•NRLF im$ Sa»BSH»5!SS3E!a3RS»Sa23?5«-*^jM* The Making of Italy 1856-1870 THE OXLERY f*^f?'^ £a(Ha»tianiBD«anM«KWKs:mj;ikfnx yt^^a/ ^xr?i^^^ Z^/iA^^n^^ tb l/ril4€y-tJfTTapoTe?yrrTrL ? '. T : r- . 6, 7 The Crimean War, Piedmont joins the Allies .... 8 The Piedmontese at the Tchernaya 9 Cavour at the Congress of Paris 9, 10 The Italian Question before the Congress .... 11, 1 2 Baron Hubner's reply to Clarendon and Walewski . . isTi? Cavour's negotiations with Clarendon . . . .15,16,17 He arranges with Napoleon III. for joint action . . 18, 19 CHAPTER II. THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED — (1856 — 1859). Cavour's report to the Turin Parliament 20 Interpreted by the press as a declaration of war against the Holy See 21 Report of M. de Rayneval to Walewski on the condition of the Papal States 21-27 Progress of Pius IX. through his States in 1857 . . .27 Cavour's preparations for war against Austria - ... 27 Armaments and conspiracies 27, 28 The Sapri expedition 28 Denounced by Cavour as an outrage against the Law of Nations 29 His words a condemnation of his own subsequent enterprise . ^o The Orsini Plot 3° Cavour and Napoleon III. at Plombieres 3° Europe on the eve of war, yet confident in the preservation of peace 3^ viii CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. PAGE Napoleon's words to the Austrian ambassador at the New Year's reception of 1859 ...._. ^ ... 32 33 33 33 33 A3 44 44 45 45>46 46 47 Marriage of Prince Napoleon and the Princess Clotilde Niel inspects the fortresses of Piedmont .... Austria strengthens her Italian garrisons ; agitation at Milan French and Piedmontese preparations for war ... Lanza proposes a war loan in the Turin Parliament . . 33, 34 Criticism of Cavour's policy by the opposition . . . 34, 35 A Savoyard deputy predicts the cession of Savoy . . 35, 36 Cavour defends his policy . . . . . . . 36,37 The loan authorized 38 Opening of the French chambers, the Emperor's speech . 2>^, 39 The pamphlet. Napoleon III. et ritalie . . . . 39, 40 The English Government asks Piedmont what are her complaints against Austria ; Cavour's reply 40, 4 1 Memorandum in reply from Austria 41-43 Reassuring article in \\iQ Moniteur j Russia proposes a Congress 43 Austria accepts the proposal on condition of previous disarma ment by Sardinia • Cavour is alarmed ; he goes to Paris Austria and England propose a general disarmament . Garibaldi given the command of the Cacciatori degli Alpi . Austria resolves to demand the disbandment of the free corps Ultimatum from Austria sent to Turin .... The French troops put in motion to enter Italy . Declaration of war . . . . Lord Malmesbury rejects the French invitation to England to enter upon the war as the ally of France ... 48, 49 CHAPTER IV. THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARDY. The Austrian commander and his plan of campaign . . 50j 51 His forces 51 Position and plans of the Sardinians 51 The Austrians cross the Ticino ; their slow advance into Pied- mont 52 Retreat of the Austrians ; attitude of the peasantry . . 52, $3 Concentration of the allied armies 54 Gyulai makes a reconnaissance in force against their right; battle of Montebelio 55, 56 The French concentration completed ; positions of the opposing forces ; plans of Nap.">leon 56-58 Flank movement of the French, masked by an advance of the Piedmontese 58 The two days' fighting at Palestro 59-6i The Austrians discover the flank march of the French ; hesita- ting action of Gyulai ; he resolves to fight on the Ticino 61, 62 MacMahon's victory at Turbigo 63 CONTENTS, ix PAGE Interference with Gyulai's plans from Vienna ... 63, 64 Battle of Magenta ; map and description of the ground . .64 Position of the opposing armies on the morning of June 4th, 1859 65 Beginning of the battle 66 The French advance checked 67 The French are reinforced and resume their advance . . 68 MacMahon to the rescue 69 Storming of Magenta, and retreat of the Austrian army . 69, 70 CHAPTER V. MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO. Condition of the French on the morrow of their victory . .71 Operations of the Garibaldlians 71,72 MacMahon enters Milan 72 Continued retreat of the Austrians and advance of the French . jt, Bazaine's victory at Malegnano ..."... 73, 74 The Austrians concentrate in the hill country behind the Chiese 75 Description of the district 75 The Austrian Emperor takes the command ; his forces . . 76 The French and Sardinian armies ...... 76, jy Hess persuades the Austrians to retire across the Mincio ; the Allies cross the Chiese . jj The Austrians change their plans and recross the Mincio . . 78 The French advance next day (June 24th) unexpectedly leads to a great battle 79 Beginning of the Battle of Solferino ...... 80 Map of the battle- field 81 First successes of the French 82 Attack on the village of Solferino 83 Success of Benedek against the Piedmontese on the Austrian right 84 MacMahon takes Cavriana and breaks the Austrian centre . 85 Sudden storm, retreat of the Austrians 85 Complete failure of the Piedmontese ; they occupy San Martino on the retirement of the Austrians . . . .85,86 CHAPTER VI. THE REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ITALY. Agitation in the Duchies . . • 87 A provisional government at Carrara 87, 88 Revolution at Florence ; Piedmont's share in effecting it . ^^, 89 Prince Napoleon with a French army occupies Tuscany ; scheme for securing him an Italian principality ... 89 His threatening movements against the Austrian garrisons in the Papal States 90 They suddenly evacuate Ancona and Bologna .... 91 Revolution at Parma 91 Revolution at Bologna 91 Volunteers from Tuscany enter Umbria and seize Perugia , . 92 CONTENTS, PAGE Colonel Schmidt with a column of Pontifical troops advances on Perugia 92 Efforts at negotiation 93 Storming of Perugia 94> 95 False charges against the Pontifical army . _. . . .96 Success of the revolution in Central Italy . . . . 96, 97 CHAPTER VII. VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. Panic in the French camp the day after Solferino ... 98 Siege of Peschiera, and projected attack on Venice ... 99 Position of the opposing forces at the end of June ; danger of the war extending . 99 Negotiations opened v/ith the Austrian headquarters ; peace of Villafranca 100, loi «^ Projects for the reorganization of Italy ..... 102 Agitation against the Treaty of Villafranca; Cavour resigns office 103 Treaty of Zurich 104 Failure of the French plans in Tuscany ; double deaUng of Napoleon III 104, 105 The Roman Question ; protests of the bishops .... 106 The Romagna annexed by Piedmont ; the Piedmontese ambas- sador sent away from Rome 106 Murder of Coant Arviti at Parma 106,107 The proposed Congress on the Affairs of Italy accepted by the Pope . . 107 Pamphlets on the Roman Question : About's La Question Roniaine ; '^?i\io\Qon's Le P ape et le Congres . 107,108 Antonelli refuses to go to the Congress unless the latter pamphlet is officially disavowed 109 Napoleon urges Pius IX. to cede the Romagna to Piedmont . 108 The Pope's reply : '■'■ Non possumus''^ .110 Encyclical of January 19th, i860, embodies this reply . no, iii The Univers suppressed for reprinting it ill Cavour returns to office in Cession of Savoy and Nice the price of the Emperor's acqui- escence in Cavour's new plans 112 The treaty signed, " Now we are accomplices" . . . .112 The annexation of Savoy and Nice ; the plebiscite ; how plebis- cites are managed 1 1 4-1 16 Plebiscites in the Duchies and the Romagna . . . .117 Excommunication of all who had a share in the annexation of the Legations 117 CHAPTER VIII. GARIBALDI IN SICILY. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 118,119 Agitation in Sicily 120 The Garibaldian expedition embarked near Genoa . . 120, 121 Action of Cavour 121 CONTENTS. xi His orders to Admiral Persano 122 Garibaldi anchors at Talamosne and receives supplies from the Piedmontese garrison 123 His lieutenant, Zambianchi, makes a raid into Pontifical territory 124 He fails to excite an insurrection and is defeated by the Ponti- fical troops under De Pimodan 124, 125 Voyage of the Garibaldians to Sicily 125 The landing at Marsala; conduct of Captain Marryat . 126, 127 Battle of Calatafami ; success of the Garibaldians . . 128, 129 The Piedmontese Government officially disavows Garibaldi, but Persan^'s squadron is ordered to assist him . . .130 Garibaldi, Dictator of Sicily He advances on Palermo . . . • Action at Parco, flank march of Garibaldi . He attacks Palermo The city bombarded Intervention of Admiral Mundy . Fighting resumed at Palermo ; spread of the insurrection through out Sicily Armistice renewed ; the treasury handed over to Garibaldi Massacres of the police by the insurgents .... Persano's action in favour of the Garibaldians He brings his fleet to Palermo The Neapolitan troops evacuate the city .... Persano tries to win over the Neapolitan navy to the revolution Arrival of the second Garibaldian expedition under Medici It lands under the escort of Persano's ships 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 138 139 139 140 140 141 141 [42 State of Sicily 143, 144 CHAPTER IX. HOW GARIBALDI OVERRAN SICILY. Persano escorts a third Garibaldian expedition under Cosenz to Palermo 145 Garibaldi expels Cavour's agent, La Farina, from Sicily . . 145 A Neapolitan corvette offers to join Persano's squadron ; he advises the commander to simply put himself under Gari- baldi's orders 146 Cavour's warning to Persano ; his precautions against the Republican plans of the dictator 147 Map of the district of Milazzo 148 Battle of Milazzo 149-153 Persano at Milazzo . . . 153 Messina the only Sicilian fortress held by the Neapolitans . 153, 154 Count Litta's mission to Garibaldi 154 Convention for the evacuation of Messina, with the exception of the citadel 155 Garibaldi master of Sicily ; Cavour sends him permission to invade the mainland I55) 156 CHAPTER X. THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. The Sardinian Embassy at Naples is made a centre of con- spiracy 157 xii CONTENTS. PAGE Treason of Liborio Romano, the Neapolitan Minister of the Interior 158 Persano's squadron conveys arms to Naples . . . .158 Persano's efforts to get up an insurrection at Naples . . 1 59-161 Remarkable letter from Cavour "161 Conspiracy to bring over the Neapolitan fleet; failure to capture the frigate Monarca at Castellamare . . . . 161, 162 Cavour prevents a premature raid upon the Papal States . .162 First attempt of the Garibaldians to cross the strait of Messina ends in failure . . . . . . . . 162, 163 Second attempt successful 163, 164 Capture of Reggio 164 Treason of the Neapolitan General Briganti ; he is shot by his soldiers 165 Collusion between the NeapoHtan officers and Garibaldi ; disorganization of the NeapoHtan troops; the surrender at Soveria 165-167 The plot at Naples ; treachery of the Count of Syracuse . 167, 168 Persano completely fails to get up a revolution in the capital . 169 Garibaldi advances on Naples ; Cavour tells Persano that as he has failed to anticipate him, he must co-operate with him . 170 Cavour sends the admiral the programme of the attack on the Papal States 170, 171 Persano submits his plans to Cavour 171, 172 Report that the Neapolitan fleet is about to put to sea ; Persano's trick to keep it in port 172, 173 An English envoy to the revolutionists at Naples . . 173, 174 Garibaldi arrives at Salerno ; he is invited to enter Naples by Liborio Romano , . -175 King Francis resolves to leave Naples 175 His farewell proclamation 176-178 He sails for Gaeta 178 Garibaldi enters Naples 179 Attitude of the people 179,180 The Neapolitan squadron incorporated in Persano's fleet . .179 Curious conference on board the English flagship Ha7i7iibal . I79 Persano sails for Ancona 179 The military position in Southern Italy 180 CHAPTER XL THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. Pius IX. appeals for aid to the Catholic world . . . .181 General La Moriciere takes command of the Pontifical army . 182 His proclamation to his soldiers 182, 183 Position assumed by the Holy See; dispatch of Antonelli 183, 184 The Pontifical army chiefly composed of Native troops . .185 Cavour's plans for the invasion of the Pontifical territory . 185, 186 Cialdini's mission to the French Emperor ; the meeting at Chambery 186 Significant proclamation of General de Noud, commanding the French garrison at Rome 187 Armed bands under Masi enter Pontifical territory ; this inva- sion described by Cavour's agents as an insurrection . 187 CONTENTS. xiii PAGE Summons to La Moriciere by General Fanti . . . .187 Indignant reply of the French general . . . . .188 Strength and positions of the army under La Moriciere . . 188 Ultimatum sent to Rome by Cavour 189 Fanti at the head of the Royal army crosses the Pontifical frontier, without waiting for a reply, and without a declara- tion of war 189 Protests of the Powers 190 Proclamations of Fanti and Cialdini 190 Plans of the opposing generals 191 Capture of Pesaro 191 Gallant action of Kanzler at San Angelo 191 Fanti takes Perugia 192 Brignone attacks Spoleto. defended by O'Reilly . . . 193 Gallant defence of the place . . ... . . '193 The Piedmontese repeatedly repulsed ..... 194 O'Reilly surrenders only when the place has become untenable 195 The campaign in the Marches of Ancona ..... 195 False report of French intervention on behalf of the Holy See . 196 Siege of Ancona 197 State of the defences 198 Approach of Persano's fleet 198 He reconnoitres the seaward forts under English colours ; collu- sion of the British consul 198,199 Persano's conference with Cialdini 199 Approach of the Pontifical army under La Moriciere . -199 Occupation of Loreto by the Pontifical troops .... 200 Death of Mizael de Pas 200 Preparations for the battle ; arrival of Pimodan's column . 200 ■*^attle of Castelfidardo 201 Fight at the Crocetti ; Pimodan mortally wounded . . . 202 Desperate defence of the Crocetti by the Pontifical troops . 203 Endl-£>f^-fehe-battte ; the Pontifical troops driven back upon Loreto 204 La Moriciere resolves to push on to Ancona with his escort . 205 Capitulation of the Pontifical troops at Loreto .... 206 Cialdini's report of the battle 207, 208 Treatment of the prisoners ; the Irish at Genoa . . . 209 The wounded , 209, 210 Bombardment of Ancona by the fleet 210 La Moriciere reaches Ancona .212 Arrival of a few other soldiers escaped from Loreto . . .212 Renewal of the bombardment 213 Attempt to assassinate La Moriciere 214 Failure of Persano to force his way into the harbour . . .214 Fighting on the land side ; the defence made good against the Piedmontese 214, 215 The fleet attacks the battery on the Mole 215 Heroic defence of the fort 216 Persano forces the harbour mouth ; surrender of the city . . 217 Although the white flag is flying, Fanti and Cialdini continue the bombardment 217 Persano protests against this atrocity 217 The bombardment on the land side continues even after Persano has occupied the town 218 La Moriciere's retirement, and death 218 Plebiscite in Umbria and the Marches 219 xiv CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. THE STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. PAGE Victor Emmanuel's proclamation to the people of Southern Italy 220 The military position in the South . . , . . .221 Beginning of the reaction against the Garibaldians . . .221 Rout of the Garibaldians at Capua 221,222 They occupy Cajazzo ......... 222 Cajazzo recaptured by King Francis 222 Defective generalship of Garibaldi ; he resolves to await the arrival of the Piedmontese before undertaking further opera- tions 223 Battle of the Volturno 223-225 Conduct of English blue-jackets on the battle-field . . . 225 Victory of GarilDaldi 226 Victor Emmanuel takes command of the army .... 226 Cavour informs the Neapolitan ambassador at Turin of the coming invasion of the Kingdom of Naples by Victor Emmanuel 227 Plan of the invasion 227 Successes of the Neapolitan Royalists in the Abruzzi . . . 228 First battle of Isernia . 228 Second battle of Isernia 229 Action at Sezza 229 Meeting of Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi .... 230 Plebiscite at Naples; wretched state of the provinces . 230, 231 Proclamation of Prince Murat 231 Cialdini repulsed on the Garigliano 232 The French fleet at Gaeta 232 Cialdini forces the line of the Garigliano 232 Surrender of Capua 233 Victor Emmanuel at Naples 233 His contempt for the Garibaldians 233, 234 His reception by the people of Naples 234 Garibaldi's farewell to his army 234, 235' Siege of Gaeta 235-237 The reaction in the Neapolitan provinces 237 Proclamation of King Francis from Gaeta .... 237-239 Attempted counter-revolution at Naples .... 239, 240 Risings in Calabria and the Abruzzi 240 General Pinelli's sanguinary attempts at repression . . .241 His failure at Civitella del Tronto 241 His infamous proclamations 242, 243 Enterprise of De Christen 243 His plans 244 Failure to obtain proper support from Gaeta .... 245 Operations on the northern frontier of the Neapolitan kingdom 246 Sack of the Abbey of Casamari 247 Battle of Banco 247 Convention between De Christen and General de Sonnaz . . 248 The French fleet withdrawn from Gaeta 249 The fortress bombarded by land and sea 250 Explosion of the great magazine 250, 251 Surrender of Gaeta 252 Departure of King Francis 253 CONTENTS. XV PAGE Siege and capture of the citadel of Messina . . . 253, 254 Surrender of Civitella del Tronto 255 Meeting of the first Italian Parliament at Turin . . . .255 Gradual recognition of the new kingdom by foreign Powers 255, 256 CHAPTER XIII. ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION. Feeling in England against the Pope and the King of Naples . 257 Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet on the Neapolitan prisons . . . 257 Influence of the Italian exiles in England 258 Real state of the Neapolitan kingdom 258 Action of Enghsh diplomatic agents in Italy .... 259 Admiral Mundy and Garibaldi 259, 260 Attacks of the Tzw^i- on the Pontifical army . . . 260,261 A Garibaldian legion organized in England with the connivance of the Government 261, 264 The Garibaldians openly assemble at Shoreditch station, and embark without any attempt at concealment . . . 264 The voyage to Italy 265 Refusal of the Government to put the Foreign EnUstment Act in operation 265 Lord John Russell's despatches an elaborate defence of Cavour's policy 296-270 CHAPTER XIV. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. Results of the policy of Cavour 271, 272 La Marmora's journey to BerHn in 1861 ; the prospect of a Prussian alliance 273 Efforts to obtain the withdrawal of the French from Rome, 273, 274 The Turin ParHament declares Rome the capital of Italy . . 275 Cavour's speech on the Roman Question .... 275-279 Garibaldi's hostility to Cavour 279 He attacks him in the Parliament 280, 281 Cavour's reply 281, 282 Ricasoli attacks Garibaldi . , 283 Cialdini's quarrel with Garibaldi 283 Illness and death of Cavour 283, 284 Ricasoli succeeds him as minister . . . . . . 284 Understanding between Ricasoli and the French Emperor . 284 Fruitless negotiations of Ricasoli with the Emperor and the Pontifical Government with a view to obtaining a footing in Rome 285-289 Agitation against his Government on the failure of the negotia- tions 289 He resigns office (March ist, 1862) 290 CHAPTER XV. THE "BRIGANDAGE." The beginnings of the reaction in the NeapoHtan provinces . 291 XVI CONTENTS, PAGE History of the civil war in the South necessarily a fragmentary one . 292 Nature of the conflict The rebels described as "brigands" Evidence that this was a misapplication of the term . The reaction not confined to the Abruzzi .... 293 293 294 295 Striking testimony of D'Azeglio 295, 296 Enterprise of General Borjes 296, 297 He is captured and executed at Tagliacozzo . . . 298, 299 Sanguinary methods of repression adopted by Cialdini and his lieutenants ; specimens of their proclamations ; reign of terror in the South 299-305 Statistics of destruction of towns in the South by the Royal troops 305 Statistics of destruction of life 306 The prisons of Naples under Itahan rule 307 Evidence of Lord Henry Lennox on the overcrowded state of the prisons 308-316 Suppression of newspapers * 316 Dissensions among the insurgent chiefs ; surrender of Tristany 317 End of the armed insurrection in the summer of 1864 . .317 Protests of Italian deputies and Garibaldians against the cruel methods used to repress it 318, 319 Protest of Napoleon 1 1 1 319 CHAPTER XVL ASPROMONTE. Ratazzi succeeds Ricasoli as prime minister .... 320 His pohcy 320 Garibaldi and the rifle clubs ; affair of Sarnico ; Garibaldians assembled for a raid into Venetia 321 Ratazzi stops the movement 322 Debate at Turin on the affair of Sarnico 323 Garibaldi goes to Sicily and announces an expedition against Rome . 32"^ He assembles volunteers at Corleone 324 Proclamation* of King Victor Emmanuel against the Garibaldian enterprise 325 Piedmontese troops violate the Roman frontier at Ceprano ; they are repulsed by the Pontifical Zouaves ; prompt action of the French army of occupation 325 Progress of the Garibaldian army through Sicily . . 325-327 Garibaldi occupies Catania 327 Manifesto of Garibaldi 328, 329 He embarks with his volunteers for the mainland . . . 329 He lands at Melito, and marches to Aspromonte . . . 330 Dangers of Garibaldi's position ; operations of the Royal troops 330 Cialdini's orders 331 Pallavicini attacks the Garibaldians at Aspromonte . . .331 Garibaldi wounded and taken prisoner 332 Excitement in Italy; Mazzini declares all truce with the Government at an end, and calls for a Republic . . "^n^ 334 Ratazzi tries to temporize 334 CONTENTS. xvii PAGE Amnesty to the Garibaldians 335 Ratazzi attempts to obtain a promise that the French will eva- cuate Rome 335 Peremptory refusal of the Emperor's Government to promise anything 335 Debate in the Turin Parliament, and resignation of the Ratazzi ministry 336 Farini forms a new cabinet ... .... 336 He soon retires through ill-health ; Ministry of Minghetti . , 336 The Italian exiles in London and the Greco conspiracy . 337, 338 Garibaldi visits England 338 His meeting with Mazzini at the house of Herzen . . . 339 Compact between the two revolutionary leaders .... 339 t CHAPTER XVII. THE SEPTEMBER CONVENTION — ITALY FINDS A NEW ALLY. Plans of Garibaldi against Rome and Venice temporarily aban- doned at the request of Cairoli and Bixio, acting as envoys from Victor Emmanuel 340 Negotiations between the Minghetti Cabinet and the French Government for the evacuation of Rome . . . • 341 The Convention of September 15th, 1864 342 Secret protocol attached to the Convention, for the fixing of the Italian capital in some other city than Rome . . . 343 The negotiations concealed both from the Pope and the Italian people , . . 343 Meeting of the Parliament at Turin ; proposed transfer of the capital to Florence 344 Excitement at Turin ; the troops fire on the people . . 344, 345 Anger against the Government ; the king dismisses the Minghetti Cabinet 345 New ministry formed by General La Marmora .... 34^ His policy ot an alliance with Prussia 346, 347 First steps towards the alliance 347 Attempts, on the suggestion of France, to obtain a cession of Venetia by purchase from Austria . . . . • 34^ General Govone sent to Berlin to negotiate with Bismarck . . 349 Bismarck's account of his plans 35^-352 He tries to commit Italy to a war against Austria without pledg- ing anything in return . . , 353 La Marmora insists on a treaty of alliance ; the treaty is drawn up 354, 355 Blindness of the French Emperor ; he is consulted, but makes no objection to the projected alliance 355 The treaty signed 35^ Bismarck's efforts to obtain a casus belli .... 357) 35^ Alarm of La Marmora on finding that at Berlin the treaty is not regarded as reciprocally binding 359 Mobilization of the Prussian army 359 Proposals for a congress ; preparations for war . . • • 3"^ Outbreak of war in Germany 3^0 war against Austria 3°' a xviii CONTENTS. CHAPTER XVIII. THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF ITALY. PAGE Principle of Italian finance : " No use being economical when one has nothing to begin with " 362 Cost of wars, revolutions, and armaments 362 Growth of the Italian debt 363 Permanent deficit 364 Heavy taxation 365 The army used to enforce payment of taxes .... 366 State of the finances in 1865 367 Scialoja becomes La Marmora's Finance Minister, and pro- poses to meet the deficit by the confiscation of Church property 367-368 CHAPTER XIX. THE WARFARE AGAINST THE CHURCH. Conflict between the new Italy and the Church . . . 369, 370 Suppression of monasteries in the Kingdom of Sardinia . 370,371 Extension of the Piedmontese law of suppression to the newly- annexed provinces in 1859 and i860 371 Imprisonment of bishops 371, 372 Various minor persecutions of bishops and priests . . 372, 2>73 Breaking-up of diocesan seminaries 374 Ecclesiastics made liable to military service . . . 374, 375 Project for complete suppression of religious orders . . . 376 Petitions against it 377 Enactment and execution of the proposed law . . . 378, 379 Summary of the methods of warfare against the Church adopted by the Italian Government 380 CHAPTER XX. CUSTOZZA AND LISSA. Plans of Italy for the war of 1866 381 La Marmora's plan for the invasion of Venetia .... 382 Forces under his command 383 Inferior forces of the Austrians 384 La Marmora enters Venetia 384 The Archduke Albert suddenly occupies the line of the Somma Campagna . 385 Ill-directed advance of La Marmora ; his vanguard surprised by the Austrians 386 Battle of Custozza 386-389 Retreat of the Italians 389 Losses on both sides in the battle 390 Complete collapse of the Italian plans , . . . , 390 Austrian projects against Southern Italy 391 Battle of Sadowa ; cession of Venetia to France . . . .391 Garibaldi's failure in the Tyrol , 392 CONTENTS, PAGE Austrians withdraw from Venetia ; invasion of the province by Cialdini 392 Medici in the Tyrol 392, 393 Persano's fleet sails for Lissa 393 Failure of the first attack on the forts 394 Failure of a second attack 395 Approach of the Austrian fleet under Tegethoff .... 396 Comparison of the opposing forces 397, 398 Battle of Lissa 39S Sinking of the Re d^ Italia 399 Crisis of the battle 400 The Palestro blown up . .401 Victory of the Austrians ; the Italian fleet retires to Ancona . 401 The Emperor Maximilian and Tegethoff 402 Persano sends false reports of a victory 402 Indignation in Italy on the truth becoming known ; Persano dismissed from the navy 403 Sinking of the Affondatore at Ancona 403 The Venetian plebiscite 403 CHAPTER XXL THE REVOLT OF PALERMO. State of Sicily 404, 405 Anarchy and discontent 406, 407 Suppression of the Sicilian monasteries 408 Republican agitation at Palermo 409 Topography of Palermo 409, 410 Beginning of the revolt 411 First successes of the rebels 412, 413 Arrival of the fleet ; bombardment of the revolted quarter of the city 414 The garrison reinforced ; defeat of the rebels . . •415, 416 Unfounded charge against the monks 417 End of the insurrection 418 CHAPTER XXII. THE CAMPAIGN OF MENTANA. Withdrawal of the French troops from Rome . . . . 419 The Pontifical army 419, 420 The Roman Revolutionary Committee 420 Ratazzi succeeds Ricasoli as prime minister . . . .421 The centenary of St. Peter 421 The cholera at Albano 421 Affair of the Legion dAntibes 421 Organization of the Garibaldian campaign against the Pontifical States 422 Proved complicity of the Ratazzi Cabinet 422 a 2 CONTENTS. PAGE Although it publicly disavows the movement . . . 422, 423 Plan of the campaign 423 Garibaldi arrested on the demand of the French Government, but soon released and sent to Caprera The Government supplies funds for the movement The first Garibaldian bands cross the frontier .... Forces and distribution of the Pontifical army under Kanzler 425, The first skirmishes 426, Victory of the Zouaves at Bagnorea Charette on the frontier Action at Monte Libretti ....... 428 Retreat of the Garibaldians ; Charette occupies the town . The Romans take no part in the Garibaldian movement . How the Garibaldians were recruited and supplied Victory of Charette at Nerola 433, The revolutionary leaders press Ratazzi to send them Garibaldi . Hesitating action of Napoleon III 435 Ratazzi allows Garibaldi to escape from Caprera and join his army 436 424 424 424 426 427 427 428 ■431 431 432 432 434 434 442, 443, Attempted Garibaldian insurrection at Rome .... 436 The Serristori barracks blown up 437, 438 Failure of the insurrection ; attempt of the brothers Cairoli . 438 They are defeated and killed at Monte Pairoli .... 439 Capture of the Garibaldian headquarters in the Trastevere . 440 Resignation of Ratazzi on the news of the failure at Rome; Menabrea forms a ministry .... Proclamation by Victor Emmanuel Garibaldi advances against Monte Rotondo He captures the place after a hard fight He advances towards Rome .... The French land at Civita Vecchia The Italian troops cross the Pontifical frontier . Kanzler arranges to attack the Garibaldians March of the Pontifical army to Mentana . Position and forces of the Garibaldians Battle of Mentana Capture of the Vigna Santucci .... The French brigade comes into action Attack on the village of Mentana The night after the battle Surrender of the Garibaldian garrison of Mentana Re- occupation of Monte Rotondo Return of the Pontifical army to Rome ; Pius IX. and the Gari- baldian prisoners 454 The Italian troops retire across their own frontier . . -455 Circular of Menabrea 455, 456 The Roman Question before the French Chamber ; M. Rouher's speech 456-458 440 441 443 444 • 444 . 444 . 444 • 445 445-447 447, 448 449 450 451 452 453 453 454 452 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXII. Documents relating to the connection of the Ratazzi Cabinet with the Garibaldian invasion of the Papal States in 1867 458-463 CONTENTS, xxi CHAPTER XXIII. WAITING FOR ROME. PAGE Altered position of affairs after the failure of the Garibaldian attempt of 1867 464 Policy of the Government at Florence 465 Assembly of the Vatican Council 465 The Florentine Government prevents a Garibaldian raid on the Papal States in the spring of 1870 465 Pursuit of a Garibaldian band by the Pontifical troops . . 465 Garibaldian conspiracy in the summer of 1870 .... 466 War between France and Prussia 467 Efforts of Napoleon to obtain the alliance of Italy ; he resolves to evacuate Rome 467 Protests and comments of the press 467, 468 Details of the evacuation 468-470 Conduct of the Itahan Government 470,471 French defeats ; Italy negotiates with Prussia to secure a free hand 471 Garibaldian agitation in Italy 472 The Roman Question in the Italian Parliament .... 473 Visconti Venosta states the policy of the Government . . 473 He solemnly declares that an attack upon the Pontifical territory would be a violation of treaties and of the Law of Nations . 474 Agitation against the Government; it prepares to violate its public pledges 475 State of Rome 475, 476 Programme of the revolution 476, 477 Circular of Visconti Venosta on the Roman Question . 478, 479 News of Sedan ; second circular of Visconti Venosta, announcing action at an early date 480 The Cabinet decides on the invasion of the Papal States . .481 Pius IX. consults the Cardinals as to the course to be adopted . 482 Letter of Victor Emmanuel to Pius IX 483 Count Ponza di San Martino sent to Rome with an ultimatum . 483 Reply of Cardinal Antonelli 484 Text of Victor Emmanuel's letter to the Pope . . . 484-486 The Pope's conversation with Count Ponza di San Martino 486, 487 Arrival of Canadian volunteers for the Papal Zouaves . . 487 Letter of the Pope to King Victor Emmanuel .... 488 The Pope and the Roman people 488 CHAPTER XXIV. THE INVASION OF ROME. Invasion of the Papal territory without a declaration of war , 489 Forces under the command of Cadorna 490 Forces under Kanzler's command for the defence . . 490, 491 Distribution of the Pontifical army 491, 492 The Italian army crosses the frontier in five columns . . 492 Advance of Bixio ; he attempts to cut off Charette from Rome 492, 493 Skilful retreat of Charette 493> 494 Civita Vecchia besieged by Bixio's army and the Italian fleet 494, 495 CONTENTS. PAGE A council of war decides to surrender the place . . . 496 Movements of Angioletti's division 497 Attitude of the people ; loyalty of the native Pontifical troops , 498 Advance of the main army under Cadorna .... 499, 500 Capture of Civita Castellana 501-504 State of affairs in Rome 5*^04, 505 Reconnaissance by the Zouaves at San Onofrio . . . 506, 507 Arrangements for the defence of Rome . . . . 507, 508 Movements of Cadorna 508, 509 Kanzler's reply to his summons 509 Second summons to Kanzler 510 Arnim the Prussian ambassador to the Vatican goes to Cadorna's headquarters 510, 511 Deserters from Cadorna's army come into Rome . . • Sn The eve of the attack 512, 513 Beginning of the bombardment 514 Attack on the Tre Archi 515 The Porta San Giovanni defended by Charette and Daudier . 515 Bixio's attack on the Trastevere, which is successfully defended by native Roman troops 516, 517 Cadorna's attack on the Porta Pia 517 The wall breached 519 Order to hoist the white flag received from the Pontifical head- quarters 519 Attack on the breach and the gate 520 The white flag hoisted by the defence but not respected by the attack 521 Bixio continues the bombardment of the Trastevere after the surrender 522 The Italian troops enter Rome ; the Pontifical troops retiring on the Leonine city and San Angelo .... 522, 523 The so-called " Roman exiles '' 523, 524 Losses of both sides in the attack and defence of Rome *. 524, 525 Itahan tributes to the bravery of the Papal troops . . 525, 526 Calumnies and blunders of the Times 526, 527 The Zouaves in the army of the Loire 527 CHAPTER XXV. THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE. Scenes at the Vatican on September 20th .... 528, 529 The Papal army spends the night on the Piazza of St. Peter's . 530 Its farewell to Pius IX 531 The march out of Rome 532 Treatment of the Pontifical army in Italy 532 The flag of the Zouaves 533 P^ate of the garrison of Bagnorea 533 The Italian soldiers of the Pontifical army 533 The squadriglieri imprisoned in defiance of the capitulation . 534 State of Rome; occupation of the Leonine city . . . -534 The provisional government organizes the plebiscite . . 535, 536 The voting and the result 537, 5 3^ Worthless character of the vote 538, 539 Protest of an Italian statesman 539-541 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXVI. TWENTY-ONE YEARS AT ROME. 1870-1891. PAGE Position of Pius IX 542 Policy of the new rulers of Rome 543 Demonstrations of loyalty to the Holy See by the Catholic world 543 Death of Victor Emmanuel . . 544 Death of Pius IX. 544, 545 Accession of Leo XIII 546 Disappointing results of the unification of Italy . . . 544-546 Debt and oppressive taxation .*..,. 546-548 Moral deterioration 548 Testimonies of friends of the Italian movement .... 549 Federalism a better policy than Unionism .... 549, 550 Examples of Germany, Switzerland, America . . . .550 Federalism the probable key to the solution of the Italian Ques- tion 550 The future of the Holy See 551, 552 LIST OF SKETCH MAPS, PAGE Magenta 64 Lago di Garda • . . .81 MiLAZZO 149 Ancona . ... .211 Capua 221 Umbria 229 Plan of Palermo, &c 410 Sketch Map of the Roman Provinces .... 490 Map to Illustrate the Attack on Rome, September 20TH, 1870 518 THE MAKING OF ITALY, CHAPTER I. CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON III. Among the Ghibelline families of Teutonic origin settled in the north of Italy, one of the oldest is that of the Bensi. In the conflicts of the Middle Ages they were invariably found on the side of the German Kaisers. At a later period we see them holding high rank in the courts and armies of the Dukes of Savoy and Kings of Sardinia. In the last century the head of the family, Michele Benso, received the title of Marquis of Cavour, a small town in the province of Pinerolo ; and Benso di Cavour, or more briefly Cavour, was henceforth the name of the family. When Piedmont became a portion of the French Empire under the First Napoleon, the Cavours, faithful to the Ghibelline traditions of the family, allied themselves with the Imperial government in Italy. The Marquis Michele Giuseppe di Cavour held the office of Grand Chamberlain in the household of Prince Camillo Borghese, the husband of Pauline Bonaparte; and in 1810, when a second son was born to the house of Cavour, the Princess Pauline held the child in her arms at the font, and the Prince was his godfather, giving him his own name of Camillo. Born under the rule of the Bonapartes in the palmy days of the First Empire, the young Camillo was destined, as the Count di Cavour, to associate himself with the policy of the Second Empire, and bring the armies of another Bonaparte across the Alps. Under the restored monarchy of Savoy, the young Count was placed at a military academy, and, later, B ^^ THE MAKING OF ITALY. received a commission in the Engineers. Curiously enough, his first work was to assist in planning and laying out a new fort to close the road between Genoa and Nice, the very line of defence to which his policy afterwards transferred the Italian frontier. An over-free expression of Liberal ideas on his part led to his retirement from the army, a career for which he had little taste, and the loss of which he did not for a moment regret. To a friend, who wrote to condole with him, he replied : " I thank you for the interest you take in the matter ; but, believe me, I shall make myself a career all the same. I have a great deal of ambition, an enormous ambition, indeed ; and I trust I shall justify it when I am a Minister, for in my day-dreams I already see myself Minister of the Kingdom of Italy," — bold words from a young man of little more than twenty years. The next period of his life was one of travel and study.^ It was not till 1847 that he made his first great step for- ward into public life, by founding, with Balbo, Santa Rosa, and Buoncompagni, the Risorgiinen to. The programme of the new journal was announced to be the advocacy of " the independence of Italy ; union between the princes and peoples ; progress in the path of reform ; and a league between the Italian States /^ — a programme in one sense satisfactory, in another of dubious import, for the words can be made to bear many meanings. At this time, how- ever, Cavour might be called a Conservative, or at the very least what would be called in France a member of the Right Centre. It was not till some years after that he 1 The following circular, issued to the Austrian officials on the frontier, and found in the police department at Milan in 1859, shows how thoroughly well the Austrian police were informed. — "Milan, May 15th, 1833. A young Piedmontese nobleman, Camillo di Cavour, is about to set out on his travels. He was formerly an officer in the Engineers, and in spite of his youth is already deeply corrupted in his political principles. I lose no time in giving this intelligence to the commissioners of police, with instructions not to permit the entrance of the person in question, unless his passport is perfectly^;/ rlgle^ and even in this case only after the most rigorous investigation into his clothes and luggage, as I have reason to suspect he may be the bearer of dangerous documents." CA VOUR AND NAPOLEON III. threw in his lot with the Liberals. In 1848 he was one of those who took the lead in obtaining the concession of a constitution by Charles Albert, and the following year saw him a member of the Piedmontese Parliament. The accession of Victor Emmanuel, or rather the power placed by the constitution in the hands of the Liberals in the last year of his father's reign, marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Piedmont. The Jesuits had already been expelled, in 1848, and an anti-Catholic law on education had been passed. The invasion of the rights of the Church in the Sardinian States was now the order of the day. The Piedmontese press, to a great ex- tent in the hands of refugees from the other states, not content with attacking the political system of Rome, Naples and Austria, applauded the Government in its war against the spiritual jurisdiction of the Holy See. Three successive concordats had been signed by the kings of Sardinia in the pontificates of Benedict XI IL, Benedict XIV., and Gregory XVI. The last of these, concluded in 1 84 1, was still in force. After the events of 1848 the Cabinet of Turin had intimated to Pius IX. a desire that it should be modified in some respects. A plenipotentiary was named by the Pope to consider the matter ; but the events which followed at Rome and Turin put an end for the time to the negotiations. Next year Signer Siccardi was sent by Victor Emmanuel on a mission to the Papal court. The affair of the con- cordat was mentioned in his credentials, but, according to Cardinal Antonelli's protest of February 9th, 1850, he never even approached the subject in the negotiations which followed, and which bore upon a different matter. He re- turned to Piedmont ; and in the first week of February, 1850, the Pope and his Secretary of State learned, first by the newspapers and then by a despatch from the Pontifical charge d'affaires at Turin, that Siccardi, as Minister of Justice, had introduced into the Piedmontese Chambers a bill to deprive the clergy of their privileges and immunities, to abolish certain holidays of the Church, and to deprive the priests and religious orders of the power of acquiring B THE MAKING OF ITALY. property in Piedmont. In the name of the Pope, Cardinal Antonelli at once protested against these measures ; ^ but, though stubbornly opposed by the Catholic party in the Senate, they passed both Houses, and received the royal assent on April 9th. They had already been condemned by the Holy See, and their execution was therefore op- posed by the clergy and the episcopate. Two bishops and many priests were thrown into prison, and professors were driven from their chairs at the universities for maintaining the rights of the Church. Finally, when in August, by order of the Archbishop of Turin, the last sacraments were refused by a Servite father to Santa Rosa, the Minister of Commerce, because he kept to the last his adhesion to the Siccardi laws, the convent of the Servites was seized, the community dissolved, and the archbishop condemned to exile for life. It was in vain that Catholic members of the Senate protested that the Government, by its high-handed proceedings, was placing Piedmont in imminent danger of a schism. The Ministry (in which Cavour now held the portfolio left vacant by Santa Rosa's death) persevered in its action against the Holy See. Acting upon these lines, the Minister of Public Worship took it upon himself to publish a circular regulating the teaching of theology in seminaries, and at the same time a civil marriage law was introduced into the Chamber of Deputies ; it passed the Lower House, but the Senate rejected it by thirty-nine votes against thirty-six. The difficulty with Rome on the question of civil marriage led to the resignation of the Ministry, from which Cavour had already withdrawn. He was now sent for by the king, and requested to form a cabinet on the basis of an agree- ment with the Papal nuncio ; but, being unable to obtain the consent of the latter to his own views on the subject of the marriage law, he declined to attempt the formation 2 For an examination of the character of the Siccardi laws and their bearing on the position of the Church in Piedmont, see the protest in extenso in the An?iales Ecclesiastiques appended to Rohr- bacher's Histoire de P^glise, Paris edition of 1869. CA VOUR AND NAPOLEON III. of a Ministry. The king endeavoured to find some one else to whom he could entrust the direction of affairs, but so strong were the Liberals in the chamber, that, meeting with no success, he sent for Cavour again. The count agreed to form a Ministry whose programme should be steadfast opposition to the Holy See. The king consented, and Cavour allied himself with Urbino Rattazzi, the leader of the Left Centre, and began his career as the Liberal and Revolutionary Prime Minister of Piedmont. " I would not have asked for anything better than to govern by means of and with the help of the Right Centre," he wrote at this time to his friend, M. de la Rive, " and gradually to develop the institutions of our country ; but it has been impossible for me to come to an understanding with that party on the re- ligious question, therefore I must do without its support."'^ With his new allies of the left he vigorously pursued the policy upon which he had accepted office. On March loth, 1854, the goods of the episcopal seminary of Turin were sequestrated, and in August the " Canons of the Lateran " and of the Holy Cross were forcibly expelled from their houses in the capital. In November, Rattazzi, as Minister of the Interior, introduced in the Chamber of Deputies a bill for the suppression of all the convents and monasteries in the Piedmontese States, and for the seques- tration of their property, financial reasons being openly alleged as the motive of this wholesale robbery. When the bill was sent up to the Senate in the following April, the bishops offered in their places in the House to come to the aid of the exchequer, and pay into it a sum of 900,000 francs, on condition of the withdrawal of the bill. But the Government, apart from all financial considerations, was determined to destroy the religious orders. The offer of the bishops was rejected, the bill was forced through the House, and became law on May 28th, 1855. Cavour, with the aid of Rattazzi and the left, had thus fully developed that part of his policy which consisted in ^ De la Rive — Le Covite de Cavour^ Recits et Souvenirs, p. 303. THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. opposition to the Holy See. By the time that the bill for suppressing the monasteries had come before the Senate, he had begun to prepare the way for his main work — the revolution which was to constitute that kingdom of Italy, of which he had been dreaming more than twenty years before. When the coup d'etat placed France in the hands of the Bonapartists, Cavour was, as we have seen, a member of the Piedmontese Government. He had retired from the ministry before Napoleon HI. was proclaimed Emperor. Like every other thoughtful man in Europe, he saw clearly enough that the advent of the Second Empire meant not peace but war, and that the third Napoleon would retain his power only by endeavouring to emulate the military glories of the first. In Italy the more far-seeing of the revolutionists from the first looked upon the new emperor as an ally. His first public act had been to join the insurgents of 1 83 1 . He had received his bapteme defeu under the walls of Civita Castellana fighting against the troops of Gregory XVI. He had been regularly initiated into the secret societies, he was pledged by oath to labour for the cause of the Revolution in Italy, and in his person a Carbonaro was enthroned at the Tuileries. True, his troops had fought against the legions of Young Italy, torn down the Republican standard from the Capitol, and restored Pius IX ; but, on the other hand, those who had closely followed the current of events, remembered that when Cavaignac first announced in the Assembly his intention of sending troops to Civita Vecchia, Louis Napoleon, then on the eve of his election to the presidency, had, through the medium of the press, entered a protest against the proposed Roman expedition "" : and that when Oudinot's expedition was actually despatched, no one ^ On December 2nd, 1848, Louis Napoleon wrote to the Constitit- tionel^ " Knowing that my absence from the vote on the expedition to Civitk Vecchia has been the subject of remark, I think it right that I should avow that, however determined to support all measures necessary for securing the freedom and authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, I still could not sanction by my vote a military demonstration, which appeared to me dangerous even to the sacred interests it sought to protect, and calculated to compromise the peace of Europe." CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON III. knew at first whether it came to support the Republic or to restore the Pope. Throughout, the policy of the President Louis Napoleon had been devious and double- faced. Had the triumvirs admitted Oudinot on the famous 30th of April, 1849, they might have found in him an ally, and but for Oudinot's determination at all costs to avenge the defeat of that day, M. de Lesseps, as Louis Napoleon's agent, would have been able successfully to complete the negotiations which he had begun for the purpose of placing the Roman Republic under the protec- tion of the French arms. Finally, in September, 1849^ the President had written to Colonel Ney at Rome one of those despatches, which, though in the form of private letters, are meant to be made public and immediately find their way into the press. " My dear Ney," he said, ^' the French Republic did not send an army to Rome to stifle Italian liberty there, but on the contrary to direct it by protecting it against its own excesses. ... I sum up in this sense the conditions of the restoration ^ of the tem- poral power of the Pope — a general amnesty, secularization of the administration, adoption of the Code Napoleon, and a Liberal Government." He thus proposed imposing upon the Pope conditions, which in twelve months would have produced another revolution, and in any case would have made Rome a French city. Fortunately he did not persist in pressing his policy upon the Papal Court ; he had sufficient occupation at home in constituting and consoli- dating the Empire ; but it foreshadowed his future action on the Roman Question. While thus the more hot-headed members of the Revo- lutionary party denounced the coup d'etat, and spoke and wrote bitterly of the man who had devised and executed it, their more clear-sighted leaders saw farther into the future, and knew that the crowned Carbonaro, Napoleon HL, would at a later time be found on the side of the ' Pius IX had already granted an amnesty to all but the triumvirs, members of the Assembly, commanders of revolutionary corps, those who had accepted and then violated the previous amnesty, and those who were guilty of crimes against the penal code. THE MAKING OF ITALY. Italian Revolution. As early as 1852 Cavour took the first step towards cultivating friendly relations with him. Numbers of French refugees had crowded into Piedmont, and, through the press, vented their anger upon the new emperor. Cavour, on the plea that Piedmont should not be allowed to be involved by foreigners in a quarrel with France, procured the enactment of a new press law, which placed the newspapers under the strict control of the Minister of the Interior. Not only was this law useful for ulterior purposes, but it enabled him to prevent the press from speaking otherwise than respectfully of Napoleon III., while the Belgian press, uncontrolled by any similar law and inspired by exiles and refugees, was every day denouncing and insulting him. Napoleon cannot have failed to have remarked this contrast between the press of Belgium and of Piedmont. It was the beginning of the alliance between his policy and that of Cavour. The Crimean war afforded the opportunity for the next step in advance. In January, 1855, a treaty of alliance was signed between England, France and Sardinia, by which the latter agreed to send 15,000 troops to the Crimea. This move of Cavour's has been applauded by some of his admirers as an act of singular daring ; ^ but there was very little courage required to enter as the ally of the two great Western Powers upon a war the result of which had been decided before a shot was fired, and doubly decided by the events military and politi- cal of the last six months of 1854. The Piedmontese troops, the pick of the large army maintained by Sardinia, were a welcome reinforcement, though the praises which have been lavished upon them, especially by Italianist writers, are rather exaggerated. The battle of the Tchernaya has been often spoken of as a splendid deed of 6 E.g. — "That the minister of a small state involved in most serious political and financial difficulties, and scarcely recovered from a terrible catastrophe which had exhausted her resources and almost destroyed her army, should have calmly and in cold blood entered upon a war with a powerful empire, was an instance of daring for which a parallel can scarcely be found in history." — Quarterly Review ^ July, 1 86 1, p. 224. CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON III, arms of Delia Marmora and the Sardinian contingent, a day which wiped out for ever the disgrace of Novara ; but any one who takes the trouble to turn to a detailed account of the Tchernaya," will learn that(i) the brunt of the close fighting throughout nearly the whole of the battle fell upon the French, and especially upon Cler's division, (2) that meanwhile the Sardinians assisted only by a well- directed artillery fire^ (3) that it was not till the battle was virtually won, that Delia Marmora pushed forward into action a portion, and a portion only of his infantry and ber- saglieri. The affair of the Tchernaya was substantially a French victory. The first Italian victory that followed the alliance between France and England was not in the Crimea. It was that which was won by Cavour at the Congress of Paris in 1856. He had spoken in the Italian Chamber of the alliance, as giving to Italians an opportunity of showing that they could fight like brave men. " I am persuaded," he had said, " that the laurels, which our soldiers will gather on the plains of the East, will profit more to the future of Italy than all that has been done by those, who have thought by declamations and by writings to effect her regeneration." This was the view of his action which he wished to be taken by the press and the public ; but in sending a Sardinian contingent to the Crimea, he was really seeking to gain for Piedmont access, not to the " field of glory," but to the field of diplomatic action. He had been in Paris in 1855 with his sovereign, as the guest of Napo- leon III., and he had held, it is said, conversations with the Emperor on the subject of Italy. He came again in 1856, as the joint representative with Villamarina of the king- dom of Sardinia. By right of the alliance, and notwith- standing the remonstrances of Austria, the representative of that little state sat side by side with those of the Great Powers, in that Congress which in its ultimate results has changed the face of Europe. That to obtain a place in the Congress was Cavour's 7 See, for instance Dr. Russell's British Expedition to the Crimeay Book vii. 10 THE MAKING OF ITALY. object in sending the Piedmontese troops to the Crimea, and that the Crimean expedition was really the starting point of Cavour's campaign for Italian Unity, was openly declared by Victor Emmanuel in i860. On October 9th, he issued from Ancona his address to the people of the South, in which he said, " I have been able to maintain in that part of Italy which is united under my sceptre the idea of a national hegemony, out of which was to arise the harmonious concord of divided provinces united in one nation. Italy was put in possession of my view, when it saw me sending my troops to the Crimea by the side of the soldiers of the two great Western Powers. I desired to obtain for Italy the right of taking part in all transactions of European interest.'^ The protocols of the Conference of Paris and the letters of Cavour ^ to his colleague, Rattazzi, who remained at the head of affairs at Turin, form a very complete record of the part taken by Piedmont in the Congress of Paris. On the 20th of February, the third or fourth day after his arrival at the French capital, he wrote to Rattazzi, " I have informed you in my special despatch of my conversation with the Emperor. I have little to add to what I said. I can only repeat that the Emperor would really like to do something for us. If we can assure ourselves of the sup- port of Russia, we shall obtain something practical ; but, if we do not, we must be content with an avalanche of assurances of amity, and good wishes. If I do not succeed, it will not be from any lack of zeal. I pay visits, I dine out, I write, I assist at meetings, in a word, I do all I can." It was indeed a busy time with him. His one object was to have the affairs of Italy discussed at the Congress, and to commit Napoleon to an anti-Austrian policy. He saw the Emperor from time to time, but he was much more frequently with his cousin. Prince Napoleon, and he did not neglect to cultivate also the friendship of Lord Claren- don, in whom Cavour found an ally ready to the extent of imprudence to interpret his innuendoes and hints, until ^ Lettres inedites du Cointe de Cavour ait com7na?ideur Urbaiii Rattazzi^ traduites par Charles de la Varenne. Paris. 1862. CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON III. at length the two men spoke openly of war with Austria. In fact the alliance with the English Whigs was even older in date than the alliance of Piedmont with Napo- leon III. ; and this because Clarendon represented, not so much England and his Sovereign, as the English Premier, Lord Palmerston, who had been for many years the best friend of the Italian Revolution. At the sitting of the 8th of April, Cavour succeeded in his object of bringing before the Congress his own views upon the state of Italy. Strictly and legally the Congress had no more right to deal with anything but the affairs of the East, than it had to deal with the private affairs of any man in Paris. But on this occasion, as on many others, international law and right were quietly disregarded, in order to clear the way for subsequent schemes of aggres- sion. Count Walewski, the Emperor's alter ego at the Congress, began to lead it beyond its legal competence by referring to the Belgian press laws and the general tone of the Belgian press with regard to the Imperial Govern- ment. France, of course, did not wish to menace Belgium, but the tone of the press was a danger to the peace of Europe. Nothing was said of the press of Piedmont, for two sufficient reasons — first, Cavour's press law of 1852 was a compliment which had not been forgotten, and secondly, the violence of the press was directed only against the Pope and Austria ; and it mattered little that the Piedmontese press constituted a danger to the peace of Europe^ now that France and Piedmont were actually designing an anti- Austrian alliance, the best preparation for which would be to irritate Austria against Piedmont, by means of the press or any other available method. The affairs of Belgium having been thus discussed in an as- sembly where she had not even the right of representation, M. Walewski called attention to what he styled " the abnormal condition " of the Papal States. The anarchy of 1848 had, he said, led France to occupy Rome, while Austrian troops held Ancona and the Legations. He admitted that there were solid grounds for this proceeding^ but he went on to say that France was anxious to put an 12 THE MAKING OF ITALY. end to it at the earliest possible moment,^ and he trusted that Count Buol would say the same for Austria. He might have added that the Pontifical Government would have been more pleased than either the court of Paris or that of Vienna to see the foreign troops withdrawn, and the States held by a Pontifical army alone. He then proceeded to speak of Naples, and, though there was no Neapolitan minister present, he urged that Ferdinand II. should grant an immediate and full amnesty to the exiles, who — as every one in the room must have known although he did not state it — were chiefly engaged in plotting against the government of the Two Sicilies in London, Paris and Turin. Lord Clarendon spoke next. He dealt largely in generalities, but complained of misgovernment in the Legations and in Naples. Count Orloff refused to take any part in the discussion. He had come, he said, to assist in re-establishing peace, and the affairs of Italy had no part in his mission. Count Buol, the representative of Austria, was the next to speak. After alluding to a previous discussion, he turned to M. Walewski's state- ment. It would be impossible, he said, to treat at that Congress of the affairs of independent states which were not even represented there. They could not occupy themselves with letting independent sovereigns know what they desired should be changed in the internal organization of their states. Nor could he follow Lord Clarendon in the observations he had made, and give any promise or declaration about the Austrian occupation of the Legations, although he joined M. Walewski in the wish that it could be prudently brought to an end. M. Walewski then rose to explain that no one had pro- posed that they should take any definite resolution, far less that they should interfere with independent states. He had only suggested that they should endeavour to complete the work of peace by occupying themselves in anticipation with complications which might arise from 9 We may be permitted to gravely doubt the truth of this statement. CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON HI. 13 certain causes/ The causes to which he alluded were foreign occupations, a threat to Austria : a system of rigorous repression, a threat to Naples : the licence of the press, a threat to Belgium. This was hardly the way to complete the work of peace ; it was rather sowing the seeds of war. In reply to M. Walewski, Baron Hubner, the second Austrian plenipotentiary, reasserted the fact that he and his colleague had no power to deal with such matters ; but he pointed out that the reduction of the Austrian garrisons in the Legations showed that the Imperial Government was anxious to put an end to the occupation. After Baron Manteuffel had remarked that the discussion of the affairs of Naples was only likely to produce a revolution in that country, Cavour spoke at some length. He did not, he said, dispute the right of any plenipoten- tiary to abstain from taking part in the debate, but he thought it important that the opinions which some of the Powers had expressed on the subject of the foreign occu- pation of the Papal States, should be set down in the protocol of the sitting. The occupation of the Legations, he said, had lasted seven years, and was assuming daily more and more of a permanent character. The condition of the country, he asserted, had not been improved. There was a state of siege at Bologna, and the presence of Austrian troops in the Legations and in Parma destroyed political equilibrium in Italy, and was a continual danger to Sardinia. As for Naples, he quite agreed with Walewski and Clarendon as to the necessity of an amnesty. Baron Hubner made an able reply on the part of Austria. He called attention to the fact that Cavour had spoken only of the Austrian occupation, he had said not a word of the French garrison in Rome, although in their origin and in their object the French and Austrian occu- ^ " — de completer I'oeuvre de la paix en se preoccupant d'avance des nouvelles complications qui pourraient surgir, soit de la prolonga- tion indefinie ounon justifiee de certaines occupations dtrangeres, soit d'un systeme de rigueurs inopportun et impolitique, soit d'un licence, contraire aux devoirs internationaux."— Protocol of April 8th, 1856. 14 THE MAKING OF ITALY. pations were exactly alike. That the state of siege existed at Bologna though it had ceased at Ancona and Rome, only proved that the state of affairs at Bologna was abnormal and required an unusual remedy. But, he said, the Roman States were not the only Italian terri- tories held by foreign troops. Sardinia had for eight years occupied Mentone and Roquebrune against the will of their sovereign, the Prince of Monaco. It is easy to laugh at this tu qitoque of Baron Hubner to Cavour, but really it was highly honourable to Austria to adopt such an argument, for in so doing he asserted the first principle of international law — that, as municipal law is the same for all men whether rich or poor, so international law is the same for all nations, and a mighty empire and an in- significant principality can claim precisely the same rights and the same independence. Cavour replied that he had not spoken of the French occupation, merely because he saw in it no danger to the independent States of Italy. It was, he said, quite diffe- rent in this respect from the Austrian occupation. This was, of course, a direct menace on Cavour's part to the Austrian dominion in the Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom ; for the mere cessation of the Austrian occupation of Parma and the Romagna could hardly so materially alter the state of affairs as to remove this peril to the inde- pendent States of Italy, of whose rights Cavour showed himself such an active champion. As for Monaco, Cavour added that Sardinia was willing to evacuate Mentone, as soon as the prince could without any danger to his autho- rity assume possession of it — precisely what Hubner had said of Bologna. His tu quoque was a complete success. M. Walewski closed the discussion by remarking that the general result of it was that the Austrian plenipo- tentiaries agreed with those of France in desiring an evacuation of the Papal States by the foreign troops : and that the plenipotentiaries had agreed for the most part that it would be expedient for the Italian Govern- ments, and especially that of the Two Sicilies, to adopt measures of clemency. CA VO UR AND NAPOLEON III. 1 5 Clarendon and Cavour left the room together. " Milord," said the Piedmontese to the English minister, " Milord, you see there is nothing to be hoped for from diplomacy. It would be time to have recourse to other means, at least so far as regards the King of Naples." "Naples must be looked to, and that soon," replied Clarendon, speaking quite in the spirit of his master, Palmerston. " I shall come and talk it over with you," said Cavour, as they parted.^ Next day he wrote to Rattazzi a private letter, supple- menting an official despatch, which he had sent to Turin on the previous evening. He wrote of Clarendon as having spoken of the Pontifical Government as " the worst that ever existed." " I believe/' he said, " his lord- ship, convinced that it was impossible to obtain any practical result, thought it well to use unparliamentary language." From this it would seem that the discussion was considerably toned down in the protocol. He then tells Rattazzi of the few words he had exchanged with Clarendon after the sitting, and continues, " I think I can talk to him of blowing up the Bourbon. Italy cannot remain in her present position. Napoleon is convinced of it, and, if diplomacy be powerless, we should have recourse to means beyond the law. I am moderate in my opinions, and yet I am favourable to bold and extreme measures. In our times boldness is, I believe, the best policy. It has done good for Napoleon ; it can also be of service to us." When Rattazzi read this letter, he evidently feared that Cavour had overrated the value of Clarendon's declarations. He telegraphed to his colleague at Paris, '^ You are right ; extreme measures are sometimes neces- sary. But do you not fear that England will abandon 2 Extract from Cavour's letter to Rattazzi, April 9th, 1856. " Comma nous sovtions je lui (Clarendon) ai dit : ' Milord, vous voyez qu'il n'y a rien h esperer de la diplomatic ; il serait temps d'avoir recours a d'autres moyens, au moins en ce qui concerne le roi de Naples.' II repondit, ' II faut s'occuper de Naples, et bientot.' Je I'ai quitte en disant, 'J'en irai causer a vec vous.'" — Lettres de Cavour a U. Rattazzi, Paris, 1862, p. 247. i6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. you, when it comes to a question of marching against Austria ? As to Naples, whatever be the solution of the matter, if the Bourbon is driven out a step will be gained." Two days after, Cavour went to see Clarendon, to "talk the matter over" with him, as he had promised.^ He told Clarendon that, in his opinion, the discussion of the 8th had proved two things — "(i)that Austria was determined to persist in her system of oppression and violence towards Italy ; (2) that the efforts of diplomacy were powerless to modify her system." Clarendon took all this for granted. He did not ask Cavour for the proofs, which he would have found it difficult to give. Neither of the two diplomatists descended to details and particulars ; it was at once easier and more convenient to deal in generalities. In presence of this state of affairs, only two courses were open to Piedmont, either to be reconciled with Austria and the Pope,'' or to prepare for war with Austria in an early future. " If," he continued, ^* the first course should be found preferable, it would be my duty on returning to Turin to advise the king to recall to office the friends of Austria and of the Pope. If the contrary, the second idea, be the best, I and my friends will not fear to prepare for a terrible war, a war to the death, a war to the knife." Here he stopped, to see what effect he had produced upon the English minister. Clarendon replied quietly, *^ I think you are right ; your position is becoming very difficult. I believe an explosion is inevitable, only the time to talk openly of it is not yet come." Cavour replied, " I have given you proof of my moderation and prudence. I think in politics one must be extremely reserved in word, extremely decided in action. There are positions where less danger lies in a bold course than in an excess of prudence. With La ^ The interview took place on April nth. This account of it is based on Cavour's letter to Rattazzi of April 12th, 1856. ■* It was always the rule with Cavour and his school to couple Austria and the Pope in one condemnation, in the hope of damaging the cause of the Papacy by associating it with that of the foreigner. It would have been more just but less convenient to treat with Rome and Vienna each on its own merits. CA FOUR AND NAPOLEON J II. 17 Marmora I believe we are in a condition to begin war ; and, short as it may be, you will be forced to aid us." Cavour had now drawn Clarendon beyond the bounds of prudence. " Oh ! certainly," he said ; " if you are in a difficulty, you can count upon us, and you will see with what energy we shall come to your assistance." '^ After that," says Cavour, very naturally, in his letter,"! did not push the discussion further." It had certainly gone quite far enough. Cavour was now confirmed in his project. Napoleon was with him, and so, he believed, was Palmerston. But there was this difference, which he failed to grasp — Napoleon meant France ; Palmerston meant only the English Liberals. *^ I leave you to judge," he wrote to Rattazzi, " of the importance of these words pronounced by a minister, who has the reputation of being a very reserved and prudent man . . . But as this is a question of life or death, we must act prudently. For this reason I intend to go to London, and consult Lord Palmerston and the other men who are at the head of the Government. If they share Clarendon^s views, we must prepare secretly, contract a loan of thirty million francs, and after La Marmora's return send Austria an tiltimatum such as she cannot accept^ and begin hostilities. The Emperor cannot oppose this war. At the bottom of his heart he desires it. Before leaving here, I shall hold to him the same language I have used with Clarendon." ^ ^ It is clear from a statement made by Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords on February 17th, 1862 (Hansard, New Series, vol. 165, cols. 347 — 351), that Cavour was over sanguine in his interpreta- tion of Lord Clarendon's meaning. In the main Lord Clarendon's statement, though meant to explain away the accounts of the con- versations at Paris given by Cavour, really confirms them. Lord Clarendon admits that he spoke with him in a way which was friendly to the policy that Cavour represented, he denies that he ever advised him to declare war against Austria, but says that he told him that England would be with Piedmont in the event of the Austrians marching on Turin. Cavour evidently has this in his mind, when he writes to Rattazzi planning a rupture with Austria. Probably had this rupture taken place, Clarendon and Palmerston would have been ready to explain that they never promised more than moral support. Cavour's letters, written immediately after the conversations, contain C i8 THE MAKING OF ITALY. On the 13th,® he and Clarendon dined with Prince Napoleon. They informed Cavour that the evening be- fore they had spoken with the Emperor on the affairs of Italy, the Prince and the Englishman both, apparently, en- deavouring to induce him to adopt a warlike determination, about which he still hesitated. The result of the conversa- tion had been that Napoleon expressed a desire to talk matters over with Cavour in person. Accordingly the Count saw him, and spoke to him to the same effect as he had spoken to Clarendon, but in more measured terms. But the Emperor was more prudent than the English minister had been. He knew that to speak too plainly to Cavour would be to put himself in his power and unduly hasten matters, and besides he had not yet in any sense elaborated his Italian policy. He hoped, he said, to bring Austria to accept more conciliatory counsels. He had already remarked to Buol that he regretted to find himself in direct opposition to the Emperor of Austria ; and Buol had told Walewski, in consequence of this remark, that Austria wished to please France in everything, and that they were really allies. Cavour looked incredulous. It is evident from his words to Rattazzi that his incredulity was twofold. He doubted Buol's words to Walewski, and he doubted if the Emperor had ever spoken to Buol at all. It was necessary, he said to the Emperor, to open the question and take a decisive attitude. He had drawn up a memorandum, which he intended to hand to Walewski. The Emperor hesitated. Finally he advised Cavour to go to London, see Palmerston, and let him know the result on his return to Paris. Notwithstanding all Napoleon's prudent reserve, the two men understood each other. The alliance was already complete. At the close of that day's sitting, an incident occurred, which Cavour took as a proof that Napoleon had really spoken to Buol. The Austrian Minister came to the nothing that is actually contradicted by Clarendon's statement made six years after in the House of Lords. ^ See letter of April 14th, 1856, Cavour to Rattazzi, La Varenne's edition, p. 255. CA VOUR AND NAP OLEON III. 19 Piedmontese Premier, and told him that his master wished to live in peace with Piedmont and had no desire to inter- fere with her institutions. Cavour replied, that during his stay in Paris Buol had given no proof of it, and that he believed the relations between the two countries were now worse than ever. At parting, Buol grasped his hand warmly, and said, " Let me hope that even politically we shall not always be enemies.'^ Three years later, in the same month of April, those two men exchanged an ulti- matum and a declaration of war. As early as the 27th of March, Cavour had addressed to Clarendon and Walewski a private note on the affairs of Italy ; I shall refer to it later on. This note was the prelude to the memorandum presented to Clarendon and Walewski on April i6th, in which Cavour and Villamarina express their disappointment at the small results of the discussion of the 8th, charge Austria with exercising an intolerable tyranny in Italy, and in guarded language menace her with insurrection and war. Having taken this step, Cavour went on to London, and saw Palmerston. But a near relative of the Premier's had just died ; he felt, or affected to feel, little disposed for the transaction of business, and Cavour could obtain from him no definite declaration, but only expressions of good will. He returned to Paris, disappointed but not discouraged. He saw the Emperor again ; and, when he left the French capital for Turin, he felt that he had obtained sufficient assurances of the active support of France to enable him to begin at once the political campaign with Austria^ the only object of which was, not to obtain any concessions from her, for these would have been fatal to his policy, but only to force her into war, a war in which the arms of France, and he believed those of England, would be upon his side. C 2 20 THE MAKING OF ITALY. CHAPTER II. THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED. 1856— 1859. The Congress of Paris was over. The first act of the drama had closed. Cavour was preparing for the second. There was a pause of three years in which no great events occurred. We may pass over them very briefly. On his return to Turin, one of Cavour's first acts was to read to the Chamber the so-called verbal note which he had addressed to Walewski and Clarendon on the 27th of March. Briefly, it was a declaration of war against the Holy See. It was for Rome what the memorandum of April 1 6th had been for Austria. It arraigned the Pon- tifical Government on the double charge of incapacity and oppression, speaking of it as an ecclesiastical government, a theocracy in which laymen had no part. Reference was distinctly made to Napoleon's letter to Colonel Neyjn 1849.^ *' Secularization and the Code Napoleon,"this was the measure of reform it proposed for the Papal Slates. Then alluding to the Austrian occupation of Bologna, it urged that Romagna should be separated, at least administratively, from the Pontifical States. In the same sitting Cavour referred to the rumours of a rapprochement between Rome and Sardinia. He denied that there was any truth \\\ them. After the reading of the verbal note, the denial was unnecessary. The newspapers freely but accurately inter- * See supra, p. 7. THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED. 21 preted it for their readers. ^' In asking for the seculariza- tion of the Legations and their administrative separation from the Court of Rome," said the Nord^ the Russian organ at Brussels, " M. Cavour has frankly expressed the hope that the practice of this system will lead to the inde- pendence of the Legations, and perhaps later on to their annexation to Piedmont." *' This note,'"* wrote the Liberal Magdoi Geneva,^ '^ this note is the most solemn manifesta- tion of the defiance given by the Sardinian plenipotentiaries to the Papal Government. . . . It is a solemn cry of repro- bation against the Pope, a programme of war against the Papacy both temporal and spiritual!' And Xh^ Journal des Di'bats declared, "This is the beginning of the dismember- ment of the Pontifical States." A week after the reading of the note in the Sardinian Parliament, M. de Rayneval sent M. Walewski an official note upon the then existing condition of the Pontifical States. De Rayneval had spent many years in Rome, and from his prominent official position the best sources of information were open to him. It was his interest to judge severely, and his memorandum was a private one, written solely for the information of his own Government. It was not, like Cavour's " verbal note," a manifesto meant for the ears of the European public. It was not written with knowledge drawn from secondary sources, but from personal acquaintance with his subject ; and it furnished the most complete reply to all the charges made by Cavour against the temporal government of the Holy See. It was not until March, 1857, that it was published, and, strange to say, it was in the London Daily Neivs that it first saw the light. How the Daily Neivs obtained it, I do not profess to know ; but in the leading Liberal journal appeared the best defence which has ever been written of the Roman administration. Its authenticity is undeniable. When it appeared, the Pays^ then a semi- official paper, declared that the terms of the report had 2 ]viay i6th, 1856. ^ Maga, May 15th, 1856. 22 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. been seriously altered. The Daz/y News then pointed out that the writer in the Pays had used a version which had appeared in the Independance Beige, a version which had undergone a double translation, first from the original into English for the Daily News, and then back again into French for the Belgian paper : that it, therefore, was not surprising that it did not exactly correspond with the original text. But to set all doubts and cavillings at rest, the Daily News then and there published a copy of the despatch in the original French. Here I can call attention only to some of M. de Rayne- val's chief statements. He begins by saying that the one point on which the Pontifical Government can be assailed is undoubtedly the partial occupation of its territory by foreign troops. " Every independent state is expected to suffice for itself, and to be able to maintain its internal security by its own forces. The Court of Rome is re- proached with falling short of this reasonable expectation, the cause of its weakness is inquired into, and it is generally believed to be discontent awakened among its subjects by a defective administration." He then proceeds to show that the discontent, so far as it exists, springs from a per- fectly different source, namely, from the agitations of the Revolutionary party. This party wishes, he says, to make an Italy which shall play a great part in the world. " But how create a powerful Italy, so long as the peninsula is divided into two distinct parts by a state neutral from the necessity of its nature and isolated from all European con- flicts ? How play a great part, when the centre of Italy is in possession of a sovereign who does not wear a sword ? " Then he points out the tendency of the Italians to split up into factions. They have, he says, no cohesive power. It is a great error, he remarks, to take the Piedmontese as types of the Italians, for there is a large Swiss and French element in that nation. The population of the States is split up into parties. There are a certain number of Car- bonari, and then there are the Mazzinians. " The universal republic, the unity of Italy, constitutional government, THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED. 23 war against Austria, is their programme. They say they are a numerous body, and are ready to act, but they never keep their word. Directed by the committees of London and Geneva, their watchword for the present is quiet and inaction, until the return of their chiefs by means of an amnesty, and the departure of the foreign troops, give them an opportunity for acting with a chance of success." Besides these there are the Moderate Liberals. " Refusing to go as far as the English constitution, there is a certain number of persons who profess attachment to the Pontifical Government, and at the same time overwhelm it with their attacks, pretending that they limit their desires to obtaining a better administration. They are not able to define exactly what they mean by this. In their eyes everything depends upon government, even to the proper maintenance of their own houses and the direction of their own affairs. .... Taxed as they are more lightly than the majority of European countries, they complain that they are weighed down with taxation. . . . Finally, they profess to have a great fear of the Mazzinians, and at the same time are opening the door to them." There is, he shows, an inertness in the mass of the people, which would make it difficult for any government. Papal or otherwise, to find a secure point (Tappiii in them. In answer to the charge that the government is in the hands of priests and not of laymen, he remarks that people generally suppose that about three thousand ecclesiastics form the administration of the State, whereas there are really less than a hundred, and half of these are not priests, but only members of the Prelatura, which is practically a lay institution. Even some of the provinces had been placed entirely under lay control, only to the discontent of the people, who complained that the lay prefect thought only of his family, and asked for a prelate to govern them. In all the eighteen provinces, in 1856, there were just fifteen priests holding offices in the government. In Rome the proportion was higher, but the laymen were still in the majority. The numbers stood as follows : — 24 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. Department. Ecclesiastics. Laymen. Ministry I i8 Council of State ... 3 5 Court of Cassation ... 9 8 Tribunal of the Rota 12 7 Civil Tribunal 3 Ii6 Tribunal of the Consulta . . . 14 • 37 Criminal Tribunal none 5S Episcopal Tribunal ... 9 17 Tribunal of Apostolic Chamber 9 16 Provincial Tribunals... none 620 Archives, Chamber of Notaries, &c." ;.".' none 16 Miscellaneous employes in Ministiy of Justice I 6 Ministry of Interior 22* 1411 „ Finance ... 3 2017 ,, Commerce 2 161 Police ... 2 404 War . none not stated Including the fifteen chiefs of provinces mentioned above. This table at once refutes the idea that the government was wholly ecclesiastical, that it was the government of a caste in which the people had no voice. In all there were less than a hundred ecclesiastics. " Is it possible," asks M. de Rayneval, " to believe that the happiness and repose of the population are powerfully affected by the presence of such a small number of persons, who, I repeat, have for the most part nothing of the ecclesiastic but the dress ? " Pius IX., he says, has laid down and observed the prin- ciple, that with the exception of that of Cardinal Secretary of State, every office is open to the laity. " Different codes of procedure in civil and criminal cases, as well as a code relating to commerce, all founded on our own (the French), enriched by lessons derived from experience, had been promulgated. I have studied these carefully," he adds ; " they are above criticism. The Code des Hypo- thkques has been examined by French jurisconsults, and cited by them as a model document. The Roman law, modified in certain points by the canon law, was held as the basis of civil legislation." There was a Council of State, comprising, among its ► THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED. 25 lay members, the Princes Orsini and Odescalchi, Professor Orioli, and the advocate Stoltz. This council discussed and prepared all laws and decrees. There were also councils for the various ministries, including a Council of Finance partly elected by the municipalities, the municipal councils themselves being elected by all the inhabitants of the com- mune, who paid a certain amount of taxes, or had taken high degrees in a university. Then, after giving further details as to the provinces, he adds : — " Abroad these essential changes introduced into the older order of things, these incessant efforts of the Pontifical Government to ameliorate the lot of the population, have passed unnoticed. People have had ears only for the declarations of the dis- contented, and the permanent calumnies of the bad portion of the Piedmontese and Belgian press. This is the source from which public opinion has derived its inspiration ; and, in spite of well-established facts, it is believed in most places, but particularly in England, that the Pontifical Government has done nothing for its subjects, and has restricted itself to the perpetuation of the errors of another age." The Government had shown singular clemency in 1849. The most severe punishment inflicted had been exile; the number of these exiles in 1856 was estimated at about a hundred. The Government had, at serious loss to itself, bought up all the paper money of the Republican Govern- ment. In 1856 there was a good metallic currency, and also a certain amount of paper in the form of notes of the Roman bank, but these stood at par, and the bank was in a flourishing condition. Commercial treaties had been concluded with many foreign states, the custom-house tariff had been lowered, and the system of farming the indirect revenues had been abolished, the Government officials themselves collecting all taxes and duties. The debt had been reduced, and the deficit in the budget had grown yearly less, and was in 1856 almost extinguished. The administration was most economical, the civil list, expenses of cardinals, pontifical palaces and museums, costing altogether only 3,200,000 francs. A Roman paid 26 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. on an average 22 francs in taxes, a Frenchman 45. The army consisted of 1 2,000 native troops and 4000 Swiss. Numerous public works had been executed, drainage works carried out in the Marsh of Ostia and the Pontine Marshes, railways and telegraphs completed or undertaken, Rome lighted with gas, and steamers intro- duced upon the Tiber. Agriculture was encouraged. In a word, the States were prosperous. There was, of course, misery ; but nowhere were there more ample resources for relieving it.^ "In truth," says M. de Rayneval^ "when certain persons say to the Pontifical Government, * Form an administration which may have for its object the good of the people,' the government might reply, * Look at our acts, and condemn us if you dare.' The government might ask not only which of its acts is a subject for legitimate blame, but in which of its duties it has failed. Are we then to be told that the Pontifical Government is a model, that it has no weaknesses or imperfections ? Certainly not ; — but its weaknesses and imperfections are of the same kind as are met with in all '* During the terrible period of inundations and eruptions in the summer of 1879 it was proposed in the Italian Chamber of Deputies that the Government should contribute to the relief of the sufferers. Cairoli replied that there were no precedents. The Deputy Cavallotti answered, " Alas ! there are too many precedents, but we must go very far back to find them ; and it is sad that we should have to seek these precedents in the records of past rulers. On the eruption of Vesuvius in 1822 the Bourbon accorded exoneration of taxes to the sufferers by the eruption. The present Government, far from follow- ing such an example, increases the taxation." Cavallotti continued : "In the inundation of 1842 what did the Papal Government do for the sufferers of Bondeno ? It condoned an entire year's taxation. . . It sustained every expense ; it maintained at its own expense the indigent population during the whole time that they remained out of their land ; it reimbursed all the expenses incurred in the rebuilding of houses destroyed or damaged ; it condoned every tax on iron and wood introduced for their reconstruction ; it rebuilt all the churches at its own expense — that is an understood thing — and several other public edifices ; it rebuilt at its own expense many of the houses of private individuals, and almost all those of the poor ; and finally it sustained all the expenses for the hydraulic works of the second category, exempting the communes and the provinces." THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED. 27 governments, and even in all men, with a very few exceptions/' Such was M. de Rayneval's report. He was no optimist, he was not writing to order, or for the public ; and his despatch is the best answer, a full and perfect answer, to the declamatory memorandums of the Count de Cavour. Another answer was given in 1857, and a practical one. The Holy Father spent the four summer months, from the beginning of May to the first week in September, in a pro- gress through his dominions. He was everywhere received with enthusiasm, and that enthusiasm reached its highest pitch in the streets of Bologna, where the state of siege had been raised by the special desire of the Pontifical Government. In Piedmont Cavour was still pursuing his course of persecution against the Church. Pains and penalties were decreed by the Ministry of the Interior against any priest who withheld the last sacraments ; the religious communities were gradually broken up, and their property sequestrated in execution of Rattazzi's law ; and, finally, the sees were kept vacant as the bishops died, until the episcopate of the kingdom of Sardinia was reduced by one fourth. At the same time he continued his preparations against Austria. Volunteers were incorporated into the Piedmontese army or formed into new corps, the fortifications of Alessandria were completed, and when they were ready to be armed a subscription for the cannon was opened in all parts of Italy by his agents. Austria withdrew her ambassador from Turin, but still with admirable patience avoided any- thing like an approach to war. She merely watched the Piedmontese armaments, and increased her own step for step with her enemy. But Cavour had more formidable weapons than those of the Piedmontese army. His embassies at the various courts of the sovereigns of Italy, were each the centre of a knot of conspirators. Indeed, the embassies of Piedmont, under Cavour's influence, had superseded the ve7tte of Carbonarism and the circles of Young Italy. Mazzini's power was all but gone. He had been forced by the current of events to give way to 28 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. the new campaign inaugurated by the Piedmontese Pre- mier, though from first to last he was ready to denounce him as a monarchist who was depriving Italy of her true destiny, a Republican government. What we may call the last serious attempt of the Mazzinians was made in 1857. The Republicans, indeed, acted in earnest on other occasions, but it was as the willing or unwilling allies of Cavour. In 1857, they "fought for their own hand," and failed. I notice the incident, less for its intrinsic impor- tance, than because in the first place one of its leaders became at a later date Prime Minister of Italy, and in the second because Cavour's condemnation of it is a condemnation from his own mouth of his own acts in i860. The Sapri expedition was planned and executed by Major Pisacane and Signor Nicotera, in the summer of 1857. It was contemporaneous with and formed a part of the same general plan of revolt as the Mazzinian outbreak at Genoa in the same year. Hence Cavour's subsequent hostility to the project and its authors. Had they been able to j'eler le Bourbon en Vair^ as he himself desired, he would doubtless have been glad ; but they tried at the same time to undermine and blow up the monarchy of Piedmont, and this was going too far. On the evening of June 25th, 1857, the Cagliari, a steamer belonging to the Compagnia Rubattino of Genoa (the same company whose vessels had later on the . dubious honour of serving as Garibaldi's transports), left the port with thirty-three passengers. Amongst these were Pisacane, Nicotera and twenty-three followers. As soon as the ship had got out to sea, they forcibly took possession of her, and directed her course to the island of Ponza in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. There they freed and armed four hundred prisoners confined in the convict prison, and having recruited their forces with this very respectable contingent, they sailed again for Sapri, where they landed and dismissed the Cagliari. They were almost immediately attacked, not only by the Neapolitan troops, but also by the Urban Guard, that is to say by the THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED. 29 armed inhabitants of the district, who were thoroughly- loyal to King Ferdinand. The Republicans and the convicts were defeated and dispersed. Pisacane was killed, Nicotera severely wounded, and taken a prisoner to Salerno, where he remained till he was liberated by the revolution of i860. On the 9th of July, 1857, Cavour wrote to Count Gropello, the Sardinian minister at Naples : — "This deplorable and criminal occurrence has excited the indignation of the Government of the king, and this indignation was shared by all sensible and honest men. You will therefore in my name express these sentiments to the ministers of his Sicilian Majesty." Unfortunately two Neapolitan cruisers captured the Cagliari^ as she steamed away from Sapri, an act which, natural as it was, the existing state of maritime law hardly justified. On board the steamer were two English engineers, and this gave Palmerston and Cavour a pretext for endeavouring to find ground for a quarrel with Naples. In this they would perhaps have succeeded, but Palmerston's cabinet was driven from office by the Tories ; and Lord Malmesbury, the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs, rightly considering that England had received all due satisfaction from the Neapolitan Government, quietly shelved the affair, regard- less of the protests of D'Azeglio, who then represented Piedmont at the Court of St. James's. But though in this sense he tried to make political capital out of the seizure of the Cagliari, Cavour through- out the negotiations never hesitated to condemn in the most ample terms Pisacane's enterprise. On the i6th of January, 1858, he wrote again to Count Gropello : — "As soon as I received intelligence of the events at Ponza and Sapri, I hastened, through the medium of your Excellency, to give proof to the Neapolitan Government of the pro- found indignation felt by the King's Government at the tidings of the criminal attack committed against the security of a friendly State." And again he wrote : — " The violent incursion of Ponza and Sapri was the work of a few conspirators bent on a desperate enterprise, and it would be an abuse of the lawful meaning of words to con- 30 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. found these attempts — in which it is difficult to say whether the guilt or the madness be the greater — with a lawful state of public war. This would be the first time that a band of wicked and factious men were ever invested with the prerogatives of a belligerent power. The attempt of Ponza and Sapri was a crime of rebellion and robbery, and for its punishment the rules of ordinary penal law ought to be applied." Cavour could hardly have used stronger terms, and in writing thus he put on record the condemna- tion of the precisely similar attempt of Garibaldi, which, thanks to his active participation, was a success, while Pisacane's was a failure.^ The year 1858 opened with the Orsini plot, and the attempt of the Italian conspirators on the life of the French Emperor on January 14th. Cavour was startled. He feared, as he himself declared, that Orsini's act would alienate the Emperor's good will, and destroy all his plans. But he was mistaken. It did not for a moment alter Napoleon's feelings, far less his plans. If anything, it only precipitated them. He, if no one else, understood the meaning of the act. It was an attempt which might be repeated, but which would not be repeated once he had publicly declared himself by his acts the ally of the revolutionary party in Italy. If he did not understand this on the night of January 14th, Orsini's letter, written before his execution, must have pointed the moral to him. But, however this may have been, only another twelve- month was allowed to pass before the decisive step was taken, and France found herself face to face with war against Austria. A definite plan of action was arranged in the summer of 1858. Cavour had obtained from the Parliament of Turin an authorization for a loan of 40,000,000 francs. The Parliament was prorogued on July 14th, and Cavour immediately set off for Plombieres, a watering place in the Vosges, where Napoleon was then staying. At the interview it is believed that the Franco- ^ On January 30th, 1876, on the motion of Signor Cairoli, the Italian Chamber of Deputies voted pensions to the survivors of Pisacane's expedition. But then Nicotera was in the Ministry. THE ALLIANCE COMPLETED. 31 Sardinian alliance was formally completed. Then, as if to diminish the importance of his interview with the Emperor, Cavour went on to Baden, where he saw the Crown Prince of Prussia (later the Emperor William I.). He then rejoined his colleagues at Turin. Europe in general dreamed only of peace. It was known that the relations between Austria and Piedmont were in a perilous state, but the French alliance was still a well-kept secret ; and when the )ear closed, there were few who did not fully believe that no immediate causes of war were to be found in Europe. The first day of the new year put an end to this pleasing delusion. , 32 THE MAKING OF ITALY. CHAPTER III. THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. On the ist of January, 1859, Napoleon III., surrounded by his court, received the diplomatic corps at the New Year's lev6e at the Tuileries. No one expected that there would be anything more than the usual complimen- tary speeches, full of fine phrases, but really meaning little or nothing. What then was the surprise of the circle, when the Emperor, turning to Baron Hubner, the Austrian minister, said, in an emphatic tone and with an animated gesture, " I regret that our relations with your Government are not so good as they were, but I request you to tell the Emperor that my personal feelings towards him have not changed." Those who were present thought anxiously of the words of the First Napoleon to Lord Whitworth on the eve of the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens. The French funds fell five per cent. ; and though an official note appeared in the Moniteiir^ asserting that there was nothing in the diplomatic relations with Austria to warrant the excite- ment and apprehension caused by the Emperor's words, this attempt to mislead public opinion produced no effect in calming the fears of Europe. The Sardinian Parliament was to open on the loth, and the King's speech was looked forward to with intense inte- rest ; but, when it was delivered, it was found to be of the usual formal kind, and beyond an allusion to the clouded political horizon with which the year began, nothing was said either of the disputes with Austria or of the alliance with France. Two days after the Paris papers announced the probability of a marriage between the Princess Clotilde, THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. '^'^ a girl of fifteen, the only daughter of King Victor Emmanuel, and Prince Napoleon. The destined bride and bridegroom had not yet even seen each other. It was a purely political marriage ; later we shall see its significance. On Sunday, the 23rd, the Prince arrived at Turin, accompanied by General Niel, who formally re- quested, in the name of the Emperor Napoleon, the hand of the Princess Clotilde for the Prince. Next Sunday the marriage took place, and Prince Napoleon went back to Paris with his bride. General Niel, who had the reputation of being the best military engineer in Europe after Todleben, remained in Italy, inspecting the fortresses of Piedmont. Events travelled quickly, crowding upon each other. Austria was strengthening her garrison in Italy, asserting that her only object was to keep down the revolutionary party within her own frontiers. At Milan, Italianist pro- clamations were posted on the walls, and those who smoked government cigars were assaulted in the streets. The Sardinian army was concentrating in Piedmont, the troops being withdrawn from Savoy, the island of Sardinia and the minor provinces. In France preparations went on slowly and secretly. The arsenals were busy, whole regiments of soldiers were employed in cartridge-making, stores were being accumulated at the southern ports, rifled guns were being substituted for smooth-bores in the artillery, troops were concentrating at Lyons and Besan9on, the fleet was being assembled in the Mediterranean, the passes of the Alps were examined by engineer officers, and Niel was engaged with La Marmora on a plan for the defence of Piedmont until the French army could reach the field of action. On the 4th of February, Signor Lanza, the Minister of Finance, rose in the Chamber of Deputies at Turin to ask for an authorization for a loan of fifty million lire. His speech was a bold one. He spoke of the well-known fact that in the previous month a fresh Austrian corps d'armee had entered Italy. A strong army, he said, was massed about Cremona, Piacenza and Pavia, as if ready for an D 34 THE MAKING OF ITALY. aggressive movement against Turin : detached corps held the villages : the export of horses into Piedmont had been forbidden, and the Imperial Government was contracting a loan of ISO millions of francs. In the presence of these facts the king's Government asked for the loan, in order to continue preparations for defence. " We feel, gentlemen/' he concluded, "as much as any one the necessity of avoid- ing new burdens upon the country and an increased weight upon the finances of the State ; and we are grieved to be compelled to propose them. But in the life of nations there arise, as you know, supreme moments, in which sacrifices are a sacred duty, an inevitable necessity. The Govern- ment, trusting to your known patriotism, does not doubt that you will be united and decided in conceding to it the means necessary for the defence of the country, and with it of the national honour, liberty, and independence." The debate on the loan followed, on the 9th. It is important from the light it throws upon the position of Piedmont and the results of the policy of Cavour. The debate was opened by Count Solaro della Margarita, the leader of the Right. No one, he said, would be so base as not to rally round the king in time of danger, but when a question perhaps involving war was brought forward, it was necessary to examine carefully the truth of the statement that the country was in danger. Beyond any doubt the situation of the various provinces was anything but pros- perous ; commerce languished, agriculture suffered, manu- facturers could not support a competition with the produc- tions of other countries, the public funds were in discredit, and the indirect revenues were every day falling off. '^ To speak candidly, gentlemen," he continued, " if since 1849 we had quietly attended to the development of our institutions, if we had made it our chief care to promote science, art, and commerce, within our own limits : if we had not extraordinarily increased the taxes : if we had not held out allurements to the factions in all parts of Italy, and evoked hopes which for eight centuries have been nourished in vain : if we had thought more of improving our own lot, than of censuring and causing anxiety to other Govern- THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. 35 ments — -we should not have the name of agitators, nor should we see the plains of Lombardy inundated with Austrian bands ; rumours of war would not arise on the Ticino.'^ The cabinet of Vienna, he asserted, was too prudent to involve its country in a general war ; and for the cabinet of Turin also the most prudent course was to remain quiet ; for Piedmont could not engage in war with- out powerful allies, and then she would be at their mercy. To approve this loan would only be to sanction hostilities ; and he, therefore, opposed the bill. Count Delia Rovere of the Centre replied in favour of the loan. He admitted that the finances were not flourish- ing ; but he said he preferred liberty and debt to riches and slavery. He spoke of an Austrian invasion as immi- nent. He allowed that Cavour's policy was a dangerous one, but, he added, all great things had their dangers. Piedmont was forced to look for foreign aid, because the other sovereigns of Italy preferred the Austrians a thousand times before the Piedmontese. The next speaker was the Marquis de Beauregard, one of the representatives of Savoy. His speech was one of the most remarkable in the debate ; for, when he spoke of his own country, though he evidently knew little of the French alliance, his words had an almost prophetic character. Savoy, he said, would yield to no part of the kingdom in its devotion to the public weal, yet he should oppose the loan. He refused to believe that the Austrian armaments were of an aggressive character. The French Emperor had publicly declared that the situation of Italy did not give any reason for war ; yet Piedmont was arming, and it was proclaimed that the glorious moment had arrived to crown the policy to which the fortunes of the country had for eight years been sacrificed. " Count Cavour," he said, '\ wishes for war, and he will do his utmost to provoke it. In the perilous situation in which his policy has placed us, war presents itself to his mind as the only possible chance of honourable liberation from the alarming debt which crushes us, and of fulfilling the engagements he has undertaken. If the existence of the monarchy of Savoy D 2 36 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. were not the stake he proposes in this terrible game, against the glory of associating his name with the deliverance of Italy, I could understand that the intrepidity of the minister might devote itself to an enterprise in which he probably believes that he has insured for himself all the chances of success ; but those who have not the secrets of which he is master or his confidence in the future, recoil affrighted before the responsibility he has assumed. For my part," he went on, " I will not give any encouragement to such a policy. I will not approve by a vote of con- fidence a policy which should always be opposed, a policy which has done so much injury to the internal situation of the country. I can inform you, gentlemen, that in Savoy the idea of a war is thoroughly unpopular. Borne down by heavy taxes, our people execrate the policy which im- poses them on the country. But war would entail on Savoy an infinitely more deplorable fate than heavy taxation — it would lead to her separation from Piedmont. And, forsooth, we the inhabitants of Savoy are to shed our blood and wear out our resources for the purpose of placing ourselves under another crown. But do not imagine that the people of Savoy are less patriotic than others in the kingdom. No ! when danger arrives we shall be among the first to strike a blow for our country. But we do not want to separate from the mother-country. I shall, therefore, vote against a bill which constitutes part of a policy necessarily leading to that result." These words created a deep impression in the House. The next speaker denounced the bill as amounting to a declaration of war ; and Count Camburzano, who followed, asked what pledge had they of French assistance, had not Napoleon declared that his empire was peace ? The honourable gentlemen on the left had by this time lost their patience. Camburzano sat down amid a storm of hisses, and Brofferio, the leader of the Radicals, springing to his feet, said he would vote for the bill and let Austria do her worst. Count Cavour now ascended the tribune and all was still. To judge from his speech one would have supposed THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. 37 that the arsenals of Piedmont were idle, that its press and its public speakers had never alluded to Austria but in friendly- terms, and that the Piedmontese propaganda in Lombardy and Venetia did not exist. He endeavoured to show that all the provocation was on the side of Austria, yet his speech was self-contradictory and a menace to Austria. His policy, he said, was not provocative. He did not arro- gate to himself the right of initiating a war. His conduct had not become aggressive since the Congress of Paris, and he defied his opponents to prove their assertions. Yet he went on to say that the Government had a right to make itself in the face of Europe the interpreter of the wants, the sufferings and the hopes of Italy. The Govern- ment had, indeed, fortified Alessandria, but it was done because everything that had taken place in Paris convinced them of the impossibility of obtaining by pacific diplomatic means the complete solution of the difficulties of the Italian question. But why, it would be asked, were the Sardinian troops assembled on the frontier, why did he ask for the loan } Because Austria was massing her troops on the Ticino, and though she spoke only of peace, it might not be the first time that warlike intentions had been con- cealed by peaceful professions. (The very thing, let me note en passant^ which Count Cavour was doing at that moment.) He concluded by saying, he thought he had shown that his actions were not provocative, nor his policy inconsiderate. He sat down amid loud cheers from the Centre and Left ; but his eloquence had not carrried persuasion with it to all minds. Count Revel, who voted for the loan, admitted that the attitude of Austria was a suspicious one, but added, " this was the consequence, if not of the public acts of the Government, at least of the tone of the press, of its frequent menaces, of its frequent proposals that Austria might be attacked by us." The debate concluded in the midst of a scene of in- describable confusion. " Go to war as much as you please," exclaimed the Savoyard, De Very, ^' that will not suppress the mountains which divide us from Italy ; as a payment 38 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. for the assistance you receive, we shall be annexed to — " The tumult made the rest of the speech inaudible. One member asked what would the Ministry consider a casus klli, Cavour prudently declined to say what provocation they would consider as justifying an appeal to arms. Finally the bill was passed, ii6 voting for and thirty-five against it. On the i8th it passed the Senate. But there was great difficulty in floating the loan. The Sardinian funds stood at a low figure, and several leading banking firms refused to have anything to do with it.^ While the bill for the loan was passing through the Parliament of Turin, events of great importance were taking place elsewhere. On the same day on which Lanza intro- duced the bill for the loan, Count Buol, the Austrian Premier, addressed a circular to the Imperial representa- tives at the courts of Europe, in which he urged the pro- bability and the necessity of all Germany acting in concert in the event of Austria being attacked by France and Sar- dinia. As a kind of counter-manifesto, Cavour in the same way published a memorandum on the concentration of troops in Lombardy. On the 7th of February, the French Chambers were opened. In his speech the Emperor deprecated the exist- ing anxiety in the public mind, and repeated that the empire was peace. It had been his purpose on ascending the throne, he said, not to renew an era of conquests, but to inaugurate a system of peace, " which could not be dis- turbed except for the defence of great national interests, religion, philosophy and civilization "—a wide exception, considering that almost every casus belli recorded in history might be classed under one of these heads. He spoke of the troubled state of his relations with Austria, asserting that, under the circumstances^ there was nothing to be wondered at in France drawing near to Piedmont. The state of Italy was, indeed, abnormal ; but there was no reason for believing in war. Such was the effect of the more important passages of the Imperial discourse, which ^ Times and Memorial Diplomatique ^ February, 1859. THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. 39 might be taken as an illustration of Talleyrand's saying that speech was given to man to conceal his thoughts. Far more light was thrown upon the Emperor's designs by a pamphlet which was just then selling by the thousand in Paris. It had appeared a {^"^ days before, and already a large edition was exhausted. The title was, " UEmpereur Napoleon III. et ITtalie." It was known that portions of it were written by the Emperor himself, while the rest was composed under his inspiration. It was, in a word, the avowed expression of his policy. The pamphlet is an open attack on Austria. The Emperor seeks to prove that the position of Austria in Italy is untenable, her expulsion a necessity, the idea of her effecting useful reforms, if permitted to live in peace, an absurdity. An Italian confederation, he urges, is the only possible solution of the Italian question ; but to this " there exists," says the Imperial pamphleteer, " an obstacle beyond Italian and beyond European interest. It is Austria's position in Lombardy. Opposition is the basis of Austrian policy. As Austria opposes reforms, so will she oppose everything else. What is to be done ? Are we to bow to the veto of Austria ? Are we to discard it ? Are we to appeal to force or to public opinion to oppose this resistance ? " There is, of course, a ready answer to the question. The idea of appealing to force is disclaimed. Heaven is asked to forbid it. The Italian question must be solved only by the influence of public opinion through- out Europe. Yet the language of the pamphlet points to war. The strength of the Austrian military position in Italy is elaborately investigated, with a view to proving that " Italian nationality will never be the result of a revolution, and can never succeed without foreign help." But where is this help to come from } It is not openly stated that it is to be from France, but in more than one passage it is broadly hinted. It is "one of the traditions of French policy," says the writer, " that the Alps, which are for her a bulwark, shall not become an armed fortress against her power." Yet France does not wish for war, but " if France, which desires peace, were forced to make war, 40 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Europe would no doubt be moved, but she need not be alarmed ; her independence would not be at stake. This war, which fortunately is not probable, would have no other object from the day when it became necessary, than to anticipate revolution by affording just satisfaction to the demands of nations, and by protecting and guaranteeing the acknowledged principles and authentic rights of their nationality." The English Government now endeavoured to bring matters to a definite issue, by asking Piedmont to formulate her complaints against Austria, in the hope that, if they were well founded, international diplomatic action might be able to remove them. Cavour's reply was but a weak one. Austria, he said, was hated by the Italians on ac- count of *' her bureaucratic pedantry, the vexatious conduct of her police, the overwhelming taxes ^ which she has established, her system of recruiting, which is more severe than any other in Europe, and her rigours and her violence even against women." The Lombardo- Venetians were discontented, he said, because they were ruled by foreigners ; and then, interpreting their feelings towards the Church by his own, he had the boldness to assert that so long as Austria was in some degree alienated from the Court of Rome, "the Lombardo- Venetians felt released from, the rule which the Church exercised in other parts of the Italian peninsula over the actions of civil life and even in the sanctuary of the family." This they accepted as a com- pensation, but the concordat had taken it from them. He then alleged that the Treaty of Vienna, of 1 815, had given such power to Austria in Italy, as to destroy the equilibrium which formerly existed. But Austria had not even confined herself to these limits. Her intervention, her treaties, made the Duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany her fiefs. Then she had occupied a large portion of the Papal States. At this point he put forward a programme, which, he said, would in his belief at least temporarily solve the Italian question. It is well to observe the word " tempo- rarily." By that one word he reserved the power of 2 They were less than those of Piedmont. THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. 41 reopening the question at a more favourable opportunity, even if Austria and the other States had then accepted his proposals. These proposals were — that Austria should give to Lombardy and Venetia a separate administration : that her power should be strictly confined to these limits, and that even the advanced works of the fortress of Piacenza ^ should be demolished : that the Romagna should be evacuated : that the Dukes of Modena and Parma should be invited to give to their people constitutions like that of Piedmont : and that the Grand Duke of Tuscany should re-enact the constitution of 1848. Finally, that the Pope should give administrative independence to the pro- vinces beyond the Apennines, as Cavour himself had proposed in 1856. In the last week of February, Austria replied to this memorandum by a despatch addressed to her Ambassador in London. Count Buol alleged in his defence that a great State could not help having a certain amount of influence over the minor powers in her vicinity ; the real question was, did she abuse this influence } Austria had never intervened on her own initiative ; she had only acted when called upon to do so by the legitimate Governments of neighbouring States. He then urged on the part of Austria a number of complaints more or less well founded against the policy of Piedmont. He said that, in 1856-57, when the Emperor of Austria visited his Italian dominions, the Piedmontese press had hurled insults against him, and had even published a defence of regicide. Austria had pointed out that this state of things could not fail to destroy all good feeling between the Governments of Vienna and Turin, and had asked for some guarantee that it would not be renewed. Cavour spoke of this moderate request as a menacing attempt to force Sardinia to alter her institutions. This Count Buol disclaimed, but the Austrian charge d'affaires was withdrawn, " that he might no longer be the eye-witness of this abnormal state of things, which the Piedmontese Government declined to remedy." Never- ^ These forts had been constructed under a special convention with Sardinia. 42 THE MAKING OF ITALY, theless, Austria had continued in friendly relations with Piedmont, and had concluded commercial conventions with her. " Despite these good intentions," he went on, " despite our constant moderation, despite our inexhaustible patience, fanatical cries of war were shouted across the Ticino, espe- cially since the commencement of the present year/' Accordingly the Austrian army in Italy had been rein- forced. " This measure, dictated by the most common prudence, was one of a purely defensive character. . . . This is, in a few words, the present state of affairs. In all honour we ask what can we do to improve it } '' Then, alluding to the alleged discontent in Central and Southern Italy, Count Buol pointed cut that everything should not be charged upon the Governments. He did not mean to say they were perfect ; but they were doing their best in a very difficult time to govern well. He did not like the Piedmontese system. Liberty there verged upon license, and was a serious inconvenience at times to neighbouring States. '* We do not the less admit," he continued, " that Piedmont is the best judge of what system of government is best suited to her. But, however much we may respect her independence, we should not think ourselves justified in imposing on other Italian States a system of government, or pointing out the proper moment for introducing improve- ments of which that system might be susceptible. However this may be, the great argument brought forward against the Papal Government is that it is unable to support itself, and is obliged to rely upon foreign assistance." This, he said, was no longer true. Negotiations were in progress to put an end to the foreign occupation. This announcement, made by Count Buol at the end of his despatch, placed the Roman question on a new footing. The one point on which M. de Rayneval had said that the Roman Government was open to attack, was now closed. It was ready and anxious to dispense with the foreign occupation. On the 22nd of Februrary ^ Cardinal Antonelli had announced to the Ambassadors of France and Austria, that the Holy Father, while " full of gratitude for the aid ^ See Momteiij; February 27th, 1859. 777^ GATHERING OF THE STORM. 43 which up to that day had been given to him by their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria, thought it his duty to inform them that henceforth his Government was strong enough to suffice for its own security and for the maintenance of peace in his States, and that consequently the Pope declared himself ready to enter into an arrangement with the two Powers, in order, with the least possible delay, to consult for the simultaneous evacuation of his territory by the French and Austrian armies." Austria was willing to withdraw. The French policy, however, required an army in Rome, and accord- ingly the French occupation was prolonged long after that of Austria had ceased, for the course of events put an end to that occupation within a few months of this date. On the 5th of March, the Moniteur published one of those reassuring articles which are the most certain signs of coming war. In this article it was stated that the French Empire was pledged to defend Sardinia against any aggressive act on the part of Austria, but that the alliance went no farther than this. After this statement, coupled with the scarcely-veiled menaces of the semi- official pamphlet on Napoleon^s Italian policy, war was inevitable. There was only one more move in the diplo- matic game before the decisive conflict began. On March 2ist the Moniteur announced that Russia had proposed a Congress on the affairs of Italy. This Congress was to meet in some neutral city,' and France, Austria, England, Prussia and Russia, were to be repre- sented at it. France at once accepted the proposal ; the adhesions of England and Prussia were received on the 23rd. But already difficulties had been put in the way of the Congress meeting, by Cavour writing to D'Azeglio, the Sardinian minister in London, that Piedmont would de- mand a place in the Congress. On the 24th Austria gave her adhesion, subject to the one condition that Sardinia should disarm before the Congress met. This condition was a very natural one ; but from the outset the counter- ^ — " une ville neutre,'' an expression which properly could only be used when a state of war already existed. 44 THE MAKING OF ITALY. demands of Sardinia and Austria made the Congress impossible, and even if it had met, probably its only result would have been to delay the war till the middle of the summer. We have seen that Cavour had shown at Paris a certain want of sang-froid^ a precipitation in believing that he had already realized his schemes in his conversa- tion with Clarendon. Now when he was on the verge of success, he showed a want of confidence in his position, the natural result of his too sanguine and precipitate character. He was like a timid chess-player, whose cool- ness deserts him just at the moment when his combina- tions are leading up to a checkmate. He was informed from some source or another that the Emperor was wavering. He was seized with a fear that the Congress would give the ruler of France a means of evading his engagements, and that Piedmont was in danger of being abandoned by her powerful ally. Cavour hastened to Paris, and arrived there on the 27th. He thought only of immediate war, but the Emperor naturally hesitated, for really his army was upon a peace footing, though the arsenals were active and preparations for war were actually in progress, but not for war before the summer. Cavour misunderstood the Emperor. Arrivabene ^ tells us, that, after the first interview, he thought Napoleon was actually desirous of withdrawing from his position. At a second interview matters were completely changed, and before Cavour left Paris, on the 2nd of April, it had been decided that war should be declared upon the earliest pretext. Meanwhile the negotiations for the meeting of a Con- gress were slowly dragging on. Austria had proposed a general disarmament. England adopted the suggestion, and on April 21st the Moniteur published her proposals to the effect that a military and civil commission should meet to regulate the disarmament, and that, as soon as it had begun its labours, a Congress should assemble, in which the five Powers and the various Italian States should be represented, as in the Congress of Laybach in ^ " Italy under Victor Emmanuel : a personal narrative." THE GATHERING OF THE STORM, 45 1 82 1. At this moment Austria took a step which pre- cipitated the war. As early as the 7th of March, the National Italian Society had, through its Vice-President, Garibaldi, and its Secretary, La Farina, issued to the secret societies in Lombardy and Venetia instructions for an insurrection to take place immediately on the outbreak of war between Piedmont and Austria. Large bodies of volunteers had been collected, armed, and organized by General Cialdini, with the avowed object of war against Austria. About the middle of April Garibaldi was summoned to the palace at Turin. There he saw Victor Emmanuel, Farini and Cavour. The latter informed him that war was on the point of breaking out. " The patience of Count Buol," he said, " is nearly exhausted, and we are only awaiting the moment when he will have lost it altogether." Garibaldi was then offered, and formally accepted, the command of the free corps of volunteers, or Cacciatori degli AlpiJ The patience of Count Buol was indeed exhausted. He saw Sardinia arming, enrolling Garibaldians, exciting insurrection in Lombardy. He saw France behind her, quietly but rapidly preparing for war. He knew that war could not be avoided. Cavour's object had been, not to seek redress from Austria on any given point, but to force her to draw the sword. Buol knew this, and he knew equally well that a delay of even two or three months would place the enemies of Austria in a better position for the conflict. If there was to be a struggle, it was better to begin it at once. Prince William, the Regent of Prussia, had held bold language on the necessity of Germany's being united in presence of the attitude assumed by France. The Archduke Albert was sent to Berlin, to know if Prussia would join Austria in presenting an ultimatum to Piedmont, requiring her to disarm and disband the free corps. The Regent declined to take such a step. His action was, in fact, a prelude to the ^ Arrivabene, " Italy under Victor Emmanuel," vol. i. p. 7. He states that his account of this interview was given him by a gentleman who was present. Probably it was Farini. 46 THE MAKING OF ITALY. policy he afterwards pursued in concert with Prince Bis- marck. He was opposed to Austria, but he knew the minor States were with her. He therefore declared that he was as ready as anyone to maintain the integrity of the German Confederation, but he held aloof from taking any part with Austria in a quarrel about Italy. He was not sorry to see her receive a heavy blow on the Southern frontier, and he did not act till action was forced upon him, and until Solferino had been fought. When he received the Regent's answer, Buol determined that Aus- tria should act alone. Read in the light of after events, this resolution was a rash one. But had not the armies of Austria been directed by the Government of Vienna upon a false assumption of the character of the coming conflict, had boldness in diplomacy been seconded by equally vigorous action in the theatre of war, and had not a misguided interference with the commanders in the field destroyed more than one promising plan of opera- tions, men might now judge very differently the policy of the Emperor Francis Joseph and Count Buol on this occasion. On the 1 8th of April, the Baron de Kellersberg, a captain of the Austrian staff, left Vienna, as the bearer of an ultimatum to Piedmont. It was in the form of a letter from Count Buol to Cavour. The Imperial Government, said the Count, had accepted the proposal made by the court of St. Petersburg for a Congress on the affairs of Italy; but, as it was impossible for pacific deliberation to be carried on in the midst of preparations for war with any hope of a successful result, Austria had requested that the Sardinian army should be reduced to a peace footing, and the volunteer corps disbanded. In the event of a disarmament, England was willing to guarantee, in conjunction with France, the integrity of Sardinia. He regretted that this proposal had been rejected, as other- wise he would have been able to withdraw^ the extra troops concentrated in Lombardy ; and by order of the Emperor he now addressed this letter to the Piedmontese Government, in the hope of its reconsidering its decision. THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. 47 He required a distinct reply, yes or no, within three days. If there should be no reply, or should it be of an unsatis- factory character, the Emperor, having exhausted every means of securing peace to his people, would be forced to have recourse to arms. Such were the terms of the letter, which was formally presented to Cavour at Turin at half-past five on the afternoon of the 23rd of April. He already knew its contents, for they had been flashed all over Europe by the telegraph-wires on the 21st. No one doubted that the reply would be a direct refusal of the proposal to disarm. The letter was, in fact, regarded as a declaration of war, and the troops were already in motion. The French railways were crowded with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, rapidly concentrating on the frontier of Savoy ; and at Toulon and Marseilles the transports were embarking stores and materiel of war. The Sardinian Parliament had been prorogued for the Easter holidays. It was convoked by a hasty summons from Cavour, and met at noon on the 23rd, five hours before the Austrian ultimatum was presented. Cavour proposed, and the Chamber passed, a law conferring dicta- torial powers upon the king in the event of war with Austria, and suspending for the time not only the liberty of the press, but also the constitution with all its guarantees for the personal freedom of the individual. On the 25th the French troops were entering Savoy. Every hour was of importance if they were to reach Turin in time to save the Piedmontese from being overwhelmed by the rapid advance of the Austrian army, which, it was expected, would follow the declaration of war. At noon, a train containing two battalions of Canrobert's corps d^armee passed through Chambery en rozcte for St. Jean de Maurienne, where the railway ceased, and the two days' march over the Mont Cenis to Susa was to begin. At eight o'clock next morning the first French transports steamed into the roadstead of Genoa. That evening the town was blazing with lights. The streets were crowded with Frenchmen of the line. Zouaves, and Turcos, and 48 THE MAKING OF ITALY, resounded to shouts of " Viva la Francia I " — " Vive ritalie!'' The war had begun. Kellersberg was on his way to Pavia, bearing Cavour's reply to the Austrian ultimatum. After acknowledging the receipt of Count Buol's letter, Count Cavour said : — " The question of the disarmament of Sardinia, which constitutes the basis of the demand which you address to me, has been the subject of numerous negotiations between the Great Powers and the govern- ment of his Majesty. These negotiations have ended in a proposition made by England^ to which France, Prussia, and Russia have adhered. Sardinia, in a spirit of con- ciliation, accepted it without reserve or arriere pensee. As your Excellency cannot be ignorant either of the proposal of England or of the reply of Sardinia, I could not add anything to make known to you the intentions of the government of the king, as regards the difficulties attend- ing the assembling of a Congress. The conduct of Sardinia in these circumstances has been appreciated by Europe. Whatever the consequences may be, the king, my august master, is convinced that the responsibility will fall upon those who were the first to arm, who refused the proposals made by a great Power and deemed just and reasonable by others, and who now substitute a threatening summons in their stead." Such were the circumstances under which the war of 1859, and with it the Italian Revolution, began. Those who regard Austria as the aggressor should remember that she only anticipated an attack ; and there is no doubt that, had the negotiations been allowed to proceed farther, the only result would have been that the French Emperor would have had more time to perfect his arma- ments and increase his forces. The real aggressor was not Austria, but Piedmont, which, under the guidance of Cavour, had deliberately provoked the Imperial Govern- ment to take this decisive action. This was well pointed out by Lord Malmesbury, when, on the 5th of the following May, he rejected the French invitation to England to take part in the war as the ally of France. In a few well-chosen THE GATHERING OF THE STORM. 49 words he summed up the course of conduct by which Sardinia had repaid Austria for her forbearance after Novara. " By violating," he said, " her treaties of extra- dition with Austria : by fostering desertions from her army : by rallying in Piedmont the disaffected spirits of Italy : by menacing speeches against the Austrian Govern- ment : and by ostentatious declarations that she was ready to do battle against the power and influence of Austria, — Sardinia has invoked the storm, and is deeply responsible to the nations of Europe." 50 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. CHAPTER IV. THE FIGHT FOR LOMEARDY. In the following pages I shall briefly narrate the story of the campaign by which Lombardy was wrested from Austria. Later will be related the events which resulted from the war and occurred simultaneously with it in other parts of Italy. I shall thus sacrifice a strictly chrono- logical arrangement, in order to make the narrative more easily intelligible. Austria had begun the war upon a false assumption. The government at Vienna persisted in believing that the attack would come, as it had come in the earlier wars of the revolution, across the Rhine and into the upper valley of the Danube, with Vienna for its direct object. But, by doing this. Napoleon would have called all Germany to armiS on the side of Austria ; and Count Gyulai, who com- manded the Austrians in Italy, in vain protested that the whole attack must and would fall upon him, and begged without avail that some at least of the troops which were being uselessly massed upon the German frontiers of Austria, should be diverted to Italy. He told his govern- ment that he would have to deal with at least 60,000 Sardinians and 130,000 Frenchmen, and that his forces were insufficient for such a task. He was. informed that calculations made at Vienna on reliable data estimated the available French force that would appear in Piedmont at no more than 80,000 men ; and further reinforcements were refused to him,' while the war-office devoted its ^ See the Austrian official account of the war, published at Vienna under the direction of Baron Kuhn, who, as Colonel Kuhn, was chief of the staff to Gyulai in 1859, and has done something to set the military character of his old chief in a better light. THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD Y. 51 energies to preparing for a chimerical campaign in South Germany. The mih'tary operations were begun by the Austrian invasion of Piedmont. Gyulai had won distinction under Radetzki, in 1848. He had much of the traditional Austrian slowness, and his combinations were twice de- stroyed by ill-timed interference from Vienna. The plan, which he was now to execute, was a simple one. He was to make a rapid advance into Piedmont, strike at the Sardinians before the French could join them, and then, by seizing Turin, interpose between the two wings of the French army, one of which was advancing by the Pass of Mont Cenis, while the other was landing at Genoa and coming up to Alessandria. If he could execute this plan, he would be able to fall with superior numbers on whichever division of the French army he might choose to attack. The forces at his disposal consisted of five corps d'armee^ the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th. Two other corps garrisoned the fortresses, and secured the possession of Lombardy. Without including these, the five corps massed on the Ticino amounted to 92,420 men, with 11,000 cavalry and 352 guns. The corps' commanders were — Prince Lichten- stein of the 2nd, Prince Schwartzenburg of the 3rd, Count Stadion of the 5th, Baron Zobel of the 7th, and General Benedek of the 8th. The Sardinian army numbered about 60,000 men. From this had to be deducted the garrisons of Alessandria and Casale, and minor detachments at other points ; so that, at most, only 50,000 men would be available to oppose the Austrian advance. A position had been selected before the war for making a stand against such an invasion. It lay along the right bank of the Dora Baltea, an Alpine stream which flows into the Po a few miles below Turin. The ground had been entrenched by the Sardinian engineers, but it was badly chosen. Its centre was weak, and though its right rested securely on the Po, it could easily be turned on the left by following the road from Vercelli to Ivrea, and then turning southward along the Turin road. It might, therefore, be regarded as certain £ 2 52 THE MAKING OF ITALY. that, if the Austrians only displayed sufficient activity, they would have no difficulty in reaching Turin. On the 1st of May they had completed the passage of the Ticino. On that day all the troops of the ist French corps had arrived at Genoa, the 3rd was at Susa and passing through Turin en route for Alessandria, the 4th crossing the Alps. Instead of moving forward as rapidly as possible, Gyulai advanced as slowly as if he were executing a mere military promenade. On the 2nd, Zobel's corps occupied Vercelli ; but it was not until the 7th that the Austrians passed the Sesia in force. Meanwhile demonstrations were made along the Po at Valenza, Frasinetto and Casale, and an Austrian detach- ment, crossing the river at Cornale, advanced as far as Tortona, and retired after blowing up the railway-bridge of Pontecurone. Up to the 4th the weather had been fine and warm. On that day heavy rains began throughout all the north of Italy, and continued, with intervals of fine weather, to the end of the campaign. The rivers rose rapidly, and in many places overflowed their banks ; in others the Pied- montese laid the country under water by artificial means. Gyulai had let the fine weather pass ; the 4th should have seen him on the Dora Baltea. His troops were now toiling slowly along the miry roads under the drenching rain. On the 8th, Ivrea was in sight, and the advanced troops reported that the position on the Dora Baltea had been abandoned. A week before, the Piedmontese, by the advice of Niel and Canrobert, had withdrawn to Ales- sandria,, where the French army was concentrating. Gyulai was within one day^s march of Turin. There was no garrison in the Sardinian capital, and between it and the Austrians there were only a few regiments of cavalry. But Gyulai first hesitated, then abandoned his plan at the very moment when its successful accomplishment was within his grasp, and began a retreat to the Ticino. He had heard that the French were about to attack Pia- cenza, he knew there was a strong force massed about Casale and Alessandria on the flank of his line of advance, THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD V. s^ and he feared for his communications. He withdrew to the district between the Sesia and the Ticino, where he con- centrated his forces on the system of roads which unite at Mortara, and stood on the defensive awaiting the first movement of the allies. Various and contradictory accounts have been given of the reception which the Austrians met with on their entry into Piedmont, and during the invasion. According to the correspondent of the Tz7nes with the Austrian army, the troops were well received. When the Sesia overflowed its banks, the Piedmontese peasantry voluntarily gave their assistance to prevent the loss the inundation would other- wise have caused to the invading army. " This circum- stance," writes the correspondent, " clearly proves how untrue are the statements made about the animosity of the Italians against the Austrians. I have myself been only three days in Piedmont on this occasion, but I have already ridden nearly a hundred and forty miles, and stopped at every village, and to an Englishman the natives would not conceal their feelings. I can assure you that their anger is all against their own government, not for this war merely, but for the whole policy of overloading them with taxes, such as our exploded window-tax and a tax on carriages, for the purpose of keeping up an army beyond the wants of the country. I speak of the peasantry • the burghers and lawyers may think differently. When the Austrians arrived at a certain town, the inhabitants re- proached them much for not coming a fortnight earlier. Expecting them, they said, they had made every excuse to delay providing their quota of the reserve of the army. The Piedmontese had carried off nearly all the horses and provisions from this part of the country. At Stroppiana they even carried off the women to work at Casale. The Austrians sent provisions for the starving inhabitants left there.'' On the other hand, it was asserted that the country people could not be induced, either by threats or promises, to give the Austrians any information as to the movements of the allies. But it seems very probable that they gave 54 THE MAKING OF ITALY. no information, simply because they had none to give ; for, during the advance on Turin and the subsequent retreat, all the allied troops were miles away on the other side of the Po. On the pth, when Gyulai began his retreat to the Sesia, the Piedmontese army occupied the right bank of the Po, from Casale to Valenza. The 3rd French corps, and part of the 4th, had arrived at Alessandria from Mont Cenis. The ist and 2nd had landed at Genoa, and were coming up through the Apennines to Alessandria, their advanced troops being near Novi. The Imperial Guard was landing at Genoa, and following the march of these two corps. Though nearly all the French infantry had reached the theatre of war, the cavalry and artillery were still far from complete, and for ten days after guns and horses were being landed at Genoa. The numbers of the infantry were on a peace footing, none of the battalions being stronger than 800 men ; and even at Solferino many of the regiments were incomplete. Such was one of the results of the sudden declaration of the war. The Emperor did not leave Paris till the army of Italy was ready to receive him. He arrived at Genoa on the 12th of May, and reached the head-quarters at Alessandria on the following day. Meanwhile Count Gyulai was in utter ignorance of the numbers, the position, and the movements of the allies. Italian patriotism is not in all cases of such a high order as to be inaccessible to pecuniary considerations, and Gyulai had money enough at his command to establish correspondence with half the cities of Piedmont ; yet, strange to say, he had no spies. In this perplexity he decided upon the worst of all possible ways of procuring information, a reconnaisance in force. This operation con- sists of an advance, against one or more points of the enemy's line, only serious enough to compel him to show his strength. When it is ascertained, the attacking troops retire. Now the disadvantage of such a manoeuvre is, that the retreat of the troops, even if the reconnaisance be suc- cessful, is sure to damp their ardour and impress them with THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD Y. 55 the idea of defeat ; while it has the corresponding effect of encouraging the enemy, who will be certain to claim the engagement as a victory. Believing that Napoleon was massing his troops to the right about Voghera for an attack on his own left at Pia- cenza, Gyulai assembled on the south bank of the Po_, below Pavia, a force of about 20,000 men and sixteen guns,^ and placed ifunder the command of Count Stadion, order- ing him to advance against the French right and threaten Voghera, so as to compel the enemy to display whatever force he had in that neighbourhood. Voghera stands in a narrow tract of flat country, between the lower spurs of the Apennines and the River Po. The ground is divided into small rice-fields, and cut up by ditches and canals, so that troops can only move by the roads. In front of Voghera, near Montebello, lay General Forey's infantry and ten squadrons of Piedmontese cavalry, the whole force being about 7000 strong. About noon, on May 20th, the Austrians came in con- tact with the French, and the first battle of the war began. Fighting in the close country which I have described, Stadion soon found that he could only bring a portion of his force into action, and Forey, notwithstanding his inferiority in numbers, was able to meet the Austrians with equal or almost equal forces, on the few roads by which they could advance.^ By three o'clock the Austrians had lost all the ground they had won by driving back the weak French outposts in the beginning of the day. They retired to the village of Montebello, a long street of red-tiled cottages with an old church and walled cemetery, standing on a spur of the 2 Nine battalions of the 5th corps, two of the 8th, six of the 9th, six squadrons of cavalry and two batteries. 3 The forces actually in contact at the various stages of the action were estimated at : — French. Austrians, On the French left at Oriolo ... 1600 ... 4700 At Cascina Nuova 4000 ... 2400 At Genestrello 5000 ... 3500 At Montebello 8200 ... 9400 56 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. hills. Supported by the artillery and covered by clouds of skirmishers, one. French brigade rushed up the long bare slope in front of the village ; while another, ascending the hills, came down upon it from the higher ground on the Austrian left. The French penetrated into the village house after house was stormed, and at length, at half-past six, the Austrians held only the churchyard. Then Stadion, believing, as he afterwards reported to Gyulai, that he had fully 40,000 men in his front, drew off his forces, leaving a few prisoners and some empty ammuni- tion waggons in the hands of the French. Both sides had lost from 1200 to 1500 men. The result of the battle was that, thanks to the gallant stand made by Forey, Gyulai believed that the French were really massed in great force about Voghera ; while the actual fact was that Napoleon was just then arranging his movement against the Austrian right. Three days before the battle of Montebello, the con- centration of the allied armies was completed. Their line extended along the right bank of the Po, from Casale to Voghera. The Piedmontese occupied the left at Casale, where they had a fortified railway-bridge over the Po. Next to them was the 4th corps (Niel) at Valenza. Be- tween Valenza and Voghera lay the 2nd corps (MacMahon), while the country round Voghera was occupied by the 1st (Baraguay d'Hilliers). In the second line, as it were, lay the Imperial Guard at Alessandria, and the 3rd corps of Canrobert at Tortona. A railway, running from Casale by Alessandria and Tortona to Voghera, linked together all the points of this extended line of between forty and fifty miles, which was held by 100,000 French and 50,000 Sardinians, with 400 guns. Two other railways stretched away from Alessandria to Mont Cenis, and by Novi through the Apennines to Genoa ; and by these the French received their reinforcements and supplies. The Emperor had three courses of action open to him. He might attack the Austrian left, centre, or right. The Austrians fronted him along the opposite bank of the Po. The Sesia covered their right, and was watched by the THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD Y. 57 7th corps (Zobel). The 8th (Benedek) was opposite Valenza, and the Sth (Stadion) opposite Voghera. Behind these were the 2nd (Lichtenstein) ; and the 3rd (Schwartz- enburg) at San Giorgio and Garlasco, where Gyulai had his head-quarters. On the left, the 9th corps (Schaffgotsche) occupied the right bank of the Po, in front of the fortress of Piacenza, and observed the long defile between the mountains and the river, in which Montebello had been fought, and through which the French would have to advance if they attempted to turn the Austrian left. The Emperor thus had in his front six Austrian corps, amount- ing in all to an effective force of 120,000 men, with 480 guns ; but they were far less closely concentrated than the allied army, as their line from the Sesia to Piacenza ex- tended over upwards of sixty miles. Their communications with their base in the Quadrilateral lay along the roads running thronjgh Milan^ Lodi and Crema. The first of these roads might be at any moment rendered unavailable by an insurrection like that of 1848. The position of the Austrians was undoubtedly a strong one ; and had they been commanded by a determined soldier like Radetzski, instead of the weak, vacillating Gyulai, the hills of Solferino would never have seen the tricolours of France and Sardinia. If Napoleon moved against their left at Piacenza, the Austrian 9th corps would have barred his advance through the narrow defile, just as Forey stopped the corps of Stadion at Montebello, and meanwhile Gyulai's main army would have poured across the Po by the fortified bridges below Pavia, cut him off from his communications with Genoa and Turin, and fallen upon his rear. If he attacked on the centre he would have to cross a broad river in the face of the enemy ; but in this case, while victory would secure him the possession of Milan, defeat would not involve the loss of his com- munications and the destruction of his army. As it was, he chose the third course. Fearing failure in an attempt against the Austrian centre, he resolved to move his army rapidly by the bridge of Casale across the Po to the right bank of the Sesia, and then, crossing that river at Vercelli, 58 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. move round the Austrian right by Novara, in the hope of reaching Milan without a battle. This movement, though in the actual event it was successful, really, as we shall see, risked everything upon a single cast of the die. At the same time it must be acknowledged that, once it was decided upon, the Emperor executed his plan with all the skill of a practised general, though it was the first time that he attempted to reduce the theories studied at Thun and Arenenberg to practice in the field. On the 20th, Cialdini's Piedmontese division occupied Vercelli, and on the two following days there was some skirmishing of little importance between the Austrian and Piedmontese outposts along the Sesia. It was not yet, however, that the flank movement of the French army began. Meanwhile, in order to confirm Gyulai in his expectation of an attack upon his left, a feint was made against Piacenza. On the 28th, the trains on the Tortona- Casale railway began to convey Canrobert's corps to Casale, while all the other corps marched along the roads, except the ist, which remained on the right at Voghera to mask the movement until next day, when it followed the rest of the army, breaking up the roads, and destroying the bridges behind it as it retired, to delay a possible advance of the Austrians from the left, which, however, never took place. Gyulai still knew nothing of his antagonist's movements, and remained on the defen- sive. In order to cover the movement from Casale to Vercelli and the passage of the Sesia, it was resolved to throw forward the Piedmontese against the Austrian right, so as to occupy both banks of the river, and drive back the enemy's outposts. This movement would not necessarily undeceive Gyulai, as he knew the Piedmontese formed the allied left, and their advance might only be a diversion intended to distract his attention from the more important attack he expected elsewhere. This advance of the Pied- montese led to the two days' fighting known as the battle of Palestro. It was the only engagement in the war in which the Italians had the chief, share of the fighting, and THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD V. 59 at the time much was made of their success. Let us see what it was really worth. On May 29th, the divisions of Fanti, Durando, Castel- borgo and Cialdini, in all upwards of 40,000 men with 60 guns, were concentrated at Vercelli, Nine miles to the eastward, at Robbio, were the head-quarters of Lillia's division of the 7th Austrian corps, and his outposts occu- pied Palestro, four miles distant on the Vercelli road, and the village of Vinzaglio, in the fields to the north of it. Each village was held by an Austrian battalion and two guns — about 2000 men in all. The reliefs coming up after the action began doubled the force of the defenders ; but still, without counting the Piedmontese reserves, the battle was five to one. At 3 p.m. on the 30th, Cialdini attacked Palestro, and Durando advanced against Vinzaglio, while the corps of P'anti and Castelborgo attempted, by a flank march, to cut off the Austrian retreat. The Austrians made a desperate resistance in the villages. The fighting was not over till half-past six. Of course the Italians, thanks to their overwhelming numbers, carried both places. The Austrians made good their retreat to Robbio, saving two guns. Their loss was about 300 men ; that of the Italians was probably heavier.** Such was the first battle of Palestro. All the glory of the day certainly remained with the Austrians. During the action Canrobert had moved his corps up to the right bank of the Sesia, opposite Palestro, and began to make a bridge over the river, it being intended that he should cross and support Victor Emmanuel in an attempt upon Robbio. Next morning, however, it was found that the Austrians had assumed the offensive. Zobel had rashly decided on attempting to recover the ground lost on the preceding day, though the force at his disposal for the attack on the Piedmontese army only consisted of two brigades of his own corps, the 7th, and two brigades of the 2nd corps, which Lichtenstein had sent up to his assis- ^ The French official report says the Piedmontese had suffered '* des pertes sensibles^'" even before they penetrated into Palestro. 6o THE MAKING OF ITALY. tance by a forced march of fifteen miles. Altogether he had not more than 19,000 men and 32 guns, or about half the force opposed to him. At 10 a.m., Weigl's brigade (4000 men and 8 guns) attacked Confienza, on the Piedmontese right, which was held by Fanti with 10,000 men and 18 guns. After a sharp fight the assailants were beaten off, Weigl, who himself was wounded in the arm, effecting his retreat to Robbio with but little loss. Meanwhile Zobel had directed his main attack against Palestro, where Dondorf's brigade was to attack Cialdini in front, while Szabo's crossed a bridge over a canal to attack his right. The 4th Austrian brigade (Kudleka) was held in reserve. Here again superior numbers were on the Italian side, two Austrian brigades, or about 9000 men and 16 guns, being opposed to Cialdini's division of 10,000 men and 12 guns, effectually supported by the French. Dondorf, driving in Cialdini's first line, pushed close up to Palestro, while the leading battalion of Szabo's brigade and his eight guns crossed the canal on the right. Can- robert was watching this movement from the other bank of the Sesia, and his guns opened fire upon the Austrians with such effect that Szabo was unable to bring up the rest of his troops to the bridge. Seeing that the advanced battalion was thus isolated, the 3rd Zouaves, plunging into a narrow branch of the Sesia, forded it, and finding their ammunition was spoilt by the water, attacked the Austrians with the bayonet. Victor Emmanuel, in per- son, brought up two Piedmontese regiments to the aid of the Zouaves, and the Austrians, unable to hold their ground or regain the bridge, were driven into the canal, losing 500 men. The eight guns were left stuck in the muddy bank, and were carried off next day by the Zouaves. By the repulse of Szabo, Dondorf found himself left alone in front of Cialdini's corps, and soon had to re- linquish his attack on Palestro. Kudleka attempted to advance against the village, but his progress was stopped by a stream too deep to be forded, and he had to retire THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARDY. 6i without effecting anything. About half-past two the Austrians ceased firing and drew off to Robbio. Thus the great victory of Palestro resolves itself into an action in which Zobel rashly attacked Victor Emmanuel with a force equal to less than half the Piedmontese army, and of this force he was only able to bring into action the brigades of Dondorf and Weigl and one battalion of Szabo's, in all at most 10,000 men, equal to a single Piedmontese division. It must be remembered, too, that the operation which decided the day — the repulse of Szabo's brigade — was the work of Canrobert's artillery and the bayonets of the 3rd Zouaves, supported by two Italian regiments, who never crossed bayonets with the Austrians. The Austrian official report states their loss at the battle of Palestro, including those drowned in the canal, at 528 killed^ 902 wounded, and 780 missing — in all 2210 men. Of the Italian loss there is no ofificial record. The Zouaves in their charge lost 46 killed, 229 wounded, and 20 missing, supposed to have rolled into the canal. The Piedmontese were now established on the left bank of the Sesia. The French army was concentrated round Vercelli ready to cross the river, and the great flank march on Milan was really begun, the troops passing the Sesia corps after corps, and moving along the road by Novara towards San Martino, where they were to cross the Ticino and advance on Milan. On the 31st, the Austrians for the first time became aware of the Emperor's intentions. That night Zobel's outposts heard through the still air the continual working of engines and rumbling of trains along the line from Casale to Vercelli ; it was evident that a great concentra- tion of troops was taking place along the Sesia. Next morning his cavalry, thrown out towards the Novara road, reported that masses of French troops were crossing at Vercelli and moving along it. Zobel had shown at Palestro that he was only too anxious to fight, and he sent the information he had collected to Gyulai at Mortara, together with a request that he might be authorized to concentrate the three corps on the 62 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Austrian right, and attempt to check the French ad- vance. Gyulai, however, gave no orders to that effect ; on the contrary, he pursued the same slow, hesitating course of action which had distinguished him since the campaign began. Not only he, but every officer in his army, must have known the advantages of the position in which he stood, for it was almost the same as that of Radetzski after he passed the Ticino in 1849. There were the Austrian corps holding the positions about Mortara, on which Radetzski had directed his march against Charles Albert. There were the French moving slowly along the Novara road, their line of communications exposed as it lay from the extreme right by Vercelli to Turin. It is true that to a certain extent this line was covered by the Piedmontese army and Canrobert's corps at Robbio ; but this was only introducing another element of weakness into the position of the allies, for it was dividing their forces. Thus it was not until the evening of the 3rd, that the allies were concentrated at Novara with their advanced corps upon the Ticino. Up to that time the Piedmontese and Canrobert's corps about Robbio were divided by a full day's march from the main body of the French army about Novara. If then Gyulai, on receiving Zobel's message on the morning of the ist, had assumed a vigorous offensive, he might have concentrated the five corps at his disposal (2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th), and leaving the third corps on his right to observe the French, he, at latest on the morning of June 3rd, at the head of 90,000 men could have fallen like a thunderbolt upon Canrobert and the Piedmontese, and driven them back upon Vercelli. Then, the occupation of the Vercelli Novara road would have made him master of the French communications. The French Emperor would have found himself in a worse position than Charles Albert in 1849, shut in between the Austrians on the one hand and the neutral ground of Switzerland on the other, and a second Novara might have anticipated the disaster of Sedan. THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD Y. 63 But Gyulai let the opportunity slip. His great object now was to reach the Ticino before the French. He ordered a concentration on Vigevano, and the hostile armies might be seen moving by parallel roads to cross the same river, the French at San Martino and Turbigo, the Austrians at Vigevano and lower down at Bereguardo ; while in front of the French at Magenta the first Austrian corps of Clam Gallas had been hurried up to dispute the passage, not of the river, but of the wide canal which lay beyond it. Even yet, however, the position of affairs offered repeated advantages to the Austrians. On the 4th, the 2nd corps had crossed the Ticino at Turbigo, and driven the Austrian detachment out of that town. The Piedmontese were following them ; the Imperial Guard was at San Martino, while the three remaining corps, the ist, 3rd, and 4th, were isolated from the rest at Novara. Had Gyulai chosen to operate on the right bank of the Ticino, it would have been quite possible for him to attack them with all his five corps, and the defeat would have cut off the Im- perial Guard and the troops that had crossed at Turbigo. In other words the allied army would have been utterly ruined. The plan Gyulai had adopted was to make a rapid march to Magenta, and, joining Clam Gallas there, fight a battle for the possession of Lombardy. On the 3rd, MacMahon had established himself on the left bank of the Ticino after a short engagement with the Austrians. On the same day their outposts abandoned the bridge of San Martino after failing to blow it up, and the Imperial Guard took possession of it. Meanwhile Gyulai had crossed lower down. But on this day an event occurred, which has never yet been properly explained, and which had the effect of deranging his plans. Gyulai was at the bridge of Bereguardo, when Count Hess, an envoy of the Emperor Francis Joseph, arrived at his head-quarters and had an interview with him. Hess had been the right-hand man of Radetzski : he therefore possessed enormous influence in the Austrian army, which he now exerted to alter Gyulai's plans. He brought 64 THE MAKING OF ITALY. orders drawn up at Vienna, which he imposed upon Gyulai. The incident had the worst possible effect upon the course of action already adopted ; for Gyulai stopped the march of three of his corps, which otherwise would have been in line at Magenta in time for the battle next day. The village of Magenta stands at a distance of two and a half miles from the left bank of the Ticino at the bridge of San Martino. Between the village and the bridge, about a mile distant from the latter, there is an embank- ment fifty feet high and about two hundred yards wide, Marcallo with steep bushy sides. Behind it runs a rapid canalized stream, known as the Naviglio Grande. At the time, the ground between the embankment and the river consisted of low-lying fields of rice and corn, intersected by ditches and rows of willows, and in many places flooded knee- deep. From the bridge of San Martino two roads and a railway-hne diverge, and, entering the embankment by narrow cuttings, cross the canal, and traversing the level plain beyond, reunite at the large village of Magenta. Taking them from north to south, the first road crosses the canal at Buffalora. Half a mile lower down, the THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD Y. 65 second bridge crosses at the hamlet of Ponte Nuovo. Three hundred yards farther on is the railway-bridge ; and a little beyond that a country road crosses the canal at the bridge and hamlet of Ponte Vecchio. Still further down, but outside the limits of the battle-field, there are two bridges at the village of Robecco. Northward of the road from Buffalora to Magenta, is a flat country traversed by numerous roads, with scattered villages. It was across this tract that MacMahon, with the 2nd corps, was ad- vancing from Turbigo. On the morning of the 4th, the 1st Austrian corps of Clam Gallas formed a weak line of battle, beginning a httle to the north of Magenta at the village of Marcallo, running thence to Buffalora, and then turning southward along the line of the embankment and canal, of which it guarded the bridges. This line thus formed an acute angle with its apex at Buffalora, one side of the angle facing the line of MacMahon's advance, the other looking towards the French advanced guard at San Martino. Within the angle were his reserves ; and Gyulai's army, with the 2nd and 7th corps in front, was hurrying up along the roads on both sides of the canal to support him. Such was the position which the French had to force on that eventful Saturday, June 4th, 1859. At eight in the morning, Wimpfenn's grenadier division of the Imperial Guard left Trecate. At half-past nine they had passed the bridge of San Martino, and their skirmishers were engaging the Austrian outposts under the willows in the swampy fields. An hour after, D'Angely, the commander of the Guard, came up and stopped this useless fighting. About eleven a carriage drove over the bridge, surrounded by an escort and a brilliant staff. The Em- peror alighted from it, mounted his horse, and rode to a point on the Ponte Nuovo road, where he remained during the battle. The Zouaves and grenadiers of the Guard stood massed in column along the two roads and the railway line. In front, among the bushes of the embankment, might be seen here and there the white coats and shining rifle- F 66 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. barrels of the Austrians awaiting the attack. But no one moved. Now and then the Emperor and his officers looked out towards Bufifalora. The plain beyond was hidden by the canal banks, but they hoped to see the white clouds rising from it, and to hear the sound of a cannonade, indicating that MacMahon had begun his attack in that direction, when the Guard would be sent forward against the bridges of the canal. But the air was clear, and no sound that could be taken for the noise of distant battle broke the hot stillness of the summer morning. Hours passed in this inaction. The leading divisions of two fresh corps had joined the Austrians. The Piedmontese army, dispatched early in the morning to assist MacMahon, was crossing the Ticino high up at Turbigo. The Emperor was becoming anxious. It is certain that he did not know on which side of the river the main body of the Austrians lay. He feared an attack on his rearward corps along the Novara road, and he saw the day slowly passing without any sign of Mac- Mahon's advance. It was two o'clock. The sharp rattle of a hot skirmishing fire was heard beyond Buffalora. MacMahon had been engaged with the Austrian outposts two hours before, and he was now driving them in upon the village. His artillery had not yet come into action, and up to that moment the fire of his skirmishers had been too distant to be heard by the Emperor and his staff. Even yet Mac- Mahon was not seriously engaged ; only his Turcos, following the retiring Austrians and carried away by their enthusiasm, had made a desperate attempt to storm the village of Bufifalora single-handed. The Emperor, hearing their fusilade, gave orders to the Guard to attack the bridges. As they advanced, the heavy reports of the guns of the 2nd corps were heard for the first time, and the smoke began to rise from the high ground beyond Bufifalora. Running or wading across the muddy fields, scrambling through the ditches, the Guards rushed forward, and hurled them- selves against the huge embankment under a hail of THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD V. 67 bullets and grapeshot. At first the attack failed. The steep slope of the bank was strewn with dead and wounded, and the Austrians held their own on every point ; while, to add to the anxiety of the moment, Canrobert's corps, which was expected from Trecate, had not yet appeared at San Martino, having been delayed for three hours on the Novara road encumbered as it was with the baggage of the army. But now the tide of fortune turned. The leading battalions of Canrobert's corps came in sight, and a partial success crowned the heroic efforts against the bridges. At Buffalora the grenadiers drove the Austrians out of the houses on the western side of the canal, and pressed on after them to the bridge in the centre of the village. There the pursuit was checked by a discharge of grape and musketry from the houses and streets on the opposite bank. Covered by the fire, the fugitives rushed over the little bridge, and the next moment a mine in one of the arches exploded, leaving a wide gap in the roadway. Nothing daunted, the grenadiers brought up some planks to the bridge, and, under the Austrian fire, tried to lay them across the gap ; and it was not until two of their officers and several men had been killed, that they gave up the attempt. In the centre the grenadiers cleared the railway-line of Austrians, and carried the railway bridge, while General Clery led the Zouaves of the Guard against the bridge of Ponte Nuovo, and they stormed it and the houses beyond, losing their gallant leader, who was shot down in the midst of the fight. Emboldened by his success. General D'Angely, with the Zouaves, grenadiers^ and chasseurs of the Guard, and two guns, attempted to drive the Austrians from the vineyards beyond the canal ; but these vineyards were lined with riflemen supported by strong reserves, and the French were beaten off with fearful loss, one of their guns falling into the hands of the Austrians, while the position they had won on the canal was endangered by the masses which Gyulai directed to his left. About the same time MacMahon's cannonade ceased, F 2 68 THE MAKING OF ITALY. and it seemed to the Emperor, who could have no direct communication with him, that he had been defeated. The truth was that he had suspended his attack to wait for one of his divisions, which had failed to join him yet, though it was nearly four o'clock. Moreover, the Piedmontese, who were to support him, were not even near the field. The general impression in the French army at the time was that Victor Emmanuel felt slighted at being sent to support the attack of a French general, thinking this an unworthy because a subordinate position. However this may be, the French attack had ceased on the Austrian right, and had been repulsed on the left ; and Gyulai telegraphed to Vienna that the battle was won. The Emperor's position was indeed a serious one. For all he knew, MacMahon was defeated. The Guards had only won two of the bridges^ and had just suffered a severe repulse beyond them ; while on his flank, between the canal and the river, masses of the enemy were seen moving up from Robecco. He sent aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to hurry up the 4th corps of Niel from Trecate, and the 3rd from San Martino, while he reinforced the Guard with a single battalion of grenadiers, which he had at his disposal. For three quarters of an hour the Guards repulsed every attack of the Austrian army. Then a division of the 3rd corps came into action, and was partly directed against the Austrian s coming up between the canal and the river (they had now got as far as Ponte Vecchio) ; while a few battalions were sent to aid the Guard in the desperate defence of the bridges they had won. At the same time the division of Espinasse joined Mac- Mahon, and he renewed his attack. In the Austrian centre he assailed Buffalora. As the two bridges lower down were in the hands of the French, the garrison was in danger of being cut off at any moment ; they therefore evacuated the village, while, on MacMahon's left, Espi- nasse drove the Austrians out of the village of Marcallo. It was now past six o'clock. The battle had raged for more than four hours. Gyulai's troops held the large THE FIGHT FOR LOMBARD Y. 69 village of Magenta, where the church, the cemetery, the railway station, and every house and street were crowded with soldiers. From Magenta his line extended to Ponte Vecchio on the left, and Corbetta on the right. The Piedmontese were coming up by Marcallo, too late to render any further assistance than sending a few guns and a single regiment of bersaglieri into action. In front of Magenta crowded the dark columns of MacMahon's corps, advancing brigade after brigade to the attack. On the railway thirty-nine guns were massed, and opened upon the line linking the Austrian centre and left. A storm had been gathering over the battle-field, and it now burst forth in all its fury. The lightning flashed across the sky, while the roar of the thunder seemed to answer the cannonade below, and the rain descended in torrents. On the embankment of the canal at Ponte Vecchio and among the houses of the little village, the 3rd and 4th corps were engaged in a close hand-to-hand struggle with the 3rd Austrian corps of Schwartzenburg. The fight surged backwards and forwards. Now the Austrians drove back the French ; now they lost the village and blew up the bridge ; again they regained the lost ground, only to lose it again. But it was at Magenta that the fight raged the hottest. There, in the narrow streets, in the gardens and enclosures, among the white-washed, red-roofed houses, under the loop-holed walls of the cemetery, Austrian and Frenchman, jager and Zouave, fought bayonet to bayonet ; while from roofs and windows a sharp fire poured down upon the combatants below. A volume might be written on the storming of Magenta, so many were the tales told at the time of the desperate courage displayed upon either side. From seven till eight the fight continued on the French right at Ponte Vecchio, and on the left in the hotly disputed village of Magenta. Slowly the red sunset deepened into twilight, and under its shade the Austrians drew off to the positions which they were to occupy for the night. Still, as the darkness gathered, the crash of rifles rang out from the houses of Magenta, as here and there a handful of 70 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Austrians fought to the death in defence of some post of vantage. It was late when the last shot was fired and silence fell. Along the fields, from Robecco to beyond Corbetta, blazed the watchfires of the Austrian bivouacs. Those of the French illumined with their flickering light the ground they had won from Magenta along the railway to San Martino, where the Emperor spent the night. A crescent moon looked down from a clear sky. Here and there along the field flashed the lanterns of the fatigue-parties, who were already collecting the wounded ; for, heaped in the villages and scattered over the fields, ten thousand Austrians and Frenchmen lay wounded, dying or dead. ^t CHAPTER V. MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO. The morning of Sunday, June 5th, broke clear and fine. The Emperor had spent an anxious night. At the end of the battle he had found his army in almost inextricable confusion, the fighting in the villages and in the close country having mingled together whole battalions and regiments. His best troops^ those of the Imperial Guard and MacMahon's tried African battalions, had suffered heavily. The Austrian right, the corps of Clam Gallas, had been crushed, it is true, but the rest of their army was intact, and still held the ground about Robecco and one of the bridges of the canal, so that it could act by either bank. He had every reason to believe that the battle of the day before would be renewed. Morning had hardly dawned, when some troops on the extreme left of the Austrians attacked Trochu's division near Ponte Vecchio, nor did they desist until they had inflicted on him a loss of over two hundred men. Gyulai had, indeed, intended to renew the engagement ; but, finding that his ist and 2nd corps were already in full retreat and far from the field, he re- luctantly gave orders for a general retreat of the whole army. Before further following the fortunes of the war, I must note some of the minor incidents, which preceded the battle of Magenta, and had no influence on that part of the campaign, though they were contemporary with it. Garibaldi had been the first of the Allied generals to enter Lombardy. With between three and four thousand volunteers, he had crossed the Ticino near the Lago Maggiore, on the night of the 23rd to the 24th of May. He occupied Varese, between the lakes Maggiore and Como, and on the 26th defeated a weak Austrian detach- ment at Sesto Calende. Next day his main body at 72 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. Varese was attacked by the Austrian division of General Urban ; but Garibaldi had barricaded the town, and held it successfully. On the following day he captured S. Fermo, and the same evening entered Como. But Urban was now advancing again in two columns, having been largely reinforced. His object was to drive Garibaldi into the country between the two lakes, and force him to sur- render or retire into Switzerland. On the night from the 30th to the 31st of May, Garibaldi attempted a coup de main at the Fort of Lavino, on the Lago Maggiore, held by four hundred Austrians. He was repulsed with great loss, and in the morning determined to retire to Varese, but he learned that it was occupied by one of Urban's columns, while the other was at Sesto Calende. Retreat and advance were alike cut ofif, he was caught in a trap, and his career as a Sardinian general would have closed on the 2nd of June, had not Urban received from Gyulai orders to join the main army immediately, as the Allies were advancing in force. Freed from the pressing peril. Garibaldi successfully resumed his guerilla warfare in the skirts of the Alpine country. Throughout the rest of the campaign he was continually on the left and a little in advance of the Allies, and thus secured them from any chance of surprise on that flank. On the ist of June the French began their operations in the Adriatic, and a strong fleet blockaded Venice. We now return to Gyulai's army. So well had the Italian committees done their work, that at the first news of the battle of Magenta the population of Milan showed unmistakable signs of insurrection. The garrison hastily evacuated the citadel, and joined in the general retreat. Pavia, too, was abandoned, the fortifica- tions being rapidly dismantled and the guns removed. But the Austrians retreated slowly; the French pursuit was still slower. It was not till the 7th that MacMahon's corps was in Milan. The people had estab- lished a provisional government and a national guard ; perfect order prevailed in the city ; and when the Allied army made their entry into the capital of Lombardy, they were received with the wildest enthusiasm. MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO. 73 But by this time the Austrians had regained heart and spirit. Something of Gyulai's determination to renew the struggle at the first opportunity had communicated itself to his men ; and, with the aid of Colonel Kuhn, he elaborated a plan for turning suddenly upon his pursuers. The Emperor Francis Joseph had arrived at Verona, to take the supreme command of his armies in Italy. From his head-quarters he had telegraphed to Gyulai, telling him that he might retire behind the Adda, but that if he saw an opportunity of immediately retrieving affairs, he should not neglect it. This allowed him complete liberty of action. The French were advancing from Milan, partly to the eastward, partly to the southward, in a very loose array. His cavalry kept him perfectly informed of their move- ments, and he determined, on the 8th, to concentrate his corps towards Malegnano on the Milan-Lodi road, and break in upon the French columns before the Emperor Napoleon could get them sufficiently in hand to fight a pitched battle with all his corps upon the field. Unluckily for Austria, Hess, who had destroyed Gyulai's combina- tions before Magenta, had returned to his head-quarters. The plan was shown to him, and he at once condemned it, and Gyulai and Kuhn had not sufficient determination to act against his judgment. The scheme was abandoned, and its abandonment gave a fresh victory to the French. On the 7th of June, Napoleon had determined on the capture of Malegnano, for so long as it was in the hands of the Austrians, he feared a retour offensif on their part against Milan. He directed against it the 1st, 2nd and 4th corps, combined under the command of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers. It was held by a weak rearguard, composed of two brigades of Benedek's corps. These had to oppose seven French divisions. But for the interven- tion of Hess, there would have been a strong force already concentrating about Malegnano by the afternoon of the 8th, and the French would have received a much warmer reception. Benedek had been in Malegnano in the morn- ing, expecting that there would be some fighting that day. At three o'clock, as there were no hostile columns in sight, 74 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. he supposed that no attack would be made later than that hour, and he left the town. Between five and six the first corps appeared in front of Malegnano, the division of General Bazaine being in advance. On the right the heads of two divisions of MacMahon's corps were in sight, pre- paring to turn the town and surround it ; on the left was the corps of Niel. Notwithstanding the enormous force thus brought to bear against them, the two Austrian brigades made a gallant stand in the barricaded and loop- holed streets of Malegnano. The fighting began at six by the attack of Bazaine's division ; it was not till half-past seven that the Austrians, turned on both flanks and in the presence of adversaries more than four times their own numbers, let go their hold of the town, and made good their retreat along the Lodi road. The French had lost upwards of 900 killed and wounded, the Austrians 1400, a very heavy loss considering the small force engaged on their side. The action was a second Palestro. A (qw battalions had fought gallantly but in vain against an army; 8000 Austrians had struggled against 36,000 French. It was the most hotly contested engagement of the war. Yet, honourable as it was for the troops of Benedek's division, the action of Malegnano, coming immediately after Magenta, had a disheartening effect on the Austrians. They continued their retreat without being molested by the French, and soon every Austrian soldier was behind the Adda. Beyond the river the retreat of the columns went on slowly and steadily. On the 15th, Gyulai held the line of the Chiese. The French advanced guard, composed of one of MacMahon's divisions, was crossing the Oglio ; the Piedmontese were close at hand upon the Mella, and had occupied Brescia. On the previous day they had been almost in contact with one of the Austrian corps ; and had Gyulai kept his divisions closer together, he might have attacked and crushed them before the French could have come within sound of their cannon. It is surprising that, even on the 15th, he did not do something to disturb the Piedmontese in their possession of Brescia. Probably he was afraid of wasting time, and was anxious to see his MALEGNANO AND SOLFERTNO. 75 army in the position which he had already decided to hold against the French. This was in the main the same as that which was actually held by the two armies of the Emperor Francis Joseph ia the great battle of the 24th, On the 1 6th, Gyulai had crossed the Chiese, and collected his army in the district in which Solferino was fought. That district lies between the Chiese and the Mincio. The latter river issues from the Lake of Garda, and passes through hilly country, before it flows into the plain in which Mantua stands. Where the Mincio leaves the lake, the fortress of Peschiera marks the north-western angle of the Quadrilateral. Half-way between Peschiera and Mantua, the Mincio is crossed by the bridge of Goito, the scene of some hard fighting between the Piedmontese and the Austrians in 1848. If we turn to any good map, we see that the Chiese on the west, and the Mincio on the east, with the southern shore of Garda on the north, and a line drawn from Goito to the Chiese on the south, will roughly form a square. Again, a line drawn from the western corner of Garda to the town of Castiglione, and thence following the diagonal of the square to the bridge of Goito, will divide the district into the hill country and the plain. The hills are a series of low ranges, which reappear beyond the Mincio and form the elevated plateau on which were fought S. Lucia, Somma Campagna and Custozza, in 1848. But between the Mincio and the Chiese the hills are more broken, and they reach their greatest height on the very edge of the plain at the village of Solferino, the position of which is marked for miles around by the abrupt ascent and the high mount behind it, on which stands a square tower of dark stone known as the Spia d' Italia, the spy of Italy, on account of the extensive view which it commands, over the Quadrilateral on the one hand and the plain of Lombardy on the other, while south- ward can be seen Mantua and the Apennines, northward the bright expanse of the Lake of Garda, and the Alpine range. To the westward of Solferino, between it and the Chiese, lies the plain of Montechiaro ; to the southward the wide, level, well-cultivated Campo di Medole. Gyulai, on the 1 6th, held with three corps the edge of ^6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the hills from Lonato on the Lake of Garda to Castiglione in advance of Solferino. The rest of his army was in the plain of Medole, and extended away towards the bridge of Goito, by which he kept up communication with Mantua, where the Emperor Francis Joseph was assembling another army. The Austrians had about 150,000 men upon both banks of the Mincio ; the effective force of the allies was about the same, without counting Prince Napoleon's corps, which was moving northward from the duchies. But Gyulai was not destined to fight another battle. He had been unfortunate, though not unskilful. He was removed from his command, and the Austrian army was reorganized. The Emperor Francis Joseph held the supreme command over two armies, the 2nd commanded by Count Schlik, who had been the first to point out the value of the position on the hills of the Mincio, and the 1st under Count Wimp- fenn. The corps and their commanders were : — 1ST Army, Count Wimpfenn. 3rd corps, Prince Van Schwarzenberg ... 20,385 men, 9th „ Schaffgotsche 21,560 „ nth „ Van Veigl 21,290 „ Reserve 3,200 „ 2ND Army, Count Schlik. I St corps, Clam Gallas 18,200 men, 5th „ Stadion 22,540 „ 7th „ Zobel 17,560 „ 8th ,, Benedek 21,300 „ Reserve 7,600 „ In all, Austria could place nearly 150,000 men and 700 guns in line of battle. With these details of the two Austrian armies we may contrast the forces of the allies, as given in the official reports of the war : — French Army. Imperial Guard, Marshal St. Jean d'Angely 1st corps, Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers ... 2nd „ Marshal MacMahon 3rd „ Marshal Canrobert 4th „ General Niel The 5th corps, 20,000 strong, was on its march north- ward from the duchies. There was a reserve artillery of ninety guns. 72 guns. 72 ,, 48 It 104 '> 64 guns. 72 )» 48 5) 72 J5 136 r) 14,022 men, 48 guns. 21,877 ,, 66 „ 17,021 >j 48 „ 23,013 66 „ 21,026 ,, 6c „ MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO. -j-j The Piedmontese army, commanded nominally by King Victor Emmanuel, but actually by Delia Marmora, con- sisted of the five divisions of Durando, Fanti, MoUard, Cialdini and Cucchiari (each about 10,000 strong) ; 2000 cavalry under General Sambry, and 3000 Cacciateri com- manded by Garibaldi, — in all about 55,000 men with 90 guns. The opposing forces were therefore nearly equal in numbers. The Piedmontese were, however, very inferior in fighting power to the Austrians ; but, on the other hand, the Imperial Guard and MacMahon's African battalions were, battalion for battalion, superior to most of the Austrian regiments. Finally, a marked superiority was given to the allies by the mere fact that they had won four successive battles, one of them of the first rank, while the only successes of Austria had been gained in unim- portant skirmishes with the Garibaldian volunteers. Up to the 19th of June, the 2nd Austrian army lay in the position occupied by Gyulai on the i6th. A portion of the 1st army was in the plain of Medole ; but the main body, with the Emperor and Wimpfenn, lay to the north of Mantua behind the Mincio. It was, however, ready to reinforce Schlik and the 2nd army as soon as the French passed the Chiese. On the 20th, the vanguard of the allies was upon the river ; but by that day a change had come over the counsels of Austria. Hess had been her evil genius throughout the campaign. He now objected to the position on the hills, as being a perilous one in case of defeat, because the Mincio lay behind it — a worthless objection as the defeat of the 24th showed, when the Austrians easily retreated across the river. Hess proposed that the hills should be abandoned, and that the army should hold the line of the Mincio. His advice was accepted, and by the evening of the 20th, only a few regiments of the Austrian army were upon the right bank of the river. The rest were massed behind it from Pes- chiera to Goito. Next day the greater part of the allied armies had crossed the Chiese. Cucchiari's Sardinians held Lonato, and on the 22nd MacMahon occupied Castiglione. 78 THE MAKING OF ITALY. The whole of the following day was spent by the French in almost complete inaction. They sent some recon- naisance parties into the hills, and along the roads of the plain. A detachment of the 2nd Zouaves occupied Solferino for a couple of hours, but was withdrawn in the evening. From the top of the tower, the famous Spia, masses of dust could be seen whirling up from the dry, scorched roads towards the Mincio, and in the Campo de Medole some of the reconnoitring parties were driven in by Austrian hussars. Evidently the Kaiser's troops were not all behind the river. On the evening of the 22nd the Austrian staff had again changed its plans. Schlik had succeeded in persuading the Emperor that a serious mistake had been made in withdrawing from Lonato and Castiglione on the 20th, and that the objections of Hess were baseless. On the morning of the 23rd the Austrians had crossed the Mincio again. By nightfall Stad ion's corps was in Solferino, Clam Gallas and his troops of the 1st corps were in Cavriana, a little to the rear of it. Behind them lay, at Volta, Zobel and the 7th corps. Benedek, with the 8th, held the hills towards S. Martino, lying between Solferino and the Lake of Garda. The cavalry of the first army was in Medole ; the three corps of Schwarzenberg, Schafifgotsche and Von Veigl, were in the plain. Thus Schlik with the 2nd army held the hills, while the first army under Wimpfenn occupied the Campo di Medole, the level country south of the road from Castiglione to the bridge of Goito. The French lay along the Chiese ; their most advanced troops, those of MacMahon, were at Castiglione. The Piedmontese were on their left about Lonato. The Em- peror had no idea that the Austrians were so near him. The reconnaisances had all ceased early in the afternoon. He believed that only Austrian advanced guards had crossed the Mincio, that their main army lay between Peschiera and Mantua, and that there would be no serious fighting next day. He had given orders for a march through the hill country to the Mincio to some of his corps, namely, those on the left and centre ; his right was to move by the level country roads on the edge of the MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO. 79 plain. Probably he expected to reach Goito before fight- ing a battle. The troops were to be in motion early on the morning of the 24th, in order to avoid as far as possible the heat of the day. The first French troops were to begin their march as early as 2 a.m. The Austrians were not to move till nine ; and thus their advanced troops at Solferino were at the outset unsupported by the other corps, and the troops in the plain of Medole being far towards the Mincio, only an advanced guard had occu- pied the town. The plan of the Austrians for the day was to attack the French along the whole line, the centre of their attack being Castiglione.^ Had they put their troops in motion a few hours earlier, they would have had suffi- cient force in hand to have repulsed the first attacks of the French, and assumed the offensive. As it was, they were forced to fight a defensive engagement on the lines taken up by their advanced troops on the evening of the 23rd. Thus all the advantage of the initiative was on the side of the French. The battle of Solferino divides itself into three portions — the fight in the centre where the corps of MacMahon and Baraguay d'Hilliers and the Imperial Guard were directed against Solferino : the fight on the right in the plain of Medole, where Niel and Canrobert faced the corps of Schwarzenberg, Schaffgotschen and Von Veigl : the fight on the allied left, where the 8th Austrian corps under Benedek received the attack of the whole Sardinian army under the hills towards the Lake of Garda. Between two ^ The French official report very truly says : — " Les Autrichiens doivent quitter, le 24, la ligne Pozzolengo — Solferino — Guidizzolo, pour atteindre les positions de Lonato, Castiglione, Carpenedolo. Les corps Fran^ais doivent de leur cote le meme jour quitter la ligne Lonato— Castiglione — Carpenedolo, pour celle de Pozzolengo — Sol- ferino — Guidizzolo. De ces deux marches inverses, le meme jour et sur la meme ligne, resultera necessairement un choc general, dans lequel se presenteront dans de meilleures conditions les troupes qui auront I'initiative. Or, les colonnes alliees, ayant re9u I'ordre de partir a deux heures du matin, apres avoir fait le cafe, et les corps autrichiens ne prenant un premier repas qu'a huit heures et demi pour partir a neuf heures, les Autrichiens devaient etre surpris par les alliees. Ce fut effectivement ce qui arriva." — Catnpagite de Pempe- reur Napoleon en Italie, p. 294. 8o THE MAKING OF ITAL V. and three in the morning the allied army began its march in four columns. Towards five o'clock, Niel's advanced guard encountered some Austrian vedettes near the farm of Resica, about a mile in front of Medole. The Austrians galloped away through the twilight, and disappeared. The French passed the farm, and in the open ground beyond they soon discovered a line of Austrian infantry, and heard guns and waggons rolling up from Medole. Niel was, in fact, in contact with the advanced guard of Schwarzen- berg's corps. A little later MacMahon encountered the Austrian outposts on the road from Castiglione to Cavriana, and Baraguay d'Hilliers came in contact with them in front of Solferino. Later still, towards six o'clock, the Piedmontese advanced troops found the Austrians in force along the ridges from San Martino to Madonna del Scoperta. All along the lines the Austrians were roused from their bivouacs, and fell into their ranks without having time to breakfast. The troops to the rear were hurried up to the front. Before Solferino and in the plain, the outposts retired skirmishing with the French. Northwards, towards the lake, the fighting did not begin till a little later in the day. Between six and seven, Canrobert's corps, operating on Niel's right, drove the Austrians out of Castel Goffredo to the south-west of Medole. At the same time Niel at- tacked Medole. Here the first serious fighting took place, and the artillery came into action on both sides. The Austrians fought well, but, outnumbered both in men and guns, they gave way about eight o'clock, leaving two cannon in the hands of the French. In the plain beyond Medole the Austrians, who had now brought up the whole of the 9th corps, formed in battle array to dispute the further advance of the French. Meanwhile the French Emperor had been roused from his bed at Montechiari on the Chiese. As he got into the saddle, he heard the cannon booming away in front towards Solferino, and to his right towards Medole. At half- past seven he had reached the high ground in front of Castiglione. Thence he could view the whole range MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO, 8i of country from the Lake of Garda to the plain. The first glance showed that a more serious battle than Magenta was before him. From Medole on the extreme right to the broken ground in front of Solferino, the clouds of smoke hung heavily over the various points where the artillery had come into action, and northward the line of fire extended away towards the lake, along the hills where Benedek was repulsing the Piedmontese divisions of Mollard and Cucchiari. It was evident, too, that the TO VERON/ ESCHieRA OVACECCIO heights of Solferino formed the key of the Austrian position. The village once taken, Benedek would be threatened on his left flank, and the way would be open for the attack on Cavriana. If that place fell, the battle would be practically over. Meanwhile it was ne- cessary for the French right to hold its ground in the plain. Information had reached Napoleon that morning to the effect that on the previous day Lichtenstein's corps had marched out of Mantua, to take part in a great turn- ing movement against his right. He therefore sent orders G 82 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. to Canrobert, to keep a watchful eye upon the road to the south of Ceresara, and to expect the appearance of fresh Austrian columns in that direction. He then galloped to MacMahon's corps, and, after a brief conference with the Marshal, rode to Baraguay d^Hilliers' position on the heights in front of Solferino, sending at the same time orders to Marshal St. Jean d'Angely to bring up the Imperial Guard from Castiglione as rapidly as possible. While the French Emperor was thus taking his share in directing the opening of the battle on his side, the Emperor Francis Joseph had been roused from his quarters beyond the Mincio ; but, unfortunately, he lost his way with his staff in the hills behind Cavriana, and it was some time before he succeeded in rejoining his army. Meanwhile his generals had each to act according to his own judgment, without being able to communicate with the Imperial head-quarters. Thus at the outset of the battle all the unity of plan and action was upon the side of the French. After the capture of Medole, Niel's columns deployed in the plain beyond, and the village of Robecco became the centre of the fight upon the French right. Canrobert, watching for the expected appearance of the heads of Lichtenstein's columns, was unable to give much support to Niel, who more than once found his corps sorely pressed by the troops of Schaffgotsche and Schwarzenberg. It was not till between ten and eleven that, after two and a half hours* fighting, and after being reinforced by some of Canrobert's battalions, he succeeded in establishing himself in Robecco. On his left the Austrians more than once tried to push in between him and MacMahon, and cut him off from the centre. The French cavalry, massed on this part of the field, defeated these attempts by a series of brilliant charges, and thus successfully kept up the connection between the French centre and right. In the centre the troops of the ist and 2nd corps gradually forced back the Austrians from the ridges in front of Sol- ferino and S. Cassiano. Their progress was. slow but steady. On the left of the allies, and there only, the Austrians were successful. The French official reports MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO. Z^ are studiously favourable to the Italians ; but even the official history of the war allows that, between eight and half-past ten, on the 24th, La Marmora repeatedly threw Durando, Mollard and Cucchiari's divisions against Benedek's position, only to see them time after time driven down the slopes by the white-coated soldiers of the 8th Austrian corps. That corps was at most 20,000 strong. A Piedmontese division is about 10,000 strong. The Austrians were thus outnumbered by the army of the king, which had, moreover, in reserve the divisions of Cialdini and Fanti. At half-past ten, the Emperor moved forward his head- quarters close to Solferino. He had heard that the Piedmontese had failed to make any impression on the Austrian right, and that Niel found it impossible in the presence of the forces opposed to him to make any pro- gress beyond Robecco. The information he had received in the morning led him to believe that any moment the Austrians might be joined by Lichtenstein's corps, which would give them a marked superiority in the plain. The Imperial Guard had joined his centre. He therefore resolved to carry Solferino at any cost. If he failed in this, there was reason to fear that the Austrians might be able to take the offensive, turn his right, and throw him back upon the Chiese. The Austrians had already been dislodged from the ground in front of the village; the way was, therefore, open for the attack. The castle and tower of Solferino, the lofty height of the Spia, and in front of it the village, with a hill crowned with cypresses on the left, and a walled cemetery on another eminence on the right, were all crowded with Austrian troops,, and bristled with artillery. The position had, however, the disadvantage of being as difficult to approach by the narrow paths in the rear as by the steep slopes in front. It was thus by no means easy for the Austrians to support the garrison of Solferino with fresh troops. Those that held it at the beginning of the action had to hold it unsupported to the end. It was an excellent position for the advanced guard on the previous day, but its advantages as the centre of a G 2 84 THE MAKING OF ITALY. long line of defence were very doubtful. The French artillery showered its shells upon the village, the ceme- tery, the cypress-hill. The fire of the Austrian guns slackened, and then up the slopes and into the village pressed strong columns of the ist corps and the Imperial Guard. The Austrians fought desperately, but they were gradually forced to give way before the weight and impetuosity of the French attack. The Guard stormed the cypress-hill ; De TAdmirault took the cemetery ; the village, and the church, and the height of the Spia were then easily forced. About one o'clock the whole position was carried. Eight Austrian guns and several hundred prisoners remained in the hands of the French, who, however, had bought their success at great cost, for the Austrian fire had told severely upon their densely massed columns of attack. While the centre was thus successful, Niel upon the right pushed back the Austrians towards Guidizzolo ; but as the nth corps of Von Veigl came into action, the battle on the plain was still undecided. Among the hills the position of the Piedmontese army, says the French official report, was very critical. Benedek, on his left, drove back Durando and Cucchiari from the hills in front of Madonna del Scoperta ; and the Piedmontese were only saved from absolute rout by the guns of the 1st French corps opening upon the flank of the advancing Austrians, and checking their attack. On the extreme left of the allies, Mollard's Piedmontese, having completely failed in the attack on San Martino, were in full retreat towards the lake. The king despatched Cialdini's division to the assistance of Durando, and ordered Fanti to support Mollard, thus throwing 20,000 fresh troops against the Austrians, and stopping the retreat of the three beaten divisions. For the whole afternoon Benedek remained master of his ground. Cucchiari had left the field. Mollard, rein- forced by Fanti, was almost inactive on the railway near the lake. Cialdini and Durando failed to make any impres- sion on Madonna del Scoperta. Stadion's corps, having retired from Solferino, covered Benedek^s left, and secured him from the attack of the ist French corps. Between MALEGNANO AND SOLFERINO. Zt^ Solferino and Cavriana the Imperial Guard gradually drove the Austrians from the heights behind San Cassiano. In the plain Niel's corps attacked Guidizzolo, but was repulsed with great slaughter. The Emperor Francis Joseph now made a last attempt to turn the fortune of the day. Though defeated at Solferino he still held Cavriana, and Benedek was victorious on the right. A success in the plain on the left might yet decide the day in his favour. The 9th and nth corps were therefore ordered to attack Niel and Canrobert. The village of Robecco became again the centre of the fight. The Austrians pressed gallantly forward, and drove back repeated charges of the French cavalry; and there were times when it seemed that they would carry Robecco. But the French displayed a wonderful firmness in resisting the attack. Four French colonels fell at the head of their regiments. Still Niel held his ground, and by four o'clock the fury of the Austrian attack was dying away, and the French right was safe. Almost at the same time the battle was decided in the centre, the Imperial Guard and MacMahon's corps successfully attacking Cavriana, and completely breaking the Austrian line. The morning had been hot and sultry. All the afternoon dark masses of clouds had been gathering over the Mincio valley and the plain of Medole. As the French fought their way into Cavriana a fearful tempest burst over the field. First came blasts of wind and blinding clouds of dust, then a deluge of rain descended, and the hurricane was accompanied by vivid lightning and loud peals of thunder. For a brief inter- val the storm and darkness almost put an end to the fighting. Then as it cleared away, the Austrians, covered by their splendid cavalry, were seen retiring in long columns by all the roads which led from the hills, and then from the plain to the fords and bridges of the Mincio. On the fall of Cavriana, Francis Joseph had given orders for a general retreat. Benedek was reluctantly forced to follow the movement of the rest of the army. As he retired the Piedmontese pressed upon him, firing on his rear guards, and pushing into Madonna del Scoperta and San Martino, as the Austrians abandoned the villages that they had held 86 THE MAKING OF ITALY. successfully since early morning. The Piedmontese flat- tered themselves that they had thus their share in the victory, but for them Solferino was only a defeat. As General Hamley says, " They had had the misfortune to engage Benedek, the most skilful and resolute of the Austrian leaders, who, meeting their too diffuse attacks in compact order, had pushed them back constantly towards the lake. He received with tears of vexation the orders of his imperial chief to abandon the ground he had won and join the general retreat." I need only add that Benedek's 20,000 Austrians had been opposed to at least 40,000 Piedmontese, and that he took 1000 prisoners, and inflicted on the royal army a loss of 4000 killed and wounded. The total loss of the allies was 2300 killed, 12,000 wounded, and 2000 prisoners and missing; of the Austrians, 2300 killed, 10,600 wounded, and about 9000 prisoners. No attempt was made to interrupt the Austrian retreat. The French had suffered heavily during the battle, the men were weary with fighting and marching, and drenched with rain, and few of them had eaten any- thing for the last thirteen hours. They bivouacked on the ground they had won, the Emperor establishing his head- quarters in Cavriana. The Austrians recrossed the Mincio, and, retiring to the line of the Adige, proceeded to reorganize their defeated army. The loss of the battle was not the fault of the Austrian soldiers, but of the vacillating plans of the imperial staff. Something, too, must be charged to the non-appearance of Lichtenstein's troops. Leaving Mantua the day before, he had received information of the approach of Prince Napoleon's corps which was coming up from Tuscany. Instead of obeying his orders and pressing on to Ceresara and Medole, he wasted time collecting information about the Prince's movements, and observing the advance of his light cavalry. Late on the evening of the 24th he heard of the great battle in which he had failed to take part, and returned to Mantua, where he was at once deprived of his command. His presence on the field might perhaps have changed the fortune of the day. ^7 CHAPTER VI. THE REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ITALY. As early as February addresses had been distributed among the people and the army of Tuscany, calling upon the Tuscans to strike for Italian liberty against Austria in the event of Piedmont declaring war. It was generally believed, and with good reason, that these addresses emanated from Turin. As the war became imminent, the agitation in Tuscany increased. Buoncompagni, the Piedmontese Minister at Florence, watched carefully over the growth of the movement. A similar movement was in progress in the Duchy of Modena. On February I2th> 1859, Mr. Walton, the English Consul at Carrara, wrote ^ to Lord Malmesbury, " We are approaching either a war or a revolution. Many respectable people here are in constant correspondence with a committee resident in Turin, in which M. Farini takes an active part, and from what I can ascertain it is to prepare the people in this district to receive Piedmontese troops, at the same time impressing upon them the necessity of avoiding any politi- cal demonstration until the Piedmontese march on the Ticino, as it is then intended to disarm the few troops here, and the Piedmontese will be requested to enter the state under the pretext of keeping order." The breaking out of the war was the signal for a revolution. On the 25th of April the Duke of Modena withdrew his weak garrison from Massa and Carrara, and concentrated his little army in the capital. Immediately a provisional ^ *' Further Correspondence respecting Affairs of Italy," 1859, xxii. [2527], p. I. THE MAKING OF ITALY. government was established at Carrara, and a column of Piedmontese troops occupied the district. Two days after there was a revolution at Florence. " For several weeks," wrote Mr. Scarlett, the English Minister at the Tuscan court,^ " the Grand Duke's govern- ment believed that the intrigues of Piedmont, seconded by Signor Buoncompagni, had paved the way to a popular explosion." . . . ** Last night (April 26th) the troops, who had long been like the people tampered with and worked upon by Piedmontese agents and Tuscan partisans of the Italian caiise, deserted the Grand Duke's standard, adopted the tricoloured Italian flag, and fraternized en- tirely with the mob in the streets." Early next morning a crowd of citizens and soldiers paraded the city, and appeared before the Italian Embassy, where Signor Buon- compagni addressed them, " recommending discipline and order." They then went to the French Embassy, to pay their homage to France.^ Later in the morning the diplomatic corps was summoned to assemble at the Pitti Palace. The Grand Duke announced to them that he would leave Florence and throw himself for protection on the Powers of Europe. Mr. Scarlett protested against this resolution, and, indeed, had the Duke stayed he would have seriously embarrassed the revolutionary party in Tuscany. But, if we are to believe the popular report in Florence, Buoncompagni had succeeded in working upon his fears and seriously alarming him for his personal safety. That afternoon he left Florence for Verona. A provisional government was appointed. " In other words," wrote Mr. Scarlett, "this country is now annexed to Piedmont." The dictatorship of the country during the war was offered to King Victor Emmanuel, and accepted by him, and on the nth of May, Signor Buoncompagni 2 " Further Correspondence," pp. 5 and 6. 3 The walls of the houses were adorned in various places with the legend, '''Viva V Italia! — Viva Vittorio Emmatiuele T' But the letters were everywhere exactly similar, and it was evident that stencil plates, provided by the Italian committee, had been carried round the city in the night. THE REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ITALY. 89 announced by proclamation that to him had been com- mitted the task of representing the King of Piedmont as dictator at Florence. He was reaping the reward of his skilfully conducted intrigues against the grand-ducal government,* and now, with the aid of France, he made Tuscany a base of operations against Parma, Modena, and the Papal States. Two delegates were sent from Plorence to the head- quarters of the Emperor at Alessandria to request for the provisional government at Florence the protection of the French arms. In response to this appeal Napoleon promised to send there his cousin. Prince Napoleon, and the 5th corps (Tarmee. He had a double object in this. In the first place it tended to promote the revolution in Central Italy, in the second to make his cousin a pro- minent figure in that part of the drama, in the hope that at the subsequent division of the spoil Tuscany would fall to his share. Prince Napoleon had married an Italian princess. His revolutionary sentiments, and the personal support he had given Cavour, had made his name popular with the Italianists. The idea, therefore, of making him the sovereign of a revived kingdom of Etruria was by no means an impracticable one, and had Napoleon been able to carry out his full programme, and " free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic," he would doubtless have been able also to make Florence the capital of a tributary Franco- Italian State, such as his uncle in his time had created. On the 23rd of May Prince Napoleon landed at Leg- horn. His written orders bade him " to do nothing against Bologna or against the Pontifical States, so long as the Austrians did not violate neutrality, and in case of such violation to explain, by a manifesto, the entry of the French troops into Pontifical territory.'* He was to con- •* Lord Stratford de Redcliffe did not hesitate to say in the House of Lords, that if Buoncompagni had acted as the correspondence appeared to show he had acted, he had forfeited his privileges as an ambassador and was subject to the laws of Tuscany. Certainly, he added, Cromwell would have hanged any ambassador who ventured thus to abuse his position as the privileged envoy of a foreign state. 90 THE MAKING OF ITALY. sider as a violation of neutrality the addition of a single man to the garrison of Ancona or Bologna, or the march of any Austrian troops into Venetia or Lombardy from the Romagna.' In a word, any modification of the status quo in the Papal States was to be made the pretext for in- vading them ; and without any such invasion, or the least pretext for it. Prince Napoleon took measures, as he him- self avowed, to drive the Austrians from Bologna by threatening their position in the Legations. From his head-quarters at Florence he directed the movements of about 20,000 French troops, the 9000 men who composed the regular Tuscan army of Ulloa, and the volunteers of General Mezzacapo.*' On the 24th he ordered the troops in the North of Tuscany to threaten the roads and passes by which the Austrians communicated with Modena and Parma. At the same time the Tuscans were directed to make demonstrations at several points against the Papal frontier.^ The Austrians had agreed with the Pontifical Government that they would not evacuate Bologna or Ancona without giving two days' clear notice, in order that there might be time to provide for the pre- servation of order in those cities. But the position of the Austrians was now becoming very precarious. They had in the first days of the war given just offence to the Pontifical Government, and irritated the people against them, by needlessly proclaiming a state of siege at Ancona. The Pope protested, and the state of siege was raised. They now saw themselves threatened by troops in Tus- cany, and by the French fleet in the Adriatic. One day, in the last week of May, a French frigate steamed up to the mouth of the harbour at Ancona, and fired a shot, and signalled to know if the Austrians had left the place yet. Another day a party of French marines was landed near Rimini to collect supplies, and for some hours the road between the two Austrian garrisons of Bologna and Ancona was thus held by the French. The news of ^ French official report of the war. ^ Afterwards Minister of War of the Kingdom of Italy. ' French official report. THE RE VOL UTION IN CENTRAL IT A LY. 91 Magenta put an end to the occupation. The Austrlans hurriedly withdrew from Ancona, and concentrated all their troops at Bologna; and on the nth of June,® their line of retreat being already threatened by the movements directed by Prince Napoleon on the frontier, they aban- doned Bologna,^ without giving the Cardinal Vicar more than a few hours' notice. On the 9th the Duchess of Parma, menaced by the Piedmontese on the one hand, and the Modenese on the other, had fled to Switzerland. The Duke of Modena left his capital for the Austrian head-quarters. On the sudden retreat of the Austrians, the Revolu- tionists of Bologna found the city in their hands. There was not a single soldier within its walls. They immediately expelled the Cardinal Vicar, tore down the Papal arms, formed a provisional government, enrolled a national guard, and sent for help to Tuscany. Volunteers from Mezza- capo's corps were soon in Bologna, and Buoncompagni sent 3000 rifles to be used in arming the national guard. Protected by the presence of the French 5th corps in Tus- cany, the provisional government at Bologna had nothing to fear from the little Pontifical army, and, moreover. Prince Napoleon and Buoncompagni had found means to provide sufficient occupation for the Papal troops in another quarter. While one portion of the Tuscan army threatened the Romagna, another had been moved to the Papal frontier which divides Umbria from Tuscany. Close to that ^ By a curious coincidence, Metternich died on the nth, the very- day on which the Austrians abandoned Bologna, their last garrison beyond their own Italian frontiers. 9 Prince Napoleon boasts of this success in his official report to the Emperor, dated Goito, July 4th, 1859. His object was, he says, " de menacer le flanc gauche de I'armee autrichienne en compromet- tant ses lignes de retraite, et de hater son abandon des duches de Parme et de Modene." . , . "La presence," he says, " de ce corps (V"^^), pret a deboucher sur I'armee autrichienne, a imprime sur cette armee une crainte assez vive pour qu'elle se soit hatee des la bataille de Magenta d'abandonner Ancone, Bologne, et succes- sivement toutes seS positions sur la rive droite du Po." 92 THE MAKING OF ITALY. frontier, in the hill country of Lake Thrasymene, stands the old city of Perugia, a place of some importance, sur- rounded by a strong wall, and from its position capable of being easily defended. There were a few Papal carbineers in the city, and these had hitherto been able to preserve order amongst its 20,000 inhabitants. But it had been decided at Florence that Umbria should be revolutionized, and Perugia was to be the scene of the chief effort of the conspirators against the peace of the Papal States. In Foligno, and some of the minor towns, the Liberals had attempted a rising on hearing the news of what had been done at Bologna ; but they were a mere handful, and, seeing that no one joined them, they submitted to the authorities, not a single shot being fired. But as Perugia lay near the Tuscan frontier, it was easy to introduce into the city a number of volunteers from Tuscany, who united themselves to the Revolutionists of the town, and on the 14th of June hoisted the Piedmontese tricolour, disarmed the carbineers, and formed a provisional government. This government lasted a week. The time was employed in preparing for resistance to the Papal troops. An envoy was despatched to Florence, to ask Buoncompagni to send to Perugia troops, arms, and a royal commissioner. Buon- compagni did not dare to do it. He could not venture to openly identify himself with the rebellion in Umbria, but he gave it sufficient help through one of his agents. " Settle it all with Cerotti," was his reply to the Perugian envoy. This Cerotti had held a command at Rome, in 1849, and had fought in the defence under Mazzini. He was now in Tuscany, whence he led 800 armed volunteers to Perugia. Other leaders brought up smaller contingents ; and arms, ammunition, and money were supplied from Florence. Prince Napoleon's troops on the frontier put no obstacle in the way of these proceedings, because the French were in Tuscany only to protect and promote them. The Pontifical troops, destined for the recapture of Perugia, left Rome on the 14th of June. They were com- manded by Colonel Schmidt, and did not number more than 2000 men. Of these, 100 Roman carbineers formed THE REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ITALY. 93 the advanced guard. The main body, 1500 strong, con- sisted of Swiss, Roman volunteers, Pontifical custom-house guards, a few engineers and a section of Roman artillery. The rear guard was formed by 400 Roman troops of the line. Thus the column was as much a native Roman as a Swiss force. On the evening of the 19th it reached Foligno. Here Schmidt heard that the rebels at Perugia, who were already 5000 strong (the majority being volunteers from Tuscany), expected to receive immediately large re- inforcements from the revolted Grand Duchy. At once he decided upon attacking the town without further delay, and during the night, by a forced march, he pushed forward his column to Sta. Maria degli Angeli, ten miles from Perugia. He halted there at 2 a.m. on the 20th. While the troops rested and had their confessions heard by the Franciscan fathers in the monastery, Signor Latanzi, a man who was most popular in the town and had long been con- nected with it, entered Perugia under a flag of truce. He came commissioned by the Holy Father to urge the rebels to submit and come to terms without useless bloodshed. But he could not persuade the leaders to accept his advice, for he had to deal, not with a few Perugians, but with a mass of invaders from Tuscany, who had taken possession of the town, and who knew that if they failed to hold it a safe retreat was open to them behind the lines of Prince Napoleon's corps. Therefore no other course remained for Colonel Schmidt but to attack the place as soon as Latanzi rejoined him. The storming of Perugia has become one of the legends of the Italian Revolution. There is a version of the story which tells how the unfortunate Perugians received no warning of the coming attack, until they found themselves surprised, plundered, and massacred, by a horde of blood- thirsty Swiss mercenaries. It will not, however, stand exa- mination in the light of authentic contemporary records. The troops who made the attack were at least as much Roman as Swiss ; the men who resisted them were to a far greater extent Tuscans than Perugians. They were not surprised ; they had for some days been arming and 94 THE MAKING OF ITALY. preparing for a struggle, and then came the warning of Latanzi's unsuccessful mission. But the fact was that the Tuscans and the refugees who got up the rising were dis- appointed at their failure, and were not prepared for the energy displayed by the Pontifical government. The rising had not spread beyond Perugia, yet they believed that, with the French behind them in Tuscany, they would not be attacked by the Papal troops. In this they were deceiving themselves, and when the attack came they cried out that they were treacherously surprised. Colonel Schmidt resolved to make the assault at the Roman gate. It was strongly barricaded, and about eight hundred yards in front of it the Benedictine monastery of S. Pietro was held by the insurgents. Between the mon- astery and the Papal troops lay the village of S. Giovanni, where the road crossed the river by a stone bridge. The village appeared to be deserted ; but, as the troops ap- proached the bridge, a shot was fired from a window, and one of the Roman soldiers of the vanguard fell. The door of the house was forced, and a man found within with a musket in his hand was shot on the spot. The soldiers had orders not to fire till they were attacked. Crossing the bridge, they deployed in silence upon the open ground beyond. Immediately a volley was fired upon them from the roof and windows of the monastery. The attack began, the gate of the building was forced, a few rebels killed and wounded and the rest driven out, leaving some prisoners in the hands of the Papal troops. In the monastery Schmidt established an ambulance for the wounded Papalini and the wounded rebels alike. He then formed his troops into three columns. The first of these, looo strong with a 9-pounder and a howitzer, he kept at the monastery for the attack of the Roman gate, which was to be made under his personal command. The other columns, each about 500 strong, were placed under the command of Commandants Pasquier and Jeanneret, who were to strike off to the right and left, and make a diversion by attacking the town on other points. A few shots were fired at the barricaded gate, a few shells were thrown over it to intimi- THE REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ITALY. 95 date the defenders ; then, it being supposed that the barricade was sufficiently shaken, the stormers attacked it. The axes of the pioneers, being of bad metal, broke after a few blows. Two scaling ladders were then placed against the barrier. The troops clambered over it, tore down the tricolour, and drove the rebels into the streets behind. Here they were confronted by a second and more formid- able line of defence, for the Tuscan volunteers had erected a strong barricade across the street, and from behind it, and from the windows and roofs of the houses and of a large hotel that stood just inside the gate, they fired upon the head of the Papal column. Among the men on the housetops some women were standing, hurling down tiles and stones. The barricade in front was stormed, the doors of the hotel and of the houses on both sides of the street were forced, and a well-directed fire of musketry cleared the house-tops. Two of the women were hit by bullets during the fighting and were killed. Stones and heavy furniture had been thrown from the hotel windows, and several shots had been fired from it. The soldiers entered it furiously, an armed group threw themselves upon them, and in the struggle that ensued the innkeeper, Storti, and two of his servants were bayonetted. In a room upstairs, an American, named Perkins, was staying with his family ; a sentry was posted at his door to secure them from harm. The fighting in the streets lasted some time, and, after it ceased, a shot was fired from a house ; it was stormed, and a man was killed inside. There was some plundering, for there had been fighting in the houses, and the Swiss and Romans were soldiers and not saints ; but most of. the things taken were restored by the officers. No one fell on the side of the rebels except in fair fight. There was no massacre of " old men, women and children," no outrage of any kind. Ninety of the soldiers, including some of the officers, were put hors de combat. The insurgents lost about seventy killed, a hundred wounded, and a hundred and twenty prisoners. Most of the remainder fled into Tuscany. Mr. Perkins had stayed in Perugia expecting to see P apal defeat. In his disappointment he went off to Florence, 96 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. whence he wrote to the Times an account of the "sack and massacre of Perugia," in which he showed an utter disregard for the real facts of the case. The Revolutionists had failed, but they were determined that the revolt of Perugia should serve their cause in another way. The legend of the sack and massacre became one of the tradi- tions of the Revolution. As an actual fact, the Papal government had done nothing but righteously repel force by force. Few rebellions ever were repressed with less bloodshed. There were no after executions for complicity in it, like those carried into effect on other occasions by the French at Paris, the Piedmontese at Genoa, the English themselves, on a grand scale, in India and in Jamaica. The revolt was fomented by foreign conspirators ; it. was firmly and mercifully repressed by the native government. In carrying out the orders of that government. Colonel Schmidt and his troops had shown as much gallantry as military tact and skill, and he well deserved the rank of General which was immediately conferred upon him, and which certainly Pius IX. would never have granted to him had there been the least foundation for the stories of sack and massacre.^ The Revolution in Central Italy had been so far success- ful that Tuscany and the duchies of Parma^ and Modena, 1 For a masterly analysis and comparison of the Revolutionary and the Roman accounts of the affair of Perugia, see Dublin Review^ September, 1859, vol. 47, Old Series. 2 The Marquis of Normanby, speaking in the House of Lords on July 15th, 1859, said : — " He had no objection to postpone the obser- vations which he desired to make upon the conduct of Count Cavour. His dispatches contained more of the suppressio veri than he (Lord Normanby) ever found in any documents of a similar nature. It would have been highly satisfactory to him to have been able to show how well the Duchess of Parma had acted throughout these transac- tions, and how completely without justification was the conduct of the Sardinian Government. He recollected the state in which she found the Duchy of Parma, and had had recent knowledge of the state in which she left it ; and he must say, looking both to her conduct with reference to her son's interest and the attention she had paid to the welfare of her people, that there would be no act which would be more deserving of opprobrium, than any attempt to dispossess her THE REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ITALY, 97 as well as Bologna and the Romagna, were in the hands of its promoters. To the latter district the Marquis d'Azeglio was soon after sent by Cavour as a Royal Commissioner, while Buoncompagni continued to rule Tuscany. On the very day of the revolution at Bologna, welcome news was telegraphed from London to Turin. Lord Derby's Min- istry had fallen, the English Liberals were again in power, and a few days after a Cabinet was formed in which Palmerston and Lord John Russell, two of the best friends of the revolutionary movement in Italy — held respectively the positions of Premier and Secretary of Foreign Affairs. of the states, which she" held in the name of her son, and which were settled on him and his heirs." Tl 98 THE MAKING OF ITALY. CHAPTER VII. VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. SOLFERINO was the last battle of the war of 1859. The day after the fight was spent by the French in burying the dead, sending the wounded to the rear, and reorganizing the various corps that had been engaged. In the afternoon there was a sudden panic in Castiglione. "At 3 p.m.," says the correspondent of the Times^ "a column of dust rose on the high road from the Campo di Medole to Castiglione, and veiled by this white cover was a rush of mules, carts, and carriages, coursing along as hard as they could, jolting the wounded, throwing them to right and left, upsetting and breaking everything. Before the rush reached Castiglione the confusion had spread there. The sick who could still walk tried to get off: it was a general sauve qui pent : officers, men, sick and sound, gendarmes, infantry, cavalry, artillery trains ; in one word, every one made off. With incredible rapidity, almost by telegraph it seemed, the rumour that the Austrians were back spread even to Brescia, causing no slight alarm. However, in an hour the whole was over ; but it cost the life of many a poor fellow, and heavy punishment to more than one officer." To my mind the lesson of this incident is, that before an Austrian success the French army of 1859 vvould have collapsed as rapidly as the army of 1870. What was the origin of the panic no one knows. It is said that it arose from some stragglers seeing a French hussar regiment, in light coloured uniforms, moving across the plain. Pro- bably something of the kind did occur, and the alarm was set on foot, and spread like wildfire. The Austrians were far enough away. By the afternoon VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. 99 of the 25th they had re-passed the Mincio, and burned the bridges. On the 28th the French were upon the river. On the 29th they threw bridges over it, and NieFs corps crossed, and pushed on to Villafranca ; the other corps followed in succession, the Emperor transferring his head- quarters to Valeggio on the left bank, on the ist of July. Nothing was seen of the Austrians. Francis Joseph had withdrawn to the line of the Adige, his right resting on Verona, his left on Legnago. He occupied the same posi- tion held by Radetzky at the outset of the campaign of 1848. On their side the Allies occupied the ground held by Charles Albert in the same year. The Piedmontese had invested Peschiera ; and the army that had fought at Solferino, reinforced by the corps of Prince Napoleon, held the heights of Custozza and the Somma Campagna. The Austrians had been reinforced, and, had the war con- tinued, they would doubtless have followed in the steps of Radetzky, assumed the offensive, and fought a great battle at Custozza. But peace was at hand. On both sides there was every motive for desiring it. Austria had suffered two terrible defeats, a French army held the Mincio, a French fleet was preparing to attack Venice, and disembark a corps d'armee, which would have raised the country in insurrection inthe Austrian rear. Hungary, too, might be disturbed at any moment. These were the motives that inclined Francis Joseph to peace. No less weighty ones presented themselves to the Emperor of the French. His success had been dearly bought ; his position on the Mincio, though a good one, was not impregnable ; a defeat within the Quadrilateral would be ruinous. But more than this, all Germany was alarmed at the progress of the French arms and the humiliation of Austria. Prussian influence could no longer keep Germany neutral, and the Regent himself was beginning to be startled at the development of Napoleon's power in Italy. It seemed probable that, if the conflict continued, France would have to fight on the Rhine and the Moselle, as well as on the Mincio and the Adige. For a struggle of these gigantic proportions she was not prepared. H 2 loo THE MAKING OF ITAL V. On the 3rd an Austrian officer came to Valeggio, to thank Napoleon for having sent some -wounded Austrian officers to Verona. The opportunity was taken to open a communication with the Austrian head-quarters. On the 6th General Fleury went to Verona^ to see the Austrian Emperor, and arrange the preliminaries of an armistice. On the 8th the armistice was concluded. That morning the French Adriatic fleet was actually getting up steam for the attack on Venice, when counter orders and news of the armistice arrived by telegraph from the French head-quarters. On the nth the two emperors met at Villafranca, and concluded a treaty, by which Lombardy was to be given to Piedmont, Venetia was to receive a considerable amount of autonomy, the ducal governments were to be restored, and an Italian con- federation organized, under the nominal presidency of the Pope. This convention, though known as the Treaty of Villafranca, was really intended to be only a basis for a subsequent treaty to be concluded between France, Austria, and Piedmont ; the peace of Villafranca defined the general basis of this agreement, but did no more. The French Emperor immediately returned to Paris. A considerable portion of his army remained in Italy until the following summer. The Austrian rule in Lombardy was at an end. Few now believe that it ever deserved one-tenth of the re- proaches that were hurled against it. M. d'Ideville, who had heard both sides, and held an important diplomatic post at Turin, says, — " To be just, those oppressors were the gentlest and best of tyrants. Their only crime^ and it was one, was to wear the white uniform and speak German." M. d'Ideville goes on to say that on one occa- sion, in his presence. Count Cavour spoke thus of the Austrians to the Baron de Talleyrand, the French Am- bassador — *'Do you know/' he said, "who, during the Austrian occupation was our most terrible enemy, the one whom I dreaded most_, and the steps of whose progress I counted day by day with dismay.? Well^ it was the Archduke Maximilian, the last Viceroy of the Lombardo- VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. loi Venetian kingdom. He was young, active, enterprising. He had devoted himself heart and soul to the difficult task of reconciling the Milanese ; and assuredly he would have succeeded. Already his perseverance, his kindly bearing, his just and liberal mind had won many partisans away from us. At no time had the Lombard provinces been so prosperous, so well administered. I began to be alarmed ; but, thank heaven, the kind government of Vienna intervened, and, as is its custom, seized without hesitation the opportunity of committing a blunder, an impolitic act, at once most fatal to Austria, most useful to Piedmont. The wise reforms of the Archduke had given umbrage to the old party of the Gazetta di Verona^ and the Emperor Francis Joseph recalled his brother Maxi- milian from Milan. I breathed freely on hearing the news. Nothing was lost : Lombardy could not escape us now." And Lombardy did not escape him. Perhaps the course of events would have been different if Maximilian had remained viceroy at Milan. If so, in saving Lom- bardy to Austria, he would have saved his own life. But for the victories of Napoleon HL in Italy the unfortunate Archduke would never have been sent to Mexico, to meet his fate in the cemetery of Queretaro. One service he rendered to Austria; with his friend, Tegethoff, he or- ganized the fleet, which seven years after was to assert in the waters of Lissa the naval supremacy of Austria in the Adriatic. Though the Treaty of Villafranca restored peace to Northern Italy, and gave Lombardy to Piedmont, it was, in reality, little better than a truce. Italy had passed not only through a war, but through the first phase of a re- volution. Napoleon III. at the Tuileries, Cavour at Turin, were waiting and watching for the further develop- ment of their plans. Napoleon saw only partially what was coming. His dream was an Italian confederation, nominally under the presidency of ^us IX., but actually governed by himself through his army of occupation at Rome, his hold upon the passes of the Alps, his influence at Turin. Cavour saw further. For him the unity of 102 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Italy meant nothing less than the subjection of the whole peninsula to Piedmont, the transfer of the capital to Rome, the complete subjection of the spiritual power, and the dominance of the Piedmontese cabinet over every depart- ment of the national life. He had already accomplished much with a view to this end. Austria was humbled ; Lombardy delivered from her rule ; the support of Napoleon III. was certain, for there was no doubt that once launched upon an Italian Unionist policy, he was too weak to free himself from the impulse of Liberal and Re- volutionary ideas represented by the action of Cavour. Further than this, in Italy itself Tuscany and the duchies were occupied either by the Piedmontese troops, or by the revolted armies which gave full and ready obedience to the Piedmontese residents. In the Romagna a provisional government was established, ready to hand over its usurped powers to Victor Emmanuel the moment that the mot (Vordre came from Paris. This government was sup- ported by an army of Revolutionists commanded by General Garibaldi, who at Bologna was drilling the men who were to follow him in his enterprise of next year. In the Pontifical States, and in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the agents of Cavour were busy preparing the way for the further development of his policy, and the disaffected were being leagued together for action, which was to ^wo. a pretext for Piedmontese intervention. While Europe spoke of peace the war clouds were gathering over its whole length of the peninsula, and French and Piedmon- tese diplomacy only delayed the bursting of the storm, in order to increase its intensity and concentrate its power. The news of the Peace of Villafranca had called forth a storm of indignation on the part of the Liberals of Italy. Had not Louis Napoleon pledged his word to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, and was this how he kept his promise ? What was Lombardy worth while the Austrians still held the Quadrilateral ? Who could rejoice over the freedom of Milan, while Venice still saw Austrian battalions in the Square of St. Mark ? And then the pro- h VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. 103 posal of a confederation under the presidency of Pius IX. — was not this rank reaction ? Thus ran the protests of the press. For a moment Napoleon was the most unpopular of men with the Liberals. The mob of Turin forced the booksellers to take his photograph out of their windows. The newspapers showed an inclination to return to their old talk about the coup d'etat. The fit of fury, however, soon passed off, men began to see that Lombardy was a solid gain to Piedmont, and that Napoleon's policy was still thoroughly Piedmontese. While the storm lasted Cavour had given in his resignation. It was the means of saving his popularity, and his retirement did not for a moment remove him from a full share in the actual direc- tion of affairs. Cavour's resignation took place on the 13th of July. Count Arese, an exile from Milan, who had become, during his banishment, a bosom friend of Louis Napoleon, was invited to form a ministry ; but he failed, and then, on the 19th, the portfolio of Prime Minister was offered to Ratazzi, Cavour's trusted colleague, who found no difficulty in forming a ministry, which inaugurated its career by declaring, through the Liberal press, that it would pursue the policy of Count Cavour, and no other. Next day, for some reason, there was a remodelling of the ministry. Ratazzi took the portfolio of Justice, while La Marmora, another tried colleague of Cavour, assumed that of Foreign Affairs and the Premiership. The first days of August witnessed the comedy of the Piedmontese commissioners yielding up their powers into the hands of the provisional governments of Romagna and the duchies, so as not to violate the letter of the stipulation agreed to at Villafranca, while these very governments looked to La Marmora and Ratazzi for counsel and support, and only held their powers till the position of affairs would permit them to go through the form of a plebiscite^ and hand over the territories they administered to the King of Piedmont. This much being accomplished, in order to save appearances, on the 6th of August the plenipoten- tiaries of Austria, Sardinia, and France met at Zurich to arrange the terms of the final treaty, of which that of I04 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Villafranca was only the prelude. But the Treaty of Zurich really settled nothing, except the definite boundary between the Piedmontese and the Austrian dominions in Northern Italy. Austria, it is true, agreed to give Venetia a certain amount of local independence, while France was to use her best endeavours to secure the return of the sovereigns to the duchies ; but these stipulations, vague enough in themselves, were rendered still more indefinite by the whole subject of the pacification of Italy being re- ferred to a European congress — which, as we shall see, was destined never to meet. It is by no means easy to say what was Napoleon's policy during the seven months that elapsed between his meeting with Francis Joseph at Villafranca and the cession of Savoy and Nice. Apparently, he had no fixed plan, but varied his aim from month to month, according to the course of events. To one point, nevertheless, he adhered pertinaciously throughout. As for the duchies, it would appear that when during the war he had allowed Cavour to revolutionize Central Italy and had sent Prince Na- poleon to Florence, it was in the hope of seeing the Prince and his young Italian bride made the rulers of a revived kingdom of Etruria. But Cavour managed so well and Prince Napoleon so ill, that all the feeling expressed by the Liberals was for union with Piedmont. It is not im- probable, therefore, that when Napoleon agreed, through his representatives at Zurich, to facilitate the return of the Grand Duke, he really intended to do so, for it was not his interest to make Piedmont too strong. There is, how- ever, an incident, the significance of which may be that from the first Napoleon looked favourably upon a Pied- montese annexation of Tuscany, though we believe that it more probably bore only upon the annexation of Romagna, and, perhaps, Modena and Parma. One day, before Cavour had resigned the Premiership, the French ambas- sador at Turin, the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, received from Count Walewski a despatch, which he was to com- municate to the Piedmontese minister. The despatch stated that, in presence of the troubles fomented by Pied- VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. 105 mont in Central Italy, the French Government declared to the Cabinet of Turin that any attempt at annexation would be regarded as a breach of treaties, and that the king should understand that it was at his own peril, without the aid of France and against her advice that he would embark on such an enterprise. The Prince de la Tour d' Auvergne, with whose personal views this note was in strict accor- dance, waited upon the Count, and courteously but firmly made these declarations to him on the part of his Govern- ment. Cavour heard him quietly to the end, and then said, with an embarrassed air, " Alas ! my dear prince, you are right. What Count . Walewski has written to you is not calculated to encourage our hopes. I acknowledge we are distinctly blamed. But," he added, his look of em- barrassment giving place to a smile, " what would you say if I were to read you on my part something I have received from the Tuileries and from a person you know ? " And so saying, he took out a letter from the Emperor's private secretary, bearing the same date as the French Premier's despatch, and assuring him that the Emperor looked very unfavourably on the annexation despatch, and that there- fore he need not be anxious about any complications which might result from it. The officer thus disavowed by his own sovereign had nothing to do but to fold up his despatch and carry it away with him.^ This incident, while it illustrates the utterly unscrupulous character of the imperial diplomacy, shows that Napoleon was throughout favourable to some increase of the terri- tory of Piedmont by means of an annexation in Central Italy. Probably the annexation referred to was that of Romagna. The peace of Villafranca had no sooner been concluded than all the official journals began to insist upon the necessity of the Pope recognizing the revolution of Bologna and ceding the Legations to Victor Emmanuel. No one doubted that this project had the support of the Cabinet of the Tuileries. Probably for the moment Napoleon's views went no farther than the cession of the ^ M. d'Ideville {Souvenirs d'un diplornate e?i Italie) relates this on the authority of one of Cavour's private secretaries. io6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Romagna ; but this alone would be a dismemberment of the territory of the Holy See, and a first step to further encroachments. In the Catholic episcopate the French bishops were the first to take the alarm. Bishop after bishop, by means of pastoral letters, protested against the intrigues for the dismemberment of the Holy See. Soon similar protests were heard from the episcopate of Ireland, Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Spain. Day after day the Univers published the full text of the pastorals of the French bishops until the Imperial Government sent it an official warning threatening a prosecution. Similar warn- ings were addressed to other papers in the Catholic press. The Univers had no other course but to obey, but M. Veuillot maintained his protest by simply announcing each day in the paper that such and such bishops had issued pastorals on the Roman question in the same sense as their colleagues. By these warnings to the Catholic press, and by seizing the Count de Montalembert's pam- phlet written in defence of the temporal power, the French Government, as early as the autumn of 1859, directly criminated itself, and made common cause with the spoilers of the Holy See. More overt acts were to follow. In September the deputies of the provisional Govern- ment at Bologna offered the Romagna to Victor Emmanuel. He told them he could not accept it, but promised to do what he could to forward their wishes at the conference. Two days after, on September 26th, the Pope, in an allo- cution, formally protested against the perfidy of Piedmont, in the Romagna. He then proceeded to break off diplo- matic relations with King Victor Emmanuel. On the ist of October the Piedmontese ambassador. Count della Minerva, received his passports from Cardinal Antonelli ; on the 1 2th he left Rome. Two other events of some significance marked the first days of October. On the 2nd Lord John Russell, speaking at Aberdeen, formally pledged the English Liberal party and the Whig Cabinet to the support of the Italian Revolution. On the same day that Revolution disgraced itself by the foul murder of Count Arviti, who was cruelly put to death by the Liberal mob VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. 107 of Farma in the streets of the city. The ringleaders of the mob were well known ; but though there were Piedmontese troops in the city no one was arrested, and the murder has to this day remained unpunished. Various difficulties as to the scope and basis of its de- liberations delayed the meeting of the Congress until the end of the year. The Pope had refused to be represented at it or to recognize its proceedings unless at the outset the integrity of the territory of the Church were accepted as a first principle. In the last week of December it was clear that he could not take any part in it ; for it became evident that French influence, then all-powerful in Europe, would be directed entirely to forcing the Congress to dis- member the States of the Church. Cardinal Antonelli was actually preparing to set out from Rome for Paris, when a pamphlet was published in the French capital which revealed the designs of Napoleon III., and showed the minister of Pius IX. that nothing but danger was to be expected from the Congress. In consequence of that pamphlet and of Antonelli's protest against it, the Congress never met. Probably the very object of the pamphlet had been to make its meeting impossible, and to attempt to overawe the Pope into concessions as to Romagna by publicly proposing as an alternative the complete dis- memberment of his States. This pamphlet was published anonymously at Paris on December 22nd. Its title was Le Pape et le Congres^ and, like the previous pamphlet. Napoleon III. et Vltalie which had heralded the war against Austria, it was written and given to the public in order to prepare the way for a new development of the Emperor's policy. It is now all but certain that it was the joint work of the Emperor and the Count de la Gu^rronniere, the Emperor supplying the ideas of the brochure^ the Count putting them into a readable form. But this was not the first pamphlet on the Roman question which had marked the new tendencies of the imperial policy. A brochure^ by M. Edmond About, entitled. La Question Romaine, had been printed in Belgium. It was a scurrilous attack on the Papal Court and the io8 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Roman administration, and although the Government took proceedings against it in order to keep up appearances, it did not contain anything worse than M. About had already written in \kv&Moniteiir^ the official journal of France. Under the Republic, M. About had been a decided Liberal ; \h^coup d'etat h3id suddenly reconciled him to the Empire. M. About's articles appeared in the official papers ; he wore the red riband of the Legion of Honour ; and in the spring of 1859 he was sent to Rome to promote the new policy of the French Empire by libelling the Pope and his Government. It is only just to M. About to add that the revolution of September 4th, 1870, reconciled him to Republicanism as effectually as the coi^p d'etat had made him an Imperialist ; and, finally, he wrote against Napo- leon III., to whom he owed everything, as bitterly as he had ever written against Pius IX. Napoleon's pamphlet, Le Pape et le Co7igrh, was a very different work from M. About's Qtiestiori Romaine. M. About's pamphlet was mere invective; Napoleon's announced a policy, and was a semi-official act of State. The thesis maintained in this now famous pamphlet was, that the temporal power of the Sovereign Pontiff was necessary to the due exercise of his spiritual power, but that the extent of his territory was of no importance whatever in the matter — nay, that the smaller the territory, the better for the Papacy : that the city of Rome itself would be quite sufficient. The anonymous author did not go quite so far as this, however ; he merely suggested that the Romagna should be separated from the territory of the Church, but the plainly marked tendency of his argu- ment was towards a far wider spoliation. It was precisely the argument of Goneril and Regan for reducing the numbers of Lear's guard, in order to finally abolish it. " Hear me, my lord/' says Goneril, — •• What need you five and twenty — ten — or five, To follow in a house where twice as many Have a command to tend you?" And then Regan goes straight to the natural conclusion, — "What need one?" VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. 109 In the wider drama, Napoleon and Cavour successfully sustained these parts. " What need you the Romag^na ? " asked the first in his pamphlet ; " or what need you, indeed, the Marches ? " — '' What need you Rome ? " asked Cavour. Never was there a more insidious attack on the temporal power than this pamphlet, which professes to defend it only in order to maintain with more show of reason that the partition of the Papal territory was an inevitable necessity. When the pamphlet appeared, Cardinal Antonelli was on the point of leaving Rome for the Congress. He at once refused to take part in any discussion of the Roman question, unless the pamphlet was officially disavowed. No disavowal came. On the contrary, the Emperor wrote to the Pope on the 31st of December, asking him to cede the Romagna to King Victor Emmanuel. In the letter Napoleon III. professed his loyalty to the cause of the Sovereign Pontiff, but he added, '' Facts have an inexorable logic, and despite my devotion to the Holy See, despite the presence of my troops at Rome, I could not avoid a certain amount of connection with the results of the national movement caused in Italy by the struggle against Austria." How very intimate the connection was, we have already seen. He then went on to treat of the position of affairs in the Romagna. " After a serious con- sideration," he said, "of the difficulties and dangers which the different combinations present — I say it with sincere regret, and painful as the conclusion may be — the solution, which appears to me most conformable to the true interests of the Holy See, will be to surrender the revolted provinces.'^ The Pope's answer was not given until nearly a week after the receipt of the Emperor's letter. Meanwhile some events occurred which were noted at the time as indications of the probable course of affairs. On New Year's Day the French officers of the garrison of Rome presented their respects to the Pope, assuring him that they were consoled for the loss of the glories of the campaign of 1859, by knowing that while guarding his throne at Rome they were no THE MAKING OF ITALY. upon the " Champ d^honneur dii CatholicismeP The Pope replied at some length, giving his blessing to the French army and to the Emperor, and praying that the latter might be enlightened to see the error of certain principles, " which had lately been set forth in a pamphlet, which might be described as a striking monument of hypocrisy and an unworthy tissue of contradictions— (?^;2 monument insigne d'hypocrisie et un ignoble tissu de contradictions) ^ Such was the opinion of Pius IX. on the Emperor's pamphlet. Three days later the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was changed, M. Walewski resigning the portfolio into the hands of M. Thouvenel, a man who from his political opinions was a much more ready co- operator in the Emperor's policy against the Holy See. The Pope's reply to the Emperor was officially for- warded to Paris on January 8th. It was published to the Catholic world in the Encyclical of the 19th. The reply was simply the Non possumus which the Popes have always opposed to every unlawful demand. " We declared to the Emperor," said Pius IX., " that We could not yield up that which was not Ours, and that We clearly understood that the victory which he wished Us to grant to the rebels of the Emilia would be a spur to the native and foreign disturbers of the other provinces to make the like attempts, when they saw the success obtained by the rebels. And, among other things. We declared to the said Emperor that We could not abdicate the said provinces of Our Pontifical dominion in the .Emilia without violating the solemn oaths by which We are bounds without giving rise to complaints and disturbances in Our other provinces, without doing a wrong to all Catholics, and, in fine, without weakening the rights not only of those Italian sovereigns who have been unjustly deprived of their dominions, but of all the sovereigns of all Christendom, who could not see with indifference certain most pernicious principles introduced. Nor did We omit to remark, that his Majesty was not ignorant by what men and with what moneys and protec- tion the recent outbreaks at Bologna, at Ravenna, and other cities, had been excited and accomplished." Such VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. was the reply to the Emperor. With equal clearness Pius IX. stated in the Encyclical his determination to abide by this resolution to the end. " With the help of God," he said, "and according to the duties of Our most weighty office, We shall fearlessly make every attempt, and shall leave nothing untried, to defend strenuously the cause of truth and justice, to guard with constancy and to keep whole and inviolate the Temporal Sovereignty of the Roman Church, its temporal possessions and its rights, which belong to the whole Catholic world ; and finally to watch over the just cause of other sovereigns. Trusting in the Divine help of Him who said, * In the world you shall have distress ; but have confidence, I have overcome the world ' ; ^ and ' Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake,' ^ We are prepared to follow the illustrious footsteps of Our predecessors, to rival their example, and to suffer the most rude and cruel trials, and even to lay down Our life, rather than in any way desert the cause of justice and of the Church of God." The answer of the French Government to this Encyclical was a simple and unmistakable one. On the 29th of January, for merely republishing the Pope's letter, the Uftivers was suppressed ; and in his official notification of the fact, M. Billault, the Minister of the Interior, plainly gave the Catholic press to understand that the fate of the Univers should be a warning to all. Liberty of the press was now at an end in France, and the Empire had prac- tically declared war against the temporal rights of the Holy See. That war was carried on rapidly and effectually throughout the rest of the year. On the 2 1st of January, two days after the Encyclical, the Ratazzi-La Marmora Ministry resigned, and Cavour became again Premier. He also took the portfolio of the Ministry of Marine, for what purpose his subsequent dealings with Persano and Garibaldi clearly showed. General Fanti, who was in command of the levies raised by the provisional government in Central Italy, accepted the 2 S. John xvi. 33. ^ S. Matthew iii. 10. 112 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Ministry of War, but without giving up his control over the troops in Florence and Bologna. All that remained now for France and Piedmont was to find a common basis of action. Already it had been said that the French Emperor must have obtained at Plombieres, in 1858, some pledge of territorial aggrandizement as the price of the assistance he was to give to Cavour's schemes. There is every reason to believe that there was at least a verbal agreement to the effect that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to France after the coming war. Early in 1859, in reply to inquiries made of him by the Derby Cabinet on private information supplied by Mr. Kinglake, Cavour had said that there was no " treaty " affecting Savoy and Nice. It was quite possible for him to have said this, if there was really only an informal understanding on the subject. The natural time for giving effect to such an understanding would have been the conclusion of the war, but when Napoleon made peace at Villafranca, he had executed only half his programme ; he therefore did not ask Cavour to carry out the cession of new territory to France. Had he attempted it at that moment, it would have put an end for ever to his popularity with the Italian Liberals. He resolved to wait ; and, accordingly, in July, 1859, Count Walewski formally assured the English ambassador in Paris, that the Emperor had abandoned the idea of annexing Savoy. Piedmont had lost Venetia, but had for the present saved Savoy and Nice. Now that he was about to consent to the annexation of Central Italy to Piedmont, he revived the project. Cavour hesitated, and tried to temporize ; whereupon M. de Talleyrand, the French ambassador, was instructed at one and the same interview to press upon the Piedmontese Government the necessity of coming to an immediate decision on the question, and to mention that the Emperor was about to order his army to evacuate Lombardy. This last informa- tion implied a threat of leaving Piedmont and her new acquisitions at the mercy of Austria. Cavour understood it. In spite of the protests of England and of Switzerland against the infraction of the treaties of Vienna implied in VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. 113 the cession of Savoy, the negotiations proceeded rapidly. Cavour made an effort to save at least Nice to Piedmont. When Azeglio was with him on the 22nd of March, re- ceiving his parting instructions before returning to his embassy in London, Cavour's last word to him was, " If we could only save Nice ! " On the same day M. Benedetti arrived at Turin, sent by the Emperor to assist M. de Talleyrand in the final negotiations. Even the fact that he was in Turin was kept studiously secret from the general public. On the 24th of March the negotiations were concluded, and the treaty of cession was signed. M. dTdeville, who was present as secretary to the French plenipotentiaries, has given us a lively picture of the scene.'' The meeting took place in one of Count Cavour's rooms in the palace of Turin. M. de Talleyrand and Benedetti represented France ; Cavour and Farini, Italy. While the treaty was being read, Cavour walked up and down the room with his hands in his pockets and his head bent down. He seemed thoughtful and preoccupied, and all his usual gaiety of manner had disappeared. As soon as the reading was finished, he took the pen and signed the treaty. Immediately his usual smile returned to his lips. Rubbing his hands together, he approached M. de Talleyrand, and said in a low voice, " Nozv we are accomplices j is it not so^ Baron ? " The words had a deep meaning. By giving Savoy and Nice to France, Cavour had secured the tacit consent of Napoleon III. to the policy, which, in the course of the next few months, was to secure for Piedmont dominion over the Duchies, the Legations, Umbria, and the Marches, Naples, and Sicily. He was now able to execute more rapidly, more boldly, and more independently, schemes which might have had to be deferred for years, had Napoleon been able to carry out the plan he had attempted in 1859, of driving the Austrians beyond the Alps, making Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, and establishing an ■• Souvenirs dun Diplomate en Italie. 114 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Italian confederation under his own influence and tutelage, with perhaps his cousin Prince Napoleon King of Tuscany, and a Murat King of Naples. The peace of Villafranca had destroyed this plan ; the events which followed had brought Cavour and Napoleon to a perfect agreement, which was sealed by the cession of two provinces to France. Well might Cavour a little later write, as he did to Prince Napoleon : — " The consequences of the peace of Villa- franca have developed themselves in the most admirable manner. The military and political campaign, which has followed that treaty, has been of greater advantage to Italy than the military campaign which preceded it. It has given the Emperor Napoleon III. greater claims on the gratitude of the Italians, than the battles of Magenta and Solferino. How often in the solitude of Leri have I not said to myself, ' Blessed be the peace of Villa- franca ! ' " There were still two acts required to complete the cession — first, the ratification of the treaty by the Pied- montese parliament ; and second, the vote in favour of France of a plebiscite in Savoy and Nice. There could be no doubt about the result of the plebiscite. The art of guiding the popular vote on such occasions was one well understood at Paris and Turin ; and Paris and Turin had agreed beforehand what the result of the vote should be. Aq opposition, led by Garibaldi, who sat as deputy for Nice, was to be expected in the Chamber of Deputies. But Cavour had canvassed the members sufficiently to feel sure of a majority. On April 2nd the Parliament met at Turin. In his opening speech the king said^ " Out of gratitude to France, for the sake of Italy, to cement the union of the two nations whose origin, principles, and destinies are alike, a sacrifice was necessary ; and I have made the one which was dearest to my heart. Reserving the vote of the people and the consent of Parliament, and with due regard to the right secured to Switzerland by virtue of international laws, I have signed a contract for the annexation of Savoy and the county of Nice to France." The treaty was discussed on the I2th. Cavour, in a long VILLAFRAACA AND ITS SEQUEL. 115 speech, insisted that the cession was the only means of securing the countenance and support of France for the further development of the Italian movement, and that it was therefore a necessity. The opposition was active and vigorous, but its numbers were few. On a division, 229 deputies voted for the ratification of the treaty of cession, and only 33 against it. Then came the plebiscites of Savoy and Nice. They were among the first of a long series ending with the plebiscite of Rome in October, 1870. They were meant to give di quasi-right to unjust annexations, by making people believe that the annexed populations were unanimously in favour of the change. Let us look closely at these plebiscites of Savoy and Nice. They will show us how the art of managing the popular vote is practically applied on such occasions. At the elections for Savoy, held before the meeting of Parliament, annexation had been a frequent topic of discussion. A protest was circulated against it, and re- ceived the signatures of 13,000 electors. It is curious that in a few weeks this solid body of electors opposed to the treaty had disappeared. At Nice, Garibaldi had resolved upon beginning a public agitation and organizing the opposition vote. He was turned aside from this purpose by Cavour placing in his hands more active work in the preparations for the expedition to Sicily. Like all the other members for the district of Nice, he had been re- turned on the distinct pledge that he would oppose annexation. But in Nice, as well as in Savoy, it would seem that some mysterious agency of conversion was at work. The authorities issued proclamations, telling the electors that, on the 15th, they would, by their free vote, choose whether they would belong to France or not, and almost commanding them to vote ^^ yes.'' At Nice, all public meetings for the discussion of the question were prohibited ; all placards, circulars, or handbills issued by the anti-annexation party were suppressed. No such restriction applied to the canvass in favour of the annexa- tion. Money was freely spent by the French party. The I 2 ii6 THE MAKING OF ITALY, vote is believed to have cost 120,000/., without counting the expenses of the voting day, when every elector with a French cockade and an affirmative voting paper was made free of the cafes and wine shops. Finally, before the day of the vote, the Piedmontese troops were withdrawn, a French garrison was marched in, two French frigates steamed into the harbour, and French officials took over the administration of the town. On the voting day the urns were guarded by National guards known to be favourable to the change. The oui tickets were freely distributed on all sides, but an Englishman tried in vain to get or to see a single non. The votes were counted — 25,743 declared for annexation ; 30 votes were cancelled. How many negative votes were there in the city of Nice which had returned Garibaldi to oppose the change t — in the district that three weeks before had elected none but anti annexationists ? There were eleven votes in the city, and 149 in the district ; in all, 160 against 25,743. The farce was played to the end. In Savoy, all the officials opposed to the annexation were dismissed, and others of French sympathies ap- pointed in their stead. The canvass against France was stopped. The walls were covered with proclamations, setting forth the benefits that would accrue from a French annexation. The 22nd was the day fixed for the voting. Not a single non ticket was allowed to be printed, while every elector was furnished with an oui by the authorities, and invited to vote it. Whoever wished to vote noir had to write his ticket, with a strong sense that his vote could not stop the annexation, and would be the worse fcr him. Finally, in this province, where, three weeks before, 13,000 electors had declared against annexation, only 235 were reported to have voted in that sense on the 22nd of April ; 71 votes were annulled, and the poll for France was officially declared to be 130,533. The fiction would have been better kept up, had the authorities been content with something less than this show of all but absolute unanimity. A month before the plebiscites of Savoy and Nice a VILLAFRANCA AND ITS SEQUEL. 117 similar farce had been played in the Duchies and the Romagna. Cavour had reaped the first-fruits of his en- gagement with France as to Central Italy. In the Romagna, as at Nice, the National Guards surrounded the urns, and in some cases with arms in their hands went round canvassing for votes. The result was, of course, what had been predetermined. In Tuscany, 366,571 votes were declared for annexation to Piedmont,, and 12,495 foi" a separate kingdom ; 4949 votes were annulled. In Emilia, which included the Romagna, Modena and Parma the official record of the vote on the question of annexa- tion was : — for, 426,006 : against^ 756 : annulled, 750. On March 15th, General Cialdini marched from Brescia to occupy the Romagna. Three days later, Victor Emmanuel formally accepted the sovereignty of the district. In the debate of April 12th, Count Cavour stated in the Chamber at Turin that in the plebiscite at Nice the same system would be followed which had been put in practice in the Emilia and in Tuscany. We have seen how the vote was managed at Nice, and we have, then, Cavour's indirect confession as to the character of the plebiscite in the Romagna. The annexation of the Romagna was the first definite accomplished act in the spoliation of the Holy See. On March 29th Pius IX. promulgated the bull, which, without naming any individual, excommunicated all who had borne a part in the annexation of the Legations. He had de- layed this last step until it was no longer possible to withhold it. The new kingdom of Italy began its career under the ban of the highest censures of the Church. Ii8 THE MAKING OF ITALY, CHAPTER VIII. GARIBALDI IN SICILY. Were we to found our estimate of the condition of the kingdom of the Two Sicih'es under the rule of King Ferdinand and during the brief reign of his son, Francis the Second, upon the writings and speeches of the revo- lutionary agitators of Italy and of their sympathizers in England and elsewhere, we should have to present a gloomy picture of the state of Southern Italy in the days of its independence. But in all these statements, whether they come from the mouths of deputies rhapsodizing in the Piedmontese Chambers, or of English members of Par- liament speaking in sympathy at Westminster, or whether we find them in the press of Piedmont, France, or England, there is quite enough of vague generalization and of sweeping charges, more than enough of fine phrases " full of sound and fury but signifying nothing ;" but there is very little of positive proof or of definite detail. And, on the other hand, there are a multitude of facts, which it would be difificult to reconcile with the theory of the utter wretchedness of the Neapolitan territory before the revolution of i860. ISlo one can examine the mass of testimony collected in M. Charles Garnier's Memoire sur le Royaume des deux Sidles, published at Paris in 1866, without being convinced that Naples under the Bourbon rule was at least as pros- perous as it has been since i860 under the Piedmontese system. Taxation was lighter there than in Piedmont, and far lighter than it is now in Italy ; the credit of the Government was good, the national debt low. The army being small, the conscription was far more tolerable than it is at present. A large part of the revenue was spent on GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 119 agriculture and public works. The first railway opened in Italy was in the kingdom of Naples, as was the first electric telegraph, the first suspension bridge, the first dioptric lighthouse. The first steamer ever launched from an Italian dockyard belonged to the Neapolitan navy. Trade was increasing, and manufactures flourished.^ There was brigandage, indeed, in some of the wilder districts ; but has brigandage disappeared under Piedmontese rule ? Murray's " Guide to Sicily" warns travellers that the roads in the island are now as safe as they were before i860, and this is a good authority on such matters. There were, it is said, grave abuses in the prison system. The fact has been disputed, and the abuses were certainly exaggerated ;^ but even granting all that to be true, I shall have soon to describe prison scenes under the rule of King Victor Emmanuel that throw it all into the shade. The Italian revolutionists had conceived the most bitter hatred ag-ainst King Ferdinand. He had earned it by firmly repressing all their attempts to overturn his throne. They had de- creed his deposition on the twofold ground, that he had no Parliament, and that his prisons ought to be reformed. Cavour took up their cause. We have seen how, at Paris in 1856, he had talked of "blowing up" the throne of King Ferdinand. Ferdinand was now dead. He prepared to overturn the throne of his son, Francis II. ^ M. Garnier gives evidence that, in the first six years of Itahan unity, some of the Neapolitan manufactures were deliberately de- stroyed in favour of those of the North. 2 Letter of Poerio from the prison of Monte Sarchio, dated April 8th, 1857. — " J'ai re9U votre lettre du i^"" de ce mois, qui m'a ete on ne peut plus agreable. Je suis bieii aise d'apprendre que votre precieuse sante va toujours de mieux en mieux, et je puis vous assurer quHl en est de ineine de inoi. Aujourd'hui, nous avons en une mag- nifique journee de printemps, et j'ai eu la consolation de me proinener a volonte. Je pense a plaisir que mon excellent C . . . sera de retour a Catanzaro dans le courant du mois ; en attendant je vous prie de le saluer et de lui souhaiter cordialement, en mon nom, une heureuse fete de Paques. Je vous ai ecrit par la poste de m'envoyer par le courrier de Paques, des fruits^ des petit s pots, des artichauts et dii beiirre^ comine de coutume. " Votre affectione neveu, " Carlo Poerio.'' 120 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Sicily afforded him a fulcrum for his lever. Although they enjoyed many privileges, amongst others exemption from the conscription, the population of the island had always been turbulent and discontented ; Italian rule has not made them more peaceable. Through the revolutionary committees, Cavour had agents in the island. As soon as he was ready to act, they prepared the way for him by an insurrection. On April 4th there were riots at Palermo, Messina and Catania, and guerilla bands appeared among the hills. Cavour immediately made ready to send efficient succour to the insurgents. He did not do it openly by declaring war against Naples, but by organizing an ex- pedition like Pisacane's expedition to Sapri in 1858. We have seen how he publicly condemned Pisacane's act as a lawless, unjustifiable attempt. In doing so, he condemned in advance his own actions of two years later. If Pisacane's expedition was unjustifiable, so was Garibaldi's ; but to Cavour attaches the additional infamy of the lying despatches and proclamations by which he endeavoured to conceal his complicity in the Garibaldian invasion of the territories of a power with which Piedmont was at peace. By means of the revolutionary committees it was easy to assemble in the neighbourhood of Genoa, towards the end of April, about a thousand Garibaldian "volunteers/' most of whom had seen service in the campaign of 1859. Garibaldi, with his old comrade Bixio as his second in command, was to lead the expedition. It was to be made to appear, as far as possible, an act of the committees, in which the Government had no share. The 5th of May was fixed for the departure from Genoa for Sicily. That evening 1107 chosen volunteers were directed to assemble, some at Foce, some at Quarto, near the Villa Spinola, a little to the east of Genoa. At 9 p.m. sixty of the volunteers went to the quay at Genoa, and seized two steamers belonging to the Compagnia Rubattino — the Piemonte and the Lombardo. The steamers had been en- gaged and paid for beforehand ; but they employed this appearance of force, in order to avoid embarrassing either the company or the Government. Owing to an accident to GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 121 the engines, the two steamers were not got round to Foce until 3 a.m. in the morning of the 6th. They found the vo- lunteers waiting for them in boats, in which they had been sitting shivering for four weary hours ; for the embarkation was to have taken place at 11 p.m. The volunteers were soon on board_, 707 embarking in the Loinhardo, of which Bixio took command, and 360 in the Piemonte, commanded by Garibaldi himself. There was a further delay of some hours, in getting on board arms and stores. It was not until 9 a.m. on the 6th that the expedition got under way. Even then, forty volunteers, who were to have brought up a convoy of arms from a depot some miles to the eastward, had to be left behind. Garibaldi and the mille di Marsala were now eji route for their destination. Meanwhile what was the Pied- montese Government doing } Cavour was providing for the safety of the expedition. It is to be remarked that, when he formed his ministry, he made himself Minister of Marine as well as President of the Council. He probably had already in view operations against the King of Naples, of which he wished to have the control in his own hands. Admiral Persano was placed in command of the fleet. His diaries of 1860,^ which he published at Florence in 1869, give the fullest details as to the arrangements made by Cavour, with a view to securing the safe transport of the Garibaldians to Sicily, not only in the case of this, their first expedition, but with regard to the numerous expeditions which followed for the purpose of reinforcing and supplying the Garibaldian army. On the 3rd of May Persano, who was at Genoa in command of a squadron of three steam frigates, tht Maria Adelaide, the Carlo Alberto and the Vittorio Emmaniiele, received orders to sail imme- diately for Cagliari in the island of Sardinia. Cagliari was the nearest point to Sicily in Sardinian territory with which Cavour had telegraphic communication, and he made it the base of operations for the fleet during the Sicilian campaign. ^ Diario private -politico-militare delP aimniraglio C. di Persano, nella campagna navale degli anni 1860-61. — Firenze. Civelli, 1869. 122 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. On the 7th of May Persano's squadron anchored in the Gulf of Cagh'ari. The same night the despatch boat, Tchnusa^ Commandant Saint-Bon, arrived from Genoa with despatches which ordered the admiral to act under the instructions of the governor of the city. On the morning of the 9th the governor told him to leave the Vittorio Rmmanuele at Cagliari, but to proceed to the port of La Maddalena with the two other men-of-war. He further told him that Garibaldi, with two steamers, had sailed for Sicily on the 6th, that if Garibaldi's expedition entered any Sardinian port he was to be stopped, but if Persano met him at sea he was to allow him to proceed. This order rather puzzled Persano. He says, he saw at once that it was not likely that Garibaldi would put into either Cagliari or La Maddalena, but if he were forced to do so by some chance, as for instance by stress of weather, did Cavour really mean that he should be stopped ? In his perplexity he sent off by the despatch boat a note to Cavour, asking him to telegraph the word CAGLIARI if he actually wished Garibaldi to be arrested in such a case, but the word Malta if he was to be allowed to go free, adding that, should a difficulty arise, he, Persano, was ready to sacrifice himself, and they might disavow his action if it were convenient. On the loth the squadron reached La Maddalena. Next day came Cavour's answer. He telegraphed neither simply Cagliari nor simply Malta, but the significant phrase " The Ministry have decided for Cagliari^ Persano says, " This special pointing out to me that the decision had been taken by the Ministry, showed me that he, Cavour, was of the contrary opinion. In order to save him anxiety, I telegraphed in reply. Ho capito (/ have under- stood)^ and resolved to let the bold condottiere proceed, even should he enter the ports where I was told to arrest him." In any case it was too late. Cavour need not have tele- graphed, Garibaldi was already in Sicily. At 9 a.m. on the morning of the 7th the two steamers had anchored off Talamone, on the Tuscan coast. A convoy of munitions of war was to have been there be- fore them, but by some mistake no trace of it could be GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 123 found. But Garibaldi knew he had other friends close at hand, and so long as the forts and arsenals of Victor Emmanuel were within reach, he had nothing to fear. Six miles to the southward lay the fort of Orbitello, garrisoned by a regiment of Piedmontese Bersaglieri, commanded by Major Giorgini. The Garibaldian Colonel Turr was despatched in all haste to the fort, and had no sooner explained what was required than Giorgini placed at his disposal four field-pieces and all the arms and ammunition he could spare. Meanwhile another supply of rifles and cartridges had been obtained from the smaller fort of Talamonc, large numbers of volunteers had landed and were drilling on the shore, sympathizers came from all sides to offer their services. Tiirr returned from Orbitello, accompanied by envoys from the Bersaglieri, who informed the general that the whole battalion was ready to follow him. He replied by declining their services and reminding them of the necessity of obedience and strict observance of discipline, which they would violate by following him without orders or permission from their superiors. The real cause of his refusal was that his two steamers were already overcrowded, and it would have been utterly im- possible to find room for another man. Two days were spent at Talamone, embarking the stores and drilling the men. It was well known at Turin that Gari- baldi was there. It would have been easy, even at that late period, to have stopped the expedition, but, as we have seen, Persano had other instructions, and it would have been strange if Garibaldi's steamers had been interfered with, seeing that his men were being armed from the forts of Talamone and Orbitello. At dawn of day on May 9th the anchors were weighed, and the Lombardo and Piemonte stood out to sea. But all the Garibaldians had not de- parted. Garibaldi had left at Talamone Colonel Zam- bianchi and sixty of the volunteers, who were to form the nucleus of a band for the invasion of the Papal territory. Of all the thousand who had left Genoa, Zambianchi was, perhaps, the best fitted for his work. He had a san- guinary fame in Italy. During the Roman Republic of 124 THE MAKING OF ITALY. 1848-49, when some priests whom he had arrested were liberated by the Republican Government, " He swore," says Farini, " as he himself acknowledged afterwards, henceforth not only to fill the place of sgherro, but also that of judge and hangman." He kept his oath. His sub- sequent massacres of priests and monks at San Callisto called forth the execration even of revolutionary writers^ and made his name a by-word for bloodthirsty cruelty throughout Italy, where he was commonly spoken of as "the Priest -Slaughterer." Such was the man who now prepared to carry the revo- lutionist propaganda into the Papal States. At the head of his sixty Garibaldians and about three hundred Tuscans, he crossed the frontier, on May nth, near the town of Latera. At his approach the prefect, panic-stricken, abandoned the place, taking with him the local police and gendarmes. Proclamations, signed by Garibaldi, calling on the Romans to rise for " Italy and Victor Emmanuel," had been industriously circulated throughout the States by the revolutionary committees, but notwithstanding all this preparation, the enterprise of Zambianchi met with no en- couragement or support from the people. The Pontifical troops were already moving against him. To defend Latera was impossible, so on the evening of the 12th, after pillaging the town, he withdrew to Grotte, about two leagues distant. A few hours after. Colonel de Pimodan and sixty mounted gendarmes, who had made a rapid march from Montefiascone, entered the town. A battalion oi chasseurs was following them, and would arrive in a few hours ; but Pimodan, hearing of the retreat of Zambianchi and fearing that he might escape him, pushed on to Grotte, without waiting for them. Zambianchi drew up his men for battle in the market-place of the little town, trusting to his superior numbers, and perhaps hoping that the gendarmes (every one of them Italians but the colonel) would desert their colours at the last moment. If he had any such hope, he was speedily undeceived. The gendarmes, led by Pimodan, charged. The struggle was short but sharp. GARIBALDI IN SICIL Y. 125 In a few minutes the Garibaldian ranks were broken, and driven in confusion out of the village. The Pontifical troops lost two killed and three wounded ; the insurgents, nine killed, twenty-five wounded, and some prisoners. Zambianchi and the remnant of his band with diffi- culty succeeded in recrossing the Tuscan frontier. " If I could have had the battalion of chasseurs which was coming from Iterbe,'' said Pimodan in his report,'' ^* the entire band would have been captured ; but it did not join me until five in the afternoon." The Papal troops were moved up to various points on the frontier to prevent a repetition of the raid ; but Zambianchi had received so warm a reception from Pimodan, that he made no attempt to retrieve his defeat. Meanwhile the main body of the expedition had pursued its way to Sicily. On the 9th, after leaving Talamone, they put into San Stefano, where there was a coal depot belonging to the Piedmontese Government, and intended for the use of the gun-boat Giglio, then cruising on the Tuscan coast. Here the two steamers renewed their supply of coal. At three in the afternoon they put out to sea again, steering west-south-west instead of following the direct course to Sicily, so as to avoid the Neapolitan cruisers. On the loth arms were distributed amid great enthusiasm. In the evening^ a volunteer on board the Lornbardo attempted to commit suicide by leaping over- board. The engines were stopped, and he was rescued. But meanwhile the Pienionte continued on her course, and was soon lost to sight in the gathering darkness. A period of great anxiety followed for those on board of both the steamers. They sought for each other, but as neither showed any light for fear of attracting a Neapolitan vessel, the search was no easy one. At length, in the middle of the night, the Lornbardo perceived a steamer bearing down on her. Bixio, fearing that the ship was a hostile one, silently cleared for action ; but as the steamers were near- ing each other, the well-known voice of Garibaldi shouted '' Official report to General Lamoriciere. Tablet, June 2nd, i860. ^ La Revolution Sicilienne^ par Chas. de la Varenne. 26 THE MAKING OF ITALY. from the deck of the supposed stranger : " Is that you, Bixio ? " " Yes ! '^ was the reply, and the two crews joined in a hearty cheer. Next morning red shirts were distributed to three hundred. The rest of the volunteers wore plain clothes, except some of the recruits from the royal army of Pied- mont, who retained the uniforms of their corps. At 8 a.m. Garibaldi gave orders to steer for Marsala. Soon the mountains of Sicily rose like blue masses above the horizon. At noon the coast was clearly visible. No man-of-war was in sight — only a solitary fishing-boat. Garibaldi hailed her, and by his order the crew laid her alongside of the Piemonte, and her captain came on board. The fisherman brought good news. For some days, he said, three Neapolitan ships — two steam corvettes, the Stromboli, Captain Carracciolo, and the Capri, Captain Acton, with the sailing-ship Amalia — had been at anchor off Marsala ; but that morning they had left the harbour and gone down the coast towards Trapani. All was there- fore clear for a landing, but there was no time to be lost ; the corvettes might return at any moment, as the approach of the two steamers would certainly be telegraphed along the coast. Steaming at full speed, the Lonibardo and the Piemonte ran into the harbour almost abreast, and stopped close by the quay or mole, the Lombardo, the larger of the two, grounding on the mud. In the harbour there were only a few coasters and two English men-of-war, the frigate Intrepid, Captain Marryat, and the despatch-boat Argus. These two vessels had arrived the day before. It was officially announced that they came to protect British interests, but it was naturally asked why they had not been sent early in April, when there was an actual insurrection in the district of Marsala; instead of in May, when it was entirely suppressed in that quarter. It was at the time generally believed in Italy, and it is to this day, that the English men-of-war had been sent to Marsala to facilitate Garibaldi's landing, or at least to serve as places of refuge for him and his followers in case of failure. Notwith- GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 127 standing the reports of Captain Marryat and Admiral Mundy, and the declaration of Lord John Russell, that impression has not been removed ; and the words of a speech of Garibaldi himself at the Crystal Palace, four years after, deepened it for many into a conviction/ The Piemontes crew landed by the mole, and seized the town, the people manifesting much more surprise than enthusiasm at the appearance of their red-shlrted guests. The men from the Lombardo landed more slowly by means of fishing-boats. Before the disembarkation was completed the two Neapolitan men-of-war came up, and after some delay opened fire. They only wounded two of the volun- teers, and did not seize the steamers until all the Garibal- dians had cleared out of them. There was certainly serious negligence and incompetence displayed by the Neapolitan navy on this occasion. The Garibaldians spent the night in Marsala.*^ Next day they marched on to Salemi, where Garibaldi spent the 13th and part of the 14th completing the organization of his column, and assembling a large body of the Sicilian insurgents who were to act with him. The first engagement with the Neapolitans took place on May 15 th. As soon as the landing of the Garibaldians was known at Palermo, General Landi left the city with a flying column, composed of the 8th chasseurs, the ist carbineers and a battalion of the loth regiment of the line, some cavalry and four mountain guns, in all between three and four thousand men. He first occupied Alcamo, but on ^ " The English people," he said, " assisted us in our war in Southern Italy, and even now the hospitals of Naples are supplied out of the abundance sent to us from this country. I speak from what I know, that the Queen and the Government of England, repre- sented by Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell and Mr. Gladstone, have done a wonderful deal for our native Italy. If it had not been for this country we should still have been under the yoke of the Bourbons at Naples. If it had not been for Admiral Mundy I should never have been permitted to pass the Straits of Messina." 7 It appears from Commander Marryat's letter to Admiral Fan- shawe, dated May 14th, that at Marsala some of Garibaldi's officers wore the uniform of the Piedmontese army. Many of the men had the Crimean medal. 128 THE MAKING OF ITALY. hearing of the advance of the Garibaldians he moved forward to Calatafami, a town strongly situated in the heart of the mountains at the junction of the roads from Marsala and Trapani to Palermo. The town and the heights on which it stands, further strengthened as they are by the. remains of Norman and Saracenic fortifications, would have been capable of a protracted defence against even more formidable foes than those with whom Landi had to deal, and it seems at first to have been his intention to await the enemy there. On the 14th Garibaldi pushed forward his advanced guard under Bixio to the village of Vita^ five miles to the south of Calatafami. Between Vita and Calatafami, the road, which is little better than a mountain track, passes over three successive ranges of hills. Anyone of these would have afforded a good position for the defence of the road ; and on the same day Landi left the town and advanced to the second or central range. Two thousand years before, its level summit and scarped sides had wit- nessed the defeat of the Romans by the people of Segeste, and it still bears the name of the Monte del Pianto dei Romania *'the hill of Roman woe." At midnight the main body of the Garibaldians began its advance from Salemi. At eight o'clock next morning they had joined their advanced guard at Vita. The force consisted of the " thousand of Marsala " and a body of twelve hundred Sicilians^ under the command ofAcerti and La Masa. At ten the outposts reported that Landi was forming the royal troops in columns of attack on the Monte del Pianto, Garibaldi immediately occupied a lower range of hills just outside Vita. His Redshirts formed the centre ; the Sicilians were on both flanks, and the four guns obtained at Orbitello were placed so as to sweep the road. Landi began the attack. The Garibaldian artillery drove back his cavalry. His infantry pushed on to the foot of the hills, and attempted to charge up them with 8 This is Captain Forbes' estimate. Vide his " Campaign of Garibaldi." GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 129 the bayonet, but they had to retire before the heavy fire of the Garibaldians, many of whom where picked marks- men whose every shot told. Garibaldi then assumed the offensive. Led by Bixio, the Redshirts rushed up the steep sides of the Monte del PiantOy but here again the advantage was with the defensive, and the attack was repulsed. Garibaldi brought up reinforcements in person. Again the volunteers assailed the Neapolitan position ; again they were driven back, and as they retired the Royalists rushed down upon them with the bayonet, while another column thrown forward on one of the spurs of the Monte del Pianto threatened to turn their right. For a moment it seemed that the battle was won. The lines of the volunteers were broken, and Garibaldi at one time found himself almost amongst the bayonets of the Neapo- litans. With the help of his staff, he succeeded in rallying his men and bringing up his reserves. The advance of the Royalists was checked. On the right and left the Sicilians were pressing on their flanks ; and Landi, who seems to have been more anxious to secure his retreat than to follow up and improve the advantage he had won, withdrew to the heights. The battle had now lasted five hours ; it was near three o'clock. Garibaldi, bringing up every man he could muster, attacked the Monte del Pianto for the third time. The struggle was a severe one. For a time the Neapo- litans held their ground against the Garibaldians in front and the Sicilians on both flanks. Those who witnessed the engagement say that it was the hottest in the whole war. Volleys were exchanged at almost hand to hand distance, and the combatants repeatedly closed with the bayonet. Garibaldi's standard-bearer, Schiaffino, was run through the body, and the flag was captured. His son Menotti was wounded, and so was young Manin. Still the attack continued as hotly as ever. At length Landi abandoned the height, and made a hurried and disorderly retreat to Calatafami. More than four hundred killed and wounded strewed the fiercely contested ground. Landi had lost one gun, 6 prisoners, 36 killed and 148 wounded ; K I30 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. the Garibaldian loss was between two and three hundred. They had suffered so severely, that they contented them- selves with occupying the position they had won, without attempting a pursuit. Landi's beaten troops did not remain at Calatafami. He withdrew them to the neighbourhood of Palermo. The news of Garibaldi^s first success gave a fresh impetus to the insurrection. The tidings of the victory were at Cagliari the next morning ; and Persano, the Piedmontese admiral, wrote to congratulate Garibaldi on his exploits. A few days after, the admiral, by Cavour's orders, placed the despatch-boat Ichnusa at the disposal of the Sicilian Baron Pisani and his son, who were on their way to Palermo ; and towards the end of the month, on the 28th of May, when the steamer Utile^ having on board a hundred recruits and two thousand rifles for Garibaldi, put into Cagliari, Persano received orders from Turin to give her captain any information that might be of service to him in pursuing his voyage to its destination. While the govern- ment at Turin was thus making use of its fleet to facilitate Garibaldi's enterprise, the Official Gazette, of May 17th, contained the following declaration : — " The government disapproved of General Garibaldi's expedition. As soon as it was informed of the departure of the volunteers, the royal fleet received orders to pursue the two steamers, and to oppose a disembarkation." We have already seen what Persano's orders really were. On May 15th Garibaldi assumed the title of Dictator of Sicily in the name of King Victor Emmanuel. On the 22nd Count Cavour addressed a note to the Cavaliere Canofari, ambassador of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies at Turin, in which he said : — " The undersigned, by order of his Majesty, does not hesitate to declare that the King's government is entirely alien to any act of General Garibaldi, that the title assumed by him is a complete usurpation, and that his Majesty's government cannot but disapprove of it." This was, perhaps, strictly true. Doubtless Cavour disapproved of Garibaldi's throwing off any part of the mask so soon ; but undoubtedly Persano's diary proves the thorough GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 131 complicity of the government with Garibaldi, and the lying duplicity of the Gazette and of Cavour's despatch. Having defeated Landi and made himself Dictator of the island, and finding the insurrection spreading all around him. Garibaldi prepared for a great enterprise. He had to choose between throwing himself into the mountainous interior of the island, there drilling his new levies, receiving reinforcements and gradually forming an army, or attempting something on a grand scale at once. He chose the latter course, and determined to attack Palermo, the capital of the island. Doubtless this had been part of his plan from the outset, for an attack on Palermo would bring him upon the seaboard again, where his ally, Admiral Persano, would be able, to a greater or less extent, to give him the co-operation of the Piedmontese fleet. Palermo was held by a garrison of 24,000 men, under the command of General Lanza, He has been denounced by writers favourable to the cause of King Francis as having been from the outset a traitor. His failure may perhaps be explained by supposing that he was a weak- minded, incapable, vacillating man, who never should have been given a command. Palermo stands on the seashore within an amphitheatre of hills whose beauty has won for them the name of the Conca d'Oro, or Golden Shell. It had a strong castello^ or citadel, and a Neapolitan squadron lay in the roadstead. At this period the majority of its 200,000 inhabitants, at all times hot-blooded and turbulent, were on the point of revolt. For two months no church bell had been heard in the city. The tongues had been taken out of the bells lest they might be used to sound the tocsin. The approaches to Palermo consist of four good roads. Two of them are by the seashore ; the two others penetrate the amphitheatre of hills, at Parco seven miles from Palermo, and at Monreale four miles outside the town. Besides these roads there are a number of narrow and difficult mountain paths. Lanza arranged his plans on the idea that the seaside paths were not only difficult but utterly impracticable for a guerilla column. He can- toned his troops in the citadel, the palace, and various K 2 132 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. large buildings, all on the northern and western sides of the town. The guns of the fleet commanded its seaward face, but the southern side was left all but unguarded, a few isolated posts being placed at the gates. The force immediately under his command numbered 14,000 men. To guard the two mountain roads, by which alone he sup- posed the Garibaldian attack could be made, he stationed 4000 men at Parco, and 6000 good troops, commanded by General Bosco, at Monreale. Garibaldi, having resolved to attack Palermo, pushed up his advanced columns to Parco and Monreale. There were numerous skirmishes, in which it could hardly be said that either party was successful. The general effect of them was to keep the Neapolitans continually on the alert, and to confirm Lanza in the idea that if Palermo were attacked it would be by the roads from the mountains through Parco and Monreale. On the 24th of May Garibaldi appeared before Parco, having crossed the hills by goat tracks from the Monreale road. Bosco was in Parco, and he immediately came out at the head of a strong column of Neapolitan volunteers. Firing com- menced on both sides, and the Garibaldians began to fall back rapidly along the road to Corleone. Bosco pursued, and sent back a message to Palermo that he had defeated the main Garibaldian force, was in pursuit, and hoped that it would be completely dispersed. He had fallen into a trap laid for him by the wily guerilla chief to whom he was opposed. On the hills near the village of Santa Christina, Garibaldi, with the bulk of his force, struck off suddenly to the eastward, leaving Carini with two guns and some of the Sicilian insurgents to continue the retreat to Corleone. Bosco followed Carini for some hours, until, ascertaining that the force he was pursuing had dwindled down to a handful of men, he began his march back to Parco, under the very natural impression that he had obtained an important success and dealt a serious blow to the insur- gents and their Piedmontese allies. Meanwhile, Garibaldi having thus deceived Bosco and disengaged himself from his pursuers, turned to the north- GARIBALDI IN SICIL Y. 133 ward, and, on the 26th, reached the village of Misilmeri. Here, by his orders, a strong force of Sicilian insurgents had assembled to join him ; and he was within a few miles of the unguarded southern side of the town. In the course of the afternoon — which was the eve of Whit-Sunday — he approached Palermo with a few of his officers, to recon- noitre, and probably to communicate with some of his friends inside the walls. He resolved as soon as it was dark to march in by the high road near the seashore. His Sicilian guides, however, persuaded him to alter his plans, and at the last moment it was decided that instead of making a detour for the seashore and gaining the high road, the columns should descend from the hills by the narrow and rugged pass of Mezzagna, which leads more directly to Palermo. The Sicilians under La Maza, about 1300 strong, led the way, preceded only by the guides and a few of Garibaldi's Redshirts. After the Sicilians came 800 Garibaldians, and then a long straggling column of insurgent bands which had not yet been fully organized or drilled. At ten, the column began its slow march down the dark rugged path- way of the pass. Lanza, in Palermo, had no idea that his enemies were so near him. He had just received news from Bosco of the skirmishing at Parco and the supposed breaking up and retreat of the Garibaldians, and he had given a supper in honour of the good news. The guests rose and dispersed at twelve, while the Garibaldians only a few miles off" were still struggling through the dark defile of the Mezzagna. The city should have been attacked before daylight on the 27th, but the guides had missed their way and delayed the column, and it was not until the dawn of Whit-Sunday was breaking, that the vanguard entered the southern suburbs in front of the Porta dei Termini. The Sicilians should have surprised the gate, but instead of approaching it in silence, they came up cheering and firing at random. The handful of Neapoli- tans on guard turned out, and fired a volley amongst them. They fell back in a kind of panic, and it was not till Garibaldi's 800 veterans pressed forward, that the gate was 134 THE MAKING OF ITALY. attacked and carried. There were few troops in the quarter of the town to which the gate gave access. As the attacking column entered the streets it met with little resistance, and Garibaldi was soon close to the great circus in the centre of the town, where the two broad streets (the Toledo and the Macqueda), which divide it into four almost equal parts, intersect each other. As the Gari- baldians advanced, the people rushed to arms, took possession of the belfries, and began to sound a wild irregular tocsin by beating the bells with hammers^ for as the tongues had been removed the bell ropes were useless. This was the sound, that, mingled with the rattle of musketr}'-, woke the whole city on Whit-Sunday morning. All day long there was desultory fighting in the streets. Lanza had been surprised, he had no plan of action, and except on a few points he offered no organized or deter- mined resistance. The Garibaldians and Palermitans occupied street after street, and strengthened their positions with barricades. At three in the afternoon more than half the town was in Garibaldi's hands. Lanza held the citadel, the fort on the mole, the Palazzo delle Finanze, the cathedral, the royal palace, and the western walls from the bastion of Aragon on the north to that of Montalto at the south-western corner of the city. The Garibaldian advance had cut him off from direct communication with the citadel, but he had still open communication through the northern suburbs with the fort on the mole and with the sea. Lanza had superior numbers on his side. In the after- noon he might easily have organized a general attack upon the Garibaldian positions, for there were not more than looo well-armed and disciplined soldiers among the insurgents ; the rest were little better than an armed mob. But Lanza remained inactive until three p.m., when he took a resolution which brought much undeserved odium down upon the young king whom he was betraying. He resolved to bombard the city with the guns of the fleet and of the citadel. In vain several of his officers protested. General Salzano, a faithful servant of Francis II., endeavoured to GARIBALDI IN SICIL Y. 135 dissuade Lanza from the determination he had taken. He was not listened to, and he broke his sword and took no further part in the operations. Between three and four the bombardment began. With the force at Lanza's command it was unnecessary ; but, once he had recourse to this extreme measure, one would suppose that he would have continued it long enough to drive the enemy out of the city. He only kept up the fire a sufficient time to cause a general panic and burn down a large number of houses. Very few people were killed. They crowded into their cellars, or into the churches which the Neapolitan guns scrupulously respected. The bombardment slackened in the night, but broke out again with full fury at daylight. Admiral Mundy sent a protest to the citadel from the English squadron, but it was not listened to. By noon matters were becoming critical for Garibaldi.^ " Had Lanza bombarded another twelve hours," says Captain ForbeSj a philo-Garibaldian writer, — " and no earthly power was at Palermo that really would have stopped him — Garibaldi would have been simply destroyed. He had not nine cartridges a man left, when it ultimately ceased . . . the lower quarters of the city were hardly tenable owing to the guns of the fort and squadron."^ At noon, on Mundy's mediation, a six hours' armistice was agreed upon, and this saved Garibaldi. It was not very strictly observed. There was skirmishing at . times between the Sicilians and Neapolitans. At six, no terms having been made, 5 During the morning of the 28th the fighting closed round the convent of the Sette Angeli, and shells fell upon the buildings. The nuns were escorted by a Garibaldian guard to the Jesuit college. P^re Botalla, in his history of the insurrection, gives high praise to the young men who formed this guard, for the courtesy with which they fulfilled their duties, and also for the assistance they gave to the Jesuits in removing the more valuable furniture belonging to the nuns from the convent. It is pleasing to be able to note this incident, which does credit to some of the followers of a man whose general conduct I have had to condemn throughout. — See Botalla's Hist, de la Revolution de Sidle, vol. i. pp. 221, 222. 1 Forbes' " Campaign of Garibaldi in the Two Sicilies, a Personal Narrative," p. 50. 136 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. fighting began again. Garibaldi passed the night of the 28th to the 29th strengthening his position and pushing his barricades up to the approaches to the palace and the glacis of the citadel. Early on the 29th the Neapolitans evacuated the bastion of Montalto, leaving there a 32- pounder, which the Garibaldians carried down to the barricades near the Finanze in order to try and shell out the guard. Lanza was inactive the greater part of the day. Once only he pushed a column of chasseurs forward into the long street of the Toledo. The column cleared several barricades, and was soon nearly in the middle of the town. Had Lanza supported it, he might have recovered all the ground he had lost, but he was either too timid or too treacherous. He recalled the chasseurs to the palace ; and they came back clenching their fists and cursing the incapacity of their general. During the rest of the day the fighting was confined to a dropping musketry fire exchanged at the barricades round the palace, and the occasional discharge of a shell from the citadel. In the afternoon Garibaldi received cheering news from the country. Girgenti and Trapani had fallen into the hands of the insurgents ; and though the garrison of Catania had repelled an attack, the whole province was in insurrection. The night passed quietly. Admiral Mundy was in communication both with Garibaldi and with Lanza, to arrange an armistice, which in such a state of affairs meant only the surrender of the city to the rebels. Mundy proved himself on this occasion a good friend to Garibaldi, and the British fleet was only one degree behind that of Piedmont in its violation of neutrality. At nine, on the morning of the 30th, General Lanza wrote to Garibaldi, that Admiral Mundy had informed him that he was ready to receive on board of his flagship the Hannibal \.^o Neapolitan officers for the purpose of opening a conference with two officers of the Garibaldians, to arrange a definite armistice. He therefore asked him to appoint an hour for a truce to begin, and an hour for the interview. Garibaldi replied by agreeing that the truce should begin at noon, and the meeting on board the Hannibal should take place at GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 137 one p.m. The truce had hardly begun, when the gate of the Termini was attacked by a Neapolitan column. It was Bosco's brigade, which, knowing nothing of the armistice and anxious to succour Lanza, had marched down from near Corleone, and had begun to force its way into the town. The Garibaldians under Carini tried in vain to hold the gate. Bosco forced it, and penetrated far into the street beyond, Carini falling severely wounded in the encounter. Garibaldi sent a hurried message to Lanza, asking him to inform Bosco of the armistice ; and soon, to the disgust of that true and gallant soldier, a Neapolitan aide-de-camp rode up, and informed him that there was an armistice — in other words, that his commander-in-chief was treating with the rebels. Bosco stopped firing at once. Had he been in Lanza's place, Garibaldi would have met with a very different reception in Palermo. About one. Garibaldi and Colonel Tiirr went on board of the Hannibal, where they were received by Admiral Mundy. General Letizia, who acted for Lanza, arrived soon after. He proposed an armistice on the basis of the following six points : — 1. That a suspension of arms should be concluded for the period about which the parties would agree. 2. That during the suspension of arms each party should keep its position. 3. That the convoys of wounded from the royal palace, as well as the families of the employes^ should be allowed to pass free through the town, in order to embark on board the royal ships. 4. That the royal troops in the palace, as well as the families of the refugees in the monasteries near it, should be allowed to provide themselves with their daily pro- visions. 5. That the municipality should address a humble petition to his Majesty the King, laying before him the real wishes of the town, and that the petition should be submitted to his Majesty. 6. That the troops in the town should be allowed to receive their provisions from the citadel. 138 THE MAKING OF ITAL V, Garibaldi objected to the fifth clause, and it was struck out. The armistice was then signed. It was to last till noon on the following day — Thursday, May 31st. Both sides spent the time in removing their wounded, burying their dead, and strengthening their fortified positions. Everyone supposed that both parties would afterwards begin the fighting in earnest. But Lanza had now lost all the little determination he had possessed at first. From incapacity he had drifted into treason ; and at ten p.m. on the 3 1st, two hours before the armistice expired, he sent Letizia to Garibaldi's headquarters to negotiate a pro- longation of it. It was agreed that the armistice should last until noon on June 3rd ; but, by an inexplicable act of weakness or treachery, Lanza and Letizia allowed a clause to be added to the armistice, by which the Palazzo delle Finanze, which contained the State Bank, should be sur- rendered to Garibaldi, and placed in the hands of his dele- gate, Crispi. This was a most important concession. '' During the afternoon," says Forbes,^ " the captain and guard at the Finanze laid down their arms, being com- pletely cut off, and Garibaldi became to his surprise the disposer of over ;^ 1,200, 000 in cash, chiefly private deposits; of course he took possession for the State. Considering that there were nearly 50,000 squadri ^ on the pay lists, it was rather needful. Only his own men fought for nothing and fed themselves, paying their own way. This spirit had not yet established itself in South Italy. The island patriots required their daily dole." This sum, of nearly a million and a quarter of money, was equal to a reinforce- ment of several battalions. Garibaldi's wholesale confis- cation had filled his military chest to overflowing. Next day he wrote to Dr. Bertani, his agent at Genoa : — " Dear Bertani, — I authorize you, not only to make an advance or to negotiate a loan for Sicily, but moreover to contract any debt whatever, as we have here immense means to satisfy all claims. — Yours ever, G, Garibaldi^ The city was generally quiet during the armistice, but there were some 2 " Campaign of Garibaldi," p. 59. ^ Sicilian insurgents. GARIBALDI IN SICIL V. 1 39 disturbances. Some of the insurgents hunted down and massacred the detective police. Captain Forbes seems to approve of this massacre. He says, " they shot those vermin without reserve.'^ Considering that the " vermin " were men shot in the streets without trial, I call it foul murder. We must now take up Persano's diary again, and see what he was doing while Garibaldi was fighting and negotiating at Palermo. On the 3rd of June, La Farina arrived at Cagliari, and presented to Admiral Persano a letter from Cavour, which directed him to forv/ard La Farina to Palermo, and to act subsequently as his own discretion would suggest, as, now that events were travelling so fast, it was impossible to give him definite orders beforehand from Turin. Persano placed at the disposal of La Farina the Maria Adelaide. According to Forbes,* the Piedmontese agent had amongst his baggage on board the man-of-war several balls of blue posters with the words upon them, Vogliamo r annessione al regno con- stituzionale del Re Vittorio Emmanuele. "We desire to be annexed to the constitutional kingdom of King Victor Emmanuel." These were to be posted in Palermo on La Farina's arrival there. Farina did not sail immediately. Next day the frigate Vittorio Emmanuele arrived at Cagliari from Palermo, bringing a letter from Garibaldi to Persano, dated the morning of the 3rd. " Admiral," wrote Garibaldi, " the armistice ends to-day at noon, and if the enemy will fight, we shall fight as we are used to do. Whilst we are staking the destiny of Italy in this conflict^ I leave it to you to do what you can for us. Yours ever affectionately, G. Garibaldi.^' Persano saw that Garibaldi was not yet sure of Lanza, he knew that the position of the insurgents was very insecure, and the letter he had just received made him anxious. After some consideration, he resolved to take advantage of the liberty of action which Cavour had given him in the letter brought by La Farina, and to sail immediately for Palermo. Next morning, before sailing, he received a letter from Cavour, telling him 4 p. 67. I40 THE MAKING OF ITALY. that some of the officers of the Neapolitan navy were willing, at a favourable opportunity, to declare for the revolution ; and the despatch-boat Governolo came into Cagliari with the news that the armistice had been again prolonged. He left the Vittorio Emmamcele at Cagliari and sailed alone with the Maria Adelaide and the Carlo Alberto. On his way he met the despatch-boat Anthion, and received confirmation of the report brought by the GovernolOy that the armistice had been indefinitely pro- longed. Next day, the 6th, he anchored in the roadstead of Palermo. The anchorage was crowded with the ships of European navies. There were Neapolitan, English, French, Austrian, Spanish and American men-of-war. Persano noted with satisfaction that Mundy's English ships lay close in to the town and covered it effectually. He anchored near them ; and La Farina opened com- munications with Garibaldi, and soon after landed. On the 7th Persano himself went on shore to visit Garibaldi. The General had good news for him. Letizia, Lanza's lieutenant, had come back the day before from a mission to Naples, bringing authority for the evacuation of Palermo by the Neapolitan troops. A miserable and disorganized attempt at resistance, a useless bombardment and a weak negotiation, had ended in a convention, which in a few days would place the whole city in the hands of the Gari- baldians. On the 7th the evacuation of the city began. It was not completed until the 19th, for the Neapolitans had, besides their troops, a large number of guns to embark, and an immense amount of stores and ammu- nition. Probably one of the motives which had led them to capitulate was the desire to save this materiel^ which would be of great use for the subsequent prosecution of the war. While the evacuation was in progress, neither Persano, nor La Farina, nor Garibaldi was idle. La Farina had had his blue posters stuck up all over the city, and was arranging with Garibaldi the civil organization of those portions of the island which were occupied by the insur- GARIBALDI IN SICIL V, 141 gents. Persano had collected all his three frigates in the roadstead, and was negotiating with some of the officers of the Neapolitan navy in order to obtain from them a general pronuncianiento for Piedmont, which would add their ships to his own, and place him in command of a really formidable force. On the evening of the 8th of June he succeeded in persuading Vacca, the commander of the Neapolitan frigate Ettore Fieramosca^ to come to his flagship and talk the matter over with him. Vacca was warm in the cause of the revolution, and promised to hoist the tricolour as soon as the whole of the squadron, or even the greater portion of it, was ready to follow his example ; but it was agreed on both sides that it was necessary to wait, as a partial movement would only warn King Francis of the treason that was being planned against him. On the nth Cavour authorized Persano to send the despatch-boat Governolo to Messina, with orders to secretly favour a movement which was being organized there. Two days later the admiral received disquieting intelli- gence. Mazzini, Mario, and " Miss White " were said to be on board of the Washington, which was bringing arms to Palermo. About Mario and Miss White Cavour cared very little ; but he feared that Mazzini would give a Republican turn to the movement in Italy. He therefore ordered Persano to ask Garibaldi to arrest his old leader, if he should be on board of the Washington. Persano saw the General, who promised that if Mazzini came to Sicily and acted against Victor Emmanuel, he would arrest him ; but he avoided giving the distinct pledge that he would arrest him if he were on board the Washington. This was what Persano required, and, as Garibaldi would not promise it, the Admiral resolved that if Mazzini appeared, he him- self would arrest him. The next few days were passed in making ready for the safe disembarkation in Sicily of a second expedition from Genoa. It was commanded by Medici, and consisted of four ships, Washington, Franklin, Oregon, and Utile, having on board 3000 men, 8000 rifles, and 400,000 cartridges. Garibaldi, Medici, and Persano, corresponded with each other as to the best course to take. 142 THE MAKING OF ITALY, It was finally resolved that the expedition should be escorted to the bay of Castellamare, near Palermo, by two of Persano's vessels, and should land there. Persano sent off the frigate Carlo Alberto and the despatch-boat Gul- nara to accomplish this task, the commander of the despatch-boat having orders to arrest Mazzini if he were with the expedition. On the 19th the two ships rejoined the squadron at Palermo, and reported that Medici had that morning safely landed his men, arms and stores at Castellamare, and that Mazzini was not on board the Washington. All was, therefore, satisfactory. But al- though Mazzini had not come, he had numerous agents in Palermo working against the annexation project, and endeavouring to obtain a declaration for a Sicilian republic. Persano had unwillingly to report to Cavour, that Gari- baldi had been led by them to mistrust La Farina, and would probably refuse to listen to any advice or instruc- tions that might be given by the Piedmontese agent. On the same day, the 19th, the evacuation of Palermo was completed. As the last of the Neapolitan transports left the harbour, they heard the report of the nineteen guns with which Persano saluted Garibaldi, who was visit- ing his flagship. After seeing him, Garibaldi visited the French and English admirals, and the American com- modore. Persano had hoped that they would follow his example, and salute the successful leader of the Pied- montese filibusters ; but he was disappointed. He con- tinued in close correspondence with Cavour. The letters, which passed between the minister and the admiral, bore upon the attempts to gain over the Neapolitan navy, and the efforts which Persano was making to close the widen- ing breach between La Farina and Garibaldi. On the 26th of June Cavour sent him an authorization to secretly land and hand over to Garibaldi two heavy guns from the fleet, and a sufficient quantity of ammunition.^ The evacuation of Palermo being completed, and Medici's reinforcement having been landed on the 19th of ^ For all matters relating to Persano my authority is the Admiral's Diary. — See under dates named. GARIBALDI IN SICILY, 143 June, Garibaldi recommenced active operations. Tiirr had been given command of the ist brigade of the Sicih'an insurgents, and Bixio of the 2nd. On the 20th Tiirr's brigade was despatched from Palermo, with orders to march through the heart of the island, by Caltanisetto and Castro Giovanni, to Catania. Tiirr fell ill before he had gone far, and had to hand over his command to another Hungarian, Colonel Eber. On the 24th Bixio's brigade marched out of Palermo by the road to Corleone, with orders to reach Girgenti, and then march along the south coast and into the province of Syracuse. From this district he was to turn northwards, and form a junction with Eber at Catania. Both Eber and Bixio would, it was hoped, collect upon their march a whole army of insurgents. On the 29th Medici's division, which formed the main body of the army and contained the best troops, began its march from Palermo along the northern coast road towards Milazzo and Messina. Garibaldi was to remain in Palermo for the first part of July, organizing the Sicilians and the reinforcements which had arrived by sea from Genoa, communicating with Persano, and re- ceiving supplies of arms and stores landed upon the adjacent coast. Meanwhile the Cabinet of Naples was repeating the offer of a separate government — Home Rule for Sicily — which it had made before the war. Many of the Sicilians would have accepted it, but the Pied- montizing party had no intention of setting up an in- dependent Sicily ; what they wished was to carry the war into the mainland, and to hand over both Sicily and Naples to a centralized Piedmontese Government. Throughout, the Sicilian cause and the Sicilian people played only the second part, and of the population of the island a large portion had no heart for the conflict. It appears from Captain Forbes' narrative, that only one house in Palermo was open to receive Garibaldi's wounded ; and he tells us that up to the i8th of July, when he arrived at Palermo, " the amount of public subscriptions throughout this fertile island in aid of Garibaldi had only amounted to 5000/., and he and his son had to pay for 144 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the hire of their horses during the first month they were in the island. With the exception of the Marquis Fardella and a few other honourable exceptions that might be numbered, no well-to-do Sicilian had joined the army. The pusillanimous and unpatriotic part taken by the majority in the destruction of the Bourbon was pitiable." These few lines, coming from such a source, are a con- fession that the movement was produced far more by action from outside than from discontent in the island, and that it was far less a Sicilian than a Piedmontese affair. H5 CHAPTER IX. HOW GARIBALDI OVERRAN SICILY. After the evacuation of Palermo, the next event of importance in the Sicilian revolution was the battle of Milazzo, fought on the 20th of July. But before reaching this point in the history of the struggle in Sicily, I must note from Persano's diary the events which were passing at Palermo — events that must not be overlooked, for they throw a light upon the inner history of the time and upon the action of Piedmont. On the 2nd of July Garibaldi informed Persano that next day an important reinforce- ment would be embarked at Genoa for Palermo, and he therefore asked for the usual escort. The Vittorio Emmanuele was dispatched for this purpose ; and on the 6th a Garibaldian column, commanded and embarked on board the Washington by Cosenz, was safely conducted under her escort into the harbour of Palermo. On the previous day a letter from Cavour ordered Persano to send one of his ships to Messina, to assist in producing the wished-for rising in that town, which up to the present had remained quiet, although there were Garibaldian bands in the neighbourhood. On the 7th Garibaldi finally broke with Victor Emmanuel's official agent in Sicily. The Dictator resented his interference, and was anxious to assert his own independence, and as far as possible hold the destinies of the Two Sicilies in his hands. Persano and Cavour had foreseen this danger, and up to the end Persano and his fleet were engaged quite as much in making sure that Garibaldi should not set up the republic that he longed for, as in assisting the general to pull down the throne of King Francis. On the 7th Garibaldi wrote to Persano that he was obliged to order La Farina to L 146 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. quit Sicily immediately. In the course of the day La Farina and his wife came on board the flagship. He said that he did not know what was the cause of this sudden action on Garibaldi's part. Persano, who doubtless believed that by himself he could manage Garibaldi better than La Farina had done, advised him not to make any attempt to re-establish himself at Palermo, but to return at once to Turin. After some discussion. La Farina agreed to take this course, and next day set out for Genoa in the despatch - boat Gulnara. The evening before, Admiral Mundy had left Palermo for Naples. " As I saw him set off," wrote Persano, " I felt that a friend of our independence was departing." Mundy had certainly done for Garibaldi all that prudence allowed him, while the English fleet lay at Palermo. The day after Mundy left, the first Neapolitan man-of- war hoisted the tricolour. On the evening of the 9th the corvette Veloce^ with whose commander Persano had been in communication through one of his officers, steamed into the roadstead of Palermo, and anchored near the Maria Adelaide. The Neapolitan commander came on board, and told the admiral that he was anxious to place his ship under his command and join the Piedmontese navy. Persano pointed out to him, that his consenting to such a step would compromise the Cabinet at Turin ; but he advised him simply to declare for Garibaldi — he could place his ship in the Piedmontese navy later on. The Veloce was therefore offered to Garibaldi, and at once accepted. Some of the officers and crew, who objected to the change, were shipped for Naples in a Sicilian vessel, and their places were filled by others, two of them engineers from Persano's squadron. The tricolor was hoisted, and the name of the corvette changed from the Veloce to the Tuckery, the name of a Hungarian volunteer of Garibaldi's army who had been killed in action. Persano then sent a telegraph message to Turin, to announce to Cavour the event which had taken place — the first result of the intrigues carried on with the officers of the Neapolitan navy. HO W GARIBALDI O VERRAN SICIL V. 147 On the nth, in reply to an inquiry of Cavour's, Persano sent to Turin a report on the political opinions of the chief men about Garibaldi with regard to the question of annexation. He said that Medici, Malenchini, Cosenz, and he believed he might add Bixio, were for the annexa- tion of Sicily to Piedmont ; but that Crispi, Bertani, Mordini, and perhaps Sirtori, were aiming at the establish- ment of a republic. As for Garibaldi himself, he was in principle for a republic, but saw the necessity of Victor Emmanuel's co-operation and assistance in order to com- plete the work of independence, and was devoted to him ; but it would be necessary to deal carefully with Garibaldi, so as not to throw him into the arms of the Mazzinians On the 1 6th Persano received a letter, in which Cavour insisted that it was necessary always to keep in view the possibility of Garibaldi's putting himself in direct opposi - tion to Victor Emmanuel's government upon the question of annexation. In that case, he said, it would be requisite to place all Garibaldi's ships, that is to say the Tuckery and the transports, under Persano's orders. Piola, who was on board the Tuckery, could be depended upon ; and in order that he might be able to bring the rest of Gari- baldi's ships over to Persano with him, Cavour arranged that three or four trustworthy officers should formally retire from the Piedmontese navy so that they might be put in command of the Garibaldian transports. On the 1 8th Persano received another letter from Cavour, dated the 14th, in which he informed him that Depretis would leave Genoa immediately to take the place of La Farina in Sicily. He added : — " The path which General Garibaldi is following is full of perils. His mode of governing, mid the consequences which result from ity discredit us before Europe. If the disorders of Sicily be repeated in Naples, the Italian cause will incur the risk of being brought before the tribimal of public opifiion^ which to our cost would give a judgment which the Great Powers would hasten to put into execution." Coming from such a quarter, these words are a terrible condemnation of Garibaldi's policy in Sicily, and show that a state of affairs existed which L 2 148 THE MAKING OF ITALY. alarmed even Cavour. Persano replied by endeavouring to reassure Cavour, protesting that Garibaldi had " a good heart, and listened to him (Persano)/'^ and that the island was in favour of annexation. On the day upon which these important letters were exchanged between Cavour and Persano, Garibaldi, leaving Sirtori at Palermo to receive Depretis, embarked on board the steamer City of Aberdeen^ and, escorted by the Carlo Alberto, made the voyage to Barcellona, on the coast near Milazzo, where Medici's headquarters lay. Medici had occupied the place on the I2th of July, assuming the title of Military Governor of the Province of Messina. At first the garrison of Milazzo, which consisted only of a single battalion of riflemen and a few gunners, was too weak to menace him ; but between the I2th, and the i8th it had been reinforced by four battalions of rifles, a battery of Garibaldi ha ctiore eccelente e mi as colt a.^^ HO W GARIBALDI O VERRAN SICIL V. 149 artillery and a squadron of dragoons ; and Colonel Bosco, who had already proved himself a trusty and enterprising officer, had taken the command. Medici was therefore in serious peril, and Garibaldi had not lost a moment in largely reinforcing him and coming himself to his assist- ance. Milazzo stands upon a promontory about four miles in length, and about six or seven hundred feet high, and a mile wide at its broadest part. The narrow isthmus, which connects the promontory with the mainland^ is only four hundred yards wide, and the town stands im- mediately beyond, and partly upon the isthmus. It is surrounded by an old wall, and defended by a strong castle, which, when Bosco held the place, mounted forty heavy guns. The Garibaldians occupied the high ground rising from Meri to Pace, about three miles from Milazzo. Their main bodies were about the villages, their outposts being placed on the wooded slopes well forward towards the town. On the 17th they held S. Pietro and Carriola as their advanced posts, their main body with the artillery being on the hills before Meri, There was sharp skirmish- ing with Bosco^s vanguard, but there was no heavy fighting till the 20th. Garibaldi had landed near Barcel- lona on the previous day, and had brought up all possible reinforcements to the main position at Meri. His avail- able force, according to Garibaldian accounts, consisted of at least 6400 men, thus distributed : — Mm. Medici's division 2400 Cosenz ... ... ... ... 1300 Malenchini (Tuscans) 700 Fabrizi (Sicilians) ... ... ... ... 2000 6400 Other accounts raise the number still higher. There were on shore only three guns— ;-an old 6-pounder and two i2-pounder ship-guns; but the revolted Neapolitan corvette, now called the Tuckery and flying Garibaldi's flag, lay off the mouth of the little river Santa Lucia, with her guns pointed towards the land. " As for Gari- 1 50 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. baldi's force," says Captain Forbes, " a more heterogeneous one never came into the field. Northern Italians pre- dominated, but English, French, Hungarians, Swiss, and Germans of all shades were represented. Of Englishmen there was a company of thirty-seven attached to Colonel Dunn's Palermitans, commonly called the English regi- ment, because raised by that officer ; it had also an English major — Wyndham.'^ ' Bosco's armxy consisted of four regiments of rifles, the 15 th regiment of the line, two squadrons of dragoons, and two batteries of artillery. Forbes, taking the rifle regi- ments at 1200 each, and the line regiment at 1000, makes the total force 6500 men and 12 guns; but the cadres must have been singularly well filled, if Bosco's regiments mustered such a force^ and probably the entire force was not over 5000 men. As Garibaldi's positions were too strong to be attacked with any reasonable hope of success, Bosco resolved to act on the defensive, and drew up his men in a line extending from Sta. Marina to Archi, so as to cover the town, his centre occupying a small hamlet a little to the north of the Garibaldian advanced post at San Pietro. " The force at Sta. Marina," says Forbes, " with three guns commanded the approach by the coast road on this side : that at Archi, with as many guns, the main road from Barcellona and the approach to the town from Messina, whilst the centre leant on detached houses near San Pietro, well strengthened with loopholes and sand- bags." Early on the morning of the 20th Garibaldi's columns came down from Meri and deployed for the attack. Malenchini, with his Tuscans and a battalion from Pa- lermo, was to attack Bosco^s right at S. Marina. Garibaldi and Medici with the centre advanced by S. Pietro, while a third attack, under Cosenz, was made upon the Neapo- litan left. That Garibaldi thus ventured to seriously attack Bosco along the whole line, proves that he must have been superior in numbers on the day of Milazzo. Far away to the extreme right a fourth column, under Fabrizi, came down upon the sea-coast, and watched the HO W GARIBALDI O V ERR AN SICIL K 151 village of Gesso, from which it was feared a Neapolitan column might advance to Bosco's succour. The fighting began at seven, and lasted nine hours. The first attack was a complete failure. Cosenz was hit in the neck, Garibaldi was slightly wounded, and several of his officers were killed ; the loss in the ranks was heavy. It was not till near noon that, having massed his reserves on the right, he succeeded in forcing Sta. Marina. The attack on this point was near failing, owing to a brilliant charge made by a Neapolitan squadron of cavalry, who sur- rounded Garibaldi's staff, and nearly succeeded in taking him prisoner. He was rescued by Major Missori. Sta. Marina having been forced, Bosco's position was turned, and he retired upon the town, the guns of the Tuckery sending shell after shell into his retreating columns. The Neapolitan line having been thus driven in, Garibaldi gave his men a short interval to rest and refresh them- selves, and then at two o'clock attacked the town. One column, led by Medici, advanced by the beach to the west of the place, another under Wyndham and Malen- chini attacked the Palermo gate, a third under Cosenz attacked the eastern gate leading to the Messina road. The ruinous wall of the town, with its numerous breaches, was but a little obstacle, and little resistance was offered by its defenders. But there was some really hard fighting in the streets and houses, as the garrison retired slowly into the castle. At four the battle was over. Bosco had occupied the citadel, and the Gari- baldians were throwing up barricades before it, to prevent a successful sortie in the night or next morning. Garibaldi had bought his victory dearly, with the loss of about 8cx) men ; the Neapolitans had lost about 200. Both sides were exhausted by the nine hours' combat under a scorch- ing sun, and the night passed quietly, with the exception of a few false alarms caused by the sentries on either side firing random shots. Most of the townspeople had retired to the high ground of the promontory beyond the castle. Those who remained gave a very bad re- ception to their uninvited guests. " They appeared," says 152 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Forbes, " utterly indifferent, and solely bent on the pre- servation of their goods and chattels."- On the day after the battle, July 2ist, there was some skirmishing early in the morning. At 8 a.m. the garrison was summoned to evacuate the castle, leaving behind the guns, stores^ and munitions. Bosco refused these terms, but offered to withdraw if he were allowed to take every- thing with him. Garibaldi, who wanted to get the guns in the castle if he could, declined to abate his demands, landed the two heavy guns of the Tuckery, and placed them in battery against the castle, and sent to Palermo for some more heavy artillery. Garibaldi was encouraged to take this bold course, because he had been informed that the castle was short of water, and moreover he knew that Bosco was telegraphing to Naples for leave to accept his terms. The wires leading to Messina had been cut, and Bosco could only send his messages by means of an old semaphore on the top of the castle, and Garibaldi had with him men who knew the code, and could therefore read all the signals of the Neapolitan general.'^ On the morning of the 22nd, Depretis, who had just arrived from Turin, was formally accepted by Garibaldi as pro-dictator of the island, and an English steamer, the Aberdeen^ ran in under the fire of the castle, landed a Sicilian battalion, some guns and ammunition, and re- turned to Palermo for more. Garibaldi sent in another summons to Bosco, in which he slightly modified his demands, so that men and officers should retain their arms. Bosco refused to treat on this basis, and all was quiet until next morning, when four Neapolitan frigates, the Fulminantey Ettore Fieramosca^ Guiscardo^ and Tancredi, ran into the bay. On board of one of the ships was Colonel Anzano of the staff, who brought from Naples full powers to treat. He had a meeting with Garibaldi at the house of the English Consul. After a long negotiation it was agreed that Bosco's troops were to leave, with their arms, and baggage, and half a battery of artillery, receiving " " Campaign of Garibaldi," p. 102. ^ Forbes. HO W GARIBALDI O VERRAN SICIL Y. 153 the honours of war, and that they were to be embarked at once. The other half-battery (four guns), the heavy guns of the castle, the mules and horses, and the stores, were to become the property of the Garibaldians. The transports arrived next morning, and the evacuation was completed in the course of the 24th. On that same day, Persano, who had been very anxiously awaiting at Messina the news of the successful termination of the negotiations, and who had not yet heard that they had ended in a capitulation, sailed for Milazzo with his three frigates, the Maria Adelaide, Carlo Alberto, and Vittorio E^nmanuele. He came in sight of the place early on the 25th, and saw the four Neapolitan war-ships at anchor in the bay, though the transports had left. Doubt- ful as to what course things had taken, he cleared for action, and ran in past the Neapolitan fleet, anchoring between it and the town. There Garibaldi came on board, and told him of his success, and his plans for the capture of Messina and the invasion of Calabria. Later in the day, Persano landed to return Garibaldi's visit, and next morning went back to Palermo in the Maria Adelaide, leaving the two other ships to follow him at an interval respectively of twenty- four and forty-eight hours. The Neapolitan fleet had, meanwhile, left the waters of Milazzo. In the meantime Garibaldi had begun to reap the fruits of his success. Bixio's brigade, which had started from Palermo a month before, to march through the centre of the island, had reached Catania, and occupied the city without resistance, having been largely reinforced by bands of insurgents on its line of march. Eber's column, traversing the southern districts of Sicily, had reached Noto, in the south-eastern corner of the island. The town and fortress of Messina was now the only part of Sicily which still remained under the rule of King Francis. There Marshal Clary had concentrated the Neapolitan forces, and thence it was that Bosco had set out upon his unfortunate expedition to Milazzo. Garibaldi, on the 24th, ordered a general movement against Messina. He 154 THE MAKING OF ITALY. knew that he had an easy conquest before him. Diplomacy was preparing the way for his triumph, pressure had been brought to bear upon the court of Naples, and Napoleon III. had been endeavouring to induce King Francis to abandon Sicily, and trust to foreign Powers to use their influence at Turin to prevent Garibaldi from in- vading the mainland. On the 24th Clary received orders from Naples to propose to evacuate Sicily. On the 26th Count Giulio Litta, an aide-de-camp of Victor Emmanuel, arrived at Palermo, the bearer of a letter from the king to Garibaldi, and of an important despatch from Cavour to Persano. In this second despatch Cavour informed the admiral of the purport of Litta's mission to the red-shirted dictator of Sicily. The king, he said, had thought fit to bow to the counsels of those who desired that, on the island of Sicily being evacuated by the Neapolitans, an effort should be made to dissuade Garibaldi from pursuing his enterprise on the mainland. The fate of the Bourbon dynasty, Cavour added, was sealed, whether Garibaldi took this advice or not. Then came directions to Persano as to his personal conduct. If there were any fighting, the fleet was to be kept away from it ; for the nearer the crisis ap- proached, the greater was the need of circumspection. He was to preserve friendly relations with Garibaldi, but not to trust him unreservedly. Litta proceeded to Garibaldi's head-quarters, but the general refused to stop even for a moment in his enterprise, feeling quite sure that, whatever course he took, Cavour and Persano would support him. He wrote to the king that he would not sheath his sword till he had made him King of Italy — proud words, which proved that Garibaldi, looking only on the surface, really believed that he, and not Cavour, was the king-maker. On the 26th Garibaldi remarked to his stafl" that there would be no more fighting in Sicily. Medici's negotiations with Clary at Messina were proceeding favourably. Two days later a convention was signed, by which all the Neapolitan troops were to be withdrawn, with the excep- tion of the garrison of the citadel, the minor forts being HO W GARIBALDI O VERRAN SICIL V. 155 given up to the Garibaldians. The garrison was to have free access to the town for the purchase of provisions, and was not to fire unless fired upon. The sea was to be equally open to both parties. In the afternoon the town was in the hands of Medici and Garibaldi, and the con- quest of Sicily was complete. The King of Naples refused to recognize the convention, but the generals completed the evacuation, and the Neapolitan flag flew only over three small fortresses, the castles of Syracuse and Agosta, and the citadel of Messina, on which it was to fly even after it had been everywhere else replaced by the tricolour of Piedmont. Sicily had been revolutionized, from Marsala to Mes- sina, in less than three months — but Garibaldi had not done it. Cavour's agents had prepared the way, and Cavour's fleet had supported the movement. Garibaldi has been justly called the enfonceiir des partes ouvertes — the man who broke through open doors — and nowhere did he deserve the title better than in Sicily. He won three victories. The first was gained over a weak, incompetent man, at Calatafami ; the second, at Palermo, was fought against a traitor ; the third, at Milazzo, and the third only, was a genuine victory. It was after receiving the news of this victory that Cavour wrote to Persano from Turin, on the 28th of July, giving full permission for Garibaldi to invade the continental provinces of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. '* Admiral," wrote Cavour, " I have received your letters of the 23rd and 24th instant. I rejoice at the victory of Milazzo, which does honour to the Italian arms, and should do its part to convince Europe that the Italians are henceforth resolved to sacrifice their lives in order to win back their country and their freedom. I beg you to present my sincere and warm congratulations to General Garibaldi. After such a brilliant victory I cannot see what there is to prevent him from passing over to the continent. I should have preferred that the Neapolitans should themselves accomplish at least the beginning of the work of regeneration ; but since they will not, or can- not move, let Garibaldi act. The enterprice cannot stop 156 THE MAKING OF ITALY. half-way. The national flag, hoisted in Sicily, must be displayed on the continent, and then on the shores of the Adriatic, until it floats over the Queen of that sea. Pre- pare, therefore, my dear admiral, to plant it with your own hands on the bastions of Malamocco,"* and the towers of San Marco." This letter shows that, so far as Cavour was concerned, Litta's mission to persuade Garibaldi to confine his opera- tions to Sicily was a hollow sham. The king may have been sincere in his effort to stop the enterprise half-way, and the hesitating Emperor of the French probably did wish that Cavour should move more slowly. But this was not to be. The revolution, which had been effected in Sicily, was to be carried on to the mainland ; and while Garibaldi invaded Calabria, the City of Naples became the next scene of Cavour and Persano's operations against a power with which Piedmont still protested that she was at peace. The young King Francis had published a series of reforms, and was anxious to conclude an alliance with Piedmont, giving at the same time virtual independence to Sicily. But Cavour desired neither reforms nor a league with Naples, nor the freedom of Sicily. His one object was to Piedmontize Italy, under cover of the cry of Italian unity ; and, as a step to this end, he was resolved, as he had said in Paris four years before, to blow up the throne of Naples. ^ One of the seaward forts of Venice, 157 CHAPTER X. THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. The Neapolitans, being either unable or unwilling to move, Cavour proceeded to work out a revolution for them. The Marquis di Villamarina, the Sardinian Ambassador at Naples, had not been idle. He had spread a network of intrigues around him, and he had friends and agents in the Civil Service, the higher ranks of the army and navy, the ministry, and even the royal family. Cavour believed that Naples was now ripe for action, and he was anxious, if possible, to precipitate matters there, so as to secure a revolution, in which Garibaldi would only play a secondary part ; for he feared that if the government lost control of the movement, the result would be to make the Republican party predominant in the south. Persano having ascertained that Garibaldi was actually making preparations for crossing the Strait of Messina, wrote to Cavour for orders as to how he was to favour and facilitate the movement, at the same time suggesting various ways in which this might be done. Before he could expect a reply to this letter, he received on the ist of August a telegram from Cavour, forwarded by Villa- marina, to the following effect : — '* Proceed at once with the Maria Adelaide to Naples, where you will receive further orders. Leave a ship at Palermo and another at Messina, and bring the Anthion with you." Next day there came a letter from Cavour, dated July 1st, giving some details of the plan for finally overthrowing the throne of Naples, in which scheme Persano was to take part. By this letter the admiral was informed that the ostensible object of his voyage to Naples would be to hold himself at 158 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the disposal of the Princess of Syracuse/ the sister of the Prince of Savoy- Carignano, and therefore a cousin of Victor Emmanuel ; *^ but," wrote Cavour, " the real object is to co-operate in the success of a plan, which is to secure the triumph of the national principle at Naples without the intervention of the Mazzinian element. The principal actors in this matter will be the Minister of the Interior, Signor Liborio Romano, and .^ You will be in rela- tion with these two personages, as well as with Baron Nisco, who proceeds to Naples with the Tanaro, and will give you a letter from me." The admiral was further warned to act with the greatest circumspection in his delicate mission. Of Liborio Romano_, Cavour wrote with unconscious satire as of a " tried and honest man." The Tanaro was to bring 200 rifles, which were to be placed at his disposal. "If the movement succeeds and the king bolts {se il re scappa)^'^ wQXit on Cavour, "take immediate command of all the squadron." The plea for this act of violence against the Neapolitan navy was to be the preven- tion of disorder. Persano was further informed that Villa- marina would present him to the Prince of Syracuse, with whom he would be in close relations. Persano was to urge him to take action in favour of the " national cause " (i.e. the cause of Piedmont), but was not to give him any knowledge of the plot with Liborio Romano. " We are at the end of the drama ; it is the critical moment," wrote Cavour, as he closed his letter. It told Persano that Piedmontese treachery, exercised through the embassy at Naples, had dug two mines under the throne of King Francis, one by the treason of his Prime Minister Liborio Romano, the other by the treason of his own uncle, the Prince of Syracuse. Four years had passed since Cavour's conversation with Clarendon at Paris, and the time was come ''^ pour f aire sauter le trone de Naples, ^^ ^ The Prince of Syracuse was a brother of Ferdinand II., and therefore uncle of the reigning king, Francis II. 2 Persano leaves this and several other names blank in the copy of this important letter published in his diary, Prima parte, p. 96. (Second Edition. Florence, 1869.) THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 159 Persano wrote in reply that Cavour was giving him a very " hard bone to gnaw," but that he would do his best. He then left the Vittorio Emmanuele and the gunboat Ichniisa at Palermo, and sent the Carlo Alberto to Messina with orders to help Garibaldi to get across the strait, but to do it without compromising Piedmont publicly. Having made these arrangements, he sailed for Naples in the Maria Adelaide. On the 3rd of August he cast anchor in the Bay of Naples. Amongst the foreign ships of war in the roadstead was the Piedmontese corvette Monzambano, and the English frigate Hannibal, carrying the flag of Admiral Mundy. A letter from Prince Eugene of Savoy- Carignano, delivered to him as he anchored, informed him that all was going well, and that he had written to the Prince of Syracuse telling him to put the fullest confidence in the Piedmontese admiral. Next day Villamarlna came on board ; Persano returned with him to the city, and the two conspirators went to the Palace of the Prince of Syra- cuse. They were with the Prince for more than an hour, and he spoke openly of his desire to see Italy united under the sceptre of Victor Emmanuel — to the surprise of Persano, who did not know that the plot had advanced so far. In the afternoon the Piedmontese dispatch-boat Dora arrived in the Bay with arms on board to be used in the projected Neapolitan insurrection. All this while, be it noted, Piedmont was before Europe at peace with the king- dom of the Two Sicilies. Cavour's envoy, Nisco, had arrived in the Dora. He came to Persano next day, and arranged for landing the arms, and on the 6th he intro- duced the admiral to Liborio Romano, who spoke freely of the coming revolution, and of his part in it, and ex- pressed a wish that General Nunziante, who had retired from the royal army in July, and was travelling in Switzer- land, were back in Naples to co-operate. On the 9th there arrived a new agent of Cavour, with a letter of introduc- tion to Persano, which, as evidence of the undoubted co- operation of members of the British Cabinet, is worth quoting at length.^ It gave Cavour's plan in a nutshell. ^ It is dated Turin, August 2,^dy i860. i6o THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. " Admiral," wrote Cavour, " this letter will be handed to you by Signor Devincenza, who at my request returns to Naples. A man of approved principles and ready for anything^ you can avail yourself of him without reserve. As he happens to be a friend of Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston, he will be able to influence Mr. Elliot, the English Ambassador, and the admiral commanding the British squadron. Prudence and daring. Admiral ; we have reached the crisis. Do all you can to get up the insurrection in Naples before the arrival of General Garibaldi^ as well to clear the way for him as to save us from diplomacy. In case, however, he is first, take at once the command of all the naval forces — as well those of the mainland as those sta- tioned in Sicily, and act in concert with the General, but also without his consent if you deem it necessary. (Signed) Yours affectionately, C. Cavour. P.S. (not autograph). — Keep the fleet united so as to be able at a short notice to bring it to Naples." In reply, the admiral asked Cavour to send him gunners of the royal artillery and bersaglieri ; he would, he said, divide them amongst the various ships of his squadron, in- forming the foreign admirals that the object of this measure was to bring his crews up to their full complement. It appears from various entries in the diary of the admiral, that the Neapolitan police suspected coming danger, and were very active. The Maria Adelaide became a refuge for con- spirators, for whom the police had made the city too hot. In Naples two rival committees were organized to promote the revolution. The first, of which Cavour's agent, Devin- cenza, was a member, called itself the Committee of Order, and was willing to act under the guidance of Villamarina, Persano and Liborio Romano. The second, in which Mazzini's influence predominated, took the name of the Committee of Action, and advocated a sudden and violent effort to drive away the king. Persano feared the rashness of this Comitato d^Azione might ruin everything, if it failed ; and if it succeeded, it might take the movement out of his hands, and give that prominence to the " elemento maz- Per- THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. i6i sano and Villamarina therefore used the Comitato dell' Or- dine as a kind of check on the Comitato dAzione. On the 1 2th, the admiral received a telegram in cipher, telling him that the Costituzione and Tanaro were on their way to join him, bringing the artillerymen and Bersaglieri that he had asked for. Earlier in the day he had received from Cavour a remarkable letter, dated August 9th. It referred to Persano's complaint that Naples was a hard bone to gnaw, and made some admissions that throw a strange light upon the popular outbreaks promoted by Piedmont throughout Italy. "Admiral," ran the letter, "precisely because Naples is a tough morsel, it will be your duty to masticate It, for you have good teeth. I will, however, make every allowance for the immense difficulties you have to surmount ; and should you not succeed, I shall be ready to say that success was impossible. The problem we have to solve is this — to help the Revolution, but to help it in such a way that it may appear in the eyes of Europe to have been a spontaneous act. If you manage it In that way, France and England are with us : If not, I do not know what they will do.-" On the 13th Persano received a letter from Depretis, the pro-dictator of Sicily, telling him that Plola, one of Garibaldi's naval officers, was on his way to the Bay of Naples In the corvette Tuckery, and that he intended in the following night to surprise the Neapolitan war-ship Monarca, which lay off Castellamare, and then to attack the town. Depretis begged Persano to co-operate by his presence. The admiral saw at once that, If he went down to Castellamare the day before the attack, the whole Pledmontese plot at Naples would be unmasked ; but he resolved to do what he could to help Plola. The ramifica- tions of the plot were so far extended that Persano was able to go at once to an officer of the Monarca, and obtain from him details of her position, etc., which would be use- ful to Plola In his night attack. Those details he com- municated to Commander Saint-Bon of the despatch-boat Ichnusa, which went out to meet Plola, who was sure to be found somewhere in the offing. Plola steamed In after M i62 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. dark in the Tuckery, but he failed to surprise the Monarca ; and her commander, Acton, though there was treachery among her officers and he was wounded by a ball, made so good a defence that the Garibaldian ship was beaten off, and with difficulty made her escape in the darkness. Leaving Persano and Villamarina thus developing the plot at Naples, we must take up the thread of Garibaldi^s operations. The Garibaldian committee at Genoa had arranged to throw a column of 3000 men into the Papal States, under the Republican Pianciani.^ Cavour dissuaded them from this enterprise, for his plans in that quarter were not yet ripe for action, and the volunteers were there- fore sent into Sicily, where Garibaldi was preparing for the invasion of Calabria. The Garibaldian army was assembled in and around Messina, a battery was erected on a sandy point commanding the strait, and along the shore were moored, or beached, three hundred fishing- boats, collected for the transport a-cross it. Every day Garibaldi's steamers brought up more men and guns. Five or six Neapolitan cruisers looked on without being able to interfere, for, by an absurd article in the convention of Messina, the Neapolitan Government had made the sea free to both parties. Thus the Neapolitan fleet was rendered powerless by the stroke of a pen, which the hand of treason must have guided. Night after night boats conveyed arms across to Calabria, where an insurrection was already organized; at length, on the evening of the 8th, Garibaldi determined to send across a column of two hundred picked men under Missori. They were to surprise after nightfall the fort of Altafiumara, on the opposite shore. In the midst of a kind of fog, which favoured the movement, the boats started from Messina. On board the Aberdeen ^ and two other steamers, 2000 men ■* Pianciani afterwards became Syndic of Rome under Victor Emmanuel, and Pasquin therefore interpreted S. P. Q. R. as signi- fying Sindaco Pianciano Qtwndcvn Republica7io. ^ " On the deck of the Aberdeen^^ says Forbes, " there was a motley group of priests, correspondents and ladies, all armed to the teeth and eager for business. There was Padre Gavazzi, as usual, with an THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 163 were ready to follow, should Missorl's enterprise be successful. But he failed to surprise the fort, and to save himself from capture he took refuge with his band among the wooded spurs of Aspromonte, a spot destined two years later to be ingloriously associated with Garibaldi's name. - The first attempt having failed, Garibaldi prepared to make a more serious effort ten days later. The army, which he had concentrated in the north-east corner of Sicily for the invasion of the mainland, was, according to Forbes, composed of 25,000 perfectly-armed '^ regular^* troops, many of them veterans of the Piedmontese army. It is to be remarked that, according to the same writer, only 5000 men, one-fifth of the entire force, were Sicilians — a fact which shows to what an extent the movement had been promoted from outside. While continuing to dis- play great activity along the Sicilian shore of the strait, in order to deceive such of the Neapolitan officers as were still faithful, and to give .to those who had joined the Piedmontese plot a pretext for not opposing him. Garibaldi began to direct his best battalions to the neighbourhood of Taormina, one of the coast towns standing between the lower spurs of Etna and the sea, to the south of Messina, and about half way between that cit)^ and Catania. It was from Giardini, the port of Taormina, that Garibaldi intended that his steamers should convey the vanguard of his army to Calabria, crossing the open sea to the south of the Strait of Messina. On the i8th. Garibaldi went to Giardini, and at nightfall the expeditionary force was embarked on board of two steamers, the Franklin and the Turino. It was composed as follows : — Bixio's brigade ... ... ... 2500 men Zucchi's ,,.. ... ... ... 1000 „ Eberhart's „ ... 700 „ — in all, 4200 men, with four mountain guns. This was immense crucifix in his waist-belt, supported on either side by a revolver, ready to administer death or absolution as circumstances might require .... One of the ladies, who has since made herself conspicuous for her pluck under fire, was dressed in the uniform of the Guides, with sword and revolver by her side; the others were going to look after the wounded." — '' Campaign of Garibaldi," pp. 130, 131. M 2 i64 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. to be the vanguard of the invasion of the mainland. The steamers were fearfully crowded. Garibaldi commanded the Franklin^ a paddle steamer of only 200 tons, which conveyed no less than 1200 men ; on board Bixio's steamer, the Ttcrino^ a screw of 700 tons, there were 3000 men. The voyage was undisturbed. The Neapolitan war steamers lay off Reggio and Messina, watching a sham expedition, which seemed every moment to be at the point of starting. It was only at 4 a.m., when Garibaldi had landed all his men at Melito, on the south coast of Calabria, that three of the men-of-war repeated the scene of Marsala, by steaming up to Melito, firing a few shells at the Garibaldian column as it left the town for the hills, and setting fire to the Turino, which had got hopelessly aground on a sand-bank. Garibaldi threw himself into the mountains, and from this time until he encountered a real resistance on the Volturno, the campaign was a well-played military comedy. On the 20th Garibaldi, Bixio, and Missori's columns closed in upon Reggio. The national guard declared for the invaders ; the castle, a good fortress, surrendered to a few rifle-shots from one of the heights which overlooked it, but which did not make it really untenable. Briganti, who was at the head of more than io,ooo men, a few miles to the north of Reggio, and who could easily have driven the Garibaldians out, did nothing. He, too, was in the plot; and Garibaldi, when he landed at Melito, knew he had even an easier task before him than that which he had accomplished in Sicily. No sooner was Reggio taken, than steamer after steamer came over with Garibaldians from Messina. The Neapolitan fleet looked on. Having arranged for the transport of his army across the strait, and obtained information as to the insurrection which had been organized and was now breaking out in various parts of Calabria, Garibaldi cleared out of Reggio, his troops divided into several columns, moving indepen- dently by the narrow roads and passes along the western slopes of the hills, which form the backbone of the long peninsula. Briganti's troops retired before him, abandon- THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 165 ing position after position, in any one of which even two or three thousand men could have held at bay an army three or four times as strong as Garibaldi's entire force. One brigade laid down its arms at S. Giovanni. The soldiers of the royal army murmured in vain against this senseless and traitorous retreat ; day by day, they spoke more openly of the treachery of Briganti and of their officers. On the 25th the royal head-quarters were at Melitto, a small village near Monteleone. Briganti was mounted on his horse in front of the priest's house, giving orders to his staff, when the soldiers, hearing that they were to retire still further before the Garibaldians, loaded their rifles, and with one furious volley riddled Briganti and his horse with bullets, crying out that he was a villain, and had sold them. Discipline and order were, of course, at an end. The army, which had shot its general, was no longer an army, but an armed mob. Several of the men threw away their arms and deserted ; the remainder ac- cepted General Ghio as their commander. The shooting of the traitor Briganti had been an act of helpless fury, and the disorganization of the army did Garibaldi's work as effectually as if he were still living. There was only one traitor the less for Cavour to pay. If not Ghio, at least his officers were as deeply in league with the invaders as Briganti had been. On the ist of September the army had fallen back to the old battle-field in the plain of Maida. The one pass by which they could retreat was closed by bands of Calabrese insurgents, who held the heights on either side. Garibaldi sent them orders to leave the pass open. Only a few of his comrades knew the game that was being played ; the rest were surprised at Ghio and the Neapolitans being thus allowed to tra- verse the dangerous pass without losing a man. Stocco, the Calabrese chief, complained bitterly of the order, and was told it was the result of the stupidity of Sirtori, the chief of the staff. Forbes, who was with Garibaldi, attri- buted it to the humanity of the general. " Garibaldi's humanity," he says, "was the key to the proceeding." This is absurd. He gave up the advantage because he 1 66 THE MAKING OF ITALY, was agreed with his enemy that there should be no campaign but only a military promenade, and he knew that Ghio would surrender without fighting. Ghio retired through the pass, and, going up the valley beyond, halted near Soveria, where he waited quietly to surrender. Let Commander Forbes, an eye-witness, describe the dis- graceful scene : — " The scouts," he says, " brought in news that the enemy were halting at Soveria, about seven miles in advance, and endeavouring to obtain food. Unable to make out their exact position, as the ^ paese ' (village) was hid in a valley, the General (Garibaldi) left the main road, and, throwing out the Calabrese as skirmishers, advanced cautiously and gained the hills, which overhang it on the west ; when within about a mile, Cosenz's column appearing in the rear, the Calabrese were sent on, Garibaldi and his staff taking up their position in a scattered hamlet a quarter of a mile above Soveria. As yet, nothing could be seen of the enemy ; but on the right the Calabrese commenced firing and cheering, having caught sight of a sentry or two ; and shortly afterwards Colonel Peard, who was in advance with three Calabrese, on leaving a vineyard found himself in the midst of seven thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery, huddled upon the main road, which here traverses the paese. Unabashed, he immediately ordered them to surrender, as they were surrounded. The officers replied, he had better ask Ghio, the general, to whom he was accordingly conducted, and who merely said that on similar occasions it was not custjmary to talk so loud in the presence of the men ; at the same time he requested Peard to come aside, and very soon agreed to send up an ofificer to Garibaldi. The firing had now ceased, and many of the troops were divesting themselves of their accoutre- ments, and beginning to mount the hills in the direction of Cosenza. A more pitiful or disgraceful sight was never seen — an army planted in a ditch, without a rear or ad- vance guard, or a single sentry or picket, capitulating to the first handful of men who came up to them." ^ Ghio ^ " Campaign of Garibaldi," pp. 199, 200. THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 167 had done his treason cleverly. He had placed his army in a trap, where it was disarmed and disbanded, without power of resisting. The southern provinces were now denuded of troops. The way to Naples was only barred by a division of 12,000 men, that lay near Salerno. The main strength of the royal army was being concentrated about Capua, on the Volturno, where, under faith- ful generals, it was to make a resistance, which was finally crushed only by the overwhelming force of Pied- mont. Meanwhile, as Persano's diary shows, the revolutionary intrigue was in full progress at Naples. Cavour's committee ^' d'ordiuel^ supported by the Piedmontese ambassador and admiral, was master of the situation, and the Mazzinian committee of action had to follow its lead. Garibaldi's arrival would, however, tend to restore the balance in its favour, and therefore Villamarina and Persano spared no effort to effect a revolution before the appearance of the Red-shirts. They were endeavouring to persuade the Count of Syracuse to make a declaration in the form of a letter to the king ; and the Neapolitan general Nunziante, and the Piedmontese generals Mezzacapo and Ribotti, had arrived, the latter to assist in the developm.ent of the plan should an appeal to force become necessary. For this purpose, also, cases of revolvers, rifles, and cartridges were landed from the Piedmontese ships. Every one of these ships had on board some companies of Befsaglieri ready to be landed at a moment's notice. On the 24th of August Villamarina and Persano suc- ceeded in persuading the Count of Syracuse to pronounce for the revolution, by addressing a long letter to the king, his nephew, in which he invited him to follow the example of the Duchess of Parma in 1859, "who, on the breaking out of civil war, released her subjects from their allegiance, and left them to be the arbiters of their own destinies. . . . Europe," he continued, " and your subjects will take your sublime sacrifice into account ; and you, sire, will be able to look up in confidence to God, who will reward the magnanimous act of your Majesty." King Francis refused to abdicate on this summons, written not in expression of i68 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the will of his people, but of that of a Piedmontese minister. It was therefore necessary to provoke, if possible, a rising en masse. The Committee " of Order," that is to say, Cavour's party, called for it ; but there was no response. The Committee of Action took the opposite course. It had heard something of Cavour's plans, and did what it could to prevent any revolt in anticipation of Garibaldi's arrival ; so that, between Royalists and Mazzinians, the city was quiet. The Count of Syracuse, feeling his position a dangerous one, left for Genoa in a Piedmontese despatch- boat on the 31st, thus consummating his treason to his nephew. Nunziante took refuge on board Persano's flag- ship. Ribotti, the Piedmontese general who was lurking in Naples, offered to take Fort St. Elmo by a coup de mahiy in the hope of exciting a rising and frightening away the king ; but Persano counselled the abandonment of the idea, as rash and compromising if it failed. Again and again, in his diary, he laments that the people will not rise. He endeavours to explain it by saying that they felt pity for their young sovereign,'' and thus admits the loyalty of the mass of the people of the capital, and the artificial nature of the movement. His orders, received from Cavour on the 29th, were sufficiently precise — if there were a successful movement, and the dictature were offered to him, he was to accept it ; if not offered to him, it would be well to have Villamarina dictator. But whether Persano were dictator or not, he was to take command of the Neapolitan fleet, land his Bersaglieri to occupy the forts, and take provisional command of all the troops that might be in Naples. He was to give provisional commissions to all the Neapolitan officers who would join him, and name one of them chief of the staff. He was further informed that two complete brigades of Piedmontese troops would be sent to Naples immediately by steamer from Genoa. The concluding sentences told him what he was to do if Garibaldi should arrive before a successful ' Diary of August 28th. THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 169 rising. " If/' wrote Cavour, " the revolution is not efifected before the arrival of Garibaldi, we shall be in a bad way. But do not be disturbed on that account. If possible, get possession of the forts ; unite the Sicilian and NeapoHtan fleets ; give all the officers commissions, and make them take the oath of allegiance to the king and constitution, and then we shall see. Meanwhile, it would be well to bring the entire squadron to Naples or its immediate neighbourhood, in order to have the largest possible force at your disposal. Admiral, the king, the country, and the ministry have entire confidence in you. Follow as far as possible the instructions that I trace out. But where un- foreseen circumstances arise, do the best you can to attain the end we all have in view — to constitute Italy, without allowing ourselves to be outdone by the Revolution. Cavour." On the 31st an attempt was made to provoke a rising. Cavour's committee, the Cornitato delt Ordine, which was under the command of Persano and Villamarina, issued proclamations to the citizens and the troops. The former were told that the time was come to make up their minds, that a firm purpose would secure success, and that they should cry, " Viva Vunita d^ Italia ! — Viva Vittorio Em- manuele R^ d' Italia ! — Viva Garibaldi Dittatore !'' The proclamation to the soldiers told them to rise, not as individuals but as a body, and declare to " the Bourbon " that they were Italians ; and it ended with the same array of vivas. There was no response. Persano noted in his diary that evening that the citizens hesitated, and the soldiers were " inert, indifferent.^' On the 1st of September Persano telegraphed to Cavour that the King of Naples contemplated sending his fleet to Trieste. Cavour replied by telegraph next day that no means should be spared to prevent the fleet passing over to Austria. Persano answered that he would, if necessary, resist by force any attempt to remove it from the Bay of Naples, adding, " but in that case, farewell to the pretence of neutrality." Meanwhile Garibaldi was approaching the capital. The Neapolitan division, which was to have I70 THE MAKING OF ITALY. covered Salerno^ was withdrawn, and there was now nothing between Garibaldi and Naples, beyond the line of the forts. Cavour changed his plans with the altered circum- stances, and the morning of the 3rd brought another letter to Persano, still begging for the rising which for weeks the admiral, the diplomatists, and the generals of Piedmont had been trying in vain to promote ; but setting forth the modification which was to take place in his attitude towards Garibaldi, and giving him the first intimation of the coming attack upon the States of the Church. This letter was dated August 31st, and ran as follows : — " Admiral, — Your telegram of the evening of the 30th convinced me that you correctly interpreted my instruc- tions of the morning. You must persevere in endeavouring to promote an insurrection or pr-onunciamento in Naples ; but you must lay aside the idea of acting without the C07icur- rence of Garibaldi^ as the army is no longer in a condition to prevent his march on Naples. We cannot and ought not to do so. Whatever would have been most opportune some fifteen days ago would now be a fatal blunder. The Government considers the arrival of Garibaldi at Naples as unavoidable. It only hopes that the honest people, aided by you and Villamarina, will succeed in persuading him not to repeat the mistakes he made in Sicily, and that he will call to power trusty persons, devoted to the cause of order, liberty and unity. That need not prevent, if opportunity offers, your taking possession of the forts, and getting under your command the entire fleet. It is now the more desirable, inasmuch as we are resolved upon another maritime expedition, as important as it is difficult. " There is now only one means of preventing the Revolu- tion spreading into our kingdom, namely, to make ourselves masters without delay of Umbria and the Marches. The Government has resolved to attempt this arduous enter- prise, whatever may be the consequences. Here is what has been arranged with this end in view. An insurrec- tional movement will break out in those provinces from the 2>th to the \2th of September. Whether it is suppressed or not, we shall intervene. General Cialdini will enter the THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 171 Marches, and advance rapidly to before Ancona. But he cannot hope to make himself master of that city, unless he is energetically assisted by the fleet. You will, therefore, let me know without delay what you consider necessary for the success of this undertaking.'* The rest of the letter related to matters of detail, mention being made amongst other things of the embarkation of rifled cannon at Genoa, to complete the armament of the fleet. Persano at once sent a telegram to Cavour, saying that he would write at length next day. Meanwhile he told him that he would either take Ancona or have his ships sunk : that if he had more troops, he could co-operate in the siege by landing them : that he would leave the Costituzioiie at Naples, the Monzainbano at Messina : that he could not get the Neapolitan fleet, unless the king left Naples : that the Sicilian navy would be useless in the coming operations : finally, that the voyage to Ancona would take seven days. The long letter, which he wrote next day, is a monument of Piedmontese treachery against Naples and Rome, two Powers with which Cavour was still formally at peace. After a few introductory sentences, Persano goes on : — " Now to business. We shall smooth the way for Garibaldi, working in perfect harmony with him. I think that Francis II. will go, when compelled by the triumphant approach of the General — not sooner. The declaration for the Unity of Italy cannot be made till he comes ; and, as I anticipate, it will be imposing, judging from the lively disposition of the people. Interpreting the orders of your Excellency, I shall be prepared to support the illustrious General in every way. If he succeed without the intervention of our forces ^ so much the better ; if not ^ we shall go in arid win. In this last supposition, your Excel- lency can always evade diplomatic complaints by laying the zvhole blame on me. The reputation of being a hot and undisciplined officer, which I have most unjustly acquired, would here be of great service. The Neapolitan fleet will come over to us. The commanding officers are safe for this. Nor shall we have any difficulty on the part of 172 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Garibaldi, because he wishes me well, and he knows how heartily I supported him in Sicily. It is all very well to say that such were my instructions, but there are two different ways of doing everything, and the General knows right well that I never hesitated or raised doubts. So on this score, too, we are safe. The getting possession of the forts is a much more difficult undertaking, as your Excel- lency can well understand. First of all, the troops in garrison must consent to go, and up to the present there is no sign of their going. Your Excellency, however, may rest assured that I shall not be slow to avail myself of the opportunity the moment it presents itself. What is of more importance just now is to have the fleet, and that shall be ours at any cost. " For the attack on Ancona, your Excellency will have to supply the squadron with as many rifled cannon as possible, complete the crews so as to fully place the ships on a war-footing, and let there be no lack of coal. The rest is our part of the business ; and we shall see that it is worthy of the king, the country, and our illustrious minister." He went on to say that Cavour might trust him not to act rashly : that he knew there were no ports in the Adriatic where he could repair his ships in case of their being dis- abled, and that he would therefore take care to preserve at least some of them intact, so as to be able still to keep the sea in the event of Austria declaring war. He concluded with assurances of secrecy, and a final message that Gari- baldi would now meet with no resistance in his advance on Naples. Hardly had he despatched this letter, when he received news, which made him anxious for his plan of getting possession of the fleet. The Neapolitan war-ships lay in the Porto Navale, a sort of great dock near the Castello Nuovo, which was approached by a narrow channel. As long as they were in the Porto, he could, if necessary, resist their exit by the channel. In the morning, the fleet was ordered out into the bay. The ofificers refused, led by those whom Villamarina and Persano had gained over ; upon which King Francis came down to the Porto, spoke THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS, 173 to the crews, and gave his orders in person. The sailors replied with cheer after cheer, and immediately four paddle steamers, the screw frigate Borbona^ and the sailing frigate Partenope passed out into the bay ; the rest of the ships were left in the Porto. Next day Persano took effectual means to block up the channel, in order to be able to stop any more of the Neapolitan vessels coming out. He sent one of his largest anchors ashore in a launch, ostensibly to be repaired, ordering the crew to lose it accidentally overboard, as they went up the channel to the Porto Navale or Dockyard. The pre-arranged accident was successfully managed without exciting any suspicion, and Persano noted it in his diary, adding that when next day any of the war-steamers of King Francis attempted to come out, he would keep them in by giving orders to the Carlo Alberto to enter the channel, and hold possession of it till she had picked up the sunken anchor. On the same day, he received from Cavour two letters, dated on the 3rd. The first is important, as showing clearly the secret action of England and her premier, Lord Palmerston, on the side of the Italian Revolution. " Admiral,'' wrote Cavour, " Mr. Edwin James^ the celebrated English lawyer, is going to Naples on an official mission, entrusted to him by Lord Palmerston and the English subscribers to the fund collected for General Garibaldi. He is charged with the personal duty of bearing to the brave General the disinterested advice of all in England who sympathize with the Italian cause and desire its triumph. Belonging to the Liberal party, Mr. James can counsel moderation and concord with greater authority ; nor can the defender of the French Bernard be disagreeable to General Garibaldi, if he warns him to be on his guard with the Mazzinian party, which seeks to destroy that unity of purpose, that has rendered possible the triumphs hitherto obtained by the great national party. Be pleased then. Admiral, to receive with every demonstration of good will Mr. James and the friends who accompany him. Amongst these I may specially mention Mr. Evelyn Ashley, son of Lord Shaftesbury, and secretary to Lord Palmerston. I shall 174 THE MAKING OF ITALY. feel particularly grateful for every kindness shown to- wards these illustrious compatriots of Nelson, and their influence will prove particularly useful to our cause." So much, en passant^ for England's underhand help to Garibaldi and Cavour. We shall see more of it when, later on, we treat as a whole the Italian policy of England, and especially of the English Whigs in i860. Cavour's second letter, of September 3rd, bore on the coming attack upon the States of the Church. " Admiral/' he said, '* it is no longer at Naples that we can acquire the moral (J) force, necessary to keep down the Revolution.^ It is at Ancona. . . . What troubles me most is, how to accommodate the expedition to what is still to be done at Naples. You cannot be in two places at the same moment, but the expedition must take precedence of everything else. I will send the San Michele to Naples ; she and the Costituzione will suffice to strengthen Villamarina's hands. , . . Going to Ancona will prevent the cession of the Neapolitan squadron to Austria, and you can easily induce it to place itself under our orders for the glorious under- taking. At any rate, do what is best. I have every confidence in you." Persano sent on his English visitors in the Anthion, with orders for them to be landed on the coast as near as possible to Garibaldi's head-quarters. His own envoys, as Cavour's note indicates, had already been despatched from the comitato dell' cordine to Garibaldi's camp. He was anxious that matters should be brought to a crisis as soon as possible at Naples, so that his fleet might be set free for the expedition against Ancona. The end was close at hand. On the 5th, at Auletta, a day's march to the south of Salerno, Garibaldi learned that that city was evacuated. The same day he received the deputations from Naples, sent by the committees. He spoke graciously to the Mazzinian delegates ; but he told the " Cavourian " deputation, that he was, and he intended 8 That is to say, the Mazzinian and Republican section of the Revolutionary party, whom Cavour wished to follow him, instead of leading him. THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 175 to remain, Dictator of the Two Sicilies, and that he would not hear a word about annexation, until, having taken Venetia and the Papal States, he could summon Victor Em- manuel to come to Rome and be crowned king of all Italy. This absurd speech meant very little, considering that the advance of the Piedmontese army through the States of the Church would soon make Cavour, and not Mazzini, master of the situation. It showed, however, how clearly Cavour had appreciated the state of affairs, when he' saw that the only way by which he could control the revolution he had evoked, was by *at once out-bidding and overmastering Garibaldi. On the 6th the Garibaldians occupied Salerno, and there Garibaldi received an important telegram from Naples. It was dated three o'clock that afternoon, and came from the traitor Liborio Romano, who was still beside the king he had sworn to serve faithfully, when he wrote the message. It is well to quote the very words : — Air hivitissimo Dittatore delle Due Sicilie — Napoli vi attende con ansiaper affidare sestessa ed i suoi futuri destini — Tutf a voi, Liboj'io Romano.^ "To the most desired Dictator of the Two Sicilies — Naples awaits you with anxiety to entrust itself and its future destinies to you. — Yours sincerely, Liborio Romano." At six that evening the king left Naples. At eleven in the morning he had sent for the officers of the National Guard, and spoke a few words to them. He thanked them for their good conduct, and told them that he had ordered his troops to respect the capital, which he was leaving in consequence of a " capitolazione diplomatica " — a submis- sion to diplomacy. In other words, yielding to his own feelings and to the advice of the foreign ambassadors, he had resolved that there should be no conflict in the streets of the capital. Persano was soon informed of this, and the day was one of constant activity and anxiety for him. He feared that the Neapolitan steamers would follow the King, and the Carlo Alberto therefore ran into the dock- ^ Forbes, pp. 229, 230. 176 THE MAKING OF ITALY. yard channel, and her officers pretended to be very busily engaged in picking up the lost anchor. The commandant of the port went to Villamarina, and protested against the Piedmontese man-of-war taking this position. Villa- marina explained that she was recovering an anchor, and had no hostile intentions, and the commandant went away apparently satisfied. Later on two Spanish war-ships steamed close into the dockyard near the Carlo Alberto, Persano watched them anxiously. He saw that the Partenope, a Neapolitan sailing-frigate, was getting ready for sea, and there were signs of activity in the dockyard. He landed, taking with him several officers of the Neapoli- tan navy, who had from time to time, on their revolutionary intrigues being discovered, taken refuge on board his ships. These officers were now to return to their own ships, and persuade the crews not to sail. The parting proclamation of the king was being placarded throughout the city. It ran as follows : — *' Royal Proclamation. ^' Among the duties prescribed to kings, those of the days of misfortune are the most sacred and the most solemn, and I wish to fulfil them with a resignation which has no weakness, and with calmness and confidence, as befits the descendant of so many illustrious sovereigns. " With such an object I address once more the people of this capital, from which I must separate myself with sorrow — sorrow that I have not been able to sacrifice my life for its happiness and its glory. " Notwithstanding that I was at peace with all the Powers of Europe, my States have been invaded unjustly and in defiance of the law of nations. The change made in my system of government,^ my adhesion to the great principles of nationality, could not ward it off; and the necessity of defending the integrity of the State has led to events which I shall always deplore. I protest then solemnly against this invasion, which the present and future ages will know how to judge. ^ By the proclamation of a constitution. THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 177 "The ambassadors at my court have had the oppor- tunity of knowing, since the beginning of this strange invasion, with what sentiments towards my people and this illustrious city my heart has been filled ; I have pro- mised to save from the ruin of a conflict the inhabitants, their property, the churches, the monuments, the public buildings, the art collections, in fine all that forms the patrimony of its civilization and its greatness ; all that ought to be handed down to future generations, and that should therefore be placed above the passions of the day.^ "The time for keeping this promise is at hand. The war approaches the walls of the city, and it is with un- speakable sorrow that I leave it, to go with a part of my army where the defence of my rights calls me. The other portion will remain to watch over the security of the city in concert with the National Guard. This security I commend as a sacred palladium to the ministry. I de- mand of the honour and civic virtue of the Syndic of Naples and of the commandant of the National Guard to spare my dear native city the horrible disorders and disasters of war, and to this end I give them both all neces- sary power of action to the fullest extent. Descended from a dynasty which for 126 years has reigned in these pro- vinces of the Continent, after having saved them from the oppression of a long line of viceroys, all my affections are here. I am a Neapolitan, and I cannot, without bitter regret, bid adieu to my beloved people, to my fellow- countrymen. "Whatever may be my destiny, whether fortunate or unfortunate, I shall always retain the most deeply affec- tionate remembrance of them. I recommend to them concord, unity, a pious fulfilment of their national duties. Let not an immoderate zeal for my crown become a source of conflict. Whether by the fortune of the present war I soon return amongst you, or whether it please the justice of God to give me back in later days the throne of my 2 Where was the patriotism of Bixio in 1870 ? Did he think in this way when he bombarded Rome ? N 178 THE MAKING OF ITALY. ancestors made more glorious by the free institutions by which I have irrevocably surrounded it, what I implore is to see my people united, strong and happy. " Signed. FRANCISCO Secondo. "Naples, Sept. 6th, i860." At the same time he addressed to the ambassadors a written protest, reserving all his rights to the throne of Naples, explaining his motive in quitting the capital, and de- nouncing the support given by Piedmont to the revolution. He did not, however, directly charge the Government with complicity, but he indicated it by showing that the main strength of the revolution came from the states of King Victor Emmanuel, and it proclaimed that it acted in his name. This done, after many sorrowful farewells, he left the palace at six o'clock in the evening, and went on board one of the Spanish frigates at the dockyard, accompanied by the Royal family, and the ambassadors of Austria, Spain, Prussia and Bavaria. The two frigates then steamed out of the bay, bound for Gaeta. The Royal fleet was signalled to follow, but only the sailing ship Partenope obeyed. Besides her own crew, she had on board many loyal sailors, who left their ships when they found that the officers had leagued themselves with Persano. At first the Piedmontese admiral thought of stopping the Partenope ; to attack her, he noted in his diary, would not have looked well, and besides being a sailing ship she was not worth much. The city was quiet, but the two committees were at war with each other. The Cavourians wished at once to estab- lish a provisional government and declare for annexation ; the Mazzinians threatened to call for an insurrection of their party, if any steps were taken before Garibaldi entered the city. The forts were held by NeapoHtan troops. A calumny against the king, invented by Piedmontese journalists, said that he had ordered them to bombard the city after his departure. The whole action of King Francis refutes it. The National Guard was kept under arms to preserve order, but order was not disturbed. Next day the THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST KING FRANCIS. 179 city was all excitement. At eleven the Cavourian party proclaimed a Provisional Government. At noon Gari- baldi and his staff arrived by train from Salerno, and, as Dictator, he dissolved it. Later on in the day he estab- lished a Ministry, with Liborio Romano for Premier, and Cosenz for Minister of War. Persano was very anxious lest Garibaldi might declare for a Republican policy, but instead he mentioned Victor Emmanuel in all his proclama- tions and speeches, and at the admiral's request by a formal decree handed over the fleet and dockyard to Piedmont. Later in the day the Neapolitan ships hoisted the Sardinian tricolour, amid the roar of salutes from Per- sano's three fifty-gun frigates. At the same time the tri- colour was hoisted on the forts. All but St. Elmo had already been evacuated and handed over to the National Guard, and even the garrison of St. Elmo was negotiating for a capitulation. And now as to the attitude of the city. We have heard much of the enthusiasm with which Garibaldi was received by the people of Naples. Some writers have alleged that this enthusiasm was confined to the two committees and their immediate supporters, and that most of the "re- joicing" was produced by artificial means. The usual reply is that these writers are clericals and reactionists I shall therefore content myself with citing the words of Commander Forbes, R.N., a Garibaldian sympathizer, who was one of the small band that entered the city with Garibaldi, and who had been with him throughout the campaign. He wrote from Naples on the nth, while the impression of Garibaldi's entry into the city was still fresh upon his mind : " Anything to equal the masquerade — for it cannot be dignified with the term enthusiasm — of the two days subsequent to Garibaldi's entry, could only be achieved by Neapolitans. Not only was all business suspended, but the entire population roused themselves ^ into a state of frenzy, bordering on madness, which ofttimes became ridi- culous, and at others dangerous, numerous assassinations ^ A doubtful phrase, considering what is said a few lines further on. N 2 i8o THE MAKING OF ITALY. taking place. Night and day the entire population were in the streets ; carriages full of putaitas offered you the alternative of a dagger or the now universal cry of Una^ symbolic of a united Italy. Bands of ruffians in red shirts invaded hotels and cafes, and forced, arms in hand, every- one to join in their orgies. Sunday, the second day, be- ing the national festival of Pie di Grotta, was worse than the first, but luckily on the previous evening Garibaldi's troops had begun to arrive, and a proclamation from the Minister of Police requesting the unwashed to reserve their energies for Venetia, rendered them a little more tranquil."'' The arrival of the Garibaldian regulars tended to restore order in some degree, and Persano on the loth landed some of the troops he had on board, sending ashore 500 Bersag- lieri and two batteries of artillery. On the same day he received from Cavour orders to sail on the morrow for Ancona, and to call at Messina in order to embark siege guns for Cialdini which had been sent there in the Dora. Accordingly he prepared to sail with the squadron, now more than doubled in strength by the accession of the Neapolitan ships. He had changed some of the names of these vessels to give them a more patriotic sound. Thus the Monarca became the Re Galantuomo, the Borbona became the Garibaldi, and the Farnese was re-named the Italia. On this same day Garibaldi paid a visit to Admiral Mundy. By a curious coincidence, a lucky chance, for it was the most unlikely thing in the world that there was an appointment, the English ambassador was on board of the flag-ship Hannibal. He had a long conversation with Garibaldi, in which, amongst other things, he tried to per- suade him that the time was not yet ripe for his projected attack on Rome and Venice.^ Next day Persano's fleet steamed out of the bay, en route for Messina and Ancona. It was the day of the invasion of the Papal States. As the fleet made its way towards Sicily four armies were preparing for conflict. The Nea- '^ " Campaign of Garibaldi," pp. 237, 238. ' Persano's Diary, September loth, i860. THE CONSPIRA CY A GAINST KING FRANCIS. 1 8i poHtan troops were gathering on the strong Hne of the Voltunio with Capua for its centre, and behind them the second hne of the GarigHano with Gaeta for their base. Garibaldi was gathering his army in and around Naples to attack them, but they were in a position such as he could not have forced. The real victory was to be given him by Cialdini's advance into the Papal States. Persano's action had placed Piedmont and the King of Naples in a state of war ; and Cialdini, after his enterprise against Ancona, was to come down through the Abruzzi and the Volturno valley, and so force the Royalists to fall back by menacing their rear. But before all this could be accomplished there was to be a brief but bloody campaign in the Marches of Ancona, for the Papal army under La Moriciere stood in the way of the Piedmontese invaders. Before telling the story of that disastrous but glorious campaign, I must glance at some of the events which preceded it. 1 82 THE MAKING OF ITALY. CHAPTER XI. THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. The violent annexation of the Romagna, the threats of the revolutionary press, and the activity of the committees in the north of Italy, could leave no doubt but that the Revolution was determined to complete its programme of a United Italy, with Rome for its capital. It was expected that the summer of i860 would witness a Garibaldian in- vasion, and Pius IX. determined to appeal for aid and protection to his sons throughout the Catholic world. An army was to be formed for the defence of the temporal rights of the Holy See, and this army was to be composed partly of Romans and Italians, partly of foreign volunteers. In April the nucleus of the new corps was formed in Rome. The command was offered to the gallant La Moriciere, the hero of Constantine, the conqueror of Abd- el-Kader, and the organizer of the Zouave regiments of the French army. Arrested by Louis Napoleon on the night of the conp d'etat, he had refused to cast in his lot with the new empire, and since 1852 he had been living in retirement. When he received the Holy Father's invita- tion to give his sword to the defence of the Church he accepted the task without a moment's hesitation. On the 2nd of April he arrived in Rome. A week later, on the 9th, his first proclamation to his soldiers appeared on the walls of the city. There was in its words a chivalrous ring which carried one back to the days of the Crusaders. " Soldiers," he said, " our Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., having deigned to summon me to the defence of his dis- regarded and menaced rights, I have not hesitated for a moment once more to take up my sword. At the sound THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 183 of that venerable voice, which has already made known from the summit of the Vatican the dangers which surround the Patrimony of St. Peter, Catholicity has been stirred, and this movement extends from end to end of the world. Christianity is not only the religion of the civilized world, but it is the source and the very essence of civilization. Ever since the Papacy has become the centre of Christen- dom, all Christian nations show even in these days a conscious knowledge of those great truths on which our faith is based. As Islamism once menaced Europe, so does now the spirit of the Revolution, and now as then the cause of the Papacy is the cause of civilization and of the liberty of the world. Soldiers ! have confidence ; be assured that God will sustain our courage, and raise it to the height of that cause, the defence of which He has committed to our arms. "The General Commanding-in-Chief, " La Morici£:re." La Morlciere's arrival in Rome, and the formation of the Pontifical army, plainly told all Europe that Pius IX. was determined to defend to the utmost his temporal power. The position assumed by the Sovereign Pontiff is very clearly defined in a despatch of M. de Gramont, the French Ambassador in Rome, dated April 14th, i860, in which he informed his Government of the replies he had received from Cardinal Antonelli to certain proposals made to the Holy See. Briefly, these proposals were, that the Roman question should be referred to a congress of the Catholic Powers, the question of the annexation of the Romagnas being reserved and therefore not discussed : that these Powers should on certain conditions guarantee the remaining territories of the Holy See, and pay an annual subvention to the Pontifical army. De Gramont thus stated Antonelli's reply : — " The Holy See will never givQ its adhesion to any protocol which contains a reserve as to the question of the Romagnas. To accept a reserve on this matter appears to it to be a concession to a fait accompli. If the Catholic Powers meet to discuss the i84 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. affairs of the Holy See, the first question which should occupy them is that of the Romagnas. Either those Powers give their adhesion to the spoliation, or they dis- approve of it. In the former case, the Holy See could not treat with them. In the latter, it cannot admit that all the Catholic States, which form so imposing a force in the world, are reduced to endure it in silence, and hide their resentment, for fear of displeasing Piedmont. They have only to declare their will and their resolve upon the matter, and the spoiler will give up to the victim of his urpation what he has torn from him. " The Holy See looks upon the question of reforms as settled in principle, but it defers the promulgation of those to which it has given its consent until it is again put in possession of the provinces annexed by Piedmont. " It will never accept a guarantee for the States which still remain under its rule, because, in its view, this would be a recognition of a difference between these States and those which have been torn from it. On this point its decision is unalterable. "The Pope has already expressed himself upon the subject of the proposed subsidies, and does not accept the plan of a rente inscribed in the budgets of the States. He will only take part in an arrangement which takes the form of a compensation for the canonical dues formerly levied on vacant benefices, and on this very account it would be most difficult to bring the matter into accord with the existing institutions of the greater part of the contributing States. " As for the assistance of troops to be furnished by the Catholic Powers other than France and Austria, the Holy See prefers to have the liberty of levying its own army, and will accept with much gratitude any facilities which the various Governments will give it for this purpose." This was the position which the Pontifical Government had assumed from the first — the position to which it stood firm till the end. There was in it nothing which could be made a cause for a quarrel by Piedmont. There was indeed a distinct protest against the occupation of the THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 185 Romagnas ; but though it pointed out that the Catholic Powers could if they wished right the wrong that had been done, it naade no direct appeal to them, nor did it announce any intention of attempting to recover the revolted pro- vinces by force. There was no word in the despatch, and no branch of the policy it laid down, out of which Cavour could make a casus belli, even if Piedmont had been in the right from the outset. But lawless aggression is seldom stayed for the want of a pretext ; and when the hour came, Cavour found that pretext in the assembling of the Papal army. That army had been collected purely for defence against enterprises similar to that which Garibaldi had directed against Naples. Of the 1 5,000 rhen who mustered in its ranks in the August of i860, two-thirds were Italians. This little army it was that Cavour, at the head of 120,000 veteran soldiers, and with all the power of his Imperial ally behind him, denounced to Europe as a menace to Piedmont. It was Cavour's policy, as we have seen it laid down in his letter to Persano, to make use of Garibaldi, but at the same time to take care that he should not become too strong, and especially to do everything to keep the Mazzinian element at bay, and prevent the Italian move- ment from passing out of the hands of the Piedmontese Royalists and into those of the Republicans from all parts of Italy. When, therefore, thanks to his own secret aid, he found Garibaldi in possession of Sicily with the excep- tion of Messina, and the mainland of Naples with the exception only of Capua, Gaeta and the Abruzzi, he de- cided that the time had come for the Royal armies to move. They would at once save Garibaldi from a possible defeat, for King Francis still had a strong military position in the north of his kingdom, and a reaction in his favour was already beginning to declare itself; they would, moreover, by securing the fruits of the former Garibaldian successes, place Naples and Sicily in the hands of Victor Emmanuel, and crush those who were intriguing for a southern republic. It would have been easy to embark an army at Genoa, and land it at Naples, but Cavour resolved that the i86 THE MAKING OF ITALY. army should march to Naples through the States of the Church, annexing two new prgvinces, thus winning new prestige in the eyes of the Revolution, and taking one more great step in the spoliation of the Holy See and the building up of United Italy, and by the point from which it entered the kingdom of Naples making the line of the Volturno untenable. The plan was arranged in August. In the middle of the month masses of Piedmontese troops were assembled on the frontiers of Tuscany and the Romagna, but the Pontifical Government was assured that these forces were placed in line upon its borders not as a menace, but as a protection, and that their object was to prevent a repetition of raids like those of Zambianchi. Later in the month the Emperor Napoleon was making a progress through Savoy, and receiving the homage of his new subjects. On the 29th he was at Chambery. General Cialdini met him there as the special envoy of Victor Emmanuel, ostensibly to convey to the Emperor the friendly congratulations of the king, really, there can be no doubt, to obtain finally his consent to the operations about to be undertaken against Ancona and Umbria. After the fall of Ancona, Piedmontese officers of rank, talking to the officers of the garrison, laughed at their hope of French intervention, and told them that the matter had been settled at Chambery three weeks before. Cavour would never have been such a madman as to act without Napoleon's consent, at the risk, too, of provoking Austria into war. This consent he received through Cialdini at Chambery, the Emperor insisting only upon Rome and the five adjacent provinces being left intact under the rule of the Pope. Having thus had his part in the prologue, the Emperor went off to Algeria, where he remained until the sanguinary drama was over, thinking, doubtless, that in Africa he was more out of the way of pressure and agitation on the Roman Question than he would have been had he gone back from Savoy to Paris. We have seen how on the 31st of August, that is to say almost as soon as he received news at Turin of the inter- THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 187 view at Chambery, Cavour wrote to Persano and told him how the campaign had been planned ; how there would be an insurrection in the Papal States between the 8th and the 1 2th ; how, whether it were put down or not, Cialdini would invade them and attack Ancona. Almost as clear an official indication of the scope of the coming campaign came from the side of France. On the ist of September General de Noue, who commanded the French auxiliary- garrison at Rome, issued a significant proclamation. He announced by this document that he had the Emperor's orders to defend against all attacks the city of Rome, the Comarca, and the provinces of Civita Vecchia and Viterbo ; in other words, the greater part of the territory which was left to the Holy See from i860 to 1870. This proclama- tion, if it meant anything, meant that the French army would not extend its operations beyond these districts, and thus it was virtually a public intimation to the Piedmontese that they might invade Umbria and the Marches of Ancona without having to fear anything from the arms of France. The insurrection, predicted by Cavour to Persano, broke out at the time and in the manner arranged. It was really an invasion. On the 8th of September bands of invaders, led by the Garibaldian Masi, crossed the frontiers of Tuscany, and tore down the Papal arms in a few towns and villages, and here and there skirmished with the police. This was the first step towards Piedmontese intervention. The journals of Turin ostentatiously announced that a great insurrection had broken out in the Papal States, and the news was telegraphed all over Europe. This was the pretext Cavour required, and which he had manufactured to meet his necessity. No sooner had Europe heard of the rising in the States of the Church than it heard that Piedmont had sent an ultimatum to Rome. On the loth of September Captain Farini, an aide-de-camp of General Fanti, the Piedmontese Minister of War and Commander- in-Chief, waited upon General La Moriciere at his head- quarters at Spoleto, and presented a letter from Fanti, in which it was intimated to the Pontifical General that by 1 88 THE MAKING OF ITALY. order of King Victor Emmanuel the Papal territory would be at once invaded by the Piedmontese troops if any expression of popular feeling were suppressed by the Papal army, or if such expression of feeling were not acquiesced in by the immediate withdrawal of the army from the disturbed districts. " I was indignant at the letter which was handed to me," says La Moriciere, in his official report. " Captain Farini, to whom I had given a very courteous reception, having said that he was acquainted with the contents of the despatch which he had brought me, I pointed out to him that the proposal made to me was that I should evacuate without a conflict the provinces with the defence of which I had been entrusted ; that for me and my army this would be a shame and a dishonour ; that the King of Piedmont and his General might have dispensed with sending us such a summons, and that it would have been more frank to declare war against us ; finally, that notwithstanding the numerical superiority on the side of Piedmont, we should not forget that there are times when, in order to defend the outraged honour of the Government they serve, officers and soldiers must neither count the numbers of an enemy nor give a thought to their own lives." Captain Farini returned to the headquarters of his chief with this soldier-like message. La Moriciere had but little force to support it. His army list amounted to 15,000 men, but he could not muster a field force of even 10,000; and after providing for his share of the. garrison of Rome, and for the entire garrison of Ancona, he could only place detachments of about 500 men each in the fortresses of Viterbo, Spoleto, Perugia, and Pesaro. The armament of his troops was very defective. Only a battalion and a half, and three companies of sharp-shooters, carried rifles, the rest had only muskets. The artillery was weak in numbers, badly horsed, and composed of old smooth-bore guns of various calibres. The whole force had been raised to meet a Garibaldian invasion, and was adequate for that purpose. It could not hope to contend successfully with the army of Piedmont. All that La THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO, 189 Moriciere could expect was to make a desperate resistance for a few days, in the hope of some Catholic Power coming to his assistance and saving his army from destruction. He could not do more than this, and he could not in honour do less. On the same day on which Captain Farini presented Fanti's insolent message to La Moriciere at Spoleto, the Count della Minerva was to have presented to Cardinal Antonelli, at Rome, Cavour's summons to the Holy Father to disband his army of see his State invaded ; but Delia Minerva, in his journey to Rome, was delayed twenty-four hours by stormy weather during the voyage to Civita Vecchia ; the ultimatum was not, therefore, in Antonelli's hands until a day after Cavour had calculated on receiving his reply. It will hardly be believed that the Minister of King Victor Emmanuel waited for no reply. He would not lose a day in putting his plans into effect ; and before these demands, unjust and lawless as they were,^ could be presented, he announced in a circular despatch to the representatives of Piedmont at the Courts of Europe that the Government of Pius IX. refused to concede the " just demands of his master the King of Piedmont," and that therefore he was compelled to. have recourse to acts of war. At the same time orders were given to Fanti to cross the frontiers. Fourteen thousand copies of a royal proclamation were distributed to the troops, in which Victor Emmanuel called upon them to " deliver the unhappy provinces of Italy from the presence of foreign adventurers ; " and the same evening the in- vasion began. " Thus,'^ says the Bishop of Orleans, " without a declaration of war, without any of the decent conventionalities which are the last safeguard of honour in the civilized world, as if we still lived in the depths of barbarism, armed masses overran the Papal States." Europe was startled at the lawless act, for there was still ^ Even the Tzmes Sind the Liberal press of England acknowledged that the form of the ultimatum demanding the disbandment of the Pope's army could not be justified, and took refuge in pleas of expediency. I90 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. at least some respect left for the forms of law between nations. Catholic Austria and Spain, schismatic Russia and Protestant Prussia united in protesting and with- drawing their representatives from the Court of Turin. The French Emperor strove to save appearances by a similar public interruption of diplomatic intercourse, though his friendly relations with Turin were, in reality, not interrupted for a day, England alone, represented by Palmerston and Lord John Russell, attempted an apology for the outrage. Unhappily the protest of the Catholic Powers was a protest and nothing more ; it was followed by no act, though it is said that the young Emperor Francis Joseph was with difficulty dissuaded from a declaration of war. The proclamations in which Fanti and his lieutenant, General Cialdini, gave their soldiers the order to advance were at once insulting to the Pontifical army and dis- graceful to the men who penned them. Fanti, in his proclamation, spoke of the chivalrous and gallant men who had left both home and country to fight in what they held to be the cause of God, as '* men without a country or a home, who had planted on the soil of Umbria the lying standard of a religion that they rendered absurd." Cialdini's proclamation was more brutal, for its only effect could be to hound on those who read it to deeds of mur- der and outrage. It was dated from the headquarters at Rimini on the morning of the nth, and was so brief that it may be given in full : — " Soldiers of the ^th Corps. — I lead you against a band of foreign adventurers, brought into our country by a thirst for gold and a lust of pillage. Combat and disperse with- out mercy these miserable assassins ; so that by your hands they may feel the anger of a people who will assert their nationality and independence. Soldiers — Perugia calls for vengeance, and though it be late, she shall have it ! — The general commanding the Fourth Corps. " Cialdini." The army thus set in motion amounted to an effective THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 191 force of 70,000 men, with which the fleet was to co-operate so far as regarded the siege of Ancona, the chief operation of the coming campaign. The invaders marched in three columns. One, moving down the coast-road, was to invest Ancona, another to occupy Umbria, while a third acting in the Apennines was to link together the operations of the two others on both sides of the chain. La Mori- ciere's plan of resistance was to concentrate what force he could at Ancona, and hold out there as long as pos- sible in the hope of the Catholic Powers coming to his assistance. The first blow was struck on the nth. The little town of Pesaro, on the sea-coast to the north of Ancona, was besieged by the Piedmontese under Cialdini. It was defended by an old wall and a fort armed with three guns, and the garrison consisted of 800 men under the command of Colonel Zappi. Zappi made a gallant resistance. It was not until next day, after having fought for twenty-two hours, exhausted his ammunition, lost heavily in killed and wounded, and seen the fort reduced to ruins, that he laid down his arms, having thus considerably delayed Cialdini's advance, and done all he could to favour La Moriciere's plans. General de Courten, who commanded at Ancona, had pushed out to the northward two columns, each about 1200 strong, commanded by Colonels Kanzler and Wogel- sang, who were to retire before the Piedmontese, observing and if possible impeding their movements. Kanzler's column, opposed as it was by fully 20,000 men, found itself surrounded on the 13th, near S. Angelo, by the masses of the enemy. Kanzler might well have lost heart, but he made the gallant resolve of fighting his way to Ancona. For four hours he repelled the attacks of the enemy, and drove back three charges of cavalry. Penally he cut his way out, leaving four of his officers and sixty of his men on the field ; and by a forced march of forty-five miles by narrow and intricate cross-roads, he regained Ancona. This was Kanzler's first exploit in an indepen- dent command. The victory of San Angelo has been 192 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. all but forgotten, eclipsed by the sadder glories of Castel- fidardo, but it deserves to be remembered. On the 15th La Moriciere, having broken up his camps at Terni and Spoleto, had reached Macerata, after travers- ing with his division forty miles of difficult roads in tv/enty-two hours. Pimodan's division was close behind him. The day before^ Fanti's columns in Umbria had won their first success — the capture of Perugia. On the 8th, after an unsuccessful attempt to overtake the bands of Masi, General Schmidt had retired into the town with his flying column composed of Swiss and Italian troops and a company of the Irish battalion of St. Patrick ; and united his force to the garrison of the town, 400 strong. On the morning of the 14th Fanti with 23,000 men invested and attacked the place. For three hours the assaults of the Piedmontese were repulsed ; then some of the Swiss and Italians, who were young troops, became unsteady, and when Fanti sent in to propose a suspension of arms in order to negotiate and carry off the wounded, Schmidt weakly granted it. The armistice provided that the Pied- montese should retire from the suburbs of the town, but they violated it by strengthening their positions in the streets with wooden barricades and by bringing up guns. In the afternoon, when the truce came to an end, Schmidt unfortunately decided on capitulating, as he thought he could not rely upon his troops. The Irish, true to their national character, indignantly protested, and did what they could to secure a continuance of the defence, but it. was in vain. Sixteen of them cut their way out, rather than surrender. The capitulation was hardly signed when it was violated. It provided that the officers should retain their swords and be free to return home ; no sooner was the town occupied, than they were disarmed and im- prisoned. Three days later, Fanti's vanguard, composed of the division of General Brignone, 8000 strong, and having 24 guns, attacked Spoleto. The memory of the defence of Spoleto is especially dear to Catholic Ireland, for it was in this engagement that there was present the largest THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFWARDO. 193 number of Irish soldiers who fought in any one single action of this campaign. Major O'Reilly of the battalion of St. Patrick commanded the garrison, which was com- posed as follows : — Two companies of the Brigade of St. Patrick ... 300 men. Swiss and Austrian recruits from the depot of the 2nd Regiment of the line ... 116 „ Franco-Beiges ... ... ... 23 „ Italian troops 150 „ Total 589 „ With these Major O'Reilly occupied the old citadel of Spoleto. A message from Mgr. de Merode^ on the i6th, had warned him to make what resistance he could, without expecting any help from Rome. In the night he heard Brignone's troops placing guns in position round the town, and he prepared for the coming attack. The Irish were posted at the gate, and at an old breach in the wall which was closed with a barricade. The Franco- Beiges were placed in a gallery commanding the approach to the gate, where they were to act as sharpshooters. The Swiss and Austrians manned the w^ill near the gateway and breach ; and the Italians, who were young troops, and on whom little reliance could be placed, were held in reserve. A single old gun formed the entire artillery of the fortress. At six in the morning of the 17th a captain of Brignone's staff came with a flag of truce and summoned O'Reilly to surrender, adding that the Piedmontese general had a whole corps d'armee under his command. O'Reilly, of course, refused ; and two hours later the attack began. The enemy, placing four batteries in position at a range of only 600 yards, battered the gate and the walls ; while the Bersaglieri began to ascend some adjoining heights from which they could fire down upon anyone that showed him- self in the interior of the fort. The Papalini, however, keeping under cover, by a well-directed rifle and musket fire, inflicted serious loss upon the assailants. In the artillery alone, four horses and thirty men were killed, besides many wounded. O 194 THE MAKING OF ITALY. At eleven the firing, which had now lasted three hours, ceased for a few minutes. A flag of truce approached the gate. It was borne by a Piedmontese officer accompanied by the Archbishop of Spoleto, whom Brignone had asked to try to persuade O'Reilly to capitulate. O'Reilly replied like a good soldier, that he had his orders to hold out as long as he could, and that therefore he had no choice in the matter. The firing therefore began again. At three o'clock, after a bombardment which had now lasted six hours, and to which the Papalini could only reply with rifle-fire, the enemy's artillery had produced considerable effect upon the defences. Great masses of the walls on each side of the gate had fallen, and the gate itself was shattered, and had been pierced in several places by cannon-shot. Brignone judged that the time had come for an assault ; and being an old grenadier who had risen from the ranks, he gallantly led it himself. Two com- panies oi bersaglieri WQnt first, two battalions of grenadiers formed the main body of the attacking column ; Brignone was in the front. " Notwithstanding," says O'Reilly,' " two discharges of grapeshot from our one cannon, they came up bravely to the gate, and tried with axes to break it down. But it was strongly propped on the inside, and our men drove the enemy back with musket-shots and bayonet- thrusts through the holes in the broken gate." After a sharp fight, the Piedmontese abandoned the assault, leaving a heap of dead before the gate. For the rest of the day they concentrated a fire of their guns upon the place. Twice the shells set fire to the roofs of buildings near the powder-magazine, and it was only with great difficulty that the flames were extinguished. From the neighbouring heights, which commanded the fort at a range of only four or five hundred yards, crowds of Bersaglieri, themselves under cover, kept up a sharp fire upon everything that moved in the old citadel, and the service of carrying food, water or ammunition, from place to place was a thing to be courageously volunteered. When night fell, O'Reilly 7 Official Report to Mgr. de Merode, dated September 26th, i860. THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 195 saw his handful of men exhausted by their exertions during the day, no reliable reserve to take their place, the ammuni- tion reduced to a few cartridges, the walls breached and the heights that commanded the fort in the enemy's possession. He knew that, though he could repulse another assault if it were made immediately, the place was untenable, and must fall at latest in the morning. There- fore at eight in the evening he sent out a flag of truce, and having secured a capitulation on honourable terms, he evacuated Spoleto next day. The Irish, fighting under cover, had lost three killed and twelve wounded ; the Piedmontese had no less than a hundred killed and three hundred wounded. The garrison had, in fact, inflicted upon them a loss equal to its entire strength. In the assault a single company of Bersaglieri had nine killed and twenty-two wounded, and Brignone had his clothes torn with bullets. The Irish had done well. They had fought as Irishmen always fight in a worthy cause ; and for their conduct at Spoleto and Ancona they received the thanks of Mgr. de Merode and of La Moriciere, as good a judge of soldiership as ever lived. The fall of Spoleto was virtually the end of the cam- paign in Umbria, the only military events subsequent to it being some unimportant skirmishes with small detach- ments, with which Brignone's columns came in contact as they overran the province. The real struggle was that which took place in the Marches of Ancona, and of which the two great events were the battle of Castelfidardo and the siege of the fortress. We have seen that La Moriciere intended that Ancona should be the centre of a resistance which he hoped to prolong until one of the Catholic Powers, France, Austria or even Spain, might intervene in favour of the Holy See. It was with this purpose that, as soon as he heard of the invasion, he prepared to put in motion all the troops he could collect to reinforce Ancona ; and the movement had not yet begun when he received intelligence which led him to believe that he could count upon the succour of France — information which con- firmed him in his plans, and which he joyfully announced O 2 196 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. to his army. On the night between the loth and nth of September he received a telegram from Mgr. de Merode to this effect : — " The French Embassy has been informed that the Emperor Napoleon III. has written to the King of Piedmont, to declare to him that should he attack the States of the Church, he would oppose the act by force" — il sy oppQserait par la force. La Moriciere and De Merode were afterwards accused, by the Piedmontese press, of having encouraged the Ponti- fical army with false hopes. This is a fault to be laid to the charge, not of them, but of the French Government, which thus had a double share in the massacre of Castel- fidardo. The French ambassador at Rome had received a despatch, which, so far as one can judge, led him to believe in a French intervention ; it was on the receipt of this despatch that Mgr. de Merode telegraphed to La Moriciere. Early on the nth, the ambassador himself telegraphed to the Comte de Courcy, the French Vice-Consul at Ancona : — " The Emperor has written from Marseilles to the King of Sardinia, that if the Piedmontese troops pene- trate into the Pontifical territories, he will be forced to oppose the act. Orders are already given to embark troops at Toulon, and these reinforcements will arrive immediately. The Emperor's Government will not tolerate the culpable aggression of Sardinia. As Vice-Consul of France, you must regulate your conduct accordingly.^ *" (Signed) Gramont." Another copy of the despatch was sent to La Moriciere, who received it as he approached Loreto on the i6th. 8 On account of its great importance it may be well to cite the original text of this despatch from M. Eugene Veuillot's Le Piemont dansle s'Eiafs de PEghse, p. 37 : — '' L'Empereur a ecrit de Marseille au roi de Sardaigne, que si les troupes piemontaises penetrent sur le territoire pontifical, il sera force de s'y opposer. Des ordres sont deja donnes pour embarquer des troupes a Toulon, et ces renforts vont arriver incessamment. Le gouvernement de I'Empereur ne tole- rera pas la coupable aggression du gouvernement sarde, Comme vice-consul de France, vous devcz rcgler votre conduite en con- sequence. " Gramont." THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 197 When the campaign was over, the Moniteur explained that there had been an unfortunate misconception, that the object of the despatch to De Gramont, and of his despatch to De Courcy at Ancona, was merely to make it clear that the Emperor did not approve of the course taken by Pied- mont ; and as for the reinforcements, they were merely intended to protect Civita Vecchia and Rome. In other words, France adhered to General de Ncue^s proclamation of September ist. The Due de Gramont's despatch could not, however, be understood in any other sense than that in which De Merode, La Moriciere, De Courcy and De Quatrebarbes understood it. It was the last touch of Imperial treachery in the campaign of i85o against the Holy See. De Courcy at once handed this despatch to the Comte de Quatrebarbes, the commandant of the fortress. The consul and the commandant decided that it would be well to send the despatch to the Piedmontese generals who were besieging Pesaro. An employ 4 of the consulate was therefore sent in all haste to Pesaro, where he found Fanti and Cialdini bombarding the town. He gave them the despatch. " Very well," said one of the generals, " we shall give you a receipt, which you can add to the other diplomatic documents." The consul's messenger suggested that the firing might be stopped. The reply given by one of the officers was, '^ We know very well what we are doing ; we have had a talk with the Emperor at Chambery a fortnight ago.^ La Moriciere, who knew nothing of what had been pre- pared at Naples, did not expect that Ancona would be attacked by sea. He did not know that a fleet of six 50-gun frigates and seven smaller ships, in all 400 guns, was on its way to assail the harbour. Ancona was really strong against an attack by land, and, as Cavour had told Persano, Cialdini could not take it without the Pied- montese admiral's co-operation. La Moriciere had put it into a good state of defence in the course of the summer. ' De Quatrebarbes, Souvenirs dAncone. 198 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. He had repaired the old walls, connecting them by a new bastloned line with the fortified height of the Monte Gardetta, which thus formed one of the main bulwarks of the town. In front of the works he had erected four small detached forts. The artillery of all these works was very defective. It was of all ages, sizes and systems, which rendered it no easy task to provide proper ammunition. As La Moriciere himself remarked, the artillery of every country in Europe was represented among his guns. One kind only was absent. There was not a single rifled gun to be found in the batteries of Ancona, and the place was held against rifled cannon by men who had only old smooth-bore cannon and muskets. To the seaward the defences were weak, for on that side no serious attack was anticipated, it being supposed that the inefficient squadron of Piedmont was sufficiently employed elsewhere ; Piedmont had, however, got a new fleet. To resist the coming naval attack, there was only an enormous chain, which stretched across and completely barred the harbour mouth. This was the last time such a defence was used in European warfare ; the line of sunken torpedoes has now superseded all other obstructions. The chain was protected from boat attacks by six small gunboats, each carrying an i8-pounder gun_, and by the two small forts of the Lazaretto and the Mole, and a stronger fort, that of the Cappucini. In all, ^g guns looked out upon the sea. Persano, sailing from Naples on the nth, reached Messina next day. Not finding there the DorUy with the promised siege-guns, he left orders that she was to follow him, and then proceeded on his voyage to Ancona. On the 1 6th he was off the harbour, but he kept well out of sight of the town and forts. About mid-day a large man-of-war, flying English colours, stood in towards the harbour's mouth, and anchored just outside the chain. The English consul went on board, and stayed there half an hour. When he returned to the shore he gave no information whatever to the authorities of the curious discovery he had made. Persano's diary tells us that THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 199 before noon on the i6th he ordered the Costituzione to go in to the harbour mouth under foreign colours and reconnoitre the place. She returned in the afternoon, and reported that there were no foreign men-of-war at Ancona. The supposed English vessel was therefore the Piedmontese frigate Costituzione^ and the English consul at Ancona, by concealing her character, made himself the colleague and abettor of spies. Next day the admiral in his flagship, without sighting Ancona, steamed along the coast towards Rimini. The fleet remained off the harbour, and from the seaward forts it was at times dimly visible on the horizon. Persano fell in with a coasting craft near Sinigaglia, and learned that the Piedmontese vanguard had passed through that town. He therefore landed at Sinigaglia, and obtained a carriage, in which he proceeded to Cialdini's head-quarters. The Piedmontese general by a rapid forced march had passed to the south-west of Ancona, and had taken up a strong position upon the hills of Castelfidardo, on the north bank of the Musone. Across the river and over the hills ran the one road by which La Moriciere was endeavouring to reach Ancona ; therefore he could only make his way there now through a pitched battle against fourfold odds. Persano spent the afternoon with Cialdini, admiring the arrangements he had made for holding his ground, and discussing the siege of Ancona. Cialdini told him that the Papalini were in his front at Loreto, and that he expected to be attacked next day ; and he suggested a serious demonstration by the fleet against Ancona in order to prevent the garrison from making a sortie upon his rear. Persano agreed that this should be done, and late in the day returned to his flagship, and rejoined his fleet in the offing before Ancona that night. La Moriciere was at Macerata on the 15th. By a forced march he reached Loreto on the i6th. In the evening he came in sight of the city built on a hill above the Musone and clustering round the great cathedral, the dome of which covers the Santa Casa. Along the hills to the north of the little river, the watch-fires of Cialdini's corps, 200 THE MAKING OF ITALY. 28,000 strong, were beginning to show in the twih'ght ; and the Piedmontese flag was flying in Loreto itself, which had been occupied by a squadron of royal dragoons in the afternoon. They retired rapidly as the cavalry of the Pontifical vanguard dashed into the streets. The little army, or rather La Moriciere's brigade, was soon bivou- acked in the great square. It numbered 2300 men, and five guns. Pimodan was to arrive next day with 2700 more, to complete the force with which La Moriciere was to attempt to fight his way to Ancona. After nightfall. Captain Pallfy of the Staff, accompanied by M. Mizael de Pas of the Guides and two gendarmes, rode out by the Ancona road to try to obtain some information about the Pied- montese. The party came upon a battery which had been placed in the line of the outposts, to close the road against a night attack ; for a gun loaded with grape was suddenly discharged at less than thirty yards distance in front of them. A horse was killed, one of the gendarmes was struck, and De Pas mortally wounded. He had been the first volunteer from France, and he was now the first Frenchman to give his life for the cause of Rome. His comrades carried him back to Loreto, where he lingered for six days in great agony, and died rejoicing in his sacrifice. The 17th was spent in preparations for the coming battle. The chaplains of the army heard the confessions of the soldiers, and in crowds they approached the altars to receive lioly Communion, on that morning and on that of the 1 8th. For many, especially among the French volunteers, it was a Viaticum. On the evening of the 17th Pimodan's column entered the town. The Pied- montese position had been carefully reconnoitred and all was ready for the battle. The road on which the army was to attack descended the hill upon which Loreto stands, and crossed by a ford the Musone, a shallow river running between steep banks. Beyond the river, it rose by a wide-sweeping curve up the hillside towards Castelfidardo. Clumps of wood dotted the slope, and two farmsteads, the Crocetti, and higher up THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 201 the Cascini, stood close to the road and commanded it. These were held by a strong Piedmontese force.^ Bersag- lieri lined the belts of wood, and from the upper slopes frowned battery after battery of rifled guns, backed by masses of infantry ready to descend to repel any attack. The vanguard of the Papal army under Pimodan marched out of the town at half-past eight o'clock. As they issued from the gates, two French priests were standing among the crowd of spectators ; " Let us kneel," said one to the other, '' these men are martyrs ! " Over the heads of the little column waved the very banners that had led the Christian army to victory at Lepanto. La Moriciere had taken them from the Holy House of Loreto, to be used in that day's battle. The second division, under his personal command, left the tov/n half an hour later. Pimodan, at the head of his men, approached the ford. The France- Beiges and the Swiss Rifles were the first to cross, deploying on the opposite bank under the fire of the bersaglieri. Behind them came a Roman regiment, and D'Arcy's company of the Irish brigade,, whose special duty it was to help the artillery to drag through the ford and up the hill beyond the two guns which were to be used in the attack on the farms. Pimodan saw at once that, if the battle was to be won, the Piedmontese position must be carried by a coup-de-main ^ and he ordered the brigade to attack with the bayonet. And here began the cowardice or treachery on the part of some of the troops which was to mar the whole plan of the day. The Italian Pontifical regiment, once under fire, wavered, and deploying, took refuge behind the reedy embankments of the stream, whence they opened a reckless fire to the front, regardless of the danger in which they placed the Franco-Beiges, who dashed past them advancing. This has been often repre- sented as an act of shameful treachery ; but La Moriciere, ^ Fanti, in his report, states that there was only a small force in the positions of the Crocetti and Cascini, and the report is so written that it would seem that they alone received the attack. The fact that they were continually supported and reinforced is kept in the back- ground. 202 THE MAKING OF ITALY. in his report, insisted that it was only one of those exhibi- tions of nervous indiscipline which often are found among young troops. Pimodan's staff-officers soon stopped this useless firing. Meanwhile the Franco-Beiges had with the bayonet rushed in among the buildings, haystacks, and enclosures of the farm of the Crocetti, making nearly a hundred prisoners, and driving the rest of the garrison up the slope in a confused flight. The two guns were dragged by the Irish up to the plateau on which the Crocetti stands, whence they opened fire upon the second farm. So far all had gone well. But now the Piedmontese, having gathered in force upon the ridges of the hill and brought their artil- lery to bear, began to assert their superiority of strength. The second farm was attacked by the Franco-Beiges, the Swiss and the carbineers, but they strove in vain to force their way forward through the storm of balls and bursting shells that rained down upon them. They fell back on the plateau of the Crocetti ; and, as they did so, an Italian column rushed down, only to be repulsed by the Papalini* who turned suddenly upon them with the bayonet. Clouds of skirmishers covered the retreat of the beaten column, and renewed the attack on Pimodan's little force. He himself was struck in the face by a ball, which broke his jaw. He tied it up, without dismounting, and turning to his men, cried out, '' Courage, mes enfants^ God is with us ! " La Moriciere saw that it was necessary to support the attack with his division. But as he crossed the stream under fire of the long-ranging rifled guns upon the heights, the 1st Swiss regiment and the 2nd Italian chasseurs broke and fled, followed by the drivers of a battery of artillery, who cut their traces and galloped off, leaving the guns useless. These guns fell into Cialdini's hands at the end of the day. What remained of his force La Moriciere sent into action. But it was not a great reinforcement, and it is a marvel that the battle lasted a single hour. The Papal troops fought desperately. A second bullet struck De Pimodan, and then a third ; a fourth pierced his chest, and at length he fell, mortally wounded. He was only thirty-eight years of age. " God is with us ! " was his cry THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 203 as he fell from his saddle, fainting and covered with blood. He was placed on a litter, and borne out of the storm of fire.^ The news of Pimodan's fall was soon conveyed to La Moriciere. He had been vainly endeavouring to rally the fugitives, whose cowardice or treachery had disorganized or destroyed many of the battalions that he had thoroughly relied upon and had hoped to lead to victory. On hearing the sad tidings from the front, he sent two of his staff- officers to try to rally the broken troops beyond the battle- field, while he himself rode closer up to the farm-house, round which the fight was raging so hotly. He had just sent into action Major Fuchman's little battalion of Austrian sharpshooters, and his reserve was quite ex- hausted. He could only now see if there was any, even a remote, prospect of success, and, if not, seek himself to reach Ancona, and prolong the struggle in the hope that yet some Catholic Power would intervene. As he ap- proached Le Crocetti he met the litter, which, borne on the shoulders of some of his men, was conveying the wounded De Fimodan to Loreto. There was only time for a grasp of the hand and a few words, and then La Moriciere went on amid the storm of Piedmontese bullets, envying no doubt in his heart the fate of his brother general. It was now near noon. The battle had raged for three hours, and a glance at the position round the farm was enough to show that further strife was useless. On the plateau about Le Crocetti, Becdelievre's battalion of 280 Franco-Beiges, and D'Arcy's company of Irish volunteers, supported on the right by the Roman chasseurs and on the left by the Swiss carbineers, had hour after hour held at bay a whole Piedmontese division. The roofs of the farm-buildings were smashed in by the fire of the enemy's artillery ; and the Piedmontese battalions, covered by clouds of skirmishers, 2 How fierce was the fight at Castelfidardo is proved by the fact that of the Papal troops nearly all the dead and very many of the wounded had received not one bayonet-wound or bullet, but several. Of the Franco-Beiges there was hardly one who had not been more or less severely wounded. 204 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. were descending the heights and closing in upon all sides of the position held by the Fapalini. The farmstead was encumbered with dead and dying. The Franco-Beiges had lost already nearly two hundred men, and only ninety of them were standing. " In vain," says La Moriciere's report, " Becdelievre, collecting what was left of his half-battalion and some portions of the two others, dashed at the assailants, and for a moment forced them to fall back ; in vain the battalion of Austrian sharpshooters, commanded by Major Fuchman, went up the hill in splendid order, and en- deavoured to re-establish the fight. The fury of the attack redoubled, and it was necessary to retreat." The handful of the Franco-Beiges withdrew from the plateau, accom- panied by the other battalions, the gunners by the sheer strength of their arms dragging away the guns, and Fuch- nian's sharpshooters covering their retreat and driving back a squadron of Fiedmontese lancers which endeavoured to interrupt it. Five thousand men had marched out in the morning ; there returned now to Loreto hardly two thousand. The Fiedmontese swarmed into the farmstead, but to their surprise they were received with a volley from the main building. All the Franco-Beiges had not gone. A few of them remained. They had been posted there earlier in the day ; and not having heard the orders for a general retreat, there they had stayed. Among them were Maurice du Bourg, De Couessin, and men of the same stamp, and they refused to surrender, kept up a sharp fire from win- dow and loop-hole, and drove back more than one attack upon the doorway ; until at last the artillery of Cialdini came into play again, the bursting shells set fire to the farm, and the flames threatened the shed where their wounded comrades lay. Then only they surrendered. The victors were so furious at this desperate resistance that they would have massacred the Franco Beiges but for the intervention of the Fiedmontese captain, Tromboni, who hadbeen taken prisoner earlier in the day by Charette, and who had remained at the fVirm. The Fiedmontese attempted no pursuit. They contented themselves with THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 205 occupying in force the banks of the little river across which the shattered column of La Moriciere had retired — to use his own words, ** not vanquished but massacred." Having seen what remained of the Papal army safe across the Musone, he resolved to push forward almost alone to Ancona. To take an army with him was now impossible, but to go himself and animate and direct the defence, though a perilous enterprise, was not impracticable. So rallying about fifty horse and three hundred foot for an escort, he struck off from the battle-field towards the coast road. Before we follow him to Ancona, we must see what fate was reserved for the army that had fought so well though so vainly in the morning. The Papal troops, many of the. ii wounded, all exhausted with the desperate struggle in which they had been en- gaged, re-occupied the town of Loreto. The night was one of constant alarms. Wearied as they were, D'Arcy's Irish soldiers of the 4th Company of the Brigade of St. Patrick were on duty at the Recanati gate, the post of honour, for it was the nearest to Cialdini's outposts. On the morning of the 19th, at eight o'clock, a council of war was held under the presidency of Colonel Guttenhoven, the senior member of the staff. All the commanding officers were present, amongst them Colonel Becdelievre of the Franco-Beiges, Bourbon de Chalus of the Guides, Fuchman of the Austrians, and D'Arcy of the Irish. Although the Piedmontese had now pushed their columns forward so as to menace the town and make retreat impossible, the French, Austrian and Irish officers urged a resistance to the death. But of these nationalities there were only about a thousand men in the town ; and the Italian and Swiss officers, who had an about equal force available, refused to have it destroyed in such a desperate enterprise. It was therefore resolved to send k parlementaire to Cialdini ; and the resolution was announced to the army in a brief order of the day, written by brave men who were brought face to face with a sad but inevitable necessity. " Gentlemen," it ran, " all the best names of France have been left upon the battle-field. We, who remain, have 2o6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. escaped only by a miracle. There is no hope for us, situated as we are. We have done our duty, and it is use- less to court death. Let us then accept a capitulation, always providing that the terms are such as we can accept, for it is vain to deceive ourselves — we are in the hands of the enemy." In pursuance of the resolutions of- the council of war. Colonel Guttenhoven proceeded toCialdini's head-quarters, and offered to capitulate on the following terms, which the Piedmontese general accepted : — " i. The soldiers shall be free and shall be restored to their homes. 2. Military honours will be given to the Papal troops ; the soldiers will lay down their arms, the officers will retain their swords. 3. The evacuation of Loreto will take place in twenty-four hours." The Papal army, still retaining its arms, marched out of Loreto late in the afternoon, and took the road to Re- canati, where the capitulation was to be carried into effect. They did not reach the town till after nightfall. Along the roadside outside the gates an entire Piedmontese division was drawn up under the command of General Leotardi. Hundreds of lighted torches were fixed here and there in the barrels of the Piedmontese rifles ; and by this weird light the Papal troops marched past, with their bands at their head, and their bayonets fixed. The Piedmontese troops presented arms as they went by. General Leotardi and his officers were on horseback at the gate of the town. The Papal troops, as they passed in, threw down their arms in an immense heap. The officers retained their swords. General Leotardi and his colleague. General Cugia, did all they could to lighten the hard lot of their gallant prisoners during the two days the Papal army spent at Recanati before it was dispersed. They invited the superior officers to their table ; and when Cugia saw the long list of the Franco-Beiges killed and wounded he exclaimed : — " What names ! This might be a list of invitations to a Court ball under Louis Quatorze." The conduct of the General- in-chief, Cialdini, presented a wretched contrast to that of his lieutenants at Recanati. THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 207 On the evening of the battle he wrote from his head- quarters at Osimo a despatch to Turin, in which he exaggerated the strength of the attack, doubtless being unable in any other way to account for the difficulty he had found in repelling it ; and, further, he basely slandered the Pontifical troops. This confused and disgraceful despatch is worth being put on record here, as a testimony to the chivalry of the " conqueror of La Moriciere " : — ''Osimo, Sept. i%th, i860. " General La Moriciere has attacked our extreme posi- tion on the spur of the hills (which, beginning at Castel- fidardo, and passing by Crocette, loses itself near the sea) at ten o'clock this morning. All the prisoners state that they had 11,000 men and 14 pieces of artillery, having combined with the troops which were at Foligno, those at Terni, Oscali, and elsewhere. He brought to his aid an attacking column of 4000 men of the garrison of Ancona.^ The assault was made with great fury ; the fight was short, but violent and sanguinary. It was necessary to take the farm-houses one after another ; and, after a pretended sub- mission, the Pontifical soldiers assassinated our men with their daggers (! !) ; several of their wounded stabbed our men who went to assist them. The results of the day are as follows : — the union of La Moriciere's army with Ancona is prevented : 600 prisoners are made, among whom are thirty officers, some of them of high rank : six pieces of artillery are in our hands, amongst them those given to Pius IX. by Charles Albert in 1848 : quantities of baggage and artillery waggons, one flag, and a vast quantity of ' Orders had been given by La Moriciere for the garrison to make this diversion on the day of Castelfidardo, but by an unfortunate error the orders were not executed, and the column never left the gates of Ancona. The only way to account for its being micntioned in Cial- dini's despatch is to suppose that he had obtained from spies informa- tion of La Moriciere's plans, and at the end of the battle had no very clear idea of the confused fight which had taken place, mistaking La Moriciere's little escort, which was trying to gain the coast road to Ancona, for some portion of a retreating column whose attack he had expected would be made from that direction. 2o8 THE MAKING OF ITALY. arms and knapsacks of the fugitives. All the wounded, amongst whom is General Pimodan, are in my power, and also a considerable number of dead. The column which left Ancona must have retreated ; but I hope to capture a large portion of it to-morrow. Numerous prisoners and deserters come in every minute. The fleet has arrived, and has opened fire on Ancona. " The General Commanding the 4th Corps dArmee^ "ClALDINI." Cialdini^s despatch from Ancona was worthy of his order of the day at Rimini,* worthy, too, of later proclamations of his, when he played the part of executioner by martial law in the South. His charge of assassination against the Pontifical troops recoils with disgrace upon himself His report that the guns, given by the father, Charles Albert, to Pius IX., had been taken for the son, Victor Emmanuel, must have raised up strange memories when the king read it at Turin; and his final boast that he had "a great number of dead in his power," was more worthy of a savage chief than of a European general. These gallant dead he huddled together in a huge trench, though friends begged in vain to be allowed to identify the loved remains of this or that fallen soldier of the Pope, in order that they might carry them to their distant homes, and bury them in the scutcheoned tombs of the noble houses to which they belonged, or in the humble churchyards of their native villages. All such requests were no sooner made than refused, and though at the time it was a harsh act I see no reason to regret it now. The gallant dead of Castelfidardo lie where they fell, buried on those slopes above the Musone that they fought so bravely and so vainly to win. The dead had, perhaps, the happiest fate. The prisoners who had laid down their arms at Loreto were, on their way home, hooted at and insulted by the rabble of the Italian towns they passed through, and left unprotected and half-starved by the Piedmontese authorities. " At * See p. 190. THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 209 Turin the French, in the face of promises of liberty, were made close prisoners in the citadel, and at last sent, in utter destitution and starvation, across that frontier over which France had sent her noble army to fight and die for Piedmont a year before. At Genoa the Irish were huddled together in a loathsome prison, ' in a condition that defies description,' to use the words of a published report. The clothes sent to them by Pius IX. were refused to them, and they barely got food enough to keep them alive. Alas! that we should have to add that Sardinia dared thus to treat British subjects, encouraged by British ministers — men who were forgetful of their most sacred duties, forgetful, too, of the blood shed by Irishmen who fought beneath the British flag on the shores of the Crimea, and on the sands of India." ^ As for the wounded, they lay patiently suffering and dying on their beds of straw, in the crowded ambulances, or in the great sanctuary of Loreto, which had been con- verted into a temporary hospital. That church_, during the days and weeks that followed Castelfidardo, was a scene of patient suffering and general self-sacrifice, of which more than one touching record is to be found in the pages of M. Eugene Veuillot's narrative of the in- vasion of 1860." There died Paul de Parcevaux, a gallant son of Catholic Brittany. " My wound is serious," he wrote home to his mother; "but as I find myself much better to-day I hope to recover. As for the rest, when going out to battle, I asked God that I might do my duty and die well, and now, since my wound, I fear death no more than I feared the shots on the i8th. In Brittany I should have very little chance of dying under such easy conditions to gain heaven. If I die here I hope to die joyfully. If there are cries of pain in the church that is our hospital, there is laughter too. They are taking away my pen and ink. Adieu, and I hope it is only until I see you again. Were it the will of God to call me to Himself ^ The Papal Volunteers, by George Goldie. Let me add that many of the Irishmen imprisoned atOenoa were veterans of the English army of India. ^ Le Piemont da?ts les Etats de VEglise. P 210 THE MAKING OF ITALY. my last thought would be of you." His wound was mortal, and he died on the 14th of October, giving " his soul to God, his body to Our Lady of Loreto, and his heart to his mother and his native Brittany." There, too, died Thibaut de Rohan-Chabot, and Frederic de Saint-Sernin. Thence young Maurice de Guerin wrote from his death- bed to a friend in France — " Long ago I offered to God and the Church the sacrifice of my life. Envy my happi- ness, and comfort my poor mother. Long live Pius IX., Pope and King ! " There died George Comte d'Heliand, the only son of a w^idowed mother, who thanked God when she heard of his gallant and saintly death. Many another name might we add, but these are enough. These are the men whom the Revolution called " the mercenaries of Pius IX. : " these are the men whom Cialdini had the baseness to defame. Such, were the vanquished of Castel- fidardo. No wonder that their memory is cherished throughout the world. " O hills of Castelfidardo ! " ex- claimed the Bishop of Orleans, Mgr. Dupanloup, when he spoke of their deeds to his people, "O hills of Castelfidardo, that drank their blood_, and keep their ashes, yesterday your name was unknown, to-day it is immortal ! " At eleven on the morning of the day of Castelfidardo, the Piedmontese fleet had steamed close in to Ancona, and bombarded the forts and the town. To the forts very little damage was done, but shells bursting in the street killed one woman and two children, and wounded one of the townsmen. At three, Persano went off to Sinigaglia, having fulfilled his mission of keeping the attention of the garrison employed while Cialdini held his ground at Castelfidardo ; but several of the ships remained, and con- tinued their fire. At Sinigaglia, Persano received letters from the Revolutionary Committee of Ancona, in which they offered to cut the chain at the harbour mouth, and surprise the battery on the mole, and spike its guns. Persano sent in a letter in reply, saying he would not ask them to peril their lives on such a hazardous enterprise ; and that he hoped to be able to break the chain himself, but if he failed he would ask their help. THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO, 211 Two hours after the bombardment had ceased the sentinels on the high fort of Monte Gardetto, looking out along the Osimo road, saw a small group of horsemen approaching. It was La Moriciere and his escort. Pressed by the bersaglieri, who had attempted a pursuit when he was striking off from the battle-field, he left the little column of 300 infantry which had formed to cover his re- treat, and hastened on with about fifty horsemen, chiefly staff-officers and Guides. They passed through the villages ANCONA, I860. of Umana and Sirolo, learning from the peasants that the way to Ancona was open, but that the Piedmontese had occupied Camerano in great force. Beyond Sirolo, the road winding along the hillsides lay for nearly five miles in full view of Camerano, from which it is divided by a deep ravine, but a cross-road from Camerano strikes into the Ancona road at a village called Poggio ; and La Moriciere thought it likely that the Piedmontese would see his little column, and by this cross-road cut him off, and bar his way. He therefore struck off to the right by P 2 777^ MAKING OF ITALY. a steep bridle-path, which led through the hills to a Camaldolese monastery on the sea-coast. At the place where he abandoned the main road he left two peasants, who swore to him by Our Lady of Loreto that they would remain there to direct any stragglers that might come up, and who faithfully kept their word. At the monastery he rested about a quarter of an hour, and then rode over the wooded hills, coming down on the main road again by a path, which struck into it between Poggio and Ancona. As he crossed the hills he heard the roar of the guns of the Piedmontese fleet before Ancona. When he entered the city at half-past five the bom.bardment still continued. It did not cease until long after nightfall. Amid cries of " Vive La Moriciere ! " the general and his staff rode to the Piazza del Teatro, where he met his old friend the Count de Quatrebarbes, the civil governor of the place. Grasping his hand, the brave fugitive said sadly, ^^ Je tCai plus d'armee^' — "I have no longer an army ! " Then La Moriciere, De Quatrebarbes, and all the officers present, went into one of the hotels, where the general told them the story of his first defeat, the only defeat he had witnessed in his long military career. He ordered a council of war to assemble next morning at the governor's palace to receive his orders. Then, throwing himself into an arm-chair, he fell asleep, while his officers stretched themselves upon mattresses on the floor. At seven next morning the council of war met, and the general learned from the officers the state of the fortress and its resources for defence. Then he visited all the works, and saw with his own eyes how matters stood. It was found that the supply of provisions was not over- abundant, so, the place being not yet invested on the land side, parties were sent out to collect and drive in cattle from the adjacent country, and in this way a large stock of meat was secured. In the course of the day, too, a ship from Trieste ran the blockade, bringing in a cargo of flour, which was a welcome addition to the magazines. Another successful blockade-runner on the same day was a large fishing-boat, which came from the coast near THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 213 Loreto, bringing in a few of the Franco-Beiges, twenty Pontifical artillerymen, two field-pieces, a standard be- longing to the Swiss, and the military chest of the Franco- Beiges and the Light Horse. Later still, a mere skiff brought in one of the Guides and a Swiss sapper. These few men, instead of going to Loreto, had struck off from the coast near the mouth of the Musone, where loyal fishermen agreed to dare the perils of wind and wave and the guns of the Piedmontese, and take them into Ancona. At midnight between the 19th and 20th, the city was startled from its sleep by the reopening of the bombard- ment by the fleet. At dawn the bombardment ceased again ; the bursting shells had done no injury to the forts, but had killed a woman and her child in one of the houses. On the 22nd the investment was complete by sea and land. Fanti, who held the supreme command, faced the Monte Gardetto. Cialdini's lines fronted the citadel and entrenched camp, and the long suburb before the Porta Pia, between the citadel and the sea. Persano's fleet lay partly off the harbour mouth, partly on the flank of the town off the Monte Gardetto, where its rifled guns could co-operate in Fanti's attack. Four hundred guns, most of them rifled, formed the armament of the fleet ; 50,000 men^ with heavy siege train landed from the Dora^ carried on the attack on shore. On Saturday, the 22nd, all arrangements for the siege were complete. At midnight the fire from the sea began, one of the frigates opening it, and, as Persano noted in his diary, " keeping it up in so sustained and regular a way that it was a pleasure to hear it." Probably it was not so pleasant for the people of the town that Persano had " come to free." At seven on the Sunday morning, the guns of Fanti and Cialdini's batteries joined in. Some of the shells burst in the churches during the morning masses. The bombardment, thus begun, went on continuously for eight days. It had been the fashion at Turin to call Ferdinand of Naples Boinba, because his ships once opened fire on a rebel Sicilian town. Victor Emmanuel might fairly have claimed the title after the exploits of his fleet 214 THE MAKING OF ITALY. before Ancona in i860, Gaeta in 1861, and Palermo in 1866, and of his army at Rome in 1870. On this same Sunday, an attempt was made to assassinate La Moriciere. The would-be assassin was an Italian sharpshooter of the garrison, and the deed was undoubtedly part of a pre- mediated plan, for it was spoken of, on the same day, in other cities of Italy. The soldier fired on his general as he was making his daily round on the ramparts. For- tunately, he missed his mark. He was seized by his comrades, tried, condemned, and executed. The forts replied most effectively to the Piedmontese fire, and the Vittorio Emmanuele was seriously injured. The fire continued on the following days. On the 24th Persano resolved to attempt to surprise the Mole battery, and cut the chain by means of a boat attack. K\. 3 a.m. on the 25th, the boats came in, towed by the Governolo. But the garrison of the fort discovered them before they were near enough to attack ; a few shots told them their surprise had failed, and they returned to the fleet. On the morning of the 26th Fanti's troops stormed the two small outlying forts of Monte Pelago and Pulito. The guns of one of the forts were carried off by an Austrian battalion, the movement being covered by a dashing charge made by two companies of the Irish, who took fifteen prisoners. In the other fort the guns were spiked before the Piedmontese got possession of it. Some dismay was caused in the town by this success won by Fanti ; but La Moriciere pointed out to his officers that the fall of outworks fifteen hundred yards from the wall was no legitimate reason for discouragement, and that as the Piedmontese came closer in they would lose the advantage of their long-ranging fire, and the smooth-bore guns of the fortress would contend with them on more equal terms. Later in the day, the repulse of a Pied- montese attack on the lunette of San Stefano, near the entrenched camp in front of the citadel, was some com- pensation for the morning's losses. A strong column endeavoured to carry the outwork by a coiip-de-main. They were allowed to advance well up the glacis before THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO, 215 th-e guns opened fire ; then they were mowed down by a storm of bullets and cannon-balls. They fell back, leaving the long slope strewn with 700 killed and wounded. Next morning they suffered before the same work a second severe repulse, and this time the Irish companies dashed out of the entrenched camp, fell upon them with the bayonet as they retired, and turned their retreat into a headlong flight. While the Piedmontese were suffering disastrous defeat on this point, Cialdini's troops were slowly fighting their way through the long suburb between the citadel and the sea in front of the Porta Pia. The fleet brought its guns to the aid of the attack, and, over- weighted by numbers, the Papalini fell back to the gate. The bombardment had set fire to the Lazaretto fort, the garrison evacuated it, and later in the day, covered by the guns of the ships, the Piedmontese crossed the narrow channel that surrounds it, and occupied what was left of its works. The darkness put an end to the fighting. But it began again at dawn. Cialdini attacked the Porta Pia. Cadorna, then a major-general, directed one of his bri- gades in the attack ; as Commander-in-Chief he was destined to attack a more famous Porta Pia ten years later. Five times the city gate was won and lost. It finally remained in the possession of the besieged, and Cialdini fell back into the suburb, placed some of his guns in position to batter the gateway, and got two heavy guns from the fleet to strengthen his batteries, as well as some sailors to work them. In the afternoon the fire of the citadel drove the Piedmontese out of the Lazaretto fort ; so precipitate was their retreat, that many of them were drowned in the sea. On the morning of the 28th Cialdini again attacked the Porta Pia; again he was repulsed with heavy loss, the Austrians, under Colonel de Gady, especially distinguishing themselves by their bril- liant conduct in holding the gate. On the land side, therefore, the circle of the works was intact ; everywhere all attempts upon the main body of the fortress had been repulsed. 2i6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. But it was upon the fleet that Cavour had relied to obtain possession of Ancona ; and the army having failed to overcome the resistance of the heroic garrison, Persano resolved upon a general attack by sea. Early on the morning of the 27th he had himself conducted a boat attack against the chain at the harbour mouth ; but he had been discovered in the darkness, and the well-directed fire of the fort on the Mole had forced him to retire. He saw that this fort effectually protected the chain from all such enterprises, and he determined to destroy it by an attack in overwhelming force. The city was already sur- rounded by a circle of fire, for a general bombardment was going on from the land batteries and the fleet. About noon, six of Persano^s fifty-gun frigates ran close in to the harbour mouth, and concentrated their broadsides upon the fort on the Mole-head. It consisted of two casemated batteries encircling the lighthouse, armed with, in all, twelve old smooth-bore guns, and garrisoned by 150 artillerymen, having for their commander an Austrian volunteer. Lieutenant Westminthal, one of the heroes of the campaign of i860. Into this little fort 150 rifled guns now poured a storm of shot and shell. The twelve guns in the fort bravely replied. Soon the Piedmontese fire began to tell. Stones fell shattered from the sea-wall, embrasures began to widen into ruinous breaches, gun after gun was dismounted, and the ranks of the little garrison were sadly thinned. At last only three guns remained in position, and so few men were left to serve them, that the more slightly wounded of those that had been struck took up the work of bringing ammunition from the magazines. The Piedmontese sailors themselves were astounded at the desperate daring of the Pontifical artillerymen. As the fire of the fort slackened, the fleet drew nearer. At length the Vittore Emmanuele goes close in to the shat- tered fort, and bearing up within pistol-shot of it, showers salvoes of twenty-five shells each upon the three guns that still defiantly answer back. A bursting shell dismounts one of them, and stretches its gunners dead and dying. THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 217 Still two guns keep up the fire, served slowly and pain- fully by weary, smoke-begrimed men. Westminthal is seen almost to the last serving one of these guns ; he falls just before the final catastrophe. Suddenly above the thunder of the bombardment rises a more terrible sound — the roar as of an up-bursting volcano. A rushing pillar of fire, volumes of white smoke flecked with flying frag- ments — and then dead silence on land and sea, as horror- stricken men stand still, and every gun ceases fire. A shell has burst in the magazine under the lighthouse, and the explosion has hurled into the air the ruined fort and the remnant of its garrison. A line of foam, and a wide ripple across the harbour mouth, tell that the chain has sunk, as the wall to which it hung gave way. Ancona is open to the fleet of Piedmont. Persano could not repress his admiration of the splendid defence of the fort; he spoke and wrote of the " admirable intrepidity " of the brave gunners who had held him so long at bay. It was half-past four on Sunday, the 28th of September, i860. Around the city, on fort and tower the white flag was flying. Now that the harbour was open, further defence was impossible. Soon out of the harbour mouth came a boat showing the white flag. She approached alongside of Persano's flagship, and Major Mauri, an officer of La Moriciere's staff, went on board. He asked for an armistice, in order that a capitulation might be negotiated. La Moriciere, Mauri said, wished to surrender to the fleet, as the land defences were intact and it was the naval attack that had made the place no longer tenable. In reply, Persano expressed his sense of the valiant defence of the garrison, but said that he could not decide as to the terms of the capitulation, for the ultimate decision lay with the Commander-in-Chief, General Fanti, to whose lines he offered to convey Mauri in one of his launches. The major returned to the town for orders. By this time it was near sunset. The white flag was flying on wall and citadel, and since four o'clock no shot had been fired on either side. Resistance was at an end. The sun went down. Everyone in Ancona was looking forward to THE MAKING OF ITALY a peaceful night, not a few were already at rest, when, to the surprise and horror of all, at nine o'clock the land batteries blazed out in a general bombardment of the unfortunate city. Not a gun was fired in reply ; neverthe- less for twelve hours Fanti and Cialdini continued that brutal and murderous bombardment. In vain Persano remonstrated. He sent one of his officers to Cialdini's batteries near the sea in front of the Porta Pia. Cadorna was in command of them. Persano's messenger begged that he would cease firing, as the admiral was in communi- cation with La Moriciere as to a capitulation, and all resistance had ceased. Cadorna said he had his orders, and refused. Persano sent back in reply a second messenger with an indignant letter, bidding Cadorna return to him the sailors and the two guns he had landed) as so long as they remained his honour was involved, and he wished the navy to have no part in such a deed. Cadorna sent back the sailors, but said he would keep the guns, as his own artillerymen were quite able to work them. So all that night, and long after dawn on the 29tli, Fanti bombarded the city which he had said he came to liberate ; and the sentries of the garrison and the terrified people in the streets, whom the white flag of truce and surrender ought to have protected, saw all night long the red trail of the shells in the sky, and heard them bursting on the walls and in the town. It was an infamous act, fit to close the lawless campaign.^ At dawn on the 29th Mauri was again with Persano. He came with full powers to treat with the generals, and Persano sent him to Fanti's outposts in one of his launches. The sailors and marines of the fleet had meanwhile occu- pied part of the town, the seaward forts and the quays ; and a fatigue party was searching for the mangled remains of the dead in the heap of ruins at the head of the light- house mole. Still the fire of the land batteries continued ; nor did it cease until nine o'clock, twelve hours after it 7 I am sorry to have to add that those who will turn to the Times of October 26th, i860, will find there a wretched attempt to defend this cruelty on the part of General Fanti. THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTELFIDARDO. 219 had begun, and sixteen and a half hours after the hoisting of the white flag. What the object of it could have been^ I cannot say. Possibly it was caused by the vexation of Fanti or Cialdini at the fleet having obtained the fall of the place, while their efforts against the land side were still unavailing. They perhaps hoped to be able to assault early on the 29th, and so win some dubious laurels for the army. On the morning of the 29th a capitulation was signed, on the same terms that had been given to the army at Loreto. La Moriciere went on board of Persano's flagship. The admiral gave him a kind and chivalrous reception, and he accepted his hospitality until the steamer was ready, which conveyed him on the first stage of the journey to his home near Amiens. There he lived in retirement for the brief space of life which still remained to him. Three years later, on Sept. lOth, 1S65, he was found dead in his bed. On a little table at his bedside lay his crucifix, a military work, and the open volume of the Imitation of Christ. So closed the life of that gallant son of France, La Moriciere, a soldier without fear and without reproach. Piedmont, having crushed the little Papal army by mere brute strength and force of numbers, attempted to place the seal of legality on its conquest, by repeating the farce of ^. plebiscite y which, like the plebiscites of Savoy and Nice, of the Romagna and of Tuscany, gave with a remarkable and touching unanimity the votes of Umbria and the Marches to the Power whose bayonets glittered round the ballot- boxes. The invading army repaired its losses, put the captured fortresses in a state of defence, and gathered for a fresh campaign on the southern frontiers of the newly acquired provinces. 220 THE MAKING OF ITAL K CHAPTER XII. THE STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. On October 9th King Victor Emmanuel — who had nomi- nally taken command of the army assembled in Umbria and the Marches for the invasion of the Neapolitan provinces — issued from Ancona a proclamation addressed to the people of Southern Italy. This address was a con- fession. Cavour's declarations of a few months before, to the effect that the Piedmontese Government was a stranger to Garibaldi's enterprise and had tried to stop it, went for nothing in the face of a Royal proclamation, which, now that Garibaldi was successful, said : — " In Sicily men were fighting for liberty, when a brave soldier devoted to Italy and to me, General Garibaldi, rushed to their aid. I could not, I had no right to, hold him back." The proclamation warned the Neapolitans against the intrigues of the Mazzinians. " I come," said the king, '* not to impose my will upon you, but to make yours respected." In fact, the army came to put down both the Dictator Garibaldi and King Francis, to turn the strong positions held by the Royal troops, and by outnumbering and overweighting the red-shirted volunteers to make the Mazzinian Republic an impossibility for Garibaldi, and check any rash enter- prises against Rome or Venice — pears yet unripe for plucking. When last we followed Garibaldi's movements, he had just secured Naples. Let us, before we follow the Royal campaign, take up the thread of the Garibaldian operations, and see what he effected during the busy month of September, while his old ally Persano was battering the forts of Ancona with his broadsides. In the earlier part of the month. Garibaldi was inactive. He ordered the four divisions of his army to be raised to 12,000 men each, but, as Forbes remarked, it was significant that to these STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 22] divisions only Calabrese and Northern Italians were admitted. Where was the unanimous rush to arms of the people of Naples and Sicily ? There was room for all who joined him in a single weak division chiefly composed of deserters from the Royal army of King Francis. Caserta was occupied with- out opposition. The Royal troops lay about Capua, 20,000 strong ; 20,000 more stretched along the Vol- turno to Cajazzo among the lower spurs of the Apen- nines. On the south bank of the river, the Garibaldians lay upon a long curve, stretching from Aversa by Sta. Maria and Caserta to Madalone, the convex side of the curve fronting Capua, and being only two and a half miles from Sta. Maria, where the Neapolitan and Garibaldian outposts were in contact. In the Abruzzi there were some insurrectionary bands in motion. At Ariano, to the east of Benevento, an insurrection of another kind, a reaction against the Garibaldian revolution had broken out. Tiirr, in the name of freedom and the rule of the popular will, trampled it out at the head of a column of nine hundred men. This was the beginning of wild work, that went on in the Two Sicilies for five years^ always in the name of freedom and the will of the people, that is to say, the free- dom of the people to will what their Piedmontese masters told them. Garibaldi came up from Naples to Caserta on the i8th, the day of Castelfidardo. It was currently reported in Naples that Capua would be taken next day, that an assault would be made merely in order to save the honour of the besieged, but that there would be no real resistance. On the 19th a strong Garibaldian column attacked the southern outworks of Capua. It was afterwards said that this was a mere feint, meant to cover the attack which was made simultaneously by another column upon the extreme left of the Neapolitan position at Cajazzo. Nevertheless, 222 THE MAKING OF ITALY, the supposed feint was continued for four long hours. It ended in the headlong rout of the Garibaldians. Charged by some squadrons of cavalry, their line gave way, a general panic seized them, some Sicilian regiments fled ejt masse ; even officers galloped off, and some of the fugitives seized the ambulance waggons, and drove away in them. Had the Neapolitans attacked in their turn, they might perhaps have driven Garibaldi back upon Naples ; but they showed a lamentable want of enterprise. This was partly due to the staff having been informed that a couple of thousand Garibaldians had succeeded in crossing the river at Cajazzo, and driving the garrison out of the town. This the Garibaldians announced as the real object of the opera- tions of the 19th, and claimed a victory. Their triumph did not last long. On the 2 1st King Francis and the Duke of Caserta in person attacked Cajazzo with a strong force, stormed the town, and drove the Garibaldians, under Colonel Cattabene, over the Volturno. Nearly a thousand of Cattabene's men were shot, bayoneted, or drowned in the river. Garibaldi, in the operations of these three days (19th to 2 1st) J showed that however able he was as a guerilla leader, he was no general. On the 19th he attacked both ends of the Neapolitan line. One attack, the least important, succeeded ; the other, which was too strong for a feint and too weak for victory, failed disas- trously ; and then, instead of supporting the column at Cajazzo if he intended to profit by his partial success, or of withdrawing it if he did not mean to follow it up, he left it unsupported to be crushed by the king's attack on the 2 1st. Garibaldi had the good sense to accept his own incompetence to conduct a successful attack. He resolved to wait upon the defensive, until the coming of the Pied- montese to his assistance. Already there were Piedmon- tese liners, bersaglieri and artillery at Naples ; but the help he was waiting for was that of Cialdini and Fanti, now battering away at the land defences of Ancona. He strengthened his position with batteries and barricades, and massed 30,000 men to defend it. Of these, 1 1,000 were Calabrese and Sicilians, the rest Northern Italians. STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA, 223 Where were the Neapolitans ? They were represented by one solitary hussar in a squadron of Aversa.^ So much for Garibaldi's liberation of a willing people. Had the Neapolitans been well led, instead of attacking Cattabene at Cajazzo on the 21st, they would have come out of Capua in force on the 20th, and attacked the Gari- baldians at Santa Maria and on the hills around it. But unfortunately they did nothing but observe Garibaldi's movements till the end of the month ; and on the ist of October, when the partial panic of the 19th was long forgotten, and when the Garibaldian position was consider- ably strengthened, they attacked it with from 25,000 to 30,000 men, divided into five columns. One of these columns, crossing the Volturno between Capua and Cajazzo, was to march upon Caserta and Maddaloni, so as to keep the Garibaldians in that direction occupied, while the four other columns attacked in front of Capua, two on the left assailing the village of St. Angelo and the steep slopes of the Monte Tifata, while on the right two others were directed against the town of Sta. Maria. The secret of the attack was not well kept. The Garibaldians knew on the day before what was coming, and were more or less prepared even for the direction it subsequently took. The operations of the day on the Neapolitan side were directed by General Ritucci. The king was with him, and more than once was within fifty yards of the Garibaldian guns. The attack upon St. Angelo was led by Generals Afanto di Rivera, Palmieri and Nigri ; that upon Sta. Maria by General Mengel. The firing began at 4 a.m., in the grey misty twilight of the autumn morning. Almost simultaneously, artillery was heard from the hills near St. Angelo and from Bixio's positions at Maddaloni. At Sta. Maria, Mengel rapidly drove in the outposts of Milvitz's Garibaldian brigade, and while one of his columns assaulted the gate of the town and a battery on the railway to the right, another pushed in between it and St. Angelo, and nearly took prisoner Garibaldi, who with his staff was hurrying to the key of his position at St. Angelo. Only the mist and a timely flight ^ Forbes. 224 THE MAKING OF ITALY. along a water-course saved him, but Count Arrivabene, the correspondent of the Daily Neivs^ who was with him, fell into the hands of the Neapolitans. Arrived at St. Angelo, Garibaldi found that Afanto di Rivera's vanguard had taken half the village, a four-gun battery, and about 300 prisoners. Round the great monastery, which formed the citadel of the place, the fight was raging hotly. Here the advance of the Neapolitans had been checked. During the day they made no further progress ; at this point, the steep slopes, and strong buildings, lined with sharpshooters and continually reinforced from Caserta, proved a natural fortress beyond the power of a coup-de-main. At Sta. Maria, the barricades of the town brought Mengel's attack to a standstill. For four hours he stubbornly assaulted them, losing heavily ; at length Milvitz and Malenchini's Garibaldians were strong enough to assume the offensive, and the Neapolitans were pressed back towards Capua. It was eight o'clock, and so far the Garibaldians had only lost the ground taken at the first rush, and both Sta. Maria and San Angelo were safe ; the Neapolitan generals had shown a want of sufficient dash and enterprise to follow up their first successes. Especially Mengel, partly misled by his guides, had wasted life uselessly in attacking Sta. Maria in front, instead of turning it, attacking Milvitz on his rear, and then pressing towards the Monte Tifata to co-operate with Afanto di Rivera and his brother generals. From eight to near eleven there was a lull in the fight, and the firing along the line became slacker. At eleven, the Neapolitans made another serious attack. It was led by the Count de Trani, the king's brother, who, covered by a heavy artillery fire, attacked Sta. Maria, but was as un- successful as Mengel had been in the morning. At noon, Bixio sent up word to Garibaldi that the attack on Mad- daloni had been repulsed. Probably the commander had given it up under the impression that having fought for nearly eight hours he had done enough to keep Bixio occupied for that day at least. For all he knew, the fight- ing before Capua was over. This attack on Maddaloni was an unfortunate part of the plan, without any corre- STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA, 225 spending gain. It diverted 7000 men from the real battle- field, and placed them at such a distance that all commu- nication with them was difficult, and they were practically isolated. The cessation of the fight at Maddaloni enabled Garibaldi to greatly strengthen his line of battle in and between Sta. Maria and San Angelo. About the same time, too, reinforcements began to arrive from Naples by rail — Sirtori, the chief of the staff, had telegraphed for them early in the day ; and the first to arrive were artil- lerymen of the regular army of Piedmont, who were dis- tributed amongst the Garibaldian batteries. Their dark uniforms were noticed by the Neapolitan officers, who were thus led to believe that a considerable force of regulars must be at hand. Two thousand bersaglieri were, indeed, coming up by train from Naples, but they did not arrive till the fight was over. Near two o'clock it became evident that the Neapolitans were becoming exhausted. A general advance of the Garibaldians took place, and the Neapo- litans fell back on Capua, losing several guns. Two of these were taken by some of Garibaldi's Hungarian hussars near Sta. Maria. They were secured and dragged into the town by a party of twelve blue-jackets from Mundy's squadron — an awkward incident variously explained ; according to the Blue Book, they were men on leave, who chanced to be there, having come up from Naples with the Piedmontese artillery to see the fighting. Before San Angelo, when the Garibaldians occupied the four-gun battery, they found in it some charred corpses. It was at once proclaimed that the Neapolitans had deliberately burned the wounded to death ; and an English illustrated paper published a picture of the horrible scene, purely imaginary, for its correspondent was. in the Garibaldian lines. The real fact was that some houses near the battery were set on fire in the fight, and the flames spread to straw in the battery, so that some of the bodies lying there were scorched and burned, but it is more than probable that they were all dead. In any case the affair was an accident of the battle. So ended the fight on the Volturno, an undoubted Q 226 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Garibaldian victory, but dearly purchased by heavy losses. It was due partly to the misdirection of the Neapolitan attack, especially on that part of the field where Mengel was in command, partly to the extreme strength of Gari- baldi's line on the steep, almost precipitous, sides of the hills round San Angelo, the key of his position. Yet there were moments when all seemed lost ; and how doubtful the combat was, is shown by the fact that the Neapolitans took more prisoners than the Garibaldians. Forbes, who was with Garibaldi, reports 500 Neapolitan prisoners ; and for the Garibaldian loss in prisoners and missing, 700. The column of Piedmontese from Naples which came up in the afternoon was a welcome reinforcement. Next day these bersaglierij with a strong force of Calabrese, suc- ceeded in cutting off and capturing, near Caserta, about 1800 men of the column which on the day before had attacked Bixio at Maddaloni. They had received a false report that the king was victorious, and were march- ing straight upon the strong position round Caserta, where they expected to find their friends. Other smaller de- tached bodies of the same column were picked up and made prisoners in the course of the day — all lamentable results of the useless and too far extended diversion against Maddaloni. Notwithstanding his victory. Garibaldi remained on the defensive in his positions at San Angelo and Sta. Maria. Nothing could be gained by a rash attack on Capua, and the king's troops were now at hand. Three thousand more troops had reached Naples by sea, and the army of the Marches would soon cross the frontier under Cialdini. Three days after the battle of the Volturno, the King of Piedmont in a proclamation to his army announced that he took personal command of them from that date. ** I am satisfied with you," he said, " because you are worthy of Italy. By arms you have vanquished your enemies, and by good conduct the calumniators of the Italian name. The mercenaries whom I set free will speak of you in foreign countries, after having learned that God recom- penses those who serve Him, and not those who oppress STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 227 peoples and despise the right of nations " — a principle true enough, but here of doubtful application, and rather blas- phemously used, unless indeed the fortune of battle is to be taken as a proof that the right is, in all cases, on the side of the victorious. Two days after, on the 6th of October, the Count de Cavour wrote a letter to Baron Winspeare, the Neapolitan ambassador, who, notwithstanding Persano's acts of war, had remained at Turin. In this letter he announced to him that th^ Piedmontese troops had received orders to enter the kingdom of Naples on account of the anarchy which prevailed there, and on account of the abandonment of the capital by the king, which he took to be tanta- mount to an abdication. Winspeare replied by a protest, in which he had no difficulty in demonstrating that the anarchy to which Cavour referred was Cavour's own work. Next day he left Turin for Gaeta. The final invasion began on the 9th, the day of Victor Emmanuel's proclamation to the people of the South. Several regiments were landed at Naples ; the division of De Sonnaz was sent by sea to Manfredonia, whence it was to march across the plain of the Capitanata to Benevento, and unite with the Garibaldians on the Volturno. The Garibaldians needed all that could be given to them, for under the influence of inaction and being no longer actively supported by Cavour's agents (for the regulars were now to do all the work) some of the battalions were melting away, and none of the country people were joining them. Almost the last reinforcement Garibaldi received was a battalion raised by a Garibaldian Committee in England, and landed at Naples in the middle of October : — of this more anon. The main Piedmontese army under the king and Cialdini entered the Abruzzi on the nth, the same day on which Garibaldi, yielding at length to Villamarina and Cavour, decreed that on the 21st Naples and Sicily should declare hy plebiscite whether or not they would be annexed to the crown of Victor Emmanuel. The Abruzzi were the scene of widespread civil war, for bands of peasants had taken up arms to resist the insur- Q 2 228 THE MAKING OF ITALY. rectionary bands organized by the Garibaldians. In the north, near the old frontier of the Marches, and not many miles from the Adriatic, the mediaeval fortress of Civitella del Tronto, perched on its lofty crag, and garrisoned by 400 men under a good officer. Colonel Giovane, refused to surrender to Cialdini, and became the centre of a guerilla warfare against the Piedmontese. The pass and town of Isernia, in the province of Molise, on the southern verge of the Abruzzi, to which it forms one of the main approaches. was held by a Neapolitan battalion, commanded by General Scotti ; hundreds of armed peasants crowded to his standard, and the movement became so serious that Garibaldi determined to try to break up Scotti's force, in which the irregulars now outnumbered the troops. He sent Nullo, Zario, and six other of his officers to Campo- basso, where they mustered the revolutionary bands of the district, and on October i8th marched upon Isernia. The Royalists defeated them with great loss, four of the Garibaldian leaders being killed. The reaction was there- fore triumphant in the Molise ; and Garibaldi, afraid that Scotti with his soldiers and peasants might leave Isernia and fall upon the flank of De Sonnaz' line of march from STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 229 Manfredonia, sent Medici with 3500 men to cover the roads leading to the south-east from Isernia. But his anxiety on that point did not last long. Cialdini, though he had to advance by difficult mountain roads, was near at hand, and two days after the Garibaldian defeat at Isernia he attacked the pass and town, throwing tenfold odds against the brave peasants and the handful of soldiers who defended it. The battle could not, and did not last long. The Royalists were driven from their position, and Scotti and 800 men were taken prisoners. The regulars were sent northwards under guards, but Cialdini shot a large number of the peasants in cold blood, and when it struck him that the Neapolitans might exact reprisals by shooting their Garibaldian prisoners — as by the public law of Europe they had a perfect right to do — he sent, through Garibaldi, a message to General Ritucci, who commanded at Capua, telling him that if one of the Garibaldians was executed he would shoot General Scotti and the other soldiers who had fallen into his hands at Isernia. Thus Cialdini began his long career of blood and massacre in the Neapolitan pro- vinces. The peasants, whom he shot year after year, were only fighting for their lawful king ; they were not like the Garibaldian filibusters from Genoa ; but Cialdini uni- formly treated them as rebels, applying to them the term " brigands," a name which, like that of klephts in the Greek insurrection, had in some previous wars been given to the insurgents of Naples, notably by the Muratists under King Joachim, when English admirals and sailors co-operated with the so-called brigands. Cialdini's capture of Isernia, and his advance southward by Venafro and Teano, so as to strike in between the Gangliano and the Volturno, rendered the latter line no longer tenable. The Neapolitans therefore, leaving a gar- rison of 6000 men in Capua, withdrew to the Garigliano. Cialdini, on reaching Teano, turned in pursuit of them, and near Sezza his vanguard encountered the rear-guard of King Francis. A sharp action followed, in which the ad- vantage was on the side of the Neapolitans, who continued 230 THE MAKING OF ITAL K their retreat to the Gangliano without bdng further molested On the 24th, by Cialdini's request, the Gari- baldian column, with the General at the head of it, had crossed the Voltumo at Cajazzo, and marched up by the Teano road to co-operate, it was said, in the puisuit of the Neapolitans. At Teano, on the 26th, Garibaldi, at the head of his troojK, met Victor Emmanuel The king and the man who had done his work so well in the South galloped up to each other, and grasped hands. Garibaldi saluting Victor Emmanuel as Re d' Italia. It would seem that the Garibaldians were brought across the Voltumo specially for this dramatic scene, for on the 28th they went back to the lines before Capua. Garibaldi's salutation of Victor Emmanuel zs Red* Italia marked his acceptance of the plebiscite, which had been carried into effect at Naples on the 21st The first step in preparing the \^ay for it had been to remove all the employis of the Bourbon dynasty and substitute thorough- going revolutionists for them. Under the rule of these men the country, even in the few weeks before the plibisdte, had already fallen into a wretched state. Mr. E^ot (now Sir Henry Elliot), the British ambassador at Naples, whose despatches show that he was favourably inclined to the Garitmldian movement, and whose evidence on this pK>int is therefore all the more important, wrote to Lord John Russell on the 15 th of October : — "According to the accounts which have reached me, the general condition of the proWnces is in the highest degree deplorable. In many parts the insecurity of life and pro|>erty has become very great, while the liberation of the convicts and criminals, the entire impunity with which crime may be committed, the deamess of provisions, the cessation of all trade, and the want of employment, give but a cheerless prospect for the banning of winter. A large pro|>ortion of the per- sons who occupied places of trust and importance were no doubt corrupt and incompetent ; but they were removed without discrimination, and they have been replaced without care; and if I am to believe the accounts of those who were no friends of the late state of things^ STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA, 231 malversation, corruption, and oppression are greater at the present moment than they have been at any previous period." Next day he wrote again to I-,ord John Russell, and spoke of the arrangements for the plebiscite. " The vote," he said, " is to be taken by universal suffrage, and although not avowedly by open voting, it is so arranged that what each man does will be known, and public opinion brought to bear on him. I do not apprehend that the proportion of negative votes would under any circumstances have been very large, but with the present arrangement there is still less chance of it. . . . Both the terms of the vote and the manner in which it is to be taken are well calculated to secure the largest possible majority for the annexation, but not so well fitted to ascertain the real wishes of the country." On the day of the plebiscite the votes were sub- jected to the force of public opinion in a very tangible form. The National Guard, with fixed bayonets, stood at the voting urns. One man who voted No at Monte Cal- vario was repaid with a stab for his boldness.- All the Garibaldians, most of whom, as we have seen, were Northern Italians, were allowed to vote in the capacity of •* liberators." The result was announced to be : — In Naples (?°^^^"^^^^^" 1,303,064 ^ (.Agamst 10,312 InSirilv {" For annexation 432,054 in:>icuy j^^gainst 667 Again the same surprising unanimity that had been witnessed in Savoy, Nice, Tuscany, the Romagna, Umbria, the Marches, and invariably on the side of the men whose troops held the country. In Naples a vote of another kind was given by the almost simultaneous insurrection which had already begun to spread from the Abruzzi to Calabria. There was truth in Prince Murat's proclamation to the Neapolitans, published immediately after the plebiscite^ when the Muratist party made an attempt to 2 Botalla, R&uolution de i860 en Sia'le, vol. ii. p. 131. 232 THE MAKING OF ITALY. profit by the dissatisfaction of the Neapolitans with their new masters. In this proclamation he declared that a wretched farce had been played in the streets of Naples, and that crowds of violent men grouped round ballot- boxes which concealed nothing formed only a travesty of a free election. When was a modern plebiscite anything else ? Where did it ever give anything but an over- whelming majority to the party in power "i The plebiscite could not, however, make Victor Em- manuel king of the south until the reaction was put down and King Francis driven from Gaeta. The former was the work of years, the latter of months. On the 29th of October Cialdini's van-guard tried to cross the Garigliano, and was repulsed by General Salzano, leaving five guns in the hands of the Neapolitans. He therefore moved his army nearer the sea, where he could cross the river under the guns of Persano's fleet, and force the Neapolitans either to fall back on Gaeta or be cut off from it. This much Persano could do for him, but he could give no further aid in the reduction of Gaeta, for off the port lay the French fleet under Admiral Barbier de Tinan, with orders not to permit a blockade. The Imperial Government was now playing into Prince Murat's hands, and had a hope that by this partial interv^ention it might be able to find some means of advancing his chances of the crown of Naples. The Royal commanders at Mola, at the mouth of the Gangliano, thought that Barbier de Tinan's inter- ference would have gone further, and that he would have prevented Persano from bombarding their positions ; but this formed no part of his mission, and the Neapolitan generals paid dearly for their negligence in not having erected heavy batteries at the river mouth, when, on the 4th of November, Cialdini, supported by the fire of the fleet, threw a bridge over the Garigliano, Mola was bom- barded, and the Royalists fell back on Gaeta. A portion of the Neapolitan army was sent to Terracina, where it surrendered to the Pontifical authorities. The rest was withdrawn into the fortress of Gaeta, which Cialdini prepared to besiege. STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 233 Capua had already fallen. At four in the afternoon of the 1st of November, in the presence of Victor Emmanuel, the Piedmontese siege batteries had begun a general bombardment, which lasted for about two hours. Arrange- ments were made for an assault early on the 2nd, but the Swiss General, Du Cornet, who commanded in the town, offered to capitulate if honourable terms were given to him ; and in the afternoon the place was in the hands of the Piedmontese. It was capable of a much longer de- fence ; the siege had really lasted only a few hours. The fall of Capua brought to an end the operations in which the Garibaldians were engaged, for the attack on Gaeta was to be entirely the work of the Piedmontese army. Garibaldi had, in reality, ended his campaign with his meeting with Victor Emmanuel at Teano. On Novem- ber 1st he was in Naples haranguing a crowd, telling them that the Pope was the chief enemy of Italy, and, in brief, " was Antichrist." On the 4th he distributed medals to the survivors of the Milk di Marsala^ the 1007 men who had landed with him in Sicily in May. Only about 500 were left, a good proof that they had not been backward, for there had not been many engagements. On the 6th Victor Emmanuel was to have reviewed the Garibaldian army at Caserta, and then to have made his entry into Naples. The divisions of Medici, Tiirr, Bixio, and Avez- zana, 15,000 strong, were assembled for this purpose at Caserta ; 7000 more under Cosenz and La Maza were at Capua; so that the Garibaldian army had dwindled to 22,000 men. The king had never shown much liking for Garibaldi and his followers, nor had he fully understood Cavour's policy. While the first Garibaldian expedition was on its way to Sicily, he had remarked to a French diplomatist, that if the Neapolitans caught and hanged Garibaldi it would greatly simplify matters : " of course," he added jestingly, " we should be very sorry, and what a splendid monument we would erect to him." ^ He now put an open slight upon the red-shirted army. Garibaldi 3 D'Ideville, Souvenirs d^un Diploinate C7i Italic. 234 THE MAKING OF ITALY, and his 15,000 men had been waiting some hours under arms, when he sent word from Capua that he could not come. Great was the indignation of the Garibaldians ; their comrade, Commander Forbes, expressed it fully when he wrote that Napoleon III. would not treat his instru- ments thus : " However great scoundrels he may think them or know them to be, he will not be quite such a fool as to tell them so. Yet this is the part Victor Emmanuel has allowed his ministers to make him play. It is as if he, the receiver of stolen goods, not content with getting them for nothing, were to turn round on the principals and say, * You are a set of Mazzinists', which in European parlance means thieves and robbers. No one looks for gratitude in this world ; but common decency becomes a monarch, if not policy." "*..." Towards evening," he continues, in an angry strain of irony, " the receiver of the stolen goods sent to say that he could not possibly mix in the society of the robbers on that day at any rate, but requested the bandit chief to act for him, and take a last fond look at the about-to-be-disbanded gang." Under a down-pour of rain. Garibaldi reviewed his army, and bade it farewell till he would raise his standard again. Next day .the king, accompanied by Garibaldi, Tiirr, and Cosenz, made his entry into Naples. " Their reception," * says Forbes, " did not correspond with the occasion, the king being before his time, the municipality unprepared, and the rain pitiless. Not of much im- portance, as even the disapprobation of the inhabitants of Naples would be the highest honour they could be- stow." But what of the plebiscite ? Did not Victor Em- manuel come in virtue of the popular will ? Or did this cold apathetic reception mean that the plebiscite was a well-arranged sham ? From Victor Emmanuel Garibaldi received a promise that his army should be incorporated in that of the king- ^ ** Campaign of Garibaldi," p. 341. » P. 342. Mr. Elliot also, in his despatch to Lord John Russell, acknowledges that the king was badly received, and tries to make the weather account for it. STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 235 dom. On the 8th he formally resigned the dictatorship of the Two Sicilies, and at daybreak on the 9th he left Naples for Caprera, paying a visit, as he departed, to Admiral Mundy. In his parting proclamation he declared that the work of Italian Unity was still incomplete, and called for a million Italians to be under arms in March, 1 86 1. So ended Garibaldi's part in the Revolution of 1859-60. He and his friends had been skilfully made to do Cavour's work ; they had been at once both aided and held carefully in check by Persano's fleet and Cial- dini's army, and Piedmont never for a moment allowed him to act except in her interest, and throughout took care that she should with certainty be able to reap the fruit of his labours. Cavour's and Persano's despatches are at once the explanation of Garibaldi's success, and of the ease with which Victor Emmanuel took Naples and Sicily out of his hands. The siege of Gaeta began on the '4th of November. Standing upon a rocky peninsula, and defended upon the land side by a triple line of fortifications, and towards the sea by strong casemated batteries, the fortress of Gaeta is capable of a prolonged defence, and if covered by a fleet would be impregnable, for the ground on the land side is of such a nature that it would be nearly impossible to put in position against the fortress a number of guns sufficient to subdue the fire of the place. The garrison consisted of 12,000 picked men, of whom all except 300 were Neapo- litans. They were commanded by Ritucci and Bosco, whose parole given at Milazzo had now expired. Colonel Afanto di Rivera acted as chief of the engineers, and displayed during the siege such ingenuity and resource as won him a high position in the military opinion of Europe. The fortress had only smooth-bore guns in its batteries, for these were the early days of rifled artillery ; before the siege was over, Colonel Afanto had actually suc- ceeded in casting, finishing, and placing in position, two batteries of heavy rifled guns. Had such energy and talent been found throughout the staff" of the Neapolitan army from the outset, joined to the courage and fidelity of 236 THE MAKING OF ITALY, men like General Bosco, the fate of the Garibaldian in- vasion might have been a very different one. From the first day of the siege of Gaeta to the last, the young king was the soul of the defence. He was continually under fire. Every day he was in the batteries encouraging the men, seeing that all was in order, taking counsel with the officers. With him often came his young queen, but her more ordinary occupation was to take charge of the hospitals, where, assisted by a French lady, the Countess Jurien de la Graviere, and fifteen Sisters of Charity, she laboured incessantly for the sick and wounded. The presence of the French fleet in the harbour enabled her to organize a system of transport, by which the con- valescent were from time to time transferred by sea to hospitals prepared for them at Terracina. It has been said of King Francis that he defended Gaeta as fortress had never been defended before. Our warlike days have seen more than one desperate and pro- tracted defence, but none more determined and more heroic than that of Gaeta in 1 860-61. We cannot follow here in detail the story of the siege. Such a nar- rative would be tedious. The daily record of batteries damaged or repaired, guns dismounted and replaced, this or that building burned by the shells, so many killed or wounded, so much ammunition expended, so much or so little progress made with the siege-works — may be passed over as of little importance. It is enough to say that it took Cialdini nearly a month to construct roads by which he brought up his heavy guns and mortars from Mola to the positions he had chosen for his first batteries in front of Gaeta. Once he had a sufficient number of guns in battery, he began a continual bombardment, which did far more damage to the houses, churches, and hospitals of the town, than to the defences. The long range of his rifled- guns made it easy for him to carry on this bombardment with little loss, for he was beyond reach of the guns of the fortress. This firing at a long range, however, could only prepare the way for the nearer approach, without which an assault would be impossible, and this approach Cialdini STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 237 failed to make ; to the end of the siege his attack was a simple bombardment at long range. Meanwhile, the sea- front being free from attack_, and the harbour open, King Francis was able to communicate with the rest of his kingdom, and to learn from day to day the progress of the reaction, styled by the invaders the brigandage, the same name which the Republicans of Paris in 1793 had given to the Royalist revolt in La Vendee. To Gaeta came foreign and Italian officers, who, after conferring with Bosco and the king, went out to the Abruzzi and the MoHse to organize the scattered bands and columns of Royalists, whom the Piedmontese in vain endeavoured to beat down. Of these volunteers the most famous was the Count de Christen, a gallant soldier who had fought for France in the Crimea. We shall hear more of his exploits and his sufferings later on. To Gaeta, too, came news of a growing reaction in Naples itself. All this furnished many motives for continuing the defence as long as defence was possible ; and the stand made by King Francis at Gaeta was, therefore, far from being what Lord John Russell called it in his despatches — " a useless effusion of blood." In Naples itself the reaction took serious proportions, and from day to day the discontent of the people with their new masters went on increasing. Even trifles added to it, such as the removal of furniture and works of art from the Royal palace to Turin, in itself a matter of no importance, but, viewed in the light of the policy of the Viceroy Farini, another proof that Italy was not being unified, but subjected to Piedmont. On the 8th of Decem- ber King Francis issued from Gaeta a proclamation to the people of the Two Sicilies. In that fortress, he told them, he defended not only his crown but the inde- pendence of their country. King and people, he said, had been alike despoiled and betrayed, but " the work of iniquity never lasts long, and usurpations are not eternal." So long as calumny and treason had struck only at him, he had been silent ; but now, when he saw his people treated as a conquered race, and their sons drafted off to 238 THE MAKING OF ITALY, Northern Italy, and when he received addresses from every part of the kingdom, it was time to protest. He was a NeapoHtan, he said ; he had never ssen any other country ; all his thoughts were bound up with the father- land, and, the heir of an ancient dynasty, he had not come, after despoiling the church and the orphan, to seize by force the fairest part of Italy. He had refused to believe in treason while traitors sat at his council-board, he had refused to shed blood when he was menaced with open revolt ; and Europe had seen the consequence of his con- fidence and of his clemency, in the triumph of the Re- volution. He had been accused of weakness, he said, because he abandoned Palermo and Naples to spare bloodshed in the streets of his two capitals. He had believed in the good faith of the King of Piedmont, when Victor Emmanuel called him his brother and friend, ex- pressed disapproval of Garibaldi's enterprise, and accepted his own advances towards negotiating an alliance to pro- mote the interests of Italy ; and now he saw this same king breaking treaties and trampling upon law. He, King Francis, had granted an amnesty, called the exiles home, and published a constitution, but all this could not avert an invasion, for it was by foreign invasion, and not domestic insurrection, that his throne had been assailed.^ "What," he said, "has the Revolution obtained for the people of Naples and Sicily? The finances, lately so flourishing, are completely ruined, the administration is a chaos, personal liberty does not exist. The gaols are full of persons imprisoned on suspicion ; instead of freedom, the state of siege exists in the provinces, a foreign general ' proclaims martial law, and decrees that all my subjects who do not bow to the flag of Sardinia sliall be shot. Assassination is recompensed ; regicide obtains an apo- theosis ; respect for the faith of our fathers is called ^ Mr. Dicey in his memoir of Cavour states, from personal testi- mony, that the insurrection in Sicily was virtually over when Garibaldi landed, only a few bands being held together near Marsala by the news of his coming. ' The Piedmontese, Pinelli. STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 239 fanaticism ; promoters of civil war, traitors to their country, receive pensions out of the pockets of peaceable tax-payers. Anarchy is everywhere ; men who have never before seen this part of Italy, or who in a long absence have forgotten its needs, constitute the govern- ment. Instead of the free institutions which I had given you, and which I wished to develop, you have had an unlimited dictature, and now martial law takes the place of the constitution. Under the blows of those who lord it over you, the ancient monarchy of Roger and of Charles III. is disappearing, the Two Sicilies have been declared provinces of a distant kingdom. Naples and Palermo will be governed by prefects from Turin." Late as it was, there was still, he said, some hope. If he conquered, his programme was a general amnesty, and separate parliaments and complete administrative inde- pendence for Naples and Sicily. But if he was to see the fall of the last bulwark of the monarchy, he would leave Gaeta with an unchanged resolve calmly to await else- where the hour when justice would be done. There were few houses in Naples which did not soon possess copies of this proclamation. Notwithstanding the activity of the Piedmontese police agents, it was posted on the walls, distributed in the streets and spread broadcast through the kingdom. Everywhere it produced a marked effect. Even some of the Liberals, in their disappointment at the character which had been taken by the annexation movement, accepted the programme of King Francis. In the provinces, columns of Royalist insurgents swept the country ; there were moments when even Naples itself seemed to be upon the verge of a counter-revolution. On the 2 1st, 23rd, and 25th of December, there were demonstrations in the streets to the cry of " Viva Francesco Secondo ! " At eight on the evening of the 29th there was an entente in the quarter of La Margellina, the crowds crying, " Away with the foreigner ! Long live King Francis ! " The Piedmontese cavalry patrolled the streets, and at some points were insulted and driven back with showers of stones. On the 31st there was another demon- 240 THE MAKING OF ITALY, stration, the garrison was reinforced, Farini prepared to cope with a general insurrection, and imprisoned large numbers of men who were believed to be leaders of the reaction, amongst them many officers of the old Neapolitan army. The Gazetta del Popolo of Milan, a Mazzinian journal, published a letter from Naples, dated January 3rd, 1 861, written by a Garibaldian correspondent, which reflected the feeling in the capital of the South. '^ When I left Genoa to come here/' said the writer, " had anyone talked to me of the possibility of the return of the Bourbon to Naples, I should have taken him for a madman ; and yet I cannot say in truth that if I were to leave this place for some time, I should be sure of being allowed a safe return. Had you been in Naples to-day and spoken with the people, you would have thought we were on the eve of a revolution, and that, too, a counter-revolution, which would be most hateful, and most fatal to the sacred cause which has been upheld till to-day at the cost of so much courage and of so many sacrifices." Similar events were taking place in the provinces. In many a town and city the shield of Savoy was torn down. On the loth of December the reaction showed itself at Maddaloni, on the i8th at Caserta, where the Garibaldian National Guard was disarmed by the people. On the 29th it was at Nocera, whence it spread through the adjoining district to Castellamare. There was fighting at Bitonto in the province of Bari, — about Avellino, in Calabria, and in the Abruzzi. In the first week of January, the insurgent bands, led by officers of the Royal army, defeated the Piedmontese and occupied Teramo. The peasant Chiavone formed a strong column in the moun- tains ; another mountaineer, Mecoli, was at the head of 4000 men. On the one hand the movement spread into Ascoli, a portion of the Pontifical territory lately annexed by Piedmont ; on the other, it extended into the Terra di Lavoro. A deputation from Calabria was at Gaeta in December ; in January it returned accompanied by some good officers, who organized the Calabrese bands, and led some of them into the Basilicata. Many of the National STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 241 Guard joined the movement. The Revolutionary press charged the Roman Government with having aided the reaction with men, money and arms. Rome was, however, in no position to give such aid. The accusation was false. Had even the handful of tried veteran officers in Rome undertaken the direction of the movement, its results would have been very different, and Victor Emmanuel would never have been called King of Italy. Unfortunately, a movement like this could not be directed with any certainty from a single besieged fortress, and, powerful as it was, the reaction lacked a central head, and could only hurl a multitude of disconnected attacks against the systematic and well-organized resistance of the Piedmontese army. As early as November, i860. General Pinelli had marched into the Abruzzi with a strong force to put down the insurrection in those provinces, from which, if it once gained head, it might seriously threaten Cialdini's army before Gaeta. He at once proclaimed that all, who, without formal licence, had any weapons in their possession, should be immediately shot ; and that all who by act or word insulted the arms of Savoy, the portrait of Victor Emmanuel, or the national flag, should suffer the same penalty, as well as all who by speeches or money tried to excite revolt. The article of the proclamation, imposing death on all who insulted the arms or the flag of Savoy or the portrait of the king even by word, was too sanguinary and sweeping even for Cialdini and Farini, and it was sub- sequently modified. Nevertheless, Pinelli's march through the Abruzzi was marked by a broad track of blood. He entered the district of Teramo, and besieged the hill- fortress of Civitella del Tronto ; Giovane and his four hundred men made a gallant and successful resistance, and the bands of Chiavone and Mecoli pressed upon Pinelli's lines, cut off his convoys, and finally forced him to raise the siege and retire after a brief campaign which was as sanguinary as it was unsuccessful. Such was the condition of affairs at the end of i860 — Gaeta still unconquered, the reaction in arms from Calabria to the Abruzzi, and even the Piedmontese tenure of the city of Naples far from secure. R 242 THE MAKING OF ITAL V, Pinelli's columns swept the Abruzzi and the Terra di Lavoro, putting down the reaction with fire and sword in one district only to see it break out afresh in another. It was strange that this people, whom the liberating army of Piedmont had come "to free," could only be made to accept " freedom " at the point of the bayonet and by the light of the torch. Pinelli's despatches and proclamations spoke of the insurgents as brigands, but they had generals of the Royal army of Naples at their head, and the opera- tions against them were a series of difficult campaigns. How ruthlessly those operations were conducted, is shown even by the admissions of the Piedmontese themselves. On January 26th, 1861, the Independente of Naples pub- lished in its news columns a letter from one of Pinelli's officers. " When we got near Mazzano," it ran, " we began the cannonade. The brigands took to flight, and we occupied the place in which fire soon effected the most complete destruction. Other columns took possession of Cassara and San Vito, which suffered the same fate as Mazzano. These villages were, as it were, enveloped in a tempest of fire; all the houses, all the farms and buildings of every kind, to which we came, were made the prey of the flames. It was a terrible sight ; all the animals, the cows and sheep and the rest, fled in terror to the hills, but the men were hunted down by their fellow-men. Every- where the flames rose in the air ; it produced upon me the most painful impression." Other letters of the same kind might be quoted. Pinelli^s own proclamations breathed only a savage fury against the insurgents, and the Pope, whom he falsely accused of secretly supporting them. Take, for instance, his proclamation from Ascoli on the 3rd of February : " Soldiers,*' he wrote, " you have laboured hard, but while there is still something to be done nothing is accomplished. A remnant of this race of brigands is still hiding in the mountains. Hasten to drive them out, and be as inexorable as fate. With such enemies mercy is a crime. . . . Indifferent to all political* principle, and longing only for booty and rapine, they are, for the time being, the paid brigands of the Vicar, not of STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 243 Christ, but of Satan, but ready to sell their daggers to others when the gold extorted from the stupid credulity of the faithful is no longer sufficient to satisfy their desires. We will annihilate them, we will crush out the priestly vampire who with his impure lips has sucked, for centuries, the blood of our mother, we will purify with fire and steel the regions he has infected, 2indfrom the ashes will rise freedom for this noble province of Ascoli. {Signed) — The Major-General, Frederic Pinelli." What was the real character of the movement, and how it was hampered and not assisted by the French officers and the Papal officials in the Pontifical States, is well shown by the story of the Count de Christen's campaign in the Abruzzi. Early in the war De Christen saw that what the movement wanted in order to succeed, was a fixed and clearly defined object, a general plan and a central direction, without which it must fail. He had gone to Gaeta in September, i860, placed his services at the disposal of King Francis, and at the head of a flying column cleared the district of Aquila of the Garibaldian invaders. Cialdini's advance from Isernia by Venafro, drove De Christen's column into the Papal States, but on his retreat he succeeded in surprising and defeating a Piedmontese detachment at San Germano. Arrived in the Papal States, his column was dis- armed by the authorities. Several thousands of Neapo- litans, who had been disarmed in the same way, were interned in the towns and villages, and, although the French troops were active on the frontier, from time to time small bodies of them succeeded in escaping into the Abruzzi to join the reaction. This was the only founda- tion of the accusations of Pinelli and others against the Papal Government. His column having been disarmed and disbanded, De Christen went back by sea to Gaeta. The siege had begun ; he proposed to the king a plan, the ultimate object of which was to organize an army and bring it down upon Cialdini's rear, this attack, coupled with a vigorous sortie from the place, being intended to force the Piedmontese to raise the siege. What he pro- posed was, that he should embark with 2000 men of the R 2 244 THE MAKING OF ITALY. garrison of Gaeta, and^ landing on the coast, traverse the Terra di Lavoro, and reach Sora on its northern border and on the verge of the Abruzzi. He had relations with the people of the district, and hoped there to double his force. At the head of this column he intended to manoeuvre, so as to force Cialdini to detach troops in pursuit of him, as was actually done when he took the field. These troops he would lead into the Abruzzi, and there, turning and evading them, regain Sora and march along the Pontifical frontier, rallying to his standard as he went several thousand of the disarmed Neapolitan troops, whom his agents would have conducted in a. few weeks into the mountain districts of the frontier, much as during the last Carlist war, despite the French cordon, Carlist bands crossed and recrossed the Pyrenean frontier. With these he hoped to come down on Cialdini, about 12,000 strong, the garrison at the same time making a general sortie. But this was only part of the plan. To prevent Cialdini from drawing reinforcements at the decisive moment from other parts of the kingdom of Naples, the Royalists were to raise the barricades in the streets of the capital, and some battalions of chasseurs were to be sent by sea from Gaeta to Calabria to give support to the reaction which had broken out there, and to rally and arm the immense numbers of Neapolitan troops which had been scattered through the country since they were dis- banded after General Ghio's traitorous surrender at Soveria. The plan was an immense one ; but had De Christen been properly supported, it might have succeeded.^ Unfortu- tunately, while approving of it and authorizing him to execute it, King Francis and his generals refused to give him the most necessary factor for its execution, namely the 2000 men from Gaeta who were to form the nucleus of his army. He reluctantly consented to try to organize such a force out of the disbanded Neapolitan corps in the ^ In case of failure De Christen intended to break up his army into a multitude of bands and flying columns, and thus carry on a well organized " brigandage " against the Piedmontese. STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 245 Papal States, though he foresaw that the attempt would have to be made " in the midst of innumerable difficulties and unheard-of obstacles, raised by the Roman Govern- ment and the French army of occupation." ^ He went into the Roman territory, but he was denounced to the autho- rities by a Neapolitan officer, whom he had thoroughly trusted ; and he had to return to Gaeta without having accomplished anything. He arrived there on the 3rd of December ; and on the night between the 4th and the 5th, at the request of Bosco, he Jed a sortie against some houses, under cover of which Cialdini^s engineers were erecting a battery ; he seized the buildings, and blew them up. Next day General Bosco told him that a deputation had come from Calabria, requesting Neapolitan troops to support and a general to direct the insurrection in that district. De Christen went to the king, and asked for the command ; but was refused, on the ground that the affair of the Abruzzi was more important. This was an unfor- tunate step for King Francis, for there was a Prussian officer, Von Kalkreuth, on whom De Christen thoroughly relied, ready to take his place in the Abruzzi ; and had De Christen gone to Calabria with a ie^ soldiers, he might have accomplished then what Borges failed to effect twelve months later. As it was, the Calabrian plan was neglected, delay followed delay till it was too late. On the 6th De Christen and Kalkreuth left Gaeta in a small ship with a few companions and a cargo of 2000 muskets and 1 20,000 cartridges. A storm drove them into Terracina, the most southern port of the Papal States. Foreseeing that the ship would be searched before long by the authorities, De Christen, during the night, transferred nearly all his arms into the hold of another ship which lay in the anchorage, and which had been searched the day before ; and in order to conceal the removal, he left on board his own ship 200 muskets and 20,000 cartridges. He then landed, to find means of transporting his cargo inland to a place of safety. At dawn the French com- 9 De Christen, Campagne dans les Abruzzcs, pp. 204, 205. 246 THE MAKING OF ITALY, mandant sent a party on board his ship and seized all that he had left in her. On the following night he embarked the rest of the arms and ammunition on some flat-bottomed boats, and his men towed them by hand along the canal of the Pontine Marshes to Foro Appio. Leaving Kal- kreuth there, he went on to Velletri^ where he met the Cavaliere Caracciolo and the Count de Coatandun, who held a General's commission in the Neapolitan army. About Velletri his agents had secretly organized a body of 300 men — Neapolitan soldiers. These were sent on in small bodies to Foro Appio ; Caracciolo and De Christen followed them, and, having armed them, Caracciolo struck off at their head into the mountains, making for the Abruzzi, while De Christen, Coatandun, and Von Kal- kreuth remained at the village to find means of sending on the arms. But the authorities of the province were in- formed of their proceedings. A detachment of French troops seized about a thousand muskets on the canal_, and kept De Christen and his friends prisoners for a few days. This was in the last week of December, i860. When he was set free he learned that while Caracciolo's column was passing through Frosinone it had been stopped, disarmed and dispersed by the Papal authorities. Failure after failure had not discouraged De Christen. In the middle of January he quietly collected 400 unarmed men near Subiaco, and, crossing the Neapolitan frontier, by a wonderful stroke of fortune succeeded in seizing without shedding a drop of blood, a Piedmontese convoy of 400 rifles and 26,000 cartridges. It was the 21st of January. Close in front of him was the town of Sora, where he had many friends. He resolved to surprise it in the following night, but as he approached in the darkness, he received information that General de Sonnaz, who had been detached from Cialdini's army to operate against him, had just occupied the place with a whole division. He retreated to the great abbey of Casamari, just inside the Papal frontier, where he asked from the monks hospi- tality for his tired and travel-stained men, who in the cold of a January night had twice forded the Liris. Next day STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 247 Chiavone and a band of peasants informed him that De Sonnaz had crossed the frontier and was advancing upon Casamari. He immediately left the convent, and en- countering the head of the Piedmontese column on the road not far off, fell back before it, skirmishing as he went, till he occupied a strong position on a hill close by. The Piedmontese fired a few shells at his column, and then sacked the convent, carrying off even the sacred vessels of the church. In one of the rooms they seized some papers, forgotten there by De Christen. Finally, they set fire to the place, and, leaving it in flames, recrossed the frontier. When they were gone, the monks extinguished the fire and saved the building. De Christen retired with his band to Banco, a mountain village still within the Papal territory. On the 17th De Sonnaz, with a column of 35,000 men and some rifled guns, left Sora for the second time, and, crossing the Papal frontier, attacked Banco on the 28th of January. The village is surrounded by a half-ruined mediaeval wall ; but its position makes it very defensible, as the hill on which it stands slopes precipitously on all sides but one. Only on the northern side is an assault possible. De Sonnaz sent forward a battalion to enter the place ; but, being received with a volley, it retreated. He then began a bombardment, which he continued from six in the morning — when he opened fire — to half-past eleven. But it had no other effect than to give fresh proof that bombardment is often more noisy than dangerous, for of De Christen's 400 men only four were wounded. Then, in the belief that he had by this prolonged fire prepared the way for success, De Sonnaz twice assaulted the village, forming his men in three solid columns of attack. Both assaults were repulsed with heavy loss, the Piedmontese leaving a number of prisoners in the hands of the Neapolitans. De Sonnaz stopped firing, and sent in a flag of truce, desiring to negotiate with De Christen himself. The two leaders met outside Bauco, and a convention was arranged and signed which put an end to the operations. Perhaps no battle had ever before been fought under such 248 THE MAKING OF ITALY. strange conditions, for it took place on neutral ground, and though Ue Sonnaz by persevering in his attacks might per- haps have carried the village, it was just as likely that at any moment French troops would come up, disarm both parties, and ingloriously march the Piedmontese over the frontier. It must have been by considerations of this kind that De Sonnaz was led to propose a convention. It was agreed to by De Christen on these terms : — (i) That General De Sonnaz should evacuate the Pontifical territory and give his word of honour not to enter it again ; (2) that De Christen should personally pledge himself not to fight either in the Calabrias or the Abruzzi ; (3) that his men and officers were free to go where they wished. From De Sonnaz De Christen learned that in their two attacks the Piedmontese had lost 500 killed and wounded, including a lieutenant-colonel and eleven other officers. After this brilliant exploit, De Christen gave up the command of the column and returned to Rome. His friend, General de Coatandun, took command of the victors of Bauco, and, taking advantage of the third section of the convention, continued the campaign. He led them into the Abruzzi, where, in the mountains round Tagliacozzo, he carried on a guerilla warfare against the Piedmontese. Until Gaeta fell De Christen could take no further part in the move- ment. So long as the presence of the French fleet kept open the roadstead of Gaeta a complete investment was im- possible ; and it could not be expected that Cialdini's bombardment of the place, severe as it was and much damage as it had done, would force King Francis to capitulate. It therefore became the immediate object of the Cabinet of Turin to secure the withdrawal of the French fleet. In this it found a potent ally in the English Cabinet. Lord John Russell, in his despatches to the Court of the Tuileries, urged the Emperor to abandon an intervention with that " freedom of action " in the South of Italy which he had so energetically maintained and pro- tected in the North. In the first days of January the Emperor adopted the views put before him by the English STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 249 and Sardinian ambassadors, and announced that he would assume a policy of non-intervention in Southern Italy. On the evening of the 8th Admiral Barbiere de Tinan informed the King of Naples that his squadron was ordered to leave the waters of Gaeta. At the same time the admiral proposed an armistice from the 9th to the 19th, adding that if it were accepted his fleet would remain in the roadstead until the truce expired. The armistice was accepted^ on condition that no works should be executed or batteries raised on either side while it was in force. This clause of the armistice was most shamefully violated by Cialdini, whose engineers were employed .bringing up guns and strengthening his lines of attack for several days during the suspension of arms. The king made use of the pause in the attack and defence to clear out the hospitals and remove the wounded to a place of safety. At the same time it afforded him an opportunity to assemble at Gaeta the ambassadors accredited to his Court, with whom he held several conferences. On the morning of the 19th General Menabrea, Cialdini's chief of the staff, came into Gaeta under a flag of truce to propose terms for a capitulation, intimating that if these were rejected the bombardment would at once recommence. The king and his generals rejected the proposed terms without hesitation ; the French fleet steamed out of the roadstead, the Piedmontese fleet, under Persano, took its place and declared a blockade, while at the same time the bombard- ment recommenced from Cialdini's batteries, to which, on account of the long range, the besieged could make no effective reply for want of rifled guns. The fleet, though it contained several ships of the old Neapolitan navy, had very few Neapolitans on board of it, and these were only to be found in two of the frigates. All the rest had left their ships, some to take part as volunteers in the defence of Gaeta, others for the merchant service.^ A single ship, the sailing frigate Parthenope, still carried the Neapolitan flag. She lay under the seaward batteries of Gaeta, and assisted in repelling Persano''s attack. 1 Bottalla, vol. ii. p. 247. 250 THE MAKING OF ITALY. On the 22nd of January there was a general bombard- ment by sea and land. The squadron was beaten off, the Garibaldi, Costituzione, and Maria Adelaide receiving severe injuries. The fire on the land side did no damage to the works that could not be easily repaired. For the following week the fleet was content with keeping up the blockade at a respectful distance from the forts, but the land batteries day after day continued the bombardment, doing far more damage to the town than to the defences. On the night of the 31st of January the monastery of Alcantara was destroyed by a shower of shells, and Mgr. Crisevolo and several priests and monks were mortally wounded. On the 29th Colonel Afanto di Rivera placed in battery twelve rifled guns, which he had succeeded in making in one of the foundries of the arsenal. Their fire caused the explosion of a powder magazine in Cialdini's lines ; probably it had not been well secured, on account of the short range covered by the guns of Gaeta until that day. Next day a shot from one of the rifled guns, which opened fire on the fleet, hit the Monzambano at a range of nearly two miles (3200 metres). Up to the 5th of February the bombardment had really effected nothing, and Cialdini had not been able to push his works near enough to breach the walls, far less to attempt an assault. He had been three months engaged in the siege, and both his army and the Ministry at Turin were becoming impatient and discouraged. On the 5th came the first hope of a speedy fall of the fortress. At three o'clock in the afternoon of that day the great maga- zine of Gaeta exploded. It is just possible that a shell may have in some way penetrated into the building (though it was supposed to be effectually blinded), and this shell would have caused a fire, spreading to the stores of gun- powder after the momentary pause in the bombardment had begun. But it is much more likely that the assertion of the Royalists is true, that a traitor had been found to destroy the magazine, and a lighted fuze had been placed in it to do what Cialdini's bombardment could not effect. Whatever was its cause, the results of the explosion were STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 251 most disastrous, especially as it was followed by the blowing up of two other powder magazines in its neigh- bourhood. Large stores of provisions were destroyed ; a breach was opened in the wall towards the sea-beach ; five batteries, amongst them the two armed with rifled cannon, were overwhelmed and ruined, and General Travasa and a hundred men were buried in the ruins. The explosion had no sooner taken place than the bombardment re- commenced from the land batteries, the fleet, for the first time since its repulse, closing in and taking part in it. The firing did not cease till midnight. The batteries of Gaeta replied. Had there been any cessation of fire, or any other sign of a panic caused by the explosion, Cialdini would probably have attempted an assault. At midnight, at the request of the besieged, an armistice of forty hours was agreed upon,^ to give an opportunity of rescuing the survivors from the ruins and burying the dead. The work had already begun immediately after the explosion ; but under the shell fire it was so perilous and difficult that the truce was applied for. Cialdini at the same time offered to let the convoys of sick and wounded pass out through his lines, and 200 men were thus removed from the crowded hospitals of Gaeta. The bombardment began again on the 7th ; but the end was now close at hand. So long as Gaeta had been open to the sea there was a hope of making it the centre of a general resistance throughout the kingdom ; even after the withdrawal of the French fleet and the beginning of the blockade by sea and land, so long as the works were intact, ammunition and stores abundant, the besieged would not hear of surrender. King Francis was determined, if he could not preserve his throne, at least to show that he could make an honourable defence of the last fortress of his kingdom; But now that the wall was breached, the main stores of provisions and munitions of war destroyed, and with them the only batteries that could effectively reply to the attack, it 2 Twenty-eight hours was the time originally stated ; a prolongation of twelve hours was subsequently agreed upon. 252 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. was clear that he could offer only a very imperfect resis- tance. It was, of course, possible to fight to the end and die among the ruins of Gaeta ; but this would have been the last refuge of despair, not the act of a king, who, though dethroned by a revolution promoted from without, still believed in the loyalty of the mass of his subjects, and still hoped in the future, as he had declared in more than one of his manifestoes. He therefore resolved to capitulate, and, on the night between the lOth and nth of February he sent out a parlementaire to Cialdini's lines to ask for an armistice in order to negotiate. At daybreak Cialdini re- commenced the bombardment, and the forts replied. At the same time he sent in a message to the effect that the besieged might negotiate, but he would grant no armistice, and would not cease firing until the capitulation was actually signed — thus again violating the laws of honourable war as he had done at Ancona, though here the violation was less flagrant, inasmuch as he gave notice beforehand, and the city was not utterly defenceless, but able to reply. In any case, however, the loss of life and destruction of property caused by this final bombardment was utterly wanton and useless. Up to the very moment of actual surrender the fire continued furiously ; and on the 13th, the last day of the siege, several magazines blew up, and many of the landward batteries were destroyed. Even while the last formality was in progress, the making of duplicate copies of the capitulation and affixing the signa- tures, the firing continued. During those three days, when practically all resistance was at an end, the "liberating army " threw nearly fifty thousand shells into Gaeta. The capitulation, signed on the 13th, provided that the king, the queen, the royal family, and their suite, were free to depart, receiving the honours due to sovereigns, and that until their departure the sea-forts should not be occupied by the Piedmontese ; that the officers of the garrisons of Gaeta, Messina and Civitella del Tronto should, if they entered the Piedmontese army, retain their rank, or that if they did not join it they should receive their full pay ; and STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA. 253 that the garrison of Gaeta should receive the honours of war, but should remain prisoners until the fall of Messina and Civitella del Tronto. Cialdini had the effrontery to offer to place at the disposal of King Francis for his depar- ture the Piedmontese frigate, Garibaldi. On the T4th the king and queen left the harbour in the French corvette, La Monette, on the first stage of their journey to Rome, where Pius IX. had offered them his hospitality in return for what he had received from King Ferdinand at Gaeta in the days of his exile. As the Mouette steamed out of the harbour the seaward forts, still manned by the Royal troops, fired a salute of twenty-one guns. Then the Royal Standard of the Two Sicilies was hauled down, and the batteries of Gaeta were occupied by Cialdini's army. So ended the heroic defence of Gaeta. It was upon a mass of blood-stained and smoking ruins, the debris of houses, churches, convents and hospitals, destroyed by the two months' bombardment, that Cialdini hoisted the tricolour of Piedmont. For Gaeta, as for many another busy town and quiet village of the Two Sicilies, the advent of the " liberators " meant only ruin and destruction. Great was the rejoicing at Turin. At Naples, the Prince of Carignano who had succeeded P'arini as Viceroy, had to issue an order for an illumination, for the city was in no mood for festivities. Though Gaeta had fallen, the Royal Standard of Bourbon still flew upon the citadel of Messina, and upon the moun- tain fortress of Civitella del Tronto ; and in the provinces the armed reaction had numerous strong columns in the field, which would be largely reinforced when the coming spring rendered mountain warfare less difficult. Of the two fortresses, Civitella was of little importance, but it was necessary to reduce the citadel of Messina at once. Cial- dini's army and siege train were therefore transferred to Sicily. Fergola, who commanded the fortress, had already rejected one summons to surrender, when, on news coming that the Senate at Turin had proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, Cialdini sent to the Neapolitan general a summons, which deserves to be placed on record beside 254 " THE MAKING OF ITALY, his infamous proclamation from Rimini and his despatches from Osimo and Isernia, Addressing Fergola, Cialdini wrote : — " I have to inform you — 1st. That Victor Emmanuel having been proclaimed King of Italy by the Parliament at Turin,^ your conduct will henceforth be considered as rebellion : " 2nd. That, in consequence, I shall grant no capitulation to you and your garrison, and you will have to surrender at discretion : "3rd. That if you fire upon the city, I shall have shot after the capture of the citadel as many officers and soldiers as there have been victims of your fire in Messina : " 4th. That your private property and that of your officers will be confiscated, to compensate for the losses caused to the families of the citizens : " 5th, and finally, that / will give up you and your sub- ordinates to the vengeance of the people of Messina. " I am accustomed to keep my word, and I can assure you that very soon you and your people will be in my power. Now, act as you will, I shall not consider you any longer as a soldier, but as a vile assassin^ and all Europe will share my view. "(Signed) Enrico Cialdini." Fergola, nothing daunted by this brutal challenge, more worthy of a bandit than of a soldier, continued his defence, and would have made a protracted resistance, had he not received from King Francis at Rome orders to capitulate. On the mediation of the Due de Gramont, the French ambas- sador at Rome, an arrangement was concluded by which on the one hand the Piedmontese Government agreed to extend the conditions which had been granted to the garrison of Gaeta to the insurgents of the Abruzzi, at whose head De Christen had placed himself as soon as he heard of the fall of Gaeta ; on the other hand, in return ^ This was not true. Cialdini's summons is dated the 28th of February ; the Bill had only just passed the Senate on the 26th, so that it had only been adopted by one of the two Houses. STRUGGLE ON THE VOLTURNO AND AT GAETA, 255 for this, the king was to send General Fergola an order to surrender the citadel of Messina to the Piedmontese. In pursuance of this arrangement, Fergola capitulated on March 13th. De Christen withdrew his column into the Papal States, and the Piedmontese frigate Costituzione was sent to convey the men to Naples, whence they were to be restored to their homes. In violation of the convention, for many of them the journey ended in the prisons of Naples. The same order that had been sent, to Fergola by King Francis was sent to Colonel Giovane at Civitella ; and he surrendered on the 20th of March, when the last Neapolitan fortress in Italy passed into the hands of Piedmont. Five days after the fall of Gaeta, the first Parliament of the new State met at Turin. At the elections only 57 per cent, of those on the register had voted, and immense numbers had not even had their names inscribed on the register at all. The new Parliament, therefore, represented only the Liberals ; the Conservatives had steadfastly abstained from voting, taking for their policy and their motto Ne elettori nb elettiy " neither electors nor elected." The chief business for the Parliament was to formally declare Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, and extend to the whole peninsula, so far as it had been annexed, the Piedmontese Statuto FondamentaleyOr (Zovi^^\\M\Xox\ granted to his subjects by Charles Albert thirteen years before, in February, 1848. On the 26th of this later February, the bill was passed unanimously by the Senate ; and on the 14th of March, with only two dissentient voices, the Cham- ber of Deputies accepted the law which made Victor Emmanuel King of Italy by the Grace of the Revolution. Next day the law was promulgated in the official gazette of Turin, which for the first time appeared with the title Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d^ Italia, On the 31st of March England recognized the new kingdom. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell had been, from the very outset, the staunch friends of the Italian Revolution ; and they now made England be the first State in the world to set its official seal upon its 256 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. success. The United States recognized it on the 13th of April, France on the 25th of June, Turkey on the 2nd of July, Portugal on the 1st of October, Belgium (adding to her recognition a meaningless declaration that it made no change in her relations with Rome) on the 3rd of Novem- ber, and Brazil on the 8th. Spain, Russia, and Prussia long hesitated to give the desired recognition. Prussia gave it at length on the ist of March, 1862. Spain held out longest of all, until June, 1865. To the last, the Ponti- fical Government refused to recognize or accept the work of the Revolution, and lodged formal protests against each definite step of its progress. Thus the kingdom of Italy was constituted, built upon Cavour's intrigues, his lawless invasions, his lying de- spatches, and his sham plebiscites. But Italian Unity was not yet complete — Rome and Venice were unrevolutionized and unconquered. More than this, the Piedmontese tenure of the South was far from secure. The Abruzzi, the Molise, Basilicata and the Calabrias, were swept by flying columns, that proclaimed war to the Piedmontese invaders. As yet Victor Emmanuel was only in name the ruler of the South ; and the sword, which Cavour had drawn to lead a stranger king to the throne of Naples, was not to be sheathed for many a year. 257 CHAPTER XIII. ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION. Before following further the policy of Cavour and his successor, it will be well to take a glance at the policy of the English Government — the Palmerston Cabinet — during the eventful months of the Garibaldian raid upon Sicily, the annexation of Umbria and the Marches, and the war in the Neapolitan provinces. It was not to be expected that when the Pope and the King of Naples were to be assailed by the Revolution, they would find many sympathizers in England. English Prote stantism^ if it was nothing else, was rf^rid^'^^y anti- P apal in i860; and much of the outcry for a free Italy had its chief source in the hope that, in building Italy up, the Pope would be pulled down. As for the King of Naples, his father Ferdinand had had the misfortune to offend Lord Palmerston and the English commercial interest in the affair of the Sicilian sulphur monopoly. He had dis- appointed Lord Palmerston in 1848, when the Liberals of Naples and Sicily, with the all but avowed aid of England, tried to overthrow his throne,, and Ferdinand refused to be driven out. Ever since then Palmerston and Russell had lost no opportunity of assailing his Government by ad- dressing to it and publishing imperious despatches and remonstrances which became the texts of the denuncia- tions and manifestoes of the Italian Liberals. Mr. Glad- stone called upon all Europe to stand aghast at the horrors of the Neapolitan prisons. Mr. Gladstone's colleagues spoke of Ferdinand as King Bomba, and of his Govern- ment as if it were a system of barbarism. Italian exiles, writing in the English press — a Mazzini, a Saffi, a Gallenga S 258 THE MAKING OF ITALY. — did what they could to intensify the hatred against Naples. The cause of the Pope and of the King of Naples were spoken of as one and the same, although they stood on a very different basis from each other, but by this as- sumption each was made to bear all the odium that could be raised against the other, and so the storm was doubled in force. What the Government of the Pope was M. de Rayneval has already told us. . Unle ss we are to regard a Pa rliament and the ballot-box as necessary to ^ (^(^(\ g overnment, it wa s ver y much superior to the Government of Piedmont . Certain it is, that his subjects, with the ex- ception of a small minority, were well contented with it. Piedmont failed in repeated attempts to induce them to revolt, and finally had to simulate revolt by invasions like those of Zambianchi and Masi, in order to obtain a pretext for intervention. As for Naples, it certainly was not a model government any more than Piedmont. But this much is certain, that^ comparing Naples under Ferdinand and Francis and Naples under Victor Emmanuel, the con- trast is greatly to the advantage of the former. Under King Ferdinand the roads were safe, life and property were secure, taxation was about one-third of what it is at present. The conscription was not oppressive in Naples, and did not exist in Sicily. Naples had the largest merchant marine of any Italian State ; and the first railways and telegraphs in Italy were the work of the old Neapolitan Government. As for the prisons, there was doubtless in them much to be reformed ; but we shall see later on that they were not reformed but made ten times worse under Piedmontese rule. There are in existence authentic letters from Poerio, the chief "martyr of liberty" at Naples, in which he thanks friends for gifts of fruit which have been sent to him, mentions various little comforts which he desires to receive from them next, and speaks of his good health ; and it must be noted that Petrucelli della Gattina, one of the foremost Deputies of the Left, confessed in the Turin Parliament that on the basis of the real living Poerio he and his friends had built up an imaginary Poerio, to be a type of Bourbon tyranny in the eyes of the public. We ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION, i^c^ shall see, further on, what the new Government did with the prisons of Naples. E ngland knew nothing but, evil of N^plf"^ When King Francis came to the throne he received with his crown an inheritan ce of English hate . His attempts at reform were laughed at, his promises were denounced- as deliberate lies before he had time to fulfil them, and when Garibaldi announced that he meant to pull down first the young king and then the Pope, the English applauded. The applause was heard in press and par- liament. We have seen how, at Paris, in 1856, Clarendon, the representative of Palmerston, frankly discussed with Cavour the destruction of the throne of Naples. There were not wanting men in both Houses to denounce this alliance with the Revolution in Italy, not only Catholics, but English Protestants whose honest reason was more powerful than their prejudices, men like Lord Normanby in the Upper, and Mr. Baillie Cochrane and Mr. Bovill in the Lower House. But their voices were drowned in the general applause of the victorious Liberals, and of men who, though they called themselves Conservatives at home, were ready to uphold the revolutionists of the Continent. The English Government did not confine its action to mere words. Its diplomatic and consular agents in Italy showed themselves consistent friends of the movement that was directed by Cavour, and led by Garibaldi. Sir Tame s Hudson, the English envoy at Turin, was openly known as the confidant, the friend and supporter of Cavour. Mr. Henry Elliot at Naples stayed there with Garibaldi, when the king went away to Gaeta, accompanied by the rest of the foreign ambassadors. Mr. ElHot, too, had at least one interview with Garibaldi, though he was accredited to King Francis. The interview took place on board the flag-ship of Admiral Mundy . Garibaldi knew that flagship well ; he had often been on board. It was in Mundy's cabin he had met the Neapolitan officers at Palermo. Mundy's squadron had been at hand at Marsala, to afford him a ready refuge if his landing failed. Mundy's squadron S 2 26o THE MAKING OF ITALY, had been at Palermo to protest against the bombardment, that, on the testimony of Garibaldians themselves, would very soon have driven them out of the town. Admiral Persano speaks repeatedly, in his diary, of the friendship of Admiral Mundy, and page after page of it reflects the moral support he received from the presence of the English fleet. Garibaldi, when he was in England in 1864, feted by his old allies, spoke publicly of the help he had re- ceived from Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, and " Lord Gladstone," as he persisted in calling the then Chancellor of the Exchequer. " I speak from what I know," he said at the Crystal Palace — " that the Government of England, represented by Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, and Lord Gladstone, has done a wonderful deal for our native Italy. If it had not been for this country, we should still have been under the yoke of the Bourbons at Naples ; if it had not been for the English Government, I should never have been permitted to pass the Straits of Messina." At Ancona we have seen how, when Persano sent in one of his frigates under English colours to safely reconnoitre the fortifications, the English consul went on board, and made himself a party to the treacherous deception, by staying there a long time, and when he returned to the shore, saying nothing to reveal the hostile character of the ship he had just left. He only acted in the way his Government would have heartily approved, and the press at home v/ould have applauded had the circumstances been known. While the Garibaldians were lauded to the skies as heroes sans peur et sans reproche, the English papers, led by the Times and the Daily Nezvs^ echoed the proclamations of Cialdini and Fanti, and spoke of the volunteers of the Papal army as mercenaries and adven- turers. When Spoleto, after a gallant defence, fell before the strong columns of Brignone, the first telegram pub- lished in England announced merely that Spoleto had capitulated, and that the 600 prisoners taken there were Irishmen — a telegram which made no mention of the defence, and was in error as to the number of the Irish volunteers, who formed a little more than one half of the ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION. 261 garrison. The Times eagerly seized upon the false news to make it the subject of an insulting leader. It told its readers that the Irish Brigade had shown what it was worth, and that all its boasting and bluster had ended without firing a shot. Ireland, it added, knew before that these men did not really represent her, that they were a lot of vagabonds ; and now we had the satisfaction of knowing that they were also cowards. The only coward in the c a<^p wa«^ j-he annnytn ous writer of this disgraceful a rticle. Spoleto, Perugia, Castelfidardo, and Ancona, saw Irishmen do deeds worthy of the days of the old Brigade. But even when the truth was known the Times did not re- tract its insults ; and when Cialdini and Fanti for eleven hours bombarded the defenceless city of Ancona, while the white flag was flying on its walls, the Times devoted another leader, worthy of the first, to a defence of this act of barbarity. The Irish volunteers who fought at Spoleto and Ancona had been sent out to Italy by stealth, for, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, the Government had declared that the action of the Catholics would be care- fully watched, and steps would be taken to prevent any breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act. But the Govern- ment was only prepared to enforce the law against the opponents of the Revolution. Garibaldi had no sooner landed at Marsala than a committee was formed in England to raise funds for his enterprise, and an appeal for sub- scriptions advertised in the daily papers. Mr. Pope Hennessy, Mr. Bovill, and others in the House of Com- mons called attention to these proceedings. The Attorney- General endeavoured unsuccessfully to show that the law could not touch them. Mr. Edwin James, a supporter of the Government, boldly defended them, and tried to lead the House away from the real question before it by an attack on the Papal army, which, he said, the Pope was collecting for the slaughter of his subjects. In the end the Government, without absolutely refusing to interfere, indicated plainly enough that the subscription would be allowed to go on. It went on for months, and other funds 262 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. were organized and accumulated with equal security, amongst them a fund to assist in arming the Italian people with a million muskets, which, however, did not succeed in producing money enough to buy a thousand. The sums collected were sent out to Italy. What became of them there is doubtless known to some one, but the world in general was left in profound ignorance on the subject. The committees of these English Garibaldian funds sent out agents to Italy, and their journeys afforded the Cabinet a means of holding direct communication with Garibaldi's head-quarters. This fact is revealed by Per- sano's diary ; and I may quote again a short letter of Cavour's, which has direct reference to it. From Turin he wrote to Persano, on the 3rd of September, i860: — " Admiral, — Mr. Edwin James, the celebrated English lawyer, is going to Naples on an official mission entrusted to him by Lord Palmerston and the English subscribers to the fund collected for General Garibaldi. He is charged with the personal duty of bearing to the brave general the disinterested advice of all in England who sympathize with the Italian cause, and desire its triumph. "Belonging to the Liberal party, Mr. James can counsel moderation with greater authority ; nor can the defender of the French Bernard be disagreeable to General Garibaldi, if he warns him to be on his guard against the Mazzinian party, which seeks to destroy that unity of purpose that has rendered possible the triumphs hitherto obtained by the great national party. Be pleased then, Admiral, to receive with every demonstration of goodwill Mr. James, and the friends who accompany him. Amongst these I may specially mention Mr. Evelyn Ashley, son of Lord Shaftesbury, and Secretary of Lord Palmerston. I shall feel particularly grateful for every kindness shown towards those illustrious compatriots of Nelson, and their influence will prove particularly useful to our cause." Mr. Edwin James and Lord Evelyn Ashley received a friendly welcome from Persano, and were by him sent on in a steamer of the Piedmontese navy to Garibaldi's head- quarters. ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION. 263 While Palmerston was thus in secret communication with Garibaldi, a Garibaldian legion was, with the con- nivance of the Cabinet, openly organized, and despatched from England. There was hardly a pretence of conceal- ment. " Lord Palmerston's construction of the Foreign Enlistment Act was adopted," said a writer in the Daily News^ " and the members of the future British legion were registered as excursionists to Mount Etna." The Daily News was, throughout the organ of the movement, and it was openly announced in its columns. The first announce- ment appeared on the nth of August, the following paragraph being printed in conspicuous type immediately after the leading articles : — " Captain Styles, formerly of the Fusilier Guards, and now of Garibaldi's staff, has arrived in London for a few days, and will enable the riflemen of the metropolis to judge of the lightness, grace, and remarkably picturesque effect of the Garibaldian uniform. The gallant captain landed with Garibaldi at Marsala, and was in the actions at Calatafimi, Palermo, and the crowning victory of Milazzo. There is no doubt that if any of our volunteers with a turn for adventure, and some little military training, should fancy to exchange for a time the battle-grounds of Hampstead or Bromley for those of Calabria in this holiday season, they would receive a warm welcome from Garibaldi. Captain Styles would, we are sure, be happy to give any explanation on this subject that might be desired. To have fought under Garibaldi will one day be thought one of the proudest memories a man can boast of." A committee-room was taken by Captain Styles in Salisbury Street, Strand. A " Garibaldi Special Fund," to defray the expenses of the '^ excursion," was opened, and advertised in the newspapers ; and a certain Captain de Rohan, who wrote letters to the Daily Nezus, in which he signed himself, " Naval aide-de-camp to General ^ October 8th, i860. Lord Palmerston's interpretation of the Act was, apparently, that the Government should stop volunteers for the Pope, and encourage volunteering for Garibaldi. 264 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. Garibaldi," came to England to assist in directing the work. On the nth of September a letter from De Rohan was published in the Daily News, in which he complained that the subscriptions were coming in very slowly, and asked for more ready help to forward the " excursionists " to Garibaldi, who, he said, would receive great moral sup- port from their presence. The progress of the legion was regularly chronicled in the Daily News. Thus, this same paper of the nth of September contained two paragraphs, one of which stated that Garibald's agents in England had purchased at Liverpool for 9000/. the steamer Cambria^ formerly belonging to the Cunard line ; whilst the other paragraph ran, — " Yesterday Captain Hampton proceeded to Manchester from Liverpool, and, previous to his leaving again at five o'clock in the afternoon, forty-seven persons had offered themselves as excursionists to Naples, and been accepted. Unfortunately there is great want of funds to equip the party." On the 1 2th of September a notice in the Daily News, signed by Captain Styles and the " Naval aide-de-camp to Garibaldi," De Rohan, called upon all the committees that had been collecting for the special fund to send in whatever money they had received. It appears that the whole sum collected was only about 3000/., and as the committee had contracted for arms and uniforms to be sent out with the men, Garibaldi had to sign bills for about 12,000/. to cover the deficit. On Saturday evening, the 1 6th of September, the first contingent of the Garibaldian legion mustered at Shoreditch railway station. There they spent the night. Next morning they were conveyed by train to Tilbury, where the steamer Milazzo was waiting in the Thames to convey them to Naples. There was not the least disguise about the embarkation. The excur- sionists went on board in broad daylight, in the presence of an applauding crowd. At Genoa, in May, the Gari- baldians had at least tried to save appearances, and went on board their steamers silently and in the dark. A second contingent, sufficient to bring the whole number up to 800, was embarked on board the steamer E^nperor at Harwich ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION. 265 on the 28th of September. A few of the volunteers went on board of her in the Thames near London Bridge ; then she went round to Harwich for the rest, who were sent down there by the Great Eastern Railway. The steamers had on board arms and red uniforms for all the men. They put into Gibraltar on the way to Naples, and stayed there some hours, under the guns of English batteries and English men-of-war. The legion was landed at Naples, and sent on to the Volturno in time to take part in some minor actions with the defenders of Capua. I t is undeniable that the Government approved of an d ro nnived at the organization and despatch of this arme d expedition against a king with whom England was a t peace, and who still had an ambas sador at the Conrfr o f St. Jameses. Parliament was not sitting, so that it was not possible by questions in the House to force the Govern- ment to act ; but other means were taken by a few English gentlemen, who saw how their country was being disgraced by this action of the Palmerston Cabinet. Before the expedition sailed, affidavits sufficient to justify the seizure of the Emperor were laid before the authorities of the Port of London. They gained time by referring the matter to the Government, and the Emperor started unmolested. She might, of course, have been stopped at Gibraltar, but the Government was only anxious that she should reach Naples in safety. Mr. Bovill, acting as coun- sel for Mr. Crawshay, of Newcastle, applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for an order to put the law in force against the Garibaldian recruiters ; he was told by the Lord Chief Justice that only the Attorney-General could move in the matter ; that he had no standing in it ; and that " volunteer attorney-generals " were not wanted. What difference was there between the expedition of Garibaldi and Bixio in the Lombardo and Piemonte from Genoa, and the Garibaldian expedition of Styles and De Rohan in the Milazzo and Emperor from London } None — except, perhaps, that the English Garibaldian Expe- dition was the more undisguised of the two. The despatches of Lord John Russell at this period 266 THE MAKING OF ITALY. were a long series of elaborate defences of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel. On the 27th of October, after nearly every State in Europe had, by withdrawing its ambassa- dor from Turin, protested against the lawless invasion of the Papal States and the Kingdom of Naples, Lord John Russell published his most famous Italian despatch, in which he endeavoured to justify England for still keeping up friendly relations with the Government of King Victor Emmanuel. The despatch was addressed to Sir James Hudson, her Majesty's Minister at Turin. " It appears," wrote the English Foreign Secretary, " that the late pro- ceedings of the King of Sardinia have been strongly disapproved of by several of the principal Courts of Europe. . . . After these diplomatic acts, it would scarcely be just to Italy or respectful to the other great Powers of Europe were the Government of her Majesty any longer to with- hold the expression of their opinion. In doing so, however, her Majesty's Government have no intention to raise a dis- pute upon the reasons which have been given, in the name of the King of Sardinia, for the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan States. Whether or no the Pope was justified in defending his authority by means of foreign levies ; whether the King of the two Sicilies, while still maintaining his flag at Capua and Gaeta, can be said to have abdicated — are not the arguments upon which her Majesty's Government propose to dilate." Having thus prudently passed over the two reasons alleged by Vic- tor Emmanuel for his intervention — reasons which were actually indefensible — Lord John Russell sought to find some better arguments for the policy of Piedmont, and found them by boldly begging the whole question. The questions to be decided, he said, were these : — " Were the people of Italy justified in asking the assistance of the King of Sardinia to relieve them from Governments with which they were discontented ; and was the King of Sar- dinia justified in furnishing the assistance of his arms to the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States t " But he forgot that there was another question to be answered first — " Had the people really asked the king to help them ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION. 267 to overturn their own Governments, or had Victor Em- manuel and Cavour, by turning the embassies of Piedmont into centres of conspiracy and then sending armed expe- ditions to complete the work thus begun, been the prime movers in the whole revolution ? " But taking the ques- tions as he had laid them down, Lord John Russell replied that there were two motives which led the people of Italy to join in subverting their Governments : first, the mis- government of their rulers ; secondly, the desire to build up a strong central Government, in order to be free of foreign control. " Looking at the question," he continued, " from this point of view, her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests." Granting this. Lord John Russell ought to have been able to say that the Italians had freely given their judgment ; and this even his own agents denied, at least so far as Naples was concerned.^ Then as 2 See Mr. Elliot's despatch to Lord John Russell. Admiral Mundy's account of the plebiscite, taken from his diary, is as follows : — " October 22nd, i860. — Yesterday I visited a few of the polling places in the city whilst the election was going forward. More than a hundred thousand people took advantage of the opportunity of recording their opinion, yet a stranger passing through the streets would have discovered no excitement, not even a crowd collected at any particular spot. Perfect order reigned -everywhere, but I think, considering the general temper of the inhabitants, it would have required strong moral courage for anyone to publicly announce him- self as an enemy to the sacred watchword of ' Italia Una.' " Every man privileged to the franchise had first to produce his paper from the mayor, showing that he was entitled to vote ; he was then admitted through a file of the National Militia up a flight of steps to a platform, on which the urns were fixed. The urns to the right and left of the central vase, and several feet distant from it, had the words ^ Si^ (yes) and ' No^ painted on them respectively in a large type. Up to one of them the man had to walk beneath the gaze of a dozen scrutators to thrust in his hand and draw out a card. It was of course open voting in the clearest sense of the word. " I remained an hour watching the progress of the election, and during that time I only saw three individuals who, after a few moments of apparent reflection, advanced slowly to the left and fished up a 'No: I must, however, observe that no offensive remark was made either by the overseers or the bystanders at this open manifestation of preference for the Bourbon dynasty ; but as voters 268 THE MAKING OF ITALY. to the action of Victor Emmanuel. Having quoted from Vattel a justification of the expedition of William of Orange to England in 1688 on the ground that "when a people, from good reasons, take up arms against an oppressor, it is an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties " — *' Therefore," he added, "according to Vattel, the question resolves itself into this : Did the people of Naples and of the Roman States take up arms against their Government for good reasons ? " In reply, he again begged the question, and raised another, which ought to have been answered first. " Upon this grave matter," he said, " her Majesty's Government hold that the people in question are them- selves the best judges of their own affairs. Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of Southern Italy had not good reasons for throw- ing off their allegiance to their former Governments ; her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them. There remains, however, a question of fact. It is asserted by the partisans of the fallen Governments that the people of the Roman States were attached to the Pope, and the people of the Kingdom of Naples to the dynasty of Francis II., but that Sardinian agents and foreign adventurers have by force and intrigue subverted the thrones of those sovereigns. It is difficult, however, to believe, after the astonishing events that we have seen, that the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies possessed the love of their people. How was it, one must ask, that the Pope found it impossible to levy a Roman army, and that he was forced to rely almost entirely upon foreign mercenaries } How did it happen, again, that Garibaldi conquered nearly all Sicily with 2000 men, and marched from Reggio to Naples with, 5000? had to deliver up their papers of identification their names and callings were of course known. Under regulations such as these I must chronicle my opinion that a plebiscite by universal suffrage can- not be received as a correct representation of the real feeling of a nation." — "The Hannibal at Palermo and Naples in 1860-61," by Admiral Sir Rodney Mundy, pp 257, 258. ENGLAND AND THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION. 269 How, but from the universal disaffection of the people of the Two Sicilies ? " Unfortunately for Lord John Russell^s argument, his statement of facts was very far from the truth. Letting pass the traditional taunt about " mercenaries/' I repeat that fully two-thirds of the Pontifical army were com- posed of natives of the Roman States ; and although some of them, as Italians have often done, proved wofuUy un- steady under fire, others — and they were the majority — did good service, especially at Ancona. As for Garibaldi's expedition. Lord Russell ought to have known that it was not the work of either 2000 or 5000 men, but of 20,000 North Italians, who received but a cold welcome from the majority of the people, and who, backed as they were by the Piedmontese fleet, were brought to bay when at last the Royal army made a stand on the Volturno. The Gari- baldians would have been destroyed there but for Victor Emmanuel's intervention, for the reaction had broken out all round them. This is the fact ; Lord John Russell preferred to argue upon the legend. After an allusion to the Austrian intervention of 1821, and a statement that, in 1848, "the Neapolitan people again attempted to secure liberty under the Bourbon dynasty, but their best patriots atoned by an imprison- ment of ten years for the offence of endeavouring to free their country,'^ ^ the despatch concluded by saying : — *' It must be acknowledged that the Italian revolution has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance. The sub- version of existing power has not been followed, as is too often the case, by an outburst of popular vengeance. The extreme views of democrats have nowhere prevailed. Pub- lic opinion has checked the excesses of the public triumph. The venerated forms of constitutional monarchy have been associated with the name of a prince who represents an ancient and glorious dynasty. Such having been the causes and the concomitant circumstances of the revolu- ^ Another bold misstatement of the case. The real offence was raising an insurrection in Naples and barricading and attacking King Ferdinand in his palace. 270 THE MAKING OF ITALY. tion of Italy, her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient ground for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe." A postscript, somewhat need- lessly, informed Sir James Hudson that he was at liberty to give a copy of this despatch to Count Cavour. It was quite evident that it was for Cavour the despatch was written. Thus, while even the French Empire, the accomplice of Piedmont, was forced to place a hypocritical censure upon the acts of Cavour, England alone among the great Powers stood forth as his apologist ; and, led away by a wretched sectarian hatred of the Papacy, the Palmerston cabinet suspended the laws of England to place men and money at the service of Cavour and Garibaldi, gave to their enterprises diplomatic aid, and helped to com- plete the destruction of the public law of Europe, to which more than once in later years England appealed in vain when she believed that its violation affected her own interests. She did not foresee, in 1860, that the simple rule of the will of the strongest and the sanctity oifaits accomplis might very soon be used against herself. 271 CHAPTER XIV. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. Cavour was not destined to preside long over the new State which his policy had called into existence, and he was to leave to other and less able, though equally unscrupulous, hands, the further development of that policy, and the final realization of his ideas. What re- mains to be told of his career may be grouped around two famous sittings of the Turin Parliament — the debate on the Roman Question in March, 1861, and the debate on the Garibaldian army in the folloiwng April. Cavour, after having spent many years in preparing for the work, had in the course of two years built up Italian Unity. The year 1859 saw the struggle with Austria, Lom- bardy won, the Romagna and the Duchies revolutionized, and nearly all Northern Italy in the hands of Victor Em- manuel. The year i860, and the three first months of 1 861, saw Sicily, Naples, Umbria and the Marches an- nexed. On the other hand, Nice and Savoy were given up to France, and thus as long as the Imperial army made her the chief military Power of the West, the new kingdom was at her mercy. This was the price Napoleon exacted for permitting the annexations in Central and Southern Italy, and the pledge which later on made him willing to let Rome pass into Piedmontese hands, for he felt that even after his army was withdrawn from Rome he would still dominate Italy by holding the Alpine passes on the one hand, and on the other that perfect command of the sea, which would enable him to strike at any point of the Italian coast, so long at least as England did not oppose him ; and he reckoned, with good reason, that England's 272 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. patronage of Italy, enthusiastic as it was, would be con- fined to loud protests and long despatches, Thus^ though Cavour had with the help of a powerful ally built up a united Italy, that ally was now his master, and even in external form Italian Unity was still imperfect ; for the Austrians had Venice, and Rome and a small territory around it were held by the reorganized Pontifical army and a French corps of occupation. Cavour was planning how best to get both Rome and Venice by the patient de- velopment of a new policy of annexation ; Garibaldi and his friends were crying out to have a rush made for both, a rush which Cavour knew would fail and ruin everything. He held them back, and found employment for some of them in shooting down the Royalist insurgents of the South ; while Garibaldi, baffled and chafing under a sense of inaction, and discontented with the treatment he and his army had received after their campaign, became more and more irritated against him. Cavour, with his work un- finished, saw both his tools menacing him with future danger, the French Empire from without, the Garibaldian party of action from within. The danger from the French Empire was neither a pre- sent nor a pressing one. It would only come into force when, after completing the unity of Italy, it became necessary to free the new State from French tutelage, and many things might happen before that. Both Cavour and his friend La Marmora fully believed that some day there might be a war with France, and that in any case it would be prudent to find some other ally to play off against France, and so get rid of foreign influence of any kind. Cavour did not live to carry out this part of the plan. La Marmora, we shall see, attempted to execute it, only to give Italy not freedom but a change of masters. All this, however, was still in the future. For the present, Napoleon III. was the ally of Cavour, and now that the possession of Savoy and Nice gave him a guarantee against the growth of the power of Italy, there was good reason to hope that he would help Cavour to go on to Rome. The conquest of Venetia might be reserved for a later day, and possibly THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 272, with the help of another ally but France ; it required no great foresight to see the possible ally in Prussia. Already, in 1859, the German Liberals had cried out to her to play the part of Piedmont in Germany ; rivalry with Austria was her traditional policy, 'and her jealousy of France would, if she were successful, make her all the more useful as an ally, for thus might be realized the hope of emanci- pation from the French protectorate. It was with such views as these that Cavour, in January, 186 1, sent La Marmora to Berlin, to congratulate the new King William on his accession. From La Marmora's revelations/ pub- lished a few years later, it appears certain that the possi- bility of a future alliance was held distinctly in view during this missioq, which to the diplomatic world at large seemed to be one of simple courtesy. Had men known then, as we know now, that a Prusso-Italian alliance was a favourite idea of General della Marmora, and that he had often spoken of it in familiar conversations with Cavour, his journey to Berlin, in 1861, would have excited some comment. Thus Cavour was providing for the future development of his policy in a new direction, while he still made use of France to further his plans. Napoleon could not consent to his getting possession of Rome by an armed attack. A great number of the leading Catholics of France and a large portion of the episcopate had already been thrown into opposition to him by his Italian policy ; and now to withdraw from Rome and lay it open to an armed attack of the Piedmontese or the Garibaldians, would be to range the whole body of the Catholics of France against his government. This he could not afford to do. But if, by persuasion or even by secret menaces, Cavour could, through some specious convention, induce the Holy Father to give up his actual sovereignty over Rome, the Emperor could withdraw the French garrison and let Italian troops take its place, provided always they came with the consent of Pius IX. But could this consent be obtained } Cavour ^ (In pd piu di luce sugli evenetnenti di 1866. 274 THE MAKING OF ITALY. thought that it could, and did his best to extort it from the Pope and the Papal Court. It appears from the memorandum addressed to the Courts of Europe by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in August, 1870, that in November and December, i860, views were exchanged between the Cabinets of Turin and Paris, as to the form which should be given to a pro- ject for the solution of the Roman Question, which Cavour intended to propose to the Holy See early in 1861 Cavour's proposal was that the Pope should retain only the Leonine City, accepting the guarantee of Italy for his freedom ; the French Cabinet proposed, in addition, that he should be given a kind of nominal suzerainty over the whole extent of the old Papal States p.s they existed in 1859. All such projects, however, were mere paper schemes, so long as there was no prospect of the Pope ac- cepting them. In the first week of January, 1861, Cavour's project was forwarded to Rome ; but though, on the i8th of January, the Emperor endeavoured to bring a strong pressure to bear upon the Pope, by announcing to the Papal Court that unless it came to terms with Italy he would withdraw his troops from Rome, Pius IX. was inflexible. But Cavour would not abandon his hope of entering Rome with the Pope's consent, and so avoiding all the delays and dangers that would attend an armed attack upon the Holy City, and the odium that would attach itself to such an enterprise. He strove to gain over this and that Cardinal ; he informed the Emperor that he was willing to offer even greater privileges to the Pope than those that were first proposed, especially in the matter of the temporalities of the Italian Bishops. Rumours were circulated that there would soon be an agreement, that the Pope was favourable to the suggested arrangement, and that it was only the obstinacy of Anto- nelli that stood in the way of it. This was the talk of Turin and Paris. The French Minister, Billault, gave a kind of confirmation to these rumours by telling some of the senators that they would soon see a rapprochement between Turin and the Vatican. When false reports like THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 275 these were persistently spread upon all sides, the time was come for the Pope to speak out and give them an authori- tative contradiction. Accordingly, on the 19th of March, he delivered an allocution, in which he denounced anew the outrages committed by the so-called Kingdom of Italy against the Church and the fresh intrigues against the Temporal Power. This put an end to the hopes of Cavour, and he replied by a counter manifesto. On the 25th of March, six days after the allocution, the Roman Question was formally raised in the Turin Parliament, the deputy Buoncompagni, Cavour's agent in the Tuscan revolution, proposing that the Chamber of Deputies should declare Rome the capital of Italy, at the same time affirming that the realization of this declaration could be effected without depriving the Pope of his dignity and independence. The vote was taken on the 27th and the resolution was carried. Cavour spoke at great length in the course of the debate preceding the vote ; his speech was one of the most important he ever delivered, and, moreover, one of the last. He expressed in it the views of the official revolution, on the proposed consummation of the downfall of the Temporal Power. " The choice of a capital," he said, " must be determined by high moral considerations — considerations on which the instinct of each nation must decide for itself. Rome, gentlemen, unites all the historical, intellectual and moral qualities which are required to form the capital of a great country. Rome is the only city in Italy which has few or no municipal traditions. Her history, from the days of the Caesars to our own, is that of a city whose importance stretches far beyond her own territory — of a city destined to be the capital of a great country. Convinced, deeply convinced, as I am of this truth, I think it my duty to pro- claim it as solemnly as I can before you and before the country. I think it my duty also to appeal under those circumstances to the patriotism of all Italian citizens, and of the representatives of all our most illustrious cities, when I beg them to cease all discussion on this question, so that Europe may become aware that the necessity of having T 2 276 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Rome for our capital is recognized, and proclaimed by the whole nation. ... I consider it certain, that, if we cannot employ the powerful argument that without Rome for a capital Italy can never be firmly united nor the peace of Europe securely established, then we shall never be able to induce either the Catholic world, or that nation which believes it to be its duty and its place to act as representa- tive of the Catholic world, to consent to the union of Rome with Italy. To prove the truth of this assertion let me make a hypothesis. Suppose that the residence of the Sovereign Pontiff, instead of being at Rome, in the centre of Italy, in that city which unites so many historical tradi- tions, was situated in the borders of the peninsula, in some town of importance if you Hke, but to which no great prestige attached — suppose, for instance, that the ancient ecclesiastical city of Aquilea had been restored, and that the Papacy had its residence there, do you believe it would be easy to obtain the consent of the Catholic Powers to the separation of the spiritual and the temporal powers in that corner of the Italian land ? No, gentlemen, you know that it would not. I am aware that in such a cause as that, you might assert the principle of non-intervention, the right that every people has to assert its own wishes, and all the grand maxims on which international law is based.- But diplomatists would tell you that in politics there are no absolute principles, that all laws have exceptions, that we ourselves have no idea of applying to all parts of Italy the principle of nationality, and that, as we are satisfied to leave Malta in the hands of England, we might well consent to a territory not essential to the formation of Italy remain- ing subject to the Papal dominion. " We should be told too that the interests of Italy, being in this instance of a secondary order, could not overbalance the general interests of humanity ; and I assure you that against such arguments as these, the finest declamations in the name of abstract principles and moral justice would prove of no effect. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs, even 2 A law, be it remarked en passant ^ which was persistently violated by Cavour's policy. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 277 if he had the good fortune to be assisted by all the pro- fessors of international law that could be found would never succeed in convincing the diplomatists with whom he would have to treat, and no negotiations could solve a question based on these terms. I repeat, then, that a declaration of the absolute necessity for Italy of possessing Rome as her capital, is not only a prudent and opportune measure, but an indispensable condition towards the success of any steps the Government may take to solve the Roman Question." He then endeavoured to combat the argument, that, if Rome were the capital of the new Italian Kingdom, there would be no guarantee for the independence of the Holy See. " If," he said, " the overthrow of the Temporal Power was to prove fatal to the independence of the Church, then I should state without hesitation, that the union of Rome with Italy would be fatal not only to Catholicism, but to Italy herself. I cannot conceive a greater calamity for a civilized people than to see civil and religious authority united in one hand, and that hand the Government. ... It is my opinion that the independence and dignity of the Sovereign Pontiff, as well as the inde- pendence of the Church, would be protected by the separa- tion of the temporal and spiritual authority, by the free application of the principle of liberty to the relations of civil and religious society. It is evident that if the separa- tion could be effected in any clear, definite and irrevocable manner, and if the independence of the Church could be thus established, the independence of the Pope would be placed upon a far surer foundation than at present. His authority would become more effectual, when no longer trammelled by all those ^ concordats,' and all those bargains, which always have been and always will remain indispens- able, so long as the Pope continues to be an independent sovereign. These weapons, with which civil authority both in Italy and elsewhere has been obliged in self-defence to arm itself, will become needless when the Pope confines himself to the exercise of his spiritual powers, and the authority of the Pope far from diminishing will increase 278 THE MAKING OF ITALY, enormously in its rightful sphere. . . . The only question is, how can we secure this separation, this liberty which we promise to the Church ? It can be guaranteed, I believe, in the most absolute way. The principles of liberty, of wh^ich I have spoken, should be inscribed formally in our statutes, and should be an integral part of the fundamental constitution of our new Italian Kingdom." The surest guarantee, he went on to say, would be found in the Italian people; their great thinkers and statesmen, he alleged, had often sought the "reformation of the temporal power," but never the destruction of the Church. " The main point," he continued, " is to persuade the Holy Father that the Church can be independent without the temporal power. But it seems to me that when we pre- sent ourselves before the Sovereign Pontiff, we can say to him, * Holy Father, the temporal power is no longer a guarantee for your independence ; renounce it, and we will give you that liberty which for three centuries you have sought in vain to obtain from all the great Catholic Powers — that liberty a few fragments of which you have won from them by concordats, on the condition of parting with great privileges and even with the use of spiritual authority — that very liberty which you have never obtained from those Powers who boast of being your allies, we, your devoted sons, come to offer you in all its fulness. We are ready to proclaim in Italy the great principle of a Jree Church in a free State." ^ It is needless to point out how illogical was Cavour's argument. Throughout he assumed, trusting apparently to the ignorance of his audience, that international law gave a sanction to the principle he had invoked in building up the Italian Kingdom z, and putting before his hearers as a primary object the possession of Rome, he told them that in order to obtain the consent of Europe to the step he proposed, they should assert that Rome was necessary to the existence of Italy, and for this assertion he gave no single reason but the desire of having an old historic city 3 Libera Chiesa in Libera Stato, a phrase which has since become traditional with the moderate Liberal party. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 279 for a capital. The very hypothesis he suggested as to Aquilea ought to have proved to his audience that Rome should be respected, and that if they sought for a new and famous capital, they should choose some other city — for instance, Milan. Most illogical of all was his statement of the guarantees to be given and the advantages secured to the Pope. No man knew better than Cavour what a Piedmontese guarantee was worth : and as for the destruc- tion of the temporal power freeing the Pope from the necessity of entering into concordats with foreign states, as these concordats were entirely an affair of the spiritual power, it is hard to see what Cavour meant or what his audience could understand by the statement. However, that audience was composed of men, who, having decided to go to Rome and pull down the Papal throne, did not want any argument on the subject ; and almost unani- mously the Parliament proclaimed that Rome was the capital of the Kingdom of Italy. So far all had gone smoothly in this the first parliament of the new kingdom. It had proclaimed Victor Em- manuel king, and Rome the destined capital. These were not points on which in such an assembly there could be much dispute. But the first great parliamentary battle was close at hand. During all the debates which had yet taken place. Garibaldi, who was one of the deputies for Naples, had not appeared in the House. He was angry at not being allowed to attack Rome or Venice, he felt that he and his army had been slighted after the Neapolitan campaign, and the old resentment against the cession of his native city of Nice to France had revived. He told a deputation of Genoese working-men that Cavour's Cabinet was composed of cowards, that the Chamber of Deputies at Turin was an assembly of lackeys, and that the king was being hurried to destruc- tion by evil counsellors. He had a special grievance in the imperfect fulfilment of the promise, which Victor Emmanuel had made to him at Naples, that his army should be incorporated in the Royal army of Italy. It was, in fact, a promise that could not be kept with any 28o THE MAKING OF ITALY. safety to the crown. Many of the rank and file would have been very unwelcome additions to any regular army ; and numbers of the officers were men of ultra- Republican opinions, or untrained men who had been rapidly promoted and made generals and colonels in a few months. The number of officers was out of all pro- portion to the number of men ; and the army lists of the new kingdom would run the risk of utter disorganization if all these names were to be added to them. To Gari- baldi, the delays and hesitations about the incorporation, the continual rejection of this man or of that, were a source of constant irritation, and at length, on the 1 8th of April, he came down to the Chamber to attack Cavour and the Government. The occasion was a momentous one. It was the first struggle of the Monarchist and Republican parties since the completion of the Revolution. The House was full. The galleries were crowded with Garibaldian sympathizers. The general, wearing his red shirt, sat in the midst of a group of his supporters. The debate was begun by Ricasoli asking what had been done as to the " army of the South," that is to say, the Garibaldians, and express- ing a hope that the Government would proceed to arm the whole nation. Ricasoli had been put up to speak as a friend of the Government, in order that Fanti, the Minister of War, might have to reply to a friendly inter- pellation instead of a hostile speech. Fanti answered that there had been difficulties as to individual volunteers, on account of the necessity of refusing to recognize their rank, so as not to be unjust to the officers of the regular army ; that all the Garibaldians had received a bonus of six months' pay ; that a large number would pass their examinations and receive commissions ; that the incor- poration of the national forces was complete ; and that there were seventeen divisions fully organized for service. Fanti resumed his seat. Garibaldi rose to deliver the attack upon the Ministry, which he had prepared, and the notes of which he held in his hand. A burst of applause greeted the red-shirted condottiere. He began THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 281 his speech, but he had not said more than a few words when he hesitated, his memory had failed him ; " his phrases became incoherent and meaningless ; he looked in vain with his eyes, aided by enormous glasses, on the notes which he held in his hand, for the thread of his ideas." ^ Two of his supporters, one on each side, tried to prompt him, and to point out in the notes the passage he had forgotten. It was useless. The Left were in a panic at their leader's failure. But after a few moments of painful indecision. Garibaldi threw down his notes angrily upon the table before him, swept the heap of papers aside, and, standing erect, burst into an extempore onslaught upon Cavour. Speaking in a loud ringing voice, and with a threatening gesture towards the minis- terial bench, he declared that it would for ever be im- possible for him to grasp the hand of the man who had sold his native city to the foreigner, or to take any part with a cabinet whose timid and mischievous policy would drive the country into a fratricidal civil war. Cavour sprang to his feet to protest against Garibaldi's language, and Right and Left burst into outcries that for a time made further debate impossible. The president, Ratazzi, succeeded in allaying the tumult, and Garibaldi continued his speech. He accused the ministry of having wearied the Southern army with neglect, and irritated it with insults, in order the more easily to break it up, of having dismissed officers for trifling reasons, and placed others on the retired list, and, finally, of having reduced it from four divisions to three. When Garibaldi had done, Bixio tried to act as a peace-maker, and begged that Cavour would overlook the personal portion of Garibaldi's speech. Ca- vour declared that he would consider the first part of that speech as not having been spoken, and then said that so far from being hostile to the Garibaldian volunteers, he had been the first to call them out in 1859 and place Garibaldi at the head of them ; but, he said, the Gari- baldian army could not be maintained on the same footing in peace as in time of war. Finally he begged for concord '^ D'Ideville. 282 THE MAKING OF ITALY. among all parties. Garibaldi replied that it was all very well placing him at the head of the volunteers in 1859, but that he had been sent only the halt and the lame as reinforcements ; and he appealed to the example of Eng- land, which maintained volunteer battalions in time of peace. Cavour then rose to complete his explanation. He denied that the case of England was parallel, as the English volunteers were not embodied. As for 1859, he said that Garibaldi himself had raised difficulties^ and had operated in the Valtelline, a portion of the territory of the Germanic Confederation, so that he could not be sup- ported. This, however, was not the real source of the difference between him and Garibaldi ; the real cause of the dissension, he acknowledged, was Nice ; and though he felt he had done his duty in that matter, he could quite understand the generaPs resentment on the subject. In conclusion, he demanded a vote of confidence, asking the Hbuse to choose between his policy and the rash adven- turous course represented by the Garibaldian element. After an animated debate, the House divided, 194 voting for the Government, and JJ against it. Garibaldi himself abstained from voting ; but in the minority were Bixio, Depretis, Ferrari, and Liborio Romano. In the course of the debate Ricasoli had attacked the position assumed by Garibaldi, and had affected to dis- believe the report of his speech to the Genoese workmen. " A calumny,^^ he said, " has been circulated against one of the members of this assembly ; he is accused of having uttered words unworthy of any honest man. I know this man, and it appears to me impossible that the odious words attributed to him could have fallen from his lips. For who, however great he may be, would dare in his pride to assign himself in our country a place apart ? Who would dare to claim for himself the monopoly of devotedness and patriotism, and elevate himself above the rest ? Amongst us one head alone should tower above all others — that of the king. Before him all bow down, and ought to bow down ; any other attitude would be that of a rebel." As he uttered the last word he angrily struck THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 283 the table with his clenched hand. The Monarchists were in the ascendant, and a storm of applause greeted his speech. After the division he left the House with Cavour, who, grasping his hand, said in the hearing of many of the deputies, "Were I to die to-morrow, my successor has been found." ^ The storm in the Chamber of Deputies was the signal for a storm outside. General Cialdini wrote and published a letter to Garibaldi, in which he accused him of having held seditious language, of having placed himself on a level with the king, of having, by the strange costume he wore in the Chamber, violated the ordinary usages of civil life, of having placed himself above the Government by speak- ing of the ministers as traitors, and of trying to drive the country against its will into adventurous enterprises. Finally, he said that, if he had been a friend of Garibaldi, he was one no longer ; that the successes of the Southern army had been ridiculously exaggerated, and that on the Volturno it had been saved from destruction by the Royal army. Garibaldi wrote a very moderate reply, but the rupture between the chiefs was a signal for quarrels among their subordinates, and in every garrison Piedmontese and Garibaldian officers were exchanging challenges and fighting duels. There would soon have been imminent danger of civil war, had not the king insisted upon a reconciliation between Cavour and Garibaldi, which was followed by a reconciliation between Garibaldi and Cialdini. A commission was appointed to report upon Garibaldi's project for the armament of the nation, and after this partial success he returned to Caprera. Cavour's words to Ricasoli after the Garibaldi debate of the 1 8th of April were almost prophetic ; in less than two months he was gone, and Ricasoli was Prime Minister of Italy. On the 2nd of June the new kingdom of Italy celebrated the Festa del Statuto for the first time. Cavour was lying ill of fever, on his death-bed. He died on the 6th, leaving it to others to follow out his policy. There is no need here to sum up his character. Of his private 5 D'Ideville. 284 THE MAKING OF ITALY. life I shall say nothing*. His public acts I have striven to record for the most part in his own words ; and anyone can read here for himself what was the character of the man who brought all the Peninsula under the rule of Piedmont, and called it United Italy. Cavour had declared that Rome was to be reached by diplomacy^ or as he expressed it, " by moral means," and not by force as Garibaldi and his party would have it. His successor, the Baron Bettino Ricasoli, as soon as his ministry was constituted, on June i ith, set himself to work out this idea of gaining Rome by moral means. The Emperor Napoleon officially recognized the Italian King- dom, and at the same time wrote a letter to King Victor Emmanuel to inform him that so long as there existed differences between him and the Pope, the French troops would continue to occupy Rome. This letter was published in the official press, in order to reassure the Catholics of France ; but, notwithstanding such declarations, the Em- peror was entirely upon the side of Piedmont, as against the Pope, and Ricasoli was negotiating with the Imperial Ministry in order to elaborate some new scheme for solving the Roman Question in the sense of persuading the Pope to give up his temporal power. The Emperor's policy was distinctly one of treachery to the Papacy. In August, the French ambassador at Turin told Ricasoli that he was instructed to inform him that the Emperor entertained the most friendly feelings towards Italy ; that in case of the Holy See becoming vacant, or on the oc- currence of some other opportunity as yet unforeseen, he would take advantage of the occasion to disengage himself from his present position by withdrawing his troops ; that meanwhile Italy could keep open the negotiations with Rome, in order to put the Pope in the wrong {^pour laisser le tort au Pape) : that she should secure tranquillity at Naples and act upon public opinion, and that the French Government would not cease to occupy itself with the Roman Question in a sense friendly to Italy. ^ ^ Memorandum addressed by the Cabinet of Florence to the Cabinets of Europe on August 29th, 1870. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 285 Having received these assurances of the support of France, Ricasoli proceeded to formulate his proposals, and submitted them to the Emperor Napoleon, as well as drafts of letters to Antonelli and the Pope, in which the proposals were to be enclosed ; and as the Court of Turin had no diplomatic relations with Rome, he begged that the French ambassador at the Vatican might be made the intermediary in presenting them. In the draft letter to the Pope — which nine years later was the model of Victor Emmanuel's final summons to Pius IX. to surrender — • Ricasoli endeavoured to show that his demands for the renunciation of the temporal power were made in the interest of religion itself. " Holy Father," he wrote, "do not cast into the abyss of doubt a whole people which sincerely desires to love and venerate you. The Church must be free, and we shall give her entire freedom. More than anyone else we desire that the Church shall be free ; but to be free, it is necessary that she should be disengaged from the bonds of a policy, which, up to the present time, has made her a weapon of war against us in the hands of this or that power." This letter, and the offers which it made, would have come with better grace from a govern- ment that had not made war upon the episcopate, the religious orders, and the secular elergy. The letter was to be accompanied by Ricasoli's Capitolato, or scheme of articles of agreement. These articles set forth that the Pope should preserve his dignity, inviolability, and in- dependence, and other personal privileges of a sovereign, and the precedence established by custom with regard to the king and other sovereigns ; that the cardinals should receive the honours of princes ; that the king would on no pretext and on no occasion place any obstacle in the way of acts done by the Pope as Head of the Church, " patriarch of the West and primate of Italy ; '' that he should have the right of sending nuncios; that he should have free communication with the bishops and the faithful, and they with him, without any interference on the pari of the Government ; that he should have the right of convoking councils and synods in such places and in such manner as 286 THE MAKING OF ITALY. he thought fit ; that the bishops in their dioceses and the cures in their parishes should be free, in the exercise of their ministry, from any interference on the part of the Government, but that they should remain subject to the common law as far as regarded offences punishable by the laws of the kingdom ; that the king should give up all patronage of ecclesiastical benefices ; that the Government should give up all interference in the nomination of bishops ; that the Government should undertake to pay a fixed annual sum to the Holy See ; that in order that all the Catholic Powers and peoples might share in the support of the Holy See, the Government should open negotiations with these Powers to determine what quota each should supply to the annual sum above mentioned ; that the object of these negotiations should also be to obtain the guarantees of the Powers for the fulfilment of the preceding articles ; that, on the basis of these conditions, the Pope should come to an agreement with the Italian Kingdom, the details being arranged by commissioners appointed by both parties. When I come to treat of the policy of the Government with regard to the Church in the provinces already under its rule,^ it will be seen how worthless were these promises and so-called guarantees ; and it is to be remarked here, that in the Capitolato nothing whatever was said of the preservation of the religious orders. When these conditions were laid before Napoleon, he expressed his belief that there was no prospect of their being accepted at Rome. They were therefore not presented, and the Pontifical Government had no official knowledge either of the letters or of the Capitolato^ until the 20th of November, when Ricasoli laid them before the Parliament at Turin. He gave at the same time the history of the project, and added : — " We shall go to Rome by a surer way, and without Europe having occasion to disapprove our action or to be alarmed at our progress." Having thus expressed his hope of still finding, with the help of France, a way to Rome, he invited the Chamber to confirm by a second vote 7 See Chapter xix. " The Warfare against the Church." THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 287 the declaration made by the Parliament on March 27th, that Rome as the capital was necessary to the Unity of Italy. The vote was, of course, all but unanimous ; and in his circular of the following January to the ambassadors of Piedmont, Ricasoli announced it to the Courts of Europe. In concert with the French Government, he made one more attempt to persuade the Holy Father to violate his coronation oath by the surrender of Rome. On the 1 2th of January, 1862, he spoke in the Chamber of Deputies of Rome as necessary to Italy, and of its pos- session as certain to be attained. A few days after in the Senate he again spoke upon the Roman Question, and said that perhaps at that moment its solution was on the verge of being accomplished. He alluded, doubtless, to a despatch which had been addressed on the i ith of January, by Thouvenel, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Marquis de la Valette, who now represented France at the Vatican, having succeeded the Due de Gramont, who had left Rome on the 6th of December, 1861. Thouvenel's despatch purported to .supplement certain verbal instructions already given to De la Valette before he left Paris. " The interests of France," he said, "are so closely affected by the antagonism of two causes, to which her political and religious traditions give an equal claim to her sympathies (!) that she cannot accept for an indefinite period the responsibility of a status quo as injurious to one as to the other, and cannot abandon the hope of opening the way to an agreement." He went on to say, that the Imperial Government regretted the events of i860, but the course of time, in political matters, necessarily removed them from " the sphere of sentiment to that of reason!' and the question now was to know whether the Holy See would maintain in its relations with Italy that inflexibility which was its right and duty in the sphere of dogma, or if, whatever might be its judgment on the transformation effected in Italy, it would be willing to accept the necessi- ties resulting from an accomplished fact of such importance. He then proceeded to argue that the past state of the 288 THE MAKING OF ITALY, peninsula could not be restored, dwelling strongly upon the recognition of the Italian Kingdom by certain of the Catholic Powers ; and he pointed out that there was now no prospect of any armed intervention restoring the lost provinces to the Holy See, at the same time expressing his belief that the Pope would not desire to see war lighted up in Europe for such an object. The immediate question, however, was not the exact way in which a solution was to be effected. " Suffice it to say," wrote the Minister, " that the Emperor's Government has preserved in this matter complete liberty of judgment and of action ; and all that we desire to know now is if we are to keep up or to abandon our hope that the Holy See will, taking into account accomplished facts, join in elaborating an agree- ment which would secure to the Sovereign Pontiff those permanent conditions of dignity, independence, and security, which are necessary to the exercise of his power." He concluded by saying, that, once this basis of agreement was accepted, France would arrange the terms with the Holy See and communicate them to Italy, guaranteeing their loyal observance in the event of Italy accepting them. The Marquis de la Valette replied to this despatch on the 1 8th. He had laid the proposals of M. de Thouvenel before Antonelli on the I2th, doing what he could to place them in a favourable light, and he was " more pained than surprised " at receiving for answer an absolute rejection. " All compromise is impossible," said the Cardinal, " between the Holy See and those who have despoiled it. And it is alike out of the power of the Pope and of the Sacred College to cede the least fragment of the territory of the Church/' De la Valette pointed out that the ques- tion, as De Thouvenel's despatch put it, was one not of principle but of facts, the existing position of affairs was a disastrous one, and the Emperor's desire was that the Pope, reserving all his rights in principle, should be extricated from that position. He then read the despatch through. Antonelli replied in a calm, measured tone, which im- pressed De la Valette as that of a man who was expressing THE FIRST YEARS OF THE NEW KINGDOM. 289 an inflexible and unchangeable determination. " I see," said the Cardinal, ''in this despatch the expression of the affectionate interest which you have not ceased to mani- fest towards us. But it is not true that there is a disagreement between the Pope and Italy. If the Holy Father has broken with the Cabinet of Turin, he has nevertheless excellent relations with Italy. An Italian himself, and the foremost of Italians, he witnesses with sorrow the cruel trials inflicted upon the Italian Church. As for coming to a treaty with the spoilers, we shall never do that. I can only repeat that in this matter all com- promise is impossible. Whatever be the reservations by which it is accompanied, or the adjustment of language in which it is expressed, from the moment we accepted it we should appear to consecrate the spoliation. The Sove- reign Pontiff on his accession, the Cardinals on their nomination, swear to cede no part of the territory of the Church. The Holy Father, therefore, will make no concession of this character. A conclave would not have the right to do it. A new Pontiff could not do it ; and his successors, century after century, would be no more free to do it than he is." De la Valette asked if he might take this as the reply of the Pope. After a mo- ment's thought, Antonelli answered that in order to fully satisfy him he would consult the Pope, and communicate his reply to the ambassador. Next day Antonelli wrote to De la Valette, that, having laid all that had passed before Pius IX., he had nothing to add or to take away from the reply which he had given the day before to his proposals. De la Valette concluded the despatch in which he narrated these proceedings, by assuring Thouvenel that to his great regret he could see no prospect of the Pope yielding even in the least degree. The failure of the negotiation was a heavy blow to Ricasoli's power in Italy. The agitation of the party of action on the Roman Question was becoming daily more outspoken. Committees were formed throughout Italy under the presidency of Garibaldi. There were riots at Pavia, Milan, Genoa, Livorno, and Naples. The cry of U 290 THE MAKING OF ITALY, " Rome ! " was raised, and with it was coupled the name of Mazzini. The Moderates were anxious to put down the committees, which they believed to be as dangerous to the throne of the King as of the Pope. Ricasoli refused, either from want of courage, or from the motive which he put forward as his reason — respect for the constitution which allowed the 'right of association so long as no un- lawful act was committed.^ The Right in the Chamber turned upon him ; the Left gave him a partial support, but in the new state of affairs he could not govern any longer. His ministry had been a failure ; on the ist of March, 1862, he resigned. Before we follow the acts of his successors, we must see what had been passing in the South since the fall of Gaeta. 8 The right, thus respected in the case of Garibaldian committees, was denied to the religious orders. 291 I CHAPTER XV. THE "BRIGANDAGE." We have seen that in the October of i860, while the Royal army of Naples was still upon the line of the Volturno, a reactionary movement against the Garibaldian and Piedmontese revolution began in the Abruzzi, and spread rapidly through the kingdom : that even in Naples an insurrection appeared at times to be imminent ; that in the provinces more than one serious defeat was inflicted upon the Piedmontese by the leaders of the so-called brigands : that the movement, however, lacked a central direction and unity of action, which De Christen^ baffled by the French and Roman authorities, in vain endeavoured to give to it : that the Piedmontese, unable wholly to suppress the movement, held it in check by military executions, and by laying waste the country : and that when Gaeta fell, Francis II. withdrew his officers and the bands under their immediate control from the Abruzzi, in order that they might take advantage of the partial amnesty offered by the Piedmontese authorities in return for the order given by the king for the surrender of Civitella del Tronto and the citadel of Messina. The struggle which, beginning in October, i860, ended in the following March, lasting altogether about five months, was the prelude of the opening act of the long civil war in the South, which went on during full five years, and was known as the " Brigandage." There really was no break of continuity ; and the movement, which began in October, i860, did not, strictly speaking, end but only changed its form. After March, 1861, it had more of a secret character ; for some months it was neglected, and disavowed by the Royal family of Naples ; U 2 292 THE MAKING OF ITALY. but in the autumn of 1861, seeing that it was a real movement of reaction throughout the kingdom, and not a local struggle, an attempt was again made to give it a central direction. The history of the " Brigandage " has never been written, and perhaps never will be written. On both sides a veil was thrown over the struggle, the Bourbonists naturally being obliged to have recourse to secret means, in order to obtain arms and sup- plies, and having carefully to conceal the movements, numbers, and plans of their bands ; while, on the other hand, the Piedmontese did their best to hide the fact that a civil war was going on in the provinces of Naples, said that the only disturbers of public order were a few bands of marauding brigands, and concealed from Europe, as far as they could, the sanguinary means by which alone the insurrection was held in check, and finally conquered. It was necessary for the Piedmontese to assume this posi- tion, so long as they wished to keep up the fiction that they were in Naples and the Neapolitan provinces, not by conquest, but by the will of the people. It would never have done to confess that the people were expressing their discontent with the new government by a widespread and long-continued insurrection. It is no wonder that, while both parties thus concealed their movements, the history of the civil war should be a very fragmentary one, so fragmentary that it is impossible to construct a con- tinuous narrative from the materials that exist. All that can be dene is to show what was the general character. of the movement, and of the measures taken by the Govern- ment of King Victor Emmanuel to break it up and sup- press it. Here and there it will be possible to detail some of the more remarkable episodes of the struggle ; but this is all that can be done.^ ^ Maffei's ** Brigand Life in Italy" (London, 1866) purports to be a history of the movement, but is a crude mass of disconnected details, and is written from the point of view of a thorough supporter of the acts of the Government. M. Charles Garnier once purposed to write a history from the opposite point of view ; as his position gave him access to much of the material for its secret history it is to be regretted that he did not carry out his plan. Such a work, coupled with the THE ''BRIGANDAGE:' 293 It appears that, throughout, the character of the move- ment was that of a disconnected and unorganized insur- rection, which had neither a settled plan nor a central direction. To get together and arm strong bands or columns of insurgents, to harass the Piedmontese army of occupation, to drive out the Piedmontese local authori- ties, and to pull down the shield of Savoy in every town and village they occupied — were the immediate objects of action. They hoped eventually to be able to unite in large armies, and menace Naples, but in this they never succeeded. They found opposed to them the picked troops of the war-trained army of the North, acting under the direction of one single commander, and on a fixed plan of gradually reducing the South to submission by exhausting its resources ; while, lest they should declare for King Francis and go over to the insurgents, the troops raised in the Neapolitan provinces were drafted to the North. The latter measure was a prudent one, for even in the northern garrisons the Neapolitans found means of expressing their disaffection towards the new state of things, and more than one conspiracy was discovered amongst them. Throughout the conflict the Piedmontese endeavoured to conceal its real character, by persistently speaking of the Bourbonists or reactionists as " brigands." The same name had been applied by the French to the Vendean insurgents of 1793, and to the Spanish guerillas. In both instances some colour was given to the name by the un- doubted fact that, wherever a country is disorganized by civil war, a certain number of bad characters take advan- tage of the general disturbance to carry on a system of real brigandage and marauding. In Naples itself, under the French Republic, and under Murat, there had been insurrections which were described as brigandage, but which were purely political. The attempt to attach odium to the Neapolitan insurgents of i860- 1864, by official documents of the Italian Government, would have afforded the means of making known in its entirety the story of the first five years of Italian rule in Naples. 294 THE MAKING OF ITALY. speaking of them as brigands, and confounding their leaders with the brigand chiefs who kept bands together only for the purpose of pillage, was an old expedient ; and indeed it only deceived those who wished to be deceived. '' You may call them brigands," said the Liberal deputy, Ferrari, speaking in the Parliament at Turin, in November, 1862, — "you may call them brigands, but they fight under a national flag ; you may call them brigands, but the fathers of these brigands twice restored the Bourbons to the throne of Naples. . . . What constitutes brigand- age ? " he asked : — " Is it the fact, as the Ministry would have us believe, that 1500 men commanded by two or three vagabonds can make head against the whole king- dom, backed by an army of 120,000 regulars? Why, these 1500 must be demigods — heroes ! I have seen a town of 5000 inhabitants utterly destroyed.^ By whom ? — Not by the brigands/^ In the debate of the 8th of May, 1863, in the English House of Commons, speakers of various opinions concurred in agreeing with Ferrari's judgment upon the so-called " Brigandage " — that it was really a civil war. " The Brigandage," said Mr. Cavendish Bentinck, " is a civil war, a spontaneous popular move- ment against foreign occupation, similar to that carried on in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies from 1799 to 181 2, when the great Nelson, Sir John Stuart and other English commanders were not ashamed to enter into relations with the brigands of that day, and their chief Cardinal Ruffo, for the purpose of expelling the French invaders." " I want to know,'' said Mr. Disraeli in the same debate, " I want to know on what ground we are to discuss the state of Poland, if we are not permitted to discuss the state of Calabria and the Two Sicilies. True, in one country the insurgents are called brigands, and in the other patriots ; but, with that exception, I have not learned from this discussion that there is any marked difference between them." Nor was it easy to see any difference. 2 An allusion to the town of Pontelandolfo, which was sacked and destroyed by the Piedmontese troops on August 13th, 1861. THE " BRIG A NBA GE:' 295 In both countries there was a guerilla warfare against the ruling power, and in both the Government was endeavouring to suppress it by the free use of fire and sword. The contention of the Piedmontese Government, and of their Liberal supporters throughout Europe, was, that the " Brigandage " was confined to one district, that it was only to be found near the Roman frontier in the Abruzzi, and that even there it was not a spontaneous movement of the people, but was carried on by invading bands organized by the Bourbonists in the Pontifical States, with the connivance of the Roman Government, and sent across the frontier to plunder and destroy, with a view only to disturbing the peace of the country, and embarrassing its Government. This was more than once affirmed by Palmerston in the House of Commons in 1862 and 1863. The theory was urged with a twofold purpose, first, to keep up the idea that the Piedmontese Government was not unpopular in the South, and secondly, to discredit the Roman Government, and afford one more pretext for the demand that Rome should be made the capital of Italy. This theory, however, falls to pieces before the facts which can be gathered from official sources, as to the measures of repression put in force by the Piedmontese in the South from i860 to 1865. To all but those who were determined to believe the contrary, it was evident that Naples was thoroughly hostile to the Piedmontese regime. On this point we may take the evidence of Massimo d^Azeglio, who certainly was not a reactionist. On the 2nd of August, 1861, he wrote to his friend Matteucci, — *' The question of whether we are to hold, or are not to hold Naples, should, it seems to me, depend upon the Neapolitans themselves ; unless we wish to change, to suit the occasion, the principles which we have proclaimed until now. We have gone forward, saying that governments which had not the consent of their subjects are illegitimate, and with this maxim, which I believe, and shall always believe to be a true one, we have turned out several Italian sovereigns. Their sub- 296 THE MAKING OF ITALY. jects not having protested in any way, have shown them- selves content with our work, and it has been made evident that if they did not give their consent to the previous Governments, they have given it to that which has succeeded them. Thus our acts have been in accord with our principles, and no one has anything to say. At Naples, too, we have made a change, in order to establish a Government on the basis of universal suffrage. But sixty battalions are required to hold the kingdom, and it seems that even these are not enough. But it will be said. What of universal suffrage ? I know nothing about the voting, but this I do know — that to the North of the Tronto battalions are not required, and on the other side they are. Therefore some mistake must have been made ; consequently, we must change either our acts or our principles, and find some means of learning, once for all, from the Neapolitans if they want us or not. I believe that against one who desires to bring, or to keep the Austrians in Italy, the Italians who do not wish this done have a right to 'make war ; but as for Italians ^ wkOy remain- ing Italians, do not wish to be united with us, we have no right to treat them to fusillades. I know that this is not the general opinion, but as I do not mean to give up my right of judgment, I say what I think." Victor Emmanuel's visits to Naples were melancholy failures ; although money was freely expended by the municipality in arches and decorations, popular enthusiasm could not be bought. In the provinces the insurrection, suppressed in one place, broke out in another. Cialdini was placed in command of the army in the South in the summer of 1861, and, by a system of merciless severity, dispersed the bands in the neighbourhood of Vesuvius, in the Basilicata and in Calabria, before the autumn. The winter put an end to the insurrection on account of the severity of the weather ; but it broke out again in the spring. It was in the winter of 1861 that General Josd Borjes made his unfortunate attempt to aid the insurrec- tion from without. He was a Catalan, who had, by his exploits in the first Carlist war, won a well-deserved name THE ''BRIGANDAGE}' 297 for dashing courage and brilliant tactical skill. He was, in fact, one of the best guerilla leaders in Europe. In 1 86 1 he was living in Paris, and the reports of the desultory- warfare in Southern Italy published in the press, inspired him with the wish to lead an expedition to Calabria, and repeat in the provinces of the old kingdom of Naples the exploits which had made him famous in Catalonia. It may be asked what he, a Spaniard, had to do with a war between Italians. I can only ask in reply, what had Cialdini and Fanti — who both served in Spain against the Carlists— to do with a struggle between Spaniards ? As Fanti and Cialdini went to Spain to support the cause of the Revolution^ so Borjes went to Calabria to fight for the cause of the Neapolitan monarchy-and for the indepen- dence of the South of Italy against the Piedmontese invaders. After having received the authorization of Count Clary, as the representative of Francis II., to take command of any insurgent bands he might meet with in Calabria, Borjes tried to organize his expedition, first at Marseilles, and then at Malta. After innumerable delays and difficulties, he got together about twenty officers, most of them Spaniards, and, taking with him a few muskets and some ammunition, embarked at Malta in a small Italian trading-ship, and landed near Brancaleone, in the extreme south of Calabria, on the 15th of September, i86i. The delays at Marseilles and Malta had ruined his enterprise. Cialdini's lieutenants had broken up all the insurgent bands in the country. Nevertheless, Borjes succeeded in gathering some partisans ; and, sometimes alone, sometimes in co-operation with a leader named Mittaca, whose band was largely composed of old brigands of the non-political type^ he carried on a guerilla warfare against the Piedmontese and the National Guards. Borjes made vain efforts to discipline and convert into soldiers the desperadoes of Mittaca's band. Had he had three hundred men, he noted in his diary, he might have done something ; but with the handful of men at his disposal he could neither rally any number of recruits to his 298 THE MAKING OF ITALY. standard, nor make his commands obeyed by Mitacca's band in Calabria or by that of Carmine Donatello in the Basilicata. The approach of winter had dispersed nearly all the insurgents. Borjes found himself almost alone, and without the resources necessary for organizing a strong column. He resolved to take refuge in the Roman States, and he made a wonderful march northwards with his little handful of men, through the whole length of the Neapolitan provinces. On the night of the 7th of December he halted, and slept at a farm within easy reach of the frontier, where he hoped to give up his arms to the French or Papal troops, and find himself in safety. Being so near the end of his march, he relaxed his ordinary precautions, and intended to make a late start next morning. His successful retreat had made him careless. Early on the 8th the farm was surprised by a detachment oi bersaglieri, and, after a desperate defence, the buildings were set on fire, and Borjes and his band were forced to surrender. "Well done, young major ! " he said, as he gave up his sword to the commander of the detachment ; and he added that his captors might be thankful he had not started earlier, as then he would have been safe in the Roman States, and would have found means to come back next year with a better band. The prisoners were marched into the neigh- bouring town of Tagliacozzo, and ordered to be summarily executed. They were led into the market-place, the Spaniards repeating a litany and preparing for death, which they all met unflinchingly. Borjes and nine of his Spanish officers were placed standing at intervals in a long row. ''We shall meet in the Valley of Jehoshaphat ! " said one of them, as he bade farewell to his comrades. Ten volleys fired in rapid succession put an end to their lives ; and then the Italians of the band were shot. The chivalrous gallantry and great military genius of Borjes won for him the esteem of foes as well as friends, and his execution was regarded with horror throughout Europe. His body was, later on, given up to his friends, and buried in Rome. Had he come early in i86i,or deferred his coming till 1862, his enterprise might have had a very different THE ''BRIGANDAGES 299 ending. It is melancholy to note that, on the very day on which he was taken a prisoner to Tagliacozza to be shot, a friend of his in Paris published a biography of Jose Borjes, relating his exploits in Spain, and predicting for him equal success in Italy.^ No news had been heard of him since he landed in September, and, as the Italians had not succeeded in capturing him in Calabria, it was supposed that he was at the head of a considerable force. It must be remarked that the shooting of Borjes, without formal trial by the ordinary courts, was an illegal act, for there was no state of siege proclaimed in Italy, and the Law Pica which legalized the shooting of brigands taken in arms was not passed till next year. However, Cialdini and his lieutenants took it upon themselves to proclaim a kind of local martial law, each in his own district. The commanders, in fact, placed themselves above the law, and when, during the Garibaldian rebellion of 1862, martial law was proclaimed in the South, it really made no practical difference in the condition of the country. Charles Garnier, in his memoir on the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,'' has collected a long series of these pro- clamations and ordinances, issued by the Piedmontese commanders during the war of the " Brigandage." Some of these were issued in order to put into execution the sanguinary laws passed by Parliament on the demand of the ministry ; but most of them were published and put in force on the mere j^^^ of the commander-in-chief of the Piedmontese army in the South, without even the formality of proclaiming martial law or the state of siege. From July, 1 86 1, onwards, this officer was General Cialdini, who had himself inaugurated this system of blood after his victory at Isernia in October, i860, when, even before the annexation had been proclaimed, he shot every Neapolitan peasant taken in arms on the side of King Francis. From these proclamations I shall select only a few. They will show at once the ruthless manner in which the war 3 " Le Gdndral Borjes," par Charles Garnier. Paris, December 8th, 1861. * " Le Royaume des Deux Siciles." Paris, 1866. 3od THE MAKING OF ITALV. was carried on by the Piedmontese, and the long time the struggle lasted. They will at the same time prove that the brigandage was not confined to the immediate neigh- bourhood of the Roman frontier, but extended through many of the provinces of the old kingdom of Naples. In June, 1861, Commandant Galatieri proclaimed from his headquarters at Teramo : " I come to defend humanity and the rights of property, and to exterminate brigandage. Gentle to the good, I shall be inexorable, terrible to the brigands. Whoever harbours a brigand shall be shot without distinction of age, sex, or condition. The same shall be the fate of spies. Whoever, on being questioned and having knowledge of the facts, does not assist the public force to discover the position and movements of the brigands, shall have his house sacked and burned. Just as punishment will follow every fault, so good acts will be rewarded ; and I am a man of honour who keeps his word. " Signed by the commander of the troops, " Galatieri. " Countersigned by the mayor of Teramo, 'TOLACCHI."^ In July, 1 861, the brigands occupied Volturino, in the Capitanata, a town of 3000 inhabitants, without meeting with any resistance. On the approach of a column of troops under Major Facino, they withdrew from the place. Facino started in pursuit of them. In his parting pro- clamation to the people of Volturino, he accused them of complicity with the reactionists. " I leave Volturino in the course of to-day," he said, " but I warn you that if the brigands re-enter the town, I too will return. I will set fire to the four corners of your houses, and thus put an end to the incessant reaction. I pledge my word of honour, as a soldier, that I shall keep this promise." ® Another of the Piedmontese officers employed against the reaction was Major P'umel, whose sanguinary deeds won him an ill-omened reputation throughout Europe. One of his proclamations, issued in February, 1862, was ^ Gamier, Documents, Ixix. ^ Gamier, Documents, Ixx. THE ''BRIGANDAGES 301 at first repudiated by the Government, but later on they gave it their approbation, and he issued others in the same sense, and many of its regulations were embodied in the decrees of the other military commanders. Speak- ing of it in the House of Commons, in May, 1863, Mr. Baillie Cochrane justly remarked that '^ a more infamous proclamation had never disgraced the worst days of the Reign of Terror in France." It ran as follows : — " The undersigned, having been commissioned to destroy brigandage, promises a reward of 1 00 lire (francs), for every brigand, alive or dead, who may be brought to him. This reward will be given to any brigand who shall kill his comrade ; moreover, his own life shall be spared. Those who, in defiance of this, give shelter or any means of subsistence or support to brigands, or seeing them or knowing the place where they may have taken refuge, do not give information to the forces and to the civil and military authorities, will be immediately shot. For the custody of animals it would be well that they should be brought into several central spots with a sufficient armed force, because it would not be of use without a consider- able force. All straw huts must be burned. The towers and country houses which are not inhabited, must be within the space of three days unroofed and their en- trances bricked up. Otherwise, after the expiration of that time, they will without fail be burned ; and all animals which are not under proper g:uard will be killed. It is prohibited to carry bread or any kind of provisions beyond the habitations of the communes, and whoever disobeys this order will be considered an accomplice of the brigands. Provisionally and under these circum- stances, the syndics are authorized to grant permission to carry arms under the strict responsibility of the landowners who shall make the request. Shooting as sport is also provisionally forbidden, and therefore no one may fire off a gun unless to give notice to the armed posts of the presence of brigands or of their flight. The National Guard of each commune is responsible for its own district. The undersigned does not mean to recognize, under present circumstances, more than two parties — brigands 302 THE MAKING OF ITALY. and anti-brigands ! therefore he will class among the former those who are indifferent, and against these he will take energetic measures, for in times of general necessity it is a crime to stand apart. The disbanded soldiers who do not present themselves within the space of four days, will be considered as brigands." ' Fumel's proclamations show very plainly how the Piedmontese Government made a solitude and called it peace. Of a similar character was the proclamation issued by Colonel Fantoni from Lucera, on February 9th, 1862. The preamble of the proclamation announced that it was issued under the direction of the prefect of the province, that is to say, under the direct sanction of the civil authorities. The first clause forbade access even on foot to thirteen forests or tracts of waste land, including the great forest of Gargano. The second, third, and fourth clauses gave the following orders : — " 2ndly — Every landowner, farmer or agent, will be bound, immediately on the publication of this notice, to withdraw from the said forests all labourers, shepherds, goatherds, &c., who may be in them, and with them to withdraw their flocks : the said persons will also be bound to destroy all folds and huts erected in these places. " 3rdly — Henceforth no one can export from the neigh- bouring districts any provision for the use of the peasants, and the latter will not be allowed to have in their posses- sion more food than is necessary for a single day for each person of their family. "4thly — Those who disobey this order, which shall come into force two days after its publication, will be, without any exception as to time, place, or person, con- sidered as brigands and, as such, shot. " The undersigned," it concluded, " in publishing this order, advises the landowners to promptly bring it to the knowledge of those in their employ, in order that they may take steps to avoid the rigours with which they are menaced, informing them at the same time that the Government will be inexorable in enforcing them." * 7 Garnier, Ixxi., and Hansard, May 8th, 1863, col. 1463. " Garnier, Ixxiii. THE *' brigandage:' 303 On the 22nd of September, in the same year (1862) Colonel Buovicini, commanding the Piedmontese force in the Basilicata, by a proclamation dated from his head- quarters at Potenza, ordered all the straw huts in the woods to be burned, all grain to be removed from out- lying farms, and all detached and unoccupied buildings to be walled up. Compared to the acts of Fantoni, Fumel and Pinelli, these were very moderate measures.^ In 1863, Di Ferrari, the Prefect of Foggia in the Capitanata (not to be confounded with the deputy of the same name), distinguished himself by his activity against the " brigands." His proclamations and despatches are well worthy of a place in the series. On the 14th of March, he proclaimed : — "To-morrow the war against the malefactors will be recommenced as actively as possible in every part of the provinces. The national guards will traverse and defend the territory of their communes ; the carbineers and the troops will give them effective support when needed. All the animals in the country will be immediately collected in a few localities to be more easily guarded. All the smaller farms will be deserted, food and forage removed, and the buildings strongly walled up. No one may go into the fields without a pass written by the syndic and countersigned by the commandant of the carbineers ; no one may carry food, provisions, arms or munitions, with- out the written authorization of the syndic, and without a sufficient escort. Whoever disobeys these orders will be immediately arrested as a promoter of brigandage and imprisoned at my will. The syndics and delegates will keep the prefecture and the sub-prefecture exactly informed as to the progress of the holy war, which, thanks to the efforts of all, will be short and decisive." \ On the 1st of May, in another proclamation, Di Ferrari ordered the arrest of all " suspected persons " in the province of the Capitanata, adding that in such cases " mercy was a crime." ^ By an order of July 8th, to pre- vent the insurgent bands from making use of horses to 9 Gamier, Ixxiv. ^ Gamier, Ixxx. ^ Gamier, Ixxxi. 304 THE MAKING OF ITALY, escape the pursuit of the troops, Di Ferrari ordered that horses should only be shod in public and specially licenced forges : and that no one who shod horses, or made horse- shoes or nails, should leave his own district without a pass indicating the route he was to take, the hour he was to start, and the hour he was to be back at his forge. Any- one having horse-shoes, nails, or tools for shoeing, was to declare the same to the authorities. All who disobeyed these orders were to be treated as accomplices of the brigands,^ By a circular of the prefect, De Luca, the syndics of the district of Avellino (the old province of Principato Ultra) were ordered to make out lists of all absent persons, and of all who were with the brigands, and to arrest the relatives of brigands to the third degree, in order to obtain from them *' useful information." Peasants were not to work in the fields without a pass, and were not to carry with 'them more food than was necessary for a single meal.'' From these proclamations it appears that the measures adopted for the suppression of the so-called " brigandage " were ; — (i.) Shooting, with or without trial, all persons taken in arms. (2.) Sacking and burning disaffected towns and villages. (3.) Imprisonment, without trial or indictment, of suspected persons and " relatives of brigands.'^ (4.) Treating as accomplices of brigands, and punishing with death or imprisonment, all who — (^.) Had in their possession arms without a licence ; (^.) Worked in the fields without a pass in any proclaimed district ; (^.) Or carried to the fields more food than was sufficient for one meal ; [d.) Or (in some districts) kept a store of food in their huts ; (^.) Or shod horses without a licence, or kept or carried horse-shoes. ' Gamier, Ixxxii. ^ Gamier, Ixxxiii. THE ''brigandage:' 305 (5.) Destroying huts in the woods, walling up all out- lying buildings, taking the people and their cattle from the smaller farms, and collecting all cattle in positions where they could be placed under a military guard. (6.) Refusing to allow anyone to stand neutral, and treating would-be-neutrals as friends and accomplices of the brigands. (7.) A further means was a rigid censorship of the press. Nor were these proclamations empty threats. How great was the destruction of life and property effected by the flying columns of troops during the war with the brigands, will probably never be known. The statistics available only partly represent it, and only extend over certain periods of the conflict ; but even these present a terrible picture of the free use of fire and sword, by which the people of the South were persuaded that Italian unity was the best means of promoting their liberty and prosperity. According to an Italian journal, the Commercio of November 8th, 1862, the following towns in the Nea- politan provinces were sacked and burned during the preceding fourteen months : — Provinces. Towns. Inhabi- tants. Molise Guaricia... 1,322 » Campochiaro 979 )) Casalduni 3,032 )j Pontelandolfo 3,917 Capitanata Viesti 5,417 )S San Marco in Lamis ... 10,612 >» Rignano 1,814 Basilicata Venosa ... 5,952 M Basile 3,400 Principato Citeriore Auletta 2,023 Eboli 4,175 Principato Ulteriore Montifalcone 2,618 ,, Montiverde 1,988. Terra di Lavoro Vico 730 Calabria Ulteriore II. Controne 1,089 „ Spinello 298 Total 49,366 3o6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Even this imperfect list proves that in 1861-62 the insurrection was not the work of a few bands of marauders on the Roman frontier^ but was a desperate struggle extending throughout the length and breadth of the king- dom. Of the seven provinces in the above list, only one — the Terra di Lavoro — touched the Roman frontier. Of the towns named in it as destroyed, the fate of two — Casalduni and Pontelandolfo in the Molise, sacked and burned by the Piedmontese in August, 1861 — was brought before the Parliament of Turin, by the deputy Ferrari, and so became better known in Europe than that of the rest. Under the market-cross of Pontelandolfo thirty women had gathered, hoping that there, at least, they would be safe from outrage and murder ; they were all bayoneted by the Piedmontese. This is no story of a Bourbonist pamphleteer ; we have it on the authority of the Liberal Ferrari ; it was denounced by him at Turin, and, on his authority, in the House of Commons by Mr. Cavendish Bentinck. This, however, was only part of a widespread reign of terror and massacre. Italian official documents, although there is good reason to believe that they under- rate the numbers, give very high totals. The following table is from the report of the commission on brigandage, and refers to the period from May, 1 861, to February 1863. Taken in arms and shot ... ... 1038 men. Killed in battle 2413 „ Made prisoners 2768 „ Surrendered 932 „ Total 7151 „ During the debate at Turin in the autumn of 1863, the deputy Miceli declared that 350 citizens had been shot as accomplices of the brigands, and that " often these so- called accomplices were innocent." A list compiled from official returns, and containing the names of men taken and shot in the field during the three first months of 1863, enumerates 188 names, though it omits the names of several shot by order of courts-martial in the barracks. The first name on the list is that of a young surgeon, THE " BRIG AND A GE." 307 who was attached in his professional capacity to one of the bands, which must therefore have been an organized insurgent column, and not a horde of marauders. Hundreds, whose lives were spared when they were taken in the field, or who, arrested in the cities as ^' sospettZy' did not even know with what they were charged, died of fever in the foul air of overcrowded prisons. Even Mr. Bonham, the British Consul at Naples, whose reports were studiously favourable to the Pied- montese regime^ admitted that there were 20,000 persons imprisoned for political reasons in the Neapolitan prisons. Other estimates placed the numbers much higher, some as high as 80,000. The great majority of these were untried. The hotels of Naples, and the roads, were carefully watched. Domiciliary visits and arrests on suspicion took place every day. De Christen paid a visit to Naples in the summer of 1 86 1. He had not done any hostile act against the Pied- montese, since the convention subsequent to the fall of Gaeta put an end to his campaign in the Abruzzi, and he was at Naples on a pleasure excursion. He was recog- nized during a domiciliary visit to his hotel, and, after an imprisonment of several months, was tried for conspiracy. His acts in the Abruzzi previous to the convention were put in evidence against him ; and after a most unfair trial, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, and actually endured a large part of the sentence before he was liberated on representations made by the French Govern- ment. After an equally unfair trial, a trial denounced even by Italian jurists as illegal,^ Mr. Bishop, an English Protestant gentleman, was found guilty of conspiracy at Naples, and also sentenced to ten years' penal servitude. He had been lying many months in prison, before he was even brought to trial. When foreign travellers were thus treated, it may be easily imagined that the form of trial was worth very little to the Neapolitan Bourbonists. As to the condition of the prisons of Naples under the * See in Hansard, Lord Normanby's speech in the House of Lords on the case of Mr. Bishop, May nth, 1863. X 2 3o8 THE MAKING OF ITALY. rule of Piedmont during the insurrection of the South, we have the evidence of Lord Henry Lennox, who, in the winter of 1862-63, visited the old Neapolitan provinces. When he went to Naples, he was very favourably inclined towards the Italian Revolution, and especially an admirer of Garibaldi. What his impressions were after his visit to Southern Italy, he informed the House of Commons during the debate of May 8th, 1863, on commerce with Naples. The importance of the question must be my apology for lengthy extracts from this evidence. In any treatment of the " brigandage " it necessarily finds a place. After re- minding the House that, in the debate of 1862, Mr. Layard had taunted Sir George Bowyer with " only being able after elaborate research to bring forward one solitary case, that of Count Christen, who had been a prisoner for six months without trial," he said that he would lay before the House other cases of a worse character. " The facts," he said, " which I am about to relate passed before my eyes ; I pledge my honour that they are true, and that I will give no exaggerated account of them. I would again remind the House that the first time I visited Naples after the formation of the kingdom of Italy, I went there as an ardent supporter of King Victor Emmanuel; that I had not been in Naples more than six days, when a gentleman who has attained the rare position of acquiring high dis- tinction in the country of his birth, and equal eminence in that of his adoption, asked me whether I would like to visit the prison of Santa Maria, in which I should have the opportunity of seeing an unfortunate countryman (Mr. Bishop). I went, and saw Mr. Bishop. I am happy to say that I saw nothing to complain of in the treatment of any of those persons who were confined in Santa Maria. The prison was cleanly, and the food was good, always supposing that the prisoners had been tried and convicted ; but I regret to say that such was not the case. One Hungarian gentle- man, named Blumenthal, who spoke French fluently, told me that he had been eighteen months in his cell without having been tried or even interrogated. From the conver- THE ''BRIGANDAGES 309 sation of those around, he had gathered that he was sus- pected of being concerned in some revolutionary proceed- ings, and he earnestly desired that he might be brought to trial. He had no objection to find with his lodging or his food. On leaving the cell of that prisoner, other prisoners gathered around me and my companion, and frequently ex- claimed in Italian, ' Why are we in prison ? ' * Why are we not tried ? * Much struck, and somewhat uneasy at what was going on, I requested of the gentleman who accom- panied me to ask of the governor that question which the prisoners had put to me. All honour to the governor, all honour to the governors of the different prisons which I visited, for they were one and all actuated by philan- thropic motives, and detested this system of which they are the unwilling instruments. The governor to whom I now particularly allude, replied that he was unable to answer the question, that he had eighty-three per- sons in his charge who had never been tried, and that about one half of these had never undergone a form of interrogation, which, I believe,is tantamount to being before a magistrate in this country. These persons were confined in prison, and were not aware of the crimes with which they were charged. Perhaps, when the House hears of these men who are thus kept in prison without being tried, they may arrive at the conclusion that they are men of intelligence and wealth, men who could head a revolution and who would be dangerous to a government firmly seated in the affections of its people. On the contrary, some of them were most miserable-looking beings, mumbling, grey-headed, crawling upon crutches, being poor old wretches who in appearance were only fit to finish their days in the neighbouring almshouse. To talk of such men as these as being conspirators, dangerous to the safety of the Government and of his Majesty the King of Italy, appears to me to be simply absurd and an outrage upon common sense. On leaving this prison, the distin- guished gentleman who was with me, said, ' This is indeed wrong ; I am an Italian, and a thorough Italian, but this is wrong, and we must inscribe our names in the visitors' 3IO THE MAKING OF ITALY. book to that effect.' I said, * It would be a great liberty in a stranger to do anything of the kind ; ' but my com- panion was of a different opinion. We therefore wrote in the book a protest, for protest I must call it, to the follow- ing effect : After acknowledging the extreme courtesy of the governor, and the generally good position of the prison, the protest went on in the following words ; — " * But the undersigned cannot help expressing how regrettable it is that some prisoners have been detained for months untried, and as far as they have assured the undersigned, not even interrogated, and without knowing from the authorities the cause of their imprison- ment' " This document being signed, it was left with the governor, and a copy was to be forwarded to the Government at Turin. Now I admit that during my visit to this prison, some little uneasiness had begun to creep into my mind, and I began to have some slight misgivings as to that state of liberty and justice of which I had heard so much- The result was that I made an application to General la Marmora and obtained from him authority to visit the other prisons of Naples. The second prison which I visited was that known as the * Concordia,' it is situated in the upper part of Naples, and is chiefly occupied by persons imprisoned for debt. Now the House will readily imagine that such men form by no means the most respect- able portion of Neapolitan society. I found these men walking about the galleries of the prison, and in the midst of them two convicted felons, one of whom was under- going a sentence of imprisonment for life for homicide, and the other of eighteen years for a grave crime. Among these prisoners, too, mixed up with the debtors and the felons, were a Roman Catholic bishop and two priests, who had been dragged out of their beds a month before, thrust into this prison, and made — if they left their cell — to pass their days in the society of needy debtors and con- victed felons, and that without knowing the crime for which they were suffering. Some honourable gentlemen around me, I am well aware, do not sympathize much per- THE '' BRIGANDAGES 311 haps with Roman Catholic bishops and priests, but they are sufficiently English in their feelings to sympathize with anyone who is treated unjustly, whether Catholic or Protestant, priest or layman. There is at present confined in that prison a man, who had been in prison two years ; he was an old man, he must have been close upon seventy ; he was bowed with years, and was confined to the prison diet, one meal a day, and nothing but water to drink. He complained, but he said * he thought — he hoped — the end was near ! ■' This second prison certainly did not remove the uneasiness, which had been excited in my mind by my visit to the first. The third prison was the ' Santa Maria Agnone/ the women's prison. Of the prisoners, there were a certain number of women confined ' for political sympathies.' I have a long list of the names of the women who have been confined in this and another prison, for longer and shorter periods, uninterrogated and untried ; no complaints can be made of want of cleanliness or of the diet ; but all this time they were compelled to associate with the lowest class of women, even those taken from the streets for immoral conduct. The next prison which I visited, was a large one at Salerno. The governor there was exceedingly courteous, and on hearing what was the object of my visit, he bade me welcome, and hoped that it would be productive of good, but he said that he thought it right to tell me that in a prison which ought to accom- modate 650 prisoners, he had then 1359, the result of which was that a virulent typhus fever had broken out, and within the previous week had carried off the physican and a warder. Among the prisoners in the first cell which I entered in this prison, were eight or nine priests and four- teen laymen, all suspected of political offences, and these were confined in this cell with four or five convicted felons. In the next cell were one hundred and fifty-seven prisoners, the greater part of whom were untried. They lived there the whole day, they slept there the whole night ; and except for a very short period, when they were allowed to take a little exercise in a very small yard, these hundred and fifty-seven wretched creatures passed the whole of 312 THE MAKING OF ITALY. their lives in this place, without knowing why or wherefore they had been brought to such a place. To show how completely unaltered was the system, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had in the year 185 1 so emphatically denounced, I will state that in this room, associating with political offenders, was a man who had been sentenced to death for murder, and who was to suffer the extreme penalty of the law within a week from that time. The next room was a long room with a vaulted roof, and in it were two hundred and thirty prisoners. To describe the state of squalor and filth in which these wretched men were, would require more eloquence than I can command. Among the prisoners were men of different classes in life — officers of the National Guard, who were condemned to this living death because they had a few months before listened, to the voice of General Garibaldi — priests and laymen, all in a most pitiable condition. One man of seventy was a wretched object. Others had been in prison so long that their clothes had worn out ; they had no money to buy new ones, and some were in such a state of nudity that they could not rise from their seats as the strangers passed along, to implore, as their companions did, our pity, and to petition us to intercede in their favour. Some of them had, literally, no trousers, shoes, nor stock- ings — nothing but an old jacket, and a rag which did duty for a shirt. It was a piteous sight — the stench was dread- ful, and the House must remember that it was then the cold weather of January ; what, then, must it be now } I dare not think of it. The food they had would not be given to any cattle in England. I threw a piece of their bread upon their floor and pressed it with my foot, but so hard was it, that I could not make the slightest impression upon it. The next spot I visited was one which had been visited by the Chancellor of the Exchequer some eleven years ago, and which he had then accurately described as a * charnel house.' It was the Vicaria — a prison situated in the most crowded and unhealthy part of Naples — into which, though it was only calculated to hold 600 prisoners, 1200 had been crowded. In this prison there were five THE " BRIG A NBA GE:' 3 1 3 rooms^ one following the other. - There were only fourteen warders for the whole of these i2CO prisoners ; and when Consul-General Bonham permitted himself to put down in an official despatch that the abuses still existing in the prison of the Vicaria were owing to the cruelty of some old Bourbon gaolers that were left, he was making a state- ment which I will take upon myself to contradict, and which Mr. Bonham must or ought to have known to be incorrect. So small was the staff" of warders for the prisoners confined there, that it was difficult, nay almost impossible, to search them ; and the consequence was that many of them were armed with weapons of one kind or another, some being thrown through the windows, the others being brought in by the sellers of provisions that visit the prison. The result is that the unhappy governor goes in danger of his life, and said to me, * I shall be only too glad if you can do any good, for I never leave my wife in the morning without the feeling that I may be brought home at night a murdered man.' Of the 1200 prisoners, 800 were confined in five rooms, with no doors between them, but iron rails ; and thus the effluvium arising from these 800 men circulated without let from one end to the other. The moment I entered the first room, the prisoners crowded round, and I was set upon with petitions, prayers, and entreaties ; indeed, the pressure was so great, that it was with difficulty that I was able to escape. I afterwards saw nearly the whole prison turned out into the yard ; and if the right hon. gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, will allow me to say so, I think he ought to be highly gratified to hear what happened. Fearing that any further demonstrations might recoil with evil on the head of the governor, I begged him to entreat the prisoners not to repeat their requests, which, as I could do nothing for them, gave me great pain — I therefore requested him to assure them that I had no influence with the Italian Government, for that, in point of fact, I was only an English traveller. But when they heard I was an English- man, the clamour was renewed, and the entreaties waxed louder; for they seemed to think, at the sound of an 314 THE MAKING OF ITALY, Englishman, that a tutelary deity had come to reHeve them from the grossest and most wicked of oppressions. The name of Gladstone was so well-known to them, ignorant though they were on other topics, that they in their simplicity thought one Englishman in 1862 could do the same as another had done in 185 1. They little know the diiference of power and influence between the two members — between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself. But to return to the yard. The sight, which there met my eyes, was one happily not often to be seen, and which I can never forget. The door by which I emerged was at the top of the lofty wall, communicating by a steep staircase down into the yard, and no sooner were the party in sight, than the prisoners rushed towards us with piteous cries again and again repeated, and, with bloodshot eyes and outstretched arms, implored not for liberty but for trial, not for mercy but for a sentence. The description of the attitude and condition of the tortured in Dante's Inferno would give the best idea of the scene that presented itself in that prison yard. And now I come to the last prison on which I wish to speak, and I will ask the House to accompany me to the fortress of Nisida, situated about five miles from Naples, on the summit of a rock, commanding the most beautiful and extensive scenery. In this prison there are none but those who have been tried and con- demned, and it is here that hard labour sentences are carried out. In this prison were a French gentleman, Comte de Christen, Signor Caracciolo, and Signor di Luca. They had been, as far as I know, rightly convicted of conspiring against the government. But it is not of such crime that I wish to speak lightly, it is one which I cannot palliate ; for those who conspire, frequently are those who put forward brave men to suffer, while they, themselves, skulk behind in safety.^ In the same prison I saw some thirty or forty very fine young men, dressed in the flaunt- ing scarlet and green vestments of shame. They had been apparently the flower of the Italian army, but were so no 6 De Christen certainly was not a man of the class here alluded to by Lord Henry Lennox. THE ''BRIGANDAGE}' 315 longer, for their sinewy arms were powerless, chained as they were by heavy irons to their brawny thighs. These young men had committed the grave crime of having deserted from the army of Victor Emmanuel,, and having listened to the voice of that brave and honest man. Garibaldi. But, how- ever detestable the crime of disloyalty — however much to be reprehended is the conduct of those men who break their oaths to their sovereign — yet considering that, only eighteen short months before, those troops who did not listen to the voice of that same Garibaldi, and who did remain faithful to their king— considering that these were disbanded as unworthy of trust, and turned adrift to gain their bread, I do say that if ever there was a man who in such a case was bound to temper justice with mercy, that manwasVictor Emmanuel, King of Italy. And now I come to a narrative from which I confess to recoil with feelings of horror and indignation ; for in one cell, narrow and most miserable, with a stone floor and four iron bedsteads, with- out a table, and without even a book to cheer their solitude, were four men chained two and two with the heaviest of irons, three of them being men of birth and education. Though owing to felons' garments it was difficult and painful to do so, I recognized in two of them Count Christen and Signor Caracciolo. Count Christen, seeing my reluctance to approach, made a sign to me to come to him, and he said, * My Lord, I appre- ciate your feelings. You feel pity for me. Do not pity me — but reserve your pity for those who degrade the name of freedom by treatment such as that which I am now suffering.' Signor di Luca was chained with similar heavy chains to a brigand, who had been con- victed of robbery and manslaughter. Here was an Italian gentleman, whose misfortune it was to differ from the Italian Government, and whose crime was conspiring against it, chained with irons to the commonest male- factor ! Against such a system as this I must enter my protest. I care not whether such deeds of darkness are done under the despotism of a Bourbon or under the pseudo-Liberalism of a Victor Emmanuel. What is called i6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. United Italy mainly owes it existence to the protection and moral support of England — more does it owe to this than to Garibaldi, or even to the victorious armies of France — and in the name of England, therefore, I denounce the commission of such barbarous atrocities, and I protest against the aegis of free England being thus prostituted. I conversed with some of the prisoners who were awaiting their trial, and they said, ' If we only knew what our sentence was, at least our despair would not be so blank. At the end of every vista, however long, a spark of light is visible. Were we condemned for ten or even twenty years, we could keep our eyes fixed on that light, and as month succeeded month, that ray, however small, would still be growing brighter, and the star of liberty would irradiate the darkness of our unhappy lot ; but now all is one blank, dark despair, without alleviation, because without hope.' " The prisons were not emptied even by the typhus that swept them again and again, for they were rapidly replen- ished. In one single night, in May, 1863, two hundred persons were arrested at Naples, without even being in- formed of their alleged offence. At the same time muni- cipalities were suppressed and battalions of the National Guard disbanded for alleged complicity with the insurrec- tion. The press was not spared. Throughout Italy a censorship, to which that of Austria was mildness itself, struck down every journal that displeased the ministry of the day. Catholic journals on the one hand, and Liberal newspapers on the other, suffered almost equal violence. The Eco di Bologna was suppressed twenty-four times in thirteen months, and its editors fined and imprisoned. The Liberal Nuova Europa of Florence was seized four times in nine days. In three years, twenty-nine of the journals of Naples were totally suppressed — others were seized on certain days ; thus of the Napoli e Torino^ seventeen issues were seized out of fifty : of the Machiavelli^ five out of eleven : and of the Aurora^ ten out of nineteen. Numerous other instances might be cited ; but these are sufficient to show that, under the new regime, the liberty of the press was an empty boast. THE ''BRIGANDAGES 317 Under all these measures of repression, and grappling with a Government armed with extraordinary powers and making ruthless use of them, the Neapolitan insurrection was doomed to fail, if it was not continually and effectually supported from without. But no such help was organized by the exiled Court. In the summer of 1863, a quarrel between the foreign and the native chiefs hopelessly dis- organized the movement. The Spanish general, Tristany, who had the chief command in the Abruzzi, brought Chiavone, one of the most popular of the native chiefs, before a council-of-war on a charge of insubordination. Chiavone was declared guilty, and sentenced to death, and the insurgents were breaking into mutiny against the sentence, when Tristany executed it with his own hand, by shooting Chiavone dead with his revolver. The shot put an end to his own influence, and broke up his force; he capitulated, in July, 1863, to the Piedmontese authorities. After this period only a few scattered bands, most of them really brigands in the true sense of the word, kept the hills. The political movement died out during the summer of 1864, but the predatory brigandage existed for years after. It had existed all through the civil war, but there were quite as many of its professors to be found on the Piedmontese as on the Neapolitan side.^ But though the armed insurrection was at an end, a great mass of the Neapolitans still looked with hope to the return of their king, and discontent showed itself both among Liberals and Royalists. In June, 1865, there w^ere numerous arrests at Salerno, on th charge of Bourbonist conspiracy. In the October of the same year, even the Liberal Popolo of Naples confessed that the anniversary of the plebiscite was a sad one, because the people of the South had seen nothing of the glory of union with Italy, and had only to bear sufferings and burdens entailed by it. To this day the South of Italy is held by the northern regiments of the Italian army. From all this it is evident that unity was forced ' Even the Italianist MafFei confesses that brigands were to be found acting on the side of the Government. 318 THE MAKING OF ITALY. upon Southern Italy by fire and sword, and that the " liberators " crushed out the real feeling of the people by wholesale executions and imprisonment, a sanguinary war of four years, and the destruction of all their local liberties. All that had been bad in the Bourbon system, the Pied- montese kept and made use of, and '^ bettered the instruc- tion,'' and even men like Nicotera and Napoleon III. confessed that the change was one for the worse. Security for life and property was gone ; and there had come instead the right to vote at elections, the conscription, heavy tax- ations, bloodshed, crowded prisons and ruined towns. The Russification of Poland is the most apt parallel for the destruction of the autonomy of the South of Italy by the agents of King Victor Emmanuel, in the years which followed the sham plebiscite of Oct. 2ist, i860. The system of outrage, massacre and bloodshed, by which the Piedmontese Government put down the reaction, was not denounced by the Bourbonists alone. Even among the Liberals of the Turin Parliament, men were found honest and outspoken enough to declare publicly what they knew to be the fact. " You cannot deny," said Ferrari, in the debate of the 29th of November, 1862, " that whole families are arrested without even a given pretext ; that many individuals acquitted by the judges still linger in prison. A new code is in operation, under which every man taken with arms in his hands is shot. This I call a war of barbarians, a war without quarter. If conscience does not tell you that you are wading in blood, I know not how to express myself.'^ On the i8th of April, 1863, the deputy Miceli, who had seen massacres perpetrated by the troops in Calabria, declared that men were shot without even the form of trial. His statements were questioned by the supporters of the Government ; and upon this. General Bixio, Garibaldi's lieutenant, and therefore no friend of the reaction, rose to confirm them. He declared that Miceli's statements were true ; that he could attest this from personal knowledge. " A system of blood,^' he ex- claimed, " is established in Southern Italy ; but it is not by shedding blood that existing evils will be remedied. There THE ''BRIGANDAGE?' 319 is truth in the statement of Miceli. It is evident that, in the South, blood alone is sought, but Parliament must not follow this course. . . . Let us first be just,'-' he concluded; " if Italy is to be a nation, we must attain our end by- justice, not by bloodshed." Nicotera, another Garibaldian, and though a Neapolitan equally an enemy of the reaction, spoke in the same sense as his fellow-deputies, Ferrari, Miceli and Bixio. " The Bourbon Government," he said, " had the great merit of preserving our lives and substance, a merit the present Government cannot claim. We have neither personal nor political liberty. The deeds we behold are worthy of Tamerlane^ Genghis- Khan, or Attila." Finally, we may cite the remonstrance addressed to the Italian Government by the Emperor Napoleon III. On July 2 1st, 1862, he wrote from Vichy to General Fleury : — " I have written to Turin to remonstrate. The details we receive are of such a kind, as to be calculated to alienate every honest mind from the Italian cause. Not only are misery and anarchy at their height, but the most culpable and unworthy acts are a matter of course. A general, whose name I have forgotten, having forbidden the pea- sants to take provisions with them when they go to work in the fields, has decreed that all on whom a piece of bread is found shall be shot. The Bourbons never did anything like that. '' Napoleon." Evidence such as this is incontrovertible, coming from the mouths of the very men who had been foremost in founding the so-called unity of Italy. 320 THE MAKING OF ITALY. CHAPTER XVI. ASPROMONTE. I MUST now resume the regular course of the narrative from the fall of Ricasoli's Cabinet on the 1st of March, 1862. On the 4th of that month a new Ministry was formed by Urbano Ratazzi, who, besides the premiership, took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Signor Sella, a civil engineer, took charge of the Finances, and Admiral Persano was Minister of Marine. The name of Ratazzi was not a popular one in Italy. It was associated with the cata- strophe of Novara ; it was destined to be associated with Aspromonte. His friendship for Napoleon III. caused him to be suspected of subserviency to France. What his policy was, even now it is difficult to say. The secret of the inner politics of Italy during his administration has been well kept. There are no such documents available as those letters of Cavour to Persano, which make the story of the Revolution of i860 a clear and simple one. In the absence of such documents, we have no clue to Ratazzi's policy ; and it must be confessed that his policy in the affairs of Sarnico and of Aspromonte cannot be fully ex- plained. It seems most likely that on these occasions he was anxious to use the Garibaldians against Austria and Rome, as Cavour had used them against Naples ; but that at the last moment his courage failed, and he yielded to pressure from without, and put down the movements which he had allowed to gather strength and consistency even if he had not actually originated or fostered them. Garibaldi had been entrusted by Ricasoli with a sort of roving commission to superintend and encourage the or- ganization of national guards and rifle-clubs, or, as it was said, to watch over the armament of the nation. He was ASPROMONTE. 321 certainly chafing- for action against either Venetia or the Papal territory, and his semi-official position and his great influence enabled him to plan some such enterprise with- out serious difficulty. There had been rumours that Gari- baldi was again thinking of taking the field with his red- shirts, but these reports had been denied, when, in the middle of May, while Ratazzi was absent from Turin with the king on a visit to Naples, Europe was at one and the same moment informed that a Garibaldian plan against Aus- tria had been discovered, and that it had been defeated. In April, Count Rechberg, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been asked in the Reichsrath at Vienna if the report of such a movement was well-founded, and had replied that the Government was taking measures for the defence of Venetia. The French Government had also addressed a friendly warning to Turin. It can hardly be supposed that the Piedmontese Government was entirely ignorant of the project. It had been the subject of un- numbered rumours and reports, and the police must have been aware of the steady flow of volunteers, arms, muni- tions and uniforms, into Lombardy, throughout April and the early days of May. Garibaldi, it is said, had assured Ratazzi that he was preparing not for a raid upon Venetia, but for an expedition against the Turks for the purpose of extending the kingdom of Greece. But it was strange that such an expedition should have been prepared far from the sea and close to the Austrian frontier. The prepara- tions went on unchecked. A large number of volunteers assembled at Sarnico, and Colonel Cattabene was to lead the Garibaldian vanguard across the Austrian frontier on the 19th of May. But the Government could not afford a war with Austria. Ratazzi had weakly allowed the move- ment to develop into something serious ; it was now both difficult and dangerous to stop it. At first persuasion was tried. General Tiirr, now an aide-de-camp to the king, was sent from Naples to endeavour to dissuade Garibaldi from his enterprise. Then recourse was had to force instead of persuasion. On the night of the 13th of May, Colonel Cattabene was arrested at Trescorre, in the same house Y 322 THE MAKING OF ITALY. that Garibaldi himself occupied, and all the plans of the expedition were seized. A large number of arrests fol- lowed among the volunteers assembled at Sarnico, and columns of Piedmontese troops occupied the roads leading to the Austrian frontier. The efficiency with which the movement was put down proved once for all that if either the Austrian or the Fapal frontier was to be violated, it would be the fault of the Government, who were quite capable of stopping a Garibaldian raid. The prisoners were removed to Brescia ; riotous crowds attempted to rescue them, but were repelled by the troops, who shot down several of the mob. Ratazzi had directed from Naples the repression of the movement. He returned to Turin with the king, on the 1 5th of May, and at once addressed a circular to the pre- fects, informing them of what had occurred, and adding that he had good grounds for saying that Garibaldi had no complicity in the project. This was an attempt on the part of the minister to put himself right with the party of action, by pretending that the " affair of Sarnico " was not the work of their chief ; but Garibaldi foiled it, by publicly assuming all the responsibility of what had occurred, and the leading men of his party signed a declaration approv- ing of the course he had taken. "As Italy," they said, " existed de jure but not de facto (for she had neither Rome nor Venice), the Government could not fetter the Italian Revolution." Why, it was asked, did the Government, if it broke with the Revolution, leave Garibaldi at liberty, and keep his accomplices in prison ; or why did it keep at the Prefecture of Palermo Signor Pallavicini, who publicly declared that he governed Sicily with the assistance of the Revolutionary party, without which he would be obliged to have recourse to grapeshot } ' On the 3rd of June the Parliament met at Turin. Garibaldi was not present, but sent a letter which was read in the Chamber of Deputies. In this letter he denied that he had ever had any intention of invading the Tyrol (but he said nothing of Venetia). He said that being engaged ^ Annuaire des deux mondes, 1862, pp. 257, 258. ASPROMONTE. 323 with the concurrence of the Government in the armament of the nation, he had merely invited a number of young men to assemble in Lombardy and await events. When the letter was read, a short discussion followed. Ratazzi expressed his regret that Garibaldi had not come to the Chamber, instead of writing. Crispi complained of the bad faith of the Government, which, he said, he could prove had promised one million of francs for the armament of ** the expedition to Greece." The Cabinet called upon him to produce his proofs ; and he replied that he was quite willing to do so, and to enter into the whole matter, but the Chamber should exclude all strangers and hold a secret sitting. Ratazzi would not consent to this, and Crispi refused to go into his revelations in public. Finally Min- ghetti moved a vote of confidence in the Government, which was carried by 189 votes, against 33. This, however, was only the prelude to a far more serious movement than the affair of Sarnico. Mazzini had just declared that, after the arrests in Lombardy, all truce with the House of Savoy was at an end ; and Garibaldi, in letters and speeches, was calling for the resumption of the national war against Austria and the Pope. On the 28th of June, he arrived suddenly at Palermo, ostensibly to wit- ness a rifle match which was to take place in the presence of Prince Humbert_, but really to prepare the way for a new campaign. On the 29th he appeared with Prince Humbert at the inauguration of the Rifle Clubs of Sicily and Palermo. Then, accompanied by Pallavicini, he began the tour of the island. The party of action was nowhere stronger than in Sicily, and everywhere he was greeted by large crowds. In the speeches which he addressed to them, he spoke of the necessity of at once marching upon Rome — Roma Morte — Rome or Death ! he said, should be the watchword of the campaign. He spoke respectfully of Victor Emmanuel, but he bitterly attacked the Emperor Napoleon. For instance, in the speech at Marsala, he ex- claimed : — "Napoleon made the war of 1859 not for us but for himself We gave him our blood in the Crimean War, we paid him sixty millions, we gave him Savoy and Y 2 324 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. Nice; and he wanted more — I know it. He acted for the aggrandizement of his family ; he has a petty prince ready for Rome, a petty lord for Naples — and so on. I know it. He wished us to be his subjects. He is the enemy of Italy ; he has kept up, and keeps up, brigandage for the destruction of the Neapolitan provinces ; he has scandalized all Europe in the vain hope of breaking the sinews of twenty-five millions of Italians. We need not stoop to solicit such a man. The French people are with us. Let Napoleon fall, and Rome is our own ! "^ The French Consul at Palermo protested against the countenance which the Marchese Pallavicini gave by his presence to these demonstrations against the Emperor ; and Ratazzi recalled him, and sent General Cugia to take control of the affairs in Sicily. Pallavicini had no sooner left Palermo, than Garibaldi at length took the decisive step, by which he began his work. He collected a number of volunteers, chiefly young men, and going out with them to Corleone, twenty-two miles to the south of Palermo, seized 200 rifles belonging to the local National Guard, armed his men, and formed a regular camp in the neighbouring woods of Ficuzza. Medici, his old comrade, now commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Palermo, wrote him a letter endeavouring to dissuade him from his undertaking ; but he refused to receive it, and continued to assemble recruits, and organize, drill, and arm them, till his camp at Ficuzza began to assume for- midable proportions. On the 3id of August, King Victor Emmanuel issued a proclamation to the Italian people, in which, without directly mentioning Garibaldi, he warned them not to allow the desire for Rome to lead them into lawless acts, but to be patient, to await the hour when the time would be ripe for the accomplishment of Italian unity. " When that hour comes," he said, ** the voice of your king will be heard amongst you. Every call to arms, which is not his, is a call to revolt and civil war." Next day. General 2 Colonel Chambers' " Garibaldi and Italian Unity,'' p. 205. ASPROMONTE, 325 Pettiti, the Minister of War, took the same ground in a general order to the army. *' They call upon you," he said to the soldiers, " to join them in a mad enterprise ; but in your name I renounce it." On the very day of this proclamation, a small column of Piedmontese troops crossed the Pontifical frontier near Ceprano. They were easily repulsed by a company of the Papal Zouaves. The incident was important, as showing that this time the French army would not tolerate an invasion ; for General de Montebello telegraphed from Rome to the French com- mandant at Velletri, to reinforce theZouaves andassistthem in repelling any Piedmontese attack upon the frontier. It was explained that the column, which had violated it, was in pursuit of brigands ; but it may very well have been that the affair was pre-arranged, to try the temper of the Papal army and the French corps of occupation. After the repulse at Ceprano the frontier was scrupulously re- spected, and the Piedmontese army devoted all its energies to putting down the Garibaldian movement, which was rapidly assuming the form of a rebellion. Sicilian volun- teers crowded to his headquarters ; others came from the mainland, but most of these were, by General Cugia's orders, prevented from disembarking from the steamers. The Royal proclamation of the 3rd was transmitted to Garibaldi, but he took no notice of it. Having organized a strong column of volunteers, he broke up his camp, and, accompanied by the deputies Nicotera and Miceli, and at the head of upwards of four thousand armed men, he set off towards Cefalu, on the north coast between Palermo and Milazzo. The troops nowhere opposed his march. He made a short halt near Cefalu, and then marched to Caltanisetta in the heart of the island. He collected numerous recruits as he went along ; others were got together by his friends in various parts of Sicily. He entered Caltanisetta in a sort of triumph, with his men drawn up in three divisions, their caps covered with crape and in many cases embroidered in front with the motto Roma Morte. The garrison had withdrawn as he ap- proached, in order to avoid a conflict ; and the people 326 THE MAKING OF ITALY. decked their houses with flags, and erected triumphal arches across the streets, to welcome the Garibaldians. At Caltanisetta, Garibaldi formed a column of between two and three thousand picked men, with whom he re- solved to cross over into the old Neapolitan territory and begin his march to Rome. His former experience had shown him that this was the largest number that he could easily take across in a single expedition. He ordered the rest of the volunteers to leave his camp, and endeavour individually to go across to the mainland and be ready to join his standard when he raised it there. They obeyed him, and crowded into Palermo and the other ports, seeking means of transit to Italy ; they were discreetly silent as to their ultimate object, and General Cugia took them for deserters from Garibaldi, and judged by their numbers that the whole enterprise was collapsing. Therefore, instead of keeping them in Sicily, he gladly assisted them in obtaining passages to the mainland ; and he, moreover, wrote to Garibaldi, offering to place a man-of-war at his disposal for his return to Caprera in case he had given up what Cugia now conceived to be a hopeless project. Without making any reply to this letter^ Garibaldi left Caltanisetta, marching towards the east coast, intending to attempt his embarkation either at Messina or Catania. On the 15th of August he passed through Leonforte, marching towards Aderno, from which two good roads run, one south-eastward to Catania, the other north-east- ward to Messina. At Leonforte, he learned that the Royal troops were at length to all appearance acting vigorously against him, for General Mella had marched up with a strong division from Catania, and held the important junction of roads at Aderno ; while General Ricotti with another column was closing in upon his rear, and cutting him off from a retreat to Caltanisetta. He at once changed his plans. He left his son Menotti with a few hundred men, on the Aderno road, ordering him to occupy Mella's attention, and conceal his real force by putting on a bold front, but at the same time to disperse his men in case of a serious attack. Then with the main column he turned ASPROMONTE. 327 back towards Caltanisetta, and leaving the main road, by narrow hill-paths passed unobserved close to General Ricotti's left, and over the mountains to Piazza at the inner end of the plain of Catania. From this point he reached Catania by a forced march in the night of the 19th of August, and was received with illuminations as if he came as a conqueror. It is possible that Mella and Ricotti seriously intended to cut Garibaldi off from the coast and force him to give up his project of crossing into Italy, and in that case his march to Piazza was a brilliant stroke of generalship ; but it is also possible that Mella marched to Aderno in order to leave Catania open to the old guerilla chief, who could, in that case, get into it as easily by an indirect as by a direct way. Until we know much more of the secret history of 1862, it will be im- possible to give a certain explanation either of Garibaldi's movements or of those of the Royal generals in this singular campaign. Mella certainly did not act as if he regarded the Gari- baldians as enemies to be attacked wherever they could be reached. Garibaldi had entered Catania at two in the morning. At seven, there was a report that the Royal troops were about to attack the town. The tocsin was rung, the volunteers stood to their arms, and the streets were barricaded, the National Guard assembling to aid in the defence. About eight, news came that the Royal troops had halted and encamped at Mistubianco, about seven miles from the city, and that Mella, on his march down from Aderno, had picked up some Garibaldian stragglers, and held them as prisoners of war. When Mella marched out of Catania some days before, he had left a company of soldiers in the town. Their captain now asked Garibaldi to allow him to march them out to join the camp at Mistubianco, and he gave the desired permission. Mordini, Nicotera, Miceli, and some other members of the Italian Parliament who were with Gari- baldi, soon after went out to see Mella, in order to know if he meant to attack Catania. They returned in the evening. Mella " had engaged not to attack the town ; he 328 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. declared he was not hostile to Garibaldi, and pretended not even to have known of his arrival at Catania. . . . He at once liberated his prisoners, and he requested Garibaldi to be allowed to get his provisions from Catania, which was at once granted." ^ The camp at Mistubianco was now no cause of alarm, and it soon began to be a source of reinforcement, for deserters began to come into Catania in large numbers to join the volunteers. Garibaldi now seemed confident that the Government was conniving at his expedition, and would not oppose him. He wrote to the king to assure him of his loyal fidelity, and he was continually repeating, " There will be no civil war ! " ^ He was further encouraged by seeing an English frigate steam into the port, and cast anchor between the Royal frigate Duca di Genova and the town. Another frigate, the Maria Adelaide, with Admiral Albini in command, arrived soon after ; but Garibaldi rightly believed he had nothing to fear from these ships. He spent five days in Catania, enrolling and drilling recruits. His son Menotti rejoined him there. By the evening of Saturday, the 23rd, all was ready for an expedition two thousand strong, which was to start the next day for Calabria. Thirteen hundred volunteers were to be left behind at Catania, to follow, it was hoped, in a later expedition. On the morning of the 24th of August, Garibaldi issued a manifesto, containing his plan of action : — '^ My pro- gramme," he wrote, " is always the same, I wish that, as far as depends upon me, the plebiscite of October 21st, i860, may be a reality, that this contract signed between king and people may be fully executed. I bow before the majesty of Victor Emmanuel, king by the will of the nation, but I am hostile to a minister who is Italian only in name, a minister who, yielding to diplomatic pressure, ordered in last May the arrests and the trials of Sarnico, as he to-day provokes civil war in the South of Italy, to win for himself the good graces of the Emperor Napoleon. . . He deceives the king, he compromises him as he has ^ Colonel Chambers' " Garibaldi and Italian Unity,'' pp. 211, 212. 4 ASPROMONTE. 329 already done by the proclamation of the 3rd of August ; by his obstinate narrowness of policy, he is driving the southern provinces into secession, he is betraying the nation. ... To Rome, then, to Rome ! On, brave men of 1848 and 1849; on, fiery young soldiers of 1859 and '60 ! Rush to the holy crusade ! We shall conquer, for on our side is reason, international law, and the feehng of the world. ... I am certain that the Italian people will not fail in this its duty. Would to God that from this day the brave national army would act with us. Italians, if it is true that I have done anything for the country, believe my words. I am resolved either to enter Rome victorious or to fall before its walls. But in the latter event, I have confidence that you will worthily avenge my death, and that you will accomplish my work.^' Having issued this proclamation. Garibaldi at five o'clock the same evening assembled 2000 armed volunteers on the quays of Catania, seized two merchant steamers, and embarked his men. Crowds looked on ; the volunteers, as they went on board, cried " Viva I'ltalia ! " and fired their rifles in the air. Close outside the port lay the two frigates com- manded by Admiral Albini, whose mission it was to prevent Garibaldi from putting to sea. The noise of the embarkation miust have warned him of what was in pro- gress ; nevertheless he made no attempt to stop the two steamers when they came out of the harbour. Albini was afterwards formally censured for his inaction on this occasion. But perhaps he knew how Persano had acted contrary to his formal instructions, when Cavour tele- graphed, " The council have decided Cagliari," ' and how Persano was honoured and rewarded. How was Albini to know that the ministers were now in earnest, and under French pressure were determined that Garibaldi should be stopped } Steering towards Cape Spartivento, Garibaldi's two transports were off Melito in Calabria early in the morn- ing of the 25th. He had landed there to begin his march See p. 122. 330 THE MAKING OF ITALY. upon Naples in i860; and he landed there now, appa- rently wishing to tread in his old footsteps, and hoping to repeat his unopposed progress of that year. The 2000 were hardly on shore when they encountered a company of regular troops. Garibaldi hoped that they would join him, but they fired upon his column and withdrew. He forbade his volunteers to return the fire, and struck off into the great mass of wooded mountains which forms the extremity of Calabria, and takes its name from the highest summit — Aspromonte. Generals La Marmora and Cialdini were at Naples when the telegraph brought them news of Garibaldi's disembarkation in Calabria. Unlike Mella and Ricotti, they acted in earnest. They at once determined to keep Garibaldi where he was, in the very extremity of Italy, and send a column of troops in search of him. That Garibaldi expected no resistance is clear from the very fact of his landing at Melito. Had he in front of him, as in i860, an army with whose chiefs he was in collusion, it would have been a good place ; but acting against real opponents he should have landed much farther to the northward, near Cotrone, whence he could easily have gained the Apennines ; while if he began his march at Melito, he would have to cross the isthmus of Tiriolo between the gulfs of Squillace and St. Eufemia, where the mountains sink in a plain — the same plain in which the expeditions of Murat and of the Bandieras were hunted down and captured. This spot was at once occupied by a strong force, to prevent all possibility of Garibaldi march- ing to the northward. Cialdini then went on by steamer to Reggio, where he arrived on the 27th. He found Colonel Pallavicini in charge of the town with a column of bersaglieri. The colonel was anxious to go in search of Garibaldi, who was moving about in the forests of Aspro- monte, apparently expecting to see the troops at Reggio ready to declare for him, as the Neapolitan garrison had done in i860. A force of six or seven battalions was rapidly assembled, and placed under Pallavicini's orders, Cialdini directing him " to make every effort to come up ASPROMONTE. 331 with Garibaldi, who was said to be encamped on the plateau of Aspromonte, and to pursue him constantly without giving him a moment's repose ; to attack him if he sought to escape^ and destroy him if he accepted battle'' These orders are taken from Cialdini's official report, *' Foreseeing also," he says, " the possibility of a complete victory, I ordered him (Colonel Pallavicini) not to treat with Garibaldi, and to accept only a surrender at dis- cretion. There was no reason," he adds, " to believe that this column alone would be able to obtain the results which it actually accomplished. It was requisite, there- fore, to close against Garibaldi every road by which he could penetrate into the interior of Calabria, Ulteriore, or Citeriore ; it was requisite to form and put in motion other columns, which should act within a limited range, because thereby they would have the greater chance of meeting with and destroying him.'' There is a certain fierceness in the tone of General Cialdini's report, which was quite in keeping with his well-known character, and which makes one feel that he had not forgotten his quarrel with Garibaldi in the pre- ceding year, and was not sorry to have the chance of hunting him down. On the 29th of August Colonel Pallavicini's troops encountered the Garibaldians on the heights of Aspro- monte. Between the contradictory accounts of both parties, it is hard to discover the truth. Both allege that they were not the first to fire. This much is certain, that the accounts of a serious engagement and a victory by the Royal troops, which the Government at Turin circulated as soon as they received the news of Aspromonte, had very little foundation in fact. The truth about the affair, on comparison of Garibaldian accounts and those of the Italian officers, seems to be : — Garibaldi had halted his column in a very strong position on high ground, and on the edge of a pine wood, when he saw Pallavicini's troops, divided into two columns,* coming up the mountain side in order of battle, and ready to attack. It was at first asserted that Garibaldi was regularly summoned to sur- 332 THE MAKING OF ITALY. render, and refused ; but it appears to me certain that no such summons was ever sent. The official narrative, drawn up by the Garibaldian staff, denies it ; Colonel Pallavicini may have intended to send such a summons, but it never reached Garibaldi. The Piedmontese colonel directed one of his columns to ascend a steep slope, in order to be ready to outflank the Garibaldian position. Garibaldi, knowing very well that a conflict was imminent with the Royal troops whom he had hoped to see frater- nize with him, had given strict orders that not a shot should be fired ; but some of the younger of the volunteers, when they saw the bersaglieri climbing the rocks to out- flank them, could not hold their hands, and fired ; and immediately the Royal troops returned the fire, and the fusillade became general on both sides. The Garibaldian officers exerted themselves to stop the firing, and the bugles sounded the order all along the line. While Gari- baldi himself was calling out, " Do not fire ! " two balls struck him ; one bruised his left leg, the other buried itself in his right foot. He remained standing, although severely wounded, and still exerted himself to stop the fight. Sud- denly an Italian staff-officer came running in through the smoke, and approached Garibaldi. He said he was come to parley ; probably he was the officer who was to have summoned the Garibaldians to surrender, when the firing precipitated the attack. While he was talking to this officer, the pain of his wound made him unable to stand, and his friends laid him on the ground under a tree. Soon after Menotti was laid beside him, wounded also by a ball in the leg. The Garibaldian fire had ceased ; the bersaglieri perceived this, and stopped firing too, but continued running up the slope, and then in a moment the two lines of soldiers and redshirts mingled together. The volunteers were rapidly disarmed ; and Colonel Pallavicini came up to Garibaldi, and spoke with him as he lay under the tree. The general asked if he might be taken on board some English ship. Pallavicini replied that he himself saw no objection, but that he should await instruc- tions from Turin. The irregular skirmish had lasted just ASPROMONTE. 333 a quarter of an hour. According to the official account there were five killed and twenty-four wounded on the side of the troops, and seven killed and twenty wounded upon that of the Garibaldians. By the capture of Garibaldi's column the Government was relieved from a serious peril. Had he succeeded in getting into the Neapolitan provinces where the Pied- montese generals were just barely able to hold their own against the so-called brigands, the Government in the south must have collapsed, the movement would then have spread far and wide, and a conflict with the French would have been inevitable. But in escaping from one danger the Government had rushed into another. The troops had fired upon and wounded Garibaldi, the idol of the Italian isshjti, and the whole party of action was now bitterly hostile to Ratazzi, and regarded him as a traitor to the cause. Garibaldi was conveyed by sea to Varignano near Spezzia, and as the wounded prisoner was landed in the dockyard he received a popular ovation. To his friends he wrote fiercely against the Government ; they had, he said, desired blood, and they had got it. Without being a sympathizer with Garibaldi, one can say that the Turin Government in 1862 acted towards him most basely and treacherously, and by its double-faced policy really lured him on to the fate he met at Aspromonte, Mazzini gave, as it were, the keynote of the clamour which burst forth against the Government, in the procla- mation, in which he called upon the party of action to break with the Moderates. " The Royal bullet," he said, " that entered Garibaldi has torn the last line of the contract made by us Republicans with the Monarchy. Freeing myself in May from every obligation towards the government in all that related to action in favour of Rome and Venice, I said, ' It is not now a question of Republic or Monarchy, it is a question of action or inertia — of unity or dismemberment — of having the foreigner in Italy or expelling him.' In my own name, and in the name of my friends, I cancel to-day those lines — the last warning given to the Government — and I declare that for us every 334 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. attempt at concord is exhausted ; dead is every hope of concession or of true Italian work from an institu- tion which, impotent to guide, is only able to repress brutally and tyrannically the holiest and most legiti- mate aspirations of a people which demands its own monarchy." This outburst of Mazzini's was everywhere echoed by the party of action. Everywhere all who^ beyond official circles, had been active in the cause of the Revolution, were incensed by the double-faced policy of the Cabinet, by the affair of Aspromonte, and by the reports from Varignano of the harsh treatment to which the wounded general was said to have been subjected by his gaolers. It was clear to Rattazzi that, though he had saved Italy from a war with France, he had at Aspromonte not only broken up the Garibaldian army, but gone far towards breaking up his own Cabinet. He made an effort to do something to counteract the prevalent unpopularity which his policy had caused. On the loth of September, by his direction. General Durando, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed a circular to all the diplomatic agents of Italy, in which, after narrating Garibaldi's attempted campaign against Rome, and the capture of his column at Aspromonte, he went on to say that the European Cabinets should not mistake the significance of these events, that the mo^ (Tordre of the Garibaldian volunteers really expressed the will of the Italian people, and that the nation had refrained from following Garibaldi only because of its confidence that the king's government would in due time fulfil its mission and make Rome the capital of Italy ; the European Powers, he said, would understand that in treating as an enemy the man who had rendered her the most brilliant serv^ices, Italy had made a supreme and final effort,- that her cause was that of European order, that she hoped the Powers would aid her in removing the obstacles to the peaceful fulfilment of her desires, and that the Catholic nations, and France espe- cially, ought to understand the danger that resulted from a prolongation of the struggle between the Papacy and ASPROMONTE. 335 the Italian kingdom. The state of things, said Durando, was one that was not tenable, and in the end might have most serious consequences for the king^s Government. The diplomatic agents of Italy were, finally, requested to communicate the despatch to the courts to which they were accredited. As a further attempt at conciliation Ratazzi, on October 7th, amnestied Garibaldi and his followers, with the exception of some of the deserters from the army ; but the amnesty, which every one knew was the result of the weakness of the Government, and which had been granted in opposition to the advice of many of its supporters, was very coldly received. On the 8th Durando sent another despatch to the Tuileries, in which, pointing out that Italy had been strong enough to repress the Garibaldian movement against Rome, he suggested that the time had come when the French occupation might be terminated, and added that the Italian government was ready to enter into negotiations, with a view to seeing what guarantee on its part, for the independence of the Holy See, would be acceptable in case of this evacuation being accomplished. Rattazzi waited anxiously for a reply to Durando's note. On October 15th he learned, to his dismay, that the French Foreign Minister, De Thouve- nel (on whose good feeling towards United Italy he had counted for a not wholly unfavourable reply), had been replaced by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, a minister much less favourably inclined towards the Italian cause. On the 26th M. Drouyn de Lhuys sent to Turin a very clear despatch, in which he answered at once the circular of September loth, and the proposal for a withdrawal of the French garrison. He simply refused to entertain the proposal for a moment, on the ground that the Cabinet of Turin had solemnly asserted before all Europe its claim to Rome, and its desire to dispossess the Pope. This was the final blow at Rattazzi's Cabinet- He tried to induce the king to dissolve parliament, but Victor Emmanuel saw clearly enough that the only possible result of holding the elections in the existing state of public feeling would be to 336 THE MAKING OF ITALY, bring in a majority of the Left. Rattazzi had therefore no resource remaining but to resign at once, or attempt a final struggle in parliament. He chose the latter alterna- tive. Parliament assembled on the i8th of November. On the 19th the opposition, led by Buoncompagni and Mordini, began its attack, the burden of the speeches being that the Government policy had resulted only in civil strife at home and humiliation abroad. The attack went on from day to day. Durando and Rattazzi at- tempted a defence ; but, seeing that defeat was inevitable, the ministry resigned on the 30th of November, without waiting for the conclusion of the debate. On the 7th of December a new Cabinet was formed by Farini, who, although he was suffering from an illness from which he was never to recover, accepted the premiership, Minghetti taking the portfolio of finance, and Peruzzi that of the interior. Farini declared that his policy would be to preserve the alliances of Italy, without sacrificing her independence, to observe the constitution, and to devote himself to the cause of the national unity, but without making promises that could not be realized. His ministry was, in fact, a period of repose. He worked hard at internal organization, in the midst of the difficulties caused on the one hand by the ever-increasing financial burdens of the new kingdom, and on the other by the prolongation of the Civil War in the south, known as the " Brigandage." At the same time the Government had to be continually on the alert even in the north, for Mazzini had not been idle since his declaration that all truce with the king-led revolution was at an end. It was said that he had formed depots of arms on the Swiss frontier, and he paid suspicious visits to Lugano, so that, though no Republican raid or revolt took place, the Government was forced to watch the frontier with troops. On the 24th of March, ill-health forced Farini to resign, and Minghetti took his place and continued his policy. Thus, after the outburst of Garibaldian enthusiasm which ended at Aspromonte, the politics of United Italy passed through a period of something like calm, though the ASPROMONTE. 337 expression can only be used in a relative sense, for strife and bloodshed still went on among the hills of the south, though even there the scene of conflict daily narrowed more and more, as band after band of insurgents here, of brigands there, was destroyed. At Caprera, Garibaldi was slowly recovering health and strength. Throughout his illness he had been cheered by hundreds of letters of sym- pathy, and convoy after convoy of substantial gifts from admirers in England. What more natural than that he should go to England as soon as he recovered, to thank them in person, and to see old adherents and supporters in London t Accordingly all was arranged for a visit to England in the spring of 1864. Just before Garibaldi's arrival an incident occurred which drew the attention of the English public to the conduct of Mazzini and the Italian exiles in London. In the course of, the trial of Greco for conspiracy against the Emperor's life it appears that he was to write for money, if he required it, to a certain Mr. Flower, at 25, Thurloe Square, Brompton ; and a reference to the London Directory showed that this was the residence of Mr. Stansfeld, M.P. for Halifax, who was then actually holding office in the Palmer- ston administration. The matter was taken up by the House of Commons, and Mr. Stansfeld having had his attention called to the passage which related to him in the speech of the French Procureur-General, indignantly denied all connection with the Greco conspiracy, of which no one in England accused him, and eulogized Mazzini, saying that he knew him well, having been eighteen years his friend, and declared him incapable of conspiring with assassins. On this point, however, he was met a few nights after by Mr. Pope Hennessy reading Mazzini's letters " On the Theory of the Dagger," his praise of the murderers of Marinovich at Venice and Rossi at Rome, and his own narrative of how he gave Gallenga the dagger for an attempt on the life of Charles Albert. It further transpired, that though Mr. Stansfeld denied that any letters had ever been addressed to Mr. Flower at his house, letters had been addressed there, to Mr. Fiore, the Italian z 338 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. version of the same name, and that this Mr. Fiore was no other than Mazzini. On the 17th of March, Sir Henry Stracy moved a resolution, which was a virtual censure of Mr. Stansfeld's conduct. In the debate which followed Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bright, at- tempted a defence of Mr. Stansfeld's action ; but even they admitted that he had been guilty of an indiscretion in allowing his house to be used as Mazzini's address, while he himself was a member of the Government, and Mazzini was generally believed to be engaged in a series of plots against the life of a friendly sovereign. On a division, the resolution that Mr. Stansfeld's conduct deserved the serious consideration of the House, was rejected by 171 votes to 161, a majority often, in which Mr. Stansfeld himself voted. He had before tendered his resignation, but Lord Palmerston had refused it ; but as it was openly asserted in the House of Commons that Mr. Stansfeld had been saved from censure only by a party division,, he again offered his resignation, and this time it was accepted. It was while the storm raised by the Greco revelations was subsiding, that Garibaldi visited England. He arrived at Southampton, where he was received by the Corporation with the Mayor at their head, hailing him as " an un- crowned king of men." In London at his public recep- tion the streets were lined with such multitudes as had never assembled to greet either foreign sovereigns or English princes. He was presented with the freedom of the city. Peers and peeresses, Protestant bishops, members of Parliament, vied with one another in paying court to the " Liberator of Italy." Lord Palmerston the Premier, Earl Russell the Foreign Secretary, and the Duke of Sutherland, threw open their houses to him. On the 17th of April he addressed a vast crowd at the Crystal Palace, and declared that Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell and "Lord" Gladstone, had done a wonderful deal for Italy. " If it had not been for this country," he said, " we should still be under the yoke of the Bourbons at Naples. If it had not been for Admiral Mundy, I should never have been permitted to pass the Straits of ASPROMONTE. 339 Messina." ^ Two days after he accomplished what was doubtless the main object of his visit — the sealing of an alliance with Mazzini. From 1859, when Garibaldi began to act with the Piedmontese Government to which Mazzini was bitterly hostile, there had been more or less of a breach between the two revolutionary leaders ; but when Aspromonte placed Garibaldi and the Government of King Victor Emmanuel in open and violent opposition, it drew Mazzini and Garibaldi together again. On the 19th of April, Garibaldi went down to the house of a Mr. Herzen at Teddington. There he met Mazzini and a number of the other exiles, and in their presence he said : *^ I am about to make a declaration which I ought to have made long ago. There is a man amongst us here, who has rendered the greatest services to our country and to the cause of liberty. When I was a young man having nought but aspirations towards the good, I sought for one able to act as the guide and counsellor of my young years. I sought such a man, even as he who is athirst seeketh the spring. I found this man. He alone watched, when all around him slept. He alone fed the sacred flame. He has ever remained my friend — ever as full of love for his country, and of devotion to the cause of liberty. This man is Joseph Mazzini.^' This speech of Garibaldi's was pronounced in the presence of reporters, and appeared next morning in the newspapers, so that it was of the character of a public manifesto. It was the most significant incident of his visit, none the less significant because at the same moment the Turin Government was seizing depots of arms in Italy. Undoubtedly Garibaldi's visit to England was not all a mere/i X XUTi? DIV 'bcWlTA "^^f^ • °^ Lfl ROCHE y CASTELLANA---. '/ ^\ •'Kill'™ D(V CEN.FERRERO Ay \', ^\ !)^C ^v A R C A ^V ROME \ 4-f_»< CORPS D'ARMg'EGEN CAOORNA FROSINONE SKETCH MAP OF THE ROMM PROVINCES TO ILLUSTRATE THE INVASrON Rome through the provinces of Velletri and Frosinone. These two divisions were linked together by the fourth corps, which was cantoned along the frontiers of Umbria. It was under the immediate personal command of Cadorna, and was composed of the nth division (Cosenz)^ the 12th (Mazd de la Roche), and the 13th (Ferrero). To resist this army of more than 60,000 General Kanzler had at his disposal an army of the effective strength of about 12,000. The nominal strength was 13,624. It may be well to give here the numbers of the THE INVASION OF ROME. 491 various corps, distinguishing those which were formed of native and of foreign troops. Gendarmerie, Col. Evangelisti Artillery, Col. Caimi Engineers, Lt.-Col. Lana ... Chasseurs, Lt.-Col. Sparagna ist Regiment of Infantry, Col. Azzanesi (2 battalions) ... Pontifical Zouaves, Col. Allet (4 battalions) Legion d'Antibes, Col. Per- rault ... Chasseurs Etrangers, Col. Jeanneret Dragoons, Col. Lepri Garrison troops, Major Ge- mini... Train and Hospital Corps ... Squadriglieri (placed under orders of Col. Evangelisti) r 8300 Roman troops ^ Of whom K 5324 Foreign vo- ^ 13,624 (. lunteers ) Men. Guns. 1863 . .. . Romans 996 . .. 40 .. )» 157 . .. >j 1174 . .. " 1691 . )> 3040 ... .. Foreigners 1089 ... ,, (French) 1 195 „ (Swiss) 567 . . Romans 544 • .. '> 285 . . 1023 ,.. 40 >» 13..624 . A glance at this, the last muster-roll of the Pontifical army, will show the absurdity of the cant-phrase of the English press — that Pius IX. relied on foreign bayonets for his defence. The foreign volunteers numbered little more than one-third of the whole force. It must be added that there was no conscription in the Papal States, and that every native soldier in the ranks was a voluntary recruit. Therefore, the number of recruits obtained from the small population of the Roman States is a testimony to the loyalty of the people to the Papal Government. If England could get as many recruits from her population, her 38,000,000 of people would keep up an army of 456,000 men. In the first week of September General Kanzler had about 2000 men in the provinces of Velletri and Frosinone, 1000 in that of Viterbo, 1000 at Civita Vecchia, about 300 in various small posts in the Comarca, and the rest of the 492 THE MAKING OF ITALY. army at Rome. The orders given to the troops were that, in the event of a Garibaldian invasion, they were to hold their ground and drive back the red-shirts ; but, if the Royal army crossed the frontier, they were to fall back slowly upon Rome, making some resistance if an oppor- tunity should occur. The various detachments were to concentrate upon Rome. The commandant of Civiti Vecchia alone had orders to attempt a prolonged resist- ance. On the evening of the loth Cadorna received orders to cross the Pontifical frontier between five p.m. on the nth and five a.m. on the 12th of September. Accordingly, at five o'clock on the evening of the nth, Bixio, with the second division, advanced upon Bagnorea. In the night, Ferrero, with the vanguard of the 4th corps darmee^ seized the bridge of Orte, and at half-past four in the morning Angioletti marched upon Ceprano in the province of Frosi- none, the scene of the Italian repulse of 1862. I shall follow in turn the operations of each column until they all united under the walls of Rome. Bixio's column crossed the frontier by the road which runs to the east of the Lago di Bolsena, from Orvieto by Montefiascone to Viterbo. The small detachments of Zouaves and gendarmes near the lake at Acquapendente, San Lorenzo and La Capraccia, withdrew according to their orders; but that at Bagnorea, composed of twenty Zouaves, was unfortunately misinformed as to the move- ments of the Italians, and was surrounded, and fell into Bixio's hands. He continued his march as far as Monte- fiascone, which was evacuated by its Zouave garrison (two companies commanded by Commandant de Saisy), as he approached.^ The Zouaves retired to Viterbo, where they joined Charette's column. Bixio spent the night at Montefiascone, his column menacing Viterbo, which was 1 A Zouave officer, who was the last to leave Montefiascone, and who traversed the streets alone, asserts that the people were only depressed and alarmed by the approach of the " liberators." Only ten or twelve Liberals were waiting in groups in the market-place to welcome the Italians. THE INVASION OF ROME. 493 also threatened from another point by Ferrero's advance from Orte. Next morning-, instead of moving upon Viterbo, he turned sharply to the right to Marta on the southern shore of the lake of Bolsena, and began to march rapidly byToscanella and Monte Romano, where he found himself upon the road between Viterbo and Civita Vecchia. By holding this road he hoped to cut off and capture Charette's seven companies of Zouaves, for the advance of Cadorna's corps directly upon Rome would make a retreat from Viterbo impossible except by Civita Vecchia. But Charette was not to be entrapped so easily. He held his ground at Viterbo till the afternoon of the 12th, and only when Ferrero's advance rendered an attack in over- whelming numbers inevitable, he retired to Vetralla. On the 13th he continued his retreat towards Civita Vecchia ; but, as he approached Corneto, his scouts reported that Bixio's division held all the available roads. A leader of less enterprise and resource would certainly have been unable to extricate himself from this position ; but the leader of the Zouaves was determined at any cost not to fall into the hands of the enemy. He gave his men a few hours' rest, and in the evening resumed his march, aban- doning the high road and striking off to the left by narrow and rugged hill-paths, where his two guns and his mitrailleuse had more than once to be dragged by main strength of arm up and down the steep sides of ravines, and where in the darkness the men with difficulty picked their way over the broken ground. Once they saw the watchfires of the Italians close to them, and actually pre- pared to receive an attack, but they were unperceived and no attack came ; and at two a.m. on the morning of the 14th they heard the welcome murmur of the sea in the distance. They were approaching Civita Vecchia ; at 3.30 they were safe within its walls. Throughout the whole retreat Charette was readily assisted everywhere by the peasants, who brought water to the men, and freely furnished carts to carry their knapsacks, and guides to conduct them in safety past the Piedmontese outposts. Evidently the feeling of the people was upon the side, not of the 494 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. " liberators," but of the " foreign mercenaries.-" Bixio re- mained at Corneto till the evening of the 14th, when he learned that Charette had escaped him. Till then, every hour he had expected to see the little Zouave column ap- pear and make a desperate attempt to fight its way to Civita Vecchia, an attempt which could only end in its destruction or capture." Finding that this part of his plan had failed, he went to Porto Clementino on the coast near Corneto, where the fleet was lying, and had an inter- view with Admiral del Carretto on board his flagship the Roma, for the purpose of arranging with him the opera- tions for the siege of Civita Vecchia. Next day_, the 15th, he moved up his headquarters to Torre Orlando, in front of the place. The garrison of Civita Vecchia consisted of between eight and nine hundred men — Zouaves and Roman chasseurs — four sections of artillery and a troop of cavalry. These troops were commanded by Colonel Serra, a Spanish officer. On the land-side the fortifications were strong enough to stand a long siege, but the seaward batteries were not armed with the heavy guns necessary for a conflict with an ironclad fleet ; nevertheless they were quite capable of such a resistance as the batteries of Ancona had made against Persano in i860. On the 12th Colonel Serra declared the place in a state of siege. On the 13th he informed the foreign consuls that he had orders to make a prolonged resistance. Next day the Italian iron- clad fleet appeared in sight of the port. In the evening it steamed away again. It had gone to Porto Clementino, where, as we have seen, the admiral concerted his plans with Bixio. The same evening Charette's column pro- ceeded to Rome by train. Numa d'Albiousse, who com- manded the Zouaves of the garrison of Civita Vecchia, had hoped that his colonel and the Zouaves of Viterbo ^ The Italian officers could hardly believe, even after the event, that Charette had retreated with his guns and baggage by those narrow hill-paths, and when they were prisoners at Civita Vecchia, after the capitulation of Rome, the Zouave officers were asked by officers of Bixio's staff to show them on the maps the roads by which they had marched in their memorable retreat from Viterbo. THE INVASION OF ROME. 495 would remain with him to help in the anticipated struggle with Bixio ; but General Kanzler sent imperative orders that Charette was to come on to Rome with his troops, as every available man would be needed for the defence of the capital. At nine on the morning of the 15th the Piedmontese dragoons were in sight of Civita and skirmishing with the cavalry scouts sent out by Serra to reconnoitre. The garrison was under arms. Half an hour later the fleet reappeared, steering for the entrance of the harbour. Unfortunately Colonel Serra now began to act with most lamentable weakness. Like most seaports, Civita Vecchia contained a mixed population, and in it were to be found more sympathizers with Italianism than anywhere else in the Papal territory. The municipality were Liberal in their sentiments, and were therefore doubly anxious for a pacific surrender, in order that the town might be placed in Bixio's hands without having to endure a preliminary bombardment. A deputation of the municipality waited upon Serra, and expostulated with him on the dangers to which a resistance would expose the citizens. The com- mandant replied that they need not be anxious, for his resistance would not go beyond an armed demonstration. Nevertheless the preparations for the defence continued. At eleven the fleet was in line off the harbour mouth with its broadsides pointed at the batteries. At twelve an Italian officer with a flag of truce appeared before the Porta Campanella. His eyes were blindfolded, and he was brought into the town in the usual way. He was the bearer of a letter from Bixio to Serra, summoning him to surrender the place within twelve hours. The terms he offered were that the native troops were to be given a place in the Royal army, retaining their rank, seniority and other privileges, while the foreign volunteers were to be safely restored to their homes. If these terms were refused, he would bombard the town. A council of war was assembled. Unfortunately Serra's indecision seemed to have affected some of the other officers, for the council asked for four days to consider the terms 496 THE MAKING OF ITALY. offered. The parlementaire replied that he knew no such delay could be granted. The council then asked that the time for deliberation should be twenty-four hours instead of twelve. T\i^ parlementaire returned to Bixio's headquarters with this request. At half-past three he reappeared at the Porta Campanella, and Captain Saballs of the chasseurs led him into the town. Bixio, he said, had refused all delay, and would open fire at three a.m. if the place did not capitulate before that hour. While he had been away a deputation from the municipality had actually been allowed to go out to Bixio's camp. He refused to receive them, but one of his staff listened to their declarations of the " patriotic sentiments of Civita Vecchia," agreed with them that it would be very lamentable if the town had to be bombarded, and informed them that they could prevent that calamity by pressing Serra to surrender. When they returned to the town a crowd, instigated by them, sur- rounded the colonel, and begged him to surrender and not to have their houses burned down by Bixio^s shells. Instead of dispersing them and arresting the ring-leaders, Serra entered into explanations, and said that the question of surrender was in the hands of the council of war, to which he then went. At the council he declared that the best course was to surrender. Major Numa d'Albiousse of the Zouaves indignantly replied that their honour and their orders from Kanzler required a resistance, at least such a resistance as would constitute an armed protest, instead of a shameful surrender without firing a shot, Serra, disregarding Kanzler's orders, insisted that as sur- render must come sooner or later it would be best to accept the terms then offered ; they would, he said, get worse terms if they fought. This was very unlikely, as the terms offered were precisely those granted to the garrisons of Spoleto, Perugia, and Ancona in i860, after a more or less prolonged siege. Several of the officers agreed with him, and the council decided to accept Bixio's terms. Numa d'Albiousse refused to sign the resolution. At half-past nine in the evening an officer came out from the council and announced to the crowd outside that THE INVASION OF ROME. 497 the determination was that there should be no resistance. D'Albiousse came out immediately after and passed through the crowd, his face dark with anger and honest indigna- tion. As soon as Captain Saballs heard of what had happened, he went to Serra, broke his sword before him, and declared that he at least would not be taken prisoner. He went on board one of the foreign steamers in the harbour. When next he was heard of it was as the daring and brilliant leader of a Carlist army in his native Catalonia. At ten two officers went out to Bixio's headquarters to arrange the details of the surrender. On the following morning, Friday, Sept. i6th, the Italian ironclad Terribile steamed into the port, and the Piedmontese troops marched into the town. The 300 prisoners of the garrison were taken by sea to the fortress of Orbitello. The Liberal portion of the populace illuminated their houses in the evening, and Serra received an ovation from them — the greatest dishonour to which a soldier could be subjected. Whether his surrender of Civita Vecchia was the result of weakness or treachery, I have no means of saying. All I know is that he proved himself utterly unworthy of his post, and that he was the one officer of rank in the Papal army who disgraced himself by such misconduct during the ten years of its existence. While Bixio's division was thus overrunning the north, Angioletti with the 9th division, 10,000 strong, was taking possession of the southern provinces of Frosi- none and Velletri. These provinces were garrisoned by about 1700 men, under the command of Colonel Azzanesi, a brave soldier who had distinguished him- self at Castelfidardo in i860 and at Viterbo in 1867. He had his headquarters at Velletri ; but the greater part of his troops, to the number of iioo, were about Frosinone, under the command of Major Lauri, a man who knew the country well and had made himself a reputation in it by his able repression of brigandage in 1866. It was he who had organized the squadriglieri^ companies of peasants wearing their national costume but regularly drilled, armed, and officered, who had been of K k 498 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the greatest value to the regular troops, both Papal and Italian,^ in hunting down the brigands. Knowing every mountain-pass and hill-path in the two rugged provinces which had been the scene of his exploits against the brigands, and being able to depend implicitly on his men (everyone of whom was an Italian, but none the less loyal to the Pope-King), Lauri was anxious to use guerilla warfare to retard Angioletti's advance. This would* have been good policy, had the Pontifical troops no other than this one division to deal with ; but with Cadorna's army advancing from Orte and Narni, and Bixio in the province of Viterbo, the only result of a prolonged resistance in the south would have been the cutting off of nearly 2000 good soldiers from Rome, where every man was needed. Kanzler therefore ordered Azzanesi and Lauri to retire as the Piedmontese advanced. Those orders were executed. Everywhere the retreating Pontifical troops received from the people unnumbered acts of kindness and proofs of sympathy. They were, I have said, every one Italians, many were natives of the district, it was a rugged country, and some of the marches were made by night ; yet not one man deserted — another proof of the fidelity of the native troops. Having entered the Papal territory on the 1 2th (one of the brigades crossing the Garigliano by anew stone bridge, constructed by order of Pius IX., and opened just eight days before) Angioletti occupied the city of Frosinone at midday on the 13th. He was at Anagni on the 14th, at Valmontone on the 15th, and on the i6th he entered Velletri. Next day his vanguard had its first sight of Rome from the Alban Hills, and he was able to communicate directly with the main army under Cadorna. Angioletti had everywhere been coldly received. At Frosinone hardly twelve " patriots " could be found to 3 As the suppression of brigandage was an affair not of politics but of necessity the Pope, in the interest of humanity, ordered Lauri to co-operate with and accept the co-operation of the Italian troops on the frontier in 1866. Thus the squadrigUeri often acted with the Royal troops. The suppression of brigandage was effected by Lauri in seven months. THE INVASION OF ROME. 499 meet him at the gate. But when he had occupied the province fresh battalions were poured in after him to garrison every important place. These were accompanied by active political agents, who picked out and gathered together the few Liberals to be found in the towns, and formed them into provisional committees of government (giunte)y which voted "loyal addresses" to King Victor Emmanuel. While these operations were in progress, the main army of invasion, consisting of the 4th corps d'armee 40,000 strong, under the immediate command of Cadorna, had crossed the Umbrian frontier and advanced up to the walls of Rome. At the end of August the three divisions com- posing this army were echelonned along the frontier, link- ing Bixio's left with Angioletti's right. Cadorna's original plan was to enter the Papal territory near the confluence of the Corese and the Tiber, which is the point on the frontier nearest to Rome. From this point the road, which follows the course of the old Via Salara along the left bank of the Tiber, with its branch road along the Via Nomentana by Monte Rotondo and Mentana, would give him a good double line of operations against Rome, the same selected by Garibaldi in 1867. But while he was preparing to advance in this direction, he received instruc- tions from Florence to the effect that he was to advance by a much longer line of operations, namely the road which runs from Narni to Civita Castellana in the pro- vince of Viterbo, and there branches, one branch ruhning on to Rome by Rignano, the other striking into the high- way from Viterbo to Rome, at Monterosi. According to Cadorna's report, " Political motives," which he does not further particularize, were assigned for choosing this long line for his advance. The Count de Beauffort, in his history of the invasion, is probably right in suggesting that the motive was to prolong the occupation of the Papal territory by Cadorna's army before the actual attack on Rome, in order to allow time for organizing demonstrations in favour of Italian Unity. Cadorna at once changed all his arrangements, concentrating his army to the right upon K k 2 50O THE MAKING OF ITALY. the frontiers of Viterbo. The 13th division (Ferrero) was assembled about Narni, with an advanced guard near the bridge of Orte, by which it was to cross the Tiber, which here formed the frontier, and march upon Viterbo. The 1 2th division (Maz6 de la Roche) was concentrated at Magliano, with its advanced guard watching the Ponte Felice, by which, when the time came, it was to cross the river and march upon Civita Castellana. In order to con- ceal his plans, the nth division (Cosenz) was to remain upon the banks of the Corese till the last moment, and then make a forced march up the Tiber to Magliano, and follow the division of Maze de la Roche across the Ponte Felice. In the country which he was to traverse Cadorna could not expect any serious resistance. There was only a small garrison without artillery at Civita Castellana. We have seen that he received orders on September loth to begin his advance between five p.m. on the nth and five a.m. on the 12th. From his headquarters at Terni, on the morning of the nth, he addressed a proclamation "To the Italians of the Roman Provinces," which in the studied moderation of its language contrasted favourably with the proclamations by which Fanti and Cialdini had heralded the invasion of 1S60. In the night between the nth and 12th Ferrero's van- guard seized the bridge of Orte, a handful of Roman gendarmes retiring before them after exchanging a few shots with the invaders. Early in the morning of the 12th the 13th division had crossed the bridge. We have seen already how it advanced on Viterbo, and how Charette evacuated the place at the last moment. Instead of pur- suing Charette, Ferrero, confident that Bixio would cut off the Papal column, remained in Viterbo organizing the Italianist Giunta^ which soon adorned the streets with the Italian flag and pasteboard "shields of Savoy," most of which had come in Ferrero's baggage- waggons. About the same time that Ferrero seized the bridge of Orte, Maze de la Roche sent a column of lancers and bersaglieri to take possession of the Ponte Felice, and at a quarter to five on the morning of the 12th the rest of his division followed THE INVASION OF ROME. 501 them into Papal territory, and advanced to attack Civita Castellana. Built upon a high rock near the ruins of the ancient city of Falisci, Civita Castellana is defended by an old fortress of the 15th century. On three sides the castle is surrounded by ravines and precipices ; on the fourth, a narrow piece of ground gives access to it from the town. A beautiful viaduct, the Ponte Clementino, thrown across a ravine, connects the town with the high-road to Borghetto and the Ponte Felice. Impregnable in the days when it was built, the castle was untenable if attacked with the powerful artillery of modern times. There were no guns upon its walls, and it had long been used as a convict prison. In September, 1870, there were 180 convicts within its walls, amongst whom were the famous brigand Gasparone, and some ex-members of his band. There, too, was the compagnie de discipline of the Roman army, seventy strong, under the charge of Captain Ruffini. These soldiers were not armed, and when the place was attacked, only a few of them were entrusted with rifles. The garrison placed there to maintain order and guard the convicts consisted of twenty-five gendarmes and squad- riglieri, and a company of Zouaves (the 5th of the IVth battalion) no strong, commanded by Captain de Resi- mont.'* At eleven o'clock on the previous night De Resimont had been informed that the invasion was immi- ment. He at once prepared to resist an attack. The windows of the castle were blocked up with mattresses, and the Zouaves left their barracks at one a.m. and took possession of it. They made their confessions, and at two o'clock a Capuchin said Mass in the chapel of the castle, and all approached the Holy Table. An hour after the Mass, at half-past three in the morning, in the midst of a thick fog the Zouaves again marched out of the castle, and De Resimont posted them in groups to defend the approach to the town by the Ponte Clementino and the Borghetto road. ^ The same who commanded the Zouave volunteers at Albano during the cholera of 1867. 502 THE MAKING OF ITALY, By this time Maze de la Roche's vanguard was close at hand, for it had soon resumed its march after seizing the Ponte Felice. It consisted of a regiment of infantry, a battalion of bersaglieri^ two squadrons of cavalry, a battery of artillery and half a company of engineers, forming a little army of 3400 men, commanded by Major General Angelino. The Piedmontese prudently waited to attack until long after daybreak, when the fog had cleared away. Angelino then threw forward one of his battalions against the convent of the Capuchins, which De Resimont had occupied, while a column of bersaglieri marched down a cross road into the ravine in which the little river Treja flows, their object being to get round to the rear of the town. The few Zouaves posted on the crest of the town- side of the ravine fired down upon them, while the little garrison of the convent opened fire upon the other column. While this firing was going on, De Resimont was informed that the enemy were surrounding the town and threat- ening the gate on the Roman side.^ Had he continued skirmishing with Angelino, he would have run the risk of being cut off from the castle, he therefore withdrew all his men into the old fortress. It was nine o'clock. The whole force of Maze de la Roche, ten thousand strong, had come up. Civita Castellana was surrounded, and a battery of artillery was placed in position to bombard the castle, while a battalion of bersaglieri entered the streets of the town. General Cadorna was present, and took command of the troops. With cries of *' Vive Pie Neufl " the garrison opened fire upon the nearest troops, who replied with musketry and artillery. About half-past nine Cadorna withdrew all his men under cover behind trees, rocks and walls, even the artillery obtaining shelter behind the garden walls of the ^ The troops, who thus approached the Roman gate of Civita Cas- tellana were two battalions of bersaglieri belonging to Cadorna's reserve. They were commanded by Lieut. -Colonel Pinelli, who led them over the Tiber by the railway bridge of Colle Rosetto, and, marching by cross roads, appeared upon the western side of Civith. between eight and nine on the morning of the 12th, thus cutting off the retreat of the garrison. THE INVASION OF ROME. 503 Capuchin convent ; and soon the Zouaves in the castle had nothing to guide their aim, but the puffs of smoke from the Italian rifles. At the same time Cadorna brought twelve more guns into action, to which the Zouaves could not oppose a single gun. For an hour and a half this bombardment continued. Two hundred and forty shells fell upon the castle or within it, but though many of them burst in the rooms occupied by the soldiers, only five men were wounded, and these not seriously. A council of war was held, and one of the Italian officers proposed that as there were no means of making a successful defence, it would be better to capitulate at once ; but Captain de Resimont and Lieutenant Sevilla of the Zouaves declared their resolve to continue the defence ; and as the majority of the garrison was formed of their troops, the resistance continued. But it was evident that it could not last lons". Under the fire of eighteen guns the old walls were begin- ning to crumble, the great keep was so shattered that it might fall at any moment, and the base of the only one of the flanking towers from which the Zouaves could fire was in a ruinous state. About eleven, Pappi, the governor of the prison, came to De Resimont, and begged him to re- consider his decision. He pointed out to him that the castle was exposed to a fire, to which there was no means of replying effectively ; that it was not a fortress but a prison : and that the inevitable result of continuing the fight would be that Cadorna's troops would, with perfect safety to themselves, reduce the place to ruins, and crush under them not only the garrison whose lives were in their own hands, but also the unfortunate convicts, whom it was his duty to take care of. De Resimont consulted his colleagues, and then informed Pappi that, for the sake of the prisoners in his charge, he consented to having the white flag hoisted. The firing ceased, and Captain RuffinI went out, and was conducted to General Cadorna. The general gave high praise to the garrison, expressing his surprise that being so few they had resisted at all, and that for two hours they had held out against the fire of his artillery. 504 THE MAKING OF ITALY, Ruffini endeavoured to obtain permission for the garrison to withdraw with its arms and baggage to Rome, but could only obtain the usual terms — that it should lay down its arms after receiving the honours of war. The Piedmontese, fighting under cover, had only lost ten men in the attack. They took possession of the town, and placed a guard upon their prisoners in the castle. This guard was com- manded by an Italian officer, who had fought in the Garibaldian army at Mentana, where he had been taken prisoner by Sevilla of the Zouaves, who was now a prisoner under his charge. The Zouaves were next day sent on to Spoleto. At the Terni station, where the train stopped for a while, they were insulted by a rabble ; but at Spoleto, and later on at Florence, they received a warm welcome from sympathizers with the Papal cause in those cities. Cadorna met with no further resistance until he reached Rome. On the I2th he waited at Civita Castellana, to give time for General Cosenz's division to come up. On the 13th, with the twodivisions of Cosenz and Maze de la Roche, and the Reserve, united under his command, he marched on to Monterosi on the road from Viterbo to Rome. There he was joined that night by Ferrero's division, which had marched down from Viterbo. Thus the whole of the 4th corps was concentrated about Mon- terosi. On the 14th Cadorna, Cosenz, and Maze de la Roche, marched on to the Casal-della-Giustiniana, about nine miles to the north-west of Rome, where they were joined next day by Ferrero's division, and reconnaissances were pushed out to their front. This was the day of the capitulation of Civita Vecchia to Bixio. From his post at La Giustiniana, Cadorna could see the dome of St. Peter's upon the southern horizon ; but he had yet to wait some days before he was able to attack the Holy City, for Bixio's division was at Civita Vecchia, and Angioletti's troops were still to the south of Velletri. Meanwhile Rome was perfectly quiet. There was not the slightest disturbance of public order ; not a single attempt to show either sympathy with the invaders, or disaffection towards the Pontifical Government. On the THE INVASION OF ROME, 505 2th the Roman papers informed their readers that, with- out a declaration of war, the armies of Victor Emmanuel had entered the territories of the Holy See, and were marching upon Rome. The same day the Pope was present at the devotions of a triduum at La Madonna della Colonna, and the people thronged round him in such crowds to ask his blessing, to touch his garments, to express their sympathy with him, that the Switzers who attended him could hardly make him a path through the multitude. Next day General Kanzler declared Rome in a state of siege. For a short time after the proclamation there was an alarm amounting almost to a panic. Shops were shut, and the people left the streets, expecting that the Italian attack was immiment, or that some insurrection in the city itself was anticipated by the military authorities ; but within an hour everything had resumed its usual appear- ance, and except for the bodies of troops and workmen engaged in walling up several of the gates and constructing tambours in front of others, the engineers throwing a bridge of boats across the Tiber from the Aventine to the Tras- tevere, and the artillerymen mounting guns upon the, old walls — no one would have thought that the city was menaced by three armies advancing from north, south, and north-west. The scanty reports given by the papers of the progress of the invasion were eagerly read^ and a hundred strange rumours circulated — at one time that Prussia was going to take the Holy See under its protection, at another that Austria was preparing for an armed intervention. More than once it was reported that the Pope was about to leave Rome and take refuge in some foreign city. Day by day there were new enlistments in the ranks of the Roman reserve volunteers, and the people of the Trastevere offered to take up arms as a body for the defence of their Pope. The offer was declined. The Papal army was strong enough to do all the Pope intended to ask of them ; a general armament would have accomplished no useful end. On the evening of the 13th, as the Italian vanguard on the Viterbo road was reported to be within seven leagues 5o6 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. of Rome, a company of Zouaves (the 6th of the Ilird bat- talion), was sent out to the convent of San Onofrio beyond the Monte Mario, with a detachment of dragoons as an out- post at La Giustiniana. Another company of Zouaves (the 6th of the Ilnd), occupied and barricaded the Ponte Molle- These detachments formed the outposts of Rome on the line of Cadorna's advance. At half-past three on the morn- ing of the 14th the Zouaves, sixty strong, occupied San Onofrio, bivouacked in front of the church, and placed a picket often men in the vineyards towards La Giustiniana, with a sentinel a hundred yards in front. The morning of the 14th was very foggy. The Italian cavalry of General Chevilly occupied La Giustiniana soon after sunrise, the Papal dragoons retiring towards the Ponte Molle, unfor- tunately without sending any warning to the Zouaves at San Onofrio, who had been given to understand that in case they were attacked the dragoons would retire upon their post and not upon the bridge. Accordingly, when about eight o'clock Sergeant Shea, who was in command of the advanced picket at San Onofrio, dimly saw a troop of hprsemen emerging from the fog in his front, h^ took them for the detachment from La Giustiniana, and with five of his men advanced to meet them. He was at once charged by between twenty and thirty Italian dragoons. The six Zouaves in the vineyard fired on them, but seeing that they could not rescue their comrades, as the Italian cavalry came rushing up in large numbers, they fell back upon the church. The captain of the Zouaves had got his men under arms, and began skirmishing with the enemy. The fire of the Zouaves left many saddles empty ; and one of the Italian officers. Count Crotti di Castiglione, was taken prisoner, his horse having been shot, and, rolling over, thrown him into a ditch, where the Zouaves disarmed him. Artillery now began to appear behind the enemy's cavalry, of which about 300 were already engaged ; and the Zouaves, seeing that Shea and his party had been captured, and that if they held their ground longer their position would be turned and their retreat cut off, rallied and marched back to Rome, taking their prisoner with THE INVASION OF ROME, 507 them. They had lost no one in the skirmish ; but Sergeant Shea, a bugler, and the four men, who had been surprised, remained prisoners in the enemy's hands. They had fought hard, although surrounded, and had not been captured until Shea, an Irish Zouave, had received several wounds, and three of his men, Aertz, Hildebrand and Wilders, had been more or less seriously wounded. Count Crotti, the prisoner taken by the Zouaves, was released by the Pope, on promising not to bear arms again in the campaign — this release being granted as a mark of gratitude to his father, the elder Count Crotti, for his protest in the Parliament at Florence against the spoliation of the Holy See. The Italian cavalry did not pursue the Zouaves, but fell back upon La Giustiniana, where, as we have seen, Cadorna soon after established his headquarters. The firing at San Onofrio was heard in Rome, and about nine o'clock orders were given to occupy the walls and gates. Accordingly the troops left their barracks and occupied the various stations assigned to them, the Roman volunteers mustering in their full strength, and joining the Swiss in guarding the Vatican. Later on in the day, Charettc's column arrived from Civita Vecchia, and the columns of Azzanesi and Lauri from Velletri and Frosi- none ; and these troops, tired as they were, took the places reserved for them in the general scheme of defence. Reconnaissances sent out to the northward showed that the enemy still kept at a safe distance from the city. But the attack could not now be very far off, and day and night the work of strengthening the weak defences of the city went on. Only on the side of the Trastevere was it at all strong. There the high ground, the Castle of S. Angelo, and the bastioned wall of the Leonine City and the quarter of the Trastevere, made a prolonged defence possible.^ But even those works were all two centuries old. The rest of the city, from the Porta del Popolo to the Testaccio, was enclosed rather than defended by a long wall, built by It was here that the Garibaldians held out in 1849 against Oudi- not, who chose the strongest side of the city for his attack. On this face of the city the Piedmontese attack of 1870 made no impression. 5o8 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the emperors and repaired at intervals and with various materials, so that its age was here 1500, there 400, years. A few of the gates, such as the Porta Pia, were modern, with massive wing-walls. But the wall was too high, often without any platform within on which even the smallest gun could be mounted, and in many places so thin that it could have been breached by field artillery. Thus, where the wall was eventually breached, between the Porta Pia and the Porta Salara, it was in places only three feet thick. At other points the walls were further weakened by internal galleries. There were few salients, and these were badly traced, not having been planned by their old Roman architects with a view to defence by artillery- General Kanzler and his engineer officers, amongst whom was Colonel Afanto di Rivera, the defender of Gaeta, had done what they could to make the ancient walls defensible. Some of the gates were walled up ; before those that were left open small tambours were constructed and armed with field-guns. Sand-bags were placed on the crest of the wall to shelter riflemen ; and wherever there was anything like a platform one or two guns were mounted. On the whole circuit of the walls there were only 160 guns ; a few of these were modern rifled pieces (none of any great weight) but most of them were old smooth-bore guns, some so old that their proper place would have been the artillery museum of an arsenal or military school. From his position at La Giustiniana, Cadorna could only attack Rome on the side of the Trastevere. This part of the enterprise he had assigned to Bixio ; but, for his part, he was resolved to attack upon the other bank of the Tiber, where he might reasonably hope to force in a few hours, at one or more points, the long weak wall of the city. He had for this purpose to transfer his army to the left bank of the Tiber, and on the 15th he occupied himself with arranging this operation. To pass the Monte Mario, force the Ponte Molle, and extend his army in the open space between the bridge and the walls with the city on his flank during the operation, might have cost a severe struggle, even against the inferior forces of the Papalini. THE INVASION OF ROME. 509 He therefore, after reconnoitring the ground, resolved to move his army by narrow cross roads to the bank of the Tiber above its junction with the Teverone, bridge and cross the river there, mass his army, and advance on Rome by the bridges of the Teverone, approaching it by the old Via Salara and Via Nomentana, now the roads to Monte Rotondo and Mentana. In this direction, too, he would have the railway to Florence in his rear. In the afternoon he sent into Rome, under a flag of truce, one of his staff- officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Caccialupi, bearing a letter to Kanzler, in which he begged the Pontifical general to allow the Italian troops peacefully to occupy the city " without a resistance which could only result in a useless effusion of blood." General Kanzler sent back a reply, which Cadorna in his report characterizes as " full of moderation and dignity." It ran as follows : — " Excellency, — I have received the invitation to permit the entry of the Italian troops under your Excellency's command. His Holiness wishes to see Rome occupied by his own troops, and not by those of another sovereign. I have therefore the honour to reply to you, that I am resolved to resist with all the means in my power, as honour and duty demand. Believe me, &c., " (Signed) Kanzler." The next day, here and there Italian reconnaissances were pushed towards the city, but nowhere did they approach within range of the walls. In the afternoon Cadorna threw a bridge over the Tiber, north of the Teverone, at Castel Giubileo, his bersaglieri crossing in boats to cover the operation. The same afternoon the diplomatic corps met Cardinal Antonelli at the Vatican. As soon as he left the conference. Count Arnim, the Prussian ambassador, sent word to Cadorna that he would come out to his headquarters on the following day. This was the beginning of the curious line of conduct adopted by Arnim during these eventful days of September, 1870. About five the Pope went to Ara Coeli, in the midst of the acclamations of an immense crowd. Later in the 510 THE MAKING OF ITALY. evening General Corchidio di Malavolta^ came in with a second letter from Cadorna to Kanzler, in which he informed him of the surrender of Civita Vecchia, and once more asked him to let the Italian troops enter Rome peacefully. In handing this letter to Kanzler, General Malavolta added arguments of his own. He said he could understand the Papal army, composed as it was, hoping to repulse 15^00 of Cadorna's army, but against five corps resistance was hopeless. If they were only admitted peacefully, he said, he could for his part promise that his men would march in to the cry of Viva Pio Nono ! He spoke of humanity being outraged by a useless resistance- Kanzler replied that the outrage to humanity was the work of those who unjustly made the attack, and sent him back to Cadorna with a letter, in which he said that the fall of Civita Vecchia in no way altered the situation at Rome, and that he would do his duty and resist. Probably Cadorna expected no other reply; but the second summons kept up the show of moderation, and caused no loss of time, as he was not yet in a position to attack. On the night of Friday, the i6th, and all through Saturday, his army, moving by bad roads, was slowly crossing the Tiber and concentrating on the Teverone. On the morning of Saturday, the 17th, at eight o'clock. Count Arnim came to Cadorna's headquarters at Casal di Villa Spada on the left bank of the Tiber, where he had a long interview with him. Arnim, it appears, took upon himself to act as a mediator — a part assigned to him by no one. He told Cadorna that everything in Rome indicated a resistance, and asked him what he meant to do. Cadorna replied, that after Kanzler's answer to his letters, he had no course but to attack and put an end to the domination of the foreign troops, " who imposed their own will on the Pope and the Romans."^ Arnim then asked the general '^ The lancers of General Malavolta's escort conversed with the Zouaves, while he was waiting at the Ponte Molle, and told them that large numbers of the ItaHan troops were discontented and murmuring at the work on which they were engaged. ^ This last was a favourite idea of the Italianists in September, THE INVASION OF ROME. 511 to delay the attack for twenty-four hours, in order that he (Arnim) might make a last effort to change the resolve of the Pope and his advisers. Cadorna agreed to this ; and, as his own report acknowledges, he was quite unprepared to attack, and in any case would have had to wait. At noon Arnim returned to Rome. In the afternoon the heads of Cadorna's columns had crossed the Teverone, and approached within two miles of Rome. Some of his soldiers deserted that evening, and came into the city, saying they would not fight against the Pope. The following day was September i8th, the tenth anniversary of Castelfidardo ; and in Rome, now that the enemy was close in sight, everyone expected the same day would be marked by the final struggle. Nevertheless, the day passed in almost perfect peace. Outside the Porta del Popolo a Zouave outpost exchanged a few shots at long range with the enemy's pickets ; some shells were fired at a column which approached too near the Porta Maggiore. From the Janiculum strong columns were seen descending into the Campagna from the Alban Hills. It was Angioletti's division closing in upon the south side of Rome. In the afternoon Count Arnim had written to Cadorna, that, notwithstanding all his efforts, the Pope was determined that there should be resistance. By that evening the whole of Angioletti's troops and Cadorna's three divisions were in position, facing the whole line of the walls on the left bank. Cadorna could have attacked next day, but he waited for Bixio, who was coming up from Civita Vecchia, to be in position to co-operate by attacking the Trastevere. He fixed the morning of Tuesday, the 20th of September, for the attack. The 19th was spent in reconnoitring the ground, and in the evening Bixio was before Rome on the right bank. Three Zouaves of 1867, returning to the standards in the hour of need — 1870. How far it was true may be judged from the facts (i) that the foreign troops were about one-third of the force in Rome ; (2) that the Papal troops, on the 20th, ceased firing the moment the order to end the resistance was given, and throughout they acted like well- disciplined soldiers. 5 1 2 THE MAKING OF ITAL Y. Tracy, a young American, now a distinguished member of the United States Congress ; Kenyon, of Gilh'ngham, a member of an English noble family ; and the present writer — had succeeded in passing through his lines from Civita Vecchia, and joining their comrades in Rome on the very eve of the attack. In the course of the 19th a band of Garibaldini approached the Porta del Popolo ; the Zouaves fired on them, killing the chief. A few cannon shots were fired from the Porta San Sebastiano at some of the enemy's troops who had come within close range ; and at the Tre Archi, where the railway runs into the city, the Zouaves exchanged some rifle shots with the Pied- montese outposts. This took place in the morning. In the afternoon the enemy tried to occupy a building about five hundred yards in front of this point. They were driven out by the guns of the Tre Archi battery. Later on a line of skirmishers pushed up to reconnoitre the position of the Zouaves, and the 6th company of the Ilird battalion of the Zouaves attacked and drove them back, killing two men and wounding two others, one of whom, a Neapolitan named Spagnoli, was brought into Rome. He died the following night in the hospital of San Spirito, expressing his sorrow at having been com- pelled to bear arms against the Holy See. At five, on the 19th, a lieutenant with a flag of truce, escorted by two dragoons, rode up to the Porta Pia. He was the bearer of a letter to General Kanzler, probably a final summons. He was given a letter in reply, and rode away, saluting the Zouave guard of the gate, and calling out — "To- morrow ! " Soon after a dropping fire was heard from the Villa Patrizi, the Zouave outpost beyond the gate. The troops there were skirmishing with the front line of the Pied- montese at the Villa Albani. An hour later a rifled-gun was mounted on the old wall of the Praetorian camp, and fired upon a column of artillery and cavalry, which were crossing the open ground in front of it. This was about six o'clock. The city was perfectly quiet. A little after midnight a few Orsini bombs were thrown into the street THE INVASION OF ROME. 513 from a house in the Corso. This was the only attempt at a disturbance, notwithstanding that several papers in the Italian press were reporting that the Romans had risen in their thousands, and that blood was flowing in the streets. Far from molesting the Papal troops in any way, the Romans, during the last days, had given them numerous proofs of their goodwill ; and numbers of the Zouaves were told by the people of the city that in case the Italians entered, the foreign volunteers of the Papal army would find a hospitable shelter in this house or in that, as long as they chose to stay. The night between the 19th and the 20th was an anxious one. There were numerous alarms, caused by the enemy's scouts appearing near the walls. The sentries on the old ramparts could see lights flashing in the vineyards and gardens, and could hear the sound of pick and shovel preparing positions for the artillery, which was to open for the invaders a way through the walls of Rome. In the city the chaplains were busy through the night, hearing the confessions of men who were calmly preparing for a death which they believed to be inevitable, for all looked forward to a struggle a outrance, against sixfold odds — a struggle not on the walls alone, but from house to house. "We will all die for the Holy Father!" said a brave Dutch Zouave in broken French to a chaplain, speaking the mind of the whole army. At the early masses^ said before daybreak at various points near the walls, officers and soldiers received the Holy Communion. The red cross of St. Peter ^ was affixed to every uniform. At half-past four all were at their posts. Along the far- extended lines of the Italians drum and bugle notes, galloping of estafettes, and rumbling of cannon wheels told that all was fast preparing for the attack. The sun rose that morning in the full brilliance of the early Italian autumn ; and through the still air, which was peculiarly clear that day, the officers and men stationed on dome and church tower to observe the enemy's movements, could see far over the Campagna and up to the blue g The reversed cross which appears in the Castelfidardo medal j. L 1 514 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Apennines on the one hand, and out to the sea coast on the other. Sixty thousand men, with more than a hundred guns surrounded the city. Cadorna's headquarters were at the Villa Albani, opposite the Porta Salara. He had chosen for the chief point of attack the weak h'ne of old wall between the Porta Salara and the Porta Pia, and his orders were to breach and storm the wall, as well as to make an assault upon the Porta Pia itself. For this attack the reserve and the divisions of Cosenz and Maze de la Roche were in line of battle from the Tiber to beyond the Via Nomentana, the heavy guns of the siege train being in battery before the Villa Albani to breach the wall. Three other minor attacks were to be made simultaneously, to force the besieged to occupy the whole circle of the walls. Ferrero's division was extended from the Tivoli road to the Via Prenestina, with orders to attack the great gateways of the Tre Archi where the railway lines pass through the wall. Still further to the Piedmontese left Angioletti's division held the ground between the Appian way and the Albano road, and had placed its guns in position against the Porta S. Giovanni and the long salient which ends in the Porta San Sebas- tiano. On the other bank of the Tiber, Bixio, with his headquarters at the Villa Pamfili, was eagerly waiting for the signal to attack the Porta San Pancrazio and the bastioned wall of the Trastevcre. Thus, with the exception of the Leonine City, the whole circle of the walls was comprised in Cadorna's plan of attack. For half an hour the Papal troops on the walls and in the little earthworks that covered the gates, or massed in the squares ready to move to any menaced point, waited in silence for the attack. Exactly at five in the morning the loud roar of a cannon came from Ferrero's lines, and a shell burst over the Tre Archi ; gun after gun answered the signal along the Italian front, the cannonade became heavier and heavier, and soon Rome was surrounded by a circle of fire and smoke. The Holy Father, saying his Mass in the Vatican, could hear close at hand the whizzing and bursting of Bixio's shells, and further away the deep THE INVASION OF ROME, 515 thunder of the heavier guns that were battering the old walls beside the Porta Pia. At the Tre Archi the Italian fire brought down masses of the wall upon the little outwork, where the few guns were placed, by which alone the Papalini could reply. By nine o'clock the masses of debris made it impossible to move the guns, and for the next hour the Zouaves could only answer the Italian fire with their rifles. At ten the wall was so shattered that a wide breach was rapidly forming, and Ferrero drew up two strong columns to assault it. Further to the left, where Angioletti was attacking the Porta San Giovanni (defended by Charette), the Italians were not so successful. The tambour in front of the gate was armed with two guns ; three others were on the wall, and the little battery was further strengthened by the arrival of four mountain- guns, commanded b}^ Captain Daudier, who had distin- guished himself at Castelfidardo and Mentana. Though the enemy had several guns for everyone of Daudier's, the fire of the Papalini three times forced Angioletti's gunners to alter the position of their batteries, three of the Italian guns were dismounted, and two of their tumbrils blew up. The Italian fire was, nevertheless, heavy and well-sustained. A large number of their shells fell at some distance within the wall. Fifty of them burst on or about the church of St. John Lateran, and it still bears the marks of the projectiles. Others burst upon the basiHca of Santa Croce. Near the Santa Scala a telegraph station had been established in the Passionist convent. Lieutenant Picca- dori of the Pontifical dragoons, a young man of twenty- three, had entered the building on his way to this station, when an Italian shell, coming through a window, struck and killed him on the spot. One of the surgeons, also, was wounded at the ambulance, and several Zouaves and gunners fell at this point. Yet after five hours' bombard- ment the position there was intact. At the same time, close at hand, another of Angioletti's batteries was attacking ' the Porta San Sebastiano with no greater result. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Tiber, General Nino Bixio was attacking the Trastevere. He had waited for more than an hour after the attack began on the other L 1 2 5i6 THE MAKING OF ITALY. bank, and he did not open fire against the Porta San Pancrazio and the adjacent walls until nearly half-past six o'clock. The defence of this point has a special interest from the fact that here, almost to a man, the troops who defended the wall were Italians, the garrison of the Trastevere being composed of cacciatori and soldiers of the line, under the command of Colonel Azzanesi, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonels Sparagna and Zanetti. At every point, it is true, native troops took part in the defence ; but here it was entirely in their hands. Had they been disloyal, or even weak in their devotion to the Holy See, what would have been easier for them than to cease their fire and let Bixio in ? Nor had they been left without temptation to adopt a treacherous course, and turn upon their comrades of the Zouaves and the Legion when the hour of trial came. " It is certain," wrote the Italianist correspondent of the Times, "that the native troops had been very much worked upon during the last three or four weeks by Italian emissaries. Fine promises were made to them, and tempting baits offered. ... It would be easy for me to name some of those who succeeded in entering the town and carrying on these intrigues in spite of the vigilance of the police." Not- withstanding all this, the native troops did their duty as bravely and as devotedly as the Zouaves. The Roman people, too, were perfectly loyal in their conduct. Had there been, as the Italian press was always alleging, a strong Piedmontese party among them, there would have been barricades in the streets, the handful of men who held the long line of wall would have bee,^. overpowered at one point or another, and the gates would have been thrown open to the invaders by a successful insurrection. But there was none of this. The people remained quietly in their houses, and in the ranks of the Papal army many a Roman rifle sent death among the invaders, and many a Roman gunner served his piece calmly amid the bursting shells of the enemy's artillery. At the Trastevere Bixio had to deal with a solidly constructed wall, and was at the same time exposed to a cross-fire from the bastions of the Leonine City, and he failed to make any impression upon THE INVASION OF ROME, 517 the defence. Perhaps it was his irritation at this failure that made him, between eight and nine o'clock, direct the fire of some of his guns not at the ramparts, but at the buildings within them. On this side Rome was actually- bombarded. Nor was the bombardment without effect. Several houses were set on fire ; a large cloth factory- near the Porta San Pancrazio burst into flames a little before nine o'clock. Numerous shells fell upon the con- vent of San Callisto. Later on a forage store and a house in the Lungara took fire. At the hospital of San Gallicano the sick had to be removed to the cellars ; in another hospital one of the patients was killed in his bed by a shell. A woman was killed in the Via Giulia, and several other non-combatants were wounded. Shells fell as far within the wall as the Piazza Navona, and three of them burst near the Vatican. These were General Bixio's tokens of goodwill towards the Romans. While Ferrero, Angioletti, and Bixio were thus at various points attacking the city, Cadorna was in person directing the main attack against the weak line of wall between the Porta Portese and the Maccao or Praetorian camp — a wall which is pierced by the Porta Pia and Porta Salara. Here Colonel Allet of the Zouaves was in command. To Cadorna's two divisions, with their 30,000 combatants and fifty-four guns, he could oppose only about 1000 men (Zouaves, carbineers, and linesmen) and sixteen guns, two of them mountain-guns. The Italian artillery, covered by long lines of skirmishers, opened fire upon the Pincio on the left, the Maccao on the right, and in the centre the Porta Pia and Porta Salara and the weak wall between them. The attack met with a stubborn resistance. The few guns which the Papalini brought into action, aided by the rapid fire of the sharp- shooters armed with the Remington, who lined the crest of the walls, repeatedly forced the enemy's batteries to change their positions. Some of the guns were with- drawn by the Italians to a distance of upwards of 1200 yards ; but even here, according to Cadorna's own officers, the long-ranging bullets of the Zouave rifles annoyed the Italian gunners. Closer to the wall the bersaglieri fell Si8 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Map to illustrate the attack on Rome, September 20th, 1870. 1 . Piazza della Colonna, headquarters of the defence, which was divided into four zones : 1st, commanded by Col. Azzanesi ; 2nd, by Col. AUet ; 3rd, by Col. Jeanneret ; 4th, by Colonel Perrault. 2. Porta del Popolo. 9- Porta San Giovanni. 3. Pincio. 10. Porta San Sebastiano. 4! Porta Salara. ii. Porta San Paolo. 5. Villa Bonaparte. 12. Porta San Pancrazio. 6. Porta Pia. I3- '^^- Peter's. 7. Maccao ( Prsetorian Camp). j 14. Porta Angelica. 8. Tre Archi. I 15- Castle of San Angelo. THE INVASION OF ROME, 519 fast under the fire of the defenders. But the force of numbers prevailed in the end. By nine o'clock, after four hours' fighting, the little earthwork in front of the Porta Pia had become untenable. One of its guns was dis- mounted, the other withdrawn. To the left of the Porta Pia masses of the wall were falling, and there would soon be a large breach. Still farther to the left, on the Pincio, the Italian fire had inflicted serious loss upon the handful of men that occupied the hill, two officers and several Zouaves and gunners having been already killed or wounded. From nine to ten the Italian artillery chiefly concen- trated its fire upon the opening breach. About half-past nine Cadonia had formed behind the Villa Patrizi two strong columns of assault, for the most part composed of his best troops, the bersaglieri. One column was com- manded by General Maze de la Roche, the other by the ex-Garibaldian General, Cosenz. A little before ten General Bottacco, of the engineers, reported that the breach was practicable. The two columns, gradually approaching each other, advanced upon the breach ; while a third, led by General Masi and Corchidio di Malavolta, attacked the Porta Pia. Just as the head of Masi's column debouched from the Villa Patrizi, a Pontifical dragoon arrived at the Porta Pia, bringing a verbal order from General Zappi to display the white flag. The day before Pius IX. had directed General Kanzler only to offer such a resistance as would amount to an armed protest, in order to prove that it was only by violence the Piedmontese entered Rome ; the resistance was to cease as soon as a breach was opened.^ It was in pursuance of these orders 1 The following is the full text of the letter of Pius IX. to General Kanzler. It is specially important on account of the opinion expressed therein on the Papal army : — " General, — At this moment when a great sacrilege and the most enormous injustice are about to be consummated, and the troops of a Catholic kiqg, without provocation, nay, without even the least appearance of any motive, surround and besiege the capital of the Catholic world, I feel in the first place the necessity of thanking you, General, and our entire army for your generous conduct up to the present time, for the affection which you have shown to the Holy 520 THE MAKING OF ITALY, that Zappi sent this message to the Porta Pia. Similar messages were at the same time sent to all the other points where fighting was going on. Major deTroussures,^ of the Zouaves, refused to accept in so serious a matter a mere verbal order brought by a private, and sent Lieutenant Van der Kerchove to General Zappi, to ask for written orders, or a verbal order to be brought by an officer of the staff. Meanwhile, the defence of the gate went on, and the rapid and well-directed fire of the two companies of Zouaves who held it kept the enemy's column at bay.^ Several Italian oflficers fell at the head of their men — Lieut.-Col. Giolitti, of the 40th regiment of the line, and Captain Ferrari were wounded, and Lieutenant Valenziani was killed. In a few minutes Van der Kerchove returned with orders to cease firing. Not another shot was fired ; and a white handkerchief was attached to a bayonet and displayed in front of the gate. It was five minutes past ten o'clock. While Masi's column advanced against the Porta Pia, the two columns of Cosenz and Maze de la Roche had See, and for your willingness to consecrate yourselves entirely to the defence of this metropolis. May these words be a soleinn docume7tt to certify to the discipline, the loyalty, and the valour of the ar7}iy in the service of the Holy See. " As regards the duration of the defence 1 feel it my duty to com- mand that this shall only consist in such a protest as shall testify to the violence done to us, and nothing more. In other words, that negotiations for surrender shall be opened as soon as a breach shall have been made. " At a moment when the whole of Europe is mourning over the numerous victims of the war now in progress between two great nations, never let it be sai 1 that the Vicar of Christ, however unjustly assailed had to give his consent to a great shedding of blood. Our cause is the cause of God, and we put our whole defence in His hands. From my heart, General, I bless you and your whole army. "Pius P.P. IX." " From the Vatican, September 19th." " One of the most distinguished officers of the regiment. He was killed at the battle of Coulmiers or Patay, December 2nd, 1870, at the head of the French Pontifical Zouaves then serving under General de Charette in the army of the Loire. 3 Of the two companies of Zouaves who held the gate one was under the command of Captain De la Hoyde, an Irish officer who had shown great bravery at Mentana. THE INVASION OF ROME. 521 attacked the breach. As they approached it the two columns mingled their ranks, and at a hundred yards from the wall they partly deployed and opened a heavy fire. The breach was held by the fourth company of the second battalion of Zouaves, and two sections of the first battalion.'' Standing upright on the debris, and disdaining to shelter themselves, they poured a sharp fire into the dense mass in front of them. The Italians fell fast. A major of bersaglieri and two other officers were killed. The column hesitated, and then began to fall back. Fifteen Zouaves had fallen dead or severely wounded on the breach, though the firing had not lasted many minutes. When they saw the assail- ants fall back, the defenders of the breach raised a great shout of " Vive Pie NeufV The enemy replied with the cry of '' Hourra Savoia!'* and rallying, returned to the charge. At that moment a staff officer, sent by Major de Troussures from the Porta Pia, arrived, bearing a white flag. The firing ceased, and Lieutenant Mauduit of the Zouaves displayed the flag on the breach. The hour was ten minutes past ten. Neither at the breach nor at the Porta Pia was the white flag respected by the Piedmontese. At the breach the enemy came on, firing upon men who stood with grounded arms defenceless before them. Climbing the slope of debris they rushed upon the Zouaves, insulted them, tore their weapons from their hands, and dragged one of their mounted officers out of his saddle, an Italian officer taking possession of the horse. At the gate, too, the Italians came on firing ; and, as they entered the Porta Pia, they shot down and killed two Zouaves, who were, like the rest, standing leaning on their Remingtons. An officer of bersaglieri fired upon Lieutenant Van der Kerchove ; the ball grazed his neck. Another officer, revolver in hand, rushed upon Captain de Couessin and tore the medals of Castelfidardo and Mentana from his breast. The soldiers followed the example of their officers, and offered every insult to their prisoners. An officer of bersaglieri honourably distinguished himself by endeavouring to keep his men in order, and beat off, with ^ In all about 150 men. 522 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the flat of his sword^ some of the assailants of the Zouaves. Unfortunately, none of his brother officers followed his example. At the same time at which the resistance ceased at the Porta Pia the white flag had been hoisted at every other point of attack. It was respected by Ferrero and Angio- letti ; but for half an hour after it had been displayed on the walls of the Trastevere, and while every gun on the ramparts was silent, Bixio continued his bombardment. It was nothing new in the Italian army to fire on the white flag — Cialdini and Fanti had done it for hours at Ancona, in i860. It was not till half-past ten that the Italian fire ceased. By that time, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the officers of the Zouaves, who urged that while the terms of capitulation were being negotiated, both sides should, according to the laws of war, maintain the positions they occupied, the Italian troops advanced into the city. The companies of Zouaves at the Pincio, the Porta Salara, the breach, and the Porta Pia, were surrounded, made prisoners and disarmed. The troops who had been placed in support of them fell slowly back as the Italians advanced, retiring towards the bridges of the Tiber. At the same time the troops who held the eastern and southern walls evacuated their posts, and joined in the general retreat towards the Trastevere and the Leonine City. The Italians entered at several points, everywhere followed by a rabble, who had assembled fro;n all parts of Italy in order to take ad- vantage of the disorders which were sure to follow the capture of Rome. These scoundrels joined in ill-treating and insulting the prisoners. The conduct of the Romans towards the retreating Pontifical army was very different from that of the invaders and their camp-followers towards the captured companies of Zouaves. Especially in the Trastevere dense masses of the citizens lined the streets watching the march of the Pontifical troops. No word of insult or disrespect was heard ; but, on the contrary, many a word of kindly sympathy and encouragement was spoken, and many a hand stretched out to grasp that of a passing soldier and give a silent assurance of goodwill. The army THE INVASION OF ROME. 523 (with the exception of the few companies of Zouaves cut off by the Italian advance), being concentrated on the right bank, the Trastcvere was now evacuated, and Bixio's column entered by the Porta San Pancrazio. The Pontifical troops occupied the Leonine City, the mass of them bivou- acking on the vast Piazza before Saint Peter's. The castle of San Angelo was still in the hands of its Papal garrison, and a guard held the bridge. With the exception of the immediate neighbourhood of the Vatican, Rome was m the hands of the Piedmontese. To accomplish '*' Italian Unity," there remained only the farce of another /^'^/i-^V^. With the Italian troops there had come into the city four or five thousand men and women, who, under the name of " Roman exiles,^' had followed the march of the invaders. A few — a very few — of these were really exiles, men of good standing who had been compromised in the events of i860 or 1867, such as Sforza Cesarini, a son of the Prince of Piombino, an Odescalchi and a Ruspoli ; but the vast majority of these people were nothing but the scum of the Italian cities, attracted to Rome by the hope of pillage and disorder. The deputy Fambri declared that by going to Rome these men had restored peace and order to the rest of Italy. Later in the day and during the following morning long excursion trains brought in further crowds of the same kind. " Rome," said the Nazione, a Liberal journal of Florence, — " Rome is given up as res nullius to all the promoters of disorder and agitation, to all the political scrapegraces, to all the fishers in troubled waters, who have till now been loafing about the streets of a hundred Italian cities One would think," it added, '' that the Government wished to make Rome the receptacle for all the wretchedness of the rest of Italy." These crowds of unwelcome immigrants were joined by the small number of ultra-Liberals to be found in Rome ;* and the mob, thus formed, insulted the Papal troops at the ^ Even Garibaldi in his "Rule of the Monk,'' written in 1868 after the failure of Mentana, was forced to confess that the Liberal party hardly existed in Rome : — ''Alas, poor Roman people!" he writes. '' But whom should we reckon under this denomination. . . . Those who are worthy of the name of people, as not belonging to the necro- 524 THE MAKING OF ITALY- Porta Pia, the Pincio and the Piazza Colonna, assaulted priests and insulted soldiers, wounded several of them, and actually killed three of the squadriglieri. The Romans held aloof from this rabble, and had no part in its proceedings. The Nazione accused them of unpatriotic indifference. The deputy Bonghi wrote to the same effect to the Perse- veranza. " It is an undoubted fact," said the Liberal Fanfullay " that the disorders at Rome were not the work of the Romans, and that those who excited them were soi-disant Romans for the time-being, who had assembled from all parts of Italy." It is not easy to ascertain what were the losses of the army of Italy in the attack on Rome. It is quite clear that in the official reports they were designedly very much underrated. According to the Gazzetta Ufficiale of Sep- tember 22nd, the entire loss was three officers and eighteen men killed, and five officers and 112 men wounded — in all 138 hors de combat. Next day it gave the names of the wounded officers, and instead of five there were ten. Cadorna in his report stated his loss at thirty-two killed and 143 wounded. A month later the FanfuUa stated the loss in wounded at 266, and added that more than a hun- dred of them were in the hospital of La Consolazione. At Civita Vecchia, a colonel oi bersaglieri told Prince Stolberg, a sergeant of the Zouaves, that the Italians had lost about 2000 men before Rome j the officers of a grenadier regiment made the same statement to the Count de Beauffort. In his history of the invasion, Beaulfort expresses his belief that this was an exaggeration ; but at the same time he points out that these various statements tend to show that when the Italians reported their loss at less than 150, they placed it much below the truth. As for the Papalini, fighting under cover, and only closely engaged with the enemy for a few minutes before mancers (i.e. priests), are some honest middle-class families, a few boatmen, and a few lazzaroni. In the country, where ignorance is fostered by the priesthood and has struck still deeper root, the people side with the clergy, but especially in the Roman Campagna where all the landowners are either priests or powerful friends of the priest- hood." — The "Rule of the Monk," vol. ii., pp. 219, 220. It is not likely that there had been much change from 1868 to 1870. THE INVASION OF ROME. 52s the white flag was displayed, and this only on one point, their losses were slight. **Ah! mon pkre^^ said Colonel Allet to a chaplain of the Zouaves in the evening, ^^Dieu ne prend que bien peu d'^lus aujourd^huij* A dragoon officer was killed and two officers of the Zouaves wounded. In the ranks, ten Zouaves, two carbineers, and three of the artillerymen (Romans) were killed. Besides these, two Zouave officers, a chaplain and two surgeons and fifty- three men were wounded.^ These numbers do not, however, include the isolated soldiers murdered by the Garibaldian mob on the evening of the 20th and on the 21st. The wounded only include those who were conveyed to the ambulances; a large number received slight wounds, which they bound up, without leaving the ranks. To the conduct of the troops, and especially of the Pontifical Zouaves, on the 20th of September, Cadorna bore testimony when he telegraphed to Florence that he had entered Rome after an " obstinate resistance." And even the press of the Revolution in Italy confessed that they had done their duty like valiant soldiers. " Modest * The following table shows the losses of the various Pontifical regiments on September 20th : — Killed. Wounded. Corps. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Total Loss. Native. Native. Foreign Foreign. Native Foreign. Chaplain and two sur- geons ... Dragoons Artillery Zouaves Carbineers Other corps* — 3 2 ID 3 2 2 9 5 5* 21 5 3 3 13 12 5 The native troops lost 27 men; the foreign volunteers 39, besides the three non-com- batants. I 5 10 5 21 27 1" 16 killed. 53 wounded. * A gendarme, a linesman, and 3 cacciatorL 526 THE MAKING OF ITALY. and brave," said the Soluzione, a Liberal journal of Naples/ ''they did their duty like heroes. The defence of Rome was courageous and brilliant. They were resolved to die to the last man on the walls, if the Holy Father had not ordered them to surrender." And it added that from this "people might judge of the barbarity, the infamy, and the vileness of those who tracked them after the entry of our (the Italian) troops, and hunted them with as much savagery as if they had been wolves." '* They fought," said the Italief "with a courage and coolness which com- mands our respect. There was nothing unworthy about them, no outcries, the most perfect order, the most exem- plary conduct Say what one will, the Zouaves fought like brave men : they gave proof of it at the Porta Pia and the Villa Bonaparte,^ where I saw them with my own eyes." It is to be regretted that, in the account of the attack on the Porta Pia which appeared in the Times^ there was no such generous tribute to brave foes. The war correspondent at Cadorna's headquarters spoke of the "slow lazy fire" of the Pontifical artillery, without informing his readers that they had only sixteen guns with which to reply to Cadorna's batteries. In order to convey the idea that the defence was entirely in foreign hands, he spoke of the " German gunners " who served the guns ; — the names of the victims show that of the thirteen Pontifical artillerymen who were killed and wounded, only one was a foreigner, the regiment of artillery being almost wholly a native one. He stated that there were i i,ooo foreign troops engaged in the defence of Rome ; whereas the real fact is there were not 4000, and the whole garrison did not number ii,ooo. This is proved by both Cadorna^s returns and General Kanzler's.^" Finally he sneered at the Zouaves for having abruptly ended the defence. They had broken their cru- sading oath, he said : there was no blood on their hands ; ' September 26th, 1870. (Correspondence.) ^ September 24th, 1870. (Correspondence.) ^ The point where the breach was made. ^" He also repeated the old calumny, that the squadriglieri were brigands in the pay of the Government. They really were the local militia who had stamped out brigandage in Velletri and Frosinone. THE INVASION OF ROME. 5 27 their uniforms were more fit for a ball-room than a battle- field — ^andsoon. Everyone now knows that it was dis- ciplined obedience to an order from the Holy Father that put an end to the defence. Otherwise it might have been continued for hours — the gate and breach, the plantations of the villa behind them, the strong inner liiie of positions including the Termini where a mass of troops was under arms, finally the streets themselves, would each and all have cost a long struggle before they were in Italian hands. When all this was stormed, a retreat by the bridges into the Trastevere would have given anew line of defence ; for the river on one side, and S. Angelo and the bastioned lines of the Janiculum and the Leonine City formed a fortress which would have cost a regular siege. " Could they not have held out as long as Garibaldi did in 1849 ? '' asked the Times correspondent. Assuredly they could on the same ground, that is to say, had the Italian attack been confined to the Trastevere as Oudinot's was, the French general having deliberately chosen the strongest point for the attack, partly to revenge the check he had received on that very point, partly that he might not have to face it after all the rest of the place was taken. Bixio, who attacked on this ground, did not make an inch of progress, and only entered after the Trastevere was evacuated in the evening. As for the courage of the Zouaves, the sneers of a Times correspondent count for little against the evidence of facts. They proved their courage right well on the battle-fields of the Loire — Cercottes, Patay, Le Mans, all witnessed the valour of the soldiers of Pius IX., and no name stood higher in the army of the Loire than that of the Papal Zouaves. There was blood enough upon their hands, when they charged into the heart of the Prussian lines at Patay^ and two out of every three of them fell fighting round the banner of the Sacred Heart. The very journal that had insulted them when they were at Rome, was forced to praise their lion-like courage, and confessed that they had " nobly repelled the scoffs and sneers for which they had so often been taken as a mark." 528 THE MAKING OF ITALY. CHAPTER XXV. THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 20th of September, in the midst of the roar of the Italian bombardment, the diplomatic body assembled in one of the halls of the Vatican to meet the Holy Father. He entered the room with a grave sad look upon his face, and reminded them how twenty-two years before the corps diplomatique had assembled around him under very similar circumstances at the Quirinal. He had written to the king, he said, but he knew not whether the letter had reached his hands. He recalled to the memory of the ambassadors how Bixio, who was now bombarding the Trastevere, had " when he was a Republican," promised to throw the Pope and the Cardinals into the Tiber. '* The memorials of Tasso," ^ he added, " run great risk at the hands of these new liberators of Italy. But these people care little for that." He spoke of his visit to the Santa Scala on the previous day. He told the ambassadors that the students of the American seminary had asked for arms, but that he had thanked them and told them to help in taking care of the wounded. He told them how, on. the previous day, he had seen every house that could claim foreign protection displaying the national flag, and he added with a touch of satire — " Prince Doria has hung out an English one, I do not know why.''' He remembered, he said, how the streets were decked with flags when he returned from Gaeta, but now they were not hung out for him. Near ten o'clock, while he was thus speaking with the corps diplomatique ^ Count Carpegna, one of Kanzler's staff- 1 An allusion to the convent of Sant* Onofrio (near the Porta San Pancrazio) where Tasso died. THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE, 529 officers, entered the room, to inform the Holy Father that a breach had been opened in the walls. The diplomatists withdrew, while • the Pope conferred with Cardinal Antonelli. In a few minutes they were recalled, and the Pope addressed them again, no longer in the easy con- versational tone which he had used before. " I have just given the order to capitulate," he said, while his eyes were full of tears. " The defence could not now be prolonged without bloodshed, and I wish to avoid that. I will not speak to you of myself. It is not for myself I weep, but for those poor children who have come to defend me as their father. You will each take care of those of your own country. There are men of all nations among them Give a thought also, I beg of you, to the Irish, English and Canadians, who have no one here to represent their interests." Cardinal Antonelli here informed the Pope that, though Mr. Odo Russell was absent, there was an English charge d'affaires in Rome, who would see to the lot of the Irish, English, and Canadian Zouaves. " I recommend them all to you,*' continued Pius IX., " in order that you may preserve them from the ill-treatment which others of them suffered some years ago.^ I release my soldiers from the oath of fidelity to me, in order to leave them at liberty. As for the terms of the capitulation, you must see General Kanzler; it is with him you must come to an under- standing on that matter." Then he dismissed the ambassadors and withdrew. Thus, at the supreme moment, his thoughts were not of himself but of his soldiers. The ambassadors went in a body to Cadorna's head- quarters, in order to beg him to give favourable terms to the Papal army. Cadorna received them courteously ; '' anticipating the request which the charge d'affaires of France proposed to make, the Italian general spontane- ously informed him that the Zouaves and the Legion d'Antibes were free. He added that personally he was An allusion to the sufferings of the prisoners of the Pontifical army at the hands of the Piedmontese in i860. M m 530 THE MAKING OF ITALY. glad to be able to pay this tribute of esteem to their courage," ^ and he spoke of the high military qualities of the Papal army. The capitulation set forth that all Rome, except the Leonine City, was to be put into the hands of the Italians : that the Papal troops were to re- ceive the honours of war^ and the foreign volunteers were to be sent to their homes. By nightfall, as we have seen, all Rome except the Leonine City was evacuated by the Papal army, and occupied by the Piedmontese. The Pontifical troops were concentrated about St. Peter's. They piled their arms in the immense Piazza in front of the great basilica, and as the night drew on some lay down beside them ; while others, who had not seen each other for several weeks, and more who had not met since 1867, paced up and down the Piazza together, during the weary vigil of the last night in Rome. Collected in groups about the fires, which were lighted near the fountains, were Zouaves, their faces half hidden in the deep hoods of their Arab manteanx ; dragoons wrapped in their white cloaks, their brazen helmets gleaming in the fitful blaze ; legionaries, carabineers, soldiers of the line and gendarmes, — all dis- cussing, in subdued but earnest tones, the disaster of the morning. It was easy to perceive in the faces of these groups, and in the look they cast towards the Vatican, how deeply they felt the outrage and affliction that day had heaped upon the Holy Father. Noon on the 21st was the hour fixed for the march out of Rome. In the morning numbers of both Romans and foreigners came to the Piazza to wish farewell to the Papal troops ; and, again and again, men whom they had never met before, voluntarily gave them their services in the way of securing their property at the barracks, or carrying messages for them into the city. In acts of kindness of this description the Romans showed themselves most zealous and active. A little before noon 3 Jules Favre's Rome et la Republique FratK^aise^ Paris, 1871, p. 50. Unfortunately, after all these compliments, Cadorna allowed the Papal troops to be disarmed and insulted. THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE. 531 for the last time trumpet and bugle sounded and soldiers fell into their ranks. When they were all drawn up in line, facing the Vatican, and ready to depart, Colonel Allet stepped forward, and in a voice broken with emotion called out — ^^ Mes enfants I Vive Pie Neufl" A tremendous cheer burst in response from the ranks. Just then the Pope appeared at a balcony, and raising his hands to Heaven, prayed : — " May God bless my faithful children ! " Never can the enthusiasm of that supreme moment be equalled. With a frantic " Eljen ! " a Hun- garian Zouave draws his sabre ; an instantaneous rush of steel is heard, and thousands of blades flash in the sunlight. The scene becomes absolutely indescribable. At the thought of leaving the Holy Father, tears of bitterest sorrow stream down the cheeks of men, who had faced death in many a desperate struggle. The trumpets sounded the advance ; and as the troops moved off, one last sad cry of Viva Pio Nono ! burst from the head of the column, and, caught up from rank to rank, was joined in, not only by the whole army, but by the crowd assembled to witness its departure. The troops marched out of Rome by the Porta Angelica. The Legion d'Antibes led the way, then came the Swiss carabineers, the Zouaves, the soldiers of the line, the cacciatori and the other native troops, and lastly the artillery. Then they turned to the left, and, marching round the walls of the Leonine City and the Gardens, reached in about an hour the ground outside the Porta San Pancrazio, where the Italian staff with several thousand soldiers, chiefly of Bixio's division, were waiting to give them the honours of war. Cadorna was on horse- back in the midst of a brilliant group of officers of rank, — Bixio, Masi, Corte, Chevilly, Pezio di Vechi, and other generals. Generals Zappi and De Courten of the Papal army stood dismounted near the Piedmontese officers ; and in the midst of the Italian staff rode— Count Arnim. The Prussian ambassador to the Holy See was sharing in the triumph of its enemies ! As the Pontifical troops marched past, the bands of the Italian regiments struck M m 2 532 THE MAKING OF ITALY. Up, and the men presented arms. Some of the Zouaves., as they went by, half turned to the Italian staff, and cried out,—" Au revoir ! " A little farther on, at the Villa Belvedere, near the road to Civita Vecchia, they laid down their arms, the officers only retaining their swords. It had been originally arranged that the troops should go on to Civita Vecchia by train from San Paolo ; and at that station the trains were actually #in readiness, and a crowd of friends were waiting to bid farewell to the Papal troops. At the last moment the arrangement was altered, the object of the change being, it is said, to prevent this demonstration. The Papal troops were ordered to march on to the railway station at Ponte Galera, about fourteen miles from Rome. The march was a sad and weary one. A little before reaching Ponte Galera, they saw the dome of St. Peter's sink below the horizon, and thus, as it were, lost the last link with Rome. At the station there was a long halt, waiting for the trains to come up from San Paolo. It was not until midnight that the Zouaves reached Civita Vecchia. There they were divided according to nationalities ; and, without being given any food, the French were marched into the Lazaretto fort ; the Irish, English, Belgians, and Dutch to the prisons. The native troops were treated even worse ; they had to spend the whole night in the railway carriages, and it was only next morn- ing that they passed through the station of Civita Vecchia on their way to the fortress of Alessandria. As they passed through Civita they cheered, " Viva Pio Nono'l " a salute to their foreign comrades confined in the forts and prisons of the city. On the 22nd General de Courten, Colonel Castella, Colonel Allet, the officers of the Zouaves, and a number of the soldiers of the regiment, were allowed to go on board of the French frigate Orino- qtie, v/hich lay in the harbour. One of the French officers of the Zouaves, Captain de Fumel, brought with him a precious charge, which he had anxiously guarded since the night of the 20th. It was the white and yellow standard of the Zouaves, the flag of Mentana. Resolved that it should not fall into the hands of the enemy, he THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE. 533 had cut it from its staff and folded it round his body, hidden in the broad red sash which forms part of the Zouave uniform. Once safe on the deck of the Orenoqice, he unrolled it. For the last time it was displayed and saluted with drawn swords. Then Charette cut it into hundreds of pieces, which were distributed to all present, for themselves and their comrades. Like the old regiment itself, the flag of the Zouaves is scattered far and wide over the world ; it is " shrined en a thousand beating hearts,-" destined, I trust, to be once more united on some future day, when its veteran guardians resume their old place at Rome. On the 25th the French Zouaves embarked for France in the Illysus, destined to leave their best and bravest on the battle-fields of the Loire. The Canadians, Irish, and English were sent on to Genoa, to await a steamer to bring them to England ; in Genoa many of them were confined in the common prison. The little garrison of Bagnorea, a single company of Belgian and Dutch Zouaves, had the hardest fate of all. They were simply conveyed to the Swiss frontier by the Italian authorities, and there they were told to make the best of their way home. They marched through Switzerland and Germany, carry- ing with them two sick and one wounded man, who re- fused to be left behind in hospital, and saying they would rather die among their comrades. In Germany they were more than once taken for escaped French prisoners. At Cologne, being without money or food, they slept a night on the stones in front of the cathedral. At length, after weary weeks of suffering, they reached the Belgian fron- tier, where they received a welcome worthy of that Catholic land. The Italian soldiers of the Papal army were chiefly interned at Alessandria. On the 30th the authorities began gradually to set them at liberty and restore them to their homes ; and they were much surprised when they found that all Italy had its representatives in the gallant ranks of the Papal army. From the Alps to Sicily, every province had sent some of its sons to fight for the Holy 534 THE MAKING OF ITAL V. gee. The Romans, as was fitting, were most numerous in the ranks; and after them came the men of the provinces annexed by Piedmont in i860. In this general release the poor squadriglieri were not included. In the face of facts the Italian Government, while, perhaps out of a not un- natural sympathy, it released Gasparone and his brigand friends at Civita Castellana, kept in prison the brave mountaineers who had put down brigandage, set them to work as convicts, treated them in fact as brigands, and did not release some of them for two years, and even then put them under the stirvetllance of the Piedmontese gen- darmerie introduced into their native districts. All this was a most dishonourable breach of the agreement made at the capitulation of Rome. On the 2 1st of September, after having paid military honours to the Papal army outside the Porta San Pan- crazio, Cadorna went back to the Porta Pia, and there made his triumphal entry into the city at the head of his staff, and of regiments of all arms selected from the five divisions with which he had marched against Rome. General Masi was named Commandant of Rome ; and on the 22nd, with a view to restoring order, he issued a pro- clamation forbidding all further demonstrations, as those which had taken place were *^ sufficiently spontaneous, grand and eloquent ; " at the same time he ordered the formation of a giu7tta, or provisional government. On the same day, in consequence of disorders in the Leonine City, it was occupied by the Italian troops. After it had been finally evacuated by the Papal army, it had been in- vaded by the horde of strangers who followed the army of Cadorna. A band of them attacked the barracks of the Piazza di San Pietro close to the Vatican, and killed a gendarme ; his comrades returned the fire, killing two and wounding several of the rioters, and the mob fled pell- mell. After this incident the Pope directed General Kanzler to request Cadorna to take measures to preserve order in the Leonine City, and that evening two battalions of bersaglieri, belonging to Cosenz's division, bivouacked before St. Peter's. On the 27th the Italians took posses- THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE. 535 sion of the castle of Sant' Angelo ; and from that day the Pope's possessions were confined to what was con- tained within the bounds of the Vatican. On the 24th Cadorna installed at the Capitol a giunta composed of eighteen members, for the most part emigres or men from other parts of Italy. The giunta was to prepare and carry into effect the plebiscite. In the city the new Piedmontese police was very active. Every day members of the Papal civil service were arrested ; and arrests were also made of those who had most actively sympathized with the Papal Government, not only men but women also being thrown into prison for that cause. The Abbate Rochetti was arrested at the altar while saying Mass, his only crime being loyalty to Pius IX. The Radical press daily announced these arrests ; and led by Sonzogno's journal, the infamous Capitate called on the police to be still more active, and suggested that this or that house should be searched, this or that arrest made. At length, on September 29th, a proclamation of the giunta announced that the plebiscite would take place on October 2nd. The formula was to be, " We desire to be united to the kingdom of Italy^ under the Constitutional Monarchy of King Victor Emmanuel II. and his succes- sors." To this proposition the Romans were exhorted to reply with a unanimous and emphatic Yes. On that same day Pius IX. published his solemn protest against the lawless occupation of Rome, declaring that he had been thereby deprived of the freedom necessary for the proper government of the Church. As for the approaching plebiscite, he forbade the Catholics to take part in it ; for to do so would be to admit that the ^itmta at the Capitol had the right or authority to submit thus to a popular vote the rights of the Holy See. The first work of the giunta had been to organize an electoral body. Their agents forcibly removed the parish registers from the custody of the priests who had charge of them ; these registers were made the basis of the electoral lists ; numbers of respectable names were, how- ever, omitted ; while those of convicts released from the 536 THE MAKING OF ITALY. prisons, where they had been confined for offences against the common law, were added to the roll. At the same time all " Romans absent from the city '' were invited to return and take part in the vote. Many of the patriots, who had arrived with the troops on September 20th, had gone home again as soon as Cadorna began to enforce something like order in the city. All these sham Romans were brought back again, travelling free at the cost of the State ; and according to the Gazzetta di Torino, they came in such numbers that many of them could not get lodgings, but slept on the benches of the cafes ^ or even in the open squares. During the night of the istand 2nd of October, in order to prevent disorders among this motley crowd, Rome was traversed by strong patrols of troops. The men who had charge of the organization of the plebiscite, had the experience of the plebiscites of 1 860, from that of Savoy and Nice to that of Naples, to guide them in making their arrangements. Everywhere the walls of Rome were covered with immense placards bearing the words,, " Yes, we ivisJi for annexatiojiJ^ During the whole of Saturday, October 1st, men went about the streets, distributing voting-papers marked 5/" (yes) ; and in the Corso a French engineer was arrested, and kept an hour at the police-station, for having asked in a loud voice where a paper marked No could be had. At early morn- ing on the following day the voting began. Groups of men, walking arm in arm with papers marked Si stuck in their hats, marched to the voting places, cheering for Victor Emmanuel, for Bixio, for Cadorna, for Garibaldi. Some of these bands of enthusiastic voters were headed by men who notoriously were not Romans— such^ for in- stance, as the renegade monk, Fra Amadeo. Neverthe- less they voted as Romans, and their votes were accepted. In the bands, too, there were youths below the legal age for the suffrage ; but the officials at the voting urns made no objection on that point. The chief voting place was at the Capitol, but there were others in every quarter of Rome. The voter, before placing his paper in the urn, THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE. 537 had to present his biglietto d'elettore, a card indicating that he had a right to vote. Not only were these cards given away indiscriminately to all who asked for them, even to foreigners, but they were not given up when the voting-paper was deposited in the urn. Thus anyone who wished could go from voting-place to voting-place, and poll as often as he liked. " Vote early and vote often,'' is said to be the direction given to the electors by active canvassers in America ; it certainly was a maxim freely acted upon on the day of the Roman plebiscite. M. de Beauffort states that he had it on good authority that a young Belgian sculptor, who was studying in Rome, anxious to test the working of the plebiscite^ went from urn to urn, and in the course of the day voted no less than twenty-two times for the annexation.'' Other foreigners amused themselves in the same way. In some cases the bands of voters in their zeal for annexation went from urn to urn. A sort of half-hearted pretence of leaving the Leonine City to the Pope had been made by Cadorna and his colleagues, and it was excluded from the vote ; but in the middle of the day a band of voters, led by Tognetti the brother of the assassin of the Zouaves at the Serristori barracks, marched across the bridge of Sant' Angelo and up to the Capitol, carrying a banner with the inscription, " Civita Leonina — Si^' and declared that, a vote having been taken in the Leonine City, 1566 had voted 5/, while there was not a single No. At half-past six the voting stopped, and the urns were conveyed to the great hall of the Capitol, and the count- ing began. At eight the result was declared by the giunta to be an almost unanimous vote for annexation. The numbers were : — Total votes given . . . 40,831 °''^~i::*": : : "''S Majority for annexation . . 40,739 Histoire de V Invasion des Etats Pontificaux, p. 396. 538 THE MAKING OF ITALY. In the Roman provinces the result of the vote was the same, though the false character of the result was even more evident. At Monte San Giovanni, for instance, where there were not more than fifty electors, nine hun- dred votes for annexation were declared to have been found in the urn. The general result for Rome and its territory was not proclaimed until the 7th of October. Including the Roman vote the official return of the result of \h^ plebiscite was as follows : — Total votes given . . . 135,291 Defective voting papers . . 103 ''Yes'' 133,681 ''No'' . . . . . 1,507 Majority for annexation . . 132,174 On the 9th a deputation went to Florence to communi- cate the result of ^^ plebiscite to King Victor Emmanuel. On the nth Cadorna left Rome; and, two days after, General La Marmora became governor of the city, and began to make preparations for the transfer of the capital from Florence. As for the plebiscite^ no one who knows anything either of Rome or of the manner in which such votes are taken, can seriously believe that it was anything but a disgraceful farce. In 1852 Victor Hugo, from his refuge at Jersey, warned the French people that a plebiscite could not be expected to give any result but that which was desired by the government in charge of the ballot boxes, and that there was no guarantee for a fair vote or a true result. He was perfectly right. The plebiscites of the Second Empire and those of Italy were managed on precisely the same principle ; and thus it was that more than seven million votes gave approval to the policy of the Second Empire, only a few weeks before it fell amid the applause of all France over its downfall. Thus it was that a fortnight after Nice had all but unanimously returned to the Pied- montese Parliament members pledged to resist annexation THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE. 539 to France, the same city of Nice hy 2, plebiscite all but unanimously declared for annexation. Thus too it was that in Rome, where Garibaldi confessed there were only a handful of Italianists to be found, and in the Roman provinces where, according to Garibaldian authorities, the invaders of 1867 could scarcely find a man who would give them a drink of water, within three years 90,000 votes called for annexation ; and in the city only 46, and in the provinces not 1500, declared against it — this, too, in a small State, which had given to the Pope several thousand native troops, of whom not one hundred would subse- quently enter the Italian army, while of 16,000 men in the Papal civil service only a very few would accept the offers made to them by the new rulers, the rest pre- ferring present want and a doubtful future to acceptance of wages given for a violation of their loyalty to Pius IX. In a word Xh.^ plebiscite was a miserable expedient ; and it would have been more candid and straightforward on the part of Victor Emmanuel and Signor Lanza to have annexed Rome by a royal decree. Against the great crime which had been committed protests came from all parts of the Catholic world — nor was Italy herself silent. I might quote many of those pro- tests, but I shall be content with citing one made on the eve of the annexation by a member of the Italian Parlia- ment, Count Crotti di Castiglione. " Sire," he wrote to King Victor Emmanuel, as soon as he heard of the invasion of the Patrimony of St. Peter, " On returning to Italy I find my native country in a state of excitement, caused by the orders given by the Ministry for the occu- pation of Rome. I protested against this act when it was only threatened ; now, when it is on the point of becoming an accomplished fact, I protest once more, I solemnly reprobate it, and I invite all my fellow- citizens who are Catholics at heart to unite with me, and to do more than I can. " As a Catholic, I cannot v/ithout a feeling of deep indignation think that my Government, which professes Catholicity, is attacking with bayonets and grapeshot the 540 THE MAKING OF ITALY. metropolis of Christianity, and the august person of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. It is in vain that those who de- prive him of his temporal power make a pretence of respecting his spiritual power. The Vicar of Jesus Christ is a sovereign. He who discrowns him must answer for it to God. Besides, who has not felt the iron hand of suc- cessive cabinets ? Have they not despoiled the clergy of their goods, profaned churches, put obstacles in the way of religious vocations, imprisoned priests, bishops and cardinals ? Yes, we all know how these men show their respect for religion. The occupation of Rome will call forth the protests of two hundred millions of Catholics. It is my duty to make this protest. '^ As an Italian, as a deputy of the Italian Parliament, I reprobate the injustice of the act. It is a flagrant viola- tion of the law of nations, a violation of the first article of the constitution of Charles Albert,^ a violation of promises recently renewed in the Chamber by the Ministry,^ a vio- lation of the Convention with France.^ Before God and before the nation, I accuse the Ministers of having tram- pled under foot all these rights and engagements. " I declare that surrounding circumstances augment to the utmost the injustice of their acts. Without having to fear any effective resistance, they attack a sovereign, who is a man of eighty years, and is at once the gentlest, the most benevolent, and the most beloved of the rulers of this world, a prince whom two hundred millions of Catholics call by the sweet name of Father. ^ Article I. of the ItaUan Constitution: — "The Catholic Apostolic and Roman religion is the sole religion of the State. The other forms of public worship, at present existing, are tolerated in accordance with the laws." ^ Declaration made by Signer Visconti Venosta,Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Chamber at Florence, August 19th, 1870: — "The obligation which Italy has undertaken neither to attack the Pontifical frontier,iior to permit it to be attacked, even if it were not enforced by treaties, would still be enforced by other sanctions provided by the or- dinary law of nations and the general political relations of states ." 7 Article I. of the Convention of September 15th, 1864: — "Italy undertakes not to attack the present territory of the Pope, and even to prevent by force any attack proceeding from the exterior." THE ROMAN PLEBISCITE, 541 '' The occupation of Rome is regarded with horror by most of the Italians. As a deputy, and as an Italian well in- formed of the feelings of my fellow-countrymen I assert this. The opposite party is a mass of anti-Catholic conspirators, held together by a press in the pay of ambitious and self- interested plotters. As an ex-diplomatist, I declare that this unjust and inexcusable abuse of material force will one day justify a foreign aggression against the independence of Italy. " I protest against those who regard as foreigners the Catholics who come and take their places under the standard of the Sovereign Pontiff. No, they are not foreigners, those sons who make of their breasts a shield for their venerated father. Those only are foreigners at Rome who bombard the Vatican. Rome, under the temporal rule of its King, Pius IX., is the spiritual metro- polis of the Catholics of France, Germany, America, as well as those of Italy. In a word, I see in this act of the Italian Ministry the violation of well-defined, sovereign and imprescriptible rights, rights both human and divine. This is why I invite all my fellow-countrymen to protest openly, but without disorder, as the first Christians made their protests. " As for myself, fearing that history may regard all the Italian deputies as accomplices in so great a crime, I deny all responsibility for it ; and I condemn this act of the Italian Ministry with the utmost indignation, in order that I may satisfy the demands of the honour of my name, my conscience and the law of God. " (Signed) Crotti di Castiglione." This letter is in itself sufficient to show that the seizure of Rome was the act, not of the whole Italian people, but of a successful political party. It is a protest worthy of a Catholic and an Italian; and, as such I here place it upon record. 542 THE MAKING OF ITALY. CHAPTER XXVI. TWENTY-ONE YEARS AT ROME (187O-1891). It is no part of my plan to trace the history of the Itah'an occupation of Rome beyond the day when the seizure of the city was consummated by the sham legalization of the plebiscite^ a formality which deceived no one but those who wished to be deceived. I have only a few words to say in conclusion on the actual state of affairs in Italy, and on the present position of the Roman Question, a question which was not solved but only entered on a new phase in 1870. Pius IX. had refused to treat with or in any way recog- nize the new masters of Rome. The Law of Guarantees adopted by the Italian Parliament granted him a revenue in compensation for the broad territories of which he had been despoiled. He refused to touch a single lira of it, and preferred to rely upon the generosity of his children in every land, rather than to become the pensioner of those who had stripped him of his civil sovereignty. His last years were spent within the boundaries of the Vatican palace. He could not have ventured to appear publicly in the city without exposing himself to the insults of the mob on the one hand, or on the other calling forth demon- strations of loyalty, which would have been made the pretext for stern military repression.^ Nor could he have 1 As to the existence of a real danger from mob violence, there is evidence enough in the scandalous riot which took place on the night when the remains of Pius IX. were transferred from the basilica of St. Peter's to his tomb at San Lorenzo. As to the risk his loyal adherents would have incurred if he had appeared in the streets, there is the evidence of what actually happened on the evening of June 20th, 1874, when the crowd gathered on the Piazza of St. Peter's, after the Te Deum for the anniversary of the Pope^s coronation, thought they TWENTY-ONE YEARS AT ROME. 543 accepted in the streets of Rome the protection of the agents of that very power against whose presence in the city he had never ceased to protest. Thus it was that Pius IX. became, practically, a prisoner in his own palace of the Vatican. He had not long to wait for evidence of the utter hollow- ness of the so-called Law of Guarantees. The extension to Rome of the law suppressing the religious orders, th'e seizure of the Roman College, the project for the expro- priation of the property of the Propaganda itself, were so many proofs of the spirit in which the new rulers of Rome interpreted their pledges, that the change of government should not in any way prejudice the Church or the Holy See in its administration of the Church. The position of the Holy Father was rendered all the more difficult by the outbreak of persecution in Germany, Switzerland, and Poland, and his resources were taxed to the utmost to provide for the needs of the distressed clergy, not only in Rome and Italy, but also in other lands. His children all over the world came to his aid. The very misfortunes and difficulties of the Holy See drew, closer the bonds that united the Catholic world to its centre. The Vatican be- came a centre of pilgrimage to an extent that it had never been before in all its long history, and this movement begun under Pius IX. has continued and gathered strength under Leo XIIL, until at length it has provoked the actively hostile opposition of the intruded government. Twice during his last years Pius IX. found himself the centre of a world-wide demonstration of loyalty and affection, first on June i6th, 1871, when he celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his coronation, the first of all the Popes who had ever reigned beyond the "years of Peter ; " and again on June 3rd, 1877, when, surrounded by saw him at one of the windows of the Vatican, and hailed him with an outburst of vivas. They were charged by troops and gendarmes, and, though they made no resistance, they were driven violently from the Piazza, several of them were arrested, and four men were tried for uttering seditious cries — one being sentenced to two years and the rest to several months of imprisonment. 544 THE MAKING OF ITALY. the bishops and pilgrims of all nations, he kept the jubilee of his episcopal consecration. The year of the Jubilee was, however, not without its sorrows. Within a few weeks of each other he was deprived by death of two of his most trusted friends and helpers, Antonelli, for so many years the Cardinal Secretary of State, and Patrizi, the Cardinal- Vicar, and his chief counsellor in all that regarded the spiritual government of the Church. In the autumn, Pius IX. himself was seriously ill ; there were repeated rumours of his death ; and the king and his ministers more than once discussed plans for influencing the approaching conclave so as to secure the election of *' a Liberal Pope," as the phrase ran. But Pius IX. was destined to outlive Victor Emmanuel, as he had outlived Napoleon III. In the first days of January, 1878, the king was suddenly taken ill at the Quirinal, a palace which he had alv/ays feared to occupy, the very traditions of his house making it painful to him to have daily and hourly reminders of his spoliation of the Holy See before his eyes. He had avoided, as far as pos- sible, sleeping even for one night in the plundered Pontifical palace, and when he felt the fever on him he begged his attendants to remove him from Rome, but the doctors per- emptorily forbade it. Soon the rumour went round the city that the king was dying. As soon as Pius IX. heard the news he sent one of his own chaplains to the Quirinal to give the dying man the last rites of the Church. Deeply wronged as he was, the Pontiff thought only of soothing the passage to eternity of his chief despoiler. Every obstacle was put in the way of the Pope's envoy at the Quirinal, and it was not until the third day of Victor Emmanuel's illness, when all hope of his recovery had been abandoned, that one of the court chaplains, furnished with full powers by the Pope, was admitted to his bedside and reconciled him to the Church. Within a month the Pope had followed him to the grave. Victor Emmanuel died on January 9th. Pius IX. on February 6th. A saintly death closed the great Pontiff's life of trial and suffering, but a life whose unwearied TWENTY-ONE YEARS AT ROME. 545 labours had opened for the Church a new era of triumphs in many a land. There is no need to write any eulogy of his character and his career. The verdict of history will rank him among the most illustrious of the successors of St. Peter^ and his Pontificate will be looked back to for centuries as one of the great epochs in the annals of the Church Catholic. It had been the hope of the Revolution that, however stubbornly Pius IX. might refuse truce or compromise with the new order of things, his successor would prove to be a man of more yielding disposition. The death of the Pope had occurred somewhat unexpectedly. Though he had been ill in the autumn of 1877, at the New Year he seemed to have recovered, and there was every expectation that his life would be prolonged for at least some months. The news of his death came at a moment when the Italian Government was fully occupied with the changes that followed the accession of a new king, and when the diplo- matists of Europe were more interested in the settlement of the conditions of peace between France and Germany than in schemes for influencing the conclave. Before the enemies of the Church had time to concert any hostile plans of action, the cardinals had assembled at the Vatican and had chosen as Supreme Pontiff, Cardinal Pecci, the Arch- bishop of Perugia. He assumed the name of Leo XIII., a name now honoured not only within the Catholic Church, but throughout the whole civilized world. From the palace prison of the Vatican he has ruled the Church for well- nigh fourteen years ; God grant that he may rule it yet ad multos annos. The first public utterances of the new Pope shattered the hopes of the usurpers. He had taken up the standard of the Church's rights from the hands of his predecessor, and he showed himself as uncompromising as ever Pius IX. had been on the question of the independence of the Holy See, and its effective guarantee in the Civil Sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff. The hope that the Roman Question would be solved by a surrender on the part of Leo XIII: of all that Pius IX. had contended for, has been long since N n 546 THE MAKING OF ITALY. abandoned by even the most optimist of the Italian party. Meanwhile, in Italy itself, as well as abroad, there has been a growing feeling that sooner or later some means must be found of restoring to the Papacy such material guarantees of independence as will put an end to the existing state of things, in which Rome is the seat of two opposing forces, and the very agencies on which the administration of the Universal Church depends are at the mercy of the changing policy of a cabinet. At the same time, there is in Italy a widespread feeling of disappointment at the results that have ensued from the revolution begun at the Congress of Paris and com- pleted at the Porta Pia. In the first place, even from the mere business point of view, the country has had to pay dearly for its so-called unity. The process of unification was carried out by a long series of costly wars, and hardly less costly revolutions, a fleet and army were organized on a grand scale in order to guard first against Austria, and then against France ; anti, though the fleet is the navy of Lissa and the army is that whose last great battle was Custozza, Italy is still trying to play the part of a great power, and to keep in line with her two huge partners in the Triple Alli- ance. The result of this policy has been a colossal debt, an annual expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the country, and a taxation that has risen to such a point that three successive ministers of finance have de- clared that it is impossible to further increase the burden. In 1862, the year when the first budget of the new Kingdom of Italy was submitted to the Parliament, the national debt was 120 millions sterling ; at the beginning of 1 891 the funded debt alone amounted to no less than 520 millions sterling. There were further provincial and municipal funded debts to the amount of 47 millions, besides a large floating debt. Of the national debt of Italy, Signor Luzzati, the present Minister of Finance, wrote in his report on the budget of 1888-89, — '^ While the State debt of Italy ranks fourth in amount, coming after the debts of France, Russia and England, yet when compared with the economical condition of the TWENTY-ONE YEARS AT ROME. 547 country it stands the highest. Thus debt charge compared to revenue is in Germany 14 per cent, Hungary 24 per cent, England 26 per cent, Austria 33 per cent, Russia 35 per cent., France 36 per cent, and Italy 38 per cent" Heavy debt and large armaments mean extravagant expenditure. But the most interesting point for our con • sideration is the effect which they produce on the individual and the household in Italy. I find very precise informa- tion on this head in an article contributed last year to the Journal des Economistes by Signor Vilfredo Pareto, one of the chief living authorities on such topics. In this article he carefully analyzes the expenditure of an artisan family of four persons actually living at Florence in 1890. He finds that their total income was 2380 francs, or a little more than 95/. sterling. Out of this they paid in taxes, direct and indirect, no less than 565 francs, or about 22/. \os. Tax- ation thus took away just 23*9 per cent, of their small income. In England the same family would have had to pay rather less than four and a half per cent of its income in taxes. No wonder that Luzzati and his two immediate predecessors at the treasury have declared that further taxation is impossible. There is also evidence of the same oppressive state of things in the annual returns of properties expropriated, that is, seized and sold in order to recover arrears of taxes. These amount to some forty thousand in a single year No wonder the people thus dispossessed are going out of the country by shiploads and seeking new homes beyond the Atlantic. It would be easy to multiply figures drawn from official reports to show that this state of things has had its natural result in decreasing trade, decreasing agricultural produc- tion and diminished wealth. The exports have declined from 1 104 millions of lire in 1880 to Zt^ millions in 1890. The official returns show that the production of wheat, maize, rice, and oil has decreased year by year. Even the cultivated lands produce less than those of France, Eng- land or Belgium, and the extent of uncultivated land is N n 2 548 THE MAKING OF ITALY. greater in proportion to the whole than in any continental country except Holland. The accounts of the banks show that private savings are diminishing, and private indebtedness increasing. Italy is suffering from a chronic crisis of four kinds. There is a fiscal crisis, for the deficit has become normal, the debt has increased out of all proportion to the resources of the country, and taxation has reached its limits. There is an agricultural crisis, the result not so much of a bad season as of over-taxation absorbing the narrow limit of profit left to the cultivator of the soil. There is a building crisis, the result of the over-speculation of land-jobbers and con- tractors which resulted from the ambitious schemes for all but rebuilding Rome adopted by the Government in 1880, which has indeed added new quarters and thoroughfares to the city, but has, at the same time, piled up an enormous municipal debt, added to the financial embarrassments of the Government itself, and involved numbers of individuals in ruin. Finally there is a banking crisis. Throughout the kingdom the banks have made advances on property that has steadily depreciated within the last few years, and the inevitable liquidation must come for all but the strongest among them. The source of all this loss and misery is none other than the costly methods adopted for making Italy a nation and a " great Power.'^ But the change that has taken place in recent years is not merely an economical one. There is also moral deterioration. To give only one instance, M. Gal- lenga, in his most recent work on Italy, though his whole life has been devoted to the cause of Italian Unity, writes of the administration of justice in the new kingdom : — **The judges of the Italian courts, from the highest to the lowest, are more wretchedly paid than they were in Lombardy and Venice under Austrian rule ; a statement which explains and justifies the complaint one so fre- quently hears in Northern Italy, that, however proud the people may be of the independence of their country, they have reason to regret the severe but incorruptible adminis- tration of German justice {Giustizia Tedesca).*' TWENTY-ONE YEARS AT ROME. 549 It would be easy to multiply quotations from M. Gal- lenga's " Italy : Present and Future ; " from authorities so divergent in other respects as ih^ Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews ;^ from such different sources as Ouida's appen- dix to a novel on the one hand,^ and Blue Books and consular reports on the other, all tending to show the same fact that the figures given above have already revealed to us, that the Italian Revolution has not brought to the fair land which it has made its own the prosperity and pro- gress that the men of 1859 ^^d i860 promised, but in its stead widespread misery and deterioration. 1 am the last to argue that there was no need of change in the old state of things in Italy ; the last to deny that there was a good and sound side to the aspiration for national unity. But there is a difference between states- manlike reform and red-handed revolution, and unity that is built upon the wholesale effacement of local institutions and local liberties, and the reducing of everything to one centralized bureaucratic system is a unity that contains the seeds of its own destruction. I have always failed to see how Italy had more to gain from being dragooned into the Union planned by Cavour, than she would have secured by the Federal system of a common unity that would not 2 I may give two brief quotations from articles on Italian affairs in these reviews. Both refer to Italian official accounts on the state of the provinces some ten years ago, at a date when the economic position of Italy was decidedly much better than it is now. Edinburgh Review^ July, 1883, p. 95. — " It is very remarkable that in the replies sent in from the various communes there is a con- stantly recurring complaint of deterioration ; and this not only in the mountain districts, or with regard to the dwellings of the labouring classes, but also generally, and with reference to their condition in all respects. Things, it is said, are much worse than they used to be." Quarterly Review^ October, 1882, p. 512. — "It is scarcely an ex- aggeration to say that all the official reports seem to form one long indictment against the revolution by which the unity of Italy has been effected. The labourer has sensibly changed for the worse ; he has to work much harder, and he feels no better than of old if he does not feel worse." * See the evidence given in her *' Village Commune," not in the fictitious story, but in the personal testimony contained in the appendix. 550 THE MAKING OF ITALY. sweep away the local autonomy of south, centre and north. This was the plan advocated by Gioberti in 1848, ac- cepted by Pius IX. in i860. It would have been tried but for the fact that Cavour and his fellow-conspirators would hear of no Italian Unity unless under the rule of the House of Savoy and the politicians of Turin. German unity has become a reality under a Federal system such as is here indicated, and the strength of Germany presents a striking contrast to the weakness of Italy. The Federal system has saved the Austrian mon- archy from disruption. It is the life of the oldest Republic in Europe, and of the greatest of the Republics of the New World. If the men who made Italy one had been law-abiding statesmen and not lawless conspirators, if there had been more anxiety to serve their common country, and less eagerness to humiliate the Papacy, this system, the safeguard of great States, would at least have been given a trial in a land where racial and local conditions render it all important that one cast-iron system should not be im- posed on each and every region from the Alps to Sicily. The doctrine of " accomplished facts " has this much of truth in it, that one cannot obliterate a long chain of events or undo all their results. So it may be said that no one now hopes, or would attempt, to restore the Italy of 1856. But it is also true that there are millions in and out of Italy who neither desire nor believe in the perpetuation of the Italy of the present day. The Roman Question exists and cannot be ignored. Sooner or later it will have to be solved, and the solution will not be arrived at by shutting one's eyes to the broad underlying facts of the situation. There must be assured liberty and independence for the Holy See. A way will have to be found of securing this in a reorganized, not necessarily a disrupted, Italy. The Federal principle seems to point to the general direction in which this reorganization will most likely be effected. But there is little to be gained by forecasts of what may be. The important point is to insist that the current of events during the period of which I have related the history has modified, not solved, this great central problem TWENTY-ONE YEARS AT ROME. 551 of the Roman Question. I believe that I have shown by the evidence of undoubted authorities, themselves for the most part actors in the events they describe, that there is but a scanty basis for the legend that represents the revo- lution that began in 1856 and ended in 1870, as anything like the act of the Italian people as a whole. It was the act of a party, accomplished throughout by the help of foreign arms, in the interest of a section of the people, and against the armed protest of whole districts of the country. To put the origin of the existing state of affairs in its true light, is to take away from it that halo of consecration as the result of a national movement, which is one of guaran- tees for its endurance. It has no right to any such title. Built up in defiance of the laws that have regulated the intercourse of civilized nations, it has been a potent agent in introducing into Europe the present state of armed peace that is crushing the very strength out of the Italian kingdom itself. Any disaster that may overtake it will be but the natural outcome of its past. But the Sovereign Pontiff, himself a son of Italy, has no desire to , see even the amelioration of his own position worked out through the ruin of his country. He has in manifold ways shown himself a lover of the people of Italy. His only quarrel is with the system which, disre- garding the elementary rights of the Holy See, makes it part of the policy of the hostile government, that has its centre at the Quirinal, to embarrass him in every way in his administration of the affairs of the Catholic Church. Most assuredly the majority of the Italian people them- selves have no desire to see this conflict between Church and State indefinitely prolonged. If it is to cease, the first concessions must come from the side of the State. Rudini or his successor may refuse to go to Canossa, as Bismarck once refused, but some day a minister of the Italian king- dom will realize that unless the monarchy is itself to perish peace will have to be made with the Holy See. Such a crisis will make the road to Canossa seem an easy one. Meanwhile the Sovereign Pontiff continues his protest against a state of things that, to use his own words, has 552 THE MAKING OF ITALY. become intolerable. He represents moral as opposed to material force, and in all the conflicts that are recorded in history between these two forces, the material power has always had to give way, where it was met with courage and perseverance. There is no fear that in the successor of St. Peter either of these qualities will be wanting, and at Rome as in Germany, in God's good time we shall see right victorious over might. THE END. GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, LD., ST. JOHN'S HOUSE, CLERKENWELL ROAD, E.C. REC'D LD 3_LD___| L.OAM OEPT m w AUG 1 2 1987 ipre ^s^B-^ --MA)UX2(]aS^_ n 5^^ ''"21-.00„.7, .39(402,5) UC. BERKELEV LIBRAf II B0030n3fli ,j>y-i 5097(7 5 UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA LIBRARY