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AUTHOR: 
 
 VEITCH, JOHN 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 EDINBURGH 
 
 DA TE : 
 
 1882 
 
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 VeiIcK, John. 1819-M. 
 iHamilTon. 
 
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 classics for Lrf^\%\\ readers., W^.Kni^M, 
 ed. v. 6.^ 
 
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tnt4e(Ct^afllmSork 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
i: 
 
 HAMILTON 
 
 B^ 
 
 J0H2^ VEITCH, LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 
 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON 
 
 MDCCCLXXXII 
 
 I 
 
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 y ::i 
 
 i .-.J 
 
 
 s 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 --T 
 
 
 CD 
 00 
 
 iO 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 I. LIFE AND WRITINGS, . . . .1-35 
 
 II. THE PROBLEM, BRANCHES, AND METHOD OF 
 
 PHILOSOPHY, ..... 36-72 
 
 in. CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS NATURE AND CONDI- 
 TIONS — MENTAL LATENCY, . . . 73-102 
 
 IV. CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS AUTHORITY AND VERACITY 
 
 — THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE, . 103-119 
 
 V. CONSCIOUSNESS— ITS PHiENOMENA — THE POWERS 
 
 OF KNOWLEDGE — EXTERNAL PERCEPTION, . 120-154 
 VT. PERCEPTION — THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY 
 AND INFERENTIAL REALISM — HAMILTON AND 
 BROWN, ..... 155-175 
 
 VIL PERCEPTION — NATURAL REALISM AND OBJEC- . 
 
 TIVE IDEALISM— HAMILTON AND BERKELEY, 176-191 
 
 Vin. PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY — GENERAL POINTS, 192-200 
 IX. CLASSIFICATION OF THE LAWS OF KNOWLEDGE 
 — NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE THOUGHT — RE- 
 LATIVITY, ..... 201-222 
 
 70969 
 
VI 
 
 Contents. 
 
 X. CLASSIFICATION OB^ THE LAWS OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
 — HAMILTON AND KANT— THE CONDITIONED 
 
 AND THE UNCONDITIONED, . . . 22.1-246 
 
 XL THE CONDITIONED AND THE UNCONDITIONED 
 
 — HAMILTON AND COUSIN — FICHTE, SCHEL- 
 
 . 247-260 
 . 261 -268 
 
 LINO, HECiEL, 
 
 Xn. INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY OK ONTOLOGY, 
 
 HAMILTON, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 LIFE AND WRITINGS. 
 
 The town of Airdrie is situated some eleven miles east 
 of Glasgow, on the highroad to Edinburgh. Within the 
 last century or less it has grown to be a big place, because 
 of digging for coal and "black-band." Three hundred 
 years ago it was ancient but unimportant. The surround- 
 ing fields had not been made hideous by repulsive black 
 heaps, and its atmosphere was unbegrimed by foulness of 
 soot and smoke. ]\Ien saw and felt the naturalness of 
 the earth around it, and the beauty of the heaven over it. 
 Very early in the sixteenth century, there stood close 
 to this old burghal town a tower of the ordinary Scot- 
 tish type. This was the residence of John Hamilton, 
 styled of Airdrie. He was the second son of the head of 
 a considerable family. Sir Eobert Hamilton, Knight of 
 Preston. Loyal to his chief and the king, he went forth 
 with them to Flodden, and there shared the fate of "dule" 
 P.— VL A 
 
HamUtoiu 
 
 along with so many other Scottish lairds. His descend- 
 ant,— liivin, third of the line, — fought on the side (jf 
 (^iieen ^lary. Another Gavin, fifth of the line, was 
 with hia hinsman, the Duke of Hamilton, at the battle 
 of Worcester ; and for the King and Covenant — he 
 tliinking tlie king believed in it — involved seriously 
 his estate of Airdrie. The spirit of the father descended 
 to his elder son, Robert, who sided with the Covenanters 
 against the unmixed brutalities of Claverhouse and the 
 Government. He fouglit imder his kinsman. Sir Robert 
 Hamilton of Preston, at Both well Bridge, where he was 
 made prisoner. The second son, William, was, first, Pro- 
 fessor of Divinity in Edinburgh, and then Principal of 
 the University, — a man of considerable note in his time. 
 Robert Hamilton of Airdrie had a son, William, who 
 became minister of Bothwell. The eldest son of the 
 minister, Robert, studied medicine in Glasgow, became 
 M.D., and then successively Professor of Anatomy, and 
 of the Practice of ]\Iedicine, in the University. He still 
 held the estate of Airdrie, — somewhat curtailed from the 
 time of the ancestor who fought at Worcester, but yet a 
 consideral)lc property. Smitten with the current spirit 
 of speculation, he lost the most of it, and the last 
 fragment of the ancient property was sold during the 
 minority of his eldest son. Dr Thomas Hamilton, the 
 younger brother of this Dr Robert Hamilton, succeeded 
 him in the Chair of Anatomy. He died in 1781. His 
 son was Dr AVilliam Hamilton ; he succeeded his father 
 in the same chair, and held it from 1781 to 1790. Dr 
 AVilliam Hamilton died in this year, leaving two sons. 
 The elder was William, afterwards Sir William Hamil- 
 ton, Baronet of Preston, a name that will not be for- 
 
 JBirthjplace and Family. 3 
 
 gotten in the history of philosophy. The younger was 
 Thomas, afterwards Captain Thomas Hamilton, a man of 
 marked literary power, who has left in * Cyril Thornton' 
 a graphic and caustic portraiture of the affluence, the 
 unconscious humour, and the homely ways of Glasgow 
 life in the earlier years of the century. This young lad, 
 William Hamilton, had a constitutional right, if there 
 be anything in heredity, to a very vigorous and varied 
 activity 
 
 He was born in a house attached to the College of 
 Glasgow, — the old, quaint, dignified buildings remind- 
 ing one of the style and the grace of Holyrood, — situated 
 in the High Street of the city, whose worn pathways 
 and picturesque crow gables had witnessed many a stir- 
 ring scene in Scottish story. The day was the 8th of 
 !March 1788. He was thus but two years old on the 
 death of his father. His upbringing devolved wholly on 
 his mother and her relatives. Mrs Hamilton had been 
 an Elizabeth Stirling. She belonged to a family of 
 merchants in Glasgow, who once had been lairds of 
 Bankeir and Lettyr, and were eventually the legal rep- 
 resentatives of Janet Stirling, the heiress of Cadder — 
 the oldest property of the Stirlings. Now, alike from 
 their historical credit and their actual position, they 
 occupied a high place amid the somewhat exclusive 
 commercial aristocracy of the city. William Stirling, 
 her father, was a man of great practical capacity 
 and energy. He founded the trade in Glasgow of 
 cotton and linen printing, first at Dalsholm on the 
 Kelvin, and then at Cordale and Dalquhurn on the 
 Leven. He was the direct lineal descendant of Robert 
 Stirling of Lettyr, who feU in a feud in 1537, and 
 
4 Jlamiltoiu 
 
 whose descendants had from about that date been 
 merchants in Glasgow. His wife was a daughter of 
 Andrew Buchanan of Drumpellier. His eldest son, 
 Andrew Stirling of Drumpellier, made out in 1818, be- 
 fore the Lord Lyon of the time, his claim to represent 
 the oldest line of the Stirlings,— that of Cadder, a family 
 of importance in the time of Edward I.^ ^Irs Hamil- 
 ton was a somewhat stern, unbending, yet withal kindly 
 woman. Thougli her father had at one time amassed a 
 fortune, her means were not large, but she was careful ; 
 and in the management of her boys, whose force of 
 character needed guidance and control, she succeeded 
 well. The eldest boy cherished through life a passionate 
 regard for his mother, and mourned her death as only a 
 true an (I loyal son could do. 
 
 Young Hamilton was sent, like other boys of the 
 time, to the Grammar or Latin school of Glasgow. He 
 afterwards, in 1800, entered the junior Latin and Greek 
 classes of the University, at the age of twelve. He was 
 in the following year sent to a school in England, at 
 
 1 This claim, impugned in the book of the * Stirlings of Keir,' is 
 thoroughly revindicated by the eminent antiquary, John Rid«lell, in 
 his 'Connuents on the Stirlings of Keir,' 1860. The story of Janet 
 Stirling of Cadder, therein baldly told, shows her as one of the worst- 
 nseil heiresses, even in lawless Scottish history. Her wardship of 
 marriage was seized by John Stirling of Keir, and she was forced 
 into a sort of Scotch marriage with his son James. When through 
 this means she had been stripped of her ancestral estate, the un- 
 manly husband divorced her on the ground of consanguinity, which 
 he declared, falsely, to have been unknoAvn to him at the time of the 
 marriage. The heiress was then handed over like a chattel, and 
 " married " to a fellow of the name of Bishop — a local writer and 
 ''servitor" to Keir, in which capacity Bishop had been his instru- 
 ment for grasping the estate of Cadder. To complete the infamy of 
 Keir, he contrived to disinherit the legitimate son of Janet Stirling, 
 and deprive him of his mother's estate. 
 
 Early Education. 
 
 5 
 
 Lromley, under the charge of a Br Dean. In 1803 he 
 went to reside in summer with the minister of Mid- 
 calder, the Eev. James Sommers. He again entered 
 the University of Glasgow in session 1803-4, and passed 
 through the Arts curriculum. The professors of the 
 time were Richardson (Humanity), Young (Greek), 
 Jardine (Logic), and Mylne (Moral Philosophy). Hamil- 
 ton was the first student of his year in logic and in 
 moral philosophy. He cherished tlirough life a great 
 regard for Professor Jardine, who, though not dealing 
 much with philosophical questions, was yet a powerful 
 general educator. Mylne taught a kind of sensation- 
 alism, based chiefly on the -writings of CondiUac and 
 De Tracy. Hamilton's first introduction to philosophy 
 cannot thus be said to have had any determining influ- 
 ence on the peculiar character of his subsequent opinions. 
 His mother and guardians had evidently destined 
 him for the profession of medicine. We find that, 
 along with the arts, he took classes in the medical 
 faculty, particularly chemistry and anatomy. In 
 the winter of 1806-7 he was in Edinburgh pursu- 
 ing his medical studies, ^feanwhile, however, he ob- 
 tained an exhibition, the Snell, in connection with 
 the University of Glasgow, but requiring the holder 
 to study at Oxford. He went there accordingly in 
 1807. Hamilton does not appear to have got much 
 from the tutors or the studies of the place. He formed 
 a line of reading for himself — embracing especially the 
 De Anima, the Ethics, the Organon, and the Rhetoric 
 of Aristotle. "When he went up for his final examina- 
 tion in ^lichaelmas 1810, he professed more and higher 
 books than had before been given up for honours 
 
6 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 in Literis Ilumaniorihus. So remarkable was the list, 
 that Mr Gaisford, then an examiner, and afterwards 
 Professor of Greek, took and kept a copy of it.^ His 
 examination was regarded at the time as one of un- 
 paralleled distinction. The period at Oxford was evi- 
 dently the turning-point of his career. He there laid 
 the foundations of that marvellous scholarship, and phi- 
 losophical and historical research, which finally became 
 the absorbing pursuit of his life. The special direction 
 which his studies were to take, was foreshadowed in the 
 Oxford list of books. 
 
 After leaving Oxford in 1810, Hamilton seems 
 to have hesitated about entering the profession of 
 medicine. He finally abandoned the idea, and began to 
 prepare for law. He passed as advocate at the Scottish 
 Bar in July 1813. After that he took up his residence 
 with his mother in Edinburgh. His legal employment 
 was never great ; but it was considerable. He was not 
 a ready speaker, — had, in fact, a certain nervous 
 hesitation in his speech, which was against his success 
 in public appearances. His tastes, too, were for the re- 
 condite departments of his profession, rather than the 
 practical and money-making. He was well versed in 
 civil law, in teinds, and he was strong in antiquarian 
 and genealogical cases. Some of the legal papers which 
 he drew up were considered remarkably able. But on the 
 whole, the famous library in the hall down-stairs had 
 greatly more attraction for him than the pacing of the 
 Parliament House. 
 
 The family of Airdrie, whom Hamilton represented, was, 
 as I have said, descended from the HamUtons of Preston. 
 
 * See Memoir of Sir W. Ilamilton, p. 53. 
 
 Baronetcy. 7 
 
 One of these was created a baronet of Nova Scotia in 
 1673. After suffering exile in Holland for his political 
 opinions, Sir AVilliam Hamilton of Preston returned to 
 England in the suite of the Prince of Orange, but died 
 suddenlv at Exeter on the march to London. His 
 brother, Eobert Hamilton, was commonly called Sir 
 Robert, though, owing to his refusal to acknowledge the 
 kincT as " an uncovenanted sovereign of these covenanted 
 nations," he never actually assumed the baronetcy. He 
 was a notable man in the struggles of the Covenanters. 
 It was under him that the party defeated Claverhouse 
 at Drumclog, and shortly afterwards lost the battle of 
 Bothwell Bridge. He died in 1701. The baronetcy 
 fell to the Hamiltons of Airdrie as heirs -male in 
 general, but it was not taken up by them. Hamilton 
 set himself to investigate the whole matter, shortly 
 after being called to the Bar. His relative, Hubert 
 Hamilton of Airdrie, had died in 1799, and he was now 
 the representative of that family. Assisted by John 
 Ptiddell, the famous antiquarian laAvyer, he presented his 
 case, according to custom, to the Sheriff of Edinburgh 
 and a jury in 1816. He was declared the heir-male in 
 general of John Hamilton of Airdrie, — who died before 
 1522, — the second son of Sir Bobert Hamilton, the 
 seventh of Preston, and thus entitled to the baronetcy. 
 Hamilton was exactly the kind of man, the pure 
 scholar and thinker, for whom Scotland had, and has, 
 absolutely no sort of provision. The only chance for a 
 man of this type, in the lack of any means for fostering 
 scholarship or culture, is a university chair. And this 
 chance is but occasional; it may be got, or lost for a gen- 
 eration, or even a lifetime. Hamilton's friends accord- 
 
8 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Edinhurgh Beview 
 
 ingly in 1820, when Dr Thomas Brown died, urged liim 
 to become a candidate for the Chair of Moral Philosophy 
 in Edinburgh. He did so, but lost it; John Wilson 
 being appointed professor. The decision turned very 
 much in those days on politics : it lay with the 
 Town Council. Hamilton was a Whig, W^ilson a Tory. 
 The Tories were in the majority, and put in their man. 
 
 Hamilton after this had no chance of any appoint- 
 ment of the least importance for sixteen years. In 1821 
 the Faculty of Advocates nominated him to the Chair 
 of Civil History in the University, worth about £100 
 u-year. This sum was not even regularly paid, owing to 
 the embarrassments of the city. In 1832 the Crown 
 gave him the office of the Solicitorship of Teinds — a 
 minor appointment, requiring his attendance once or 
 twice a-week in the Parliament House. The salary was 
 quite inconsiderable. This was the only legal promotion 
 he received. 
 
 From 1820 onwards to 1829 there is little to record, 
 l)eyond the fact of constant reading and application to 
 his favourite pursuits. About this period. Phrenology 
 was attracting notice in Edinburgh, and Hamilton was 
 prompted to examine its pretensions. He addressed 
 himself to the investigation of its principal general 
 doctrines, particularly those respecting the function of 
 the cerebellum, and the existence and extent of the 
 frontal sinuses. His observations and experiments, con- 
 ducted in a singularly careful and methodical manner, 
 resulted in conclusions entirely subversive of the phreno- 
 logical allegations on the points at issue. ^ 
 
 Two years after his mother's death, Sir William 
 ^ See Memoir, pp. 114, 115. 
 
 married his cousin, Janet IMarshall, 31st March 1829. 
 In her he found a helpmate of the most fitting and 
 truest sort. She had a fund of wonderful practical 
 power. She was unwearied in her assistance to her 
 husband in his work, especially as amanuensis. His 
 marriage, his comparatively limited means, and the 
 character of his wife, furnished him with inducements to 
 composition, which his habit of absorption in study, and 
 an exaggemted ideal of what a piece of work ought to 
 be, threatened to prevent him even from attempting. 
 
 The seven years from 1829 to 1836 was the most 
 productive era of his life. He was now forty-one ; he 
 had amassed stores of learning on varied subjects ; he 
 had quietly matured a power of consecutive thinking 
 and trenchant dialectic unequalled in his day. But he 
 had -written little or nothing. Fortunately a new editor 
 — Mr Macvey Xapier — had been appointed to the * Edin- 
 burgh Eeview,' who had some acquaintance and sym- 
 pathy with philosophical questions. Encouraged by [Mr 
 Xapier, Sir William contributed to the * Eeview ' from 
 1829 to 1836 those essays on philosophical subjects, 
 which riveted the attention of the few men of the time, 
 in this country and abroad, who had any real knowledge 
 of philosophy, and on which his repute as a thinker 
 must, for the most part, ultimately rest. The power 
 and mastery of detail shown in the discussion of the 
 other subjects which he treated in the same period, 
 iittracted notice in even a wider sphere. The nature, 
 amount, and variety of the work which he did in this 
 period, may be gathered from the following summary of 
 his contributions to the * Eeview.' These were — " Cous- 
 in's Writings, and Philosophy of the Unconditioned," 
 
10 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 1829; "Brown's Writings, and Philosophy of Percep- 
 tion," 1830; "Epistol* Obscurorum Virorum," 1831; 
 "State of the English Universities," 1831; "Oxford," 
 1831; "Eevolutions of Medicine," 1832; "Johnson's 
 Translation of Tennemann*s Manual," 1832; "Logic," 
 1833 ; " Cousin on German Schools," 1833 ; " The Eight 
 of Dissenters to admission into the English Universi- 
 ties," 1834 and 1835; "The Patronage and Superin- 
 tendence of Universities," 1834 ; "The Deaf and Dumb 
 —review of Dalgarno," 1835; "The Study of Mathe- 
 matics," 1836; "The Conditions of Classical Learning," 
 1836. After a lapse of three years, in 1839 he made his 
 last contribution to the * Eeview,' in the form of a notice 
 of Idealism and Arthur Collier. 
 
 These contributions to the ' Eeview * represented fairly 
 the different lines of Hamilton's interest and intellec- 
 tual activity. The exceptions are his study of Mod- 
 ern Latin Poetry, of Buchanan, and Luther and the 
 Lutheran writings. His essays on Oxford and English 
 University Eeform bore fruit in the Commission of 1850 ; 
 and at present there is a tendency to make changes in the 
 line he indicated — viz., restoring the old practice of 
 2)ublic lectures and professorial education.^ 
 
 In 1836 Hamilton was appointed to the Chair of 
 Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edin- 
 burgh. It was chiefly through the influence of 
 Cousin, Brand is, and others on the continent of Europe, 
 brought to bear on the Town Council of Edinburgh, 
 that Hamilton, by a small majority, obtained the 
 appointment. The men in whose hands the appoint- 
 ment lay, knew themselves as much of philosophy, 
 
 1 See Memoir, p. 167 et seq. 
 
 Chair of Logic. 
 
 
 and the merits of philosophical candidates, as they 
 knew of the differential calculus. But they had the 
 advantage of being tied to no philosophical sect. 
 From this, their ignorance preserved them. The only 
 danger was, that they might look at a candidate from the 
 point of view which alone interested them — the political 
 or ecclesiastical. This was no worse, at any rate, than 
 the prevailing nepotism of the Glasgow Senate of the 
 time. Hamilton held the Chair for twenty years, until 
 his death in 1856. 
 
 It was in 1836, while composing his first course of 
 lectures, that Hamilton turned his attention to a new 
 edition of Eeid's Works. His labours on Eeid were 
 greatly interrupted ; the book finally appeared in 1846. 
 
 In 1844 Hamilton was struck down by illness. It 
 was an attack of paralysis, hemiplegia of the left side. 
 The stroke was sudden and heavy to bear. He was yet 
 in his prime, and, up to the day of his seizure, had been 
 active and athletic beyond most men. The illness which 
 followed was tedious, and it left him broken in health 
 and vigour. His intellect, however, was entire, active, 
 and acute as before, and his wonderful memory remained 
 unimpaired. He himself, indeed, considered that his 
 memory was even better and more relial)le after his ill- 
 ness than before. This improvement he accounted 
 for by his being liable to fewer outward abstractions 
 than formerly. But there was much physical weakness, 
 which made all bodily exertion laborious and painful. 
 StiU he carried on his congenial work, brought out his 
 edition of Eeid's Works, and republished, with additions, 
 his contributions to the * Edinburgh Eeview.' With the 
 exception of the winter of 1844-45, he appeared regularly 
 
12 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 in his class-room, read a portion of the hour's lecture, 
 having an assistant who read the remainder. The income 
 of the Chair was not great ; barely £500 a-year. Out of 
 this, up to 1844, £100 a-year had to be paid to the for- 
 mer occupant. There was no retiring allowance. Had 
 there been any provision of this sort, Sir AYilliam would 
 doubtless have withdrawn from the work of the Chair 
 before his death. But there is no ground for the state- 
 ment that his state of health in any way lessened his 
 efficiency in the Chair. His mode of teaching and his 
 influence remained entirely unimpaired to the close of 
 liis career. This was due to the heroic nature of tlie 
 man, who, true to his favourite motto, showed, auiid 
 physical infirmity, that in man the greatest thing is 
 mind. 
 
 After his illness, Hamilton's friends on both sides of 
 politics, but especially those on the Conservative side, 
 made an effort to have his public services and contribu- 
 tions to philosophy and literature rewarded by a pension. 
 This was in 1846. Lord John Russell, the Minister of 
 the day, offered him £100 a-year. This he declined, on 
 the ground of its inadequacy to his services. The con- 
 duct of the ^linister throughout this matter was an 
 offence to the Whigs, and a subject of scorn on the part 
 of the Conservatives. An arrangement made by some 
 friends resulted in the pension being bestowed on Lady 
 Hamilton, some three years later. This sort of thing has 
 been pretty nearly always the case. Scientific discoverers, 
 who can make their work palpable to eye, ear, and touch, 
 and even intriguing local politicians, who can manage 
 a borough or county, are rewarded ; but for men of ab- 
 stract thought there is little appreciation and no provi- 
 
 
 Lectures. 
 
 13 
 
 sion. The kind of faculty which gets to high places does 
 not understand their work, and takes no account of them. 
 Yet these men have proved in the end the most influen- 
 tial forces in moulding society. But as this action takes 
 time, and meanwhile does not influence votes, the men 
 themselves may live unassisted, and, so far as the poli- 
 tician is concerned, die unregarded. 
 
 The Lectures on Psychology and INIetaphysics, and 
 those on Logic, as we now have them, were written 
 durinfr the nights of the winters of 1836-37 and 1837-38. 
 Nothing like them had been known or felt before in 
 Scotland or in a Scottish University. These Lectures 
 were for twenty years the most powerful factor in the 
 philosophical thought of Scotland. But for them the 
 knowledge of questions, of authors, and of technical 
 terms current abroad, would have been unknown to our 
 philosophical literature ; even the present state of philo- 
 sophical discussion, where it is reactionary and adverse, 
 would not have been possible. At the same time, we 
 ought to understand properly the position of those 
 Lectures as an exposition of their author's philosophical 
 opinions, and in relation to his other writings. I thus 
 spoke on this point in 1869 : — 
 
 " It is perhaps necessary here to say a word regarding the 
 place of the Lectures as an exposition of their author's philo- 
 sophical doctrines, and in relation to his other writings. 
 What has been already said of the circumstances under which 
 tliey were composed, and the purpose which they were designed 
 to subserve, is sufficient to show their special and exceptional 
 character as expositions of their author's opinions. Tliis was 
 pretty fully explained in the Preftice to tlie first edition of 
 the Lectures (p. ix. et seq.) But as a recent critic, who 
 professes * to anticipate the judgment of posterity on Sir W. 
 
u 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Other Writings. 
 
 U 
 
 Hamilton's labours,' has yet represented the Lectures as * tlie 
 fullest and only consecutive exposition of his philosophy,' 
 and has very elaborately criticised the author's opinions on 
 this assumption, it may be proper again to state the matter 
 at greater length. Though written subsequently, in point of 
 time, to the articles in the * Edinburgh Review ' on Cousin 
 (the Unconditioned), on Perception, and on Logic, the Lec- 
 tures were yet prior to nearly all the footnotes on Reid, to 
 all the Dissertations supplementary to the same author, and 
 to the development of Sir William's special logical doctrine 
 of a Quantified Predicate with its consequences — prior, in 
 fact, to all that can fairiy be regarded as the published 
 authoritative expositions of his philosophical doctrines, ex- 
 cepting only the articles in the * Review.' In the Lectures, 
 indeed, we find the subject of Perception treated with some- 
 what greater dettiil, and certainly with more diffuseness, than 
 in the article on the Siime subject in the * Review ; ' but we 
 must have recourse to the Dissertations supplementary to 
 Reid (Notes B, C, D, and D*) for the full and final develop- 
 ment of Sir William's own doctrine of Perception, To these, 
 as he himself tells us in a footnote to the article on Perception, 
 republished in the * Discussions,' he gives references * when 
 the points under discussion are more fully or more accurately 
 treated.' These Dissertations were published for the first 
 time in 1846, ten years after the * Lectures on Metaphysics 
 were written. Again, the doctrine of the limitation of human 
 knowledge — of the Conditioned and Unconditioned — is for- 
 mally expounded only in the article on M. Cousin's WTitings, 
 republished in the 'Discussions' (1852), and in the new 
 matter contiiined in Appendix L A and B. In the * Lectures 
 on Metiiphysics ' (L. xxxviii., xxxix., xl.) he states the doc- 
 trine with some illustrations, and seeks to show its applica- 
 tion to the principle of causidity. But this exposition is 
 slighter and looser in manner than that in the article on 
 Cousin, and earlier in time than the consideration of the 
 same point in the Appendix to the * Discussions,' where, as 
 he siiys, a * more matured view of the conditions of thought ' 
 
 is to be found than that given in the review of Cousin. 
 The Lectures on Consciousness contain, among other matters, 
 the distinctive doctrine which he developed under the desig- 
 nation of the Argument from Common Sense ; but here, too, 
 we must refer for the latest and most precise exposition of 
 the doctrine to Note A of the supplementary Dissertations to 
 Reid's Works. The ' Lectures on Logic ' contain, of course, 
 the fullest exposition of his views of the details of that 
 science from the Aristotelic and Kantian standpoints. But 
 his new and special logical doctrines (with the exception of 
 that of Comprehension in Concepts, Judgments, and Reason- 
 ings) are only cursorily and incidentally treated in two lec- 
 tures, which he occasionally interposed in the middle of the 
 course on Logic, and which are to be found in the Appendix 
 to the second volume of the Logic Lectures (p. 255 (c), first 
 edition). The latest and fullest development of his special 
 logical theory is to be found in the * Discussions,' second edi- 
 tion. Appendix II. A and B. On many topics — especially 
 the distinctive doctrines in the philosophy of their author — 
 the Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic can in fairness be 
 tiiken merely as the point from which he started in his course 
 of philosophical investigation ; and where there may appear, 
 as there must do in tlie career of every man of vitality of 
 thought and activity of research, any difference or discrepancy 
 between the earlier and the later form of opinion — as, for 
 example, in his theory of association — the later view, espe- 
 cially if it be also that published by himself, is that which 
 ouglit, in common fairness, to be attributed to the author, 
 and dealt with as his. What renders this the more impera- 
 tive in the present case is, that Sir William did not find it 
 necessary or expedient to embody the fuller or more advanced 
 statement in his series of Lectures, which were already suffi- 
 cient to occupy the whole time of each session, and most 
 adequately to fulfil the wants of university instruction. For 
 the more elaborate and more advanced discussions of certain 
 questions he was content to refer his students to his published 
 writings. After their first composition, indeed, the Lectures 
 
16 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 were never substantially changed ; they received only occa- 
 sional verbal alterations. Though amply sufficient for the 
 purposes of class instruction, they were always spoken of by 
 their author as falling far short of complete or adequate 
 courses, whether of Metaphysics or of Logic — as forming, in 
 fact, only introductions to a full and thorough-going discus- 
 sion of the principal topics of those sciences. In the Lectures 
 he certainly intnxluces and briefly discusses a number of 
 subjects upon which lie has not otherwise given anything t«> 
 the world. But these are taken up always and only with a 
 view to class instruction, and do not receive at his hands (as, 
 in the time allotted to each course, they could not) that pro- 
 longed or deliberate treatment which is accorded to the sub- 
 jects of the * Discussions ' or of the * Dissertations on Reid,' 
 publishiMl in his lifetime. On the more elementary and trite 
 parts of philosophy and logic. Sir William, moreover, was 
 content to piece together expositions from authors who had 
 clearly stated current or received opinions. This practice lie 
 carried to a gretiter extent than was desirable or commend- 
 able ; the only consideration that could even temporarily 
 excuse it being the pressure under which the Lectures were 
 originally written — for whicli, however, he had ample time. 
 sul)se<[uently to apply a remedy. Whatever degree of censure 
 may be awarded on this ground, it is a matter of positive 
 unfairness in any critic who professes to discuss Sir W. 
 Hamilton's opinions, to deal with these Lectures — written 
 early, hastily, for a special and temporary purpose, never 
 revised for publication by their author, not containing either 
 the most authentic or the most complete statements of his 
 peculiar doctrines — as of co-ortlinate authority with his other 
 published writings ; and, keeping all this out of view, actually 
 to represent them as * the fullest exposition of his philosophy.' 
 This they are not, in any true or pertinent sense of those 
 wortls ; they are simply offhand expositions of a series of 
 pliilosophical questions, and are in many respects of styh' 
 and treatment in absolute contrast to the author's published 
 ^mtings. What a knight in undress was to himself armed 
 
 MilVs Use of them. 
 
 17 
 
 cap-d'piej this Sir William is in the loose robes of the Lec- 
 tures compared with himself in his usual formal and guarded 
 manner. The spirit of ancient chivalry would have disdained 
 to draw the sword at a vantage, and would have sought a foe 
 when his armour was on : but the modem philosophical 
 knight-errant is of a different type ; he strikes his home- 
 thrusts through the loose robe, and withal loudly proclaims 
 that his opponent was armed to the teeth. 
 
 " As to the other statement, that they are * the only consecu- 
 tive exposition of his philosophy,' it is hardly better founded 
 than the preceding. Though the Lectures, especially those 
 on Logic, show great clearness and power of arrangement 
 of a certain number of philosophical topics for purposes of 
 academical instruction, and are thus * consecutive,' they are 
 far from being a * consecutive exposition of his philosophy ; ' 
 for a consecutive development of his distinctive theories in 
 Metaphysics and Logic he has not anywhere given, unfortu- 
 nately enough for the interests of those sciences, but espe- 
 cially for a competent comprehension of his views by his 
 critics." ^ 
 
 Mr Mill notices this criticism of his method of dealinsr 
 with Hamilton in the preface to the fourth edition of his 
 * Examination.' What he has to say in reply is, that the 
 Lectures are to be considered " a fair representation of 
 his [Hamilton's] philosophy." " A complete representa- 
 tion," he says, *' I never pretended they were ; a correct 
 representation I am bound to think them ; for it cannot 
 be believed that he would have gone on delivering to 
 his pupUs matter which he judged to be inconsistent 
 with the subsequent development of his philosophy." 
 This is all Mill has got to say in answer to the charge — 
 (1) that he had represented the Lectures as "the fullest 
 and the only consecutive exposition of his philosophy," 
 
 I Memoir, pp. 209-213. 
 P. — VI. * J B 
 
18 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Avhile it was shown that they did not contain many of 
 his doctrines at all, and these the latest and most matured. 
 Is " a fair representation " equivalent to " the fullest and 
 the only consecutive exposition " 1 How is a hook " a 
 fair representation of a philosophy" which does not con- 
 tain its latest developments?— It is all, moreover, he has 
 to say in answer to the charge (2) that he had actually 
 proceeded on the assumption that the earliest statements ^ 
 of the Lectures were of co-ordinate authority with those 
 made at a later period, and declared to he " more ma- 
 tured expositions " of the doctrines; and had criticised 
 Hamilton's opinions accordingly. 
 
 The quibhle about " correct representation " need de- 
 ceive no one. The Lectures are to be viewed as a correct 
 representation of Hamilton's philosophy, because, their 
 author having delivered them to the end, there could be 
 nothing in them inconsistent with the subsequent de- 
 velopment of his philosophy. But might not Hamilton 
 have advanced to new doctrines, nay, doctrines wliicli 
 superseded earlier opmions, without thinking it necessary 
 to embody these in his courses of lectures, designed, as 
 they were, for purposes of comparatively elementary in- 
 struction 1 Might he not, for example, have advanced 
 on the doctrines of the Aristotelian logic,— even replaced 
 some of these by others,— pomting out generally that he 
 aid so, without there being any possible supposition of 
 inconsistencies between the earlier views of the Lectures 
 and the subsequent development of his philosophy? 
 And is this not exactly what the evidence lying clear 
 before Mill might have taught him was the fact ? In 
 this case, does the quibble about " a correct representa- 
 tion " save the character of the critic ? Are the Lectures 
 
 Zast Illness. 
 
 19 
 
 to be regarded as " a correct representation " of doctrines 
 maintained by the author, which they do not contain? 
 Onwards from 1844, the course of HamUton's life was 
 a struggle,— a noble struggle with physical infirmity. 
 But Hamilton did grand and continuous work durincr 
 that period to the end of his life. This is shown in the 
 additions to the * Discussions,' and in the edition of 
 lieid's Works. 
 
 All through this period of life, onwards to the close 
 there is a curious pathetic interest. His eldest boy had 
 gone out to India as a soldier, and the father was keenly 
 interested in the career of the son. This is touchingly 
 apparent in the letters sent from home to India whtch 
 conveyed the father's dictation, or his loving message 
 Once the lad, suddenly attacked by natives in the 
 mght, had risen and baffled them with the keen blood 
 and courage of his race. The news reached the old 
 man at home, and all the deep affection and pride of 
 Ills nature rose in him and throbbed to tender emo- 
 tion. Hamilton's was a character of such strength, that 
 whether it found outlet in abstract thought or in feel- 
 ing, it appeared always as if that were its only, because 
 its intensest, form. 
 
 Sir William was for some years before his death 
 engaged, at the instance of the trustees of Miss Stewart, 
 on a complete edition of Dugald Stewart's works. Thi^ 
 lie accomplished. But the memoir of Stewart was stHl 
 to be written. To this he had made certain fragmentary 
 contributions ; but the hand was failing somewhat. The 
 thought of the work evidently pressed heavily upon him. 
 He passed away before the task was required of him. 
 It was, if I remember rightly, on Saturday the 3d of 
 
20 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 May 1856 that I called at the house, 16 Great King 
 Street, to inquire for him. I had learned that he was 
 not so well as ll had been at the close of the session 
 about the middle of April, and some days before when 
 I had seen him. I had had the honour of assisting him 
 in the work of the class during the session, chiefly read- 
 ing the greater portion of each day's lecture. I had 
 thus the privilege of daily intercourse with him during 
 the last six months of his lifetime. The deeply affec- 
 tionate, the true, inner nature of the great strong man, 
 was revealed to me by many a slight and touching 
 incident, too sacred to be given to the world, and prob- 
 ably such as this said world would not care for. On 
 this Saturday I found Lady Hamilton anxious, tearful. 
 There was the intense devotion of the eager- hearted 
 woman, mingled with a painful foreboding. The symp- 
 toms indicated congestion of the brain. On Monday 
 morning, the 5th, there was the beginnmg of uncon- 
 sciousness; and when I went again on Tuesday, he 
 had passed away early that morning. 
 
 Hamilton was a man to love, to fear, and to revere. 
 t thus wrote of him after his death, and I have nothhig 
 to add or change : — 
 
 « All through life there was a singleness of aim, a purity, de- 
 votion, and unworldliness of purpose, and a childlike freshness 
 of feeling, which accompanied, guided, and in a great measure 
 constituted liis intellectual greatness. To the vulgar ambi- 
 tions of the world he was indifferent as a child ; in his soul 
 he scorned the common artifices and measures of compromise 
 by which they are frequently sought and secured. To be a 
 master of thought and learning, he had an ambition ; in this 
 sphere he naturally and spontaneously found the outlet for 
 his powers. But this craving, passionate as it was, never did 
 
 As Teacher and Writer. 
 
 21 
 
 Tl 
 
 harm to the moral nature of the man. The increase of years, 
 the growth of learning and fame, took nothing away frcmi 
 the simplicity of his aim, his devotion to its pursuit, or his 
 freshness of heart. No sordid covering ever gathered over 
 his soul to restrain the warmth, the quickness, the chival- 
 rousness, the generosity of his early emotions ; no hai'<lened 
 satisfaction witli the routine of the world settled down on 
 a nature which had looked so long and so steadily at the 
 point where definite human knowledge merges in faith : — 
 
 ' Time, which matures the intellectual part, 
 Had tinged the hairs with grey, but left untouched the heart.' 
 
 The elevated intellectual sphere in wliich he lived carried 
 with it a corresponding elevation and purity of moral atmo- 
 sphere ; the ideals of philosophy had been to him far more 
 than the world of the reiil." 
 
 After Sir "William Hamilton's death, a sum was sub- 
 scribed for a Fellowship in connection with the Univer- 
 sity of Edinburgh, in honour of his memory. A bust of 
 him was also made by Brodie, the cost of Avhich was 
 defrayed by subscription. This is now in the Senate 
 Hall of the University of Edinburgh. Best of all, per- 
 haps, twenty gentlemen in his native city subscribed 
 £2000 to purchase his library. This is now intact, 
 — a gift to the University of Glasgow, in which ho 
 was educated, and by which he Avas sent as a Snell 
 exhibitioner to Oxford. 
 
 Lady Hamilton survived her husband for more than 
 twenty years, dying on the 24th December 1877. This 
 year (1882), on the 2d of [March, the only daughter, 
 Elizabeth, jiassed away, after showing that she inherited 
 in no small measure her father's liigh aims, and much 
 of his characteristic poAver. 
 
 Looking back on his life, the career of Hamilton 
 
•a J 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Hume arul Reid. 
 
 23 
 
 presents itself to us in two aspects — that of a teacher of 
 philosophy, and that of a Avriter on jihilosophy. Of his 
 power as a teacher, I shall here only say that he inspiretl 
 the youth who listened to him by the feeling of an 
 absolutely disinterested love of truth ; of a simple life 
 devoted to the walks of abstract thought, as if therein 
 was for him the highest charm and the most natural 
 sphere of life — all professional, all worldly ambition 
 being utterly sunk and insignificant. And to those of 
 his students thus feeling him and thus inspired by him, 
 who gave themselves up for a time to his power, and 
 followed from day to day the clear, firm-paced, vigorous, 
 and consecutive steps of his prelections, he became the 
 moulder of their intellectual life. During the twenty 
 years in which he occupied the Chair, from 1836 to 
 1856, his influence as a teacher of philosophy was un- 
 equalled in Britain. It is doubtful whether it had any 
 parallel in a Scottish, or a British, University before; 
 certainly it has had none since. 
 
 But it is chiefly as a writer and contributor to the 
 progress of philosophical thinking that I have now to 
 do with Sir W. Hamilton. Up to his time, the com- 
 plexion of philosophical thought in Scotland may be 
 said to have been wholly native to the soil. There 
 could be no question as to the originality of such 
 writers as Hume and Reid, to say nothing of inferior 
 names. Hume was negative and destructive of cher- 
 ished beliefs, but the weapon was wholly his own — 
 the criticism of the principles of Locke and Berkeley. 
 His tone, too, was that of the pococurante man of the 
 century in which he lived ; easy, good-humoured, some- 
 what indifferent, finding a sort of certainty in the facts 
 
 I 
 
 of the present world, but looking very much on what 
 might cast up afterwards, as a chance unpredictable as 
 the throw of the dice, yet not denying the possibility 
 at least of some sort of evolution in the unknowal)le 
 future. He was the Edinburgh polite man of letters all 
 over, with more subtlety than any other man of his day, 
 and probably less belief than even the most of the men 
 around him, and that was very little, in dignity of 
 character or purity and elevation of motive. There was 
 a great talk in this circle of " the beauty of virtue," 
 but the admiration was much more for the beauty than 
 
 the virtue. 
 
 Thomas Beid, on the other hand, who followed Hume 
 in the order of time, was more of a typical Scotchman 
 and Scotch thinker than Hume or any one before 
 liim. Reid was strongly conservative of our natural 
 beliefs. He did not think that " reason " could give him 
 anything better. He was not less original in his defence 
 of these, and in reply to Hume, than Hume had been 
 in attack. In fact, he challenged the title of " Reason " 
 to say anything of superior authority, unless it could, to 
 begin with, vindicate itself as better than natural belief 
 in its ultimate form. Reasoning on groundless or un- 
 i:)roved assumptions is not Reason. If Reid's thought 
 was not so subtle as that of Hume, it was more robust ; 
 and the spirit which he carried into philosophy was 
 not one due to the helles htfres society of Edinburgh 
 of the time, but had grown up through the influence 
 and associations of the Scottish country manse and the 
 traditions of the old Scottish Kirk. His father was 
 a clergyman; his forefathers had been clergj^men for 
 generations; and the moral spirit of Reid was, in a 
 
34 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 delation to previous Fhilosojphers. 
 
 25 
 
 measure, an outcome of liis ancestors. It was a thor- 
 oughly earnest spirit, deepened into reverence by a long 
 course of solitary meditation on the ultimate questions 
 regarding man, the world, and God, and tlie bearings 
 on these of the current philosophy. Eeid had not a 
 very wide acquaintance with the literature of pliilo- 
 sophy; but he saw in the issues of the premisses of 
 Locke and Berkeley very grave bearings on moral and 
 theological beliefs, and those premisses it was his func- 
 tion to scrutinise. The highest thought could not be 
 left in contradictory results. 
 
 Adam Fergusson, the historian of the Eoman Ee- 
 public, and expounder of the stoical system of ethics 
 in Edinburgh, had force and eloquence of style ; but * 
 he was a moral pliilosopher rather than an inquirer 
 into the theory of knowledge. Dugald Stewart, his 
 successor, was the one man of learning of the school of 
 Scottish tliought ; but even his learning was more of an 
 accomplishment than an inspiring, originating element 
 in his philosophy. He kept very close to the views of 
 Eeid, of which he was a singularly clear and eloquent 
 exponent. 
 
 Dt Thomas Brown, whose influence intervened be- 
 tween that of Stewart and Hamilton, was indebted 
 largely to foreign sources for his opinions, but only to 
 one school, the sensational of France. He was in- 
 spired by Condillac and De Tracy. His writings and 
 teachings form a sort of foreign episode in our philo- 
 sophical literature. With certain positive relations to 
 Hume, he has no distinctive originality, and cannot 
 be said to have had a permanent or continuous influence 
 on the thought of the country. Certain of his more 
 
 especially sensational doctrines have influenced the two 
 Mills, father and son, and thus afiected the thinkino- 
 of England, which, since the days of Locke, has always 
 been under the influence of impressions rather than ideas. 
 In moral spirit Hamilton was allied to Eeid, not to 
 Hume, and he followed in the line of the earlier Scottish 
 thought as represented by Eeid ; but he carried this up 
 to far higher issues than had before been dreamt of. 
 Both Eeid and Stewart had properly returned to psy- 
 chology — in a word, to consciousness, as they were 
 forced to do by the meagre analysis on which Himie 
 had proceeded. Hamilton thoroughly accepted their 
 method, that of a scrutiny of consciousness in its 
 fullest integrity; but he was clearer and more precise 
 in his tests and criteria. And not satisfied with the 
 somewhat partial and faltering applications of psycho- 
 logical results to metaphysical questions by the earlier 
 thinkers, Hamilton boldly grappled with the highest 
 questions of philosophy regarding our knowledge of 
 being. Infinite and Absolute Eeality. Even the manner 
 and style of dealing with the psychological and logical 
 questions took new forms in his hands. He brought the 
 questions nearer to the methods of the learned, and 
 to the treatment of them in other schools. Even in 
 his youth he had gone far beyond the range of read- 
 ing in philosophy then usual in Scotland. He had 
 studied the *Organon' of Aristotle, and had acquired 
 a mastery of it at an early age, rarely paralleled at 
 the close of the long and laborious eff'orts of a life- 
 tune. Even at Oxford he knew it better than all the 
 tutors. He was familiar with the principal schoolmen. 
 Durandus and Biel he had studied well, and with 
 
26 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 Edinhurgh Beview ' Essays. 
 
 27 
 
 a shrewdness and power of assimilation that stood him 
 in good stead, when in later life lie elaborated his doc- 
 trine of Perception. Descartes and the Cartesian 
 school had been matter of minute investigation ; and 
 from Descartes he gathered the ultimate principle in 
 his theory of knowledge— viz., the subversion of doubt 
 in the fact of consciousness. He had mastered German 
 at a time when few people in the country knew any- 
 thing about its literature or philosophy. He had given 
 diligent and quite competent attention to the ' Critique/ 
 and to the logical wiitings of Kant. He had traced the 
 course of subsequent German speculation through Fichte, 
 Schelling, and Hegel, as his unpublished notanda especi- 
 ally show. The influence of Kant both upon the cast of 
 liis thought and his philosophic phraseology is marked 
 enough. In point of positive doctrine, however, the two 
 men in Germany he most nearly approached were Jacobi 
 and G. E. Schulze. His relation to the absolutism that 
 followed Kant~was decidedly antagonistic from the first; 
 but the mode of thought which it represented, and its 
 phraseology, are seen in his writings. This reading and 
 training in other schools widened his conceptions of the 
 problems of philosophy, and disclosed to him points of 
 view and relations among those problems, unnoticed in 
 the homespun thinking of Scotland that went before 
 him. And when he made his first published contribu- 
 tion to philosophy, in the essay on Cousin, in the * Edin- 
 burgh Review* of October 1829, the first impression, 
 even among people who professed some philosophical 
 knowledge, was that of astonished bewilderment rather 
 than admiration, or even appreciation. 
 
 The essay on Cousin dealt with a question regarding 
 
 { 
 
 the reach and limits of human knowledge which was 
 wholly new, in form at least, to British speculation. 
 That on Perception (1830) revealed an amount of philo- 
 sophical learning, and put the question on grounds not 
 less new to our literature. It pointed out issues, more- 
 over, which turned on the question of the ultimate 
 authority of the intuitive consciousness, which had 
 not been previously seen to be involved. The dis- 
 cussion on Logic (1833) was not less a revelation 
 to the country. It put the science on a basis which 
 had not been possible through any previous line of 
 analysis in Scotland. It brought to a point the issue 
 between the two schools of the Deductive and the In- 
 ductive Logics, boldly challenging for the former an in- 
 dependent sphere and proper laws. Whether we agree 
 or not with the conclusions of those essays, we must 
 admit that any one who differs from them cannot aiford 
 to pass by the forms of the questions which Hamilton 
 stated for the first time in our literature, or the argu- 
 ments by which his own view is supported, without 
 virtually acknowledging that he has left principal posi- 
 tions in philosophy unassailed, and trenchant reasoning 
 unanswered. 
 
 As the form of the questions in those discussions 
 differed greatly from what had gone before, so did the 
 style. The thinking was exact, precise, and very subtle ; 
 so was the expression. The severely abstract character 
 of the thought, and the learning that had brought treas- 
 ures from other schools, found outlet in a correspondingly 
 abstract style and in technical terms which were simply 
 a bewilderment to the mere vernacular reader. On 
 such the power and historical importance of the first 
 
28 
 
 Ham ilton. 
 
 Their Reception. 
 
 29 
 
 essay at least were greatly lost. It is thus that Jeffrey 
 AVTote of the review of Cousin, on its publication, to the 
 editor of the * Edinburgh Review : ' — 
 
 "Cousin, I pronounce beyond all doubt the mo.st un- 
 readable thing that ever appeared in the * Review.' . . . 
 It is ten times more mystical than anything my frientl 
 Carlyle ever wrote, and not half so agreeably -wTitten. It is 
 nothing to the purpose that he does not agree with the most 
 part of the mysticism, for he affects to understand it and to 
 explain it, and to think it very ingenious and respectable, 
 and it is mere gibberish." ^ 
 
 Tliis is about as fair a sj^ecimen of the sutor ultra 
 crepklam as could well be given. But it may be taken 
 as a specimen of the level of philosophical knowledge 
 which had been reached, even by the leading literary 
 authority of the time. The inherent force of the dis- 
 cussion was shown by the place which it finally attained 
 in public opinion at home, in face of the degree of ignor- 
 ance which it had to overcome. Sir James ^lackiiitosh, 
 a man whose reading and cast of mind were of greater 
 l)readth and philosophical culture, showed a better appre- 
 ciation of the essay when he said — 
 
 " I think the review of Cousin has no fault but that of not 
 being in the least degree adapted to Englisli and British 
 understiindings, for wliom it should have been meiint. But 
 the writer is a very clever man, with whom I should like to 
 liave a morning tete-d-tSte." 
 
 3Iackintosh here touched the only fault of the 
 
 essay, but it was obviously one which, though it 
 
 might have been lessened, could not be whcdly removed 
 
 within the limits of a Review article. We should be 
 
 ^ Correspcmdence t^f the late Macvey yapier, p. 68. 
 
 I 
 
 thankful that Mr Macvey Xapier's penetrating sense 
 put Jeffrey's criticism aside, and solicited the author to 
 continue his contributions to the * Review.' Of course, 
 in Germany and France, where there really was some 
 knowledge of the higher philosophical questions, the 
 discussion was at once appreciated, and attracted the 
 notice of the eminent philosophic thinkers of the time. 
 There is indeed no parallel in our times to the European 
 reputation which those three Review articles gained in 
 the short space of seven years, for a man known only 
 by their authorship. Even now we may look back on 
 them as containing in substance the whole philosophy 
 of Hamilton. His labours on Reid, his Lectures, and 
 the Discussions in their final form, cannot be said essen- 
 tially to go beyond the lines of thought therein laid 
 down. There are naturally advances, and there are 
 modifications; but these years, from 1829 to 1836, were 
 really the productive years in the growth of his philo- 
 sophical thought. 
 
 Well might Napier write in 1836 — 
 
 « I confess that I have a sort of selfish joy in this splendid 
 approbation of those papers, which I have been instrumental 
 in drawing forth from you, and for the doing of which I 
 have been blamed by those who should have known better 
 what a journal like the ' Edinburgh Review ' owes to science 
 and the world." 
 
 Hamilton, while he lived and wrote, was confessedly 
 the most powerful speculative thinker in Britain. He 
 was also the most learned, the man best acquainted in 
 his time with philosophical opinions, past and present. 
 No one before him had put the questions of philo- 
 sophy as they needed to be, in face of the historical 
 
30 
 
 HamUton, 
 
 development which they had readied. His mode of 
 statement and discussion, his pliraseology, were then all 
 utterly new to British philosophical literature. But at 
 the same time there was an imperfectly realised convic- 
 tion among reflective men that in his hands the philo- 
 sophical problems had taken new shapes, and had re- 
 ceived new and powerful solutions. And the average 
 of moderately informed people, who took an interest 
 in those questions, accepted his conclusions as almost 
 absolute dicta, at least utterly " irredarguable conclu- 
 sions," to use an expression of his own. The state of 
 dogmatism or acquiescence thus superinduced was not 
 altogether healthy ; and it was well that one fonu of 
 intense action or dogmatism should lead to a reaction — 
 the reaction at least of rethinking his processes, and so 
 revivifying liis conclusions, and possibly modifying them. 
 As he himself says : — 
 
 " If the accomplishment of philosophy imply a cessation 
 of discussion, if the result of speculation be a paralysis of 
 itself, the consummation of knowledge is only the condition 
 of intellectual barbarism." ^ 
 
 But, as a rule, reaction in philosophy, when carried out 
 through the mere passive receptivity of opinions, is vio- 
 lent and irrational And so it has proved in the case of 
 Ifiimilton. It was unfortunate in this point of view, 
 that the reaction was led principally by a man who, 
 with a high repute in other branches of study, had 
 really no accurate or broad acquaintance with the ques- 
 tions of intellectual philosophy, and none whatever with 
 the development of philosophy from Kant to Hegel and 
 
 * Discussions, p. 40. 
 
 MilVs CriHcis7)i, 
 
 31 
 
 Cousin, the period with which Hamilton had especially 
 dealt. It was mifortimate, too, that what may be called 
 the speculative faculty of the critic was of a cast which, 
 compared with that of Hamilton, was utterly out of 
 proportion either for understanding or criticising. Com- 
 bined with this was the circumstance of a public press 
 full of the idea of the power of this man on other sub- 
 jects, — not accurately acquainted at the same time with 
 the scope or method of Hamilton's speculations, — ready 
 to accept a critic's statement without questioning, how- 
 ever ignorant or incompetent ; leady thus to spread the 
 critic's estimate over an equally uninquiring and ill-read 
 public. Hence it came about, that, with a few honour- 
 able exceptions, the critic's estimate was accepted as in- 
 telligent, and his verdict as all - prevailing and final. 
 Happily for the interests of truth, the tide has turned ; 
 and even the " general reader " is beginning to discover 
 that the critic so lauded in his hour, while making here 
 and there his little acutenesses, has. the essential defect 
 of misconceiving his author on every essential point of 
 his philosophy. It seems impossible for ]\I r Mi ll to | 
 place himself in Hamilton's sphere of vision, that of, 
 abstract speculative thought. Mr Mill may be strong in 
 the region of the axiomata media, and the bearing of such 
 l)rinciples on pmctice and life ; but lie is certainly weak 
 where Hamilton was strong. The proof of this is to 
 be found in the fact that he has entirely misconceived 
 the doctrine of the Unconditioned, and, indeed, of the 
 Ilelativity of knowledge in general ; that he has missed 
 the point of the argument against Cousin ; that he has 
 confused throughout the Infinite and the Indefinite ; 
 tliat he has mistaken the argument from Kegativo 
 
" ■ • ' — [—--^-1 
 
 S3 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 notion; that he has misrepresented the distinction 
 between Belief and Knowledge; that he has entirely 
 misunderstood the distinction between Immediate and 
 ^[ediate Knowledge. As for Hamilton's main logical 
 doctrines, Mill's examination is for the most part a 
 simple caricature.^ 
 
 There is an intellectual fairness and breadth of view- 
 characteristic of the trustworthy critic. This weighs a 
 writer's statements, tries to find the meaning of his words, 
 to compare and truthfully conciliate apparently conflicting 
 expressions of them, with a view to elicit the real meaning. 
 But of this there is no trace in ^lill's work. One of 
 the most constant practices, indeed, of the * Examina- 
 tion,' in dealing with Hamilton's style, is to put into his 
 terms some popular meaning, without at all inquiring 
 whether the writer he criticises has defined these terms or 
 not in a philosophical sense, or whether he even uses 
 them in a sense accepted in philosophy. It is thus easy 
 to treat statements as meaning what was never contem- 
 plated. This method of criticism is convenient and 
 cheap, but it is fruitless of anything but the semblance 
 of victory.^ 
 
 1 On this point, see Hamilton v. Mill, passim, a very able and con- 
 clusive exposure of Mill's perpetually recurring fallacies on the logical 
 points. 
 
 2 Of the first and second editions of the 'Examination,' this, said 
 by a competent critic, is less than literally true : — 
 
 " A reader who compares the two editions together will probably 
 be surprised at the number of silent omissions and corrections. 
 These, no doubt, show a laudable desire on the part of the author to 
 amend his work ; but on the other hand, they also show that it was 
 originally written with very insufficient preparation. The majority 
 of the amendments, so far as I can see, do not much improve the 
 argument, though they are evidence of the author's persevering deter- 
 mination to find Sir W. Hamilton wrong somehow or other."— Mr 
 
 f 
 
 Other Criticmii. 
 
 33 
 
 .1 
 
 if 
 
 I 
 
 As to the constant parade of « contradictions " which 
 Mill makes, it may be said once for all, that Hamilton's 
 " contradictions " are, as a rule, simply MiU's confusions. 
 There may be, nay, there must often be, apparent contra- 
 dictions in a phUosophical system which deals with the 
 highest questions. A thinker of a true metaphysical 
 insight has said: — 
 
 " Some uncertainty of view, possibly even involving incon- 
 sistency, is by no means a defect in a philosopher in my eyes • 
 if only It seems to arise not from confused thought, but froni 
 a contmued nism in the conception of truth, a stru^crle a 
 feeling after it." ^ ^° ' 
 
 Mill's "contradictions,^' on the other hand, are either 
 grounded in misconception, or they are the result of 
 strained verbal interpretation. 
 
 One other form of criticism of Hamilton is curious 
 when we consider his relations to the history of phil- 
 osophy, and his novel and rich philosophical learning. 
 His feeling for the past, and for the thinkers who had ' 
 preceded him in the same field, was very marked. This 
 led him to his extraordinary research into the history of 
 opinions, which consumed so much of the best energies 
 of his life. Careful in tracing philosophical opinions to 
 their source, he was unwearied in verification, in saga- 
 ciously tracking back to first-hand authority. He has 
 thus done a measure of justice to foregoing thinkers, 
 revealed unknown treasures of thought, and shown in 
 many instances the continuity of philosophical opinions. 
 This work is wholly without a parallel in Britain. I do 
 
 Mansel, in Cant P.ninc, No. 21, 1867, p. 19. It was over this original 
 edition that the self-complacent raised their shout of triumph. 
 
 1 Exploratio Pki/osophica, by John Grote, B.D., p. 129. 
 
 P. — VL 
 
S4 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 not think that he has always mastered in their full reach 
 and relations the systems to which he refers. His read- 
 ing was probably too multifarious for this. When he 
 gave special study to a system he mastered it, as, for 
 example, that of Descartes and several others. At the 
 same time he would have been the last man to dream 
 of judging an author or determining his opmions by a 
 formula called historical, which is to grasp all systems 
 and fix the place of each. This is named, of course, a 
 law of Reason, while Reason never knew it, and ex- 
 perience disavows it. It is a law, too, which can- 
 not plead either intuitive consciousness or the test of 
 necessity in its favour, and does not even possess 
 inherent consistency. Yet this is the kind of criticism 
 which we find confidently in these days applied to 
 Hamilton. Its recommendation is of course that it 
 saves the trouble of mastering the system to which it is 
 applied, for if we know what in the course of philosophy 
 a man at a given epoch must think, we are saved a great 
 deal of reading of what he did think and say. Hence 
 such phrases as that his philosophy is that of "the 
 individual consciousness," "irreflective common-sense," 
 "the ordinary understanding," &c. These and similar 
 expressions, when they have any meaning, show simply 
 that the people using them do not know what are 
 the essential positions of Hamilton's philosophy. It 
 is thus no wonder that we find him actually classed 
 indiscriminately with Berkeley, Hume, and ^lill, and so 
 treated historically. Hamilton, above all men, deserves 
 to be read, and needs to be studied before he is judged, 
 or rather caricatured. 
 
 There was about Hamilton a sterling, open-eyed 
 
 Hamilton's Honesty. 
 
 35 
 
 honesty. When he spoke of an outer world, its reality 
 and vindication, he meant what he said. He had no 
 subterfuge of new meanings or aliases under which he 
 sought to keep by the terms while eviscerating the sub- 
 stance. He meant to hold by an Ego and a Kon-Ego in 
 the literal meaning of those terms, distinct, independent, 
 neither determining, nor determined by, the other. 
 AVhen he spoke of personality and immortality, and 
 sought philosophically to vindicate these, he did not 
 palter with the convictions on which mankind act and 
 must act. He meant, and he held by, a true person- 
 ality, whose reality was not simply in some other or 
 infinite reality, but a definite fact of human experience. 
 JS'or would he ever have thought of retaining the term 
 immortality, if all that could be vindicated was only 
 a corporate immortality; for he would have had the 
 acuteness to see that an immortality of individuals, 
 who in themselves have no guarantee of immortality, 
 is simply a contradiction in terms. And he certainly 
 would not have retained the word God in his phil- 
 osophy, if he had believed God to be a mere develop- 
 ment from Pure Being or Pure iS'othing up to the Ego 
 of " Reason," which in itself realises and constitutes all 
 that is. When he had cast away the thing, he would 
 not, through self-illusion, have retained the name.^ 
 
 1 See the emphatic protest of Ueberweg on this voini— History 
 vol. ii. p. 521. ' 
 
36 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 THE PROBLEM, BRANCHES, AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hamilton reaches liis conception of the problem of 
 Philosophy through his view of science as regulated by 
 the principle of causality. In our oixlinary knowledge, 
 we are aware of a fact, or that something is. Science 
 asks the question, How or why the fact is 1 In this it 
 is impelled and guided by the need we feel of thinking 
 a cause for each event But the scientific step is only 
 one in the direction towards which the causal need 
 impels. Science is knowledge — a form of knowledge. 
 AVlience knowledge in this form? If we seek a cause 
 of the fact of experience, we may, nay must, equally 
 ask for a cause of our knowing the fact. Knowledge 
 has its cause or source in what we call mind, and it is 
 ])ossible only under certain conditions. Tlie primary 
 problem of Plulosophy is thus to investigate the nature 
 and necessary conditions of knowledge, — the conditions 
 of its own pos.sil)ility. ^Miat is knowledge 1 Wliat are 
 the laws of knowledge 1 Such is Hamilton's conception 
 of the problem of philosophy proper. 
 
 Keeping this in view, we can see how the philosophy 
 of Hamilton rises to its highest question— that of the 
 
 Problem of Philosophy. 37 
 
 nature of our knowledge of the absolutely first, or of 
 the unconditioned. The line of causality in finite 
 things leads backwards and upwards to the problem of 
 an ultimate or primary cause, and we have the points- 
 is this a necessity of inference? is it an object of know- 
 ledge 1 m what sense is it an object of faith ? 
 ^ Philosophy, guided by the principle of causality, finds 
 Itself on the path which leads from effects to causes 
 and thus seeks to trace up " the series of effects and 
 causes, untd we amve at causes which are not them- 
 selves effects." But these first causes, or the first cause, 
 philosophy cannot actually reach. Philosophy thus re- 
 mains for ever a tendency~a tendency unaccomplished 
 Yet in thought or theory it can be viewed as completed 
 only when this unattainable goal is reached. Further 
 the higher we ascend in the line of causes, the less is 
 the complexity-the nearer we are to simplicity and 
 "luty. But it is only in imagination that we can reach 
 unity— "that ultimate cause, which as ultimate cannot 
 again be conceived as an effect" 
 
 Hamilton may fairly be regarded as holding the belief 
 m Unity to be a principle alongside of causality, thou-h 
 speaking of them as of the same origin. Following this 
 principle, and ascending from generalisation to generali- 
 sation, we also tend to the one. "Tlie conscious E-o 
 the conscious self, seems also constrained to require that 
 unity by which it is distinguished in everything which it 
 receives, and in everything wliich it produces, "i Unity 
 is the one great aim of our intellectual life. This is 
 shown in perception, imagination, generalisation, jud- 
 ment, and reasoning. And "reason, intellect (rovs), 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. III. 
 
38 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 concatenating thoughts and objects into system, and 
 tending always upwards from particular facts to general 
 laws, from general laws to universal principles, is never 
 satisfied in its ascent till it comprehend — what, however, 
 it can never do — all laws in a single formula, and con- 
 summate all conditional knowledge in the unity of 
 unconditional existence."^ 
 
 Philosophy thus tends necessarily not towards a 
 plurality of ultimate or first causes, but towards one 
 alone. This first cause it can, however, never reach as 
 an object either of immediate or positive knowledge. 
 Eut as the convergence to unity in the ascending series 
 of causes is manifest, ill so far as our view extends, 
 analogy forces us to regard it as continuous and com- 
 plete. There is thus a philosophical belief in, though 
 not a philosophical knowledge of, the ultimate or 
 primary unity. We have here in brief both the posi- 
 tive and the negative aspect of his Metaphysic of the 
 Absolute. 
 
 The essential points in Hamilton's philosophy at its 
 highest reach lie in this outline, — virtually given in the 
 opening metaphysical lectures. He there warns ofi" what 
 may be called pure thought, reason, or speculative in- 
 telligence, regarded as a faculty ^;er se, as Kant and 
 others since his time have viewed it, from the sphw-e of 
 , the first or unconditioned being or cause. At the same 
 \ time, he marks off his doctrine from mere Agnosticism, 
 \ — such as is represented by ^Ir Herbert Spencer, who 
 \ simply ignores Hamilton's broad view of the problem. 
 Spencer's theory is that the origin of natural law and 
 \ things is absolutely inexplicable — incognisable. This 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. IV. 
 
 I 
 
 His General Position. 
 
 39 
 
 taken by itself is pure and simple agnosticism. Hamil- 
 ton holds that Deity as a cause beyond which there 
 is no cause, — a cause not conditioned, — is inconceiv- 
 able by us, owing, however, simply to our limitation. 
 He holds, also, that the how or mode of divine causality 
 is not conceivable by us. In both cases the meaning 
 would be best expressed by the term incomprehensible. 
 This indicates simply an impossibility on our part of 
 rising beyond the fact to the how of the fact. But this 
 is not the whole of Hamilton's teaching. He holds at 
 the same time that analogically, or on the ground of the 
 personal and moral side of our consciousness, there is 
 good reason for believing in a God at once personal, 
 intelligent, causal, and moral This is a totally different 
 doctrine from that of a mere or pure agnosticism. His 
 first or negative doctrine was meant simply to banish 
 from the sphere of sound thought and accurate philo- 
 sophy a theory of a God founded on "pure thought," 
 divorced from experience, or above relation, which could 
 be nothing in its primary nature but an unconscious im- 
 personality, or the mere vague substance of all that 
 phainomenally is. 
 
 As an object of pure thought or reason, the Uncon- 
 ditioned in the sense of an Absolute x^er se, or an Abso- 
 lute made relative as a cause, so that, out of time, to 
 begin with, this being may yet be conceived as neces- 
 sarily flowing into time, — all this Hamilton regards as 
 empty conception — as transcending real or positive 
 thought; the latter view, indeed, as contradictory. There 
 above time lies the mystery for mere intelligence, the 
 mystery of the absolute beginning, and the mystery of 
 the infinite regress of things ; yet it is not inexplicable 
 
40 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 how this is a mystery to us,— when we have got a 
 profound analysis of what our thought is, and how it 
 is subject to time and relations. Hamilton is opposed to 
 the "intellectual intuition" of Schelling, "the ideas" 
 of Kant, "the pure being" of Hegel : but he is not less 
 opposed to the dead negation or indifference of Comte or 
 Spencer as to problems of origin ; for he holds that the 
 question of a first cause — of beginning — must come up 
 ' in all normal minds for answer and solution; that the 
 restriction of view to mere natural phaenomena is the 
 death of healthy thought and feeling — the quenching 
 of the necessary and legitimate aspirations of philoso- 
 phic faith. 
 
 One can quite well understand the hostility, even 
 animosity, which a philosophy like that of Hamilton's 
 has met with from Positivists, Pantheists, and Hegelians. 
 The first dislike it because it raises the question of a 
 Divine or first cause, defines the sphere within which it is 
 cognisable, and points to the moral grounds which necessi- 
 tate it by implication. This is a trouble to Positivism, 
 because it wishes to restrict itself to sequences and 
 coexistences between facts, and relegate the question of 
 Deity to the sphere of the wholly incognisable and 
 insoluble. It feels, too, that its regress of phaenomena, 
 neither capable of being pursued infinitely nor stopping 
 absolutely, is a causeless absurdity,— a kind of niglit- 
 mare under which it sleeps uncomfortably. To tlie 
 Pantheist, again, Hamilton is equally repugnant. The 
 pantheistic unity may be either a material substance 
 underlying all, or it may be the so-called " idea," which 
 is not yet either conscious or personal But the pro- 
 cess of development of the actual is alleged to be 
 
 y 
 
 I - 
 
 OpposiTig Schools. 41 
 
 equally comprehensible on both schemes. This Hamil- 
 ton denies, and charges the process in both cases with 
 inherent absurdity; that the pantheistic unity can 
 develop and yet remain one ; that the impersonal can 
 develop into the personal in any form; that the 
 Hegelian "idea" can, being nothing, become aught- 
 can become this, too, through a dialectic of contradiction 
 which saps intelligibility, and yet professes to be com- 
 prehensible. He opposes equally all those schemes. 
 He virtually says : This problem of origin and develop- 
 ment cannot be solved by any process of pure thought, 
 caU it idea, substance, unconditioned, or knowledge 
 of aught in itself, or above experience. We have no 
 starting-point of this sort: for to intelligence, as a specu- 
 lative question, the unconditioned is a mystery in any 
 form ; yet looking to experience,— looking to conscious- 
 ness in all its breadth, to the facts and the implications 
 of the moral data, the grounds of the moral life,— there 
 is necessity for holding a personal God, partly revealed 
 to us out of the intellectual mystery. This is repugnant 
 to the narrow physicist, who makes knowledge convert- 
 ible with uniform sequence of phenomena, and that 
 even of a limited sort, the sensible ; to the absolutist, 
 who thinks he has got to the point whence he may 
 know how the synthesis of subject and object has arisen. 
 For him, of course, there is no mystery, or there ought 
 to be none. He finds in the absolute Ego, which sees 
 itself in everything, the solution of the problem of the 
 universe. In this all contradictions are consciously re- 
 conciled, and truth lies in their remarkable unity. 
 
 The nature and proper scope of the principle of 
 causality, the notions of simplicity and unity, and 
 
 f 
 
42 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 the relation of the ultimate unity to our dual experi- 
 ence, or the duality of being in experience, — these are 
 questions which arise for discussion on Hamilton's 
 view of the sphere and result of philosophy. But it 
 is clear that the first thing requisite for all those ques- 
 tions is an analysis of knowledge itself, — its facts and 
 its laws. 
 
 Mind, then, is the object of study in philosophy, and 
 the three great questions regarding it are these : — 
 
 (1.) What are the facts or phaenomena to be observed 
 and generalised 1 This we may call the Phoenomenology 
 of Miiidy or Phcenomenal Pdychology. It is commonly 
 called simply Psychology. 
 
 (2.) Wliat are the laws which regulate these facts, or 
 under which they appear 1 or what are the necessary 
 and universal facts — that is, laws by which our faculties 
 are governed, and which afford criteria for judging or 
 explaining their procedure 1 The answer to this ques- 
 tion is found in the department of the Nomology of 
 Mindy or Nomologwul Psychology. 
 
 (3.) We may ask what are the results or inferences 
 which the fact* of mind or consciousness warrant ? Or 
 what are the real results, not immediately manifested, 
 which these facts or phtenomena warrant us in drawing 1 
 The branch of philosophy which deals with this ques- 
 tion is Ontology and Meta2)hysics Projr)er, Hamilton 
 prefers to call it Inferential Psychology. 
 
 There is little difficulty in understanding what is 
 included under Psychology. It is simply the observa- 
 tion, analysis, generalisation of the mental phaenomena 
 or manifestations, with a view to their reduction to ulti- 
 mate faculties and capacities. There would be groups 
 
 Branches of Philosophy. 
 
 43 
 
 of phaenomena, acts and states of mind, referred to ulti- 
 mate or primary powers and susceptibilities. 
 
 Under the second head, — that of homology, — we 
 must apparently include two sets of general facts or 
 laws, — those which may be regarded as necessary and 
 universal in consciousness or mind, — such as the laws 
 of the understanding or faculty of thought proper, the 
 primary laws of logic. But as there will be a nomology 
 for every specific mental faculty and capacity, — such as 
 the feelings and desires, — there will fall to be included 
 under nomology not only necessary and universal laws, 
 but laws generalised from experience. For it will 
 hardly be maintained that tlie laws regulating the feel- 
 ings or the desires are anything but generalisations from 
 experience. Hamilton has not expressly distinguished 
 the generalised and the universal in this connection, but 
 obviously his practice supposes the distinction. 
 
 Under the third head, — that of Ontology or Meta- 
 physics Proper, — we have what are called inferences or 
 results. This points to an essential distinction in the 
 doctrine of Hamilton. AYe may consider the facts of 
 consciousness exclusively in themselves simply as facts. 
 But we may also consider them as furnishing us with 
 grounds of inference to something out of themselves.^ 
 For example, as effects they may lead us to infer the 
 analogous character of their unknown causes; as phae- 
 nomena, they may warrant us in drawing conclusions 
 regarding the distinctive character of tliat unknown 
 substance of which they are the manifestations. Infer- 
 ence and analogy may thus enable us to rise above t3ie 
 mere appearances of observation and experience. Thus 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. VII. 
 
41 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 we may infer the immortality of the soul and the exist- 
 ence of God, although these are not given us as pha-no- 
 mena, or objects of immediate knowledge.^ 
 
 This is obviously a very important point As Hamil- 
 ton holds that even the Ego or self of consciousness is 
 not an immediate object of knowledge, but inferred— 
 apparently directly from the phcenomena; and as he 
 holds a similar view regarding material substance, these, 
 the Ego and material substance, would form two of the 
 results or inferences of ontology. The identity and 
 immortality of the Ego would also be reached somehow 
 as inferences or results. And lastly, the existence and 
 attributes of Deity would be an-ived at by the same 
 method. These— the Ego, the World, God— would be 
 the highest forms of being attainable by us. They 
 would be the highest points of ascent in metaphysics 
 proper or the science of being. 
 
 This division of philosophy was apparently that 
 originally in the view of Hamilton when he commenced 
 Ids course of lectures. But he has not in the arrange- 
 ment of his lectures, nor indeed anywhere in his philo- 
 sophical writings, adhered to it with any constancy in 
 practice. And it would be impossible, perhaps, without 
 doing some violence both to the development of his 
 thinking and to some portions of his philosophy itself, 
 to seek rigidly to force his speculations into the order 
 of those departments. At the same time, this scheme 
 affords a good general arrangement, under which his 
 philosophical opinions may be set; and I shall endea- 
 vour, as far as I may, to keep this order in view in the 
 present summary of his opinions. 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. VII. 
 
 Psychological Question. 
 
 45 
 
 The first question, then, is the psychological one, — 
 What is mind as known to us % What is a mental fact 
 or phsenomenoni The answer to this is, it is a con- 
 sciousness at least. A fact of mind is as it is known, 
 and it is known only as there is consciousness of it. 
 Mind as a mere potency is to us nothing. 
 
 The fundamental point— the main inspiration of the 
 philosophy of Hamilton— is that philosophy is simply 
 an explicit or articulate development of human con- 
 sciousness. ^Consciousness in some form or other affords 
 the possibility of experience, — is the ground of it, the 
 limit and measure of it. Human experience, whether 
 in the past or the present, is the expression for the 
 consciousness of this or that individual in presence of 
 the universe of fact and event. Ko form of knowledge 
 transcends consciousness — no acTO mind is realised by us 
 as such without appearing as an object of consciousness.^ 
 
 11 
 
 " In all legitimate speculation with regard to the plia?no- 
 mena of mind, it is consciousness which affords us at once 
 (1) the capacity of knowledge ; (2) the means of observation; 
 
 (3) the point from whence our investigation should depart ; 
 
 (4) the limit of our inquiry; (5) the measure of its validitv; 
 and (6) the warrant of its truth." i 
 
 Hamilton's method is thus strictly reflective and 
 analytic. It is in fact the method of analysis of the 
 complete facts of consciousness, or mental experience, in 
 tlie fullest sense of the term. It is directed, in the first 
 place, to the phienomena of consciousness, as it now exists 
 in its mature state, to the various mental acts and states 
 of which we are conscious, and it proposes to reduce 
 
 1 ReicCs Works, p. 929. 
 
46 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 these to their utmost simplicity,— to find, in a word, 
 the ultimate faculties and capacities of our mental con- 
 stitution. Hence out of it arises the threefold classifica- 
 tion of the powers of Cognition, Feeling, Desire and Will. 
 The best illustration of the analytic method as em- 
 ployed by Hamilton is perhaps to be found in his sev- 
 erance of the elements of External Perception, his dis- 
 tinction of Sensation and Perception, and his final 
 analysis of what is truly and primarily the object of 
 intuitive knowledge in sensa His treatment of the 
 Laws of Association may also be cited as a good illustra- 
 tion. His method as applied to mind is philosophical, 
 or if it be preferred, scientific — scientific in the best 
 sense of the woriL 
 
 The method is directed, in the second place, to find 
 the universal facts or laws under which those powers 
 are exercised, and through which we may be able prac- 
 tically to regulate and improve their exercise. These 
 are what Hamilton pre-eminently regards as facts of 
 consciousness. Under this head it will be found that 
 Hamilton proposes to analyse and distinguish by certain 
 tests what are primitive and elementary principles of 
 knowledge, and what are secondary and derivative. He 
 is at special pains to point out that principles which are 
 mere generalisations from experience may be mistaken 
 for necessary and universal laws, — that principles appar- 
 ently intuitive may be really after all only derivative ; 
 in fact, one main portion of his philosophy lies in the 
 attempt to reduce most of the necessary principles to a 
 single universal fact in our consciousness— namely, that 
 which he calls the impotency of the mind to compass 
 the unconditioned or irrelative in any form. The phil- 
 
 s 
 
 m 
 
 h 
 
 I 
 
 F(Kts of Consciousness. 
 
 47 
 
 osophy of Common Sense is especially directed to distin- 
 guish what is really ultimate in our consciousness, and 
 what is merely derivative and empirical. Hamilton's 
 firet rule is, " that no fact be assumed as a fact of con- 
 sciousness but what is ultimate and simple." ^ m alleged 
 fact of consciousness is such if it can be shown to\e 
 " a generalisation from experience," or a composite pro- 
 duct of elements given in experience, capable of being 
 sundered and reduced thus to prior elements. 
 
 " Whenever in our analysis of the intellectual phcenomena 
 we arrive at an element which we cannot reduce to a gener- 
 alisation from experience, hut which lies at the root of all 
 experience, and which we cannot therefore resolve into any 
 higher principle,— this we properly call a fact of conscious- 
 ness. Looking to such a fact of consciousness as the last 
 result of an analysis, we call it an ultimate principle ; look- 
 ing from it as the first constituent of all intellectual com- 
 bination, we call it a prirnary principle. A fact of conscious- 
 ness is thus a simple, and, as we regard it, either an ultimate 
 or a primary datum of intelligence."* 
 
 Secondly, this ultimate priority supposes necessity. 
 It must be impossible not to think it. Ey its necessity, 
 truly realised, can we recognise it as an original datum 
 of intelligence, and distinguish it from the product of 
 generalisation and custom. 
 
 Thirdl}^, the fact as ultimate is given us with a mere 
 belief in its reality. Consciousness reveals that it is, 
 but not how or why it is; otherwise this knowledge 
 would be prior, and we should need to go backwards 
 until we reached the truly ultimate. ^ 
 
 It is thus that Hamilton speaks of the first principles 
 of knowledge as inconceivable; better had he said m- 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XV. 2 j^id. 3 m^ 
 
48 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 compi'ehensihle.^ As the true meaning of the conceivable 
 and inconceivable is essential alike to the understanding^ 
 of the method and the system, we must here explain it. 
 Hamilton has clearly stated the meaning of the con- 
 ceivable to be that of realising in the mind a concept 
 or general idea say of mw, mountain, man, by embody- 
 ing the common attributes of each in an individual 
 image or object. This is the most usual form of the 
 conceivable. This always implies that the attributes 
 embodied in the individual image are non-contradic- 
 tory. In this lies the negative requisite of conceivabil- 
 ity. The absolutely inconceivable arises when two con- 
 tradictory attributes are sought to be embodied in one 
 imago or object of thought; as, for exami)le, square-circle. 
 We can put a meaning into each of these terms, — 
 square and circle,— vfQ know what we propose to think 
 by square-circle, but we cannot actually think or con- 
 ceive square-circle, because the attributes are contradic- 
 torily exclusive. And of course we cannot believe such 
 a thing to be, or to be possible. As Hamilton has put 
 it, we know what is sought to be united here, — that is, 
 " the unity of relation ; " but we cannot accomplish a 
 "unity of representation." 2 
 
 And this shows at once what Hamilton means when 
 he speaks of our being unable to conceive something, 
 or an object as possible. As he has himself expressly 
 stated, by "possible" he means logically possible- 
 possible in thought, as in a single image or unity of 
 representation. Here are his words. Reid had said: 
 " A man being able to conceive a thing is no proof that 
 
 J As he does elsewhere. See below, p. 106 
 * See Reid's Works, p. 377, note. 
 
 The Conceivable. 
 
 49 
 
 I 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 ill 
 
 it is possible." On this Hamilton remarks, "Xot cer- 
 tainly that it is really x>ossible, but that it is problemati- 
 cally possible — i.e., involves no contradiction ; violates 
 no law of thought The latter is that possibility alone 
 in question." ^ This application of the term to conceive 
 is identical with the first,— is, in fact, simply the first 
 stated in a negative form. We are unable to conceive 
 as possible, as in thought one, an object with contradic- 
 tory attributes. All else we can mentally represent. Mill 
 raises this application of the verb to conceive into a second 
 sense of the term, and actually supposes Hamilton to 
 mean that the mind " could not realise the combination 
 as one which could exist in nature ; " ^ in other words, 
 that we cannot believe the conception to be realised, 
 because it is opposed to our limited experience of real 
 or physical law. Hamilton has no such meaning or 
 referenca What is possible in thought, — that is the 
 point, and the deeper point ; not what is believable in 
 reality, or according to our notions of physical law. 
 anil's favourite illustration of the antipodes being for 
 long unbelievable, because contrary to a limited experi- 
 ence, has nothing whatever to do with the matter. As 
 a concept, antipodes is in Hamilton's sense perfectly 
 possible; as a judgment of reality, it would be an 
 improbable hypothesis to people with a limited experi- 
 ence. What is or is not believable at a given time, 
 according to the existing amount of experience, has 
 nothing to do with what is or is not conceivable on the 
 abstract conditions of the thinkable.^ 
 
 1 Reid's Works, p. 379, note t. 2 ExamiTiation, p. 32 (4th ed.) 
 
 ' See Mill's whole chapter vi. , where he parades his discovery of 
 the three meanings of the conceivable. 
 
 P.— VI. n 
 
50 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 It is thus clear that, logically, any two attributes 
 which are non- contradictory may be mentally com- 
 bined in one image. But there may be attributes whicli 
 we know as a matter of fact are combined or coexist, 
 while the mode or manner of their combination we can- 
 not conceive. This Hamilton teaches. We taay know 
 that two things coexist, and yet not know how they do 
 so, — that is, be able to conceive the manner of their co- 
 existence : in his own words, to conceive the coexistence 
 as possible. This Hamilton calls also the inconceivable, 
 or incomprehensible. This is the sense in which he 
 applies inconceivable, incomprehensible, to the first prin- 
 ciples of knowledge. "A conviction is incomprehen- 
 sible when there is merely given to us in consciousness 
 that its ohject is (on cort), and when we are unable to 
 comprehend, through a higher notion or belief, why or 
 
 hoiO it is (StOTt COTt)."^ 
 
 The tcht/ or how would, in this case, be the reason or 
 ground of the conviction, as well as the conception of 
 the mode in which the subject and predicate of the con- 
 viction are conjoined. / am conscious of an object^ may 
 thus be a conviction or knowledge, though how 1 a.m so 
 conscious I cannot say, or even conceive ; how " I " and 
 " conscious " are conjoined, — how " I," " conscious," and 
 " object " are conjoined To be unable to conceive as 
 possible in this sense is not incompitible with knowing 
 the fact; it is only incompatible with knowing the 
 ground, reason, or cause of the fact. Unless this point 
 is correctly apprehended, the key to Hamilton's distinc- 
 tion of Knowledge and Belief — indeed, to the whole 
 of his philosophy of the Conditioned — is lost. And 
 
 1 ReicTs WorU, p. 754. 
 
 The Incomprehensihle, 
 
 
 1 
 
 SI 
 
 Mm 13 not the only critic who has groped and failed 
 here. 
 
 This meaning or application of the term Conceivable 
 readily connects itself with the primary sense as given 
 by Hamilton. We refer an object to a class,~that is 
 we make it one with the class, through its common attri- 
 bute. We thus conceive it under a general notion or 
 head. W^e brmg or subsume a particular proposition 
 under a more general, as an instance of it. We thus 
 conceive or comprehend it. We infer a consequent or 
 conclusion in a reasoning from its antecedent or grounds. 
 We thus comprehend it in its sequence or connection 
 But suppose we run back our notion te the most general 
 or universal notion which we can form,— or our major 
 proposition in the reasoning to the most general or uni- 
 versal proposition; and suppose, further, that we are 
 thus face to face with what is universal or ultimate 
 m knowledge,— then Hamilten would say we have 
 reached the limit of the conceivable or comprehensible • 
 for now, though we know, even apprehend, the ultimate' 
 notion or principle, it is not capable of being conceived 
 as intelligibly connected with any notion or principle 
 beyond itself. Let the point at which we arrive in this 
 regress be, lam conscious, or / am conscious of a non-ego 
 —or lam conscious of some ^^em^/,— Hamilton would say 
 here we are at the^incomprehensible,-not, be it observed, 
 the mcognisable; for while admitting this most general 
 notion, fact, or truth, I have no means of conceiving or 
 comprehending how I am conscious, -how I am conscious 
 of seH and not-self,-how I am conscious of something 
 being. These are not cases of a higher notion ; they are 
 no doubt particular instances of universal principles or 
 
52 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 the liighest notions ; but these are the ultimate principles 
 of all knowledge and intelligibility themselves. 
 
 And now we see clearly enough why Hamilton dis- 
 tinguishes between Knowledge and Belief, or philosophic 
 faith. It is possible that, in the case of a combination 
 of attributes, the mode of which we cannot conceive, we 
 may yet believe that there is an explanation of the com- 
 bination. We may even believe this at the ultimate 
 point in the regress of knowledge. How I am, or come 
 to be, a conscious being, I cannot, with only my own 
 consciousness, conceive, but may suppose it explicable 
 if another consciousness were, out of which mine arose. 
 Or how, for example, there may be in one being the 
 union of Personality and Infinity, — this I may not be 
 able to conceive, and yet I may be at liberty to believe 
 that someliow, unknown to me, such a combination is 
 possible, even in fact. This is not impossible in reality, 
 unless it can be shown that the attributes to be com- 
 bined are tnily contradictory ; and this we cannot abso- 
 lutely show in any case Avhere the mode of combination 
 alone is not explicable. The beginning of existence, — 
 the first step in the being of the world and its laws, — 
 may not be conceivable by me, yet I may be at perfect 
 liberty to believe that a beginning of things and laws 
 somehow there was. Nothing can bar my belief in 
 such a beginning' except the proof that beginning and 
 ^senomenal feeing are absolutely contradictory. This 
 is a point which no one, on any principle of philo- 
 sophy, could possil)ly establisli. Belief, therefore, 
 Hamilton says, and says truly, is wider than know- 
 ledge ; and knowledge pushed back, even in weari- 
 ness, to its ultimate ground, means, suggests possibili- 
 
 
 Knowledge and Belief, 53 
 
 ties in which we may believe, and which yet we do 
 not know. 
 
 And is tliere not an analogy to this in the advance 
 of Science % l\Tien Science gets to a general law or an 
 explanation of a fact— immediately higher than the fact 
 —this -fact is comprehended. The glass cracks under 
 hot water, and this remains incomprehensible until it 
 is found that bodies expand under heat. This, of course, 
 is relatively incomprehensible; it is so until it is ex- 
 plained. But go back t^ tlie law of gravity, or the 
 mutual attraction of the particles of bodies : this is, in 
 tlie present state of scientific knowledge, inexplicable',— 
 incomprehensible. We do not know how it is that bodies 
 are thus mutuaUy attracted. We may some day come to 
 know this. But meanwhile we have but the general fact 
 of the attraction, and the ground or mode of it is entirely 
 inconceivable. In Hamilton's view there is at least a 
 partially paraUel case in certain of the first principles of 
 knowledge. We know them, — cannot know without 
 them,— but how they are and are so known to us we 
 do not know. 
 
 In the case of physical law,— even what now appears 
 to us the ultimate,— there is always a possibihty of our 
 surmounting our actual ignorance. There is no inher- 
 ent or essential impossibility in getting to a higher know- 
 ledge, in the light of which physical laws, now ultimate 
 to us, may stand as to mode clearly revealed. But what 
 Hamilton maintains is, that there are ultimate principles 
 in knowledge which we accept, and must accept, although 
 we are wholly unable to reduce them to higher grounds, 
 —to bring them under wider notions or more general 
 principles. Of course what Hamilton here contends 
 
54 
 
 Hamiltmi. 
 
 for is not a temporary but an essential incomprehensi- 
 bility in the nature of knowledge. And this cannot be 
 relevantly met by talk about inevitable states of mind 
 regarding antipodes, ghosts, darkness, or precipices. The 
 principle denied to be incomprehensible must be shown 
 to be capable of reduction to a principle beyond, or wider 
 than, itself. In the proof of this, the principle itself 
 must not be assumed. In the proof which assails the 
 ultimacy of the principle, no principles ought to be as- 
 sumed which are not vindicable on grounds of ultimacy 
 as first principles. Of all this Mill cannot be said to 
 have even a glimpse ; and in his attempted reduction 
 of the antithesis of the Ego and non-Ego to a neutnnn 
 lower than or beyond both, he has violated every law 
 of legitimate argument. He has assumed general prin- 
 ciples as ultimate, without attempting to give a guarantee ; 
 and on the strength of these he has sought to show that 
 a principle deeper than any of them — even one supposed 
 in each — is derivative from them. It is almost super- 
 fluous to suggest that, had he been successful in show- 
 ing that the antithesis of Ego and non-Ego is derivative, 
 the whole problems of the reality and the guarantee of 
 first principles remain exactly as they were, — in his case 
 slurred, and misapprehended. 
 
 The criticism usually directed against Hamilton on 
 the point as to the contradiction involved in saying that 
 the Infinite or Inconditionate, as absolute or infinite, is 
 inconceivable, and yet that we may, nay, must believe 
 in it, — in one or other of its forms, — proceeds on the 
 misconception now pointed out There is nothing in- 
 consistent in such a statement We know perfectly 
 Trhat we mean when we use the terms infinity and timej 
 
 I 
 
 1 
 
 Criticism of Mdliod, 55 
 
 or an absolute commencement of time, just as we know 
 what we mean by two straight lines and by enclosing a 
 space. But what we feel it impossible to do in im^i- 
 nation or in thought, in any form, is to conceive infini'ty 
 and time, or an absolute beginning of time, in one image' 
 or in one concept Yet we may believe that 'this com- 
 bination of infinity and time is possible in reality. There 
 may even be reasons which lead us to suppose that it is 
 so, and that an absolute beginning of time is not really 
 true. These reasons would lead to the positive belief in 
 one of the alternatives, though this would never enable 
 us actually to conceive how infinity iind time are com- 
 bined in one object of knowledge. 
 
 Hamilton's method, though thus obviously of the most 
 analytic type, has been described as quite the reverse, 
 and named « introspective." The suggestion here is that 
 Hamilton's method, as " introspective," simply looks at 
 the facts, real or supposed, of consciousness, as we now 
 find it in its matured state, and does nothing in the way 
 of attempting to answer the question as to how the pres- 
 ent forms and laws of consciousness,— how its present 
 contents, in a word,— have growTi up. Hamilton is 
 accused, moreover, of accepting as intuitive or original 
 any fact or principle of consciousness, because, " in his 
 opinion, he himself, and those who agree with him, 
 cannot get rid of the belief in it" « A belief" is held^ 
 it is said, "to be part of our primitive consciousness,-^ 
 an original intuition of the mind,— because of the ne- 
 cessity of our thinking it" 
 
 According to Mill, the fact of a principle or a belief 
 being necessary in our present state of consciousness, is 
 no proof that it is an original or primary principle. It 
 
56 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 may have grown up to this state of necessity. It may 
 not have been originally a necessity of knowledge or 
 belief; its necessity may, in a word, be accounted for 
 by the influence of association, — inseparable association. 
 It may be questioned, indeed, according to Mill, whether 
 there are " any natural inconceivabilities." To appeal 
 to present consciousness is of no use. 
 
 " We have no means of interrogating consciousness in the 
 only circumstances in which it is possible for it to give a 
 trustworthy answer. Could we try the experiment of the 
 first consciousness in any infant, — its first reception of the 
 impressions which we call external, — whatever was present 
 in that first consciousness would be the genuine testimony of 
 consciousness. . . . The proof that any of the alleged uni- 
 versal beliefs or principles of Common Sense are affirmations 
 of consciousness, supposes two things, — that the beliefs exist, 
 and that they cannot possibly have been acquired." ^ 
 
 Mill, further, emphatically approves Locke's method 
 of seeking " the origin of our ideas," before going to our 
 present consciousness to ascertain what and how many 
 those ideas are, — in a word, seeking an explanation of 
 the contents of consciousness, before ascertaining by 
 observation of them what characters they actually pre- 
 sent. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to point out to any intelligent 
 and candid student of Hamilton's writing, that this de- 
 scription of his method as introspective has no founda- 
 tion in fact His method is as much " psychological " 
 or analytic as that of Mill himself is, or any follower of 
 the Associational Psychology. The only difference is, 
 that Hamilton's use of the method is more philosophically 
 and scientifically regulated than ^Mill's. The question is 
 
 1 Exam.f chap. ix. p. 178. 
 
 
 ' 
 
 li 
 
 Criticism of MetJiod. 
 
 67 
 
 not as to method, but as to the extent or degree to which 
 analysis can go, the assumptions which it must make, and 
 the guarantee of those assumptions. 
 
 In Psychology, or Phsenomenal Psychology, Hamilton 
 analyses our ordinary consciousness and beliefs rigidly 
 and thoroughly, and seeks to show from what primary 
 elements, as in External Perception, these have grown up. 
 The difference on this and on other points of psychological 
 science between Hamilton and Mill, for example, is truly 
 as to the nature and number of the primary elements, — 
 as to the doctrine or result of the analysis, — not as to the 
 method itself. And in regard to the universal principles, 
 facts, or conditions of consciousness, as Hamilton calls 
 them. Mill entirely mistakes Hamilton's procedure. Hamil- 
 ton gives, as we have seen, at least three specific rules for 
 ascertaining these — viz., ultimacy, necessity, inexplica- 
 bility. Under the first of these tests, Hamilton has dis- 
 tinctly laid down that the alleged ultimate fact of con- 
 sciousness must be shown not to be "a generalisation from 
 experience," or " the mere result of custom," — not, in 
 fact, to be a product simply of experience. And what 
 else or other does Mill demand by his so-called psycho- 
 logical method, or by the need of showing that the 
 principle " cannot possibly liave been acquired by experi- 
 ence " t Would the operation, or his process of associa- 
 tion, not be properly enough described as custom 1 And 
 does not Hamilton constantly distinguish logical neces- 
 sity from associational or customary connection 1 
 
 But there is a more vital error on Mill's part than 
 even this. This is shown in the following words : — 
 
 " He [Hamilton] completely sets at naught the only pos- 
 sible method of solving the problem [of the original facts of 
 
58 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 consciousnesss]. He even expresses liis contempt for that 
 method. Speaking of extension, he says : * It is truly an 
 idle problem to attempt imagining the steps by which 
 we may be supposed to have acquired the notion of exten- 
 sion, when, in foct, we are unable to imagine to ourselves 
 the possibility of that notion not being always in our pos- 
 session.' * . . . That we cannot imagine a time at which 
 we had no knowledge of extension, is no evidence that there 
 has not been such a time." 
 
 If the author of this criticism had taken the trouble 
 to master the method of Hamilton, which he so lightly 
 contemns, he would have seen a meaning which he has 
 not apprehended in the phrase, " that lies at the root of 
 all experience," — that is, "the condition of conscious- 
 ness," *' the condition of the possibility of knowledge," 
 — and other similar expressions illustrating the test of 
 ultimacy and simplicity. These phrases mean that we 
 ought not to presuppose the notion or principle which 
 we profess to generate out of experience in the experi- 
 ence itself, which is adduced as proof of its genesis. 
 Tliis is not only sound scientific method, — it is the very 
 heart of it And it is this principle which IVIill him- 
 self perhaps violates more constantly than any other 
 inquirer. But Mill supposes Hamilton to mean by 
 this that " we cannot imagine a time at which we had 
 no knowledge of extension," the truth being that 
 Hamilton is pointing out that there is no possibility 
 in thought of even conceiving any percept or sensation 
 out of which the notion of space can be generalised, with- 
 out therein assuming the notion of space itself. This is 
 a position to be examined on its own grounds ; but as 
 a condition of sound method— call it philosophical or 
 1 lUid, p. 882. s Exam., chap. ix. p. ISO. 
 
 Vindication of Metliod. 
 
 59 
 
 .1 
 
 scientific— it is indisputable. Hamilton enforces it not 
 only under his test of ultimacy, but under that of in- 
 explicability. And what more vital or searching test can 
 we have of a derivative as opposed to an ultimate stage 
 in our knowledge, than that of necessary implication 1 
 And it may be added, that the practical application of 
 the test will show the petitio iwincipii involved in Mill's 
 attempted genesis of space out of sensations in time,— 
 of the notion of the Ego and Kon-Ego from what is sup- 
 posed not to imply either,- and others of his characteristic 
 doctrines. 1 It is even a peculiarity of the philosophy of 
 Hamilton, that he applies this test of logical implication 
 in the way of positive derivation of the principles of 
 knowledge ; for his corollaries of the Law of the Con- 
 ditioned, — causality and substance, — are given by him 
 as implicates of a higher or primary law. And whether 
 we regard his deduction as correct or not, it was cer- 
 tainly a very important and a very scientific application 
 of philosophical method, just as his attempt to gener- 
 alise the ordinary facts of consciousness,— our acts and 
 states of mind,— into groups, and refer them to ultimate 
 powers, was in the line of sound psychological inquiry 
 and progress. All this has for its aim and spirit the 
 unity of knowledge and truth. 
 
 The view that the consciousness of the infant being 
 is the only genuine, is somewhat ridiculous. As has 
 been well said, — 
 
 " It is wholly contrary to all analogy, and therefore to all 
 'primnA facie, probability, that consciousness alone of all our 
 natural properties needs no development, no education. We 
 
 1 On this point see an able criticism in The Battle of the Two 
 Philosophies, p. 57 et seq. 
 
60 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 Vindication of Method. 
 
 61 
 
 know that our senses require education ere we can obtain 
 from thera genuine testimony : why are we to assume that, 
 in the case of consciousness, this is only to be had when it 
 is in that half-awakened, vague, indistinct state in which 
 it exists in the infant, and that in its full energy it is neces- 
 sarily deceptive ? " * 
 
 It would, indeed, be about as sensible and scientific to 
 seek to ascertain the future form and symmetry of the 
 tree— to divine the idea of trunk, branch, and leaf 
 — from the hidden potency of the germ alone. It 
 is the study of the mature development in the first 
 instance which can guide us to the elements and the 
 original constituents. Certainly the view which would 
 give tlie first place to " the origin of ideas " and of the 
 contents of consciousness, is about as unscientific a con- 
 ception as could well be imagined. Stated broadly, 
 it is an absurdity. We are to inquire into the ori- 
 ginal causes of facts which we have not scrutinised, 
 
 which we do not even know to exist, or which we 
 know only in a haphazard way; and if we set out 
 with the distinction, as Mill seems to propose, of " our 
 acquired ideas," and an inquiry into their origin,^ wc 
 must ask him for the test for discriminating between 
 the acquired and the original ideas, which is exactly 
 what we are supposed to be in quest of, by the method 
 he proposes. Don't examine the facts— seek the causes 
 first, is a new version of scientific method 
 
 But let us look for a moment at the actual working of 
 this so-called " psychological " method as opposed to that 
 named "introspective." The former proposes to show 
 
 1 Battle of the Two Philosophies, pp. 52, 53. 
 
 2 Exam., chap. ix. p. 177. 
 
 4 
 
 I 
 
 how all our knowledge of matter, mind, logical and meta- 
 physical principles of the utmost necessity and univer- 
 sality, is developed out of scmation. Xow what is 
 semation? It is at least, and at most, a state of 
 consciousness. It is not here pretended that tins is 
 developed in an intelligible process from anything 
 lower. How is it got tlien,— how is it known to be^ 
 —but by introspection — internal observation? In 
 what way, then, are we to speak of a psychological 
 method as different from, and superior to, one of 
 introspection, seeing the latter lends to tlie former its 
 very basis? 
 
 But there is more here. IVe find that wlien tliis 
 superior and primary « psychological " method is to be 
 applied to the simple case of the genesis of the notion of 
 externality and the material world, it cannot take a step 
 without certain postulates. It must be allowed to sup- 
 pose "the human mind capable of expectation,"— the 
 laws of the "association of ideas" leading to insepar- 
 able association. These imply time and succession,— 
 and laws regulating sequence. These, tlien, are not 
 generated. What gives them or guarantees them 1 If 
 tliey are found as facts of mind, what is the method of 
 doing so but introspection ? With such assumptions as 
 these before him, in an elementary case like the genesis 
 of the notion of externality, how can Mill profess to say 
 that all our knowledge arises from sensation? His 
 method has not only begged or borrowed them from 
 introspection, but it has borrowed them in a clumsy 
 way without analysis of them,— without seeing what 
 is already involved in them,— without seeing that no 
 one could possibly take a more suicidal position than 
 
62 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Transcendental Metlwd. 
 
 63 
 
 he himself does. These assumptions are utterly incon- 
 ceivable per se. Sensation is knoim sensation,— it is a 
 consciousness at least It cannot be known apart from 
 relations of unity, difference, &c. — involved in its very 
 knowledge. It implies a sentient, as much as associa- 
 tion implies an associator. It implies time and sequence. 
 It, in fact, is only possible in knowledge, as it is pos- 
 sible in our knowledge, and as it involves all the 
 essential laws of knowledge. Mill's peculiar method is. 
 Give me the first principles of knowledge, and I slmll 
 evolve the genesis of hnowledge. 
 
 Objection may be taken to the analytic method of. 
 psychology on the side of what is called the "transcen- 
 dental " method or " transcendental deduction." We find 
 in Kant, — at least in the * Critique,' — a certain setting 
 aside and depreciation of the psychological method of 
 observation and analysis of the mind. In this, of 
 course, he is utterly inconsistent, because no one can 
 dispense with it, and he himself actually employs it in 
 a partial way. Wc are all now tolerably familiar with 
 his famous question as to how experience is possible; 
 and it is with a view to give a complete answer to this 
 question that he has recourse to " transcendental deduc- 
 tion." As to what he precisely aimed at in this method, 
 and as to the true character of the method itself, his fol- 
 lowers and commentators are obviously very far from a 
 common understanding. This, however, seems to be clear, 
 that at the outset of the * Critique,' Kant did not apply 
 psychological observation and analysis to test Hume's 
 position of the limitation of intuitive apprehension or 
 external perception to impressions,— mere states of con- 
 eciousnesa He accepted this limitation, but sought to 
 
 \ 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 show that in order to constitute sensation or impression 
 an object of knowledge, more than itself is required,— 
 viz., time, space, category, which are purely mental or a 
 priori. When we come, however, to examine what ohject 
 or objective with Kant means in this connection, we find 
 that it is simply that the naked material called impres- 
 sion is to be set under necessary and universal connec- 
 tions or relations. It is therefore in one important 
 aspect as much subjective— i.e., a mere state of the 
 consciousness— with Kant as with Hume. It is objec- 
 tive only in the sense of being clothed in certain a ^^non 
 forms and categories,— certain mutual relations, and 
 relations to the unity of the Ego as apperceptive or 
 truly conscious. If this be the whole of Kajit's work, 
 it is not much, and we are as far off from knowing 
 the possibility of experience as we were before. For 
 experience would simply mean a necessary context of 
 subjective impressions,— the reality of the world, of the 
 soul, of God Himself, being left wholly undetermined. 
 If it be Kant's aim to show the possibility of experience, 
 in the ordinary sense of the tenn, on the basis of Hume's 
 limitation of knowledge, pirn time, space, and category, 
 as pure forms of consciousness, his attempt is necessarily 
 a failure. A real or independent world, a real or true 
 unity of the Ego, Kant could not reach on any such 
 method. When, therefore, people speak of his show- 
 ing or deducing the possibility of experience, they are 
 using a wholly ambiguous expression,— the experience 
 whose conditions are supposed to be deduced being 
 in no way necessarily like the experience which we 
 know in consciousness, whether intuitive or inferential. 
 Kant, in abandoning the psychological method, could 
 
G4 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 not consistently tell us, in the first place, what experi- 
 ence is, or what experience he was speaking of, and 
 whose possibility he was seeking to deduce. If he 
 thought that he could by his method reach even the 
 conditions of our ordinary experience, — sifted, tested, 
 and analysed, — he was mistaken. In abandoning the 
 /psychological method, he threw away the key to the 
 door of his prison-house, and then deluded himself 
 with the idea that by making a circuit of the walls he 
 could reach the open air. 
 
 As to the transcendental method itself, it might be 
 readily shown that, whether it be regarded as a process 
 of logical subsumption, or a constructive, synthetic pro- 
 cess, it is illogical, inconsistent, and useless. There can 
 be no logical subsumption of anything, or matter of ex- 
 perience, under either form or category, — time, space, 
 causality, or whatever the a prion notion be, — unless 
 the matter subsumed is already apprehended as possess- 
 ing the feature of the form or category — as, e.g., in time 
 or as a cause ; and if this be so, the matter subsumed is 
 already constituted under form or category, and not left 
 to the mind to do it for tlie first time. There is appre- 
 hension of relation existing, — not the imposition of rela- 
 tion not yet existing. Besides, there is no knowledge 
 of pure form or category on the one side, and (naked) 
 matter on the other. Though virtually assumed, it is 
 absolutely impossible ; for there would thus be know- 
 ledge ere it is constituted. Even if there were, there 
 would be no means whatever of subsuming the matter 
 given under different categories. How could we in 
 such a case distinguish M'hat is to be subsumed under 
 time alone, or time and space together, or under sue- 
 
 Transcendental Metliod. 55 
 
 cession, coexistence, causality, or substance ? Obviously 
 only arbitrarily and irrationally. 
 
 Divorce the reason or sum of the principles of pure 
 knowledge from the understanding, and set these facul- 
 ties apart, as Kant does,— then there is no possibility of 
 uniting them, or through their union constituting human 
 knowledge, or any object of intelligibility. ^ 
 
 But the transcendental method, interpreted as one of 
 synthetic construction, is perhaps more completely self- 
 contradictory than the view of it now represented. The 
 true transcendental method is represented as synthetic ; 
 it adds to the element — say impression — something 
 besides itself, sometliing beyond itself, or from with" 
 out. As element merely, the impression does not 
 exist for us as conscious beings,— is, in fact, mean- 
 ingless until the elements ah extra are added to it. 
 The transcendental method is thus a creation of 
 knowledge or experience. It is further a creation 
 out of nothing; for the added elements— viz., time, 
 space, category— make the meaningless or non-existent 
 impression of something,— an object ; and we have thus 
 disclosed to us the process of the origination of experi- 
 ence. This is possible only through a priori constnic- 
 tion so carried on. ]^ow, be it observed that the tran- 
 scendental method as thus interpreted professes to prove, 
 or deduce, or show to be necessary, each of the specified 
 elements of the complete whole called knowledge of an 
 object It professes to do this also, starting from the 
 
 1 The above was written before the appearance of Dr Hutchison 
 Stirling 8 Text-Booh to Kant. I am gratified to find that his view is 
 in substance the same. The reader would do well to refer to his 
 lucid and admirable exposition of Kant's svstem generally 
 
e^ 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 impression or sensation. Kow the impression is not 
 liiiown per se, — does not exist for us at all as an intel- 
 ligible or even conscious object ; for we have no object 
 of knowledge or consciousness, unless as we are con- 
 scious of the whole transcendental apparatus brought to 
 bear on the impression, and so make it cognisable. In 
 these circumstances, I maintain that it is absolutely 
 imj)0ssible for us ever to reach an object of knowledge 
 or intelHgibility at all. We cannot start from an im- 
 pression as a datum from which to deduce or estabhsh 
 the necessity of other elements — viz., time, space, and 
 category ; and this for the obvious reason that the 
 datum — the impression 7>er se — is confessedly meaning- 
 less and non-existent even in consciousness. A ground 
 of proof or intellectual process, which is meaningless, 
 is no ground of proof. You cannot sliow anything 
 furtlier to be necessary to a meaningless element, non- 
 existent in knowledge. And the same holds true of 
 any other element in the complex whole supposed to be 
 capable of affording a starting-point for the deduction, 
 or of proving the necessity of the other elements. Let 
 time per *v', or space or category per «e, or self ^>er se^ 
 be tlie alleged starting-point, there is no possibility of 
 proving anything else to be necessary to it or involved 
 in it, for the simple reason that there is as yet, by 
 supposition, no object of knowledge. Transcendental 
 deduction, as thus interpreted, is no process of proof 
 of the necessity of other elements besides sensation, 
 or besides anything else from which it starts, to consti- 
 tute knowledge. As a process of construction it is 
 entirely futile. It not only fails to vindicate our right 
 to use the necessary principles of knowledge, it wholly 
 
 Hamilton and Hume, 
 
 67 
 
 fails to connect the one side of our knowledge with 
 the other. If this be the method of the "articula- 
 tion of consciousness," it is an articulation without 
 joints. 
 
 And yet this method is alleged as proving, demon- 
 strating against Hume and his impressional theory, that 
 the impression per se is not only unfit to be the basis of 
 knowledge or experience, but even that it is meaningless, 
 — no object of consciousness, non-sensicaL Do not the 
 upholders of the transcendental method see that the 
 impression per se is equally meaningless to them as to 
 liim ? — that if it is meaningless as a ground of construct- 
 ing knowledge with him, it is not less meaningless for 
 them, as utterly empty and naked? The impression j5>er 
 se may be meaningless, but then it is unfit to be the sub- 
 ject of a proposition, or to have any definite correlative. 
 In a word, the transcendental method, if it is to do any- 
 thing at all, must be able to create both its ground and 
 itself out of nothing. It must ascend, in a word, to 
 the vagaries of "pure thought," and its spontaneous 
 determinations, as Hegel vainly imagines he reveals 
 them. 
 
 Obviously the analytic method of Hamilton is a great 
 deal deeper than any so-called transcendental deduction, 
 as it is also free from hypothetical metaphysical formulse, 
 which foreclose the law of the facts. Psychology is 
 necessary as affording not only a knowledge of what is 
 to be deduced, — of that experience whose conditions are 
 sought,— but of the method of all intelligible deduction, 
 — of every act which professes to evolve with conscious- 
 ness one thing from another. Every rational method is 
 thus conditioned by psychology and its data. It cannot 
 
 J I ' 
 
68 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 take a step without these ; it can otherwise know neither 
 what it seeks nor the road it takes. 
 
 In the application of the analytic method to philos- 
 ophy — especially to the question of Hume's limitation 
 of knowledge — the way is quite clear, and the principle 
 sound. AVlien it is said that knowledge, to begin with, 
 is an impression, a consciousness, it must be on the 
 ground simply of psychological observation and analysis. 
 But if the statement rests on an appeal to the ultimate 
 in consciousness, so does the denial of it on the psyclio- 
 logical method. This question of fact must thus be 
 settled on the process of evidence j^roper to the case. 
 This is the method of Keid, and it is that of Hamilton, 
 — the latttT carrying out the analysis Avith far greater 
 jirecision and rigour than the former. Then if Hume's 
 statement be a traditional one, — or a hypothetical one, 
 taken up on the authority of previous philosophers, — it 
 still falls to be tested by psychological observation and 
 experiment, '^o one is at liberty to assert a matter of 
 fact simply on authority, when it is open to testing, 
 much less so to lay down a principle in philosophy. 
 Further, applying the same method, Hume's system, as 
 that of any other thinker, may be tested by the principle 
 of consistency or non-contradiction. Hume could not 
 object to this — for in reasoning at all he postulates this 
 principle ; and an incoherent system is a false system. 
 This test has been applied to the system alike by Eeid 
 and Hamilton. Further, it is quite competent, on the 
 analytic method, to show, in regard to the principle of 
 Hume's or any other system, that it involves, by neces- 
 sary implication, more than its author allows, or than is 
 provided for in the system. It is a complete miscon- 
 
 Suhjedive Certainty. 
 
 €9 
 
 
 
 ception to hold that this process is competent only to a 
 method of " transcendental deduction." On the contrary, 
 the use of reasoning to implication by this method might 
 be properly challenged as seeking to connect the non- 
 empirical with the empirical, — what is not got from 
 experience with experience itself. But the procedure is 
 quite competent from one form of experience to another, 
 — from an act to an agent, — from a series of changes to 
 an underlying permanent. These are simply applications 
 of the philosophical method of Hamilton, and looked at 
 merely as modes of procedure in seeking truth, they are 
 thoroughly legitimate. How far they have been success- 
 fully carried out is another matter, and one of detail, 
 which can be ascertained only by a comparison of the 
 conflicting philosophical systems, and a minute examina- 
 tion of the philosophy of Hamilton. 
 
 There is a talk in some quarters of the insufficiency 
 of subjective certainty or assurance, and the need for 
 an objective one. But the answer has already been 
 given. 
 
 " The necessity we find of assenting or holding is the last 
 and highest security we can obtain for truth and reality. 
 The necessary holding of a thing for real is not itself reality : 
 it is only the instrument, the guarantee of reality. It is 
 not an objective, it is only a subjective, certainty." ^ 
 
 Objective certainty, or the certainty of objective exist- 
 ence, can mean only that 
 
 " I, the subject, must hold the thing known for objectively 
 existent, — that is, I have but the highest subjective certainty. 
 Any other certainty is unattainable, even contradictory, for 
 human thought. A subject cannot be any otherwise certain 
 
 1 Reid's Works, p. 800. 
 
70 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 than that it ia certain. To be objectively certain, in the 
 sense here indicated, the subject must be both itself and the 
 object, and, as such, be able to become certain. Yet certainty 
 has no meaning except as in a subject." ^ 
 
 In other words, the last ground of appeal in knowledge 
 is, I am conscious of being constrained to think a fact 
 — a truth — a series of truths related. Necessary relation 
 may be the object of thought, but the guarantee of the 
 necessity is still my consciousness of this necessity, — my 
 subjective assurance of what is necessary and universaL 
 That is, in other words, the last ground of appeal of the 
 doctrine of Common-Sense, — the meaning of Instinctive 
 or Primary Belief. 
 
 There is a habit of writing about such divergent 
 thinkers as Locke and Leibnitz which characterises their 
 philosophy as " individualist." Berkeley, Hume, Eeid, 
 and Hamilton are all classed under the same vague and 
 assumptive phraseology. The meaning seems to be, that 
 the systems of these thinkers accept as a fact the exist- 
 ence of the concrete thinking-subject, and endeavour to 
 show how this subject, as an individual consciousness, is 
 related to the wider universe of which he forms a part 
 Or how the varied contents of the experience of the 
 individual are to be accounted for, and what certainty 
 attaches to his subjective consciousness of things. This 
 is apparently to be regarded as the true aim and method 
 of the very different philosophers just enumerated. Look- 
 ing at the really different systems of those thinkers, it 
 seems amazing to find them grouped together, and grouped 
 in such a category. 
 
 The true or metaphysical way of looking at philosophy 
 
 1 Hermes quoted, Reid's Works^ pp. 800, 801. 
 
 
 Tlie only Certainty. 
 
 71 
 
 as opposed to the individual or psychological is said to 
 be asking a question of this type : What is the nature 
 of the relation between the individual himself, as one 
 part of the system, and the system as a whole 1 Sup- 
 posing now that questions of this sort are put — how, 
 I ask, are they to be answered? By what method 1 
 Can they be answered by any method which is not one 
 of individual or subjective certainty in the first instance ] 
 How can any solution of the question of my relation to 
 the system of things of which I am, or suppose myself, 
 a part, bo given which does not fall to be tested by 
 my consciousness or thought as an individual 1 or how 
 otherwise can I solve the question, what is the nature 
 or meaning of my own existence, or of the existence 
 of things around me? Nay, if I have no guarantee 
 of my own conscious existence in the first place, how 
 can such questions be put, or how can I put such ques- 
 tions at all ] ^Vhat could the solution of them be after 
 all, but the conceptions which I, an individual conscious 
 thinker, may be able to form of myself or things — of 
 the whole of things, and of my relations to them % And 
 supposing that these very individual conceptions are 
 proved to be common to mankind, what certainty could 
 I have of this but the certainty which is in my con- 
 sciousness as an individual? And then am I not ex- 
 actly where I was ? — still in face of the question as to 
 whether and how far my knowledge thus guaranteed 
 is convertible with the absolute, permanent, self-abiding 
 reality of things? Can we ever transcend subjective 
 certainty ? Is not the question of philosophy. How far 
 can this certainty carry us or assure us? and that 
 whether we ask how the contents of actual experience 
 
72 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 grow up in the individual, or what the individual is, 
 or how he is related to the whole of things. 
 
 What is this knowledge of the infinite, absolute, or 
 universal beyond, before, and in the individual, but the 
 individual's conception of the infinite, absolute, and 
 imiversall And why should this or that individual 
 suppose that his conception means more than just the 
 conception which, as an individual, he is capable of 
 forming] or that it is anything but an individualised 
 infinite, or absolute^that is, something representative 
 of the transcendent Infinite or Absolute ? 
 
 73 
 
 /■ 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS NATURE AND CONDITIONS — 
 MENTAL LATENCY. 
 
 Though Hamilton states Phajnomenal Psychology as 
 first in the order of the branches of philosophy, his 
 treatment of the subject in the 'Lectures' leads him 
 naturally to deal with what may be called the homology, 
 or doctrine of the laws of consciousness in general The 
 mental facts or phenomena are embraced by him in one 
 general word — consciousness. He regards all the special 
 phenomena as simply forms or facts of consciousness. 
 
 " Consciousness is to the mind what extension is to 
 matter or bodyT^ Though both are phaiiiomena, yet both 
 are essential qualities, for we can neither conceive mind 
 without consciousness, nor body without extension."-^ 
 To state its meaning generally meanwhile, it may be 
 described as |^ the knowledge that I, or the Ego, or self, 
 exists in some detenninate state. 'M It is only in this 
 knowledge that mental pha^nomena are for us, — are, in 
 fact, at all. "With this they appear, — i.e., become 
 phaenomena; w4th this they disappear, — cease to be 
 phaenomena. '\ Hence in a systematic exposition it is 
 
 1 Metaphysics^ L. IX. 
 

 74 * Hamilton. 
 
 natural to prefix a statement of the laws or conditions 
 of consciousness itself, for all the special phaenomena 
 must be more or less regulated by those laws. If there 
 be necessary laws or conditions, these will extend to all 
 the phtenomena, and will retjuire to be summarised. 
 The classification of the phaenomena themselves, and 
 the general or generalised laws, fall to be subsequently 
 exposed. This science may be called the Nomology of 
 Consciousness, and will form the introduction to Psychol- 
 ogy proper or Phainomenal Psychology. 
 
 Hamilton obviously^ilistinguishea[ though he does not 
 separate/consciousness from the definite act in which it 
 is manifested^' The former, or general consciousness, he 
 regards as the immediate basis or form of all possible 
 knowledge. He finds it, or he realises himself in it, 
 and he regards it as impossible to say how it has arisen, 
 what are the conditions under which it is possible. But 
 with regard to any definite act of consciousness, — be it 
 perception, sensation, judgment, volition, — he professes 
 to be able to find by psychological method "the uni- 
 versal conditions under which alone such an act is pos- 
 sible." These universal conditions are exemplified in 
 the determinate or individual acts of consciousness, and 
 they are known from a study and comparison of the 
 acts. But how they are or arise, we cannot telL They 
 are the ultimate for us, constituting the essence of the 
 very intelligence which illegitimately seeks to know 
 their genesis. 
 
 How consciousness is possible is an unphilosophical 
 question, in so far as it points to determining this possi- 
 bility by consciousness itself. "We cannot explain how 
 we come to be conscious of self, of mental states, of 
 
 Row Consciousness is Possible ? 
 
 75 
 
 f 
 
 1 
 
 external objects, by any process of consciousness, for 
 the obvious reason that we assume our being conscious 
 as the means of explaining how we are conscious at 
 all, or how we come to be conscious. Consciousness in 
 one or other definite manner is for us the primary 
 revelation, — the alpha of our being. It is a revelation 
 and a constitution 'of existence, in the strictest sense of 
 these terms, of us, but not by us. "VVe exist, and we 
 know we exist, only in as far as for the first time we 
 consciously energise. This does not, be it observed, 
 preclude questions about the growth of the contents of 
 consciousness. These are psychological questions, and 
 quite within the competency of research; but the ex- 
 planation of how there is consciousness at all, or in 
 any form, this is unphilosophical, — inexplicable by con- 
 sciousness itseK. Consciousness is the first, the last, 
 the abiding mystery of being. ^ 
 
 This problem is virtually attempted by writers who 
 make use of such phrases as, — How is knowledge pos- 
 sible 1 What are the ultimate conditions of knowledge ] 
 These questions are quite legitimate, — are, in fact, the 
 questions of Eeid, Hamilton, and Cousin, in the sense 
 of being simply proposals for the analysis of the con- 
 sciousness in which we are revealed to ourselves, — in 
 which any knowledge is realised. Hamilton's " condi- 
 tions" or "limitations" of consciousness refer to the 
 possibility of it in a good and soimd sense. They are 
 adduced after analysis of the fact, — after the experi- 
 mental tests of doubt and non-contradiction, — as the 
 common or universal and necessary elements of know- 
 ledge, — those elements apart from which we may try to 
 1 See Reid's Works, pp. 930, 746, 801. 
 
75 Hamilton. 
 
 tlilnk knowledge but cannot. But these are originally 
 psychological data, as much as the contingent experi- 
 ences in which they are manifested, and which tliey 
 condition. They are found by testing facts to be nec- 
 essary and universal in the first instance, and as such 
 tliey are recognised as laws. In this sense, but in 
 this only, can we speak of showing how knowledge or 
 consciousness is possible ; it is seen to be possible only 
 as certain essential conditions of it, for which we have 
 but its ovm warrant, are fulfilled in our experience. 
 
 To attempt to explain thinking by thinking, or know- 
 ledge by knowledge, is in its last resort reasoning in a 
 circle. To know Jiow we know is to know, — to assume 
 that we can and do know, and know truly. But if we 
 know in knowing how we know, we have assumed 
 knowledge as a fact, and as a validity, in order to 
 explain the fact and its validity. To explain know- 
 ledge, or to show the possibility of knowledge in this 
 sense, is an absurdity. We assert knowledge, and we 
 assert true knowledge, or knowledge as a valid instm- 
 nient of knowing. Our explanation thus, whatever it be, 
 is valid only on the supposition that knowledge there 
 is, which does not need explanation. 
 
 Further, the metaphysical possibilities of knowledge, 
 — subject and object, substance, cause, <fec., — are only 
 possibilities in the sense that oiu* knowledge of objects 
 is limited to such as stand in one or other of those 
 specifiable metaphysical relations. Before experience, 
 however, we know nothing of them, or of their possi- 
 bility. We find them in concrete forms. We find them 
 necessary. We generalise and class them as matter of 
 knowledge. But to pretend to explain how we think or 
 
 An Unphilosojyhical Qucstio7i. 
 
 77 
 
 \ 
 
 f 
 
 I 
 
 know under the relation of subject and object, or 
 indeed of any metaphysical relation, is a vain dream, 
 and the result merely of confusion as to the use of 
 words. Again, to state analytically or psychologically 
 the elements necessarily involved in any act of know- 
 ledge is not to explain the act or its possibility, but 
 only to state in detail elements of whose coming toge- 
 ther we know nothing. It is, in fact, an ideal analysis 
 of elements never given separately, and of whose actual 
 synthesis, therefore, we can give no account. 
 
 " How consciousness in general is possible ; and how, in 
 particular, the consciousness of self and the consciousness of 
 something different from self are possible ; in what manner 
 we can have a consciousness of any absolute ^ affection of the 
 thinking subject, and a consciousness of self in representa- 
 tive relation either to an external possibility or to a pre- 
 vious act of consciousness ; — all these questions are equally 
 unphilosophical, as they all equally suppose the possibility 
 of a faculty exterior to consciousness and conversant about 
 its operations. But all philosophy of mind, if it does not 
 wander into the region of hypothesis, must employ con- 
 sciousness as the only instrument of observation. Conscious- 
 ness gives us the existence both of the absolute and of the 
 relative affections of the mind ; and it gives all these as facts 
 equally ultimate and inexplicable." ^ 
 
 To explain how consciousness as in us arises has been 
 essayed on the part of the cerebro-psychological phil- 
 osophy ; but, as might be shown, without effect. The 
 method is as much ah initio null as the method by con- 
 sciousness itself. From unconscious nerve - moments 
 we cannot show the passage into consciousness. They 
 may precede constantly, uniformly ; their transmutation 
 
 1 Absolute as opposed to representative. ^ Reich's Works, p. 930. 
 
78 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Subject aiid Object. 
 
 79 
 
 into consciousness is inconceivable — that is, we cannot 
 show how the conscious rises out of the unconscious. 
 If consciousness is to explain its own origin, it must 
 assist at, even preside over, its own creation and evo- 
 lution. 
 
 Viewing consciousness, then, on Hamilton's method, 
 what is revealed to us 1 Take any special consciousness 
 or experience. I know, I feel, I desire. Wliat is 
 necessarily involved in each of these 1 This, that when 
 I know, I know that I know; when I feel, I hiow 
 that I feel ; when I desire, I hiow that I desire. With- 
 out this common element, there would be neither know- 
 ledge, feeling, nor desire. 
 
 " And this knowledge, which I, the subject, have of these 
 modifications, of my being, and through which knowledge 
 alone these modifications are possible, is what we call 
 (consciousness. . . . Consciousness is thus the recognition by 
 the mind or Ego of its acts and affections ; in other words, 
 the self-affirmation that certain mmlifications are known by 
 me, and that these modifications are mine.^ 
 
 Though the simplest act of mind, consciousness ex- 
 presses a relation subsisting between two terms, — an I 
 or self being the subject of a certain modification, and 
 some modification belonging to the subject Conscious- 
 ness thus in its simplicity necessarily involves three 
 things : 1. A knowing subject ; 2. A known modifi- 
 cation ; 3. A knowledge of the subject of the modifica- 
 tion. ^ These points Hamilton holds to be given by 
 philosophical analysis, by reflection, or the attempt to 
 realise clearly and distinctly what consciousness is, or 
 what the simplest experience is, 
 
 1 Jletajphysics, L. XI. 2 Hid. 
 
 I 
 
 We thus at the outset meet with the fundamental 
 distinction of the subject of mind proper, and the state 
 or phaenomenon. This distinction is essential to the 
 conscious act. But we must avoid ambiguity here. 
 The phaenomena of mind are not to be understood as 
 appearances in the popular sense of that term, — such 
 things as seem only to be, as opposed to what truly 
 exists. They exist truly and really. They are phaeno- 
 mena, realities as opposed to what does not exist, or 
 is not observed to exist. They are not seeming things 
 in the sense of being merely illusory appearances of real 
 phaenomena or presentations. They are really and truly 
 existent things for us, and the standard according to 
 which we must try all illusory appearances, — simulacra 
 of phaenomenal reality. 
 
 Phaenomenal reality is also, we must note, opposed 
 to absolute existence, — the existence of that which 
 subsists per se, that is, what is absolutely without attri- 
 butes, absolute substance. It is opposed also to the 
 existence of an absolute subject, or that which subsists 
 under phaenomena, a,nd yet is supposed to be known in 
 itself apart from or otherwise than through the phaeno- 
 mena.^ AVhatever view may be taken in regard to the 
 contrast between absolute reality and relative existence, 
 Hamilton holds explicitly that existence is known by 
 us, — kno^vn, too, directly or immediately in or under 
 relation to our faculties, their number, constitution, and 
 laws. 
 
 But the phaenomena or states of consciousness are 
 somehow essentially and inseparably related to a Self, 
 Ego, or Subject. This is, properly speaking, the mind. 
 1 Metaphysics, L. VIII. p. 149. 
 
80 
 
 Hamiltmi. 
 
 The phnenomena are mental ; they are pha^nomenal of 
 the niincL Mind is " the subject of the various internal 
 ph.Tnomena of which we are conscious, or that subject of 
 which consciousness is the general phaenomenon." ^ This 
 subject is, moreover, one ; it is recognised as one, while 
 the various phfenomena are changing, passing. This 
 affords the contrast of subject and object. 
 
 ** Sul)ject denotes the mind itself ; subjective that which 
 belonj^'s to or proceeds from tlie tliinking subject. Object, on 
 the other hand, is a tenn for that about which the knowinix 
 sul)ject is converwiuit,— ^what the schoolmen have called the 
 materia circa qnam; while oljjective means that which belongs 
 to or proceeds from the object kno^vn." ^ 
 
 Here the question arises, — AMiat precisely is the rela- 
 tion of knowledge between the Ego and the non-Ego, or 
 the subject and object of consciousness ? Hamilton holds, 
 that while the state or act of consciousness is known 
 directly and immediately, the subject of the state, the 
 conscious subject is not so known. We know directly 
 the phaenomena of matter and of mind ; but the subject, 
 in tlie sense of that which subsists under these pha> 
 nomena, we do not know directly or apprehend. Xor 
 do we know this subject in the sense of substance or 
 that wliich subsists by itself apart from the pha^nomena. 
 Indeed he tells us explicitly that 
 
 " mind and matter as knoA\Ti and knowable are only two 
 different series of phajnomena or qualities ; mind and matter 
 as unknown and unknowable are the two substances in which 
 thet*e two different series of phsenomena or qualities are sup- 
 posed to inhere. The existence of an unknoAVTi substance is 
 only an inference we are compelled to make, from the exist- 
 
 1 Metaphysics^ L. IX. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
 
 Consciousness a General Power. 
 
 81 
 
 ence of kno^vn phsenomena ; and the distinction of two sub- 
 stances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of 
 the two series of phsenomena to coinhere in one." ^ 
 
 He connects this statement with the general principle, 
 that of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know noth- 
 ing. Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is only 
 relative. 2 Still a basis, unknown in itself, alike of the 
 mental and material phsenomena, is "supposed," "in- 
 ferred," naturally and necessarily. To maintain that 
 mind and matter have no substantial existence is 
 
 " to belie the veracity of our primary beliefs ; it leaves un- 
 satisfied the strongest necessities of our intellectual nature ; 
 it admits as a fact that the phsenomena are connected, but 
 allows no cause explanatory of the fact of their connec- 
 tion." 3 
 
 It follows from what has been said of the connection 
 between a mental phajnomenon and consciousness, that 
 the latter is coextensive with or the genus of all the 
 mental phaenomena. In other words, if consciousness 
 be regarded as a power of knowledge, it is a general 
 power, not a special one. Perhaps it would be best to 
 keep by the expression that consciousness is the general 
 condition of the mental phasnomena, — that without 
 which none of them is a phsenomenon for us. Ham- 
 ilton strongly insists on this view, and criticises Eeid 
 rigorously for holding, as he alleges, that consciousness is 
 a special faculty of knowledge. According to Hamilton, 
 Reid, following Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, 
 Eoyer-Collard, and others, makes consciousness a special 
 faculty of knowledge, co-ordinate with the other special 
 
 r. 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. VIII. 
 —VI. 
 
 ^'lUd. 
 
 ^Ibid. 
 F 
 
 * • - -• I 
 
82 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 faculties, such as perception and memory, and dis- 
 tinguishes consciousness from each of these, as he dis- 
 tinguishes each of these from the other. He also attri- 
 butes to Reid the doctrine that the peculiar object of 
 consciousness is each operation of mind, — say perception, 
 memory, imagination, — to the exclusion of the objects 
 of those acts. 
 
 1^0 w Hamilton very strongly objects to this view or 
 alleged view of Reid. (1.) Consciousness cannot be 
 really distinguished from the special faculties of know- 
 ledge; that is, consciousness is not unless as a special 
 faculty is exercised. (2.) No one of these can be really 
 discriminated from consciousness — that is, there is no 
 exercise of a special faculty apart from consciousness. 
 (3.) It is impossible to conceive a faculty of knowledge 
 which is cognisant of a mental operation and not 
 cognisant of its object. With regard to the first point, 
 we know (Ae., feel, perceive, remember, imagine, &c.) 
 only as we know that we feel, perceive, remember, &c. 
 / know and / know that I know are not two distinct 
 acts, but one and the same act of mind. I cannot know 
 Avithout knowing that I know — i.e., feel, perceive, re- 
 member. There is no consciousness for me apart from 
 some specific act of knowledge. I must be perceiv- 
 ing, remembering, imagining, if I am conscious at all 
 Secondly, I cannot exercise any act of knowledge, — 
 perceiving, remembering, imagining, — without at the 
 same time and in the same act being conscious of it. 
 Tliere is no special faculty in exercise, apart from con- 
 sciousness. Thirdly, I cannot be conscious of the act of 
 knowledge, — say perception, — without being conscious of 
 the object perceived. I cannot be conscious of remem- 
 
 Consciousness a General Fewer, 
 
 83 
 
 bering without being conscious of the object of memory 
 — i.e., the picture in the mind, and so of imagination. 
 For, (1.) In that case there would be two acts in percep- 
 tion : there would be the perception with its object, 
 the outward quahty; there would be the consciousness 
 with its object, the inward act— the perception. (2.) If 
 we were conscious of the act and not conscious of the 
 object at the same time, we could not tell what sort 
 of act we are conscious of. It is the object which giveo 
 its character to the act \ and without a consciousness of 
 it, we could not tell whether the act is perception, 
 memory, or imagination. Unless I am conscious of 
 the object perceived, I cannot say that I perceive at 
 all, and I cannot say that the perception is of a rose, 
 or a table, or a chair. 
 
 On these grounds, Hamilton holds consciousness to 
 be the general power of knowledge, — not a special 
 power, but the genus or highest class, containing under 
 it as species all the other powers of knowledge. It is 
 probable, however, that Eeid and others use conscious^ 
 ness in a narrower sense than Hamiltoa They mean 
 by it chiefly, if not exclusively, self- consciousness, or 
 the recognition by the mind or self of its own acts and 
 states, with the implicate of a self somehow subsisting 
 permanently in those acts and states. This, no doubt, 
 is to contemplate consciousness in one only of its aspects ; 
 and it is rather this exclusiveness of view which is to be 
 censured, than any general or positive misconception of 
 the sphere of consciousness, regarded in its relations 
 universally to the mental acts and their objects. This 
 self- consciousness of Reid and Stewart is almost con- 
 vertible with voluntary or reflective consciousness, which 
 
Si 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 makes the acts its matter of contemplation, without 
 special reference to the objects, but without expressly 
 denying that consciousness in the general sense ex- 
 tends to acts and objects alike. Of course the pro- 
 priety of applying the term self-consciousness to an act 
 which is only by inference, even if immediate inference, 
 cognisant of tlie self, is open to question. But this 
 criticism would apply to Hamilton's oft-repeated doctrine 
 on this point as well as to that of Eeid and Stewart. 
 
 This doctrine of the inseparability of the conscious 
 act of knowledge and its object, might have been left 
 to its self-evidence, had it not been for the extraordinary 
 misconception of Hamilton's doctrine on the point to 
 be found in ^lill's criticism. This is a part of his general 
 misunderstanding of the distinction between Immediate 
 and Mediate knowledge, to which the doctrine of the 
 inseparability of the conscious act and object is closely 
 related. 
 
 Mill charges Hamilton with giving two irreconcilable 
 " definitions " of consciousness. Hamilton, of course, ex- 
 pressly tells us that consciousness is in any proper sense 
 of the term indefinable. It can, as he explains, only be 
 *' philosophically analysed." ^ " Its most general charac- 
 teristic " or characteristics can be stated ; and these are 
 to be realised in reflection, each man for himself. But 
 what are the two so-called " definitions " 1 The first or 
 most general characteristic is "the recognition by the 
 thinking subject of its o^vn acts or affections." This is 
 consciousness itself. Later, Hamilton states as a feature 
 of the act of consciousness, " that it is an immediate or 
 intuitive knowledge, and that this holds of every act of 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XI. 
 
 3fiirs Criticism, 
 
 65 
 
 consciousness." Consciousness is always of what is now, 
 or of what is now and here. This may be a percept, or a 
 picture of what is no longer now, or now and here. The 
 consciousness is of the picture or representation. Tliis 
 is immediate knowledge ; but the picture may hold up 
 to the mind a past object. The knowledge of the past 
 through the present is mediate knowledge. How can 
 these statements be regarded as incompatible Is it 
 not held that the apprehension of the act or affection of 
 tlie mind is intuitive or immediate ? How, then, is this 
 irreconcilable with the statement that the act of con- 
 sciousness is intuitive ? 
 
 But JMill seeks, by putting a meaning of his own into 
 Hamilton's words, to bring out an inconsistency. Hamil- 
 ton holds, that in some acts of consciousness, — as per- 
 ception, — we apprehend immediately not only the act, 
 but the object of the act. We perceive only as we are 
 conscious, and we perceive only as Ave perceive the ob- 
 ject. How is this inconsistent with the statement that 
 the conscious act is immediate or intuitive] or witli 
 the former statement of the character of consciousness % 
 If Mill had shown, or sought to show, that the percipi- 
 ent act exists, or is possible, as a matter of consciousness, 
 apart from its object, and that in the percipient act there 
 is thus necessarily a double act of knowledge, he would 
 have attempted something relevant. What he does is 
 quite different. Hamilton is to be held as meaning, by 
 the recognition on the part of the thinking subject of its 
 own acts or affections, also of " all that is therein im- 
 plied, or, as he would say, contained." Hamilton is to 
 be held as doing no such thing, in several senses of these 
 words, or in any sense of the word relevant to the pres- 
 
8Q 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 ent point Neither Hamilton nor any one else with a 
 correct conception of consciousness, would hold that it 
 has for its object every implicate of every act of know- 
 ledge or state of mind. Consciousness is of the present, 
 and the present only, — of what is now, or now and here. 
 And he offers a perfectly distinct explanation of the re- 
 lation of any existing cognitive act of consciousness to 
 what lies beyond the sphere of the now or here. But 
 putting this utterly foreign meaning on Hamilton's words. 
 Mill asks — 
 
 " How can he refuse the name of consciousness to our me- 
 diate knowledge,— to our knowledge or belief (for instance) 
 of the past ? The past reality is certainly implied in the 
 present recollection of which we are conscious ; and our 
 author has said that all our mediate knowledge is contained 
 in our immediate, as he has elsewhere said that knowledge 
 of the outward object is contained in our knowledge of the 
 perception." ^ 
 
 ** The past reality is certainly implied in the present 
 recollection of which we are conscious." In what sense 
 implied? It is not a present object of consciousness; 
 it is a past object or reality. This past object is in 
 consciousness as an image, — it is now an ima^^ed 
 or represented object As a represented object it is 
 known, and this is the only possible sense in which it 
 can be known ; and as such the knowledge is immediate, 
 — immediate or intuitive of the image. Our mediate 
 knowledge is thus " contained " in our immediate, but 
 not "implied" in it, as Mill would pervert the sense. 
 ]S"or has Hamilton ever said " that all our mediate know- 
 ledge is contained in our immediate, just as knowledge of 
 
 * Exam., chap. viii. p. 144. 
 
 Its Groundlessness. 
 
 87 
 
 I 
 
 the outward object is contained in our knowledge of the 
 perception." He has often said the very reverse, — that 
 while the object kno^vn in perception cannot be separated 
 from the percipient act, the past object in memory — i.e., 
 the original or presented object — does not necessarily 
 now exist, because we are conscious of its image, or that 
 it was presented to us at a past time ; whereas the ob- 
 ject in perception being now apprehended, now neces- 
 sarily exists. This confusion of "the past reality" as 
 object of presentation and of representation, runs through 
 the whole of Mill's criticism of Hamilton's doctrine of 
 presentative and representative knowledge. He never 
 once gets within sight of Hamilton's meaning, and thus 
 misconceives the essential point of his whole doctrine of 
 Cognition and of Eealism.^ Mill actually goes the 
 length of assuming that the representation of that which 
 has never been perceived at all, as in the theory of Eep- 
 resentative Perception, is exactly parallel with the rep- 
 resentation in Memory of that which was presented or 
 perceived at a past time, and that there is no more diffi- 
 culty of representation in the one case than in the other ! 
 Mill carries out his misconception in reference to the 
 distinction of Knowledge and Belief. » 
 
 " If it be true that * an act of knowledge ' exists, and is 
 what it is 'only by relation to its object,' this must be 
 equally true of an act of Belief ; and it must be as manifest 
 of the one act as of the other, * that it can be known only 
 through the object to which it is correlative.' Therefore, 
 past events, distant objects, . . . inasmuch as they are 
 believed, are as much objects of immediate knowledge as 
 things finite and present, — since they are presupposed and 
 
 1 See below further on this point, chap, vi 
 
88 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 implicitly contained in the mentiil fact of belief, exactly as 
 a present object is implicitly contained in the mental fact of 
 perception." ^ 
 
 Belief no doubt implies an object believed in ; belief 
 as an act of consciousness implies a consciousness of the 
 object believed in; but the object believed in is not 
 necessarily always an object of the same sort. It may 
 be an object which I perceive now and here— in this 
 time and this space. I may believe in the reality of 
 that, because I am conscious of it. Or tlie object be- 
 lieved in may be an imaged object corresponding to 
 that wliicli was once presented to me, — now no longer 
 possibly in existence; and this imaged object, with 
 the judgment that it has arisen from a presentation in 
 the past, is the object of wliich I am conscious,— nay, 
 cognisant only,— and of all that I am immecHately cog- 
 nisant. I believe that the image in my mind represents 
 what once was ; but the past event itself is not as much 
 an object of immediate knowledge as is this present, or 
 even an object of immediate knowledge at all The same 
 is true of the belief in the distant (or absent) object,— dis- 
 tant in space. This is no more apprehended immediately, 
 because the image of it is apprehended, than the past 
 event is apprehended intuitively because of the image of 
 it in the consciousness. 
 
 Besides the features of (1) knowledge, (2) knowledge 
 by me, and (3) immediate knowledge implied in con- 
 sciousness, Hamilton specifies other "conditions" or 
 "limitations." These are most fully given in l^ote 
 H to neMs WorU^ 
 
 1 Exam,, chap. viii. p. 151. 
 
 * P. 929. For an earlier sketch see Metaj}hijsics, L. XT., XII. 
 
 Conditions of Co7iscious7i€ss 
 
 m 
 
 (4) Consciousness is an actual, not o. potential know- 
 ledge. There may be knowledge in the mind in a state 
 of potentiality, as, for example, — 
 
 "a man is said to know— that is, is able to know— that 7 
 -f 9 = 16, though that equation be not, at the moment, 
 the object of his thouglit ; but we cannot say that he is con- 
 scious of this truth unless while actually present to his 
 mind." ^ 
 
 (5) It is an appreliemlon. To know, we must know 
 something ; and immediately and actually to know any- 
 thing is to know it as now and here existing— that is, 
 to apprehend it. 
 
 (6) It is a discrimination, and supposes therefore 
 plurality and difference. For we cannot apprehend a 
 thing unless we distinguisli the apprehending subject 
 from the apprehended object. 
 
 a. There is the contrast between the opposites, — self 
 and not-self. Ego and non-Ego, mind and matter. 
 
 h. There is the discrimination of tlie modifications, — 
 acts and states of the internal subject or self from each 
 other. We are conscious of one mental state only as v^o 
 distinguish it from another. 
 
 c. There is tlie discrimination of the facts and quali- 
 ties of the external world. We are conscious of an ex- 
 ternal quality or body only as we distinguish it from 
 others. 2 
 
 (7) It is a judgment. We cannot apprehend a thing 
 without, pro tanto, affirming it to exist. Tliis condition 
 is virtually contained in the preceding. It is a judg- 
 ment affirmative of subjective or ideal existence in 
 which all consciousness is realised. 
 
 I Metaphysics, L. XI. 2 ma.^ L. XXXIV. 
 
90 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 (8) The eighth condition is, AVhatever is thought is 
 thought under the attribute of existence, — existence 
 being a notion aprion\ and the primary act of conscious- 
 ness an existential judgment. If we are only conscious 
 as we apprehend an object, and only apprehend it as we 
 affirm it to exist, existence must be attributed to the 
 object by the mind ; and this could not be done unless 
 existence as a notion virtually pre-existed in the mind.^ 
 
 Hamilton insists strongly on the fact that judgment 
 is the simplest or most elementary act of knowledge. 
 But he recognises two kinds or rather degrees of judg- 
 ment, — what we might venture to name the j^^jchologi- 
 cal (or better metaphysical) judgment, and the logical. 
 The first or simplest form of judgment is " the primary 
 affirmation of existence, — the existential judgment." 
 " The notion of existence is native to the mind. The 
 first act of experience awoke it, and the first act of con- 
 sciousness was a subsumption of that of which we were 
 conscious under this notion; in other words, the first 
 act of consciousness was an affirmation of the existence 
 of something. The first and simplest act of comparison 
 is thus the discrimination of existence from non-exist- 
 ence ; and the first or simplest judgment is the affirma- 
 tion of existence, — in other words, the denial of non- 
 existence. "^ 
 
 The existence affirmed in the primary judgment is 
 either ideal, as of a mode of consciousness, or real, as of 
 a quality of a non-Ego. 
 
 The other form of judgment, which may be called the 
 logical, is " a judgment of something more than a mere 
 affirmation of the existence of a phsenomenon, — some- 
 
 1 Raid's W(yrks, p. 934. 2 Metaphysics, L. XXXIV. 
 
 Conditions of Consciousness. 
 
 91 
 
 i 
 
 thing more than a mere discrimination of one phseno- 
 menon from another." This is "the more varied and 
 elaborate comparison of one notion with another, and 
 the enouncement of their agreement and disagreement."^ 
 This comparison of notion and notion, or of individual 
 and notion, — of subject and predicate, — is obviously 
 only possible through the primary judgment, for subject 
 and predicate as separate notions must be conceived, 
 and in the conception affirmed ideally to be, ere we can 
 join or disjoin them in the secondary or logical judgment. 
 This is an important and fundamental point in every 
 philosophy of knowledge and being. 
 
 (9) The ninth limitation of consciousness is, that Avliile . 
 only realised in the recognition of existence, it is only ' 
 realised in the recognition of the existent as conditioned.^ 
 
 (10) The tenth limitation of consciousness is that of 
 Tirtie. This is the necessary condition of every conscious 
 act ; thought is only realised to us as in succession, and 
 succession is only conceived by us under the concept of 
 time. Existence and existence in time is thus an ele- 
 mentary form of our intelligence. But we do not con- 
 ceive existence in time absolutely or infinitely — we con- . 
 ceive it only as conditioned in time; and existence 
 conditioned in time expresses at once and in relation, the 
 three categories of thought, which afford us in combina- 
 tion the principle of causality. Existence thus known 
 as successive, is essential to what we call consciousness ; 
 and the latter accordingly involves Memory.^ 
 
 The general doctrine of consciousness now given 
 suggests several points for remark. I confess there 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XXXVII. « See further below, chaps, ix., x., xi. 
 » Compare Metaphysics, L. XI. 
 
92 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Knowledge of the Ego. 
 
 93 
 
 seems to me some very considerable amliiguity in the 
 doctrine of Hamilton regarding our knowledge of the 
 Ego. The Ego, or Self, cannot be tiidy or properly 
 said to be unknown or unknowable. It is true that 
 we do not know a self per se, or an Ego, out of rela- 
 tion to a state or act of consciousness. I know myself 
 to be, only as I know myself to be feeling, to be per- 
 ceiving, to be willing, or in some definite act. I never 
 apprehend myself apart from a conscious state ; I never 
 apprehend a conscious state apart from myself. This is 
 tme ; and in that sense, as separate existences, self and 
 phainomenon are alike unknowable, if not meaningless. 
 But I do apprehend or know myself truly, really, when 
 I apprehend or know any state of consciousness. " I am 
 conscious of this or that thing " means that I know myself 
 to Ije, — to be one, — to be one among many, — to be one 
 and the same, — to be more than the existing or tempo- 
 rary state. And if I know all this, I know a great deal 
 about myself, — as much, in fact, as I know about the 
 act or state itself. And in so knowing myself, I know 
 myself not by means of inference or suggestion from the 
 previous or contemporaneous knowledge of the act or 
 state ; I know myself directly as in and along with the 
 act or state. At least, in and along with this act or state, 
 I know myself to be ; and in and along with the various 
 acts and states, I know niyself to be one and the same. 
 It is only with regard to my identity that succession of 
 various states is needed ; and it is only here, and in and 
 through these, that there can be any ground for saying 
 that I do not directly or immediately know myself to be 
 the same. ^ly oneness and identity are consciously im- 
 plied, at least, in the very fact of my knowledge of a 
 
 ii 
 § 
 
 succession in consciousness. It would seem, indeed, that 
 while self can be directly apprehended as in contrast to 
 the act or state of consciousness, as soon as we can realise 
 the fact and meaning of an act or state at all, it is only 
 through the knowledge of successive states that we can 
 know the identity of the self,— as against the manifold ; 
 while, at the same time, the knowledge of the manifold 
 is possible only through the knowledge of the accompany- 
 ing—even underlying— identity of self. The identity 
 of self cannot thus be given in a single intuition ; it can 
 be realised only through its relation to successive in- 
 tuitions, as these can be realised only through relation 
 to this identity. 
 
 If, moreover, there be a primary belief in a conscious 
 subject or Ego, if, further, its reality be inferred or 
 supposed on the general principle of a necessity of 
 thought, and if this subject be known as different from 
 that of tlie material phaiuomena, — it cannot properly be 
 said to be unknowable, or even unknown. The conscious 
 subject, in so far as it is that which knows, feels, and 
 %vills, is very distinctly and definitely an object of know- 
 ledge to itself. What it is, or whether it is, independ- ' 
 ently of these relative manifestations, may be considered 
 soluble questions or not ; but thus at least, as the term 
 of a relation, it is object of definite, even immediate 
 knowledge. 
 
 On this point of the mediate or inferential know- 
 ledge of the Ego, Hamilton cannot, however, be said to 
 be quite consistent. There are passages in which he 
 seems to assert an immediate knowledge or conscious- 
 ness of the Ego or Self as well as of the state and alon^r 
 with it. 
 
 \ 
 
91 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 He tells us that "the something of which we are 
 conscious, and of which we predicate existence in the 
 primary judgment, is twofold, — the Ego and the non- 
 Ego. We are conscious of both, and affirm existence of 
 both."^ If we are conscious of the Ego, as we are of 
 the non-Ego, it must be kno^vn immediately, not me- 
 diately. The immediate knowledge of the Ego, as well 
 as of the non-Ego, seems indeed essential to his doc- 
 trine of Natural Dualism. These are regarded as the 
 original and ultimate elements of our experience, — given 
 or presented in mutual relatioa 
 
 Hamilton's doctrine regarding the Identity of Self 
 and its ground is not more satisfactory. In evolving 
 fully the conditions of consciousness, he makes one of 
 these succession in time, and hence Memory. He adds 
 to this that Memory is necessary, («) in order to the 
 holding fast, comparison and distinction of the mental 
 states; (1)) their reference to self. "Without it, each 
 moment in the mental succession would be a separate 
 existence 
 
 " The notion of the Ego or Self arises from the recognised 
 permanence and identity of the thinking subject in contrast 
 to the recognised succession and variety of its modifications. 
 This recognition is possible only through memory. The 
 notion of self is, therefore, the result of memory. But the 
 notion of self is involved in consciousness, so consequently is 
 memory 
 
 »2 
 
 This is, perhaps, stated in a way too unqualified. It 
 is certainly not the whole of the truth in the matter. 
 For, on the other hand, {a) consciousness as a direct act 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. IX. * Ihid., L. XI. 
 
 V 
 
 Consciousness and Mental Fhxnomena. 95 
 
 of intuition is obviously necessary to memory. Memory 
 of that which was never in consciousness is obviously 
 impossible. Memory cannot thus ground consciousness ; 
 consciousness grounds memory. 
 
 ih) The notion of self and the notion of the per- 
 manence and identity of self are not quite the same; 
 and while the identity of self is known through succes- 
 sion and variety, possible only on the supposition of 
 memory, the notion of self cannot be said to be " the 
 result of memory." Memory itself already supposes the 
 notion of self and a permanent identical self capable of so 
 knowing the succession and variety in contrast to itself.^ 
 It would be better to say that consciousness is realised 
 in and through memory, and memory is realised in and 
 through consciousness; and that both repose on and 
 presuppose a self, one and identical in time, — a reality 
 which, however, is revealed to us, or which we know 
 ourselves to be, only in consciousness, and in fuU and 
 clear, or reflective consciousness. 
 
 Consciousness, thus, being the common element or 
 condition of all mental phaenomena as such, certain 
 important questions still arise. The most general of 
 these is, "What precisely is the relation of consciousness 
 to each kind or class of the mental phaenomena % Is it 
 related to each in exactly the same way, or if differ- 
 ently, howl 
 
 On this point it cannot be said that Hamilton's doc- 
 trine is perfectly clear. He tells us, no doubt, that 
 consciousness, this general condition of the existence of 
 the modifications of mind, " or of their existence within 
 the sphere of intelligence," is "not to be viewed as 
 1 Compare Reid's Works, pp. 350-353. 
 
96 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 anything different from these modifications themselves."^ 
 It may be taken, in fact, as their mmmum genm, or as 
 that element >vhich can he predicated of each kind 
 universally. 
 
 « Consciousness is simple,— is not composed of parts, either 
 similar or dissimilar. It always resembles itself, differing 
 only in the degrees of its intensity : thus there are not 
 various kinds of consciousneas, although there are various 
 kinds of mental modes or stiites, of wliich we are conscious." 2 
 
 What, it may be asked, is it that constitutes the 
 difference in kind of a mental state, if it be not a 
 difference in consciousness 1 So far as the relation of 
 consciousness to the acts of knowledge is concerned, we 
 may take the doctrine a^ sufficiently clear and explicit. 
 On this point he says : ^^Consciousness and knowledge 
 are, in fact, the same thing considered in different 
 relations, or from different points of view. Knowledge 
 is consciousness viewed in relation to its object; con- 
 sciousness is knowledge viewed in relation to its subject. 
 The one signalises that somefhhig is Irnoirn {hy me); the 
 other signalises that I htoio (something)."^ 
 
 When we come to the question of the precise relation 
 of consciousness to the facts of feeling, desire, and voli- 
 tion, there does seem considerable difficulty in its proper 
 statement and adjustment. Consciousness being admit- 
 tedly the mtimmwi genus of all the modifications of 
 mind, each is a consciousness, l^ut then each kmd — 
 feeling, desire, volition — differs from knowledge, and 
 from each other. In answer to those who maintain the 
 faculty of cognition to be the fundamental power of 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XT. ^ Ibid. 
 
 » Rnd's Works, Note H, p. 933. 
 
 Mental Latenjcy. 
 
 97 
 
 mind from which all others are derivative, he says that 
 they did not observe that although pleasure and pain, 
 desire and volition, are only as they are known to be, 
 yet in these a quality of mind absolutely new has been 
 superadded. This was not involved in, and, therefore, 
 could not have been evolved out of, the new faculty of 
 knowledge.^ In what terms, then, are we to describe the 
 specific difference ? The common element is knowledge, 
 and knowledge only. How am I to distinguish, thus, 
 perception from feeling, or feeling from desire or voli- 
 tion ] Wherein precisely lies the difference in the con- 
 sciousness? Is it an element other or more than con- 
 sciousness'? Is this, then, a mental element] Or is 
 there in the consciousness of feeling or volition a mental 
 element which is not a conscious element % Either con- 
 sciousness is more than mere recognition of each mental 
 state as mine, or there is more than consciousness in each 
 mental phaenomenon. Consciousness seems indeed to be 
 badly described when it is restricted to simple recog- 
 nition or knowledge of mental modifications : as such it 
 is not convertible with every mental modification expe- 
 rienced, and yet we cannot throw out of consciousness 
 either the distinctive element of feeling, desire, or 
 volition. 
 
 " Consciousness is the general condition of their ex- 
 istence [the modifications of mind], or of their existence 
 within the sphere of intelligence" ^ It is to be regarded 
 "as a general expression for the primary and funda- 
 mental condition of all the energies and affections of our 
 mind, inasmuch as these are know7i to exist." ^ 
 
 ^ Metaphysics, L. XI. 
 
 3 Rdd's Works, p. 929. 
 P. — YL 
 
 ^Ihid, 
 
98 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Mental Latency, 
 
 99 
 
 These and similar statements would seem to imply 
 tliat apart from a consciousness there is no mental phae- 
 nomenon, that every mental phsenomenon is a conscious- 
 ness. But this is not consistent with what Hamilton 
 elsewhere maintains. He very expressly teaches a 
 doctrine of what is called! Mental Latency ^This im- 
 plies that there are modifications of mind, activities 
 and passivities, of which, while they exist, there is no 
 consciousness, which never rise into consciousness at 
 all, and which are yet influential on our actual or con- 
 scious experienced g^he first degree of latency is shown 
 in the possession hy the mind of what it does not 
 actually at the present moment put into use, — as the 
 knowledge of a language. The second degree is shown 
 when knowledge and habits of action of which the 
 mind is wholly unconscious in its ordinary state are 
 revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary ex- 
 altations of its powers, — as in febrile delirium, somnam- 
 bulism, &c. The third and highest degree is found in 
 our ordinary experience, when mental activities and pas- 
 sivities of which we are unconscious manifest their ex- 
 istence by effects of which we are conscious. He even 
 maintains " that what we are conscious of is constructed 
 out of what we are not conscious of, — that our whole 
 knowledge is made up of the unknown and the incog- 
 nisable." \\ His general Ime of proof of this position is, 
 that certain parts of consciousness necessarily suppose 
 those mental modifications to exist, and to exert an in- 
 fluence on the conscious processes. He appeals to the 
 facts of Perception, Association, and the acquired Dex- 
 terities or Habits, in support of his views. 
 
 1 Metaphysics^ L. XVII. Cf. Reid's Works^ p. 933 
 
 Of course, if there be truly mental acts and states 
 below or beyond consciousnessfconsciousness is not in- 
 dispensable to mental activity— is not an essential con- 
 dition of a mental energy. It is only the condition of 
 the phenomena of the mind, or those energies of mind 
 which appear or are known to us, — to the Self or Eo-o 
 — " of their existence within the sphere of intelligence," 
 or " inasmuch as these are known to exist.''] It cannot 
 consistently be maintained that every mental modifica- 
 tion is a conscious one, or appears in consciousness, and 
 that there are modifications of mind of which there is no 
 consciousness whatever. Consciousness would indeed on 
 this view be the highest development of mental energy, 
 but not the only one. It would include only the experi- 
 ence we have of the mental energies. This would be equiv- 
 alent to saying that consciousness of the mental modifica- 
 tions is essential to those modifications which we know 
 and experience in the shape of feeling, desire, and will. 
 
 There are serious difficulties on any aspect of this 
 doctrine of latent mental energies. Are these, it may 
 be asked, the same in character with the conscious ones 
 —with conscious knowledge, feeling, and volition? If 
 so, how can it be said that consciousness is essential to 
 knowledge, feeling, volition? Are they different from 
 the conscious modifications, and yet mental? Then ; 
 they differ by opposites,— even contradictories,— for the , 
 conscious and the unconscious are so ; and yet they are 
 regarded as of the same genus,— mental This whole ' 
 doctrine of latency, and its consistency with one main * 
 position in his philosophy, are obviously points which 
 Hamilton has not thoroughly sifted. And the truth is, 
 that his proof is by no means cogent. 
 
 y 
 
100 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Mental Latency, 
 
 101 
 
 Tliis third degree of latency may be fairly questioned. 
 It is not clear that there is any necessity to suppose 
 that each half of the minimum vidhile^ for example, 
 makes any impression on the mind. The conscious act of 
 ])erception may arise as a new phfenomenon only after a 
 certain amount of surface has reflected the rays of light. 
 Tor it is not sho^vn that the reflection of the liglit or the 
 amount of illuminated surface is more than a mere con- 
 cause, which operates only in conjunction with coexist- 
 ing mental power. If it is merely the occasion of a per- 
 ceptive energy, — an a})prehensive act, — there is no need 
 for supposing its halves or elements to have had any 
 effect, before tlicir synthesis, and then only in the mo- 
 ment of their cognition by the conscious mind 
 
 Further, the uecidiarity of Hamilton's third degree of 
 Latency is that jwhat is latent — the unconscious mental 
 modification — never is in consciousness at all before it 
 exists in latencyj In ^lemory or Delirium, on the other 
 hand, there was first a conscious state ; and this, through 
 decay or decrease, falls, as it were, below consciousness 
 into latency. Tliere is thus a peciUiar difficulty for the 
 third grade of latency in attempting to show that the 
 conscious arises out of the unconsciou§J This cannot 
 be regarded as a mere case of physical transmutation of 
 force ; for the two states are not supposed to be equally 
 physical, or of the same kind at all There is, in fact, 
 |no natural community or known continuity of develop- 
 ment between the unconscious — now called mental — 
 and the conscious state or act] The union thus of the 
 two halves of the minimum sensibile cannot be regarded 
 as affording as product this new, unique, and singidar 
 phaenomenon, the consciousness of the object. There is 
 
 
 a break here of physical continuity ; — and the physical 
 analogy is inapplicable. There is far more in the con- 
 scious act of the perception of a surface than the mere 
 surface, or the union of the two portions of the rays of 
 light. All the space and time conditions, and certain of 
 the categories of thought, are involved, — especially dis- 
 crimination or judgment. The phoenomenon of conscious 
 perception is thus not only unique, it contains more 
 than its supposed antecedent or cause. The simple 
 explanation of the fact seems to lie in this : (1) That 
 certain physical or physiological conditions, or impres- 
 sions, are needed in the Sense ; and (2) that these must 
 be completed or fulfilled ere the conscious act arises. 
 The amount of the reflection of the rays of light and the 
 conscious perception may stand to each other in the re- 
 lation of antecedent and consequent, and yet tliere may 
 be no community or continuity of development between 
 the unconscious and the conscious. Cjmpressions on the 
 organs and nerves may be needed, to a definite extent ; 
 but it does not follow that the conscious sensation or 
 perception is the product or up-gathering of these im- 
 pressions, which are wholly unknown to consciousness.! 
 !N'othing is gained, moreover, by introducing the notion 
 of unconscious mental modification as an intermediary. 
 For of this we can form no precise iconception. Ob- 
 viously mental latencies may in some sense be allowed 
 in regard to acts and states once in consciousness. These 
 do not pass beyond the sphere of mind, — at least beyond 
 the power of recall But mental modifications not orig- ) 
 inally conscious seem to imply great difficulty, and ex- / 
 plain nothing. 
 
 To apply the term knowledge, as Hamilton does, to 
 
102 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 a state or mode of consciousness in latency is of very 
 doubtful propriety. As latent,— as below consciousness, 
 —it is not knowledge : it is admittedly only knowledge 
 as it is realised in a present or actual mode of conscious- 
 ness. But then it is no longer potential or a potency ; 
 it is an actual conscious state. To call it knowledge, 
 when in latency or potentiality, is certainly to contradict 
 the statement that consciousness is all knowledge, or 
 that all knowledge is consciousness. And if it be only 
 knowledge when it has ceased to be latent and risen to 
 consciousness, then it was not properly knowledge be- 
 fore. In truth, the phrase potential knowledge can only 
 properly be construed as referring to certain conditions 
 of knowledge,— partly physiological, partly psychological, 
 — antecedent to or accompanying the actual conscious- 
 ness. But it would be well not to call these knowledge, 
 — even potential knowledge. 
 
 \ 
 
 103 
 
 CHAPTEE lY. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS AUTHORITY AND VERACITY — THE 
 ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE. 
 
 The Philosophy of Common Sense, as held and ex- 
 plained by Hamilton, is none other than the attempt to 
 analyse knowledge or consciousness, — our experience, in 
 fact, into its elements He has explicitly and with re- 
 iteration shown that by " Common Sense " he does not 
 mean the transfer to philosophy of "a sound under- 
 standing applied to vulgar objects, in contrast to a 
 scientific or speculative intelligence," as an instrument 
 of research. 
 
 " It is ill this sense," he says, « that it has been taken by 
 those who have derided the principle on which the philo- 
 sophy which has been distinctly denominated the Scottish, 
 professes to be established." ^ 
 
 He has further explicitly shown that the Argument 
 from Common Sense or the method of the Philosophy of 
 Common Sense, though 
 
 "an appeal to the natural con\action8 of mankind, is not 
 an appeal from philosophy to blind feeling. It is only an 
 appeal from the theoretical conclusions of particular philo- 
 sophers to the catholic principles of all philosophy." * 
 
 Metajphysics, L. XXXVIII. 
 
 ^Reid's Works, ^. 751. 
 
104 
 
 HamiltoTi, 
 
 As it has been well put : — 
 
 (( 
 
 It carries the appeal into a sphere where the philosophic 
 and the vulgar have ceased to be distinguished ; it shows 
 that not the mind of the philosopher, and not the mind of 
 the vulgar, but the mind of man is what philosophy has to 
 deal with, and that its office is to resolve current beliefs into 
 their elements, not satisfied until it has reached the final 
 and absolutely pure deliverance of consciousness." ^ 
 
 Hamilton tells us : — 
 
 " The first problem of philosophy is to seek out, purify, 
 and establish, by intellectual analysis and criticism, the ele- 
 mentary feelings and beliefs in which are given the element- 
 ary truths of which all are in possession." " This is depend- 
 ent on philosophy as an art. Common Sense is like Com- 
 mon Law. Each may be laid do^^^l as the general rule of 
 decision ; but in the one case it must be left to the jurist, 
 in the other to the philosopher, to ascertain what are the 
 contents of the rule.'' - 
 
 Nothing can well be more explicit than these state- 
 ments. And we should long ago have ceased to hear 
 the paltry criticism of the Philosophy of Common Sense 
 to which Hamilton here refers. His own practice alone 
 should have sufficed to give people a better light. This 
 philosophy differs as to method in nothing from any 
 other possible philosophy which is consistent with itself. 
 Every system must accept and start from experience, — 
 individual or universal, or both. A beginning alleged 
 in a point above or beyond our actual experience is an 
 absurdity. This is a method which professes to con- 
 struct itself and its datum. Such a method is not pos- 
 
 1 Encyclop. Brit, Sir W. ITamiltorif by Miss Hamilton. 
 * Reiil's W&rkSy pp. 751, 752. 
 
 • 
 
 Argument from Common Sense, It 
 
 sible ; and if it were, it would never yield a philosophy 
 of experience, or be anything but abstract and fantastic 
 verbalism. The value of the philosophy of Common 
 Sense, in this respect, is, that it indicates the ultimate 
 and universal elements in experience, and attempts 
 also their co-ordination, and, so far, their systematising. 
 And one thing it does legitimately ; it challenges a so- 
 called speculative or rationalising philosophy to show 
 how what is alleged to be illusory or unreal in our actual 
 experience has grown up to be as it is ; and this is a 
 task which that style of speculation is much more in- 
 clined to pass by than to attempt. The usual shift is, 
 while employing the term experience, and words indicat- 
 ing its contents as facts, to sublimate these into merely 
 verbal relations. 
 
 The principles of Common Sense which Hamilton 
 professes to find, and which he seeks by a strictly 
 philosophical method, are thus simply the necessary and 
 universal principles of human knowedge, — reached, as 
 they can only be reached, through analytical reflection 
 on experience itself. If there be such principles at all, 
 they must be reflected in common belief and action, in 
 history, in language, in morals, and in social institutions. 
 What degree of importance is to be given to the practical 
 embodiment and application of those principles is a very 
 pertinent question for philosophy. But Hamilton does 
 not put this recognition and exemplification as the ulti- 
 mate basis of philosophy; he fairly grants it to be matter 
 of analysis, along with the consciousness of the indi- 
 vidual thinker, and in the light of that consciousness. 
 He off*ers criteria for determining the existence, the 
 nature, the number of those princiides; and those who 
 
lOG 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 attack his position must understand this. Otherwise 
 their efforts are but a heating of the air. In a very- 
 marked way, indeed, did Hamilton recognise the prac- 
 tical embodiment of the universal principles of know- 
 ledge. He regarded it as a datum to be dealt with, and 
 the principles realised as worthy of respect and careful 
 scrutiny. It was not to him a proof that a principle 
 is illusory or false because it happens to be commonly 
 embodied in history and civil institutions, or proceeded 
 upon in human action. This he left for Spinoza, and 
 those who profess to construct what they call reality ; 
 to show how greatly superior this ideal scheme is to 
 anything realised, and, indeed, that whatever, in actual 
 experience, does not conform to \i^ requirements, is truly 
 unreal or non-existent. No one in these times has 
 struck with firmer hand than Hamilton at a theory 
 which confounds and perverts the fundamental distinc- 
 tions of experience, and resolves reality into a spinning 
 whirl of contradictions, or into figures of such indefinite- 
 ness as, like the spectre crowd — 
 
 " seem to rise and die, 
 Gibber and sign, advance and fly, 
 Wliile nought confirmed can ear or eye 
 Discern of sound or mien." 
 
 The criteria, — the essential notes or characters, — by 
 which we are enabled to distinguish our original from 
 our derivative cognitions, are, as finally stated by Hamil- 
 ton, four : — 
 
 1. Their Incomprehensibility. When we are able to 
 comprehend how or why a thing is, the belief of the 
 existence of that thing is not a primary datum of con- 
 
 Tests of Principles, 
 
 107 
 
 V 
 
 -il 
 
 Bciousness, but a subsumption under the cognition or 
 belief which affords its reason. 
 
 2. Their Simplicity. If a cognition or belief be 
 made up of, and can be explicated into, a plurality of 
 cognitions or beliefs, it is manifest that, as compound, it 
 cannot be original 
 
 3. Their !N"ecessity and Absolute Universality. These 
 may be regarded as coincident, — for when a belief is 
 necessary, it is, eo ipso^ universal ; and that a belief is 
 universal, is a certain index that it must be necessary. 
 To prove the necessity, the universality must, however, 
 be absolute ; for a relative universality indicates no 
 more than custom and education, although the subjects 
 themselves may deem that they follow the dictates of 
 nature. 
 
 4. Their Comparative Evidence and Certainty. This 
 alone, with the third, is well stated by Aristotle, " What 
 appears to all, that we affirm to he ; and he who rejects 
 this belief will assuredly advance nothing better deserv- 
 ing of credence." ^ 
 
 Hamilton, in laying down and applying those canons 
 of analysis, expressly seeks to set aside, as neither 
 primary nor ultimate, what can be shown to be due to 
 mere generalisation. The two first tests, — Incomprehen- 
 sibility and Simplicity, — provide for this. He even 
 says : " An element of thought being found necessary, 
 there remains a further process to ascertain whether it 
 be (1) by nature or education; (2) ultimately or deriv- 
 atively necessary \ (3) positive or negative."^ 
 
 1 Reid's Works, pp. 754, 755. Cf. Metaphysics, IJ. XV. 
 
 2 Reid's WorkSf p. 18 ; Metaphysics, L. XXXVIII. See helow, 
 chaps, ix. X. xi. 
 
mos 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Hamilton virtually says, in regard to the proposed gen- 
 eralisation of the whole of knowledge from experience, 
 — This cannot be done, for the reason that there is pre- 
 supposed at every step of the generalising process, — from 
 the beginning and all through, — a fact or facts of con- 
 sciousness not given in the generalisation. I cannot 
 even conceive the particulars to be generalised, or the 
 law of the process, without bringing to them what is 
 beyond them, or truly ultimate in knowledge, — what, 
 in fact, "lies at the root of all experience." And in 
 regard to any special generalisation of a law, Hamilton 
 would say, — You are not entitled to call that an acqui- 
 sition from experience or a generalisation, if it can be 
 shown that the very act or process of generalising is 
 CJirried on under the presupposition of that which you 
 profess to evolve in the end. This, he would say, is the 
 case in regard to the eduction of space out of time, of 
 the Ego out of sensation, and other points. Our present 
 consciousness is to Hamilton simply what it is to any 
 inquirer, — the matter of analysis. He is not, as has 
 been ignorantly done, to be regarded as unfaithful to 
 his method 
 
 " when he succeeds in tracing a belief or notion, of which 
 we cannot now divest ourselves, into a generalisation from 
 experience, and as ignorant of the only possible scientific 
 method whenever he asserts of another that it cannot have 
 been acquired by experience, because that experience pre- 
 supposes it." ^ 
 
 This, in fact, in both its sides, is his method. 
 
 It may be asked, On what are those criteria grounded ? 
 
 ' Battle of the Philosophies, p. 55. One of the best discussions of 
 the points between Mill and Hamilton. 
 
 Antlwrity of Principles. 
 
 109 
 
 Have they a basis in consciousness itself, or in some- 
 thing higher 1 To this Hamilton would virtually reply, 
 
 Let the fact of knowledge or consciousness at all be 
 
 accepted, — and that we know is implied in our very 
 being — in our putting conscious questions — in perceiv- 
 ing and thinking, — then these criteria being realised by 
 us in the course of reflection on knowledge or conscious- 
 ness, we become aware of them as the tests of the ul- 
 timate in knowledge before which we recoil, or the 
 limits beyond which we cannot go. They are merely 
 general statements of what we meet with in reflecting 
 on our conscious experience, when we seek to push 
 back this experience to its ultimate possibility for us. 
 They are not criteria superinduced upon that experience 
 from any higher or other source than itself. They are 
 the features of the definite principles at the root of 
 knowledge. Each individual must go through a pro- 
 cess of reflection for himself, in order to realise them 
 and their meaning; but in so doing, he rises above 
 his mere individual experience, and puts himself in 
 the sphere of universal knowledge for man. He unites 
 himself with mind in humanity. There is no mere in- 
 dividualism in such a system ; there is rather the lift- 
 ing up of the individual from his narrow sphere to the 
 realm of the universal and the etems!, 
 
 The transition to the question of the Authority 
 of those principles of knowledge thus found, and its 
 solution, is comparatively easy. It is asked, What is 
 the authority of those primary elements of knowledge 
 as warrants and criteria of truth? How do those 
 primary propositions certify us of their own veracity ] 
 To this Hamilton replies : — 
 
110 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Authority of Principles, 
 
 " The only possible answer is, tliat as elements of our 
 mental constitution, — as the essential conditions of our know- 
 ledge, — they must by us be accepted as true." ^ 
 
 Hamilton has no proof — attempts no proof of the 
 authority of those principles As Reid says : — 
 
 " Every kind of reasoning for the veracity of our faculties 
 amounts to no more than tiiking their own testimony for 
 their veracity. There is an absurdity in attempting to 
 prove by any kind of reasoning, probable or demonstrative, 
 that our reason is not fallacious, since the very point in 
 question is whether reasoning may be trusted." ^ 
 
 Hamilton virtually accepts this position. He points 
 to our natural or spontaneous faith in them as a 
 simple fact in knowledge; and all that he does is to 
 show that when we question this faith, or seek for 
 a ground of it, we can but state the necessities or limi- 
 tations under which we find ourselves conscious of 
 thinking, and through which we are in the end com- 
 pelled to rest in it. Descartes might fairly be trans- 
 lated as meaning the same thing. We fall back with 
 him on tlie veracity of God, as the author of our facul- 
 ties. This is not properly a proof, it is a statement of 
 our natural faith in the spontaneous outgoings of our 
 powers, — our perception and our reason. And Hamilton, 
 when he speaks of a gratuitous doubt, merely implies 
 that the supposition — the gratuitous supposition — of our 
 intelligence being delusive, is to be confronted wath the 
 natui-al presumption of its truthfulness, which w^e feel 
 and accept, and is not to be adopted unless there be 
 a proof that we have been created the victims of delu- 
 
 1 ReicCs Works, p. 743. 
 
 ^IivteU. Powers, vi. p. 447. Cf. HamUton, Reid's Works, p. 761. 
 
 1 
 
 11x3 
 
 sion. But this it is for the gratuitous doubter, or the 
 dogmatist who denies, consistently to adduce. 
 
 Nowhere has Hamilton stated the character of the 
 argument from Common Sense more succinctly and 
 clearly than in these words : 
 
 "To argue from Common Sense is nothing more than to 
 render available the presumption in favour of the original 
 facts of consciousness-<^« whM is by nature necessarily 
 BELIEVED to be, truly is. Aristotle, in whose philosophy thk 
 presumption obt^iined the authority of a principle, thus 
 enounces the argument : ' What appears to all, that we affirm 
 to be; and he who rejects this belief will assuredly advance 
 nothing better worthy of credit.'-(Eth. Nic, x. 2.) As this 
 argument rests entirely on a presumption, the fundamental 
 condition of its validity is that this presumption be not dis- 
 proved. The presumption in favour of the veracity of con- 
 sciousness IS redargued by the repugnance of the facts them- 
 selves, of which consciousness is the complement ; as the 
 ^uth of all can only be vindicated on the truth of each 
 The argument from common sense, therefore, postulates and 
 lounds on the assumption— that our original beliefs be not 
 proved self-contradictory. 
 
 " The harmony of our primary convictions being supposed 
 and not redargued, the argument from common sense is 
 decisive against every deductive inference not in unison with 
 them. For as every conclusion is involved in its premi^^es 
 and as these again must ultimately be resolved into some 
 original belief, the conclusion, if inconsistent with the 
 primary phoenomena of consciousness, must, ex hypothed, be 
 inconsistent with its premises-that is, be logicaUy false 
 Un this ground our convictions at first hand peremptorilv 
 derogate from our convictions at second." i 
 
 These primary principles being ascertained, and affirm- 
 ing themselves as necessary beliefs or principles, we 
 
 1 Discussions, p. 90. 
 
.12 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 presume them trae, until they are proved to be falsa 
 by their mutual contradiction, direct or indirect We 
 assume, thus, and apply a certain test of truth and false- 
 hood, — the principle of non-contradiction. This, again, is 
 itself a deliverance of common sense or a primary prin- 
 ciple of consciousness. But it asserts itself as of a 
 higher grade than certain other primary principles ; for 
 contradictory incompatibility is the annihilation of the 
 act of consciousness or thought. This principle, there- 
 fore, the sceptic must admit ; for he too, in challenging 
 the truth of these primary data, thinks, or exercises 
 a definite act of consciousness, and thus assumes the 
 principle of non-contradiction. Now, what Hamilton 
 challenged the sceptic to do, was to prove these 
 primary principles false. He admitted that if they 
 be proved contradictory, they are discredited. But he 
 might have added, the sceptic cannot do this without 
 assuming not only the negative test of non-contradiction, 
 but the positive laws of inference, — all of which are 
 simply themselves forms of ultimate principles. In 
 fact, the essential laws of our intelligence cannot be 
 proved to be deceitful, without assuming the truth of 
 the essential laws of our intelligence. 
 
 There are two kinds of ultimate truths, — the strictly 
 Necessary and the Contingent. 
 
 "Necessity, he tells us, is of two kinds. There is one 
 necessity, when we cannot construe it to our minds as pos- 
 sible that the deliverance of consciousness should not be 
 true. This logical impossibility occurs in the case of what 
 are called Necessary Truths— truths of reason and intelli- 
 gence ; as in the law of Causality, the law of Substance, and 
 still more in the laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded 
 
 Authority of Principles. 
 
 113 
 
 Middle. There is another necessity, when it is not unthink- 
 able that the deliverance of consciousness may possibly be 
 false, but at the same time when we cannot but admit that 
 this deliverance is of such and such a purport. This is seen 
 in the case of what are called Contingent Truths or truths 
 of fact. Thus, for example, I can theoretically suppose 
 that the external object I am conscious of in perception 
 may be, in reality, nothing but a mode of mind or self. I 
 am unable, however, to think that it does not appear to 
 me — that consciousness does not compel me to regard it, — 
 as external — as a mode of matter or not-self. And such 
 being the case, I cannot practically believe the supposition 
 I am able speculatively to maintain, for I cannot believe 
 this supposition without believing that the last ground of 
 all belief is not to be believed; which is self-contradictory. 
 . . . The argument from common sense, it may be ob- 
 served, is of principal importance in reference to that class 
 of contingent truths. The others, from their converse being 
 absolutely incogitable, sufficiently guard themselves." ^ 
 
 We thus are able to see in Avhat sense Hamilton 
 alleges that the facts of consciousness, simply as facts, are 
 above doubt. This is true to the extent that beinjr 
 conscious we cannot, without subreptio jmncipii^ doubt 
 our being conscious. But in regard to an alleged spe- 
 cific deliverance of consciousness, — as that an extended 
 thing there is, — this, as a specific fact of consciousness, 
 must be admitted ere we can say that to doubt its being 
 a fact of consciousness involves a contradiction. So 
 that the principle of contradiction is directly of little or 
 no avail here. This is a point which Hamilton has not 
 accurately distinguished. The main question is as to 
 the fact whether consciousness testifies in a given way 
 or not. Of course this may be so, and we may be under 
 
 ^ Reid's Works, p. 753. 
 P. — VI. H 
 
114 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 a necessity of admitting that it is so, but this is not 
 a necessity primarily guaranteed by the principle of 
 non-contradiction. Hamilton, however, would maintain 
 that, as the fact is testified to by consciousness, — is an 
 ultimate deliverance of consciousness, — to suppose the 
 testimony false is to say that consciousness can truly 
 contradict itself — that is, can be a true ground of belief 
 now, and a false ground then. There is thus a mediate 
 contradiction, — a contradiction in holding, on the groimd 
 of consciousness, the fact of the testimony, and holding, 
 on the same ground, the falsehood of the testimony. 
 
 It thus may be fairly argued that the Idealist who 
 admits the fact of the testimony to non-mental reality in 
 perception, and who at the same time denies its truth, 
 — says the object perceived is after all but a form of 
 consciousness, — is mediately contradictory or inconsis- 
 tent. He virtually says consciousness as perception is 
 an illusion, and this he does either gratuitously or on 
 some alleged ground. The gratuitous denial may bo 
 thrown out of accomit. But the denial which proceeds 
 on a ground or reason must found this either on an 
 origmal or on an acquired principle in consciousness. If 
 the former, consciousness is assumed to be true in order 
 to prove itself false. If the latter, we have the absurdity 
 of an acquired principle or ground in consciousness 
 brought forward as of superior authority to an admitted 
 primary deliverance. This principle, moreover, cannot 
 be established or accepted, unless as itself grounded on 
 something primary in consciousness ; and we thus have 
 a ground alleged as sound or true, which yet is traced 
 back to a class of primary deliverances, which it is 
 adduced to discredit. The only mode of escape from 
 
 Ultimate Positions. 
 
 115 
 
 absurdity and mediate contradiction on the part of the 
 idealist, is to deny that consciousness as perception does 
 testify to the reality of non-mental or non-conscious 
 objects. The idealist, in denying the truth of the 
 primary deliverance, must assume some principle at the 
 least of coequal rank with the deliverance he denies 
 and thus mediately contradict, — amiiliilate his own 
 method of criticism. 
 
 On this head there seem to me to be but three satis- 
 factory positions : — 
 
 r. Consciousness as a given datum, or experience, 
 as realised in consciousness, is to be analysed and sifted 
 as far back as it possibly can,— analysed until it guaran- 
 tees itself, and guarantees itself as realised in certain 
 ultimate forms or principles. 
 
 T, These being thus revealed as the necessary- 
 grounds and conditions of knowledge, are to be accepted 
 by us under pain of abrogating knowledge altogether, 
 and thus paralysing even doubt and negation. 
 
 3°, The veracity of those deliverances, in as far as 
 they testify to what is beyond themselves, cannot be 
 proved— /.e., established by reasoning. JS'either can it 
 be disproved— 2.e., by reasoning. The judge of con- 
 sciousness can only be consciousness itself. Conscious- 
 ness is thus assumed, in judging, to be trustworthy. The 
 veracity of consciousness cannot be disproved, for con- 
 sciousness alone could show this unveracity ; but in so 
 domg it would necessarily subvert its own conclusion 
 as itself a deliverance of consciousness. 
 
 We cannot, however, give the benefit of this argu- 
 ment to such a position as that of Terrier. ^ He holds 
 1 Institutes, Introd. § 39 et seq. 
 
116 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 that even the ascertained and sifted primary data c»f 
 consciousness are natural inadvertences, and at the same 
 time that man is to be taught to think correctly, and 
 that philosophy is to be reasoned out from the begin- 
 ning. This is really to admit the fact of the testimony 
 of the primary data of consciousness to certain things, 
 and yet to dispute their truthfulness. Now the trust- 
 worthiness of these primary deliverances cannot be 
 assailed without assuming the trustworthiness of them, 
 or of some of them at the same time. A subordmate 
 principle, or an acquired principle, dependent as it 
 must be on some one or more of them, is obviously a 
 futile basis of assault And if they are all natural 
 inadvertences, both realism and idealism, dogmatism 
 and scepticism, will be found about equally worthy or 
 worthless. Besides, one would like very much to know, 
 if philosophy is in such circumstances to be reasoned 
 out from the beginning, where and when is the begin- 
 ning 1 By no method of reasoning known to us can we 
 create a beginning out of nothing. Our very reasoning 
 itself would be a postulated beginning. "WTiat, then, is 
 this beginning from which we are to start? — how, further, 
 and by what rules, is it to be reasoned out ] If it is a 
 primary datum of consciousness, it is a natural inadver- 
 tence, and reasoning based on that will not help man 
 to think more correctly. If it is not, then what is it ] 
 If a subordinate principle, it is either derived from these 
 data, or it is of inferior authority. It is inferior even to 
 a natural inadvertence. One would like, further, to 
 know something of tlie nature and authority of the rules 
 of the reasoning thus advanced to correct our natural 
 inadvertences. It can hardly be supposed capable of 
 
 Belief and Cognition, 
 
 117 
 
 dispensing with the law of necessary implication or self- 
 consistency. And this, it will be found, is but a con- 
 Crete application of a very primary datum of conscious- 
 ness, — the law of non-contradiction. Yet as such it 
 ought to be a natural inadvertence ! 
 
 As ultimate, and therefore incomprehensible, in the 
 proper sense of not being explicable by principles other 
 than or beyond themselves, our primary principles are 
 by Hamilton said to be given us in the form rather of 
 heliefs than cognitions. Tliis would seem so self-evident 
 as to be indubitable, at least to any one who would 
 avoid the absurdity of asserting knowledge, and yet 
 holding an infinite regress of grounds of knowledge, — 
 asserting a knowledge which never begins. Hamilton 
 clearly explains the doctrine in the following words : — 
 
 " * We know what rests on reason, but believe what rests 
 on authority.' But reason itself must at last rest on author- 
 ity, for the original data of reason do not rest on reason, 
 but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of 
 what is beyond itself. These date are therefore, in rigid 
 propriety. Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is that in the last re- 
 sort we must perforce philosophically admit that belief is the 
 primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate 
 ground of behef." i " The ultimate facts of consciousness are 
 given less in the form of cognitions than of beliefs. Con- 
 sciousness in its last analysis — in other words, our primary 
 experience — is a faith. We do not in propriety Inow that 
 what we are compelled to receive as not self is not a per- 
 ception of self ; we can only on reflection believe such to 
 be the case, in reliance on the original necessity of so believ- 
 ing, imposed on us by our nature.'' 2 
 
 On this, !Mill tells us that Hamilton recognised, besides 
 1 RekVs Works, p. 760. 2 Discussions, p. 86. 
 
118 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 knowledge, a second source of intellectual conviction, 
 which he calls belief, and further, that in Hamilton's 
 opinion 
 
 "belief is a higher source of evidence than knowledge; 
 belief is ultimate, knowledge only derivative ; knowledge 
 itself rests finally on belief ; natural beliefs are the sole war- 
 rant for all our knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, is an 
 inferior ground of assurance to natural belief." i 
 
 For the first statement there is no ground whatever. 
 Knowledge as belief — that is, ultimate knowledge— 
 with Hamilton means simply and obviously that form of 
 knowledge which cannot be explained by or derived 
 from aught beyond itself, but announces itself in the 
 necessity of thinking it. He expressly says that our 
 primary cognitions are not due to "a certain peculiar 
 sense distinct from Intelligence." 2 
 
 On the latter statement I must quote the pointed 
 criticism of an acute writer: — 
 
 " Sir W. Hamilton says nothing of the kind. Take these 
 three propositions; a = b; b = c; therefore, a = c. Suppose 
 the truth of the first two rests on intuition, in which case we 
 cannot prove, but do believe them to be true. The truth of 
 the last proposition rests wholly on the truth of those two 
 first. Does it therefore rest on an inferior ground of assur- 
 ance ? Not the least. Our certainty of its truth cannot 
 exceed, but neither can it by any possibility be less than our 
 certainty of the two first. The inference sought to be drawn 
 [by Mr Mill] is palpably false." ^ 
 
 Thought, call it reason or reasoning, must ultimately 
 be grounded on some first principle or principles, given 
 
 1 Exam. chap. v. p. 76. « Rdd^s Works, p. 756. 
 
 3 Battle of the Two Philosophies, pp. 28, 29. 
 
 Ultimate Teat of Truth, 
 
 119 
 
 in experience. Thought may awake to consciousness of 
 itself in the consciousness of this principle, but thought 
 does not in any sense create the principle; for this 
 would be to assume that thought is already there to 
 create what really is itself. But for a principle given 
 in experience, and ultimately to us inexplicable, our 
 reason would be utterly impotent, — something like the 
 Avell-kno^vn Mahomet's coffin, hanging between heaven 
 and earth, and having no place in either. 
 
 In this inquiry into human knowdedge, we may 
 possibly find that our ultimate test of truth or true 
 knowledge is something in the shape of a barrier or 
 limit to thought, such as we cannot overpass. In this 
 case truth in its last analysis would be a simple necessity 
 of thought, which guarantees its own certainty. And 
 this will be found to be the case. We cannot have a 
 test of ultimate truth separate from the truth itself. It 
 must be its own guarantee, — its owti self -proclaimed cer- 
 titude. And this certitude will be found to regulate in 
 a way the whole body of human knowledge. This will 
 afford criteria which we shall be able to apply to sub- 
 ordinate propositions, — to the matter and form of our 
 ordinary and scientific thought. 
 
120 
 
 CHAPTEK V. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS PHENOMENA — THE POWERS OF 
 KNOWLEDGE — EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 
 
 What then, according to Hamilton, are the phae- 
 nomena or contents of consciousness? This is the 
 question of Phaenomenal Psychology. 
 
 The whole phsenomena of consciousness may be 
 grouped into three great classes — viz., Knowledge or 
 Cognition, Feeling, Desire and Will (Conation). These 
 phaenomena indicate fundamental faculties and capaci- 
 ties of mind. We are not, however, to suppose that 
 these are entities really distinct from the conscious 
 subject, and really different from each other. It is the 
 same simple subject whicli exerts every energy of any 
 faculty, and which is affected by every mode of any 
 capacity of mind. 
 
 The mind can exert different actions, and be 
 affected by different passions. These actions and pas- 
 sions are like, and they are unlike. We thus group 
 them together in thought, and give them a common 
 name. And these groups are really few and simple. 
 Again, every action is an effect; every action and 
 passion a modification. Every effect supposes a cause ; 
 
 i' 
 
 N< .f 
 
 1 
 
 
 Classification of Mental Flit -^nomena. 121 
 
 every modification a subject. When we' >*'^y thus that 
 the mind exerts an energy, we virtually say'^^^® mind is 
 the cause of this energy. When we say thaf the mind 
 acts or suffers, we virtually say that the mind^ is the 
 subject of a modification. The mind is thus the^^^com- 
 mon cause and subject of those various acts and stali'^s 
 which fall into a few simple groups. Hence we properly 
 say that the mind is the faculty of exerting such and 
 such a class of energies, or it has the capacity of being 
 modified by such and such an order of affections. Faculty 
 thus means the causality of the mind in originating 
 certain energies or acts; capacity means the suscepti- 
 bility the mind has of being affected by a particular 
 class of feelings.^ 
 
 This threefold division of the mental phaenomena 
 might, as seems to me, be rendered more precise and 
 accurate by sundering Desire and Will Desire is much 
 more nearly allied to Feeling than to Will In its ori- 
 gin. Desire points either to agreeable feeling, or to the 
 pain which arises from the consciousness of a want, in 
 the absence of an object represented as suitable to our 
 nature in some form or aspect. In its result. Desire is a 
 tendency pointing to one definite issue, — tlie realisation 
 of the object or aim represented. It is thus in both 
 aspects distinguished from Will Will in its highest 
 and proper form passes into act through the contempla- 
 tion of alternatives : there is free choice or determina- 
 tion. In its issue, it is not restricted to a single result, 
 but has always the possibility of one or other alternative 
 of choice. Desire and Will agree in being characterised 
 by the element of 7iisus or effort; but the one is a 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XX. 
 
/ 
 
 122 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Powers of Krmoledgc. 
 
 123 
 
 fatal determination, the other is a free power. The 
 most accurate division, accordingly, is, I think, into the 
 fourfold form of Knowledge, Feeling, Desire, Will 
 
 Hamilton's analysis and classification of the phaeno- 
 mena of knowledge is simple and exhaustive. 
 ' (1.) As we are endowed with a faculty of Cognition 
 or Consciousness in general, and as we have not always 
 possessed the knowledge which we now possess, we 
 must have a faculty of acquiring knowledge. This 
 acquisition can only be accomplished by the immediate 
 presentation of a new object to consciousness. Hence 
 it is sho\\Ti that we have a faculty which may be 
 called the Acquisitive^ Prcsentative, or Receptive, 
 
 New knowledge is either of things external or inter- 
 nal, — the phasnomena of the Ego or of the non-Ego. 
 In the one case we have the faculty of Fjcternal Per- 
 ception; in the other that of Internal Perception, or 
 self-consciousness. The acquisitive faculty is the fac- 
 ulty of experience, — external and internal Eeflection 
 in its original and proper sense is self- consciousness 
 concentrated 
 
 (2.) As capable of knowledge, we must be able to 
 retain or conserve it when acquired. This is the power 
 of mental Retention simply, — the Conservative or Re- 
 tentive Faculty. This is memory strictly so called, or 
 the power of retaining knowledge in the mind, but out 
 of consciousness. This implies our capability of losing 
 from consciousness the object presented: otherwise 
 there would be no room for a new object. 
 
 (3.) It is not enough to possess the power of Reten- 
 tion, we must further be able to recall what is retained 
 out of unconsciousness into consciousness. This is the 
 
 rvf 
 
 Reproductive Faculty. It is governed by the laws of 
 Mental Association. If these laws are allowed to oper- 
 ate without the intervention of the will, this faculty 
 is Sucrcrestion, or Spontaneous Suggestion ; if under the 
 influe°nce of the will, it is Reminiscence or Recollection. 
 (4 ) There is further required for the consummation 
 of Memory and Reproduction, a faculty of representing 
 in consciousness and of keeping before the mmd the 
 knowledge presented. This is the Representative 
 Faculty, called Imagination or Phantasy. The Imagi- 
 nation of common language-the Productive Imagination 
 of philosophers-is nothing but the Representative pro- 
 cess plus the Comparative. 
 
 Imagination and Reproduction are not to be con- 
 founded : the two powers have no necessary propoi-tion 
 to each other. The power of representing may be, 
 often is, much stronger than the power of recall. 
 
 (5 ) But all these faculties are only subsidiary, iliey 
 acquire, preserve, and hold up the materials for the 
 use of a higher faculty which operates upon them. 
 This is the Elaborative or Discursive faculty. ilns 
 faculty has only one operation; it compares, -- it is 
 comparison-the faculty of relations. Analysis and 
 synthesis are the conditions of comparison ; and the 
 results of comparison as exercised under its conditions 
 are Conception or Generalisation, Judgment, and Reason- 
 ing. The faculty is also caUed Thought Proper, Aiavota, 
 Discursus, Verstand. 
 
 (6 ) But the knowledge we have is not aU due to 
 experience. What we know by experience is contingent ; 
 but there are cognitions in the mind which are neces- 
 sary -which we cannot but think,-which thought sup- 
 
124 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 poses as its fundamental condition. These are not 
 generalisations from experience ; they are native to the 
 mind. These are the laws which afford the conditions 
 of the capacity of knowledge. They are of a similar 
 character ; and on the power possessed by the mind of 
 manifesting these we bestow the name of the Regu- 
 lative Faculty. Other names are Reason and Common 
 Sense. Tliis is not properly a faculty or active power, 
 in the sense in which this phrase is applied to the other 
 faculties. It is rather tlie sum of the fundamental 
 principles or laws of thought^ 
 
 The first point under this classification is that Ex- 
 ternal Perception is an intuitive faculty or faculty of 
 immediate knowledge ; while Memory and Imagination 
 are representative or mediate in their action. We have 
 thus to ask what precisely is meant by intuitive or 
 immediate knowledge? And in the case of external 
 perception, we have the further question, Wliat precisely 
 is the object or objects said to be immediately known ] 
 In the case of an immediate or intuitive act of know- 
 ledge, the mind apprehends an object or quality as now, 
 or as noio and here existing. I am conscious of the feeling 
 of heat as a present fact, — that is an intuitive act. I am 
 conscious of perceiving an extended or resisting object, — 
 that also is an act of immediate or intuitive knowledge. 
 But the heat I feel or the extension I perceive passes 
 away. I still know that I felt the one and perceived the 
 other. This is ^lediate or Representative Knowledge. 
 I now know, through a medium, a representation or image 
 of what I no longer perceive. In plain words, I now 
 remember ; whereas, formerly, I felt or perceived. 
 
 1 On this see above, p. 103, 
 
 ^ 
 
 Immediate and Mediate Knowledge. 125 
 
 The features of immediate and mediate knowledge 
 may be thus stated and contrasted. 
 
 (1.) An act of immediate knowledge is simple : there 
 is nothing beyond the mere consciousness of that which 
 knows, of that which is known. An act of mediate 
 knowledge, on the other hand, is complex ; for the mind 
 is both conscious of the act or mental image as its own, 
 and of this as representative of or relative to an object 
 beyond the sphere of consciousness. 
 
 (2.) In immediate knowledge the object is simple. 
 The object in consciousness and the object in existence 
 are the same. In mediate knowledge the object is two- 
 fold, — the object known and representing being different 
 from the object unknown, except as represented. The 
 immediate object should be called the subject ive-ohject or 
 md)Ject-ohJect / the mediate or unknown object the object- 
 object. 
 
 (3.) Considered as judgments, — for every act of con- 
 sciousness is a judgment or affirmation, — in an intui- 
 tive act, the object known is known as actually exist- 
 ing. The cognition is therefore assertory, inasmuch as 
 the reality of that, its object, is given unconditionally as 
 a fact. In a representative act, the represented object 
 is imknown as actually existing; the cognition, there- 
 fore, is problematical, the reality of the object repre- 
 sented being given only as a possibility, on the hypo- 
 thesis of the object representing.^ 
 
 (4.) Representative knowledge is exclusively subjec- 
 tive; its immediate object is a mere mental modifica- 
 tion, and its mediate object is unknown, except in so 
 far as that modification represents it. Intuitive know- 
 
 ^ Metaphysics, L. XXIII 
 
i2e 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 ledge, on the other hand, if consciousness is to be 
 credited, is either subjective or objective, for its single 
 object may be either a phrenomenon of the Ego or of the 
 non-Ego, — either mental or material. 
 
 (5.) An intuitive cognition, as an act, is complete and 
 absolute, as irrespective of aught beyond the domain 
 of consciousness ; wliereas a representative cognition is 
 incomplete, being relative to and vicarious of an exist- 
 ence beyond the sphere of actual knowledge. The 
 object likewise of the former is complete, being at once 
 known and real ; in the latter, the object known is ideal, 
 the real object unknown. 
 
 In Hamilton's view, every cognitive act which in 
 one relation is mediate or representative, is in anoth.-.r 
 immediate or intuitive. For an illustration and proof 
 of this, let me call up the image of a particular object 
 —say the High Church. In this act, what do I know 
 immediately or intuitively ? what mediately or by rep- 
 resentation 1 I am conscious or immediately cognisant 
 of the act of my mind, and therefore of the act which 
 constitutes tlie mental image of the Church ; but I am 
 not conscious or immediately cognisant of the Church as 
 existing. Still I know it; it is even the object of 
 my thought. But I only know it through the mental 
 image ; and it is the object of thought, inasmuch as a 
 reference to it is necessarily involved in the act of 
 representation. 
 
 Tlie term immediate requires attention here. Hamil- 
 ton recognises that other sense of immediate in which 
 it is opposed to thought proper, or the reference of 
 an object to a class. When we think or recognise an 
 object by relation to other things, under a certain notion 
 
 Immediate and Mediate Knowledge, 127 
 
 or general term,— this too is mediate knowledge. He 
 holds that there is a wide sense of immediate, accord- 
 ing to which "we apprehend an individual thing, either 
 through sense or its representation in the phantasy." 
 This is "in a certain sort an absolute or irrespective 
 knowledge," and it is justly named immediate, in con- 
 trast to thought proper or the comparative act of the 
 understanding.^ 
 
 This mediate or comparative act of reference to a class 
 will vary with the quality of the object attended to by 
 the thought: an individual object— the object of this 
 time, or this time and this space — may thus be capable 
 of reference to various classes of things. According to 
 Hamilton's view, this is quite a subsequent reference, 
 supervening upon perception or intuition. And he 
 holds that there is an individual of perception prior 
 to this altogether. What individualises a quality or 
 object of intuition is the noit\ or the now and here, of 
 the quality perceived or apprehended. ^ 
 
 At the same time, it would be entirely to mistake 
 Hamilton's doctrine on this point to maintain that 
 there is a perception of the quality 2^er ^c, or apart 
 from the general conditions of knowledge. On the 
 contrary, he expressly tells us over and over again that 
 intuition is subject to all the conditions of consciousness 
 already enumerated,^ — implying, therefore, judgment 
 and discrimination, and the primary conditions of the 
 thinkable. Further, under comparison, Hamilton shows 
 the steps through which intuition passes up to the stage 
 
 1 Reid's W&rks, p. 804, Note B. 
 
 * On this whole matter see Reid's Works, Note D*, p. 878 
 
 » Cf. Reid's Works, Note D*, p. 877 et se^. 
 
128 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 of logical generalisation and classification. He recog- 
 nises the primary stage of the mere existential judg- 
 ment, — the affirmation of the something — the discri- 
 mination of the Ego and non-Ego, — of the multiplicity 
 in the successive and manifold presented to self-con- 
 sciousness and perception, — the reference of the phaeno- 
 mena to substance, — the collation under the notion of 
 causality. All this he recognises as really implied in 
 and inseparable from intuition. And having stated 
 this in its proper place, he thinks himself at liberty, 
 and justly so, in dealing with intuition logically per 
 se, as a matter thus fitted for scientific treatment. It 
 is a mere misrepresentation to s^^eak of external per- 
 ception, or of intuition generally, as implying a sepa- 
 rate or special kind of knowledge in the sense of an 
 absolute divorce from the conditions of thought or 
 consciousness in general. What can be more explicit 
 than this] — 
 
 " Apprehension and Judjjment are really one, as each in- 
 volves the other (for we apprehend only as we judge some- 
 thing to be, and we judge only as we apprehend the exist- 
 ence of the terms compared), and as together they constitute 
 a single indivisible act of cognition ; but they are logically 
 double, inasmuch as by mentiil abstraction they may be 
 viewed each for itself, and as a distinguishable element of 
 thought." ^ 
 
 Of course he never thought it necessary to be constantly 
 recalling those conditions, or restating them, whenever 
 he referred to Perception as a special act 
 
 As to the other and totally distinct position, that in- 
 tuition can be developed out of these universal condi- 
 
 1 RdiTs W(yrks, p. 806. 
 
 Criticism of the Distinction. 129 
 
 tions set up per se, or as a basis of evolution, HamHton 
 would of course have said that such a procedure is 
 wholly lUegitimate, and as incapable of vindication as 
 the doctrme of perception per se. The variety in the 
 content of perception is wholly inexplicable on any 
 hypothesis, or so-caUed theory, of the universal specify- 
 ing Itself in this or that quality of things. In this case 
 every quality must be identical with every other. Difi^er- 
 ence is impossible. 
 
 It- is thus clear that the criticism of Hamilton's doc- 
 trme on this point, which proceeds on the assumption 
 that all thought is mediate,— or the application of a 
 notion to the thing or object thought,-is totally inept 
 Hamilton thoroughly recognises this in the only sense 
 in which it has a meaning. There is no thought, 
 knowledge, or consciousness unless as embodyin- "the 
 most general or universal notions,— categories,— of in- 
 telligence, -such as self, not-self, being, and relation, 
 &c. He holds, moreover, the application or the em- 
 bodmient of those notions to be equaUy necessary in 
 intuition and in representative cognition. But this 
 he mamtains, does not abolish the distinction between 
 Perception and IVIemory or Phantasy. This is a distinc- 
 tion subordinate to that of the universal and the par- 
 ticular m knowledge. And it depends on a new element 
 introduced into knowledge-viz., that of a definite suc- 
 cession m time,-the contrast of present and past, and 
 of present and future. The cognition in each case is 
 m the wide sense equally mediate, but this common 
 element m the two acts does not abolish the difi-erence 
 between me perceiving and me remembering what I per- 
 
 P.— VL ^ 
 
130 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 ceived,— does not abolish the difference between past, 
 present, and future. To adduce, therefore, this general 
 feature of knowledge,— the mediate,— as a criticism of 
 Hamilton's distinction, is to miss its whole point, and 
 virtually to confound, in fact abolish, the two distinct 
 acts of Intuition and Representation. 
 
 The word real or really existing,— as applied to the 
 object of intuition,— needs some explanation. This 
 is equivalent to "the object in itself." This again is 
 convertible with "the object actually existing." Now 
 what is actual existence according to Hamilton? It 
 means the thing or object known as existing in its when, 
 or in its tchen and where. The when and ichere of an 
 object are immediately cogidsable only if the when be 
 now {ie., at the same moment with the cognitive act), 
 and the where be here {i.e., within the sphere of the 
 cognitive faculty). Therefore a presentative or an in- 
 tuitive knowledge is only competent of an object present 
 to the mind either in time alone, or both in time and 
 
 space.^ 
 
 "The thing in itself" or "the object in itself" does 
 not mean anything beyond the contrast of what we 
 know in intuition and what we know in representation. 
 It does not mean, as Hamilton has expressly told us, 
 "things in themselves and out of relation to all else, 
 in contrast to things in relation to and known by intelli- 
 gences, like men, who know only under the conditions 
 of pliirality and difference." ^ The real with Hamil- 
 ton is primarily the existent as opposed to the non- 
 existent—a. something in contrast to a nothing: it is 
 further, and secondarily, the object perceived or the 
 1 ReidU Works, p. 809, Note B. =» lUd., p. 805. 
 
 Perception Proper. 131 
 
 object of intuition, as contrasted with the image of it 
 in memory or phantasy. 
 
 Now what, according to Hamdton, is the state of 
 consciousness, or the testimony of consciousness in Per- 
 ception or Perception proper? He maintains that in 
 the simplest act of Perception there is 
 
 « the observation of two facts, or rather two branches of 
 the same fact, that I am, and that something different from 
 me exists. In this act I am conscious of myself as the per- 
 ceivmg subject and of an external reality as the object per- 
 ceived ; and I am conscious of both existences in the same 
 indivisible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the 
 subject does not precede or follow the knowledge of the 
 object; neither determines, neither is determined by the 
 other. Tlie two terms of correlation stand in mutual counter- 
 poise and equal independence : they are given as connected 
 m the synthesis of knowledge, but as contrasted in the antith- 
 esis of existence."^ 
 
 It is this deliverance revealed in consciousness which 
 leads mankind to believe equaUy in the reality of an 
 external world and in the existence of their own minds. 
 Consciousness declares our knowledge of material quali- 
 ties to be intuitive. Even those philosophers who 
 reject an intuitive perception find it impossible not to 
 admit that their doctrine stands decidedly opposed to 
 the voice of consciousness and the natural conviction of 
 mankind. 2 
 
 " The universal belief of mankind is, that the immediate 
 object of the mind in perception is the material reaUty itself 
 and that as we perceive that object under its actual condi- 
 tions, so we are no less conscious of its existence, indepen- 
 
 1 Reid's WorU, p. 805. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 747, 748. 
 
132 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 (lently of our minds, than we are conscious of the existence 
 of our own mind, independently of external objects." ^ 
 
 The main ground of objection to Kealism has been and 
 is now, that mind and matter are substances not only 
 of different but of the most opposite natures,— separated, 
 as some say, by the whole diameter of being; that 
 what immediately knows must be of a nature corre- 
 spondent, analogous, to that which is known; hence 
 mind cannot be immediately conscious of matter. 
 
 This principle, as Hamilton shows, has had the widest 
 effect on philosophical theories,— especially of percep- 
 tion. Out of it have come Eepresentationalism in its 
 cruder and finer forms, and generally the hypothesis 
 devised for effecting an intelligible intercourse between 
 mind and matter. Dut it is a mere arbitrary assump- 
 tiun,— without necessity, without even probability, in 
 its favour. The counter-assumption of the need for a 
 contrariety or opposition between subject knowing and 
 object known, is of the same character. 
 
 " We know and can know nothing aiwiori of what is pos- 
 sible or impossible to mind, and it is only by observation and 
 by generalisation a -posteriori that we can ever hope to attain 
 any' insight into the question. But the very first act of 
 our experience contradicts the assertion that mind, as of 
 an opposite nature, can have no inmiediate cognisance of 
 matter. In perception we have an intuitive knowledge of 
 the Ego and the non-Ego, equally and at once."^ 
 
 A further objection is, that the mind can only know 
 immediately that to which it is immediately present. As 
 external objects cannot come into the mind, or the mind- 
 
 1 Reid's irorX-5, Note N, p. 964. - Metaphysics^ L. XXV. 
 
 Natural Realism, 
 
 133 
 
 go out to them, such presence is impossible ; hence they 
 can be only mediately known. 
 
 The principal hypothesis devised to get over this 
 imaginary difficulty is that of Divine interference. On 
 occasion of material impressions on the organs of sense, 
 followed by sensations, we have a perception or imme- 
 diate knowledge of the existence and qualities of the 
 bodies by which the impressions are made. But we 
 know no connection whatever between these sensations 
 and the perceptions. This leads readily to the hypothesis 
 that the cause of perception is a Divine act interposed 
 on occasion of the sensation. This, as mystical and 
 hyperphysical, and incompatible with an intuitive per- 
 ception, may be set aside. -^ 
 
 But the assumption is without ground : — 
 
 (1.) The mind is not situated solely in the brain, or 
 in any one part of the body. It is really present wher- 
 ever we are conscious that it acts. " The soul is all in 
 the whole, and all in every part." AA^e have no more 
 right to deny that the mind feels at the finger-points 
 than to assert that it thinks exclusively in the brain. 
 The report of consciousness is, that we actually perceive 
 at the external point of sensation, and that we x>erceive 
 the material reality.^ 
 
 (2.) The external object perceived is not the distant 
 object, as has been supposed. 
 
 " We perceive through no sense aught external, but what 
 is in immediate relation and in immediate contact with its 
 organ ; and that is true which Democritus of old asserted, 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XXV. 
 
 - But on this point see note in Reid's Works, p. 861, for his mature<l 
 doctrine. 
 
134 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 that all our senses are only modifications of touch. Through 
 the eye we perceive nothing but the rays of light in relation 
 to, and in contact with, the retina ; what we add to this 
 perception must not be taken into account. The same is true 
 of the other senses." i " In fact, the consciousness of external 
 objects on this doctrine is not more inconceivable than the 
 consciousness of species, or ideas on the doctrine of the 
 schoolmen, Malebranche, or Berkeley. In either case, there is 
 a consciousness of the non-Ego, and in either case the Ego 
 and non-Ego are in intimate relation. There is, in fact, on 
 this h}T)othesis no greater marvel that the mind should be 
 cognisant of the external reality, than that it should be con- 
 nected with a body at all. The latter being the case, the 
 former is not even improbable, all inexplicable as both 
 equally remain." 2 
 
 He subsequently notices the objections of Hume and 
 Eichte to intuitive perception, but, as he shows, they are 
 really unworthy of serious attention. ^ 
 
 There being an intuitive perception of a non-Ego in 
 the foi-m of material reality, what, it may be asked, is 
 the precise object, or what are the precise objects, of 
 this intuition? 
 
 On this point there is a difference of opinion between 
 Hamilton and the older Scottish philosophers, Eeid 
 and Stewart. Hamilton's view is, that the object of 
 perception, in so far as it is a quality of the extra- 
 bodily world, — or world beyond our organism, — is that 
 which is in contact with the organ of sense. " An ex- 
 ternal object is only perceived inasmuch as it is in rela- 
 tion to our sense, and it is only in relation to our sense 
 inasmuch as it is present to it." He therefore holds 
 it to be improper and ** a confusion of ideas," to speak 
 
 Metaphysics^ L. XXV. 
 
 2iWrf. 
 
 3 Ibid., L. XXVII. 
 
 Sphere of Perception. 
 
 135 
 
 as Eeid does of the perception of a distant object in 
 vision. 
 
 " To say that we perceive the sun and moon is a false or 
 elliptical expression. We perceive nothing but certain modi- 
 fications of light in immediate relation to our organ of 
 vision. ... It is not by perception, but by a process of 
 reasoning, that we connect the objects of sense with existence 
 beyond the sphere of immediate knowledge. It is enough 
 that perception affords us the knowledge of the non-Ego at 
 the point of sense. To arrogate to it the power of immedi- 
 ately informing us of external things which are only the 
 causes of the object we immediately perceive, is either posi- 
 tively erroneous or a confusion of language." ^ 
 
 As will appear from what follows, he even limits more 
 precisely the sphere of perception, and perception in 
 vision. He finally denies any perception of external or 
 extra-organic objects through sight, indeed through any 
 sense except that of locomotive effort, yielding us resist- 
 ance and extension. Hamilton, accordingly, censures 
 Reid and others for speaking of the knowledge of the 
 distant object in sight as a perception : it is in his view 
 a mediate and inferential knowledge. It is clear from 
 this that Hamilton's intuitive perception is extremely 
 limited, so far as the extra-bodily world is concerned, 
 and that it is but the germ of the processes through 
 which we build up our knowledge — our actual or matured 
 knowledge — of this outward world. At the same time, 
 the precise limitation of the sphere of perception does 
 not affect the character and value of the doctrine as a 
 theory of our immediate contact or communion with the 
 world of material reality. 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XXVII. 
 
136 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 The line of speculation regarding tlie sphere of Per- 
 ception thus laid doTO by Hamilton in 1836 was tlie 
 one along which his thought worked, until the Dis- 
 sertations D and D* appended to Reid's Works were 
 printed and stereotyped in 1841 and 1842, though not 
 pubhshed until November 1846. In these,— on the 
 Qualities of Body, and on Perception and Sensation,— we 
 have his matured and final doctrine. The general posi- 
 tion taken by him is to distinguisli between the two 
 forms of material reality, represented by the bodily 
 organism and the extra-bodily or extra-organic world ; 
 and, in this connection, to extend sensation from a merj 
 state of the mind or consciousness to a consciousness or 
 affection of the sentient organism, to limit perception 
 to an apprehension of the locality and the relations of 
 sensations, and to an apprehension of resistance in the 
 extra-organic object. Still further, then, does he go in 
 the line of making our sense-knowledge the result of 
 a process of inference superadded to a comparatively 
 hmited sphere of immediate apprehension, intuition, or 
 consciousness. All perception is an immediate or pre- 
 sentative cognition, and thus apprehends what is vow 
 and Jiere existent. It is further a sensitive cognition, 
 and thus apprehends the existence of no object out of 
 Its organism, or not in immediate correlation to its 
 organism. But what precisely is Sensation 1 and what 
 is Perception? — or Sensation and Perception, viewed 
 in contrast ? Sensation proper is the consciousness of an 
 affection of the sentient bodily organism ; not of the mind 
 merely, but of the bodily organism as sentient or mind- 
 pervaded. Perception proper, on the other hand, is 
 conditioned by sensation, and is primarily {a) the appre- 
 
 Sphere of Sensation and Perception, 137 
 
 hension of the locality of the sensation as in the bodily 
 organism ; (h) the apprehension of the sensations as like 
 or unlike, and as out of or totally external to each other; 
 (c) the apprehension of a resisting something external to 
 our organism. Except, therefore, in this last instance, 
 the sphere alike of Sensation and Perception is limited 
 to the organic world, or our bodily organism. 
 
 " As animated, as the subject of affections of which I am 
 conscious, the organism belongs to me ; and of these affec- 
 tions which I recognise as mine. Sensation proper is the 
 apprehension. As material, as the subject of extension, 
 figure, divisibility, and so forth, the organism does not be- 
 long to me, the conscious unit ; and of these properties which 
 I do not recognise as mine, Perception proper is the appre- 
 liension." 
 
 J^either Sensation nor Perception proper, in as far 
 as the latter apprehends the primary qualities of body 
 in general, carries us beyond the bodily organism. 
 Through these we apprehend nothing of the world 
 ordinarily known as external and extra - organic. In 
 sensation we know nothing of the cause of the organic 
 affection of which we are conscious. A perception of 
 the primary qualities does not originally and in itself 
 reveal to us the existence and qualitative existence of 
 aught beyond the organism apprehended by us as ex- 
 tended, figured, divided, &c. The primary qualities of 
 things external to our organism we come to learn only 
 by inference from the affections which we come to find 
 they determine in our organism. In other words, by 
 tlie senses of taste, smell, hearing, sight, touch proper, 
 we get no direct knowledge whatever of any world 
 external to our bodily organism. How, it may be asked. 
 
138 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 do we come to get .*ny such perception or direct know- 
 ledge of this outward world ] Only in one way. 
 
 " The existence of an extra-organic world is apprehended 
 in the consciousness that our locomotive energy is resisted, 
 and not resisted by aught in our organism itself. For in the 
 consciousness of being thus resisted is involved as a correla- 
 tive the consciousness of a resisting something external to 
 our organism. Both are, therefore, conjunctly apprehended. 
 This experience presupposes space, and motion in space." 
 
 This presupposition obviously with Hamilton affords no 
 difficulty, for — 
 
 " every perception of sensation out of sensation will afford 
 the occasion, in apprehending any one, of conceiving all the 
 three extensions ; that is, of conceiving space. . . . We are 
 unable to imagine the possibility of that notion [space], not 
 being always in our possession." * 
 
 We have thus both an a x'^ioH and an a posterion 
 knowledge of space, as a necessary condition of the 
 possibility of thought, and as a percept contingently 
 apprehended in this or that actual complexus of sen- 
 sations. ^ 
 
 This doctrine shows clearly how far beside the mark is 
 the usual commonplace criticism that Hamilton accepts 
 the "common-sense," or "ordinary understanding," or 
 " unreflective common-sense " of mankind, as a guarantee 
 for his philosophical facts or data. On the contrary, his 
 analysis of the common belief given in perception is as 
 searching and thorough-going as anything in the history 
 of the question. It is not an acceptance simply of what 
 is usually received or believed, in its bare literality, but 
 1 ReifTs Works, p. 882. -' Ibid. 
 
 |J 
 
 if 
 
 
 HemarJcs on Theory of Perception. 139 
 
 an eminently scientific, and at the same time philoso- 
 phical, attempt to get at the true import of the fact ; and 
 this he does while he conserves the whole principle and 
 meaning of the belief. As he pertinently remarks — 
 
 " It is suflficient to establish the simple fact, that we are 
 competent, as consciousness assures us, immediately to appre- 
 hend through sense the non-Ego in certain limited relations ; 
 and it is of no consequence whatever, either to our certainty 
 of the reality of a material world, or to our ultimate know- 
 ledge of its properties, whether by this primary apprehen- 
 sion we lay hold, in the first instance, on a larger or a lesser 
 portion of its contents." ^ 
 
 With regard generally to this doctrine, which may be 
 called the Organic and Locomotive theory of sensation 
 and perception, there are difficulties, and, as I think, 
 several needed supplements. 
 
 In the first place, it obviously carries us but a very 
 little way on the line of building up our matured know- 
 ledge of the material world, in its extra-organic form, as 
 that which lies beyond the bodily organism. The dis- 
 tance from the consciousness of the sentient organism, 
 with its localised sensations and perceptions of exten- 
 sion, — and even from the apprehension of the resisting 
 something, — to our full world experience, is a long 
 and tedious route. How and why we come to refer 
 our sensations to extra-organic causes are questions that 
 wait solution. 
 
 In the second place, it is not clear that the localis- 
 ing of the sensation in the bodily organism necessarily 
 implies that it is an affection of this organism, even as 
 sentient or animated. We may localise without going 
 
 1 Reid's Works, p. 814. 
 
140 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 this length, or holding that the sensation as sensation 
 is more than a purely mental state. The localising need 
 mean nothing more than the reference, intuitive or 
 acquired, of the sensation to its proximate cause or con- 
 cause in the bodily organism. We may place, as Miiller 
 holds, the sensation in touch at the spot where the nerve 
 normally terminates, without implying that the sensa- 
 tion itself is actually an affection of the organism. A 
 sensation spread over a surface is hardly congnious with 
 the quality of indivisibility which a sensation proper 
 undoubtedly possesses. 
 
 In the third place, it seems to be going too far to say 
 that our apprehension of an extra-organic object is due 
 to resisted locomotion alone. Contact and pressure, it 
 might be contended, equally lead to this apprehension. 
 In simple contact, when the hand is at rest and yet in 
 contact with the extra-organic surface, there is ground 
 for supposing that there is the apprehension of a twofold 
 surface — viz,, that of the extended sentient organism and 
 that of the object in immediate correlation. Yet there 
 is no effort at locomotion. 
 
 In pressure, again, from without upon the organism, 
 and tending to compression of it, there may be the 
 apprehension both of externality and extension, while 
 there is no effort on the part of the body towards loco- 
 motion. In fact, this is one of the most common forms 
 of our experience. This could hardly be realised with- 
 out at least an intuition of outness, of externality in 
 space. 
 
 In a note Hamilton recognises this point, but im- 
 perfectly. He says : " The quasi - primary quality is 
 always simply a resistance to our inorganic volition [to 
 
 Beniarhs on Theory of Perception. 141 
 
 move] as realised in a muscular effort. But, be it 
 remembered, there may be muscular effort, even if a 
 body weighs or is pressed upon a part of the muscular 
 frame apparently at rest."^ This is obviously an after- 
 thought, and it is not sufficient for the requirements of 
 the case. 
 
 In the fourth place, it seems doubtful whetlier the 
 apprehension of resistance or of a resisting something as 
 extra-organic in the locomotive effort is fitted or suffi- 
 cient to give the intuition of extension or an extended 
 thing. The intuition of resistance might be quite well 
 satisfied by a force — a degi-ee or intension of force — in 
 correlation with the organism. Electricity would be 
 sufficient to impede the locomotive effort ; yet we should 
 hardly regard this as adequate to give us the intuition 
 of an extended object, though it might be apprehended 
 as external. These considerations tend to show that 
 the locomotive power has received somewhat exaggerated 
 importance as a factor in our apj^rehension of extra- 
 organic objects. The three sources of knowledge — Con- 
 tact, Pressure, and Locomotion — seem to me to be re- 
 quired to go together, and yield a conjoint result, ere 
 we can f orai the complex notion of body, — as ex- 
 ternal, extended, and resisting. After that it would be 
 easy to show how by association, induction, and infer- 
 ence we connect with it our subjective sensations. ^ 
 
 Hamilton it should be kept in mind, nowhere pro- 
 
 1 Reid's Works, p. 866. 
 
 2 I am inclined even to go further, and to hold that, besides 
 the sources now mentioned, we have other direct perceptions of out- 
 ward reality. But on this and other points, especially the true cri- 
 terion of organic and extra-organic body, the limits of this volume 
 restrict me from entering. 
 
142 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 Qualities of Body. 
 
 143 
 
 fesses to find in perception the material world in its 
 essence, nature per se, or in what may be called its tran- 
 scendent reality. He constantly proclaims that of " the 
 absolute existence " of the material world we perceive 
 nothing, — indeed ultimately know nothing. But he 
 not less strenuously contends for the fact that we per- 
 ceive and thus know more than a mere sensation or 
 state of consciousness. We perceive the quality of a 
 not-self or non-conscious reality. This is intuitively 
 known. It is known as independent of, and distinct 
 from, any quality of me, tlie percipient, in the act 
 of perception. There is a simultaneous consciousness 
 of the quality and of me the percipient. The know- 
 ledge of the subject perceiving does not precede nor 
 follow the knowledge of the object perceived : neither 
 determines, neither is determined by, the other. The 
 doctrine is thus one at once of Eealism and Dualism. 
 As the knowledge of the object or quality is not before 
 that of the subject. Materialism is precluded; as the 
 knowledge of the subject perceiving is not before the 
 object perceived, Idealism is equally proscribed. 
 
 This quality is more than, it is over and above, the 
 sensation ; yet it is still relative to us and our modes 
 of perceiving, while existing in antithesis to us in and 
 during the act of perception. This doctrine is per- 
 fectly compatible with the declaration that the sub- 
 strate of the quality is unperceived, — nay, is ultimately 
 incognisable, — or that we cannot dogmatise about it. 
 The only inconsistency is the supposition entertained 
 by Mill, that because the quality perceived is not re- 
 garded as a state of the conscious subject, because it 
 is regarded as the quality of a non-Ego, therefore it 
 
 jf 
 
 must be held to be known and to exist, as we per- 
 ceive it, as absolute transcendent material reality, or 
 out of and above all our perception and all perception. 
 But this is a pure misconception. What we already 
 perceive is the first question — quality of Ego or non- 
 Ego : ichetlier we perceive it directly (intuitively) or 
 representatively, — this also is a preliminary question. 
 But holding a quality of a non-Ego — that is, something 
 other than a sensation — to be intuitively perceived, we 
 are at perfect liberty thereafter to refrain from further 
 dogmatism, or to adopt the view of the incognisability 
 of its ultimate ground, substance, or cause. 
 
 The problem which Hamilton presents to himself 
 appears to be this. What, looking to our apprehen- 
 sion of the fact, and our conception of body founded 
 thereon, are the necessary and essential marks or fea- 
 tures in our notion of body ? In other words, what 
 are the elements in and through which we must con- 
 ceive body, if it is to be conceived at all? There 
 are features in body under which we may and do ap- 
 prehend and conceive it, and yet in their absence 
 the notion of body would not be annihilated. The 
 answer to this question, then, is that the Primary 
 Qualities, dependent on the apprehension and notion 
 of body as space-filling, and therefore as ultimately in- 
 compressible, are the essential elements or conditions of 
 our conception of body. These are — (1) Extension, (2) 
 Divisibility, (3) Size, (4) Density or Rarity, (5) Figure, 
 (6) Absolute Incompressibility, (7) ^lobility, (8) Situa- 
 tion. All such are deducible from the space - filling. 
 The Secundo-Primary qualities, dependent on the appre- 
 hension of the fact and mode or degree of resistance, 
 
lU 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 \ 
 
 SuhJecHve and Objective. 
 
 145 
 
 are contingent or accidental. They may be dispensed 
 with, and yet the conception of body remain. And 
 the Secondary Qualities — the sensations — are merely 
 consciousnesses in the organism of effects ultimately 
 learned to be caused by obscure properties in the 
 extra-organic objects. But the peculiarity of the se- 
 cundo-primary and the secondary qualities is that they 
 are apprehended and conceived as experienced only in 
 certain of the senses, — that they may pass away, and 
 yet our appreliension and conception of body remain. 
 Body, therefore, is to us an object apprehended and 
 conceived as possessing certain qualities — extension, 
 figure, &c.f which depend on the occupation of space. 
 Kow there are numerous expressions in Hamilton 
 which indicate this objectivity, and nothing more. 
 Yet these may be construed in a sense which he did 
 not contemplate. "VVe have the following expressions : 
 The primary qualities are "attributes of body as 
 body," whereas the others are of this and that body, 
 — properly qualities, suchnesses. The primary express 
 "the universal relations of body to itself," — "the pos- 
 sibility of matter absolutely," — whereas the secundo- 
 primary express only the "possibility of the material 
 universe as actually constituted," the secondary "the 
 possibility of our relation as sentient existences to that 
 universe." The primary are " conceived as necessary and 
 perceived as actuaL" The secundo-primary are "per- 
 ceived and conceived as actual;" the secondary are 
 " inferred and conceived as possible." The three sets are 
 to be rounelly regarded as mathematical, mechanical, 
 physiological. Again : " Our nervous organism, as a 
 body simply, can possibly exist, and can possibly be 
 
 \v 
 
 kno'WTi as existent, only under those necessary conditions 
 of all matter which have been denominated its primary 
 qualities." The primary qualities or modes of the non- 
 Ego are "definite in number and exhaustive." The 
 secondary are " indefinite." There are " any number of 
 unknowTi capacities in our animal organism," and " any 
 number of unknown poAvers in matter" to excite these. ^ 
 No doubt, some of these expressions, taken ab- 
 stractly, might be interpreted as meaning that we have 
 an actual and necessary knowledge of what body is in 
 itself, apart from our perception, as self-subsisting, and 
 whether we perceive it or not; that we have got in 
 this the knowledge of matter or body per se, — the 
 transcendent reality. But Hamilton humes straight- 
 way to disown this interpretation. Ohjecfive, we are 
 told, means only a contrast to subjective. It means 
 the perception of 
 
 "a quality of the non-Ego in immediate relation to my 
 mind. Siihjective means, wlien I know it only as the hypo- 
 thetical or occult cause of an affection of which I am con- 
 scious, or when I think it only mediately through a subject- 
 object, or representation in and of the mind." 2 
 
 Again : — 
 
 "In saying that a thing is knoT\Ti in itself, I do not mean 
 that this oljject is known in its absolute existence — that is, 
 out of relation to us. Tliis is impossible; for our know- 
 ledge is only of the relative. To know a thing in itself or 
 inmiediately is an expression used merely in contrast to the 
 knowledge of a thing in a representation or mediately." ' 
 
 This reference — what may be called the Ontological 
 
 J See Reid's Works, pp. 846, 858, 865, 866. « Ihid., p. 846. 
 
 a See Reid's Works, p. 866. 
 
 P. — VI. K 
 
146 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 — is no doubt the least explained point in Hamilton's 
 philosophy of Perception. Do we actually perceive 
 and conceive in those primary qualities body as body 
 jyer «e, — as that which exists and subsists whether we 
 perceive it or not — in its o^vn actual, absolute reaUty, — 
 the transcendent thing of existence 1 
 
 My view is that Hamilton says no to this question. 
 We have no knowledge in perception, or in conception 
 which is founded wholly on empirical perception, of 
 body as body, — of body in its absolute super-sensible 
 existence. We have a mixed or rather complex cog- 
 nition in which the quality of a non-Ego appears : this 
 is not a sensation or state of consciousness simply ; it is 
 not a mere quality of the Ego ; it is a quality of the 
 non-Ego, such as it must appear to our perception. As 
 a time and space object, we know this quality as a 
 reality. In time and space it is permanent, uniform to 
 us ; and that is all we can say, or need to know. 
 
 Whether the substance, or power on which it imme- 
 diately depends, is to be conceived as atomistic or dyna- 
 mistic, is not settled. But, settle it as you will, there 
 is the great incognisable beyond, into which atomism or 
 dynamism itself runs back. These would be but dis- 
 covered forms or grounds of the quality perceived and 
 stUl relative in knowledge. But surely it is something 
 to have made out what in our perception and thought 
 body is, and must be to us — what it constantly and 
 permanently remains for us — what if it were changed 
 from, it would cease to be the object we know and 
 name. Unless we can go back to infinity in the science 
 of things, is not this an adequate resting-place for finite 
 knowledge 1 And what more shall we ever be able to 
 
 Kant and Hamilton. 
 
 147 
 
 make of the essential in body than simply those primary 
 qualities, and of the actual in body than tliis form of 
 resistance to our powers — the fact of a force, — and those 
 sentient aff'ections which are either modes of our ani- 
 mated frame or their mental results, — limited, consti- 
 tuted, made definite by the fundamental susceptibilities 
 of our organism 1 The permanency and the uniformity 
 of this experience, in all its phases, is for us the true 
 reality of things. 
 
 The fundamental element of difibrence between the 
 position of Hamilton and that of Kant in relation to 
 perception is that the former, by liis immediate appre- 
 hension of the quality of the not-self, puts himself in a 
 relation to material reality, which Kant precluded him- 
 self from doing at the outset, and which he could not 
 accomplish in the end. Kant never rose above the 
 traditional psychology which offered merely a sensation, 
 impression, or affection of the conscious subject, as the 
 matter of external perception, or, as he puts it, 
 
 " the apprehension of representations as niodifications of the 
 soul in intuition." ^ 
 
 This rejection of the immediate apprehension of a 
 non-Ego, decided, as Hamilton says, the destiny of his 
 philosophy. 
 
 " The external world, as known, was only a phsenomenon 
 of the internal ; and our knowledge in general only of self, 
 the objective only subjective, and truth only the harmony 
 of thought with thought, not of thought with things." ^ 
 
 Hamilton holds further that Kant's subsequent attempt 
 
 1 Kritik, Trans. An., I. ii. s. 2 ; Hartenstein's ed., p. 611. 
 ' MetaphysicSf App. (b), p. 400. 
 
148 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 to 1)10 ve the reality of a material world above and beyond 
 apprehension and consciousness,^ is a failure, and, in 
 fact, in contradiction with his o^vn philosophy. If the 
 knowledge of a material non-Ego be not given or imme- 
 diate, a proof of its reality in any form is an impossi- 
 l)ility, — nay, it may even be said the notion on such 
 terms is an impossibility. 
 
 Hamilton further differs from Kant as to Time and 
 Space. These he holds with Kant to be necessities or 
 necessary forms of consciousness ; but he regards them 
 also — at least space in concrete extension, — as a percept, 
 — an object of experience actually perceived. They are 
 in no sense forms imposed upon objects, — subjective 
 Rl)ectra through or in which we set objects, or which 
 we use in constituting them. We are thus not pre- 
 cluded from regarding the time and space world as a 
 real subsisting world of things ; and those forms are 
 more than mere subjective ways of beholding or rather 
 constituting things. They are conditions of things, not 
 of us the percipients merely. There is an immediate 
 knowledge or consciousness of the external object as 
 extended. The extension as known and the extension 
 as existing are convertible, — known because existing, 
 and existing since known. ^ 
 
 As Hamilton remarks, the discrimination of the pri- 
 mary and secondary qualities of matter or body is essen- 
 tial to Natural Realism. On the system of Kant, 
 and indeed in German philosophy generally, this dis- 
 tinction is not taken into account. As to the Kantian 
 system itself — 
 
 ^ See Kritik, Vorrefle (1787), Hartenstein, p. 32, Supp. xxL 
 a ReiJ:s W(yi'ks, p. 842. 
 
 Kant and Hamilton. 
 
 149 
 
 "it is," says Hamilton, "built on its positive negation, or 
 rather its positive reversal. For Kant's transcendental 
 Idealism not only contains a general assertion of the subjec- 
 tivity of all our perceptions ; its distinctive peculiarity is, in 
 fact, its special demonstration of the absolute subjectivity of 
 space or extension, and in general of the primary attributes 
 of matter — these constituting what he calls the form^ as the 
 secondary constitute what he calls the matter of our sen^-ible 
 intuitions (see in particular Proleg., s. 13, anm. 2)."^ 
 
 The different use of the terms ohjed, objective^ by 
 Kant and Hamilton, lead to mistake on this matter. 
 Object and objective with the latter refer to the quality 
 of a non-Ego in immediate correlation with an act of the 
 conscious-subject, as the mode or degree of resistance in 
 locomotion. With Kant the meanings are many and 
 various. The most relevant sense is perhaps that im- 
 plied where Kant defines concept (Begriff) as — 
 
 " the one consciousness which unites into one representation 
 the part by part perceived, and afterwards reproduced mani- 
 fold." 2 
 
 This view of the matter given to the concept, or even 
 of the known object, is neither adequate nor self -con- 
 sistent. It is not the case that every individual object 
 perceived is made up in this way. The definition can 
 refer only to such objects as are given in parts in space, 
 or in time, or in time and space. These are not the whole 
 of the objects of knowledge, nor are they even the 
 whole of the objects of which we are conscious in Ex- 
 ternal Perception. A sensation felt and known by me 
 as a state of consciousness is not known in this way, 
 
 1 ReiiVs Works, p. 845. 
 
 2 Kritik, Trans. An., I. ii. s. 2 ; Hart., p. 614. 
 
150 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 nor, though in knowledge, is it "an object," in this 
 wholly narrow sense of the term. A taste, an odour, a 
 muscular feeling, an apprehension of resistance, is not 
 known by me in the way of part after part perception. 
 Each of these sensations or objects of consciousness is a 
 wholly indivisible unit, and it is only a false and futile 
 psychology which would represent it as anything else. 
 The sensation is wholly indivisible, — of definite degree 
 or intensity, — but not composed of part after part appre- 
 hended and reproduced. It is surprising that any one 
 who has really followed the course of modern psychology 
 should make such a statement as that every sensation 
 in consciousness is necessarily made up of a series of 
 parts or points. This is only true of an " object " which 
 is constituted by the apprehension of successive points 
 in time, or coexisting points in space. But this is a 
 comparatively narrow class of object. We do not so 
 apprehend the sensations, taste, odour, muscular feeling, 
 or the percept of resisting force. These sensations or 
 percepts, when added together, do not for the first 
 time form "an object" in this Kantian sense. They 
 form a complexus or series of objects, each of which 
 is as much an object of apprehension, and therefore of 
 knowledge, as the complexus itself can possibly ba 
 
 But further, an object which supposes a series of 
 parts after parts perceived, implies the several percep- 
 tions and consciousness of each part in succession. 
 Otherwise the object as a manifold could never be made 
 up or known. The objects in space mainly fulfil this 
 requirement,— such as line, surface, length, and breadth. 
 In these we go on to the whole object apprehended by 
 adding part known to part kno^vn. But "a manifold 
 
 Kant and Hume, 
 
 151 
 
 before you " ere we can perceive any individual object as 
 such is either a meaningless or a self-contradictory ex- 
 pression. There is no need for " a manifold," as it is 
 called, in the majority of cases ; and ere you can have 
 the manifold, you need to have the parts of the mani- 
 fold in succession, and apprehended severally and in 
 their relations. In each of those apprehensions there 
 is an object kno^vn, and known in relation to the con- 
 scious-subject. There can be no putting together in 
 the shape of " a manifold " in the way of representa- 
 tion of points never consciously presented, — not in fact 
 already objects of perception and knowledge. And it 
 might be added, that not only is the notion of object 
 slipped into this manifold, as an element, before the 
 individual object is contemplated, but the category of 
 quantity — ay, and the notion of a permanent self- 
 conscious subject — is implied, as already given, all 
 through. So that if we are to organise knowledge from 
 the beginning, we must go a good deal deeper than " the 
 manifold of sensation." Apart altogether from the ques- 
 tion thus suggested by " the manifold of sensation," it 
 is quite clear that the superposition on this by the con- 
 scious-subject of subjective forms, of time and space — 
 the representation according to the schema of time in 
 imagination and the imposition of category in virtue of 
 the unity of self-apperception — are wholly impotent to 
 raise sensations or affections into a real or material world, 
 — into an external world in any proper sense of the word. 
 Necessary connection of impressions or sensations — the 
 objectivity of them in Kant's language — so that they 
 show the same relations to every human intelligent, this 
 may be got, but that is alL And sensations do not thus 
 
152 
 
 ffamilton. 
 
 become, cannot become, perceptions of objects •\vitliin 
 and without, — our world of experience. A necessary 
 and universal connection of subjective sensations may be 
 opposed to Hume's view of contingent and customary 
 conjunction; but that is alL Eeal objectivity in the 
 sense of externality, in the form of extension or force, 
 as qualities of a non-Ego, we cannot reach on su(;h a 
 metliod. 
 
 There is in Kant the constant repetition of the doc- 
 trine of the limitation of our knowledge in External 
 Perception to representations, — wholly subjective states, 
 — and representations (as he is often driven to put it) 
 of an incognisable transcendent object, — which is a 
 simple absurdity, — and representations caused by this 
 object, admitting no predicate or attribute, yet a cause, 
 — which is a simple contradiction. Yet, finally, in his 
 second edition, he offers a j-^roo/ of " the existence of 
 objects in space outside myself." The gist of it is — 
 
 " I am conscious of my own existence as determined in 
 time ; this presupposes something permanent in the percep- 
 tion ; this permanent cannot be anything within me, because 
 in me are only changing representations ; the perception of 
 this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me ; 
 the determination of my existence in time is, therefore, pos- 
 sible only by the existence of real things which I perceive 
 outside me. Hence the consciousness of my own existence 
 is, at the same time, an immediate consciousness of the exist- 
 ence of other things." He adds, " The immediate conscious- 
 ness of the existence of external things is here not assumed, 
 but proved."' ^ 
 
 AVhy can the changes in my representations or sub- 
 jective states in time not be known through the perma- 
 
 ^ Compare Mliller, vol. i. p. 476. 
 
 Kant's Proof of Externality. 
 
 153 
 
 nent Ego of consciousness ? Only because it is wrongly 
 assumed that this Ego is itself a representation, — that it 
 is not intuitively apprehended as a fact, and known as 
 a permanent fact in the succession. If the Ego be per- 
 manent, and be known as such in and through the suc- 
 cessive states, this is enough to render the idea of the 
 changes in me possible and actual But, apart from this, 
 is the consciousness of these changes only possible 
 through " the existence of real things which I perceive 
 outside me " % Why may not the change be satisfied by 
 a permanent spiritual Power with whom I am in com- 
 munion 1 Does the need for a permanent imply specifi- 
 cally the kind of permanent ? But does the perception 
 of the external thing necessarily give me or imply its 
 permanency 1 The perception of the moment certainly 
 does not guarantee the permanency through other mo- 
 ments of the thing perceived. This permanency, if it 
 be at all, is not a perception, but a conception subse- 
 quent to the perception, — even an inference. Yet this 
 permanency, known indirectly, inferentially, is an "im- 
 mediate consciousness " ! There is the necessary and 
 immediate consciousness of the permanency of real things 
 outside me, and yet this consciousness is the result of 
 inference, and problematical inference. But if this be 
 so, — if there be no immediate consciousness or percep- 
 tion of the permanency of real things outside me, the 
 process is useless, on Kant's own showing, for the pur- 
 pose of enabling me to know the determination of my 
 states in time; there is no permanent of real things 
 immediately perceived, and there is none implied as a 
 coiTelative to the changes in the states of consciousness. 
 " The scandal," therefore, " to philosophy and to human 
 
154 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 reason in general," which Kant alleges as attaching to 
 our accepting the existence of things without us on 
 faith only, still remains, so far as his effort is concernetL 
 But the truth is, this is not a matter of faith only ; it 
 is a matter of direct or intuitive knowledge, inexplicable 
 certainly, and therefore only ultimately a faith, — yet not 
 more so than, as Kant himself expressly admits, is the 
 "how of the permanent in time in general, the coex- 
 istence of which with the variable produces the concept 
 of change."^ Eealism asks and requires nothing more 
 than an admission of this sort to vindicate its principle. 
 
 1 KHtik, Vor., Sd eel. p. 37 ; Muller, vol. ii. p. 387. 
 
 155 
 
 CHAPTEE YI. 
 
 PERCEPTION — THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY AND INFER- 
 ENTIAL REALISM — HAMILTON AND BROWN. 
 
 There is a doctrine of Perception which arises from 
 a violation of the integrity of the fact as given in 
 consciousness. This is the great rival theory to that 
 of Natural Eealism. It may be called Cosmotlietic 
 Idealism, Hypothetical Realism, or Hypoflietical Dmil- 
 ism. The upholders of this theory regard the object 
 of consciousness in perception as only a modification 
 of the percipient subject, or at least a phainomenon 
 numerically different from the object it represents, — 
 yet maintain the reality of an external world. This 
 reality, and the knowledge of it, the scheme seeks by 
 various hypotheses to establish and explain. This is 
 the most inconsequent of all systems, yet it has been 
 embraced under various forms by the immense majority 
 of philosophers.^ 
 
 Hamilton, as is well known, regards Brown's doctrine 
 of Perception as that of Hypothetical Eealism. In 
 other words, he regards Brown as holding — (1.) That 
 the existing external world is not directly or immedi- 
 
 1 Discussions, p. 56. 
 
156 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 ately apprehended, but posited on the principle of sug- 
 gestion or inference. (2.) That our knowledge of it 
 is representational ; and " that the representative object 
 is a modification of the mind, non-existent out of con 
 sciousness ; the idea and its perception being only dif- 
 ferent relations of an act (state) really identical"^ 
 
 Mill holds in regard to Ero\vn's doctrine that it is 
 not one of representative perception at all, and that 
 Hamilton was entirely wrong in regarding it as sucli, 
 besides being as usual inconsistent in his criticism. He 
 maintains further that Brown's doctrine of Perception 
 was not even a doctrine of mediate knowledge, and that 
 it was thus not different from Hamilton's o-vvn theory 
 on the subject^ It can very easily be sho^^^l that not 
 one of these statements is correct, and that the incon- 
 sistencies which Mill imagines he has found in Hamil- 
 ton's criticism arise wholly from his misconception of 
 Hamilton's doctrine of Eepresentation and mediate know- 
 ledge, and even to a great extent of Brown's theory of 
 Perception, or rather his failure to observe the two 
 differing theories which run all through Brown's writ- 
 ings on this subject. The only reason for noticing 
 Mill's criticism at all, is that the doctrine really held 
 by Hamilton may be seen to stand out in clear relief 
 against misrepresentation. 
 
 In the outset, ^lill mistakes Hamilton's doctrine of 
 Eepresentative knowledge in its most essential point. 
 It is not the case, as ^lill alleges,^ that representative 
 knowledge with Hamilton always means knowledge of 
 a thing " by means of something which is like the thing 
 
 1 Discussions, p. 57. 
 
 3 Ihid., p. 162. 
 
 Exam. c. x., p. 196 et seq. 
 
 li 
 
 Representation not ResemUance. 157 
 
 itself." It is not even true that representative know- 
 ledge need mean this in any case. The representation 
 need not be like the thing represented, but, as Hamil- 
 ton says, it must be " conformable with the original," — 
 with " the intuition which it represents." ^ 
 
 This may or may not be a relation of resemblance. In 
 memory, the picture of the past event presented must 
 give us the event as it at first appeared to the sense ; 
 but there is no likeness as of a painting to the original. 
 The elements of the painting, and the elements of the 
 thing painted, are of the same material type : they are 
 of the same common genus. The two are thus alike. 
 But in memory the image is a mental or spiritual image 
 which may represent a material or physical fact, whose 
 elements are of a totally different sort from the ele- 
 ments of the mental picture. Material qualities in 
 intuition may be represented by spiritual qualities in 
 memory. There is no analogy here " like that of a 
 picture to its original" Memory represents to me a 
 scene in space ; but the image or mode of mind is not 
 necessarily extended. A picture which represents a 
 scene in space is necessarily extended; it is in fact 
 simply another form of space. 
 
 ]\Iill is thus mistaken in supposing that a doctrine 
 which makes the representative medium a sensation — 
 something not like in kind to the thing represented— 
 necessarily escapes being representational The char- 
 acter of the medium in this respect matters nothing, if 
 only it be supposed capable of giving us a knowledge 
 more or less adequate of the original, as it would be pre- 
 sented to us, or as it exists in experience. The whole 
 
 1 Reid's W&rks, p. 811. 
 
158 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 Heprcsentation not EcsemUance. 
 
 159 
 
 ^ 
 
 series of philosophers who hold what Hamilton calls the 
 finer form of the representative hypothesis, — that the 
 medium is a mere state of the mind, — could not have 
 been classed by Hamilton as representationalists at all, 
 if he had held what Mill attributes to him, a resem- 
 blance in character between the medium and the thing 
 represented ; and certain of the earlier Cosmothetical 
 Idealists, instead of holding, as Mill attributes to the 
 whole of them, the doctrine of similarity between the 
 y thing represented and the medium, held the very reverse. 
 They held the doctrine of species in perception, be- 
 cause the species was of the nature of the mind, and 
 thus mediated between the two incompatible substances, 
 matter and mind. Conformity with the intuitions rep- 
 resented, or conformity with the thing represented, thus 
 in no degree implies likeness in the medium. 
 
 Surely it is conceivable that my knowledge of an 
 event — say, the rapid sweep of the river which I saw 
 yesterday — may be conformable to it, without implying 
 that the mental picture is " like " in quality to the 
 physical motion I saw, or even a form oS motion at alL 
 Conformity and its absence between the presentation 
 and the representation in no way depend on the likeness 
 of the medium. The medium and mental picture would 
 be the same in character and nature if I wrongly repre- 
 sented the current I saw as nmning north, instead of 
 south ; yet this representation would not be conformable 
 to the intuition. This sentence, already quoted, might 
 alone have kept Mill right ; but there is a passage in 
 which Hamilton has expressly pointed out the difference 
 between " similarity in existence " and " similarity in 
 representatioa" 
 
 « If,' he says, « we modify the obnoxious language of 
 Descartes and Locke, and, instead of saying that the idea^ or 
 notions of the primary qualities resemlle, merely assert that 
 they truly represent these objects,-that is, afford us such a 
 knowledge of them as we should have were an immediate 
 intuition of the extended reality in itself competent to 
 man, then Descartes, Locke, and Reid would be found 
 at one. « The whole difficulty and dispute on tliis point is 
 solved on the old distinction of similarity in existence and 
 similarity %n representation, which Reid and our modern philo- 
 sophers have overlooked." 
 
 He refers here to a passage quoted from Biel,^ in 
 which the distinction between the material object and tlie 
 spiritual image is clearly drawn. Representative acts 
 are '' figmentay" not because of similarity in being or 
 essence {in essendo), or that they are of the same species 
 with the objects represented, but because of similarity in 
 representation,— that is, they represent things with their 
 properties as they really are presented to us. The non- 
 resembling character, accordingly, of Brown's modifica- 
 tions, or sensations, or states of mind, to the unappre- 
 liended reality or unknown cause, does not save him 
 from being a representationalist. 
 
 But MiU errs still more vitally when he fails to see 
 that presentation or intuition is, in Hamilton's view, 
 essential to representation. There is no point on which 
 Hamilton has more strongly and more properly insisted 
 than this,— that what we represent in memory was once 
 necessarily an object of intuition, -that what we repre- 
 sent in imagination as possible was, in its parts at least, 
 an object of intuition,— that we can conceive even no 
 jmrt of the past or the future, the elements of which did 
 
 1 Reid's Works, p. 842 ; cf. Discussions, p. 66. 2 p. gj^^ 
 
160 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 not appear in direct, presentative, or intuitive know- 
 ledge. Mill never got a glimpse of this fundamental 
 doctrine, and has thus wholly misconceived not only 
 Hamilton's doctrine, but its application to theories of 
 representative perception. Mill actually tells us that 
 Hamilton 
 
 " jiffirms that we cannot possibly recognise a mental modifi- 
 cation to be representative of something else, unless we have 
 a present knowledge of that something else otherwise ob- 
 tained." 1 
 
 Of course, Hamilton never said anything so absurd. 
 "VVliat he said was, that we never can represent what has 
 not been in itself, or in its elements, presented to us. 
 A present knowledge of the object represented, as a 
 condition of the representation, is simply ludicrous. If 
 we had this " present knowledge," the representation 
 would be the idlest act in the world. 
 
 Mill is, if possible, still further astray when he sup- 
 poses that 
 
 " in treating of memory Sir W. Hamilton requires a pro- 
 cess of thought precisely similar to that which, when employed 
 by opponents, he declares to be radically illegitimate." 2 
 
 There is no analogy whatever in the two cases. The 
 representationalist professes to have an image or represen- 
 tation in consciousness of that which he never perceived 
 or found in intuition, — which he never directly knew. 
 The very hypothesis of representation is founded on this 
 assumption ; for if we could directly perceive the ex- 
 ternal reality, we should not need to have recourse to 
 representation in order to know it, — be it a tertium quid 
 
 » Exam., c. x., p. 204. 2 lUd., p. 205. 
 
 MilVs Misapprehensions. lei 
 
 or a form of mind merely. The representational 
 theories thus absolutely violate every condition of the 
 representative knowledge implied in memory, and no 
 critic could have made a greater blunder than in suppos- 
 ing the two processes the same. What Hamilton pro- 
 perly charges against representationalism in its cruder 
 and finer form alike is, that the mind is blindly deter- 
 mined to represent the reality which it never appre- 
 hended,— never knew. MiU understands this so little 
 that he says — 
 
 " it is a literal description of what takes place in memorv." 
 
 Mill's conception of memory must be a peculiar one. 
 We are able evidently on his principles to remember and 
 represent to ourselves an event which we never actually 
 perceived or witnessed. We are able also to believe 
 that this event took place. Memory is merely a blind 
 determination to represent what was never actually an 
 object of direct experience. 
 
 But was Brown's doctrine one of representationalism? 
 The truth on this point is, that Bro\^^l held uncon- 
 sciously two distinct theories on the subject of percep- 
 tion The one may be described more properly as a 
 doctrine of Inferential Realism ; the other was substan- 
 tially a doctrine of Representationalism. In the former 
 doctrine Brown approximates to the somewhat crude 
 view of perception which Reid gave in his first work, the 
 * Inquiry,' though even here Mill is wrong in thinking 
 the theories of Reid and Brown identical The theory 
 of inferential Realism may be stated simply as teaching 
 the suggestion and inference of an unapprehended some- 
 thing, called an outward world, from subjective states 
 
 P. — VL T 
 
16S 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 known directly as sensations and affections of our con- 
 Bciousness. But as this unapprehended something may 
 be a not^elf, and yet not material substance, it is 
 necessary to hold in a theory of Realism that this 
 something is known to be corporeal or material, and 
 existent in space. Brown holds both those positions ; 
 although the former may be held apart from the latter, 
 as in Berkeleyanism. , 
 
 MiU ventures on the dogmatic assertion that Brown s 
 doctrine of Perception was not even one of mediate 
 perception. The reason he gives is that in Browns 
 view there is no tertium qidd between the mind per- 
 ceiving and the outward object. There is only "the 
 perceptive act," which is "the mind itself perceiving. 
 Hence Brown's doctrine is the same as Sir W. Hamilton s 
 own view : " for Brown thinks we have on the occasion 
 of certain sensations an instantaneous and irresistible 
 conviction of an outward object." ^ A more inaccurate 
 Tiew alike of the doctrines of Brown and Hamilton, 
 could not be given. Brown's "perceptive act" is a 
 mediate act or process, for it is a process of inference 
 from the known to the unknown, or at least to the 
 unapprehended,-from the state of mind called sensa- 
 tion, which is aU we apprehend or can apprehend, on his 
 view, to the outward permanent world, which, unless as 
 the cause of certain sensations, is wholly unknown and 
 unknowable. The words quoted, moreover, as a de- 
 scription of Hamilton's doctrine, are such as would 
 excite a smile in the merest sciolist in his writings. 
 
 But take the one form of Brown's doctrine-that 
 represented by Mill as the proper one. This is, that " an 
 
 1 Meam,, c. x., p. 198. 
 
 I 
 
 Brown's Doctrine. 
 
 163 
 
 unknown something," or "something external "is sug- 
 gested to us by our sensations, — we knowing this " some- 
 thing " only as a cause of these sensations and affections, 
 but not any one of the attributes which it possesses in 
 itself. Even on this view of Brown's doctrine, the 
 knowledge we have is property mediate. The thing 
 itself — the something external — is not known or appre- 
 hended by us directly, or as it exists ; it is not appre- 
 hended in its own attributes. It is known only in and 
 through the sensation which it causes in us, and this 
 is properly a mediate, not an immediate or intuitive 
 knowledge. On this view, indeed, the sensations need 
 not represent corresponding qualities in the something 
 external, though at another time BroAvn says they do ; 
 but all the same, as our knowledge of this something is 
 merely through its effects, it is emphatically a mediate 
 knowledge. The thing apprehended— the sensation— is 
 not convertible with the reality existing : the existence 
 of the reality is inferred from the knowledge of the 
 sensation. 
 
 But the truth is, that Brown's doctrine throughout is 
 essentially one of mediate knowledge in Perception. He 
 expressly limits knowledge or consciousness in Percep- 
 tion to a mere state of the mind — an affection of the 
 mind — the mind existing in some particular affection. 
 In this respect there is no distinction between sensation 
 and perception. Each has equally an object, or equally 
 no object. In each case there is simply a reference of a 
 subjective state to an (objective) cause or occasion. On 
 this point even, as to the precise cause or its nature. 
 Brown, as we shall see, is not consistent. But he has 
 no idea whatever of the possibility of immediate percep- 
 
 \ 
 
164 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 tion in Hamilton's sense, and even, I venture to say, in 
 Eeid's later sense. Whenever a glance of this dawns on 
 him, he scouts the very possibility of the doctrine. He 
 says : — 
 
 " What I learn by perception of the colour, or softness, or 
 shape, or fragrance, or taste of a peach, is a certain state of 
 ray o^\^l mind, for my mind surely can be conscious only of 
 its own feelings." ^ 
 
 Again, he says : — 
 
 " The material object itself he [Reid] surely could not con- 
 sider as forming a part of the perception, which is a state of 
 the mind alone. To be the object of percepti(m is nothing 
 more than to be the foreign cause or occasion on which this 
 state of the mind directly or indirectly arises." ^ 
 
 There is in these passages, and in others following 
 them, not only a denial of the possibility of im- 
 mediate perception; there is the limitation even of 
 knowledge in general to mental affections, — a limi- 
 tation which logically excludes the possibility of a 
 knowledge alike of external reality, other minds, and 
 Deity. These can, in fact, on this doctrine, be regarded 
 only as hypothetical causes of certain mental affections 
 in us. Our whole knowledge lies within the circle of 
 subjectivity; the real universe is wholly incognisable. 
 That the external world, if known at all on such a 
 doctrine, can be known only through our own subjective 
 aflfections as their cause, and thus mediately, there can- 
 not be the slightest question. 
 
 But with all this, Brown most explicitly holds by the 
 ordinary realism as a matter of belief. Nothing can be 
 
 1 L. XXIV., p. 154. 
 
 1 L. XXV., pp. 159, 160; ct p. 166. 
 
 Bcid and Brown, 
 
 105 
 
 stronger than his language on this point. He accepts 
 in the most unreserved manner " the belief in the real 
 existence of an external universe," " in the existence of 
 foreign changeable external bodies as separate from the 
 mind, and of a corporeal frame capable of being affected 
 by other bodies.'' ' This is a belief which no scepticism 
 can shake. "It is physically impossible not to admit " 
 that such a world does exist.^ It is as impossible to 
 disbelieve the reality of some external cause of our 
 sensations as it is to disbelieve the reality of the 
 sensations themselves.' 
 
 The only question which he thinks it possible to raise 
 is as to how, or in what circumstances, this belief has 
 arisen.* This is for him the problem of perception. 
 How he has solved it, and whether his solution is at 
 all legitimate, are separate points to be noticed in the 
 
 sequel 
 
 On what ground, if any, it may be asked, did Brown, 
 while repudiating an immediate knowledge of an external 
 world, still hold by the belief in its reality? Hamilton 
 says — 
 
 " He [Brown] assumes the existence of an external world 
 beyond the sphere of consciousness, exclusively on the 
 ground of an irresistible belief in its unknown reality. In- 
 dependent of this belief, there is no reasoning on which the 
 existence of matter can be vindicated : the logic of the idealist 
 he admits to be unassailable." ^ 
 
 This is true ; but it is necessary to add that Brown has 
 attempted to show, by a sort of inference, how this 
 
 1 L. XXII., p. 135. 2 Hid, 3 L. XXIV., p. 151. 
 
 * L. XXII., p. 135. ^ Discussions, p. 56. 
 
166 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Beid and Brown. 
 
 167 
 
 knowledge and belief have arisen in the mind. His 
 theory is a sort of inferential realism, and it is fallacious. 
 But it requires express notice, even to show its fallacy. 
 
 To the inferential realist there are but two modes 
 open, — that of suggestion, and that of inference. Eeid, 
 in the beginning, countenanced the first. Brown accepts 
 the second. ^lill has not seen the distinction between 
 these two methods, and he is thoroughly mistaken in 
 identifying Brown's method with that of Eeid. 
 
 In his first work, the * Inquiry,* Eeid's doctrine is no 
 doubt properly a form of inferential realism. The sen- 
 sation, a purely subjective state, suggests to us the notion 
 and the reality of an agent or quality different from 
 itself, — not a state of mind at all. Thus tactile feeling 
 suggests to us for the first time the notions, and the belief 
 in the reality, of hardness, smoothness, extension, and 
 motion, — to be reckoned as primary qualities of body. 
 But taking even this, the most favourable form of 
 Eeid's doctrine of perception, IVIill is mistaken in sup- 
 posing that it is identical with that of Brown. For, in 
 the first place, the objects or qualities which Eeid holds 
 to be suggested or immediately inferred are qualities 
 thereafter known and recognised as properties of body ; 
 whereas Brown's external object, also suggested or 
 inferred, is, after the inference, an object whose proper- 
 ties are not knowiL It is simply an external cause of 
 subjective states, call these states sensations or primary 
 qualities. Between the tactile feeling and the extension 
 as notion there is no difference in character. They are 
 equally states of the mind, and of the mind alone, — 
 equally, in fact, sensationa The non-Ego of Brown is 
 only ** something external j " all that he supposes us 
 
 I 
 
 capable of knowing regarding it is, that it is the cause 
 of certain affections in us. This is Brown's explicitly 
 declared doctrine, though, as we shall see, he does not 
 keep consistently to it. 
 
 But, in the second place, Eeid's principle of inference 
 and suggestion of the external object is wholly different 
 from BroT\Ti's. Eeid, in the beginning, holds that the 
 sensation suggests the primary qualities, though a specific, 
 original, instinctive principle. Given certain sensations, 
 these necessarily imply the notion and belief of certain 
 other or ulterior facts. Brown, on the other hand, ex- 
 plicitly discards this specific principle. 
 
 " It is not by any peculiar intuition we are led to believe 
 in the existence of things without. I consider this belief as 
 the effect of that more general intuition, by which we con- 
 sider a new consequent in any series of ascertained events as 
 the sign of a new antecedent." ^ 
 
 In fact. Brown considers it an instance of the universal 
 law of Causality as interpreted by himself. The infer- 
 ence on such a principle is easily shown to be utterly 
 impossible. 
 
 In the first place, there is no knowledge or apprehen- 
 sion of this reality by any of the senses of Smell, Taste, 
 Hearing, Touch proper : the sensations or affections of 
 those senses are simply states or modifications of mind, 
 but they tell us nothing of an external reality or cause. 
 Consciousness cannot in these, and indeed in any of its 
 forms, transcend its own state. In none of these senses, 
 moreover, do we obtain the two fundamental elements 
 of our notion of matter — extension and resistance. 
 
 1 L. XXIV., p. 151. 
 
168 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Fallacies in BrowrCs Doctrine, 
 
 We have a notion not only of extension but of " ex- 
 ternal existence." The notion of extension is not iden- 
 tical with this. 
 
 « To what, then," he asks, " are we to ascribe the belief of 
 external reality which now accompanies our sensations of 
 touch ?" His explanation is as follows : " It appears to me 
 to depend on the feeling of resistance, which, breaking in 
 without any knouTi cause of difference on an accustomed 
 series of feelings, and combining with the notion of exten- 
 sion, and consequently of divisibility, previously acquired, 
 furnishes the elements of that compound notion which we 
 term the notion of matter. Extension and resistance— to 
 combine these simple notions in something which is not our- 
 selves, and to have the notion of matter, are precisely the same 
 thing." 1 
 
 This is a singular and glaring specimen of petitio 
 principiL Whence our belief in external or non-mental 
 existence 1 Extension and resistance are " feelings," 
 " notions," subjective states merely. These combined 
 can but constitute a more complex mental state. This 
 is not an external reality,— it is not the matter which 
 Brown is in search of. But he quietly adds, " to 
 combine these simple notions in something which is 
 not ourselves, and to have the notion of matter, 
 are precisely the same thing." But when and how 
 do we get this "something which is not ourselves," 
 this " something " which is over and above our sensa- 
 tions ? This is n*t explained; it is assumed. But, 
 further, does Brown mean to say, in the face of all his 
 philosophy, that "the feelings "—extension and resist- 
 ance — can reside in or be the properties of " something 
 
 1 L. XXIV., p. 150. 
 
 169 
 
 
 
 not ourselves," — non-mental — not even mind, or a subject 
 of conscious states 1 A something not ourselves with 
 the feelings extension and resistance ; this, forsooth, is 
 matter or external reality, — reality that transcends alike 
 the sphere of sensation and our own bodily organism ! 
 This is simply the most contradictory form of Cosmo- 
 thetic Idealism ; and it is Eepresentationalism, if any- 
 thing is, for the known world of extension and resist- 
 ance is the counterpart of " the something " that tran- 
 scends it, seeing that this something is endowed with 
 our very feelings or notions. 
 
 But Brown's inference of a cause of resistance in 
 something that is not self, is wholly unwarranted on 
 the premises and by the process here given. (1.) It is 
 supposed to be reached on the principle, assumed to 
 be intuitive, of similar antecedents having similar con- 
 sequents. When antecedents are similar, consequents 
 are similar; true, but for all this there may be events 
 which have no antecedents at alL If we infer an ante- 
 cedent at all in the case, it will be in virtue, first of all, 
 of the principle that every event or change in our ex- 
 perience has a cause — a cause of some sort. This prin- 
 ciple or necessity is not involved in the principle, that 
 where antecedents are similar, consequents are similar; 
 on the contrary, this latter principle is founded on the 
 other as one at least of its essential elements. 
 
 (2.) But if we carry out our inference on the principle 
 of difference of antecedent from difference of consequent, 
 the antecedent inferred will still necessarily be one 
 within our experience, not a something wholly un- 
 known to us, of which we cannot predicate either 
 affirmatively or negatively. I have the feeling of re- 
 
 V 
 
 k 
 
170 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 sistance ; I know nothing more ; I have no right to 
 speak of *' some object opposed to me." This is to 
 introduce an object which is not a sensation. But 
 why speak here of an antecedent at all % There is 
 even no antecedent in time here. The feeling of 
 resistance is not, ex ?if/poi?iesi\ preceded in my states 
 of consciousness by anything I know, or any state 
 of consciousness. It arises suddenly, unexpectedly, 
 from nothing known to me that has gone before. I 
 have no known antecedent to fall back upon ; and as 
 my whole knowledge or consciousness in the matter 
 is limited to antecedents which are states of my own 
 mind, I ought naturally to seek the antecedent among 
 these, not in the wholly new notion of something op- 
 posed to me, — some object which is not myself, — an 
 object which transcends alike my experience and my 
 knowledge. If I do reach this notion, I certainly do 
 not get it by the principle of similarity of sequence 
 between antecedents and consequents. And just as 
 little can I reach it by the principle of causality. This 
 principle might tell me there is a cause of the feeling of 
 resistance ; it could never tell me what that cause is, 
 or give to me the new notion of a particular cause. 
 This must be learned from a wholly different source, 
 and is a step entirely subsequent to, as it is beyond the 
 sphere of, the principle of causality. 
 
 Further, the external world of popular irresistible 
 belief is a world in space. This is the world which 
 Brown has to establish by his process of inference from 
 the feeling of resistance. But how can the principle of 
 causality do this in any form 1 A cause of the sensation 
 may be established — but how am I to know that it is 
 
 Fallacies in Brown's Doctrine. 
 
 171 
 
 
 a spatial existence] Any form of cause — spiritual or 
 material alike — satisfies the idea of cause. How then 
 can I thus account for this belief in corporeal substance 
 distinct from myself 1 Obviously, the whole process is a 
 mere fallacy. And if we have this belief which Brown 
 assumes, it never arose in the way he supposes it did. 
 We have no alternative but to retrace our steps, and to 
 admit with Hamilton that we have illegitimately sun- 
 dered the immediate perception or intuition of the 
 external object from the irresistible belief in it ; that, in 
 fact, we believe in an outward world in space because 
 we know an outward world there, and believe that we 
 know it. 
 
 But the truth is, that on Brown's principles of the 
 limitation of knowledge to states of consciousness, we 
 could never even suppose this cause of resistance, when 
 suggested to us, to be a non-mental or non-sensational 
 object. We could certainly never suppose it identical 
 with the notion of a material world, separate and sep- 
 arable from ourselves, — a not-self in the ordinary sense 
 of that term. In this case we should naturally think 
 that this unknown cause was a spiritual force, like our- 
 selves — a will like our own. Knowing no causes or 
 antecedents but our volitions or other states of con- 
 sciousness, we should, if we thought of the cause of a 
 new sensation, such as resistance, think it as different 
 from ourselves but analogically the same. So that in- 
 stead of reaching the common notion of external mate- 
 rial reality, we should regard the surrounding universe 
 as a series of wills or consciousness powerful enough 
 to resist our own. 
 
 Kay, we might go even further than this, and show 
 
 / 
 
172 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 that to Brown such a consciousness is not possible. 
 For supposing the feeling and knowledge of a not- 
 self or external cause of sensation were produced in 
 the mind by this process of inference, what is it on 
 Ijrown's principles but a state of the mind conscious 
 only of itself as a state % Our knowledge on his prin- 
 ciples is limited entirely to the mental state, and its 
 content, whatever it may be, is mental — a part of the 
 state. What advance, then, have we made by reach- 
 ing the consciousness or feeling of an external cause, 
 beyond tliis, that we have got merely to another 
 feeling or sensation like that which this is supposed 
 to account for? The feeling of resistance does not 
 bring before us the external reality or thing itself 
 existing, for the external world as more than a state 
 of our own mind we cannot know, but it suggests, or 
 we infer from the feeling, the notion of this workL 
 On the ground of this suggested or inferred notion 
 we are led to believe that a reality corresponding to 
 the notion exists in a sphere beyond our consciousness. 
 The world itself as a reality — as a matter of fact — we 
 never can either observe or know. It is merely imaged 
 to us in a notion as a not-self — a corporeal substance — 
 and thus believed in as real, — as a correspondent and 
 counterpart to the notion. This actual world is thus 
 with Brown never known ; it is believed to be because 
 of its notion, and in conformity with its notion. Then 
 what is this but a doctrine of Eepresentationalism in the 
 strictest sense of that term — a supposed coiTespondence 
 between a state of consciousness and what transcends 
 consciousness altogether ? — what has never been in 
 consciousness, and never can be, and which accordingly 
 
 
 
 Vindication of Hamilton's Criticism. 173 
 
 can never be compared with the notion — or known 
 to be truly represented? Between Brown's doctrine 
 and that of Hamilton there thus emerges an absolute 
 contrast. Brown believes in that which he does not, 
 and cannot, apprehend or even know ; he believes that 
 he has a notion of it, and a notion conformable to its 
 reality and its character. His belief extends beyond his 
 knowledge, for he believes in an object wholly tran- 
 scending consciousness. With Hamilton the object is 
 first of all apprehended as a matter of fact — as a fact of 
 our direct experience; and we on the ground of this 
 knowledge believe the thing to exist, or to be real, 
 just as knowing any one of our sensations we be- 
 lieve it to exist, or to be real while we know it, and 
 on the ground of the knowledge. In a word, Hamil- 
 ton's intuition is a knowledge, Brown's suggestion and 
 inference is a belief— a belief in that which in itself 
 cannot be either apprehended or known. 
 
 But there are passages in Brown which are quite in- 
 consistent with the absolute incognoscibility of the real 
 outward world. They, in fact, amount to a doctrine of 
 representative perception, in the proper sense of the 
 term. The sensations or subjective states are excited 
 in us by what is not itself an object of perception. It 
 is yet regarded by us, and believed to be non-mental, 
 material, and spatial Nay, the feeling of extension 
 is "the direct or immediate result of the presence of 
 the external body with the quality of which it corre- 
 sponds."^ "The permanence and universality of the 
 agents which possess the primary qualities." "Our 
 bodily frame is itself extended and resisting." ^ " There 
 
 1 L. XXVI., p. 166. 2 See L. XXVI., p. 165, oxi^ passim. 
 
i..._ X 
 
 174 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 is something which is external to ourselves and in- 
 dependent of our transitory feelings, — something which 
 it is impossible for us not to regard as extended and 
 resisting."! A doctrine of this sort, besides being in- 
 consistent with the inference of a mere " something " as 
 cause of our sensations, is a doctrine of representation ; 
 for through our sensations, as representative media, we 
 are alleged to know the essential properties of body, — 
 nay, to know it as what, on the vulgar belief, we think 
 we perceive it to be, material or non-mental, — extended 
 and resisting. It is no longer merely the unknown 
 cause or correlate of sensations. 
 
 Hamilton was quite well aware of the connection of 
 the two doctrines of Inferential Realism and Representa- 
 tionalism. He tells us expressly that, in regard to the 
 two latter forms of the hypothesis, in which the repre- 
 sentation is a modification of the mind, — one of those 
 attributed to Brown, — "the subaltern theories have 
 been determined by the difficulty to connect the repre- 
 sentation with the reality in a relation of causal de- 
 pendence. "2 And later, in speaking of these subaltern 
 theories, he divides them into those which suppose 
 natural and supernatural causes : " Of these, the natural 
 determination to represent is either (1) one foreign and 
 external (by the action of the material reality on the 
 passive mind, through sense), or (2) one native and 
 internal," &c.3 The former of these fitly describes 
 Brown's process of inference and suggestion of the 
 unapprehended external world, through the feeling of 
 resistance. 
 
 1 L. XXV., p. 60. 2 Discussions, p. 68. 
 
 » Meid's Works, p. 818. 
 
 Vindication of Hamiltotis Criticism, 175 
 
 These things being so, Hamilton's criticism of Brown's 
 doctrine is perfectly vindicated. All that need be 
 conceded in the matter is, that Hamilton, while ex- 
 posing the fallacy of Brown's attempt to reduce space to 
 time and the succession of muscular feelings, did not 
 expressly exhibit the fallacy of his inference of an ex- 
 ternal reality from the feeling of resistance, and thus 
 did not quite complete the case against him. 
 
 ii 
 
 
176 
 
 CHAPTEE YIL 
 
 PERCEPTION — NATURAL REALISM AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 
 HAMILTON AND BERKELEY. 
 
 As opposed to the doctrine of Natural Eealism or Dual- 
 ism, Hamilton notes the theories of Idealism. Accord- 
 ing to Idealism, the object of consciousness in perception 
 is ideal — that is, a phenomenon in or of the mind. If 
 the idea be regarded as a mode of the human mind it- 
 self, we have Egoistical Idealism. If the idea be viewed 
 not as a mode of the human mind, we have the scheme 
 of non-Egoistical Idealism. If the ideal object be sup- 
 posed to be in the perceiving mind itself, there is needed 
 the hypothesis, among others, of its infusion by Deity. 
 If this object be not in the mind itself, there is needed 
 the hypothesis of the human mind being conscious of 
 it in a Higher Intelligence, to which it is intimately 
 present. We have, in a word, the hypotheses respective- 
 ly of Berkeley and Malebranche. 
 
 Hamilton regards Berkeley's doctrine as one of objec- 
 tive or non-Egoistical Idealism. The idea or ideal object 
 is not a mere state or mode of the mind ; but it is in 
 the perceiving mind, and it is infused into it at the 
 moment of consciousness, immediately by God. The 
 
 Bealism and Idealism. 
 
 177 
 
 ideal object is thus not a mere mode of the mind. It is 
 a non-Ego, the quality or effect of a non-Ego. This 
 non-Ego is with Berkeley Deity. HamUton points out 
 the general approximation of thorough -going Realism 
 and thorough-going Idealism: — 
 
 "Both buUd upon the same fundamental fact— that the 
 extended object immediately perceived is identical with the 
 extended object actually existing. For the truth of this both 
 can appeal to the common sense of mankind, and to the 
 common sense of mankind Berkeley did appeal not less con- 
 fidently and perhaps more logically than Reid. Natural 
 Realism and Absolute Idealism are the only systems worthy 
 of a philosopher ; for, as they alone have any foundation in 
 consciousness, so they alone have any consistency in them- 
 selves." 1 
 
 Berkeley no doubt held that these ideas in the mind, 
 whether called sensations or perceptions, were on the 
 same level, and were capable of existing out of the 
 individual act of perception, and out of the individual 
 mind altogether, — in other individual minds and out 
 of all human minds. But Berkeley held that they 
 were not capable of existing per se, — that is, out of 
 some mind, or any mind. Hence he was led to hold 
 that there is a divine or omnipresent mind, who excites 
 the ideas in or communicates them to individual mindsi 
 The esse of the idea is percipi^ but not the percipi of 
 the individual act of perception, or of the act of any 
 individual man. This is essential to their (perceived) 
 reality, in our consciousness, but they do not cease to be 
 when our perception or consciousness of them ceases to 
 be. They are constant or permanent apart from our 
 perception. 
 
 1 Pceid's Works, p. 817. 
 P.— VL M 
 
178 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 I venture to think that Hamilton admits too much 
 to Berkeley. That the extended thing perceived is the 
 extended thing existing may be true; but I doubt 
 very much whether in Berkeley's sense and in Hamil- 
 ton's these are the same. The sensation of pleasure or 
 pain — red or green — is also in Berkeley's sense a form 
 of the non-Ego, excited or determined by the omni- 
 present mind. And this is with Berkeley quite as 
 distinct and independent, in the absence of the inter- 
 mediary substance matter, as any primary quality. 
 But this is confessedly not on the level of extension 
 or any primary quahty. Why, then, should we regard 
 the perception of the extended thing, or the ex- 
 tended thing, as in any other category than the sub- 
 jective sensation of pleasure or pain? These are all 
 equally excitable or communicable by the Divine Mind, 
 — they are both equally in the mind of the individual. 
 Is their being in the mind or being passing modes of the 
 mind really distinct 1 Can they ultimately be regarded 
 as something more than modes of consciousness or states 
 of mind, determined equally by a power, which can 
 also determine these in other individuals'? Berkeley 
 on this point is vague and unsatisfactory. 
 
 Let us take only the primary quality of extension, 
 as in an extended object perceived. The extension or 
 extended thing perceived is separate from the mind, 
 though in it, and permanent (in the Divine Mind). 
 If this be Berkeley's doctrine, it certainly approaches 
 Natural Kealism. This too says the extension perceived 
 is in the consciousness, or an object of the consciousness, 
 during the perception. Hamilton adds, it is distinct 
 from ^d independent of the percipient act It is real, 
 
 Tlie Question of Realism, 
 
 179 
 
 
 and there is a Dualism, — two numerically different 
 things,— the conscious percipient, and the extension 
 perceived as existing. The question arises. Does the 
 extension apprehended as distinct and independent of 
 us subsist after the act of perception has passed away 1 
 If so, does it subsist exactly as we perceive it, or in 
 some form of potency merely, which is capable of again 
 presenting to us the extension or extended object % I 
 confess I do not find in Hamilton's writings a perfectly 
 explicit answer to these questions. No doubt ordinary 
 common sense says and believes that the extension per- 
 ceived exists, whether we perceive it or not, exactly as 
 we perceive it. But Hamilton would not, and need not, 
 hold himself bound by an unanalysed dictum of this 
 sort. His appeal to common sense is always under the 
 restriction of the principle of philosophical analysis and 
 criticism. It is sufficient for him to show the essential 
 germ of truth at the root of the popular belief, — to show, 
 in fact, how the conception itself of material reality has 
 arisen. It is clear, I think, that the individual act of 
 perception, as restricted to the now and here of present 
 consciousness, cannot reasonably yield the conclusion 
 that the distinct and independent extension continues 
 to exist, far less exist as we perceive it. This would be 
 to extend our assertion of existence beyond the indi- 
 vidual moment, whereas our perception is restricted to 
 that moment. At the same time, we should not be 
 entitled to affirm that the extension perceived ceases to 
 exist, the moment we cease to perceive it. As distinct 
 and independent of our single act of perception, there is 
 no ground for holding it to disappear from reality with 
 that act of perception. The possibility of its -subsist- 
 
180 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Berkeley and Hamilton. 
 
 181 
 
 ence is thus clear. But extension is after all with 
 Hamilton only a quality, not a substance, the quality 
 of a substance corporeal or material,— different from the 
 conscious subject,— a substance of which ultimately, or 
 as it is in itself, we are wholly ignorant. This ultimate 
 reality is probably regarded by Hamilton as something 
 above space and time conditions. And he may fairly 
 be supposed to hold that the world perceived in space 
 and time, is a world subsisting, whether we perceive it 
 or not, with the potency of presenting to us certain 
 qualities. This seems to be implied in his doctrine of 
 Natural Kealism, when taken as an explanation of the 
 recurrence of our perceptions, after the numerous breaks 
 or interruptions. ' When face to face with this question, 
 he says — 
 
 " If Berkeley held that the Deity caused one permanent 
 material universe (be it supposed apart or not apart from his 
 own essence), which universe, on coming into relation with 
 our minds, through the medium of our bodily organism, is, 
 in certain of its correlative sides or phases, so to speak, ex- 
 ternal to our organism, objectively or really perceived (the 
 primary qualities), or determines in us certain subjective 
 aflFections of which we are conscious (the secondary quali- 
 ties) ; in that case I must acknowledge Berkeley's theory to 
 be virtually one of natural realism, the differences being 
 only verbal. But again, if Berkeley held that the Deity 
 caused no permanent material universe to exist, and to act 
 uniformly as one, but does Himself eitlier infuse into our 
 several minds the phsenomena (ideas) perceived and affec- 
 tive, or determines our several minds to elicit within con- 
 sciousness such apprehended qualities or felt affections ; in 
 that case I can recognise in Berkeley's theory only a scheme 
 of theistic idealism— in fact, only a scheme of perpetual and 
 universal miracle, against which the law of parcimony ia 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 conclusive, if the Divine interposition be not proved neces- 
 sary to render possible the facts." ^ 
 
 Here, clearly, Hamilton points to a material universe 
 created, to its priority to perception, to the perception of 
 certain of its qualities (the primary) as objective or real, 
 to their correlation with our organism, and the perma- 
 nency of this material world and of these qualities amid 
 our interrupted perceptions. This subsists as the subject 
 of the quality perceived, and as the cause of subjective 
 affections and sensations in us. In this way Hamilton's 
 doctrine of Natural Eealism is broadly distinguished 
 from Berkeley's doctrine of even the immediate per- 
 ception of the primary qualities, as dependent on the 
 constantly repeated causality of the Divine Mind. Even 
 if Hamilton merely contended for an intermediate world 
 of force, subsisting by itself in space and time, this would 
 differentiate his doctrine from that of Berkeley, and it 
 would be sufficient for a doctrine of Eealism. For, 
 according to Berkeley, the esse of sensible reality is 
 percipi, and no quality of matter, or material substance 
 even, can exist simply .or ^9er se— that is, as unperceived 
 by some mind. The assumption, however, of the abso- 
 lute convertibility of esse and x>ercipi is not competent 
 on Hamilton's allegation of the perceived distinctness 
 or independence, involving externality, of the primary 
 quality. It is always thus possible that the quality may 
 have an existence in space and time, apart from indi- 
 vidual perception ; and this existence may be either of 
 the quality as perceived, or of the quality in the form 
 of a material power, capable of presenting it to the per- 
 cipient And at the utmost, Berkeley can identify the 
 
 1 Memoir, pp. 34G, 347. 
 
182 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 esse of sensible reality with the iierciiyi only on the 
 unwarranted assumption that our percqn limits the 
 existence of the quality perceived to a percipi. This 
 lie cannot prove without assuming that the percipi- 
 ent act and the quality perceived are not numeri- 
 cally distinct or independent in the moment of per- 
 ception, and this is the very point at issue. It does 
 not follow that, because we only apprehend a quality 
 or fact in a definite act at a given moment, such 
 quality or fact ceases to be the moment our apprehen- 
 sion ceases, unless it pass into some other percipient 
 mind. The true inference is, that our perception ceasing, 
 we cannot say anything about the perceived object, or 
 the conditions of its existence, apart from our percep- 
 tion; and if its distinctness from us as a fact be ap- 
 prehended, along with its reality in the perception, the 
 
 presumption rather is tliat its esse is not Birn^ly percipi 
 
 that, for aught we know, it may truly subsist, all percep- 
 tion ceasing or being interrupted. Being may transcend 
 all being known by us : we cannot at least affirm that it 
 does not, on the ground simply that we know somethinf', 
 and some being. 
 
 Eut it should be kept in mind that Realism or 
 Dualism does not require that the object perceived, in 
 the form of the primary quality, should subsist after 
 our perception, or amid our interrupted perceptions, ex- 
 actly as we perceive it. All that is logically required 
 is that, on the ground of the perceived quality, as dis- 
 tinctly non-spiritual or material, there is a substance, 
 matter or force, or both conjoined in one, intermediate 
 between the percipient and the divine action, which is 
 capable of exhibiting the known material qualities, and 
 
 What Natural Eeali&in Implies. 183 
 
 is the ground of this world perceived in space and time. 
 Material existence 7;er se, or apart from perception, not 
 being impossible, the positive proof of the permanence of 
 the material world in space and time will be found in 
 the known difference between material and spiritual 
 qualities in our experience, and the uniformity with 
 which the former recur to our apprehension, in a man- 
 ner impersonal and apart from our volition. Order, 
 regularity, law, in our perceptions, do not necessarily 
 point to such an immediate action of the divine mind, 
 in the presentations of sense, as is implied in Berkeley- 
 anism. The Deity does not need " to perform a petty 
 miracle on each representation of each several mind." 
 There is no need for a doctrine of omnipresent creation ; 
 the cosmos of things may have been constituted in one 
 great act, and its grand order permanently established. 
 The ultimate reference of order and uniformity to God 
 does not destroy the possibility of the impress of these 
 by Him on an intermediate world of matter and force 
 in a single moment, and it may be for all time. In this 
 case the material contents of space and time would be 
 phsenomenal of matter and force, and of mind as well, 
 in their regulated orders of succession and coexistence. 
 A world of force, subordinated to law, with its qualities 
 changing from potential to actual — through growth, de- 
 cay, and transmutation — yet unchanging to our concep- 
 tion in its definite order, would remain the permanent 
 amid our passing yet corresponding perceptions ; a world 
 real now, real ere my individual life was, real to the 
 individualities around me, and subsisting when "I," 
 and " thou," and " they," after the transmutation of our 
 organic being, are garnered in the chaotic dust out of 
 
184 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 which the wonderful forms of Hfe and beauty continue 
 to arise. 
 
 The Berkeleyan theory is weak and insufficient (1.) 
 It takes no proper account, makes no adequate analysis, 
 of the facts of sensation and perception. To describe 
 our knowledge of the outward worid indiscriminately by 
 the terms sensation, idea, perception, &c., is to speak 
 vaguely. Is the mere subjective affection of our sensible 
 pleasure or pain identified with the intuition of extension 
 or resistance to muscular and locomotive effort % Then 
 is the sensation taken wholly out of its place, and ranked 
 as different and more than what it is. Is this latter in- 
 tuition classed with the sensation ? Then is the act low- 
 ered to what it is not, mutilated and distorted. Are 
 sensation and perception treated as generically the same, 
 simply because they are supposed to relate to sensible 
 reality, and involve a percipient subject 1 Then the whole 
 question of intuitive Eealism is slurred over. How can 
 Berkeley, or any one else, settle the question of the 
 meaning of material reality, unless by an accurate sci- 
 entific analysis of that which we intuitively perceive 1 
 Hamilton's appeal to intuitive knowledge must be hon- 
 estly faced, ere any statement can be made regarding the 
 meaning of material existence. How such a notion even 
 arises in consciousness, as matter of debate, must be 
 explained. And if externality and materiality, in the 
 proper sense of these terms, cannot be accounted for, 
 the causes of the iUusion must also be legitimately 
 explained. 
 
 The use of the term idea to describe the fact of sense- 
 perception is ambiguous. The subject plus consciousness 
 of the object, is the idea. What, then, is meant by the 
 
 Berhelci/s Doctrine, 
 
 185 
 
 object ? Is it a sensation merely, — a subjective state or 
 property; or is it a percept, a quality of a non-Ego 1 
 The whole point of the difference lies here. We may 
 speak of ideas and sensations and sense-given pJicenomena, 
 but until we realise this distinction and face it, our work 
 is of no avail Berkeley summed up his doctrine in two 
 propositions. The one proposition he regards as that of 
 the common sense of mankind, the other that of the phi- 
 losophers. The truth of his system is their conciliation. 
 " The vulgar," he says, " are of opinion that these things 
 they immediately perceive are the real things." Philoso- 
 phers are of opinion " that the things immediately per- 
 ceived are ideas which exist only in the mind." ^ Man- 
 kind not only believe that the things they immediately 
 perceive are the real things, but that they are indepen- 
 dent of the act of perception, and in this sense perfectly 
 real This doctrine is utterly incompatible with the iden- 
 tification of sensible things with "ideas which exist 
 only in the mind," whether " the mind " be regarded 
 as " the mind " of all finite percipients, or as only the 
 Divine Mind, or as both the Divine and finite minds. 
 It is of no consequence that these ideas are independent 
 of the will of the percipient, and therefore of his per- 
 sonality. So are dreams in a great measure ; and so are 
 essentially the laws of association. Their esse is still 
 simiply percipi ; they are wholly subjective, and do not 
 subsist except as the acts of the percipient, or independ- 
 ently of these acts. As Ueberweg has well said, hitting 
 the blot here — 
 
 " The first proposition (that which the ordinary mind cor- 
 
 ^. — 111 I 
 
 1 Third Dialogice, vol. i. p. 359. The reference is to Professor 
 Eraser's admirable edition of Berkeley. 
 
186 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 rectly affirms) is, that tlie real table, and all real unthinking 
 objects generally, are the table and the objects which we see 
 and feel. The second (or scientific one) is, that what we see 
 and feel consists entirely of phsenomena — i.e., of certain 
 qualities, such as hardness, weight, shape, magnitude, whicli 
 inhere in our sensations, and consequently that what we see and 
 feel is nothing but sensation. From the combination of these 
 two propositions, it follows that real objects are phsenomena 
 of the kind just mentioned, and that consequently there 
 exists in the world nothing besides these objects, whose esse 
 13 percipi, and the percipient subjects. But * what we see 
 and feel ' is ambiguous. If by this expression we understand 
 oiir sensuous perceptions themselves^ then the second proposi- 
 tion is true, but the first not. If, on the contrary, we under- 
 stand by it the transcendental objects (or things in them- 
 selves) which so act upon our senses, that in consequence of 
 this action perceptions arise in us, then the first proposition 
 is true, but the second false ; and it is only by a change of 
 meaning that both are true, whence the syllogism is faulty 
 on account of a quaternio terminorum. Our sensations de- 
 pend upon a previous affection of the organs of sensation, 
 and this affection depends on the existence of intrinsically 
 real external objects." ^ 
 
 (2.) The notion of outness or externality is miscon- 
 ceived, and it is erroneously identified with that of 
 distance. Externality is supposed to mean either ex- 
 ternality to our present sense -experience in our past 
 sense - experience now no longer actual, or in our 
 future sense-experience not yet actual, or externality 
 to our own personal experience altogether in the sense- 
 experience of other minds, present, past, and future. 
 Such externality is inadequate even to the proper ex- 
 tension of the term. This is not necessarily more than 
 externality in time ; it is the difference in the first case 
 1 History of Philosophy, vol ii. p. 89. 
 
 The Notion of Externality, 
 
 187 
 
 simply of the present from the past or future in sense- 
 experience. This need mean nothing more than the 
 difference in a succession of feelings. In the second 
 place, there is no externality at all, if the other person 
 be with us contemporaneous, for the same time cannot 
 be external to itself ; and if the other person be past or 
 future, there is nothing but the difference of the notion 
 of myself from the notions of other selves; that is, 
 either no externality at all, or an externality common to 
 different notions. But externality is not limited to a 
 difference in succession merely. There is also an exter- 
 nality of coexistence in the same time. One point in 
 a succession in the course of time may be external to 
 another, even if the first point perishes at once, and the 
 other succeeds, equally perishing. But an externality of 
 coexistence is impossible, unless the two points subsist, 
 and subsist in the same time. And this is the true 
 externality ; that of sensible reality or of the world of 
 sense-experience. Succession does not necessarily give 
 this, nor does it imply succession at all ; for in the one 
 moment of time I may apprehend the coexistence. 
 This consideration, moreover, is fatal to the whole at- 
 tempted genesis of space out of time. There is presup- 
 position of the point at issue. 
 
 Further, outness or externality is not identical with 
 distance in space. Outness is implied in simple contact 
 of the hand with an extra-organic body, although there 
 be no appreciable distance between them, as indeed it 
 is implied in one colour alongside another, where no line 
 of demarcation is sensibly discernible. Distance means 
 degree of outness of one thing from another ; but it 
 presupposes outness as a fact and a conception. Exter- 
 
188 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 nality is given in any form of contact, in any form of 
 locomotive effort, and is the essential condition of our 
 even conceiving its varying degrees, — that is, distance in 
 a linear relation to the bodily organism. 
 
 Further, what is there more or less unintelligible in 
 the externality of the unthinking object to the organ of 
 sense, than there is in the externality of the thinking 
 finite subject to me, the thinking finite subject 1 Can I 
 not form an equally adequate or an equally inadequate 
 conception of each 1 Is even the continued subsistence 
 of space, jTer se, less intelligible than the continued sub- 
 sistence of Deity j9er se ? 
 
 (3.) The Berkeleyan explanation of the permanence of 
 material reahty or sensible things is wholly inadequate. 
 It is admitted or contended for as an interpretation of 
 Berkeley, that sensible things, visible or tangible, do 
 not pass out of reality when they cease to be seen or 
 touched by me, or even by all individual human beings. 
 Our perceptions of them are intermittent, but sensible 
 things are permanent They are thus independent of 
 our perceptions. The material world, as geology teaches, 
 has existed thousands of years before men and sentient 
 beings. The sensible objects around us do not pass out 
 of being when we cease to perceive them. How is this 
 so, and in what sense is it so 1 In the state of present 
 sensation, or perception, the actual knowledge is always 
 only of a limited kind. In the vision, for example, of 
 a tree, what we apprehend by sight is not the whole of 
 what is, or of what we should apprehend if we were to 
 apply to the tree the sense of touch and muscular effort 
 These would give us more and other actual sensations 
 (perceptions) than we have by sight alone. Still look- 
 
 The PermancTice of Things. 
 
 189 
 
 ing at the tree, — experiencing the sensation of vision, — 
 we believe that the actual sensations of touch in con- 
 nection with it are possible, and that they woidd be 
 actually experienced if we were to touch the tree. The 
 actual visual sensations are thus signs of other conceiv- 
 able but as yet non-actual sensations. This connection 
 has been established by association, — by, in fact, a sort 
 of induction. The existence of a " sensible thing " thus 
 implies all that can be found in the actual sensation, 
 and in the guarantee, objective and universal, which 
 this gives us of conceivable sensations which we may 
 experience. It is added that the most distinct and 
 easily imaginable objective reality is found in the asso- 
 ciation between what is seen and what is felt, — between 
 Sight and Touch. 
 
 The main point to be noted here is, that supposing 
 the principle sufficient to account for the permanence 
 and independence of sensible things, it is odd that it 
 should not give us this conviction, in an identical sense, 
 in regard to every connection of our sensations (or per- 
 ceptions). AVhy, for example, does not the association 
 of a taste with a smell, or a taste with a sound, or a 
 sound with the feeling of pressure or contact, not give 
 us this conception and conviction of the permanent pos- 
 sibility of the smell to come, or the sound to come, or 
 the feeling of contact to come, in the same sense as of 
 the extension or force ? We expect, for example, when 
 we smell an orange, that the taste associated with the 
 former orange is now capable of becoming an actual sen- 
 sation; while the same association leads us to expect 
 that if the touch were applied to the visible orange we 
 should find resistance, extension, and solidity. But do 
 
190 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Essential Point in Eealism. 
 
 191 
 
 we therefore believe that the taste was permanent and 
 independent in the same sense in which the extension 
 was permanent and independent of our perceptions? 
 Surely there is all the difference in the world between 
 the permanence or independence of tangible extension 
 and that of the mere feeling of contact, the sensation of 
 taste, of pleasure or pain. In the latter cases we know 
 that the actual sensation ceases to be the moment it 
 passes out of consciousness. Do we mean to say that 
 because of its association with some other sensation, it 
 nevertheless continues to be after it ceases to be felt, 
 in the same sense in which extension once perceived, or 
 force once resisted, continues to be after our conscious- 
 ness of each has passed away ] There is little wonder 
 that the objective reality in the case of the associations 
 of sight and touch is clear and distinct, seeing that the 
 object of perception is in its nature so thoroughly different 
 from that in the other senses. And this lays bare the 
 whole fallacy of this method of explaining the independ- 
 ence and permanence of sensible reality. The association 
 itself of past and present sensations, and of percepts, 
 requires explanation. They have been connected in 
 our experience, and they have recurred in a uniform 
 way, ere we begin to expect and believe that they will 
 so recur again. This is an independence of us, and a 
 permanence, already given, presupposed. It is this 
 whikh generates the association with its consequent ex- 
 pectancy and belief in a future permanence. But surely 
 if such a permanence and independence be already pre- 
 supposed, the association generated out of it cannot 
 explain this independence and permanence. This is 
 simply a case of varepov irporcpov. Whatever may be 
 the cause of our belief in and expectation of the perma- 
 
 /I 
 
 nence and independence of the sensible world, it is not 
 given in this petitory theory. 
 
 The essential point in JSTatural Eealism is, that 
 whatever be the object immediately apprehended, be it 
 bodily extension, be rt resistance of inertia, of muscle, 
 or fibre to volition, or to the organic effort to move, 
 this is not a mere mode of the conscious mind or 
 conscious agent. This relation is not represented by 
 that of substance and attribute. The extension I per- 
 ceive, be it bodily even, is not a quality of the Ego ; 
 the resistance I apprehend in locomotion, though it 
 cause a sensation which is mine, is not a sensation 
 which is mine, but something in contact with a wholly 
 different set of nerves, the locomotive, as opposed to 
 the mere nerves of pressure and sensibility, " All mus- 
 cular contraction is dependent on the agency of one set 
 of nerves, all feeling of muscular contraction on an- 
 other." ^ In perception, then, the quality perceived is 
 not related to me as a mere feeling, or sensation, or 
 emotion is, a passing state of my sensibility. It is the 
 quality of a non-Ego, the revelation of what is, but is 
 not me. It cannot be said to be created by me, and I am 
 not entitled to say that it ceases to be merely because I 
 cease to perceive it. Dogmatism on this point is pre- 
 cluded ; and there being recurrence or uniformity in the 
 percepts, the probability is on the side of a permanent 
 non-Ego in one form or another. The mental volition 
 I put forth is a mode of me, the one permanent willing 
 agent ; but the extension which I apprehend, the resist- 
 ance which I meet with, these are not mine in the same 
 sense, and can never be proved to be so. This is all 
 that Natural Realism or Dualism needs to contend for. 
 
 1 JteieTs Works, p. 865. 
 
192 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 PHiENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY — GENERAL POINTS. 
 
 There are several salient points under Phsenomenal 
 Psychology which, though not of equal prominence and 
 importance in the philosophy of Hamilton with those 
 already discussed, would yet fall to be noticed in an 
 adequate exposition of his contributions to the science 
 of mind. These I can barely indicate, owing to the 
 limits of this volume. 
 
 (1.) There is the law regulating Perception and Sensa- 
 tion. This is :— that, above a certain pomt, the stronger 
 the Sensation, the weaker the Perception ; and the dis- 
 tincter the Perception, the less obtrusive the Sensation. 
 Looking at the different senses, it is found that precisely 
 as a sense has more of the one element, it has less of 
 the other. In Sight and Hearing, knowledge or percep- 
 tion predominates; in Taste and Smell, sensation pre- 
 vails. There are, in other words, qualities of a non- 
 Ego apprehended or known principally in the former ; 
 in the latter there is the experience of the subjective 
 states of pleasure or pain. 
 
 Looking to the impressions of the same sense, these 
 differ in degree and in quality or kind. Above a cer- 
 
 Lav) of Perception and Sensation. 193 
 
 tain limit, if the impression be strong, as in sight, we 
 are dazzled and blinded, and consciousness is limited to 
 the pain or pleasure of the sensation. Perception is 
 virtually lost in the glare. Looking to the difference 
 in kind, and selecting colour and figure in sight, in 
 the former there is more of sensation, in the latter more 
 of perception. In colour there are fewer differences 
 and relations than in figure, but a much higher sensuous 
 enjoyment. In the apprehension of figure, its varieties 
 and relations, the accompanying pleasure is more refined 
 and permanent. In painting there is pleasure from 
 vivid and harmonious colouring, and pleasure from the 
 drawing and grouping of the figures. The gratification 
 we feel in the colouring is, as more sensuous, less refined 
 and lasting than that which we derive from the harmoni- 
 ous relations of the figure. As a rule, the pleasure of 
 sensation is more intense but less refined and enduring 
 than that arising from perception, allied as it is to intel- 
 lectual energy. 
 
 (2.) Under the heads of Memory and Imagination 
 there are the conditions of knowledge out of con- 
 sciousness, — already generally referred to under men- 
 tal latency.^ And there is the view of the organ of 
 Imagination as being the original sense excited from 
 withia There are cases of persons who, having lost 
 their sight, are no longer capable of representing the 
 images of visible objects. In these instances it is 
 found that disorganisation has not only affected the eye, 
 but extended to the optic nerves and thalami, — those 
 parts of the brain which constitute the internal instru- 
 ment of the sense. Had the eye alone been destroyed, 
 
 1 See above, p. 98. 
 P. — VL If 
 
194 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 •while optic nerve and thalami, the real organ of vision, 
 remained unimpaired, the imagination of forms and 
 colours would have continued quite vigorous. Similar 
 cases are recorded in regard to the deaf. Even volun- 
 tary motions are imitated in and by the imagination. 
 In representing speech, the movement of the counte- 
 nance, and the limbs, there is a kind of tension in the 
 same nerves through which, by an act of will, I can de- 
 termine an overt and voluntary motion of the muscles. 
 When imagination is very lively, this outward move- 
 ment actually takes place. It is thus more than prob- 
 able that there are as many organs of Imagination as 
 
 of Sense. 
 
 There is (3) the theory of the Laws of Association, at 
 which Hamilton worked- for long, without completing 
 it, yet leaving very valuable results. The points here 
 of especial note are his final reduction of those laws to 
 two, instead of one, as in the Lectures — viz.. Repetition 
 or Direct llemeinbrance, according to which " thoughts 
 coidentical in modification, but differing in time, sug- 
 gest each other ; " and Redintegration or Reminiscence, 
 according to which " thoughts once coidentical in time 
 are, however different as mental modes, again suggestive 
 of each other, end that in the mutual order which they 
 originally held." From the combination of these laws 
 arise the special ones of Similarity, Contrast, and Co- 
 adjacency. 
 
 Similarity depends on Repetition, for resembling 
 objects being to us identical in their resembling points, 
 must call up each other. Redintegration then comes 
 into play. They now form parts of the same mental 
 whole. 
 
 Concepts. 
 
 195 
 
 Contrast connects itself with Repetition and Redinte- 
 gration, because all contrast is of things contained under 
 a common notion, — qualities contrasted are thus to a 
 certain degree similar. The opposite sides of contrast 
 make up a common whole. 
 
 Coadjacency embraces thoughts related to each other, 
 as Cause and Effect, Substance and Attribute, &c., and 
 are thus mutually suggestive. 
 
 (3.) Under the head of Comparison there is the theory 
 of General Notions or Concepts. 
 
 The concept is the point of view under which we re- 
 cognise a plurality of objects as a unity. It is a notion 
 of resemblance, and thus implies relation. Objects are 
 grouped as merif riverSy inountahis^ because of resembling 
 qualities apprehended. The relation of resemblance we 
 cannot depict in Imagination, but we can form an indi- 
 vidual image of man, river, or viountain, and consider it 
 as representing, though inadequately, the other objects 
 of the class. A concept j)er se is unimaginable, even 
 unthinkable, but it can be realised in and through the 
 image of an individual of the class whose attribute or 
 attributes it contains. An abstract concept is a mere 
 potentiality in knowledge, — that which is capable of 
 being definitely realised in an image ; an actual concept 
 is an image pliLs the knowledge of relation to other 
 resembling objects, real or possible. The ancient prob- 
 lem of Nominalism and Conceptualism is thus solved. 
 It is impossible to form a notion of the class — say, man — 
 corresponding to the universality of the class itself, as 
 has been maintained by conceptualists, — ultra-conceptu- 
 alists. For in this case our one notion or representa- 
 tion would be of ichite and black, tall and short, fat and 
 
' 
 
 196 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 thin men, of contrary, even contradictory, qualities. Our 
 picture or actual image must be of some one of the class, 
 but through the resemblance known by the understand- 
 ing this one image is representative of all the other 
 objects of the class. There is more here, however, than 
 the Ultra-Nominalist doctrine that the community or 
 generality lies in the name alone. It lies in the image 
 constituted into a representation. 
 
 The ground of this theory is to be found in the distinc- 
 tion of the two sides of the concept, — Comprehension 
 and Extension, — a distinction first introduced into philo- 
 sophical literature in these times by Hamilton. Every 
 notion has or means an attribute or attributes. Man 
 means living^ sentient^ reasoning ^ responsiUe. This is the 
 content or comprehension. Every notion has or means 
 objects, real or possible, in which the attribute or attri- 
 butes inhere, or to which they belong. Man means 
 Hack mfin, ichiie man, copper-coloured man. This is 
 the compass or extension. To put Hamilton's doctrine 
 precisely, we should say that we cannot realise any part 
 of the comprehension of the notion without embodying 
 it, the common attribute or attributes, in an individual 
 image. In no one act, therefore, can we realise all the 
 class — that is, all the objects of the class; but in one 
 act we can realise what is essential to each, applicable 
 to, and thus representative of all, actual or possible. 
 
 Hamilton further holds that Comprehension and 
 Extension in notions are regulated by the law, — the 
 greater the extension, the less the comprehension, and 
 vice versd. When I predicate existence of an ob- 
 ject, I say the least that is possible of it Compre- 
 hension is at its minimum, — there is the least number 
 
 I 
 
 ] 
 
 Theory of Pleasure and Pain, 
 
 197 
 
 of qualities. When I predicate Alexander of the in- 
 dividual, I say the most that is possible of him, — here 
 comprehension is at its maximum. There is the greatest 
 sum of qualities or attributea And in the former case, 
 extension is at its maximum, for existence takes in 
 every class of objects. In the latter case, extension is 
 at its minimum, for it includes but one object 
 
 Out of this distinction arise two kinds of Judgments. 
 We have the comprehensive judgment, when our predi- 
 cate is an attribute, — as tlie river runs. We have the 
 extensive judgment, when our predicate is a class or 
 object-group, as plant is organised. Hamilton carries 
 out this distinction to Reasoning, and makes two distinct 
 but convertible kinds of syllogism, — the comprehensive 
 and the extensive. 
 
 (4.) Under the psychology of the Feelings, there is his 
 theory of the laws of Pleasure and Pain, founded mainly 
 on the Aristotelic doctrine of pleasure as the result of 
 free and full, and pain of impeded or over-strained, energy. 
 This admits of most important applications in .^thetics, 
 in Morals, and in practical life. He has himseK applied 
 it to the emotions accompanying imagination in com- 
 bination with the understanding — viz., the Beautiful, 
 the Sublime, the Picturesque. 
 
 In the case of the Beautiful, the imagination and 
 understanding act together ; and each faculty readily 
 accomplishes its function. "Variety or complexity of 
 parts is supposed ; these it is for the imagination to hold 
 up or represent, while it is the part of the understanding 
 to make of them a whole. When an object is so con- 
 stituted as readily to allow imagination and understand- 
 ing, working together, to reach, the conception of the 
 
198 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 unity of the object, — the feeling of the beautiful arises. 
 A beautiful thing is thus one whose form occupies the 
 imagination and understanding in a free and full, and, 
 consequently, in an agreeable activity. 
 
 The feeling of the Sublime, on the other hand, is a 
 mingled one of pleasure and pain — of pleasure in the 
 consciousness of strong energy, of pain in the conscious- 
 ness that this energy is vain. We try, for example, to 
 bring the immensity of space under an image ; we try, at 
 the same time, to measure it by other quantities. We 
 have the same experience in dealing with transcendent 
 Power. Lutwe fail; imagination and understanding are 
 baffled, and we desist, — fall back into repose. There is 
 the pleasure of the full energy, in tlie first instance, the 
 pain of its continuance as forced and impeded; and there 
 is the pleasure of the contrast in the state of repose. 
 Hence the sublime at once attracts and repels. 
 
 The feeling of the Picturesque, again, is in contrast 
 to both the Beautiful and the Sublime. The object is 
 varied, and abrupt in its variety: it is regularly irregu- 
 lar. We thus do not even seek to reduce it to harmony. 
 It is thus neither beautiful nor sublime ; but the mind 
 is content to linger over its details, and thus get such 
 pleasure as each part may afford. It was the harmony of 
 the whole which was sought by classical art ; it is too 
 often the pleasure of detail, of point or episode, which 
 modem works yield or seek to give. 
 
 (5.) Under the head of the Conations — Desire and Will 
 — the important point is his doctrine of Free-Will as a 
 psychological fact Hamilton holds will to be a free cause 
 — that is, a cause which is not also an effect, — an absolute 
 
 Free- Will. 
 
 199 
 
 or unconditioned cause. This he regards as established, 
 on the ground of the direct testimony of consciousness, 
 and indirectly as an implicate in our consciousness of 
 duty and responsibility. He holds, at the same time, 
 that free-will, as an absolute cause or commencement in 
 time, is inconceivable. Morally, however, a will deter- 
 mined by motive excludes responsibility ; while a motive- 
 less volition is worthless. It is, therefore, impossible for 
 us to conceive the possibility of moral liberty, either in 
 man or in God ; and yet the fact is not to be held as 
 disproved on the ground of this incomprehensibility — 
 this impossibility of conceiving the Jioio of the fact. Here 
 his special theory of the judgment of Causaljty, as the 
 result of an impotence to conceive an absolute com- 
 mencement in the universe, comes into application. It 
 is only an incapacity of thinking an absolute commence- 
 ment, not a positive deliverance or positive necessity of 
 intelligence. This purely negative judgment cannot be 
 held as counterbalancing the unconditional testimony 
 of consciousness. Free-will is not impossible in fact, be- 
 cause of the judgment of Causality, — for virtually this 
 is not a law of fact or things. It is grounded on a mere 
 mental impotence to conceive an absolute commence- 
 ment. But finally, he urges, that while free-will sup- 
 poses as a fact an unthinkable absolute beginning in 
 time, necessitarianism supposes as a fact the equally un- 
 thinkable alternative of an infinite non-commencement 
 As speculative schemes, the two theories are thus equally 
 balanced. The very objection of incomprehensibility di- 
 rected by the necessitarian against the upholder of free- 
 will is equally valid against himself. Mere speculative 
 
200 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 thought is unable to decide between the two altemativea 
 We are left here, as we are on all ultimate questions of 
 philosophy, to experience,— to consciousness— to the light 
 of its facts and analogies. The consciousness of moral 
 law, as implying moral liberty in man, gives a decisive 
 preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over fate.^ 
 
 » Cf. Discussions, pp. 623-625 ; Metaphysics, L. II. ; PuiiTs Works, 
 pp. 616, 617, p. 624, note. 
 
 201 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE LAWS OF KNOWLEDGE — NEGA- 
 TIVE AND POSITIVE THOUGHT — RELATIVITY. 
 
 Supposing it admitted that a certain complement of 
 cognitions must be allowed as having their origin in the 
 nature of the thinking principle itself, the question arises 
 as to what are ultimate and elementary, and what are 
 to be regarded as modifications or combinations of these. 
 The reduction of our native cognitions to system still 
 remains to be solved. The most ingenious of the 
 attempts, that of Kant, is neither a necessary deduc- 
 tion, nor a natural arrangement of our native cognitions. 
 The truth is that philosophers have not yet established 
 the principles on which the solution of this problem 
 ought to be undertaken.^ The classification of the con- 
 ditions of knowledge which Hamilton now gives is in 
 the line of completing the I^omology of Consciousness 
 or of knowledge in general In the analysis of the Con- 
 ditions of the Thinkable about to be referred to, Hamil- 
 ton goes deeper than he did in the analysis of the con- 
 ditions of Consciousnesa For in these, while he refers 
 to object as such, he does not analyse it precisely; 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. XXXVIII. 
 
20! 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 whereas in the latter exposition, his main aim is to state 
 the conditions, logical and metaphysical, of an object of 
 thought — indeed of knowledge as such, or in general 
 He seeks to lay down the ultimate conditions at once of 
 possibility and impossibility in our knowledge. 
 
 In the scheme which Hamilton terms the " more 
 matured " form of his analysis and classification of the 
 conditions of the thinkable,^ the first point is the dis- 
 tinction of thought — that is, knowledge in its most 
 general form — into Negative and Positive. Negative 
 thought emerges when existence is not attributed to an 
 object By existence, however, Hamilton obviously 
 means existence subjective or objective — either ideal 
 or real — that is, either possible or actual existence in 
 the object of thought Every object which we can posi- 
 tively think as possible has existence attributed to it — 
 that is, ideal existence or existence as an object of thought, 
 and, therefore, of possible reality. Every object thought 
 or known as real, is thus also by implication first, as it 
 were, thought as possible. Negative thought is not, 
 however, the absence of mental activity. It asserts what 
 is unthinkable. The mind tries to think the irrelative 
 or the contradictory, and fails. We contrast the relative 
 and conceivable, which we positively think, with their 
 opposites. We only know, indeed, what non-existence 
 means, by reference to the existence which we know. 
 Hence, in negative thought there is mental effort or 
 activity ; there is the consciousness of its contrast with 
 the conceived and conceivable. 
 
 But negative thought is of two kinds, and is deter- 
 mined by two different sets of conditions. First, we may 
 
 ^ Discussions, p. 602. 
 
 Forrtml Laws of the Thinkable, 
 
 203 
 
 try to think the contradictory, — to unite in one indivis- 
 ible act of thought two contradictory attributes. In this 
 case, the result of the effort is nothing or zero. This is 
 " the really impossible " — the nUiil purum — mere noth- 
 ing — the impossible, not only in thought but in reality. 
 
 This condition, tlien, of thought and knowledge, 
 being presupposed as not violated — ^having got in truth 
 the not-impossible — we come to that second condi- 
 tion, or set of conditions, which makes positive thought 
 for us. This is existence thought as relative or condi- 
 tioned — thought under relation. It is only when we 
 clothe the object of thought in relation, — in relation to 
 the self, or to other objects, — that Ave have a positive 
 object of thought or knowledge at all This, in its most 
 simple or abstract form, is something — some thing or 
 being. Low^er than this thought cannot go. It is the 
 ultimate in knowledge ; only now do we think at all, — 
 only now do we apprehend or know. 
 
 Let us look, then, at the first-named conditions. 
 
 These laws — Identity, Non-Contradiction, Excluded 
 Middle — are common phases of one great law. The 
 first involves all the others. The moment a thing or 
 quality is apprehended or thought, it is so appre- 
 hended or thought The law thus necessarily comes 
 into play. Affinuation or determination is impossible 
 without presupposing that A is A. The object, thus 
 determined, by the affirmation of a certain character or 
 quality, cannot be thought the same when this quality 
 is denied of it Assertions regarding a thing are mu- 
 tually contradictory when the one says that the thing 
 possesses the character which the other says it does not 
 at one and the same time. The contradictory is un- 
 
204 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Ajpplication to Ahsolutis^n. 
 
 205 
 
 thinkable. A = not A = 0. This is the principle of all 
 logical negation. 
 
 The law of Excluded Middle between Contradictories 
 asserts that, of two repugnant notions, both of which 
 cannot be in the same subject, we must yet think the 
 one or the other as being in that subject. A either is 
 or is not. The alternatives under identity and non-con- 
 tradiction are alone possible; of these one or other is 
 necessary. The violation of any of these laws renders 
 the process of thought suicidal, or absolutely null. 
 
 It should here be observed, that while Hamilton holds 
 a contradictory concept or judgment to be null as an 
 object of thought, he does not hold that it is incapable 
 of being understood in the sense and to the extent that 
 we may know full well the meaning of each term, taken 
 separately. We understand thus what is proposed by 
 an attempt at their mental combination. But we cannot 
 
 " unite the tenns in a mental [concept or] judgment, though 
 they stand united in a verbal proposition. If we attempt 
 this, the two mutually exclusive terms not only cannot be 
 thought as one, but in fact annihilate each other ; and thus 
 the result, in place of a positive judgment, is a negation of 
 thought"! 
 
 Attention to this somewhat obvious distinction might 
 have saved a great deal of criticism of a superficially 
 acute kind ; as, for example, that the contradictory and 
 the inconceivable must be conceived in order to be pro- 
 nounced such. 
 
 These things premised, it is easy to see how the 
 philosophy of Hamilton regarding the very possibility 
 of an object of knowledge in any form, be it intuitional 
 
 1 Logic, L. VI. j Jieid's Works, pp. 378, 379. 
 
 
 or conceptual, confronts philosophies of the so-called 
 Absolute in knowledge. He charges the Absolutists in 
 general, meaning Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, with proceed- 
 ing on a subversion of all logical truth. Apart from the 
 condition of Kelativity, Hamilton would disallow Hegel's 
 position both as to ground and method. By very differ- 
 ent and contradictory methods the thinkers of this class 
 arrive at the same end, but their systems all agree in 
 being at variance with the logical laws.^ 
 
 Hamilton's general charge against those who deny the 
 universal application of the three laws in question is, 
 that this implies the subversion of the reality of thought, 
 — in fact, of knowledge in any form ; and as this sub- 
 version is itself an act of thought, it mnnihilates itself. 
 What you have left when you have denied, or seemed 
 to deny, the principles of Identity, Non-contradiction, 
 Excluded Middle, and yet assert knowledge is really 
 nothing. You may baptise it in words if you choose, but 
 you cannot realise it in any form of concept. There is 
 a verbal object, but no object of thought ; there is a 
 verbal proposition, but no mental judgment. To allege 
 a thought or judgment in such circumstances is to sub- 
 vert even its possibility. If A existing and A not 
 existing are at once true, there is no agreement or dis- 
 agreement between thought and its objects. Truth and 
 falsehood are merely empty sounds. We think only by 
 affirmation and negation; these are only as they are 
 exclusive of each other. Unless, therefore, existence 
 and non-existence be opposed objectively, as these are 
 subjectively, all thought, all truth, is mere illusion. ^ 
 
 It might be added that if the identity of contradic- 
 
 1 Logic, L. VI. 
 
 * Logic, L. VI. ; cf. L. V, 
 
206 
 
 JTamUton. 
 
 Hegelianism, 
 
 207 
 
 tories be alleged, the allegation, as no more true than its 
 contradictory, is at once paralysed. If it be alleged that 
 this identity may hold in the sphere of the relative or 
 finite, — in that of the Understanding, but not in that of 
 the so-called Reason or Pure thought, which cognises 
 the Absolute, — then there are two wholly contradictory 
 spheres of knowledge; and we should need a higher 
 Reason and still purer thought to tell us which is the 
 true, or how these are to be reconciled. A dualism of 
 the very worst sort would still remain unreconciled and 
 unreconcilable. 
 
 Further, it is easily shoAvn that Hegel's pretentious 
 attempt to apply the law of contradiction to Pure Beinfr. 
 as the basis of his logic, implies a violation of the very 
 condition under which any one of those laws of thought 
 can be applied. There is no identity unless it be of a 
 definite quality or sum of qualities, or a definite object 
 perceived or thought. The very conception of identity 
 implies something to be identified with itself at least 
 It implies an A to begin with, and the very possibility 
 of contradiction implies the same definitude. We can- 
 not speak of Not A, unless we have already an A or 
 object given. And as Pure Being is, without qualities, 
 utterly undetermined, it is neither identical with itself, 
 nor can anything be predicated as difi'erent from it. It 
 is not an A, of which a Not A can even be said. So 
 that Hegel's law of immanent evolution, through bein^. 
 non-being, becoming, is as empty and impotent a formula 
 as could be laid down. It is wholly hypothetical, and 
 can never get under way without postulating that def- 
 inite reality and those laws which it is proposing to 
 construct. The verbalism of " synthetic thought " is a 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 mere covering of the petitio principil involved. There 
 is no synthesis, there is no progress, for the simple 
 reason that there is no beginning in pure being or pure 
 thought. 
 
 Hamilton, speaking of Schelling and Hegel, says : — 
 
 " Both stuck to the Absolute, but each regarded the way 
 in which the other professed to reach it as absurd. Hegel 
 derided the Intellectual Intuition of Schelling as a poetical 
 play of fancy; Schelling derided the Dialectic of Hegel as a 
 logical play with words. Both, I conceive, were right ; but 
 neither fully right. If Schelling's Intellectual Intuition 
 were poetical, it was a poetry transcending, in fact abolish- 
 ing, human imagination. If Hegel's Dialectic were logical, 
 it was a logic outraging that science and the conditions of 
 thought itself. Hegel's whole philosophy is indeed founded 
 on two errors — on a mistake in logic, and on a violation of 
 logic. In his dream of disproving the law of Excluded 
 Middle (between two Contradictories), he inconceivably mis- 
 takes Contraries for Contradictories ; and in positing pure 
 or absolute existence as a mental datum, immediate, intuitive, 
 and above proof (though, in truth, this be palpably a mere 
 relative gained by a process of abstraction), he not only mis- 
 takes the fact, but violates the logical law, which prohibits 
 us to assume the principle which it behoves us to prove. 
 On these two fundamental errors rests Hegel's Dialectic ; 
 and Hegel's Dialectic is the ladder by which he attempts to 
 scale the Absolute." * 
 
 There is no doubt that this confusion of contrary and 
 contradictory opposition runs all through the Hegelian 
 dialectic, and vitiates it fundamentally. It is essential 
 to the dialectic as a progressive movement that the 
 opposite in each case should be a positive. But so far 
 as contradictory negation is concerned, there is no posi- 
 1 Discussions^ p. 24 — note added. 
 
208 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 live — mere negation satisfies it, — the pure abolition of 
 the subject. Through this no movement is possible. 
 There is simple paralysis. Synthesis is a dream. None 
 abolishes owe, but does not add to it 
 
 If the negation be contrary, this, in the first place, 
 supposes a concept or class notion already constituted 
 with sub-classes, — supposes already a process of experi- 
 ence, thought, and the laws of thought which are sought 
 to be subverted. In the second place, even the contrary 
 negation does not give a definite or single positive, but 
 only one out of a number of possible positives or oppo- 
 sites. And the whole idea of proceeding to construct 
 knowledge by negation, — whether the forms of know- 
 ledge merely, or the matter of knowledge, or both, — is 
 a mere imagination. But further, Hamilton's view of 
 thought as itself cognitive of existence in this or that 
 determinate mode, — quality, in fact, and its relations, — 
 and as such grounded on intuition, is fatal to the whole 
 Hegelian hypothesis of Pure Being as an apprehensible 
 or knowable object at alL To the term Ens, or exist- 
 ence in general — Being, Thing, &c. — there corresponds 
 no conception, no positive notion. We have no know- 
 ledge in apprehension or perception of being in general, 
 or pure being. There is no object of experience, in 
 short, which corresponds to these terms. There is no 
 knowledge of the universal per se. All that we appre- 
 hend is the individual, definite, determinate, — something 
 known as this, not that Being is known in the indi- 
 vidual or determinate thing, but never per se. To lay 
 down this so-called notion as a starting-point for the 
 evolution of a philosophical system is vain. 
 
 Hamilton proceeds to develop his theory of the Con- 
 
 Belativity. 
 
 209 
 
 ditions of the Thinkable beyond what may be called the 
 formal point — viz., the bare or formal possibility of any 
 object of thought or knowledge at alL Relativity is the 
 second great condition, or name for a ncAV series of con- 
 ditions. The violation of the formal laws of thinkimr 
 precludes the possibility of thinking anything whatever. 
 Their fulfilment is thus a negative condition for positive 
 thought But the condition of Relativity must also be 
 fulfilled ere even something can be thought or known. 
 And here we are told that 
 
 " the condition of RelatiWty, in so far as it is necessary, is 
 brought to bear under two principal relations; the one 
 springing from the subject of knowledge— the mind thinking 
 {the relation of knowledge)-, the other, which is subdivided, 
 from the object of knowledge— the thing thought about {the 
 relations of Existence). . . . The relation of Knowledge 
 is that which arises from the reciprocal dependence of the 
 subject and object of thought, Subjective and Objective, 
 including Self and not-Self, or Ego and non-Ego. Whatever 
 comes into consciousness is thought by us either as belong- 
 ing to the mental self exclusively (subjectivo-subjective), or 
 as belonging to the not-self exclusively (subjective-objective), 
 or as belonging partly to both (subjectivo-objective)." ^ 
 
 Hamilton's doctrine of Relativity has thus a twofold 
 aspect It refers, on the one hand, to the conditions 
 under which the object of knowledge exists; and it 
 refers, on the other, to the conditions under which the 
 object of existence is knowa 
 
 The two meanings of the word condition which run 
 through all the philosophy of Hamilton come out in 
 these statements. (1.) Tlie necessary relation of the sub- 
 ject to the object and of the object to the subject is the 
 1 Discussions, ibid., p. 604 ; cf. p. 14. 
 
 P. — YI. Q 
 
210 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 condition — the essential condition — of the knowledge of 
 each ; and as this relation is supposed in all our thought, 
 it is a universal condition of our thought Thought 
 thus obeys conditions. "Conditional limitation is the 
 fundamental law of the possibility of thought." Each 
 term, subject, or object, is simply the condition of the 
 thought of the other. (2.) Apart from the law or limit 
 to knowledge of the relation of subject and object, what 
 we know of either or of anything is a mode, quality, 
 or state. This is properly called a condition, or mode, 
 of being of the subject It answers, in fact, to the deter- 
 minate modes of existence, already spoken of as the 
 matter of positive thought The special modes of exist- 
 ence are the special conditions under which it is known 
 and knowable by us. "To think is thus to condition," 
 because it is to know this or that object, and this or 
 that object in a particular mode or condition. To con- 
 dition is thus identical with determining, or thinking in 
 the form of determinate being. ^ 
 
 This twofold aspect of relativity as put by Hamilton 
 has been entirely misconceived by Mill and others. 
 Mill, indeed, recognises what may be regarded as one 
 phase of objective relativity — viz., 
 
 "that we only know anything by knowing it as distin- 
 guished from something else ; that all consciousness is of dif- 
 ference ; that two objects are the smallest number required 
 to constitute consciousness ; that a thing is only seen to be 
 what it is by contrast with what it is not. It is not in this 
 sense," he adds, " that the phrase— relativity of knowledge 
 —is ordinarily or intentionally used by Sir W. Hamilton." » 
 
 Mill is as far wrong in referring this law to Hobbes 
 ' See Logic^ L. V. * Examiiiatum, p. 6. 
 
 I 
 
 Subjective and Objective Relativity. 211 
 
 as its author, as he is in denying that it is ordinarily and 
 intentionally recognised by Hamilton. The distinction 
 of Subjective and Objective Eelativity is as old at least 
 as the time of Sextus Empiricus. Things are relative, 
 in the first place, inasmuch as they appear to a person 
 judging ; and they are relative in the second place, inas- 
 much as no object comes into the mind which is not 
 accompanied by some other with which it is necessar- 
 ily compared, and found like to or different from it* 
 Hamilton's doctrine of relativity might be taken as a 
 full, new, and explicit development of those two forms 
 of relation. 
 
 This latter principle, made specific, forms an essential 
 part of Hamilton's doctrine of Eelativity in its objective 
 aspect It is laid down by him as a condition of con- 
 sciousness itself— that of Contrast or Discrimination, and 
 shown by him to have a threefold application—viz., to 
 the difference of Self and I^ot-self— of the conscious 
 states from each other,— of the parts and qualities of the 
 outward worid.2 Difference in the object known is for 
 him a universal condition of knowledge. Hamilton 
 most certainly would not have thrown together the 
 several clauses purporting to express the same doctrine, 
 which Mill has done, as these may easily be shown to 
 mean several totally different things. And he would 
 have readily pointed out that two objects, in Mill's 
 sense, are not required to constitute plurality in the 
 object, but simply the object and its opposite concept 
 
 There is one other respect, and that an essential one, 
 in which Mill has misrepresented Hamilton's doctrine. 
 He speaks approvingly of the doctrine which 
 » Uypotyposes, L. I. c. xiv., §§ 135 et seq, 2 Metaphysics, L. XI. 
 
212 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 " holds the entire inaccessibility to our faculties of any other 
 knowledge or thing than that of the impressions which they 
 produce in our mental {sic) consciousness. This is a sub- 
 stantial doctrine of relativity." * 
 
 This — which may be named the doctrine of Imprcs- 
 sional Relativity — is the mode in which he habitually 
 interprets Hamilton's use of the expressions phcBiwmemnty 
 l)hcBtiomenal knowledge^ and relative knowledge. ^lill is 
 never able to see that these can mean anything but a 
 doctrine of impressions from incognisable objects on 
 what he calls the "mental" consciousness. This is 
 what, as a critic, he has no business to do. Hamilton 
 uses the expressions referred to in a totally different 
 sense from that which Mill would force upon them. 
 And further, Hamilton would most certainly have repu- 
 diated as illogical and contradictory this "substantial" 
 doctrine of relativity. He would have shown that the 
 inference from the impression to the unknown object is 
 bad on any view of the principle of causality — as wholly 
 transcending its sphere; as in fact assuming that this 
 principle can not only tell us that there is a cause of an 
 impression, but the nature of the cause itself, as at least 
 not an impression — the cause being at the same time con- 
 tradictorily pronounced absolutely incognisable. And he 
 would further have pointed out that this so-called rela- 
 tivity of knowledge is neither a primary nor an essential 
 relativity, as every fundamental doctrine on such a point 
 ought to be. It is not primary, for in supposing an ob- 
 ject to be known as the cause of impressions, it supposes 
 the prior relation of mind and object, and it supposes 
 also the fundamental categories of one and many, cause 
 
 1 Examination, c. ii. p. 13. 
 
 Kinds of Relativity. 
 
 213 
 
 and effect, &c. It is not essential to knowledge, for the 
 whole sphere of our knowledge of our conscious states, 
 is possible without it. We do not know the acts and 
 states of consciousness as impressions on the conscious- 
 ness from an incognisable object. We know these 
 directly — essentially. And such a theory of relativity, 
 if set up as the only one substantial and important, 
 •would leave the greater part of our knowledge untouched 
 and absolute. 
 
 But there is a further point in the doctrine : — 
 
 " All existence known by us is relative existence [exist- 
 ence under what may be called its objective relation — rela- 
 tion to the being beyond it.] . . . But it does not follow that 
 all relative existence is relative to us ; that all that can be 
 known even by a limited intelligence is actually cognisable 
 by us." 
 
 This leads to a more precise limitation of our knowledge. 
 " All we know is known only under the special condi- 
 tions of knowledge." Here relativity is divided into 
 two branches — 
 
 " 1°, The properties of existence are not necessarily, in 
 number, only as the number of our faculties of apprehending 
 them. 
 
 " 2°, The properties known are not to be held as known 
 in their native purity, and without addition or modification 
 from our organs of sense, or our capacities of intelligence." ^ 
 
 AVe have a certain number of susceptibilities and 
 faculties, organic and intellectual. These are "accom- 
 modated " in their nature or constitution to correspond- 
 ing objects, whether potencies or actual forms of being 
 in the universe. As is the number of those subjective 
 
 1 IletajahysicSf L. VIII, 
 
214 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Belativity and External Perception. 215 
 
 powers, so is the number of the objects known by us. 
 But possible modes of existence, — modes that may be 
 known by other more richly endowed intelligences than 
 we — even by us if our powers were increased in number, 
 — these we are not entitled to deny. We can conceive 
 them as possible — that is, as possible modes in relation 
 to a possible intelligence. We have, so to speak, the 
 scheme or framework of their reality ; but it is not filled 
 up — it is void of content. Against all this, on the 
 principles of the theory of relativity, nothing can be 
 said. The strongest passage^ implies a universe with 
 modes of being and knowledge possible to us, apart 
 altogether from our faculties of apprehension. It is 
 even said that if every eye to see, if every ear to hear, 
 were annihilated, that which could be seen, that which 
 could be heard, would still remain. The could he here 
 may be taken, however, simply as expressing a subsist- 
 ing potentiality — a power that would operate to seeing 
 and hearing, if the condition of the organic function 
 were supplied; otherwise what is phoenomenal, or the 
 object of a sense, must be regarded as existing, whether 
 we perceive it or not, exactly as we perceive it. And 
 this form of existence might, in a subordinate sense, be 
 considered as absolute — in existence as in knowledge, 
 the same to all human intelligence. Be this as it may, 
 the broad principle is clear that the variety of our 
 perceptions and sensations depends on the various poten- 
 cies, so to speak, in an objective universe — primarily 
 sundered from us — indifferent to us and our powers; 
 and only through our relationship to it, with properly 
 accommodated faculties, do we come to know aught. 
 
 1 Metaphyncs, L. VIII. 
 
 II 
 
 And on no other ground can the infinite variety in the 
 matter or objects of our cognition be explained. Deduced 
 from the general abstract laws of intelligence it cannot 
 be ; any one quality a priori deducible from any other 
 is an equally vain doctrine. There is a parallelism 
 between the universe of objective being and of subjec- 
 tive knowledge ; this parallelism, this correlation, is the 
 first and last fact for us. 
 
 But besides the probable inadequacy in number of 
 our faculties to the possible modes of being, there is a 
 consideration of still greater importance : — 
 
 "What we know is not a simple relation apprehended 
 between the object known and the subject knowing, but 
 every knowledge is a sum made up of several elements ; and 
 the great business of philosophy is to analyse and discrim- 
 inate these elements, and to determine whence these con- 
 tributions have been derived." 
 
 Hamilton illustrates this by reference to external 
 perception. In this act the mind does not know the 
 external object " in immediate relation to itself, but 
 mediately in relation to the organs of sense." This is 
 the case universally in Sense-Perception. Further, the 
 object of perception " may make its impression on the 
 organ through an intervening medium." 
 
 " As the full object presented to the mind, in perception, 
 [sight] is an object compounded of the external object emit- 
 ting or reflecting light, t.c, modifying the external medium, — 
 of this external medium, — and of the living organ of sense, in 
 their mutual relation, — let us suppose, in the example I have 
 taken [perception of a book], that the full or adequate object 
 perceived is equal to twelve, and that this amount is made 
 up of three several parts,— of four, contributed by the book, 
 of four, contributed by all that intervenes between the book 
 
216 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 and the organ, and of four, contributed by the living organ 
 itself." 1 
 
 As in sense, so in every act of knowledge. AVe are 
 liable to be deceived by not distinguishing what is con- 
 tributed by the mind itself. 2 
 
 This reference to the composite character of the object 
 of External Perception is not to be taken as conflicting 
 with the doctrine of immediate perception or natural 
 realism, elsewhere so frequently inculcated by the writer. 
 Indeed, it harmonises thoroughly with the latest form 
 of his doctrine of Immediate Perception, as an appre- 
 hension in and through the organism of extension and 
 resistance. The total, full, or real object is here stated 
 to be a composite one, but this is the total object as 
 apprehended by the mind, — not the object merely, or 
 element of the object in immediate relation to the organ 
 of sense. This composite object of outward space, of 
 hodily affection, may be made up through different acts 
 of immediate apprehension or perception, — indeed is 
 confessedly so made up, ere it is presented as a whole 
 to the mind. And it seems to be the aim of the later 
 analysis by Hamilton of Perception to show this, and to 
 show how the total object is successively constituted. 
 But there is nothing in Hamilton's statements to show 
 that he regarded any quality or element of the non- 
 Ego as illusorily presented to us as a part of the Ego, 
 or vice versa. These elements are given together, but 
 they are capable of exact discrimination ; and this it 
 is the express aim of the philosophy of perception to 
 accomplish. 
 
 Hamilton's general principle, that existence is wider 
 
 1 Metaphysics, L. VIII. - PjUI. 
 
 Objections to Relativity. 
 
 21' 
 
 than our knowledge, has been assailed on the ground 
 that as subject implies object, there is no reality separ- 
 able from an intelligence which thinks. Inability to 
 conceive such an object, or existence, means inability to 
 conceive an abstraction. There is no absolute being in 
 the sense of being out of relation to thought. 
 
 Because subject implies object, object 7>er se, out of 
 relation to a conscious subject, is, it is argued, unreal 
 On the logical principle of correlation, the one term im- 
 plies the other in our thought A half means and implies 
 another half ; a centre implies a circumference ; the one 
 end of a stick implies the other. Thinking the one, we 
 must think the other; each is meaningless by itself. 
 But this is a purely analytic act of thought. It is a taut- 
 ology, and has no metaphysical import. It never touches 
 the question at issue as to whether the existence of the 
 object, as a matter of fact, is or is not suspended on the 
 consciousness of it by the knowing self or subject in any 
 given case. It may be quite true that if I know, I know 
 an object in contrast to me the subject knowing, and 
 that there is no object known by me at all unless as 
 object to me the subject. But the object may, for all 
 that, possess a permanent and potential existence, of such 
 a kind that it is capable of reappearing to me as a similar 
 object or phenomenon. The subject undoubtedly pos- 
 sesses such an existence ; for it is identical, and appears 
 in its identity amid the variety of objects ; and if the 
 argument were worth anything, it would be valid against 
 the existence of the subject per se as well The identity 
 of the self, and the permanence and uniformity in the 
 recurrence of the objects of experience, are utterly in- 
 compatible with the identity of the relation of conscious 
 
1' 
 
 218 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 subject and known object, or of knowledge with that of 
 existence. It leaves the relation itself ungrounded, and 
 it makes existence convertible with the actual fleetinjj 
 relations of subject and object. 
 
 But there is a confusion in a criticism of this sort 
 between relation to us as subject, or to our thought, and 
 relation to any subject or tliought. Although it were 
 proved that subject and object are inseparable, — that the 
 one always implies the other,— it does not follow that 
 the sphere of subject and object in reality is identical 
 with that of the Ego and non-Ego, or subject and object, 
 of human consciousness. Even admitting that being apart 
 from object to a subject is meaningless or unreal, it does 
 not follow that being is identical with the object to the 
 human or conscious subject. Consequently, there may 
 be being or object out of relation to every human con- 
 sciousness, and yet in relation to other knowers. This 
 would be the irrelative to us, and as such would be 
 incognisable, equally with the irrelative per se. So 
 far as the doctrine of Hamilton is concerned, it matters 
 nothing whether the irrelative be one allowed to be real, 
 as relative to others, or one denied to be real, so long as 
 it is the irrelative, incognisable, for us. But the implied 
 purport of the criticism is dogmatically and illegitimately 
 to assume that the relative is the real, and the relative 
 for us is the absolutely real 
 
 But further, because we can conceive no object out of 
 relation to a subject, it does not follow that this definite 
 or limited existence of object is the only existence, or is 
 convertible with all existence. Absolute in the sense of 
 irrelative being is not a contradiction in terms, — cannot 
 by us be pronounced to be so. What is not a contradic- 
 
 L\ 
 
 
 Objections to Belativity, 
 
 219 
 
 tion is possible, — possibly existent. It is the negation, 
 no doubt, of definite, limited, or known being ; but we 
 cannot say that existence out of all relation to a knower 
 is a contradiction, unless on the supposition that definite 
 or known being is the only being, or is all being. But 
 this is a simple petttio principiL We reason thus : 
 Known being is all being ; irrelative being is a contra- 
 diction of known (relative) being ; therefore there is no 
 absolute (irrelative) being. If this be not so, of what 
 else is irrelative being a contradiction % AVhat does its 
 affinnation contradict except the arbitrary limitation of 
 being to relative or known being in the first place? 
 And what kind of argument is this but a tautological 
 see-saw ? What if relative being ^^er se be itself incon- 
 ceivable ? What if we can but hold it as a portion of 
 what we must think — the definite side % Does not the 
 fact of relative or known being in our experience sug- 
 gest a surrounding of the unknown and unknowable, as 
 strictly for us at least irrelative ] Does not the very 
 insufficiency of the being we actually know necessarily 
 suggest to us not only the possibility but the fact of 
 transcendent being as a ground of this known and tem- 
 porary sphere ? If there be no sphere of the irrelative 
 or transcendent, what must follow but that experience is 
 God, — God as He is and as He must be, — the one being 
 the all, the all being the one ? 
 
 It may be added that Kant is entirely opposed to this 
 inference. He holds the object of the Idea of an Ego, 
 one, simple, indivisible, to be incapable of affirmation 
 on speculative grounds. It is not matter of intuition ; 
 it cannot be brought under any concept of the under- 
 standing ; it can only be speculatively inferred through 
 
220 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 a paralogism; yet he maintains that it is possible in 
 reality, and that it may admit of proof on other than 
 speculative grounds. The case is very much the same 
 with the Ideal of Reason, — God. Kant very pertinently 
 asks how any one can contest the objective reality of 
 those ideas, seeing there is no contradiction in them, and 
 he knows as little how to deny as we how to assert their 
 possibility.^ He thus perfectly recognises the principle 
 that mere inconceivability in no way implies non-exist- 
 ence, — that in fact existence is wider than conceivable 
 knowledge, that is, relative knowledge. This is really 
 all that Hamilton, in common with philosophers of the 
 most opposite schools, contends for. 
 
 But it has been alleged that to say that human know- 
 ledge is relative, or only of the phaenomenal, is to imply 
 a contradiction. We cannot say that our knowledge is 
 relative or phsenomenal unless we know that absolute or 
 something of which it is phaenomenal If we know 
 that knowledge is relative, we know that of which it is 
 a manifestation. Those who take this position obvi- 
 ously forget that precisely the same reasoning must 
 apply to the relation of Causality, if it applies at all to 
 the relation of Substance and Phsenomenon. A change 
 appears to me, — an apparent rise of a quality or thing 
 into being. Somehow, it matters nothing how, I am 
 led, even constrained, to think this change as but a new 
 form of something which went before it, and which has 
 been transmuted into it ; but as yet, and until science 
 comes to my aid, I do not know what. In other words, 
 I have asserted a cause, — the need for a cause ; but the 
 cause itself I do not as yet know. Is this a contradio 
 
 1 KritV:^ Hart., p. 486 } MuUer, vol. ii. p. 577. 
 
 Objections to Eelativity. 
 
 221 
 
 tory procedure, or an unreasonable procedure ? Am I 
 to be debarred from (synthetically) predicating a cause 
 of change % Am I to wait until I know the cause before 
 I can assert that the change is an efifect % Certainly, if 
 the argument be well founded on which I am debarred 
 from asserting a substance or ground of being for a given 
 quality, or for a change in a series of qualities. But it 
 is impossible that I can ever find the cause on such a 
 ridiculous position. If I cannot predicate, first of all, 
 the necessity of the unknown cause, I should never 
 move a step by science to seek the cause. 
 
 But we know well that the change of the present 
 moment is the product of a cause in a past time, though 
 we do not in the least know what that cause is. "VVe 
 know quite well that the light or the sound we see or 
 hear is the result of something beyond the immediate 
 sphere of sense, and yet have to wait for centuries ere 
 we know what that is, — whether a form of motion, and 
 what sort of motion. And here even the two relations 
 of cause and effect, and of substance and phenomenon, 
 may be shown to coincide. We might quite well trans- 
 late change or eff'ect into quality, and cause into active 
 substance. And we might speak with perfect propriety 
 of the effect being pha3nomenon, and a phaenomenon 
 of what is as yet unknown. Light is in a sense a 
 quality or phsenomenon of the ground or substance, 
 motion; it, as well as heat and sound, is phsenomenal 
 to us, in the first place, of being or substance which 
 we do not know, but which we happen in the course 
 of the ages to come to know. Yet we properly called 
 it phsenomenal, when we did not know that of which 
 it was phsenomenal And, consequently, what is true in 
 
222 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 any special instance is true in the last resort. Even if 
 the cause or substance of the sum of phaenomena known 
 by us were found to be incognisable, we might stiU 
 with perfect reason hold that it is the phsenomenon 
 or effect of an unknown reality. What is true of 
 cause is true of substance. I may still be entitled to 
 speak of substance, ultimate substance, as absolute, as 
 incognisable by me, and know that somehow it is — 
 that my knowledge is of its manifestations — even though 
 in itself it be wholly veiled from me. ^My knowledge, 
 taken as a whole, may ultimately be found so imperfect 
 as in itself to suggest the something beyond. This is 
 bound up with it, implied in it. This dim correlative 
 is enough to enable me to say that the fact is phaenom- 
 enal, relative alike to substance and cause. We have, 
 and can have, no concomitant or independent know- 
 ledge of the substance, which might enable us to deter- 
 mine what wo know as phsenomenaL It is enough if 
 the definite experience, the fact or sum of facts we know, 
 be unthinkable by us, per se, apart from a reference to 
 something which grounds and yet transcends it. With 
 this as a correlative, a necessary correlative, we are 
 yet perfectly entitled to say that our knowledge, our 
 definite or positive knowledge, is of the relative, and 
 only of the relative; while our faith, founded on the 
 conscious limitation of our knowledge, proclaims its im- 
 perfection, its inadequacy as the expression of aU reality. 
 
 223 
 
 'i 
 
 i 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OP THE LAWS OF KNOWLEDGE — HAMIL- 
 TON AND KANT — THE CONDITIONED AND THE UNCON- 
 DITIONED. 
 
 We may be allowed to have a knowledge of Time and 
 Space and Existence in Time and Space. We appre- 
 hend or know the present moment, the point or points 
 of space before us, the fact or phaenomenon in space, — 
 the extended object. We may, nay, must, raise cer- 
 tain questions regarding this knowledge. Is the point 
 of time which I know connected with a moment beyond 
 it ? Is it necessarily so connected 1 It would seem so. 
 This last kno\\Ti moment of time is obviously to my 
 thought dependent on a preceding moment. The pre- 
 sent means the present as against the past. But this pre- 
 ceding moment in its turn depends on a further moment. 
 It matters not what be the object I think as filling the 
 moment of time ; as I think the moment in which it is, 
 I necessarily think this moment as itself dependent on 
 a still previous one. The question arises. How far can 
 I go back 1 How far can I go adding on to the pres- 
 ent moment — that is, making a regressive synthesis of 
 moments ] Here I have but two opposing alternatives, 
 
224 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 if I am to reach completeness in my regress. Either I 
 must be able to go backwards until I realise the infinite 
 regress of time, or until I find a point before which 
 there is no time — that is, an absolute commencement of 
 time. The former I cannot do, for this would imply the 
 infinite addition in thought of finite times, and such an 
 addition would itself require an eternity for its accom- 
 plishment^ On the other hand, I am able as little to 
 conceive or imagine an absolute commencement of time 
 — that is, a beginning beyond which time is conceived 
 as non-existent As well try to think without thought, 
 as seek to realise this. 
 
 What holds of time holds of space. It is impossi- 
 ble for us to represent to ourselves the immensity — 
 the boundlessness of space, or the absolute totality of 
 space, — space beyond which there is no space. All that 
 we reach in each case is the indefinite — that beyond which 
 we can always go — not, however, realising anything 
 but this possible indefinitude of movement. The in- 
 definite however expanded is always the finite. The 
 indefinite is merely the negation of the actual apprehen- 
 sion of limits ; the infinite is the negation of the possible 
 existence of limits. ^ We fail to reach the infinite in 
 quantity — that is, " the unconditionally unlimited ; " we 
 fail equally to reach the absolute in quantity — that is, 
 " the unconditionally limited." Our knowledge is thus 
 of the conditioned, and of the conditioned only. The 
 moment or point known is known as related to, depen- 
 dent upon, or conditioned by something else — some other 
 moment in time or point in space. 
 
 The same is true of the relations of cause and sub- 
 * Discitssions, p. 29. * Logic, L. VI. 
 
 The Unconditioned. 
 
 09 p; 
 
 \ 
 
 / 
 
 Stance. To take only the former. Wo start from a 
 given phenomenon in time— something that appears to 
 be. This leads us at once to think of a cause or form of 
 existence by and througli which it has arisen into appar- 
 ent being. Whence this cause in its turn, is the neces- 
 sary question. If it be necessary to put ih^ question in 
 the first instance, it is always necessary. Here, too, we 
 fall back upon an infinite regress of phicnomenal causes : 
 or we must arrive at a cause in the series which is not 
 Itself an eff"ect, an absolutely first cause of phenomena. 
 I3ut neither of these alternatives is conceivable by us. An 
 infinite regress of causes could be realised only in an in- 
 finite time; an absolute commencement is for us incon- 
 ceivable. We must tliink tlie phenomenon as exist- 
 mg— as existing relatively in time. Change is always 
 within existence ; there is previous existence implied in 
 change. There is thus always relation to being beyond. 
 Hence, as we are unable to realise either an absolute com- 
 mencement of time or an infinite non-commencement of 
 time, we can actually realise neitlier an infinite regress of 
 causes nor an absolutely first cause— a cause not itself 
 an effect Either of tliese would be a form of the un- 
 conditioned. In the case of the infinite regress of causes, 
 the unconditioned lies in the totality of the series, for 
 each of the members is conceived as conditioned or re- 
 lative ; in the ca^e of the absolute commencement, the 
 unconditioned is the first of the series, having no con- 
 dition before it, while it is the condition of all that 
 follows. 
 
 It should here be observed that Hamilton's position 
 regarding the ultimate impossibility of compassing the 
 totality of the conditions of time and space, the un- 
 
226 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 conditioned in eitlier, holds good, whether we regard 
 these as real in the sense of self-subsisting objects out- 
 side of us, or the relations of self-subsistmg objects, or 
 merely ideal forms of thought. It is sufficient for 
 his argument that time and space are at least quanti- 
 ties; and this they are, be they objective or merely 
 subjective. Even intensive quantity — degree* or power 
 — would form a basis for exactly the same argument, 
 whether it be regarded as material or purely spiritual. 
 So that Kant's professed solution of the first two cos- 
 mological antinomies, infinitude and finitude in time 
 and space, by supposing the phsenomenon in these to 
 be purely subjective, or non-existent out of us, in no 
 way affects the ground of Hamilton's general doctrine 
 as to our power of conceiving or knowing. 
 
 Further, it is sufficient for the doctrine of the condi- 
 tioned in its psychological application that existence in 
 any form be given, and what we think we necessarily 
 think as existing in some form. What we think about 
 must be thought to exist, and to exist in time, or in 
 tune and space. And this existence, whether objective 
 or subjective, we are unable to conceive either as abso- 
 lutely commencing, or as infinitely non-commencing. 
 Our capacity of thought is thus proved incompetent to 
 what we necessarily think about Existence, time, 
 space, are the indispensable conditions of actual thought; 
 and yet when we seek to run them back to the counter- 
 alternatives, in one or other of which we cannot but 
 admit they exist, we are unable, as even Kant himself 
 allows, positively to represent or conceive either.^ 
 
 By condition thus in thought, Hamilton means that 
 
 1 Compare Metaphysics, vol. ii., App. IL 
 
 Meanings of Condition. 
 
 227 
 
 without which thought cannot be, or an object cannot 
 be thought. In thought he would include intuition, or 
 perception of the individual, and conception or compre- 
 hension of the general and universal, — in fact, conscious- 
 ness in the sense of knowledge. Every object which 
 Ave think in this wide sense is known as the term of a 
 relation; it is object to the conscious subject or self. 
 This is the condition of being known. Every object is 
 also known or knowable as existing in certain necessary 
 relations ; the principal of these being that of sub- 
 stance and quality, time and space, or succession and 
 coexistence. These are the conditions of the object as 
 existent and knowable. In each there is difference, 
 plurality, relation. It should also be noted that condi- 
 tion is not synonymous with caiise. Condition is simply 
 that without which, on the one hand, an object is not 
 known, and, on the other, without which it is not 
 knowable by us. Cause, again, is at the least that by 
 and through which an object is, or is given in our expe- 
 rience, — " the power of effectuating a change." Hamil- 
 ton would certaiidy not have regarded the moments of 
 time taken in regress as causes of the moment from 
 which we start; or the coexisting points of space as 
 causes, much less mutually causative. These are simply 
 conditions, — conditions of each other. Kant himself 
 has not avoided this confusion of causality and succes- 
 sion in his solution of the third antinomy, — freedom 
 and necessary causation; and the fallacy frequently 
 recurs in contemporary neo-Kantian literature. But the 
 jpod hoc and the ;propter hoc stiU survive as incapable of 
 identification. 
 
 Our thought, then, is of the conditioned, and the con- 
 
228 
 
 Harailton. 
 
 ditioned only. Let us try to rise above tliis in regard 
 to time or space, the beginning of the world or series 
 of phsenomena, the component elements of the world, 
 the infinitely divisil)le or the aljsolutely indivisible, 
 natural causation and free causation, the contingent 
 or changeable in things and the necessary; we are 
 equally precluded from reaching the unconditioned in 
 any form. AVe have a series of opposing, even contra- 
 dictor)^ alternatives, the moment we seek to rise above 
 the finite, conditioned, or relative. Yet, in Hamilton's 
 view, wo are able to say that our intelligence is not 
 deceitful, — is not driven to the despair of scepticism. 
 It is weak, but not illusory. The problem of Hamilton 
 is to show how this is so, — whence these contradictory 
 alternatives rise, and how even on the principles of 
 human knowledge we are able and obliged to accept one 
 of the alternatives. 
 
 This, then, is the Conditioned for us. But Hamilton 
 distinguishes between " the conditioned " and " the con- 
 ditionally conditioned," " the relatively or conditionally 
 relative." The correlative phrases are the unconditioned, 
 and " the unconditionally conditioned," " the relative 
 absolutely, or infinitely." What precisely is the dis- 
 tinction between the conditioned and the conditionally 
 conditioned % The former is of course the mean between 
 either term of the unconditioned, absolute or infinite, 
 — the opposite or contradictory alike of the uncondi- 
 tionally limited, or absolute, and of the unconditionally 
 ludimited, or the infinite, — say of time as a whole, as 
 completed, and of time as never ending. The condi- 
 tionally conditioned is the opposite or contradictory of 
 the unconditioned of the conditioned. The conditioned 
 
 The ConditioTmlly Conditioned, 
 
 229 
 
 as thought always implies two terms, — a relative and 
 correlative — as before and after, here and there, sub- 
 ject and object, substance and pha?nomenon. The one 
 of these is conditioned by the other; subject condi- 
 tions object, object conditions subject, — so substance 
 and phienomenon. Let us now try to think one of these 
 per 86^ one out of relation to the other, and we cannot, 
 because we cannot think the uitfconditioned of the con- 
 ditioned. "VYe must, therefore, think the conditionally 
 conditioned. The unconditionally conditioned, or the 
 unconditional of the conditioned, would be either of 
 these terms thought per se. This is impossible, un- 
 thinkable. The unconditioned would be the uncondi- 
 tioned absolutely, or infinitely, — the genus of the abso- 
 lute or the infinite. The conditioned ^^er se would l)e 
 the relative, or the finite, in abstraction. But the 
 conditioned we know is a conditionally conditioned, that 
 is, it is a term relative to or conditioned by another 
 term, as object by subject, quality by substance. Each 
 is conditioned by the other; it is internally or condi- 
 tionally conditioned. 
 
 The Unconditioned is thus simply the highest ex- 
 pression for the common element in what is properly 
 absolute and infinite in thought, or as these can be 
 understood. In each there is an element that may be 
 named unconditioned — viz., in the absolute, uncon- 
 ditional limitation; in the infinite, unconditional non- 
 limitation — i.e. (absolute) completeness; (infinite) end- 
 lessness. The genus of the two, that which holds 
 their common element is thus the Unconditioned. No 
 l)roper objection can be made to this expression, as none 
 can be made to the Incomprehensible, the Contradictory, 
 
230 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 The Uiuonditioned Contradictory. 231 
 
 or the Fnknowable. All these mean simply a common 
 element ; and we are not to infer that this is either a 
 personification or an abstraction, supposed to he realisahlo 
 j>er se. It is an accurate way of stating this element. 
 Its realisation is, of course, subject to the ordinary con- 
 ditions under which any universal notion is actually 
 thought. 
 
 At this point there emerges the crucial distinction be- 
 tween the Unconditioned and the species, or Incondition- 
 ates which it contains— viz.. Absolute and Infinite. The 
 Unconditioned, as connoting the common element in the 
 absolute and infinite, signifies simply limitation regarded 
 as complete, or non-limitation as actual. But the Uncon- 
 ditioned has been taken to mean one notion, in which 
 arc actually united both those kinds of sub-sjiecies— 
 the complete and the endless. According to Hamil- 
 ton, the Unconditioned, regarded as the actually re- 
 alised genus or sum of the two inconditionates — the 
 Absolute and the Infinite — is not only an inconceiv- 
 able notion; it is a contradiction — a notion whicli 
 annihilates itself through a simple violation of the law 
 of non-contradiction. This notion or alleged notion of 
 the Unconditioned is, according to Hamilton, no notion 
 at all, but a pure and simple contradiction— the annihila- 
 tion of thought. We know what the terms mean, but 
 they not only baffle conception; their union destroys 
 a subject of predication at all. Each of the terms, or 
 inconditionates, supposed to be united under it, is sim- 
 ply, as irrelative, inconceivable. As such the object 
 shadowed out is not necessarily impossible in reality, or 
 non-existent The Absolute by itself is not a contra- 
 diction or self-contradiction ; the Infinite by itself is not 
 
 
 a contradiction or self-contradiction. Tlie inconceiv- 
 ableness of each does not preclude tlie possibility in 
 existence of each. But the alleged notion of the Un- 
 conditioned, or the attempt to combine in one thought 
 or to grasp the Unconditioned as one, does imply an 
 impossibility alike of thought and being. The Uncon- 
 ditioned regarded. as one, or thought as one, is neces- 
 sarily the union of contradictories. We have in it, for 
 example, the assertion of an absolute beginning and its 
 negation ; we have the assertion of an absolutely first 
 and of an infinite series. We have absolute and infinite 
 affirmed, — absolute limitation, infinite non -limitation. 
 We have contingency in things, and a necessary ground 
 of things as alternatives. These we cannot conceive as 
 one notion, or as one. Thus joined in their extension, 
 they are pure contradictories. They not only cannot bo 
 applied to one object of thought ; they simply, as thus 
 applied, annihilate the matter or object of thought. 
 The Unconditioned is thus, in Hamilton's view, "the 
 formally illegitimate, — a fasciculus of negations of the 
 Conditioned in its opposite extremes." We are able to 
 conceive the requisites of the Unconditioned as a notion ; 
 we know the meaning of the terms in which its postu- 
 lates are couched. But that is all. We know enough 
 to know that these postulates imply contradictions ; and 
 the attempt to fuse them results simply in the zero of 
 thought and knowledge. This, according to Hamilton, 
 has "no objective application" — no reality, because it 
 has "no subjective affirmation." It is a nullity in 
 thought, and therefore a nullity in existence. 
 
 " It affords no real knowledge, because it contains nothing 
 even conceivable ; and it is self-contradictory, because it is 
 
 I 
 
232 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 not a notion, either simple or positive, but only a fasciculus 
 of negations,— negations of the Conditioned in its opposite 
 l^\t^emes, and bound together merely by the aid of language 
 and their common character of incomprehensibility." ^ 
 
 The meaning here stands out perfectly clearly — viz., 
 that the Unconditioned is the contradictory. The incon- 
 ditionate, whether absolute or infinile, is not self-con- 
 tradictory, but simply irrelative and inconceivable. 'Jo 
 l>oint out this, which should not have needed to be 
 pointed out to any one assuming the position of a critic 
 of the system, is to answer the objections to it, founded 
 on misconception. One critic, after quoting this passage, 
 actually calls upon us to note this as 
 
 " tlie first and most fundamental of Sir W. Hamilton's argu- 
 ments, tliat our ideas of the Infinite and Absolute are ' only 
 a fasciculus of negations.' " * 
 
 The fundamental argument is nothing of the sort. There 
 is a double misrepresentation of Hamilton's statement 
 and argument iu this : (1) He is not speaking at all of 
 " our ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute," but of our 
 idea (alleged) of the Infinite and Absolute as one notion, 
 or of a supposed single conception of Infinite and Ab- 
 s<dute. Ho denies the unity or possible unity of any 
 such notion. And (2) he denies it on the ground that 
 the alleged notion is not only a fasciculus of negations 
 but of contradictions, and that accordingly it is psycho- 
 logically unreal, a mere delusion. 
 
 Cut the climax of misconception is still to be realised. 
 
 ' Ditcussions, p. 17. 
 
 « Mill's Examination, p. 38 (1st ed.) In the 4th ed., p. 53, the 
 sentence runs, "are purely negative, and the Unconditioned which 
 combines the two, a fasciculus of negations." 
 
 MUVs Criticism. 
 
 233 
 
 " If we are told," Mill says, " that there is some one Being 
 who is or which is The Absolute, — not something absolute, 
 but the absolute itself, — the proposition can be understood 
 in no other sense than that the supposed Being possesses in 
 absolute completeness all predicates : is absolutely good and 
 absolutely bad ; absolutely wise and absolutely stupid ; and 
 so forth. The conception of such a being — I will not say of 
 such a God — is worse than a fasciculus of negations, — it is 
 a fjisciculus of contradictions ; and our author might have 
 spared himself the trouble of proving a thing to be unknow- 
 able, which cannot be spoken of but in words, implying the 
 impossibility of its existence." * 
 
 Clearly here " The Absolute " of the critic is meant to 
 stand for " The Unconditioned " of Hamilton. And this 
 latter is the object of criticism. But would not any one 
 reading this suppose that Hamilton had only alleged 
 the Unconditioned, or the Absolute thus used for it, to 
 be "a fasciculus of negations;" that he had not declared 
 it to be " a fasciculus of contradictions ;" and that he had 
 on other grounds than that it is a fasciculus of contradic- 
 tions sought " to prove " it unknowaljle 1 That certainly 
 is the impression conveyed by the critic, and apparently 
 sought to be conveyed; but it is false in every partic- 
 ular. Hamilton, as we have seen, expressly repudiated 
 the Unconditioned or the Absolute, on the ground that 
 when properly analysed it is a fasciculus of the nega- 
 tions of the conditioned in its opposite extremes, — that 
 it is self-contradictory, and formally illegitimate. He 
 gives and requires no further proof that there is any 
 being corresponding to such a notion. The notion itself 
 is psychologically null. 
 
 It ought further to be observed that there can be no 
 
 1 Mill's Examination, p. 59. 
 
234 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 greater mistake than to identify Hamilton's incondi- 
 tionates with Kant's nonmenon. The latter is supposed 
 to be of a wholly different nature from the ol)ject of 
 experience, — the phcTnomenon. It is incognisablft, as 
 existhig in and by itself, without any relation to us, 
 or our knowledge, — incapable, in fact, of predication 
 on our part. But the inconditionate, — say an infinite 
 regress of time or phaenomena in time — an absolute 
 coinmencement of time or of existence in time, — this is 
 not an object of a wholly different kind from our phaj- 
 nomenal eX'perience. AVe know time and we know 
 phaenomena in time, and what we are supposed to do 
 in the infinite regress of unconditioned commencement 
 of these is to carry out a definite concept of things in 
 experience beyond all oar actual experience, — nay, all 
 our possible experience. It is, in fact, to seek to extend 
 our knowledge of the actual to a point where there is no 
 experience, but still to connect this knowledge with our 
 actual experience, so as to make up, as it were, the whole 
 of it. In tnith, the inconditionates of Hamilton come 
 very near in character the antinomies of Kant, — the 
 pairs of so-called contradictory Ideas in regard to origin 
 in time, limit in space, freedom and causality, contingent 
 and necessary being; while the treatment of them, or 
 solution of the contradiction, is very different in the two 
 cases. 
 
 An accurate reading of Hamilton's doctrine might 
 thus have saved him from the charge of " creating " first 
 of all " a fictitious logical entity," — an absolute reality, 
 unconditioned, unqualified, existing in and for itself, in- 
 dependently of any mind to know it, and then with say- 
 ing that consciousness is impotent, or has an inherent 
 
 The Irrelative not Meaningless. 
 
 235 
 
 inability to think this fiction. This is neither accurate 
 nor fair. There is nothing in Hamilton's statements or 
 reasonings to justify this. No such " fictitious logical 
 entity " was created by Hamilton. But this fiction or 
 fictitious logical entity was (as it is now, in a covert 
 form) the basis of philosophical theory, and of very 
 pretentious philosophical theory, when Hamilton took up 
 the question of the Unconditioned ; and what he did was 
 not to create a fiction, but to show what was supposed 
 to be a reality, and the ultimate reality of things to be 
 either contradictory, and thus a fiction, or one of two 
 inconceivable, because irrelative alternatives. Hamilton 
 tore off the cover from the fiction and revealed it to philo- 
 sophical analysis. To state the matter otherwise is simply 
 to reverse the work of his philosophy. It is odd to find 
 a man represented as creating what he abolished as an 
 object of thought at all, and thus an impossible object of 
 being. 
 
 This is the result of Hamilton's analysis of " the Un- 
 conditioned." But while this is so, he would certainly 
 have objected to the further criticism that the irrelative 
 or inconditionate as inconceivable by us is meaningless, 
 and can therefore have nothing corresponding to it in 
 existence. The irrelative is not meaningless thoudi 
 inconceivable, any more than the terms of the contra- 
 dictory are meaningless. We know what a wholly self- 
 limited being would mean, as we know what an infin- 
 itely non-limited being would mean. And we have no 
 right whatever to deny the possibility of the existence 
 of either of these as objects. This would be to dogma- 
 tise beyond knowledge, or to assume the convertibility 
 of actual knowledge and existence. It is only of the 
 
236 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 contradictory that we can predicate absolute non-exist- 
 ence, because it is self-annihilating in thought. The 
 irrelative, though transcending relative knowledge, is at 
 the same time its necessary complement. It is further 
 forgotten that if on the ground of the meaninglessness 
 of the irrelative, no predicate is possible regarding it, 
 non-existence itself is impossible. The proper position 
 is non-determination, or saying nothing about it. 
 
 It is the merit of Hamilton that he analysed the 
 question of the unconditioned, and showed the inherent 
 absurdity of one prevailing sense of it, while he pointed 
 out the real possibilities in the case. His inconditionates 
 are simijly the forms under which we must put the 
 (juestions as to the origin of the world, as to moral 
 freedom, and GoiL They are further the exclusively 
 opposite forms, and it may be (piite possible to deter- 
 mine one or other as a fact, though not possible to do 
 so on purely speculative grounds. Hamilton has shown 
 liimself no enemy to insight; but his dialectic is the 
 mortal foe of non-sense. 
 
 Mill, as we have seen, misconceives Hamilton's funda- 
 mental position regarding the unconditioned. His at- 
 tempt to break down the law of the conditioned itself is a 
 signal failure. Mill imagines that by substituting what 
 lie calls " a concrete reality," or " a something " for the 
 abstraction, the unconditioned, Hamilton's reasoning for 
 the inconceivability of either absolute or infinite breaks 
 down.i He has at length got to admit that the uncon- 
 ditioned as representing one being is self-contradictory, 
 as Hamilton had shown it to be. 
 
 The gist of Mill's argument is, that " we know the 
 
 ^ Ejcaminaticm, p. 61. 
 
 The Infinite and Indefinite. 
 
 237 
 
 infinite [in the concrete or something infuiite] as 
 greater than anything finite, and this is not to know it 
 as finite."^ What precisely does this mean ? Does the 
 phrase mean that we can actually conceive — at once 
 think and imagine the infinite in any form — as of time, 
 space, degree — as greater than anything finite? This is 
 simply the point in dispute. What Hamilton alleges is 
 that we cannot in any way know or represent to our- 
 selves such an object of thought. A\^e know the require- 
 ments of the conception, but we cannot realise it. A 
 space greater than any finite space, actually conceived 
 by us, is what is denied as a possilnlity ; and space con- 
 ceived as greater than the finite space of a given act or 
 attempt in this or that moment, is not the infinite at all, 
 but the indefinite. Is it meant that we believe space 
 or time, the infinite in any form, as transcending what 
 we actually conceive, or transcending the finite of any 
 given knowledge? This is admitted, but a belief that in 
 the utmost stretch of finite thought we do not exhaust 
 or compass the infinity of the object thought, is an ex- 
 traordinary proof that we do know this infinity. And 
 what is the phrase really but a statement that the greater 
 than anything finite is the infinite 1 But this is not the 
 infinite at all. This is nothing positively realised as 
 utterly or actually unlimited. This only means that 
 wdien we have got the length of any the utmost finite, 
 thoro is still always something stretching outwanls, 
 al)ove, and beyond it, whatever be the malter, be it time, 
 S])ace, degree — in which we seek to reahse the unlimited. 
 Uliis, of course, is the mere indefinite. Supposing that 
 we had compassed the utmost finitude, this would sim2% 
 
 1 Examination, p. 62. 
 
238 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 be tlie absolutely complete, or the absolute in whatever 
 form. This, again, is what Hamilton denies, and pro- 
 perly denies, in regard to all quantity, time, space, or 
 degree. But to know that there is a greater, an indefin- 
 itely greater, than anything we reach, is simply to say 
 that any quantum we can compass is not equal to all 
 the compassable. The infinite is simply confused with 
 the possibility of indefinite progress, and this, as Ham- 
 ilton points out, is not compassable to infinity, unless 
 on the condition of thought working always, — always 
 tlirough infinite time 
 
 Historically, Hamilton's theory of the conditioned 
 connected itself directly with that portion of the criti- 
 cism of Kant in which he dealt with the Ideas of the 
 lieason. Through this Hamilton's criticism was directed 
 to the whole subsequent positions of Absolutism in Ger- 
 many and in France. If liis positions be well founded, 
 the assumptions and the methods of Fichtc, Schelling, 
 Hegel, and Cousin, are bad intellectually, as they are 
 contradicted morally and theologically, on grounds as 
 ultimate as anything alleged for them can be. 
 
 Kant holds that " the Idea " of Eeason is more than 
 a mere negation of tlie conditioned; it is positively 
 thought, although intuition gives us no object corres- 
 ponding to it, and although it cannot be conceived by the 
 understanding, being above this, — in fact, merely a logical 
 tendency to systematise what is actually conceivable. 
 He holds further that " the Idea " gives us no real know- 
 ledge, — that it is a necessary and inevitable source of 
 illusion, at the same time that the critical method is 
 able to show how the illusion has arisen ; and while un- 
 able to destroy the fact of the illusion, can yet guard us 
 
 Kant's Antinomies. 
 
 239 
 
 against being deceived by it. In the case of the Idea 
 of the " Ego " as one, simple, indivisible, existing really 
 anywhere, or in our consciousness, as there more than 
 a merely logically indivisible synthetic act, he professes 
 to show that while Ileason necessarily leads to this as 
 a positive idea, it does so through a detectal^le paralo- 
 gism. We mistake in fact the mere universal form of 
 all consciousness of knowledge for us, for an "Ego" 
 subsisting in and through our consciousness, as really 
 one and indivisible, while we truly have no intuition 
 of this, even no concept of it. We mistake for "a real 
 self, as it exists by itself, a pluenomenon only given to 
 the sensibility of this to us unknown being." ^ The 
 critical method shows that reason naturally and neces- 
 sarily mocks us with "a transcendental illusion of 
 reality where there is no reality." 
 
 In regard to the cosmological ideas, these are truly 
 and absolutely contradictory antinomies. Yet they are 
 the legitimate product of Eeason. We have the posi- 
 tive thought (Idea) of a commencement of the world 
 in time, a first absolutely unconditioned, and we have 
 its contradictory in infinite non-commencement, or re- 
 gress of conditions. We have the contradictions of a 
 limited and unlimited world in space. We have equal 
 grounds for holding that the world is composed of 
 simple elements, and that it is not ; that there is a free 
 or unconditioned cause, a first cause, and that all is 
 under necessary causation; that there is a necessary 
 Being at the root of the Universe, and that there is 
 none, nothing but the order of things. 
 
 Each of these, thesis and antithesis, can be supported 
 1 Kritikf Hart., p. 373; MUUer, vol. ii. p. 427. 
 
240 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 by equally cogent reasons, from the very nature of 
 Reason, So far, then, as Reason is concerned, it is the 
 source of two sets of propositions regarding the highest 
 objects of knowledge which are mutually subversive. 
 A first cause, and no first cause ; a necessary being at 
 the root of the universe, and none such : these pro- 
 positions are each at least equally possible, equally 
 supix)rted, and hence Reason is self-contradictory and 
 discredited. Xo doubt Kant undertakes to show, in the 
 case of the two firet antinomies, how the illusion has 
 arisen : that we mistake phivnomena for things in them- 
 selves ; that Ave mistake categorised objects of perception, 
 which have no existence outside of us, for things tmly 
 existing outside of us; that we thus illegitimately apply to 
 them the contradictory predicates, (definitely) finite and 
 (definitely) infinite, whereas these have no true applica- 
 tion in the case. 1'he things to which we apply them 
 l>eing only subjective pluTnomena, our categorised im- 
 pressions or ailections, cannot be spoken of either as 
 finite or infinite. They have a quantity only in our 
 thought; and our thouglit never rises beyond the in- 
 definite, that is, we can never stay in the regress of 
 time at a pht^nomenon that does not imply another 
 phaenomenon (condition) beyond it; and we thus can 
 never reach, either in intuition or in conception, an 
 al>solutely first in the series. On the other hand, we 
 can never actually reach the infinite series, the uncon- 
 ditioned of infinity, and we mistake this necessity of 
 endless regress on our part for a real infinity. But all 
 that we actually reach is the indefinite, the finite and 
 the infinite being equally inapplicable to the regressive 
 tendency of our thought dealing with mere pha?nomena 
 
 \ 
 
 Kant and Hamilton. 
 
 241 
 
 of our own consciousness, constructed by ourselves, and 
 called objects of external intuition. This applies also 
 to the second antinomy. There is, in a word, no 
 real infinite regress to be grasped: all that exists is 
 what we constitute in thought or by our synthesis, and 
 this is merely an indefinite approximation to an ideal 
 goal. 
 
 The third antinomy is solved by the supposition of an 
 unconditioned or First cause, Free- Will, as noumenon, 
 and a natural necessary causality among phsenomena in 
 the world of experience. As the phaenomenal world is 
 really nothing, has no subsistence, real freedom is pos- 
 sible. There is a twofold causation at work, but only 
 one is real. 
 
 The fourth antinomy is solved much in the same way. 
 In time all is conditioned or determined by what went 
 before, but above time there may possibly exist a neces- 
 sary Being. There is necessary determination in time, 
 alongside Absolute or Unconditioned Being above it. 
 Here, too, there are two sorts of causes at work ; but, 
 as phsenomena exist only in consciousness, the infinite 
 regress is only in appearance, a law of thought, not of 
 things. The phtenomena may have a first imconditioned 
 cause, provided it be in the intelligible world, and exer- 
 cise only intelligible causality, which does not touch 
 time or space. 
 
 The Ideal of Reason, God, is treated as simply a per- 
 sonification ; and the proofs of His reality as an object 
 are, as is well known, summarily set aside by the critical 
 method. 
 
 Hamilton holds that his doctrine diff'ers from Kant's, 
 in that 
 
 P. — VI. ft 
 
242 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 " our faculties are sliown to Le weak, not deceitful. The 
 luind is not represented as conceiving two propositions, sub- 
 versive of each other, as et^ually possible ; but only as un- 
 able to understand as possible either of the two extremes ; 
 t)ne of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repug- 
 nance, it is compelled to recognise as true." ^ 
 
 What Kant regards as positive Ideas, clothing his 
 unaccomplished hypotheses in Platonic nomenclature, 
 Hamilton views as mere negations of the conceivable 
 or conditioned, and, therefore, as incapable of gi-ound- 
 ing contradictory propositions equally possible, or being 
 supported by two contradictory trains of reasoning 
 equally valid. He holds that we are only unable to 
 understand as possible either of the extremes, one of 
 which, on the ground of their mutual rej^ugnance, we 
 are compelled to "recognise as true."^ Qiu* faculties 
 are weak, not deceitful. He thus avoids the obligation 
 of solving the contradictions involved in an actual 
 thought of the Unconditioned, or Infinite, or Absolute. 
 The Unconditioned is not a positive thought at all, but 
 the negation simply of positive thought as Conditioned 
 or Relative. In it you transcend the positive sphere of 
 thought, and your " Ideas " are merely negations hypos- 
 tatised. 
 
 Hamilton has thus no need to have recourse to " trans- 
 cendental idealism," or the assertion of the entire sub- 
 jectivity of the perceived world, a piece of dogmatism 
 which is even incompatible with the critical method 
 itself. He has no need further to admit the contradic- 
 tories in the first two antinomies as valid, if the perceived 
 world in time or space, or any world in time or space, 
 
 1 Discussions, p. 15. s jn^i^ 
 
 The Critical Method. 
 
 243 
 
 be allowed to be self-subsisting. For Kant's solution 
 fails the moment you hold even an unperceived but 
 inferred substantial reality in time or space, different 
 from and beyond the subjective affection clothed in 
 category. It fails, in fact, to save Reason from absolute 
 contradiction on every recognised view of the external 
 world save his own, that is, save one view that has 
 neither jjsychology nor anything but an unanalysed 
 tradition in favour of its essential assumption. 
 
 The critical method professes to be different from the 
 dogmatical. How so? It professes to criticise the 
 proof of the Ideas, viz., an Ego, a real-Ego, anywhere in 
 the universe or in human consciousness, — a beginning, 
 an infinite regress, or a creator. It says, in result, we 
 cannot affirm any one of these things. Reason is para- 
 lysed ; there is a paralogism, or an annihilation through 
 contradictories, tlie cosmological antinomies. Is this 
 really different from dogmatism? In no way whatever. 
 The critical method proceeds on principles, and on an 
 alleged representation of the ultimate principles of human 
 reason. How otherwise can it correct the aberrations 
 of Reason 1 If its assumption of the ground principles 
 is coiTect, it is not merely critical, but absolute and dog- 
 matical If not, it is not even critical, or worthy of 
 being spoken of as validly critical or anything else. 
 The Reason, after the utmost that can be said for it 
 in the way of correcting, or opening, our eyes to the 
 necessary illusions wath which it mocks us, is still essen- 
 tially a faculty of illusion — in fact, of deceit. It is so 
 in regard to the highest possible objects of human intel- 
 ligence and interest, — Self, Liberty, and God. If there 
 "be essential contradiction inherent in the Reason in 
 
241 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 regard to any one of the forms of the Unconditioned, 
 c>ur whole intelligence is discredited, and the Practical 
 lieason cannot after that be regarded as trustworthy. 
 Hamilton's position, on the other hand, is that as irrel- 
 ative these objects cannot be positively thought, and 
 regarded as positive ideas in Reason ; while as contra- 
 dictorv extremes one or other must be held to be real. 
 AVliich of them is so, falls to be determined by consid- 
 erations drawn from our actual experience, intellectual 
 and moral. 
 
 T(j this it may be added that the doctrine at the root 
 of the whole theory of the Conditioned, of a conscious 
 self, really one, simple, identical, in and through the 
 succession of the facts of consciousness, is a wholly 
 different view from anything found in Kant. What 
 Kant demands as the ultimate a lyrlorl condition of 
 knowledge is a synthetic act of self- consciousness or 
 apperception ; and he clearly holds that we have no 
 grounds in this to assert an Ego, one, simple, indivisi- 
 ble anywhere in the universe, or even " in the think- 
 
 The " I " of Kant is but the factor 
 
 mg consciousness. 
 
 in a statiB of consciousness, logically one and indivis- 
 ible, but not capable of being regarded as really one 
 ami the same. In every representation there is an " I," 
 but it is not necessarily the same subsisting "I." All 
 that is demanded is an " I " logically or generically the 
 same in every succeeding act. This is the universal con- 
 dition of the possibility of knowledge. This synthetic 
 act can readily be shown to be a mere contradictory as- 
 sumption, — the assumption of an act without an agent, 
 — the assumption of unity in modification without a one 
 being modified, — a secondary and derivative abstraction 
 
 KanCs Bodriiu of the Ego, 
 
 245 
 
 from a fact of experience for which it is substituted, 
 and which it is adduced to discredit. Of course no one 
 need contend for a contentless Ego up in cloudland, 
 transcending all thought and consciousness, — a by itself 
 existing Ego, — and postulated as one and indivisible. 
 This is a mere chimera of a perverse and preposterous 
 abstraction. The Ego one and indivisible, for which we 
 need to contend, is the one Ego of our actual conscious- 
 ness, one amid its successive modifications or diff'erences. 
 This, I maintain, Kant does not give us, and cannot 
 consistently give us. He cannot get beyond mere ground- 
 less logical relation. He denies this Ego as an object 
 alike of intuition and conception; and in so doing he 
 saps the ground of every philosophy, his own structure 
 among the rest. 
 
 In this synthetic act, divorced from a personal Ego, — 
 from the Ego of consciousness, — reduced to a mere co- 
 factor in passing conscious modifications, and in the only 
 Ego, postulated as an Idea, being a transcendent object, 
 which is not known even to be "a thinking being," — 
 we see the germ of 8ul)sequent absolutist developments. 
 There is the suggestion of the " pure Ego " of Eichte, and 
 the "infinite Ego" of others, both empty abstractions 
 baptised as the true and only real, and credited with the 
 power of working out the universe. Matter, Mind, and 
 God, in defiance of all laws of intelligibility and fact. 
 Subsequent absolutism is a mere wheeling round of 
 Kantianism.^ Kant ends in vacuOy where consciousness 
 and knowledge perish; the system-mongers who have 
 followed him have conceived the sublime idea of com- 
 mencing where he ended. Kant thought he descried 
 
 ^ Kritik, Hart. : Midler ^ vol. ii. p. 329. 
 
DIG 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 247 
 
 from afar tlio land of tho unconditioned, as something 
 on the limits of real knowledge,— the little world of 
 sensation and its coherent requisites. In tins he was 
 comparatively cautious and harmless, though not illu- 
 minative. Others since his time have made tliis uncon- 
 ditioned the starting-point, even the all in all, of know- 
 ledge and reality,— with this among other resiUts, that 
 the passing generations of individuals are as "children 
 of the mist," baptised "the universal," out of which in 
 spectral forms they appear in time, and into which again 
 they disai)pear and are dissolved. But it is these systems 
 which will have their little day. Human experience 
 and human history have always proved too strong in the 
 end for contradictory paradox and abstraction. 
 
 
 CHAPTEE XT. 
 
 THE COXDITIOXED AXD THE UXCOXDITIOXEn — HAMILTON 
 AXD COUSIX — FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL. 
 
 There are other doctrines of the absolute more positive 
 than that of Kant, and we can now see how Hamilton 
 deals with theories alleging either a conception or a 
 knowledge of being called absolute or infinite, or the 
 absoluto-infinite. It is his pre-eminent merit to have 
 analysed those words ahsolute^ iv finite, unconditioned, 
 and to have shown precisely what they mean, and must 
 mean, either as representing one being, or as predicates 
 of being in any form. A knowledge of being, a concept 
 of being, called absolute or infinite, is alleged. Hamilton's 
 question at once emerges, — What precisely do you mean 
 by this so-called object of thoughts Is it a one, a 
 unit embodying both the inconditionates, the uncon- 
 ditional negation of limitation, the infinite, or the un- 
 conditional affirmation of limitation, the absolute — i.e., 
 the finished, perfected, completed — what is out of rela- 
 tion, — the simple contradictory of the infinite 1 This 
 would be named the absoluto-infinite. If there be a 
 concept of this, if there be a positive and real knowledge 
 of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and if the 
 
248 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Cousin^s Position. 
 
 249 
 
 terms Absolute, Infinite, Unconditioned, be employed 
 to denote this unit of existence, this Deity, if you 
 choose, then the upholder is bound to prove that his 
 
 "one corresponds, either with that Unconditioned which 
 we have distinguished as the absolute, or with that Uncon- 
 ditioned which we have distinguished as the Infinite, or 
 that it includes both, or that it excludes both." 
 
 Hamilton's charge against the upholders of this know- 
 ledge is that they have not done this, and have never 
 attempted to do it. And what he further urges is that 
 neither under the so-called concept of the uncondi- 
 tioned as the sum of absolute and infinite, as the fusion 
 of tlie two in their distinctive comprehension, nor 
 under either extreme, absolute or infinite, can they get 
 a positive concept or knowledge of existence as one. 
 The one alleged to be conceived or known cannot be 
 the identity of the two contradictory notions, absolute 
 and infinite, and it can as little be the exclusion 
 of both. These are the alternatives, the dilemmatic 
 disjunctions, which Hamilton presents to absolutism 
 in any form; and these are the positions ^vhich must 
 be assailed and abolished ere we can affirm that we have 
 a knowledge of being as one, of being in its all-com- 
 prehending unity, as the abolition and yet the absorj)- 
 tion of the duality or difierence actually found in our 
 experience. 
 
 2n^ow there are two ways of assailing those positions, 
 and but two ways. The one of these is represented by 
 Cousin, and by writers since his time, who unconsciously 
 adopt his line and method. The other mode is repre- 
 sented by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 
 
 AVhat, then, is Cousin's position? and how does he 
 
 
 vindicate it ? We shall take this first, not because it 
 was so historically, but because it is necessary to clear 
 the ground for the purely absolutist theories. Cou- 
 sin's position is simply this, that in our consciousness, 
 or ordinary conscious experience, under the laws of our 
 actual Understanding or Thought, we can not only con- 
 ceive, but know, and know immediately as an exist- 
 ing object, what is called, without precision, the infinite, 
 or absolute, or unconditioned being. 
 
 The first vice of this doctrine is the non-discrimina- 
 tion of the object, called absolute or infinite. It is not 
 identified either with the unconditioned proper, or with 
 either of its species, the inconditionates, absolute or 
 infinite. The former alternative would be a violation of 
 intelligibility itself, for the supposed object as a unity 
 of thought would be self-contradictory. 
 
 Secondly, the identification of this object either with 
 the absolute or the infinite is impossible under the laws 
 of consciousness, or intelligence in general. Cousin 
 liimself allows that "the condition of intelligence is 
 clifference ; and an act of knowledge is only possible 
 where there exists a plurality of terms." This Hamilton 
 holds to be true ; and hence he argues that it is both 
 incorrect and inconsistent for Cousin to hold the alleged 
 knowledge. Under such conditions there is neither a 
 knowledge nor a notion even of absolute being in any 
 form. This implies the negation of diff'erence and 
 plurality ; and we can know only as we distinguish our- 
 selves from the object in the act of knowledge, know, 
 therefore, only what is relative. The only immediate 
 result is a contradiction. For the absolute as known, 
 and the absolute as existing, are admitted to be one, 
 
250 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 identical. But the absolute, as known by an intelligenco 
 which always necessarily distinguishes itself from its 
 object, is different from the absolute whose essence is 
 unity. We have, then, the contradiction on such a 
 scheme of two objects, each called absolute. 
 
 Further, supposing that there is a distinction between 
 knowledge and existence, the absolute as known must 
 still bo known as absolute imitv. This is the condition 
 or hypothesis of its existence at alL As such, the so- 
 called absolute known must be identified either with the 
 subject knowing, the object known, or with the indiffer- 
 ence of both. As identified either with subject or with 
 object, it is contradistinguished from the object, or 
 from the subject ; it is no longer a unity, a one being, 
 but a simple relative. The third supposition, that the 
 absolute is identical with the neutrum or indiff'erence 
 of the subject and object of knowledge, abolishes the 
 admitted condition of intelligence which says that only 
 in this distinction of subject or object is knowledge 
 possible. Holding, in a word, the distinction of self 
 and not-self in knowledge, we cannot know, cannot 
 conceive, that all-comprehending unity named Absolute 
 Being. 
 
 Hamilton, it is hardly necessary to observe, meant by 
 the absolute being known under the condition of the 
 plurality of intelligence, that it could not be known as 
 the only thing, as the only being, all-comprehensive 
 of reality. For this condition of intelligence always 
 supposes the knower known along with it, and distin- 
 guished from it. There is always, therefore, something 
 out of the absolute or object known, and this is thus 
 never wholly or absolutely one — complete, perfect, fin- 
 
 Thc Absolute as One. 
 
 251 
 
 ished in itself, — an all-embracing unity. He had no 
 need whatever to contend for the utterly inept position, 
 as Mill supposes,^ that the absolute qua absolute is in 
 itself plural. Moreover, plurality in the absolute itself 
 is in no way inconsistent with its imity or oneness, as 
 comprehending all existence. The absolute, as soul, 
 might contain a plurality which did not imply outward 
 difference or distinction, or an Ego along with it and 
 contradistinguished from it. But Hamilton's argument 
 did not in the least require him to refer to this, nor does 
 he. He speaks only and correctly of the incompatibility 
 of absolute unity in knowledge, if subject and object 
 be always conceived as different existences, as two or 
 plural. If the knower and the known be necessarily 
 thought as different, the thought of wliat is absolutely 
 one, or a being absolutely one and all-comprehensive, 
 is impossible, inconceivable and unknowable. That is 
 the sum and point of his argument; and of this his 
 critic has not got a glimpse. 
 
 But there is another essential point in the doctrine of 
 Cousin. This is the link by which he seeks to connect 
 the absolute with the relative or conditioned. The 
 deduction of the relative from the absolute is an in- 
 soluble problem on any scheme of absolutism, be it 
 that of Fichte, Schelling, or HegeL But Cousin seeks 
 to bridge the gulf by identifying the absolute with a 
 certain relation, by, in fact, conditioning it, making 
 it a relative. He defines the absolute as an " absolute 
 cause — a cause which cannot but pass into act." This, 
 according to Hamilton, is suicidal. (1.) It defines by 
 relation and conditions that which can be only as exclu- 
 
 A Examination, p. 64. 
 
252 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 give of both. This is simply playing fast and loose with 
 words. What exists absolutely— that is, not under rela- 
 tion; total, self-complete, and what exists absolutely 
 as a cause — such as cannot but pass into act, — are con- 
 tradictory notions. This is to deny all relation j and to 
 affirm one in the same thing or object 
 
 (2.) What exists merely as a cause, exists merely for 
 the sake of something else. In this it reaches its per- 
 fection, its completeness. 
 
 (3.) What exists necessarily as a cause, is to that ex- 
 tent not all-sufficient to itself; and what exists abso- 
 lutely as a cause, exists in absolute dependence on the 
 effect for its reality. Such a cause exists only in its 
 effects. This is really a thing becommg, or seeking to 
 be, developing into reality. 
 
 But, (4.) this is to subject the Deity, identified with 
 the Absolute, to a necessity — a necessity of self-manifes- 
 tation identical with the creation of the universe, and to 
 subvert the fundamental postulate of a divine nature. 
 A Being existing only as it acts to produce what is ex- 
 ternal to itself, and necessarily so acts, is no God. This 
 is a limited, restricted being, in itself imperfect, not 
 even real, unless in its effect. 
 
 One of the worst of Mill's misconceptions of Hamilton 
 comes out here. He actually puts this question — 
 
 " Why is M. Cousin under an obligation to think that if 
 the absolute, or, to speak plainly, God, is only known to us 
 in the character of a cause, He must exist only as a cause \ " 
 
 This question would have had some relevancy if Cousin 
 had admitted his absolute or Deity to be or be known 
 as anything else than a cause, and a necessary one. This 
 
 Criticism of Cousin. 
 
 253 
 
 is the assumption which Hamilton challenged. As put 
 by Mill, it is an irrelevant question. The absolute 
 of Cousin — that which is all -being and one being — 
 is defined by him as that " which cannot but pass into 
 act," cannot but pass into the creation which is, and is 
 his manifestation. This is his essential nature, his being. 
 And thus, if the absolute, whatever it be called, be, as 
 Cousin says it is, only as it is cause, and cause of a 
 definite effect, this object exists only as cause and this 
 cause, and nothing more. The necessity of causation 
 under which Cousin places the object, identifies and 
 restricts it to the single manifestation or relationship. 
 It has no choice, no freedom, no reserve of power. 
 There is no personality with a free alternative. It must 
 act and be, exactly as it is, and only as it is. Creation 
 is a necessity, and God is the necessity of creation. He 
 is as He creates, and as He does create, nothing else or 
 other. An absolute and necessary cause is only as it 
 causes, and causes in one way. That is why Hamilton 
 says, this being, if God, must exist merely as a cause, and 
 thus as an imperfect, inchaotic, thing, — a becoming wait- 
 ing for its development and reality, — a thing that must 
 not only be what is, but must be everything that is. 
 
 Cousin's position, that of naming a particular relation 
 — ^viz., causality, the absolute, and regarding the cause 
 us necessarily determined to act, has been taken up again 
 in these times, with little or no apprehension of its 
 inconsequences, and its utter insufficiency to express the 
 nature of a Deity. Such a conception is in no proper 
 sense absolute and infinite, nor is it the absolute or the 
 infinite. It is simply a narrow and rigid limitation of 
 Power to a given definite issue, that which actually 
 
254 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Schcllitu/, 
 
 255 
 
 comes out of it, presumably our experience. Specula- 
 tively, this conception is imworthy of God ; morally, it 
 is destructive of a God altogether. For where there is 
 necessary determination to a given issue, there is nothing 
 infinite ; where there is no choice, not necessitating even 
 intelligence, there is nothing moral. This is simply 
 Fate ; and even if it be supposed conscious in the pro- 
 cess, this would not elevate it, but reveal to itself its 
 own limitation and degradation. 
 
 And what is more and worse, this absolute cause 
 imder an absolute necessity of manifestation, a neces- 
 sity M'hich extends over its whole nature, must issue in 
 another absolute, as full and complete a form of being 
 as itself; and then you have the contradiction of two 
 absolutes, the one the cause or author of the other, in 
 succession. Or if the former has not perished in the act 
 of creation, the two absolutes, forsooth, exist in correla- 
 tion. Fui'ther, if the resulting universe be regarded as 
 finite, the act of creation is also finite ; and God is not 
 thought as infinite. Or if the universe be held infinite, 
 it is the effect of a finite Creator, — an obvious contra- 
 diction. "What more is needed to show that we have 
 got beyond sense and intelligibility, and that all this 
 so-called rationalistic dogmatism is pure verbalism? 
 
 The lowest form of this theory is reached when we 
 have the infinite and finite set up, not simply as limit- 
 ing correlatives, but as existing, or real, each through 
 the other. Here each is only as, and if the other, 
 is; each depends for its reality on that of the other; 
 and the two vacuous entities in synthesis make the 
 real This hollow relationship, or relativity 2>^ «e, is 
 the infinite, or all we can get for it. This is the see-saw 
 
 theory of Being. The name is preserved, the reality 
 is gone; neither the one term baptised God, nor the 
 other baptised man, truly is. Tliis is worse than Cousin's 
 Absolute Cause ; for it sought to hold by a real cause 
 working to a real effect ; but this in mere illusory rela- 
 tionship sniks God in man, and man in God ; each may 
 be interpreted in terms of the other ; they have no dis- 
 tinctive reality whatever ; cannot be discriminated, and 
 cannot thus be known in any form of individuality 
 or personality. This is the absolute of relativity, the 
 mere mirage of realit}^, whether finite or infinite. 
 
 But this mode of reaching absolute existence repre- 
 sented by Cousin has been repudiated by the philosophers 
 of the purely absolutist type. They would admit the 
 force of the criticism, which excludes the knowledge of 
 it from reflective consciousness, and yet maintaui that 
 it is cognisable, if not conceivable. This, in Hamilton's 
 view, is Schelling's position, and it is vu'tually the posi- 
 tion of Fichte and HegeL Schelling's doctrine is the 
 one specially selected by Hamilton for criticism. 
 
 "Schelling holds that there is a capacity of knowledge 
 above consciousness, and higher than the understanding, and 
 this knowledge is competent to human reason as identical 
 with the Absolute itself. In this act of knowledge— which, 
 after Fichte, he calls the Intellectual Intuition — there exists 
 no distinction of subject and object, — no contrast of know- 
 ledge and existence ; all difference is lost in mere difference, 
 all plurality in simple unity. The intuition itself— Reason 
 and the Absolute— are identified. The Absolute exists only as 
 known by Reason ; and Reason knows oiJy as being itself 
 the Absolute." i 
 
 To this Hamilton objects — first, that the so-called 
 
 1 Discussions, p. 20. 
 
256 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 absolute is an abstraction or point of indiiference reached 
 by annihilating the subject and object of consciousness 
 alike. It is not absolute existence, but absolute priva- 
 tion. Secondly, that by no process possible to intelligence 
 can relative or conditioned being be shown to be evolved 
 from this absolute being or stage of indifference. It is 
 impossible to connect the state of intuition or clairvoy- 
 ance above consciousness with the state of consciousness 
 itself, by memory. And the philosopher, while personal 
 and conscious, writing or speaking of this absolute above 
 personal individuality and consciousness, deals only with 
 empty words. ^ 
 
 Here it should be observed that Hamilton's criticism 
 of Schelling does not necessarily suppose the truth of 
 his own pecidiar doctrine of the Conditioned, or theory 
 of the derivation of the laws of Relative Knowledge. 
 All that he proceeds upon is the universal principle of a 
 Self and not-Self, or subject and object, in knowledge. 
 It is indifferent to his criticism of Absolutism, whether 
 the principle be a positive law of thought, or one derived 
 from the impossibility of thinking either subject per so 
 or object ^jcr se. If the law be admitted, whatever its 
 grounds, the criticism of Schelling's position is vahd. 
 
 This duaUsm of Hamilton excludes the possibility of 
 any absolute doctrine whatever as matter of thought. 
 With Fichte he has not dealt expressly or at length. 
 But the application is obvious. Fichte^s absolute Ego, 
 which is above our consciousness, and therefore tran- 
 scends the distinction of an Ego and non-Ego, is for 
 Hamilton unthinkable. No mere or pure Ego, that is, 
 something which is neither Ego nor non-Ego, yet capable 
 
 1 Discussions, pp. 22, 23, 
 
 Hegel. 
 
 257 
 
 of developing into both, can be regarded as matter of 
 thought in any form. Abstraction being made of the 
 Ego and non-Ego of consciousness, the residuum called 
 the Absolute is simply zero, a void term, and can form 
 the ground of no reasonable philosopliical theory within 
 the sphere of consciousness. 
 
 The same line of criticism applies to Hegel. It is 
 obvious that if conscious thought be possible only under 
 the conditions of plurality and difference, and a Self and 
 a not-Self, as contrasted yet independent relatives in the 
 very moment of the contrast, any conception such as 
 that called Pure Being or Pure Thought or Idea in its 
 potential form is utterly incognisable. Belation and dif- 
 ference, in object and act of knowledge alike, have dis- 
 appeared ; and the residuum as incognisable, is incapable 
 of forming the basis of any dialectical movement, imma- 
 nent or other. This pure or unconditioned being is as 
 such the undifferenced. There is therefore no discrimina- 
 tion of self and object ; they are as yet one, or rather there 
 is neither the one nor the other ; yet this is thought or 
 knowledge. Xow no such thought or knowledge is pos- 
 sible to our consciousness. There cannot be a state of 
 conscious thought or knowledge in which I am as against 
 an object, and in which also I am not as against an 
 object. No thought of mine can unite in one the per- 
 sonal and the impersonal, — can hold me in being, and 
 being that is not yet discriminated as me and not me. 
 There is here not a transcending of consciousness merely; 
 there is, in the very statement of the cognisability of the 
 object, a felo de se, — a suhversio principii, — as much as 
 in a doubt of the act of consciousness itself. Conscious- 
 ness, thought, knowledge, have ceased to have meaning 
 
 P.— VI. R 
 
258 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 for us the moment the relation of contrast between Self 
 ami not-Self, subject and object, has been obliterated or 
 abstracted from. Ko method of dialectical verbalism can 
 ever on such a })asis restore consciousness to itself. 
 
 The deduction of certain of the necessary laws of 
 thought, — esj^ecially Causality and Substance, — from the 
 doctrine of tlie Conditioned is an important point in the 
 philosophy of Hamilton. He holds that the necessity 
 we are under of thinking every jihsenomenon we appre- 
 hend as tlie quality of something out of relation, and 
 as such absolute and imknowable, — the known pha3- 
 nomenon of an unknown substance, — arises on the one 
 hand from an impotency on our part to think mere sub- 
 stance, substance j>er se^ — that is, irrelative being; and 
 on the other, from an impotency to think a pha^nomenon 
 as such and nothing more — that is, the relative as abso- 
 lutely relative, — tlie relative per se. Try to think sub- 
 stance per se, and you cannot ; you at once and neces- 
 sarily clothe it in quality. Try to think phaenomenon 
 or quality per se, and you at once refer it to a substance 
 beyond and incognisal)le. Hence the law of Substance 
 and Accident or Phcienomenon.^ 
 
 The necessity of the Causal Judgment arises from a 
 similar impotency. We think what we think as exist- 
 ing, as existing in time, — therefore as relative in time. 
 The object or event appears to begin to be, but we can- 
 not think it absolutely beginning in time. In other 
 words, the quantum of existence which it has or mani- 
 fests is not an addition to the quantum of existence 
 already in the universe. This we cannot represent to 
 ourselves, either as increased without abstraction from 
 
 1 See especially ReicTs Works, pp. 934, 935. 
 
 aaai 
 
 Theory of Cause. 
 
 259 
 
 other entities, or as diminished without annexation to 
 them. "VYe are compelled to believe that the object — • 
 that is, the certain quale and quantum of being, whose 
 phaenomenal rise into existence we have witnessed — did 
 really exist, prior to this rise, under other forms. By 
 form must be understood any mode of existence conceiv- 
 able by us or not. But to say that a thing previously 
 existed under different forms, is to say that a thing had 
 causes.^ The universal necessity, accordingly, of which 
 we are conscious, to think causes for every event arises 
 from our inability to realise in thought an al^solute com- 
 mencement of being. 
 
 This theory of the origin of substance and cause opens 
 up a wide field of discussion, upon which I cannot now 
 enter. It seems to me to be the least satisfactory por- 
 tion of the philosophy of Hamilton. The tendency of 
 the theory is to weaken the force of those laws, and thus 
 of the bonds which knit together our finite experience. 
 It may be (questioned whether the impotency on our part 
 to conceive an absolute commencement of being guar- 
 antees the necessity of the law of causality as an objec- 
 tive principle, or as more than a mere subjective neces- 
 sity on our part. Causality would thus cease to be a 
 necessary law of things. There would always be the 
 possibility of an absolute or uncaused commencement 
 as a fact. 
 
 Further, it may be questioned whether the converti- 
 bility of the quantum of existence in a given or phe- 
 nomenal form with that quantum previously existing, 
 whether known or not, is identical with the concept 
 of causality. " To say that a thing previously existed 
 1 See Discussions, pp. 620, 621. 
 
iJ60 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 under different forms, is to say that a thing had causea" 
 may be true ; but it does not quite say that the thing 
 WC18 cattsed. Tliere is here the condition of the new 
 event or pliasnomenon, — hardly its cause. We still re- 
 quire the ground or determining element in each actual 
 change. We still require to ask why was there a change 
 at all from the one form or quantum to the other ; even 
 why it was this change and not another. Even suppos- 
 ing that we could not conceive the existent arisuig from 
 the non-existent, while we perceive the existent arising ; 
 tliis would not give the explanation of the movement or 
 transmutation in the previously existent — that is, the 
 dynamic force implied in change. 
 
 We ought, however, hero to keep in mind that this is 
 a theory of the origin of those i>rinciples merely, prob- 
 ably an unsatisfactory one. It would l)e a mistake to 
 suppose that if this theory were shown to be untenable, 
 the doctrine of the nature of our knowledge as more 
 than relative would fall with it. On the contrary, all of 
 importance in the philosophy of Hamilton would still be 
 conserved. 
 
 261 
 
 CHAPTEE Xll. 
 
 INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY OR ONTOLOGY. 
 
 What, it may be asked, was the aim of Hamilton in 
 his theory of the Conditioned, as bearing on a philo- 
 sophical and rational theology ] 
 
 The aim, main and direct, of his criticism of the ab- 
 solute theories is to show, in the first place, that our 
 intelligence, call it Intuition or Eeason, cannot of itself, 
 or apart from experience, give us a knowledge either of 
 tlie existence or of the attributes of Deity. If it can, 
 he virtually reasons, the Deity must appear either in the 
 form of the unity of the absolute and infinite, or he 
 must appear in the form of the absolute (the wholly 
 limited, or wholly self-limited), or in that of the infinite, 
 the endlessly unlimited. But the former so-called con- 
 cept, the unconditioned proper, is a purely contradictory 
 concept, and can typify nothing real. And while each 
 of the latter concepts as simply irrelative is not in itself 
 contradictory, and its object, therefore, not necessarily 
 non-existent, it is yet impossible for mere reason or pure 
 thought, to say that Deity is the absolute, or the infinite, 
 — is to be referred to either category. All that it can say 
 is that, hypothetically, if he is, he must be either the one 
 
262 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 or the other, but cannot be both. Hamilton strongly 
 insists that the correlation of absolute with relative, 
 of infinite with finite, proves nothing as to the reality 
 of the absolute or infinite. As a correlative, neither is 
 necessarily more than a mere negation of relative or 
 finite. This con-elation, then, while essential in Eeason, 
 is no proof of the reality or existence of the object, 
 whether absolute or infinite. The correlation is satisfied 
 by pure or ideal negation. And this is all the length 
 reason can by itself go. Consequently, if we are to 
 identify Deity either with the absolute or the infinite, 
 this must be done on grounds other than those of pure 
 reason or pure thought. And what are these possible 
 grounds'? Hamilton would allege one, if not two, but 
 one first and principally. And this is Experience ; the 
 experience, first, which we liave of the insufficiency of 
 tlie conditioned, or of conditioned being as the whole of 
 the possible in reality. In thinking the relative, we 
 cannot think it by itself, we are driven from it and 
 beyond it. In thhiking the finite, we have a similar 
 experience. We are thus naturally insi)ired with a kind 
 of suggestion and belief in being, transcending what Ave 
 actually experience. 
 
 He would add to this that there are various modes of 
 thought in our actual experience which lead us outwards 
 and upwards to this transcendent reality, to a natural 
 faith in what we cannot by reason grasp. These in par- 
 ticidar are the concepts of Substance, Cause, Moral 
 Law. 
 
 There is, further, as Hamilton would admit, the pos- 
 sibility of the fact of a supernatural revelation or know- 
 ledge of Deity. This may be supposed to be indepen- 
 dent alike of Eeason and ordinary Experience. Hamil- 
 
 JTamilton^s Beal Aim, 
 
 263 
 
 ton very distinctly allows that this revelation supple- 
 ments our ordinary knowledge of Deity; though he 
 certainly would not admit anything to be properly a 
 revelation which could be shown to contradict any fun- 
 damental law of our consciousness, whether specidative 
 or moral. To represent him, however, as has been done, 
 as having for " his avowed aim, by demonstrating the 
 actual and essential weakness of human intelligence, to 
 lend new and exclusive authority to a supernatural reve- 
 lation, and to supersede reason by faitli, as the sole 
 organ of religious knowledge," — is utterly Avithout 
 ground. There is nothing in the scope of his reasoning, 
 nothing in his positive statement, to countenance such a 
 representation of his philosophy. Hamilton's primary 
 aim was that of vindicating the rights of our normal 
 intelligence against illegitimate pretensions to know- 
 ledge, which could end only in scepticism. To conceive 
 the " faith " of which Hamilton constantly speaks as 
 faitli in supernatural revelation is a mistake. He means 
 what indeed he says he means, philosophic faith — faith 
 in reality, Avhich transcends positive or relative know- 
 ledge, and Avhich is necessitated in his view by the 
 very limitation of positive knowledge itself. He cer- 
 tainly discountenances Reason or Pure Thought as an 
 organon of theology. He properly regards it as the 
 organon of a self-contradictory verbalism, and of empty 
 concepts. He held experience, especially of mind, 
 to be a ground for deciding alternatives in theology, 
 for setting the balance one way or other in favour of 
 opposite positions not otherwise determinable. But he 
 neither sought for any purpose to weaken our intelli- 
 gence, nor to exalt exclusively a supernatural revelation. 
 And Avith regard to the applications to theology of his 
 
264 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 principles sulxsequently made, Hamilton is not to he held 
 responsil)le further than for their logical consequences. 
 
 To enter upon the grounds on which Hamilton con- 
 ceived that we could f(jund inferences in regard to tran- 
 scendent being, or being beyond intuition and concept 
 proper, Avould be to discuss the last and highest depart- 
 ment of his philosoi)hy— viz., Inferential Psychology or 
 Ontology. This, however, my limits forbid. In the 
 foregoing pages I have necessarily, to some extent, anti- 
 cipated certain points in this department, especially the 
 principles of the inferences. On this, which might be 
 called the constructive side of the philosophy of Hamil- 
 ton, he cannot be said fully to have explained his views. 
 lUit the main principle of it may be stated as that of 
 -Analogy, or Inference through Analogy. On the ground 
 of what we find in experience and actual consciousness 
 only, can we rise to convictions regarding the nature of 
 mind, of the world, and of God. 
 
 In regard to the two first objects— mind and the 
 world— while he liolds the substance of each incognis- 
 able per sr, he virtually holds it to be relatively kno%\^able 
 through the specific qualities or manifestations. On this 
 point, however, he ought to have been more explicit, and 
 to have said that we know the two finite substances mind 
 and matter to be, and to be of different natures appropriate 
 to their manifestations. These are to be accepted as true 
 revelations of the subsisting nature of each,— whatever 
 mystery or incognisability may attach to an attempt to 
 penetrate further. Hamilton has numerous statements 
 which bear out this view. Indeed, in regard to mind, 
 there is a step further to be taken; for it is knoAvn 
 primarily as Ego or Self in its unity amid successive 
 states. 
 
 Mato^l Substance. 
 
 2G5 
 
 In regard to what may l)e called material substance — 
 that of the Kot-self in sensible exjjerience — his philo- 
 sophy affords a true light, if only it be carried a step 
 further than he left it. AVhile w^e need not hold the 
 sensible quality to be as we perceive it, out of and above 
 perception, we may, nay, must still hold the quantum 
 of being as a Xon-ego, which it represents to continue 
 in being. We cannot conceive this either increased or 
 diminished; we can conceive only change, transmuta- 
 tion. Therein thus we have the permanent, the sub- 
 stantial of the Kon-ego. It is the permanence of the 
 quantum of existence in the sensible universe. This is 
 what perishes not, only changes. This is all that Real- 
 ism need ask. It does not require permanency, above 
 perception, in the definite olgect of perception ; the per- 
 manent quantum in the matter is alone sufficient, sub- 
 sisting in potency, and capable of coming into correlation 
 with our organism and the fixed laws of our mental 
 powers. This is precisely what Hamilton has expressed 
 in his doctrine of the ultimate incompressibility of mat- 
 ter in space. 
 
 In respect to the existence and character of God, the 
 same principle holds good. These points are to be 
 reached by Analogy from our experience. A noumenal 
 entity called God in absolute abstraction from all rela- 
 tions is not the God we seek to infer or reach. It is, so 
 to speak, not a being unconditioned, but a being incon- 
 ditionate for which we inquire. He is the absolute 
 ])eing in free relation to the world and to mind. He 
 is related on the side of time and space to the things 
 therein, yet not as a link in the series, but as the ground 
 of the whole ; on the side of mind He is related to the 
 Ego and the contents of consciousness, — to intelligence, 
 
266 
 
 Ham ilton. 
 
 personality, freedom, morality, as their ultimate ground 
 and possibility. These reveal his truest nature for us 
 as the unconditioned cause. Even of this God, thus 
 defined, we have no intuition and no proper comprehen- 
 sion; but we have grounds fur believing Him to be, 
 and we know certain relations to the world and to con- 
 sciousness through which He reveals Himself. These 
 relations do not disclose Him in the fulness of His bemg : 
 as relations they are restrictive, and they are not possibly 
 even all the relations in which He might be manifested. 
 They give us an imperfect, partial, representative know- 
 ledge of God, but one which is true and sure, and while 
 capable of increase and sublimation, is incapable of being 
 contradicted in the course of time and development. 
 
 The main point of the question is — Does a state of 
 things exist in our experience such as is oidy possible 
 through the agency of a Divine cause or Deity 1 Lut 
 what is the notion of a Deity ] 
 
 It is not merely that of a first cause, or even an 
 omnipotent first cause, but intelligence and virtue in a 
 primary and omnipotent cause. To establish the i*eality 
 of such a Deity, we must show that intelligence stands 
 first in the absolute order of existence, and that the uni- 
 verse is governed by moral laws. But the analysis of 
 our experience gives us mind ; intelligence as a free 
 power, independent of matter and necessity, and thus a 
 spiritual and immaterial subject. In this we have the 
 condition of the proof of God. For Analogy entitles 
 us to infer that intelligence holds the same relative 
 supremacy in the universe which it liolds in us. There 
 is the priority of free creative intelligence. The law of 
 the ]Microcosm applies to the ^Macrocosm. 
 
 Again, as moral agents and the free subjects of a 
 
 Doctrine of Analogy. 
 
 267 
 
 moral order, we are connected with a supreme intelli- 
 gence by whom that order is established, sustained, and 
 regulated. It is thus supposed that the moral order of 
 our experience is necessarily connected with a tran- 
 scendental power and order. 
 
 The position as put by Hamilton needs considerable 
 supplement, especially in the Imks of inference. AVe 
 may indeed conceive an ideal intelligence first in thmgs, 
 and causative, as our own is, in strict analogy with our 
 experience. We may also conceive an ideal sphere of an 
 Intelligence free and moral, in accordance with the re- 
 quisites of our own. But do tliese actually exist 1 Are 
 they more than ideal conceptions] The knowledge of 
 them is only possible through analogy. If there be 
 nothing but brute matter in our experience, and no free- 
 dom, only mechanical necessity, clearly we cannot even 
 think, far less infer, intelligence and morality in a tran- 
 scendent sphere. But while there is thus a knowledge, 
 even a presumption through analog}^, the mode of infer- 
 ence requires to be more ex})licitly shown and stated, — 
 either in the way of a proof through causality, or as a 
 supplement to the imperfection of our experience, or as 
 the necessity of continuous realisation and development 
 of our moral nature. This, however, is clear, that Ham- 
 ilton is an agnostic only in the sense of denying and 
 exploding a ridiculous absolutism : and though, in the 
 process of inference, Hamilton leaves several links un- 
 supplied, there is yet no other opening into the super- 
 sensible, unless through Analogy. If we find not the 
 image of God in our own consciousness, we shall rise 
 neither to the belief nor to the knowledge that there 
 is a God, and a God for us. 
 
 I have not attempted to discuss the Logic of Hamil- 
 
268 
 
 Hamilton. 
 
 ton in this volume. There was not space to do it 
 justice. I can hut indicate the fact tliat until the time 
 of Hamilton logical study and learning was at a very- 
 low ebh in the Universities both of Scotland and En^^- 
 land. Whately's Elements (1826) was an improvement 
 on Aldrich, hut it was Hamilton who fresliened the faded 
 dialectic of Oxford. AVe liave to look to the writings 
 on Logic of Archbishop Thomson, Dean ISfansel, and the 
 late Professor Spalding of St Andrews, to appreciate the 
 new line of precision and scientific treatment of the sub- 
 ject which was due to Hamilton's discussion of Whately's 
 treatise in the Edinhurffh Review in 1833, and to his 
 subsequent logical expositions, fragmentary as these were. 
 Hamilton, in fact, has revolutionised the treatment of 
 the science of Logic in Britain. 
 
 The points requiring notice under the Logic are his 
 view of the science as one of formal relations, — his view 
 of the Laws of Thought, — of Concepts, embracing the 
 doctrine of Comprcliension and Extension, carried out to 
 Judgments an<l lleasonings,— his theory of Logical Judg- 
 ment, including tlie Quantification of the Predicate, with 
 its application to Syllogism,— his Unfigured Syllogism, 
 and his new canons. This wide subject must meanwhile 
 be left untouched. 
 
 BXD OF HAMILTON. 
 
 PUNTED BT WILUAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 
 
 MESSRS WM. BLACKWOOD & SONS' 
 
 NEW PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 This Day is Published. 
 
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