& 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: BOWES & BOWES 
 LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED 
 GLASGOW : JAMES MACLEHOSE & SONS 
 
 1915 
 
« DEMOCRATIC ' 
 
 By W E Heitland MA 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: BOWES & BOWES 
 LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED 
 GLASGOW : JAMES MACLEHOSE & SONS 
 
 1915 
 
 A discursive 
 
The following pages have been written at intervals in the course of 
 several months, during which I have watched with anxiety the develop- 
 ment of events at home and abroad. To me it is the events at home 
 that have throughout been the chief cause of uneasiness. I fancy many 
 of my countrymen have much the same feeling. Of the doings on 
 the various fronts few are qualified to form definite opinions, even were 
 they well supplied with knowledge of the facts. But the doings in 
 this country have had a significance not to be mistaken, sometimes 
 justifying serious alarm. All have seen, from various points of view, 
 that our political and social system is undergoing a severe strain. 
 While some warn us that Democracy is on its trial, others find the 
 cause of blunders and misfortunes in the excessive influence of aristo- 
 crats or capitalists. Unable to accept either of these views, and seeing 
 no middle position between partisan extremes, I have been driven to 
 consider Democracy as a working fact in the United Kingdom under 
 the strain of present conditions. I ask myself 1 How far is our very 
 democratic system compatible with successful vigour in war, and with 
 the use of success, if achieved, to establish peace on a more solid 
 footing than heretofore?' In my attempts to find an answer I had to 
 ramble round my point, coming back to it again and again as my 
 inquiry proceeded. My fixed point was, and is, that the best interests 
 of humanity demand government on a democratic basis so arranged 
 as not to be government by the noisiest. That this is possible I still 
 believe : but I do not draw this comforting conclusion from the utter- 
 ances of those who talk most loudly of Democracy. 
 
 In the course of my argument I have ventured to offer several con- 
 structive suggestions on peace-policy. No doubt it savours of presump- 
 tion to do so. But the slow composition of this little work has resulted 
 in some of these suggestions being forestalled by certain speakers and 
 writers whose opinion would carry far more weight than mine. I have 
 not borrowed or stolen from these public characters. But their con- 
 clusions may serve to give respectability to mine. And the chief 
 of my suggestions are so far as I know not yet put forward. I am 
 therefore emboldened to put what I have to say into print. To the 
 Gallipoli and Salonika expeditions I make no reference. What will 
 be the final outcome of these two enterprises we cannot tell. Nor do 
 we know enough to judge whether our diplomacy in the Balkan coun- 
 tries has, as some think, been too slow and mild to meet the necessities 
 of the time. If that view of it be just, the mismanagement would seem 
 to be due to a timid misuse of democratic principles. I am aware 
 that much of what I have written is stale enough. But it is hardly 
 possible to give new points of view without restatement of the old. 
 
 December 191 5 
 
 W E H 
 
' Democratic ' 
 
 It may seem at first sight a mere waste of time to take 
 a single word, and that an adjective, as the subject of a 
 small treatise in time of war. It is indeed a pity that there 
 should be any reason for doing so. But it happens that 
 the word 'democratic' is just now constantly being used 
 so as to mislead not only the hearers or readers but also 
 those who address them as speakers or writers. It is so 
 used as to imply that every action, every movement, every 
 institution, that is (or is called) democratic is, as such, good, 
 and not only good but efficient : and that therefore you 
 have only to democratize everything in order to put an 
 end to all the sufferings of an unhappy world. I am 
 myself convinced that the tendency of democratic move- 
 ments is on the whole good. All the more therefore I am 
 convinced that they are good only in so far as they are 
 efficient. If the sovran people has really, after full know- 
 ledge and consideration, made up its mind that this or that 
 should or should not be done, I hold that no hindrance 
 ought to prevent the accomplishment of its will. But any- 
 one that has watched the course of politics for thirty or 
 forty years will have noticed that such a situation very 
 seldom occurs in practice. The elections put in power a 
 party on whose programme certain measures appear. This 
 is taken to be enough for practical purposes. If we have 
 no better plan to suggest (and I have not) we must be 
 content with this very rough method of ascertaining the 
 popular will. It is sadly imperfect, but so are we : and in 
 internal matters, more or less understood by the voters, it 
 is felt to be better than the dictation of an absolute (per- 
 haps an unintelligent) government It may be described as 
 a plan of providing a safety-valve. If the sovran people is 
 not pleased with the legislation that follows, it cannot 
 
4 Need of special knowledge. 
 
 deny* that it placed these legislators in power. This 
 consciousness prevents revolutionary explosions. 
 
 There are however questions the answers to which call 
 for technical or special knowledge that is possessed by 
 few. An internal question of the kind is that of sanitation 
 and town-planning. An external one is foreign policy. 
 No one is elected to Parliament as a sanitary reformer 
 pure and simple. And a man who came before the elec- 
 tors as a student of other nations, and appealed for support 
 simply on that ground, would have little chance against a 
 commonplace party hack. Yet these are both serious 
 matters. Sanitary reform is a necessity, and must be 
 pushed on in the teeth of interested or ignorant oppo- 
 sition. Foreign policy, if carried on without a wide 
 knowledge always kept up to date, is a source of public 
 danger. Now our present practice is something like this — 
 we electors do not vote on these questions: we leave 
 enthusiasts and experts to promote sanitary reforms, 
 knowing that there is enough apathy and formality in 
 Parliament to check over-hasty action : we trust our dip- 
 lomatic specialists to uphold the interests and rights, the 
 honour and duty, of our country in relation to foreign 
 states. And this we do on the well-understood condition 
 that there is to be no officious meddling, no provocative acts, 
 such as might be a just cause of irritation to our neigh- 
 bours. Our Foreign Ministers know that above all things 
 they must strive to maintain peace. But they also know 
 that the people mean peace accompanied by prosperity, 
 and that prosperity is only to be had on condition of the 
 freedom and security of the whole Empire : and that this 
 in turn depends on the sufficiency of our means of defence 
 and the freedom of communications by sea. Moreover it 
 is clear that, even if we could provide sufficient means of 
 defence singlehanded, Parliament would never vote the 
 sums needed for doing so. The only possible resource 
 left is to turn to account the force of those interests that 
 
 * This is what political theorists call the ' consent of the governed.' 
 
 I 
 
Policy and speed. 
 
 5 
 
 we have in common with other nations : in other words, 
 security is only to be had by using alliances to make up 
 the deficiency in our armed forces. And alliances create 
 duties, for it is not possible to get the advantages without 
 the disadvantages. To take an instance. The conquest of 
 Holland and Belgium by a great naval and military power 
 would place us in a position of extreme danger. It would 
 at once impose on us the very burdens from which we 
 shrink — that is, if we meant to remain free ourselves. 
 Therefore, guarantee or no guarantee, the freedom of 
 those countries is a vital interest to us. 
 
 Here we have a specimen of the problems with which 
 our Foreign Office has to deal. It has to face what 
 actually exists, not to proceed as if we were living in a 
 golden age of secure peace and goodwill among nations. 
 The possibility of war can never be left out of sight. In 
 the world as it is at present diplomatic notes are waste 
 paper unless they are understood to have at need sufficient 
 force behind them. So the Foreign Office depends on the 
 cooperation of the Treasury, the War Office, the Admiralty, 
 if its representations are to be listened to abroad. In duty 
 to us and our allies it is bound to take a line on inter- 
 national questions, while intervention that produces no 
 good result is bad for both. These are stale truths, but 
 recent developments have made them more serious than 
 ever. Railways, motor transport, telegraph and telephone, 
 wireless telegraphy, flying machines, submarines, high ex- 
 plosives, giant guns, modern army systems, have all tended 
 to lay stress on the necessity of speed, not only in actual 
 warfare, but in the diplomacy that strives to keep the 
 peace. In seasons of crisis hours and minutes are of 
 supreme importance. A slight hitch may give time for 
 irrevocable steps. In a few hours millions of men may be 
 on the way to the fronts, bombs may be dropping on 
 towns, ships may be sunk by torpedoes, and great fort- 
 resses only holding out to be cracked like nuts. The 
 Foreign Minister may suspect that his efforts are doomed 
 
6 Hope from change of feeling 
 
 to fail in the face of a settled resolve of one party to make 
 war. But only actual failure can prove this to be so. In 
 dire haste he must do all he can to avert the calamity : and 
 it should be counted to him for righteousness, though the 
 plague be not stayed. 
 
 It can hardly be denied that this is a dreadful state of 
 things, and that the discovery of an effective remedy would 
 come as a welcome relief to mankind. Now there seem to 
 be only two main influences available for bringing about 
 the desirable change. No humane person will start with a 
 prejudice against either of these as means to a good end, 
 but he will feel bound in each case to ask two questions,-- 
 (i) is this attainable, and how soon ? (2) if attained, is it 
 likely to prove effective ? The first influence is a change 
 of national and international feeling : the second a change 
 of national and international machinery. That the former 
 of these, if attained, would be effective, is at least highly 
 probable. But its attainment, if we assume it to be pos- 
 sible, is surely far off. The good folks who in different 
 countries strive to promote moderation at home and good- 
 will abroad are apt to be suspected (sometimes with reason) 
 of too great readiness to sacrifice national interests for in- 
 sufficient benefits. The sacrifice is obvious and certain, 
 the benefit uncertain and often obscure. Most of them are 
 very wellmeaning people, but they may easily become 
 unpatriotic in practice without knowing it. Most of them 
 are not impelled by any motive of private interest. They 
 are willing to impute such motives to their opponents, 
 motives of a commercial or stock-exchange character, but 
 the charge is more easily made than proved, and we should 
 note that these motives need not, and perhaps do not, affect 
 one side only. There is surely a certain amount of malign 
 interpretation on both sides. When we turn to inter- 
 national feeling, it is at once clear that the first condition 
 of effectiveness is reciprocity. If nation A treats nation B 
 with steady friendliness for many years, only refusing to 
 become the tool of B's ambitions, while B takes every con- 
 
or from change of machinery ? 7 
 
 cession as a proof of A's weakness, how can you rely on 
 international goodwill as an influence making for peace 
 between them ? A is uneasy and B contemptuous. The 
 situation is not one to be relieved both speedily and peace- 
 fully. The choice seems to rest between a long strain of 
 competition, with some hope of improved relations through 
 the effect of time, and an armed struggle resulting in either 
 the subjection of A or the humiliation of B. 
 
 I sincerely hope that the desired change of feeling will 
 some day come, a great boon to future generations. But 
 I think it is at present far off. If it is to be genuine, it 
 will have to come by slow degrees An international 
 confidence of mushroom growth will hardly have the 
 strength to bear inevitable strains. It is perhaps a con- 
 sciousness of this difficulty that leads some peace-loving 
 persons to seek the means to their end in a change of 
 machinery. Assuming (what is not really true) that our 
 diplomatists conduct our foreign policy at their own sweet 
 will, the proposal is that in future that policy shall be 
 under 'democratic control.' On the face of it this means 
 that the sovran people, often now spoken of by the Greek 
 name Demos, is to direct foreign policy itself. The man 
 in the street is not unwilling to be told that he is a capable 
 fellow. That he could do this or that better than the man 
 at present in charge, is a flattering suggestion. He will 
 not warmly resent it. So long as men do not explain 
 what they mean by democratic control, the blessed words 
 will be popular owing to their alluring sound. The charm 
 found by the good old dame in ' that blessed word Meso- 
 potamia' is faint compared with the charm of ' democratic ' 
 to the ordinary voter. It is used with much unction by 
 popular writers. But it is well to remember that, not only 
 the word itself, but the associations that make up its flavour, 
 are Greek in origin, and that writers are consciously or 
 unconsciously influenced by those associations. The picture 
 of a sovran Demos, patriotic and intelligent, directing all 
 his own affairs at home or abroad, a Demos whose officials 
 
8 Direct or Primary Democracy 
 
 tremble before him, is at the back of men's minds. The 
 few who have studied ancient Greek democracy at first 
 hand very naturally prefer it at its best to average forms 
 of its chief rival, Greek oligarchy. Writers who get their 
 information from modern treatises lay stress on the pre- 
 ference and pass lightly over the reservations made by 
 judicious students. The further you get from the student, 
 the more completely do the qualifications drop away. 
 There is left a residuum of confident assumption that in 
 ancient times at least what was democratic was therefore 
 also good. This suggests the question whether the same 
 principle may not hold good of modern times : at least it 
 would seem that anyone maintaining the contrary needs 
 to bring very strong evidence to support his view. 
 
 Let me now briefly set out a few of the main charac- 
 teristics of the most famous of ancient democracies, Athens. 
 Of others it need only be said that they were either un- 
 important or sad failures. Official posts were very numerous. 
 The normal term of office was one year. The powers of 
 officials were jealously limited and they were severely held 
 to account on going out of office. Only the board of the 
 ten 'Generals,' who managed war and foreign relations, 
 were always elected by vote, and were re-eligible. The 
 appointment of other officials was made either by drawing 
 lots or by a combination of election with the lot. So little 
 importance was attached to the careful choice of fit men 
 for particular posts. The duties of the several offices were 
 largely of a routine character, easily discharged by citizens 
 whose everyday lives from childhood up brought them into 
 close touch with local and national affairs. The Senate, 
 which was a Grand Committee whose chief duty was to 
 discuss public business and prepare it for the final decision 
 of the Assembly, was chosen by lot. By these arrange- 
 ments it was provided that the greatest possible number 
 of citizens should bear some part at least in the adminis- 
 tration of the state, whether they were competent or not. 
 The real power in all matters lay with the general Assembly 
 
illustrated from Athens. 9 
 
 of citizens. It could not only accept or reject proposals 
 laid before it on such matters as alliances, war and peace, 
 or taxation, or condemn accused persons to fines banish- 
 ment or death. Checks on hasty action existed only in 
 the legislative department, and these were much weakened 
 in the latter days of the Democracy. For Demos in As- 
 sembly retained the dangerous power of initiative. He 
 was led by public speakers, and oratory was at once the 
 glory and the bane of Athens. For eloquence is no 
 guarantee of wisdom. An unscrupulous speaker, bent on 
 rising to power by becoming the voice of the passions of 
 the moment, easily got a hearing. He might (some did) 
 induce the People to embark on a wicked war, or to 
 sentence thousands of prisoners to death in cold blood. 
 Demos might (and once at least did) repent in time and 
 revoke his decree. But his usual practice was to vent his 
 wrath on the orators who had led him into acts that he 
 looked back upon with regret or shame. As a rule, a 
 decree was not recalled. 
 
 Great and terrible indeed was the power of Demos in 
 Assembly. But of whom did the Assembly consist ? Not 
 of delegates, but of the citizens themselves in person. It 
 is plain that an active governing body of this kind is only 
 possible in a small state, ridiculously small according to 
 modern ideas. Nobody had as yet thought of a represen- 
 tative system. And who were the citizens ? They were 
 the legitimate male descendants of former citizens ; that 
 is, of former members of a community the origin of which 
 was not exactly known. The surviving traditions of the 
 past recorded that the present liberties and rights of 
 Athenian citizens had only been won after long struggles 
 with a class of nobles, who had in olden days held all 
 power. But the poorer commoners, once they had gained 
 the full rights of citizenship, were just as exclusive as the 
 old land-owning nobles had been before them. Pure 
 citizen birth, with certain religious rights attached to citizen 
 birth, was the regular basis of this hereditary citizenship. 
 
 V 
 
io Citizenship. The Assembly. 
 
 Aliens were allowed to reside in Athens, and even en- 
 couraged to do so. A very large share of the commerce 
 of Athens was in their hands, but they could not own 
 Athenian land. Athens in truth could not do without her 
 resident aliens : but residence had nothing to do with 
 citizenship, which remained hereditary. Once or twice, 
 under the pressure of some great necessity, exceptions 
 were made, but these incorporations were granted with 
 much reluctance, and formed no precedent. In her grand 
 days, when Athens commanded the sea and ruled a large 
 empire of tributary states, her citizens throve on the 
 revenues that poured in year by year. They did not desire 
 to share the profits of empire with aliens : and when the 
 empire was lost there was little left to share. Citizenship 
 became more strictly hereditary than ever, confined to 
 those who were of civic extraction on the mother's side as 
 well as the father's. 
 
 Thus the number of men (women did not count) quali- 
 fied to take part in the Assembly was not large. Set 
 against the total of aliens, regularly resident or on passing 
 visits, and slaves, they seem to have been a minority of the 
 male population. But in practice it was never possible to 
 bring together all the citizens on any one occasion. Some 
 would be in the country too busy to leave their farms. 
 So me would be abroad on private or public business. 
 Wars were frequent, and many would be absent serving 
 in the fleets and armies. And those at home were but 
 human, liable to be sick or lazy. We know that it was 
 sometimes not easy to secure a full attendance, and that at 
 length it was found necessary to provide a small fee. The 
 voting was by show of hands, in other words a counting by 
 heads of those present. This hasty decision, by a majority 
 of what was often a poor percentage of the whole citizen 
 body, constituted a Decree, binding on the whole state. 
 The absent, being unrepresented, had no voice in the 
 matter, and we know that on one famous occasion the men 
 at the front refused to be bound by the act of the men at 
 
Military service. 1 1 
 
 home. Nor need we wonder at this. The Assembly voted 
 under the immediate influence of the passions roused or 
 inflamed by the speakers : and the speakers were often 
 shortsighted, even when honest. The Assembly often 
 settled offhand questions on which a well-informed states- 
 man would not have given a judgment without careful 
 inquiry and thought. So policy in the main depended on 
 the popular orators or ' demagogues ' [leaders of Demos]. 
 And on the whole they made a pretty mess of it. 
 
 It this or that be 'democratic' according as it is a 
 genuine expression of the sovran people's deliberate will, I 
 confess that I cannot find much of the kind in Athens, 
 beyond the sharing of offices and emoluments. But I have 
 left to the last the most truly democratic institution of all, 
 that of universal compulsory service in war. Not only was 
 every citizen bound to serve as required in the army or 
 fleet, and regularly trained for the purpose from his youth 
 up, but the resident aliens had to serve also. These resi- 
 dents enjoyed considerable privileges : therefore they were 
 required to perform considerable duties. There could be 
 no substitutes* in military duty ; even as the citizen had 
 no representative to speak or vote for him in political life. 
 Rich and poor were on an equal footing. If the masses 
 were jealous of the rich, still there was at the back of men's 
 minds a very Greek feeling that the rich man was less likely 
 to steal the public money. Hence rich men were at times 
 placed as 'generals' in positions of trust for which they 
 were unfit. I have now said enough of Athens. I turn to 
 the modern world with its vast states and problems on a 
 gigantic scale, the age of coal and oil, of electricity and 
 steam. I am to inquire how democracy works under 
 modern conditions, and how far it seems able to control 
 and improve international relations, at present finding 
 expression in bloodshed and ruin. 
 
 * In the later democracy of the fourth century BC the employment of pro- 
 fessional soldiers hired from anywhere 1 ecame nrvire and more the rule, a 
 symptom of the decay of civic life and the decline of Athens. 
 
12 Representative Democracy. 
 
 And now, how about democracy in the modern king- 
 dom of Great Britain and Ireland ? It is clearly impossible 
 for our millions of voters scattered over the country to 
 meet in person as members of a general Assembly. They 
 must act through representatives, to whom they delegate 
 their powers for limited periods. This system has gradu- 
 ally developed in a 'popular' direction, so that we are now 
 really governed by the majority of the House of Commons. 
 What is the position of a Member of this House ? So far 
 as his constituents have approved certain measures, he is 
 bound to vote for those measures in the same spirit and 
 sense in which his supporters approved them. But what 
 if a sudden change of circumstances has created a new and 
 unforeseen situation ? Suppose him pledged to vote for 
 a reduction of the army. What is he to do, if the session 
 opens with the news that the country has been forced into 
 war ? Is he nevertheless to vote for reduction, or to return 
 to his constituency and risk the chances of a fresh election ? 
 While he is applying for a fresh ' mandate,' what will the 
 enemy be doing ? Commonsense will decide that his duty 
 is not to hesitate but to act promptly in the common 
 interest of all. In other words, he is to some extent an 
 instructed delegate, but he is necessarily more than this. 
 Inasmuch as sudden crises are always possible, and Par- 
 liament is the only power available for dealing with them, 
 Members must have (and exercise) a discretion that is not 
 expressly included in their instructions. No outsiders can 
 take their place: they cannot, if they would, shirk their 
 responsibility. Or we may put it thus, Parliament as a 
 body has necessarily a responsibility beyond that assumed 
 by individual Members : the Member for Darlington is 
 also a Member of Parliament, simply. And, since the 670 
 Members, if all patriotic and wise, cannot all be equally 
 qualified to judge on all subjects, an elaborate system of 
 leadership is required to make the whole machine work. 
 Private judgment is surrendered to an extent probably 
 greater than we ordinary citizens imagine. Thus the 
 
The Majority Question. 13 
 
 responsibility and power that we convey to our M Ps by 
 the votes of our local majorities is in turn conveyed by them 
 to a few leading men. It is on the right judgment of these 
 leaders that we depend in critical moments. In short, our 
 Democracy is necessarily a system of delegation, for good 
 or for evil. Our responsibility as electors amounts to this, 
 that, if we chose bad representatives, it is we ourselves who 
 are likely to suffer for our blunder, i 
 
 The general principle underlying democratic govern- 
 ment is that the decision of the whole voting body is 
 determined by the vote of the majority of the body, — 
 that is, by simple count of heads. But in no representative 
 system* as yet in being is there any security for the attain- 
 ment of this result, so far as regards the electors. We 
 vote by constituencies, and in some constituencies the 
 Member is returned by a big majority, in others by a very 
 small one. But in the House all the votes are of equal 
 value. It may happen that in a division the majority of 
 Members' votes represents a minority of electors' votes. 
 Nor can the facts of the case be ascertained by a mere 
 adding-up of the total votes given, and the majorities in 
 the several constituencies at the last elections. Some 
 Members are returned unopposed, and there arc no figures 
 to add in. Moreover there are always a good many votes not 
 used in an election, and by no means always for reasons 
 of indifference on the part of voters. The result of an 
 election is a very rough-and-ready declaration of public 
 opinion. Hence we hear of plans for ' proportional repre- 
 sentation,' by which it is thought that a more truly repre- 
 sentative result would be gained. But nothing less than a 
 massed vote of the whole country at one time would effect 
 
 * The most famous case illustrative of the matter of this section is the 
 1876 Presidential election in U S A. After a long and bitter dispute it was 
 decided that the Presidential electors were for Hayes 185, for Tilden 184. 
 But it was admitted that the 184 had been returned by a larger number of 
 voters than the 185. This was of course a point of no importance in the 
 dispute, for the voting for Presidential electors was an affair of each separate 
 State, 'not of the Union. Hayes became President. See J F Rhodes, 
 History of the United States, vol vii ch 44. 
 
14 Group-voting and its defects. 
 
 much. So long as we vote by constituencies (that is, by 
 groups), very little can be done to prevent the utter 
 swamping and discouragement of hopelessly-outnumbered 
 local minorities. And local feeling is strong enough to 
 put the abolition of local constituencies outside the range 
 of practical politics. My conclusion is that the present 
 rough machinery, with a redistribution of seats now and 
 then, must serve for the needs of this generation, whatever 
 may be the possibilities of a more exact and refined method 
 in the future. It is not the roughness of our machinery, 
 but the frequent efforts to treat it as exact, that are the 
 real trouble. There is far too much talk of ' mandates,' 
 too little recognition of the national duty and responsibility 
 resting on Members of Parliament. This is owing to the 
 party-machines ; and party-machines are not the organs 
 of national feeling and judgment, but of the will and interest 
 of the intriguing Few. What they do not represent is the 
 deliberate will of Demos, the sovran people. 
 
 We must not omit to consider the nature of our voting 
 constituencies. What is their character, their real value as 
 bodies for electing our national governors and instructing 
 them as to their conduct when elected ? An honest elector 
 claims a right to express his opinion by his vote. But 
 very often he has no candidate before him in whose pro- 
 fessed policy he has full confidence. He must vote for a 
 man in order to vote for a policy, and he generally ends by 
 voting for the one with whose programme he most nearly 
 agrees. So far as concerns local interests, trade interests, 
 and all such matters in which he has some practical know- 
 ledge and experience to guide him, he votes pretty 'straight' ; 
 that is, for what suits him best. Very naturally. If you 
 challenged his conduct, he would reply that his vote was 
 not given him to vote for what suits other people :— they 
 have their own votes. But when it comes to large national 
 questions in which his own personal interests are not 
 directly concerned, his course is not so clear. Only a very 
 small percentage of voters can find time to study such 
 
Want of clear decisions. 15 
 
 questions thoroughly enough to form careful opinions of 
 their own. They have to depend on what party-newspapers 
 and party-candidates tell them, and a sound judgment is 
 not easily formed on such materials. The general result 
 is that a voter swallows this or that party programme 
 because of some one or more items that take his fancy. 
 For instance, he votes for Mr ' Lincoln ' as an enemy of the 
 House of Lords. It does not occur to him that perhaps 
 the House of Lords may be more interested in the welfare 
 of the nation than a Hungarian Jew of doubtful record. 
 Did Mr Lincoln truly represent Darlington in 1910 ? 
 Certainly not. This is a flagrant case. But the same 
 thing occurs, only in a less striking form, practically every- 
 where. Party programmes are formed by mixing up a 
 number of issues that have really nothing to do with each 
 other. Under this system of party-politics we contrive to 
 muddle along somehow. But to pretend that we ever by 
 means of it get a clear and deliberate vote on great questions, 
 taken separately on their merits, is absurd. 
 
 That we do muddle through in ordinary times is 
 all to the credit of our national commonsense and self- 
 control, in fact to moral qualities that make the best of a 
 clumsy and imperfect system. But in critical times we are 
 wholly dependent on the bundle of high moral qualities 
 that we call by the name of patriotism. War is the 
 extreme case of such a situation. That our country may 
 do her duty, and do it with honour, all must submit to 
 sacrifices, and must be content to leave the direction of 
 affairs in the hands of a very few men, whether we like 
 their policy in ordinary times or not. Just now, the strain 
 on our patriotic endurance is very severe. We can only 
 hope that the country will stand fast. Only by supreme 
 energy and patience can we redeem past neglect and win 
 peace without ruin. If we squabble at home, all the noble 
 efforts of our brave men on sea and land will be vain. We 
 have to deal with an enemy who has for these forty years 
 been preparing for war with a definite purpose. We are as 
 
16 Franchise-policy. Aliens. 
 
 amateurs suddenly called upon to face professionals, and 
 every conceivable means has been used to gain advantages 
 over us I will not go into this subject at length ; it has 
 been fully treated by many writers. But the present need 
 for the active display of stedfast patriotism suggests an 
 inquiry into our policy with regard to the franchise. What 
 care, if any, have we taken to ensure that our constituencies 
 shall truly give voice to the patriotic feelings that exist in 
 all parts of the country ? 
 
 We are justly proud that our islands have for centuries 
 been a refuge for the victims of oppression abroad. We 
 have welcomed and protected them. We have made it 
 easy for them to become our fellow-citizens, with all the 
 rights conferred by full citizenship. In receiving these refu- 
 gees on an equal footing with our own people we gained a 
 number of loyal citizens, many of them remarkable for 
 talent and industry. So far, it is well. Somewhat differ- 
 ent is the case of those foreigners who in recent years 
 have settled here for purely economic reasons, not as 
 refugees flying from persecution in their native lands. 
 Still, these must be above the average capacity in some 
 respect, or they would fail. And in one or two generations 
 they mostly become English enough. Of an utterly differ- 
 ent character is the most recent immigration of aliens, who 
 come over with the known approval of a foreign govern- 
 ment, and are secured against downright failure by a 
 secret resource. Any information that they can get for 
 the use of their government against our interest has more 
 or less money value. Let the spy prove himself useful, 
 and he will at least not be allowed to starve. He may 
 even settle down here and become a naturalized English- 
 man* in a very short time and on payment of a trifling fee. 
 Thus he gets access to our ballot-boxes : he may even sit 
 in our House of Commons. Now I think most patriotic 
 citizens would agree that to stop naturalization of aliens 
 altogether is not desirable. But would they not admit 
 * See Whitaker's Almanac for 1915, page 429. 
 
Military Service. 
 
 17 
 
 that we are much too easy-going in this matter ? Whether 
 women should or should not have votes is a question on 
 which opinions differ. But to exclude Sarah Brown from 
 simple voting, while Hermann Schleicher can even sit in 
 Parliament, is surely a monstrous absurdity. For British 
 naturalization does not ensure British loyalty ; nor does 
 womanhood surely imply incompetence. In what sense can 
 our 'democratic ' practice reasonably be called democratic ? 
 
 The contrast just referred to reminds me of the import- 
 ant question of military service. In theory every man 
 within certain limits of age and free from infirmities is 
 liable to serve in the defence of his country. But ours is 
 the only democratic government of note that has refused 
 to enforce this liability. Even in America* it was found 
 necessary to resort to a draft by ballot in the great Civil 
 War. The case of Switzerland is enough to shew that 
 compulsory service has no unavoidable connexion with an 
 aggressive policy. But the same may be truly said of all 
 small states that value their own independence. In truth 
 service as a duty is the fullest expression of democratic 
 citizenship. We are now learning this. Our speakers and 
 writers are never tired of pointing out that the worker in 
 the factory, the doctor, the nurse, the stretcher bearer, are 
 all doing national service, even war-service, as a duty ; not 
 the men afloat or in the trenches only. The call is for 
 everyone to serve where he or she will be of most use. 
 But one thing is omitted — the duty of the responsible 
 government to say boldly that in a season of grave crisis 
 each individual cannot be left to fix where his own particular 
 post should be. If we grant that in all human societies 
 unnecessary interference with the freedom of individual 
 members is an evil to be avoided, we have to remember 
 that the societies themselves need freedom, if they are to 
 exist. Once conquered and subject, they are on the way 
 
 * Since writing this, I see that the story of the draft enforced in the United 
 States is fully told by Mr J Ellis Barker, in Nineteenth Century for Sept 1915. 
 It is worth reading. See also Rhodes' History of U S A. 
 
1 8 Democracy and Freedom. 
 
 to perish as societies, and their members to be more or less 
 completely absorbed in the organization of their conquerors. 
 Now Democracy claims to be the political system most of 
 all favourable to the freedom of mankind. It is therefore, 
 more than any other, dependent on the safeguarding of 
 national independence. The individual citizen must at a 
 pinch be ready to give up his full freedom of action, and 
 submit to take orders from his government. That is, unless 
 he prefers to take orders from a conquering alien, and 
 eventually to be employed in subjecting others to the same 
 yoke. In which case he can hardly be reckoned a loyal 
 citizen. Suppose the result of the present war to be a 
 proof that democratic nations cannot be trusted to hang 
 together and put forth their full strength by united effort. 
 We see what a terrible strength is shown by a nation 
 united under an absolute government and driven to the 
 fiercest exertions by autocratic power. If democratic 
 Britain, torn by dissensions, cannot hang together to secure 
 her own independence, the prospect for free institutions all 
 over the world is black indeed. 
 
 And yet in that dark hour it would not be democratic 
 principles that had failed so disastrously, but only our 
 foolish interpretation of them. If we ask of Democracy 
 that which neither it nor any other principle of government 
 can give, Democracy will fail us, as it has failed other 
 peoples ancient and modern. No system can work so as to 
 stand the strain of circumstances that are always changing, 
 unless the very best wisdom available be employed for its 
 direction. Nor will wisdom serve our turn, unless it be 
 used, not only with loyalty, but with courage. It is not 
 the best form of government that can bring us safely 
 through the storm, but orderly obedience to the best leader- 
 ship. It is an affair of the spirit. The strength of absolute 
 governments lies in the general readiness to submit to 
 authority. Such nations gain immensely in time of war 
 by simply having to continue that which they have practised 
 in time of peace ; for orderly cooperation has with them 
 
Looking to stable peace. 19 
 
 become a second nature. The case of democracies is more 
 complicated. Bent on leaving to their citizens the utmost 
 personal freedom of action, and assuming that this freedom 
 is a good thing for the future of humanity, it is not easy 
 for nations organized on this model to rally quickly and 
 effectively in order to face a sudden and pressing danger. 
 The power to do this, splendidly displayed by France, is 
 a proof that not only the bodily frame of democracy, but 
 the animating spirit, is present. Whatever the defects 
 (and defects there are and will be) democratic France is 
 alive. Of nations as of persons it is true that a corpse is 
 not a man. 
 
 Let it be granted that we in this country are waking 
 up, and beginning to recognize that leadership and co- 
 operation are our first needs if we are to come successfully 
 out of the war. Let it be added that we did not want this 
 war and want to have no more wars, if possible. Success, 
 from our point of view, must mean a settlement that tends 
 to promote a stable peace. The longer the war lasts, the 
 more thorough the settlement will have to be. But mere 
 ' terms of peace ' will not give us what we desire. In case 
 of defeat this is manifest : the enemy have left us no room 
 for doubt. In case of victory, all will depend on the wise 
 rearrangement of relations between the various nations as 
 constituted by the terms of peace. A number of well- 
 meant proposals are being put forward with the aim* of 
 forwarding such a rearrangement, — Peace Leagues, Inter- 
 national Councils and Legislatures, enforcement of delay 
 in the settlement of differences, International Police, and 
 so forth. No doubt much might be effected by machinery 
 of this character, always provided that the machinery is 
 fairly and consistently worked, and above all things pro- 
 vided that it never ceases to be driven by sufficient power. 
 And this persistent power is only to be found in the per- 
 sistence of a pacific and equitable spirit. A mere rush of 
 enthusiasm, nations embracing each other with tears of joy, 
 is more likely to be the forerunner of reaction than a 
 
20 Possibility of an international Court. 
 
 guarantee of lasting goodwill. A recent peace-projector 
 has suggested that a whole year ought to be spent in 
 working out satisfactory terms of peace. I do not think 
 it could be properly done in less than a generation — say 
 between 30 and 40 years. No arrangement will be so 
 perfect as to solve all awkward problems. Some difficulties 
 will surely be overlooked, some will turn out to have been 
 misunderstood. If the settlement is to have a good chance 
 of permanence, there mnst be some means of modifying 
 parts of it that are found not to work well, before serious 
 friction arises from these defects. And here is, so far as I 
 see, the only chance of setting up a court for dealing with 
 international disputes on a practical basis. 
 
 I submit that any such court cannot hope to have at its 
 back the power needed to make it effective and useful, 
 unless the nations concerned are very nearly unanimous in 
 a belief of its practical utility. This belief can only be got 
 by experience, and this experience a court that only does 
 occasional business, mostly business of little interest to the 
 world in general, is hardly in a position to furnish. How 
 to create a solid tradition, so strong that a great majority 
 of nations would be unwilling to do without the court, — 
 this is, I hold, the real problem. Now a court charged 
 with the duty of watching a settlement, a settlement 
 recognized as not unlikely to need reconsideration in un- 
 foreseen matters of detail, may well be able in the course 
 of 30 or 40 years to prove its worth as a practical peace- 
 maker, and create a tradition of no little solidity. The 
 more business it has to deal with in that period, the better 
 for that purpose. Should things turn out so that it has 
 very little to do, there is compensation in the discovery 
 that the settlement entrusted to its care was after ail less 
 imperfect than had been expected. The end of the period 
 would leave the settlement in a form reasonably regarded 
 as final. That is, the international relations of the states, 
 which for a fixed period guaranteed the decisions of the 
 court, would start afresh, their compact having expired. 
 
Needful basis of mutual trust. 21 
 
 No business would remain save voluntary arbitrations. 
 Such is the character of the so-called Hague Tribunal. It 
 only acts when appealed to, and its powers consist in the 
 pledges of the contending parties to abide by its decisions. 
 Its weakness is seen when it is used as a centre of ' confer- 
 ences.' Then the object in view is to establish new and 
 better principles for the international relations of states in 
 peace and war. We have reason to know that it cannot do 
 much. All states can claim a share in a Conference, and 
 the community of interest is of too faint a quality to enable 
 it to act with vigour. A state that is preparing for con- 
 quests will agree to nothing that in any way lessens the 
 advantages it has gained or is gaining by its preparations. 
 We know what happened when an effort was made to 
 procure a reduction of armaments all round. It failed 
 through the refusal of Germany. Attempts to make Inter- 
 national rules by these means have been, and probably will 
 be, failures. 
 
 But, if we succeed in this war, we shall find ourselves 
 and our Allies in the presence of an opportunity such as 
 may never recur. We shall be exhausted, and sorely 
 tempted to patch up a hasty settlement that may give us 
 momentary rest. We may neglect to profit by the one 
 great gain, that of having become fully conscious of our 
 common interests and common feelings. These interests 
 and feelings we ought to turn to good account while the 
 consciousness of them is still fresh. In any effort to pro- 
 mote stable peace we should have the support of a number 
 of the states now neutral. They have seen enough of war. 
 A Peace-League, the aspiration of many writers, is at such 
 a moment possible. But it could not work in practice* if 
 it included any state or states reasonably mistrusted by the 
 
 * Mr C E Fayle in his interesting book The Great Settlement seems to 
 think that, when the war is over, treaties can at once be made with Germany 
 and Austria with a view to the improvement of international relations in the 
 future. From this view I utterly dissent. It seems to me that the facts of the 
 situation make it impossible. But of course each separate Power can make 
 treaties with them. Admission to any sort of Concert must surely follow, not 
 precede, the restoration of mutual trust. 
 
22 Difficulties of an International Court. 
 
 rest. For instance, how could Belgium or Serbia, Russia 
 or France, discuss questions on an equal and friendly foot- 
 ing with Germany ? Nay, would they not excusably view 
 with suspicion any readiness on our part to cooperate with 
 Germany for any purpose ? Long years must surely pass 
 before they can look back calmly on the history of this 
 awful war, and put any trust in German honesty or risk 
 anything on the security of German pledges. And, without 
 a sound basis of confidence in mutual good faith and good 
 will, a Peace- League would be a silly and even dangerous 
 sham. Who could accept patiently the ruling of an inter- 
 national court in which the decision had been reached by 
 the operation of the German vote ? Not the present gene- 
 ration, surely. Those who aim at a Peace-League must, if 
 they mean business, try to found it as a League of none 
 but genuinely friendly Powers. Only thus could it prosper 
 and become a real League of Peace to which, when bygones 
 are bygones, the new generation of Germany might be 
 admitted. But this could only be if existing partners were 
 satisfied that the traditions of Berlin had been abandoned, 
 and that the sons might safely be forgiven the crime of 
 their fathers. 
 
 It is obvious that any such arrangement as that sketched 
 above would depend on the firmness and good faith of the 
 partners. Autocratic governments (supposing any such to 
 remain after the war) are well able to be firm, though their 
 good faith is often suspected. They are apt to be more 
 firm in their purposes than in their promises. Democratic 
 governments (I hope I am not too optimistic) have perhaps 
 a better reputation for good faith than for firmness Their 
 statesmen are apt to be afraid of the attacks of rival 
 politicians, who may wish to supplant them in popular 
 favour by representing firmness as provocative action Yet 
 it is at times impossible to keep faith without being firm 
 Who is to judge where is precisely at a given moment the 
 dividing line between firmness and provocation ? Suppose 
 Great Britain and France, friends for many years and 
 
What would Demos say ? 23 
 
 partners in a large Peace-League, to have on some occasion 
 different interests in some dispute with a third partner. 
 The third partner is willing to compromise the matter on 
 terms agreeable to France. The case is referred to the 
 court of the League, and the award is made in favour of 
 the French proposal, by a majority* of one. But the 
 greater partners, France excepted, voted in the minority 
 with Great Britain. Some of them are much annoyed by 
 the award, while the third partner, standing to lose some- 
 thing in either event, would gladly have acquiesced in 
 having no award at all. Things are looking black, as if 
 the Peace-League might end in a war between the partners. 
 The simple means of avoiding this is for our Government 
 to announce promptly that they will fight, if compelled, in 
 defence of the unwelcome award. Clearly it would be 
 possible to represent the announcement as an usurpation 
 of popular rights. ' What right have a pack of men who 
 happen to be in office to involve us in war for a cause that 
 even they themselves do not approve, merely to suit the 
 interests of France?' No doubt Demos would give a 
 hearing to those who urged considerations of good faith 
 and duty to the League. But the retort would be 'aren't 
 we doing enough for good faith by submitting to an un- 
 welcome award ? ' If invited to decide between the two 
 views, what would the decision of Demos be ? Who can 
 tell? The minor circumstances of the moment would 
 have, as always, a disturbing influence. All we know is 
 that the opponents of proposed measures are often more 
 alert than those who support them. 
 
 It may be said that the above illustration is too far- 
 fetched and imaginative. How to treat of a scheme as yet 
 wholly in the clouds, without imagination, I do not know. 
 Difficulties in many other forms might easily arise, and I 
 lay no particular stress on my imagined details. A more 
 serious criticism would be that I depict nations and their 
 
 " I am assuming equality of votes among the partners. The old European 
 Concert of the Great Powers has been a failure. 
 
Need of time. Nationalism. 
 
 governments as being liable to the same weaknesses- 
 jealousy, selfishness, and the like— as have often made 
 trouble in the past. Indeed I do not believe that any 
 League, however solemn, will suddenly change the nature 
 of mankind, and (if I may so express it) humanize human 
 societies once and for all. A higher morality is more likely 
 to invent better machinery than a better machinery to 
 create a higher morality. This does not imply that better 
 machinery will not be helpful. The danger is that ma- 
 chinery devised in a moment of enthusiasm, and responding 
 to the aspirations of war-worn peoples, may appear less 
 satisfactory when the enthusiasm has been cooled by time. 
 Democratic states in particular will be wise not to attempt 
 too much, for fear of reaction. Time must be given for 
 democracies of various character to run without friction in 
 international harness ; and it is better to make supple- 
 mentary treaties as needed than to suffer from the wish of 
 some partners to repeal parts of the compact agreed to by 
 them all. Human weakness notwithstanding, the gradual 
 uninterrupted growth of a habit of loyalty may carry 
 mankind far on the way to the wished-for goal. 
 
 Speculating as to the future is no doubt risky : the pro- 
 phet is always open to this reproach. But after all it is the 
 future that most deeply concerns the welfare of the human 
 race. Therefore it is well not to ignore criticisms of the past 
 in which we are recommended to seek guidance for the better- 
 ment of the coming age. One of the most thoroughgoing 
 of these is that which sees in * nationalism ' the canker ever 
 poisoning the relations between states. States are regarded 
 as rival units, competition between which is inevitable. The 
 growth of pride and ambition in some produces fear in 
 others, and suspicion and jealousy all round. In each 
 there is an inability to appreciate fairly the point of view of 
 others ; an inability which, if fostered by a malignant or 
 corrupt government, may develope into downright blind- 
 ness. By secret manipulation of the Press, for instance, a 
 whole people may be so overfed with misrepresentations 
 
What does Internationalism mean ? 25 
 
 and inspired with ' nationalist ' passion as to become a 
 storm-centre. Others will be led to follow suit in a greater 
 or less degree. And the outcome of the misunderstandings 
 that arise is sooner or later war. The cure suggested for 
 these evils is the abandonment of Nationalism. I have not 
 yet seen a working scheme shewing exactly to what lengths 
 it is proposed to go. As a mere floating aspiration it is 
 quite harmless. But a reconstruction even of Europe on 
 an 'internationalist' basis is a project that would surely 
 depend on numberless details impossible to forecast. It 
 seems to differ from Peace-league schemes only in imply- 
 ing a more complete abdication of independent policy on 
 the part of all the states It does not seem to mean a 
 Federal Union, with certain state-rights reserved to its 
 members for carrying on their local governments. What- 
 ever it may mean, it seems to me a far-off dream, out of the 
 range of practical politics. Moreover, it is idle to suppose 
 that the problems involved can in future be treated as 
 concerning Europe only. 
 
 Projects of this kind naturally move us to ask whether 
 there may not be a good side to Nationalism as well as a 
 bad one. As between individuals, competition may be 
 overdone, no doubt : but does it not tend to avert the evils 
 of stagnation ? Does not the same hold good to some 
 extent as between nations? Is not that 'community of 
 tradition* and hope, which alone consummates the identity 
 of a nation' an influence as compatible with good as with 
 evil ? Is there not some good to be gained from national 
 pride that derives satisfaction from winning a name for fair 
 dealing ? And is not the self-consciousness of an independ- 
 ent state a moral factor of a higher order than that of one 
 merged in a motley union and supreme only in local affairs ? 
 To me a nation is something more than the mere total 
 number of its citizens ; and I hope to be pardoned for saying 
 Yes to all these questions. I hold that sober Nationalism 
 
 * An excellent defining expression of Mr D G Hogarth, Philip and 
 Alexander, p. 8. 
 
26 Nationalism and Nationality. 
 
 is a wholesome thing, and that to destroy it, because it has 
 sometimes been tainted and misapplied, would be to do 
 humanity an ill turn. And in anti-nationalist utterances I 
 find what seems to imply a certain admission in which 
 there is comfort. Some, if not all, while professing to 
 ignore the present war, glide into the proposition that, in 
 the rearrangement after the war, the leading principle 
 should be recognition of the claims of nationality. With 
 this I agree, so far as it may be possible to get over prac- 
 tical difficulties which are known to exist in certain parts 
 of the world. But the doctrine, if I understand it aright, 
 points to a deliberate approval of aspirations to union 
 based on conscious national affinities. Will not a policy of 
 this kind directly tend to encourage Nationalism ? 
 
 The importance of this 'nationalist' question, and the 
 need of perfect candour on the part of those who deal with 
 it in public, is manifest when we consider it as a topic on 
 which popular leaders address the Demos. To confuse the 
 ideas of men in large meetings, or of hasty readers, is easy 
 when the subject is so complicated as this is. The sovran 
 people will respond readily to an appeal to high principles, 
 but has not much time to think, and so is apt to overlook 
 inconsistencies. Is it too much to say that an average 
 meeting would be quite capable of passing a general reso- 
 lution against Nationalism and also one in favour of the 
 claims of nationalities ? If the resolutions were forwarded 
 to the M P for the constituency, what is he to do ? Is it 
 fair to place him in such a dilemma ? I do not think so. 
 The meeting can not have seen the consequences of its 
 act. But it stands committed to an absurdity, and it is 
 not easy for a man dependent on popular support to say 
 so openly. Is he to act as his commonsense and conscience 
 bid him, or is he to vote for what he knows to be wrong, 
 yielding to the clamour of an ill-informed and misguided 
 crowd ? The meaning of Democratic Control would be at 
 stake in such a case as this. If we pronounce for the latter 
 alternative, the name seems plausible, but ' democratic ' 
 
' Democratic Control.' 27 
 
 does not imply that Demos is acting on full knowledge and 
 consideration and therefore expressing his deliberate will. 
 If we choose the former, the control exercised by the 
 Member's vote can only be called ' democratic ' in a very 
 loose sense. It rests on the duty of each local M P to the 
 country as a whole, and honest M Ps already recognize 
 this duty. If it is Parliament that is expected to control 
 our foreign policy, the machinery exists It is democratic 
 in the sense that the men charged with ' control ' have to 
 be in accord with those who elect them as to the general 
 spirit and tendency of that policy. That is all. Demos, 
 so far as possible, remains supreme in the last resort ; but 
 it must be remembered that in modern states his mere 
 size, necessitating representation, disables him from acting 
 effectively and with knowledge in matters that require a 
 swift and well-informed judgment. One very old meta- 
 phor, that of the ' ship of state,' expresses this truth in 
 common language. The skipper and his crew are charged 
 with the duty of bringing their passengers safe into a par- 
 ticular port. But no sane man supposes that the control 
 of navigation by the passengers would contribute to the 
 success of the voyage. They chose their ship, and by the 
 rules of its governance they must abide while at sea. They 
 need not, and if discontented will not, put to sea in the 
 same vessel hereafter. 
 
 In the case of our own democratic country there is a 
 special consideration, already of vast importance, which is, 
 if we pull through this war, likely to be still more important 
 for many a year. Can our foreign policy in future be 
 conducted solely with reference to the will of the voters in 
 these two islands ? We bear our present burden of taxation, 
 and face the prospect of its coming increase, largely owing 
 to the wealth concentrated here through investment of 
 British capital in Greater Britain. Dominions, Common- 
 wealths, Unions, not only add to our financial resources. 
 Their men face the horrors of European war in a common 
 cause. I need not enlarge upon their deeds. Are these 
 
28 Claim of Greater Britain. 
 
 great and growing communities, sharing the cruel losses 
 now, to have no voice in Imperial policy in the days of 
 peace ? Democratic they all are. In some of them military 
 training is compulsory and women have votes. What has 
 of late years roused them from the untroubled pursuit of 
 material wealth and given them an imperial self-conscious- 
 ness ? What but their awakening to the real aims of Ger- 
 man policy ? Could they remain blind to the significance 
 of German annexations in the South Seas with naval bases 
 and wireless stations to guard a bounty-fed commerce that 
 no one molested ? No, no more than Japan could ignore 
 Tsing-tau. Could they mistake the designs at the back of 
 German tyranny and brutality in Africa ? Ask General 
 Botha. That able Dutchman knew, as few have known, 
 the nature of German and English imperial systems. So 
 he chose rather to see his people linked with Great Britain 
 than compressed by Germany. No doubt he well knew 
 what power it was that for years fomented race-jealousies 
 in South Africa and made inevitable the Boer war. But 
 our democracy at home saw none of these things. Flattered 
 by self-seeking politicians, who won a cheap-and-nasty 
 popularity by concealing unpleasant facts, Demos never 
 got into touch with the plain truth. And the voice of 
 misguided voters inevitably gave an unpractical bias to 
 Parliament. 
 
 Can any reasonable man,not on the stump forthe purpose 
 of bamboozling voters, sincerely pretend that our island con- 
 stituencies are qualified to give wise and deliberate decisions 
 on matters affecting the relations between the British Em- 
 pire and all or most of the other peoples of the world ? I 
 do not think so. Has the ordinary voter then no voice at 
 all in questions of the kind,— no ' control ' ? To be sure he 
 has a voice in choosing a representative on whom he relies 
 to promote in Parliament the peace and prosperity that 
 he desires. If he thinks that the Member has failed in his 
 duty, he can vote for another next time. To borrow the 
 illustration of Aristotle, the judge of the meal is not the 
 
Cookery and Government. 29 
 
 cook but the person that has to eat it. For there must 
 always in politics be some in the position of a cook or 
 cooks ; but they are not autocrats : they are responsible to 
 the public opinion of their fellow-citizens. Demos cannot 
 do his own cooking, as things are, — and he knows it. But 
 he can choose his cooks. Now the cook's business is to 
 cook, not to look to his employers for fresh instructions on 
 every little detail, every pinch of salt pepper vinegar or 
 sugar. At that rate the meal would never get cooked. 
 Even so with our political cooks. A ministry is there to 
 lead and govern, more particularly in matters where accurate 
 up-to-date knowledge is indispensable, and in times of doubt 
 and danger. By being in office they shut out others from 
 leading and governing ; and without leading and governing, 
 Demos being unable to act for himself in person, the need- 
 ful is not done at all. When the hour of trial comes, 
 nothing is ready, and the enemy is upon them as a thief in 
 the night. Poor slow old Demos, doomed to walk in the tight 
 boots of Representation, and to see only through the dust 
 raised by popular eloquence, tottering and dazed, is a 
 pitiful spectacle. Can this be John Bull, who used to 
 boast of his institutions, a pattern to the world, mournfully 
 gazing on empty platforms and cobwebbed ballot-boxes in 
 utter bewilderment ? Does his plight suggest to sym- 
 pathetic observers a Demos in his glory, ready to give sharp 
 well-considered orders to his ministers ? No — the men of 
 his choice, who won his favour by withholding unwelcome 
 truths, are now called upon to lead and give orders, and 
 are distressingly awkward in a new capacity. Do what 
 they may, whatever political combinations they make, 
 leading men of all parties are first of all concerned to shew 
 themselves democrats. It is painful to have to exercise 
 control, and probably to eat a good many of their own 
 words. But so it must be : they must act, and act with- 
 out a direct ' mandate.' 
 
 Does such a situation imply that modern Democracy is 
 a failure ? I do not think so ; but it surely does imply 
 
30 Imperial economic relations. 
 
 that Demos has much to learn. For instance, there is 
 little sign of a general recognition in this country that 
 Great Britain represents only a part of what may be called 
 British interests. Our democrats rightly sympathize with 
 movements tending to raise wages of handworkers. But 
 they seldom dwell upon the fact that British manufacturers 
 and trade generally would not be what they are if the 
 British Empire did not exist. No doubt a vast deal of 
 windy nonsense has at times been uttered by inflated 
 Imperialists on the subject of the Empire. But contempt 
 for suchlike poor stuff should not blind us to the true value, 
 to us at home, of the great British unit. When democratic 
 orators shirk (as I fear they often do) the duty of pointing 
 out that our economic position is closely connected with 
 our position as nucleus and centre of the great British 
 world, they do wrong. It is far easier to denounce the 
 greed of capitalists, sometimes justly, than to be quite 
 candid in stating the whole economic problem. This 
 seems to me a serious matter, for the end of the war will 
 assuredly raise the question of imperial economic relations. 
 Demos will need to understand that our prosperity in 
 recent years has largely depended on the prestige of the 
 British Empire This is now challenged by a state that 
 has built up a gigantic military power, superior to the joint 
 forces of Russia and France both on land and sea. That 
 power has only been attained by the help of a quite unpre- 
 cedented economic growth. That growth has been on the 
 basis of a fiscal system widely different from ours, and an 
 educational system of almost brutal efficiency. If our 
 people are to make the best of their opportunities when 
 peace comes, they will need to learn much from our 
 enemies. That there will have to be changes in our edu- 
 cational system is already admitted by many : the chief 
 fear is lest slavish copying may lead to undesirable results. 
 But the fiscal system can hardly be left unquestioned. In 
 our case it has an imperial bearing as well as an economic 
 one. To ask ' how shall we for the moment do the biggest 
 
Forecasts of Cobden. 31 
 
 trade ? ' is only one side of this question. There is another, 
 'how shall we best ensure the security of our trade?' It 
 has been often urged that nothing is so likely to promote this 
 as an Imperial union gradually becoming closer by easy 
 steps. Now here is a problem of which perhaps neither 
 the mere Imperialist nor the mere Economist will find the 
 solution. All I am doing here is to point out that there 
 the problem is, that it will be criminal cowardice to shirk 
 it, and that to present any contemplated solution to the 
 sovran people will call for unusual exertions of tact and 
 candour. 
 
 If anyone will read through the collected speeches of 
 Richard Cobden, he will I think feel himself carried away 
 by the clearness and apparent cogency of the arguments. 
 But he will every now and then come upon some passage 
 setting forth or taking for granted the mutual relations and 
 policy of various states, their economic condition, and so 
 forth. These passages will seem strange in the 20th cen- 
 tury. But inquiry into the facts of the middle of the 19th 
 century will soon convince the reader that in stating facts 
 Cobden was remarkably careful. Yet in his forecasts of 
 the future Cobden went wrong to an absurd degree. Why ? 
 The answer is obvious the moment the reader observes that 
 no sufficient allowance is made for immense changes trans- 
 forming the whole face of the civilized world. Well aware 
 of vast changes in the past, Cobden and his school seem, 
 like the promoters of the great Exhibition of 185 1, to have 
 imagined that a position of stability had been reached. 
 Once their free-trade policy had triumphed, they were 
 content : surely the rest of the world must be contented 
 also. Unbroken peace would leave the nations free to live 
 by the sacred law of Demand and Supply, producing and 
 consuming to their hearts' content, and venerating the 
 British constitution in their leisure hours. That the rest 
 of the world would practically stand still, and be content to 
 provide profitable markets for the produce of our then 
 supreme industries, was the tacit assumption that underlay 
 
32 Principles and practice. 
 
 the Cobdenite principles. And this naturally coloured all 
 their views of foreign policy. That other nations would not 
 acquiesce in such a situation, that they would set up 
 industries of their own, protect them by tariffs, and succeed 
 in becoming powerful competitors, was not clearly foreseen. 
 If a prophet had ventured to hint that vast resources would 
 be accumulated by these means, and that those resources 
 would be applied to effect our ruin, he would most surely 
 have been saved from violence only by contempt. And 
 yet this has been the outcome of the world-movements 
 following the triumph of Cobdenism. 
 
 I cannot argue against Free-Trade as an aspiration. It 
 may be my ignorance, but I see a great truth contained in 
 its principles. But it is not with principles so much as with 
 the application of principles that practical politics have to 
 deal. I remember that, when the temperance reformers 
 made their first attack on the liquor trade, the first effect 
 was to cause the conversion of private concerns into joint- 
 stock companies. This move interested a far greater 
 number of persons in the stability of the trade, and the 
 temperance reform was set back for many years. The 
 blunder has been a costly one. I need not press the point 
 that well-meant enthusiasm is liable to overlook difficulties, 
 • defeating its own ends by lack of foresight. In the case of 
 Free-Trade I conceive the error to have been of the follow- 
 ing kind. The general policy of the Free-traders, being 
 based on the assumption that their principles would shortly 
 prevail all over the world, omitted to provide for the possi- 
 bility of one-sided free-trade. Commanding, as they then 
 did, all the chief markets, they felt secure. Cheap food 
 was the one present need that dwarfed and obscured all 
 other considerations. So far I presume they were right. 
 The boom of prosperity that ensued was at all events 
 enough to satisfy the generation 1846 — 76. But other 
 days were at hand. The aggressive competition of indus- 
 trial Germany steadily grew, and it gradually became clear 
 that Germany was not content with enjoying the freedom 
 
Facts not faced. 33 
 
 of our markets while meeting us with tariffs in her own. 
 She desired territories in which she could secure monopoly 
 by excluding others. She grabbed vast areas of land, but 
 her so-called Colonies were an economic failure. Mean- 
 while her trade grew and grew, largely at our expense, and 
 with it her ambitions. The British Empire stood in the 
 way, and must be put out of the way. Two lines of attack 
 were possible, the short one of crushing naval victory, the 
 longer one of gaining control of Europe and using its 
 resources for the conquest of Great Britain and Ireland and 
 dissolution of the British Empire. Advance was made on 
 both these lines with ever- increasing speed, but the response 
 of Great Britain was confined to some precautions against 
 naval defeat. The crisis of 1914 found us with a strong 
 navy, but a very weak army : some sections, in particular 
 the artillery, had even been lately reduced. And even the 
 increase of the navy had only been carried in face of oppo- 
 sition. Yet our all was at stake. 
 
 Those who have any memories must recall the constant 
 flow of soothing assurances poured over the country in 
 recent years. A great war was ' inconceivable,' ' too hor- 
 rible,' and so on. The basest motives were imputed to 
 some who spoke with warning voice : a gallant old soldier 
 was said to be in his dotage. No names were too bad for 
 the prophet Blatchford. In short all honest men who faced 
 facts were swept aside in a torrent of calumny. We see 
 the results in the thousands of unnecessary deaths and 
 wounds, made inevitable by our state of unreadiness 
 for war. On this I need not dwell. The cruel story is 
 felt, and will long be felt, in the sorrow of mourning homes. 
 The bereaved silently ask, ' How do we know that our dear 
 ones are not of those needlessly sacrificed, for what ? To 
 enable a pack of self-seeking politicians to court popularity 
 by hiding the truth. Granted that some of these gentry 
 sincerely believed what they said. It is small comfort to 
 admit that some of the blood-guilty were not rogues but 
 fools.' But the past is past. Thousands of our bravest 
 
34 Weaknesses of our system. 
 
 have died — in vain ? No, not as yet wholly in vain. They 
 have given us time to prepare for the future, if we will but 
 use it. Why is it that politicians such as those just referred 
 to are able to exert a sinister influence on our politics ? 
 Because of the ignorance, apathy, jealousy, of our voters. 
 Most of them do not know what they are doing when 
 common national interests are in question. Most of them 
 care little or nothing for what does not immediately affect 
 themselves. Most of them are bitterly jealous of anything 
 resembling privilege ; which is indeed not unnatural, con- 
 sidering the past. Politicians adapt themselves to present 
 circumstances, and move along the line of least resistance. 
 Now, to call upon voters to rise above their ordinary level 
 has in it a certain flavour of reproach —who is this man 
 that tells us we are unsatisfactory while he asks for our 
 votes ? Those untouched by the reproach will not so 
 resent it. But, Demos being but human, these will be few. 
 On the other hand it is easy to persuade any man that 
 nobody is more worthy of privilege than himself. A poli- 
 tician succeeds more cheaply by gratifying jealousy than 
 by striving to remove narnuvmindedness and ignorance. 
 
 All this, I repeat, does not prove that Democracy 
 is a failure. It means that we habitually ask of it what it 
 cannot give. It suggests that the affairs in which we have 
 a common interest with other British communities beyond 
 the seas should be controlled by a body specially chosen 
 by us and them to represent that common interest. Muni- 
 cipalities and trade-unions agree in choosing representatives 
 to act in furtherance of their local or sectional interests. A 
 tailor will hardly be selected to guide the Amalgamated 
 Engineers. The principle of qualification by fitness is re- 
 cognized all round, save in national politics. Need we go 
 on belying our British commonsense like this ? Are not we 
 ordinary citizens men enough to apply in matters of vast 
 common interest the same principles that guide us in sec- 
 tional interests? If the Demos of the mother-island is 
 admitted to be the safest ultimate judge of his own home- 
 
Skilled work necessary. 35 
 
 affairs, is not Demos of All-Britain, acting by his representa- 
 tives, the safest judge of matters that concern him as a 
 whole, not the Home-Demos only ? More and more, as 
 the years go by, specialization* spreads in all departments 
 of life. Our civilization assumes it and rests on it at every 
 turn. Surely it is not too much to say, that overwhelming 
 reasons are needed to justify the control of skilled political 
 work by persons chosen on all manner of grounds for all 
 manner of purposes, and by only one of the component 
 parts of the Empire. And I have met with no such 
 reasons. At the present moment we owe a great debt to 
 our diplomatists for their foresight and tact. In spite of 
 the weak policy of our Governments, who dissembled perils 
 that they dared not face, we have not, with shortsighted 
 meanness, left our friends to be destroyed and made the 
 same fate certain for ourselves. Our diplomacy has striven 
 hard for peace : foiled in this endeavour, it sent us into war 
 with consciousness of an honourable cause, and mobilized 
 the goodwill of the world. It could do no more. How 
 conies it then that, with much pretence of making no 
 reference to the present situation, the present moment 
 is chosen for attacking diplomacy as a sinister influence, 
 and therefore proposing to put it under 'democratic con- 
 trol ' ? 
 
 I fancy the answer to this question is not very far to 
 seek. At all times notoriety has a charm for many minds. 
 To many the joy of their lives is a belief in their own 
 superior intelligence. To such persons a notoriety, achieved 
 by whatever means, naturally takes the appearance of 
 well-earned popularity, and justifies itself. The outbreak 
 
 * J F Rhodes, History of U S A, vol vi p 384, quotes the weighty words 
 of C W Eliot, the great President of Harvard, in 1869. ' As a people, we do 
 not apply to mental activities l^e principle of division of labor; and we have 
 but a halting faith in special training for high professional employments. The 
 vulgar conceit that a Yankee can turn his hand to anything we insensibly carry 
 into high places where it is preposterous and criminal .... What amount of 
 knowledge and experience do we habitually demand of our lawgivers? What 
 special training do we ordinarily think necessary for our diplomatists?' .... 
 etc. 
 
36 An insincere appeal. 
 
 of a war deplored by the whole country was a great temp- 
 tation to these persons. That any Government should 
 dare to act in the matter without direct consultation of 
 such able and willing advisers as themselves, was galling. 
 But they were too few to assert their authority with effect. 
 The only hope was to appeal to the masses. But the 
 appeal had to be made by a clique whose leading charac- 
 teristic was a hearty contempt for the opinions of others. 
 Their appeal was therefore from the first tainted by in- 
 sincerity. They could only gain a favourable hearing by 
 creating an impression that the war had been brought 
 about by mismanagement. Yet public feeling was clearly 
 against embarrassing the Government. It was found 
 necessary to protest that attacks on the system of diplo- 
 macy had no reference to recent action of the Foreign 
 Office, and in fact nothing to do with the present war. I 
 do not suppose that many people were taken in by the 
 protest. It was grotesque, and the choice of this moment 
 for making the attack was left unexplained. Perhaps we 
 may risk a guess at the reason. At a painful moment of 
 strain and sorrow, when the nerves of many were shaken 
 by the awful war-storm, and hearts were yearning for 
 peace, there would be a chance for the vendor of patent 
 political remedies. The process was, first to give a garbled 
 version of the origins of war (of course not this war), then 
 to lay the blame on diplomacy (of course without personal 
 reference), and then to offer a remedy warranted to cure 
 (of course without the alternative effect generally allowed 
 for in the case of powerful drugs). Regular practitioners 
 in politics, as in medicine, are apt to be shy of promising a 
 certain cure : while advertisements in our newspapers prove 
 the huge demand for patent remedies. And in one par- 
 ticular respect the two departments present a pretty close 
 analogy. The quack advertiser generally throws the bur- 
 den of a correct diagnosis on the patient, only offering him 
 a selection of symptoms, cautiously worded, to choose 
 from. How many patients misjudge their ailments under 
 
Elusive quackery. 37 
 
 such loose guidance, and suffer for their error, we are not 
 informed. It is enough that some recover from something 
 or other after undergoing the treatment, and on this result 
 the advertiser thrives. Translated into political terms, this 
 is almost exactly the procedure of the advocates of ' demo- 
 cratic control.' We may add that in cases of wrong 
 diagnosis, when the cause of the patient's recovery or 
 death cannot be traced to the treatment employed, the 
 quack doctor generally eludes responsibility. Either the 
 error was not his, or the treatment was not strictly carried 
 out. In short, he claims the credit of success and disowns 
 the discredit of failure. 
 
 We have seen that Dembs cannot act in person on his 
 own behalf. He must be led. If led into disaster, he will 
 turn upon his leaders. As things now are* in politics, this 
 means that he will drive his present Ministers out of office. 
 The penalty is a heavy one, even if his wrath be just. Men 
 who with great labour have qualified themselves for the 
 direction of public departments — and this is especially the 
 case in the conduct of foreign affairs — are shelved under a 
 stigma which they may never have the chance of removing. 
 It may be hard, but it cannot be helped : to avoid such an 
 ending to his career, a man of any spirit and ability will 
 spare no pains Those who are volunteering their high 
 statesmanship risk no penalties of the kind. When they 
 urge Demos to take foreign affairs into his own hands, they 
 mean ' under our leadership.' But these amateur guides 
 have little or nothing at stake in case of failure, for they 
 know that in our age and country the unsuccessful are not 
 guillotined. They are not steadied by the habitual con- 
 
 * J F Rhodes, History of US A, vol IV p 471, speaking of Lincoln's policy 
 in reference to the Mexican enterprise of Napoleon III, says ' Our democracy 
 and our representatives in Congress probably will never learn that the delicate 
 questions of diplomacy, until they reach the point where constitutionally the 
 Senate and the House must be partakers in the action, ought to be left to t lie 
 executive. It will prove generally, as it did certainly in this case, that the 
 President and the Secretary ot State can deal with such matters with greater 
 foresight and wisdom.' We must not forget that President and Secretary do 
 not exist by mere favour of Congress, as our Ministers do by that of the House 
 of Commons. 
 
38 Indifference dangerous. 
 
 sciousness of responsibility. Should Demos follow their 
 advice, and have reason to regret it, what can he do to his 
 bad advisers? Nothing, unless they are in office and so 
 liable to disgrace. But that case seems excluded by their 
 own programme, for they do not ask to be put in office, so 
 far as I know, or even in Parliament. Their position seems 
 rather to be this, that the House of Commons is to control 
 foreign policy, being itself under control of the constituen- 
 cies, who will act as required. Some of their utterances 
 seem indeed to omit the last stage, leaving the control to 
 Parliament, simply. But then no change is needed, and 
 why all this pother about nothing ? The truth is, their 
 scheme really points to a fundamental* change: but they 
 shrink from saying so. More candour would lead to ex- 
 posure of an absurd misconception of modern democracy 
 and its possibilities. Of a kind of cleverness they have 
 plenty. Let us hope that Demos will not be gulled into 
 taking cleverness for wisdom. 
 
 A cool observer who has his eye on this movement, 
 and has noted that so far it does not seem to have had any 
 open effect on public opinion, may think it unwise to pay 
 any attention to what might better be ignored. I wish I 
 could think so too, but I do not. The danger is not at the 
 present moment, when discussion of far-reaching schemes 
 is deadened by the strain of the war. Any effects of this 
 movement will only shew themselves in the season of 
 coming trial, when the war-strain is over and excitement 
 no longer helps us to endure it. Even if we win and win 
 well, terrible burdens will remain, and remain to be borne 
 for many years. Taxation has not yet reached its height, 
 nor have the masses of the population as yet any clear 
 notion of what the pressure is likely to be. The reaction 
 will probably be extreme. To conduct us safely through a 
 period of depression, when political passions revive and 
 
 * 1 do not discuss Referendum schemes, for I cannot learn that any such 
 are as yet definitely proposed. They do not seem to be capable of application 
 to vast areas under present conditions. 
 
Onward, not Backward. 39 
 
 find discordant voices, will be such a task as statesmanship 
 has never yet had to face. The discontented will be ready 
 to listen to the wildest proposals, and it will be a mercy if 
 our politics do not become a jumble of crude projects hastily 
 debated in an atmosphere of bitter recrimination. Should 
 a little clique of visionaries, backed by the machinations of 
 secret traitors, succeed in catching the public ear at such 
 a moment, we should be in extreme peril. The deliberate 
 nature of German designs upon the freedom of Europe 
 would be kept out of sight : the proofs that have accumu- 
 lated since the outbreak of war would be ignored. Our 
 objects in going to war would be sacrificed to an illusory 
 acceptance of momentary ease, and the shadow of another 
 fight for existence would darken our prospects from the 
 very first days of a rotten peace. Demos would surely not 
 wilfully desire such a result. But, if he once let himself be 
 captured by persons such as I have described, he may easily 
 act so as to render inevitable an undesired result. 
 
 These remarks obviously suggest the question— if you 
 are so strongly convinced of the liability of Demos to err, 
 why do you profess yourself a democrat ? Are you not 
 really in favour of some basis of government other than 
 democracy ? I do not despair of meeting this with an 
 answer at once full and sincere. That the system of 
 governments on a narrow basis has for the present had 
 its day, and that nothing short of a world-wide change in 
 human nature will revive it, I firmly believe. Everywhere 
 peoples are gaining or increasing the right of having some 
 voice, however small as yet, in their own government. 
 The Russian Duma seems to have become a living part 
 of the nominally autocratic government, and the war is 
 hardly likely to weaken it. Even Turkey and China, with 
 their tragic or comic travesties of constitutional rule, offer 
 to free constitutions the sincere flattery of formal imitation. 
 So far as we can see, Onward not Backzvard is the domi- 
 nant movement in popular politics. Naturally : for if 
 nations are to be called upon to act as solid units— and 
 
40 Education and Leading. 
 
 war is an extreme case of this — the unity of each nation 
 needs to be real, or it will not have strength to stand a 
 severe strain. Therefore to indulge in smoking-room 
 chatter, blaming Demos for his follies and ignoring his 
 virtues, is idle waste of time. For this or that particular 
 duty or function one man or a small committee may be 
 worth far more than a million of ordinary citizens. But 
 this is a stale truth, confessed by Demos in all his clubs 
 unions and games. He knows very well that men are not 
 equal, and that different men have different special capaci- 
 ties. That a government would be stronger for resting on 
 the support of a small number of electors is a mere delusion. 
 Under the conditions of modern life, when news is flashed 
 at once into every corner of the world, it is not possible to 
 prevent men from feeling an interest in events. And, at 
 any moment when things seem to be going badly, the 
 voteless masses are subject to a special irritation. They 
 may judge their rulers hastily and unfairly: they will be 
 all the more inclined to do so, if they have had no share in 
 choosing them. Therefore I hold that democracy, slow 
 and clumsy though its movements may be, is a safer basis 
 of government than a system of narrow franchise. What 
 Demos needs is not restriction, but education and leading. 
 
 The astounding results that may be achieved by thorough 
 education and firm leading are now manifest to all in the 
 case of Germany. That the aims of German rulers have 
 been a defiance of humanity and good faith, revolting to 
 all civilized mankind, is not the point with which I am 
 here concerned. The fact remains that they have so edu- 
 cated their masses as to have the absolute disposal of more 
 than 60 millions of people. So far they have made them 
 acquiesce in a partial and delusive franchise, and endure 
 the brutal tyranny of Prussian officers. How long this 
 submission will last we cannot tell. But I think we may 
 fairly assume that a main cause of this submissiveness has 
 been the active promotion of German interests by the 
 government. It has not been easy to make discontent 
 
German efficiency. 41 
 
 effective so long as the government was active and success- 
 ful in spreading German influence and German trade all 
 over the world. An inspired Press saw to it that the 
 government got full credit for their energy. Hans and 
 Fritz might in theory be Socialists and opposed to mili- 
 tarism : but for the present they had no practical policy 
 able to supersede that of the government. So education 
 tamed the people and confirmed the power of their rulers. 
 Parliamentary institutions remained a sham. 
 
 It is in the direction of a better education, as thorough 
 as the German but less mechanical and more human, that 
 we should look to forward the improvement of our own 
 people. After vast expenditure of energy and money, it is 
 still true that we have not yet developed their capacities in 
 such a way as to qualify them for holding their ground 
 in competition with Germans in the markets of the world. 
 This is particularly the case in that grade of education 
 which I may call post-primary. We have not followed up 
 the work of the elementary schools in a practical spirit. 
 Two instances of our neglect, in which we have for years 
 been giving points to our commercial rivals, are well known, 
 though we have as yet done little to make up for them. 
 One is the neglect of foreign languages, not to mention 
 foreign weights measures and currency. The other is the 
 neglect of scientific and technical equipment. In modern 
 industries the capitalist and the handworker are as of old 
 highly important. But the great and growing importance 
 of the specialist class, electricians chemists skilled clerks 
 and so forth, has not been so recognized as to produce a 
 supply of fit men of our own to meet the demand. How 
 far our educational system has been to blame, I cannot 
 tell : but I do know that only too often the need has been 
 met by accepting the ready-made article from Germany. 
 No doubt it seemed profitable to employ trained men at 
 low salaries : whether these trained men were not secretly 
 serving other masters, was a question generally blinked. 
 And so we let our country be filled up with spies. Men 
 
42 Education in a wide sense. 
 
 who saw what was going on were uneasy : but what could 
 they do ? Just nothing. The politicians assured the people 
 that all was well. Of any serious effort to train our people 
 for the competition between nations there was no sign. 
 The dissatisfaction here and the satisfaction in Germany 
 went on growing side by side. The attention of the British 
 Demos was diverted from the real danger without to exag- 
 gerated dangers within, suitable for the raising of party 
 cries as a means of keeping certain politicians in office. If 
 this state of things had lasted much longer, Lord only 
 knows what would have come of it. The stupidity of 
 German leaders saved us just in time. They thought 
 rightly that rot had set in among us : but in fact it had 
 not yet gone far enough for their purposes. This miscal- 
 culation has upset their plans and may end in their defeat. 
 
 When we are speaking of education, we need not restrict 
 that term to the formal sense of such training as Schools 
 and Universities can give. They can do much, but the 
 practical training given by the free exercise of a share of 
 power however small — say an occasional vote — may per- 
 haps do even more. When the citizen is periodically 
 reminded of his own personal concern in the welfare and hon- 
 our of his country, he is more likely to shew a rational and 
 stubborn loyalty in its hours of trial. An American* writer, 
 speaking of the development of political education in the 
 rebellious Colonies between 1764 and 1775, points out how 
 much they had learnt from their experience. ' The masses ' 
 he says ' learnt that a dependent government is the strongest 
 in the world, for it must accord with public opinion, and 
 therefore meet with public support ; that constitutions and 
 laws are but ink and paper unless they approximate to 
 that sole origin of force and authority ; and that it is not 
 the government which supports the people, but the people 
 who support the government. The masses are by their 
 
 ferred P tnt^i C f eS ,f^ FOrd ' In \ roducti r * Jefferson* s Works. .The period re- 
 ferred to is that of the quarrel preceding the Declaration of Independence in 
 
American experience. 43 
 
 nature and condition, however, negative rather than positive, 
 and when constructive rather than destructive or obstructive 
 force is required, they are compelled to delegate a portion 
 of their powers.' He goes on to shew that in the original 
 constitutions of the States the ' classes ' secured an influence 
 out of proportion to their numbers. This vantage has long 
 since passed away. Full democratic equality has suc- 
 ceeded, and its weak points have been illustrated in the 
 history of the United States. Nevertheless their govern- 
 ment, supported by a patriotism that at times reposes but 
 never sleeps, has weathered the most awful of storms and 
 has given the surest proof of its strength. The cruel 
 iniquities of the Reconstruction period after the Civil War 
 exhibit on a large scale the vices to which a great Demo- 
 cracy is liable : the confession of sin and final abandonment 
 of a wicked policy are a cheering proof that a Democracy 
 of free citizens can reform its ways. How could the quality 
 of inner soundness express itself better than in this power 
 of self-amendment ? Indeed the whole period of 30 years 
 from 1850 to 1879 in the United States is an unparalleled 
 spectacle of a great Democracy passing through the fire of 
 extreme trials. The failure of compromise in the explosion 
 of noble or ignoble passions, the agony of four years bloody 
 war attended by a hideous grovth of corruption and the 
 exposure of disheartening weaknesses, the avenging of great 
 wrongs by greater— all these phenomena were enough to 
 alarm observers to whom the cause of popular government 
 was dear. To these trials was afterwards added another 
 which is still operative, the difficulty of assimilating vast 
 numbers of miscellaneous alien immigrants. Yet the great 
 Republic goes forward unshaken. Time is needed for 
 dealing with the problems presented by so mighty a mass, 
 but courage is not lacking, and the time is not wasted. So 
 far there is no apparent falling away from the resolve in- 
 culcated by Abraham Lincoln, that ' the government of the 
 people, by -the people, and for the people, shall not perish 
 from the earth.' 
 
44 Suggestions. 
 
 True it is that the existence of a powerful Executive,* 
 in the person of a President holding office for four years, 
 does provide a certain check on hasty action in the 
 American democracy. Also that the Constitution of the 
 United Kingdom in its present state provides no such 
 check. Neither a Gracious King nor a patriotic House of 
 Lords can restrain us from sudden and ill-considered 
 action. A General Election may and does in a moment 
 transfer power from one party to another, and issues of 
 permanent importance are left to be decided without 
 appeal by men elected with other issues in view. Second 
 thoughts may often be best : whether better or worse, they 
 have now less chance with us than in the United States. 
 How far our older traditions may be reckoned a set-off 
 against this disadvantage, I cannot tell, but am not in- 
 clined to make much of this point. A more fruitful line 
 of inquiry seems to lie in the question whether the present 
 state of things may not suggest some remedy. And it 
 may be observed that the need of some check on hasty 
 decisions is much more evident in some departments of 
 government than in others. English tradition would lead 
 us to deal first with obvious needs, not to defer all im- 
 provements until we can agree upon a theoretically perfect 
 scheme. Now I have pointed out above that the control 
 of foreign policy, generally concerned with matters of which 
 the ordinary citizen has not the knowledge necessary to 
 form a judgment, is already a subject of vital interest to all 
 the peoples of the British world. I have suggested that it 
 should, indeed must, in future be organized on an All- 
 British footing. The founders of the United States had to 
 face a problem not the same as ours, but having some 
 resemblance to it. They had to unite independent states 
 in a Federation and to avoid the slightest menace to their 
 several independence Now the power of dealing with the 
 
 "-'A^S^.j^rffil'?? Inde P e " d T e of Executive' 
 
Necessary authority of Representatives 45 
 
 world outside was and is the most striking attribute of 
 state-sovranty. By giving to all the States, great or small, 
 equal representation in one of the two Houses of Congress 
 (the Senate), and giving to that House the control of 
 foreign policy, they placed that department on a coopera- 
 tive footing. They left mere numbers to prevail in the 
 other House. Now the several independent parts of the 
 British Empire are not exactly in the same position as 
 States of the American Union. Even if they were united 
 in a Federation, their union could hardly be as close as 
 that of America. The difference between a continuous 
 territory and a number of widely scattered units would 
 make it impracticable. But it will be seen that these British 
 units would be more, not less, independent than the several 
 States of USA. Therefore the case for their having a 
 voice in the control of foreign relations is so far stronger 
 than that which has been approved in America. To recog- 
 nize this in a practical form ought not to be beyond the 
 resources of a prudent statesmanship. 
 
 But, whatever may be the rearrangements adopted 
 after the return of peace in this or other departments, it 
 will still remain true that the success of democratic govern- 
 ments depends on their efficiency. It is useless to recog- 
 nize the necessity of Representation and then to destroy 
 our only instrument of government by cutting away the 
 authority of Representatives. In recent years we have 
 seen the authority of elected leaders defied by members of 
 trade-unions. And we know that trade-unions take an 
 active part in politics. Should it ever become a common 
 phenomenon in our political life for electors to repudiate 
 the acts of those whom they elected, there is an end of 
 democracy. No means of ascertaining the present will 
 of the electorate will be left. Call it mob-rule, call it 
 anarchy —what you will. Such a situation is never pro- 
 duced by a popular majority : only a violent minority can 
 do these things, working by intimidation. The acts of a 
 particular Parliament may rouse our indignation and dis- 
 
4<5 
 
 gust. There is nothing to be done for the time but to 
 protest and endure them. In time of peace we can only 
 wait until the next election tells us^on which side the 
 majority lies. In time of war we have to take the dis- 
 advantages of Democracy with its advantages. At no given 
 moment can we know the full truth of things as it exists at 
 that moment Our criticisms are formed in a darkness for 
 the most part unavoidable. It is our duty not to weaken 
 our leaders by imputing to them errors that we cannot 
 prove. The weakening may be produced, but do we stand 
 to gain by it ? How if after all the error should be our 
 own ? 
 
 ' No democracy was ever founded and no democracy can ever be 
 founded on (he motto — Struggle for existence and survival of the 
 fittest. A common interest in the general welfare is absolutely essential 
 to the perfect union which is contemplated in the creation of a self- 
 gover7iing cooperative Commonwealth! 
 
 Lyman Abbott, America in the making. 
 Newhaven 191 1. 
 
 J. PALMER, PRINTER ALEXANDRA STREET, CAMBRIDGE.