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THE OTHER SIDE 
 OF THE MEDAL 
 
 Addresses delivered 
 by the Netherlands Representative 
 in the Security Council of the United Nations, 
 Mr. E. N. van Kleffe ns, 
 
 dining the discussions of the Indonesian Question 
 (July 31 — August 26, 1947). 
 
Distributed by the Netherlands Information Bureau, 10 
 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y., which is registered 
 with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of 
 Justice, Washington, D. C., ns an agent of the Royal Nether- 
 lands Government. A copy of this material is being tiled with 
 the Department of Justice, where the registration statement 
 of the Netherlands Information Bureau is available for 
 inspection. Registration under the Foreign .'Vgents Regis- 
 tration Act does not indicate approval or disapproval of this 
 materh»l by the I nited States Government. 
 
FOr^^EWORD 
 
 On July 21, 1947, the Netherlands Government, recognizing 
 that further negotiations with the Government of the Republic 
 of Indonesia would remain futile, began enforcement action in 
 the territory of the Republic. 
 
 The name “Republic of Indonesia’’ tends to create the im- 
 pression that its territory extends to the whole of the Indonesian 
 Archipelago. That is not so. The Republic’s territory comprises 
 only the islands of Sumatra and Java with the adjacent smaller 
 island of Madura. It does not comprise all the rest of the Archi- 
 l)elago, where since 1946 two other states have come into being 
 — that of Borneo, whose territory is the island of that name, and 
 East Indonesia, consisting of Celebes, the Lesser Sunda Islands, 
 the Moluccas and scores of other larger and smaller islands. 
 
 The map appended to this little volume shows this clearly. 
 
 On March 25, 1947, an agreement was signed in Linggadjati 
 between the Netherlands Government and the Government of 
 the Republic of Indonesia providing for the early federation of 
 East Indonesia, Borneo, and the Republic. The voluntary 
 acceptance of this Agreement by the Republican Government 
 seemed to point to a co-operative attitude. 
 
 In fact, however, this Government, which never succeeded in 
 establishing real authority, failed to establish tranquillity in its 
 territory, failed to set hostages free, allowed violence to reign, 
 encouraged attempts to bring East Indonesia and Borneo under 
 the domination of the Republic, and generally led the country to 
 economic ruin. 
 
 When all hope of improvement had clearly become un- 
 founded, the Netherlands Government, which as the sovereign 
 power is responsible for peace and order if the local authorities 
 do not act, reluctantly came to the decision that enforcement 
 measures were unavoidable. It was this action which gave rise 
 to the discussions in the Security Council of the United Nations, 
 which adopted the resolutions printed at the end of this little 
 volume. 
 
On July 30th, 1947, the acting representative of Australia on the 
 Security Council drew the Council’s attention to the situation 
 prevailing in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia (i.e. Java, 
 Madura, and Sumatra) ; the same was done on that day by the 
 permanent liaison officer of India. 
 
 The Council, considering that circumstances required an immedi- 
 ate discussion of the question, without granting the usual delay of 
 three days, proceeded to discuss the substance of the letters of the 
 acting representative of Australia and of the permanent liaison 
 officer of India in its meeting of July 31st. 
 
 The first question which arose was whether representatives of the 
 Republic of Indonesia should he admitted to the Council table. 
 With regard to this suggestion, the Netherlands representative 
 said : 
 
 “I wish to thank the Members of the Security Council for the oppor- 
 tunity accorded us to present our point of view, without vote. I take the 
 liberty of asking to he heard at this early stage because the question of 
 admitting representatives of the Republic of Indonesia to this Council table 
 seems to me to prejudge the whole question at issue before this Council at 
 this time. 
 
 “What is the Republic of Indonesia? I wish to remind the Council that 
 this is a misleading name. Indonesia is that whole archipelago reaching 
 from Sumatra in the West to New Guinea in the East, in which at the 
 present moment there is not only the Republic of Indonesia, which comprises 
 geographically only the islands of Java and Sumatra and is not designed to 
 comprise any more than that, hut there are also the States of Eastern Indo- 
 nesia, comprising Celebes, the Moluccas, the Lesser Sunda islands and a 
 number of other islands in the east of the archipelago, and also the State of 
 Borneo. These two States are destined, together with the Republic of 
 Indonesia — which, I cannot repeat often enough, comprises only the islands 
 of Java and Sumatra — to be affiliated, associated, and federated into some- 
 thing which, according to the agreement of Linggadjati — with which the 
 Council, I take it, is familiar — is to he called the ‘United States of Indo- 
 nesia.’ That State-to-be, and no other state in those regions, is, according to 
 that agreement which bears the signature of the representative of the Re- 
 public of Indonesia, to be a sovereign, democratic State on a federal basis. 
 
 “The Republic of Indonesia, no more than the State of Eastern Indo- 
 nesia or of Borneo, is no sovereign State. It never has been a sovereign 
 State. It is a political entity to be affiliated ultimately with the two 
 other States I have named, and to he part of a federation. It has a Govern- 
 ment which is only dc facto. But a Government of what ? Of the sovereign 
 State? No, not of a sovereign State, but a State in the nature of- — I mention 
 this with all due respect to these States with which the Republic of Indo- 
 nesia, ]ilus Eastern Indonesia and Borneo, is comparable — let us say. New 
 York or Utah or New South Wales or Paraiba in Brazil, or a State of the 
 
 [ 2 ] 
 
United States of Venezuela. I submit, that being so, there is no justification 
 for asking a political entity of that kind to be admitted to this Council table. 
 
 “I may recall, to complete the picture of the true legal status of the 
 
 Republic of Indonesia, that it was founded as a political weapon by the 
 
 Japanese in Saigon. The present President of the Government of the 
 
 Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Soekarno, was summoned to Japanese Head- 
 
 quarters just before the capitulation of Japan and was ordered there to 
 found or establish this political entity, which he did. I repeat that it has 
 never been recognized as a sovereign State by anyone. The Government has 
 only received de facto recognition for what it is — namely, an entity to be 
 affiliated and federated with these two other States when the time comes — 
 and we hope that will be very soon indeed.” 
 
 In the afternoon of the same day (July 31st), Mr. van Kleffens 
 
 made the following statement : 
 
 ‘Tt will be my endeavour to try to show the Council that, although this 
 is a case admittedly of military action, it is a form of military action with 
 which this Council has no concern. 
 
 “If, then, the President will allow me to speak on the resolution as it 
 now stands, I should like to point out, first, that the military action which 
 is at present, much to our regret — I must stress that — being taken in Java 
 and Sumatra, is being taken not only with the full backing of all the 
 political parties and all the trade unions in The Netherlands, with the sole 
 exception of the communists, but also — and this seems to me extremely 
 important — with the full understanding and approval, which have been 
 voiced in public, of the Governments of the two fellow States, if I may 
 use that expression, of the Republic of Indonesia — namely. Eastern 
 Indonesia and Borneo. This action has been undertaken with the prior 
 knowledge of the two sister States of Indonesia. I am not revealing any 
 secret when I say that the two Governments of these two States — and I 
 use the word ‘States’ in the sense of states to be merged into the federation, 
 not sovereign states — of Eastern Indonesia and Borneo have asked us 
 more than once to take that action at an earlier time, but we have been 
 anxious to exhaust every possibility of avoiding a clash before taking 
 these measures. 
 
 “W hat was it that made us take this action in Java and Sumatra, and 
 what is the true nature of that action? The Council will recall that, in the 
 Linggadjati Agreement, many points were settled about the future nature 
 of the United States of Indonesia and the form in which the United 
 States of Indonesia-to-be would be affiliated with the Kingdom of the 
 Netherlands under the House of Orange. However, this Agreement did 
 not settle — although it was supposed by us that it went without saying — 
 such matters as the cessation of the loathsome practice of keeping hostages. 
 The Republic of Indonesia went on to behave as a sovereign state, which 
 the Linggadjati Agreement itself said it was not — in other words, no more 
 
 [ 3 ] 
 
direct agreements with other states. It did not settle that there would be 
 no more blockade of territories held by Dutch troops in such areas as 
 Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya and elsewhere; that there would be at 
 least an observance of the truce which has been signed at the end of last 
 year and on account of which w’e have had innumerable complaints in 
 respect of violation of that truce. 
 
 “I heard only yesterday that this matter was to be put before the 
 Council, and it appeared a little later that this was to be done with un- 
 precedented haste. I do not complain at all about that haste, but I hope the 
 Members of the Council will understand that for that reason it has not 
 been possible for me to bring before this Council and lay upon the Council 
 table the wealth of documentary material which I shall he glad to present 
 to the Council at a later stage if the Council so desires, to reinforce my 
 statements. I have asked the Government of the Indies for documentar}- 
 evidence of more than one thousand violations of Armistice which have 
 come to our knowledge. 
 
 “All these points the Council looked for in vain in the Linggadjati 
 Agreement. They are not mentioned there. But it goes without saying that 
 if there was to be constructive co-operation on the basis of that Agreement 
 — co-operation of which there was no trace, or hardly any, in the real sense 
 of that word, everything being promises and disavowals and evasions and 
 words, words, w'ords — if then, there was to he constructive effort, at least 
 the hostages should have been freed. Here I may mention — and these are 
 the latest data that are at my disposal — that by the end of June there were 
 still seven hundred white hostages being kept there, and about ten thousand 
 other hostages. I ask the Council to realize what that means. They were 
 people who, almost all of them, had been kept in Japanese concentration 
 camps ever since the islands of Indonesia had been overrun by the enemy, 
 and these concentration camps rank with the most dreadful which this earth 
 has seen in the course of the last fifteen years or so. 
 
 “These people might rightly have expected, when X-] day came, that 
 they would at last be set free, but they were not set free. They were 
 kept by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia most of the time in 
 circumstances of great squalor. I submit to the Council that, as the I.ondon 
 Times wrote one day, the keeping of hostages is a practice which is in- 
 consistent with the principles of any government that calls itself a civilized 
 government, even if it is only the government of a state in the sense I have 
 described, and not a sovereign and independent State. 
 
 “.About foreign relations, there was no cessation of endeavors to 
 make agreements wdth other States, in spite of the fact that Article 2 of 
 the Linggadjati Agreement provides that the only sovereign state in those 
 parts would be the United States of Indonesia — that is, the Republic plus 
 Eastern Indonesia and Borneo, linked up together on the basis of a 
 federation. 
 
 “The food blockade of the areas held by Dutch troops continued until 
 we took this action. The hostilities against our troops continued unabated. 
 
 “All these points had been put before the Government of the Republic 
 
 [4] 
 
time after time, and in a little while, for which I ask the Council’s in- 
 dulgence, I shall put documentary material before this Council on the 
 basis of which that is made abundantly clear. But in spite of all our en- 
 deavours, nothing came of it — nothing at all. 
 
 “Let it not be said that this action was merely undertaken because we 
 still continued to differ over one point in connection with the execution of 
 the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement — namely, the constitution of a 
 joint gendarmerie. Misrepresentation has been taking place here, as on 
 other points, and I am very glad that at last we shall be given the oppor- 
 tunity to present our case here, which has been befogged to an incredible 
 extent by forces of propaganda beyond our control. 
 
 “It follows, and I think this is pure logic, that if the questions I have 
 just named, which were of the very gravest import to us and to every- 
 body concerned — especially those poor hostages — were not regulated under 
 the Linggadjati Agreement, the arbitration clause in that Agreement as 
 .such was not applicable to those questions. I should like to make the 
 comparison with two people who agree to build a house. They make that 
 agreement and say that if they disagree on the furniture or the general 
 lay-out of the house they will submit those points to the better judgment 
 of a third impartial party. But if one of the parties shows by his acts 
 that he is not going to build at all. the arbitration clause clearly is not 
 operative. So it was in the case of the Linggadjati Agreement, and that 
 was the reason why there was no obligation at all on the part of the Govern- 
 ment of The Netherlands to have recourse to arbitration. 
 
 “It may be asked why we did not resort to arbitration even if there 
 was no obligation. I tbink our record shows that we have gone to the 
 last limits of patience and forbearance before resorting to this action. T 
 beg tbe Council to ponder, wbat would it have meant if we had resorted 
 to arbitration ? It would have meant more delay, more suffering, and no 
 chance of bringing agreement closer witbin a reasonable time, and that is 
 why, in view of all those considerations taken together, we decided reluct- 
 antly — but with the backing of tbe whole country and the wholehearted 
 approval of the States of Eastern Indonesia and Borneo, to take this action. 
 
 “The chief characteristic of the Republic has been — and this is very- 
 pertinent to the discussion at present here in progress — that it had no 
 authority at home. It was not obeyed. This is not because I say so, but 
 because these are incontrovertible facts, and I shall make that clear to the 
 Council if I may. Time and again emissaries of the Republican Govern- 
 ment entered into discussions with representatives of the Netherlands 
 Government. Many times they came to an agreement which they said 
 they had to refer back to their capital. Though, of course, we gave every 
 possibility to them for referring back these agreed points to their authorities 
 in the capital, invariably — or at least in very many cases — they were dis- 
 avowed on the spot. 
 
 “^Moreover, undisciplined troops and lawless armed hands continued to 
 range the countryside, living on the population on the land, in other 
 words by terrorizing the inhabitants. We know — ^and here again I shall 
 
 [ 5 ] 
 
be happy to present documentary evidence, for which I have asked but 
 which, owing to the circumstances, I cannot present at present — that many 
 people, excellent elements, people of education, insight and experience, 
 have received threats that if they ever fell into the hands of the Govern- 
 ment of the Republic, measures would be taken against them. 
 
 “The average native has had more than enough of this. The people of 
 Java are not an industrial proletariat. They are small landowners, there 
 being a law which forbids any white person to have land there, a law 
 which we made in order that the land should belong to the inhabitants years 
 and years ago, to be quite correct in 1870. These people are peaceful folk, 
 like everybody here in the United States or in the country of any other 
 Member, and they ask for protection. They want to get rid of the Republic 
 or at least of the Republican Government, because I must point out very 
 clearly that we have nothing at all against the Republic as an institution. 
 They want to get rid of that Republic, and that is the explanation of the 
 fact that our troops have been so well received. You may say, ‘Ah. but 
 we see in the papers all these stories about plantations being set on fire, 
 etc.’ That may well be. But it does not undermine my statement in any 
 way. because those are precisely the acts of those bands and disobedient 
 troops of which I have just spoken, and to that I shall if necessary 
 summon witnesses. 
 
 “Another word about those troops and their general character of law- 
 lessness, and that is, why do they possess arms ? They possess arms because 
 the Japanese left those troops with arms when they had to surrender, leaving 
 them as a thorn in our side, as a sort of time bomb, if I may use that ex- 
 pression, to create trouble after the defeat of Japan. Those arms have 
 been accepted, and unfortunately they have been used in an irregular 
 manner. 
 
 “In other words, an intolerable situation has arisen on all sides. The 
 administration of the Government degenerated visibly. Profitseekers. 
 people who have taken over houses which did not belong to them, and 
 so on were those who sought to extend its existence. They were the 
 vested interests of that Republican Government. There was nothing which 
 seemed to point to an improvement. The people, the honest, common 
 agricultural folk of Java and Sumatra, could no longer be abandoned to 
 their oppressive government, a government which has at all times had a 
 totalitarian character, I may add. The President, who w’as placed in 
 power by the Japanese, saw fit to arrogate to himself the fullness of 
 public authority, dismissing ministers at will without appointing others in 
 harmony with the Parliament of the Republic and acting as if he were 
 the sole authority in the State. 
 
 “Now. I want to give you an illustration of this action we have been 
 compelled to take. In the spring of this year, there were troops of ours 
 along the perimeter of the area held by Dutch troops around the city of 
 Surabaya. This place had the somewhat difficult name of Modjokerto. 
 
 “Troops of the Republic of Indonesia razed houses to the ground 
 against the will of the inhabitants because no one likes to have his house 
 
 16 ] 
 
razed to the ground, practiced the scorched earth policy there, ravaged 
 rich rice lands and generally created havoc in that area. They opened 
 dikes and locks so that areas that were urgently needed for cultivation in 
 the interests of feeding the population were made unfit for that purpose. 
 
 “Of course, vve could not tolerate such wanton destruction. Our troops 
 went in and met with very little opposition. Our troops, to the happiness 
 of the inhabitants, restored order, closed the dikes, repaired the locks, 
 and saw that the people could live there without being molested. Now, 
 did we ask that the Republic should withdraw its authority there? No sir, 
 we did not. On the contrary, we asked the Republican authorities, if they 
 cared to, to continue not in the employ of the Netherlands Government 
 but as Republican authorities. 
 
 “All we care about is that anarchy, chaos and lawlessness should cease 
 and that the great masses of the people, on behalf of whom we act as the 
 guardians of their security and true liberty, should at last be enabled 
 again to live in peace. 
 
 “This is clearly not war. What we are doing now is Modjokerto on a 
 large scale. We are comj>elled to do so by circumstances and much against 
 our will, our bidding. This is not war. The best word we have been able 
 to find for it — but I do not wish to quarrel about words — was ‘police 
 action.’ 1 repeat that we do not wage war against the Republic. We shall 
 be quite happy to continue negotiations with the Republic but we cannot 
 go on with a government which is divided within itself, not obeyed by 
 those under its de facto authority, and generally evasive, unconstructive 
 and uncooperative. 
 
 “Is this the re-establishment of Colonialism as has been said here and 
 there? It is not. Here, I must ask for credit. Judge us by our acts. We 
 ask for your credit and we feel we are entitled to ask for your credit. 
 
 “What we want to do is to act with these people as partners. The time 
 is past — and we know it well — for servants, under what, in earlier days, 
 might perha])S justly have been termed ‘Colonial administration.’ Partners, 
 not servants — that is what we want. 
 
 “Let us now analyze the relevant portions of the Charter against this 
 l)ackground. The Charter was designed to operate between sovereign 
 states. Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter says, ‘The Organization is 
 based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’ 
 
 “I beg to observe that no state is eligible for membership which is not 
 a sovereign state. Let me add that in Committee I, 1 of the San Fran- 
 cisco Conference in its report to Commission I, it was stated that sovereign 
 equality includes the following elements : 
 
 “ ‘. . . 2. That each state enjoys the right inherent in full sovereignty.’ 
 
 “There is on the side of the Republic of Indonesia no question of full 
 sovereignty. The sovereign power — and I think this has never been 
 disputed yet — is The Netherlands whose Government has difficulties with 
 one of its constituent elements, not with an external element. 
 
 “We therefore contend : 
 
 “First, the Charter is not applicable to what is now happening in Java 
 
 [7] 
 
and Sumatra; and 
 
 “Second, that although it seems to us that that contention is adequate 
 to rule out action of any kind, including an affirmative vote on the 
 Australian draft resolution now before us, we consider in addition that this 
 is a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of The Netherlands. 
 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter reads as follows ; 
 
 “ ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
 Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
 jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
 matters to settlement under the present Charter ; but this principle shall 
 not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VIL’ 
 “Now, I come to Chapter VIII. Assuming purely and simply for argu- 
 ment’s sake that the Charter is applicable — which I deny — to what is now 
 taking place in Java and Sumatra, where then, I ask, is there any danger 
 to rnational peace or security, let alone breaches of the peace or acts 
 of aggression in defiance of the Charter? In what countries outside the 
 Netherlands’ territory are there any signs of danger to peace caused by 
 this action? Therefore, with regard to paragraph B of the Australian 
 draft resolution, as I have already said, the Linggadjati Agreement is not 
 applicable here. The Australian resolution says that we are invited 
 ‘with the Indonesian Republic to settle disputes by arbitration in accordance 
 with Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement. . . .’ Well, I have already 
 said that I think that article is not applicable because of the facts that gave 
 rise to this action. 
 
 “This does not mean that we are not anxious to proceed to a settlement 
 with the Republic of Indonesia — Java and Sumatra — on the basis of the 
 Linggadjati Agreement at the earliest possible moment. Very soon, we 
 anticipate that conditions in Java and Sumatra will be such, thanks to our 
 action, that discussions can be resumed with the Government of the Republic 
 of Indonesia. Once order is restored, when the common man is free again 
 to express his opinion and is not cowering under threats of lawlessness 
 and chaos, we shall be happy to inaugurate such talks at once. This means 
 that, I hope, our action will be concluded very soon. If a helping hand of 
 some friendly power — for instance, of the Lffiited States of America — could 
 be useful we shall be only too glad to avail ourselves of it. 
 
 “The Charter has its limitations. The Security Council has no right 
 to extend its limits. If the Council thinks that the Charter is inadequate, 
 let the United Nations write a better Charter. But let the Council not 
 overstep the boundaries laid down in that Charter as it now fortunately 
 or unfortunately is at present. 
 
 “As long as the text of the Charter is what it is today, it must be 
 applied as it is. Some of us may regret that, but it is well-known the 
 Charter was never meant to be a cure for all the evils and ills in this world. 
 
 “In one of his earlier statements this afternoon, I heard the representa- 
 tive of Australia mention that this was a matter of international concern. 
 When I had the honour and privilege of being the representative of my 
 country on the Security Council, I had occasion to hear that expression. 
 
 18] 
 
I heard that expression, if I recall, in the course of the discussion of the 
 Spanish question about a year ago. I had occasion then to say that I 
 could not warn the Council enough against the loose use of that expression. 
 It does not figure in the Charter, and it is an easy way to let the Council 
 assume responsibilities for which it has not been instituted. There are 
 many matters of international concern which do not fall within the terms 
 of the Charter. 
 
 “W hen there are internal disputes in any given states — federal or non- 
 federal states — of a certain magnitude, public opinion is easily aroused, 
 especially when there are questions of different races involved. 
 
 “Last year when the matter of British troops in Indonesia came up for 
 discussion in the Security Council, I remember ver}’ well what I said on 
 that occasion, when the Council decided it had found no reason for taking 
 action — and this very largely on considerations identical with or akin to 
 those which I have just advanced. I said that nevertheless m3' Govern- 
 ment realized very well that the Indonesian people wanted to set up an 
 autonomous state, and that that would meet with our wholehearted co- 
 operation and approval. That struck a chord in man}' human hearts. It 
 was for that reason alone that I undertook at that time to acquaint the 
 Council with an}' agreement we would reach with the Republic of Indonesia. 
 It was in order to keep that promise that the Linggadjati Agreement was 
 sent to the Security Council for its information in the beginning of this 
 year, and for no other reason ; we did not ask the Security Council to 
 register it, as has been said in some newspaper. We have done nothing 
 of the sort. It would have been entirely inconsistent with our attitude and 
 with the truth of the matter at all times, had we asked this Agreement 
 to be registered with the United Nations. No, we only kept our promise 
 that this Agreement would be sent to the Council for its information — 
 nothing more. 
 
 “\\’e are faithful to the conviction that we understand this question 
 not to be a matter for the Security Council to deal with, no more than 
 when there is bloodshed and when troops are being sent to quell dis- 
 turbances. let us say, in connection with a strike of any magnitude ; in 
 such a case also there may be casualties on both sides. Although that is 
 our contention, we continue to realize that this matter interests many 
 people in spite of the fact — and I must repeat it — that this is of no concern 
 to the Security Council under the terms of the Charter as it reads. 
 
 “Therefore, I am glad to announce that my Government is going to 
 invite a number of other Governments, to send a representative to In- 
 donesia. and not only to the Republic, but also to Eastern Indonesia and 
 Borneo, with the request that, as honest men, they will report their 
 findings to the world. 
 
 “Much as it has been misunderstood and misrepresented, we feel our 
 case is a simple, straightforward, honest case and we can afford to let 
 the full light of publicity be shed on it. 
 
 “I hope that, whatever the Council does, it will think twice and even 
 more often before it does anything that will lend comfort to lawless and 
 
 [ 9 ] 
 
uncooperative elements and cause dejection and despair to those millions 
 of people — and in Java alone there are forty million people — who expect 
 that the day will at last dawn when constructive enterprise in the constitu- 
 tional sense will at last take the place of chaos and terror. 
 
 “The responsibility of the Council in this case is a very heavy one. Do 
 not be misled by those who brand our action as being directed against the 
 forces of liberalism in Eastern countries. On the contrary, if the Council 
 embarrasses our honest constructive efforts, the responsibility for failure 
 in that upward movement in these regions will be the Council’s, not ours.” 
 
 When the Australian proposal was discussed, to the effect that 
 the Netherlands (iovernment and the Government of the Indo- 
 nesian Republic should order their troops to cease fire, Mr. van 
 Kleffens said : 
 
 “What I wanted to say on this occasion is that I have the very fullest 
 res]:>ect and understanding for the generous impulse which prompts many 
 Members of the Council to express the wish that hostilities should cease ; it 
 coincides entirely with our own wish that the}' should cease at the earliest 
 possible time. 
 
 “When that wish is expressed in a form which makes it look as if it 
 is done as a matter of right, it makes it difficult for us, not only in regard 
 to safeguarding our own position but in the interest of the Security Council 
 itself, one of the principal Organs of the United Nations of which we are 
 a Member. I therefore warmly applaud the idea just put forward by the 
 representative of the United States, after the representative of France 
 had initiated that idea, that some clause should be put in to reserve the legal 
 position as to the competence of the Council. I think the Council will find 
 that this will make matters a good deal easier and I therefore earnestly 
 express the hope that it will be done.” 
 
 During the discussions of an amendment to the proposed Austra- 
 lian resolution offered by the representative of the Soviet Union, 
 demanding that Dutch troops be withdrawn to the demarcation 
 lines existing before July 20th, the Netherlands representative said, 
 on August 1 st : 
 
 “T must caution the Security Council very earnestly against accepting 
 the Soviet Union amendment. The plain truth of the matter is that if our 
 troops were withdrawn from the areas where they have now restored 
 order, there would be, when the Republican bands returned, terrible acts 
 of retaliation, to which a great number of people belonging to various 
 races would fall victim. 
 
“I therefore repeat that I must caution the Council very earnestly 
 against the acceptance of this amendment. I want to declare here and now 
 that if the amendment were accepted, my Government would bear no 
 responsibility for certain things which are sure to follow and which the 
 Council, I feel sure, would hereafter regret.” 
 
 The Soviet amendment was rejected. 
 
 On August 7th, the representative of India gave in an extensive 
 speech his views on the Indonesian question and on developments 
 in Indonesia since the beginning of the Japanese occupation. As 
 the next speaker, the Netherlands representative said : 
 
 “We have just heard a pretty full discussion of the internal affairs 
 of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a Member of the United Nations. 
 That description was in very many respects accurate, not in all, but I do 
 not think that the Council has jurisdiction to deal with these matters and 
 therefore I shall refrain from going into these questions except in one 
 sense, and that is this. I do not want the legend that we took action 
 against the Republican forces because we could not agree on the gendar- 
 merie to gain further credence. That has been said on many occasions ; 
 I repeat, because I said it last week, that it is not true. 
 
 “The reasons why we took that action were, as I said then, the follow- 
 ing. Hostages were still being kept, not a point from the Linggadjati 
 .Vgreement ; the territories held by us were systematically starved and 
 foodstuffs were prevented from being moved in, not a point from the 
 Linggadjati Agreement ; and hostilities did not cease, again not a point 
 from the Linggadjati Agreement. 
 
 “I mentioned that we had evidence, and I am going to produce this 
 evidence of more than one thousand infractions of the armistice signed 
 in October last year.* Then there was the general impotence of the 
 Republican Government to master those wild and lawless elements which 
 were roaming the countryside and terrorizing the population, and coupled 
 therewith were the chaotic conditions that prevailed in the territories 
 under the nominal authority of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
 "Order had to be restored in the interest of the people. We do not 
 glory in that brief campaign ; there is little glory to be reaped from police 
 action, which as the Council knows is the best phrase we have been able 
 to find for what happened. 
 
 “We do not. I repeat, want to destroy the Republic. All we want is 
 to establish and maintain order, so that at least the Republican Govern- 
 ment may be obeyed by its own so far lawless elements. Is it not hair- 
 raising when one hears of the Republican Governor of Eastern Java, 
 a physician. Dr. Moerdjani, report, according to a Republican newspaper 
 
 1 ) Presented to the Security Council on September 2nd, 1947. 
 
 [ 11 ] 
 
called Soeara Rakjat Kediri, that no less than 13 per cent of the population 
 of the island of Madura, which is almost one with Java and has a popula- 
 tion of about two million, had died from starvation and that 27 per cent 
 of the population are now in such a state of hunger oedema — an illness 
 well known in the Slav countries on the continent of Europe — that they 
 are beyond recovery? That is the kind of condition which forced us to 
 take action. We could not face it any longer when such a situation prevailed. 
 
 “Let me quote a witness, who has given me his permission to mention 
 this or any other portion from his report. He is Mr. Leslie B. Moss, 
 Executive Director of the American Church World Service, a responsible 
 organization created by the Protestant Churches of America to organize 
 their aid to churches abroad. 
 
 “Mr. Moss says ; ‘There are close observers of the situation who feel 
 certain that the temporizing tactics of the Indonesians arise not so much 
 from fear of the Dutch authorities as from the realization of their own 
 unreadiness to provide experienced dealing with the hard tasks of state- 
 manship and government. Whether this fact plays an important part in 
 the situation can hardly be surely known, but in any case there is continued 
 criticism between the two. My own feeling’— he has been on the spot — ‘is 
 that there is too much of the debating and bargaining psychology among 
 the Indonesians and a genuine lack of comprehension of what the task 
 of government over seventy million people involves. They discuss inter- 
 minably, it seems, points in the agreement which they signed quite freely 
 after they had participated in making it, but the points they discuss are 
 the ones that are clear and precise ; about the ones which are vague or 
 general in their terminology, about which there could conceivably be 
 grounds for differences of interpretation, they raise few questions in the 
 field of clarification.’ 
 
 “It is that sort of condition, and not disagreement on that one point 
 of the joint gendarmerie, which was the reason for our action. I do not 
 want that other story to gain ground. 
 
 “We also went in to help not only the Republic, but also such countries 
 as Eastern Indonesia and Borneo. We want to help them — not oppress 
 them — to overcome these growing pains on a basis of complete civic 
 freedom and autonomy. We should like to help them federate into a 
 United States of Indonesia. However, the Republic could not or would 
 not desist from its aggressive tendencies. It wanted to eat up its neighbours 
 and co-equals. I hope that you will have the occasion to speak with the 
 representatives of Eastern Indonesia and Borneo, who will be here next 
 week. When you speak with them you will be convinced that what I have 
 said is so. 
 
 “The people of Eastern Indonesia and Borneo are out to preserve 
 their own freedom, and they have refused to be part and parcel of the 
 Republic of Indonesia which has consistently tried to swallow them up.’’ 
 
 112 ] 
 
On August 12th, the Security Council took up once more the dis- 
 cussion of the question of inviting a representative of the Indo- 
 nesian Republic to appear before the Council. On this matter, Mr. 
 van Kleffens said : 
 
 “I have already pointed out on July 31 that only representatives of 
 sovereign and independent states, generally recognized as such, can be 
 asked to participate in a discussion under Article 32 of the Charter. 
 
 “I submit again that the Republic of Indonesia is not a sovereign and 
 independent state, generally so recognized. 
 
 “The Republic has explicitly recognized that fact. I have here before 
 me the text of a letter addressed by the President of the Republic, Mr. 
 Soekarno himself, to the American Government on July 10 of this year, 
 in which he said : 
 
 ‘The Indonesian Government recognizes that during the transition 
 period between now and ultimately on January 1, 1949, The Neth- 
 erlands is to retain sovereignty and ultimate authority in Indonesia.’ 
 
 “I submit that this is highly pertinent, Mr. Chairman, and I draw par- 
 ticular attention to the words ‘retain’. You cannot retain what you did not 
 possess previously. Even if — what is not quite clear — the Republic now 
 repudiates tbe Linggadjati Agreement which provides for that interim- 
 period to which Mr. Soekarno referred in the passage I have just quoted. 
 The Netherlands must he deemed to have sovereignty and what Mr. 
 Soekarno very rightly called ‘ultimate authority’ in the Republic. It is 
 ])recisely on the basis and strength of that sovereignty and ultimate author- 
 ity that we have taken the action which is retaining the attention of the 
 Security Council. 
 
 “But let us suppose that all that were not so. Even then it seems to me 
 indisputable that, if the Republic, repudiating Linggadjati, claims sov- 
 ereignty, that sovereignty must find a basis either in conditions existing 
 before Linggadjati or else in something which happened since Linggadjati. 
 I beg to assert that neither before — nor after Linggadjati did the Republic 
 fulfill the conditions which in international law should be fulfilled if there 
 is to be any question of sovereignty. These conditions are : 
 
 “1. Governmental authority. This, in the case of the Republic, is 
 singularly absent. It has become apparent time after time that, because of 
 lack of authority, the Republican Government was unable to carry out 
 engagements it had contracted. I refer to the numerous examples I have 
 given on July 31 and again on August 7. I shall not weary the Council by 
 repetition. 
 
 “2. The second condition for sovereignty is : a well-defined territory 
 in which authority is exercised. Most especially before Linggadjati there 
 was no such territory. At all times has the Republic shown aggressive and 
 expansionist tendencies ; its Government had the ambition to rule the 
 whole archipelago, including large areas which refused to be dominated 
 from Java. The very name of the Republic bears witness to that fact; the 
 name ‘Republic of Indonesia’ is a program. Moreover, even in certain 
 
 [13] 
 
areas which the Re])uhlic alleged already belonged to it, the population 
 showed that it did not recognize its authority. 
 
 “3. The third condition is that there should be a population whose 
 inenihers are not at the same time nationals of an other state. It is a fact 
 that the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Republic do not consider 
 that they are only and exclusively citizens of the Republic. They know that 
 they have also ties with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
 
 “In the hope of strengthening the Government of the Republic, we have 
 recognized it in Linggadjati as exercising de facto authority in Java and 
 Sumatra. Neither more, nor less. It has not been recognized by us as a 
 de jure government. 
 
 “Still less has the Republic (as contrasted with the Government of the 
 Republic) been recognized by us as a sovereign and independent state. 
 
 “It is surprising, in the light of these facts, that neither the Republic 
 nor its Government has been recognized as a sovereign and independent 
 state by any appreciable number of other governments. It may have made 
 conventions with a few countries such as India, or Egypt, or Syria. If so, 
 and leaving aside for the time being any discussion of the political motives 
 of these few countries, I submit that this proves very little. What deter- 
 mines the situation is the fact that the Republic has not been recognized by 
 any appreciable number of countries as a sovereign and independent state; 
 in other words : it has not found that general measure of recognition which 
 is beyond a doubt required if a state is to be treated as a sovereign and inde- 
 l)endent state by a body representing the generality of States such as the 
 Security Council. 
 
 “The members of tbe Security Council do not sit here as tbe spokesmen 
 of their own countries alone. The Charter provides that the members of the 
 Council act on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations (Art. 24, 
 first paragraph). Seen in that light, no member of the Security Council, not 
 even one whose government has made some agreement with the Republic 
 of Indonesia, bas tbe right to disregard the fact that the vast majority of 
 the members of the United Nations have not recognized the Republic as a 
 sovereign and independent state. 
 
 “The Charter has only been written for dealings between fully recog- 
 nized governments of States which had in turn been generally and fully 
 recognized. If this rule is not adhered to, the door is open here to repre- 
 sentatives to any usurper-government in any state, recognized or not re- 
 cognized. Surely that has never crossed the mind of anyone in San Fran- 
 cisco or elsewhere. So long as ( 1 ) the state in question has not been gen- 
 erally recognized de jure, and so long as (2) a state so recognized has not 
 a de jure government, it is not, it cannot be, a state in the sense of the 
 Charter. It may be a most respectable state forming part of a federation, 
 such as any state of the USA, or of Mexico, or of Venezuela, or of Brazil, 
 or of Australia. Or it may be a nascent state. Or it may be a state which, 
 because of patent and obvious weaknesses, does not, or not yet, inspire that 
 general confidence which alone can win it general recognition as an inde- 
 pendent or sovereign state. But it is not a State in the sense of the Qiarter. 
 
 [14] 
 
“This is purely a legal question, Mr. Chairman, and T apologize if those 
 who are more impressed with the human side of the question think that for 
 once I have dealt only with the legal side of the matter. Let me reassure 
 them. I shall have plenty to say on the human side later on. 
 
 “I conclude ; no representative of the Government of the Republic can 
 he admitted to participate in this di.scussion under Article 32 of the Charter, 
 the Republic not being a sovereign and independent state generally recog- 
 nized as such.” 
 
 After the Council had decided, in spite of objections raised by a 
 a number of representatives, to extend an invitation to repre- 
 sentatives of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. van Klefifens said; 
 
 “To keep the record quite clear, I want to point out that I make no 
 objection at all to the decision which has just been taken by the Council, 
 for the reasoti that the President has made it clear that the decision was 
 taken without prejudice of any sort and that the resolution was not based 
 on Article 32 of the Charter or rule 39 of the rules of procedure. I do not 
 wish to gag the Republic of Indonesia or to prevent it from giving informa- 
 tion here and presenting its point of view. What I have been concerned with 
 all along is merely the correct application of the Charter in a general sense 
 and as far as the Republic of Indonesia is concerned. 
 
 “I have only one reservation to make, and that reservation is directed 
 to the idea that Mr. Sjahrir be accepted here as Ambassador. I do not tbink 
 that the State of Michigan, which the President has just mentioned, has 
 Ambassadors, or that any state comparable to the Republic of Indonesia 
 has Ambassadors. In that respect, therefore, I must make a purely formal, 
 but express, reservation. 
 
 “I should also like to reserve for delegations representing the States 
 of Eastern Indonesia and Borneo the right to present their views. They 
 are on their way here, and I am very anxious that they should be heard at 
 the same time as the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia. I do not 
 want to see a situation arise in whicb the point of view expressed by the 
 delegation of the Republic of Indonesia would not at once find its counter- 
 part in statements by the representatives of its sister states, Eastern Indo- 
 nesia and Borneo. The gentlemen representing these two latter states are 
 on their way, as I have said, and I have every hope that they will arrive in 
 New York on Thursday or Friday. I must very earnestly urge that, for the 
 sake of impartiality, the Council not take up this question until these two 
 delegations have arrived. They are using every possible dispatch. Because 
 of the hazards of air travel, however, I cannot say with certainty whether 
 they will be here on Thursday or will not arrive until Friday.” 
 
 To a question put by the Australian representative, whether any 
 government in the world has recognized de facto, de jure, or in 
 any other way either of the two governments referred to, the Neth- 
 erlands rejiresentative declared ; 
 
 115] 
 
“My reply is that so far as I know, these Governments have been 
 recognized for what they are ; namely, Governments which are exactly on 
 the same level as the Republic of Indonesia, by the Netherlands Govern- 
 ment. If they have not been recognized by anyone else as such, that is only 
 because no opportunity has arisen as yet. However, that does not preclude 
 them from being recognized as such by anyone else. 
 
 “I submit that the question raised by the Australian representative is 
 completely beside the point. What is at issue — and that is the stand of the 
 Council to my understanding — is that anyone will be heard by the Council 
 whose testimony will be of value to it in arriving at a conclusion. And 
 there is not the slightest doubt that these people who are to be associated 
 with the Republic of Indonesia in what ultimately will be the United States 
 of Indonesia have a major interest to be heard and have a right to present 
 their points of view just as much as the Republic of Indonesia.” 
 
 On August 14th, the Security Council discussed the proposal that 
 representatives of the States of East Indonesia and (West) 
 Borneo be invited to appear before the Council. Mr. van Kleffens 
 made the following remarks : 
 
 “I think I can completely reassure those Members of the Council who 
 wanted to know that the States of East Indonesia and Borneo, which is 
 called West Borneo at the present time, are fully co-equal with the Republic 
 of Indonesia. Article 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, bearing the signa- 
 ture of the Republic of Indonesia together with the others, states that the 
 component states of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic 
 of Indonesia. Borneo and the Great East. That was the name then of what 
 is now known as East Indonesia. East Indonesia and Borneo have all the 
 public rights, prerogatives and duties which make them states able to take 
 their place on a footing of complete equality with the Republic of Indonesia 
 in the United States of Indonesia to be. 
 
 “In the case of the Republic there is this Linggadjati Agreement. In 
 the case of the others there are constitutive acts just as, for instance, there 
 was a constitutive act on the part of the United States which resulted in the 
 independence of the Philippines. I think, therefore, that, legally speaking, 
 this is completely in order, and surely if the United States of America 
 could do what is a little more in respect of the Philippines, then we surely 
 could do what is a little less, namely, to give full self-government to East 
 Indonesia and Borneo. 
 
 “I want to point out that these people are vitally interested in this 
 matter, more so perhaps because of proximity than the Philippines them- 
 selves. Must they be precluded from stating their views? I submit that at 
 the meeting of the Council the day before yesterday, the President said that 
 he was going to put to a vote only the matter of the invitation of the repre- 
 sentatives of the Indonesian Republic who appeared before the Security 
 
 116 ] 
 
Council during the discussion of this question, without any definition or 
 determination, and it was on that basis that the Council went along and 
 admitted these representatives. Why should there be no definition or deter- 
 mination in the case of one but a painstaking scrutiny of text in the case of 
 the other. I trust that these remarks will suffice to put at rest the minds of 
 those representatives who still had any doubts as to the admissibility of 
 these two states.” 
 
 The proposal was rejected. 
 
 The same day, after the representative of the Indonesian Repub- 
 lic, Mr. Sjahrir, had spoken, the representative of China pro- 
 ]X)sed that the meeting of the Council be adjourned. Thereupon, 
 the Netherlands representative stated : 
 
 “I am very sorry. I do not want to be difficult but I am very anxious 
 to speak tonight because at the end of what I have to say I have an announce- 
 ment to make of some imixjrtance. I am very anxious for the meeting not 
 to adjourn after only one of the parties has been able to state his case. I 
 shall not be any longer than can be helped.” 
 
 Nevertheless, the adjournment was accepted by the Council. 
 
 On August 15th, Mr. van Klefifens was the first speaker after the 
 
 opening of the session. The Netherlands representative said : 
 
 ‘‘First of all, it is my duty to register on behalf of my Government a 
 word of disappointment, complaint and protest in respect to the way in 
 which the Security Council has dealt with what we consider perfectly 
 reasonable requests on our part. Not all the points I have in mind were of 
 equal moment, but they all point to the same thing — some reluctance on the 
 part of the Council, to use no stronger word, in adequately safeguarding our 
 interests. 
 
 “This first became apparent when, knowing that my Prime Minister 
 wanted to speak to me on the telephone a fortnight ago, I asked for a two- 
 hour suspension of the discussion because I did not know whether the 
 premises on whicli I was basing the conduct of the case I have the honor 
 to defend were still valid or whether they were not. This was debated and 
 thereupon refused. 
 
 “The second point I have to complain of is the way in which the question 
 of the admission of East Indonesia and Borneo was disposed of. When we 
 dealt with the admission of the Indonesian Republic, the admission was 
 expressly granted on the basis that there was neither definition nor deter- 
 mination of the Republic’s status or of any provision or text on which the 
 admission rested. Yet, when we discussed yesterday the admission of East 
 Indonesia and Borneo, there was every attempt at definition and deter- 
 mination. 
 
 [ 17 ] 
 
“T protest this, although I realize that it is for the Council and for the 
 Council only to decide whether or in what measure it wishes to lay itself 
 open to the charge that it uses, what the Belgian representative called the 
 other day, two weights and two yardsticks, deux poids et deux mesures. 
 
 ‘‘I particularly comjdain about the fact that there were Members of the 
 Council who said, without being contradicted by others, that the admission 
 of people representing twenty million souls who have been elected b}' due 
 democratic process as their spf)kesmen, ‘might complicate matters’ and 
 should therefore he refused too. It goes without saying that in any lawsuit, 
 the intervention of a third party, just like the hearing of witnesses, to a 
 certain extent complicates matters. But is that, in any country when respect 
 for law prevails, a reason to refuse its intervention or not to hear witnesses? 
 
 “I suggest that the Security Council is treading on very dangerous 
 ground when it takes that road. Its reputation for ini])artiality cannot but 
 suffer if it does. 
 
 “Finally. I was and am sorry that the Council at no unreasonably late 
 hour refused to hear me yesterday. Far he it from me to question the 
 Council’s right to refuse me the opportunity to speak then. \\’hat I complain 
 of is that in my own, and other j^eople’s judgment, my Government’s case 
 was thereby put at a disadvantage. Why all this? 
 
 “I shall now briefly advert to Mr. Sjahrir’s statement. It undoubt- 
 edly was an admirable presentation of a case which is difficult to argue. Its 
 basic weakness, of course, was that it consisted of a highly coloured chrono- 
 logy coupled with slogans such as that about the Atlantic Charter, and gen- 
 eralizations of a very imprecise character. It was, in other words, a plausible 
 document addressed to uninformed opinion rather than a precise factual 
 statement. 
 
 “I do not propose to discuss point for |X)int the various allegations made 
 bv Mr. Sjahrir. I have asked my Government to do that in a public detailed 
 statement, if they wish to make such a statement, and I have just been 
 informed that they do. 
 
 “Let me just quote one example. It sounds very nice when Mr. Sjahrir 
 says that his Government has accepted the offer of good offices of the 
 United States of America. The truth is, as everybody knows, that that 
 acceptance, if that word is not too much for what has happened, was so 
 loaded and weighted with reservations and conditions that the LMited States 
 so far have not shown that they consider that acceptance as an acceptance. 
 It was reason for them, I believe, to send the United States Consul-General 
 to the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, to ascertain exactly what they 
 meant. I have not been informed that what they meant is perfectly clear 
 and that it is as unequivocal an acceptance of the L^nited States offer of 
 good offices as, for instance, that of my Government which has no reserva- 
 tion or condition attached to it at all. 
 
 “Wdiat I want to do is to give you the grim and raw facts of conditions 
 prevailing in the Republic, seen, not through the rose-tinted glasses Mr. 
 Sjahrir had held up before you, hut through the uncolored medium of stark 
 reality. The territory of the Republic, in strong and striking contrast with 
 
 118 ] 
 
the autonomous states of Borneo and East Indonesia, has never ceased to 
 be turbulent. Armed clashes between the more or less regular army, armed 
 political groups, and armed bands owing allegiance to no one, occurred 
 frequently. At present, Netherlands troops have the difficult task of safe- 
 guarding the population against terrorism by stray Republican troops and 
 other armed bands in the territory we now occupy. 
 
 “It is a sad and striking fact that the Rei)uhlican Government appears to 
 be either unwilling or unable systematically to counteract this wanton use of 
 force, this arbitrary violence. As a result of its inadequacy in this, as in other 
 respects, the attitude of subordinate national Republican authorities, of 
 their police and of influential citizens vis-a-vis these armed elements, is ac- 
 cordingly weak. And I may add here that evidence abounds that through the 
 radio which they have at their disposal, and by word of mouth, so far from 
 restraining, if they can restrain these troops and bands, they have on the 
 contrary incited them to continued violence. 
 
 “The nature of the devastation wrought by the Republicans shows that 
 there is system in it. It is largely directed against foreign property. The 
 economic future of the country does not interest these wild elements at all. 
 Just to give one example which I can multiply, they singled out for destruc- 
 tion, the world renowned sugar laboratory at Pasuruan, open to everybody 
 and a veritable storehouse of information for the whole world regarding 
 sugar botany and sugar industry. Devastation, arson and murder are the 
 order of the day. The worst excesses seem to have taken place against the 
 Chinese. But the indigenous population and the Eurasians sutber equal 
 cruelty. 
 
 “The Netherlands authorities in Batavia have promised to send me 
 photographic and documentary evidence of this at the earliest possible date. 
 Meanwhile, they are doing all they can to help the stricken people, irrespec- 
 tive of whether they are of Dutch nationality or not, and to protect the others 
 against violence at the hands of the Republican terrorists. 
 
 “The terrible nature of the acts of cruelty perpetrated by them dis- 
 courages the indigenous population from openly expressing, together with 
 their revulsions, their hope that thanks to our action, these bands will be 
 brought under control. Even so, several cases have occurred of killing 
 village chiefs and others who endeavored to establish law and order. 
 
 “It is greatly to the credit of these local authorities and also to that of a 
 number of Republican officials, including esjrecially in Eastern Java the 
 police, that they have the courage to take personal risks in trying to establish 
 order and public safety. 
 
 “It appears to be very difficult for many people to realize what are the 
 grim facts of the situation and especially how widely it is at variance with 
 the incessant statements of Republican propaganda. It is a regrettable fact 
 that the cliche picture of ])oor Indonesians struggling to gain their freedom 
 has taken possession of many minds and, yet, nothing could be more in- 
 accurate. 
 
 “The inhabitants of the Republic can have that freedom any time just 
 as the inhabitants of Borneo and East Indonesia have obtained it. All we 
 
 [ 19 ] 
 
want is to end anarchy and chaos ; in other words, it is not we, The Nether- 
 lands, who stand in the way of that freedom, it is the lawlessness which the 
 inept Republican Government has never yet succeeded in controlling. That 
 Government — and there are, I believe, thirty ministers in Mr. Soekarno’s 
 present cabinet — rests on people who have arms but who cannot control. 
 
 “There were, originally, many good elements amongst those who sup- 
 ported this Republican (government, but gradually, ultimate control was 
 seized by others, less desirable peojde, until now, the afifairs of the Republic 
 are dominated in reality by those who during the Japanese occupation 
 delivered thousands of their own nationals to the enemy to serve as slave 
 labor; those who preached hate of all foreigners and incite to their whole- 
 sale murder, such as the Commander-in-Chief has done; those who organ- 
 ized ‘])eople’s tribunals’ which caused to be put to death thousands of 
 innocent people ; those who have ap])ropriated property belonging to others 
 and who grew rich by theft, extortion and other corruption ; the terrorists, 
 the profiteers, the job-seekers and all those immoral and undisciplined 
 elements who come to the surface in any widespread upheaval anywhere. 
 
 “I ask you, gentlemen, whom now do you want to help? These people? 
 Or the decent citizens, those whom we are supporting? Already the Coun- 
 cil’s action, though impelled by generous sentiment, has given new hope, 
 boldness and energy to the bad, and despondency to the vast majority. 
 
 “Why look at these fearful issues on which the future of so many 
 millions depends through the distorting lenses of the inapplicable cliche 
 which I mentioned a few minutes ago ? Are the organs of the United Nations 
 to be blinded by theories and generalizations ? Or does the Council recognize 
 that it must take the facts as they are, judging each case on its true merits? 
 
 “The Council knows best where its duty towards decency lies, but what 
 it has not appeared to have understood is that, contradictory though it may 
 seem, the Council’s ‘cease fire’ has resulted in the murder of hundreds of 
 innocent people. I beseech the Council to ponder that carefully. 
 
 “Fundamentally, what we have to contend with are remnants of Japan- 
 ese ideology, Japanese methods, Japanese indoctrination. Do you think I 
 e.xaggerate, Mr. President ? Allow me, then, to call a witness whom I think 
 no one will challenge; I mean Mr. Sjahrir. 
 
 “There was published in November 1945 by the Republican Information 
 Service a ]:>amphlet by Mr. Sjahrir entitled ‘Our Fight’ from which I beg 
 leave to quote these passages : 
 
 ‘In general, the secret Japanese societies, the “Black Dragon’’, “Black 
 h'an’’ and others originating from the Japanese Fifth Column, Kempei 
 Tai, Kaigun and others, were strongly tuned to the spirit of our )muth, 
 and they have influenced their spirit to a certain extent, though in many 
 cases our youth maintained their hate of the Japanese, but their hearts 
 were unconsciously influenced by this Japanese propaganda ; their at- 
 titude and their thoughts, even, were often similar to those of the Japan- 
 ese. 
 
 ‘Their enthusiasm is shown, in the first place, in the abhorrence of 
 
 120 ] 
 
foreign races, in reality indicated by the Japanese as enemies : the allied 
 peoples, Netherlanders, Indo-Europeans of our own race, Amboinese, 
 the people of Minahassa, both our own race, the Chinese, and then — a 
 word which I do not understand — the internal governments. 
 
 ‘The aim was nothing else if need he than to hate the whole world with 
 the exception of the Japanese. This was the situation before the de- 
 claration of the defense of Indonesia and these are also the raw ma- 
 terials for the construction of Free Indonesia. 
 
 ‘When the State of Free Indonesia was proclaimed, the governors were 
 mostly previous civil servants or helpers of the Japanese. This forms 
 the obstruction to freeing our community of Japanese influence, which 
 is dangerous to the mentality of our youth. 
 
 ‘All unrest in the community was directed by our youth to aversion of 
 foreign peoples present in our country, to marching with lances, that 
 has now already grown into murder and robbery and other tendencies 
 that, seen from the viewix)int of struggle from the social signifies noth- 
 ing and is reactionary, as every fascist deed will always be reactionary. 
 The late arrival of the Allied army to relieve the Japanese, who had no 
 further desire to rule, gave a good opportunity to the State of the 
 Indonesian Republic to establish the authority of the Indonesian Re- 
 public. This, however, has not had the desired effect. 
 
 ‘The main reason is that the leaders of the Republic were not strong 
 enough — many of them have been accustomed to bow and scrape for 
 the Japanese or Netherlanders; their spirit is uncertain, and it is clear 
 that they were not capable of acting and carrying responsibility. The 
 second reason is that many amongst them feel an obligation towards 
 the Japanese, who presented them with the preparations for a free 
 Indonesia, and, finally, they took into consideration that, thanks to 
 cooperation with the Japanese, they were able to take command. There- 
 fore, it was possible, when the Japanese power lessened and later 
 crumbled and, in addition, was not superceded by military Allied power, 
 that the State of the Indonesian Republic could not organize their 
 own national authority and seems to be an ungoverned State and an 
 ungoverned people. The restless people have not yet had a training and 
 did not yet know how the social problem stood in connection with the 
 Government. 
 
 ‘Through this, confusion was caused that increased more and more ; 
 in this State the people’s agitation had many undesired and not control- 
 lable results caused by persons who induced agitation. The murder and 
 robbery of foreign people, understandable in these circumstances, 
 proves clearly the weakness of the Government of the Indonesian Re- 
 public, which is not yet considered by the people to be a Government it 
 has to take into account and has to respect.’ 
 
 “Have I exaggerated? No more in this respect, as you will have seen, 
 then, alas, in any other respect. Now'here did we meet, in the course of our 
 action, with people burning with indignation at what we w'ere doing. On the 
 
contrary, there was relief, althougli tenii)ered with fear that the lawless 
 elements might regain control. And they may regain control if the Security 
 Council takes upon Itself the dreadful responsibility of supporting the 
 Republican Government as now constituted. Think of what that would 
 mean to thousands of peaceful folk, indigenous and Chinese. Their blood 
 will be upon you, not upon us. I go as far as to .say that the Security Council 
 may yet have to ask the Netherlands Government, on humanitarian grounds, 
 and if the Members wish to face realities, to resume and complete our 
 efforts to save the people from this unobeyed Government. Meanwhile, it 
 goes without saying that we shall take all necessary measures to protect the 
 public as best we can, conscious as we are of our responsibilities in this 
 matter. 
 
 “Who is there who thinks that arbitration boards are, in these circum- 
 stances, anything but a cruel mockery, a hollow expedient? You can arbi- 
 trate differences of opinion with orderly and well-established governments 
 such as those of Eastern Indonesia and of Borneo, but not with the unobeyed 
 Government of the Republic which, as matters stand, would he unable to 
 give effect to any awards made. 
 
 “This having been said, I come to the Australian draft resolution. That 
 draft clearly implies that this Council has jurisdiction to hear this case. I 
 submit that, having heard all the statements that have been made, the Council 
 is now sufficiently enlightened to decide at last the previous question — la 
 question prkilable — the question which, by its very nature, must have pre- 
 cedence in this as in all other cases ; that is, the question as to whether or not 
 the Council has jurisdiction. I submit that we cannot go on day after day, 
 meeting after meeting, as if the Council has any jurisdiction in this case at all, 
 when there are grave doubts, to say the least of it, that the Council has any 
 jurisdiction at all. 
 
 “This all important question of jurisdiction is implied in the Australian 
 resolution. It sometimes seems to me that there are some Members of the 
 Council who are inclined to make the United Nations act, even if it has no 
 right to act, simply because people like the United Nations to act. 
 
 “The United Nations scored a success with the cease-fire invitation. You 
 know that we accepted that on humanitarian grounds, not because we recog- 
 nized the jurisdiction of the Council. We are glad when the Council is 
 useful, but let the Council, and the governments represented on the Council, 
 be content with that success. Let them not overstep the limits of the Coun- 
 cil’s jurisdiction. If the law does not give public authority the right to act, 
 then public authority must desist from acting, even if the general public 
 would like it to act. Anything else. I submit, is license, the arbitrary use of 
 factual power. Let the Council beware of establishing such precedents, 
 precedents which, in the course of time, may bother your country, just as 
 my country may be bothered now. M’hat may he hailed now as a triumph 
 for the United Nations may well prove in the course of time to be the first 
 step on the road to its ruin, for no public body will endure that oversteps 
 the written limits of its own jurisdiction. 
 
 “What, may I ask, is your aim? That tranquility be restored in the 
 
 [ 22 ] 
 
territory of the Republic, or is it your aim that some sort of role be played 
 by the Security Council, even if the Council’s jurisdiction is non-existent, 
 or, at least, extremely doubtful? 
 
 “I should like to recall that the Netherlands Government has accepted 
 the Council’s wish that military action should cease, not because it 
 recognized the Council’s jurisdiction which it expressly did not, but because 
 it wanted to take into full account the humanitarian motives which no 
 doubt were the foundations of the Council’s action. That is about as far 
 as the Netherlands Government can go. 
 
 “We think it is a most dangerous precedent to see the Council being led 
 step by step towards an assertion of full jurisdiction which it so manifestly 
 does not possess. First, the Council was requested to ask for ‘cease fire.’ 
 Now, the Council was asked to appoint a Commission to supervise this 
 or that and to report on the situation in Indonesia. What will the next 
 step be ? Will the Council next be asked to pronounce upon the merits of 
 the question which gave rise to our action? I submit that a very dan- 
 gerous technique, a step by step technique, is being inaugurated here, 
 a technique to which the Netherlands Government will not be a party. 
 
 “The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of the original Members of 
 the United Nations; and in conformity with Article 73 of the Charter, the 
 Netherlands Government is responsible for the administration of a terri- 
 tory of which the Republic of Indonesia forms j)art. The Netherlands 
 Government has undertaken, in full accordance with the principles of the 
 relevant Chapter of the Charter — Number 11 — to give, at an early date, 
 full self-government to the ])eoples of Indonesia. In conjunction therewith, 
 the Netherlands Government has undertaken to sponsor the United States 
 of Indonesia, by virtue of the Linggadjati Agreement, for Membership 
 in the United Nations. In spite of all the dififerences that have arisen, the 
 Netherlands Government maintains unswervingly their firm resolve to 
 carry this constructive constitutional program into complete effect, conscious 
 of her primary and ultimate responsibility in this important matter. 
 
 “If, then, we hold that the Security Council should refrain from appoint- 
 ing a commission as suggested by Australia, this does not mean — and I 
 want to stress these words — that our attitude in this matter is purely nega- 
 tive. I am authorized to say that the Netherlands Government is prepared 
 to propose to the Republic of Indonesia that each — the Republic of In- 
 donesia and The Netherlands — designate one state, these two states so 
 designated to be asked to appoint one other state which is considered by 
 them to be completely impartial. This impartial state, if it is willing, would 
 then send a number of its nationals to Indonesia to enquire into the situation, 
 to supervise the cease fire, and to see what conditions obtain there. It 
 should be clearly understood that the report these people would make to 
 their government would be given the very widest publicity. 
 
 “In case the Republic of Indonesia fails to accept unequivocally the 
 good offices of the United States of America, this third truly impartial 
 state could, at the same time, be empowered by the Netherlands Govern- 
 ment and by the Republic of Indonesia to use its goods offices for a twofold 
 
 123 ] 
 
purpose — firstly, to bring about the immediate resumption of discussions 
 between the two parties ; and secondly, to report on the situation as it 
 has developed up-to-date. That is our first proposal which — I want to un- 
 derline that — takes into full account the fact that some uncertainty still 
 prevails as to whether we can make use of the offer of good offices so 
 generously made by the United States of America or not. 
 
 “Now, the second proposal of my Government is that all the career 
 consuls stationed in Batavia shall jointly and immediately — because the 
 situation has an element of the greatest urgency — draw up a report on 
 the present situation on the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura so as 
 to lose no time whatsoever. This can be done almost at once, and it should 
 be done almost at once. We hope that in this way, an important contribu- 
 tion will be made towards obtaining an impartial and unbiased understand- 
 ing of the actual facts and circumstances which my Government would 
 warmly welcome. The Netherlands Government, therefore, is requesting 
 those countries that have career consuls-general at Batavia to give the 
 necessary instructions to this effect to their representatives. I hope that 
 what I have described is clear and that the constructive character of these 
 proposals will at once be seen. 
 
 “Now, I feel obliged to stress two further points in connection with 
 these proposals. In the first place, we deem it only fair and equitable that if, 
 at the resumption of discussions between the parties, the Indonesian Federa- 
 tion — that is to say, the United States of Indonesia to be — or any matter 
 pertaining to that Federation is brought into the debate, the other member 
 States of that Federation to be will be invited to take part in the discussion. 
 That is a matter of common fairness. In the second place, I cannot state 
 emphatically enough that it is not sufficient for the Government of the 
 Republic of Indonesia to declare that they have given a cease fire order 
 but that that order must become effective and be obeyed, which is not the 
 case at the present moment ; and at the same time, all subversive action 
 on the part of adherents of the Republic of Indonesia must end and the 
 Government at Jogjakarta must immediately stop their present campaign 
 of incitement, by radio and by word of mouth, to such subversive action. 
 
 “It must be clearly understood by the Members of this Council that it 
 is asking the impossible to expect that the Netherlands Government con- 
 tinue their observance in the strictest sense of their invitation to cease 
 hostilities if, at the same time, the forces of the Republic are carrying on 
 their open and subversive warfare. 
 
 “As I said, there still is the United States’ offer of good offices. We 
 have accepted it without reservation. So far, the Republic, in spite of 
 clever words, has not done that in so unqualified a way as is obviously 
 necessary. It goes without saying that our acceptance will continue to hold 
 good and any suggestion I have made as being acceptable and even desirable 
 to us would, of course, be only acted upon in consultation with the Govern- 
 ment of the United States, should their good offices be accepted un- 
 equivocably by both parties. If not, even then we wish to proceed with 
 an investigation but not with an investigation ordered by the Security 
 
 1241 
 
Council, the Council having no jurisdiction. We are all for a commission 
 or an investigation but we hold that the Security Council has not the right 
 to establish one ; this in the superior interest of a correct application 
 of the Charter. 
 
 “To those Members of the Council who, in the Greek case, say that 
 sending a commission cannot be tolerated because it constitutes an infringe- 
 ment of the sovereignty of Greece, I would say this : If you make that 
 objection in the Greek case, how can you possibly advocate the opposite 
 in the Indonesian case ? Whatever the status of the Republic of Indonesia, 
 everybody agrees, including the Republic itself — I refer to the letter I 
 quoted from the other day written by Mr. Soekarno to the Government 
 of the United States on July 10 — The Netherlands still has sovereignty 
 over Indonesia. 
 
 “In the Greek case, the sovereign power accepted the Commission. 
 Nevertheless, some Members here say that there is infringement of 
 sovereignty. They are literally plus royaliste qiie le roi. But if in their 
 eyes this constitutes infringement of sovereignty, how much more serious 
 is that infringement when, as in this Indonesian case, the sovereign power 
 categorically objects not to a commission, but to a commission instituted 
 by the Security Council. 
 
 “I think I have said all I have to say at this time. I only pray you to 
 act quickly. Rape, murder and arson are the order of the day in the 
 Republic of Indonesia, and many lives are being lost day after day, partly 
 because of the unfortunate cease-fire invitation which you have given. That 
 is an element, as I said, of great urgency. 
 
 “If you could finish your labors today, I would welcome it in the 
 name of my Government, but in any case we are going to do something 
 about it, and I hope that the Council will not decide that it should be the 
 Council, itself, which should establish a commission. 
 
 “I have made constructive proposals. I hope that that points the way 
 to the ultimate tranquilization of that unhappy area.” 
 
 On August 22nd, the Security Council discussed the second part of 
 the Australian resolution, namely, the question whether the matter 
 should be submitted to arbitration, i.e. a mode of settlement ending 
 in a binding decision of arbitration. On this subject, Mr. van 
 Kleffens stated : 
 
 “When the Australian resolution, in any of the variations now before 
 us, not excluding the otherwise moderate Chinese amendment, is put to 
 the vote, Mr. Chairman, each Member of this Council who casts an affirma- 
 tive vote, states thereby implicitly that the Council has jurisdiction in this 
 case. You cannot get away from that. In other words : no one can vote 
 affirmatively for the Australian resolution in any of its shapes or forms who 
 is not convinced in his conscience that, on the basis of the formal rules of 
 the Charter, the Council has jurisdiction. A very important precedent is to 
 
 [ 25 ] . 
 
be established here today, or in the next meeting, a precedent which will 
 stand in respect of future matters, and which will have an important bear- 
 ing on all troubles which may arise in the future when a faction in any 
 country, claiming to be a government, opposes the sovereign or paramount 
 power. 
 
 “I have consistently tried, as the Council knows, to show that the 
 Council has no jurisdiction. In view of the gravity of the moment permit me 
 to recapitulate very briefly : First, because we consider that the Charter 
 is applicable only to disputes between sovereign states generally recognized 
 as such. Secondly, even if it is assumed that the Charter is applicable, we 
 regard this matter as a domestic question which quite clearly does not 
 endanger international peace. If there were such danger, the Secretary- 
 General of the United Nations, in his recent report, could not have 
 said that he saw no such particular danger. He would have mentioned this 
 particular danger had he seen it. 
 
 “I know very well that an important element in this case is that the 
 parties involved in the conflict are of different races, whereas in the 
 American Civil War, for instance, that was not true. But, surely, difference 
 of race is not a fact which gives the Security Council jurisdiction. If it 
 were, we should soon see India sitting at this Council table and giving an 
 account of race riots in numerous Indian cities, riots which have claimed 
 many more victims than has our brief police action. Or else — that is, if 
 the Security Council asserts jurisdiction — we shall see Hindustan and 
 Pakistan at the Council table next month, with the Council taking upon 
 itself to discuss their difficulties. There should not be two weights and 
 two yardsticks. 
 
 “Thirdly — and then I shall have finished with the question of jurisdic- 
 tion — assuming the Charier to be applicable to a case such as this — the 
 Government of The Netherlands says that, it having become abundantly 
 clear that there is no danger to international peace and security. Chapters 
 \T and YH are not applicable. 
 
 “I should like to see what a Court of Law would think of this reasoning. 
 Why should the Council consider confronting us with decisions which, 
 resting as they would on a basis of excess of authority, would, as the 
 representative of Belgium said the other day. be null and void and bind- 
 ing on no one? 
 
 “If, then, we hold that the Council has no jurisdiction, and for that 
 reason it cannot adopt resolutions implying that it has, we also submit that 
 this is no calamity, since there is no need for action by the Council. I am 
 happy to announce that, since the Council discussed this question last 
 Friday, my Government has approached the powers which have career 
 consular officers in Batavia for the purpose of having those officers au- 
 thorized to investigate and report on what is happening and what has 
 happened in Indonesia. It may be interesting to tbe Council to know exactly 
 who these career consuls are. They are consular officers of Australia, Bel- 
 gium, China, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the L^nited 
 States of America. There are certain other consular officers in Batavia, but 
 
 [ 26 ] 
 
they are not career consuls, and we did not care to put consuls who are 
 at the same time merchants into a position which they might possibly, or 
 even probably, find a little difficult in their particular situation. 
 
 “Needless to say, these gentlemen will be given every facility, for we 
 have nothing to hide and everything to gain from an unbiased investigation. 
 Moreover, the generous ofifer of the United States of good offices having 
 been withdrawn, our suggestion that an impartial power be designated by 
 two apjxfintee-powers, each chosen by one of the parties, still holds good, 
 hut the Republican Government has so far been mute in this respect. 
 
 “There is nothing more the Council can usefully do. All it can do — and 
 I am sorry to say all it has done — plays into the hands of the extremists. 
 
 “As the Lieutenant Governor-General said over the radio two days 
 ago, on August twentieth : A\’e have stopped our action to reaffirm our 
 willingness to try every method of minimizing the use of force, and to give 
 the present Republican Government one more opportunity to revise its 
 aggressive attitude and violent methods.’ 
 
 “But the Republic interpreted our coni])liance with the Council’s cease 
 fire invitation as an admission on our ]«rt of military defeat, so that they 
 could do as they jdeased. Never was there such killing on the part of 
 Republican troops and bands as since the Council’s cease fire invitation. 
 
 “ft is a strange and dreadful paradox that your cease fire invitation 
 has had an effect diametrically opposed to your humane intentions. The 
 number of our casualties since the cease fire invitation is fast approach- 
 ing — if at this moment it has not already ajiproached — that of our casualties 
 during that fortnight of police action. But infinitely greater is the number 
 of Chinese and civilian casualties. Must the Council now add to such 
 dangerous resolutions? Does the Council really think that this increases 
 its prestige? 
 
 “I ask the Council not only to observe its own law : the Charter, but also 
 the realities : to see things as they are. and not as it thinks — or would like 
 them to be. Do not let thoughts of how this Council could reap an apparent 
 success come first — a success which would ])robahly prove to be a 
 boomerang. But rather let us wish to see this matter settled with as little 
 bloodshed as possible. That is what we are offering the Council. 
 
 “^^'hat I want to stress particularly today in what may be a final word 
 on my part is the conflict between illusion and reality. I want to say to the 
 Council — and I trust I am not overstepping the limits of permissible can- 
 dor — that all those who may feel inclined to vote for any draft resolution 
 giving the Security Council a part to play in this affair, are laboring under 
 an illusion which may prove to be very dangerous to the Security Council 
 and its prestige. 
 
 “If the Council had allowed us to restore peace and justice, it would 
 have seen a community longing for internal peace and justice, returning to 
 work for them.selves and for the world at large. That is the reality. But 
 the Council chose to follow the illusion that its cease fire invitation would 
 bring order and tranquillity. It failed because it did not realize what this 
 Republican Government is really like. 
 
 [ 27 ] 
 
“Is the Council going to make a second, and worse, mistake by 
 solemnly ordering a commission to investigate to what extent its invitation 
 is being flouted by the Republic? Does it really think that to do that is 
 conducive to raising the prestige of the Council? That radio in Jogjakarta 
 apparently is very persuasive, when I see how it has led the Council to 
 take this Republican Government seriously. 
 
 “Allow me to say that that radio is about all that Republican Govern- 
 ment has — a microphone, but no authority ; a voice, but no allegiance ; arms, 
 but no administration; terror, but neither peace nor justice. That is the 
 Republican Government which, to the astonishment of all those who are 
 familiar with conditions out there as they are, is still being taken seriously 
 here. 
 
 “A year ago, Mr. Sjahrir, then Prime Minister of the Republic, was 
 successfully kidnapped. One of the chief kidnappers w’as imprisoned, was 
 recently released without trial, and now is Minister of the Interior of 
 the government Mr. Sjahrir serves, and in which Mr. Soekarno himself 
 is now merely a tool in the hands of some sinister characters. 
 
 “That is the sort of government some Members of the Security Council 
 seem still inclined to take seriously. The Council will decide its own course, 
 but if it allows itself to become the dupe of such people, I am fearful for 
 the future of the Security Council. 
 
 “Illusion as opposed to reality. If you create a commission to go there, 
 whatever its task, what can it do? If you really want the fighting to stop, 
 you must either send troops or allow us to bring about, together with 
 freedom, that security for which millions there are yearning. What, after 
 all, are we here for around this table? We are here, as we understand it, 
 to make this world a slightly better place to live in, a little more secure, a 
 little more prosperous, and a little more pleasant especially for the common 
 man. Do you think that the way to make Indonesia happy is to uphold 
 this Republican Government by giving it even more recognition and stature? 
 
 “Do you not realize that those inarticulate millions whose fate you 
 decide, look up to you with fear and trepidation? It is pure illusion to 
 think that the Government of the Republic represents anything but itself. 
 It is pure illusion to think that they could carry out any arbitral award. 
 
 “The truth is that this Republican Government does not embody an idea, 
 but only its own short-lived personal vested interests. Our idea is that of 
 the great majority of Indonesians; to wit, freedom, self-government and 
 federation for the constituent parts of Indonesia; that is what we and 
 they advocate. With us, full implementation of the principles of Linggadjati 
 remains a sacred trust. But what yon have encouraged so far is a handful 
 of men who, on a dictatorial basis, want to subjugate the whole of Indonesia 
 to their domination. 
 
 “I asked you to hear the representatives of East Indonesia and of 
 Borneo, but you refused them a hearing, on doubtful legal ground, it seems 
 to me, which in any case you did not apply to the Republic, and because 
 ‘it w'ould complicate matters.’ It is strange to me, to see this Council, the 
 chosen instrument of liberty, stifling liberty’s voice. 
 
 [28] 
 
“This is a momentous decision for the Security Council to take. This 
 issue is, in the domain of law : observance of the Charter or non-observance ; 
 and in the realm of facts : a choice between illusion and reality. Those 
 issues are so important that the world will watch your decision and its 
 consequences with more than usual interest. Cast, then, your votes, and 
 may your decision prove to be wise.” 
 
 “I should like to comment on certain remarks that the President 
 has made.* 
 
 “First of all, the President referred to the question of invitations to 
 East Indonesia and Borneo. Since the representative of Belgium has 
 submitted a formal proposal on that matter, I shall say only this : Since, 
 in the case of the Philippines, a similar question was submitted to the 
 Council twice and voted upon twice, I do not see why the same procedure 
 cannot be followed in the case of East Indonesia and Borneo. 
 
 “A second question raised by the President was this: Are The Nether- 
 lands responsible for law and order in the Republic of Indonesia?* My 
 reply is an emphatic ‘Yes.’ We are still the sovereign power there; we 
 have been recognized as being the sovereign power by everybody, including 
 the Republic of Indonesia in its note of July 10, sent in reply to a com- 
 munication from the United States Government, to which I have re- 
 peatedly referred. Legally, therefore, there is no question. As a matter of 
 fact, does the President think that, after having lived with these people 
 for three hundred years and more, we can see that country go to wrack 
 and ruin and not step in to see to it that these people are protected from 
 lawless elements?” 
 
 On August 26th, the Security Council discussed a Polish draft 
 resolution to remind The Netherlands and the Indonesian Re- 
 public of the “cease fire” invitation issued by the Security Council 
 on August 1st. In connection herewith, Mr. van Kleffens said: 
 
 “In order that the Council, and we ourselves, understand the exact 
 
 * The President had remarked : “As far as I understand the situation, the Indo- 
 nesian Republic is a state de facto having the authority within its territory. If atrocities 
 or irregularities and illegalities are committed by that Government, and in case that 
 Government is solely responsible for public order within its territory, then it may be 
 considered that these accusations come under domestic jurisdiction. 
 
 “But on the other hand, if the claim of the Netherlands Government is correct, 
 that the Netherlands Government is stilt responsible for public order and for the safety 
 of the country, and they are interfering to re-establish order, the matter may be 
 considered differently. 
 
 “This matter is not very clear to the Council at the present time. The Council 
 considered that under the .■\greement, the Indonesian Republic is responsible for internal 
 public order, and that it is to maintain it. The Indonesian Republic has its own ad- 
 ministration and its own methods of dealing with matters within its territory and we 
 have not heard any proof to the contrary in that respect, that the Netherlands Govern- 
 ment is responsible for public order wdthin the territory of the Indonesian Republic. 
 
 “I call this matter to the attention of the Council, and especially to the representa- 
 tive of the Indonesian Republic, in order to clarify this matter and reply to the 
 accusations made by the representative of The Netherlands.” 
 
 [ 29 ] 
 
meaning of this proposal. I beg leave to ask a question of the Polish repre- 
 sentative through the President. I raise this point because it brings out so 
 very vividly the considerable difficulties of fact we have to contend with in 
 Sumatra, Java and Madura. 
 
 “Ten days ago, intelligence reached our lines in northern Sumatra that 
 Republican elements had herded together in a cemetery near a place called 
 Pankalan Brandan approximately four thousand Chinese, without food, 
 without water, without shelter of any kind, who were thus exposed to 
 certain death. 
 
 “This place was outside our lines. Nevertheless, we decided to rescue 
 these unfortunate people, although we knew that this would probably draw 
 upon us the fire of Republican troops, as it did. 
 
 “My question now is this : Does or does not the Polish proposal now 
 before us mean that henceforth we would have to abstain from similar 
 rescue action ? Four thousand lives were involved in this case. I hasten to 
 add that I know very well that Polish soldiers, like our own, would not 
 abstain. I have seen too much of their chivalrous disposition. 
 
 “I should like a straight answer to my question, and after that, I have 
 a few more remarks to make.” 
 
 The representative of Poland did not answer the pertinent ques- 
 tion put by Mr. van Klefifens, but said : 
 
 “The representative of The Netherlands quoted a case where 
 four thousand Chinese were herded together and exposed to 
 the danger of death by starvation. I cannot enter into a 
 discussion as to whether such a situation occurred or not. 
 
 There is a Commission there, and we expect reports from that 
 Commission at any time.” 
 
 He then proceeded to give many quotations from the Jogjakarta 
 
 radio and Republican army communiques. IMr. van Kleffens later 
 
 continued ; 
 
 “I shall not go into the very partial and one-sided enumeration of the 
 supposed infractions of the cease fire order which the Polish representative 
 imputed to us. I can only say that the list was characterized by the mention 
 of paratroops which we had used. Well, it is perhaps a pity for us, but we 
 have no paratroops. 
 
 “The cease-fire order, or invitation, means very little if the Republican 
 troops and marauding bands do not stop their murder and destruction. I 
 wish to submit to the Council that a very difficult position arises when it is 
 the Central Republican Government or the Command of Republican troops 
 who incite, by radio, to cruelty, sabotage, destruction and subversive action 
 of all kinds. 
 
 “I have here a number of instances thereof, which I shall be happy to 
 transmit to the Council. These include transcripts of actual radio broad- 
 casts from Jogjakarta. I shall only quote two at this moment. The Repub- 
 lican General Sutomo said on August 17, ‘Burn every house of the Dutch, 
 burn everything ; to murder a Dutchman is easy enough ; he cannot stay 
 
 130] 
 
awake eternally.* etc. The Prime Minister on August 2l stated, ‘Our 
 country will continue to do everything to harm the enemy.’ 
 
 “These statements can be easily multiplied. They are the clearest 
 incitement to violence. I believe that it is clear if that continues it will in- 
 evitably be seen that, through no fault of ours, the cease-fire invitation has 
 not been complied with by the Republic. If so, we will, of course, have to 
 determine how’ to meet such a factual situation. 
 
 “I submit that if the Polish resolution is adopted — and I have not the 
 slightest objection to it being adopted, and we shall do our utmost to abide 
 by it — it will mean, first and foremost, that the Security Council thereby 
 requires the Republic to refrain from such subversive action as I have just 
 mentioned. 
 
 “I shall henceforth try to inform the Council, without prejudice to the 
 question of jurisdiction, of further incitement by the Republican authorities 
 to the acts complained of. This is realit}% and I am afraid that all the rest 
 is theory.’’ 
 
 The resolutions adopted by the Security Council were as follows : 
 
 I. 
 
 August 1, 1947 
 
 THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 NOTING with concern the hostilities in progress between the 
 armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, 
 CALLS UPON the parties 
 
 (a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and 
 
 (b) to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means 
 and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of 
 the settlement. 
 
 II. 
 
 August 25, 1947 
 
 A. 
 
 WTIEREAS the Security Council on 1 August 1947, called upon the 
 Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cease hostilities forthwith, 
 AND W'HEREAS communications have been received from the 
 Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia 
 advising that orders have been given for the cessation of hostilities. 
 
 AND WTIEREAS it is desirable that steps should be taken to 
 avoid disputes and friction relating to the observance of the “cease 
 fire” orders, and to create conditions which will facilitate agreement 
 between the parties. 
 
 THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 1. notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the parties to comply 
 with the resolution of 1 August 1947, 
 
 [ 31 ] 
 
2. notes with satisfaction the statement by the Netherlands Govern- 
 ment issued on 11 Aus^ust, in which it affirms its intention to or- 
 ganize a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in 
 accordance with the purpose of the Linggadjati Agreement, 
 
 3. notes that the Netherlands Government intends immediately to 
 request the career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly to report on 
 the present situation in the Republic of Indonesia, 
 
 4. notes that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has re- 
 quested appointment by the Security Council of a commission of 
 observers, 
 
 5. requests the Governments members of the Council who have career 
 consular representatives in Batavia to instruct them to prepare 
 jointly for the information and guidance of the Security Council 
 reports on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the 
 Resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947, such reports to cover 
 the observance of the “cease fire” orders and the conditions prevail- 
 ing in areas under military occupation or from which armed 
 forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between 
 the parties, 
 
 6. requests the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic 
 of Indonesia to grant to the representatives referred to in para- 
 graph 5, all facilities necessary for the effective fulfillment of 
 their mission, 
 
 7. resolves to consider the matter further should the situation require. 
 
 B. 
 
 THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 RESOL\^ES to tender its good offices to the parties in order to 
 assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with 
 paragraph (B) of the Resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947. 
 The Council expresses its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist 
 in the settlement through a committee of the Council consisting of three 
 members of the Council, each party selecting one. and the third to be 
 designated by the two so selected. 
 
 III. 
 
 August 26, 1947 
 THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 TAKING into consideration that military operations are being con- 
 tinued on the territory of the Indonesian Republic : 
 
 1. reminds the Government of the Netherlands and the Government 
 of the Indonesian Republic of its resolution of 1 August 1947, 
 concerning the “cease fire order” and peaceful settlement of their 
 dispute ; 
 
 2. calls upon the Government of the Netherlands and the Government 
 of the Indonesian Republic to adhere strictly to the recommendation 
 of the Security Council of 1 August 1947. 
 
 [32] 
 
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