MASTER NEGATIVE NO. 91-80315 MICROFILMED 1991 » COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK ii as part of the Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library I COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: KING, HENRY CHURCHILL TITLE: AN OUTLINE OF THE MICROCOSMUS ... PLACE: OBERLIN DA TE : [C1895] COLUMBIA UNIVEI^ITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT DIDLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET Master Negative # Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record •HISJ^J-L""^^'*' <^^ PHILOSOPHY D193L91 1213 King. Henry Churchill, 1858-1934. An outline of the mcrocosnus of Hermann Lotze by Henry Churchill King... Based upon the English translation. Oberlin, Ohio. Pearce & Randolph printers (Cl896j ' viii, 105 p. 23 ^. Restrictions on Use: '^-^^ASf; TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA FILM SIZE:__3:S_M_^i^L-^_ REDUCTION RATIO:__ IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA ^A~ IB IIB DATE FILMED: IqM-^^ INITIALS__i^r_£i2 HLMEDBY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS. INC WOODDRIDGE. CT Vi^. c Association for information and image iManagement 1100 Wayne Avenue. Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 ^•^K*'' < ^.m V>/ Centimeter 12 3 4 5 iiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiii iiiimii I I I Inches 1 1 1 1 6 7 8 imiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliii I I I I 9 10 11 12 13 iiiliiiili iiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilii iili liiij rn I TTT I •^ 1.0 jri— iubu. 1.4 1 ^^ 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 I.I 1.25 14 15 mm iiliiiiliiii MfiNUFflCTURED TO flllM STRNDPRDS BY APPLIED IMAGE, INC. ^^^ .«iW >? y-«» 4* ^:^. /?' i^.j.-i»'^ ■ ^:r#. j«. < s^' ^=v^ -T* T^ ^W. y^ 4 .*> "* «*f ?•«. ' ■'■r^ «♦ 1*"^ 5 ^ *i // / «fc n > i i '" t I I t n &^ .*. »s « • ' • • ' . AN OUTLINE k •••••ti • 41 • • : • • • t > ' • % H • m • % • * • ^-»Hi* • • • • •!••• •» *• •(* "F • * * ■ • • • • • • • ! • • » i # • » THE MICROCOSMUS OF 'A -f^ HERMANN LOTZE. BY HENRY CHURCHILL KING, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN OBERLIN COLLEGE. BASED UPON THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION. Pbarce & Randolph, Printers, OBERLIN, OHIO. • « » t • « * • • . • » • • t • t • • • % • * t • V t • • » « •• • •«•* '•• •• »♦ * • , • » » « • • ,» • • • . . » • • , » * « « • • a • * .♦. .'. « • • « • « • • > I « • • • - • » I • * • • • Copyright. 1895, By H. C. KING. Printed with the full consent of Messrs. T. & T. Clark, publishers of the English Translation of the Microcosmus. GIFT or PWES1DENT N. M. BUTLER NOV 26 1937 T2.13 > / ^ PREFACE. This Outline of Lotze's Microcosmus has been prepared for the use of my own classes, and at their request. Such an outline seems almost essential to en- able students to cover the work in reasonable time and with any thorough grasp of the argument. The Microcosmus itself has seemed to me to be particularly valuable in bringing students to an appreciative discussion of the great funda- mental problems of thought, because of the singularly broad and untechnical nature of its discussion. This very character of the discussion, however, serves often somewhat to conceal the precise course of the argument ; and the great ex- tent of the discussion increases the difficulty. Both facts make a careful outline of the argument desirable. And such an outline is entirely possible ; for the whole work is for Lotze a unit — one single connected inquiry in which every part has its place. The complete force of the argument, even in its smaller parts, still more in its entirety, is unlikely to be discerned by a mere reading. The Out- line, following all the hints of Lotze, aims to bring out the connection of the whole work. I may hope that it may prove not without value for any reader who really wishes to master this work of Lotze, which "has the double merit for his students of being the completest expression of his general views and of revealing most clearly the motives and convictions which guided his speculative endeavor." It is hardly possible that the outline reflects the exact shade of Lotze's thought at each point; nor can the outline be always entirely significant without reference to the text. The method of the analysis is not absolutely the same for all chap- ters ; for a few chapters it seemed sufficient to give not much more than a topical analysis; but in general the attempt is made to bring out the argument with con- siderable fullness. The fuller statements of the subjects of the chapters are in- tended to give a practical summary of the entire work, and of its most important conclusions. The condensed outline of the whole aims to give the connection of the entire argument. The references are of course to the pages of the English translation. For students, the outline of the chapters will be most useful after they have carefully noted for themselves all Lotze's own suggestions as to the course of the argument. Oberlin College, June, i8gs- 1 t I: 1; I! f i ^ BRIEF SURVEY OF THE ENTIRE WORK. An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World. An Anthropology which aims to investigate the whole Significance of Human Life in the great whole of Nature, showing by a joint Consideration of Individual Life and of the History of the Civilization of the Race, the absolute Universal- ity in Extent and the complete Subordination in Significance of the Mission of Mechanism in the Structure of the World, especially so far as concerns Man — thus showing the entire Harmony of the Mechanical and Ideal Views. Introduction to the work. A. Author's Introduction. The aim of the work is to show the Harmony of the Mechanical and Ideal Views, especially in Man, the Microcosmus. B. The Mechanical View itself. Chapters I-II. (I) Comparison with other Views. Chapter I. (II) Statement of the Essential Features of the View. Chapter IL I. General Survey of the Conditions of All Life, as showing the Mechanism of Universal Laws. Books I-IH. A. The Prevalence of Mechanism in the Body. Chapters III-VI. (I) As Explaining the Basis of Life. Chapter III. (II) In the Mechanism of Life. Chapter IV. (Ill) In the Structure of the Body. Chapter V. (IV) In the Conservation of Life. Chapter VI. B. The Difference oi the Soul, though Mechanism is present. Book II. (I) The Conception of the Soul. Chapters I-II. (A) The Existence of the Soul. Chapter I. (B) The Nature and Faculties of the Soul. Chapter II. (II) The Forms of Activity of the Soul, for which Mechanism will ac- count. The Train of Ideas. Chapter III. (Ill) The Forms of Activity of the Soul not completely explicable by . Mechanism. The Source and Justification of all Ideal Views. Chap- ters IV-V. (A) The Forms of Relating Knowledge. Chapter IV. (B) The Feelings, Self-Consciousness, and Will. Chapter V. C. The Extent of Mechanism in the Relations of Mind and Matter. Book III. (I) A more special Examination of the Relations of Body and Soul in Particular. Chapters I-III. (A) As to the possible Connection of Body and Soul. Chapter I. (B) As to the possible Conception of the Seat of the Soul. Chap- ter II. (C) As to the special Forms of the Reciprocal Action between Body and Soul. Chapter III. (II) Preliminary Statement of the Possible Final Explanation of the Re- lations of all Mind and Matter. Chapters IV-V. ^ VI (A) Life in all Matter. Chapter IV. (B) Mechanism leaves open all questions of Origin and Destiny, and requires the Infinite Substance. Chapter V. Conclusion of Books I-III. 393-401. II. Special Consideration of Human Affairs, as demanding the Ideal View, Books IV-VIII. A. The Distinguishing Characteristics of Man. Books IV-VI. Introduction. How far the Great Whole of Nature, in which Man stands, requires the Ideal View. Chapters I-IH. (A) A Preliminary Examination of the Possible Combinations of the Mechanical Explanation and the Ideal Interpretation of Nature. We must start from Reality itself. Chapter I. (B) Just how far the Mechanical Theory can account for Nature. We must assume "Inner Nature." Chapter IT. (C) The Mechanical View is only a disguised expression for the Real Unity of Nature, and requires the Infinite. Chapter HI. (I) As to Body. Chapters IV-V. (A) The Human Body is at the Head of the Scale of Creatures, as to the Capacity of Work and of Happiness (An Ideal Standard). Chapter IV. (B) The Question as to the Varieties of the Race. Chapter V. (II) As to Mind. The Distinguishing Characteristic of the Human Mind is its Sense of a Universal Truth and Right — the "Capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite." Book V. Introduction. — How an Essential Peculiarity of the Human Mind would have to be Thought. Chapter I. (A) The Characteristic Features of Human Sentience — Every Con- tent has its Place, and its Intrinsic Excellence. Chapter II. (B) Human Language bears the impress of a Universal Order Chapter III. (C) Human Intelligence has a Clear Consciousness of Universal and Necessary Truth. Chapter IV. (D) Man has an ineradicable Sense of Duty^ giving Universal Re- lations. Chapter V. Conclusion of Book V. 713-714. (Ill) The Relation of Man to his Environment. The Influence of the Universal and Uniformly Acting Conditions of Man's Life upon his Development. They never suffice to explain Human Development without preceding Predisposition. Negative Result. Book VI. (A) The Influences of External Nature. Chapter I. (B) The Influences of Man's Own Nature. Chapter II. (C) The Influences of Progressive Civilization. Chapter III. (D) The Influences of the most Important Features of the Social. Order. Chapter IV. (E) The Influences of the Views held as to the Nature and Destiny of Man. Chapter V. Conclusion. The Religious View becomes the Starting Point of our ^ final considerations. Our own Ends are not clear. We need to understand the Plan of the Whole. Conclusion of Books I-VI. Volume II, 119-121. I Vll B. Man's Connection with the Whole of Reality and his Position in that Whole. The Plan of the Whole Cosmos, so far as made plain. Books VII-VIII. (I) The Light thrown on the Plan of the Whole by the Survey of Ex- ternal History. Book VII. (A) The Creation of Man. Man's Historical Connection with Ex- ternal Nature. There is no Danger to Ideal Views here. Chap- ter I. (B) The External History of Humanity. Chapters II-V. i. The Meaning of History. The Point of View is Faith in the Continued Existence and Sharing of all the Genera- tions. Chapter II. ii. The Forces that work in History. These cannot Exclude Freedom and Inner Nature. Chapter III. iii. The External Conditions of Development guide rather than cause Development. Chapter IV. iv. The Historical Development itself shows Real Progress, a Strong Basis of Hope, but no Clear Goal; but this is in Harmony with the Design of the Earthly Life. Chapter V. (II) The Light thrown on the Plan of the Whole by the Results obtained in Different Lines by the Progress of Civilization — the Connection of Ideas which the Intellectual Labor of the Human Race has gradually attained. Book VIII. (A) The Gradual Development of Scientific Knowledge — Logical, Scientific, Philosophic. There must be no Identification of Logic and Metaphysics, as in a False Idealism. The Nature of Things, only the Whole Mind can experience. Chapter I. (B) The Development of Material Civilization is accompanied by no proportional increase in the Happiness of Life. Chapter II. (C) The Characteristic Esthetic Ideas of the Different Periods in their Influence on Life. ^Esthetic Ideas have comparatively little Echo in Modern Life. Chapter III. (D) The Development of the Religious Life of the Race shows the Preponderance of the Cosmological Element in Heathendom, of the Moral Element in Judaism and Christianity, and in the Present, the returning Preponderance of the Cosmological Ele- ment in Dogmatics and a less close Connection of Religion with Life. Chapter IV. (E) The Development of the Political Life of the Race shows in the Modern Age much larger Recognition of the Individual Life, with the Recognition both of Absolute Natural Right and of Historic and Legitimate Right. Chapter V. III. Conclusions as to the Cosmic Whole. The Unity of Things. Possible Unity of the Spheres of the Actual, the Necessary, and the Ideal. Reality, Laws, and the Good are but the Content, Mode of Action, and End of God, as Living Love. Book IX. A. The Being of Things is a State of Relatedness, implying one Truth and the Infinite Substance. Chapter I. B. The Correspondence of the Real Intellectual and the Apparent Spatial Places of Things. The Reciprocal Action of Things is the Sole Reality, Chapter II. vni C. Only Beings which exist for Self-Spirits— are Real. "All that is Real" is Spiritual. Chapter III. D. The Infinite is Personal. Chapter IV. E. The Complete Unity of the Actual, of Eternal Truths (Laws), and of the Good in the one Good-in-itself, Living Love, God. Chapter V. Conclusion of Entire Work: The Absolute Universality of Mechanism and Its complete Subordination in Significance. The True Reality is "the liv- ing personal Spirit of God, and the World of Spirits which He has Cre- ated." Volume II, 727. wr f i I :/5 r AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION. The Point of View and Purpose of the Author, Especially as to the Relation of the Ideal and Mechanical Views. I. The Defects of both opposing Views. A. The "Philosophy of the Feelings," necessarily an obscure and unquiet Movement, vii. B. Defect of the merely Scientific View in the "Deification of Truth.'* VIII. (I) Not just, as an independent Estimation of its Value. (II) Not Calculated to produce Conviction, ix. IL No Evasion of the Difficulty in the Conflict is possible, x. A. Practical Contradiction involved. B. The two Tendencies cannot be kept apart. C. Old Contradictions continually arise, xi. IIL The whole Conflict is due only to terminating Investigation prematurely. ^w 1 X • A. On the Side of Science. Its own Fundamental Elements, when thought through, lead to the supersensuous World. B. On the Side of the Ideal View. The advance of Science has only ben- efited the Ideal View. (I) Illustrations. (A) In Geography. (B) In Astronomy. (C) As to Origin of Man. (D) In Geology. (II) Summary Conclusion, as to the Undeifying of Nature,— the Ma- crocosm. XIV. (Ill) But special Difficulty is felt as to the Microcosm of Man, in the ad- vance of Mechanical Science, xv. (A) Here Mechanism seems to threaten the very existence of an Ideal World. (B) Hence special Need of showing the Harmony of the Mechan- ical and Ideal Views here. (C) A personal Reason also for Lotze. IV. Hence, the Purpose and Theme of the Book, is to show that, in the World of Man, Mechanism is indeed absolutely universal in extent, but completely subordinate in significance, xvi. J ^ ^ BOOK I. THE BODY. CHAPTER I. Conflicting Views of Nature. The Attractiveness and Defects of the Mythological and World-Soul Views of Nature, and the Considerations which have led to the Mechanical View instead; and the raising of the naturally suggested question of the resfllting conception of Man's Relation to Nature. I. The Mythological View of Nature involved no such Universal Vitalizing of nature as is commonly assumed. § I. Introduction. The Attractiveness of the Mythological View. ^. The Reasons why the Mythological View could not universally Vitalize Nature. 2. <(I) This Illusion is possible only to the child. (II) Since Active Life must build on Necessity in the Connection of events. B. In fact no Mythology has attempted such a universal Vitalization of Nature. (I) It left out much from its representation of the Cosmos, especially the entire sphere of Universal Laws. (II) Even in its chosen narrower field it was unsuccessful. 4. (A) It was unable to Spiritualize Matter. (B) It failed to lend to events the higher bloom of Freedom. 6. C. Thus Mythology really comes far short of what it seemed to promise. 7. II. The World Soul View of Nature. § 2. Introduction. This view arose earlier than the Mythological and still persists. A. The Genesis and Indistinctness of the View. 8. (I) The Genesis of the View. (II) Its Indistinctness in the notion of Impulse. 9. B. Reasons for the Attractiveness of the View. 10. (I) The noblest part of life is not always felt to be definitely thought and willed. (II) Even the definite and conscious Thinking and Willing seem really directed to a distant and mystical summum bonum. 11. (III) The Fascination of a Vista into the Infinity of a Nature working unconsciously in us. (IV) The Attractiveness of the Analogy of the relation of our own Soul and Body. 12. C. The Disadvantages of the Theory. 13. (I) Even Philosophy does not remove its indistinctness. (II) It gives at best to the parts of Nature only the outward signs of activity without inner Experience. D. Even the fullest statement of the View has its difficulties. 15. (I) The Complete Statement, in the Conception of an Infinite Reason. (II) Its Difficulties. 16. ■h. ^ 4> 1 K> (A) It has no expression for the Essence of the World-Soul. (B) It leaves out much of Nature, especially failing to take up into itself the trivial, common-place, actual world. 17. III. The Mechanical View of Nature. § 3. ^ A. Considerations leading to the Mechanical View. (I^ The Influence of Machinery. (II) The Influence of the growing Dominion of Man over Nature. 19. (Ill) The Influence of the further consideration that each product is seen to be a part of a whole — of actually existing combinations. (A) In Inorganic Nature. (B) In Organic Nature. 20. i. The Vital Force is limited by the given Material which it has to use. ii. Even the Persistence and Functions of the Organism are Mechanically explained. 21. B. Conclusion as to the Views of Nature. The gradually changing View'of Nature. 22. (I) The Steps toward the Mechanical View of Nature. (II) The Final View reached extends Mechanism over the whole of Na- ture, recognizing only the simple and indestructible forces which perpetually inhere in the elements. 25. IV. The Place of Man in Nature. § 4. A. The diminishing sphere of Independent Human Life. 24. B. Hence the New Questions arising. 25. (I) A persistent Faith in an Eternal First Cause and in free human spirits has maintained itself against the advancing mechanical view. (II) Hence these problems of the relation of the Ideal and Mechanical in Man are now thrust into the fore-ground and demand a new ex- amination of Mechanical Necessity. 26. CHAPTER II. Nature as Mechanical. The Necessary and the Merely Probable (Pliable) Elements in the Main Con- ceptions of the Mechanical View of Nature. I. The Universality of Law — Nature necessarily a Whole. § i. A. This is the Fundamental Conception of the Mechanical View involving its Necessary Elements. 27 B. But individual Mediate Inferences are not all alike unquestionable; the Pliability of Science — its Probable (Pliable) Elements. 28. II. The Attempt at Strict Determination of Effects. A. By Tracing to the Final Elements, Atoms. § 2. (I) What is Necessary in the Conception of Atoms. 29. (A) While recognizing the ideal elements in the world as to origin, as to process search must be directed to the single Real Ele- ments. 30 ^ (B) This search soon brings to the assumption of Atoms, — count- less, invisible, persistent, unchangeable. 31. (II) The Probable (Pliable) Elements in the Conception of Atoms. 32-36. (A) Science does not assume the atoms as the Unconditioned. 32. (B) Does not infallibly settle the Identity of the Nature of Atoms. 33. i. Varying Tendencies at work on this point. ii. The Ancient Atomatic Theory was one of identity, but in- volved an inexplicable primary construction. 34. iii. The conception of the Non-Homogeniety of i^oms would avoid this difficulty and admit of a consistent theory. 34. (C) Science need not deny the Immateriality of atoms. 35. B. By Determining the Universal Laws (of Motion). § § 3 and 4 to p. 45. (I) The Law of Persistence. § 3. (A) The Necessary Elements as held (not proved except by expe- rience). 36. (B) The Probable (Pliable) Elements. 37. i. We may assume a direct action on each other of the Inter- nal States of Atoms. ii. But experience must and can give only external relations, iii. Hence the capacity or necessity to produce a given effect never potentially exists in the nature of a single atom or body. 38. a. Since Action is always a mutual relation and never a perpetually inherent power. b. But practically we may so speak. iv. Yet such a mode of speech is possible only on the suppo- sition that the internal states leave the nature of the atoms unaltered; and in this lies strictly the * 'immutability of material atoms.'* 39. v. This assumption of unchangeableness is to be taken as a general but not necessarily absolutely universal property of the elements of nature 40. (II) The Law of the Composition of Forces. § 4 to p. 45. (A) The Necessary Elements as held (not proved except by experi- ence). 41. i. The Notion of Resultant Forces. ii. The Law of the Equality of Action and Reaction. 42. (B) The Probable (Pliable) Elements. i. There is nothing necessary in the supposition (made in the statement of this Law of Composition of Forces) of the indifference with which several different forces act side by side in the same element without occasioning any mutual disturbance. 43. ii. Hence the Internal States of Atoms may influence their Ex- ternal Relations, iii. And therefore the Experienced Unchangeableness of the Laws of Action is not to be regarded as absolutely neces- sary. 44 III. Concluding Inferences. 45-49. A. As to the Results of Science in the Explanation of Nature. 15. B. As to the General Bearing of Mechanical Dynamics on the Study of Life. 46. (I) Considerations leading to the reference of all changes in a body either to Internal Movements of its parts or to changes in its Cir- cumstances. (II) This leads to the Rejection of a special Life Force in organisms. 47. (Ill) But does not require that the Final Elements should be lifeless points devoid of any internal nature. 48. % ip CHAPTER III. The Basis of Life. The Inferiority of the Vital Force Theory as compared with the Mechanical Theory as an explanation of the Basis of Life. Introduction. General Comparison of the two Views. § I. I. The Transitoriness of the Body, chemically considered, cannot be regarded as especially favoring the Vital Force Theory. § 2. A. The inference of a special Vital Force from the fact of the Decomposition of the Dead Body is quite gratuitous. 51. B. There is Decomposition in the Living Body also. 52-4. (I) Quite Similar to that in the Dead Body. 52. (II) The Differences may easily be due to Diverse Accessory Circum- stances. (A) The favorable circumstances in the Living Body. (B) The unfavorable circumstances in the Dead Body. 53. (C) The Study of Disease Confirms this View. (D) Hence there is no need of a Special Vital Force. C. The Description of the Perishableness of Organic Bodies is exaggerated. 54. D. The Effect of the Change of Elements on Vitality. Life survives the De- composition, even in the living body, only within certain manifest limi- tations. II. The Propagation of Life, and Growth, do not Require a Special Life Force. §3- A. In Propagation, there is no peculiar Difficulty in the fact that the vital force is not impaired. 56-8. (I) This fact is really in harmony with the Theory of all Forces. 56. (II) The real Simplicity of the Process calls for no Impairment of En- ergy. 57. B. In Growth. 58-60. (I) The Increase of Frame should not involve Decrease of Energy. 58 -60. (A) The supposed Difficulty is due to the common prejudice that an Organism is a bundle. (B) In Reality added Material adds Power. 59. i. Since the Elements are not Indifferent te the Task, ii. And the Binding Ligaments are the peculiar Forces of the Elements themselves. (II) No Special Force is needed for the Direction of Material in Growth. 60. (A) Nearly an Impracticable Task. (B) Wholly Unnecessary. III. Nor does the Peculiar Harmony of the Processes of the Body —the Adjust- ing Activity that accommodates itself to Circumstances — call for a special Vital Force. § 4. A. The Facts are Exaggerated. 6i. B. A somewhat similar Adjustment is possible even in the case of Machines. 62. C. Moreover the Curative Reaction is possible only when the Essential Character of the Internal Arrangement is unaltered. IV. Nor does the Theory of the Vital "Idea of the Whole," as a ruling principle, afford a tenable defense for the Vital Force Theory. § 5. A. The Facts seem to show rather a System of physical Actions and Reac- tions. 63. B. A more General Consideration shows such a system necessary. 64. (I) The Idea of the Whole as Pattern and Plan is not Adequate, 64. (A) Since it requires Universal Laws for its Realization. (B) And hence its Power is only Apparent, the real Power being the Original Arrangement. (C) The Reason for the Original Arrangement lies outside the Pres- ent Investigation. (II) Nor does the Idea of the Whole as the Higher Bond afford an Ade- quate Solution. 65-8. (A) Since the Bond is really so a Reacting Part. 66. (B) And there is no Evidence of any such Superiority of any One Part. (C) The Added Supposition that the Bond is not necessarily De- pendent on Physical Laws involves the Peculiar Activity of a Soul. (D) But even the Hypothesis of an Organizing Soul is less satisfac- tory than the Mechanical Theory. 67. V. Conclusion, g 6. A. The Differences between Machines and the Productions of Nature. 68-73. (I) Not in the Capacity of Excitation. 68-70. (A) For in both Inorganic and Organic Composite Bodies, the final effect depends much on the Internal Connection of Parts, in- volving capacity of Excitation. 68. (B) This Capacity of Excitation is no less characteristic of the Sim- pUst Substratum, since results everywhere depend also on Inner Nature. 69. (II) The Real Differences between Machines and Organisms. 70-73. (A) The Limitations of Human Machines in the Restriction to rigid Instruments already prepared, in the External Connection of their Parts, and in that the Impetus is almost always received from without. (B) This is all Different in the Agencies of Nature. 71. i. Even Inorganic Nature is very Different from human Ma- chines. ii. Still more Organic Nature. 72. B. Final Restatement of the Grounds for holding the Mechanical Theory of the Basis of Life. 73-74. (I) Not from a Disregard of Ideal Considerations. 73. (II) But from the Conviction that Nature necessarily forms a Whole. (Ill) And from the Failure of the Theory of a Special Vital Force. 1 I i « <^ CHAPTER IV. The Mechanism of Life. The Difference between Organic and Inorganic Bodies as to three of the four Modes of Occurrence of Processes in the Body— Constant and Periodic Opera- tions, Progressive Development, and Reaction against Chance Impressions. (Cf. Chap. VI.) Introduction. A. Summary Review of Chapters I.-III, and Transition to Chapter IV. 75. B. Introductory Statement of the four Modes of Occurrence of Processes in Living Bodies. 76. I. The Differences between Organic and Inorganic Bodies even in Constant and Periodic Operations. Both Operations are brought about by far more complicated processes in the Organic. 77~79' II. The Differences in the Third Mode of Occurrence of Processes— Progressive Development. A. No Progressive Development in the Inorganic, only imperfect anticipa- tions (as in the planetary system), helping to understand the Peculiarity of Life. 79-80. B. Progressive Development in the Organic. 80-98. (I) Requires External Influences for its Development. (II) But, in particular, involves the Extensive application of Chemical "^ Affinities and Molecular Forces. § 2. (A) Giving the Living Body the advantage of a Compact unchang- ing and yet not rigid but Movable Figure. 81. (B) Also securing to the Living Body the advantage of the Absence of an exceedingly intimate Connection of Parts. 82. i. Saving it from endless Disturbances. ii. Yet making possible the finest Connections, where and a$ necessary. (C) Bringing about at each moment a new foundation for subse- quent Development. 83. (D) And Helping to the Explanation of the Development of Forms from Formless Germs. Introduction. No spontaneous Generation now. i. The First Stages in the Process. 84. a. The Possible Production of the Germ. b. The Mutual Reaction of Conformation and Stimuli. New Habits of Chemical Action, especially the Influence of the enclosing Tissues themselves. 85. The Effect of Different Periods of Growth on Different Parts. 86. (III) The Differences in the large use of Unremitting Change of Ma- terial. §3-5. Introduction. i. Much less constant change of Material in Vegetable than in Animal Life. 86. ii. The Need of Constant Repair of Capacities in the Animal Body. 87. (A) The Significance for the general ends of life of this Perpetual Change of Material. It is the simplest means of Repair. § 3. 11. 111. \ 9 I. 1. 11. 111. IV. 11. 111. It avoids the necessity of Remedial Reaction for every Disturbance, using instead the stratagem of perpetual Re- treat. 89. Even makes possible the Efficacy of the Remedial Reac- tions which do occur. 90. Yet it is not so universal but that it admits always a Regu- lar Nucleus. The Processes of the change may themselves yield just those Motive shocks which life requires for Development. 91. (B) The Modg of the change, that is, the definite Chemical Processes producing the change. § 4. i. The Processes in the Vegetable World prepare for Animal Life. 92. The Processes in the Animal Body. 93. a. The Progressive Formation of the Constituents of the Body. b. The Retrogressive Conversion for Death. 95. The Various Functions of Water in the Living Body, — Vegetable and Animal. 96. (C; The Organs of the Change — or the Resulting Steps in the Building up of the Organism — Cells, Fibres, Organs. § 5. CHAPTER V. Structure of the Animal Body. Some of the Main Features of the Structure and Operations of the Human Body, as employing Mechanical and Chemical Agencies. Introduction. I. The Bony Framework. § i. A. The Bones of the Head. lOO. B. The Spinal Column. C. Ribs and Pelvis. loi. D. The Limbs. 102. II. The Muscles and the Motor Nerves. § 2, A. The Muscles. 102-105. (I) Their Structure. (II) Their Movements. 103. (Ill) Conclusion. — They show the manifest use of Mechanical Contriv- ances. 104. B. The Motor Nerves. (I) Their Structure. (O) Their Operations are due to some Change in their physical condition, ni. The Vascular System and Circulation of Blood, as showing Mechanical and Chemical Agencies. § 3. A. Description of the Structure and Mechanical Operations of the Vascular System. 106-108. B. The Chemical Processes in the Vascular System for Nutrition and Heat, 108-110. rV. Respiration. § 4. Introduction to Remainder of Chapter, iio. A. Description of Structures. 110-112. (I) Pulmonary Circulation, no. (II) Windpipe and Lungs. III. B. The involved Processss. V. Nutrition. 113-118. Introductory Transition. — The Relation of the Digestive and Respiratory Systems. A. Digestion. § 5. (I) Description of the Alimentary Canal and its Dependencies. 113. (II) The Process of Digestion in the Stomach. 114. (Ill) The Process of Digestion in the rest of the alimentary canal. (A) The Liver and its influence on Digestion. (B) The general Purport of the Chemical Processes in the reciprocal actions involved in Digestion. B. Assimilation. § 6 to 118. (I) The Vessels in Assimilation. 1 16. (II) The Involved Mechanical and Chemical Processes. (Ill) The Changes in the Blood. VI. Excretion. 118- 120. CHAPTER VI. Conservation of Life. A few Examples of the Physical and Organic Compensation of Disturbances (the fourth Form of Occurrence of Processes in the Organic Body, cf. Chap. IV.) for the Preservation of the Bodily Form, and of the Capacity of Vital Operations. General Introduction. § i. A. Transition to the Subject. 121. B. Statement of the three Forms of the Compensation of Disturbances. 122-124. (I) The simple Physical. 122. (II) The Organic. (Ill) The Psychical. 123. I. The Simple Physical Compensation of Disturbances. § 2. A. Mechanical Adjustments. 124. (I) Muscular Movement. (II) Favorable Relations. (Ill) Circulation of the Blood. ^ B. Chemical Adjustments, especially in maintaining the Normal Composi- tion of the Blood. 125-128. (I) In directing the amoflnt of Absorption and Renewal in the general circulation. 125. (II) In the action on the Secretory Organs, as removing surplus water and salts from the blood. 126. (Ill) In the various processes for the Removal of Organic Ingredients from the blood. 127. (A) As regularly determined by the Composition of the Blood itself. ' (B) In case of Hindrance of Secretion by some organ. i. The organic ingredients seek other Egress, ii. Substitutory Processes. 128. lO II. The Organic Compensation of Disturbances. § 3. Introduction. 128-129. (I) The Need of Organic Compensation. (A) The Physical may be involved. (B) The merely Physical are often inadequate. (II) Preliminary Survey of the Nervous System. (A) Cerebro spinal System. (B) The Sympathetic System. A. Description of the Sympathetic System as the Chief Means for Organic Compensation. 129-131. B. The Influence of the Sympathetic System. 131-135. (I) Upon Various Organic Processes. (A) The Intestines. (B) The Vascular Trunks. (C) The Heart. (11) How far it fills the Office of Sensory Nerves. 132. (III) Influence on Changes in Composition of the Corporeal Juices. Possible Methods. 133. (A) Change in Membranes. (B) Direct Chemical Action of the Nerves. (IV) General Summary of the Influence of the Sympathetic System upon the Conservation of Life. 134. (A) The simple Sympathetic System alone. (B) As supplemented by the Cerebro-Spinal System. 135. (C) The necessary Mental Supplement in Animal Life. III. Conclusion of Book L— Consequent General Sketch of Life. Corroborating the Mechanical View. § 4. A. The Lack of Unity in the Living Body. B. The Inconstancy of the Living Body. C. The Dependence of the Living Body. BOOK II. THE SOUL. CHAPTER I. The Existence of the Soul. An Examination of the Three Chief Characteristics, (Freedom of Will, the Incomparability of Psychical and Physical Processes, and the Unity of Conscious- ness,) held to diff"erentiate the Psychic L=fe from the whole Course of Nature, and so furnish Grounds for the Belief in the Existence of the Soul. Introduction. § i. A. The Question Stated. 143. B. The universal Prejudice in favor of the belief in the Existence of the Soul in opposition to experience. I. The First Differentiation— Freedom of Will. 144-148. 1 ! ; I II A. Experience does not prove the Fact nor the Value of Freedom. .145-147. (I) The Incalculableness of Conduct is in harmony with the universal Phenomena of Excitability . 145. (A) The Fact of Incalculableness. (B) Internal Relations are always Obscure. (C) And hence the Necessary Connection seems broken. 146. (II) The Ethical Need of Freedom is not Universally nor Clearly Held. (Ill) The Prevalence of Law in the greater part of Psychic Life is ad- mitted. B. But neither does Experience prove the Non-existence of Freedom. The unbroken connection between mental phenomena and corporeal changes proves only that the latter are a set of conditions. 147. II. The Second Diff^erentiation — the Incomparability of Psychical and Physical Processes. 148-152. A. The Fact. 148. B. The Consequent Necessity of Two Diverse Grounds of Explanation. (I) The Reason for the Right of insisting on Diverse Grounds. 149. (II) The Right claimed only as in Natural Science. C. The Hypothesis of the Union of the Psychical and Physical in the Same Being. § 3. Introduction. The Question stated. 150. (I) Still a Double Being. (II) The Justification and the Barrenness of the View. 151. (A) Its Justification is that it sets aside Crass Materialism. (B) Its Barrenness. 152. i. It gives no Real Explanation. ii. Is at most Unfruitful. iii. Out of harmony with later Considerations. III. The Third Differentiation — Unity of Consciousness. § 4-6. A. What it is not, and what it really is. § 4. (I) Not that the Number of Beings inhabiting an Organic Form is limited. 152. (II) Not that we have a Persistent Consciousness of the Unity of our being. 154. (III) But the Unity of a Being Conscious of Itself. 155. (IV) Yet not that the Consciousness of the Unity of our Being is a direct Guaranty of that Unity. 156-158. (A) What is not the ground of our Unity. 156. (B) The Belief rests on the fact of our being able to appear to our- selves at all. 157. i. The Statement, ii. The Source of Difficulty is in the loose use of "Appearance." B. Impossibility of explaining Unity of Consciousness as a Combination of a Plurality of Eff"ects. § 5. (I) The Argument from the Analogy of the Law of Composition of Motions rests on an Inaccuracy in its expression. 158. (II) Strictly interpreted, the Analogy indicates that a plurality of sep- arate operations becomes one only as the States of one Body. 159-161. (Ill) Thus the Conception of a Soul is the best Explanation of Mental Phenomena. i6i. (A) The Explanation of Consciousness. 10 II. The Organic Compensation of Disturbances. § 3. Introduction. 128-129. (I) The Need of Organic Compensation. (A) The Physical may be involved. (B) The merely Physical are often inadequate. (II) Preliminary Survey of the Nervous System. (A) Cerebro-spinal System. (B) The Sympathetic System. A. Description of the Sympathetic System as the Chief Means for Organic Compensation. 129-131. B. The Influence of the Sympathetic System. 131-135. (I) Upon Various Organic Processes. (A) The Intestines. (B) The Vascular Trunks. (C) The Heart. (II) How far it fills the Office of Sensory Nerves. 132. (III) Influence on Changes in Composition of the Corporeal Juices. Possible Methods. 133. (A) Change in Membranes. (B) Direct Chemical Action of the Nerves. (IV) General Summary of the Influence of the Sympathetic System upon the Conservation of Life. 134. (A) The simple Sympathetic System alone. (B) As supplemented by the Cerebro-Spinal System. 135. (C) The necessary Menial Supplement in Animal Life. III. Conclusion of Book I.-Consequent General Sketch of Life. Corroborating the Mechanical View. § 4. A. The Lack of Unity in the Living Body. B. The Inconstancy of the Living Body. C. The Dependence of the Living Body. BOOK II. THE SOUL. CHAPTER J. The Existence of the Sota. An Examination of the Three Chief Characteristics, (Freedom of Will the Incomparability of Psychical and Physical Processes, and the Unity of Conscious- ness,) held to diff-erentiate the Psychic L^fe from the whole Course of Nature and so furnish Grounds for the Belief in the Existence of the Soul. Introduction. § i. A. The Question Stated. 143. B. The universal Prejudice in favor of the belief in the Existence of the Soul in opposition to experience. I. The First Differentiation— Freedom of Will. 144-148. II A. Experience does not prove the Fact nor the Value of Freedom. 145-147, (I) The Incalculableness of Conduct is in harmony with the universal Phenomena of Excitability. 145. (A) The Fact of Incalculableness. (B) Internal Relations are always Obscure. (C) And hence the Necessary Connection seems broken. 146. (II) The Ethical Need of Freedom is not Universally nor Clearly Held. (Ill) The Prevalence of Law in the greater part of Psychic Life is ad- mitted. B. But neither does Experience prove the Non-existence of Freedom. The unbroken connection between mental phenomena and corporeal changes proves only that the latter are a set of conditions. 147. II. The Second Diff"erentiation — the Incomparability of Psychical and Physical Processes. 148-152. A. The Fact. 148. B. The Consequent Necessity of Two Diverse Grounds of Explanation. (I) The Reason for the Right of insisting on Diverse Grounds. 149. (II) The Right claimed only as in Natural Science. C. The Hypothesis of the Union of the Psychical and Physical in the Same Being. § 3. Introduction. The Question stated. 150. (I) Still a Double Being. (II) The Justification and the Barrenness of the View. 151. (A) Its Justification is that it sets aside Crass Materialism. (B) Its Barrenness. 152. i. It gives no Real Explanation. ii. Is at most Unfruitful. iii. Out of harmony with later Considerations. III. The Third Differentiation — Unity of Consciousness. § 4-6. A. What it is not, and what it really is. § 4. (I) Not that the Number of Beings inhabiting an Organic Form is limited. 152. (II) Not that we have a Persistent Consciousness of the Unity of our being. 154. (III) But the Unity of a Being Conscious of Itself. 155. (IV) Yet not that the Consciousness of the Unity of our Being is a direct Guaranty of that Unity. 156-158. (A) What is not the ground of our Unity. 156. (B) The Belief rests on the fact of our being able to appear to our- selves at all. 157. i. The Statement. ii. The Source of Difficulty is in the loose use of *' Appearance." B. Impossibility of explaining Unity of Consciousness as a Combination of a Plurality of Effects. § 5. (I) The Argument from the Analogy of the Law of Composition of Motions rests on an Inaccuracy in its expression. 158. (II) Strictly interpreted, the Analogy indicates that a plurality of sep- arate operations becomes one only as the States of one Body. 159-161. (Ill) Thus the Conception of a Soul is the best Explanation of Mental Phenomena. l6l. (A) The Explanation of Consciousness. 12 (B) Even on the hypothesis of a Psychic Life in all Matter. 162. C. There is even a Distinct Contrast between Relating Knowledge and the Composition of Physical Effects. § 6. (I) All our Ideas preserve the Same Content through all Vicissitudes. 163. (II) Especially does Comparison require Distinction at the very moment of Relating. 164-165. (Ill) Conclusion of Section. 165-166. Conclusion of Chapter. The Supposition of the Existence of a supersensuous Soul, as distinct from the material Body, is the best present Hypothesis. § 7. CHAPTER II. Nature and Faculties of the Soul. An Examination of the Considerations opposing and favoring the Doctrine of the Mental Faculties, and of the Nature of the Soul so far as it can be known to us. I. The Doctrine of the Mental Faculties. § 1-3. Introduction. How it arose. 168. A. Considerations Opposing the Doctrineof the Faculties. Its Defects as com- pared with the physical Doctrine of Energy. § i. (I) Does not define the Laws of Action. 169. (II) The mental Faculties are Incomparable with each other. 170. (III) We are unable to state precisely the Conditions of mental phenom- ena. 171. (A) The Faculties are not Energies constantly exercised. (B) Their Genesis has been too little investigated. (IV) Hence the Doctrine has lost sight of the proper End of Science— the Search for Causal Connection, which would teach us to discern the future. 172. B. Considerations Favoring the Doctrine. § 2-3. (I) Negative Considerations. § 2. (A) The Doctrine of the Plurality of the Faculties is not incompat- ible with the Soul's Unity, but rather arises naturally out of the very conception of that Unity. 173. (B) The Doctrine is no more Unfruitful for the purposes of Explana- tion than the single conception of the Unity of the Soul. Both theories are compelled to accept as a matter of fact the Variety - / of Psychic Manifestations. 174. (C) Nor is any theory of Original and Derived Faculties able to set aside the Plurality of the Faculties ; although the Derivation of many of the Mental Powers may be freely admitted, e. g. Judgment and Imagination. 175. (II) Positive Considerations. Impossibility of a Single Primitive Fac- ulty. No Derivation can take us beyond the threefold division of Thought, Feeling, and Will. § 3. (A) Statement of the Question, Is there a single primitive Frculty ? 177. ' (B) Examination shows that Thought, Feeling and Will do not necessarily involve one another. 178. J 13 (C) Yet the Whole Soul is Active in each, though in a one-sided way. 180. (D) Yet, again, the Trinity of the Faculties may be final. i8i. II. The Nature of the Soul. § 4-7. A. The Nature of the Soul is a constant Element in the production of the Higher Reactions. The Soul is not an indifferent Stage. § 4. (I) The Theory that the Higher Reactions are due solely to Elabora- tion of Simple Sensations. 181. (II) The true theory of the Influence of the Soul in these Higher Reac- tions. 182. (A) The Statement of the Theory. (B) The Theory Illustrated in the Contrast between Plant and Psychic Life. 183. B. The Mutability of the Soul and its Limits. § 5. (I) Objection : The Mutability implied in the preceding section is an- tagonistic to strict Unity, which appears to leave no room for Varia- tion. 184. (II) This Charge may be admitted and yet the Mutability is to be held. 185-188. (A) Else there would be no Center for Action. 186. (B) This Mutability does not involve any risk of a Meaningless Variation. i. Nothing IS completely determined from without, ii. The Inner Nature may be more effective than all other In- fluences. (C) There is, in fact, less Mutability in the Soul than could easily be Vindicated. 187. C. The Nature of the Soul is to be known only through its Acts. § 6-7. Introduction. 188. (I) This Limitation is equally true of all other things. § 6. (II) Nor does it involve the Loss of much that is of Importance. § 7. (A) The true Essence lies in that which the Subject of the Devel- opment has become^ not in a bare Primitive Soul. 190. (B) The Real Question sought to be answered — How the Soul came to be — is Insoluble. 191. CHAPTER III. Of the Train of Ideas. An Examination of the General Conjectures which may be gathered from a Re- view of the Main Outlines of our Inner Experience, in order to reach a more Definite Insight into the Laws of Psychic Life in the Train of Ideas. Introduction to Chapter. § i. The Peculiar Difficulties in the Explanation of Mental Life, as compared with Bodily Life, and with Physical Nature. A. Most of the Conditions in Mental Life precede Experience. 193. B. The Laws even of Present Experience are Obscure. 194. C. Thus arise Great and Peculiar Difficulties in the Explanation of Mental Life. I. The Examination of different more or less Adequate General Conjectures for the Explanation of the Train of Ideas. § 2-4. /" 14 A. Conjectures as to How Ideas Persist. 196-197. (I) Not a Self-evident Result of a universal Law of Persistence. 196. (II) Yet Facts seem to necessitate the Assumption of this Persistence. 197. (Ill) And it is the Condition of any possible Mental Synthesis. B. Conjectures as to How Ideas are Expelled from Consciousness, or How the Train of Ideas is determined. § 2-4. (I) In general, we may recognize fully that Ideas are expelled from Consciousness by the Influence of other Ideas. 197. (A) Experience shows this. (B) But it does not follow from the Unity of the Soul. (C) We must therefore seek an Explanation in the Nature of Con- sciousness. 198. (II) We are to examine, therefore, first, the Conjecture of the N'arrow- ness of Consciousness as the Ground for the Expelling Influence of Ideas. § 2. (A) The Shortcomings of the Vulgar Conceptions of the Nature of Consciousness. 198. i. Consciousness as a Space of Limited Extent, ii. Consciousness as a Light, iii. Even the Conception of Consciousness as an Exhaustible Force fails to explain the Alternation of Consciousness and Unconsciousness. 199. (B) The Answer of Common Opinion to this last Difficulty, in the Theory of the Persistence of Impressions but not of Conscious- ness. (C) An Examination of the Tacit Assumption underlying this An- swer, viz.: that the Whole Process is a Sequence of two events, an Impression and a Vital Reaction. 200-202. i. This is true in ordinary composite Forms of Being. 200. ii. In the Simple Nature of the Soul it is at least not neces- sary ; there may be absolute Simultaneity. iii. The Appeal to Experience leaves the Question Unsettled. 201. a. The Process of Sensation favors the Conception of Simul- taneity — no unconscious Psychic Stimulation. b. But the Facts of Forgetting seem to imply Sequence rather — some Reciprocal Action between the Conscious and the Unconscious. 202. (III) The Uncertainty as to the Narrowness of Consciousness compels the Examination of the more detailed Conjectures, for explaining the Expelling Influence of Ideas, made by the two opposed Theo- ries of the Nature of Consciousness — The Theories of its essential Narrowness and of its indefinite Extent. § 3-4. Introduction to Sections 3 and 4. 202. The Two Opposed Theories of Consciousness. (A) Examination of the Conjectures made by the Theory of the Narrowness of Consciousness. § 3. Introduction. 203. The Two Conjectures to be examined— J/r^«^A of Ideas, i |t : l» 15 and Contrast of Ideas — both fail to explain why Ideas do not blend. 203. i. Examination of the Conception of Degrees of Strength of Ideas, as explaining the Expelling Influence of Ideas. 203- 209. a. The possible Threefold Meaning of Strength as applied to Ideas. (i) Amount of Content, (ii) Intensity of Stimulation — Disturbance, (iii) Influence on the Train of Ideas. b. Their Application to Remembered Ideas (the most favor- able case for the Theory of the Narrowness of Conscious- ness cf. p. 201) in the Train of Ideas. 204-206. (i) The Second Meaning can have no application here. There is no Disturbance in Memory as such. 205. (ii) The First Meaning is also without application, since Contents do not blend, and the Activity is unvary- ingly the same, (iii) While the Third Meaning assumes the Answer sought. 206. c. The very Conception of numberless Degrees of Strength or Clearness of Ideas, making possible a steady and gradual obscuring, is a Mistaken Inference. (i) Direct Observation of the Process is impossible, (ii) The Facts seem rather to show many and abrupt pauses in this obscuration. (a) In Ideas of Simple Sv^nsation, the seeming Dif- ference of Strength is due to Altered Content. 207. (b) In Compound Perceptions, the growing Indis- tinctness is due : 1. Either to the Falling away of certain Parts. 2. Or the Loss of Connection with other Ideas. 208. d. Conclusion as to Strength of Ideas. The Expelling In- fluence of an Idea does not depend on its Strength. 209. ii. Examination of the Conception of the Contrast of Ideas, 209-2 1 1 . a. The Facts as to present Sensations do not favor the the- ory of Contrast, as the Expelling Influence. b. Self- Observation as to Ideas proper does not favor the Theory. (B) The Attempt to find a more adequate Conjecture for the Ex- pelling Influence of Ideas, upon the Theory of the Indefinite Extent of Consciousness, leading to the Assumption of a mov- ing Inner Sense — a fluctuating light of combining attention. §4. Introductory Transition. 211. i. The Facts as to the Indefinite Extent of Consciousness. 212-213. i6 a. * 'Narrowness" of Consciousness does not seem to hold true for Sensations proper. 212. b. It does seem to be true as to Memory, which seems to require Sequence in Ideas. c. Yet Relating Knowledge guarantees the Simultaneity of a Plurality of Ideas. ii. The Condition of Extent of Consciousness is the Discern- ment of Relations — the Inner Sense. The Extent of Con- sciousness is not therefore definitely fixed but depends upon power in using the Relating Faculty. 213. II. The Laws guiding the Train of Ideas are the Laws of Association and Re- production. § 5. Transition and Introduction. 214. The Laws of the Inner Sense have not yet been stated. A. The necessarily Admitted but Finally Inexplicable Fact of the Associa- tion of Ideas in Unconsciousness. 215. B. The Conditions under which these Associations occur, or the Conditions of the Reproduction of Ideas. 216-218. (I) The final Condition is previous Association or Affinity. 216. (II) This includes all special conditions. (Ill) The Direction of Mental Growth will determine which mode of Reproduction shall predominate. 217. C. The Grounds of Decision between different Associations called up (or the Reason for the Expelling Influence of Ideas) are a constantly altering degree of Affinity between Ideas, and a constantly changing degree of Interest. D. This great Complexity of the Conditions produces the seemingly Wanton Play in the Train of Ideas. 219. CHAPTER IV. The Forms of Relating Knowledge. The Necessity, Preconditions, and Forms of Relating Knowledge. I. The Necessity of Relating Knowledge. Knowledge of any Whole involves a knowledge of Two Kinds of Relations. § i. A. Relations involved in the Discernment of an Order in Time. 220-222. (I) Both Ordered Memory and Intelligent Apprehension of a Whole re- quire some Systematic Arrangement of the several Impressions from the first. 220. (II) A Proposed Explanation of the Nature of the Arrangement, as due to Gradual Diminution of the Impression. 221. (A) Graduation in Impressions. ' (B) Graduation in Recollection. (Ill) The Necessity for so Complex an Explanation. 222. (A) Not simply to account for the Order of Repetition. Repetition in the same Order was to be expected. (B) But such Repetition in Memory is not clear as a Fact. (C) And, the Perception having been once completed, the thing to be explained was why Memory does not now recall the Whole at once. i \r 1 f 17 B. Relations involved in the Idea of a Connection of Ideas, or in Knowledge of a Change of Knowledge. 223-226. (I) Real Understanding of a Whole requires the Discernment of a Con- nection of Ideas. 223. (II) This Discernment of Connection or Knowledge of Change is not Mechanical^ following inevitably from the Mechanism of the recip- rocal Actions between the immediate Presentations of the Soul. (A) It does not follow from the mere Notion of the Unity of the Soul. (B) Nor from the mere Notion of the Soul, as a Thinking Being, though this is a plausible Conjecture. 224. (Ill) But this Knowledge of Change of Knowledge requires a new and distinct Manifestation of Psychic Energy, a comprehensive and Comparative Consciousness, an active Relating Knowledge. (A) Even in Sense Impressions, Knowledge of the Parts may give no idea of their Combination as a Whole, because of possible Alteration in the Laws. (B) So in Knowlege of a Change of Knowledge, there is discerni- ble a similar Alteration of Laws, which precludes the before- mentioned *'Plausible Conjecture," since this Knowledge as- sumes Forms which are not the simple products of certain pro- cesses in the Train of Ideas, but seem to be contributed by a new Phase of the Activity of the Soul itself. 225. II. The Preconditions of Relating Knowledge— the ''Forms*' which the Soul contributes. "Innate Ideas.' 2. A. Previous Conceptions of Innate Ideas. 226. (I) The Earlier Conception. (II) Kant's Conception of ''Forms"— Space, Time, and the Categories. B. The True Conception of Innate Ideas. 227. (I) Not an Original Conscious Possession. (II) But an Innate Tendency to develop certain Modes of Conception. C. These Modes of Conception cannot be derived from the Mechanism of immediate Cognition. 228. (I) Experience is only the Occasion for their Arising. (II) They show the real Unity of the Mind in its Attempt by the Re- lating Activity to grasp a Whole. III. The Forms of Relating Knowledge, or the Kinds of Relating Activity. § 3-5 A. The Relating Activity in Sense^ in the Apprehension of the World in Space and Time. § 3. Introduction. 229. (I) The Existence of Time Relations in the Soul is only a Condition of the Active Intuition of Time as a whole. (II) In like Manner, out of the World of Spaceless Impressions within us, the Soul fashions actively the Intuition of Space. 230. (III) Both Time and Space, thus, are evolved by the Mind from itself, whether or not they are also Objective. (IV) Transition. The World of Time and Space, so given, is a Product of Unconscious Activity, but in fact, it is never presented without Evidences of a further Conscious Activity of Thinking. 231. B. The Relating Activity in the Understandings in the Apprehension of the World in Thought, § 4- i I i8 (I) The Distinction of the Activity of Thought from the Mechanism of Perception and Memory, though aided by them. 232. (II) The Three Forms of Thinking Activity. 233-235. (A) The Concept. 233. i. The Aid given by the Mechanical Course of Ideas, ii. The Distinction of the Concept as giving a Coherent Whole. (B) The Judgment. i. The Contributing Acts of Perception and Memory, ii. The Distinction of the Judgment, as a Unity of Subject and Predicate, thought under certain Conceptions. (D) The Syllogism. i. The Contribution of the Mechanical Course of Ideas, ii. The Distinction of the Syllogism as a Unity dependent on the Thought of a Universal Law. (Ill) Our Sense Apprehension of Thought is permeated with these Con- ceptions, yet for any adequate view of the Essential Connections, the Understanding requires the Aid of Experience. 235. C. The Relating Activity in Reason^ in the Effort after Unifying Compre- hension. S 5. (I) The Distinction between the Understanding and the Reason. 237. (A) The Understanding does not ask as to the Final Unity. (B) But to seek the completely Unifying Consciousness is the pre- cise Task of Reason. (II) The Limitations of Reason. 238. (A) The Difficulties of the Problems. (B) The Need of the Aid of Science. CHAPTER V. Of the Feelings, of Self Consciousness, and op the Will. The Origin, Forms and Constant Presence of Feelings ; and the Three Direc- tions in which Feeling acts with Momentous Force upon our Mental Life as fur- nishing a Basis for Reason's Determinations of Worth, for the Fact of Self Con- sciousness, and for Will, I. The Origin of the Feelings. § i. , A. As a Fact. 240. (I) They cannot be traced to Ideas. (II) But are an Original Capacity of the Soul. B. Explanation of Feelings of Pleasure and Pain, as Stimulations in Har- mony with the Soul's Vital Evolution, and as Disturbances of its Perma- nent Course, respectively. C. The Relation of this Explanation to Ordinary Experience. 241. (I) The Ordinary Consciousness is not likely consciously to see or state this Explanation. (II) Yet it is in Harmony with its underlying Convictions. (III) And its fuller meaning Experience gradually defines. II. The Three Chief Directions of the Workings of Feeling on the rest of our Mental Life. § 2-5. Introduction. 242-244. (I) The great Variety af the Forms of the Feelings. 242. f p.^ '9 (II) Their Constant Attendance (^not as subsidiary events) upon every Manifestation of Mental Activity. A. Feeling as furnishing a Basis for Reason's determinations of Worth. §2. (I) In iEsthetic Ideals. 244. (II) In the Ideals of the Theoretical Reason — Feelings as influencing our Theory of the Universe. (A) The Fact of this Influence even when involving Inconsistency. i. In case of Unconscious Inconsistency. 245. ii. Even when Inconsistency becomes Conscious. (B) The Limitations in the Justification of this Influence. (Ill) In Ideals of the Practical Reason. 246-248. B. Feeling as Furnishing a Basis for the Fact of Self-Consciousness. § 3-4. Introduction. Theories of the Origin of Self-Consciousness. 248. (A) Inadequate Theories. i. Self-Consciousness as an Inborn Characteristic. ii. Self-Consciousness as the Result of Long Training. (B) The True Theory is that Self-Consciousness is imperfectly known but decisively Discriminated. (I) The Significance of Self-Consciousness. §3. (A) Not the Coincidence of Thinker and Thought. 249. ' (B) But that our Ego is the Thinker of our own Thoughts. i. Now ihis must be Due to Immediate Certainty as to what is ours, which cannot come from insight into the Nature of the Soul. ii. But does come from Feeling. 250. a. The simplest Feeling is enough, but no mere Intelligence however great is Sufficient. b. Thus Self-Consciousness is the Interpretation of the Sense of Self, and indirectly grows in Fulness and Clearness of Representation, and in Extent. 251. (II) Some Points in the Delineation of the Growth of Self-Conscious- ness, bringing us to the Conception of the Will. The Distinction of the Pure Ego from the Empiric Ego. Transition Section. § 4. (A) At first Self-Consciousness Centers in the Body. (B) Then in a Moving Force within the Body. (C) Then we seem to find in our Abiding Disposition the True Ego as distinguished from the Empiric Ego. 252. (D) But finally it is felt that the True Conception of the Ego re- quires at least one point of Freedom. Transition Paragraph. 253. C. Feeling as Furnishing a Basis for Belief in the Freedom of the Will. § 5. (I) The Sphere of Volition is unquestionably very limited. 254-256. (A) The Impulses of Sense include no True Volition. 255. (B) The greater part of Customary Actions are without Real Voli- tion. (C) There is Real Volition only where Distinct Consciousness of impulses, and Deliberation are present. 256. (II) Even if there were an unbroken Chain of Mechanism, the Name Will would be needed to denote a Peculiar Psychic Element. (A) The Existence of the Name for a simple process is itself an Ar- gument for the Reality of the Distinction. 20 (B) The Peculiar Element is that of Approval or Intention which is Conceivable even if the Will had no Power. 257. (III) Indeed, Unlimited Freedom of Volition does not at all involve Ex- haustless Capability of Performance ; the latter is necessarily very Limited. (IV) And this Limited Power the Universal Law of Casuality does not forbid. 259-261. (A) The Immovable Conviction is against a Mere Blind and Neces- sary Vortex of Events. 259. (B) Moreover the Law of Causality Properly stated makes no such Requirement. 260, i. We need not see in every Event an Effect in the strict Me- chanical Sense, ii. What Constitutes the Absolute Authority of the Causal Law is that each Constituent, once introduced into the actual Course of Events, continues to Act according to Universal Laws, iii. Hence the Universal Course of things may at every Mo- ment have Innumerable Beginnings whose Origin lies out- side of it, but can have none not necessarily Continued within it, and therefore along with unlimited Freedom of Will there may be also a Limited Power of Absolute Com- mencement. 261. Conclusion of Book II. § 6. Conviction of the Difference of Psychic and Natural Events. A. The Difference summarily stated consists in the Fact that the Elements are Different and that the Modes of Energy are Different. 261. B. This Difference is Asserted not only against Materialism but also against a prevalent merely Mechanical View of Things. 262. C The Facts of Consciousness Bear Constant Witness to the Magnitude of this Difference. BOOK III. LIFE. CHAPTER I. The Connection Between Body and Soul. The General Method of Inquiry; the General View of Occasionalism as to the Connection between Body and Soul; and the General Effects of this View on Three of the Questions Involved in the Connections between Body and Soul: how Sensations arise, Guidance of Movements, Influence of the Soul on Bodily Form, General Introduction to the Book. § I. Different Stages of Apprehension of the World; True and Derivative Stand- points. •0 ■ 91 A. The Pressing Nature of the Questions Concerning th2 Connection of Mind and Matter on account of the many Interests Involved. 267. B. These many Interests themselves Complicate the Inquiry and seem to call for a Separation of the Involved Problems — Scientific and Philo- sophical. 268, C. For such a Separation of the Scientific and Philosophic Problems, there are weighty Reasons and for using chiefly the Scientific Method. 268-273. (I) Preference for things Attainable Leads to the Scientific Method. 269. (II) There is less Liability to Error in the Scientific Method; yet, our inquiry will reserve to itself the Right of making the Preliminary Results so obtained Matter of a more advanced Investigation. (Ill) The Constant mixing of the two points of view only hinders Clear- ness and Convenience. The True Method is to determine once for all the Limits of the Proper use of the Ordinary Modes of Concep- tion. 271, I. The General Theory of Occasionalism as to the Connection of Body and Soul. § 2-3. A. The Inadequacy of the Opposing Theory of a Bond between Body and Soul. § 2. (I) Their Reciprocal Action is itself the Bond. 273. (II) The Question of how they were united at first may be asked. 274. (Ill) But any question of a permanent Bond is Superfluous and Con- temptible; the real question is as to the numberless reciprocal Re- actions. B. Possibility and Final Inexplicableness of All Reciprocal Actions. Occa- sionalism. § 3. (I) Insight into Details leaves all unsolved the Final Mystery of the possibility of any Reciprocal Action, even Mechanical. 275. (II) For all Mechanical Working presupposes the Transferability of Motion and the solid Construction and Connection of Masses, in both of which is already assumed the Reciprocal Action to be ex- plained. (Ill) Thus the Problem of the Connection of Body and Soul is not an Exceptional one, though they are Heterogeneous. 277. (A) There is the same Final Inexplicableness in all Connection. (B) This Inexplicableness is not really increased by the Dissimilar- ity of Body and Soul. 278. i. Since Homogeneity does not help to give real explaining Conditions, but only to form an Image, which can indeed be given in Physical Re-actions, but not, of course, in the case of the Connection of Body and Soul. ii. The seeming Heterogeneity may even here finally disap- pear. 279. iii. And in any case the only Homogeneity required for an Act of working is the Homogeneity of two centers of Action which is given in the case of the Soul and the Body. (IV) But it must be remembered that there are no Reciprocal Actions in General; the inquiry must be directed to Particular Re-actions. (V) The Consequent Conception of the Theory of Occasionalism. 280- 281. 22 (A) As Holding everywhere alike, the Connection of Soul and Body being a single case under this General Law. (B) We may even apply the Conceptions of Ordinary Life as to Reciprocal Action — when rightly understood — to the Soul, since even in the case of Atoms no real Contact is supposed. IL The General Effects of the View of Occasionalism on the Questions Involved in the Connection of Body and Soul. § 4-5. A. On Conception of How Sensations Arise. The Bodily States are only Occasions. 281-283. B. On the Conception of the Guidance of Corporeal Movements by the Soul. 283-287. (I) Even in purely Voluntary Motions the Will is still only an Occa- sion. 283-285. (II) This is still more the case in Involuntary Movements. 285. (Ill) Conclusion as to the Guidance of Movements. (A) The Soul is not a Conscious Steersman of the Body. (B) The Will is only Living Volition; the accompanying Accom- plishment is a gift of the Universal Necessity of Nature. 286. (C) Thus the Soul only blindly Initiates Movement. 287. C. On the Conception of the Influence of the Soul on Bodily Form. § 5. (I) There is no Conscious Influence. 287. (II) But the Unconscious Influence might be great and Important. 288. (HI) Yet the most that clear Experience seems to justify is a General En- noblement or Degradation. CHAPTER II. Of the Seat of the Soul. The Seat of the Soul : the Various Possible Conceptions ; the Development of the True Conception ; and the Value of the Discussion. Introduction. 290. A. Why the Question arises. B. The Simplest Meaning of the Question is that it is an Inquiry as to the Point whither all Impressions from without must be transmitted, and whence in return come the Impulses by which the Soul acts on its Envi- ronment. I. Various Possible Conceptions of the Space Relations of reciprocally acting Beings. § i. A. Theology gives us the Conception of a Being, not merely in some rela- tion to all the rest of the Universe, but in an equally close and Grada- tionless Relation to every Part of it. 291. B. Physical Science, in gravitating Particles, has accustomed us to the Con- ception of Beings that reciprocate action directly with all Others Similar to themselves (and with no others), but in different Degrees of Relation- ship with different Individuals. 291-292. C. A Third Conception is possible, according to which a thing would act directly and unvaryingly over a Fixed Extent of Space, but be only in- directly in reciprocal action with all that lay beyond its Limits. 292-295. 23 I .. 1 /' (I) False Assumptions to be avoided in this Conception. A Force must not be conceived as something always proceeding from a Working Element, even when there is no Second Element on which it can act. 292. (II) The Underlying Assumption implied in this Third Cpnception is, that a Thing is where it acts. 293. (Ill) Consequent Possible Cases of this Third Conception. 294. II. The Application of these Conceptions in the Development of the True Con- ception of the Seat of the Soul. § 2. A. The Inapplicability of the First Conception. The Soul is not Omnipres- ent in its Body. 295-297. (I) The Limited Sphere of the Soul's Conscious Operations in the Body. 295. (II) The Soul is in Direct Reciprocal Action only with the Brain. There, accordingly, it has its Seat, in the Sense which the word ought to have. 296. B. Insufficiency (rather than Inaccuracy) of the Second Conception. 297— 300- (I) This Conception would mean that the Soul would exchange Action with those Elements alone, whose Effects approximated within an imperceptibly small Interval to the Point of its Maximum Action — the only Place of the Soul's Direct Efficacy, and hence its Exclusive Seat. 297. (II) For this Conception there seems to be no Anatomical Ground. 298. (IH) Indeed such a Point of Common Intersection of the Nerves could not be an Indivisible Point, but must be a Cubic Space. 297. C. The Third Conception only is Adequate. For even the Second Concep- tion, if it is to mean anything, must be resolved into the Third, since it is exactly the Taking Place of Reciprocal Action in a given space which constitutes that Space the Soul's Seat ; hence we may affirm that the Soul's Seat is in Many Places in the Brain. 300. D. A Fourth Conception — that of a Mobile Soul — may be rejected as of Little Value. III. The True Conception of the Seat of the Soul, so developed, is confirmed by the Consideration of certain Psychical Phenomena which involve the Recip- rocal Action of Soul and Body. § 3-5, Introduction. The View now reached of the Seat of the Soul requires one further Modification, since what one Element undergoes from another will depend not only on what that other is permanently, but also on its Present Temporary State. 301. A. The Way in which Movements Arise. § 3. (I) Here the Soul can do nothing else than produce or endure a State in itself. This State is distinguished only qualitatively from others, and on the Quality depends not only the Kind and Amount, but also the Place of the Action attached to it by Nature. (II) The Soul has then simply to proclaim its States and wait till what is required comes to pass. 303. (A) Illustrations of these Relations in Mimetic and Other Move- ments. 304. (B) Details as to the manner of the Propagation of the Mental States over the Bodily Organs cannot be given. 305. 24 B. Conditions of Space Perception. § 4-5. (I) The Theory of Local Signs. § 4. (A) The Question. How, upon any theory, is Consciousness of a Spatial Order possible? 306. (B) There must be a moment at which Situation in Space, in pass- ing into Consciousness, reappears not as Situation in Space, but as Perception of the same, through Qualitative Differences of Stimulations. 307. (C) Now Two Things seem needful to a Distinct Perception of Space. 308. i. An Innate Impulse to form Conceptions of Space, ii. And an Impetus proceeding from the Impressions them- selves, which can lie only in a Qualitative Property of some Kind which the Impression acquires, in virtue of the peculiar Nature of the Place at which it comes into contact with the Body — a Local Sign. 308-309. (D) This Dependence of Space-Perception upon Qualitative Inter- nal States corresponds with the Results formerly arrived at as to the Origin of Movements. 310. (II) The Opposed Theory that Space Relations pass as such into the Soul, naturally held that each Impression is conveyed to it by a Dis- tinct Nerve Fiber. § 5. (A) But such a Separation of the Nerve Fibers achieves nothing for an Explanation of Space-Perception. (B) The Significance of the Unbranched Nerve Fibers is therefore probably to be otherwise explained. 311. IV. The Value of the Discussion of the Seat of the Soul. § 6. A. A Distinct Answer to the Question as to the Seat of the Soul is necessary to give Definiteness to our Conception of the Reciprocal Relation of Body and Soul. 313. B. And the View reached stands squarely opposed to the View of the Om- nipresence of the Soul in the Body. 3^3-315. CHAPTER III. Forms of the Reciprocal Action between Body and Soul, An Inquiry as to how far the Body affords Helps to the various Operations of the Soul; undertaken for the purpose of reviewing the diverse Forms of the Re- ciprocal Action between Body and Soul, and of incidentally considering the Functions of the several Parts of the Brain. Introduction to the Chapter. § i. The Conception of Organs of the Soul. A. The Conception of the Brain, as Organ of the Soul, is an attempted es- cape from Materialism. 316. B. But this Conception itself needs much in the way of Explanation. C. The Only Sense in which the Inquiry for Organs of the Soul seems justi- fied is as an Inquiry for a Circle of little Aids — Organs only indirectly. 317- D. And this Inquiry will serve to bring out the Forms of Reciprocal Action of Body and Soul. 318. 'tis 25 I. In Sensation. § 2-3. A. Operations in which the Soul does not require Corporeal Assistance. 318. B. Operations in which the Soul does require Corporeal Assistance. 319-323. (I) In Spatial Arrangement of Perceptions. § 2. (A) A Conjecture as to the Form in which the need of Local Signs is met, at least in Sight. (B) This Conjecture would give the very type of a Central Organ of Space Perception. 320. (II) In Feelings of Pleasure and Pain accompanying Sensations. § 3 . (A) These are plainly affected by Bodily States, both as to Content, and Intensity. 321. (B) But the Limits of this Affection cannot here be determined, and we are left in doubt whether a peculiar Central Organ of Feeling is here to be assumed. 322. II. In the Higher Energies of the Soul. § 4. In Higher Intelligence, and in Moral and ^Esthetic Judgment, the Coopera- tion of the Bodily Functions consists only in the unrestricted Action of a number of preparatory Organs being required for the Realization of many indirectly necessary Prerequisites of Operations. III. In Memory. § 5. Introduction. The Significance of an Organ of Memory. 325. A. The Great Difficulties of assuming a Special Organ of Memory. 325-327. B. The Greater Simplicity of the Theory of a Direct Retention by the SouL 327-328. (I) Why not assume a Single Process of Retention by the Soul itself. 327- (II) Indeed, in any case, Memory requires reference to the Soul's Unity. (A) Even in Images of Sense-Perception. (B) Still more, in General Conceptions. 328. C. Nor does the Testimony of Experience favor such a Special Organ. 328-332. (I) In ordinary Sleep and in Unnatural Unconsciousness, it is not nec- essary to consider that Consciousness depends upon the Brain as its Efficient Cause, but only that it is hindered by the Disturbance of the Brain as by a positive Obstacle. 328. (II) In Half-lapses of Memory, it may be granted that much remains unexplained, but it seems possible to bring them under the same Theory. 330-332. (A) During Health. 330. (B) Change through Disease and Advancing Age. (C) Remarkable Disturbances of Memory by Disease or Injuries. 331. IV In Bodily Movements. § 6. A. The Soul does not know, devise, or directly control the Mechanism of Movement, but some Organ of Movement must be necessary, in Compar- tive Indepence of the Soul, for the Protection of Life. 332. B. Yet the Soul can improve this Mechanism — especially in the case of Man. 333- C. Though the Rarity of Meaningless Movements in the Young, and the Ease with which Coherent Movements are called forth, both look for Ex- planation to a Central Organ of Movement, whose Functions are: 26 (I) Execution of the General Movements of the Body. 334. • (II) The Direction of these Movements in a Resisting World. 335. (A) Giving (by means of its intertwined sensory and motor fibers) a Purposive Reaction with Mechanical Necessity. (B) And by taking account of the Kind of Stimulus, even giving the Appearance of deliberate Choice. D. But Practice and Habit can further develop the Primary Function of the Central (Vgan. 336.- (I) Since what the Corporeal Organization could not devise, it can re- tain. (II) Hence the Hypothesis of a Divisible Soul — itself inherently im- possible — is wholly unnecessary, even in cases of decapitation. Conclusion of the Chapter. § 7. A. There are Two Forms of Immediate Help of the Body to the Soul — Spatial Arrangement of Impressions and Spatial Movements. 338. B. But the Rationalizing of Sense-Impressions is due to the Soul alone. 339. C. Hence the Functions of the Brain are much simpler than are supposed by Phrenology. (I) We certainly cannot assert a Soul independent of the Body. (II) But the Admission of Special Organs in different Parts of the Brain, for particular Higher Mental Faculties, has after all little probability on its side. (III) Yet even the subtler Peculiarities of Mind are doubtless largely in- fluenced by the Bodily Life, but not through the Assignment of Special Organs. 340. (IV) Though in the sense of an indirect yet very powerful Influence on Menial Life, even the Cerebral Hemispheres may be called Organs; while in a more special sense, the same name may perhaps be ap- plied to the Lower and more definitely favored Regions of the Brain. 341. D. There is little Evidence for supposing the Body a Hindrance to the Soul's free Development. 342. CHAPTER IV. Life in Matter. An Attempt to prove that the Universality of Mechanism does not rob the World of its Glory, but is even consistent with the Existence of Life in all Mat- ter, i. e., with the Animation of the whole W^orld; and a Statement of the Effect of this View of Life in Matter on the Conception of Body and Soul. Introduction. 344. A. The Natural Protests against the Mechanical View. B. The Consequent Needed Answer. I. The Objection, from the Ideal Point of View, to the Mechanical View of Nature, as robbing the World of its Glory. § i. A. The Naive View of Nature. (I) This View has final Confidence in the Reality of Sense-Perception, and follows upon a Deep Need in Men. 345. (II) This Earnestness in regard to Sense-Perception only temporarily disappears in the case of Accidental Combinations, and Arbitrary Forms. 346. ' 1 27 B. Of this Belief in the essential Significance of Sense-Perception and in the consequent Glory of the World, the Mechanical View seems to rob us. 347-349- (I) Doubtless the Reality of the World is utterly severed] from our Senses by the Mechanical View. 347. (II) And there can be no successful Defense of the Reality of Sense Phenomena against that View. Sensations cou/dhave no meaning in Things. II. The Double Answer to the Objection to the Mechanical View. § 2-3. Introduction. The Complaints of the Ideal View. 349. A. The Special and Higher Worth of Sense. 349-353- (I) The Assumption, underlying these Complaints of the Ideal View, that the sole Office of Sentience is to present things as they really are is not Scientific, 349. (A) The Final Effect in a Chain of Processes is naturally Different from the Beginning. 350. (B) The Influences which have led to this Assumption — the Influ- ences of Daily Life and the peculiar Interest of Science — have tended to make us forget that the World of Sensation is itself one of the Greatest of all Events. 351. (C) In fact, the truer Conception would seem to be, that the Essen- tial Truth of the. Universe is the Meaning set forth so as to be intelligible to the Spirit. 352. B. Life in Matter. 353-364. Introduction. 353-355. (A) But the Answer just made to the Idealist's Complaint seems open to the Objection, that Half the World is still only Means — an Objection to be fully met, only by making Things themselves Conscious. 353. (B) We are brought therefore to the purpose to vindicate the Exist- ence of Life in Matter — the Exclusive and Original Reality of the Mental Sphere. 354. (I) The Final Elements of All Matter are Unextended Atoms. 355-360. (A) The Previous Discussion of the Mechanical View brought us to the necessary Assumption of many independent Centers of ForcCy possid/y Unextended. 355. (B) Considerations tending to prove that Matter is Unextended. i. There is no Subject for the so-called fundamental Proper- ties of Matter. ii. And if this Subject be taken as Supersensible, Extension cannot be a Property. a. For Extension of Matter necessarily implies the Relation between Many single distinguishable Points. 356. b. And hence cannot be attached as a Predicate to a Single Element — even the Ultimate Atoms, since even here Ex- tension is conceivable only as Intensive Force. 357. iii. The Possible Source of our Idea of Extension is in the Unconscious Transfer to Things, of our Joy of Passing beyond Limits. 358. a. The Possible Explanation. b. The Need of some such Explanation. 359. 28 iv. Moreover our Theory of Unextended Atoms affords a completer Explanation of Phenomena. (II) There is thus admissible the Thought of an Inner Mental Life per- vading all Matter— the Animation of the Whole World. § 3. (A) Statement of the View. 360. (B) The Objection to this Second Answer to the Idealist's com- plaint that it goes beyond our craving and requires more than we can believe, — overlooks the Beauty of the Simple Constitu- ents of Matter, which is not altered by Position. 361. (C; Moreover this Theory of the Animation of the Whole is not set forth merely in answer to a Craving, but springs from the Conviction of the radically Unthinkable Conception of Some- thing Existent that never had an Independent Being. (D) This View gives animation greater than that imagined by My- thology, but has no Place in Scientific Conceptions, though satisfying the Ideal Demands. 362-363. III. Result of this Modification of our Previous View on the Conception of Body and Soul. § 4. A. Soul and Body are thus seen to be Homogeneous Supersensible Beings, and so the Difficulty of mutual Reaction is lessened for some minds. 364. B. But this does not mean the Development of Body into Soul or vice v^rsa. (I) The One indivisible Soul must still be sharply contrasted with the Animated Body. (II) Since the possible Anima'.ion of the Nerves is wholly without Sig- nificance for the Soul. 365. (III) For the Nerves are merely Messengers in any case. C. In fact, only the Beauty of the Body is made more Intelligible. 366. D. The Resulting Image of Body and Soul is that of an Association of Many Beings with a governing Soul rather than a Unity of All. 367. (I) This View is more satisfactory than that of the Unity or Fusion of the Soul with the Bodily Organism. (A) The Body would not be more fully ours on the latter Theory, (B) Moreover any unnecessary Blending of the Many into the One degrades the Dignity of Life and of Happiness. 368. (II) Observation gives little Confirmation to the Theory of Unity. CHAPTER V. Beginning and End of Soul-Life. An Attempt to show that the Mechanical View leaves enlirely open all Ques- tions of Origin and Destiny, and indeed itself is wholly dependent, requiring the thought of the Infinite Substance ; and an Inquiry how far we may understand the Origin and Destiny of the Soul in particular. Introduction. A. The Suggested Questions of Origin and Destiny. 370. B. The necessarily great limitations of our Knowledge here. C. We must see whether our View leaves these Questions open. 371. I. The Relation of Scientific Mechanism to all Questions of Origin and Des- tiny. § 1-4. ■•*» J. 29 A. Scientific Mechanism leaves the Questions of Beginning and End entirely open. § I. (I) Science does not consider Beginning or End. (II) Science cannot anywhere overstep these Boundaries. 372. (III) Hence we may await its Results with Patience, and without any Apprehension for a Religious View of the Origin of Things. 373. (IV) Yet this Apprehension exists, but only from failure to see the De- pendence even of Mechanism on God. 374. B. Mechanism is itself entirely Dependent, looking to the Infinite Substance. § 2-3 (1) The Attempt to regard Mechanism as Independent. § 2. (A) It is Strange but Intelligible. 375. (B) The Inadequacy for the Scientist of the Ordinary Answer to this Attempt. (C) The Scientist may even claim it unnecessary to acknowledge the Primary Source of the World in God, making the Sway of Uni- versal Laws enough. 377. (D) The Assumption herein involved must be examined. (II) The Examination of the Assumption (underlying all Attempts to hold the Independence of Mechanism) that the Sway of Unchanging Laws determines all Reciprocal Actions, and is alone necessary to complete the Mechanical View. § 3. (A) The Inexplicability of the Transmission of Action between two Indifferent Elements. 378. (B) A Realm of Laws cannot explain this, for Laws are but State- ments of an Order discerned by Mind in Things, and cannot precede Things. 379. (C) But all these Relations and Laws can finally be thought only as existing in the Unity of an Infiniie Living Being. 380. i. And this Recognition of a'l Infinite Substance is thus re- quired by every example of Reciprocal Action — even the simplest Reactions of Mechanism. 381. ii. Moreover this Universal Being is not mere Bond, but the Sovereign Power, assigning to each Individual the Sphere of its possible Activity. 382. C. And this Theory of the Infinite Substance is fully in Harmony with both the Conceptions hitherto reached — the Vital Activity of the Human Soul, and the Mechanism of Nature. § 4. (I) The Relation of the Soul's indivisible Being to the several Forms of its Action is even the best Analogy of the Relation of the Infinite Substance to Finite Things. 382. (A) The Soul and its States. 383. (B) The Infinite and Finite Things. (II) The Theory is equally in Harmony with Mechanism when rightly understood. 384-387. (A) The contrary Impression of the Independence of Mechanism proceeds solely from unconsciously changing the constantly re- curring Actual Relations of Things into Necessary Relations of Thought. 385-387. i. Illustrations. 385. 30 ii. Such Causal Connections, demonstrable as undeniable Facts, could become intelligible as Necessities, only if we could discern the Purpose of the Infinite, and so see them, not merely as Facts, but as a Part of the inherent Consistency of the Infinite — which is thus required for any intelligible Conception of Mechanism itself. 386. (B) The Theory of the Infinite Substance therefore has no quarrel with Mechanism, nor even with its Phraseology, when applied to Particulars, since Mechanism itself is only the true Efficacy of the Infinite. II. An Inquiry as to the Origin and Destiny of the Soul, in particular. § 5. A. The Destiny of the Soul. 387-390. (I) One Class of Arguments for Immortality — arguing from the "Na- ture of Things" — falls into the precise Error of the Defenders of the Independence of Mechanism. There is no such Nature of Things except as the Product of the Creative Power itself, and the Pur- poses of that Power we cannot fully know. 388. (II) But this very Conception of the Relation of the Finite to the Infin- ite Substance seems to require that the Destinies of the Individual must be accordant with the Dictate of the Whole ; and hence that will last forever which, on account of its Excellence and its Spirit, must be an Abiding Part of the Order of the Universe. 389. B. As to the Origin of the Soul. 390-392. (I; The Infinite Anterior History of the Soul is Improbable. 390. (II) Nor does the Body produce it. (Ill) The most probable Theory is that of Creation, upon the formation of the organic Germ. (A) Statement of the Theory. (B) There is more Unity and Simplicity in this Process than in the Conception which we can give of it. 391. (C) Yet it is a dim Conjecture at best, as is most Knowledge of the Course of the Spiritual Order of the Universe, the chief Light on which is from what ou^ht to be. CONCLUSION OF BOOKS I.-III, A Review of the Three Different Views of Nature previously considered, to show their possible Reconciliation in the View now reached, and to determine ex- actly to what Extent, and in what Sense, Mechanism is held. Introduction. 393. I. The Mythological View. 393-395. A. Our Theory has all its Advantages, giving Enjoyment and Freedom ab- solutely throughout Nature. 394. B. While it keeps close to the most rigorous Scientific Study of Nature. C. And, at the same time, avoids the great Inconsistency of the Mytholog- ical View, by finding in the acknowledged necessary Order itself the ground of Conviction of the one Creative Infinite. 395. II. The World-Soul View. 395-397. A. The Theory we have reached enables us to retain all the fundamental Doctrines of this View. B. But this View gives in reality only a Soul of Nature^ and therefore re- -•> 31 quires supplementing — if only by the Conviction (not to be scientifically known) of the Unity of Nature and the Sphere of Ethics — that Nature is only the Condition for the Realization of the Good. 396, C. But the Attempts of the World-Soul View to fully express this Unity have led only to miserable Shifts. 397, III. The Mechanical View. 397-401. A. This View is granted unreservedly as to the Relations of Finite Things in Nature. B. But it is denied as a Final Explanation, since the Dependence of all Mechanism is asserted, as the instrumental Forms employed by God. 398. C. But none the less do we require the Recognition of its Absolute Validity. 399- (I) On Scientific Grounds. (II) And in spite of the Natural Revolt of the Ideal View. (Ill) On the Ground of the Ideal itself, i. e. for the sake of the Ethical Ideal, which requires Man to embody his ideals in External Forms, within the firm bonds of a Necessity which he holds sacred. 401. BOOK IV. MAN. CHAPTER I. Nature and Ideas. A Preliminary Examination of the Problem of the Possible Combination of the Mechanical Explanation and the Ideal Interpretation of Nature. I. The Genesis of the Conception of the Ideal Interpretation of Nature beside that of the Mechanical Explanation. § i. A. Our Confidence in our own Individuality leads us the more readily to grant Individuality to the Phenomena of Nature. 405. B. And such an Admission is really necessary to any true Unity in Nature. 406. C. And this Desire for Unity in Nature is increased by the Thought of the inevitable Bearing of the Plan of Nature on the Meaning of our own Action. D. Such a View the bare Conception of Mechanism cannot satisfy; the real Creative Nature is felt to be back of Laws, in the Original Selection and Arrangement of the Elements; and the Basis and Origin of this Order is * imperatively sought. 407. E. To such a Search, the Mechanical View objects that Order ought to be felt to be more natural than Disorder. F. But in this Objection itself, the Mechanical View has conceded the Ra- tional Order of the Primal Condition of the World; and hence inevitably there arises beside the Mechanical Explanation of Nature the Conception of its Ideal Interpretation. 408. 32 II. The Mutual Independence of these Conceptions, and the Necessity of Com- bining them. § 2. A. Their Possible Independence in all Particular Researches. 409-411. B. The Necessity of Combining them in any Theory of the Universe that aims at Completeness. 41 1-4 12. III. Two Inadequate Attempts at such Combination. § 3. A. Purposive Creation. 412-414. (I) The Statement and Partial Justification of the View. 412. (II) The General Difficulties involved in the Conception of a Designing Activity when ascribed to the Divine Being. (Ill) The Resulting Contradiction in the View, since it requires both Creative Wisdom and a Dark Background in God. 414. B. The Conception of the "Ideal in the Real." (I) The Statement and General Defects of the View. (II) The Great Defect is in seeking to avoid the difficulty by really con- verting Reason into the Dark Background. This View is only more obscure than the other. 415. IV. Any Adequate Combination of the Mechanical Explanation and the Ideal Interpretation of Nature must start from an Exhaustive Study of Nature as a Fact. § 4. A. Any complete Theory of the Universe must have Three Starting Points- Laws, Ideas, and Experience. 417. B. But the First Two must be studied in the Last. CHAPTER II. Nature Evolved from Chaos. A Detailed Examination as to just how far the Mechanical Theory in its widest possible Conception can account for a real Unity of Nature as evolved from Chaos (as against the Objections of the Ideal View); involving a Statement of all the Leading Usages and Modes of Operation, which Nature actually employs. I. The Possibilities of the Mechanical View, as it is Commonly Conceived, set forth in argument against the Ideal View. § 1-3. A. Doubt as to the Supremacy of Ends in Nature. § i. (I) The Question. Is there a General Purposiveness in Nature? 411. (II) The Answers. 420-423. (A) Experience seems to give a Mixed Impression as to any Exter- nal Ends in Nature. 420. (B) But the Ideal View contends for the Recognition of Inherent Ends as lying in the Creatures' own Existence. 421. (C) This Theory of Inherent Ends is an Insufficient Defense. 421-423. i. For to prove a Systematic Purposiveness in Nature on this theory of Ends would require (l) a priori Knowledge of what Events and Forms are of absolute Worth; and (2) Proof that only such form part of Nature. 422. ii. But in fact, the Theory usually assumes the Excellence of Things as they are, and then shows that the present Ar- rangements are adapted to produce them. iii. Such a Proof necessarily ends in a meaningless Play on Words. <\ 33 B. The Idealist's Defense of Ends in Nature. § 2. v (I) To these Objections, the Ideal View replies that it does not build its Conviction of Purposiveness in Nature on ordinary Connections of Cause and Effect, but on the fact of the Combinations of Ends, for which an undesigned Convergence can hardly account. 423-425. (A) It might grant the contention of the Mechanical View as to a single structural Relation. 424. (B) But the Mechanical Contention becomes incredible, in the case of a Combination of innumerable such Relations; and this occurs even in Single Organs. (II) Moreover, granting Mechanism as means, the Origination of the Germs requires a Designing Consciousness; and this once admitted, we may rationally believe in its Cooperation, even where we do not see it. 425. C. The Attempted Mechanical Explanation of the Development of Things from Chaos. § 3. (I) The Mechanical View explains the Idealist's Admiration of Nature as unconsciously due to the thought of the mere Number of Parts, and of the Variety of Movements, which yet may be very simply ex- plained. 426. (II) The Idealist grants that this argument has force, but maintains that, however simple the original germs, the great Marvel still remains — how just this appropriate Selection came to be, (III) The Mechanical View replies: (A) This Objection makes the unjustifiable Assumption that other * Selections were prevented from appearing, wnereas, in fact, no other than a Mechanical Selection is needed. 427. (B) For a Development of Things out of the innumerable Possibil- ities of Chaos can be shown on Mechanical Principles. (IV) The Ideal View replies that this only explains a Mechanical Ab- sence of Contradiction, not the true Rationality of Things. 429. (V) The Mechanical View replies that Experience shows no such invari- able Rationality, but only a Partial Rationality such as Mechanism can account for. II. The Possibilities of the Mechanical View as Corrected and Expanded (in harmony with Mechanical Principles). § 4-5. Introduction. 431. The Idealist yet urges the monstrous Improbability of the Meckanical Theory of the Universe, even if admitted possible. A. The Correction of the Mechanical View. 432. The Idealist utterly denies the wholly unwarranted Assumption of the Mechanical View, that the Original Condition contained Countless Possi- bilities. B. The Expansion of the Mechanical View. 432-439. The Mechanical View can still be adapted (in entire harmony with Me- chanical Principles) to this new conception of the Primitive State. (I) The Atoms need not be assumed as Identical. (II) The Forces may be taken as Expressions of Inner States. 433. (III) The Atoms may be Supersensible. (IV) The View may include also an Inherent Purposiveness in Things 34 and in their Operations — a Principle of Progress Inherent in every- thing. 434. (A) The Statement of the Principle. (B) May be included in the Mechanical View as a Part of the Actual Nature of Things. 435. (C) And it is thus properly brought into the Mechanical View, since Mechanism must always assume as matter of fact, a certain Na- ture of Things. (D) The Application of the Principle. 437-439. i. Would account even for Life. 438. ii. As may be better understood by Comparison with Processes of Social Grouping — the Inner States and the Inherent Principle of Progress in the corporeal elements thus ex- plaining both Life, and even Distribution into Genera and Species. C. The Bearing of the Mechanical View, so corrected and expanded upon Ideal Interests. § 5. (I) A Real Unity of Nature is still so possible. The Unity of Nature considered as a Product of manifold Actions and Reactions. (A) A Unity gradually arising as in Society. 440. (B) Such a Unity is perhaps as really rational as a Primal Unity. (II) And there is even possible the full Recognition of the Moral Ideals, as Facts of the Inner Nature of Souls. 441. CHAPTER III. The Unity of Nature. The General Inferences as to the Unity of Nature derivable from the Formal Unity of the Basis of Things (necessarily involved in the fact of reciprocal rela- tions); and the Particular Inferences, derivable from Actual Experience, rather than from the Nature of the Supreme Cause. Introduction. 443. Transition from Chapter II. I. General Inferences as to the Unity of Nature from the Formal Unity of the Basis of Things. § 1-3. A. The Unity of the Basis of Things. § i. (I) The Mechanical Theory itself everywhere requires the Unity of a Universal System of Law. 444. (II) And this System of Law is thinkable only as due to a Real Unity of all Things — one actual Infinite Being. 445. B. The General Inferences from this Unity of the Basis of Things. § 2. Introduction. 445-447. (A) We can argue only from the Formal Unity, not from the Na- ture of the Supreme Cause. 445. (B) This Formal Unity will give the Conception of the Sum of Reality as a Completed System, each part supplementing the sum of the rest. 446. (C) The Possible Applications of this Conception. (I) The Chemical Elements form a Complete System. 447. (II) The original Distribution of Atoms must have been under Law. 35 (III) The Preservation of Unity in the Course of Events is to be as- sumed. 448-452. (A) This requires Constant Compensation of Disturbances. 448. (B) The Nature of this Compensation of Disturbances. 449-452. i. The Task required is the Perpetual Preservation of the Or- der contained in the Meaning of the first Creation of Na- ture. 449. ii. The Way in which this Task is Accomplished is through the Inner States of Things. 450. iii. This renders possible the Conception of Miracles. 451. a. The Possible Conception. Altering the Inner States of Things indirectly modifies the usual Result of the Law of their external Relations. b. This Conception is not here to be employed. 452. (IV) The Unity of the Supreme Cause seems further to require a Pro- gressive Development— a Scries of Cosmic Periods. 452-455. (A) The General Conception of this Progressive Development. 452. (B) The Extent to which this Conception may be applied to the . Supreme Cause. 454. C. These General Inferences indicate the marked Limitation of our Knowl- edge and Being. § 3. II. Particular Inferences as to the Unity of Nature, from Experience, rather than from the Nature of the Supreme Cause. § 4-5. A. Not from ft Knowledge of the Nature of the Supreme Cause. 456-462. (I) Statement of this View. 457. (II) Objection to this View. (A) Objections to the General Tone of the View, as claiming Appli- cation to Universal Nature. § 4. (B) Objections to the View, as applied to Terrestrial Nature, es- pecially to the Gradation of Animal Life. § 5 to p. 462. i. The Lower Animals may not be mere Transitional Forms; but the Aim may have been to give shape to a Variety of Types of Life, such as should leave no element unenjoyed and unused. 459. ii. And the Types of Outward Form are not to be considered as the Ideal which Nature sought to realize. 460. a. It is True that the Types exist. b. But these Formal Relations have too little deep meaning. c. Hence Content is rather to be regarded as the Cause of the Typical Formation, than vice versa. 461. B. But from Actual Experience of Phenomena. 462-464. (I) This shows Three Successive Types when Content is regarded. 462 -464. (A) General Uniformity in the Chemical Tyipt of Composition. (B) General Uniformity in the Economic Type of the Animal King- dom. (C) General Uniformity in the Morphological Type. (II) Conclusion. The Actual Character of Terrestrial Nature is thus to be taken as the Cause of the Forms and Gradations of Terrestrial Life, which are the only Forms in which the Commands of the high- est Ideas can be carried out on Earth. 464. 36 CHAPTER IV. Man and Brute. An Investigation of the Comparative Advantages of the Human Body and of Animal Bodies, showing that the Human Body stands at the Head of the Scale of Creatures, when estimated by Capacity of Happiness and of Work. Introduction. 465-468. Grades of Animals and their Significance. A. Position in a Scale of Forms does not determine the Value of a Creature. §1- (I) This is the Outcome of the Previous Discussion. 465. (II) But is Opposed to the Common View. (Ill) Which involves an Irrational Idolatry of Lifeless Forms. 466. B. But the Real Measure of the Value of a Creature is Capacity for Happi- ness and for Work. Judged by this Standard, the Human Body is at the Head of the Scale of Creatures. The Theme of the Chapter. 467-468. I. The Human Body has the most Advantageous Organization as to Size, Strength, and Length of Life. 468-475. A. General Advantages of the Vertebrate Animals, as compared with the In- vertebrate. 468-472. (I) As to Size and Strength. 468-471. (A) Disadvantages of the Forms without any Solid Framework. 468. (B) Disadvantages of the Forms with External Framework. 469. (C) Advantages of the Vertebrates in the Possibility of a Body of Considerable Bulk and Strength. 470. (II) Possibility of Longer Life with no frequent Metamorphoses. 471. B. Advantages of Man among the Vertebrates in these Particulars. 472-475. (I) As to Size and Strength. 472. (II) As to Length of Life. 473-475. (A) Man has Most Life. 473. (B) Taking into account the Effect of both Size of Body and of the Life-Plan on Duration of Life, Man's is the most advantageous Organization. 474. II. The Human Body has the most Advantageous Organization as to the Out- side Necessities of Life. 475-480. A. In Requirements as to Food. 475-479. (I) Man is not restricted to either Vegetable or Meat Diet for Preserva- tion of Life. 475. (II) No important Modifications of Man's Vital Activities follow consid- erable Restrictions in either Quantity or Kind of Food. 476-479. (A) As to Quantity. 476. (B) As to Kind. 477-478. i. Indications in Animals. 477. ii. As Applied to Man. We need to Appeal to Experience. 478. (C) The Appeal to Experience in Man, as to both the Quantity and Kind of Food. B. In Capacity for Acclimatization. 480. (I) Man is not dependent on One Kind of Food. (II) And is Able to protect himself against the Results of Climate, through the Hands. Transition. 37 III. The Human Body has the most Adv*antageous Organization, in that the Arms and Hands are left free as Instruments of Action — so necessitating the Upright Position. 480-489. A. The Real Differentiation of Man's Body from other Animal Bodies is in the Free and Many-sided Function of the Arms. 480. B. This necessitates the Upright Position in a Mammal. — Causes of the Up- right Position. 481-486. (I) The Matter is different in other Orders, 481. (A) In Lower Orders. (B) In Birds, whose Structure does solve the Mechanical Problem involved. 482. (II) In a Mammal other Devices would be necessary — the Simplest being the Erection of the Longitudinal Axis and the resulting Modifica- tions. 483. (A) Formation of the Legs, especially their Bulkiness. i. As Counterpoise, ii. To provide for Powerful Muscular Action. (B) Formation of the Foot, fitting Man alone for the Erect Posture. 485. C. The Question of the Effects of this Upright Position on the Structure and Operations of the Body. 486-489. (I) No important Reaction on the Structure and Functions of the In- ternal Organs can be ascertained. 486. (II) Even in External Structure of the upper part of the Body, we find but One Considerable Distinction — the Different Position of the Maximum Diameter. 487. (Ill) As to the Formation of the Head. (A) We can not prove it to be a Necessary Result of the Upright Position. (B) But may see in it that Variation which offered the most distinct Expression of an Inner Life intended for a higher destiny. Transition. 488. IV. The Human Body is at the Head of the Scale of Creatures in Beauty of Form, as reflecting the most Significant Inner Life and every slightest feature of it most distinctly and simply. 489-494. A. This is not the Beauty of a False Symbolism, but True Beauty. 489-492. (I) A mere Symbolism is utterly empty. 489. (II) But there is an Expressive Beauty of Form. 490. (A) Not as though the Forms were significant of themselves. (B) But as Manifestations making possible the Joy of Reciprocal Existence, and so a genuine Beauty reflecting Life. 491, B. In such a Genuine Beauty, the Human Body Excels. 492-494. CHAPTER V. Varieties op the Human Race. A Discussion of the Problem of the Specific Unity or Diversity of the Human Race ; an Investigation of the Possible Hypotheses of the Origin of the Varieties of the Race ; and a Characterization of the Five Leading Types, Introduction to the Chapter. § i . 38 An Inquiry as to the Conditions of the Origin of Individual Forms within a family. Introduction. 495. A. Very inconsiderable Modifications of the Corporeal Constitution occur after Birth ; yet New Individual Peculiarities of Formation appear in the course of generations within the Family. 496. B. A Possible Theory to account for these Variations. 497-505. (I) Obstacles in the way of these Variations becoming fixed and propa- gated. (A) Propagation by Seed. 497-499. 1. The Contrasted Methods of Propagation in Plants, ii. But in the Higher Animal World, Propagation is only by Seed. 498. (B) Crossing of different Species. 499-500. (II) Some further Probable Generalizations from Experience as to the Influence of the Bodily Formation of the Parents on that of the Child. 500-502. (Ill) The Resulting Probable Theory of the Origin of Individual Pecul- iarities is that the Reason is to be found in the Pervading Unity in Organic Form. 502-505. (A) This may account for Considerable Variation inside a Family in the course of generations. 502. (B) And also for Observed Resemblances to Animals. 503-505. i. The Possible Application of the Theory. 503. ii. The Extent of these Resemblances. 504. iii. Yet it is doubtful how much Importance is to be attached to these Resemblances. 505. I, A Discussion of the Problem of the Specific Unity or Diversity of the Race. 505-511. Introduction. 505-507. (I) The Tenacious Persistency of Species. 505. (II) Two Possible Interpretations of Original Unity — a mere General Type as in Plants, or One Actual Original Form. 507. A. Considerations favoring an Actual Single Source of all Races. 508. B. Considerations favoring a Number of Race Forms. 509. (I) The Question is one of Fact — as to the Possibilities of Variation for Nature in the C:ircumstances, and these are difficult to determine. (II) The Facts seem to indicate the Original Difference of a Number of Race Forms. II. An Investigation of the Possible Hypotheses as to the Origin of the Race. 5"-5i^- A. Historical Observations on Man do not seem to prove that any Fluctu- ating Elements of Climate, Habitat, etc., are capable of bringing about such extensive Alterations in human development, as are indicated in the Race Forms. 51 1-5 13. • B. The same Result seems indicated by Observations in the Animal World. 513- C. Experience therefore, on the whole, is not in favor of any very Important Modifying Power in the External Influences with which we are at present acquainted. 514. I • 39 D. And, in any case, these Climatic Influences are to be regarded as merely Subsidiary Conditions, taking advantage of some Natural Tendency in the Formative Influence. 514-516. (I) Statement of the Theory. 515. (II) Its Advantages in Explanation. III. Characterization of the Five Leading Race Forms. § 3. A. The Negroes. 516-518. B. The Red Indians. 518. C. The Malays. 519. D. The Mongolians. E. The Caucasians. 520. IV. Supplementary Observations. § 4. A. The Difficulty of accurately interpreting the Significance of these Race Types and the Variations from them. 520-522. {!) Even as to the Influence of Climate. 521. (II) Or of the Results of Crossing. B. The Notions of Species and Variety. 522-525. (I) Mere Names settle Nothing. 522. (II) The Admitted Fact of the Fruitfulness of Intermarriages between the Races does not at all settle the question of the original Unity of the Race. (Ill) Nor can the term Variety carry with it the Assertion that the Races have been evolved from a common Primitive Stock by means of External Influences. 523. Conclusion of Book IV. §5. A. Transition to Book V. 525. B. Relation to Darwinism. 526. There is no occasion for restatement in view of this Theory, since these Views have already been anticipated, and the Convictions with which we would meet their claims stated with sufficient Explicitness. BOOK V. MIND. CHAPTER I. Mind and Soul. An Attempt to show how an Essential Peculiarity of the Human Mind (as con- trasted with Animal Souls) must be thought, should the Examination of Facts compel us to presuppose such ; undertaken not in order to settle Metaphysical Questions, but merely to indicate the Point of View of our next Inquiry. Introduction to the Chapter. 531-532. Three Questions proposed as to the Relation of the Mental Life of Man to that of the Lower Animals. 40 A. Is it possible to name any preponderantly Important Power, any definite Faculty added to Human Nature by means of which its Development is carried far beyond the Limits of Animal Activity? 531. B. Or if in Man Capacities common to the Lower Animals are only carried farther, can we point to any Circumstances that explain this Sudden Ad- vance, announced by no Preparatory and Instrumental Intermediate Stages ? C. Or, are we mistaken here, and do the various Conditions of Human Life really form a Series of Progressive Stages of Development that lead unin- terruptedly from the torpor of Animal Life to the Summit of Human Culture ? I. The Conception of the Addition in Man of the Rational Mind to the Sentient Soul of Animals. Duality of Mind and Soul. § i. Introduction. 532. A. A Distinct Conception of the Reciprocal Relation of Mind and Soul is possible. 532-534. (1) The Higher Nature of the Mind would on the one hand unfold its own Inner Life, on the other exert a modifying, guiding, and direct- ing Influence on the Action of the Soul, and through it on the Body, 533- (II) There is thus possible the Image of a close and not unfruitful Con- nection of two Beings that in distinct separation from one another carry on the mechanical action of Psychical Reciprocity. 534. B. Considerations unfavorable to this Conception of Duality. This Sunder- ing of two Supersensible Powers has nothing to recommend it but the Remembrance of the Animal World. 535. II. The Possible Conception of the Essential Peculiarity of the Human Mind, when this Duality of Mind and Soul is set aside. Question i. § 2-4. A. General Conception of the Nature of the Human Soul. § 2. Introduction. Any Higher Faculty in Man is to be thought not as added to the Stock of the Animal Soul, but as involved in the Nature of the Human Soul from its beginning. 535. (I) The Soul is not to be thought as formed from a Psychic Substance. 536-540. (A) The generalizing process of Conception leads us naturally to convert a Name, given originally to Beings recognized as Het- erogeneous (though with common form of being and acting), into a Name for a Homogeneous content or Nature, and so come, e. g. to the conception of material substance as common to things. 536. (B) A similar process in Psychology leads to the Conception of Souls and of Psychic Substance. 538-540. i. The Conception of Souls. 538. ii. The Conception of Psychic Substance. 539. a. The End sought is to secure a firm and durable Nucleus. b. Its Impossibility. No changes in a Psychic Substance can explain the Differences in Souls. (II) The Soul is not to be thought as a Simple Quality. This gives no adequate Source of the Variety in Mental Development. 540. (III) But the Nature of the Soul is to be found in its Original Diverse Content. 541-543. 41 'II •> (A) It is essential to conceive the Soul as constantly interposing anew in all its Operations. 541. (B) This mode of conceiving the Soul is in harmony with the way in which we view the Nature of other Things. 542. B. Remarks as to the Mode in which this Conception is to be framed. What is meant by the Nature of the Soul? § 3-4. (I) Restatement of the Previous Conclusion as to the Nature of the Soul. — The Essential Content of the Soul lies in what the Soul be- comes in the Course of its Development. (Cf. Book II., chapter ii., §6-7.) 543- (II) Supplementary Considerations. Can we regard as the Original Con- tent of the Soul the Idea of its Development — the Idea within each Soul that expands into the Variety of Manifold Activities, as into its Natural Results ? 544-556. (A) The Reality of the Idea. Rest of § 3. i. The Natural Search for a fixed insoluble Core of Reality. 546. ii. In truth, •* Reality " is but an Abstraction from the differ- ent and manifold Real Things; the Real is the Content — the Idea, embodied in a manner incomprehensible by us, in the Form of Efficacious Substantiality. 547. iii. The Nature of Things is not Existence or Activity. 548. a. The Notion involved of a Subjectless Action is unthink- able. 549, b. Nor could we form any consistent Conception of the way in which Things could present themselves to us if their Essence consisted wholly in Activity. (B) The Unity of the Idea. § 4. i. Objections to the Idea as necessarily Complex. 551, ii. Failure of the Theory of the Nature of Things as a Simple Primitive Quality. 552-553. a. Either the Simple Quality is only a new Name. 552. b. Or it gives no real Unity, since it is without the germ of Variety which is indispensable. iii. How can the Content of an Idea have the Unity which is indispensable to the Existent? 553-555. a. The Double Meaning of Idea, as expressing first the Con- tent of Things, and secondly the Form of the Thought- Image in which we reproduce that Content. 554. b. The Idea, in the first sense, is capable of Original Unity. c. And is especially Appropriate to express the Essence of a Thing. (C) Conclusion on the Idea as constituting the Nature of a Thing. It is not meant that Thought and Being are identical. Mind and Mental Life are more than Thinking. 555. III. Conclusion of the Chapter. § 5. A. As to Man's Position in the Realm of Souls. 556-558. (I) It is important to Know not the Relative Position of Man in a Scale. 556. (II) But his Actual Relation in Experience with other Beings. 557, B. As to Question II. of the Introduction. 558-561. 42 (I) The Difficulties of a Definite Answer. (A) Apart from Experience, the Answer could hardly be expected from anything short of the Final Results of Speculation. 558. (B) The Appeal to Experience is liable to two Opposite Errors. 559. i. Magnifying the Differences between Men and Animals, ii. Overestimating the External Aids of Working. 560. (II) Its Irrelevancy, since in any case the Human Development is the Higher, and the possession of this forms the Abiding Distinction between Men and Animals. C. As to Question III., and Transition to chapter ii. 561. It is proposed to show in the Further Inquiry that there are definite At- tributes or Characteristic Habits of Working which are common to all Human Souls, and which distinguish Men from the Lower Animals. CHAPTER II. Human Sentience. An Attempt to bring into relief the Distinctive Characteristics of Human Sen- tience (as compared with that of the Lower Animals), both in what it Receives and in what it impels Man to Do. Introduction. 563-564. A. Reasons for treating Sentience. 563. B. The Physical Causes of our Sensations are not to be considered. I. The Distinctive Characteristic of Human Sentience, as to what it Receives. It never apprehends Impressions as mere indifferent Content, but in the ac- companying Feeling becomes aware, not merely of their Value for us, but of an Intrinsic Value. § 1-2. Introduction. 564-567. A Theory of a real Correspondence of Stimuli and Sensations. (I) A Misleading Form of this Theory. 564. (A) Statement of the Theory. (B) Its Failure in that it gives only Fancies a<^tf«/ Sensation, not the peculiar Fancy of Sensation itself. 565. (II) A Proper Application of the Theory, and the true Form of the Ques- tion of the Meaning of our Sensations — What Meaning does the Sentient Soul itself inevitably connect with these Processes, at the Moment of their Performance. 566. A. The Comparison of Animal and Human Sentience. The rest of § I. (I) As concerns the Qualitative Content of the Sensations. 567-568. (II) As to the Accompanying Feeling. 569-573. (A) In Man, emotional Intensity declines in the Higher Senses, and Judgment becomes more prominent. 569. (B) Hence follows the Essential Distinction between Human and Animal Sentience. Human Sentience becomes aware of In- trinsic Value. 570. i. The Comparison. 571. ii. The Facts as to Man. B. The Consonance of the Nature of our Sensations with the Stimuli to which they correspond. § 2. (I) The Discerning of an Intrinsic Value in Sensations is a Distinctive V i 4 T' 43 Feature of our Sentience, and of great Influence on our View of the World. 573. (II) Examples. 574-577- (A) Light. 574. i. Puts all Things in Relations. 575. ii. Just this Significance seems to be given in the Sensations of Radiance and Color. (B) Sound seems to give the Inner Nature of Things. 577. Conclusion on the Meaning of Sensations. II. The Distinctive Characteristic of Human Sentience in what it Impels Man to Do. It gives to his Action a Form in virtue of which it takes its Place in the special System of an Order of Life (as if discerning an Intrinsic Value), not merely in Nature. § 3-5. A. Esthetic Judgment. § 3. Introduction and Transition. 578. (I) Symmetry in Space and Time. We think we can discern in both an Inherent Order. 579. (II) Mathematical Aspect of Sense Imagination. 580-581. (A) Man is alone the Counting Animal, in the sense of discerning each Number in its Place in an Infinite Series. 580. (B) All sorts of Ideas as to Relations of Magnitude easily and early find their way into our Minds. 581. (III) These are but Illustrations of the ^Esthetic Judgment to which our Phantasy subjects the Forms and Events of Nature. 582-586, (A) In the New Ordering of Natural Relations. 582-584. i. In Nature. 582. ii. In Life. 583. (B) In Expanding our Sentience in the Understanding and Sympa- thetic Enjoyment of Alien Forms of Existence. 584-586. i. The Notion of a Relationship never arises within us, with- out some Feeling of Pleasure or Pain appropriate to the Re- lationship. 584. ii. Unquestionably the Vividness of these Perceptions is added to by our abiding Remembrance of the Activity of our own Body. B. The Two Classes of Action, corresponding to the two Characteristics of the iEsthetic Judgment. § 4-5. (I) Action in which there is an Expansion of our Sentience. §4. (A) The Use of Implements. 586-1)90. i. In the Use of one's own Body, especially the Hand, one is guided by a Feeling of Situation apparently immediate. 586. ii. As the Tool-using Animal, Man is guided continually by a Double Feeling of Contact — as if by an Extension of Sen- tience into the Tool — on which all Use of Implements de- pends. 587-589. iii. Further Considerations. 589-590. a. An extraordinary Amount of Assistance in the Investiga- tion of Objects comes from this Character of our Sense of Touch. 589. b. Not only the Hands, but the Whole Body is capable of Similar Perceptions. I If 44 c. These Phenomena furnish a Natural Explanation of the Illusion of the Omnipresence of our Souls in our Bodies. (B) Customs of Ornament and Dress. 590-595. Introduction. 590. The Theory. Much of the Pleasure in Ornament and Dress arises from the Extension of our Sentience in them, and the consequent heightened and ennobled Vital Feeling of the Wearer. i. Examples of Different Forms of Extended Sentience. Coi- 592. ^^ a. In the case of a Rod. (i) Horizontal, (ii) Perpendicular. b. In the case of a Ball suspended by a Thread. c. In the case of a Hollow Vessel. ii. Corresponding Instincts in Dress. 592-595. a. Head and Foot-wear. 592. b. Hanging and Waving Drapery. 593-594. c. Clothes in the strict sense. 594-595. (II) Action in which there is a New Ordering of Natural Relations. Ceremonious Order. § 5. (A) In Movement of the Body. 596. (B) In all Social Arrangements. 597. Conclusion of the Chapter. 598-600. A. Summary of the Distinctive Characteristics of Human Sentience. 598. B. Human Sentience is the Intensest and Richest. 599. CHAPTER III. Speech and Thought. An Investigation of Speech and Thought as Characteristic Endowments of Man; showing the Share of the Body in the Formation of Speech, and the close Relation of Speech and Thought, in that Thought comes to Manifestation in the Organization of Language, and is aided by the latter in its Operations Introduction. The Carrying off of Excitation by Movement Generally. § i A. In case of Inconsiderable Stimuli. 601. B. In case of Powerful Stimuli. Three modes of transference of Excita- tion. 602. I. The Share of the Body in the Formation of Speech. § 2. A. Special importance of the Change of Respiratory Movements for the Carrying off Excitation. 604. B. The addition of Voice in many Animals. (I) The Fact. (II) Consequent Physical Predisposition to Expression of Inner States by Tone. 605. C. The Reasons why only Man has developed Voice into Speech. No gen eral Articulation of Sounds in Animals. 605-613. Introduction. 606. (I) Defective Sense of Hearing in Animals. 607-610. (A) Lack of Susceptibility for Harmonic Intervals. \ i 45 (B) The Distinctions of Articulate Speech-sounds have for them no emphatic ^Esthetic Value. (C) Hence, only Man shows Susceptibility for an Objective Truth in Sounds, such as gives the real sound-material of Speech. 608. i. In case of Vowel Sounds. ii. In case of Consonant Sounds. 607. iii. Conclusion. (II) Imperfection of Vocal Mechanism in Animals. 610. (A) In all Animals having Voice, there is probably some impulse to Vocal Expression. (B) But in Man alone probably is there a true Corporeal Organ of Speech, as is shown by comparison with Animals. 61 1, D. Even Modifications of Vowels and Consonants in the Inflexion and Com- position of Words may be due, at least in part, to Organic Conditions. 613. (I) Acoustic. 614. (II) Phonetic. (Ill) Grammatical. II. Relation of Speech to Thought. § 3-6. A. Speech begins Wuh the Meaning attached to Articulate Sounds. § 3. (I) The Origin of the Meaning of the Simplest Words can hardly be discerned. 615. (II) The Origin of Expressions for Supersensible Ideas and Relation- ships. 616. {^A) Due to Vigorous Comparative Imagination. (B) And to the Influence of National Characteristics. 617. B. Detailed consideration of the Relation between Speech and Thought. § 4-6. (I) Thought comes to Manifestation in the Organ of Speech. § 4. Introduction. i. The end of Speech is not merely the Communication of Thoughts, but also of Feelings. 618. ii. But such expression of Feeling, only so far as it may come under the forms of Thought. 619. (A) The peculiar nature of Thought as contrasted with the Train of Ideas. (B) This peculiar Activity of Thought comes to Manifestation in the Organization of Language. 621. i. Language separates the simple Elements of Thought in its Distinction of the Parts of Speech, e. g., in Nouns, Ad- jectives and Verbs. ii. It is no Objection to this View, that the Distinction be- tween the Parts of Speech is not embodied in special sound- forms, as the great number of Syntactical Forms of Lan^ guage show. 624. iii. Even the Peculiar Thought of a Nation becomes embodied in its Language, especially in its earlier forms. 625. (II) Thought is aided by Language in its Operations, in spite of seeming Disadvantages. § 5 and 6 to page 638. tl ll i 46 (A) Two seeming Disadvantages in the Influence of Language on Thought, which do have real danger for thinking, and yet are important and necessary, g 5. i. Importance of Names. 627. ii. The existence of a Multitude of Modes of Expression \vith' which Thought cannot keep pace, especially the Substan- tializing of Dependent Conceptions. 628. a. Statement. 629. b. This Tendency is dangerous for our Thinking, and yet it is indispensable for a full Apprehension of the World. 630. (B; Two further seeming Disadvantages, which in general are not so at all, but are Real and Valuable Aids to Thinking 8 6 631-638. ^' ^ ' i. The fact that the Order of the Sentence is not the order of Thought. ii. The amount of Time which Words occupy. 632. a. This seems a real hindrance. b. But wordless ideation is possible. 633. c. Yet Language is here a Help not a hindrance. 634, (i) Defensively— The Objection here made against Lan- guage is really an objection against all human Thinking: for Language is here but the Reproduc- tion of the necessarily Discursive Tendency of our Thought. 635. (a) Only Moments and Fragments of Silent Insight are possible to us. (b) The finite mind must use Analogies. 636. (ii) Positively— This Discursive Thought would remain very imperfect without Language. 637. (Ill) Moreover, Conversation contributes much to high Human Devel- opment. 638. CHAPTER IV. Knowledge and Truth. An Investigation of the Difference between Human Intelligence and the Idea- tion of Brutes, as existing, not in the Mechanism, but in the Ideal Nature of Man's Mind; that is, not in any peculiar forms of connection, but in the Pro- gressiveness of Man's Nature as seen in his immeasurably Wider Intellectual Hori- zon, in the Stages of Reflection and in the Attainment of both the Conception of Truth and of at least some measure of Knowledge of it. General Introduction to the Chapter, g 1-2. A. The Progressiveness of Man as due to the Peculiar Nature of the Human Soul, g I. (I) The Cooperation in all Progress both of the Natural Capacities of the Mind and of the Influence of Historical Development. 640. (A) Seen in Language. (B) And Everywhere. 641. (II) Danger of Exaggeration as to either of the two Elements of Progress. \f 47 # (III) The True View of the Causes determining the various levels of Devel- opment reached by the diff'erent Animated Beings. 642. (A) These Levels are not due chiefly to External Conditions. (B) But to the Peculiar Nature of the Psychic Life to be developed. 643. (IV) Now the Peculiarity of the Human Psychic Life is precisely this Methodical Pursuit of Development, — Progressiveness. 644. B. The Necessity of the Conception of the Mechanical Realization of this peculiar Ideal Nature of the Mind, g 2, (I) The Conception of the Ideal Nature of the Mind. 645. (II) The Conception of how the Ideal Nature of the Mind acquires Power in the Mechanism of Development. 646. (A) The Analogy in plant life. (B) How far Applicable to the Mind. 648 (C) How far Inapplicable. In the development of the mind there is a harmony of necessary connection indeed, but also one of aesthetic justice, an ideal harmony referable to the original con- tent of the mind. 649. (Ill) This Theory, therefore, completely reconciles the Conflicting Views of Mental Life, — the Mechanical and Ideal. 650. L The Distinctive Nature of Human Intelligence in the Stages of Reflection. §3-4. Introduction. (I) General idea of the Distinctive Nature of the Human Mind. 652, (II) This Distinctive Diff^erence must be thought in one of two ways, as the possession of peculiar Forms of Connection, or as greater Com- pleteness or Many-sidedness of Action in the use of these forms of connection — Progressiveness. 653. (III) In any case, for the largest advance, the Latter must come in. A. In the Second Stage of Reflection,— Recognition of Relations arising from the Mechanism of the Inner States, g 3. (I) The Distinctive Diff"erence does not consist in the Existence of the Stage itself nor in any of the Relations involved in it. 655. (II) But in the Completeness and Many-sidedness of the Action. The Progressiveness of Man in comparison with the Animal. 656. (A) The Universal Human desire for Knowledge. 658. (B) The Universal Human Tendency to active Dominion over the World. 659. (C) The Many-sidedness of development in Man is insured by his long and helpless Childhood. 660. B. In the Third Stage of Reflection. Detaching the General from the Partic- ular. § 4. (I) Here, too, the Distinctive Diff"erence in Man does not consist in the possession of peculiar Forms of Connection. 661. (II) But in the Many-sidedness of Human Ideation here which makes the general image into a law-giving type or an essential nucleus in pro- gressiveness. 662. (A) In the region of Knowledge. 663-667. i. A degree of Perfection in Concepts is reached by Man in his progressive development which is denied to Brutes. 663. 48 ii. In Human Concepts also the Universal is the formative law of the Particular. 666. (B) In Matters of Practice a similar pervading Sense of Order is characteristically Human. 667. II. The Distinctive Nature of Human Intelligence in the Attainment of Truth. §5-6. A. Coming to the Conception of Truth. § 5. (I) Not by Innate Ideas. 669. (II) If by anything Innate, then by Innate Judgments. (A) Some Judgments seem necessarily true. 670. (B) These are of very various Origin. (C) All are due rather to the whole Mind than to mere Intelligence and are not developed without Experience. 671, (D) Of the very few which may be regarded as original, the Law of Identity and the Law of Causality may be taken as Examples. Whence comes their necessity? 672. i. Not from External Experience — either Observation or Ex- periment — nor from Internal Phenomena, ii. But by the Law of Identity itself. 673. a. This Law is a primaiy condition of any possibility of connection between things. b. The possible Conception of Truth so reslilting is dis- tinctive of the Mind of Man in its original nature. 674. B. Coming to the Knowledge of Truth. The Development of Man's natural Metaphysics. § 6. (1) Only a Gradual Approximation to Truth is possible. 675. (II) Since the most Contradictory Ideas are often associated together in our application of the notion of Truth. 676. e. g. (A) In the Application of the Law of Identity. (B) In the Application of the Law of Causality. 677, (III) An example of the average height of Knowledge attained in the de- velopment of the Human Mind may be found in the Organization of Language. 678. (IV) There is thus a Gradual Approximation toward the Knowledge of Truth. 680. Conclusion of Chapter. 681. CHAPTER V. Conscience and Morality. An Investigation as to how far there is in Man, as a Distinctive Peculiarity of his Nature, an Innate Moral Law which rules his Sentiments and a Spiritual Rev- elation which Determines his Ends, showing that Man has an Ineradicable Sense of Duty, but that the Content of Duty, especially as to Ends, is developed only by Active Co-operation of the Intellect and through Experience. Introduction to Chapter. § 1-2. A. The Philosophy of the Feelings. § i. (I) The various Forms of a Theory of the World formed by the Philos- ophy of the Feelings. 682. (II) All these Forms assume that Reality has no meaning except as it is 49 productive of Happiness, whether the Feeling be Enthusiastic or Despairing. 683. B. The probable Meaning of Conscience may be discerned from the outset. (I) This Judgment of the Worth of Things must Determine our Judg- ment of our own Worth, Ends, and Duty. 684. (II) From the Analogy of Knowledge there is probably no finished and complete Ideal of Action as a Natural Endowment of Man. 685. (Ill) But only an original Sense of Obligation, the Content of which must be developed through Experience. I. An Investigation of Pleasure and Pain so far as they are related to Ethical Inquiry. § 3-4. A. Pleasure and Pain as Actual Motives to Action. § 3. Introduction. Only through Feelings of Pleasure and Pain do we pass into the sphere of Action proper. 687. (I) Pleasure and Pain are the actual Motives to Action in its Historical Development. 688. (II) The notion of Worth. 689. (A) Indissolubly connected with the notion of Pleasure. (B) The Austerity of Moral systems is wrong in denying this con- nection. 690. i. Kant. ii. Other Systems. a. No Worth in the mere Formal Submission to the Abso- lute. 691. (i) We must assume Feeling in God. (ii) A Conflict of Wills is not in itself displeasing. b. No Meaning can be attached to a merely Formal Relation of Wills. 692. (C) Whatever Mechanism is employed, the Goal must be found in Happiness. 693. B. Pleasure as an Ethical Principle. § 4. (I) Pleasures in the nature of the case are necessarily Qualitative, cor- responding to the Inherent Worth peculiar to the particular case of excitation. 694. (II) So conceived. Pleasure is not simply Egoistic nor without an inner Principle of Judgment. 695-r- II. The Development of Morality. § 5-6. A. How the Impulses to Action (in Pleasure and Pain) and the Conscious- ness of their Worth originate. § 5. (I) Even in Emotions of Sense many conditions tend to make compar- tively Subordinate immediate Physical Enjoyment. 697. (II) Emotions of Self. 698-706. (A) The gradual Development of the Emotions of Self and of the Intensity of the Instincts of Love and Hatred at the same time. 698. (B) Absolute Egoism is theoretically the only Original Motive Power. 700. (C) But Natural Egoism is necessarily checked. 701. i. In Actual Life, ii. There is an internal Contradiction in Egoism itself. i so a. Man's very Egoistic Pride must really contain the germ of a higher development in the necessary recognition of some well-established ground of natural comparison. b. Even the very Preference which the Egoist assumes for himself must come under some other general and valid notion. 702. c. This hidden Shackle of Egoism is soon transformed into an external bond. 704. d. This Non-Egoistic Tendency is greatly assisted by Man's uncvonquerable impulse toward Imitation. 705. B. The Development of Morality proper. § 6. (I) Instinctive Obedience. 706. (A) A system of Traditional Morality growing up through Expe- rience and at first largely external may give a powerful Sense of Obligation. (B) The Moral Worth of such a Morality depends upon its Concep- tion of the Significance and End of Human Life. 707. (II) Progress toward Conscious Principles of Action. The Contribution of Reflection to the Development of Morality. 708. (A) Reflection seeks first to find the Reasons for appropriate Action in the Nature of Man. (B) But later sees that Man's Factual Nature cannot alone give a true idea of his End. 709. (C) And Religious Views may contain here serious error. Conclusion of Chapter. § 7. A. Man has an Original Sense of Duty, but (as in the case of Knowledge) its Details come only gradually. 710. B. So, also, there is only a Gradual Extension of Morality over all Life, and especially a gradually Deepening Conception of the Meaning of Life through Reflection and Experience. 711. Conclusion of Book V. The Capacity of becoming Conscious of the Infinite is the Distinguishing Characteristic of the Human Mind. § 8. BOOK VI. THE MICROCOSMIC ORDER. THE EVER-RECURRING CONDITIONS OF MAN's LIFE. CHAPTER I. The Influences of External Nature. An Investigation of the Varied Influences of External Nature upon Man, as one of the Ever-recurring Conditions of his Life; denying any mysterious Paral- lelism between the Macrocosm and the Microcosm, and showing that external Nature has chiefly influenced Man through the perception of its Ordered Mech- anism. < 4 1 51 Introduction to the Book. History and the Microcosmic Order. A Com- parison between the Subjects of Books VI. and VII. § i. A. The Constant Elements in human life are likely to be overlooked in comparison with the phenomena of the Historic Progress of the Race. 3. B. Yet these Constant Elements include practically all the Springs of Emo- tion and constitute what we mean by the Microcosmic Order. 4. C. To investigate this Microcosmic Order — the Ever-recurring Conditions of Man's Life — is the task of the present Book. 6. I. An Investigation of the Eff'ects of Cosmic and Terrestrial Influences on the Human Soul, that is, an investigation of the theory of a mysterious Parallel- ism between the Macrocosm and the Microcosm. § 2. Introduction. (I) The Statement of the theory. 7. (II) The general Objection to the theory, as evincing a preference for the Unintelligible, either greatly exaggerating admitted facts or failing to trace any precise connections at all. A. The supposed Reflection in Man of Day and Night. 8. B. The Reflection of the Seasons, and of Geologic Ages. C. The Parallelism between Natural and Spiritual Revolutions. 9. D. The Mirroring of Climate in the Character of a people. II. E. The Mirroring of the General Geographical Character of a Continent in a people. 12. II. An Investigation of the more Direct Influences of External Nature upon Man. § 3. A. The seeming Proof of any detailed Reflection of the Natural Features of a Country on the Character of its Inhabitants is very deceptive. 13. B. "The Life with Nature." No useful results in the inquiry can be reached without a study of the Necessary Conditions for any true understanding of the Educative Influence of Nature on Man. 15. (I) The Conditions of the Capacity for the reception of the ^Esthetic Worth of Nature. 16. (A) The Culture of Social Life is needed to give a permanent charm to nature. (B) So Nature is chiefly enjoyed as the Background of the Work • and Associations of Life. 17. (II) Hence not the ^Esthetic Worth of Nature, but the steady Immu- tability of the Mechanism of Nature first impressed Man's Sense through Work, and became here his chief Educator. 19. III. Conclusion on the Relation of Man to Nature. Either »the supposed mys- terious Parallelism between the Macrocosm and the Microcosm or the sup- posed more direct Influences of External Nature upon Man, could have in any case little eff"ect on the Development of Man, in comparison with the much more Powerful Motives coming from human Passions and Circum- stances. § 4. A. Either as to his Bodily and Mental Constitution. 21. B. Or, still less, as to his Moral Development. ^ 52 CHAPTER II. The Nature of Man. An Investigation of the Influences exerted upon the Development of Men by their own Nature, as one of the Constant Conditions of their Life, especially by Temperament, Age, Sex and Nationality. Introduction. A. The Certainty and Desirability of the Influence of our own Natures. 24, B. The Origin of the Varieties of Human Endowment cannot be traced. I. Differences of Temperament. § 1-2. A. The Meaning of Temperament — the General Characteristics of the Course of Mental Life. § I. B. A Consideration of the Four Main Types of Temperament, as naturally and rightly occurring in the successive stages of the Life of the Individ- ual and of the Race. § 2. (I) The Sanguine Temperament — seen in great Rapidity in the suc- cession of Ideas and in easily roused Feeling. 26. (A) Natural and Fitting in the Childhood of the Individual and of the Race. (B) Its Disadvantages when continued later. 27. (II) The Sentimental Temperament — a general propensity to give one's self up to Moods, accompanied by a Theoretical Vagueness and an Unwillingness to use Practical Means. 29. (A) Natural and Fitting in Youth. (B) -How this Temperament may Naturally become Gently Melan- choly. 31. (C) Its great Defect lies in its Indisposition to Serious Work. (III) The Choleric Temperament — Unreceptiveness for New Impressions, but great Force and Endurance of Re-action when Feeling is once aroused. 32. (A) Natural and Fitting to Manhood. (B) Its Defects lie in its Tendency to Narrowness and Prejudice. 33. (IV) The Phlegmatic Temperament — Solidness of Mental Life, with a State of Steady Equanimity. Natural and Fitting in Advanced Age. 34-36- • C. Conclusion as to Temperaments. 36. Unusually favorable Conditions both of Natural Disposition and of Out- ward Circumstances are required for this Ideal Succession of Tempera- ments. (I) The Influences of Civilization. (II) The Connection between the Vital Feelings which have a Cor- poreal and those which have a Mental Origin. (A) Impossible at present to trace out. 37. (B) But many Observations show this Connection to be very intimate. II. The Mental Differences of the Sexes. § 3. A. The Consideration of the Diff'erences more closely connected with the Body. 39-41. (I) The Symbolical Significance of the Bodily Form. (II) The Frame of Woman has less power of work and can hardly fail to Influence Organic Feeling. 40. ' 9 « 53 (III) Woman has a greater Capacity of Adaptation to the most Various Circumstances. B. The Diff'erences in the Higher Mental Life of the Sexes. 41-47. Introduction. The Difficulty of Stating these Differences. 41. (I) There is no Diff"erence in Intellectual Capacity. 42. (II) The General Difference seems to be that the Knowledge and Will of Men aim at Generality those of Women at Completeness, (A) The General Contrast. i. In Knowledge. Men tend to emphasize the General, — the Mechanical, Women the Concrete, the Ideal side, ii. In Will, a similar Difference is to be seen. 43. (B) Very many Traits bear witness to this General Dissimilarity. 44. i. As to the Mechanical side of Life — Business, Space, Time, Forms, and Law in General, ii. As to Property. 45. iii. As to Truth. 46. III. Differences of Nationality. § 4. A. The Influences of Heredity are Manifest. 47. B. Yet Original Differences in Endowment here cannot be denied. 48. CHAPTER III. Manners and Morals. An Investigation of the Influences of Advancing Civilization upon Man's De- velopment in Manners and Morals, as shown, negatively, in the Untrustworthi- ness of Natural Disposition and, positively, in certain Illustrations of such Development — as to the use of Food, as to Cruelty, as to Cleanliness of Body and Mind, as to Modesty, and as to Social Customs. Introduction. A High Moral State can be Developed only gradually. 50. I. The Untrustworthiness of Natural Disposition as a Guide to Moral Devel- opment. § I. Introduction. 51. This is to be expected in case of Complex Social Relationships but it is Equally True of Simpler and Earlier States. A. In a State of Nature, there is no Comprehensive View of Life and hence no Consistent Character. 52. B. Among Civilized Peoples, it is also not their Natural Disposition but the Inherited Forces of Science, Art, Law and Religion which make their Moral Condition seem so Superior; though even so there are great Inconsistencies. 53. C. Moreover there is an Inevitable and Morally Advantageous Deficiency in any Morality, a deficiency, namely, of perfectly clear Theoretic Insight into the grounds of the binding Validity of its demands. 54. II. Instances both of the Dawning Moral Taste which led Men gradually to seek Emancipation from the guidance of more Natural Insfinct, and also of the Mistakes to which Reflection was exposed in this Progress. § 2-4. A. As to Food. 55-59. (I) No Scruple as to Vegetable Food. 55. (II) But often Scruples as to Animal Food. 56. 54 (A) The Limitations among Civilized Peoples. (B) Reasons for these Limitations. 57. (C) The Tendency to Cannibalism. (Ill) Conclusion as to Food. 58. The Development here shows a gradual growth of the Sense of the Inviolability of Human Personality. B. As to Cruelty and Blood-thirstiness. 59-61. (I) The Barbarism of Various Periods of the Past. 59. (II) Barbarism in the Civilized Present. 60. C. The Simple Phenomena in which Advancing Civilization shows a grad- ual heightening of the Sense of Self-esteem— Cleanliness of Body and of Mind, g 3. (I) Cleanliness of Body— Naturally Connected with the Endeavor after Order and Consistency in the Inner Life. 61. (II) Cleanliness of Mind— The Inner Virtue of Truthfulness. 62-65. (A) Cases of Systematic Untruth. 62. (B) Petty Incoherent Falsity. i. Pervades all Strata of Civilized Society. a. Seen in the Prevailing Inclinations of the Lower Classes. 63. b. And in the more Intelligent Upper Classes as well. ii. Is akin to that Impurity and Untrustworthiness of the Inner Life which appears among Barbarous Men. a. The Barbaric Tendency in the Subserviency to the Pass- ing Mood. b. This Running Wild of the Course of Thought and of changes of Mood appears also among Civilized Nations. 65. D. Modesty, g 4. (1) In its Stricter Sense. 65-70. Introduction. The Sense of Shame has a Natural Foundation in the Reluc- tance of the Spiritual Nature to Recognize its Indissoluble Connection with the World of Sense. 65. (A) The Earlier Indications as to the Sense of Modesty are some- what Contradictory. (B) Two one-sided but Mutually Opposed Views in Civilized Reflec- tion—the Exaggerated Contempt for all Nature as something in itself Unclean, or the Cool Assumption that everything which is Natural is Pure. 67. i. True Modesty is not Disparagement of Nature. ii. Nor Exaltation of Nature. a. Whether Impassioned Voluptuousness. 68. b. Or Coarse Realism. iii. But a Middle Path of Real Delicacy of Feeling. (C) The Development of Modesty, as Determining the Limits of Marriage, rests upon a growing Sense of the Worth of Person- ality and of the Individual Soul. (II) Modesty in its Wider Meaning. 70-74. (A) The Realism of Self-development as the One End. 71-73. i. The Characteristics of this Disposition. 71. » 55 ii. Its great Defect is a Deficiency in that Submission and Self-sacrifice which make one Element of Morality. 72. (B) The Idealism of Work. 73. i. Its Characteristics. ii. Its Danger Lies in the Tendency to too great Reserve. 74. E. As to Social Customs. 74-75. CHAPTER IV. The Order of External Life. An Investigation of the Influences exerted upon Man's Development by the most important and necessary Features of the Structure of External Life in So- ciety, i. e. by Permanent Settlement, the Family Life, Society, and the State. Introduction to Chapter. Nature and Culture, g i. A. Comparison of the States of Nature and Culture. 76-77. (I) The Complex Culture of modern civilization often seems useless. 76. (II) Yet only Culture makes Isolation endurable. B. The Thesis of the Chapter. Only a cultured Civilization unfolds before us the full Worth and Joy of every Moral Relation. 77-79. C. The intended Scope of the Inquiry. 79-81. (I) Not to include the Origin, Causes, or Obstacles of Civilization, nor a Comparison of civilizations. (II) But the individual Features of the Social Order most necessary to Man's Development — Home, Possessions, and a Sphere of Work; Family Life ; Society ; Historical Connection through the State. 80. I. The Need of Permanent Settlement, g 2. A. The Tendency toward Permanent Settlement through the powerful Im- pulse to Acquisition. 81. B. Diff"erent Modes of Life very diff"erently affect this Impulse. (I) The Hunter's Life, not conducing to any thought of collecting the Results of One's Labor, tends very little to develop Social Union. (II) The Shepherd's Life, with its movable Property, calling out differ- ent qualities, tends to develop the elements of rural Economy and Society. 82. C. But the real beginning of higher Civilization is found in the change to Permanent Settlement. 84-88. ' (I) Need first drives men to permanent Occupation of the Land. 84. (II) But Agriculture has a definitely Educative Power. 85. (III) It is still more important that the contrast between the Home Cen- ter in this Permanent Settlement and the Unboundedness of the external World brings out most expressly the contrast between Na- ture and the World of Mind. (IV) To this is to be added, the Influence of a Sphere of Work — the Spiritual Possession of one's surroundings through Work upon them. 86-88. n. The Need of Family Life, g 3. A. No high Development of the Family Life is possible among Hunters. 88. B. The Influence of the Shepherd's Life here is more favorable, but it de- pends much upon the Race. 89. 56 C. But only Permanent Settlements and the Sphere of Work which first establishes itself in House and Home form the firm Basis of consolidated Family Life. 90. III. The Need of Society. § 4. A. The Need of others' Recognition runs through our whole Life. 91. B. The Influence of the Division of Labor in a Complex Society. 92. (I) Its Advantages lie in its giving greater definiteness and force to Universal Truths, and greater Individuality to the Workers. 93. (II) Its Dangers lie in the tendency to Narrowness of Thought and Bluntness of Sensibility, and in the powerful Disturbance of the Stability and Security of all Moral Restraints. 94. C. The constant Tendency toward a still more complex Society, in the in- creasing Reciprocal Influence of diff'erent Divisions of the Race, espe- cially through the Pursuit of Luxuries. 95. IV. The Need of the State, as giving Historical Connection with the Past and Future. § 5. A. The conflict between the Wants of the Individual and the Mechanism of ordered Political Life. Individual Hardships do not disprove the gen- eral Beneficence of Civilization. 97. B. The conflict between Subjective Self- Will and the Obligation of an Ob- jective Order. The State has a Moral Basis in its Historical Continuity which links Men indispensably with the Generations both of the Past and Future. 98. CHAPTER V. The Inner Life. An Investigation of the Influences exerted upon Man's Development, by the Views of Life produced in the Human Mind in the various Attempts to' answer the Questions of the Position and Destiny of Man, viz.: by the View of Man as a Transitory Natural Product, by Superstition, and by Religiousness. Introduction. § i. A. Doubts concerning the Ends and Aims of Human Life. loi. B. These very Questionings distinguish Man; and the Influence of his var- ious Answers to these Questionings forms the Theme of the chapter. 103. I. The View which regards Man as a Transitory Natural Product, g 2. Introduction. (I) The Danger of an a priori Over-estimation of Human Worth. (II) Yet, on the other hand, there is a Natural Tendency to view Men as Transitory Phenomena. 105. A. This View appears in a twofold Aspect. 106. (I) The View, as a Spontaneous Feeling. 107. (II) The View, as a Reflective and Conscious Judgment. B. Moral Greatness and Purity of Life are not logically connected with this View. 108. C. It may be doubted whether this View has ever become a really pervading Sentiment of the Whole Nature, in Spontaneous Thought and Action, as well as in Reflection. 109. (I) The Adherents either of Materialism or Pantheism have not seemed able wholly to rid themselves of all idea of the Persistence of the Ego. no. 57 (II) The Facts seem to be that the Unsophisticated Consciousness is never quite free from a Presentiment of Something Supersensuous, nor, on the other hand, able to raise these Presentiments to a con- dition of unquestioned Authority, in. D. The Defenders of a Materialistic View are hardly entitled to speak at all of Aims in Life, yet they reveal in many Manifestations the suppressed Belief in a World of Spiritual Interests. II. The Superstitious View of Life. The Belief that the Supersensuous is im- mediately and mysteriously Present in all the most Insignificant Affairs. § 3. A. Diff'erent Forms of its Manifestation. 113. B. The View is prevailingly gloomy, and yet involves unconsciously a Higher Estimate of Finite Personality, in its emphasis on Responsibility. 1 14. III. The Religious View of Life. § 4. A. This View combines the Consciousness of our own Weakness with the Belief that we are called nevertheless to an Imperishable Work in the World. 115. B. But not only the Difficulty in reconciling the conclusions of Faith and of Science, but also the natural Unsteadiness of our Thoughts and Feelings hinder us in constantly maintaining this View. 116. CONCLUSION OF BOOKS I.-VI. I. Summary of Conclusions from Books I.-III., and Chapters i.-iii. of Book IV. The Result reached was, that the Creative Nature is the first and only Real, of whose Activity Mechanism is merely the Form. 1 19-120. A. Conclusions of Books I.-III. B. Added Inferences from Book IV., Chapters i.-iii. II. Summary of Conclusions from Book IV., Chapters iv.-v., and Books V.- VI. The Distinguishing Characteristics of Man. 120-121. A. The Investigation of the Relation of Man to his Environment gave the negative result that the Environment never suffices to explain Man's De- velopment without assuming in Man Predispositions to Civilization of the most special kind. B. But, on the other hand, the Position and Destiny of Man in the great Whole of Reality has not been made clear except in particular parts. This requires the Tracing, so far as possible, of the Plan of the Whole, in Books VII. and VIII. 58 BOOK VII. HISTORY. CHAPTER I. The Creation of Man. An Investigation of the Question as to the Origin of Man; showing that a General Answer .s possible, but that satisfaction as to Details is impossible. Introduction to Chapter. § i. k . A. Obscurity of the Beginnings and Future of Man's Life. 125-126 (I) In the Individual. 125. (II) In the Race. 126. B. The Attraction of the Theme, and the Need of considering it, on ac- count of the Difficulties already felt by many in consequence of Attempts of Science to answer the Question of the Origin of Man. 126-127 iTlT ^^^'''''''" ^''''''" '^' ^"^'" ''^^'" by Creation and by A. The Seemingly Opposed Views. 127. (I) Biblical. (II) Scientific. 128. B. But no really necessary Antagonism. (I) In any case, the real Creative Efficacy is only in the fF/Z/of God. (II) The Process therefore would be the same to an observer, whether it were thought of as pervaded by the Creative Activity of God or as TT XT . °"^y ^ ^"^^^^^^^^ E^'olulion according to Natural Law. 120' II. Nor does such a Harmony of Nature and Creation need to identify the Sphere of Nature and the Sphere of History § 3 Introduction. The Questions arising. 130. A. The Great Error often made by the defenders of Arbitrary Divine Inter- ference is in allowing the Possibility of a spontaneous Action and Reac tion of Elements at all, independently of God. 130-132 B. A Second Error assigns such Interference only in Completion by Divine Aid. 132-133. ^ A^ivuic (I) The Objection. God's working n,ay not be restricted to the Forms of Nature's Activity. 132. (II) The Answer. Completion by Divine Aid must either be according to rule or not according ,0 rule. The first would be included in a true v,ew of Mature, and the second would seem to make God no greater. C. Yet this very Ascription of Consistency to the Divine Activity is repug- nant to the secret Craving of our Souls, because it seems to deny any really free living personal God, and impliedly any Freedom in Man. 133. /tt! I^^ ^^^^'''°"- A" History so seems meaningless, n. (11) The Answer. ^ (A) The Distinction between the Sphere of Nature and the Sphere of History may be granted, in reserving Freedom for the inner Mental Life. 134. •4.. I i '4 ^ 59 (B) But this does not need that we should mark off the Physical Origin of Man as not belonging to the Sphere of Natural De- velopment. 135. (C) Our Demands for a Sphere of Freedom in History are still wholly met in our own Inner Life, and in such Guidance as can take place through Action and Reaction between God and the Spiritual Nature of Man. 136. III. The Genesis in Nature of Living Beings and of Man. § 4. A. In general, this Genesis may be affirmed to be a Part of the Necessary Development of Nature. 137. B. But it is impossible to satisfy a Curiosity that extends to Details. 138-143. (I) Yet two Considerations deserve attention from those who regard this Impossibility to set forth Details as an Objection against the • General Conclusions of Natural Science. 139. (A) This Difficulty in describing the Beginnings is common to all Theories. (B) We are accustomed to estimate One and the Same Idea very differently, as a Conjecture, and as the Expression of a Fact. 140. (II) It is Useless to tarry longer over these Investigations into Origins, whether Astronomical, Geological or Physical. 141-143. CHAPTER n. The Meaning of History. An Examination of the Chief Views of the Meaning of History; showing the Inadequacy of the Theories which regard History as the Education of Humanity, as the Development of the Idea of Humanity, as a Divine Poem, or as of no Worth in its Development ; and the Necessity (while not overestimating the his- torical element in life) of Faith in a Real and Living Community of the Plurality of Minds separated in Time, and in the consequent Worth of History. Introduction. What is History? The most Contradictory Opinions are held concerning it. § i. I. History as the Education of Humanity. § 2. A. The Difficulties of Carrying Out the View — of Tracing any clear definite Educative Plan in History. 145. B. The Difficulties in the Application of the View. Education is only intel- ligible to us when a single Individual is concerned, in whom earlier Ex- periences may bear fruit in Growth. 146-148. (I) The Difficulties in the Application to Successive Generations of Men. The only Humanity common to the Generations seems to be the Concept of Humanity, which can neither experience anything nor undergo Education. 146. (II) The Same Difficulties in the Application of the Views to each Par- ticular Age. 147-148. (A) Each Age shows a large Spiritual Proletariat. 147. (B) This Fact is a serious Difficulty for a Theory of the Divine Education of the Race. C. The Difficulties as to the precise Reason for the Process. 148-154. / 6o (I) The Difficulty felt is, just Why, with Divine Resources, an End should have been set before us, which could only be reached through Historical Development. 148. (II) The Answer proposed is, that Man must become in Knowledge what he is in Fact. 149. (Ill) But this Idea, which has truth in the case of the Individual, cannot be transferred to the Race. (A) It would require either a Vicarious Development by one for an- other, or a Repetition by later Minds of the evolutional Strug- gles of their Predecessors. 150. (B) These Conditions, in fact, seem not to be fulfilled. i. In General, Conscious Knowledge is propagated either not at all, or most imperfectly; only its finished Results enter, as a great Aggregate of Prepossessions, ii. In the most favorable case — that of Science. 152-153. a. The Progress of Science is not directly Human Progress — Advance in conscious Knowledge. 152. b. Nor the conscious Enjoyment of the Beneficent Effects of Science left behind. 153. Conclusion. The Result, therefore, seems to be that men grow to be what they are without a Consciousness of their Growth, and that there- fore the notion of Education is not applicable to the History of the Race. II. History, as the Development of the Idea of Humanity. § 3. A. The Theory characterized. 154-156. (I) Its Claims. The History of Mankind (like all genuine evolution) is but the Realization of its own Concept. This Idea serves to ex- plain all the Processes of History. 154. (II) Its Lacks. 155-156. (A) It fails to explain all as due simply to this Strict Development of the Idea of Humanity. 155. (B) It lacks a Definite Notion of the Relation of the Idea to the Practical Means of its own Realization. (C) And results in a necessary sacrifice of all Individual Life and Joy to the Development of the Universal Idea of Humanity. 156. B. The Definite Argument against the Theory. 156-168. (I) It must either remain wholly Mystical, affording no clear insight into the exact connection between the Evolution of the Idea and the Results of Individual Efforts, and so giving no real Solution of the Problem of History. 156. (II) Or it must choose between two Solutions according to the Definition given to the "Mind of Humanity." (A) If the "Mind of Humanity" is interpreted concretely, as ex- isting onfy in the countless Multiplicity of Living Men, the Theory reduces to the common and intelligible View, that only those phases of Development are durable, which correspond to the essential Sameness of the Nature, Needs and Circumstances of Men. (B) The Other Interpretation of the "Mind of Humanity" as the Absolute or "the Universal World-Spirit" (really taken by the Theory), either reduces to the View, just mentioned, of His- tory as a Natural Process, or leads directly back to the Idea of 61 the Education of Humanity, or rather confusedly blends the Ideas of an Educational and Natural Process. 158. (Ill) This Inexactness of Thought is particularly to be urged against the Theory in its use of the Idea of Phenomenon or Appearance. (A) The necessary Presuppositions of the Idea are a Being which appears, and another Being to whom it appears. 159. (B) Now the Appearance of a Being seems to us to have real Value, only when it is not mere Process, but signifies the entrance of something real into a Consciousness which takes Pleasure in it. 160. (C) The Theory, therefore, must say for whom this Appearance is, whom this Development benefits. 161-168. i. Only Three Answers are possible, no one of which is ade- quate. 161-164. a. Not Mankind themselves, for the Mass of Mankind show no sense of the Meaning of the Historical Develop^ ment. 162. b. Not God, foi this would make all the Sufferings and Strivings of Finite Creatures only the Trappings of this Process of Development, whose sole aim would be that it might appear to God. 161-164. c. Certainly not a Select Few among Men. 164. ii. Nor can the Theory deny the Need of Answer, without really denying itself, and making the Development of the Idea only Mechanical Means, — a guiding Clue, not the real End and Meaning of History. 164-168. a. The attempted Answer. The Idea is really and effect- ively present in Things themselves, and in their connec- tions, and not merely in the Consciousness of an Ob- server. 164. b. But this really reduces the Idea to a part of the Me- chanical Means. 165. c. But just this Interpretation, the Theory intends to reject, finding in the hidden Self-Development of the Idea the final Sense of History, the Supreme Good itself, and so involving itself in the Superstition of a Veneration of Forms, to which all the Real Value of a joyous Self- conscious Reality is to be sacrificed. 166. III. History as a Divine Poem. § 4. A. This View has some weight, as a mere Comparison. 168. B. But, as a Real Theory, it gives no positive Enlightenment. IV. The Discussion of the Theory which denies any Worth in the Historical Development. § 5* A. The Theory is a real one in both Thought and Practice. 169. B. Discussion of the Theory itself. 170-172. (I) In its Extreme Form, is Self-Contradictory. 170. (II) In a more Moderate Form. 171. (A) Can be logically held, the Value for Mankind of the Coherence of History lessening, as the immediate Relation of each indi- vidual Soul to the Supersensible World is estimated more highly. mti' 62 (B) And such an Unhistorical Life seems in fact to be that lived by most of the Race. C. Supplementing this Theory, with one which makes possible the real Unity of Humanity and the Worth of History. The Sense of the Con- tinuity of History— felt in every Age and practically acted upon— will not admit a Denial of all Unity in History, but rather requires the Belief in an actual Community of the Generations. 172-176. (I) The Evidences of the Sense of the Continuity of History. 172. (H) The Necessity for such a Belief in the Preservation of the Happi- ness of All, lies in the Fact, that only so can the World itself ap- pear as a Significant and Worthy Whole. (HI) The inevitable Condition of such a Preservation of the Happiness of all is to be found only in a Real and Living Community of the Generations. 173. (A) This primitive Faith alone enables the more Modern Views to free themselves from Internal Contradictions. 174. (B) But neither it nor our Empirical Knowlege enables us to exhibit the Plan which History follows. 175. CHAPTER HL The Forces that Work in History. An Inquiry as to the Forces that work in History, as manifested both in the Origii^of Civilization, and in the Laws of its Development. I. Theories as to the Origin of Civilization. § 1-4. General Introduction. § i. (I) There have been Two Opposed Views from the Beginning-the Origin in a Golden Age, and the Origin in Brutal Savagery. 176. (II) The View of the Enlightenment regarded Civilization as the Arbi'- trary Product of Human Action— the Product of Deliberate Calcu- lations. 177. (Ill) Later extravagant Forms of the Theory of the Divine Origin of Civ- ilization, though in part justified in their Ideas of a Fall of Humanity, yet afford little evidence of an Ideal Primitive State. 178-179. A. Theories of the Divine Origin of Civilization. 8 2. (I) The Origin of Civilization is not to be attributed to Intercourse with Angels. 180. (II) Nor to an Influence of the Godhead upon the Human Mind, just as Immediate, though more Hidden. (A) Producing either an Alteration of the General Laws of the Psychic Life. 181. (B) Or an Alteration of the Moods and Receptivity of the Mind (III) Nor is the Nidus of the Primitive Mental Condition to be found specially in the Religious Life. It is not possible, necessary or de- sirable that true Religion should exhibit the Course of Nature and Human Freedom, as the immediate shadow and Reflection of what is Divine. 182. B. The Theory of the Organic Origin of Civilization. § 3. (I) The Statement of the Theory. Civilization is supposed to grow necessarily out of the Innate Constitution of our Mental Being, and I 63 yet to be the immediate Product of a Mind that is common to all. 183. (II) Its General Difficulties. (A) The Obscurity of the Facts as to this Rule within us of an Un- conscious Necessity. (B) Difficulties in applying the Conception to the Origin of Civili- zation. 184. (III)^Examination of the Application of the Theory to the Origin of Language as a Special Example. (A) Even the Original Sounds must have begun with Individuals. (B) As to the Origin of Words. 185. i. These, too, must have begun with Individuals, but the probable Number of Individual Language Builders must yet have been very limited, ii. The necessary Conditions are met in gradual Growth of the Vocabulary within a Tribe, and in gradual Transmission. 186. (C) As to the Origin of Grammatical Constructions, the Abundance of Forms itself probably bears witness to many originally Di- verse Attempts at the formation of language. (IV) Conclusion and Transition. In general, we may conclude that no Unconscious Necessity, but only Individual Living Minds are the Centers of Action in History. 187. C. The Importance of Individual Persons in both the Origin and the Devel- opment of Civilization. Transition Section. §4. (I) The Influence of a few Mighty Men. 188. (A) In the known Development of History. (B) Hence probably also in the Origin of Civilization. 189. (II) Civilization shows commonly two Stages in each Sphere of Life the Exercise of the General Instincts of the Many, and Great Indi- vidual Contributions. 189-191. (A) In our Relations to Nature. 189-191. (B) In Social and Political Life. 191. (C) In Religion. (Ill) Yet this Power of the Individual is necessarily so largely limited by the required Receptivity of the Masses, that the historical Develop- ment need not lose all Logical Consistency. 191-192. II. Laws of the Historic Order of the World. § 5-6. Introduction. 192-194. (I) Such Laws are not inconsistent with a Plan for the Guidance of History. 192. (II) But there are very great Difficulties in determining them. 193. A. Laws supposed to rule within comparatively Short Periods, indicated by Statistical Results. 8 1;. Introduction. 194. (I) Illegitimate Application of Statistics. (A) Wrong Use of Statistical Formulae. 195. (B) Making a mere Realization of Statistic Relations the Aim and informing Idea of History. (II) The Legitimate Application of Statistics to (i) Phenomena which we may regard as being Subordinate Ends of the Cosmic Order, or I 64 merely Means to the Realization of Higher Ends, and to (2) Phe- nomena which we may compare to the Impeding Friction which must always bear a certain determinate proportion to the size of a machine) is quite Obscure. The Insignificance of the Extent to which this additional Determination does away with Existing DiflS- culties. 196-202. (A) The Equality of Numbers of the two Sexes e. g. may be reck- oned a Means for the Attainment of the Higher Ends of Life, but the determinate Arrangements by which it comes about continue quite Obscure. 197. (B) The Course of the Spiritual Life of Society is still more Ob- scure. The Consideration of Phenomena which may be com- pared to Impeding Friction. 198-199. i. We are unable in any scientific sense to treat the Sum of unknown Conditions as a Compelling Force. 198-199. a. In General. 198. b. This may be Illustrated in Offences against Property. 199. ii. There is no Clear Harmony shown between the Validity of such Statistical Laws and Individual Freedom of Will. 199- 202. a. The Statistical Theory as usually held, does most seri- ously limit Freedom. 199. b. Yet there is no irreconcilable Contradiction between the Assumption of Freedom and the Assumption of a limit- ing Sum of Conditions. 200. c. Still it is wholly incredible that the Struggle of Will and Moral Consciousness against Obstructive Elements should be as exactly predetermined with regard to its Result as these Statistical Laws indicate. 201-202. (i) The fact is, that these Laws do not measure at all the really Moral Elements in the case. 201. (ii) The Real Connections remain Obscure, and hence we seem to be able only to regard Crime as a kind of Friction of Society, and so essentially constant. B. Supposed more Universal Laws, partly very Unimportant, partly not of Demonstrable Universality. § 6. (I) The Law of Uniformity is practically only the very Simple Observa- tion that the Culture of a Later Period is commonly a further De- velopment of the Impulses received from Preceding Periods. 203. (II) The Law of Contrast is not less Simple. (A) In General, it has manifest great Limitations. (B) In Individual Departments of Life, it has a natural Psycholog- ical Basis. 204. (C) Thus there arises the Alternation of Characteristic Forms of Civilization in History. 205. (III) The Law of the Decay of Nations is no settled Law of History. 205- 207. (IV) The Question of the Influence of Transmission and Tradition. Are Similar Elements in the Customs and Legends of Different Nations ,. / •■■ 6s due to Transmission from one to the other, or are they all Indige- nous Productions due to the essential Sameness of Human Nature? 207-209. (A) Taken Broadly, both Views are to be accepted to some extent 207. (B) But the Latter View has more Limitations than are often recog- nized. 208. (C) Yet the General Scope of Tradition in History is difficult to es- timate. 209. CHAPTER IV. External Conditions of Development. An Examination of the Influences of External Conditions of Development upon Mankind, showing that, while quite essential, they are to be regarded as Guiding rather than Causing the Development; and illustrating this Influence in Various Unhistoric Races— Polar, Polynesian, Negro, and Red. Introduction to the Chapter. § i. As to the Origin of Mankind. Introduction. 210-212. (I) History in the sense of a Coherent Development connects but few Sections of Mankind. 210. (II) The Gradual Development of the Idea of Humanity. (A) In Classic Antiquity. 211. (B) The Influence of Christianity. i. Christianity really first gave the Idea of Humanity. ii. But connected it with the Hebrew Account of Man's Origin. iii. The Doubts which have assailed this Account, in spite of its Beauty, seem to call for a brief Consideration of the Bearing of Theories of the Origin of the Race upon our Philosophic View. A. The Assumption of the Common Origin of Mankind. 212-214. (I) Would have no real Bearing on Moral Results. 212. (II) Since, in fact, this Supposed Unity has nowhere continued to oper- ate in History. 213. (Ill) Hence is suggested that we should place the Unity of Mankind in the Future as an End to be sought, rather than in the Past. 214. B. The Assumption of Plurality of Origin, 214-217. Introduction. 214. (I) The Theory of two great Families— the Active White and the Pas- sive Black. 214-215. (II) The Theory that the Diflferent Families of Men sprang up inde- pendently of one another at different Places. No decisive Judgment can as yet be given here ; hence it has only been possible to face the Various Possibilities and forecast the Consequences of all on our Philosophy. C. Conclusion as to the Origin of the Race. No Ideal View is affected by either Theory. 217-218. I. An Investigation of the Seeming Variety of Mental Endowment of the Dif- ent Races as possibly due to External Conditions. § 2. 66 i A. Objections from the Theory of the Original Equality of All Men's Capac- ity for Civilization. 218-220. (I) The Theory. 218. (II) The Answer. The Theory imposes on Nature a greater Simplicity of Origin than Nature really has. Nature rather begins with all the rich Variety of Creatures possible. 219. B. But, though we vindicate the Possibility of the Assumption of Original Differences of Endowment, it should not be thoughtlessly employed. 220. (I) Such an Assumption does not mean any absolute Differentiation. The Difference is only in Disposition, not in the Nature and Mode of Operation of ihe Mental Powers in general. (II) Whether these Varieties of Disposition are due to Original Endow- ment or to External Conditions Historical Experience can hardly decide, but Some Original Difference seems essential. 221. C. The Objection of Moral Considerations to the Theory, as involving In- justice. (I) The Objection is not without Weight. (II) Yet the Limiting Power of Original Endowment is as conceivable as the known Limiting Power of External Conditions. 222. II. The Guidance of Development by External Conditions. § 3. Introduction. 222. A. The Facts as to Man's Development. 223-226. (I) How the Development of even the Individual Man differs from all lower Development. Man must find out by manifold Experience Necessary Ends, Efficient Instruments, and the most useful Division of Labor. 223. (II) A Growing Society is obliged to appropriate also by well-considered Division and Combination of its Powers, the less obvious Utilities of Natural Products. Primitive Nature seems ever to withdraw fur- ther into the Background. 224. (Ill) Hence it is only when this Early Progress has transferred the Cen- ter of Existence from the Natural World to the Artificial World of Society that distinctively Human Life begins. 225. B. The Consequent Natural Dependence on External Conditions. 226-229. (I) In this Development by Man of the Complex World of Social Re- lations, External Circumstances have furnished the Stimulations which first called forth his Activity, the Guiding Conditions which fix the possible Aims and Content of his Being, and the Material on which he works. 226. (II) Hence the First Steps towards Development can only be made pos- sible by the Favor of Natural Circumstances, by which also their Direction is in the first instance determined. 228. C. Nevertheless, External Conditions alone cannot explain the Actual Course of History. 229. III. A Brief Survey of Peoples, whose Life is either Unhistorical, or if historical Interrupted, showing that their Fate is partly, but only partly, due to Exter* nal Conditions. § 4-5. A. The Polar Races greatly limited by their Conditions. 231. B. The Polynesians lacking Vivifying Contact with other Nations. 232-234. (I) Their General Characteristics. 232. (II) The Influence of Caste. 233. 67 C. The Negroes. 234-238. (I) The Influence of Cultured Nations produced no Civilization among the Negroes. 234. (II) The Explanation of this Fact is Difficult. 235-238. (A) It does not lie in a Fixed Limitation of Intellectual Endow- ment. 235. (B) Rather, in part at least, in Peculiarity of Disposition. (C) Still more, perhaps, in Special Circumstances which have hin- dered not only the Imitation of Foreign Culture but also an Indigenous Development of high Civilization. 236. (D) Whether the Negro Temperament is the Result of these Cir- cumstances, or whether there was an Original Difference of Endowment, cannot be wholly settled. 237. D, The Red Men. 8 c. (I) In Northern America. (A) Their General Characteristics. 238. (B) Their Attitude toward Civilization. 239-241. i. On the Part of a Few Individuals, it was Hospitable. 239. ii. But not on the Part of the Most. 240. (II) In Mexico. Mexico shows a Civilization which may be regarded as the Native Development reached by the Genius of the Indian Race under favorable Climatic Conditions. 241-243. (A) Their Civilization Characterized. 241. (B) Its Limitations bear witness to its Native Origin. 242. (Ill) In South America. 243. (A) Favoring Natural Conditions enabled Peru to attain a remarka- bly Flourishing Civilization. (B) In Eastern South America, Civilization was hindered by Natural Phenomena. E. Conclusion. 243-244. (I) A Further Survey of Unhistorical Peoples would only confirm the Impossibility of speaking of a past History of Mankind. (II) The Best the Future can bring is the Diffusion of European Civil- ization over the whole Earth. CHAPTER V. The Development of History. An Attempt to trace the External Course of Human Development by giving the Characteristics of the Civilizations of the Chief Periods and Peoples, showing a Progressive Advance but no Clear Goal. General Introduction to the Chapter. § 1-2. A. The Stationary Civilization and Nomadic Life, and General Characteris- tics of the East. § i. (I) Its Stationary Civilization. 245-247^ (A) Its Locations. 245. (B) Its Brighter Side. (C) Its Darker Side. 246. (II) Its Nomadic Life. 247. 68 (III) The History of Asia is full of the Conflict between these two Forms of Life. 247-249. (A) Later Conflicts. (B) Earlier Conflicts. 248. (IV) These Circumstances have been Influential in the Formation of So- cial Order. 249-252. (A) The Development of Aristocracy. 249. (B) Hereditary Callings. 250-252. "^ i. At the Beginning. 250. ii. These Customs have swayed in many ways the Civilization of Later Times. (V) Estimate of the Civilization of the East. 252-255. (A) These Conditions, in many respects hard, seem to have been needed to make Men aware that their Vocation is not the mere Supply of Physical Needs. 252. i. Caste first brought into the World the Idea of a Vocation, ii. Despotism brought the Feeling of the Connection of all Mankind. iii. The Petty Priestly Restrictions maintained the Feeling of a Constant Connection between Earthly Existence and a Uni- versal History extending beyond the Earth. 253. (B) The Characteristic Feature thus of the Civilization and Philos- ophy of the East is the Sense of being embraced in a Vast and Predestined Order. (C) Yet the Civilized States of Asia have not been without Mental Revolutions, but they have been Isolated in their Influence 254. B. The Two Great Families of the Race that have been concerned in the Connected Development of History. § 2. (I) The Semitic. 255. (II) The Indo-Germanic. 256. I. Ancient History. § 3-4. A. The Characteristics of the Greek Civilization. § 3. (I) Its Environment and General Development. 257. (II) Its Characteristic Feature is that it shows the First Youthful Self- Comprehension of the Human Mind, involving both the Critical Im- pulse and its Youthful Freshness. 258. (A) The Thought of seeking out the very Grounds and Bases of our Judgment of Things, and of combining them demonstratively and deductively in a System of Truths— the Foundation of Science in fact— is the Glory of the Greeks. 259. (B) This Spirit of Investigation is brought into all Departments. (C) But this Spirit of Investigation exerted a Double Influence on the Greeks, not only the Impulse to Reverence for that which is in itself True, but also the Ever-busy Search for a Truth that is yet more True, which brought an Over-estimation of Pure Thought and Logical Forms. 260. (D) This Sophistical Excess of Free Thought came only gradually to prevail. 262. B. The Characteristic Contributions of the Roman Civilization. § 4. i 69 (I) They combined the Nations of the Earth in the Community of a Vast Political Life, and have permanently impressed themselves on the Civilization of the most Diverse Countries. 263-264. (II) The Great Contribution of the Roman Civilization is the Develop- ment of Law. 264-267. (A) The Romans' Broad View of the Problem involved. They aimed to combine in satisfactory practice Respect for Transmitted Rights, Provision for New Wants, and the Conditions required for the Growth and Continuance of the Whole. 265. (B) The Results of the Unparalleled Social Struggle arising were not wholly fortunate. 266-267. i. Up to the Empire. 266. ii. During the Empire. 267. II. The Middle Ages. § 5-7. A. The Influence of the Hebrews and Christianity. § 5. (I) The Hebrew Influence, through their Living Conviction of the Spir- itual World of God and his Kingdom. 268. (II) The Influence of Christianity. 269-273. (A) Its Satisfaction of the Understanding in its Doctrines. 278. (B) Its Satisfaction of the Heart in its Characteristic Tone of Humil- ity and Hope, its Consolations and its Promises. 270-272. (C) Its Satisfaction of the Will in its Commands, requiring the right Inner Life. 272. (D) The Temporary Service of Christianity's Earlier Formalism. 273- B. The Germanic Nations. § 6-7. (I) Character and Early History before the Middle Ages. § 6. (A) Their Meager Culture. 274. (B) Their Qualities of Character, especially the Trait of Willing Service and Absolute Personal Devotion. 275. (C) The Germanic Movement over the Roman Empire. 276-277. i. The Blending of all imaginable Forms of Life in the Roman Empire. 276. ii. Its Influence on the Germans, giving the Characteristics of the Middle Ages. 277. (II) The Germanic Nations in the Middle Ages. § 7. (A) The Frankish Kingdom and the Influence of the Empire of Charlemagne, in the Ideal it furnished. 278. (B) The Influence of Small Slates. 279. (C) The Development and Influence of Feudalism. 279-281. i. Its Development. 279. ii. Its Influence. a. Favorable. b. Unfavorable. 280. (D) A certain Characteristic Sense of Justice was not lacking. Every Historical Relation seemed de facto Just. 281. (E) The Influence of the Church. 282-285. i. At first, at the Head of Progress and Civilization. 282. ii. At the End of this Period, the Church had become a Hin- drance to Progress. 283-284. a. It no longer led the Van of Science. 70 b. Even the Cure of Souls had lost its Energy. 284, iii. The Struggle between Church and State. (F) Some of the Special Influences leading to the Modern Period were Striking Historical Events and Discoveries. 285. III. The Characteristics, the Problems, and the Difficulties of Modern Times. The Distinguishing Characteristic of the Age is Revolution — that Enlighten- ment which sought to break the Dominion of all Prejudice and to undermine every Ill-founded Belief. § 8. Introduction. A. Revolution in Religion. The Reformation. 287-288. B. Revolution in the State. 288-291. (I) The Successive Changes. 288-290. (II) The Spirit of Criticism here has triumphantly maintained many General Principles, but has not been very happy in finding satisfac- tory Forms for the Principles. 290-291. (A) What has been Established. 290. (B) There is still Great Mistrust. C. Revolution in Science. 291-292. IV. Conclusion. The Basis of Hope, and the Goal of Civilization. §9. Introduction. 292. A. The Basis of Hope. There are Greater Safeguards than there were in Antiquity against Unjustifiable Excesses and against the External Forces which might endanger the continued Existence of Civilization. 293-297. (I) Civilization is more established against External Forces. 293. (II) And Internally in Modern Humanism. 294-297. (A) An Intensification of Self Control is the Distinguishing Charac- teristic of Modern Civilization. 294. (B) This Refined Conscience of Modern Society. i. Is felt inevitably, ii. And is the Basis of Hope. 296. B. What as to the Goal ? 297-301. Introduction. The Question. 297. (I) In the Small Fragment of History we know, we can tiace a Progress. (II) But we know Little of the Remoter Past. 298. (Ill) And can know Little of the Future. 299-301. (A) The Probable Spheres and Extent of Progress. 299. (B) But Human Nature will not change and Life will always remain a long way behind its Ideals. 300. 71 BOOK VIII. PROGRESS. CHAPTER I. Truth and Science. An Attempt to trace briefly the Gradual Development of Scientific Kowledge, in those Greatest Steps— Mythologic Fancy, Cultured Reflection, Scientific Cog- nition — which have furnished Humanity New Aims, and given a Different Color- ing to Man's whole Philosophy; showing especially the Progressive Self Com- prehension of Scientific Cognition, in the Development of a definite Conception of Truth and in Enlightenment concerning the Intellectual Means to the Ends set forth, thus bringing out the three Great Stages in Scientific Cognition— Logical, Scientific, and Philosophic. General Introduction. 305-306. A. To the Book. 305. B. To the Chapter. Its Subject. 305-306. (I) Reasons. 306. (II) Limitation of the Theme. I. Mythologic Fancy. § i. A. In Antiquity. 306-308. B. In Modern Times. 308-311. (I) The World of Perception is not taken as the World of Truth. 308, (II) Thus we often share the Conviction of Mythology, that that alone which is W^orthy truly exists, and so seek only the Whole of an In- dividual Phenomenon, not the Universal Conditions upon which alone any Ideal can be realized. 309-311. II. Cultured Reflection. § 2-3. A. In General. § 2. (I) A Period of Active and Inquisitive Reflection naturally follows the Mythologic Fancy, and gradually works out to greater clearness the Idea of a Nature of Things — a Necessary, Self-Existent Truth. 311. (II) Thus Cultured Reflection is naturally opposed to the Mythologic and Youthful View, is still Fragmentary, but has greater Reverence for Truth. 312-314. y (A) Its Hostility to Mythologic Fancy. 312. (B) Its Fragmentariness. 313. (C) Yet Greater Reverence for Inherent Truth. 314. B. Cultured Reflection among the Greeks. § 3. Introduction. 314. The Main Stages of Greek Thought. (I) The Meagerness yet Worth of the Infancy of their Science. 314— (A) In the Study of Human Life. 314-316. i. Its Meagerness. 314. ii. Its Worth. 315. -x^ — '- (11) 72 (B) In the Sfudy of Nature. 316-317. i. Its Meagerness. 316. ii. Its Worth. iii. Still shows the Mythologic Tendency in the Desire to see Principles embodied in Phenomena. Transition. ,16-717 In general this Stage of Greek Thought shows a special Reverence ITT e. ../''I ^""""''"'"^""^^^y^^^^i^^l Forms of Occurrence. 317 III. Scientific Cognition. §4-8. *^ '* General Introduction. 318-321. (I) The M«i„ Cbaracteris.ic of this New Period is theDiscernment of a l/n,r,rsai Truth, through the Idea of the Concept. 3.8. ,11! I !"'?<»•'»''« of this Discovery of Socrates. 3,9 (!) Th« Task Of becoming conscious of the Forms and Principlesof the Procedure of Thought in order to reach Tru.h-llgicai Science. 320. ---^K'^a' (2) The Inquiry as to the Worth which all these Laws of Thought witTThin^'t^h^'^ ": Comprehension of Truth and Acquaintance With Ihings themselves. A. The Logical Stage. Antiquity's Overestimation of Logical Forms and Introduction. 321-324. ^^^ tie Vr-^""r 'r "' "' ^'"-Ph-.icated Consciousness as to , h Re lafon of Thought to its Object, in view of the W^^,/.. 0'^*~3'^3* i. Th^P^cesses of Thought must be determined by the Nature of the Thinking Subject. 321. ii. But also by the Nature of its Objects. 322 "■ 1^1'/' f7 '''''" "" ''"P '" """<> «•■« complicated mo/, of the entire Relation of Thought to its Object. b. But does not seem to hold for the Separate Elements of (R^ A« ;^''°;«'"-"'e Concept, the Judgment, the Syllogism. (B) Assurriing for the present the Illusiveness of this more detailed Semblance of Thought and Things, its Injurious Consequen es are evident, since it leads to the Attempt to Answer' Met! (I) "ihe Case of Concepts. Plato-s Attempt to grasp the Nature of the Thing in General Concepts. Rest of § 4 '^^ luempT"";™"' '"•'"""'^"'^ °f ■- kinds to make such an i. Observation of Animal Species, ii. The Fact of the Moral Ideas *^* ?t"t'hem "" "" °'^"" "' ''"'""°" ^"^^ '''''' ^''y of '""■''"g (C) The Mutual Relation of Thought and Existence does not con- SIS. in this, that a fixed number of Concepts .. ^.,,„„^ ,„ to us Things, and as Thought are the /,/.,,.<,/ ryS,„^, f * w > v» 73 (II) In the Case of Judgments and Syllogisms. Aristotle. 8 c Introduction. ^ ^* i. The Deficiencies of Plato's Views. 328. ii. Aristotle's Partial Correction of Plato. 329 iii. He is still involved in the Confusion of Logic and Meta- physics. (A) The Treatment of Judgments. 329-333. i. It is not recognized that Properties inhere in and are con- nected with the TAin^ quite otherwise than the Marks are related to the Concept. 329. ii. He still really reasons directly from Concepts, as in the case of the Concepts of Potentiality and Actuality. 331 in. Even where he seems to do more, he is really only offering the Analysis and Comparison of Concepts as Real Explana- tions of their Content. 332. (B) The Treatment of the Syllogism and System. Z33-33<, 1. The Confusion of Logic and Metaphysics continues here also. 333. ii. This Kind of Overestimation of Logical Forms is perhaps not the least injurious, but it is the most Excusable, -i-ix^ 335- B. The Scientific Stage. The Limitation of Thought to the Elaboration of Experiences. The Characteristics of the Exact Sciences. 8 6 Introduction. 335-338. (A) Recapitulation. The Hindrances to the Advance of Knowledge in the Point of View of Antiquity. 335. (B) The Transition to the new Scientific Period through Christian Thought, which gave a Renewed and Powerful Impulse to In- vestigations as to the Capability of a Knowledge of the Truth 33^33^' i. Christian Thought developed the Contrast between the Phenomenal World of mere Opinion and the Real World of Knowledge almost entirely from Moral Points of View. 336. ii. It therefore only made the Conflict the more Pressing* 331-33^. (I) Respect for Experience, in the Exact Sciences. 338-340. (A) This meant a Deeper Reverence for Truth. 338. (B) And the Investigation of Nature had marked Advantages over the Examination of the Inner Life. 339. (H) The Development of the Idea of Universal Natural Law. 340-342. (A) In Antiquity. 340. (B) In Later Times. 341. (Ill) The Resulting Limitations which Science imposes on itself. 342-345. (A) Its Dependence upon Experience. 342. (B) It restricts itself to a Mathematical not a Speculative Develop- ment of given Data. (C) It restricts itself to Phenomena. 344. C. The Philosophic Stage. Its Principal Standpoints and its Efforts in trying to reach a Knowledge of the Nature of Things. § 7-8. Introduction. 345-347. jj! 74 (A) The Problems which remained still inexplicable fell to Philoso- phy. 345- (B) Philosophy's Three Great Problems. 346. (C) The Necessary Conviction of the Certainty of our Cognizing Truth. (I) An Insufficient Realism. § 7. (A) A Real World is assumed. 347. (B) But this does not make our Ideas, Copies of Things. 348. (C) Yet this Knowledge is not devoid of all connection with what really exists. (D) The Resulting Realistic Philosophy which starts only from Phe- nomena, but fails to satisfy the Idealistic Bias of the Soul. 350. (II) A False Idealism, which maintains the Identity of Thought and Being, g 8. Introduction. 351. The Meaning of its Thesis. (A) Idealism leaves Being itself quite unexplained. (B) It is particularly beside the point to speak of Thought as that with which Being is Identical. 352-355. i. This Attempt really rests upon a widespread Error of re- garding as a Product of Thought anything for which lan- guage has furnished a Name, although Thought may have contributed very little to its Content. 353. ii. It would be more Simple and True to say that Being con- templates itself. 354. (C) Idealism really only Knows the Import of Things, but believes that this is their Essential Nature. Like Realism, it still re- mains at the Phenomenal Point of View. 355. i. Religious Belief had cherished and expressed the same Conviction in another way. 356. ii. Philosophic Idealism tried to surpass this Faith in two ways. a. It replaced the Personal God by " the Idea." 357. b. It hoped to be able to express the Whole Content of this Idea completely and systematically in Thought. (i) This Promise could be fulfilled only by breaking off from the Nature of the Thing all' which remained incomprehensible to Thought, (ii) And both the Natural and the Moral World received the Treatment which traced back the Real Content °^ ^" Things and Events to what was merely Formal 358. Conclusion of the Chapter. 359-360. The Nature of Things does not consist in Thoughts, and Thinking is not able to grasp it; yet perhaps the Whole Mind experiences in other forms of Its Action and Passion the essential Meaning of all Being and Action; Thought subsequently serving it as an Instrument by which that which is thus experienced is brought into the Connection which its Nature requires and IS experienced in more intensity in proportion as the Mind is master of this Connection. 75 CHAPTER II. Work and Happiness. The Bearing of Economic Progress on Happiness. An Attempt to trace the Development of the Material Civilization of the Race, by a special Consideration of the varied Historical Forms and Conceptions of Work (upon Things, and in the Use or Construction of the Relations of Human Society) and their Influence particularly upon the Happiness of Life ; showing that there has been no clear General Advance in Happiness, proportioned to the Material Development. Introduction. § i. A. The Subject of the Chapter. 361. B. Consideration of the Relation of Pleasure to the Means of Pleasure. 362- 368. (I) What does the manifest Increasing Dominion of Mind over Nature signify for Happiness? 362-365. (A) It may seem doubtful whether this Increasing Dominion over Nature does not really result for us in Greater Dependence upon Nature, since Leisure appears continually to gro-^'- less. 363. (B) Yet it is Erroneous to try to divide Labor and Enjoyment. 364. (II) Still it is not Indubitable that the Internal Progress of a State of Culture involves in itself a continuous Heightening of the Enjoy- ments of Life. 365. (A) The Patriarchal State e. g. seems to show an unusual Concen- tration and Intensifying of Consciousness and Life. 366, (B) Hence, though not without Limitations, it is an Attractive Type of Life, to which it often seems desirable to return. 367. I. The Forms and Conceptions of Work in Antiquity. § 2, A. In the Heroic Age. 368-369. (I) The Facts, Labor was held in Contempt. 368. (II) Estimate of the Age. In part right, they forgot that it is only Labor which can develop a coherent Character. 369. B. The Liberal Culture of Antiquity, and its Substructure of Slavery. 369- 376. (I) Among the Greeks. 369-375. Introduction. 369. The Change in the Estimate of Labor as the Greeks came to their Brilliant Period. 369. (A) The Greek Idea of Education contrasted with the Modern, in its View of Labor : Many-sided and Self-contained Develop- ment vs. the Accomplishment of some Individual Life- Work. 370- (B) The Consequent Place given Work in Greek Life. 371-373. i. Varied and Interesting Tasks were afforded the Leisure Class. 371. ii. But there was Contempt for all Common Labor, exercising Injurious Influences. a. As to the Love of Work. b. As to Public Duty. c. As to the Family Life. iii. Hence the Problem of the Relation between Labor and the liberal Enjoyment of Life is solved by them only super; ficially and mechanically— by the Institution of Slavery. 372. a. Aristotle's Theoretical Defense of Slavery. 373. b. The Real Causes of Slavery. c. The Harshness of the Theory was only partially miti- gated in Practice. 374. (C) The Liberal Culture of the Greeks rested therefore upon a Foun- dation of Slavery. 375. (II) Among the Romans. The Roman Empire (in this sphere) only de- veloped further the pernicious Germs already found in the Greek Life. 375. II. The Growth and Preponderance of the Industrial Classes in the Middle Ages. § 3. Introduction. 376. The Contrasted Characteristics of the Ancient and Medieval Period. A. The Historical Circumstances. 377. B. The Effects on Labor. All Labor became systematized into Guilds. 378. (I) The apparent resulting Arbitrary Restrictions were largelv justified 379. (II) The Results of this Relation were of Advantage. (A) To Labor, in Gain in Honor and Earnestness. (B) To Public Life, in Prosperity and Beauty. (Ill) To this View of Life, blending Work and Enjoyment, was due nearly the whole Content of the Life of the Times. 380. HI. The Modern Forms of Labor and their Social Consequences. § 4-5. A. The Indirect Influence of Historical Circumstances upon the Forms of Labor. § 4. (I) The Influences directly connected with Geographical Discoveries. 381-382. (A) The Discoveries themselves. 381. (B) The Help of Science. (C) Commerce. (D) Political Projects. i. Restrained by the Circumstances, /TTA -r "* ^^^ Discoveries gave a new Field of Experiment. 382. (II) The Influence of Physical Science, making Greater Tasks possible by making all possible Applications of a Discovery. 382. (Ill) The Growing Influence of Political Science. 384. B. The Direct Influence of the Development of Machinery upon Labor 8 c Introduction. 385. -SO* (I) Economic Advantages of Machinery. 386. (II) The Disadvantageous Effects. 386-391. (A) Even upon External Conditions. 386. (B) Upon the Mental Development of the Individual Workers, since for moderate capacities Labor is no longer either Enjoyment or a Means of Culture. 388-389. (C) Upon Social Relations, preventing mere Faithful Work from attaining Independence. 389-391. (Ill) In another direction Labor has broken through the Restrictions of the Guild Life with much Advantage, and not without some Disad- vantage. 391-393- rf«L- \ i > 17 (A) The Gain, in a Free Field of Labor. (B) The Loss is in part met by Voluntary Combinations for definite Objects. 392-393. Conclusion of Section. 393-395. (A) Thus the Age shows everywhere a tremendous Reliance upon the Trustworthiness of Machinery. All Activity as far as pos- sible is made mechanical, and so there is Little Enjoyment of Work. 393' (B) And, on the other hand, there is also Little Enjoyment of Leisure. 395. Conclusion of Chapter. 395-397. A. Human Life seems to be turned more and more into a Struggle for Exist- ence. Labor does not contain in itself its own Reward. 395. B. There is no General Advance in the Happiness of Life, proportioned to the Increase of External Goods. 396 CHAPTER in. Beauty and Art. An Attempt to set forth the Characteristic ^Esthetic Ideas and Art of the Main Periods of History, especially in their Influence upon Life ; showing that the Echo of Art in Modern Life is much less than in Antiquity, and of a less Satis- fying Kind. Introduction. § i. Art is to be treated bere, not as an "Organism," but as an Expression of Human Feeling. I. Eastern Vastness. The most Ancient Nations of the East found Beauty chiefly in what was Vast. § 2. A. The Evidences of the Fact. 399. B. Vastness was for them a Real Esthetic Notion, setting forth the Imper- ishableness of the Race. 400. C. Hebrew Sublimity. Only the Hebrews have left us speaking Monu- ments of the Mental Life of the Individual^ and so made Sublimity possi- ble. 401-404. (I) ^Esthetic Characteristics of the Hebrew Language and Literature. 402. (II) The Resulting Sublimity in both Descriptive and Lyric Poetry. (Ill) The Defect. The Earnestness of this Religious Bias of Mind to- wards Sublimity did certainly pervade Life, but could not endow it with harmonious and many-sided Beauty. 403. II. Greek Beauty. § 3. A. The Greek Language, as showing the admirable Richness and Flexibility of the Mental Life of the Greeks, especially by its independent Indication of Relations by separate words. 404-407. (I) In General. 404. (II) In Homer's Time. 405-406. (A) The Language of Homer. 405. (B) Homeric Discourse. (Ill) The Greeks' High Estimate of Language. 406. B. The Greek Attitude toward Nature. 407-410. /" 78 (I) In General. Nature affected them chiefly as the Setting of their own Lives. For them the Value of Human Society was far above any ab- sorption in the Beauty of Nature. 407. (II) The Influence of their Environment. 408. (A) The Favoring Physical Conditions. 408. (B) Their Intellectual Possession of their Country. 409. (C) The Favoring Natural Environment itself aids greatly in seem- ing to confer upon Greek Life, Artistic Foim. 410. C. The Influence of Greek Art on Greek Life. 411-416. Introduction. 411. The Mobility of Greek Fancy. (I) The Diff"erent Forms of Greek Art characterized. 411-416. (A) In Music, it was chiefly Measure and Harmony which was es- teemed, and there was a probable Poverty of Artistic Con- tent. (B) The Greek Lyric has two peculiar Features- a Predilection for the Picturesque Presentation of Events, and the Habit of Stor- ing up the Outcome of Poetic Excitement in some general Proposition or some Proverb. It does not exhibit much of the true Spirit of Song. 412. (C) The Greek Drama aims to illustrate some universal Truth of Practical Experience by reference to great Examples; and had a steady Educative Influence upon the People. 414. (D) Painting seems to have had least Influence upon the National Life. (E) The masterly Perfection of Greek Sculpture had a vastly more important Influence on Life. (II) From what was finest and most beautiful in this World of Art the People were not excluded. The Greek Life was permeated with Beauty, as no other Age has ever been. 416. III. Roman Elegance and Dignity. § 4. A. A Comparison of the Greek and Latin Languages, showing th-^ natural Esthetic Influence of the latter. The Latin has a Sterner Aspect, group- ing together more simply and concisely the items of fact with fewer par tides, thus giving the Idea of a Life full of Power, and using its Power with calm Mastery. 416-418. B. The Historical Significance of the Esthetic Contributions of the Romans 418-423. (I) The Defect in the Greek Instinct, in the Lack of Warmth and In- tensity of Feeling. 418. (II) The Contrasted Roman Instinct. Passionately stirred, they yet took the path of Self-Suppression, and so were led to the development of a Style of Esthetic Representation which has permanent Historic Value. 418-423. (A) Producing a Literary Style which aimed at an Ideal of Correct- ness. 419. (B) And making Elegance the distinguishing Characteristic of Roman Art. 420. (C) Illustrated in Horace. 421. C. The Contribution of the Ideal of Roman Elegance to Life. 423-424 (I) It gave an air of Grandeur to the Prose of Life. 423. ..f ii Jl 79 (II) And left to the Men of succeeding Centuries a large part of that which gave Beauty to their Life. 424. IV. The Individuality and Fantasticalness of the Middle Ages. § 5. Introduction. 424. A. The Contrasted Spirit of Antiquity and of the Mi-Idle Ages. 425-427. (I) For Antiquity, Harmony with Nature was the One Aim ; there were no recognized Aims beyond", and the Involved Contradictions were overlooked. 425. (II) For the Middle Ages, Christianity had demolished the calm Self- Sufficingness of the Secular World. 426. B. The Resulting Characteristics of the Middle Ages. 427-430. (I) They grasped with vigor a High Ideal but lacked all thoroughly de- veloped Insight into the Means necessary to realize it, and so at- tained to no Clear Views concerning the Earthly Tasks of Human Life. 427. (II) They thus show everywhere the Emphasis on the Individual and the Whole, but a Neglect of the General — the Universal. 429. C. The Consequent generally Unfavorable Influence on Art. 430. D. The Connection of their ^Esthetic Characteristics with Life. 431-432. (I) They lived a Life full of Poetic Impulses from the very Strength of which they suff"ered. 431. (II) But left the very important Legacy of Dissatisfaction with what is merely Phenomenal, and that Longing for the Infinite which gives the Keynote to the -Esthetic Temper of Modern Times and to its Poetry. 432. V. Beauty, Art, and i^stheticism in Modern Times. § 6. A. The ^Esthetic Characteristics of the Modern Age. 432-435. (I) The Echo of Art in Life is much Less, and of a less Satisfying Kind. 432. (II) The General Barbarism of our Attitude toward Art. 433. (III) The Manifest Present Tendency is to a still completer Divorce of iEsthetic Elements from Social Life, reserving all Excitement and Enthusiasm for the retirement and solitude of the Private Life of Individuals. 435. B. The Consequent Influence upon Art. 435-439- (I) On Art Appreciation. The living Emotion of the Beautiful is rarer, (II) On Art Production. 436-439. (A) There have not been wanting Great Geniuses. 436. (B) But Modern Art has lacked the Advantage of Ancient Art in its Possession of Artistic Forms generally established by Tradi- tion and Constant Practice ; and hence has had the double Task of finding first an Ideal and then the Form in which to embody this Ideal. 437. C. The ^Esthetic Element in Modern Life. 439-443* (I) This showed itself first in Italy, in the Cultivation of Formal Excel- lence in all the Dexterities and Refinements of Style, both in Lan- guage and in the Intercourse of Life. 439. (II) Then in France, in the Employment of their Intellectual Strength upon Problems of Social Intercourse, first giving to the Spirit of Modern Times a characteristic ^Esthetic Expression, especially in the Production of the French Prose Style. 8o (III) Seen also in the Rococo Style. 441. (IV) And at the Present Day in a Mathematical Element of Exactness, Neatness, Conciseness, Clearness, and Simplicity, which has an ele- ment of Hope for Art. 442. CHAPTER IV. The Religious Life. An Attempt to trace the Religious Development of the Race; pointing out the Characteristic Contributions of the East and the West in their different Emphasis on the two Sources of Religious Ideas, Nature and Social Life; showing the Pre- ponderance of the Cosmological Element in Heathendom (having no gain for Life) and of the Moral Element in Judaism and Christianity ; disclosing in the Present a returning Preponderance of the Cosmological Element in Dogmatic Theology, and a less close Connection than formerly of the Christian Doctrine and Church with Life. General Introduction to the Chapter. § 1-2. A. Comparison of the Religious Life of the East with that of the West. § i. (l) The Religious Life of the East is Distinguished from that of the West. 444-446. (A) By a Permanent Difference of the Course of Development; the Thought of the Supersensuous World pervades all Life. 444. (B) By a Permanent Difference of Disposition. The Early Survey of all Goals led to a marked Quietism— a repose of cosmic con- templation, for which there is no real Development possible. 445- (II) The Religious Life of the West developed a Contrary Bias. 446- 448. (A) Its Disposition is to emphasize, not the World as a Whole, but its Universal Laws, which at once opened the Prospect of re- constructing both Nature and Human Life — the Prospect of a Real Development. 446. (B) Its Course of Development has tended toward an Alienation from God and from what is Divine in all Departments of Thought. 446-447. (C) Hence arise the apparently Discouraging Signs of the Times as to Religion. 447. B. Nature and Social Life as Sources of Religious Ideas. § 2. (I) Nature. 44S-451. (A) The Ways in which Nature may lead to Religious Conceptions. 448. (B) Yet these Cosmological Elements have contributed Little to any useful Progress in Life and Humanity. 449-451. i. Usually only very Small Sections of Nature are known. 449. ii. And even the Fullest Cosmological Insight is not fruitful. 450. iii. Especially can no Observation of Nature teach Moral Truths. (II) Social Life as a Source of Religious Ideas. 451-453. 1 81 (A) Under Meager Social Conditions, no Coherent and Comprehen- sive View of Nature and the Order of Events is possible, and no Coherent Maxims of Conduct, (B) And this Danger from the Cosmological Element is a Perma- nent One at all Stages of Civilization. 451-452. i. For, even if there were a Just Perception of the Facts, it would not involve a Just Estimation of their Worth. 451. ii. And even where there is Undisturbed Reverence for the Content of Moral Ideas, there is still Danger in Men's Preference for a Cosmological Construction of Philosophy, 452. Conclusion of the Introduction, and Transition. 452-453. I, Preponderance of the Cosmological Element in Heathendom. § 3-4, A. The Eastern Nations. § 3. (I) The Earlier Incoherent Foreshadowings of a Supersensuous Woild, arising in a Meager Social Development. 453-456. (A) Fetich Worship. 453. (B) Presentiments of Immortality. 454. (C) Paying Divine Honors to Animals. (D) The Idea of the Transmigration of Souls. 455. (II) The Later Comprehensive Religious Systems, in which the Thought of fully developed Civilizations culminated. 456-460. Introduction. 456. (A) In Egypt, Religion was not overgrown with Cosmological Speculations (which had nothing for Life) and cherished valu- able Elements of Moral Conviction. 456-457. (B) In India, an Excess of Cosmological Speculation took away all Meaning from Human Life. 457-459. (C) The Iranian Races obtained better Results, but finally devel- oped a Superfluity of External Forms. 459. B. The Greeks. § 4. (I) The Development of their Religious Life. 460-461. (A) The Influences of Nature were Less Controlling. 460. (B) The Larger Share is undoubtedly contributed by a successful Development of Moral Life in Society. (II) The Popular Religion never attained Coherent Unity. 461-464. (A) In General. 461. (B) The Elements of their Common View of the Gods. 462. (C) The External Forms of Worship. 464. (Ill) The Greek Religion never attained any real Conception of a King- dom of Heaven. 464-465. II. ThePreponderanceof the Moral Element in Judaism and Christianity. § 5-6, A. In Judaism. § 5. Introduction. 465. (I) Cosmological Speculation is almost wholly absent from Judaism. (II) The Danger was thus avoided of regarding first Natural 111 and then Moral Evil as Necessary Constituents of the Cosmic Order. 467, Conclusion and Transition. B. In Christianity. § 6. (I) Christian Doctrines contain exclusively Religious Truth conveyed in a Form of Expression which is also exclusively Religious. Chris- 82 ■ tiahity developed directly neither Cosmological nor Social Theories. 468. (II) As to the Connection between Earthly Reality and the Kingdom of Heaven, Christianity offers not Detailed Knowledge but Cer- tainty, establishing a new Life upon a Foundation of Truth. 469. (Ill) Some Aspects of the Relation of the Christian to other Philosophic Views. 470-476. (A) Points in which Christianity might seem to offer Nothing New, though really Differing. i. Christianity finds the Summary and Ground of Morals in the Will of God, giving a Meaning to Life, such as other re- ligions do not. 471. ii. With the Christian Precepts, Promises are always conjoined. Any complete Philosophy must require that Good should not vanish out of the Universe unrequited. 472-474. (B) Points in which Christianity goes distinctly beyond all other Religions — in the Worth it ascribes to each individual Man. 474-476. III. Christian Life and Thought in the Present. § 7-8. A. Returning Preponderance of Cosmology in the New Philosophical Dog- matism. § 7. Introduction. 476-477. (A) The Demand of the Church for Faith in the Whole Historical Account of Revelation is met with Growing Opposition. 476. (B) Though the Providential Relation of God to the History of the World may be freely admitted. 477. (C) But Difficulty arises as to the Acceptance of (l) the whole Bib- lical History and (2) the Doctrines of Dogmatic Theology. (I) The Difficulties in Accepting all Biblical History. 477-481. (A) Its Figurative Form. 477. (B) Doubts arising from the Change in Men's Conception of Na- ture. 478-479. i. The Change. 478. ii. Yet the general Possibility of Miracles may be freely ad- mitted. (C} Doubts arising from the Way in which we take the Spiritual Meaning of the Record of the Events. 480. e. g. i. The Ascension, ii. The Resurrection. (II) The Difficulties in the Acceptance of the Doctrines of Dogmatic Theology. 481-4S8. Introduction. 481. (A) Its Failure clearly to determine the Content of its Doctrines. 482. (B) Its Present Tendency to Emphasize Cosmological Elements, with no Gain for Life. 483-488. Introduction. Reasons for the Tendency. 483. i. Dogmatic Investigations seldom make a Conscientious Use of even the Modest Results which Modern Philosophy has » obtained. 484. ii. And no Gain Accrues to Life. 485-488. c. g. I I I 83 a. As to the Doctrine of Creation. b. As to Eschatology. c. As to the Doctrine of the Trinity. (i) The Slight Biblical Basis for the Speculations. 486. (ii) And, though there is a Natural Need which leads men to make these Attempts, still Philosophy seems able practically to contribute Nothing here that can help a Living Faith. B. The Less Close Connection of the Church with Life. § 8. Introduction. 489. (I) The Church is an Institution peculiar to Christianity. (II) The Development of the Organization of the Church, becoming finally in Claim a Cosmic Power. 490. (III) The Injurious Effect on Life of this Colossal Attempt to establish a Cosmic Order. 491. (IV) The Protestant View of the Church, and the Present Tendencies separating the Church and Life. 492. Conclusion. As to the Future. 493-494. (A) What is to be Hoped, looking to Closer Connection of the Church with Life. 493. (B) This may necessitate a Temporary Overthrow of the Organiza- tion of the Church. CHAPTER V. Political Life, and Society. An Attempt to trace the Development of the Political Constructions of An- tiquity in their Influence on the Life of their own Times, and in their Later Ef- fects; and to consider the Leading Political Questions of the Modern Age, thus arising from the Recognition both of Abstract Natural Right, and of Historic and Legitimate Right. I. Political Life, and Society in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. § 1-4. A. The Political Constructions of Antiquity. § 1-3. (I) The Earlier Political Constructions, which were not True States. § I. Introduction. 495-499 The Family Relations in themselves are not sufficient to insure Social Progress, i. Reactions of Bad Surroundings on the Family. 496-497. a. As to Relations of Husband and Wife. 496. b. As to Relations of Parents and Children. ii. Even apart from such Crude Misinterpretations, Family Life does not teach Social Morality. 497-499. a. The Relations of the Family are Special and Unique. 497- b. They do not therefore tend directly to the Development of a Strict Sense of Justice. 498. iii. Hence the States most directly founded on the Family Re- lation have lacked some of the Qualities of True States. (A) Tribal States, whether Greek or Semitic, in the excessive Em- phasis on the Bond of Consanguinity greatly retarded their own Social Development. 499-501. 84 (B) The Kingdoms of the East. 501-504. i. Their Origin. 501. ii. The Ground of their Possible Continuance lies chiefly in the Uncertainty of each man concerning the Views of others. 502. ill. Illustrated by the Asiatic Despots with their empty Arbi- trariness. 503. (C) The Paternal Despotisms of China, Mexico and Peru. 504-505. i. All had the Thought of an Ordered Administration. 504. ii. Yet none were Promotive of Progress for long, since Soci- ety did not rest on the Recognition of Individual Personal Rights. (II) The Political Constructions of the Greeks. § 2. (A) The Political Constitution of Sparta. 506-509. i. All Individual Powers were exhausted in keeping up the Whole. 506. ii. Yet Sparta was not destitute of Mental Wealth and Happi- ness, though both lacked Content. 507. iii. And their Mental Progress was chiefly due to their Sur- roundings, and in spite of their Constitution. 508. (B) The Political Constitutions of the Ionic Tribes. 509-511. i. The Wish to take a Personal Part in Government and the Nature of the Country favored the Independent Develop- ment of Small Communities. 509. ii. This Participation of the People in the Course of Public Affairs is free from Danger only at Times when Political Development is just beginning, or when it is fully Accom- plished. 510. (C) The Bearings of the Greek Political Constitutions on the Polit- ical Development of the West. 511-520 i. The State becomes a Construction of Human Reason. 511— 515. a. This is the Great Contribution of the Greeks. 511. b. The Danger involved in this Theory, of diminishing the Sense of Obligation to the Institutions by which Justice is carried out. 512-514. c. The Tendencies to this Sophistic Consideration of the State in Greek History. 514. ii. The Greeks' View of the State lacked the Modern Sensitive Consciousness of the Significance of Human Personality, and completely subjected the Individual Life to the State. 515-517. a. The Natural Impulses toward this Subjection of the In- dividual. 517. b. Society and the State became thus almost wholly Coin- cident, and both suffered from the Admixture. 518-520. (i) The State as distinct from Society was needed as an Articulate Conscience. 518. (ii) The Greeks suffered from this Deficiency, and so were guided by no Respect for any developed Sys- tem of Universal Law. 519. , 85 (III) Civil Life and Law in Rome. § 3. Introduction. 520. The Development of Law, of Jurisprudence, and of a general Sense of Right in Modern Society is a Legacy from Rome. (A) The Roman Tendencies as contrasted with the Greek. 521-524. i. The Greek Tendencies, of a strong Impulse to Sociability, and a Predilection for Speculative Knowledge, neither of them, favored the Development of a strong Sense of Right. 521-522. ii. The Contrasted Roman Tendencies. 522-524. a. An Inductive Temper in Questions of Conduct as against the Speculative Tendency ol the Greeks. 522. b. A lively Consciousness of Personal Rights, as against an Extreme Social Tendency. 523. (B) These Predominant Tendencies led to a Splendid Development. 524-526. i. Of the Sense of Private Right. 524. ii. Of Public Law ; but in such a way that Private Right came to seem Immutable, and in contrast. Public Law to seem the Result of Convention. 525. a. This did not involve a less Devotion to the Common- wealth in Rome than in Greece. 526. b. And the Political Development of Rome was in Har- mony with an even more Accurate View of the Origin of Personal Rights. 527. (C) Effects of Roman Law on Later Legal Customs. 528. B. Political Life, and Society in the Middle Ages. § 4. (I) The Growing Absolutism of Kingly Power first delivered the Mid- dle Ages from a wholly Fragmentary Social Life. 529. (II) This Absolutism was very far from being a Return to Oriental Des- potism. 530. (III) It was itself based upon Historical Tradition, and helped to de- velop the Notion of Historic and Legitimate Right. 531. (IV) Yet the Struggle between Absolutism and those Powers which were at once Barriers lo it and to Social Progress brought out still more strongly the Contrast between Absolute Natural Right, and His- toric and Legitimate Right. Transition. 532. II. The Leading Political Questions of our Modern Age. § 5-10. A. The Two Practically Settled Fundamental Convictions of our Time. § 5-6. (I) The Autonomy of Society. Absolute Natural Right. § 5. (A) The Modern Conception of Society makes the Individual both Goal and Point of Departure. 533. (B) The Defense of this View. 533-540. i. The charge against the View, that it threatens Opposition to nearly all the Forms under which Human Life must go on, may be met by the Answer that all these Forms are in- deed called in question, but not in order to be denied but in order that they may be reaffirmed and for better reasons. 533-535- 86 ii. To the Further Charge that the View recognizes no Inherent and Absolute Right in these Forms to fashion Human Ex- istence, and shows only a one sided Desire for Material Prosperity it is to be said : a. The latter Statement is not true. 536. b. And the Demand for a Worship of Empty Forms is ut- terly vain. 536-540. (i) It is unbearable when Social and Political Life are attempted to be forced into Forms which signify something or other, but help men not at all. 537- 538. (ii) The only Order that can be Obligatory for us is that which is indispensable or helpful for the Accom- plishment of our Human Destiny. 538. (iii) The whole Influence of the Philosophy of the Idea here has been bad. 538-539. (iv) Conclusion. There is no real Subject, no Substance, no Place in which anything worthy or sacred can be realized except the Individual Ego; the Personal Soul. 539-540. (II) National and Historical Law. Recognition of, but not Domination by. Historical Law. Historic and Legitimate Right. § 6. (A) The Assumption of Radicalism, that the Past may be treated as of no Account, is entirely Unwarranted and Impracticable, since an Isolated Man cannot be a Subject of Rights. 540. (B) An Attempted Intermediate Position— that Rights are made effective first in Society. i. This would require a clear Demarcation between the Law of Private Rights and Legal Determinations. 541. ii. This Distinction is Untenable. 542. a. As to the Individual. b. And as to Society as a Whole. 543. (C) A Double Attitude only is Practicable. 543-544. i. On the one hand, the Laws of one Age can neither furnish irrevocable Rules for the Future, nor have the unconditional Majesty of the Moral Commands themselves. 543. ii. Yet, on the other hand. Positive and Grave Injustice may result from unthinking Radicalism. B. Practicable and Impracticable Postulates for the Carrying out of these Convictions. § 7-10. Introduction. 544. The Men of the Present Age are seeking for Legal Forms, which may admit of Necessary Progress being made, without breach of Legal Continuity. (I) As to the Duty of Society to its Members. § 7. (A) Society should not formally exercise its Power over its indi- vidual Members as a Right belonging to it, nor systematize this in permanent Institutions further than is necessary. Public In- stitutions should rest on the sober Ground of Reciprocal and General Interest. 545. % » 87 (B) The Return Services of Society consist chiefly in the Natural Reactions of the Interests which it embraces. 546. (C) The Amount of Limitation which Society can impose upon In- dividual Wills must itself be but limited. 546-548. (II) As to the Relations of the State and Society. § 8. (A) Reasons for Considering. 549. (B) The Possibility of a Universal Society, replacing States. 550. i. Tendencies to Cosmopolitanism. ii. Difficulties. (C) Our Aim is the Discussion of Principles not Details, and hence only to ask (i) what the State is and must remain for Modern Society, and (2) what advantageous Transformations of Forms are possible. 551-560. i. What the State is and must remain. 552-557. a. It needs Community of Origin, Language, and Custom. b. Only Stationary Peoples are able to furnish the complete Conditions for a Real State. 553. c. It is neither to be Desired nor Expected that the Con- trasts involved in States should disappear (as the Exam- aniples of mere Federations show). 554-556. d. Conclusion. How the State is developed from Society. The Four Elements which go to form the State are (i) Community of Language and a Natural Unity; (2) a sufficient Inherited Territory; (3) a Government repre- senting the Historical Continuity of the National Mind; and (4) the General Conviction that all Freedom of In- dividual Development must result from the Possibility of Legal Harmony between the People and the Govern- ment. 556-557. ii. The Best Form of the State. Hereditary Monarchy is the Form of Government which in itself and under present Conditions offers the greatest Security for Steady Develop- ment. 557-560. a. The Danger in all Republican Constitutions. — The Nat- ural Struggle between Different Classes of Society be- comes a Struggle for Political Power. 557-559. b. The Argument for Hereditary Monarchy. 559-560. Transition. 560, (III) As to Constitutional Monarchy. § 9. (A) While its Fundamental Thought is true, the System has two great Lacks. 560-563. i. Its Low Estimation of the Corporate Element — Combina- tions representing, partly the most important Callings, partly the especial Local Interests of diff"erent Districts. 561. ii. Its Tendency to regard the State as a rigid Framework to which all National Life must accommodate itself. 561-563, (B) For the Working out of the Corresponding Reforms. i. Existing Institutions are not adapted. 563. ii. Socialism, and the Theory of the Abstract State have no Promise. 564. (IV) As to International Relations. § 10. 88 (\) As to the Permanence and Obligation of Treaties. 565. (B) Impracticableness of International Arbitration. 565-567. i. The Natural Repugnance to it. 565. ii. The Conditions necessary to make it practicable are want- ing. (C) The Final Principle in International Politics. 567. BOOK IX. THE UNITY OF THINGS. CHAPTER I. Of the Being of Things. An Investigation of the Being of Things, showing that their Being is not Self- Dependence but a State of Relatedness ; that the Natures of Things are at least so far Comparable as to admit of One Universal Truth being valid for the entire Manifold of Reality ; and that their Reciprocal Action requires their Substantial Connection in the Unity of the Infinite. Introduction to the Book, and to the Chapter. 571-579. A. General Introduction to the Book. § 1-2. (I) The General Purpose of the Author in the Book, g i. Introduction. 571. (A) The Aim is to present the Coherent Results of Long Reflection, concerning the great Ultimate Questions. 572. (B) And so to bring together into their Final Results, the scattered Lines of Investigation which have preceded. 573. (C) Bringing out thus the Real Coherence of these Scattered Views, 574. (II) Limitations of the Task of the Book. § 2. (A) The Three Elemental Forms of Knowledge, and the Problem of their Connection. An Indication of the Limitations of the Pos- sible Accomplishment. 574-576. i. The Three Elemental Forms of Our Knowledge — necessarily valid Truths, immediately given FactSy Determinations of Worth. 574. ii. The Incoherence of these. 575. iii. This Incoherence both hinders our Knowledge and is also the Source of the Doubts which oppress our Life. iv. Hence our Possible Task is much limited. Assuming that there is but one Origin of the World — that which is most Worthy, we seek for this One Origin a more exact Expres- sion, and such Verification as it is capable of. 576, (B) The General Method of the Task. 576-578. i. To show that the Earlier Mechanical Mode of Thought con- strains to this Later Ideal Mode. 576. •' i 89 ii. By the Recovery of the Links between the Finite and the Infinite— the Many Things and the One — by showing that the Finite requires the Infinite. 577. B. Introduction to the Chapter. 578-579- (I) Our Immediate Inquiry thus, is for the Being of Finite Things — that Nature by virtue of which Things are similar and are Things. 578. (II) And involves Two Questions: (i) What is the Being which we require in Things, in order that our Theory of the World may find in them a firm Foundation? (§ 3.) (2) What may and must Things be, in order that they may partici- pate in this Being? (§ 4-5.) 579. I. The Being of Things is not Self-Dependence but a State of Relatedness. § 3. A. The Answer even of Ordinary Thought affirms that Being is a State of Relatedness. 579-580. B. The Answer of Some Philosophical Reflection is that Being is a wholly Self-Sufficing Self-Dependence. 580-587. (I) Such "Pure Existence" is a Product of Abstraction, without real Independent Existence, as is shown by the Use of the Terms — Affirmation and Positing. 581. (A) Affirmation, 582. (B) Positing. (II) Nor is there Existence before all Relations. 583-^85. (A) The Theory. 583. (B) The only Priority here is Logical not Metaphysical. (C) In fact, there is no Real Existence when all Relations have been denied. 584~585' i. A completely Unrelated Thing, even if admissible, could never enter into Relations. 584. ii. And no Existing Thing could get rid of all Relations. 585. (III) The Theory of the Self-Sufficing Self-Dependence of Things still objects, that then there is nothing Stable at all. 585-587. (A) This is the most Erroneous of all Objections, since it wholly mistakes the Business of Philosophy, which is not to state a Mode of Procedure for a Creation of a World not yet existent, but only to understand the Connection of the World which already exists, which does show just this Continuous Arch of Mutually Related Things. 585. (B) If, then, there is Nothing that is Unrelated, we are entitled to say that it belongs to the Notion and Nature of Existence to be Related. 586. II. What Things may and must be in order that they may participate in Being, as a State of Relatedness. § 4-5. Introduction to § 4-5. The Relation of Thought to the Relations of Things. 587-588. (I) This Relation is not Arbitrary; Thought finds, it does not invent, the Relations. 587. ' (II) But it finds Two Kinds of Relations: (I) Relations which must hold between Things, in order to affi^rd the Ground of any Future Event— the Comparability of Things. (§4.) / !! go (2) Relations which are the Aciua/ Connections of Reciprocal Ac- tion between Things. (§ 5.) (Ill) The Immediate Question of § 4 thus becomes: What must be as- sumed as to the Natures of Things, in order to understand how a Law can be not only a Valid Truth in the Realm of Thoughts, but also a Determining Power in the World of Things? 588. A. The Comparability of the Natures of Things is a necessary Condition of the Possibility of One Truth— Universal Law— being valid for the Mani- fold of Reality. § 4. (I) No General Law could be stated of Things of which such Compar- ability did not hold. 588. (II) This underlying Assumption of Comparability as to the Natures of Things is everywhere tacitly made even by those who formally deny it, but its Significance is not adequately perceived, viz., that it makes impossible any Self-Dependence of Things, but constrains us to regard the Specific Nature of Everything as being a definite Member of an all-embracing Series in the Existable World. 589-594. (A) Those who formally deny this Assumption reach the same Re- sult in a Roundabout way, and in any case are obliged to admit that in point of fact all that exists is Comparable. 590. (B) Yet the significance of this Assumption is misunderstood, since ^it is regarded as far more natural and Self- Evident than it is. 591. i. It is only because we have already assumed that the World is a Coherent Whole,— that there is One Truth which is valid amid the Multiplicity of Reality,— that the Assump- tion of the Comparability of Things seems Self-evident. 592. ii. The Seeming Self-Evidence of the Assumption rests also on the Mistaken Conception of a Realm of Laws existing Prior to Things, and Controlling them. 593. (Ill) Conclusion. Comparability is not to be made to mean more than it does. 594. B. The Relations which are the Ac/ua/ Connections of Reciprocal Action between Things. The Reciprocal Actions of Finite Things are explica- ble only by their Substantial Connection in the Unity of the Infinite. § 5. Introduction. 594. (I) The Thought of an Objective Connection between Things is impos- sible; only in as far as two Beings cause some Passion in one an- other can they be Reciprocally Acting Causes. 595. (II) Upon what Assumption is the Fulfillment of this Requirement Think- able? 596-598. (A) Not by the Idea of Some Influence passing from One Thing to Another. 596. (B) Nor by the Assumption of a Pre-established Harmony. 597. (C) Nor by the Continual Mediating Activity of God, so long as God and Things are separated from one another in the same way as Individual Things used to be. (D) But only by the Assumption of a Substantial Community of Being between all Things, as Parts of one Single Infinite Sub- stance. 598. 91 (III) How this itself is thinkable, is reserved for later Consideration ; and no Explanation is attempted of Direct and Immediate Relations. 598-599. III. Summary of the Conclusions of the Chapter. § 6. A. Proposition I. All Intelligibility of the Cosmic Course depends upon Universal Relations which connect all Things together, and really make them what they are. (§3.) B. Proposition II. The Natures of Things are at least so far Comparable that there can be One Universal Truth valid for all Things, (§ 4.) C. Proposition III. The Reciprocal Actions of Things must be understood by reference to a Continuous and Substantial Unity of All — One Infinite Being. (§5.) CHAPTER II. The Spatial and Supersensuous Worlds. An Investigation of the Nature of the Spatial and Supersensuous Worlds ; showing the Ideality of Space, the Correspondence of the Real Intellectual and of the Apparent Spatial Places of Things, and that the Sole Reality is the imme- diate Reciprocal Action of Things. Introduction. 602. I. The Spatial World. The Ideality of Space. § i. Introduction. (I) Connections with the Results of the Previous Discussions. (II) Connections with Kant's View. 603. A. The Nature of Space cannot be determined by Psychological Investiga- tions. 604-606. (I) These show indeed that Spatial Intuition arises in us from the Re- ciprocal Action of Non-Spatial Impressions. 604. (II) But this proves nothing as to the Spatial or Non-Spatial Character of the External World. 605. B. But the Nature of Space can be determined only by a Metaphysical Dis- cussion as to the Kind of Reality Space could have on account of its Signification. 606-610. (I) Its Signification. 606-609. (A) Unsatisfactory Statements of its Signification. 606. i. An Infinite Something or Property. ii. Form, Order, or Relation. iii. Even "Background" or Possibility of Juxtaposition in- volves a Circle in Proof. (B) The Better Method of reaching its real Signification seems to be to examine the Law of Juxtaposition, which is seen to be peculiar in that it is not like the Formative Law which a Con- cept imposes on its Examples. 607-609. i. These give no real Coordination — establish no significant Connection between the Examples. 607. ii. But it is exactly this that the Law of Juxtaposition does do; it combines all the different Instances of its Application into one Whole; hence here for the first time Coordination has a special meaning. 608 92 iii. We come thus to the Real Signification of Space, as an In- tuition, which appears to us as the all-embracing Whole, in which and through which is possible the Multiplicity of all those Relations, from the Summation of which it has itself really originated. (II) The Consequent Kind of Reality which Space can have. 609-610. (A) Not, even on former Views, Pre-existing Real Empty Form; nor Pre-existing Real Relations. 609. (B) Still less, on our View can Space have its Existence elsewhere than in the Mind. (C) The exact Kind of Reality which it can have is to be found in its Existence as Intuition in Ideating Beings. 610. II. The Supersensuous World. § 2-3. A. The Correspondence of the Real Intellectual and of the Apparent Spatial Places of Things. §2. (I) It is probably impossible either to prove that Space is a Subjective Form of only Human Intuition, or to prove the Universal Necessity of the Intuition of Space. 611. (II) But even the most extreme Views of the Phenomenal Nature of Space can only explain the Applicability of Space to the World by the Assumption of some Correspondence between the Apparent Spatial and the Real Intellectual Relations. 612. (Ill) The Development of this Standpoint of Correspondence. 613-617. (A) The Observed Natural Capacity of Spatial Images to give sensi- ble form to Intellectual Relations. 613. (B) But these Intellectual Relations have still a recognized special Meaning of their own, which is only reflected in their Spatial Form, without being bound to it. 614. (C) The Spatial Appearance of the World does not altogether re- sult from the mere Existence of the Intellectual Order among Things ; it is only complete when this Order has exerted its In fluence upon those to whom it is to appear. 615. i. Hence the Spatial Appearance of the World cannot be the Same to all by whom it is intuited. ii. Yet these Different Appearances are not without Connec- tion. iii. Under these Conditions of merely subjectively intuited Space, we have in point of fact exactly what would be afforded us by a real Objective Existence of Space if such were possible. 616. iv. The Fundamental Notions of Natural Philosophy, however, must be here left out of account. B. Removal of even the Intellectual Relations between Things. The Imme- diate Reciprocal Action of Things is the Sole Reality. § 3. (I) Things do not, in fact, constitute a Motionless Organization of a Manifold ; hence either the Nature or Relations of Things must be mutable. 617-622. (A) The Relations are not Mutable ; indeed even in the Real In- tellectual World there are no Relations between Things. 618. (B) But the Sole Reality is the Reciprocal Action of Things, exer- 11. 111. 93 cised directly without Mediation, i. e., the Natures of Things are Mutable. 619-622. i. Some Immediate Reciprocal Action is a Necessity. 619. The only Process — Mediation — which can take place is a Process of the gradual Completion of Causes as yet incom- plete. 620. Hence Reciprocal Action is not rendered less thinkable by our not allowing of anything between Things, and is itself the Sole Reality. 621. (II) This asserted Mutability of Things is entirely in harmony with their real Unity, as that Consistency of Meaning of which the changing States of a Thing are only the varied Expressions. 622. III. Summary. § 4. A. Proposition IV. The Nature of a Thing is One as regards its Consist- ency, but, within the limits of this Consistency of Meaning, Mutable. (Last part of § 3.) B. Proposition V. The Objective Relations of Things do not consist in Spa- tial Movements. Space exists only in Things as the form of an Intuition through which they themselves become conscious of their Supersensuous Relations to one another. (§ 1-2.) C. Proposition VI. Even the Supersensuous Order of the World does not consist in a tissue of complicated Relations between Things, but only in the Totality of the Reciprocal Action of Things. (§ 3.) CHAPTER III. The Real and the Ideal (Spirit). A Closer Determination of the Nature of the Real, showing that the Contra- dictions involved in the Common Notion of Things allow us to give Realness only to that which is of the Nature of Mind — that which exists for Self. Introduction. 626-628. A. The Preceding Results have been of essentially Formal Significance. We have not determined that Real What of Things — that Nature by which each is differenced from others. 626. B. This Question cannot be evaded by a simple Confession of Ignorance, for this is not merely an Ignorance about Particulars, but we have not even a General Notion of the Essential Nature of a Thing, which should show the Possibility of Things at all. 627. C. This is manifest from the Fact that the Formal Conditions, which we have required from all Being and Action, cannot be satisfied by Things as they are commonly thought. I. The Contradictions in the Notion of Things (as commonly thought) and their Formal Determinations, which show that these make Demands which Things thought as Self-less cannot fulfill. § I. A. Difficulties as to the What of Things. 628-632. (I) We have found that the Being of Things is not — (A) Sensible Qualities. 628. (B) Supersensible Intellectual Qualities. (C) Unknown Qualities. 629. (D) Simply Unknown. (E) Merely a Significant Thought. 630. 94 i. The Theory, ii. The Defect. (II) But we seem to need to think of the What of a Thing as an Opera- tive Idea. 631-632. (A) But it is we who give this Reality to the Idea. 631. (B) Hence, Things, as commonly thought, cannot meet this De- mand. 632. B. Difficulties as to the Unity of Things. 632-634. (I) We have found the Unity of Things to consist in the Logical Con- nection between their Internal States, and the only applicable Case of such Unity we know is in our own Inner Life. 632. (II) And in our own Inner Life it is only because vi^ appear to ourselves to be Unity, that in truth we are Unity. The only Real Unity therefore that we are able to think depends on Consciousness ; and hence, Things, as commonly thought, cannot meet this Demand 633- C. Difficulties as to the Mode of Existence of Things. 634-636. (I) We have found that the Reciprocal Action of Things must take the place of all Relations between Things, as the Sole Reality. 634. (II) But such Reciprocal Action implies a Suffering or Passion in a Being, which can take place only where there is Feeling and Conscious- ness, and hence Things, as commonly thought, cannot meet this Demand. 635. II. Three Possible Inferences from these Contradictions which seem to exclude each other, and which yet all confirm the Invalid Conception of Things as commonly thought. § 2. Transition and Introduction. 636. A. Subjective Idealism must still presuppose Things in some sense, and Re- ciprocal Action between them and us. 637-638. B. Objective Idealism. Only Minds are Real. 638-641. (I) Its Negative Ground. The very Content of our Idea of the World forbids us to concede its Reality except as Appearance. 639-640. (A) The Reality of other Minds is granted. 639. (B) But not the Reality of the Phenomenal World which is Com- mon to all Minds. i. This i- not to be taken as due to Individual Minds, ii. And we cannot rationally ascribe it to a Multitude of Things, since the Assumption of Things has no other use for us than this, that Things mark for us fixed Positions in the Real World. 640. (II) Its Positive Ground. Its Explanation of the Phenomenal World Things are Acts of the Infinite wrought within Minds alone or States which the Infinite experiences nowhere but in Minds- the Unity of the Infinite itself thus bringing to pass the Phenomenal World which is Common to all Minds. 640-641. C. The Third Path. All that is Real is Mind. Introduction. 642. (I) The View has many Grounds. (II) The Real Distinction between this View and Objective Idealism 643-646. ij I 95 (A) Not that Idealism denies that Things are "External" to God, and that this View asserts it, thus assuming that Realness is a definite Formal Relation to God. 643. ^^^ < "Ir?" 1\'°'^ °^ ^^''^''" ^^''^^' "^^^ ^°"1^ be gained for Self-less Things by such Externality, and what could be the real Meaning of such Externality? 644-646. i. Nothing whatever could be gained for Self-less, Uncon- scious Things ; they would only lose in Reality. 645 II. Hence it is seen that this very Existence for Self is the * 'Externality" or Realness wanted. (C) Conclusion. 646-647. i. Realness is the special Kind of Reality which we ascribe to Ihings (not to Actions). 646. ii. This Realness is the Being of that which exists for Self, lii. But as there are Degrees of Consciousness, so there are De- grees of Realness in Things, while all continue to be imma- nent in the Infinite. iv. Hence the Distinction between Idealism and the View that Ail that IS Real is of the nature of Mind, is that Idealism convinced of the Selflessness of Things, on this account wili not allow that they are more than States of the Infinite • while the other View leaves undecided the question whether this Assumption of Selflessness is appropriate, holding how- ever, that It is far more likely to be ^appropriate, and so ^^'at Things are all of the nature of Mind. 647 III. What It is that we must seek to Construct, and What it is that we have to Recognize as immediately Given. § 3-4. Introduction. 647-649. ''^ I^^''?"x,'"^ Considerations seem nt least to show that there is in Mind the Nature of a Real Being. 647. (II) But a Demand for the further Explanation of Mind will still be made. 648. (Ill) But to attempt this seems to us to be to take a decided step into the perverse region of those Investigations which seek to know by what Machinery Reality is manufactured. Hence arises the Question of S 3~4' A. Only so far as Changing Action depends upon Altering Conditions has Prlb'lems.'"t Psychology, to solve Explanatory and Constructive (I) Illustrations of the Constructive Mania which would end by de duc.ng the whole Positive Content of Real Things from mere Mod- ihcations of Formal Conditions. 649. (A) The Tendency to regard the Sensations of Light, Colors Sound, etc., as no more different than their External Occa- sioning Causes, i. e. as really determined in Nature by these mere Occasions. 649-650. (B) The Similar Tendency to the merely Formal Explanation of Feelings, and Stirrings of the Will. 650. (II) All such Explanations, even if correct, teach us only the Occasion ing Conditions of the Changing Action of Things, not the Produc- 96 ing Causes of the real Content of Things. Science cannot therefore hope to make out, from any data, how it can happen at all that there can be Ideas, Feelings, and Volitions, and that one Inner State can influence another. It can only accept all this as Given. 651. B. TheExjlanation of this Mania for Constructing what is most Real and hence;.nnust be accepted as simply Given. § 4. Introduction. 652. (A) It will be insisted that there is still a Constructive Task within the Mind. (B) This is due particularly to the Ineradicable Inclination to regard the "Contingent Aspects," the Auxiliary Notions and Relations by which we succeed in thinking the Connection between Real Things when they already exist, as Actual Machinery by means of which those Things come to exist. (I) The Process by which the Mind really reaches its Ontological No- tions from itself, and then applies them in Explanation of itself. 653. (II) This is an Inevitable Process of our Thinking, but it is possible nevertheless to be conscious that all those Ontological Notions are but Products of Thought ; and this True State of the Case forces itself upon us on different Occasions, with different degrees of clear- ness. 654-656. (A) In the Thought that "Our Ego possesses Self-Consciousness." 654. (B) In the Conception of Substance and Attributes. 655. (C) In the Conception of Excitation and Reaction. (D) In the Conception of the Homogeneity of reciprocally acting Elements. (Ill) It is especially in those Cases, in which we are constrained always to return to the same Modes of conceiving Reality, that these in- evitably appear to us as Conditions which not only make our Knowl- edge of the Thing possible, but make the Thing itself possible. 656. IV. Summary of the Chapter. § 5. A. Proposition VII. The Demands made by the Notion of Things and their Formal Determinations can be fulfilled only by that which is of the nature of Mind. (§1.) B. Proposition VIII. Hence either only Minds exist, or Things are Beings which share with Minds in various degrees the general Characteristic of Mentality, namely Self- Existence. (First Part of § 2.) C. Proposition IX. The Realness of Things and their Self-Existence are notions which have precisely the Same Significance. (Last Part of § 2, §3-4.) (1) A Mind which continues immanent in the Infinite, directly that it ex- ists for Self, has in this very Self-Existence the fullest Realness. (2) Realness is not to be understood as a Consequence attached to Self- Existence. It is only the Living Mind that is, and nothing is before it or external to it; but it exists in such a way that it can only make its own Existence and Action Objects of Reflection by giving to their manifold Content a Framework of Abstractions, Connections, etc., which easily come to appear as being Conditions of its own Reality. f 97 CHAPTER IV. The Personality of God. An Investigation of the Question of the Personality of God, showing that the Common Proofs of the Existence of God do not bring us to the Personality of the Infinite ; that the Theories of the Impersonal Form of the Supreme Being are un- tenable ; that the Objections to the Possibility of the Personality of the Infinite are not valid; that, in fact. Personality is Complete only in the Infinite. Introduction to the Chapter. § i. Faith and Thought. Answers to Objections to Philosophical Investigation here. Introduction. . 659. A. The First Objection and its Answer. 660. (I) The Objection. Concerning the Ultimate Questions of Faith, Phil- osophical Investigations must remain resultless. (II) The Answer. Whatever the View of the Origin of Religious Truths, unquestionably something will be left to be done by Scientific Cog- nition. Reason must be able at least to have some Understanding of the Revealed Truth. A Religion cannot consist simply of Mys- teries. B. The Second Objection and its Answer. (I) The Objection. But Religious Faith like Scientific, affords a Cer- tainty of that which no Cognition can grasp. (II) The Answer. There is a germ of Truth here, but there is an essen- tial Difference between Scientific and Religious Faith. 661. (A) Scientific Faith is only in Universal Propositions, which are at bottom but the very Nature of Cognizing Reason itself. (B) Religious Faith is essentially in the Reality of some Being or Event or Series of Events— Facts. But not more than its own Being can be known to the Mind in immediate consciousness. C. The Third Objection and its Answer. (I) The Objection. Religious Faith is rather comparable to the Intui- tion by which Content is given to Universal Principles. (II) The Answer. There is Truth here ; but every sensuous Impression regarded in itself is but a way in which we are affected ; in itself it gives no knowledge of any Matter of Fact. So also the Divine In- fluence would produce merely a feeling, a mood, a mode of affec- tion; what is thus experienced becomes a Revelation only through some Work of Reflection. 662. Conclusion of Section. The Consequent Limitations of Philosophical Inves- tigation in the Religious Sphere. I. An Examination of the Common Proofs for the Existence of God, showing their Failure fully to reach a Personal God. § 2. Introduction. 663. The Inherent Difficulty of the merely Syllogistic Proofs of the Uncondi- tioned. They presuppose the Absolute Validity of a Truth which Knits all the World together. 663. A. The Cosmological Proof. 664-666. This concludes from the Contingent and Conditioned Character of every- thing in the World to the Existence of a Necessary and Unconditioned and hence absolutely Perfect Being. 98 (I) Examination of the Notions "Contingent" and **Necessary." 664- 665. (A) In their strict Speculative Meaning, * 'Contingent" and "Con- ditioned" are contradictory, as are also ''Necessary" and "Un- conditioned." 664. (B) As Determinations of Value. Taken thus, ''Necessary" connotes such unconditional Value that it seems in virtue of this Value to deserve also uncondi- tional Existence. Only in such a sense can it be required that the Supreme Principle of the Universe should be necessary. 665. (II) Examination of the Notion, "Perfection." "Unconditioned" is not confined to a Perfect Being. (Ill) Conclusion. The Cosmological Proof can not attain to the Relig- ious Conception of God, but to the Metaphysical Conception of the Unconditioned, and is not even able to establish the Unity of this Unconditioned. 666. B. The Teleological Proof. 666-669. This Proof is Unable to fulfill the four Requirements necessarily made upon it. (I) It is unable to show that there is in the World a Purposive Connec- tion which cannot result from an undesigned Cooperation of Forces 666. (II) It is unable to show that Purposiveness pervades the whole World harmoniously and without Exception. 667. (III) Not only the Defectiveness of Scientific Knowledge, but also the Internal Difficulties of the Idea of Design itself when applied to God hinders the Argument in showing that Creative Wisdom in carrying out its Designs never experiences Opposition. (IV) The Proof is unable to show the Unconditional Worth and the Sacredness of the Designs which we plainly see pursued in the World. 668. Conclusion on the Teleological and Cosmological Proofs. 668-669. (I) The Teleological Proof is destitute of all Demonstrative Force, and what it seeks is better stated in the Ontological Proof. (II) The Cosmological Proof is better replaced by the Proof of One Infinite Substance from the possibility of Reciprocal Action. C. The Ontological Proof. 669-671. (I) The Various Forms of putting it. 669. (A) The false Scholastic Form. (B) Anselm's Form is more suggestive. 670. (C) The Fundamental Thought involved is that that which is most Worthy must exist. It would be intolerable to think other- wise. (II) Plainly this Conviction is not logically Demonstrable. The Real Force of the Ontological Proof is in its Expression of the Imme- diate Certainty of this Conviction, and it is this Conviction which carries the Teleological Proof far beyond its logical inferences. (Ill) But even this Conviction gives no formal Determinateness to the Nature of God. 671. Vrf / y \ \\ 99 II. The Untenableness of the Theories of the Impersonal Form of the Supreme Being. § 3. Introduction. 672-673. (I) The Limitation of our Theme to the Defense of the Notion of a Personal God. 672. (II) How the Theories of the Impersonal Forms of the Supreme Being arose against Natural Instinct. A. The Supreme Being as a Moral World Order. 673-676. (I) No Order can precede the ordered Material. 673. (II) The Conception of an Aciivg Order either is without meaning, or leads back inevitably to the Conception of an Ordering Being. 674. (III) And the Conception of a Moral Order, to be thinkable, really in- volves the Conception of a Personal God. 676. B. The Supreme Being as Infinite Substance— Pantheism; its Relation to our View. 676-677. (I) Pantheism makes the Spatial World, Existent Being. 677. (II) Regards the inexhaustible Force of the Unconditioned as manifest- ing itself in Extended Figures. (Ill) Makes the Spiritual World a Development from the Material. (IV) Suppresses all that is Finite in favor of the Infinite. C. The Supreme Being as Self-developing Idea will be treated later. III. Answers to Objections to the Possibility of the Personality of the Infinite. § 4. A. The Conceptions of the Relation of the Ego and Non-Ego, as the Basis of Objections to the Personality of God. 678-685. The Three Interpretations: (1) What the term Ego denotes can be comprehended in Reflective Analy- sis only by reference to the Non-Ego. (2) It is not conceivable that this Content of the Ego should be experi- enced without that contrasted Non-Ego being experienced at the same time. (3) The Existence and Active Influence of a Non-Ego is the Condition without which the Being upon which this Influence works could not be an Ego. (I) As to the First Two Interpretations. We admit that the Ego is thinkable only in relation to the Non-Ego, but we add that it may be experienced ^x^yxoM's, to and out of every such Relation, and that to this is due the Possibility of its subsequently becoming thinkable in that Relation. 678-680. (II) As to the Third Interpretation. 680-685. (A) That Form of the View, which rests on ill-chosen Analogies which are supposed to show how an Activity originally directed entirely outwards, by the Resistance of the Non-Ego becomes transformed into Self-Consciousness, may be set aside at once. 680. (B) A more respectable Form of the View holds that Self-Con- sciousness could never be developed even in a Being whose Nature is capable of it, without the Cooperation and Educative Influences of an External World. i. It is not sufficient to answer that this Educative Stimu- lation is not necessary for the Nature of God, since that is IV lOO Self-cognizant Idea, eternally unchangeable. For Person- ality can never belong to any Idea but only to something which changes, suffers, and reacts. 682. ii. Yet the Transference of the Conditions of Finite Person- ality to the Personality of the Infinite is not justified 68^- 685. ' ^ a. That which is only approximately possible for the Finite Mind— the Conditioning of its Life by itself— takes place without limit in God, and therefore no Contrast of an External World is necessary for Him. 683. b. As to the Primary Impulse in God, every Theory of the Universe must somehow and somewhere recognize the Actual Movement itself as an originally given Reality. 684. B. Personality is really Complete only in God. 685-687. (I) Since the Finite Being always works with Powers with which it did not endow itself, and according to Laws which it did not establish. (II) The Limitations which arise in the case of the Finite Being from its being a Part in a Whole. 686. (Ill) Still less do Finite Beings exist wholly /or themselves in a temporal point of view. Much disappears from Memory. Summary of Results. §5. A. ProposiUon X. Sel'fhood, th« Essence of all Personality, does not depend on any Opposu.on of the Ego to a Non-Ego, but it consists in an imme- diate Self-Existence. B. Proposition XI. For the Infinite only is there possible a Self Existence wh.ch needs neither to be initiated nor to be continuously developed by something not itself. v "] C. Proposition XII. Perfect Personality is in God only. CHAPTER V. God .\nd the World. An Investigation of the Difficulties connected with the thought of the Relation between God and the World: Dilficulties as .„ the Source of Iternal Truths as .0 Creafon Preservation, and Government; as to the Possible Harmony o'th^ Spheres of Actuality, Necessity, and Ideality-Reality, Laws, and the Good Introduction to the Chapter. §1. / , c oooa. ^A. Transition. 689. B. The Theme of the Chapter. ^' J^l^^T '^ '^' ^'''"'^ '^'"'^^^ ""^ '^^'' R^I-t'^n to God. 8 2 A. T^he Relation of the Laws of Cognition, and of the Course of Events to the Being of God. 690-698. ^^venis 10 (I) Inadequate Theories of the Relation. 690-693. (A) The Recognition of the Eternal Truths as Primary and Uncon- ditioned, as being an absolutely valid Necessity, to which even the Living Reality of God is subject. 690-692. i. This would not only involve a Contradiction as to the Un- conditionedness of God. 69a ) ^ lOI ii. But also involves another Contradiction as to the Nature of Truth. The whole body of Truth cannot precede the whole of Reality or that One Supreme Being from which it flows, as though it were a power existing in vacuo; for of Truths, we can only say that they are valid, not that they exist. (B) The Theory that the Eternal Truths are Creations of God. 692. This View too involves Contradiction in the Notion of Truth; for Truths can no more be made than they can exist independ- ent of Reality. Still more impossible is it to imagine Creative Activity directed to such an impossible Aim as the Original Production of all Truth. (C) The Middle View, that these Eternal Truths are the Necessary Consequences of God's own Being. 693. This is also impossible, for the Conception presupposes some universal intrinsically Valid Standard. (II) The Resultlessness of all these Views is due to the Fact that they use the name God as merely a provisional anticipatory designation of a Being thought of as not yet full and complete in his Reality. That this is unthinkable may be shown by considering two typical Questions representing the Metaphysical and Ethical Difficulties of the Subject. 693-699. (A) The Representative Metaphysical Difficulty involved in the Ori- gin of Eternal Truths. 694-698. i. What is the Real Meaning of Creating Truth? 694-695. a. The Misleading though Common Mathematical Form of the Question as to the Metaphysical Difficulty presup- poses the Prior Validity of the Law of Identity. 694. b. Hence, more generally expressed, the Question would run thus: Can the Will of God establish the Law of Identity, so as by means of it to make true some Indi- vidual Relation which contradicts it? 695. (i) The Second Clause of the Question again really pre- supposes an Existing Standard of Truth, and more- over looks to seeking in God an Omnipotence devoid of Intelligence, (ii) Hence the Question becomes : Whether the Trutb which is not yet can be established by God — whether God can bring about the Production of the whole unnameable Region within which there is a Distinc- tion, not previously existent, between the True and the Untrue, the Possible and the Impossible. Now if this is the Real Meaning of Creating Truth, who is the God to whom we ascribe this Creation? Is He not the Perfect and Complete God in whose Being we imagine that all Truth already is? The Divine Power cannot be thought as without Content and without Direction. Hence just that which we know as the Sum of the Eternal Truths is the Mode of Action of Omnipotence, but not its Product. 697. 11. 111. Conclusion, 1 02 (B) The Representative Ethical Difficulty in the Question: How can God himself be True, if not subject to Truth? 698 It IS impossible to understand Truth as an Object of Recoeni- t|on for any Being that does not by its own Nature participate ,„ -r .1. ^'j' '''f^^°" *" ""y "ay impossible to set up in opposition to Truth a God for whom Truth has as yet no Validity, whether we re gard H.m as ,ts Creator, or as Accommodating Himself to it. It is only through God's ExisUm, that Truth subsists ^ ^' IXiT"" °' ''^'"'""^"'•"^ °f ^'-'" ^^""h 'o the Being of God. ject of Recognuton, unless that Will already contains that Good in the same way as we have said that Truth must be contained by the Mind which apprehends it. 698. ^ "■ IXlT^^ Conditions of the Relation between God and the World 8 , ^ Introduction. The Question concerns only the Meaning and Religious Worth of the Permanent Relation between Creator and Creature established by Creation, regarded as having taken place. (1) Creation is not an Act of God. 700-703 '""^ rTHr. ^"'^"7, '^''''°" '"' ""' ^''* '^ ""'' "-^ '"ink we di- rectly feel in Movement the transmission of Active Will into our Limbs, and wish to find the same Self-Enjoyment of Living Energy m God. 700. ** (B) But a well-known Psychological Illusion has here misled us ; in fact, the essential Characteristic of an Act is that it is the col sequence of a Volition which willed it and nothing else. 70" (C) Moreover, ,n the sense in which we use Work of Men it can not be ascribed to God. He will be directly conscious 'of ,.,.; consequence of h s Will as being what it is, and so there wlu he^nc. ..m.t_at.ons tn the Self-Enjoyment of his own Vitality J (II) Creation is not an Emanation from the Divine Intelligence. 703- Introduction. The Question of Insight as preceding Will in God. (A) There is a Possibility of Distinction between the Realized and Unrealized Thoughts of God. Our thoughts concer g h"^ Creative Action must set out not from the equal Possib if.y of that which was Uncreated, but from its Impossibility which was originally recognized by Him. 703-70C ' ^^j'.'^'j^ ^'""^^^-" ""-^^ -"e Correction 'and Explanation. i. It cannot mean that the Images of different Worlds were pr^ent to and known by God. as being .„ M,W.« pos" ible or impossible. 705. 103 ii. But the Thoughts of the Non-Existent are Thoughts which on account of their Content— of their own Resultlessness, their Incoherence and the Incapacity of Development of their Constituents— could neither form Worlds nor enter into connection with those Thoughts of Existing Things which are connected and logically consistent. Hence Will and Intelligence are not here to be separated. 705-706. (Ill) Conclusion as to Creation. The World proceeds from the Will of God. 706-707. (A) We do not use the expression, the World is the Product of His Will. 706. (B) But yet we say the World was willed by God, since the Real Nature of Will is only the Approval by which the Being that wills attributes to himself that which he wills. It is such an uniform and Unchanging Will that we have regarded as con- nected with or eternally based upon the Divine Thought of the World. 706-707. B. The Conception of the Relation between God and the World implied in Preservation and Government. How does the Freedom of the Finite consist with the Unconditionedness and Omniscience of the Infinite? §4. Introduction. The Question. 707. (I) Our Inquiry can end only with a Po.stulate. 708. (II) The Ideality of Time, as the Ground of the Answer. 708-712. (A) Must we not presuppose at least an actual Temporal Succession? 709-711. i. Much may be said in answer to this natural Objection with- out invalidating it. 709-711. a. There are Considerations tending to show that the true Reality in any Succession is only the conditioning Force, unaffected by Time. 709. b. The Whole of Reality may thus be considered as a Whole of xMembers which condition one another, and is comparable to a System of Truths; Finite Beings being themselves members of this Whole, and hence always seeing events in Time. 7 to. ii. This View may be said to disprove the Existence of Un- ending Empty Time, but it cannot by any ingenious torture of thought really avoid the temporal Succession of Events. 711. (B) But the necessary Recognition of the Course of Time is con- nected in us with a strong feeling that the Recognition cannot contain any Final Utterance on the subject. In some real sense the Past and Future are held still to exist. (Ill") Conclusion. 712-713. (A) As to the Omniscience of God. God Himself is not a Member of the Whole of Reality, but, as its all embracing Essence, is as near to any one part of the Reality as to any other, and so knows the Infinite Whole as Present. 712. (B) As to the Freedom of the Finite. Free Actions also find their place in this Timeless Reality, not as non-existent and future. 104 but as Existent. Hence Omniscience can observe Eree Action as something real. 713. III. The Relation between God and the World implied in the Inventive Thought by which God has given Content, Order, and End to the World. The Re- lation of the Spheres of the Actual, the Necessary, and the Good. § 5-7. A. The Relation of Content and Order — Reality and Laws. 713-715. Introduction. 713. (I) That Direction of the Eternal Power which led to the Existing World of Forms is the Original, First, and Only Reality. 714. (II) But we are not able to show just how the Universal Laws are con- nected with Reality. (A) We know only a very Small Part of Reality. (B) And this Question really becomes absorbed in the more impor- tant one. In what connection both stand to that which has Eternal Worth? 715. B. The Relation of the Three — Content, Order, End — Reality, Laws, and the Good. The Postulate of their Harmony : There is only the One Real Power appearing to us under the threefold image of an End to be realized — namely, some definite Good — then on account of the definite- ness of this, a formed and developing Reality, and finally in this Reality an unvarying reign of Law. 715-726. (I) The Insurmountable Difficulty in the way of carrying out scientifically this Postulate — in the Existence of Evil and of Sin in Nature and History. 716-719. (A) Inadequate Explanations. 716. (B) Faith only is here possible. 717. (C) Additional Considerations. § 6. i. We may appropriately emphasize the Smallness of our View of the World. ii. Our Struggle here is against the Confidence of Views which impoverish Faith without enriching Knowledge. 718. (II) The Unity of the Three Principles in a Living Love. § 7. (A) The Conceptions of Good and of Good Things reached through Conscience and Feeling. 719. i. In the Case of the Agreeable and Useful, we regard '*Good" here as merely a Generalization. ii. In the Case of the Morally Good, there is hope of reaching some Universal which actually exists in such Universality — the Good-initself. 720. (B) The Conception of the Good-in-itself. 720-721. i. The Popular View ends in the Recognition of a Formal Re- lation of Wills as the Supreme Good, ii. The True View holds that Good and Good Things do not exist as such, independent of the feeling, willing and know- ing Mind. What is Good in itself is some felt Bliss ; what we call Good Things are Means to this Good ; the only Thing that is really Good is that Living Love that wills the Blessedness of Others. 721. (C) This Living Love — the Goodin-itself—As Reality, Law, Worth. (D) This Postulate cannot be scientifically proved. 722-726. 10s i. It would require that all the Moral Ideas should be ex- Plnmed from Love. This can be done with fair Success. ii. It would require that Existing Reality should be explained from Love. This is possible only i„ a very modes, degree iii. It would require that the Eternal Truths should similarly be explained. This involves detailed Requirements which arl impossible of Fulfillment. 724-726 wnicn are (E) Hence we ca„ only end in Faith in the Ultimate Harmony of all in Living Love. 726. ^ CONCLUSION OF THE ENTIRE WORK. S 8 Introduction. 727. I. The Scientific Attitude which has guided the whole Ta.W >,,« k one hand a Struggle ngainst Veneration of meTe e'Tv For^s I " 'I' other, a Struggle against all Fanaticism. ^ ' ™'' ""^' "'^ ^^^ II. The Consequent Double Attitude towari Mechanism R.c *r re tific Worth of Mechanical Investigation in Nat andlS o^T'^nd R^f "." Hig'^Isl'Rea'lir •"^'" '""" ^^ "^ '" '^ --^-^^!^ in. Hence the Sum of Wisdom has seemed to be neither to neelect Me.h • nor to make it other than Subordinate. 728 ^ Mechanism A. The Universal is everywhere inferior to the Particular. L r- '"'^ "*^' '^ ^"^ ""Slit to be. is not Matter and is still W Idea but ,s the Living Personal Spirit of God and the World of P sonal Spirits which He has created ^ ^"' »'. « • » « • • • • * • « • • • > • • • k • • « « • • • • t • • * • • • • « • • • • • • • • • • • • • ■• • • • •• •• « « ( './. • >> J • • • a • • • % V • » • • • • * • .»••••• • • • • _• • « • • • *■<* • • 4* > m m\' ■»— ^ jfeS3^5«r« COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES This book is due on the date indicated below, or at the expiration of a definite period after the date of borrowing, as )^ provided by the rules of the Library or by special arrange- ment with the Librarian in charge. DATE BORROWED DATE DUE OCT 1 6 1950 DATE BORROWED NOV 1 195' NOV 1 7 1950 DATE DUE >^' ^i W93L91 -^ COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES %^Wm^ Butler C193L91 Lotze ■>vi ^i^J^-jQju^^^^ —