MASTER NEGA TIVE NO 92-80747-4 MICROFILMED 1992 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the . „ "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project Funded by the .TmnTi-c NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANTTTES Re nroductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia Universit}^ Libraiy reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. A VTHOR ESHER, REGINALD BALIOL BRETT TITLE: TO-DAY AND TO MORROW . . . PL A Cli: LONDON DA TIL 1910 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET Master Negative # Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record " ■ f i942 E335 Esher, Reginald Baliol Brett, 2d viscounty 1852- 1930* To-day and to-morrow, and other essays, by Viscount Esher ... London, J. Murray, 1910. 2 p. 1, vii-ix p., 1 I, 269, ilj p. 22^-. Reprinted in part from the Nineteenth century. Contents. — To-day and to-morrow. — The dynamic quality of a territo- rial force. — A problem in military education. — National strategy. — The study of modern history. — Queen Victoria's journals. — General Gordon. — Lord Roscbery and Mr. Pitt. — The ideals of the masses. — A lost leader. — Appendix: South African war commission. 1. Gt. Brit— Pol. & govt. 2. Gt. Brit.— Defenses. 3. Gr. Brit.— Hist.— Addresses, essays, lectures. i. Title. i |i Library of Congress w 13-2352 DA560.E8 . J. ti ll J ■ ■■ Restrictions on Use: TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA REDUCTION RATIO:__air_ FILM SrZE:_. IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA IIA IB IID DATE FILMED: 3i./s? /52.__ INITIALS Al^- HLMEDBY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS, INC WOODDRIDGE, CT ' ^ %. ^ ^ % .% o. c Association for Information and Image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 1 2 3 ii iiiiiii| i|l||i|l||i|l| mlii| I iiiii,iiiiimiijii,i TTT TTT 6 ilim 7 8 liiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiil T Inches 1 1.0 I.I 1.25 9 iiiliii 10 11 liiiiliiiiliiiiliii Jf 13.2 UO 1.4 TTT 12 13 14 15 mm lllllllllllUlllllllllllllllllll 25 2.2 2.0 8 1.6 T T Wi MfiNUFfiCTURED TO PIIM STfiNDfiRDS BY APPLIED IMfiGE. INC. 5*5. *^ <* «.'S -^A^ ^- h^Jrl :^^--i^ '-*V / • V .A-^ :^-" r=H S» ^^ /i 3^^-*^-* " ^SS M ftR > $mc :^ i}< 'Hm r-^irgiKK^.i- u ^B^BB H •.r.-. •.-•.-.• ml^ •J.'.-.-.:::'.: 1*^- '"♦^ Ji'^nf^ ^ LIBRARY I TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW AND OTHER ESSAYS TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW AND OTHER ESSAYS I i BY VISCOUNT ESHER G.C.B., G.C.V.O. LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1910 h ^ Or ^v? sO I ^1 -J2 PREFACE These papers, several of merely fugitive interest, are reprinted with no idea that they will add to the sum of human knowledge. It is pure vanity of authorship. They are gleaned from the work of many years, hastily performed amid the pressure of business. They seem to require this amount of apology. It was impossible to correct grave errors of style, without completely rewriting whole passages ; an amount of labour which did not appear to be warranted. The lecture on Queen Victoria was delivered at the Royal Institution, and again at the Mid- land Institute, Birmingham. As an attempt to comment upon the " Corres- pondence of the Queen," it lacks, I hope not insight, but fulness of detail. As it stands it may serve to stimulate curiosity about the un- pubUshed journals of the Queen's early years ; — curiosity which, by the gracious leave of His Majesty the King, may hereafter possibly be satisfied. vii VUl PREFACE The essay on General Gordon is the last tribute I can pay to the memory of the heroic and gentle nature of him who was my friend. I cannot pretend to agree with all the views expressed many years ago in the papers on Political and Imperial affairs. But I honestly believed every word of them when they were written, and I regret nothing which I have said. The "Note" from the South African War Report has been added as an Appendix, because it serves to explain those views upon the gradual evolution of our Army from a Pretorian Guard into a Nation in Arms, which I have done my best to farther, and hope to Uve to see accomplished. In the first of these Essays 1 ventured to suggest a reform in the antiquated and cumbrous financial procedure of the House of Commons. This suggestion when first published, ehcited from Mr Gibson Bowles, a master of the subject, two or three private letters full of such sound criticism that I cannot frankly hold to the plan which I had proposed. To the critical passages I rigidly adhere, but I abandon the constructive proposal, leaving the remedy to more experienced hands. I must thank the Editor of the NineteeJith \ PREFACE IX Century, who kindly gave me leave to reprint the papers which appeared in that magazine; and to my critical and sometimes hostile friend Mr Leo Maxse, I desire also to offer my best thanks for leave to print the first of these Essays and to appropriate the title of this volume. Feftruury 1910. CONTENTS I. TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW II. THE DYNAMIC QUALITY OF A TERRITORIAL FORCE ...... III. A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION IV. NATIONAL STRATEGY .... V. THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY . VI. QUEEN VICTORIA'S JOURNALS . VII. GENERAL GORDON .... VIII. LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT IX. THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES . X. A LOST LEADER APPENDIX . PAGE 1 18 35 60 81 115 162 184 220 237 263 n TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW, AND OTHER ESSAYS i|' ft TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW In this land the secrets of national defence cannot be resolved in Cabinets or Committees and then be locked away in the breasts of naval or military officers, or even in those of statesmen. Although Americans might deny it and French- men question it, Great Britain among the Great Powers of the world alone possesses a purely democratic form of government. Powers of sustained action and negation, such as are vested in the President or the Senate of the United States, have no place in our institutions. Our poUtical atmosphere, thanks to the practice of Parliament and to the power of the Press, is more rarefied than that of France. So that no scheme of national defence, however well planned, however ingeniously devised, could be for long concealed from the prying eyes of those who, by speaking and writing, direct that 1 A t TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW supreme authority with whom lies the responsi- bility for finding the practical means upon which all schemes of defence ultimately rest. This supreme authority is the enfranchised voter. Of this individual, well educated to-day, becoming better educated every day, all plans of defence, involving as they must moral and material sacrifice, are bound to have the approval, and to his reason they must appeal. It is upon this appeal that the voluntary system, as opposed to military conscription, is in truth based. So long as the reasons, for which large demands of flesh and blood and brain as well as material wealth are made, can clearly be brought home to a nation so that the people voluntarily respond and yield freely what the safety of the nation demands, the voluntary system is secure. But the moment that the response is withheld, and that either the men or the money necessary for the preservation of the State are not forthcoming, all history shows that, sometimes happily before, but more commonly after, disaster, the voluntary system is abandoned. Some may think that too much publicity is given to reflections and discussions of national defence, but in a real Democracy — to use a colloquial phrase — openness of speech is the sole method of enabling the supreme authority, the nation itself, to reason and to conclude. A few years back, the sahent historical deduction which THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE S accounts for the change in the destinies of Portugal, Spain and Holland as World-Powers, and the circumstances attending the struggles between France and Great Britain for dominion oversea, were known only to a few. Now they are the commonplaces of the secondary schools. Every young Briton reaUses, or should realise, the conditions under which this country lost an Empire and built up another, and he has been stimulated to consider for himself the conditions upon which this new and world-wide Empire can hold together. He knows that a century ago our grandfathers were locked in a deadly struggle with what is now a friendly people, for the possession of the vacant lands over which our people were destined to flow, thus open- ing up avenues of escape for his forbears, unimagined wealth for men and women of British blood, and creating markets for the manufactured goods upon which and upon which alone the material prosperity of this country finally depends. He sees clearly that a similar struggle may recur and that some other nation, now friendly, may be impelled, by forces too strong to be restrained, to wrest from us the commercial and Imperial dominion so hardly won. It follows that he should desire to be assured, and to assure himself, that sound and effective preparation has been made to meet a danger which our forefathers successfully 4 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW combated, and which we or our children may have again to face. No perfectly sane man ventures to question to-day the proposition that the Imperial safety and commercial prosperity of an island race such as ours are determined by command of the sea. This doctrine is our sole legacy from the Great Rebellion. From the time of the Common- wealth, we are told by the most suggestive of historical teachers, England's maxim was that she is not a military State, that she ought to have no army, or the smallest possible, but that her navy ought to be the strongest in the world. If Cromwell's Navigation Act laid the founda- tions of our commercial supremacy, the maritime power organised by Vane and wielded by Blake was the beginning of that sea-command which we have never so far rehnquished. A century later, when the war broke out with Spain, the navy of England was equal to the combined navies of France and Spain, and the "two- Power standard " at sea had been unconsciously established by statesmen whose policy of land war was confined to subsidies and alhances. If in the three wars between 1740-83 and in the Napoleonic wars which closed in 1814 the struggle with France for our commercial rights was decided in our favour, it was due to the prudence and courage of the ruhng classes of Englishmen in those days, who never shrank THE EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY 5 from the sacrifices which naval supremacy entails. The luminous American protagonist of the doctrine of Sea-power, writing twenty years ago, expressed grave doubt whether the Sea- power of Great Britain may not suffer from the passing of supreme authority into the hands of the *' people at large." Although its broad basis still remains in a great trade, large mechanical industries and an extensive colonial system, he thought it doubtful whether a democratic government would have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the willingness to ensure prosperity by adequate expenditure in peace, and he beheved that he already saw signs of England tending to drop behind. But the story of the past two decades shows him to have been mistaken, for perhaps at no time in all our history has greater keenness been displayed in Parliament and in the Press on naval questions, and during that period the annual charge for the fleets has almost doubled. During this period, however, a material change has occurred in the balance of naval power both in the eastern and western hemispheres. Twenty years ago, in the 'eighties, France appeared to be the only rival to Great Britain at Sea, and the centre of gravity of maritime power in Europe was still sought for in the A 2 4 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW combated, and which we or our children may have again to face. No perfectly sane man ventures to question to-day the proposition that the Imperial safety and commercial prosperity of an island race such as ours are determined by command of the sea. This doctrine is our sole legacy from the Great Rebellion. From the time of the Common- wealth, we are told by the most suggestive of historical teachers, England's maxim was that she is not a military State, that she ought to have no army, or the smallest possible, but that her navy ought to be the strongest in the worid. If Cromwell's Navigation Act laid the founda- tions of our commercial supremacy, the maritime power organised by Vane and wielded by Blake was the beginning of that sea-command which we have never so far relinquished. A century later, when the war broke out with Spain, the navy of England was equal to the combined navies of France and Spain, and the *' two- Power standard " at sea had been unconsciously established by statesmen whose policy of land war was confined to subsidies and alliances. If in the three wars between 1740-83 and in the Napoleonic wars which closed in 1814 the struggle with France for our commercial rights was decided in our favour, it was due to the prudence and courage of the ruhng classes of Englishmen in those days, who never shrank 1 THE EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY 5 from the sacrifices which naval supremacy entails. The luminous American protagonist of the doctrine of Sea-power, writing twenty years ago, expressed grave doubt whether the Sea- power of Great Britain may not suffer from the passing of supreme authority into the hands of the " people at large." Although its broad basis still remains in a great trade, large mechanical industries and an extensive colonial system, he thought it doubtful whether a democratic government would have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the wiUingness to ensure prosperity by adequate expenditure in peace, and he beheved that he already saw signs of England tending to drop behind. But the story of the past two decades shows him to have been mistaken, for perhaps at no time in all our history has greater keenness been displayed in Parhament and in the Press on naval questions, and during that period the annual charge for the fleets has almost doubled. During this period, however, a material change has occurred in the balance of naval power both in the eastern and western hemispheres. Twenty years ago, in the 'eighties, France appeared to be the only rival to Great Britain at Sea, and the centre of gravity of maritime power in Europe was still sought for in the A 2 i 6 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW Mediterranean. To-day it has shifted to the North Sea, while in the Pacific the naval power of England has yielded to the United States on the western Uttoral and to Japan in the Far East. Even ten years ago, on the eve of the South African War, the flag of England flew supreme over the oceans and seas of the world. To-day we have been forced to abandon our supremacy over the great waterway which separates Canada as well as the United States from the Far East. Although we may flatter ourselves with the pleasing thought that this abandonment is due to the Japanese AlHance on the one hand, and our blood relation to the United States on the other, it is due, in point of fact, to the rise of German sea-power. The centre of gravity of maritime power, owing partly to the weakness of the French and mainly to the enormous growth of the German fleet, has shifted from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. So rapid has been the acquisition of naval strength by Germany, and so formidable are her fleets in being and in preparation, that she has forced upon England a concentration which has thrown the control of the Pacific into other hands. Concurrently with this development of sea- power, Germany has shown a determination to compete with Great Britain for the carrying trade of the w^orld. Her mercantile marine. li GERMANY OUR RIVAL 7 both in efficiency, in attractiveness, and in freight charges, has become a serious rival to ours. The trade-routes of the world are covered with German shipping, and into every nook and corner of the civiUsed and half-civilised world German goods rapidly and surely are pushing their way. For two centuries we disputed with Spain, Holland, and France for the sea-borne commerce of the world. We are now face to face with another rival, more formidable in determination, in skill, and in commercial inteUigence than they. This rivalry may prove to be of a friendly character, but on one condition only, that condition being that we retain the undisputed command of the sea-approaches to our shores. Holland, wrote the greatest of Dutch statesmen, will never in time of peace take resolutions strong enough to lead to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. "The character of the Dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the face, they are indisposed to lay out money for their own defence. I have to do with a people who, Uberal to profusion when they ought to economise, are often sparing to avarice when they ought to spend." If an English statesman has ever to make a similar confession, our island people will only on sufferance continue to be free. Across the North Sea lies a nation already 8 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW sixty millions strong, with the most highly trained and formidable army ever known in history, a nation highly educated, unspoilt as yet by luxury, proud of its achievements, ambitious for its future and dependent for its further development upon finding outlets for a popula- tion growing and confined, and upon creating markets for its manufactures. A German states- man, or pubhcist, or merchant, looking abroad and ahead, sees in the immediate foreground — while Russia lies still in half-awakened torpor —the rivalry of England. Is there any Enghsh- man who, in their place, would not feel the same? This is not the language of fear or dislike or of unreasoning jealousy. The Germans are a proud people struggling for commercial development and determined to achieve their purpose. Like other commercial rivalry, the rivalry of nations requires a victim. They look to themselves and we have to look to ourselves. If we take advantage of our insular position, of our vast maritime seaboard, of our splendid maritime population, and of the incomparable uses which could be made of Greater Britain oversea, the position of England is commercially secure, and we need have no fear of Germany. The struggle with her will end as the struggle with Spain, with Holland and with France ended a century ago. But if the "people at large" prove to be faint-hearted in peace, like 1 THE TWOPOWER STANDARD 9 the countrymen of the great De Witt, the British Empire will share the fate of the Dutch, although England could hardly hope for that degree of immunity from absorption which so far Holland enjoys. If, then, it is recognised that command of the European seas is an inflexible condition of our national security — for it now appears to be useless to attach this condition to the Far Eastern ocean — how is this command to be maintained. The "two-Power standard" is a good phrase, but it is by no means easy to define and exemplify in materiel and in personnel, in ships and guns and men. It is far easier, far clearer, and infinitely more safe to adopt the simpler standard, and, avoiding "paper pro- grammes," for every ship which our great rival builds, to build two of equal strength. Let Germany force the pace, but let England win the race. That is a pregnant phrase and a plain policy, which every member of the British electorate can understand. Of any sound scheme of national or Imperial defence, naval supremacy based upon the simple proposition of two to one is the vital essence. Under modern conditions, situated as England is to-day, with her vast population dependent upon sea-borne supplies of food and raw material, with her solvency and existence bound up with her export and import trade, and the 10 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW NAVAL SUPREMACY 11 ocean-way her sole communication between Britons oversea, no supremacy based upon a lower standard of fleet-power than double that of her most powerful competitor can render her secure. As sea-power is distributed to-day, and so far as its distribution can be foreseen, this standard will give us in reality a two-Power standard — excepting always the United States — of so unmistakable a kind that no illusion either in our own minds or in the minds of others is possible. Thus far the majority of those who have given much attention to questions of defence are probably agreed. But the moment attention is directed to the con- dition of the fleet at any specific time, or its natural growth and expansion, wide diver- gence of opinion manifests itself. Some high authorities hold that the British fleet to-day is not only twice but four times as powerful as that of Imperial Germany. Other high authorities never tire of stating that the game is half lost, and that in the month of January 1912 we shall have parted with the command of the sea. The question therefore above all other questions vital to the electorate and to every British man and woman, whether resident in these islands or beyond them, is — whether the present Board of Admiralty, or any Board of Admiralty which may succeed it, fulfils the primary duty of its existence ; that primary duty being to ensure supremacy at sea not only to-day, and not only to-morrow, but on the day after to-morrow. Naval supremacy cannot be extemporised. It must be forecast and care- fully prepared. Up to comparatively recent times, until, in short, the methods by which the German Empire was evolved from the kingdom of Prussia were recognised in this country, but little account was taken by statesmen or even by professional sea and military officers of what has been called peace strategy. Even the Boer War found the nation wholly unprepared with any carefully considered plan to meet a con- tingency in which we might have had to carry on military operations against the united Dutch of South Africa, while threatened or attacked elsewhere by sea and land. Had any Great Power, or combination of Great Powers, inter- vened in March 1900, there can be little doubt that such intervention would have been resisted, and the army in South Africa cut off* from reinforcement and supply until the command of the sea had been secured. That the defence of these islands and the maintenance of our Imperial position require a Fleet of pre- ponderating strength is a proposition which for more than twenty years seems to have been realised by the nation, but what the people of this country never appear to grasp is that 1« TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW THE COST OF DEFENCE It national policy and national armament must keep in tune. At one moment they press for a lower scale of expenditure and for large reductions in the cost of the army and the navy. The next, they insist upon political or philanthropic action, which may land them in war with a nation which counts its armed men, not by thousands, but by millions. The maxim of the Commonwealth, that England was not a military State, that she ought to have no army, or the smallest possible, but that her navy ought to be the strongest in the world, was sound enough in the latter half of the seventeenth century, when her responsi- bilities and aims were wholly different. To-day by England we do not mean these islands in the western sea, but an England which is spread over the whole surface of the world. Our people, therefore, must inevitably decide, and the decision cannot be safely postponed, whether they mean to remain one nation, although broken up into different States, and whether they mean, both as States and as individuals, to take their full share of all the burdens of national defence. Australians have already shown signs that they recognise the obliga- tion and are not unready to meet it. But our own people, the forty millions inhabiting these islands, with older traditions and wider experience, and greater responsibihties and more \ '1 perilously situated, should surely take the lead. That any period of peace can be prolonged is an idle dream. Thirteen years ago the cost of the navy was little over twenty-one and a half millions, and of the army twenty-one millions. Since then we have conquered the Soudan, undertaken vast responsibilities in Egypt, and employed nearly half a million of soldiers in South Africa in a war which lasted three years. To-day the cost of the navy is thirty millions, and that of the army twenty-eight miUions. At what then will these figures stand five years hence, or even next year ? Who can tell ? And who is presumptuous enough to say that within that period we may not be engaged in a conflict beyond these shores, and involved in a war not strictly localised, and with our communications not absolutely safe ? The fundamental truth of national strategy may be laid down by the Defence Committee, and accepted by the Executive Government of the day, and endorsed by Parliament and by the people. This was the case with the principles of what was called the ** Stanhope Minute," dated 8th December 1888. But nothing happened, and in 1899 the nation's power of defence and offence was much what it was ten years before. The Royal Commission on the War in South Africa held their last sitting on 10th June 1903. 14 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW The report was issued in August of that year, and it is true that some very distinct results were achieved, and few soldiers would deny that the Regular Army is better prepared, as regards staff, training, and materiel, than it was at the outbreak of the Boer War. A genuine attempt has been made to reorganise the Volunteer forces, and an attempt based on sound principles of war. But there is much the same doubt experienced, and much the same critical attitude adopted towards the fitness of the military forces to fulfil their functions at home and abroad as towards the Navy. Parliament votes, year after year, huge sums for armaments, and nearly sixty milhons of taxes are collected from the people of these islands to pay for the mihtant services of the nation. Yet it cannot be said that the highest naval and military authorities ever express them- selves satisfied that Great Britain possesses either a Fleet or an Army at all adequate to or efficient for her requirements. Curiously enough, the House of Commons, which has to vote these enormous sums, takes great trouble— by means of a Standing Committee— to see that every penny is applied to the service for which it is voted. This committee overhauls accounts, calls witnesses, who are examined and cross-examined, and in short possesses very wide powers, which it exercises thoroughly with excellent results. EXAMINATION OF EXPENSES 15 But there is no Standing Committee to enquire whether the money voted is spent to the best advantage. There are discussions upon the Navy and Army Estimates in the House itself, and, year after year, the country watches, with sad amusement, painstaking and conscientious Members of ParHament striving for information, being fenced with by Ministers who are wrung with anxiety to preserve proper official reserve and the consequent respect of their Depart- ments. It is not worth while even for the Mother of Parliaments to examine a custom which has grown up in France, under which the Estimates for the Navy and the Army are sub- mitted to committees representing all sections of the Chamber, with wide powers of examina- tion, extended in some cases to visual tests, and with instructions to report the result of their labours to the Chamber itself? In spite of certain well-known scandals in administration, the French people have the satisfaction of know- ing that to the enquiries and labours of one of these committees was not long ago due the completion of the armaments of the frontier fortresses and their provisioning with munitions of war. The educational value of these com- mittees is inestimable, bringing as they do Members of Parliament of all shades of opinion, many of whom are misinformed and some of whom are hostile to all forms of expenditure 16 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW on armaments, into contact with personnel and matMel, which for the first time they begin to realise and to understand. If the thesis upon which this argument is based is a reasonable one, and if the enfranchised voter is the supreme authority, who eventually has to decide whether Great Britain is to retain command of the sea, and whether armed forces are a necessity of empire, surely there is much to be said for aUowing him, through his elected representative, to come face to face with the highest expert opinion, and to ascertain for himself whether the supremacy of the Navy and the efficiency of the Army are shams or reaUties. The writer of these pages was for many years a Member of the House of Commons, and for many years the head of one of the State Departments. He has served on Royal Commissions and committees, and has had a somewhat varied experience of govern- ment. He can affirm, therefore, with a certain degree of knowledge, that no more formidable and efficient piece of machinery exists within the constitution for ascertaining the truth than the Standing Committee of the House of Commons which goes by the name of the Committee of PubUc Accounts. If Parliament is satisfied that we must look to the Fleet to provide the first, second and third lines of national defence, and if ParUament is in earnest CHANGES IN PROCEDURE 17 I- in declaring that no money shall be spared in order to secure the supremacy of Great Britain at sea, should not Parliament itself take care that these intentions are made good? If it is a function of Parliament to audit expenditure upon which national credit is based, is it not equally its duty to audit the fleet upon which our national existence depends ? Although the Navy is the vital interest, and although the peril of the naval position during the next few years can hardly be exaggerated, and demands the untiring examination and care of ParUament, it is obvious that the same chain of reasoning appHes to the land forces of the Crown. If, then, the younger and more ardent Parliamentary spirits, to whose hands the nation seems inclined to trust its destinies, will free themselves from tradition and prejudice, they may obtain, by certain changes in the procedure of the House of Commons, results far more valuable to this country than they are likely to secure by any reform of the House of Lords. B 1 THE ELGIN COMMISSION 19 j'i! II THE DYNAMIC QUALITY OF A TERRITORIAL FORCE I HAVE tried to say elsewhere that for a nation like ours, which is not confined to a few islands in the Western seas, but stretches over the surface of the world, the idea of a prolonged peace is an idle dream. On 10th June 1903 the Commission appointed to enquire into the war in South Africa sat for the last time. 44 That war" — wrote Sir George Taubman Goldie, in his Note on the Report—- produced the most perilous international situation in which the Empire has found itself since the days of Napoleon ; " and when those words were written he little knew the very real and tremendous peril from foreign intervention which had threatened us. Every one knows now. " Only an extraordinary combination of for- tunate circumstances, external and internal" ^he went on to say — "saved the Empire 18 during the early months of 1900, and there is no reason to expect a repetition of such fortune, if, as appears probable, the next national emer- gency finds us still discussing our preparations." Evidently in Sir George Goldie's mind was running the remembrance of Prussian statesmen and soldiers in 1806 still discussing what new piece of patchwork they should put into the antiquated military organisation of the Great Frederick, when Napoleon swept over them at Jena, and Prussia disappeared. The document to which I allude was one of two Notes appended to the Report of Lord Elgin's Commission. The first Note recommended certain definite changes in War Office administration, the creation of an Army Council, the abolition of the post of Commander - in - Chief, and the appointment of an Inspector- General of the Forces. On 17th November, in the same year, a Special Committee was constituted and ap- pointed practically to carry out these recom- mendations. Before the month of May 1904 the necessary changes were initiated, and they were shortly afterwards completed. In consequence of these changes a General Staff — a plant of slow growth — has become a reality, and it has been followed by a thorough so \Vi\ TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS reorganisation of the Army into two lines, com- pleted by the well-known Act of 1907. ^ The second Note, which I venture to think was of no less value, but which has remam^d/ dead letter, dealt directly with what m the body of the Report the Commissioners declared was the "true'lesson of the war." This, m heir opinion, was " that no military system w.U be itisfacfory which does not contam powers of :;"outside the limit of the regular forces of the Crown, whatever that limit may be. Sir George Goldie pushed this doctnne to a conclusion. "Every physically sound boy, he wrote, " of seventeen years of age, not serving in the Navy or the Merchant Service, and un- provided with a certificate (from the appointed Luitary authority) that he is an efficient member "f a vlnteer Cadet Corps, would have to serve for a term in National Cadet Schools-officered as are Woolwich and Sandhurst, by officers of %rotL':olU Sir Frederick Darley and Sir John Edge, added a Note statmg their agreement with Sir George Goldie's " suggestion tLt every boy not disqualified by infirmity should be compelled to undergo a course of military training." And \f ^^ -.^^X^e of opinion to the effect that with Sir George Taubman Goldie's scheme, as explained by him, for National Military Education I cordially THE TRUE LESSON OF THE WAR 21 agreed, as the only practical alternative to Conscription. There was no mistake about the intentions of the Commissioners. The whole body signed the Report, which declared the " true lesson " of the war to be a want of military expansion outside the limit of the Regular Army, but did not pronounce definitely how this defect was to be remedied. Sir George Goldie suggested, in unmistakable terms, and three of his colleagues cordially agreed with him, that a remedy was to be found in universal compulsory training of a military character for boys of seventeen, for a term of six, eight, or ten months, unless they had been previously trained at school. I can say with certitude, that neither Sir George Goldie nor any of us were thinking of England as an island group, but we had always constantly before us Britain and Greater Britain oversea, with all her political and commercial risks, in our minds, and this recommendation was not insular but Imperial. It was a sug- gestion made at the end of a prolonged enquiry upon which infinite care and labour were be- stowed, and it was made with the full responsi- bility not of individual opinion, but of collective judgment. Years have passed. A scheme intended to give expansion to the military forces of the B 2 Ill HI ft TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS Crown was tentatively put forward by one Secretary of State for War, but received no support from his colleagues or from the public, and proved abortive. Then another Secretary of State succeeded in obtaining the assent of Parliament to a complete reconstruction of our Army organisa- tion. It is much to have achieved, that the Regular Army should have a fixed War organisation, not on paper, but in actual brigades and divisions. It is a still greater achievement to have con- verted the Militia from a force which could only be used for service at home, except by consent of the men, into a force which can be used for purposes of draft or reinforcement abroad in time of war, thus for purposes of war adding 70,000 men to the Regular Army. This additional force— the Special Reserve- enables the Regular Army to be mobihsed, and provides for six months' wastage of war. To that extent we are stronger than ever we have been before. Mr Haldane's final achievement, so far, has been to provide, as regards organisation, com- mand, and staff, fourteen territorial divisions and fourteen yeomanry brigades, with artillery and transport, enlisted for service at home, and automatically to be embodied when the MR HALDANE^S PLAN 25 Reserves of the Regular Army are called out by Proclamation. If Mr Haldane's plan proves completely successful, we shall have within these islands — apart from the garrisons of India, Egypt, and the Colonies : — 1. Six divisions of Regular Infantry with a proportional amount of Artillery and other arms, and four Cavalry Brigades. 2. A not inadequate reserve of Regulars, and in addition a Special Reserve of half-trained men, Hable to instant embodiment and for use abroad on the outbreak of war, who are calcu- lated to be sufficient to keep those six divisions supplied in the field for six months. 3. We shall also have fourteen divisions of Territorial Troops and fourteen Yeomanry Brigades. In the creation of this Territorial Force, the present Secretary of State has contrived deeply to interest his fellow-countrymen. The response to the appeal made by His Majesty the King to his Lieutenants of Counties has been indeed remarkable. All over the country men of high position have thrown themselves with patriotic energy into the movement, and their example has been followed by persons of all classes. For the moment, in spite of strong views held privately by many that the principle of \ if In i ^ fl TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS compulsion should be adopted in the interests both of military efficiency and national moral tone, the voluntary system holds the field. It is of no use at present to shut our eyes to this salient fact. Every practical patriot will therefore, naturally, do his best to carry out the wiU of his country in its present mood, and be ready to sink his personal predilections for the public good. The salient fact, which is in itself enough to inspire enthusiasm, is that for the first time smce the Napoleonic scare of 1805 a definite and clear role has been assigned to the Volunteer or Territorial Forces of the Crown. The Executive Government, through the mouth of the Secretary of State for War, have explained that, although Great Britain relies upon the Fleet for the protection of these shores, yet, in order that the Fleet may securely carry out this paramount and vital mission, a mobile Territorial Force of a certain strength is a necessity. It is not important to argue or explam this proposition. It may be accepted as the basis and the justification of the great effort which is being made to create fourteen di\dsions and fourteen mounted brigades of Territorial Troops. It is an invigorating and inspiring thesis. Every man who enlists into the Temtonal Force may feel that when he voluntarily under- CITIZEN SOLDIERS 25 takes the obhgations which the Act of 1907 imposes, and sacrifices time and often money for the sake of his country's safety, he is not taking upon himself a fictitious, but a grave and serious duty. He is no longer an amateur, "playing at soldiers," but he is a citizen soldier, coming for- ward as a free man to bear responsibilities which others are shirking. This is the spirit in which the men of old esteemed it a privilege rather than a duty to be permitted to serve in the ranks of the Roman Republic. It is the noblest sacrifice which young men to-day who cannot afford to be professional soldiers can make of their leisure. Sport and games, excellent things in them- selves—hunting, shooting, football, and golf- are subsidiary means of sustaining the manhood of our people. Indirectly they contribute to our defensive force by raising national physical standards. But they are largely the pastimes of the idle and the rich, of men and women who, incapable of sustained patriotic effort, are content to enjoy the fruits of other men's labour, and to rely for their security upon the length of their purse, or the self-sacrifice of their neighbours. This, however, is a digression. There is another use to which a mobile Territorial Force can conceivably be put. li. K TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS I have never been able to see why it should not voluntarily meet the difficulty and supply the v^ant of " expansion " upon which the Elgin Commission laid such profound stress. The Militia of old was a force in many respects resembling the Territorial Force of to-day, and very gallantly, over and over again, the Militia responded to the demand of its officers and of the country. The ideal Territorial Force is to be composed of young men, untrammelled by family ties and not too heavy of foot, of men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, who have not lost the elasticity and freedom of youth, and who are keen (as young men usually are) for excite- ment and for the fray. This is a force altogether dissimilar from the Volunteers. \\ hy then not take advantage of the en- thusiasms and fine courage of youth? Why should not the Territorial units volunteer, as units, for Foreign Service. They would not be likely to be wanted, nor indeed could they be used, except in a war in which the sea- command was so well assured that invasion or raid risks were negUgible. I am not here speaking of the "Special Reserve," or of attempting to obtain by any method in peace time a promise of service in the field outside these islands. TERRITORIAL F. MILITIA «7 I am speaking of permission and encourage- ment in time of severe stress being given to units of the Territorial Force to volunteer for foreign service as complete units. Not only combatant, but auxiliary troops; not only infantry, cavalry, and artillery, but transport and supply columns and Army Medical Corps. It may be said, " What is the good of half- trained troops ? " The answer is, that if Mihtia were good enough for garrison duty, for lines of com- munication, and finally to send to South Africa, the Territorials are better. In view of the superior quality of the men of which the force is composed this answer is complete. Less than ten years ago, with great difficulty, forces with no training at all had to be rapidly improvised and sent to the assistance of the Regular Army, in a war against a small nation of farmers. What would happen if such improvised and quite untrained levies had to face within the confines of the Empire the highly- trained troops of some great European power ? The Regular Army is no doubt very efficient, but it is very small, and can never be other than very small. Nothing could be more futile, in view of our vast responsibilities elsewhere, than 28 TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS to rely upon our Regular Army as a second line of Home Defence, or as the sole unsupported line of defence for our Empire oversea. Experience has taught us that expansion of this Regular Army may become, at any time, a necessity under the conditions of modern war, even against a small State; and the reasoned opinion of men who have had special oppor- tunities of studying the problem, is that expansion of the Regular Army in the event of any serious war, for the defence of our possessions oversea, may be a condition possibly of our continued existence as a nation. Glancing abroad we see, for the first time since 1814, a Great Power in Europe menacing, though friendly at the present time, that commercial and maritime supremacy which Great Britain has slowly built up since the seventeenth century. National security cannot be purchased by alliances or " ententes," but only by self-reUance and adequate preparation. We all of us know that, if we are to be secure, we shall be forced in the years to come to build two ships for every keel laid down by the greatest European naval Power, whichever that Power may be. But our place in the world cannot be main- tained by sea-power alone, and for home defence and " imperial defence " our people must prepare themselves to tight ashore. ARE WE READY? 39 From oversea. Englishmen living under the U ion Jack, speaking our language— -just as closely knit to aU of us at home, for purposes of unity and self-defence, as any German living in Munich is knit to any German living in Berlin- may stretch out a hand and ask for assistance. What response shall we be in a position to make ? From India, from Canada, from Australia, from Africa, at any hour the cry may come. Are we ready? If not, when shall we be ready ? The nation has decided, through its repre- sentatives and the Ministers they have chosen, to give Mr Haldane's plan a trial. It is surely the last trial likely to be made of the purely voluntary system— a system, never- theless, so interwoven with our national ideas and habits, that even its total breakdown would certainly not be followed by " compulsion " in its most effective form. It is a real but not recognised danger, that if Mr Haldane's plan fails we may get m its place a system of compulsion which from its half-and-half character is bound gravely to affect the number and quality of the personnel of the Navy and Regular Army, and may thus leave us worse off in armed strength than we are now. It must never be forgotten, however, that, although we may be forced into compulsion by t 1 80 TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS RELATIVES AND EMPLOYERS SI the slackening of the voluntary spirit throughout the country, there are no signs that the British people have changed their ingrained habits. The English Constitution, as every one knows, is based upon compromise, so dearly cherished by the British temperament. We have always wished to eat our cake and have it, to enjoy the best of both worlds ; and we have, in pohtics, managed fairly well to achieve this Utopian ideal, by calling ourselves a "democracy," and by adhering to most of the methods and pre- judices of an "aristocracy." We are the least " democratic " of nations in practical everyday life, yet we pride ourselves upon having the most soundly "democratic" political institutions in the world. The basis of what is called "democracy," however, is not only equahty of status, but equahty of sacrifice. And yet all through our political system there runs a maximum of un- equal demand for self-abnegation on behalf of the pubUc and of the State. So long as this demand is met by men and women who give time and money of their own free will to the State, there is no " democracy " in its true sense. The voluntary principal, whether it takes the form of unpaid services to or financial support of schools, hospitals, magistracy, representation on local or imperial bodies, county associations, or Territorial troops, is anti-democratic, and the men and women who render such services are paying not only their own share, but the shares of others, towards the support of the country and the Empire. Inequality of sacrifice is supposed to bring gratitude and honour in its train. When we think of " voluntary service " in the Territorial Force, it must be remembered that gratitude is due not only to the man who comes forward and gives up his time to drill and dis- cipline which he might be spending in amuse- ment or study. The sacrifice cuts deeper ; and relatives, perhaps deprived of a seaside holiday because the father or brother is in "camp" during the annual holiday, are paying their share. And what about the employer ? If he puts obstacles in the way of camp, he is thought to be " unpatriotic." In reality he is nothing of the kind. He is merely a negative sort of person, like everybody else. It is the employer who permits his people to go to camp, and who is willing to sacrifice un- earned wages and give an increase of holiday, who is the active patriot whose name should be written in gold letters on the country's roll of honour. We are, as a nation, fond of statistics and TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS memorials. The logical sequence of the voluntary system would be to publish annually a " Roll of Honour" containing the names of those who give service free on behalf of the "idle rich" and the " irresponsible poor." In the county of London we propose to make a start in this direction. The great employers of labour have been personally approached, with the help of the Trade Societies, and asked to specify the numbers of men they can spare annually for camp. It is being arranged that local recruiting com- mittees, with the assistance of officers command- ing units, shall endeavour to recruit up to these numbers, and no further, from the patriotic firms who thus give their countenance and help to the London force. Then the smaller employer will be approached, and shortly it is hoped that this section of the " Roll of Honour " can be pubhshed, as an example to all. Recruiting, on a plan of this kind, may possibly produce the total number of men required, since it tends to widen knowledge of the conditions of Territorial service and local interest in the scheme of National Defence, and, in any case, it has the merit of obtaining as recruits men who are not hampered by restric- tion, and who are free to attend the annual camp, which from the military standpoint is the criterion of efficiency. COMPULSION ? S8 So far, in our country, " compulsion " has been tried only in relation to boys and girls. It has never yet been tried upon grown men and women. But if freedom of the kind with which we are familiar is to be maintained as part of our political system, it can only be- in relation to the standards of other nations — by organising the voluntary system in such a way as to give results equal if not superior to those obtained under ** compulsion." This should not be beyond the reach of the practical genius of our race. Under existing circumstances, in the present state of the balance of world-power, and with our Fleet maintained at the standard laid down by universal consent, the country has been told that a Territorial Force of a certain strength is necessary for the adequate defence of these shores. This force may have wider potential uses. It is sought to obtain it under a voluntary system which is congenial to the habits of the nation. But it has to be obtairted. And there must be a term within which it should be complete up to the estabUshment laid down by the General Staff of the Army. Fortu- nately, there are manifold signs that the people will respond to the appeal of their Sovereign and of Parliament. If they fail to do so, and if the careful enquiries 84 TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS and conclusions upon which this scientific organi- sation for Home Defence has been based are beheved to be sound, there can only be one alternative, however hateful it may appear to the majority of our fellow-countrymen. III A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION. The truth about the Navy was told twenty- four years ago with excellent results, but the truth about the Army has not been told. The Army has never been popular in England, and this fact, dating from times when a standing Army was thought to menace public hberty, has been one of the main obstacles to sound military organisation. The people of this country have never taken a whole-hearted interest in the military forces of the Crown, with the result that sometimes jobbers and sometimes faddists have had the Army at their mercy. Any one who has been present, in a seaport town, at the reception of a ship of war, and in a garrison town, when a new battaUon takes up its quarters, will have noticed the difference in the welcome accorded by the citizens. Long before Captain Mahan began to write, the English people had instinctively realised that their security, as a nation, rested upon the 35 86 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION invincibility of the British Fleet. The Navy was always the popular Service, and naval heroes the darlings of the nation. Soldiers were looked upon as mercenaries, who had to be tolerated, and the Army as a sort of Royal whim, that might easily become a popular danger, unless carefully watched. On the stage and in books, the sailor came to be represented as everything that was gallant and debonair, while the Army was generally typified by a somnolent and peculiarly heavy dragoon. Even the superb Marlborough was travestied, without remonstrance, by prejudiced historians, and the Duke of Wellington, in spite of unparalleled service, was mobbed and the windows of Apsley House were stoned and broken. It is true that the Household Troops, both Cavalry and Infantry, thanks to their fine uniforms and exemplary conduct, have been popular in the Metropolis, just as a few Scottish regiments have roused enthusiasm in the stolid hearts north of the Tweed ; but the great mass of Cavalry and Infantry of the Line, which have grilled in the tropics, and lead dismal lives in out-of-the-way stations all over the world, have until quite recent times borne the burden of Empire unwept and unsung. The result has been that the English people have always readily listened to detraction, but IM WHAT IS THE ARMY.? 87 ! have wearied quickly of reasoned criticism in everything that concerns the Army. They have rarely got beyond the total of the Estimates. If these were at a reasonable figure, efficiency was a matter of indifFerence. The nation was not unwilling to pay, provided that they were not worried with details, and that a fairly decent show could occasionally be given on Laffan's Plain for the benefit of a foreign potentate. Luckily for the nation, the Army Estimates rose to £30,000,000 per annum, and the British people at last awakened sufficiently to enable a minister to ask and endeavour to answer two questions, upon which any sound organisation of the Army must necessarily depend. The necessity to obtain an answer to these vital questions, preluded the advent of the Defence Committee, and at last some considera- tion has been given to the double problem— (a) the purposes for which the Army is maintained, and (6) the composition and size of the Force required. "The purposes for which an Army is main- tained" was defined, on the authority of the Defence Committee, by Mr Balfour in the House of Commons ; and the principal functions c 2 ■J S8 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION of that Committee, are from time to time, as conditions change, to reconsider the basis upon which a Military Force must always rest. In the past, the Executive Government of the day has been too much occupied with politics and immediate questions of administration, to give time to the consideration of problems, which, in relative importance, are nevertheless vital to good and sound government. The Defence Committee supplies the Prime Minister for the time being with the machinery required; that is to say, with a bureau of a more or less permanent character, whose primary function is to collect information and formulate ideas, enabling the Cabinet to deal with the all- important question of the Peace Strategy of the Empire. Every variation in the balance of World- power, every acre added to the dominions of King Edward, and every change, either by treaty or understanding with a Great Foreign Power, alters the conditions and purposes for which an Army is required. That these altera- tions should be constantly and scientifically studied, was one of the main objects for which the Imperial Defence Committee was con- stituted, and for which it is retained in its present shape. THE VOLUNTARY SYSTEM S9 I II The ** Composition of the Army" is a factor constantly forgotten by writers and speakers and by the public, when indulging both in criticism and suggestion upon mihtary affairs. The Army is composed of Volunteers, whether troops are called Regular or Territorial; the voluntary principle of enlistment lies at the root of the matter. This condition has been imposed and is still imposed, and apparently is likely to be imposed, by the will of the nation. Yet there are critics and writers who constantly forget this obvious circumstance, and continually fail to see that under a voluntary system the treatment of military questions, and the treat- ment of officers and men, must be wholly different from what would be possible under a compulsory system. Under a compulsory system the highest efficiency can be obtained by methods extremely vigorous and simple. As is often said in another connection, it is easy to govern by the sword. But under a voluntary system, every step is sur- rounded by difficulties. Tact is required, and dis- cernment, a light hand, and not too tight a rein, the arts of cajolery, a reasonable emolument. i\ ^1 40 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION suitable and fair rewards, justice in selection and rejection, every consideration to the weakness and failings of young manhood, all tempered by firm and gentle discipline, if officers and men are, in the first place, to be obtained for the Army, and in the second place, to be retained in the Army. Efficiency is not the sole consideration, for we have got to get our raw material before it is possible to convert it into the product required. It is easy to gibe at the War Office, and to belittle the value of the Army. The War Office, under present circumstances, whatever it may have been in the past, is nothing more or less than a body of selected soldiers, sufficiently old to have experience, and sufficiently young to possess professional sympathy, to whose hands the administration of the Army has been entrusted. The executive command of the Army rests, under the King, with those highly gifted officers who would— in the event of war— lead men to battle. Although this system has been working for only a short time, excellent results have been obtained. The Field Army is more highly trained, and better organised than ever before in the history of the nation. This much is admitted by so great and so unbiassed a judge as Lord Roberts. ADMINISTRATION AND IMPROVEMENT 41 Of course much remains to be done before the *' Administration " of the Army is up to the high standard to which that of the Navy has been brought ; but considering the natural gifts for administration pecuharly characteristic of soldiers, as may be seen, for example, by reference to Lord Cromer's reports on Egypt, there is every hope that the time is not distant when the War Office will cease to be the favourite « Aunt - Sally " and cock-shy of the Press and of the public. If this is to be the case, our soldier administrators must reaUse that they too are bound by the conditions imposed upon them by the nation ; and that it is not their business to try by circuitous methods to impose other conditions upon the people of the country ; but to work loyally the system, as they find it, to the highest possible point of efficiency. That point may be a degree lower than the possible efficiency, but it is settled by the con- dition precedent of the problem which they have to solve. Two examples will suffice. In a country where compulsory service prevails, it is a simple matter to enforce sumptuary laws for officers, to enforce a harsh disciphne, to grant but little leave, and to insist upon a high standard of military education; but under a voluntary system, especially where younger officers receive emoluments at a rate wholly inadequate, and are therefore compelled to 42 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION supplement out of their own pockets the votes of Parhament for the support of the Army, very tender treatment becomes necessary, and per- suasion, not force, is the only means by which officers in sufficient numbers can be obtained and retained. Men, after all, are no less human than their officers. Under a compulsory system of service, a man may be subjected to every discomfort— and even to harsh treatment by his superiors ; but under voluntary enlistment, men's idiosyncrasies must be studied : and it becomes impossible, when the recruiting market is limited, and demand ever on a par with the supply, to clothe men in unappealing dress, to juggle with their limited pay, to quarter them all the year round in stationary camps far from every amuse- ment and resource, and to stint them of furlough. The highest possible state of efficiency is properly the main object in view of those en- trusted both with the training and administration of officers and men of the Army, but subject to the governing condition that for every officer or man who leaves the Army the nation has to go hat in hand to another to replace him. Ill As Lord Roberts has pointed out, it is in numbers, both of officers and men, that the Army and its reserves are deficient to meet the If MR HALDANE'S AIM 4^8 strain of a great war, and to fulfil the requirements which have been laid down and tacitly accepted by Parliament as essential to the maintenance of our Empire. To make good this deficiency under a voluntary system, and at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer, is the object of Mr Haldane's recent changes, and of the Act of Parhament passed in 1907. A shortage of 7,000 officers, and a potential reserve quite unable to meet the demands of a great war, such as that by which Mr Balfour chose to illustrate his argument in the House of Commons, were the main con- siderations which prompted Mr Haldane to reconstruct the Land Forces of the Crown. It is upon his success that the continuance of a voluntary system of enUstment must depend, if the domestic safety of this country is to be secured, and if British dominion is to be main- tained in India. The Kings Colonial Dominions, growing rapidly in wealth and population, will before long be able to answer for their own safety, and for their connection with the Crown ; but the peace and security of Great Britain and of India, depend upon the voluntary effort made by the people of these islands to train them- selves to fight by sea and by land any Foreign Power which ventures to attack them. 44 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION ■f IV If numbers of trained men are necessary for our Empire, which cannot be protected by sea-power only, sound organisation is quite as essential ; for in the opinion of all authorities, military and civil, who are qualified by experience to judge, it is organisation that wins battles in every sphere of human activity. Under modern conditions of life, whether in peace or in war, whether in commercial or military strategy, victory inchnes to the force which is most thoroughly and highly organised. In 1870 the population and armies of France and Germany were not disproportionate, except in so far as the organisation of Germany, systematised by careful forethought, was incom- parably superior. In Manchuria, it was the system quite as much, and in truth more than the high quality of her troops, which led to the triumphs of Japan, and which equahsed the enormous disproportion between her resources and those of Russia. In the inevitable struggle which Ues before Europe, with a Power numerically stronger than any other except Russia, and better organised for war than Frederick and Napoleon ever were, what chance have numerically weaker Powers ORGANISATION THE KEYNOTE 46 unless they too are organised in the same high degree ? Organisation implies forethought and pre- paration, and we are apt to think that because for centuries we managed well without either, and because from these small islands has grown an Empire world-wide in extent, an unsystem- atised method which has served so well in the past, will continue to serve us still. This is to misread history, and the open book of the world's face to-day. It is the " Brown Bess" argument, famiUar to soldiers nearly sixty years since. Traits of character, as well as physical abilities, which obtained fine results amid people as fore- thoughtless as ourselves, lose tremendously in value when pitted against the growing organisa- tion of the twentieth century. For organisation is the keynote of the days in which we are Uving, and without it all forms of prosperity are fleeting and are the sport of chance. Mr Haldane, to judge by his speeches, possibly because of his German education, seems to be imbued with this notion. He apparently recognises that in order to prepare to meet a foreign foe. and to be ready to defend ourselves against attack, the nation must be thoroughly organised. It will no longer suffice to have a crowd of armed men with stout hearts and generous - 4-'g'-.«I^S|^' til 4f5 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION minds wholly ignorant of the difficulties of modern war. Numbers according to his schemes are necessary, but they must be organised numbers. The idea underlying Mr Balfour's conception of a Defence Committee, was strategical forecast and preparation against possible attack. The present Prime Minister has greatly increased the scope and activities of the instrument forged by his predecessor. Mr Haldane seems to desire to apply the same principle to the Army itself, and if he succeeds, then the mantle of Cardwell will have fallen upon his shoulders. What Mr Cardwell did for the Regular Army, by the rather dim military light of the 'seventies, Mr Haldane will have done in a far higher degree under the brighter illuminants of the present day. When we speak, however, of organisation, it is perhaps desirable to define the sense in which it is here used. •.I Organisation for war means thorough and sound preparation for war in all its branches, from the higher command to every source of supply. This would be the meaning applied to the word in the best managed commercial undertakings in Germany or the United States. The raising I PROBLEMS OF ORGANISATION 47 of officers and men, their grouping into smaller and larger units, their physical and moral improvement, their supply with the mat&iel of war, and their education and training for obedience and command, are the fruits of a sound and practical organisation. In what degree centralisation is necessary, where it can advantageously be dispensed with, and the piecing together of the whole com- pficated machinery of modern war— these are the problems which confront military organisers to-day, and w^hich, from the varying conditions imposed by a voluntary system of mihtary service, can never be wholly shelved. It is not within the scope of this essay to allude further to the details of military organisa- tion. The purpose of the wTiter is served if the comprehensive meaning of the word has been made plain, and the breadth of the field which lies ever before the military organiser has been clearly understood. War is an amalgam of personnel and materiel, and success in war depends upon scrupulous attention being given to perfecting in peace its component parts. And it is owing to the great complexity of the various parts of a whole, upon the perfection of which success depends, that the question arises whether the means taken to ensure good workmanship and supervision are adequate and I ■u Ji 1 mil 48 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION the best possible. For upon whom does the weight of responsibility really lie ? With whom does the organisation of the Land Forces of the Crown rest, and who are the persons who, by their training and know- ledge, are professionally competent to supervise the various branches and the infinite detail of this great concern ? From the lowest to the highest, from the subaltern in command of a half-company to the soldiers who sit on the Committee of Imperial Defence, the officers of the Army have to bear the burden in peace and the responsibility in war. Every profession is, in a sense, self-supporting. The character and standard of capacity in every profession depend upon the profession itself. That of arms is no exception to the rule. The methods by which the " Learned Pro- fessions " recruit and train young men are well known, and it is upon these methods proving efficacious that the reputation of the professions of the Church, the Law, of Medicine, and of Teaching, ultimately rests. In all these professions certain tests are required, and certain encouragements are given, to those who desire to practise them. According to the manner in which these tests are applied, and these encouragements are offered, is the standard of professional efficiency maintained. INTELLECTUAL EQUIPMENT 49 If it is true that the security of the Empire largely depends upon the soundness of Army organisation, and that the organisation of the Army mamly rests upon the capacity of its officers, then the tests applied and the encourage- ment given to officers become matters of vital importance, not only to the Army but to the nation. At this point it is worth while to put a question, and in all friendliness and perfect good faith, to suggest a doubt, whether the intellectual equipment of the average British officer of high rank and middle life is equal to that of men of the same standing in other professions. That many officers of high rank hold their own, in all respects, with their peers in the professional or commercial worid, is so obvious as not to be worth stating, except to avoid misconstruction. But the question concerns the average. By eminent statesmen who have been brought into contact with officers, by politicians, by lawyers, and by men who have passed their hves in financial or mercantile affairs, and by members of the Civil Service, who see adminis- trators from all classes of society, the thesis has been sustained that the average intellectual equipment, the power of careful reasoning, and the store of accumulated knowledge, together \ .^ V n I 1 50 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION with the habit of application, are inferior in the higher ranks of the Army to what is found in men in relative positions in other walks of life. If this represents a true state of facts, and if the sound organisation of the Army turns on the intellectual equipment of its officers, then the Army lies under a disadvantage whatever the organisation which may be given to it. And if the facts are true, what is their cause, and where does the remedy lie? VI If a man fails to fulfil expectations formed of him, his judges and his critics are apt to ex- amine his early life and its associations, and to seek there the cause of failure. In the case of an individual, should judgment fall upon some influence or lapse in youth, which is assumed to be the underlying cause of a deplorable result later in Hfe, such judgment may not always be right. If, however, a whole family exhibit signs of similar failure, the case of those who contend that it is due to faulty upbringing is strengthened. In considering a class or a nation, the deduc- tion is rendered more probable still. If the habits of military officers are compared with those of other professional men, it will be found that up to the age of nineteen or twenty their JUNIOR OFFICERS 61 lives show no marked difference from the lives of other boys. Again, where an officer reaches field rank, and is employed either in training troops or in administering some portion of the Army, his life is fairly laborious, his mind is expanding, and his ambition to succeed develops rapidly, after the manner of all men engaged in arduous pursuits. But if we compare the period in a soldier's life, during the ten years between boyhood and man- hood, during that period above all others when the habits of men become fixed on irrevocable lines, with these same ten years in the Hves of the clergy, the lawyer, the Civil servant, or even of sea-officers, we find a marked and significant difference. When an officer joins the Army, he is very properly subjected to the discipline which follows from learning the technical elements of any pro- fession. Until his promotion to the rank of lieutenant, his time is fully occupied, and his attention constantly on the stretch. When his first promotion comes, whatever the arm of the Service, although in a lesser degree in the more technical branches, the tension is somewhat relaxed. Generally speaking, however, his working hours become fewer, and by the time an officer reaches the immature age of two or three and ,' ii A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION twenty, he is generally free after one o'clock in the afternoon. If he is rich, he can devote his day to any form of sport, or to any of those manly games, which differentiate the British regimental officers from the officers of all other armies, and for certain purposes, are an invalu- able form of training for war. It would be a calamity for the Army and for the nation if the love of sport were to lose its hold on the youth of the nation. But the poorer officers are restricted by their poverty, and however keen in desire, indulgence is limited by the length of their purse. It happens, then, that time hangs heavily on the hands of many young men, who have no inclination to idle, but have no inducement and no call to find employment. In almost every other profession a young man is provided with an inducement, or is forced to work during many hours of the common work- ing day. In the learned professions, advancement and wealth depend upon hard work, while the Navy is fortunate, owing to its limited numbers, in being able to impose, without fear of diminishing the supply, a considerable strain upon younger officers. With the Army the case is altogether different. The demand for officers and the supply are by no means out of all proportion, and when the ii-> INDUCEMENT NOT FORCE tastes of large numbers of excellent regimental officers, and the reasons for which they enter the Army are realised, it is abundantly plain that to impose upon them conditions out of all keeping with their emoluments and prospects, would be to lose the better class of young men of the type which all experienced soldiers are anxious to retain m the Service. To force them to work, and to employ arbitrary means to make them acquire habits of application, are not remedies. It is inducement and not force which is required. At the same time, the inference appears to be irresistible, that the failure of the average British officer of field rank to hold his own with men of the same standing in other professions, is due to the more or less wasted years between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five. How often does it happen that a keen and ambitious man, on the threshold of high com- mand, alive to all the grave responsibiUties about to fall upon him, laboriously preparing himself to bear them, is heard to lament those wasted years ! He is conscious of a Umited scope of essential knowledge, and he tries hard to make up for lost time. But he has never acquired the habit of application, and work weighs heavily upon him. He ardently desires information, but he has never learnt by practice how to seek it. He has no idea what are the books to read, and, what is worse, he has no notion of the right way to d2 54 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION read them. He is like a gallant horse striving under the hands and knees of an inexperienced horseman. It is a sad picture, often seen in the higher ranks of the Army, most creditable to the fine body of gentlemen of whom those ranks are composed, but discreditable to the system imder which their youth spent itself. What, then, is the remedy? VII What inducement can be offered to a young man during these crucial years to which allusion has been made, which will lead him to adopt habits of appUcation, and to prepare himself for the higher needs of the profession ? A young man leaving school for a university life soon realises that at college he is not forced to work, that he may idle through days and weeks and months without restraint; but he also soon discovers that unless he chooses to apply his mind to some definite course of study, the prizes of a university career will be denied him At the Bar, in the medical profession, and in the Church, the same discovery is made at an early stage in a man's career. The temptation in all these cases is advancement. Periodical tests spread over a course of years, INDUCEMENT TO WORK 55 which perforce imply extensive and systematic reading, are the means employed. By this avenue only can a man reach the goal which is his aim. The inducement to read in all these professions lies in the fact that reading leads to an objective which is not far ahead, in dim distance but is within reach of the student. Many young soldiers try to acquire from books scientific knowledge of their profession. But human nature being what it is, their efforts are bound to be spasmodic. A young man is suddenly fired, by example or precept, with a desire to be a general, and it is borne in upon him that this implies an acquaintance with miUtary history. He most laudably works for a week or a month at the strategy of a campaign. He writes a meritorious precis and draws a map or two. Then it is borne in upon him that he cannot be a general for twenty years or so, and he says to himself, "There is plenty of time," and succumbs to the attraction of the anteroom fire and a novel. All this is very human and very natural, life and youth being what they are. How in the world could it be otherwise ? Possibly he may think of the Staff College. But then he discovers that the capacity of the Staff College is very limited, and that the competition is very severe. Besides, the men with whom he would have to compete are years older than himself. Dis- r / ( 56 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION heartened, he turns aside. Perhaps, incidentally, he hears that in order to mobilise Mr Haldane's six Divisions of the Regular Army, at least two hundred more officers, having had a staff training, would be required; and that in order to mobilise any portion of the Territorial Army no staff-trained officers are available at all. This he looks upon as a humorous eccentricity on the part of the high military authorities, but it seems to open no special avenue for his youth- ful ambition. In point of fact, does not the solution of the whole problem lie in these facts ? Mr Haldane has grasped and pressed home the idea that officers must "specialise" for certain adminis- trative posts, and must be scientifically trained to perform certain administrative duties. No man is forced by Mr Haldane's scheme to speciaUse, but he is given an inducement to do so. It may be said that to enter the Staff College is an inducement to a certain class of officer, but the limited capacity of the Staff College renders this inducement nugatory in the case of young officers anxious to qualify themselves for staff work, and quite capable of being trained sufficiently for lighter forms. To enlarge the capacity of the college so as to admit of training any officer who desires to qualify himself for staff work, would entail a cost which is pro- THE STAFF COLLEGE 57 hibitive, even if there were not other and obvious reasons which make such a solution impractical. There are, however, other methods, which, although they would involve a change in the conception hitherto attached to a Staff College course, are not unworthy of consideration. Whatever the original intentions of those who devised the Staff College were, it has become not so much a training school for men with the highest qualifications for special staff work, as an avenue of all kinds of promotion in all branches of the Army. The danger of suggesting a definite plan always is, that readers fix upon any blot which appears to them a fatal objection, and proceed not only to condemn the plan, but the whole argument upon which the necessity for some plan or other is founded. Any plan, however, if framed to remedy the defects which have been pointed out, should be based upon certain clear principles. It must provide an inducement for young men between the ages mentioned to work at Mihtary History, at Military Geography, at Strategy and Tactics, and it should provide means for maintaining their interest in these subjects. Annual tests of progress, as at the universities, should be insisted upon, provided that they are not made difficult of access, or an excuse for /'. 58 A PROBLEM IN MILITARY EDUCATION relieving officers of their regimental and routine duties. The whole idea which underlies this argument is that time now available, but wasted, should be utilised — not by disciplinary rules, but voluntarily and by inducement. It should not be beyond the ingenuity of those entrusted with the training of officers to devise a scheme by which young men could be tempted to quahfy themselves by a triennial course of reading to act as '* emergency staff officers." Even if the list of those '' qualified " according to such tests became a long one, it could never be too long for our possible requirements. From this hst, and from this list only, officers might be selected for the personal staff— or for adjutancies of battalions or regiments. Thus another inducement would be offered to young men to devote some hours of the day to intellectual exercise. From this Ust, and not necessarily by com- petition, but by selection tempered by further tests, the most highly gifted might be chosen for a course of Staff College training, using that college as a real training school, and not merely as an avenue of advancement. These are not definite suggestions, but only indications of the Une along which enquiry by those seeking a remedy might possibly move. REMEDIAL MEASURES 59 Once admit that the evil is real, and once grasp the true principles upon which an improved system should be based, and the remedial measures cannot well escape the fertile and practical minds of the officers who are entrusted at the present time with the training of the Army. -I IV NATIONAL STRATEGY A GENERATION ago France lay prostrate and the German Empire was bom. When men began to seek the causes of these mighty events they were found to be the natural result of patient careful military preparation by a number of highly trained Prussian officers, and of want of military foresight on the part of the French. No more striking example of the effect of careful scientific study of military problems on the part of the victors and of careless methods on the part of the vanquished can be found in history. From that period dates a new military era. The lessons of 1870-71 were taken seriously to heart by all the civilised Powers of the world. Even through the Far East, to which Western ideas had hitherto been aUen, the shock of the four great battles on the Rhenish frontier per- meated, and Japan became, in a marvellously short space of time, a factor in the pohtical and strategic problems of mankind. 60 IMPERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 61 Rapidly the Great Powers began to set their mihtary households in order — adopting the German model ; while France, slowly recover- ing from the exhaustion of war, thanks to the marvellous frugality of her people, gradually resumed her historic place in the Councils of Europe. But England, while she added enormous tracts in North and South Africa to the Empire, only half grasped the truth that the responsibilities of Imperial rule involve corresponding effort, although by the combined action of a few far- sighted writers in the Press and one or two patriotic sailors, the Fleet, which had been permitted to sink below the level of safety, was placed upon an adequate footing. Just as the books of Seeley had opened the eyes of his countrymen to the expansion of their Empire, so the writings of Mahan expounded to all men the doctrine of the value of Sea-Power. Under the romantic spell of Lord Beaconsfield the full meaning of Imperial rule began slowly to dawn on the minds of Britons. A prolific and hardy race, squeezed out of their narrow islands, their surplus energy aided by their love of fighting, suddenly became aware that they had created such an Empire as the world had never known. It was a growth rather than a creation; a struggle for existence rather than for power. A new school of pohtical thought Wmu et NATIONAL STRATEGY swept the old ideas away, and the parochial politician of the nineteenth became the colonial statesman of the twentieth century. Some future historian will, doubtless, trace the economic and social forces which drove congeries of States into closer union, and which brought about first the growth, then the con- ception, and finally the clash of Empires. Scientific thought is uncongenial to the British temperament in commerce and in statecraft. As we have Uved, so we live on from hand to mouth and from day to day. There are, how- ever, times when some great danger from which the country has contrived to escape brings home to us the vast risks which are incurred by the neglect of principles and truths which history and experience teach. At such moments England pauses, and surveys for a short time her sea-girt Empire, and counts the forces upon which that Empire rests, and against which it may have to contend. Such a breathing space was granted after the recent war in South Africa, and upon the correctness of the estimate thus formed the future may possibly depend. Though some may yet be found to deny that the material prosperity and moral greatness of England rest largely on her Imperial status, the sense of our countrymen all over the world holds to the contrary opinion; while all aUke would admit that Imperial rule can have no other WAR AND PREPARATION 6S ultimate basis than adequate and organised physical force. In a memorable phrase Mahan has summed up the case, and has shown how "Nelson's storm-tossed ships, on which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the Empire of the World." u "War, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and passionate drama." Yet, Jomini would not have denied that scientific preparation for war contributes largely to success. A nation in case of war should have determined before- hand where to strike, and should be prepared to strike. In 1866 and again in 1870, Prussia reaped the advantage of forethought and scientific preparation. Koniggratz, and the four great battles of August and September 1870, are a tribute to intellectual quite as much as to material force. Austria and France went to war eii amateur. The French Commanders had a loosely con- ceived plan of a dash across the Rhine, and of interposing a French army between northern and southern Germany. As a strategical con- ception the plan was not unsound, but no details t M I 84 NATIONAL STRATEGY had been worked out for rapid mobilisation, and still less for concentration ; and long before any advance could be made, the victorious Prussian armies had taken the initiative invaluable in war and were over the frontier, threatening the road to Paris. In 1 ST6 the Russians, in spite of overwhelm- ing numbers, failed to reap the fruits of enormous sacrifices, by neglect of that primary duty of great aggressive Empires, which is to be pre- pared for war in times of profound peace. In 1899 Great Britain exhibited to the world similar failings. On the other hand, the striking successes of Japan proved once more, if proof were wanted, the inestimable value in war of readiness and forethought. It is well known that for years the Japanese fully foresaw the certainty of a struggle with Russia. Schemes were elaborated and every detail of preparation attended to with precision and care, so that the long-expected blow fell where it had been planned to fall, with extra- ordinary rapidity and success. Again we have the triumph of intellectual force exemplified, when material forces were not unequally balanced. It is realised in Germany that the French have learnt the lesson of 1870, and that some of the acutest minds in France have been for FRENCH PREPARATIONS 66 many years devoted to the consideration of problems of defence and offence. That the French have not adopted the views of German strategists, but have struck out a line of defence based on different principles of war, is also fully realised at Berlin ; and there is no German officer of distinction who is not aware that in a future struggle between the two nations the contest will not be decided on the battlefields of 1870-71. The French have, by a chain of fortresses of great strength closing all roads upon which it would be possible to penetrate into France from the east and north east, " deprived strategy of its mobility," and they will be practically able in any future war with their old antagonists to select their own field of battle. There is no reason to doubt that the French can concentrate their field army, in positions long since selected, as rapidly as the Germans. These are the factors of the problems which the Great General Staff at Berlin are con- tinually engaged in considering. There are many divergent opinions as to their proper solution, and only the test of war can decide their relative merits ; but the German Staff are bound, by every claim of prudence, to decide upon a definite scheme, and to keep ready all the essential orders and instructions for the strategic concentration of their armies. 66 NATIONAL STRATEGY NEW CONSIDERATIONS 67 !<• < 11 > No one with any knowledge of the scientific habits of thought characteristic of Germans doubts that every detail is complete and every order ready to be issued. It is worth while here to consider a few of the problems which those concerned with tl^defence of the British Empire have to solve, as well as the machinery employed hitherto for their solu- tion. It may then be possible to draw some con- clusion as to what still requires to be provided. How many Englishmen alive are there who have thought consecutively and scientifically upon National Strategy? And of these, how many are in the direct employ of the State for this purpose? The problems involved are numerous and ever-changing, as new responsi- bilities are incurred and when the conditions of warfare are modified by scientific invention. The occupation of Egypt, the annexation of the Dutch Republics in South Africa, and the Japanese Alliance, profoundly affected the National Strategy of the Empire. The inven- tion of the submarine vessel, and the Marconi system of telegraphy, will unquestionably lead to still greater modifications. The occupation of Egypt, followed as it must be by the consolidation of French influence in Morocco,^ cannot fail to affect conditions in 1 This was written before the Treaty with France was made public. the Mediterranean, which has ever been, and still remains, the centre of European gravity. The removal of a menace to our Colonial possessions in South Africa, and the provision of an unrivalled and secure training-ground for troops half way between these islands and the East Indies, opens up novel strategic questions which await solution. Submarine boats, coupled with a system of rapid communication by wireless telegraphy, will not impossibly alter the schemes of defence for our coaling stations all over the world. The Japanese Alliance, coupled with the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Far East, has changed the balance of Sea Power in the Pacific. On the other hand, the growing fleets of the United States and of Germany introduce from year to year fresh elements and new political considerations. The questions confronting the Great General Staff of the German Army are constantly under- going revision, but they are simple and stable compared with those affecting our world-wide Empire. There is hardly any point on the earth's surface which can change ownership, and certainly no modification in the relative power of any two foreign states can take place, without affecting the National Strategy of Great Britain. The Admiralty possess a well-organised system 68 NATIONAL STRATEGY of recording, in times of peace, the move- ment of ships all over the world. At any hour during the day the Sea Lords are able to locate the position of a British or foreign vessel, and to calculate the precise effect upon our fleets of the movements of foreign ships of war. The Naval Intelligence Branch can thus from (la) to day amend and alter plans for the distribu- tion of the Fleet, as well as schemes of naval defence, in the event of the country being suddenly and unexpectedly plunged into war. Our Admirals are constantly reminded that the supremacy of the seas may, at any time, be decided within a space of twenty -four hours. In order to face such an eventuahty with prospects of success, the ever - varying con- ditions under which the Battle Fleet may have to contend are constantly kept in view. But by what competent authority are the ever - changing conditions of Imperial Strategy systematically considered ? NATIONAL DEFENCE 69 III Private and pubUc records show that from the close of the Peninsular War to the end of the South African Campaign no systematic con- sideration of what can best be described as National Strategy existed, either within the Cabinet or the Departments of State. The Duke of Wellington could not altogether divest himself of military instinct, in spite of the cares of domestic policy. Lord Palmerston possessed a taste for such problems. Lord Beaconsfield took aerial flights into the region of Imperial defence. But it has been left to publicists, without any special knowledge, but dependent upon newspapers and books, to endeavour to inspire Englishmen with the spirit of strategical enquiry. Mahan's work came as a revelation. The influence of Sea Power is now, after a few short years, a platitude of poUtical journalisrn, but the deeper practical lessons of Mahan's teaching have been learnt slowly, and have only quite recently — aided by the South African War— borne fruit. To Lord Salisbury belongs the credit of having appointed a Committee of the Cabinet for the consideration of questions of National Defence. Presided over by the Duke of Devonshire, the Committee met seldom, and generally for the consideration of some urgent question of the moment, but from this evanescent creation there was evolved, when Mr Balfour became Prime Minister, a very different body, with wider aims and greater aptitudes. For the first time in English history some attention was given, by responsible statesmen, to National and Imperial Strategy, involving £ 2 '!! . 70 NATIONAL STRATEGY not only the Military but the Naval and Indian forces of the Crown. In Mr Balfour the country possessed a Minister with a mind sharpened by dialectics, and a temper chastened by philosophic enquiry, who was pecuUarly fitted for the task of sifting the often conflicting opinions of military and naval experts. His judicial summaries and final decisions are recorded in State papers of quite extraordinary interest and value. These documents form the earliest record of an attempt to deal systematically with questions affecting National Strategy. For some years a Colonial Defence Committee and a joint Naval and Military Committee had constantly met to discuss the defence of isolated stations within the Empire; but the power of initiative was wanting on both bodies, and many of their recommendations passed unheeded. Their purview^ was not wide enough, and their functions were very properly limited. The Defence Committee, on the other hand, as now constituted, deals with the largest problems, and, having the Prime Minister as Chairman, contains within itself the source of political and practical initiative. Mr Balfour claimed the right to vary its component parts, for, like the first idea of the Cabinet itself, time is required to enable this MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 71 novel growth to take root in the political institu- tions of the country. Signs have not been wanting of misconception and jealousy aroused in the minds of politicians mistrustful of a novel pohtical force, which they do not see their way to control by campaigns on the platform or in the Press. The Defence Committee has been hitherto in name a Committee of the Cabinet. In reahty it has been nothing of the kind. While the Prime Minister has been the Chairman of it, and the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, and occasionally other Secretaries of State have been summoned to attend, its most important members have been the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty and the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Commander- in-Chief and the Director-General of MiUtary Intelligence, and recently the Chief of the General Staff" and the Director of MiUtary Operations at the War Office. The principal Members of the Indian Council were summoned to its deliberations when questions affecting India were under discussion, and on one occasion an eminent Colonist was asked to be present. In order to realise the novelty of this pro- cedure, and the change which has occurred, it is only necessary to note that durmg the early sittings of the South African War Commission, 72 NATIONAL STRATEGY when Sir William Nicholson, then Director- General of Military Intelligence, was asked whether his assistance had ever been sought by the Defence Committee, he not only replied in the negative, but professed complete ignorance of the procedure, and almost the existence, of that mysterious body/ That, within a few months, a Committee pre- sided over by the Prime Minister, constituted with the full knowledge and regular assistance of the principal Naval and Military Authorities, should meet as often as once a week for the systematic discussion of Imperial questions of Defence, and should attempt to lay down principles of Imperial and National Strategy, and to work out schemes for defensive, and, if necessary, for offensive operations of War, is a starthng and welcome innovation in our methods of government. So far, Mr Balfour's work, by far the most important and far-reaching act of his Administra- tion, is admirable, and full of hopeful possibilities. Much, however, remains to be done. IV The primary step should be to give continuity and permanence to the Defence Committee. 1 Similar questions were purposely put to other hi^h military authorities with similar results. GRAVE DEFECTS 7S Records of great value, embodying the labours of the Committee, are at present scattered among its Members, or in charge of an extemporised secretary.^ There are no arrangements ensuring that Mr Balfour s work, and the decisions of the Committee, will be placed at the service of his successor in office. Not only may this involve work bemg done over again, but the threads of a policy may easily become entangled or lost. There is no Staff, and there are no records, by which the tradition can be handed on from one Administration to another. In order to remedy this grave defect, it is desirable to apply the principles which govern the Civil Service of the country to the Defence Committee, and to supply the Prime Minister with a Branch or Department, whose business would be to preserve the records, and thus safe- guard the traditions of National Strategy. For these purposes a Secretary and a small Staff and a suitable building are required. It has been proposed that this Department should be under the Prime Minister of the day, and the Secretary should be the Secretary of the Defence Committee. He would attend its meetings, where he would have no voice, but he would be the compiler of its minutes and the guardian of its records. 1 The suggestions contained in Section IV. have been adopted. 74 NATIONAL STRATEGY If 1 :!l Several objections have been urged to the appointment of such an official, but they are none of them convincing, and they cannot even be said to be weighty. It has been urged that a Permanent Secretary to the Defence Committee would, if he were a capable man, acquire too preponderating an authority in the National Councils. Precisely the same argument could be urged against the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, yet successive Civil servants of great ability have filled that high office to the advantage of the State. It is urged that such an official and his staff would interfere with the work of the Chief of the General Staff of the War Office, and thereby create confusion and friction. It is, however, obvious that their functions need not clash. The problems which the Defence Committee are asked to solve are problems involving con- siderations not solely of a military character, but concerned with Naval, Indian, Colonial, and Political issues with which the Chief of the General Staff is not of necessity primarily in touch. Many examples could be given, but two will suffice. Take the alliance between England and Japan, and assume the status quo before the outbreak QUESTIONS OF DEFENCE 75 of hostiUties between Japan and Russia as the conditions precedent: should Hong-Kong be defended, and if so how, are essentially problems for the Defence Committee. Another question which has often been asked, but has never yet been answered, that is, for what purposes is the British Army required ? is one to which the Defence Committee might pay some degree of regard. On the other hand, assuming that Hong-Kong is to be defended by troops and forts,^ what number of troops are required, and of what type ? These are questions for the General Staff of the Army ; and it would be for the General Staff to say, when once the purposes for which the British Army is intended have been laid down, what numbers are wanted, and how they should be distributed. In short. National Strategy, though it must be considered by the General Staff of the Army, must be decided by the Defence Committee, whereas purely Military Strategy is in all its bearings mainly a matter for the General Staff, just as Naval Strategy is mainly a matter for the Intelligence Branch of the Admiralty. In discussing the functions of the Defence Committee, it should not be forgotten that both the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the General Staff are invariably summoned to its dehbera- * This is merely a hypothesis, and not a suggestion. 1 #j HI \t ii' 76 NATIONAL STRATEGY tions. as well as their principal Assistants, so that upon questions of Imperial Strategy they have their say, although a final decision rests with neither of them. _ To suppose that complicated questions ot Imperial Strategy, involving combined Naval and Military preparations, and possibly the assistance of India, or the adherence of the Colonies, could be settled satisfactorily by the Admiralty, or the War Office, or by commumca- tions between the two Departments, as they were formerly carried on, is to exhibit a confused sense of practical possibilities, as well as callous- ness to the lessons of experience. That hitherto there has been a want of co- ordination between the two great Services is not only a fact, but it is explained by the absence of a proper co-ordinating body. The Cabinet, as a whole, has neither the time nor the special capacity for the task. Most of its Members are not qualified to consider and decide the questions involved, but, above all, they are occupied with duties, parliamentary and admims- trative, which take up all their available time. The Defence Committee, as constituted by Mr Balfour, may not be an ideal body, as con- ceivable by a Siey^s or any other constitution- monger, but it is a practical and workable machine, which fits in with our i'arliamentary and Administrative Institutions, and in no degree WHAT MIGHT HAVEJIBEEN? T7 impairs the final responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament. And it is reasonable to expect that, when supplied with a suitable Staff, the Defence Committee will fulfil duties vital to the safety of the Empire, which up to the present time have been insufficiently performed ; and that we may look forward to possessing Naval and Military Forces calculated upon their joint and not separate uses, and distributed economically with regard to our Imperial requirements. The origin and opening of the Boer War is so fresh in the minds of our countrymen that it is worth while to consider what course events might have taken had the Defence Committee been constituted as at present, and in operation, during the three years preceding the Ultimatum of Mr Kruger in October 1899. Would it, for instance, have been necessary for a Director-General of the Ordnance, possessing the independence of character of Sir Henry Brackenbury, to prefer such an indictment as that officer laid before the Government in December of that year, after the outbreak of the war, showing the utter unpreparedness of the country to undertake the initial defence of the Empire in case of attack? ft 78 NATIONAL STRATEGY SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS 79 Would it have been possible for the Boers to have armed themselves to the teeth during three years, with the full knowledge of the MiUtary Authorities in PaU Mall, and to have prepared for hostilities which could only have had one possible objective, without any corresponding preparation on the part of the British Govern- ment, even so elementary as the thorough map- ping of Natal and of the north of Cape Colony ? Would it have been possible to carry on political negotiations for many months in a dangerous state of tension without adequate consideration being given to questions of supply and the accumulation of animal and wheeled transport, and of an initial plan of campaign ? Would it have been possible to have over- looked for three crucial years the vital importance of Delagoa Bay, and to have failed to make arrangements with Portugal, impossible after the outbreak of war, but which, had they been made in time of peace, might have shortened the conflict by two years ? It is not contended that all these questions were primarily for the Defence Committee. They are, several of them, purely military matters, with which a well - organised General Staff could adequately deal. But they all of them possess a bearing upon National Strategy of immense importance, and in view of the political exi- gencies of the time, could not have escaped the consideration of a Prime Minister, had he been constantly in personal touch with the Naval and Military Authorities, not spasmodically, but in the natural and ordinary way of business at weekly meetings of the Defence Committee. It is always undesirable to tread the delicate ground of hypothesis when discussing Inter- national relations; but after all, the decaying Persian Empire, the growing power of Russia in the East, the storm -swayed kingdom of Afghanistan, and our Imperial interests in the Indian Ocean are realities and not dreams. Possible new combinations of Great Powers, the shipbuilding estimates of rival States, the Oriental Renaissance, led by Japan, are conditions of the future which cannot be ignored. It is wholly unscientific, it is not common- sense, to contend that problems based upon considerations such as these should be left to some fugitive hour of a Cabinet discussion, or to the chance reflections of a harassed, but more than ordinarily prescient. Minister. They and many others which will occur to the mind of every Englishman are the subject matter for a Defence Committee. They are fruitful of thought and labour, because they are ever- changing. It is only a man ungifted with imagination, or hide-bound with red tape, who could contend that a *' permanent nucleus " — as the Department for 80 NATIONAL STRATEGY the Defence Committee has been called— is not as much wanted for the President of such a Committee as for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, or for even the Board of Agri- culture. To maintain, as some do, that to consider care- fully problems which may only be soluble by force of arms, and to be prepared for war, is to increase the risk of War, is a futile contention, and there is no clearer proof of its futility than this fact, that of all Great Nations on the earth, the British Empire has displayed least military forethought, and yet, for fifty years, hardly a year has passed when Peace has reigned within her frontiers. Yet, it must not be assumed that because the Fates have been exceptionally kind, and because we have, as one of our Prime Ministers has said, hitherto "muddled through" successfully, we shall inevitably be so fortunate. In the long run, luck in War is on the side of statesmen who by prudence and forethought bend it to their will. 27M March 1904. THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY' It is with some trepidation and reluctance that I consented, at the request of Sir John French, to speak to such an audience and in such a place. Nothing but the unvarying kindness which I have received in this command would have tempted me, for I do not claim to possess any of the aptitudes of a lecturer, or the skill of that large body of persons who seem to enjoy addressing their fellow-countrymen. I must ask your pardon beforehand, should I, during what I have to say, lapse into a tone which may be thought didactic. It would show a want of courtesy, which I should regret ; but the mere term "lecture" imphes a form of speech which is far from the spirit in which I am addressing you. Another doubt which has assailed me is the difficulty of a topic. I could not venture to speak to you upon a purely military subject, and I was tempted to decline altogether, when • A lecture delivered at Aldershot 16th January 1907, to the officers of the command. 81 ' [U 8ie THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY I remembered a lecture to which I listened with great interest, and I hope some advantage, years ago, on the value of the study of modern history to professional men. It then occurred to me that I might be able to say something on the value of the study of modern history to a soldier, which might perhaps be of interest. We are all of us apt to confound the educa- tional importance of the study of a subject, with its direct professional use : and to forget that the greatest zeal and enthusiasm for pro- fessional detail will not save a man, in the outer world, from being treated as an ignoramus, by men whose ability he cannot deny, if his pro- fessional aptitude is not based upon a wide foundation of professional knowledge. But what, it may be asked, has this to do with the study of modern history, or with the connection between that study and the pro- fession of arms ? The answer is, that every officer, if he is worth his salt, hopes and expects to become a general, that a general is almost bound to have duties thrust upon him beyond those of actual com- mand, and that modern history is the school of generalship. It has often been pointed out that war is not an exact science, but a great drama, played — with more or less skill — by actors swayed by liiauaii passion and human weakness. And THE VALUE OF HISTORY 85 modern history, being in great measure the illustration and the record of human passions and weakness, becomes an integral part of the knowledge without which no actor on the stage of what is so aptly called the theatre of war can successfully play his part. Before, however, pursuing the enquiry as to what constitutes modern history from the point of view of the soldier, and the various methods of studying it, I should Uke to draw your atten- tion for a moment to the manifestations of the value of a knowledge of it in the careers of some of the greatest of your predecessors. Of our own countrymen, the commanders in war who loom largest in the eyes of all men beyond, as well as within these islands, are Marlborough, Wellington, and Nelson. Of the Duke of Marlborough it was said by his brilliant contemporary, Bohngbroke, "that he was the greatest statesman and the greatest general that this country, or any other country, had ever produced." It is not to the exagger- ated terms of this eulogy that I wish to draw your attention, but to the circumstance that to his statesmanship, rather than to generalship, priority is given by so shrewd a judge as Bolingbroke. In order to realise the skill of Marlborough as a statesman and diplomatist, we must think of the period between RamiUies and Oudenarde, and of his uninterruptedly > ' ■ I m 84 THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY intimate relations with Prince Eugene, and his management of Charles XII. of Sweden. From his despatches to Godolphin, and his corre- spondence with Prince Eugene, it becomes evident that although he was proud of saying that his historical knowledge was confined to the pages of Shakespeare, his generalship was founded on reasoned information about the history of his time, and that this information was the mainspring of his extraordinary success. What has been said of Marlborough is pro- foundly true, that his transcendent ability as a general, a statesman, a diplomatist and an administrator, guided not only England, but Europe, through the war of the Spanish succes- sion. The question I want you to consider is, what chance this country would have had in maintaining the struggle against the ambition of Louis XIV., had our destinies been entrusted to a soldier less deeply versed in the knowledge of the great problems at issue, and of the history of the nations with which he was brought into contact and into conflict. To open casually, almost at any page, the despatches of the Duke of Wellington, is to be struck by his thorough acquaintance with, not only the personality of the men who were directing the armies of Europe, but with the cross-motives of statesmen and politicians, of states and provinces, and of the historical causes WELLINGTON AND NELSON 86 which were operating not only in Europe, but beyond the Atlantic, and which aU. directly or indirectly, affected the difficult attempt in which he was engaged, to hang on to the edge of the Spanish Peninsula, against apparently over- whelming force. An iUustration of his range of information may be found in a memorandum dated the 8th February 1808, in which he discusses at great length the pohcy of effecting a revolution in the Spanish dominions of America. It is as good an example as any other which may be culled from his despatches, of the trained mind, and wide knowledge, which, quite as much as the prestige of his victories, enabled him to hold his own, not only with those who were opposing him at home, but with the shrewdest inteUects of the Continent at the Congress of Vienna, and during the whole of the year 1815, pre- ceding and following the Battle of Waterioo. Of Nelson it is difficult to speak in this con- nection, without apparent exaggeration of phrase. Upon his power of penetrating the schemes of his opponents, upon his acute and decisive under- standing of political situations, rest his greatest achievements. His failures too are worth study, for they were nearly always failures to persuade his superiors to do the right thing, and to impart to them his marvellous insight. Those who have taken Nelson largely on trust, may dwell on his F ^ if 86 THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY sailor's instinct, but those who have looked at his vast correspondence will appreciate the amount of time and thought which throughout his life he gave to the history of that century of fighting which led up to the final destruction of the French and Spanish fleets. To use a phrase which is very familiar to you, Nelson's " Appreciations " of the political factors governing a situation, such, for instance, as that which confronted Great Britain when face to face with the Northern Combination in 1801, are an object lesson to all those upon whom the responsibility of high command in war may fall. Without that profound study of which I have spoken, such accurate insight would degenerate into guess work and mere conjectures. From this digression I would ask you to go back to the enquiry as to what constitutes modern history from the point of view of the soldier. One of the greatest masters of our language in the nineteenth century, perhaps the greatest and a very peace-loving man— once defined a soldier's duty. " A soldier's vow," he said, " to his country is that he will die for the guardian- ship of her domestic virtue, of her righteous laws, and of her anyway challenged, or endangered honour." If we accept this definition, the study of modern history would appear to embrace, for a soldier, an examination of such possible or probable contingencies as might imperil the THE SOLDIERS DUTY 87 domestic virtue or righteous laws of our country, or endanger our national honour. It must be evident that the domestic virtue, by which the writer meant the hearths and homes of our people, can only be imperilled by external attack. Righteous laws, on the other hand, may be subverted by internal convulsion. While our national honour is bound up with the maintenance of our engagements to other states, and with our responsibility for subject races and our dependencies all over the world. It is to modern history that the soldier, and the statesman, must look for guidance, if he seeks to forecast the possible peril, and the actual duties and responsibilities, which may at any time lay upon him the burden of redeeming his vow. In a lecture of this kind it is impossible to be exhaustive, and I can only venture upon a few illustrations of my meaning. There is no phrase, which from the days of EHzabeth, Englishmen have been fonder of, when speaking of their country, than that of this " Sea-girt Isle." It has always appealed to our self-complacency, and to a comfortable sense of security. Long since the phrase has ceased to have its ancient meaning, and to bear the sense m which our forefathers used it. But men use it still, and indeed what in slang terms is called the '' Blue Water School " base their contention i ri 88 THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY upon its descriptive accuracy. Yet, if modem history teaches any lesson at all, it is the trans- formation of this island kingdom into an Empire with frontiers, like those of other states, con- tiguous to the military powers of the world. Although the British are an island race, they are no longer an island state. When I first made this remark (upon the epigrammatic turn of which I rather prided myself) to a young officer, I was told it was a platitude. What is the meaning of platitude ? It means a truth so obvious as not to require defending or even perhaps stating. If then this notion that we are no longer an island state is so obvious that it hardly requires defending or even stating, the theories of the extreme " Blue Water School" have no sound historical basis. I am not alluding here to the school of thought, at the head of which stands Sir John Fisher— a master of the arts of naval strategy and of parliamentary tactics— but of the exaggerators, the men who, to serve some political end, tear a sound reason to tatters. For stripped of verbiage, the argument of the extreme " Blue Water School" amounts to this, that Great Britain requires for defence the strongest possible Navy, and subject to that condition, her Army may be reduced to a police force for the Empire in time of peace. CAPTAIN MAHAN 89 There never was a more fatal illusion. I do not suppose there is a soldier here who does not believe in the Navy, or who doubts that with our seafaring population, our coasts and harbours, our possessions scattered over the ocean, and our enormous population dependant upon food imports, the first duty of a statesman is to ensure that our Fleet should be at least equal to the fleets of any two powers not only in Europe but in the world. That is common ground. I yield to no one in admiration for the historical and reflective writings of Captain Mahan. His books on "Sea Power" opened up a new phase of military thought, not only in Europe and America, but in the Far East, and have produced a world-wide effect. But, at the same time, I know of no recent writings that have indirectly done more mischief in this country, by strengthening our self-complacent attitude of mind, and by inducing us to hold more strongly than ever to the view that we are, thanks to a powerful Navy, safeguarded against attack and disaster. To hold such a view is to misread not only modern history, but ancient history as well. It is not Captain Mahan's fault that his mean- ing has been travestied, and his deductions misrepresented and misunderstood. It would seem clear that the inference he desires to draw !i f^' \ I I Ml 4 nil 90 THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY from the events which are so admirably described in his books, is that, other things being equal, the command of the sea gives victory; and that without adequate sea-power no nation is a "great power." Any one ftimiliar with the modem history of Europe would understand that when Captain ^lahan, in a fine passage, says that "Nelson's storm -tossed ships upon which Napoleon had never looked, stood between him and the dominion of the world," he never meant to imply or suggest that the rising of Europe after 1812, and the coalition armies, and Wellingtons tenacity in the Peninsula, were not quite as important factors in destroying Napoleon's supremacy in Europe as the British Fleet. In 1806 — a year after Trafalgar — we were in complete command of the sea. The French and Spanish fleets were non-existent. Yet Napoleon w^as at the height of his power after Jena, and practically master of the Continent. Suppose for a moment that the treaty of Tilsit had remained operative, and that the Franco- Russian aUiance had been maintained unbroken, of what avail would have been Nelson's victory or ColUngwood's all-powerful fleet ? We should have been forced to make peace, Belgium and Holland would have remained French possessions, slowly but surely we must have lost command of the sea, and the British Empire, BLUE WATER SCHOOL 91 commercially and politically, as we know it, would never have come into existence. The study of modern history suggests this comment upon the doctrines of the extreme "Blue Water School," that sea-power may be a decisive but cannot be the sole factor in a war for empire, just as an overwhelmingly powerful artillery may be the decisive but cannot be the sole factor in determining the fate of a battle. I have but to remind you of the American civil war, and of the causes which led to the ultimate triumph of the North, to recall another example of the truth of this proposition. Captain Mahan's thesis has been mischievously used to prove much more than he contended for. He has, for instance, never maintained that in the great wars for European independence against Louis XIV. and Napoleon, victory was achieved by fleet power alone, and his volumes show clearly how much aUve he is to the fact that, in order to bring those wars to a final conclusion, vast armies were required, which in numbers exceeded those of France. He would be the first to assert that for the national security of Great Britain, and for the safety of our vast heterogeneous empire, a powerful Navy is a necessity, but it is incredible that he would deny that a large military force for defence against aggression, and possibly to check the abnormal and dangerous growth of ! > I 1 .1 Ji liJ! I: 148 QUEEN VICTORIA'S JOURNALS of Irish Disestablishment through a Tory House of Lords appeals to the Sovereign for assistance, and achieves success through her mediation. What a confusion of democratic ideals is there I Institutions more hide-bound, less malleable, would not have stood the strain — and these volumes of the Queen's Correspondence contain lessons for all who, for the sake of symmetry, or abstract polity, or momentary convenience, may desire to substitute dogmatic restriction and a statutory formula for so flexible a medium of Government. If I have made my meaning clear, the value of a Monarchical system like ours should be enhanced by a study of the Queen's Correspondence. Unqualified eulogy would be unworthy of our subject, and the last thing Queen Victoria would have desired. In her public capacity as Sovereign of these realms she occasionally committed errors of judgment ; but not often. It would be vain to select examples either for praise or blame. We have been engaged upon an examination of causes and results, rather than upon a critical estimate of specific acts. This, however, I should like to say. I have had exceptional opportunities of examining at first hand the inner history of a reign, extending over sixty years, during which every document was preserved —even the least important of VERY FEW MISTAKES UO telegrams. It has been my duty to arrange this vast mass of political papers with as much care as I could devote to the task, and I can assert, with the fullest conviction, that I have found no trace of any grave mistake committed by the Queen in her capacity as Sovereign. Perhaps the only serious error made by the Queen was her seclusion during the long period from 1861 to 1874 — when she allowed her deep feelings as a woman to prevail against the claims made upon her as Head of the State. But these claims were of the lesser kind. The greater claims she met during those years in a degree which will only be fully realised, if it should become possible to publish a further selection of her correspondence during that period. She displayed none of the graver faults of the greatest of her predecessors on the Throne. Although often treated with ingrati- tude she never showed the resentment of Elizabeth. The cold indifference characteristic of WiUiam III. was foreign to her nature. Although she resembled in many ways her grandfather, George III., she could have been relied upon not to misunderstand the American Colonies. It is necessary to speak of her private Ufe — it was so bound up with her public life — and upon the connection between these her influence over her people mainly rested. At this point, K 2 Ji, m .11' 150 QUEEN VICTORIA'S JOURNALS owing to His Majesty the King's gracious per- mission to quote from her Journals, the Queen has spoken and can speak for herself. I have known of no better way to bring home to you the deep underlying truth about Queen Victoria than to quote her own words, at different and characteristic periods of her life. The passages I have quoted were not intended when they were written for any eye but hers. It was only many, many years later, when con- fronted with fabulous statements about herself and her family, which had obtained credence, that she began to contemplate usmg material accumulated over a long period of time, for the purpose of giving a picture, that was truthful, of persons and events so absurdly travestied. This change of sentiment about pubhcity in- fluenced her to print extracts from her Journals, and subsequently determined His Majesty the King to allow the pubUcation of her corre- spondence. When I spoke of the importance of atmosphere in history, and the difficulty of creating it, I had, as I have said, already determined not to make the attempt. My intention was to give you pictures of the Queen in her own words. We have had a glimpse of the Child Princess in that "Palace in a Garden" which appealed so strongly to the author of '' Sybil," the hours passed in the sclioolroom with the Dean of HER EARLY LIFE 151 Chester, or at a music-lesson, or washing her terrier *' Dash," with an occasional ride on her pony, accompanied by her mother, and on Sundays making extracts of the sermon. There was the weekly letter from her uncle, King Leopold, to be read, and perhaps a lecture to be heard in the presence of her Mother, from Baron Stockmar. She played with her dolls. There were hundreds of them, small dolls, most of which she dressed herself, and ticketed with well-known names of illustrious persons whom she had seen dining at Kensington Palace, or whom she had watched from the Duchess of Kent's box at the Opera. All these dolls were carefully preserved and are alive to this day numbered and catalogued in the young Princess's child hand. Then suddenly she was Queen. After her Accession her life completely changed. To comparative isolation and greyness succeeded a period of high tension and keen enjoyment. Rose, not grey, became the prevailing colour. Her mind expanded at the touch of this wonder- ful spring time. A secluded maiden, whose only draught at the fountain of life had been an evening at the theatre, was suddenly translated from the schoolroom to the most exciting spheres of politics and of regal state. Her companions were thenceforth Ministers of State, her Ministers. She no longer dressed dolls, but presided at li 152 QUEEN VICTORIANS JOURNALS Councils. She, who had never walked down the staircase at Kensington Palace unless held by the hand, hke a little child, rode twenty miles of a morning, at the head of a cavalcade of courtiers. She, who had spent her mornings with the excel- lent Dean of Chester, reading geography, now spent her afternoons with her Prime Minister, discussing the affairs of Europe. But the aroma of the schoolroom was about her still. Here is her Journal for Monday, 2nd April 1838 :— " 1 said to Lord Melbourne I was so stupid that I must beg him to explain to me about Sir William Follett again; he answered very kindly; 'It is not stupid, but I daresay you can't understand it ' ; and he explained it to me like a kind father would do to his child ; he has something so fatherly, and so affectionate and kind in him, that one must love him.'* A week later the Queen writes describing one of many evenings spent with her Prime Minister at Buckingham Palace : — " Sunday, April 8. — Lord Melbourne looked over one of the Volumes (the 6th) of a work called * Gallery of Portraits ' ; there are portraits of all sorts of famous people in it, with short Memoirs of them attached to them. Lord Melbourne looked carefully over each, reading the accounts of the people and admiring the prints. I wish I had time to write down all the clever observa- tions he made about all. It is quite a delight for me to hear him speak about all these things ; he LORD MELBOURNE 158 has such stores of knowledge ; such a wonderful memory ; he knows about everybody and every- thing ; who they were, and what they did ; and he imparts all his knowledge in such a kind and agreeable manner ; it does me a world of good ; and his conversations always improve one greatly. " I shall just name a few of the people he observed upon : — Rayleigh, Hobbes, who was * an infidel philosopher ' ; he had been tutor to one of the Earls of Devonshire, he said ; Knox : — Lord Melbourne observed that those Scotch Reformers were very violent people ; but that Knox denied having been so harsh to Mary Queen of Scots as she said he had been ; Lord Mansfield; Melancthon, whose name means Black Earth in Greek, and whose head he admired; Pitt, whose print Lord Melbourne said was very like ; — * he died in 1806 when I came into Parliament.' He (Ld M) came in for Leinster ; Wesley, Lord Melbourne said the greatest number of Dis- senters were Wesleyans ; he read from the book that there were (at his death) 135,000 of his followers ; Porson, Lord Melbourne said : ' 1 knew him ; he was a great Greek scholar ' ; and looking at the print — ' it's very like him. ' Leibnitz, a great German philosopher, and a correspondent of Queen Caroline, wife to George II. ; spoke of her being so learned and her whole Court too ; ' the Tories laughed at it very much,' and Swift ridiculing the Maids of Honour wrote : — * Since they talk to Dr Clark, They now venture in the Dark.' Addison, Lord Melbourne admires his • Spectator,' his * Cato ' he also admires, but says it's not like a Roman tragedy; 'there is so much love in it' Addison died at Holland House ; he disagreed very much with his wife, Lady Warwick. Holland House was built, he i i 1 l. II* 154 QUEEN VICTORIA'S JOURNALS said by Rich, Lord Holland in the reign of Charles 1st. Madame de Stael, whose print he thought very like ; ' She had good eyes, she was very vain of her arms.' She was over here in '15 and died in '17, aged 51 ; she disliked dying very much; Lord Melbourne also knew her daughter the Duchesse de Broghe ; he said 'Louis Philippe dislikes her as much as Napoleon did her Mother: Lord Melbourne saw Madame de Broghe for a moment when he was at Paris for the last time in 1825. He read from the book, and with great emphasis, the following passage, what Napoleon said of Madame de Stael; — 'They pretend that she neither talks politics nor mentions me-; but I know not how it happens that people seem to like me less after visiting her.' Queen Elizabeth ; spoke of her, and that her mother must have been very handsome ; etc. " Spoke of pictures ; Lord Melbourne does not admire Murillo much, nor Rubens ; he so greatly prefers the Italian Masters to any others; spoke of subjects for painting; of the Holy Family being constantly painted. * After all,' he said, ' a woman and a child is the most beautiful subject one can have.' " Then she adds : — " It was a most delightful evening." There is nothing very remarkable in these utterances of Lord Melbourne. The interesting aspect of them is the circumstances in which they were deUvered. The normal evenings were spent in this fashion, following after mornings consumed in reading despatches, and in signing HER DAILY LIFE 155 her name, to be succeeded by afternoons occupied in riding through the streets and through the crowds that waited daily at Hyde Park Corner to see the Queen : — " At I past 12, 1 rode out with Lord Conyng- ham. Lord Uxbridge, Lord Byron, Lady Mary, dearest Lehzen, Miss Cavendish, Miss Quentain, Sir F. Stovin and Col. Cavendish, and came home at ^ p. 3, having ridden tvcenty-two miles. . . . We rode very hard and Tartar went most delightfully, never was there such a dear horse. We rode to Richmond, through part of the Richmond Park, out at Robin Hood Gate, and home over Wimbledon Common and Vauxhall Bridge. It was as hot as summer, and going I thought I should have melted ; coming over Wimbledon Common there was some dehcious air. It was a heavenly day. At 6 m. p. 4 came Lord Melbourne and stayed with me till 20 m. to 5. He seemed well. Spoke a good deal of my ride." Two more extracts from these early journals and I have done : — " 1838. Monday, July 9.— At f p. 11 I went to a Review in Hyde Park. I could have cried almost not to have ridden and been in my right place as I ought ; but Lord Melbourne and Lord Hill thought it more prudent on account of the great crowd that 1 should not this time do so, which however now they all see I might have done. Lord Anglesey (who had the command of the day, looked so handsome, and did it beauti- fully and gracefully) regretted much I did not ride. I drove down the lines. All the Foreign 156 QUEEN VICTORIA'S JOURNALS Princes and Ambassadors were there, and the various uniforms looked very pretty. The troops never looked handsomer or did better; and I heard their praises from all the Foreigners and particularly from Soult. There was an immense crowd and all so friendly and kind to me." " 1838. ^^^ednesday, July 25.— Wrote my Journal. At a i to 8, I went into the Throne Room with my Ladies and gentlemen and Feo and Mama, where I found the Duchess of Gloucester, the Duke of Sussex, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, and Augusta and George. After waiting a little while we went into the green drawing-room, which looked very hand- some lit up, and was full of people all in uniform. I subjoin an account of all the arrangements, and all the people. After remaining for about five minutes in that room, talking to several people, amongst others to good Lord Melbourne, we went into dinner which was served in the Gallery and looked, 1 must say, most brilliant and beautiful. We sat down one hundred and three and might have been more. The display of plate at one end of the room was really very handsome. I sat between Uncle Sussex and Prince Esterhazy. The music was in a small Orchestra in the Salloon, and sounded extremely well. Uncle Sussex seemed in very good spirits, and Esterhazy in high force and full of fun, and talking so loud. I drank a glass oi stein-wine with Lord Melbourne who sat a good way down on my left between the Duke of Devonshire and Lord Holland. After dinner we went into the Yellow Drawing- room. Princesse Schwartzenberg looked very- pretty but tired ; and M me. Zavadowsky , beauti- ful and so sweet and placid. About 20 m. after we ladies came in, the gentlemen joined us. I DESCRIPTION OF A PARTY 157 spoke to almost everybody ; Lord Grey looked well; the Duke of Wellington, ill, but cheer- ful and in good spirits. I spoke for some time also to Lord Melbourne who thought the Gallery looked very handsome ; and that the whole * did very well ' ; * I don't see how it could be better,' he said. He admired the large diadem I had on. " At about 11 came some people who (as the Gallery was full of dinner, &c.) were obliged to come through the Closet, and of whom I annex a list. Lady Clanricarde I did not think looked very well; Lady Ashley, Lady Fanny, Lady Wilhelmine, and Lady Mary Grimston looked extremely pretty. Strauss played delightfully the whole evening in the Saloon. After staying a little while in the Saloon, we went and sat down in the further Drawing Room, next to the Dining Room. I sat on a sofa between Princesse Schwartzenberg and Mme. StroganofF; Lord Melbourne sitting next Mme. StroganofF; and in a little while Esterhazy near him, and Furstenberg (who talked amazingly to Lord Melbourne, and made us laugh a good deal) behind him. The Duchess of Sutherland and the Duchess of Northumberland sat near Princesse Schwartzenberg and a good many of the other Ambassadors and Ambassadresses were seated near them. The Duchess of Cambridge and Mama, &c., &c., were opposite to us ; and all the others in different parts of the room. Several gentlemen, foreigners, came up behind the sofa to speak to me. We talked and laughed a good deal together. I stayed up till a ^ to 1. It was a successful evening." The language is very simple, but Macaulay's famous description of a scene in Whitehall is not more vivid. ,1 !■' 158 QUEEN VICTORIA'S JOURNALS I have some faint hope that through the medium of these quotations from the Queen's Journals I may have been able to create that atmosphere of which I spoke. Remembering, so, 1 myself do, what in later days that atmos- phere was, 1 am more than diffident. During these later years, from which the pubhshed correspondence is far removed, there was a hushed reverence surrounding the Queen, hard to describe, and difficult even to suggest. It is no exaggeration to say that eminent statesmen and humbler folk aUke moved through the corri- dors of Windsor as through a shrine. It was not the atmosphere of sycophancy or adulation. It was the atmosphere of deep memories, of noble names, of Imperial growth, of national struggles, and of glorious triumphs. It was an atmosphere of queenly pity, of intrepid courage, of personal sorrows, and of duties simply performed through long years, stretching far back beyond the remembrance of any save the Queen herself In spite of its grandeur, there was a soUtude, an aloofness, about the life of the Queen, which made men half afraid to speak above a whisper. I have dwelt, I hope not unduly, upon the earher years of the Queen's reign, for it is these years that the pubhshed correspondence covers. In preparing that correspondence for pubhca- tion it was felt that it should tell its cwn story, LEARNING TO WALK ALONE 159 and that no attempt should be made to analyse or discuss the character and actions of the Queen. If it should be found possible to bring the story down to a later period the same course v/ill be followed. And I may say that the interest deepened as the years rolled on. This is not only because events are more recent, and the personahties of those who surrounded the Queen are more vividly known to us ; but because after the loss of her guide and coun- sellor in 1861 the character of the Queen changed and strengthened. For the first time she stood absolutely alone. Although, as she herself said, in her desolate and isolated condition she turned to Lord Palmerston and to Lord John Russell as old and tried friends, they did not and could not occupy the place that had been filled by Lord Melbourne in her girlhood, and by the Prince Consort through her happy married life. It is only within the last few months that by an accident the Queen's letters to Lord John Russell have come to light — and it is curious to observe that for four years she wrote to him in her own hand at least once a day. During most of that period Lord John Russell was Foreign Secretary. The Queen was learning to walk alone. This is not the time or place in which to attempt any deeper analysis of the character of Queen Victoria. If, as Cardinal Newman 160 QUEEN VICTORIA'S JOURNALS once said, men are guided by type rather than by argument, and if the majority are swayed more by example than by the logic of facts, the Queen has rendered a mighty service not only to her people but to her successors on the Throne of this Kingdom. No Sovereign ever exercised over the minds of men and women of many races a more powerful influence. We started to enquire— What we owe to Queen Victoria? What was the secret of her influence ? and what will be her place in history ? 1 venture to hope that to these questions I may have suggested, under the necessary limita- tions of such an occasion as this, a partial reply. We owe to Queen Victoria the reinstatement of the Monarchical principle in the eyes of all grave and earnest men. We owe to her the deep respect with which the British Crown is regarded by the subjects of this vast Empire. The secret of her influence was her unfaltering devotion to duty, her simple regard and— if the word is not misplaced — her narrow adhesion to the plain unvarnished truth in every action and relation of her long life. To attempt to expose her weaknesses would be an unbecoming and singu- larly fruitless task. We do not claim— those who were her loyal and devoted subjects— that she was other than extremely human. But we do claim that, in the glare of her great virtues, her faults may be allowed to he in shadow. HER PLACE IN HISTORY 161 The Queen's place in history cannot yet be defined. There are few more treacherous quicksands than those which surround the domain of historical forecast. This much, however, may be safely ventured: that as the reign of Elizabeth rounded off* and set a seal on that period of splendid intellectual growth, during which England became one of the first of European powders, so the reign of Queen Victoria rounded off* and set a seal upon that no less heroic period of commercial and racial expansion in which Great Britain became a world-wide Empire. ^i i; u > I ' iij VII GENERAL GORDON A PERSONAL REMINISCENCE My acquaintance with General Gordon, which soon became a fast friendship, began in April 1880. He had been appointed Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India, and I was at that time acting in a similar capacity to Lord Hartington, who was Secretary of State. On the 14th of May 1880 Gordon sailed for India, and my brother, who was aide-de'Camp to Lord Ripon, sailed with him. They became very intimate, and Gordon gave him a little volume, " Clarke's Scripture Promises," and wrote in it, " To my dear and honest young friend Eugene L. Brett, 3 June, 1880." It was the day that Gordon resigned his post as Private Secretary. On the 2nd of July he arrived at Pekin, and was soon engaged in helping his old friend, Li Hung Chang, who, as an advocate of peace, was in imminent danger from the War Party in China. Gordon returned to England in November. 162 H CHARACTERISTICS 16S Early in the following month he came to see me at the Indian Office, and from that time onwards was constantly in and out of my house in Tilney Street. He would generally come in the morning, a queer figure, with a loose com- forter round his throat, and a hat — by no means a good one — tilted back on his head ; the eternal cigarette between his lips. He was of small stature— very small, like so many great men — and of spare figure. He would have passed unnoticed anywhere, except for his eyes, which were of that pecuUar steel-like blue common to enthusiastic natures, more especially when the enthusiast is a soldier. He would lounge into the library, and stand — for he hardly ever cared to sit — for hours at a time, leaning against the mantelpiece, or walking up and down the room. His talk was as fresh as a spring morning, full of humour, and his language as simple as the book of Genesis. Complexity of thought, confusion of ideas, prolixity of speech, were impossible to him. He saw with wonderful clearness, perhaps some- times not very far. He detested cant, and although he could be strangely indignant, and was deeply roused by faithlessness, his charity knew no bounds. Repentance made up, in his eyes, for every crime. Hence his judgment of men was vari- able, and often appeared inconsistent. Although ' « ' ii ' s| 164 GENERAL GORDON it occasionally amused him to be deceived, he was rarely taken in. His religion was never obtruded, but it was as much part of his daily life as smoking cigarettes. He literally walked with God, and if it were not disrespectful, one might almost say arm in arm with Him. Our first talks were about India, for I was then much absorbed in the questions relating to that Empire, which were of primary interest— the settlement of Afghanistan and Indian finance. Gordon was a rigid economist, and it was on financial grounds mainly that he favoured the retirement from Kandahar: — " The strong point of the Government vis-a-vis Kandahar," he wrote, " is the expense. Let them say to the Opposition, Will you tax the people of England to keep Kandahar ? The Opposition will not answer this." His solution of all Frontier difficulties was an agreement with Russia : — " I forgot to mention one point that I think of great importance— to have a Russian Envoy with the Court of the Viceroy, and an English Envoy with Kaufmann. A great many mis- understandings would then be avoided. We are certainly not strong enough to allow this, if Russia asks it." He was constantly railing at what he con- sidered an extravagant scale of expenditure upon pay and allowances : — 8 VIEWS ON ECONOMY 165 " T would not alter the pay of the private soldier in India, but I should make an onslaught on other ranks. The cutting down must be done from home, in conjunction with Baring (now Lord Cromer, whom he looked upon as the one strong and able man in India) ; and as with the present high pay there is the greatest amount of grumbling, with the lower rate they would have something to grumble for. It is a pity not to have a cause for everything." In January 1881 Gordon wrote to me at great length upon the necessity for economical administration in India, especially in view of the abandonment of the Opium Duty, which he beheved to be inevitable :-^ " Did Lord Northbrook show you a paper on Aden I sent him? Aden, above all places, wants looking to. There are three colonels or lieut. -colonels of R.A. there, and a colonel R.E. Singapore has a captain R.A. and a Ueutenant RE. All these holes and corners want routing out. They remind one of the sentry in the Winter Palace at St Petersburg, who had been put on by the Empress Catherine to watch a rose, and has been kept on ever since. " The Commanders-in-Chief of the two Presi- dencies, Madras and Bombay, get £6,000 a year, and are an immense luxury. The post is a very subordinate one. Many Governors of Colonies do not get this salary. I am sure that an enormous saving could be made in Indian finance by working on the following hnes : — " (1) DisbeUeve, or believe with some degree of mistrust, all that Indian mihtary officials say l2 t ! I v\ i 189 sympathy, innate rather than acquired, Lord Rosebery obviously comprehends and appreciates the cold dignity of Mr Pitt's manner, so unusual in a youth. But, as a child, Mr Pitt had learned from Lord Chatham, a master of histrionics, to be dignified and self-possessed in the presence of strangers. "Little Mr Secretary," or "the Philosopher," as he was called, was fond of romps, his father tells us; but his tutor writes of him, at seven years old, as sage and self-possessed, and, even then, intelligent enough to rejoice that his father's peerage would still leave to him the name of William Pitt, and that, not being the eldest son, he could "serve the country in the House of Commons hke his papa." Lord Rosebery also can appreciate the " grim humour of the British Constitution which, in the prime of life and intellect, may pluck a man from the governing body of the country in which he is incomparably the most important personage, and set him down as a pauper peer in the House of Lords." He himself is in a position to appraise the grim humour of the Constitution, which Hkewise may ordain that a man eminently quahfied to shine in the House of Commons, possibly to rule that unruly assembly, may never have been eligible to sit there. It is idle but curious to speculate upon what might have happened if an accident of an accident had removed Mr Pitt's elder ■-II '$1 ii [i j" 190 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT brother from the scene at any time during Mr Pitt's boyhood, or indeed up to 1801. Yet, a century ago, political power had not, as now, passed completely to the House of Commons. Now it is only under conditions specially favour- able that a Prime Minister can govern the country from a seat in the House of Lords. One essential condition is that the Leader of the House of Commons should not be of pre-eminent ability. L'^^^ Salisbury, it is said, reahsed fully the advantage to his government of the retire- ment of Lord Randolph Churchill from the leadership of the Lower House. Had this not happened he would have ceased to be first in Cabinet Council. With self-assertion in his dis- position, the Leader of the Commons is certain to prevail over the Head of the Government, handicapped by the ponderosities of the House of Lords. With the removal of Lord Randolph Churchill, all possible opposition to Lord SaUsbury from within the Government dis- appeared. With the exception of Mr Balfour, the Prime Minister's colleagues, if not exactly ornamental phantoms, as Lord Rosebery calls Mr Pitt's, were all very excellent and clerkly persons, and neither individually nor collectively did they threaten his authority. Mr Balfour's relation to him was peculiar and unusual. So that Lord Salisbury was master of his Cabinet very uiuch as Mr Pitt was master of his. But there PREMIER AND COMMONS 191 is a difference. For had Mr Pitt been removed to the Upper House, his lieutenants in the House of Commons would have been left unpro- tected, and exposed to the full blast of an opposition oratory unrivalled in pariiamentary history. Lord Sahsbury's lieutenants, on the other hand, enjoyed the support of allies who more than covered their deficiencies. The Liberal Unionists stood towards the Government in much the same relation as the goddesses of Olympus stood towards their favourite com- batants in the Trojan war. One of them, indeed, in the guise of Mr Goschen, actually fought within the ranks. But mythological conditions such as these are rarely found, and the rule gains in stringency every year that our Constitution, if it is to work smoothly, demands that the Prime Minister shall be in the House of Commons, and shall be the most powerful and capable member of his party. If the grim humour of the Constitution in its present form puts obstacles in the way, these obstacles must give place to necessity. For the days of Portlands and Rockinghams and Liverpools are over, and experimental excursions in the direction of such methods of compromising rival ambitions can only lead to parliamentary confusion. Lord Rosebery is apparently imbued with this conviction, and in view of future possibilities Ml^ r i I !«• LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT it is a point of considerable interest both to him and his fellow-countrymen. Speaking of Shelburne and Fox, and the impossibility of their serving together as respective leaders of the two Houses, he points out that, although it would be " too much to maintain that all the members of the Cabinet should feel an implicit confidence in each other, humanity — least of all pohtical humanity — could not stand so severe a test, yet between a Prime Minister in the House of Lords and the Leader of the House of Commons such a confidence is indispensable, lic^ponsibility rests so largely with the one and articulation so greatly with the other, that unity of sentiment is the one necessary link that makes a relation, in any case difficult, in any way possible. The voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau may effect a successful imposture, but can iuircily constitute a durable Administration." But no " unity of sentiment " could have made an Administration durable of which Lord Shelburne was the head, and in which Fox was set to lead the House of Commons. To Lord Tlosebery the character of Shelburne — one of tiie suppressed characters of English history, as Lord Beaconsfield described him — appears to be antipathetic. It was not otherwise to his contemporaries. Yet this is strange, for, though Shelburne was, a^ Lord Beaconsfield depicted him, of a reserved SHELBURNE 193 and somewhat astute disposition, and although deep and adroit, he was brave and firm. Besides, his administrative ability was conspicuous, and the richness and variety of his information on all political and historical questions was remark- able. He has been called the ablest and most accomplished Minister of the eighteenth century by one of whom, without much exaggeration, a similar phrase might be used in the nineteenth. For such a man, with such attainments. Lord Rosebery might have been expected to feel some sympathy. Imagine some Shelburne of our own time, interested as he was in foreign affairs, maintaining relations with the principal European Courts as a friend of foreign Ministers, not supreme in debate, but eminent in the art of parliamentary disputation, a man in whose know- ledge of affairs the public feel confidence, and confident himself in his power of directing them wisely. Imagine, further, such a man Prime Minister, in the House of Lords, out of touch with the dominant Chamber. And, finally, imagine, in a nominally subordinate position, Mr Fox, perhaps the representative of some large popular constituency, such as Derby — conscious of his power to indulge in every caprice of the moment, headstrong in foreign poUtics, im- petuous in judgments formed hastily, as a fighter in the van forms judgments, and not with all the responsibility of supreme leadership, wielding N 1 il 194 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT the vast authority which a parliamentary majority in the House of Commons bestows upon its Leader. Such a poHtical combination could not from the nature of the case be otherwise than unstable. Mr Fox, anxious for the maintenance of a Government of which he himself was the head, chastened by all the weighty cares of supreme responsibility, might have gov^erned the country with advantage and success. But as a subordinate, even to Shelburne, the idea was preposterous. Mr Pitt himself, ten years younger than Fox, and twenty-three years younger than Shelburne, felt the incongruity of a similar position. He tried it, but was not anxious to revive the experiment. Mr Pitt's Government affords proof of how strong and durable a Government can be at the head of which stands a supremely able man, supported in the main by colleagues, perhaps good administrators, possibly wise in council, but inarticulate in parliament. Mr Pitt stood alone, and held his own wuth perfect ease in debate. Dundas was his second. The rest were ciphers. Yet Mr Pitt succeeded when Govern- ments of all the talents, one Administration which preceded and two which have followed his, failed to govern well, or to maintain their ground for long against debating power very inferior to that which Mr Pitt successfully resisted. The Whigs who founded ''govern- PITT AND WHIG TRADITION 195 ment by Cabinet " had no conception of a first Minister other than as one of the King's servants who should be primus inter pares. As late as 1782 Lord North would not permit his family to call him Prime Minister, declaring the term to be unconstitutional. And when he met Mr Fox for the first time to discuss the basis of the Coalition, and Mr Fox put forward the Whig theory of Cabinet responsibility for the govern- ment of the country, in opposition to what was then called " government by departments," controlled either by the Monarch, or by a Minister in the name of the Monarch, this view was cordially accepted by Lord North, and the principle influenced the conduct of business by the Joint Administration which was formed shortly afterwards. But it was repudiated by Mr Pitt when he assumed office. Brought up a Whig, he broke the Whig tradition. His relation to George III. was rather that of an Imperial Chancellor than an Enghsh Premier. No doubt this was largely due to the character of the man, to his extraordinary self-confidence, and his quiet assumption that he was a match for any man or combination of men. The training of his boyhood, and his '' sequestration," as he called it, in early youth from all companion- ship save that of Lord Chatham, had led him to think that, if he was a fit companion for his father, he was fitted to rule mankind. Lord Kl 196 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT Chatham describes how carefully he was forced to watch himself, conscious that his son imitated him from childhood. He discussed literature and politics with his son when the boy had not passed his fourteenth year. Even then the "fineness of his mind," Lady Chatham writes, "made him enjoy with the highest pleasure what would be above the reach of any other creature of his small age." And Mr Mollis, who visited father and son when they were residing together at Lyme Regis, noted the " Counsellor's " firm accents, and observed how distinct and clear his ideas were. Mr HoUis and the boy of fourteen, " these two friends of liberty and virtue," as Lord Chatham calls them, " were tete-a-tete, walking up and down the steep hill. In this converse not only the constitution of the State, but the universal frame of Nature, was, I daresay, thoroughly discussed." What wonder that the lad acquired confidence in himself? It must have seemed so natural to him that the son, the friend, the companion of Chatham, should not find his equal among men. His precocity was very plainly recognised by Lord Chatham. To his " sweet intelligent boy " who was the " hope and comfort of his life," he writes congratulating himself that there was at Cambridge " one with- out a beard, yet with all the elements so mixed in him, that Nature might stand up and say * This is a man. ' " When at twenty-one he SELr-<:ONFIDENCE 197 appeared in the House of Commons, Mr Fox said Lord Chatham was living again in his son. So Mr Pitt, probably unconsciously, believed, and his public declaration — which in any one else would have been thought somewhat presump- tuous — that he would not accept a subordinate office, came quite naturally from the lips of one who, as Lord Rosebery says, went into the House of Commons as an heir enters his home. This self-confidence, which in men who fail is ridiculous, in those who succeed has a touch of sublimity. Nor is such jierte uncommon in those destined to rule. Lord Rosebery perhaps remembers that, years ago, a young politician, who had just — what is with singular inappro- priateness called — finished his education, was warned by an old and affectionate teacher " not to take plush," whereby w^as meant one of those subordinate ornamental appointments which Ministers are fond of dangling before the eyes of promising youth. The reply was what Mr Pitt might have written under similar circum- stances ; " I have been offered plush tied up with red tape, and have refused it." Mr Pitt, apart from his striking personality, is a figure specially interesting as the founder of modern Liberalism. Lord Rosebery felicit- ously points out that Liberalism represents less the succession to, than the revolt against, Whiggery. The Venetian party, as Lord N 2 ^piH '' 198 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT Beaconsfield calls the Whigs, had well-nigh completed their noble work for England. They achieved this, that they made modem England possible without a revolution. But the days in which oligarchical government was possible were fast passing away. The rapid decay of the Whigs dates from the Coalition Govern- ment. The phrase which Lord Rosebery uses about Mr Fox was true of the Whig party — the swell of soul was no more. Their work was done. Under the auspices of Adam Smith and of Edmund Burke the Liberal Party slowly acquired shape with Mr Pitt for a leader. He himself, during the first ten years of his adminis- tration, was as much a modern Liberal as though he were the president of a caucus. At that time, "the people," politically speaking, were the middle classes, and Lord Rosebery calls him the man of the middle classes. He should be canonised as their patron saint, for in him is personified all that is best in them. Parliamentary reform. Free Trade, the removal of religious disabilities — these were the subjects that occupied his mind. They are the well- worn planks of the Liberal platform at the present time. No doubt he became absorbed in the duty forced upon him of carrying on a great war. But this is not seriously incompatible with Liberal opinions, for, although Liberals commonly denounce war in the abstract, Liberal WHIG DISLIKE OF PITT 199 Prime Ministers have a singular aptitude for becoming involved in warlike operations ; — while in the prosecution of them they invariably manage to retain the support of their followers. The Whigs, even when they voted for him, hated Mr Pitt, much as in recent times their descendants hated Mr Gladstone. And for very similar reasons. He was, as Gibbon said, excellent and virtuous — qualities which com- mend a man to the middle classes, but not to an oligarchy. Of his virtue, no one who knew him ever doubted. " Adieu, again and again, sweet boy!" wrote Lord Chatham; "and if you acquire health and strength every time I wish them to you, you will be a second Samson, and, what is more, will, I am sure, keep your hair I" Lord Chatham, as far as the world is aware, was not mistaken. But, nevertheless, the Whigs, many of whom possessed a characteristic capacity for subordinating their private senti- ments to fondness for the winning side in poUtics, disliked Mr Pitt as much as they loved the dissolute and charming patrician who was his political rival. It was said of him in compli- mentary condemnation — " Multa tulit fecitque puer ; sudavit et alsit ; Abstinuit Venere." Experience, perhaps, justifies that instinct which is mistrustful of irreproachable virtue in a politician, for often this quaUty has been found ij 200 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT not incompatible with tyrannical ideas and un- scrupulous methods of enforcing them. A man who has contrived to chain up the wild beast within himself takes but little account of fetters, and easily persuades himself that it is his duty to adjust gyves to the wrists of his neighbours. But among the inheritance of the Whigs was another instinct — that true appreciation of political facts which no prejudices can altogether smother in a governing class. And while Mr Fox remained of the opinion that the business of an Opposition is to oppose, he himself was aware, and showed by his subsequent conduct as a Minister that he was aware, that Mr Pitt, during the second half of his administration, was not only an English Prime Minister but that he was the leader of every man in Europe who desired Europe to be free. It was on this ground that the Portland Whigs openly supported the Government of Mr Pitt. Lord John Russell, who speaks with the authority of Whigdom, repudiates the idea that Mr Pitt was affected by Burke's policy of a crusade against the revolutionary Government of France. Mr Pitt, he says, took a totally different view of the nature and object of the war. He was ready to admit that we had nothing to do with the internal government of France, provided its rulers were disposed and able to maintain friendly relations with foreign Governments. He sought PITT IN PEACE AND WAR 201 to confine France within her ancient limits, to oblige her to respect established treaties, and to renounce her conquests. In short, he treated Robespierre and Carnot as he would have treated any other French rulers whose ambition was to be resisted and whose interference in the affairs of other nations was to be checked and prevented. Lord Rosebery's view is not different. In his opinion the Government, it can hardly be denied, pushed their neutrality to an extreme point, before Mr Pitt yielded to the rising temper of the nation. He sees, as fair-minded men not infatuated by Whiggery, like one eminent historian, or not gazing at Mr Pitt's career through the eyes of an Irish attorney, like another, have long ago seen, this pathetic figure of a peace-loving Minister, caring for his budgets and his domestic reforms, clinging to hope with the tenacity of despair that war may be averted ; but "as it fades, the darkness closes, and the Pitt of peace, prosperity, and reform disappears for ever." Lord Rosebery has no doubt about Mr Pitt s policy in regard to the great war ; and it is well that he has not. For it is by his appreciation of this crisis in our national affairs that a statesman may fairly be judged who has not himself been tried with fire. Lord Rosebery's tenure of the Foreign Office was short. And, although he I 1 f ^ f02 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT showed a firm grasp of the sound principle of continuity in the conduct of foreign affairs and a great power of hard work, he had no oppor- tunity for a full display of his capacity. He held office so short a time that it would be grotesque to attempt to form a final opinion of him as a Foreign Minister by his attitude towards the Triple AUiance, or by his language to ilussia in what was called the *' Batoum Despatch." In describing, however, the struggle which was sincerely made by Mr Pitt to maintain peace, and even, after two years of war, to secure it, and, further, in the unhesitating approval which he gives to the main purpose of the war. Lord Rosebery's bent of mind can be followed. In the last words he spoke in public Mr Pitt remarked that England had saved herself by her exertions, and would, he trusted, save Europe by her example. The great need for exertion was by no means over, and on the morrow of Austerlitz, in spite of Trafalgar, England was not saved. The whole war with Napoleon was the touchstone of the spirit of our race. The recognition of this, and of the part which Mr Pitt filled, is the touch- stone of the mind of a statesman. While Mr Fox could write of an English military force employed against the enemies of his country that ** he believed, as well as hoped, that it had THE GREAT MINISTER 808 not the smallest chance of success," the English people suffered privations, sacrificed blood and treasure, under the disinterested guidance of a Minister who alone stood upright in Europe against the furious blasts of French militarism. It is small wonder that Mr Pitt was neglectful of literary talent, of science, and of artistic merit. His mind, and the minds of his countrymen, were too full. Yet this neglect has been charged against his memory. It is certainly true that at no time in history was English art at a much lower ebb. Houses and streets which grew up in those days were meanly built. Oak ceased to be used in constructing dwelling-houses and furniture. It was wanted for Lord Nelson's ships. And money was wanted badly for Mr Pitt's vacillating allies on the Continent. What small sums men had to spare in those days they spent in having engraved on seals, or carved on rings, the image of the Minister who repre- sented to them the struggle of the nation to maintain its independence, and they wore them with pride during his lifetime, and with pious sorrow after his death. Whatever the future may hold in store for Lord Rosebery, whatever the relation between him and his countrymen may prove to be, he has given them an opportunity of stamping their minds and those of their sons with the image of an Englishman who, if he failed to organise 204 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR FYTT victory, at least enabled England to maintain the position which Burke assigned her as the tutelary angel of the human race. No portion of Lord Rosebery's story of Mr Pitt's career can have been so difficult to write as the chapter in which he deals with Ireland. Certainly in no portion of the volume has the author achieved greater success. Hampered by the knowledge that every line would be scrutin- ised for references to the living controversy, he nevertheless has boldly defended Mr Pitt's policy ; he has described it as " generous and comprehensive in conception as it was patriotic in motive." Lord Rosebery s personal position in dealing with this subject must obviously have been unenviable had he lacked courage. To have been a member of the Cabinet which introduced the Home Rule Bill of 1886, to be one of the leaders of a party pledged to introduce another Bill for the modification of the Act of Union, to know that your political opponents and many kind friends are watching for every slip or ambiguity of expression — these are not the conditions under which an appreciative biographer would choose to discuss the Union and the Irish policy of Mr Pitt: yet the task has been accompUshed. The policy of the Union has been justified, the circumstances attending it more than extenuated, and the personal relation of Mr Pitt to the transactions m UNION AND HOME RULE t05 of the year 1800 amply defended. And Lord Rosebery issues from the ordeal uncompromised and logically consistent as a defender of Mr Pitt and a lieutenant of Mr Gladstone. It is a notable feat. But it is more than notable, it is eminently useful. For Lord Rosebery helps to rehabilitate the poUcy of Home Rule, not, perhaps, before some such process had begun to be required. Mr Gladstone, owing to the youthful indiscretion of a follower, had been made to appear as the denouncer of his great predecessor. The cry had been taken up, not unnaturally, and one more splash of tar had been cast at a policy which has been distorted and magnified by violent partisanship on both sides, into proportions wholly false, which it never ought to have assumed in discussion and never can assume in a practical form. In the first year of the century, as towards its close* there were many circumstances which necessi- tated the trial of a new experiment in Irish government. First, Mr Pitt was hampered in the Continental struggle by an ill - governed, rebellious Ireland in his rear. Secondly, it had become apparent that, under a constitutional monarchy, a king cannot act as a sovereign of two independent and co-equal parliaments. The King of England has no constitutional power apart from his Ministers for the time being. Except upon their advice, and through them. 206 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT he cannot perform any political act. His Ministers are responsible to the English House of Commons, and may be retained or dismissed by a well-understood process at its pleasure. Therefore, by an obvious logical inference, the English House of Commons must, under the Constitution as the English people had got to understand it, possess supreme authority over every legislative or executive body dependent for the full exercise of its powers upon the concurrence of the sovereign. The arrange- ments under which the Irish Parliament had come into existence in 1782 did not work smoothly or even possibly under these condi- tions. No form of Home Rule which does not recognise this constitutional fact and provide for it has a fair chance of permanent success. Another reason which made a change in the government of Ireland urgent and imperative was the internal condition of the Irish Parlia- ment. Except by means of gross corruption, Ireland could not be governed through the Irisli House of Commons. There had been a time when a similar state of things existed in England. But with a purer system of govern- ment Ireland had not kept pace, and corruption, worse than that of Walpole, was rampant. In the Irish House of Commons eighty-four seats were close boroughs, so that to talk as if Ireland, in losing her Parliament, had lost a IRISH CORRUPTION «07 representative assembly, is absurd. Reform, at that time, was impossible. Mr Pitt had tried Reform in England and had failed. For another generation Parliament remained unreformed, and Ireland meanwhile had to be governed. Mr Pitt had contemplated abolishing, by purchase from their patrons, the close boroughs in England. This is what was done by Corn- wallis and Castlereagh in Ireland. Recently, for present political purposes, it has become the fashion to say that monstrous means were used to induce the Irish people to sell their birthright. But the means used to bring about the Union were not one whit more monstrous, or indeed different, from those used normally to govern Ireland. While to describe as the birthright of a people an assembly dominated by eighty -four borough representatives in the hands of a few nobles, is a ludicrous misuse of terms. The means used were not unobjection- able, wrote Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, a fair- minded critic, but they were less objectionable than force, which was the only practicable alternative of bringing about the Union. And not because the people valued their birthright, but because the Union robbed the borough- monger of his lucrative business, and checked the corrupt dealing of lawyers and professional politicians. The means used were a million and a quarter spent in compensating the patrons 208 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT of boroughs, and a shower of peerages and pensions on deposed functionaries. It has been supposed that secret and unavowed means of corruption were used. But the CornwaUis and Castlereagh papers refute this suggestion. There was a bargain, as Sir G. Lewis observed, but it was a bargain in market overt. For every penny spent was accounted for in documents made pubhc by Mr Pitt, after the Union was accomphshed. CornwaUis — the sterHng splendour of whose character Lord Rosebery recognises — hated having to use the means employed. But he never suggested that any other were possible. And, like Castlereagh, he believed he was finally corrupting in order to permanently purify Irish government. The end may not justify the means, but it quahfies the estimate which reasonable men put upon them. Cant is the weakness of our race. We are fond of flattering ourselves that we are not as our forefathers were. Yet the political end is, in these days, often considered to excuse the pohtical means. The late Lord Wolverton used to assert that he had, on one occasion, given an Irish member of Parliament two hundred pounds for his vote. Certainly peerages, and so-called honours, have been dangled by Party Whips before the eyes of wavering followers in even more recent days. While, in principle, there is very little to GOVERNMENT AND CHANGE 209 I distinguish the offer of a large measure of land- purchase at the public expense to Irish landlords, to induce them to modify their hostility to a BiU for Home Rule, from the measure by which Mr Pitt obtained the assent of the Irish borough lords to the Union. Statesmanship sometimes requires that of two evils the lesser be chosen. The majestic mind of Burke was torn by con- flicting desires to free Ireland from misgovern- ment and to maintain the independence in Europe of Great Britain. It is easy, from the safe distance of a lapsed century, to look back and judge the methods of men who were forced to decide questions of national life and death amid the lurid clouds of war abroad and dis- affection at home. If the claim of the Irish to manage their domestic affairs at the end of the nineteenth century is based upon the proceedings which took place at the end of the eighteenth to induce them to abandon that privilege, it might well be dismissed as frivolous. It is a gross though common form of superstition that forms and methods of government are based on eternal principles. Were it so, to govern would be a simple matter of administration. But the vary- ing circumstances of a people, the constantly modified conditions of national prosperity, the ever-changing relations between races of different blood and habits — these are the unknown and o "' «10 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT unknowable factors which dominate politicians, and make of statesmanship not a science but the finest of fine arts. The Union was proposed and carried by men who were impressed by the necessity of dealing with Irish misgovernment Hi tfit interests of both countries, and regarded thiN measure as a hopeful experiment. " Ireland cannot be saved," wrote Cornwallis, "without the Union, but there is no certainty that it will be saved by the Union." It was, in truth, no certainty. Many experiments have since been tried to save Ireland. And it is in the nature of a further experiment that men, not infatuated by shibboleths or blinded by partisan- ship, view the proposal of Home Rule. The Union was a portion only of Mr Pitt's scheme for Ireland. It is his sinister destiny. Lord Rosebery points out, to be judged by thib petty fragment. He strove hard to carry tlirough a comprehensive policy, and in the eiiurt he fell from power. No stronger proof o: sincerity can be required from a Minister. It is at this point in his career that his conduct as a gentleman is called into question. He has been charged with having, in March 1801, abandoned the position which he had adopted ill i liiruary, for the purpose of maintaining his place at the head of the Government ; and baviiicT, with the approval of his colleagues, resigned office on the refusal of the King to PITT AND GEORGE III. «11 agree to Catholic Emancipation, he is accused of having secretly, without the knowledge of his colleagues, written to the King and offered to abandon that measure and to carry on the government. The evidence upon which these charges are based is a statement of Lord Malmesbury's that Mr Pitt had written such a letter to the King, and Mr Fox's assertion that Lord Grenville had informed him that Mr Pitt had made such a proposal, and that he knew nothing of it. If such a letter ever had been written, it seems incredible that no copy of it should have been made and preserved among Mr Pitt's papers. Lord Stanhope and Sir G. Lewis disbelieved Lord Malmesbury's statement. It seems clear that Dr Willis, who had repeated George II I. 's complaint to Mr Pitt that his illness was owing to the conduct of his Minister, carried back to him the promise from Mr Pitt that he would not in the King's lifetime reopen the question. But it is equally clear that Canning and his other friends pressed him to retain office, and that he refused to make any advance or proposal, or to move in the matter. There remains Lord Grenville's statement to Mr Fox. If Lord Grenville's feelings towards Mr Pitt, shown by his refusal to join him in 1804, are taken into consideration, it seems not impossible that he may have put the darkest \\ 1»! !|s 21 « LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT interpretation upon a transaction that must, to those not completely in Mr Pitt's confidence, have been always obscure. All that Lord Grenville can have known of his own know- ledge was that Mr Pitt had not taken him into confidence. That Mr Pitt had written to the King, with or without the approval of 1) undas, can only have been known to him at second-hand. Lord Rosebery has not cared to pursue in great detail this matter, and apparently prefers to set the unquestionable facts of i\ir Pitt's resignation on the Catholic question, and his retirement from office for years, against doubtful secret transactions, based not even upon plain documentary evidence, but upon the sour gossip of the time. It has been said, to his detriment, that Mr Pitt died friendless and alone. This is a gross exaggeration. For his death was sudden. It was only on the 12th of January that he arrived at his house at Putney. Two days later he saw Lord Wellesley, who had just returned from India. It is true that from that time onward no one saw him, except his family and Bishop Tomline. But nine days later he was dead. ** Now is the stately column broke, The beacon-light is quenched in smoke, The trumpet's silver sound is still. The warder silent on the hill. PITT'S DEATH tlS Oh think, how to his latest day, When death, just hovering, claim'd his prey. With Palinure's unalter'd mood. Firm at his dangerous post he stood ; Each call for needful rest repelPd, With dying hand the rudder held, Till in his fall, with fateful sway, The steerage of the realm gave way."" It may well be asked. Is any other statesman embalmed as is Mr Pitt in such verse as that from which these lines are taken ? — verse echoed in the hearts of Britons wherever they were found scattered over the world! The politicians who stood aloof from him in 1804, who possibly neglected him in sickness, nevertheless wept at his death. Proud and disinterested men, though they receive full measure of admiration and respect, do not often inspire strong affection. It would not be fair if they did so. They would absorb more than their share of earth. To the world, Mr Pitt's manners were not genial. The mask, which his youth forced him to wear in 1783, became habit, and only rarely was removed. It is doubtful whether even Canning, whom Lord Rosebery says he loved as a son, ever saw him in the mood in which he revealed himself as late in life as 1804 to the young William Napier. Mr Pitt is described as rising from table to meet his young guest, clasping him warmly by both hands ; and, later o2 ^^i il fU LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT on, he and the two young Stanhopes actually engaged in a game of romps, and were about to blacken their host's face with burnt cork, when Lords Castlereagh and Liverpool were announced. They were requested to wait awhile, " and the great Minister instantly turned to the battle, catching up a cushion and belabouring us with it in glorious fun. We were, however, too many and too strong for him, and after at least ten minutes' fight got him down, and were actually daubing his face, when, with a look of pretended confidence in his powers, he said, ' Stop I This will do ; I could easily beat you all, but we must not keep those grandees wait- ing any longer.' His defeat, however, was palpable, and we were obliged to get a towel and basin of water to wash him clean, before he could receive the grandees. Being thus put in order, the basin was hid behind the sofa, and the two lords were ushered in." Napier then describes the total change in Mr Pitt's manner ; how his tall, ungainly, bony figure seemed to grow to the ceiling, and how, throwing back his head, he spoke without regard- ing the figures of the men who bent before him. He dismissed them with a stiff incUnation of the body, and then, turning to his boyish com- panions, with a laugh caught up the cushion and renewed the fight. Napier speaks of another occasion when he saw Mr Pitt on the parade- ground of the Horse Guards talking to several PITT'S MANNER 215 gentlemen, evidently on business. When about forty yards from him Napier caught his eye, and was advancing to greet him, when instantly his countenance changed, with a commanding fierceness of expression, difficult to describe, which emphatically said : " Pass on ; this is no place for fooling." This picture of Mr Pitt, so charming and so unexpected, may well be placed alongside of Mr Fox's game at rounders with Albemarle, then a boy, at St Anne's Hill ; and Nelson, seated under the dining-room table, playing with young Nisbet. Still, in the House of Commons, men who knew him described his manner as cold, if not repulsive, never inviting approach or encouraging acquaintance. Smiles were not natural to him, and, though young, and surrounded by admirers and flatterers, he maintained a sullen gravity. Many passages of strong sarcasm — a weapon of which he was master — are recorded in his speeches. But few instances of fine wit have been remembered. It must have thickened as time went on, from the days of the club at the Boar's Head in East Cheap. But he seems to have condescended occasionally to chaff his colleagues. A story is told of Dundas, who, when being shaved at Edinburgh, suddenly felt the razor drawn across his throat, while the barber rushed from the room, exclaiming, ** Take that, traitor 1 " Dundas put up his hand to feel 1/ I I ! ai6 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT for blood, but the crime had been committed with the back of the razor. On his appearance in the Cabinet, after this story had doubtless reached his colleagues, Mr Pitt enquired : " Are you quite sure your head is on your shoulders ? " Otlierwise, more jokes were made at Mr Pitt's expense than are attributed to him. His eloquence, Lord Rosebery observes, must have greatly resembled that with which Mr Gladstone fascinated two generations. Lord Brougham told Bishop Wilberforce that Mr Pitt possessed a power of endless speech, almost too niiicti ^o ; wiih the same grandeur on every subject. A description which certainly does not qualify Lord llosebery's comparison. Heroes have been said never altogether to satisfH' the requirements of their valets, and whoseever the fault, there is no doubt that a man appears under quaintly different aspects to his contemporaries. Mr Pitt's old carter, who Tvas still alive at HoUwood in 1862, spoke of his mailer as " A very nice sort of man, who would do what any one asked him." It may be doubted whether George IIL would have altogether endorsed this view. In his dealings with the King the Minister's stiff unbending nature evidently hindered the growth of warm feeling. Lorci lieaconsfield thus described to a friend his own method of dealing with the Sovereign i never contradict. I never deny. PITT'S APPEARANCE «17 But I sometimes forget." Mr Pitt's intercourse with George III. was not carried on upon such agreeable terms. And when he resigned office in 1801 the King threw himself into the arms of Addington Uke an emancipated schoolboy. Mr Pitt's figure is probably more familiar to Enghshmen to-day than it was to his con- temporaries. In Hanover Square, in the Cambridge Senate House, in the corridor of the Houses of Parliament, in Westminster Abbey, marble and bronze, noble and dignified, still remind the beholders of the great and dis- interested Minister. It is a face and figure which, although, as Lord Rosebery observes, they may lend themselves to chance resemblance and ignoble comparison, once seen are not easily forgotten. Among the many fine tributes to his memory. Lord Roseber}^'s henceforth will find a fitting place. To deny that Mr Pitt made mistakes would be absurd. On doit des egards aux vivants ; on ne doit, aux morts, que la verite. His errors were largely due to the habit which in boyhood he called his "sequestration." Like Pericles he was difficult of access. And aloofness from the rough and tumble of familiar intercourse, although it may enhance personal dignity, deadens that fine instinct in the management of men which is commonly called tact. Lord U M ii 'M 218 LORD ROSEBERY AND MR PITT Rosebery's fellow-feeling has induced him to lay no stress upon this. He himself as a boy was difficult of access, even to his tutor. So much so that the unusual method had on one occasion to be adopted of tearing over his verses in order to secure his presence in pupil room. It had the desired effect. And to his enquiry of why that indiiinity lia I been put upon him, he was told the story of how Absalom burnt Joab's corn when he found that an interview could not be obtiificd by less drastic means. This earned for Lord Rosebery a nickname, which he bore placidly, as IMr Pitt bore that of the ** Counsellor." His political colleagues may perhaps regret the lack of that ready invention which secured a result for which they have often wished in vain. But it is not from the mistakes and faults of Mr l^itt that lessons may be learnt. Lord Rosebery has judged wisely in laying stress upuii his success and his virtues. Errors are the common property of politicians. But Mr Pitt's laborious habits, his noble patriotism, his unflinching courage, the scornful disregard of self, which enabled him to stand, Uke Palinure, undaunted amid trials and disasters almost beyond human endurance, which permitted him to bear the torch of national freedom aloft until he 1 on 1(1 pass it to the Duke of Welhngton's more fortunate hand, — these are the qualities PITTS QUALITIES 219 from which his successors and his countrymen may learn a lesson. Lord Rosebery has himself clearly learnt it well, and should he be destined to stand among the successors of Mr Pitt, as trustee for the happiness of millions of his fellow-countrymen, it does not appear that he would shrink under the responsibihty. May he find himself then among those happy rulers, as Burke called them, who have the secret of possessing unsuspecting confidence. I •» i|i i i;! IX HIE IDEALS OF THE MASSES^ Cardinal Newman's death marks our epoch as one blest by wide religious toleration. No party leader as combative in politics as Cardinal Newman was in religion would be likely to receive after death such universal chorus of praise. Cardinal Newman, though he disclaimed the title, was above all things a leader of men. Though his life was the life of a saint, his voice was the voice of a champion. He revelled in polemics, and he excelled in them. For thirteen years no Anglican fought harder and used sharper weapons on behalf of the Anglo- Catholic Church than he. He was imbued with the sense that "opposition to the Church of Rome was part of the theology " of the Church of England, and tliat ''he who could not protest against the Cliurch of Rome was no true divine in the Enghsh Church." From this point of view he never wavered. Later on he came to acknow- ledire that *' Protestantism was the dreariest of possible religions; that the thought of the 1 Written in 1890. 220 TOLERANCE AFTER PASSION 221 Anglican service made him shiver, and the thought of the Thirty-nine Articles made him shudder." A generation ago the severity of language with which he adorned this theme would have been resented by English clergymen and Anglican congregations. "Lead, kindly Light," would have had no place in Church song. It is a curious example of liberal tolera- tion that the opponent and critic should have been forgotten, and only the poet and saint remembered. So tolerant are we that it is doubtful whether to-day in England any religious difference of opinion whatever could raise more than a passing gust of popular prejudice. Passion seems to have passed out of the religious atmosphere of the nation. To many who can look back to those years eventful for the Church, when ** Froude's Remains " was published, and when Dr Pusey first connected himself with the nameless movement then in full swing, to which he subsequently stood sponsor, the religious flutter caused by Moody and Sankey, or Mr Bradlaugh, or General Booth, appear no more than flashes of sheet lightning. The storm passed away ages ago. Curiously enough, Charles Greville, living in placid circles of racing or political gossip, seems not to have seen the Tracts jor the Times or heard of their authors. If he did, he thought them ephemeral, and unworthy of notice. But ii ti i^ THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES younger men than he, men young enough to appreciate Tennyson, men who had passed into the universities from pubUc schools, and had issued forth into the world imbued with the influences of Arnold on the one hand, or Dr Newsman on the other, in spite of the engrossing political struggles of the day, were, perhaps, more passionately affected by Tract 90 than by aii} utterance of Cobden or Bright. Nothing is more certainly true, as ^Tr Gladstone has pointed out, than "that according to the constitution of the human mind, everything tends towards fixity as life proceeds, and that, upon the whole, each generation of our gentry carry with them to the grave that set of doctrinal and ecclesiastical impressions which they received at the university, without material enlargement or modification." Consequently, before 1833, the majority of educated Englishmen were content with a sleepy acquiescence in orthodox doctrine of the Georgian divines, administered by orthodox clergy of the good old - fashioned type drawn in masterly fashion b\ George Ehot in " Adam Bede." But when the mystical year 1830, with its sudden upheaval of traditions, political and social, all over Europe had passed away, young men's iiiiiids, roused to contemplate drastic changes, turned entieally towards the religion of their fathers. if FIXITY AS UFE PROCEEDS «2S If Puseyism, as it was ultimately called, was the reaction under such leaders as Keble and Newman, partly against " liberahsm " and partly against the high-and-dry " country clergy," it was followed by reactions quite as violent against itself. Yet the High Churchmen of forty years ago, undergraduates then, are the High Church- men of to-day who look uneasily at the genera- tion passing into middle age, and with dread at the younger generation coming to early man- hood. If the authors of '* Lux Mundi " cause trouble within the Church, the men who at Oxford have grown up under the singularly unecclesiastic Master of Balliol, or at Cambridge under the author of "Ecce Homo" and Mr Henry Sidgwick, are not likely to " tend towards fixity as life proceeds " in orthodox Anglican doctrine. For the past fifteen years at Oxford, Canon King, now Bishop of Lincoln, and at Cambridge, Canon Westcott, now Bishop of Durham, have established influence over small knots of young men. But the tone of neither university has been set by them. And if Mr Gladstone is correct in believing that each " generation of our gentry carry with them to the grave that set of doctrinal and ecclesiastical impressions which they received at the university," then it may be safely asserted that among the vast majority of men under forty indifference to doctrinal disputes rather than toleration is the dominant feeling. i ' ti ii^ a li i I . II S24 THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES Half a century ago, when Cardinal Newman was on his death -bed as an Anglican — for so he expressed it — men disputed religious doctrines, if with bitterness, at least with ardent faith. Pusey, Ward, WilUams never doubted in the sense that Arthur Clough doubted then — corrupted, as Dr Arnold thought, by the con- tagion of Tractarians — and every one doubts now. Anghcans in those days were as positive of their faith as Catholics are certain of theirs in these. Whereas the spirit of doubt, bred of historical criticism applied to religion, of biological science applied to morals, has swept over the Church of England. It has softened her asperities. Prejudice has almost vanished under its breath. Jews, formerly scorned, are regarded with friendli- ness ; Dissenters, formerly hated, with respect ; and Catholics, formerly feared, with interest, and in many cases, such as Cardinal Manning and the late Cardinal Newman, with affection. To what cause is this change due? If Matthew Arnold's vision was clear, the wide- spread indifference to religious controversy is owing to the decline of middle-class influence in England. In his view middle-class liberalism broke the Oxford movement. For a while its force was irresistible. Then suddenly it was thrust into the second rank, became a power of yesterday, and lost the future. It has received no effectual support from the flower of English REUGION IN POLITICS 225 youth educated at the universities. If the new power, the power of the masses, has ideals of its own, those ideals are clearly altogether out- side the sphere of religion. The religious com- plexion of the old popular leaders was never left in doubt. W ith men of the stamp of Bright or Forster or Shaftesbury, keen politicians as they were, openly avowed religion took precedence of politics. But who knows or enquires into the religious opinions of Mr Burns or Mr Labouchere? Forty years back, confidence would not have been unreservedly bestowed by the middle-class dispensers of power, in some difficult social crisis, upon Cardinal Wiseman or John Stuart Mill. To-day, on the other hand, would not the men who preponderate in govern- ing England, accept unquestioning the advice or decisions of Cardinal Manning or x\ir John Morley in matters which most nearly touch their daily lives? During Cardinal Manning's noble efforts to settle the dockers' strike, no question was ever raised by those he was assist- ing, or by onlookers, as to his authority or position Tt is true that to take precedence in charity is one thing, while to receive precedence in rank is a very different thing. What was obviously an act of mere courtesy on the part of the Lord Mayor of London raised protests at once. But from whom? From the masses? It would be interesting to know whether among P li ' id 226 THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES the anonymous letter- writers to the Times news- paper, many recent graduates of the universities, or representatives of what are called the "masses," could be found. Such a point as ** courtly pre- cedence" would excite no jealousy except among middle-class Englishmen, and by the masses it would be altogether ignored. Of course it may be argued that the English orthodoxy has become more tolerant in the highest and most liberal sense ; and men, who feel strongly them- selves on ritual and dogma, are content to admit that others may hold different views without having deserved excommunication. But is it not more probable that whatever individual opinion may be, public opinion, now represent- ing different orders of men, has grown careless about dogma, and indifferent to ecclesiastical impressions ? Before many years pass away, all doubt upon the point will be set at rest. In former days. Englishmen who thought about pubhc affairs, whatever their ecclesiastical bias, and whose minds carried beyond their domestic wants, formed or imbibed lofty ideals. The aristocracy, from immemorial times, up to their meridian of power under Mr Pitt, took noble care of individual liberty and of national fame. The middle classes, when their turn came to rule, proved themselves to be animated before all by Christian teaching. Their chosen leaders, THE RELIGION OF THE MASSES 227 Sir Robert Peel and Mr Gladstone, have gloried in applying Christian ethics to politics, and have even tried to extend them to the domain of everyday international relations. But what of the masses of the proletariat? Are not their ideals somewhat vague and meagre, and is not religion in a dogmatic sense quite beyond their horizon ? Were a true religious census taken in England, what kind of tale would be told ? In Canada and Australasia, where it is attempted to ascertain religious figures with accuracy, it is admitted that vast numbers give their nominal allegiance to Churches, to which in no serious sense they belong. Still, if the masses, or working classes, have no religion, have they lofty ideals of state duty or national sacrifice? The great problem of the future, for England and the EngHsh race, lies in the answer to the question whether or no the artisans, the labouring classes, will develop an altruistic ideal at aU. At present individual effort, among the masses, is limited to some simple domestic aim. A man wishes to improve his own position, or that of his family. Any idea of sacrifice on behalf of a cause, worldly or unworldly, is beyond his imagination. Life to him is too bitter a struggle. This is true of the vast majority of cases. Undoubtedly IdeaUsm, whether knightly, religious, or patriotic, developed slowly among the classes who formerly I; J 2«8 THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES ruled England. It was a virtue not inherent in Norman nobles or in British merchants. It was the growth of centuries, fostered by the lessons of poets or preachers, and flourished as the standard of hving was generally raised, along with the other standards of morals and ideas. We shouli! nut expect to find among the barons who fought at Bosworth or their wives, a man like Colonel Hutchinson and his wife Lucy, who seem to tit in so neatly with the lofty enthusiasms of the Great Rebellion. Again, a real character, although chosen from noble fiction, like Dinah Morris, would seem anachron- istic even in the seventeenth century. George Eliot had observed the working classes as she had observed others. Yet in " Silas Marner " there is no ideaUsm beyond the golden-haired Eppie, and Fehx Holt was not a genuine workman. More recent writers, notably the author of the " Revolution in Tanner s Lane " have seen gUmmerings of the sacred fire in men of the artisan class. Mr Tom Mann, whose name is now familiar to most readers of newspapers, appears to possess in a high degree, whether his aims are ill or well directed, the genuine intellectual enthusiasm and reach of soul which raise high hopes for the future of his order. Doubtless, numerous examples could be dis- covered, but they would require seeking. Among the prosperous middle classes, the MR CARNEGIE ON GOVERNMENT 229 puritan spirit which is characteristic of them, with its narrowness and nobleness as well, does not require seeking. You feel it in the atmosphere which surrounds them. At the Trades Union Congress held in Liverpool, where the working classes were re- presented fully, the discussions, full of interest and eagerness and practical enthusiasm as they were, certainly lacked ideaUsm. No speaker, as speakers were reported, touched a deeper note. It was impossible not to feel the want of orators with the tone of mind which marked Mr Bright and his companions. Mr Carnegie, addressing Scotsmen at Dundee on the merits of republican forms in government, suggested, indeed, ideas to his democratic audience beyond immediate material advantage. His references to universal brotherhood, to a federation of the world, accelerated by the spread of the English- speaking race, seemed to move the pulse of his hearers. Perhaps on the lines of the " Inter- national " some creed of " Pax Britannica " might seem to the English people worth all personal sacrifices. To make England inclined, as she once was, "to shrink into her narrow self," in reaUty the " tutelary angel of the human race," might possibly become an object to Englishmen in a wider sense than Burke ever dreamed. Mr Carnegie lays stress wisely upon the expansion of English blood and p2 "( I m '!■ 230 THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES NOT ALL SELF-INTEREST 281 English speech. Federation of these, he thinks, if it ever is accomplished, might make a greater England the arbitress not of Europe only but of the world. She could enjoin disarmament and enforce order. It is certain, and the point might be pressed, that the only common denominator at present between England and the wider England beyond the ocean is that of Labour. If ever a girdle is to be woven round our England and Australasia and Africania and the lost America, it will be by the hands of the working classes. Princes and peers and plutocrats, however willing, are powerless here. Though they have speech in common, the blood is not theirs. The common people of England, as they are sometimes called, may possibly federate the Enghsh race. That is an ideal before which all efforts of their predecessors with ruling attributes sink into insignificance. It is an ideal worthy of the dream of a great ruling class, the mightiest of all ruling classes, an educated, self-governing people. It must, however, not be forgotten that if it is rare to find a man capable of using profitably and nobly great riches, to make profitable or noble use of poverty is rarer still. For this reason the sense of mankind long ago decided that both extremes of wealth and poverty were undesirable in a well-ordered state. Certainly the efforts to obviate them have not hitherto been happy. The doctrines of a political economy based on that curious type, an individual animated solely by a self-regarding desire to accumulate as much wealth as possible, have singularly failed to do so. In England the rich grow richer, and the poor poorer every day. A new school of economic philosophy condescends to admit that men have other passions besides that for wealth, and other virtues besides that of self-interest. In this admission lies a new-born hope for the future. For the moment you abandon the firm ground that every man is the best judge of his own interest, and that his interest is invariably financial to the exclusion of all other considerations, deduction after deduction may lead you into endless labyrinths of what economists consider false sentiment. Among the many forms of false sentiment very noble ideals find place. It is difficult, for example, to see how any strict economist of the old school could logically approve of Trades Unions or their methods. For a Trades Union is the negation of the principles, " every man for him- self," " the supply follows the demand," and of the individual struggle for life. Combination is a plan invented to defeat the Darwinian theory ; to minimise the severity of natural laws against the weaker members of society. The sanctions of combination, which give to Trades Unionism III t \i f ^ 282 THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES its force, are those practices, said to be illegal, but nevertheless freely used, of boycotting, of picketing, and of intimidation. A priori these methods appear dangerous and bad. Are they indispensable ? It is ardently asserted that they are used with beneficial results, and only in rare instances misused. No anomaly could be greater, and no breach of apparently essential laws more incongruous. Yet who can doubt that the laws deliberately enacted against these methods have been broken, and that the world in general and England in particular have widely benefited in consequence? EngUsh policy is indeed reared on paradox. Laws are enacted, are broken, and society seems none the worse, but all the better. No doubt some of the means employed are rough. Strikes are but a coarse way of adjusting legitimate dis- putes between employer and employed. Yet the moment that any proposal is made with the intention of minimising the suffering inevit- able from coarse methods of the kind, the parrot cry of "socialism" is raised, and no arguments however quietly urged will receive attention. Yet it may be that from combinations such as these, from the effort to effect them, and utilise them, there will spring the new Ideal fur which we are seeking. The people, half educated, are anxious for guidance. They are bewildered by noisy agitators for and against THE CHURCH AND THE MASSES 23S their well-being. At present they look in vain for high leadership. From the Church of England they receive little attention or assistance. Frederick Maurice forty years ago, Mr Stubbs quite recently, are names of notable Churchmen who were yet something more to the labouring masses. But the archbishops and bishops, with the exception of the late Bishop of Durham, seem to stand loftily aloof from the turbulent swaying crowd of their fellow-countrymen. Among Christian ecclesiastics Cardinal Manning alone has stepped down from his archiepiscopal throne and stood face to face with the people. And of prominent politicians who, except Mr John Morley, has ventured to speak freely and openly to them on the topics which fill their daily thoughts? All respect and admiration is due to him for his boldness in holding to old doctrines which are unpopular and discredited. No greater service, except his conversion to the opposite views, could be rendered to the working classes than Mr John Morley is rendering to them by opposing the demand for legislative inter- ference with the hours of labour. It is a dis- putable question, upon which thoughtful and practical men strongly differ. It involves a departure in legislation full of grave results to commercial interests. It requires thorough dis- cussion. Mr John Morley's opposition ensures li 234 THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES li! this. If he is defeated in debate and worsted in the struggle, as he probably will be, the working classes will owe him no grudge. For if they can triumph over him, they may be doubly reliant on the strength and justice of their cause. Mr John Morley has only their interest in view. His opinion as to what con- stitutes their interest differs from that of the advocates of a short labour day. But where are the other professed leaders of the people? What are they waiting for? It is not, as many of them seem to think, a question of what the majority of the working classes want. The question is whether what the working classes want is really for their good. The working classes are eminently reasonable. They are prepared to yield to argument, and to be convinced. They look for leadership, but it is strangely long in mani- festing itself. As Edmund Burke educated the nation in Liberal principles, as Mr Disraeli educated his party in tactics, as Mr Gladstone educated his in pohcy, so the masses to-day await the teaching of experienced and honest statesmanship on the unsettled questions to which they have recently awakened. It is high time that others beside Mr John Morley stepped into the arena. Ireland is no doubt an absorbing topic. It is the favourite battle-ground of party fighters. The claims of UNSELFISH MOTIVE POWER 235 Irishmen, too, are irresistibly strong for priority of treatment. But to the most careless observer it is clear that other matters besides Ireland are disturbing the surface of English life ; and that moral forces recently called into active existence are beginning to make themselves felt. The social relations of classes to each other, of labour to capital, of man to woman, of both to the state, are all destined to be tested by the new state power just feeling its strength. Is it not of vital importance to us that the guidance of this new state power should be in good hands ? That is to say, in the hands of men themselves actuated by deep and enduring principles, and prepared to use their influence with a view to their primary enforcement. Material improvement, betterment of social conditions, more equal distribution of wealth, all these are aims excellent in themselves. But these objects as they present themselves in a practical shape to men, can scarcely be attained, should they make any demand upon personal sacrifice, unless behind the effort to achieve them Ues some strong unselfish motive power. That seems to be a fair inference from the story of the past. In former struggles EngUshmen have keenly felt this stronger motive. It has been relied upon by statesmen of old to obtain the consent of their countrymen to great sacrifices. If Burke's appeal to the national love of liberty Mi 236 THE IDEALS OF THE MASSES was necessary to carry through the great war against Napoleon; if Wilberforce would have had a poor chance of abolishing slavery had he not felt himself and known how to awake in others the love of abstract justice ; and finally if Mr Gladstone, by applying Christian morality to international quarrels, was able to avert a fratricidal war with America, which under the aristocratic government of forty years before could not have been prevented ; then surely at the present time no question is more full of grave import for the future than to determine what are the deeper motives in the working classes to which an appeal can be made, and to find leaders willing and competent to make it. X A LOST LEADERS " With maUce towards none, with charity to aU, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in." These words are quoted from an address of Lincoln's by Mr Motley in a letter to the Duchess of Argyll. They should be his epitaph, says Mr Motley, and goes on to ask who in the long roll of the world's rulers have deserved a nobler one. Enthusiasm and reverence, if a leader would be powerful, are the sentiments his character should inspire. Determination, skill, courage, are qualities which appeal to the reason of mankind. But men are not led by reason alone. If what Spinoza said of laws be true — that those are strong which appeal to reason, but those are impregnable which compel the assent both of reason and the common affec- tions — the observation apphes with greater force to the law-maker, and to the leader. For years after his death, the men who had 1 Written in 1891. 237 238 A LOST LEADER followed him through the stormy years of strife could scarcely bear to hear Lincoln's name spoken. It is the quality of soul that is able to stir strong feehngs of this kind which those with a hard fight before them seek in their leader, if they be wise. In England, at the present time, of how many who lead or aspire to lead their fellow-countrymen in the turmoil of political warfare could the words Mr Motley quoted be truthfully written? Yet loftiness of character carries as great an influence with the English people now as at any time in our history, while any conspicuous want of it is fatal to leadership. In aristocratic forms of government intellect takes precedence of character. Aristocracies are perhaps not the keenest judges of what is called a good character. But the Enghsh democracy of to-day seems for the present inclined to accept the high standard required by their predecessors who occupied the interregnum between the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 and that of 1867. The interweaving of morality with national pohtics has been a task congenial to the nature of ]Mr Gladstone, and under his guidance the English - speaking races have made marked progress towards a higher civilisation. But of late a disposition has shown itself among certain classes to insist upon closely connecting private morals with the political PRIVATE MORALS IN PUBLIC LIFE 889 effectiveness. Qualified, and with reservation, the sentiment is wholesome enough. But, pushed remorselessly to its logical conclusion, grave dangers hover round it, which must be clear to any reflective mind. In view of events, quite recent, the results of which no man can foresee, either in their direct or indirect aspects, som% of these dangers and difficulties are worth consideration. A man of Napoleonic daring, of immense resource, a tried and tested leader not only of a party, but of a nation, is ruined and his power destroyed by an offence against public morals. Had he broken the criminal law, the gravity of the crime, and its place in the scale of crime, could have been better estimated. Judges — who fix punishments — are trained to the task, and perform it on the whole equitably. But there are offences which are not offiences against the criminal law of the country. On the contrary. By the Divorce Act, adultery, which formerly stood on the borderland of crime, was by the voice of the English people placed among ordinary breaches of civil contract, for which by a civil action at law the aggrieved party could obtain relief and damages. Adultery, in short, was legalised by Act of Parliament. The Parliament which enacted that law has much to answer for. The change marked indelibly, and in doing so may have given an impulse to J40 A LOST LEADER the decline of orderly and decent family life in England. The old idea was that " Nuptiae sunt conjunctio maris et feminae, et consortium omnis vitae, divini et humani juris communicatio." But by the Law of Divorce marriage no longer was « a life-long feUowship of all divine and human rights." It became a mere partnership— not, it is true, co-equal in all respects-and treated as the years rolled on with greater and greater levity. There was a period in Rome, Mr Lecky says, during which law and public opinion com- bined in making matrimonial purity most strict. For five hundred and twenty years there was no such thing as a divorce in Rome. But as Rome decUned morals dechned, and divorce became so common that St Jerome had heard of a wife who was married to her twenty-third husband, she being his twenty-fifth wife. There were, however, what some would consider compensa- tions ; for women, from being submissive wives, had assumed a position of equality with men, and great independence of opinion and manners. One of the loftiest of modem ideals is the - emancipation " of women. Free divorce lurks behind. Every one knows that Lady Mary Wortley Montagu for years advocated a BiU to assimilate marriage to a lease of seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years, in spite of the remmder that in all such leases it is usual to insert a covenant to keep and leave in good repair. But DIVORCE «41 the present law of divorce is so unfair as between rich and poor that, the principle once admitted, greater facilities cannot fail in common justice to be given, and a day will come when emancipated woman will bring free divorce in her train, if she still wear one. As yet, however, divorce carries with it shame ; and the seventh commandment. Lord Salisbury remarks, has, in the eyes of platform moralists, eaten up all the others. If injustice is sometimes done, it is of the rough- and-ready sort, because discrimination by the public between cases of adultery is too difficult. The sentence is a " decree nisi," granted without reference to extenuating circumstances. Any man who aspires to influence his fellowmen must take this risk into account — that, more than ever before, the house he inhabits and those he frequents are made of transparent glass. In earher times a prominent politician, given that society approved his private acts, had nothing to fear on the score of morals from pubUc criticism. Society, in the sense of people who went to Court, drew a cle?.r and well-defined line between public actions and private vices, always providing that those vices were not unfashionable. The public followed suit. Private vices were ignored, but political immorality was not readily forgiven. George III. drank water, but his people were as coldly indifferent to the fact (which in these days would possibly have counted as a set-off ut A LOST LEADER PUBLIC OPINION 243 to his hatred of reform) as they were to the drunkenness of the King*s Ministers. Had Mr Pitt consumed even more port than he did, his poUcy would not have been any less popular; while, had Mr Fox had all the moral qualities which distinguished Sir Robert Peel, his reputa- tion could never have survived the turpitude of the Coalition. The monarchy scarcely bent under the weight of George IV.'s private vices and his treatment of Mrs Fitzherbert ; but had his successor not yielded to the pressure of Lord Orev in 1832, WiUiam IV. might have ended his days at St Germain. When Lord Melbourne was acquitted, after a trial in which the Tories said it had only been proved that he had had more opportunities than any man ever had before and had failed to avail himself of them, it was known that, had the verdict been the other way, he would have resigned his office of Prime Minister. But he was a sensitive man, and probably an innocent one. There is no proof or suggestion that his resignation would have been forced upon him by the circumstances of the case. The Duke of WelUngton and Mr Greville were both of opinion that it would not. On the other hand, this same Mmister was enabled to discard the services of the most trenchant Radical intellect in England at tlie time — to omit Lord Brougham, against whose private character nothing could be charged, from his Cabinet — without any better reason than he himself gave in replying to a speech of extraordinary power from the ex-Chancellor. " My lords," he said, " your lordships have heard the powerful speech of the noble and learned lord, one of the most powerful ever delivered in this House, and I leave your lordships to consider what must be the strength and nature of the objections which prevent any government from availing themselves of the services of such a man." But with the reign of Queen Victoria came a change. At first owing to her extreme youth, and afterwards owing to the nobleness of character so marked in the Prince Consort and herself, the tone of the Court gave to society a different fashion in morals. Of late years, the seclusion of the Queen, added to other circum- stances which are patent enough, has caused fashionable ethics to lapse from the high standard of forty years ago. But society is no longer the arbiter of morals in politics. A new force has gathered strength — the force of the people's opinion. It might have been doubted by cavillers at democracy, having the French Revolution in mind, in what direction that force would be directed. Any doubt upon the matter has been set at rest by the events of the last twenty years. The ethical standard which finds favour with the people, both in regard to public and private *'■! ' i i|4,4 A LOST LEADER actions, bears very favourable comparison with that of the oligarchy with whom formerly the choice between one politician and another rested. It is difficult, without giving just ground for offence, to make this clear by example. But there is no harm in pointing to the statesmen who, since the Reform Bill of 1867 — since political power became vested in what are called the masses — have held the office of Prime Minister. Lord Beaconsfield was neither a gambler, a drunkard, nor a rake; while Mr Gladstone and Lord SaUsbury are both men, either of whom, so far as private morals are concerned, is qualified to be an archbishop. Indeed, it may be truthfully said that they both possess special aptitude for that sacred office. It would be rash to infer any objective advantage to a nation accruing from the circumstance that its ruler possessed every domestic virtue. The advantage is subjective, and lies in the effect produced upon the people by the contemplation of their ideal, or the non- contemplation of the reverse. For a Minister may be a saint in private life, and yet be cruel and a tyrant. M. Noel, writing of Danton, whom he knew, said, ** He is a good son, a good husband, a good father, a good relative, a good friend; and I leave you [his correspondent], who lay so much stress on good morals, to infer the consequences." Yet Danton, powerful as he was, left much to be ST COLMAN'S GIRDLE S45 desired in his public capacity. There are examples, and many, some of whom could be named and others in more recent times best left unnamed, whose private vices were notorious, but to whom Englishmen owe it that their liberties have been duly maintained. To assume that domestic virtue is a necessary attribute to beneficent statesmanship is a superstition. It is a belief held on religious or theological grounds, but capable of scientific disproof. But, Uke some other superstitions, it is ennobling to those who cling to it, and, in certain stages of the world's progress, to destroy it might be fatally mischievous. Among the Irish saints there was one, St Colman, who possessed a girdle which would only meet round the chaste. To-day, in Eng- land, that girdle is labelled "supreme political authority." In Ireland it yet remains to be proved whether the saint's girdle has not lost its virtue. But whether or no the capacity to make laws and prudently administer them depends upon keeping inviolate the seventh commandment, the English people are inclined to act as if it were so. Whether it is the view of the masses, or whether the masses, having no strong opinion on the point, yield to the pressure of the " non- conformist conscience," may for the present purpose be left unconsidered. The view that q2 246 A LOST LEADER }i unchastity is a barrier to the exercise of power may be said, by recent clear proofs, to obtain in English politics. Disquahfication on this ground not only applies to supreme leadership ; the rule extends to the commanders of co-ordinate forces, to the chiefs of any group of men who aspire to act with the main body of a political party. It may before long be still further extended to individuals. Inquisition may follow, penetrating men's social armour, laying bare their private lives by questions on the hustings, and by attacks on the platform and in the press. Here again injustice, sometimes gross, may be done, for lynch law is the only form in which popular justice can be applied to morals. When their guardianship has passed from an ecclesiastical authority (the Church) to a lay authority (the people), one tyranny in all human probability will have been substituted for another. If the Church treated with undue laxness the vices of one monarch or Minister, the people may treat with undue severity the immoralities of another. It is stepping beyond the region of likelihood to suppose that George IV. and Mr Fox could in our time stand the strain of fortunes lavished in play, of bankruptcy certificated by Parliament, of usury and buffoonery standing where men have been accustomed to look for culture and decorum. Hitherto, in order to weaken a political combination or destroy a WILKES' POPULARITY 247 policy, apart from solid convincing argument, it was necessary to expose dishonest motive or corrupt method. But in future there will be strong temptation to use different weapons. After Wilkes was expelled from the House of Commons in 1769 he became the hero of the people, the incarnation of the great principle that a constituency was free to choose its repre- sentative and to be represented by the man of its choice, without veto from other constitu- encies and other representatives. His infamous character and notorious profligacy were ignored by his admirers. In these days there is no reason to suppose that this luminous principle would have obscured from vision the character of the man ; and a modern Wilkes, whatever he might represent, would stand no better chance than an Irish politician, whom it is unjust to name in the same sentence with him, stands to-day. It would be useless to argue for a Wilkes on the ground of principle, against a powerful opponent like the Times, bent on destroying the man, and calmly ignoring everything but his vices. A modern politician must be careful of his environment ; like humbler mortals, he is necessarily a slave to it. If the tone of society under George III. in which politicians moved was loose, they ran no risks beyond their purses and their health. But to-day the fierce light of the "nonconformist conscience" has i A LOST LEADER begun to play upon politicians, their pleasures, and the company they keep. "The ladies/' said Horace Walpole, " game too deep for me ; " and it has been said of that period that the eagerness of women in society to win at cards from their friends and acquaintances destroyed all pleasant and rational intercourse in London drawing-rooms. But in those days no one kiic.^ or cared whether the loser was the Lord Chancellor or Mr Fox. When the Postmaster- General, Sir Edward Fawkener, had gambled away a large sum at White's Clubhouse, and some one observed, " See how he is robbing the mail ! " every one laughed. But would the merri- ment ring quite so true if the anecdote were told of a Cabinet Minister to-day ? A game of faro could not then destroy a coalition. But to-day it might ruin a party. George Selwyn, when he was told that a waiter at a club had been arrested for some crime, remarked, " What a horrid idea he wiU give of us to those fellows in Newgate 1 " He probably did not reaUy care, and it certainly did not matter, what opinion was formed of him and of the set in which he lived, by those "fellows in Newgate," or even by the other feUows who hung about the doors of the House of Commons to pick up scraps of oratory delivered in intervals of the business of dining and of play. But to-day the private habits of poUticians are sharpened mto weapons PERSONAL GRATIFICATION «4.9 turned against themselves ; and a " horrid idea " given of these to those " fellows " in the gallery or in the lobbies at Westminster might lead to the wrecking of a Cabinet, possibly of a Constitution. Mr John Morley, in an essay of darmg and profound analytical power, has pointed out that, although selfish oligarchies have not as a rule wanted courage, yet the cowardly French noblesse ran from the fury of the Revolution because they were an ohgarchy, not of power or duty, but of self-indulgence. But it is also obvious, in retrospect, that the French nobles misread the signs of the times in which they lived, although years before they had been plain to Rousseau in France, and even to Lord Chester- field in England. "Blind and obstinate choice of personal gratification" might have been in- nocuous in the days of Madame de Pompadour ; persistence in that choice thirty years later was not merely dangerous, but fatal. When levity of demeanour, even of the highest lady in France, broke out in incredible dissipations, in indiscreet visits, in midnight parades and mystification, and above all in insensate gambUng, it was felt by grave politicians, oligarchs themselves, aware of the danger, that the storm when it broke could not be ridden out. Rank, beauty, or wealth have to pay the penalty of conspicuousness. Every action is known and open to canvass. 250 A LOST LEADER ^Wl ^tll To-day, as then, the poor are very poor, and the toilers have to toil hard. It may not be true, but it is believed now, as then, that the gaming- tables of the rich are replenished by the hapless drudgery and the painfully hoarded rental of the poor. Party men and politicians should be careful not to misspell — like the noblesse of France — the signs of the times in which they live. Quite recently, to an Irish audience, it was asserted by their late leader that he owed his present position to a notorious evening journalist and Mr Michael Davitt. What he meant was that he had been overthrown by the spirit of fanaticism which the former seems to have power to rouse. A terrible and furious passion for chastity, overwhelming all considerations of justice and expediency, which can thus be wielded by the pen of one man and flung against an individual to-day or a class to-morrow, might, if society survived, leave a fearful wreckage behind. The ** nonconformist conscience" may be ridiculed, but it is not narrower than was the conscience of Robespierre. It is, perhaps, not perfectly sane. It may be repellent to many of us. There is no one, as Mr Morley once feel- ingly observed, in all the world with whom it is so difficult to sympathise as with the narrower fanatics of our own political faith. And the "nonconformist conscience," finding expression THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS i251 in the daily newspaper in these days of universal education, is a force to which the improvisations of Camile Desmoulins from a chair in a pubUc garden are child's play. The power of the press is only as yet half-fledged. If Benjamin Constant could hold that the press is the mistress of intelligence, and intelligence is the mistress of the world, what would he say of the news- papers to-day ? Their capacity to influence has grown with the capacity of the people to read them. It is far truer than when Balzac said it, that the press is le peuple en folio, Mr Labouchere represents, very brilliantly, a certain school of journalism. If what the theatre was to the limited Athenian commonwealth the press is to England, then Mr Labouchere is able to scourge as he often does with as great justice and humour, with deadlier effect, than Aristo- phanes. It so happens that Mr Labouchere does not share the views of the Greek satirist in politics. But his methods are not dissimilar ; and it is not inconceivable that he should ally himself, with all the fervour of scepticism, to the " nonconformist conscience " in a crusade against vice, which happened to coincide with pohtical opinion, which he honestly thought baneful to his country; Greville had no doubt that political motive was the influence which made Lord Melbourne a defendant in an action for crim, con. *'01d Wynford was at the N .*i 1 J52 A LOST LEADER bottom of it all, and persuaded Lord Grantley to urge it on for mere political purposes." The case was notoriously weak, and ought never to have been brought into court. But political venom was stronger than legal scruples. And if men in the position of Lords Wynford and Grantley, more than half a century ago, at a time when poUtical passions were certainly not stronger than now, could sanction such methods of destroying a political adversary, what is to be expected of journalists, demagogues, place- hunters, impecunious Tadpoles and Tapers of every degree, banded together by common hatred of their poUtical opponents, unrestrained by moral or social checks, confident that they have only to appeal to the ''nonconformist conscience " and to the vktuous independence of the before-mentioned evening joumahst— independence beyond all question— to be sure of hearty response? In discussing a matter of this kind it is difficult not to think foolishly, as Dr Johnson used to say, and to clear the mind of cant. It is extremely hard to weigh carefully the obvious practical drawbacks against the possible moral gain. Ask the first three men you meet on what ground they condemn the fallen Irish leader, and they will give you, in all probability, three different reasons. One will say that it was REASONS FOR CONDEMNATION «53 because rehance may no longer be placed upon his word or his good faith. " I waive the quantum o* the sin, The hazard of concealing ; But oh I it hardens a' within And petrifies the feeUng." Another will say it is because of the breach of the seventh commandment, the enforcing of which is essential in the interests of family life and vital in the interests of society. The third, if he is a Nonconformist, and candid, will admit that his mind is influenced by St Paul's clear precept to the Corinthians, that they were " not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator." "I wrote unto you in an epistle," St Paul reiterates, "not to company with fornicators." Mr Frederic Harrison's position is different again ; and no one can refuse assent to the pro- positions he has so clearly laid down. Comte's system, it is well known, rested upon the sub- ordination of politics to morahty, inasmuch as spiritual reconstruction of society was the start- ing-point from which he looked forward to regenerate poUtical institutions. Mr Frederic Harrison not unnaturally fails to see any spiritual side to the ludicrous and sordid details proved in the divorce court. Suppose the evils which appeal so strongly to men of such different castes of thought are ^4 A LOST LEADER i ^* admitted to the full, even then it is open to doubt whether the evil of the punishment does not exceed the evil of the offence. It is an old belief that, if that be so, the suffering ultimately reaped will exceed the suffering prevented, and that exemption from a lesser evil will only be purchased at the expense of a greater. In one of Mr Herbert Spencer's works he quotes a dialogue between Mr Palgrave, travel- ling in Arabia, and a Wahhabee, which runs somewhat after this fashion: " The greatest of sins is to worship a creature of clay." " Doubtless," said I ; " but what, then, is the second ? " "To drink the shameful (that is, to smoke tobacco)," he replied. " But what of murder, adultery, and bearing false witness against thy neighbour?" " God is very merciful," said my friend, mean- ing that these are little sins. "Two sins alone are not to be forgiven — polytheism and smoking?" I questioned; and the sheikh, with due solemnity, replied that this was so. Perhaps no better example could be found of the labyrinths into which men wander when they attempt to substitute ecclesiastical formulae for the common law of the land. That ecclesiastical formulae may properly govern social rules of conduct is a different contention altogether. To exclude a man from :,i THE CASE OF BRADLAUGH 265 associating himself with you on behalf of a public enterprise because he smokes tobacco is one thing. To exclude him from your private dwelling is a totally different thing. The most ardent partisan can draw a distinc- tion between what schoolboys call "sending to Coventry" — that is, moral reprehension — and what Irishmen call " boycotting" — that is, social ostracism. Sir Charles Russell could discern no difference in principle between them. That may be so. But he would not have asserted that there was no difference in degree. And difference in degree is the essence of the matter. An attempt was made to exclude Mr Bradlaugh from Parliament and public life, in the teeth of his constituents, because his theological views and his views on the proper interpretation of the marriage service of the Church differed from those of the majority of prosperous, well-to-do Enghshmen. Mr Bradlaugh and his constituents — who, fortunately for themselves, or they might have recoiled from the fight, are none of them prosperous or well - to - do — stood firm. The struggle was severe. Passions ran high. The "nonconformist conscience" was much exercised, but fortunately a sound Liberal principle of countervaiUng strength, because well established by tradition, was too powerful for bigotry and partisanship: Mr Bradlaugh became a member of the House of Commons. His success was A LOST LEADER accompanied by reaction so violent, that not only has Malthusian Atheism been received in the House of Commons with more than civihty, but it has been welcomed on Nonconformist platforms— notably and recently at Sheffield— with enthusiasm second only to that reserved for the leaders of the Liberal party. Reaction is the vengeance of Nature upon those who do violence to her. And when rational moral reprehension for breaches of moral laws tends to degenerate into grotesque persecution the moment for reaction is dangerously near at hand. But it is thought that distinctions can be drawn between delinquents, and that while this man is declared impossible as an ally or con- federate another may be tolerated. To differen- tiate between degrees of moral turpitude may be possible to a confessor, but for the pubhc it would be an idle attempt. Imagine the ennobling charm of a controversy, conducted by rival divines, supported by rival orators and rival newspapers, as to whether or no some particular type of co-respondent was or was not a suitable political ally. To pause a moment will be to conclude that, if the rule is to be enforced at all, its application must be universal. The risks must be faced, the evils encountered. It has been said of sexual self-control that there is probably no branch of ethics which has MORALITY AND PUBLIC OPINION «57 been so largely determined by special dogmatic theology, and there is none which would be so deeply affected by its decay. If beyond the pale of the Catholic Church dogmatic theology with difficulty holds its ground, it may be worth while to endeavour to substitute healthy public opinion for religious anathema as a sanction for morals. Habit founded on reason may be the highest sanction which can be hoped for morals in the future. Morality stimulated and checked by fitful gusts of popular prejudice could not be said to possess any sanction at all. Let it be assumed that, in view of the decay of dogmatic belief, ^public opinion requires to be strictly schooled and moral rules severely enforced, and that the voice of the people is to be substituted for priestly excommunication. But a day of temptation must inevitably come. Recently the conffict lay between the supposed interests of the Irish people and the strain upon the " nonconformist conscience." To-morrow, for the first party to that conflict may be sub- stituted the material interests of what are called the ** masses," or possibly of the nation. In some European struggle England may have to choose between taking her place alone against a powerful foe and accepting the assistance of an ally led by another Napoleon III., fresh from another coup (Tetat — the good faith exhibited in its accompHshment finding n 258 A LOST LEADER THE PRIEST IN POLITICS 259 apologists — and whose decorous life would perhaps receive the approval of Mr Price Hughes. Would morality, guaranteed by- public opinion, survive the shock of such a betrayal ? Or, to take another case. Suppose in some prolonged and hard-fought struggle for what are called the rights of labour an alliance between the Liberal party and the party of Mr Davitt is threatened by the private moral delinquency of some leader whose overthrow would imply the disruption of the confederacy and indefinite postponement of its objects: could Mr Davitt rely upon the "masses" to support an act of self-abnegation ? And should he fail, again it may be asked, Would morality, resting upon its new sanction, survive the betrayal ? Among the precepts upon which the Liberal party has always placed reliance are to be found the following : 1. You are not warranted in going behind the choice of a constituency to which you do not belong, or of a party of which you are not a member. 2. It is contrary to public interest that any test, religious or moral, should be applied to a duly elected representative of the people. 8. A constituency is the best judge of its own requirements and its own honour, subject to the law of the land as administered by the judicial authorities. Yet to conspire together to refuse to act with a duly elected member of Parliament, sent up by his constituents to act with you for a common object, is practically to disfranchise the constituency. In former times, men who, by whatever name they called themselves, stood on the ground which the Liberal party occupies to-day, did not relish the interference of priests in politics. In Italy and in France this feeling is as strong as it was in England under William and Mary. The objection was a practical one, founded on experience. The difficulties of government, ot transacting public affiiirs, were great enough already, and it seemed useless and mischievous to further complicate them. Besides, every political priest, whether he be Cardinal Mazarin or Archbishop Croke or a Mr Price Hughes, smacks of the inquisitor. In the domain of morals, under ecclesiastical rules, inquisition and the confessional and excommunicatory powers may have their uses. In the domain of politics they are out of place. If it takes a man most of his leisure time in life to look to his own morals, and to see that he not only presents a reputable figure, but endeavours to ensure that his parliamentary representative is of unblemished character, and the party to which he belongs adheres steadily 260 A LOST LEADER to the principles they profess, how can he decently undertake the hke duties of his neighbours ? "I can say, in the simpUcity of my soul, I love not, I love not — I say, I love not to rake into sores, or to discover nakedness." Thus spoke Oliver Cromwell, whose conscience would perhaps stand comparison with that of any of his antitypes. When, on his death-bed, he prayed that his people might be ''given consistency of judgment," he must have had prevision of the responsibilities they would some day take upon their shoulders. The English people have hitherto chosen their leaders well. They can be trusted to choose again without special glorification of individual men and without assistance from the " Vigilance Society." If they can find one " without maHce, with charity to all, with firmness in the right as God gives him to see the right" — one who indefatigably " strives on to finish the work he is in " — they select him by an indefinable process to govern in their name. If such a man is not forthcoming, they take him who approximates nearest to this ideal. The process seems to be one of natural selection, and the result will bear careful scrutiny. The Prime Ministers of Queen Victoria will favourably compare with the rulers of any European nation over the same period ot time. Sufficient to any group RESPONSIBILITY OF CHOICE 261 of men is the responsibility for their own leader, and the choice of him. It is a responsi- bility not hghtly to be borne, and no test is too severe which they may apply to determine their choice. But, beyond this limit, prudence without malice, and charitable to boot, will restrain her ardour for virtue. b2 APPENDIX NOTES BY COMMISSIONERS Note by Viscount Esher I HAVE signed this Report in which I generally concur, but I desire to add the following observa- tions : — The main defects in the organisation of the War Office, elicited by the evidence, are first, the want of co-ordination between the branches of that Department, and the consequent weakening of the influence of the Secretary of State with his colleagues in the Government; and secondly, the absence of a proper system of inspection, ensuring that the military policy of the Secretary of State, sanctioned by the Cabinet and by the votes of ParUament, is carried into effect. When the Secretary of State has made un- successful attempts, from time to time, to obtain the assent of the Cabinet to expenditure necessary in the interests of the country, his efforts have been weakened by his failure to show a consensus of military opinion in favour, as the First Lord of the Admiralty continually does, of the policy which he recommends. The condition in 1899, as disclosed in Sir H. Brackenbury's Memorandum, of our Armaments, 265 264 APPENDIX of our Fortresses, of the Clothing Department, of the Transport of the Army Medical Corps, of the system of Remounts, shows that either the Secretary of State was culpable of neglect, or that he was in ignorance of the facts. In order to secure co-ordination between the branches of the War Office, and to strengthen thereby the hands of the Secretary of State, the only practical remedy would appear to be the establishment of a Council or Board on the lines of the Admiralty. It is worth while to remark, in this connection, that administration by a " Board " has been found to work successfully in every great commercial enterprise, in the Govern- ment of India, at the Admiralty, and — if the Cabinet may not inaptly be designated a Board — in the Government of the Kingdom. Two important underlying causes have contributed to the evolution of this kind of administration. First, that discussion in council is the most successful method of obtaining a right solution of difficult problems; and, secondly, that a collective appeal to external opinion, whether in the shape of the Treasury, or Parhament, or the public, carries more weight than the dictum or arguments of one man, however ingenious and however capable. The administration of the Admiralty has often been favourably compared with that of the War Department. There cannot well be an inherent superiority in sailors to soldiers as administrators, nor in the choice of First Lords of the Admiralty to Secretaries of State for War. Further, the Board of Admiralty have appealed more success- APPENDIX 265 k fully both to Chancellors of the Exchequer and to Parliament than has the Secretary of State for War, and although this may partly be accounted for by the greater consideration attached, properly, to the needs of the Navy, it is not the sole reason for the greater facihty with which that Service has obtained large grants of public funds ; for in addition to money voted it has invariably secured a higher degree of public confidence. In face of these facts it may truthfully be contended that the sound administration of the Admiralty results from the system under which the First Lord determines all naval questions in council with his principal advisers, after formal discussion, and is thus enabled to approach the Treasury, the Cabinet, and Parliament with the force of professional opinion behind him. The Board of Admiralty is composed of the First Lord, the First and Second Naval Lords, the Third Sea Lord, the Junior Naval Lord, the Civil Lord, the Financial Secretary, and the Under-Secretary of State. A War Office Council might be constituted to comprise the Secretary of State, the Adjutant- General, the Quartermaster - General, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Director- General of Military Intelligence, the Financial Secretary, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and the Under-Secretary of State. The administrative work of the Admiralty is distributed in departments under the control of the members of the Board, and the work of the War Office could be divided in a similar manner. To the Adjutant-General should be assigned the movements of troops, the framing of military regulations affecting discipline, training, military ^66 APPENDIX education, promotion, and appointments. All the subsidiary branches controUing these matters should be subordinate to that officer. The Quartermaster-General should control, with one exception, the spending departments of the Army. The Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Transport, Commissariat, Clothing Depart- ments, the Army Medical Department, should all be subsidiary branches of his Department. The Director- General of Ordnance should be responsible for Armament. The Director- General of Military Intelligence should have no executive functions, and that important officer s duties should be Hmited to the framing of schemes of defence, the initiation and working out of changes from time to time, as necessity requires, in the organisation of the Army, the preparation of maps, and the collection of mili- tary information in all parts of the world. It may be said that the advice of these officers is at the service of the Secretary of State under the existing system, but more than this is re- quired. Discussion in the presence of the Secretary of State, if possible agreement, or an acceptance of the decision of a majority, are essential elements in the military administration of the War Office, if the Secretary of State for War s policy is to carry, among his colleagues and in Parliament, the weight which attaches to the views of the First Lord of the Admiralty. A marked characteristic of the Navy is the loyalty of naval officers to each other, and to their chiefs ; while in the Army from the junior ranks upwards, a spirit of criticism has become a military tradition, which is mischievous to the Service, and may take years to eradicate. APPENDIX 267 In addition to the advantages of administra- tion by Council, already referred to, may be added the probability that agreement, or loyalty to decisions once taken, in the highest places, may gradually tend to produce a similar state of feeUng throughout the body of Army officers. II It will have been noticed that it is not pro- posed to include the Commander-in-Chief among those forming the Army Board or Council. Since the death of the Duke of Wellington the position of the Commander-in-Chief has been gradually becoming more anomalous, until a crisis was reached in the year 1899, upon which it is unnecessary to dilate. The speeches of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Wolseley upon their mutual relations in the House of Lords will not readily be forgotten. The tact of the Duke of Cambridge, and his position as a Member of the Royal House, just rendered possible a system within the War Office which subsequent arrangements have proved to be impossible, if the efficiency of the War Department is ever to be established. The only practical remedy is the abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief, as recom- mended by the Hartington Commission, and the appointment of a General Officer Commanding the Army removed from the War Office into a distinct building, possibly the Horse Guards, with a new definition, by Order in Council, of his duties and responsibiUties. He might be entrusted with the discipline of the Army, but his principal functions should be those of an Inspector-General of His Majesty's Forces, and 268 APPENDIX he should be responsible to the Secretary of State. His position would be analogous to that of an auditor in the region of finance. He should have to certify annually in writing as to the actual efficiency and condition of whatever military organisation has been settled by the War Department and by Parliament. Ihat is to say, if two Army Corps, or three, or six, are the large units agreed to by Parliament, he should certify annually that they are efficient and complete. Further, he should report and certify as to the condition of fortresses, ordnance, magazines, clothing, stores, equipment hospitals, etc^ and he should be held responsible for the accuracy of his certificates. Hitherto, the Secretary of State has been forced to rely upon the Chiefs of Departments whose duty it is to organise those Departments for information as to their efficiency, with results at once misleading and dangerous. The object of the change suggested is to give the Secretary of State an Inspecting Officer of the highest rank and military qualifications, whose principal functions would be to keep him informed of the actual condition of an organisation for which that officer was not himself responsible. Ihe importance of such a check or audit cannot weU be exaggerated. . xu One advantage which would accrue to the military organisation of the Army by the aboli- tion of the Commandership-m-Chief should not be overlooked. Under the existing system a soldier appointed to that office, except he has reached the final stages of his career, is practi- cally shelved after a tenure of five years. Re- appointment is a course of procedure undesirable APPENDIX 269 for many obvious reasons. The Admiralty here again may be taken as a model, for there is no naval command so clearly superior to all others that after his tenure of it an officer need be re- moved from the active Ust while still fit for service In the Army, on the other hand, were an officer in the prime of hfe appointed Commander- in-Chief under existing conditions, his further employment would be a matter of considerable difficulty. This is a point worthy of careful consideration. To summarise, therefore, these recommenda- tions, they are briefly : — First, to reorganise the War Office Council, and to define more clearly their functions, as an advisory and executive Board, presided over by the Secretary of State, in whom, however, final responsibility to Parliament must be reserved. Secondly, to decentralise internally the War Department, by a re-arrangement of duties, under the respective members of the Board, abolishing the cross jurisdiction now existing. Thirdly, to abolish the Commandership-in- Chief, and to appoint a General Officer Com- manding the Army, responsible to the Secretary of State for the efficiency of the military forces of the Crown. With Sir George Taubman-Goldie's Scheme, as explained by him, for National Military Education, I cordially agree, as the only practical alternative to conscription. PRINTED AT THE EDINBURGH PRESS, 9 AND II YOUNG STREET. THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA, 1837-1861. THE NATIOxVAL EDITION. Published by Command of His Majesty the King. Edited by Arthur Christopher Benson, M.A., C.V.O., and Viscount Esher, G.C.V.O., K.C.B. The Complete and Revised Text of the Original Edition, with i6 Portraits. Crown 8vo., 3 vols., 6s. net; also in 3 vols. Demy 8vo. With 40 Photogravure Illustrations. £Si 3S- net. A cheaper edition of A. C. Benson* s two Works. THE HOUSE OF QUIET. 1 2th Impression. 5s. net. 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