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AUTHOR: 
 
 SWEDENBORG, 
 EMANUEL 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 ONTOLOGY: FROM A 
 PHOTOLITHOGRAPHIC 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 PHILADELPHIA 
 
 DA TE : 
 
 1880 
 
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 Oitolo'^ia. Enp;, Cabell, 
 
 Swedenborg, Emanuel, 1688-1772, • 
 
 Ontology, by Einanuel Swedenborg, From a photo- 
 lithographic copy of the original Latin manu* 
 script still preserved in the library of the , 
 Academy of aciences at Stockholm. Tranalated by ^ 
 Philip B, Cabell ... Philadelphia, Printed by 
 Jo S, Lippinoott k oo, , 1880. 
 
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 :% 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 BY 
 
 EMANUEL SWEDENBOKG. 
 
 FROM A PHOTOLITHOGRAPHIC COPY OF THE ORIGINAL LATIN 
 
 MANUSCRIPT STILL PRESERVED IN THE LIBRARY OF 
 
 THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AT STOCKHOLM. 
 
 
 TRANSLATED BV 
 
 PHILIP B. CABELL, A.M., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT LANGUAGES IN URBANA UNIVERSITY. 
 
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 „ . . P,RINTED BY * 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO., THILADELPHIA. 
 
 1880. 
 
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 ADYEETISEMENT. 
 
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 Copyright, 1880, by Philip B. Cabkll, A.M. 
 
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 In Hs preface to tte Latin edition of Swedenborg's « De 
 Anima" Dr. Emanuel Tafel mentions a short tract entitled " De 
 Oniologia," which was bound in the same MS. volume with the 
 larger treatise. The publication of this tract, Dr. Tafel says, 
 was omitted at the time in deference to the wishes of the Swe- 
 denborg Society, yet he deemed it of such importance that he 
 gave its table of contents in the preface before mentioned. 
 This special notice in so distinguished a quarter, and the ready 
 access given to Swedenborg's posthumous MSS. by the Photo- 
 lithographic copies of them, so ably edited by Dr. R. L. Tatel, 
 led to the transcription and translation of the tract. The gen- 
 erosity of a Boston gentleman,* who had seen a notice of its 
 contents, supplied the means for its publication. 
 
 It is believed that the treatise will be useful in more clearly 
 defining certain philosophical terms in frequent use through- 
 out Swedenborg's scientific writings. Although it was probably 
 written at some period prior to the author's illumination, it 
 seems quite reasonable to infer that the meaning of those terms 
 remained essentially the same in his Theological works. 
 
 The translator is quite aware of imperfections in his perform- 
 ance. His task, though brief, was not an easy one. The hand- 
 writing of the original is in parts so obscure that there are still a 
 few passages in which the text has not been determined beyond 
 
 * Kev. Wm. R. Alger. 
 
 8 
 
 ^) 
 
 «J^;>;'L, 
 
^ ADVERTISEMENT, 
 
 doubt. Moreover, in subjects so purely abstract, perfect accu- 
 racy and perspicuity are difficult of attainment. K these have 
 been at all approached, it is largely owing to the able assist- 
 ance of friends who have kindly reviewed both the Latin tran- 
 scription and the subsequent version. Without desiring to 
 render them responsible for his own short-comings, the trans- 
 lator acknowledges his obligations to Dr. S. H. Worcester, 
 of Bridgewater, Mass., and Prest. F. Sewall, of Urbana Uni- 
 versity. 
 
 Urbana, Ohio, Nov. 6th, 1880. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER • PAGE 
 
 I. — Form— Formal Cause "^ 
 
 11. — Figure l^.- 
 
 ni. — Organ — Structure l'^ 
 
 IV. — State — Changes op State 15 
 
 V. — Substance 1*^ 
 
 VI.— Matter— Material 20 
 
 VII. Extent — Extension— Continuous — Contiguous— Part 24 
 
 VIII.— Body— Things Corporeal 27 
 
 IX. — Essence — Essentials 29 
 
 X. — Attribute ^^ 
 
 XI. — Predicate ^^ 
 
 XII.— Subject . • ^'^ 
 
 XIII. — Affection ^'^ 
 
 XIV.— Accidents . . . • ^^ 
 
 XV. — Contingents ^^ 
 
 XVI. — Modes— Modification ^^ 
 
ONTOLOGY.* 
 
 ?4 
 
 L»y 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 ^ FOKM— FOKMAL CAUSE. 
 
 Form is divided into external and internal External or 
 extrinsic form is that which is outside of the essence of a sub- 
 stance. Thus indeed every accidental form might be called 
 an external form; but by extrinsic form we understand an 
 exemplary cause or idea, according to the hkeness of which 
 an effect is produced. Intririsie form is that which consti- 
 tutes the thing formed either substantial or accidental. Ac- 
 cidental form is that which exists in a substance, whether 
 that substance be spiritual or material, and which, together 
 with that substance, in which it exists, constitutes an acci- 
 dental compound. Intrinsic substantial form is either form- 
 ing or assisting. When forming, it is either regarded as one 
 part of a physical compound, and is then called the form 
 of that part, or it is regarded as the whole of whatever 
 belongs to any given substance, and is then called the form 
 of the whole. Thus the whole essence of the natural body 
 is called its form in this sense. Of form separable from 
 matter there exists only one example, namely, the rational 
 soul. Inseparable form is that which is so bound to matter 
 that it cannot exist or operate outside of matter. This also 
 makes generic and specific forms. Assisting form is that 
 which does not actuate or form its own matter, but only 
 assists it, bestowing upon it motion and operation. Form, in 
 a wider acceptation of the term, is divided into metaphysical 
 
 * See vol. vi., pp. 323-342, PhotoUth, 7 
 
g ONTOLOGY, 
 
 and physical. Metaphysical form, in the sense of essence, 
 is the whole essence of a substantial thing, or, according to 
 others, its entire nature. No form constitutes s, compound, 
 •except in conjunction with matter of some kind. Some 
 have asserted that form pre-exists in matter before the gen- 
 eration of a thing. Others have said that forms are actually 
 in matter before things are generated; nevertheless, that 
 they do not appear, but, during the confusion of the forces 
 resident in matter, they, as it were, lie hid, and become 
 manifest by means of generation : as for instance, the plant, 
 in the matter of a seed. Others have asserted that^ before 
 generation, form has actual esse in matter, imperfect indeed, 
 and as it were, inchoate ; but that, by means ^ of gene- 
 ration, form begins to be in matter according to its perfect 
 esse. Still others have said that all substantial forms are 
 made anew by the act of creation. The Peripatetic philoso- 
 phers taught that certain substantial forms are spiritual and 
 independent of matter, though truly forming it ; but that 
 there are other material forms so inherent in matter, that 
 they depend upon it for their creation and being. Of the 
 former kind are human souls alone. Robert Baron, 
 
 Metaphysics. 
 
 Form is substance incomplete and imperfect, or half-sub- 
 stance, but joined to matter it becomes substance entire. 
 Form is described as a second principle, second part, or 
 second ingredient of natural things. These regard not the 
 potency of form, but its actuality, which latter it derives from 
 matter. Aristotle says that form desires matter as the female 
 does the male. Form is that which not only gives esse to 
 things, but which also makes them diverse, and distinguishes 
 one from another. Dupleix. 
 
 Essential determinations are what is commonly called form, 
 likewise also formal cause. He understands the form of the 
 human body, who understands, not only its structure, conse- 
 quently the figures of its organic parts, and the manner in which 
 they are joined together, but also the combination of similar 
 parts, whence the organic parts are composed. Similarly, he 
 understands the form of a stone, who knows by what combi- 
 nation the particles are produced and in what manner they 
 are joined together in order that the mass of the stone may 
 
 FORM— FORMAL CAUSE. Q 
 
 result. An ens derives from its form the fact that it is of 
 a given genus or species, and that it is distinguished from 
 others. From form also an ens derives the power of acting 
 in a given manner. Form must be regarded as among the 
 causes of things, for by means of its form we understand 
 why an ens is such as it is, rather than something else, and 
 why it is suited to act in a given manner. Consequently, 
 the reason of these things is contained in the form. It is 
 therefore the principle upon which the ois depends, that it 
 may exist such as it is ; consequently it is a cause of the ens. 
 In this respect essential determinations are called form. 
 Form is, therefore, the principle of the actuality of the ens, 
 upon which doubtless depends the existence of the ens as 
 such ; so that form and essence are thus distinguished from 
 each other, although each of these is constituted by essential 
 determinations; in a different respect however from that 
 which they have to the ens itself. AVolf. 
 
 Form is the entire construction of a body, embracing the 
 composition, co-ordination, subordination, and determination 
 of its parts, whether these be integral parts or the individual 
 parts of a compound, whence that compound derives not only 
 its essence but the quality of its essence. For from the form 
 is derived the fact that the ois is such as it is found to 
 be ; so that from a knowledge of the form, there follows also 
 a knowledge of the quality and essence of any given body, 
 besides also of its dependence and relation to others. For 
 such knowledge involves that of its connexions, position, 
 its order, its fluxion, and many other things, which cause the 
 body to be such as it is, rather than something else. In 
 compounds and in bodies there are matters, or things which 
 flow from matters, and which determine the form. For 
 form, without matter, in corporeal things, is a mere imag- 
 inary entity or an idea which does not really exist. Hence, 
 by some all that is called matter by which form is deter- 
 mined : so that where form is, there is matter ; for, that a 
 
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 J 
 
 10 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 FORM— FORMAL CAUSE. 
 
 11 
 
 thing be a form at all, this it derives from matter. The re- 
 sult is that three principles are established, namely, matter, 
 form, and the privation of form. All that is matter from 
 which is form, but the word material has a different sense so 
 far as it is opposed to spiritual. 
 
 Spiritual form, on the other hand, cannot be called a con- 
 struction, composition, or determination of parts, for all these 
 are terms which apply to forms purely material and corporeal. 
 Yet in spiritual forms there must be understood a certain 
 determination, yea also an ordination of entities and of forces 
 flowing thence, which bear an analogy and a certain corre- 
 spondence to those which exist in bodies. For spiritual forms 
 and their operations exceed all ideas which are material, or 
 which are joined to material things, yea even the very words 
 by which those ideas are expressed. For there exist higher 
 analogies which are too unlimited and too undefined to be 
 expressed by them. Moreover spiritual forms have this in 
 common with others, that spirits derive from their form the 
 fact that they are such as they are understood to be ; and this 
 is the reason why there is given such a variety of spirit, or 
 of spiritual forms. 
 
 In the mean time Simple forms, or forms simply consid- 
 ered, are superior and inferior ; of which some, or all, may 
 occur in a compound form ; as, in the animal body, in which 
 forms simply considered are all contained ; and because we 
 cannot understand of what quality corporeal form can be, 
 without the understanding of simple forms, therefore these 
 latter must be explained. 
 
 External form is taken in two senses: first as inferior form; 
 for inferior form is always exterior, and superior is always 
 interior. Thus the rational mind is an internal form, while 
 the body is an external form ; or, cause is internal form and 
 effect is external form : since, indeed, effect reveals, as in an 
 image, its own cause. Under external form also are included 
 
 1) 
 
 the outward construction and determination of the body, 
 whence are derived its comeliness or deformity, its beauty 
 and loveliness. This external- form is equally the image of 
 the internal form, for in like manner as form has its deter- 
 minations, so also it should have its terminations, which truly 
 correspond with its internal determination. For example, 
 every circular form must consist of perpetual circles as its 
 parts ; and the common circle itself, by its own determi- 
 nation indicates what its internal form is. Thus internal 
 and external forms will correspond. Otherwise an angular 
 form might externally assume the circular form, or even 
 the spiral, not however of itself or of its own nature, but 
 from art. From its very hardness, coldness, or resistance, 
 it appears that the form itself is angular. It must therefore be 
 seen whether the internal form produces naturally the external, 
 thus whether they correspond, or whether some more perfect 
 form have been superinduced upon it : as, for instance, the 
 human form impressed or engraved upon wax, marble, or 
 brass. That a form may be truly human, in every smallest 
 part there must be something human, or inspired with a human 
 
 soul. 
 
 Everything must have its own form, that there may be some- 
 thing from whence is derived its actuality or essence, its quid' 
 dity (a word I would like), its quality, causality, and its very 
 faculty of acting and being acted upon. Thus a thing without 
 form is an atom of no principle, that is nothing. Each thing, 
 mode, sense, or force has its own form. Every body, viscus, 
 or part, whether solid or fluid, as the blood, the animal spirit, 
 yea the soul itself, has its form. Every society, least and 
 greatest, has its own form of government, its dependence 
 and relation to others, its order, laws, and other things, 
 which are determined along with its form. 
 
12 
 
 ONTOLOGY, 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 FIGURE. 
 
 In a compound, which is not continuous, all the parts have 
 a determined position with regard to each other. The boun- 
 dary of an extent is called figure. A finite compound ens is 
 endowed with a certain figure. A compound ens in imagi- 
 nary space, in which it is supposed to exist, designates a figure 
 agreeing with its own ; a plane figure if its own be plane ; a 
 liollow figure if its own be convex ; and a convex figure if 
 its own be concave. If to a compound ens certain parts be 
 added, or if from the same any be taken away or transposed, 
 and in the boundary of its extent anything occurs which was 
 different before, the figure of those parts is changed. But if 
 nothing then occurs which was not in the same manner com- 
 prehended under their former boundary, their figure is not 
 changed. Figure is an accident ; for figure is not a modi- 
 fiable ens. For since figure is the boundary of an extent, 
 we cannot conceive any other change in it, than that it be 
 taken away, or that another be substituted in its place. In- 
 deed we can by no means conceive that it possesses intrinsic 
 determinations, of which some are changed into others, while 
 still others remain the same, nor consequently that it is like a 
 subject which is capable of diverse determinations, since such 
 a subject is the extent which is limited ; but the boundary of 
 the same is not so. Therefore figure is an accident. 
 
 Wolf's Ontology. 
 
 Figure appears as though it might signify external form, 
 but there is a difference between them. External form refers 
 itself to its internal as to something continuous with it ; as, 
 for example, the expression of the face, of the actions and of 
 the speech, to the mind. In so fiir as the face itself is re- 
 garded as the external form of the human head, and refei^ 
 itself to the internal form of the same, it must not be called 
 a figure ; but in so far as it is taken separately from that 
 
 FIGURE. 
 
 13 
 
 4 
 
 form, and indeed is regarded as a surface, which belongs to 
 planometry, it is called a figure ; wherefore there is given a 
 figure of the face, a figure of the mouth, of the nose, of the 
 eye ; but the form involves all these at once. In Geometries, 
 figure differs from form as a plane from a cube, and the pecu- 
 liar nature of figure is like that of a geometric figure con- 
 sidered as regards its integral construction and its nature 
 resulting thence, being that of a compound. Thus form is 
 withdrawn from figure, the more it is raised to the higher 
 powers, as, for instance, to the cube of a square, and the cube 
 of a cube, and so on : for these are far removed from the 
 measure of plane surfaces. So also there are superior 
 forms, which cannot be called figured forms, because they 
 are not bounded by space within themselves, but only 
 by imaginary space without themselves: for in order that 
 they may include space in themselves, there must be refer- 
 ence to some centre, superficies or diameter; and further, 
 when these perish, as they do when such determinations 
 exist, then perishes also the idea of space ; because in form 
 itself, there is no idea of space, but the latter can be con- 
 ceived of as outside of it. Such form also is free from figure, 
 because it is free from space and extent ; moreover it is with- 
 out every limitation. Thus superior forms gradually recede 
 from the idea of space and figure, as they are more highly 
 elevated. Therefore, as determinations regarded as within a 
 space constitute form, so terminations regarded as it ivere 
 without that space, constitute figure. On the other hand, in 
 a form of which there are given no terminations, except such 
 forms as may be regarded as continuous, the figure itself 
 must be ideally conceived as without that form, and not, as 
 though it were adjoined to it. For a form which occupies no 
 space regarded as such in itself, cannot be said to be termi- 
 nated, but its terminus, or its every termination, must be 
 conceived as occupying space outside of that form. 
 
14 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER IIL 
 
 ORGAN— STRUCTURE. 
 
 An organic body, by virtue of ite composition, is suited to 
 its own peculiar action. A simple organic body is one which 
 is composed of no other organic parts. The reverse is true 
 of a compound organic body. The essence of an organic 
 body consists in its structure. The reason of those things 
 which enter into an organic body, in so far as it is or- 
 ganic, whether they are actually in it, or may be m it, is 
 contained in its structure. In that same structure ought to 
 be contained a sufficient reason why the organic body is 
 suited to an action of that peculiar kind. If the parts of an 
 organic body consist of mixed matter, and the mixture of 
 it be in any manner dissolved, the organic body perishes. 
 •^ H Wolf. 
 
 Structure is the same as form, but only in compounds, 
 which are physically and mechanically considered, and to 
 which are attributed parts, space, extent, mass, magnitude, 
 matter, weight, motion, figure, and the like; but form is 
 something more universal and is given also in more simple 
 things, yea in the most simple, with the proviso, nevertheless 
 that'structure corresponds with it. For such things, as those 
 above mentioned, must be conceived as residing in each and 
 every form, although they be not actually in it, but in their 
 stead certain analogous and more interior qualities, which 
 cannot be so named or to which sucli predicates do not 
 
 apply- ^ . . 1 
 
 An organ is an instrument and supposes some principle or 
 principal cause by which it is brought into action ; so that it 
 does not possess in itself a principle of action, unless so far as it 
 derives it from another cause holding the chief place. The 
 human body is purely organic, the soul being its active princi- 
 
 STATE— CHANGES OF STATE. 
 
 15 
 
 ^ 
 
 pie. In like manner the body consists of an unbroken series 
 of organs or instruments of the active soul. The term organic 
 is properly predicated of the parts of the animal kingdom. 
 The term instrument belongs to things without life. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 STATE— CHANGES OF STATE. 
 
 From the determination of the changeable properties of a 
 thing arises its state, so that state is the co-existence of 
 changeable properties, with the same in a fixed condition. 
 If state consist of intrinsic changeable properties, namely, of 
 modes, it is called internal ; if of extrinsic properties, such as 
 are the relations of the thing to other things, it is called ex- 
 ternal state. If the same changeable properties exist in two 
 things, A and B, their states are the same : if diverse, their 
 states are diverse. If the changeable properties, which are 
 predicated of a thing, do not remain the same, its state is 
 changed. The internal state of a thing is changed if its 
 modes do not remain the same; but its external state is 
 changed if its relations to other things do not remain the 
 same. A finite ens may have now some states and then 
 others, but it cannot have all at the same time. Wolf. 
 
 State is the co-existence of determinations in any given 
 form ; as, in the circle, the co-existence of the determination 
 of the diameters from the circumference towards the centre. 
 The state of the circle is not changed so long as the circle 
 remains a circle. When the circle is expanded and contracted, 
 then its state is not changed, but its forces tire varied and 
 modified, or, in other words, there is a variation and modifica- 
 tion of its forces, from which variation and modification new 
 forms and new states are wont to be formed, the essence of the 
 
 V 
 
s . - 
 
 14 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 STATE— CHANGES OF STATE. 
 
 15 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ORGAN— STRUCTURE. 
 
 An organic body, by virtue of its composition, is suited to 
 its own peculiar action. A simple organic body is one which 
 is composed of no other organic parts. The reverse is true 
 of a compound organic body. The essence of an organic 
 body consists in its structure. The reason of those things 
 whicli enter into an organic body, in so far as it is or- 
 ganic, whether they are actually in it, or may be in it, is 
 contained in its structure. In that same structure ought to 
 be contained a sufficient reason why the organic body is 
 suited to an action of that peculiar kind. If the parts of an 
 organic body consist of mixed matter, and the mixture ot 
 it be in any manner dissolved, the organic body perishes. 
 -^ Wolf. 
 
 Structure is the same as form, but only in compounds, 
 which are physically and mechanically considered, and to 
 which are attributed parts, space, extent, mass, magnitude, 
 matter, weight, motion, figure, and the like; but form is 
 something more universal and is given also in more simple 
 things, yea in the most simple, with the proviso, nevertheless 
 that'structure corresponds with it. For such things, as those 
 above mentioned, must be conceived as residing in each and 
 every form, although they be not actually in it, but in their 
 stead certain analogous and more interior qualities, which 
 cannot be so named or to which such predicates do not 
 
 apply- , . . 1 
 
 An organ is an instrument and supposes some principle or 
 principaf cause by which it is brought into action ; so that it 
 does not possess in itself a principle of action, unless so fer as it 
 derives it from another cause holding the chief place. The 
 human body is purely organic, the soul being its active princi- 
 
 ^ 
 
 & 
 
 pie. In like manner the body consists of an unbroken series 
 of organs or instruments of the active soul. The term organic 
 is properly predicated of the parts of the animal kingdom. 
 The term instrument belongs to things without life. 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 STATE— CHANGES OF STATE. 
 
 From the determination of the changeable properties of a 
 thing arises its state, so that state is the co-existence of 
 changeable properties, with the same in a fixed condition. 
 If state consist of intrinsic changeable properties, namely, of 
 modes, it is called internal ; if of extrinsic properties, such as 
 are the relations of the thing to other things, it is called ex- 
 ternal state. If the same changeable properties exist in two 
 things, A and B, their states are the same : if diverse, their 
 states are diverse. If the changeable properties, which are 
 predicated of a thing, do not remain the same, its state is 
 changed. The internal state of a thing is changed if its 
 modes do not remain the same; but its external state is 
 changed if its relations to other things do not remain the 
 same. A finite eiis may have now some states and then 
 others, but it cannot have all at the same time. Wolf. 
 
 State is the co- existence of deteiminations in any given 
 form ; as, in the circle, the co-existence of the determination 
 of the diameters from the circumference towards the centre. 
 The state of the circle is not changed so long as the circle 
 remains a circle. When the circle is expanded and contracted, 
 then its state is not changed, but its forces are varied and 
 modified, or, in other words, there is a variation and modifica- 
 tio7i of its forces, from which variation and modification new 
 forms and new states are wont to be formed, the essence of the 
 
16 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 SUBSTANCE. 
 
 17 
 
 circle remaining the same. From sucli variation in the ani- 
 mal body vital actions are produced ; and in the atmospheric 
 world, modifications, which, in the sensory organs, become 
 
 sensations. 
 
 Changes of state are changes of determinations in any 
 given form in respect to their co-existence ; as, in circular 
 forms, in respect to the co-existence of their determinations, 
 that is, of the radii towards the centre ; thus, when the de- 
 termination of the centre is changed, the state of the circle 
 is changed, as when it is transf!)rmed into an ellipse, a 
 cycloid, a conoid, a parabola, and other figures. So also it 
 is with all other forms, except in angular forms, where there 
 is no change of form without its destruction and removal ; 
 there is only given a change of figure. These changes of 
 state are called changes of modes '^ for these changes them- 
 selves produce among themselves new forms, which are prop- 
 erly called modifications, but in the animal body, sensations. 
 By means of such changes imaginations are effected, for 
 these are so many ideas, which are reproduced by similar 
 changes of state. For this reason modifications correspond 
 to sensations : for changes are either of forces or of modes. 
 The perfection of superior forms consists in mutability of 
 state, or of states ; for the soul, from any change of any 
 organic form in its own body, understands the state of it and 
 what it signifies ; for, without change of some kind, no sen- 
 sation is given and no perception, still less any action. From 
 changes of state, or variation of modes, new forms exist, thus 
 successively, before they do simultaneously, or before they 
 co-exist; for, there may be given common states, under 
 which are contained many particular ones,— universal states, 
 beneath which are singular ones,— and general states, 
 including specific and individual ones. A common and 
 universal state is formed from those which are particular 
 and singular. There are equations which are composed suc- 
 
 
 cessively by reasonings and analogies. On the same principle 
 we reason, that, while in finite existences there can be given 
 several states at the same time which are not self-created, 
 there are infinitely more in superior forms. 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 SUBSTANCE. 
 
 Wolf. Substance is an indestructible and modifiable sub- 
 ject ; or it is the subject of intrinsic determinations constant 
 and variable ; or, substance is a subject in which the essentials 
 and attributes are the same, while its modes are successively 
 varied. Aristotle. It is an ens which subsists of itself 
 and sustains accidents. Leibnitz, to the ordinary notion of 
 substance, adds that of action as its genuine characteristic, so 
 that by its power of acting it may properly be distinguished 
 from accidents. Descartes defines substance as a thing 
 which so exists that it needs no other thing for its own ex- 
 istence. Such is his idea of God. Clauberg in like manner 
 understands substance as a thing which so exists it needs no 
 other subject for its own existence; moreover that its opposite 
 is accident, which exists, as it were, in some other subject or 
 whose esse is to be in something. But, according to the school- 
 men, God is not in predicates, but is above all predicates. 
 Locke adheres to the common notion of substance and does not 
 vance beyond it, while he calls it the substratum or basis of 
 qualities, which have the power of producing in us simple 
 ideas, and which are commonly called accidents. Wolf. The 
 common notion of substance is imaginary. The state of sub- 
 stance can be changed ; whence we infer that substances are 
 endowed with force. In substances, whose state is actually 
 changed, there is a continuous attempt at action. Accidents 
 cannot exist without substances. In a compound entity 
 nothing substantial is given except simple entities. There 
 are no substances except simple substances, and compound 
 
 8 
 
18 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 SUBSTANCE. 
 
 19 
 
 entities are aggregates of simple substances. Therefore simple 
 substance only is properly substance. It is, however, m ac- 
 cordance witli established usage to call all compound en^ties, 
 in the material world, substances. Robert Green, an Eng- 
 lishman, argues that substance differs from accident in the 
 possession of active force. If there be force in a compound 
 substance, it should result from the forces of the simple sub- 
 stances composing it. , . i • i 
 In the modifications of things nothing substantial perishes 
 
 or is produced. Wolf. 
 
 Substance is that which in itself possesses its -own esse. 
 Primary substances are such primarily, properly and princi- 
 pally ; they are individual entities, singular substances and 
 the fundamentals of all things, which are in theni and which 
 are predicated of them. Secondary universal substances are 
 genera and species. They are by this author divided into 
 most universal, universal, generic, specific and individual 
 He supr)Oses primary substances to be accidents : also tliat 
 there are given spiritual and incorporeal substances, as, angels 
 
 and souls. Dupleix. 
 
 That subject in which exist all those things which we hnd 
 meeting in a real thing we call substance. When we con- 
 sider this, of what quality it is, we are able to attribute 
 nothing to it, because we may remove all its qualities 
 from it and include them among accidents. The substan- 
 tial of things is therefore said to be unknown, ihus the 
 notion of substance is imaginary, and consequently substance 
 itself, such as we commonly imagine it, is an imaginary 
 ens Descartes has well observed that substance cannot 
 be conceived of, unless by means of a certain primary 
 determination, to which all the other determinations are 
 referred : although he may not be regarded as having pro- 
 gressed so far, so long as he holds extension to be the tun- 
 damental constituent of corporeal substance, and thought, 
 that of incorporeal substance, since something more universal 
 is given in each. If the state of substances is changed, that 
 they are endowed with force, follows of necessity. Let us 
 suppose that only one substance exists, and that its state is 
 changed ; there will be given in that substance a sufficient 
 reason of that change, and so action will be given ; where- 
 
 fore, since, in a thing which acts, there must be admitted 
 something which contains in itself a sufficient reason of the 
 actuality of the action, and so, a certain force ; as a conse- 
 quence, substance itself must be endowed with force. 
 
 Wolf. 
 
 Substances like forms are simple and compound, prior and 
 posterior, superior and inferior ; but properly speaking and 
 with regard to first principles, there are no substances given, 
 except such as are simple, first and supreme, which are at the 
 same time the most perfect. Yet posterior and compound 
 substances must also be called substances, in so far as forms, 
 attributes, changes, modes, accidents and qualities appertain 
 to them. In like manner, every form distinct from others is 
 a substance in so far as it is a subject in which form resides, 
 and in so far as it is adjoined to and predicated of form. 
 Thus substance remains substance, although the state of its 
 form be changed. For nothing substantial perishes or is pro- 
 duced by variation or modification of form. In this all defini- 
 tions can coincide ; but to give a single definition, which shall 
 exhaust all the qualities of substance, I scarcely believe to be 
 possible, yet that they all do coincide can be shown. In 
 superior substances, predicates, accidents and qualities have 
 no place, for these are above all notion of predicates. 
 
 In order that there may be substances, they must be modi- 
 fiable and able to change their states, thus they must be en- 
 dowed with force. The modifications themselves, which are 
 changes of state, or variations of forces, aUhough they are 
 forms, can by no means be called substances, but the opera- 
 tions of substance ; for, regarded in themselves, the modifi- 
 cations are not modifiable and cannot change their state, 
 being only the operations of substances, which latter do 
 change their states. Thus, thought cannot be called sub- 
 stance, nor can sensation. For the sensory organs are the 
 very substance of the sensations ; viz. : the eye is the organic 
 
20 
 
 DNTOLOOr. 
 
 substance of the sensation of sight; the ear, of hearing; the 
 tongue, of taste ; the brain, of all the sensations ; also, the 
 cortical glands are the organic substances of the imagina- 
 tion, and alo7iff with what is purely of the understanding they 
 belong to thought. Therefore the sensories are substances, 
 because they are organic forms ; sensations, however, are not. 
 The whole body is a substance composed of all organic sub- 
 stances. The soul is a substance whose operations are spiritual, 
 for it is a form and indeed a spiritual form. In like manner 
 with other things. Active and motive force ought to be con- 
 ceived of as like substance, though of another nature. It is 
 not substance, however, but only appears so. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 MATTER— MATEKIAL. 
 
 All matter is in continual motion. If matter does not 
 chano-e its place it is owing to the resistance of contiguous 
 things. The active force in a body should be conceived to be 
 quite as durable as the matter in it. Matter and active force 
 are not substances. In the elements are contained the ulti- 
 mate reasons of those things which are discerned in material 
 things ; consequently in simple substances is contained the 
 ultimate reason why matter and active force appear as two 
 substances diverse from each other. That which is deter- 
 mined in a compound ens is called matter ; whence a com- 
 pound 6718 is said to consist of matter. The word matter is 
 taken more widely, so as to designate the substantial, because 
 by means of essential determinations it is made specific, so that 
 this particuhir ens comes forth, and not another ; but from 
 this looser signification we very properly abstain, lest while 
 attributing matter to simple substances in its transcendental 
 signification, we may seem to attribute it to them in its phys- 
 
 i J 
 
 MA TTER—MA TERIAL. 
 
 21 
 
 f 
 
 t 
 
 ical signification, which latter obtains in common speech, and 
 is contained in the definition of it. Matter therefore is called 
 matter from which [ex qud^, to distinguish it from a sub- 
 ject, which latter is called matter in which [in qua], and 
 to distinguish it from an object, which last is termed matter 
 about which [circa quani]. Wolf. 
 
 Matter is presented to our consideration in three modes. 
 1. That it is the subject and seat of form and accidents: thus, 
 the body is the seat of the rational soul, which is its form, and 
 of many accidents. 2. In so far as anything is made out of 
 it ; as, out of wood. 3. As the subject of an agent ; as wood, 
 of fire. Thus we have matter in which, out of which, and by 
 means of which. Primal matter is sometimes considered as 
 without form and accident, and then it is mental ; but natural 
 matter is first without form, and is, as it were, before form and 
 the subject of form and accidents. Secondary matter is an 
 effect, it being joined to primal form. If we speak of matter 
 as the principle of natural causes, we understand only primal 
 matter. Primal matter when under consideration is abstruse 
 and obscure. The ancient philosophers said that it was not, 
 and could not be understood in the nature of tilings, unless 
 by means of an indirect and imperfect conception. Such was 
 Plato's mode of expressing it. Aristotle's thus: that that 
 which must be considered as without form and accidents, 
 must be understood by means of analogy and similitude, as 
 you understand the light by means of which you perceive 
 things to be. Aristotle says that matter is the primal sub- 
 ject, from which all things subsist ; that all things are born 
 at the outset from themselves and not by means of another, 
 and that matter is that ultimate part into which things are re- 
 solved and terminated. If we consider the evident order of 
 the creation of the world, we necessarily conceive of matter 
 before form, as of something underlying and fundamental, 
 from which, by changes and by series, forms come forth. 
 Just as the Physicists say that form is derived from^ the 
 potency of matter, or from a natural faculty, potency, dispo- 
 sition, and aptitude, which is in it, for successively receiving 
 forms. They say that man alone and his form do not result 
 from matter. Aristotle also knew that this form came from 
 some other source than from matter. In passing he asserts that 
 
22 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 primal matter is separated from all form, and that thence 
 results all form. Dupleix. 
 
 Matter is extent endowed with the force of inertia. Mat- 
 ter is modified by variation of figure. A substantiated phe- 
 nomenon is one which appears Hke a substance. Matter and 
 motive force are substantiated phenomena ; yet motive force 
 and matter necessarily appear as diverse substances. Many 
 of the schoolmen however placed these in contrast, also re- 
 garding tliem as material and immaterial substances; for 
 example, when they said that the soul was simple, they called 
 that sim])le, which is not composed of quantitative parts. 
 Unity is not a number, but is the principle of all numbers. 
 
 Wolf. 
 
 That is called 3Iatter {materia) which is determined in 
 order that form may exist, or, it is that from which form 
 exists ; for without matter no determinations can be given, 
 and hence, no form ; so that if from form you take away 
 matter, nothing remains, and its substance falls into nothing ; 
 just as if you were to take away the viscera from the body, 
 or the stones from a house, which are therefore called mate- 
 rials. It w^as in this sense that the ancients accepted the 
 word matter — so likewise, the men of our time, although 
 they are unwilling to confound it with the Substantial. 
 
 Anything Material {materiale), on the other hand, ac- 
 cording to every use of speaking, is to-day that which is 
 heavy, endowed with the force of inertia, and which is in 
 space. The word by usage is taken from stones, marble, 
 woods, and similar things, which are called materials, but 
 to these only so far as they are inanimate and dense. The 
 same word by no means applies to simple things, such as are 
 spiritual substances and others. Wherefore, in order to avoid 
 contradictions and disputes, a distinction is made between 
 primal elements, and substances, which is the reason that 
 such substances are called immaterial, that is, not heavy and 
 inert, not partaking of motion, part, or extent. But in order 
 
 \ 
 
 MA TTER—MA TERIAL. 
 
 23 
 
 that dispute on this point may be avoided, it should be fully 
 defined what matter is, and then what is material, according 
 to the common understanding and received usage. 
 
 Matter, philosophically understood, may be attributed even 
 to spiritual forms, for matter is that from which form is, 
 whether you term it substance or element. Without matter 
 from wdiicli [ex qua], form never exists: just as w^ithout 
 object, there is no sensation, for matter is the very subject 
 which is determined. Moreover we speak of a '' matter of 
 dispute," and a matter of dispute is not anything material. 
 Thus we have matter philosophical, physiological, and theo- 
 logical. Therefore matter philosophically considered is not 
 supposed to be heavy, inert, and corporeal, but is regarded 
 as the principle of being, and that without wdiich there is no 
 determination and no form ; for that something which is de- 
 termined is called matter. On the other hand, physical 
 matter, or material, is only that w^hich is found in the 
 lowest forms, especially in angular form and in the earth. 
 Material of this kind begins to be put off by superior forms, 
 for, the less it is finited, the less it becomes material. Thus, 
 the soul is not material, which is without part, extent, figure, 
 gravity, but it does not cease to be matter, that is, the prin- 
 ciple from which the body exists, nor does the soul itself 
 cease to exist and subsist from its own matter, or principle, 
 so far as it is a form. Form without matter is not an ens, is 
 not determined, still less is it determinable. But the matter 
 of the soul must not according to the vulgar acceptation and 
 in a grossly physical sense, be conceived of as material. 
 
 From these things it appears how ideas purely critical may 
 confuse a subject, and how the mere signification of a word 
 may protract a discussion. All such niceties, however, are 
 mere puerile ornamentations, and ill become men. 
 
 . 
 
24 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 EXTENT— EXTENSION— CONTINUOUS— CONTIGUOUS— PART. 
 
 If we represent to ourselves several things diverse from, 
 and existing outside of, each other, as if they were in one, 
 the notion of extension arises ; so that extension is the co- 
 existence in one, of many and diverse existences, or if you 
 prefer it, of things existing outside of each other ; and in- 
 deed is constituted by the union of many things existing out- 
 side of each other ; thus it is required for the notion of exten- 
 sion that they be united among themselves, and that they form 
 a one. Since in an extent there are many things, wliich taken 
 too-ether constitute the same with itself taken as a unit, and 
 indeed which constitute the extent itself, every extent has 
 parts, each of which exists outside of another, and which are 
 united among themselves. That which has parts, one of 
 which exists outside of another, and which are united among 
 themselves, is an extent. Jungius defines extension as that, 
 on account of w^hich corporeal substance has part outside of 
 part. Clauberg defines body or extent (which, witli a dis- 
 ciple of Descartes, are synonymous terms), as that which has 
 part placed outside of part. Of the union of tlie parts tliey 
 make no mention, nevertheless, they tacitly suppose it, be- 
 cause they conceive of extension in a body as being parts, 
 and those parts as being united among themselves. Un- 
 limited parts of extent regarded in the abstract, do not differ 
 except in number. To a right line we do not attribute ex- 
 tension except regarded in the abstract. Indeed the parts of 
 a line do hot differ except in number. The case is the same 
 with a solid or mathematical body ; but extent of this kind 
 is not given in the nature of things. A, B, and G however 
 they be taken in extent regarded in the abstract, differ m 
 none of their qualities, nor are intrinsic diverse determinations 
 found in them, unless in each one's having existence proper 
 to itself. Wolf's Ontology. 
 
 Contiguous things are not continuous. Continuity ex- 
 cludes the possible existence of a part diverse from, and m- 
 
 EXTENT-EXTENSION- CONTINUO US-CONTIG UO US— PART. 25 
 
 terraediate between two other parts given next to itself. 
 That which is interrupted or not continuous renders actual 
 or possible the existence of a part, diverse from and interme- 
 diate between two given parts. Two limited extents are 
 called contiguous, whose surfaces mutually touch each other, 
 so that they remain two, and by no means form one extent. 
 So, contiguity excludes the actual existence of an interme- 
 diate third. Nothing, however, prevents a third extent from 
 
 beins placed between contiguous extents. 
 
 "" ^ Wolf's Ontol. 
 
 The elements of material things exist outside of each other 
 and are united to each other. Aggregates of elements are 
 extended ; they are also continuous. Every body arises from 
 that which is not extended, nevertheless itself is extended, 
 for the elements themselves of things material are not ex- 
 tended. Extension and continuity in a body you do riot per- 
 ceive unless confusedly. Extension and continuity are 
 phenomena: for whatever is perceived confusedly, by way 
 of the senses, is called a phenomenon. Wolf's Cosmology. 
 
 An actual part is one which is contained by its own limits ; 
 a possible part is one whose limits may be assigned at will. 
 In the continuous regarded in the abstract, parts are only 
 possible, not actual. But in a continuous series of contig- 
 uous things, the parts are actual. Contiguous parts consti- 
 tute what is continuous. Wolf. 
 
 Bxtoit is defined as that which has parts outside of parts, 
 and thus is to be united. It is commonly believed that no 
 form can be given, which does not consist of parts outside of 
 parts, for there must be something to be determined, in order 
 that form may exist, and this something we conceive of as a 
 part. But let us see of what quality an extent ought to be, 
 which should be said to consist of parts, and of what quality 
 one which is without parts. In every inferior and more im- 
 perfect form, there is given extent which consists of parts, or 
 material extent, or, what comes to the same thing, extension 
 of matter. Therefore bodies are such extents. But in 
 superior forms extension cannot be denied, so far as there 
 
 4 
 
26 
 
 ONTOLOGY, 
 
 IS form, and so far as there are essential determinations, and 
 so far as form is actual and not ideal, and in the concrete ; to 
 say that it is without extent, would he to say that it is non- 
 existent, or an ens not possible in nature. Such an extent 
 cannot be said to consist of parts, nor of parts outside of 
 parts, nor with the idea of breadth, length, and depth. 
 Hence it is not corporeal. 1. Such an extent does not con- 
 sist of parts ; for parts, if they are contained within their 
 own boundaries, are figured, elementary, heavy, inert, ter- 
 restrial forms ; while there are none such in an extent not 
 material, but they are either substances or forms, or if you 
 prefer so to express it, they are such things as are deter- 
 mined ; and those things, forms, or substances, are of no 
 fio-ure, gravity, or any material predicate. 2. Nor does such 
 an extent consist of parts outside of parts ; for, what is out- 
 side will be either above, below, or at the sides ; and a place 
 will then be given either at the centre, or in the surface, or 
 somewhere, when, in the form, tlie before mentioned rela- 
 tions may have perished, as in the circle ; for who will sup- 
 pose any part of a circle to be above or below another? 3. 
 Wherefore there perishes the idea of breadth, length, and 
 depth ; but that idea perishes in the form, so also the idea of 
 extent' such as has been described, but there does not perish 
 the idea of space, and thus of extent outside of the form ; for 
 whatever is in it is without place in itself, but not without 
 place in the universe, outside of itself. 
 
 Therefore every form is extended, even supreme and 
 spiritual form, but it does not consist of parts such as are 
 parts terrastrial, and forms angular, heavy, and inert, and 
 such as are the elements of material things ; but they consist 
 of substances or forms which are determined, for there will 
 be something determinable and determined, which must be 
 
 the analogue of part. 
 
 Therefore such extent is not material, so far as material is 
 
 BODY— THINGS CORPOREAL. 
 
 27 
 
 described as consisting of parts which are heavy and inert ; 
 but it ought rather to be spoken of as pure or substantial 
 extent, for bodies are aggregates of substances. 
 
 Substances themselves, considered as parts in such forms, 
 are without the idea of place, and of tendency towards a 
 centre, or periphery, upwards, or downwards, thus there 
 perishes the idea of breadth and length, such as is proper to 
 
 every extent. 
 
 This extent, itself not material, cannot be said to occupy 
 space in itself, but that which is without it is said to oc- 
 cupy space ; for while within it, there is no respect of centre 
 and place, still it occupies, space in the universe. 
 
 Part signifies that which is of a form angular, terrestrial, 
 and figured. Thiis the elements of material things are 
 parts; and because angular forms can put on the face and 
 surface of superior forms, as the circle and the spiral, there- 
 fore even a circular part is called a part ; but if it should be 
 purely circular and spiral, it would immediately cease to be 
 such a part. 
 
 • • 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 BODY— THINGS CORPOREAL. 
 
 Primitive corpuscles are those in which no reason of 
 their composition can be assigned except in their elements. 
 Derivative corpuscles are those whose reason of composition is 
 in lesser ones. Visible bodies all consist of derivative cor- 
 puscles. The reason of the composition of those which come 
 together in visible bodies, is contained in the qualities of 
 the derivative corpuscles, and in the mode in which the 
 same are joined together. Bodies are compound substances. 
 
 Wolf. 
 
 Body is a word of several meanings. It signifies, 1. Quan' 
 
I' 
 
 23 . ONTOLOGY. 
 
 tity, and, in a mathematical sense, is put for the three dimen- 
 sions of body conjoined with or united to solidity and matter, 
 and sometimes altogether abstracted therefrom. 2. Corporeal 
 substance ; as, man, tree, stone, thus in a physical sense ; 
 (vrivficial bodies, as houses, statues, or, all the works of art, 
 not nature's ; also natural bodies, 3. When applied to arti- 
 ficial things, it is matter joined to form and thus the entire 
 body. 4. When applied to natural things, it is primal matter 
 or the subject of natural form, which is of itself formless, but 
 for the most part susceptible of many and diverse forms 
 successively. Natural bodies are divided among themselves 
 into simple, which are not composed of, or mixed with the 
 matter of another body, and into compound and mixed, 
 
 DUPLEIX. 
 
 Material bodies are all those which arise from the elements 
 of things material or from so many very minute triangular 
 or square particles ; thus they are all angular forms, of what- 
 ever figure as well as composition they may be. For those 
 triangular and square particles are primitive corpuscles, yea, 
 the very elements themselves, from whose aggregates material 
 bodies arise and are derived. 
 
 But animate bodies are all compound substances and forms, 
 from their first to their last natural order, derived, and thus, 
 compounded ; but one substantial reigns in that whole body, 
 that is the soul, and besides this substantial there is given 
 none other force in this body. Therefore these bodies are 
 compound substances, or simple substam^e alone, which is 
 their soul, and which, by derivation, forms its own body. 
 But what body is, has been shown above. 
 
 Each body has its own soul, which is wholly in every part 
 of it, and which has formed its body after its own image. 
 Other things which have been added were taken from the 
 mineral kingdom. 
 
 ESSENCE— ESSENTIALS. 
 
 29 
 
 
 I ' 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ESSENCE— ESSENTIALS. 
 
 Essence is distinguished from the other qualities which 
 reside in an eiis, because, while it has no intrinsic reason why 
 it should enter into the ens, but ought to be regarded as the 
 first thing in it, the other qualities which are therein or may 
 be therein, have a reason for being in the same. Therefore 
 essence may be defined as that which is first conceivod con- 
 cerning an ens, and in which is contained a sufiicient reason 
 why the other qualities are actually in it, or may be in it. 
 SuAREZ says that the essence of a thing is that which is first 
 and radical, and the inmost principle of all the actions and 
 properties which appertain to the thing. Afterwards he 
 asserts that it is that which is conceived first to belong to, 
 and first to be constituted in, the esse of a thing, and of such 
 a thing as it is. Again, that real essence is the principle 
 or root of real operations or effects. Descartes says that 
 essence is that leading property of any substance, which con- 
 stitutes its very nature and essence, and to which all the 
 other properties are referred : Clauberg. — Of all the prop- 
 erties which are attributed to any given thing, we are accus- 
 tomed to consider one as first, chief, and inmost to the thing, 
 which in a manner embraces all the other properties, or is 
 certainly, as it were, their root and foundation. This es- 
 pecial thing we call the essence, and with respect to the 
 properties and operations thence proceeding, we also call it 
 the nature of the thing, but thus our ideas of essence and of 
 nature become confused. Wolf. — Those properties in an ens 
 which are not mutually inconsistent, and which, on the other 
 hand, are not determined by each other, are called essentials, 
 and constitute the essence of an ens. For example, the num- 
 ber three, and equality of the sides are the essentials of an 
 equilateral triangle ; and in morals it is a truth not inconsistent 
 with itself that an action conformable to natural law may arise 
 from a habit of the will. Essence is the first thing which is 
 
 % 
 
 sA 
 
■^^-■■W^i 
 
 ESSENCE— ESSENTIA LS. 
 
 31 
 
 30 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 II 
 
 H 
 
 conceived about an ens, and without it an ens cannot be. If 
 anything is determined by means of essentials, that ought 
 constantly to be in the ens. If anything is not determined 
 by essentials, and yet is not inconsistent with the same, that 
 thing may be in the ens, although it be not actually in it : 
 on the other hand, if it is inconsistent with those same essen- 
 tials, it cannot be in the ens. For example : it does not follow 
 that a line drawn from the vertex to the base of a triangle is 
 so determined by essentials, because it can be so drawn after 
 the triangle is constructed. But it is inconsistent with an 
 obtuse-angled triangle that one of its angles be a right angle. 
 Again : there is no inconsistency in a stone's being white, but 
 there is inconsistency in its being lighter than air. That 
 which is not inconsistent with essentials, and yet is by no 
 means determined by essentials, by the author is called mode, 
 by the schoolmen, predicable accident. Whatsoever resides 
 in an ens, that has a place either among its essentials, or its 
 attributes, or its modes. Those things which constantly reside 
 in an ens, and are not determined by other things which are in 
 it at the same time, are in the number of its essentials : but 
 those which are constantly in it, and are determined by other 
 things which are in it at the same time, are attributes. By 
 means of its essence an ens is possible. We understand the 
 essence of an ens, when we understand the fii-st mode by which 
 it can come into existence, consequently by a genitive defini- 
 tion. Why the essentials are in the ens, no intrinsic reason 
 can be given, whence it may be understood why the same 
 are in it, as why an equilateral triangle has three sides. ^ In 
 the essence of an ens is contained the reason of those things 
 which, besides itself, are either constantly in the same, or 
 can be in it. All similar things have the same essence, and 
 the essentials are similar, if the essence be similar. Essences 
 of things are like rational or common whole numbers. 1 or a 
 number is a combination of units which, while they can be, are 
 not at the same time necessarily, combined. Nevertheless, 
 while necessity does not oppose, no unit can be taken from, and 
 none added to the number, while it remains intact. Essences 
 of things are immutable : so that if, as it were, any essential be 
 taken away, or some other superadded, the essence no longer 
 remains the essence of that ens, to which it had before be- 
 
 longed, but is changed into the essence of a diverse ens. Es- 
 sences of things are immutable. The necessity which arises 
 from the essence of an ens is absolute, but that which proceeds 
 from another source does not exist, except hypothetically. Es- 
 sences of things are absolutely necessary. Essentials are qual- 
 ities, consequentlv genera and species are determined by 
 qualities. Individuals have the same essentials, so far as they 
 are contained under the same species, and species and inferior 
 genera have the same essentials, so far as the species are con- 
 tained under the same genus, and the inferior genera, under 
 the same superior genus. Species and genera differ by means 
 of essentials, which, while tlie other essentials remain the 
 same, can be determined in a different manner. Constant 
 intrinsic determinations are essentials and attributes : modes 
 however are variable. Wolf's 07itol. 
 
 Essence is in all things and is most general, which is the 
 reason that it can with difficulty be defined ; for that which 
 is, as it were, by all clearly conceived in individual things, 
 by definition becomes obscure. Nor can it be presented by 
 a single definition which shall exhaust everything which is 
 in the whole of it ; wherefore we must approach the subject 
 in another way, and by examples solely, arrive at a clear 
 understanding of essence and of things similar. We may 
 then form partial definitions which can be combined into one 
 manifest general definition. 
 
 The most general definition of essence is this, namely : 
 Essence is essence ; or this : It is what it is. Nothing can 
 be defined by means of itself except essence ; for besides it 
 there is nothing in a subject which properly belongs to it 
 But this amounts to nothing, as a definition. 
 
 In every ens there seems to be given its esse, its essence 
 and its essential, and that one flows from the other, or that 
 one supposes the other. 1. The esse of a form in a universal 
 sense is matter, its essential is its determination, its essence is 
 the form itself. 2. The things which constitute the essence of 
 
'liiiML 
 
 32 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 a circle are its periphery, its diameters, and its centre. With- 
 out these there is no circle ; and if they are not in it, they 
 must be supposed to be in it. 3. The essence of a triangle is 
 that it consists of three sides and three angles. 4. But the es- 
 sence of form resides in each single form as its universal, nor 
 does it recede therefrom ; thus every principal essence is de- 
 duced from that which is first and supreme or universal. 5. 
 The essence of an animal is that it enjoys a soul and a body. 
 This holds good in all genera and species. 6. Human es- 
 sence, besides the specific properties already mentioned, is tliat 
 it enjoys a rational mind ; otherwise it is not man. 7. The 
 very universal essence in every body is the soul, whence is 
 derived the body. She rules in all particulars. Thus there 
 are given, as it were, differences of essence which are specific 
 and singular. Thus we say that this is the essence or the soul 
 of a thing. If the essence or soul of a tiling recedes, the thing 
 dies. 8. The essentials of a muscle are its fibres. Specifically 
 they are the fibres determined in a peculiar manner, or the 
 form. Thus essence and form will agree. Therefore the reign- 
 ing essence in all things is called their soul, which is in all 
 things from the very beginning, and is the very beginning. 
 The other things which depend upon it are its body. But the 
 essence of the body is the form which is made up of the 
 naked essential determinations or those of the soul. The es- 
 sence of a special form occurs in the word itself or denomi- 
 nation of that form : as, triangle, quadrangle, rational animal, 
 or man, and thus in an easy manner it is specifically desig- 
 nated, of what quality it is, namely the genus is designated 
 and on the other hand, the specific difference. 
 
 '.\ * 
 
 f, I 
 
 ATTRIBUTE. 
 
 33 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 ATTEIBUTE. 
 
 If anything is determined by means of essentials, that 
 must constantly be in the ens. Those things which are de- 
 termined by means of essentials are called attributes, it 
 anything be determined by means of all the essentials taken 
 tocrether it is called a proper attribute, but if only by some 
 of^them, it is called a common attribute. Thus the three 
 sides of the triangle are the essentials of an equilateral tri- 
 angle ; the number three of the angles is a common attribute ; 
 the three angles equal among themselves is a proper attri- 
 bute Whatever is in an ens, has a place either among its 
 essentials, or its attributes, or its modes. Attributes are con- 
 stantly in an ens ; modes may be, or may not be m it. ihose 
 things which are constantly in an ens, and are not determined 
 by means of other things, which are in it at the same time, 
 are to be ranked in the number of essentials. But those 
 thino-s which are constantly in an ens, and are determined by 
 means of other things, which are in it at the same time, are 
 attributes. For if we embrace in our idea all the things 
 which are in an ens, we discern in that idea that some things 
 are determined by others, which are in the ens at the same 
 time ; and in enumerating what those things are, which serve to 
 determine the rest, we understand that certain things which 
 are in the ens must be put in the first place. These are not 
 mutually inconsistent with each other, and nevertheless are 
 not determined by other things which are in tlie ens at the 
 same time. Why attributes are present, a sufficient reason is 
 contained in the essentials. Why common attributes are 
 present, a sufficient reason is contained in some of the essen- 
 tials • why proi)er attributes are present, a sufficient reason is 
 contained in all the essentials. Those things, which are ol 
 the same species, have the same attributes and proximate 
 possibilities of the same modes, likewise also what are called 
 remote conditional possibilities. Things which are of the 
 
* 
 
 1 1. 
 
 84 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 same genus have the same common attributes, and possibili- 
 ties of the same modes, which are like common attributes. 
 Things which have the same proper attributes and possibili- 
 ties of the same modes, which are like common attributes, 
 are of the same species. Things which have the same com- 
 mon attributes, or possibilities of the same modes, which are 
 like common attributes, are referred to some same genus.^ 
 Essences of things are absolutely necessary; attributes of 
 things are absolutely necessary. The proximate possibility 
 of mode is absolutely necessary. Attributes of tilings and 
 proximate possibiUties of modes are attributes and modes 
 unchangeable in themselves. Quantity being excluded, they 
 are qualities ; and they are also accidents. Attributes are 
 not modifiable, but unchangeable, and incapable of other 
 determinations successively; therefore they are accidents. 
 The possibility of modes, whose reason is contained in essen- 
 tials, must be included among attributes ; for example, the 
 divisibility of a parallelogram by its diagonal into two equal 
 parts is determined by the parallelism of its sides and by 
 their number, and so it is an attribute of the parallelogram. 
 
 Wolf. 
 
 Words predicable and attributive are/v^. 1. Genus, the 
 supreme and most general, always genus, even when sub- 
 altern, which last in a certain respect is genus or species. 
 2. Species, the lowest and most special, always species, and 
 attributed immediately to individuals, even when subaltern, 
 which last in a certain respect is genus and species. 3. 
 Difference, either essential, constituting a part of the defini- 
 tion or essence of the thing, or accidental, which does not 
 regard the essence of the thing. 4. Property, which is ap- 
 plicable, either generally to a whole subject and not to it 
 alone ; or to one subject only, and not generally and entirely 
 to this ; or entirely to one subject and to it alone, but not 
 always; or entirely to one subject, and to it alone and 
 always. 5. Accident, common and separable from its effec- 
 tive subject; or inseparable from its subject, unless by 
 means of perception. Dupleix. 
 
 Besides the essentials in any given ens, more things are 
 required. Essentials alone do not constitute an ens, that it 
 
 ATTRIBUTE. 
 
 35 
 
 M 
 
 be such as it is. That it is a form, it derives from its essen- 
 tials ; that it is such a form, from its determinations ; that 
 it can be such, both from its essentials and its attributes. 
 That it can be what it is, is an attribute. That essence is 
 in anything is an attribute, and thence an accident. 
 
 The essentials of a muscle are its motor fibres : its at- 
 tributes are that the motor fibres are connected by their 
 own bands, that they are surrounded by a common mem- 
 brane, and that they are thus fitted for producing a cer- 
 tain action. It is an attribute, so far as the muscle is de- 
 termined to a special action, that it consists of a tendon, 
 and that it is fastened to a small bone, or to a movable 
 and an immovable part. The common membrane itself, 
 the tendons, and the rest, have their own essentials, but they 
 nevertheless are attributes of the other. The essentials of 
 the eye are its fibres, its vessels, its humors ; its attributes 
 are the possibilities of its modes, of receiving phenomena by 
 sight— -and so likewise its very form and the things acces- 
 sory to its essentials. 
 
 An attribute of the angular form is that it is hard, heavy, 
 angular. This attribute reigns universally in all species 
 and individuals. Its essentials are the elements, from which 
 come its essential determinations, namely, that they are con- 
 tinually opposite and repugnant, thus contrary to each other, 
 whence comes gravity. 
 
 The attributes of the circular form are that it can be ex- 
 panded and contracted ; that all its diameters meet in the 
 centre ; that mobility is confined to its periphery, outside of 
 its centre ; thus motion and rest at the same time in one 
 body, or liberty and co-action ; that it can be revolved about 
 an axis ; can resist and yield ; can undergo changes of state ; 
 that it can be the measure of angular forms, and can give the 
 sines of all angles whatsoever. 
 
 We cannot know what any form, body, or subject, is, 
 
 \ 
 
"T 
 
 n 
 
 36 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 unless we know its attributes. Thus we must know the 
 attributes of the circular form ; that it can be contracted and 
 expanded; can yield and resist; can be turned about an 
 axis ; and at the same time that the direction of its revo- 
 lutions may be reversed ; that it refers every motion to the 
 centre, and that all rest is lost at the periphery ; that it 
 measures every triangular form ; that it has a certain per- 
 petual regard to the angular, and yet has no angle, no plane, 
 no opposite direction, except in one place, or in the centre, 
 where direction is absolute. These by some are called pre- 
 dicates, because they are determined by essentials, but they are 
 proper attributes, and like proper attributes, common at- 
 tributes are to be distinguished from them. 
 
 That is a proper attribute, which can be attributed to that 
 ens, and not to another. That is a common attribute which 
 can be attributed to things superior, and reigns everywhere. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 PREDICATE. 
 
 Predicates are absolute which are attributed to their 
 subject absolutely without any condition added. Predicates 
 become hypothetical under a given condition ; they are not 
 supposed as possible, unless in potency. 
 
 Whatsoever is within an ens, and whatsoever can be in it, 
 that can be predicated concerning the ens, and is called a 
 predicate. Thus it is a universal word, and general term 
 for all essentials, attributes, accidents, and modes. 
 
 From predicates which agree, and which do not agree or 
 are inconsistent, every ens may be known, what it is, and 
 of what quality it is ; for an ens is described by mere pred- 
 icates. They are so many characters and indications of the 
 
 )\ 
 
 f i# 
 
 SUBJECT.— A FFECTION. 
 
 37 
 
 ens. Predicates also are set forth by means of types and 
 representations, so that when all the essence and nature can- 
 not be described, this may be done by means of similitudes. 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 SUBJECT. 
 
 That is called a subject in which all these predicates and 
 adjuncts reside. Every substance is a determined subject. 
 It is that, concerning which something is predicated ; and 
 that which is described and defined is a subject. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 
 affection. 
 
 Wolf says that under affection are comprehended both 
 attributes and modes, namely, predicates both intrinsic and 
 extrinsic. Hence (he says) that predications are the same 
 as affections. 
 
 But every affection supposes in the ens an active and a 
 passive, acting and reacting, giving and receiving. It also 
 supposes a form, possibility of modes, likewise essentials so 
 determined, as well as mutabiHty of state. Whether this be 
 in one subject, in which as it were several things are con- 
 sidered, or among several subjects, in order that there may 
 be an affection, there will be that which affects and that 
 which is affected. What thence results is called an affection. 
 The one subject is not always affected as are the states of the 
 affecting subject, but something intermediate arises; indeed, 
 
 *^*.-- 
 
 ,^ 
 
t'» 
 
 38 
 
 ONTOLOGY, 
 
 the one is aflfected in a contrary manner ; for there is an ap- 
 plication of the modes of the other, which causes the appro- 
 priate affection to result therefrom. The internal sensory is 
 aflfected by the eye with its sight ; but the aflfection is such as 
 is the internal sensory and its intermediate ; yea, also the 
 intellect contributes to it ; so that there are three things 
 which are aflfected. Every aflfection proceeds as far as to 
 the first substantial in all bodies. • 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 ACCIDENTS. 
 
 That which is not. modifiable is an accident. Gravity in 
 a stone is an attribute. Color or whiteness in a stone is an 
 accident. Accidents are quantity, magnitude, figure, situa- 
 tion, space, place, time, duration. Attributes and modes are 
 accidents. The essence of a compound ens consists of noth- 
 ing but mere accidents. Accidents are intrinsic and extrin- 
 sic. Substance is not an accident, but accidents cannot exist 
 without substance. Accidents derogate from nothing. 
 
 Therefore accidents are all those things which are not 
 substances, and thus not subjects ; for accidents belong to 
 substances. Intrinsic accidents are those which are within 
 substance, so far as that means, at the same time, a subject 
 in which form is, and in which modes obtain ; but in primal 
 substance, accidents cannot be given, because from it they 
 proeeed ; otherwise you would put accidents before substance. 
 
 Thus substance itself is the subject of accident; for in 
 compound substance nothing is given except accidents. 
 
 I 
 
 CONTINGENTS. 
 
 39 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 CONTINGENTS. 
 
 A CONTINGENT is that which may be or may not be, or, 
 which is not necessary : as, the color of a stone, the erudition 
 of a man. So it is changeable, and has not a suflScient reason 
 in the essence. Contingents have no necessary existence,^ 
 except a hypothetical one. A contingent ens has a suflScient 
 reason outside of itself in another ens. There is such a thing 
 as a series of contingents. 
 
 Contingents indeed happen from a cause not necessary, 
 which appears necessary to us, as from Providence. Matters 
 of chance all appear as contingents, while they flow from 
 necessary causes unknown to us; as, for example, the 
 slaughter of the infants by Herod. And again, the fashion- 
 ing of our own characters has a necessary cause in the state of 
 the soul. Every Divine Providence proceeds by means of 
 mere contingents, as in the case of Joseph, and the like ; so 
 that nothing may appear as necessary, although it be neces- 
 sary, in this supposed state of things. Nothing is given 
 purely necessary in physics, but it becomes necessary, this or 
 that being given or supposed. Thus contingents might be 
 said to be the causes of necessities, and necessities the causes 
 of contingents, and so they might be confounded. Among 
 contingents might be placed the highest necessity, but we 
 do not so regard it. 
 
 . % 
 
 
1 
 
 40 
 
 oNTOLoar. 
 
 %0 
 
 CHAPTEK XVI. 
 
 MODES— MODIFICATION. 
 
 Every change of a durable thing consists in variety of 
 modes. Variation and succession of modes is modification. 
 Ail modes are variable. Modes and determinations are 
 almost the same. The soul is modifiable, because it can 
 have perceptions of other things and desires for them. A 
 stone is modifiable because warm or cold, dry or moist, can 
 be added to it. Every mode consists in limits or limitations. 
 If it consists in only one limit, it is simple. 
 
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