MASTER 
 NEGATIVE 
 
 NO. 91 -80254 
 
MICROFILMED 1991 
 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK 
 
 as part of the 
 "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project 
 
 Funded by the 
 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES 
 
 Reproductions may not be made without permission from 
 
 Columbia University Library 
 
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT 
 
 The copyright law of the United States ~ Title 17, United 
 States Code ~ concerns the making of photocopies or other 
 reproductions of copyrighted material... 
 
 Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to 
 accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order 
 would involve violation of the copyright law. 
 
AUTHOR: 
 
 MURRAY, CLARK J. REV. 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 OUTLINE OF SIR WILLIAM 
 HAMILTON'S ... 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 DA TE : 
 
 1871 
 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES 
 PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET 
 
 Master Negative # 
 
 Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record 
 
 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 
 
 Restrictions on Use: 
 
 
 FILM SIZE: 
 
 IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA. 
 
 j^>^ 
 
 TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA 
 
 REDUCTION RATIO: 
 
 IB IIB 
 
 II2C. 
 
 DATE FILMED: L7UzIh.i::. INITIALS__i?^_^fl 
 
 HLMEDBY: RESEARCFI PLTOLICATIONS. INC WOODBRIDGE. CT 
 
D 
 
 Association for Information and image iManagement 
 
 1100 Wayne Avenue. Suite 1100 
 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 
 
 301/587-8202 
 
 \ 
 
 Centimeter 
 
 12 3 4 
 
 iiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilii 
 
 TTT 
 
 Inches 
 
 1 1 1 
 
 5 6 7 8 
 
 iiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilii 
 
 ' ' I 
 
 1 
 
 1.0 
 
 LI 
 
 1.25 
 
 9 
 
 iiiiliii 
 
 10 
 
 iiiliii 
 
 n 
 I 
 
 llllilllMl 
 
 Li 
 
 12.8 
 
 2.5 
 
 l» 
 
 II == 
 
 
 Ih 
 
 \'-' 
 
 2.2 
 
 1*3 
 
 IIIIM 
 
 
 US 
 
 is 
 
 2.0 
 
 I& 
 
 
 
 U> u 
 
 
 Kuu 
 
 
 
 > 
 
 1.8 
 
 
 
 \.4 
 
 1.6 
 
 
 ^m 
 
 
 12 13 14 15 mm 
 
 iiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiii 
 
 TTT 
 
 I 
 
 MRNUFfiCTURED TO RUM STRNDRRDS 
 BY APPLIED IMRGE* INC. 
 
Columbia JBni'ott^itp 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 IK 
 
OUTLINE 01' 
 
 SIR WILLIAM IIAMILT0:N"'S 
 
 PHILOSOPHY, 
 
I» 
 
 ^ 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 A TEXT-BOOK FOR STUDENTS, 
 
 BY THE 
 
 < • • 1 • 
 
 REY. J. iCLAUK MBHRAY, 
 
 nOrBSSOR of MKHTAL A»D moral PUILOSOPUY, QUEEK'S UNIVEBSITT, CAITAOA. 
 
 1 ) 
 
 
 ?12Eit5 an Introtiucti0n, 
 
 I } > 
 
 5 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. JAMES McCOSH, LL.D, 
 
 rRBSIDBUT OF PBl»CBTON COLLBOE, NEW JEBSBT.^^ 
 
 BOSTON: 
 
 G- O XT L D A^l^Ti LINCOLN", 
 
 59 WASHIKOTON STREET. 
 
 NEW YORK: SHELDON AND COMPANY. 
 
 CINCINNATI : G. 8. BLANCHAKD k CO. 
 
 TOEONTO, ONT.: ADAM, STEVENSON & CO. 
 
 1871. 
 
o 
 
 09 
 
 IKo tje iiHem0r2 
 
 or 
 
 SIR WILI.IAJM HAIVIJCLTON, 
 
 THIS ESSAY 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1870, by 
 GOULD AND: I^INCOLN,,.. .•, 
 In the office of the Litra.iaa ot 'Congress, » at, T^i^hihgton. 
 
 It! I • • 
 
 : « I I J ■ • 
 , , It 
 
 t I 
 t I 
 
 /J^ THE EXPOSITION OF HIS PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Is Inscribed 
 
 BT 
 
 A GBATEFUL PUPIL. 
 
 •*0n Earth there is nothing great but Man: 
 In Man there is nothing great but Mind.** 
 
 Rockwell 4 Cuurcuill, PrinterB, Boston. 
 
 ^ ^J o u 1 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 ■^<!fi9i< 
 
 The primary object of this work is to provide a convenient 
 text-book in philosophy. The labors of Sir William Hamilton 
 as a professor formed generally the most powerful influence 
 in the philosophical education of those who came within their 
 reach ; and a similar influence has extended into wider circles 
 through his writings. It seemed to me, therefore, that his 
 philosophy might still be made a valuable instrument of 
 philosophical culture. 
 
 The chief difficulty in the way of this lay in the selection 
 of one of his works, suitable for use as a text-book. A very 
 slight acquaintance with these is sufficient to show that none 
 of them by itself presents a complete view of his philosophical 
 opinions in systematic order.^ The Lectures on Metapliysicst 
 
 1 For many readers it may not be unnecessary to enumerate the works of 
 Sir William Hamilton. (1.) His edition of RHd's Works (1846) contains, besides 
 many valuable footnotes, a number of supplementary dissertations on various 
 philosophical subjects. Only a few of the intended dissertations were ever 
 completed; but since his death his editors have published the fragmentary 
 materials he had collected for the dissertations which had been left unfinished. 
 (2.) The articles which he had contributed to the Edinburgh Review were col- 
 lected into one volume, with numerous additions, under the title of Discusswns 
 in Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform (1852). 
 (3.) The lectures, which he had been in the habit of delivering to his classes, 
 were published posthumously; the Lectures on Metaphysics, in 1859; the 
 Lectures on Logic, in 1860. 
 
X 
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 which contain the fullest account of his philosophy, and from 
 which, therefore, the largest extracts have been drawn for the 
 present work, besides being devoted mamly to one subdivision 
 of his system, fail to give his matured views, or the matured 
 expression of his views, on some subjects, while the discussion 
 of many points is overladen with a mass of extraneous matter, 
 which is generally confusing to the beginner and unnecessaiy 
 for the comprehension of Hamilton's own system. I have, 
 therefore, thought it advisable to attempt the systematic ex- 
 hibition of his philosophical opinions without regard to the 
 order or the mode of treatment which he has followed in any 
 of his writings. 
 
 In doing so, however, it was necessary to adopt some 
 order ; and it seemed to me that I had no right to adopt any 
 other than that which the philosopher has himself suggested 
 in his distribution of the philosophical sciences,^ though he 
 has nowhere been able to carry it out. This distribution 
 may possess comparatively little merit, and has ceitaiuly 
 exerted no influence in directing the course of speculative 
 thought in Europe or America, such as has flowed from 
 Hegel's or from Comte's classification of the sciences ; but the 
 system of Hamilton would be inadequately represented by 
 following any other course than that which I have adopted. 
 
 With regard to the liberties which I have taken in the 
 composition of this Outline, I may remark, in the first place, 
 that it has frequently been necessary to transfer passages 
 from their original contexts, and that, in doing so, I have 
 introduced them into their new contexts by such connectino" 
 particles and phrases as seemed most appropriate. I have 
 
 ISee Lectures on Metaphysics ^ VII 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 XI 
 
 also frequently left out of a passage a few words which were 
 not essential to its meaning, especially when they appeared 
 to be intended rather for an audience than for readers. Such 
 slight liberties I have not considered it necessary to indicate. 
 Occasionally, moreover, where Hamilton's editors intimate 
 that he has adopted the language of another writer for the 
 expression of his views, I have not preserved the marks of 
 quqjation, as these might have been confusing to a student. 
 In one or two instances, however, I have ventured on an 
 independent or abridged statement of Hamilton's doctrine; 
 but such passages have been uniformly pointed out in the 
 footnotes. It may also be added that I am responsible for the 
 tabular classifications at pages 83 and 88, as well as for some 
 slight alterations of expression in the others. With these ex- 
 planations it may be said that the text is wholly Hamilton's. 
 
 As an exposition of Hamilton's Philosophy, the Outline con- 
 tains some imperfections which were unavoidable. Even in the 
 language these may at times be traced : for, while the volume 
 is in the form of a text-book for private study, the largest 
 portion of it is extracted from lectures which were intended 
 to be delivered to a class; and though I have endeavored to 
 leave out all the most obtrusive expressions of direct address, 
 it was impossible to destroy the general form of phraseology. 
 Some passages, moreover, undoubtedly suffer from being 
 used as an exposition of a doctrine in a different connection 
 and in a different point of view from that in which they were 
 originally written. I believe, however, that no liberty which 
 I have taken in the composition of the book has originated 
 a single piisrcpresentation of Hamilton's opinions, while the 
 whole volume offers a fair representation of his complete 
 
XII 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 philosophical system. At the same time I do not take the 
 responsibility of recommending that my book should be ac- 
 cepted as a final authority in any important question concerning 
 Hamilton's doctrine, without referring to the works of the 
 philosopher himself. I have, therefore, uniformly subjoined, 
 within parentheses, a distinct reference to the place in his 
 works from which each passage of the Outline is extracted; 
 and, to prevent mistake, I may observe that each reference 
 embraces the whole passage between it and the previous 
 refereftce. I am not without hope, therefore, that, while the 
 Outline may serve the purpose for which it is primarily 
 designed, it may also be of some use to those who desire an 
 acquaintance with Sir William Hamilton's system of philosophy, 
 and have found the state of his writings a formidable obstacle 
 in their way. 
 
 I have only to add that the work is merely expository, and 
 that, therefore, while I have avoided any criticism of Hamilton's 
 doctrines, I do not always undertake the responsibility of their 
 defence. I believe, however, that the teaching of philosophy 
 must still, at least, be conducted by helping the student to 
 master the varying points of view from which the different 
 representative systems look out on the field of speculation. 
 For this reason, I trust that a slight service has been rendered 
 to the cause of philosophical education by presenting, with a 
 completeness which has never before been attempted, the 
 eystem of Sir William Hamilton. 
 
 J. CLAllK MUURAY. 
 Queen's College, Ont., October, 1870. 
 
 [ 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Introductory Note, by Db. James McCosh 
 
 PAoa 
 
 XXIII 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 § 1. The General Nature of Philosophy 19 
 
 (A) Nominal Definition of Philosophy 19 
 
 (B) Real Definition of Philosophy . . , . . .20 
 
 I. Historical or Empirical Knowledge . . . .21 
 
 TL. Philosophical or Scientific Knowledge . . .22 
 
 * Philosophy, strictly so called, is the Science of Mind . 24 
 
 § 2. Classification of the Philosophical Sciences 25 
 
 Tabular View of the Classification 27 
 
 FIRST DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DEFINiriON OF THE SCIENCE, AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS 
 
 IN THE DEFINITION. 
 
 Phenomenal Psychology defined . . 81 
 
 Terms of the definition explained 31 
 
 XIII 
 
XIV 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 XV 
 
 (A) Torms expressing the Manifestations of Mind . . .33 
 
 (B) Terms expressing the Unknown Basis of Mental Manifesta- 
 
 tions 34 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL. 
 
 § 1. Consciousness: Its General Nature 87 
 
 § 2. Consciousness: Its Special Conditions 40 
 
 (A) Undisputed Conditions: — I. It is an actual knowledge. 
 
 II. It is an immediate knowledge. III. It supposes dis- 
 crimination. IV. It involves judgment. V. It implies 
 memory . * 40 
 
 (B) Disputed, whether consciousness is ^ particular faculty, or the 
 
 universal condition, of intelligence ..... 42 
 
 I. It cannot be discriminated from the other faculties . 43 
 n. It is cognizant of their objects, as well as of their 
 
 operations 45 
 
 $ 3. Consciousness : Its Evidence and AtUhority ..... 46 
 
 (A) It is the principal source from which all knowledge of mental 
 
 phenomena must be obtained. — Phrenology ... 47 
 
 (B) Authority of its Testimony. — Two points of view, under 
 
 which its deliverances may be considered .... 48 
 
 Rules for applying its Testimony 53 
 
 § 4. Consciousness : Classification of its Phenomena . • • . 53 
 
 I. Knowledges; II. Feelings; III. Conations .... 54 
 Criticism of Objections to the Classification: I. That the throe 
 classes are not co-ordinate; II. That there can be only 
 
 two fundamental powers of mind 56 
 
 i> 
 
 I, 
 
 FIRST PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY . OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 What is meant by a mental power • 61 
 
 Distribution of the Faculties of Knowledge 63 
 
 Tabular View of the Distribution • • • 66 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 § 1. External Perception 67 
 
 (A) Distinction between Sensation and Perception ... 68 
 
 Law : Sensation and Perception are always in the inverse 
 ratio of each other 69 
 
 Illustration of the Law : I. From a comparison of the dif- 
 ferent senses; II. From comparing diflFerent impressions 
 of the same sense, as different (1) in degree, (2) in kind 69 
 
 (B) Distinction in the Qualities of Matter 73 
 
 The qualities as contemplated from the point of view of 
 
 Sense and from that of the Understanding ... 74 
 
 I. Deduction of the Primary Qualities . . . . 76 
 
 II. Induction of the Secundo-Primary Qualities ... 78 
 
 III. Induction of the Secondary Qualities .... 81 
 Tabular Classification of the Qualities of Matter . . . 8S 
 The Object in Perception is either a primary quality or the 
 
 quasi-primary phasis of a secundo-primary ... 84 
 In Perception, therefore, two facts are always given, that I 
 •t. am, and that something different from me exists . . 86 
 
 Theories of Perception, which arise from the acceptanoe or 
 non-acceptance of these facts in their integrity . . 87 
 
 li 
 
XVI 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 xvn 
 
 Tabular Classification of these theories .... 
 
 §2. Self- Consciousness 
 
 Self-consciousness contrasted with Perception .... 
 
 The fundamental forms of Self-Consciousness are Time and Self, 
 
 as those of Perception are Time and Space. Two difficulties 
 
 removed ••••• 
 
 88 
 90 
 90 
 
 91 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE CONSERVATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 The relation of the Conservative Faculty to the Presentative on the one 
 
 hand, and to the Reproductive and Representative on the other . 94 
 
 $ 1. The fact of Retention 96 
 
 That Cognitions, in the interval between acquisition and repro- 
 duction, continue to subsist in the mind, though out of con- 
 floiousness, is proved 
 
 I. From External Perception, by (1) the Sense of Sight, (2) 
 
 the Sense of Hearing, (3) the other Senses ... 96 
 
 II. From the Association of Ideas 99 
 
 III. From our Acquired Habits and Dexterities. Three 
 theories to account for these 100 
 
 1. That of Hartley and Reid criticised • . .101 
 
 2. That of Stewart criticised 102 
 
 3. Hamilton's own theory explained . • • • 103 
 § 2. Explanation of Retention 104 
 
 Retention is explained by the self-activity of the mind, the real 
 difficulty being, not how a mental activity endures, but how it 
 ever vanishes ..••••••. 105 
 
 Inferencks. 
 
 1. That Retention extends to all the mental phenomena . . 107 
 
 2. That to explain Retention, physiological hypotheses are un- 
 
 necessary. Dependence of memory on the state of the 
 brain 107 
 
 \ 
 
 )\ 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY. 
 
 Reproduction governed by Laws . . 110 
 
 Distinction between the primary and the secondary Laws of Reproduction 111 
 
 § 1. Primary Laws of Reproduction ....... 112 
 
 (A) General. 
 
 T. Law of Possible Reproduction ...... 112 
 
 II. Laws of Actual Reproduction . • . • • .112 
 
 1. Law of Repetition 114 
 
 2. Law of Redintegration 114 
 
 (B) Special. 
 
 I. Law of Similars 115 
 
 II. Law of Contrast 116 
 
 III. Law of Coadjaccncy 117 
 
 $ 2. Secondary Laws of Reproduction ....... 117 
 
 General Law of Preference acts 117 
 
 (A) By relation to the thought suggesting, giving . . .118 
 
 I. Law of Immediacy • 118 
 
 II. Law of Homogeneity 118 
 
 (B) By relation to the mind, giving the Law of Facility. What 
 
 thoughts are more easily suggested 118 
 
 § 3. Distinction of Suggestion and Reminiscence 120 
 
 Reminiscence explained ......•• 120 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE REPRESENTATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 This faculty is determined to represent by (1) the Reproductive Faculty, 
 (2) the Faculty of Comparison. Imagination . 
 
 Productive Imagination is therefore Representation plus Comparison 
 Representation is not limited to sensible objects 
 
 Dreaming, Somnambulism, Reverie 
 
 The Organs of Imagination the same as those of Sense . 
 
 126 
 
 127 
 123 
 128 
 131 
 
xvin 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 JLIX 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 134 
 134 
 134 
 135 
 135 
 135 
 136 
 136 
 138 
 
 140 
 
 f 1, Primary Acts of Comparison . . • 
 
 1. AfiBrmation of Existence .... 
 
 2. Discrimination of tho Ego and tho Non-ego 
 
 3. Judgment of Agreement or Dissimilarity 
 
 4. Recognition of Substance 
 6. Recognition of Cause • • • 
 
 ^ 2. Classification . . • • • 
 
 (A) Collective Notions . • . 
 (P^ Abstraction, poetical and scientific 
 
 (0) Generalization; General Notions; Their Extension and Com- 
 prehension 
 
 What is the object of Consciousness, when we employ a gen- 
 eral term ? Antagonistic doctrines of the Nominalists and 
 
 the Conceptualists 
 
 Conoeptualism originates in ambiguity of terms 
 Theories on the question of the Primum Cognitum 
 
 1. That terms are first expressive of individual objects 
 
 2. That they first express classes ..... 
 
 3. That they first express neither the precisely general nor 
 
 the determinately particular, but the vague and con- 
 fused. (Hamilton's theory) 
 
 § 3. Judgment 
 
 § 4. Reasoning 
 
 I. Deductive Reasoning, 1. In Comprehension; 2. In Extension . 
 
 II. Inductive Reasoning, 1. Incomprehension; 2. In Extension 158 
 Reasoning, which is synthetic in Extension, is analytic in 
 
 Comprehension. Confused application of the terms Analysis 
 and Synthesis 160 
 
 142 
 144 
 145 
 145 
 146 
 
 147 
 
 150 
 153 
 153 
 
 1/ 
 
 I 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE REGULATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 This faculty is the source of necessary or a priori cognitions . . . 162 
 
 Criteria of such cognitions: 1. Incomprehensibility; 2. Simplicity; 
 
 3. Necessity and Universality; 4. Certainty .... 164 
 
 The conditions of positive thought are: 1. Non-contradiction, and 
 
 2. Relativity 165 
 
 § 1. Non-contradiction involves tho three laws of: 1. Identity; 2. Con- 
 tradiction; 3. Excluded Middle 166 
 
 § 2. Relativity implies that we can know neither the unconditionally 
 limited (the Absolute) nor the unconditionally unlimited (the 
 Infinite), but only the limited, and the conditionally limited. This 
 condition is brought to bear under two relations : . . . 167 
 
 (A) The Relation of Knowledge 169 
 
 (B) The Relations of Existence, which are either 
 
 I. Intrinsic, of Substance and Quality, or . . . . 169 
 
 II. Extrinsic, comprehending Time, Space, and Degree . 170 
 Tabular view of the Conditions of Thought 174 
 
 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI. 
 
 LAW OF THE CONDITIONED IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE PRIN- 
 CIPLE OF CAUSALITY. 
 
 Statement and Illustration of the principle 173 
 
 Theories to explain the principle explained and criticised . . . 177 
 Tabular view of these theories ........ 180 
 
 SECOND PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Eolation of the Feelings to the Cognitions on the one hand, and the 
 
 Conations on the other 193 
 
CONTENTS, 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 XXI 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ABSTRACT THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 
 
 Definition of Pleasure and Pain 198 
 
 Their different kinds : 1. Positive and Negative Pleasure and Pain; 
 
 2. Pain of Restraint and that of Over-exertion 199 
 
 (a) by itself, (6) in conjunction with imagination. 
 The last include : i. the Beautiful; ii. the Sublime; 
 iii. the Picturesque ....... 208 
 
 II. The practical, the concomitants of our conative powers, 
 comprehending those that relate to (1) self-preserva- 
 tion, (2) enjoyment of existence, (3) preservation of 
 the species, (4) our tendency to perfection, (5) the 
 moral law 219 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE ABSTRACT THEORY APPLIED TO THE CONCRETE 
 
 PHENOMENA. 
 
 I 1. The Feelings as 'Causes 200 
 
 As Causes the feelings are divided into the pleasurable and the 
 
 painful 200 
 
 I. The apparent contradictions to the theory in actual life are 
 
 really confirmations ,...•••• 200 
 
 II. The theory is confirmed by the affections called painful : 
 
 (1) Grief; (2) Fear; (3) Pity; (4) Enjoyment of tragedies 202 
 Four general causes which affect the intensity of our Feelings : 
 I. Novelty; II. Contrast; III. Harmony or Discord between 
 coexistent activities ; IV. Association ..... 203 
 
 § 2. The Feelings as Effects 206 
 
 As effects of the different energies of life, the feelings may be 
 classified in accordance with the different classes of energies. 
 
 (A) The Sensations, or feelings which accompany the exercise of 
 
 bodily powers, are divided into (I.) those of Sensus Fixus, 
 and (II.) those of Sensus Vagus ..... 206 
 
 (B) The Sentiments, or feelings which accompany the exercise of 
 
 the higher mental powers, comprehend 
 I. The contemplative, the concomitants of our cognitive 
 powers, which are divided into (1) those of the sub- 
 sidiary faculties; (a) Self-consciousness and (6) Im- 
 agination, and (2) those of the elaborativo faculty. 
 
 i» 
 
 THIRD PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 1 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONATIONS. 
 
 Terms to express these phenomena .•••••. 225 
 They are divided into 
 
 (A) Desires, blind and fatal tendencies to action . . . .226 
 
 (B) Volitions, free tendencies to action. The freedom of will is 
 proved (1) directly, (2) indirectly, though it is incon- 
 ceivable (1) because of the Law of the Conditioned, (2) 
 because motiveless volition is morally unaccountable. But 
 the inconceivability does not invalidate the fact, (1) be- 
 cause the causal judgment is merely a mental impotence, 
 (2) because fatalism is equally inconceivable . • . 226 
 
 SECOND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (A) Nomology of the Cognitions 231 
 
 (B) Nomology of the Feelings 232 
 
 (C) Nomology of the Conative Powers 233 
 
XXII 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 THIRD DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PU B LI SHED BY 
 
 GOULD AND LINCOLN, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 EXISTENCE IN GENERAL. 
 
 The axiom, that wo havo no knowledge of existence itself, but merely 
 of its phenomena, explained in reference to I. Matter, and II. 
 Mind 237 
 
 This axiom is divided into two : 
 
 I. That the properties of existence are not necessarily of the same 
 
 number as our faculties of apprehending them . . . 240 
 
 II. That the properties known are not necessarily known in their 
 
 native purity 242 
 
 Certain inforonces, however, regarding existence itself may be necessi- 
 tated by its phenomena 244 
 
 59 Washington Street, Boston. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EXISTENCE OF GOD AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 
 
 The notion of a God implies not only Omnipotence, but Intelligence and 
 
 Virtue; and Virtue involves Freedom 247 
 
 The proof of God's existence, therefore, requires the proof of two prop- 
 ositions : 
 
 L That the universe is the creation of a free original intelligence 250 
 II. That the universe is governed not merely by physical, but by 
 
 moral, laws 252 
 
 Value of mental science to theology 253 
 
 Evil influences of the exclusive study of physical science . . . 254 
 Consequences which would result from referring everything to the 
 
 mechanism of nature 256 
 
 1 
 
 HAMTLTON'S TjBCTVItES, embracing the Metaphysical and Logi:;ai, 
 
 Courses; with Notes, from Original Materials, and an Appendix, conta'jiing 
 the Author's Latest Development of his New Logical Theor>'. Edited by Kev. 
 Henry Loncjueville Mansel, B. D., Prof, of Moral and Metaphysical Phi- 
 losophy in 3Iagdalen College, Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., of Edinburgh. 
 In two royal octavo volumes, viz., 
 
 I. Metaphysical Lectures. Royal octavo, cloth, 3.50. 
 
 II. Logical Lectures. Royal octavo, cloth, 3.50. 
 
 B^ G. & L., by a special arrangement with the family of the late Sir William Hamilton, are the 
 authorized, and only authorized, American publishers of this distinguished author's matchlest 
 Lkctukks ox Metaphysics and Logic. 
 
 The above have already been introduced into nearly all our leading colleges. 
 
 LOOMIS* ELEMENTS OF GEOLOGY ; adapted to Schools and Colleges. 
 With numerous Illustrations. By J. R. LooMis, President of Lewisburg Uni- 
 versity, Pa. 12mo, cloth, 1.25. 
 
 " It is surpassed by no work before the American public." — Jf. B. Anderson^ LL. D., President 
 Rochester University. 
 
 PEABODT'S CimiSTIAXITT THE BELIGIOX OF NATITRE, 
 
 Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in 18C3, by A. P. Peabody, 
 D. D., LL. D., Preacher to the University, and Plummer Professor of Christian 
 Morals, Harvard College. Royal 12mo, cloth, 1.50. 
 
 A masterly production, distinguished for its acuteness and earnestness, its force of logic and faifr 
 ness of statement, written in a style of singular accuracy and beauty. 
 
 PALET^S NATURAL THEOLOGY: Illustrated by forty Plates, with Sc 
 lections from the Notes of Dr. Paxton, and Additional Notes, Original and 
 Selected, with a Vocabulary of Scientific Terms. Edited by John Wake, 
 M. D. Improved edition, with elegant illustrations. 12mo, cloth, embossed, 
 1.75. 
 
 MANSEL'S PROLEGOMENA LOGIC A f the Psychological Character of 
 Logical Processes. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D. 12mo, cloth, 
 1J25. 
 
 YOUNG LADIES* CLASS HOOK: a Selection of Lessons for Reading n 
 Piose and Varse. By Ebenezer Bailey, A. M. Clotli, embossed, 1.25. 
 
N 
 
 <|0wlir anir f intolti's |pubIitaiions. 
 
 MAVBN'S MENTAL PHIZOSOPHT ; Including the Intellect, the Senrt. 
 bilities, and the Will. By Joseph Haven, Profe88or of Intellectual and 
 Moral Philosophy, Chicago University. Royal 12rao, cloth, embossed, 2.00. 
 ^ It it tMjlieved this work will be found preeminently diatinguished for the Completekkss witk 
 
 Which it presents the whole fubject. 
 
 HAVEN'S MOIiAZ rHILOSOrJIT : Including Theoretical and Practical 
 Ethics. By JOSEPH Haven, D. D., late Professor of Moral and Intellectual 
 Philosophy in Chicago University. Royal 12mo, cloth, embossed, 1.75. 
 It is eminently scientific in method, and thorough in discussion, and iU views on unsetUcd que** 
 fions in morals are discriminating and sound. 
 
 MOPKINS* ZECTUltES ON MOBAZ SCIENCE, delivered before thC 
 Lowell Institute, Boston, by 3Iauk Hopkins, D. B., President of Williaml 
 College. Royal 12mo, cloth, 1.50. 
 
 > An important work from the pen of one of the most profound thinkers of the ccc 
 
 WATI.AND*S ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE, By FRANCIS 
 VVayland, D. D., late President of Brown University. 12mo, cloth, 1.75. 
 
 WAYLAND'S MORAL SCIENCE ABRIDGED, and adapted to the 
 
 use of Schools and Academies, by the Author. Half mor., 70 cts. 
 The same, Cheap School Edition, boards, 45 cts. 
 
 WATLAND'S ELEMENTS OF FOIITICAL ECONOMY. By FRAN. 
 CIS Wayland, D. D. 12mo, cloth, 1.75. 
 
 WAYLAND*S POLITICAL ECONOMY ABRIDGED, and adapted 
 to the use of Schools and Academies, by the Author. Half mor., 70 cents. 
 All the above works by Dr. Wayland are used as text-books hi most of the coUeges and higher 
 ichools throughout tlie Union, and are highly approved. 
 
 AGASSIZ AND GOULD'S PRINCIPLES OF ZOOLOGY; Touching 
 the Structure, Development, Distribution, and Natural Arrangement, of the 
 RACES OF Animals, living and extinct, with numerous Illustrations. For 
 the use of Schools and Colleges. Part I. Comparative Physiology. By 
 Louis Agassiz and Augustus A. Gould. Revised edition. 1.50. 
 
 PART II. Systematic Zoology. Jn preparation. 
 ••It is simple and elementary in Its style, full in its illustrations, comprehensive in its range, yet 
 Irell condensed, and brought into the narrow compass requisite for the purpose intended." — 5i/tt- 
 mcm's Journal, 
 
 HITTER'S GEOGRAPHIC AIj STUDIES, Translated from the German 
 of Carl Ritter, by Rev. W. L. Gage. With a Sketch of the Author's Life, and 
 a Portrait. 12mo, cloth, 1.50. 
 This volume contains the grand gencralizatiotis of Hitter's life-work, the ErdkQnde, In eighteen 
 
 volumes; his lectures on the RelaUons of Geography and History, and a number of important 
 
 pipers on Physical Geography. 
 
 t^ROGBESSIVE PENMANSHIP, Plain and ornamental, for the use of 
 Schools. By N. D. Gould, author of " Beauties of Writing," " Writing M**- 
 ier's Assistant," etc. In five parts, each, 20 cts. 
 
 W ' 
 
 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 
 
 Sir "William Hamilton was the greatest metaphysician 
 of his age, and his metapliysics will be studied by thinking 
 minds in all coming ages. But his system was not drawn 
 out in a compendious form by himself. In order to find it, 
 students have to search a number of treatises in the shape 
 of reviews, dissertations, class-lectures, notes, and notes 
 upon notes. The stablished metaphysician delights in all 
 this as an exhibition of the working of Hamilton's pene- 
 trating intellect, and because of the value of the seeds 
 which, in the exuberance of his learning, he scatters in his 
 progress. But as he often moves with great rapidity, and 
 turns off at sharp angles into collateral discussions, the 
 younger student in apt to be left behind and to become per- 
 plexed, and he longs to have some guide who may furnish 
 him with a clear and combined view of the philosophy as a 
 whole. This felt want has been supplied in Professor 
 Murray's " Outline of Hamilton's Philosophy." 
 
 I have carefully read the work in proof, and I am able to 
 
 say that it fmiiishes an admirable summary, — clear, cor- 
 
 xxin 
 
XXIV 
 
 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 
 
 rect, and readily intelligible, of the leading doctrines and 
 connections of Hamilton's Philosophy. The account is ren- 
 dered mainly in Hamilton's own language, by one who un- 
 derstands his philosophy, and who has the higher merit of 
 entering thoroughly into the spirit of his great teacher. I 
 have observed that in points in regard to which there have 
 been disputes as to Hamilton's meaning, Professor Murray 
 seems to me to give the proper version. 
 
 Those who are led by this brief exposition to take a gen- 
 eral view, as from a height to which Piofessor Murray has 
 conducted them, of the country spread out before them, will 
 be allured, when he has left them, to enter upon a more par- 
 ticular exploration for themselves, when they will find in- 
 numerable scattered ore which could not have a place in a 
 mere Outline. 
 
 The testimony now given will not be esteemed of less 
 
 value because it comes from one who feels that Hamilton 
 
 has often followed Kant's Critical Method too implicitly, 
 
 and who dissents from his doctrines of Causality, of the 
 
 Relativity of Knowledge, and of the negative nature of our 
 
 Idea of the Infinite. 
 
 JAMES McCOSH. 
 Princeton, New Jersey, U. S., Oct. 1, 1870. 
 
 .-/ 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 THE GENERAL NATURE AND DIVISIONS OF 
 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 1. THE GENERAL NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 In commencing a course of philosophical discipline, 
 it is important to obtain, at least, a general notion of 
 what philosophy is. In order to this, there are two 
 questions to be answered : (^A) What is the mean- 
 ing of the name? and (^B) What is the meaning of 
 the thing? 
 
 (A) Nominal Definition of Philosophy. Philoso- 
 phy is a term of Greek origin, — it is a compound 
 of <f(koq, a lover or friend, and (To<pta, wisdom — specu- 
 lative wisdom. Philosophy is thus, literally, a love 
 of wisdom. But if the grammatical meaning of the 
 word be unambiguous, the history of its application 
 is involved in considerable doubt. According to the 
 commonly received account, the designation of phi- 
 losopher was first assumed and applied by Pythag- 
 oras ; but this rests on very slender authority. It 
 is probable, I think, that Socrates was the first who 
 adopted, or, at least, the first who familiarized, the 
 
 19 
 
 
20 
 
 AN OVTLINS OF 
 
 •expression. It was natural that he should be anxious 
 to contradistinguish himself from the Sophists («f 
 aofoi^ ol (jixpiffrai), literally, the wise men; and no 
 term could more appropriately ridicule the arrogance 
 of these pretenders, or afford a happier contrast to 
 their haughty designation, than that of philosopher 
 (i. e., the lover of wisdom) ; and at the same time it is 
 certain that the substantives <pdoffo(pia and (pddaoipoq first 
 appear in the writings of the Socratic school. It is 
 true, indeed, that the verb <ptXoffof£Xv is found in Herod- 
 otus (I. 30) ; and that, too, in a participial form, to 
 designate a man who had travelled abroad for the 
 purpose of acquiring knowledge. It is, therefore,, 
 not impossible that, before the time of Socrates, 
 those who devoted themselves to the pursuit of the 
 higher branches of knowledge were occasionally 
 designated philosophers ; but it is far more probable 
 that Socrates and his school first appropriated the 
 term as a distinctive appellation ; and that the word 
 philosophy, in consequence of this appropriation. 
 
 came to be employed for the complement of al l 
 
 higher knowledge, and more especially to denote the 
 science conversant about the principles or causes of 
 existence . 
 
 {B) Real Definition of Philosophy, It is, per- 
 haps, impossible adequately to define philosophy. 
 For what is to be defined comprises what cannot be 
 included in a single definition. For philosophy is 
 not regarded from a single point of view ; . it is some- 
 times considered as theoretical, that is, in relation to 
 man as a thinking and cognitive intelligence ; some- 
 times as practical, that is, in relation to man as a 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 21 
 
 moral agent ; and sometimes as comprehending both 
 theory and practice. Again, philosophy may either 
 be regarded objectively, that is, as a complement of 
 truth known ; or subjectively, that is, as a habit or 
 quality of the mind knowing. In these circumstances 
 I shall not attempt a definition of philosophy, but 
 shall endeavor to accomplish the end which every 
 definition proposes, — make you understand, as pre- 
 cisely as the unprecise nature of the object-matter 
 permits, what is meant by philosophy, and what are 
 the sciences it properly comprehends within its 
 sphere. 
 
 All philosophy is knowledge, but all knowledge 
 is not philosophy. Philosophy is, therefore, a kind 
 of knowledge. What, then, is philosophical knowl- 
 edo-e, and how is it discriminated from knowledge 
 
 in general ? 
 
 I. We are endowed by our Creator with certain 
 faculties of observation, which enable us to become 
 aware of certain appearances or phenomena. These 
 faculties may be stated as two, — Sense or External 
 Perceptio n, and Self-Consciousness or Inlerual Pei- 
 ception ; and these faculties severally afford us the 
 knowledge of a different series of phenomena. (1.) 
 Through our senses we apprehend what exists or| 
 what occurs in the external or material world ; (2.) i 
 By our self-consciousness, what is or what occurs in 
 the internal world or world of thought. The infor- 
 mation which we thus receive is called Historical or 
 Empirical knowledge. 
 
 1. It is called historical, because, in this knowl- 
 edge, we know only the fact, only that the phenome- 
 
22 
 
 AJ^ OUTLINE OF 
 
 
 noil is ; for history is properly only the narration of a 
 consecutive series of phenomena in time, or the 
 description of a coexistent series of phenomena in 
 space. Civil history is an example of the one; 
 natural history, of the other. 
 
 2. It is called empirical or experiential^ if we 
 might use that term, because it is given us by experi- 
 ence or observation, and not obtained as the result of 
 inference or reasoning. 
 
 Historical or empirical knowledge is, therefore, 
 simply the knowledge that something is. Were we 
 to use the expression, the knowledge tliat^ it would 
 Bound awkward and unusual in our modern lan- 
 guages. In Greek, the most philosop h ical of all 
 tongues , its parallel, however, was familiarly em- 
 ployed. It was called to org, that is, i] yvmai^ oTt ifTTtv , I 
 should notice, that with us the knoivledr/e (hat, is com- 
 monly called the knowledge of the fact. As examples 
 of empirical knowledge, take the facts, whether known 
 in our own experience or on the testified experience 
 of others, that a stone falls, — that smoke ascends, — 
 that the leaves bud in spring, and fall in autumn, '• — 
 that such a book contains such a passage, — that such 
 a passage contains such an opinion, — that Cajsar, that 
 Charlemagne, that Napoleon existed. 
 
 II. But things do not exist, events do not occur, 
 isolated — apart — by themselves ; they occur, and are 
 conceived by us, only in connection. Our observation 
 affords us no example of a phenomenon which is not 
 an effect ; nay, our thought cannot even realize to it- 
 self the possibility of a phenomenon without a cause. 
 We do not at present inquire into the nature of the 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 23 
 
 connection of eflfect and cause, either in reality or in 
 thought. It is sufficient for our present purpose to 
 observe that, while, by the constitution of our nature, 
 we are unable to conceive anything to begin to be 
 without referring it to some cause, — still the knowl- 
 edge of its particular cause is not involved in the 
 knowledge of any particular effect. By this necessity, 
 which we are under, of thinking some cause for every 
 phenomenon ; and by our original ignorance of what 
 particular causes belong to what particular effects, — 
 it is rendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the 
 mere knowledge of the fact of a phenomenon ; on 
 the contrary, we are determined, we are necessi- 
 tated, to regard each phenomenon as only partially 
 known, until we discover the causes on which it de- 
 pends foi- its existence. For example, we are struck 
 with the appearance in the heavens called a rainbow. 
 Think we cannot that this phenomenon has no cause, 
 thou<>-h wc may be wholly ignorant of what that cause 
 is. Now, our knowledge of the phenomenon as a 
 mere fact — as a mere isolated event — does not 
 content us ; we therefore set about an inquiry into the 
 
 cause, which the constitution of our mind compels 
 
 us to suppose, — and at length discover that the rain- 
 bow is the effect of the refraction of the solar rays by 
 the watery particles of a cloud. Having ascertained 
 the cause, but not till then, we are satisfied that we 
 fully know the effect. 
 
 Now, this knowledge of the cause of a phenomenon 
 is different from, is something more than, the knowl- 
 edge of that phenomenon simply as a fact ; and these 
 two cognitions or knowledges have, accordingly, re- 
 
24 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 ceived different names. The latter, we have seen, is 
 called historical or empirical knowledge; the former 
 is called philosophical or scientific or rational knowl- 
 edge. Historical, is the knowledge that a thing is; 
 philosophical, the knowledge lohy or how it is. The 
 Greek language w ell expresses philosophical know l- 
 edge as the diott, — the Yvu)at<; Store effr i. 
 
 Such is philosophical knowledge in its most exten- 
 sive signification ; and in this signification all the sci - 
 ences occupied in th e research of causes may be 
 viewed as so many branches of philosophy . There is, 
 however, one section of these sciences which is de- 
 nominated philosophical by pre-emnience, — sciences 
 which the term philosophy exclusively denotes, when 
 employed in propriety and rigor. What these sci- 
 ences are, and why the term philosophy has been spe- 
 cially limited to them, I shall now endeavor to make 
 you understand. 
 
 " Man/' says Protagoras, "is the measure of the 
 universe : " and in so far as the universe is an object 
 of knowledge, the paradox is a truth. Whatever we 
 know, or endeavor to know, we know and can know 
 only in so far as we possess a fticulty of knowing in 
 general ; and we can only exercise that faculty under 
 the laws which control and limit its operations. How- 
 ever great and infinite and various, therefore, may be 
 the universe and its contents, these are known, not as 
 they exist, but as our mind is capable of knowing 
 them. 
 
 1. In the first place, therefore, as philosophy is a 
 knowledge, and as all knowledge is only possible 
 under the conditions to which our faculties are sub- 
 
 8IR WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 25 
 
 jected, the grand, the primary problem of philosophy 
 must be to investi«rate and determine these conditions 
 as the necessary conditions of its own possibility, 
 
 2. In the second place, as philosophy is not merely 
 a knowledge, but a knowledge of causes, and as the 
 mind itself is the universal and principal concurrent 
 cause in every act of knowledge ; philosophy is, con- 
 sequently, bound to make the mind its first and para- 
 mount object of consideration. The study of mind 
 is thus the philosophical study by pre-eminence. 
 There is no branch of philosophy which does not sup- 
 pose this as its preliminary, which does not borrow 
 from this its light. In short, the science of mind, 
 whether considered in itself or in relation to the 
 other branches of knowledge, constitutes the princi- 
 pal and most important object of philosophy, — con- 
 stitutes in propriety, with its suite of dependent 
 sciences, philosophy itself. 
 
 From what has been said, you will, without a 
 definition, be able to form at least a general notion 
 of what is meant by philosophy. In its more exten - 
 sive aiqnijication^ it is equivalent to a knowledge of 
 t hings by their causes; while, in its stricter meaning ^ 
 it is confined to the sciences which constitute^ or hol d 
 immediatehf of, the science of mind . {Metaph,, Lec- 
 ture III.) 
 
 § 2. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES, 
 
 The whole of philosophy is an answer to three 
 questions: (1.) What are the Facts or Phenomena to 
 be observed? (2.) What are the Laws which regu- 
 
\ 
 
 26 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 late these facts, or under which these phenomena 
 appear? (3.) What are the real Results, not imme- 
 diately manifested, which these facts 5r phenomena 
 warrant us in drawing? 
 
 I. If we consider the mind merely with the view 
 of observing and generalizing the various phenomena 
 it reveals, we have one mental science or one depart- 
 ment of mental science ; and this we may call the 
 Phenomenology of Mind, It is commonly called 
 Psychology, — Empirical Psychology, or the Induc- 
 tive Pldlosophy of Mind: we might call it Phenome- 
 nal Psychology. It is evident that the divisions of 
 this Science will be determined by the classes into 
 which the phenomena of mind are distributed. I shall 
 hereafter show you that there are three great classes 
 of these phenomena, — namely, (1.) the phenomena 
 of our Cognitive faculties, or faculties of Knowl- 
 edge ; (2.) the phenomena of our Feelings, or of 
 Pleasure and Pain ; (3.) the phenomena of our Cona- 
 tive powers, or of Will and Desire. 
 
 II. If, again, we analyze the mental phenomena 
 with the view of discovering and considering, not 
 contingent appearances, but the necessary and univer- 
 sal facts, that is, the Laws, by which our faculties 
 are governed, to the end that we may obtain a crite- 
 rion by which to judge or to explain their proced- 
 ures and manifestations, we have a science which we 
 may call the Nomology of Mind^ or Nomoloqical Psy- 
 chology. Now, there will be as many distinct 
 classes of Nomological Psychology as there are distinct 
 classes of mental phenomena under the Phenomeno- 
 logical division. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHY. 
 
 27 
 
 III. The third great branch of philosophy is that 
 which is engaged in the deduction of Inferences or 
 Results. In the first branch philosophy is properly 
 limited to the facts afibrded in consciousness, con- 
 sidered exclusively in themselves. But these facts 
 may be such as not only to be objects of knowledge 
 in themselves, but likewise to furnish us with grounds 
 of inference to something out of themselves. As 
 efiects, and effects of a certain character, they may ena- 
 ble us to infer the analogous character of their unknown 
 causes ; as phenomena, and phenomena of peculiar 
 qualities, they, may warrant us in drawing many con- 
 clusions regarding the distinctive character of that 
 unknown substance, of which they are the manifesta- 
 tions. Now, the science conversant about all such 
 inference of unknown being from its manifestations, is 
 called Ontology, or Metaphysics Proper, We might 
 call it Inferential Psychology. 
 
 The following is a tabular view of the distribution 
 of philosophy as here proposed : — 
 
 I. Cognitions, 
 II. Feelings, 
 
 Mind or 
 
 Consciousness 
 
 affords 
 
 (A) Facts, of which the science is Phe- 
 nomenal Psychology, embracing 
 
 III. Conations. 
 I. Cognitions, of which the sciences 
 
 (B) Laws, of which I are Logic, etc. 
 
 ., . . v-^„^ 1 II' Feelings, of which the science 
 
 the science is Nomo- I i^\ . 
 
 < is Esthetic. 
 
 LOGICAL PSYCHOLO- \ ^^^ Cona/tcn., ofwhich the sciences 
 GY, embracing / -are (1.) Ethics and (2.) 
 
 \ Politics. 
 
 (C) Results, of which the science is Inferential 
 
 Psychology, ^y^^jz)^^"^ i^ 
 
FIRST DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 I 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENAL PYSCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DEFINITION OF THE SCIENCE AND EXPLANATION OF 
 TERMS IN THE DEFINITION. 
 
 Phenomenal Psychology — Psychology, strictly 
 so denominated — is the science conversant about the 
 phenomena or modifications or states of the Mind or 
 Conscious Subject or Soul or Spirit or Self or Ego. 
 
 In this definition I have purposely accumulated a 
 variety of expressions, in order that I might have the 
 earliest opportunity of making you accurately ac- 
 quainted with their meaning. Before, therefore, 
 proceeding further, I shall pause a moment in expla- 
 nation of the terms in which this definition is ex- 
 pressed. 
 
 The term Psychology itself is a Greek compound, 
 its elements being <poxTJ, signitying soul or mind, and 
 ;«>o<r, signifying discourse or doctnne. Psychology 
 is, therefore, the discourse or doctrine treating of the 
 human mind. 
 
 The above definition of psychology contains two 
 correlative sets of terms, — the one designating the 
 phenomena of knowing, willing, feeling, desiring, etc., 
 
 31 
 
32 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHT, 
 
 33 
 
 ill Avhich the mind becomes known; the other des- 
 iiruaiinff the mind, considered as the unknown sub- 
 stance to which these phenomena belong. Of the 
 former class are the vfords phenomenon, mode, modifi- 
 cation, state; and to these may be added the analogous 
 terms quality, j^roperty, attribute, accident. Of the 
 latter class are subject, mind, soul, spirit, self, ego, 
 {A) Terms expressing the Manifestations of 
 
 THE Mind. 
 
 I. Phenomenon is the Greek word for that ivhich 
 appears, and may therefore be translated by appearance. 
 There is, however, a distinction to be noticed. (1.) In 
 the first place, the employment of a Greek term shows 
 that it is used in a strict and philosophical applica- 
 tion. (2.) In the second place, the term appearance is 
 used to denote not only that which reveals itself to 
 our observation, as existent, but also that which only 
 seems to be, in contrast to that which truly is. There 
 is thus not m'erely a certain vagueness in the word, 
 but it even involves a kind of contradiction to the 
 sense in which it is used when employed for phenome- 
 non. In consequence of this, the term phenomcuoii 
 has been naturalized in our language as a philosoph - 
 ical substitute for the term appearance . The terms 
 phenomenon and appearance are employed in reference 
 to a substance, as known; the remaining terms, in 
 reference to a substance, as existing. 
 
 n. A mode is the manner of the existence of any- 
 thing. Take, for example, a piece of wax. The wax 
 may be round, or square, or of any other definite fig- 
 ure ; it may also be solid or fluid. Its existence in 
 any of these modes is not essential ; it may chtmge 
 
 from one to the other without any substantial altera- 
 tion. As the mode cannot exist without a substance, 
 we can accord to it only a secondary or precarious 
 existence in relation to the substance, to which^we ac- ^^^^i?^^-^ 
 cord the privilege of existing by itself, per se existere; 
 but though the substance be not restricted to any par- 
 ticular nTode of existence, we must not suppose that 
 it can exist, or at least be conceived by us to exist, m 
 none. All modes are, therefore, variable states : and 
 though some mode is necessary for the existence of a 
 thing, any individual piode is accidental. 
 
 III. Modification is properly the bringing a thing 
 into a certain mode of existence ; but it is very com- 
 monly employed for the mode of existence itself. 
 
 IV. iS^a^e is a term nearly synonymous with mode, 
 but of a meamng more extensive, as not exclusively 
 limited to the mutable and contingent. 
 
 V. Quality is, likewise, a word of a wider signifi- 
 cation, for there are essential and accidental qualities. 
 (1.) The essential qualities of a thing are those apti- 
 tudes, those manners of existence and action, which it 
 cannot lose without ceasing to be. For example, in man, 
 the faculties of sense and intelligence ; in body, the di- 
 mensions of length, breadth, and thickness ; in God, 
 the attributes of eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, 
 etc. (2.) By accidental qualities are meant those apti- 
 tudes and manners of existence and action which sub- 
 stances have at one time and not at another, or which 
 they have always, but may lose without ceasing to be. 
 (a) For example, of the transitory class are the 
 whiteness of a wall, the health which we enjoy, the 
 fineness of the weather, etc. (6) Of the permanent 
 
 8 
 
 { 
 
34 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 class are the gravity of bodies, the periodical move 
 ment of the plaoets, etc. 
 
 VI. Attribute is a word properly convertible with 
 quality^ for every quality is an attribute, and every 
 attribute is a quality ; but in our language, custom 
 has introduced a certain distinction in their application. 
 Attribute is considered as a word of loftier signifi- 
 cance, and is, therefore, conventionally limited to qual- 
 ities of a higher application. Thus, for example, it 
 would be felt as indecorous to speak of the qualities 
 of God, and as ridiculous to talk of the attributes of 
 matter. 
 
 VII. Property is correctly a synonym for peculiar 
 quality ; but it is frequently used as coextensive with 
 quality in general. 
 
 VIII. Accident^ on the contrary, is an abbreviated 
 expression for accidental or contingent quality. 
 
 {B) TERaiS EXPRESSING THE UNKNOWN BaSIS OF 
 
 MENTAL Phenomena. 
 
 I. The word mind is of a more limited application 
 than the term soul. In the Greek Philosophy the 
 term (po^^^, soul, comprehends, besides the sensitive 
 and rational principle in man, the principle of organic 
 life both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms. 
 
 Since Descartes limited psychology to the domain 
 of consciousness, the term mind has been rigidly em- 
 ployed for the self-knowing principle alone. Mind, 
 therefore, is to be understood as the subject of the 
 various internal phenomena of which wo are con- 
 scious. 
 
 n. The tenn subject {subjedum, j5;ro<rra<T«^, jSroxe^otsvov) 
 
 is used to denote the unknown basis which lies 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 35 
 
 under the phenomena of which we become aware,' 
 whether in our external or internal experience. But 
 the philosophers of mind have, in a manner, usurped 
 and appropriated this expression to themselves. Ac- 
 cordingly in their hands the phrases, conscious or 
 thinking subject, and subject simply, mean precisely 
 the same thing ; and custom has prevailed so far that, 
 in psychological discussions, the subject is a term now 
 currently employed throughout Europe for the mind 
 or thinking pnnciple. The utility of this expression 
 is founded on two circumstances. The first is that it 
 affords an adjective ; the second, that t he terms sub- 
 j ect and subjective have opposing: relatives in the term s 
 object and objective, so that the two pairs of words to - 
 gether enable us to designate the primary and mos t 
 important analysis and antithesis of philosophy in a 
 more precise and emphatic manner than can be done 
 by any other technical expressions. Subject, we have 
 seen, is a term for that in which the phenomena, re- 
 vealed to our observation, inhere, — what the school- 
 men have designated the materia in qua. Limited to 
 the mental phenomena, subject, therefore, denotes the 
 mind itself; and subjective, that which belongs to, or 
 proceeds from, the thinking subject. Object, on the 
 other hand, is a term for that about which the know - 
 ing subject is conversant, — what the schoolmen hav e 
 styled the materia circa quam ; while objective means 
 that which belongs to, or proceeds from, the object 
 knoAvn ; and thus denotes what is real in opposition to 
 what is ideal, — what exists in nature in contrast to 
 what exists merely in the thought of the individual. 
 III. The terms self and ego we*shall take together, as 
 
86 
 
 AN OUTLINE, OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 they are absolutely convertible. The self, the I, is 
 recognized in every act of intelligence, as the sub- 
 ject to which that act belongs. It is I that perceive, 
 I that imagine, I that remember, I that attend, I that 
 compare, I that feel, I that desire, I that will, I that 
 am conscious. The I, indeed, is only manifested in 
 one or other of these special modes ; but it is mani- 
 fested in them all ; they are all only the phenomena 
 of the I, and, therefore, the science conversant about 
 the phenomena of mind is, most simply and unam- 
 'biguously, said to be conversant about the phenom- 
 ena of the I or Fgo. This expression, as that 
 which, in many relations, best marks and discrimi- 
 nates the conscious mind, has now become familiar 
 in every country, with the exception of our own. 
 Why it has not been naturalized with us is not unap- 
 parent. In English the I could not be tolerated ; 
 because, in sound, it would not be distinguished from 
 the word significant of the organ of sight. We 
 must, therefore, either renounce the term, or resort 
 to the Latin J^go; and this is perhaps no disadvan- 
 tage, for, as the word is only employed in a strictly 
 philosophical relation, it is better that this should be 
 distinctly marked, by its being used in that relation 
 alone. The term self is more allowable ; yet still the 
 expressions Ego and Non-Ego are felt to be less awk- 
 ward than those of Self and Not-Self. {Lectures on 
 Metaphysics, VIII. and IX.) 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL. 
 
 In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental 
 phenomena, these are all seen to comprise one essen- 
 tial element, or to be possible only under one 
 necessary condition. This element or condition is 
 consciousness, or the knowledge that I, — that the 
 Eo'o exists, in some determinate state. In this 
 knowledge they appear or are realized as phenomena, 
 and with this knowledge they likewise disappear, or 
 have no longer a phenomenal existence ; so that con- 
 sciousness may be compared to an internal light, by 
 means of which, and which alone, what passes in the 
 mind is rendered visible. It follows, therefore, that 
 consciousness must form the first object of our con- 
 sideration. 
 
 § 1. CONSCIOUSNESS : ITS GENERAL NATURE. 
 
 Nothing has contributed more to spread obscurity 
 over a very transparent matter than the attempts of 
 philosophers to define consciousness. Consciousne ss 
 cannot be defined ; we may be ourselves fully aware 
 what consciousness is, but we cannot, without confu- 
 sion, convey to others a definition of what we our- 
 selves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain. 
 
 37 
 
38 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 ^J- 
 
 Consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge. 
 Conscfousness is itself the one hiii:hest source of all 
 comprchensibility and illustration ; how, then, can 
 we find aught else by which consciousness may be 
 illustrated or comprehended? To accomplish this, it 
 would be necessary to have a second consciousness, 
 through which we might be conscious of the mode in 
 which the first consciousness was possible. In short, 
 the notion of consciousness is so elementary, that it 
 cannot possibly be resolved into others more simple. 
 It cannot, therefore, be brought under any genus, — 
 any more general concej)tion ; and, consequently, it 
 cannot be defined. But thou gh consciousness cannot 
 be logically defined, it may, however^ be philosop hic 
 callv analyzed . This analysis is efiected by observing 
 
 and holding fast the phenomena or facts of conscious- 
 ness, comparing these, and, from this comparison, 
 evolving the universal conditions under which alone 
 an act of consciousness is possible. 
 
 But before proceeding to show you in detail what 
 the act of consciousness comprises, it may be projDer, 
 in the first place, to recall to you, in general, what 
 kind of act the word is employed to denote. I 
 know, I feel, I desire, 'etc. What is it that is neces- 
 sarily involved in all these ? It requires only to be 
 stated to be admitted, that when I know, I must 
 know that I know, — when I feel, I must know that 
 I feel, — when I desire, I must know that I desire. 
 The knowledge, the feeling, the desire, are possible 
 only under the condition of being known, and being 
 known hy me. For if I did not know that I knew, 
 I would not know ; if I did not know that I felt, I 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 39 
 
 \ 
 
 would not feel ; if I did not know that I desired, I 
 would not desire. Now, this knowledge, which I, 
 the subject, have of these modifications of my being, 
 and through which knowledge alone these modifica- 
 tions are possible, is what we call consciousness. The 
 expressions Ihiow that I know; I Jcnow that I feel; 
 I know that I desire ; are thus translated by, 
 / am conscious that I know; I am conscious that I 
 feel; I am conscious that I desire. Consciousness is 
 thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the mind 
 or ego of its acts and affections; — in other words, 
 the self-affirmation that certain modifications artf 
 known by me, and that these modifications are mine. 
 But, on the other hand, consciousness is not to be 
 viewed as anything different from these modifications 
 themselves, but is, in fact, the general condition of 
 their existence, or of their existence within the 
 sphere of intelligence. Though the simplest act of 
 mind, consciousness thus expresses a relation subsist- 
 ing between two terms. These terms are, on the one 
 hand, an I or Self, as the subject of a certain modi- 
 fication; and, on the other hand, some modifi- 
 cation, state, quality, affection, or operation belong- 
 in"" to the subject. Consciousness, thus, in its 
 simplicity, necessarily involves three things, — (1.) ^ 
 recognizing or knowing subject ; (2.) a recognized or 
 known modification ; and (3.) a recognition or knowl- 
 edge by the subject of the modification. 
 
 We may, therefore, lay it down as the most general 
 characteristic of consciousnes s, that it is the recogni- 
 t ion hy the thinking subject of its num. acts or afec- 
 tions. 
 
40 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHY. 
 
 41 
 
 § 2. CONSCIOUSNESS : ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS. 
 
 In this, the most general characteristic of con- 
 sciousness, all philosophers are agreed. The more 
 arduous task remains of determining its special con- 
 ditions. Of these, likewise, some are almost too 
 palpable to admit of controversy. 
 
 (A) Before proceeding to those in regard to which 
 there is any doubt or difficulty, it will be proper, in 
 the first place, to state and to dispose of such deter- 
 minations as are too palpable to be called in question. 
 Of these admitted limitations, 
 
 I. The first is, that consciousness is an actual and 
 not a potential hiowledge. Thus a man is said to 
 know, that is, is able to know, that 7 -f- 9 are = 16, 
 though that equation be not, at the moment, the 
 object of thought ; but we cannot say that he is con- 
 scious of this truth unless while it is actually present 
 
 to his mind. 
 
 II. The second limitation is, that consciousness is 
 an immediate, not a mediate knowledge. We are said, 
 for example, to know a past occurrence when we 
 represent it to the mind in an act of memory. We 
 know the mental representation, and this we do im- 
 mediately and in itself, and are also said to know the 
 past occurrence, as mediately knowing it through the 
 mental modification which represents it. Now, we 
 are conscious of the representation as immediate ly 
 know^n ; but we cannot be said to be conscious of t he 
 thing represented, which, if known, is only know n 
 throug:h its re])resentation. 
 
 I 
 
 III. The third condition of consciousness, which 
 may be held as universally admitted, is, that it sup- 
 poses a contrast, — a discrimination; for we can be 
 conscious only inasmuch as we are conscious of some- 
 thing ; and we are conscious of something only inas- 
 much as we are conscious of what that something 
 is, — that is, distinguish it from what it is not. This 
 discrimination is of different kinds and degrees. (1.) 
 In the first place, there is the contrast between the 
 two grand opposites, self and not-self, — ego and 
 non-ego, — mind and matter. We are conscious 
 of self only in and by its contradistinction from 
 not-self; and are conscious of not-self only in 
 and by its contradistinction from self. (2.) In 
 the second place, there is the discrimination of 
 the states or modifications of the internal subject 
 or self from each other. We are conscious of one 
 mental state only as w^e contradistinguish it from 
 another ; where two, three, or more suCh states are 
 confounded, we are conscious of them as one ; and 
 were we to note no difference in our mental modifica- 
 tions, we might be said to be absolutely unconscious. 
 (3.) In the third place, there is the distinction 
 between the parts and qualities of the outer world. 
 We are conscious of an external object only as we 
 are conscious of it as distinct from others ; w^here 
 several distinguishable objects are coAfounded, we 
 are conscious of them as one ; where no object is dis- 
 criminated, we^re not conscious of any.i 
 
 IV. The fourth condition of consciousness, which 
 
 * See this subject treated more fully under Phenomenology of the 
 Cognitions^ Chap. V., § 1. 
 
42 
 
 AN OVTLINE OF 
 
 STIi WILLI A^T TJAMILTON^ S PniLOSOPLIT. 
 
 43 
 
 may be assumed as very generally acknowledged, is, 
 that it involves judgment,^ A judgment is the men- 
 tal act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of 
 another. This fourth condition is in truth only a 
 necessary consequence of the third, — for it is im- 
 possible to discriminate without judging, discrimi- 
 nation or contradistinction being, in fact, only the 
 denying one thing of another. 
 
 V. The fifth undeniable condition of consciousness 
 is memory. This condition also is a corollary of the 
 third. For without memory our mental states could 
 not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each 
 other, and referred to self. Without memory, each 
 indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental 
 succession would stand isolated from each other, — 
 would constitute, in fact, a separate existence. The 
 notion of the ego, or self, arises from the recognized 
 permanence and identity of the thinking subject in 
 contrast to tlie recognized succession and variety of 
 its modifications. But this recognition is possible only 
 through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, 
 the result of memory. But the notion of self is in- 
 volved in consciousness, so consequently is memory, 
 (Lect. on Metaph,, XI. Compare Meid's Works, pp. 
 932-7.) 
 
 (-B) We are now about to enter on a more disputed 
 territory. Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, and philoso- 
 phers in general, have regarded consciousness, not as 
 a particular faculty, but as the universal condition of 
 intelligence. E-eid, on the contrary, following, prob- 
 ably, Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, Royer- 
 
 * See note on preceding page. 
 
 f 
 
 Collard, and others, has classed consciousness ^s a co- 
 ordinate faculty with the other intellectual powers ; 
 distinguished from them, not as the species from the 
 individual, but as the individual from the individual. 
 And as the particular faculties have each their peculiar 
 object, so the peculiar object of consciousness is the 
 operations of the other faculties themselves, to the ex- 
 clusion of the objects about which these operations are 
 conversant. 
 
 This analysis we regard as false. ^ For it is impos- 
 sible, in the first place, to discriminate consciousness 
 from all the other cognitiv^e faculties, or to discrimi- 
 nate any one of these from consciousness ; and, in the 
 second, to conceive a faculty cognizant of the various 
 mental operations, without being also cognizant of 
 their several objects. , 
 
 I. We know, and Wekyiow that we know: — these 
 propositions, logically distinct, are really identical; 
 each implies the other. We know (i. e., feel, per- 
 ceive, imagine, remember, etc.) only as we know that 
 we thus know; and we know that we know, only as we 
 know in some particular manner (i. q., feel, perceive, 
 etc.). So true is the scholastic brocard : ^^ Non senti- 
 mus nisi sentiamus nos sentire ; non sentimus nos sen- 
 lire nisi sentiamus^ The attempt to analyze the 
 
 * This is described by Hamilton as ^^ihQ first contested position," 
 which he intends to maintain, with regard to consciousness {Lect. on 
 Metaph.f p. 143, Am. ed.) ; but it leads him into a long digression 
 {Ibid., pp. 143-182), at the close of which there is no mention of any 
 other contested positions. Did this digression cause him to forget 
 his apparent intention to continue the subject from which he started? 
 His editors give no indication that they have observed this 
 omission. — J. C. M. 
 
44 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 co-niti6ii / hnoiv, and the cognition 1 know that 1 
 hnow, into the separate energies of distinct faculties, 
 is therefore vain. But this is the analysis of lleid. 
 Consciousness, which the formula Ilcnow that I know 
 adequately expresses, he views as a power specifically 
 distinct from the various cognitive faculties compre- 
 hended under the formula I know, precisely as these 
 faculties are severally contradistinguished from each 
 other. But here the parallel does not hold. I can 
 feel without perceiving ; I can perceive without imag- 
 inino-; I can imagine without remembering; I can 
 remember without judging (in the emphatic significa- 
 tion) ; I can judge without willing. One of these acts 
 does not immediately suppose the other. Though 
 modes merely of the same indivisible subject, they are 
 modes in relation to each other, really distinct, and ad- 
 mit, therefore, of psychological discrimination. But 
 can I feel without being conscious that I feel? — can 
 I remember without being conscious that I remember? 
 t)r, can I be conscious without being conscious that I 
 perceive, or imagine, or reason, —that I energize, in 
 short, in some determinate mode, which Reid would 
 view as the act of a faculty specifically different from 
 consciousness? That this is impossible Reid himself 
 admits. But if, on the one hand, consciousness be 
 only realized under specific modes, and cannot there- 
 fore exist apart from the several faculties in cumulo; 
 and if, on the other, these faculties can all and each 
 only be exerted under the condition of consciousness ; 
 consciousness, consequently, is not one of the special 
 modes into which our mental activity may be resolved, 
 but the fundamental form,— the generic condition of 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 45 
 
 them all. Every intelligent act is thus a modified 
 consciousness; and consciousness a comprehensive 
 term for the complement of our cognitive energies. 
 
 II. But the vice of Reid's analysis is further mani- 
 fested in his arbitrary limitation of the sphere of con- 
 sciousness ; proposing to it the various intellectual 
 operations, but excluding their objects. "I am con- 
 scious," he says, "of perception, but not of the object 
 I perceive ; I am conscious of memory, but not of the 
 object I remember." 
 
 The reduction of consciousness to a particular fac- 
 ulty entailed this limitation. For, once admitting 
 consciousness to be cognizant of objects as of operations^ 
 Reid could not, without absurdity, degrade it to the 
 level of a special power. For thus, in the ^7-5^ place, 
 consciousness, coextensive with all our cognitive fac- 
 ulties, would yet be made co-ordinate with each; and 
 in the second, two faculties would be supposed to be 
 simultaneously exercised about the same object, to 
 the same extent. 
 
 But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at 
 least, equally untenable. The assertion that we can 
 be conscious of an act of knowledge without being 
 conscious of its object, is virtually suicidal. A men- 
 tal operation is only what it is by relation to its ob- 
 ject; the object at once determining its existence, and 
 specifying the character of its existence. But if a 
 relation cannot be comprehended in one of its terms, 
 so we cannot be conscious of an operation without 
 being conscious of the object to which it exists only 
 as correlative. For example. We are conscious of a 
 perception, says Reid, but are not conscious of its 
 
46 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 47 
 
 object. Yet how can we be conscious of a perception, 
 that is, how can we know that a perception exists, — 
 that it is a perception, and not another mental state, 
 — and that it is the perception of a rose, and of noth- 
 ins: but a rose ; unless this consciousness involve a 
 knowledge (or consciousness) of the object which at 
 once determines the existence of an act, specifies 
 its kind, and distinguishes its individuality? An- 
 nihilate the object, you annihilate the operation ; an- 
 nihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate 
 the consciousness of the operation. In the greater 
 number indeed of our cognitive energies, the two 
 terms of the relation of knowledge exist only as iden- 
 tical ; the object admitting only of a logical discrimi- 
 nation from the subject. I imagine a Hippogryph. 
 The Hippogryph is at once the object of the act and 
 the act itself. Abstract the one, the other has no ex- 
 istence ; deny me the consciousness of the Hippo- 
 gryph, you deny me the consciousness of the imagina- 
 tion ; I am conscious of zero ; I am not conscious at 
 all. {Discussions, pp. 47-49. Compare Led. on 
 3Ietaph., XH.) 
 
 § 3. CONSCIOUSNESS : ITS EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITY. 
 
 I now proceed to consider consciousness as the 
 source from whence we must derive every fact in the 
 Philosophy of Mind. And in prosecution of this 
 purpose I shall, in the first place, endeavor to show 
 you that it really is the principal, if not the only, 
 source from which all knowledge of the mental 
 phenomena must be obtained ; and, in the second 
 
 I 
 
 place, I shall consider the character of its evidence, 
 and what, under different relations, are the degi^ees 
 
 of its authority. 
 
 {A) As consciousness has been shown to be the 
 condition of all the mental phenomena, it is mainly, 
 if not solely, to consciousness, that' we must resort 
 for an acquaintance with these phenomena. Accord- 
 ing to the doctrine of phrenology, indeed, an ac- 
 quaintance with the various mental powers may be 
 obtained by observation of the various parts of the 
 brain, which that science maintains that it has dis- 
 covered to be their several organs. But though the 
 mind, in its lower energies and affections, is imme-; 
 diately dependent on the conditions of the nervou^ 
 system, and, in general, the development of the 
 brain in different species of animals is correspondent 
 to their intelligence, still it is impossible to connect 
 the mind or its faculties with particular parts of the 
 nervous system. For I have proved, by the most 
 extensive induction, that the alleged physiological 
 facts on which phrenology professes to be based, 
 such as its assertion of the correspondence betweer 
 the development of the cerebellum and the functioi 
 which it ascribes to it, are often not only unfounded, 
 but the very reverse of the truth. ^ 
 
 » In the above paragraph I have endeavored to embody the teach 
 ing of Sir William Hamilton on the subject of which it treats. His 
 editors have relegated this portion of his lectures, so far as it seemed 
 worthy of preservation, to an appendix {Led. on Metaph., Appendix 
 II.), where it may be consulted. I have thought it unnecessary to go 
 into detail, both because the position of phrenology has changed 
 since Hamilton's time, and because it is unnecessary to digress into 
 the question concerning the function of the various organs in the 
 
48 
 
 AN OVTLINE OF 
 
 (B) We proceed to consider, in the next place, 
 the authority, the certainty, of this instrument. 
 
 Now, it is at once evident, that philosophy, as it 
 affirms its own possibility, must affirm the veracity of 
 consciousness ; for, as philosophy is only a scientific 
 development of the facts which consciousness reveals, 
 it follows, that philosophy, in denying or doubting 
 the testimony of consciousness, would deny or doubt 
 its own existence. (Lect, on 3fetap^h,,^y,) How, 
 then, do the facts of consciousness certify us of the ir 
 own veracity? To this the only possible answer i s, 
 that as elements of our mental constitution, as 
 the essential conditions of our knowledge, the y 
 must by us be acc e pted as true. To suppose the ir 
 
 falsehood, is to suppose that we are created capa ble 
 of intelligence, in order to be made the victims of 
 delusion ; that God is a deceiver, and the root of o ur 
 nature a lie. But such a supposition, if gratuitou s, 
 i s manifestly illegitimate. For, on the contrary, th e 
 data of our original consciousness must, itjs eviden t, 
 in the ilrst instance^ be presumed true. It is only if 
 proved false, that their authority can, in consequen ce 
 of that proof, be, in the second instance, disa l- 
 lowed . 
 
 Here, however, at the outset, it is proper to take a 
 distinction, the neglect of which has been produc- 
 tive of considerable error and confusion. It is the 
 distinction between the data or deliverances of con- 
 sciousness considered simply in themselves, as ajpjpre^ 
 
 encephalon, in order to vindicate, not only the value, but the neces- 
 Bity, of reflection in the study of mind. — J. C. M. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosopht. 
 
 49 
 
 hended facts or actual manifestations, and those 
 deliverances considered as testimonies to the truth of 
 facts beyond their own pheno^nenal reality, 
 
 I. Viewed under the former limitation, they are 
 above all scepticism. For as doubt is itself only a 
 manifestation of consciousness, it is impossible to 
 doubt that, when consciousness manifests, it does 
 manifest, without, in thus doubting, doubting that 
 we actually doubt; that is, without the doubt con- 
 tradicting and therefore annihilating itself. Hence 
 it is that the facts of consciousness, as mere phenom- 
 ena, are by the unanimous confession of all sceptics 
 and idealists, ancient and modern, placed high above 
 the reach of question. 
 
 II. Viewed under the latter limitation, the deliver- 
 ances of consciousness do not thus peremptorily 
 repel even the possibility of doubt. I am conscious, 
 for example, in an act of sensible perception, (1.) of 
 myself, the subject knowing; and, (2.) of something 
 given as diflerent from myself, the object known. To 
 take the second term of this relation : that I am 
 conscious in this act of an object given, as a non-ego, 
 — that is, as not a modification of my mind, — of 
 this, as a phenomenon^ doubt is impossible. For, as 
 has been seen, we cannot doubt the actuality of a fact 
 of consciousness without doubting, that is subverting, 
 our doubt itself. To this extent, therefore, all scep- 
 ticism is precluded. But though it cannot but be 
 admitted that the object of which we are conscious in 
 this cognition is given, not as a mode of self, but 
 as a mode of something different from self, it is, how- 
 ever, possible for us to suppose, without our supposi- 
 
50 
 
 AN OVTLINE OF 
 
 tion, at least, being felo-de-se, that, though given as 
 a non-ego, this object may, in reality, he only a repre- 
 sentation of a non-ego, in and by the ego,. Let this, 
 therefore, be maintained ; let ihQ fact of the testimony 
 be admitted, but the truth of the testimony, to anght 
 beyond its own ideal existence, be doubted or denied. 
 How in this case are we to proceed ? It is evident 
 that the doubt does not in this, as in the former case, 
 refute itself. It is not suicidal by self-contradiction. 
 The Idealist, therefore, in denying the existence of 
 an external world, as more than a subjective phenom- 
 enon of the internal, does not advance a doctrine ab 
 initio null, as a scepticism would be which denied the 
 phenomena .of the internal world itself. 
 
 It is, therefore, manifest that we may throw wholly 
 out of account the phenomena of consciousness, con- 
 sidered merely in themselves ; seeing that scepticism 
 in regard to them, under this limitation, is confess- 
 edly impossible ; and that it is only requisite to vin- 
 dicate the truth of these phenomena, viewed as 
 attestations of more than their own existence, seeing 
 that they are not, in this respect, placed beyond the 
 possibility of doubt. 
 
 When, for example, consciousness assures us that, 
 in perception, we are immediately cognizant of an ex- 
 ternal and extended non-ego ; or that, in remembrance, 
 through the imagination, of which we are immediately 
 cognizant, we obtain a mediate knowledge of a real 
 past ; how shall we repel the doubt, — in the former 
 case, that what is given as the extended reality itself is 
 not merely a representation of matter by mind ; in the 
 latter, that what is given as a mediate knowledge of 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 51 
 
 the past, is not a mere phantasm, containing an illu- 
 sive reference to an unreal past? We can do this 
 only in one way. The legitimacy of such gratuitous 
 doubt necessarily supposes that the deliverance of 
 consciousness is not to he presumed true. If, there- 
 fore, it can be shown, on the one hand, that the de- 
 liverances- of consciousness must philosophically be 
 accepted, until their certain or probable falsehood has 
 been positively evinced ; and if, on the other hand, 
 it cannot be shown that any attempt to discredit the 
 veracity of consciousness has ever yet succeeded ; it 
 follows that, as philosophy now stands, the testimou}^ 
 of consciousness must be viewed as high above sus- 
 picion, and its declarations entitled to demand prompt 
 and unconditional assent. 
 
 I. In the first place, as has been said, it cannot but 
 be acknowledged that the veracity of consciousness 
 must, at least in the first instance, be conceded. 
 'INeganti in cum hit prohaUo^ Nature is not gratui- 
 tously to be assumed to work, not only in vain, but 
 in counteraction of herself ; our faculty of knowledge 
 is not without a ground to be supposed an instrument 
 of illusion ; man, unless the melancholy fact be proved, 
 is not to be held organized for the attainment, and 
 actuated by the love of truth, only to become the 
 dupe and victim of a perfi(5ious creator. 
 
 II. But, in the second place, though the veracity 
 of the primary convictions of conaciousness must, in 
 the outset, be admitted, it still remains competent to 
 lead a proof that they are undeserving of credit. But 
 how is this to be done ? As the ultimate grounds of 
 knowledge, these convictions cannot be redargued 
 
52 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 from any higher knowledge ; and as original beliefs, 
 they are paramount in certainty to every derivative 
 assurance. But they are many ; they are, in author- 
 ity, co-ordinate; and their testimony is clear and 
 precise. It is therefore competent for us to view them 
 in correlation ; to compare their declarations, and to 
 consider whether they contradict, and, by contradict- 
 ing, invalidate each other. This mutual contradiction 
 is possible in two ways. (1.) It may be that the 
 primary data themselves are directly or immediately 
 contradictory of each other ; (2.) It may be that they 
 are mediately or indirectly contradictory, inasmuch 
 as the consequences to which they necessarily lead, and 
 for the truth or falsehood of which they are therefore 
 responsible, are mutually repugnant. By evincing 
 either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be 
 disproved ; for in either case consciousness is shown 
 to be inconsistent with itself, and consequently incon- 
 sistent with the unity of truth. But by no other 
 process of demonstration is this possible, (Beid'a 
 WorJcSy pp. 743-5.) 
 
 Before we are entitled to accuse consciousness of 
 being a false witness, we are bound, first of all, to see 
 whether there be any rules by which, in employing 
 the testimony of consciousness, we must be governed ; 
 and whether philosophers Hiave evolved their systems 
 out of consciousness in obedience to these rules. For 
 if there be rules ^nder which alone the evidence of 
 consciousness can be fairly and fully given, and, 
 consequently, under which alone consciousness can 
 serve as an infallible standard of certainty and truth, 
 and if x^hilosophers have despised or neglected these, 
 
 sin WILLIAM Hamilton's piiilosopjii. 
 
 53 
 
 then must we remove the reproach from the instru- 
 ment, and affix it to those blundering workmen who 
 have not known how to handle and apply it. Now, 
 in attempting a scientific deduction of the philosophy 
 of mind from the facts of consciousness, there are, in 
 all, if I generalize correctly, three laws which afi'ord 
 the exclusive conditions of psychological legitimacy. 
 
 I. The Law of Parcimony : That we admit nothing 
 which is not either an original datum of consciousness 
 or the legitimate consequence of such a datum. 
 
 II. The Law of Integrity: That we embrace all 
 the original data of consciousness and all their legiti- 
 mate consequences. 
 
 III. The Law of Harmony : That we exhibit each 
 of these in its individual integrity, neither distorted 
 nor mutilated, and in its relative place, whether of 
 pre-eminence or subordination. (^Lect, on Metajph,, 
 XV., and Reid's Works, p. 747.) 
 
 § 4. consciousness : classification of its phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 On taking a survey of the mental modifications or 
 phenomena of which we are conscious, these are seen 
 to divide themselves into three great classes. (1.) In 
 the first place, there are the phenomena of Knowledge ; 
 (2.) In the second place, there are the phenomena of 
 Feeling, or the phenomena of pleasure and pain ; and 
 (3.) In the third place, there are the phenomena of 
 Conation, or of will and desire. Let me illustrate 
 this by an example. I see a picture. Now, first of 
 all, I am conscious of perceiving a certain com-j 
 
 ^2;Agi&., 
 
54 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 |i)leincnt of colors and fi<?iircs ; I recoirnize what the ob- 
 jeet is. This is the phciioiiienoii of Cognition ov Knowl- 
 edge, But this is not the only phenomenon of which 
 I may be here conscious. I may experience certain 
 affections in the contemplation of this object. If the 
 picture be a masterpiece, the gratification will be un- 
 alloyed ; but if it be an unequal production, I shall 
 be conscious, perhaps of enjoyment, but of enjoyment 
 alloyed with dissatisfaction. This is the phenomenon 
 of Feeling, or of Pleasure and Pain, But these two 
 phenomena do not yet exhaust all of which I may be 
 conscious on the occasion. I may desire to see tho 
 picture long, — to see it often, — to make it my own, 
 and, perhaps, I may will, resolve, or determine so 
 to do. This is the complex phenomenon of Will and 
 Desire, The characters by which these three classes 
 are reciprocally discriminated, are the following: — 
 
 I. In the phenomena of cognition, consciousness 
 distinguishes an object known from the subject know- 
 ing. This object may be of two kinds : it may either 
 |be the quality of something different from the ego ; or 
 lit may be a modification of the ego or subject itself. 
 jln the former case, the object, which may be called 
 for the sake of discrimination the object-object, is given 
 as something different from the percipient subject. 
 In the latter case, the object, which may be called the 
 siihject'Ohject, is given as really identical with the 
 conscious ego ; but still consciousness distiniruishes 
 it, as an accident, from the ego. As the subject 
 of that accident, it projects, as it were, this subjective 
 phenomenon from itself, — views it at a distance, 
 — in a word, objectifies it. This discrimination of 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PIlILOSOPnY. 
 
 55 
 
 self from self — this objectification — is the qualityl 
 which constitutes the essential peculiarity of cog- 
 nition. 
 ^ II. In the phenomena of feeling, on the contrary, 
 consciousness does not place the mental modification 
 or state beyond itself; it does not contemplate it 
 apart, — as separate from itself, — but is, as it were, 
 fused into one. The peculiarity of feeling, there- 
 fore, is that there is nothing but what is subjectively 
 subjective; there is no object different from self, — 
 no objectification of any mode of self. We are, 
 indeed, al)ic to constitute our states of pain and 
 ])leasnre into objects of reflc'ction ; but in so far as 
 they are objects of refiection, they are not feelings, 
 but only reflex coi^nitions of feelinijs. 
 
 III. In the phenomena of conntion, there is, as in 
 those of cognition, an object, and this object is also 
 an object of knowledge. Will and desire are only 
 possible through knowledge, — y Ignoti nulla ciipido' ' 
 But thou<di both cosfnition and conation bear relation 
 to an object, they are discriminated by the difference 
 of this relation itself. In cognition, there exists no 
 want ; and the object, whether objective or subject- 
 ive, is not sought for, nor avoided ; whereas in cona- 
 tion there is a want, and a tendency supposed, which 
 results in an endeavor, either to obtain the object, 
 when the cognitive faculties represent it as fitted to 
 aflbrd the fruition of the want ; or to ward off the 
 object, if these faculties represent it as calculated to 
 frustrate the tendency of its accomplishment. {Led, 
 on Metajph,, XLII.) 
 
56 
 
 AN^ OUTLINE OF 
 
 To tlie abovo cliissifictitiou of the mcntiil plicnom- 
 ena objections have been taken. 
 
 I. It has been objected, that the three classes arc 
 co-ordinate. It is evident that every mental phenom- 
 enon is cither an act of knowledge,, or only possible 
 thr()U2:h an act of knowledij^e, for conscionsness is a 
 knowledge, and, on this principle, many philoso- 
 jphers, as Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Wolf, Plat- 
 ner, and others, have been led to regard the 
 fixcnlty of cognition as the fundamental jiower of 
 mind, from which all others arc derivative. To this 
 the answer is easy. These philosoplu^rs did not 
 observe that, although pleasure and pain, although 
 desire and volition, are only as they are known to be ; 
 yet, in these modiiications, a quality, a phenomenon 
 of mind, absolutely new, lias been superadded, which 
 was never involved in, and could, therefore, never 
 have been evolved out of, the mere faculty of knowl- 
 edge. The f^iculty of knowledge is certainly the first 
 in order, inasmuch as it is the conditio sine qua non 
 of the others ; and we are able to conceive a being 
 possessed of the power of recognizing existence, and 
 yet Avholly void of all feeling of pain and pleasure, 
 and of all powers of desire and voliticm. On the 
 other hand, we are wholl}^ unable to conceive a being 
 possessed of feeling and desire, and, at the same 
 time, without a knowledge of any object upon which 
 his affections may be employed, and without a con- 
 sciousness of these affections themselves. 
 
 We can farther conceive a being possessed of 
 knowledge and feeling alone, — a being endowed with 
 a power of recognizing objects, of enjoying the cxer- 
 
 SIR WILLIAM BAMILTON'S PRILOSOPHT. 
 
 57 
 
 cise, and of grieving at the restraint of his activity, 
 — and yet devoid of voluntary agency — of that 
 conation which is possessed by man. To such a 
 being would belong feelings of pain and pleasure, 
 but neither desire nor will, properly so called. On 
 the other hand, however, we cannot possibly conceive 
 the existence of a voluntary activity independently 
 of all feeling; for voluntary conation is a faculty 
 which can only be determined to energy through a 
 pain or pleasure, — through an estimate of the rela- 
 tive worth of objects. 
 
 In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and cona- 
 tions, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these 
 phenomena are possible independently of each other. 
 In our philosophical systems, tney may stand sepa- 
 rated from each other in books and chapters; in 
 nature, they are ever interwoven. IiLAY^IZ^J^^ 
 
 bimi)lest5_j]^^ : 
 
 nnd de sire or will, go tcLConslitute thc_mc^^^^ ; 
 
 and it js only by a scientific abstra^tion^ that we ar e 
 
 able to analyze th^ state^ into ek^^^ 
 
 never real iy existent but in mutual combination, 
 
 lluJsLdcmjijitsjireigm 
 
 portions ij5_jlif^rcnt_sbiles^^^ 
 
 d^mtcs^_soni^tJmc^^ 
 
 which t hey are not aU coexistent. {Led. on MetapJu, 
 
 XI.) 
 
 II. A second objection is urged by Krug, a distm- 
 
 guished champion of the Kantian system, who goes 
 
 so far as to maintain, not only that what have ob 
 
 taincd the namo o^ feelings constitute no distinct clas 
 
 of mental functions, but that the very supposition i 
 
58 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 absurd, and even impossible. The power of cogni- 
 tion and the power of conation, he holds, are in pro- 
 priety to be regarded as two different fundamental 
 powers, only because the operation of our mind ex- 
 hibits a twofold direction of its whole activity, — one 
 inwards, another outwards ; in consequence of which 
 we arc constrained to distinguish, on the one hand, 
 an immanent ideal or theoretical, and, on the other, 
 a transeunt real or practical, activity. Hence it is 
 argued that, if we interpolate a third species of ac- 
 tivity, its direction must be either immanent or 
 transeunt, or both, or neither of these ; but on the 
 first three suppositions there are still only two kinds 
 of mental activity, and on the fourth there is merely 
 an additional activity, in no direction, which is no 
 activity at all. In answer to this it may be said, (1.) 
 That, in place of two forms of mental activity, we may 
 competently suppose three, ineunt, immanent, and 
 transeunt. (2.) That directions are properly ascribed 
 only to the movements of external things. (Abridged 
 from Lecture XLI. of the Lect, on Metaj)7i.) 
 
 The order of these phenomena is determined by 
 their relative consecution. Feeling and appetency 
 suppose knowledge. The cognitive faculties, there- 
 fore, stand first. But as will, and desire,- and aver- 
 sion suppose a knowledge of the pleasurable and 
 painful, the feelings will stand second as intermediate 
 between the other two. (Lect. on Metaph., XI.) 
 The phenomena of knowledge come, therefore, first 
 under consideration, and philos ophy is Jiniicipjilly 
 and pr imarily the /Science of Knowledge, (Reid'a 
 
 FIRST PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 I 
 
 Works, p. 808, note.) 
 
FIRST PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 
 
 I NOW proceed to the particular investigation of the 
 first class of the mental phenomena, and shall com- 
 mence by delineating to you the distribution of the 
 cognitive faculties which I shall adopt, — a distribution 
 different from any other with which I am acquainted. 
 But I would first premise an observation in regard to 
 psychological powers. 
 
 As to mental powers, you are not to suppose them 
 entities really distinguishable from the thinking prin- 
 ciple, or really different from each other. Mental 
 powers are not like bodily organs. It is the same 
 simple substance which exerts every energy of every 
 faculty, however various, and which is affected iu 
 every mode of every capacity, however opposite. 
 
 It is a fact, too notorious to be denied, that the mind 
 is capable of different modifications ; that is, can exert 
 different actions, and can be affected by different p«as- 
 sions. But these actions and passions are not all dis- 
 
 61 
 
62 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 similar ; every action and passion is not different from 
 every other. On the contrary, they are like, and they 
 are unlike. Those, therefore, that are like, we group 
 or assort together in thouijht, and bestow on them a 
 common name ; nor are these groups or assortments 
 manifold, — they are, in fact, few and simple. Again, 
 every action is an effect ; every action and passion a 
 modification. But every effect supposes a cause ; 
 every modification supposes a subject. When we say 
 that the mind exerts an energy, we virtually say that 
 the mind is the cause of the energy ; when we say 
 that the mind acts or suffers, we say, in other words, 
 that the mind is the subject of a modification. But 
 the modifications, that is, the actions and passions, of 
 the mind, as we stated, all fall into a few resembling 
 groups, which we designate by a peculiar name ; and 
 as the mind is the common cause and subject of all 
 these, we are surely entitled to say, in general, that the 
 mind has the faculty of exerting such and such a class 
 of energies, or has the capacity of being modified 
 by such and such an order of affections. On this doc- 
 trine, a faculty is nothing more than a general term 
 for the causality the mind has of originating a certain 
 class of energies ; a capacity^ only a general term for 
 the susceptibility the mind has of being affected by a 
 particular class of emotions. 
 
 From what I have now said, you will be better pre- 
 pared for what I am about to state in regard to the 
 classification of the first great order of mental phe- 
 nomena, and the distribution of the fiiculties of knowl- 
 edge founded thereon. I formerly told you that the 
 mental phenomena are never presented to us sepa- 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 63 
 
 rately ; they are always in conjunction, and it is only 
 by an ideal analysis and abstraction that, for the pur- 
 poses of science, they can be discriminated and con- 
 sidered apart. The problem, proposed in such an 
 analysis, is to find the primary threads which, in their 
 composition, form the complex tissue of thought. In 
 what ought to be accomplished by such an analysis, 
 all philosophers are agreed, however different may 
 have beeA the result of their attempts. I shall not 
 state and criticise the various classifications pro- 
 pounded of the cognitive faculties. I shall only de- 
 lineate the distribution of the faculties of knowledge 
 which I have adopted, and endeavor to afford you 
 some general insight into its principles. 
 
 I again repeat that consciousness constitutes, or is 
 coextensive with, all our faculties of knowledge, — 
 these faculties being only special modifications under 
 which consciousness is manifested. It being, there- 
 fore, understood that consciousness is not a special 
 faculty of knowledge, but the general faculty out of 
 which the special faculties of knowledge are evolved, 
 I proceed to this evolution. 
 
 I. In the first place, as we are endowed with a fac- 
 ulty of Cognition, or Consciousness in general, and 
 since it cannot be maintained that we have always 
 possessed the knowledge which we now possess, it 
 will be admitted that we must have a faculty of ac- 
 quiring knowledge. But this acquisition of knowl- 
 edge can only be accomplished by the immediate 
 presentation of a new object to consciousness ; in other 
 words, by the reception of a new object within the 
 siDhere of our cognition. We have thus a faculty 
 
64 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 which may be called the Acquisitive, or the Presenta^ 
 
 tive, or the deceptive. 
 
 Now, new or adventitious knowledge may be either 
 of things external or of things internal. If the ob- 
 ject of\nowledge be external, the faculty receptive 
 or presentative of the qualities of such object will be 
 a consciousness of the non-ego. This has obtained 
 the name of External rerception, or of Fercejition sim- 
 ply. If, on the other hand, the object be internal, 
 the faculty receptive or presentative of the qualities 
 of such subject-object, will be a consciousness of the 
 ego. This faculty obtains the name of Interiml or 
 Befex Perception, or of Self -consciousness. By the 
 fore ign psychologists this faculty is termed also the 
 
 Internal Sense, 
 
 II. Ill the second place, inasmuch as we are capa- 
 ble of knowledge, we must be endowed not only with 
 a faculty of acquiring, but with a faculty of retaining 
 or conserving it wlien acquired. We have thus, as a 
 second necessary faculty, one that may be called the 
 Conservative or Retentive. This is Memory, strictly 
 so denominated. 
 
 III. r>ut, in the third place, if we are capable of 
 knowledge, it is not enough that we possess a faculty 
 of acquiring, and a foculty of retaining it in the mind, 
 but out of consciousness ; we must further be endowed 
 with a faculty of recalling it out of unconsciousness 
 into consciousness ; in short, a reproductive power. 
 This Ilejrroductive faculty is governed by the laws 
 which regulate the succession of our thoughts, — the 
 laws, as they are called, of Mental Association. If 
 these laws are allowed to operate without the inter- 
 
 SlJt WILLIAM HAMILTON^ S PniLOSOPHY, 
 
 65 
 
 vention of the will, this faculty may be called Sugges- 
 tion, or Spo7itaneoiis Suggestion; — whereas, if applied 
 under the influence of the Avill, it will properly obtain 
 the name of Reniiniscente, or Recollection, By repro- 
 duction, it should be observed, that I strictly mean 
 the process of recovering the absent thought from un- 
 consciousness, and not its representation in conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 IV. In the fourth place, as capable of knowledge, 
 we must not only ha endowed with a presentative, a 
 conservative, and a reproductive faculty ; there is re- 
 quired for their consummation a faculty of represent- 
 ing in consciousness, and of keeping before the mind 
 the knowledge presented, retained, and reproduced. 
 We have thus a ReprcHentative faculty ; and this ob- 
 tains the name of Imagination or Rhantasi/, 
 
 V. In the fifth place, all the faculties we have con- 
 sidered are only subsidiar3^ They acquire, preserve, 
 call out, and hold up, the materials, for the use of a 
 higher faculty which operates upon these materials, 
 and which we may call the Elahorative or Discursive 
 faculty. This faculty has only one operation, — it only 
 compares. It may startle you to hear that the high- 
 est function of mind is nothing higher than compari- 
 son ; but, in the end, I am confident of convincing 
 you of the paradox. 
 
 VI. But, in the sixth and last place, the mind is not 
 altogether indebted to experience for the whole appa- 
 ratus of its knowledge. What we know by experi- 
 ence, without experience we should not have known ; 
 and as all our experience is contingent, all the knowl- 
 edge derived from experience is contingent also. But 
 
 5 
 
66 
 
 AiT ODTLIXE OF UAMILTON^S rJlILOSOPnT. 
 
 there are cognitions in the mind which are not con- 
 tinircnt, — which arc necessary, — which we cannot 
 but think, — which thonght supposes as its fundamen- 
 tal condition. These cognitions, therelorc, are not 
 mere generalizations from experience. But if not de- 
 rived from experience, they must he native to the 
 mind. These native cognitions are the hiws by which 
 the mind is governed in its operations, and which af- 
 ford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge. 
 These necessary laws, or primary conditions of nitel- 
 ligence, are phenomena of a similar character ; and 
 ivc must, therefore, generalize or collect them into a 
 class ; and on the power possessed by the mind of 
 manifestinir these phenomena we may bestow the 
 name of the Eegulative fViculty. (^LecL on 3Ietaj)h., 
 XX.) 
 
 The following is a tabular view of the distribution 
 of the Special Faculties of Knowledge. 
 
 na 
 
 I— 
 
 P 
 O 
 
 < 
 
 S5 
 
 c 
 
 o 
 
 I. Presentative 
 
 1. External — Perception. 
 
 2. Internal — Self-Consciousnesa. 
 
 II. Conservative— Memory. 
 
 rl. Without will — Suggestion. 
 
 III. Reproductive^ . . 
 
 C 2. With will — Reminiscence. 
 
 IV. Representative — Imagination or Phantasy. 
 V. Elaborative — Comparison, or the Faculty of Relations. 
 VI. Regulative — Reason or Common Sense. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 THE PEESENTATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 This faculty is subdivided into External Perception 
 and Internal Pei^ejption, or Self-consciousness. I 
 commence with the former of these. 
 
 § 1. EXTERNAL PERCEPTION, 
 
 External or Sensitive Perception, or Perception sim- 
 ply,^ is that act of consciousness whereby we appre- 
 hend in our body, (1.) certain special affections, 
 whereof, as an aniinated organism, it is contingently 
 susceptible ; and (2.) those general relations of exten- 
 sion, under which, as a material organism, it necessa- 
 rily exists. Of these perceptions the former is sen- 
 sation proper ; the latter, perception proper, (Beid's 
 Works, pp. 876-7.) This distinction it is necessary 
 to explain, as well as a correlative distinction in the 
 qualities of matter ; and we shall thus be the better 
 
 *For a sketch of the various meanings of the word Perception, see 
 2iei(Vs Worksy p. 876, note. — J. C. M. 
 
 67 
 
68 
 
 AN OUTLiyE OF 
 
 prepared for understanding the true theory of percep- 
 tion. 
 
 {A) Sensation and Perception. Before pro- 
 ceeding to state the great law which regulates the 
 mutual relation of these phenomena, it is proper to 
 say a few words illustrative of the nature of the phe- 
 nomena themselves. Perception is a special kind of 
 knowledge ; sensation a special kind of feeling ; and 
 Knowledge and Feeling, it will be remembered, are two 
 out of the three great classes, into which we divided 
 the phenomena of mind. Now, as Perception is only a 
 special mode of Knowledge, and Sensation only a spe- 
 cial mode of Feeling, so the contrast of Perception and 
 Sensation is only the special manifestation of a con- 
 trast, which universally divides the generic phenom- 
 ena themselves. It ought, therefore, in the first 
 place, to have been noticed, that the generic phenom- 
 ena of Knowledge and Feeling are always found 
 coexistent, and yet always distinct; and the oppo- 
 sition of Perception and Sensation should have been 
 stated as an obtrusive, but still only a particular, ex- 
 ample of the general law. But not only is the dis- 
 tinction of Perception and Sensation not generalized 
 by our psychologists ; it is not concisely and precisely 
 stated. A Cognition is objective, that is, our con- 
 sciousness is then relative to something different from 
 the present state of the mind itself; a Feeling, on the 
 contrary, is subjective, that is, our consciousness is 
 exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experi- 
 enced by the thinking subject. Cognition and feeling 
 are always coexistent. The purest act of knowledge 
 is always colored by some feeling of pleasure or pain ; 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 69 
 
 for no energy is absolutely indifferent, and the gross- 
 est feeling exists only as it is known in consciousness. 
 This being the case of cognition and feeling in general, 
 the same is true of perception and sensation in par- 
 ticular. Perception proper is the consciousness, 
 through the senses, of the qualities of an object 
 known as different from self; Sensation proper is the 
 consciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure 
 or pain, which accompanies that act of knowledge. 
 Perception is thus the objective element in the com- 
 plex state, — the element of Cognition; Sensation is 
 the subjective element, — the element of Feeling. 
 
 The most remarkable defect, however, in the pres-r 
 ent doctrine upon this point, •is the ignorance of our 
 psychologists in regard to the law by which the phe- 
 nomena of cognition and feeling, — of perception and 
 sensation, — are governed, in their reciprocal relation. 
 This law is simple and universal ; and, once enounced, 
 its proof is found in every mental manifestation. It 
 is this : Knoivledge and Feeling, — Perception and 
 Sen.^ation, — though always coexistent, are always in 
 the inverse ratio of each other. That these two ele- 
 ments are always found in coexistence, as it is an old 
 and a notorious truth, it is not requisite for me to 
 prove. But that these elements are always found to 
 coexist in an inverse proportion, — in support of this 
 universal fact, it will be requisite to adduce proof 
 and illustration. 
 
 In doing this I shall, however, confine myself to 
 the relation of Perception and Sensation. 
 
 I. The first proof I shall take from a comparison 
 of the several senses; and it will be found that, pre- 
 
70 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 cisely as a sense has more of the one element, it has 
 less of the other. Laying Touch aside for the moment, 
 as this requires a special explanation, the other four 
 senses divide themselves into two classes, according 
 as Perception or Sensation predominates. The two 
 in which the former element prevails, are Sight and 
 Hearing ; the two in which the latter, are Taste and 
 Smell. 
 
 1. Taking the first two, it will be at once admitted 
 
 that 
 
 (a) Sight at the same instant presents to us a greater 
 number and a greater variety of objects and qualities 
 than any other of the senses. In this sense, therefore. 
 Perception is at its maximum. But Sensation is here at 
 its minimum ; for in the eye we experience less organic 
 pleasure or pain from the impressions of its appro- 
 priate objects (colors), than we do in any other 
 sense. 
 
 (b) Next to Sight, Hearing afibrds us, in the 
 shortest interval, the greatest variety and multitude 
 of cognitions ; and as sight divides space almost to 
 infinity, through color, so hearing does the same to 
 time, through sound. Hearing is, however, much 
 less extensive in its sphere of Knowledge or Percep- 
 tion than sight ; but in the same proportion is its 
 capacity of Feeling or Sensation more intensive. 
 We have greater pleasure and greater pain from 
 single sounds than from single colors ; and, in like man- 
 ner, concords and discords, in the one sense, affect us 
 more agreeably or disagreeably, than any modifications 
 of light in the other. 
 
 2. In Taste and Smell the degree of Sensation, 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHT, 
 
 71 
 
 that is, of pleasure or pain, is great in proportion as 
 the perception, that is, the information they afford, is 
 
 small. 
 
 3. In regard to Touch, without entering on dis- 
 puted questions, it is sufficient to know, that in those 
 parts of the body where sensation predominates, per- 
 ception is feeble; and in those where perception is 
 lively, sensation is obtuse. In the finger-points 
 tactile perception is at its height ; but there is hardly 
 any other part of the body in which sensation is not 
 more acute. Touch, therefore, if viewed as a single 
 sense, belongs to both classes,— the objective and 
 the subjective. But it is more correct to regard it as 
 a plurality of senses, in which case touch, properly 
 so called, having a principal organ in the finger- 
 points, will belong to the class in w^hich perception 
 proper predominates. 
 
 II. The analogy, which we have thus seen to hold 
 good in the several senses in relation to each other, 
 prevails likewise among the several iynpressions of the 
 same sense. Impressions in the same sense differ 
 both (1.) "1 degree and (2.) in quality or kind. 
 
 1. Taking their difference in degree, and supposing 
 that the degree of the impression determines the 
 degree of the sensation, it cannot certainly be said, 
 that the minimum of Sensation infers the maximum 
 of Perception ; for Perception always supposes a cer- 
 tain quantum of Sensation : but this is undeniable, 
 that, above a certain limit. Perception declines, in 
 proportion as Sensation rises. Thus, in the sense of 
 sight, if the impression be strong we are dazzled, 
 blinded, and consciousness is limited to the pain or 
 
72 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 pleasure of the Sensation, in the intensity of which 
 Perception has been lost. 
 
 2. Take now the difference, in hind, of impres- 
 sions in the same sense. Of the senses, take again 
 that of Sight. Sight, as will hereafter be shown, is 
 cognizant of color, and of figure. But though figure is 
 known only through color, a very imperfect cognizance 
 of color is necessary, as is shown in the case (and it 
 is not a rare one) of those individuals who have not 
 the faculty of discriminating colors. These persons, 
 who probably perceive only a certain difference of 
 light and shade, have as clear and distinct a cog- 
 nizance of figure, as others who enjoy the sense of 
 sight in absolute perfection. This being understood, 
 you will observe, that, in the vision of color, there is 
 more of Sensation ; in that of figure, more of Per- 
 ception. Color affords our faculties of knowledge 
 a far smaller number of differences and relations than 
 figure ; but, at the same time, yields our capacity of 
 feeling a far more sensual enjoyment. But if the 
 pleasure we derive from color be more gross and 
 vivid, that from figure is more refined and permanent. 
 It is a law of our nature, that the more intense a 
 pleasure, the shorter is its duration. The pleasures 
 of sense are grosser and more intense than those of 
 intellect ; but, while the former alternate speedily 
 with disgust, with the latter we are never satiated. 
 The same analogy holds among the senses themselves. 
 Those in which Sensation predominates, in which 
 pleasure is most intense, soon pall upon us ; whereas 
 those in which Perception predominates, and which 
 hold more immediately of intelligence, afford us a less 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 73 
 
 exclusive but a more enduring gratification. How soon 
 are we cloyed with the jjleasures of the palate, com- 
 pared with those of the eye ; and, among the objects 
 of the former, the meats that please the most are 
 soonest objects of disgust. This is too notorious in 
 regard to taste to stand in need of proof. But it is 
 no less certain in the case of vision. In painting, 
 there is a pleasure derived from a vivid and harmo- 
 nious coloring, and a pleasure from the drawing and 
 grouping of the figures. The two pleasures are dis- 
 tinct, and even, to a certain extent, incompatible. 
 For if we attempt to combine them, the grosser and 
 more obtrusive gratification, which we find in the col- 
 oring, distracts us from the more refined and intellect- 
 ual enjoyment we derive from the relation of figure ; 
 while, at the same time, the disgust we soon expe- 
 rience from the one tends to render us insensible to the 
 other. (^Lect. on il/e^ap/i., XXIV.^) 
 
 (B) Distinction in the Qualities of Matter. 
 
 The qualities of body I divide into three classes. 
 Adopting and adapting, as far as possible, the previ- 
 ous nomenclature,^ the first of these I would denomi- 
 nate the class of Primary, or Objective, Qualities ; the 
 second, the class of Secundo-Primary^ or Suhjectivo- 
 Objective, Qualities ; the third, the class of Secondaii/, 
 or Subjective, Qualities. 
 
 The general point of view from which the Qualities 
 of Matter are here considered is not the Physical, but 
 
 ' See also Reid's Works, Note D *. This note contains a history of 
 the recognition of the distinction between sensation and perception. 
 
 2 For a history of this distinction, consult Beid's WorkSj note D. 
 — J. C. M. 
 
74 
 
 AK OUTLIKE OF 
 
 the PsycJiologicah But, under this, the ground of 
 principle on which these qualities are divided and des- 
 ignated is, again, twofold. There are, in fact, within 
 the psychological, two special points of view; (1.) 
 that of Sense, and (2.) that of Understanding. 
 
 1. The point of view chronologically prior, or first 
 to us, is that of Sense. The principle of division is 
 here the different circumstances under which the qual- 
 ities are originally and immediately apprehended. On 
 this ground, as apprehensions or immediate cognitions 
 through Sense, the Primary are distinguished as ob- 
 jective, not subjective, as peivepts proper, not sensa- 
 tions proper ; the Secundo-primary , as objective and 
 subjective, as percepts proper and sensations proper; 
 the Secondary, as subjective, not objective, cognitions, 
 as sensations proper, not percepts proper. 
 
 2. The other point of view, chronologically poste- 
 rior, but first in nature, is that of Understanding. 
 The principle of division is here the different charac- 
 ter under which the qualities, already apprehended, 
 are conceived or construed to the mind in thought. 
 On this ground, the Primary', being thought as essen- 
 tial to the notion of Body, are distinguished from the 
 SecundO'primary and Secondary, as accidental ; while 
 the Primary and Secundo-primary , being thought as 
 manifest or conceivable in their own nature, are distin- 
 guished from the Secondary, as in their own nature oc- 
 cult and inconceivable. For the notion of Matter hav- 
 ing been once acquired, by reference to that notion, 
 the Primary Qualities are recognized as its a prion or 
 necessary constituents ; and we clearly conceive how 
 they must exist in bodies in knowing what they are 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 75 
 
 objectively in themselves ; the Secundo-primary Qual- 
 ities, again, are recognized as a posteriori or contin- 
 gent modifications of the Primary, and we clearly con- 
 ceive how they do exist in bodies in knowing what 
 they are objectively in their conditions ; finally, the 
 Secondary Qualities are recognized as a posteriori or 
 contingent accidents of matter, but Ave obscurely sur- 
 mise how they may exist in bodies only as knowing 
 what they are subjectively in their eflfects. 
 
 It is thus apparent that the Primary Qualities may 
 be deduced a priori, the bare notion of matter being 
 given ; they being, in fact, only evolutions of the con- 
 ditions which that notion necessarily implies ; whereas 
 the Secundo-primar}' and Secondary must be induced 
 a posteriori; both being attributes contingently super- 
 added to the naked notion of matter. The Primary 
 Qualities thus fall more under the point of view of 
 Understanding, the Secundo-primary and Secondary 
 more under the point of view of Sense. 
 
 I. Deduction of the Primary Qualities. — Space or 
 extension is a necessary form of thought. We cannot 
 think it as non-existent ; we cannot but think it as 
 existent. But we are not so necessitated to imagine 
 the reality of aught occupying space ; for while unable 
 to conceive as null the space in which the material 
 universe exists, the material universe itself we can, 
 without difficulty, annihilate in thought. AUthat ex- 
 ists in, all that occupies, space, becomes, therefore, 
 known to us by experience ; we acquire, we con- 
 struct, its notion. The notion of space is thus native, 
 or a priori; the notion of what space contains, ad- 
 
76 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR IFILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPnY, 
 
 77 
 
 ventitioiis, or a posteriori. Of this latter class is that 
 of Body or Matter. 
 
 Now, we ask, what arc the necessary or essential, 
 in contrast to the contingent or accidental, properties 
 of Body, as apprehended and conceived by ns ? The 
 answ^er to this question affords the class of Primary, 
 as contradistinguished from the two classes of Secun- 
 do-primary and Secondary Qualities. 
 
 It will be admitted that we are able to conceive 
 body only as that which (1.) occupies space, and (2.) 
 is contained in sjpace, . But these catholic conditions 
 of body, though really simple, are logically complex. 
 We may view them in different aspects or relations. 
 
 1. Tlie property oi filling space (Solidity in its 
 nnexclusive signification, Solidity Simple) implies 
 two correlative conditions : {a) the necessity of tH- 
 nal extension, in length, breadth, and thickness (Solid- 
 ity Geometrical) ; (b) the corresponding imjyossibility 
 of being reduced from ichat is to what is not thus ex- 
 tended {Solidity Physical, Impenetrability.) 
 
 (a) Out of the absolute attribute of trinal exten- 
 sion may be again explicated three attributes under 
 the form of necessary relations : (i.) JSTumber or Di- 
 visibility; (ii.) Size, Bulk, or 31agnitude; (iii.) 
 Shape or Figure, 
 
 i. Body necessarily exists, and is necessarily 
 known,- either as one body or as many bodies. N^um- 
 ber, i.e., the alternative attribution of miity or plu- 
 ralty, is thus, in a first respect, a primary attribute 
 • of matter. But, again, every single body is also, in 
 different points of view, at the same time one and 
 many. Considered as a whole, it is, and is appre- 
 
 < 
 
 hended as actually one ; considered as an extended 
 whole, it is, and is conceived, potentially many. 
 Body being thus necessarily know^n, if not as already 
 divided, still as always capable of division. Divisibil- 
 ity or Number is thus likewise, in a second respect, a 
 primary attribute of matter. 
 
 ii. Body (multo majus, this or that body) is not 
 infinitely extended. Each body must, therefore, have 
 a certain finite extension, which, by comparison with 
 that of other bodies, must be less or greater or equal ; 
 in other words, it must by relation have a certain 
 Size, Bulk, or Magnitude ; and this again, as esti- 
 mated both («) by the quantity of space occupied 
 and {fi) by the quantity of matter occupying, affords 
 likewise the relative attributes of Dense and Bare, 
 
 iii. Finally, bodies, as not infinitely extended, 
 have consequently their extension bounded. But 
 bounded extension is necessarily of a certain Shape or 
 Figure. 
 
 (b) The negative notion, the impossibility of con- 
 ceiving the compression of body from an extended to 
 an unextended, its elimination from space, affords the 
 positive notion of an insuperable powder in body of 
 resisting such compression or elimination. This 
 force, which, as absolute, is a conception of the un- 
 derstanding, not an apprehension through sense, has 
 received no precise or unambiguous name. AYe might 
 call it Ultimate or Absolute Incompressibility . 
 
 2. The other most <?cneral attribute of matter, that 
 of being contained in space, in like manner affords, by 
 explication, an absolute and a relative attribute : (a) 
 the Mobility y that is, the possible motion, and conse- 
 
I 
 
 78 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 quently the possible rest, of a body ; and {h) the 
 Situation, Position, Ubication, that is, the local cor- 
 relation of bodies in space. For 
 
 (a) Space being conceived as infinite (or rather 
 being inconceivable as not infinite) , and the place oc- 
 cupied by body as finite, body in general, and of 
 course each body in particular, is conceived capable 
 either of remaining in the place it now holds, or of 
 being translated from that to any then unoccupied 
 part of space. And 
 
 (b) As every part of space, i.e., every potential 
 j)Iace, holds a certain position relative to every other, 
 so, consequently, must bodies, in so far as they are 
 all contained in space, and as each occupies at one 
 time one determinate space. 
 
 II. Induction of the Semndo-Primary Qualities. 
 These qualities are modifications, but contingent mod- 
 ifications, of the primary. They suppose the pri- 
 mary ; the prhnary do not suppose them. They have 
 all relation to space, and motion in space ; and are 
 all contained under the category of Eesistance or 
 Pressure. For they are all only various forms of a 
 relative or superable resistance to displacement, 
 which, we learn by experience, bodies oppose to other 
 bodies, and, among these, to our organism moving 
 through space, — a resistance similar in kind (and 
 therefore clearly conceived) to that absolute or in- 
 superable resistance, which we are compelled, inde- 
 pendently of experience, to think that every part of 
 matter would oppose to any attempt to deprive it of 
 its space, by compressing it into an inextended. 
 
 In so far, therefore, as they suppose the Primary, 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's pbilosopht. 
 
 79 
 
 which are necessary, while they themselves are only 
 accidental, they exhibit, on the one side, what may 
 be called a quasi-primary quality ; and, in this re- 
 spect they are to be recognized as percepts, not sen- 
 sations, as objective affections of things, and not as 
 subjective affections of us. But, on the other side, 
 this objective element is always found accompanied 
 by a Secondary quality or sensorial passion. The 
 Secundo-primary qualities have thus always two 
 phases, both immediately apprehended. On their 
 primary or objective phasis, they manifest themselves 
 as decrees of resistance opposed to our locomotive en- 
 ergy ; on their secondary or subjective phasis, as 
 ??/o^ie.s of resistatice or pressure affecting our sentient 
 or<ranism. Thus standinii: between, and, in a certain 
 sort, made up of, the two classes of Primary and Sec- 
 ondary qualities, to neither of which, however, can 
 they be reduced; this their partly common, partly 
 peculiar nature, vindicates to them the dignitj^-of a 
 class apart from both, the others, and this under the 
 appropriate appellation of the Secundo-primary Qual- 
 ities. 
 
 They admit of a classification from two different 
 points of view. They may be (1.) physically, they 
 may be (2.) psychologically, distributed. 
 
 1. Considered physically, or in an objective rela- 
 tion, they are to be reduced to classes corresponding 
 to the different sources in external nature from which 
 the resistance or pressure springs. And these sources 
 are, in all, three: (a) that of Co-attraction; (b) 
 that oi Repulsion ; (c) that of Inertia, 
 
 (a) Of the resistance of Co-attraction there may 
 
80 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 be distinguisliccl, on the same objective principle, two 
 subaltern genera: (i.) that of G^rawVy, or the co-at- 
 traction of the particles of body in general ; and (ii.) 
 that of Cohesion, or the co-attraction of the particles of 
 this and that body in particular. 
 
 i. The resistance of Gravity or Weight, according to 
 its degree (which, again, is in proportion to the Bulk 
 and Density of ponderable matter), afibrds, under it, 
 the relative qualities of Heavy and Light (absolute and 
 
 specific) . 
 
 ii. The resistance of Cohesion (usiug that term in 
 its most uuexclusive uuivcrsality) contains many spe- 
 cies and counter-species. AVithout proposing an ex- 
 haustive, or accurately subordinated, list, of these 
 there maybe enumerated (^/) the Hard and Soft; (/5) 
 the Firm (Fixed, Stable, Concrete, Solid,) and i^?«26Z 
 (Liquid), the Fluid being again subdivided into the 
 Thich and Thin ; (r)the Viscid and Friable ; with (o) 
 the Tough and Brittle (Ruptile and Irruptile) ; (0 the 
 Jiigid and Flexible; (t) the Fist^ile and Injissile; (:) 
 the Ductile and Inductile (Extensible and Inextensi- 
 blc) ; (ry) the Retractile and Irretractile (Elastic and 
 Inelastic) ; (0) (combined with Figure) the Rough 
 and Smooth; (t) the SHpperij and Tenacious. 
 
 {b) The resistance from Repidsion is divided into 
 the counter-qualities of (i.) the (relatively) Compress- 
 ible and Incompressible (ii.) the Besilient and Irre- 
 silient (Elastic and Inelastic). 
 
 (c) The resistance from Inertia (combined with 
 Bulk and Cohesion) comprises the counter-qualities of 
 the (relatively) Movable and Immovable, 
 
 There are thus at least fifteen pairs cf counterat- 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHT. 
 
 81 
 
 tributes which we may refer to the secundo-priinary 
 qualities of body; — all obtained by the division and 
 subdivision of the resisting forces of matter, consid- 
 ered in an o1)jective or physical point of view. 
 
 2. Considered psycUologicoU y , or in a subjective 
 relation, they are to be discriminated, under the genus 
 of the Relatively resisting, (a) according to the de- 
 gree in which the resisting force might counteract our 
 locomotive faculty or muscular force, and (b) accord- 
 in^ to the 7node in which it misfht affect our capacity 
 of feelinir or sentient oriranism. Of these species, the 
 former Avould contain under it the gradations of the 
 qnasi-pfimary quality, the latter the varieties of the 
 secondarv Quality — these constituting the two ele- 
 mcnts of which, in combination, every secundo-pri- 
 mary quality is made up. 
 
 Til. Induction of the Secondary Qualities. — The 
 secondary, as manifested to us, are not, in propriety, 
 qualities of body at all. As apprehended, they are 
 only subjective aflections, and belong only to bodies 
 in so far as these are supposed furnished with the pow- 
 ers capable of specifically determining the various 
 parts of our nervous apparatus to the peculiar action, 
 or ratlier passion, of which they are susceptible ; which 
 determined action or passion is the quality of which 
 alone sve are immediately cognizant, the external con- 
 cause of that internal effect remaining to perception 
 altogether unknown. Thus, the secondary qualities 
 (and the same is to be said, mutatis midandis, of the 
 secundo-primary) are, considered subjectively, and 
 considered objectively, affections or qualities of things 
 diametrically opposed in nature, — of the organic and 
 6 
 
/ 
 
 82 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 inorganic, of the sentient and insentient, of mind and 
 matter; and tliongh, asmntually correlative, and their 
 several i)airs rarelv obtaininii: in common laniriiniro 
 more than a single name, they cannot well be con- 
 sidered, except in conjunction, under the same cate- 
 gory or general class : still their essential contrast of 
 character must he ever carefully borne in mind. And 
 in speaking of these qualities, as we are here chiefly 
 concerned with them on their subjective side, I re- 
 quest it may l)e observed, that I shall emj^loy the qk- 
 "pression Secondari/ qualities to denote those phenome- 
 nal affections determined in our sentient or^^^anism by 
 the agency of external bodies, and not, unless when 
 otherwise stated, the occult powers themselves from 
 which that agency proceeds. 
 
 Of the secondary qualities, in this relation, there 
 are various kinds ; the varict}' principally depending 
 on the differences of the different parts of our nervous 
 apparatus. Such are the proper sensibles, the idio- 
 pathic affections of our several organs of sense, as 
 Cohir, Sound, Flavor, Savor, and Tactual Sensation ; 
 such are the feelings from Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, 
 etc. ; nor need it be added, such are the muscular and 
 cutaneous sensations which accompany the perception 
 of the secundo-primary qualities. Such, though less 
 directly the result of foreign causes, are Titillation, 
 Sneezing, Horripilation, Shuddering, the feeling of 
 what is called Setting-the-teeth-on-edge, etc.., etc.; 
 such, in fine, are all the various sensations of bodily 
 pleasure and pain determined by the action of external 
 stimuli. {lleicVs Works, Note D.) 
 
 From the above account of the distinction between 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPBY, 
 
 83 
 
 (=1 
 o 
 
 n 
 
 o 
 
 xn 
 
 W 
 1— t 
 
 S 
 
 .3 
 
 3 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 ^ 13 ^ -5^ S 
 
 ^ ^ ^ E^ c^ ^ 
 ^^ /~» /'■N /»^ ,^-v •« 
 
 Nm' ^i/ Nm' N.X N^ 
 
 I 
 
 s 
 a 
 
 e3 
 
 •73 
 G 
 c3 
 
 so 
 
 60 
 
 I 
 
 a 
 
 1^ 
 
 «j 
 
 -CI 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 5 .-^ i: « s 
 /"^ ^>Ss. y»-v "^ ■'•^ **■ ^"^ 
 
 b ^ 
 
 Vn 
 
 I 
 
 a 
 
 e3 
 
 Q) -. 
 
 
 to 
 
 a 
 
 fco 
 
 s 
 
 ^•^- to 
 
 
 C!5 
 
 e 
 
 •'I 
 
 
 «1 
 
 d 
 d 
 
 «0 
 
 
 
 1^ S 6 
 
 < 
 a 
 
 H 
 
 o 
 
 12; 
 
 o 
 i-i 
 
 H 
 
 < 
 
 O 
 
 I— ( 
 
 (^ 
 i-t 
 m 
 m 
 
 < 
 
 o 
 
 P3 
 
 < 
 
 < 
 
 c3 
 
 
 .2 
 
 
 r S 
 
 S 
 
 ?5» 
 
 I I 
 
 s ^ § 
 
 C 3 '-3 ^ 
 
 C -. 
 — o 
 
 o ^ j; 
 
 &i.?e 
 
 
 to R, .o 3 
 
 B 
 
 •» to 
 
 e g — 
 
 P J ^ S» 
 
 6 -2 re •= 
 
 bO 
 
 •I -E 
 
 I a 
 
 « 
 
 I 
 
 n 
 O 
 
 u 
 
 o 
 
 
 • >. no 
 
 O 
 
 > 
 
 •= P 
 
 O § » 
 
 w a 00 
 
 I 
 
 a 
 
 P Cm 
 
 O 
 
 sT w 
 
 .<= 3 
 
 «„ o 
 « :5 
 
 O o 
 
 ' r3 
 
 O 
 CO 
 
 B 
 O 
 
 tc to *» 
 
 !* > a 
 
 bO bfi I 
 
 S ""^ ^ 
 
 =^ ^ "2 
 
 S 
 
 c 
 
 d 
 
 o 
 
 o d 
 
 d b 
 
 .> o 
 
 O -^ d 
 
 d 
 
 C 
 
 o 
 
 to 
 00 
 
 «M 
 
 o 
 
 N 
 
 M ar^ 43 
 
 SO > 
 
 GO d 
 
 » 
 
 u 
 
 •-s 
 
 ca 
 
 !? 
 
 o 
 
 H 
 
 o 
 
 s 
 a 
 
 En 
 
 d 
 a 
 
 
 
 03 |j Vi* 
 
 O S 00 
 
 in ^ O 
 
 S I 
 
 d o 
 
 to 
 
 u 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 a 
 d 
 
 .2 ^ 
 
 o 
 
 (0 
 
 v 
 
 s 
 d 
 
 
 d 
 o 
 
 
 
 '-< " 
 
 
 
 V — 
 
 I I O 
 
 R, g M 
 
 ^ » 5? 
 12 « » 
 
 00 u d 
 
 § 'I' -3 
 ^ -s -§ 
 
 .^■^ <i "^ 
 
 (4 
 
 o 
 
 < 
 
 O 
 u 
 
 .5 -« d 
 
 rP 
 
 in 
 
 oo 
 d 
 
 Cm 
 
 O 
 
 O 
 
 
 o 
 
 s 
 
 a 
 
 CO 
 
 d 
 
 u 
 o 
 d 
 (i 
 
 s 
 o 
 
 a 
 
 d 
 d 
 bO 
 
 o 
 
 d 
 d 
 
 o 
 
 a 
 
 d 
 d 
 
 o bO 
 
 o «- 
 
 d o 
 
 o 
 
 d J 
 
 O 00 
 
 "d tc 
 
 &• d 
 
 DO ,0) 
 
 d "^ 
 
 en .M 
 
 d ^ 
 
 o 
 
 to w 
 o 
 
 d 
 
 2 o 
 
 d a 
 
 o © 
 
 >-r d 
 
 O "d rj ~» 
 
 > H 5 M 
 
 I 
 
 -V- 
 
 M 
 
 C9 
 
 o 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 e3 
 
 I 
 
I 
 
 84 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 sensation and perception, and of the distinction in tho 
 qualities of matter, it will be seen (1.) that in percep- 
 tion proper the object perceived is always either (a) 
 a primary quality, or (h) the quasi-piimary phasis 
 of a secundo-priniary, (2.) that the primary qualities 
 are perceived as in our organism, the quasi-primary 
 phasis of the secundo-primary as in correlation to our 
 organism. Thus a perception of the primary qualities 
 do'^s not, originally and iu itself, reveal to us the ex- 
 istence, and qualitative existence, of aught beyond 
 the organism, apprehended by us as extended, fig- 
 ured, divided, etc. The primary qualities of things 
 external to our organism we do not perceive, i.e., 
 immediately knoio. For these we only learu to infer, 
 from the affections which we come to iind that they 
 determine in our organs : —affections which, yielding 
 us a perception of organic extension, we at length dis- 
 cover, by observation and induction, to imply a cor- 
 responding extension in the extra-organic agents. 
 
 Farther, in no part of the organism have we any 
 apprehension, any immediate knowledge, of extension 
 in its true and absolute magnitude ; perception noting 
 only the fact given in sensation, and sensation afford- 
 ing no standard, by which to measure the dimensions 
 given in one sentient part with those given in another. 
 For, as perceived, exi:ension is only the recognition 
 of one organic affection in its outness from another ; — 
 as a minimum of extension is thus to perception the 
 smallest extent of organism in which sensations can 
 be discriminated as plural ; — and as in one part of the 
 organism the smallest extent is perhaps some million, 
 certainly some myriad, times smaller than in others,— 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 85 
 
 it follows that, to perception, the same real extension 
 will appear in this place of the body some million or 
 myriad times greater than in that. Nor does this 
 difference subsist only as between sense and sense ; 
 for in the same sense, and even in that sense which 
 has very commonly been held exclusively to afford a 
 knowledge of absolute extension, I mean touch proper, 
 the minimum, at one part of the body, is fifty times 
 greater than it is at another. 
 
 ,N^<The existence of an extra-organic world is appre- 
 hended, not in a perception of the primary qualities, 
 but in a perception of the quasi-primary phasis of the 
 secundo-primary, that is, in the consciousness that 
 our locomotive energy is resisted, and not resisted by 
 auirht in our orcranism itself. For in the conscious- 
 ness of being thus resisted is involved, as a correla- 
 tive, the consciousness of a resisting something ex- 
 ternal to our organism. Both are, therefore, conjunctly 
 apprehended. This experience presupposes indeed 
 a possession of the notions of space and motion in 
 space. But on the doctrine that space, as a necessary 
 condition, is a native element of thought; and since 
 the notion of any one of its dimensions, as correlative 
 to, must inevitably imply, the others, — it is evident 
 that every perception of sensations out of sensations 
 will afford the occasion, in apprehen'Sing any one, of 
 conceiving all the three extensions, that is, of con- 
 ceiving space. On the doctrine, and in the language, 
 of Keid, our original cognitions of space, motion, etc., 
 are instinctive, — a view which is confirmed by the anal- 
 ogy of those of the lower animals which have the 
 power of locomotion at birth. It is truly an idle 
 
86 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 problem to attempt imagining the steps by which we 
 may be supposed to have acquired the notion of exten- 
 sion, when in fact we are unable to imagine to our- 
 selves the possibility of that notion not being always 
 in our possession. We have, therefore, a twofold cog- 
 nition of space ; (1.) an a priori or native imagination 
 of it, in general, as a necessary condition of the pos- 
 sibility of thought; and (2.) under that, an a 
 postenori or adventitious percept of it, in particular, 
 as contingently apprehended in this or that actual 
 complexus of sensations. (Reid's Works, pp. 881 
 
 -2.) 
 
 When, therefore, I concentrate my attention in the 
 simplest act of Perception, I return from my observa- 
 tion with the most irresistible convi(^tion of two facts, 
 or rather two branches of the scuiie fact, that lam, 
 and that something different from me exists. In this 
 act, I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, 
 and of an external reality as the object perceived ; and 
 I am conscious of both existences in the same indivis- 
 ible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the sub- 
 ject does not precede or follow the knowledge of the 
 object; neither determines, neither is determined by, 
 the other. The two terms of correlation stand in 
 mutual counterpoise and equal independence ; they 
 are given as connected in the synthesis of know ledge, 
 but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence. 
 
 Such is the fact of Perception revealed in conscious- 
 ness, and as it determines mankind in general in their 
 equal assurance of the realit}^ of an external world, 
 and of the existence of their own minds. Conscious- 
 ness declares our knowledge of material qualities to 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPnY. 
 
 87 
 
 be intuitive. Nor i« the fact, as given, denied even 
 by those Avho disallow its truth. So clear is the de- 
 liverance, that even the philosophers who reject an 
 intuitive perception find it impossible not to admit 
 that their doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the 
 voice of consciousness and the natural conviction of 
 mankind.^ 
 
 The contents of the fact of perception, as given in 
 consciousness, being thus established, what are the 
 consequences to philosophy, according as the truth of 
 its testimony (I.) is, or (H.) is not, admilt'^d? 
 
 (I.) If the veracity of consciousness be uncondition- 
 allv admitted; if the intuitive knowledsfc of mind 
 and matter, and the consequent reality of their antith- 
 esis be taken as truths, to be exphiined if possible, 
 but in themselves to be held as paramount to all doubt, 
 — the doctrine is established which we would call the 
 scheme of Katitral Rt^nlisyn, or Natural Dualism, 
 
 CII') But, on the other alternative, five great varia- 
 tions from truth and nature may be conceived ; and 
 all of these have actually found their advocates, ac- 
 cording as the testimony of consciousness, in the fact 
 of perception (I.)? i^ ivholly, or (2.) is partially, re- 
 jected. 
 
 1. If wholly rejected, that is, if nothing but the 
 phenomenal reality of the fact itself be allowed, the 
 result is Nihilism, 
 
 2. \{ partially rejected, four schemes emerge, ac- 
 cording to the way in which the fact is tampered with. 
 
 * For admissions to this effect, see Heid's WorkSj pp. 747-8. 
 J. C. M. 
 
88 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 -I 
 
 I 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 o 
 
 g 
 
 H 
 
 2 
 
 t— I 
 CO 
 OQ 
 
 (25 
 
 1^ 
 p 
 n 
 
 H 
 
 I 
 
 o 
 
 ■4^ 
 
 
 I.. 
 
 ^ .« .« 
 
 <, < 
 
 
 50 
 
 ?» 
 
 o -ti "2 -^ 
 
 'T' O ^ 
 
 *o 
 
 o 
 
 * If 
 
 o 
 
 •• 
 
 a> 
 
 *• 
 
 •1=^ 
 
 
 ©^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 o 
 
 1 
 
 09 
 
 •^ 
 
 ►» 
 
 o 
 
 <i> 
 
 M 
 
 hi 
 
 H 
 
 •5 
 
 ^> 
 
 a 
 
 • 
 
 <w 
 
 Ol 
 
 
 o 
 
 ^ to 
 
 }25 a 
 
 I I 
 
 en a. 
 
 v.? "* 
 
 
 bO 
 
 I 
 
 s 
 
 en a 
 H .2 
 
 SIB WILLIAM IIAMILTON^S PniLOSOPHY. 
 
 89 
 
 (i.) If the veracity of cousciousness be allowed to 
 the equipoise of the object and subject in the act, but 
 rejected as to the reality of their antithesis, the system 
 of Absolute Identity emerges, which reduces both mind 
 and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same 
 common substance. 
 
 (ii.) and (iii.) If the testimony of consciousness be 
 refused to the co-originality and reciprocal indepen- 
 dence of the subject and object, two schemes are de- 
 termined, according as the one or the other of the 
 terms is placed as the original and genetic. Is the 
 object educed from the subject, Idealism; is the sub- 
 ject educed from the object, 3Iaterialism, is the result. 
 These systems are all conclusions from an original 
 interpretation of the ftict of consciousness in per- 
 ception, carried intrepidly forth to its legitimate 
 issue. But there is one scheme, which, violating the 
 integrity of this fact, and, with the complete idealist, 
 re^'arding the object of consciousness in perception 
 as only a modification of the percipient subject, or, at 
 least, a phenomenon numerically difterent from the 
 object it represents, — endeavors, however, to stop 
 short of the negation of an external world, the reality 
 of whichf and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks 
 by various hypotheses to establish and explain. This 
 scheme, — which we Avould term Cosmofhetic Idealism, 
 Hypothetical Realism, or Hypothetical Dualism, — 
 although the most inconsequent of all systems, has 
 been embraced, under various forms, by the immense 
 majority of philosophers. {Reid's Worlcs, pp. 748-9.)^ 
 
 iSee also Discussions, pp. 65-6; and Lect. on Metaph. (XVI.) 
 JieicTs WorkSy Note C, contain a more elaborate classification of the 
 
90 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 § 2. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 Sin WILLIAM Hamilton's pniLosornY, 
 
 91 
 
 
 This faculty will not occupy us long, as the princi- 
 pal questions regarding its nature and operation have 
 been ah^eady considered, in treating of Consciousness 
 in general. 
 
 I formerly showed that it is impossible to distin- 
 guish Perception, or the other Special Faculties, from 
 Consciousness, — in other words, to reduce Conscious- 
 ness itself to a special faculty. I stated, however, 
 that though it be incompetent to establish a faculty 
 for the inunediate knowledge of the external world, 
 and a faculty for the immediate knowledge of the in- 
 ternal, as two ultimate powers, exclusive of each 
 other, and not merely subordinate forms of a higher 
 immediate knowledge, under which they are compre- 
 hended or carried up into one, — I stated, I say, that 
 thouirh the immediate knowlcdires of matter and of 
 mind are still only modifications of Consciousness, j^et 
 that their discrimination, as subaltern faculties, is 
 both allowable and convenient. 
 
 The sphere and character of this faculty of acquisi- 
 tion will be best illustrated by contrasting it with the 
 other. Perception is the power by which we are 
 made aware of the phenomena of the external world ; 
 Self-consciousness, the power by which we apprehend 
 the phenomena of the internal. The objects of the 
 
 various theories of perception. In the Lpct, on Metnph. (Lect. 
 XXV.) will be found a vindication of Natural llealism; and in the 
 following lecture, a polemic against Hypothetical Realism. — 
 J. C. M. 
 
 former are all presented to us in space and time ; 
 space and time are thus the tw^o conditions^ — the 
 two fundamental forms of external percep- ion. The 
 objects of the latter are all apprehended by us in time 
 and in self; time and self arethus the two conditions, 
 — the two fundamental forms, — of Internal Perception 
 or Self-consciousness. Time is thus a form or condi- 
 tion connnon to both faculties ; while space is a form 
 peculiar to the one, self a form peculiar to the other. 
 What I mean by the form or condition of a faculty, 
 is that frame, that setting (if I may so speak), out 
 of which no object can be known. Thus, we only 
 know, through Self-consciou<ness, the phenomena of 
 the Internal world, as modilications of the indivisible 
 Ego or conscious unit ; we only know, through per- 
 ceptinn, the phenomena of the External world, under 
 space, or as modi Heat ions of the extended and divisible 
 Non-ego or known plurality. Two difficulties, how- 
 ever, mav here be suiriifested : — 
 
 1. It may be asked, if self, or Ego, be the form of 
 Self-consciousness, why is the not-self, the Non-ego, 
 not in like manner called the form of Perception ? To 
 this I reply, that the not-self is only a negation, and, 
 though it discriminates the objects of the external cog- 
 nition from those of the internal, it does not afford to 
 the former any positive bond of union among them- 
 selves. This, on the contrary, is supplied to them by 
 the form of Space, out of which they can neither be 
 perceived, nor imagined by the mind. Space, there- 
 fore, as the positive condition under which the Non- 
 ego is necessarily known and imagined, and through 
 
V 
 
 92 
 
 ^.V OUTLINE OF 
 
 which it receives its unity in Consciousness, is properly 
 said to afford the condition, or form, of External Per- 
 ception. 
 
 2. But a more important question may be started. 
 If Spc^ce, if extension, be a necessary form of 
 thought, this, it may be argued, proves that the mind 
 itself is extended. The reasoning here proceeds upon 
 the assumption that the qualities of the subject know- 
 ing must be similar to the qualities of the object 
 known. This, as I have already stated, is a mero 
 philosophical crotchet, — an assumption without a 
 shadow even of jirobability in its favor. That the 
 mind has the power of perceiving extended objects 
 is no ground for holding that it is itself extended. 
 Still less can it be maintained, that because it has 
 ideally a native or necessary conception of Space, it 
 must really occupy Space. Nothing can be more ab- 
 surd. On this doctrine, to exist as extended is sup- 
 posed necessary in order to think extension. But if 
 this analogy hold good, the sphere of ideal Space, 
 which the mind can imagine, ought to be limited to 
 the sphere oi real Space which the mind actually fills. 
 This is not, however, the case ; for though the mind 
 be not absolutely unlimited in its power of conceiving 
 Space, still the compass of thought may be viewed as 
 infinite in this respect, as contrasted Avith the petty 
 point of extension, which the advocates of the doc- 
 trine in question allow it to occupy in its corporeal 
 domicile. 
 
 The faculty of Self-consciousness affords us a knowl- 
 edge of the phenomena of our minds. It is the source 
 of Internal experience. You will, therefore, observe, 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 93 
 
 that, like External Perception, it only furnishes us 
 with facts ; and that the use we make of these facts 
 — that is, what we find in them, what we deduce 
 from them — belongs to a different process of intelli- 
 gence. Self-consciousness afibrds the materials equally 
 to all systems of philosophy ; all equally admit it, and 
 all elaborate the materials which this faculty supplies, 
 according to their fashion. (Led. on Metaph.j 
 XXIX.) 
 
 .' I 
 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE CONSERVATIVE FACULTY. 3IEMORY PROPER. 
 
 Through the powers of External and Internal Per- 
 ception, we are enabled to acquire information, — 
 experience ; but this acquisition is not of itself inde- 
 pendent and complete ; it supposes that we are also 
 able to retain knowledge acquired, for we cannot be 
 said to get what we are unable to keep. The faculty 
 of Acquisition is, therefore, only realized through an- 
 other faculty, — the f^iculty of Iletention or Conserva- 
 tion. Here we have another example of what I have 
 already frequently had occasion to suggest to your 
 observation ; we have two ^iculties, two elementary 
 phenomena, evidently distinct, and yet each depend- 
 ing on the other for its realization. Without a power 
 of Acquisition, a power of Conservation could not be 
 exerted ; and, without the latter, the former would be 
 frustrated, for we should lose as fast as we acquired. 
 But as the faculty of Acquisition would be useless 
 without the faculty of Retention, so the faculty of Re- 
 tention would be useless without the faculties of Re- 
 
 94 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTOh^S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 95 
 
 production and Representation. That the mind 
 retained, beyond the sphere of consciousness, a treas- 
 ury of knowledge would be of no avail, did it not 
 possess the power of bringing out, and of displaying, 
 — in other words, of reproducing, and representing, — 
 this knowledge in consciousness. But because the 
 faculty of Conservation would be fruitless without the 
 ulterior faculties of Reproduction and Representation, 
 we are not to confound these faculties, or to view the 
 act of mind, which is their joint result, as a simple 
 and elementary phenomenon. Though mutually de- 
 pendent on each other, the faculties of Conservation, 
 Reproduction, and Representation are governed by dif- 
 ferent laws, and, in different individuals, are found 
 greatly varying in their comparative vigor. The in- 
 timate connection of these three faculties, or elemen- 
 tary activities, is the cause, however, why they have 
 not been distinguished in the analysis of philosophers ; 
 and why their distinction is not precisely marked in 
 ordinary language. In ordinary language, we have, 
 indeed, words which, without excluding the other fac- 
 ulties, denote one of these more emphatically. Thus, 
 in the term Memory^ the Conservative Faculty, the 
 phenomenon of Retention is the central notion, with 
 which, however, those of Reproduction and Represen- 
 tation, are associated. In the term Recollection^ again, 
 the phenomenon of Reproduction is the principal no- 
 tion, accompanied, however, by those of Retention 
 and Representation, as its subordinates. 
 
 By ^lemory or Retention, you will see, is only 
 meant the condition of Reproduction ; and it is, there- 
 fore, evident that it is only by an extension of the 
 
96 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 term that it can be called a faculty, that is, an active 
 power. It is more a passive resistance than an energy, 
 and ought, therefore, perhaps to receive rather the 
 appellation of a capacity. But the nature of this ca- 
 pacity or faculty \vc must now proceed to consider. 
 {Lect, on Mefa^h,, XXX.) 
 
 § 1. THE FACT OF DETENTION, 
 
 In the first place, then, I presume that the fact of 
 Ketention is admitted. We are conscious of certain 
 cognitions as acquired, and we are conscious of these 
 cognitions as resuscitated. That, in the interval, 
 when out of consciousness, these coirnitions do con- 
 tinue to subsist in the mind, is certainly an hypothe- 
 sis, because whatever is out of consciousness can only 
 be assumed ; but it is an hypothesis which we are not 
 only warranted, but necessitated, by the phenomena, 
 to establish. For, besides the phenomena of Reten- 
 tion, there are many which it is impossible to explain 
 by any other hypothesis ; and I shall here adduce the 
 evidence which appears to me not merely to warrant, 
 but to necessitate the conclusion, that the sphere of 
 our conscious modifications is onlv a small circle in 
 the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, 
 of which we are only conscious through its effects. 
 
 I. External Perception, Let us take our first ex- 
 ample from Perception, and in that faculty let us 
 commence with 
 
 1. The sense of Sight, Now, you either already 
 know, or can be at once informed, what it is that has 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 97 
 
 \ 
 
 (I 
 
 obtained the name of 3Iinimum Visihile, You are of 
 course aware, in general, that vision is the result of 
 the rays of light reflected from the surf ice of objects 
 to the eye ; a greater number of rays is reflected from 
 a larger surface ; if the superficial extent of an object, 
 and, consequenlly, the number of rays which it re- 
 flects, be diminished beyond a certain limit, the ob- 
 ject becomes invisible ; and the Minimum Visihile is 
 the smallest expanse which can be seen, — which can 
 consciously affect us, — which we can be conscious of 
 seeing. This being understood, it is plain that, if we 
 divide this Minimum Visihile into two parts, neither 
 half can, by itself, be an object of vision, or visual 
 consciousness. They are, severally and apart, to 
 consciousness as zero. But it is evident that each 
 half must, by itself, have produced in us a certain 
 modification, real though unperceived ; for as the per- 
 ceived whole is nothing but the union of the unper- 
 ceived halves, so the Perception — the perceived 
 affection itself of which we are conscious — is only 
 the sum of two modifications, each of which severally 
 eludes our consciousness. When we look at a distant 
 forest, we perceive a certain expanse of green. Of 
 this, as an affection of our organism, we are clearly 
 and distinctly conscious. Now, the expanse, of which 
 we are conscious, is evidently made up of parts of 
 w^hich we are not conscious. No leaf, perhaps no 
 tree, may be separately visible. But the greenness 
 of the forest is made up of the greenness of the 
 leaves ; that is, the total impression of which we are 
 conscious is made up of an infinitude of small im- 
 pressions of which we are not conscious. 
 7 
 

 I 
 
 98 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 2. Sense of Hearing, — Take another example, 
 from the sense of hearing. In this sense, there is, in 
 like manner, a 3Iinimum Audihile, that is, a sound the 
 least which can come into perception and conscious- 
 ness. But this 3Iunmum Audlbile is made up of parts 
 which severally affect the sense, but of which affec- 
 tions, separately, we are not conscious, though of 
 their joint result we are. We must, therefore, here 
 likewise admit the reality of modifications beyond the 
 sphere of consciousness. To take a special example. 
 When we hear the distant murnnir of the sea, — what 
 are the constituents of the total perception of which 
 we are conscious? This murmur is a sum made up 
 of parts, and the sum would be as zero if the parts 
 did not count as something. The noise of the sea is 
 the complement of the noise of its several waves ; — 
 
 7:u>Tiiov rz xuiidziov * Avrjpif/fiov yiXatr/m — ; and if the noise of 
 each wave made no impression on our sense, the noise 
 of ihe sea, as the result of these impressions, could 
 not be realized. But the noise of each several wave, 
 at the distance we suppose, is inaudible ; we must, 
 however, admit that they produce a certain modifica- 
 tion, beyond consciousness, on the percipient subject; 
 for this is necessarily involved in the reality of their 
 result. 
 
 3. The same is equally the case in the otJier senses; 
 the taste or smell of a dish, be it agreeable or disa- 
 greeable, is composed of a multitude of severally im- 
 perceptible effects, which the stimulating particles of 
 the viand cause on different points of the nervous ex- 
 pansion of the gustatory and olfactory organs ; and 
 the pleasant or painful feeling of smoothness or rough- 
 
 \ 
 
 sin WILLIAM Hamilton's piiilosophy. 
 
 09 
 
 ness is the result of an infinity of unfelt modifications, 
 which the body handled determines on the countless 
 papillae of the nerves of touch. 
 
 II. Association of Ideas, —l^ct us now take an ex- 
 ample from another mental process. We have not 
 yet spoken of what is called the Association of Ideas ; 
 and it is enough for our present purpose that you 
 should be aware, that one thought suggests another 
 in conformity with certain determinate laws, — laws 
 to which the successions of our whole mental states 
 are subjected. Now, it sometimes happens, that we 
 find one thought rising immediately after another in 
 consciousness, but whose consecution we can reduce 
 to no law of association. In these cases we can 
 generally discover, by an attentive observation, that 
 these two thoughts, though not themselves associated, 
 are each associated with certain other thoughts, so 
 that the whole consecution would have been regular 
 had these intermediate thoughts come into conscious- 
 ness between the two which are not immediately as- 
 sociated. 
 
 You are probably aware of the following fjict in 
 mechanics. If a numl)er of billiard balls be placed 
 in a straight row, and touching each other, and if a 
 ball be nmde to strike, in the line of the row, the ball 
 at one end of the series, what will happen? The mo- 
 tion of the impinging ball is not divided among the 
 whole row ; this, which we might a prion have ex- 
 pected, does not happen ; but the impetus is trans- 
 mitted through the intermediate balls, which remain 
 each in its place, to the ball at the opposite end of 
 the series, and this ball alone is impelled on. Some- 
 
100 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 thiiiir like this seems often to occur in the train of 
 thought. One idea mediately suggests another into 
 consciousness, — the suggestion passing througJi one 
 or more ideas which do not themselves rise into con- 
 sciousness. The awakening and awakened ideas here 
 correspond to the hall striking and the hall struck off; 
 while the intermediate ideas of wdiich we are nncon- 
 scious, hut which carry on the suggestion, resemhle 
 the intermediate halls which remain moveless, hut 
 communicate the impulse. An instance of this occurs 
 to me, with which 1 was recently struck. Tljinking 
 of Ben Lomond, this thought was immediately fol- 
 lowed hy the thought of the Prussian system of edu- 
 cation. Now, conceivahle connection between these 
 two ideas, in themselves, there was none. A little 
 reflection, however, explained the anomaly. On my 
 last visit to the mountain, 1 had met upon its summit 
 a German ijentleman, and thouirh I had no conscious- 
 ness of the intermediate and nnawakened links between 
 Ben Lomond and the Prussian schools, th(»y were un- 
 doubtedly these; the German, — Germany, — Prus- 
 sia, — and, these media being admitted, the connec- 
 tion between the extremes was manifest. 
 
 Mr. Stewart explains this phenomenon on a differ- 
 ent hj'pothesis ; but his explanation will be considered 
 in connection with the similar explanation, which ho 
 gives, of 
 
 III. Our Acquired Hahits and Dexterities, "which 
 in like manner are capable of explanation only on the 
 theory I have advanced. In these phenomena the 
 consecution of various operations is extremely rapid ; 
 but it is allowed on all hands that, though we are con- 
 
 siR WILLIAM Hamilton's rniLosornr, 
 
 101 
 
 scious of the series of operations, that is, of the men- 
 tal state which they conjunctly constitute, — of the 
 several operations themselves as acts of volition w^e 
 are wholly incognizant. Now, this incognizance may 
 be explained on three possible hypotheses. The first 
 regards the wdiole series of operations as merely me- 
 chanical or automatic, and thus denying to the mind 
 all active or voluntary intervention, consequently re- 
 moves them beyond the sphere of consciousness. The 
 second, again, allows to each several motion a sepa- 
 rate act of conscious volition ; wdiile the tJdrd, which 
 I would maintain, holds a medium between these, 
 constitutes the mind the agent, accords to it a con- 
 scious volition over the series, but denies to it a con 
 sciousness and deliberate volition in regard to each 
 separate movement in the series w^hich it determines. 
 
 1. The first of these has been maintained, among 
 others, by two philosophers who in other points are 
 not frequently at one, — by Reid and Hartley. 
 "Habit," says Reid, ''differs from instinct, not in its 
 nature, but in its origin ; the last being natural, the 
 first acquired. Both operate without w^ill or inten- 
 tion, without thought, and therefore may be called 
 mechanical principles." 
 
 But this opinion is unphilosophical for two reasons, 
 (a) In the first place, it assumes an occult, an in- 
 comprehensible principle, to enable us to comprehend 
 the effect. (Jb) In the second place, admitting the 
 agency of the mind in accomplishing the series of 
 movements before the habit or dexterity is formed, it 
 afterwards takes it out of the hands of the mind in 
 order to bestow it on another agent. This hypothesis 
 
102 
 
 Ay OUTLINE OF 
 
 Sin WILUAM HAMILTOn'^S PHTLOSOPnr, 
 
 103 
 
 thus violates the two great laws of philosophizing: 
 (a) to assume no occult principle without necessity ; 
 (6) to assume no second principle without necessity. 
 
 2. The second hypothesis, which Mr. Stewart 
 adopts, is at once complex and contradictory. It 
 supposes a consciousness and no memory. Now, 
 
 (f/) This is altogether hf/pol helical . It cannot ad- 
 vance a shadow of proof in support of the fact which 
 it assumes, that an act of consciousness does or can 
 take place without any, the least, continuance in mem- 
 ory. 
 
 (b) This assumption is disproved by the whole anal- 
 ogy of om^ intellectual nature. It is a law of mind, 
 that the intensity of the present consciousness deter- 
 mines the vivacity of the future memory. Memory 
 and consciousness are thus in the direct ratio of each 
 other. On the one hand, looking from cause to ef- 
 fect, — vivid consciousness, long memory; faint con- 
 sciousness, short memory ; no consciousness, no 
 memory; and, on the other, looking from effect to 
 cause, — long memory, vivid consciousness; short 
 memorjs faint consciousness ; no memory, no con- 
 sciousness. Thus the hypothesis, which postulates 
 consciousness without memory, violates the funda- 
 mental laws of our intellectual being. 
 
 (c) This hypothesis is at once illegitiwaie and su- 
 perfluous. As we must admit, from the analogy of 
 perception, that efficient modifications may exist with- 
 out any consciousness of their existence, and as this 
 admission affords a solution of the present problem, 
 the hypothesis in question here again violates the 
 law of parcimony by assuming, without necessity, a 
 
 
 plurality of principles to account for what one more 
 easily suffices to explain. 
 
 3. The third hypothesis, then, — that which em- 
 ploys the single principle of latent agencies to account 
 for so numerous a class of mental phenomena, — how 
 does it explain the phenomenon under consideration ? 
 Nothing can be more simple and analogical than its 
 solution. As, — to take an example from vision, — in 
 the external perception of .a stationary object, a cer- 
 tain space, an expanse of surface, is necessary to the 
 minimum visibile; in other words, an object of sight 
 cannot come into consciousness unless it be of a cer- 
 tain size ; in like manner, in the internal perception 
 of a series of mental operations, a certain time, a cer- 
 tain duration, is necessary for the smallest section of 
 continuous energy to which consciousness is compe- 
 tent. Some minimum of time must be admitted as 
 the condition of consciousness, and as time is divisible 
 ad 2?2/?wi7e/??z, whatever minimum be taken, there must 
 be admitted to be, beyond the cognizance of con- 
 sciousness, intervals of time, in which, if mental agen- 
 cies be performed, these will be latent to conscious- 
 ness. If we suppose that the minimum of time, to 
 which consciousness can descend, be an interval called 
 six, and that six different movements be performed in 
 this interval, these, it is evident, will appear to con- 
 sciousness as a simple, indivisible point of modified 
 time ; precisely as the minimum visibile appears as 
 an indivisible point of modified space. And, as in 
 the extended parts of the minimum visibile, each must 
 determine a certain modification on the percipient sub- 
 ject, seeing that the efiect of the whole is only the 
 
104 
 
 ^.V OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON^ S PHILOSOPnY. 
 
 105 
 
 conjoined cfTcct of its parts, in like manner, the pro- 
 tended parts of each conscious instant, — of each dis- 
 tinguishable minimum of time, — though themselves 
 beyond the ken of consciousness, must contribute to 
 give the character to the whole mental state which 
 that instant, that minimum, comprises. This being 
 understood, it is easy to see how we lose the con- 
 sciousness of the several acts, in the rapid succession 
 of many of our habits and dexterities. At first, 
 and before the habit is acquired, every act is slow, 
 and we are conscious of the effort of deliberation, 
 choice, and volition ; by degrees, the mind proceeds 
 with less vacillation and uncertainty; at length, the 
 acts become secure and precise : in proportion as this 
 takes place, the velocity of the procedure is increased, 
 and as this acceleration rises, the individual acts drop 
 one by one from consciousness, as we lose the leaves 
 in retiring further and further from the tree ; and, at 
 last, we are only aware of the general state which re- 
 sults from these unconscious operations, as we can at 
 last only perceive the greenness which results from 
 the unperceived leaves. (Lec^ on Metaph,, XVIII. 
 and XIX.) 
 
 § 2. EXPLANATION OF RETENTION. 
 
 But if it cannot be denied that the knowledge we 
 have acquired by Perception and Self-consciousness 
 does actually continue, though out of consciousness, 
 to endure, can we, in the second place, find any 
 ground on which to explain the possibility of this en- 
 durance? I think we can, and shall adduce such an 
 
 \ 
 
 explanation, founded on the general analogies of our 
 mental nature. The phenomenon of retention is in- 
 deed so natural on the ground of the self-energy of 
 mind, that we have no need to suppose any special 
 faculty for memory ; the conservation of the action 
 of the mind being involved in the very conception of 
 its power of self-activity. 
 
 Let us consider how knowledge is acquired by the 
 mind. Knowledge is not acquired by a mere passive 
 afiection, but through the exertion of spontaneous ac- 
 tivity on the part of the knowing subject ; for though 
 this activity be not exerted without some external ex- 
 citation, still this excitation is only the occasion on 
 which the mind develops its self-energy. But this 
 energy being once determined, it is natural that it 
 should persist, until again annihilated by other causes. 
 This would, in fact, be the case, were the mind 
 merely passive in the impression it receives ; for it is 
 a universal law of nature, that every effect endures as 
 long as it is not modified or opposed by any other ef- 
 fect. But the mental activity, the act of knowledge, 
 of which I now speak, is more than this ; it is an 
 energy of the self-active power of a subject one and 
 indivisible ; consequently, a part of the Ego must be 
 detached or annihilated, if a cognition once existent 
 be again extinguished. Hence it is, that the problem 
 most difficult of solution is not^ how a mental activity 
 endures^ hut how it ever vanishes. 
 
 The solution of this problem is to be sought for in 
 the theory of obscure or latent modifications of mind. 
 The disappearance of internal energies from the view 
 of internal perception does not warrant the conclusion 
 
106 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 107 
 
 that they no longer exist. Every mental activity be- 
 longs to the one vital activity of mind in general ; it 
 is, therefore, indivisibly bound up with it, and can 
 neither be torn from, nor abolished in, it. But the 
 mind is only capable, at any one moment, of exerting 
 a certain quantity or degree of force. This quantity 
 must, therefore, be divided among the different activ- 
 ities, so that each has only a part ; and the sum of 
 force belonging to all the several activities taken to- 
 gether is equal to the quantity or degree of force be- 
 longing to the vital activity of mind in general. Thus, 
 in proportion to the greater number of activities in 
 the mind, the less will be the proportion of force 
 which will accrue to each ; the feebler, therefore, 
 each will be, and the fainter the vivacity with which 
 it can affect self-consciousness. This weakening of 
 vivacity can, in consequence of the indefinite increase 
 in the number of our mental activities, caused by the 
 ceaseless excitation of the mind to new knowledge, be 
 carried to an indefinite tenuity, without the activities, 
 therefore, ceasing altogether to be. Thus it is quite 
 natural that the great proportion of our mental cog- 
 nitions should have waxed too feeble to affect our in- 
 ternal perception with the competent intensity ; it is 
 quite natural that they should have become obscure 
 or delitescent. In these circumstances, it is to be 
 supposed, that avery new cognition, every newly ex- 
 cited activity, should be in the greatest vivacity, and 
 should draw to itself the greatest amount of force ; 
 this force will, in the same proportion, be withdrawn 
 from the other earlier cognitions ; and it is they, con- 
 
 I 
 
 ^ 
 
 sequently, which must undergo the fate of obscura- 
 tion. 
 
 In further explanation of this faculty I would annex 
 two observations which arise out of the preceding the- 
 ory. 
 
 1. The first is, that retention does not belong alone 
 to the cognitive faculties, but that the same law ex- 
 tends in like manner over all the three primary classes 
 of mental phenomena. It is not cognitions only, but 
 feelings and conations, which are held fast, and which 
 can, therefore, be again awakened. This fact, of the 
 conservation of our practical modifications, is not in- 
 deed denied ; but psychologists usually so represent 
 the matter, as if, when feelings or conations are re- 
 tained in the mind, that this takes place only through 
 the medium of the memory ; meaning by this, that 
 we must, first of all, have had notions of these affec- 
 tions, which notions being preserved, they, when 
 recalled to mind, do again awaken the modification 
 they represent. From the theory I have detailed to 
 you, it must be seen that there is no need of this in- 
 termediation of notions, but that we immediately re- 
 tain feelings, volitions, and desires, no less than 
 notions and cognitions ; inasmuch as all the three 
 classes of fundamental phenomena arise equally out 
 of the vital manifestations of the same one and indi- 
 visible subject. 
 
 2. The second result of this theory is, that the va- 
 rious attempts to explain memory by physiological 
 hypotheses are as unnecessary as they are untenable. 
 This is not the place to discuss the general problem 
 touching the relation of mind and body. But in prox- 
 
108 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 imate reference to memory, it may be satisfactory to 
 show, that this faculty does not stand in need of such 
 crude modes of explanation. It must be allowed, that 
 no faculty affords a more tempting subject for mate- 
 rialistic conjecture. No other mental power betrays 
 a greater dependence on corporeal conditions than 
 memory. Not only, in general, does its vigorous or 
 feeble activity essentially depend on the health and 
 indisposition of the body, more especially of the ner- 
 vous systems ; but there is manifested a connection 
 between certain functions of memory and certain parts 
 of the cerebral apparatus. This connection, however, 
 is such as affords no countenance to any particular 
 hypotheses at present in vogue. For example, after 
 certain diseases, or certain affections of the brain, 
 some partial loss of memory takes place. Perhaps 
 the patient loses the whole of his stock of knowledge 
 previous to the disease, the faculty of acquiring and 
 retaining new information remaining entire. Perhaps 
 he loses the memory of words, and preserves that of 
 things. Perhaps he may retain the memory of nouns, 
 and lose that of verbs, or vice versa; nay, what is 
 still more marvellous, though it is not a very unfre- 
 quent occurrence, one language may be taken neatly 
 out of his retention, without affecting his memory of 
 others. By such observations, the older psycholo- 
 gists were led to the various physiological hypotheses 
 by which they hoped to account for the phenomena 
 of retention, — as, for example, the hypothesis of per- 
 manent material impressions on the brain, — or of 
 permanent dispositions in the nervous fibres to repeat 
 the same oscillatory movements, — of particular or- 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PBILOSOPHT, 
 
 109 
 
 gans for the different functions of memory, — of par- 
 ticular parts of the brain as the repositories of the 
 various classes of ideas, — or even of a particular 
 fibre as the instrument of every several notion. But 
 all these hypotheses betray only an ignorance of the 
 proper object of philosophy, and of the true nature of 
 the thinking principle. They are at best but useless ; 
 for if the unity and self-activity of mind be not denied, 
 it is manifest, that the mental activities, which have 
 been once determined, must persist, and these corpo- 
 real explanations are superfluous. {LecL on Metxiph.y 
 XXX.) 
 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 THE REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY. 
 
 I NOW pass to the next faculty in order, — the fac- 
 ulty which I have called the Reproductive. I am not 
 satisfied with this name ; for it does not precisely, of 
 itself, mark what I wish to be expressed, — namely, 
 the process by which what is lying dormant in mem- 
 ory is awakened, as contradistinguished from the rep- 
 resentation in consciousness of it as awakened. 
 
 Perhaps the Resuscitative Faculty would have been 
 better ; and the term Reproduction might have been 
 employed to comprehend the whole process, made up 
 of the correlative acts of Retention, Resuscitation, and 
 Representation. Be this, however, as it may, I shall 
 at present continue to employ the term in the limited 
 meaning I have already assigned. 
 
 Every one is conscious of a ceaseless succession or 
 train of thoughts, one thought suggesting another, 
 which again is the cause of exciting a third, and so on. 
 But if thoughts and feeliugs and conations (for you 
 must observe, that the train is not limited to the phe- 
 
 110 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 11 1 
 
 nomena of cognition only) do notarise of themselves, 
 but only in causal connection with preceding and sui)- 
 sequent modifications of mind, it remains to be asked 
 and answered, — Do the links of this chain follow 
 each other under any other condition than that of sim- 
 ' pie connection ? — in other words, inay any thouglU, 
 feeling, or desire he connected with any other? Or is 
 the succession regulated by other and special laivs, ac- 
 cording to which certain kinds of modification exclu- 
 sively precede, and exclusively follow, each other? 
 The slightest observation of the phenomenon shows 
 that the latter alternative is the case ; and on this all 
 philosophers are agreed. Nor do philosophers differ 
 in regard to what kind of thoughts are associated to- 
 gethei'. They differ almost exclusively in regjird to 
 the subordinate question, of how these thoughts ought 
 to be classified, and carried up into system. This, 
 therefore, is the question to which I shall address 
 myself. (Lect, on Mefaph,, XXXI.) 
 
 The relations, on the ground of which one thought 
 suggests another, give us what may be called the 
 primary laws of Reproduction; but when several 
 thoughts are all capable of being suggested by another, 
 as all equally related by the primary laws, what de- 
 termines Which of these thoughts shall actually be 
 suggested ? The principles that determine this may 
 be named secondary laws of Reproduction,^ 
 
 » In this paragraph I have attempted an explicit definition of the 
 distinction, as drawn by Hamilton, between the primary and the sec- 
 ondary laws of reproduction. — J. C. M. 
 
112 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 § 1. PltlMARY LA.WS OF JiE PRODUCTION 
 
 There are three subjective unities^ wJioles, or identi- 
 ties, each of which affords a ground of chronological 
 succession, and reciprocal suggestion, to the several 
 thoughts which they comprehend in one. In other 
 words, Reproduction has three sources. These are 
 (1.) The unity of thoughts, differing in time and mod- 
 ifcatlon, in a co-identity of Subject; (2.) The unity 
 of thoughts, differing in time, in a co-identity of Mod- 
 ification ; (3.) The unity of thoughts, differing in 
 modljication, in a co-identity of Time. The three 
 unities thus characterized constitute three 
 
 (A) General Laws of Reproduction. 
 
 I. Law of Possible Reproduction. Of these 
 unities the j^rs^ affords a common principle of the pos- 
 sibility of association, or mutual suggestion for all our 
 mental movements, however different in their charac- 
 ter as modifications, however remote in the times of 
 their occurrence ; for all, even the most heterogene- 
 ous and most distant, are reproducible, co-suggestihle^ 
 or associahle, as, and only as, phenomena of the same 
 unity of consciousness, — affections of the same indi- 
 visible Ego. There thus emerges the Law of Asso- 
 ci ability or Possible Co-Suggestion : All thoughts 
 of the same mental subject are associable, or capable of 
 suggesting one another, 
 
 n. Laws of Actual Reproduction. But the 
 unity of subject, the fundamental condition of the as- 
 eociability of thought in general, affords no reason 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'' S PIlILOSOPnY, 
 
 113 
 
 w^hy this particular thought should, de facto, recall or 
 suggest that. We require, thcrefors, besides a law 
 of possible, a law or laws of actual Reproduction. Two 
 such are afforded in the two other unities, — those of 
 Modification and of Time. 
 
 And now let us, for the sake of subsequent refer- 
 ence, pause a moment to state the following symbolic 
 illustration : — 
 
 ABC 
 
 A^ 
 
 Here the same letter, repeated in perpendicular or- 
 der, is intended to denote the same mental mode, 
 brought into consciousness, represented, at different 
 times. Here the different letters, in horizontal order, 
 are supposed to designate the partial thoughts inte- 
 grant of a total mental state, and therefore coexistent 
 or immediately consequent, at the moment of its actual 
 realization. This being understood, we proceed : — 
 
 Of these two unities that of modification affords the 
 ground, why, for example, an object determining a 
 mental modification of a certain complement and char- 
 acter to-day, this presentation tends to call up the 
 representation of the same modification determined by 
 that object yesterday. Or suppose, as in our sym- 
 bols, the three A's to typify the same thought, deter- 
 mined at three different times, be the determining 
 movement of a presentation or a representation. On 
 the second occasion, A' will suggest the representation 
 of A. This it will not be denied that it can do ; for, 
 
 8 
 
Hi 
 
 AN OVTLIKE OF 
 
 OH the possibility hereof depeiicls the possibility of 
 sirnjjle remembrance. The total thought, after this 
 suggestion, will be A' -}- A ; and on the third occa- 
 sion, A'' may suggest A' and A ; both on this princi- 
 ple, and on that other which we are immediately to 
 consider, of co-identity in time. Wc have thus, as a 
 first general law of actual Reproduction, Suggestion, 
 or Association : — 
 
 1. The Law of Repetition or of Direct Re- 
 membrance : Thouglits^ co-identical in modification, 
 hut differing in time, tend to suggest each other. 
 
 The unity of time affords the ground why thoughts, 
 different in their character as mental modes, but hav- 
 ing once been proximately coexistent (including 
 under coexistence immediate consecution) as the 
 parts of some total thought, — and a totality of 
 thought is determined even by a unity of time, — do, 
 when recalled into consciousness, tend immediately to 
 suggest each other, as co-constituents of that former 
 whole, and mediately, that Avhole itself. Thus let 
 (A, B, C, D, E, F) be supposed a complement of 
 such concomitant thousfhts. If A be recalled into 
 consciousness, A will tend to reawaken B, B to re- 
 awaken C, and so on, until the whole formerly co- 
 existent series has been reinstated, or the mind di- 
 verted by some stronger movement on some other 
 train. We have thus, as a second general law of ac- 
 tual Reproduction, Suggestion, or Association, — 
 
 2. The Law of Redintegration, of Indirect 
 RexMembRxVNCE, or of Reminiscence : Thoughts, 
 once co-identical in time, are, however different as men^ 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 115 
 
 tal modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in 
 the mutual order which they originally held. 
 
 Philosophers, in generalizing the phenomena of re- 
 production, have, if the exception of Aristotle be ad- 
 mitted, of these two, exclusively regarded the law of 
 Redintegration. That of Repetition was, however, 
 equally worthy of their consideration. For the exci- 
 tation of the same by the same, differing in time, is 
 not less marvellous than the excitation of the differ- 
 ent by the different, identical in time. It was a prin- 
 ciple, too, equally indispensable to explain the phe- 
 nomena. For the attempts to reduce these to the 
 law of Redintegration alone will not stand the test 
 of criticism ; since the reproduction of thought by 
 thought, as disjoined in time, cannot be referred to 
 the reproduction of thought by thought, as conjoined 
 in time. Accordingly we shall find, in coming to de- 
 tail, that some phenomena are saved by the law of 
 Repetition alone, while others require a combination 
 of the two laws of Repetition and Redintegration. 
 Such combinations of these two laws constitute the 
 
 (B) Special Laws of Reproduction. The laws 
 under this head are, — 
 
 I. The Law of Similars: Things, — thoughts, 
 resembling each other (be the resemblance simple or an- 
 alogical) , are mutually suggestive. 
 
 From Aristotle downwards, all who have written 
 on Suggestion, whether intentional or spontaneous, 
 have recognized the association of similar objects. 
 But whilst all have thus fairly acknowledged the ef- 
 fect, none, I think (if Aristotle be not a singular 
 exception) , have speculated aright as to the cause. 
 
116 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 111 ij^enonil, Similarity has been lightly assumed, 
 liglitly laid down, as one of the ultimate principles of 
 associations. Nothing, however, can be clearer than 
 that resembling objects, — resembling mental modifi- 
 cations, — being, to us, hi their resembling points, 
 identical, they must, on the principle of Repetition, call 
 up each other. This, of course, refers principally to 
 suggestion /or the first time. Subsequently, Redinte- 
 gration co-operates with Repetition ; for noio the re- 
 sembling parts have formed together ^ar^5 of the same 
 mental ivhole, and are, moreover, associated both as 
 similar and as contrasted, 
 
 II. The Law of Contrast: Things, — tliowjhts, 
 contrasted with each other (be the contrast one of con- 
 trariety or of contradiction) , are mutualhj suggestive, 
 
 1. All contrast is of things contained under a com- 
 mon notion. Qualities are contrasted only as they 
 are similar. A good horse and a bad syllogism have 
 no contrast. Virtue and vice agree as moi'al attri- 
 butes ; great and little agree as quantities, and as ex- 
 traordinary deflections from ordinary quantity. Even 
 existence and non-existence are not opposed as difier 
 exit genera, but only as species of existence, — posi- 
 tive existence and negative existence. Conspecies 
 thus (as wolf and dog) may be associated either as 
 similars or as contraries, — similars as opposed to ani- 
 mals of other genera, — contraries as opposed to each 
 other. Contraries are thus united under a higher no- 
 tion. 
 
 2. Affirmation of any quality involves the negation 
 of its contradictory, — the affirmation of goodness is 
 virtually the negation of badness ; and many terms 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 II 
 
 for the contradictory qualities are only negations jind 
 affirmations, — just, unjust, — finite, infinite, — par- 
 tial, impartial. Hence logical contradictory opposi- 
 tion is even a stronger association than logical con- 
 trariety, because only between two. 
 
 3. Contrast is a relation, —the knowledge of con- 
 traries is one. 
 
 4. Consciousness is only of the distinguishable; 
 and therefore contrast most clearly distinguished must 
 heighten consciousness. 
 
 III. The Law of Co-adjacency: Things,— 
 thoughts, related to each other as Cause and Effect, 
 Whole and Parts, Substance and Attribute, Sign and 
 Signified, are mutually suggestive. 
 
 § 2. SECONDARY LAWS OF REPRODUCTION, 
 
 In obedience to the primary laws, movements sug- 
 gest and are suggested in proportion to the strictness 
 of the dependency between that prior and this poste- 
 rior. But such general relation between two thoughts 
 — and on which are founded the two Abstract or 
 Primary laws of Repetition and Redintegration — is 
 frequently crossed, is frequently superseded, by an- 
 other, and that a particular relation, which determines 
 the suggestion of a movement not warranted by any 
 dependence on its antecedent. To complete the laws 
 of reproduction we must therefore recognize, as a 
 Secondary or Concrete principle, what may be styled 
 (under protest, for it is hardly deserving of the title 
 Law), The Law of Preference: Thoughts are 
 suggested, not merely by force of the general subjective 
 
118 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 relation subsisting between themselves; they are also 
 suggested in proportion to the relation of interest {from 
 whatever source^ in which these stand to the individual 
 mind. 
 
 This general law of Preference yields, as its modes, 
 the special secondary laws ; for, under the laws of 
 possibility, one thought being associated with a plural- 
 ity, and each of that plurality being therefore suggest- 
 ible, it suggests one in preference to another according 
 to two laws: (1.) By relation to itself, the thought 
 most strictly associated with itself; (2.) By relation 
 to mind, the thought most easily suggestible. That 
 there must be two laws, is shown, because two associ- 
 ated thoughts do not suggest each other with equal 
 force. B may be very strongly associated with A, 
 but A very slightly associated with B. This is two- 
 fold ; (1.) in order of time, (2.) in order of interest. 
 
 (A) Under the first head, that of suggestion by re- 
 lation to the thought suggesting ^ may be stated the fol- 
 lowing special laws : — 
 
 I. The Law of Iaimediacy : Of two thoughts^ if 
 the one be immediately^ the other mediately, connected 
 with a third, the first will be suggested by the third in 
 preference to the second. 
 
 n. The Law of Homogeneity : A thought will 
 suggest another of the same order in preference to one 
 of a different order. 
 
 Thus a smell will suggest a smell, a sight a sight, 
 an imagination an imagination, in preference to a 
 thought of a different class. 
 
 (B) Under the second head, that of suggestion by 
 relation to the mind, may be stated, as a special law, 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPnY, 
 
 119 
 
 The Law of Facility : A thought easier to suggest 
 will be roused in preference to a rnore difficult one. The 
 
 easier are 
 
 I. Those more clearly, strongly impressed than the 
 reverse. Such are ideas more undistractedly, atten- 
 tively received; in youth, in the morning; assisted 
 by novelty, wonder, passion, etc. Hence, also, sights 
 are more easily suggested than smells, imaginations 
 than thoughts, etc. 
 
 II. Those more recent, than older (ceteris par- 
 ibus) . 
 
 HI. Those more frequently repeated (cceteris par- 
 ibus) . 
 
 IV. Those which stand more isolated from foreign 
 
 and thwarting thoughts, 
 
 V. Those which are more connected with homoge- 
 neous and assisting thoughts, 
 
 VI. Those more interesting to (1.) natural cogni- 
 tive powers, talents ; (2.) acquired habits of cognition, 
 studies ; (3.) temporary line of occupation. 
 
 VII. Those more in harmony with affective dispo- 
 sitions, (1.) natural, (2.) habitual, (3.) temporary.^ 
 {Reid's Works, Note D***.) 
 
 » It is due to Sir William Hamilton to bear in mind, that bis the- 
 ory of the laws of reproduction seems never to have been worked 
 into a form perfectly satisfactory to himself. Nearly all that relates 
 to the secondary laws, as weU as to the special primary laws, is left 
 in an unfinished state. The exposition in reference to these pomts, 
 which I have given, is taken, with a few alterations and additions of 
 expression, from the fragments obtained by Mr. Mansel among Sir 
 William's papers. — J. C. M. 
 
120 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 § 3. DISTINCTION OF SUGGESTION AND -REMINISCENCE, 
 
 The faculty of Reproduction may be considered as 
 operating either spontaneously, without any interfer- 
 ence of the will, or as modified in its action by the in- 
 tervention of volition. In the one case, as in the 
 other, the Reproductive Faculty acts in subservience 
 to its own laws. In the former case, one thought is 
 allowed to suggest another, according to the greater 
 general connection subsisting between them ; in the 
 latter, the act of volition, by concentrating attention 
 upon a certain determinate class of associating circum- 
 stances, bestows on these circumstances an extraordi- 
 nary vivacity, and, consequently, enables them to ob- 
 tain the preponderance, and exclusively to determine 
 the succession of the intellectual train. The former 
 of these cases, where the Reproductive Faculty is left 
 wholly to itself, may not improperly be called Spon- 
 taneous Suggestion, or Suggestion simply ; the latter 
 ought to obtain the name of Reminiscence or Recol- 
 lection. 
 
 To form a correct notion of the phenomena of Rem- 
 iniscence, it is requisite that we consider under what 
 conditions it is determined to exertion. In the first 
 place, it is to be noted that, at every crisis of our ex- 
 istence, momentary circumstances are the causes which 
 awaken our activity, and set our recollection at work 
 to supply the necessaries of thought. In the second 
 place, it is as constituting a want (and by want^ I 
 mean the result either of an act of desire or of voli- 
 tion) , that the determijuing circumstance tends prin- 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 121 
 
 cipally to awaken the thoughts with which it is asso- 
 ciated. This being the case, we should expect that 
 each circumstance which constitutes a want should 
 suggest, likewise, the notion of an object, or objects, 
 proper to satisfy it ; and this is what actually hap- 
 pens. It is, however, further to be observed, that it 
 is not enough that the want suggests the idea of the 
 object ; for if that idea were alone, it would remain 
 without efiect, since it could not guide me in the pro- 
 cedure I should follow. It is necessary, at the same 
 time, that to the idea of this object there should be 
 associated the notion of the relation of this object to 
 the want, of the place where I may find it, of the 
 means by which I may procure it, and turn it to ac- 
 count, etc. For instance, I wish to make a quota- 
 tion : this want awakens in me the idea of the author 
 in whom the passage is to be found, which I am de- 
 sirous of citing; but this idea would be fruitless, un- 
 less there were conjoined, at the same time, the 
 representation of the volume, of the place where I 
 may obtain it, of the means I must employ, etc. 
 
 Hence I infer, in the first place, that a want does 
 not awaken an idea of its object alone, but that it 
 awakens it accompanied with a number, more or less 
 considerable, of accessory notions, which form, as it 
 were, its train or attendance. This train ma}^ vary 
 according to the nature of the want which suggests 
 the notion of an object ; but the train can never fall 
 wholly off, and it becomes more indissolubJy attached 
 to the object, in proportion as it has been more fre- 
 quently called up in attendance. 
 
 I infer, in the second place, that this accompani- 
 
122 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 ment of accessory notions, simultaneously suggested 
 with the principal idea, is far from being as vividly 
 and distinctly represented in consciousness as that 
 idea itself; and when these accessories have once 
 been completely blended with the habits of the mind, 
 and its reproductive agency, they at length finally dis- 
 appear, becomiug fused, as it were, in the conscious- 
 ness of the idea to which they are attached. 
 
 Thus, if we appreciate correctly the phenomena of 
 Eeproduction or Ecminiscence, we shall recognize, as 
 an incontestable fact, that our thoughts suggest each 
 other, not one by one successively, as the order to 
 which language is astricted might lead us to infer ; 
 but that the complement of circumstances, under which 
 we at every moment exist, awakens simultaneously 
 a great number of thoughts ; these it calls into the 
 presence of the mind, either to place them at our dis- 
 posal, if we find it requisite to employ them, or to 
 make them co-operate in our deliberations, by giving 
 them, according to their nature and our habits, an 
 influence, more or less active, on our judgments and 
 consequent acts. 
 
 It is also to be observed, that, in this great crowd 
 of thoughts always present to the mind, there is only 
 a small number of which we are distinctly conscious ; 
 and that, in this small number, we ought to distinguish 
 those which, being clothed in language oral or men- 
 tal, become the objects of a more fixed attention; 
 those which hold a closer relation to circumstances 
 more impressive than others ; or which receive a pre- 
 dominant character by the more vigorous attention we 
 bestow on them. As to the others, although not the 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON^ S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 123 
 
 objects of clear consciousness, they are nevertheless 
 present to the mind, there to perform a very impor- 
 tant part as motive principles of determination ; and 
 The influence which they exert in this capacity is even 
 the more powerful in proportion as it is less apparent, 
 being more disguised by habit. {Led. on Metaph.^ 
 
 xxxn.) 
 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 THE REPRESENTATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 By the faculty of Eepresentation, as I formerly men- 
 tioned, I mean strictly the power the mind has of 
 holding up vividly before itself the thoughts which, 
 by the act of Reproduction, it has recalled into con- 
 sciousness. Though the processes of Representation 
 and Reproduction cannot exist independently of each 
 other, they are nevertheless not more to be confounded 
 into one than those of Reproduction and Conservation. 
 They are, indeed, discriminated by differences suffi- 
 ciently decisive. Reproduction, as wc have seen, op- 
 erates, in part at least, out of consciousness. Repre- 
 sentation, on the contrary, is only realized as it is 
 realized in consciousness ; the degree or vivacity of 
 the Representation being always in proportion to the 
 degree or vivacity of our consciousness of its reality. 
 Nor are the energies of Representation and Reproduction 
 always exerted by the same individual in equal inten- 
 sity, any more than the energies of Reprodnction and 
 Retention. Some minds are distinguished for a higher 
 
 124 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF HAWLTON^ S PHILOSOP/IY. 125 
 
 power of manifesting one of these phenomena ; others, 
 for manifesting another ; and as it is not always the 
 person who forgets nothing who can most promptly 
 recall what he retains, so neither is it always the per- 
 son who recollects most easily and correctly who can 
 exhibit what he remembers in the most vivid colors 
 It is to be recollected, however, that Retention, Re- 
 production, and Representation, though not in differ- 
 ent persons of the same relative vigor, are, however, 
 in the same individuals, all strong or weak in refer- 
 ence to the same classes of objects. For example, if 
 a man's memory be more peculiarly retentive of words, 
 his verbal reminiscence and imagination will, in like 
 manner, be more particularly energetic. 
 
 In common language, it is not of course to be ex- 
 pected that there should be found terms to express 
 the result of an analysis which had not even been per- 
 formed by philosophers ; and, accordingly, the term 
 Imagination^ or Phantasy^ which denotes most 
 nearly the Representative process, does this, how- 
 ever, not without an admixture of other processes, 
 •which it is of consequence for scientific precision that 
 we should consider apart. 
 
 In the view I take of the fundamental processes, 
 the act of Representation is merely the energy of the 
 mind in holding up to its own. contemplation what it 
 is determined to represent. I distinguish, as essen- 
 tially difierent, the Representation and the determi- 
 nation to represent. I exclude^ from the Faculty of 
 Representation all power of preference among the ob- 
 jects it holds up to view. This is the function of 
 faculties wholl3^ different from that of Representation, 
 
120 
 
 jiN OUTLINE OF 
 
 Sin WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PIULOSOPIIY. 
 
 127 
 
 ^vhich, though active in representing, is wholly pas* 
 sive as to what it represents. What, then, it may be 
 asked, are the powers by which the Representative 
 Faculty is determined to represent, and to represent 
 this particular object, or this particular complement 
 of objects, and not any other? These arc two. 
 
 1. The first of these is the lleproductive Faculty. 
 This faculty is the great immediate source from which 
 the Representative receives both the materials and the 
 determination to represent ; and the laws by which 
 the Reproductive Faculty is governed govern also the 
 Representative. Accordingly, if there were no other 
 laws in the arrangement and combination of thought 
 than those of association, the Representative Faculty 
 would be determined in its manifestations, and in the 
 character of its manifestations, by the Reproductive 
 Faculty alone ; and, on this supposition. Representa- 
 tion could no more be distinguished from Reproduc- 
 tion than Reproduction from Association. 
 
 2. But there is another elementary process which 
 w^e have not yet considered : Comparison, or the 
 Faculty of Relations, to which the representative act is 
 likewise subject, and which plays a conspicuous part 
 in determining in what combinations objects are rep- 
 resented. By the i^rocess of Comparison, the complex 
 objects, called up by the Reproductive Faculty, un- 
 dergo various operations. They are separated into 
 parts ; they are analyzed into elements ; and these 
 parts and elements are again compounded in every 
 various fashion. In all this the Representative Fac- 
 ulty co-operates. It, iirst of all, exhibits the phe- 
 nomena so called up by the laws of ordinary associa- 
 
 
 
 tion. In this it acts as handmaid to the Rc])rodnctive 
 Faculty. It then exhibits the phenomena as variously 
 elaborated by the analysis and synthesis of the Com- 
 parative Faculty, to which, in like manner, it performs 
 the |)art of a subsidiary. 
 
 This being understood, you will easily perceive 
 that the lma<j:ination of common lan«:ua£:e — the 
 Productive Imagination of philosophers — is nothing 
 but the Representative process, ])lus the process to 
 which I would give the name of the Comparative, In 
 this compound operation, it is true that the Represen- 
 tative act is the most conspicuous, perhaps the most 
 essential, element. For, in the^r.s^ place, it is a con- 
 dition of the possibility of the act of comparison, that 
 the material on which it operates (that is, the objects 
 reproduced in their natural connections) should be 
 held up to its observation in a clear light, in order 
 that it may take note of their various circumstances 
 of relation ; and, in the second^ that the result of its 
 own cl.iboration, that is, the new arrangements which 
 it proposes, should be realized in a vivid act of Rep- 
 resentation. Thus it is, that, in the view both of 
 the vulgar and of philosophers, the more obtrusive, 
 though really the more subordinate, element in this 
 compound process has been elevated into the princi 
 pal constituent ; whereas, the act of Comparison — 
 the act of separation and reconstruction — has been re- 
 garded as identical with the act of Representation. 
 
 Thus Imagination, in the common acceptation of 
 the term, is not a sim[)le but a compound faculty, — 
 a faculty, hosvever, in which Representation forms the 
 principal constituent. If, therefore, we were obliged 
 
128 
 
 AN OUTLtSE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 129 
 
 to find a common word for every clemontjny procoss 
 of our Jinalysis, Imar/lnation would 1)C the term which, 
 with the least violence to its meaning, could ))e ac- 
 commodated to exj^ress the Kepresentative Faculty. 
 
 By Imagination, thus limited, you are not to 'sup- 
 pose that the faculty of representing mere objects of 
 sense alone is meant. On the contrary, a vigorous 
 power of Eepresentation is as indispensable a condi- 
 tion of success in tlie abstract sciences as m the poet- 
 ical and plastic arts; and it may, accordingly, be 
 reasonably doubted whether Aristotle or Homer were 
 possessed of the more powerfnl Imagination. The 
 term Imagination^ however, is less generally npi)lied 
 to the representations of the Comparative Faculty 
 considered in the abstract than to the representations 
 of sensible objects concretely modified by comparison. 
 The two kinds of imagination are, in fact, not fre- 
 quently combined. Accordingly, using the term iu 
 this its ordinary extent, that is, in its limitation to 
 objects of sense, it is -finely said by Mr. Rume : 
 "Nothinir is more dans^erous to reason than the flights 
 of imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of 
 more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright 
 fancies may, in this respect, be compared to those 
 angels whom the Scriptures represent as covering 
 their eyes with their wings." 
 
 Dreaming, Somnambulism, Eeverie, are so many 
 eflfects of imagination determined by association, — at 
 least, states of mind in which these have a decisive in- 
 fluence. 
 
 1. Dreaming, If an impression on the sense often 
 commences a dream, it is by imagination and sugges- 
 
 \ 
 
 } 
 
 tion that it is developed and accomplished. Dreams 
 have frequently a degree of vivacity which enables 
 them to compete with the reality ; and if the events 
 which they represent to us were in accordance with 
 the circumstances of time and place in Avhich we stand, 
 it would be almost impossible to distinguish a vivid 
 dream from a sensible perception. " If," says Pascal, 
 " we dreamt every night the same thing, it would per- 
 haps aflcct us as powerfully as the objects which we 
 perceive every day. And if an artisan were certain 
 of dreaming every night for twelve hours that he was 
 a king, I am convinced that he would be almost as 
 ha[)py as a king who dreamt for twelve hours that 
 
 he was an artisan It is only because 
 
 dreams are difierent and inconsistent, that we can say, 
 when we awake, that we have dreamt; for life is a 
 dream a little less inconstant." 
 
 The influence of dreams upon our character is not 
 without its interest. A particular tendency may be 
 strengthened in a man solely by the repeated action 
 of dreams. Dreams do not, however, as is commonly 
 supposed, afl'ord any appreciable indication of the 
 character of individuals. It is not always the subjects 
 that occupy us most wdien awake that form the mat- 
 ter of our dreams ; and it is curious that the persons 
 the dearest to us are precisely those about whom we 
 dream most rarely. 
 
 2. SomiiambuUsm is a phenomenon still more as- 
 tonishing. In this singular state, a person performs 
 a reo-nlar series of rational actions, and those. fre- 
 quently of the most diflacult and delicate nature, and, 
 what is still more marvellous, with a talent to which 
 
 9 
 
130 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 he could make no pretension when awake. His mem- 
 ory and reminiscence supply him with recollections 
 of words and things which perhaps were never at 
 his disposal in the ordinary state ; he speaks more 
 fluently a more refined language ; and, if we are 
 to credit what the evidence on which it rests 
 hardly allows us to disbelieve, he has not only per- 
 ceptions through other channels than the common or- 
 gans of sense, but the sphere of his cognitions is am- 
 plified to an extent ftir beyond the limits to which 
 sensible perception is confined. This subject is one 
 of the most perplexing in the whole compass of phi- 
 losophy ; for, on the one hand, the phenomena are so 
 marvellous that they cannot be believed, and yet, on 
 the other, they are of so unambiguous and palpable 
 a character, and the Avitnesses to their reality are so 
 numerous, so intelligent, and so hiuh above every 
 suspicion of deceit, that it is equally impossible to 
 deny credit to what is attested by such ample and un- 
 exceptionable evidence. 
 
 3. Reverie, The third state, that of Reverie, or 
 castle-building, is a kind of waking dream, and does 
 not difier from dreaming, except by the consciousness 
 w^hich accompanies it. In this state, the mind aban- 
 dons itself without a choice of subject, without control 
 over the mental train, to the involuntary associa- 
 tions of imagination. It is thus occupied without 
 being properly active ; it is active, at least, without 
 effort. Young persons, women, the old, the unem- 
 ployed, and the idle, are all disposed to reverie. 
 There is a pleasure attached to its illusions, which 
 renders it as seductive as it is dangerous. The mind, 
 
 sin WILLIAM HAMILTON^ S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 131 
 
 'J ; 
 
 « 
 
 by indulgence in this dissipation, becomes enervated ; 
 it acquires the habit of a pleasing idleness, loses its 
 activity, and at length even the power and the desire 
 of action. 
 
 Organs of Imagination. I shall terminate the 
 consideration of Imagination Proper by a speculation 
 concerning the organ which it employs in the repre- 
 sentations of sensible objects. The organ which it 
 thus employs seems to be no other than the organs 
 themselves of Sense, on which the original impressions 
 were made, and through which they were originally 
 j)erceived. Experience has shown that Imagination 
 depends on no one part of the cerebral apparatus ex- 
 clusively. There is no portion of the brain which has 
 not been destroyed by mollification, or induration, or 
 external lesion, without the general faculty of Repre- 
 sentation being injured. But experience equally 
 proves that the intracranial portion of any external 
 organ of sense cannot be destroyed without a certain 
 partial abolition of the Imagination Proper. For ex- 
 ample, there are many cases recorded by medical ob- 
 servers, of persons losing their sight, who have also 
 lost the faculty of representing the images of visible 
 objects. They no longer call up such objects by remi- 
 niscence ; they no longer dream of them. Now, in 
 these cases, it is found that not merely the external 
 instrument of sight — the eye — has been disorgan- 
 ized, but that the disorganization has extended to 
 those parts of the brain which constitute the internal 
 instrument of this sense, that is, the optic nerves and 
 thalami. If the latter — the real organ of vision — 
 remain sound, the eye alone being destroyed, the im- 
 
132 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON' S PBILOSOPHY, 
 
 agination of colors and forms remains as vigorous as 
 when vision was entire. Similar eases are recorded 
 in regard to the deaf. These facts, added to the ob- 
 servation of the internal phenomena which take phice 
 during our acts of representation, make it, I think, 
 more than probable that there are as many organs of 
 Imagination as there are organs of Sense. Thus I 
 have a distinct consciousness, that, in the internal 
 representation of visible objects, the same organs are 
 at work which operate in the External Perception of 
 these ; and the same holds good in an imagination of 
 the objects of Hearing, Touch, Taste, and Smell. 
 
 But not only sensible perceptions, voluntary mo- 
 tions, likewise, are imitated in and by the imagination. 
 I can, in imagination, represent the action of speech, 
 the play of the muscles of the countenance, the move- 
 ment of the limbs ; and when I do this, I feel clearly 
 that I awaken a kind of tension in the same nerves 
 through which, by an act of will, I can determine an 
 overt and voluntary motion of the muscles ; nay, 
 when the play of imagination is very lively, this ex- 
 ternal movement is actually determined. Thus we 
 frequently see the countenances of persons, under the 
 influence of imagination, undergo various changes ; 
 they gesticulate with their hands, they talk to them- 
 selves, and all this is in consequence only of the im- 
 agined activity going out into real activity. I should, 
 therefore, be disposed to conclude, that, as in Percep- 
 tion, the living organs of sense are from without de- 
 termined to energy, so, in Imagination, they are de- 
 termined to a similar energy by an influence from 
 within. (Lect. on Metaph,, XXXIII.) 
 
 J 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 The faculties with which we have been hitherto 
 engaged may be regarded as subsidiary to that which 
 we are now about to consider. This, to which I gave 
 the name of the Elaborative Faculty, the Faculty of 
 Relations, or ComjDarison, constitutes what is properly 
 denominated Thought, and corresponds to what the 
 Greek philosophers understood by dtdxna, the Latin by 
 Discursus. It supposes always at least two terms, 
 and its act results in a judgment, that is, an affirma- 
 tion or negation of one of these terms of the other. 
 
 In opposition to the views hitherto promulgated in 
 regard to Comparison, I will show that this faculty is 
 at work in every, the simplest, act of mind ; and that 
 from the primary affirmation of existence in an origi- 
 nal act of consciousness to the judgment contained in 
 the conclusion of an act of reasoning, every operation 
 is only an evolution of the same elementary process, 
 — that there is a difierence in the complexity, none 
 in the nature of the act. What I have, therefore, to 
 
 133 
 
1S4 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 prove is, in the first place, that Comparison is sup- 
 posed in every, the simplest, act of knowledge ; in the 
 second^ that our factitiously simple, our factitiously 
 complex, our abstract, and our generalized notions 
 are all merely so many products of Comj^arison ; iu 
 the tJdrd, that Judgment, and, in the fourth^ that 
 Reasoning, is identical with Comparison. 
 
 § 1. PRIMARY ACTS OF COMPARISON, 
 
 1. The^r^^ or most elementary act of Comparison, 
 or of that mental process in which the relation of two 
 terms is recognized and affirmed, is the judgment vir- 
 tually pronounced, in an act of Perception, of the 
 Non-ego, or, in an act of Self-consciousness, of the 
 Ego. This is the primary affirmation of existence. 
 The notion of existence is one native to the mind. It 
 is the primary condition of thought. The first act of 
 experieuce awoke it, and the lirst act of consciousness 
 was a subsumption of that of which we were conscious 
 under this notion; in other words, the first act of 
 consciousness w^as an affirmation of the existence of 
 something. The first or simplest act of Comparison 
 is thus the discrimination of existence from non-ex- 
 istence ; and the first or simplest judgment is the 
 affirmation of existence, in other words, the denial of 
 non-existence. 
 
 2. But the something of which we are conscious, 
 and of which we predicate existence, in the primary 
 judgment, is twofold, — the Ego and the Non-ego. 
 We are conscious of both, and affirm existence of 
 both. But we do more ; we do not merely affirm the 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 135 
 
 \ 
 
 
 existence of each out of relation to the other, but, in 
 affirmins: their existence, we affirm their existence in 
 duality, in difference, in mutual contrast ; that is, we 
 not only affirm the Ego to exist, but deny it existing 
 as the Non-ego ; we not only affirm the Non-ego to 
 exist, but deny it existing as the Ego. The second 
 act of Comparison is thus the discrimination of the 
 Ego and the Non-ego ; and the second judgment is 
 the affirmation that each is not the other. 
 
 3. The third gradation in the act of Comparison is 
 in the recognition of the multiplicity of the coexistent 
 or successive phenomena, presented either to Percep- 
 tion or Self-consciousness, and the judgment in regard 
 to their resemblance or dissimilarity. 
 
 4. Tha fourth is the Comparison of the phenomena 
 with the native notion of Substance, and the judgment 
 is the grouping of these phenomena into different bun- 
 dles, as the attributes of different subjects. In the 
 external world this relation constitutes the distinction 
 of things ; in iho internal, the distinction of pow- 
 
 ers. 
 
 5. The fifth act of Comparison is the collation of 
 successive phenomena under the native notion of Caus- 
 ality, and the affirmation or negation of their mutual 
 relation as cause and effect. 
 
 § 2. classification. 
 
 So fiir, the process of Comparison is determined 
 merely by objective conditions ; hitherto, it has fol- 
 lowed only in the footsteps of nature. In those, 
 a<^ain, we are now to consider, the procedure is, iu a 
 
136 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 
 Stn WILLIAM HAMILTON'S VTlILOSOPnY. 
 
 137 
 
 certain sort, artificial, and determined by the necessi- 
 ties of the thinking snbject itself. The mind is finite 
 in its powers of comprehension ; the objects, on the 
 contrary, which are presented to it, are, in proportion 
 to its limited capacities, infinite in number. How, 
 then, is this disproportion to be equalized? How can 
 the infinity of nature be brought down to the finitude 
 of man? This is done by means of Chissification. 
 Objects, though infinite in number, are not infinite in 
 variety ; they are all, in a certain sort, repetitions of 
 the same common qualities, and the mind, though lost 
 in the multitude of individuals, can easily grasp the 
 classes into which their resembliug attributes euable 
 us to assort them. This whole process of Classifica- 
 tion is a mere act of Comparison, as the follow^ing de- 
 duction will show. 
 
 (A) Collective NoTioxs. In the first place, this 
 may be shown in regard to the formation of complex 
 notions, with which, as the simplest species of classi- 
 fication, we may commence. ^Sy Complex or Collec- 
 tive notions 1 mean merely the notion of a class formed 
 by the repetition of the same constituent notion. 
 Such are the notions of an army, a forest, a town, a 
 number. These are the names of classes, formed 
 by the repetition of the notion of a soldier, of a tree, 
 of a house, of a unit. You are not to confound, as 
 has sometimes been done, the notion of an army, a for- 
 est, a town, a number, with the notions of army, forest, 
 toion, and number; the former, as I have said, are 
 complex or collective, the latter are general or univer- 
 sal notions. 
 
 It is evident that a collective notion is the result of 
 
 comparison. The repetition of the same constituent 
 notion supposes that these notions were compared, 
 their identity or absolute similarity affirmed. 
 
 In the whole process of classification the mind is in 
 a great measure dependent upon language for its suc- 
 cess ; and in this, the simplest of the acts of Classifica- 
 tion, it may be proper to show how language affords 
 to mind the assistance it requires. Our complex no- 
 tions being formed by the repetition of the same notion, 
 it is evident that the difficulty we can experience in 
 forming an adequate conception of a class of identical 
 constituents will be determined by the difficulty we 
 have in conceiving a multitude. The comprehension 
 of the mind is limited ; it can embrace at once but a 
 small number of ol)jects. It would thus seem that an 
 obstacle is raised to the extension of our complex ideas 
 at the very outset of our combinations. How, then, 
 does the mind proceed? When, by a first combina- 
 tion, we have obtained a complement of notions as 
 complex as the mind can embrace, we give this com- 
 plement a name. This being done, we regard the as- 
 semblage of units thus bound up under a collective 
 name as itself a unit, and proceed, by a second combi- 
 nation, to accumulate these into a new complement of 
 the same extent. To this new complement we give 
 another name ; and then again proceed to perform, on 
 this more complex • unit, the same operation we had 
 performed on the first; and so we may go on rising 
 from complement to complement to an indefinite ex- 
 tent. Thus, a merchant, having received a large un- 
 known sum of money in crowns, counts out the pieces 
 by fives, and having done this till he has reached 
 
138 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 Sin WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPnT, 
 
 139 
 
 twenty, he lays them together in a heap ; around 
 these he asseml)les similar piles of coin, till they 
 amount, let us say, to twenty ; and he then puts the 
 whole four hundred into a hag. In this manner he 
 proceeds, until he fills a number of bags, and placing 
 the whole in his cotFers, he will have a complex or 
 collective notion of the quantity of crowns which ho 
 has received. It is on this principle that arithmetic 
 proceeds ; tens, hundreds, thousands, myriads, hun- 
 dreds of thousands, millions, etc., are all so many 
 factitious units, which enable us to form notions, vairue 
 indeed, of what otherwise we could have obtained no 
 conce[>tion at all. So much for complex or collective 
 notions, formed without decomposition, — a process 
 which I now go on to consider. 
 
 (B) Abstraction. Our thought, that is, the sum 
 total of the Perceptions and Representations which 
 occupy us at any given moment, is always, as I have 
 frequently observed, compound. The composite ob- 
 jects of thoughts may be decomposed in two ways, 
 and for the sake of two different interests. 
 
 1. In the first place, we may decompose in order 
 that we may recombine, influenced by the. mere pleas- 
 ure which this plastic operation affords us. This is 
 poetical analysis and synthesis. On this process it is 
 needless to dwell. It is evidently the work of com- 
 parison. For example, the mint)taur, or chimera, 
 or centaur, or gryphon (hippogryph),'or any other 
 poetical combin.ition of different animals, could only 
 have been effected by an act in which the representa- 
 tions of these animals were compared, and in which 
 certain parts of one were affirmed compatible with 
 
 certain parts of another. How, again, is the imagina- 
 tion of all ideal beauty or perfection formed ? Simply 
 by comparing the various beauties or excellences of 
 which we have had actual experience, and thus being 
 enabled to pronounce in regard to their common and 
 essential quality. 
 
 2. In the second place, we may decompose in the 
 interest of science ; and as the poetical composition 
 was principally accomplished by a separation of in- 
 tegral parts, so this is principally accomplished by an 
 abstraction of constituent qualities. On this process 
 it is necessary to be more particular. 
 
 Suppose an unknown body is presented to my 
 senses, and that it is capable of affecting each of these 
 in a certain manner. As furnished with five different 
 organs, each of which serves to introduce a certain 
 class of perceptions and representations into the mind, 
 we naturally distribute all sensible objects into five 
 species of qualities. The abstraction of the senses is 
 thus an operation the most natural ; it is even impos- 
 sible for us not to perform it. Let us now see 
 whether abstraction by the mind be more arduous than 
 that of the senses. 
 
 ^Ye have formerly found that the comprehension of 
 the mind is extremely limited : it can only take cog- 
 nizance of one object at a time, if that be known with 
 full intensity ; and' it can accord a simultaneous at- 
 tention to a very small plurality of objects, and even 
 that imperfectly. Thus it is that attention fixed on 
 one object is tantamount to a withdrawal, to an ab- 
 straction, of consciousness from every other. The ab- 
 straction of the intellect is thus as natural as that of 
 
140 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 the senses ; it is even imposed by the very constitu- 
 tion of our minds. 
 
 But is Abstraction, or rather, is exclusive attention 
 the work of Comparison? This is evident. The ap- 
 plication of attention to a particular object, or quality 
 of an object, supposes a choice or preference, and this 
 again supposes Comparison and Judgment. But this 
 may be made more manifest from a view of the 
 act of generalization, on which we are about to en- 
 ter. 
 
 (C) Generalization. The notion of the figure of 
 the desk before me is an abstract idea, — an idea that 
 makes part of the total notion of that body, and on 
 which I have concentrated my attention, in order to 
 consider it exclusively. This idea is abstract, but it 
 is at the same time individual ; it represents the fig- 
 ure of this particular desk, and not the figure of any 
 other body. But had we only individual abstract no- 
 tions, what would be our knowledge? We should be 
 cognizant only of qualities viewed apart from their 
 subjects (and of separate phenomena there exists none 
 in nature) ; and as these qualities are also separate 
 from each other, we should have no knowledge of 
 their mutual relations. We should also be over- 
 whelmed with their number. 
 
 It is necessary, therefore, that we should form Ab- 
 stract General notions. This is done when, comparing 
 a number of objects, we seize on their resemblances ; 
 when we concentrate our attention on these points 
 of similarity, thus abstracting the mind from a consid- 
 eration of their differences ; and when we give a name 
 to our notion of that circumstance in which they all 
 
 sin WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 141 
 
 as^ree. 
 
 The General Notion is thus one which makes 
 us know a quality, property, power, action, relntion ; 
 in short, any point of view under which we recog 
 nize a plurality of objects as a unity. It makes us 
 aware of a quality, a point of view, common to many 
 things. It is a notion of resemblance ; hence the 
 reason why general names or terms, the signs of gen- 
 eral notions, have been called terms of resemblance 
 {termini similitudinis) . In this process of Generali- 
 zation we do not stop short at a first Generalization. 
 By a first Generalization we have obtained a num- 
 ber of classes of resembling individuals. But these 
 classes we can compare together, observe their simi- 
 larities, abstract from their differences, and bestow on 
 their common circumstance a common name. On 
 these second classes we can again perform the same 
 operation, and thus ascending the scale of general no- 
 tions, throwing out of view always a greater number 
 of differences, and seizing always on fewer similarities 
 in the formation of our classes, we arrive at length 
 at the limit of our ascent in the notion of being or ex- 
 istence. Thus placed on the summit of the scale of 
 classes, we descend by a process the reverse of that 
 by which we have ascended ; we divide and subdivide 
 the classes, by introducing always more and more 
 characters, and laying always fewer differences aside ; 
 the notions become more and more composite, until 
 we at length arrive at the individual. 
 
 I may here notice that there is a twofold kind of 
 quantity to be considered in notions. It is evident 
 that in proportion as the class is high it will, in the first 
 place, contain under it a greater number of classes, 
 
142 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR 1VILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 143 
 
 and, in the second, will include the smallest com- 
 plement of attributes. Thus bein(/ or existence con- 
 tains under it every class ; and yet, when we say that 
 a thing exists, we say the very least of it that is pos- 
 sible. On the other hand, an individual, though it 
 contain nothing but itself, involves the largest amount 
 of predication. For example, when I say, This is 
 Richard, I not only affirm of the subject every class 
 from existence down to man, but likewise a number 
 of circumstances proper to Eichard as an individual. 
 Now, the former of these quantities, the external, is 
 called the Extension of a notion ; the latter, the in- 
 ternal quantity, is called its Comprehension or Inten- 
 sion, They are in the inverse ratio of each other : 
 the greater the Extension, the less the Comprehen- 
 sion ; the greater the Comprehension, the less the Ex- 
 tension. 
 
 Having given you this necessary information in re- 
 gard to the nature of Generalization, I proceed to con- 
 sider one of the most simple, and, at the same time, 
 one of the most perplexed, problems in philosophy, — 
 in regard to the object of consciousness, when we em- 
 ploy a general term. In the explanation of the pro- 
 cess of Generalization, all philosophers are at one ; 
 the only diflferences that arise among them relate to 
 the point, whether we can form an adequate idea of 
 that which is denoted by an abstract, or abstract and 
 general term. 
 
 Throwing out of account the ancient doctrine of 
 Realism, which is curious only in an historical point 
 of view, there are two opinions which still divide phi- 
 losophers. Some maintain that every act and every 
 
 object of mind is necessarily singular, and that the 
 name is that alone which can pretend to generality. 
 Others, again, hold that the mind is capable of forming 
 notions, representations, correspondent in wiiversalUy 
 to the classes contained under, or expressed by, the gen- 
 eral term. The former is the doctrine of JVbrniJialism ; 
 the latter, the doctrine of Concej)tualism. 
 
 The Nominalists maintain that every notion, con- 
 sidered in itself, is singular, but becomes, as it were, 
 general, through the intention of the mind to make it 
 represent every resembling notion, or notion of the 
 same class. Take, for example, the term 77ian, Here 
 we can call up no notion, no idea, corresponding to 
 the universality of the class or term. This is mani- 
 festly impossible. For as 7na7i involves contradictory 
 attributes, and as contradictions cannot coexist in one 
 representation, an idea or notion adequate to man can- 
 not be realized in thought. The class man includes 
 individuals, male and female, white and black and 
 copper-colored, tall and short, fat and thin, straight 
 and crooked, whole and mutilated, etc., etc. ; and the 
 notion of the class must, therefore, at once represent 
 all and none of these. It is, therefore, evident, though 
 the absurdity was maintained by Locke, that we can- 
 not accomplish this ; and, this being impossible, we 
 cannot represent to ourselves the class man by any 
 equivalent notion or idea. All that we can do is to 
 call up some individual image, and consider it as rep- 
 resenting, though inadequately representing, the gen- 
 erality. This we easily do, for as we can call into 
 imagination any individual, so we can make that indi- 
 vidual image stand for any or for every other which 
 
144 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 145 
 
 it resembles in those essential points which constitute 
 the identity of the class. This opinion, which, after 
 Hobbes, has been maintained, among others, by 
 Berkeley, Hume, Adam Smith, Campbell, and Stew- 
 art, appears to me not only true, but self-evident. 
 
 A general notion is nothing but the abstract notion 
 of a circumstance in which a number of individual ob- 
 jects are found to agree, that is, to resemble each 
 other. Now, resemblance, being a relation , cannot 
 be represented in Imagination.^ The two terms, the 
 two relative objects, can be severally imaged in the 
 sensible phantasy, but not the relation itself. This is 
 the object of the Comparative Faculty, or of Intelli- 
 gence Proper. To objects so different as the images 
 of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence, 
 different names ought to be given ; and, accordingly, 
 this has been done wherever a philosophical nomen- 
 clature of the slightest pretensions to perfection has 
 been formed. In the German language, which is now 
 the richest in metaphysical expressions of any living 
 tongue, the two kinds of objects are carefully distin- 
 guished. In our language, on the contrary, the terms 
 idea, conception^ notion, are used almost as convertible 
 for either ; and the vagueness and confusion which is 
 thus produced, even within the narrow sphere of spec- 
 ulation to which the want of the distinction also con- 
 fines us, can be best appreciated by those who are 
 
 * It must be observed that the term Imagination is here used for 
 the representation of sensible objects alone. See above, p. 128. — • 
 J. C. M. 
 
 \ 
 
 
 l'> 
 
 h 
 
 conversant with the philosophy of the different coun- 
 tries.^ 
 
 In connection with general terms, another curious 
 question has likewise divided philosophers. It is this : 
 Does Language originate in General Appellatives or 
 by Proper Names^ Did mankind, in the formation 
 of language, and do children, in their first application 
 of it, commence with the one kind of words or with 
 the other? The determination of this question — 
 the question of the Primum Cognitum, as it w^as 
 called in the Schools — is not involved in the question 
 of Nominalism. On this question two opposite theo- 
 ries have been advanced. 
 
 1. Many illustrious philosophers have maintained 
 that all terms, as at first employed, are expressive of 
 individual objects, and that these only subsequently ob^ 
 tain a general acceptation. This opinion I find main- 
 tained by Vives, Locke, Rousseau, Condillac, Adam 
 Smith, Steinbart, Tittel, Brown, and others. "There 
 is nothing," says Locke, "more evident than that the 
 ideas of the persons children converse with (to in- 
 stance in them alone) are like the persons themselves, 
 only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the 
 mother are well framed in their minds ; and, like pic- 
 tures of them there, represent only those individuals. 
 The names they first gave to them are confined to 
 these individuals ; and the names of nurse and mamma, 
 the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. 
 
 ^ In the lAct. on Metaph. (Lect. XXXV.) will be found an elabo- 
 rate critique of the doctrine of Conceptualism, in the form in which 
 it was maintained by Dr. Thomas Brown. — J. C. M, 
 10 
 
146 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance have 
 made them observe that there are a great many other 
 things in the world that in some common agreements 
 of shape and several other qualities resemble their 
 father and mother, and those persons they have been 
 used to, they frame an idea which they find those 
 many particulars do partake in ; and to that they give, 
 with others, the name man, for example. And thus 
 they come to have a general name and a general 
 idea." ^ 
 
 2. On the other hand, an opposite doctrine is main- 
 tained by many profound philosophers. " General 
 terms," says Leibnitz, "serve not only for the perfec- 
 tion of languages, but are even necessary for their es- 
 sential constitution. For if by particulars be under- 
 stood things individual, it would be impossible to 
 speak, if there were only proper names, and no appel- 
 latives, that is to say, if there were only names for 
 things individual, since, at every moment, we are met 
 by new ones, when we treat of persons, of accidents, 
 and especially of actions, which are those that we de- 
 scribe the most ; but if by particulars be meant the 
 lowest species {species infimce) , besides that it is fre- 
 quently very difficult to determine them, it is manifest 
 that these are already universals, founded on similarity. 
 Now, as the only difference of species and genera lies 
 in a similarity of greater or less extent, it is natural 
 to note every kind of similarity or agreement, and 
 consequently to employ general terms of every de- 
 gree ; nay, the most general being less complex with 
 
 * Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding , III., 3, 7. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 147 
 
 regard to the essences which they comprehend, al- 
 thouirh more extensive in relation to the thin2:s indi- 
 vidual to which they apply, are frequently the easiest 
 to form, and are the most useful. It is likewise seen 
 that children, and those who know but little of the 
 language which they attenjpt to speak, or little of the 
 subject on which they would employ it, make use of 
 general terms, as thing, plant, animal, instead of us- 
 ing proper names, of which they are destitute. And 
 it is certain that all proper or individual names have 
 been originally appellative or general." ^ 
 
 3. But I have now to state a third opinion, inter- 
 mediate between these, which conciliates both, and 
 seems, moreover, to carry a superior probability in its 
 statement. This opinion maintains, that, as our 
 knowledge proceeds from the confused to the distinct, 
 so, in the mouths of children, language at first ex- 
 presses neither the precisely general nor the determi- 
 nately 2^ci^'l^cular, but the vague and confused; and 
 that, out of this, the universal is elaborated by gen- 
 erification, the particular and singular by specifica- 
 tion and individualization. 
 
 Though our capacity of attention be very limited in 
 regard to the number of objects on which a faculty 
 can be simultaneously directed, yet these objects may 
 be large or small. We may make, for example, a 
 single object of attention either of a whole man, or of 
 his face, or of his eye, or of the pupil of his eye, or 
 of a speck upon the pupil. To each of these objects 
 there can only be a certain amount of attentive per- 
 
 * Kouveaux Essais, Lib. III., cap. 1. 
 
148 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 149 
 
 ception applied, and we can concentrate it all on any 
 one. In proportion as the object is larger and more 
 complex, our attention can of course be less applied 
 to any part of it, and, consequently, our knowledge of 
 it in detail will be vaguer and more imperfect. But 
 having first acquired a comprehensive knowledge of it 
 as a whole, we can descend to its several parts, con- 
 sider these both in themselves, and in relation to each 
 other, and to the whole of which they are constituents, 
 and thus attain to a complete and articulate knowledge 
 of the object. We decompose, and then we recom- 
 pose. 
 
 But in this we always proceed first by decomposi- 
 tion or analysis. All analysis indeed supposes a fore- 
 gone composition or synthesis, because we cannot 
 decompose what is not already composite. But in 
 our acquisition of knowledge, the objects arc pre- 
 sented to us compounded ; and they obtain a unity only 
 in the unity of our consciousness. The unity of con- 
 sciousness is, as it were, the frame in which objects 
 are seen. I say, then, that the first procedure of 
 mind in the elaboration of its knowledge is always 
 analytical. It descends from the whole to the parts, 
 — from the vague to the definite. Definitude, that is, 
 a knowledge of minute differences, is not, as the op- 
 posite theory supposes^ the first, but the last, term of 
 our cognitions. Between two sheep an ordinary spec- 
 tator can probably apprehend no difference, and if 
 they were twice presented to him, he would be unable 
 to discriminate the one from the other. But a shep- 
 herd can distinguish every individual sheep ; and 
 *why? Because he has descended from the vague 
 
 knowledge which we all have of sheep, — from the 
 vague knowledge which makes every sheep, as it were, 
 only a repetition of the same undifferenced unit, — to 
 a definite knowledge of qualities by which each is con- 
 trasted from its neighbor. Now, in this example, we 
 apprehend the sheep by marks not less individual than 
 those by which the shepherd discriminates them ; but 
 the whole of each sheep being made an object, the 
 marks by which we know it are the same in each and 
 all, and cannot, therefore, afford the principle by 
 which we can discriminate them from each other. 
 Now this is what appears to me to take place with 
 children. They first know the things and persons 
 presented to them as wholes. But wholes of the same 
 kind, if we do not descend to their parts, aftbrd us no 
 mark by which we can discriminate the one from the 
 other. Children, thus, originally perceiving similar 
 objects — persons, for example — only as wholes, 
 do at first hardly distinguish them. They apprehend 
 first the more obtrusive marks that separate species 
 from species, and, in consequence of the notorious con- 
 trast of dress, men from women ; but they do not as 
 yet recognize the finer traits that discriminate indi- 
 vidual from individual. But, though thus apprehend- 
 ing individuals only by what we now call their specific 
 or their generic qualities, it is not to be supposed 
 that children know them by any abstract general 
 attributes; that is, by attributes formed by com- 
 parison and attention. On the other hand, because 
 their knowledge is not general, it is not to be sup- 
 posed to be particular or individual, if by particular 
 be meant a separation of species from species, and by 
 
 i 
 
150 
 
 AN OVTLTNB OF 
 
 J 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosopht. 
 
 151 
 
 
 
 individiml, the separation of inclivklual from indi- 
 vidual: for children arc at first apt to confound in- 
 dividuals together, not only in name, but in reality. 
 
 What I have now said is, I think, sufficient in regard 
 to the nature of Generalization. It is notoriously a mere 
 act of Comparison. We comjDare objects ; we find 
 them similar in certain respects, that is, in certain 
 respects they affect us in the same manner ; we con- 
 sider the qualities in them, that thus affect us in the 
 same maimer, as the same ; and to this conmion qual- 
 ity we give a name ; and as we can predicate this 
 name of all and each of the resembling objects, it con- 
 stitutes them into a class. Aristotle has truly said 
 that general names are only abbreviated definitions, 
 and definitions, you know, are judgments. For ex- 
 ample, animal is only a compendious expression for 
 organized and animated body; man, only a summary 
 of rational animal, etc. 
 
 m 
 
 § 3. JUDGMENT, 
 
 In the processes of judgment and reasoning, the act 
 of Comparison is a judgment of something more than 
 a more affirmation of the existence of a ]ihenomonon, 
 — something more than a mere discrimination of one 
 phenomenon from another; and, accordingly, while 
 it has happened that the intervention of judgment in 
 every, even the simplest, act of primary cognition, as 
 monotonous and rapid, has been overlooked, the name 
 has been exclusively limited to the more varied and 
 elaborate comparison of one notion with another, and 
 the enouncement of their agreement or disa<?reemeut. 
 
 It is in the discharge of this, its more obtrusive func- 
 tion, that ^ve are now about to consider the Elabora- 
 tive Faculty. • 
 
 I have already noticed that our knowledge docs not 
 commence wnth the individual and the most particular 
 objects of knowledge, — that we do not rise in any 
 regular progress from the less to the more general, 
 first considering the qualities which characterize indi- 
 viduals, then those which belong to species and gen- 
 era, in regular ascent. On the contrary, our knowl- 
 edire commences with the vague and confused. Out 
 of this the general and the mdividual are both equally 
 evolved. In consequence of this genealogy of our 
 knowledge we usually commence by bestowing a name 
 upon a whole object or congeries of objects, of which, 
 how^cvcr, we possess only a partial and indefinite con- 
 ception. In the sequel, this vague notion becomes 
 somewhat more determinate ; the partial idea which 
 we had becomes enlarged by new accessions ; by de- 
 grees our conception waxes fuller, and represents a 
 greater number of attributes. With this conception, 
 thus amplified and improved, we compare the last no- 
 tion which has been acquired ; that is to say, we com- 
 pare a part with its whole, or with the other parts of 
 this whole, and, finding that it is harmonious, — that it 
 dovetails and naturally assorts with other parts, — w^e 
 acquiesce in this union ; and this we denominate an 
 act of judgment. 
 
 I have the concepticm of a triangle, and this concep- 
 tion is composed in my mind of several others. 
 Among these partial notions, I select that of two sides 
 greater than the third, and this notion, which I had at 
 
152 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 81R WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 153 
 
 first, us it were, taken apart, I reimite with the othovg 
 from which it had been separated, saying the triangle 
 contains always two sides, which together are greater 
 than the third. 
 
 Every time \ye judge, we compare a total concep- 
 tion with a partial, and we recognize that the latter 
 really constitutes a part of the former. One of these 
 conceptions has received the name of subject; the 
 other, that of attribute or predicate. The verb which 
 connects these two parts is called the copula. The 
 quadrangle is a double triangle; nine is an odd num- 
 ber; body is divisible. Here quadrangle , nine^ body^ 
 are subjects ; a double triangle^ an odd number^ divis- 
 ible, are predicates. The whole mental judgment, 
 formed by the snbject, predicate, and copula, is called, 
 when enounced in ^v or ds, proposition. 
 
 In discourse, the parts of a proposition are not al- 
 ways found placed in logical order ; but to discover 
 and discriminate them, it is only requisite to ask. 
 What is the thing of which something else is affirmed 
 or denied? The answer to this question will point 
 out the subject; and we shall find the predicate if we 
 inquire, What is affirmed or denied of the matter of 
 which toe spealc? 
 
 In fine, when we judge, we must have, in the first 
 place, at least two notions ; in the second place, we 
 compare these; in the third, we recognize that one 
 contains or excludes the other ; and, in the fourth, we 
 acquiesce in this recognition. 
 
 1/ 
 
 § 4. REASONING. 
 
 Simple Comparison or Judgment is conversant with 
 two notions, the one of which is contained in the 
 other. But it often happens that one notion is con- 
 tained in another not immediately, but mediately, and 
 we may be able to recognize the relation of these to 
 each other only through a third, which, as it imme- 
 diately contains the one, is immediately contained in the 
 other. Take the notions A, B, C, — A contains B ; 
 B contains C ; A therefore also contains C. But as, 
 ex hypothesis we do not at once and directly know C 
 as contained in A, we cannot immediately compare 
 them together and judge of their relation. We there- 
 fore perform a double or complex process of compari- 
 son ; we compare B with A, and C with B, and then 
 C with A through B. We say, B is a part of A ; C 
 is a part of B ; therefore C is a part of A. This 
 double act of comparison has obtained the name of 
 Reasoning; the term Judgment being left to express 
 the simple act of comparison, or rather its result. 
 
 Reasoning is either from the whole to its parts ; or 
 from all the'^parts, discretively, to the whole they con- 
 stitute, collectively. The former of these is Deduc- 
 tive, the latter is Inductive, Eeasoning. The state- 
 ment you will find, in all logical books, of reasoniiigs 
 from certain parts to the whole, or from certain parts 
 to certain parts, is erroneous. I shall first speak ©f 
 the reasoning from the whole to its parts, — or of 
 
 I. Deductive Reasoning. It is self-evident, that 
 whatever is the part of a part is a part of the whole. 
 
154 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 This one axiom is the foundation of all reasoning from 
 the whole to the parts. There are, however, two kinds 
 of whole and parts ; and these constitute two varieties, 
 or rather two phases, of deductive reasoning. This 
 distinction, which is of tlie most important kind, has 
 nevertheless been Avholly overlooked by philosophers, 
 in consequence of which the utmost perplexity and 
 confusion have been introduced into the science. 
 
 I have formerly stated that a projiosition consists 
 of two terms, — the subject and the predicate. Now, 
 in different relations we may regard the sul)ject as the 
 whole and the predicate as its part, or the predicate 
 as the whole and the subject as its part. 
 
 Let us take the proposition, milk is white, Now, 
 here we may either consider the predicate white as 
 one of a number of attributes, the whole complement 
 of which constitutes the subject 7nilk, In this point 
 of view, the predicate is a part of the subject. Or, 
 again, we may consider the predicate tvhite as the 
 name of a class of ol)jects, of which the subject is 
 one. In this point of view, the subject is a part of the 
 predicate. 
 
 You will remember the distinction, which I for- 
 merly stated, of the twofold quantity of notions orterms. 
 The Extension of a notion or term corresponds to the 
 greater number of subjects contained under a predi- 
 cate ; the Intension, or Comprehension, of a notion or 
 tej:m, to the greater number of predicates contained 
 in a subject. These quantities or wholes are always 
 in the inverse ratio of each other. Now, it is sin<ru. 
 lar that logicians should have taken this distinction 
 between notions, and yet not have thought of applyin^^ 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 155 
 
 it to reasoning. But so it is ; and this is not the only 
 oversight they have committed in the application of the 
 very p'rimary principles of their science. The great 
 distinction we have established between the subject 
 and predicate considered severally, as, in different re- 
 lations, whole and as part, consHtutes the primary and 
 principal division of Syllogisms, both Deductive and 
 Inductive ; and its introduction wipes off a complex 
 mass of rules and qualifications, which the want of it 
 rendered necessary. I can, of course, at present, 
 only explain in general the nature of this distinction ; 
 its "details belong to the science of the Laws of 
 Thought, or Logic, of which we are not here to 
 
 treat. t i. n 
 
 1. Deductive Reasoning in Comprehension, I shall 
 
 first consider the process of that Deductive Inference 
 in which the subject is viewed as the whole, the pred- 
 icate as the part. In this reasoning, the whole is deter- 
 mined by the Comprehension, and is, again, either a 
 Physical or Essential whole, or an Integral or Mathe- 
 matical whole, (a) A Physical or Essential whole is 
 that which consists of not really separable parts, of or 
 pertaining to its substance. Thus, man is made up of 
 two substantial parts, — a mind and a body; and 
 each of these has again various qualities, which, though 
 separable only by mental abstraction, are considered 
 as so many parts of an essential whole. Thus the at- 
 tributes of respiration, of digestion, of locomotion, of 
 color, are so many parts of the whole notion we have 
 of the human body ; cognition, feeling, desire, virtue, 
 vice, etc., so many parts of the whole notion we have 
 of the human mind ; and aU these together, so many 
 
156 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 parts of the whole notion we have of man. (b) A 
 Mathematical or Integral or Quantitative whole is that 
 which has part out of part, and which therefore can 
 be really partitioned. The Integral, or, as it ought 
 to be called, Integrate whole {totrnn integratam) is 
 composed of integrant parts {partes integ r antes) , 
 which are either homogeneous or heterogeneous. An 
 example of the former is given in the division of a 
 square into two triangles ; of the latter, in the divis- 
 ion of the animal body into head, trunk, extremities, 
 
 etc. 
 
 This being understood, let us consider how we pro- 
 ceed when we reason from the relation between a com- 
 prehensive whole and its parts. Here it is evident 
 that all the parts of the predicate must also be parts 
 of the subject; in other terms, all that belongs to 
 the predicate must also belong to the subject. In the 
 words of the scholastic adage, J^ota notce est nota 
 rei ipsius; Predicatum predkati est predicatum sub^ 
 jecti. An example of this reasoning : — 
 
 Europe contains England ; 
 
 Enofland contains Middlesex ; 
 
 Therefore, Europe contains Middlesex. 
 
 In other words, England is an integrant part of Eu- 
 rope ; Middlesex is an integrant part of Europe. This 
 is an example from a mathematical whole and parts. 
 Again : — 
 
 Socrates is just (that is, Socrates contains justice 
 as a quality) ; 
 
 Justice is a virtue (that is, justice contains virtue 
 as a constituent part) ; 
 
 Therefore, Socrates is virtuous. 
 
 sin WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 157 
 
 In other words, justice is an attribute or essential 
 part of Socrates ; virtue is an attribute or essential 
 part of justice ; therefore, virtue is an attribute or 
 essential part of Socrates. This is an example from 
 a physical or essential whole and parts. 
 
 2. Deductive Reasoning in Extension, I proceed, 
 in the second place, to the other kind of Deductive 
 Reasoning, — that in which the subject is the part, 
 the predicate is the whole. This reasoning proceeds 
 under that species of whole which has been called the 
 Lojrical, or Potential, or Universal. This whole is 
 determined by the Extension of a notion ; the genera 
 having species, and the species individuals, as their 
 parts. The parts of a logical or universal whole are 
 called the subject parts. 
 
 From what you know of the process of generaliza- 
 tion, you are aware that general terms are expressive 
 of attributes which may be predicated of many^differ- 
 ent objects ; and inasmuch as these objects resemble 
 each other in the common attribute, they are consid- 
 ered by us as constituting a class. Thus, when I say 
 that a horse is a quadruped ; Bucephalus is a horse ; 
 therefore, Bucephalus is a quadruped; —I virtually 
 say, — horse, the subject, is a part of the predicate 
 quadruped; Bucephalus, the subject, is part of the 
 predicate horse; therefore, Bucephalus, the subject, is 
 part of the predicate quadruped. In the reasoning 
 under this whole you will observe that the same word, 
 as it is whole or part, changes from predicate to sub- 
 ject ; horse, when viewed as a part of quadruped, be- 
 ing the subject of the proposition ; whereas, when 
 
158 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 viewed as a whole containing Bucephalus, it becomes 
 the predicate. 
 
 II. Inductive Reasoning is founded on the princi- 
 ple, that what is true of evenj constituent part belongs^ 
 or does not hdong, to the constituted whole. Induction, 
 like Deduction, may be divided into two kinds, ac- 
 cording as the whole and parts, about which it is con- 
 versant, are Comprehensive or Extensive. 
 
 1. Thus, in the /ormer; — 
 
 Gold is a metal, yellow, ductile, fusible in aqua 
 regia, of a certain specific gravity, and so on; 
 
 These qualities constitute this body (are all its 
 parts) ; 
 
 Therefore, this body is gold. 
 
 2. In the latter: — 
 
 Ox, horse, dog, etc., are animals, that is, are con- 
 tained under the class animal ; 
 
 Ox. horse, dog, etc., constitute (are all the con- 
 stituents of) the class quadruped ; 
 
 Therefore, quadruped is contained under animal. 
 
 Both in the Deductive and Inductive processes the 
 inference must be of an absolute necessity, in so far 
 as the mental illation is concerned ; that is, every 
 consequent proposition must be evolved out of every 
 antecedent proposition with intuitive evidence. I do 
 not mean, by this, that the antecedent should be nec- 
 essarily true, or that the consequent be really con- 
 tained in it; it is sufficient that the antecedent be 
 assumed as true, and that the consequent be, in con- 
 formity to the laws of thought, evolved out of it as its 
 part or its equation. This last is called Logical or 
 Formal or Subjective truth ; and an inference may be 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 159- 
 
 subjectively or formally true, which is objectively or 
 
 really false. 
 
 The account given of Induction in all works of 
 Logic is utterly erroneous. Sometimes we find this 
 inference descril)cd as a precarious, not a necessary, 
 reasonino-. It is called an ilhilion from some to all. 
 But here the some, as it neither contains nor consti- 
 tutes the all, determines no necessary movement, and 
 a conclusion drawn under these circumstances is log- 
 ically vicious. Others again describe the Inductive 
 
 process thus : — 
 
 What belongs to some objects of a class belongs to 
 
 the whole class ; 
 
 This property belongs to some objects of the class ; 
 
 Therefore, it belongs to the whole class. 
 
 This account of Induction, which is the one you 
 will find in all the English works on Logic, is not an 
 inductive reasoning at all. It is, logically considered, 
 a deductive syllogism ; and, logically considered, a 
 syllogism radically vicious. It is logically vicious to 
 say, "that, because some individuals of a class have 
 certain common qualities apart from that pro[)erty 
 which constitutes the class itself, therefore the whole 
 individuals of the class should partake in these quali- 
 ties. For this there is no logical reason, — no neces 
 sity of thought. The probability of this inference, 
 and it is only probable, is founded on the observation 
 of the analogy of nature, and, therefore, not upon the 
 laws of thought by which alone reasoning, considered 
 as a logical process, is exclusively governed. To be- 
 come a formally legitimate induction, the objective 
 probability must be clothed with a subjective neces- 
 
 I 
 
160 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's pniLosopnr. 
 
 161 
 
 sity, and the some must be translated into tJie a?? which 
 it is supposed to represent. 
 
 In tlie deductive syllogism we proceed by analysis, 
 thiit is, by decomposing a whole into its parts; hut 
 as the two wholes with which reasoning is conversant 
 are in the inverse ratio of each other, so our analysis 
 in the one will correspond to our synthesis in the 
 other. For example, when I divide a whole of exten- 
 sion into its parts, — when I divide a genus into the 
 species, a species into the individuals it contains, — I 
 do so by adding new ditierences, and thus go on ac- 
 cumulating in the parts a complement of qualities 
 which did not belong to the wholes. This, therefore, 
 which, in point of extension, is an analysis, is, in 
 point of comprehension, a synthesis. In like manner, 
 when I decompose a whole of comprehension, that 
 is, decompose a complex predicate into its constit- 
 uent attributes, I obtain by this process a simpler 
 and more general quality, and thus this, Avhich, in re- 
 lation to a comprehensive whole, is an analysis, is, in 
 relation to an extensive whole, a synthesis. As the 
 deductive inference is Analytic, the inductive is Syn- 
 thetic. But as induction, equally as deduction, is 
 convei-sant with both wholes, so the synthesis of in- 
 duction on the comprehensive whole is a reversed 
 process to its synthesis on the extensive whole. 
 
 You will therefore be aware, that the terms analysis 
 and synthesis, when used without qualification, may 
 be employed at cross pui'poses, to denote oporaticms 
 piecisely the converse of each other. And so it has 
 happened. Analysis, in the mouth of one set of phi- 
 losophers, means precisely what synthesis denotes in 
 
 the mouth of another ; nay, what is even still^more 
 frequent, these words are perpetually converted with 
 each other by the same philosopher. I may notice, 
 what has rarely, if ever, been remarked, that synthe- 
 sis, in the writings of the Greek logicians, is equivalent 
 to the analysis of modern philosophers ; the former, 
 regarding the extensive Avhole as the principal, applied 
 analysis, zar' ^^'/ryv, to its division ; the latter, viewing 
 the comprehensive whole as the principal, in general 
 limit analysis to its decomposition. This, however, 
 has been overlooked, and a confusion the most inex- 
 tricable prevails in regard to the use of these words, 
 if the thread of the labyrinth is not obtained. (Lect. 
 on Metajph,, XXXIV.-XXXVIL) 
 
 11 
 
 [ 
 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE REGULATIVE FACULTY. 
 
 I NOW enter upon the last of the Cognitive Faculties, 
 
 the faculty which I denominated the Ilegulative. 
 
 Here the term famlty, you will observe, is employed 
 in a somewhat peculiar signification, for it is employed 
 not to denote the proximate cause of any definite en- 
 ergy, but the power the mind has of being the native 
 source of certain necessary or a priori cognitions ; 
 which cognitions, as they are the' conditions, the forms, 
 under which our knowledge in general is possible, 
 constitute so many fundamental laws of intellectual 
 nature. It is in this sense that I call the power which 
 the mind possesses of modifying the knowledge it re- 
 ceives, in conformity to its proper nature, its Regula- 
 tive Faculty. The Regulative Faculty is, however, 
 in fact, nothing more than the complement of such 
 laws; it is the locus principiormn. It thus corre- 
 sponds to what was known in the Greek philosophy 
 under the name of vod^, when that term was rigor- 
 ously used. To this faculty has been latterly applied 
 
 162 
 
 Alf OVTLIKE OF n A MILTON^ S miLOSOPnT. 
 
 163 
 
 the name Reason ; but this term is so vague and am- 
 biguous, that it is almost unfitted to convey any defi- 
 nite meaning. The term Common Sense has likewise 
 been applied to designate the place of principles. This 
 word is also ambiguous. In the first place, it was the 
 expression used in the Aristotelic philosophy to denote 
 the Central or Common Sensor?/, in which the differ- 
 ent external senses met and were united. In the sec- 
 ond place, it was employed to signify a sowid under- 
 standing applied to vulgar objects, in contrast to a 
 scientific or speculative intelligence; and it is in this 
 siirnification that it has been taken by those who have 
 derided the principle on which the philosophy, which 
 has been distinctively denominated the Scottish, pro- 
 fesses to be established. This is not, however, the mean- 
 ing which has always, or even principally, been at- 
 tached to it ; and an incomparably stronger case might 
 be made out in defence of this expression than has 
 been done by Reid, or even by Mr. Stewart. It is, in 
 fact, a term of high antiquity and very general accep- 
 tation. Were it allowed in metaphysical philosophy, 
 as in physical, to discriminate scientific differences by 
 scientific terms, I would employ the word noetic, as 
 derived from v«5c, to express all those cognitions 
 that originate in the mind itself ; dianoetic to denote 
 the operations of the Discursive, Elaborative, or Com- 
 parative Faculty.* {Lect, on Metaph., XXXVIEE.) 
 
 ^ For an account of the various names by which the principles of 
 Common Sejise have been designated, see Beid's Works^ Note A. 
 This note is an elaborate dissertation on the Philosophy of Com,mon 
 Stn^e, and deserves study in this connection. — J. C. M. 
 
164 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 The essential notes or characters, by which we are 
 enabled to distinguish our original from our derivative 
 cognitions, may be reduced to four : — 
 
 1. Their Incomprehensihility , When we arc able 
 to comprehend how or why a thing is, the belief of 
 the existence of that thing is not a primary datura of 
 consciousness, but a subsumption under the cognition 
 or belief which affords its reason. 
 
 2. Their 8im;plicity. If a cognition or belief be 
 made up of, and can be explicated into, a plurality of 
 cognitions or beliefs, it is manifest that, as compound, 
 it cannot be original. 
 
 3. Their Necessity and Absolute Universality. 
 These may be regarded as coincident. For when a 
 belief is necessary, it is, eo ipso, universal; and that 
 a belief is universal is a certain index that it must be 
 necessary. To prove the necessity, the universality 
 must, however, be absolute; for a relative univer- 
 sality indicates no more than custom and education, 
 howbeit the subjects themselves may deem that they 
 follow the dictates of nature. 
 
 4. Their Comparative Evidence and Certainty. 
 This, along with the third, is well stated by Aristotle : 
 "What appears to all, that we affirm to he; and he 
 who rejects this belief will assuredly advance nothing 
 better deserving of credence." (Reid's Works, pp. 
 754-5.) 
 
 Though it be now generally acknowledged, by the 
 profoundest thinkers, that it is impossible to analyze 
 all our knowledge into the produce of experience, ex- 
 ternal or internal, and that a certain complement of 
 cognitions must be allowed as having their origin in 
 
 STR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 165 
 
 the nature of the thinking principle itself; they are 
 not at one in regard to those which ought to be rec- 
 ognized as ultimate and elemental, and those which 
 ought to be regarded as modifications or combinations 
 of these. The reduction of our native cognitions to 
 system is therefore a problem which still remains to 
 be solved. These cognitions are founded on the nec- 
 essary conditions of thought; and we have now to 
 see that philosophers have failed to enumerate all 
 those conditions. {Lect. on Metaph., XXXVIII.) 
 
 Now, the conditions of all positive thought are two : 
 (1.) JVbn-contradiction ; (2.) Relativity. If either of 
 these conditions be violated, thought (employing that 
 term as comprehending all our cognitive energies) is not 
 positive, — it is only negative; for thought is positive 
 only when existence, objective or subjective, is predi- 
 cated of an object. If the condition of Non-contra- 
 diction be not fulfilled, there emerges The really im- 
 possible, — Mhil purum; if that of Eelativity be not 
 
 purified, there results The Impossible to Thought, 
 
 Nihil cogitabile. It might be supposed that negative 
 thinking, being a negation of thought, is in propriety 
 a negation therefore, absolutely, of all mental activity. 
 But this would be erroneous. In fact, as Aristotle 
 obsgrves, every negation involves an affirmation, and 
 we cannot think or predicate non-existence except 
 by reference to existence. Thus even neo^ative thouo-ht 
 IS realized only under the condition of Relativity and 
 positive thinking. For example,* we try to think, — to 
 predicate existence in some way, — but find ourselves 
 unable. We then predicate incogitability ; and if we 
 
166 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 do not always predicate, as an equivalent, (objorli\^-) 
 non-existence, we shall never err. 
 
 It is only, then, when both of these conditions are 
 fulfilled, that we think — Something. 
 
 § 1. THE CONDITION OF NON-CONTRADICTION. 
 
 This condition is insuperable. We think it not 
 only as a law of thought, but as a law of things ; and 
 while we suppose its violation to determine an abso- 
 lute impossibility, we suppose its fulfilment to afiord 
 only the Not-impossible. Thought is, under this con- 
 dition, merely explicative or analytic; and the condi- 
 tion itself is brought to bear under three phases, 
 constituting three laws: (1.) the law of Identity: 
 (2.) the law of Contradiction (more properly Non- 
 contradiction) ; (3.) the law of Excluded Middle 
 (between two contradictories) .^ The science of these 
 is Logic; and as the laws are only explicative. Logic 
 is only formal. 
 
 Though necessary to state the condition of Non-con- 
 tradiction, there is no dispute about its effect, no dan- 
 ger of its violation. When, therefore, I speak of the 
 Conditioned, the term is used in special reference to 
 Kelativity. By existence Conditioned is meant em- 
 phatically existence relative, — existence thought 
 under relation. Eolation may thus be understood to 
 contain all the categories and forms of positive thought. 
 (^Discussions, pp. 602-3.) 
 
 ' For a full discussion of these laws see Led. on Log.-, V. and VI. ; 
 and Appendix IV. — J. C M. 
 
 
 SIB WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 167 
 
 § 2. THE condition OF RELATIVITY. 
 
 By this condition it is implied that the mind can 
 conceive, and can consequently know, only the limited^ 
 and the conditionally limited. The unconditionally un- 
 limited, or the Infinite, the unconditionally limited, or 
 the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the mind ; 
 they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, 
 or abstraction of, those very conditions under which 
 thought itself is realized: consequently the notion 
 of the Unconditioned is only negative, — negative of 
 the conceivable itself. For example: — 
 
 I. On the one hand, we can positively conceive 
 neither (1.) an absolute whole, that is, a whole so 
 great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part 
 of a still greater whole, nor (2.) an absolute part, that 
 is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as 
 a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. 
 
 II. On the other hand, we cannot positively repre- 
 sent or realize or construe to the mind (as here Un- 
 derstanding and Imagination coincide), (1.) an in- 
 finite whole, for this could only be done by the infinite 
 synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would re- 
 quire an infinite time for its accomplishment ; nor (2.) , 
 for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an 
 infinite divisibility of parts. 
 
 The result is the same whether we apply the pro- 
 cess to limitation in space, in time, or in degree. The 
 unconditional negation and the unconditional affirma- 
 tion of limitation — in other words, the Infinite and 
 the Absolute, properly so called — are thus equally 
 
168 
 
 AN OUTLINE OP 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 169 
 
 inconceivable to US. The conditionally limited (which 
 we may briefly call the Conditioned) is thua the only 
 possible object of knowledge and of positive thought ; 
 thought necessarily supposes condition. For as the 
 eagle cannot outsoar the atmosphere in which he floats, 
 and by which alone he is supported ; so the mind can- 
 not transcend that sphere of limitation within and 
 through which exclusively the possibility of thought 
 is realized. 
 
 The Conditioned is the mean between two extremes, 
 — two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither 
 of lohich can he conceived as possible^ but of which, on 
 the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, 
 one must be admitted as necessary. Our faculties are 
 thus shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind 
 is not represented as conceiviiYg two propositions, 
 subversive of each other, as equally possible ; but 
 only as unable to understand, as possible, either of 
 two extremes, one of which, however, on the ground 
 of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recog- 
 nize as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, 
 that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted 
 into the measure of existence ; and are warned from 
 recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessa- 
 rily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And, 
 by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very 
 consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above 
 the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the 
 existence of something unconditioned beyond the 
 sphere of all reprehensible reality. (^Discussions, pp. 
 13-15.) 
 
 The condition of Relativity is therefore not insuper- 
 
 )> IP 
 
 \ 
 
 able. We should think it not as a law of things, but 
 merely as a law of thought. Thinking, under this 
 condition, is amj)liative or synthetic. Its science, 
 Metaphijsic, using that term in a comprehensive mean- 
 ing, is therefore material, in the sense of non-formal. 
 The relations under which this condition is brought 
 to bear are either necessary and original, or contin- 
 gent and derivative. The latter are such as One and 
 Other, End and Mean, Whole and Part, etc., etc. 
 Relations like these, which we frequently employ in 
 the actual applications of our cognitive energies, ad- 
 mit of classification from difierent points of view ; but 
 to attempt their arrangement at all, far less on any 
 exclusive principle, would here be manifestly out of 
 place. In so far, then, as it is necessary, the condi- 
 tion of Relativity is brought to bear under two prin- 
 cipal relations ; the one springing from the subject of 
 knowledge {the relation of Knowledge) , the other from 
 the object of knowledge {the relations of Existence), 
 
 (A) The Relation of Knowledge is that which 
 arises from the reciprocal dependence of the subject 
 and object of thought. Whatever comes into con- 
 sciousness is thought by us either as belonging to the 
 mental self exclusively {subjectivo-subjective) , or as 
 belonging to the not-self exclusively {ohjectivo-objec- 
 tive) , or as belonging partly to both {subjectivo-objec- 
 
 tive), 
 
 (B) The Relations of Existence are either in- 
 
 trinsic or extrinsic, 
 
 I. The intrinsic, which may also be called the qual- 
 iiative, relation is that of Substance and Quality 
 (quality being variously styled form, accident, prop- 
 
170 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 erty, mode, affection, phenomenon, appearance, attri- 
 bute, predicate, denomination, etc.). Substance and 
 Quality are manifestly only thought as mutual rela- 
 tives, 
 
 1. We cannot think a quality existing absolutely, in 
 cl>r of itself; we are constrained to think it as inhering 
 m some basis, substratum, hypostasis, subject, or sub- 
 stance. 
 
 2. But this substance cannot be conceived by us, 
 except negatively, that is, as the iinapparent, — the 
 inconceivable correlative of certain appearing quali- 
 ties. If we attempt to think it positively, we can 
 think it only by transforming it into a quality or bun- 
 dle of qualities, which, again, we are compelled to re- 
 fer to an unknown substance, now necessarily supposed 
 for their incogi table basis. 
 
 Everything in fact may be conceived as the quality 
 or as the substance of something else. But absolute 
 substance and absolute quality, — these are both in- 
 conceivable, as more than negations of the conceiv- 
 able. 
 
 II. The extrinsic relation of existence may be called 
 quantitative, and is threefold, as constituted by three 
 species of quantity, — Time, Space, and Degree. 
 
 i. Time, Protension, or Protensive quantity, called 
 likewise Duration, is a necessary condition of thought. 
 It may be considered both (1.) in itself, and (2.) in 
 the things which it contains. 
 
 1. In itself, — 
 
 (a) Time is positively inconceivable, firstly, either, 
 (a) on the one hand, as absolute, that is, absolutely 
 commencing or absolutely terminating, or (/?) on the 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHT, 
 
 171 
 
 other hand, as infinite or eternal, whether ab ante or 
 a post; it is no less inconceivable, secondly, if we at- 
 tempt '(«) to fix an absolute minimum or (/5) to fol- 
 low out an infinite division. 
 
 (b) Time is positively conceivable, if conceived, 
 firstly, as an indefinite past, present, or future, or, sec- 
 ondly, as an indeterminate mean between the two 
 unthinkable extremes of an absolute least and an mfi- 
 nitc divisibility ; for thus it is relative, 
 
 2 Things in Time fire either, firstly, comclusive, 
 whJn, (a) if of the same time they are, pro tanto, iden- 
 tical apparently and in thought, (&) if of different times 
 (as causes and effect, causes et causatum), they appear 
 as different but are thought identical ; or, secoiidly, 
 they are coexclusive, when they are mutually either 
 prior and posterior or contemporaneous. The impossi- 
 bility of thinking as non-existent in time (either past 
 or future) aught which we have conceived as existent, 
 affords the principle of (7aw5a?z7y, etc.i ^ ^ 
 
 ii Space, Extension, or Extensive quantity is, m like 
 manner, a necessary condition of thought, and may 
 also be considered both (1.) in itself and (2.) m the 
 things which it contains. 
 
 1 Tn itself "—" 
 
 (a) Space 'is positively inconceivable, firstly, as a 
 whole, either («) infinitely unbounded or (/5) absohdely 
 bounded ; secondly, as a part, either (a) infinitely 
 divisible or (/5) absolutely indivisible. 
 
 (b) Space is positively conceivable as a mean be- 
 
 . SCO this principle developed in the Appendix to this Chapter. - 
 J. C. M. 
 
172 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 tween these extremes, that is, either as an indefinite 
 whole or as an indefinite part ; for thus it is rela^ 
 tive. 
 
 2. The tilings in Space may be considered, firstly^ 
 in relation to Space itself, when the extension occu- 
 pied by a thing is called its place, and a thing chang- 
 ing its place gives the relation of motion. Considered, 
 secondly, in relation to each other, they are either (a) 
 inclusive, thus originating the relation of containing 
 and contained, or (h) coexclusive, thus determining the 
 relation of position or situation, — of here and there 
 (Ubication). On Space are dependent what are 
 called the Primary Qualities of body, strictly so de- 
 nominated, and Space combined with Degree aflfords, 
 of body, the Secundo-primary Qualities. Our inabil- 
 ity to conceive an absolute elimination from space of 
 aught which we have conceived to occupy space, 
 gives the law of what I have called Ultitnute Incow^ 
 pressibility, etc.^ 
 
 iii. Degree, Intension, or Intensive quantity is not, 
 like Time and Space, an absolute condition of thought. 
 It may therefore be thought as null, or as existing 
 only potentially. But thinking it to be, we must 
 think it as a quantity ; and, as a quantity, it is posi- 
 tively both inconceivable and conceivable. 
 
 1. In itself,, — 
 
 (a) Degree is positively inconceivable, («) abso^ 
 lutely, either as least or as greatest, (y5) infinitely^ 
 either in increase or diminution ; but 
 
 (b) It is positively conceivable, in so far as it is 
 
 > See above, Chap. I., § 1. (B). — J. C. M. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's pmLosornr, 
 
 173 
 
 conceived as relative, — as indefinitely high or higher, 
 as indefinitely low or lower. 
 
 2. The things thought under Degree, (a) if of the 
 same intension, are correlatively uniform ; (b) if of a 
 diflferent degree, are correlatively higher or lower. 
 
 Degree is developed into the Secondary Qualities 
 of body, and, combined with Space, into the Seciindo- 
 primary,^ (Discussions, pp. 602-8. Compare Lect. 
 on Metaph,, XXXVIII.) (On the next page is given 
 a tabular view of the above conditions of thought.) 
 
 APPENDIX TO CHAPTEK VI. 
 
 LAW OF THE CONDITIONED IN ITS APPLICATION TO 
 THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY. 
 
 To manifest the utility of introducing the principle 
 of the Conditioned into our metaphysical speculations, 
 I shall (always in outline) give one only, but that a 
 signal illustration of its importance. 
 
 Of all questions in the history of philosophy, that 
 concerning the origin of our judgment of Came and 
 Effect is perhaps the most celebrated ; but, strange to 
 say, there is not, so far as I am aware, to be found 
 a comprehensive view of the various theories proposed 
 in explanation, — not to say, among these, any satis- 
 factory explanation of the phenomenon itself 
 
 The phenomenon is this : When aware of a new 
 appearance, we are unable to conceive that therein 
 
 * See the preceding note. — J. C. M. 
 
174 
 
 AN OVTLIXE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's pniLosopnr. 
 
 175 
 
 ft 
 
 pa 
 
 M 
 H 
 
 m 
 m 
 
 M 
 
 M 
 
 H 
 
 O 
 
 O 
 
 M 
 
 H 
 
 M 
 
 A 
 
 »Q 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 
 a 
 
 l-H M 
 
 « 
 
 I 
 
 60 
 
 a 
 
 > 
 
 o 
 
 M 
 
 H 
 O 
 
 h-l 
 P 
 
 H 
 
 !»5 
 O 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 09 
 
 •3 
 
 O 
 
 9 
 OQ 
 
 <D 
 
 a 
 
 Q ••• 
 
 
 5» 
 
 O .g 
 
 i-i 
 
 ^ -a 
 
 r4 
 
 H 
 
 n 
 
 .OQ 
 
 
 ^ i 
 
 • M tra >. 
 
 gcc '-3 
 
 ! 5 
 
 « j3 
 
 59 -M "^ 
 
 _>-; o a 
 
 o a 
 
 a « e3 
 
 a- o 
 
 r 60 
 9 a 
 
 ^ 
 
 a. . 
 « 3 
 
 
 « R a 
 H 0» *r 
 
 P*^ 
 
 o a » 
 
 
 « 9 
 
 2 ^ 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 «M 
 
 O 
 
 O 
 
 ® g 
 ..H OQ 
 
 c9 
 
 o 
 u 
 
 1-9 
 
 O 
 
 a 
 o 
 
 n 
 c 
 o 
 v 
 
 ^ 
 
 1^ 
 
 09 
 
 o 
 
 n 
 
 sT t* "S 
 
 ^ jp^ ^ 
 
 § 2 -^ 
 
 2 « ^ 
 
 fl oa *M 
 
 •^ CO 
 
 ••M -<-> 4^ 
 
 c-si^-g t» a s 9 
 
 15 
 1 
 
 r- 
 
 ^8 
 
 
 Q .S to 
 
 (m ' 9 
 
 ^- « "^ 
 
 C> "^ d 
 
 "^ "t; ••< 
 
 9 ^ «a 
 
 -S 
 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 ,£3 
 
 ; 
 
 o 
 
 e 
 
 B 
 
 
 i 
 
 H 
 
 H 
 
 fa 
 
 O 
 
 09 
 
 g 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 EH 
 
 » 
 
 g 
 
 a 
 
 fo 
 
 
 O 
 
 M 9 
 
 9 
 
 a 
 
 13 
 
 9 
 
 • 1-4 
 
 -a 
 
 9 
 
 " .s 
 
 9 
 O 
 
 a 
 
 o 
 
 9 
 
 r3 
 9 
 
 a 
 
 ea 
 
 h 
 
 u 
 
 9 
 
 -a 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 has originated any new existence, and are therefore 
 constrained to think that what now appears to us under 
 a new form, had previously an existence under others 
 _ others conceivable by us or not. These others (for 
 they are always plural) are called its cause; and a 
 cause, or more properly causes, we cannot but suppose ; 
 for a cause is simply everything without which the 
 effect would not result, and all such concurring, the 
 effect cannot but result. We are utterly unable to 
 realize in thought the possibility of the complement 
 of existence being either increased or diminished. 
 We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing 
 becoming something, or, on the other, something be- 
 coming nothing. When God is said to create out of 
 nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing 
 that he evolves existence out of nothing but himself; 
 and in like manner we conceive annihilation only by 
 conceiving the Creator to withdraw his creation, by 
 withdrawing his creative energy from actuality into 
 power. 
 
 . << Nil posse creari 
 
 De Nihilo, neque quod genitu 'st ad Nil revocari ; " 
 
 *t Gigni 
 
 De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil posse reverti." 
 
 These lines of Lucretius and Persius enounce a phys- 
 ical axiom of antiquity, which, when interpreted by 
 the doctrine of the Conditioned, is itself at once re- 
 called into harmony with revealed truth, and, express- 
 ino- in its purest form the conditions of human thought, 
 expresses also implicitly the whole intellectual phe- 
 nomenon of causality. 
 
 There is thus conceived an absolute tautology be- 
 
176 
 
 JN OVTIJKE OF 
 
 tween the effect iiiicl its causes. "We think the causes 
 to contain all that is contained in the effect ; the ef- 
 fect to contain nothinir Avhicli was not contained in the 
 causes. Take an example. A neutral salt is an 
 effect of the conjunction of an acid and an alkali. Here 
 we do not, and here we cannot, conceive that, in ef- 
 fect, any new existence has been added, nor can we 
 conceive that any has been taken away. But another 
 example : Gunpowder is the effect of a mixture of 
 sulphur, charcoal, and nitre ; and tiiese three sub- 
 stances are again the effect of simpler constituents, 
 and these constituents again of simpler elements, either 
 known or conceived to exist. Now, in all this scries 
 of compositions, we cannot conceive that aught begins 
 to exist. The gunpowder, the last compound, we are 
 compelled to think, contains precisely the same quan- 
 tum of existence that its nltimate elements contained 
 prior to their combiiuition. Well ; we explode the 
 powder. Can we conceive that existence has been 
 diminished by the annihilation of a single element 
 previously in being, or increased by the addition of a 
 single element which was not heretofore in nature? 
 "Omnia mutantur; nihil interit," is what we thiidv, 
 what we must think. This, then, is the mental phe- 
 nomenon of causality, — that we necessarily deny in 
 thought that the object, which appears to begin to be, 
 really so begins ; and that we necessarily identify its 
 present with its past existence. Here it is not requi- 
 site that w^e should know under what form, under 
 what combinations, this existence was previously 
 realized ; in other words, it is not requisite that we 
 should know what are the particular causes of the par- 
 
 I 
 
 SIR mLLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPIlT. 177 
 
 • 
 
 ticular effect. The discovery of the connection of 
 determinate causes and determinate effects is merely 
 continircnt and individual, -merely the datum ot 
 experience ; but the principle that every event should 
 have its causes is necessary and universal, and is im- 
 posed on us as a condition of our human intelligence 
 itself. This necessity of so thinking is the only phe- 
 nomenon to be explained. , . . e 
 The opinions in regard to the nature and origin ot 
 the principle of causality fall into two groat catego- 
 ries. The first category (A) comprehends those 
 theories which consider this principle as Empirical, 
 or a posteriori, that is, as derived from experience; the 
 other (B) comprehends those which view it as Pure, 
 or a priori, that is, as a condition of intellirjence itself. 
 These two primary genera arc, however, severally 
 sul)divided into various subordinate classes. _ 
 The former category (A) , under which this princi- 
 ple is re<rarded as the result of experience, contains two 
 classes, i^.asmuch as the causal judgment may be sup- 
 posed founded either (I.) on an Origirml, or (II.) on 
 a Derivative, cognition. Each of these again is 
 divided into two, according as the principle is sup- 
 posed to have an ohjective, or a subjective, origin. In 
 the former case, that is, where the cognition is sup- 
 posed to be oriixinal and undcrived, it is Objective, or 
 rather Objectivo-Objcctive ; when held to consist m 
 an immediate perception of the power or efficacy of 
 causes in the external and internal icorlds (1.) ; and 
 Sul7jcctive, or rather Objcctivo-Subjective, when 
 viewed as given in a self-consciousness alone of the 
 j)oicer or efficacy of our own volitions (2.). In the 
 
 ■ X2 
 
178 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPUT, 
 
 179 
 
 latter case, that is, where the cognition is supposed 
 to be derivative ; if objective, it is viewed as a product 
 of Induction and Genemlization (3.) ; if subjective^ 
 of Association and Custom (4.). 
 
 In like manner, the latter category (B), under 
 which the causal principle is considered not as a re- 
 sult, but as a condition, of experience, is variously 
 divided and subdivided. In the first place, the opin- 
 ions under this category fall into two classes, inasmuch 
 as some regard the causal judgment (I.) as an Ulti- 
 mate or Primary law of mind, while others regard 
 it (II.) as a Secondary or Derived. Those who hold 
 the former doctrine, in viewing it as a simple original 
 principle, hold likewise that it is a positive act, — an 
 affirmative datum of intelligence. This class is finally 
 subdivided into two opinions. For some hold that the 
 causal judgment, as necessary, is given in what they 
 call '' the principle of Causality,'' that is, the principle 
 which declares that everything which begins to he must 
 have its cause (5.) ; while at least one philosopher, 
 without explicitly denying that the causal judgment 
 is necessary, would identify it with the principle of 
 our " Expectation of the Constancy of Nature" (6.). 
 
 Those who hold that it can be analyzed into a higher 
 principle, also hold that it is not of a positive, but of 
 a negative, character. These, however, are divided 
 into two classes. By some it has been maintained, 
 that the principle of Causality can he resolved into the 
 principle of Contradiction (7.), which, as I formerly 
 stated, ought in propriety to be called the principle 
 of Non-Contradiction. On the other hand, it may be 
 (though it never has been) argued, that the judgment 
 
 \ 
 
 of Causality can he analyzed into what I called the 
 principle of the Conditioned, — the principle of relativ- 
 ity (S,). To one or the other of these eight heads 
 all the doctrines that have been actually maintained 
 in regard to the origin of the principle in question, 
 may be referred ; and the classification is the better 
 worthy of your attention, as in no work will you find 
 any attempt at even an enumeration of the various 
 theories, actual and possible, on this subject. (The 
 table on the next page affords a general conspectus 
 
 of these theories.) 
 
 An adequate discussion of these several heads, and 
 a special consideration of the differences of the indi- 
 vidual opinions which they comprehend, would far 
 exceed our limits. I shall, therefore, confine myself 
 to a few observations on the value of these eight doc- 
 trines in general, without descending to the particular 
 modifications under which they have been maintained 
 by particular philosophers. 
 
 (A) Theories which derive the Causal Judg- 
 ment FROM Experience. Of these, 
 
 I. The first two, — (1.) that which asserts that we 
 have a perception of causal agency as we have a percep- 
 tion of external objects; and (2.) that which maintains 
 that we are self-conscious of efficiency, — have been 
 always held in combination, though the second has 
 been frequently held by philosophers who have aban- 
 doned the first as untenable. Considering them to- 
 gether, that is, as forming the opinion that we directly 
 and immediately apprehend the efficiency of causes, 
 both external and internal, — this opinion is refuted 
 by two objections. The first is, that we have no such 
 
180 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 O 
 P 
 
 •^ 
 
 OQ 
 
 
 < 
 
 W 
 
 EH 
 
 p^ 
 
 O 
 
 !z; 
 
 o 
 
 M 
 
 o 
 
 H 
 
 O 
 H 
 
 < 
 
 m 
 H 
 
 M 
 
 o 
 
 » 
 
 M 
 
 H 
 
 O 
 
 H 
 
 H 
 
 o 
 
 9 
 e3 
 
 a "3 
 
 CO a 
 
 p rS 
 
 d ^ 
 
 «a cj 
 
 «> a 
 
 a © 
 
 >% 
 
 o 
 a 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 (a 
 p^ 
 
 1 
 
 cd 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 d 
 o 
 
 ■*» 
 
 o 
 
 ^ -3 
 
 o 
 
 a> 
 
 o 
 O 
 
 (A 
 
 a 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 O 
 P4 
 
 a 
 
 I 
 
 a 
 o 
 
 S 
 
 a 
 
 fa 
 
 a 3 
 
 
 Pi 
 
 
 .A 
 
 o 
 
 ■«» 
 a 
 
 M 
 
 «M 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 Oi 
 
 o 
 
 C3 
 
 Pi 
 -3 
 
 o 
 
 <o 
 
 o* 
 
 CO 
 
 eS 
 
 
 g 
 
 o 
 
 cu 
 
 H 
 
 -a 
 
 »f-« OQ 
 
 .2 o 
 
 o o 
 
 CO i-^ 
 
 e3 On 
 
 ^^ s 
 
 If £ 
 
 a a 
 
 'S o 
 
 H **^ 
 
 o « 
 
 ^ -3 
 
 h5 ® 
 eS ^ 
 
 -t ® o 
 
 . *» 
 
 » W) g 
 
 -= § 
 
 to '^ 
 H © 
 
 .9* 
 'S 
 
 a 
 
 kt 
 
 o 
 
 a 
 
 © a 
 
 a o 
 
 » 
 
 oa 
 
 a 
 
 N 
 
 s 
 
 ^ 
 
 Jz; 
 
 H 
 
 M 
 
 ^^ 
 
 s 
 
 CU 
 
 <1 
 
 
 PE4 
 
 Is 
 
 o 
 
 8 
 
 ■3 
 
 8 
 
 2 *• 
 
 6 H 
 
 o 
 
 £■•2 § 
 
 o 
 
 <} « © 
 
 n 
 
 5/i2 WILLIAM BAMILTON*S PBILOSOPBT, 
 
 181 
 
 apprehension ; the second, that if we had, this being 
 merely empirical, merely conversant with indi- 
 vidual instances, could never account for the quality 
 of necessity and universality which accompanies the 
 judgment of causality. 
 
 (a) First objection, (1.) as against the first theory. 
 In regard to the first of these objections, it is now 
 universally admitted, that we have no perception of 
 the connection of cause and effect in the external 
 world. For example ; when one billiard-ball is seen 
 to strike another, we perceive only that the impulse of 
 the one is followed by the motion of the other, but have 
 no perception of any force or efficiency in the first, 
 by which it is connected with the second, in the rela- 
 tion of causality. Hume was the philosopher who 
 decided the opinion of the world on this point. He 
 was not, however, the first who stated the fact, or 
 even the reasoner who stated it most clearly. I could 
 adduce a whole army of philosophers previous to 
 Hume who had announced and illustrated the fact. 
 
 First objection, (2.) as against the second theory. 
 There are many philosophers who surrender the exter- 
 nal perception, and maintain our internal conscious- 
 ness, of causation or power. This opinion was, in 
 one chapter of his Essay, advanced by Locke, and, at 
 a very recent date, it has been amplified and enforced 
 with distinguished ability by the late M. Maine de 
 Biran, one of the acutest metaphysicians of France. 
 On this doctrine, the notion of cause is not given to 
 us by the observations of external phenomena, which, 
 as considered only by the senses, manifest no causal 
 efficiency, and appear to us only as successive ; it is 
 
 • C I 
 
182 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON^ S PniLOSOPHT, 
 
 183 
 
 given to us within, in reflection, in the consciousness 
 of our operations and of the power which exerts them, 
 — namely, the will. I make an effort to move my 
 arm, and I move it. When we analyze attentively 
 the phenomenon of effort, which M. de Biran considers 
 as the type of the phenomena of volition, the follow- 
 ing are the results: 1^, The consciousness of an 
 act of will ; 2°, The consciousness of a motion pro- 
 duced ; 3^, A relation of the motion to the volition. 
 And what is this relation? Not a simple relation of 
 succession. The will is not for us a pure act without 
 efficiency, — it is a productive energy ; so that, in a 
 volition, there is given to us the notion of cause ; and 
 this notion we subsequently project out from our in- 
 ternal activities, into the changes of the external 
 
 world. 
 
 This reasoning, in so far as regards the mere empir- 
 ical fact of our consciousness of causality, in the rela- 
 tion of our will as moving, and of our limbs as moved, 
 is refuted by the consideration, that between the overt 
 fact of corporeal movement of which we are cognizant, 
 and the internal act of mental determination of which 
 we are also cognizant, there intervenes a numerous 
 series of intermediate agencies of which we have no 
 knowledge; and, consequently, that we can have no 
 consciousness of any causal connection between the 
 extreme links of this chain, — the volition to move 
 and the limb moving, as this hypothesis asserts. No 
 one is immediately conscious, for example, of moving 
 his arm through his volition. Previously to this ulti- 
 mate movement, muscles, nerves, a multitude of solid 
 and fluid parts, must be set in motion by the will ; 
 
 \\ 
 
 but of this motion we know, from consciousness, abso- 
 hitely nothing. A person struck with paralysis is 
 conscious of no inability in his limb to fulfil the de- 
 terminations of his will ; and it is only after having 
 willed, and finding that his limbs do -not obey his vo- 
 lition, that he learns by his experience, that the exter- 
 nal movement does not follow the internal act. But 
 as the paralytic learns afiter the volition that his limbs 
 do not obey his mind ; so it is only after volition that 
 the man in health learns that his limbs do obey the 
 mandates of his will. 
 
 (h) The Second Objection, mentioned above, is 
 Mai to the theory which would found the judgment 
 of causality on any empirical cognition, whether of 
 the phenomena of mind or of the phenomena of mat- 
 ter. Admitting that causation were cognizable, and 
 that perception and self-consciousness were competent 
 to its apprehension, still, as these faculties could only 
 take note of individual causations, we should be 
 wholly unable, out of such empirical acts, to evolve 
 the quality of necessity and universality, by which 
 this notion is. distinsruished. Admittino: that we had 
 really observed the agency of any number of causes, 
 still this would not explain to us how we are unable 
 to think a manifestation of existence without thinking 
 it as an effect. Our internal experience, especially 
 in the relation of our volitions to their effects, may be 
 useful in giving us a clearer notion of causality ; but 
 it is altogether incompetent to account for what in it 
 there is of the quality of necessity. 
 
 II. As the first and second opinions have been 
 usually associated, so also have the third and fourth ; 
 
184 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 that is, the doctrine that our notion of causality is the 
 of spring of (he objective principle of Induction or Gen- 
 eralization, and the doctrine that it is the oppring of 
 the subjective principle of Association or Custom. 
 
 3. In regard to the former, it is plain that the ob- 
 servation that certain phenomena are fonnd to succeed 
 certain other phenomena, and the generalization con- 
 sequent thereon, that these arp reciprocally causes and 
 effects, could never of itself have engendered, not 
 only the strong, but the irresistible belief, that every 
 event must have its cause. Each of these observa- 
 tions is contingent ; and any number of observed con- 
 tingencies will never impose upon us the feeling of 
 necessity, — of our inability to think the opposite. 
 Nay, more, this theory evolves the absolute notion 
 of causality out of the observation of a certain number 
 of uniform consecutions among phenomena ; that is, 
 it would collect that all must he, because some are. 
 But we find no difficulty w^hatevcr in conceiving the 
 reverse of all or any of the consecutions we have ob- 
 served ; and yet the general notion of causality, 
 which, ex hypothesis is their result, ^ve cannot possibly 
 think as possibly unreal. We have always seen a 
 stone fall to the ground when thrown into the air ; 
 but we find no difficulty in representing to ourselves 
 the possibility of one or all stones gravitating from 
 the earth ; only we cannot conceive the possibility 
 of this, or any other event, happening without a 
 
 cause. 
 
 4. Nor does the latter afford a better solution. 
 The necessity of so thinking cannot be derived from a 
 custom of so thinking. Allow the force of custom to 
 
 I 
 
 sin WILLIAM HAMILTON S miLOSOPIIT. 
 
 185 
 
 be great as may be, still it is always limited to the 
 customary ; and the customary has nothing whatever 
 in it of the necessary. But we have here to account 
 not* for a strong, huifor an absolutely irresistible belief. 
 On this theory, also, the causal judgment, when asso- 
 ciation is recent, should be weak, and should only 
 gradually acquire its full force in jDroportion as cus- 
 tom becomes inveterate. But do we find that the 
 causal judgment is weaker in the young, stronger in 
 the old? There is no difference. In either case, 
 there is no less and no more ; the necessity in both is 
 absolute. 
 
 (B) Theories which maintain the Causal Judg- 
 ment TO be a Deliverance of Intelligence. Of 
 the four opinions comprised under this category, 
 
 I. The first two agree in holding that the causal 
 judgment may be identified with a primary intellec- 
 tual principle. 
 
 5. Of these, the first (the fifth in general) main- 
 tains that this principle is necessary, making its rejec- 
 tion in thought impossible. To this are to be referred 
 the relative theories of Descartes, Leibnitz, Kames, 
 Re id, Kant, Fichte, Bouterweck, Jacobi, Stewart, 
 Cousin, and the majority of modern philosophers. 
 Now, w^ithout descending into details, it is manifest 
 in general, that against the assumption of a special 
 principle, which this doctrine makes, there exists a 
 primary presumption of philosophy. This is the Law 
 of Parcimony, which forbids, without necessity, the 
 multiplication of entities, powers, principles, or 
 causes ; above all, the postulation of an unknown 
 force where a know^n impotence can account for the 
 
186 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 I? 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPIIY, 
 
 187 
 
 phenomenon. We are, therefore, entitled to apply 
 Occam's razor to this theory of causality, unless it be 
 proved impossible to explain the causal judgment at 
 a cheaper rate, by deriving it from a higher, and that 
 a negative, orighi. On a doctrine like the present is 
 thrown the onus of vindicating its necessity, by show- 
 ing that, unless a special and positive principle be 
 assumed, there exists no competent mode to save the 
 phenomena. It can only, therefore, be admitted pro- 
 visoriiy ; and it falls of course, if the phenomenon it 
 would explain cau be explained on less onerous condi- 
 tions. Leaving, therefore, this theory, which cer- 
 tainly does account for the phenomenon, to fall or 
 stand, according as either of the two last opinions be, 
 or be not, found sufficient, I go on to that preceding 
 
 these. 
 
 6. Dr. Brown has promulgated a doctrine of Caus- 
 ality, which may be numbered as the sixth ; though 
 perhaps it is hardly deserving of distinct enumeration. 
 He actually identifies the causal judgment, which to 
 us is necessary, with the principle by which we are 
 merely inclined to believe in the uniformity of nature's 
 operations. But apart from all subordinate objec- 
 tions, it is sufficient to say that the phenomenon to be 
 explained is the necessity of thinking, — the absolute 
 impossibility of not thinking, — a cause; whilst all 
 that the latter pretends to is, to incline us to expect 
 that like antecedents will be followed by like conse- 
 quents. This necessity to suppose a cause for every 
 phenomenon, Dr. Brown, if he does not expressly 
 deny, keeps cautiously out of view, virtually, in fact, 
 
 eliminating all that requires explanation in the prob- 
 lem. 
 
 II. The two remainino^ theories aijree with the fifth 
 and sixth in regarding the causal judgment as of a pri- 
 on origin, but difier from them in viewing it as deriv- 
 ative and secondary. Of these two theories, 
 
 7. The first attempts to establish the principle of 
 Causality upon the principle of Contradiction. Listen 
 to the pretended demonstration : Whatever is produced 
 without a cause, is produced by nothing, in other 
 words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing can no 
 more be a cause than it can be something. The same 
 intuition, which makes us aware that nothing is not 
 something, shows us that everything must have a real 
 cause of its existence. To this it is sufficient to say, 
 that the existence of causes being the point in ques- 
 tion, the existence of causes must not be taken for 
 granted in the very reasoning which attempts to prove 
 their reality. In excluding causes, we exclude all 
 causes ; and consequently exclude " nothing " con- 
 sidered as a cause ; it is not, therefore, allowable, 
 contrary to that exclusion, to suppose ''nothing'' as a 
 cause, and then from the absurdity of that supposition 
 to infer the absurdity of the exclusion itself. If every- 
 thing must have a cause, it follows that, upon the ex- 
 clusion of other causes, we must accept.^ nothing as 
 a cause. But it is the very point at issilB, whether 
 everything must have a cause or not ; and, therefore, 
 it violates the first principles of reasoning to take this 
 quoesitum itself as granted. This opinion is now uni- 
 versally abandoned. 
 
 8. The eighth and last opinion is that which re- 
 
188 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 garcls the judgment of causality as derived ; and 
 derives it not from a power, but from an impotence, 
 of mind ; in a word, from the principle of the Con- 
 ditioned. I do not think it possible, without a de- 
 tailed exposition of the various categories of thought, 
 to make you fully understand the grounds and bear- 
 ings of this opinion. In attempting to explain, you 
 must, therefore, allow me to take for granted certain 
 laws of thought, to which I have only been able inci- 
 dentally to allude. Those, however, which I postu- 
 late, are such as are now generally admitted by all 
 philosophers who allow the mind itself to be a source 
 of cognitions ; and the only one w^iich has not been 
 recognized by them, but which, as I endeavored 
 briefly to prove, must likewise be taken into account, 
 is the Law of the Conditioned, that the conceivable has 
 always two opposite extremes, and that the extremes are 
 equally inconceivable. 
 
 Philosophers, who allow a native principle to the 
 mind at all, allow that Existence is such a principle. 
 I shall, therefore, take for granted Existence as the 
 hi<*-hest category or condition of thought. All that 
 we perceive or imagine as different from us, w^e per- 
 ceive or imagine as objectively existent. All that 
 we are conscious of as an act or modification of self, 
 we are conscious of only as subjectively existent. All 
 thought, therefore, implies the thought of existence. 
 As a second category or subjective condition of 
 thought, I postulate that of Time. This likewise 
 cannot be denied me. It is the necessary condition 
 of every conscious act ; thought is only realized to us 
 as in succession, and succession is only conceived by 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 189 
 
 < ' 
 
 us under the concept of time. Existence and Exist- 
 ence in Time is thus an elementary form of our intel- 
 ligence. But we do not conceive existence in time 
 absolutely or infinitely, —we conceive it only as con- 
 ditioned in time; and Existence Conditioned in Time 
 expresses, at once and in relation, the three categories 
 of thought which afford us in combination the princi- 
 ple of Causality. This requires some explanation. 
 
 When we perceive or imagine an object, we per- 
 ceive or imagine it (1.) As existent, and (2.) As in 
 Time ; Existence and Time being categories of all 
 thought. But what is meant by saying, I perceive, 
 or imagine, or, in general, think an object only as I 
 perceiv"^, or imagine, or, in general, think it to exist? 
 Simply this : that, as thinking it, I cannot but think 
 it to exist, in other words, that I cannot annihilate it 
 in thought. I may think away from it, I may turn 
 to other things, and I can thus exclude it from my 
 consciousness ; but, actually thinking it, I cannot 
 think it as non-existent, for as it is thought, so it is 
 
 thouirht existent. 
 
 But a thing is thought to exist, only as it is thought 
 to exist in time. Time is present, past, and future. 
 We cannot think an object of thought as non-existent 
 de presenti. But can we think that quantum of exist- 
 .ence of which an object, real or ideal, is the comple- 
 ment, as non-existent, either in time past, or in time 
 future ? Make the experiment. Try to think the ob- 
 ject of your thought as non-existent in the moment 
 before the present. You cannot. Try it in the mo- 
 ment before that. You cannot. Nor can you annihi- 
 late it by carrying it back to any moment, however 
 

 190 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 distant in the past. You may conceive the parts of 
 which this complement of existence is composed, as 
 separated ; if a material object, you can think it as 
 shivered to atoms, sublimated into ether; but not 
 one iota of existence can you conceive as annihilated, 
 which subsequently you thought to exist. In like 
 manner, try the future, — try to conceive the prospec- 
 tive annihilation of any present object, of any atom 
 of any present object. You cannot. All this may be 
 possible, but of it we cannot think the possibility. 
 But if you can thus conceive neither the absolute com- 
 mencement nor the absolute termination of anything 
 that is once thought to exist, try, on the other hand, 
 if you can conceive the opposite alternative of infinite 
 non-commencement, or of infinite non-termination. 
 To this you are equally impotent. This is the cate- 
 gory of the Conditioned as applied to the category of 
 Existence under the category of Time. 
 
 But in this application is the principle of Causality 
 not given ? Why, what is the law of Causality ? Sim- 
 ply this, — that, when an object is presented phenom- 
 enally as commencing, we cannot but suppose that 
 the complement of. existence, which it now con- 
 tains, has previously been ; in other words, that all 
 that we at present come to know as an eflfect must 
 previously have existed in its causes ; though what 
 these causes are, we may perhaps be altogether un- 
 able even to surmise. (Led. on Metaph,, XXXIX., 
 and Discussions, pp. 609-622. Compare also Lect. 
 on Metaph., XL.) 
 
 I 
 
 SECOND PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PEENOMENOLOQT OF THE FEELINQS. 
 
SECOND PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION, 
 
 In entering on the second great class of mental 
 phenomena, there is a preliminary question to be dis- 
 posed of: What is the position of the Feelings by 
 reference to the two other classes ; and, in particular, 
 should the consideration of the Feelings precede or 
 follow that of the Conations ? * 
 
 To resolve this problem let us take an example. 
 A person is fond of cards. In a company, where he 
 beholds a game in progress, there arises a desire to 
 join in it. Now, the desire is here manifestly kin- 
 dled by the pleasure which the person had and has 
 in the play. The feeling thus connects the cognition 
 of the play with the desire to join in it ; it forms the 
 bridge, and contains the motive, by which we are 
 roused from mere knowledge to appetency, — to co- 
 nation, by reference to which we move ourselves so 
 as to attain the end in view. 
 
 Thus we find, in actual life, the Feelings interme- 
 diate between the Cognitions^and the Conations. And 
 
 13 " " ^'^ 
 
194 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this relative position of the several powers is neces- 
 sary : without the previous cognition, there could be 
 neither feeling nor conation ; and without the previ- 
 ous feeling there could be no conation. For if the 
 mere cognition of a thing were sufficient to rouse co- 
 nation, then it is evident (1.) that all objects, known 
 in the same manner and in the same degree, would 
 become equally the objects of desire and will ; while 
 (2.) all persons would desire an object equally, as 
 lono' as their cognition of the object remained the 
 
 same. 
 
 Our conclusion, therefore, is, that as in our actual 
 existence the feelings find their place after the cogni- 
 tions and before the conations, so in the science of 
 mind the theory of the feelings ought to follow that 
 of our faculties of knowledge, and to precede that of 
 OUT faculties of will and desire. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 
 
 . CHAPTER I. 
 
 ABSTRACT THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 
 
 I PROCEED to deliver the theory of pleasure and 
 pain. 
 
 I. Man exists only as he lives ; as an intelligent 
 and sensible being, he consciously lives, but this only 
 as he consciously energizes. Human existence is only 
 a more general expression for human life, and human 
 life only a more general expression for the sum of 
 energies in which that life is realized, and through 
 which it is manifested in consciousness. * 
 
 Observation, The term energy is here used to com- 
 prehend all the mixed states of action and passion of 
 which we are conscious. 
 
 II. Human existence, human life, human energy, 
 is not unlimited, but on the contrarj^ determined to a 
 certain number of modes, through which alone it can 
 possibly be exerted. These different modes of action 
 are called, in different YeXntiow^, powers, faculties, ca^ 
 jpacities, disjyositions, habits, 
 
 III. Man, as he consciously exists, is the subject 
 of pleasure and pain ; and these of various kinds ; 
 
 195 
 
 f 
 
/» 
 
 196 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 but as man consciously exists in and through tho 
 exertion of certain determinate powers, so it is only 
 through the exertion of these powers that he l)eeomes 
 the subject of pleasure and pain ; each power being 
 in itself at once the faculty of a specific energy, and 
 a capacity of an appropriate pleasure or pain, as the 
 concomitant of that energy. 
 
 IV. The energy of each power of conscious exist- 
 ence having, as its reflex or concomitant, an appro- 
 priate pleasure or pain, and no pleasure or pain being 
 competent to man, except as the concomitant of some 
 determinate energy of life, the all-important question 
 arises : What is the general law. under which these 
 counter-phenomena appear in all their special mani- 
 festations ? 
 
 V. The answer to this question is : the more 
 perfect, the more pleasurable, the energy ; the more 
 imperfect, the more painful. 
 
 VI. The perfection of an energy is twofold : (1.) 
 subjective, by relation to the power of which it is the 
 exertion; (2.) objective, by relation to the object 
 about which it is conversant. 
 
 VII. (1.) Bi/ relation to its power, an energy is 
 perfect, when it is tantamount (a) to the full, and (b) 
 not to more than the full, complement of free and 
 spontaneous energy which the power is capable of 
 exerting ; an energy is imperfect, either (a) when 
 the power is restrained from putting forth the whole 
 amount of energy it would otherwise tend to do, or 
 (b) when it is stimulated to put forth a larger amount 
 than that to which it is spontaneously disposed. 
 
 . The amount of energy in the case of a single power 
 
 '/ 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHY. 
 
 197 
 
 111 
 
 1 1 
 
 IS of two kinds, (a) intensive, (b) protensive, A per- 
 fect energy is, therefore, that which is evolved by a 
 power, both in the degree and for the continuance to 
 which it is competent without straining ; an imperfect 
 energy, that which is evolved by a power in a lower 
 or in a higher degree, for a shorter or for a longer con- 
 tinuance than, if left to itself, it would freely ex- 
 ert. 
 
 When we look to complex states in which ^plurality 
 
 of powers may be simultaneously called into action, 
 we have, besides (a) the intensive and (6) protensive 
 quantities of energy, (c) a third kind, to wit, the ex- 
 tensive quantity. A state is said to contain a greater 
 amount of extensive energy, in proportion as it forms 
 the complement of a greater number of simultaneously 
 co-operating powers. This complement, it is evident, 
 may be conceived as made up either of energies all 
 intensively and protensively perfect and pleasurable ; 
 or of energies all intensively and protensively imper- 
 fect and paintul ; or of energies partly perfect, partly 
 imperfect ; and this in every combination afforded by 
 the various perfections and imperfections of the inten- 
 sive and protensive quantities. 
 
 It may be here noticed that the intensive and the 
 two otber quantities stand always in an inverse ratio to 
 each other; that is, the higher the degree of any en- 
 ergy, the shorter is its continuance, and, during its 
 continuance, the more completely does it constitute 
 the whole mental state. 
 
 VIII. (2.) Bf/ relation to the object about which it 
 is conversant (and by object is here denoted every 
 objective cause by which a power is determmed to 
 
198 
 
 AX OUTLINE OF 
 
 STJl ]VILLIA.\[ HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPIIY, 
 
 199 
 
 
 ftctivity), an energy is perfect, Avhen this object is of 
 such Ji chanicter as to afford to its power the contlitioii 
 requisite to let it spring to full spontaneous activity; 
 imperfect, when the object is of such a character as 
 either (a) to stimulate the power to a degree or to a 
 continuance of activity beyond its maxinnnn of free 
 exertion ; or (b) to thwart it in its tendency towards 
 this its natural limit. An object is consequently 
 pleasurable or painful, inasmuch as it determines a 
 power to perfect or to imi)erfect energy. 
 
 But an object, or plurality of objects sinuiltaneously 
 presented, may determine a plurality of powers into 
 co-activity. The complex state, which thus arises, is 
 pleasurable in proportion as its constitutive energies 
 are severally more perfect ; painful in proportion as 
 these are more imperfect: and in proportion as an 
 object, or a complement of objects, occasions the av- 
 era""e perfection or the average imperfection of the 
 complex state, is it, in like manner, pleasurable or 
 
 painful. 
 V. IX. In conformity to this doctrine, pleasure and 
 ^ pain may be thus defined : Pleasure is a reflex of the 
 spontaneous and animpeded exertion of a power, of 
 whose energy we are conscious; Pain, a reflex of the 
 overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power. 
 
 Observations. I. In illustration of these definiiions 
 it may be observed that, 
 
 1. Pleasure is defined to be the reflex of perfect 
 energy, and not to be either energy or the perfection 
 of energy itself; and why? {a) It is not simi)ly de- 
 fined an energy, because some energies are not pleas- 
 urable, being either painful or indifferent. (6) It is 
 
 not simply defined the perfection of an energy, be- 
 cause we can easily separate in thought the perfection 
 of an act from any feeling of pleasure in its perform- 
 ance. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, of the 
 definition of pain, as a reflex of imperfect energy. 
 
 2. The term spontaneous refers to the subjective^ 
 the term unimpeded to the objective, perfection. 
 
 3. There are powers in man, the activities of 
 which lie beyond the sphere of consciousness ; ^ but 
 it is of the very essence of pleasure and pain to be 
 felt, and there is no feeling out of consciousness. 
 
 II. It is also to be observed that, on this doctrine, 
 there are different kinds of pleasure and pain. 
 
 1. In the first place, these are twofold, inasmuch as 
 each is oWhQv positive and absolute or negative and rel- 
 ative, (a) The mere negation of pain does, by re- 
 lation to pain, constitute a state of pleasure. Thus 
 the removal of toothache replaces us in a state which, 
 though one really of indifference, is, by contrast to 
 our previous agony, felt as pleasurable. This is neg- 
 ative or relative pleasure, (b) Positive or absolute 
 pleasure, on the contrary, is all that pleasure w^hich 
 we feel above a state of indifference, and which is 
 therefore prized as a good in itself, and not simply as 
 the removal of an evil. On the same principle pain 
 is also divided. 
 
 2. But, in the second place, there is a subdivision 
 of positive pain into (a) that which accompanies a 
 repression of the spontaneous energy of a power, and 
 (b) that which is conjoined with its effort w^hen stim- 
 ulated to over-activity. (Led. on Metaph., XLII.) 
 
 ^ Sec Phenomenology of the Cognitions, Chap. II., § 1. 
 
AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 201 
 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE ABSTRACT THEOKY APPLIED TO THE CONCPvETE 
 phenomena: classification of the FEELINGS. 
 
 We may consider the feelings either as causes or 
 as effects, (1.) As causes, they are viewed in rehition 
 to their product, — pleasure, or pain. (2.) As effects, 
 they are viewed as themselves products of the action 
 of our different constitutive functions. 
 
 § 1. THE FEELINGS AS CAUSES. 
 
 In this point of view, the feelings are distributed 
 simply into the pleasurable and the painful; and it 
 remains, on the theory I liave proposed, to exphiin in 
 general the causes of these opposite affections, without 
 descending to their special kinds. 
 
 I. The thcorv meets with no contradiction from the 
 facts of actual life ; for the contradictions, w^liich at 
 first sight these seem to offer, prove, w^hen examined, 
 to be real confirmations. Thus it might be thought 
 that the aversion from exercise, — the love of idle- 
 ness, — in a word, the dolce far niente, — is a proof 
 
 200 
 
 that the inactivity, rather than the exertion, of our 
 powers is the condition of our pleasurable feelings. 
 This objection, from a natural proneness to incrtion 
 in man, is superficial. Is the far niente — is that 
 doing nothing, in which so many find so sincere a 
 gratification — in reality a negation of activity, and not 
 in truth itself an activity intense and varied? To do 
 nothing, in this sense, is simply to do nothing irk- 
 some, especially to do no outward work. But is the 
 mind internally, the while, unoccupied and inert? 
 This, on the contrary, may be vividly alive, — maybe 
 intently engaged in the spontaneous play of imagina- 
 tion ; and so far, therefore, in this case, from pleasure 
 being the concomitant of inactivity, the activity is at 
 once vigorous and unimpeded, and such accordingly 
 as, on our theory, would be accompanied by a high 
 degree of pleasure. Ennui is the state on which we 
 find nothing to exercise our powers ; but ennui is a 
 state of pain. 
 
 II. A strong confirmation of the theory is derived 
 from the phenomena presented by those affections 
 which we em.phatically denominate the painful. 
 
 1. Take, for example, the affection of grief, — the 
 sorrow we feel in the loss of a beloved object. Is 
 this affection unaccompanied with pleasure ? So far 
 ''s this from being the case, that the pleasure so greatly 
 predominates over the pain as to produce a mixed 
 emotion, which is far more pleasurable than any other 
 of which the wounded heart is susceptible. 
 
 2. In like manner, fear is not simply painful. It 
 is a natural disposition, has a tendency to act ; and 
 there is consequently, along with its essential pain, a 
 
202 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 certain pleasure as the reflex of its energy. This is 
 finely expressed by Akenside : — 
 
 "Hence, finally, by night 
 The village matron round the blazing hearth 
 Suspends the infant audience with her tales, 
 Breathing astonishment! of witching rhymes 
 And evil spirits of the death-bed call 
 Of him who robbed the widow and devoured 
 The orphan's portion ; of unquiet souls 
 Risen from the grave to ease the heavy guilt 
 Of deeds in life concealed ; of shapes that walk 
 At dead of night and clank their chains, and wave 
 The torch of hell around the murderer's bed. 
 At every solemn pause the crowd recoil, 
 Gazing each other speechless, and congealed 
 With shivering sighs, till, eager for the event, 
 Around the beldame all erect they hang. 
 Each trembling heart with grateful terrors quelled.*' 
 
 3. Pity, also, which, being a sympathetic passion, 
 implies a participation in sorrow, is yet confessedly 
 agreeable. The poet even accords to the energy of 
 this benevolent affection a preference over the enjoy- 
 ments of an exclusive selfishness : — 
 
 " The broadest mirth unfeeling folly wears 
 Is not so sweet as virtue's very tears.'* 
 
 4. On the same principle is to be explained the en- 
 joyment which men have in spectacles of suffering, — 
 in the combats of animals and men, in executions, in 
 tragedies, etc. ; a disposition which not unfrcqucntly 
 becomes an irresistible habit, not only for individuals, 
 but also for nations. The excitation of energetic 
 emotions, painful in themselves, is also pleasura- 
 ble. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHT. 
 
 203 
 
 We may here notice four general causes which con- 
 tribute to raise or to lower the intensity of our ener- 
 gies, and consequently to determine the correspond- 
 ing degree of pleasure or pain. 
 
 I. JSToveltj/, The principle on which novelty 
 determines a higher energy is twofold ; and of these 
 the one may be called the subjective, the other the 
 
 objective. 
 
 1. In a subjective relation, the new is pleasurable, 
 inasmuch as this supposes that the mind is determined 
 to a mode of action, either from inactivity or from 
 another state of energy, (a) In the former case, en- 
 ergy, the condition of pleasure, is caused ; (b) in the 
 latter, a change of energy is afforded, which is also 
 pleasurable ; for powers energize less vigorously in 
 proportion to the continuance of the same exertion, 
 and, consequently, a new activity being determined, 
 this replaces a strained or expiring exercise, that is, 
 it replaces a painful, indifferent, or unpleasurable feel- 
 ing by one of comparatively vivid enjoyment. 
 
 2. In an objective relation, a novel object is pleas- 
 ing, because it affords a gratification to our desire of 
 knowledge. Tlie old is already known, and therefore 
 no longer occupies the cognitive faculties ; whereas 
 the new, as new, is still unknown, and rouses to en- 
 ergy the powers by which it is to be brought within 
 the system of our knowledge. 
 
 II. Contrast operates in two ways ; for it has the 
 effect of enhancing both the real or absolute, and the 
 apparent or relative, intensity of a feeling. (1.) As 
 an instance of the former, the unkindness of a person, 
 from whom we expect kindness, rouses to a far higher 
 
204 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 pitch the emotions consequent on injury. (2.) As an 
 instance of the latter, the pleasure of eating appears 
 proportionally great when it is immediately con- 
 nectetl and contrasted with the removal of the pangs 
 of hunofer. 
 
 in. The relation of harmony or discord^ in which 
 one coexistent activity stands to another. At differ- 
 ent times we exist in different complex states of 
 feeling, and these states are made up of a number of 
 constituent thoughts and affections. At one time — 
 say during a sacred solemnity — we are in a very 
 different frame of mind from what we are in at an- 
 other, — say during the representation of a comedy. 
 Now, then, in such a state of mind, if anything occurs 
 to awaken to activity a power previously occupied, or 
 to occupy a power, previously in energy, in a differ- 
 ent manner, this new mode of activity is either of the 
 same general character and tendency with the other 
 constituent elements of the complex state, or it is not. 
 (1.) In the former case, the new energy chimes in 
 with the old ; each operates without impediment from 
 the other, and the general harmony of feeling is not 
 violated; (2.) in the latter case, the new energy jars 
 with the old, and each severally counteracts and im- 
 pedes the other. Thus, in the sacred solemnity, and 
 when our minds are brought to a state of serious con- 
 templation, everything that operates in unison with 
 that state — say a pious discourse or a strain of sol- 
 emn music— will have a greater effect. But suppose 
 that, instead of the pious discourse, or the strain of 
 solemn music, we are treated to a merry tune or a 
 witty address ; these, though at another season they 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON^ S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 205 
 
 might afford us considerable pleasure, would, under 
 the circumstances, cause only pain. 
 
 IV. Association, It is evident, in the first place, 
 that one object, considered simply and in itself, will 
 be more pleasing than another, in proportion as it, of 
 its proper nature, determines the exertion of a greater 
 amount of free energy. But, in the second place, the 
 amount of free energy, which an object may itself 
 elicit, is small, when compared with the amount that 
 may be elicited by its train of associated representa- 
 tions. Thus it is evident, that the object, which in 
 itself would otherwise be pleasing, may, through the 
 accident of association, be the occasion of pain ; and 
 on the contrary, that an object, naturally indiffer- 
 ent or even painful, may, by the same contingency, 
 be productive of pleasure. 
 
 This principle accounts for a great many of our 
 intellectual pleasures and pains ; but it is far from 
 accounting for everything. In fact, it supposes, as its 
 condition, that there are pains and pleasures not 
 founded on association. Association is a principle of 
 pleasure and pain, only as it is a principle of energy 
 of one character or another ; and the attempts that 
 have been made to resolve all our mental pleasures 
 and pains into association are guilty of a twofold vice. 
 For ( 1 . ) they convert a partial into an exclusive law ; 
 and (2.) they elevate a subordinate into a supreme 
 principle. {Led. on Meiaph,, XLIV.) 
 
 The influence of association, by which Mr. Alison 
 and Lord Jeffrey, among others, have attempted to 
 explain the whole phenomena of our intellectual 
 pleasures, was more properly, I think, appreciated by 
 
206 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 Hutcheson. "We shall see hereafter," he says, and 
 Aristotle said the same thing, ''that associations of 
 ideas make objects pleasant and delightful, which are 
 not naturally apt to give any such pleasures ; and the 
 same way, the casual conjunction of ideas may give a 
 disgust where there is nothing disagreeable in the 
 form itself. And this is the occasion of many fantas- 
 tic aversions to figures of some animals and to some 
 other forms. Thus swine, serpents of all kinds, and 
 some insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with 
 aversion by many people, who have got some acci- 
 dental ideas associated with them. And for distastes 
 of this kind no other account can be given." 
 
 § 2. THE FEELINGS AS EFFECTS. 
 
 Since all feeling is the state in which we are con- 
 scious of some of the energies or processes of life, as 
 these energies or processes differ, so will the correla- 
 tive feelings : in a word, there will be as many differ- 
 ent feelings as there are distinct modes of mental 
 activity. Now, the feelings, which accompany the 
 exertion of the bodily powers, whether cognitive or 
 appetent, will constitute a distinct class, to which we 
 may with great propriety give the name of Sensations; 
 whereas, on the feelings, which accompany the ener- 
 gies of all our higher powers of mind, we may, with 
 equal propriety, bestow the name of Sentiments. 
 
 (A) The Sensations may be divided into two 
 classes: (1.) those included under what has been 
 called Sensus Fixus, comprehending the five deter- 
 minate senses of touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight; (2.) 
 
 Sin WILLIAM HAMILTON'S miLOSOrHY. 
 
 207 
 
 those included under what has been called Sensus 
 Vagus, comprehending such sensations as those of 
 heat and cold, of muscular tension and lassitude, of 
 hunger and thirst, etc. 
 
 I. Sensus Fixus. In regard to the determinate 
 senses, each of tliese organs has its specific action, and 
 its appropriate pleasure or pain. This pleasure and 
 pain, which is that alone belonging to the action of 
 the living organ, and which therefore may be styled 
 organic, we must distinguish from that higher feeling, 
 which perhaps results from the exercise of imagina- 
 tion and intellect upon the phenomena delivered by 
 the senses. Thus, I would call organic the pleasure 
 we feel in the perception of green or blue, and the 
 pain we feel in the perception of a dazzling white ; 
 but I would be perhaps disposed to refer to some 
 other power than the external sense the enjoyment we 
 experience in the harmony of colors, and certainly 
 that which we find in the proportions of figure. 
 
 When it is required of us to explain, particularly 
 and in detail, why the rose, for example, produces 
 this sensation of smell, assafoetida that other, and so 
 forth, and to say in what peculiar action does the per- 
 fect or pleasurable, and the imperfect or painful, ac- 
 tivity of an organ consist, we must at once profess 
 our ignorance. All that we can say is, that, on the 
 general analogy of our being, when the impression of 
 an object on a sense is in harmony with its amount of 
 power, and thus allows it the condition of springing 
 to full spontaneous energy, the result is pleasure; 
 whereas, when the impression is out of harmony with 
 
208 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 the amount of power, and thus cither represses it or 
 stimulates it to over-activity, the result is paiu. 
 
 II. Sensus Vagus, The same explanation must be 
 applied to the sensations which belong to this sense, 
 but in regard to these it is not necessary to say any- 
 thing in detail. 
 
 (H) The Sentiments may be divided into (1.) the 
 contemplative, the concomitants of our cognitive pow- 
 ers, and (2.) the practical, the concomitants of our 
 powers of conation. 
 
 I. The contemplative sentiments are again distribu- 
 ted into (1.) those of the subsidiary faculties, and 
 (2.) those of the elahorative faculty. 
 
 1. The feelings, accompanying the subsidiary fac- 
 ulties, may be subdivided into (a) those of self-con- 
 sciousness, and (6) those of imagination, compre- 
 hend in o- under ima«rination the relative faculty of 
 
 reproduction, 
 
 (a) Sentiments attending Self -consciousness. By 
 self-consciousness we become aware that w^e live. 
 Now, we are conscious of our life only as we are con- 
 scious of our activity^ and we are conscious of activity 
 only as we are conscious of a change of state ; for all 
 activity is tlie going out of one state into another. 
 Now, if there be nothing which presents to our facul- 
 ties the objects on which they may exert their activity ; 
 in other words, if there be no cause whereby our act- 
 ual state may be made to pass into another, there 
 results a peculiar irksome feeling of a want of excite- 
 ment, w^hich we denominate tedium or ennui. An 
 inability to thought is a security against this feeling, 
 and therefore tedium is far less felt by the uncultivated 
 
 -» , 
 
 sin WILLIAM HAMILTOX S P/IILOSOP/IY, 
 
 209 
 
 than by the educated. The more varied the objects 
 presented to our thought, the more varied and viva- 
 cious our activity, the intenser Avill be our conscious- 
 ness of living, and the more rapidly will the time 
 appear to fly. Hence we explain why we call our 
 easy occupations pastimes, and why play is so engag- 
 ing when it is at all deep. Games of hazard de- 
 termine a continual change, — now w^e hope, now we 
 fear; while in games of skill, we experience also the 
 pleasure which arises from the activity of the under- 
 standing in carrying through our own, and frustrating 
 the plan of our antagonist. 
 
 All that relieves tedium, by affording a change and 
 an easy exercise for our thoughts, causes pleasure. 
 The best cure of tedium is some occupation which, by 
 concentrating our attention on external objects, shall 
 divert it from* a retortion on ourselves. All occupa- 
 tion is either labor or play ; labor when there is some 
 end ulterior to the activity, play w^hen the activity is 
 for its own sake alone. In both, however, there must 
 be ever and anon a change of object, or both will soon 
 grow tiresome. Labor is thus the best preventive of 
 tedium, for it has an external motive which holds us 
 steadfast to the work; while, after the completion of 
 our task, the feeling of repose, as the change from the 
 feeling of a constrained to that of a spontaneous state, 
 affords a vivid and peculiar pleasure. Labor must 
 alternate with repose, or we shall never know what is 
 the true enjoyment of life. 
 
 Thus it appears that a uniform continuity in our in- 
 ternal states is painful, and that pleasure is the result 
 of their commutation. It is, however, to be observed^ 
 14 
 
210 
 
 yt\ OVTLiyE OF 
 
 tliat the clmiige of our perceptions aiul thoughts, to be 
 pleasing, must not l)e too rapid ; for as the intervals, 
 Avhcn too long, produce the feeling of tedium, so, 
 Avhen too short, they cause that o( (jiddineas or verti(jo. 
 The too rapid passing, for example, of visible objects 
 or ot" tones before the senses, of imaires before the 
 phantasy, of thoughts before the understanding, occa- 
 sions the disagreeable feeling of confusion or stupe- 
 faction, Avhich, in individuals of very sensitive 
 temperauKMit, results in nausea or sickness, 
 
 (h) Seidlments aftending Imagination, Whatever 
 in general facilitates the play of imagination, is felt 
 as pleasing ; Avhatever renders it more dilHcult is felt 
 as displeasing. We are pleased with the portrait of 
 a person whose face we know, if like, because it en- 
 ables us to recall the features into consciousness easily 
 and freely ; and we are displeased with it, if unlike, 
 because it not only does not assist, but thwarts us in 
 our endeav(n* to recall them ; while, after this has 
 been accomplished, we arc still further pairicd by the 
 disharmony we experience between the portrait on the 
 canvas and the representation in our own imagina- 
 tion. A short and characteristic description of things 
 which we have seen pleases us, because, without 
 exacting a protracted eflfort of attention, and through 
 a few striking traits, it enables the imagination to 
 l)la(!e the objects vividly before it. On the same prin- 
 ciple, whatever facilitates the reproduction of the ob- 
 jects Avhich have been consigned to memory is 
 pleasurable ; as, for example, resemldances, contrasts, 
 otht^' associations with the passing thought, metre, 
 rhyme, symmetry, appropriate designations, etc. To 
 
 Srn WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 211 
 
 realize an act of imagination it is necessary that Ave 
 comprehend the manifold as a single whole : an ob- 
 ject, therefore, which does not allow itself without 
 difficulty to be thus represented in unity, occasions 
 pain ; whereas an object, which can easily be recalled 
 to system, is the cause of pleasure. The former is 
 the case when the object is too large or too complex 
 to be perceived at once, when the parts are not promi- 
 nent enough to be distinctly impressed on the memory. 
 Order and symmetry, again, facilitate the acts of re- 
 production and representation, and consequently afford 
 us a proportional gratification. But, on the other 
 hand, as pleasure is in proportion to the amount of 
 free energy, an object which gives no impediment to 
 the comprehensive energy of imagination may not be 
 pleasurable, if it be so simple as not to afford to this 
 faculty a sufficient exercise. Hence it is, that not 
 variety alone, and not unity alone, but variety com- 
 bined with unity, is that quality in objects, which we 
 emphatically denominate beautiful, 
 
 2. Under the head of the feelings which are asso- 
 ciated with the elahorative faculty or the understand- 
 ing, it w^ill be proper to consider, in the first place, 
 those which arise from the operations of the under- 
 standing by itself, and afterwards those which accom- 
 pany the joint exercise of the understanding and the 
 
 imagination. 
 
 (a) Sentiments attending the exercise of the Under- 
 standing by itself The function of the understanding 
 may in general be said to bestow, on the cognitions 
 which it elaborates, the greatest possible compasff, the 
 greatest possible clearness and distinctness, the great- 
 
212 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 est possible certainty and systematic order ; and inas- 
 much as we approximate to the accomplishment of 
 these ends, we experience pleasure ; inasmuch as we 
 meet with hindrances in our attempts, we experience 
 pain. Obscurity and confusion in our cognitions we 
 feel as disagreeable, whereas their clearness and dis- 
 tinctness afford us sincere gratification. We are 
 pained by a hazy and perplexed discourse, but rejoice 
 in one perspicuous and profound. Hence the pleasure 
 we experience in having the cognitions we possessed, 
 but darkling and confused, explicated into life and 
 order ; and, on this account, there is hardly a more 
 pleasing object than a tabular conspectus of any com- 
 plex whole. We are soothed by the solution of a 
 riddle ; and the wit which, like a flash of lightning, 
 discovers similarities between objects which seemed 
 contradictory, affords a still intenser enjoyment. 
 
 The multitude — the multifarious character — of 
 the objects presented to our observation stands ift^ 
 signal contrast with the very limited capacity of th<« 
 human intellect. This disproportion constrains us t^ 
 classify. Now, the process of classification is per- 
 formed by that function of the understanding which 
 apprehends resemblances. In this detection of the 
 similarities between different objects an energy of the 
 understanding is fully and freely exerted ; and hence 
 results a pleasure. But as in general notions the 
 knowledge of individual existences loses in precision 
 and completeness, we again endeavor to find out dif- 
 ferences in the things which stand under a notion, to 
 the end that we may be able to specify and individual- 
 ize them. This counter-process is performed by that 
 
 SIR WILLIA.n nAMlLTON'S PnTLOSOP/IY. 
 
 213 
 
 function of the understanding which apprehends dis- 
 similarities between resembling objects, and in the 
 full and free exertion of this energy there is a feeling 
 of pleasure. 
 
 The intellect further tends to reduce the piecemeal 
 and fragmentary cognitions it possesses to a systematic 
 whole ; in other words, to elevate them into Science. 
 Hence the pleasure we derive from all that enables us 
 with ease and rapidity to survey the relation of com- 
 plex parts as constituting the members of one organic 
 whole. The intellect, from the necessity it has of 
 thinking everything as the result of some higher 
 reason, is thus determined to attempt the deduction 
 of every object of cognition from a simple principle. 
 When, therefore, we succeed or seem to succeed in 
 the discovery of such a principle, we feel a pleasure ; 
 as we feel a pain when the intellect is frustrated in 
 this endeavor. 
 
 To the feelings of pleasure which are afforded by 
 the unimpeded energies of the understanding belongs, 
 likewise, the gratification we find in the apprehension 
 of adaptation of means to ends. Human intelligence 
 is naturally determined to propose to itself an end ; 
 and, in the consideration of objects, it thus naturally 
 thinks them under this relation. If, therefore, we con- 
 sider an object in reference to an end, and if this ob- 
 ject be recognized to fulfil the conditions which 
 this relation implies, the act of thought, in which this 
 is accomplished, is an unimpeded and consequently 
 pleasurable energy ; whereas the act of cognizing that 
 these conditions are wanting, and the object therefore 
 
21-1 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 ill adapted to its end, is a thwarted, and therefore a 
 painl'ul, energy of thought. 
 
 (6) Sentiments attending the Understanding and 
 the Imagination in conjunction. The feelings of satis- 
 faction which result from th^ plastic imagination, that 
 is, the phantasy and the understanding conjointly, are 
 principally those of beauty and snblimitij ; and the 
 judgments which pronounce an object to be sid>lime, 
 beautiful, etc., are called, by a metaphorical expres- 
 sion, Judgments of Taste, They have also been called 
 ^sthetical Judgments ; but both terms are unsatis- 
 factory. In the following observations it is almost 
 needless to observe that I can make no attempt at 
 more than a simple indication of the origin of the 
 pleasure we derive from the contemplation of those 
 objects, which, from the character of the feelings tliey 
 determine, are called beautiful, sublime, picturesque, 
 etc. 
 
 i. The Beautiful has been divided into the free or 
 absolute, and the dependent or relative. In the former 
 case it is not necessary to have a notion of what the ob- 
 ject oughtto be before we pronounce it beautiful, or not ; 
 in the latter case such a previous notion is required. 
 We judge, for example, a flower to be beautiful, 
 though unaware of its destination, and that it contains 
 a complex apparatus of organs all admirably adapted 
 to the propagation of the plant. When we are made 
 cognizant of this, we obtain, indeed, an additional 
 gratification, but one wholly different from that which 
 we experience in the contemplation of the flower 
 itself, apart from all consideration of its adaptations. 
 This distinction appears to me unsound. What has 
 
 sin WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 215 
 
 been distinguished as dependent or relative beauty is 
 nothing more than a beautified utility or a utilized 
 beauty. Be this, however, as it may, our pleasure 
 in both cases arises from a free and full play being 
 allowed to our cognitive faculties. 
 
 (a) In the case of /ree beauty, — beauty, strictly 
 so called, — both the imagination and the understand- 
 ing find occupation ; and the pleasure we experience 
 from such an object is in proportion as it affords to 
 these faculties the opportunity of exerting fully and 
 freely their respective energies. Now, it is the prin- 
 cipal function of the understanding, out of the multi- 
 farious presented to it, to form a whole. Its entire 
 activity is, in fact, a tendency towards unity ; and it 
 is only satisfied when this object is so constituted as 
 to afford the opportunity of an easy and perfect j)er- 
 formance of this its function. The object is then 
 judged to be beautiful or pleasing. This enables us 
 to explain the differences of different individuals in 
 the apprehension of the beautiful. If an understand- 
 ing, by natural constitution, by cultivation and exer- 
 cise, be vigorous enough to think up rapidly into a 
 whole w4mt is presented in complexity, the individual 
 has an enjoyment, and he regards the object as beau- 
 tiful ; wliereas if an intellect perform this function 
 slowly and with effort, if it succeed in accomplishing 
 the end at all, the individual can feel no pleasure (if 
 he does not experience pain), and the object must to 
 him appear as one destitute of beauty, if not positively 
 ugly. Hence it is that children, boors, in a word 
 persons of a weak or uncultivated mind, may find the 
 
216 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 parts of a building beautiful, while unable to compre- 
 hend the beauty of it as a whole. 
 
 (/5) In the case of relative or dependent beauty we 
 must distinguish the pleasure we receive into two, 
 combined indeed, but not identical. The one of these 
 pleasures is that from the beauty which the object 
 contains, and the principle, of which we have been 
 just considering. The other of these pleasures is that 
 which we showed was attached to a perfect energy of 
 the understanding in thinking an object under the 
 notion of conformity as a mean adapted to an 
 
 end. 
 
 The result, then, of what has now been said is, that 
 a thing beautiful is one whose form occupies the imagi- 
 nation and understanding in a free and full, and con- 
 sequently in an agreeable, activity, 
 
 ii. The feeling of pleasure in the sublime is essen- 
 tially different from our feeling of pleasure in the 
 beautiful. The beautiful affords a feeling of lui- 
 mingled pleasure in the full and unimpeded activity 
 of our cognitive powers ; whereas our feeling of sub- 
 limity is a mingled one of pleasure and of pain, — of 
 pleasure in the consciousness of strong energy, of 
 pain in the consciousness that this energy is in vain. 
 But as the amount of pleasure in the sublime is greater 
 than the amount of pain, it follows that the free energy 
 it elicits must be greater than the free energy it 
 repels. The beautiful has reference to the form of an 
 object, and the facility with which it is comprehended. 
 For beauty, magnitude is thus an impediment. Sub- 
 limity, on the contrary, requires magnitude as its 
 condition ; and the formless is not unfrequently sub- 
 
 siR WILLIAM Hamilton's PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 217 
 
 lime. That we are at once attracted and repelled by 
 sublimity, arises from the circumstance that the 
 object, which we call sublime, is proportioned to one 
 of our fiiculties, and disproportioned to another ; but 
 as the degree of pleasure transcends the degree of 
 pain, the power whose energy is promoted must be 
 superior to that power whose energy is repressed. 
 
 The sublime may be divided, according to the three 
 quantities, into the sublime of extension, the sublime 
 of protension, and the sublime of intension; or, what 
 comes to the same thing, the sublime of space, the 
 sublime of time, and the sublime of power. In the 
 two former the cognitive, in the last the conative, 
 XDOwers come into play. 
 
 (a) An object is extensively or protensively sub- 
 lime when it comprises so great a multitude of parts 
 that the imagination sinks under the attempt to rep- 
 resent it in an image, and the understanding to 
 measure it by other quantities. Baffled in the attempt 
 to reduce the object within the limits of the faculties 
 by which it must be comprehended, the mind at once 
 desists from the ineffectual effort, and conceives the 
 object not by a positive, but by a negative, notion ; it 
 conceives it as inconceivable, and falls back into 
 repose, which is felt as pleasing by contrast to the 
 continuance of a forced and impeded energy. Exam- 
 ples of the sublime — of this sudden effort, and of 
 this instantaneous desisting from the attempt — are 
 manifested in the extensive sublime of Space, and in 
 the protensive sublime of Eternity. 
 
 (/?) An object is intensively sublime when it in- 
 volves such a degree of force or power that the imag- 
 
218 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 ination cannot at once represent, and the understand- 
 ing cannot at once bring under measure, the quantum 
 of this force ; and when, from the nature of the 
 object, the inability of the mind is at once made 
 apparent, so that it does not proceed in the ineffectual 
 effort, but at once calls back its energies from the 
 attempt. 
 
 It is thus manifest that the feeling of the sublime 
 will be one of mingled pain and pleasure ; pleasure, 
 from the vigorous exertion and the instantaneous 
 repose ; pain, from the consciousness of limited and 
 frustrated activity. This mixed feeling in the con- 
 templation of the sublime object is finely expressed 
 by Lucretius when he says : — 
 
 "Me qusedam divina voluptas 
 Percipit atque horror." 
 
 111. 
 
 The Picturesque, however opposite to the sub- 
 lime, seems, in my opinion, to stand to the beautiful 
 in a somewhat similar relation. An object is posi- 
 tively ugly, when it is of such a form that the imagi- 
 nation and the understanding cannot help attempting 
 to think it up into unity, and yet their energies fail 
 in the endeavor, or accomplish it only imperfectly 
 after time and toil. The cause of this continuance of 
 effort is, that the object does not present such an 
 appearance of incongruous variety as at once to com- 
 pel the mind to desist from the attempt of reducing it 
 to unity ; but, on the contrary, leads it on to attempt 
 what it is yet unable to perform, — its reduction to a 
 whole. But variety — variety even apart from unity 
 — is pleasing ; and if the mind be made content to 
 
 SIR WILLIAM uamilton's pniLOSOPnT, 
 
 219 
 
 expatiate freely and easily in this variety, without at- 
 tempting painfully to reduce it to unity, it will derive 
 no inconsiderable pleasure from this exertion of its 
 powers. Now, a picturesque object is precisely of 
 such a character. It is so determinately varied and 
 so abrupt in its variety ; it presents so complet-e a ne- 
 gation of all rounded contour, and so regular an irreg- 
 ularity of broken lines and angles ; that every attempt 
 at reducing it to an harmonious whole is at once 
 found to be impossible. The mind, therefore, which 
 must forego the energy of representing and thinking 
 the object as a unity, surrenders itself at once to the 
 energies which deal with it only in detail. 
 
 II. The practical feelings are divisible into five 
 classes, as they relate to (1.) our self-preservation, 
 (2.) the enjoyment of our existence, (3.) the preser- 
 vation of the species, (4.) our tendency towards de- 
 velopment and perfection, (5.) the moral law. 
 
 1 . The feelings of selfjpreservation are those of hun- 
 ger and thirst, loathing, sorrow, bodily pain, repose, 
 fear at danger, anxiety, shuddering, alarm, composure, 
 security, and the nameless feeling at the representa- 
 tion of death. Several of these feelings are corpo- 
 real, and may be considered, with equal propriety, as 
 modifications of the vague sense. 
 
 2. T\\Q feelings relating to the enjoyment of existence 
 arise from the fact that man is determined not only 
 to exist, but to exist wiB\l ; he is therefore determined 
 also to desire whatever tends to render life agreeable, 
 and to eschew whatever tends to render it disagree- 
 able. All, therefore, that appears to contribute to 
 the former, causes in him the feeling of joy; whereas 
 
220 
 
 AK OUTLIXE OF 
 
 all thtit seems to threaten the liittcr excites in him 
 the repressed feelings of fear, anxiety, sorrow, etc., 
 which we have ah-eady mentioned. 
 
 3. Man is determined not only to preserve him 
 self, but to preserve the species to which he belonirs, 
 and with this tendency various feelings are associated. 
 To this head belonn: the feelinii^s of sexual love and 
 parental affection. But the human affections are not 
 limited to family connections. " Man," says Aristotle, 
 "is the sweetest thinir to man." We have thus a ten- 
 dency to social intercourse, and society is at once the 
 necessary condition of our happiness and of our per- 
 fection. In conformity with his tendency to social 
 existence man is endowed with a sympathetic feeling ; 
 that is, he rejoices with those that rejoice, and grieves 
 with those that grieve. Compassion or pity is the 
 name given to tlie latter modification of sympathy ; 
 the former is without a definite name. Besides sym- 
 pathetic sorrow and sympathetic joy, there are a 
 variety of feelings which have reference to our exist- 
 ence in a social relation. Of these there is that con 
 nected with vanity, or the wish to please others from 
 the desire of being respected by them ; with shame, 
 or the fear and sorrow at incurring their disrespect ; 
 with pride, or the overweening sentiment of our own 
 worth. To the same class we may refer the feelings 
 connected with indignation, resentment, anger, scorn, 
 etc. 
 
 4. There is in man implanted a desire of develop- 
 ing his powers, — a tendency towards perfection. In 
 virtue of this, the consciousness of all comparative 
 inability causes pain ; the consciousness of all com- 
 
 SIR mLLlAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 221 
 
 parative power causes pleasure. To this class belong 
 the feelings which accompany emulation, — the desire 
 of rising superior to others; and envy,— the desire 
 of reducing others beneath ourselves. 
 
 5. We are conscious that there is in man a moral 
 lavj, which unconditionally commands the fulfilment 
 of its behests. Inasmuch as moral intelligence imcon- 
 ditionally commands us to perform what we are con- 
 scious to be our duty, there is attributed to man an 
 absc^lute worth. The feeling, which the manifesta- 
 tion of this worth excites, is called respect. With the 
 consciousness of the lofty nature of our moral tenden- 
 cies, and our ability to fulfil what the law of duty 
 prescribes, there is connected the feeling of self- 
 respect; whereas, from a consciousness of the contrast 
 between what we ought to do and what we actually 
 perform, there arises the feeling of self-abasement. 
 The sentiment of respect for the law of duty is the 
 moral feeling, which has by some been improperly 
 denominated the 77ioral sense; for through this feeling 
 we do not take cognizance whether anything be 
 morally good or morally evil, but when by our intel- 
 ligence we recognize aught to be of such a character, 
 there is herewith associated a feeling of pain or 
 pleasure, which is nothing more than our state in ref- 
 erence to the fulfilment or violation of the law. Man, 
 as conscious of his liberty to act and of the law by 
 wliich his actions ought to be regulated, recognizes 
 his personal accountability, and calls himself before 
 the internal tribunal which we denominate conscience. 
 Here he is either acquitted or condemned. The ac- 
 
222 
 
 ,T.T», 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF nAMTLTON S PniLOSOPIlT. 
 
 quittal is connected with a peculiar feeling of pleasur- 
 able exultation, as the condemnation is with a peculiar 
 feeling of painful humiliation, — remorse. {Led. on 
 Metaph., XLV. and XL VI .) 
 
 THIRD PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONATIONS. 
 
THIRD PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONATIONS. 
 
 Under the third class of mental phenomena are 
 comprehended both the phenomenon of desire and 
 the phenomenon of volition. In English unfortunately 
 we have no term capable of adequately expressing 
 what is common both to volition and desire, that is, 
 the nisus or conatus, — the tendency towards the reali- 
 zation of their end. Were we to say the phenomena 
 of tendency/, the phrase would be vague ; and the 
 same is true of the phenomena of doing. Again, the 
 term phenomena of ajppetency is objectionable, because 
 (to say nothing of the unfamiliarity of the expression) 
 appetency, though perhaps etymologically unexcep- 
 tionable, has, both in Latin and English, a meaning 
 almost synonymous with desire. Like the Latin 
 appetentia, the Greek o>£,^tc is equally ill-balanced ; 
 for, though used by philosophers to comprehend both 
 will and desire, it more familiarly suggests the latter, 
 and we need not, therefore, be solicitous, with Mr. 
 Harris and Lord Monboddo, to naturalize in English 
 the term orectic. Again, the phrase phenomena of 
 activity would be even worse ; every possible objection 
 
 15 ^^^ 
 
226 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 can be made to the term active j^owers, by whicli the 
 philosophers of this country have designated the oreo 
 tic faculties of the Aristotelians. For you will ob- 
 serve that all faculties are equally active ; and it is 
 not the overt performance, but the tendency towards 
 it, for which we are in quest of an expression. The 
 term Conative is employed by Cud worth, and I shall 
 adopt the word conations as the most appropriate 
 expression for this class of phenomena. (Lect, on 
 Metaph,, XI.) 
 
 The conations, as tendencies to action, are divisible 
 into classes, as such tendencies are either blind and 
 fatal, or deliberate and free. The former are desires, 
 the latter, volitions, 
 
 (A) Desires may be subdivided according to their 
 objects, for they relate either (1.) to Self-preserva- 
 tion, or (2.) to the Enjoyment of Existence, or (3.) 
 to the Preservation of the Species, or (4.) to our 
 Tendency towards Development and Perfection, or 
 (5.) to the Moral Law.^ {Lect, on Metaph,, XLVI.) 
 
 II. Will is a free cause, a cause which is not also 
 an effect, a power of absolute origination. (Discus- 
 sions, p. 623.) It is proved to be so, 
 
 1. Directly^ by an immediate testimony of con- 
 sciousness to the fact {Lect, on Metaph., II. ; Eeid's 
 Worhs, p. 624, note, and pp. 616-7, notes) ; while 
 
 ' It may be observed that this is the classification of the desires 
 given above (Phenomenology of the Feelings, Chap. II., § 2, (B) 
 II.) ; and it is the only classification attempted by Sir William Ham- 
 ilton. It ought not, however, to be forgotten tliat it is suggested, 
 not in an independent treatment of the desires, but in a description 
 of the feelings which the desires originate. — J. CM. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 
 
 227 
 
 2. Indirectly also it is implied in our conscious- 
 ness, at once of an uncompromising law of duty, and 
 of our bein^ the accountable authors of our actions. 
 {Led. on Metaph., II. ; Discussions, pp. 623-4.) 
 
 The fact of a free volition is indeed positively in- 
 conceivable, and that for two reasons : — 
 
 1. The Law of the Conditioned in Time, under the 
 form of the Law of Causality, renders impossible the 
 conception of an absolute commencement. 
 
 2. On the one hand, the determination of the will 
 by motives can be conceived only as a necessitation 
 which would render moral accountability impossible. 
 On the other hand, were we to admit as true what we 
 cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motive- 
 less volition would be only casualism ; and the free 
 acts of an indifferent, are, morally and rationally, as 
 worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined 
 
 will. 
 
 Hoiv, therefore, moral liberty is possible in man or 
 in God must remain, under the present limitation of 
 our faculties, wholly incomprehensible ; but the fact 
 of liberty cannot be redargued on the ground of its 
 incomprehensibility. For, 
 
 1. The judgment of causality, which renders free 
 will inconceivable, has been proved not to depend on a 
 power of the mind, imposing, as necessary in thought, 
 what is necessary in the universe of existence. This 
 judgment is a mere mental impotence, — an impotence 
 to conceive either of two contradictories ; and as the 
 one or the other of contradictories must be true, whilst 
 both cannot, there is no ground for inferring a fact to 
 be impossible merely from our inability to conceive its 
 
228 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 possibility. At the same time, if the causal judgment 
 be not an express affirmation of mind, but only an 
 incapacity of thinking the opposite, it follows that 
 such a negative judgment cannot counterbalance the 
 express affirmative, the unconditional testimony, of 
 consciousness, that we are, though we know not how, 
 the true and responsible authors of our actions, not 
 merely the worthless links in an adamantine series of 
 causes and effects. 
 
 2. But not only may tte fact of our moral liberty 
 be shown to be possible, though inconceivable ; the 
 very objection of incomprehensibility, by which the 
 fatalist had thought to triumph over the libertarian, 
 may be retorted against himself. The scheme of 
 freedom is not more inconceivable than the scheme 
 of necessity. For whilst fatalism is a recoil from 
 the more obtrusive inconceivability of an absolute 
 commencement, on the fact of which commencement 
 the doctrine of liberty proceeds ; the fatalist over- 
 looks the equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability 
 of an infinite non-commencement, on the assertion of 
 which non-commencement his own doctrine of neces- 
 sity must ultimately rest. As equally unthinkable, 
 the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus 
 theoretically balanced. But practically our conscious- 
 ness of the moral law, which, without a moral liberty 
 in man, would be a mendacious imperative, gives a 
 decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom 
 over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act, if we 
 are accountable for our actions. (Discussions, pp. 
 623-5.) 
 
 SECOND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 NoMOLOGiCAL PSYCHOLOGY, or the Nomology of 
 Mind, is that science which investigates, not contin- 
 gent appearances, but the necessary and universal 
 facts, that is, the laws^ by ^vhich our faculties are 
 governed, to the end that we may obtain a criterion 
 by which to judge or to exphiin their procedures and 
 manifestations. Now, there will be as many depart- 
 ments of Nomological Psychology as there are classes 
 of mental phenomena ; for as each class proposes a 
 different end, and, in the accomplishment of that end, 
 is regulated by peculiar laws, each must consequently 
 have a different science conversant about these laws, 
 that is, a different Nomology. 
 
 (A) First Part of Nomological Psychology: 
 Nomology of the Cognitions. There is no one, no 
 Nomological, science of the Cognitive faculties, in 
 general ; though we have some older treatises which, 
 though partial in their subject, afford a name not un- 
 suitable for a nomology of the cognitions, — namely, 
 Guoseologia or Gnostologia. There is no indepen- 
 dent science of the laws of Perception ; if there were, 
 it mi<rht be called Esthetic, which, however, as we 
 shall see, would be ambiguous. Mnemonic, or the 
 
 231 
 
232 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 science of the hiws of Memory, has been cliiboratocl 
 at least in numerons treatises ; but the name Anam- 
 nestic, the art of Recollection or Reminiscence, might 
 be equally well applied to it. The laws of the Repre- 
 sentative faculty, — that is, the laws of Association, — 
 have not yet been elevated into a separate Nomolog- 
 ical science. Neither have the conditions of the Reg- 
 ulative or Legislative faculty, the faculty itself of 
 Laws, been fully analyzed, far less reduced to system ; 
 though we have several deservedly forgotten treatises, 
 of an older date, under the inviting name of Nbolo- 
 gies. The only one of the cognitive faculties, Avhose 
 laws constitute the ol>ject-matter of a separate science, 
 is the Elal)orative. This Nomology has obtained the 
 name of Logic' among other appellations, but not 
 from Aristotle. The best name would have been 
 DiANOETic. Logic is the science of the laws of 
 thousrht in relation to the end which our co«:nitive 
 faculties propose, — z. e., the True. To this head 
 might be referred Grammar, — Universal Grammar, 
 Philosophical Grammar, or the science conversant 
 with the laws of Language, as the instrument of 
 thought. 
 
 (B) Second Part of Nomological Psychology : 
 Nomology of the Feelings. The Nomoloijv of oui 
 Feelings, or the science of the laws which govern our 
 capacities of enjoyment, in relation to the end which 
 they propose, — i. e., the Pleasurable, — has ob- 
 tained no precise name in our language. It has been 
 
 ^ Sir William Hamilton has a separate course of lectures on Logic, 
 which, however, could not, even in the most abridged form, be em- 
 bodied in the present work. — J. C. M. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHT. 
 
 233 
 
 called the Philosophy of Taste, and, on the Continent 
 especially, it has been denominated Esthetic. Neither 
 name is unobjectionable. The first is vague, meta- 
 phorical, and even delusive. In regard to the second, 
 you are aware that aUdri<n<; in Greek means feeling in 
 general, as well as sense in particular; as our term 
 feeling means either the sense of touch in particular, 
 or sentiment, — and the capacity of the pleasurable 
 and painful in general. Both terms are, therefore, to 
 a certain extent, ambiguous ; but this objection can 
 rarely be avoided, and Esthetic, if not the best ex- 
 pression to be found, has already been long and gen- 
 erally employed. The term Apolaustic would have 
 been a more appropriate designation. 
 
 (C) Third Part of Nomological PsrcHOLOGfr: 
 Nomology of the Conations. The Nomology of 
 our Conative powers is Practical Philosophij, properly 
 so called; for practical philosophy is simply the 
 science of the laws regulative of our will and desires 
 in relation to the end which our conative powers pro- 
 pose, — i, e., the Good. This, as it considers these 
 laws in relation to man as an individual, or in relation 
 to man as a member of society, will be divided into 
 two branches, — Ethics and Politics ; and these again 
 admit of various subdivisions. {Lect. on Metajph.^ 
 VII.) 
 
THIRD DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CIIAPTEE I. 
 
 EXISTENCE IN GENERAL. 
 
 In connection with the general division of the phil 
 osophical sciences it was stated that the third great 
 branch of phih)sophy investigates the inferences which 
 are to be drawn from the phenomena presented in 
 consciousness. It is not, therefore, to be supposed 
 that we have an immediate knowledge of existence 
 itself; we know it merely through the phenomena in 
 which it is manifested. It is consequently necessary 
 now to explain the great axiom, that all human Icnoivl- 
 edge is only of the relative and phenomenal. 
 
 In this proposition the term relative is opposed to 
 the term absolute; and therefore, in saying that w^e 
 know only the relative, I virtually assert that we 
 know nothing absolute, — nothing existing absolutely, 
 that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us 
 and our faculties. I shall illustrate this by its appli- 
 cation. Our knowledge is either of matter or of 
 mind, 
 
 I. Now, what is matter? What do we know of 
 
 237 
 
238 
 
 ^.V OUTLINE OV 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPnY. 
 
 239 
 
 matter? Matter or l)()dy is to us the iifime cither of 
 sometliinsc hnown or of somethinsf nnhnown, 
 
 1. In so fur as matter is the name ^ov sometJiing 
 Tcnown^ it means that which appears to us under the 
 forms of extension, solidity, divisibility, fignre, mo- 
 tion, roughness, smoothness, color, heat, cold, etc. ; 
 in short, it is a common name for a certain series or 
 aggregate or complement of appearances or phenom- 
 ena manifested in coexistence. 
 
 2. Bnt as these phenomena appear only in conjunc- 
 tion, we are compelled by the constitution of our 
 nature to think them conjoined in and by something ; 
 and as i\\^y are phenomena, we cannot think them the 
 phenomena of nothing, but must regard them as the 
 properties or qualities of something that is extended, 
 solid, figured, etc. But this something, absolutely 
 and in itself, — that is, considered apart from its phe- 
 nomena, — is to us as zero. It is only in its quali- 
 ties, only in its effects, in its relative or phenomenal 
 existence, that it is coirnizable or conceivable ; and it 
 is only by a law of thought, which compels us to tliink 
 something, absolute and unknown, as the basis or 
 condition of the relative and known, that this some- 
 thing obtains a kind of incomprehensible reality to us. 
 Now, that which manifests its qualities, — in other 
 words, that in which the appearing causes inhere, that 
 to which they belong, — is called their subject^ or sub^ 
 stance^ or substratum. To this subject of the phenom- 
 ena of extension, solidity, etc., the term matter or 
 material substance is commonly glyen ; and, therefore, 
 as contradistinguished from these qualities, it is the 
 name of something unknown and inconceivable. 
 
 II. The same is true in regard to the term mind. 
 1. In so far as mind is the common name for the 
 states of knowing, willing, feeling, desiring, etc., of 
 which I am conscious, it is only the name for a certain 
 series of connected phenomena or qualities, and, con- 
 sequently, expresses only what is known. 2. But in 
 so far as it denotes that subject or substance in which 
 the phenomena of knowing, willing, etc., inhere, — 
 something behind or under these phenomena, — it 
 expresses what, in itself, or in its absolute existence, 
 
 is unknown. 
 
 Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are^ 
 only two different series of phenomena or qualities ; 
 mind and matter, as unknown and unknowable, are 
 the two substances in which these two different series 
 of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. 
 The existence of an unknown substance is only an in- 
 ference we are compelled to make from the existence 
 of known phenomena; and the distinction of two 
 substances is only inferred from the seeming incom- 
 patibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere 
 
 in one. 
 
 Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is thus, 
 as Ave have said, only relative ; of existence, abso- 
 lutely and in itself, we know nothing ; and wa^ay 
 say of man what Virgil says of iEneas, contemplating 
 in the prophetic sculpture of his shield the future 
 glories of Eome, — 
 
 (( 
 
 Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet." 
 
 f 
 
 Thus, our knowledge is of partial and relative ex- 
 isten.ce only, seeing that exifetence in itself, or abso- 
 
240 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 241 
 
 lute existence, is no object of knowledge. But it 
 does not follow that all relative existence is relative 
 to us; that all that can be known even by a limited 
 intelligence is actually cognizable by us. We must, 
 therefore, more precisely limit our sphere of knowl- 
 edge, by adding, that all wo know is known only 
 under the special conditions of knowledge. 
 
 Now, this principle of the relativity of all humnn 
 knowledire divides itself into two branches. In the 
 ^rst place, it would be unphilosophical to conclude 
 that the properties of existence necessarily are, in 
 number, only as the number of our faculties of appre 
 bending them ; or, in the second, that the properties 
 known are known in their native purity, and with- 
 out addition or modification from our organs of sense, 
 or our capacities of intelligence. I shall illustrate 
 these in their order. 
 
 I. In re«:ard to the first assertion, it is evident that 
 nothing exists for us, except in so far as it is known 
 to us, and that nothing is known to us, except certain 
 properties or modes of existence, which are relative 
 or analogous to our faculties. • Beyond these modes 
 we know, and can assert, the reality of no existence. 
 But if, on the one hand, we are not entitled to assert, 
 as actually existent, except what we know ; neither, 
 on the other, are we warranted in denying, as possi- 
 bly existent, what we do not know. The universe 
 may be conceived as a polygon of a thousand, or a 
 hundred thousand, sides or facets ; and each of these 
 sides or facets may be conceived as representing one 
 special mode of existence. Now, of these thousand 
 sides or modes, all may be equally essential, but three 
 
 I 
 
 or four only may be turned towards us, or be analo- 
 gous to our organs. One side or facet of the uni- 
 verse, as holding a relation to the organ of sight, is 
 the mode of luminous or visible existence ; another, 
 as proportional to the organ of hearing, is the mode 
 of sonorous or audible existence ; and so on. But if 
 every eye to see, if every ear to hear, were annihi- 
 lated, the mode of existence to which these organs 
 now stand in relation, — that which could be seen, 
 that which could be heard, — would still remain ; and 
 if the intelligences, reduced to the three senses of 
 touch, smell, and taste, were then to assert the im- 
 possibility of any modes of being except those to 
 which these three senses were analogous, the procedure 
 would not be more unwarranted, than if we now ven- 
 tured to deny the possible reality of other modes of 
 material existence than those to the perception of 
 which our five senses are accommodated. I will illus- 
 trate this by a hypothetical parallel. Let us suppose 
 a block of marble, on which there are four difierent 
 inscriptions, — in Greek, in Latin, in Persic, in He- 
 brew ; and that four travellers approach, each able to 
 read only the inscription in his native tongue. The 
 Greek is delighted with the information the marble 
 affords him of the siege of Troy ; the Roman finds 
 interesting matter regarding the expulsion of the 
 Kings ; the Persian deciphers an oracle of Zoroaster, 
 and the Jew is surprised by a commemoration of the 
 Exodus. Here, as each inscription exists or is sig- 
 nificant only to him who possesses the corresponding 
 lan2:uao:e ; so the several modes of existence are man- 
 ifested only to those intelligences who possess the 
 
 16 
 
242 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 srn mtuAM nAmzroN's rmiosnrnr. 
 
 243 
 
 corresponding organs. And as each of the four 
 readers would be rash, if he maintained that tlie mar- 
 ble could be significant only as significant to him, so 
 should we be rash, were we to hold that the universe 
 had no other phases of being than the few that are 
 turned towards our faculties, and which our five senses 
 
 enable us to perceive. 
 
 Before leaving this subject, it is perhaps proper to 
 observe that, had we faculties equal in number to all 
 the possible modes of existence, whether of mind or 
 matter, still would our knowledge of mind or mat er ♦ 
 be only relative. If material existence could exhibit 
 ten thousand phenomena, and if we possessed ten 
 thousand senses to apprehend these, of existence abso- 
 lutely and in itself we should be then as ignorant as 
 
 we are at present. 
 
 II But the consideration that our actual faculties 
 of knowledge are probably wholly inadequate in num- 
 ber to the possible modes of being, is of comparatively 
 less importance than the other consideration to which 
 we now proceed, that whatever we know is not Mown 
 as it is, but only as it seems to us to he; for it is of 
 less importance that our knowledge should be hmited, 
 than that our knowledge should be pure. It is, there- 
 fore of the highest moment that we should be aware 
 that' what we know is not a simple relation appre- 
 hended between the object known and thq subject 
 knowing, but that every knowledge is a sum made up 
 of several elements, and that the great business of 
 philosophy is to analyze and discriminate these ele- 
 ments, and to determine from whence these contribu- 
 tions have been derived. I shall explain what I mean 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 by an example. In the perception of an external 
 ol)ject, the mind does not know it in immediate re- 
 hition to itself, but mediately, in relation to the mate- 
 rial orsrans of sense. If, therefore, we were to throw 
 these organs out of consideration, and did not take 
 into account what they contribute to, and how they 
 modify our knowledge of, that object, it is evident 
 that our conclusion in res^ard to the nature of external 
 perception would be erroneous. Again, an object of 
 perception may not even stand in immediate relation 
 to the organ of sense, but may make its impression on 
 that oriran throu2:h an intervenini^ medium. Now, if 
 this medium be thrown out of account, and if it be 
 not considered that the real external object is the sum 
 of all that externally contributes to afiect the sense, 
 we shall, in like manner, run into error. For exam- 
 ple, I see a book, — I see that book through an ex- 
 ternal medium (what that medium is, we do not now 
 inquire), — and I see it through my organ of sight, 
 the eye. Now, as the full object presented to the 
 mind (observe that I say the mind), in perception, is 
 an object compounded of (1.) the external object 
 emitting or reflecting light, i, e., modifying the exter- 
 nal medium, of (2.) this external medium, and of (3.) 
 the livino: origan of sense, in their mutual relation, let 
 us suppose, in the example I have taken, that the full 
 or adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and 
 that this amount is made up of three several parts, — 
 of four contributed by the book, of four contributed 
 by all that intervenes between the book and the 
 organ, and of four contributed by the living organ 
 itself. 
 
244 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 I use this illustration to show, that the phcnoiiie- 
 non of the external object is not presented imme- 
 diately to the mind, but is known by it only as 
 modified through certain intermediate agencies ; and 
 to show that sense itself may be a source of error, if 
 we do not analyze and distinguish what elements, in 
 an act of perception, belong to the outward reality, 
 what to the outward medium, and what to the action 
 of sense itself. But this source of error is not limited 
 to our perceptions ; and we are liable to be deceived, 
 not merely by not distinguishing in an act of knowl- 
 edge what is contributed by sense, but by 'not dis- 
 tinguishing what is contributed by tlie mind itself. 
 This is the most difficult and important function of 
 philosophy ; and the greater number of its higher 
 problems arise in the attempt to determine the shares 
 to which the knowing subject, and the object known, 
 may pretend in the total act of cognition. For, accord- 
 ing as we attribute a larger or a smaller proportion to 
 each, we either run into the extremes of Idealism and 
 Materialism, or maintain an equilibrium between the 
 two. (^Lect, on Metaph., VIII.) 
 
 But although existence be only revealed to us in 
 phenomena, and though we can, therefore, have only 
 a relative knowledge either of mind or of matter ; still, 
 by inference and analogy, we may legitimately attempt 
 to rise above the mere appearances which experience 
 and observation afibrd. Thus, for example, the ex- 
 istence of God and the Immortality of the Soul are 
 not given ns as phenomena, as objects of immediate 
 knowledge ; yet, if the phenomena actually given do 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 245 
 
 necessarily require, for their rational explanation, the 
 hypotheses of immortality and of God, we are as- 
 suredly entitled, from the existence of the former, to 
 infer the reality of the latter. {Ibid,, VII.) 
 
AK OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PUILOSOPnY, 247 
 
 INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EXISTENCE OF GOD AND OmORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 
 
 The miucl of man rises to its highest dignity when 
 viewed as the object through which, and through 
 which alone, his unassisted reason can ascend to the 
 knowledge of a God. 
 
 The Deity is not an object of immediate contempla- 
 tion ; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our 
 reach ; we can know him only mediately through his 
 works, and are only warranted in assuming his exist- 
 ence as a certain khid of cause necessary to account 
 for a certain state of things, of whose reality our ftic- 
 ulties are supposed to inform us. The affirmation of 
 a God being thus a regressive inference, from the 
 existence of a special class of effects to the existence 
 of a special character of cause, it is evident that the 
 whole arjrument hin^res on the fact, — Does a state of 
 things really exist such as is only possible through 
 the agency of a Divine Cause ? For if it can be shown 
 that such a state of things does not really exist, then 
 
 24(i 
 
 \i. 
 
 \ 
 
 our inference to the kind of cause requisite to account 
 for it is necessarily null. 
 
 We must, first of all, then, consider what kind of 
 cause it is which constitutes a Deity, and what kind 
 of efiects they are which allow us to infer that a Deity 
 must be. 
 
 The notion of a God is not contained in the notion 
 of a mere first cause ; for in the admission of a first 
 cause Atheist and Theist are at one. Neither is this 
 notion completed by adding to a first cause the attri- 
 bute of Omnipotence ; for the atheist who holds mat- 
 ter or necessity to be the original principle of all that 
 is, docs not convert his blind force into a God, by 
 merely affirming it to be all-powerful. It is not until 
 the two great attributes of Intelligence and Virtue 
 (and be it observed that Virtue involves Liberty) — I 
 say, it is not until the two attributes of intelligence 
 and virtue or holiness are brought in, that the belief 
 in a primary and omnipotent cause becomes the be- 
 lief in a veritable Divinity. But these latter attri- 
 butes arc not more essential to the divine nature than 
 nic the former. For as original and infinite power 
 docs not of itself constitute a God, so neither is a God 
 constituted by intelligence and virtue, unless intelli- 
 gence and goodness be themselves conjoined with this 
 original and intinite power. For even a Creator, 
 intelligent and good and powerful, would be no God, 
 were he dependent for his intelligence and goodness 
 and power on any higher principle. On this supposi- 
 tion, the perfections of the Creator are viewed as lim- 
 ited and derived. He is himself, therefore, only a 
 dependency, — only a creature ; and if a God there 
 
218 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 be, he must, be sought for in that higher prhieiple, 
 from which this subordinate principle derives its attri- 
 butes. Now, is this highest prmciple {ex hypothe.He^ 
 all-powerful) also intelligent and moral; then it is 
 itself the veritable Deity. On the other hand, is it, 
 though the author of intelligence and goodness in 
 another, itself unintelligent ; then is a blind Fate con- 
 stituted the first and universal cause, and atheism is 
 
 asserted. 
 
 The peculiar attributes which distinguish a Deity 
 
 from the original omnipotence or blind tate of the 
 
 atheist being thus those of intelligence and holiness 
 
 of will, and the assertion of theism being only the 
 
 assertion that the universe is governed not only by 
 
 physical but by moral laws, we have next to consider 
 
 how we are warranted in these two afiirmations : (1.) 
 
 that intelligence stands first in the absolute order of 
 
 existence, in other words, that final preceded efficient 
 
 causes; and (2.) that the universe is governed by 
 
 moral laws. 
 
 The proof of these two propositions is the proof of 
 a God ; but before considering how far the phenom- 
 ena of mind and of matter do and do not allow us to 
 infer the one position or the other, I must solicit your 
 attention to the characteristic contrasts which these 
 two classes of phenomena in themselves exhibit. 
 
 In the compass of our experience, we distinguish 
 two series of facts, — the facts of the external or ma^ 
 terial world, and the facts of the internal world oi 
 world of intelligence. These concomitant scries of 
 phenomena are not like streams which merely run 
 parallel to each other ; they do not, like the Alphcus 
 
 SIR WJLLTAM ITAMILTOn's PniT.OKOVnY. 
 
 1i^ 
 
 and Arethusa, flow on side by side without a com- 
 mingling of their waters. They cross, they combine, 
 they are interlaced ; but notwithstanding their inti- 
 mate connection, their mutual action and reaction, 
 we are able to discriminate them without diffi- 
 culty, because the}^ are marked out by characteristic 
 diflerences. 
 
 The phenomena of the material world are subjected 
 to immutable laws, are produced and reproduced in 
 the same invariable succession, and manifest only the 
 blind force of a mechanical necessity. 
 
 The phenomena of man are, in part, subjected to 
 the laws of the external universe. As dependent 
 upon a bodily organization, as actuated by sensual pro- 
 pensities and animal wants, he belongs to matter, and, 
 in this respect, he is the slave of necessity. But what 
 man holds of matter does not make up his personality. 
 They are his, not he ; man is not an organism, — he 
 is an intelligence served by organs. For in man there 
 are tendencies — there is a law — which continually 
 urge him to prove that he is more powerful than the 
 nature by which he is surrounded and penetrated, 
 lie is conscious to himself of faculties not comprised 
 in the chain of physical necessity; his intelligence 
 reveals prescriptive principles of action, absolute and 
 universal, in the Law of Duty, and a liberty capable 
 of carrying that law into efifect, in opposition to the 
 solicitations, the impulsions, of his material nature.- 
 From the coexistence of these opposing forces in man, 
 there results a ceaseless struggle between physical 
 necessity and moral liberty, — in the langungo of Rov- 
 chilion, between the Flesh and the Spirit; and this 
 
'JbO 
 
 AN OUTLIXK OF 
 
 ^Xr\\<r(y\Q constitutes at once the distinctive character 
 of humanity, and the essential condition of human 
 development and virtue. 
 
 In the facts of intelligence we thus become aware 
 of an order of things diametrically in contrast to that 
 displayed to us in the facts of the material universe. 
 There is made known to us an order of things, in 
 which intelligence, by recognizing the unconditional 
 law of duty and an absolute obligation to fulfil it, rec- 
 ognizes its own possession of a liberty incompatible 
 with a dependence upon fate, and of a power capable 
 of resisting and conquering the counteraction of our 
 animal nature. 
 
 Now, it is only as man is a free intelligence, a 
 moral power, that he is created after the image of 
 God, and it is only as a spark of divinity glows as the 
 life of life in us, that we can rationally believe in an 
 Intelli<]:ent Creator and Moral Governor of the uni- 
 verse. For, let us suppose that in man intelligence 
 is the product of organization, that our consciousness 
 of moral liberty is itself an illusion; in short, that 
 acts of volition are results of the same iron necessity 
 which determines the phenomena of matter ; on this 
 supposition the foundations of all religion, natural and 
 revealed, are subverted. The truth of this will bo 
 best seen by applying the supposition of the two posi- 
 tions of theism previously stated. 
 
 I. In regard to the former, how can we attempt to 
 prove that the unlvei'se is the creation ofajree orvjinal 
 intelligence, against the counterposition of the atheist, 
 that liberty is an illusion, and intelligence, or the 
 adaptation of means to ends, only the product of a 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPnT. 
 
 251 
 
 blind fate? As w^e know nothing of the absolute 
 order of existence in itself, we can only attempt to 
 infer its character from that of the particular order 
 within the sphere of our experience ; and as we can 
 affirm naught of intelligence and its conditions except 
 what w^e may discover from the observation of our 
 own minds, it is evident that we can only analogically 
 carry out into the order of the universe the relation in 
 which we find intelligence to stand in the order of the 
 human constitution. If in man intelligence be a free 
 power, in so far as its liberty extends, intelligence 
 must be independent of necessity and matter ; and a 
 power independent of matter necessarily implies the 
 existence of an immaterial subject, that is, a spirit. 
 If, then, the original independence of intelligence 
 on matter in the human constitution, in other 
 words, if the spirituality of mind in man, be supposed 
 a datum of observation, in this datum is also given 
 both the condition and the proof of a God. For we 
 have only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, 
 that intelligence holds the same relative supremacy in 
 the universe which it holds in us, and the first positive 
 condition of a Deity is established, in the establish- 
 ment of the absolute priority of a free creative intelli- 
 gence. On the other hand, let us suppose the result 
 of our study of man to be, that intelligence is only a 
 product of matter, only a reflex of organization, such 
 a doctrine v/ould not only afford no basis on which to 
 rest any argument for a God, but, on the contrary, 
 would positively warrant the atheist in denying his 
 existence. For if, as the materialist maintains, the 
 only intelligence of which we have any experience be 
 
252 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF 
 
 a consequent of matter, — on this hypothesis, he not 
 only cannot assume this order to be reversed in the 
 relations of an intelligence beyond his observation, 
 but, if he argue logically, he must positively conclude, 
 that, as in man, so in the universe, the phenomena of 
 intelligenc^e or design are only in their last analysis 
 the products of a brute necessity. Psychological ma- 
 teiialism, if carried out fully and fairly to its conclu- 
 sions, thus inevitably results in theological atheism ; 
 as it has been well expressed by Dr. Henry More, 
 nitllus in microcosmo sjnrUus, nullus in macrocosmo 
 Deus. I do not, of course, mean to assert that all 
 materialists deny, or actually disbelieve, a God. For, 
 in very many cases, this would be at once an unmer- 
 ited compliment to their reasoning, and an unmerited 
 reproach to their faith. 
 
 II. Such is the manifest dependence of our theology 
 on our psychology in reference to the first condition 
 of a Deity, —the absolute priority of a free intelli- 
 gence. But this is perhaps even more conspicuous in 
 relation to the second, thai (he universe is governed 
 not merely by jpJiysical but by moral laics; for God is 
 only God inasmuch as he is the Moral Governor of a 
 Moral World. 
 
 Our interest, also, in its establishment is incom- 
 parably greater ; for while a proof that the universe 
 is the work of an omnipotent intelligence gratifies 
 only our speculative curiosity, — a proof that there is 
 a holy legislator, by whom goodness and felicity will 
 be ultimately brought into accordance, is necessary to 
 satisfy both our intellect and our heart. A God is, 
 
 SIB WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPBT, 
 
 253 
 
 
 indeed, to us, only of practical interest, inasmuch as 
 he is the condition of our immortality. 
 
 Now, it is self-evident, in the first place, that, if 
 there be no moral w^orld, there can be no moral gov- 
 ernor of such a w^orld ; and, in the second, that we 
 have, and can have, no ground on which to believe in 
 the reality of a moral world, except in so far as we 
 ourselves are moral agents. This being undeniable, 
 it is further evident, that, should we ever be con- 
 vinced that we are not moral agents, we should like- 
 wise be convinced that there exists no moral order in 
 the universe, and no supreme intelligence by which 
 that moral order is established, sustained, and regu- 
 lated. 
 
 But in what does the character of man as a moral 
 agent consist? Man is a moral agent only as he is 
 accountable for his actions, in other words, as he is 
 the object of praise or blame ; and this he is only in- 
 asmuch as he has prescribed to him a rule of duty, and 
 as he is able to act, or not to act, in conformity with 
 its precepts. The possibility of morality thus depends 
 on the possibility of liberty ; for if man be not a free 
 agent, he is not the author of his actions, and has 
 therefore no responsibility, no moral personality, at 
 all. 
 
 Theology is thus wholly dependent on psychology! 
 or mental science ; and psychology operates in three 
 ways to establish that assurance of human liberty 
 which is necessary for a rational belief in our ow^n 
 moral nature, in a moral world, and in a moral ruler 
 of that world. 
 
 1. In the first place, an attentive consideration of 
 
254 
 
 JN OUTLINE OF 
 
 J 
 
 the phenomena of mind is necessary in order to a 
 luminous and distinct apprehension of liberty as a da- 
 tum of intelligence. 
 
 2. In the second place, a profound philosophy is 
 necessary to obviate the difficulties which meet us 
 when we attempt to explain the possibility of this 
 fact, and to prove that the datum of liberty is not a 
 mere illusion. For, though an unconquerable feeling 
 compels us to recognize ourselves as accountable, and 
 therefore free agents, still, when we attempt to real- 
 ize in thought how the fiict of our liberty can be, we 
 soon find that this altogether transcends our under- 
 standing, and that every effort to bring the fact of 
 liberty within the compass of our conceptions only 
 results in the substitution in its place of some more or 
 less disguised form of necessity. The tendency of a 
 superficial philosophy is therefore to deny the fact of 
 liberty, on the principle that what cannot be conceived 
 is impossible. A deeper and more comprehensive 
 study of the facts of mind overturns this conclusion 
 and destroys its foundation. It proves to us, from 
 the very laws of mind, that, while we can never un- 
 
 " derstand how any original datum of intelligence is 
 
 \ possible, we have no reason from this inability to 
 
 j doubt that it is true. 
 
 L- 3. In the third place, the study of mind is neces- 
 sary to counterbalance and correct the influence of 
 the study of matter ; and this utility of psychology 
 rises in proportion to the progress of the natural sci- 
 ences, and to the greater attention which they engross. 
 An exclusive devotion to physical pursuits exerts an 
 evil influence in two ways. In ihQ first place, it di-. 
 
 sin WILLTAM HAMILTON'S PniLOSOPHY. 
 
 T>, 
 
 255 
 
 verts from all notice of the phenomena of moral lib- 
 erty, which are revealed to us in the recesses of the 
 human mind alone ; and it disqualifies from appreciat- 
 ing the import of these phenomena, even if presented, 
 by leaving uncultivated the finer power of psjx'hologi- 
 cal reflection, in the exclusive exercise of the faculties 
 employed in the easier and more amusing observation 
 of the external world. In the second place, by exhib- 
 iting merely the phenomena of matter and extension, 
 it habituates us only to the contemplation of an order 
 in which everything is determined by the laws of a 
 blind or mechanical necessity. Now, what is the 
 inevitable tendency of this one-sided and exclusive 
 study? That the student becomes a materialist, if he 
 speculate at all. For, in the first place, he is familiar 
 with the obtrusive facts of necessity, and is unaccus- 
 tomed to develop into consciousness the more recon- 
 dite facts of liberty ; he is, therefore, disposed to 
 disbelieve in the existence of phenomena whose reality 
 he may deny, and whose possibility he cannot under- 
 stand. At the same time, the love of unity, and the 
 philosophical presumption against the niulii plication 
 of essences determine him to reject the assumption 
 of a second, and that an hypothetical, substance, ig- 
 norant as he is of the reasons by which that assump- 
 tion is legitimated. 
 
 In the infancy of science, this tendency of physical 
 study was not experienced. When men first turned 
 their attention on the phenomena of nature, every 
 event was viewed as a miracle, for every eficct was 
 considered as the operation of an intelligence. God 
 was not exiled from the miiverse of matter ; on the 
 
4 
 
 2."6 
 
 y<y OUTLINE OF 
 
 contrary, he was multiplied in proportion to its phe- 
 nomena. As science advanced, the deities were grad- 
 ually driven out ; and long after the sublunary world 
 had been disenchanted, they were left for a season in 
 possession of the starry heavens. The movement of 
 the celestial bodies, in which Kepler still saw the 
 agency of a free intelligence, was at length by New- 
 ton resolved into a few mathematical principles ; and 
 at last, even the irregularities which Newton was com- 
 pelled to leave for the miraculous correction of the 
 Deity, have been proved to require no supernatural 
 interposition ; for La Place has show^n that all con- 
 tingencies, past and future, in the heavens, find 
 their explanation in the one fundamental law of grav- 
 itation. 
 
 But the very contemplation of an order and adapta- 
 tion so astonishing, joined to the knowledge that this 
 order and adaptation are the necessary results of a 
 brute mechanism, when acting upon minds which have 
 not looked into themselves for the light of which the 
 w^orld without can only afford them reflection, far 
 from elevating them more than any other aspect of 
 external creation to that inscrutable Being who reigns 
 beyond and above the nnivcrse of nature, tends, on 
 the contrary, to impress on them, with peculiar force, 
 the conviction, thjit as the mechanism of nature can 
 explain so nmch, the mechanism of nature can ex- 
 plain all. 
 
 Should physiology ever succeed in reducing the 
 facts of intelligence to phenomena of matter, philoso- 
 phy would be subverted in the subversion of its three 
 great objects, God, Free-Will, and Immortality. 
 
 r 1 
 
 sin WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 257 
 
 True wisdom w^ould then consist, not in speculation, 
 but in repressing thought during our brief transit from 
 nothinirness to nothingness. For why? Philosophy 
 would have become a meditation, not merely of death, 
 but of annihilation ; the precept, Knoiv thyself, w^ould 
 have been replaced by the terrible oracle to CEdi- 
 pus : — 
 
 " May'st thou ncvei know the truth of what thou art; *' 
 
 and the final recompense of our scientific curiosity 
 would be wailing, deeper than Cassandra's, for the 
 ijrnorance that saved us from despair. {LecL on 
 Metaph., 11.) 
 
 ••• 
 
 
 • • •• 
 
 • • • 
 
 • t • 
 
 • « 
 
 • •• 
 
 • « 
 
 • •• 
 
 • • 
 
 • •• 
 
 • • • 
 
 • • • • • •••'••»,••. 1' 
 
 • »••• «• •• »• •« • 
 
 • •• •• * ••• V* 
 
 ••k« • •• • 
 
 • • • 
 
 • • 
 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 • « • 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 
 * « 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 a • 
 
f- 
 
 This book is due two weeks from the last date stamped 
 below, and if not returned at or before that time a fine of 
 
 five cents a dav will be incurred. 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 »• 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I..' 
 
 I 
 
 / 
 
 9a.H/8 
 
 n 
 
 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES 
 
 010669906 
 
 S 
 
 S&/^' 
 
 w r 
 
 WAY 17 1934