THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 
 
 EEPOET 
 
 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE 
 
 ON TITK OPERATIONS OF THE 
 
 ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 CAUSES OF ITS INACTION AND ILL SUCCESS. 
 
 ITS SEVEEAL CA.MPA.iaiSrS. 
 
 WHY M'CLELLAN WAS REMOVED. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 REMOVAL OF BDRN8IDE. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 PUBLISHED BY THE TRIBUNE ASSOCIATION. 
 1868. 
 
Avery Architectural and Fine Arts Library 
 Gii 1 01 SiaaiourB. Durst Old York Library 
 
An Intensely Interesting Book. 
 
 AMONG THE PINES; 
 
 Or, Down South in Secession Time. 
 
 BY EDMUND KIRKE. 
 
 One of the most graphic and truth-telling volumes which has ever been written 
 of the South and Southern Society. 
 
 One handsome duodecimo volume, over 300 pages, cloth bound, price $1 ; or 
 paper covers, price 75 cents. 
 
 The North American Review, in a twelve-page review of this wonderful work, 
 says : — " The book is not a novel, yet it possesses the attraction of a highly wrought 
 and powerful work of fiction. It has an intense and terrible interest in some parts of 
 its story, and the scenes, incidents, and characters are portrayed with uncommon 
 graphic and dramatic power. Yet the work is not only not a regular novel, but we are 
 assured that there is absolutely nothing fictitious in it, save in the alteration of a few 
 names and dates. * * * A very remarkable book." 
 
 AMONO THE jE=»I3NTE1JS. 
 
 To meet the large and increasing demand for this work, THE TRIBUNE has 
 assumed its publication, and will sell it on the following terms : 
 Single copies, in cloth, 81 ; in paper covers, 75 cents. 
 (Single copies sent by mail, post-paid, on receipt of price.) 
 
 Twenty-five copies, paper covers 50 cents each. 
 
 One hundred copies, paper covers .45 cents each. 
 
 Cash must accompany the order. 
 
 Address THE TRIBUNE, New York. 
 
 SECOND EDITION NOW READY. 
 
 A pamphlet edition of the United States Tax Law, with the Amendments passed 
 at the late session of Congress. It also contains an alphabetical list of articles taxed. 
 
 Beside the law, which is word for word in accordance with the original text, we 
 append to it an Alphabetical Recapitulation of every article taxed, and the amount of 
 the tax levied thereon. This renders it as complete and convenient as it is possible to 
 make it. 
 
 Price 10 cents, post-paid ; $7 per 100 if sent by express ; $8 per 100 if by mail. 
 Address THE TRIBUNE, New York. 
 
THE NEW- YORK TRIBUNE. 
 
 THE NEW- YORK DAILY TRIBUNE 
 
 IS PUBLISHED EVERT MORNING AND EVENING (SUNDAYS EXCEPTED), BY THE 
 
 TRIBUNE ASSOCIATION, 
 
 IN THE TRIBUNE BUILDINGS, 
 
 Cor, of Nassau & Spruce Streets, opposite the City Hall," 
 
 And delivered to City Subscribers at 18 cents j>er week. Mail Subscribers $8 p« 
 annum, in advance ; $4 .'for 6 months." 
 
 THE NEW-YORK WEEKLY TRIBUNE 
 
 A VERY LARGE PAPER FOR THE COUNTRY, 
 
 Is published every Saturday Morning at the low price of $2 per annum, in advance. 
 Three Copies for $5; Five Copies for $8; Ten Copies for $15 ; Twenty Copies to one 
 address (and any larger number at the rate of $1 25 per aim), $25 ; Twenty Copies 
 to address of each subscriber (and any larger number at the rate of $1 50 each), $30. 
 Any person sending us a club of twenty or more will be entitled to an extra copy. 
 Subscriptions to commence at any time. 
 
 Advertisements in the Weekly Tribune cost ONE DOLLAR A LINE for 
 each insertion. Nothing inserted for less than $5. 
 
 THE SEMI- WEEKLY TRIBUNE 
 
 Is published every Tuesday and Friday Morning. Price $3 per annum ; Two Copieu 
 for $5; Five Copies for $12. ' 
 
 THE NEW- YORK TRIBUNE 
 
 FOR EUROPEAN CIRCULATION 
 
 Ii published on the departure of each Mail Steamer for Liverpool at $5 per anntm^ 
 postage included* Single Copies, Five Cents. Address 
 
 THE TRIBUNE ASSOCIATION, 
 
 No. 154 Nassau Street, N. Y, 
 
REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE 
 
 OK 
 
 THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 
 
 Mr. Wade, from the Joint Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War, submitted the following re- 
 port, with the accompanying testimony: 
 
 CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 
 
 In December, 1861, a joint committee of the two 
 houses of Congress, consisting of three members of 
 the Senate and four members of the House of Rep 
 resentatives, was appointed, with instructions to in- 
 quire into the conduct of the present war. 
 
 Tour Committee proceeded to the discharge of the 
 duty devolved upou them, and have labored zeal- 
 ously, and they trust, faithfully, for that purpose. 
 As evidence of that, they would refer to the large 
 mass of testimony taken by them, upon many sub- 
 jects, and herewith reported. 
 
 The subject of inquiry referred to them was one 
 of the utmost importance and magnitude. Upon 
 " the conduct of the present war" depended the 
 issue of the experiment inaugurated by our fathers, 
 after so much expenditure of blood and treasure — 
 the establishment of a natiou founded upon the ca- 
 pacity of man for self-government. The nation was 
 engaged in a coutest for its very existence; a rebel- 
 lion, unparalleled in history, threatened the over- 
 throw of our free institutions, and the most prompt 
 and vigorous measures were demanded by every 
 consideration of honor, patriotism, and a due regard 
 for the prosperity and happiness of the people. 
 
 Your Committee could perceive no necessity for 
 recommending any particular legislation to Con- 
 gress. Its previous course showed that no such re- 
 commendation was required. When Congress met 
 the preceding July, fresh from the people — called 
 upon to provide for the safety of the Government 
 and the maioteuance of the national honor and ex- 
 istence — the representatives of the people gave full 
 evidence that they comprehended the duty devolved 
 upon them, and had the courage and will to fully 
 discharge it. The administration called by the peo- 
 ple to tue head of the Government, in this the most 
 critical period of the nation's history, was more 
 promptly and fully supported tban that of any 
 other Government of wbich history has pre- 
 served any record. The call of the President for 
 money and meu had been more than complied 
 with; no legislation wbich he had deemed 
 necessary had been denied by Congress, and the 
 people had most nobly and generously supported and 
 sustained what their representatives had promised 
 in their name. Tiie same Congress, fresh from their 
 constituents, had again met, and there could be no 
 doubt that, as they had before acted, so would they 
 continue to act. It needs but to re'er to the history 
 of the Congress just closed, it* prompt and thorough 
 action, clothing the Executive with tbe fullest 
 power, placing at his disposal all the resources of 
 men aud money which, this nation possessed, to 
 prove that your Committee judged rightly that Con- 
 
 gress needed no prompting from them to do its en- 
 tire duty. 
 
 Not upon those whose duty it was to provide the 
 means necessary to put down the Rebellion, but 
 upon those whose duty it was to rightfully apply 
 those means, and the agents they employed for that 
 purpose, rested the blame, if any, that the hopes of 
 the nation have not been realized, and its expecta- 
 tions have so long been disapooiuted. 
 
 Your Committee therefore concluded that they 
 would best perform their duty by endeavoring to 
 obtain such information in respect to the conduct of 
 the war as would best enable them to advise what 
 mistakes had been made in the past, and the proper 
 course to be pursued in the future; to obtain such 
 information as the many and laborious duties of the 
 President, and his Cabinet prevented them from ac- 
 quiring, and to lay it before them with such recom- 
 mendations and suggestions as seemed to be most 
 imperatively demanded; and the journal of tue pro- 
 ceedings of your Committee shows that, for a long 
 time, they were in constant communication with the 
 President and his Cabinet, and neglected no oppor- 
 tunity of at once laving before them the information 
 acquired by them in tbe course of their investi- 
 gations. 
 
 Many specific subjects of investigation presented 
 themselves for the consideration ot your Committee, 
 any one of which might well require the action of a 
 committee for itself; and all of which, if lullj in- 
 vestigated, would demand the attention of alt the 
 representatives in Congress. It was apparent from 
 the first that your Committee would be compelled to 
 confine their attention to a few of the more prom- 
 inent subjects of inquiry; to those the investigation 
 of which would best enable them to comprehend 
 the causes and necessity, if any, for the delay and 
 inaction characterizing the operations of our armies 
 in the field. 
 
 And while each of those subjects has received 
 from them the attention whic!i its importance 
 merited, so far as they were able to give it, the at- 
 tention of your Committee has been turned more 
 particularly to the history of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac. In the history of that arm)- is to be found all 
 that is necessary to enable your Committee to report 
 upon " the conduct of the war. ' Had that aimy 
 fulfilled all that a generous and confiding people 
 were justified in expecting from it, this rebellion 
 had long since been crushed, and the blessiugs of 
 peace restored to this nation. The failure of that 
 army to fulfill those expectations has prolonged this 
 contest to the present time, with all its expenditure 
 of hie and treasure, for it has to a great extent neu- 
 tralized, if not entirely destroyed, the legitimate 
 fruits which would otherwise have been reaped 
 from our glorious victories in the Wesst. 
 
 Therefore, while your Committee have not failed 
 to take the testimony of witnesses in relation to mil- 
 itary operations in other parts of the country, and 
 also upon various subjects to which their attention 
 has been specially directed by Congress and the 
 War Department since the Committee was first ap- 
 pointed, the principal part of the testimony taken 
 
 SEYMOUR DURST 
 
by cbem relates to the Army of the Potomac and 
 those subjects more immediately connected with its 
 operations. They have taken the testimony of nearly 
 200 witnesses, almost entirely men in tne military 
 service of the Government, including about 100 
 generals. 
 
 The disaster at Bull Ren in July. 1S61, was fully 
 investigated by your Committee, a6 being the first 
 conflict of the national troops with armed treason 
 upon the field of baU'e; und also because the troops 
 there engaged formed the nucleus aroond which has 
 since been collected the vast aud magnificent Army 
 of the Potomac. The result of then investigation 
 your Committee eubnit in a separate report. 
 
 Your Commttee Lave also investigated the disaster 
 at Ball's Bloff, that battle being the first conflict of 
 any extent in which any of the troops of the army 
 of "the Potomac were engaged after its re-organiza- 
 tioD. A separate report of that disaster is also sub- 
 mitted. 
 
 Immediately upon the organization of your Com- 
 mittee, and before pr o< ceding to the taking of any 
 testimony, they addressed to Gen. McClellan, who", 
 by the retirement of Gen. Scott, had become Gen- 
 eral- in-Chief of the Army, the iollowing communi- 
 cation : 
 
 '• Washington, D. C, Dec. 21, 1861. 
 " Sir: You Bre rware that a Joint Committee has been ap- 
 pointed by the Senate and Kouse of Representatives to in- 
 quire into tUe ' conduct of the war.' Onr Committee, at a 
 mee ting held this moinii-g, uueirimously c xpressad a desire, 
 before proceeding in their official duties, to have an interview 
 with j on at our room at the Capitol, at such time as may suit 
 your convenience, in view of your pressing engagements. 
 
 " Our place of met tit c is tile room of the Committee on 
 Territories of the Sei.stt-. 
 *' I remain, very respec tfully, vour?, 
 
 T 'B. F. WADE, Chairman. 
 * ilsj.-Gen. Geo. F. McClellan. GeLerd Commanding 
 Army United States." 
 
 While fully appreciating the dignity and power 
 with which they were clothed by the concurrent 
 action of both bouses of Congress, they deemed it 
 but ust to award to his position the consideration of 
 asking him to confer with them in relation to the 
 best method of fulfilling those expectations which 
 the people had a right <o hone for from an adminis- 
 tration upon which they bad, through their repre 
 eent&tives, conferred such plenary powers. A refer- 
 ?nae to the journal of yonr committee -will show that 
 ifl-bealth prevented Gen. McClellan from immedi- 
 ately complying with this invitation. The necessi- 
 ties of the case, however, were so preesiug and 
 urgent that your committee concluded to proceed at 
 once to the taking of testimony. 
 
 ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 Soon after the battle of Bull Bun, in July, 1861, 
 Gen. McDowell was superseded, and Gen. McClel- 
 lan was called by the President to the command of 
 the army of the Potomac. The campaign in Western 
 Virginia, the credit of which had been generally 
 ascribed to Gen. McClellan; the favor with which it 
 was understood he was regarded by Gen. Scott, then 
 general-in-chief of the army of the United States; 
 even his comparative youth, holding out the promise 
 of active and rigorous measures; all these considera- 
 tions tended to infuse hope into the public mind, and 
 to remove the gloom and despondency which had 
 followed the disastrous Issue of the campaign just 
 ended. 
 
 Every energy of the Government and all the re- 
 sources of a generous and patriotic people were freely 
 and lavishly placed at thedispoeal of Gen. McClellan 
 to enable him to gather together another army and 
 put it in the most complete state of efficiency, so that 
 offensive operations might be resumed at the earliest 
 practicable" moment. The Army of the Potomac 
 became the object of special care to every depart- 
 ment of the Government, and all other" military 
 movements and organizations were made subordinate 
 to the one great purpose of collecting at Washington, 
 and organizing there, an army which should over- 
 power the forces of the enemy, and forever 
 crush out any hope of success which the 
 liebebj might cherish. Even when the army of 
 
 the Potomac had attained di-nensions never before 
 contemplated ia the course of military operations 
 upon this continent, aud seldom, if ever, equaled in 
 modern times, no portion of its rapidly increasing 
 numbers was permitted to be diverted, even for a 
 brief period, to the accomplishment of other enter- 
 prises. The generals ia charge of the various expe- 
 ditions from time to time inaugurated, and from 
 which so much benefit was anticipated — Gen. But- 
 ler, Gen. Sherman, Gen. Burnside, and others — 
 were compelled to look elsewhere for the troops to 
 compose their commands, to rely upon the continued 
 patriotism of the people, and the zsal of the Execu- 
 tives of the various States for the raising of those 
 regiments which would enable them to depart for 
 the fields of duty assigned to them. No considera- 
 tion was for a moment allowed to diminish or impair 
 the efficiency of the Army of the Potomac, and the 
 unexampled spectacle was presented to other nations, 
 who were intently watching the course of events in 
 this country, of the larges t army of the present cen- 
 tury being raised entirely by voluntary enlistments 
 in the brief period of a tew months. 
 
 When Congress assembled in this city, in the be- 
 ginning of December, 1861, so successful had been 
 the exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had 
 the people responded to their country's call, that the 
 consolidated morning reports, furnished your Com- 
 mittee by the Adjutant General of the aiiny, show- 
 ed that, exclusive of the command of Gen. Dix, at 
 Baltimore, the Army of the Potomac consisted of 
 about 185,000 men. 
 
 During the time this large army had been collect- 
 ing and organizing, nothing of importance had trans- 
 pired in connection with it, except the closing of the 
 navigation of the Potomac by the Kebels, which 
 your Committee treat of more at length in another 
 part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of 
 Ball s Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate 
 report. 
 
 The weather during the Fall season, and for some 
 weeks after the convening of Congress, continued 
 unusually favorable for active military operations. 
 As month after month passed without anything 
 being done by the Army of the Potomac, the people 
 became more and more anxious for the announcement 
 that the work of preparation bad been completed 
 and active operation would soon be commenced. 
 
 From the testimony before your Committee it ap- 
 peared that the Army of the Potomac was well 
 armed and equipped, and had reached a high etate 
 of discipline by the last of September or tjie firBt of 
 October. The men were ready and eager to com- 
 mence active operations. The generals in command 
 of the various divisions were opposed to going into 
 winter quarters, and the most of them declared they 
 had no expectation of doing so. 
 
 CORPS ORGANIZATION. 
 In reference to the proper organization of so large 
 an army as that about Washington, in order that it 
 might be the batter able to act most effectively in 
 the field, the testimony of the witnesses examined 
 upon that poiut is remarkably uuanimous. The 
 generals moat familiar with the subject seemed to 
 regard of the utmost importance ths division of the 
 army into corps d'armee, and that, too, in time for 
 the instruction of the troops in the movements 
 necessary to render such an organization the most 
 effective. Tour Committee deemed it 60 vitally 
 necessary that they repeatedly brought the subject 
 to the attention of the authorities, and urged its 
 immediate adoption with all the arguments in their 
 power. The President and the Secretary of War 
 concurred with them in the necessity of such a 
 measure; but it did not seem to be regarded with 
 much favor by Gen. McClellan. Indeed, Gen. 
 McClellan stated to your Committee, at the time ot 
 their conference with him. that, although it might 
 at some time be expedient to divide the army into 
 army corps, the subject was one of great difficulty. 
 He said it was a delicate matter to appoint major- 
 generals before they had been tried by actual 
 service, and had shown their fitness to 
 
5 
 
 be selected to command 30,000 or 40,000 
 men. A major-general coald not be stowed 
 away in a pigeon-hole, if he should prove iucompe- 
 tent, so easily as a brigadier-general. He proposed, 
 therefore, to himself manage ibis entire army in 
 some battle or campaign, and then Belect from the 
 brigadier-geuerals in it such as prove themselves 
 competent for higher commiuds. Consequently, 
 the divieion of the army into army corps was not 
 even begun uutil after the movement of the army in 
 March had commenced, and then only in pursuance 
 of the direct and repeated orders of the President. 
 
 Gen. McClellan, however, continued to oppose 
 the organization of the army into army corp"s, as 
 will be seen from the following dispatch to him 
 from the Secretary of War, dated May 9, 1862: 
 
 " The President is unwilling to have the army corps organ- 
 ization broken up, but also uuwilling that the commanding 
 general shall be trammeled and enjbana«6ed in actual skir- 
 mishing, collision with the euemy, and on the eve of an ex- 
 pected great battle. You, therefore, may temporarily suspend 
 that orgauizatiou in the army uuder your immediate com- 
 mand, and adopt any you Bee tit, uutil further orders. He also 
 writes you privately." 
 
 The provisional corps of Gen. Fitz-John Porter 
 and Geu. Franklin were thereupon formed by re- 
 ducing the other corps from three to two divisions. 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY. 
 Your Committee endeavored to obtain as accurate 
 information as possible in relation to the strength 
 and position of the enemy in front of Washington. 
 The testimony of tbe officers in our army here upon 
 that point, however, was far from satisfactory. 
 Early in December an order had been issued from 
 headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the 
 front from examining any persons who should come 
 into our lines from toe direction of tbe euemy, but 
 all such persons were to be sent, without examina- 
 tion, to tne headquarters of the army. Restrictions 
 were also placed upon the movements of scouts. 
 The result was, that the Generals examined appeared 
 to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the 
 enemy opposed to them, having only such informa- 
 tion as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. 
 The strength of the enemy was variously estimated 
 at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed 
 the highest estimate based their opinion upon in- 
 formation received at headquarters. As to the 
 strength of the enemy's position, the general im- 
 pression seemed to be founded upon information ob- 
 tained from the same source, that it was exceedingly 
 formidable. Subsequent events have proved that 
 the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of 
 these estimates, and the strength of their fortifica- 
 tions very greatly overestimated. 
 
 DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON. 
 
 Your Committee also sought to ascertain what 
 number of men could be spared from this army for 
 offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the 
 works of the enemy in front were of such a charac- 
 ter that it would not be advisable to move directly 
 upon them. The estimate of the force necessary to 
 be left in and around Washington to act entirely on 
 the defensive, to render tbe capital secure agaiuet 
 any attack of the enemy, as stated bv the witnesses 
 examined upon that poiut, was froin 50.000 to 80,000 
 men, leaving 100,000 or upward that could be used 
 for expeditions at other points. 
 
 In connection with the same subject, your Com- 
 mittee inquired in reference to what had been done 
 to render .the fortifications here, which had been 
 constructed at such expense and with so great labor, 
 most effective for the defense of Washington. Your 
 Committee are constrained to say that adequate 
 provision never was made to properly man those 
 fortifications and exercise men in the management of 
 the guns. Several of the witnesses testified that 
 they had repeatedly called the attention of the 
 authorities to the matter, but without success. And 
 when the movement of the army commenced in 
 March, the lew regiments that had been placed in 
 the forts and partially instructed in the use of the 
 guns, were almost entirely withdrawn, leaving tbe 
 
 fortifications to be manned by raw and inexperienced 
 troops. 
 
 THE BLOCKADE OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The subject of* the obstruction of the navigation 
 of the Potomac naturally demanded the considera- 
 tion of your Committee. Upon that point your 
 Committee would call tbe attention of Congress to 
 the testimony of Capt. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secre- 
 tary of the Navy. Upon reference to his testimony, 
 it will appear that, in J une, 1861, the Navy Depart- 
 ment proposed to the War Department that meas- 
 ures be adopted to take possession of Matthias 
 Point, in order to secure the navigation of the Po- 
 tomac from any danger of being interrupted. From 
 some cause, no steps were then taken for that pur- 
 pose. The subject was again brought to the atten- 
 tion of the War Department by the Navy Depart- 
 ment in the month of August, shortly after the bat- 
 tlb of Bull Run. Nothiug, however, was done at 
 that time in regard to it. 
 
 lu October, 18G1, the Navy Department again 
 urged the matter upon the consideration of the War 
 Department. The Port Royal expedition was then 
 in preparation, and would soon be ready to start. 
 The Navy Department represented that it would be 
 absolutely necessary to send with that expedition, 
 in order to insure its success, the greater portion of 
 the Potomac flotilla, because, being very powerful 
 vessels, of light draught, with their machinery pro- 
 tected, they were better fitted for that service than 
 any other vessels in the possession of the Navy 
 Department; and if anything was to b8 done by 
 them to secure the uninterrupted navigation of the 
 Potomac, it must be done before they left. It was 
 proposed to the President ana the War Department 
 that the gunboats should take and destroy the Rebel 
 batteries which had then begun to make their ap- 
 pearance upon the river, and which even then en- 
 dangered the safety of vessels passing up and down 
 the Potomac. Wnen that had been done, it waa 
 proposed that a sufficient number of troops should be 
 landed at Matthias Point, &c, to intrench them- 
 selves, under the protection of the gunboats, 
 until they should be able, with the assistance of 
 the smaller boats of the Potomac flotilla, to hold 
 their position against any force the enemy would be 
 likely to brmg against them. It was represented 
 that unless some such steps were taken the departure 
 of those vessels upon the Port Royal expedition 
 would be the signal for the closing of the navgation 
 of the Potomac, which representation the result 
 proved to be correct. As was well urged by the Navy 
 Department, the whole question amounted simply to 
 this : Would the army cooperate with the navy in 
 securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, 
 or, by withhoiaing that cooperation at that time, 
 permit so important a channel of communication to 
 be closed. 
 
 WHY IT WAS NOT RAISED. 
 
 After repeated efforts, Gen. McClellan promised 
 that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to 
 proceed down the river. The Navy Department 
 provided the necessary transports for the troops, and 
 Capt. Craven, commanding the Potomac flotilla, 
 upon being notified to that effect, collected at 
 Mathias Point all the boats of his flotilla at the time 
 named. The troops did not arrive, and the Navy 
 Department was informed of the fact by Capt. 
 Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring 
 of Gen. McClellan why the troops had not been sent 
 according to agreement, was informed by him that 
 his engineers were of the opinion that so large a 
 body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he 
 had" concluded not to send them. Capt. Fox replied 
 that the landing of the troops was a matter of which 
 the Navy Department had charge ; that they had 
 provided the necessary means to accomplish the land- 
 ing successfully; that no inquiry had been made of 
 them in regard to that matter, and no notification 
 that the troops were not to be sent. 
 
 It was then agreed that the troops should be Bent 
 tbe next night. Capt. Craven waa again notified, 
 
6 
 
 and again had bis flotilla in readiness for the arrival 
 of the troops. But no troops were sent down at 
 that time, nor were any ever sent down for that 
 purpose. 
 
 Capt. Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the Com- 
 mittee as to what reason was assigned for not send- 
 ing the troops according to the second agreement, re- 
 plied that the only reason, so far as he could ascer- 
 tain, was, that Gen. McClellan feared it might bring 
 on a general engagement. 
 
 The President , who had united with the Navy De- 
 partment in urging their proposition, first upon Gen. 
 Scott and then upon Gen. McClellan, manifested 
 great disappointment when he learned that the plan 
 had failed in consequence of the troops not being 
 sent. And Capt. Craven threw up his command on 
 the Potomac and applied to be sent to sea, saying 
 that, by remaining here and doing nothing, he was 
 but losing his own reputation, as the blame for per- 
 mitting the Potomac to be blockaded would be im- 
 puted to him and the flotilla under his command. 
 
 Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy De- 
 
 {mrtinent the effec ive vessels of the Potomac flotilla 
 eft upon the Port Koyal expedition. The navi- 
 gation of the river was almost immediately there- 
 after closed, and remained closed until the Rebels 
 voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March 
 following, no steps having been taken, in tne mean- 
 time, for reopening communication by that route. 
 
 ORDERS TO MOVE. 
 On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of 
 the United States, as Commander-in-Chief of the 
 Army and Navy, issued orders for a geueial niove- 
 mt>nt of all the armies of the United States, one re- 
 sult of which was the series of victories at Port 
 Henry, Fort Donelson, &c, which 60 electrified the 
 country and revived tue hopes of every loyal man 
 in the Lnd. 
 
 LINE OF OPERATIONS. 
 After this long period of inactioa of the Army of 
 the Potomac the Presideut of the United States, on 
 the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following 
 order : 
 
 " Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 31, 1362.' 
 " President's Special War Order .No. 1. 
 
 " Ordered, that ah the disposable force of the Army of the 
 Potomac, alter providing saiely for the defense of Washing- 
 ton, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of 
 seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad soutuwest- 
 ward of what is know n as Manassas Junction ; ah details to 
 be in the discretion of the General-in-Chief, and tno ex- 
 pedition to move before or on tlit, 22d day of February next. 
 
 " ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 
 
 To this order Gen. McClellan wrote an elaborate 
 reply of the same date, objecting to tne plan theitin 
 indicated as involving " the error of dividing our 
 army by a very difficult obstacle (the Occoquan) 
 and by a distauce too fc.reat to enable the two por- 
 tions to support each other, should either be at- 
 tacked by tne masses of tne enemy, while the other 
 is held iu check.'' He then proceeded to argue in 
 favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock 
 or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to tne 
 Rappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would 
 be required to provide the necessary means of trans- 
 portation. He stated that he regarded "success as 
 certain, by all the chances of war," by the route he 
 proposed, while it was " by no meaus certain that 
 we can oeat them [the enemy] at Manassas." 
 
 To this the Presideut made the following reply: 
 "Executive Mansion, Washington, Feb. 3, 1862. 
 
 "My Dear Sib: You and I have distinct and different 
 plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to 
 be down the Chesapeake, up tiie Rappahannock to Urbanna, 
 and across laud to the terminus of the railroad on York River; 
 mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest 
 of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory auswers to the 
 following questions 1 shill gladly }ield my plan to yours: 
 
 " 1. Does not your plin involve a greatly larger expenditure 
 of time and m niey than mil e 1 
 
 " 2. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than 
 mine? 
 
 " 3. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than 
 mine ? 
 
 "4. In fact, would i: not be less valuable in this, that it 
 would brean no great line of the enemy's communication, 
 while mine would? 
 
 " 5. In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be mor« 
 difficult by your plan than by mine ? 
 
 " Yours, truly, " A LINCOLN. 
 
 " Major-Gen. McClellan." 
 
 Your Committee have no evidence, either oral or 
 documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the 
 arguments that were submitted to the consideration 
 of the President that led him to relinquish his own 
 line of operations and consent to the one proposed 
 by Gen. McClellan, except the result of a council of 
 war, held iu February, 1862. That council — the 
 first, so far as your Committee have been able to 
 ascertain, ever balled by Gen. McClellan, and then 
 by the direction of the President— was composed of 
 twelve generalp, as follows: McDowell, Sumner, 
 Heintzelman, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, 
 W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, 
 Barnard, and Naglee (from Gen. Hooker's Division). 
 
 To them w T as submitted the question whether they 
 would indorse the line of operations which Gen. 
 McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the de- 
 liberation was a vote of eight to four in favor- 
 of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence 
 down the Chesapeake Bay, up the Rappahannock, 
 landing at Urbanna, and across the country to Rich- 
 mond. The four Generals who voted against the 
 proposed movement were Gens. McDowell, Sumner, 
 Heintzelman and Barnard. Gen. Keyes voted for 
 it with the qualification that no change should be 
 made until the enemy were driven from their batte- 
 ries on the Potomac. 
 
 At this point it may be well to consider the prin- 
 cipal arguments for and against the movement upon 
 Richmond direct from Washington, and the move- 
 ment by way of the Lower Chesapeake, including 
 that first proposed by way of the* Rappahannock 
 river, and the one fiually adopted by way of For- 
 tress Monroe and the peninsula. 
 
 In expressing opinions upon this and other sub- 
 jects relating more immediately to military opera- 
 tions in the field, your Committee do not undertake 
 to form and express opinions of their own, but 
 content themselves witn setting forth those ex- 
 pressed in their testimony by military men whose 
 education and experience entitle them to speak con- 
 fidently upon those subjects pertaining to their pro- 
 fession. 
 
 WHY THE DIRECT ROUTE WAS BEST. 
 The arguments in favor of the direct and against 
 the lower route to Richmond were many and 
 weighty. Some of them are most tersely expressed 
 in the letter of the President to Gen. McClellan, of 
 February 3, 1862, before referred to. Beside those, 
 the direct movement enabled the largest amount of 
 tioops to operate actively iu the field, as the army 
 in its movement immediately covered Washington, 
 and thereby rendered the presence of a larae foice 
 here unnecessary. By the adoption of the lower 
 route a division of the army was rendered impera- 
 tive, in order to provide for the safety of the Capital 
 against any attack from the enemy. Thus, to use 
 the language of Gen. McClellan himseif, in refer- 
 ence to the movement proposed against the enemy 
 while at Manassas, " committing the error of divid- 
 ing our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a 
 distance too great to enable the two portions to sup- 
 port each other, should either be attacked by tue 
 masses of the enemy while the other is held in 
 check." 
 
 , Tne army in moving direct from Washington 
 avoided all the delays and disorder consequent upon 
 the embarkation aad disembarkation of so large a 
 force with all its materiel. And by investing Rich- 
 mond on the north and north-west, we cut them off 
 from one of their great sources of supply, the Shen- 
 andoah Valley, and at the same time prevented their 
 raids through that region of couutry, which so par- 
 alyzed all efforts to send the few troops left in 
 Washington to the assistance of the army on the 
 peninsula. 
 
 Gen. McClellan states in his testimony that by 
 adopting the route by way of Annapolis and the 
 Rappahannock, he hoped, if proper eecreey was pre- 
 
7 
 
 served, to he able to reach the vicinity of Richmond 
 before the Rebel army at Manassis could be concen- 
 trated there for its defense. Whatever probability 
 there may have beeu for the realization of such a 
 hope at the time the Rappahanuock route was de- 
 cided upon, it was entirely removed when the enemy 
 evacuated Manassas, before any actual movement 
 was made by our army. And Gen. McClellan at 
 once relinquished the Rappahannock route, and de- 
 cided, with the concurrence of his corps command- 
 ers, to g) by way of Yorktown and the peninsula. 
 
 Que great objection to the peninsula, route, as in- 
 dicated by the testimony of all the witnesst-s who 
 testify upon that point, including Gen. McClellan 
 himself, was the to'al want of information in refer- 
 ence to the nature of the country there, the kind and 
 condition of the roads, the preparations for defense, 
 &c. The difficulties and embarrassments our army 
 labored under from the begiuniug of that campaign, 
 from that want of information, are very evident 
 from the testimony. 
 
 DECISION OF THE COUNCIL. 
 The decision of the couucil of twelve Generals in 
 February was to move by way of Annapolis and 
 thence to the Rappahannock. The question of 
 reopeniug the navigation of the Potomac, 
 by driving tne enemy from their batteries 
 upon the river, was discussed. It was, however, 
 finally decided that the enemy should be left in pos- 
 session of their batteries, and the movement should 
 be made without disturbing them. This is proven 
 by the testimony, and also by the second paragraph 
 
 •of the order of the President, dated March 8, 1862, 
 
 .as follows: 
 
 "Executive Mansion, March 8, 1862. 
 " President's General War Order No. 3. 
 
 u Ordered, That no change of the b<tse of operations of the 
 Army of the i'o'.omac sha:l bo male without leaviug in and 
 about Washington such a force as, in thu opinion of the Gene- 
 ral-m-Ctiiet aud the Commanders of all the A/my Corps, shall 
 leave thf "aid city entirely seoure. 
 
 " That no more than two Army Corps (about fifty thousand 
 troops) ot said Army ot the i'o'oin.ic snail be moved en route 
 for a new base of operations until the navigation of the I'oto- 
 macfroui Washington to the Chesapeake liay shall b& freed 
 from the enemy's ba teries and Other obstructions, or until the 
 President shall hereafter give express permission. 
 
 "That any moveinnt aforesaid en route tor anew base oi 
 opera ions, which ui*y be ordered by the General-in-Chief, 
 end which may be intended to move upon the Chtsapeake 
 Hay, shall begin to move upon the B*y as early as the 18th 
 March insl., and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible 
 that it so move a3 early as that day. 
 
 " Ordeied, Tnat tbo Army ana Navy co-operate in an im- 
 mediate etl >it to crpture the enemy's batteries upon the 
 Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay. 
 
 " ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
 
 " L. Thomas, Adjt.-Gen." 
 
 Before the movement by way of Annapolis could 
 he t-xecuted, the enemy abandoned their batteries 
 upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at 
 Centre ville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the 
 Rappahannock. 
 
 MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY. 
 
 When Gen. McUiellan, then in the City of Wash- 
 ington, he>:rd th \t the enemy had evacuated Manas- 
 sas, he proceeded across the river aud ordered a 
 general movement of the wholo army in the direc- 
 tion of the position lately occupied <>y the euemy. 
 The army moved on the niornnig of the 10th of 
 March, the greater part of ir. proceeding no further 
 than . Fairfax Court-iimse. A small force of the 
 army proceeded to Manassas aud beyond to the line 
 of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the euemy 
 had retired beyond tnat ri/er and destroyed tne rail- 
 road bridge across it. 
 
 On the 1Mb of March Gen. McClellan ordered, by 
 telegraph, the transports from Annapolis to Wash- 
 ington (Alexandria /), to embavk the army trom 
 there, and informed the Department that ne pro- 
 posed to occupy Manassas with a portion of Gen. 
 Banks's command, and throw all the force he could 
 Concentrate upon the line previouhly determined 
 Upon. Subseauent events in the vailey of the Shen- 
 andoah, tevniinaling, for a time, in the battle of 
 Winchester of M*rcb 23, prevented the force under 
 Gen. Banks from leaving tnat valley. 
 
 ANOTHER COUNCIL. 
 On the 13th of March Gen. McClellan convened at 
 Fairfax Court-Uouae a couu il of war, consisting of 
 four of the five commanders of army corps (Gen. 
 Banks being absent), and informed them that he 
 proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way 
 of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead 
 a plan of movement by way of York and James 
 Rivers. The result of the deliberations of that coun- 
 cil was as follows: 
 
 H BA DCJTTARTHRS ARMT OP TH K FoTOMAC, ) 
 
 Fairfax Court-Housr, March 13, 1862. 5 
 " A council of the Generals commanding army corps at the 
 headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the 
 opinion: 
 
 l ' First : That the enemy, having retreated from Manassas 
 to Gordonsville. behind the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, 
 it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that 
 the operations to be oarried on will be best undertaken from 
 Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers, upon 
 Richmond; provided, fir^t, that th<5 enemy's'vessel, the Mer- 
 limac, can b« neutralized ; second, the means of tranportation 
 sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new 
 base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move 
 down the Potomac; third, that a naval auxiliary force can be 
 had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries in 
 York River; fourth, that the force to be left to cover Wash- 
 ington shall be such as to give an entire feelins of security for 
 its sifety from menace. Uuauimous. 
 
 " Second: If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then 
 be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the 
 earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing 
 bridges, repairine railroads, and stocking them with material 
 sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected 
 for ooth the Orange and Alexandria and the Acquia and Rich- 
 mond Railroads. Unanimous. 
 
 "Note — That with the forts on the right bank of the Po- 
 tomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occu- 
 pied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 
 men would suffice, (Keyes, Heintzeiman and McDowell.) A 
 total of 40,01)0 men for the defense of the city would suffice, 
 (Sumner.)" 
 
 The same day Gen. McClellan informed the War 
 Department that "the Council of Commanders of 
 Army Corps have unanimously agreed upon a plan 
 of operations, and Gen. McDowell will at once pro- 
 ceed with it to Washington and lay it before you." 
 
 To this the Secretary of War replied: "What- 
 ever plan has been agreed upon proceed at once to 
 execute, without losing an hour for my approval." 
 THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS. 
 
 The plan of operations was submitted to the Presi- 
 dent on the same day, and he approved the same; 
 but gave the following directions as to its execution: 
 
 " First: Leave such force at Manassas junction as shall 
 make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess 
 himself of that position and line of communication. 
 
 " Sec' nd : Leave Washington secure. 
 
 " Tliird : Move, the remainder of the force down the Poto- 
 mac, choosing a naw base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere 
 between here and there; or, at all events, move such re- 
 mainder of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by some 
 route." 
 
 EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY. 
 The army was directed to return to Alexandria to 
 be embarked for the peninsula; previous to their 
 embarkation all the corps to he concentrated upon 
 the division nearest Alexandria. The transporta- 
 tion not proving sufficient for immediate embarka- 
 tion, the troops were, for several days, exposed to 
 the rains which then set in, being deprived of their 
 former camping accommodations, although, in many 
 instances, not far distant from them, baying only 
 shelter tents to protect them from the iaclemency of 
 the weather. 
 
 To Gen. McDowell was at first assigned the ad- 
 vance ot the expedition. Bat when it was found 
 that there was not transportation enough to emoark 
 at once his satire corps, he consented, in order to 
 utii ze what \yas there, to allow his troops to remain 
 until such time as they eould be moved together, 
 with the understanding that the troops preceding 
 him should not operate upon bis proposed field of 
 labor. The result, however, was, that the corps of 
 Gen. McDowell was put off till the last, which, in 
 pursuance of subsequent orders, led to his corps 
 being retained here ior the defense of Washington. 
 
 HOW WASHINGTON WAS LEFT UNDEFENDED. 
 
 By reference to the President's general war order, 
 No .3 of March 3, 1862, it will be seen that no 
 
ft 
 
 change of base of operations of the army of the Po- 
 tomac was to be made without leaving in and about 
 Washington such a force as in the opinion not only 
 of Gen. McClellan, but of '*tbe commauders of all 
 the army corps," \va6 sufficient to render the capital 
 entirely secure. And by reference to the report of 
 the council of war held at Fairfax Coart- House, on 
 the 13th of March. 1862, consisting of Gens. McDow- 
 ell, Sumner, Heinizelman, and Keyes, it will be 
 seen that three members of that council deemed 
 necessary for the safety of Washington " that the 
 forts on the right bant of the Potomac should be 
 fully garrisoned; those on the left bank occupied, 
 and a covering force of 25,000 men." The other 
 General (Sumner) deemed 40,000 men in all sufficient. 
 
 Notwithstanding this order of the President, and 
 the decision of the council, when Gen. McClellan 
 himself lefjp Alexandria for the peninsula, he sent 
 back orders, without conference with the command- 
 ers of corps, for all the corps of the Army of the Po- 
 tomac, but that of Gen. Ba?iks, to embark at once 
 for the peninsula. Just orevious to leaving, Gen. 
 McClellan addressed the following communication to 
 the Adjutant- General of the army : 
 
 " Headquarters Army of thb Potomac, ~> 
 " Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. * 
 
 " General: I have to request that you will lay the follow- 
 ing recommendation before the Honorable Secretary of War: 
 
 "The approximate nurnbers^and positions left near and in 
 rear ot the Army of the Potomac are about as follows: 
 
 " Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his 
 charge, Bufficreut troops to give him 5.000 for the defense of 
 Baltimore, and 1,988 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapo- 
 lis, &.c. Fort Delaware is jvery well garrisoned by about 400 
 men. 
 
 *' The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 
 10.000 meD ; other disposable troops, with Gen. WadBworth, 
 beirg about 11,400. 
 
 "The troops employed in guarding the railways in Mary- 
 land amount to some 3,359 men. Those it is designed to re- 
 lieve, being old reziments. by dismounted cavalry, and to send 
 them forward to Manassa9. 
 
 " Gen. Abercoaibie occupies Warrenton with a force which, 
 including Col. Geary at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at 
 his disposal, will amount to some 7,730 men, with 12 pieces of 
 artillery. 
 
 " I have the honor to request that all the troops organized 
 for service in Pennsylvania aDd in New-York, and in many of 
 the Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. 1 learn 
 from Gov. Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in 
 Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent at 
 once to ManasBas. Four thousand men from Gen. Wads- 
 worth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with 
 the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force, 
 under Gen. Abercombie, to something like 18,639. 
 
 " It is my design to push Gen. blenker's division from 
 Warrentoa upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg, 
 too, to allow matters to assume a dehnite form in that region 
 beforo proceeding to his ultimate destination. 
 
 " The troops in the Valley of the Shenandoah will thus be, 
 including Blenker's division, 10.1.28 strong, with 24 pieces of 
 artillery. Bauks's filth corps, which embraces Gen. Shields's, 
 19,687 strong, with 41 guns; some 3,652 disposable cavalry, 
 and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men, amount to about 
 35,157 men. 
 
 : * It is designed to relieve Gen. Hooker by some regiment 
 — say 850 men, leaving, with 500 cavalry, 1,350 men "on tiie 
 Lower Potomac. 
 " To recapitulate: 
 
 " At Warrenton there is to be 7,780 men. 
 
 At Manassas there is to be 10.859 men. 
 
 " In the Valley of the Shenandoah 35.467 men. 
 
 " On the Lower Potomac 1.350 men. 
 
 " In all 54,456 men. 
 
 " There will thus be left for the garrisons snd the front of 
 Washington, under Gen. vVadsworth, 18,000 men, exclusive 
 of the batteries under instruction. 
 
 " The troops organizing, or ready for service in New-York, 
 I learn will probably number more than 4,000. These should 
 be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition where 
 most needed. 1 am, very respectfully, vour obedient servant, 
 
 "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major-Gen. Commanding. 
 
 " Brig-Gen. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. Army." 
 
 This statement, to use the expression of one of the 
 witnesses, was ''very indefinite." Gen. Wads- 
 worth, who had been ordered to take charge of the 
 defenses of Washington, upon learning the disposi- 
 tions of troops proposed by Gen. McClellan, and 
 feeling the great importance of the trust committed 
 to his charge, and the total inadequacy of the means 
 provided him for that purpose, addressed to the Sec- 
 retary of War the following communication: 
 
 " HEADQTJARTER8 MILITARY DISTRICT OF WACHINGTOK, ) 
 
 " Washington. D. C, April 2, 1862 5 
 " Sir: I have the honor to submit the following condensed 
 statements of the forces left under my command for the de- 
 fenses of Washington: 
 
 Infant-y 15,335 
 
 Artillery 4,294 
 
 Cavalry, six companies only mounted, '84« 
 
 Total 20,477 
 
 Deduct sick and hi arrest and eonfinemeat 1,455 
 
 Total present for duty 19,022 
 
 "I have no mounted light artillery under my command. 
 " Several companies of the reserve artillery of the Army of 
 
 the Potomac are still here, but not under my command or fit 
 
 tor service. 
 
 " From this force I am ordered by Gen. McClellan to detail 
 two regiments (good one9) to join Richardson's division 
 (Sumner's corps) as it paBses through Alexandria ; one regi- 
 ment to replace the 37th New-York Volunteers in Heintzel- 
 man's old division ; one regiment to relieve a regiment of 
 Hooker's division at Budd'a ferry — total, 4 regiments. 
 
 " I am further ordered tbis morning by telegraph to send 
 4,000 men to relieve Gen. Sumner at Manassas and Warren- 
 ton, that he may embark forthwith. 
 
 " In regard to the character and efficiency of the troops under 
 my command, I have to state that nearly all the force it new 
 anfl imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are 
 in a very disorganized condition from various causes, which 
 it is not necessary to state here; several regiments having 
 been relieved from brigades, which have gone into the field, 
 in consequence of their unfitness for service— the best regi- 
 ments remaining having been selected to take their place. 
 
 " Two heavy arillery regiments, and one infantry regi- 
 ment, which had been drilled for some months iu artillery 
 service, have been withdrawn from the forts on the south side 
 of the Potomac, and I have only been able to fill their places 
 with very new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted 
 with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their 
 pre.-ent position. 
 
 " I am not informed a? to the position which Major-Gen. 
 Banks is directed to take ; but at this time he is, as 1 under- 
 stand, on the other side of the Bull Run mountains, leaving 
 my command to cover the front, from the Manassas Gap 
 (about 20 miles beyond Manassas) to Acquia Creek. 
 
 " I deem it my duty to state that, looking at the numerical 
 strength aud character of the force under my command, it is 
 in my judgment entirely inadequate to, and unfit for, the im- 
 portant duty to which it is assigned. I regard it very im- 
 probable that the enemy will assail us at thi* point, but thie 
 belief is based upon the hope that they may be promptly en- 
 gaged elsewhere, and may not learn the number and the char- 
 acter of tae force left here. 
 
 " I have the honor to be vonr obedient servant, 
 " JAS. S. WADSWORTH, 
 
 " Brig.-Gen. and Military Governor. 
 
 " Hon. Secretary op War." 
 
 Those communications were brought to the con- 
 sideration of the President by the Secretary of War. 
 The subject was at once referred to the Adjutant- 
 General of the Army, and Major-Gen. E. A. Hitch- 
 cock, with instructions to report at once whether 
 the orders of the President had been complied with. 
 
 Their report is as follows: 
 
 " Washington. D. C, April 2, 1862—7:40 o'clock. 
 
 " In compliance with your instructions, I bava examined 
 the papers submitted to me, and have the honor to make the 
 followir.g report: 
 
 " First: The President's war order, No. 3, dated March 8, 
 requires that on taking up any new base ot operations, the 
 City of Washington snail be left entirely secure. The other 
 points of the order it is unnecessary to consider, as the 
 enemy, since its date, have abandoned their positions and 
 batteries on the Potomac, and retired behind the Rappa- 
 hannock. 
 
 " Seco?id : The council cf general officers held at Fairfax 
 Court-House, March 13, took place after the enemy had 
 retired from Manassas and destroyed the railroad in their 
 rear. The council decided unanimously to take up a new 
 ba?e of operations from Fort Monroe, and three of the gen- 
 erals—a majority — decided that the force necessary to be 
 left should be sufficient to fully garrison the forts on the right 
 bank of the Potomac, and 'to occupy' those on the left 
 bank, with a covering force of 25,000. It is. we thiuk, the 
 judgment of officers, that some 30,000 men would be necessary 
 thus to man these forts, which, with the number of the cover- 
 ing force, would rr ake a total of 55,000. 
 
 •'Third: The President's directions of March 13 to Gen. 
 McClellan direct, first, to leave such a force at Manassas 
 Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy 
 may not repossess it ; second, that W ashington shall be left 
 entirely secure; third, that the remainder of tne army move 
 down the Potomac, or move in pursuit of the enemy. In 
 regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have 
 destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to a* snme 
 that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation 
 of their late position, and therefore no very large force would 
 be necessary to hold that position. 
 
 "Fourth: Major-General McClellan's report to the Adju- 
 tant-General, of April 1, after giving the several positions #f 
 the troops proposed to be left for the defense of Washington, 
 

 
 gives a representation as follows: At Warreuton there is 
 to be 7,7<i0; at Manatsaa, siy, 10,059; iu the valley of 
 the Shenandoah, 33,467; on the Lower Potomac, 
 1,350. Total in all, 55,150. And there would 
 be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under 
 Gen. VVadsworth, some 18,000. In the above enumeration, 
 Gen. Banks's Army Corps ia included ; but whether this corps, 
 operating in the Shenandoah Valley, should be regarded a* a 
 part of tiie force available for the protection of the imme- 
 diate front of Washington, the undersigned express no 
 opinion. 
 
 " Fifth: Gen. Wadsworth's roport of April 2d gives his 
 force as follows: infantry, 15,335; artillery, 4,491; civalry, 
 858 — six coruniuies only being mounted, Total, 20,477. 
 
 " Deduct sick, in arrest and confinement, 1,455. Total for 
 duty, 19.022. 
 
 "From this force Gen. Wadsworth is directed to detach 
 two good regiments to Richardson's division, Sumner's corps, 
 which should be deducted from his command, one regiment 
 to reptece the 37th New- York, in Heintzelmm's old division, 
 and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's 
 Ferry — total, four regiment*. 
 
 " It is also ordered to send 4,000 men to relieve Sumner at 
 Manassas and Warreuton. Gen. Wadsworth represents that 
 he ha* no mounted light artillery under bis command ; states 
 that there were several companies of reserve artillery still 
 here, but not under his command, or fit for service. 
 
 " Gen. Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force 
 is new and imperfectly disciplined ; that several of the regi- 
 ments are in a very disorganized condition, some of them hav- 
 ing been relieved from brigades which have gone into the 
 field, in consequence of their unfitness for service, the best 
 regiments remaining having been selected to take their place ; 
 two heavy artillery regiments and one infautry regiment, 
 which had been drilled for months in artillery service, having 
 been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Poto- 
 mac, and their places supplied with new infantry regiments, 
 entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of lit- 
 tle or no value in their present position. If there was need 
 of a military force for the safety of the City of Washington 
 within its own limits, that referred to in the report of Gen. 
 Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate. 
 
 "In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the 
 commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the de- 
 fense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the 
 force represented by Gen. McClellan as left for that purpose, 
 we are of the opinion that the requirements of the President, 
 that the city shall be left 'entirely secure.' not only in the 
 opiuion of the geueral-in-chief, but that of the ' commanders 
 of the army corps ' also, has not been fully complied with. 
 
 " All of which is respectfully submitted. 
 
 •' L. THOMAS, Adjt.-Gen. 
 
 " E. A. HITCHCOCK, Msj.-Gen. U. S. A." 
 
 THE .PRESIDENT PROTECTS THE CAPITAL. 
 The day after this report was written, the Presi- 
 dent directed the Secretary of War to order one corps 
 of ihe Army of the Potomac to remain in front of 
 Washington until further orders. The corps of Gen. 
 McDowell, being the only corps remaiuiug intact 
 here, was selected to remain, without the knowledge 
 of Gen. McDowell, he being engaged, at the time of 
 receiving this order, in making preparations to im- 
 mediately follow the rest of the army to the penin- 
 sula. 
 
 THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Gen. Heintzelman, v^o commanded the first 
 troops of the army of the Potomac that landed on the 
 peninsula, arrived at Portress Monroe on the 23d of 
 March, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas. 
 He had orders to encamp as near Portress Monroe 
 as possible, in order that the enemy should have no 
 idea of the direction iu which the army was to 
 move, whether toward Yorktown or Norfolk. Gen. 
 Heintzelman states that shortly after landing he ob- 
 tained information that the enemy had not more 
 than 10,000 troops at Yorktown and on the Peninsu- 
 la, and is satisfied that he could have advanced and 
 isolated Yorktown, in which case there would have 
 been no serious obstacle in the way of proceeding di- 
 rectly to Richmond. On the 27th of March be sent 
 out reconnoitering parties as far as Big Bethel and 
 Watt's Creek, and went near the Half way House, 
 where about 400 of the enemy, and a little* artillery 
 were seen. He telegraphed to Gen. McCieliau what 
 he was doing, aud received a dispatch, in reply, that 
 he (Gen. McClellan) hoped that nothing had been 
 done to <jive the enemy information of the line of 
 operations of the army. The reconnoissauce was 
 then withdrawn. 
 
 Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe, 
 and on the 2d of Aprh Gen. McClellan himself ar- 
 rived. On the 4th of April the army commenced its 
 movement in the direction of Yorktown, and on the 
 
 5th appeared before the enemy's lines. Gen. ? Mc- 
 Clellan states that he moved from Portress Monroe 
 sooner than he otherwise would have done, upon 
 hearing that the enemy were sending down re-en- 
 forcements. 
 
 DELAY BEFORE YORKTOWN. 
 All the testimony goes to prove tint when our 
 troops first landed on the Peninsula the force of the 
 enemy there consisted of Magruder's command, vari- 
 ously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except 
 by Gen. McClellan, who estimates it from 15,00 J to 
 20,000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, United States 
 Senator from Virginia — then living within the Rebel 
 lines, near Williamsburg — testifies that the Rebels 
 did not determine to re-enforce Magruder until it 
 was apparent that our forces intended to stop be- 
 fore Yorktown and commence a regular siege of the 
 place. It is now evident, whatever may have been 
 the opinion of our officers at the time, tbat our forces, 
 when they first appeared before Yorktown, could 
 have pierced the line of works across Ike Peninsula 
 there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown, 
 and cutting off re-enforcements, when theplace must 
 have fallen in a very short time. Some of oar Gene- 
 rals expected and desired that that should be done. 
 Gen. Heintzelman forwarded to Gen. McClelUn the 
 application of Gen. Hamilton, commanding a divi- 
 sion, for permission to force the enemy's lines. No 
 answer was received to the application. 
 
 HOW MANY TROOPS M'CLELLAX HAD. 
 Instead ol that, however, a siege was determined 
 upon, contrary to the desire of the President, who, 
 as early as the 9th of April, wrote to Gen. McClel- 
 lan as follows: 
 
 "There is a curious mystery about the number of troops 
 now with you. I telegraphed you on the 6th, urging that you 
 had over 100,000 with jou. I had just obtained from the Sec- 
 retary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own 
 returns, making 103,000 then with you and euMroute to you. 
 You now say that you will have not 85,000, when all en route 
 to you shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 
 25,000 be accounted for ? As to Geu. Wool's command, I un- 
 derstand it is doiog for yoa precisely what a like number of 
 your own would have to do if that command was away. 
 
 " I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to yoo 
 is with you by this time, and if so, I thiuK. it is the precise 
 time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will 
 steadily gain on you— that is, he will gain faster by fortifica- 
 tions and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcementa 
 alone. 
 
 " And, once more, let me tell you it is iadispensable to you 
 that you strike a biow. I am powerless" to help this. 
 You will do me the justice to remember I always wished not 
 going down tiae bay iu search of a field, instead of fighting at 
 or near Manassas, as only shifting aud not surmounting a dif- 
 ficulty ; that we should find the same enemy and the same or 
 equal intrenchmeuts at either place. The country willnot fail 
 to note — is noting now — that the present hesitation to move 
 upon an intrenched position is but the story of Manassas re- 
 peated." 
 
 And the repetition was made complete nearly a 
 month later, when the euemy, in the face of a su- 
 perior force, evacuated their works without loss and 
 without the knowledge of the general commanding 
 our army. 
 
 M'CLELLAN WANTS MORE TROOPS. 
 Gen. McClellan, however, did not deem his forces 
 sufficient, and objected very strongly to the order of 
 the President detaching MeDoweli's corps for the 
 defense of Washington, as " imperiling tne success 
 of our cause." He called again and again for re- 
 enforcements, asking for Franklin's and McCail's 
 Divisions of McDowell's corps, to be under com- 
 mand of Franklin ; insisting tnat Franklin's Divis- 
 ion, at least, should be sent to him. On the 11th 
 of April Franklin's Division was ordered to Alex- 
 andria to embark for Fort Monroe. On the 14th, 
 Gen. Franklin reported to Gen. McClellan near 
 Yorktown, but his troops remained on board the 
 transports until after the enemy evacuated the place, 
 when they were ordered to West Point. 
 
 HE WANTS TRANSPORTATION. 
 On the 6th of April Gen. McClellan telegraphed 
 to the President, " I have by no means the trans- 
 portation I must have to move my army even a few 
 miles; " and asks that all his orders for wagon trains, 
 
10 
 
 &c, may at once be complied with. Ail "was sent 
 to him as desired, until even Gen. McDowell found 
 himself so stripped of the transportation designed 
 for his corps, that when he moved to Fredericksburg 
 it was with the greatest difficulty he could move 
 supplies for his small force from Acquia to Falmouth 
 until the railroad was completed. 
 
 A month was spent before Yorktown-, our army, 
 in the opinion of come of our ablest officers, becom- 
 ing more demoralized by the labors of a long siege 
 than it would have been even by an unsuccessful 
 assault. 
 
 The returns in the Adjntant-Geueral's office, 
 signed by Gen. McClellan and his Adjutant-General, 
 show that on the 30th of April, 1862, the forces on 
 the Peninsula under Gen. McClellan amounted to 
 112,392 present for duty. 
 
 HE WANTS GUNS. 
 
 On the 1st of May the President telegraphs to 
 Gen. McClellan: "Your call for Parrott guns from 
 Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argnes in- 
 definite procrastination. Is anything to be done?" 
 YORKTOWN EVACUATED — M'CLELLAN CHA- 
 GRINED. 
 
 On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th 
 of May, the enemy evacuated Yorktown without 
 loss. One of the witnesses testifies that Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan was very much chagrined and mortified at 
 the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to 
 open from Lis latteries on Monday, the 5th of May. 
 PURSUIT OF THE REBELS. 
 
 The evacuation was discovered by day light on the 
 morning of the 4th. Between 10 and 11 o'clock, 
 Gen. Stoneman, with the cavalry and sotte Jight 
 horse artillery, started in pursuit. About 1 o'clock, 
 Gen. Hooker, with his division, le« r t Yorktown, with 
 orders to bupport Gen. Stoneman. Gens. Sumner, 
 Heiutzelmau and Keyes also moved out during the 
 day, with the whole or portions of their corps. 
 About five miles from Yorktown the division of Gen. 
 Hooker was delayed for some time in consequence of 
 other troops, couiing from another direction, getting 
 into the road before him. 
 
 In the meantime Gen. Stoneman had overtaken 
 the rear of the enemy with his cavalry, and followed 
 them up closely, keeping up a running fire all the 
 time, until the enemy reacned their woiks in the 
 neighborhood of Williamsburg, when the pursuit was 
 checked. Gov. Sprague was sent back to hurry up 
 the infantry support under Gen. Hooker. After Con- 
 siderable delay, finding it impossible to pass the 
 troops ahead of him, Gen. Hooker turned off and 
 proceeded by another road, of which he had obtained 
 information from some of the inhabitants; marched 
 till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at dav- 
 light, and came up to the advanced works of the 
 enemy a li; tie after 7 o'clock, about half a mile from 
 Fort Magruder, and at once engaged ths enemy. 
 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 There seems to have been great misapprehension 
 and confusion in relation to the management of the 
 troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first 
 commenced on Sunday, Gen. Heintzelman was in- 
 structed by Gen. McClellan to take charge of oper- 
 ations in front. On the morning of Monday orders 
 were sent to Gen. Sumner to take" the command; 
 Gen. McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to 
 superintend the sending of two divisions up the 
 York River to West Point. A heavy rain set in on 
 Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracticable 
 for the passage of troops. The troops of the differ- 
 ent commands became mingled — divisions and brig- 
 ades, to some extent, were separated from each 
 other — and it seems to have been difficult to get the 
 troops up in time. 
 
 During Monday forenoon Gen. Hooker, finding 
 himself hard pressed by the enemy, ai.d understand- 
 ing that Geu. Sumner had 30,000 troops with him, 
 seut repeatedly for reinforcements. So did Gen. 
 Stoneman and Gen. Heintzelman, but no reeuforce- 
 ments arrived. Gen. Sumner states that, haviog 
 sent Gen. Hancock to the right, he had at the center 
 
 only about 3,000 infantry — the cavalry there not be- 
 iner fitted for operations against the enemy, on ac- 
 count of the country being so wooded. Upon re- 
 ceiving the call for reinforcements to be sent to the 
 left to Gen. Hooker, be sent staff officers to hurry 
 up troops from the rear, his own corps being some 
 ten miles off, and ordered Kearney to re-enforce 
 Hooker. Re-enforcements not coming up to Gen. 
 Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the 
 Piince de Joinville and Gov. Sprague went to York- 
 town to urge Gen. McClellan to come up to the 
 front, and take charge of matters there. Gov. 
 Sprague arrived at Yorktown about 1 o'clock, hav- 
 ing been about an hour in going down. He testifies 
 that when Gen. McClellan was told the condition of 
 affairs at the front, he remarked that he had sup- 
 posed " those in front could attend to that little mat- 
 ter." After some time Gen. McClellan started from 
 Yorktown, and reached the viciuity of Williamsburg 
 about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 HOOKER DOES THE FIGHTING. 
 By that time Gen. Kearnej- had rea -1 ed the 
 field and re-enforced Gen. Hooker, taking command, 
 being the senior in rank to Gen. Hooker. Gen. 
 Hancock h;,d been engaged on the right, but, upon 
 being re-enforced, had succeeded in repulsing the en- 
 emy, losing about forty men. The principal fighting 
 was dene by the troops under Gen. Hooker, his di- 
 vision sustaining a loss of about 1,700 men. Before 
 he was re-enforced, his troops were obliged to hold 
 their position with the bayonet and such ammuni- 
 tion as the men could obtain from the bodii s of those 
 who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that it 
 was impostible to bring up fresh ammunition. 
 
 RETREAT AND PURSUIT. 
 
 That nigbt the enemy evacuated their position at 
 Williamsburg. Gen. McClellan states that after he 
 arrived on the fieli he was so satisfied that the ene- 
 my had been beaten and would be compelled to evac- 
 uate their position that night or be takeo at a great 
 disadvantage, i hat he countermanded orders to the 
 divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick and sent them 
 back to Yorktown. 
 
 The next day the pursuit was continued for a 
 short distance by Gen. Stoneman and the cavalry, 
 with a small body of infantry. Several of the Gen- 
 erals testify that, had the enemy been promptly fol- 
 lowed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they 
 could hove been followed, right into Richmond — one 
 of them says without firing a gun. Gen. McClel- 
 lan says that the roads were so bad, in consequence 
 of the rains, tbat it was impracticable to make a 
 vigorous pursuit. 
 
 The battle of Williamsburg appears to have beea 
 fought under many and serious disadvantages. 
 .No hing was known of the nature of the country or 
 the defensive works of the enemy until our troops 
 arrived before them; there was no controlling 
 mind in charge of the movements; there was uncer- 
 tainty in regaid to who was in command; each Gen- 
 eral fought as he considered best j and, by tke time 
 the General Commanding appeared on tlicfield, the 
 pi iucipal part of the fighting was over. 
 
 FURTHER DELAY. 
 
 Some three or four days were spent at Williams* 
 burg tor the purpose of bringing up supplies, &c, 
 and then the line of march was taken up for the 
 Chickahominy. It was about the time "that the 
 army left Williamsburg that Norfolk was taken 
 and the Merritnac destroyed. But preparations had 
 been made before those events occurred to have sup- 
 plies sent up York River instead of the James, and 
 the line afterwards followed was adopted. The 
 consequence was that the gunboats were of little or 
 no service in tbe operations against Richmond, and 
 remaned entirely inactive, except in some opera- 
 tions agaiust Fort Darling, until they were called 
 upon to proteci the army when, in July, it fell back 
 to the James River. 
 
 The distance between Williamsburg and the line 
 of operations on the Chickahominy was from forty 
 to fifty miles, and the army was most two weeks 
 
11 
 
 in moving that distance. The firet troops that 
 crossed the Chickahominy were the corps of General 
 Keyes, which crossed on the 24 ifa of May, followed 
 by "the corps of Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th. 
 The rest of onr army remained on the left bank of 
 the Chickahominy until the battle of Fair Oaks, 
 when the orps of Gen. Sumner crossed to the as- 
 sistance of Gene. Heintzelman and Keyes. 
 MCCLELLAN STILL CALLING FOR MORE TROOPS. 
 
 Gen. M'Clellan continued calling for re-enforce- 
 ments, representing that the force of the enemy in 
 his front was superior to his own, and that the 
 force un ier Gen. McDowell would do more for the 
 protection of Washington, if sent to his army, than 
 in any other position in which it could be placed. 
 In a letter written on the 21st of May he asks that 
 Gen. McDowell's corp3 be sent to him by water 
 rather than by land, as the more expeditions mode, 
 and that he and his forces be explicitly placed under 
 his orders, "in the ordinary way." He closes his 
 letter by saying: 
 
 " I believe there is agre it struggle before this army, but I 
 am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen 
 its force as much as I can; but, in any event, I shall fight it 
 with all the skill., and caution, and determination that I pos- 
 sess. And I trust that the result may either obtain for«e the 
 permaneut confidence of my Government, or that it may close 
 my career." 
 
 In reply to the request of General McClellan that 
 General McDowell should j-un nis forces by water, 
 the President states, on the 21st of May: 
 
 " McDowell can reach you. by laud sooner than he could get 
 aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, 
 uuless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force re- 
 sisting him will not be confronting you at Richmond. By land 
 he will reach you in five days after starting; whereas, by 
 water, he would not roach you in t*vo weeks, judging by past 
 experieuje. Franklin's single division did not reach you in 
 ten days after I ordered it." 
 
 JACKSON IN THE SHENANDOAH. 
 Preparations were accordingly made for General 
 McDowell to leave Fredericksburg on the 25th of 
 May to join Gen. McClellau. Just at that time, 
 however, Jackson commenced his expedition down 
 the Shenandoah Valley, and Gen. McDowell, to- 
 gether with Gen. Fremont, from Western Virginia, 
 was sent to the assistance of Gen. Banks, and to in- 
 tercept Jackson in his retreat. Upon being informed 
 of this, Gen. McClellan replied that the movement 
 of Jackson wa3 probably intended to prevent re- 
 enforcements being sent to him. The President re- 
 plied, giving him full information as to the condition 
 of affairs in the valley, and closed by saying: 
 
 •* If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach we should 
 be utterly helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, 
 and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my rea- 
 son for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please un- 
 derstand this, and do the best yon can with the forces yoa now 
 have" 
 
 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 
 
 On the 31st of May and the 1st of June the bat- 
 tles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks were fought. As 
 there has been so much controversy in regard to the 
 conduct of some of the troops engaged in that bat- 
 tle, your Committee will refer more particularly to 
 the testimony of Gen. Casey, who commanded the 
 advanced division, upon which the attack was first 
 made. Gen. Cisey states that, when the cacnpaign 
 of the Peninsula commenced, his division consisted 
 principally of raw and inexperienced troops. They 
 had Buffered greatly from the labors and exposures 
 incident upon the siege of Yorstown and the ad- 
 vance of the troops up the Peninsula. Some of them 
 had been for weeks without shelter, being com- 
 pelled to leave their camp equipage behind when 
 ordered on the pursuit of the enemy after the evacu- 
 aton of Yorktown. That division took the lead 
 across the Chickahonmiy, taking up a position 
 at Seven Pines, where it established itself by throw- 
 ing up intrenohmenta and cutting abatis. 
 
 A few days before the battle of Seven Pines, con- 
 trary to the advice and opinion of Gen. Key eg and 
 Gen. Casey, the division was ordered three-quarters 
 of a mile io the front, within six miles of Richmond, 
 his pickets extending within hve miles. They had 
 no support on their right or their left, the remainder 
 •f the corps to which they belonged (Keyes's) being 
 
 in their rear. They at once commenced digging rifle- 
 pits and cutting abatis, the pickets at night being at- 
 tacked l»v the enemy, who were repulsed. About 
 11 o'clock on the morning of the 31st the pickets re- 
 ported the enemy approaching, and an aid of Gen. 
 Johnston was capturedjand brought in with import- 
 ant papers upon him, Gen. Casey, with this aid 
 and nis general officer of the day, went to Gen. 
 Keyes and reported the circumstances to him. Gen. 
 Keyes testifies that for some days before the attack 
 he sent to Gen. McClellau reports of his condition, 
 the threatening attitude of the enemy in his imme- 
 diate vicinity, and urged that Gen. Sumner be sent 
 across to his support. This was not done, however, 
 until after the attack commenced. Reports continued 
 to come in of the approach of the enemy. The di- 
 vision was called out and formed, the working men 
 called in, and preparations made to meet the coming 
 attack. Two lines of battle were formed — one in 
 the rifle-pits, and another about one-third of a mile 
 in advance — composed of five or six regiments aud 
 four pices of artillery. A regiment had previously 
 been sent out to support the pickets. About 20 min- 
 utes to 1 o'clock the enemy commenced the attack 
 in force, s ipposed to amount to about 35,000 men, 
 attacking in front and on both flanks. After fight- 
 ing for some time, the enemy continuing to come on 
 in force, the forces in front fell back to the rifle-pits, 
 aud fought there until nearly surrounded. Re-en- 
 forcements had been promised, and Gen. Casey had 
 selected the position to which they were to be as- 
 signed; but no re-euforcement6 came up to his posi- 
 tion until just before he was forced to fall back f rom 
 his second line, when a single regiment arrived. Af- 
 ter about three hours' lighting the division fell back 
 from its second line with a loss of 1.433 in killed, 
 wounded, and missing. In the course of an hour 
 after Casey's division had been driven back, the re- 
 mainder of our forces were swept back from a mile 
 aud a half to two miles from Casey's first liue, when 
 the enemy were checked, and the fighting ceased for 
 the day. 
 
 During the battle Gen. Sumner, whose corps was 
 on the left bank of the Chickahomiuy, was ordered 
 by Gen. McClellan to hold his forces in readiuess to 
 cross. Gen. Sumner not only did that, but at once 
 called out his forces and moved them until the heads 
 of the columns were at the bridges ready to cross, 
 thereby saving between one and two hours. When 
 the order came to cross he immediately moved his 
 forces in the direction of the field of battle, came up 
 with and engaged the enemy, and relieved the pres- 
 sure upon the troops engaged upon his left. 
 
 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 
 
 The next day, the 1st of June, the enemy attacked 
 Gen. Sumner st Fair Oaks. Gen. Hooker, who had 
 been ordere i forward the day before by Gen. Heint- 
 zelman with one-half of his division, hearing the 
 firing of the enemy upon Gen. Sumner's forces, pro- 
 ceded at once in that direction aud engaged the 
 enemy. In a short time the enemy were repulsed, 
 and fell back in confusion. There waB no communi- 
 cation between the forces under Gen. Sumner and 
 those under Gen. Heiutzeluian (Hooker's), but each 
 fought as he deemed beat under the circumstances. 
 Gen. McClellan was with the main part of the army 
 on the left bank of the Chickahomiuy. After the 
 fighting was ovtr he came across to tie right bank 
 of the river. 
 
 HOOKER'S RECONNOISSANCE. 
 
 On the morning of Monday Gen. Heintzelman 
 ordered Gen. Hooker to make a reconnaissance in 
 force, which he did, advancing to within lour miles 
 of Richmond, meeting with no resistance except a 
 little from the enemy's pickets. Upon being in- 
 formed by Gen. Heiutzelmau of what he had done, 
 Gen. McClellan ordered the troops to be recalled and 
 occupy the position that had been held by Casey's 
 division. 
 
 The officers engaged in that battle, who have been 
 examined, testify that the army could have pushed 
 right on to the City of Richmond with htlle resist- 
 a?icc; that the enemy were very much broken and 
 demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c, 
 
12 
 
 that mi<?ht impede their flight. Gen. McClellan 
 seems to have contemplated an immediate move- 
 ment upon Richmond, for, the day after the battle, 
 June 2, he writes to the Secretary of War: 
 
 41 The enemy attacked in force aid with great spirit yester- 
 day morning, but are everywhere mo.-t signally repulsed with 
 great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, aud 
 uniformly broke the' enemy. The result is, that our left is 
 within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to 
 fall to cross with the reBt of the force and ma"e a general at- 
 tack. Should I find them holding firm iu a very strong posi- 
 tion, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fort 
 Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that I can 
 venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The vic- 
 tory is complete, aud all credit is due to the gallantry of our 
 officeisaud men." 
 
 The movement was not made, however, as Gen. 
 McClellan states, because of the high stage of water 
 and the bad roads. 
 
 MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS. 
 
 On the 6th of June McCall's division of Gen. 
 McDowell's corps was ordered to join the army on 
 the peniueula. On the 8th of June Gen. Mc'Clellan 
 telegraphs: " I shall be in perfect readiness to move 
 forward and take Richmond the moment that Mc- 
 Call reaches here and the ground will admit the 
 passage of artillery." On the 10th or 11th of June 
 McCall's troops commenced arriving at the White 
 House. 
 
 Preparations continued to be made in Washington 
 to send down by laud from Fredericksburg the re- 
 mainder of Gen. McDowell's corps, he being direct- 
 ed to co-operate fully with Gen. McClellan, but re- 
 taining an independent command. This does not 
 appear to have been in accordance with General 
 McClellan's wishes; for, on the 16th of June, he 
 telegraphs to the Secretary of War: 
 
 *' It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell aud 
 his troo; s ara completely under my control. I received a 
 telegram from him requesting that McCall's division migit bo 
 placed so as to join liim immediately upon his arrival. That 
 request does m>t breathe the proper spirit; whatever troops 
 come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good, 
 I do not feel ?i at in such circumstances as those in which I 
 am now plac. 'eu. Ml Dowell should wish the general in- 
 terest to be aa iced tcr the purpose of increasing his com- 
 mand. If I t fully control all his troops 1 want none of 
 them, but wouiu prefer to fight the battle with what I have, 
 and let others be . ^sponsible lor the results." 
 
 On the ISrh of June, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to 
 the Secretary ef War that he has received informa- 
 tion from deserters to the effect that troops have left 
 Richmond to re- enforce Jackson; that the movement 
 commenced on the 8th ; and that if re-enforcements 
 have gone to Jackson, they are probably not, 
 less than 10,000 men; that be cannot vouch for the 
 truth of toe statement, but that it seems pretty cer- 
 tain that it is believed in Richmond and among the 
 Rebel troops. To this the President replies, on the 
 same day, that the information is corroborated by a 
 dispatch' from Gen. King at Fredericksburg, and re- 
 marks: " If this is true, it is as good as a re- 
 enforcenent to you of an equal force." 
 
 On the same day Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the 
 President : 
 
 " A generil eugseement may take place at any hour. An 
 advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The 
 enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They 
 certainly htve great numbers and extensive works. If ten or 
 fifteen thoustnd men have left Richmond to re-euforce Jack- 
 ton, it illustrates their strength aDd confidence. After to-mor- 
 row we ahall fight tbe Rebel af my as soon as Providence will 
 permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the 
 eaith and sky, and the completion of some necessary pre- 
 liminaries.'' 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE ARMY. 
 The returns of Gen. McClellan to the Adjutant- 
 General's office give the following as the strength of 
 the army on the peninsula on the 20th of June : 
 Present for duty, 115.102; special duty, sick and in 
 arrest, 12,225; absent, 29,511— total, 156,838. 
 
 STUART'S RAID. 
 About this time the Rebel General, Stuart, with 
 his cavalry, made his celebrated raid, making the en- 
 tire circuit of our army unharmed, aud discovering 
 the nature of our communications with the York 
 Eiver. 
 
 JACKSON THREATENS AN ATTACK. 
 On the 24th and 25th of June, Gen. McClellan 
 telegraphs the Secretary of War that he is informed 
 by deserters and contrabands that Jackson is con- 
 templating an attack upon his right arid rear. As 
 this dispatch of Gen. McClellan, and the one of the 
 President in reply, ars dated immediately previous 
 to the " Sfcven days' battle," they are given here in 
 full. 
 
 " Received 8.50 p. m. 
 
 McClellan's June 25—6.15 p. m. 
 
 " I have just returned from the field, and find your dispatch 
 in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands, just in, give in- 
 formation confirming the supposition that Jacksot's advance 
 is at or near Hauover Court-Ho^se, and that Beauregard ar- 
 rived, with strong re-enforcements, iu Richmond 3-esterday. 
 I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right a'id rear. 
 The Rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and 
 Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior 
 odds if these reports be true ; but this army will do all in the 
 power of man to hold their position and repulse an attack. I 
 regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that I am in 
 no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent re- 
 peatedly tbe necessity of re enforcements ; that this was the 
 decisive point ; aud that all the available means of the Govern- 
 ment should be concentrated here. I will do all tbat a gene- 
 ral can do with the 6pleudid army I have the honor to com- 
 mand ; and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can 
 at legist die with it, and share its fate. But if the result of the 
 action which will occnr to-morrow, or within a short time, is 
 a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoul- 
 ders; it must rest where it belongs. 
 
 " Sines I commenced this, I have received additional intel- 
 ligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's 
 movements and Beaureg«d's. I shall probably be a'tacked 
 to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickabominy 
 to airange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is nc 
 use in my again asking for re-enfo. cements. 
 
 " GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-GeneraL 
 
 "Hon. E. M. Stanton. Secretary of War." 
 
 The answer of the President is as follows: 
 
 •■ Washington. June 26, 1862. 
 
 " 'Sour three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, 
 ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in 
 making your point, are very gratifying. 
 
 "The later one of 6i p. in., suggesting the probability of 
 your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men. and talking of whom 
 the responsibility will belong to, pains me very much. I give 
 you all 1 can. and act on the presumptijn that you will do the 
 best you can with what you have; while you continue, ungen- 
 erously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I 
 would. I have omitted, I shall omit, no opportunity to send 
 vou re-enforcements wheuevt-r I possibly can. 
 
 "A. LINCOLN. 
 
 " Major-General McClellan." 
 
 BATTLE OF MECHANTCSVILLE. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 26th of June, between 2 
 and 3 o'clock, the enemy, in considerable force, made 
 a vigorous attack upon the troops of Gen. McCall'^ 
 Division, stationed at Mechanicsville, consisting of 
 tbe two brigades of Seymour and Reynolds. The 
 action lasted until nightfall, wheu the enemy were 
 repulsed. Troops were sent up by Gen. Porter to 
 the assistance of those engaged; but they were not 
 m the battle, though some of them were in position 
 to support the right of the line. 
 
 About 12 o'clock tbat night the troops were 
 ordered to fall back to Gaines's Mill, which was ac- 
 complished without loss. 
 
 BATTLE OF GAINES'S MILL. 
 
 On the 27th the battle of Gaines s Mill was 
 fought, principally by the troops under Gen. Porter. 
 Our forces there engaged were from 27,000 to 30, 000; 
 the force of the enemy being from two to three 
 times that number. Tbe enemy were in sucb su- 
 perior force that, although our troops fought with 
 exceeding bravery, they were driven back with 
 a less of about 9^000 men, in killed, wounded and 
 missing. 
 
 Gen. McClellan was questioned as to the policy 
 of leaving the right w;ng, consisting of only about 
 30,000 men, to meet the attack of tbe superior force 
 of the enemy, instead of withdrawing it to the 
 rioht bank of the Chickabominy before the battle 
 of Gaines's Mill. His testimony on that point is as 
 follows: 
 
 " Question. Whatever might have been the intentions of 
 the enemy, as the attack was" to have been made by him. 
 would it not have beeu better to have placed both wings of 
 our army on the same side of the Chickabominy prior to the 
 battle of Geinec'* Mid ? 
 
 '• Answer. 1 do not think they ought to have been brought 
 to tbe same side of the river before they actua'ly were. 
 
L3 
 
 " Question. What advantage was gained by Leaving the 
 right wing of our army to. be attacked by a greatly superior 
 force ? 
 
 •' Answer. It prevented the enemy from tjettinz on our flank 
 and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the 
 armvandits material. 
 
 " Question. Will you explain what was done by the right 
 wing of our army at or about the time the left was engaged 
 which saved our tlvk from attack and enabled the army and 
 its material to be withdrawn ? 
 
 "Answer. By desperate fighting they inflicted so great a 
 loss on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank 
 of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of the 
 way. " 
 
 RETREAT OF THE WHOLE ARMY DECIDED ON. 
 
 Duriog the night after the battle of Gaines's Mill 
 all our forces were concentrated on the right hatfk of 
 the Chickahoininy, and the next day the movement 
 to the James Kiver was determined upon. Gen. 
 Heintzelmnn testifies tbat the night after that battle 
 he was seat for by Gen. McClellan ; that he found 
 everything packed, ready to leave; that Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan said there were two tbiuus to be done — to 
 concentrate his forces and risk all on a battle, or to 
 withdraw to the James lfiver; that if he risked a 
 battle there, and was beaten, the army was destroyed. 
 Gen. Heintzelman advised him not to risk a battle 
 under such circumstances, for if that army was lost 
 the cause would be lost; that it were better to go to 
 the James River and await re-enforcements. Gen. 
 McClellan replied that he was of that opinion him- 
 self, and that was determined upon. That night, at 
 12:20 a. m., Gen. McClellan telegraphs the Secre- 
 tary of War that he (Gen. McClellan) is not responsi- 
 ble for the result, but feels that the Government has 
 not sustained his army. 
 
 To this the President replies, on the 2Sbh : 
 
 " If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the 
 price we pay for the enemy not being in Wathington. We 
 protected Washington and ttie enemy concentrated on you. 
 Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us 
 before the troops sent could have got to you. 
 
 " Save your army at all events. Will send re-enforcements 
 as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, 
 to-morrow, or next day." 
 
 The 28th of June passed without any serious 
 fighting. Col. B. S. Alexander testifies that on the 
 afternoon of that day he was sent for by Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan, and went to his headquarters, at Savage's 
 Station, arriving there about dark. He received in- 
 structions to proceed with an escort to the James 
 River, send back a sufficient number of men to act 
 as guides for the different columns of the army, 
 communicate with the gunboat-, and order supplies 
 to be brought up the river; to examine both shores of 
 the James to the mouth of the Chickahoininy, and 
 ascertain the landing places; proceed up the Cbick- 
 ahominy to the head of navigation and ascertain 
 the places where the army could croes, in case of 
 necessity, and then return to headquarters and re- 
 port. He left Savage's Station that night, and 
 reached the James River the next afternoon. By 
 the time he had completed his examination the army 
 bad reached the James River at Malvern, 
 
 M'CLELLAN PROPOSES TO DESTROY HIS BAG- 
 GAGE. 
 
 While at headquarters, receiving his instructions, 
 be was shown, as he testifies, a printed order, not 
 then issued, directing the destruction of the bag- 
 gage of officers and men, and the tents, camps, 
 equipage, and things of that kind; appealing: to the 
 army to submit to this privation, as it would be only 
 temporary— '' only for a few days." He remon- 
 strated with Gen. McClellan against issuing such 
 an order; that it would have a bad effect, would de- 
 moralize the army, as it would be telling them more 
 plainly than they could be told in any other way 
 1hat they were defeated and running for their lives. 
 The order was not issued, aud Gen. McClellan tes- 
 tifies that he has no recollection of any such order. 
 THE RETREAT TO JAMES RIVER. 
 
 The retreat to the James River haviug been de- 
 cided upon, the army took up its march, being at- 
 tacked by the enemy in the day time, and however 
 successful in repelling those attacks, evacuating 
 their positions during the night. Tne actions ot 
 
 Savage's Station, Glendale and Malvern were fought 
 during the movement of the army to the James, the 
 enemy being repulsed in eaoh day's fighting, and 
 our army falling back, under orders, during the 
 night. 
 
 It would appear, from all the information your 
 Committee can obtain, that the battles were jought, 
 the troops handled, new dispositions m/de and old 
 ones changed, entirely by the corps commanders, 
 without directions from the Commanding General. 
 He would place the troops in the. morning, then halve 
 the field and seek the position for the next day, giv- 
 ing no directions until the close of the day's fight- 
 in g, when the troops would be ordered, to fall back 
 during the night to the nexo position selected by 
 him. In that manner the army reached the James 
 River. 
 
 BATTLE OP MALVERN HILL. 
 The battle of Malvern Hill, of the 1st of July, 
 was the moat fiercely contested of any upon the 
 peninsula. The troops were placed in tho morning, 
 under direction of Geo. McClellan, who then left the 
 field, returning to it again in the afternoon. The 
 first action of the day commenced about 10 o'clock 
 in the forenoon, but did not continue long. The 
 principal action, when the enemy attacked most 
 vigorously and persistently, commenced late in the 
 afternoon, and continued till aft^r dark, the enemy 
 being repulsed and beaten at every point. Many of 
 the officers examined by your Committee are of the 
 opinion tbat the enemy were so severely punished 
 on that day tbat they could have been followed into 
 Richmond had our army followed them up vigor- 
 ously. 
 
 It is tru<* that our army had been severely tried 
 during the preceding week, fighting, as they did, 
 nearly every day, and retreating every night. The 
 corps commanders and the tro :ps under them fought 
 moat bravely— no troops better. However disheart- 
 ened they may have become by wnat all must have 
 regarded as a'precipitate retreat during the night, 
 they still fought with the moat obstinate bravery 
 when attacked in the day time by an exultant and 
 successful enemy. 
 
 M'CLELLAN STILL RETREATS. 
 The commanding general, however, determined to 
 fall back from Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwith- 
 etanding the victory won there by our army. He 
 eeems to have regarded his army as entirely unfitted 
 to meet the enemy, for on toe day of the battle at 
 Malvern, evidently before that battle toak place, he 
 writes to the Adjutant-General of the army from 
 Haxall's plantation. 
 
 AND STILL WANTS TROOPS. 
 " My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result 
 if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall 
 retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can ren- 
 der more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge 
 that not an hour should be lo t in sending me fresh troops. 
 More gunboats are much needed." 
 
 On the 2d of Julv the President telegraphs to Gen. 
 McClellan: 
 
 " Your dispatch of yesterday morning induces me to hope 
 your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to 
 reason with you for a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men 
 to be promptly sent you, you must surely labor under some 
 gross mistake of fact. Recently vou sent papers showing 
 your disposal of foices made last Spring for the defense of 
 Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find in- 
 cluded in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now please be 
 assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 
 15,000. All of Gen. Fremont's in the valley; all of Gen. 
 Banks's; all of Gen. McDowell's not with, you; and all in 
 Washington, taken to gether do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000, 
 with Gen. Wool and Gen. Dix added to those mentioned. I 
 have not outside of your army 75,000 men east of the mountains. 
 Thus the idea of sending you 50,000 men, or any other con-' 
 siderable force, promptly, is singly absurd. If, in your fre- 
 quent meutiou of responsibility, you had the impression that 
 1 blame you for not doing more than yon can, please be re- 
 lieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner 
 you will not ask impossibilities of me. 
 
 " If you thiuk you are not stroDg enough to take Richmond 
 just now, I do not ask you to try jnst now. Save the army, 
 material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offen- 
 sive again as fast I can." 
 
 On the 3d of J uly, after the army had reached 
 
14: 
 
 Harrison '8 Bar. Gen. McClellan writes to the Secre- 
 tary of War: 
 
 " I am in hopes that the enemy is as completely worn out 
 as we are ; he was certainly very severely punished in the 
 last battle. * * * *'...'" * 
 It is, of course, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but I 
 doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with 
 their colors. 
 
 " To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond, and 
 putting an end to this rebellion, re-enforcements should be 
 sent me rather much over than less than 100,000 men." 
 
 THE ARMY HELPLESS. 
 
 The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harri- 
 son's Bar was very precipitate. The troops, upon 
 their arrival there, were huddled together in great 
 confusion, the entire army being collected within a 
 space of about three miles along the river. No or- 
 ders were given the first day for occupying the 
 hights which commanded the position, nor were the 
 troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack 
 in force by the enemy, and nothing but a heavy 
 rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing 
 up their a) tiller y, saved the army there from de- 
 struction. The enemy did succeed in bringing up 
 some of their artillery, and threw some shells into 
 the camp, before any preparations for defense had 
 been made. On the 3d of July the hights were taken 
 possession of by our troops and works of defense 
 commenced, and then, aud not until then, was our 
 army secure in that position. 
 
 NUMBER OF TROOPS. 
 
 By reference to the testimony of Mr. Tucker, As- 
 sistant-Secretary of War, it will be seen that prior 
 to the 5th of Apiil, 1862, 121,500 men had been 
 landed on the peninsula. Shortly afterward Gen. 
 Franklin's division of Gen. McDowell's corp?, num- 
 bering about 12,000 men, was sent down. In the 
 early part of June Gen. McCall's division > of the 
 same corps, of about 10,000 men, wa6 sent down, 
 together with about 11,000 men, from Baltimore 
 and Fortress Monroe, and about the last of June, 
 some 5.000 men of Gen. Shields's division were also 
 sent down. Total, 159,500 men. 
 
 On the 20th of July, 1862, according to the returns 
 sent to the Adjutant-General's office by Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan, the Army of the Potomac, under bis com- 
 mand, was as lollows: Present for duty, 101,691; 
 special duty, sick, and in arrest, 17,828; absent, 38,- 
 795; total, 158,314. This included the corps of Gen. 
 Dix, amounting to 9,997, present for duty, or in all, 
 11,778 men. 
 
 M'CLELLAN IDLE. 
 
 The army remained at Harri-on's Bar during the 
 month of July and a part of August. It engaged 
 in no active operations whatever, and was almost 
 entirely unmolested by the enemy. The subject of 
 the future operations of the army was a matter of 
 much deliberation on the part of the Government. 
 Gen. McClellan claimed that the James River was 
 the true line of approach to Richmoud, and that he 
 should be re-enforced in order to renew the cam- 
 paign agaiust that place. The President visited 
 the army about the 8th of July, but nothing was 
 then decided upon. 
 
 HIS ARMY ENERVATED. 
 
 On the 25th of July Gen. Halleck vis'ted the army 
 at Harrison's Bar, accompanied by Gen. Burntide, 
 who hal come from North Carolina, with the greater 
 portion of his force, to Fortress Monroe. The gen- 
 eral officers were called together, and the question 
 of withdrawing the army was submitted to them. 
 The council was of rather an informal character. 
 The majority of the officers expressed tuemselves in 
 favor of a withdrawal of the army. Gen. Barneide 
 testifies that, i*s he understood from the officers there, 
 the army was not, in a good condition, sickness was 
 increasing, many of the regiments were without 
 shelter and cooking utensils, and many of the men 
 were without arms^ The general opinion expressed 
 by the leading officers was that the men had become 
 very much enervated. One of the leading officers 
 said that his command could not, in his opinion, 
 march three miles and fight a battle. This condition 
 
 of the troops waB one of the reasons assigned for the 
 final withdrawal of the army from the peninsula. 
 M'CLELLAN'S DEMAND FOR RE-ENFORCEMENTS. 
 
 Gen. McClellan applied for 50,000 re-en forceuientg 
 to enable him to resume active operations. Gen. 
 Halleck > when be visited the army, informed Gen. 
 McClellan that the Government could furnish him 
 only 20,000 additional troops. Gen. McClellan con- 
 sented to renew operations with that numoer of re- 
 enforcements, and Gen. Halleck left with that un- 
 derstanding. But the day that he left Gen. McClellan 
 wrote to him, a.-king for 15,000 or 20,000 troops from 
 the^ Western army, in addition to those promised to 
 him, urging very strongly that they should be 
 brought here temporarily, t» be returned to the West 
 after Richmond should have been taken. As this 
 could not be dote, the order was given for the with- 
 drawal of the arm v as rapidly as possible, in order to 
 co-operate with the forces under Gen. Pope, then in 
 the presence of a suDerior force of the enemy. 
 
 M'CLELLAN'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 In regard to the re-enforcement of the army while 
 at Harrison's Landing, the testimony of Gen. Mc- 
 Clellauis as follows: 
 
 " Question. How many available men did you estimate that 
 you had at Harrison's Bar, and how many more would you 
 have required in order to undertake a movement successfully 
 upon Richmoud? 
 
 "Answer. I thiuk I had about 85.000 or 90,000 men at Har- 
 rison's Bar, and would have undertaken another movement in 
 advance with about 20,000 more re-enforcements. My view 
 was that pretty much everything that the Government could 
 have controlled ought to have been massed ou the James 
 River. I did not believe the enemy would trouble YVashing- 
 ton so long as we hid a powerful army in the vicinity of Rich- 
 mond, ajid did not share the apprehensions for the safety of 
 Washington that were eutertained by a g>eat many. 
 
 "I asked for 50.000 men at first, on the ground that I thought 
 the array should be made as strong as possible, and as little as 
 possible left to chance. When Gen. Halleck came down to 
 Harrison's Bar, my recollection is that he said that 20,000 
 men, or something about that number, was alt that could be 
 had, and I said that 1 would try it again with that number. 
 I have no recollection of having asked at a subsequent period 
 f r a greater number than 20,0u0 as a necessary preliminary to 
 a movement. 
 
 " Question. About how many men had been lost from the 
 25th of June until you reached Harrison's Bar, iu killed, 
 wounded, and missing ? 
 
 "Answer. I think the loss was about 14,000; but I could 
 not tell positively witbout looking at the returns. 
 
 " Question. Will you state in what your chances for success 
 would have been greater, with the addition of 20,000 men to 
 the number which you had at Harrison's Landing, than chey 
 wereiu front of Richmond, and before Jackson had formed a 
 junction with the rest of the enemy's forces? 
 
 " Answer. I should have counted upon the effect of the 
 battles, which had just taken place, upon the enemy. We 
 had then strong reasons to believe that the enemy's losses had 
 been very much heavier than our own, aud that portions of 
 his army were verv much demoralized, especially after the 
 battle of Malvern Hill." 
 
 GEN. BARNARD'S REPORT. 
 In closing their report upon the campaign of the 
 Peninsula, your Committee would refer to the report 
 of Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers of the 
 Army of the Pcto-nac during that campaign, made 
 to Gen. McClellan. The conclusion of his report, 
 wbich he terms a retrospect pointing out the mis- 
 takes that were made, and thus tracing the causes 
 of its (the Peninsular campaign's) failure to their true 
 soarces," is as follows: 
 
 CAUSES OF M'CLELLAN'S FAILURE. 
 " One of the prominent among the causes of ulti- 
 mate failure was the inaction of eight months, from 
 August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than &uy other 
 wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In No- 
 vember, 18G1, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully 
 supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet about as 
 complete iu numbers, discipline, and organization as 
 it ever became. For four months, the great marine 
 avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, 
 and that capital kept in a partial state of siege by a 
 greatlv inftiior enemy, in face of a movable army of 
 150,000 men. 
 
 " In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk could 
 and should have beeu taken. The Navy demanded 
 it, the country demanded it, and the means were 
 ample. By its capture the career of the Merrima c, 
 
15 
 
 which proved so disastrous to oar subsequent opera- 
 tions, would have been preveuted. The preparation 
 of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department 
 was not without forebodings of the mischief it 
 would do. 
 
 " Though delay might mature more comprehensive 
 plans, and promise greater results, it is not the first 
 case in which it has baen shown that successful war 
 involves something more than abstract military prin- 
 ciples. The true question was to seize the fir6t prac- 
 ticable moment to satisfy the, perhaps, unreasonable 
 but natural longing of an ambitious nation for re- 
 sults to justify its lavish confidence, and to take ad- 
 vantage of au undivided cornmaud and untrammeled 
 liberty of action while they were possessed. 
 
 "When the army did move, a plan was adopted 
 perfectly certain to'invite, nay, compel, interference, 
 and when the army was to go by Aunapolis to the 
 lower Chesapeake, I felt confident that one-half 
 would scarcely have been embarked before the other 
 half would have been ordered back to Washington. 
 The enemy was then at Manassas, and a feint, even 
 if not reality, of an attack upon Washington was so 
 obvious, so certain to create a panic, which no Ex- 
 ecutive could resist, that interference with the re- 
 moval of the rest of the army was certain. 
 
 " When the enemy fell back behind the Rappa- 
 hannock, and destroyed the railroad bridges, the cir- 
 cumstances were greatly changed, aud there were 
 strong arguments for the hue adopted. Yet, results 
 have proved how many reasons there were to be con- 
 sidered, besidd the purely military ones, which 
 opposed themselves to the adoption of such a line. 
 
 "The facts connected with the withholding of Mc- 
 Dowell's corps have been so completely exhibited in 
 the proceedings of the McDowell Court of laquiry, 
 that every one who wishes can form his own judg- 
 ment. Whether it was wi-:e or unwise, it was one 
 of those things resulting from the taking of a line of 
 operations which did not theu cover Washington. 
 
 ' " At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on 
 the Peninsula the Rebel army was at its lowest ebb. 
 Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port 
 Royal, Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, 
 Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge; and reduced by 
 fcicknese, loss in battle, expirations of periods of 
 service, &c. ; while the Conscription law was not 
 yet even passed, it seemed as if it needed but one 
 vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion, so nearly 
 throttled. How, then, happened it that the day of 
 the initiation of the campaign of this magnificent 
 Army of the Potomac was the day of the resuscita- 
 tion of the Rebel cause, which seemed to grow pari 
 passu with the slow progress of its operations ? 
 
 V However I may be committed to any expression 
 of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly 
 did suggest it), my opioion now is that the lines of 
 Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is 
 reason to believe that they were not held in strong 
 force when our army appeared before them ; and we 
 know that they wei'e far from complete. The pres- 
 tige of power, the morale, were, on our side. It 
 was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We 
 should probably have succeeded. But if we had 
 failed, it may well be doubted whether the shock of 
 an unsuccessful assault would be more demoralizing 
 than the labors of a sie.i*e. 
 
 " Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or 
 lay in the swamps of Warwick. We lost few men 
 by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the 
 army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the ex- 
 citement of combat, impaired their morale. We did 
 not carry with us from Yorktown so good r.u army 
 as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month 
 gained by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts' 
 content. They are not yet exhausted. 
 
 "The siege haviug been determined upon, we 
 should have opened our batteries on the place as fast 
 as they were completed. The effect on the troops 
 would have been inspiring. It would have light- 
 ened the siege and shortened our labors; and, be- 
 sides, we would have had the credit of driving the 
 enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, 
 
 as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for pru- 
 dential reasons. 
 
 "Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it 
 was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force. 
 But the battle of Williamsburg, fought, as it was, 
 without reconnoiteringthe position, without concert 
 of action among the different corpB and division 
 commanders, and almost without orders, was a blun- 
 der which ought not to have Happened. 
 
 " We knew of this position beforehand, and we 
 knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if 
 the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a 
 strong one, for he would be lighting for time to get 
 his traiiiB out of our reach. We fought; we lost 
 several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If 
 we had not fought, the next day a battle would in 
 all probability uave been unnecessary. But if it had 
 been necessary, we should have had time to have 
 brought up our resources, reconnoitered the position, 
 and delivered our attack in such a way that some 
 result would have flowed from it. 
 
 "We had every advantage. Franklin's division 
 landed at We6t Point on the next day, and Sedg- 
 wick's division on the day following. Those two 
 divisions, had the enemy waited another day at 
 Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, 
 and in that case we would have been superior in his 
 front and have had two divisions in his rear. His 
 hasty retreat, aud perhaps his capture must inevit- 
 ably have followed, and the great object of keeping 
 Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him 
 to West Point, would have been accomplished. 
 
 " On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed 
 the Chickahominy, and connected with the navy in 
 the James River. We should then have had a united 
 army, and the cooperation of the navy, and proba- 
 bly would have been in Richmond in two weeks. 
 The fact that we did not know the character of the 
 Chickahominy as au obstacle (as it lay across our di- 
 rect road to Richmond), that our transports were on 
 the York River, and that the railroad furnished a 
 good means of supply to the army, that we wished 
 to connect with McDowell coming from Fredericks- 
 burg, &.c, determined our route. In taking it we 
 lost essentially all that was worth going eo far to 
 gain, viz: the James River approach and the coop- 
 eration of the navy. 
 
 " The route chosen, two weeks should not have 
 been spent in traversing the forty miles from Wil- 
 liamsburg to Bottom's and New Bridges; and the 
 barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at 
 Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in 
 making use of the circumstance to turn and seize the 
 passage of New Bridge, which might have been 
 done by the 28th of May, and even earlier, had 
 measures been pressed and prepared for it. 
 
 " The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should 
 have been taken advantage of. It was one of those 
 occasions which, if not seized, do not repeat them- 
 selves. We now know the state of disorganization 
 and dismay in which the Rebel army retreated. We 
 now know that it could have been followed into 
 Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been 
 no resistance to overcome to bring over our right 
 wing. Although we did not then know all that we 
 now do, it was obvious at that tims that when the 
 Rebels struck the blow at our left wing, they did not 
 leave any means in their hands unused to secure suc- 
 cess. It was obvious enough that they struck with 
 their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in dis- 
 order with three-fifths of ours. We should have 
 followed them up at the same time that we brought 
 over the other two-fifths. 
 
 " After it was known that McDowell was called 
 off to another quarter, there was no longer hope of 
 an increase of force by the junction of his corps. 
 Tbere were no other re-enforcements to look for be- 
 yond what we received by the middie of the month 
 of June. The Rebel force was known or supposed 
 to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the 
 influx of troops from other parts, and by the breaking 
 up of Beauregard's army. 
 
 " At last the moment came when action was im- 
 
16 
 
 perative. The enemy assumed the initiative. We 
 had, warning of when and where he was to strike. 
 Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th of 
 June, our army would have been concentrated on 
 the right bank of the Chickahominy River, while 
 Uoo corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on 
 the left bank. Whatever course we then took, 
 whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of 
 the enemy on the right bank, cr move at once for 
 the James, we would have had a concentrated army 
 and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first ; 
 and in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we 
 would have been in the same case on the morning of 
 the 27th as we were on that of the 2&th, minus a lost 
 battle and a compulsory retreat. Or had the for- 
 tified lines, tla-own up expressly for that object, been 
 held by 20,00) men, as they could have been, we 
 would have 'fought on the other side with 80,000 
 men instead of 27,000. Or, finally, had the lines 
 been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank 
 of the Chickahominy, we might have fought and 
 crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our 
 communication, and then returned and taken Rich- 
 mond. 
 
 "As it was, the enemy fought with his whole 
 force — except enough left before our lines to keep up 
 an appearance — and we fought with 27,000 men, 
 losing a battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we 
 were driven from our position, our advance for con- 
 quest turned into a retreat for safety by a force prob- 
 ably not greatly superior to our own. 
 
 " la view of the length of time which our opera- 
 tions before Richmond consumed, there is now no 
 doubt that the depot at the White House should 
 have been fortified, as well as one or two points on 
 the railroad thence to the Chickahominy; that the 
 tete-de-pont at Bottom's Bridge should "have been 
 completed, and likewise tttes-de-pont,ox strong posi- 
 tions, prepared to cover the debouches from our 
 bridges to the left bank of the Chickahominy. 
 With these the army would have possessed free- 
 dom of motion to concentrate on either side, and the 
 disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have 
 occurred. 
 
 44 When the army reached the James River it 
 needed no prophet to predict the disasters which 
 have 6ince befallen our country's cause. If the 
 army bad sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied 
 that so much fruitless toil, and so much disaster, 
 had deprived it of the clan which results from suc- 
 cess alone. It was, moreover, as well as our forces 
 elsewhere, sadly diminished in numbers. On the 
 other hanii, the whole army, from its first low state, 
 had risen up an army most formidable in numbers, 
 excellent in organization, and inspired by a great 
 success. Had its number, indeed, approached to 
 that attributed to it— 200,000 men— there is little 
 doubt that a march upon Washington would have 
 speedily followed our withdrawal to the James. 
 
 " From such considerations, as well as those fol- 
 lowing from the results of the past operations, I 
 counseled the immediate withdrawal from the 
 James to reunite with our forces coveiing Wash- 
 ington." 
 
 The report of Gen. Barnard is the only report of 
 the officers engaged in the campaign of the" Peninsula 
 which your Comrmtlee have obtained. Tue report 
 by the commanding general has not yet been made, 
 and the reports of his subordinates" have not been 
 sent by him to the Department. 
 
 CO-OPERATION WITH GEN. POPE. 
 
 Gen. Burueide, with his command, was the first 
 to leave the peninsula. He landed at Acquia and 
 proceeded to Fredericksburg, relieving Geu. King, 
 who proceeded at once to rejoin his corps (.McDow- 
 ell's) then with Gen. Pope. Soon after, Geu. Barn- 
 eide was ordered to send all possible assistance to 
 Gen. Pope, and at once ordered two of his three 
 divisions (Reno's and Stevens's) up tbe Rappahan- 
 nock. Sbortly after that tbe advance of the army of 
 tbe Potomac, Fitz John Porter's corps, reached Ac- 
 quia, and was sent forward by Gen. Burnside to 
 Gen. Pope. The rest of the Army of tne Potomac, 
 
 except Keye6'8 corps, left to garrison Yorktown, 
 proceeded to Alexandria, and from there joined Gen. 
 Pope. Geo. Sumner stopped at Acquia and debarked 
 a portion of his corps there; but he received orders to 
 re-embark them again and proceed to Alexandria, 
 which he did. 
 
 The troops sent to the assistance of Gen. Pope were 
 sent by orders of Gen. Halleck; for those sent from 
 Acquia the orders were given through Gen. Burn- 
 side; for those sent out from Alexandria, the orders 
 were given directly to the corps commanders, until 
 Gen. McClellan arrived, on the 26th of August; after 
 which the orders were given through him. 
 
 The circumstances connected with the campaign 
 of the Army of Virginia have been so fully investi- 
 gated by the military courts in the cases of Gen. Mc- 
 Dowell and Gen. Fitz- John Porter, the proceedings 
 of which were public, that your Committee have not 
 deemed it necessary to make so thorough an investi- 
 gation of that campaign as they would otherwise 
 have done. They refer, therefore, principally to the 
 orders and correspondence, in relation to the delays 
 in tbe forwardiDg of Gen. Sumner's and Gen. Frank- 
 lin's corpa from Alexandr a to the assistance of Gen. 
 Pope. 
 
 MCCLELLAN'S DELAYS IN SENDING ASSISTANCE. 
 
 At 10 a. m., Aug. 27, Gen. Halleck telegraphs 
 Gen. McCleltau that 
 
 " Franklin's corps should inarch in that direction ( Manassas) 
 
 as soon as possible." 
 
 At 10:40 a. m. Gen. McClellan replies: 
 
 "I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his 
 corps at once, and to repair here ( Alexandria) in person to in- 
 form him as to his means of transportation. Kearney waa 
 yesterday at Rappahannock; Forcer at Bealton, Kelly's, Bur- 
 nett's, &lc. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to- 
 day." 
 
 At 12 m. on the same day Gen. Halleck telegraphs 
 
 to Gen. McClellan: 
 
 "Telegrams from Gen. Porter to Gen. Burnside, just re- 
 ceived, say that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, 
 and Ricketts, near Warrenton : Reno on his right. Forter is 
 marching on Warrenton to re-entorce Pope. Nothiug said of 
 Heiutzelaian. Porter reports a general battle imminent. 
 Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying 
 three or lour days' provisions, to be supplied, as far as possi- 
 ble, by railroad." 
 
 From Gen. McClellan to Gen. Halleck, same day, 
 sent 12:5 p. m., received 1:40 p. m.: 
 
 " My aid has just returned from Gen. Franklin's camp. Re- 
 ports mat Gens. Franklin, Smith, and Siocutn, are ail in 
 Washington. He gave the order to the next in raukto place 
 the corps in readiness to move at once." 
 
 From same to same, sent 1:15 p. m., received 
 1:50 p. m. 
 
 " Franklin's artillery has no horses, except for tour guns 
 without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of 
 these facts, will it not be well to push Sumnar's corps here 
 by wdter as rapidly as possible to make immediate "arrange- 
 ments for placing the works in front of Wasnington iu an effi- 
 cient condition of defense. 1 have no means of knowing tbe 
 enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, 
 withou; his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in 
 front? niiould not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate 
 Falmoutb and Acquia, at the same time covering the retreat 
 of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? 
 I do not see thit we have force enough on Laud to form a con- 
 nection witb Pope, whose exact position we do not know. 
 Are we sale in the direction of the valley V 
 
 At 1:50 p. m. Gen. Halleck replies: 
 
 "Ye3; I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. 
 The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the commanding 
 officer at Edwardj's Ferry asks for cavalry. Have you auy 
 to spare him 1 The enemy see ms to be trying to turn Pops'* 
 right. Is there no way of communicating %vith him?" 
 
 On he morning of the 2S'Ji of August, Gen. Hal- 
 leck telegraphs to Gen. Fraukliu: 
 
 " On pitting with Gen. McClellan, about two o'clock this 
 morning it was understood that you were to move with your 
 corps to-day toward Manassas Junction, to drive the eueiny 
 from the railroad. I have just learned that the General has 
 not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his or- 
 der, act on this." 
 
 At 1:05 p. m. of the same day, the 23th, Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck: 
 
 "Your dispatch to Franklin received. I have been doing 
 all possible to harry artillery and cavalry. The moment 
 Franklin can be started with a reasonable amoant of artillery 
 
IT 
 
 ho shall go. * * * * * * Please see Bar- 
 nard, and be sure the wo-h toward Chain Bridge are perfect- 
 ly secure. 1 look upon those works, especially Ethan Alien 
 and Marcy, as of the first importance." 
 
 At 3:30 p.m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. 
 McClellan: 
 
 "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as la r ge a force as 
 possible toward Mantissas, so as to communicate with Pope 
 before the enemy is re-euforced." 
 
 At 4:45 p. m. Gen. McClellan replies: 
 " Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's 
 corps is now in condition to move and right a batrre. It 
 would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have ssnt aides 
 to ascertain the c unlit ion of the commands of Cox and T>ler, 
 but 1 s ill think that a premature movement in small force 
 will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent 
 out. I repeat that i will lose no time in preparing the troops 
 now here for the field, and that whatever orders you may 
 give, after heating what I have to say, will be carried out." 
 
 At 8:40 p.m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. 
 McClellan: 
 
 " There mnst be no further delay in moving Franklin's 
 corps toward Manassas ; they must go to-morrow morning, 
 ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get reidy there 
 will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be de- 
 feated or victorious witftout our aid. If there is a want of 
 wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the 
 wagons can come to their relief." 
 
 At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs : 
 " Your dispatch received. Frauklin's corps has been or- 
 dered to imrcb at 6 o'clock to-morrow moruing. Sumner has 
 abou: 14,000 infdntry, without cavalry or artillery here." 
 
 At 10:30 a. m. of the 29th, Gen. McClellan tele- 
 graphs to Gen. Halleck: 
 
 " Franklin's corps is in motion ; started about 6 a. m. I can 
 gy e him but two squadrons of cavalry. ***** If 
 yamner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without 
 Any trustworthy troops in and near Washington. Yet Frank- 
 / lin is too much alone. What shall be done ? Have but three 
 / squadrons belonging to the Army of the Potomac. Franklin 
 has but forty rounds of ammunition, aad no wagons to move 
 more. I do not think FranKlin is in condition to accomplish 
 much if be meets strong resistance. 1 should not have moved 
 him but for your pressing orders of last night." 
 
 ^ At 12 m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 
 
 " Do yon wish the movement of Franklin's corps to con- 
 tinue ? He is without reserve ammunition and without 
 transportation." 
 
 In another dispatch of same date he telegraphs : 
 " Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for 
 duty. How far do you wish this force to advance ?" 
 
 At 3 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan: 
 
 " I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out 
 something about the enemy. Pernaps he may get such in- 
 formation at Auandale as to prevent his goiog further; 
 otherwise he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get some- 
 thing from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or 
 through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more ac- 
 tively, and rind out where the enemy is. I am tired of 
 guesses." 
 
 At 2:40 p. m. the President asks of Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan: 
 
 "What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What, 
 generally?" 
 
 At 2:45 p. m., received 3:30 p. m., Gen. McClel- 
 lan replies: 
 
 " The last news 1 received from the direction of Manassas 
 was from sti izglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacu- 
 ating Centr<-ville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. 
 
 I This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two 
 courses should be adopted: First, To concentrate ail our 
 
 [ available fores to open communication with Pope. Second, 
 To lezre Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use ail 
 meaus to make the capital perfectly safe No middle course 
 will now auswer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I 
 
 I will do all in my power to accomplish it. 1 wish to know 
 
 |l what my orders aad authority are. I ask for nothing, but will 
 obey whatever orders you give. 1 only ask a prompt decision, 
 
 ! that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do 
 to delay longer." 
 
 At 4.10 p. m. the President replies: 
 ! * " Yours of to-day just received. I think vour first alterna- 
 I tive, to wit: ' to eoucen.rate all oar available forces to open 
 communication with fope,' is the right one. But I wish not 
 to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your 
 counsels." 
 
 FRANKLTN'S DISOBEDIENCE. 
 At 7.50 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. 
 MoCleilan: 
 
 " Yon will immediately send construction train and guards 
 to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. 
 I have just Wen told that Franklin's cotps stopped at Anan- 
 dale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all 
 contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this 
 disobedience. That corps must pu«h forward, as I directed, 
 to protect the railroad and open our commanications with 
 Manassas." 
 
 M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. 
 
 To this Gen. McClellan replies, at 8 p. m., re- 
 ceived 8.50 p. m.: 
 
 " It wa* net safe for Franklin to mova beyond Anandale, 
 under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. 
 Gen. Frauklin remained here until about 1 p. m , endeavoring 
 to arrange for supplies for his command. 1 am responsible for 
 both these circumstances, and do not sse that either was in 
 disobedience to j our orders. Pleate give distiuct orderB in 
 reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. * * * * In, 
 regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, 
 as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, 
 when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed te 
 me." 
 
 At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs : 
 " Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin 
 to place himself in communication with Gen. Pope, by ad- 
 vancing as soon as possible, and at the same time cover tho 
 transit of Pope's supplies." 
 
 At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan forwards to Gen. 
 Halleck a dispatch received from Gen. Franklin 
 at Anandale, dated 7 : 15 p .m., in which Gen. Franklin 
 gives rumors concerning the battle of that day, clos- 
 ing thus: 
 
 "Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the country 
 will not support him." 
 
 At 5 a. m. of the 30th of August Gen. Pope sent a 
 dispatch to Gen. Halleck, received at 3.20 p. m., 
 from battle-field near Groveton. Virginia, containing 
 an account of the battle of the day before, and closing 
 as follows: 
 
 M'CLELLAN REFUSES SUPPLIES TO POPE. 
 " I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's, and Sturgis's 
 regiments to Centreville. as also forage and subsistence. 1 
 received a note this morning from Gen. Franklin, written by 
 order of Gen. McClellan, saying that wagons and cart would 
 be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send 
 a cavalry escort to Alexandria t> bring them out. Such a re" 
 quest, when Alexandria is Jvll of troops and we fighting the 
 enemy, needs no comment. Will you have these supplies sent, 
 without the least delay, to Centreville ?" 
 
 At 9.40 a. m., August 30, Gen. Halleck telegraphs 
 to Gen. McClellan: 
 
 " I am by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of 
 yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was 
 very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last 
 night that the Quartermaster's Department could have given 
 him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time 
 since bis arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of 
 opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should 
 have acted more promptly." 
 
 At 11 a. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 
 
 " Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity 
 of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia Pike, on 
 Anandale and Fairfax Court-House, if this is the route you 
 wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to 
 join Pope as promptly as po&aible. Shall Conch move also 
 when he arrives?" 
 
 At 12:20 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs: 
 "I think Couch should land at Alexandria, and be im- 
 mediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the 
 fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may 
 have other information by that time. * * * Send trans- 
 ports to Acquia to bring np Bnrnfide's command. I nave 
 telegraphed to him, and am awaiting his answer." 
 
 At 2:15 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs: 
 "Frankin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed for- 
 ward with all possible dispatch. They most use their legs and 
 make forced marches. Time now is everything." 
 
 At 5 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. 
 Halleck: 
 
 "Major Hammerstein of my staff reports, from two miles 
 this oicle of Cetrevilie, at 1:30 p. m., tiut Franklin's corps 
 was then advancing rapidly. Sumner's corps moved at 1 :45 
 p.m. The orderly who brought the dispatch fiom Hammer- 
 stein states th it he learned tbat the fighting commenced five 
 miles beyond Centreville, and that our people had been driv- 
 ing them all day. Hammerstein says all he learns was favor- 
 able." 
 
 At 10:10 p. m. Gen Halleck telegraphs to Gen. 
 McClellan: 
 
 " All of Sumner's C irpa on the south side of the river, not 
 actually required in the forU, should march to Pope's relief 
 
18 
 
 pr 
 
 Vrl 
 
 fide > 
 
 Gen. J 
 
 divisic 
 
 roc* 
 
 th 
 
 < 
 
 i 
 
 Replace them with new regiments. Fratklin should also be 
 hurried on to re-enforce Pope." 
 
 On the same day — Aug. 30. hour not given — Gen. 
 McClellau eent the fallowing to Gen. Halleck. 
 
 "Ever since Gen. Franklin received notice that he was to 
 march from Alexandria, he has been using erery effort to get 
 transportation for his extra ammunition. But he was uui- 
 formly told by the Quartermasters here that there was noue 
 disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After 
 the departure of his corps, at 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured 
 20 wagons to c^rry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading 
 some of Gen. Banks's supply train for that purpote. 
 
 " Gen. SumDer was one entire day in endeavoring, by ap- 
 plication upon Quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient 
 number of wagoDs to transport his reserve ammuuition, but 
 without success, and was obliged to march without it 
 
 " 1 have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is 
 landed to be at occe loaded with ammunition for Sumner aud 
 Franklin, but they will not go far to ward supplying the defi- 
 ciency. 
 
 •' Eighty-fire wagons were got together by the Quartermas- 
 ter last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under 
 an escort at 1 a. m., via Alexandria. 
 
 " Every effort hasbeen made to carry out your instructions 
 promptly. The difficulty seems to consist in tne fact that 
 the grr-ster part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria 
 and Washington l a? been needed for current supplies of the 
 garrisons. At ail events, such is the state ot the case as rep- 
 resented to me by the Quartermaster, and it appears to be 
 true. I tdke it for granted that this has not been properly ex 
 plained to you." 
 
 At 10:45 a. m. of the 31tt of August, Gen. Pope 
 sends the following to Gen. Halleck Iroui Centreville : 
 
 " Our troops are all here, and in position, though much 
 used up and worn out. 1 think it wouid. perhaps, have been 
 greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or 
 four days aio. But you may rely upon our sivinj tnem (tne 
 enemy) as desperste a fight as 1 can force our men to stand 
 up to. I shsu.d like to know wbe;her you feel s-cure about 
 Washington, should this army be des roytd. I shall n t lit it 
 as long as a man will stand op to the work. You must judse 
 what is to be done, having iu view the safety of the capital. 
 The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissauce in our 
 front at Cub Run, wither in advance of an attach to-day I 
 don't yet know. I send jou this that you may know our 
 position and my purpose." 
 
 On the 2d of September Gen. Pope was ordered to 
 fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his 
 army cauie under the command of Gen. McCiellan. 
 M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR POPE'S DEFEAT. 
 
 The following is from the testimony of Gen. Hal- 
 leck : 
 
 "Question. Bad the Army of the Peninsula been brought 
 to co-operate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost 
 energy that circumstaices would have permitted, in ycur 
 judgment, as a mililary man. would it no: have resulted in our 
 victory instead of <.ur defeat ? 
 
 - Answer. I thought so at the lime, and 6tLl think so." 
 
 In relation to the command of Gen. McCiellan, he 
 himself testifies as follows: 
 
 "Question. WhBt position did you occupv after your 
 arrival at Alexaodiia, and you had forwarded the troops 
 which had ueen under your command t:> the astistauce of 
 Geu. Pope ? 
 
 " Answer. I was for some little time — one or two davs, two 
 or three days, perhaps — wiihout any position: merely at my 
 ©amp, without auy command On" Monday, the 1st of Sep- 
 tember, I received verbal instructions from Gen. Halleck to 
 take command of the defenses of Wasaixgt ju. I w*s, how- 
 ever, expressly prohibited from, in any wav, assuming any 
 control over tne troops ur.drr Gen. Po'f e. I think it was on 
 the next day after that 1 was instructed veroaiiv by the 
 President and Uen. Halleck to go out and meet the armv 
 which was coming in, and to assume command ot it when it 
 approached the position that 1 considered it ought to occupy 
 for defensive pa po^es, and to post it properly." 
 
 The testimony of Gen. Halieck upon the same 
 point is as follows: 
 
 "Question. What was the position of Gen. McClellau in 
 regard to the troops of the Army of the Potomac as they 
 landed at Acquia Creek and Alexandria ? Were tnev under 
 hiscommsna; and it so, now long did they remain under his 
 command? 
 
 '•Answer. Gen. McClellau retained the command of 
 the Army of the Potomac as it landed at those 
 two points, except such portions of it as were sent 
 into the ;:t:d ULder Gen. Pope. Those portions were consid- 
 erea as temporarily detached fiooi his command, but f ti 1 be- 
 longing to his army, and he was directed that ail orders sent 
 from mm to the troops as detached, while under Gen. Pope's 
 immediate command, DOnN sent through toe headquaiters 
 at V\ t5-.iLgu.2j. He retained command of all the t.co;s of 
 his army a* they landed at those place* until sent into the 
 field, and repo. ted to Gen. Pope; and they continued to re- 
 main under hu command, with the exception of his detach- 
 ment, until Geu. Pope's army fell back on Washington 
 when all came unuer Gen. McCieUan's command. On his 
 
 (Gen. McClel'.&n's) arrival at Alexandria he waa to'd to take 
 immediate, command of all the troops in and about Washing- 
 ton, in addition to those which properly beloDjied to the Army 
 of the Pc tomac. Some davs after he had bevn verbally direct- 
 ed to take such command he asked for a f jrmal order, which 
 was issued from the Adjutant-General's ofri.e. The order 
 issued from the Adjutant-General's offi ce was after Gen. 
 Pope's army commenced falling back, and was dated Sept. 2; 
 but Gen. McCiellan had been in command ever since his arri- 
 val in Alexa-idria. 
 
 " Question, At what time did he arrive in Alexandria ? 
 
 "Answer. He arrived at Alexandria on the 2'3th of August 
 The formal order was i-sued that he might have no difficulty 
 with Gen. Pope's forces ; that they might not queuiou bis 
 authority." 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND. 
 
 Very soon after Geu. Pope and His army fell back 
 on "Washington the Rebel army entered Maryland. 
 Preparations were immediately made by the author- 
 ities in Washington to follow" them. 
 
 In relation to the command of th9 army in Mary- 
 land your Committee will quote from the testimony 
 of G,n. McClallm and Gen. Halleck. The testi- 
 mony of Geu. McCiellan is as follows: 
 
 "Question. What position did you occupy after your ar- 
 rival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded tue troops which 
 had been under your commani to the assistance of Gen. 
 Pope ? 
 
 " Answer. I was for some little time— otie or two days, 
 two or three da\s. perhaps — wiihoat any posi iou; merely at 
 my camp, without any commaud. On Monday, the 1st of 
 September, I received verbal iustiuctions from Geo. Hulleck 
 to take command of the defenses of Washington. I was, 
 however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming 
 any control over the troops under Gen. Pop*. I think it was 
 on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by 
 the President and Gen. Hal eck to go out and me«t the army 
 which wus coming in. and to assume command of it when it 
 approached the position which I considered it ought to occa- 
 py for defensive purposes, and to post it properly. 
 
 M'CLELLAN FORGETS. 
 
 " Question. How long did you remain in command of the 
 defenses of Washington, at.d what orders did you next re- 
 ceive, nod from whom ? 
 
 ' A wwer. 1 do not think that order, assigning the defenses 
 of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other oue issued in 
 its place. I had oniy verbal communications with Gen. Hal- 
 leck before I stirted on the Antietam ca^ipai^n. And it was 
 never definitely decided, up to the time tbat I left, as to 
 whether I was to go or not. I asked the question two or three 
 times of Gen. Halleck, whether 1 was to command the troops 
 in the fi^'d. and he said it had not been determined. And I do 
 not think that it ever was. / think tnat was une of those things 
 that grtic into shape ise'f. When, the time came 1 went out." 
 
 The lolloping u the testimony of Gen. Halleck 
 upon that point: 
 
 " Question. By whose orders was Gen. McCiellan placed in 
 commatd of the army that left Washington to operate in 
 Maryland; aud were these orders verbal or iu writing? 
 
 "Answer. As I -tated the ether day, the order tout given 
 verbally t) Geu McCiellan by the President, at G*n. McClel- 
 lajS* h^usf, about 9 o'cl ck in th'. morning, previous to Gen. Mc- 
 Ciellan leaving the city for Rockvrlle. 
 
 ■• 1 will aid that Gen. McCie Ian, in virtue of big being 
 placed in command of the foitincations of Washington and 
 the troops lor defense within them, was really in command of 
 all the trooj s here at that time. The question was discussed 
 by the President lor two or three days ag to who should take 
 command of the troops that were to go into the field. The 
 decision teat made by himsdf, and announced to G-.n. McCiel- 
 lan in my pr.stncr. 1 did n.t know wnat the decision was 
 unti I heard it thus announced." 
 
 M'CLELLAN FORGETS AGAIN. 
 
 In regard to the instructions giveuto Gen. McClel- 
 lau his testimony is as follows: 
 
 " Qaestion. Did you have any interview with the President 
 in relation to taking command of the troops for the Maryland 
 campaign, or receive any instructions from him on that 
 point ? 
 
 '•Answer. Id? not think he gave me any instructions tfter 
 that morning, when I was told to take command of the army 
 n front of \Vashingtcn. I do not think he gave me any in- 
 structions about the Maryland campaign. 
 
 '• After you commenced the movement, did you receive any 
 instructions from any one ? 
 
 "Answer. I received some telegrams, that might be locked 
 upon in the nature of instructions, from Gen. Halleck and 
 Ircm the Present, ihe general tenor of Halleck's dis- 
 patches was that I was committing an errvr in g >>ng so far 
 away frvm Washington ; that I was going rather too fast. 
 He had tue impression tbat the main force of the enemy was 
 on the south eide of tLe Potomac, and that tbey hod only a 
 small force in front cf me to draw me on, and then tliey 
 would come into Washington in rear. As late as the 13th of 
 September. I recai.ect a telegram r,f Gen. Halleck: in which 
 he press-ed tha' Seine idea, and told me that I was wron^ in 
 goiLg so far away." r 
 
19 
 
 by 
 
 The testimony of Gen. Halleck upon that point is 
 as follows: 
 
 '• Question. What instruction*, if any, were given to Gen. 
 McCleiun in regard to the conduct of the campaign in Mary- 
 land ? 
 
 * "Answer. The diy the Pretident gate Gen. McCUilan di- 
 reetio.it to take command of the forces in the field, we had a 
 
 ffeng conversation in regard to the campaign in Maryland. I; 
 
 [was agreed between u» that the troops should move np the 
 Potomac, and, if p-ssible. separate that portion o:" Gen. Lee's 
 army wnich bad crosiei the Potomac from the remainder on 
 
 ' the Virginia side. There were no definite instructions, fur- 
 ther than that understanding between us, as to the general 
 
 1 flan of the campaign. 
 
 "I submit Herewith copies of di«patche? to and from Gen. 
 MeClellan. after be left Washington to take coram at d of op- 
 
 [••rations in Maryland, to the time thst he was relieved from 
 command. Ttiese papers comprise aH the dispatches sent to 
 and received fr< m Gen. MeClellan, so far as I know, except a 
 letter datrd October 13, addressed to him by the President, 
 and wbicb was shown to me j ist as the President was about 
 to dispatch it to G-n. MeClellan, and Gen. McClellan's reply, 
 dated October 17." [The letter of the Presiden-, with the 
 reply of Gen. McCleLan, is incorporated in another part of 
 this reoott-J 
 
 " In regard to Gen. SIcClel'an's going too /tutor too far 
 from Wa\hint.tm. there can be found no tuch telegram from 
 me to him. He has mistaken the meaning of t&e trlezrams I 
 
 ' seat him. I telegraphed him that he was goins too far, not 
 from Washington, bat from the Potomac, leaving Gen. Lee 
 the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between 
 him and Washington. I thought Gen. MeClellan should keep 
 more upon the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than 
 his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry, 
 which was the point then in most immediate dinger; that he 
 was pushing forward his right too last relatively to the move- 
 
 PMntB of his left — not that the army was moving tso fast or 
 too far from Washington." 
 
 The letter of Gen. Halleck of Sept. 13, referred to 
 Gen. MeClellan, is as follows: 
 " Sent 10:45 a. m. 
 
 ■• Wak Department. } 
 " Washington. D. C>S-pt. 13, 1862. 5 
 "Major-Gbn. McClbixan: Yours of 5:30 p. m., yester- 
 vday, is just received. Gen. Banks cannot safely spare eight 
 Bew regiments from here. You must remember that very 
 few tr :ops are now received from the North, nearly all being 
 stopped to guard the railroad. Four regiments were ordered 
 .to Gen. Dix to replace Peck's division. Porter to-jk away 
 yetterdiy oxer 20.00U. Until you know more certainly the 
 enemy's force south of the Potomac you are wrong in thus 
 ■■covering the capital I am of opinion that the enemy will 
 sesd a small column to Pennsylvania, so as to draw* your 
 forces in that direction, then suddenly move or. Washington 
 wit !_ the forces eo&tn o: the Potomac, and those he may cross 
 ever. 
 
 *• In your letter of the lltfc yoo attach too little importance 
 to the capital. I assure you that you are wrong. Tee capture 
 of this place will throw" us oack six mor.tcs.~if it should not 
 destroy us. Beware of the evils I now point out to you. You 
 saw them when nsre. bat yoa seem to i" j.-ge: them in the dis- 
 tance. No mnre troops can be sent from here till we nave 
 fresh arrivals from the North." 
 
 M CLELLAN PROPOSES TO SACRIFICE WASH- 
 INGTON. 
 
 The let er from Gen. MeClellan. of the 11th, to 
 which Gen. Halleck here refers, contains the fol- 
 lowing: 
 
 '"I believe this army fully appreciates the importance of t 
 victory a: this time, and will figat well; but the result of a 
 general battle, with such edds as the euemy now appears to 
 have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful; and, if 
 we shoald be defeated, the consequences to the country 
 would be disastrous in the extreme. Coder these circum- 
 stances, I would recommend that one or two of the three 
 army corps now or. the Potomac, opposite Washington, be at 
 once withdrawn, and sent to re-er.force this army." I would 
 also auvt.-e that the force of CoL Miles at Harper's Ferry, 
 where it can be of little use. and is continually exposed to be 
 ''cot off by the enemy, be immediately ordered here. This 
 woulu add about 21. 0,0 old troops to our present force, and 
 would grea ly Btrei gthen u;. 
 
 " If tnere are any Rebel forces remaining on the ether side 
 of the Potomac, they must be so few that the troops left in 
 the fort?, af.er the two co ps shall have been withdrawn, will 
 be sufficient to check them : and with the large cavalry force 
 now on that side. sept well out in front to give warning of 
 the distant approach of any very large army, a part of this 
 army might be sent back within the intrenciiments to assist 
 in repelling au attack. But even if Washington should be taken 
 while these armies are confronting each other, this would not, 
 in my judgmenf. bear comparison with the ruin and disasters 
 whica would follow a s ngle defeat of this army. If we should 
 he successful in conquezing the gigantic Rebel army before as, 
 we would have no diriicuity in recovering it. On the other 
 hand, shoald their force prove sufficiently powerful to defeat 
 ■a, could all the forces now around Wasningon oe sufficient 
 to prevent such a victorious army from carrying the woiks cn 
 this side of tte Potomac after taey are uncovered by cur 
 army? I thkk not." 
 
 Your Committee having gone eo fully into the de- 
 tails of the Peninsula campaign, do not deem it 
 necessary to devote eo much space to the campaign 
 in Maryland. The same mind that controlled the 
 movements upon the Peninsula controlled those in 
 Maryland, and the same general features character- 
 ize the one campaign that characterized the other. 
 In each may be seen the same unreadiness to move 
 promp:ly and act vigorously ; the same desire for 
 more troops before advancing; and the same refer- 
 ences to the great superiority of numbers on tbe 
 part of the enemy. Your Committee, therefore, con- 
 tent themselves with referring briefly to the leading 
 operations of the campaign. 
 
 HARPER'S FERRY. 
 
 In relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, 
 your Committee have not deemed it necessary to 
 take much testimony apon that subject. Tue mili- 
 tary commission which was convened in this city in 
 October last fally investigated that subject, and their 
 report has been given to the public. Attention is 
 called merely to two telegrams of Sept. 11. which 
 passed between Gen. MeClellan and Gen. Halleck, 
 and which are as follows : 
 
 •' Rockvillb, Sept. 11 — 9:45 a. m 
 
 " CoL Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, I understand, 
 with 9,000 troops. He can do nothing where' he is, but could 
 be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that be be 
 ordered at once to join me by the most practicable route. 
 
 " GEO. B. Mc ILELL AN. 
 
 " Major-General Commanding. 
 •* Maj r-Gea. H. W. Hai.t.ecs- Ger-eral-iE-CMef." 
 
 " Was Dspaet»bxt. ) 
 •' Washtvgtox. D. C , Sept. 11. 18o2— Sent 2:20 p m. i 
 
 " There is no way for Col. Miles to join you at present. 
 The only chance 1b to defend His works until you can open a 
 communication with him. When you d"> so, he will be tab- 
 ject is your orders. EL W. HALLECK. 
 
 ■■ Generii-i'-C^irf. 
 
 " Major-Gen. McClell^.v R: :>v-:..r." 
 
 SOUTH MOUXTADf. 
 On the 14th of September tbe battle of Sooth 
 Mountain was fought — the troops at Turner's Gap 
 being under command of Gen. Burnside, and those 
 at Crampton s Gap being under the command of 
 Gen. Franklin — resulting in the enemy retiring to 
 the vicinity of Shepaerdstown. 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 On the 17th of September the battle of Amietam 
 was fought. It was commenced by Gen. Hooker oa 
 the right, at dawn, our troops driving the ejemy 
 before them, aDd gaining an important poskion. 
 When Gen. Hooker was wounded and taken from 
 the field, Gen. Sumner took command of our right. 
 Gen. Sumner ha i teen ordered to hold his corps in 
 readiness to advance an hour before daylight, bat 
 did no: receive the order to advance ujtil 7:20 in 
 the morning. Gen. Mansfield, who had come up to 
 the support of Gen. Hooker, had been killed. Our 
 troops, seeing their leaders fall, and being very 
 heavily pressed by the enemy, were forced Dack for 
 some "distance from the advanced position Gen. 
 Hooker had reached; but finally, With the assistance 
 of the troops brought up by Gen. Sumner, checked 
 the enemy's progress and maintained taeir position. 
 
 On the left, Gen. Burnside, about 10 o'clock, was 
 ordered to attack the enemy a: the bridge across the 
 Antietam in his front, and to effect a crossing there. 
 Tne advance of Gen. Burnside was met by a most 
 obstinate resistance on the part of the enemy, and it 
 was not until lj o'clock that the bnlge was carried. 
 By 3 o'clock Gen. Burnside's whole command had 
 crossed and taken position on some elevated ground 
 just above the bridge. He was then ordered to take 
 the bights commaucing the town of Shep herds to wtj, 
 which was done after" desperate fighting. By that 
 time the enemy on our left had been re-enforced by 
 withdrawing some of their troops from opposite our 
 right, where our advance had been checked, and 
 Gen. Burnside was compelled to give up some of 
 the ground he hid succeeded in occupying. He had 
 sent to Gen. MeClellan for re-enfereements, but re- 
 ceived in reply that there were none to be had. but 
 he must hold the bridge at all hazards. 
 
20 
 
 The corps of Gen. Fitz John Porter, in the center, 
 wasnot brought into action at all. Gen. Hooker testi- 
 fies that he had been given to understand that there 
 were to be attacks made simultaneously on the right, 
 center, and left of our army. He attacked at dawn ; 
 but Gen. Burnside on the left was not ordered to at- 
 tack until 10 o'clock., and there was no attack made 
 in the center by Gen. Porter. 
 
 M'CLELLAN ATTACKS BY DRIBLETS. 
 
 In regard to the manner of conducting the attack 
 at Antietam, Gen. Sumner testifies: 
 
 " I have always believed that, instead of sending these 
 troops into that action in driblets as they were sent, if Gen. 
 McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on 
 the left flank of the enemy, we could not have failed to throw 
 them right back in trout of the other divisions of our army on 
 our left— Bumside's, Frauklin's. and Porter's corps. As it 
 was, we went in, division after division, until even one of my 
 own divisions was forced out. The other two drove the 
 enemy and held their position. My intention at the time 
 was to have proceeded entirely on by their left and move 
 down, bringing them right in front of Burnside, Franklin and 
 Porter. 
 
 " Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been 
 impossible ? 
 
 " Answer. I think so." 
 
 The battle closed at dark, our army having gained 
 some little advantages, at a heavy loss, bnt nothing 
 decisive. The attack was not renewed the next 
 day, the two armies occupying the positions held by 
 them at the close of the yesterday's battle. 
 
 WHY THE ATTACK WAS NOT RENEWED. 
 
 In relation to the policy of renewing the aUo$k 
 on the day after the battle, Gen. McClellan testifies: 
 
 "The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had 
 been so great, and the e wes so much disorganization in some 
 of the commands, that I did not consider ic proper to reuew 
 the attack that day. especial y as 1 was sure of the arrival that 
 day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about 15,000 man. 
 As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that 
 morning, I happened to recollect tbe returns of the Fir.-t 
 Corps — lien. Hooker's— mado the morning of the 18th, by 
 which there were about 3,500 men reported present for duty. 
 Four days after that the returns of the same corps showed 
 13,500. 
 
 THE REBELS ELUDE M'CLELLAN. 
 " I had arranged, however, to renew the attack at daybreak 
 on the 19th, but ( 1-arned some time during the night or early 
 in the morning, that the enemy had abandoned his position. 
 It af;e:ward proved that he moved with great rapidity, and, 
 not being incumbered by wagons, was enabled to get his 
 troops across the river before we could do him any serious in- 
 jury. 1 think that, taking iuto consideration what tne troops 
 had gone through, we got as much out of them in this Antie- 
 tam campaign as human eudurance would bear." 
 
 WHAT BURNSIDE THOUGHT. 
 
 The testimony of Gen. Burnside, on the subject 
 of renewing the attack upon the enemy the day 
 after the battle, is as follows; 
 
 "Question. Did you expresi any opinion to Gen. McClel- 
 lan, or to any one at headauarters, in relation to renewing the 
 attack the next day ; and if so, what opinion did you express ? 
 
 " Answer. I did express an opinion to Gen. McClellan on 
 the subject. After my com mand was all in position— say 8V 
 o'clock at night — I went over to Gen. McClellan's headquar- 
 ters, at Cadysvilie, and expressed the opinion to Gen. Marcy, 
 his chief of stair", that the attack ought to be renewed the next 
 morning at 5 o'clock. I also expressed the tame opinion to 
 other members of Gen. McClellan's staff. Gen. Marcy told 
 me that 1 ought to see Gen. Mc'Jlellau and tell him what I 
 thought of tne matter. 1 went iato Gen. McClellan's tent, 
 and in the coarse of the conversation I expressed the same 
 opinion to him, and told him that if I could have 5,000 fresh 
 troops to pass in advance of mine I would be willing to com- 
 mence the attack on the next morning. He sbid that he had 
 been thinking the matter over and would make up his mind 
 during the night, and if I would send a staff" officer to his 
 headquarters, to remain there over night, he would seud me 
 orders early in the morning; arid if he concluded to renew the 
 attack, he would send me the necessary men. 1 did send the 
 staff officer over, but G^u. McClellan concluded not to renew 
 the attack the next day. 
 
 " Questiorj. Would tnere have been any difficulty in fur- 
 nishing the 5,000 fresh troops which you df>ired, as the corps 
 of Gen. Fitz-John Porter, some 15,000 or 20,000 men, had not 
 been engaged ? 
 
 "'Answer. There would have been no difficulty in furnish- 
 ing tbe 5,000 trefh troops. In fact, Gen. McClellan did send 
 Gen. Morell's division, of quite that strength, to report to me, 
 but not with orders to me to renew the attack." 
 
 FRANKLIN'S OPINION. 
 Gen. Franklin testifies: 
 
 " Question. Were you oonsulted in relation to reaewing 
 the attack the next day ? 
 
 " Answer. When Gen. McClellan visited the right In the 
 afternoon. I showed him a position on the right of this wood 
 I have already mentioned, in which was the Dunker Church, 
 which I thought commanded the wood, and that if it could be 
 taken, we could drive the enemy from the wood by merely 
 holding this point. I advised that we should make the attack 
 on that place the next morning, from Gen. Sumner's position. 
 I thought there was no doubt about our being able to carry it. 
 We had plenty of artillery bearing upon it. We drove the 
 enemy from there that afternoon, and I Had no doubt that we 
 could take that place ths next morning, and 1 thought that 
 would uucover the whole lefc of tiie enemy. 
 
 " Question. If that had been made, and that point had been 
 carried, what would have been the effect upon the enemy 1 
 
 " Answer. It would have been very disastrous to them". 
 
 "Question. What reasons were given for not making the 
 attack the next morning 1 
 
 " Answer. I did not hear the direct ressou of the General 
 Commanding, but I have understood that the reason was, that 
 he expected some fifteen thousand new troops — those which 
 would make the thing a certain thing — and he preferred to 
 wait to make this attack ou the right, until these new troopa 
 came. 
 
 "Question. And that di lay gave thi enemy an opportunity 
 
 to escape ? 
 " Answer. J think it did." 
 
 On the night of the 18th of September the enemy 
 abandoned their position and retired across the Poto- 
 mac into Virginia, without molestation. Our army 
 slowly followed, and took up a position along the 
 Potomac, on the Maryland side, occupying Maryland 
 Hights on the 20th, and Harper's Ferry on the 23d. 
 LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES. 
 
 Gen. McClellan, on the 29th of September, re- 
 ports our losses at South Mountain at 2,325; at An* 
 tietam, 12.469 — total losses in both battles, 14,794. 
 In relation to the losses of the enemy in both those 
 battles, in killed, wounded, prisoners and stragglers, 
 Gen. McClellan says: 
 
 " It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the Rebel 
 army lost at least<j0.000 of their best troops in thou brief cam- 
 paign in Maryland." 
 
 M'CLELLAN WANTS MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS. 
 
 After the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan 
 called for re-enforcements, and announced his deter- 
 mination to fortify Maryland Highte, making a re- 
 quisition on Gen. VVadsworlh, then in Washington, 
 lor 2,000 contrabands lor that purpose. On the 27th 
 or September he writes to Gen. Halleck: 
 
 AND PROPOSES TO FORM A MILITARY SCHOOL. 
 
 " My present purpose is to hold the army about as it now 
 is, rendeiing Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river 
 closely, inttnding to attack the enemy should he attempt to 
 cross to this side. Our posses.-iou of Harper's Ferry gives us 
 the great advantage of a secure debouche ; but we cannot avail 
 ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we 
 cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we 
 now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river 
 rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose con- 
 centrating the army somewhere near Harpei's Ferry, and then 
 acting according to circumstances, viz: Moving ou Winches- 
 ter if. from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are 
 likely to gain a great advantage by doing so ; or else devoting 
 a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruc- 
 tion of the new troops preparatory to an advance on what- 
 ever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as 
 absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old 
 corps for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments 
 be tilled at once. 
 
 * * * * * * 
 
 '• My own vie<v of the proper policy to he pursued is to re- 
 tain in Washington merely the force nece.-sary to garrison it, 
 and to send everything else available to re-enforce this Brmy. 
 The railroads give us the means of promptly re-enforcing 
 Washington, should it be necessary. If 1 am re-enforced as I 
 ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold my- 
 self responsible for the safety of W ashington." 
 
 M'CLELLAN KEEPS HIS MEN IN CAMP. 
 
 On the 7th of October Gen. Halleck replies. Af 
 ter referring to the draft expected in some of the 
 Northern ScateB he says: 
 
 " But you cannot delay the operations of the army for these 
 drafts. It must move, and the old Tegiinents must remain in 
 their crippled condition. The convalescents, however, will 
 help a little. The country is becoming very impatient at the 
 waut of activity in your army, aud w« must push it on. 
 
 " I am satisfied that the enemy are falling back toward Rich- 
 mond. We must follow them and seek to puouh them. 
 Tnere is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too 
 much immobility, aud we must try to remedy t ! ie defect. A 
 reduction of Damage and baggage-trains will etfect something ; 
 but the real difficulty is they are not sufficiently exercised in 
 marching-, they lie still in camp too long. 
 
 "After a hard march one day is time enough to rest ; lying 
 still beyond that time does not rest the men. If we comparo 
 
21 
 
 the average distance marched per month by our troops for 
 the la«t year with that of the Rebels, or with European 
 armies in the field, we will see why our troops march no bet- 
 ter. They are not sufficiently exorcised to make them good 
 and efficient soldiers." 
 
 On the 1st of October Gen. McCleilan asked for 
 authority to build a double track suspension bridge 
 and a permanent wagon bridge across the Potomac 
 at Harper's Ferry, which Gen. Halleck declined to 
 give. About that time the President visited the 
 army. Alter his return to Washington the follow- 
 ing order was sent to Geo. McClellau by Gen. Hal- 
 leck: 
 
 M'CLELLAN ORDERED TO MOVE. 
 
 •' Wau Department. I 
 - Washington, D. C , Oct. 6. 1862. $ 
 
 "lam instructed to telegrauh you as follows: The Presi- 
 dent directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the 
 enemy or drive him South. Your army must move now 
 while the roads are good. 
 
 " If you cross the river between the enemy and Washing- 
 ton, and cover the Utter by your line of operations, you can 
 be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley 
 of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 cm be sent 
 to you. The President advises the interior line between 
 Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is 
 very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You 
 will immediately report what time yoa adopt, and where you 
 intend to cros* the river ; also, to what point there-enforce- 
 ments are to be sent. It is necessary that a plan of your 
 operations be positively determined on before ordeis are given 
 for building bridzes or repairing railroads. 
 
 "Iam directed to add tbat the Secretary of War and the 
 G en eral-ia -Chief fully concur with the President in these 
 instructions. 
 
 " W. H. HALLECK, Genera'-in-Chief. 
 " Maj.-Gen. McClellan." 
 
 To this Gen. McCleilan replies on the same day: 
 " It is important, in making my decUion regarding the 
 route to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, 
 what description of troops I am to be re-enforced with upon 
 the Shenandoah route, and also upon the other route between 
 the enemy and Washington ; whether they are to be old or 
 new troops, or what proportion of each. If possible, I should 
 be glad to have Ptck's divisiou sent to me, if it can be got here 
 within a reasonable time. 
 
 " Second. Will you iuform me what the present condition 
 of the Alexandria and Leesburg Railroadas ; also the Manassas 
 Gap Railroad; and what time it would require to put them in 
 working order ? It is believed that the Harper's Ferry and 
 Winchester Railroad is not materially injured." 
 
 To this Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th: 
 " The Manassas Gap Road can he repaired in a few days. 
 The Leesburg Road is much more injured. You can reach 
 the former iu less time than would be required to repair the 
 latter. The troops to be sent you will be partly new and 
 partly old— mostly new." 
 
 HIS PLANS AND FEARS. 
 On the same day Gen. McClelkn telegraphs : 
 
 "After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my 
 vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenau- 
 doah for immediate operations against the enemy now near 
 Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the 
 army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and 
 Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth 
 of the Shenaudoah, we would leave it in the power of the en- 
 emy to recross into Maryland, and thus check thp movements. 
 In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage 
 of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could 
 be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point 
 of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement 
 between the Shenandoah aud Washington. 
 
 " I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of 
 the Shenandoah Vulley as important for ulterior objects. It is 
 important only so long as the enemy remains near Winches- 
 ter. And we cinuot follow that line far beyond that point, 
 simply because the country is destitute of supplies, ani we 
 have not sufficient means of transformation to enaoie us to ad- 
 vance more than 20 or 35 milts bevoud a railroad or canal ter- 
 minus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon 
 Staunton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that 
 route, and we must then take a new line of operations baaed 
 upon water or railway communication. 
 
 " The only possible o'oject to be gained hy an advance from 
 this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Wiochester. If they 
 retreat, we have nothing to gain by pursuing them, and, in 
 fact, cannot do so to any great distance. The objects I pro- 
 posed to myself are — to ligut the enemy, if they remain near 
 Winchester; or, failing in that, to force them to abandoii the 
 Valley of the Shenandoah, there to adopt a new aud decisive 
 line of operations which shallstrike at the heart of the Rebellion 
 
 "I have taken a;l possible measures to insure the most 
 prompt equipment ot the troops. But, from all that I can 
 learn, it will be at least three days before the first, fifth, and 
 sixth corps are in readiness to move from their present camps. 
 Tfley need shoes and other indispensable article.s of clothing, 
 as well as shelter tent*, &c. I beg to assure you that not an 
 hour shall be lost in carrying your instructions into effect. 
 
 " Please send the re-enforcements to Haiper'B Ferry. > 
 would prefer that the new regiments be %ent as regiments, not 
 brigaded, unless already done so with old troop*. I would 
 aaain ask for Peck's division, and, if possible, Heintzelman's 
 corps. If the enemy give fight near Winchester, it will be a 
 desperate sflair, requiring all our resources. I hope that no 
 time will be lost in sendiug forward the re enforceuie»ts, that 
 I may get them in hand as soon as possible." 
 
 STUART'S CAVALRY RAID. 
 
 On the 10th of October the Rebel General, Stuart, 
 made his raid into Pennsylvania, returning into Vir- 
 ginia, having made the entire circuit of our army. 
 On the 13th Geu. McClellau reported to Gen. Hal- 
 leck the result of the raid, and ascribed its success to 
 the deficiency of our cavalry, and urged "the imper- 
 ative necessity of at once supplying this army, in- 
 cluding the command of Gen. Banks, with a suffi- 
 cient number of horses to remount every dismounted 
 cavalry soldier within the shortest possible time. It 
 this is not done we shall be constantly exposed to 
 Rebel cavalry raids." 
 
 To this Gen. Halleck repliee : " Your telegram of 
 7 p. m. yesterday ie just received. As I have already 
 informed you, the Government has been a T >d is mak- 
 ing every possible effort to increase the cavalry 
 force. Remounts are sent, to you as rapidly as they 
 can be procured. The President has read your tel- 
 egram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy 
 had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry 
 would not be so likely to make raids north of it." 
 
 THE PRESIDENT TO M'CLELLAN. 
 
 On the 13th of October the Precideot wrote to 
 Gen. McCltllan concerning the operations of the 
 army. And on the 17th of October Gen. McCleilan 
 wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the- 
 reply of Gen. McCleilan are as follows; 
 
 " Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 13, 1862. 
 
 " My Dear C>ir : You remember my speakiog to 
 yon of what I called your overcautiousness. Are 
 you not overcautious when you assume that you 
 cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing 
 Should you not claim to be at least his equal in 
 prowess, and act upon the claim ? 
 
 " As I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Halleck 
 that you cannot subsist your army at Yv'incuester, 
 unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that 
 point be put in working order. But the enemy 
 does now subsist bis army at Winchester at a dis- 
 tance nearly twice as great from railroad transporta- 
 tion as you would have to do without the railroad 
 last named. He now wagons from Culpepper 
 Court-House, which is just about twice as lar as 
 you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. Ha is 
 certainly not more than half as well provided with 
 wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased 
 for you to have the advantage of the railroad from 
 Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all 
 the remainder of Autumn to give it to you, aud in 
 fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and 
 mas', not be ignored. 
 
 " Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as 
 vou know, is, ' to operate upon the euemy'a commu- 
 nications as much as possible without exposing your 
 own.' You seem to act as if this applies against 
 you, but cannot apply iu your favor. Change posi- 
 tions with the enemy, and think you not he would 
 break your communication with Richmond within 
 the next twenty-four hours ? You dread his going 
 into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in fall lorce, 
 he gives up his communications to yon absolutely, 
 and you nave nothing to do but to follow and ruin 
 him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon 
 aud beat what is left behind all the easier. 
 
 " Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer 
 Richmond than the enemy is by thy route that you 
 can and he must take. Yv r hy can you not reach 
 there before him, unless you admit tuat he is more 
 than your equal on a march ? His roate is the arc 
 of a circle, wtdie yours is the chord. The roads are 
 as good on yours as on his. 
 
 You know I desired, but did not order, you to 
 cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shen- 
 andoah aud Blue Ridge. My idea wae, that this 
 
22 
 
 would at once menace the enemy's communications, 
 which I would seize if he would permit. If he 
 should move northward, I would follow him closely, 
 holding his communications. If he should prevent 
 our seizing his communications, aud move toward 
 Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if 
 a favorable opportunity should present, aud at least 
 try to beat him to Richmond on the iusidd track. I 
 Bay 'try;' if we never try, we shall never succeed. 
 If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither 
 north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea 
 that if we cannot beat him when he hears the wast- 
 age of coming to us, we never can wheu we bear the 
 wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple 
 truth, "and is too important to be lost si^ht of for a 
 moment. In coming to us, he teuders us an advan- 
 tage which we should not waive. We should not so 
 operate as to merely drive him away. As we must 
 beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if 
 at all, easier near to us than far away. If we can- 
 not beat the enemy where he now is, we never cau, 
 be again being within the intrenchments of Rich- 
 mond. 
 
 " Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on 
 the inside track, the facility of supplying from the 
 side, away from the enemv, is remarkable, as it 
 were by the different spokes of a wheel, extending 
 from the hub toward the rim, and this, whether you 
 move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, 
 hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord- 
 line, as you se?, canies you by Aid ie, Hay market 
 and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, 
 railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, 
 meet you at all points from Washington. Tbe 
 same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press 
 closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The 
 gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be 
 about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, 
 to wit: Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; 
 Snicker's, eighteen; Ashbj's, twenty-eight; Man- 
 assas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five, and Tuorn- 
 ton's, fiity-three. I should thiak it preferable to 
 take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to 
 make an important move without your knowledge, 
 and compelling him to ke9p his forces together for 
 dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack 
 if you should wish. For a great part of the way 
 you would be practically between the enemy and 
 both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to 
 spare you the greatest number of troops from here. 
 When, at length, running for Richmond ahead of 
 him enables him to move this way; if he does so, 
 turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he 
 should be engaged long before such poitt is reached. 
 It is all easy if our troops march as well as the ene- 
 my, and it is unmanly to say they caunot do it. 
 This letter is in no sense an order. 
 
 " Yours, truly, " A. LINCOLN. 
 
 " Mej.-Gen. McClellan." 
 
 '* Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
 •' Camp in Pleasant Valley, Oct 17, 1862. J 
 
 "Sir: Your letter of the 13th inst. reached me yesterday 
 morning, by the hands of Col. Perkins 
 
 " I had seat out strong reconnoissance*, early in the morn- 
 ing, in the direction of Chariestown. Leetown. &.O., and, as 
 sharp artillery firing was heard, I felt it incumbent to go to 
 the front. 1 did not leave Chariestown until dark, &o that I 
 have been unable to give to your Excellency's letter that full 
 and re-pectful consideration which it merits at my hands. 
 
 " I do Dot wish to detain Col. Perkins beyond thii morn- 
 ing's train. I therefore think it best to send him back with 
 this simple acknowledgment of the receipt ol your Excel- 
 lency's letter. I am not wedded to any particular plan of 
 operations. I hope to have, to-day, reliable information as 
 to tbe position of the ene ny, whom I still believe to be be- 
 tween Bunker Hill and Winchester. I promise you that I 
 will tiive to your views the fullest and most unprejudiced 
 consideration, and that it is my intention to advance the mo- 
 ment my men are shod, and my cavalry are sufficiently reno- 
 yated to be available. 
 
 " Your Exctlle icy may be assured that I will not adopt a 
 course which differs at all from your views, without first 
 fully expl-rining my reasons, and giving you lime to issue 
 such instructions as may seem best to you. 
 
 " 1 am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant. 
 
 "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
 " Major-General United States Army. 
 
 " His Excellency the President." 
 
 MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS WANTED. 
 Gen. McClellan continue 1 to ask for ra-enforce- 
 ments — for horses — raying that the is^ue to his army 
 was only 150 per week; and for clothing, stating 
 that his arrny needed shoes and other articles of 
 clothing, and " had for some time past been suffering 
 for the want of it," and that he was " constra'ned to 
 believe that it was in a great degree owing to the 
 want of proper action on the Dart of the Qartermaa- 
 ter's Department." The subject was referred to the 
 Quartermaster-General, and he was ca lei upon for 
 a statement in regard to the matter. There waa 
 much correspondence upon the subject between Gen. 
 Halleck, Gen. McClellan, and Gen. Meigs. The re- 
 sult of the examination is fully stated ia the follow- 
 ing communication of the Secretary of War, of the 
 27th of October, and the reply of Gen. Hilleck, of 
 the 28th of October: 
 
 M'CLELLAN'S MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
 
 " War Dkpaktment, ) 
 " Washington City, Oct. 27, 1862. ) 
 
 "General: It has been publicly stated thit the army 
 under Gi n. McClellau has been unable to move, during the 
 fine weather of this Fall, for want of shoes, clothing, and other 
 supplies. You will please report to this Department upon 
 the following points: 
 
 " First : To whom, and in what manner, the requisitions for 
 supplies to tl.e army under Gen. McClellan have been made 
 siuce you a-sumed command as Ceneral-in-Chief; and whether 
 any requisition for supplies of any kind has since tbat time 
 been made upon the Secretary of War, or communication had 
 witn him, except through you? 
 
 "Second: If you, as General-in-Chief, have taken pains to 
 ascertain tbe condition of the army in respect to the supplies 
 of shoes, clothing, arms, and other necessaries : an ■ whether 
 there has been any neglect or delay, by any Department or 
 Bureau, in filling the requisitions lor supplies; and what has 
 been, and is, the condition of that army, as com! ared with 
 other armies, iu respect to supplies? 
 
 "Third: At what date, after the battle of Antietam, the 
 orders to advance egiinat the enemy were given to Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan, and bow often hive they been repeated? 
 
 "Fourth: Whether, in your opinion, there bas been any 
 want in the army under Gen. McClellan of shoes, clothing, 
 arma, or other equipments or supplies, that ought to have pre- 
 vented its advance against the enemy when the order was 
 given? 
 
 '• Fifth : How long was it after the orders to advance were 
 given to Gun. McClellan before he informed you that any 
 shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are his 
 means of promptly communicating the wauts of the army to 
 you, or to the proper bureaus ol the War Department? 
 
 " EDWIN M. STANTON, 
 
 " Secretary of War. 
 
 "Maj -Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief." 
 
 "Washington. Oct. 28, 1862. 
 
 "Sir: In reply to the several interrogatories containsd in 
 your letter of yesterday, I have to reporc: 
 
 "First: That requisitions for supplies to the army under 
 Gen. McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of 
 bureaus here ; that is, for Quartermasters supplies by his 
 Chief Quartermaster on the Quartermaster-Geneiai j for Com- 
 missary supplies by his Cnief Commifl3ary oa the Commis- 
 sary-General, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my 
 knowledge, made upon tne Secretary of War. aud noue upon 
 the General-in-Chief. 
 
 " Second: On several occisiong Gen. McClellan has tele- 
 graphed to me that his army was deficient ia certain supplies. 
 All these telegrams were immediately referred to the heads of 
 bureaus, with orders to report. It was ascertained that in 
 every instance the requisitions had been immediately filled, 
 except one, where the Quanermaster-Geaeral had been 
 obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, 
 tents, &.c, not having a full supply here. 
 
 " There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neg- 
 lect or delay in any department or bureau in issuing all sup- 
 plies asked for by Gen. McClellan, or by the officers of his 
 staff. Delays L ave occasionally occurred in forwarding sup- 
 plies by raii, on account of the crowded condition of the de- 
 pots or of a want ot cars ; but whenever notified of this, agents 
 have been sent out to remove the difficulty. U"der the ex- 
 cellent superintendence of Gen. Haupt I think these delays 
 have been less frequent and of shorter dnration t:ian i« usual 
 with freight trains. Any army of the size of that of Gen. 
 McCiellau will frequently be for some days without the sup- 
 plies asked for, on account of neglect in maaing timely requi- 
 sitions, and unavoidable delays in fotwaraiug them and in 
 distributing them to the different brigades and regimeuts. 
 From all tne information I can obtain, I am of the opinion 
 that the requisitions from ttiat army have been lit ed more 
 prompt y. and that trie men, as a general rule, bave been 
 better supplied than our armies operating in tbe West. The 
 latter have operated at much greater distances lrom the 
 scurces of supply, and have had lar less facilities for transpor- 
 tation. In fine, I believe tnat no armies in the world, wnile 
 in compaign, have been more promptly or better supplied 
 than ours. 
 
 " Third: Soon after the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan 
 was uiged to give me information of his iutended movements 
 
23 
 
 in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washing- 
 ton, re-enforcements could be sent from this place. On the 
 let of October, finding that he proposed to operate from 
 Harper's Ferry , I urged Mm to oross the river at euce and 
 give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvan- 
 tage of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Poto- 
 mac m<i impaired the roads. On the 6th of October he was 
 peremptorily ordered ' to cross the Potomac and give battle to 
 the enemy, or drive bim south. Your army must move now 
 while the roads are good.' It will be observed that three 
 weeks have elapsed since this order was given. 
 
 " Fourth: In my opinion there has been no such want of 
 supplies in the army under Gen. McClellan as to prevent his 
 compliance with tbe oiders to advance against the enemy. 
 Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could 
 have received bis supplies almost as readily as, by remaining 
 inactive, on tbe north side. 
 
 " Fifth: On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to 
 his intended movements, Gen. McClellan stated that it would 
 require at least three days to supply the First, Fifth and Sixth 
 Corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable 
 articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents. No complaint 
 Was made that any requisitions had not been filled; aud it was 
 inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the 
 distribution of his supplies, 
 
 " On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies, 
 sent by rail, had been delayed. As already stated, agents 
 were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint ; 
 and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the 
 •ame date (the 11th) he spoke of many of his horses having 
 broken dowu by fatigue. On the 12th he complains that the 
 rate of supply wa> only 150 horses per week for the entire 
 army, there and in front of Washington. I'immediately di- 
 rected the Quarterrna-aer-General to inquire into this matter, 
 and to report why a larger number was not furnished. GeD. 
 Meigs reported on the 14th that tbe average issue of horses to 
 Gen. McClellan's army, in the field aud in frout of Washing- 
 ton, for the previous six weeks, had been 1,450 per week, or 
 8,754 in all; in addition, that a large number of mules had been 
 supplied ; aud that the number of animals with Gen. McClel- 
 lan's army, on the Upper Potomac, was over 31,000. He also 
 reported that he was then sending to the army all the horses 
 he could procure. 
 
 "On the 18th Gen. McClellan states, in regard to Gen. 
 Meigs's report, that he had filled every requisition for shoes 
 and clothing: ' Gen. Meigs may have ordered those articles to 
 be forwarded, but they have not reached our depots; and un- 
 less greater effort to iusure prompt transmission is made by 
 the departmeut of which Gen. Meigs is the head, they might 
 as well rem; in in New-York or Philadelphia, so far as this 
 army is concerned.' 1 immediately called Gen. Meigs's atten- 
 tion to this apparent neglect of his department. On the 25th 
 he reported, as the result, of his investigation, that 48,000 pairs 
 of boots and shoes had been received by the quattermaster of 
 Gen. McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and 
 Hagerstown; that 20,000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot 
 on tbe 21st; that 10,000 more were on their way ; and 15,000 
 more ordered. Col. Ii galls, aide-dt-camp and chief quarter- 
 master to Gen. McClellan, telegraphed on the 25th ; ' The suf- 
 fering for want of clothing is exaggerated 1 think; and cer- 
 tainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regi- 
 mental aud brigade quartermasters.' On the 24th he tele- 
 graphed to the quartermaster-general that : 'the clothing was 
 not detained in the cars at the depots; such compla ntsare 
 rrouadless. The fact is, the clothing arrives end is issued ; 
 but more is stil needed. I have ordered more than would 
 seem necessary from any dsta furnished me; and I beg to re- 
 mind you that you have always very promptly met all my 
 requisitions as far as clothing is concerned. Our department 
 i9 not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I 
 foresee no time when an army of over 100,t00 men will not 
 Oall for clothing and other articles.' 
 
 " In regard to Gen. McClellan's means of promptly commu- 
 nicating the wants of his army to me, or to the pioper bureaus 
 of the War Department. I repeat that, in addition to the ordi- 
 nary imils. he has been in hourly communication with Wash- 
 ington by telegraph. 
 
 " It is due to Gen. Meigs that I should submit herewith a 
 copy of a telegram received by him from Gen. McClellan. 
 TSee documents.] 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 
 " Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War." 
 
 m'clexlan still delays. 
 On Oct. 21, Gen. McClellan informs Gen. Halleck 
 that be has nearly accomplished supplying his army 
 with the clothing absolutely necssary 'for marching. 
 He complains, however, of his want of cavalry, and 
 concludes: 
 
 " Without more cavalry horses our communications, from 
 the moment we march, would be at the mercy of the large 
 cavalry fores of the enemy, and it would not be possible for 
 us to cover our rlanks properly, or to obtain the necessary in- 
 formation of the position and movements of the enemy in 
 such a way as to insure success. My experience has shown 
 the necessity of a large and efficient cavalry foice. Under the 
 foregoing circumstances. I beg leave to ask whether the Presi- 
 dent desires me to march on the enemy at once or to await 
 the reception of the new horses, every possible step having 
 been taken to iusure their prompt arrival." 
 
 To this Gen. Halleck replies on the same day. at 
 3:30 p.m.: 
 
 " Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the Presi- 
 dent. He directs me to say that he hps no change to make in 
 his order of the 6th inst. If you have not been, and are not 
 now, in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such 
 want of ability. 'Ihe President doeb not expect impossibili- 
 ties, but is very anxious that all this good weather should 
 not be wasted In inactivity." 
 
 On the 22dof October Gen. McClellan telegrapba: 
 
 " Alter full consultation, I have decided to move upon th« 
 line indicated by the President in his letter of the 13th inst., 
 and have accordingly taken steps to execute the movement. 
 I will inform you, from time to time, of the occupation of 
 Leesburg, Hillsborough, Suickersville, fee. I shall need all 
 the cavalry and other re-enforcements you can send me from 
 Washington." 
 
 On the 23d Gen. Halleck replies: 
 
 " Should you move as proposed in your telegram of yester- 
 day, I can send about 20,000 men from Washington to re-en- 
 force you." 
 
 ABOUT CAVALRY. 
 
 On the 25th of October Gen. McClellan transmits 
 to Gen. Halleck a report of Col. Robert Williams, 
 commanding a detachment of cavalry, in which it is 
 stated that nearly half his horses are unsound, from 
 " sore tongue, grease, and consequent lameness and 
 sore backs," and that "the horse3 which are still 
 sound are absolutely broken down from fatigue and 
 want of flesh." 
 
 To this the President replies to Gen. McClellan 
 on tte same day: 
 
 " I have just read your dispatch about sore tongue and fa- 
 tigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the 
 horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam 
 that fatigues anything?" 
 
 Gen. McClellan replies on the same day: 
 " In reply to your telegram of this date, I have the honor to 
 state, from the time this army left Washington, on the 7th of 
 September, my cavalry has been constantly employed in mak- 
 ing recoanoissances, scouting and picketing. Since the battle 
 of Antietam six regiments have made a trip of 200 miles, march- 
 ine 55 miles in one day, while endeavoring to reach Stuart's cav- 
 alry. Gen. Pleasauton, in his official report, states that he, 
 with the remainder of our available cavalry, while on Stuart's 
 track, marched 78 miles in 24 honurs. Beside th^se two re- 
 markable expeditions, our cavalry has been engaged in picket- 
 inn and scouting 150 miles of river front since the battle of 
 Ail tietam, and haV made repeated reconnoissances since that 
 time, engaging the enemy on every occasion, and, indeed, it 
 has performed harder service since the battle than before. I 
 beg that you will also consider that this same cavalry was 
 brought from tbe peninsul", where it encountered most la- 
 borious service, and was, at the commencement of this cam- 
 paign, in low condition, and from that time to the present has 
 had no time to recruit. If any instance can be foutid where 
 overworked cavalry has performed more labor than mine 
 since the battle of Antietam I am not conscious of it." 
 The following is the reply of the President: 
 " Yours, in reply to mine, about horses, received. Of 
 course, you know the facts better than I. Still, two considera 
 tions remain: Stuaii's cavalry outmarched ours, having cer- 
 tainly done more marked service on the peninsula aid every- 
 where since. Secondly, will not a movement of our anny 
 be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the enemy to concen- 
 trate nstead of 'foraging' in squads everywhere?" 
 
 MORE MEN WANTED. 
 
 On the 27th of October, Gen. McClellan tele- 
 graphed to the President: 
 
 •'Your excellency is aware of the very great reduction of 
 numbers that has taken place in most of the old regiments of 
 this command, and how necessary it is to fill up these skele- 
 tons before taking them again into action. 1 have the honor, 
 therefore, to request that the order to till up the old regiments 
 with drafted men may at once be issued." 
 
 To this the President replies as follows on the 
 same day: 
 
 " Your dispa'ch of 3 p. m. of to-day. in regard to filling up 
 old regiments with drafted men, is received, and tte request 
 therein shall be complied with as far as practicable. 
 
 'And now I ask a distinct answer to the question: Is it your 
 purpose not to go into action again until the rxen now being 
 drafted in the States are incorporated in the old regiments?" 
 
 The following is Gen. McClellan's reply— after re- 
 ferring to previous communications in relation to fill- 
 ing up the old regiments, he says: 
 
 " In the press of business, I then called an aide, 
 and telling him 1 had conversed with you upon the 
 subjected, 1 directed him to write for me s dispatch, 
 asking your excellency to have the necessary order 
 given. I regret to say that this officer, after wriiing 
 the dispatch, finding me still engaged, sent it to the 
 telegraph office witnout first submitting it to me, 
 under the impression tbat he had communicated my 
 
views. He, however, unfortunately added, 1 before 
 taking them into action again.' Tnia phrase was not 
 authorized or intended by me. It has conveyed al- 
 together an erroneous impression as to my plans and 
 intentions. To your excellency's question I answer 
 distinctly that 1 have not had any idea of postponing 
 the advance until the old regiments are filled by 
 drafted men. I commenced crossing the army into 
 Virginia yesterday, and shall push forward as rap- 
 idly as possible to endeavor to meet the enemy." 
 
 Your Committee would say tuat, in their opinion, 
 a stall' officer who could, f rom negligence or other 
 cause, add to a dispatch from the General command- 
 ing an army to the President, that which tl was not 
 authorized or intended," should at least be assigned 
 to some Ooher duty. 
 
 m'clellan takes four weeks to cross the 
 
 POTOMAC. 
 
 The movement of the army across the river, which 
 was commenced upon the 2(ith of October, coulinued 
 slowly, uutil on the 5th of November Gen. McClel- 
 lan announced to the President that the last corps 
 of his army finished crossing on the 3d of Novem- 
 ber, just four weeks from the time the order to cross 
 was given. 
 
 In the letter to the President, of the 17th of Oc- 
 tober, Gen. McClellan writes: 
 
 " Your Excellency may be assured that 1 will not adopt a 
 coarse which differs at all from your views without first fully 
 explaining my reasons aud giving you time to issue such in- 
 structions as niay seem best to you." 
 
 THE END OF M'CLELLAN. 
 Gen. McClellan was relieved from the command 
 of tne Army of the Potomac, in pursuance of the 
 following orders: 
 
 "Headquarters of the Army. ) 
 " Washington, D. C, Nov. 5, 1862. 5 
 " General: On receipt of the order of the President, sent 
 herewith, you will immeJiately turn over your command to 
 Major-Gen. Buruside, aud repair to Treutou. New-Jersey, 
 reporting ou your arrival at that place by telegraph for further 
 orders. Very respectfully, your obedient servant. 
 
 " H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 
 "Major-Gen. McClellan. Commauuing, &c, &c." 
 
 "War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, i 
 " Washington, Nov. 5, 1862. J 
 "General Orders, No. 182. — By direction of the Presi- 
 dent of the United States, it is ordered that Maior-Gen. 
 McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the 
 Potomac, and that Major-Gen. Burn»ide take th<j command of 
 that army. 
 
 " By order of the Secretary of War. 
 
 "E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General." 
 
 OPERATIONS UNDER GEN. BURNSIDE. 
 
 Upon assuming command of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, Gen. Burnside at once determined to follow 
 the line of operations which be had previously sug- 
 gested to Gen. McClellan; that is, to make Fred- 
 ericksburg the base of his operations. He assumed 
 command ou the 7th or 8th of November, aud on the 
 9tb forwarded to Washington his proposed plan of 
 operations. On the 12th of November Gen. Halleck 
 came to Warrenton, and, with Gen. Meigs, had a 
 conversation with Gen. Burnside upon tne future 
 movements of the army. 
 
 Gen. Buruside stated that his plan was " to con- 
 centrate the army in the neighborhood of Warren- 
 ton; to make a small movement across the Rappa- 
 hannock, as a feint, with a view to divert the 
 attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe 
 that we were going to move in the direction of Gor- 
 donsville, and then to make a rapid movement of the 
 whole army to Fredericksburg;" for the reason 
 that " we would all the time be as near Washington 
 as would the enemy, and after arriving at Freder- 
 icksburg we would be at a point nearer to Kich- 
 mond than we would be even if we should take 
 Gordonsville." 
 
 THE PONTOONS — WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
 THEIR DELAY? 
 Gen. Burnside desired to have provisions and 
 forage, together wich pontoons to enable the army 
 to cross the liappuhaunock. Gen. Meigs testifies 
 that while at Warrenton he wrote an order to Gen. 
 Woodbury, in VVcis'iiugtou, to call on the Quarter- 
 master at Washington for transportation for the 
 
 24- 
 
 pontoons to Acquia Creek, which order Gen. Halleck 
 bigned, and it was sent off' to the telegraph office. 
 
 WOODBURY SAYS HE WAS NOT. » 
 
 Gen. Woodbury states that he received that order 
 on the morning of the 13th of Nov. He testifies: 
 
 " Gen. Halleck's order to me of the 13th mad* it apparent 
 that the army was preparing to march to Fredericksburg. As 
 to the time when the movement would be mude I never re- 
 ceived ar.y information. Fearing, however, that the move- 
 ment wo iid be precipitate. I weat to Gen. Halleck's office, 
 and urged him to delay the movement some five days, in order 
 that the necessary preparations might be made to insure 
 succes?. To this he replied that he would do nothing to 
 deliy for au instant the advance of thearmy oa Rich- 
 mond. I rejoiued that my suggestion was not intended to 
 cause deliy, but rather to prevent r. In making this sugges- 
 tion I had reference not only to the pontoon traia, but the 
 landiugs still to be created lor the Quartermaster and Com- 
 missary Departments." 
 
 HALLECK SAYS HE WAS NOT. 
 Gen. Halleck testifies: 
 
 " I will state that all the troops in Washington and its vi- 
 cinity were under the command of Gen. McClellan when he 
 was relieved, and be issued his orders directly to the com- 
 manding officer of Washington, with one single restriction: 
 that no troops should be moved from the comojand of Wash- 
 ington until I was notified by Gen. McClellan or the com- 
 manding officer here. In all other respects thej' were all un- 
 der bib direction. Gen. Burnsi ie, when he relieved him, was 
 told that they lemained precisely the same as before. On my 
 visit to Gen. Burnside, at Warrenton, on the 12th of Novem- 
 ber, in speaking about the boats and things that he required 
 from here, I repeated to him that they were all subject to his 
 oiders with that single exception. To prevent the necessity 
 of the commanding officer here reporting the order lor the 
 boats here, the order was drawn up upon hi* table, and signed 
 by me, directly to Gen. Woodbury, ou the evening of the 
 12th, 1 think— the evening that I was there. I saw Gen. 
 Woodbury on my return, and he told me he had received the 
 order. I told him that in all these matters he was under Gen. 
 Burnside's direction. I had nothing further to give him, ex- 
 cept to communicate that order to him. In conversation with 
 him and Gen. Meigs, it was proposed that the train of pon- 
 toous should go down by laud, as they could be gotten down 
 sooner in that way, without interfering with the supplies 
 which had to be sent to Acquia Creek. 1 gave no other o'rder 
 or direction in relation to the matter than that all other mat- 
 ters were under Gen. Burnside's direction, lie also informed 
 me, while at Warrenton, that Capt. Duane, Chief of the Engi- 
 neers, had also sent an order to Harper's Ferry for the pon- 
 toon traiu there to go down. The order had been issued. 
 They being under Gen. Burnside's immediate and direct com- 
 mand, I did not interfere at all in relation to them. 
 
 " Question. Do you know whether there was any delay in 
 etartina them, or in their progress there? 
 
 " Answer. I heard that there was a delay from the steam- 
 ers getting aground with the pontoons; aud there was a delay, 
 as 1 understood, in the train going down by laud, on account 
 of the difficulty of the roads, and the inexperience, perhaps, 
 of the officers in command, and it had to be taken by water 
 part of the way ; it could not get get through by land. I con- 
 sidered, from tne reports I received, that these delay s resulted 
 mainly from accident aud the elements, that no man had any 
 control over. Gpn. Burnside telegraphed to me in relation to 
 Gen. Woodbury, thinking that he had not used due diligence j 
 but afterward told me he was perfectly satisfied with what 
 Geu. Wooabury had done, and tuat he did not know but what 
 the commanding officer of the train that went devvn had done 
 his duty also; that he was disposed to make no further in- 
 vestigation of that matter; that he was pretty well satisfied. 
 
 " Question. Was there any request for you to delay the 
 advance of the men until the boats arrived, or anything of 
 that kind 1 
 
 "Answer. No, Sir. I remember this, that Gen. Wood- 
 bury, in conversation with me, said that Gen. Buruside could 
 not get down for several days alter I told him, and that he 
 coulu not land the boats until Gen. Burnside arrived; 1 think 
 I remarked to him that I did not know exactly the day when 
 Gen. Burnside would move; but 1 could not tell him, as the 
 General did not know himself. Wliile I was ar Warrenton he 
 proposed this movement, and he was directed to brake all 
 preparations for it. but not to begin it until the President 
 was consulted. 1 returned on the afternoon of the 13tb, and, 
 1 think, ou the morning of the 14th, I had an interview with 
 the President, in which he consented to Gen. Burnside's 
 plans, and I ioiiuediateiy telegraphed to him to go ahead as he 
 had proposed. 1 understood that there was considerable 
 deiay in getting the boats from Acqiia down to the Rappa- 
 baunock River, on account of the bad roads, difficulty of 
 transportation, &c, but no other delay than that whica would 
 naturally occur over a rough couutry lite that; aud acci- 
 dental delay in laying the biidges was reported to me, from 
 the inexperience of the poutouiers who laid the upper 
 bridges ; there was considerable delay in that. We could not 
 commence the repair of the rtilroad until Gen. Burnside took 
 po.-session of it, as it was all in the possession of the enemy, 
 'i hat was understood betweeu him and Gen. iiaupt, in my 
 pieseuce. Geu. Haupt went out with me to make the ar- 
 rangement for repairing the roads as early as pos»ible. I re- 
 member the conversation ; he could not laud anything, but 
 would have everything down ready as ooon as he could, and 
 
25 
 
 when he found Gen. Burnside was in possession, he would 
 cominence." 
 
 BURNSIDE EVIDENTLY WAS NOT. 
 
 Gen. Burnside testifies in relation to the forward- 
 ing of the pontoons: 
 
 " I understood that Gen. Halleck was to ?ive the necessary 
 orders, and then the officers who should receive those orders 
 were the ones responsible for the pontoons coming here 
 (Fredericksbun?). I could have earned out that part of the 
 plan through officers of my own; but, having just taken the 
 command of an army with which I was but little acquainted, 
 it W88 evident that it wa* as much as I could attend to, with 
 the assistance of all my officers, to change its position from 
 Warren ton to Fredericksburg ; and I felt, indeed I expected, 
 that all the parts of the plan which were to be executed In 
 Washington would be attended to by the officers at that 
 place, under the direction of the different departments to 
 which those parts of the plan appertained. 
 
 " Question. Did you or not understand thaf you yourself 
 were to be responsible for seeing that those orders were car- 
 ried out ? 
 
 "Answer. I did not. I never imagined for a moment that 
 I had to carry out anything that required to be done in Wash- 
 ington." 
 
 On the 16th of November Gen. Burnside started 
 the columns of his army from Warrenton to Freder- 
 icksburg, not having heard anything of the delay of 
 the pontoons from Washington. The telegram an- 
 nouncing the delay did not reach Gen. Burnside 
 until the 19th of November. The corps of Gen. 
 Sumner was in the advance, and it was the intent on 
 that he should cross over to Fredericksburg and take 
 possession of the place. But the non-arrival of the 
 pontoons in time prevented the movement which 
 had been contemplated, and necessitated the adop- 
 tion of other measures. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 Gen. Burnside then began to make preparations 
 for another movement, bringing up the pontoons as 
 rapidly as possible, to euuble his forces to cross the 
 river j 
 
 The plan determined upon was to cross the river 
 at two points; the right wing to cross opposite Fred- 
 ericksburg, and the left win« to cross from three to 
 four miles below the city. The left wing was com- 
 posed of the Left Grand Division, with a corps from 
 the Center Grand Division, making a force of from 
 50,000 to 60,000 men, the whole being under com- 
 mand of Maj.-Gen. Franklin. The crossing was 
 made successfully at both points, but with much op- 
 position from sharpshooters on the right. 
 
 PLAN OF BATTLE. 
 
 Gen. Burnside states the following in regard to 
 his plan of attack: 
 
 " The enerny had cut a road along in the rear of the line of 
 hights where we made our attack, by meaos of which they 
 connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long 
 detour around through a bad country. 1 obtained from a 
 colored man, from the other side of the town, information in 
 regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted 
 to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason 
 for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend 
 to make the attack on the right until that position had 
 been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, 
 cutting their line in two; and then 1 proposed to make a 
 direct attack on theirfront and drive them out of their works." 
 ORDERS TO FRANKLIN. 
 
 The following is the order to Gen. Franklin, who 
 commanded the left: 
 
 " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ? 
 
 " December 13, 5:55 a. m. i 
 
 " Gen. Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain 
 with yon during the day. The general commanding directs 
 that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid 
 movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send 
 out at once a division, at lea^t, to pass below Smithfield, to 
 seize, if possible, the bights near Capt. Hamilton's, on this 
 side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, 
 and its line of retreat open. He ha3 ordered another column 
 of a division or more to be moved from Gen. Sumner's com- 
 mand up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph 
 road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the 
 bights on both of those roads. Holding these higbts, with the 
 hights near Capt. Hamilton's, will, 1 hope, compel the enemy 
 to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes 
 these moves by columns, distant from each other, with a 
 view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own 
 forces, which might occur in a general movement during the 
 fog. Two of Gen. Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the 
 bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instruc- 
 tions to Gens. Suomer and Hooker will be forwarded to you 
 by an orderlv very soon. Yoa will keep your whole com- 
 mand in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. 
 The watchword which, if possible, should be given to every 
 company, will be ' Scott.' 
 
 " 1 have the honor to he. General, very respectfully, your 
 obedient servant, JOHN G. PAttKE, Chief ot Staff. 
 
 '' Major-Gen. Fkanrmn, Commanding Department, Grant! 
 Division Army of Potomac." 
 
 FRANKLIN'S INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. 
 
 Gen. Franklin states, when last examined, that 
 he received the above order at about 7:30 a. m., and 
 that he at once took measures to carry out what he 
 considered to be the meaning of the order, that is, 
 *' an armed observa'.ion to ascertain where the enemy 
 was." In his testimony, given when your Commit- 
 tee were at Falmouth, he says: *'I put in all the 
 troops that I thought it proper and prudent to put in. 
 I fought the whole strength of my command, as far 
 as I could, and at the same time keep my connection 
 with the river open." 
 
 FRANKLIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFEAT. 
 
 From the testimony it would appear that the at- 
 tack was in reality made by one of the smallest di- 
 visions in Gen. Franklin's command — the division 
 of Gen. Meade, numbering about 4,500 men. This 
 division was supported on its right by Gen. Gibton'a 
 Division of about 5,000 men. On the left was Gen. 
 Doubleday's Division, forming the extreme left of 
 our line, nearly at right angles with Gen. Meade's 
 Division, and extending to the river. Just as Gen. 
 Meade's Division advanced to the attack, Gen. Bir- 
 ney's Division, of Gen. Stoneman's corps, numbering 
 about 7,000, came up and took position immediately 
 in rear of Geo. Meade. 
 
 GEN. BIRNEY FAILS TO SUPPORT MEADE'S AT- 
 TACK. 
 
 The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing 
 the first line of the enemy, and gaining the crest of 
 the hill. Gen. Gibbon, seeing Gen. Meade advanc- 
 ing to the attack, ordered his division forward. Af- 
 ter his last brigade had advanced, driving the enemy 
 with the bayonet, and he was preparing his batter- 
 ies to open upon a Rebel regiment that made their 
 appearance on his left, Gen. Gibbon was wounded 
 and taken from the field. Gen. Meade's division 
 having reached the crest of the hill, formed them- 
 selves in the presence of the reserves of the enemy, 
 who opened fire upon them in front, and they also re- 
 ceived a fire upon their flank. The superiority of 
 the enemy was so overwhelming that Meade's divis- 
 ion was forced back, as was also Gibbon's divMon. 
 The enemy pursued uniil checked by Birney's divis- 
 ion. Our lorces continued to hold their position, 
 without renewing the attack, until they were or- 
 dered to withdraw across the river. 
 
 The losses sustained in the attack, in killed, 
 wounded, and missing, were as follows: Meade's 
 division, 1,760; Gibbon's division, 1,249; Birney's 
 division, 961. 
 
 FRANKLIN DISOBEYS A DDRECT ORDER TO 
 ATTACK. 
 
 Gen. Burnside, upon hearing of the small force 
 ordered to attack the enemy, sent an order to Gen. 
 Franklin to make a vigorous attack with his whole 
 force. Several of the witnesses testify that had the 
 attack been renewed with all the available force 
 tinder Gen. Franklin's command it would have been 
 successful. Gen. Franklin testifies that it was not 
 an order, but a request, and that when he received it 
 it was too late to renew the attack, and therefore he 
 did not do H. 
 
 Gen. Franklin testifies as follows: 
 
 " The order under which 1 was acting directed that the line 
 of retreat should be kept open. It also directed that I snould 
 hold my troops in position lor a rapid march down the Rich- 
 mond road. I never dreamed that this was considered as a 
 strong attack at all, until since the battle took place. At that 
 time 1 had no idea that it was the main attack, but supposed 
 it was an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy 
 was. * * * * * * I was 
 
 strengthened in this opinion by the staff officer who brought 
 it, (the order). \* ***** * 
 
 " Question. Did you not understand, from this order, that 
 you were to use all the troops necessary to seize and bold the 
 higbts near Capt. Hamilton's, and that the General command- 
 ing considered that that was necessary to be done in order to 
 secure success? 
 
 " Answer. No ; I did not. I should suppose that the crder 
 would not have limited me to ' at least a division,' as the word- 
 ing of it shows, had such beeu his intention ; and. besides, he 
 directs me to keep my whole command is position to move 
 
26 
 
 along the old Richmond road. If he had intended me to rise 
 my whole force, if necessary, to hold that hill, he hardly 
 would have coupled it with the condition to keep my com- 
 mand in readiness for this other movement. 
 
 " Question. Was the other movement feasible until after the 
 possession of those hi^hts by our troops ? 
 
 '• Answer. 1 think that the other movement, if it had been 
 ordered with my whole force, would have necessarily involved 
 the possession of those hights. Had I been ordered to move my 
 whole force along the Richmoud road, I should have been com- 
 pelled to take all that would be found in the road, and those 
 hights would have been in the road. 
 
 "Question. As it was indispensable that we should have 
 possession of tho^e hights in order to move down the old 
 Richmond road, and as you were ordered to send out at least 
 one division to pass below Smithfield and seize, if possible, 
 those bights, did jou not deem that the order required of you 
 that you should, when repulsed in the first attempt, renew 
 the attack ? 
 
 " Answer. 1 think it did ; but by the time the Rebels were 
 driven back into the woods by Birney's division and Sickles'* 
 division, it was past 3 o'clock. It was dark, at that time, by 
 5 o'clock, and it was too late then to make such aa attempt 
 with the slightest hope of success." 
 
 The testimony of all the witnesses before your 
 Committee proves most conclusively that, had the 
 attack been made upon the left with all the force 
 which Gen. Franklin could have used for that pur- 
 pose, the plan of Gen. Burnside would have been 
 completely successful, and our army would have 
 achieved a most brilliant victory. 
 
 After the attack on Saturday, our army remained 
 in position until Monday night, when it was with- 
 drawn across the rivef without loss. 
 
 Your Committee have not considered it essential 
 to report upon the operations of the right wing of 
 our army in this battle, for the reason that the suc- 
 cess of the movement evidently depended to a very 
 great extent upon the successful operation of the 
 left. Although our troops on the ri.'ht fought most 
 gallantly, making repeated attacks, r,:e strength of 
 the eEemy's position "was such that our forces were 
 compelled to retire. 
 
 AFTER FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 On Jan. 26, 1863, the following resolution was 
 adopted by the Senate, and referred to your Com- 
 mittee: 
 
 " Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
 be instructed to inquire whether Major-Gen. A. E. Burnside 
 has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for 
 the movement of the Army of the Potomac, or any partion of 
 the same : and if so, whether any subordinate Generals of said 
 army have written to or visiied Washington, co oppose or 
 interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether 
 such proposed movements have been arrested or interfered 
 with, and if so. by what authority." 
 
 Under that resolution, your Committee proceeded 
 to take the testimony of Major-Gene. A. E. Burn- 
 side aud John G. Parke, and Brig.-Gens. John New- 
 ton, John Cochrane, aud William W. Averill. Tnat 
 testimony brings to light the following facts: 
 "burnside's plans. 
 
 Shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg, Gen. 
 Burnside devised a plan for attacking the enemy in 
 his front. Tbe main army was to cross at a place 
 some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. The 
 positions for the artillery to protect the crossing 
 were all selected, the roads were all surveyed, and 
 the corduroy was cut for preparing the roads. At 
 the same time a feint of crossing was to be made 
 some distance above Falmouth, which feiLt could 
 be turned into a positive attack should the enemy 
 discover the movement below; otherwise the main 
 attack was to be made below. 
 
 A GRAND CAVALRY EXPEDITION. 
 
 In connection with this movement of the main 
 army, a cavalry expedition was organized, consist- 
 ing of 2 500 of tne best cavalry in the Army of the Po- 
 tomaa, 1,000 of whom were picked men. The plan 
 of that expedition was as loDows: Accompanied by 
 a brigade of inlantiy detailed to protect the crossing 
 of the Rappahannock, it was to proceed up to 
 Kelly's Ford; there the 1,000 picked men were to 
 cross", and to proceed to the Rapidan and cross that 
 river at Raccoon Ford; then to go onward and cross 
 the Virginia Central Kail road at Louisa Court- 
 House; the James River at Goochland or Carter's, 
 blowing up the locks of the Jamts River Canal at 
 the place ef crossing; cross the Richmond and 
 Lynchburg Railroad at a point south of there, blow- 
 
 ing up the iron-bridge at the place of crossing; crota 
 the Richmond. Petersburg and Weldon Riilroad 
 where it crossed the Nottoway River, destroying the 
 railroad bridge there; and then proceed on by Gen. 
 Pryor's command, and 6ffect a junction with Gen. 
 Peck, at Suffolk, were steamers were to be in wait- 
 ing to take them to Ac quia Creek. 
 
 To distract the attention of the enemy, and de- 
 ceive them in regard to which body of cavalry wai 
 the attacking column, at the time the thousand 
 picked men crossed the Rappahannock, a portion of 
 the remaining l,5'-)0 was to proceed toward W^rren- 
 ton; another portion toward Culpepper Cjurt- 
 House; and the remainder were to accompany the 
 thousand picked men as far as Raccoon Ford, and 
 then return. While this country expedition was in 
 progress, the general movement was to be made 
 across the river. 
 
 On the 26th of December, an order was issued for 
 the entire command to prepare three days' cooked 
 rations; to have their wagons filled with ten days' 
 small rations, if possible; to have from ten to twelve 
 days' supply of beef cattle with them; to take 
 forage for their teams and their artillery and cavalry 
 horses, and the requisite amount of ammunition — in 
 fact, to be in a condition to move at twelve' hours' 
 notice. 
 
 GENS. COCHRANE AND NEWTON TRY TO PRE- 
 JUDICE THE PRESIDENT AGAINST BURN- 
 SIDE. 
 
 Shortly after that order was issued Gen. John 
 Newton and Gen. John Cochrane — the one com- 
 manding a division and the other a brigade in the 
 left Grand Division, under Gen. Wm. B. Franklin 
 came up to Washington on leave of absence. Pre- 
 vious to obtaining leave of absence from Gen. 
 Franklin, they informed him and Gen. Wm. F. 
 Smith that when they came to Washington they 
 should take the opportunity to represent to some 
 one in authority here the dispirited condition of the 
 army, aud the danger there was in attempting any 
 movement against the enemy at that time. 
 
 When they reached Washington, Gen. Cochrane, 
 as he states, endeavored to find certain members of 
 Congress, to whom to make the desired communica- 
 tion. Failing to find them, he determined to seek 
 an interview with the President for the purpose of 
 making the communication directly to nim. On 
 proceeding to the President's house, he there met 
 Secretary Seward, to whom he explained the object 
 of his being there and the general purport of bis pro- 
 posed communication to the President, and requested 
 him to procure an interview for them, whtcu Mr. 
 Seward promised -to do, and which he did do. 
 
 THE GENERALS PREVARICATE. 
 
 That day the interview took place, and Gen. 
 Newton opened the subject to the President. At 
 first the President, as Gen. Newton expresses it, 
 " very naturally conceived that they hud co j»e there 
 for the purpose of injuriug Gen. Burnside, a;,d sug- 
 gesting some other person to fill his place." Gen. 
 Newton states, that while he firmly believed that 
 tne principal cause of the dispirited conaition of the 
 army was the want of confidence in the military ca- 
 pacity of Gen. Burnside, he deemed it improper to 
 say so to the President " right square out, " and 
 therefore endtavoied to convey the same idea indi- 
 rectly. When asked if he cousideieu it any less im- 
 proper to do such a thing indirectly than it was to 
 dout directly, he qualified his previous acs rtioo. by 
 saying that his object was to imormthe P*»si lent of 
 wnat he considered to be the condition ot the aiiny, 
 in the hope that the President wo'.ild mase inquiry 
 and learn the true cause for himteif. Upon perceiv- 
 ing this impression w t on the miud of the President, 
 Gens. Newton aui Cochrane state that they hast- 
 ened to assure the President that he was entirely 
 mistaken, and so far succeeded that at the close of 
 the interview ihe President said to them he wai 
 glad they had called upon him, at d tnat he hoped 
 that good would result from the interview. / 
 THE PRESIDENT INTERFERES. 
 
 To return to Gen. Bnrnude. The cavalry expe 
 
27 
 
 dition had started ; the brigade of infantry detailed 
 to accompany it had crossed the Rappahannock at 
 Richard's Ford and returned by way of Ellis's Ford, 
 leaving the way clear for the cavalry to cross at 
 Kelly's Ford. The day they had arranged to make 
 the crossing Gen. Barnside received from the Presi- 
 dent the following telegram: 
 
 " I have good reason for saying that you must not make a 
 general movement without letting me know of it" 
 
 Gen. Burnside states that, be could not imagine, at 
 the time, what reason the President could have for 
 sending him 6uch a telegram. None of the officers 
 of his command, except one or two of his staff who 
 had remained in camp, had been told anything of 
 his plan beyond the simple fact that a movement 
 was to be made. He could only suppose that the 
 dispatch related in some way to important military 
 movements in other parts of the country, in which it 
 was necessary to have cooperation. 
 
 THE CAVALRY HALTING. 
 
 Upon tba receipt of that telegram, steps were im- 
 mediately taken to halt the cavalry expedition 
 where it then was (at Kelly's Ford) until further 
 orders. A portion of it was shortly afterward sent 
 off to intercept Stuart, who had just made a raid to 
 Dumfries and the neighborhood of Fairfax Court- 
 House, which it failed to do. 
 
 BURNSIDE COMES TO WASHINGTON. 
 
 Gen. Burnside came to Washington to ascertain 
 from the President the true state of the case. He 
 was informed by the President that some general 
 officers from the Army of the Potomac, whose names 
 he declined to give, had called upon him and repre- 
 sented that Gen. Burnside contemplated soon mak- 
 ing a movement, and that the army was so dispirited 
 and demoralized that any attempt to make a move- 
 ment at that, time must result in disaster; that no 
 prominent officers in toe Army of the Po-omac were 
 in favor of any movement at that time. 
 
 Gen. Burnside informed the President that none 
 of his officers had been informed what his plan was, 
 and then proceeded to explain it in detail to the 
 President. He urged upon the President to grant 
 him permission to carry it out, but the President de- 
 clined to do so at that time. Gen. Halleck and Sec- 
 retary Stanton were sent for, and then learned, for 
 the first time, of the President's actiou in stopping 
 the movement; although Gen. Hall-ck was pre- 
 viously aware that a movement was contemplated 
 by Gen. Burneide, Gen. Halleck, with Gen, Burn- 
 side, held tuat the officers who had nude those repre- 
 sentations to the President should be at once dis- 
 missed the service. Gen. Burnside remained here 
 at tbat time for two days, but no conclusion was 
 reached upon the subject. 
 
 HIS PLANS BECOME KNOWN TO THE REBELS. 
 
 When he returned to his camp he learned that 
 many of the details of the general movement, 
 and the details of the cavalry expedition, had 
 become known to the Rebel sympathizers in Wash- 
 ington, thereby rendering that plan impracticable. 
 When asktd to whom he had communicated his 
 plans, he stated that he had told no one in Wash' 
 ington, except the President, Secretary Stanton, 
 and Gen. Halleck; and in his camp none knew of it, 
 except one or two of his staffi officers, who remained 
 in camp all the time. He professed himself unaole 
 to tell how his plans had become known to the 
 enemy. 
 
 HE ASKS FOR ORDERS BUT GETS NONE. 
 A correspondence then took place between the 
 President, Gen. Halleck and Gen. Burnside. Gen. 
 Burnsnie desired distinct authority from Gen. Hal- 
 leck, or some one authorized to give it, to make a 
 movement across the river. While urging the im- 
 portance and necessity for such a movement, he can- 
 didly admitted tnat there was hardly a general officer 
 in his command wno approvea of it. Wniie willing 
 to take upon himself all the responsibility of the 
 movement, and promising to keep in view the Presi- 
 dent's caution concerning any risk of destroying the 
 army of the Potomac, he desired to have at least 
 Gen. Halleck's sanction or permission to make the 
 movement. Gen. Halleck replied that while he had 
 
 always favored a forward movement, he could not 
 take the responsibility of giving any directions as to 
 how and when it should be made. 
 
 HE TAKES THE RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 Gen. Burnside then determined to make a move 
 ment without any further correspondence on the 
 subject. He wa6 unable to devise any as promising 
 as the one just thwarted by this interference of his 
 subordinate officers, which interference gave the ene- 
 my tue time, if not the means, to ascertain rvhat he 
 had proposed to do. He, however, devised a plan 
 of movement, and proceeded to put it in execution. 
 As is well kuown, it was rendered abortive in con- 
 sequence of the severe storm which took place 
 shortly after the movement began. 
 
 Gen. Burnside states that, besides the inclemency 
 of the weather, there was another powerful reason 
 for abandoning the movement, viz: the almost uni- 
 versal feeling among his general officers against it. 
 Some of those officers freely gave vent to their feel- 
 ings in the presence of their inferiors. 
 
 GENERAL ORDER NO. 8. 
 
 In consequence of this, and also what had taken 
 place during the battle of Fredericksburg, &c. Gen. 
 Burnside directei an order to be issued, which he 
 styled general order No. 8. 
 
 That order dismissed same officers from the ser- 
 vice, subject to the approval of the President, re- 
 lieved others from duty with the army of the Poto- 
 mac, and also pronounced sentence of death upon 
 some deserters who had been tried and convicted. 
 
 Gen. Burnside states that he had become satisfied 
 that it was absolutely necessary that some such, ex- 
 amples should be made, in order to enable him to 
 maintain the proper authority over the army unler 
 his command. The order was duly siguea and is- 
 sued, and only waited publication. 
 
 Two or t hree of his most trusted staff officers rep- 
 resented to Gen. Burnside that should he then pub 
 lish that order, he would force upon the President 
 the necessity of at once sanctioning it, or, by refus- 
 ing his approval, assume an attitude of hostility to 
 Gen. Burnsid". The publication of the o.der was 
 accordingly delayed for the time. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT REFUSES TO SUSTAIN BURN- 
 SIDE. 
 
 Gen. Burnside came to Washington and laid the 
 order before the President, with the distiuct assur- 
 ance that in no other way could he exerc se a proper 
 command over the Army of the Potomac; and he 
 asked the President to sanction the order, or accept 
 his resignation as major-general. The President 
 acknowledgtd that Gen. Burnside was right, but 
 declined to decide without consulting with some of 
 his advisers. To this Gen. Burnside replied that, if 
 the President took time for consultation, he would 
 not be allowed to publish that order, and therefore 
 asked to have his resignation accepted at once. 
 This the President declined to do. 
 
 HOW BURNSIDE CAME TO BE RELIEVED. 
 
 Gen. Burnside returned to his camp aud came 
 again to Washington that night at the request of 
 the Presideuc, aud the next morning called upon the 
 President for his decision. He was informed that 
 the President declined to approve his order No. 8, 
 but had concluded to relieve him from the command 
 of the Army of the Potomac, aud to appoiut Gen. 
 Hooker in "his place. Thereupon Geu Burnside 
 again insisted that his resignation be accepted. This 
 the President declined to do; and, afier some urg- 
 ing, Gen. Burnside consented to take a leave of ab- 
 sence for thirty days, with the understanding that 
 at the end of that "lime he should be assigned to 
 duty, as he deemed it impioper to hold a commission 
 as major-general and receive his pay without ren- 
 dering service theretor. Gen. Burnside objectea to 
 the wording of ttte order which relieved him from 
 his command, and which stated that it was 4> at his 
 own request," as being unjust to him and unfound- 
 ed in fact; but upon the representation that any 
 other order would do injury to the cause, he con- 
 sented to let it remain as it then read. 
 
 The foregoing statement of the facts proved, to- 
 
28 
 
 gether with the testimony herewith submitted, so 
 fully and directly meet i l ae requirements of the 
 resolution referred to them, that your Committee 
 deem any comment by them to be entirely unne- 
 cessary. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Your committee think it better to submit the testi- 
 mony which they have taken in relation to the con- 
 duct of the war, without criticism to any consider- 
 able extent of military plans or movements, leaving 
 each reader to form his own conclusions from the 
 testimony, and such opinions of competent military 
 men as it mav contain. 
 
 As they look back over the struggle of the past 
 two years, thev feel that although we have not, ac- 
 complished all that we hoped and expected within 
 the time, still the great progress made gives us full 
 assurance of final success. 
 
 When the Government took its first active steps 
 toward resisting the Rebellion the Rebels had been 
 for more than five months actively and openly 
 making preparations to resist its authority and defy 
 its jurisdiction. They had usurped the control of 
 the machinery of one State government after another, 
 and thus overawed the loyal people of those States. 
 They had even so far control of the Federal Govern- 
 ment itself as to make it not only acquiesce, for the 
 time being, in measures for its own destruction, but 
 contribute to that end. They had seized and taken 
 into their possession the arms and muuitious of war 
 of the government. They had scattered and 
 demoralized the army, and "sent the navy to the 
 most distant parts of the world. 
 
 There was treason in the Executive maneion, 
 treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and 
 the House of Representatives, treason in the army 
 and navy, treason in every department, bureau and 
 office connected with the Government. When the 
 new Administration came into power it was neces 
 earily obliged to adopt its measures with the greatest 
 caution, scarcely knowing friend from foe. An army 
 and navy had to be created. There was scarcely a 
 battalion of loyal national troops to protect the capi- 
 tal; and the first sense of security felt in the capital 
 was when the volunteer troops entered it, summoned 
 from their homes for its protection. At the same 
 time it was with great difficulty that the loyal peo- 
 ple could make themselves believe that any serious 
 resistance to the authority of the Government would 
 be attemped. There were not wanting those who 
 confidently asserted that it was but an outburst of 
 disappointed partisan spirit, which they predicted 
 would yield to jan exhibition of force, and a deter- 
 mined and united spirit on the part of the people of 
 the loyal States to suppress it. Instead of such an 
 easy suppression, we have spent two years, almost, 
 in warfare. We have thrown into the field a mil- 
 lion of men. We have poured out our resources 
 like water, and we find cu;.- Ives still ^engaged in 
 the fearful struggle. 
 
 But the national cause is not the only one for 
 which false anticipations were formed — for which 
 the present condition of things presents a striking 
 contrast with the early visions of its supporters. 
 Those who heard, in Congress and elsewhere, the 
 extravagances of the conspirators will knoAV what 
 w r ere their hopes, what their expectations. 
 
 A speedy march upon the capital ; a speedy over- 
 throw of the legal Government; a speedy submis- 
 sion of a people too pusillanimous to maintain their 
 rights; aud a speedy subjection of the whole country 
 to the assumptions of the South, were the prominent 
 features of their delusion. 
 
 The conspirations taught their people to believe 
 that if war came it would not be on their soil. As 
 yet, the hostile foot has scarcely trod the soil of a 
 free State, and it is upon the soil of the States in 
 open rebellion that tiie contest has mainly been 
 waged. 
 
 The Rebels found themselves, almost without 
 resistance, in possession of every fort and harbor on 
 the sea-coast of the revolted States, except Fort 
 Pickens, Pensacola harbor, and the isolated fortifica- 
 tion* and harbors of Tortugas and Key West. 
 
 They were, for the time being, masters of the terri- 
 tory of the revolted States, of the depots, ar*enala_ 
 and fortifications of the Government, and had high 
 hopes that all the slaveholding Border States 
 would soon be united with them. The fact that so 
 many of these States hold to-day their true and 
 loyai position in the Government demonstrates that 
 true patriotism and loyalty is not confined to any 
 section of the country, and gives lull assurance 
 that the Government will be maintained, its juris- 
 diction over every foot of our territory established, 
 and our nationality vindicated. 
 
 The events of the past two years are too fresh in 
 the memories of all to require recapitulation. 
 
 WHAT THE WAR HAS ACCOMPLISHED. 
 
 Your Committee will, however, briefly call 
 attention to the fact that, from the commencement 
 of active military and naval operations in the 
 Winter and Spring of 1862, almost uninterrupted 
 success for eight months attended all our operations, 
 resulting in va6t conquests. The triumphs of the 
 navy at Hatterae, Port Royal and Fort Henry, 
 were followed by the victories and conquests of the 
 army at Mill Spring, Fort Donelaon and Roanoke 
 Island. Missouri was wrenched from the Rebel 
 grasp, and the Rebel armies driven iuto Arkansas, 
 where thev were defeated in a pitched battle at Pea 
 Ridge. * 
 
 By the capture of Fort Donelson Kentucky was 
 permanently redeemed, the capital of one of the 
 largest revolted States seized, her great rivers laid 
 open to our flotillas, and the war carried to the bor- 
 ders of the Gulf States. The Rebel stronghold on 
 the Mississippi, Columbus, Island No. 10, Fort Pil- 
 low, together with Memphis, the most important 
 commercial city of the State, fell into our hands. 
 
 The autumn of 1861 had witnessed the important 
 capture of Hatteras and Port Royal by the navy. 
 These successes were followed through the combined 
 operations of the army and navy, in the Winter and 
 Spring of 1862, by the capture of Roanoke island 
 and Newbern, Beaufort and Fort Macon, and by 
 the reduction of the important fort, Pulaski, con- 
 trolling the entrance to the Savannah river; of Fort 
 Clinch, cont- oiling the harbor and railroad depot of 
 Fernandina; of Fort Marion, at St. Augustine. By 
 the first-nan -d operations we acquired control of the 
 spacious inhiud w r aters of North Carolina (Albemarle 
 and Pamlico sounds), and their adjacent shores, and 
 of one of her two important seaports — Beaufort. 
 By the last, we made ourselves masters of the rich 
 sea islands and important harbors extending along 
 the coast from Charleston to St. John's; leaving in 
 the possession of the Rebels, on the Atlantic coast, 
 but two harbors, Charleston and Wilmington. 
 
 But the brilliant triumphs of our army and navy 
 elsewhere were surpassed by the capture of the 
 great city of the Gulf, the depot of the great Valley 
 of the Mississippi — New-Orleans; an achievement 
 which, estimated by the importance of the conquest 
 and the noble daring of its execution, is scarcely sur- 
 passed in history. By this important conquest we 
 obtained control of a large portion of Louisiana, and 
 accomplished the mo3t important and difficult step 
 toward obtaining the entire control of the Missis- 
 sippi River, and caused the surrender of the harbor 
 of Pensacola, with the forts yet held by the 
 Rebels. 
 
 In these hastily sketched military and naval ope- 
 rations, extending in the West through the States of 
 Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee and Kentucky, and 
 on the Atlantic seaboard from Hatteras to Florida, 
 and ou the Gulf from Pensacola to the mouths of the 
 Mississippi, we really made conquests as vast as it 
 often fails to the lot "of the most powerful and war- 
 like nations to make in so short a period of time. 
 We pushed our conquests by land through Missouri, 
 Kentucky and Tennessee to the very boundaries of 
 the Gulf States; obtained control of the Mississippi 
 River, except about 200 miles; occupied the coasts of 
 North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia — a 
 large portion of Louisiana; seized every important 
 fort and harbor in the Rebel territory, save three 
 (Wilmington, Charleston and Mobile,) reducing to a 
 
29 
 
 corresponding extent the labors of the blockading 
 squadron; captured fourteen permanent sea-coast 
 forts, among winch were the largest on the South- 
 ern coaBt, such as Pulaski, Barrancas, McKae, Jack- 
 son, and St. Philip. Following these conquests was 
 the reduction of Yorktowu and the evacuation of 
 Norfolk, by which the waters of the James and 
 York Rivera were laid opeu to our lleets, and the 
 Rebels deprived of the facilities furnished by a great 
 navy-yard, and compelled to destroy their only means 
 of menacing our lleets in Hampton Roads — the Mer- 
 rimac. 
 
 WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. 
 
 Had the success of the Army of the Potomac dur- 
 ing this period corresponded with the success of our 
 arms in other parts oi the country, there is reason 
 to believe that the termination of the campaign of 
 1862 would have seen the Rebellion well-nigh, if 
 not entirely, overthrown. 
 
 Had Norfolk been captured during the Winter of 
 1861-62, and the Merrimac taken possession of or 
 destroyed, the way to Richmond, by means of the 
 James River, would have been open, and the fatal 
 delays of the Peninsula avoided; or had the enemy, 
 wheu at Manassas, some time during the Autumn of 
 1861 or Wiuter of 1S61-62, have been compelled to 
 come out from bis iutrenchments and give us 
 battle, as he might have been, by threatening or 
 actually interrupting his communication between 
 Richmond and Manassas, on which he wholly de- 
 pended for supplies — a liue so long and difficult to 
 maintain that we subsequently did not deem it 
 practicable for us — we could have met him with an 
 army greater than it was ever proposed to take 
 against Richmond, and either have opened the way 
 to the Rebel capital or made it unnecessary to go 
 there. 
 
 In military movements delay is generally bad — in- 
 decision is almost always fatal. In our movements 
 we seem to have too often forgotten that momentum 
 is made up of weight andvelocity ; that the force of 
 the blow may depend as much upon the celerity of 
 the movement as upon the weight of t'ae body moved. 
 The world's history shows that the successful 
 General has met his enemy the day before he waa 
 expected — not the week' or niontn after. Some of 
 our points of attack have been so clearly indicated 
 to the enemy beforehand, and our movements made 
 with so much delay and hesitation, that he has been 
 able not only to fortify his positions and concentrate 
 his forces, but even to call into the field new armies 
 to meet ua. At such points we have failed. 
 
 It is particularly worthy of note that, in the re- 
 verses which followed the failure of the Peninsula 
 campaign, at the time when the army of the Rebels 
 had reached its greatest strength and its highest state 
 of enthusiasm, they did not permanently regain any 
 territory or recapture and hold any of the important 
 or controlling points before held by us on Rebel soil. 
 Their marches upon Washington, Maryland, and 
 also Louisville, were little more than raids, from 
 which they were obliged to retire before our oppos- 
 ing forces. This fact clearly shows that while it is 
 impossible for us to constantly retain military pos- 
 session of all the vast Rebel territory over which we 
 may be called upon to pass in our operations against 
 their armies, still the territory once held or occupied 
 by us cannot be permanently regained by them — a 
 sure indication of our ultimate success. 
 
 The past, notwithstanding its errors and reverses, 
 is full of encouragement, and gives full assurance of 
 final success. No great war was ever oonducted by 
 any people or Government without great mistakes — 
 giving to the critics of the time and those of suc- 
 ceeding generations a wide and ample held for their 
 labors. No people on earth were ever called sud- 
 denly into a great war more totally unprepared than 
 were the loyal people of this Government. We felt 
 so well assured of our position among the powers of 
 the world that we had almost concluded we had 
 fought our last battle, and our army and navy had 
 come to be regarded by many as useless appendages 
 to the Government. We had concluded that, doing 
 justice to the nations of the world, we should re- 
 ceive justice in return; and the loyal portion of the 
 
 people were devoting all their energies and powera 
 to the arts of peace, the advancement of civiliza- 
 tion, the development of the rich and varied re- 
 sources of our new and great country; and in these 
 every man found full occupation lor his talents and 
 a wide field for his ambition — no man ever dreaming 
 that the parricidal arm would ever be raised against 
 a Government so mild in its sway, so benignant in 
 its influence over all its subjects. 
 
 It was indeed difficult lor a people thus engrossed, 
 suddenly and almost without warning, to turn its 
 attention to war. The Rtbels believed us to be so 
 entirely devoted to the pursuits of peace that we 
 should yield to their demands rather than be di- 
 verted from them; and hence their nefarious at- 
 tempt to overthrow this fair Government, and 
 erect on its ruins that horrid deformity, a free Gov- 
 ernment with human Slavery for its coruer-stone. 
 How terribly they have been mistaken, the past has 
 already shown ; and yet the energies and powera 
 and resources of the loyal people have hardly be- 
 gun to be applied to the suppression of the Re- 
 bellion. They must meet and contend in battle 
 with that strength and power and intelligence 
 which has built factories and workshops, railroads 
 and steamboats, covered the ocean with ships, and 
 filled the markets of the world with the product of 
 its brain and hands; and they will find these no less 
 powerful for destruction than for production, when 
 when once fully applied in that direction. 
 
 All the great industrial intsrests of the loyal 
 States were never more active, more prosperous, 
 than at this time. All that has been lost by the 
 supply of men to the army bas been made up by in- 
 creased activity and energy, and the adaptation of 
 machinery to work heretofore done by the human 
 hand. There is only this marked difference: here- 
 tofore all these great forces have been applied for 
 the benefit of the arts of peace; now they all look 
 primarily to the prosecution of war; aDd years 
 would have to elapse — far more than would be re- 
 quired to crush out the Rebellion — before we should 
 develop our full strength for war. 
 
 Within less than two years we have thrown into 
 and sustained in the field an army of a million of 
 men. We have created a navy with which we have 
 blockaded a coast greater in extent than was ever 
 attempted by any Government before, and by our 
 inventions and improvements so completely revolu- 
 tionized naval warfare as to render the navies and 
 sea-coast defenses of the world w T ell nigh useless. 
 
 The efficiency of this blockade is attested not only 
 by the destitution of the Rebels in every article of 
 foreign production, but by the cry that comes to ua 
 every day from all parts of the world, in any degree 
 dependent upon the products of the blockaded terri- 
 tory, stimulating us to still greater exertion to crush 
 out this Rebellion, that the blockaded ports may be 
 thrown open to the legitimate commerce of the 
 world. 
 
 And while, in our efforts to maintain our Govern- 
 ment and vindicate free institutions, we neither 
 asked nor desired the aid of any foreign nation or 
 Government, we did at least expect of the leading 
 Powers of Europe that they should refrain from ex- 
 tending aid and encouragement to a Rebellion against 
 a friendly Government, thereby prolonging a strug- 
 gle which can only bring misery and suffering upon 
 the whole civilized world, and may in the end lead 
 to a war between our Government and some of 
 those Powers, the full effects of which the future 
 alone can cisclose. 
 
 OUR RESOURCES. 
 
 We have carried on. shall carry on and conclude 
 this war, without touching one dollar of the accumu- 
 lated capital of tbe country. We are already aston- 
 ished at the revenue now being raised from the tax- 
 ation of our daily productions, and yet we do not be- 
 gin to realize the amount to be yielded by the sys- 
 tem already adopted, or the extent to wbich that 
 system may be enlarged, without imposing any 
 grievous burdens upon the people — any burden to 
 which they will not cheerfully submit to accomplish 
 the object intended. 
 
 No Government can long carry on a war wkick 
 
30 
 
 must be sustained by the accumulated capital the of 
 country, and there is scarcely a limit to the time war 
 may be prosecuted by a Government whose credit 
 is sustained by the revenues derived from the accu- 
 mulating wealth of the country. 
 
 REBEL DEFICIENCIES. 
 
 Every dollar the Rebels have expended or 
 can expend in this Rebellion has been and 
 must continue to be drawn from their accumu- 
 lated captal. Their intercourse with foreign nations 
 has been almost wholly suspended, all their indus- 
 trial interests have been paralyzed, and there is no 
 source from which they 'can derive revenue or means 
 for the maintenance of the war, except by depriving 
 the people of their property, day after day, and 
 year after year, so long as the war shall continue, 
 thus reducing them to poverty and want. This is 
 a truth which the people in the revolted States are 
 already beginning to realize. They had been made 
 to believe that an export duty on cotton, which the 
 world would be obl'ged to pay, would yield them 
 the richsst revenue ever realized by any Govern- 
 ment, and that if the Federal Government should 
 attempt interference with its exportation, they 
 could command the armies and navies of Europe to 
 fight their battles for them. How bitter must be 
 their disappointment as they apply with their own 
 hands the torch which consigns it to ashes, and then 
 are compelled to supply to their leaders, from their 
 other property, the means to sustain the Rebellion ! 
 Their curretcy has almost ceased to be regarded, 
 even by themselves, as the representative of value. 
 
 Conscription has exhausted their people, and the 
 wealth which long years of uninterrupted prosperity 
 under the best government the world ever saw, had 
 placed in their haads, has already been expended, 
 aud they are now struggling on with the vain hope 
 that dissensions among ourselves or foreign interven- 
 tion may save them from that ruin which they see 
 clearly impending over them. Every day must show 
 them more and more clearly that on neither of these 
 sources can they rely for help. The utter scorn and 
 contempt with which every man in the ljyal States 
 who proposes any adjustment of this contest except 
 the absolute, uuqualilied, and unconditional subju- 
 gation of every Rebel in the land to the Constitution 
 and the laws, is held by every officer and soldier in 
 our army, aud every loyal man in the country, must 
 banish irom their minus the last ray of hope from 
 that source. The reaction wtrich followed the recent 
 slight manifestations of a willingness on the part of 
 a few Secession sympathizers to offer terms of com- 
 promise must convince them that they have no allies 
 in the loyal States on whom they can rely; and the 
 present condition of affairs ia Europe must forever 
 crush that false and delusive hope which they have 
 heretofore entertained, that the intervention of 
 European powers might enable them to accomplish 
 what they know full well they can never attain un- 
 aided. 
 
 THE TASK BEFORE US. 
 
 We now see clearlv what we have to do. We 
 must obtain uninterrupted control of the Missis- 
 sippi. We must reach those great railroad arteries 
 — the one bordering the Atlantic seaboard, the other 
 stretching through the Virginia and Tennessee val- 
 leys to the west aud south. We must, as soon as 
 possible, take the few fortified seaports remaining 
 in posststion of the Rebels, cut it off from all ex- 
 ternal sources of food and arms, and have surround- 
 ed it by forces which can press upon it from any 
 quarter, iit the same time severing into isolated por- 
 tions the Re:>el territory and destroying their means 
 of intercommunication, by which alone they have 
 hitherto been enabled to meet us in force wherever 
 we have presented ourselves, aud by which alone 
 they have been able to feed and buppiy their armies. 
 
 By possessing ourselves of, and keeping open, the 
 great natural highways alone (and a possession of a 
 navy by us should have early sugested this), we 
 sever parts of their territory mutually dependent, 
 and, while crippling them, enable ourselves to 
 speedily concentrate our forces at any point where 
 it may be advisable to strike. 
 
 These decisive measures we are actually execut- 
 ing or preparing, to execute. The successes and con- 
 quests we have already described have carried ua 
 through the preliminary stages, and the blows we 
 now strike — each one of them that succeeds — will 
 reach the very vitals of the Rebellion. Let any one 
 cast his eye upon the map, and these truths will be 
 apparent. 
 
 It may be in the future, as in the past, we shall 
 meet with reverses: they are the inevitable inci- 
 dents of a great war extending over so vast a terri- 
 tory, and requiring great armies at so widelv sepa- 
 rated points. We have already seen that it" is not 
 our true policy to attempt an actual military occu- 
 pation of the Rebel territory, except at a few and 
 important controlling points. We must destroy 
 their armies, and to do this we must concentrate, 
 not scatter, our forces. It is better to operate suc- 
 cessfully against one stronghold or one army than to 
 attempt three and fail. The indications now cleariy 
 are that, both in the East aud West, the campaign of 
 1863 will give us bril iant achievements- — decisive 
 victories. Our Generals now in the field have the 
 full confidence of the soldiers and the people, and 
 the armies will go forth, knowing that their ranks 
 are to be made full; that every day that passes will 
 add to, not diminish, their strength or numbers. 
 Never before did the world see such an army in the 
 field; never before did Generals iead such men to 
 battle. Each man goes forth feeling, not only that 
 he has a soldier's reputation to maintain, but also 
 that he has a country to defend in which hi3 inter- 
 est is as great a6 that of the highest officer in the 
 land. Such an army, with its energy, power, intel- 
 ligence and will, properly directed, must be invin- 
 cible. The past has already demonstrated that the true 
 American soldier can be relied upon, to dare, do, 
 and endure all that human power "can attempt, ac- 
 complish, or sustain. 
 
 Let no men be placed or kept in commaud of such 
 men who have uot the ability to command aud the 
 will to do; thus the errors and mistakes of the past 
 will be avoided in the future, the fond hopes and 
 anticipations of a true and loyal people realized, the 
 Government vindicated and rebellion speedily and 
 forever crushed. 
 
 We know that this contest has cost U9 and will 
 cost us treasuiesand blood — the best blood ever shed 
 by any people in maintenance of their Government 
 and in dTlense of free institui ions — the blood of the 
 flower of our land. Lei, us not make their lives a 
 vain offeriug, by for a moment entertaining the idea 
 of a partition of our territory, which womd forever 
 involve us in anarchy and border wars, or by any 
 base compromise with Rebels. 
 
 We owe it to the noble dead who have shed their 
 blood in founding and defending this Government; 
 we owe it to ourselves; we owe it to the couutless 
 millions who are to come after us, to maintain this 
 Government and the institutions we have inherited 
 from our fathers — the richest legacy ever bequeathed 
 by one generation to another — and to transmit them 
 to our posterity, if not improved, certainly unim- 
 paired. 
 
 In conclusion, your Committee will only say, that 
 all the men who hold high positions in the army and 
 navy, and have renderei valuable services to the 
 country, with whom they have held intercourse, 
 unite in the opinion that fighting, and only fighting, 
 can end this Rebellion ; that every traitor in the 
 land must and shall be made to acknowledge and 
 yield absolute, unqualified and unconditional obe- 
 dience-, to the Constitution and laws. 
 
 Aud your Committee believe this to be the senti- 
 ment, not only of the army and navy, bat of every 
 man in the country — traitors and cowards alone ex- 
 cepted. 
 
 B. F. WADE, 
 Z. C. CHANDLER, 
 On the part of the Senate. 
 
 D. W. GOOCH, 
 JOHN CO </ U DE, 
 VV. JULIAN, 
 M. F. ODELL, 
 Ob the part of the Howe.