "the whole of the Punjaub was annexed to British India 
 in March, 1849;" whereas, "if the most favourable cir- 
 cumstances had succeeded, and on the 4th of September, 
 1854,") (when the Maharajah obtained his majority) "the 
 Governor-General, in fulfilment of Treaties permitted to 
 remain in force, "J had withdrawn the British troops, and 
 handed over the Punjaub to its youthful Sovereign, "with 
 a revenue improved by peace, an exchequer replenished 
 by honesty and economy, and an army improved by dis- 
 cipline," no one can believe "that the peace of the frontier 
 would have lasted for a year, or a second Sikh war have 
 been avoided. " 
 
 I cannot enter into the designs of Providence, but 1 
 freely acknowledge that Major Edwardes had many pre- 
 cedents for his assumption. Every conquest has been 
 hailed as providential by the conqueror. "Te Deum" is 
 sung by the victor for every victory. 
 
 Nor do I consider myself at all bound to enter upon 
 the point of inquiry raised by Lord Dalhousie and Major 
 Edwardes, whether the Sikhs in the early part of 1848, 
 were so determined on having a second struggle with 
 British power, that our military delays and errors in 
 dealing with the Mooltan outrage only " precipitated the 
 
 * Ante, p. 141. f A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 145. 
 
 * A most expressive formula. 
 
 A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, pp. 145, 146. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 149 
 
 crisis," which was inevitable and must have arrived "sooner 
 or later." 
 
 A mere guess or surmise of what might have hap- 
 pened under different circumstances, cannot prove that 
 a certain decision was wise, or just. If the annexation 
 of the Punjaub was an iniquitous proceeding ; if its in- 
 iquity has been made manifest, it is no reply to say either 
 that it was Providential, or that it must have happened 
 sooner or later. 
 
 This guess, or surmise, of the inveterate and inextin- 
 guishable hostility of the Sikhs, is by no means warranted 
 by the history of our previous relations with them, by the 
 progress of events during the insurrection, or by our ex- 
 perience of other States and other races in India. No 
 doubt there was a turbulent spirit abroad in 1848 ; there 
 were elements of political and religious fanaticism per- 
 vading large classes in the Punjaub, especially the Sikhs 
 serving in the army, or connected with the soldiery. We 
 knew all this when we undertook the Guardianship ; our 
 protective occupation was invited expressly to meet those 
 perils. No doubt this turbulent and fanatical spirit be- 
 came hostile to the British occupation, and to the party 
 of Sikh Sirdars who co-operated with the Resident, when 
 the new administration was carrying into effect the reduc- 
 tion and restraint of the army. But there would have 
 been the same hostility against a purely native Govern- 
 ment, if it had attempted to enforce, without British assist- 
 ance, the same unpopular measures. 
 
 About the time of the bad news from Mooltan, however, 
 everything indicated that the Punjaub was settling down 
 into a state of peaceful industry. A general impression 
 prevailed of the overwhelming and resistless power of the 
 British Government, and of the moderation and justice of 
 its policy. On April 6th, 1848, the Resident thus re- 
 ported to the Governor-General : 
 
 " Perfect tranquillity prevails, at present, throughout all the 
 territories under the Lahore Government ; and I have no reason 
 to think that the apparent contentment of the people is other 
 than real. We have now, or have had during the cold months, 
 British officers in all parts of the country ; and the impression 
 seems general that all classes are satisfied at the present state of 
 
150 CHAPTEK VI. 
 
 things. In those villages, chiefly in the Manjha. to which numbers 
 of the disbanded soldiery have returned, we sometimes hear of 
 prophetic rumours being circulated, of a day coming when the 
 Sikhs are again to be brought into collision with the British, and 
 with a different result from the last ; but, beyond this idle and 
 infrequent talk, there is nothing to indicate that the return of the 
 Khalsa independence is either expected or desired. The universal 
 civility and kindness with which all Europeans, of all ranks and 
 callings, whether officials, or travellers, or sportsmen, are treated, 
 is very remarkable."* 
 
 It is impossible to say exactly what permanent effect 
 would have been produced on the habits and pursuits of 
 the people, if this tranquillity could have been preserved 
 during the six years and a half of the Maharajah's minor- 
 ity that remained, when the disturbances first broke out, 
 or even in the five years and a half that remained, accord- 
 ing to the Treaty if Lord Dalhousie had not decided in 
 favour of annexation when the insurrection was finally 
 quelled in March 1849. If a judicious system had been 
 brought into play, five or six years might have accus- 
 tomed the people to the advantages of peace and order, 
 and a strong native Government might have been installed 
 at Lahore. 
 
 Great changes for the better had certainly begun to tell 
 in the first fifteen months of British occupation. A great 
 advance had been made towards a state of political quiet- 
 ude, the best evidence of which is to be found in the slow- 
 ness and reluctance with which the successive steps in the 
 insurrection were taken. 
 
 Notwithstanding the dangerous excitement that un- 
 doubtedly prevailed throughout the lower ranks of the 
 Sikh soldiery, both those in the service and those recently 
 disbanded, there had been no extensive mutiny, or deser- 
 tion of numerical importance, until Rajah Shere Sing went 
 over to the enemy in September, from motives which we 
 have already discussed. When Sirdar Chuttur Sing and 
 his son, with the troops under their command, were openly 
 cooperating with the Dewan Moolraj, who had now defied 
 the British power for five months with impunity, when 
 General Whish was obliged, as the result of Rajah Shere 
 Sing's defection, to raise the siege of Mooltan, and wait 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1840, p. 127. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 151 
 
 for reinforcements,* a great stimulus was given to the 
 ambition and fanaticism of the disaffected Sikhs through- 
 out the Punjaub. And yet up to October 4th, the Resi- 
 dent writes, no Sirdar had joined Chuttur Sing,f and he 
 had failed utterly to induce any of the Regular troops, ex- 
 cept those who had been with him in Hazara, and against 
 whom Captain Abbott had taken the initiative, to join his 
 banner. He had marched " towards the camp of his son, 
 Rajah Shere Sing and the other insurgents, in despair at 
 the refusals he had received from the Sikh officers at 
 
 c/ A/ 
 
 Peshawur."J It was not until October, that the troops 
 at Bunnoo and Peshawur broke into mutiny, when Mool- 
 raj had held out for six months, and Chuttur Sing was, to 
 all appearance, unchecked and unopposed. 
 
 Thus the main cause of an " unpremeditated and acci- 
 dental"|| outbreak, according to Lord Dalhousie, growing 
 into a formidable insurrection, was the long delay before 
 any attempt was made to punish the Dewan Moolraj, a 
 delay which, by degrees, raised him from a very low grade 
 in popular estimation to the rank of the great heroes of 
 Hindoo lore, and dissipated almost all the advantages of 
 the brilliant success of Major Edwardes and General Cort- 
 landt, at the head of the Maharajah's troops. This delay, 
 astonishing and inexplicable to the people at large, was 
 explained by the Resident to the most influential men of 
 the country in a sense the most alarming and exasperating 
 possible. They were told that " they must put down the 
 rebellion by their own resources, as the only hope of saving 
 their Government."^ No wonder a rumour soon got abroad 
 among the Sirdars and soldiery, as Major Edwardes tells 
 us that " the British meditated declaring the Punjaub for- 
 feited by the recent troubles and misconduct of the troops."** 
 The rumour was true. 
 
 As if to add more fuel to these inflammatory rumours, ' 
 to stir up against us every feeling of loyalty and chivalry 
 at the most critical moment, the Maharanee, " the mother 
 of all the Sikhs," was suddenly deported from the country, 
 and imprisoned at Benares, under circumstances which, w r e 
 
 * Punjaub Papers, 1849, p. 355. t Ibid., p. 381. 
 
 t Ibid., pp. 390, 391. Ibid., pp. 375, and 397. 
 
 || Ante, p. 131 (note). 1" Ante, p. 139. ** Ante, p. 111. 
 
152 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 may be sure, assumed in the telling an aspect of violence 
 and indignity.* The effect upon the Sikh troops of this 
 most ill-judged measure, was, as we have seen, immediate.*!" 
 The Ranee's influence was almost annihilated, J when we 
 made her a martyr, and it revived at once. 
 
 The rumour as to the impending annexation, the doubts 
 as to his daughter's marriage with the Maharajah, and the 
 facts as to the Ranee's persecution, may have already con- 
 verted old Chuttur Sing into a conspirator, but it was the 
 Mussulman insurrection of his own Province, headed by his 
 colleague, Captain Abbott, unchecked and unreproved by 
 the Resident, that compelled him to become a rebel. 
 
 Surely it is sufficiently obvious that among a warlike 
 race and sect like the Sikhs, so lately dominant through- 
 out the Punjaub in Church and State, and after the 
 stirring events of the previous six years, these successive 
 temptations and provocations could not but prove irresis- 
 tible, and that they form an ample explanation of the 
 phenomena and development of the second Punjaub war, 
 without resorting to the unwarrantable surmise that " a 
 renewal of war " was inevitable, and that our dilatory pro- 
 ceedings merely "precipitated the crisis." There is no- 
 thing to show that, without these delays and errors of 
 judgment on our part, there would ever have been a crisis 
 at all. Measures for which the British Resident and the 
 Governor-General were solely responsible, made a hero out 
 of the timid Dewan Moolraj, a martyr out of the baffled 
 Maharanee, and a formidable rebel leader out of the infirm 
 and aged Governor, Sirdar Chuttur Sing. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie could not, or would not, see, that his 
 full responsibility, not only for the military delays, but for 
 every exciting and irritating incident, and for every step, 
 good or bad, that was taken before or after the first ex- 
 plosion at Mooltan, effectually barred his ingenious method 
 of separating the Durbar, as " the Government of Lahore," 
 from the Resident, the absolute head of that Government. 
 During the period prescribed by the Treaty for the Maha- 
 rajah's minority, no crisis, no second struggle, could absolve 
 the British Government from the obligations of Guardian- 
 
 * Ante, pp. 106, 107. t Ante, p. 108. % Ante, p. 103. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 153 
 
 sliip and management, so long as it professed to fulfil those 
 duties, and was able to do so without interruption. 
 
 Even supposing that every administrative measure be- 
 fore the outbreak at Mooltan, and every step taken by the 
 Resident after it, had been the wisest possible, supposing 
 the rebellion had not been in 'the slightest degree provoked 
 or extended by any error, excess, omission, or delay of the 
 British Government, Lord Dalhousie's case would not 
 be in the least improved. Supposing that the surmise 
 by which he attempted to justify the annexation, were de- 
 monstrably true, and that the Sikhs were really animated, 
 from the first day of the occupation, with so deep and 
 bitter a hostility, that they only watched their opportunity 
 for revolt, and would never have been pacified without a 
 second lesson, then I say that they were entitled to that 
 second lesson without any extra charge. The State of 
 Lahore had paid heavily in money, and in territory, for 
 the first lesson ; and we had undertaken, in consideration 
 of an annual subsidy, secured on the public revenues 
 administered by us, to perform the oifice of Teacher for a 
 term of years. If unexpected difficulties had presented 
 themselves in the performance of this office, we should, 
 even then, have had no right to complain. But it was 
 not so. We understood quite well the nature of the evils 
 we had engaged to encounter and cure, and they were 
 clearly aggravated by our own malpractice. 
 
 In his last instructions to the Resident, before publicly 
 announcing the annexation of the Punjaub to the British 
 dominions, Lord Dalhousie wrote as follows : 
 
 " The time has arrived at which it is necessary that the deter- 
 mination which the Governor- General has formed regarding the 
 future administration of the Punjaub, should be communicated to 
 the Government at Lahore. 
 
 " On meeting the Council of Regency, you will present to them 
 the Note herewith transmitted, in which the determination of the 
 Government of India, regarding our future relations with the 
 Punjaub, is fully set forth. 
 
 ' ' If the Government of Lahore should acquiesce in that determi- 
 nation, you are authorised to grant the Terms which are contained 
 in the enclosed paper."* 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 648. 
 
154 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's object in thus thrusting prominently 
 forwa-rd the Council of Regency, and investing it, in its 
 last moments, with the character of "the Government of 
 Lahore," is transparently obvious. He wished to fasten 
 upon the Regency a sort of national responsibility, in 
 which the Maharajah might be included. But the Council 
 of Regency, apart from British control, never was " the 
 Government of Lahore," and its maintenance up to the 
 date of annexation, proves the very contrary of what Lord 
 Dalhousie wished. The continued existence of this Re- 
 gency, throughout the rebellion, proves that British re- 
 sponsibility and guardianship were never shaken off or 
 shifted for a day. If indeed the British Guardian had 
 been driven from his position at Lahore ; if he had lost the 
 custody of the Maharajah's person ; if he had been forced 
 to abdicate for a time the functions of government, he 
 might have been justified in reentering the country as a 
 conqueror, and declaring all previous engagements to be at 
 an end. But no such interruption ever took place. The 
 Resident's authority as chief ruler of the Punjaub was 
 never suspended. During the rebellion, which in Lord 
 Dalhousie's opinion warranted him in dethroning his Ward, 
 the capital city w^as never disturbed ; and the Govern- 
 ment of the Punjaub, exactly as we had chosen to organ- 
 ise it, including the Council of Regency, was unaltered 
 to the last. Six out of the eight Councillors remained 
 faithful to their engagements, and signed the Terms, under 
 compulsion.* 
 
 These six Sirdars, Rajah Deena Nath, Bhaee Nidham 
 Sing, (the head of the Sikh religion, )Fakeer Noor-ood-deen, 
 Shumshere Sing Sindhanwalla, and Uttur Sing Kalee- 
 walla, who were perfectly blameless in their public con- 
 duct, were told that " if they refused to accept the Terms 
 which the Governor-General offered, the Maharajah and 
 themselves would be entirely at his mercy," and would 
 not be " entitled to receive any allowance whatever." If 
 they signed the Terms, and continued "to give their ad- 
 vice and assistance, whenever they were called upon to do 
 so," their jagheers (landed estates) would not be confis- 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p]>. 049, 053. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 1,55 
 
 cated, though no promise of hereditary tenure could be 
 made. But, " if they did not subscribe to the conditions," 
 the Resident " could not promise that any consideration 
 would be shown them." * 
 
 In the last crisis of the rebellion, on the 1 8th of Novem- 
 ber, a Proclamation had been issued, sanctioned and ap- 
 proved by Lord Dalhousie on the 14th of December, 1848, 
 which contained the following announcement : 
 
 " It is not the desire of the British Government that those 
 who are innocent of the above offences, who have taken no part, 
 secretly or openly, in the disturbances, and who have remained 
 faithful in their obedience to the Government of Maharajah Dhu- 
 leep Sing, be they Sikh or be they of any other class, should 
 suffer with the guilty. "f 
 
 Were the six members of the Council of Regency guilty? 
 On the contrary, they had done their best for the British 
 Government during a season of extraordinary trial and 
 temptation, and had faithfully co-operated with the Resi- 
 dent in the administration of the Punjaub. Yet they 
 were told that unless they signed and sealed the deposi- 
 tion of their Sovereign, and the destruction of the State, 
 they would be made to suffer with the guilty, that their 
 estates would be confiscated, and that no consideration 
 would be shown them. 
 
 Was the young Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, whose Govern- 
 ment was professedly upheld in this wonderful Proclama- 
 tion, guilty ? We must suppose that the extraordinary 
 political casuistry of the Resident was accepted at Head 
 Quarters, and that the Governor General's Ward was con- 
 sidered to be guilty "in the person" of his mother, who 
 was a prisoner at Benares, or of those " evil disposed and 
 insurgent Sirdars," who, according to this document, had 
 rebelled against his own Government. For he was made to 
 suffer with the guilty. He was dethroned, despoiled, and 
 banished. 
 
 Furthermore, this same Proclamation declares to "the 
 loyal subjects of the Maharajah," as well as to any " who, 
 merely through ignorance, may have been led away by the 
 false statements of the evil-disposed," that "the army" of 
 
 * Papers, Punjaitb, 1849, pp. 649, 650. t Ibid., p. 449. 
 
156 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, " has entered the 
 Lahore territories, not as an enemy to the constituted Go- 
 vernment, but to restore order and obedience."* But 
 where two recent treaties stood in the way of annexation, 
 what was a Proclamation more or less ? 
 
 And though Lord Dalhousie thus publicly proclaimed 
 on the 18th of November, 1848, that the large army under 
 the Commander-in-Chief was not entering the Punjaub 
 "as an enemy to the constituted Government," he had 
 already written secretly to the Resident, on the 3rd of 
 October, "The Governor-General considers the State of 
 Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war 
 with the British Governmeiit.""f 
 
 The State of Lahore at war with the British Govern- 
 ment, while the Sovereign of the Punjaub was at Lahore, 
 the Ward and Pupil of the Resident ! The State of Lahore 
 at war with the British Government, while the adminis- 
 tration of the Punjaub was carried on at Lahore by the 
 British Resident, in the name of the infant Sovereign, by 
 virtue of a Treaty with him, and in unaltered accordance 
 with the arrangements of that Treaty ! Where was that 
 State of Lahore with which the British Government was 
 at war, to be found ? In the camp of Rajah Shere Sing, 
 or in the fortress of Mooltan, which had been summoned 
 to surrender on the 5th of September, "after the firing of 
 a royal salute in honour of Her Majesty the Queen, and 
 her Ally, His Highness Maharajah Dhuleep Sing" ?J Was 
 it personified by the Dewan Moolraj, or Chuttur Sing, or 
 Shere Sing, who were all proclaimed as rebels " against 
 the Government of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing"? 
 
 Straightforward and truthful answers to these questions 
 will prove that the British Government was not at war 
 with the State of Lahore. 
 
 The State of Lahore in October, 1848, and up to the 
 day of its destruction, was to be found at Lahore, em- 
 bodied and represented, in the persons of the Maharajah, 
 the Resident, who was at the head of the Government, 
 and his colleagues, the Council of Regency, the continuity 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 449. t Ibid., p. 375. 
 
 | Ibid., p. 327 ; Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 471. 
 Papers, Pwijanb. 1*19. pp. 200, 4:38. 4-19, and 562. 
 
 I 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 157 
 
 of whose functions was never interrupted or disturbed by 
 war or tumult for a single day. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie avoids altogether the question of Guar- 
 dianship. He makes exaggerated complaints of universal 
 treachery and perfidy, and founds upon them his iniquitous 
 claims to treat the Prince, who had never ceased to be 
 his Ward, as a vanquished enemy ; to repudiate all the 
 Treaties, which had never ceased to be enforced, as null 
 and void ; and to appropriate the Punjaub, which he had 
 never ceased to occupy and administer in trust, as a con- 
 quest. * It was impossible for the British Government to 
 conquer the territory, which it was occupying by virtue of 
 a Treaty of protective alliance. Far from war having ever 
 been declared against the State of Lahore, the war was 
 carried on, and the submission of the rebels was demanded, 
 from first to last, in the name of our Ally, the Maharajah 
 Dhuleep Sing. 
 
 On the 3rd of October, 1848, Lord Dalhousie secretly 
 and confidentially "intimates" to the Resident, that he 
 "considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and 
 purposes, directly at war with the British Government." 
 On the same day, he expresses his satisfaction, in another 
 letter to the same official, at hearing that the fortress of 
 Govindghur, in the city of Umritsur, up to that time 
 garrisoned by Sikh troops, has been handed over to a 
 British force, "in accordance with the terms of the Treaty 
 of Bhyrowal.""!* 
 
 With a view, it may be presumed, to minimise opposi- 
 tion, to retain the influence of the Durbar, and the services 
 of the local troops, and to keep the feudatory Princes and 
 the Sikhs of our own provinces quiet, he will not openly 
 declare war; but, with a view to ulterior demands, he 
 "intimates" war against the Lahore Government, in a 
 secret letter to his own agent, who is at the head of that 
 Government ! 
 
 Having conducted the administration of the Lahore 
 State, for two years and three months, through the trials 
 and troubles of a rebellion, by means of his own agent and 
 his own nominees, in the name of his Ward and Ally, the 
 Maharajah, under a Treaty which he upholds and enforces 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 661. t 2bid.< p. 374. 
 
158 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 to the last, he turns round, when the rebellion is over, 
 declares the Treaty to have been violated, and therefore 
 null and void, and explains that the successful campaign, 
 ostensibly carried on for the suppression of a rebellion 
 against the Government of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, 
 really constituted a war against the Maharajah and the 
 State of Lahore, by which the British Government has 
 "conquered" the Punjaub.* 
 
 In his indictment against the State of Lahore, Lord 
 Dalhousie falls into several exaggerated misstatements. 
 He says, "the whole body of the nation, army and people 
 alike, have, deliberately and unprovoked, again made war 
 upon us."t In a subsequent passage of the same despatch 
 he betrays his knowledge of the facts that "the Sikh people 
 form comparatively a small portion of the population of 
 the Punjaub," and that "a large proportion of the inhabi- 
 tants, especially the Mahomedans," took no part in the 
 hostilities, and had no sympathy with the rebellion. J 
 
 Even if the meaning of the phrase, "the whole body of 
 the nation," is restricted to the dominant sect of Sikhs, 
 about a sixth of the population, it is inaccurate. There 
 is a list of thirty-four Sirdars, or leading Chieftains in the 
 Blue Book, who, with their relatives and dependents, took 
 no part in the rebellion. Twenty-eight of these are Sikhs, 
 only two are Mahomedans, and four are Hindoos. Among 
 the six faithful members of the Council of Regency, was 
 Bhaee Nidham Sing, "the head of the Sikh religion." 
 
 Lord Dalhousie ventures to write as follows : "It is 
 a shameful fact that of the Sirdars of the State, properly 
 so called, who signed the Treaties, the greater portion 
 have been involved in these hostilities against us."|| That 
 also is an erroneous accusation. A careful analysis of the 
 several lists and documents proves that the majority of 
 those who signed the Treaties were not involved in hosti- 
 lities against us. Of the sixteen Sirdars who signed the 
 Treaties and Articles of Agreement of 1846, only five 
 joined in the rebellion, and one, Runjore Sing Majeetia, 
 who was in the Council of Regency, was imprisoned at 
 Lahore, on suspicion of carrying on a treasonable corre- 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, p. 661. t IMd., p. 660. 
 
 % Ibid., p. 664. Ibid, p. 36. || Ibid., p. 660. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 159 
 
 spondence. In the list of disaffected Sirdars, Eunjore 
 Sing Majeetia is put down as "convicted,"* but his conduct 
 was not the subject of any judicial investigation ; and in 
 another part of the Blue Book his guilt is said to have 
 been "proved" by an attempt to escape after his arrest, 
 and by his having destroyed or concealed some of his 
 papers.")" There seems to have been nothing like evidence 
 against him. Of the eight Councillors, then, six were 
 faithful ; one was suspected ; one only, Rajah Shere Sing, 
 took the field against the Government of Lahore. 
 
 To the list of Sirdars who remained faithful to their 
 duty, who adhered to the cause of the Government of the 
 Punjaub, as constituted under Treaty by the Governor- 
 General, must certainly be added the name of Sirdar Khan 
 Sing Man, the Sikh Governor appointed to supersede the 
 Dewan Moolraj, who accompanied Mr. Yans Agnew and 
 Lieutenant Anderson to Mooltan. So strong seems to 
 have been the very natural prejudice against every Sikh 
 who took part in that ill-fated expedition, that the Re- 
 sident, in his first report of the treacherous destruction of 
 the two young English officers, jumped at a hasty conclu- 
 sion which was very unjust to Khan Sing Man. He wrote 
 to the Governor-General : " The Sirdar made terms for 
 himself; and the British officers were left to be cruelly 
 butchered," J an account by no means borne out by the 
 words of the only statement before him at that time, All 
 that his informant, Peer Ibrahim Khan, the British Agent 
 at Bhawulpore, had written on this point, was : " Sirdar 
 Khan Sing Man, by the permission of Mr. Yans Agnew, 
 begged for quarter, upon which he was seized, and the 
 two gentlemen killed. " 
 
 The following description of what had passed was given 
 by an eye-witness, Kootub Shah, a Mahomedan soldier : 
 
 " Sirdar Khan Sing offered to devote his life ; but Mr. Agnew 
 objected, saying it was useless for him to sacrifice himself; that, 
 alone, he could do nothing ; and that he had better ask for quarter. 
 The Sirdar's people went outside the Eedgah, and demanded 
 quarter. The troops then entered the place, and plundered every- 
 thing. On their approaching the Sirdar, he said that he had 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 489. t Ibid., p. 501. 
 
 J Ibid., p. Itt). Ibid., p. 138. 
 
160 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 asked for quarter, and that it would be useless to kill him, but 
 that they might do what they pleased. He requested them to 
 spare the wounded British officers. They, however, refused to 
 listen to him, and seized him. 
 
 " During that day the Sirdar was kept in confinement in the 
 Amkhas ; the next day he was taken to the fort, -where he was put 
 in irons with his son"* 
 
 This deposition was made in June, 1848 ; and is fully 
 confirmed by the fact, for which Sir Herbert Edwardes 
 vouches, that " he remained in confinement throughout the 
 siege, until the ruins of the exploded magazine at once 
 killed and buried him. After the fall of the Fort," (in 
 January, 1849) " his body was dug out, and was found so 
 heavily ironed, that it must have been impossible for him 
 to walk. His little boy had been apparently sleeping be- 
 side him on the bed." Major Edwardes, like the Resident, 
 had heard conflicting accounts of Khan Sing's behaviour, 
 but, he says, "under, these circumstances, I thought it 
 right to adopt the most charitable construction of the 
 Sirdar's conduct, caused him to be buried with all honour, 
 and sent the gold bangles which were on the arms of his 
 son, to the surviving members of the family."t 
 
 Sir Herbert Edwardes likewise ascertained that Gool- 
 deep Sing, the Sikh Commandant of the Infantry Regi- 
 ment forming part of Mr. Agnew's escort, " replied alike 
 to bribes and threats, that they might blow him away from 
 a gun, but should never induce him to take service with 
 the enemy." He, also, " was put in irons by Moolraj, and 
 in despair at the shame which had been brought on Mr. 
 Agnew's escort, threw himself into a well, as he was pass- 
 ing it under a guard, and was drowned. "J 
 
 In the list of " openly disaffected Sirdars of the Lahore 
 State, ascertained to be in rebellion and insurrection," for- 
 warded by the Resident on the 25th of December, 1848, 
 for the information of the Governor-General, we find Golab 
 Sing Povindea and his son Sirdar Alia Sing included, to 
 whose names, however, with two others, this note is ap- 
 pended : " It is most probable that these Sirdars are 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 462, 463. 
 
 t A Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, p. 102. 
 
 I Ibid., vol. ii, p. 161. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 161 
 
 under restraint with the Peshawur troops."* They were 
 certainly under restraint. 
 
 Sirdar Goolab Sing Povindea was the General in com- 
 mand of the Division of Sikh troops at Peshawur, and also 
 Governor of the Province, and Major George Lawrence, t 
 the Resident's Assistant at that place, repeatedly praises 
 his constant exertions, and those of his son, Colonel Alia 
 Sing, to preserve good order in the district, and keep the 
 troops steady to their allegiance. J Indeed all the superior 
 officers at this station, with one exception, appear to have 
 been most active and zealous, and to have done their best on 
 behalf of the Government of Lahore. With their assist- 
 ance, Major Lawrence most gallantly remained at his post 
 until the middle of October, 1848, when the troops broke 
 into open mutiny. Soon after this, an intercepted letter 
 from the rebel leader, Rajah Shere Sing, contains this pas- 
 sage : " The Peshawur troops have left that place, with 
 all the guns. The Povindea " (Sirdar Golab Sing Povin- 
 dea) " and Elahee Bukhsh" (the General of Artillery||) 
 " are in confinement, and the Feringhees have fled to the 
 Khyber."l[ 
 
 Thus Lord Dalhousie's wholesale impeachment is not 
 just, even if restricted to " the army." Again we find 
 General Whish, in his final despatch of the 23rd January, 
 1849, after the fall of Mooltan, expressing his thanks to 
 General Cortlandt, "who commanded the Regular Regi- 
 ments and Artillery of the Durbar,"** i. e. of the Lahore 
 Government, and the Governor-General himself sends 
 his thanks to General Oortlandt for the same services, "as 
 an officer of the Maharajah of Lahore, through the Resi- 
 dent, "ft 
 
 Notwithstanding the defection of Rajah Shere Sing, 
 Major Edwardes had still a considerable force of Durbar 
 troops under his command, at the end of the siege of 
 Mooltan, and was able to detach six guns and a Regular 
 Regiment, besides Irregular troops, to reinforce Lieutenant 
 Taylor at Lukkee.JJ That officer and Lieutenant Young, 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 490. t Now Sir George Lawrence. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 291, 315, 339, 397, 398. 
 5 Ibid., pp. 339, 397. || Ibid., p. 340. f Ibid., p. 414. 
 
 ** Ibid., p. 556. ft Ibid., p. 586. H Ibid., pp. 551, 570. 
 
 M 
 
162 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 acting under the directions of Major Edwardes, main- 
 tained themselves in different parts of the Derajat and 
 Trans-Indus territory, and retook several forts from the 
 insurgents, without the aid of any British troops. * Lieu- 
 tenant Taylor appears to have had at one time 5,000 men 
 with twelve guns under his command. J" Some of these 
 were the old Regular Infantry and Artillery of the Lahore 
 Government, some were new levies, but all were in the 
 service of the Native State, and raised from the popula- 
 tion of the country subject to Maharajah Dhuleep Sing. 
 One superior officer, at least, who was with Lieutenant 
 Taylor, was a Sikh, Futteh Sing, mentioned as " a good 
 soldier. "J Some troops in the pay of two of the loyal 
 Sirdars attached to the Lahore Government, Misr Sahib 
 Dyal and Dewan Jowahir Mull, did good service to the 
 end of the campaign. || Dewan Jowahir Mull in person, 
 with Sheikh Emam-ood-deen, an officer of high rank under 
 the Lahore Government, formerly Governor of Cashmere, 
 were present" with their men" at the action of Soorujkoond, 
 near Mooltan, on the 7th November, 1848, and are said by 
 Major Edwardes to have "behaved very well."*!} Soon 
 after this affair, Sheikh Emam-ood-deen and his force were 
 detached by Major Edwardes, to drive the rebels out of 
 the district of Jhung ; and while General Whish was con- 
 cluding the siege of Mooltan, the Sheikh was occupied in 
 investing the stronghold of Chuniote, the rebel garrison 
 of which, 2,000 strong, laid down their arms to General 
 Whish on the 9th February, 1849, on his march from 
 Mooltan to join Lord Gough's army, and were made over 
 as prisoners to Sheikh Emam-ood-deen.** 
 
 Misr Sahib Dyal, whose men did their duty so faithfully 
 to the last, was selected by the Resident in November, 
 1848, to accompany the Head-quarters of the Commander- 
 in-Chief, Lord Gough, "as the chief officer on the part of 
 the Durbar," the Regency, with whom, according to Lord 
 Dalhousie, we were then, "to ah 1 intents and purposes, 
 directly at war!" He is described as "an able and highly 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 588, 630. f Ibid., p. 585. J Ibid., p. 633. 
 See the list, Ibid., p. 547. || Ibid., p. 631. 1 Ibid., p. 422. 
 
 * Ibid., pp. 457, 584, tidwardes's Year on the Punjaub Frontier, vol. ii, 
 p. 556. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 163 
 
 intelligent person, of considerable experience and know- 
 ledge of the country, and of approved fidelity to the in- 
 terests of the young Maharajah and the British Govern- 
 ment."* 
 
 This same Misr Sahib Dyal had, at an earlier period, 
 brought to a successful conclusion, by means of the troops 
 under his own command, a most important aifair, which 
 had caused much anxiety to the Resident, and occupied a 
 large British force for more than a month, the destruction 
 and dispersion of a formidable band of insurgents, at one 
 time 5,000 in number, under a noted fanatic, Bhaee 
 Maharaj Sing, who, in communication with Dewan Mool- 
 raj, the rebel Governor of Mooltan, and well provided with 
 funds, was scouring the country, and summoning the 
 Sikhs to join in a religious war. The last scene in the 
 active career of this fanatic is thus described in the Re- 
 sident's despatch of the 13th June, 1848. 
 
 " Misr Sahib Dyal was as good as Ms word ; and lie and his 
 people kept their promise faithfully. On arriving at Jhung, the 
 Bhaee' s force had diminished to about 1000 or 1200 men ; the 
 Misr's party immediately attacked them, and, though really in- 
 ferior in numbers, they were fresh, while their opponents were 
 hungry, and tired by a long and harassing retreat. A great 
 many of the rebels were killed in the encounter, and three or four 
 of the Misr's men, and ten or twelve wounded. The whole rebel 
 force was driven into the Chenab, a difficult river to cross at all 
 times, and now formidable from being much swollen by the rains 
 and the melted snow. It is calculated that from 500 to 600, horse 
 and foot, perished in the river, among the rebels, Bhaee Maharaj. 
 Three hundred of the rebels were taken by the Misr's soldiers in 
 boats, and put into confinement in Jhung. The Bhaee' s four 
 officers, Sikhs of some note, were among the prisoners, and are 
 now on their way to Lahore in irons ."f 
 
 Lord Dalhousie writes to the Secret Committee that 
 "the destruction of the outlaw, Bhaee Maharaj, and the 
 utter discomfiture of his followers, is an event which has 
 greatly tended to the support of British authority. "J 
 
 The death of Bhaee Maharaj on that occasion became 
 afterwards a matter of doubt ; but his fame and influence 
 were annihilated ; and Lord Dalhousie, in his final Minute 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 444. f Ibid., p. 213. 
 
 J Ibid., p. 187. Ibid., p. 625. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 declaring the annexation of the Punjaub, admits that "the 
 measures taken against Bhaee Maharaj Sing, who, with 
 some thousand followers was raising the country in the 
 Rechna Doab, and the flight and dispersion of his followers, 
 combined to keep down any manifestations of disaffection 
 in the neighbourhood of Lahore."* 
 
 Thus even his own words, extracted from the Blue Book, 
 contradict Lord Dalhousie's complaint that "the Regency, 
 during these troubles, gave no substantial or effective 
 assistance to the British Government, "j" 
 
 It is true that the Resident at one time speaks of his 
 Councillors as merely "acquiescing" in the plans he was 
 pursuing, as deficient in "zeal, energy, and judgment. "J 
 On the 14th July, 1848, however, he writes : "A great 
 change has come over the spirit of the Durbar : they have 
 been making the most decided and very successful exer- 
 tions to procure carriage of every description for the use 
 of the British troops, and to aid in the conveyance of the 
 siege train." One member of the Regency, Rajah Deena 
 Nath, was sent from Lahore on a mission into the Hazara 
 Province in September, 1848; and after his return the 
 Resident writes to the Governor-General : 
 
 " His presence in that part of the country had the effect of 
 assuring the inhabitants, and he certainly appears to have used 
 his influence, in every way, to defeat the machinations of Sirdar 
 Chuttur Sing. Since his return he appears to have entered, 
 zealously and earnestly, into the measures adopted for punishing 
 the rebels, by the confiscation of their jaghires, and the attach- 
 ment of their houses and property, and for counteracting the plots 
 of the insurgents." || 
 
 On August 16th, 1848, the Resident writes as follows 
 to Lord Dalhousie : " The conduct of the Durbar, collec- 
 tively and individually, has been entirely satisfactory in 
 everything connected with this outbreak, and, indeed, in 
 all other respects for the last two months, "^f 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, always overlooking the fact that the 
 control of the finances was in the hands of the British 
 Resident, places first and foremost among the " gross vio- 
 lations" of Treaties of which " the Sikhs" had been guilty, 
 the non-payment of our military subsidy. 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 657. t Ibid., p. 660. t Hid., p. 197. 
 Ibid., p. 256. || Ibid., p. 379. 1 Ibid., p. 289. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 165 
 
 " In return for the aid of British troops, they bound themselves 
 to pay to us a subsidy of 22 lakhs per annum. From the day 
 when the Treaty was signed, to the present hour, not one rupee 
 has ever been paid. Loans advanced by the British Government 
 to enable them to discharge the arrears of their disbanded troops 
 have never been repaid."* 
 
 And in the Proclamation declaring the Punjaub to have 
 become British territory, he says ; " Of their annual tri- 
 bu^e no portion whatever has at any time been paid ; and 
 large loans, advanced to them by the Government of India, 
 have never been repaid, "j* 
 
 The Blue Book contradicts the assertion that " not one 
 rupee," that " no portion," had ever been paid. On Feb- 
 ruary 23rd, 1848, the Resident reports as foUows to the 
 Governor-General. " The Durbar have paid into this trea- 
 sury gold to the value of Rupees 13,56,837. By this pay- 
 ment they have reduced their debt to the British Govern- 
 ment from upwards of forty lakhs of rupees to less than 
 twenty-seven. " J 
 
 In this same despatch, written about six weeks before 
 the outbreak at Mooltan, the Resident recorded his satis- 
 faction with the financial arrangements and prospects of 
 the Durbar. 
 
 " They have thus, by economy and care, been able to make 
 good four months' pay of the Irregular Cavalry, to discharge the 
 whole of the arrears of the men who have been pensioned and 
 disbanded, to meet their current expenses, and have still, at this 
 moment, full eight lakhs of rupees in the different treasuries to 
 meet the public exigencies." 
 
 If a financial equilibrium had not been restored, and if 
 the regular payment of the tribute had not commenced, 
 when the rebellion of 1848 once more threw everything 
 into confusion, it was no fault of the Council of Regency. 
 Not only had the British authorities accepted the trust 
 with their eyes open to the disordered state of the finances, 
 but the Resident? opposed by the Council of Regency and 
 supported by the Governor-General, had introduced ex- 
 tensive changes into the fiscal system, leading, as had been 
 anticipated, to a very serious loss of revenue. 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 659. t Ibid., p. 654. 
 
 I Ibid., pp. 110, 111. Ibid., p. 111. 
 
166 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 In a letter dated July 3rd, 1847, the Resident states as 
 follows to the Governor-General : 
 
 " I propose only to give half salaries, until the State is clear of 
 its debts, which I now estimate at thirty-five lakhs. 
 
 " I found the treasury empty. 
 
 ' ' Deficiency of cash, as I said before, and entire want of public 
 credit, have tied my hands ; indeed, but for the loan of seven 
 lakhs of rupees granted by our Government, I do not know what 
 I could have done. 
 
 " Estimating the debt of the Durbar for last year at nine lakhs, 
 the account will stand, at the end of the present year, leaving a 
 balance of Rs. 13,95,265, which, I fear, cannot be paid off under 
 a year and a half, exclusive of the twenty-two lakhs subsidy 
 yearly."* 
 
 The financial reforms introduced by the Resident were 
 certain, as he admitted, to entail an immediate, though 
 perhaps only a temporary, sacrifice of revenue. These are 
 his reports to the Governor-General on August 28th, and 
 December 16th, 1847, and January 12th, 1848. 
 
 1 . " The finances of the Lahore Durbar are certainly not in a pro- 
 sperous condition. By the returns lately submitted to the Gover- 
 nor-General, there is a surplus of twenty-nine lakhs and upwards, 
 but out of this sum the annual commutation, payable to the British 
 Government, aod the extra expenses consequent on the new sys- 
 tem of paying Councillors, Adawluttees, and Nazims must be de- 
 frayed. A reform of the Customs as well as the land-tax, all abso- 
 lutely necessary, will probably not involve a sacrifice of less than 
 from- twelve to fifteen lakhs of rupees.^ 
 
 2. " The finances are still in a very unsatisfactory state ; it is the 
 one great difficulty which now remains. The introduction of the 
 new system of land-tax ; the reform in the Customs ; t he loss at- 
 tendant on reforming the currency, and calling in all the depreciated 
 coinage ; with the sums necessary for paying up the arrears of 
 the Irregulars, and the civil officials, cannot but amount to a large 
 sum. Much of this pressure, no doubt, is but temporary ; still 
 in the exhausted state of the treasury, it is with the greatest dif- 
 ficulty that the Durbar can meet its demands. J 
 
 3. " The revenue settlement is rapidly progressing. 
 
 " The difference between the real and nominal revenue will, 
 probably, be little less than a fourth ; and from the former must 
 again be deducted the reductions on the summary settlement. The 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 22, 23, 24. f Ibid., pp. 56, 57. 
 t Ibid., p. 93. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 167 
 
 
 
 savings from the decreased expenses of management will go far 
 to meet the last noted deficiency ; but still the income will, I fear, 
 inevitably fall short of the expenditure."* 
 
 On January 31st, 1848, he reports some further reduc- 
 tions in the Customs duties. 
 
 " In the Customs I have reduced the duties on dried fruits and 
 other articles, from five rupees per maund to three rupees j on 
 silk, from forty to twenty-four rupees ; on English coarse calicoes, 
 from thirty to twenty rupees ; and on sugar from two rupees to 
 one rupee per maund. "-f 
 
 All these measures received the Governor-General's ap- 
 proval and confirmation. They were not so favourably 
 viewed by the Council of Regency, but no opposition was 
 attempted, or would have been permitted. The Resident 
 makes the following remarks in a despatch to Lord Dal- 
 housie of April 6th, 1848. 
 
 " The settlement was, of course, most summary, and its details 
 have yet to be filled up. Its working must be most carefully 
 watched. The Durbar was averse to its introduction, but yielded, 
 as they always do ; and contented themselves, with the exception 
 of Rajah Deena Nath, with standing aloof from its execution ; 
 leaving the whole matter to the Resident and his Assistants. 
 
 " Rajah Deena Nath sees the financial embarrassment of the 
 State, and feels that the more we interfere with details, especially 
 where the revenue is concerned, the less will be the Durbar' s re- 
 sponsibility for financial difficulties and deficiencies. "J 
 
 There is no reason to doubt the wisdom of these revenue 
 settlements ; they prove, however, that the temporary 
 failure of the Punjaub State to meet its pecuniary engage- 
 ments was not wilful or faithless ; they prove not merely 
 the full knowledge and participation of the British Govern- 
 ment, in those fiscal and administrative changes which 
 made immediate solvency impossible, but its sole responsi- 
 bility for those changes. 
 
 Yet Lord Dalhousie places t*he regular payment of the 
 Subsidy among "the main provisions of the agreement," 
 which " the Sikhs" had " either entirely evaded, or grossly 
 violated. " There was neither evasion nor violation. The 
 only cause of the subsidy having fallen into arrears, was 
 that the Resident, in the plenitude of his powers, had 
 thought fit to lessen the receipts of the State, and to di- 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 99. t Ibid., pp. 104, 105. 
 
 J Ibid., p. 128. Ibid., p. 659. 
 
168 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 
 
 vert the expenditure into other channels. These financial 
 measures were, doubtless, most judicious, but they were 
 entirely the Resident's work, approved by the Governor- 
 General, reluctantly accepted by the Durbar. They were 
 of temporary effect ; and ample assets remained available, 
 at the end of the war, for the gradual liquidation of all 
 possible demands on the part of the British Government. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie totally fails to make out any violation 
 of the Treaty against the Lahore State, the only specific 
 instance he adduces, the non-payment of the subsidy, being, 
 as we have seen, a mere matter of account, a circumstance 
 by which the case is not in the least modified to the pre- 
 judice of the State of Lahore.* He contrives to fasten a 
 plausible stigma of perfidy and violation of treaties upon 
 the State of Lahore, only by ringing the changes through 
 several paragraphs, upon the terms, " the Sikh nation," 
 " the Sikhs," " the Sikh people," and " the Government" 
 or " State of Lahore, "t until a thorough confusion is esta- 
 blished. For these are not convertible terms. 
 
 What " the State of Lahore" was, and what " the Go- 
 vernment of Lahore" was, during the British occupation 
 and management, under the Treaty of Bhyrowal, we 
 have just determined. 
 
 " The Sikh people," as we have already remarked,! is 
 not a phrase synonymous with " the people of the Punjaub," 
 the great majority of whom took no share in the revolt, 
 and felt no sympathy with it ; while at least 20,000 sub- 
 jects of the Lahore State, enrolled in its service, fought 
 on the side of the Government, and assisted in suppressing 
 the rebellion. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie evidently perceived the forensic and 
 moral difficulty in the way of annexation, created by the 
 relation of Guardianship tinder the Treaty of Bhyrowal, 
 between the two States, between the infant Sovereign 
 of the Punjaub and the Governor-General of British India. 
 He saw the necessity of meeting that difficulty somehow. 
 He could not leave it entirely unnoticed. But he did not 
 state it fully or fairly; and the solution offered in the 
 following passages is quite inadequate. 
 
 * Ante, p. 165. f Papers, Punjaub, 1849, pp. 661. 662. 
 % Ante, p. 158. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 169 
 
 " It has been objected that the present dynasty in the Punjaub 
 cannot with justice be subverted, since Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, 
 being yet a minor, can hardly be held responsible for the acts of 
 the nation. With deference to those by whom these views have 
 been entertained, I must dissent entirely from the soundness of 
 this doctrine."* 
 
 No such unsound doctrine lay before him. The objec- 
 tion was not to the subversion of a minor, but to the sub- 
 version of a Ward by his Guardian. Nor was it merely 
 a question of "subverting a dynasty," but of subverting a 
 State, protected and administered, under Treaty, by the 
 British Government. I have already shown that Lord 
 Dalhousie had no right to speak of the acts of the rebels, 
 either as "the acts of the nation," or of "the State of 
 Lahore, "f 
 
 Lord Dalhousie went on to argue that this imaginary 
 false doctrine, the irresponsibility of a minor Sovereign, 
 had "been disregarded heretofore, in practice, and dis- 
 regarded in the case of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing him- 
 self." He continues thus : 
 
 " When, in 1845, the Khalsa army invaded our territories, the 
 Maharajah was not held to be free from responsibility, nor was 
 he exempted from the consequences of his people's acts. On the 
 contrary, the Government of India confiscated to itself the richest 
 provinces of the Maharajah's kingdom, and was applauded for the 
 moderation which had exacted no more. 
 
 " Furthermore, the Maharajah having been made to pay the 
 penalty of the past offences of his people, due warning was given 
 him that he would be held, in like manner, responsible for their 
 future acts. The Maharajah, in reply, acknowledging this warn- 
 ing, says, ' If in consequence of the recurrence of misrule in my 
 Government, the peace of the British frontier be disturbed, I 
 should be held responsible for the same. 
 
 " If the Maharajah was not exempted from responsibility on 
 the plea of his tender years, at the age of eight, he cannot, on 
 that plea, be entitled to exemption from a like responsibility, now 
 that he is three years older.^J 
 
 It is strange that Lord Dalhousie should have so com- 
 pletely overlooked the real difference between 1846 and 
 1849. The question of age was immaterial at both periods. 
 There was no plea of exemption in 1846 when the warning 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 663. f Ante, p. 159. 
 
 t Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p, 663. 
 
170 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 was given and acknowledged, because the Maharajah was 
 the reigning Prince of an independent State. Although 
 he was a minor, his mother, his near relatives, and their 
 chosen advisers, were the actual Rulers of the State. In 
 1849 the actual Ruler of the State was the British Resident, 
 under the Governor-General's instructions. 
 
 Of course a minor Prince is the personal representative 
 of the State, and must stand or fall with its fortunes. 
 But a minor Prince under the tutelage of a powerful 
 neighbour, cannot justly be held responsible for the acts 
 of the nation which his Guardian has undertaken to guide 
 and control. 
 
 In 1846 the Maharajah was a conquered enemy. In 
 1849 the Maharajah was a Ward; the British Govern- 
 ment was the Guardian. His mother, his natural Guar- 
 dian and late Regent, was banished from the Punjaub ; 
 several of his relatives and former ministers were in prison 
 or exile. The Maharajah was now entirely exempt from 
 responsibility, simply because all responsibility had been 
 assumed by the British Government. 
 
 From the 16th of December, 1846, the date of the 
 Treaty of Bhyrowal, down to the 29th of March, 1849, 
 when the Proclamation annexing the Punjaub was issued, 
 the Government of Lahore was in strict subordination to 
 the British Government ; and its subordination was never 
 interrupted, suspended, or relaxed for a single day. If, 
 indeed, the Government of Lahore could justly have been 
 made responsible for any of the untoward events of 1848 
 and 1849, Sir Frederick Currie., the Resident, must have 
 been the first person indicted, for he was the absolute 
 head of that Government. This is a fair reductio ad 
 absurdum of that sophistical and fallacious rhetoric, by 
 which Lord Dalhousie confounded "the Sikhs," "the Sikh 
 nation," "the people of the Punjaub," "the Lahore Govern- 
 ment," and "the State of LahoTe," as if they were syno- 
 nymous and co-extensive terms, with the object of justify- 
 ing the violation of Treaties, and the evasion of a sacred 
 duty. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's motives, as avowed by himself, for 
 abandoning the office of Guardian, and the noble work of 
 restoring order and self-government to the Punjaub State, 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 171 
 
 when so much progress had already been secured, were 
 not of the highest order. To me they appear morally low, 
 politically short-sighted, and altogether unworthy of a 
 great and generous nation, claiming to play the part of 
 Imperial Instructor and Exemplar to India and the East. 
 He argued that if our Government continued to maintain 
 "the Sikh nation as an independent State," and instituted 
 a reformed administration by "a larger measure of British 
 control," "we should have all the labour, all the anxiety, 
 all the responsibility, which would attach to the territories 
 if they were actually made our own ; while we should not 
 reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue and 
 acknowledged possession."* 
 
 That labour, anxiety, and responsibility we had under- 
 taken ; those benefits, imaginary enough, as we now 
 know, we had foregone by the Treaty of Bhyrowal. As 
 to "a larger measure of British control," there could be no 
 larger measure than those "unlimited powers" in every 
 department, which we held under that Treaty, and which 
 the Resident had never ceased to exercise. 
 
 On the other hand, Lord Dalhousie observed, "the re- 
 venues are very considerable in the aggregate. A large 
 proportion has, hitherto, been diverted from the public 
 treasury in jaghires to the Chiefs. A considerable amount 
 of revenue will now be recovered from the confiscation of 
 the jaghires of those who have been engaged in hostilities 
 against us."t He has "no hesitation in expressing a con- 
 fident belief that the Punjaub will, at no distant time, be 
 not only a secure, but a profitable possession. "J 
 
 "At no distant time,"- before Lord Dalhousie's tour of 
 office expired, this "confident belief" was signally con- 
 tradicted. 
 
 In addition to this delusive hope of profit, and the desire 
 to evade a burdensome obligation, Lord Dalhousie alleges 
 a regard for "self-defence," and "the security of our own 
 territories," as compelling us "to relinquish the policy which 
 would maintain the independence of the Sikh nation in 
 the Punjaub. " 
 
 "There never will be peace in the Punjaub," he urges, 
 
 * Papers, Punjaul, 1849, pp. 662, 663. f Ibid., p. 664. 
 
 J Ibid., p. 665. Ibid., p. 661. 
 
172 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 "so long as its people are allowed to retain the means and 
 the opportunity of making war. There never can be now 
 any guaranty for the tranquillity of India, until we shall 
 have effected the entire subjection of the Sikh people, and 
 destroyed its power as an independent nation."* 
 
 The same equivocal use of the terms, "the Sikh people" 
 or "nation," and "the people of the Punjaub," is employed 
 here, as throughout this despatch. The people of the 
 Punjaub in general were not hostile, as Lord Dalhousie 
 acknowledged, t The Sikh army and the turbulent por- 
 tion of the Sikh people, had been effectually subjected, 
 and deprived of the means of making war. Reduced in 
 numbers, subdued to orderly discipline, the Sikh army 
 never could have regained its insolent pre-eminence in the 
 State, as the embodied representative of the Sikh religion 
 and Commonwealth, the Khalsa Punth. And its con- 
 spicuous humiliation was sure to operate in a very whole- 
 some manner upon the Sikh population, not only in the 
 Punjaub, but throughout Sirhind, the Jullundhur Doab, 
 and the feudatory States on both sides of the Sutlej. 
 
 Deprived of all supremacy and influence over many of 
 these minor States, whose resources were now transferred 
 to the British Government, and proved of material assist- 
 ance during the campaign of 1849, weakened by the loss 
 of Jullundhur and Cashmere, the former in our posses- 
 sion, the latter placed on her flank as a jealous rival, the 
 Punjaub State, even if freed from the British occupation, 
 could hardly be considered independent after the Treaties 
 of 1846. Certainly her independence was not of such a 
 character as to afford reasonable grounds of apprehension 
 for "the tranquillity of India," or for "the security of our 
 own territories." Lord Hardinge had taken good care of 
 that. 
 
 By Articles II, III, and IV, of the Treaty of the 9th 
 of March, 1846, the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing renounced 
 for himself, his heirs and successors, "all claim to, or con- 
 nection with the territories to the south of the Sutlej," 
 and between the rivers Sutlej and Beas, (the Jullundhur 
 Doab,) ceded to the British Government ; and also gave 
 up Cashmere and the Hill Countries, designed to form a 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 662. f A nte, p. 158. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 173 
 
 Principality for Rajah Golab Sing. By Article VII, the 
 "Regular Army of the Lahore State" was "henceforth 
 limited to twenty-five Battalions of Infantry, and 12,000 
 Cavalry," and this force was never to be increased without 
 the express permission of the British Government. By 
 Article IX the control of the rivers Beas, Sutlej, and 
 Indus, in respect to tolls and ferries, was to rest with the 
 British Government. By article X, British troops, due 
 notice being given, were to be allowed to pass through the 
 Lahore territories. By Article XI, no European or Ame- 
 rican was to be taken into the service of the Puiijaub 
 State without the permission of the British Government. 
 By Articles XII and XIII "the independent Sovereignty" 
 of Rajah Golab Sing was recognised, and any dispute or 
 difference between him and the Lahore State was to be 
 referred to the British Government, whose decision was 
 to be final. By Article XIV no territorial acquisitions 
 were henceforth to be made "without the concurrence of 
 the British Government."* 
 
 The "independence" stipulated in this Treaty for Rajah 
 Golab Sing, tributary and feudatory of the British Govern- 
 ment, signifies, of course, merely independence of Lahore. 
 This is an instance of the looseness and want of precision 
 with which the terms "independent" and "independence" 
 have been used in our Indian Treaties and State papers, 
 and by no one more frequently than Lord Dalhousie. But 
 even if the meaning of the term "independence," which he 
 applies to "the Sikh nation," be confined to that freedom 
 of internal administration which was to be restored to the 
 Punjaub at the end of the Maharajah's minority, there cer- 
 tainly was nothing in the prospect to alarm a British 
 statesman. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, in fact, could not have constructed his 
 specious case of "self-defence" against the dangerous "in- 
 dependence" of the Punjaub State, he could not even have 
 deceived himself on the subject, if he had not employed 
 that misleading formula, "the independence of the Sikh 
 nation." 
 
 The Sikh nation, if a sect can be called a nation, 
 
 * Papers, the late Hostilities, 1846, pp. 99, 101 ; and Collection of Treaties, 
 Calcutta (London, Longman & Co.,) vol. ii, pp. 261, 26P>. 
 
174 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 neither constitutes the population of the Punjaub, nor is 
 confined to the Punjaub. It was not the Sikh religion, 
 nor the Sikh nationality within the Punjaub, that rendered 
 the establishment of a strong and orderly Government in 
 that country so difficult, but the large floating population 
 of recently disbanded soldiers, and their favourite leaders, 
 belonging to the dominant sect, and accustomed to political 
 supremacy. The organisation of the Sikh army was not 
 thoroughly broken up ; the defeated Khalsa had not for- 
 gotten their old habits, nor lost their old hopes. All that 
 they wanted was that second lesson, which we had pro- 
 mised to administer, if necessary. 
 
 The pacification of the Punjaub after 1849, is not in the 
 least explained by its becoming a British Province, but by 
 the simple fact that the Sikhs had been well beaten, and 
 that they knew it. Whatever doubt may have been left 
 on their minds after the campaign of 1846, was now ef- 
 fectually dispelled. They could not contend against the 
 British Government. They had been made to lay down 
 their arms ; they had lost all their guns ; their proudest 
 and most trusted Chieftains were all discomfited ; their 
 saints and prophets were all discredited ; their union was 
 dissolved. They had been defeated without disgrace ; a 
 great deal of fanatical nonsense had probably been knocked 
 out of them ; and, by all accounts, they bore no particular 
 grudge against us for the lesson we had taught them. 
 
 There is, in fact, no reason to doubt that the Punjaub 
 would have been as peaceful and friendly under a Native 
 Prince during the last nineteen years, as the States of 
 Nepaul and Gwalior have been, the former for fifty years 
 since its last defeat, the latter for twenty-four years since 
 its final subjection to the British Government. 
 
 The Nepaulese, animated by a long career of conquest, 
 and with an overweening confidence in their own power 
 and resources, made war upon us in 1814. Their successes 
 against our troops in the first campaign, induced them to 
 protract the contest for nearly two years ; but they were 
 taught the error of trusting in the inaccessibility of their 
 mountain fastnesses, and their Envoy was compelled to 
 present on his knees at the British General's Durbar,* the 
 
 * Prinsep's Marquis of Hastings' Administration, (Allen, 1825), vol. i, p. 205. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 175 
 
 Treaty of peace ratified by the Maharajah, giving up all 
 the points in dispute, and ceding a large tract of territory. 
 Since this humiliation in March, 1816, a British Resident 
 has been constantly at the capital of Nepaul ; that Govern- 
 ment has maintained the most amicable relations with us ; 
 and in 1857-8 a force of 20,000 Goorkhas, commanded by 
 the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, Maharajah 
 Jung Bahadoor, cooperated with Lord Clyde's army in 
 suppressing the rebellion in Oude. 
 
 The military operations of 1843 in the territories of 
 Maharajah Scindia of Gwalior, had for their pretext and 
 object the coercion of a turbulent and unmanageable army, 
 unnecessarily large for the purposes of the Native State, 
 and massed so as to threaten our frontier near the im- 
 portant city of Agra. Two battles were fought ; the de- 
 feated army was disbanded, and reorganised on a limited 
 scale under a new and more stringent Treaty. Since that 
 time the State of Gwalior has given no ground of complaint; 
 and in the crisis of 1857, Maharajah Scindia and his minis- 
 ters, though placed in the vortex of insurrection, sur- 
 rounded by mutinous and clamorous troops, "raised, paid, 
 disciplined, and" (recently) "commanded by British officers," 
 in the style which, in Lord Dalhousie's opinion, could alone 
 make native troops safe ;* contrived to render most valu- 
 able services to the British Government. 
 
 Every historical analogy, every contemporaneous event, 
 all the probabilities of the case, indicate that the Sikhs, 
 under the reformed Government of Maharajah Dhuleep 
 Sing, would have been as proud and as eager to cooperate 
 with British troops in 1857, as were the Sikhs under the 
 Sikh Rajahs of Puttiala, Jheend, Nabha, and Kuppoor- 
 thulla, as were the troops of the Rajah of Cashmere, or the 
 Nepaulese under Jung Bahadoor. Delhi was the accursed 
 city of the Mogul, the centre of Mussulman arrogance, the 
 place of martyrdom of the great Sikh prophets, and de- 
 voted by their predictions to the vengeance of their dis- 
 ciples. Animated by these traditional animosities, with 
 the hope of plunder, and "the old scorn for the Poorbeah 
 Sepoy, "t the Sikhs rallied to our banner in the newly raised 
 
 * Papers, Punjaul, 1849, p. 662. 
 
 f Trotter's History of India from 1844 to 1862, vol. ii, p. 70. 
 
176 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Punjaubee Regiments, and pressed towards Delhi with 
 confidence and good will. But these notorious induce- 
 ments would have operated with double force under the 
 rule of their own Rajah. As it is, the extensive re-employ- 
 ment of the Punjaubees in 1857, their share in the glory 
 and plunder of Delhi and Lucknow, unquestionably revived 
 much of their soldierly self-respect, but with it, by all ac- 
 counts, somewhat of a bitter sense of their inadequate 
 military rewards, and of their degradation as a race, 
 feelings that are by no means conducive to abject and con- 
 tented submission. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie argued, that "warlike in character, and 
 long accustomed to conquest, the Sikhs must, of necessity, 
 detest the British as their conquerors."* But if the ad- 
 ministration of the Punjaub during the Rajah's minority, 
 had been continued, there would have been no "con- 
 querors" to detest. It was Lord Dalhousie who, by a 
 violation of the Treaty, converted our protective occupation 
 into a so-called conquest. If the Treaty had not been 
 violated, the defeated insurgents would have been simply 
 a vanquished party in the State, and, as I believe, finally 
 vanquished. No humiliation would have fallen on the 
 Maharajah, upon the Board of Regency, or upon the Sir- 
 dars, their followers, and the troops, who had supported 
 the constituted authorities. And even for the vanquished 
 party, the fanatical lower class of Sikhs, if the Punjaub 
 State had been maintained, the participation of its army in 
 the military exploits of the British Government, would 
 have taken out all the sting of defeat in the pride of a 
 common victory. 
 
 The fact is that the Government of the Punjaub, so long 
 as there was a regular Government, never had the least 
 inclination to go to war with us. The State of Lahore, 
 throughout the time of its greatest pride and prosperity, 
 under Runjeet Sing, had remained on the best terms with 
 the British Government. Even after the great Maharajah's 
 death, amidst the excitement of our disasters in Affghan- 
 istan, and the operations to retrieve them and withdraw 
 our troops, amicable relations were preserved for several 
 years, until what Lord Hardinge correctly described as 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 662. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 177 
 
 "a democratic revolution";* threw all the power of the 
 State into the hands of the army. The military Puncha- 
 yuts used their power in a manner that was most offensive 
 and alarming to all adherents of Runjeet Sing's dynasty. 
 They "issued their orders, under the designation belonging 
 to the Sikh sect, before Runjeet Sing became a monarch, 
 viz. : the Khalsa Punth, (Khalsajee-ka Punth)" the 
 Company of the Elect. "They formally assumed the Go- 
 vernment, and sent letters bearing their seal, inscribed 
 merely with the name of God, to all local officers, military 
 leaders, and members of the Durbar, requiring their pre- 
 sence and obedience, "t The Princes, the ministers, the 
 nobles, even the superior officers of the army, all who had 
 anything to lose, were on the side of peace with us, and 
 good order within their own frontier. It was so in 1845, 
 and equally, or more so, in 1849. 
 
 We have seen how long, and how stoutly, Rajah Shere 
 Sing resisted the growing impulse, with what reluctance, 
 under what an imperative summons, amid what confusion 
 and despair, he at last yielded. And, after all, he alone, 
 out of the eight leading Sirdars of the Punjaub, selected 
 to form the Council of Regency, took part in the insurrec- 
 tion, and then, not as a voluntary participator in the 
 common cause, but closely touched by special motives of 
 personal honour, and the Oriental sense of implicit filial 
 obedience. 
 
 Many of the Sirdars withstood for a long time every 
 incentive to rebellion, and were at last dragged or forced 
 into it by the soldiery who surrounded them. The army 
 was, in fact, the sole obstacle to be overcome before a 
 reformed and self-sustaining Government could be estab- 
 lished in the Punjaub. Under our protective manage- 
 ment, with or without a second struggle, that obstacle 
 would have been overcome. The reorganisation of the 
 army, and pacification of the Sikhs and other warlike 
 tribes, were merely matters of time. The intervals of the 
 Rajah's minority would probably have been sufficiently 
 long. The negotiators of the Treaty of Bhyrowal certainly 
 contemplated the possibility of a second struggle. Lord 
 Hardinge and Sir Henry Lawrence were prepared for it, 
 
 * Papers, the Late Hostilities, 1846, p. 6. f Ibid., p. 8. 
 
 N 
 
178 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 though they did not expect it ; and but for a strange suc- 
 cession of mishaps and errors of judgment, I firmly believe 
 the second struggle would have been avoided. In either 
 case, whether the second struggle was unavoidable, whether 
 it was provoked or aggravated by our shortcomings or 
 faults, we ought to have borne the brunt of it without 
 complaining. 
 
 The spirit, the habits, the traditional pride of the old 
 Khalsa troops, in the ranks of the local army, and in the 
 districts chiefly inhabited by the Sikhs, were the unruly 
 elements we had undertaken to curb and coerce. It was 
 our duty to conquer those unruly elements ; but having 
 done so, we had no right to say, as Lord Dalhousie did, 
 that we had "conquered" the territories under our tutelage. 
 That was not a conquest, it was a breach of trust. We 
 availed ourselves to the utmost, and to the last moment, 
 of our advantageous position as the civil and military 
 administrators of the Punjaub ; we held its strongholds, 
 and disposed of all its resources, including 20,000 soldiers 
 recruited from its population ; we disarmed many wavering 
 and doubtful opponents by appealing to their conservative 
 interests and loyal sentiments, and disavowing hostility 
 to their Sovereign and institutions ; all this we were 
 authorised and bound to do, with the object of quelling 
 the insurrection, but not with the object of violating the 
 Treaties, as soon as the crisis was over, by turning our 
 occupation into possession. 
 
 The results of that ill-advised acquisition up to the 
 present time, seem to me to have been of a mixed charac- 
 ter, absolutely injurious and exhausting to the British 
 Empire, relatively beneficial in some respects, prejudicial 
 in others, to the people of the Punjaub, but I can per- 
 ceive no advantage, material or moral, that has been 
 gained by any person or class, that could not have been 
 more fully and effectually conferred and secured, without 
 annexation than with it. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie objected, that "hesitation on our part 
 would be attributed, not to forbearance, but to fear ; it 
 would be regarded, not as the result of a magnanimous 
 policy, but as the evidence of a pusillanimous spirit." 4 
 
 * Papers, Punjaub, 1849, p. 664. 
 
THE PUNJAUB. 179 
 
 This is a most frivolous and unstatesmanlike objection. 
 Magnanimity after success never presents the appearance 
 of fear, and is not in the least liable to be mistaken for it. 
 All India was thoroughly impressed with the complete 
 subjection of the Sikh army. There were manifold means 
 available for making that subjection, and the submission 
 of the entire people, a visible object to the whole Peninsula, 
 and for turning it to the honour and credit of the Imperial 
 Power. According to the Oriental ideas the greatest 
 Sovereign is he who can make Princes, and who has the 
 largest number of Princes under his command and protec- 
 tion. Lord Dalhousie might have gained the hearts of 
 Princes and people by a plain statement of what had been 
 done, and what it was intended to do in the Punjaub. 
 Instead of doing so, he violated Treaties, abused a sacred 
 trust, threw away the grandest opportunity ever offered to 
 the British Government, of planting solid and vital reform 
 up to the northern limits of India, and by an acquisition 
 as unjust as it was imprudent, entailed a heavy burden 
 upon the Empire. That, I believe, will be the verdict of 
 posterity and history, upon the transactions which have 
 just passed under our review. 
 
 N 2 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHOKS AND APOLOGISTS. 
 
 BOTH the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson seem 
 desirous of impressing two somewhat ill-assorted notions 
 upon their readers, firstly, that a deliberate policy of 
 gradually absorbing all the Native States has always been 
 the wisest policy for the British Government of India, and 
 will continue to be so for the future ; secondly, that Lord 
 Dalhousie did not form any such deliberate policy. They 
 tell us that "he did not originate the doctrine of 'lapse;' 
 that he did not extend it ;" that some of the annexed 
 States simply "lapsed by operation of law ;" and that the 
 Governor-General could not throw away "a golden oppor- 
 tunity;"* while in the most notable instance of all, that of 
 Oude.he "deprecated annexation," and "is not responsible" 
 for it. t 
 
 With the alleged scruples and misgivings of the chief 
 agent in these territorial acquisitions, and their legal and 
 accidental character, I have already dealt. J I shall only 
 add here that it is quite true that Lord Dalhousie did not 
 "originate the doctrine of lapse;" but by his eager and un- 
 questioning adhesion to that doctrine with its visionary 
 array of precedents, which a fair and candid inquiry would 
 have immediately dispelled, he made it his own, and gave 
 it practical efficacy. " The doctrine of lapse" was originated 
 by some Bengal and Bombay Civilians, and first applied 
 to a Sovereign State with which a Treaty of perpetual 
 alliance existed, by the late Sir J. P. Willoughby, then a 
 Member of Council at Bombay, in the matter of the Sat- 
 tara succession. Some years ago I remarked, "Mr. J. P. 
 Willoughby was the real parent of Annexation ; Lord 
 Dalhousie was only its nursing father. " But that cannot 
 
 * A Vindication, pp. 41, 42. f Ante, p. 46. 
 
 I Ante, pp. 50, 51, 72, 74 ; and pp. 10 to 20. 
 The Empire in India, chapter on " Sattara." 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 181 
 
 diminish his responsibility in the least. The "doctrine of 
 lapse" was a cruelly effective process, but without a policy 
 of annexation accepted by the Supreme Government it 
 would never have been applied. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll denies that there ever was "a policy 
 of annexation" at all ;* and Sir Charles Jackson declares 
 that, if there ever was such a policy, by the time Lord 
 Dalhousie left India, no reigning Prince remained who had 
 any reason to dread it, except the Eajah of Mysore. 
 
 " Then it is suggested that all the Princes of India were 
 alarmed by these annexations, and feared the application of the 
 doctrine of ' lapse' to their own successions; but the truth is that 
 the doctrine was capable of a very limited application among 
 Princes. Lord Dalhousie repeatedly declared that it was appli- 
 cable to dependent States only. 
 
 ' ( I do not believe that one independent Sovereign was alarmed 
 by these lapses of territory, but if there was such a Sovereign, 
 his fear was most unreasonable, and might have been removed 
 by ten minutes' conversation with the Resident at his Court, or a 
 reference to Calcutta. But the range of this supposed dread was 
 still more limited, for the doctrine, requiring the consent of the 
 British Government to adoptions by dependent Sovereigns, is in- 
 applicable to those of the Mahometan faith, and it was Lord Dal- 
 housie'' s fate to gather in nearly the whole crop of dependent 
 Hindoo territories. I believe that Mysore was the only one remain- 
 ing at the close of his administration."! 
 
 I shall take the last two sentences first, both because, 
 if they held good, they would, indeed, confine within very 
 narrow bounds the alarm and anxiety among native Princes 
 at the special process of rejecting adopted heirs, and be- 
 cause they present a strange example of the incompetence, 
 and want of preparation for the business he has taken in 
 hand, betrayed by Sir Charles Jackson, as soon as he 
 wanders from the particular Blue Books, on which he and 
 the Duke of Argyll would have every one pin their faith. 
 Yet there are Blue Books in existence, not to say school- 
 books, that might have saved Sir Charles Jackson from 
 the error in question. He says that Lord Dalhousie 
 "gathered in nearly the whole crop of dependent Hindoo 
 territories," and believes that "Mysore was the only one 
 remaining at the close of his administration." There are 
 
 * India under Dalkousie and Canning, pp. 4, 5, 16. 
 t A Vindication, p. 33. 
 
182 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 literally more than a hundred dependent Hindoo States 
 left. I exclude from consideration those Princes or Chief- 
 tains who only possess what is called "second class juris- 
 diction," of whom there are at least another hundred, 
 and refer to those who maintain a military force, and have 
 the power of life and death within their own dominions. 
 
 Though I cannot admit that there is any "indepen- 
 dent" Hindoo Prince within the geographical limits of 
 India, except the Maharajah of Nepaul, I shall exclude, 
 for the present, the greater Princes of Rajpootana, the 
 Eajahs Scindia of Gwalior, Holkar of Indore, and others, 
 the extent of whose territories, and their internal auto- 
 nomy, may have led Sir Charles Jackson to suppose that 
 they did not come under the head of "dependent Sove- 
 
 reigns." 
 
 Mr. J. C. Marshman, mentioned several times in Sir 
 William Sleeman's letters as the writer of "rabid articles" 
 in the Friend of India, in favour of the absorption of 
 native States,* has recently published a History of India, 
 in which he naturally takes up the defence of Lord Dal- 
 housie's administration. He, likewise, tries to deprecate 
 censure on the unjust restrictions of the Hindoo law of 
 inheritance, by contracting their sphere, but he is less 
 vague than Sir Charles Jackson, and deviates into a de- 
 cided misrepresentation. 
 
 " It appears to be forgotten that the application of this law of 
 succession was confined to extremely narrow limits. It did not 
 affect any of the Mahomedan Princes of India ; and the Court of 
 Directors and Lord Dalhousie explicitly declared that it was appli- 
 cable exclusively to those subordinate and dependent Principalities 
 which had been created by the ( spontaneous generosity' of the 
 British Government,, and not to any of the independent Sovereigns. 
 It was, in fact, restricted to the States of Mysore, Sattara, Nag- 
 pore, and Jhansi, and possibly to one or two others of minor 
 account."f 
 
 This statement is utterly inaccurate. Neither the Court 
 of Directors nor Lord Dalhousie ever made any such de- 
 claration. The pretended prerogative of rejecting adopted 
 heirs was extended by Lord Dalhousie, in a passage which 
 I shall quote at full length a little further on, to the 
 
 * Sleeman's Oude, vol. ii, pp. 390, 395. 
 
 t History of India, (Longman and Co.) vol. iii, p. 400. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 183 
 
 "States which recognise formally the supremacy of the 
 British Government,"* a formula which would include 
 every Native State in India, with the exception of three or 
 four. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson, who has "been in India/' does "not 
 believe that one independent Sovereign was alarmed by 
 these lapses of territory." Let us hear the opinions of some 
 persons whom he would himself allow to have had better 
 opportunities than himself of judging. 
 
 General Sir John Low, the last surviving pupil and 
 Assistant of Sir John Malcolm, who passed more than 
 thirty of the most active years of his life among Native 
 Princes and their subjects, tells us that "the confidence 
 of our native allies was a good deal shaken by the annex- 
 ation of Sattara," and that it roused feelings of discontent 
 and alarm throughout Malwa and Rajpootana, where he 
 was at that time Agent to the Governor-General, f And 
 Sir Frederick Currie, Resident and Councillor under Lord 
 Dalhousie's Government, and now in the Council of India, 
 in his Dissent from the despatch of 1864 on the Mysore 
 question, remarks: "The decision in the Sattara case, 
 whatever its merits may be, undoubtedly caused surprise 
 and alarm throughout the length and breadth of India. "J 
 
 The Duke of Argyll is strangely unwilling to give Lord 
 Dalhousie the full credit of the policy which he defends 
 and upholds. 
 
 " It is indeed true that the annexation of the Punjaub proved 
 to be the first of a series of annexations. What is not true is 
 precisely that which is most commonly believed, viz., that this 
 was the result of a policy preconceived and deliberately pursued. 
 No policy was, or could be formed, applicable to the very different 
 circumstances which, in these various cases, terminated in a like 
 result/' || 
 
 If for "policy/' the Duke of Argyll would substitute the 
 word, "process," in the last sentence, his statement would 
 be quite correct. The policy was the same throughout ; 
 the process was varied according to the different circum- 
 stances of each case. We have just seen Sir Charles Jack- 
 
 * Kerowlee Papers, 1855. f Paper, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 43. 
 
 t My *ore Papers, 1866, p. 46. 
 
 This is a mistake ; the annexation of Sattara was the first of the series. 
 || India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 4. 
 
184 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 son, after assuming that Lord Dalhousie had cleared off all 
 the "dependent" Princes, except Mysore, and satisfying 
 himself that no "independent" Sovereign could have been 
 alarmed at the clearance, observing that "the range of the 
 supposed dread was still more limited, for the doctrine," 
 of lapse, "is inapplicable to those of the Mahomedan faith." 
 Mr. Marshman makes the same observation. It is quite 
 true that the custom of adoption, though recognised in 
 their law, is not a binding duty upon Mahomedans, does 
 not form the essence of their inheritance, does not exclude 
 collaterals, and thus did not. offer the convenient handle 
 for Lord Dalhousie's operations among Mussulman, that it 
 did among Hindoo families. But he surely extended 
 "the range of the supposed dread" quite sufficiently by 
 his treatment of the Mussulman King of Oude, the 
 Nizam, Ameer Ali Morad, and the Nawab of the Carnatic. 
 He showed that the doctrine of "lapse" was not the only 
 weapon in his armoury, and that he could vary his process 
 according to circumstances. The policy was avowedly the 
 
 O J. t/ t/ 
 
 same in every case ; the pretext alone varied. 
 
 The policy was "preconceived and deliberately pursued," 
 and is clearly enough announced in Lord Dalhousie's own 
 words, penned within six months of his arrival in India, 
 and quoted by the Duke of Argyll. 
 
 " It was in the discussion of the Sattara question that Lord 
 Dalhousie recorded his dissent from the doctrine apparently im- 
 plied though not directly asserted by Sir George Clerk that the 
 maintenance of native Governments in the midst of our own do- 
 minions was in itself politic and advantageous : 
 
 " There may be conflict of opinion (he says) as to the advan- 
 tage or propriety of extending our already vast possessions beyond 
 their present limits. No man can deprecate more than I do any 
 extension of the frontiers of our territory which can be avoided, 
 or which may not become indispensably necessary for considera- 
 tions of our own safety and of the maintenance of the tranquillity 
 of our own Provinces. But I cannot conceive it possible for any 
 one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just op- 
 portunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories 
 which already belong to us, by taking possession of States which 
 may lapse in the midst of them ; for thus getting rid of those 
 petty intervening Principalities which may be made a means of 
 annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of 
 strength ; for adding to the resources of the public treasury ; and 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 185 
 
 for extending the uniform application of our system of govern- 
 ment to those whose best interests, we sincerely believe, will be 
 promoted thereby. "* 
 
 "This," the Duke adds, "is the nearest approach in any 
 of Lord Dalhousie's writings to the advocacy of 'a policy 
 of annexation.'" In a subsequent part of the Essay he says 
 that this passage was quoted, "as containing the broadest 
 assertion of his principle." t 
 
 The Duke is quite wrong in supposing this to be either 
 "the nearest approach," or "the broadest assertion," to be 
 found in Lord Dalhousie's writings, though it is near 
 enough and broad enough to prove a deliberate policy of 
 "getting rid of intervening Principalities," and is by no 
 means limited in the manner Mr. Marshman pretends, to 
 those of our own creation. "The nearest approach" and 
 "the broadest assertion" will be found in two short para- 
 graphs (28 and 30) immediately preceding and following 
 that one (29) which the Duke has extracted. Here they 
 are : 
 
 " 28. In like manner, while I would not seek to lay down any 
 inflexible rule with respect to adoption, I hold that on all occasions 
 where heirs natural shall fail, the territory shall be made to lapse,% 
 and adoption should not be permitted, excepting in those cases in 
 which some strong political reason may render it expedient to de- 
 part from this general rule. 
 
 " 30. Such is the general principle, that, in my humble opinion, 
 ought to guide the conduct of the British Government in its disposal 
 of independent States, where there has been total failure of all 
 heirs whatsoever, or where permission is asked to continue, by 
 adoption, a succession which fails in the natural line." 
 
 In these two paragraphs Lord Dalhousie advises that 
 the doctrine of "lapse," in default of a lineal male descend- 
 ant, shall be considered as "a general principle" to be ap- 
 plied "on all occasions" "in the disposal of independent 
 States." 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson thinks it unfortunate, that "in one 
 of the most important passages" (of this Minute) "the word 
 'independent' appears instead of 'dependent,'" and declares 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 27. t Ibid., p. 39. 
 
 % ''Made to lapse," the quintessence of arbitrary confiscation lies in that 
 phrase. E. B. 
 
 Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 83. As for the meaning in Lord Dalhousie's 
 mouth of "natural heirs," "the natural line," etc,, see ante p. 42. 
 
186 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 that "the whole argument of the Minute requires that it 
 should be 'dependent.'" The word "independent" ap- 
 pears in important passages of that paper, not once only, 
 but three times. "\ In one of these (para. 32) the word could 
 not be altered into "dependent" without destroying the 
 argument, such as it is. The Governor-General argues 
 that "the territories" (of Sattara) "are interposed between 
 the two principal military stations in the Presidency of 
 Bombay ; and are at least calculated, in the hands of an 
 independent Sovereign, to form an obstacle to safe com- 
 munication and combined military movement.''^ The ar- 
 gument is worthless, as was immediately pointed out by 
 General Sir John Littler, one of the Supreme Councillors, 
 but if the proper word, "dependent," had been used, the 
 absurdity of supposing the little subordinate State of Sat- 
 tara to be a military "obstacle," would have been trans- 
 parently obvious. "Independent" sounded like something 
 formidable, and, therefore, it suited Lord Dalhousie's rhe- 
 torical purpose to employ it. In the other passages of 
 this Minute, and elsewhere, however, he seems to use the 
 word as if it were synonymous with "separate." His 
 phraseology is frequently vague and equivocal. 
 
 But Sir Charles Jackson, who believes that "the whole 
 crop" of dependent States, except Mysore, was gathered 
 in by Lord Dalhousie, does "not believe that one hide- 
 pendent Sovereign was alarmed" at the harvest. He uses 
 the terms "dependent" and "independent," as loosely and 
 indeterminately as Lord Dalhousie did ; and I can only 
 guess that he would designate as "independent," those 
 Hindoo Princes who have the largest territories and re- 
 venues. If so, it will be easy to show, firstly, that Scindia 
 and Holkar, the two most important Hindoo Princes out 
 of Rajpootana, were directly threatened by the "doctrine 
 of lapse;" secondly, that they were intensely alarmed by 
 its practical results during Lord Dalhousie's reign. 
 
 In his Minute on the Sattara Succession, Mr. (afterwards 
 
 * A Vindication, p. 33. 
 
 t Paragraphs 1, 30, and 32, Sattara Papers, 1849, pp. 80, 82. 
 
 I Paragraph 32, ibid., p. 83. 
 
 This requires no alteration, but I must admit that I have found numerous 
 instances scattered through Indian state-papers, in which others, besides Lord 
 Dalhousie, use the word ^independent" as if it meant "separate." 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 187 
 
 Sir) J. P. Willoughby dwells upon "the social evils re- 
 sulting from adoptions," and especially the bad effects of a 
 long minority, never giving the least thought to the per- 
 fect opportunity thereby afforded for the effectual reform 
 of a Native State by British agency and influence. The 
 following ominous passage occurs here : 
 
 " A more striking exemplification of the evils above referred to 
 is afforded by the dissensions in the family of Dowlut Rao Scindia. 
 On the death of this Chief, his widow, her Highness the Baiza 
 Baee, adopted a son, and continued to exercise regal powers for 
 some years, until at last a struggle for the supremacy occurred 
 between them, terminating in 1833 in the adopted son being pro- 
 claimed Sovereign, his mother being obliged to seek an asylum 
 in British territory. This Chief dying on February 7th, 1843, 
 another adoption was allowed* and the political evils resulting 
 therefrom, and a violent collision with the British Government, 
 terminating in war and bloodshed, are of too recent an occurrence 
 to require to be dwelt upon. These are strong facts in support 
 of those who are of opinion that the annoyance by adoptions of 
 sovereign and territorial rights, ought in the present state of 
 India to be discouraged as much as possible, and that all fair 
 lapses should be annexed to the British Empire, when no absolute 
 right will thereby be violated. The existence of so many Sove- 
 reignties and Chiefships, interspersed with our own territory, is 
 in many ways inimical to good government, and to the welfare and 
 prosperity of the people ; and if this is admitted, it follows that, 
 on every fair occasion, their number ought to be diminished."t 
 
 I commend this decisive and summary avowal of a 
 general policy of annexation to the attention of Mr. 
 Marshman, who has very recently, in reply to strictures 
 on his History, declared once more that the doctrine of 
 "lapse" "referred to the 'subordinate States' of Mysore, 
 created by Lord Wellesley, to Sattara, Nagpore, and 
 Jhansie, which owed their existence or restoration to Lord 
 Hastings, and to Sumbulpore ; and to no others," and that 
 the late Sir John Willoughby was "the great patron of 
 Native Princes," and "one of the most strenuous advocates 
 of their rights. "J I particularly commend to his attention 
 the fact that in Mr. Willoughby's Minute the great Prin- 
 cipality of Gwalior, in the possession of the Scindia family, 
 
 * That of the reigning Maharajah, Jyajee Rao Scindia. E. B. 
 
 t Sattara Papers, 1849, pp. 70, 71. 
 
 t Letter in the Homeward Mail, February 6th, 1868. 
 
188 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 is declared to be one of those Hindoo States in which an 
 adoption must be "allowed" by the British Government, 
 before it becomes valid for a succession ; and regret is ex- 
 pressed that an adoption was so "allowed" in 1843. It 
 is recommended that this "annoyance" should be dis- 
 couraged for the future, and that "all fair lapses should 
 be annexed." 
 
 Thus the State of Gwalior, and the dynasty of Scindia, 
 are menaced with extinction on the first favourable oppor- 
 tunity. Mr. Willoughby's Minute was called by Lord 
 Dalhousie "a text-book on adoptions," and Sir Charles 
 Jackson informs us that "he was in the habit of referring 
 to it, when similar questions subsequently arose."* 
 
 And other people, there can be no doubt, were in the 
 habit of referring to it. Hear Lord Canning on that 
 point. 
 
 " It must not be supposed that because these documents are 
 published in Blue Books and in English, they are beyond the 
 knowledge of Native Courts. They are, on the contrary, sought 
 for and studied by those whose dearest prospects they so closely 
 affect. It is not many months since I was informed, by the Go- 
 vernor- General's Agent in Central India, that a Native Court had 
 received from England the Parliamentary Papers on Dhar before 
 they had reached my own hand/'f 
 
 In the Sattara, Jhansi, and Nagpore Blue Books, Scindia, 
 Holkar, and other Hindoo Princes, would have found 
 abundance of matter more alarming than anything we have 
 yet quoted. Mr. Willoughby was less cautious in his 
 language than Lord Dalhousie, but the Bengal Civilians 
 in the Supreme Council were more outspoken than either 
 of them. The following extract is from a Minute on the 
 Sattara question by Mr. F. Millett : 
 
 " The intersection of our territories by many native States, 
 interferes with measures of general improvement. I believe it 
 to be for the best interests of the people that our direct admini- 
 stration should gradually extend itself over the whole country com- 
 prised within the bounds of British India ."% 
 
 And this is the opinion of Mr. J. A. Dorin on the occa- 
 sion of Nagpore being annexed : 
 
 * A Vindication, p. 12. 
 
 t Paragraph 7 of the Adoption Despatch of April 30th, 1860. 
 
 Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 85. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 189 
 
 ec So far as we can foresee the ultimate destiny of this great 
 Empire, its entire possession must infallibly be consolidated in 
 the hands of Great Britain. Thoroughly believing in this dis- 
 pensation of Providence, I cannot coincide in any view which 
 shall have for its object the maintenance of native rule against 
 the progress of events which throws indisputed power into our 
 possession/'* 
 
 In addition to the testimony of Sir John Low 
 and Sir Frederick Currie, as to the discontent and alarm 
 among our allies, "throughout the length and breadth of 
 India," besides the obvious certainty that the successive 
 "lapses" of Sattara, Jhansi, and Nagpore, the contents of 
 the Blue Books, and the rumours about Rajpootana, must 
 have terrified Scindia, and d fortiori his weaker neighbour, 
 Holkar, we have the positive evidence of Lord Canning, 
 the Governor-General, and of Colonel Macpherson, the 
 Resident at Gwalior in 1857, that Maharajah Scindia, in 
 common with other Hindoo Princes, was in a state of great 
 anxiety on the subject of the succession in his family. 
 
 In the well-known Adoption Despatch, of the 30th of 
 April, 1860, Lord Canning, after alluding to the "haze of 
 doubt and mistrust in the mind of each Chief as to the 
 policy which the Government will apply to his own State 
 in the event of his leaving no natural heir to the throne," 
 says : 
 
 " It is to this alone that 1 can attribute the extraordinary satis- 
 faction with which my assurance to Scindia that the Government 
 would see with pleasure his adoption of a successor if lineal heirs 
 should fail, and that it was the desire of the Paramount Power 
 that his House should be perpetuated and flourish, was accepted 
 by those attached to his Court, to the extent that at Gwalior the 
 news was received with rejoicings very like that which would have 
 marked the birth of an heir. 
 
 " To the same cause I ascribe the manifest pleasure of the 
 Maharajah of Rewah, when a like assurance was given to him. 
 He said to me that his family had been in Rewah for eleven hun- 
 dred years, and that my words had dispelled an ill-wind that had 
 long been blowing upon him." 
 
 Can any one doubt what that "ill- wind" was ? Sir 
 Frederick Currie,t when a member of Lord Dalhousie's 
 
 * Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 38. 
 
 f Now a Member of the Secretary of State's Council of India. 
 
190 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Government in 1852, opposed his Lordship's desire of an- 
 nexing the little Rajpoot Principality of Kerowlee, by 
 refusing to recognise an adoption, which the Governor- 
 General's Agent, a few days before the Rajah's death, had 
 been desired to discountenance,* but which, nevertheless, 
 took place. The adopted son, as usual, was "a distant 
 relative of the late Maharaja, and a lineal descendant from 
 the founder of the Kerowlee Raj."f Had Lord Dalhousie 
 been permitted to begin nibbling at the States of Raj- 
 pootana, had the decree of confiscation gone forth, 
 feelings of despair and hatred would have been roused, 
 which might have incalculably enhanced our difficulties in 
 1857. Fortunately Sir John Low and Sir Henry Lawrence 
 were successively Agents to the Governor-General in Raj- 
 pootana during the two years of suspense. Their powerful 
 representations gave great weight to Sir Frederick Currie's 
 opposition ; and these efforts were supplemented at home 
 by the India Reform Association, recently established and 
 actively at work, under the guidance of Mr. John Dickin- 
 son, Mr. Henry Seymour, M.P., and the lamented Mr. J. 
 F. B. Blackett, then M.P. for Newcastle. A threatened 
 motion in the House of Commons turned the scale, J and 
 secured a majority of the Court of Directors against the 
 proposed inroad on the ancient States of Rajpootana. 
 
 Mr. Kaye justly remarks that "Sir Frederick Currie's 
 Minute on the Kerowlee question is an admirable state- 
 paper accurate in its facts, clear in its logic, and unex- 
 ceptionable in its political morality. " It is all that, and 
 much more. If carefully examined, it will be found to go 
 to the very root of "the doctrine of lapse," and to mark 
 an epoch after which Lord Dalhousie can have no longer 
 remained under any delusion on that subject. 
 
 The Kerowlee discussion took place in 1852 : it followed 
 the annexation of Sattara, but preceded those of Jhansi 
 and Nagpore. Sir Frederick Currie had left for the time 
 his seat in Council, to act as Resident in the Punjaub, 
 when the Sattara Raj was annexed, and, therefore, took no 
 part in that debate. Considering, as we may presume, the 
 
 * Kerowlee Papers, 1855, p. 7. t Ibid., p. 11. 
 
 % Quarterly Review, 1858, p. 269. 
 
 History of the Sepoy War, vol. i, p. 93, (note). 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 191 
 
 annexation of Sattara to be a settled case, approved and 
 confirmed by the Court of Directors, he touches it some- 
 what cautiously, but in paragraph 1 of his Minute he im- 
 plicitly attacks the pretended prerogative by which that 
 measure was justified. 
 
 " I will admit that the general law and custom of India do, 
 usually, require the recognition of the Paramount Power to the 
 adoption of an heir to a dependent or protected Principality ; but 
 so do the law and custom require the same recognition to the suc- 
 cession of a natural heir ; and I am not prepared to admit that the 
 Supreme Power is more competent to withhold its recognition of the 
 one than of the other."* 
 
 The " recognition usually required," in Sir Frederick 
 Currie's opinion, is merely that regulative recognition, "for 
 the purpose of averting dissensions and bloodshed, "^ which 
 Sir George Clerk admitted in the Sattara question, and 
 which both of these eminent men declare cannot be with- 
 held. Both of them also pronounce "an adopted heir to 
 stand in exactly the same relation as a natural heir."J 
 
 No one can doubt that Sir Frederick Currie, having said 
 so much in his recorded Minute, must have spoken much 
 more clearly and fully to Lord Dalhousie in verbal con- 
 sultation. He must have shown the Governor-General the 
 nonentity of the imaginary "law and custom of India," 
 with its pretended list of precedents, upon which the 
 extinction of the Sattara State was founded. He can- 
 not have attacked the supposed law and precedents 
 in any other way than that in which I have attacked 
 them, by denying their existence. Their existence is a 
 matter of fact, not of opinion. Challenged to produce 
 those precedents, Lord Dalhousie must have fallen back 
 upon Mr. Willoughby's Minute, the "text-book on adop- 
 tions," and it must have been brought home to him that 
 its confident assertions, upon which he had relied, in 
 good faith, but with culpable carelessness, were utterly 
 unfounded. 
 
 And we find that the Governor-General does not base 
 his proposal to annex Kerowlee on "the ordinary and in- 
 variable practice" of the " Sovereign State," as he had done 
 
 * Kerowlee Papers, 1855, p. 11. f Ante, p. 18. 
 
 t Sattara Papers, 1849, pp. 63, 64. Ante, pp. 9 to 20. 
 
192 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 in the Sattara case.* He no longer ventures, in the face 
 of Sir Frederick Carrie, to cite "the immemorial law and 
 custom of India." Even in a second Minute, written in 
 reply to that of his colleague, he says : 
 
 "After considering the arguments of Sir Frederick Carrie, I 
 still think that the right is clear of withholding confirmation, 
 founded upon the decision of the Honourable Court in 1849."f 
 
 The conclusion seems hardly avoidable that after the 
 31st of August, 1852, the date of Sir Frederick Currie's 
 Minute, Lord Dalhousie must have been well aware that 
 "the doctrine of lapse" did not rest on any ordinary prac- 
 tice or immemorial law, but solely on that verdict of the 
 Honourable Court in the Sattara case, which had been 
 drawn forth by his own hasty misdirection. The Kerowlee 
 case fixes the time, after which, if Lord Dalhousie enforced 
 against any Hindoo State the sham prerogative of rejecting 
 an adopted heir, he sinned against knowledge. And he 
 did so. Sir Frederick Currie's opposition terminated by 
 his return to England, and the doctrine of "lapse" was 
 applied to the friendly and faithful States of Jhansi and 
 Nagpore in 1854. 
 
 "But," observes Mr. Kaye, referring to the narrow escape 
 of Kerowlee, "it is not to be supposed that because no 
 wrong was done at last, no injury was done by the delay. 
 Public rumour recognises no Secret Department. It was 
 well-known at every native Court, in every native bazar, 
 that the British Government were discussing the policy 
 of annexing or not annexing Kerowlee." 
 
 " The Eajpoot Princes lost their confidence in the good faith of 
 the British Government. Kerowlee had been spared, they 
 scarcely knew how ; some were fain to attribute it to the well- 
 known justice and liberality of Henry Lawrence. But the same 
 moderation might not be displayed again ; there were childless 
 men among them ; and from that time a restless uneasy feeling 
 took possession of them, and no man felt sure that his House 
 would not perish with him. It was not strange indeed that a 
 year or two afterwards there should have been in circulation all 
 over the country ominous reports to the effect that the policy of 
 Lord Dalhousie had eventually triumphed, and that the gradual 
 absorption of all the Rajpoot States had been sanctioned by the 
 Home Government."! 
 
 * Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 82. f Kerowlee Papers, 1855, p. 13. 
 t The Sepoy War, vol. i, pp. 96, 97. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHOHS AND APOLOGISTS. 193 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson will not believe that there was 
 any "dependent" Prince, except the Rajah of Mysore, 
 left in India, to be alarmed at "the doctrine of lapse," or 
 that any "independent" Prince could have been so "un- 
 reasonable" as to be alarmed, either at the doctrine or the 
 practice, and he casts doubt upon Mr. Kaye's report of the 
 general alarm throughout Rajpootana. He requires "a 
 little more particularity as to the date and venue of the 
 rumour;" thinks it "very improbable that a native rumour 
 would be couched in the exact language used by Mr. 
 Kaye," and pronounces that "it was, like most Indian 
 rumours, totally destitute of truth."* I am not so sure of 
 that. Of the prevalence of such a report in the last year 
 or two of Lord Dalhousie's administration, couched in the 
 exa.ct language used by Mr. Kaye, there can really be no 
 question, f It may not have been based on any official 
 communications, or upon any plan reduced to writing, and 
 yet it may, and I suspect it did, represent very accu- 
 rately the "large views," J at which the Government of 
 India, and probably the Ministry at home, and perhaps a 
 majority of the Court of Directors, had arrived, by the 
 time the Dalhousie "series" was completed in the annexa- 
 tion of Oude. 
 
 When the case of Kerowlee came before Lord Dalhousie 
 and his Council, the series had only just commenced. The 
 Punjaub being called a conquest, they had only acquired 
 Sattara by "the doctrine- of lapse." In his Minute, dated 
 the 30th of August, 1852, the Governor-General himself 
 suggests that "the refusal of sanction to adoption in the 
 case of Kerowlee might create alarm and dissatisfaction in 
 the elder and more powerful States of Hajpootana, as being 
 apparently significant of the intentions of the British Go- 
 vernment towards themselves. Such an alarm," he con- 
 tinues, "would be unfounded. For I presume that the 
 Government of India would not at any time be disposed 
 to interfere with the customary mode of succession among 
 
 * A Vindication, p. 50. 
 
 f I presume Sir Charles Jackson does not mean to remind us that rumours 
 do not circulate among natives in the English language. 
 
 J " He had large views." India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 67. "Lord 
 Dalhousie was a great administrator and statesman, with large views." A 
 Vindication, p. 3. 
 
 
 
194 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 these old Rajpoot States, whose antiquity, whose position 
 and feelings, would all make it our policy to leave them 
 in the possession of such independence as they now 
 enjoy."* 
 
 Still, though he admits that Kerowlee is "a Rajpoot 
 Principality, and, unlike the existing Mahratta and Ma- 
 homedan dynasties, has the claims of antiquity in its 
 favour, "f he cannot allow these scruples and misgivings to 
 turn him from his general policy. "The arguments appear 
 to me to preponderate in favour of causing Kerowlee to 
 lapse. "J He argued that "the supremacy of the British 
 Government" over this little Principality, was "practically 
 declared," in the Treaty of 1817, "by the remission of tri- 
 bute payable to the Peishwa," and was, moreover, "speci- 
 fically acknowledged by Kerowlee in the 3rd Article of 
 the Treaty." And, he said : 
 
 "In the Minute upon the case of Sattara in 1848, I recorded 
 my own opinion that the British Government should not neglect 
 such rightful opportunities as might occur, of extending its rule 
 over Native States which fell to its disposal, either by total lapse, 
 or by the succession depending on the recognition of an adoption. 
 1 did not advise that adoption should universally be refused the 
 sanction of the Government, but I was of opinion that it should 
 not be admitted in States which recognised formally the supremacy 
 of the British Government in India, unless strong political reasons 
 recommend the exception in any particular case or cases." 
 
 If the supremacy of the British Government over Ke- 
 rowlee was practically declared by the remission of tribute, 
 the declaration must have been still more practical where 
 tribute was actually paid. ALL the States of Rajpootana, 
 including "the elder and more powerful States" of Oodey- 
 poor, Jyepoor, and Jodhpoor, either pay tribute, or have 
 tribute remitted, under their Treaties with the British 
 Government. By these Treaties they all " acknowledge 
 the supremacy" of the British Government, and promise 
 to act in "subordinate cooperation. "|| The elder and more 
 powerful States enjoy no more independence than Kerow- 
 
 * Kerowlee Papers, 1855, p. 9. f Ibid., p. 9. $ Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 8. 
 
 || Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 1864, (London, Longman and Co.) vol iv, 
 pp. 1 to 100. The accidental and merely nominal independence of the Ran a 
 of Dholpoor is scarcely worth mentioning as an exception, see pp. 121, 1 22, 
 of the sains volume of Treaties. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 195 
 
 lee ; the terms by which they are bound are quite as 
 stringent as those which bind the smaller Principalities. 
 
 The demise of the Kerowlee Sovereignty, from which the 
 doubtful succession arose, took place in July, 1852. The 
 final decision of the Court of Directors is dated the 5th of 
 July, 1854.* The Blue Book did not appear till 1855. 
 However alarming may have been the rumours during the 
 two years of suspense, they were amply justified by the 
 positive disclosures of the Parliamentary Papers. Here 
 was perilous stuff enough to poison the drop of consolatioli 
 to be derived from the reprieve of Kerowlee. For it was 
 evidently a mere reprieve. The Rajpoot States, great and 
 small, having " recognised formally British supremacy," 
 were all pronounced liable to extinction, on the first failure 
 of a lineal male heir. It was declared advisable to neglect 
 no opportunity of annexing native States, "unless strong 
 political reasons recommend the exception in any particular 
 case or cases." Thus all were denied any right of perma- 
 nent existence ; all were left dependent on the tender 
 mercies of the British Government, and the political no- 
 tions which might prevail when "a rightful opportunity" 
 occurred. For the time being they were protected only 
 by certain vague scruples, founded on their "antiquity, 
 position, and feelings," which, mentioned by Lord Dal- 
 housie with the greatest indifference, had been overcome 
 by him on the first temptation. 
 
 Kerowlee, however, Lord Dalhousie admitted, was "iso- 
 lated," and "would not consolidate our territories like Sat- 
 tara."t The same might be said of the other States of 
 Rajpootana, though, by the bye, we have a large Province, 
 Ajmeer, in the very centre of them. But how long would 
 this isolation continue, if the process of absorption were 
 carried on among those "Mahratta and Mahomedan dynas- 
 ties," which, according to Lord Dalhousie, had not even 
 "the claims of antiquity in their favour" ? If at any future 
 "rightful opportunity," the dominions of Scindia, of Hol- 
 kar, of the Powars of Dhar and Dewass, or of the Nawab 
 of Tonk, scattered in detached portions, up and down 
 Rajpootana, were to be "made to lapse," the more ancient 
 
 * Kerowlee Papers, 1855, p. 5. f Ibid., p. 9. 
 
196 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 States would immediately be wanted, in order "to con- 
 solidate our territories." 
 
 In addition to these very obvious considerations, the 
 Rajpoot Princes and their advisers could not fail to observe 
 that between 1852, when Lord Dalhousie's Minute was 
 written, and 1855, when the Papers were published, a 
 great advance had been made in the process of consolida- 
 tion. Jhansi, one of the few Principalities ruled by a 
 Brahmin family, had been "caused to lapse," in spite of 
 the regular adoption of a kinsman by the Rajah, and 
 without consulting the Home Government. The great and 
 important State of Nagpore was annexed, not only without 
 any reference to the widows and other relatives of the 
 Rajah, but, as in the case of Jhansi, without any reference 
 to the Court of Directors, as if their concurrence was con- 
 sidered as a matter of certainty.* The annexation of the 
 Kingdom of Oude, and dethronement of the reigning King, 
 without war, without a quarrel, without a complaint, 
 without any pretext that was intelligible or credible to 
 the Hindoo mind, gave the finishing stroke to the new 
 aspect of affairs. No Rajpoot Prince could now believe 
 that there would ever be two years of suspense again, if 
 any one of the brotherhood should die without male issue. 
 
 During the last two years of Lord Dalhousie's adminis- 
 tration, and especially about the time of his departure 
 from India, that portion of the Calcutta Press which re- 
 presented the opinions of the Bengal Civil Service, re- 
 sounded with exultations at the success of the acquisitive 
 system, and assurances or predictions of its speedy and 
 symmetrical completion. 
 
 On the 12th of January, 1854, when the fate of Nag- 
 pore was supposed to be under consideration, the Friend 
 of India declared that "the decision of the Governor- 
 General" would "decide whether the country which has 
 been committed to our charge is ultimately to be fused 
 into one great and progressive Empire, or to continue split 
 into Principalities, in which two hundred and eighty 
 Rajahlings exhaust the energies left them by debauchery 
 in every species of oppression." The waiter pronounces 
 
 * Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 37 ; Jhansi Papers, 1855, p. 5. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 197 
 
 every Native State to be merely "an exceptional juris- 
 diction," as were the Palatinates of Lancaster and Chester. 
 These Indian Palatinates have the additional disadvantage 
 of being invariably ruled by a debauched despot, and must 
 be got rid of as rapidly as possible. He refers to what he 
 considers to have been the doubtful and timid action of 
 our Government before 1848, but "at last," he says, "a 
 policy was found," and is recorded in Lord Dalhousie's 
 Minute on the Sattara succession. Under the doctrines 
 there laid down, " the whole of India must pass gradually 
 under our rule": "we shall gain Province after Province." 
 Alluding to the possibility of some opposition, he concludes 
 thus : "We cannot believe that Lord Dalhousie will yield 
 one inch to the clamour of an ignorant section of the last 
 of English political parties, or hesitate to maintain a policy 
 which is at once great, righteous, and his own." 
 
 When the fate of Nagpore was no longer in suspense, 
 the Friend of India, on the 16th of March, 1854, rejoices 
 over the decision, because it settles "three great principles, 
 unity of dominion, equality of taxation, and centralisa- 
 tion of the executive." He explains what he means by 
 unity of dominion. ' ' The two hundred and fifty Kinglings, 
 whose names and territories have been recorded by the 
 Court of Directors, must inevitably disappear, and that 
 speedily." 
 
 The same writer, on the 18th of May, 1854, remarks 
 on the annexation of Jhansi, that "to change India from 
 a congeries of States into an Empire one and indivisible, 
 it is only necessary to maintain the policy which Lord 
 Dalhousie has laid down. It must, however," he continues, 
 "to be just, be invariably adhered to. The system must 
 be rigidly enforced, till the Indian Palatinates become 
 what the English Palatinates now are, evils whose extent 
 is known only to the antiquary." 
 
 But this able editor rises to the highest degree of satis- 
 faction on the 13th of December, 1855, when he quotes a 
 recently published article from the Edinburgh Review, re- 
 commending the annexation of Oude, then on the eve of 
 its accomplishment. With such powerful support the good 
 work cannot stop there. " Oppression," he says, "will not 
 be extinct with the monarchy of Oude." And he points 
 
198 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 out, as the Princes whose misrule most urgently demands 
 the abolition of their Principalities, the Rajah of Travan- 
 core, the Nizam of the Deccan, and the Guicowar of 
 Baroda. The accession of "the great Whig Review" to 
 the cause of Imperial consolidation, appears to the Editor, 
 and justly so, most significant and important. The Whigs 
 were then in power, and the Edinburgh Review had long 
 been regarded as their organ. And if that fact, as 
 is very probable, had never been understood or heard of 
 before in Rajpootana, and at the Durbars of other native 
 States, this hint in the Friend of India, everywhere anx- 
 iously consulted, is sure to have enlightened them, and 
 never to have been lost sight of. The idea was by no 
 means a novel one to Indian politicians, for the Friend of 
 India itself was generally reputed, and flourished to some 
 extent on that reputation, to be the organ of the Calcutta 
 Foreign Office. 
 
 A time was to come, when the hint of the Friend of 
 India was to be verified, and the alarm of the native 
 Princes renewed and redoubled, after a brief period of 
 security, by an Edinburgh Reviewer, the apologist and 
 advocate of annexation, stepping forward and announcing 
 himself to the world as a Whig Cabinet Minister, his Grace 
 the Lord Privy Seal. 
 
 On the 3rd of January, 1856, referring to a Native 
 State, which was then not badly managed, and is now one 
 of the best governed Provinces in India, our own not ex- 
 cepted, the Friend of India said : "Annexation is the 
 only remedy for the great disorders of Travancore." 
 
 On the 24th of July, 1856, the same journal predicts, 
 that "the knell of the Princes of India" has sounded ; and 
 that "men now living may see the Empire one and indi- 
 visible." 
 
 Perhaps Sir Charles Jackson may now be disposed to 
 confess that the Princes of Rajpootana, and other Princes 
 of India whom he calls "independent," may have had some 
 slight grounds for fear, without deserving to be reviled as 
 ' ' unreasonable. " 
 
 The Duke of Argyll will, perhaps, now admit, that there 
 really was "something which was called 'Lord Dalhousie's 
 policy, '"by others besides those "fifth-rate writers," whose 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 199 
 
 injustice and ignorance of Blue Books he denounces. The 
 previous extracts from the Friend of India prove that 
 during Lord Dalhousie's administration, his admirers and 
 supporters understood that there was a settled policy of 
 annexation, and that this policy was emphatically Lord 
 Dalhousie's "his own." 
 
 Mr. J. C. Marshman, whose connection with the Friend 
 of India still continues, and who was proprietor and 
 Editor of that journal until 1854, coolly writes in 1867 of 
 "the annexation policy, as it has been someivhat insidiously 
 termed"* as if it were a novel term of reproach, which he 
 could not recognise at all. 
 
 The following passage, published in the Friend of India 
 about three months after Lord Canning assumed the Go- 
 vernment, may serve as another specimen of the triumphant 
 tone that then prevailed, and may also remind the Duke 
 of Argyll, Sir Charles Jackson, and Mr. Marshman, that 
 the phrase, "policy of annexation/' to which they now seem 
 to object, was invented by its advocates and not by its 
 adversaries. 
 
 " The policy of annexation may be considered secure. One 
 by one its opponents are convinced,, or otherwise confess by their 
 silence,, that they are logically defunct. The dreamers who feared 
 that the Empire would be weakened by extension, and the Orien- 
 talists who believed native governments better than civilised rule, 
 are already, for practical politics, extinct."f 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, at the time Lord Dalhousie left 
 Calcutta, was the Governor-General's Agent in Rajpootana, 
 where those doubts and fears existed, stigmatised by Sir 
 Charles Jackson as utterly "unreasonable." Let us hear 
 what he thought on the subject : 
 
 " The Serampore weekly paper, the Friend of India, which was 
 Lord Dalhousie's organ, and is conducted with great ability, is a 
 perfect Filibuster. Almost every number contains a clever article 
 on the duty of absorbing Native States, resuming jaghires, etc/^J 
 
 Nor is the effect of these citations to be neutralised by 
 the averment, that, whatever may have been the alarms 
 excited by rumours of a connection between the Govern- 
 
 * History of India, vol. iii, p. 399. 
 t Friend of India, June 6th, 1856. 
 J Kaye's Lives of Indian Officers, vol. ii, p. ;>!!. 
 
200 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ment of India and a certain weekly paper, we have no right 
 to make Lord Dalhousie answerable for its leading articles, 
 or to assume that he approved of them. Lord Dalhousie 
 himself took the very unusual step, unprecedented, I 
 believe, except by Sir Robert Peel's letter to the Editor of 
 the Times in 1835,*- of informing the Editor of the 
 Friend of India, that, to say the least, he had found 
 nothing to disapprove in the doctrines taught by that 
 journal in the last two years of his Government. The 
 gentleman who, as he tells us, had conducted that paper, 
 "single-handed," during the whole of that period, published 
 in its columns on the 31st of December, 1857, the following 
 interesting letter addressed to himself : 
 
 Government House, March 3rd, 1856. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 Before I quit this land I am desirous of offering you 
 my thanks for the fairness with which you have always set your 
 judgment of my public acts before the community, whose opinions 
 are largely subject to your influence, for the frequent support you 
 have given to my measures, and for the great and invariable per- 
 sonal courtesy you have shown to myself. 
 
 I regret exceedingly that while at Barrackpore I was so close a 
 prisoner as to be unable to receive the guests whom I should have 
 desired to see. On the one occasion on which I made the attempt 
 I broke down, and was obliged to forego all further attempts of 
 the same kind. 
 
 I should be glad if I thought there was any chance of my 
 seeing you in Calcutta before .the evening of the 6th, when I 
 embark for England. 
 
 If not, I pray you to accept my parting thanks, and to believe 
 that, if they have seemed tardy, they, nevertheless, are cordial 
 and sincere. I beg to remain, my dear Sir, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 Meredith Townsend, Esq. DALHOUSIE. 
 
 The letter does honour both to the writer and to the 
 recipient, to Lord Dalhousie, because he deferred this 
 graceful acknowledgment of his obligations to the Friend 
 of India, until its support had become almost a matter of 
 indifference to him, until the moment when his own power 
 and influence were about to disappear, to the Editor, be- 
 cause the contents of the letter prove the disinterested 
 and public spirited character of his pernicious counsels. 
 
 * Carlytts Collected Works, vol. i, p. 376. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 201 
 
 Lord Dalhousie would certainly have tendered no such 
 expressions of respectful thanks and greeting to a man 
 whose labours on his behalf had already been requited, 
 directly or indirectly, by the bestowal of favours, in any 
 of the numerous forms at the Governor-General's command. 
 The letter proves that not even the charm of "gilded 
 saloons," supposed to have its influence in some regions 
 of the globe, and peculiarly attractive in general at Cal- 
 cutta to one not belonging to the official aristocracy, can 
 have fostered the singular community of thought and 
 feeling between the two men. But the letter, and its 
 publication, prove the existence of that strong sympathy, 
 and its full appreciation on both sides, and explain, in 
 some measure, how that sympathy still shows itself every 
 now and then, by a few words of reminiscent eulogy or 
 regretful comparison, in the writings currently attributed 
 in the present day to the former Editor of the Friend of 
 India. 
 
 So long as the friends and admirers of the late Lord 
 Dalhousie, confine themselves to such general and passing 
 panegyrics, it is not easy, nor would it often be useful or 
 becoming, to challenge their effusions. But when, like the 
 authors of the two apologies which have hitherto formed 
 the chief theme of our remarks, they reiterate and reassert 
 the worst of their client's political heresies, even those 
 recanted by his successor, we can no longer remain silent. 
 Some English politicians perhaps the majority, not 
 deeply versed or interested in the details of Indian affairs, 
 have arrived at a general conviction that the deliberate 
 policy of annexation was a mistake, or was, at any rate, 
 carried on too far and too hastily ; but they have no clear 
 notion of the legal merits of any particular case, and be- 
 lieve the more important territorial extensions to have 
 been all but unavoidable. It is in order to assist this 
 large class to form a more decided judgment, that I have 
 given so much space to the annexations of Oude and the 
 Punjaub. With the same object in view, I must now 
 make a few remarks on a more insidious, because less in- 
 discriminate style of apologetics, much in use with those 
 who have changed their opinions, but cannot submit to 
 acknowledge that they ever were wrong, or that their 
 
202 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 former opponents ever were right. They have, indeed, 
 changed their opinions, but not, they flatter themselves, 
 for the reasons so persistently urged upon them by their 
 adversaries. Their former policy may have been partially 
 erroneous, but it was a noble and a generous policy, and 
 only failed from circumstances which nobody could have 
 foreseen. 
 
 Thus a very acute and vigorous writer in the Spectator 
 of October 6th, 1866, advises Lord Cranborne, then the 
 Secretary of State for India, to arrest the annexation 
 of Mysore, " though for reasons other than those upon 
 which so much stress has been laid." He makes light of 
 " Treaties, promises and Hindoo rules of succession," but 
 doubts the prudence of closing every field to native ambi- 
 tion, and of" sowing distrust over an entire Continent/' by 
 " changing our policy every six years." He admits that 
 the policy of annexation failed, but then Lord Dalhousie's 
 projects were magnificent, and he was " the most states- 
 manlike Governor-General, except Lord William Bentinck, 
 who ever reigned in India." 
 
 cc He intended to make of the Continent one vast military 
 monarchy, the right arm of England in Asia, ruling a rich and 
 orderly people, who, slowly disciplined by British sway, slowly 
 permeated by British education, and slowly, if possible, brought 
 to perceive the superior claims of Christianity, might in the end 
 be ready for self-government as a thoroughly civilised and pro- 
 gressive Asiatic people. If that was a small policy, where is 
 there a great one to be found ? It failed, first, because Lord Dal- 
 housie retired ; secondly, because it lacked one essential datum 
 the acquiescence of Northern India ; and thirdly, because it had 
 one radical, and, we fear incurable defect. It barred up native 
 careers." 
 
 It may be admitted that this sounds like a great policy, 
 but as the writer confesses that it was impracticable, un- 
 acceptable to the people, and crushing to all honourable 
 aspirations, I cannot understand why it is to be called 
 statesmanlike. To suggest that it failed, " because Lord 
 Dalhousie' retired," is a mere bravado of posthumous adu- 
 lation. The policy of annexation broke down conspicu- 
 ously amidst the awful lessons of 1857, most conspicu- 
 ously when the bulk of the population of Oude joined 
 heart and soul in the rebellion. Lord Dalhousie could 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 1*0 3 
 
 have done nothing to check or quell the rebellion, that 
 Lord Canning omitted. But let the writer in the Spec- 
 tator himself tell us what he conceives to have been the 
 great lessons of 1857. 
 
 " The mutiny did teach us that the natives prefer their own 
 system of government, with its open careers and occasional in- 
 justices, light taxation, and frequent robberies, to our more orderly, 
 more rigid, but leaden rule ; that it was dangerous to produce so 
 awful a scene as a Continent occupied only by officials and 
 peasants ; that the Native Principalities acted as breakwaters when 
 a surge of native feeling we will say, at the risk of being mis- 
 understood, of national feeling threatened to overwhelm the 
 foreigners. Madras was saved by the Nizam. Bombay was 
 saved because Grwalior broke the rush of the wave which had the 
 able coward, Tantia Topee, on its crest. The Punjaub was saved 
 because the old Sikh Princes of the Protected States stood 
 honestly by our side." 
 
 How could a more severe condemnation be passed upon 
 the policy of "getting rid of petty intervening Princi- 
 palities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but 
 which can never/' Lord Dalhousie ventured to think, " be 
 a source of strength' 7 ?* Yet the Editor of the Spectator 
 wants us to confess that this was not " a small policy," 
 but " great" and " statesmanlike." I cannot agree with 
 him ; and he evidently cannot agree with himself. 
 
 As to the alleged intention of " slowly disciplining" the 
 people of India " for self-government," the Editor of 
 the Spectator may have exclusive sources of information 
 regarding Lord Dalhousie's esoteric doctrines and ulterior 
 designs, but assuredly nothing of the sort can be gath- 
 ered from his published Minutes. There is a great deal 
 said about " adding to the resources of the public trea- 
 sury," about swelling the revenues of the annexed coun- 
 tries by confiscating the estates of all malcontents, but 
 nothing about visions of " self-government," even in the 
 most distant future. When Sattara was to be annexed, 
 he said : " The district is fertile, and the revenues pro- 
 ductive. The population, accustomed for some time to 
 regular and peaceful government," the Rajah's, be it re- 
 membered, " are tranquil themselves, and are prepared 
 for the regular government" (which by his own account 
 
 * Ante, p. 184. 
 
204 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 they had got already), " our possession of the territory 
 would give."* On two occasions, when Nagpore was to be 
 annexed, and when the Nizam's richest provinces were to 
 be sequestrated, the Governor-General boasted, as Sir 
 Charles Jackson reminds us,f of having acquired the best 
 cotton-growing districts in India ; and thus, said Mr. J. B. 
 Norton, " cotton stuffed the ears of Justice, and made her 
 deaf as well as blind. "J But there was not a word of 
 " self-government," or " progressive civilisation," or " the 
 superior claims of Christianity." Those fine words would 
 not have made the policy more just or more statesmanlike, 
 but still they were not there. 
 
 This clever writer, unable to reduce his old and his new 
 opinions to harmony, at once repentant and reprobate, 
 tries to give up the practice and maintain the principle, 
 to exalt the theory and cry down the conclusion, to 
 abandon the policy of annexation as inexpedient for the 
 time, but to leave the question open for the future. He 
 seems to make a great point of having no decided policy 
 for the treatment of Native States in India at present ; he 
 considers that since the failure of the great and states- 
 manlike policy of annexation, we have drifted into a period 
 of transition and experiment, and he only dreads lest 
 the experiments should be varied too often. He objects 
 to the rejection of the Mysore Rajah's adopted son, be- 
 cause the Princes and people of India understood from the 
 terms of the Royal Proclamation of 1858, that adopted 
 heirs would always be recognised. And, he asks : " Is it 
 wise or right, for the sake of one Province, to abandon so 
 suddenly in so apparently crafty a style, a policy meant 
 for an Empire ?" Still he anticipates the possibility that 
 it may be abandoned. 
 
 ' ' It may be necessary one day to unsettle it, the new policy 
 may fail, as the old one failed, a third policy of appointing picked 
 native rulers for life may prove wiser than either, but till we re- 
 solve, and announce that we resolve, that the mixed system shall 
 end, let us at least adhere to it." 
 
 He cannot make up his mind to acknowledge, that the 
 policy of annexation is either unjust, or absolutely inex- 
 
 * JSattara Papers, 1849, p. 83. f A Vindication, p. 40. 
 
 J The Rebellion in India, p. 98. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 205 
 
 pedient. In discussing whether Mysore shall or shall not be 
 annexed, he says, that " the single point at issue is whether 
 the existence of subordinate hereditary jurisdictions is bene- 
 ficial to all India or not. That is a very difficult and, with all 
 deference to the very able Indians who signed the petition 
 presented by Mr. Mill,* by no means a settled point." 
 He still doubts whether autonomy should be allowed to 
 any Native State, except on condition of its paying what 
 he calls " a fair tribute." " In the case of a State not paying 
 a fair tribute, autonomy is injustice, for the people of 
 Bengal are taxed to exempt the people, say of Guzerat." 
 With blind persistence in the errors of Lord Dalhousie 
 and Mr. George Campbell, he still hankers after the re- 
 venue belonging to Native States, and thinks that with it 
 the British treasury might be replenished. He is strangely 
 ignorant, or unmindful, of the actual results of that ac- 
 quisitive policy, which in one breath he admits to have 
 failed, and in another declares to have been great and 
 statesmanlike. Instead of the resources of the public 
 treasury being augmented, as Lord Dalhousie promised, 
 a monstrous tribute is annually extracted from our older 
 possessions, and poured into the recently-annexed Pro- 
 vinces. The people of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, are 
 taxed to supply the financial drain of the Punjaub, Oude 
 and Nagpore, and not to meet any expenditure created 
 by Native States. " The Bengalees, being our subjects," 
 says the Editor of the Spectator, " are taxed for the ge- 
 neral defence of the Empire, while the Guzerattees are 
 not."f That is an extraordinary assertion for one who be- 
 lieves that in our most desperate hour of need "the Nizam 
 saved Madras," the Maharajah Scindia saved Bombay ; 
 that the Punjaub was saved by the old Sikh Princes ; that 
 " a signal from the Rajah of Mysore would have brought 
 the descendants of Tippoo's soldiers down upon Madras, 
 and he did not give it ; and that the despised Nawab of 
 Moorshedabad could have imperilled our possession of Cal- 
 
 * Petition to the House of Commons, presented by J. S. Mill, Esq., M.P. 
 for Westminster, on August 10th, 1866. 
 
 t As a matter of fact, the Guzerattees pay a good deal of direct tribute to 
 the British Government, but that is an immaterial inaccuracy, for many Native 
 States do not, and he might, with a little more care, have chosen one of them 
 for his illustration. 
 
206 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 cutta." Were not the " subordinate hereditary jurisdic- 
 tions beneficial to all India" then ? Did they not then 
 contribute to the "general defence of the Empire"? Are 
 they not contributing now, so long as they keep them- 
 selves prepared to render similar services, if ever rebellion, 
 internal war or foreign invasion, should again, in the 
 Editor's words, "threaten to overwhelm the foreigners 
 with a surge of national feeling " ? 
 
 3 O 
 
 The Editor of the Spectator, clearly identified with 
 the former" single-handed" Editor of the Friend of India, 
 affords a good example of the truth of the following 
 words written on the 20th of December, 1857, by the 
 venerable Mountstuart Elphinstone to Sir Edward Cole- 
 brook : " I think the ardour for the consolidation of ter- 
 ritory, concentration of authority, arid uniformity of ad- 
 ministration, which was lately so powerful, must have 
 been a good deal damped by recent events. Where should 
 we have been now, if Scindia, the Nizam and the Sikh 
 Chiefs, had been annexed ?" * 
 
 His ardour has been damped. The loudest spokesman 
 during the annexing mania gives up the policy as a failure, 
 but he cannot bear to admit that it deserved to be a 
 failure, that it was not only a violent injustice, but that 
 it was mean, petty and short-sighted. 
 
 The most seriously objectionable feature in this, as in 
 other essays by the same hand, is not so much the effort 
 to make the policy of annexation appear great and states- 
 manlike, as the persistent assumption that it was just. 
 The Queen, according to him, is "the only true Sovereign" 
 in India. The Native States are merely "subordinate here- 
 ditary jurisdictions." 
 
 " If, therefore, the general welfare of India required that 
 Mysore should be directly administered by her" the Queen's, 
 " agents, no right whatever could be pleaded in bar of that 
 supreme necessity, any more than the right of the Highland Chiefs 
 to hereditary jurisdiction could be pleaded against an Act taking 
 it away from them." 
 
 What would be "pleaded in bar" of the arbitrary an- 
 nexation of Mysore, or any other Native State, in time of 
 peace, would be "a Treaty of perpetual friendship and al- 
 
 * Asiatic Joiimcd, vol. xviii, p. 334. 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 20 7 
 
 liance;" and that is considerably "more" than can ever 
 have been pleaded in favour of any Highland Chieftain's 
 heritable jurisdiction. The proposed analogy is absurd. 
 He goes on : 
 
 " The natives have never denied this, never questioned the 
 right of the Mogul to remove any Mohammedan Ruler or invade 
 a Hindoo State, if considerations of general policy required it, 
 lay down in fact as a general principle that a Sovereign must be 
 expected to increase his direct dominion by all fair means, one of 
 which, they add, is force." 
 
 If by this he means to say, that the natives of India 
 have never questioned the right of a Sovereign to carry on 
 a war of conquest, it is true. But if he means to say, that 
 the Mogul ever possessed the unquestioned right of re- 
 moving any Ruler in India, Mohammedan or Hindoo, ex- 
 cept his own appointed Deputies, or ever pretended to the 
 right of restricting the law of inheritance in Hindoo Prin- 
 cipalities, it is utterly untrue, and without the smallest 
 foundation. He brings forward "the doctrine of lapse" 
 once more, as if it were intact. 
 
 " The annexation of Mysore may be, in our judgment is, per- 
 fectly legal, but it appears to every Native Prince, and therefore 
 to every native, an unfair, underhanded attempt to cancel the 
 Golden Bull. Whether the Rajah of Mysore had a right to adopt 
 or not, without the consent of the Paramount Power, does not 
 signify a straw ; we do not believe that he had, but we readily 
 acknowledge that to prove he had not, Lord Crauborne must 
 quote Mussulman precedents directed against Hindoo Houses." 
 
 That which he "readily acknowledges" is totally incor- 
 rect. There are no " Mussulman precedents" for the pre- 
 tended prerogative of rejecting adopted heirs. There was 
 no precedent at all, until, as Sir George Clerk said, Lord 
 Dalhousie's Government "led off with that flagrant in- 
 stance of the bare-faced appropriation of Sattara."* 
 
 The other analogy which this writer attempts to draw, 
 between the absorption of Mysore, or any other Native 
 State, in British India, and the extinction of Hanover, as 
 a separate State, by Prussia, though not so ridiculously 
 disproportionate in scale as that of the Highland Chief- 
 tainships, is totally inadmissible. He says : 
 
 * Ante, pp. 9 to 20 
 
208 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 " The analogy is not perfect, for in India the Queen possesses 
 a special and admitted right in every Native State which the King 
 of Prussia did not possess in Germany, namely, a right to control 
 all foreign affairs, and to appoint an Envoy whose ' advice must 
 be followed on every occasion/ great and small. She is, in fact, 
 the only true Sovereign." 
 
 In many Native States the British Resident has no* right 
 to interfere in internal affairs. This inaccuracy, however, 
 may be passed over, for substantially the irresistible in- 
 fluence of our Government is not much overstated. But 
 a very little reflection will convince any one, that the 
 more stringent is the controlling power over the minor 
 States, the less excuse, morally, the less reason, practically, 
 must there be for destroying their separate existence. 
 The treaties which secure certain cessions of territory, tri- 
 bute and supremacy, to the British Government, secure 
 also certain equivalent services and reserved rights to the 
 protected Sovereignties, among which, surely, permanent 
 existence must be presumed, were it not expressed clearly 
 enough in the terms "perpetual friendship and alliance." 
 And if they can be controlled, they can be reformed. 
 
 If a treaty between Prussia and Hanover had secured 
 to the great German Power the right to control all foreign 
 affairs, as in the new treaties of the Northern Confedera- 
 tion, and if Hanover had scrupulously remained within 
 the scope of this engagement, as the Native States of India 
 have always done, the King of Prussia would have had no 
 right, according to any doctrine or process hitherto devised 
 at Berlin, to abolish the separate Sovereignty, We need 
 not enter upon the merits of the quarrel ; suffice it to say, 
 that Hanover was undoubtedly conquered in a war with 
 Prussia. Without fighting for it, the King of Prussia 
 would have had no pretext for annexing Hanover. With- 
 out popular support in Germany, he would have had no 
 power to do so. 
 
 The last words at once suggest the utter inappropriate- 
 ness of the comparison. We did not fight for Oude, Nag- 
 pore, Jhansi, or Sattara. We did not obtain those terri- 
 tories by conquest, but by prevarication, backed by force. 
 The abolition of those separate States was called for by no 
 popular want or complaint, was sanctioned by no popular 
 
ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS. 209 
 
 approval. The forty millions of Germans speak one lan- 
 guage. The hundred and eighty millions of India, diverse 
 in race and creed, speak upwards of twenty distinct lan- 
 guages. There was no national movement for unity in 
 India. The impulse of the annexation policy came from 
 the English professional administrators, instigated by the 
 pride of race, and the lust of patronage and promotion. It 
 is true, in a certain sense, that Lord Dalhousie, as Sir 
 Charles Jackson says, did not "invent," or "originate" that 
 policy. He was, unwittingly, the tool of "the Services." 
 The Friend of India was their mouthpiece. 
 
 To that extent, a very good case might be made out 
 in Lord Dalhousie's exculpation, from the purely official 
 point of view, if once the misleading and mischievous 
 attempts to exalt him into a great statesman were 
 dropped. But the apologists are not satisfied to argue 
 that much light has been thrown upon the contro- 
 versy within the last ten years, that above all the 
 rebellion of 1857 was a political revelation, they 
 are not content to plead that Lord Dalhousie seemed 
 to have good grounds for his erroneous doctrines at 
 the time, that he was supported by the general opinion 
 and feeling of his advisers and subordinates. They ac- 
 knowledge no error or excess. They do not palliate, they 
 extol, both the policy and the process, both in the past 
 and for the future. 
 
 If this were nothing more than a question of historical 
 glory, if Lord Dalhousie's political canonisation were 
 merely a matter of sentimental interest, no one would 
 care to play the part of Devil's Advocate. But by this 
 time it has been made sufficiently manifest, that the pre- 
 tensions and principles we denounce, are by no means ex- 
 tinct, and are explicitly reaffirmed by the vindicators of 
 Lord Dalhousie's reputation. The Duke of Argyll in some 
 degree represents a powerful class of politicians, and his 
 name carries great weight. Sir Charles Jackson's pamphlet 
 was well calculated to produce a considerable effect on 
 current English opinion. The Spectator has deservedly 
 won an influential position among the more cultivated 
 Liberals. The study of Indian affairs is very unattractive, 
 and a feeling of national self-reproach is very unpleasant ; 
 
210 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 so that to be told, firstly, in a Review of recognised 
 authority, like the Edinburgh; secondly, by his Grace the 
 Lord Privy Seal in person; thirdly, by a retired Indian 
 judge so much respected as Sir Charles Jackson, and, oc- 
 casionally, by a journal of high character, like the Spec- 
 tator, that we have never been to blame at all ; that if our 
 policy has failed, it was yet a great and statesmanlike 
 policy, and deserved to succeed, is eminently soothing and 
 satisfactory to most people. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE TEST OF PREVISION. 
 
 THE Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson in their 
 pamphlets, and Mr. J. C. Marshman in his History, all 
 protest against any charge of want of foresight being 
 brought against Lord Dalhousie, for not having provided 
 against such a convulsion as the Mutinies of 1857, and 
 for having allowed the more important posts in Northern 
 India to be denuded of European troops. All three go 
 very far in their protestations. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll declares that the native Army 
 "had never been regarded in connection with even the 
 possibility of a contest of race against race," and that "no 
 such thoughts had ever entered into the minds of Indian 
 statesmen or of Indian soldiers."* This, as I shall prove, 
 is a very great mistake. 
 
 Mr. Marshman's views can hardly be reconciled with 
 those last quoted. He says, that "the repeated acts of 
 insubordination by the Sepoys convinced Lord Dalhousie 
 that the native Army was no longer to be depended on/'f 
 It may be so: the former Editor of "Lord Dalhousie's 
 organ," may have better materials for judging than are 
 generally available ; but nothing to that effect is to be 
 seen in any of Lord Dalhousie's published Minutes or 
 despatches. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson says that "fifteen months before the 
 Mutiny began," Lord Dalhousie had protested against the 
 reduction of the European force which took place in his 
 time, and had recommended "a very considerable increase 
 to that force, as well as a large reduction of the native 
 Army."J I have no correction to offer to Sir Charles 
 Jackson's statement, except one of degree. For "a very 
 considerable increase" of the European force, I should sub- 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 51. 
 
 t History of India, vol. iii, p. 448. $ A Vindication, p. 158. 
 
 P 2 
 
212 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 stitute, "a very moderate increase/' For "a very large 
 reduction of the native Army," I should substitute "a very 
 small reduction." 
 
 From the accounts given by the Duke of Argyll and 
 Sir Charles Jackson, we find that Lord Dalhousie, about a 
 month before he left India, proposed to raise the nominal 
 Indian establishment of European Infantry from thirty- 
 three to thirty-five battalions, and to disband about 14,000 
 Sepoys, out of a native army numbering 233,000 men.* 
 
 These seem to have been the most remarkable sugges- 
 tions contained in the "nine Minutes" on military affairs, 
 produced by Lord Dalhousie on the 28th of February, 
 1856, the last day he presided in Council. The contents 
 of these Minutes, as described by Mr. Marshman and Sir 
 Charles Jackson, afford proof positive that Lord Dalhousie 
 was totally blind to the real dangers of the day, the 
 results of his own policy. 
 
 He brought forward certain plans for modifying the 
 organisation of the army; he recommended a trifling 
 addition to the European force, to bring it up to its former 
 standard, but merely on grounds of general efficiency. He 
 had not the least notion of the increased military strain 
 arising from the newly annexed territories. So little did 
 any such anxiety cross his mind, that in the most im- 
 portant of these nine Minutes, (No. 2) he assigns European 
 troops to specified places, and assigns none to Oude, though 
 European troops were actually there at the time, to support 
 the Resident in carrying out the annexation, then in pro- 
 cess of execution. Sir Charles Jackson thinks this Minute 
 was written some time before its date, and that "if Lord 
 Dalhousie had adverted to the approaching annexation of 
 Oude when he signed the Minute, he would have altered 
 his suggestion" (of adding two European battalions to the 
 Bengal establishment,) "into a positive demand for a still 
 greater increase, "j" This is a perfectly gratuitous supposi- 
 tion, and I see no reason whatever for acceding to it. 
 The fact of no permanent force of European troops being 
 allotted to Oude long after the annexation had been 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, pp. 51 to 63 ; A Vindication, pp. 
 158 to 167 ; Marshmaris History, vol. iii, pp. 448*, 450. 
 t A Vindication, pp. 164, 165. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 213 
 
 arranged and was in progress, proves that Lord Dalhousie 
 considered that territorial acquisition to have imposed no 
 additional military burden upon the Empire. We have 
 every reason, in fact, to assume that he thought the annex- 
 ation of Oude, as he had said of the annexation of Nagpore 
 and Sattara, would "consolidate our military strength," 
 and "absorb a separate military Power/'* He really be- 
 lieved that he could take into our direct administration 
 these new Provinces, covering two hundred thousand 
 square miles of territory, with twenty-five millions of in- 
 habitants, without the services of one additional soldier 
 being required. He was enabled to keep up the temporary 
 and superficial appearance of not having entailed a heavy 
 burden on the Imperial resources, solely by not calling for 
 a proper augmentation of European troops to occupy the 
 new Provinces, and by the whole charge of the Regular 
 troops in the Punjaub being laid on the revenues of Bengal: 
 Had he demanded a reinforcement of 1 5,000 British soldiers 
 for the Punjaub, Nagpore, and Oude, had the Punjaub 
 accounts not been cooked, the expence would have opened 
 all eyes to the ruinous nature of his policy. 
 
 He did not insist upon any reinforcement as a precaution 
 that was urgently and imperatively required, nor did he 
 allude to the extended area of the Empire as having 
 rendered any augmentation necessary. He really asked 
 for no augmentation at all, over and above the number of 
 European soldiers that were in India before the annex- 
 ations of Nagpore and Oude. He only asked for the 
 return of four Battalions that had been sent to the Crimea 
 and to Persia. The Duke of Argyll tells us that "the 
 urgent necessities of the Russian war had compelled the 
 Government at home to diminish sensibly the number of 
 European Regiments in India,"f so that "the total number 
 of European troops had suffered a gradual diminution from 
 48,709, at which they stood in 1852, to 45,322, at which 
 they stood when Lord Dalhousie closed his government 
 in India. "J Thus the four Battalions required to complete 
 the establishment which Lord Dalhousie considered to be 
 essential, would merely have brought up the number of 
 
 * Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 83 ; Rajah of Berar, Papers, 1854, pp. 35, 36. 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 61. % Hid., p. 63. 
 
214 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 British soldiers to what it was in 1852. Indeed all Lord 
 Dalhousie's remonstrances in his Minute of the 5th February 
 1856, were directly against "the withdrawal of European 
 troops from India to Europe and Persia." The Duke of 
 Argyll acknowledges this very clearly : 
 
 " Lord Dalhousie saw with regret the necessity for a temporary 
 reduction of the European Force ; but the risk which was actu- 
 ally incurred thereby was not the risk against which he had it in 
 his mind to guard. There was not, indeed, any danger which he 
 considered imminent."* 
 
 The apologists are not quite in accordance among them- 
 selves. The Duke of Argyll says that in remonstrating 
 against a reduction of the British troops, Lord Dal- 
 housie was guarding against no "danger which he con- 
 sidered imminent." Mr. Marshman, perhaps from better 
 soiirces of information, assures us that "the repeated acts 
 of insubordination had convinced him that the native 
 Army was no longer to be depended on."f The Duke not 
 only denies that Lord Dalhousie felt any anxiety as to the 
 fidelity and obedience of the Sepoys, but roundly asserts 
 that no fear on the subject had ever been expressed by 
 any one. 
 
 " No such thought ever entered into the minds of Indian states- 
 men, or of Indian soldiers. They knew that without the Native 
 Army our Empire never could have been acquired, and they knew, 
 too, that without it that Empire could not be maintained for a 
 single year. To doubt its fidelity would have been to doubt our 
 own powers of rule. 
 
 " It is not surprising, therefore, that we look in vain for any 
 symptom of a fear which would have gone so deep and would 
 have implied so much.^J 
 
 If the Duke never looked beyond his infallible Blue 
 Books for information, he may well have "looked in vain"; 
 many "thoughts" and "symptoms" may well have escaped 
 his inquiry. He certainly would "look in vain" among the 
 self-glorifying despatches and Reports of the annexing 
 period, for any "doubt" or "fear" as to the good- will of the 
 native troops, or the content of the newly acquired Pro- 
 vinces. But if he had extended his reading a little, he 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 61. f History, vol. iii, p. 448. 
 % India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 51. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 215 
 
 might have found the "symptoms" of which he was in 
 search, not only in the writings of the most eminent 
 Indian soldiers and statesmen, from Warren Hastings 
 downwards, but in books and pamphlets, written during 
 Lord Dalhousie's Government, and expressly connecting 
 the danger of military revolt with the policy of annexation 
 and resumption. 
 
 Sir Thomas Munro wrote as follows : 
 
 <( Even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, 
 it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards 
 the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such 
 a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer any 
 warlike neighbours to combat, would gradually lose its military 
 habits and discipline, and that the native troops would have leisure 
 to feel their own strength, and for want of other employment, to 
 turn it against their European masters. 
 
 11 We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the pro- 
 tection they have received, or attachment to our mild government, 
 would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us 
 in a struggle with the native army."* 
 
 Here is the opinion pronounced in 1832 by Sir Henry 
 Russell, for many years Resident at Hyderabad : 
 
 " A well conducted rebellion of our native subjects, or an ex- 
 tensive disaffection of our native troops, is the event by which our 
 power is most likely to be shaken ; and the sphere of this danger 
 is necessarily enlarged by every enlargement of our territory. The 
 increase of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, is an 
 increase not of our strength, but of our weakness." 
 
 Lord Metcalfe, after speaking of " the disaffection dor- 
 mant, but rooted universally among our subjects," says: 
 
 ' ' It may be observed that the tried services and devotion of our 
 native Army furnish a proof to the contrary of the preceding as- 
 sertion. Our native Army is certainly a phenomenon, the more so 
 as there is no heart-felt attachment to our Government on the part of 
 our native troops. 
 
 " We can retain our dominion only by a large military establish- 
 ment ; and without a considerable force of British troops the fidelity 
 of our native Army could not be relied on. 
 
 " Our danger does not lie in the military force alone of Native 
 States, but in the spirit by which they are actuated towards us ; and 
 still more in the spirit of our subjects, from one end of India to the 
 other/' f 
 
 * Gleig's Life of Sir T. Munro, vol. ii, p. 33. 
 
 t Selections from Lord Metcalfe } s Papers, (1855) p. 144. 
 
216 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Sepoys were our subjects, and to a great extent 
 representative men among them, and they were peculiarly 
 exposed to be personally taunted in places of public resort, 
 with being accomplices in the destruction of all the his- 
 torical dignities and ancient institutions, which every 
 native with a spark of honour and national pride, was 
 bound to admire, to love, and to respect. Let us hear 
 what Sir Henry Lawrence said on that subject, after the 
 annexation of Oude, but before the outbreak of the re- 
 bellion ; 
 
 " The Sepoy is not the man of consequence he was. He dis- 
 likes annexations, among other reasons, because each new pro- 
 vince added to the Empire widens his sphere of service, and at 
 the same time decreases our foreign enemies, and thereby the 
 Sepoy's importance. The other day an Oude Sepoy of the Bom- 
 bay Cavalry at Neemuch, being asked if he liked annexation, re- 
 plied : f No. I used to be a great man when I went home ; the 
 best in the village rose as I approached ; now the lowest puff their 
 pipes in my face/"* 
 
 General Briggs, in 1 849, when the annexation of Sattara, 
 the first in Lord Dalhousie's series, had just taken place, 
 warned the advocates of consolidation that if they did 
 away with "the right of adoption, with respect to the 
 Princes of India, they woiild tread on delicate ground." 
 No one would believe that they were going to confine the 
 process to sovereignties. 
 
 " If you are to do away with the right of individuals to adopt, 
 you will shake the faith of the people of India; you will influence 
 that opinion which has hitherto maintained you in your power ; 
 and that influence will thrill through your army and you will find 
 some day, as Lord Metcalfe more than once said. ' we shall rise 
 some morning, and hear of a conflagration through the whole 
 Empire of India, such as a few Europeans amongst millions will 
 not be able to extinguish/ Your army is derived from the pea- 
 santry of the country, who have rights, and if those rights are in- 
 fringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity of 
 that army. You have a native army of 250,000 men to support 
 your power, and it is on the fidelity of that army your power rests. 
 But you may rely on it, if you infringe the institutions of the people 
 of India, that army will sympathise with them, for they are a part 
 of the population ; and in every infringement you make upon the 
 rights of individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men, who 
 
 * Kaye's Lives of Indian Officers, vol. ii, p. 320. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 217 
 
 are either themselves in the army, or upon their sons, their fathers, 
 or their relatives. Let the fidelity of your army be shaken, and 
 your power is gone." 
 
 When the proposed annexation of Kerowlee was under 
 consideration in 1853, Mr. John Sullivan, formerly a 
 Member of Council at Madras, wrote as follows : 
 
 " We must remember that in order to keep India at all, we are 
 obliged to hold it by a strong military grasp ; that our chief mili- 
 tary instrument is the Sepoy ; and that a very large portion of 
 the Bengal and Bombay armies are Rajpoots, whose feelings of 
 clanship are as strong as those of Highlanders, and who still re- 
 tain a lively recollection of the ancient grandeur of their race. 
 If we sap the foundation of our rule by acts of injustice to the Raj- 
 poot Princes, we shall surely awaken a sympathy for them in the 
 hearts of the native army ; and the greatest of Indian authorities 
 has told us what the consequence will be, whenever our native 
 army is roused to a sense of its own strength."* 
 
 The following extracts are taken from India, its Go- 
 vernment under a Bureaucracy, a pamphlet by Mr. John 
 Dickinson, published in 1853, before the annexations of 
 Nagpore and Jhansi, and when the question of confiscating 
 Kerowlee, which would have been the first encroachment 
 on Rajpootana, was yet undecided. 
 
 " There are many signs and warnings in India at this moment, 
 and if the present system is allowed to go on, it will soon expose 
 our Empire to a greater peril than it has ever yet encoun- 
 tered (p. 8.) 
 
 " The present system is not only ruining and degrading the 
 natives of India, but is bringing our Empire into a more critical 
 situation every day. (p. 27.) 
 
 " The natives seem what they know we expect them to appear ; 
 we do not see their real feelings : we know not how hot the stove 
 may be under its polished surface. For the fire is not out ; we 
 are obliged to keep it up by our native army, ivhich may blaze into a 
 conflagration and burn the Empire. There may be some conspiracy, 
 of which, as at Vellore, we have not even a suspicion, until the 
 native Regiments open their fire on our barracks : and, as a mer- 
 chant who is obliged to throw all his treasure overboard to save 
 the ship, a storm may arise in India which will cost us more to 
 maintain our power, than all we have gained, or can ever hope to 
 gain, by our confiscations, (p. 166.) 
 
 " Would not a violation of religion and the rights of property, 
 
 * Are we bound by our Treaties ? A Plea for the Princes of India, (Effing- 
 ham Wilson, London,) 1853, p. 70. 
 
218 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 which lit a flame of insurrection in Rajpootana, and sent over 
 three-fourths of our Bengal Sepoys to the enemy, instantly paralyse 
 the right arm of England ?" (p. 177.) 
 
 This warning was plain enough. It may, perhaps, be 
 objected that Lord Dalhousie could not be expected to 
 listen to every volunteer adviser in England. I shall show, 
 therefore, that, besides Sir Henry Lawrence, whose opi- 
 nions were no secret, there were others in constant official 
 communication with him in India, who uttered the same 
 warnings, and urged the same remonstrances. 
 
 General Sir William Sleeman wrote in these terms to 
 Sir James Weir Hogg, very fruitlessly, for that gentle- 
 man was Lord Dalhousie's strongest supporter in the Court 
 of Directors, on the 12th of January, 1853 : " The Na- 
 tive States I consider to be breakwaters, and when they 
 are all swept away, we shall be left to the mercy of our 
 native army, which may not always be sufficiently under 
 our control."* 
 
 The following passage is taken from a letter addressed 
 by Sir William Sleeman to Lord Dalhousie himself, on the 
 10th of April, 1852 : 
 
 <( In September 1848,1 took the liberty to mention to your 
 Lordship my fears that the system of annexing and absorbing 
 Native States, so popular with our Indian service, and so much 
 advocated by a certain class of writers in public journals, might 
 some day render us too visibly dependent upon our native army ; 
 that they might see it, and accidents might occur to unite them, or 
 too great a portion of them, in some desperate act. 33 "f 
 
 Some of these expressions of opinion, especially those of 
 General Briggs, remarkable for its calm sagacity, Sir 
 William Sleeman, and Mr. John Dickinson, seem to me to 
 approach as closely to the character of prophetic warnings, 
 as has ever occurred, or can be expected to occur, in the 
 efforts of human intellect. 
 
 What becomes now of the Duke of Argyll's very confi- 
 dent and very extravagant assertions, that " no Indian 
 statesman or soldier" ever entertained a doubt of the fide- 
 lity of the native army ; that " no such thought ever en- 
 tered into their minds ;" and that " we may look in vain 
 for any symptoms of such fear" ? 
 
 * Sleeman' s Oude, vol. ii, p. 392. f Ibid., vol. ii, p. 362. 
 
THE TEST OF PKEVISION. 219 
 
 " Looking back/' says the Duke of Argyll, "as we now 
 do, upon the years of Lord Dalhousie's rule through the 
 light of subsequent events, we naturally search for any- 
 thing in the transactions of the time which can have had 
 any bearing on the condition of the Native Army." "It 
 cannot be said that during those years any new influence 
 was brought to bear upon it."* 
 
 If the Duke will " search" in those same passages in 
 which I have just shown him the "symptoms" of that 
 fear," for which he had " looked in vain," he will also find 
 what "new influences" were "brought to bear" upon the 
 native Army during " the years of Lord Dalhousie's rule." 
 There was something " in the transactions of that time," 
 that made the native troops, in the words of Sir Thomas 
 Munro, "feel their own strength," that altered, to use 
 the words of Lord Metcalfe, "the spirit by which the na- 
 tive States/' and, therefore, " our subjects, from one end 
 of India to the other, were actuated towards us." It was 
 " Annexation," which Sir Henry Lawrence tells us, "the 
 Sepoys disliked," and which Sir Henry Russell had warned 
 us, would prove " an increase not of our strength, but of 
 our weakness." When the adopted heirs of Hindoo Princes 
 were repeatedly rejected, " the faith of the people of India," 
 as General Briggs predicted, " was shaken," and " that in- 
 fluence thrilled through the army," when the most sacred 
 rights of the Native Sovereigns were " infringed," we could 
 " no longer depend upon the fidelity of the army ;" when 
 " the institutions of the people of India" were "infringed," 
 to the detriment of the greatest families, "the Army sym- 
 pathised with them," for they too had families, and many 
 of them had lands. When, in the words of Mr. Dickinson, 
 " a violation of religion and the rights of property," had 
 been systematically carried on for some years against our 
 faithful and submissive AUies, the native troops could no 
 longer trust that the religion and property of our subjects 
 would be respected; and on the first occasion of their suspi- 
 cions being roused, "the native Army blazed into a con- 
 flagration," and "three-fourths of the Bengal Sepoys" 
 became our enemies. 
 
 Such was "the new influence" that was "brought to 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, pp. 49, 50. 
 
220 CHAPTER V1TI. 
 
 bear" upon the native Army during " the years of Lord 
 Dalhousie's rule," and were it not for the Duke of Argyll's 
 personal responsibility in the worst " transactions of that 
 time," he would have learned the lesson without any 
 assistance. 
 
 The Duke talks about " looking back through the light 
 of subsequent events," and about " every fifth-rate writer 
 having his say," during the agony of the Great Indian 
 Mutiny, " against something which he called ' Lord Dal- 
 housie's policy'." Let me remind him, and the other apo- 
 logists and eulogists, who all raise a similar cry, that I 
 have now not only displayed what was really called "Lord 
 Dalhousie's policy of annexation" by his Lordship's friends 
 and supporters, but have shown that some, at least, of 
 "the fifth-rate writers," whose "ignorant injustice" is de- 
 nounced by his Grace, did not wait for " the Great Indian 
 Mutiny" to condemn that policy, and cannot now be ac- 
 cused of judging it "by the light of subsequent events." 
 
 That light, however, can enable any one now to see, 
 that there was more statesmanlike foresight and moral dig- 
 nity, and a higher sense of national honour, in the grave 
 censures and gloomy forebodings of General Briggs and 
 Mr. John Dickinson, than in the shallow exultation of the 
 retiring Governor-General, who boasted that " in eight 
 years, four Kingdoms," besides " various Chiefships and 
 separate tracts," " had been placed under the sceptre of 
 the Queen of England," that he had added "four millions 
 sterling to the annual income of the Indian Empire," and 
 that he should leave it in peace, " without and within."* 
 
 It is not enough to say that Lord Dalhousie manifested 
 no statesmanlike foresight. All his most confident pro- 
 mises were contradicted and falsified in the most unequi- 
 vocal and conclusive manner, within fifteen months after 
 his departure from India. His financial anticipations had 
 already been sufficiently refuted, for those who could form 
 an impartial judgment, by the evident results of his policy 
 before his departure. 
 
 In opening the series of annexations in 1848 with that 
 of Sattara, Lord Dalhousie declared that "by taking pos- 
 
 * Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, February 28th, 1856, Reviewing his 
 Administration, (paragraphs 11, 12, 19,) p. 7. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 221 
 
 session of Native States," under the doctrine of lapse, lie 
 would "add to the resources of the public treasury."* 
 When about to relinquish the reins of government, he 
 boasted of having added "four millions sterling to the 
 annual revenue of the Empire." But what is the true pic- 
 ture ? " We were not prepared," the Court of Directors 
 wrote to him in 1852, "to find that the annexation of 
 Sattara would prove a drain on the general revenues of 
 India/' In the eight years of Lord Dalhousie's adminis- 
 tration he added 8,354,000 to the public debt : in the 
 three last of these years there was a heavy deficit, amount- 
 ing in 1853-4, though India was at peace, to 2,044,000, 
 and in 1854-5 to 1,850,000. f In his flourishing finan- 
 cial summary Lord Dalhousie only gave the gross receipts 
 of his territorial acquisitions, and said nothing at all about 
 the expenditure. He even included in this alleged addi- 
 tion to the revenue of the Empire, 500,000 from the 
 Assigned Districts of Hyderabad, administered in trust for 
 the Nizam, J not one penny of which could fall into the 
 British Treasury. 
 
 He declared that "petty intervening Principalities" 
 might be made " a means of annoyance," but could " never 
 be a source of strength," and that by "getting rid of 
 them" we should " acquire continuity of military commu- 
 nication," and " combine our military strength. " The time 
 of trial soon came, and it was then found that one great 
 source of strength lay in those "petty intervening Prin- 
 cipalities," which not only gave us no " annoyance," but 
 afforded the most serviceable aid in men, money, and moral 
 influence, so that one of Lord Dalhousie's former thick- 
 and-thin partisans is now compelled to admit that "Ma- 
 dras was saved by the Nizam," " Bombay by Maharajah 
 Scindia," and " the Punjaub by the old Sikh Princes. w |[ 
 
 On the other hand, instead of our military strength being 
 combined or consolidated, it was so scattered and dispersed, 
 as a direct result of Lord Dalhousie's policy, that the great 
 strategic and political centres of Delhi, Bareilly and awn- 
 
 * Ante, p. 184. 
 
 t Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 1856, para. 23, p. 8. The Rebellion 
 in India, by John Bruce Norton, pp. 162, 167. 
 
 $ Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 1156, para. 19, (note) p. 7. 
 Ante, p. 184. Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 83. || Ante, p. 203. 
 
222 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 pore, fell into the hands of the rebels almost without a 
 struggle ; the small forces at Lucknow and Agra were 
 beleaguered ; and Allahabad and Benares were barely saved 
 in time. 
 
 There was not a single British soldier in the Kingdom 
 of Oude from 1846 to 1856, when it was annexed, in- 
 cluding the period of our Sutlej and Punjaub wars, when 
 every man was urgently required. We have now in Oude 
 one Regiment of Dragoons, seven Batteries of Artillery, 
 and four Battalions of Foot, at an annual cost of about 
 600,000, or nearly half the revenue of the Province, 
 without counting the native troops. This is the way we 
 " have consolidated our military strength," and " added to 
 the resources of the public treasury." 
 
 During the great rebellion, the immediate offspring of 
 Lord Dalhousie's injustice and imprudence, which broke 
 out with the mutiny of the Bengal Sepoys in 1857, and 
 was not finally suppressed till 1859, it became necessary 
 to augment the British forces in India to the enormous 
 number of 122,000 men ; of whom 35,000 disappeared en- 
 tirely from the muster-rolls in those three years, having 
 either died or been discharged from wounds or ruined con- 
 stitutions ; and during the same three years upwards of 
 'forty millions sterling were added to the public debt of 
 India. Thus did Lord Dalhousie's policy " consolidate our 
 military strength/' and " add to the resources of the public 
 treasury." 
 
 In 1848 Lord Dalhousie said : " The assumption of the 
 Raj" (of Sattara) "will cause no ferment or discontent 
 among other Native Powers."* In 1854 he was told in 
 Council by Sir John Low, speaking from his own personal 
 knowledge and experience, that "the confidence of our 
 Native Allies was a good deal shaken by the annexation 
 of Sattara," and that it had roused feelings of " dread and 
 discontent, "f Sir Frederick Currie, also, has recently 
 stated, and he must have said the same thing to Lord 
 Dalhousie when the Kerowlee case was before the Supreme 
 Council, that " The decision in the Sattara case, whatever 
 
 * Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 82. 
 
 t Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, pp. 42, 43. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 223 
 
 its merits may be, undoubtedly caused surprise and alarm 
 throughout the length and breadth of India."* 
 
 Mr. Mansel, the Eesident at Nagpore, in his despatch 
 of the 14th of December, 1853, quoted by Lord Dalhousie 
 himself, said : " The subject of adoption has been one of 
 much interest and anxiety to the Court people, especially 
 since the close of the Sattara discussions.""^ 
 
 The prevalence of discontent and dread among the Na- 
 tive Princes, contrary to Lord Dalhousie's expectations, is 
 thus confirmed by Lord Canning, in his very cautiously 
 worded Adoption despatch of 1860 (paragraph 2) : 
 " There appears to be a haze of doubt and mistrust in the 
 mind of each Chief as to the policy which the Government 
 will apply to his own State in the event of his leaving no 
 natural heir to his throne, and each seemed to feel, not 
 without reason, that in such case the ultimate fate of his 
 country is uncertain." Such was the political effect of 
 Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation. 
 
 He asserted, in the Farewell Minute reviewing his 
 own measures, that the extinction of the Nagpore Princi- 
 pality " was hailed with lively satisfaction by the whole 
 population of the Province."* He greeted Lord Canning 
 on his arrival at Calcutta with the telegraphic message, 
 "AlliswellinOude!" 
 
 And Sir Charles Jackson puts it to us, as an unanswer- 
 able question, if we suppose the annexations to have caused 
 general discontent, and to have been "a principal cause of 
 the rebellion, "- 
 
 "How was it that Nagpore and Sattarah remained faithful to 
 our rule ? Surely the inhabitants of Sattarah had as much cause 
 of complaint as those of Jhansi, and Nagpore as Sumbulpore, and 
 yet during the rebellion neither Nagpore nor Sattarah joined the 
 insurgents. It was no fear of British troops that caused the dif- 
 ference, for the European Regiment had long been withdrawn from 
 Nagpore, and Sattarah never had such a garrison." || 
 
 Before proceeding further, let us first put Sir Charles 
 Jackson's facts right a little. It is true that there was no 
 Regiment of European Infantry at Nagpore, there is 
 
 * Mysore Papers, 1866, p. 46. 
 
 t Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, pp. 17, and 54. 
 
 $ Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 1856, paragraph 27, p. 9. 
 
 Ibid., 1856, p. 21. || A Vindication, p. 39. 
 
224 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 one there now, but there were "British troops" of the 
 most imposing description, though not of great numerical 
 strength. There was a splendid Troop of Horse Artillery, 
 and the Head Quarters and one Company of a Battalion of 
 Foot Artillery, altogether more than 250 men with 
 twelve guns. The native Regiments all belonged to the 
 Madras Presidency. 
 
 "Sattara," he says, "never had such a garrison." No, 
 never until 1857, when the dangerous conspiracies that 
 were discovered, and the general agitation and excitement 
 of the Mahratta Provinces, compelled Lord Elphinstone to 
 take the earliest opportunity of stationing European troops 
 at Sattara. Detachments of the 14th Dragoons and 3rd 
 Europeans arrived there on the 19th of June, 1857. 
 
 Mr. Marshman, formerly of the Friend of India, makes 
 similar assertions in his History. 
 
 1 { That the annexation by war or lapse did not create the mutiny,, 
 appears evident from the fact that except in the case of Oude, and 
 the little Principality of Jhansi, under the instigation of the en- 
 raged Ranee, none of the annexed Provinces manifested the 
 slightest disposition to turn against us in the great crisis. Sattara 
 and Nagpore were tranquil."* 
 
 There were sixteen executions for treasonous conspiracy 
 at Sattara in 1857 and 1858, besides numerous sentences 
 of transportation and imprisonment. If this is not indi- 
 cative of "the slightest disposition to turn against us," 
 what does it indicate ? 
 
 The following account of a scene that took place at Sat- 
 tara in June, 1857, appeared in the Bombay Telegraph : 
 
 ' ' Several arrests have been made ; the ringleaders are being 
 brought in prisoners almost daily. The gallows-tree has hard work 
 awaiting it. Its services were put in requisition this morning. The 
 prisoner in a bold fearless manner mounted the drop, and during 
 the process of adjusting the noose and pinioning, he, in a loud firm 
 voice, addressed the crowd in the following words (my informant 
 knows Mahrattee as well as English) : ' Listen, all ! As the English 
 people hurled the Rajah from his throne, in like manner do you 
 drive them out of the country. This is murder. This example is 
 made to frighten you, but be not alarmed. Sons of Brahmins, 
 Mahrattas and Mussulinen, revolt ! Sons of Christians look to 
 yourselves !"f 
 
 * History of India, vol. iii, p. 450, 
 
 t Quoted in The Rebellion, by John Bruce Norton, pp. 96, 97. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson says that "Nagpore was faithful to 
 our rule," Mr. Marshman that " Nagpore was tranquil." 
 In the Province of Nagpore, without counting those killed 
 in open rebellion or summarily put to death by military 
 authority, there were nine executions in 1857 for high 
 treason, and seventeen officers and soldiers of the Local 
 Force, formerly the Rajah's Army, were hanged for mutiny. 
 The English Sergeant Major of one native corps was killed 
 by mutineers. An English official of the Electric Tele- 
 graph Department was murdered by rebels. Two petty 
 Chieftains, the Zemindars of Arpeillee and Sonakhan, 
 were engaged in open rebellion, the latter of whom 
 was hanged. As compared with the stirring events, and 
 brilliant exploits farther North, Mr. Marshman may still 
 choose to call this "tranquillity," but even he can scarcely 
 persist in saying that there was not "the slightest disposi- 
 tion to turn against us." 
 
 It is very natural that those who did their best, in office 
 or in the Press, to promote the rapacious schemes which 
 at once broke down our moral supremacy, and dispersed . 
 our military strength, should shut their eyes to all those 
 facts which prove a very general disaffection, and should 
 speak of the great Indian Rebellion as a mere mutiny of 
 Bengal Sepoys. In their anxiety to shake off the painful 
 feeling of self-reproach, they have been led to make some 
 remarkable declarations. The Duke of Argyll, for instance, 
 who as a Cabinet Minister might have had access to the 
 best information, most erroneously asserts that "the in- 
 fection of the mutiny never reached the Presidencies of 
 Madras or of Bombay," and that "the entire armies of 
 Bombay and of Madras escaped the plague."* When the 
 Duke penned these lines, he cannot have heard of the 
 Field Forces that were actively engaged for so many 
 months in suppressing insurrection, not without much 
 bloodshed, in the Rewa Kanta, in the Satpoora district, 
 on the Goa frontier, in Kolapore, Nargoond, Shorapore, 
 Jumkhundee, Kopal, and other parts of the Mahratta 
 country ; or of the murder of Mr. Man son, the Collector, 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning (Longman and Co.) 1865, pp. 118 
 and 02. 
 
226 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 by the rebel Chieftain of Nargoond, who had been refused 
 permission in 1851 to adopt a near relation as his heir. 
 
 The Duke, when he wrote these sentences, cannot have 
 heard of the mutiny of the 27th Bombay Native Infantry 
 at Kolapore, when three of their officers were murdered, 
 and of the terrible retribution inflicted on the mutineers 
 by General Le Grand Jacob ;* or of the mutiny of the 21st 
 Bombay Regiment at Kurrachee, for which seven men 
 were hanged and three blown from guns ; or of the 
 Golundauze Artillery at Shikarpore and Hydrabad in 
 Scinde, where a Havildar was blown from a gun ;t or of 
 the 2nd and 3rd Bombay Cavalry at Neemuch and Nus- 
 seerabad ; or of the disaffection and plots among the 10th 
 and 1 1th Infantry in the city of Bombay itself, when two 
 Sepoys were blown from guns and others transported ; or 
 of the attempted mutiny of the 2nd Grenadiers at Ahme- 
 dabad, for which upwards of twenty men were executed. 
 These trifles had escaped his notice, and yet he censures his 
 opponents for not, as he alleges, studying the Blue Books ! 
 
 Immediately on the publication of India under Dal- 
 liousie and Canning, the Duke of Argyll was taken to 
 task, as to the alleged tranquillity of the Bombay Presi- 
 dency and Army, by General Le Grand Jacob, who had 
 promptly addressed the Editor of the Edinburgh Review 
 on the appearance of the original articles in 1 863, in a letter 
 which, it appears, the noble contributor had not the ad- 
 vantage of seeing before his Essays were reprinted. In 
 the correspondence which ensued, the Duke made a partial 
 and very inadequate admission of his errors. He expressed 
 his readiness, if he had the opportunity, "to qualify the 
 statement made in the Review, and to mention the ap- 
 pearance and effectual repression of the mutinous spirit in 
 Bombay. "J This mention of a "mutinous spirit" very in- 
 sufficiently recalls transactions for which, as General Jacob 
 had reminded him, "some hundreds of Sepoys and native 
 officers, in divers corps, were tried and executed, or trans- 
 ported, besides those shot or cut down in fight. " Al- 
 
 * Correspondence as to Mutiny and Rebellion in the Bombay Presidency, 
 1865, pp. 11, 12, 13. f The Sindian, September 21st, 1857. 
 
 f Correspondence between Major General Jacob and the Duke of Argyll, 
 (Privately printed, 1865,) p. 8. Idem., p. 5. 
 
THE TEST OF PEE VISION. 227 
 
 though the Duke acknowledges "the mutinous spirit" and 
 its "repression," he says nothing of the actual outbreaks of 
 mutiny and rebellion. 
 
 Under the form of a criticism on Mr. Kaye's Sepoy War, 
 an article in the Edinburgh Review of October, 1866, con- 
 tinues and reiterates the same justifications of the acquisi- 
 tive policy, the same assertions that the insurrection of 
 1857 was "simply" and "merely a military mutiny," and 
 by no means "a popular rebellion,"* the same denunciations 
 of all dissentients, which pervade the two Essays reprinted 
 by the Duke of Argyll. Such a harmony and consistency 
 with the previous articles is kept up throughout, that at 
 first one would confidently attribute all three to the same 
 author, until certain indications of style negative that sup- 
 
 Eosition. The Duke of Argyll, for instance, would never 
 iy claim to local experience and personal observation, as 
 the writer does who contrasts the strange notions of "those 
 who have no practical acquaintance with the people of 
 India" with the more enlightened ideas of "those who 
 'know' all about "the faith of ignorant Hindoos."^ 
 
 This Edinburgh Reviewer "regrets" and "laments" that 
 Mr. Kaye should have "made himself, to a great extent, 
 the mouthpiece of a party small in numbers and smaller in 
 ability, Englishmen too, for the verdict of thoughtful 
 foreigners has been very different," that he should have 
 "lent the credit of his high reputation to abet those party- 
 writers" who attack the memory of Lord Dalhousie.J Of 
 course the spirit of party never enters the pages of the 
 Edinburgh Review ; and an Edinburgh Reviewer, even 
 though for twenty years he had been successively the 
 leader and spokesman of the annexation policy in the Court 
 of Directors, the House of Commons and the Council of 
 India, cannot be "a party- writer," and must bring a per- 
 fectly unbiassed judgment to the defence of that policy, 
 and the discussion of its results. 
 
 Just as the Duke of Argyll denounces all the assailants 
 of Lord Dalhousie's measures as "fifth-rate writers," the 
 more recent Reviewer, with equal depth and refinement 
 of sarcasm, sets them down as "a party small in numbers 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 98 ; Edinburgh Review, October 
 1866, p. 300. f Edinburgh Review, October 1866, p. 304. J Ibid., p. 300. 
 
 0*2 
 
228 CHAPTER VII 1. 
 
 and smaller in ability." Like the other vindicators he care- 
 fully avoids grappling with any of his opponents, re- 
 strained, no doubt, by "a proud sense of what is due to 
 himself,"* and though he quotes one of them, neither 
 mentions his name nor gives a reference to the book. 
 
 The Reviewer taunts us with being "a small party." 
 He is right, and if he had added that it was not a very 
 popular party, he would not have been far wrong. There 
 cannot be a more ungraceful and thankless position than . 
 that of an accuser and detractor, one who denounces 
 national exploits, decries recognised merit, and prophesies 
 evil things. It would have been much more pleasant to 
 have joined, many years ago, that much larger and more 
 popular party which hailed and echoed the confident as- 
 surances of Lord Dalhousie, his colleagues in Council, Mr. 
 R. D. Mangles and the Friend of India, that by destroy- 
 ing Native States we should add to the resources of the 
 public treasury, combine our military strength, and gain 
 the cheerful allegiance of the unfortunate people, "impa- 
 tient for the rule of the stranger, rather than suffer" any 
 longer from "the rod of iron" with which their Native 
 Princes had "scourged the nationality out of them." t We 
 did not believe in either the highly coloured obloquy cast 
 upon native rule, the supposed desire of the people to ex- 
 change it for British administration, or the imaginary 
 benefits that our own Government would derive from its 
 ill-gotten acquisitions. Let the Reviewer and the Duke 
 of Argyll call to mind that this party, "small in numbers 
 and smaller" if they will have it so "in ability," did not 
 spring up, wise after the event, amid the lurid lights of 
 the Rebellion of 1857, but had raised the voice of rebuke 
 and warning during several previous years. Let them call 
 to mind that all the confident hopes and promises of the 
 great party, strong in place and power, to which they be- 
 long, have been falsified, that instead of having added 
 to the public resources, they have added to the public 
 debt and expenditure ; that instead of combining our 
 military strength in India, they weakened it, and by their 
 consequent demand for British soldiers, have, for the time, 
 paralysed the military strength and political influence of 
 
 * Ante, p. 4. f Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 52. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 229 
 
 the Empire in Europe, and throughout the world. On the 
 other hand, the small party who received the splendid 
 visions and premature exultation of Lord Dalhousie and 
 his supporters with cold incredulity and bitter remon- 
 strance, have given the best proof of their more sound 
 political science, by having manifested the power of pre- 
 ' vision. And without ascending to the period before 1848, 
 the political school stigmatised by the Edinburgh Review, 
 is now seen to be the school of Henry St. George Tucker 
 and Mountstuart Elphinstone, of Sleeman, Samuel Mac- 
 pherson, George Clerk, and Henry Lawrence. 
 
 On one point it must be admitted that the Edinburgh 
 Reviewer of 1866 does us more justice than we could well 
 expect at his hands. Instead of branding us with the 
 extremely effective epithet of "un-English, "he admits our 
 nationality. The " small party" is described by him as con- 
 sisting of " Englishmen, for the verdict of thoughtful 
 foreigners has been very different." * But if our party is so 
 small, and his own, it is to be supposed, comparatively 
 large, how is it that the Reviewer is reduced to quote 
 " thoughtful foreigners" in support of his views ? How is 
 it he cannot cite the opinions of thoughtful and indepen- 
 dent Englishmen on his side ? How is it that every one 
 who comes forward, even behind the screen of a Review 
 or a newspaper, to defend Lord Dalhousie's policy, is 
 always sure to be, like the Edinburgh Reviewers, impli- 
 cated in the progress of that policy, and interested in de- 
 nying its disastrous results ? The Reviewer cites as a 
 high authority Sir John Lawrence. He might as well 
 have cited Mr. Mangles. In many respects Sir John Law- 
 rence is undoubtedly a high authority. He has been a 
 successful administrator in peace ; and in time of war, 
 in 1849 and 1857, he showed himself as bold and clear- 
 sighted in his plans, as he was skilful and provident in 
 organisation. Few men more able, more honest, more 
 lofty in character, ever entered the public service in India. 
 He is a man of whom his country may weU be proud. 
 But in every fibre of his heart he is a functionary. He is 
 nothing if not a Bengal Civilian. He was trained in the 
 school of Mr. Thomason. He was the favourite Lieu- 
 tenant of Lord Dalhousie. He cannot be expected to 
 
230 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 pronounce the most active and eventful period of his pub- 
 lic career a mistake. Of course he can draw no lesson 
 from the Rebellion but that of military precautions, and 
 can see no cause but the greased cartridge for that tre- 
 mendous convulsion. 
 
 We return, therefore, to the two "thoughtful foreigners," 
 M. de Montalembert and M. de Tocqueville, than whom, 
 the Reviewer assures us, there can be "no higher or more 
 
 o 
 
 impartial authorities." M. de Montalembert's character 
 commands universal respect ; he is eminent as a scholar 
 and as a man of letters ; but his public career at home has 
 not been either so successful or so consistent as to make 
 him a political oracle for the world. I am not prepared 
 to bow to his authority in Indian any more than in Italian 
 politics. 
 
 The eloquent brochure from which the Reviewer quotes 
 was notoriously written as a vehicle for an attack on the 
 French Government, with no real reference to the affairs 
 of India. The hackneyed eulogy of the East India Com- 
 pany, and assertion that the insurrection was entirely the 
 work of the Sepoys, adopted from some of the English 
 journals of the day, carry no greater weight because re- 
 peated by M. de Montalembert, who had no special means 
 of knowing the truth, and had made no special inquiry 
 into the subject. 
 
 M. de Tocqueville was, indeed, a master of political 
 science ; but then his opinion, far from helping the Re- 
 viewer, is entirely in our favour. M. de Tocqueville, we 
 quote from the Review, " has compressed his opinion into 
 a single sentence, as vigorous as it is profound. c Je crois,' 
 he observes, speaking of the mutiny, ' que les horribles 
 evenements de 1'Inde ne sont en aucune facon un souleve- 
 ment contre 1'oppression ; c'est une revolte de la barbarie 
 contre 1'orgueil.'"* 
 
 " A revolt of barbarism against pride !" The struggle of 
 despised Asiatics against the arrogance of Western civili- 
 sation, that is exactly the concise description of the Re- 
 bellion of 1857 that we could accept. Does the Reviewer 
 accept it ? Does he really think that it corresponds, or 
 can be reconciled, with the assurance of himself and Sir 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, October 1866, p. 302. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 231 
 
 John Lawrence, that the Rebellion was caused by "the 
 cartridge affair and nothing else."f Does he suppose that 
 M. de Tocqueville uses the term, " orgueil," pride, in a 
 sense eulogistic of British rule ? 
 
 On the other hand, where did the Reviewer find that 
 the assailants of Lord Dalhousie considered the Rebellion 
 of 1857 to be " un soulevement contre 1'oppression," a 
 rising against oppression, or in his own words " the con- 
 sequence and retribution of civil misgovernment," " the 
 insurrection of an oppressed people "? Not in Mr. Kaye's 
 book, the only work opposed to his own views to which he 
 gives a reference ; certainly not in my book, The Empire 
 in India, which he quotes without naming, nor in any 
 book of mine. The Reviewer might know from Mr. Kaye, 
 whom he styles " to a great extent, the mouthpiece of the 
 party," that they attribute the outbreak to " manifold 
 causes" producing a general feeling of suspicion and disaf- 
 fection, upon which the cartridge affair acted as the spark 
 to a mine, none of the causes amounting to what is properly 
 called " oppression," but rather to what M. de Tocqueville 
 terms " orgueil," pride or contempt. This pride of race and 
 culture, disguised, even from the British rulers them- 
 selves, by benevolent though cheap consideration for the 
 masses, who never come really into competition or contact 
 with them, led them to dislike and scorn all rights and 
 claims which impeded their plans or checked their undi- 
 vided supremacy. Consequently the natives of the country 
 were excluded from all share in the Government of the 
 British Provinces, and from every administrative office of 
 honour and emolument ; while the tendency of our rule 
 from the first was to lower the position, and destroy the 
 public career of great nobles and proprietors. At later 
 periods, varying in the different Presidencies, in the Pun- 
 jaub, and in Oude, the native landed aristocracy saw ruin, 
 immediate or prospective, brought to their doors, by our 
 revenue settlements, resumption laws, and Inam Commis- 
 sions, strenuously supported by Lord Dalhousie, "the 
 Services," speaking through the Friend of India, and the 
 Mangles party in the Court of Directors. But even when 
 they lost property or income, the natural leaders of the 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, October 1866, p. 303. 
 
232 CHAPTEll VIII. 
 
 people did not lose their influence. The masses found no 
 cause for gratitude towards the British Government. They 
 everywhere not only sympathised but suffered with the 
 despoiled landlords. 
 
 With increase of power, the same pride of race and cul- 
 ture led us to regard direct British possession as the sole 
 remedy for the defects of Native States, and produced an 
 impatient contempt for the Treaties by which we had 
 secured every step of our advance. They now seemed to 
 fetter our progress. ' The Friend of India derided them 
 as "musty old parchments." 
 
 By the extinction of allied and protected Principalities, 
 and by the resumption of landed estates, for the most part 
 under the false doctrine of "lapse," "the rights and insti- 
 tutions of the people of India," represented by their Princes 
 and nobles, were "infringed upon" systematically, and, as 
 General Briggs had predicted, "the native army, being a 
 part of the population, sympathised with them."* A 
 general suspicion of bad faith in all our dealings was 
 spread through the land ; the air was thick with rumours, 
 imprecations, and threats. 
 
 When Lord Dalhousie left Calcutta, after perpetrating 
 the annexation of Oude, the moral influence of Great 
 Britain in India was, for the time, annihilated. On the 
 first direct provocation applied to their own religious pre- 
 judices, the Sepoys led the way in revolt, expecting the 
 Princes and the people everywhere to answer to their 
 signal and to follow their example. 
 
 The following extracts from the letters of the late 
 Major Samuel Charters Macpherson, who was Resident at 
 Scindia's Court during the crisis of 1857, give at once the 
 opinions formed by that distinguished and lamented officer, 
 and those of Rajah Dinkur Rao, the able Minister of the 
 Gwalior Principality : 
 
 ' ' It was the opinion of the more intelligent Chiefs of the Gwa- 
 lior State, who were but few in number, that the Bengal native 
 army believed our Government to have intended, through the 
 greased cartridges, to strike at the Hindoo and Mahomedan re- 
 ligions in favour of Christianity. But they held that the army 
 was predisposed to revolt through the disaffection of the popula- 
 tion, and that the chief causes of the popular dissatisfaction with 
 
 * Ante, p. 216. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 233 
 
 our rule were the extinction of Native States and our consequent 
 measures, the depression of Chiefs and heads of society. 
 
 " Every cause assigned for the revolt has tended to produce it; 
 but dissatisfaction with our rule, common to the army and the 
 people, was the preliminary condition sine qua non. The main 
 cause of that dissatisfaction was actual and apprehended disturb- 
 ance of rights connected with the soil. 
 
 " The mutiny arose in the villages, not in the cantonments. 
 
 " You see that Lord Ellenborough quite understands that 
 the population are hostile to us that the rising has been a revolt 
 of the people, not of the army. I alone ventured to say this here 
 for a long time." 
 
 Mr. W. Edwards, of the Bengal Civil Service, a Judge 
 of the High Court of Agra, printed in 1859 for private 
 circulation an interesting account of his Personal Adven- 
 tures during the Rebellion, with reflections on its origin 
 and cause. These chapters are embodied in a work pub- 
 lished by him in 1866, when, as he says, "his subsequent 
 experience of seven years in India had tended to confirm 
 him in the views and opinions therein expressed/'* 
 
 The following passages will give some idea of the con- 
 clusions at which he has arrived. After speaking of cer- 
 tain recently lost privileges and other new grievances of 
 which the native troops complained, especially of "the vast 
 distances they now had to travel in going to their homes 
 on furlough and rejoining their Regiments," in consequence 
 of the Punjaub having become a British possession, the 
 higher rate of pay they had received while it was foreign 
 territory being stopped, he says : 
 
 " While our native army was in this state of discontent 
 and restless suspicion, Oude was to their astonishment and ex- 
 treme dissatisfaction annexed. There is not the slightest doubt 
 that this act was regarded by the native army as one of rude and 
 unjustifiable spoliation, and I believe that they would have re- 
 sented it at first, had they not been under the conviction that the 
 home authorities would annul the decision of the Governor- Gene- 
 ral, and restore Oude to the King. 
 
 ' ' As soon as it became known that the mission of the Oude 
 royal family to England had proved ineffectual, and that no hope 
 remained of the restoration of the country to the King, I noticed 
 a marked change in the feelings and demeanour of the Mahomedans 
 of my district, and of the Sepoys in particular. 
 
 * Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian, (Smith, Elder and Co., 1866) Pre- 
 face, p. viii. 
 
234 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 11 While the minds of our Sepoys were, from the. causes I have 
 already detailed, full of resentment against the Government,, and 
 suspicious of its good faith, the report was spread among them 
 by the instigators of the rebellion that the Government intended 
 to take away their caste, and compel them forcibly to adopt 
 Christianity, and for this purpose had cartridges (' cartoucli,' as 
 they called them,) prepared with pigs' fat to destroy the caste of 
 the Mahomedans, and with cows' fat that of the Hindoos. 
 
 " The rural classes, who afterwards broke out into rebellion, 
 had other causes (to which I will hereafter allude) which moved 
 them, but as they themselves were not affected by the cartridges, 
 they were indifferent on the subject, although they freely expressed 
 deep sympathy with the Sepoys, having no alternative between 
 losing their caste and mutinying.""* 
 
 In explaining "the condition and feelings of the people 
 in general, and particularly of the agricultural classes in 
 the North West Provinces at this time, which predisposed 
 them to rebellion/'"!" he enters into detailed criticism of our 
 revenue, judicial and police system, and of many recent 
 changes, "beautiful on paper," which "caused the most 
 bitter resentment and disaffection among the agricultural 
 body."J The most mischievous of these he considers to 
 have been "the action of our Resumption laws, the aboli- 
 tion of Zemindary and Talookdaree rights," and the pro- 
 cesses of our civil Courts, by the combined action of which, 
 he says, 
 
 " Society in the North- Western Provinces had become in 
 late years thoroughly disorganised. The ancient proprietary body 
 remained, it is true, but in the position of tenants on their heredi- 
 tary estates, smarting under a sense of degradation, and holding 
 intact their ancient feudal power over their old retainers, who 
 were willing and ready to cooperate with them in any attempt to 
 recover their lost position/' 
 
 The personal observation, inquiry, and experience of two 
 such men as Major Macpherson and Mr. Edwards, placed 
 far apart, with perfectly distinct spheres of duty, and 
 under very different circumstances, will, I think, carry con- 
 siderably more weight than the second-hand repetitions of 
 M. de Moiitalembert, even though pressed upon us by 
 "the high and impartial authority" of an Edinburgh Re- 
 viewer, who, for all we know, may be personally as much 
 
 * Personal Reminiscences, pp. 313, 314, 315. t Hid., p. 318. 
 t Ibid., p. 321. Ibid., p. 323. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 235 
 
 responsible for the policy of annexation, and as deeply 
 concerned to clear it from every stain of blood, as the Duke 
 of Argyll or even as Mr. R. D. Mangles. 
 
 We look upon the policy of annexation as one great 
 cause, perhaps the greatest, but by no means the only 
 cause that accumulated the mine of combustibles to which 
 the cartridge affair acted as a spark. We point out not 
 only the connection between the policy of annexation and 
 the terrible outbreak of 1857, but that in that outbreak 
 the policy failed in every sense of the word, and in its 
 failure proved the falsity of all Lord Dalhousie's promises 
 and expectations, the futility and inadequacy of all his 
 preparations. 
 
 The enthusiastic partisan of Lord Dalhousie's reputation 
 who writes in the Spectator, assures us, however, that the 
 first and principal reason why the "great" and "statesman- 
 like" policy of "one vast military monarchy" in India 
 "failed," was "because Lord Dalhousie retired."* This 
 means, if it means anything, that Lord Dalhousie pos- 
 sessed faculties for dealing with mutiny and rebellion far 
 beyond what can be claimed for his successor, Lord Can- 
 ning. 
 
 Now, during the eight years of his administration, it 
 fell three times to Lord Dalhousie's lot to deal with 
 mutiny, once with a petty insurrection, and once to cope 
 with a succession of mutinies, culminating in a formidable 
 rebellion ; and in every instance he proved himself un- 
 equal to the occasion, incapable of appreciating the dan- 
 ger, feeble and irresolute in his measures of repression and 
 retribution, tardy and confused in his control of military 
 operations. 
 
 The first of these occasions arose out of the dangerous 
 combination of the Bengal Regiments in the Punjaub in 
 1849 and 1850, when at last the 66th Native Infantry at- 
 tempted to seize the Fort of Govindghur. The mutinous; 
 spirit was subdued for the time by the judicious method, 
 partly of stern correction, partly of just concession, adopted 
 by Sir Charles Napier, and in a great degree by his com- 
 manding personal influence. Few will now question the 
 
 * Ante, p. 202. 
 
236 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 happy inspiration which prompted that great soldier to 
 disband the mutinous 66th on the spot, and to place their 
 colours in the hands of an Irregular Battalion of Goorkhas, 
 admitted to their place in the Line. Few will now join 
 with Lord Dalhousie in his doubts of the necessity of that 
 step, or in his expression of regret that the Commander- 
 in-Chief should have acted on his own responsibility in the 
 matter. In the conflict which followed as to the summary 
 suspension, pending a reference to Government, of an order 
 withholding certain extra allowances from the Sepoys, 
 there can be little doubt that Napier's action was prac- 
 tically right, although officially unauthorised. But mark 
 how contemptuously Lord Dalhousie treated the idea of a 
 conspiracy among the Native Regiments, and of the Empire 
 having been in peril. He presumed to charge Sir Charles 
 Napier, a soldier seventy years of age, renowned through 
 Europe, and covered with honourable wounds, with having 
 made use of " extravagant and mischievous exaggerations," 
 with having brought "unjust and injurious imputations" 
 against the Bengal Army.* He had read "the statements' 7 
 of the Commander-in-Chief with "incredulity." Yet the 
 testimony of all the superior officers in the Punjaub, in- 
 cluding Sir Colin Campbell, afterwards Lord Clyde, was 
 to the same effect, that "the mutinous spirit was very for- 
 midable," and was only kept down by the presence of a 
 powerful European force, t "There is no justification," con- 
 tinued his Lordship, "for the cry that India was in danger. 
 Free from all threat of hostilities from without, and secure, 
 through the submission of its new subjects, from insurrec- 
 tion within, the safety of India has never for one moment 
 been imperilled by the partial insubordination in the ranks 
 of its army/'J 
 
 When we add that in his Farewell Minute the sole re- 
 ference to the Sepoy was to say, that "the position of the 
 native soldier in India has long been such as to leave 
 hardly any circumstance of his condition in need of im- 
 
 * Papers (printed by the East India Company) Discussions between the Mar- 
 quis of Dalhousie and Sir Charles Napier, 1854, p. 15. 
 
 t Defects of the Indian Government, edited by Sir William Napier, 1853, 
 p. 59. 
 
 t Papers, Discussions between Dalhousie and Napier, (Minute by Lord Dal- 
 housie, paragraph 37) p. 15. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 237 
 
 provement,"* Sir Charles Jaekson may, perhaps, be able 
 to understand "on what authority Mr. Kaye speaks of 
 Lord Dalhousie's 'rooted conviction of the fidelity of the 
 Sepoy.'"t 
 
 Can anyone believe that Lord Dalhousie, so blind in 
 1850, so regardless of warning, so confident in "the sub- 
 mission of our new subjects," would have been more watch- 
 ful and more far-sighted than Lord Canning in 1857, when 
 the first symptoms of mutiny appeared, and when Oude 
 was on the eve of insurrection ? 
 
 The second of these occasions was in 1852, when the 
 38th Bengal Native Infantry refused to proceed on foreign 
 service to Burmah. Lord Dalhousie yielded to them, and 
 supplied their place by a Regiment of Sikhs. J The follow- 
 ing remarks on this incident are from the Hurkara, one of 
 the Calcutta daily papers : 
 
 ' ' Our readers will not forget that Lord Dalhousie was the first 
 Governor-General who succumbed to mutineers. When the 38th 
 N. I. (the corps which raised the cry of mutiny in Delhi) refused 
 to go to Burmah, Lord Dalhousie gave in ; from that instant the 
 feelings of the Sepoys, in all probability, underwent a change to- 
 wards their masters. That act was sufficient to demoralise an 
 army : who can say that it did not do so ? 
 
 " It has been the fashion in certain circles to abuse Lord Ellen- 
 borough. Whatever may have been his faults, he never allowed 
 himself to be conquered by mutineers. There are many in India 
 who recollect that when the 4th and 64th Regiments refused to 
 go to Scinde, they did not meet with the same mild treatment as 
 the 38th, when they declined to go to Burmah. The difference 
 of conduct on the two occasions showed the difference between 
 the two men. Lord Ellenborough compelled the Sepoys to carry 
 out his order ; the Sepoys compelled Lord Dalhousie to put up 
 
 * Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 1856, (para. 151) p. 39. Even with 
 regard to the 'material condition of the native troops, he was quite wrong. 
 They had many substantial grievances, among others the increased length and 
 frequency of marches, entailing great expenses, particularly upon the Madras 
 troops, who are always accompanied by their families. The pay of the Irregu- 
 lar Cavalry was at starvation point. Since Lord Dalhousie left India, the 
 emoluments of almost every branch and every rank of the Native army have 
 been augmented, directly or indirectly. Lord Dalhousie most injudiciously 
 lowered the pay and injured the prospects of the Hyderabad Cavalry, some of 
 the finest corps in India. 
 
 f A Vindication, p. 1 69 ; Kai/e's Sepoy ' War, vol. i, p. 324. 
 
 J Marshmaris History of India, vol. iii, p. 367. 
 
 . I think this must be a misprint for the 34th, which was disbanded with 
 ignominy by Lord Ellenborough in 1844 at Meerut, in presence of all the troops 
 of the station. 
 
238 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 with their resolves. The one saved India, the other brought it to 
 the verge of ruin."* 
 
 The third of these occasions was in 1855, when the 3rd 
 Hyderabad Cavalry mutinied at Bolarum, and cut down 
 Brigadier Colin Mackenzie, the Commandant of the Divi- 
 sion, and Captain Murray, one of their own officers. 
 Brigadier Mackenzie was left for dead with no less than 
 ten wounds. Let us hear Lord Dalhousie's own descrip- 
 tion of what took place after the first outbreak and at- 
 tempted assassination. 
 
 " It is clear to the Governor- General in Council, from the evi- 
 dence before him, that the greater part of the Regiment in the 
 Lines was in a state of open mutiny ; some rushed into the streets, 
 cutting and hacking at the passers-by, and brutally assailing even 
 women in their course. 
 
 " Their European officers were not allowed to approach them. 
 They paraded without orders from their European officers, and 
 without any of the usual calls to parade, but by the direction of 
 their Rissaldar. They were armed, and mounted and equipped. 
 They sent out videttes to watch the approach of other troops 
 sent for from Secunderabad, and acted as a military body guided 
 by other orders than those of their regular European superiors. 
 
 " Such proceedings are manifestly destructive of all discipline, 
 and tend not less to destroy all confidence in the fidelity of troops 
 that serve the Government. They appear to the Governor-Gene- 
 ral in Council to call for grave animadversion and for severe 
 punishment. 
 
 " They appear to his Lordship in Council to call the louder for 
 animadversion and punishment, that this is not the first time 
 that the Hyderabad Cavalry has been guilty of violence towards 
 their European officers." t 
 
 And then most lame and impotent conclusion ! after 
 the long-winded " animadversion," came the decree of 
 what he called " severe punishment." Six native officers 
 were dismissed the service, without a Court-martial ; while 
 three of the ringleaders in the murderous attack on 
 Brigadier Colin Mackenzie were, in Lord Dalhousie's 
 words, " arrested," and " with them," he added, " the law 
 of the land will deal." They were eventually sentenced 
 to fourteen years' transportation. 
 
 * Quoted in Norton's Rebellion in India, 1857, p. 176. 
 
 t General Order, Fort William, No. 132, January 23rd, 1856 ; Calcutta 
 Gazette, January 26th, 1856. I am not aware whether this General Order has 
 been given in any Parliamentary Return. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 239 
 
 The mutiny had broken out on September 21st, 1855. 
 Lord Dalhousie's verbose judgment was promulgated on 
 January 23rd, 1856, after a delay of four months. All 
 possibility of a striking example had then gone by ; but 
 the weakness and tameness of the Governor-General's 
 grave lecture to these mutineers and assassins on the im- 
 propriety of their conduct, "manifestly destructive/' as he 
 said, " of all discipline !" taken in conjunction with his 
 slow and inconclusive proceedings, by no means convey 
 the impression that in a tremendous crisis, like that of 
 1857, he would have exhibited more promptitude, firm- 
 ness or vigour than Lord Canning.* 
 
 The petty insurrection was that of the Sonthals, 
 the wild aboriginal tribe of the Kajmahal Hills, who 
 possessed scarcely any arms but pickaxes and bows and 
 arrows, t In consequence of most discreditable vacilla- 
 tion and mismanagement this revolt was kept alive from 
 July to December 1855, to the great alarm and injury 
 of the peaceful inhabitants, and was not suppressed 
 without the employment of a considerable military 
 force, at a very great expense, and with much more 
 bloodshed and more severity towards the misguided in- 
 surgents than ever ought to have been necessary. Lord 
 Dalhousie was at Ootacamund on the Neilgherry Hills, 
 and probably trusted, for some time, the subordinate 
 Government of Bengal to put down a disturbance within 
 its own limits. He cannot, however, be relieved from 
 responsibility ; and in this instance, also, he clearly 
 showed no aptitude for planning operations, and no just 
 appreciation of the damage done to the dignity and autho- 
 rity of Government by dilatory measures in the face of 
 rebellion. 
 
 The most formidable insurrection during Lord Dal- 
 housie's vice-royalty was that of the Punjaub. We have 
 shown how that insurrection was intensified and extended, 
 
 * I am not to be told that I have " concealed" anything in this case. I know 
 that Brigadier Mackenzie's conduct in personally confronting the men who had 
 disobeyed his very reasonable orders regarding the route of a procession, was 
 questioned. I am quite prepared to go into that point, and fully to justify the 
 Brigadier's proceedings. I take the fact of open mutiny, as stated in Lord 
 Dalhousie's own words, and I show that he paltered with it. 
 
 t Marshman's History of India, vol. iii, p. 376. 
 
240 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 how a petty outbreak grew into a rebellion, and was pro- 
 tracted till it assumed the proportions of a war, in conse- 
 quence of a succession of blunders and delays for which 
 the Governor-General was fully answerable. He hesitated 
 to support Edwardes until it was too late ; he sent no 
 succour to Hazara or Peshawur ; he hampered Lord Gough 
 by misdirections, and held him back by positive orders, 
 giving time, and opportunity and confidence to the rebels, 
 and contributing directly to the disasters of Chillian walla. 
 So much has already been said in these pages on this sub- 
 ject, that it will suffice to add here a few extracts from an 
 author strongly prepossessed in favour of Lord Dalhousie, 
 Mr. J. C. Marshman, formerly Editor of the Friend of 
 India. The first refers to the period of vacillation and 
 inactivity immediately following the outrage at Mooltan. 
 
 ' ' The emergency for which the foresight of Lord Hardinge had 
 made provision by his moveable Brigades had now arisen ; but 
 there was no longer Sir Henry Lawrence at the head of affairs in 
 the Punjaub, or Lord Hardinge at the head of the Government. 
 The Resident at Lahore was an amiable and intelligent Civilian, 
 the Governor- General was an able statesman, but young in years, 
 and new in authority. He was as yet but partially acquainted 
 with those who held posts of importance in the Government, and 
 was, moreover, without any of that military experience which 
 enabled his predecessor to maintain, without presumption, a 
 powerful control of our military movements. Had Sir Henry 
 Lawrence been at Lahore, he would have moved the Brigade 
 upon Mooltan, with the same promptitude which he had exhibited 
 in his march to Cashmere at the beginning of the winter, to 
 crush Imarn-ood-deen, and doubtless with the same success. 
 Had Lord Hardinge been at the head of the Government, he 
 would have taken upon himself to despatch the large force he had 
 massed on the North West frontier and collected at Bukkur, and 
 invested Mooltan before Moolraj could make any adequate prepa- 
 rations for resistance. A march through Scinde and from Lahore 
 in the month of May would doubtless have occasioned many 
 casualties, but our Empire in India had been acquired and main- 
 tained, not by fair-weather campaigns, but by taking the field on 
 every emergency, and at any season."* 
 
 After setting forth the original orders given by the Re- 
 sident, Sir Frederick Currie, for an advance on Mooltan, 
 the withdrawal of those orders, the reference to the Com- 
 
 * History of Indict, vol. iii, p. 313, 314. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 241 
 
 mander-in-Chief, and Lord Gough's opinion that military 
 operations should be postponed to the cold weather, Mr. 
 Marshman adds : 
 
 " Lord Dalhousie gave liis concurrence to this decision. Sir 
 Henry Lawrence aptly described this procrastination as ' a reso- 
 lution to have a grand shikar (hunt) in the cold season under his 
 own lead/* 
 
 " The paltry outbreak of Moolraj, fostered by the folly of delay, 
 had grown into a portentous war."f 
 
 In his description of the final Punjaub campaign, which 
 opened so inauspiciously with the indecisive affairs of 
 Ramnuggur and Sadoolapore, Mr. Marshman has the fol- 
 lowing passage : 
 
 "Throughout the month of December," 1848, "and the first 
 half of January," 1849, "the British army remained inactive be- 
 tween the Jhelum and the Chenab. This policy, which has been 
 the subject of much censure, was in some measure owing to the 
 restrictions imposed on the movements of the force by Lord Dal 
 housie, who had requested Lord (rough, after the battle of Sadoo- 
 lapore, ' on no consideration to advance beyond the Chenab except 
 for the purpose of attacking Shere Sing in the position he then 
 held, without further communication with him/ He had, in fact, 
 injudiciously interfered with the military dispositions of the Com- 
 mander- in- Chief, on whom the responsibility of the campaign 
 rested. 
 
 " But, however injudicious may have been this act of inter- 
 ference on the part of the Governor-General, subsequent events 
 gave reason to regret that it was not prolonged. Indeed, the 
 whole plan of the campaign has been condemned by the judgment 
 of the highest military authorities. "J 
 
 It may be very possible in each and all of these in- 
 stances to say a great deal in extenuation of Lord Dal- 
 housie's shortcomings, and even to trace one or two of 
 them to persons and circumstances quite beyond his con- 
 trol. All that I am concerned to urge is that the uni- 
 formity of these negative results cannot produce in the 
 mind of any reasonable inquirer a positive impression of 
 Lord Dalhousie's great capacity. Whenever an emer- 
 gency arose, he was manifestly found wanting. From the 
 enormous means at his disposal, a successful result was 
 ultimately attained, where the object was merely that of 
 
 * History of India, vol. p. iii, 314. f IbuL, vol. iii, p. 320. 
 
 J Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 331, 332. 
 
 R 
 
242 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 overcoming material resistance, as in the great and little 
 wars against the Sikhs and the Sonthals, but at a dis- 
 proportionate cost, and after a long and injurious delay. 
 In the three cases of military mutiny he was manifestly 
 deficient in firmness and discrimination. On not one of 
 these five occasions, all presenting some analogy with the 
 far more serious crisis of 1857, can Lord Dalhousie be 
 said to have evinced either breadth of vision, promptitude 
 in action, or fertility of resource. 
 
 Nothing can be found in the annals of India, during 
 or since the administration of Lord Dalhousie, to justify 
 that invidious reflection, half eulogy and half apology, 
 that the annexation policy failed, "firstly, because Lord 
 Dalhousie retired." That policy never could have suc- 
 ceeded, if Lord Dalhousie had remained twenty years at 
 Calcutta. It failed at its first trial, not because its au- 
 thor had retired, but because it was rotten at the core, 
 materially and morally, It had destroyed our persuasive 
 influence and ruined our high reputation. It had tainted 
 every organ, and weakened every function of the Empire. 
 While it made our power almost exclusively dependent 
 on physical force, it had scattered our European soldiers, 
 and exasperated the native troops. As a financial and 
 military policy it had so utterly failed before Lord Dal- 
 housie left India, that, unless he shut his eyes very closely, 
 he must have begun to suspect it himself. 
 
 The writer in the Spectator who considers Lord Dal- 
 housie's policy, although it failed, to have been " great" and 
 "statesmanlike," admits that during the mutinies "the Na- 
 tive Principalities acted as breakwaters when a surge of 
 national feeling threatened to overwhelm" the British 
 rulers. The same writer acknowledges that " Bombay 
 was saved because Gwalior broke the rush of the wave 
 which had Tantia Topee on its crest."* But how was it 
 that Scindia of Gwalior did us such good service ? He 
 was childless : he had no " natural heir," according to the 
 new law of succession enacted by Lord Dalhousie for Hin- 
 doo Princes who enjoyed the advantage of our protective 
 alliance. He had seen during the late Governor-General's 
 tour of office the Principality of Sattara abolished, of which 
 
 * Ante, p. 203. 
 
THE TEST OF PREVISION. 1243 
 
 the Rajah was not only regarded as the head of all the Mah- 
 ratta tribes, and the living memorial of their glory, but was 
 known to have been quite irreproachable in his relations 
 to the Paramount Power, and towards his own subjects. 
 He had seen the State of Nagpore extinguished, " one 
 of the substantive Powers of India"* of which the Rajah 
 was, beyond dispute, of higher rank, both by descent and by 
 the historical origin of his sovereignty, than himself or any 
 other Mahratta Prince, f and who, also, had given no cause 
 for complaint, either as a subordinate Ally or as a Ruler. 
 He had seen, close to his own door, the Principality of Jhansi, 
 ever faithful and serviceable to the British Government, 
 snatched without mercy from a Mahratta Brahmin family 
 by the rejection of an heir adopted from the founder's kin. 
 He had seen the two greatest Mussulman potentates of In- 
 dia, both of them friendly and submissive to our Government, 
 subjected to the cruellest treatment, on grounds quite un- 
 intelligible and indefensible according to the rude politi- 
 cal notions of Gwalior, the Nizam despoiled of his rich- 
 est provinces, the King of Oude dethroned, and his 
 Kingdom confiscated. What reason had Maharajah Jyajee 
 Rao Scindia to expect a better fate for his own family and 
 Kingdom ? They were actually threatened, and marked 
 down for extinction in Mr. Willoughby's Minute, " the 
 text-book on adoptions. "+ 
 
 Colonel Macpherson, who was Resident at the Court of 
 Gwalior in 1857, has explained the reason very clearly in 
 an interesting Report dated February 10th, 1858. He 
 attaches the greatest importance to the impressions re- 
 ceived by the Maharajah, his chief Ministers and advisers, 
 during their visit to Lord Canning at Calcutta early in 
 1857, shortly before the outbreak of the rebellion. "Be- 
 sides gratification from the courtesies of the Governor- 
 
 * Ante, p. 29. 
 
 t Both the Sattara and Nagpore families of Bhonslas claim descent 
 from the Sesodia Ranas of Oodeypoor, the most illustrious Rajpoot line 
 of India, whose sovereignty can be traced for 1700 years. In both cases 
 there is a blot in the scutcheon, but the descent seems to be acknow- 
 ledged by the genealogists of Oodeypoor, see the History of Meywar, by 
 Captain Brookes (Calcutta, 1859,) pp. 10 and 13. Until' the same dis- 
 tinction was conferred upon the Gaekwar by Lord Canning in 1859, the 
 head of the Bhonsla family at Nagpore was the only Mahratta Prince, be- 
 sides the Rajah of Sattara, who presumed to wear a golden anklet. 
 
 Ante., p. 188. 
 
 R2 
 
244 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 General, and the great enlargement of their views of our 
 power and resources," they obtained the strongest assur- 
 ances that it was Lord Canning's policy to maintain " the 
 stability of Scindia's House and rule, in conformity with 
 Hindoo usages. Had the Maharajah and his people," 
 continues Colonel Macpherson, " now apprehended the 
 extinction of their State by our disallowing the adoption 
 of an heir, I conceive that it would have been impossible 
 to induce them to make the efforts in co-operation with us 
 which the crisis required."* 
 
 Is it possible that, so long as Lord Dalhousie was at 
 Calcutta, the Maharajah and his people should have ceased 
 to apprehend the extinction of their State ? Can any one 
 believe that Lord Dalhousie, holding that " on ah 1 occa- 
 sions where heirs natural shall fail, the territory should be 
 made to lapse, and adoption should not be permitted, "f 
 and looking upon Mr. Willoughby's Minute as " a text- 
 book on adoptions/' could have given the Maharajah the 
 strong assurances that Lord Canning gave him ? Mr. 
 Willoughby, in a passage we have already quoted, ex- 
 pressed the greatest regret that two recent adoptions had 
 been permitted in the Scindia family, especially that of 
 the reigning Prince himself, and trusted that this "annoy- 
 ance" would be " discouraged" for the future. The Maha- 
 rajah and his Ministers, well versed in the Sattara Blue 
 Book, would never have ventured to visit Calcutta at all, 
 if Lord Dalhousie had remained there. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson says that if any "independent 
 Hindoo Sovereign" had been so "unreasonable," as to be 
 alarmed at the progress of annexation, "his fear might 
 have been removed by ten minutes' conversation with the 
 Resident at his Court. "J Mr. Marshman, also, with 
 singular accordance, maintains that " if any alarm had 
 arisen in the minds of the independent Princes, a few 
 words of explanation from the Resident would have been 
 sufficient to dispel it." 
 
 Mr. Marshman, I suspect, has had better means of 
 knowing the works and ways of the Calcutta Foreign 
 
 * Return to the House of Lords, Honours and Rewards to Native Princes, 
 , p. 94. f Ante, p. 18f>. 
 
 Ante, p. 181. History of India, vol. iii, p. 400. 
 
THE TEST OF PKE VISION. 245 
 
 Office, than Sir Charles Jackson. I must really appeal to 
 his candour to reconsider this very imaginative proposition. 
 Does he, on further reflection, mean deliberately to affirm 
 his belief that Lord Dalhousie would have permitted the 
 Resident at the Court of Scindia, Holkar, the Gaekwar, 
 the Rajah of Rewah, Kolapore, Travancore, or any one of 
 fifty other Princes that might be mentioned, to quiet the 
 apprehensions of a childless Sovereign by an assurance, 
 "in ten minutes' conversation/ 5 that the adoption of an 
 heir by himself or his widow would be recognised by the 
 Paramount Power ? Will he be so good as exert his 
 imagination a little more, and try to picture to himself 
 the reception Lord Dalhousie would have given in 1856 to 
 the report by any Resident of " a few words of explana- 
 tion" to that effect. I must ask Mr. Marshman to tax his 
 memory a little. Does he really mean to assert that, 
 between 1853 and the end of 1856, when he and his 
 successor in the editorial chair, whom Lord Dalhousie 
 thanked for " the fairness with which" he had "set" his 
 Lordship's " public acts before the community," and for 
 "the frequent support given to his measures,"* were 
 constantly ringing "the knell of the Princes of India," f 
 and declaring that " the two hundred and fifty Kinglings 
 must inevitably and speedily disappear," + Lord Dalhousie 
 himself would have calmed the fears of those two hundred 
 and fifty Kinglings, (with the exception of Mysore, and 
 perhaps " one or two others of minor account, ") and 
 would have offered them such reassurances as Lord Canning 
 offered to Scindia, or would have sanctioned the offer of 
 such reassurances by the Residents at their Courts ? No, 
 now that I have refreshed his memory, Mr. Marshman 
 no more believes it than I do. 
 
 Scindia would not have gone to Calcutta, nor would 
 Colonel Macpherson have advised him to take such a step, 
 if Lord Dalhousie had remained there. If, however, the 
 Maharajah had summoned up resolution, in spite of all 
 the discouragement that would have been thrown in his 
 way, to visit the Governor-General, and had ventured to 
 give full expression, as he did to Lord Canning, to his 
 fears for " the stability of his House and rule," there can 
 
 * Ante, p. 200. f Ante, p. 198. J Ante, p. 197. Ante, p. 182. 
 
246 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 be little doubt as to the treatment he would have expe- 
 rienced. He would have been treated as the Rajah of 
 Puttiala was, when he visited Calcutta in 1855, and pre- 
 sumed to bring forward a grievance, and even to speak 
 of appealing to London. The Mahratta Rajah, if not more 
 easily silenced, would have been told, as the Sikh Rajah 
 was, that if he did not go home immediately, and mind 
 his own affairs, his country would be sequestrated, and 
 managed for him by a British officer. Probably he would 
 have been reminded, in that grand and statesmanlike style, 
 so much admired by some people, that the Governor- 
 General could "crush him at his will. 7 '* 
 
 Not only have we no reason whatever to believe that if 
 Lord Dalhousie had not retired when he did, he would 
 have been more able to meet and quell the rebellion of 
 1857 than his successor, but we have every reason to 
 believe that his presence at Calcutta would have aggra- 
 vated its perils and horrors immeasurably, by inflaming 
 our enemies, giving strength to adventurous spirits, and 
 paralysing the conservative interests of the country. It 
 is highly improbable that the Native Princes in general 
 would have behaved so well towards our Government, if 
 the destroyer of so many of them had remained at the 
 head of affairs. 
 
 * As Lord Dalhousie told the Nizam, see Empire in India, p. 348. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MERITS AND MOTIVES. 
 
 IF then, it may be asked, you refuse credit to the Marquis 
 of Dalhousie as a constructive and progressive statesman 
 in time of peace, and even as an energetic and skilful 
 ruler in time of war, what position do you assign him ? 
 Do you deny him all merit whatever ? Do you question 
 his great abilities ? Certainly not. The description given 
 of him by the Duke of Argyll seems to me to be just and 
 accurate, so far as it goes, with the exception of two words. 
 "Lord Dalhousie," says his friend, "had large views, a 
 rapid intellect, indefatigable industry, admirable habits of 
 business, great self-reliance. He was a vigorous writer, 
 and had the faculty of ready speech/'* All this may be 
 conceded except the " large views." Lord Dalhousie had 
 not large views ; his views were invariably the nearest 
 and the narrowest possible. Will any one point out some 
 of Lord Dalhousie's large views ? 
 
 Lord Dalhousie was a clever, energetic public function- 
 ary, with considerably power of expression. Under a con- 
 stitutional Government, with a watchful, we]l-informed 
 public opinion to keep him and his colleagues in the right 
 path, he might have been an efficient Minister. In a 
 secondary position he might have been a valuable public 
 servant. He was quite unfit to be Master anywhere, even 
 with all the checks and restraints of a free country. In 
 spite of the Duke of Argyll's suggestions of " the sacri- 
 fice he made in accepting even that ' Imperial appoint- 
 ment' which is the greatest office England has to give, 
 except the Government of herself," f I do not believe 
 he had either the tact, or the temper, or the earnest- 
 ness to guide a Cabinet, to hold a party together, 
 f 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 67. f Ibid., p. 67. 
 
248 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 or to manage a popular assembly. His overweening self- 
 confidence and intolerance of opposition would have soon 
 struck him out of the list of leaders. But he was deficient 
 in more solid qualities. He had no originality, and no 
 foresight. He neither penetrated causes, nor calculated 
 consequences. He was manifestly incapable of taking a 
 larger view of any proposed measure than the merely 
 empirical view of a professional functionary. All his 
 declared purposes were superficial, all the means he em- 
 ployed to effect them, were mechanical. 
 
 In the state-papers of almost every Governor-General 
 since Warren Hastings, we obtain now and then a glimpse 
 of some great principles of government, something that 
 betokens an insight into human character, into the feelings 
 and interests of the strange people, whose ancient civilisa- 
 tion and complicated forms of society must be so largely 
 modified by the extension of British supremacy. Nothing 
 of the sort can be found in the political Minutes of Lord 
 Dalhousie. You may search them in vain for a single 
 new idea, for a single striking thought, for one word of 
 generous regret, or genial hope, for anything but the 
 peculiar dialectics, at once peremptory and tortuous, by 
 which he made out his case for annexation, and the cold- 
 hearted, formal arrangements by which his plan was to be 
 carried out. He abolished a Kingdom as coolly, and with 
 as little compunction, as he abolished a Board. This was 
 much admired at Calcutta during the last three years of 
 his administration ; but it was simply a proof of those 
 imperfect sympathies and that total blindness to everything 
 but some immediate, showy result, which are utterly irre- 
 coricileable with any pretension to statesmanship. 
 
 Of course when Lord Dalhousie had determined on annex- 
 ing a Native State, after positively declining to undertake 
 its reform, because he objected to "the labour and anxiety," 
 without "the benefit of increased revenue,"* he dropped 
 a few commonplaces as to "the real good" of the uncom- 
 plaining inhabitants, " whose best interests, we sincerely 
 believe, will be promoted by the uniform application of our 
 system of government ;"t and Sir Charles Jackson reminds 
 us that in his Nagpore Minute, Lord Dalhousie observed : 
 
 * Ante, pp. 69 and 72. 
 
MERITS AXD MOTIVES. 249 
 
 " 
 
 I place the interests of the people of Nagpore foremost 
 among the considerations which induce me to advise that that 
 State should now pass under British Government ; for I conscien- 
 tiously declare that unless I believed that the prosperity and hap- 
 piness of its inhabitants would be promoted by their being placed 
 permanently under British rule, no other advantages which could 
 arise out of the measure would move me to propose it."* 
 
 Mere decency required some such declaration as this; be- 
 sides which there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the 
 avowal. It was the conscientious belief none the less be- 
 cause it upheld their personal and class interests and pro- 
 fessional prejudices of all those who surrounded him at 
 Calcutta. But no one can pay much attention to Lord Dal- 
 housie's Minutes without perceiving, apart from his refu- 
 sal to reform Native States, that administrative improve- 
 ment was a very secondary consideration compared with the 
 acquisition of territory and revenue. Except in the case 
 of Oude, which obviously required very delicate treat- 
 ment and a careful avoidance of all suggestion of its being 
 a profitable affair, he never dwelt much on " the inesti- 
 mable blessings" which, in the official cant of the day. 
 were to be conferred on the new subjects, but always on 
 the immense material advantages he was about to acquire 
 for his own Government, " a secure and profitable pos- 
 session," " increase of re venue, "t " additional resources to 
 the public treasury," " consolidation of our military 
 strength, "J " enlarged commercial resources," "a steady 
 and full supply of cotton wool," such were the true 
 incitements to annexation, some of them utterly frivolous, 
 all falsified in the result- 
 
 Mr. Marshman affords us, in the following anecdote, a 
 fair opportunity of measuring the height and depth of 
 Lord Dalhousie's genius, his lofty aim, the broad range of 
 his Imperial vision. 
 
 ' ' When Mr. Cobden, soon after the conquest" of Pegu, " pub- 
 lished a pamphlet to denounce its iniquity, Lord Dalhousie re- 
 marked to a friend, ' the British nation will one day find that Pegu 
 pays, and the crime of having placed it under British protection 
 will be condoned/ "|| 
 
 * A Vindication, p. 21. t Ante, pp. 98, 171. 
 
 J Ante, p. 221, and Papers, Berar, 1854, p. 36. 
 
 A Vindication, pp. 39 and 41. 
 
 || Marshman's History of India, vol. iii, p. 375. 
 
'2')0 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 When we call to mind the historian's antecedents as 
 Editor of the Friend of India, we are less surprised at the 
 innocent unconsciousness with which he strips the gilt off 
 his hero's policy, and exposes the common idol of their 
 political faith in all its sordid nudity. It pays ! How 
 little did Lord Dalhousie, the official clique and their 
 organ at Calcutta, know of the standard of national mo- 
 rality by which Mr. Cobden, and ultimately the British 
 people, would judge their proceedings ! How little does 
 the veteran partisan of annexation understand it now ! 
 
 The anecdote is too characteristic for us to doubt its 
 authenticity. Whether these words actually escaped Lord 
 Dalhousie's lips on this, and on several other occasions, 
 (as has been said,) or not,* they strike the key-note of his 
 acquisitive policy. With whatever variations and accom- 
 paniments, his Minutes are all set to that tune. It pays ! 
 And the English officials and journalists of India, with a 
 few noble exceptions, all joined in the chorus. It pays ! 
 
 But it did not pay. With this very low aim, and this 
 very short range, he missed his mark. Before the Rebellion 
 came, with its forty millions of debt, augmented expendi- 
 ture, clumsy experiments in taxation, and financial diffi- 
 culties of which we see only the beginning, the balance 
 sheet, if fairly analysed, had condemned Lord Dalhousie's 
 policy. It did not put money in our purse ; and by 
 destroying our good name and moral influence throughout 
 India, it made us poor indeed. 
 
 An undignified, ungenerous tone, unworthy of the 
 kingly place he occupied, characterises all Lord Dalhou- 
 sie's dealings with the great families he dispossessed. It 
 proves much more than a want of magnanimity, it proves, 
 as Mr. Kaye has well expressed it, that he " had no ima- 
 gination," and thus never came to " understand the genius 
 of the people among whom his lot was cast." 
 
 " He could not understand the tenacity of affection with 
 which they cling to their old traditions. He could not sympa- 
 thise with the veneration which they felt for their ancient dynas- 
 ties. He could not appreciate their fidelity to the time-honoured 
 institutions and the immemorial usages of the land. 
 
 * It has never before, to my knowledge, been said by any of his friends. 
 Without Mr. Marshman's corroboration, I should never have thought of im- 
 puting it to him, " Save me from my friends." 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 251 
 
 " With, the characteristic unimaginativeness of his race, he could 
 not for a moment divest himself of his individuality, or conceive 
 the growth of ancestral pride and national honour in other breasts 
 than those of the Campbells and the Ramsays."* 
 
 This was not the man to rule an Empire. Incalculable 
 heart-burnings and indignation were excited throughout 
 Northern India, and among all the Mahomedans as far 
 South as Hyderabad, by his ungenerous treatment of the 
 King of Delhi. The abolition of the Royal dignity 
 at the demise of the reigning King, which he recom- 
 mended, was disapproved by the Court of Directors, 
 but still left to his discretion. The plea which he ad- 
 vanced to strengthen his recommendation, and to en- 
 force the removal of the next King and his family from 
 the Palace at Delhi, and the reduction of their privi- 
 leges, was eminently characteristic of his habitual use of 
 words of equivocal meaning, or of no meaning, if they 
 seemed to give a specious legality to some measure of con- 
 fiscation. He said that the King's eldest son having sud- 
 denly died, the heir apparent to the Crown was " not born 
 in the purple"^ As if that insignificant term, borrowed 
 from the phraseology of the Greek Empire, could weaken 
 the claim of the Prince in question ! 
 
 No argument in favour of Lord Dalhousie's proposal 
 can be drawn from the point made so much of by the 
 Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson, that the presence 
 of the House of Timour at Delhi " gave to the mutineers 
 a standard and a name, and the semblance at least of a 
 political object." J 
 
 Without any necessity for going into the question of 
 our obligations to the House of Timour, or of their obliga- 
 tions to us, their existence was a great fact with which 
 the Viceroy had to deal, or to let it alone. There was 
 the King at Delhi, in possession of certain revenues and 
 privileges, surrounded by a tribe of relatives. Lord Dal- 
 housie did not propose to annihilate them, but only to 
 annoy them. He did not propose to make them state- 
 prisoners, or to remove them to some safer locality, but 
 merely to turn them out of their Palace. 
 
 * The Sepoy War, vol. i, pp. 356, 357. 
 
 t Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 1856, para. 41, p. 11. 
 
 $ India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 97. 
 
252 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The vast advantage gained by the mutineers in the 
 unresisted occupation of Delhi and possession of the King's 
 person, was thrown into their hands, not by any error that 
 Lord Dalhousie's proposal would have counteracted, but 
 by the strange neglect that left Delhi, the centre of his- 
 toric glory and political change, ungiiarded by European 
 troops. 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, ever vigilant both as a soldier and 
 a statesman, observed in 1844 : 
 
 " The Treasury at Delhi is in the city, as is the Magazine ; the 
 latter is in a sort of fort, a very defenceless building, outside of 
 which in the street, we understand, a party of Sepoys was placed, 
 when the news of the Cabul disasters arrived. We might take 
 a circuit of the country and show how unmindful we have been 
 that what occurred in the city of Cabul may, some day, occur at 
 Delhi, Benares, or Bareilly."* 
 
 The wretched old King was certainly unprepared for 
 the actual outbreak ; he was from first to last a mere tool 
 in the hands of the mutineers. And if the Princes in 
 general threw in their lot with the rebels, it must not be 
 forgotten that they were naturally exasperated by Lord 
 Dalhousie's recent and impending decree for their removal 
 and degradation. The rumour of that ill-advised measure 
 had spread throughout India, and, taken in conjunction 
 with many similar acts, had done a great deal to excite 
 disaffection. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson observes that Lord Dalhousie ad- 
 vised the abolition of the Nawabship of the Carnatic, be- 
 cause " a Court at the Presidency, though destitute of 
 authority and power, must be inimical, or at all events 
 discontented, and capable of being made a nucleus for in- 
 trigue." These were the Governor-General's words, and 
 his apologist adds : " The conduct of the titular Sove- 
 reign of Delhi in 1857, and the gathering of the disaffected 
 around that shadow of the Great Mogul, have sufficiently 
 illustrated the wisdom of these remarks.'^ 
 
 He forgets that Lord Dalhousie did not propose to tie 
 up the Wallajah family in sacks and throw them into the 
 sea, to keep them in Madras Jail, or to dispose of them by 
 
 * Essays, p. 51. f A Vindication, p. 105. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 253 
 
 any safe process that would have prevented them from 
 forming " a nucleus for intrigue." He could not get rid 
 of them ; he only turned them out of their Palace, and re- 
 duced them to comparative beggary. Lord Dalhousie said 
 that they "must be inimical, or at all events discontented," 
 a perfectly groundless imputation, but Sir Charles 
 Jackson himself can hardly deny that Lord Dalhousie took 
 the best means in his power to make them " inimical and 
 discontented." 
 
 If during the crisis of 1857 Prince Azeem Jah, de jure 
 Nawab of the Carnatic, instead of using all his influence 
 to suppress the fanatical spirit among the Mussulman popu- 
 lation of the Carnatic,* had formed "a nucleus of intrigue/' 
 or had become as openly "inimical" as the Princes of 
 Delhi were, that would not have " illustrated the wisdom 
 of Lord Dalhousie's remarks." It would simply have 
 proved that bad faith and political ingratitude had pro- 
 duced their natural results, had converted friends into 
 foes, had transformed a centre of conservatism into a nest 
 of conspiracy. 
 
 I am not at all called upon to go into the Carnatic ques- 
 tion here. Sir Charles Jackson, Mr. Marshman and other 
 vindicators have adhered to their usual course of quoting 
 and paraphrasing the official papers, without attempting 
 to deal with the arguments on the other side.t 
 
 I will, however, endeavour, to set those right who have 
 been persuaded that the Treaty of 1801, made with Azeern- 
 ood-Dowlah, the father of Prince Azeem Jah, is a personal 
 Treaty, because it does not contain the words "heirs and 
 successors." Article II of that Treaty expressly "confirms 
 and renews " the old Treaties which contain ample guaran- 
 ties of succession to the Nawab Wallajah's " heirs and 
 successors." Lord Dalhousie, indeed, with that marvellous 
 audacity of assertion which succeeded so well with his 
 private conclave of three or four well-disposed Councillors, 
 wrote as follows : 
 
 * In a despatch of September 1st, 1858. the Court of Directors mentioned 
 as one reason for increasing the stipend offered to Prince Azeem Jah, " the in- 
 fluence of his name and position over the numerous Mahomedan population of 
 Madras, and the excellent conduct of that population during our recent diffi- 
 culties." 
 
 t The Empire in India, Chapters on The Carnatic, and The Musnud in 
 Abeyance, and also Chapter xvii, Rights and Titles. 
 
254 CHAPTEH IX. 
 
 " In the determination of tlie future disposal of the Musnud of 
 the Carnatic, it is quite unnecessary to make any reference to the 
 Treaties of 1785, 1787 and 1792. Subsequently to the date of 
 those Treaties, it was declared by the British Government that 
 the detected treachery, and secret but active hostility of the 
 Nawabs Mahomed Ali and Omdut-ool-Oomra, had placed them in 
 the position of public enemies, had rendered their territories justly 
 liable to forfeiture, and had, therefore, abrogated the Treaties 
 which had previously been in force."* 
 
 And then lie proceeds to quote two passages from Lord 
 Wellesley's Despatches in which there is not one word as 
 to the Treaties being abrogated. No such declaration in 
 fact was ever made anywhere before 1856. We have only 
 to contrast Lord Dalhousie's assertion with Article II of 
 the Treaty of 1801, and we shall see at a glance that the 
 former is quite contrary to the truth. Lord Dalhousie 
 states that the old Treaties were " abrogated" and that no 
 reference can now be made to them. Article II of the 
 Treaty of 1801 "confirms and renews such parts of the 
 Treaties heretofore concluded between the East India Com- 
 pany and their Highnesses, heretofore Nabobs of the Car- 
 natic, as are calculated to strengthen the alliance, to 
 cement the friendship, and to identify the interests of the 
 contracting parties. "f This confirmation appears to me to 
 be the very reverse of abrogation. 
 
 By the Preamble of the same Treaty the Nawab Azeem- 
 ood-Dowlah, father of the present claimant, was " estab- 
 lished by the East India Company in the rank, property 
 and possessions of his ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of the 
 Carnatic" ; and by Article I, "in the state and rank, with 
 the dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors." The 
 state and rank of his ancestor, the Nawab Wallajah, with 
 whom the first Treaty was made, was that of hereditary 
 Nawab and Sovereign of the Carnatic. The Proclamation 
 issued by the Government on the 31st July, 1801, to the 
 Zemindars and people of the Carnatic, expressly states that 
 Azeem-ood-Dowlah " has succeeded to the hereditary rights 
 of his father, and by full acknowledgment of the Honour- 
 able Company, to the possession of the said Musnud. "J 
 
 * Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 47. 
 
 t Collection of Treaties, Calcutta (Longmans, London) vol. v, p. 249. 
 
 t Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 105. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 253 
 
 The Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlali, his eldest son Azum 
 Jah, and his grandson, Gholam Mahomed Ghous Khan, were 
 successively recognised and proclaimed as Sovereigns of the 
 Carnatic and as Allies of the British Government. When 
 the late Nawab, then an infant, succeeded his father, who 
 died on the 12th November 1825, a letter was addressed 
 by the Court of Directors to Prince Azeem Jah, the present 
 claimant, on his being appointed Regent during the mino- 
 rity of his nephew, from which the following extract is 
 taken : 
 
 " The accession of Ghoolam Mahomed Grhous Khan Bahadoor, 
 the legitimate son of the late Nabob, to the throne of his ancestors, 
 we readily confirmed, and we pray God that he may long live to 
 enjoy the honours and perpetuate the line of the ancient and illustri- 
 ous family of which he is the descendant and heir" 
 
 A letter of similar purport was sent to the Prince by 
 His Majesty King George IV, countersigned by Lord 
 Ellenborough, as President of the Board of Control, in 
 which the following words occur : 
 
 " We cannot but admire the beneficent dispensation of Provi- 
 dence, which in taking from his Highness his illustrious father, 
 our friend, has given to him in your Highness a second father, 
 endowed with equal virtues, and capable of maintaining in the 
 splendour and dignity which are its inheritance , the illustrious House 
 of the Nabobs of the Carnatic." 
 
 Moreover, during the life-time of his nephew, Prince 
 Azeem Jah had been officially recognised in public docu- 
 ments as the heir presumptive of the Musnud. In 1829, 
 on the occasion of the appointment of Mr. Scott to be 
 Physician to the Nawab, the Court of Directors wrote as 
 follows : 
 
 " We disapprove of the principle of this arrangement, but under 
 the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Nawab being an infant 
 and in delicate health, and the Naib-i-Mookhtar (Azeem Jah) 
 being the next heir, in case of his demise, the appointment of Mr. 
 Scott admits of justification."* 
 
 And in 1843, when the list of persons claiming exemp- 
 tion from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was 
 revised, the Governor (the Marquis of Tweeddale) in 
 Council observed, 
 
 * Carnatic Papers, I860, p. 15. 
 
2.36 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 " His Highness the Prince Azeem Jah Bahadur (the late Naib- 
 i-Mokhtar) does not hold that place in list No. 1, to which he is 
 entitled, in consideration of the position he has lately occupied in 
 communication with the British Government, and of that which 
 he still holds in relation to his Highness the Nawab, and to his 
 succession to the Husmid. It is, therefore, resolved, that the name 
 of Prince Azeem Jah be placed first on the list of such relations 
 of his Highness."* 
 
 Lord Dalhousie treated these unequivocal acknowledg- 
 ments of the Nawab's dignity being hereditary, and of 
 Prince Azeem Jah being next in succession, in the following 
 elevated style, a good specimen of the political casuistry 
 which he found so cruelly effective : 
 
 " To indicate an expectation, or even an intention, is not to 
 recognise or confer a right. The words, therefore, which have 
 been quoted, conferred no right on Azeem Jah, and conveyed no 
 pledge or promise of the succession to him ; and, although they 
 indicated a favourable intention on the part of the Government 
 towards him, the Government has since had but too much reason 
 to forego all such intentions in favour of himself, and the members 
 of his family. "f 
 
 He completely misconceives the effect of these incidental 
 admissions of hereditary right. Undoubtedly to indicate 
 an expectation or an intention does not confer a right, 
 but it constitutes the plainest admission possible of an 
 existing right. Prince Azeem Jah never professed to 
 found his claim on those incidental admissions. He based 
 his right on the Treaties concluded with his ancestors and 
 his father, and produced these documents simply to prove 
 what was the actual construction put upon those Treaties, 
 only five years before Lord Dalhousie s arrival in India, 
 by those British authorities who now, under Lord Dal- 
 housie's instructions, sought to deny their validity. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie says that "the words which have been 
 quoted, indicated a favourable intention of the Govern- 
 ment towards" Prince Azeem Jah. They indicated nothing 
 of the sort. There is not the least suggestion of grace or 
 favour, of good or bad feeling in either of the documents. 
 They are perfectly cold and formal. The position of Prince 
 Azeem Jah as heir presumptive is mentioned as an ordinary 
 matter of fact, applicable to the matter in hand, and open 
 
 * Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 9. ^ Ibid., p. 35. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 257 
 
 to no doubt or question. Lord Dalhousie gratuitously 
 suggests that there was " a favourable intention" towards 
 the Nawab in 1843, in order that he may in some measure 
 account for the altered views of our Government in 1856. 
 He says : " The Government has since had too much 
 reason to forego all such intentions in favour of himself 
 and the members of his family." This imputation was 
 as unjust, and as ungenerous, as the previous one that 
 "they must be inimical, or at all events discontented." 
 The conduct of Prince Azeem Jah, of his nephew the 
 late Nawab, and the members of his family, in their 
 relations with our Government, since 1843, had been 
 
 Citively faultless. That Lord Harris and Lord Dal- 
 isie fancied they could add some strength to then- 
 case by introducing the utterly irrelevant and impertinent 
 question of the late Nawab's private morals and manners, 
 only shows how weak they felt that case to be when con- 
 fined within its true limits. That the late Nawab, not- 
 withstanding some redeeming features in his character, was 
 dissipated in his habits and reckless in his expenditure, 
 cannot, I believe, be denied. From his infancy he was the 
 Ward of our Government. Their utter and inexcusable 
 neglect to provide for his proper education, and to surround 
 him with suitable companions, was the incessant theme of 
 indignant remark among the enlightened natives of the 
 Presidency. His alleged loose morals, however, never led 
 to any public scandal, never caused the slightest incon- 
 venience or embarrassment to our Government. The ex- 
 tension by Lord Dalhousie of these injurious aspersions so 
 as to include Prince Azeem Jah " and the members of his 
 family," can only be adequately described as calumnious. 
 Prince Azeem Jah's private character has always been irre- 
 proachable. 
 
 What sort of reception would a Radical Member of 
 Parliament or journalist meet with, who should propose 
 to annul the hereditary sinecure, or pension, or charge 
 upon the Post Office or Excise revenues, or to resume the 
 Crown or Church lands, enjoyed by some noble family, on 
 the ground of the immoral life of the actual or late pos- 
 sessor ? And yet what comparison can there be between the 
 tenure of such possessions, held by a Royal grant or mere 
 
258 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 prescription, and of that which rests upon solemn treaties, 
 treaties, moreover, upon which alone depends our title 
 to occupy and govern the Carnatic, guaranteed by the 
 Treaty of Paris in 1763 to the Wallajah family. 
 
 There is not a family in India to which we are so deeply 
 indebted, to which we are bound by so many reiterated 
 promises, recorded in treaties, and confirmed by a series of 
 autograph Royal letters, as that of the Nawabs of the 
 Carnatic. As our power grew more secure, their support 
 became less necessary. The demands and encroachments 
 of the East India Company gradually increased, and are 
 marked by the successive Treaties. The relative positions 
 of the contracting parties were very peculiar, and hardly 
 compatible with the good government of Southern India 
 in settled times. Still, making every allowance for the 
 difficult situation, we did not treat the Wallajah family 
 well ; and having at last made an opportunity, in a manner 
 far from creditable to ourselves, in 1801, we extorted from 
 them a new Treaty, by which all executive and adminis- 
 trative power was resigned into the hands of the British 
 Government. 
 
 We might have been satisfied now. No one thought 01 
 disturbing that settlement until Lord Dalhousie arrived 
 in India. It struck him that it did not "pay" He ob- 
 served that " a large share of the public revenue" was 
 " allotted" to the Nawab.* In another part of the same 
 Minute he said that " no grant of anything is made by this 
 Treaty to any one but the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah 
 himself."")" Lord Dalhousie was very fond of calling a 
 Treaty a " grant. "J He misunderstands the Carnatic 
 Treaty of 1801 altogether. Nothing was granted by it to 
 any one but the East India Company. The Nawab was 
 the grantor, the Company was the grantee. Azeem-ood- 
 Dowlah being established in his ancestral possessions, 
 granted " the civil and military administration " of them 
 to the Honourable Company, a certain annual income being 
 " allotted," or rather reserved for the Nawab. Twenty 
 years after the date of that Treaty, during the reign of 
 
 * Minute of February 28th, 1856, para. 43, Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 50. 
 t Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 48. % Ante, p. 22. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 259 
 
 Azeem-ood-Dowlah's son, Sir Thomas Munro, then Gover- 
 nor of Madras, wrote as follows : 
 
 By the -first Article" (of the Treaty of 1801) "the Nawaub 
 Azeem-ul-Dowlah Bahadoor is formally established in the state 
 and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon,, of his ancestors. 
 
 " By the 3rd Article the Nawaub does not relinquish his sove- 
 reignty; he merely renews the Article of former treaties, by 
 which he engages not to correspond with foreign States without 
 the consent of the Company. 
 
 " By the fifth Article, one fifth part of the net revenue of the 
 Carnatic is allowed for ' the maintenance and support of the said 
 Nawaub/ 
 
 " The fifth part is his claim as Sovereign of the whole Car- 
 natic. 
 
 ' ' By the tenth Article, the rank of the Nawaub as a Prince and 
 as an Ally of the British Government, is declared. No change 
 in the political situation of the Nawaub has taken place since 1801. 
 He is still Prince of the Carnatic, and he is a party to the Treaty 
 by which one-fifth part of the revenue is secured to him." * 
 
 Lord Hastings describes in his Private Journal an inter- 
 view he had in 1813 with the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah 
 and his four sons, one of whom was Prince Azeem Jah. 
 When the Nawab, by an expressive Oriental obeisance, 
 threw himself and his children under the protection of the 
 Governor-General, Lord Hastings observes that he felt the 
 most lively emotion, "from the reflection on the altered 
 state of that family through its adherence to British inte- 
 rests, a family so grievously humiliated by us." The 
 Nawab, says Lord Hastings, "having adverted to the 
 Treaty, and professed his anxiety for an assurance that I 
 should cause its provisions to be observed," " I answered 
 that a treaty plighted the faith of the nation, so that it 
 must be my duty to maintain its terms according to their 
 true spirit, which ought always to be construed most 
 favourably for the party whose sole dependence was on 
 the honour of the other, "f 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's views as to the construction of Indian 
 Treaties differed widely from those of his gallant predeces- 
 sor. Far from agreeing with him, and, I may add, with 
 all writers on International Law, that Treaties should 
 
 * Gleig's Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. ii, p. 356. 
 f Private Journal, (1858) vol. ii, p. 11. 
 
 S2 
 
260 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 always be construed most favourably for the weaker party, 
 he seems to have adopted, perhaps he originated, the Duke 
 of Argyll's formula, that they " expressed nothing but the 
 will of a Superior imposing on his Vassal so much as for 
 the time it was thought expedient to require."* 
 
 It is an absolute certainty, not to be shaken by any 
 plausible misrepresentation, that before the death of the 
 late Nawab in 1855, when Lord Dalhousie wrote from 
 the Neilgherry Hills to Lord Harris at Madras that there 
 was "no direct heir to the Musnud"^ no doubt as to 
 the hereditary nature of the Nawab's dignity had ever 
 been expressed or hinted at by any British authority. No 
 word of grace or favour had ever been employed at either 
 of the two successions that had taken place since the 
 Treaty of 1801. Neither the phrase nor the idea of " a 
 personal Treaty," of binding force only during the life 
 of the present claimant's father, can be found in the 
 transactions of any Governor of Madras or Governor- 
 General, from Lord Wellesley down to Lord Hardinge. 
 
 In a Memorandum drawn up in 1806 by the Duke of 
 Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) for the informa- 
 tion of the Ministry, and as materials for a Parliamentary 
 defence of his brother, the Marquis Wellesley, it is ex- 
 pressly stated that the Treaty of 1801 was concluded so 
 that "the civil and military government of the Carnatic 
 was transferred for ever to the Company ; and the Nabob 
 Azeem-ood-Dowlah, and his heirs, were to preserve their 
 title and dignity, and to receive one-fifth part of the net 
 revenues of the country. "J Prince Azeem Jah is a son of 
 the Nabob Azeem-ood-Dowlah. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie wanted this " large share of the public 
 revenues. " Having determined on getting 'it by a per- 
 verse interpretation of the Treaty, never contemplated be- 
 fore, and which never has been, and never will be sanc- 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 11. 
 
 f Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 17. 
 
 J Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, vol. iv, pp. 564, 565 
 
 It may be as well to explain that although termed, for the diplomatic 
 purposes of the time, "a fifth share of the revenues of the Carnatic," a 
 Separate Explanatory Article transformed the Nawab's share into a fixed in- 
 come, which at the time of the late Nawab's death was not a fifteenth share. 
 Of course Sir Charles Jackson does not understand this. A Vindication, 
 p. 84. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 261 
 
 tioried by any jurist,* having decided on turning the 
 Wallajah family out of their Palace into the streets, he 
 raked in all the gutters of Madras for dirt to throw at 
 them. 
 
 And for what ? Is it necessary to say another word to 
 point out the utter imbecility of the notion that by mak- 
 ing an influential family poor and discontented you can 
 prevent it from becoming " a nucleus for intrigue "? 
 
 The deposition of the Wallajah family, viewed simply 
 as a question of political expediency, was a most short- 
 sighted and unstatesmanlike proceeding. Not only did it 
 bring great dishonour upon our Government, but it de- 
 prived us of a substantial security. It has shaken the 
 allegiance and estranged the feelings of a large section of 
 the people, a sober, orderly, and industrious class, whose 
 historical antecedents and progressive aspirations give them 
 a more important place in the social equilibrium of India 
 than might seem warranted by their comparative numbers. 
 So closely does the reception of all questions of law and 
 politics among the Mussulman community depend upon 
 religious considerations, so accustomed are they, in the 
 absence of a priesthood, to pay the profoundest deference 
 in such matters to the decision of the highest established 
 dignitary of their own faith, that it was an inestimable 
 advantage to our Government to have a person of Princely 
 rank, associated with us by ancient ties, traditionally and 
 habitually attached to British interests, placed at the head 
 of the Mahomedans of Southern India, as their Imaum or 
 religious leader. Residing at one of the great centres of 
 our power, with so much to lose, and so little to expect 
 
 * The following opinion of Mr. Lush, Q.C., (now Mr. Justice Lush) refers 
 to much longer and more elaborate Opinions by Sir Travers Twiss, now the 
 Queen's Advocate, and the Hon. J. B. Norton, Advocate- General and Member 
 of the Legislative Council at Madras. u I entirely concur in the opinions ex- 
 pressed by Dr. Twiss and Mr. Norton, that the Treaty is an enduring contract, 
 binding on both sides, so long as there exists any member of the family of the 
 Nabob Azeem-ul-Dowlah capable of succeeding to the rank. And I come to 
 this conclusion upon consideration of the terms of the Treaty itself, read with 
 reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and without regard to 
 the Letter, Proclamation and Despatch which followed it. These documents, 
 however, might be called in aid, were the language of the Treaty ambiguous, 
 as a contemporaneous exposition of its meaning. But whether read with or 
 without them, it does not appear to me to admit of any other construction than 
 that contended for by His Highness Azeem Jah." 
 
 Temple, December 1st, 1864. (Signed) ROBERT LUSH. 
 
262 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 from any disturbance or change, he could not be other- 
 wise than conservative in politics and moderate in religion. 
 The ruin of the Wallajah family has operated to the 
 detriment of our Imperial system in various directions, 
 and these evil effects will be aggravated rather than dimi- 
 nished by the lapse of years. The Mahomedans in gene- 
 ral are indignant and disgusted at seeing their spiritual 
 Chief, the patron and guardian of their religious rites, 
 impoverished and degraded by the British Government. 
 How much these feelings are embittered, and to what a 
 
 O 
 
 large extent they are shared by the Hindoos of the Car- 
 natic, in consequence of the question of Sovereignty, set 
 at rest under the last Treaty, being stirred up again by 
 our "flagrant breach of faith, is well understood by those 
 who are best able to inquire. 
 
 But this is not all. It may be difficult for many of us 
 to commiserate a man with an income of 15,000 a year, 
 the increased stipend offered to Prince Azeem Jan.* For 
 several years, however, he refused to touch it, and was at 
 last reduced to draw sums on account, only under pro- 
 test, and by the sheer starvation of his servants and 
 small creditors. And it must be remembered that this 
 stipend was merely a life income for a man nearly seventy 
 years of age, with four sons, a tribe of near relatives, and 
 innumerable hereditary adherents and dependents. The 
 Nawab's annual revenue had been about 120,000. When, 
 therefore, the representative head of this great family 
 was reduced to penury, the Palace converted into Public 
 Offices, the Hoyal establishments broken up, and all that 
 " pageantry and buffoonery" abolished which offends the 
 Duke of Argyll's severer tastes, the occupation of many a 
 Mussulman of stalwart frame or ready wit, was gone. We 
 had no place for him ; he had "no claim on the considera- 
 tion of Government." Some few may learn to dig ; some, 
 especially the old, are not ashamed to beg ; but all those 
 of a higher spirit and of the best qualifications, went off, 
 sooner or later, to Hyderabad. Doctors of the Law, profes- 
 sors of Arabic learning and science, men of the sword and 
 of the pen, pedants and swash-bucklers, if you will, 
 found no refuge nearer than the Nizam's Dominions. A 
 * Lord Dalhousie proposed 10,000 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 263 
 
 good riddance ! it may be said. Indeed ! They were well 
 in hand at Madras, employed, tolerably contented, and 
 under control. Lord Dalhousie's policy has thrown them, 
 a most unwelcome burden, on the Nizam's resources,- for 
 many of them brought claims and recommendations that a 
 Mussulman Sovereign could not resist, and it may easily 
 be conceived what pleasing pictures of British rule they 
 must have brought with them, and what grateful senti- 
 ments towards the Paramount Power they are likely to 
 entertain and to propagate. There were quite enough of 
 these classes at Hyderabad, without these hungry refu- 
 gees from Madras to swell the crowd and to heighten dis- 
 affection. 
 
 The Nawab of the Carnatic in our hands was a very 
 serviceable instrument : the attractions of his Court most 
 usefully counterbalanced, to some extent, the preponderat- 
 ing influence exercised by the Nizam over the Mussulman, 
 population of the South. The British Government, under 
 Lord Dalhousie's guidance, has done its best to transform 
 this preponderating influence into an absolute and undi- 
 vided supremacy, to suppress old rivalries and jealousies 
 which were by no means injurious to the cause of order, 
 and to set up in their stead new sympathies and common 
 grievances, to knit more closely the social and religious 
 ties between the Deccan and the Carnatic, and to make 
 Hyderabad the centre of political and religious thought 
 and authority, to which the eyes of all Southern Maho- 
 medans are henceforth to be turned. 
 
 For results such as these, so honourable and so advan- 
 tageous to Great Britain and to India, the family of our 
 oldest Ally was degraded and despoiled. It may serve as 
 a fair specimen of Lord Dalhousie's statesmanship. We 
 shall be told perhaps, that " it paid." Well the Indian 
 Exchequer has been deriving an apparent profit every 
 year of rather more than 50,000 by repudiating the 
 Treaty, and if Lord Dalhousie's arrangements were main- 
 tained, the annual gain would increase as the life-pensions 
 lapsed. 
 
 But can Lord Dalhousie's arrangements be maintained ? 
 Have they been maintained ? Prince Azeem Jah's stipend 
 was increased by one-half in 1858, without the effect of 
 
264 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 inducing him to renounce his rights. A large grant of 
 money has more recently been made for the payment of 
 his debts, and it is understood that some plan of compro- 
 mise is now under consideration by which a hereditary 
 title with a permanent annual income will be settled on 
 him and his heirs. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson says that " the Government under- 
 took to pay the Nawab's debts."* The Nawab's debts 
 amounted to nearly 400,000, or about three years' income, 
 and could, of course, have been easily paid off by good man- 
 agement, which it was always within the power of our Go- 
 vernment to enforce. Those debts were contracted on the 
 credit of the Nawab's revenue, and when our Government 
 was pleased to sequestrate that revenue, they were clearly 
 bound to answer for the debts. But they were not satis- 
 fied with the revenue ; they confiscated everything that 
 could be turned into cash. All the lands, gardens, buildings 
 and personal property belonging to the family, every relic 
 and heirloom, down to the musnud of state and other in- 
 signia of the Nawab's dignity, were either appropriated to 
 the purposes of our Government, or sold for their benefit. 
 In this way about 350,000, nearly the amount of the 
 debts, was raised. The principal Palace where Prince 
 Azeem Jah was born, and the last three Nawabs, his father, 
 brother and nephew, died, is turned into a range of Pub- 
 lic Offices, while the Prince is compelled to pay a heavy 
 rent for one of the minor residences, granted for his use by 
 the late Nawab, and which he has occupied for the last 
 forty years. Sir Charles Jackson must have been quite 
 unaware of these facts when he gave our Government 
 credit for having paid the Nawab's debts. 
 
 Credit and praise for what is represented as unexampled 
 liberality and generosity, are often demanded for our Go- 
 vernment, and especially for Lord Dalhousie, on grounds 
 quite as insufficient as in that of the Carnatic. Thus the 
 Duke of Argyll, after declaring that in the case of Sattara, 
 "private rights and private property were not called in 
 question," adds : 
 
 1 ' Lord Dalhousie not only admitted the adopted boy to be the 
 * A Vindication, p. 105. 
 
MEEITS AND MOTIVES. 265 
 
 Bajah's private heir, but he went out of his way to recommend 
 that a special allowance should be assigned to him by the Govern- 
 ment of India." * 
 
 Surely Lord Dalhousie did not go "out of his way" very 
 far, when he recommended that some provision should be 
 made for the adopted son and heir, according to the law of 
 the land, of a friendly Prince, exemplary in all his public 
 relations towards us and his subjects, whose territories we 
 had confiscated, and whose Civil List, almost the only 
 source of income to the Royal family, we had suppressed. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson writes as follows : " Lord Dal- 
 housie never disputed the validity of adoptions as such. 
 He never denied their alleged spiritual effect," this was, 
 indeed, truly liberal ! " and nothing he said or did could 
 affect their validity as acts done in the performance of a 
 religious duty. He recognised them as facts, and was 
 careful to give effect to them so far as the private pro- 
 perty of these Princes was concerned, "f 
 
 Lord Dalhousie frequently made much more liberal pro- 
 fessions than he was prepared to carry into practice. 
 Whatever he may have said, it is certain that he was not 
 " careful to give effect" to the rules for the proper reten- 
 tion or descent of private property in the several instances 
 of acquisitions of territory and revenue. 
 
 On every occasion, including the Punjaub, there was 
 more or less spoliation of private property. Of the Car- 
 natic confiscations we have already spoken. Notwithstand- 
 ing the confident assertions of the two apologists, it is quite 
 certain that the whole of the Sattara Rajah's plate, jewels 
 and other personal property, was not given to his adopted 
 son. Lord Dalhousie himself tells us that the Honourable 
 Court, w r ho, we cannot doubt, merely approved and con- 
 firmed, as usual, the suggestions from India, " while they 
 declared their desire to provide liberally for the Sattara 
 family, and their wish that the ladies" not, be it observed, 
 the adopted son, "should retain jewels, furniture and 
 other personal property suitable to their rank, still objected 
 that so much property which was fairly at the disposal 
 of the Government, was greatly in excess of what was 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 29. t A Vindication, p. 8. 
 
266 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 required."* And he employed this case as a precedent 
 for the spoliation of the Nagpore Palace. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson devotes a whole Chapter of his 
 Vindication to the defence of Lord Dalhousie from the 
 charge of having despoiled the Bhonsla family of Nag- 
 pore. I have already treated that subject very fully, but 
 Sir Charles Jackson, though quoting me two or three 
 times, does not attempt to deal with my arguments, f 
 
 I showed that although the sum realised by the sale of 
 the personal property of the Bhonsla family, and the 
 seizure of their private treasure, only amounted to about 
 270,000, Lord Dalhousie had good reason to expect a 
 much larger sum, and that, according to his plan, 
 
 " The private personal property of the Bhonsla family, computed 
 by Mr. Mansel at some fifty-five or sixty lakhs of rupees" (550,000 
 or 600,000,) " was declared to be the first source from which the 
 Ranees' life-annuities were to be supplied, and it was only in case 
 of any deficiency that the annexing Government was to be called 
 upon to bear any part of the expense. In short, the private pro- 
 perty was sequestrated and sold, to provide the public stipends 
 granted as compensation for the loss of their sovereignty ; their 
 capital was confiscated, their valuables sold by auction, and life- 
 annuities were conferred upon them out of the proceeds !"J 
 
 That Lord Dalhousie's object is correctly interpreted in 
 this passage appears clearly enough from the following 
 sentence in the despatch of the Court of Directors on the 
 subject : 
 
 ff From the very considerable personal property of the Rajah, 
 you have decided to allot to the Ranees, jewels, furniture and other 
 articles suitable to their rank ; and, as we understand your inten- 
 tion, to form the remainder into a fund, from which the pensions 
 will be defrayed, your Government making up any deficiency." 
 
 My comments were thus continued : 
 
 ' ' Setting aside for the moment the utter iniquity of the annexa- 
 tion, and assuming that there was a genuine lapse for want of an 
 heir capable of reigning, I find it very difficult to trace the pro- 
 cess of reasoning, by which Lord Dalhousie and the Court of 
 Directors contrived to persuade themselves that the immediate 
 family of a friendly Sovereign whose territory we had annexed, 
 were not entitled to the custody and management of their own 
 
 * Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 13. 
 
 t A Vindication, p. 81, and see The Empire in India, " The Bhonsla Fund." 
 
 J Empire in India, p. 230. Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 1. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 267 
 
 private property, but were entitled only to a life-interest in such 
 a proportion of it as the annexing Government chose to consider 
 sufficient for their maintenance. Most people, I think, would on 
 mature consideration decide, that the intrusive Power was bound 
 in honour and in justice to provide from its own revenues, aug- 
 mented as they were by the revenue of the new acquisition, an 
 adequate and becoming income for the representatives of the 
 ejected dynasty, for these members of the Royal family who had 
 formerly depended upon the Civil List of the Sovereign. Most 
 people would come to the conclusion, that even if the representa- 
 tives of the friendly dynasty were, or were assumed to be, merely 
 the widows of the last Sovereign, the obligation to provide for 
 them would remain equally strong. And this being granted, it 
 appears by no means equitable that the whole, or any part, of this 
 provision should be derived from the confiscated personal property 
 of the deceased Sovereign."* 
 
 On all this part of my argument Sir Charles Jackson 
 has not a word to say. 
 
 I then went on to point out that there was a "singular 
 inconsistency of statement both in LordDalhousie's original 
 instructions, and in Mr. Temple's recent Report on this 
 financial master-piece/' 
 
 " In his very natural desire to overlay this ugly deed with a 
 little moral gilding, Lord Dalhousie betrayed himself into some 
 inconsistency of language, but his practical object is not at all 
 ambiguous. He intended absolutely to appropriate the private 
 property of the family, and with the proceeds to supply, or reduce 
 as much as possible, the annual expense of their maintenance. 
 He does indeed repeatedly declare that the proceeds shall not be 
 ' alienated from the Bhonsla family/ But as he simultaneously 
 employs in these very Minutes, and in the orders issued at the 
 same time to the Commissioner, other terms implying a totally 
 opposite meaning, these pretty expressions become mere prevari- 
 cations, and fail entirely to give an air of decency to what was, in 
 fact, a daring act of spoliation." f 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson "can find nothing in Lord Dal- 
 housie's Minutes to justify these remarks," against which 
 he indignantly protests. Let me assist him once more. 
 Lord Dalhousie did indeed say that the money realised 
 by the sale of " the jewels, furniture and other personal 
 property," should be " constituted a fund for the benefit of 
 the Bhonsla family/' But his further instructions show 
 
 * Empire in India, pp. 230, 231. f Ibid., pp. 240, 241. 
 
268 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 that the only "benefit" to be conferred on them was to be 
 given in the shape of pensions for life ; that the pensions 
 were to be drawn from the Bhonsla Fund, so far as it 
 would go, and that if " the value likely to be realised " 
 (by the sale of the jewels, etc.) should prove to have 
 been " over-estimated, the Government should be prepared 
 to make up any sums that may be wanting to afford ade- 
 quate stipends to the family."* Thus as our Government 
 was clearly bound, whether the Raj ah had left much or little 
 personal property, to provide an adequate income for his 
 widows, the money realised by the sale of the personal pro- 
 perty would conduce to the benefit of our Government and 
 not of the Bhonsla family, more especially as the Ranees 
 could not live for ever, and one of them was more than 
 seventy years of age. 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson, admitting that Lord Dalhousie 
 was " not sufficiently explicit as to the destination of this 
 Fund eventually," that he " did not explain how the Fund 
 was to be dealt with when the pensions were paid off,"- 
 i.e. when the pensioned widows were all dead, still be- 
 lieves that the Fund was intended "to be an inalienable 
 deposit," " an inalienable fund for the benefit of the 
 Bhonsla family, "j- Mr. Marshman, in the following pas- 
 sage, seems to entertain the same opinion : 
 
 " There can be little doubt that this mode of disposing of the 
 jewels and gems which had been accumulated by that Royal House 
 for more than a century, by the hammer of the auctioneer, was 
 revolting to the feelings of the native community, and open to all 
 the censure that has been passed upon it ; but the proceeds, 
 amounting to twenty lakhs of rupees, were considered a sacred 
 deposit for the use of the family." J 
 
 The Bhonsla family would no doubt be highly gratified 
 to hear that this Fund is considered to be a sacred and 
 inalienable deposit for their benefit, by Mr. Marshman and 
 Sir Charles Jackson, and might be encouraged to renew their 
 claim to have, to say the least, some voice in its disposal ; 
 but the apologists have simply been misled by the ambigu- 
 ity of the language that has been used. Lord Dalhousie cer- 
 
 * Further Papers, Berar, p. 10. f A Vindication, pp. 78, 79. 
 t Marshman's History of India, vol. iii, p. 395. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 269 
 
 tainly said that the Rajah's personal property should " not 
 be alienated" from the family, but at the same time he said 
 that the proceeds should be employed for certain public 
 purposes, which ought to have been, and otherwise must 
 have been, defrayed from the public revenue. Mr. Temple,* 
 when Chief Commissioner of the Nagpore Provinces, in his 
 Administration Report for 1861-62, terms the Bhonsla 
 Fund " a deposit in the hands of the British Government 
 for the benefit of the Bhonsla family." But in a subse- 
 quent passage he claims this Fund as "a set-off against 
 the expense of pensioning the family and its retainers." 
 
 Although, therefore, Lord Dalhousie deprecated " the 
 petulance' and vexatious opposition" of the Rajah's 
 widows, and declared that "a Fund for the use of the 
 Ranees is to be formed out of the value of property 
 to be sold for their behoof,"t nothing can be more clear 
 than that he never intended them to have the use of 
 it. The private moveables of the Bhonsla family, 
 the Ranees' own personal jewels, the clothes in their 
 possession, and the furniture of the rooms they occupied, 
 excepted, all went to the hammer for the benefit of 
 the British Government. The money realised was nothing 
 more than an extraordinary source of revenue, brought to 
 account, and kept for some years, as " the Bhonsla Fund." 
 The application of that name to the Fund was nothing more 
 than a financial equivocation. The declaration that it was 
 "for the use of the Ranees" was intended to smooth 
 difficulties, to prevent violent opposition and resistance, 
 and to cover a scandalous and shameless act of plunder with 
 a temporary veil of propriety and benevolence. 
 
 But Sir Charles Jackson has still a few words to say : 
 
 " While this sheet has been in the press, the Calcutta corre- 
 spondent of the Times announces, that Sir C. Trevelyan has f ab- 
 sorbed' this Fund, and f capitalised ' it. I suppose this means that 
 the money has been taken by the Government, and Government 
 Paper substituted for it." J 
 
 * Now Sir Richard Temple, K.C.S I., who since a great part of this book 
 was printed has accepted the office of Financial Member of Council, Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer for India. 
 
 t Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 30. 
 
 j A Vindication, p. 79. 
 
270 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Not at all, it means something very different. 
 
 On the 1st of April, 1865, Sir Charles Trevelyan, ex- 
 plaining the Regular Estimate for the current year in the 
 Legislative Council of India, observed on an increase of 
 117,776 under 'Miscellaneous Civil Receipts,' that "it 
 arose from the transfer of the balance of the Blionsla Fund 
 to Revenue, after deducting 30,849, invested with a view 
 to disconnect the Government from certain permanent re- 
 ligious endowments. The pensions chargeable on this 
 Fund much exceed the annual proceeds, and the excess 
 was paid out of Revenue. The whole of the pensions have 
 now been charged against Revenue, and the Fund has 
 ceased to exist/'* that is to say has been openly appro- 
 priated by the Government of India. The solemn mockery 
 of "a deposit" has disappeared, and the personal property 
 of the dispossessed Royal family is quietly absorbed as " a 
 set-off" to the expense of their stipendary maintenance. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll is indignant that the assailants of 
 Lord Dalhousie should profess "allegiance to some great 
 principle of morality which was not evident to a States- 
 man of as high a honour as ever ruled in India, to the 
 great majority of his Council, to the Court of Directors, or 
 to the members of the Queen's Government at Home."t 
 
 No Governor-General has ever met with substantial 
 opposition from his Council of functionaries. As to the 
 Court of Directors, many of whom strove in vain to resist 
 the tide of annexation, the Duke of Argyll himself shah 1 
 relieve them from all responsibility. 
 
 ' ' Whatever errors had been committed in the Grovernment of 
 India had been the errors of the Crown of its responsible Minis- 
 ters in England or in India. The Company, as a governing body, 
 had been dead for more than seventy years. It had been dead, 
 but not buried. Its skin had been preserved, and set up as if it 
 were still alive. " J 
 
 Whatever blame may attach to the administration of any 
 Governor-General must rest on his own shoulders, just as 
 he is fully entitled, on the other hand, to enjoy the credit 
 
 * Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India for making 
 Laws and Regulations, 1865, p. 152. 
 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, preface, pp. vii, viii. 
 J Ibid., p. 102. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 271 
 
 of all his successes. So long as he retained the confidence 
 of the Home Government, a man of Lord Dalhousie's 
 ability could always have his own way. 
 
 As to the "high honour" of Lord Dalhousie, no one ever 
 thought of impugning it. It is not his honour, but his 
 capacity, that is questioned. He was fully equal to the 
 duties of office ; he was unequal to the higher functions of 
 government. There can be no doubt that his intentions 
 were excellent. His errors arose from his taking a mean 
 and mechanical view of Imperial supremacy, scarcely rising 
 above the notion of making it "pay." And his only idea 
 of making it "pay" seems to have been that of getting as 
 much revenue and ready money as possible, regardless of 
 establishments and expenditure. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll wants to know in what "great prin- 
 ciple of morality" Lord Dalhousie's policy was deficient. 
 Its deficiency was not so much in any lofty principle, ap- 
 preciable only by European saints and philosophers, as in 
 certain primary doctrines of social and political morality, 
 which come home to the heart of every peasant in India, 
 and which no competent Ruler of Oriental nations could 
 have ever misunderstood or forgotten. The mutual obli- 
 gations of Sovereign and Vassal, of protector and depend- 
 ent, of master and servant, have constituted in India, from 
 time immemorial, the very keystone of society and of the 
 State. Those relations and the corresponding obligations, 
 may have become dim and confused in the great Anglo- 
 Saxon communities of the two Worlds, and some of us may 
 have begun to look upon them as transitory phenomena. 
 But wherever they still subsist, and are respected as fun- 
 damental principles of politics and law, in the manners and 
 customs of the tribe and the family, as among Asiatic 
 nations, and eminently in India, they cannot be disregarded 
 or rudely shaken without disastrous results. 
 
 It was by transactions like those we have just discussed, 
 by deposing friendly families to whom we had promised 
 perpetual protection, and by adding to the extinction of 
 their Sovereignty the desecration of their Palaces, and the 
 spoliation of their wealth, that Lord Dalhousie outraged 
 decency as well as justice, and roused disgust and resent- 
 ment all over India. It was by the contemplation and 
 
272 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 recollection of the painful scenes and humiliating results 
 arising from some of these transactions, that the present 
 writer was provoked some years ago into using some strong 
 language with reference to Lord Dalhousie's public conduct 
 as a British Viceroy, against which Sir Charles Jackson, 
 Mr. Marshman, and the Edinburgh Review of October, 
 1866, all remonstrate. 
 
 Feeling strongly that the most distinctive measures of 
 Lord Dalhousie's administration were acts of unexampled 
 political baseness, raising many of our most faithful, sub- 
 missive and unobtrusive feudatories into the conspicuous 
 position of victims and martyrs, placing ignorant Mahratta 
 women on a moral elevation far above their despoilers, 
 debasing the name and lowering the dignity of the great 
 Sovereign and nation whom he represented, in the eyes 
 of the people of India, I said he was "the basest of 
 rulers." 
 
 Sir Charles Jackson, who twice quotes the passage in 
 question, protests that "these remarks might have been 
 excusable, if Lord Dalhousie had done his great deeds to 
 aggrandise his own fortune," but it should be " remembered 
 that all his acts were done in the service of his country."* 
 In another place he complains of "the imputations which 
 have been so freely cast upon the memory of a great States- 
 man, "t 
 
 The Edinburgh Reviewer of October, 1866, quoting the 
 
 same passage without naming the book or the author, says : 
 
 "Mr. Kaye, it gives us pleasure to record, writes in a very 
 
 different spirit. He has given Lord Dalhousie full credit 
 
 for the entire singleness and purity of his motives. "J 
 
 Those who assailed Lord Dalhousie's measures, both 
 while he was in power and since his retirement and death, 
 assailed him as a public man and on public grounds, and 
 none of them are, to my knowledge, open to the charge of 
 making unfair imputations. They attacked his character 
 as a Ruler, not his private character, his "high honour," or 
 " the purity of his motives." Nor ought they to be de- 
 terred by such unfair remonstrances, or by appeals, 
 doubtful in truth as well as in taste, to his alleged "sacri- 
 
 * A Vindication, pp. 176, 177, and p. 2. f Ibid., p. 42. 
 
 I Edinburgh Review, October 1866, p. 301. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. '27 X 
 
 ftces,"to his "life prematurely worn out in the service of 
 his country,"* from applying the most searching criticism, 
 and, if necessary, the severest reprobation, to a policy 
 which has had such momentous results, which is still held 
 up for our admiration and recommended for future com- 
 pletion. 
 
 No one would deny or doubt Lord Dalhousie's public 
 spirit in accepting the office of Governor-General, or the 
 untiring energy with which he gave himself to the work. 
 But there is a spice of that abject reverence for titular 
 distinctions which taints the manliness of English life, in 
 the scarcely disguised assumption that the official labours 
 of an Earl of long descent are sanctified by an element of 
 disinterested heroism, to which no claim can be laid by 
 men of coarser clay. Almost any one of the educated 
 classes, who accepts office in India after having commenced 
 his avocation at home and attained to some degree of suc- 
 cess in it, may be said to make a sacrifice. The sacrifice 
 must be very large that is not compensated by the posi- 
 tion of Viceroy of India, with emoluments of nearly 4 0,000 
 a year,"]" and the prospect, according to numerous prece- 
 dents, of a large donation or pension at the end of the 
 usual term. The greatest prize to be won on the political 
 field of Great Britain would not have given a compara- 
 tively poor nobleman a large personal fortune in eight 
 years, and Lord Dalhousie would have been more or less 
 than human if he had been utterly indifferent to such 
 homely considerations. 
 
 No one, to my knowledge, has ever impugned "the 
 singleness and purity of his motives," or doubted that he 
 always had in view what he supposed to be "the service 
 of his country." But we object that he took a confined 
 view of what was good for the country, that he always 
 had his eye on forms of administration and not on the 
 substance of government; that he always preferred, in per- 
 fect sincerity, the narrow measure of the permanent official 
 to the broad survey of the statesman. Whatever aggran- 
 
 * A Vindication, p. 2. 
 
 t The salary is .24,000 per annum, but great establishments are maintained 
 at the public expense, and contingent allowances made for purposes of enter- 
 tainment and representation. 
 
 T 
 
274 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 clised the great official Department of which he was the 
 Head, must be expedient and just, good for the people of 
 India, good for the British Empire. In short, to compare 
 great things with small, I look upon Lord Dalhousie's 
 motives and conduct in prosecuting his policy of annexa- 
 tion, very much as the Duke of Argyll, some three years 
 ago, looked upon the motives and conduct of the Commis- 
 sioners of Woods and Forests in pursuing their policy of 
 annexing the Foreshores of Scotland. I think of his 
 "proceedings," as his Grace did of theirs, that they were 
 "not creditable, "and that they were carried on by what 
 was "not a legitimate method." Like the Commissioners 
 of Woods and Forests against whom the Duke appealed, 
 Lord Dalhousie "stretched and extended" the claims of 
 the Imperial Government "by a system which aims at secur- 
 ing the acquiescence of individuals on the calculation that 
 they will not resist." Like those officials, he constantly 
 "held the most confident and peremptory language," when 
 he would, "nevertheless, have shrunk from defending the 
 claim before a court of law,"* and even from referring it 
 for the opinion of his own law officers. I think that the 
 general tendency of the foreign policy of India, instigated 
 by the Civil Service and prosecuted under Lord Dalhousie's 
 guidance, was that of introducing everywhere "an expen- 
 sive and vexatious management for the sake of extending 
 business, "f It was I still borrow the Duke's appropriate 
 phraseology, "a policy deliberately and actively pursued, 
 a policy not consistent with fair dealing." J It was a 
 policy "offering many temptations to proceedings of a very 
 doubtful character/' and which, unless "played with per- 
 fect fairness and candour towards individuals, must tend 
 to unjust and oppressive dealing. It then becomes a policy 
 not merely for establishing the just claims of the Crown, but 
 for breaking down and usurping both public and private 
 rights. " I think of Lord Dalhousie, as the Duke did of 
 rhly respectable officer of the Woods and Forests, that 
 ds eagerness to assert and establish what he conceived 
 to be the rights of the Crown, he took very little pains to 
 ascertain the local facts and the rights of others. "|| 
 
 * Papers, Foreshores of Scotland, 1866, p. 6. f Tbid., pp. 7 and 10. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 15. IbW., pp. 15, 16. || Ibid., p. 32. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 275 
 
 In the words of the Duke of Argyll when called to ac- 
 count by my Lords of the Treasury for having "imputed 
 motives" to the Woods and Forests and its officers,* "at- 
 tributed their proceedings to improper motives," t I reply 
 to similar remonstrances that "I have never expressed any 
 doubt that all the officers of the Department acted accord- 
 ing to their own views of public duty." Like his Grace, 
 I urge that "it is one thing to point out that a public 
 officer is placed under a natural and unconscious but 
 powerful bias in a particular direction, and it is quite 
 another to accuse him of consciously recommending im- 
 proper proceedings for the purpose of procuring gain," J 
 or, I may add, of being deficient in "some great principle 
 of morality. " When charged with impugning "the single- 
 ness and purity" of Lord Dalhousie's "motives," I answer, 
 with the Duke, that "I have never attributed to him any 
 other motive than zeal to secure what he considered" a 
 great public object. "But, "still in his Grace's words, "I 
 have represented, and do still represent, that he and his 
 Department pursued that object in a spirit and in a 
 method injurious to the just rights of individuals and the 
 public." || 
 
 The Duke of Argyll explains that "the motive" which 
 he really "attributed to the Department of Woods and 
 Forests," was "the desire to establish, upon a series of 
 successful precedents, certain claims on behalf of the Crown 
 in respect of Foreshores, which, in Scotland at least, have 
 only been recently asserted, which it is notorious that the 
 most eminent writers on the law of Scotland have not 
 recognised."^]" Kef erring to "the precedents" brought for- 
 ward in the official report, he observes that "so far as 
 quoted by Mr. Howard, they are all of very recent date,"** 
 and that the Department is gradually "founding a general 
 principle by securing successive cases of individual acqui- 
 escence, "ft 
 
 These objections to the official procedure of a Depart- 
 ment are singularly analogous to my own strictures on 
 "the doctrine of lapse," so "recently asserted" in India, 
 
 * Foreshores of Scotland, 1866, p. 15. t Ibid., p. 18. J Ibid., p. 18. 
 Ante, p. 270 || Foreshores of Scotland, 1866, p. 31. f Ibid., p. 15. 
 
 ** Ibid, p. 19. ft Ibid., p. 15. 
 
 T 2 
 
276 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ' 'which it is notorious that the most eminent writers on 
 the law" of India, "have not recognised," which it was 
 sought to establish as "a general principle," partly on an 
 imaginary series of precedents, and partly on precedents 
 "of very recent date," obtained by "securing the acquies- 
 cence of individuals on the calculation that they could not 
 resist."* 
 
 I had a two-fold object in bringing forward this 
 parallel between the principles involved in the several 
 claims of Government, here to barren strips of coast, 
 there to broad and fertile Provinces, and the official 
 procedure to enforce them, in Scotland and India. 
 Firstly, I wished to show that when what appears like 
 official sharp practice is brought near to our own doors in 
 matters in which we take a personal or neighbourly in- 
 terest, even so calm and dispassionate a person as the Duke 
 of Argyll may manifest considerable indignation, use pretty 
 strong language, be supposed to impute "unworthy and 
 improper motives ;" and yet may not have intended to make 
 any "personal charge,"")" or to accuse an officer or a Depart- 
 ment of acting with deliberate injustice, and of being de- 
 ficient in some "great principle of morality." 
 
 Secondly, the Duke's complaint against "the spirit and 
 method "of the Department with which he came in colli- 
 sion, may aid us to define the nature and extent of the 
 defective appreciation of right and wrong which I attribute 
 to Lord Dalhousie and his official advisers. For what is 
 that "unconscious but powerful bias in a particular direc- 
 tion," leading to "a policy not consistent with fair dealing," 
 "a policy for breaking down and usurping both public 
 and private rights," of which the Duke and I complain, 
 although neither he nor I "accuse" any one of " recom- 
 mending improper proceedings for the purpose of procuring 
 gain" ? It is the professional spirit, the tendency of every 
 organised body of officials, and of every separate Depart- 
 ment, to magnify its own value and importance, and to 
 enlarge the sphere of its authority. The Civil Service of 
 India, from its great emoluments, from the peculiar inde- 
 pendence and irresponsibility given by its "covenants" and 
 
 * Ante^ p. 275, and see ante, pp. 10 to 20. 
 t Foreshow of Scotland, 1866, pp. 10, 18. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 
 
 its statutory privileges, from the frequent intermarriages, 
 and close family ties with the Directors and great Proprie- 
 tors of the East India Company, which had made it almost 
 a caste, was the proudest and most powerful official hier- 
 archy recorded in history. " Though somewhat shorn of its 
 beams by the disappearance of the Company, and the re- 
 cruitment of its ranks by competition instead of patronage, 
 the Indian Civil Service still possesses the virtual control of 
 every Department in its ordinary workings, and a virtual 
 monopoly not only of all the judicial, financial and admi- 
 nistrative offices of any consequence, but of every post 
 equivalent to that of Minister or Councillor of State in a 
 European Government. No other Civil Service in the 
 world, unless it be the Chinese, approaches so nearly to 
 the character of a Governing Guild. The tendency to 
 self-exaltation that assails the members of such a peculiar 
 body, bad enough if they were subject to ah 1 the social 
 influences of a free national life, is immeasurably aggra- 
 vated by their position as highly educated strangers, in the 
 midst of an inferior civilisation, withdrawn by their habits 
 and tastes, as much as by language and religion, from all 
 but official relations with the people around them. Natur- 
 ally and inevitably they are practically indifferent to any 
 public opinion but that of their own class. With equal 
 certainty, and almost in proportion to each one's honest 
 consciousness of good work performed, comes the feeling 
 that whatever is "good for the Service," must be good ser- 
 vice for the country. Hence arises an extraordinary con- 
 fusion of official aggrandisement with national advantage, 
 which has always prompted the Indian Civil Service, like 
 those officials of whom the Duke of Argyll complains, to 
 promote the establishment of "their expensive and vexa- 
 tious management" all over India, not merely "for the sake 
 of extending business,"* but with a thorough conviction 
 that it was the true panacea for all political disorders, 
 Imperial and local, that it would fill the British treasury, 
 and make the country prosperous. Constituted as the 
 Government of India has been since the consolidation of 
 our supremacy, it has ever stood in need of vigilant super- 
 vision and restraint by the Executive and Legislative 
 
 * Ante, p. 274:. 
 
278 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 powers of Great Britain, and of an enlightened statesman 
 at the helm as Governor-General, to save it from degener- 
 ating into mere officialism. Imperfect arid intermittent as 
 this restraint has always been, it almost entirely ceased to 
 act during Lord Dalhousie's Viceroyalty. He was no 
 statesman ; ah 1 his mental and moral predilections fell in 
 with those of the professional hierarchy which he should 
 have tempered and controlled. Circumstances and events 
 conspired to throw absolute power into his hands. His 
 own talents and business energy, his personal and political 
 connections, aided by the strong Calcutta party in the 
 Court of Directors, gave fuh 1 relief to successes, real and 
 apparent, cast a veil over failures and lavish expenditure, 
 and silenced all opponents. There were not many of them. 
 
 No man who took a statesmanlike or original view of 
 Indian affairs in any Department, was ever admitted to the 
 confidence of Lord Dalhousie, or ever obtained the slightest 
 influence over him. He was incapable of understanding 
 them. He shunned them, or shook them off, with instinc- 
 tive aversion. He quarrelled with Sir Charles Napier, and 
 snubbed General John Jacob, two soldiers of widely diver- 
 gent attributes, who, if he had fairly estimated their qua- 
 lities, and availed himself of them, might have done much 
 for the Indian Army. He completely ignored and ne- 
 glected Sir Arthur Cotton, a true man of genius, the 
 greatest Engineer that ever entered the public service in 
 India, whose counsels would have saved millions of money 
 and millions of lives, would have covered India with a net- 
 work of navigable rivers and canals, pouring fertility over 
 its plains, conveying its bulky goods to the coast, and 
 swelling the public income without taxation, at half the 
 expense of a few lines of Railway, utterly inefficient for 
 the transport of produce, delusive as a military measure 
 in time of war or insurrection, a perpetual burden on the 
 revenues in time of peace. He silently declined consult- 
 ing with Sir William Sleeman.* He shelved Sir Henry 
 Lawrence. 
 
 The few eminent men in the Indian Services who depre- 
 cated the policy of annexation before 1857, had ah 1 been 
 removed by their sphere of duty from the petty forms and 
 
 * Ante, p. 68. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. :279 
 
 details of a regular Collectorate or the routine of an estab- 
 lished office. In the field of Indian diplomacy, and in the 
 management of newly acquired and unsettled tracts of 
 country, they had been made to deal with States instead 
 of districts, and had been often brought face to face with na- 
 tives of all classes, who were neither their suitors nor their 
 subordinates. These were not the men to find favour in 
 Lord Dalhousie's eyes. He did not want originality or 
 liberality. He wanted unquestioning acquiescence. His 
 sole idea of policy was to " extend the business " of the 
 Department, at the head of which he found himself placed. 
 That was his great motive. The chief merit which he 
 recognised in those who served under him was one which 
 he possessed himself in a marked degree dexterity in 
 getting through business. There is not the least trace in 
 any of his political Minutes that he ever looked upon the 
 mighty task of Government as anything but that of en- 
 forcing administrative regularity. 
 
 And thus it was that while no man, probably, was ever 
 less disposed to be led by his Secretaries and Councillors, 
 his narrow views coincided so exactly with those of the 
 elder Civilians that they easily managed him, without, 
 perhaps, either party being quite aware of the process. 
 Sir John Willoughby, as we have seen, was the author of 
 " the doctrine of lapse," and worked out the ruling pre- 
 cedent of Sattara. Mr. (now Sir John Peter) Grant, as 
 Secretary to Government, framed a Note on the Jhansi 
 succession, which, being accepted by the Governor-Gene- 
 ral as " a very full and clear exposition, "f may be said to 
 have settled the case. Sir John Grant, when subsequently 
 admitted to a seat in Council, held his own opinion on 
 several occasions more strenuously and effectually than 
 Lord Dalhousie was accustomed to or liked. Some signs 
 of irritation at Mr. Grant's argumentative success in the 
 Oude question can, I think, be traced in the very in- 
 consistent sentences, already quoted, in which he de- 
 clared his " honourable colleague's views " to have seemed 
 " so erroneous " to him, that, "if it had unfortunately 
 found favour with the Honourable Court," he " must have 
 declined to take part in any policy founded upon it ; " and 
 
 * Jhansi Papers, 1855, p. 19. 
 
280 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 yet immediately afterwards, in the Duke of Argyll's words, 
 " he agreed to a course which was logically defensible on 
 no other principle than that which Mr. Grant maintained."* 
 He protested that he could never carry out Mr. Grant's 
 policy, and, in the same Minute, " murmuring ' I can ne'er 
 consent', consented." 
 
 The truth is that Mr. Grant, though spoiled for states- 
 manship by too many years of Indian office-work, was a 
 man of much greater ability, more extensive experience, 
 and more solid acquirements than Lord Dalhousie. Grant- 
 ing the false premisses and false principles from which they 
 both started, and the illicit assumptions in which they 
 were both agreed, Mr. Grant's Oude Minute was far more 
 logical, more straightforward, altogether stronger, than 
 the Governor-General's. He very conclusively exposed 
 the weakness of Lord Dalhousie's declaration that " the 
 King's consent" was " indispensable," and that it would 
 not be " right to extract this consent by means of menace,"t 
 while the very essence of the plan recommended consisted 
 in holding over him the terror of his own assassination and 
 the pillage of his capital. " Certainly," said Mr. Grant, 
 "in the supposed case, he would have little reason in the 
 end to thank us for our scruples in his favour on the ques- 
 tion of his rights. "J 
 
 Finally, waiving the question too large for discussion 
 here of the comparative and relative advantages of rail- 
 roads in India, it seems necessary to remind some people 
 that Lord Dalhousie did not invent railways, or the elec- 
 tric telegraph, or the penny postage. 
 
 Whatever merit may attach to the vigorous prosecution 
 of that badly planned and badly constructed work, the 
 Ganges Canal, belongs to Lord Hardirige.|| Sir Macdonald 
 
 * Ante, pp. 49, 50. f Oude Papers, 1856, p. 187. J Ibid., p. 218. 
 
 No one, I presume, would dispute the positive benefits conferred by the 
 expenditure of eighty millions of capital, almost entirely drawn from Great 
 Britain, in India, or by the improved means of locomotion. The only question 
 is whether they are worth the money, and whether the money might not have 
 been more advantageously laid out. Meanwhile, the investment of such a vast 
 sum, supplemented by twenty millions of public money, in an unremunerative 
 and precarious undertaking, dependent on an annual subsidy to make up its 
 moderate dividend of 5 per cent., has thrown a serious obstacle in the way of 
 great works more suitable for the country and the people, certain to give 
 handsome returns, and hardly exposed at all as railroads are to destruction 
 or damage, involving a cessation of earnings, in the event of war or rebellion. 
 
 || S'iY Henry Lawrence's Essays, pp. 330, 331. 
 
MERITS AND MOTIVES. 281 
 
 Stephenson and his staff had laid the foundations of the 
 first railroad, and the system of guaranteed interest to 
 shareholders had been conceded by the Court of Directors 
 at Lord Hardinge's suggestion, two years before Lord 
 Dalhousie arrived at Calcutta.* A scheme of cheap 
 postage, almost exactly on the terms ultimately adopted, 
 had been framed by Mr. Riddell, the Postmaster-General 
 of Agra, and submitted to the Court of Directors, with 
 Lord Hardinge's strong recommendation in its favour, in 
 the year 1846.t 
 
 The introduction of these improvements during Lord 
 Dalhousie's administration was simply a chronological 
 accident. No doubt he pressed them on with his usual 
 vigour, and threw the new Departments at once into 
 working order with his rare aptitude for organisation 
 and for the details of public business. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's official nominations and promotions 
 were invariably made with great care, with an exclusive 
 and scrupulous regard to claims and qualifications, accord- 
 ing to his own conscientious appreciation of them. The 
 exercise of his patronage was generally judicious. But it 
 must be remembered that he did not discover the Law- 
 rences. Lord Hardinge had placed the three brothers in 
 the Punjaub. All that Lord Dalhousie did was to transfer 
 the greatest of the three, Sir Henry, because he would 
 not carry on the work of confiscation fast enough, to a 
 place which for him, and in comparison to that which he 
 left, was almost a sinecure. The removal was effected 
 with as much consideration as possible, but Sir Henry 
 Lawrence, as Mr. Kaye tells us, felt himself to have been 
 " unfairly and ungratefully treated/ 'J 
 
 * Ibid., pp. 332, 333 ; Trotter's History of India from 1844 to 1860, vol. i, 
 pp. 93, 94. t Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays, p. 339. 
 
 t Sepoy War, vol. i, pp. 62, 63. 
 
CHAPTER X, 
 EEFORM OR DESTROY? 
 
 AFTER completing his paraphrase of those infallible and 
 all-sufficient documents, the Blue Books, with reference to 
 each of Lord Dalhousie's more important acquisitions of 
 territory, the Duke of Argyll concludes that part of his 
 dissertation with the following words : 
 
 " Such were the principal territorial additions by which the 
 frontiers of British India were carried to the line at which they 
 still remain, and at which, in all human probability, they will con- 
 tinue to remain for many years to come."* 
 
 Why does the Duke anticipate the sudden discontinu- 
 ance, "for many years to come," of the gradual process by 
 which Native States are extinguished ? If that process, 
 as planned and practised by Lord Dalhousie, be justifiable 
 and beneficial, why should it be discontinued for a single 
 year ? It is true that the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, 
 and the Adoption Despatches of 1860, to neither of which 
 the Duke was a party, and both of which he distinctly 
 deprecates, have raised considerable obstacles to the 
 future enforcement of the "doctrine of lapse," but those 
 obstacles are by no means insurmountable, as we have seen 
 in the recent narrow escape from extinction of the ancient 
 Raj of Mysore, at the hands of a Cabinet in which the 
 Duke of Argyll had a seat. Nor would it be at all diffi- 
 cult to seize upon many "rightful opportunities," quite as 
 specious as any of Lord Dalhousie's era, for claiming "a 
 perfect lapse," and refusing, in his language, to "throw 
 away territory, "f or for declaring the Government of a 
 Native State to be "hopelessly bad," and absorbing it out 
 of sheer benevolence. 
 
 How can we, in justice and humanity, neglect any occa- 
 sion of annexing one of those badly governed States, which 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 40. 
 t Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 36. 
 
REFORM Oil DESTROY ? 283 
 
 Lord Dalhousie thought were not worth the trouble of 
 improving,* and the Duke of Argyll considers to be un- 
 improveable ? If "the vices" of "native Governments" are 
 "systematic, and their virtues casual," if "the dependent 
 position to which they are reduced by our power in India, 
 does not contribute to make them better,"f if annexation 
 is "the only security for good government,"! why should 
 the good work be intermitted "for many years to come ?" 
 
 Injustice to the Duke's consistency, it must be admitted, 
 that in alluding to the "probability" that there will be no 
 "territorial additions" for "many years to come," a limited 
 term, after all, he evinces no personal inclination or in- 
 tention to interrupt the good work ; he would rather seem 
 to regret the weakness of the present generation, and to trust 
 that their eyes may be opened ere long to the great bless- 
 ings derivable from a policy of annexation, which, though 
 suspended for a time, may be wisely resumed, when "the 
 violent reaction" now "beginning to subside/' has subsided 
 entirely. 
 
 From the commencement to the end of his two Essays , 
 the Duke of Argyll acknowledges no defect or excess of 
 principle or of procedure in the territorial acquisitions of 
 Lord Dalhousie's Government. He considers it "more than 
 doubtful whether it was expedient" to send forth the 
 Queen's Proclamation of 1858 to the Princes and People 
 of India. "As regards the administration of affairs in 
 India, no change whatever of principle was required." 
 "The Government was not a new one, neither were its 
 principles of administration new." "It would have been 
 better to stand on the character which the Government of 
 India had never forfeited, and which it required no new 
 Proclamation to define. "|| 
 
 And his objection to Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch 
 of 1860, wherein "the doctrine of lapse" was substantially 
 recanted, runs in the same direction : 
 
 " One question immediately rises to our lips on reading this 
 proposal : What room is left for the discharge of our obligations 
 to the people, as distinguished from the Rulers, of Native States ? 
 What is to be done in such a case as Oude ? Is disloyalty to our- 
 
 * Ante, pp. 69, 72, 73. t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 30. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., Preface. || Ibid., pp. 105, 106. 
 
284 CHAPTER X. 
 
 selves to be the only crime recognised in our dealings with Native 
 Governments ? Is incompetence, or cruelty, or corruption the 
 ruin of a country, and the misery of its people- are these to be 
 tolerated, and if tolerated then virtually protected, by the Para- 
 mount Power in India. "* 
 
 In this passage, and in the next one which I shall quote, 
 the Duke reiterates that confused notion of the reigning 
 Prince being the embodied State, and of the State being 
 dependent for its existence from day to day upon his per- 
 sonal character and qualifications, that we have already 
 discussed in our comments on the Oude question, f If we 
 consider the Ruler to be "corrupt," or "cruel," or "incom- 
 petent," we must no longer protect or tolerate the State ! 
 One bad Native Prince renders a Native Government im- 
 possible ! The only improvement of which a Native State 
 is susceptible, is that of being improved off the face of the 
 earth ! 
 
 Lord Canning having observed that in the case of 
 "serious abuses in a Native Government," threatening 
 "anarchy or disturbance," the proposed measure will not 
 debar the Government of India from stepping in to set 
 matters right, "nor from assuming temporary charge of a 
 Native State," but that, in his opinion, "the penalty of 
 sequestration or confiscation should be used only when 
 the misconduct or oppression is such as to be not only 
 heinous in itself, but of a nature to constitute indisputably 
 a breach of loyalty or of recorded engagement to the Para- 
 mount Power," the Duke of Argyll objects strongly to any 
 such reservation : 
 
 " This is the assertion of a principle which is more than doubtful, 
 and which, in extreme cases, it will never be possible to maintain. 
 There was no breach of loyalty towards the British Government 
 on the part of the Rulers of Oude. Except, therefore, upon a 
 higher principle than this, we could not have permanently rescued 
 the people of that distracted country. But surely the duty of 
 protecting the people of India from Rulers who are hopelessly 
 bad, is a duty at least as binding on us as the duty of maintaining 
 our own dominion." { 
 
 Thus the Duke of Argyll, recently a Cabinet Minister, 
 not only justifies the annexation of Oude, but holds out 
 the prospect of an indefinite series of similar cases. Con- 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 121. f Ante, pp. 77, to 06. 
 
 | India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. \'2'2. 
 
REFORM OR DESTROY ? 285 
 
 sldering the native Rulers to be "hopelessly bad," he would 
 annex any minor State whose Prince may prove to be "in- 
 competent." His "higher principle" enables him to disre- 
 gard all the maxims of International Law, and to nullify 
 solemn engagements, even when there is "no breach of 
 loyalty " on the other side. 
 
 The Duke's fundamental error is that of overlooking 
 what Mr. J. M. Ludlow has aptly termed "the corporate 
 character of Sovereignties."* This corporate character is 
 well asserted in the following passage from Sir Frederick 
 Currie's valuable Minute on the Kerowlee succession : 
 
 ' ' The Kerowlee treaty is not one of a personal character between 
 the British Government and Maharajah Hurbuksh Pal, and the 
 heirs of his body. It is a treaty, in my view at least, between 
 the British Government and the Kerowlee State. 
 
 " The engagement is between the British Government on the one 
 hand, and the Kerowlee Government on the other, the contracting 
 party in each case being the representative for the time being of 
 the respective Governments. "^ 
 
 In order to maintain for every State included within 
 the Indian Empire the right of individual existence, so 
 long as it is able and willing to fulfil its engagements, we 
 need not claim for it an absolute independence, or assert 
 its international equality with the Imperial Power. A 
 feeble State is as much entitled to existence as a strong 
 one. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll, in a passage already noticed, re- 
 minds us that Jhansi was not one of "the old independent 
 States of India. "J Although his Grace is completely mis- 
 taken in supposing that " Jhansi had been erected into a 
 Principality by ourselves ; " although Lord Dalhousie's 
 statements, by which the Duke was misled, that Jhansi 
 was " held under very recent grant from the British Go- 
 vernment as Sovereign," " under a grant such as is issued 
 by a Sovereign to a subject," were totally unfounded, it 
 
 * Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India, p. 141. 
 
 t Kerowlee Papers, 1855, p. 11. 
 
 J Ante, p. 21. 
 
 Ante, p. 21. Mr. Marshman, with admirable audacity, says that this case 
 of Jhansi was settled by " the lex loci of the Province, as expounded by Sir 
 Charles Metcalfe^ and asserts that Sir Charles Metcalfe interfered in the dis- 
 puted succession of 1835. (History, vol. iii, pp. 396, 397.) Both assertions 
 are incorrect. Ante, pp. 24, 25. 
 
286 CHAPTER X. 
 
 is true, and has never been denied or doubted, that it was 
 a dependent Principality, debarred from external action, 
 except in " subordinate co-operation," with the Protective 
 Power. But this fact, instead of as the Duke seems to 
 imagine rendering the State of Jhansi more, ought to 
 have rendered it less liable to extinction than any of "the 
 old Independent States." Under the rude political maxims 
 and traditions of India, a faithful feudatory has stronger 
 securities for its integrity and permanence than an inde- 
 pendent neighbour. So long, for example, as its obliga- 
 tions are fulfilled, the alliance by which it is bound to the 
 Paramount Power is essentially, and not formally, per- 
 petual. Hostilities cannot be declared against it. It 
 cannot be swallowed up by conquest. 
 
 The little Raj of Jhansi had been conspicuous in its 
 loyal attachment and useful services to the British Go- 
 vernment. Its absorption by the Suzerain, under the 
 shallow pretence of a "lapse," was a proceeding not only 
 most hateful and offensive in the eyes of all Native Princes 
 and their Ministers, but quite unintelligible to them, ex- 
 cept on the supposition of bad faith. Unacquainted, as 
 they are, with English interests and prejudices, the mis- 
 conceptions of Hindoo law and history, the illusive pre- 
 cedents founded thereon, and the benevolent, though 
 mistaken, solicitude for the supposed good of the people, 
 by which the claim to reject adopted heirs was supported, 
 were always so unreal and unreasonable in their eyes as 
 to seem quite insincere. They could understand the 
 conquest of a hostile or alien State the more independent 
 the more open to attack they could understand the con- 
 fiscation of a delinquent State ; but they could never un- 
 derstand the unprovoked destruction of a faithful depen- 
 dency. 
 
 If examined in the light of the International Law of 
 Europe, which fully recognises the "imperfect sovereignty" 
 of tributary and dependent States, the process of terminat- 
 ing their separate existence by mutilating the law of suc- 
 cession in the reigning family will be seen to be equally 
 illegal and iniquitous. 
 
 And if we look at it from the higher point of view of 
 our national morals, and our national mission in the East, 
 
REFORM OR DESTROY ? 287 
 
 the policy of causing " lapses," in order to gain territory 
 and revenue for the British Empire, will be found to be 
 obstructive and retrogressive, as well as unjust. 
 
 The victories and treaties of Lords Wellesley and 
 Hastings proclaimed the final superiority of British arts 
 and arms, and gained for the East India Company a regu- 
 lative supremacy both in external and internal affairs over 
 all the Native Principalities. This has been turned to 
 very little account. Whatever credit we may claim, since 
 the subjection of our rivals and opponents, for administra- 
 tive reforms and material progress within the limits of our 
 own Provinces, we have done very little for the improve- 
 ment of the allied and tributary States. In this direction 
 our shortcomings and self-seekings are but too manifest. 
 So long as peace and quiet are preserved, the Subsidy 
 paid regularly, or secured by a territorial cession, no great 
 scandal thrust into view, and no obstacles offered to com- 
 merce by excessive customs or transit duties, the Native 
 Ruler has been left very much to his own devices. The 
 Court of Directors and up to this day the same notions 
 prevail generally at Calcutta could never conceive any 
 scheme for correcting the abuses of Native States except 
 that of converting them into Collectorates, and sending 
 out a batch of Writers. Within the last three or four 
 years, however, a change for the better seems to have 
 come over the spirit of the Calcutta Foreign Office, more 
 especially since the final orders of the Home Government 
 as to the restoration of Dhar. Something has been done 
 for the reform of Oodeypoor, though not, it is to be feared, 
 in a style likely to be acceptable or permanent. The man- 
 agement of Bhawulpore, during the Nawab's minority, 
 seems to be conducted on a judicious plan. It is to be 
 hoped that a good use may be made of the opportunity of 
 managing Tonk, after the recent deposition of its Nawab, 
 and the substitution of his infant son. 
 
 The Government of Bombay has done a good piece of 
 work in the reform and restoration of the Kolapore State, 
 and the little Principality of Sawunt Warree. The Go- 
 vernment of Madras has dealt wisely and justly with the 
 only two Native States Travancore and Cochin com- 
 mitted to its charge. The former, in particular, taken in 
 
288 CHAPTER X. 
 
 hand in 1809 after a period of anarchy and open war, was 
 extricated from its difficulties by direct British manage- 
 ment, and has improved and prospered steadily under 
 careful supervision. Great attention has always been 
 paid to the education of the Royal family; and, under the 
 enlightened rule of the present Maharajah, Travancore is 
 rapidly becoming a model Principality. 
 
 The Calcutta Foreign Office has no such peaceful 
 triumphs to boast of. Had Mysore, which never was in 
 such disorder as Travancore or Kolapore, been managed 
 from Calcutta on the same generous and moderate prin- 
 ciples that have guided the authorities of Bombay and 
 Madras, the country would never have been overloaded 
 with those costly establishments the offspring of patro- 
 nage which have formed, and still form, the only true 
 and substantial obstacle to the restoration in that State 
 of a purely Native Government. 
 
 Calcutta had for so many years been such a hot-bed of 
 jobbery and place-making, the crop was so rich during the 
 era of annexation, and the appetite so grew by what it fed 
 on, that during the last two or three years of Lord Dal- 
 housie's Government, the notion of undertaking the reform 
 of a Native State from disinterested motives would have 
 been scouted as utterly fantastic and absurd. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, as we have seen, protested against tem- 
 porary management in every case that came before him. 
 He objected to having "the labour, the anxiety, and the 
 responsibility " of such a charge, unless accompanied by an 
 "increase of revenue and permanent possession."* Nor 
 were plausible and specious phrases wanting to prove that 
 temporary management was impracticable. 
 
 " To supplant the British government of any Province," 
 says Sir John Peter Grant, in his Minute on the Oude 
 question, "by the best native government that ever yet 
 existed, is in one moment to abolish law, and establish 
 arbitrary power in its place. " j" But what is to prevent us 
 from gradually supplanting British management by a better 
 native government than "ever yet existed," from revers- 
 ing the procedure considered inevitable by Sir John Grant, 
 from establishing law in a reformed Principality, and 
 
 * Ante, pp. 69, 72, 73. f Oude Papers, 1856, p. 211. 
 
REFORM OR DESTROY ? 289 
 
 abolishing arbitrary power ? Nothing that I know of, ex- 
 cept the private interests and professional prejudices of the 
 covenanted and commissioned Services. 
 
 Sir John Grant's objection, highly characteristic of the 
 Bengal Civilian, is, in fact, identical with that more re- 
 cently advanced by Mr. R D. Mangles, a retired Bengal 
 Civilian in the Indian Council, against the prospective re- 
 storation of a Native Government in Mysore under the pre- 
 sent Rajah's adopted son. In that case, he said, the young 
 Prince "must be permitted to become the actual Ruler of 
 his country, to appoint his own officers, and to administer 
 justice and the revenue according to his own views and 
 principles"* 
 
 The fallacy is transparent enough ; for why should not 
 the Prince be so carefully educated, the forms of his Govern- 
 ment and the plan of his administration so constituted, 
 that he should be as much habituated as constrained to 
 govern according to our " views and principles." The Rajahs 
 of Travancore and Kolapore, no thanks to the Calcutta 
 Foreign Office, have learned to do so. 
 
 In the same Minute, arguing against any plan for the 
 temporary management of Oude, Sir John Grant wrote 
 as follows : 
 
 " I confess myself unable to understand those who are convinced 
 that, in a particular case, the Native Government is so extremely 
 bad, and so hopelessly incorrigible, that it must be supplanted by 
 a British Government ; but contend that this cannot properly be 
 done, unless it be made an essential part of the scheme, that at 
 some future indefinite time, the British Government shall be sup- 
 planted in its turn, by the Native Government, now to be set 
 aside for its incorrigible worthlessness."f 
 
 The fallacy into which Sir John Grant has fallen in this 
 passage is also transparent enough. It is the very ordin- 
 ary fallacy of employing a phrase in one sense at the be- 
 ginning, and in a very different sense at the end of a sen- 
 tence. He first assumes that a certain corrupt Native 
 Government is "hopelessly incorrigible" by internal effort, 
 and that British interference is absolutely necessary, a 
 case which ah 1 his opponents might admit. In the conclu- 
 sion the word "incorrigible" has come to mean that a bad 
 
 * Mysore Papers, 1866, p. 85. f Oude Papers, 1856, p. 210. 
 
 U 
 
290 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Native Government is "incorrigible," notwithstanding all 
 the assistance, instruction and guidance of the Protecting 
 Power. His opponents having acknowledged the disorder 
 to be incorrigible without temporary management, he 
 quietly assumes them to have acknowledged it to be in- 
 corrigible by temporary management. He assumes that 
 if a Native Government is ever to be restored, it must be 
 the old corrupt Native Government "of arbitrary power." 
 We are, in fact, called upon to believe that a Native Go- 
 vernment must always be dependent on the personal cha- 
 racter of the Prince ; that the Protecting Power can destroy 
 and coerce, but cannot teach, cannot take securities for 
 good administration, or exercise any supervision or con- 
 trol ; that a Native Prince may submit to be dethroned 
 and exiled, but would never submit to be fettered by a 
 Civil List, a Code, or a Council of State. In short, if there 
 were any validity in his argument, if it were not a mere 
 example of using ambiguous terms and begging the ques- 
 tion, we should have to admit, in defiance of experience, 
 that a reformed Native State is an impossibility. 
 
 Mr. J. C. Marshman, formerly Editor of the Friend of 
 India, preaches the old Calcutta doctrine in his newly- 
 published History. To restore a Native Government in 
 Mysore would be, according to him, "to sacrifice to a new 
 theory the welfare of a whole people," and "to demolish the 
 fabric of prosperity we have been building up for half a 
 century." He considers the maintenance of this Native 
 State "so repugnant to every feeling of humanity, that 
 before the period for consummating this policy arrives, it 
 is to be hoped that some future Secretary of State will be 
 found to annul it, as the present Secretary of State has 
 annulled the decision of his predecessor."* 
 
 Mr. Marshman, it will be seen, writes in very strong 
 language, in the habitual style of the Friend of India. 
 The old leaven of Calcutta cockneyism, the most insolent 
 cockneyism in the world, for the narrow conceit of a 
 mushroom metropolis is aggravated by the arrogance of 
 race, pervades every page of his observations on the 
 allied Principalities of India. He can see nothing but a 
 vision of "the follies, vices and excesses of a Native Court." 
 
 * History, vol. iii, p. 418. 
 
REFORM OR DESTROY? 291 
 
 He shrinks from no exaggeration. He speaks of the two 
 cases of Hyderabad and Nagpore,* " where the country 
 had flourished under British management, and had been 
 desolated when restored to the Native Princes. "f I am 
 quite sure that Mr. Marshman would find it as impossible 
 as I have found it, to trace any accounts of either of these 
 countries having been "desolated," in any official or non- 
 official descriptions of Hyderabad or Nagpore. 
 
 The Duke of Argyll makes use of a similar and equally 
 inexcusable exaggeration. After observing that some dis- 
 tricts of the Nagpore country contained "the best of the 
 cotton-fields in India," he says, "it was a matter of Impe- 
 rial concern to the British Government that the fertile 
 territory of this State should no longer be wasted and 
 spoiled by the wanton perpetuation of abominable mis- 
 rule."! 
 
 A full refutation of Lord Dalhousie's clap-trap for home 
 consumption on the subject of cotton, would be out of 
 place here. As a point of political economy it was absurd ; 
 as a plea for annexation it was equally absurd and immo- 
 ral. During the Mahratta Government of Nagpore the 
 production of cotton was immense, and one of the great 
 markets for that staple, Hinghenghat, was situated within 
 its frontiers. The Duke has no pretence whatever for 
 suggesting that the people of those districts had not "the 
 peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of industry. " The Blue 
 Books contain plenty of highly coloured strictures, but 
 none to that effect. If there were any impediments to 
 trade from bad roads or transit duties not brought for- 
 ward in the Blue Books the Rajah's Government was 
 entirely subject to our influence for their removal or recti- 
 fication. The Rajah could have made good roads quite as 
 effectively, and much more cheaply, than could have been 
 done by means of that scandalous repository of patronage 
 and peculation our Department of Public Works. 
 
 Direct British administration has done nothing, could 
 do nothing, in Nagpore, to increase the breadth of land 
 under cotton, that could not, or would not, have been 
 done by a Native Government. The cultivation was, of 
 
 * Ante, p. 69, 70. t History, vol. iii, p. 425. 
 
 J India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 38. Ibid. 
 
 u2 
 
292 CHAPTER X. 
 
 course, enormously stimulated by the high prices prevail- 
 ing during the rebellion in the United States. When the 
 dearth of cotton had brought a heavy pressure from Man- 
 chester to bear upon our Government, one measure was, 
 indeed, devised,- which a Mahratta Rajah would not have 
 thought of, though the Resident might have induced him 
 to carry it out. Cotton Commissioners were appointed 
 with handsome salaries. This measure, as usual, in the 
 mode and details of its execution, savoured of fuss and 
 jobbery, and has produced an inordinate amount of fools- 
 cap. There is little reason to believe that this enlightened 
 expedient has ever added one pound to the cotton crop of 
 Berar and Nagpore, and although, by the collection of 
 statistics, and the distribution of seed and gins provided 
 by the Manchester Cotton Supply Association, a consider- 
 able amount of good has been done, this could have been 
 done more easily and more effectually by a cheaper native 
 agency. 
 
 The Duke's charge against the Native Government, 
 however, goes far beyond the want of a Cotton Commis- 
 sioner. He makes use, as we see, of a very forcible ex- 
 pression. He says that " this fertile territory was wasted 
 and spoiled" 
 
 The Duke of Argyll and Mr. Marshman have quoted 
 from the Blue Book the just invectives of Mr. Mansel, the 
 last Resident at Nagpore, against the most flagrant abuses 
 of the Rajah's administration. Did the following passage 
 in that same despatch entirely escape their notice ? 
 
 " If the state of things in ISTagpore is compared with the condi- 
 tion of Hyderabad or Oude, and if a traveller passing through the 
 country stops but to look at the luxuriant cultivation in the cotton 
 soil, the absence of crimes by open violence, the civil, simple 
 people, or the bustle of the main street of the capital, he will form 
 a judgment favourable to the character of the Kajah, and to the 
 action, if not the principles of his rule."* 
 
 This is certainly not a picture of a country "desolated," 
 " spoiled," or " wasted," words unwarranted by anything 
 in the whole Report. The unfavourable features of the 
 Rajah's administration, upon which he comments most 
 severely, Mr. Mansel attributes, "above all, to the oscilla- 
 
 * Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 1G. 
 
REFORM OR DESTROY ? 293 
 
 tion in the system pursued by the Resident in respect to 
 advice and control/'* i.e., the neglect of the British Go- 
 vernment. 
 
 It is satisfactory to be able to adduce the unimpeachable 
 testimony of Sir Richard Temple for several years Com- 
 missioner of Nagpore and the Central Provinces to con- 
 tradict the exaggerated calumnies as to the disorder and 
 oppression prevailing in Nagpore, which were allowed to 
 weigh in the balance against that State, when the ques- 
 tion of its further existence was debated in 1854. 
 
 In his recently published letter of the 10th of August 
 last, written from the Residency at Hyderabad, in answer 
 to Sir John Lawrence's circular of inquiry as to the com- 
 parative popularity of Native and British rule, Sir Richard 
 Temple, a man by no means likely to have a bias in favour 
 of Orientalism, tells us nothing of those " desolated," 
 " spoiled, and wasted " tracts, which the lively imagina- 
 tions of the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Marshman have de- 
 picted. He says : 
 
 " I have on the whole a favourable opinion of the administra- 
 tion of the Nagpore country by the Mahratta Sovereigns of the 
 Bhoiisla House. There were many excellent points about their 
 rule ; but some of these were owing to the care of British officers, 
 such as Sir Richard Jenkins, Colonel Wilkinson, and others."f 
 
 That is the true work for the Protecting Power to un- 
 dertake in the minor States friendly instruction, not 
 sweeping destruction. And Sir Richard Temple, while 
 observing that " the constitution, system, and principles 
 of the Nizam's civil government are really excellent," says 
 nothing of any part of the Hyderabad country having 
 been " desolated,' 7 either in the present day or in the past. 
 Yet he mentions a recent case in which British manage- 
 ment has been supplanted by the re-establishment of 
 native rule. 
 
 " The Raichore and Dharaseo districts, which were assigned by 
 the Nizam to Our Government, after remaining under our manage- 
 ment for several" (six) " years, were retransferred to His High- 
 ness' Government" (by the Treaty of 1860). "I certainly have 
 understood, from officers in a position to know, that the people 
 much regretted the retransfer, and were full of apprehension, 
 
 * Papers, Rajah of jforar,1854, p. 17. 
 
 t Papers. British and Native Systems, 1868, p. G9, 
 
294 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Such. I believe was the fact at the time, though they have since not 
 had any cause to lament, for the Nizam's civil government in that 
 quarter has been well conducted." 
 
 The experiment, so much deprecated by Sir John Grant,* 
 does not seem to have led to "the abolition of law/' which 
 he dreaded, nor to that "collapse of order and state of 
 confusion," which Sir John Lawrence declared must cer- 
 tainly ensue if the reigning Sovereign of Mysore were re- 
 placed at the head of his own reformed administration.')" 
 Sir Richard Temple, in fact, contributes his evidence to 
 the truth of what I lately stated, that if our statesmen 
 " would turn their attention for no research is required 
 to the real precedents for reforming Principalities, they 
 would find that the 'schemes/ which Mr. Mangles pretends 
 have ended in 'utter and hopeless ship wreck/ J the 'ex- 
 periments ' which the Governor-General declares must be 
 ' futile and pernicious/ have never failed." \\ 
 
 The good results of restoring two reformed districts to 
 the Nizam's Government, in spite of the very small efforts 
 we have made to improve the general administration of 
 Hyderabad, prove at once the beneficial effects of our 
 temporary management, and the possibility of making 
 those beneficial effects permanent. 
 
 Are we then to pursue and extend our reforming opera- 
 tions among the Native States of India, or are we to seize 
 every opportunity and pretext for converting them into 
 British Provinces ? The Duke of Argyll considers that 
 our supremacy "does not contribute to make them better;" 
 that annexation is "the only security for good govern- 
 ment; "and that this security should be exacted whenever 
 a Native Government is "corrupt" or "incompetent," ex- 
 actly as was done "in such a case as Oude."^[ No mis- 
 takes were made by Lord Dalhousie in appropriating 
 Native States; "no change of principle is required."** 
 
 Mr. Marshman, adhering to the policy of the Friend of 
 India, under which "the two hundred and fifty King- 
 lings are to disappear," and "the whole of India is to 
 pass gradually under our rule,"'|"|' looks forward with pro- 
 
 '* Ante, p. 288. t Mysore Papers, 1866, p. 59. J Ibid. p. 87. Ibid. p. 59. 
 
 || Mysore Reversion, 2nd edition, p. 222. f Ante, p. 283, 284. 
 
 ** Ante, p. 283. ft Ante, p. 197. 
 
REFORM OR DESTROY ? 295 
 
 plietic exultation to the time when the British Empire 
 shall " reach the same point of consolidation as that of 
 Eome under the Caesars, these independent Principalities 
 expire from the extinction of every element of vitality, 
 and the Princes themselves subside into the position of 
 grandees."* 
 
 I need not dwell on the public importance of any such 
 declaration of principles by the Duke of Argyll. Until 
 distinctly disavowed by some eminent member of his 
 party, it will continue to be regarded with terror in India 
 as a manifesto of the Whig leaders. 
 
 Mr. Marshrnan, personally, has, of course, less weight. 
 The persistent defence of the annexation policy in his 
 History his advocacy of its end and aim, his repetition 
 of all its pleas, his incendiary wishes for its revival arid 
 consummation are chiefly significant from the fact that 
 the Senate of the Calcutta University, a body largely 
 composed of officials, and completely under official influ- 
 ence, has lately chosen this work as the standard for their 
 examinations, a rule which imposes it as a class-book on 
 all the higher schools of Bengal and Northern India. 
 When this fact is viewed by the light of Mr. Marshman's 
 uninterrupted connection with the Friend of India, still 
 characterised by incessant slanders and threats against 
 Native States occasionally renewed by the Editor as Cor- 
 respondent of the Times still popularly reputed to be a 
 sort of organ of the Indian Foreign Office, it will be seen 
 to afford some little insight into the latent proclivities of 
 the Calcutta bureaucracy. 
 
 The quiet approval or indifference with which these 
 vindications and reassertions of the acquisitive policy are 
 received in London, and the hearty greetings with which 
 they are welcomed in official circles at Calcutta, sufficiently 
 prove that I am not wasting my time in attacking them 
 that there is a real danger, however remote, of the 
 policy of annexation being revived in full force. 
 
 This danger is not the less, but the more real, because 
 at present neither the minds that govern the State, nor 
 the minds that govern the Press of Great Britain, have 
 grasped a definite policy for the Imperial rule of India. 
 
 * History, vol. iii, p. 401. 
 
296 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The tone of Parliamentary debates, and of articles in the 
 leading Reviews and journals, whenever the discussion of 
 Indian affairs cannot be avoided, ' proves this beyond a 
 doubt. Good faith must be kept ; treaties must be re- 
 spected ; no unfair advantage should be seized ; but still 
 the existence of so many "petty despotisms," interspersed 
 among the more favoured British Provinces, is evidently 
 regarded as a provisional arrangement. No aggressive 
 position is taken up ; it is not so much a policy as the 
 total absence of a policy. For instance, according to the 
 clever writer who so often treats of Indian topics in the 
 Spectator, the policy of annexation, quite legal and justifi- 
 able in itself, failed because Lord Dalhousie retired, and 
 because it did not afford a career to native talent and am- 
 bition.* If, therefore, a second Lord Dalhousie should 
 arise, and introduce the plan of "native Chief Commis- 
 sioners, " the policy of annexation might be resumed, with- 
 out risking the opposition of the Spectator, or of those who 
 hold similar opinions. 
 
 As another example, here is a passage from the speech 
 made by Mr. Samuel Laing, member for the Wick Burghs, 
 formerly Financial Member of the Viceroy's Council, and 
 so far an authority in the House of Commons on Indian 
 subjects, in the debate of the 24th of May, 1867, when 
 Sir Stafford Northcote announced the decision of Govern- 
 ment to maintain the State of Mysore by recognising the 
 Rajah's adopted son. 
 
 " The question of annexation was so unpopular that he did not 
 wish to be understood as being favourable to it. He was not a 
 partisan of annexation,, and he must say that he thought the policy 
 of annexation had been carried under Lord Dalhousie's adminis- 
 tration to an extent which he could scarcely approve. But he 
 thought it due to the memory of that distinguished statesman to 
 say that in his opinion the case, as regarded annexation, was not 
 so clear as it at first sight appeared to some persons to be. The 
 existence of Native States in India, except as far as it was based 
 on treaty and sanctioned by the allowing of hereditary possession, 
 was a very doubtful policy either for British interests or for the 
 welfare of the inhabitants of British India. If we looked at the 
 past condition of the Punjab, Oucle, and other districts which had 
 been recently annexed, and compared it with their present condi- 
 
 * Ante, p. 202. 
 
REFORM OR DESTROY? 297 
 
 tion, we should see how much the people themselves had bene- 
 fited by the change of government. Any one who had read 
 Sir William Sleeman's interesting work would learn how bad had 
 been the condition of Oude under its Native Princes." 
 
 It has plainly never struck the honourable gentleman 
 that there can be any method of effecting " a change of 
 government " in a badly managed Native State, except 
 that of annexation. It is equally plain that he merely 
 tolerates Native States, reluctantly, without hope, and 
 without any fixed intentions for the future. 
 
 So long as these indefinite notions prevail, so long as we 
 are without a distinct, intelligible, and progressive Im- 
 perial policy, the Native Sovereignties of India cannot be 
 considered safe. The annexationists having a very clear 
 idea of what they want, and the beneficial effect of their 
 object upon aU parties, if it can be fairly acquired, being 
 as yet hardly disputed or doubted, they have a great 
 advantage on their side, when any question of territorial 
 aggrandisement comes up for immediate decision. Good 
 opportunities and pretexts for the pursuit of their very 
 simple policy are certain to present themselves from time 
 to time, and there is not likely to be any very violent 
 dispute as to what may constitute a fair acquisition. Where 
 all are agreed that the end is desirable, there is little 
 chance of a quarrel about the means. 
 
 What we want, therefore, is an Imperial policy for 
 India that shall be more than tolerant of Native States ; 
 that shall recognise their corporate nature, and no longer 
 consider their duration to be dependent on the talents and 
 good behaviour of a Prince, or the vitality of a particular 
 family. We want a policy that shall be proof against every 
 provocation and every temptation not one that will work 
 smoothly with a Salar Jung or a Dinkur Eao, and break 
 down with the first incompetent Minister or contumacious 
 Prince. We want a policy that shall practically acknow- 
 ledge the duty of instruction to be inherent in that of 
 protection. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 
 
 THE evils arising from the systematic neglect of our Impe- 
 rial duties of instructing and reforming the allied and 
 protected States of India, had been a frequent topic of 
 complaint and remonstrance for years before Lord Dal- 
 housie jumped to the conclusion that destruction was 
 the only remedy for them. The same considerations were 
 pressed upon him from time to time during the rapid pro- 
 gress of his series of annexations. 
 
 Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, imputed the 
 disorders that had crept into the administration of that 
 State to the want of " certainty and permanence"* in the 
 control of our Government. 
 
 f ' My own opinion is that had the same course of interference 
 been carried out from 1840 to 1853 in a uniform, kind and effective 
 manner, much or most, if not all, of this trouble would have been 
 avoided. The argument of the natives with whom I have fre- 
 quently conferred on this subject is, that the British Kesidents at 
 Nagpore should participate in the blame charged to the Rajah by 
 myself : for if the same S3 r stem of advice and check which was 
 contemplated by the last Treaty had been carried out from first 
 to last, the Rajah would never have been tempted into habits of 
 indolence and avarice. "f 
 
 When the objections made by the Court of Directors to 
 the Oude Treaty of 1837 were under the consideration of 
 the Supreme Council, Mr. T. C. Robertson wrote as follows 
 in a Minute dated the 28th of January, 1839. 
 
 " Our persevering indifference towards the lavish profusion and 
 other extravagancies of the late Ruler of that State, was, I appre- 
 hend, regarded by the native community, more especially the 
 Mahomedan portion, as flowing from any rather than disinterested 
 motives, and was even imputed by many to a crafty design of 
 bringing his dominions into a condition to afford a pretext for 
 adding them to our own." J 
 
 * Papers, Berar, 1854, p. 17. f Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 7. 
 
 J Oude Papers. 1858, p. 52. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 299 
 
 And here are some of Lord Metcalfe's reflections on the 
 reforming measures which had been introduced in the 
 Nizam's Dominions by his own influence as Resident : 
 
 ' ' It is remarkable that our interference was then for the first 
 time exercised with a benevolent view to the protection and hap- 
 piness of the Nizam's subjects. Every former act of interference, 
 however subversive of the independence of the Hyderabad State, 
 was dictated solely by a regard for our own interests, without any 
 care or thought for the welfare of the people whom we had deli- 
 vered up to a Ruler of our own selection."* 
 
 The strange alacrity with which these operations were 
 suspended, at the first suggestion of a young and inexpe- 
 rienced Prince in 1829, and Lord Dalhousie's positive 
 refusal to renew them in 1851, have already fallen under 
 our observation in these pages. f We have also remarked 
 upon Sir William Sleeman's appeals to Lord Dalhousie 
 with regard to the Kingdom of Oude, fruitlessly continued 
 through five years. J 
 
 Those who opposed the policy of annexation were actu- 
 ated by anxiety for the stability of British rule, and the 
 welfare of the people, and not by the absurd sentiment- 
 alities now attributed to them by Mr. Marshman, with a 
 great show of candour and impartiality, in the following 
 passages of his History ; 
 
 " There has always been a succession of men in the Direction 
 at home, and in the public service abroad, prepared to advocate 
 the cause of Native Princes as Princes, without any particular 
 reference to the merits or demerits of their government. Among 
 them may be enumerated some of the most eminent men con- 
 nected with the administration, Tucker, Malcolm, Henry Law- 
 rence, Clerk, Outram, Sleeman, Low, all animated with an honour- 
 able and chivalrous feeling of respect for the royal families of 
 India." 
 
 Contrasting their views with those of the Dalhousie 
 school, he says : " The feelings of one party incline to the 
 wishes and susceptibilities of the Princes of India ; those 
 of the other to the interests of the people."|| As Mr. 
 Marshman does not teh 1 us from what acts or utterances 
 of these two parties he has drawn this broad distinction 
 
 * Metcalfe's Papers, p. 225. t Ante, p. 69, 70, 73. t Ante, p. 65, 68. 
 Marshman ] s History, vol. iii, p. 400. || Ibid., vol. iii, p. 401. 
 
300 CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 between their feelings, let us hear one or two of those 
 whom he has mentioned speak for themselves. In several 
 passages, previously quoted at greater length, Sir Henry 
 Lawrence objects to our behaviour towards Oude, that we 
 have " interfered in trifles, and stood aloof when import- 
 ant questions were at issue"; and that "this interference 
 has been more in favour of men than of measures."* " We 
 have not been guiltless"; he said, "in repenting of the 
 past, let us look honestly to the future. For once let us 
 remember the people, and not legislate merely for the 
 King."t _ 
 
 Sir William Sleeman, writing in 18 53, with special refer- 
 ence to an article in the Friend of India by this same 
 Mr. J. C. Marshman, warns his correspondent of the harm 
 that may be done if that gentleman should succeed in 
 spreading the doctrines of " the annexation school" in 
 England, declaring them "to be prejudicial to the stabi- 
 lity of our rule in India, and to the welfare of the people, 
 which depends on it."J 
 
 No men have ever contended and laboured more ear- 
 nestly for the welfare of the people of India, and for the 
 reform of the Governments under which they are placed, 
 than those whom Mr. Marshman bedaubs with the epi- 
 thets of " eminent", "honourable" and " chivalrous", while 
 he brands them with the imbecility of respecting and advo- 
 cating "the wishes and susceptibilities of royal families", 
 " without any reference to the merits or demerits of their 
 government." No one ever insisted more strongly on the 
 maintenance of British supremacy, and on the necessity of 
 its being exercised for the good of all classes, than Henry 
 Lawrence, Sleeman, and Sir George Clerk who is happily 
 still with us to answer for himself, but they believed 
 that British supremacy would be weakened by bad faith. 
 They would have promptly employed that supremacy to 
 reform the institutions of allied and friendly States ; while 
 Lord Dalhousie held aloof, refusing to interfere, because 
 no material profit could be reaped, but watching for some 
 trumpery pretext to destroy and despoil. 
 
 In its policy towards badly administered States, which 
 
 * Ante, p. 81. t Ante, p. 84. 
 
 + Sleeman a Oude, vol. ii, p. 390. Ante. p. 65, 72 to 77. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 301 
 
 required a little assistance to set them right, our Govern- 
 ment has sometimes erred in the opposite direction to that 
 of neglect. We have overwhelmed our patient with nurses 
 at his expense, until he has almost lost the use of his 
 limbs. When General Cubbon entered upon the duties of 
 sole Commissioner of Mysore in the year 1834, he had 
 five English Assistants, raised in two or three years to 
 seven in number, their united salaries being about 13,000 
 a year. There are now in round numbers 90 English offi- 
 cers employed under the Mysore Government, and their 
 united salaries are nearly, if not quite, 90,000 a year, or 
 one-tenth of the revenuess of the Principality. 
 
 When the question of the annexation of Mysore at the 
 death of the present reigning Rajah, was under discus- 
 sion in the Council of India, one of the most respected 
 and most liberal minded Members of the Council, Sir 
 Erskine Perry, wrote as follows : 
 
 " I cannot help thinking that however popular in the public eye 
 the determination not to annex Mysore may be, however politic 
 the views of Lord Cranborne as to the employment of natives in 
 high places, undoubtedly are, if the opinions of Council had been 
 fully taken on this subject, it would have fully appeared that the 
 interests of the people of India would have been best promoted, 
 and the special claims of natives of rank and education to a share 
 in the government of their country would have been much sooner 
 realised, by the continuance of British Government in that Pro- 
 vince."* 
 
 ' Sooner ' and ' later' are comparative terms, very indefi- 
 nite in their acceptance and application. But British 
 management has lasted long enough in Mysore to afford a 
 fair criterion of its tendency, when untempered by native 
 influence, to foster the honourable ambition of native pub- 
 lic servants. When after thirty-four years of British 
 management the number of English officials has risen from 
 seven to ninety, while that of superior native officers has 
 dwindled to sixteen, and only one Hindoo has yet been 
 promoted to the charge of a district, the tendency to realise 
 Native aspirations, which Sir Erskine Perry perceives in 
 British management, cannot be said to have operated very 
 "soon" or to be doing its work very rapidly. 
 
 * Mysore Papers, 1867, No. 271, p. 12. 
 
302 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The same process that has attained to such a pitch in 
 Mysore has been steadily carried on in the Assigned Dis- 
 tricts of Berar, still possessed in sovereignty by the Nizarn, 
 but managed in trust for him by a British Commission, 
 under the Resident at Hyderabad. Appointments are in- 
 cessantly multiplied and salaries augmented for European 
 officers of the civil and military services, so that although 
 the two districts of Nuldroog and the Raichore Doab were 
 restored to the Nizam in 1860, there is now a larger and 
 much more costly establishment of English officers for the 
 two Berars than there was for the four Provinces before 
 1860. And while this utterly unnecessary addition is 
 made to the numbers and emoluments of the European 
 agency, the native officials are overworked, underpaid, de- 
 graded and disheartened. 
 
 Let us now turn to one of our own minor Governments, 
 the Central Provinces, the greater part of which was an- 
 nexed in 1854, on the death of the late Rajah of Nagpore 
 without male issue, not, as we know, without an heir, 
 and let us see whether Sir Erskine Perry's vision of the 
 advancement of " the interests and special claims of natives 
 of rank and education to a share in the Government," has 
 been realised there or not. There is the usual number of 
 English officers in every Department. Not only has no 
 Native been as yet placed in charge of a district, but not 
 one has been admitted to that list of Assistants who are 
 eligible for further promotion. Yet that list contains the 
 names of seven Uncovenanted Europeans. There are alto- 
 gether 25 Natives holding respectable fifth-rate appoint- 
 ments in the Central Provinces, with no prospects, accord- 
 ing to routine and custom, of ever rising to any charge 
 such as that of a district. On the other hand, besides 
 seven Assistants and twelve Extra Assistants whom we 
 know by their names to be Uncovenanted Europeans or 
 East Indians, there are 4 officials of the same class in the 
 Customs, 3 in the Revenue Settlement, 3 in the Conser- 
 vation of Forests, 1 2 in the Police, and 22 in the Public 
 Works Department, in all 63 Uncovenanted Europeans. 
 
 One might naturally suppose that within the bounds of 
 a State like Nagpore which, to say the least, was tolerably 
 well governed, there might have been found by this time 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 303 
 
 one or two native officials fit for the charge of a district, 
 after a probation of fourteen years. If not, surely there 
 must have been some deserving persons in other Provinces, 
 who might have been brought in. The Saugor and Ner- 
 budda Territories, forming a large part of the Central 
 Provinces, were conquered from the Nagpore Rajah in 1 8 1 8. 
 Nagpore was annexed in 1854, the native Sovereignty 
 abolished, and all the Rajah's great officials pensioned or 
 turned adrift. Eight or ten of the second-rate officers 
 were employed as Extra Assistants. 
 
 And now in 1868 how is the official hierarchy of these 
 reunited Provinces constituted ? Fifty years have elapsed 
 since the conquest of one portion ; fourteen years since the 
 so-called "lapse" of the other. All the best offices, nearly 
 a hundred in number, utterly unattainable by natives, are 
 held by Civilians and military officers, in addition to whom 
 no less than sixty-three Uncovenanted Europeans and 
 East Indians have been introduced into the country. 
 Twenty-five fifth -rate appointments are enjoyed by 
 natives. 
 
 The constant multiplication of offices in favour of 
 English gentlemen, entirely defeats what ought to be the 
 chief object of managing the whole or part of an allied and 
 protected State. That object ought to be that of forming 
 a school of public servants for the Native State, who might 
 be capable of carrying on and perpetuating the reformed 
 institutions which are introduced by the Paramount Power. 
 The system that has hitherto been pursued in many such 
 cases renders the vital engraftment of reformed institutions 
 impracticable in itself, and unpalatable to those whom it 
 ought to be our aim to convert to our views. By all the 
 higher appointments being reserved for English officers, 
 the native officials have no opportunity of practising or 
 proving their abilities to uphold and work the new insti- 
 tutions. The working of the machine is made to depend 
 so entirely upon English correspondence and forms, that if 
 the English officers were suddenly withdrawn, the whole 
 fabric would fall into confusion and ruin. At the same 
 time British administration presenting to the Prince and 
 his Ministers, and even to the native officials who have 
 taken part in it, a scene of proscription and contempt for 
 
304 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 their own race, none of them feel any great wish to pre- 
 serve so much of it as they have been able to understand. 
 
 This was the very mistake in our administration of the 
 Punjaub, detected by the experienced eye of Sir William 
 Sleeman, and subsequently admitted by Sir Henry Law- 
 rence, which, in the words of the former, "created doubts 
 as to the ultimate intention of our Government with re- 
 gard to the restoration of the country to the Native Ruler, 
 when he came of age. The native aristocracy," he con- 
 tinued, "seem to have satisfied themselves that our object 
 has been to retain the country, and that this could be pre- 
 vented only by timely resistance."* 
 
 He wrote as follows to a friend in a letter dated the 
 18th of May, 1848 :- 
 
 " Things are not going on so well as could be wished in the 
 Punjaub ; and it appears to me that we have been there commit- 
 ting an error of the same kind that we committed in Afghanistan, 
 that is taking upon ourselves the most odious part of the ex- 
 ecutive administration. 
 
 " Our duty would have been to guide, control and check ; and 
 the head of all might have been, like the Sovereign of England, 
 known only by his acts of grace. 
 
 ' ' By keeping in this dignified position we should not only have 
 retained the good feelings of the people, but we should have been 
 teaching the Sikh officers their administrative duties till the time 
 comes for making over the country; and the Chief and Court 
 would have found the task, made over to them under such a sys- 
 tem, more easy to sustain. 
 
 " All the newspapers, English and native, make the adminis- 
 tration appear to be altogether English, it is Captain This, 
 Mr. That, who do, or are expected to do, everything ; and all over 
 the country the Native Chiefs will think, that the leaving the 
 country to the management of the Sirdars was a mere mockery 
 and delusion."! 
 
 That Sir William Sleeman would not have recommended, 
 and did not contemplate, the annexation of the Punjaub, 
 is sufficiently clear in this extract from another letter. 
 
 " Of course, the outrage at Mooltan must be avenged, and our 
 authority established ; but, when this is done, Currie should be 
 advised to avoid the rock upon which our friend Macnaghten was 
 wrecked. We are too impatient to jump down the throats of 
 those who venture to look us in the face, and to force upon them 
 
 * Sleeman's Oude, vol. i, p. xliii. f Ibid., vol. i, p. xxxv. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 305 
 
 our modes of doing the work of the country, and to superintend 
 the doing it ourselves in all its details, or having it done by 
 creatures of our own, commonly ten times more odious to the 
 people than we are ourselves."* 
 
 The same blot had been hit many years before by Sir 
 Thomas Munro, who besides being a fine soldier and a 
 practical administrator, had much of the statesman in his 
 composition. 
 
 " It is too much regulation that ruins everything. Englishmen 
 are as great fanatics in politics as Mahomedans in religion. They 
 suppose that no country can be saved without English institu- 
 tions. The natives of this country have enough of their own to 
 answer every useful object of internal administration, and if we 
 maintain and protect them our work will be easy."f 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence never approved the extinction of 
 the Punjaub State. He doubted the justice of the mea- 
 sure ; he was convinced of its imprudence. A friend and 
 brother officer of his tells us that "with a refinement of 
 the justice and moderation which were such conspicuous 
 features of Sir Henry's character, he dissented from the 
 policy of annexation. He thought that another effort 
 might have been made to save the Sikh Empire from 
 destruction, "f Soon after that step was decided on, he 
 wrote as follows to Mr. Kaye: 
 
 "I am sorry you have taken up the annexation cry. It may 
 now, after all that has happened, be in strictness just ; but it cer- 
 tainly is not expedient, and it is only lately that I have been able 
 to bring myself to see its justice." 
 
 It was Chillianwalla that turned many minds in favour 
 of annexation, and this consideration had evidently been 
 pressed upon Sir Henry Lawrence. " After all that has 
 happened," after witnessing actions in which the carnage 
 and the trophies were almost equally divided, when the 
 din of battle had scarcely ceased, and under the close per- 
 sonal influence of Lord Dalhousie, he can only "bring 
 himself "to say that "it may be, in strictness, just." He 
 has no doubt that it is inexpedient. 
 
 On the question of our administration, though he had 
 
 * Sleemari's Oude, vol. i, p. xxxvi. 
 
 t Gleig's Life of Sir T. Munro, vol. iii, p. 252, 253. 
 
 Kaye's Sepoy War, vol. i, p. 50, 51. 
 
 Kaye's Indian Officers, vol. ii, p. 303. 
 
 X 
 
306 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 taken a great part in it, and, as Mr. Marshman observes, 
 " his name was one of auspicious omen in the Punjaub, 
 where, in popular opinion, the rebellion arose on his de- 
 parture and was quelled on his return,"* his views were 
 substantially the same as those of Sir William Sleeman. 
 
 " Looking back on our Begency career,, my chief regrets are 
 that we did so much. 
 
 " Whatever errors have been committed have been, I think, 
 from attempting too much from too soon putting down the 
 native system, before we were prepared for a better. "f 
 
 Our statesmen, of all parties, have from time to time 
 declared that the aim of British supremacy in India ought 
 to be, as desired by Sleeman and Henry Lawrence, that 
 of preparing the people for self-government. Few and 
 far between have been the steps taken in that direction. 
 Whenever, either by direct management, or by judicious 
 and authoritative counsel, we have introduced reformed 
 institutions into a Native State, we have made a step for- 
 ward. Whenever, in time of peace and without some 
 stern political necessity, we have taken direct and perma- 
 nent possession of territory, which might otherwise have 
 remained a coherent Native State, we have taken a step 
 backward. 
 
 There cannot be a more incorrect assumption than that 
 which is so frequently made, that British rule alone is pro- 
 gressive, and that Native rule is either retrogressive or 
 stationary. Such vainglorious notions are contradicted by 
 historical facts no less than by all that we know of the 
 laws of human development. At the critical period when 
 our power first began to be felt in India, the Hindoo 
 nations were passing through a great political and social 
 revival, of pure home growth, which destroyed Mussul- 
 man ascendancy throughout the Continent. Our inter- 
 vention, and that of the French, checked and diverted, to 
 some extent, the course of Mahratta revolution, but its 
 popular and progressive tendencies are evident enough. 
 In the Mahratta camps, where Hindoos and Mahomedans 
 . of every tribe combined on equal terms against the parti- 
 sans of the old order of things, and against foreign in- 
 
 * History, vol. iii, p. 352. 
 
 t Kayo's Indian Officers, vol. ii, p. 297 and 306. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 307 
 
 vaders from Persia and Afghanistan, the germs of national 
 feeling were laid, and religious toleration was established. 
 Under what circumstances of unity or diversity, of Fede- 
 ration or autocracy, the States of Hindostan would have 
 settled down, into what prevailing form their institu- 
 tions would have been moulded, after the complete disin- 
 tegration of the Mogul Empire, if they had been undis- 
 turbed by Western influences, ' it would be useless to 
 attempt to speculate. Anarchy never lasts long ; and war 
 cannot go on for ever. Sooner or later an equilibrium 
 must have been restored. As it was, sixty-two years of 
 almost incessant warfare, in one quarter or another, elapsed, 
 between 1757 and 1819, before British supremacy was 
 firmly secured. We cannot therefore claim to have effected 
 the pacification of India within a period much shorter than 
 would in all probability have sufficed to bring about a 
 similar result by natural and internal action. 
 
 Since the Treaties of 1819, negotiated by Lord Hastings 
 at the end of his great campaign, progress in India has 
 depended almost entirely on the administrative achieve- 
 ments and example of the British Government. Consti- 
 tuted as the Native States are at present, restricted by 
 their Treaties with a Power of overwhelming strength and 
 inscrutable purposes, they have become incapable of spon- 
 taneous expansion. Ambition and emulation are repressed 
 in all classes, from the Sovereign to the clerk and private 
 soldier; the force of public opinion, the sense of public 
 responsibility, are weakened till they almost disappear. 
 Relieved by us from all fear of rivals or rebels, the Prince, 
 feeling his greatest danger to lie in the misconstruction of 
 his conduct by our representative at his Court, finds his 
 ease and safety most fully secured by keeping things as 
 they are. Left entirely to themselves, the Native States 
 would work out their own destinies, slowly and painfully, 
 not, perhaps, without dynastic or personal changes. De- 
 barred from external action and reciprocal intercourse, not 
 so much enlightened as overshadowed by British domina- 
 tion, they cannot advance without our initiative, and will 
 not take a step without our instructions. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie refused, on principle, to give any in- 
 structions, and in the indiscriminate rapacity of his policy 
 
 x2 
 
308 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 threw down all distinction between friends and foes, re- 
 moved every incentive to regular and orderly government, 
 annulled all belief in British good faith, and gave to every 
 piece of admonition from Calcutta the appearance of a 
 menace or a trap. He was right both logically and prac- 
 tically, from his point of view, in refusing to undertake 
 the reform of Native States. If the vices of these States 
 are incurable, it would be a waste of time to attempt to 
 cure them. If the sort of principle on which Lord Dal- 
 housie acted be true and just, it is not worth our while to 
 interfere, unless we can obtain full possession and com- 
 mand of their revenues ;* for partial improvements would 
 but postpone that salutary " crash", j" which we with, of 
 course, " a scrupulous regard to the claims of justice and 
 equity", should rather seek to precipitate. 
 
 Again, looking at the question practically, it would be 
 impossible to combine two policies so radically incompa- 
 tible. The reforming process could not be carried on in 
 the more important States, nor could its effects be expected 
 to prove permanent in any, without some efforts of per- 
 suasion on our part, without some faith in our good inten- 
 tions on theirs. What persuasive inducements could be 
 brought forward by us, what act of faith could be extorted 
 from them, when the published Minutes of the Governor- 
 General disclosed his plan that " on all occasions'", where 
 there was no lineal male descendant in " States which re- 
 cognised formally the supremacy of the British Govern- 
 ment", " the territory should be made to lapse" ?J Any 
 acknowledgment of British supremacy, or submission to 
 British authority, that could be, by any contrivance, 
 evaded or postponed, would obviously be political suicide 
 in a Prince, and treason in a Minister. Every tendency 
 in the Native States to profit by such lessons as we could 
 
 g've was swept away by the policy of annexation. British 
 uardianship in the Punjaub had, to say the least, a dis- 
 astrous result for our Ward. British management, as ex- 
 emplified in Mysore, appeared to native politicians to be 
 a process very similar to that by which the boa constrictor 
 lubricates his victims before swallowing them. There 
 could be no doubt or question as to Lord Dalhousie's views 
 
 * Ante. p. 72, 73. f Ante, p. 7G. J Ante, p. 185, 194. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 309 
 
 with regard to this Principality;* and until the 22nd 
 February, 1867, when Lord Cranborne made his memor- 
 able declaration in the House of Commons that the Maha- 
 rajah's adopted son would be recognised, nothing had 
 occurred to relieve any one's mind on the subject. Sir Ers- 
 kine Perry very fairly describes the general opinion that 
 prevailed : ' ' I have been twice in Mysore, and saw a good 
 deal of its administration under Sir Mark Cubbon, and I 
 firmly believe that, at the time Lord Canning's Proclama- 
 tion appeared, not a statesman in India ever contemplated 
 the restoration of Mysore to a Native dynasty, "f 
 
 There is little in the Mysore question, even as it stands 
 at present, to reassure Native Princes and Ministers, or to 
 reconcile them to the process of reform. It tells them 
 that if to allow free course to the new system, the per- 
 sonal authority of a Sovereign is once suspended, there is 
 great danger of its never being restored. They see that 
 although succession is promised to an infant heir, the 
 reigning Prince is virtually deposed, and the whole frame- 
 work of a Native State broken up, for the benefit of an 
 ever increasing number of English officials. 
 
 Besides Mysore, there is another instance of British 
 trusteeship, w^hich has naturally formed a frequent subject 
 of painful and anxious consideration in many parts of 
 India. In particular, the Government of Hyderabad has 
 never ceased to watch with interest our treatment of their 
 former dependent, the Nawab of the Carnatic. The pre- 
 sent Nizam's father in 1853, when pressed to cede terri- 
 tory for the pay of the Hyderabad Contingent, made these 
 singular observations to the Resident, General Low : 
 
 " ( I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe considered that 
 I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put upon the 
 same footing as Mahomed Ghous Khan' (meaning the present 
 Nawab of Arcot), f to have a pension paid to me like an old 
 servant, and have nothing to do but to eat, and sleep, and say 
 my prayers/ Here His Highness made use of an exclamation in 
 Arabic, which expresses both surprise and anger, and with a 
 manner and a tone of voice which seemed to me to indicate anger 
 in no ordinary degree. "% 
 
 * The Mysore Reversion (2nd edition), p. 41. 
 t Mysore Papers, 1867, p. 10. 
 
 j Papers, the Nizam, 1854, p. 120. The expression was " Astaghfir-ullah," 
 God forgive me ! signifying resentment and ironical repentance. 
 
310 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Since that interview took place, even the "pension paid 
 to him like an old servant" has been denied to Mahomed 
 Ghous Khan's heir : the Palace, gardens, country resi- 
 dences, furniture, and other personal property of the family 
 have been sold by auction for the benefit of the British 
 Government, a very complete justification of the Nizam's 
 suspicions and resentment at the proposal made to him, a 
 renewed warning to the Hyderabad family, its advisers 
 and adherents, to beware of British counsels. The fanatic 
 and ultra-conservative parties at the Nizam's Court, 
 opponents of the sagacious Minister, Salar Jung, are able 
 to point to the Punjaub, Mysore and the Carnatic as in- 
 stances of the natural results of trusting to British pro- 
 fessions, and submitting to British management. If the 
 prospect of a long minority, or the fact of dissensions and 
 disorders, in Hyderabad or any other of the more impor- 
 tant Principalities, should appear to present a task beyond 
 the capacity of those at the head of affairs, it would be 
 much more difficult now to obtain the acquiescence and 
 concurrence of the most influential persons in the State to 
 the complete control and guidance of British officers, than 
 it would have been before our Government had forfeited 
 its character for fair dealing and disinterested purposes. 
 
 In order to regain that character, and to recover the 
 moral influence we have lost, nothing more is necessary 
 than to settle on equitable and generous terms some of 
 those outstanding questions which have been for many 
 years a reproach to the British Crown, and a cause of dis- 
 trust to all Indian Rulers. The restoration of Mysore to 
 the appearance and condition of a protected State, ad- 
 ministered by Natives under the guidance of a British 
 Resident, would be the most striking inauguration possible 
 of the new era. It would be far better in every respect 
 if this could be done, by a prompt and decided process, 
 during the present Rajah's life-time ; but if not, the 
 gradual transmutation should be so timed that the young 
 Prince, on attaining his majority, should find no cumbrous 
 establishments overloaded with English incumbents to im- 
 pede his installation, and perhaps to form a pretext for 
 his indefinite exclusion from power. 
 
 The latest intelligence from Madras informs us that the 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 311 
 
 Government of India has failed to discover the means of 
 expending the sum of fifteen lakhs of rupees (150,000) 
 allotted to secure in the words of the despatch from 
 home, "the comfort and independence" of Prince Azeem 
 Jah, so as to advance that object ; and that there has been 
 no visible result except the appointment of an English 
 gentleman from the Civil Service as Special Commissioner 
 with a salary of 5,000 a-year. Three successive Secre- 
 taries of State, from both sides of the House, having agreed 
 to make concessions which amount to an acknowledgment 
 that gross injustice has been done to the Wallajah family, 
 by far the most dignified, the most graceful and the most 
 advantageous step for our Government to take, at the pre- 
 sent juncture, would be to restore Prince Azeem Jah to 
 the musnud of his ancestors with such modifications of the 
 existing Treaty as may bring it within the scope of altered 
 times and circumstances. 
 
 Two such acts of justice and magnanimity as these, 
 royally announced and royally executed, would give us 
 immense leverage for inducing the commencement of those 
 effective reforms in the larger States, especially in the 
 Nizam's Dominions, by which alone our resources can be 
 strengthened and relieved, and the regeneration of India 
 be placed beyond the reach of danger. 
 
 Long experience in Parliament and in office, and some 
 difference of opinion in the Cabinet, may have deterred 
 Lord Halifax from reversing the recent decision of a pre- 
 decessor belonging to his own party;* but there are many 
 signs and symptoms in the conduct and records of both 
 the Carnatic and Mysore cases, as they were left by Sir 
 Charles Wood, to lead us to suppose that he was very 
 averse to the course recommended by the majority of his 
 Council, seconded by one or two more weighty voices, and 
 that Lord Halifax in Opposition would not be grievously 
 distressed if the Rajah of Mysore and the Nawab of the 
 Carnatic were to be admitted at last to their proper places 
 through the doors which he would not close. 
 
 Whether the restoration of Mysore to the political scene 
 
 * It fell to the sad lot of Mr. Vernon Smith, now Lord Lyveden, to confirm, 
 as President of the Board of Control, all the worst acts of Lord Dalhousie's 
 administration. 
 
312 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 as a separate though subordinate Native Government be 
 completed during the present Rajah's reign or at the end 
 of his son's minority, great care should be taken to avoid 
 all appearance of violating the Partition and Subsidiary 
 Treaties of 1799. Let us beware how we loosen the 
 sanctions of our Indian treaties. We cannot justly or 
 safely attempt to tamper with a treaty of fifty years' 
 standing, on the plea that it was a bad bargain. It was a 
 bargain, and must be adhered to. Our only title to the 
 greater part of our possessions in India is a title by treaty. 
 We do not hold many Provinces directly by conquest. 
 Our only title to possession, our only moral claim to the 
 allegiance and subordination of the Princes of India, and, 
 as I believe, ah 1 our future power of permanent influence 
 for the education and civilisation of India, depend on the 
 preservation and development of our existing system of 
 treaties. 
 
 Lord Cranborne deserves the highest credit for states- 
 manlike judgment and foresight in having decided, so soon 
 after his advent to office, on overruling the majority of his 
 Council and the proceedings of the Government of India, 
 by the recognition of the Mysore Rajah's adopted heir, 
 thus saving the State from extinction. Sir Stafford 
 Northcote, however, with the great advantage of starting 
 on his journey from that advanced point which had been 
 won by his immediate predecessor, has improved his own 
 position and lost no ground of any value, by "not having 
 thought it necessary to repeat the argument of Lord Cran- 
 bome," uttered in debate only, and not embodied in a 
 despatch, "that the Maharajah's right under the Treaties 
 of 1799, was merely a personal one."* 
 
 The notion that the Treaties of 1799 are binding upon 
 us only for the life of the Prince with whom they were 
 contracted, because they do not contain the words "heirs 
 and successors," is one that can derive no support from the 
 recognised standards of International Law, and which will 
 never it may be confidently predicted, be supported by 
 any opinion from the law advisers of the Crown. 
 
 There is a broad distinction between a real and a per- 
 sonal treaty. A real treaty is made for public objects, and 
 
 * Mysore Papers (No. 271), 1867, p. 5. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 313 
 
 is to last as long as those public objects last. A personal 
 treaty is made for the private objects and interests of a 
 Prince or family, and is to last only as long as the person 
 or the family lasts. Thus a treaty made between two 
 Princes for a family alliance or compact whether relating 
 to a marriage, or a campaign, or joint resistance to revolu- 
 tion, instances of each of these being found in modern his- 
 tory is a personal treaty. It has no direct reference to 
 the interests of the State or people, but only to those of 
 the King or dynasty, and expires with them. A treaty 
 also, such as we have made at different times in India, 
 granting a pension for life or lives, as reward or compen- 
 sation, to a Prince or family, is a personal treaty. Under 
 treaties of this sort we secured certain annual payments 
 for their lives to Dowlut Eao Scindia and some ladies of 
 his family.* The Treaty made by the Duke of Wellington 
 with Amrut Rao, and the terms of capitulation between 
 Sir John Malcolm and Bajee Eao, the last Peishwa,j* are 
 also instances of personal treaties. 
 
 The base of all the attacks on the Mysore and Carnatic 
 Treaties lies in this error, that a treaty is "personal" be- 
 cause it does not contain the words "heirs and successors.' 1 
 These words are not essential, though after the fatal ad- 
 vantage that has been taken of their absence, I cannot say 
 they are superfluous. Even an undoubted personal treaty 
 would not necessarily expire, for want of these words, at 
 the death of the individual named in it, if its evident 
 object was to secure certain advantages to his family. A 
 reigning Prince when named in a treaty is the representa- 
 tive of a State, which is permanent, and of sovereignty, 
 which is always hereditary. Grotius lays down the rule : 
 
 " If a treaty is made with a King by name, without any men- 
 tion of heirs and successors, it is not therefore presently to be 
 reputed personal, for as it is well observed by Pedius and Ulpian, 
 the person is often inserted in the contract, not that the contract 
 is personal, but to show with whom the contract was made. 
 
 " If it be added to the treaty that it shall stand for ever, or that 
 it is made for the good of the Kingdom, it will from hence fully 
 appear that the treaty is real."J 
 
 * Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, vol. iv, p. 245. 
 
 t Ibid., vol. iii, p. 90 and 188. J Grotius, lib. ii., cap. 15 (16). 
 
314 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 No words can be stronger than those used in the Mysore 
 Treaties of 1 799 : they are "perpetual" they are to last "as 
 long as the sun and moon endure." What words can be more 
 conclusive ? Of their public objects there can be no doubt. 
 The Partition Treaty is said to be made "to establish per- 
 manent security and general tranquillity." The Subsidiary 
 Treaty declares itself to be made "to carry the stipulations 
 of the Partition Treaty into effect -for the protection and 
 defence of the territories of the contracting parties or either 
 of them -for the happiness of the people and the mutual 
 welfare of both States." 
 
 According to Wheaton, the greatest of modern autho- 
 rities, 
 
 "Treaties are divided into personal and real. The former relate 
 exclusively to tlie persons of the contracting parties, such as 
 family alliances, and treaties guaranteeing the throne to a parti- 
 cular Sovereign and his family. They expire, of course, on the 
 death of the King, or the extinction of his family. 
 
 " The obligation of treaties, by whatever denomination they 
 may be called, is founded not merely upon the contract itself, but 
 upon those mutual relations between the two States which may 
 have induced them to enter into certain arrangements. Whether 
 the treaty be termed real or personal, it will continue so long as 
 these relations exist."* 
 
 In this instance of Mysore the family exists, and the 
 " mutual relations between the States" exist ; and there- 
 fore, whether they be termed real or personal, the Treaties 
 of 179 9 hold good. 
 
 Lord Wellesley did some very grasping and arbitrary 
 things, but he never had the sly and underhand intentions 
 that have been imputed, both with reference to the My- 
 sore and the Carnatic Treaties. Lord Wellesley's aim in 
 constructing the Treaties of 1799 was undoubtedly that 
 of gaining the tightest hold possible over Mysore and its 
 resources ; and he no doubt thought he could gain a 
 tighter hold by omitting the words " heirs and successors", 
 thus leaving the succession open for decision by the pro- 
 tecting Power. With an infant on the throne, incapable 
 for many years of begetting or adopting a son, his claim 
 to the throne being disputed, as we know, by other mem- 
 
 * Elements of International Law, Boston, 1855, p. 39 and 41. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 315 
 
 bers of the family, this seemed a more important point 
 at the time than it does now. But there is literally no- 
 thing to show that Lord Wellesley ever thought of appro- 
 priating Mysore at the Rajah's death ? or of declaring the 
 Sovereignty of Mysore not to be hereditary. Everything 
 recorded in his despatches tells against such a notion. He 
 speaks of restoring "a family', "a dynasty'; of establish- 
 ing "a Kingdom" and "a State." The lead-pencil correc- 
 tions and erasures in the original draft of the Treaty, dis- 
 covered by Lord William Hay at the British Museum, and 
 described by him in a speech at the House of Commons 
 on the 24th of May, 1 86 7, do not evince the intention attri- 
 buted to them by the noble lord; and, if they did, would 
 be quite unavailable, and could not strengthen Lord Dal- 
 housie's doctrine. Not a trace, not a hint of a personal 
 Treaty is to be found in the Marquis Wellesley's papers, 
 or in any official document before 1856, when Lord Dal- 
 housie, in the full career of annexation, sounded the first 
 note of menace against Mysore.* 
 
 Sir Stafford Northcote himself, in his despatch to the 
 Governor-General of the 16th April, 1867, distinctly ac- 
 knowledges the Treaties of 1799 to have been dynastic and 
 not personal. He says : 
 
 " Without entering upon any minute examination of the terms 
 of the Treaties of 1799, Her Majesty's Government recognise in 
 the policy which dictated that settlement a desire to provide for 
 the maintenance of an Indian dynasty on the throne of Mysore, 
 upon terms which should at once afford a guarantee for the good 
 government of the people, and for the security of British rights 
 and interests. Her Majesty is animated by the same desire, and 
 shares the views to which 1 have referred." f 
 
 In announcing Her Majesty's desire "to maintain that 
 family upon the throne, in the person of his Highness's 
 adopted son, upon terms corresponding with those made in 
 1799, so far as the altered circumstances of the present 
 time will allow'' it is to be hoped the Secretary of State 
 does not propose to change the terms of the Treaty of 1 799 
 for our advantage, on account of the relative strength of 
 the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore and ourselves having 
 
 * Mysore Reversion (2nd edition), p. 41. 
 t Mysore Papers (No. 239), 1867, p. 9. 
 
316 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 altered in the interval. That would be to revert in another 
 form to the plan denounced by Sir Henry Lawrence, the 
 most illustrious victim of Lord Dalhousie's policy : 
 
 " We have no right, as the Friend of India constantly now 
 desires, to break our treaties. Some of them were not wise ; but 
 most were, at the time they were made, thought very advantageous 
 to us. It would be outrageous, now that we are stronger, to break 
 them."* 
 
 After giving instructions for the infant heir's education, 
 the Secretary of State proceeds thus : 
 
 "If, at the demise of his Highness, the young Prince should 
 not have attained the age which you, upon consideration, may fix 
 for his majority, the territory shall continue to be governed in his 
 name upon the same principles, and under the same regulations, 
 as at the present time. Upon his reaching that age, or at an 
 earlier period, if you should think it desirable, it will be the duty 
 of the British Government, before confiding to him the adminis- 
 tration of the whole, or any portion, of the State, to enter into an 
 arrangement with him for the purpose of adequately providing 
 for the maintenance of a system of Government well adapted to 
 the wants and interests of the people. "f 
 
 For ensuring a reformed and regular system, and even 
 for the readjustment of the subsidy, as suggested in the 
 last paragraph of this despatch, in consideration of the 
 increased expense of supporting troops, our Government 
 might fairly demand some revision of the existing Treaty ; 
 but great moderation ought to be observed in imposing 
 any additional burden on Mysore. The chief authorities 
 on International Law tell us that the provisions of a 
 treaty must always be interpreted in the sense most 
 favourable to the weaker party, not, be it observed, from 
 motives of magnanimity or compassion, but on the sound 
 legal principle, that we can only consider the intentions 
 of the parties at the time of the transaction ; and that if 
 the stronger party had intended to impose heavier condi- 
 tions than are literally stated on the face of the Treaty, 
 he, being able to dictate his own terms, would have taken 
 care to have them plainly expressed. The dynastic nature 
 of the Treaty, and therefore its validity after the death of 
 
 * Kaye's Indian Officers, vol. ii, p. 310. 
 t Mysore Papers (No. 239), 1867, p. 9. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 317 
 
 the reigning Rajah, has already been proved, and is, as just 
 pointed out, recognised by Her Majesty's Government. 
 That recognition is implied once more in the paragraph 
 last quoted from the despatch, in which the Secretary of 
 State directs that " on the demise of his Highness, the 
 territory shall continue to be governed in his" the young 
 Prince's " name". He is to be at once proclaimed as the 
 Sovereign of Mysore and successor to his father; the ex- 
 isting Treaty is to hold good, and no new arrangement is 
 to be made until the Prince attains his majority. Whether 
 deferred to that period, or whether, as would be far more 
 effective and becoming, the new arrangement should be 
 made at once with the reigning Prince, admitted to a con- 
 sultative share in the government of his country, it must 
 never be forgotten that the Maharajah, old or young, can 
 only negotiate as the representative of the Mysore State, 
 and that no curtailment of territory or augmentation of 
 tribute ought to be imposed on that State without some 
 just claim or a fair equivalent. No increase of the sub- 
 sidy could be honestly demanded on any other ground 
 than that of the enhanced cost of maintaining the British 
 troops, or as a commutation for the reduced number of 
 Auxiliary Cavalry kept up by the Mysore Government. 
 No cession of territory could be reasonably required except 
 by way of convenient transfer and rectification of frontiers, 
 as was done by the Supplementary Treaty of 1803,* and 
 as might be done now by the exchange of Serin gapatam 
 and some enclaves on the borders in our possession for the 
 great military station of Bangalore and the Hill districts 
 where coffee can be grown, and where some eighteen or 
 twenty English planters are to be found, f Anything be- 
 yond this would be an arbitrary extortion, whether the 
 opportunity should arise from our own wrong in the hasty 
 and unwarrantably protracted supersession of the old 
 Raj ah, J or from our sacred duty of Guardianship during 
 the minority of his son. In the latter case it would be 
 the same political crime that we committed in the Punjaub, 
 only without the palliation of war. It would be a prac- 
 
 * Collection of Treaties (Calcutta, 1864), vol. v, p. 165. 
 
 t Vide Note at the end of this Chapter. 
 
 t Mysore Reversion, 2nd edition, p. 21 to 25 and 191. 
 
318 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 tical application of the Duke of Argyll's theory that our 
 Treaties with the Native Princes of India "expressed 
 nothing but the will of a Superior imposing on his Vassal 
 so much as for the time it was thought expedient to 
 
 require/'* 
 
 If we desire to obtain the highest degree of influence in 
 the Native States, with a view to their administrative re- 
 form, we must forget all such formulas as these ; we must 
 give up the use of inverted commas in writing of "Trea- 
 ties" with Nawabs and Rajahs ; we must use the same 
 standard of weight and measure in dealing with Hindoo 
 communities and individuals that we use in dealing with 
 Europeans. All tendencies in the opposite direction savour 
 merely of contempt, and approach to the introduction of 
 the Dred Scott doctrine into the region of International 
 Law. "The negro race," said Chief Justice Taney, "have 
 no rights which the white man is bound to respect." And 
 we know where that memorable judgment led to. 
 
 Many of the replies sent to Sir John Lawrence's circular 
 of July 1st, 1867, especially those of Mr. R. H. Davies, 
 Chief Commissioner of Oude, Sir Richard Temple, Resi- 
 dent at Hyderabad, Colonel Clerk of Mysore, and Mr. 
 A. A. Roberts, Judicial Commissioner of the Punjaub, 
 show that a keen sense of the main defects of our system 
 is by no means rare among the ablest and most distin- 
 guished of our public servants in India. The Governor- 
 General, having begun by declaring his "opinion that the 
 masses of the people are incontestably more prosperous 
 and (sua si bona norint) far more happy in British territory 
 than they are under Native Rulers," "considers that the 
 present would be a good opportunity for proving this belief 
 by a concentration of" what he is pleased to call "statistics 
 from different parts of India, "f He invokes his minor pro- 
 phets to bless the work of his and their hands; and al- 
 though most of them, as might have been expected, have 
 responded to his wishes, and none of them have cursed 
 him altogether, the best of them have fully justified the 
 doubts expressed by Lord Cranborne which led to this 
 inquiry. 
 
 * India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 11. 
 t Papers, British and Native Systems, 1868, p. 4. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 319 
 
 In reading the strictures on Native Government which 
 abound in the replies to Sir John Lawrence's circular, it 
 must be remembered that, even when they are just and 
 reasonable, they relate only to unreformed States. As Sir 
 Donald Macleod, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub, 
 observes : 
 
 " If the comparison were made with really well governed Native 
 States, and such I believe are to be found, the comparison might 
 not, in the estimation of the people, be altogether in favour of the 
 British Government, save in so far as the continuance of just rule 
 in a Native State where there are no constitutional guaranties 
 must ever be dependent on the character of the Chief, and there- 
 fore wanting the stability of British rule."* 
 
 Let it be the object of our Imperial policy to obtain 
 those "constitutional guaranties," to establish them in 
 every Native State on a sure foundation, and to see that 
 they are not disturbed. 
 
 Mr. C. A. Elliott, of Futtehgurh, also appears to have 
 got the true bearings of the discussion. 
 
 " That the British Administration has secured to its subjects a 
 vast increase in security, prosperity and material comfort, com- 
 pared with those it succeeded to, is gross, open and palpable. 
 The question admits of no discussion. But the comparison Sir 
 John Lawrence wishes to make is not with the Native States, 
 which preceded us, but with those which are our contemporaries 
 and which exist in districts alongside of our districts. Can we 
 prove that our people are more prosperous and happier than those 
 who live in the neighbouring Native States ? 
 
 " My impression is, that the better a Native State is, the more 
 it approaches our system. In Bhopal, which is probably the best 
 Native government in India, I really know of no difference that 
 exists in theory ; practically the government is laxer, less rigid, 
 and more in sympathy with the governed. "f 
 
 The most remarkable paper that the occasion has brought 
 forth is, perhaps, the Memorandum voluntarily offered by 
 Sir Robert Montgomery, late Lieutenant-Governor of the 
 Punjaub, dated "AthenaBum, March 1 868," and published 
 in the Times of the 30th March, when the greater part of 
 this book was in type, from which I cannot refrain from 
 making a few extracts confirmatory of much that the party 
 of "fifth-rate writers," "small in numbers and smaller in 
 
 * Papers, British and Native Systems, 1868, p. 114. f Ibid., p. 105. 
 
320 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 ability," have been feebly attempting to teach during the 
 last fifteen years. 
 
 ' f If the balance be fairly struck, it will undoubtedly be found 
 in favour of our rule as regards the material prosperity of the 
 country and the progress of civilisation. But the point still re- 
 mains, do the Natives feel themselves happier under our rule than 
 under that of a Native Government ? Would those now living 
 under a Native Government prefer it to being annexed to the 
 British territory ? 
 
 " I unhesitatingly affirm that they would not elect to change 
 their condition, and to forfeit their nationality. 
 
 "It is well, I think, that this reflection of popular sentiments 
 should be held up against the temptation of annexation for the 
 supposed good of the people ; although it is but fair and due to 
 ourselves that we should justify the continuance of our dominion 
 by the many material advantages it has conveyed. 
 
 " The common error lies in our insular proneness to contract 
 and generalise to embody in one class all the many separate 
 nationalities and distinct races which have been successively added 
 to the rule of England. In an Empire made up of such differing 
 languages and distinct customs, it must be popular, as it is politic, 
 to encourage to a great extent a local administration and a local 
 adaptation of laws. 
 
 " The people should be more largely employed in all social and 
 municipal affairs, which they are most competent to manage. Till 
 quite recently this was neglected, and even now it is very partially 
 done. The appointment of Honorary Magistrates, Municipal Com- 
 mittees, etc., only three or four years ago, met with opposition 
 from many officers/' 
 
 That "local administration" and "local adaptation of 
 laws," which Sir Robert Montgomery sees is so urgently 
 required, can be more effectually promoted by the main- 
 tenance, restoration, and enlargement of Native Princi- 
 palities, than by any system of Provincial Councils or 
 Municipal Committees in the Provinces under direct 
 British rule. 
 
 Sir Robert Montgomery, in the sentences just quoted 
 from his Memorandum, observes that "the appointment of 
 Honorary Magistrates met with opposition from many 
 officers." Some remarks by Sir Bartle Frere on Sir Stafford 
 Northcote's despatch of the 8th February, 1868, recently 
 printed as a Parliamentary Return, recommending the em- 
 ployment of Natives in the higher grades of the public 
 service, corroborate what I have said on this subject. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 321 
 
 11 As regards the past, I think an} r Native of India must feel 
 that, even under the present law, much more might be done to 
 employ competent Natives in high office, if those who have the 
 distribution and control of patronage were really in earnest in 
 their professions of anxiety to see Native agency more extensively 
 used. 
 
 " I cannot think that the spirit in which the subject is handled 
 in many of the papers forwarded to us by the Government of 
 India, indicates any sense of the only means whereby the great 
 gulf between European and Native employes of Government can 
 ever be bridged over." 
 
 Colonel Hopkinson, Agent to the Governor-General on 
 the North-east Frontier, observes in his reply to the cir- 
 cular, that " if endeavours are ever made to develope the 
 moral nature of the Natives after the fashion of the Anglo- 
 Saxon race, it will be found that for the most part they 
 originate either in England or with Englishmen out of the 
 official pale in India."* 
 
 The prevailing tendencies of home legislation, of the 
 Secretary of State's controlling influence, and of English 
 public opinion, so far as they have become operative or 
 demonstrative since the Mutinies were suppressed, have 
 been decidedly liberal and conciliatory towards the people 
 of India. Natives have been admitted, under the Acts of 
 1862, to the Legislative Councils of the three Presidencies 
 and to the Bench of the High Courts of Bengal and Bom- 
 bay. Had these very limited measures been proposed for 
 the consideration, had they depended on the decision of 
 the Provincial Governments, they would never have been 
 carried out. 
 
 There are, and always have been, marked and brilliant 
 exceptions to the professional narrowness of view generally 
 prevailing in the Indian Civil Service, which has rendered 
 it, as a body, averse both to the maintenance of Native 
 States, and to the advancement of our own Native sub- 
 jects in the higher grades of public employment. Liberal 
 tendencies are evidently spreading among Indian officials, 
 and will become more common and more confirmed, as 
 English public opinion, both in and out of Parliament, 
 becomes more definite and more clearly pronounced. 
 
 Mr. C. A. Elliott, of Futtehgurh, seems to perceive the 
 
 * Papers, British and Native Systems, 1868, p. 16. 
 
 Y 
 
322 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 vicious circle in which we are entangled, without seeing 
 the way out of it, seems to observe the goal towards 
 which we should aim, without seeing the road towards it. 
 In his answer to Sir John Lawrence's circular, from which 
 we have already quoted a sentence, he writes as follows : 
 
 f{ We assume, and history and the consent of the civilised world 
 justify us in assuming, that we are placed by Providence in India 
 for the good and the improvement of the people, to educate and 
 stimulate them up to such a point that they may at last be able 
 to govern themselves."* 
 
 But he adds : "As long as this work remains to do, we 
 cannot be really popular." Over one third of India in area, 
 and one fourth in population, the work is ready. The 
 people in the allied and protected States can be allowed 
 to govern themselves, without our cutting them adrift, or 
 neglecting our share in the work. And we can make the 
 Imperial Power "popular" by judiciously increasing the 
 area and population of those Principalities that prove 
 themselves worthy of such an augmentation. 
 
 The nearest approach to self-government that the people 
 of India can make in their present phase of civilisation, 
 must be made by means of reformed Native States, own- 
 ing allegiance and subordination to the Imperial Power. 
 By the medium of such States we can exert a far stronger 
 influence over the native mind, and gain a far more secure 
 hold over the resources of India, than we can by means of 
 our direct possessions. 
 
 India is a Continent, not a country; and there is no 
 part of the world where provincial self-government is more 
 imperatively required, where uniformity and centralisation 
 may become a greater curse. 
 
 If the Imperial Power holds the sea; if she alone con- 
 ducts the external relations of the Empire, and the poli- 
 tical intercourse between the States ; if her troops visit 
 and occupy, at pleasure, any and every place and post 
 throughout the land ; if no customs or transit-duties can 
 be levied without her concurrence; if by her treaty-right 
 of authoritative counsel, and by her moral influence, she 
 can modify and control the institutions of every State, 
 
 * Papers, British and Native Systems, 1868, p. 105. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 323 
 
 there will be full scope for British statesmanship, an inex- 
 haustible field for British energy and enterprise. In this 
 way only can we rule India without demoralising and de- 
 grading her people. If the Paramount Power is not con- 
 tent to be the Head, but will also insist upon playing the 
 part of hands and feet, and lungs and digestive organs, 
 if every centre of municipal and social life is to be sacked 
 or starved to nourish an official metropolis at Calcutta 
 and another in London, there may, for a time, be a de- 
 ceptive appearance of plethora, but the constitution of the 
 Empire will not be permanently strengthened. There 
 will be constant danger of convulsive fits, if not of a fatal 
 apoplexy. 
 
 The clever writer in the Spectator, to whom we have 
 several times referred, so fully believes in the necessity of 
 training India for self-government, that, with imaginative 
 devotion to his political idol, he makes it the end and aim 
 of Lord Dalhousie's policy.* In the free atmosphere of 
 Great Britain, with the lessons of the last ten years, both 
 he and in a less degree -his coUeague, Mr. Marshman, 
 have lost some of the prejudices and antipathies of Cal- 
 cutta, but there is a solution of continuity between their 
 old and their new opinions which no amount of vague libe- 
 rality can now render consistent. 
 
 Mr. Marshman admits it " has been the opprobrium of 
 our administration ever since the days of Lord Cornwallis," 
 that "with the progress of our Empire a blight comes 
 over the prospects of the higher and more influential classes 
 of native society," that " there is no room for their aspir- 
 ations in our system of Government : they sink down to 
 one dead level of depression in their own land." He thinks 
 that " the remedy for this error is to be found, not in per- 
 petuating the power so constantly abused, of Native Princes, 
 simply on the ground of finding employment for native 
 intelligence and ambition, but to incorporate these qualities 
 in our own administration, with all necessary safeguards 
 against the defects of the Oriental character"^ 
 
 Mr. Marshman cannot resist the Pharisaic sneer with 
 which he qualifies his recommendation, and which, recur- 
 
 * Ante, p. 202, 203. t History, vol. iii, p. 402. 
 
 Y2 
 
324 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 ring frequently in his volumes, must render them peculi- 
 arly acceptable to the rising generation of educated Hin- 
 doos upon whom they are forced by the Educational 
 Department. He traces the origin of this " opprobrium of 
 our administration" to the days of Lord Cornwallis. The 
 Editor of the Spectator seems to admit that it was inten- 
 sified by the "great" and " statesmanlike" policy of Lord 
 Dalhousie, which "had one radical and incurable defect; 
 it barred up native careers."* 
 
 Since the greater part of these pages have been in type 
 I have learned that this fault in our system had struck 
 even Lord Dalhousie himself, as appears in the following 
 extract from one of his state-papers : 
 
 " It is a cause of constant regret that there do not exist in the 
 public service some offices of large emolument and high position, 
 to which Native gentlemen of ability and character might rise, so 
 that the office and the pay of Principal Suddur Ameen should no 
 longer be the boundary of a Native gentleman's ambition in the 
 British Service."f 
 
 It is not, perhaps, very strange that the Governor- 
 General, in the full swing of that career which seemed to 
 be what the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson want 
 to persuade us it really was, " a long and splendid admi- 
 nistration", J "one brilliant and uninterrupted success", 
 should not have perceived that he was aggravating, even 
 to hopelessness, the very grievance he professed to regret. 
 The Editor of the Spectator does perceive it, but tries 
 very hard to escape from contrition and full recantation by 
 suggesting an impossible compromise. He, as we have 
 seen, clings to the policy of annexation as a theory, while 
 admitting it to have failed in practice. || He speaks of the 
 present state of affairs as "a mixed system"; thinks "the 
 new policy may fail, as the old one failed", and it may then 
 " be necessary to unsettle it." So that although he thinks 
 we should "adhere" to "the mixed system", "until we 
 resolve, and announce that we resolve, that it shall end", 
 
 * Ante, p. 202. 
 
 t I quote from a Memorial to Sir Stafford Northcote, Secretary of State for 
 India, recently sent by the Bombay Native Association. I do not know in what 
 Minute or despatch Lord Dalhousie expressed these views. 
 
 t India under Dalhousie and Canning, p. 67. 
 
 A Vindication, p. 179. || Ante, p. 202. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 325 
 
 he looks forward to a series of experiments, and even pro- 
 poses one himself, as a a third policy", that of "picked 
 Native Rulers", or Chief Commissioners, " for life."* 
 
 We shall never arrive at an Imperial policy, until we 
 entirely abandon these crude notions of attempting politi- 
 cal experiments, even upon such a corpus vile as India. 
 But have we a corpus vile there, upon which we may play 
 tricks and try experiments with impunity ? The people 
 of India may be an inferior race, backward in civilisation, 
 degraded by superstition, and incapable of attaining to 
 the intellectual grandeur and social purity of European 
 nations, though these assertions are open to many qualifi- 
 cations. Before absolutely relegating them to a much 
 lower grade in the scale of humanity, we might reflect a 
 little upon the superstition and corruption that are so rife 
 in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Russia, and ask why the moral 
 and political progress of Hindoo communities is to be con- 
 sidered more hopeless than that of European nations. 
 Whatever we may consider d priori ought to be the case, 
 neither the criminal statistics nor the social phenomena of 
 India, as compared with our own, entitle us to place our- 
 selves at an immeasurable height above the Indian races. 
 And surely their mere numbers entitle them to some little 
 respect. The Asiatic population under British supremacy, 
 including the Native States of India, nearly trebles that 
 of the whole Russian Empire. The Queen has more Ma- 
 homedan subjects than the Sultan of Turkey. Surely 
 it would not be unjust, unreasonable, or imprudent to pay 
 some little attention, to give some kindly consideration, 
 to the wishes and opinions, and even to the prejudices 
 and ambitions, of nearly two hundred millions of human 
 beings. What can be ultimately expected from a policy 
 of contempt, except that judgment which is pronounced 
 against him who shall call his brother ' Thou fool' ? 
 
 Now two things are sufficiently obvious to those who 
 have learned to see a little below the surface of things in 
 India, firstly, that the wishes, opinions, prejudices and 
 ambitions of the reflective and sensitive classes do not 
 turn in the direction of " picked Native Rulers" or " Chief 
 Commissioners"; secondly, that no such class of function- 
 
 * Ante, p. 204. 
 
326 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 aries, European or Native, could obtain one tithe of the 
 influence over the people of all classes, for preserving order 
 or for aiding progress, that can be exercised by Native 
 Sovereigns well disposed towards the Paramount Power. 
 Native Rulers for life, "picked" by the British Govern- 
 ment, which, by the bye, possesses no special faculty for 
 picking them, would have to be supported by British 
 troops just as much as English Governors and Chief Com- 
 missioners. A Native Prince can stand by himself. At 
 critical moments the mass of the people will obey no one 
 else. They would think it wrong, dangerous, unlucky, to 
 disobey or oppose a Rajah ; they would feel themselves 
 legally, morally and socially safe in obeying him. There 
 is no such feeling with regard to a British official, whose 
 influence rests entirely on visible or accredited physical 
 force.* The people will plunge into the dark with their 
 own Prince ; they will only go as far as they can see with 
 a Collector. In no part of the world is the " divinity that 
 doth hedge a King" more respected than in India. 
 
 Sir Richard Temple, in his letter to the Governor- 
 General of the 10th of August, 1867, recognises this fact 
 with reference to a Mussulman Sovereign who has been 
 the chief butt of the annexationists for many years, whose 
 person and Government have been the subject of their 
 unbounded scorn and slander : 
 
 f ' With some classes of the people, the feeling of personal loy- 
 alty to the Sovereign is intense. I could recall many instances 
 of this. Before me now, at Hyderabad in the Deccan, there is one 
 of the strongest cases in point. The veneration felt for the per- 
 son and office of the Nizam seems boundless. Though no Native 
 Sovereigns in India can be more secluded, uninformed, and even 
 bigoted, than the successive Nizams have been, yet even these 
 Princes must have about them some kingly qualities, some tinc- 
 ture of statecraft, in order to inspire awe and maintain personal 
 prestige as they have done."f 
 
 When we consider that the British Government can 
 wield this immense moral power at its will, it does seem 
 
 * This assertion is not in the least modified by the vast personal influence 
 exercised by such men as Outram, Kicholson, Abbott, Sir Herbert Edwardes 
 and others, for the most part over wild tribes, and for military purposes. Be- 
 sides, the Services are not made up of such men as these. And of course I do 
 not mean that a Prince is always obeyed. 
 
 t Papers, British and Indian Systems, 1868, p. 74. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 327 
 
 extraordinary that any one who pretends to higher motives 
 than the interests of the Service, who has some knowledge 
 of history, some insight into human character, and some 
 idea of political science, can propose either to destroy it, 
 or to turn it against us, can still hanker after the subver- 
 sion of these hereditary jurisdictions, and think of replac- 
 ing them either by British Commissioners or by " picked 
 Native Rulers for life". With our fearful responsibilities, 
 with our enormous stake in the peace and prosperity of 
 India, we cannot afford such a waste of power. We want 
 the Native Princes much more than they want us. We 
 want them for the discipline and the education of two 
 hundred millions of Asiatics. We can instruct and manage 
 the two hundred Princes, their families and followers ; we 
 cannot sway the millions without the good will of their 
 natural leaders. 
 
 In the actual phase of Indian civilisation Monarchy is 
 the only form of government that is suitable or acceptable 
 to the people, that possesses the two essential qualities of 
 stability and impulsive force. No "picked Native Ruler" 
 or British Commissioner, however highly educated, 
 though strained and sifted by a dozen successive competi- 
 tions, could ever maintain order or propagate reform as 
 could be done by a Native Prince, however ignorant, whom 
 we have rendered amenable to our purpose. And there 
 is no necessity that Native Princes should be ignorant. If 
 most of them are so, it is only another proof of our neg- 
 lect. 
 
 In this, as in other affairs, we had better be content 
 with the tools we find ready made to our hands, and make 
 use of the old royal families, without picking or choosing 
 when it can be avoided. We can educate Sovereigns, but 
 we cannot improvise them. Nations can do it, by a pro- 
 cess of natural selection, in the stormiest scenes of their 
 struggle for existence; but neither a Sivajee nor a Hyder 
 Ali would serve our turn. Such Princes have not con- 
 servative propensities, and would not be easily led into 
 constitutional government. 
 
 The capabilities of India can never be fully developed 
 by a process of perpetual dry-nursing. Our pupils, with- 
 out being released from tuition, or allowed to run riot out 
 
328 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 of bounds, must be allowed to grow, to use their limbs 
 and faculties, and to exercise the arts and accomplishments 
 that we may be proud of having taught them. And as 
 they prove themselves able and willing to carry on the 
 good work which we have planned and initiated, we may, 
 with great relief and advantage to our own over-strained 
 establishments, enlarge their bounds, and place more con- 
 fidence in them. For instance, if the administration of 
 Mysore be judiciously organised during the young Prince's 
 minority, instead of abusing our trust by carving out a 
 small Principality for him, it would be far more advan- 
 tageous, both for the Imperial Power and for the people 
 of Southern India, if we were to extend the frontiers of 
 the State, perhaps even to the full dimensions of Tippoo 
 Sultan's Kingdom, except the sea-board Provinces. Sir 
 John Malcolm, one of the most far-seeing of our few Indian 
 statesmen, long ago anticipated these views. He said of 
 Mysore : 
 
 "It may, in the course of events, be a consideration of policy 
 to increase, instead of diminishing, the wealth and limits of a 
 State which, while it affords us resources fully equal to the same 
 extent of our own dominions, is exempt from some of the objec- 
 tions to which those are subject."* 
 
 By the marked and acknowledged administrative im- 
 provements introduced during the reign of the present 
 Nizam throughout his Dominions, that Prince has fairly 
 earned the boon upon which he is known to have set his 
 heart, the restoration of the two Provinces of Berar, held 
 in trust for him by our Government, to his own occupa- 
 tion and management. Those districts were taken from 
 his father, by means of menace and compulsion, as a mate- 
 rial guaranty for the regular payment of a Contingent 
 Force, a burden which we had, most unfairly and insi- 
 diously, "rendered permanent, contrary to the principle 
 of the Treaty, and altered so as to be useful for our own 
 purposes." " Its commands and staff-appointments", con- 
 tinues Major Moore, one of the Court of Directors, " have 
 afforded rewards for meritorious officers who had distin- 
 guished themselves in our own armies ; and it has been 
 altogether a fertile source of patronage." On the other 
 
 * Malcolm's Political History, 1811, p. 375. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 329 
 
 hand, while we imposed this "incubus on the Nizam's 
 finances", we turned these troops to our own pecuniary 
 benefit in another way. Relying upon the Contingent for 
 preserving peace and good order in the Nizam's domi- 
 nions, we " disregarded our own engagements", and " for 
 thirty years the number of our troops", the Subsidiary 
 Force, " kept up within the Hyderabad country was more 
 than one fourth less than the number for which we had 
 contracted" under the Treaty of 1800, in return for valu- 
 able cessions of territory.* 
 
 The Nizam's Ministers were reduced to the greatest 
 extremities in order " to meet our inevitable demand for 
 the monthly pay of the Contingent", controlled by our 
 Resident, and commanded by our officers, whose emolu- 
 ments, costing our Government nothing, were swelled to 
 a scale of preposterous extravagance. f 
 
 " Overwhelmed with financial difficulties, the Nizam was 
 at length unable to pay the Contingent, arid we kindly 
 lent him the money from our own treasury, first at 12 per 
 cent., and latterly at 6 per cent, interest ; and thus our 
 staunch Ally incurred a debt to us of about 50 lakhs of 
 rupees" (500,000), "the consequences of which were the 
 present Revised Treaty. "J 
 
 The opinions thus expressed by Major Moore were sup- 
 ported in Protests by Sir Henry Wiliock and Colonel 
 Sykes, who quoted the testimony " of successive Residents 
 at Hyderabad, officers of high character and standing, viz., 
 Sir Charles Metcalfe, Colonel Stewart, General Fraser and 
 Colonel Low", who " severally declared that we were not 
 justified by treaty in making such large calls on the 
 Nizam's treasury. " Colonel Sykes doubted whether " a 
 legal, equitable or moral responsibility could be fixed upon 
 the Nizam for the repayment of the total advances made 
 by the British Government. "|| Colonel Davidson, Resi- 
 dent at Hyderabad in 1860, and who had been Assistant 
 Resident in 1853, when the Revised Treaty was extorted 
 from the Nizam, as he says, " by objurgations and threats", 
 declares, that "had the pecuniary demands of the two 
 Governments been impartially dealt with, we had no just 
 
 * Papers, Nizam's Debt, 1859, p. 4, 5. t Ibid., p. 16, 17. 
 
 I Ibid., p. 5. Ibid. t p. 9. || Ibid., p. 11. 
 
330 CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 claim against the Nizam", "in 1853 we had little or no 
 real pecuniary claim against the Nizam/'* 
 
 Such being the origin of the sequestration, and the 
 account being but little modified in our favour by the ter- 
 ritorial restoration and exchanges, and the relinquishment 
 of a large balance of alleged debt under the Treaty of 
 1860, which still left the Nizam's large counter-claims of 
 long-standing un touched, f every dictate of equity and 
 policy should prompt our Government to replace these 
 Provinces, with their reformed institutions and improved 
 revenue, in the direct possession of their Sovereign. 
 
 In a despatch dated the 5th of September, 1860, our 
 Government reasserted the Sovereignty of the Nizam in 
 the Provinces, and desired to " explain to his Highness 
 distinctly that the object of the Government of India in 
 retaining in its hands a part even of the Assigned Dis- 
 tricts, is simply that it may hold a material guaranty for 
 the performance of the conditions of Art. VI of the Treaty 
 of 1853, and that the Government of India desires to hold 
 this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the 
 Assigned Districts, not in Sovereignty, but in trust for his 
 Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up, and no 
 longer." It fully acknowledged "the fact that the aliena- 
 tion of this portion of the dominions of his Highness is 
 temporary only, and for a special purpose conducive chiefly 
 to the security of the Hyderabad State, and to the pre- 
 servation of tranquillity throughout its limits. "J 
 
 Assuming the justice and advisability of keeping up the 
 Contingent, on its reduced scale, it may have been neces- 
 sary, from the disordered state of the Nizam's finances, and 
 the loose mode of administration in 1853, to take such a 
 material guaranty for the regular payment of our demands. 
 Since that time, however, and especially since 1860, partly 
 from the relief afforded by the revenue of the districts 
 restored under the Treaty of that year, partly from the 
 careful economy and judicious measures of the Minister 
 Salar Jung, the finances have arrived at a much more 
 satisfactory condition. Unquestionable security could now 
 be given for the punctual payment of the Contingent ; 
 
 * Papers, the Deccan, 1867, p. 27. t Ibid., p. 4, 5 and 27. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 20. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. l]:\] 
 
 and it might be found expedient still further to reduce 
 the expenses of that Force, to withdraw gradually some of 
 the European officers, and to transfer the corps, with their 
 own consent, to the direct service of the Nizam, as soon 
 as efficient Native Commandants could be trained and 
 appointed. This process might be carried on step by step 
 with the conversion of the irregular and ineffective troops 
 now forming the Nizam's army, and who as fast as they 
 were disbanded, would furnish a certain proportion of good 
 recruits for the disciplined Regiments. This plan, roughly 
 sketched here, and intended to occupy several years in 
 execution, might be made a measure of economy at once 
 for the Nizam's Government and for ours. Half the neces- 
 sity both for the Subsidiary Force and the Contingent 
 would disappear with the reconstruction of the Nizam's 
 Army, and the breaking up of those numerous, disorderly 
 levies which now infest the country. The Nawab Salar 
 Jung has recently taken a most effectual step towards 
 preserving peace and tranquillity, by forbidding the open 
 display of arms, especially in the city of Hyderabad. 
 
 If we wish to strengthen the hands of the brave and 
 wise Minister who has done so much to reform the Hydera- 
 bad State during the last fifteen years, we ought to re- 
 turn to his charge the two Provinces of Berar. The 
 honour and credit of restoring the integrity of the Nizam's 
 Dominions would redouble his influence with all classes, 
 from the Sovereign downwards, and arm him with irre- 
 sistible authority to pursue and extend the work of or- 
 ganisation. Besides, the introduction of all the essentials 
 of good government into every. Province, and into every 
 department of the administration, might be made the con- 
 dition of relinquishing the Berars. The results of the 
 partial restitution under the Treaty of 1860, have been 
 most encouraging, both by the continued good manage- 
 ment of the retransferred Provinces, and in the stimulus 
 and examples thereby given to the general progress of the 
 country. Complete restitution might be made the means 
 and occasion of regenerating the Nizam's Government. 
 We can gain nothing, while the cause of civilisation loses, 
 so long as this great act of redress and instruction is de- 
 nied or delayed. 
 
332 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The Edinburgh Reviewer of October 1866, whose Essay 
 has already fallen under our notice,* has learned nothing 
 from the Rebellion of 1857, except to take precautions 
 against another military mutiny. He has nothing to sug- 
 gest except that we should reduce our Native troops to 
 the lowest possible degree ; arm our European Infantry 
 with breech-loaders, and provide our Artillery with guns 
 and projectiles " of the latest and most approved inven- 
 tion/' to be employed, if necessary, " against Asiatics who 
 could not possibly possess themselves of similar weapons." 
 " It would be rash/' he adds, " to place these improved 
 arms in the hands of Natives, by whom they might be 
 turned against ourselves." Having then, he says, "re- 
 duced our own force, we might well demand that the Na- 
 tive Princes should disband a corresponding number of 
 their own troops." Then he trusts, "in a generation or 
 two, unless we wilfully keep it alive, the military spirit of 
 the people will, for the most part, have died out."t 
 
 A noble policy and hopeful prospects ! He sees that 
 " the reduction by one-third of the amount of European 
 force now maintained in India would be a very sensible 
 relief to England," but he cannot, of course, admit that 
 the vast area and multiplied posts to be occupied in con- 
 sequence of Lord Dalhousie's annexations, have anything 
 to do with the burdensome demand for European soldiers. 
 He does not see that the Rebellion of 1857 revealed, but 
 did not create, the want of British troops. While he feels 
 the inconvenience of being compelled to supply so much 
 physical force from England, he can think of no remedy 
 but that of diminishing the armed force recruited in India, 
 whether in our own service or in that of our Allies. In 
 short, the policy of annexation, which the Reviewer is 
 bound to uphold, having begun in bluster and contempt, 
 now sinks down into mistrust and the muzzle. 
 
 Clearly the Edinburgh Reviewer, and those who think 
 with him, would declaim vehemently against my sugges- 
 tion for converting the Nizam's Army into a small but ef- 
 ficient force. My opinion, on the contrary, is that if we 
 make the Native Princes trust us, we can always trust 
 them. Their troops, properly equipped and disciplined, 
 
 * Ante, p. 227 to 235. f Edinburgh Review, October, 1866, p. 33$. 339. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. 
 
 occasionally brigaded in camps of exercise with the move- 
 able columns which should take the place of our sub- 
 sidiary divisions and garrisons, ought to be a source of 
 military strength, and, still more, a visible display of moral 
 strength in our favour, to the great relief of our finances 
 and our muster-roll. 
 
 With these convictions on my mind, I cannot but de- 
 precate as most ill-advised that effort of superior power, 
 by which Sir John Lawrence, about a year ago, compelled 
 the Maharajah Scindia to break up the miniature army, 
 complete in every branch, which he had carefully organised 
 and trained, and which, in unsuspecting complacency, he 
 had invited the British Resident to review at Gwalior. 
 That act, much lauded at Calcutta for its vigilance and 
 vigour, appears to me to have been extremely petty, un- 
 dignified and impolitic. What harm could that little 
 force have done to us ? One of our Divisions could have 
 walked over it any day. A Regiment of Dragoons and a 
 Troop of Horse Artillery, well handled, could probably 
 have dispersed it after a morning's march. On the 
 other hand, in case of real necessity, the cooperation of 
 that smah 1 body with the Maharajah at their head, would 
 bafne thousands of insurgents and intriguers, would de- 
 termine the good conduct of many feudatories and millions 
 of subjects. 
 
 By such an open and stinging rebuff to our faithful 
 Ally, he is lowered in the eyes of his own adherents and 
 people. His influence though of inestimable value to 
 us was still insufficient in the crisis of 1858 to restrain 
 the bulk of his troops and followers from joining in the 
 Rebellion. The result of the struggle, proving his wis- 
 dom and foresight, must have added immensely to the 
 Prince's authority, until our Government was pleased to 
 shake it once more by displaying their want of confi- 
 dence, and by wounding him in a matter known to be 
 his special pride. 
 
 The Imperial Power of India will not grow stronger 
 or more secure by the weakness and humiliation of the 
 feudatory Princes. Nor will 'the general belief in our 
 strength and security be fortified in the least by the mani- 
 festation of mistrust. 
 
oo 4 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Apart from all other objections, that mistrust was al- 
 together misdirected. We need have no fear of the 
 visible armies of ah 1 the Native Sovereigns of India. In 
 the words of Lord Canning's last letter to General Sir 
 Mark Cubbon : " We have nothing to fear from them 
 individually, if we treat them rightly ; while they have 
 individually an influence which is invaluable to us as Su- 
 preme Rulers in India, if we will but turn it to account."* 
 Not one of them has the slightest wish to measure his 
 strength against ours. They are neither willing nor able 
 to combine against us. So long as we can see their little 
 armies, we know where to have them, in case of any un- 
 avoidable collision or unexpected contumacy. And not 
 being able to concur in the Edinburgh Reviewer's expec- 
 tation that "the military spirit" in India "will have died 
 out in a generation or two," I prefer to see the warlike 
 elements of the population organised and disciplined under 
 responsible leaders, to having them compressed or driven 
 out of sight into predatory courses or hidden conspiracy. 
 
 The Edinburgh Reviewer of 1866 does not fear " in- 
 surrections of the people." " How," he inquires, " are the 
 supposed insurgents to obtain weapons wherewith to face 
 Armstrong guns and breech-loading rifles of the newest 
 construction ?"t 
 
 There are plenty of arms in India, and they will always 
 be attainable. Three thousand miles of coast can never 
 be blockaded. The Reviewer, and the party he represents, 
 do not, we may suppose, seriously think that by any pre- 
 cautions of diplomacy, police or legislation, they can destroy 
 or neutralise the physical force of two hundred millions of 
 men, that their hostility, without breech-loaders, or even 
 their disaffection, without any arms at all, would not be 
 formidable ? 
 
 If ever, from errors or adverse circumstances that it 
 would be useless to anticipate, there should be anything 
 like a hostile unanimity against ^us in India, the country 
 might be made too hot to hold us almost without a shot 
 being fired. The insurgents, if there were any, would not 
 be required " to face Armstrong guns". At no time shall 
 
 * Note B at the end of this volume. 
 
 t Edinburgh Review, October, 1866, p. 338. 
 
AN IMPERIAL POLICY. : >:>f) 
 
 we have any military dangers, properly so called, to fear 
 from within. A British army of 25,000 men could march 
 from one end of India to the other, overcoming all possible 
 opposition, and providing for its own subsistence. But 
 we do not want to conquer, we want to govern India. 
 Our supremacy would be utterly untenable for a day with- 
 out Native cooperation on an enormous scale; and if that 
 were withdrawn, or no longer to be trusted, all semblance 
 of a Government would soon be at an end. We should 
 become, in every sense of the word, a foreign body in the 
 system, and should be starved in the midst of plenty. 
 Great Britain is now, unfortunately, dependent upon the 
 revenues and railway earnings of India for large annual 
 remittances, of which the amount has largely increased 
 within the last ten years. To secure the regular payment 
 of these vast sums, the Government of India must main- 
 tain peace, good order and general content. 
 
 Our highest efforts should be directed to the reform of 
 Native States as the only solid foundation of an Imperial 
 system, the only effectual means of permanent civilisation. 
 Only so far as our institutions are accepted and esta- 
 blished in the allied Principalities, can they be considered 
 secure even in our own Provinces. To carry out the work 
 of reform, particularly in the larger and more important 
 States, with full effect, and with the good will and cheer- 
 ful aid of those most deeply concerned, we shall require 
 to make use of the much neglected and almost forgotten 
 agency of Native diplomatists. 
 
 We have done a great work for India : we have made 
 rough places smooth ; we have improved the soil ; we 
 have cut down and torn up by the roots many noxious 
 weeds; we have planted many trees of stately growth and 
 useful quality ; but we shall lose the fruit of our labour if 
 we refuse to permit the people to carry on the cultivation 
 themselves, when we have shown them how to do it. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 (A.) 
 
 COFFEE-PLANTERS IN MYSORE AND ENGLISH 
 GENTLEMEN IN INDIA. 
 
 (Page 317.) 
 
 IN Remarks on the Mysore Blue Book, pp. 59 to 65, (embodied as 
 Chapter X in the 2nd Edition of the Mysore Reversion, pp. 238 
 to 244,) I fully refuted the plausible argument advanced both in 
 the despatches from Calcutta and in a Minute by Mr. R. D. Man- 
 gles, against the restoration of a Native Government in Mysore, 
 on account of the number of English coffee-planters in that Pro- 
 vince. I showed that there could not be more than from 25 to 
 30 persons of that description among a population of about four 
 millions, and that instead of Mysore being, as Mr. Mangles as- 
 serted, " full of European settlers/' these two dozen or so of 
 planters not, properly speaking " settlers" at all, were located 
 only in two small hilly districts on the outskirts, beyond which 
 coffee cultivation could never be extended. 
 
 Not satisfied with this exposure, Mr. Mangles returns to the 
 charge in a Dissent dated April 24th, 1867, objecting to Sir Staf- 
 ford Northcote's despatch recognising the Rajah's heir. He re- 
 peats his former erroneous statement, though in terms slightly more 
 vague and guarded. He says, that " Englishmen in considerable 
 numbers have been permitted, if not encouraged, to settle in that 
 territory as coffee-planters."* From very recent and authentic 
 information I am now enabled to state that the number of English 
 coffee-planters in Mysore does not exceed sixteen in number, or in- 
 cluding their assistants, some of whom are not Europeans but of 
 mixed extraction, about thirty, not, one might suppose, a very 
 formidable or important body. 
 
 But this handful of Englishmen do not, as I pointed out in my 
 original remarks on this topic, constitute a large proportion of 
 the coffee-planting interest in Mysore. We learn from the Ad- 
 ministration Report of Mysore for the official year 1865-6, that 
 the collections under the head of " Coffee" amount altogether to 
 
 * Mysore Papers, (No. 271), 1867, p. 13. 
 
APPENDIX. M7 
 
 102,781 Rupees, (10,278) of which 88,470 Rupees (8847) were 
 paid by Natives, and 14,311 Rupees (1431) by European 
 planters. Sixteen planters, paying the splendid revenue of 1400 
 per annum into the public treasury, are magnified by Mr. Mangles 
 into " a considerable number" of British settlers, whose interests 
 should be paramount among four millions of Hindoos paying an 
 annual revenue of a million sterling. 
 
 But in justice to Mr. Mangles we must admit that in his second 
 Minute he does not, as he did in his first, dwell exclusively on the 
 jeopardised interests of the English planters. He is concerned 
 for the Rajah and the Principality of Mysore, who, in his opinion, 
 if not protected by annexation, may be crushed by " the superior 
 intelligence and energies" of the terrible sixteen. The whole 
 passage deserves attention. 
 
 " I desire to add, that it appears to me that the impolicy of reesta- 
 blishing a Native Government in Mysore is much aggravated by the 
 circumstance that, of late years, Englishmen in considerable numbers 
 have been permitted, if not encouraged, to settle in that territory as 
 coffee -planters. It may be regarded as a certainty that, during the 
 long minority of the adopted son, this class will be materially increased. 
 No Native Government, such as India has ever yet seen, would be able 
 to deal equably and consistently with such a body of men. The 
 Englishmen would take their stand, with characteristic strength of 
 will, upon their rights, as recognised or assumed under the British pro- 
 tectorate. Their treatment by the Maharajah, or rather by his ministers 
 or servants, would oscillate, according to the caprice of the hour, be- 
 tween undue favour, involving wrong to the native population, and 
 high-handed justice.* On any occasion of extreme excitement, such 
 as that engendered by the differences between the indigo planters and 
 the ryots in Bengal, the Government would be utterly unable to con- 
 trol the English planters, otherwise than by acts of despotic violence, 
 which would as certainly provoke equally violent resistance. And it is 
 hardly too much to say, that if, in the course of a few years, any large 
 addition should be made, as is highly probable, to the number of such 
 settlers in Mysore, nothing but the constantly recurring interposition 
 of the British Government would prevent them from making them- 
 selves practically masters of the country, either with the consent of the 
 Rajah, through the instrumentality of loans of money, or in superses- 
 sion of his authority, by the abuse of their superior intelligence and 
 energies. The same qualities which have won for our nation the Em- 
 pire of India, would make our countrymen, if let alone, the virtual 
 masters of Mysore. And incessant interference on the part of the 
 British Government, to obviate such a result, would reduce the Rajah 
 to the condition of the merest cypher, the sport of opposing forces. "f 
 
 Still persisting, in spite of the information within his reach, in 
 talking about " Englishmen in considerable numbers settled as 
 
 * Is not this a slip of the pen, or a misprint, for " injustice"? 
 f Mysore Papers (No. 271), 1867, p. 12, 13. 
 
 Z 
 
338 APPENDIX. 
 
 coffee-planters/' he considers it "as a certainty that,, during- the 
 long minority of the adopted son, this class will be materially in- 
 creased." Nothing can be more unlikely. The very small class 
 of English planters has decreased, is decreasing, and will probably 
 have all but disappeared before twenty years have elapsed. They 
 cannot exist without those exceptionally high profits which are no 
 longer to be obtained in the face of native competition. The 
 native planters will buy them all out by degrees. From all that 
 we can hear, most of them are in the market already, but as the 
 Editor of the Friend of India and correspondent of the Times has 
 recently informed us, "their property has so deteriorated in value- 
 as to be unsaleable at its proper price." There may be differences 
 of opinion as to what "a proper price" is, and also as to the cause 
 and time of the deterioration, which we will consider shortly, but 
 there can be little doubt as to the falling prospects of the Euro- 
 pean coffee-planters in Mysore. 
 
 Their prospects, however, may revive ; there may be a good 
 time coming for them; but even then the argument of Mr. 
 Mangles would not be improved. He ignores the fact, pointed 
 out in my previous correction, that the fearful task of controlling 
 the English planters would not be thrown entirely upon the Rajah 
 and his ministers ; that under special capitulations, of which one 
 was concluded with the Nizam in 1861,* the British Resident is 
 always constituted the judge in crimes and disputes arising among 
 Europeans and descendants of Europeans within Native States. 
 
 The picture that is drawn by Mr. Mangles of these sixteen 
 coffee-planters, paying the immense sum of 1400 per annum on 
 their holdings, complaining of this tax as "a heavy burden,"f 
 trying in vain to sell their property, and yet "making themselves 
 practically masters of the country, through the instrumentality of 
 loans of money" to the Rajah, may be pronounced brilliant but so 
 highly coloured as to be quite out of keeping. Mr. Mangles says 
 that "by the abuse of their superior intelligence and energies, 
 our countrymen, if let alone, would become the virtual masters of 
 Mysore." Well, but they would not be "let alone." If every 
 one of the sixteen English planters were a sort of cross between 
 Talleyrand and Shylock, with endless talents for intrigue and 
 boundless funds wherewith to furnish loans to the Rajah, they 
 would not be " let alone" to extort a bond and exact their pound 
 of flesh from the British tributary. His fears, however, may be 
 moderated. The coffee -planters are neither so wealthy nor so 
 ambitious, nor are British Residents so careless or so powerless as 
 he supposes. And we may remind Mr. Mangles that the corrupt 
 
 * Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 1864 (Longman & Co., London), vol. v, 
 p. 117. This concession was, I believe, made by the Nizam chiefly on account 
 of the Railway passing through his dominions. 
 
 t Remarks on the Mysore Blue Book, p. 62; Mysore Reversion (2nd Edition), 
 p. 2-41. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Englishmen, the Paul Benfields and others, of whom he is evi- 
 dently thinking, who formed the class of ' Nabobs' towards the 
 close of the last century, and whose vast fortunes were wrung from 
 the Nawabs of the Carnatic, Bengal, and Oude, and the Rajah of 
 Tanjoro, by the imposition of loans, chiefly fictitious, were not 
 coffee-planters, but Covenanted Civilians of the Company's Ser- 
 vice. They acquired and exercised their evil influence over these 
 unfortunate Princes, not by means of any <! superior intelligence 
 and energies," but by the lowest and most infamous practices of 
 fraud and intimidation. They possessed, or were believed to 
 possess, the power of gaining political advantages for the Native 
 Princes, or of saving them from injury and oppression. Even 
 supposing that times and circumstances were in any respect 
 similar, what political power or influence could a coffee-planter be 
 supposed to possess ? 
 
 The Calcutta Correspondent of the Times, for several years, both 
 in that capacity and in his other character of Editor of the Friend 
 of India, has kept up an incessant fire of slander and insult upon 
 Native Princes and their administration, and has striven hard to 
 ensure the annexation of Mysore. In a letter to the Times, dated 
 the 10th of March, 1866, this public instructor introduced the 
 following veracious picture into a general invective against Native 
 States. 
 
 " The Chief, if he is active, squeezes his tenantry and kills their trade 
 by grievous monopolies, if he is debauched, as is more generally the 
 case, they have half-a-dozen tyrants, in the shape of his courtiers, in- 
 stead of one. Mutilation , the ravishing of women, torture, suttee, and 
 MI axnlh, or burying alive, are the rule, and the present policy is not to 
 interfere until these evils reach a height which would endanger the 
 peace of our own subjects." 
 
 As to the maintenance of the Mysore State, 
 
 " Whatever be the justice of the old Chief's claim, England ought 
 to know that Mysore cannot be restored after being 40 years under 
 English rule." 
 
 "What could we do with the hundreds of European planters who, 
 during the last third of a century, have been attracted by our ad- 
 ministration to settle there and clothe the slopes of its hills with the 
 coffee plant ?" 
 
 Baffled for the time, but not vanquished by Sir Stafford North- 
 cote's decision, he still continues his efforts, in the hope, like his 
 London Correspondent, Mr. Marshman, "that before the period 
 for consummating this policy arrives, some future Secretary of 
 State will be found to annul it, as the present Secretary of State 
 has annulled the decision of his predecessor/'* In a letter dated 
 the 24th of February, which appeared in the Times of the 23rd of 
 
 * Ante, p. 290. 
 
340 APPENDIX. 
 
 March 1868, he dresses up the old coffee-planting bugbear with 
 "a nice derangement" of epithets and figures far surpassing the 
 first and second style of Mr. Mangles in treating the same 
 subject. 
 
 " The coffee planters have taken the alarm in Mysore, where, by the 
 last census, there were no less than 14,302 Europeans and East Indians 
 out of a total population of .3,900,735." 
 
 Who would not on a hasty perusal suppose that these 14,302 
 persons were all coffee-planters ? 
 
 " They," the coffee-planters, whom the ordinary reader now sup- 
 poses to be 14,302 in number instead of 16 ! " say that a breach of 
 faith has been committed by the Secretary of State, that the legality 
 of their titles is now questioned, and that their property has so dete- 
 riorated in value as to be unsaleable at its proper price. The correspon- 
 dence on native rule shows that this feeling prevails among the major- 
 ity of the natives also. These native officials are at once to be em- 
 ployed wherever practicable, even before the boy- Rajah comes of age. I 
 report these things as likely to be the source of no little future trouble." 
 
 The statement as to the number of Europeans and East Indians 
 residing in Mysore may be literally correct, yet it is calculated to 
 produce a very erroneous impression. The Times Correspondent 
 does not say whether nearly 2,000 British soldiers stationed in 
 the Province are included among the 14,302 persons, but certainly 
 nineteen-twentieths of that number are petty shopkeepers and 
 camp-followers of mixed extraction, and of both sexes, with their 
 children, in the great military cantonment of Bangalore; not one 
 in five hundred being a coffee-planter or a producer of any de- 
 scription. As to the sixteen actual coffee-planters not the 
 shadowy " considerable numbers" of Mr. Mangles, nor the 14,302 
 insinuations of the Times Correspondent ' ' they" may complain 
 that " a breach of faith has been committed," " that the legality 
 of their titles is questioned, " and that " their property is deterio- 
 rated in value," but they would find it very difficult to trace any 
 connection between the last and only tangible ground of complaint 
 and the recognition of the Maharajah's heir, or to found upon it 
 any claim for compensation. The British Government will, of 
 course, take good care that their titles are not disturbed, and that 
 they have every facility for carrying on their business, or for dis- 
 posing of their property, as they may feel inclined. There is no 
 reason to fear any " future trouble." 
 
 This same letter in the Times of the 23rd of March contains 
 another very flagrant example of the untrustworthy nature of " our 
 Calcutta Correspondent's" information, of the utter trash that is 
 forced upon the public mind with all the weight of the powerful 
 organ upon which the Editor of the Friend of India has unfor- 
 tunately contrived to fasten himself. Speaking of the proposed 
 new Government for Bengal, he says : 
 
APPENDIX. 341 
 
 " If a Council is given to Bengal then a demand will be made by 
 the large non-official community of Calcutta and Bengal to be repre- 
 sented by at least one highly paid outsider ; and the Bengalees, too, 
 will probably make a similar request. It is difficult to see how either 
 can be refused. It will not be difficult to find an Englishman of high 
 character and ability, and a Native might be appointed so soon as one 
 in every way qualified could be found. The custom of appointing 
 merchants only to honorary positions in the Legislative Councils can- 
 not be said to be useful either to Government or to the public. Such 
 men are overworked in their own business, which they cannot afford 
 to leave. No non-missionary remains in India an hour longer than he 
 can help. But pay and honour a man of this class like an ordinary 
 Civilian, and very good members will be secured. There are no less 
 than 150,000 pure Englishmen in India. Of these, 58,000 are soldiers 
 and officers, and 3,500 covenanted officials of different orders, civil, 
 ecclesiastical, and medical. This leaves 89,000 English gentlemen, who 
 are settlers and merchants of different kinds, and the great majority 
 of these are in Calcutta and Bengal. Are these 89,000 to be in no 
 way represented anywhere, either in India or England ? This question 
 will be put very loudly, I doubt not, if a New Executive Council is to 
 be created." 
 
 Let us examine his figures a little. His sum total of 150,000 
 Englishmen in India is considerably overstated, as I shall show, but 
 we will accept it provisionally. After deducting the soldiers and 
 officials, he says there remain " 89 ,000 English gentlemen" Verily, 
 the colour-blindness of a West Indian Creole among Negroes is 
 clear vision compared with that of a Calcutta Cockney among 
 Hindoos. Observe the quiet assumption, that every " pure Eng- 
 lishman" in India must be a " gentleman". It never even struck 
 him that there might be a few " ladies" to keep the " gentlemen" 
 company. If he had thought of that, he might have written 
 with much more verbal and a little more numerical accuracy 
 " persons"; for among those counted as Europeans in 1861, there 
 were nearly 20,000 women, a large deduction from his " gentle- 
 men" to begin with. It might also have struck him, if he had 
 not been in such a hurry, that there would be a few "young 
 gentlemen", sometimes profanely called "boys", among them. 
 
 Even with these modifications, his estimate would be far above 
 the truth ; for where did the Calcutta Correspondent get the round 
 number of 150,000 with, which he started? The last census of 
 the Europeans in India was taken, I believe, in 1861. The sum 
 total then was 125,945. There were probably more Englishmen 
 in India then, for the simple reason that there were more soldiers. 
 In 1861 there were altogether 84,083, officers and men of all 
 branches of the Army, and if we deduct these from the total, there 
 remain 41, 862; from which we must again subtract 19,306 women, 
 which leaves a remainder of 22,556. From these again we must 
 take the Covenanted civil, ecclesiastical and medical servants at 
 
342 APPENDIX. 
 
 the Correspondent's own figure of 3,500, and there remain 19,056. 
 But from these again we must deduct the Uncovenanted servants 
 of Government, who cannot be reckoned at much less than 1,500 
 more, which will reduce the number of independent Europeans to 
 about 1 7,500 ; from which a further deduction of children under 
 age, and of foreigners, would have to be made before we arrived 
 at the true net result of Englishmen in India not in the service of 
 Government. These may be finally set down at about 12,000 of 
 all classes, instead of the absurdly exaggerated estimate of " 89,000 
 English gentlemen", proposed by the Calcutta Correspondent of 
 The Times. 
 
 These " 89,000 English gentlemen", he says, " are settlers and 
 merchants of different kinds." Reduce the number to 12,000, and 
 even then none of them are " settlers", and not one-tenth of them 
 are either " gentlemen" or "merchants". It is obvious that 
 among the non-official Englishmen in India, a very small propor- 
 tion can belong to the class, who, by virtue of their education, 
 manners, and profession, are usually called ff gentlemen". The 
 great bulk of them are shopkeepers, artisans, small clerks and 
 commercial assistants, railway engineers and drivers, sailors, pen- 
 sioners from the army, and others of even humbler grades, with 
 not a few of vagabond character. 
 
 By the Correspondent's own description there are no " settlers" 
 among them, for he says : " No non-missionary remains in India 
 an hour longer than he can help", a sufficient answer to the pre- 
 posterous demand of representation in the Government of Bengal 
 put forward on behalf of these irresponsible visitors to India, the 
 best of whom have no permanent stake in the country, and no 
 object but that of making money and taking it away as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM EARL CANNING'S LAST PRIVATE 
 LETTER TO GENERAL SIR MARK CUBBON, K.C.B., 
 
 COMMISSIONER OF MYSORE, DATED NOV. 24TH, 1860. 
 
 (Page 334.) 
 
 " I have no doubt that the policy of disruption and separation was 
 the right one fifty years ago, when the Rohillas and Mahrattas pos- 
 sessed armies and artillery which they could increase at pleasure with- 
 
APPENDIX. 343 
 
 out our consent, and, indeed, without our knowledge. But now it is 
 quite different. These Chiefs can scarcely cast a gun, they certainly 
 could not equip it unknown to us. They feel their dependence on us, 
 since 1857 more than ever. We have nothing to fear from them indi- 
 vidually, if we treat them rightly ; whilst they have individually an 
 influence which is invaluable to us as Supreme Rulers in India, if we 
 will but turn it to account. To do this we must put them into a posi- 
 tion to become useful instruments of civil government, and to take a 
 pride in it. It is not a hopeless task, as some pretend. If it were, 
 Sindia would not, in May last, when I was returning to Calcutta, have 
 taken his place in the mail-cart, to meet me in the Trunk Road, for no 
 other purpose than to show me the results of his own revision of his 
 revenue-assessments, made in compliance with exhortations given to 
 him six months before at Agra. Unluckily he missed me. Nor would 
 Maharajah Maun Sing, the Oude malcontent, and all but rebel, who 
 wisely became loyal just in time, have told me last week with pride, 
 that since he had been a Magistrate he had judged upwards of six hun- 
 dred cases, in only two of which his judgment had, on appeal, been 
 reversed ; speaking, too, with warmth of the kindness and trouble 
 bestowed upon him by the Chief Commissioner, who had taken him 
 into his camp for a fortnight to teach him the forms and spirit of our 
 magisterial administration. 
 
 "In one way or another in every way, in short we must teach 
 these men unmistakably, that, whether they be Chiefs of States or sub- 
 jects, no change in the Supreme Power in India will be a gain to them, 
 either as regards property, religion, social position, or national preju- 
 dices ; and that the largest possible share of consideration and autho- 
 rity which they can have under any Paramount Power, they shall have 
 under ours. If, as is very probable, the day of a European war is not 
 distant, the need to us of such a conviction in their minds will soon 
 make itself felt. To hold our Indian Empire in its present dimensions, 
 through a war with France and Russia, we must hold it by some other 
 means than the few English Regiments which, in such a case, would 
 be spared to us. 
 
 "It is the same with our own old dominions in India as with the 
 Native States. We have governed the North- Western Provinces in 
 such a fashion that the Lieutenant- Govern or is with difficulty able to 
 find Native gentlemen of such position as to make them useful and 
 influential Magistrates ; and in ten or fifteen years more it would be 
 pretty nearly the same with the Punjaub. The influence of the land- 
 holders, instead of being conciliated and enlisted on our side, has been 
 broken up and diluted till it has all but disappeared in the North- 
 West ; and we present the extraordinary spectacle of a Government 
 which has no root in its soil, governing a country mainly agricultural, 
 and one in which the value of landed possessions, and the respect for 
 hereditary tenures, are as strongly felt as in any country in the world, 
 by ignoring the landlord. We have kept a smooth surface upon this 
 unsound state of things longer than could have been expected ; and 
 fortunately, when the break-up came, three years ago, we had no 
 enemies in the field but such as did not know how to profit by our dis- 
 
;U4 APPENDIX. 
 
 advantage, and we were able to dispose of them before they learnt the 
 way. 
 
 " It may not be so in a long European war, with foreign cruisers 
 threatening our Indian ports, foreign emissaries busy in the interior, 
 and English recruits hard to come by." 
 
 This extract has already been printed in the Homeward Mail. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LONDON : 
 T. RICHARDS 37, GREAT QUEEN STREET, W.C. 
 

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