CHINA AND KOREA 
 
 BY 
 
 O. N. DENNY, 
 
 • ADVISOR TO THE KING 
 AND 
 
 DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
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 CHINA AND KOREA. 
 
 BY 
 
 O. N. DENNY, 
 
 ADVISOR TO THE KING 
 AND 
 
 DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2016 
 
 https://archive.org/details/chinakoreaOOdenn 
 
A vacancy having occurred in the position of Foreign Advisor 
 to the King of Korea and Inspector of Customs, and Ilis Majesty 
 having requested His Excellency Li Chung Tang to procure the 
 services of another, I was in July 1885 invited to the post. I 
 entered upon the duties of Advisor — the Customs branch of the 
 position having been placed under the Customs of China before 
 my arrival in the East — with the assurance that in my efforts to 
 preserve peace and good order and in all that pertained to the 
 prosperity of Korea I should have the cordial support of the 
 Viceroy, an assurance which, I regret to say, has not been verified. 
 
 On the contrary from the very first, I have met with almost 
 every conceivable kind of opposition from Chinese sources. The 
 failure of the Viceroy to keep his promise in this regard I am at 
 a loss to understand, unless it is due to the Peking government’s 
 disapproval of his Korean policy. In view of this, and the fact 
 that China’s course seems so unwarrantable and unjust, as well as 
 against the best interests of Korea and China, I determined to avail 
 myself of the present occasion to publicly point out — all efforts of 
 a private character having failed — the dangerous ground China is 
 trying to occupy, and to present Korea’s side of the controver-sy, 
 with a view to correcting if possible, some of the accepted fallacies 
 on the situation in the peninsular Kingdom and its relations with 
 
2 
 
 the Celestial Empire which have been so often misrepresented in the 
 native and some of the foreign newspapers in China during the past 
 two or three years, through design or under a misapprehension of 
 the law as well as the facts. In doing this, the harsher the crit- 
 icism may appear to be the more it is to he regretted that they 
 are merited. First — I shall notice Chinas claim to vassal or de- 
 pendent relations with Korea. Second — The former’s treatment 
 of her so-called vassal. Third — The charge that the King is weak 
 and unfit to govern the country, and before I have finished I shall 
 endeavor to show that the former is about as fictitious, as the latter 
 is without foundation. As Korea, in the exercise of a right which 
 none but sovereign and independent states possess, concluded a 
 treaty of friendship, navigation, and commerce with Japan, inde- 
 pendently of China, and later on with Western countries in 
 accordance with international usage, the rights acquired and 
 the obligations assumed must be detennined by the laws which 
 have always governed the enforcement of such compacts ; in the 
 light of these defined and well settled rules it will he in order to 
 inquire into some of the rights, powers, and responsibilities of a 
 sovereign state, and how vassal relations are established, as well as 
 into the duties and obligations a dependent state owes to its suze- 
 rain in order to more clearly determine the political status of 
 Korea. In general terms, a sovereign or independent state is de- 
 fined by almost all authors on international jurisprudence to be 
 any nation or people, whatever the character or form of its con- 
 stitution may be, which governs itself independently of other na- 
 tions, while Wheaton, who ought to be the best authority in this 
 case as China has adopted him as her standard author, says 
 “Sovereignty is the supreme power by which any state is governed 
 “this supreme power may be exercised either internally or ex- 
 “ternally. Internal sovereignty is that which is inherent in the 
 “people of any state or is vested in its ruler by its municipal con- 
 “stitution or fundamental laws. External sovereignty consists in 
 
3 
 
 “the independence of one political society in respect to all other 
 “political societies; and it is by the exercise of this branch of sove- 
 “reignty that the international relations of one political society are 
 “maintained in peace and in war with all other political societies.” 
 A nation which has always managed its internal as well as 
 external concerns in its own way, free from the interference or 
 dictation of any foreign power, is juridically independent, and 
 must he ranked in the category of sovereign states. The unerring 
 test, however, of a sovereign and independent state, is its right to 
 negotiate, to conclude treaties of friendship, navigation, and com- 
 merce; to exchange public ministers; and declare war and peace 
 with other sovereign and independent powers. These are rights 
 and conditions compatible and consistent with sovereignty which, 
 when possessed by a state, place it in the great family of indepen- 
 dent nations ; while states which do not possess such powers must 
 he ranked as semi-independent or dependent according to the 
 expressed terms of the agreement. An advocate of vassalage in the 
 North China Daily News, some months ago, in support of his 
 position, used substantially the following language. — “At the end 
 “of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries, the sanction of 
 “the Chinese Emperor had to he obtained before the successor 
 “chosen by the King of Korea could receive the title of Heir- 
 “Apparent, and then could not assume the title of King until it 
 “was conferred on him by Peking.” The correspondent states 
 the case much stronger than the facts warrant. If he had put it in 
 the form of a request, a graceful act by a tributary state, rather 
 than on the basis of an imperative obligation to the Peking 
 government, he would have been more in accord with the facts. 
 But whether he over or under stated them makes no material 
 difference, as relations of vassalage were never established by the 
 commands of a superior in exceptional cases or through the defer- 
 ential acts of an inferior. Liu Kiu, Anuam, and Burmah, in the 
 history of China’s precarious claims to vassalage over those states. 
 
4 
 
 did the same thing, and to-day the first named forms a part of the 
 sovereignty of the empire of Japan, the second belongs to the 
 Eepublic of France, while the third recently passed to the sovereign 
 control of Great Britain. Wheaton on the law of nations states 
 the case infinitely stronger against the correspondent than the 
 latter does in favor of China’s contention, when he says. — “The 
 “sovereignty of a particular state is not impaired by its occasional 
 “obedience to the commands of other states, or even the habitual 
 ^‘influence exercised by them over its councils. It is only when this 
 “obedience or this influence assumes the form of express compact 
 “that the sovereignty of the state inferior in power is legally affected 
 “by its connection with the other.” John Austin, a modern 
 writer of considerable celebrity on international law, in one of his 
 able lectures delivered in London in 1873, states the case with 
 equal clearness when he says. — “A feeble state holds its inde- 
 “pendence precariously or at the will of the powerful states to whose 
 “aggressions it is obnoxious, and since it is obnoxious to its aggres- 
 “sions it and the bulk of its subjects render obedience to com- 
 “mands which they occasionally express or intimate ; but since 
 “the obedience and commands are comparatively few and rare, 
 “they are not sufficient to constitute the relation of sovereignty 
 “and subjection between the powerful states and the feeble state 
 “with its subjects. In spite of those commands, and in spite of 
 “that obedience, the feeble state and its subjects are an indepen- 
 “dent political society whereof the powerful states are not the 
 “sovereign portion, although the powerful states are perma- 
 “nently superior, and although the feeble state is permanently 
 “inferior, there is neither the habit of command nor a habit of 
 “obedience on the part of the latter, and although the latter is 
 “unable to defend and maintain its independence, the latter is 
 “independent of the former in fact or practice.” The only vassal 
 or dependent relations recognised by the law of nations are those 
 resulting from conquest, international agreement, or convention. 
 
5 
 
 of some kind, and as such relations do not exist between the two 
 countries by virtue of either one of these requirements, and in all 
 reasonable probability wiU never be established by agreement or 
 convention, it remains to be seen whether they will exist in 
 future by conquest. Korea, however, is a tributary state of 
 China : relations which have been sustained in the past, with the 
 utmost good faith, and which Korea desires in all sincerity to con- 
 tinue so long as China’s treatment is generous, friendly, and just. 
 But the tributary relations one state may hold to another do not and 
 cannot in any degree affect its sovereign and independent rights. 
 For this reason, the tribute annually paid by Korea to China does 
 not impair Korean sovereignty or independence any more than the 
 tribute now paid by the British government to China, on account 
 of Burmah, impairs the sovereign and independent rights of the 
 British Empire, or the tribute formerly paid by the principal 
 maritime powers of Europe to the Barbary States affected the 
 sovereign rights and independence of those European powers. 
 Wheaton says, concerning the Barbary States, that. — “While they 
 “are anomalous in character, yet their occasional obedience to the 
 “commands of the Sultan, accompanied with irregular payments 
 “of tribute, does not prevent them from being considered by the 
 “Christian powers of Europe and America as independent states, 
 “with whom the international relations of war and peace are main- 
 “tained on the same footing with other Mohammedan sovereign- 
 “ties.” There are good and valid reasons why Korea desires to pre- 
 serve the traditional relations of close friendship with China which 
 have so happily existed between the two countries so long. Their 
 geographical positions under friendly intercourse make them a 
 source of strength to each other, while the fact that Korea has 
 drawn largely upon China’s population, language, religion, laws, 
 education, arts, manners, and customs, which have contributed so 
 much to the sum total of Korean civilization, all combine to 
 strengthen the chain of attachment and cause her to look to China, 
 
6 
 
 as in the past, for friendly advice rather than in any other 
 direction; and in my judgement nothing will interrupt this friend- 
 ship but a continuation of the illegal and highhanded treatment 
 Korea is now receiving at the hands of the Chinese, and their studied 
 and persistent attempts to destroy Korean sovereignty by absorbing 
 the country. It was due to the faith which the King had in 
 China’s professions of friendship for Korea that induced His 
 Majesty, when the advisability of making treaties with tVestern 
 countries was pressed upon him, to take counsel of the distin- 
 guished Viceroy at Tien Tsin, and I know of my own knowledge 
 that it was due to a similar faith in the King that induced the 
 Chung Tang to advise the establishment of such relations as the 
 surest means of improving the condition of the country and people, 
 as well as of preserving the sovereign rights of his kingdom ; and 
 later on, when the first of the Western treaties came to be negotiat- 
 ed — which was with America — the Viceroy was invited as the 
 friend of the King, and as having the broadest experience in such im- 
 portant matters, to assist in the negotiations. Two drafts were 
 submitted to that convention for consideration, one by the Viceroy 
 and the other by the special envoy who conducted the negoti- 
 ations for the United States. The very first clause in the Viceroy’s 
 draft was a demand for the recognition of vassal or dependent 
 relations between China and Korea, which the agent of the U. S. 
 government declined to consider or even discuss further than to 
 say that as his mission was to make a treaty of commerce and 
 friendship with an independent state, such a treaty he would 
 make or none at all Notwithstanding this, the Viceroy urged 
 the approval of this dependent clause to a point beyond which he 
 could not go, without breaking off negotiations, when he yielded, 
 and the treaty was then concluded upon the basis of other 
 independent states, and was signed at Chemulpo May 22nd 1882. 
 Even if vassalage had been acknowledged in the American treaty 
 by the negotiators, it would not have received the approval 
 
7 
 
 either of the U. S. government or the King of Korea. The next 
 treaty that Korea made was in October following, with China and 
 at the latters request, and while this treaty has been denom- 
 inated, “rules for the land and water commerce between the tra- 
 ding populations of China and Korea,” and while there is the 
 usual mystification and vagueness pervading it that characterizes 
 all of China’s intercourse with the peninsular Kingdom, yet it 
 comes nearer being a treaty of friendship, navigation, and com- 
 merce than anything else, as 1 shall endeavor to point out further 
 on. Treaties with other countries followed in quick succession in 
 the general tenor of the American one, which were however dis- 
 cussed and concluded, not at Tien Tsin but in Seoul, without re- 
 ference to the Viceroy or the Chinese government. Had vassalage 
 existed between the two countries in accord with international 
 jurisprudence at the time the American treaty was made does 
 anyone at all versed in public affairs suppose that the Viceroy 
 would have tried so hard to procure their acknowledgement by a 
 friendly power in a public treaty f Ko, the attempt was based 
 solely on the utter weakness of the contention, which no one 
 appreciated more fully than the Viceroy himself. After the ratifi- 
 cation of the American treaty the question of dependency, for the 
 moment at least, seems to have been abandoned ; at all events 
 arrangements were at once made for the enforcement of the stipu- 
 lations of the treaty : ports were opened, a customs service estab- 
 lished by the King, with Inspector, Commissioners and a full 
 staff of officers for the work. Diplomatic representatives were 
 appointed as treaties were ratified, who from time to time, pre- 
 sented their credentials and took their respective places at His 
 Majesty’s court in Seoul, and among them was the representative 
 of China with the title of His Imperial Chinese Majesty’s Com- 
 missioner printed on his card and appointed in pursuance of the 
 treaty already referred to. This official continued in an unassuming 
 way to represent his government upon terms of equality with his 
 
8 
 
 colleagues for more than two years, when he was succeeded by the 
 present Commissioner Yuan — for supposed meritorious services 
 rendered his government in the disturbances of 1884 — who, for a 
 short time, followed in the foot-steps of his predecessor ; but the 
 honor so suddenly thrust upon him seems to have inflated him to 
 such an extent that serious consequences might have resulted to 
 him had not his indiscreet enthusiasm found vent in the re- 
 surrection of the dependency scheme, which, for the credit of his 
 government, ought never again to have come to the surface ; for if 
 the conclusion of Japanese and American treaties upon the basis of 
 Korean independence, every article of the latter having been 
 approved by the Viceroy, followed by similar treaties with the 
 leading powers of Europe, and China having shared in their prac- 
 tical operations for two and a half years, did not honorably settle 
 it, the question ought to have finally disappeared when the Li-Ito 
 convention adjourned, by the terms of which China disposed of 
 whatever right she had left — without the consent of Japan — to send 
 troops to Korea, the only means as a last resort, every indepen- 
 dent nation possesses of enforcing its sovereign rights when assailed 
 or called in question. Some time in 1885, after I had been invited 
 to Korea but before my arrival, a policy of ahsorhtion, gradual or 
 otherwise, seems to have been decided upon by the Peking govern- 
 ment. The position of advisor and inspector of customs was seg- 
 gregated, and the Customs service pa.ssed to the control and direction 
 of the Chinese service under the plausible assurance that it would 
 be better and more economically administered, and that there was 
 no political significance to be attached to the change, and while 
 the service has been honestly and well administered under the 
 change, yet no one act, since the conclusion of the treaties, has con- 
 tributed so much to mislead the public mind in regard to the true 
 relations existing between China and Korea politically, than this 
 ill-advised one on the part of the Korean government. 
 
 Keither in the meanwhile, was Commissioner Yuan idle, for 
 
9 
 
 it was about tbis time that he adopted as a title for his Legation 
 that miserable misnomer and subterfuge “Eesidency”, and in the 
 most insolent way claimed to advise and even direct the King in 
 long-winded memorials, and upon public and official occasions to 
 assume the role of host instead of guest, on the flimsy pretext that 
 he is “at home” in Korea. 
 
 But it is asserted that vassalage is distinctly acknowledged in 
 the treaty sometimes called “the overland trade regulations” above 
 alluded to. Kow I assert with much confidence, that if that con- 
 vention establishes anything so far as this question is concerned, 
 it is exactly the contrary to this. While there are only eight rather 
 lengthy articles in that treaty, yet, as already observed, they cover 
 about all that is necessary in an ordinary treaty of friendship, 
 commerce, and navigation. Under the 1st Art China has dis- 
 patched her Commissioner with diplomatic powers to Seoul, and 
 Consuls to all the open ports to guard the interests of Chinese 
 merchants and other subjects. The second article yields to China 
 exterritorial privileges for her subjects, similar to those enjoyed by 
 the citizens and subjects of the most favoured nations. Art. 3rd 
 permits the merchant ships of both countries to visit the open 
 ports of the other fixes the duties to be paid, provides for relief 
 in case of shipmecks, regulates the conduct of fishing vessels, &c. 
 Art. 4th permits merchants of either country to visit the open 
 ports of the other, for the purposes of trade, where they may pur- 
 chase lands and houses, provides tonnage dues as well as re- 
 export tariff, inhibits trade at the capitals of both countries, com- 
 pels merchants wishing to purchase native produce in the interior 
 to first obtain permits of their Consuls, while persons desiring to 
 travel in either country for pleasure must be provided with pass- 
 ports. Art. 7th provides for the dispatch once a month to Korea 
 of a vessel belonging to the China merchants Company, and per- 
 mits Chinese Men-of-War to repair to the open ports of Korea for 
 the purpose of protecting China’s consuls and other residents. In 
 
10 
 
 the text of this treaty there is not only no reference to vassalage 
 or dependency, hut the demands and concessions made exclude 
 the existence of such relations at the time it was concluded. 
 
 If China believed in the validity of vassal relations, can it be 
 supposed that provisions would have been made for ex-territorial 
 privileges and passports for Chinese subjects in Korea 1 certainly 
 not ; for to have done so would have presented the spectacle of a 
 sovereign state demanding ex-territorial rights and privileges for 
 her own subjects within her own sovereignty, which is the very 
 acme of absurdity. The only reference to vassalage is in a 
 preamble published at the head of the treaty, which may or 
 may not have been in its present form at the time the treaty was 
 signed. This extraordinary preamble begins as follows. — “Korea 
 “has long been one of o%ir vassal states, and in all that concerns 
 “rights and observances there are already fixed prescriptions which 
 “require no change.” Can this be the language of a high joint 
 convention created, not to sign away the sovereign rights of a 
 nation but to protect them in in its intercourse with a neighbouring 
 state ? It seems rather the ex-parte assertion of a fallacy than 
 any proof of the existence of a fact. But the closing paragraph of 
 this preamble, if anything, is still more remarkable. It reads, — 
 
 “It is understood that the present rules are to be viewed in 
 “the light of a favour granted by China to a dependent state, and 
 “are not in the category of favoured nation treatment applied to 
 “other states.” Is it a favour to Korea for that state to grant ex- 
 territorial privileges to the subjects of China while the latter lays 
 claim to vassalage over the former ? Is it a favour to Korea to 
 permit Chinese Men-of-War to repair to her open ports to protect 
 Chinese Consuls and other residents ? and, finally, is it a favour to 
 overrun the Korean Capital with Chinese merchants, while there 
 is not a Korean merchant in all China 1 There is an additional 
 reason why this preamble must be viewed with suspicion, and that 
 is this : as the Viceroy was one of the plenipotentiaries who con- 
 
11 
 
 eluded the treaty, it is quite out of the range of reason to believe 
 that that distinguished official could have been a party to the 
 assertion that the rules alluded to in the preamble, “are not in 
 the category of favoured nation treatment applied to other states”, 
 for hardly five months before this he discussed and sanctioned as 
 the professed friend of Korea the XIV Art. of the American treaty, 
 which provides as follows. — “The high contracting powers here- 
 “by agree that should at any time the King of Chosen grant to 
 “any nation or to the merchants or citizens of any nation any 
 “right, privilege, or favour connected either with navigation com- 
 “merce, political or other intercourse wdiich is not conferred by this 
 “treaty, such right, privilege or favour shall freely inure to the 
 “benefit of the U. S. its public officers, merchants, and citizens.” 
 Jlut said the most eminent statesman of the Celestial Empire re- 
 cently. — “Korea is a vassal of China’s, because upon the conclu- 
 “sion of treaties with Western countries the King gave to the 
 “plenipotentaries who conducted the negotiations autograph letters 
 “to be conveyed to the heads of their respective governments in 
 “which such relations were admitted.” Here again I must take 
 issue with the assertion, even though it is made by so emi- 
 nent a personage as Li Chung Tang. It is true that just prior 
 to signing the American treaty an autograph letter was handed 
 down by the King to be delivered with it to the president of 
 the U. S., but that letter admitted nothing more than the King 
 now asserts, namely, that Korea is a tributary state of China, 
 but which as I have endeavored to point out, does not affect, much 
 less destroy, the sovereign rights of a state, while it asserts in lan- 
 guage that cannot be minsunderstood the sovereign and indepen- 
 dent character which the Korean government has always maintain- 
 ed. Subsequent autograph letters given by His Majesty were, in 
 effect, the same as the first one, so far at least as the relations of 
 Korea to China are concerned. The following is a correct trans- 
 lation of the letter of the King to the President of the United States. 
 
12 
 
 His Majesty the King of Chosen herewith makes a commu- 
 nication : “Chosen has been, from ancient times, a state tributary to 
 “China ; yel hitherto full sovereignty has heen exercised by the Kings 
 '‘‘of Chosen in all matters of internal administration and foreign re- 
 “lations. Chosen and the U. S. in establishing now by mutual con- 
 “sent a treaty, are dealing with each other upon a basis of equality. 
 “The King of Chosen distinctly pledges his own sovereign powers 
 “for the complete enforcement in good faith of aU the stipulations 
 “of the treaty, in accordance with international law. As regards the 
 “various duties which devolve upon Chosen as^ tributary state to 
 “China, with these the U. S. has no concern whatever. Having 
 “appointed envoys to negotiate a treaty, it appears to be my duty, 
 “in addition thereto, to make this preliminary declaration. 
 
 “To the President of the United States, 
 
 “May 15th 1882.” 
 
 Whatever interpretation the advocates of vassalage may choose 
 to put upon the plain, candid, and unmistakable language contain- 
 ed in the above letter, or however much they may attempt to twist 
 or pervert its meaning, it is perfectly clear that the American 
 government have given it a construction strictly in accord with its 
 phraseology as well as spirit ; for they now hold that under the 
 treaty of friendship and commerce which accompanied it, the 
 question of Korea’s vassalage to China has been definitely settled, 
 so far, at least, as that government is concerned. In Paragraph 64 
 first vol. of Whartons digest of international law of the U. S., the 
 following language is used by the government. 
 
 “The existence of international relations between the two 
 “countries (the U. S. and Korea) as equal contracting parties, is to 
 “be viewed simply as an accepted fact, “and”, the independence of 
 “Korea of China is to be regarded by the U. S. a^ now estab- 
 “lished.” Neither does the American government stand alone in 
 this regard, for at least two other great powers claiming relations 
 to the peninsula, equal in importance, politically as well as com- 
 
13 
 
 mercially to those claimed by China, insist on maintaining the same 
 sovereignty for Korea, that the U. S. does, while it is the solemn 
 joint declaration of Japan and Korea as expressed in the first 
 article of their treaty concluded February 1876, which declares 
 that, “Chosen being an independent state, enjoys the same 
 “sovereign rights as does Japan, and that their intercourse shall 
 “thenceforward be carried on in terms of equality and cour- 
 “tesy.” Independently of the treaties which have been made with 
 Korea, the historical relations of this country with China, under 
 the present Dynasty^t least for the past two hundred years of its 
 reign,«do not admit the existence of any such conditions toward 
 each other as suzerain and vassal. When these relations are held 
 by states in the legal international acceptation of the term, that 
 which disturbs the heart of the sovereign affects the pulse of the 
 vassal, and yet, so far as is known, neither the wars which have 
 been waged against China by foreign states, nor her rebellions, nor 
 internal dissentions, have apparently disturbed or concerned Korea 
 any more than if one nation had been located near the north pole 
 and the other in the tropics. And yet it was the duty of Korea, 
 as a vassal of China, to have furnished an army from her hundreds 
 of thousands of soldiers which she has had or could have raised at 
 any stage of her civilization, as well as munitions of war, to aid 
 China in the hour of her greatest need ; but not a soldier, gun, or 
 dollar, seems to have crossed over from Korea for that purpose. In 
 addition to this important fact, if such relations ever existed, they 
 ought certainly to have left their imprint on the civilization of 
 Korea, either upon the national emblems, coins, laws, or in some 
 other way, as pubhc notice to other nations of Chinas responsibility 
 when grievances were to be redressed or wrongs atoned, as well 
 as an acknowledgement on Korea’s part of the acceptance of such 
 relations. To those who are versed in international affairs Korea 
 cannot bo considered a dependent state, for the reason that the law 
 and the facts have placed her in the column of sovereign and inde- 
 
14 
 
 pendent states, where she will remain, unless through the force of 
 of superior numbers she is taken out of it. Korea has the right of 
 negotiation, a vassal state has not ; Korea has concluded treaties 
 of friendship, commerce, and navigation with other sovereign and 
 independent states without reference to China, which a vassal 
 cannot do, and in virtue of those treaties has dispatched public 
 ministers to the courts of her respective treaty powers, while vassal 
 states cannot even appoint Consuls-General but only Consuls and 
 commercial agents. Korea has the right to declare war or peace, 
 which a vassal cannot do, except through its suzerain. China is 
 represented at the Korean court by a diplomatic officer, and by 
 Consuls at all the open ports, and when the interests of the Korean 
 government demand it they will he similarly represented in China, 
 or friendly intercourse will surely cease to exist between the two 
 governments. The following language of Bluntshli, a modern inter- 
 national jurist of great clearness, is forcibly applicable here. He 
 says. — “Inasmuch as sovereignty tends to unity, such distinc- 
 “tions between vassal sovereignty and sovereign sovereignty 
 “cannot subsist long. History shows us the truth of this prin- 
 “ciple. During the middle ages a quantity of vassal states ex- 
 “isted both in Europe and Asia. To-day they have nearly all dis- 
 “appeared, because they have been transformed into sovereign 
 “states, or have been absorbed by more powerful states. Inter- 
 “national law ought to keep an account of their developement. 
 “It ought to respect it. It ought not to contribute to retard it by 
 “seeking to 'perpetuate the unsustainahle formalities of an antiquat- 
 “ed jurity," 
 
 International law will keep an account of their development 
 too, and, in its vigilance for the rights of the weak, will keep an 
 account of Korea also in her struggle for the maintenance of inde- 
 pendent state-hood. After having been by the great nations of the 
 international world literally dragged from that seclusion which 
 had for so many centuries enveloped the little Kingdom in mys- 
 
15 
 
 tery, to join the family of civilized nations under the expressed 
 guarantee of assistance in the event of oppression or unjust treat- 
 ment, those powers will surely not permit the stultification of this 
 assurance by allowing their youngest member to be strangled at 
 the very threshold of its international life. 
 
 China’s friend and ally Korea desires to be, but her voluntary 
 slave never. The Austro-Hungarian minister of state, M. Kalnoky, 
 lately said. — “A vassal state in the 19th century is an anacronism.” 
 However this may be, the times will be indeed sadly out of joint 
 when China succeeds by her peculiar methods in establishing 
 vassalage with Korea : not only so, hut when she does, a new 
 chapter will have to be added to international jurisprudence, the 
 principles of which such well known expounders as Grotius, 
 Vattel, and Wheaton never comprehended. 
 
 Even for China at this late day, after yielding the point in the 
 treaties, and, until quite recently, accquiescing in the execution of 
 all their provisions, declining responsibility for Korea’s conduct at 
 times when responsibility stood for something, and having con- 
 cluded a treaty with Korea herself, now to claim the existence of 
 dependent relations is not only to abuse language and offend in- 
 telligence, but it is also an attempt to defy international precedents. 
 But perhaps the most careless and inexcusable assertion in re- 
 lation to this question is the one that the Korean government ad- 
 mits its vassalage without any qualification whatever, for nothing 
 is further from the truth ; and when the King, under well-con- 
 sidered advice, appointed a minister to Japan and afterwards the 
 plenipotentaries to Europe and America, in order, if possible, to 
 break up the pernicious medc^someness of the Chinese with 
 Korean affairs ; which step met with such stubborn opposition 
 from the Peking government, as well as adverse criticism in certain 
 public journals in the East, His Majesty emphasized, by that 
 public act, his denial of this fallacious statement. Apparently 
 thenjjs no limit to the tricks and devices resorted to by the advo- 
 
IG 
 
 cates of vassalage. 
 
 A correspondent of the Japanese journal) wri- 
 
 ting to that paper on the 17th of November last seems to have fallen 
 a victim to one of these, for he says. — “It appears that a convention 
 “on the appointment by Korea of ministers to foreign countries has 
 “been concluded between her and China, and that it consists of the 
 “following three articles. 1st The Korean Minister of State shall, 
 “before sending a minister abroad, ask advice of the Chinese Min- 
 “ister in Korea. 2nd Should the Korean Minister abroad have oc- 
 “casion to communicate with the representatives of any other foreign 
 “power in the same country on a matter of business, he shall con- 
 “sult with the Chinese Minister in that country. 3rd The Korean 
 “Minister of State shall, no matter what the official rank of a 
 “Minister appointed by them to a foreign country may be, not 
 “allow him to take precedence over the Chinese representative in 
 “the same country.” The only document which could he tortur- 
 ed into anything like the above articles is the following telegraphic 
 instruction from the Viceroy to Commissioner Yuan, dated about 
 the 5th of November last. 1st “After arriving at his post the 
 “Korean representitive has to call at the Chinese Legation to ask 
 “the assistance of the Minister, and to go with the Korean re- 
 “presentative to the Foreign Office to introduce him, after which 
 “he may call where he likes. 2nd K there happen to be festiv- 
 “ities at court, or an official gathering, or any dinner, or the health 
 “of someone is drunk or in meeting together, the Korean repre- 
 “sentative has always to take a lower place than the Chinese 
 “representative. 3rd If there happen to he any important or se- 
 “rious questions to discuss, the Korean representative has first to 
 “consult secretly with the Chinese Minister, and both have to talk 
 “over the matter and think together. This rule is compulsory, 
 “arising from the dependent relations, but as this does not con- 
 “cern other governments, they will not be able to inquire into the 
 “matter. At present this question (sending Ministers) has not 
 
17 
 
 “been decided by Imperial decree. They (the Korean’s) have to 
 “be advised in a friendly spirit. China and Korea have to cher- 
 “ish for each other feelings of relationship. Ministers are selected 
 “from among the Mandarins of reputation, therefore confidence 
 “and respect has to be shown to them, and this is the way Korean 
 “representatives should treat the representatives of China. This 
 “has to be communicated to the Korean Foreign Office, then to be 
 “handed over to the King, who must order his representatives to 
 “act accordingly.” But notwithstanding the above commands, 
 the King did not “order his representatives to act accordingly.” 
 His Majesty replied, substantially, that, while his ministers would 
 be instructed to show due respect and deference to the ministers 
 of China yet as he had appointed in pursuance of all treaties with 
 Korea full Ministers, he could not now change their titles with- 
 out giving cause for unfavourable comment as well as unjust su- 
 spicions. Having therefore appointed full Ministers they should, 
 in their presentation at court, be governed by the rules of et- 
 iquette which govern^ the presentation of the Ministers from 
 other countries ; accordingly the original instructions to the Min- 
 isters, which do not contain any of the above conditions were 
 permitted to stand. 
 
 As a matter of fact the Korean Minister to Washington, was 
 presented to the President by the Secretary of State, and to the 
 Secretary of State entirely independently of the Chinese Min- 
 ister, which caused the latter to telegraph to the Viceroy at Tien 
 Tsin, who in turn telegraphed to Yuan in Seoul, who, with his 
 usual tactics, undertook to stir up the President of the Foreign 
 Office, but all to no purpose. Neither will the Ministers to Europe 
 be presented at court by the Chinese Ministers. Even if such an 
 anomalous proceeding were attempted, it would hardly be carried 
 out, for there is no country of respectability, jealous of its national 
 honour, that will care to attempt to set the absurd and unprece- 
 dented example of receiving a plenipotentiary, envoy, or minister of 
 
18 
 
 any sort from a vassal state. Even the so called memorial (letter) 
 which the King addressed to the Emperor of China in answer to 
 questions from Peking, explaining his reasons for as well as his 
 right to send Ministers to Europe and America, is regarded by 
 China and by vassalage advocates as another link in the chain 
 which, they hope, is to bind Korea to the Celestial Empire. 
 The trouble seems to arise from this ; the language used by the 
 King to express his tributary relations is persistently and erro- 
 neously interpreted to mean vassal relations by China and her 
 supporters. When the King refers in the so-called memorial to the 
 Emperor, to tributary envoys and plenipotentaries he is entirely 
 consistent with international jurisprudence as appUed by other 
 nations in their intercourse with each other, while China’s appel- 
 lation of vassal envoys and plenipotentiaries is a misnomer, because 
 entirely inconsistent with the laws of civUized nations. Such laws 
 do not recognize vassal envoys, plenipotentiaries, or ministers of 
 any kind, for the reason that vassal states have power to create 
 only Consuls and commercial agents. In this connection there is 
 another trick which deserves attention, and that is this : letters or 
 documents written or translated to suit the occasion are frequent- 
 ly published in the press in China, purporting to be from the 
 King of Korea, inferentially if not positively admitting Korea’s 
 vassalage. In answer to such statements I am informed, upon the 
 very best authority, that the King has never admitted in docu- 
 ments or otherwise the existence of such relations, and further, if 
 anything has been admitted by any official of the government at 
 any time which even implies vassalage, it is without authority and 
 void. The King knows only too weU the object of the insidious 
 conduct of China toward his country, aside from this he cannot be 
 induced or intimidated into admitting a national fallacy. Even if 
 dependent relations could be created by admissions,^ the Eiing, 
 under the threatening, violent, and criminal treatment of China 
 for two and a half years past, were to admit vassalage in the most 
 
19 
 
 abject way it would not be binding upon his government, for ad- 
 missions under duress are not only no evidence of a fact but they 
 are not even admissions. Other independent states, with but few 
 commercial interests to protect and no questions of sovereignty to 
 settle, dispatch to foreign countries public ministers, and noth- 
 ing is said against it ; but when the King of Korea in accordance 
 with the expressed stipulations in all the treaties with other inde- 
 pendent powers does the same thing, a perfect shower of invective 
 greets the public ear from some quarters, while from others, more 
 mild, the acHs characterized as mischievous and ill-advised and that 
 it was forcing to the front a question which [ought to have been 
 kept in the background, while the King and his advisors turned 
 their attention to the developing of the resources of the country. It 
 is quite true that the question was forced to the front, not by the 
 King and his advisors but by the tyranny and oppression of 
 China, largely through the conduct of Commissioner Yuan, which 
 for petty schemes, criminality, injustice, and brutality has seldom 
 if ever been equalled in the annals of international intercourse. 
 With a view to placing the heel of China on the neck of Korea, 
 he has not only opposed almost every effort which has been made 
 in the direction of internal developement, but he has, through the 
 mercenary brigade which he always keeps about him, brought 
 failure and ridicule upon almost every effort the better class of 
 Koreans have made to transact business for the government or 
 themselves, in order to make it appear that they are but a nation 
 of helpless children, who can never learn business, and who, for 
 that reason, need a Chinese guardian over them. He has threat- 
 ened the King repeatedly, through certain Korean officials, with 
 the Chinese army and navy and with the vengence of the Viceroy, 
 in order to compel compliance with his wishes and demands, while 
 to weaken the Eoyal authority in the eyes of officials and subjects 
 alike, he has abused and trampled upon the long established and 
 sacred customs of the court by riding in his chair, into the palace 
 
20 
 
 almost up to the very entrance leading to the presence of the 
 King, accompanied by coolies, servants, and horsemen, who, at 
 times have conducted themselves in a disorderly manner ; while 
 in the excitement of July and August of 1886, of which he was 
 the principal cause, and which, judging from his actions, was in- 
 tended as an excuse for violent measures, arising out of his at- 
 tempt to force the government to admit that the King was the 
 author of a letter His Majesty never wrote, said to contain a re- 
 quest for the protection of a friendly power against the aggres- 
 sions of China, the language and conduct of China’s represent- 
 ative would have done credit to the chief of braggadocios. In 
 some of his conduct he has been more or less applauded and en- 
 couraged by one or two foreign officials, while in all of his disreput- 
 able work he has been much assisted by some petty Chinese officials 
 as well as by certain of China’s gun-boats sent to the open ports in 
 Korea for the purpose of protecting Chinese Consuls and mer- 
 chants, as stipulated in their treaty, and as alleged or published in 
 the so-called preamble of such treaty, as a favour granted hy China 
 to a dependent state, which have been detected in some of their at- 
 tempts to smuggle red ginseng out of the country. These gun- 
 boats, on their arrival from China, are in the habit of bringing 
 more or less cargo which their officers demand shall be landed 
 without examination, while the customs authorities urge the right 
 of inspection as in ordinary cases, to see whether or not, it con- 
 tains dutiable goods. Invariably the Chinese Consul takes up the 
 side of the gun-boat people, and, in their behalf, appeals to Com- 
 missioner Yuan in Seoul, who, in turn threatens and abuses the 
 President of the Foreign Office until the order is given to pass the 
 goods without examination. The last case of smuggling ginseng 
 by one of these gun-boats occurred in October, when several thou- 
 sand dollars worth of the drug was seized, the largest chest of 
 which was covered hy the seal and signature of Commissioner 
 Yuan ! The chief Commissioner of Customs has done aU in his 
 
21 
 
 power to break up these lawless and fraudulent practices. He has 
 appealed to the President of the Foreign Office, to the Viceroy at 
 Tien Tsin and to the Inspector-General of Customs in China, to 
 aid him in enforcing the laws and regulations of the Korean 
 customs service, but thus far without avail. The President of the 
 Foreign Office frankly says he is powerless as against the Chinese 
 in these matters. Even with the fraudulent treatment it has 
 received, the revenues for the year just closed amounts to two 
 hundred and fifty thousand ($250,000) dollars, a sum which, 
 under legitimate and fair treatment, would have been considerably 
 increased, thereby avoiding the apparent necessity for some per- 
 sons to waste so much false sympathy over the expenditure of a 
 few thousand dollars in sending Ministers to Europe and America. 
 But the culminating act of China’s representative for cold blooded 
 villainy lays in his plot, exposed in July last, to dethrone 
 and carry off the King to make temporary room for a pliant tool. 
 The execution of this diabolical business, involved riots, arson, 
 bloodshed, and probable assassinations, besides imperilling the lives 
 of all foreigners in Seoul, as well as those of many native people. 
 Every detail of this wicked conspiracy is in the possession of the 
 King, and which would, no doubt have been carried out but for 
 the integrity and loyalty of Prince Min Yong Ik, one of the ab- 
 lest and truest of Korean subjects, who, with the knowledge of the 
 King had been let into the plot, and who faithfully reported its 
 different phases from time to time to His Majesty, as well as to 
 myself, who were enabled thereby to control and defeat it. Perhaps 
 the most extraordinary part of this infamous business is the draft 
 of it, which was to have been and doubtless was submitted to the 
 Viceroy for his approval or rejection. The principal features of 
 this draft were as follows. Native soldiers were to be drilled at 
 Kang Wha, under the pretext of garrisoning the point against the 
 “outside barbarian.” These soldiers were to be reviewed by the 
 Chinese representative in order that they might readily recognize 
 
22 
 
 their commander at the critical moment. They were to be placed 
 conveniently near the palace. Then the Tai Wan Kiun or ex- 
 regent’s palace or house was to he fired, and the work of the in- 
 cendiary laid at the door of the King, which was to be the signal for 
 an up-rising of the ex-regent’s following who hate the Queen and 
 her party with intense bitterness. The rioters were to attack the pal- 
 ace, when Commissioner Yuan was to have appear|^on the ground 
 as he did in 1884, and in command of the troops already referred 
 to, under the pretence of quelling the rioters, was to take possess- 
 ion of the person of the King and carry him out of the palace ; 
 then declare the son of the King’s elder brother Heir apparent, and 
 the ex-regent, regent, until the Heir agreed upon attained his 
 majority, thereby enabling the Chinese, under the direction of the 
 regent, to thoroughly invest the government and country. Neither 
 did China’s representative neglect the financial part of the scheme, 
 for he placed in the hands of a certain general three thousand 
 taels, (about $ 4,500) out of which the expenses of drilling and 
 moving the troops were to be paid. This sum was however re- 
 turned to the Chinese Legation after the departure of Min Yong 
 Ik, and the collapse of the conspiracy. The Chinese government 
 cannot plead ignorance of the conduct of their officials in Korea, 
 for they have been fully advised from time to time through differ- 
 ent channels. Twice I visited Tien Tsin under authority from 
 the King, when the fullest discussions were had with the Viceroy 
 with respect to Yuan’s extraordinary conduct, and the policy of the 
 Peking govenment toward Korea. In my first interview in Sep- 
 tember 1886 I urged an amicable understanding between China 
 and Eussia as well as Japan in regard to the political affairs of the 
 peninsula, as the surest means of preventing irritation and dis- 
 order ; and before my return the Viceroy assured me that such an 
 understanding would not only be reached but that China would 
 change her representative, as Yuan was too young, not only in years 
 but also in experience for such a post. In fact, said the Viceroy, 
 
23 
 
 the position had already been tendered to the present Tao-tai of 
 Tien Tsin, also to the Tao-tai who had just been appointed at Che- 
 foo, but that both had declined. On the occasion of my second 
 visit in October 1887, to discuss Korea’s right to send public 
 ministers abroad, and to open ports in the interests of trade, as 
 well as to expose Yuan’s latest villainy, if it became necessary, at 
 one interview, ^finding that the Viceroy turned a deaf ear to every- 
 thing reflecting in any way upon Yuan, I was about to dispose of 
 him once for all, as I supposed, by presenting the indisputable evi- 
 dences of his recent conspiracy, when, to my amazement, the Vice- 
 roy, coolly informed me that he knew all about the dethronement 
 scheme. That while Yuan was in it, yet it was all the fault of 
 Min Yong Ik who laid the plot and induced Yuan to go into it, and 
 that for his stupidity in letting himself be drawn into such a thing he 
 has been severely reprimanded. The reprimand was due, probab- 
 ly, not so much to Yuan’s stupidity, for being drawn into it, as 
 the Viceroy said, as to the detection and failure of his own wick- 
 ed conspiracy. And still, in the face of this criminal record. 
 Yuan continues the representative of China to Korea, in violation 
 of the closing paragraph of the first article of the treaty between 
 the two countries which says. — “Should any such officer disclose 
 “waywardness, masterfulness or improper conduct of public busi- 
 “ness, the superintendent of trade for the northern ports and the 
 “King of Korea respectively, will notify each other of the fact 
 “rtWfZ ai once recall him." In view of all this, the inquiry naturally 
 suggests itself, why is the commissioner stubbornly kept at Seoul ? 
 Is it because China, desiring to take possession of Korea, and hav- 
 ing no excuse in the eyes of civilized nations for doing so, expects 
 him through his violent conduct to furnish one 1 It is to be 
 hoped not. Nor is this aU : What must be the moral status of a 
 government which insists on being represented at the court of a 
 neighboring state by a smuggler, conspirator, and diplomatic out- 
 law ? I submit the language is not too strong, in view, of the facts 
 
24 
 
 and the following record applicable to th era, copied from a well- 
 known author on international law. — “Several instances are to be 
 “found in history of ambassadors being seized and sent out of the 
 “country. The Bishop of Boss, ambassador of Mary Queen of 
 “Scots, was imprisoned and then banished from England for 
 “conspiring against the sovereign, while the Duke of Norfolk 
 “and other conspirators were tried and executed. . In 1584, De 
 “Mendoza the Spanish ambassador in England was ordered to quit 
 “the realm for conspiring to introduce troops to dethrone Queen 
 “Elizabeth. In 1684, De Bass, the Erench minister, was order- 
 “ed to depart the country in twenty-four hours, on a charge of con- 
 “spiring against the life of CromweU. In 1717 Gyllenborg, the 
 “Sweedish ambassador, contrived a plot to dethrone George I. He 
 “was arrested, his cabinet broken open and searched, and his papers 
 “seized. Sweden arrested the British minister at Stockholm by 
 “way of reprisal. The arrest of Gyllenborg was necessary as a 
 “measure of self-defence, hut on no principle of international law 
 “can the arrest of the British minister by Sweeden he made just- 
 “ifiahle. Eor similar reasons, Callamare, Spanish ambassador in 
 “Erance, was in 1718, arrested, his papers seized and himself con- 
 “ducted to the frontier by military escort. So recently as 1848, Sir 
 “H. Bulwer, the British ambassador in Spain, had his passports re- 
 “turned, and was requested to leave Spanish territory by the govern- 
 “ment. Certain disturbances had taken place in certain parts of 
 “Spain, and the government persuaded themselves that Sir H. 
 “Bulwer had lent his assistance to the disaffected.” — And had the 
 Korean government possessed the national strength to enforce their 
 rights, another case of far more recent date would have been add- 
 ed to the above list in the person of Commissioner Yuan. The 
 Chinese authorities seemed to he considerably exercised over the 
 surrender of Kim Ok Kiun by the Japanese government, in order, 
 that he might he justly punished for his conspiracies ; and who 
 would doubtless have been wiLLingly given up by that government 
 
25 
 
 were not international precedents against the surrender of political 
 offenders, and yet the conspiracies of the Chinese representative 
 are of a far graver character than those of Kim Ok Kiun, for the 
 former’s were directed against the King, the head and front of all 
 government in the Kingdom, while the latter’s were directed more 
 against certain high officials than otherwise. If the Chinese au- 
 thorities were sincere in their efforts to have Kim Ok Kiun pro- 
 perly punished for his crimes, then they surely will not condone 
 the greater offence of their own representative against the King 
 now. The oppressive conduct of China is not confined alone to 
 her small officials in Korea, nor to those who periodically visit the 
 country in gun-boats, for it extends to Tien Tsin and Peking. 
 After my return from the north, where I went to inspect the na- 
 tural resources of that part of Korea, I recommended among other 
 things that, as Ping An is the center of a large section of country 
 rich in agricultural and mineral wealth, legitimate trade would he 
 encouraged and increased, the customs revenues largely augment- 
 ed, the smuggling carried in and out the Ta Tong river checked, 
 while the preliminary work of opening the valuable coal and other 
 mines located near there — already determined upon by the govern- 
 ment — would be facilitated by establishing an open port at or near 
 the city. The proposition was also warmly supported by the 
 Chief Commissioner of Customs, and subsequently that efficient 
 officer was instructed by the King to take the preliminary steps. 
 A steamer was dispatched with a customs officer on board to sur- 
 vey the river, and to locate the port at the nearest practical point 
 to Ping An. While this work was going on, the Chief Com- 
 missioner was informed by Yuan that the Viceroy Li, would not 
 permit a port to he opened at that place. The Chief Com- 
 missioner humiliated by this unjust and unwarrantable interfer- 
 ence was compelled to direct the vessel with the customs officer 
 to return. At first, the King declined to believe that such an order 
 <x)uld emanate from the Viceroy, but direct communication with 
 
26 
 
 the Chung Tang, through myself, confirmed the statement of 
 China’s representative. In the discussion of this subject the Vice- 
 roy based his objections upon the erroneous and illogical grounds 
 that, as Ping An is near the port of New Chwang in China, an 
 open port there would seriously interfere with Chinese trade. In 
 the first place New Chwang is several hundred miles from Ping 
 An, and secondly, there is not annually a thousand dollars worth of 
 trade carried on between the two points. But if there were even 
 one million dollars worth or ten for that matter, are the revenues of 
 the Korean government entitled to no consideration from China, 
 or was it the object of the Peking government in getting control 
 of the customs service of Korea to so direct and manipulate it, as 
 to make the natural resources and wealth of the country subserve 
 the interests of China instead of Korea ? The right of every state to 
 increase its wealth, population, and power by opening ports for the 
 stimulation and encouragement of trade, the extension of its navi- 
 gation, the improvement of its revenues, arts, agriculture, and com- 
 merce, is incontrovertible and is recognized by every civilized nation 
 under the sun, and the sooner China is compelled to recognize the fact 
 also the better it will be for the family of nations, whose comity and 
 friendship she essays to share, as well as for her own interests. Nei- 
 ther do the commands of the Viceroy stop at opening ports, for His 
 Excellency asserts, without a stammer or a blush, that Korea cannot 
 negotiate loans with which to aid in the developement of the natural 
 resources of the country or transact in her own way, as she has for 
 centuries past, the business of the government without first asking 
 and obtaining the consent of China. In view of such a long train 
 of cruel, unjust, and tyranical conduct as is here presented, China’s 
 professions of friendship for Korea under the claim of vassalage 
 become simply monstrous in their sincerity. Nor do the mischiev- 
 ous consequences of such meddlesomeness stop here. Eor if the 
 Viceroy, in his commands to the Korean government, can practical- 
 ly defeat the commercial part of the treaties made with other coun- 
 
27 
 
 tries, His Excellency can by similar commands nullify every stipu- 
 lation of those agreements, whether they apply to the appointment 
 of public ministers, opening ports for convenience of trade, the 
 collection of duties, or the rights of citizens and subjects of the 
 treaty powers whether of person or property. How long the treaty 
 rights of other countries, and the lives of their nationals are to bo 
 jeapordized and trifled with or how far China will be permitted to 
 go in the direction she now seems to he headed before a halt is 
 called, depends entirely upon the faith and value other powers 
 besides the U. S. attach to their stipulations with Korea. I say 
 other powers besides the U. S., because that government, with no 
 political interests in the peninsula to protect, has through their 
 distinguished Secretary of State, having in mind the faith pledged 
 in the first article of the American treaty, informed China that 
 as the former has concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce 
 with Korea on the basis of a sovereign and independent state, she 
 expects the rights and privileges so acquired to be respected. 
 Were the national autonomy of China endangered, or the rights 
 and immunities of her subjects threatened with destruction by the 
 continued independence of Korea, and China were, for that reason, 
 to proceed openly to annex the country instead of assuming re- 
 lations with it which do not exist, and endeavoring by false preten- 
 ces to sustain the assumption, the case would be different. For 
 the right of self-preservation is just as inherent in a nation as it is 
 in individuals, while the most solemn and responsible obligation it 
 owes to its people is the guarantee of all their rights under a 
 stable and well administered government. The King having ap- 
 pointed and dispatched public ministers to all countries in treaty 
 relations with Korea — a course so fatal to the claims of vassalage — 
 the time has surely come for China to quit masquerading with the 
 “Korean question”, and frankly announce in unmistakable terms 
 her policy towards the peninsula. For until the question is settled 
 one way or the other, it will not only continue as now, to be a 
 
26 
 
 very serious and disturbing element in the politics of the East, 
 but it will delay if not prevent internal developement and the re- 
 formation of long established abuses in Korea; but with the 
 question settled in favour of the continued independence of the 
 country, and entire responsibility for the duties and obligations 
 already assumed through its international agreements, and with 
 labour made honorable by Eoyal decree and idleness condemned 
 as it is in Western countries, where the fact is recognized that the 
 only key to real greatness, permanent prosperity, and national 
 strength, lies in the recognition of the truth that to engage in all 
 branches of labour and business enterprises is not only respectable 
 but laudable and worthy of the highest commendation and en- 
 couragement. Then with the idle Yangban class (so-called gentle- 
 men) which are now feeding upon and exhausting the labour of the 
 country, because it is considered dishonorable to work, compell- 
 ed to earn the bread they eat, and the agricultural classes stimu- 
 lated and encouraged by the protection of their surplus products, 
 from the squeezing and other dlegal exactions now laid upon it, 
 -sure to follow sooner or later under settled political conditions — 
 Korea would then enter upon that era of prosperity which the na- 
 tural wealth of the country so justly merits. A few words now in 
 reply to the stale charge that the King is weak and vacillating in 
 character, and I leave the subject of Korea’s sovereignty and griev- 
 ances to those who are able to protect and right them ; and upon 
 this point, two years experience as His Majesty’s foreign advisor 
 and Vice President of the Home Office (privy council) should en- 
 able me to speak advisedly. For during that time some of the 
 most trying phases of the Korean problem have presented themselves 
 for solution, and through them all the King has shown a firmness, 
 cheerfulness, and patience, worthy of any ruler of a great nation. 
 Often his language and bearing have indicated much anxiety, but 
 never weakness or anger. It is true that, since Korea’s contact 
 with Western people, dazzled by the 'glitter and novelty of the 
 
cliange, aud encouraged by the smooth words of adventurers and 
 some unscrupulous persons, the government have been led into 
 undertaking impracticable ventures, whose failures have created a 
 reputation for extravagance and fickleness which will perhaps take 
 years of prudence and economy to remove ; but every Asiatic na- 
 tion has had to pass through such an experience, and Korea must 
 liave hers also. After dispatching the ministers to Europe and 
 America against the Imperial protests of China, the King ought 
 not to be longer accused of either fear or a want of firmness of 
 character. His ^lajesty received the protest with that quiet 
 ilignity which had characterized his bearing in other important 
 matters, and after hearing and carefully weighing China’s objec- 
 tions — relying on his rights as expressed in and guaranteed by the 
 treaties as well as by international law — the ministers were order- 
 ed to leave for their respective posts, against the ultimatum of the 
 Peking government, the positive conditions prescribed by the 
 Viceroy as well as in the face of the blustering conduct and diplo- 
 matic antics of Commissioner Yuan, supplemented by the persis- 
 tent eftbrts of a few cowardly Korean officials, whose well beaten 
 track between the palace and the Chinese Legation indicates the char- 
 acter, of their patriotism as well as of their devotion to their King. 
 No, from my own knowledge I should rather say that Ilis Majesty 
 is far too strong a character to suit those whose purposes it serves 
 not to have it so. It must be borne in mind also, that His Majesty 
 luis no Kingdom to gain through an arrogant exhibition of strength 
 of character, but lie has one to lose through an exhibition of weak- 
 ness or fear. The King’s character for universal kindness may 
 have been mistaken for weakness ; even some of his subjects say 
 His Majesty is too kind for the good of the public service. His 
 habits are those of perfect sobriety and industry, and being pro- 
 gressive in his nature he is constantly seeking information which 
 will aid him in directing his subjects into those paths that lead to 
 the higher planes of civilization which have done so much to 
 
30 
 
 humanize and christianize the Western world. Unfortunately in 
 this great work, the King, with a few exceptions stands alone. 
 Those who are in sympathy with Western progress are, as a rule, 
 without influence or following, while those who possess both, ad- 
 here to the tradition of the past with a loyalty worthy of better 
 things. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the King of Korea surely deserves 
 the sympathy and support of all good people. 
 
 Seoul, Korea, 
 
 February Srd, 1888. 
 
 0. N. DENNY. 
 
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