34Tn Congress, } 1st Session, j SENATE. Ex. Doc. No. 36. REPORT or THE SECRETARY OF WAR, IS COMPLIANCE WITH A resolution of the Senate of the llth ultimo, calling for information relative to the fortifications necessary for the proper defence of New York and Brooklyn. Maach 3, 1856. — Read, referred tu the Committee on Military Atiairs, and ordered to be printed. War Department, Washington, March 1, 1856. Sir: In answer to the resolution of the Senate of February 11, 1856, "That the Secretary of War be requested to report to the Senate whether any, and, if any, what additional fortifications are necessary for the proper defence and })rotection of the city and harbor of New York, and of the navy yard and public property at Brooklyn," I have the honor to report that additional ibrtifications are necessary for the objects specified in the resolution. Before attempting to designate the permanent works which it is deemed proper to construct, I will premise that the great purpose of fortification in this case is to prevent a hostile fleet from approaching the city, and thus to compel the enemy to land his forces in order to attack. With this view, the fortifications originally constructed in the harbor of New York have long been neglected, and our attention has been concentrated upon erecting impassable barriers on the two great avenues of approach from the sea to the city. For this pur- pose two points were selected, one about seven miles from the city, at the Narrows, on the southern or main channel, and the other about sixteen miles from tiie city, at Throg's Neck, at the entrance into East river, from Long Island sound. If these be made impass- able to a hostile fleet, the necessities resulting from a land attack may be left without much apprehension to the resources which will always be at command whenever such an occasion shall arise, and it is not believed to be claiming too much for the patriotism, the skill, and the valor of our people to suppose, that wherever they can be arrayed in s\ich numbers as at the city of New York, an invading army will ^ have to choose between the alternative of captivity or a grave. 2 FORTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROrEU OSS A Rccond or exterior line of (lerenco, though not considered neces- sary ibr the city ofKew York, lias rehitions to its commerce, to inter- nal communication, and tlie naval o])erations of the United 8tate«, in connexion with the harbor of Mew York, such as })robably to bring it withiu the ]mr|;ose of the resolution, and it w-ill tlierelbre be treated of in this rejjort. Proceeding, then, to consider the various works in the order of their relative importance, I would recommend, first, the com])letion of the works now under construction at Statin Island, and the rebuilding of Fort Tompkins. Second, the construc- tion of a fort on Wilkins' Point, o})posite Fort Schuyler on Tbrog's Keck. Third, the completion and rei)air of the works in the harbor of New York. Fourth, the construction of the Ibrt on Sandy Hook ; and filth, the const nicl ion of works on the shoals beyond it, should it be found i)racticable to erect them at reasonable cost. Directing our attention to the main channel, we find at the Narrowis, seven miles I'rom the lower part of the city, the first position on this avenue of approach susceptible of such defence by ibrtifications as com])letcly to close it against an enemy's fleet, and fulfil all tlie re- quirements of the first and great object of deience and ])rotection to the city and harbor. Here, ibr the space of a mile, the channel is about a mile wide. Favorable as this position is, yet it possesses the disadvantage (in connexion with the object in view) of deep water from shore to shore, and, being straight, admits the passage of ships of the greatest draught at all hours of the day and night, in every con- dition of the tide, with all the rapidity that their means of propul- sion can impart. This position was selected as accomplishing, at comparatively small cost, the first and great object in view. Of the permanent works proposed for this end, those finished are Forts Ham- ilton and La'ayette on the Long Island side of the channel, and batte- ries Hudson and Morton on Staten Island. To complete the defences, there remain on Staten Island the comjiletion of Fort Richmond, which is under construction, and the erection of Fort Tojnpkins, on the site of the ruins of the fort of that name begun in 1810 by the State of New York. When all these permanent works are finished, they will, with the additional temporary batteries and works to be thrown up when hostilities are imminent, effectually close this chan- nel of approach. The deience of this important position from an attack by water being incomplete, the construction of Fort Richmond and of Fort Tompkijna claim attention first, and their erection should precede that of all other works. These ibrtifications, in addition to protecting the city and harbor of New York against an attack by water, on the southern avenue of approach, limit to the beach of Uravesend bay, less than two miles in extent, any attempt to land a hostile army under cover of a fleet on that part of Long Island which can be approached by water, from the roadstead between the Narrows and Sandy Hook. The water is slioal along the whole of this beach and does not admit the approach of a fleet nearer than one mile to the shore. The erection of temporary batteries and other defensive woiks must, under such circumstancea, deieat any attempt to land, even supposing no aid or diversipn fr.om DEFENCE OF NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN. 3 the water side. PiVen tlic heaviest guns of t'le fl3et, at the distance of a mile, coiihl not destroy the batteries nor drive out the forces occu- pying them. The advantage would be si decidedly in favor of the repealing force, the exposure of the enemy in crowded boats wouhl be so great, that the result to him must be disastrous de!cat. No other position could he so favorable to us for foiling such an enterprise. The proximity to the Narrows and Brooklyn, the latter eight miles distant, and the distance from the shore at which the fleet must lie, renders it vastly stronger than a more distant landing place, which would, doubtless, be sought in pre'erence by an enemy, either on the south shore of Long Island, outside t!ie roadstead, or in Long Island sound. The introduction of steam into naval warfare has greatly increased the facilities and probabilities of an attack by water by Long Island sound. The East river affords i)ositions susceptible of strong defence. The best, having in view all the ends to be attained, is at the narrow entrance from Long Island sound, sixteen miles from the lower part of the city. The i)lan of de'ence for this position j)roposed the erec- tion oi'two works, one on each side of the channel. That on Throg's Neck — Fort Schuyler, a powerful work — is nearly completed. The fort proposed to be erecte 1 opposite to Fort Schuyler, on Long Island, has not yet been commencad, and its prompt construction is recom- mended in order to complete the Recurity from an attack on New York by water from this direction. These two works will not only accom])lish the first and principal object sought for in the defence and protection of New York, but will aid materially in preventing an attack by land, the bearing they have upon such an enterprise being clearly shown in the report of Brigadier General Totten, chief engineer. The great strength of Fort Schuyler, and the narrowness of the channel way luidei' its gnns, renders the defence at this point proba- bly more secure than that by the main or southern channel, in the present condition of the works there, and if appropriations are not made at the same time for the additional fortifications required on both channels, that for the works on the principal avenue should be made first. The works in the harbor of New York bavin"' already been con- structed, should be kept in repair and maintained in the condition proposed by the chief engineei* until the completion of the exterior barriers shall have removed the possibility of an enemy's fleet entering the harbor. The completion of the works just enumerated in the manner recom- mended by Brigadier General Totten, chief engineer, whose report to this department upon the subject of the re^^olution is annexed to this communication, together with such temporary batteries and field works as can be thrown up when hostilities are threatened, will, it is believed, eftectually protect the city of New York, the numerous ship- ping in its harbor, the city of Brooklyn, the navy yard, and other public property there, from an attack by a fleet. They do not dis- pense with the necessity, in the event of hostilities, of a strong land force on Long Island, nor the occu])ation of lines of defence on that 4 FORTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPER island, and defensive arrangements to prevent a landing. Nor can any system of defence by fortification or other means dispense with them. The entrances to the admirable roadstead between the Narrows and Sandy Hook are entirely without defence. Its occupation by an enemy's fleet, to which it is now open, would completely seal this outlet of the port of New York ; would interrupt the interior water communication with the Delaware; would give him great advantages in cruising off the port against our shipping, both mercantile and military, and would deprive our navy of all the advantages to be derived from its use for similar purposes. These; objects, however desirable to be gained, may properly be considered as ulterior to the protection of the city from attack by water and land. To secure this roadstead to our own use, and to prevent the losses and hazards following its occupation by an enemy, the entrance must be closed by forts suitably placed upon the shoals adjoining the chan- nels in advance of Sandy Hook, and upon the extremity of that point. In many respects the general position just designated is the best for attaining the objects sought, in fortifying the Narrows, since a fleet can attempt to pass it only in the day and during a flood tide ; and as the ships must necessarily move slowly and cautiously through the channels, (except ])ast the extremity of the Hook,) they Avould be a long time under fire, and would fight under the disadvantages of a divided attention during that time, they could not attempt to pass the forts before silencing them. But from the number of channels and the character of the works on the shoals^ the complete defence oi" this position would be very costly. With the view of keeping out an enemy from the roadstead and securing it to our own use, and to prevent an attempt to land at Grave- send Bay, the board of engineers projected two works on these shoals in addition to the temporary woi k to be erected on Sandy Hook upon the commencement of hostilities. But surveys subsequent to that time have made known a channel of greater capacity than the two ship channels then used; and repeated minute surveys since afford, in the language of Gen. Totten, " so many reasons to doubt the stability of these shoals that it has been found necessary to confine the projects for defence to Sandy Hook, it being proposed to erect thereon a strong permanent fortification." But this work, with the batteries afloat and ashore under its protection, would secure, in an imperfect and partial manner, the objects for which the forts on the shoals were originally planned. The defence can only be made thorough by the erection of works upon the shoals as well as the Hook. The character of the changes to which they are probably subjected will doubtless in- crease the cost of their erection, but it remains yet to be determined, by further investigation, whether to such an extent as to require the abandonment of the plan. It is highly probable, from the indications of the charts in use seventy or eighty years ago, that the new or Gedney's channel was then known to exist. Tlie clianges which have taken place in the nature of marine war- fare by the introduction of steam and the increased power of the arma- ment of ships, bring into importance channels which were before c^)m- DEFENCE OF NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN. 5 paratively insignificant in tlieir bearing upon defence. Steamships of fifty guns, twenty guns and less, with draughts of twenty-three feet, twenty feet and less, liave armaments of the same calibre as the steam- ships of one hundred and one hundred and thirty guns. Formerly fleets were composed principally of ships-of-the-line, the frigates accompanying them occupying very much the same relative position as light infantry to an army. But now fleets may be formed of these lighter draught steamships, which, in the nature of their armament, are, for many purposes, elevated to the position of line-of-])attle ships. Frigates, too, now carry heavier guns than ships-of-the-line formerly, and hence it is scarcely less important to close the frigate channels than those of the 100-gun ships. Since, according to the coast survey chart of New York bay and harbor, published in 1845, steam and sail ships of the rates mentioned may enter the roadstead between the Narrows and Sandy Hook by the swash channel, witiiout approaching the proposed fort on the Hook nearer than two miles, and while lying out of reach of the fire of this fort and that of the works at the Narrows, effect many of the objects which the work on Sandy Hook w^as designed to prevent, it would not fully attain the objects desired. It thus appears of the 235 war steamers of tlie British navy, (built and buikling,) but 30, rated from 70 to 120 guns, draw too much water for the swash cliannel. Of that navy there are, besides numerous smaller vessels, 70 sail sliips between the rates of 30 and 60 guns, principally 42's, 44's, and 50's, whose draughts are not too great for this channel, as exhibited on the pub- lished charts, and we learn from the latest resurveys that ships-of- war, even of the largest size, may safel}^ pass through it. From all theses considerations I deem it advisable that as large ap- propriations should now be made for the completion of the works at the Narrows and Throg's Neck as can be advantageously expended, and that the work at Sandv Hook should be considered secondarv, and either be postponed until after the completion of the works just mentioned, or prosecuted at the same time, if appropriations can be made therefor without interfering with the rapid construction of thos(.' herein presented as of primary importance. It may be well, in this connexion, to remark that the use of steam to propel war vessels, and the heavy calibre of the armament, even of the smaller vessels, have given a new value to permanent fortifica- tions and seem to have rendered them indispensable where field-works would formerly have sufficed. The contrary o])inion has lecently be- come popular, and, if permitted to fasten itself in the public mind, may have a pernicious influence upon the defence of our sea coast. The idea is prevalent with many who have not attentively examined or closely studied the circumstances that are supposed to support the opinion, that temporary earth works are better able to resist the de- structive power of the new armaments of steamers than permanent works, and should be substituted for them. This opinion has grown out of, or derives its principal support from, the brilliant and pro- tracted defence of Sevastopol by works thrown up on the occasion under the skill and energy of the Russian engineer Todtleben ; and^ FORTIFICATIONS FOR TIIK FROPER apparently sustained by his professional reputation, is calculated to do i^reat harm. With steam vessels, the attacking fleet may select calm weather, so that the accuracy of their fire will not he disturbed by the motion on the wave, may stand in nearer to the defensive works than would be hazarded by sail vessels, and with guns of the heavy calibre now used and the increased accui'acy of fire due to a steady deck, earth works l)attered at short i-anges would be promptly reduced. Hollow shot, which break harmlessly against the masonry of a y)ermanent work, from the fire cf a steamer at close distance penetrate deeply the earth parapets of field works, and, exploding wliere thus buried, rapidly destroy them. So of solid shot, the ])enetration of which is much less in tiie more solid and durable i'am[)art of tlie ])ermanent work than in the loosely aggregated earthen parapet of the field work. The problem for the engineer now is, how to increase the strength of permanent woi-ks so as to keep pace with the increased destructive- ness of artiller}'. The foregoing views differ in some respects from those contained in the I'cport of the chief engineer, and the diffidence with which I dis- sent from any opinion of his on such subjects has only been overcomo by the necessity imposed on me by the resolution to report my own views. Referring to the estimates contained in the report of the chief en- gineer for the amount of appropriation which will be required for the several woiks therein ])roposed, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JEFF'N DAVIS, Secretary of War. Hon. J. D. Bright, Premdent of the Senate. Engineer Department, Washmgton, February 14, 1856. Sir: A resolution of the Senate, of the 11th instant, in relation to additional fortifications for New York harbor, having been sent to this office for report, I have the honor to submit what follows: The resolution requests the Secretary of War " report to the Senate whether any, and if any, luhat, additional fortifications are necessary for the proper defence and protection of the city and harbor of New York, and. of the navy yard and public property at Broohlynf" Thei-e are tw^o distinct channels to the interior of this harbor, with draught enough in each for the largest vessels of war, namely: Ist, The entrance at the south, between Sandy Hook and Long Island ; and, 2d, That at the east, by the way of Long Island sound. These are for a floating force. There is a third avenue, which can be followed by a land ibrce only ; but which is so short and easy as to need defence not less than the others. I sliall briefly mention the existing fortifications on each route, and those required in addition : DEFENCE OF NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN. 7 1. Pa.ssarje by Sandy Hook. — The defences most remote from the city, on this line of approach, are those at the "" Narrows" about eeven miles below the lower point of the city. These consist of Forts Hamilton and Lafayette, on the Long Island side, and batteries Hudson and Morton, on Staten Island — all finished and efficient works. On the Staten Island side, there is, moreover, a work in progress, called Fort Richmond; and there is needed, in addition, at this passage the rej)air, perhaps the reconstruction almost, of Fort Tompkins, a work begun by the State of New York in 1810, but never finished. Quite near tlie lower point of the city, and as a second line for the defence of this passage, there are fortifications on Governor's, Bed- low's, and Ellis' islands. In this part of the harbor there should be recalled into the general service, and suitably armed in case of danger. Castle Clinton, (Castle Garden.) It occupies a good position, may soon be put in good condition, and made to supply twenty-six guns of the largest calibre. No new permanent fortifications have been proposed to be added to this second line. The lower harbor, that is to say, all that broad water lying between the narrows and Sandy Hook — one of the best roadsteads on the At- tantic coast — is entirely without defences, its entrance being as open to an enemy as to ourselves. And its possession by a 8U])erior naval power, whicli could not now be disputed, w^ould effect a perfect block- ade of the city throughout all seasons of the year. On studying this subject some thirty-five years ago, the board of engineers regarded the importance of closing this outer entrance as so great, that they pi-ojected for the purpose, in addition to works to be erected during war upon Sandy Hook itself, two large casemated forts, to be founded u})on shoals outside of the Hook, estimated to cost each $1,680,000. Minute surveys since made of those shoals afi:brd so many reasons to doubt their stability, that it has been found necessary to confine the projects for defence to Sandy Hook, it being proposed to erect thereon a strong permanent fortification, for which work appropria- tions have, for many years, been solicited by this department. The necessity for such a work to shut the lower harbor u[) from an enemy's occupation relates not alone to the perfect blockade that its possession would enable liim to maintain throughout all seasons ol' the year, but it relates also to the landing place within eight miles of the navy yard and Brooklyn heights, that its possession would allow him to take advantage of at anv moment. The short and easy route for a land force, be(ore mentioned, is from this landing in Gravesend bay, which, though quite practicable while covered by a fleet in the bay, would be a very hazardous, if not im- practicable, enterj)rise were the enemy's fleet excluded by fortifications on the Hook. Beyond Gravesend bay the southern coast of Long Island is so covered by shallow bays and marshes that a landing in any portion of it would hardly be undertaken in the lace of defensive arrangements that a short time would suffice to prepare. A lort on Sandy Hook, which, by the range of its own fire and that of batteries, afloat and asliore, under its protection, would control all s FORTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPER the lower part of the outer harbor, would also contribute materially to the defence of the passage, should a fleet attempt to force its way up to the city and navy yard, since the main shij) channel, including Gedney's channel, ])ass(;s within effective range. 2. J^a^scHjc btj the '-East river'' from Long Island sou7id.—H\\\B channel is now defended by Fort Schuyler, a strong work, nearly completed, on Throg's Neck," at a narrow pass in the East river, about sixteen or eighteen miles from the city. It is pro})Osed, in addition, to erect a fort on the Long Island . ide of the East river, and o])posite Fort Schuyler. The two forts will atford a very secure defence to that channel. But these two forts, besides commanding the water })assage, w^ill have a very controlling action upon any attempt upon Brooklyn heights or the navy yard by a land force moving on Long Island from a landing either on its north or south shore, since any number of our own troops arriving from tlie north could, under their cover, be passed over upon the flank or rear of any sucli expedition. A march on the main land down u])on the city from a landing distant some twenty miles, wliich these forts would compel, with the unfordable Spiken- devil creek in front, and a very populous country in rear, would be (j^ifite out of the question. Even Fort Schuyler alone partially acoom4)lishes the same objects so long as it holds the channels sate. Tlie construction of a fort on the opposite shore may less injuriously be j)ostponed, and is of less pressing importance, therefore, than Sandy Hook. The complete system of permanent defences for New York harbor requires, then, the erection of the following fortifications : a fort on Sanky Hook, the rebuilding of Fort Tompkins, Staten Island, and a fort on the East river opposite Fort Schuyler. Should there be no special reasons for desiring the earliest possible completion of the system, new operations may now be restricted to the first position above named. The total cost of the fort projected for Sandy Hook is estimated, at present prices, at 11,500,000 ; and an appropriation should now be granted of $250,000, in order to secure a certain amount of efficiency at an early day. Any i)articular concern as to the condition of our foreign relations should, however, cause the commencement of both the other works without delay by an appropriation of not less than $150,000 for each. The cost of rebuilding Fort Tompkins has not been calculated, be- cause the extent to which the old structure and the old materials may now be used can only be known as the work advances. The cost was roughly estimated at $450, 000 many years ago, including repairs then required to adjacent batteries. The battery repairs have since been made, but I am of opinion that, with the diflerence of prices, placing these ruins in the state of efficiency demanded by the position and the object, can not be set down at a less cost than $600,000. The estimate made thirty years since, for the w^oik to stand oppo- site Fort Schuyler, was $686,000. The rise in prices of labor and materials since should raise this estimate to $850,000, To recapitu- late — DEFENCE OP NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN. 9 1. This report recommends the commenceraent of a fort on Sandy Hook, by an appropriation of $250,000; total cost §1,500,000. 2. The commencement of repairs on Fort Tompkins, Statea Island, by an appropriation of $150,000;. total cost $600,000. 3. The commencement of a new fort opposite Fort Schuyler, on the East river, by an appropriation of $150,000 ; total cost $850,000. The above works to be begun in the order of arrangement — the first mentioned without delay. In case of a supposed urgency, all to be begun at once. This report also recommends the restoration to the defensive system in due time^ and the refitting and re-arming, of Castle Clinton — now known as Castle Garden. It recommends, moreover — supposing such matters to fall within the scope of the Senate's inquiry — the putting and keeping in order and readiness, as to defensive strength arid armament, all existing works; and the completion, promptly, of those under construction. The estimates lately submitted to Congress by the War Department in- clude the sum of '$'75,000 for Fort Richmond, and $42,300 for the necessary extension of the site of the ibrts on Staten Island. The senior engineer in the harbor of New York presented besides — but not in time lor them to be submitted to the Secretary of War with other annual estimates — a call for $15,000 for Fort Schuyler; $00,000 for the completion of Fort Wood and the sea wall of Bedlow's Island; $4,000 for repairs of Fort Columbus; $7,000 for repairs and wharf at Fort Hamilton; and $2,000 for completing magazine at battery Hud- son — all which sums 1 believe to be necessary for the due preparation and preservation of the works mentioned. On the actual approach of a war with a maritime power, much will remain to be done by impromptu resorts — such as temporary batteries under the shelter of permanent forts, for the augmentation of fire upon important points ; the erection of block houses, towers, &c., to guard landing places and passes, and cover advanced batteries, &c. But while many important aids will undoubtedly be thus supplied, it will not be easy to say, long before hand, what, nor v/here, they must be. To a great extent the nature and number of these resorts must de- pend on the then condition of the permanent defences. I say nothing of the floating aids to the system of permanent de- fences, since no inquiry is made as to these. They will be important auxiliaries in some respects, and in certain positions; but as to these also, it would be useless now to specify either their number or their nature. We know, however, with certainty, that the resources of such a city as New York will quickly supply almost unlimited means of this kind, whenever thev mav be wanted as means of defence within its waters. Returning the resolution herewith, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, Brevet Brigadier General and Colonel Engineers. Hon. Jefferson Davis, Secrefarij of War, Ex. Doc. 36 2 i£x ICtbrta SEYMOUR DURST -± ' 'Tort nleAtw ^im^erdamx- of Je HarJiatarus FORT NEW AM.STEFJ>AM. (MEW YORK) , 1651. "When you leave, please leave this hook Because it has heen said "Ever'thing comes t' him who waits Except a loaned hook." Avery Architectural and Fine Arts Library Gift of Seymour B. Durst Old York Library ■