N \ •i'^ii^^aa^ejv Columbia ^Hnibersittp in tijc Citp of iBleto ^orb r' -A-.'- <^-5'i';1 ^ ^ms^^f^. .<^ €^^^ i^X:^^mm^ mm; ^mi^Q: Wli^ f^ ^mm^c: B^^>>i: ^mms usual, French diplomacy was to lay the Continent under contribution, but at the same time occupy the various cabinets with proposals and negotiations, which led to nothing but helped to gain time, Talleyrand's exchange of notes with Thugut, which lasted for five months, had no other object. In May, when the French armies were marching, the one on Bavaria and the other over the Alps, and Bonaparte had left Paris to take the command in Italy, he wrote to his Minister from Lausanne, directing him not to break off negotiations with Thugut, but to continue them by means of Lavalette, the French charge d'affaires in Dresden, " His principal task," wrote the First Consul, " must be to express a desire for peace, to listen to all that is said to him, to hint that we shall have no difficulty in coming to an understanding with Eome, Sardinia, and Switzerland, to say that the treaty of Campo Formio must be carried out, liut that modifica- tions of it are admissible. Citizen Lavalette must 340 LIFE OF TALLEYRAND. [Ch. put nothing down in writing, bind himself to nothing, adopt a thoroughly conciliatory attitude, and reply to all proposals made on behalf of Austria that he will lose no time in submitting them to his government. All this will help to settle the preliminaries." One of the last communications which Talleyrand received from Bonaparte before Marengo, dated from Novara on the 1st of June, betrays his annoyance with Prussia. Beurnonville rightly asserted that she would never be of any use to France, and pointed out that the im- pending collapse of the Turkish Empire was producing an identity of interests between France and Russia. A similar train of thought runs through the fifty-two notes and bulletins by means of which Talleyrand kept the First Consul informed of the diplomatic situation during the latter's absence in Italy, which lasted barely two months, from the 6th of May to the 3rd of July, Chance and haste have prevented these documents from disappearing and probably being de- stroyed, with all the letters addressed to Napoleon in the imperial archives, by Talleyrand's order in April 1814. He was to have accompanied the First Consul, but a serious illness detained him in Paris, and his intention to follow him later on was not carried out. But he sent him reports every other day, the principal interest of which is that they prove how completely paralysed the diplomatic action of France would have been without the prestige of the victories on the XI.] RELATIONS WITH SPAIN. 341 Danube and on the Po. Semonville wrote from Holland that the first news of a defeat would be the signal for revolt in every part of the country and for mutiny of the troops, that all parties were on bad terms with France, and that a change of personnel would probably involve complete disorganisation, as there were no partisans of the French alliance in Holland. It was not till after Marengo that they condescended to furnish the seven thousand men demanded by Bonaparte. Spain, whose fleet had been blockaded off Brest since August 1799, betrayed an inclination to abandon her submissive attitude, and lend an ear to English overtures. The French government was obliged to take advantage of the circumstance that letters were opened in the Spanish post-office, to address flattering remarks to the Queen in the despatches to the ambassador, Alquier, and followed up the impression so produced by presents of French millinery, A letter is extant signed by Talleyrand and addressed to the " Citoyenne Minette," who took boxes packed with dresses to Madrid, dealing with her and her mission in a thoroughly serious spirit. In a report on the general European situation, dated the 21st of June, the Minister expresses the opinion that Spain needed peace more than all the other Powers, because none was affected by such a disproportion between engagements and the ability to carry them out, as existed in her case. As regards Prussia, 342 LIFE OF TALLEYRAND. [Ch. l^onaparte and Talleyraud warned each other of the danger of listening to the vague assurances of Haugwitz or of placing any reliance on his " sterile fecondite." Talleyrand even proposed to dispense with the dilatory untrustworthy offices of Prussia, and to enter into direct relations with Eussia, as it would be easier to influence the Court of Berlin through the Tsar than the latter through Berlin. The difficulty was to find a go-between who would be fersona grata to the Tsar. Talleyrand thought of his old friend Choiseul-Gouffier, who had resided in St. Petersbm-g for a long time, and then of another emigre, Caraman. But Choiseul was not in favour with Paul, and Caraman was devoted to the interests of Louis XVIII., although Talleyrand was not aware of it. Some other expedient had to be found. Bourgoing, the French agent in Hamburg, endeavoured, by means of his Russian colleague Muravieff, to get a letter from Talleyrand into the hands of Pauin, the Emperor's favourite, conveying the intention of the First Consul to send six thousand Russian prisoners back to their own country with all military honours. But Muravieff was frightened by the order of the Tsar prohibiting all intercourse with the official diplo- matists of France on pain of instant dismissal, and Talleyrand's letter finally reached its destination by means of subordinate agents. At the same time a Russian prisoner-of-war, the officer Sergejeff, was de- XI.J - THE TSAE AND MALTA. 343 spatchecl to St. Petersburg with a duplicate of it to which was added a postscript of far greater importance than the letter itself. Malta, which was blockaded by the English and defended by a weak French garrison, was on the point of surrendering. In 1798 Paul had procured his own nomination as Grand ^Master of the Order of St. John, which was quite dependent on him for support, and in process of dissolution. The 3Ialtese were his favourite plaything, the chivalrous element in his crusade against the Revolution, and the posses- sion of the island " sa folie," as Haugwitz says, for which he would have given the half of his empire. The First Consul now offered him the island, thereby gaining the advantage of either depriving the English of it or embroiling them with their northern ally. Whether the move would succeed seemed at hrst doubtful. The Tsar made no reply to the communica- tions of the French government, or to the semi-official flatteries of the French Press, which thanked him among other things for having " thwarted the mad schemes of the Directory." Talleyrand was obliged as before to have recourse to Berlin for information about Russia. England is hardly mentioned in his reports at this time. They refer to the intrigues of English agents in Switzerland, in Italy, and at the South German courts, and to the plan for provoking an insurrection in Provence ; he also points out on one 344 LIFE OF TALLEVBAND. [Ch. occasion that no concessions could be expected from England, but does not expatiate further on the situa- tion, which for the time seemed to be be^'ond the range of diplomatic influence. At this point the news of INIarengo arrived and made him exclaim : " Quel d^but et quel denouement ! La posterite pourra-t-elle croire aux prodiges de cette campagne ? Sous quels auspices votre retour nous est promis ! II n'y a point eu d'empire qui ne fut fond^ sur le merveilleux, et ici le merveilleux est la verite." Talleyrand was among those who, like Fouche, Roederer, and many others, viewed the First Consul's decision to take the command in Italy with anxiety. The question, What was to become of France if he did not come back ? was discussed quite openly, and bv Bonaparte as much as by any one else. To Eoederer, who even at this early stage dwelt on the necessity of having a direct heir, he said that the succession of one of his brothers was the worst thing that could happen, that Moreau had no friends, and that Carnot was probably best fitted to be chief of the state. When the same question was discussed in Talleyrand's presence by Sieves, Fouche, Carnot, and La Fayette, the choice lay between the two last-named. A report was circulated in Paris that in crossing the St. Bernard tlio First Consul had been in danger of being cut down by an Austrian detachment, whereupon Talleyrand begged him to take care of "himself, adding that for a XL] RESUMPTION OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 345 long time to come his name was the only guarantee for the safety of the state. Lucien's INIemoirs are alto- gether wrong in speaking of "a conspiracy of Auteuil," v^here Talleyrand then lived, at this juncture. If it was not in his character to leave anything to chance, it was just as little his interest to replace Bonaparte by La Fayette. In the night of July 2nd-3rd the Yivst Consul returned to Paris, surrounded by a halo of prestige from the battlefield of Marengo, the lustre of which was undimmed by the successes of Moreau in South Grermany and the claim of Kellermann and the dead Desaix to the victory of June 14th. The object of the campaign had been attained. Millions })0uved into the treasury from Germany and Italy. Beyond the Alps Austria was deprived of the result of her successes in 1799, and forced to sign the convention of June loth, which fixed the JNIincio as her prelimi- nary frontier. Negotiations for peace could now be resumed, and immediately after the victory the First Consul, in a long letter to the Emperor Francis, written "from the battlefield," which was directed much more against English than Austrian policy, reverted to peace on the basis of Campo Formio, with a better right than he had done six months previously. The bearer of the letter was General Count Joseph St. Julien, who arrived in Paris with the reply of his Sovereign a few weeks later, on the 346 LIFE OF TALLEYRAND. [Cii. 21st of July, having been too late to catch the First Consul in Lombavdy. The Emperor announced his readiness to accept a general truce, but once more declined to be ] tarty to a treaty the stipulations of which would plunge Europe into fresh agitation. He added that he was prepared to conclude a durable peace on a different basis, and endeavour to bring it into harmony with the engagements which he had been obliged to enter into since the resumption of hostilities. This last significant passage referred to an agreement with England, which had been signed in Vienna by Thugut and Lord Minto on the 20th of June, after a long delay and in ignorance of the result of the battle of Marengo. Austria was to receive a subsidy of two-and-a-half millions sterling, and in return promised not to conclude a separate treaty of peace with France before the end of February. Nothing could have come more amiss to the First Consul. His object was, and could not help being, to obtain peace at once, as his own individual achieve- ment and as the result of the battle of Marengo. It was with this end in view that he had written the, as he himself said, " somewhat original " letter to the Emperor Francis. He now made Talleyrand take part in a very unworthy piece of intrigne. St. Julien was not a diplomatist by profession. His instructions were to propose a serviceable basis for the future public XT.] NEGOTIATIONS WITH ST. JULIEN. 347 negotiations, and so prevent public expectation from being once more disappointed by a premature and useless commencement of them. This was the extent of his powers. In spite of this, a week after his arrival in Paris, he had signed preliminaries binding the Emperor to close the ports of his empire against his English allies, and so contradicting the contents of his own letter, Campo Formio being again taken as the basis of the understanding and the frontier of the Ehine being abandoned. St. Julien had certainly entertained doubts as to whether he was justified in taking a step of this importance. But Talleyrand allayed them by assuring him that, in his place, and as the confidant of his sovereign, he would act in precisely the same manner ; fresh scruples on the part of the General were met by the threat that, if he refused to sign, hostilities would be resumed forthwith; whereupon St. Julien liesitated no longer, but left for Vienna with the treaty in his pocket and accompanied by Duroc. The First Consul's adjutant was ordered amongst other things to insist on a speedy conclusion of the definite treaty. But he did not get beyond the Austrian outposts, where pass- ports for the onward journey to Vienna were refused him. In the meanwhile these proceedings were to be kept a profound secret in Paris. But St. Julien had let the cat out of the bag ; while Talleyrand denied that any agreement had been signed, Sainte-Foy and 348 LIFE OF TALLEYllAND. [Cii. ^Madame Gfraud admitted to tlie Prussian ambassador : " II ne saurait convenir de rien avec vous. Le premier Consul, qui a tout fait et tout redige, lui a jn'escrit le secret, mais il u'en est pas moins vrai que lui et St. Julien out signe les preliminaires a La Malmaison le 30, a une heure du matin." It has been urged in ex- planation of St. Julien's conduct, which threw Tliugut's whole policy to the winds, and which the latter stigmatised in his first panic as " a mad step, unpre- cedented in the history of the world," that the Emperor Francis was more eager for the speedy conclusion of peace than his Minister, and that St. Julien knew this. Thugut's letters certainly show that he awaited the Emperor's decision with great anxiety. But it was given in accordance with his own views. St. Julien was disavowed and sent to a foi'tress, the separate treaty was rejected and a congress proposed in its stead, and the English ambassador in Vienna was at once informed of what had taken place, so as at all events to frustrate the intention of the French to represent the event as a breach of faith with England. The document conveying the decision, which was dated the 11th of August and addressed to Talleyrand, reached Duroc in good time, who thus returned with a complete diplomatic defeat instead of the hoped-for success. " J'ai bien su," remarked the First Consul to Eoederer a few weeks afterwards, " que les pouvoirs de ]M. de St. Julien n'dtaient point en regie, quand j'ai ratifie XL] CONGRESS OF LUNEVILLE. 349 les preliminaives de paix signes par lui. !Mais j'etais hien aise de mettre rEmperem* dans le tort aux yeux de r Europe, et cela m'a reussi." Talleyrand probably did not take snch an optimist view. In his answer to Thugut he had to maintain the fiction that St. Julien had abused his confidence; but he admitted to the Council of State that the Austrian envoy's powers were insufficient, and that therefore there was no ground for making the matter the subject of a public complaint or the point of departure for a fresh rupture. It would be better, he added, to agree to Austria's proposals, and, without discontinuing hostilities, consider what should be the new basis of peace. The Emperor P'rancis had proposed Luneville as the place of meeting for the new congress ; Count Cobenzl, the negotiator of Campo Formio, arrived there on the 24th of October, and then accepted an invitation of the P'irst Consul to spend a few days in Paris. He was the guest of Talleyrand, who had not seen him since they met at Strasburg, and who relates in his Memoirs how Bonaparte, who in 1707 had treated with Cobenzl on the footing of complete equality, now so contrived matters that at the first audience, which was given late in the evening, there was no chair forth- coming for the Imperial ambassador to take a seat beside him. In their exchange of views also such marked differences manifested themselves that Cobenzl's speedy return to Luneville seemed desirable from every 350 LIFE OF TALLEYEAND. [Cii. point of view. Joseph Bonaparte was to conduct tlie negotiations there. A few weeks before, on the 3rd of October, he had signed the first peace of the Consulate, the treaty with the United States, as after the events of 1798 it seemed unadvisable to conclude it through Talleyrand. It was not without some opposition on the part of the Minister that Joseph managed to get this treaty named after the place where it was signed, his country-seat Morfontaine. A more difficult task awaited him at Luneville, where Cobenzl made de- mands out of all keeping with the military situation, which had changed at all points to the disadvantage of Austria, the great bone of contention now being that France insisted on a separate peace with Austria, and the latter refused to act independently of England. At the end of November the First Consul met Cobenzl's obstinate diplomatic resistance with the resumption of hostilities. Moreau's victory at Hohenlinden achieved what Marengo had failed to accomplish, and Austria agreed to cede Italian territory which Brune's advance to the Adige had already placed in her opponent's hands. In the meanwhile Talleyrand's despatches to Joseph in Luneville betrayed a bitterness which was generally foreign to him. The episode with St, 'Julien had left its sting. Cobenzl felt the effect of it in the manner in which the conqueror's terms were dictated to him after the successes of the two campaigns. XI.] PEACE OF LUNEVILLE. 351 Talleyrand carried out the First Consul's orders by declaring that all further discussion was inadmissible. The conditions of Campo Formio were revived ; the Adige became Austria's boundary in Italy, and the valley of the Khine France's Grerman frontier. On the 9th of January Talleyrand wrote to Joseph that Piedmont should be restored to the King of Sardinia, to preserve the balance of power in Europe, and that there was no objection to the re-instatement of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. On the 20th of January he had to countermand his instructions on the last point, for Bonaparte, in order to gain over the Queen of Spain, had made the preliminary secret treaty of San Ildefonso on the 1st of October, which promised her nephew and son-in-law at Parma the title of king, and a larger territory in the shape of Tuscany or the Legations, in return for which Spain restored Louisiana to France and left her Parma and Elba. Since Marengo Godoy had again become Minister, and Tuscany was now finally fixed on at Luneville as an indemnity for the Duke of Parma, INIodena, and after- wards the Legations, being added to Cisalpina. Talley- rand reiterated the views which he had expressed in 1798 by pointing out that the necessity for finding- compensation for Modena and Tuscany in Germany would be the most effectual way of making Austria recognise the principle of the secularisations. The ecclesiastical states, he remarked, should share in the 352 LIFE OF TALLEYRAND. [Ch. losses sustained by the Empire, and only the hereditary princes should obtain an indemnity. On the 9th of February the peace was signed which destroyed Thugut's policy and closed his official career. On the 7th of March it was ratified by the Empire. After a contest lasting for nearly ten years Austria was isolated, driven out of Lombardy, and depri\ed of her position in Italy and of all hopes of aggrandisement in South Grermany. She had obtained Venice, given up the Rhine frontier, and lost the Netherlands : in the traditional struggle for supremacy in central Europe she had succumbed to her French adversary. The result, great as it was, did not absorb the activity of French diplomacy. While negotiations were pro- ceeding with Austria, their effect was watched in Berlin and St. Petersbm-g. As regards the Tsar, the problem was complicated by the eccentricity of his character. At this moment he was just as angry with England as with Austria, for England called on him to continue the war, but took no steps to obtain the exchange of the Russians, who were taken prisoners at Zurich, and neglected his troops, which, after the defeat in Holland, were quartered in Jersey and Guernsey, and suffered great privations there during the winter. The rupture became complete when Malta fell into the hands of the English on the 5th of September, and the latter refused to comply with the Tsar's demand to surrender the island, which was so important both from a XT.] RUSS A'S CHAXGE OF FRONT. 353 strategical and commercial point of view. His mind moved by leaps and bounds, and all calmer feelings were merged in a resolve to^ revenge himself on his faithless allies. The treaty of alliance between Prussia and Russia of 1702 had been renewed with certain modifications on the 28tli of July, shortly after Marengo. The original plan of a confederation of the northern Powers, England included, against France, was now transformed into a league of armed neutral- ity between Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and afterwards Denmark, with the object of protecting the neutral flags against England's tyrannical interpretation of maritime law ; the British ambassador was requested to leave St. Petersburg, English vessels in Russian ports were seized, and at the end of the year Russia, Sweden, and Denmark signed a convention binding themselves to take the offensive against England in the following spring. The deeper his liatred of England, the more intense was his sudden admiration foi- the conqueror of P)rumaire. Tlie change which had long been quietly preparing found its first open expression in the mission of General Sprengtporten to Paris, to take charge of the six thousand Russian prisoners. Fourteen days later, on the 30th of December, a friendly letter of Paul's announced the despatch of a Russian pleni- potentiary as desired by the First Consul, and at the same time the Tsar intimated to the government in Berlin, which was inclined to raise difficulties, that he VOL. I. 23 354 TJFE OF TALT-KVKAND. [Ch. agreed to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine and to indemnifying the temporal states of the Empire bv secularisations. Since the 3rd of October there had existed an understanding between Beurnonville and Kriidener, which became more and more unaffected by Prussian influence. The new ambassador, the Marquis Luchesini, who had replaced Sandoz-Eollin, now used-up, in Paris since the end of October, was negotiating with Talleyrand as to Prussia's mediation between Russia and France when the situation had already undergone a complete change. After the liattle of Hohenlinden and Paul's overtures to the First Consul the French iMinister changed his tone, and declared that the impending peace with the Tsar would determine the attitude of P'rance towards Prussia. These negotiations were in active ^jrogress when the First Consul escaped by a mere chance from the infernal machine on the evening of December 24th. 1^'ouche. now admirably served by Barere. who had turned police-spy, discovered that the real authors of the crime were the Royalists ; but being attacked on all sides and pressed to take this course by the First Consul, he consented to the deportation of one hundred and thirty Terrorists. " Ddporter des honimes a I'occasion d'un crime qui leur est etranger, me parait le comble de riniquite," said Fouche's violent opponent Koederer to R^al, when the latter told him on the 30th of December that the Chouans were the real culprits. XI.] DEPORTATION OF TKRRORISTS. 355 '' Fouche feva toujours ses listes," was the reply, " parce que ce sont des homines mauvais par eux- m6mes." Three days before this Talleyrand had been consulted by the First Consul in presence of the Council of State on the point whether the sentence should be carried out by means of a special law or by the direct action of the executive. Eoederer states that Talleyrand answered as follows : " Je pense que votre pouvoir suflfit pour agir et que vous devez en user. Je pense que le gouvernement doit montrer qu'il salt se defendre ; cela est necessaire au dedans et au dehors. Les ii^gociatious out ete interronipues vingt jours, a cause de I'affaire de Ceracchi."' Accord- ing to Miot de Melito Talleyrand's reply was couched in more laconic style : " A quoi bon avoir uu Senat, si ce n'est pour s'en servir ? " At all events, the point was decided in accordance with the second view, the legal dictatorship being conferred on the Senate, which for the first time oidered deportation by means of a senatus-consultum. The First Consul admitted openly that he struck at the Terrorists not because of the attentat, which they did not commit, but on account of the crimes of the Terror, the 2nd of September, the 31st of May, and the conspiracy of Babeuf. They met with no compassion and deserved none ; but the reign of arbitrary power had com- menced ; the sentence was directed not against tlie crime, but against persons who were thought capable 356 J'i^'K <^l'' TALLEYRAND. [Ch of committing it. On the 9tli of January Ceracchi, Arena, Topino-Lebrun, and Domerville were executed for an alleged attempt on the life of the First Consul. Five other conspirators, whose guilt was not proved by more satisfactory evidence, met with a similar fate, whereupon two of the real autliors of the crime of the 24th of December, the Royalists Carbon and Saint- Kegent, were actually discovered. Talleyrand was implicated in these arbitrary pro- ceedings, which condemned innocent men to death, and justified his attitude by the necessity of maintain- ing the authority of the government in the face of foreign powers. This practical object was attained. The Tsar, who did not do things by hahes, ordered Louis XVIIL, who was living under his protection and at his expense at Mittau, to leave Russian territory. While the exile and his suite were wandering from place to place along the high roads amid the snows of winter, the Russian envoy Kalitscheff was received with royal honours in Paris at the end of Februaiy, and brought instructions to make the conclusion of peace conditional on the cession of Malta to the knights of the Order of St. John, and on the in- dependence of Naples and Sardinia, Bavaria and Wurtemberg. The First Consul was ready to comply with these demands. Although the incorporation of Piedmont into France had already been decided on, he contented himself with claiming Savoy and XL] DEATH OF THE TSAI!. 357 consenting to the peace with Naples, which was signed on the 18th of JNIarch, on condition that the Neapolitan ports shonld be closed to the Dutch. France, Russia, and Prussia were to come to an under- standing as to compensations in Germany. At the same time Prussia's troops closed the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, In addition to this, the Tsar indulged in the idea of advancino- on India bv^ wav of Khiva and O It Herat, in order to punish the English in that part of the world for the breach of faith which had deprived him of Malta. These combinations, which in many respects were a prelude to those at Tilsit, were destined to have an abrupt termination. Paul's last ]jolitical act was the ultimatum to Prussia to occupy Hauover or be prepared for a Russian attack. It was this despatch which arrived in Berlin with Pahlen's postscri})t : " Sa Majeste est indisposee aujourd'hui. Cela pourrait a\-oir des suites." It was dated the 23rd of March, the day of his death, and led to the advance of Prussian troops into Hanover, to which the King, who had entirely different schemes in view, gave his consent with reluctance. The hrst pronouncement of the new Tsar Alexander was in favour of peace with France, but also of peace with England; and a few weeks later the coalition created out of such heterogeneous elements fell to pieces. The only tears which were shed for Catherine's ill-fated son are said to have come from 358 LIFE OF TALLEYEAND. [Ch. XI. Bonaparte, when he heard of the ghastly deed by which Russia once more tempered her despotism. Talleyrand took the matter more coolly, and received the official intimation, that Paul had died of ajx)plexy like his father, with the remark that it seemed advisable to invent a new disease in Eussia. END OF VOL. I. Printed by Haz«ll, Watson, & Viney, LU., London and Aylesbuiy. ' "* * COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY UBRARIK 931146 Columbia University in the City of New York JUN Z^ 1962