fEB 3 December 19, 1948, Holland invaded the Repubhc of Indonesia with a crushing, sneak attack like Japan’s on Pearl Harbor, hke Nazi Germany’s on Holland itself. The U.N. -negotiated Renville Agreement was trampled. Solemn international discussions were used as cover-up for weeks of Dutch preparation. Holland, home of Kris Kringle and good cheer, timed its murder for Christmas. World leaders were conveniently dispersed. The U.N. General Assembly had adjourned. So had the U. S. Congress. In Indonesia itself, the Dutch first cut off the U.N. dele- gation’s telegraph lines, then “notified” it. Elaborate decep- tions kept Republicans off guard. Then the Dutch struck without mercy or honor, but with American-manufactured planes, tanks, guns. IN ONESIA These pages tell: • THE LONGER STORY OF DUTCH TREACHERY • THE STORY OF WHY THE REPUBLIC WILL NEVER QUIT • THE STORY OF WHY THE DUTCH CAN NEVER WIN The Netherlands lately and always has promised Indonesian independence in words, brutally suppressed it in fact. THE RENVILLE AGREEMENT, JAN. 17, 1948 promise — free plebiscites within six months to a year in areas claimed by both sides; a con- stituent convention; an all-Indonesia legislature; voluntary Dutch-Indonesian union. On Feb. 3, 1948, Queen Wilhehnina broadcast to the world; “Coloniahsm is dead.” deed.,, — all-out invasion on Dec. 19, 1948; complete sea blockade of Repubhcan trade for 2?2 years, even on essential imports like medical supphes. THE LINGGADJATl AGREEMENT, MARCH 1947 promise — a sovereign United States of Indonesia by January 1949; guarantee of Indonesian rights in interim period; voluntary Dutch-Indonesian union. deed,,. — aU-out invasion on July 20, 1947, stopped short of complete destruction of the Repubhc only by Security Council cease-fire order; refusal to implement Agree- ment because of “re-interpretation”; sea blockade. POST-SURRENDER PERIOD, AUGUST 1945 promise — constitutional reform; new era. deed... — immediate mobihzation of war-starved Dutch reservists for invasion service in Indonesia; dispatch of 120,000 troops over the next year or two. QUEEN WILHELMINA'S WAR-TIME PLEDGE, DEC. 6, 1942 promise — a post-war conference leading to . . .“a commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao will participate.” deed... — pre-war refusal to train Indonesians mihtarily for their own defense; post-war use of armed force to restore Dutch power. The direct, Hitler-like rupture of the Renville Agreement is the most recent case in point promise — The Renville Agreement, Jan. 17, 1948, reached through the U.N. Good Offices Committee, with especial U. S. encouragement, stipulated in particular; “10. ) This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be terminated.” In general, it provided a mihtary truce and a set of 18 pohtical principles as a basis for final settlement. deed... — The Dutch “notified” the Committee and the Repubhc of their Dec. 19 invasion just as it began. Telegraph facifities of both were cut in advance, ehminating U.N. communications. The Linggadjati Agreement, March 1947, was likewise breached by a bloody, unheralded invasion during negotia- tions on its implementation. promise — After hysterical, false denunciation of the Repubhc as Japanese-created, terror by Dutch forces and estabhshment of Dutch-controlled “independent” states out- side the Repubhc had all failed to break it, the Dutch next tried negotiation. The Linggadjati Agreement, which resulted, guaranteed Indonesian freedom, with something like dominion status. It also provided an interim period during which a mixed Dutch-Indonesian administration would prepare for the transfer of power. Furthermore, it gave formal Dutch recognition of the Republic as the de facto authority in Java, Siunatra and Madura, the three main islands. deed,,, — The agreement reached was 90% Dutch, but the Repubhc accepted it to facih- tate a quick settlement. This was in June 1946. Republicans were assured Dutch ratification was a matter of a few days or weeks. Actually, it was March 1947 before Dutch signatures were aflBxed. The intervening months were occupied with Dutch obstruction and attempts to force new proposals on the Repubhc. Both before and after signing, Holland repeatedly ignored the Agreement, occupying major Repubhcan cities, bringing in 120,000 troops, 30,000 more than previously agreed. Dutch “interpretations” of their commitments were so exten- sive that even after the signing, implementation was impossible. Negotiation continued. At midnight July 20, 1947, while Repubhcan leaders awaited reply to their latest formal communication, they were abruptly notified of suspension of the Agreement. Simultaneously, fuU-scale war was launched. It ended only when the Security Council issued a cease-fire order some days later. By that time, Holland had what it wanted most, the richest producing areas of the Repubhc. Before, during, and just after the War, Holland volubly prom- ised freedom, belied itself in action. promise — The famous Visman Report of 1941 supposedly laid the technical base for it; Queen Wilhelmina’s speech of December 1942 pledged it; Dutch utterances just after the surrender of Japan seemed to assume it. deed ... — The Visman Report provided excuse for years of delay, while being made; Dutch administration and weakness left Indonesia defenseless before Japan. After the war, Holland left no effort undone to thwart, then destroy the universal vehicle of Indonesian independence — the Repubhc. These infamies against 70,000,000 peaceful, long-suffering Indonesians — and against the United Nations — spring in- evitably from the faithless Dutch repression of three centuries. * Dutch double-talk notwithstanding, the cornerstone of all democracy, universal hteracy, was eflFectively prevented. Funds were never assigned, teachers never developed for mass education. Pleading poverty in the world’s richest colony, Dutchmen developed only speciahzed schools for Indonesian aristocrats’ sons and daughters, who learned obedience along with their 3 R’s and in higher education. * Mass organizations were unceasingly harassed. Nationahst leaders, including those who head the Republic today and many others who did not survive, were exiled for years at a time to remote swamps and jungles, often killed. * A nominal Peoples Council or Volksraad before the war was subject to the veto of both Governor General and the Dutch Parliament. Even then a high proportion of its members were appointed, not elected. And on top of that, those elected were chosen by a system of suffrage so indirect as to be meaningless. * Brutality like that of the Nazis at Lidice was meted out when the cup of slavery ran over and an uprising occmred. In 1926 whole districts of villages in Java were burned to the ground, the inhabitants murdered by fully equipped Dutch troops. In 1947 some 30,000 Indonesians were massacred in Macassar, Gelebes. Under its masquerade of paternalistic colonizer, Holland's program was extremely simple^ self-enrichment. * Indonesia was a vast treasure-house and workshop where 70,000,000 hved at subsistence level, their output streaming to the profit of a minority in Holland’s 9,500,000 population. — 15% of Holland’s national income. — $200,000,000 per year in straight profits ( which made up annual Dutch foreign exchange deficit). — $4,000,000,000 invested Dutch capital in Indonesia. — The average income of a family of five Indonesians was 15-30 cents per day. — 400,000 Dutch persons possessing a vested interest in Indonesia as a colony. — Complete Dutch mononoly of Indonesian trade, excluding U. S. and others. Issued by the Repu Ave., New York 1, N. Agents Registration ington, D. C., as a. Jogjakarta, Java, ! filed with the De statement is avai Foreign Agents 0h6istration disapproval of OflSce of 350 Fifth the Foreign Justice, Wash- Indonesia, erial is being registration ation under the cate approval or ftates Government. January, 1949 'I 303