MASTER NEGA TIVE NO .92-80490 MICROFILMED 1991 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code -- concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: THOMPSON, JOSEPH P[ARRIoHj TITLE: FINAL CAUSE; A CRITIQUE OF THE Mr M^ijL k^ JlL • LONDON DA TE : [1 884] Restrictions on Use: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT Master Negative # -AliMlQrJ. DIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET Original Material as I'ihned - Existing Bibliographic Record r [ft T*^' ■ * v m Thoir.pnon, Joseph P^arrir.h^ 1819-in79, Finnl cause; a critique of the failure of Palcy ^tA the fallacy of Huine... vrith an appen- dix on Professor Huxley's "Hume." 2d ed. London, Hardv.'icke, fl8P4^ * 1^' p« c.l en. Cory in Butler -Library~of-~Philosophy. TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA FILM SIZF: ->^ r^ r^, REDUCTION RATIO: IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA Qg) IB IIB DATE FILMED:„3_iH_-A5s INITIALS fHA'C^ HLMED BY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS. INC WOODBRIDGE, CT ' MX Association for Information and image Management 1 1 00 Wayne Avenue. Suite 1 1 00 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 1 2 3 lij l|ll|ll|ll|ll|ljli|l ll|ll|ll Inches ii 4 5 Jmjmjim] m m|im 7 8 iiliiiiliiiilii 1.0 9 L 10 I I I I.I 1.25 mm UL 1 2.8 3.2 4n 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 11 iiliiiili 12 13 ulmjiimlmi 14 15 mm ITT M MfiNUFRCTURED TO fillM STONDRRDS BY fiPPLIEO IMAGE, INC. -t^ ^^ I991H88 FT Colitmblrt ©oUcitc in the Citu of yctw Dovh 74^/f ft I • • > ■> • FINAL CAUSE: A CRITIQUE OF THE FAILURE OF PALEY AND THE FALLACY OF HUME. BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D.,LL.D. WITR AN APPENDIX ON PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S "HUME." SECOND EDITION. LONDON : HARDWICKE & BOGUE, 192, PICCADILLY, W. A. ASHER & CO., 5, UNTER DEN LINDEN, BERLIN. PARIS : GALIGNANI & CO. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. • ••••••••• • • • ••• •,,• • t • • t * . » , - - f . « "' . ■• t • t • • • t • • • ' t •«,"•• • , , t ' t • •••••• ;• •: • o • t >, * • • 7 > • J ' tS 5 • 4 • * • • • • • c • > i ft a ^ • » • i( FINAL CAUSE; A CRITIQUE OF THE FAILUEE OF PALEY AND THE FALLACY OF HUME. -•o«- IN his ''History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century/' Mr. Leslie Stephen pays an earnest and impartial tribute to the two writers of that period, who were the foremost disputants upon the doctrine of a final cause in Nature as proving the existence of God^ — David Hume and William Paley. Of Hume he says: — ''We have in his pages the ultimate expression of the acutest scepticism of the eighteenth century, — the one articu- late statement of a philosophical judgment upon the central questions at issue/'* And again : — " Hume's scepticism completes the critical movement of Locke. It marks one r of the great turning-points in the history of thought. From - 1 * Chap. vi. sec. 3. B 157162 his writinrrs we may date the definite abandonment of the philosophical, conceptions of the preceding century, leading, :m'^^i\i^ oSafees, id dn abandonment of the great questions as •'inso'liible; and," in others, to an attempt to solve them by a TM^w metliod. :|ium(» did not destroy ontology or theology, b)i(>.',he'He.siroybd: the old ontology; and all later thinkers, who , have. ^lOt .beea content with the mere dead bones of *mttn>jt pllitosophy,* have built up their systems upon entirely * hew lines/'* Of Paley Mr. Stephen says :— " The Natural Theology lays the basis of his whole system. The book, whatever its philo- sophical shortcomings, is a marvel of skilful statement. It states, with admirable clearness and in a most attractive form, the argument which has the greatest popular force, and which, duly etherealized, still passes muster with metaphysicians'. Considered as the work of a man who had to cram himself for the purpose, it would be difficult to praise its literary merits too highly. The only fault in the book, considered as an instrument of persuasion, is that it is too conclusive. If there were no hidden flaw in the reasoning, it would be impossible to understand, not only how any should resist, but how any one should ever have overlooked the demonstration. '^f In the history of polemics there is hardly another instance of such collapse of popularity as has befallen the book, the style and method of which Mr. Stephen has here so justly praised. The argument of Paley was regarded by theologians of his time as invincible; and his illustrations from Nature were so attractive to youth that his '* Natural Theology '' was adopted as a text-book in colleges. Upon the basfs of his famous axiom was built np the series of '' Bridgowater Treatises," in which anatomy and physiology, astronomy^ geology, and various branches of physics were brought to illustrate and establish the evidence of design in Nature. So keen a logician as Archbishop Whately used his acumen to adapt Paley's reasoning to the later discoveries and develop- ments of science ; and so careful a physicist as Dr. Whewell led his " Induction of the Physical Sciences " up to the same conclusion. Yet to the present generation, within less than ^^g^^^y years from its first appearance, Paley's ''Natural Theology " is already antiquated as to its once brilliant and conclusive demonstrations, and as an authority is well-nio-h obsolete. ° Quite otherwise has been the fate of Hume. Mr. Stephen * Chap. ill. sec. 43. t Chap, viii, iv. 38. 3 reminds us that '' his first book fell dead-born from the press ; few of its successors had a much better fate. The uneducated masses were, of course, beyond his reach ; amongst the educated minority he had but few readers; and amongst the few readers still fewer who could appreciate his thoughts. ^^* Add to this that Hume, though deeming himself a match for the philo- sophers and theologians of his time, had a secret dread of that religious pugnacity in the common people of Scotland which is so quickly roused against an assailant of popular beliefs, and therefore kept back, to be published afr?r his death, his '' Dialogues on Natural Religion," — the book most fitted to provoke that acrimonious criticism which insures literary success. Now, however, within a century of its first appear- ance, we find this masterly product of Hume's dialectics still acknowledged as the standard treatise of philosophical scepti- cism. Scotch philosophers since his day have laboured to reform philosophy in the light of Hume's criticism ; Kant attempted to refute his scepticism ; John Stuart Mill virtually built upon Hume ; and he has lately been revived in Germany, with the honour of translation and the prestige of authority. His fame grows with time. This is due partly to the beauty of Hume's style, and the clearness and depth of his reasoning; due also to the decline of theological asperity, and the growth of a tolerant spirit among various schools of thought ; and due not a little to the tone of audacity, — or what he himself styled '' a certain boldness of temper," — with which Hume assailed convictions which had come to be accepted as axioms both in philosophy and in religion. And I am of opinion also that no small part of the favour which has accrued to Hume is due to the metaphysical fallacies which have sprung up side by side with the scientific facts which have discredited Paley. The whole history of science discloses a disposition to metaphysical speculation awakened by each new discovery in physical nature. With every fresh deposit of facts upon the borders of science comes a fresh brood of fallacies upon the adjacent borders of hypothesis; and the progenitors of these have a natural affinity for the greatest of sceptics, who was notably the dupe of his own fallacies. This phenomenon of the simultaneous generation of fact and fallacy is itself worthy of scientific investigation. But it is enough to note it here as showing that the failure of Paley's demonstration of Grod in Nature should not drive us over to Hume's contra- diction, which is demonstrably a fallacy. Chap. i. 1 k .^1 5 ii| Paley's statement of the doctrine of an end in Nature was irom the first open to these two objections. (1) .Instead of form ulatino- a pnmosition to ifinroved or P''.'''^"!nJf^ t^^^L^o»^-c-^i7F5HrwlTHrnie convic tLoT^fT tnj^if]i arises in tlie n^^ tacitly a_ssuii2ed th^TlW^Jn^^ and wrappedjhis aiism se lf- vei^^^i^^l ^JIid^-^^] I he soiigLtJo^b-engthen by nmltifariousjllustrations. (^)AssuminglTIil design or contrivance^iii^tiTS the whole held of Nature Paley was betrayed into the use of illustrations, sometimes far-fetched, sometimes superficial or lackincr con- lirmation, which wear the appearance of making out a case. Ihere cannot be design without a designer, contiwance without a contriver," was the axiom upon which Paley built up his treatise. He does not seem to have been aware,— at east, he takes no notice of the fact,— that Hume had assailed tins axiom, and the very illustration of the watch by which 1 aley so tnuniphantly asserts it, at the one point at which it might be vulnerable, and if vulnerable, then worthless to 1 aley s end, viz., that the axiom rests solely upon experience and holds only within the range of possible human action and observation 1 hougli Hume's assertion is a flilhicy, yet he had put It so plausibly that Paley could not afford to pass it by and by leaving Ins fundamental premise open to doubt and contradiction, Paley failed to establish the existence of a feupreme Being from traces of design in Nature, however curious and multiplied. Indeed, he himself fell into the com- mon fallacy of begging the question in the very statement of it. lliat design implies a designer is as obvious as that thoucrht imp les a thinker ; but the materialist denies personality to the thinking substance; and to apply the term design to every hint of adaptation in Nature, in the sense of an intelligence shaping matter to an end, is to assume the existence of God in the very torm of proving it. It was also an error of Paley that he sought to make out the ^oo,f;,,>,..of the end, as part of the evidence of a supreme con- triver; or at least to show the preponderance of irood over evil in apparent ends. In this endeavour he was sometimes 80 unfortunate as to throw the weight of his illustration into the opposite sea e. Thus, in asserting that - teeth were made to eat not to ache," he failed to dispose of the fact that they do ache, as an objection to any ruling design in their structure and composition. Their aching is not always due to some violation of nature, since Hid beasts in our Zoological Gardens fnZ "'? "?^"";^ "^^""^^ ^^"-Sevy, It will not quiet the jumping tooth-ache, nor ease a neuralgic nerve to assure the suflerer that teeth and nerves were not made for the purpose of givlntr pain. Indaed, it is quite a popular fancy that nerves are demons of evil. The ivhence and the wherefore of evil must be taken into view in forming an estimate of the end for which a thing was made, of unity and wisdom in its design, or of any purpose whatever in its existence. But the question of a hnal cause in things is not to be set aside by some single character- istic or quality of a thing which seems to mark it as useless or even injurious. , • . •.• x That every event argues a cause is an intuitive, not an experimental, conviction of the human mind. Whether the cause is intelligent and purposing, or is only a material or an / accidental antecedent, is to be determined by observation and analysis of the thing itself in its place, and its relations. Moral qualities or purposes, suggested by certain properties of a thing as inhering in the Cause,— if Cause there be,— do not necessarily enter into the proof of the existence of an intelligent Cause, which might be either good or evil. Stripping Paley's statement of its verbal assumptions, and setting aside such of his illustrations as are crude, or anti- quated, his fundamental argument for the Creator as evinced / by the traces of design in Nature is not only tenable in face of the more recent discoveries of science, but is illustrated and confirmed by a far richer array of natural phenomena than Paley had ever imagined. We may improve, however, upon his statement of the doctrine of final causes as follows: The perceived collocation or combination of phenomena or forces in Nature toward a given result, produces in the mind the immediate conviction of an intelligent purpose behind such phenomena and forces. This statement, while it retains the essence of Paley's axiom, avoids his logical vice of including in the definition the very term to be defined. A fixed series of events may be mechanical; but the combination of several independent series of phenomena toward a distinctive result must be referred to Thought purposing that event. Nature with all her forces and * material has never produced a single thing that answers to the idea of an invention. This is always the product of human intelligence appHed to the powers and substances of Nature. The contri- vance seen in a machine instantly refers us to the mind as its cause. Thus, electricity is a power everywhere present in Nature ; yet electricity has never produced an electrical machine, an electric telegraph or telephone, or an electric light. But though Nature cannot turn her own powers into a practical machine, and the least hint of an adaptation of these powers to the purposes of man suggests the intervention of the human intellect, yet the natural powers which man subordi- 6 nates to his intelligent uses venuun greater and more wonderful timn the inventions to which they are applied. Are then the povvers and substances of Xatiiiv uhicl, stand, as it were waiting for the touch of the invent,,, '- i^enius to make them available wherever mind shall lead the way, themselves mere things of chance or products of material law with no inh-td iu their existence? AVI,,.,. i„,,de available do they p.wlaim mtelbgence, and yet is the marvellous property of amihldlil,! only a meaningless phenomenon of matter ? Hitherto the phrascoL.gy ol the doctiine of design, and. the illustrations of tl,e doctrine have had a cei-tain coarseness of fibre, sucrestino- a mechan.cal universe turned out by what Cowper styfes " the great.l///^ar of all that moves," and needing the constant over- sight of the .Maker to keep it in working order. 'J'he sublime person, hcations of the creation in tl,<. Itible have been liternlized by om- matter-of-fact philosophy, a.s though the differential calculus could measure the asti-onomy of Job or of the l<>tli ir "t \''n f ™''T; \^ ,•''•"'??■■".? »s into nearer contact with wfiat lyndall has called the " subsensible worhl," has at once enlarged the sphere of our vision, and heightened its powers. Teleology ad.lresses itself to some finer sense within ]t widens Its circle without changing its centre. The mechanism of the universe drops away, a,ul we find or feel the Thoi„,l.t of the Infinite Mind projecting itself in the actual thro.iUi Unite forms and combining and comprehending the wholein an ever-unfo Iding purpose, lleuce, we may say with von ]?aerenbach, Durwin has not rendered Teleology impossible under any and every f.-rm, but has conducted philosophical Bcionce to atiother and the true inception of desiU."* Irue, von Laerenbach would find the solution of" the universe in Mo,usm ; but his testimony from a scientific point of view shows that the question of Causality will not down and that, after all sciences. Nature persistentl/ demands the nitenifore ot her own phenomena. Zeller, of Berlin, i„ his paper read before the Academy of Science " upon the Teloological and the Mechanical interpre- tations of Mature in their application to the universe " seeks to combine the necessary in Nature with the purposive in Kcasou Since, on all sides, the investigation of Nature so tar as it has been carried, shows us a firm linking to. * It is a groundless assumption of Zeller that because life is it has always been ; an assumption not warranted by the law of scientific induction. Ihe rule of experience by which physicists would bind us forbids such a gene- ralization upon phenomena of which there is no possible record. This is not scientific testimony, but speculative hypothesis. "Hh, 8 He in mechanism Tlie mechanism of the universe may be concluded w.thm motion and the correlation of forces • but force IS a quality, not a cause, and motion demands an ongin and beyond both lie the immensities of vitalism and or iQteiligence. Hume attempted to break down tlie teleolomcal argument by assailing the conception of cause and efft^ct. He main- tamed that - order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes is not of itself any proof of design, but only so far as It has been experienced to proceed from that principle,^^ and also, that our experience of design, from the operations of the human mind, cannot furnish an analogy for 'Uhe irreat universal mind," which we thus assume to be the Author of iNature. Hence, according to Hume, before we could infer that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and act like the huinau, it were requisite that we had experience ot the origin of worlds, and it is not sufficient, surelv, that we have seen ships aud cities arise from human art and contrivance/' '^'J^9Jk«l4^^iAitiaii^^a^^^^^ by the universal consciousness of mankind. Most assuredly our belief that any particular object in which we perceive the adaptation of parts to each other, or of means to an end, must have pro- ceecled from a designing cause, does not arise out of a pre- yious observation or experience of such cause in objects of the same class. Of the millions of men who wear watches, how very few have ever seen the parts of a watch faf med anJ put together ! Yet every possessor of a watch is sure that it had a maker; and this conviction could not be strengthened by his going to Geneva and seeing watches made by hand, or to^Walthain and seeing them made by machinery. The first maker of a watch had no '^experience '' to follow He used his own inventive skill. The watch existed in his luind before he shaped it in metal. And when the first watch was completed it testified of itsvJf, to every observer, of the designing mmd and the cunning hand which had produced it And this because, as Hume himself says, '^ Throw several pieces of steel together without shape or form ; they will never arrange themselves so as to complete a watch '' This IS not an inference from the study of such a casual heap of steel, but is an immediate and irresistible cognition of the human mmd One does not need to trace the loose bits of steel trom their entrance at one end of the factory to their emergence as a completed watch at the other, in order to be satisfied that, at some point of their course, a designing hand has adjusted them to each other. The perceived adjustment \m I I i\ 9 produces this conviction instantaneously ; and no amount of experience could render the conviction more certain. The conviction that a particular combination of means for an end is the product of a designing cause, is not at all dependent upon the *' experience '' of such cause in Jilie cases. Neither does the conviction that adaptation proceeds from design rest upon *' experience 'Mn avy case whatever. That the adaptation of means to an end proceeds from an intelligent and purposing foresight of that end is an intuitive conviction of the human mind. To be convinced of this causal conn ection the mind requires neither argument nor observation ; it could accept no other explanation of the existence of the event. The mind assumes this causal rela- tion of intelligence to adaptation, in those very observations of nature or discoveries of inventive skill which Mr. Hume would include in the term '^ experience." As the print of a human foot upon the sand gave taj Kobinson Crusoe the immediate conviction that there was another man upon what he had supposed to be his uninhabited island ; as the impressions of feet, talons, fins, vertebrae, embedded in rock, certify the geologist of extinct races ; so does the least token of adaptation at once articulate itself with the conception of design. In the gravel-beds of the Somme were picked up at first a few flint stones, bearing rude marks of having been shaped for use. No human remains were associated with them. The beds in which they lay were hitherto supposed to antedate the appearance of man ; yet these shapen flints produced in every observer the instantaneous conviction that man was there at the period of this formation. When once the eye had satisfied itself that these forms were not the result of natural attrition, were not worn but shaped, — that this flint, however rudely shaped, was intended for a knife or a hatchet, this block for a hammer, this pointed stone for a spear, — the mind at once pronounced it the work of man. The adaptation points to design, and the design points to a grade of human intelligence. It does not matter that we cannot divine the specific use of this or that implement ; if the object itself shows that it was shaped for some use, if it is not merely a stone but an implement, there springs up at sight of it the necessary conviction that this was the work of a designing cause. Hence Hu me's appeal toj ^ experi ence " is fallacio us in thege neral a s well a s m the particular. ^ llJqually fallacious is Hume's^otrjection to the analogy from the products of human design to the works of a hi^jher intelligence. The scale of the works, the vastness of the C I ;l 10 iateliit^euco requisite to have conceived, and of tlie power to have exocuted them, have no place in the conviction of desi<;n. This arises from the single fact of ajjji^ltattoi^f whether seen in the wheels of a watch or of a locomotive, in the point of a pin or the lever of a steam-engine, in the antenna? of an ant or the proboscis of an elephant. Could Lord Rosse's telescope itself be projected by a series of lenses to the farthest star within its field, this immensity of adaptation would no more exhaust the principle than does the actual size of the telescope as compared with the eye of a beetle. Size, number, magni- tude have no relation to the notion of adaptation, which in and of itself produces the conviction of design. Moreover, the human mind is the only possible unit by which we may compute the optTations of '' the universal mind.^' Jf we drop the argument from design, and fall back upon ontology, still the finite mind which we know in con- sciousness is the only agent by which, through analogy, contrast, or negation, we can attain to a conception of the Infinite. r The very observations which Hume would classify under " experience ^' must be made and recorded by this self-same mind ; and no man has a higher confidence in the scope and the trustworthiness of its powers than the philosopher who attempts to account for the existence of Nature without either a cause or an end. But as our conception of causality and of personality, derived from consciousness, is capable of being projected from ourselves into the infinite or '^ universal '' mind, — just as we can project a mathematical line or circle into in- finite space, — so adaptation seen in Nature reflects our con- ception of design up to the highest heaven and back to the farthest eternity. The mathematician does not pretend to comprehend the infinities or the infinitesimals which he nevertheless conceives of as quantities in his calculations. It would require his life- time to count up the billions which he handles so freely on a sheet of paper. The mind which can conceive of infinite number and of universal space without comprehending either, can also derive from itself the conception of a " universal mind/^ To do complete justice to Hume, I will now sum up his argument and my reply. In his essay on '' Providence and a Future State/* Hume says : — '' Man is a being whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connection and co- herence, according to the laws which Nature has established for the government of such a crenture. When, therefore, we find that any work has proceeded from the skill and 11 industry of man, as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences con- cerning what may be expected from him ; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation."*' Hence he concludes, we cannot *' from the course of Nature infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed and still preserves order in the universe,"'* inasmuch as we have had no experience of such a cause in Nature, upon which to ground this inference. At least three oversights or misconceptions are apparent in this statement. (1.) Mr. Hume overlooks the fact that each man is conscious of a designing faculty within himself, and does not need to be certified of the adaptation of means to ends through the observation of this faculty in other men. There was a titue when a first man invented the first machine, or adapted some- thing to his own ends ; and surely he had no experience of design in other men to create faith in himself as a designer. He put forth a conscious power; his experience of what he could accomplish confirmed his conception of design, but did not create it. So it is with us all. When we see adaptation to an end, we say at once, Here was an intelligent cause, and this not because we have observed that other men have pro- duced designs, but knowing ourselves as intelligent des'gning causes, we of course refer adaptation to intelligence. (2.) This points us to Hume's second oversight; he fails to perceive that the single thing to which adaptation refers us is intelligence. It is not man in general as a being or an animal, but the intelligent spirit in man that is immediately and in- dissolubly connected with the notion of adaptation. Man does many things that are purely animal ; he eats, walks, sleeps, like other animals, by an instinct or a law of his nature, and we never think of asciibing such acts to an intelligence superior to physical laws and functions. But the adaptation of means to ends we refer directly to such intelligence ; and it is this thing of intelligence that difierentiates such efi'ects from purely physical sequences by the nature of their causes. Crunched bones on a desert island might suggest beasts of prey, but a cairn suggests man. An approach to such adap- tation on the part of the beaver, the bee, the dog, the ant, disposes us to clothe such animals with the attribute of reason. And on the same principle, — that it is intelligence and not man we think of directly we perceive adaptation, — do we refer such adaptation in Nature to an intelligence higher than Nature ♦ " Prov. Und Fut. State," vol. iv. p. 168. 12 and higlier tlian man. It is Intelligence that we associate with adaptation, and we are not limited to intelligence as mani- fested by man as an animal of skill and industry. In point of fact the great advances of physical science in recent times have been due more to the imaginative and inventive faculty prompting investigation, than to inference from experience. Science itself looks forward not backward. Its spirit is in- quisitive, and its discoveries spring from the desire to know not only tvhat is, but why it is, — to reach at once the first elements of things and their final cause. And (3.) Hume has overlooked the fact that when once this idea of the connection between adaptation and intelligence has entered the mind, from whatever source, it does not require to be renewed, but remains always as an intuitive perception ; no amount of experiences can strengthen or weaken it, and this for the reason that the conviction of a designing cause does not rest in observations or experiences, greater or less, of man and his contrivances, but lies in the thing of perceived adaptation ; it does not require a knowledge of the cause or source of the adaptation. That wherever there is an adapta- tion of means to an end, there must have been an intelligent cause is an intuition of the mind. This term intuition should not be confounded with the notion of innate ideas. An intui- tion is a self-evident truth ; the mind may come to the know- ledge of such a truth in various ways, and by many processes ; but when once it is perceived, it is seen to be true, as a pro- position in and of itself, which no amount of reasoning or of evidence could make clearer or stronger than it is in its own simple statement. For example, the sum of all the parts is together equal to the whole. (A child may learn this, if you please, by trying it; but once gained it is there.) Everything that begins to be must have a cause ; whatever exists must exist in time and in space. To this class of self-convincing truths belongs this also, that the adaptation of means to an end springs from an intelligent and designing cause. Under these criticisms of common sense and of universal conscious- ness Hume's elaborate structure falls to the ground. I am aware that this reasoning involves the interminable controversy between sensation and consciousness as the originator of ideas. But it is clear that external phenomena do not and cannot impart to us the idea of a cause. We cannot see a cause, feel a cause, hear a cause. What we perceive in Nature is never cause as a substantial entity, but only the sequence of phenomena. And yet the mind unhesi- tatingly affirms of every phenomenon which actually comes to pass, that it is not self-originated, but must have had a cause. Whence has themind this conception of the necessary rela.- 13 tion of an event to a cause ? I answer that this is a necessary cognilion of the human mmd, given in and of the mind itself. The mind knows itself as a cause. It does not matter here whether this knowledge be spontaneous or the result of mental experiences. Of the first origin of cognitions in a child, the first realization of consciousness, we have no possibility of record. But this we know; that there comes to every mind a moment when it awakes to the feeling " I can" and " I will." It knows the Ego in consciousness, and clothes the Ego with volition and with causality. With the blow of a hammer I break a crystal. We say the blow is the cause of the fracture ; and this loose use of the term cause is sanctioned by usage. But where and what is the cause ? In the hammer? Or in the contact of the hammer with the crystal ? Does it reside in the hammer ? Or is it developed by the blow ? There is no sense nor instrument fine enough to detect it. We see the blow, we see the fracture, but not ten thousand such experi- / ences would enable us to see the cause. The cause, you will/ say, is the force applied behind the hammer. But that force/ is not an entity ; it is only a quality of the cause, and than cause is the power which is in me put in action by my willl All force is but cause in action. And the sublime doctrine o4 universal force points of necessity to universal cause, and that cause intelligent. Having its sole idea of cause through the consciousness of itself as a cause, the mind intuitively refers every event to a cause adequate in power and wisdom to the result. Even upon Hume's own principle, the thing which '' experi- ence " has taught us is that the adaptation of means or the collocation of materials for an end, must be referred to an intelligent designer purposing that end. And the world has grown so old in the infallibility of this so-called experience, that it accepts the principle as an axiom alike in its applica- tion to a watch and to a world. The principle being recovered, we are prepared to apply it more carefully than did Paley to the evidence of Nature to a supreme intelligent Cause. Teleology is not an invention of Christian theology. In. p erceiving an end in Nature, an d from this .assum ing p /Jiyiru^ Author ^^ iL^Kj^im^er^I^latoand Aristotle anticipated Paul and Augustine ; and we are all familiar with Cicero's reply to the Epicurean notion that the world was formed by a chance concourse of atoms. " He who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the letters of the alphabet, made of gold or any other substance, were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as legibly to form a book, say the Annals of Ennius. I doubt whether chance 14 could make a single line of them But if a concourse of atoms can make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city, which are works of less labour and difficulty ? '' Many of the witnesses which Paley brought forward to establish the fact of design in Nature have been discredited through the searching cross-examination of modern science; and some have even been so twisted and turned as to lean to the opposite side. But what then? This impeach- ment of testimony prejudices the jury, but cannot blind an impartial judge to the principles which underlie the case. Much the same has happened in Geology. Many of the facts relied upon by earlier geologists have been modified in their meaning and their relations, or have been quite set aside by the research of later times. Theories have changed with every new master of the science, and the now-accepted theory of Lyell may yet be modified by the results of deep-sea soundings and of ex|)lorations in the Sierra Nevada. But no one dreams of doubting that there is in the structure of the earth a foundation for a science of Geology. And so we may trace there a foundation for a science of Teleology, all the more clear because the superficial mechanism of design has been swept away. Indeed, the very terms designer, contriver, smack of the mechanical, the coarse, the vulgar. Professor Tymiall, who certainly has no belief in final cause in the theological sense, is already helping us to finer terms for Teleology itself; and these terms occur in examples best fitted to illustrate the finer meanings and methods of this science. These examples are found in heat and in light. There is even more of science than of poetry in the saying that coal is " bottled sunlight. '^ For what purpose was cod produced, but that it should serve for fuel; should be made to give back in practical and beneficial uses the heat it had condensed from the sun ? And for wliose use intended but for man ? Nature in her operations has no service for this concentrated extract of ferns and trees. No animal tribes in l)urrowing or foraging had ever sought out the coal, or applied it to their wants. But when man had need of other fuel than the surface of the earth could furnish him, there lay the beds of coal ready to his hand. Can we resist the conviction that coal was provided in anticipation of the coming of man- stored, so to speak, in the cellar of his future abode? If there were, indeed, such a purpose in the formation of coal, the relation between the purpose and the result is the more impressive because it was so long latent, and required acres for Its development. Not fact and form alone, but idea and intent as well, are in process of development. The plan in evolution is also the evolution of a plan* Prof. Tyndall has •> 15 given us the very term to characterize this phenomenon. '^ Wood and coal can burn ; whence come their heat, and the work producible by that heat ? From the immeasurable reservoir of the sun, Nature has proposed to herself the task of storing up the light which streams earthward from tho sun, and of casting into a permanent form the most fugitive of all powers. To this end she has overspread the earth with organisms which, while living, take in the solar light, and by its consumption generate forces of another kind. These organisms are plants. The vegetable world indeed constitutes the instrument whereby the wave-motion of the sun is changed into the rigid form of chemical tension, and thus prepared for future use. With this i>revision the existence of the human race itself is inseparably connected.^' In the terms which I have italicised, Teleology is so etherealized that nothing re- mains of the grossness of the old conception of the mechanism of the universe. Fre vision is so much finer than design or contrivance ! We no longer require to see either the watch or the world in the process of making ; we no longer hear the starting of the machinery ; but as in Ezekiel's vision there is a spirit of life within the wheels, and they are borne on mighty wings. The objection to this illustration, that if coal were intended for the use of man, it should have been evenly distributed over the globe, and upon the surface, seems too frivolous for a philosophical reply. But the reply is given in the whole nature of man, and in the totality of the ends of his exist- ence. Man shall not live by coal alone. The distribution of the earth ^s products gives rise to that system of industries, to that development of energy, skill, foresight, and invention, and to that brotherhood of humanity which comes of wide- spread intercourse, which render human existence so much higher than that of brutes. I am not strenuous, however, for this illustration. I have adopted it because a leading man of science seems driven to teleology to account for the fact of coal. Thus teleology, as in Harvey^s discovery of the circulation of the blood, is often the guide of science to higher ends. My object in this essay is not to prove the doctrine of final causes, but to point out the lines of proof ; in the true con- ception of causality, and in the wise interpretation of those more subtle phases of Nature which science now deals with, and which so transcend the mechanical causes of Paley. As with heat, so with light. To describe the web of relations subsisting between solar light and the media through which this passes to the human eye, Tyndall has recourse to the same refinement of teleology. '* We have, in the first place^ in solar light an agent of I 16 17 exceeding complexity, composed of innumerable constituents refrangible in different degrees. We find, secondly, the atoms and molecules of bodies gifted with the power of sifting solar light in the most various ways, and producing by this sifting the colours observed in nature and art. To do this they must possess a molecular structure commensurate in complexity with that of light itself. Thirdly, we liave the hunian eye and brain, so organized as to be able to take in and distinguish the multitude of impressions thus generated. The light, therefore, at starting is complex ; to sift and select it as they do, natural bodies must be complex ; while to take in the impressions thus generated, the human eye and brain, however we may simplify our conceptions of their action, must be highly complex. Whence this triple complexity? If what are called material purposes were the only end to be served, a much simpler mechanism would be sufficient. But, instead of simplicity, we have prodigality of relation and adaptation,— H.nd this apparently for the sole piu'i^ose of enabling us to see things robed in the splendour of colour. Would it not seem that Nature harhoured the intention of educating us for other enjoyments than those derivable from meat and drink ? At all events, whatever Nature meant,— and it would be mere presumption to dogmatize as to what she meant, — wx» find ourselves here as the upshot of her operations, endowed with capacities to enjoy not only the materially useful, but endowed with others of indefinite scope and application, which deal alone with the beautiful and the true.^^"^ In how many distinct forms and phrases in the two passages cited, does Mr. Tyndall pay homage to the intuitive convictTon of purpose, intention, design as seen in the adaptations of Nature : ''Nature has proposed to herself'; ''to this end '' - ''with this prevision ''; "atoms gifted with the power''; "prodi- gality of relation and adaptation " ; " for the sole purpose " ; "Nature harboured the intention"; "whatever Nature meant." Tyndall is a master of language, whether as the poet picturing the Alps, or as the philosopher analyzing and defining Nature. In these passages he is the man of science upon his own ground, reporting his observations and experi- ments. And he tells us that in two of the most delicate, subtle, yet all-pervasive forces of Nature,— heat and light,— he finds everywhere traces of intelligence. Since only intelligence can harbour an intention, can have a meanino- or purpose, or act with prevision for an end. ^ Two parallel incidents in geology will show that the scientific mind intuitively discriminates between Nature and Inttllitrcnce. m> '.' } (1) In digging a well in Illinois, the workmen at a depth of several feet struck upon the trunk of a tree, and under this upon a bit of copper ore identical with that of Lake Superior. The inference was that ages ago the copper had been w^ashed from its native bed, and lodged in the alluvium of the Missis- sippi valley, — perhaps that the great lakes then had an outlet through the Mississippi, — and over this deposit a forest had grown, which in time was buried beneath the ever-accumulating surface. The whole process was ascribed to natural causes, — the interest concentrating in the question of time. (2) In working the copper-mines of Lake Superior, the miner came upon traces of excavation, of smelting, of rude implements of labour; and the immediate conviction was, Man has been here before us, — probably that unknown race who built the mounds in the Mississippi valley had discovered and worked these mines. How shall we account for the difference in these judgments, — the one pointing to Nature, the other to Man ? The judgment in each case was spontaneous, and each judg- ment is accepted by science as correct. The dividing line between them is, that perceived adaptation to an end betokens an intelligent purpose directed to that end. A corresponding instance is familiar to English geologists. At a considerable depth in the delta of the Nile were found remains of pottery. The immediate conviction was that man was on the soil at the period of this formation. Beyond question the pottery was the work of man ; and the geological age of the deposit would determine how far back man existed on the borders of the Nile. When it was suggested that the pottery bore marks of Greek workmanship, the inference was that either by accident it had worked its way so deep, or the Nile deposit had been more rapid than is commonly supposed. The question recurs, how do we make this distinction between Man and Nature, and the answer lies in the one fact of adaptation to an end. Now, Professor Tyndall assures us that in the single fact of light and vision "we have prodigality of relation and adapta- tion." From the point of view of physical science he cannot look beyond the bounds of Nature, and hence he provides the intelligence which adaptation demands by personiji/ing Nature. I accept implicitly Tyndall's testimony to the wondrous fact ; and not being under the restriction which the pure scientist must observe, I accept the conviction of my own intelligence that snch intelligence is above Nature. The principle of Teleology is thus attested by science itself in its most subtle and intricate investigations. Indeed, that principle becomes more patent the farther it is removed from the sensuous into 1 D • Tyndall oil Lij;''', Lee. 1, 18 the .v«?,-sensiblc wo. Id. There wo touch upon causes first n.ediate, and final. It does not matter that the relation of cause and effect is often obscure. Could we have looked npon our planet in the Carboniferous era, who could have seen refiected in that murky atmosphere the coal-prate glowing m our dwellings, the furnace in our factories ? We are living in an unfinished system, an era of the evolution of phenomena and, as I have said, the development of the ideas that lie at the back of phenomena. • . . .1 „ o„;i Neither does it disparage Teleology to point to the evil that is in the world. Moral evil is the product of man s free afrency. But free will is the highest endowment of a rational creature. The power of moral choice makes man akin to the Jnfinite and the Absolute; and moral evil is a perversion ot this most illustrious attribute of being, and the possibility ot perversion lies in the nature of free will, and gives to virtue its worth and its glory. Hence it may be that moral evi is incidental, in respect of divine prevention, to the best possible ^^ aHo physical evil, this is but partial and relative. Our own experience testifies that this often serves to discipline the intellect of man, to put fibre into his will, and train hiin to noble and heroic action in subjugating Nature to the service of the human family. The very doctrine of Natural Selection shows of how much worth to man is the struggle for existence as a moral element in the development ot character. . , . e • i.„,i Here, too, comes in the fact that the system is unfinished. Things that seem untoward because unknown may ^have a britrhter end : " from seeming evil still educing good. Science is teaching this, especially in chemistry, by trans- forming what once was feared as hurtful and hostile o man into some higher ministry of the Beautiful and the Useful, ordered by wisdom and beneficence. What serviceable dyes, what exquisite tints, are evolved from the noisome refuse of coal-tar ! -, -c m } ^ '^ And iust this service should science render if Teleology is true For if there be a Creator, He must be spirit, and apprehensible only by spirit. Hence, the more we are developed in mind by science, and the more we penetrate through science to the silent, impalpable forces of Nature, the neare? shall we come to Him who is invisible ; till, with Dante, emerging into the light Bterne, we can say :— " And now was turning niy desire and will, Even as a wheel that equally is moved. The Love which moves the sun and the other stars." 19 V* APPENDIX. Since the foregoing Paper was read, Professor Huxley has published a Life of Hume, with an analysis of his works, which in its cheap and attractive form may give a fresh impulse to tlie popularity of the Scotch philosopher. A review of Hume's philosophical system, as a whole, would here be out of place. Supposing Huxley's synopsis of it to be now at hand I must restrict myself to the points raised in my paper— Cause, Power, Intuition. It is a hopeful sign that such a master in physics as Pro- fessor Huxley should invoke such a master in metaphysics as Hume (just as Prof. Tyndall invokes Lucretius) in support of his own teachings ; that Science, which we have been told was the only knowledge— the knowledge of things by observation of the senses— should have recourse to Philosophy to sift and classify phenomena under ideas^ in order that they may have a place in the category of knowledge. The necessity for this I have endea- voured to show in the article, *' What is Science ? " in the " British Quarterly Review" for January, 1879 ; and the recognition of this dependence of science upon philosophy for its own expression would put an end to much of the controversy over physics and metaphysics. As to ideal speculation, Professor Huxley goes quite far enough. On page 55 he says, " All science starts with hypotheses— in other words, with assumptions that are unproved, while they may be, and often are, erroneous ; but which are better than nothing to the seeker after order in the maze of phenomena. And the historical progress of every science depends on the criticism of hypotheses, on the gradual stripping off, that is, of their untrue or superfluous parts, until there remains only that exact verbal expression of as much as we know of the fact, and no more, which constitutes a perfect scientific theory." This statement of the way of attaining a scientific knowledge of external phenomena raises two questions, which must be answered before we can have any confidence in such knowledge. Who or what is it which makes that " criticism of hypotheses " upon which " the progress of every science depends" ? And how do we " know a tact," or who are the We who know a fact, so as to reduce it to its " exact verbal expression *' ? Professor Huxley is not quite satisfied with Hume's negation of mind ; that " what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.*' Of this view, Huxley says, " He [Hume] may be right or wrong ; but the most he, or anybody else, can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of the mind than that it is a series of perceptions." Here, again, I ask, AVho or what are th^e We, who know this, or anything else ? 20 21 Dots a mere " series of perceptions," each of which gives pkice in turn to its successor, know it.^elf «« a series, and that this series is all that can be known of mind? Has a series of ever-changin;,', ever-vanishing impressions a continuity of consciousness, a power of retention as memory, and of dis- crimination as judgment ? There can be no criticism without comparison, without remembrance, without selection, without discriminating judgment ; and the question forces itself home to the school of Hume, If the mind " is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions," where or what is that faculty which examines and compares these impressions, and which reduces them to an " exact verbal expression" as fact or knowledge ? The truth is that Mr. Hume and Professor Huxley necessarily jissume a somefhing within man which, though it cannot be known " by d irect observation," yet knows itself, and knows other things. The existence of this something, which we call mind, is asserted by the consciousness of all mankind and in the language of every people. It is proved by the consciousness which every man has of personal identity and of individuality ; by his exercise of memory and of will ; and above h11 by his sense of right and wrong, and his sponta- neous emotions in view of good or of evil. This something knows itself us u Cause, as a Power, and as possessing freewill; that is, in all actions having a moral quality it has power to choose a course of action and also power to choose the contrary. Whatever the motive which finally determines its choice— Sfiy, if you please, the greatest apparent good -there is always the power of contrary choice. Every man knows these things to be true of himself. But it is absolutely impossible to predi- cate any of these things of a mere " series of perceptions." Though the existence and the properties of mind may "lie beyond the reach of observa- tion,"— as the term observation is applied to the study of nature,— yet the existence of mind is known in consciousness with a certainty as absolute as that which pertains to the phenomena of nature observed and reported through the senses. In either case the conviction of certainty is given in the mind, or it could not exist at all. How can I know anything if I do not first know the I who knows, so far as to have full confidence in the observations which I make, and in the judgments which I form \ Now, there are also truths which the mind knows by intuition, of which it is as certain as of any fact ascertained by observation, and indeed as certain as of its own existence. Such truths do not depend upon experience but are assumed in all experience. They could not be made a whit more clear or certain by reasoning or observation than they are seen to be by direct cognition. Of this class of truths are the axioms of mathematics. Hume admits that there are " necessary truths,' bui he would not class with these the axiom of causation, " That whatever event has a beginning must have a cause." Professor Huxley is more inclined to class causation with necessary truths, and this upon scientific grounds. Thus, on p. 121, he says, "The scientific investigator who notes a new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, but he will, without »•» hesitation, seek for that cause. If you ask him why he does so, he will pro- bably say that it must have had a cause ; and thereby imply that his belief in ciiusation is a necessary belief." What is true of the man of science is equally true of the human mind under all possible conditions. It is an intuitive conviction of a necessary truth, that every event must have a cause. It is absolutely impossible for the mind to conceive the contrary. Let any one conceive of absolute universal Nothingncae a'ld he will find it impossible to conceive of anything as beginning to be ! Either, then, we must have recourse to the unphilosophical conjecture of an infinite series, or we must believe in an eternal Creator of the universe. In like manner, that adaptation points to a purposing intelligence is an intuitive cognition of the human mind. This does not arise from experience of adaptive power in other men ; and though continually verified by ex- perience, it does not rest in experience for its proof. Here too, as above, it is impossible for the mind to conceive the contrary. Having already exposed the fallacy of Hume on this point, and having traced the notions of causation and of power to their seat in the mind itself, I trust I have opened anew the way for the evidence of God in Nature, which physics is more and more unveiling, for metaphysics to take note of and classify. The reader who is interested in the preceding points of raetaphysiciil inquiry, but who lacks facilities for studying German philosophy in the original, can put himself in communication with two of the greatest thinkers of Germany, by reading A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant, by Professor Edward Caird, of the University of Glasgow ; and The Logic of Hegel, by William Wallace, M.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Kant was not satisfied with the argument from desigrn, or as it is better called, the physico-theological argument for the being of God ; and while" controverting Hume on some points, he agFeecT^tOilOhanheje^ ce~ of order in the universe could at most establish dt f inite caus e. This point 1 have considered on page 10. But another form of reply presented by Pro- fessor Caird is so thoughtful and suggestive that I give the gist of it here, referring the reader to the full argument in his eighteenth chapter. " Why do we seek in things, in the world, and in ourselves, a truth, a reality, which we do not find in their immediate aspect as phenomena of the sensible world ? It is because the sensible world as such is inconsistent with itself, and thus points to a higher reality. We believe in the infinite, not because of what the finite is, but quite as much because of what the finite is not ; and our first idea of the former is, therefore, simply that it is the negation of the latter. All religion springs out of the sense of the nothingness, unreality, transitoriness— in other words, of the essentially negative character of the finite world. Yet this negative relation of the 22 mind to the finite is at the same time its first positive relation to the infinite. * We are near waking when we dream that we dream/ and the consciousness of a limit is already at least the germinal consciousness of that which is beyond it. The extreme of despair and doubt can only exist as the obverse of the highest certitude, and is in fact necessary to it." Hegel, who was fond of reducing every conception to the last possible analysis, siiys, " We must decidedly reject the mechanical mode of inquiry when it comes forward and arrogates to itself the place of rational cognition in general, and when it seeks to get mechanism accepted as an absolute category." He then shows how even the argument from design has been vitiated by a mechanical tone.* " Generally speaking, the final cause is taken to mean nothing more than external design. In accordance with this view of it, things are supposed not to c^rry their vocation in themselves, but merely to be means employed and spent in realizing a purpose which lies outside of them. That may be said to be the point of view taken by Utility, which once played a great part even in the sciences. Of late, however, utility has fallen into disrepute, now that people have begun to see that it failed to give a genuine insight into the nature of things. It is true that finite things as finite ought in justice to be viewed as non-ultimate, and as pointing beyond themselves. This negativity of finite things, however, is their own dialectic, and in order to ascertain it we must pay attention to their positive content. " Teleological modes of investigation often proceed from a well-meant desire of displaying the wisdom of God, especially as it is revealed in Nature. Now in thus trying to discover final causes, for which the things serve as means, we must remember that we are stopping short at the finite, and are lial)le to fall into trifiing reflections. An instance of such triviality is seen, when we first of all treat of the vine solely in reference to the well- known uses which it confers upon man, and then proceed to view the cork- tree in connection with the corks which are cut from its bark to put into the wine-bottles. Whole books used to be written in this spirit. It is easy to see that they promoted the genuine interest neither of religion nor of science. External design stands immediately in front of the idea : but what thus stands on the threshold often for that reason gives the least satisfaction." 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V P On Current Physical Astronomy. By tlio late J. Rkddie, Esq., IL>n *Sec V I Analysis ot Human Responsibility. By Rev. Preb. Irons, D.D. (See part' 13.')' Concluded. VOL. V. 17. On the Origin of the Negro. By the Right liev. Bishop Titcomb D D ^" ^?he'r:^P^emiS;;^r^>R^:^^rf ^"^^^^ ^^ ^ ''-^^ ^^^^^^^^^.s^ Revelation. By ,Q ^° f"" xN mierical System af the Old Testament. By the Rev. Dr. Thornton V P 18. On Sponkxneous Cenerat.on ; or, the Problem of Liti By the Rev. Pro essor Ki'rk. A Demonstration of the Existence of God By the Rev. J. M'Cann i) g^^'''^ "^^^^ Why Man must Behovfi in C.wf Utr n>., i..*„ ^ - y^.^L^, u.u. 19. iiO. Why Man must Believe in (Jod. By the late James Reddi'e. Esci.. Hon Sec V I On Geological Proofs of Divine Action. By S. R. Pattison Eso F p ^ * On True Anthropology. By W. Hitchman, Esc^^, M I) ' ^'^ ^'^'^ On C-omparative Psychology. (Second Paper.) By E. J. Morshead, Esq., Hon For Sec V I On the High Numbers in the Pentateuch. By P. H. G( " " '- ' ' ^' ^^^' ^'^' Isi-ael in Egypt. By the Rev. 11. Mol-le, M.A VOL. VI. ^GossE, Esq., F.R.S., V.P. 23. 24. On The Moabite Stone, by Captain F. Petrie, Hon. Sec ""^ 'b/ tbtuevi ^'n^^^^TTVi s"""^ " ^'''"''""""' "'"' ^''''ton.atica. Laws. On Biblical Pneumatology and PsychoJogy. By the Rev W W Enptt^ih \t a On Some Scriptural Aspects of M^n's Tif^artite^ Nature ' By 1 ^fev.'c GrahIm On Ethnic Testimonies to the Pentateuch. By the Right Rev Bishoo T tc.Vmr n n On the Darwinian Theory. By the Rev. Prebendary Irons D D ^ TiTtoMB, D. D. Serpent Myths of Ancient Egypt. By W. R Cooi-fr F VOL. VII. 25. <^° Natural Theolocry, considered with respect to Modern Philosophy. By the Rov. G. ilENSLOW, M.A., r.L.b. On Fatalism. Contributed by the Rev. J. Robbins D D 26. On Darwinism Tested by Recent Researches in Language. ' Ey F. Bateman, Esq., M.D., &c. On force and its Manifestations. By the Rev. J. M'Cann D D * i ' >^^' On Professor Tyndall's - Fragments of Science for Unsiientific People." By the Rev. Prebendary Irons. D.D. f j On the Origin of the Moral Sense. By fhe Rev. Professor Kirk o- S^X""^^^ V^"^ I'^nergy. By Charles Brooke, Esq., M.A., F.R.S., V.P. 2/. On Darwinism and its Effects upon Religious Thought. By C. R. Bree, Esq , M D &c Remarks on some of the Current Principles of Historic Criticism. By Rev. Preb Row, M.A* OQ ^" ?«T''''^^^^,''^^^.''*^^^T!r'''*^^°^''^^^^"^<^-'' ByJ.ELlOT HowARD,Esq.,F.R.S,F.LS 28. On the Law of Creation-Unity of Plan, Variety of Form." By Rev. G. W. VVeldon M A. Some Remarks on the Present Aspect of Enquiries as to the Introduction of Genera and Species m Geological lime. By Principal J. W. Dawson, LL.D. F R S 29. 30. 31. 32. V VOL. VIIL The Pala3olithic Age Examined. By N. Whitley, Esq. (Annual Address.) On the Moral and Social Anarchy of Modem Unbelief. Bv the Rev Principal T. P. Boultbee, LL.D., Vice-President. ^ On the Identity of Rea.son in Science and Religion. Rev. R. Mitchell On Buddhism. By the Right Rev. Bishop Piers C. Claughton, D.D., &c., with communi- cations from Professors Chandler and Brewer. On the Contrast between Crystallization and Life. By John Eliot Howard Esq F R S On the Brixham Cavern and its Testimony to the Antiquity of Man— examined' Bv N Whitley, Esq., Sec. Royal Inst, of Cornwall. - ^y ^y. On the Rules of Evidence as applicable to the Credibility of History. By W. Forsyth Esq., Q.C., LL.D., M.P., Vice-President. ' ' On the Principles of Modern Pantheistic and Atheistic Philosophy as expressed in the last work of Strauss, Mill, &c. By the Rev. Prebendary C. A. Row, M.A. Paper on the same, by Professor Challis, F.R.S. On " Prehistoric Traditions and Customs in Connection with Sun and Serpent Worshin " J. S. PuENE,Esq., LL.D., F.S.A., with Illustrations. (1872-73.) ^ worsnip. VOL. IX. 31 On the Harmony between the Chronology of Egypt and the Bible. By the Rev. B. W. oAV ILE, M.A. On the Ethiail Condition of the Eariy Scandinavian Peoples. By E. W. GosSE Esq On Magnitudes in Creation and their bearings on Biblical Interpretation. By tl?; Right Rev. Bishop Titcomb, D.D. Paper on the same, by Professor Challis F R S • with communications from the Astronomer Royal's Department, the Radclifie Observer, and rrof essor Pritchard, F.R.S. ' On Biblical Interpretatiou in connection with Science. Bv the Rev. A. I. McCaul. M.A. n A ^^?^,^^^^'' ^^^^ ^ communication by Principal J.'W. Dawson, LL D F R S On the Final Cause as Principle of Cognition and Principle in Nature. By Prifessor G S Morris, of Michigan University, U.S. ^ icasur vx. o. On the Bearing of certain Palaeontological Facts upon the Darwinian Theory of the Ori'gin F G S^^&c Evolution in General. By Professor H. A. Nicholson, M.D., D.Sc, On the Early Dawn of Civilization, considered in the Light of Scripture. By J. E. Howard. JliSq., r.K.S. ' On the Indestructibility of Force. By the Rev. Professor Birks, M.A. On Mr. Mill's Essays on Theism. By Rev. Preb. W. J. Irons D.D. SI). 3G 8 THE INSTITUTE. ( X. 37. r 38. .Pattison, Esq.,F.G.S. or Scientitic Purposes. By the Kev. On the Chronolopry of Recent Geolop^. On the Nature and Character ot The Helat'iofof'tS; 'script,,™ Account T;;:o Dolugo to Physical Science. By Professor An E?a;;Si„'L^f 'th'^-'BeJ JUL from a Scientific point of view. By J. E. How.KD. /Ann^l^X^iress; Modem Philosophic Scepticism examined By the late Rev. R. lUlN. ( p R S V P R A.S.. The Rivleloje OImtvit. On the fctr;,.ca„ I,an^.afre. Bv the liev. 'f-^'' TA"on »I A 89. On •' Present Day Materialism. " »>:f » '^-^o'^.J'on p "i "vice-Pres. (« p.rts 6, 15, 33). On the Sorrows ol Scepticism. By ''<"•''••' '■?,''r";' , „ 'iieT. B. W. SiV.lE, M.A. On Heathen Cosm..i;.m,es, corapare.l "'th the Hebrew ^"^ '^.^- jj j). On the Place of Science in E.lu.at.on By 1 rofe^sor H. A. r. icuol!,o. , On E^-pt and the Bihle. By J. E. Howakd, Ls.,., h . U.S. ^ VOL. XI. The Flint " ImplemenU" of Bri.ham Cavern. By N. WniTLHV, Esq. (PKoiosrarUM, On -l^h:SrA.ricnHural Implements of America. By Pr. J. W. Dawson. F.R.S. (1S76.7. Tn Examination of " "-/'-Xsic^r^deLe'" bX'' "- mB^B. The Uncertainties of Modern Physicjl ^ui-nce. ny '°' TheEthicsof Belief. liy.lVofe.sor II. Wack^ M. A. (lb/ie-and Modern Astrono:ny ^^^^J^l^^^'^'^''-^' On Comparative Fsycholo-y. By L. J. Morshlad, )^^<\. VOL XII. 8°s^^tr^!r^?'i^s>a^.^Si^fe!rrs Tom KINS. With Numerous Notes by various A ssyriolopsts. On the Ilorxis Myth. 15y W. 1! Notes ny varum"* /\»n.>"»"iv/f,.-v.-. » -«v. ?oo>>FU, Esq., F.R.A.S., M.R.AS,, Sec. Soc. Bib. Arch. 46. 47. 48. The History of the Alphabet. r>v Key. Is^iac layl^>^'/- A' ^hT^^^Geogr^pCof'tho iJ^t.''-!';^ 'l^fess'or V L. Pobxkk. V.B.. LL.D. (Yolume XII. published in January. 1879.) V PROOBESS OF THE INSTITUTE " ■ ♦^o «« i«f Tanuarv 1871, 203. 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