89th Congress j COMMITTEE PRINT 
 
 1st Session J 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 
 COMBINED REPORTS 
 ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE 
 
 SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 
 ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 
 ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 
 
 OP THE 
 
 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
 UNITED STATES SENATE 
 
 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE! 
 43-947 WASHINGTON : 1965 
 
 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
 Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price 35 cents 
 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
 
 JAMES 0. EASl 
 JOSTs L. McCLBLLAN, Arkansas 
 SAM J. EEVIN, Jk., North Carolina 
 THOMAS J. DODD, Conneotieut 
 PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 
 EDWARD V. LONa, Missouri 
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 
 BIRCH BAYH, Indiana 
 QUENTIN N . BURDICK, North Dakota 
 JOSEPH D. TYDINGS, Maryland 
 GEORGE A. SMATHEES, Florida 
 
 D, Mississippi, Chairman 
 EVERETT McKINLEY DIEKSEN, Illtaois 
 ROMAN L. HEUSKA, Nebraska 
 HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii 
 HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 
 JACOB K. JAVITS, New York 
 
 Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration op the Internal Securitt 
 Act and Other Internal Sectjeitt Laws 
 
 JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
 THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman 
 JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSEA, Nebraska 
 
 SAM J. EEVIN, Je., North Carolina EVEEETT McKINLEY DIEKSEN, lUinoiS 
 
 BIRCH BAYH, Indiana HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 
 
 GEORGE A. SMATHEES, Florida 
 
 J. G. SooKwiNE, Counsel 
 BXNJAUIN Mandel, Director of Research 
 
 n 
 
9am 
 
 CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE AMERICAS 
 
 Introduction by Senator Thomas J. Dodd 
 
 In January 1962, in response to the stepped-up Communist activity 
 in the Western Hemisphere following Castro's takeover in Cuba, 
 the Organization of American States established the Special Con- 
 sultative Committee on Security Against the Subversive Action of 
 International Communism. It was made up of experts in the field 
 of communist theory and practice who "advise member governments 
 that, according to the circumstances, might require and request such 
 assistance" on combatting Communist subversion within their re- 
 spective countries. 
 
 Since its inception, the Consultative Committee has prepared 
 four major reports, which, taken together, constitute the most 
 thorough and objective study on Communist penetration in Latin 
 America compiled_ to date. But these reports, unfortunately, were 
 distributed in limited quantity, in mimeographed form, so that to 
 this day only a handful of people are aware of their contents. 
 
 Because the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security considers 
 these reports of such timely importance, we are reprinting them in 
 this volume in the hope of drawing to them the attention they merit. 
 
 The first report is a study of the history of the international Com- 
 munist movement in general, its objectives and methods, and the 
 alternatives to communism offered by a free, democratic society. 
 
 The second report considers the techniques employed by Com- 
 munist agents in recruiting, training, psychological penetration, and 
 militarization in Latin America, and it described in great detail 
 Castro's efforts at spreading subversion. 
 
 The third report broadens its coverage to Communist efforts in the 
 whole of the Western Hemisphere, discusses the question of coexist- 
 ence, and the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
 
 The fourth report stresses the need for greater inter-American co- 
 operation to overcome Communist penetration and considers the im- 
 pact of the Sino-Soviet split is having on subversion in the Americas. 
 
 In the introduction to its first report, the Consultative Committee 
 aptly summarizes the present scope of Communist activities in the 
 Americas with these words: 
 
 Lacking sufSoient numerical strengtli and without Soviet and Cliinese Com- 
 munist military forces close enough to this hemisphere to give them support, the 
 Communists are dangerous only to the extent that they usurp the strength of 
 others; that is, the students, the workers, rural workers, writers, and even political 
 leaders. Since the great majority of the citizens of the Americas believe in the 
 ideals of national independence and individual liberty, and reject intervention 
 and dictatorship, the Communists can strengthen themselves, and even come into 
 power, only through a program of deceit that assumes many and varied forms. 
 Only thus can Communist subversion triumph. 
 
 I have underscored the phrase program of deceit because it is the 
 underlying theme and the main message of these reports. Moreover, 
 that phrase is the key to a proper understanding of the Communist 
 offensive in the Americas. 
 
 m 
 
IV 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Only by fraud and deception can the Communists hope to gain even 
 momentary acceptance by the peoples of the Americas. 
 
 They camouflage their true objectives by supporting all popular 
 causes and posing as the champions of human freedom and dignity. 
 
 Their immediate goal is to promote and sustain disorder; to impede 
 progress by frustrating land and social reforms, and by sabotaging 
 programs for economic development like the Alliance for Progress and 
 ■efforts toward an effective Latin-American "common market." In 
 short, to discredit and debilitate any scheme that shows promise of 
 success. 
 
 In the long run, communism aims to subjugate the world, and we 
 should not refrain from reminding ourselves that, by its own words 
 and deeds, the international Communist movement is a world con- 
 spiracy. Their goal does not change. However, policies and tech- 
 niques of subversion vary with regional, national, or local circum- 
 stances. This is what causes confusion in the West and the Free 
 World. 
 
 Skillfully applying the economy-of-forces principle, as the Consul- 
 tative Committee observes, 
 
 * * * the ambitious arm of Communist effort reaches out toward any place 
 where prevailing circumstances will permit it to act to advantage. Thus, the 
 Communists abandon their penetration of Europe in order to go into violent 
 action in various regions and countries of Asia and Africa, and finally, America. 
 The imperialist desire that motivates them neither weakens nor halts. It is 
 sustained action, carried out with minute precision. 
 
 Therefore, classical political and strategic concepts are helpless, 
 because, by the time the Free World has mobilized its efforts against 
 communism in one area it has "already ceased in that place and 
 reappeared in another." 
 
 As pointed out by the Consultative Committee, the Communist 
 assault in the Western Hemisphere manifests itself in five major ways: 
 (a) Subversive activities (agitation, strikes, guerrilla warfare, 
 etc.), which in some countries have reached the point of open 
 insurrection; 
 
 (6) Acts of sabotage and sympathetic terrorism, carried out 
 by small, but perfectly trained and equipped groups, following 
 preestablished plans and intended to create a climate conducive 
 to general insurrection ; 
 
 (c) Infiltration into governmental spheres, including the armed 
 forces, which endangers institutional stability itself; 
 
 (d) Penetration into information agencies and media (press, 
 radio, and television) with personnel especially trained in Com- 
 munist propaganda; and 
 
 (e) Growing participation in the educational field, particularly 
 at the university level, seeking, among other things, to rapproche- 
 ment workers, not for the purposes of trade union improvement 
 but only to develop their own subversive activities. 
 
 It bears repeating that the Communists do not necessarily plan to 
 succeed next week, although they would like to, but they are dedicated 
 to constant, sustained subversion over _any_ number of years. 
 
 At the time of this writing, the situation in the Dominican Republic 
 is still precarious and the future of freedom in that country is uncer- 
 tain. The initial unilateral intervention by the United States was 
 at first called for to protect American and other foreign nationals in 
 Santo Domingo, and, later, when it became clear that the Communists 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 V 
 
 had moved into command positions in the rebellion, to prevent 
 disorder from degenerating into a Castro-style takeover. 
 
 This intervention has been criticized by the Communist press as 
 an illegal invasion of the Dominican Republic's sovereignty and as 
 an example of American "imperiaUsm." Some observers in our own 
 country characterized our action as an "American Hungary" or as a 
 return to "Gunboat Diplomacy." 
 
 These criticisms and characterizations are simply not in line with the 
 facts — facts cited not only by the United States Government but also 
 by Latin- American governments themselves and their representatives 
 in the OAS. 
 
 Because these facts have been beclouded by the rapid pace of events 
 and by criticism at home and abroad, we have appended to this study, 
 beginning at page 107 the First Report of the Special Committee set 
 up by the Organization of American States to investigate the situation 
 in Santo Domingo firsthand. 
 
 The First Report establishes beyond a doubt the need for prompt 
 and decisive intervention by the United States, which is, after all, the 
 only power of this hemisphere capable of enforcing peace quickly, 
 efficiently, and effectively. According to the First Report, the action 
 was necessary to prevent a bloodbath in the streets of Santo Domingo. 
 
 The Special Committee notes : 
 
 * * * the streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses and stores were closed, 
 including those selling food of prime necessity. Also closed were banks and 
 government offices, and, in general, the city's entire normal activity had come to a 
 halt. Many refugees and other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the 
 various American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally 
 told us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the premises 
 of their respective missions. Consequently, there was an evident lack of security 
 and of authorities having effective control of the situation. Public services were 
 nonexistent, including the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. 
 The atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish. Rumors 
 and other unverifiable reports were cnculated regarding bloody incidents in various 
 parts of the city. 
 
 The Committee made the following observation on its interview with 
 Camaano : 
 
 The Special Committee was witness during that interview with the so-called 
 "Constitutional Military Command" to one detail that could not pass unnoticed. 
 This was the presence of a uniformed person carrying arms, who said he was part 
 of the command and who spoke Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The 
 Secretary General of the Organization of American States interrogated him in 
 loud voice before everyone, asking him: ' 'Who are you? What are you doing here?" 
 The person replied: "I am Andre Riviere, my nationality is French, I fought in the 
 French Army in Indochina, and I am working in Santo Domingo. I have Joined 
 this command." While he took no part in the conversations. Riviere was in the 
 discussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority with which he 
 gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and the door where we were was 
 quite obvious. 
 
 The First Report also explains in detail the activities and discussions 
 of the Special Committee with the various groups and individuals 
 involved in the Dominican drama. The report clearly shows that the 
 United States had to act in the interests of the Dominican people, in 
 the interests of preventing the spread of communism in Latin America, 
 and in the interests of its own security. 
 
 In the words of the Consultative Committee : 
 
 England, the United States, and France constitute three great examples of 
 sacrifice; of political and social revolutions; of victory over the selfish tendency of 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 human nature; of respect for freedom, equality, and fraternity, not just as hollow 
 words but as true and objective moral values. They are three examples of 
 democratic nations, which in ceaseless struggle for the rights of man, have de- 
 fended the inalienable prerogatives of the individual against huipiliation and 
 filavery. 
 
 Discussing some of the more optimistic factors for improvement in 
 LatiQ America, they state : 
 
 For example, the standards set by the Catholic Church for reforming. the social 
 ■order and the condition of workers are clearly revolutionary. In particular, the 
 programs of the Alliance for Progress, both in concept and scope, embody a pro- 
 found economic and social revolution. 
 
 The reports which follow, prepared by the Organization of American 
 States, by Latin Americans themselves, expose the international 
 Communist movement for what it really is: a movement based on 
 fraud and deceit, on violence and terror — a movement which, while it 
 claims to be revolutionary and progressive, is the embodiment of 
 .everything reactionary and retrogressive. 
 
 Thomas J. Dodd, Vice Chairman, 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Special Constjltative Committee on Security Initial General Report, 
 
 1962 
 
 Page 
 
 Explanatory note 1 
 
 I. Introduction 3 
 
 II. General statement of the problem 4 
 
 A. Evolution of the direction of the international Communist 
 
 movement 4 
 
 B. Brief references to the world situation of communism 6 
 
 C. Incidence of the international Communist movement in the 
 
 American Hemisphere 7 
 
 D. Conclusions 12 
 
 III. Deceit — Basic to Communist objectives and methods: 
 
 A. Deceit in Communist objectives: 
 
 1. The great deceit of communism :-- 13 
 
 2. Communist objective: Triumph throughout the world. 14 
 
 3. Domination of the Soviet Communist Party over 
 
 Communist Parties in the Western Hemisphere 14 
 
 4. The triumph of communism is fatal to national 
 
 independence 15 
 
 B. Deceit in Communist methods : 
 
 1. Communists' need for deceit 16 
 
 2. Use of diplomatic representatives , 17 
 
 3. Use of words: 
 
 (a) Nationalism 18 
 
 (6) "Peaceful coexistence" 18 
 
 (c) Democracy 18 
 
 Id) Dictatorship..- : 19 
 
 4. Use of people: 
 
 (a) Workers 20 
 
 (6) Students 21 
 
 (c) The so-called "reactionaries" 22 
 
 5. Communist use of promises 
 
 (o) Prosperity 22 
 
 (6) Land - — 23 
 
 6. Communist use of violence 24 
 
 7. Communist opposition to constructive reforms 25 
 
 C. Conclusions 26 
 
 .IV. Reply of democratic society 27 
 
 V. Recommendations 31 
 
 A. Measures to counteract subversive activities 31 
 
 B. Vigilance for the purpose of warning against acts of aggression, 
 
 subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, and 
 
 self-defense 35 
 
 APPENDIXES 
 
 1. Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers 
 
 of Foreign Affairs 37 
 
 2. Resolution I of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of 
 
 Foreign Affairs 38 
 
 3. Conditions of admission to the III Communist International 40 
 
 TO 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Paper Prepahbd at the Request op the Cottncil Committee Entettsted 
 With the Study of the Transfer of Funds to the American Republics 
 
 FOB Subversive Purposes, the Plow op Subversive Propaganda, and 
 THE Utilization of Cuba as a Base for Training in Subversive Tech- 
 niques, February 8, 1963 
 
 Pagi 
 
 Introduction 45 
 
 I. Communist subversion 47 
 
 A. General considerations 47 
 
 B. Some techniques employed 48 
 
 1. Recruitment and training 48 
 
 2. Infiltration 49 
 
 3. Psychological impregnation 49 
 
 4. Dislocation 50 
 
 6. Process of militarization 50 
 
 II. Cuba as a base for subversion in America 51 
 
 A, Cuba as a training center 51 
 
 1. Training centers 51 
 
 2. Organizations devoted to the spread of subversion in 
 
 America : 52 
 
 3. Congresses and meetings 52 
 
 4. Conclusions 53 
 
 B. Control of travel 53 
 
 1. General considerations 53 
 
 2. Recommendations ; 54 
 
 (a) National procedures 54 
 
 (6) International procedures 55 
 
 III. Transmission of subversive propaganda 56 
 
 A. General considerations 56 
 
 B. Subjects of the propaganda : 57 
 
 C. Instruments of propaganda 57 
 
 1. Diplomatic and consular missions 57 
 
 2. Trade and technical assistance missions 57 
 
 3. Binational centers and associations for friendship or 
 
 culture 68 
 
 4. Radio 58 
 
 (a) Local broadcasts 58 
 
 (6) Transmissions from abroad 68 
 
 (c) Telecommunications 69 
 
 5. Printed propaganda , 59 
 
 (a) Foreign publications 59 
 
 (b) Local publications 60 
 
 6. Motion pictures and television 60 
 
 D. Conclusions 61 
 
 E. Recommendations 61 
 
 1. Diplomatic and consular missions 61 
 
 2. Trade and technical assistance 61 
 
 3. Binational centers and friendship and cultural 
 
 societies 61 
 
 4. Radio propaganda 62 
 
 5. Telecommunications 62 
 
 6. Printed propaganda 62 
 
 7. Motion pictures and television 62 
 
 IV. Transfer of funds to the American Republics for subversive purposes.. 62 
 
 A. General considerations 62 
 
 B. Obtaining of funds 63 
 
 1. Funds collected in each country 63 
 
 2. Funds received from abroad 64 
 
 C. Conclusions 64 
 
 D. Recommendations 64 
 
 V. General recommendations 65 
 
 VI. Final consideration : 66 
 
CONTENTS IX 
 
 Report of the Special CoNsuiiTATivE Committee on SBctrRiTT on the Woek 
 
 Done Dtoing Its Fikst Regular Meeting, September 24 to October 18, 1963 
 
 Fas* 
 
 I. Introduction 69 
 
 II. Work done previously by the Committee 69 
 
 III. Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere 74 
 
 A. General panorama: 
 
 1. Present situation 74 
 
 2. Principal manifestations 74 
 
 3. Infiltration into governmental spheres 74 
 
 4. Informational media 74 
 
 5. The problem in the universities 75 
 
 6. International communism and Castroism 75 
 
 7. "Coexistence" 76 
 
 8. The Sino-Soviet conflict 76 
 
 B. Considerations 76 
 
 IV. General conclusions 77 
 
 Report op the Special Consultative Committee on Security on the Work 
 Done During Its Third Regular Meeting, November 16 to December 
 
 II, 1964 
 
 ' Page 
 
 I. Meeting 79 
 
 II. Participants 79 
 
 III. Activities 79 
 
 A. Meeting with Chiefs of Central American Security Agencies. 79 
 
 B. Study of the desirability of strengthening inter-American co- 
 
 ordination aimed at the more effective control of Communist 
 
 activities in the Americas 80 
 
 C. Study of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its influence on Com- 
 
 munist activities in the Americas 81 
 
 D. Date and agenda of the fourth regular meeting 81 
 
 E. Election of Chairman and Vice Chairman 81 
 
 appendixes 
 
 I. Desirability of Strengthening Inter-American Coordination Aimed 
 at the More Effective Control of Communist Activities in the 
 
 Western Hemisphere ■ 83 
 
 II. The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Influence on Communist Activities 
 
 in the Americas 89 
 
 First Report of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of 
 Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
 
 States— Actions in Dominican Republic, Dated Mat 8, 1965 107 
 
SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY 
 AGAINST THE SUBVERSIVE ACTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
 COMMUNISM 
 
 INITIAL GENERAL REPORT, 1962 
 
 Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., General Secretariat of the Organization 
 
 of American States 
 
 EXPLANATOEY NOTE 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security was created by 
 Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of 
 Foreign Affairs held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962.i 
 As it is pointed out in the preamble of Resolution II, international 
 communism makes use of highly complex techniques of subversion, 
 and in the task of opposing these methods certain states may benefit 
 from mutual advice and support. Being firmly united for the com- 
 mon goal of fighting the subversive action of international communism 
 and preserving democracy in the Americas, the American States fur- 
 ther considered that for such purpose they can and should assist each 
 other, particularly through the use of the institutional resources of 
 the Organization of American States. It was deemed advisable, there- 
 fore, to make available to the Council of the Organization the services 
 of an advisory body, made up of experts, the main purpose of which 
 would be to advise member governments that, according to circum- 
 stances, might require and request such assistance. 
 
 Pursuant to Resolution II, the Council of the Organization, at its 
 regular meeting on March 8, 1962, resolved to create the Committee, 
 to be composed of seven members whom the Council would elect by 
 secret ballot from a list that the Secretary General would prepare of 
 candidates put forward by the Governments by March 15. The 
 Committee was to hold its first meeting no later than April 2, in order 
 that it might be able to submit to the Council the initial general 
 report referred to in paragraph 2(c) of Resolution II. 
 
 At its regular meeting on March 21 the Council of the Organization 
 elected the following persons to make up the Committee: 
 
 Mr. Manuel Campos Jimenez (Costa Rica) . 
 
 Gen. Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez (Peru). 
 
 Prof. Joaquim Canute Mendes de Almeida (Brazil). 
 
 Lt. Col. Francisco Marcelo Ramirez (Argentina). 
 
 Lt. Col. Julio Cesar Vadora Rozier (Uruguay). 
 
 Gen. Thomas D. White (United States). 
 
 Lt. Col. Joaquin Zaldivar (El Salvador). 
 The Committee held its first session at the headquarters of the 
 Organization of American States during the period April 2-30, 1962, 
 and elected Mr. Manuel Campos Jimenez Chairman and Gen. Julio 
 Cesar Doig Sanchez Vice Chairman. Dr. F. V. Garcia-Amador 
 
 1 The text of Besolution II is given in ap. 1. 
 
 1 
 
2 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 acted as Technical Adviser to the Committee, Mr. Modesto Lucero as 
 Administrative Secretary, and Miss Joan Hetzel as Assistant Secretary. 
 
 This initial general report has been prepared on the basis, among 
 other factors, of a large volume of basic documentary information 
 supplied by the General Secretariat of the Organization and by 
 members of the Committee. The nature of these documents has 
 led the Committee to the conclusion that they should remain at its 
 disposal and that the confidential classification attached to them by 
 their sources of origin should continue in force. This step has been 
 taken until such time as the Council approves the regulations by which 
 the Committee is to be governed in this respect. 
 
 The report contains five chapters. The first is an introduction, 
 which points out certain incongruities noted in the attitude assumed 
 by citizens of the free world with respect to the intentions, methods, 
 and dangers of communism, as these were denounced by the Ministers 
 of Foreign Affairs at Punta del Este. Chapter II takes up the evolu- 
 tion of the direction of the international Communist movement and, 
 especially, the way in which it has affected the American Hemisphere. 
 Chapter II explains in detail the tactic of "deceit," on which both the 
 objectives and the methods of communism are based; and chapter IV 
 gives the democratic society's reply. Chapter V contains the recom- 
 mendations made by the Committee in conformity with paragraph 
 2(c) of Eesolution II. 
 
I. INTEODUCTION 
 
 The instructions received from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
 the Council of the Organization of American States with respect to 
 this first report were brief, to the effect that the Committee should 
 submit to the Council no later than May 1, 1962, "an initial general 
 report, with pertinent recommendations regarding measures that 
 should be taken." In following these instructions, and in view of the 
 vastness and complexity of Communist action, the first problem was 
 to determine the type of report that would be most useful at this time. 
 
 As the problem was studied, the solution became clear. It emerged 
 from the consideration of three ostensible incongruities that are at 
 once revealed upon analyzing, first, Communist intentions; second, 
 Communist methods; and third, the Communist danger. 
 
 With respect to Communist intention, the Ministers of Foreign 
 Affairs declared at Punta del Este that they had been able "to verify 
 that the subversive offensive of Communist governments, their 
 agents, and the organizations that they control, has increased in 
 intensity." They added that the purpose of this offensive is "the 
 destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of totali- 
 tarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers." Here 
 the incongruity lies in the fact that citizens of free countries of this 
 hemisphere tolerate, or are inclined to tolerate and support, known 
 Communists. 
 
 With respect to Communist methods, the Ministers of Foreign 
 Affairs declared that in order to "* * * hide their true intentions, 
 the Communist governments and their agents exploit the legitimate 
 needs of the less-favored sectors of the population * * *" and that 
 "with the pretext of defending popular interests, freedom is sup- 
 pressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are 
 violated, and the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of 
 life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party." Nonetheless, 
 citizens of free countries of this hemisphere cooperate, or are inclined 
 to cooperate, with known Communists. 
 
 With respect to the magnitude of the Communist danger, the Min- 
 isters of Foreign Affairs declared that Communist subversion consti- 
 tutes "one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in 
 the internal affairs of other countries." Nevertheless, prominent 
 persons in the hemisphere underestimate, or persist in underestimat- 
 ing, the Communist danger, maintaining that it is easy to control 
 since the number of Communists in the hemisphere is still small.* 
 
 It is appropriate to ask what causes these incongruities. The reply 
 can be given in a single word: deceit. Lacking sufficient numerical 
 strength and without Soviet and Chinese Communist mifitary forces 
 close enough to this hemisphere to give them support, the Communists 
 aredangerous only to the extent that they usurp the strength of others; 
 that is, the students, workers, rural workers, vmters, and even political 
 leaders. Since the great majority of the citizens of the Americas 
 
 ' The complete text of Hesolution I, on "Communist Offensive in America," is given in app. 2. 
 
 3 
 
4 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 believe in the ideals of national independence and individual liberty, 
 a.nd reject intervention and dictatorship, the Communists can 
 strengthen themselves, and even come into power, only through a 
 program of deceit that assumes many and varied forms. Only thus 
 -can Communist subversion triumph. 
 
 The Committee believes that at this time it would best accomplish 
 its mission by submitting an initial general report in which the various 
 Communist techniques of deceit are described. 
 
 These Communist techniques deserve careful study. Therefore 
 this report presents certain data and gives some examples that should 
 help any genuinely patriotic and alert observer to analyze Communist 
 words and action and to protect his country against them. It also 
 offers some recommendations on measures that should be taken in 
 order effectively to counter the subversive action of international 
 communism and thus to strengthen the defense system of the hemi- 
 sphere. In this connection, aware that many citizens and organiza- 
 tions of our hemisphere are zealously engaged in numerous activities 
 designed to achieve social, economic, and political progress on the 
 basis of national independence and respect for individual liberty, the 
 members of this Committee have undertaken the task assigned to 
 them with the hope that their contribution may be an important part 
 of the total effort. 
 
 II. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PEOBLEM 
 
 Communism operates on a worldwide scale. Its methods and pro- 
 cedures are adapted to the local conditions that will most favor its 
 development, and they vary from simple infiltration for subversive 
 purposes to the use of violence, according to the objective, the direc- 
 tion of the action, and the resistance that may be encountered. 
 
 a. evoltttion of the direction op the international 
 Communist Movement 
 
 To provide a better understanding of the objectives pursued by 
 international communism and of its methods and modes of action, it 
 is important to make a synthesis of the evolution that has occurred 
 in the direction of the movement. 
 
 The forms and tactics employed have been many and varied, but 
 it is interesting to point out that communism mexorably adheres to 
 four fundamental principles: maintenance of the objective, econorny 
 of forces, sustained action, and the firm will to win. 
 
 It can be said that for more than 40 years the IMarxist-Leninist 
 movement has striven to extend Soviet totalitarianism throughout the 
 world. There is no doubt that the attempts m.ade in that direction, 
 successfully at times and unsuccessfully at other times, have sprung 
 from a purpose of achieving world dominion — a purpose that is 
 always concealed and disguised by its leaders but is always real and 
 nurtured as a permanent aspiration. Resorting to various methods 
 with inconceivable craftiness, taking advantage or not of the help 
 of occasional Western alHes, or with the help of its present ally. Red 
 China, the Soviet Union has kept its eager desire for world dominion 
 alive and unchanged. 
 
 Circumstances have occurred in which for long periods of time the 
 Soviet effort has not had any preponderant incidence in certain areas. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 5 
 
 such as Latin America before 1958, or Western Europe after its re- 
 covery, to which the Marshall plan contributed so greatly. But 
 this must not be looked upon as a lack of coherence or as disintegration 
 in the planned strategy. On the contrary, the results obtained show- 
 perfectly well that the Soviet leaders have apphed the principle of 
 economy of forces. 
 
 To that end the ambitious arm of the Commimist effort reaches out 
 toward any place where prevailing circumstances will permit it to 
 act to advantage. Thus, the Communists abandon their penetration 
 of Europe in order to go into violent action in various regions and coun- 
 tries of Asia and Africa, and finally, America. The imperiaUst desire 
 that motivates them neither weakens nor halts. It is an undertaking 
 without hurry but without pause. It is sustained action, carried out 
 with minute precision. 
 
 This apparent incoherence somewhat disconcerts the free world, 
 which struggles against Marxism-Leninism according to classical 
 political and strategic plans and concepts. Thus, the defense mech- 
 anism of the free world does not manage to finish preparing to act 
 before it finds that the Communist action has already ceased in that 
 place and reappeared in another. 
 
 Nothing is more useful to international communism than the new 
 and peculiar form of action used since 1947, the so-called cold war. 
 This is a deceitful, merciless struggle that ranges from psychological 
 action and the peaceful winning of wills to guerrilla warfare and sub- 
 versive war, using all kinds of action, even the most detestable, such as 
 intimidation, sabotage, terrorism, espionage, and treason. 
 
 In order to create more confusion in the thinking of the free world, 
 international communism falsely preaches a policy of "peaceful 
 coexistence," just as it deceitfully distorts the traditional concepts of 
 peace and democracy, or exploits the just aspirations of slowly de- 
 veloping nations for welfare and progress, inflaming their equally 
 just nationalist, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist sentiments. 
 
 Certainly, Communist action is sustained. But what is still more 
 serious, there is no room for doubt that the world is virtually at war — 
 an atypical kind of war, which is being waged by _ international 
 communism and suffered by the democracies. In this sense, it is 
 undeniable that the Marxist dialectic has changed the saying of 
 Clausewitz that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," 
 to the assertion that "peace is only the continuation of war by other 
 means." 
 
 Unfortunately, this present stage of affairs has found the free world 
 inadequately prepared. Certain unbalances cause large areas and 
 large sectors of population to live in despair if not in desperation. 
 Furthermore, the structure of the democratic countries taken as a 
 whole is not monolithic, in the same sense as that of the Communist 
 world, whose unity of command has so far shown no rifts. Irrespec- 
 tive of whether the ideological dispute between the principal members 
 of the Communist world is fictitious or real, the important thing is 
 that any such dispute does not substantially_£affect the tactic of 
 deceiving and upsetting the free world. 
 
 Their firm wiU to wia is impelled by the aim to destroy everything 
 that is not communism itself. The Marxist-Leninist concept of the 
 world and of man places communism face to face with the alternative 
 of winning the victory or disappearing. 
 
6 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 B. Brief References to the World Situation of Communism 
 
 The Soviet Union and now Communist China use diverse tactics to 
 impose Marxist-Leninist domination on the world, ranging from 
 internal or external subversion to direct or indirect military action, 
 and from diplomatic maneuvers to carefully veiled and deceptive 
 psychological action that finds expression in many forms and styles. 
 One characteristic deception is the incorporation of Communists in 
 genuine national movements for political, social, economic, and 
 cultural reform, in order eventually to take control of them. This is 
 a Communist tactic designed to seduce and win over most, if not all, 
 of public opinion. Thus, it tries to overcome any popular resistance 
 to the systematic diversion of those national movements toward the 
 international Communist line dictated from abroad. 
 
 Direct or indirect military action was evident when the armies of 
 the U.S.S.R., the so-called forces of liberation, did not confuie them- 
 selves to liberating the people of the countries they occupied from the 
 Nazi totalitarian yoke, but subjugated them to Communist totalitar- 
 ianism and suppressed, with greater or lesser intensity, the self- 
 determination and freedom of those peoples. 
 
 Military action, climaxing the psychological action of deceit, or 
 both simultaneously, resulted in the collapse of China and of other 
 countries such as North Korea and North Vietnam. 
 
 Communist China has made an effective contribution to the military 
 action with its guerrilla technique. The methods developed by 
 Mao Tse-tung in the war with the Japanese and nationalist China 
 were used in Cuba by Castro, and in Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo. 
 By means of these methods, the "war of liberation" is falsely presented 
 as an internal revolution, once psychological action and subversion 
 have laid the necessary groundwork. In that way communism uses 
 military tactics to advance itself without any apparent manifestations 
 of aggression from the outside; this also demonstrates the technique 
 of deceit in the use of force to impede international defensive military 
 action. 
 
 The psychological tactic of deceit — applied in the areas of just as- 
 pirations for national independence, self-determination, democracy, 
 economic progress, cultural improvement, and social justice — is what 
 in some cases in Asia, Africa, [and America has deformed legitimate 
 popular movements in respect to electoral policies, differences, and rev- 
 olutionary or trade-union struggles. This is exactly what happened 
 in Cuba in the just and heroic phase of the revolution, and what is 
 happening or can happen in other countries of America. 
 
 Unhappily, in the ideological struggle for the supremacy of one of 
 the two revolutionary currents — international communism, based on 
 historic atheist materialism, and democracy, based on national philos- 
 ophies — international communism meets with less resistance than 
 does democratic revolution. Groups, classes, regions, and nations — • 
 conscious or unconscious of the aforementioned psychological attitude, 
 more sentimental than rational, that takes hold in the disorderly and 
 shapeless popular mind — put forth claims that international com- 
 munism always tries to cement and coordinate according to specific 
 strategic methods in support of its policy of world supremacy, which 
 is aimed toward the prior destruction of all the postulates of democracy. 
 On the other hand, the policy of democratic revolution, a policy of 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 7 
 
 constructive progress instead of the destruction of values, has to travel 
 a rougher road. This is due to the fact that the feelings of rebellion 
 among the despairing and discouraged sectors of the countries' pop- 
 ulations are frequently based on the prevailing indifference to national 
 problems and on a lack of faith in the political, social, and economic 
 values of Western civilization. 
 
 International communism takes advantage of this state of mind, 
 which is widespread in Latin America, and also in certain sectors of 
 the United States, to develop its psychological campaign. It seeks 
 to infiltrate and seize control of political parties by making use of 
 demagogic opportunism; of labor groups by taking advantage of the 
 absence of trade-union traditions ; of groups of rural workers by making 
 false promises; and of student groups by taking advantage of the 
 idealism and enthusiasm characteristic of youth. 
 
 C. Incidence of the International Communist Movement in 
 THE American Hemisphere 
 
 Always preserving its centralized direction, the international Com- 
 munist movement plots its strategy and its tactics in accordance with 
 the resolutions approved at the numerous congresses, meetings, and 
 conferences of the Communist Party and its related bodies. 
 
 With respect to the American hemisphere, mention should be made 
 of the Third International, or Comintern, created in 1919 for the 
 purpose of assuming the general direction of the Communist move- 
 ment. At its second congress (1920), the Third International estab- 
 lished 21 conditions for affiliation of the Communist Parties of the 
 entire world, including those in the Americas, thereby establishing 
 their international character.^ According to the second of these 
 conditions : 
 
 Every organization desiring to join the Communist International shall be bound 
 systematically and regularly to remove from all the responsible posts in the labor 
 movement (party organization, editorship, labor unions, parliamentary factions, 
 cooperatives, municipalities, etc.) all reformists and followers of the centre and 
 to have them replaced by Communists. * * * 
 
 The third condition stated that: 
 
 The class struggle in almost every country of Europe and America is entering 
 the phase of civil war. Under such conditions the Communists can have no. 
 confidence in bourgeois laws. They should create everywhere a parallel illegal 
 apparatus, which at the decisive moment should be of assistance to the party 
 to do its duty toward the revolution. In every country where, in consequence 
 of martial law or of other exceptional laws, the Communists are unable to carry on 
 their work legally, a combination of legal and illegal work is absolutely necessary. 
 
 And in the seventh condition it was stated that : 
 
 Parties desirous of joining the Communist International must recognize the 
 necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with reformism and the policy of the 
 "centrists," and must advocate this rupture amongst the widest circles of the party 
 membership without which condition a consistent Communist policy is impossible. 
 The Communist International demands unconditionally and preemptorily that 
 such rupture be brought about with the least possible delay. 
 
 At its sixth congress in 1928, Trotsky's opposition having been 
 eliminated, the Third International decided to give greater attention 
 to the Communist Parties of the Latin American countries, and 
 through the executive committee of the Comintern it issued various. 
 
 ' The text of the 21 conditions for afflliation with the Third International is given in app. 3. 
 43-947—65 2 
 
S COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 specific instructions, such as: to fight for a labor and farm labor 
 government; to fight for a federation of proletarian republics; and to 
 help the revolutionary bourgeois governments of small countries, 
 without abandoning the Communist watchword themselves. This 
 was due to the fact that between 1919 and 1928, Communist Parties, 
 or parties inclined toward Communist ideology, inspired by the afore- 
 mentioned 21 conditions, had been organized in various American 
 countries, but without being formally subordinate to the Third 
 International. 
 
 In 1929 a Latin American conference in Buenos Aires made evident 
 the inefiicacy and weakness of the Communist movement in Latin 
 America. Consequently, the movement decided to take steps to 
 strengthen itself by centralizing the Communist Parties under the 
 direction of a secretariat responsive to Moscow. The activities of 
 international communism in Latin America were already being 
 coordinated as a whole by the Latin American Bureau and the Carib- 
 bean Bureau, which had been created between 1922 and 1928 to 
 control the Communist and related parties of the hemisphere for the 
 purpose of insuring their strict adherence to the line dictated from 
 Moscow by the agents of the Comintern. 
 
 Another congress of the Third International was convened to meet 
 in Moscow in 1934, but at the last moment it was changed into a 
 Latin American Conference, in which delegates of the canceled 
 congress participated. This conversion shows the importance of 
 Latin America to the objectives of international communism, a 
 circumstance that was expressly stressed during the conference: 
 
 The Latin American question is of major interest, for the policy we adopt there 
 will serve as a precedent for other parts of the world. 
 
 The results of that conference in Latin America were a fruitless 
 armed movement (Brazil, 1935) and electoral alliances that led to 
 political upsets (ChUe, 1938, and Cuba, 1940 and 1944). 
 
 The Seventh Congress of the Third International (1935), definitively 
 establishing the thesis of Dimitrov, based on the intensive use of 
 intellectuals, led to the creation of popular fronts to participate in the 
 various kinds of electoral battles in the various countries.^ In its 
 application to Latin America this thesis of the popular front was most 
 successful in the labor groups. 
 
 Thus it was that the aim for unity in the international Communist 
 movement, which led to the foundation in Montevideo in 1929 of the 
 Latin American Trade-Union Confederation (Confederacion Sindical 
 Latinoamericana) , which was affiliated to the Red Trade-Union Inter- 
 national, had a decisive influence on the organization of the Confed- 
 eration of Workers of Latin America (Confederacion de Trabaj adores 
 de America Latina, CTAL), which took place in Mexico in 1938. 
 Through its various congresses (Mexico City, 1941; Cah, 1944; 
 Mexico City, 1948; Santiago, Chile, 1953), as well as through the 
 indecision and contradictions in its positions, the CTAL encouraged 
 the adherence of the trade unions to international Communist leader- 
 ship, a situation that culminated with the Soviet campaign "for 
 peace" and in the conversion of the CTAL, for all practical purposes, 
 into a subsidiary of the World Federation of Trade Unions, for the 
 creation of which it had taken the initiative in 1945. 
 
 • As opposed to tlie classist and insurrectional theory advanced by Manuilsky. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 9 
 
 In that same year, Moscow, allied with the democratic countries, 
 astutely dissolved the Comintern, supporting international under- 
 standing with a pretense of peaceful purposes. But unfortunately, 
 when the integration of the aforementioned popular fronts was 
 consolidated under the inspiration and directives of international 
 communism, Moscow created front or facade organizations * and 
 installed the Cominform as the coordination and information office 
 •of the Communist Parties as well as an instrument of propaganda and 
 reinforcement in the so-called cold war. 
 
 Since then the popular fronts and the local affiliates of the inter- 
 national front organizations have manifested themselves through 
 Communist participation in the electoral campaigns in democratic 
 countries ; in opposition groups ; in countries where dictatorships exist ; 
 in popular movements on behalf of various causes, and revolutionary 
 movements that have been chiefly anti-imperialist in purpose; in 
 infiltration in labor unions, particularly with a view to promoting 
 strikes ; in utilization and winning over of student and young people's 
 groups, especially through the exploitation of nationalistic ideas; in 
 systematic propaganda about the U.S.S.R. by all possible means, 
 designed principally to awaken enthusiasm for international com- 
 munism and stir up hatred for the democratic system; and in false 
 campaigns in favor of free trade and pacifism. 
 
 Furthermore, the meeting of South American Communist Parties, 
 convoked by the Cominform and held in Montevideo in 1950, was 
 outstandingly important, as will be demonstrated later on; and a 
 meeting of the heads of 61 Communist Parties throughout the world 
 was followed by a high-level Conference of Latin American Communist 
 Parties held in Moscow in 1957. 
 
 The 20th and 21st Congresses of the Communist Party of the 
 U.S.S.R., held in Moscow in 1956 and 1959, respectively, marked an 
 about-face in Soviet policy, particularly with the proclaimed elimina- 
 tion of the cult of personality, which was apparently replaced by 
 the concept of democratic centralism; "peaceful coexistence," which 
 implies the apparent dissolution of the Cominform; the inclusion of 
 America in the so-called "peace zones"; and the formation in the 
 political field in each country of national democratic fronts (a blend of 
 heterogeneous ideologies in which the Communist Parties do not show 
 their identity). The directives comprehended party reorganization 
 and reinforcement of the illegal apparatus. 
 
 The Latin American Conference in Mexico City in 1961 was con- 
 vened under the slogan "For national sovereignty, economic emancipa- 
 tion, and peace," and reference will be made to it later in this report. 
 
 In September 1961 the Conference of Unalined Countries was held 
 in Belgrade, with 28 nations participating. The basic topic was the 
 fight for national independence and support for the fight in Algeria, 
 Angola, Tunisia, and the Congo. But no attention was paid to the 
 fact that nations such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Tibet, among 
 others, have the same yearning for independence. Harsh criticism 
 was applied to the countries that international communism calls 
 capitalist and imperialist, and disarmament and the easing of world 
 tensions were endorsed. Nonetheless, no reference was made to the 
 nuclear tests that the U.S.S.R. was carrying on during the week when 
 the conference was meeting. 
 
 < Organizations set up by communism under disguise, in which it denies participation, whereas its Identity 
 is preserved in the popular fronts. 
 
10 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 On October 31, 1961, the 22d Congress of the Communist Party 
 of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow. It approved the program of 
 the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. for the formation of the Com- 
 munist society. The program's principal points dealt with the pas- 
 sage from capitalism to communism, and it laid down rules for the 
 international working class movement and the struggle for peace and 
 "peaceful coexist once." 
 
 In view of tlie foregoing statements, it is desirable to emphasize 
 the following aspects, which are considered to be extremely important : 
 
 1. The meeting of South American Communist Parties, convened 
 by the Cominform and held in Montevideo in 1950: Its objective was 
 to examine the situation in the area concerned, for the purpose of 
 implementing the appropriate strategy and coordinating the struggles 
 in the regional areas involved. 
 
 Its declared purposes were to accelerate the gradual destruction of 
 the forces of capitalism, democratic systems, and private enterprise, 
 and to weaken and impair the standing of international capitalism 
 and the enemies of the U.S.S.R. 
 
 Its recommendations, to be applied to each country according to the 
 need, covered direct coalition of Communist groups with bourgeois 
 governments; agitation to incite rebellion and to deceive the masses 
 against those governments; revolutionary extremism and sabotage; 
 a united front of Communist Parties and all forms of organizations 
 of the masses; and social revolution in any coimtry that was 
 "prepared." 
 
 The following obligations were assumed: Recognition by the Ameri- 
 can Communist Parties of the Commxmist Party of the U.S.S.R. as 
 the leader in the international Communist struggle, to which they 
 owed obedience and loyalty; the granting of permission to the Latin 
 American Communist Parties, for the first time, to determine their 
 own objectives and suggest the strategy to be followed in their juris- 
 diction ; adherence to the decisions of the Cominform, which, through 
 its international front organizations, would provide resources of all 
 kinds ; and, in the event the Communist Parties gained control of the 
 government, an oath of allegiance to the U.S.S.R. 
 
 Among the resolutions adopted for these purposes, the following 
 deserves special note: A minority that is technically superior to the 
 majority classes may govern and direct them, subject and control 
 them, within the dictatorship of the proletariat. For this purpose it 
 was provided that within the party ranks there would be a limited 
 number of loyal, thoroughly indoctrinated, active, competent persons, 
 expertly versed in the struggle; and a South Atlantic Committee was 
 created in Montevideo to consolidate the leadership of the South 
 Pacific Committee that is based in Santiago, Chde. 
 
 Taking into account the strategic position of the Caribbean area, 
 in 1952 Moscow worked out a plan for Communist operations in that 
 area. The features of this plan were as follows: 
 
 (a) Its realistic approach, since it took advantage of all con- 
 tions that would be favorable to its activities, such as the critical 
 situation of the Latin American economy in the postwar period; 
 economic, social, and cultural underdevelopment; class and racial 
 differences; autocratic governemnts; the continued existence of 
 foreign colonies; and, in general, all of the factors that foster 
 latent discontent among the masses. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 11 
 
 (6) Its prudence in transforming the Communist Parties into 
 disguised instruments of what is really Red action, by creating 
 organizations and movements that apparently have no connec- 
 tion with Communist leadership (fronts for anti-imperialism, anti- 
 colonialism, national liberation, peace, etc.) . 
 
 (c) Its flexibility in utilizing a great variety of methods involv- 
 ing action that is sometimes "peaceful" and other times revolu- 
 tionary, and ceaseless psychological action. 
 
 2. The second meeting of the heads of the 61 Communist Parties 
 of the world, held in Moscow in 1957, and followed immediately by a 
 high-level conference of the Latin American Communist Parties. 
 
 The more important aspects of these meetings were : Khrushchev's 
 special mention of the Latin American representatives and his deliber- 
 ate omission of any mention of the presence of certain countries, in 
 order not to disturb the negotiations that were underway for the 
 establishment of diplomatic relations; the reorganization of the execu- 
 tive apparatus of the International for Latin America; and the peace 
 manifesto signed by all of the parties, without exception, the postu- 
 lates of which may be summarized as ratification of the well-known 
 watchwords (infiltration into all national parties, without exception; 
 encouragement of nationalism; formation of national democratic and 
 popular fronts; orientation of the struggle against imperialism, and so 
 forth, and greater emphasis on the need for bringing the action of the 
 Communist Parties adequately into line with regional, national, and 
 local characteristics. 
 
 The results of these resolutions in the American Hemisphere have 
 been as follows: the appointment of a greater number of Latin 
 American representatives in international front organizations; meet- 
 ings of the Communist Parties for the purpose of "exchanging ex- 
 periences" and "forming new cadres"; change in opera,tional tactics 
 to avoid committing the Communist Parties to acuvities that are 
 opposed to peaceful coexistence, and instead, carrying out revolu- 
 tionary operations through agents who have infiltrated into non- 
 Communist organizations; and intensification of psychological action 
 through a cultural and artistic offensive among the higher social 
 classes. 
 
 3. The Congress of Peiping in 1959, in which 20 prominent delega tes 
 from 9 Latin America,n countries participated. At that meetmg the 
 Chinese leaders recommended "insurrectional tactics against the 
 advances of Yankee imperialism in Latin America" and stressed 
 the urgency of creating an Afro-Asian-Latin American front. Con- 
 sequently, Claina began an offensive in the American Hemisphere 
 involving propagandistic, economic, subversive, cultural, and other 
 aspects. 
 
 4. The Congress of the Communist Party of France in 1959, at 
 which Soviet and Chinese representatives debated their differences 
 and agreed to these compromises: division of zones of influence; 
 acceptance of the Soviet thesis (peaceful coexistence), with the ex- 
 ception that the Chinese (insurrectional) method should be used in 
 areas where conditions are favorable to it; and seizure of power by 
 communism in those countries where national fronts led by the 
 Communist Party already exist (as in the case of Cuba). 
 
 5. The Conference of representatives of the 81 Communist and 
 Labor Parties that met in Moscow in 1960: This was by far the most 
 
12 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 important of the meetings held recently by the Communist Inter- 
 national and, practically speaking, it gave rise to a new Comintern. 
 In it, the fundamental objectives, namely, "peaceful coexistence," 
 support for "just wars," solidarity with Cuba, and the establishment 
 of a "democratic" national front in every country, were not changed. 
 However, with respect to Latin America, the meeting served to deter- 
 mine the strategy and tactics to cope with the situation and the objec- 
 tives set, and it was decided that "Operation America" would hence- 
 forth be directed exclusively from Moscow. 
 
 The principal lines of the plan envisaged by the Conference were: 
 The possibility of extending the field of action by creating another 
 base of operations and exploiting the situation that existed ra the so- 
 called "soft zones"; preparation of subversion plans in case a new 
 operational base was established; tactical changes in the Communist 
 Parties, setting up the real direction of the movement in secret and 
 using the old leaders merely as a cover, in order to distract the atten- 
 tion of the security agencies ; and the operation of a network of secret 
 radio transmitters, schools for agents and liaison personnel, work- 
 shops for the counterfeiting of documents and money, traffic in nar- 
 cotics, etc. 
 
 6. The Latin American Conference on National Sovereignty, 
 Economic Emancipation, and Peace, held in Mexico City in March 
 1961 under the auspices of the Latin American Office of the World 
 Peace Council. Its real purpose seems to have been to determine 
 what new steps to take in the hemisphere in favor of the extension of 
 communism. The basic agreements, which were prepared by a small 
 group of technicians, were included in a plan of action that may be 
 summarized as follows: To pursue south of the Eio Grande, with the 
 greatest possible animosity, the campaign against the United States; 
 to develop a "plan of the Latin American nations for their economic 
 emancipation," establishing agencies in each country to make the 
 necessary studies and suggest the measures they deem appropriate 
 (among these, the expansion of international trade without restric- 
 tions, and Ibero-American integration at the trade union, youth, 
 educational, and other levels); to set up a single Latin American 
 Central Labor Office, apparently divorced from the CTAL; to encour- 
 age the formation of the Afro-Asian-Latin American bloc; to con- 
 solidate the advance of the Cuban revolution; and to promote a 
 "conference" of representatives of the underdeveloped countries of 
 Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America. 
 
 D. Conclusions 
 
 The synthesis made in this chapter on the Communist movement 
 enables us to draw some conclusions about its true nature and the 
 strategy of destruction that it uses : 
 
 1. The Communist Parties of America are international in character 
 and are subject to the directives that issue from Moscow. (See the 
 21 conditions in app. 3.) Direction of the movement is carried on in 
 accordance with resolutions adopted at congresses, meetings, and 
 conferences of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and related 
 agencies and parties. 
 
 2. The Communist Parties of America and their members have 
 pledged themselves not to fight in defense of their countries if they 
 should be attacked by the U.S.S.R. 
 
COMBINED EEPOKTS ON COMMXJNIST SUBVERSION 13 
 
 3. The directive body of the Communist apparatus began in 1952 
 to intensify its action with respect to the Communist Parties of 
 America, assuming the direction and making plans for the offensive 
 in the American Hemisphere. General action has become more 
 intensive as a consequence of the events in Cuba. 
 
 4. In the leadership of the American Communist Parties, the tactic 
 presently employed is that of keeping the principal leaders concealed 
 and using as a front persons whose notoriety as Communists lessens 
 their effectiveness. This tactic enables them to infiltrate agents into 
 key positions in the political, economic, and social organizations of 
 the American countries. This is an element of grave danger to the 
 independence and democratic systems of these nations. 
 
 5. Since 1945 international communism has made very wide use 
 of "frontism," based on front (or facade) organizations to promote 
 action that will favor its aims. This action tends chiefly toward 
 the creation of "fronts" that may cover various fields, such as "peace 
 front," "labor front," or "student front," their outstanding charac- 
 teristic being that they are regarded as non-Communist. 
 
 6. Communism exploits the logical desire of the peoples to seek 
 solutions for their problems — problems that are evident and that, 
 fm'thermore, stand in urgent need of solution. Through the tactics 
 of deceit, communism takes advantage of social realities so that when 
 the moment arrives in which governments are approaching solutions 
 in the national interest, it creates obstacles to any measures which, 
 precisely because they are suitable, would deprive it of its battle cry. 
 
 7. Communism adapts to the environment and creates conflicts or 
 intensifies existing situations, seeking party members and "fellow 
 travelers" (these latter being more numerous, influential, and listened 
 to than the declared Communists). 
 
 8. Communism employs various strategies and trickeries, it uses 
 legal and illegal procedures; it remains silent and conceals the truth; 
 it acts alone, or jointly with any ally who may help achieve its ptirpose. 
 Its final objective is to dominate the world. 
 
 9. Communist strategy has found a new route of approach, taking 
 advantage of the peoples' yearning for independence and desire for 
 peace, and of neutralism and the existence of neutralist blocs, whether 
 or not these are developed under the direction of international com- 
 munism, in order to attempt to reduce the potential of the free world. 
 
 III. DECEIT— BASIC TO COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND 
 
 METHODS 
 
 A. Deceit in Communist Objectives 
 
 1. THE GREAT DECEIT OF COMMUNISM 
 
 The Communists' greatest deceit is in the way they mask their true 
 objectives. Communist Parties exist in varying size and legal status 
 in all the nations of this hemisphere and in each nation are composed 
 chiefly of citizens of that nation. Four questions should be asked : 
 
 What objectives do these national Communist Parties profess 
 publicly? 
 
 What objectives do they, in fact, pursue? 
 Who determines their real objectives? 
 
14 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Can national independence survive the Communists' attain- 
 ment of their real objectives? 
 National Communist Parties in our hemisphere publicly profess 
 ideals that are accepted by most people. Their statements constantly 
 affirm Communist intentions to achieve power through peaceful means, 
 to provide land to the peasants and homes for the workers, and to 
 «stablish a government by the people. A prominent Communist in 
 South America recently declared: "The majority of the people under- 
 stand that we are fighting for democracy, and that we are most 
 patriotic." However, as a good Communist, he concluded his speech 
 by declaring that the Communist Party was an integral part of the 
 international Communist movement. 
 
 2. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE: TRIUMPH THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 
 
 After the 1960 meeting of 81 Communist and Labor Parties of the 
 world in Moscow, lOirushchev declared, on January 6, 1961: 
 
 The unity of the ranks of every Communist Party and the unity of all Com- 
 munist Parties constitutes the united international Communist movement directed 
 at the achievement of our common goal: the triumph of communism throughout 
 the world. 
 
 In referring to the same meeting, M. A. Suslov, a member of the 
 Presidium of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.K., declared on 
 January 18, 1961: 
 
 After this historic meeting, the ways of the international Communist move- 
 ment became still clearer, the means of our common struggle still more reliable 
 and true, our ranlis still closer and our great goal — communism — still nearer. 
 
 Thus, Khrushchev and Suslov with blatant clarity affirmed that 
 communism is aggressive. In so doing they have repeated the theme 
 proclaimed by Communist leaders since the 1917 October revolution 
 and which as long ago as 1922 Stalin himself had defined in unmis- 
 takable terms as "the amalgamation of the toUers of the whole world 
 into a single world Socialist Soviet Republic." 
 
 3. DOMINATION OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OVER COMMUNIST 
 PARTIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
 
 As has been noted, the major meetings of the world Communist 
 movement since 1917 have been held in Moscow and have been staged 
 and dominated by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.E. The 
 Second Congress of the Third Communist International, in the 16th 
 of its 21 conditions, provided that the decisions of the Communist 
 International would be binding on all parties belonging to it. This 
 condition has meant in practice that every Communist Party must 
 unreservedly support the U.S.S.R. The clearest verification of such 
 support is to be found in the radical shifts that Communist Parties 
 have had to make in the course of the years to adjust to the change m 
 Soviet foreign policy. These readjustments have taken place ir- 
 respective of whether the world Communist movement called itself 
 the Comintern, the Cominform or, as at present, had no formal name. 
 In this way, the conduct of the Communists has shown the falseness 
 of the argument that the national Communist Parties are autonomous, 
 as well as of the idea that they adhere to the principles of the Com- 
 munist Party of the U.S.S.R. only because, like the Marxist-Leninists 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST StJBVERSION 15 
 
 they are, they think in the same way and, therefore, share the same 
 opinions. 
 
 This record also demonstrates that for all practical purposes, the 
 Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is the Soviet Government. This 
 makes it understandable that Khrushchev should be at the same time 
 First Secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and Premier 
 of the Soviet Government. 
 
 The continuing direction of the world Communist movement by the 
 Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is evident from the following. In 
 the newspaper Pravda, its official organ, on June 12, 1960, it was stated 
 that the platform of the international Communist movement "con- 
 tains what represents, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, a 
 creative generalization of the collective experience of the fraternal 
 
 f)arties, and defines its objectives for the present period" (that is, basic 
 aws applicable to all countries). The "platform" referred to in this 
 Pravda article is set forth in the declaration of the Communist Parties 
 issued in Moscow on November 21, 1957, which was signed only by 
 the Communist Parties from the bloc countries. However, its text 
 noted that it was drafted after the bloc parties had "consulted with 
 representatives of the fraternal parties in the capitalist countries." 
 In this conference it was declared that "all parties were bound by the 
 imity of Marxist-Lenist ideology." After the issuance of that declara- 
 tion the Communist Parties of the world publicly proclaimed that 
 ideology to be their guide to action. 
 
 An example of the tight bonds between the Communist Party of 
 the U.S.S.R. and national Communist Parties is the fact that the 
 Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. very recently praised one of the 
 largest Communist Parties in our hemisphere * for "its contribution 
 to the strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist unity of the world 
 Communist movement." The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. 
 declared that it and that party were "immutably tied by bonds of 
 soHd friendship and conformity of views." 
 
 4. THE TEITJMPH OF COMMUNISM IS FATAL TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. 
 
 As has been said, since World War II the Soviet Union has used 
 national Communist Parties, usually taking advantage of the presence 
 or threat of its own armies, to install subservient minority govern- 
 ments in countries in Eastern Europe. In Cuba the Soviet-directed 
 Communist Party has managed, by capturing a successful internal 
 revolution, to gain control of the national government and exercise 
 power with Soviet military aid. In no country have the Communists, 
 once they have gained power, permitted demonstrations of opposition 
 to Soviet-directed policy, or any other form of national independence. 
 The countries dominated by the Communists have transformed their 
 political, economic, and social institutions to adjust them to the 
 Soviet model. They have obediently voted in the same way as the 
 Soviet Union on all major issues in the United Nations. Their press 
 and radio subserviently parrot the daily propaganda line emanating 
 from Moscow. In this way, Soviet domination through a national 
 Communist Party is fatal to national independence. 
 
 • Keterence was made to the Chilean Communist Party. 
 
16 COMBINED EEPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 B. Deceit in Communist Methods 
 1. communists' need for deceit 
 
 Always operating as a subversive minority in free nations, and 
 pursuing basic objectives incompatible with national independence, 
 the Communists try to capture the strength of their fellow citizens 
 through wide use of deceit. 
 
 In this connection, Lenin observed in March 1922: 
 
 Without an alliance with non-Communists in the most varied spheres of 
 activity there can be no question of any successful Communist con structive work 
 
 And Khrushchev, in 1958, asserted: 
 
 If one is to speak of the role and place of non-Communist parties, it must first 
 of all be stressed that under present circumstances collaboration of the Com- 
 munist Party with other parties, for the Socialist transformation of society, is not 
 only possible but essential. 
 
 The Communist Parties of the world acknowledged no ethical 
 restraints on their methods. Thus, in 1920 Lenin declared: 
 
 At the basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the consolidation and 
 consummation of communism. That also is the basis of Communist training, 
 education, and tuition. 
 
 Lenin instructed all Communists to "combine illegal forms of 
 struggle with every form of legal struggle." 
 
 Leaders of Communist movements that have succeeded in sub- 
 jugating free nations have been surprisingly frank in recounting the 
 deceitful tactics that allowed them to attain power. For example, 
 statements made by Matyas Kakosi, Deputy Premier of Hungary 
 in 1952 and by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
 Czechoslovakia in 1948, both emphasize that the Communists de- 
 liberately deferred statements of their final aims during their struggle 
 to obtain power. Rakosi mentions at that time "we did not discuss 
 the problem before the people * * *" and J. Kosak, of Czecho- 
 slovakia, explains: 
 
 The necessity of a thorough explanation of political lines had to be coupled 
 with caution lest necessary allies be alarmed; they were to be won over by prac- 
 tical politics and not by statements of final aims of the [Communist] party, which 
 might dissuade them from cooperation with the Communists. * * * 
 
 The Cuban Communists also have pursued the standard Communist 
 method of deceit. In answer to questions he had received from 
 Jules Dubois in 1958, Fidel Castro declared the following, as quoted 
 in La Revolucidn Cubana (Editorial Palestra, Buenos Aires, 1960): 
 
 I have never been and am not a Communist. If I were, I would have the 
 •courage to say so. 
 
 In answer to another question, Raul Castro declared: 
 
 If I were a Communist, I would belong to that party and not to the 26th of 
 July [movement]. 
 
 On another occasion, in February 1959, Fidel Castro said: 
 
 Raul, Guevara, and all of them are men who are very much in agreement with 
 my political way of thinking, which is not a Communist way of thinking. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 17 
 
 Later, in his speech of December 2, 1961, he gave himself and all 
 the above previous declarations the lie by declaring: 
 
 I believe absolutely in Marxism. Did I believe in it on January 1, 1959? 
 I believed on January i * * * I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist- 
 Leninist until the last day of my life. 
 
 A few days later, on December 20, 1961, Castro made it perfectly 
 clear that his reasons for having deceived the Cuban people were 
 essentially the same as the reasons for which Czech Communists and 
 Hungarian Communists had deceived the Czech and Hungarian 
 peoples. Castro told the National Congress of the Schools of Kevolu- 
 tionary Instruction: 
 
 Of course, if we stood on Turquino Peak at the time when we were "cuatro 
 gatos," and said, we are Marxist- Leninists — from the top of Turquino Peak — 
 we might possibly have been unable to descend to the plain below. 
 
 Communist subversive activities range from the narrowly covert 
 (such as espionage), to hidden participation in legal organizations 
 (such as labor unions) , _ to open activity as an avowed Communist 
 Party. All these activities are characterized by deceit in varying 
 degree as to their ultimate objective — or as to their methods, or both. 
 Therefore, they are not always easy to identify. 
 
 2. USE OF DIPLOMATIC BEPEESENTATIVES 
 
 Communism makes wide use of its diplomatic representatives as a 
 means of carrying out espionage, in connivance with the members of 
 the local Communist Parties. 
 
 In 1955 the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage released a 
 highly instructive report, after a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy 
 (Vladimir Petrov) had sought asylum and declared that two Soviet 
 spy rings had been operating in Australia since 1953. 
 
 In 1960 the head of the Hungarian Trade Mission to Brazil (Gyorgi 
 Lazar) requested asylum in Brazil and identified two members of 
 his staff, Laszlo Dari and Janos Eredel, as personnel of the Hungarian 
 Secret Service. 
 
 It is significant that the present Ambassador of the Soviet Union in 
 Havana, Sergei Kudriatzev, has carried on significant espionage 
 work, having been involved in the famous Gouzenko case in Canada." 
 The report of the Royal Commission lists Kudriatzev as one of the 
 rnembers of the Soviet Embassy staff who engaged in espionage ac- 
 tivities, and declares that: "So far as the evidence discloses, the first 
 head of the mihtary intelligence espionage system in Canada after the 
 arrival of the Soviet Minister was Sergei Kudriatzev, whose official 
 title was First Secretary of the Legation (later Embassy)." 
 
 There has come to light direct intervention and participation of 
 uiplomatic and consular agents of the present Cuban Government in 
 the internal affairs of various Latin American countries. As the 
 latest report of the Inter- American Peace Committee points out, these 
 acts of intervention have, in many cases, caused those agents to be 
 declared persona non gi'ata or to be withdrawn by the Government 
 of Cuba, in some cases at the request of the government to which 
 they were a ccredited or, in other cases, as a result of the pressure of 
 
 ' It was Igor Gouzenko who revealed the existence in Canada of a widespread conspiracy to obtain secret 
 official information. Gouzenlro, who had been sent to Canada in June 1943, with the official title of "civilian 
 employee" of the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, was the cipher clerli on the staff of the military attache. 
 Colonel Zabotin. 
 
18 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMTJNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 public opinion. On several occasions, these situations have caused 
 the breaking of diplomatic relations.'^ Also, it is interesting to note 
 that over the last 2 years a considerable number of Cuban diplomatic 
 and consular officials have publicly resigned their positions rather 
 than serve as agents of propaganda, espionage, and other subversive 
 activities in the service of international communism. 
 
 3. USE OF WOBDS 
 
 (a) Nationalism 
 
 The Communists recognize that the love of national independence 
 is a powerful political force and they seek to identify themselves with 
 it. They permit, in the areas under their domination, expressions of 
 "national feelings," in limited forms, as in the use of national costumes, 
 songs,_ and languages. They explain this tactic by saying that it is 
 historically justified for the present. They thus acknowledge that 
 their support for national independence is merely a temporary expe- 
 dient. The element of deceit in their attitude is shown by the contrast 
 between the following two quotations: 
 
 While opposing nationalism and national egoism, Commtmists at the same time 
 always devote much attention to the national feelings of the .masses. (Program 
 of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., approved by the XXII Congress of the 
 Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.) 
 
 Nationalism clears the road for open bourgeois, anti-Communist ideology. 
 This conclusion applies not only in the international field. It is necessary for us 
 to wage a resolute and determined struggle against the slightest nationalist mani- 
 festation, from wherever they may originate, whatever form they assume — • 
 whether economic, ideological, or cultural. (Report of the secretary of the 
 Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.B., broadcast by Radio 
 Moscow on Dec. 27, 1961.) 
 
 (6) "Peaceful coexistence" 
 
 Far more interested in talking about "peace" than in achieving it, 
 the Communists have made heavy play of the phrase "peaceful 
 coexistence." Soviet propaganda has encouraged non-Communists 
 to look upon "peaceful coexistence" as a desirable alternative to the 
 "cold war." At the same tune, however, the Communist Party of 
 the U.S.S.R. has carefully defined "peaceful coexistence" to Com- 
 munist audiences not as an alternative to but as a part of the "cold 
 war." In fact, "peaceful coexistence" is merely a modern name for 
 the constant Communist attack against free nations, in which they 
 employ all means short of general war. On October 10, 1959, Khru- 
 shchev affirmed : 
 
 * * * coexistence is the extension of the struggle of two social systems. * * * 
 We should decisively and continuously struggle for our ideas, for our way of life, 
 for our Socialist system. 
 
 (c) Democracy 
 
 The Communists speak deceitfully of democracy, always carefully 
 defining it to mean a form of government that they can control. 
 Kirushchev has said: 
 
 For us, democracy is the true power of the people; it is the all-round develop- 
 ment of the spontaneous, action and activity of the ^working masses;., their self- 
 government. 
 
 » With regard to the specific cases described in the Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee, see- 
 document OBA/Ser.L/III, CIP/1/62. 
 
COAIBrNED BEPOKTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 19 
 
 Klruslichev, however, had made an emphatic distinction between 
 "the peoples' democracy as a form of the dictatorship of the prole- 
 tariat" and what he referred to with scorn as the "so-called pure 
 democracy." 
 
 For his part, Fidel Castro, speaking on March 26, 1962, on the 
 Marxist-Leninist methods for selecting the leaders of the new state 
 party in Cuba, said that the masses have "a great spirit of justice" 
 but, sometimes, "choose someone who has a negative past." To 
 clarify, he added: "* * * the mass is not going to elect the nucleus; 
 the party is not an elected party; it is one of selection, with the selec- 
 tion to be organized through the principle of democratic centralism." 
 
 As shown in the ideas quoted, Khrushchev identifies democracy 
 with dictatorship; and Castro shows how this works — by selection 
 instead of election, selection by the Communist Party instead of 
 election by the people. Democratic centralism thus practiced is by 
 no means democratic, but it certainly is centralized. It is the Com- 
 munists' disguise for Communist dictatorship. 
 
 In no country of the world have the Communists gained control of 
 the national government through democracy. In no country under 
 their domination have the Communists permitted their power to be 
 challenged by freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the exercise 
 of civil rights against oppression, or the holding of free elections. 
 
 (d) Dictatorship 
 
 Lenin repeatedly endorsed dictatorship. He declared in 1918: 
 
 The irrefutable experience of history has shown that in the history of revolu- 
 tionary movements the dictatorship of the individual persons was very often the 
 vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes. 
 
 Khrushchev in 1957 criticized some "politicians who call themselves 
 Communists" for being "in favor of socialism but without the dicta- 
 torship of the proletariat, without the leadership of public life on the 
 part of the working class and its vanguard — the Communist Party — ■ 
 and without the implementation of the principles of proletariat 
 internationalism." In this sense, in advocating the "dictatorship 
 of the proleta,riat," the Conomunists advocate a dictatorial regime. 
 The Communists have no quarrel with dictatorship, provided they 
 can control it through the Communist Party. 
 
 True to the Communist tactics of deceit, and well aware of the 
 Western Hemisphere's aversion to dictatorship, Castro declared in a 
 speech made on April 22, 1959, in Central Park, New York City, that 
 his revolution practiced the democratic principles of "humanism," 
 which meant "neither dictatorships of men, nor dictatorships of castes, 
 nor oligarchy of classes: government of the people without dictate r- 
 
 in Cuisa a dictatorship of the Communist Party supported and 
 directed by the Soviet Union. 
 
 Bias Roca, Secretary General of the Popular Socialist Party of 
 Cuba (the Communist Party) and now a member of the directorate 
 of the all-powerful Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (Inte- 
 grated Revolutionary Organizations, ORI) wrote an article in Cuba 
 Socialista in December 1961 in which he makes the following state- 
 ments about the XXII Congress of the Communist Party, which 
 had just taken place in Moscow: 
 
 The program approved by the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the 
 Soviet Union has great importance for our country, as a country taking the first 
 
 ships a,nd without oligarchy. 
 
20 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIS* SUBVERSION 
 
 steps in the construction of socialism, for the program summarizes and defines, 
 the fundamental lessons that are derived from the experience of socialist construc- 
 tion in the Soviet Union as well as in the countries of Europe and Asia that made 
 their revolution after World War II. Furthermore, it demonstrates to our people, 
 in clarity, where we are going, toward what achievements and conquests we have 
 set our course. * * * 
 
 * * * The dictatorship of the proletariat is a necessary, but transitory, condi- 
 tion for constructing socialism and opening thereby the path toward communism. 
 In order to guarantee the fullest liberty to each member of society, it has been 
 necessary to have a period of dictatorship of the proletariat, to restrict certain 
 liberties, to repress the enemies of the revolution, the enemies of socialism, the 
 enemies of the working class and the farm laborers. * * * 
 
 In all of the countries dominated by communism, the so-called 
 transitory dictatorship continues. 
 
 As can be seen, in order to maintain themselves in power. Com- 
 munist dictatorships use and refine tyrannical methods. They have 
 used these methods against citizens of all classes, including the 
 proletariat, in whose name the Communist Party attempts to exercise 
 its domination. Thousands of refugees from Communist-dominated 
 Cuba and tens of thousands of refugees from Communist-dominated 
 East Germany are members of the proletariat. An increasing number 
 of refugees from Cuba have been fishermen, laborers, and peasants 
 fleeing the "dictatorship of the proletariat." 
 
 4. USE OF PEOPLE 
 
 (a) Workers 
 
 The Communists frequently make use of labor organizations and 
 foment strikes, not to improve the workers' welfare but to achieve 
 Communist domination over the workers' organizations. In Jruguay, 
 the meatpacking company Establecimiento Frigorlfico del Cerro, S.A. 
 (EFCSA) is owned by its 4,000 vorkers. EFCSA is still independent 
 of the Communists. In 1961 the Cominunist-dominated Federaci6n 
 Aut6noma de la Carne (Meat Workers' Federation) made a determined 
 and sustained attack on EFCSA, attempting to force EFCSA workers 
 to go on strike and resorting openly to violence in the streets against 
 EF SA workers as well as against the workers of the other meatpack- 
 ing plants who defied the strike order. These Communist tactics 
 provoked a strong condemnation by Gremialismo Libre, the official 
 organ of the non-Communist Confederaci6n Sindical del Uruguay 
 (Trade Union Federation of Uruguay), which declared that inter- 
 national communism had confessed by the mouth of a known native 
 Communist, the bringing about of 16 political strikes in Uruguay. 
 
 The Communist zeal for using workers for their perverse ends is 
 noticed throughout the hemisphere. Jornada, official organ of the 
 Confederacion de Trabaj adores de Venezuela (Workers' Confedera- 
 tion of Venezuela, CTV) , made the following statement in its editorial 
 entitled "La Fedepetrol" (Federation of Oil Workers), on April 6, 
 1962: 
 
 But throughout all its struggle, the Fedepetrol has had an important enemy. 
 This is not the logical and natural enemy — the petroleum companies — against 
 whom have been waged battles notable in sacrifice and heroism, to achieve vic- 
 tories and social claims. The irreconcilable enemy of the Fedepetrol, which, 
 constantly, but without success, has tried to destroy it or subvert it from within, 
 is the Communist Party that operates in Venezuela. 
 
 Outside of the Fedepetrol, the Communist Party has publicly announced its 
 intent to found a parallel and divisionist organization. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 21 
 
 The Fedepetrol will continue in its battle station, with and at the side of the 
 people and its democracy. Meanwhile, the Communist Party, with its divisionist 
 and parallel organization, if it succeeds in founding one, will continue to be, 
 what it always has been, in the country's democratic and labor field: A divisive 
 minority, which, because it has been unable to accept the reality of being a 
 minority, has been led through desperation to falsify historic and socioeconomic 
 realities and in the agony of frustration to make senseless attempts to spark 
 another civil war to see if ' some stroke of fortune might smile on it in such a 
 dangerous adventure. 
 
 (6) Students 
 
 The Communists make special efforts to use students, cynically 
 trying to exploit their vitality, idealism, and capacity for leadership. 
 In most student organizations the independent students far outnumber 
 the Communists and have succeeded in maintaining control. But in 
 some organizations the Communist minorities have taken advantage 
 of divisions and apathy on the part of the majority to acquire positions 
 from which they can dominate them. 
 
 One of the favorite tactics of the Communist Party is to use students 
 to organize demonstrations on behalf of persons or positions that suit 
 Moscow's objectives. The Communists call these demonstrations 
 spontaneous. But everyone sees that they use the same slogans, occur 
 at the same time in different countries, and generally foUow shortly 
 after an exhortation in Pravda. 
 
 As professional political agents, the Communist organizers tend to 
 become "permanent students." The independent students are be- 
 coming increasingly aware of the Communists' deceits and manipula- 
 tions. In some countries in Latin America they have successfully 
 fought them and thereby preserved the independence of the student 
 organizations. This type of struggle characterized the Fourth Latin 
 American Congress of Students (LACS) at Natal, Brazil, in October 
 1961. After blistering arguments, the delegates of some national 
 student federations, abandoned the conference. The representatives 
 of 10 anti-Commimist federations issued a press statement that said, 
 in part: 
 
 Ever since the world political situation adopted its present shape, that is, the 
 conflict between two intrinsically antagonistic blocs for world domination, the 
 Latin American student body has firmly stated its attitude of open struggle 
 against the imperiahst domination exerted by the United States over Latin 
 America. It has also made it clear that it will not permit oppression by one great 
 power to be replaced by the domination of another, the Soviet Union which already 
 turns its ambitious eyes to Latin American with obvious voracity. 
 
 It is evident that to those who believe that Latin America should subject itself 
 to the Soviet Union in particular and to the militaristic bloc of the so-called 
 Socialist countries in general, such an independent attitude of the Latin American 
 student body was a great eyesore, and they had to devote all their energies to 
 combat it. 
 
 ^ ^ 4! H< % 
 
 For the Fourth Latin American Congress of Students, the national unions 
 controlled by elements which wanted to doom Latin America to a hateful pro- 
 Soviet servility, were planning, perhaps, to make the sad attitude they support 
 definitely triumphant. But the student mass was not long in taking action to 
 return to its original independent and democratic attitude, and with the Fourth 
 Latin American Congress of Students nearing it was evident that the revolutionary 
 good faith of the majority of the national unions would not allow a continuation 
 of the betrayal of their healthy principles of freedom for our people, the conception 
 of this freedom being independence of all foreign powers. 
 
22. COMBINBD REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 (c) The so-called reactionaries 
 
 The Communists not only use leaders of students' and workers' 
 groups but also collaborate with those whom they publicly call 
 reactionaries. In a televised interview on January 8, 1961, shortly 
 after his return from a trip behind the Iron Curtain, Ernesto Guevara 
 interrupted one of his customary diatribes against the oligarchies to 
 make an exception of Generalissimo Trujillo, whom he said "is now 
 our friend." 
 
 In June of 1960, while Dominican groups that were later to form 
 part of the government were still suffering under severe dictatorial 
 repression, the movimiento Dominicano popular (Dominican popular 
 movement, MPD), had been permitted to establish an office in Ciudad 
 TrujUlo. Even after the Dominican police had ostentatiously shut 
 that office in August 1960, the MPD continued to operate in the 
 country with considerable liberty. The MPD's leader gave an 
 unmistakable indication of his party's basic character on January 
 22, 1962, when he described the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs 
 at Punta del Este in the following terms: 
 
 The Punta del Este Conference, which begins tomorrow, is nothing but a 
 meeting of all the servile governments, all the lackey governments serving U.S. 
 imperialism, for the purpose of imposing sanctions on the only country that has 
 a true democracy, a Socialist democracy (Cuba). 
 
 During that meeting, the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Repub- 
 lic declared: 
 
 We regard the Government of Cuba today as a constant threat, and it is 
 absurdly paradoxical that it was not a threat for the Trujillo government. 
 
 Let me explain. When the Castro government still enjoyed hemispherewide 
 prestige in the early months of his triumph it permitted the embarkation of an 
 expedition against the Trujillo dictatorship, which arrived on Dominican soil on 
 June 14. We thank him for it. 
 
 It was a sacrifice of a handful of heroes, as was the Luper6n expedition 10 years 
 before, in 1949. When the invading forces were exterminated, Trujillo made his 
 peace with Castro, and months later there was already an understanding between 
 the two governments, which was denounced for the first time in the press of the 
 hemisphere early in January 1961. 
 
 Trujillo proclaimed his as the first Socialist government of America and to- 
 gether with Castro launched a violent campaign against Venezuela, the United 
 States, and the Catho'ic Church, which had just censured him for the tortures 
 and crimes he committed in his infernal dungeons. 
 
 Communism, with its campaign of penetration, hate, and subversion, represents 
 a continuing threat to the new republic. 
 
 5. COMMTTNIST USE OF PROMISES 
 
 (a) Prosperity 
 
 The Communists try to extend their power by making false prom- 
 ises._ They tout their economic system as the only truly scientific and 
 efficient system capable of assuring material prosperity, personal 
 security, and social equality to the common man. On October 10, 
 1960, Khrushchev said: 
 
 Communism means quite real and concrete conditions of the people's life. It 
 means a short working day, good housing, the world's lowest rent, good clothes, 
 well-fed and nourished children * * * and the abolition of taxes so that in 
 5 years we shall have no taxes at all — such are the elements of communism in 
 reality, in practical life. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 23 
 
 Fidel Castro, on January 2, 1962, hailed the opening of the "Year 
 of Planification" saying: 
 
 The "Year of Planification" * * * will mean that the advance will be more 
 rapid, that it will be more secure * * * it signifies that the revolution has gained 
 extraordinarily, that it is capable of developing its economy on a planned basis. 
 The people know what this means; they know that our economy will develop 
 without problems, that it will develop without crises; that there will be more 
 employment; that there will be more means of production; that we will be able to 
 have greater wealth; that we will achieve greater output; and that with the greater 
 output a higher standard of living. * * * 
 
 The Communists promise a better life for the common man but the 
 record shows that they have not been able to produce it. They strip 
 the people of their civil liberties and rights under the pretext that the 
 temporary sacrifice of personal freedom is essential to the achievement 
 of the common welfare. They are unable to establish social equality 
 because their system of totalitarian control makes it imperative that 
 the vast state bureaucracy become a privileged oligarchy. They have 
 failed to achieve material prosperity for the masses of the people 
 because the insatiably power-hungry apparatus of the state places 
 military and industrial requirements ahead of the needs of the 
 individual. 
 
 Current Communist crises demonstrate the falsity of Communist 
 promises. The production of food is not keeping pace with the growth 
 of population in the Soviet Union. In Communist China the dis- 
 astrous consequences that the Communist system has had on agricul- 
 tural production has caused a drastic retrenchment in the execution of 
 the government's industrial plans and serious widespread scarcities 
 of food and clothing for the Chinese people. This is the significance 
 of the "10 tasks for the readjustment of the national economy in 1962" 
 put forward by Premier Chou En-lai at the recently held National 
 People's Congress. 
 
 In Cuba Castro followed his New Year's promise of prosperity by 
 imposing 2 months later a severe rationing of basic foodstuffs, and a 
 few weeks later Ernesto Guevara, the Minister of Industry, dashed 
 false promises of increasing agTicultural production when he admitted 
 that the all-important sugar crop had been "bad" and placed responsi- 
 bility on "bad agricultural work and bad industrial work" which he 
 described as "enormous inefficiency." 
 
 (b) Land 
 
 Perhaps the most tragic deceit practiced by the Communists is the 
 false promise they make in response to man's natural desire to own 
 his own land. The Communists promise that their revolution will 
 make this hope come true. In La Historia Me Absolvera (History 
 Will Absolve Me) in 1953, Castro said: 
 
 The second revolutionary law granted the unattachable and intransferable 
 ownership of the land to all the tenant farmers, share croppers, and squatters who 
 were occupying parcels of five or less caballerlas (approximately 165 acres) of 
 land, the state compensating the former owners on the basis of the income they 
 would obtain on the said parcels in an average of 10 years. 
 
 On April 9, 1961, Ernesto Guevara echoed the same theme, in an 
 issue of Verde Olivo (organ of the Revolutionary Armed Forces). 
 He said: 
 
 Concretely, the soldier who belonged to our first guerrilla army of the farm- 
 worker type comes from the portion of this social class that demonstrates most 
 
 43-947—65 3 
 
24 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 aggressively its love for the land and its possession. That is, it demonstrates 
 perfectly what can be classed as a petit bourgeois spirit; the peasant fights because 
 he wants land; for himself, for his children, in order to work it, to sell it, and to 
 enrich himself through his work. 
 
 However, on December 20, 1961, Castro did an about-face and 
 denied the idea of private ownership of land. _ In his speech to the 
 National Congress of the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction, he 
 said: 
 
 * * * The idea of socialism is an idea that is the exact antithesis of private 
 ownership. 
 
 In another part of the same speech he described another deceit 
 practiced on the farmers, declaring, 
 
 * * * xhe term, for example, "the people's farm" has the advantage that the 
 concept is included within the term itself; that is, an enterprise that belongs to 
 the people. If we called a people's farm a sovjos, it is very probable that many 
 people would be asking without knowing that it is a people's farm. 
 
 In the Communist system prevailing in Cuba a "people's farm" 
 means the same thing as what Communists in other countries call a 
 sovjos, that is, that the land does not belong to the man who works it. 
 
 However that may be, the important fact is that the Communists 
 seek by every means to turn aside the rural workers from the construc- 
 tive plans that are being prepared or carried out through democratic 
 channels in the campaign for an equitable agrarian reform, in order to 
 involve them in a hateful class conflict. Thus, they place agrarian 
 reform at the service of international Communist agitation instead of 
 placing at the service of the genuine interests of rural workers, as 
 true democrats do, the sufficient technicians and resources for an 
 effective rational exploitation of the land for the benefit of man. 
 
 6. COMMUNIST USE OF VIOLENCE 
 
 Obviously, violence plays an important role among Comniunist 
 tactics and is by no means regarded by the Communists as inconsistent 
 with peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev, in his speech to the XX 
 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, declared: 
 
 * * * And the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle may 
 assume, the use or nonuse of violence in the transition of socialism, depends on 
 the resistance of the exploiters. * * * 
 
 Speaking in Moscow, shortly after the December 1960 Congress 
 of 81 Communist and Labor Parties had issued a statement containing 
 a reaffirmation of the Sino-Soviet goal to communize the world, 
 Ernesto Guevara declared: "We wholeheartedly support the declara- 
 tion adopted by that Congress." 
 
 In connection with Cominunist intervention in Venezuelan affairs, 
 on February 15, 1962, the Minister of the Interior of that country 
 presented to the Committee of the National Congress a report that 
 said, in part: 
 
 The National Government has in its power various documents emanating from 
 the leadership of the Communist Party of Venezuela and of the Movimiento de 
 Izquierda Revolucionaria (Leftist Revolutionary Movement), as well as reports 
 and statements about instructions for the political work, drawn up by their 
 leaders, according to which those parties would assume responsibility for the 
 direction and execution of the events of January and in which they maintain 
 there is a need for a change of government by violent means, through permanent 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 25 
 
 activities of agitation and public disorders, even going so far as the use of armed 
 violence and insurrectional propaganda within the national armed forces, all for 
 the purpose of achieving, in what they describe as a short period of time, the over- 
 throw of the present constitutional Government. 
 
 On February 14, 1962, President Betancoiirt, in his address on the 
 occasion of the third anniversary of his administration, declared that 
 his government "born of the direct popular will, has been attacked by 
 two serious conspiracies — one of them, the one that attempted to put 
 mto the Government the one that was swept out on January 23, and 
 the other, the one that endeavors to establish in Venezuela a branch 
 of Cuba, which is in turn a branch of those who exercise the govern- 
 mental power in Russia and in Communist China." 
 
 He added: 
 
 The Government is applying the same force it has used against the conspirators 
 of those rash attempts who acted with the aim of establishing a dictatorship just 
 like that overthrown on January 23, against the conspirators who receive arms 
 and money from Communist Russia, through the branch office they have set up 
 in Havana. 
 
 The Venezuelan Communists have requested aid from abroad against 
 the Government of Venezuela. On April 10, 1962, the official organ 
 of the Communist Party of the United States, the Daily Worker, 
 pubhshed a letter from the Secretary for International Relations of 
 the Communist Party of Venezuela, requesting the fraternal support 
 of the Communist and Workers' Parties against "the pohcy of the 
 Betancourt-Copei government of servile betrayal in favor of imperial- 
 ism. * * *" There is no reason why the Venezuelan Communists 
 should have any scruples about asking the U.S. Communists for help, 
 since both are foreign agents of the same boss. 
 
 For reasons of space, the committee omits mention of other sources 
 that, just as the foregoing do, clearly reveal the role violence plays in 
 Communist tactics, as well as the degree to which it is used in the 
 continuous intervention of international communism and its agents 
 in the internal affairs of the American countries. 
 
 7. COMMUNIST OPPOSITION TO CONSTRTTCTIVE REFORMS 
 
 Jealously attempting to monopohze for themselves all credit for 
 any socially constructive measures, the Communists aggressively prac- 
 tice a "dog-in-the-manger" poUcy regarding any constructive meas- 
 ures proposed by others. In BoHvia the revolutionary MNR Govern- 
 ment is attempting to revitahze the mining industry, including both 
 private and nationalized mines, with the help of financing and tech- 
 nical assistance from West Germany and from the Inter-American 
 Development Bank. The name of this mutual effort is "Operacidn 
 Triangular" (triangular plan). Tin is by far Bolivia's more impor- 
 tant export and the mines have vital importance directly to thousands 
 of miners and mdirectly to hundreds of thousands of BoKvian citizens. 
 If the triangular plan fails all these people will suffer. If it succeeds' • 
 they wiU all benefit. ' 
 
 But the Communists are attempting, with notable use of the- 
 customarily rich language of Communist invective, to discredit the 
 plan. They have called its technicians and consultants "agents of 
 imperialism" and denounced the plan as evidence of the Government's 
 intention "to deliver up the national wealth and the lungs of the 
 working class to the voracity of the imperialists." On August 19 
 
26 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 1961, La Naci6n, official organ of the MNK, published a resolution of 
 the MNR cell of the Chauffers Union of La Paz that stated: 
 
 The triangular plan is not only of interest to a certain group or sector of labor, 
 but is of vital importance to the whole country.* * * 
 
 * * * In the face of the infiltration of Communist larvae in Bolivia, it is the 
 duty of every citizen to speak out and fight openly against the Red tyrants of 
 subversion. 
 
 On August 21, the same publication deplored the fact that: 
 
 The arguments that have been wielded to attack the triangular plan are based 
 principally on political falsehoods that describe this opt-ration as "proimperialist" 
 and the revolutionary government as "antilabor" and "reactionary." 
 
 On August 28, 1961, President Paz Estenssoro declared: 
 
 The triangular plan is of national interest primarily because its results will be 
 of benefit not only to the mine workers but to the working class of the country in 
 general. 
 
 C. Conclusions 
 
 The Communist technique of deceit uses and abuses words and robs 
 them of their legitimate meaning, replacing it with a Marxist-Leninist 
 interpretation. The seduction which such words exercise over the 
 popular mind furthers the purposes of Communist aggression against 
 the Western World. 
 
 Democracy must itself not play the Communist game of misuse of 
 words. In this respect, it should avoid applying the epithet "Com- 
 munist" to persons who, with good intentions and not influenced by 
 disruptive ideas, ask for reforms that are necessary or oppose pro- 
 cedures that, to serve personal interests, run counter to the interests 
 of the community. To do so is to damage sound people who are 
 motivated purely by patriotic ideals, giving^ the Communists free 
 advertising and creating confusion from which only they benefit. 
 This Committee uses the word "Communist" only to refer to the 
 Marxist-Leninists, so as to request that anti-Communist measures be 
 applied against them. 
 
 Bearing in mind that this report is general and initial, and prepared 
 in a very short period of time, we have in this chapter tried to give 
 primary emphasis to the basic characteristic of Communist subver- 
 sion — deceit — without which it would fail in free countries. The 
 Committee has illustrated this deceit with only a few examples, which 
 are or have been in the public domain, although in some cases in a 
 form distorted by the Communists. Communist subversion, of 
 course, uses other methods and tactics that have been shown in con- 
 crete acts, and that have not been considered in this report because 
 of its preliminary nature. Consequently, this study is considered 
 initial and should be continued, amplified, and improved. 
 
 The Committee is convinced that the peoples of America, when 
 they know the objectives, methods, and procedures of communism 
 as these are exposed to the light of the truth, cannot tolerate known 
 Communists, accept the existence of a national Communist Partj^, or 
 much less allow communism to achieve its goal of world domination. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 27 
 
 IV. REPLY OF DEMOCEATIC SOCIETY 
 
 Throughout the course of this work various aspects of the inter- 
 national Communist movement were exposed and analyzed, including 
 its development and the deceitfulness of its purposes and methods. 
 Men in general, and particularly those who endure its tensions, will 
 have asked themselves to what its development is due, in view of its 
 destructive purpose and the falsity of its acts. 
 
 The Committee is firmly convinced that the Communist advance is 
 due mainly to the lack of information regarding its true aims; to the 
 fact that it takes possession of legitimate aspirations of the people, 
 distorting these to its benefit, as has been said ; and to the lack of faith 
 in the institutions and leaders of democracy on the part of certain 
 discouraged sectors. 
 
 Since everything referring to the aims and methods of communism 
 has now been covered thoroughly, the Committee desires to contribute 
 to a clarification of the truth by developing a few ideas in this chapter 
 that would permit a consideration of the problem from a more appro- 
 priate point of view. 
 
 It is well to remember that close to a century before the Marxist 
 philosophy made its appearance, respectable and important nations of 
 the world were forging pages filled with heroism and glory in the 
 struggle of peoples against oppression, inequality, and selfishness, 
 which have served as a pattern and an example to other peoples. The 
 French Revolution and the advent of the United States as an inde- 
 pendent nation are outstanding examples of this, and they served as a 
 source of inspiration for the movements of liberation of the Western 
 Hemisphere. The respect for human rights that gave them impulse 
 and characterized them is reflected in the political constitutions of the 
 Latin American countries. 
 
 England, the United States, and France constitute three great ex- 
 amples of sacrifice; of political and social revolutions; of victory over 
 the selfish tendency of human nature; of respect for freedom, equality, 
 and fraternity, not just as hollow words but as true and objective 
 moral values. They are three examples of democratic nations, which 
 in ceaseless struggle for the rights of man, have defended the inalien- 
 able prerogatives of the individual against humiliation and slavery. 
 
 As may be seen, communism has no right to proclaim itself as de- 
 fender of human rights. Modern democratic society, based upon 
 rational philosophic doctrines of human and spiritual content, offers 
 more guarantees than a society based upon a materialistic, atheistic 
 philosophy that looks upon man as a means and not as an end in 
 himself. But the sphere of action of modern democratic society is 
 even more vast, because it contemplates and seeks a solution to the 
 problems affecting peoples, principally those countries or population 
 sectors of slower material and technical development. 
 
 Basing itself on its determinist philosophy, which teaches that man 
 is at the service of the economy, the Communist movement deceit- 
 fully proclaims itself as the system that will solve the economic prob- 
 lems of the world, and attacks the most outstanding countries of 
 modern democratic society, branding them as "capitalist. It is 
 clear that when capitalism acts selfishly with no sense of social re- 
 sponsibility, it is fatal to the progress of peoples, and it is for this 
 reason that the free countires fight against this type of capitalism in 
 
28 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMWIST SUBVERSION 
 
 order to prevent the deterioration of their own economies. But it 
 must be pointed out that by referring to the most important nations 
 of modern democratic society as "capitalistic," communism seeks only 
 to discredit them, as an indispensable step toward destroying them. 
 
 It is also appropriate to consider the economic aspect, with regard 
 to the actual achievements of both systems, always with the desire of 
 demonstrating the truth. 
 
 Communism pretends to be a movement that will solve the economic 
 problems of the world. Without undertaking a major analysis of 
 their causes, it is enough to point to the acute food shortages suffered 
 by the Cuban, Kussian, and Chinese people. These are samples of 
 the economic "well-being" promised by communism. 
 
 In contrast, it is well to recall the efforts exerted by modern demo- 
 cratic society to raise the standard of living of the people through 
 economic aid administered through such far-reaching plans as the 
 Marshall plan, the bilateral or multilateral economic agreements, 
 encouragement of the formation of regional common markets (Euro- 
 pean Common Market and Latin American common markets), and 
 the Alliance for Progress. 
 
 Relative to the success of regional markets, it is suflELcient to point 
 •out that communism has tried to imitate the European Common 
 Market by installing the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance 
 (CEMA) . However, it would be interesting to inquire of the impov- 
 erished peoples of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria or the 
 Baltic countries, regarding its results. Unfortunately, the only reply 
 to such an inquiry would be one dictated by the Communist bosses, 
 praising the "successes" of the "Red paradise." 
 
 In another line of thought, communism deceitfully gives assiu-ance 
 that its system will permit the social improvement of humanity. 
 Clearly this will not be possible, since the materialistic philosophy in 
 practice places man at the unconditional service of the state. It is 
 certainly inadmissible that the enslavement of peoples means social 
 betterment of the kind the world needs, save as justification for 
 maintaining a "new class" in power. 
 
 In fact, the concept of caste prevailing in the selection of leaders of 
 the Communist movement, which thus becomes autocratic and oli- 
 garchic, is quite well known. This excludes every possibility that it 
 would give acceptance to the free play of democratic institutions that 
 characterizes our society, in which every man may succeed in acquiring 
 significance and representation in line with his aptitudes and qualifica- 
 tions. It is for this reason that communism considers our democratic 
 electoral systems decadent and replaces them with the preeminence 
 of a single despotic and cruel party. 
 
 Does communism consider that the human rights enunciated in the 
 Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization 
 of American States lack validity because the "hiunan rights" recog- 
 nized in the Communist world are better? Does communism believe 
 that the social and labor laws that are in effect in the countries of 
 modern democratic society are so unsuited for social betterment that 
 they must be replaced by Communist slavery? 
 
 Communism considers that the family and. a society based thereon, 
 essential elements in the structure of the democratic world, are anti- 
 quated and harmful. Should they be liquidated, as in Red China, 
 by destroying the family tie and preventing the formation of contig- 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 29 
 
 uous social groups through the permanent displacement of the 
 population throughout the country? 
 
 The deeply human basis on which the development of culture and 
 science in the democratic countries rests permits the purest and freest 
 creations of the mind and spirit. Must this be changed because 
 subjugation to the state and to the party, the sole sources capable of 
 creations such as those advocated by communism, is better? 
 
 Finally, does communism believe that the idea of God and the sub- 
 jection of free man to his religion must disappear because religion "is 
 the opiate of the people" and because man is only matter? ^ 
 
 The answer to the questions raised is clear and constitutes the reply 
 of modern democratic society to the Communist world. It may be 
 summarized by saying that communism's pretensions are false. But 
 even if a certain amount of good faith were ascribed to its intentions, 
 the solutions that modern democratic society has been seeking since 
 before the appearance of communism are better in every field, basically 
 because of their moral and human content. In contrast with commu- 
 nism, our society believes in man, in his capacity for creation and in his 
 spiritual vakies, which enable him to improve his position. 
 
 It is clear that the world is undergoing an overall revolutionary 
 process. Modern democratic society has, without ceasing, adopted 
 systems of hfe in order that its peoples might enjoy greater well-being, 
 receiving the benefits of technology while developing greater and 
 greater respect for human rights and fundamental liberties. In this 
 democratic revolution all sectors are actively participating (govern- 
 ments, intellectuals, students, workers, the rural population, business- 
 men, the armed forces, and churches), and this revolution reaches into 
 every field of complex modern society as a consequence of the many- 
 faceted activities of man. 
 
 International communism therefore has no right to arrogate to itself 
 any claim to having initiated this social revolution, belonging as it 
 does to the people, who with great effort and sacrifice are forging a 
 better world. For example, the standards set by the Catholic Church 
 for reforming the social order and the condition of workers are clearly 
 revolutionaiy.' In particular, the programs of the Alliance for 
 Progress, both in concept and scope, embody a profound economic 
 and social revolution. 
 
 This is the background of the revolutionary change that the Com- 
 munists are exploiting. They are the vultures of this process of 
 modernization. They believe that the unstable conditions that emerge 
 during the course of this process of modernization are vulnerable to 
 subversion, sabotage, and even guerrilla warfare. Despite their 
 doctrine of "historic inevitability" they know that they have only a 
 limited time in which to gain power in the underdeveloped areas. 
 They recognize that their opportunities to gain power diminish in 
 proportion to the speed with which progress becomes evident and 
 
 ' On this point it is worthwhile copying the following paragraph from ch. V of "The Program of the 
 Communist Party of the U.8.S.R.," approved at its XXII Congress: 
 
 "The party uses the metliod of educational influence to educate the people in the spirit of the scientific- 
 materiaUst outlook and to overcome religious prejudice without insulting the feelings of the behevers. 
 It is necessary to explain patiently the inconsistency in religious beliefs which arose in the past from the 
 subjection of people by the elemental forces of nature and social oppression, and from lack of knowledge 
 of the true causes of natxiral and social phenomena. In this it is necessary to seek the support of the achieve- 
 ment of modern science, which gives a fuller picture of the world, increases man's power over nature, and 
 leaves no place for the fantastic inventions of religion about supernatural forces." 
 
 » See paper encyoiicals "Quanta Cura," "Rerara Novaruni," "Quadragesimo Anno," and "Mater et 
 Magistra." 
 
30 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 social problems find proper solution. Hence, their great emphasis on 
 subverting existing institutions, and exploiting, the tensions, strains, 
 and conflicts of interest that necessarily accompany so radical a change 
 in the social system. 
 
 It should be asked, then, whether international communisin, which 
 pretends to be the chosen agency for achieving social progress in the 
 world, is not actually the element that has been disturbing and 
 retarding the revolution that modern democratic society has been 
 carrying out. 
 
 It is necessary here to alert the people to the prejudicial action of 
 certain elements in making the development of this revolutionary 
 process more difficult, through indifference, selfishness, unbridled 
 ambition for power, or systematic opposition to every measure they 
 did not originate. 
 
 It is amazing, therefore, to see how persons who are responsible for 
 the fate of political^ parties, unions, professional associations, organi- 
 zations of students, intellectuals or artists, of manifest non -Communist 
 orientation, tolerate the infiltration of known and even confessed 
 Communists into the governing bodies of these organizations, thereby 
 permitting the direction of their organizations to be wrested from 
 their hands. 
 
 In the same way dictatorships and their adherents, whatever their 
 orientations, by their acts reject democracy, which they oppress and 
 quell in order that they will have no opposition to their ambition for 
 power. They cause a weakening of democratic institutions and a loss 
 of faith in the national destiny, thereby creating a favorable atmos- 
 phere in which Communism, with international support, can emerge 
 as the spokesman for a return to constitutional government, with a 
 view eventually to installing its own dictatorship. 
 
 At the same time those who systematically oppose reform, by their 
 selfishness and deliberate disregard for reality, obstruct and weaken 
 all measures for improvement, making it possible for mtemational 
 communism to strengthen its position by championing reform and 
 using the attitude of those who oppose change as an example of the 
 inadequacy of the democratic sj^stem. 
 
 Fmally, it should be pomted out that the committee is fully aware 
 of the negative effect which two well-known factors have, or can have, 
 on efforts to form a united front against communism in various 
 countries. These factors are: what has become known as "McCarthy- 
 ism," that is, a deformation of the action that was advocated by the 
 late Senator Joseph McCarthy of the United States; and the existence 
 of persons and organizations who make a "business" of anti-Commun- 
 ist sentiment and action. Both elements, working at the official and 
 the private level, and conscious or not of the damage they are doing, 
 follow a hard line of action against persons, organizations, or govern- 
 ments, accusing them indiscriminately of being Communist. Besides 
 frequently causing unjust injury to the persons, organizations, and 
 governments accused, this line of action provides free propaganda 
 for communism and, what is still more serious, detracts from the 
 solution of the real problems facing the people. 
 
 It is essential that any split appearing in the ranks of democratic 
 men and nations should disappear. It is necessary to close ranks 
 against the common enemy. The moment for decision has arrived. 
 All men of good will who recognize and accept the need for a demo- 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 31 
 
 cratic social revolution must put aside inertia, selfishness, and in- 
 difference, in order to win a better world, which they and future 
 generations may enjoy in freedom. 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security is in agreement 
 with the foregoing and, in its initial effort, has wished to direct the 
 revealing light of truth against the basic tactic of Communist subver- 
 sion, deceit, demonstrating it by means of verifiable facts. It is 
 convinced that Communist subversion is carried out by national 
 Communists, within their national frontiers. Therefore the right to 
 combat this subversion lies in the hands of governments and patriotic 
 citizens. Joining forces with all of those who are dedicated to the 
 struggle against Communist subversion, the Committee presents this 
 initial general report as a contribution to that noble cause. 
 
 V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 The recommendations set forth below are the recommendations that 
 the Committee, in this first stage of its work, has considered pertinent 
 with respect to Resolution II, 2(c) of the eighth meeting of consultation 
 of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The first recommendations are re- 
 stricted to the measures that the American States should take to 
 counteract the subversive action of international communism; the 
 second, to other aspects of the problem contemplated in Resolution 
 II of Punta del Este. 
 
 A. Measures to Counteract Subversive Activities 
 
 1. According to Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation, 
 the Committee is to submit to the Council of the Organization in this 
 report any general recommendations its considers pertinent in this 
 initial stage of its work regarding measures that should be taken with 
 respect to the subversive action of international communism. To 
 that end, the Committee carefully examined the efforts that have been 
 made in the past to combat and to eradicate from this hemisphere 
 subversive activities directed, assisted, or instigated by extraconti- 
 nental powers, designed to replace our democratic institutions with 
 totalitarian ideologies and forms of government. 
 
 2. This almost uninterrupted struggle against subversive action has 
 now entered its third decade. When the activities of the Axis agents 
 were involved, the system of security against subversion functioned 
 satisfactorily and gave satisfactory results. The first three meetings 
 of consultation recommended the various kinds of internal measures 
 that each state should take to prevent and punish espionage, sabotage, 
 propaganda, and the other subversive activities, and those that should 
 be taken to ensure the degree of international cooperation required 
 for the effective operation of the system. The earnestness with which 
 the governments adopted measures and cooperated with each other 
 made it possible to check Nazi-Fascist subversive action in the 
 Western Hemisphere effectively. 
 
 3. Unfortunately, the situation has been, and continues to be, 
 entirely different in the matter of the fight against the subversive 
 action of the international Communist movement. It cannot be 
 denied that not only have the results obtained in World War II not 
 been obtained in this matter, but the Sino-Soviet powers have been 
 
32 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 able to carry on their offensive largely unimpeded in several countries, 
 and a beachhead has been established in American territory, which 
 constitutes a very grave threat to the security of the hemisphere. 
 This development of the Communist offensive is contrary to the 
 objectives and decisions that have appeared in resolutions adopted by 
 the inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation since 
 1948. For purposes of the recommendations stated below, the Com- 
 mittee deems it advisable to pause here in order to quote the pertinent 
 sections of the above-mentioned resolutions. 
 
 4. When the problem of the preservation and defense of democracy 
 against the threat of subversive action by international commimism 
 was presented for the first time at the Conference of Bogota (1948), 
 the American Kepublics resolved — 
 
 1. To reaffirm their decision to maintain and further an effective 
 social and economic policy for the purpose of raising the standard 
 of living of their peoples; and their conviction that only under a system 
 founded upon a guarantee of the essential freedoms and rights of the 
 individual is it possible to attain this goal. 
 
 2. To condemn the methods of every system tending to suppress 
 political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of 
 international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine. 
 
 3. To adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance 
 with their respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary 
 to eradicate and prevent activities, directed, assisted, or instigated 
 by foreign governments, organizations, or individuals tending to over- 
 throw their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their 
 domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, subversive 
 propaganda, threats, or by any other means, the free and sovereign 
 right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their 
 democratic aspirations. 
 
 4. To proceed with a full exchange of information concerning any 
 of the _ aforementioned activities that are carried on within their 
 respective jurisdictions. 
 
 5. The fourth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
 (Washington, 1951), convoked specifically because "the growing threat 
 of international Communist aggression has demonstrated the urgent 
 necessity that the free nations of the world determine the most effective 
 methods for preserving their freedom and independence," and "the 
 need for adopting measures to insure the economic, political, and 
 military defense of this hemisphere is urgent and of common interest 
 to the American Republics," resolved: 
 
 (1) To recommend to the governments of the American States- 
 la) That, mindful of their unity of pm-pose and taking account of the 
 contents of Resolution VI of the second meeting of consultation in Havana 
 and Resolution XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American 
 btates m Bogota, each American republic examine its respective laws and 
 regulations and adopt such changes as it may consider necessary to assure 
 that the subversive activities of the agents of international communism 
 directed against any of them, may be adequately prevented and punished; 
 
 (b) lhat, in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions 
 they enact measures necessary to regulate in the countries of America transit 
 across international boundaries of those foreigners who there is reason to 
 expect will attempt to carry out subversive acts against the defense of the 
 American Continent; and 
 
 (c) That, in the application of this resolution, they bear in mind the 
 necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most eiHcacious means the 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 33 
 
 rights of the human person as well as their firm determination to preserve 
 and defend the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American 
 republics. 
 
 For the purpose of facilitating the fiilfiUment of the objectives of this 
 resolution, it was recommended that the Pan American Union prepare 
 technical studies on certain aspects of subversive action. In accord- 
 ance with the recommendation, the Department of Legal Affairs 
 prepared a report on "Strengthening of Internal Security," which 
 was submitted to the governments and published in 1953. 
 
 6. In the "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the 
 Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of 
 International Communism," the 10th Inter- American Conference 
 (Caracas, 1954), again insisted on the need to adopt and carry out 
 measures to counteract the subversive activities of the international 
 Communist movement, recommending that the American govern- 
 ments, without prejudice to such other measures as they might con- 
 sider desirable, should give special attention to the following steps for 
 the purpose of counteracting such activities within their respective 
 jurisdictions: 
 
 (a) Measures to require disclosxire of the identity, activities, 
 and sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of 
 the international Communist movement or who travel in the 
 interests of that movement, and of those who act as its agents 
 or in its behalf; and 
 
 (b) The exchange of information among governments to assist 
 in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the inter- 
 American conferences and meetings of Ministers of Foreign 
 Affairs regarding international communism. 
 
 7. In view of the foregoing, the Committee has not considered it 
 necessary, in this initial stage of its work, to examine the measures 
 intended to counteract subversive activities. It considers that, at 
 least for the moment, it has the vast experience acquu-ed through the 
 measures adopted during World War II. However, the Committee 
 does consider it desirable — and an unavoidable duty — owing to the 
 nature and scope of its terms of reference, to pomt out to the Council 
 of the Organization the urgent need for each and every one of the 
 American governments to give the greatest possible application to the 
 measures that have been adopted since 1948 by the inter-American 
 conferences and meetings of consultation. As stated above, in the 
 fight against the subversive action of international communism, the 
 American governments in general have not, unfortunately, demon- 
 strated the same zeal and earnestness that they manifested dming 
 World Wax II in fighting Nazi-Fascist subversive action, and perhaps 
 this is one of the reasons for the degree of development of Sino-Soviet 
 and Castro activities in these past few years. 
 
 8. In connection with the foregoing, it should be noted that in 
 Resolution VIII, the Fourth Meeting of Consultation (1951) explicitly 
 stated: 
 
 Since the said subversive action recognizes no boundaries, the present situation 
 requii-es, in addition to adequate internal measures, a high degree of international 
 cooperation among the American Republics, lookuig to the eradication of any 
 threat of subversive activity which may endanger democracy and the free way 
 of life in the American Republics. 
 
34 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 It is obvious, therefore, that owing to the methods employed by 
 international communism, the lack of cooperation of one state can 
 render inoperative the measures adopted by a contiguous state; and 
 when several states fail to cooperate, the system for defense against 
 subversion as a whole becomes ineffective. The interdependence of 
 the measures to counteract subversive action is such that if any 
 government fails to apply them, the system is weakened and is entire 
 effectiveness is undermined. This is the impression one receives from 
 surveying the American scene over the past few years. 
 
 9. Along the same line of thought, the Committee would also like 
 to recommend that, in adopting and applying internal measures, the 
 governments act with the necessary vigor which is required to combat 
 subversive action. In making this recommendation, the Committee 
 has kept in mind especially two fundamental considerations: The 
 first is that the agents of international communism, as the Fourth 
 Meeting of Consultation stated, are attempting to destroy the demo- 
 cratic institutions, "utilizing for this purpose the exploitation and the 
 abuse of these selfsame democratic liberties"; and secondly, that the 
 measures adopted by the competent authorities to counteract the 
 subversive action, whatever its nature and scope, are not, by anj^ 
 means, inconsistent with the internal and international obligation of the 
 state to respect human rights and fundamental liberties. 
 
 10. In connection with this second consideration, the Committee 
 wishes to add that the subversive action of international communism 
 
 Eresupposes the performance of acts directed, assisted, or instigated 
 y foreign powers or governments, and that therefore, they constitute 
 grave acts against the public order and the security of the state, 
 especially when the ",gent carrying out the subversive action is a 
 national or citizen of that state. Under the laws of all the countries 
 of the world, and the international instruments governing the matter, 
 the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental liberties is subject 
 to the limitations and restrictions that the state is expressly authorized 
 to impose for reasons of internal security or other reasons that are 
 considered vital to the welfare of the nation. It can be easily under- 
 stood, therefore, what a legal and political mistake it would be to 
 tolerate subversive activity or fail to combat it adequately, out of 
 fear that human rights and fundamental liberties would not be 
 respected. 
 
 11. The above recommendations and considerations, therefore, are 
 completely consistent with the aim, already expressed in Resolution 
 VIII repeatedly quoted, that in applying the measures referred to, 
 the states should bear in mind "the necessity of guaranteeing and 
 defending by the most efhcacious means the rights of the human 
 
 erson as well as their firm determination to preserve and defend the 
 asic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American Eepub- 
 lics." On this point, the above-mentioned Pan American Union 
 report states that in its conclusions care was taken to guard "against 
 the possibility that such ways and means be used to obstruct or sup- 
 press genuinely democratic expressions of opinion, activities, or politi- 
 cal aspirations, completely foreign to international communism." 
 The same legitimate concern appears again in Resolution I, 4(c) of 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 35 
 
 the Eighth Meeting of Consultation as one of the basic political 
 principles set forth in that resolution: 
 
 The repudiation of repressive measures which, under the pretext of isolating or 
 combating communism, may facilitate the appearance or strengthening of 
 reactionary doctrines and methods which attempt to repress ideas of social 
 progress and to confuse truly progressive and democratic labor organizations and 
 cultural and political movements with Communist subversion. 
 
 B. Vigilance for the Purpose of Warning Against Acts of 
 Aggression, Subversion, or Other Dangers to Peace and 
 Security, and Self-Defense 
 
 In establishing this Committee, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation 
 resolved: 
 
 "1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain 
 all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, 
 subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such 
 acts,_ resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this 
 hemisphere and to make recommendations to the governments of the member 
 states with regard thereto." 
 
 In the preamble to Kesolution II, it is stated "it is advisable, there- 
 fore, to make available to the Council of the Organization of American 
 States a body of an advisory nature * * *." In this connection, the 
 Committee takes the liberty of offering its technical services to the 
 Council for the purposes outlined in the paragraph cited above. To 
 this effect, the Committee also takes the liberty of submitting to the 
 Council for consideration its recommendation that the member states 
 be invited to furnish the Council with any information that they may 
 exchange between themselves, pursuant to the resolutions mentioned 
 above, as well as any evidence they obtain regarding Communist 
 deception that can be added to the evidence contained in this report. 
 This information would be examined by the Committee from the purely 
 technical standpoint, in accordance with whatever directives the 
 Council might issue to it, in order that general studies and pertinent 
 recommendations might be submitted to the Council for consideration. 
 
 The Committee makes this recommendation having in mind the 
 fact that Communist deception and techniques vary constantly, and 
 that only by studying them in a determined, continuous and com- 
 parative manner, can conclusions be reached and suggestions made 
 that would be of great utihty in more effectively combating com- 
 munism. In all this, the Committee is fully aware that it is the govern- 
 ments and peoples of America who have the right, capacity, and 
 interest to counteract the subversive action of the international 
 Communist movement. 
 
 The Eighth Meeting of Consultation also resolved : 
 
 3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider 
 appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate as 
 may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats 
 or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting 
 from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers in 
 accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such a» 
 the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty 
 of Reciprocal Assistance. 
 
■36 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 view of the nature and scope of this paragraph of Resolution II 
 the Committee considers that it would be highly desirable for the 
 General Secretariat to prepare a study of the background of the exer- 
 cise of individual and collective self-defense, especially with reference 
 to the threats and acts referred to in the said paragraph. 
 
 The Committee also deems that it would be very useful to the 
 general objectives of Resolution II if the General Secretariat would 
 issue a new, up-to-date edition of the report on "Strengthening of 
 Internal Security," published in 1953. 
 
 Apbil 30, 1962. 
 
 Manuel Campos Jimenez, 
 
 Chairman of ihe Committee. 
 Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez, 
 
 Vice Chairman of the Committee. 
 Fkancisco Marcelo Ramirez. 
 Thomas D. White. 
 Joaquim Canuto Mendes de Almeida 
 Julio Cesar Vadora Rozier. 
 
 JOAQUfN ZaLdIvAR. 
 
APPENDIXES 
 
 APPENDIX 1 
 
 EESOLUTION II OF THE EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSUL- 
 TATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
 Special Consultative Committee on Secueity Against the 
 SuBVEESivE Action op International Communism 
 
 Wliereas international communism makes use of highly complex 
 techniques of subversion in opposing, and in the task of counteracting 
 such techniques which certain states may benefit from mutual advice 
 and support; 
 
 The American states are firmly united for the common goal of 
 fighting the subversive action of international communism and for 
 the preservation of democracy in the Americas, as expressed in Reso- 
 lution XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American 
 States, held in Bogota, in 1948, and that for such purpose they can 
 and should assist each other, mainly through the use of the institu- 
 tional resources of the Organization of American States ; and 
 
 It is advisable, therefore, to make available to the Council of the 
 Organization of American States a body of an advisory nature, made 
 up of experts, the main purpose of which would be to advise the mem- 
 ber governments which, as the case may be, require and request such 
 assistance, 
 
 The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
 serving as organ of consultation in application of the Inter-American 
 Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
 
 Resolves: 
 
 1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States 
 to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against 
 any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and secu- 
 rity, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued inter- 
 vention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recom- 
 mendations to the governments of the member states with regard 
 thereto. 
 
 2. To direct the Council of the Oi^anization to establish a Special 
 Consultative Committee on Security, composed of experts on security 
 matters, for the purpose of advising the member states that may 
 desire and request such assistance, the following procedures being 
 observed: 
 
 (a) The Council of the Organization shall select the member- 
 ship of the Special Consultative Committee on Security from a 
 list of candidates presented by the governments, and shall define 
 immediately terms of reference for the Committee with a view to 
 achieving the full purposes of this resolution. 
 
 (6) The Committee shall submit reports to such member 
 states as may request its assistance ; however, it shall not publish 
 
 37 
 
38 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 these reports without obtaining express authorization from the 
 state dealt with in the report. 
 
 (c) The Special Consultative Committee on Security shall 
 submit to the Council of the Organization, no later than May 1, 
 1962, an initial general report, with pertinent recommendations 
 regarding measures which should be taken. 
 
 (d) The Committee shall function at the Pan American Union, 
 which shall extend to it the technical, administrative, and finan- 
 cial facilities required for the work of the Committee. 
 
 (e) The Committee shall function for the period deemed 
 advisable by the Council of the Organization. 
 
 3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may 
 consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and 
 to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their 
 capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or 
 other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued 
 intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance 
 with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as 
 the Charter of the Organization of American States and Inter- 
 American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
 
 APPENDIX 2 
 
 EESOLUTION I OF THE EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSUL- 
 TATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
 Communist Offensive in America 
 
 1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, 
 convened in their Eighth Meeting of Consultation, declare that the 
 continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere 
 are now in danger. 
 
 The Ministers have been able to verify that the subversive offensive 
 of Communist governments, their agents and the organizations which 
 they control, has increased in intensity. The purpose of this offensive 
 is the destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of 
 totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers. 
 The outstanding facts in this intensified offensive are the declarations 
 set foith in official documents of the directing bodies of the inter- 
 national Communist movement, that one of its principal objectives 
 is the establishment of Communist regimes in the underdeveloped 
 countries and in Latin America; and the existence of a Marxist- 
 Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly alined with the doctrine 
 and foreign policy of the Communist powers. 
 
 2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and hide their 
 true intentions, the Communist governments and their agents exploit 
 the legitimate needs of the less-favored sectors of the population and 
 the just national aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext 
 of defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, democratic 
 institutions are destroyed, human rights are violated and the indi- 
 vidual is subjected to materialistic ways of life imposed by the dicta- 
 torship of a single party. Under the slogan of "anti-imperialism" 
 they try to establish an oppressive, aggressive imperialism which 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 39 
 
 subordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and aggressive 
 interests of extracontinental powers. By maliciously utilizing the 
 very pnnciples of the inter- American system, they attempt to under- 
 mine democratic institutions and to strengthen and protect political 
 penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of Communist 
 governments and their agents constitute one of the most subtle and 
 dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other 
 countries. 
 
 3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of the hemi- 
 sphere to the intensification of the subversive offensive of Communist 
 governments, their agents, and the organizations that they control 
 and to the tactics and methods that they employ and also warn them 
 of the dangers this situation represents to representative democracy 
 to respect for human rights, and to the self-determination of peoples.' 
 
 The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles 
 of the inter-American system. 
 
 4. Convinced that the integrity of the democratic revolution of the 
 American states can and must be preserved in the face of the sub- 
 versive offensive of communism, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs pro- 
 claim the following basic poUtical principles: 
 
 (a) The faith of the American peoples in human rights, liberty, 
 and national independence as a fundamental reason for their 
 existence, as conceived by the Founding Fathers who destroyed 
 colonialism and brought the American Kepublics into being; 
 
 (6) The principle of nonintervention and the right of peoples to 
 organize their way of life freely in the political, economic, and 
 cultural spheres, expressing their will through free elections, with- 
 out foreign interference. The fallacies of Communist propa- 
 ganda cannot and should not obscure or hide the difference in 
 philosophy which these principles represent when they are ex- 
 pressed by a democratic American countiy, and when Commu- 
 nist governments and their agents attempt to utilize them for 
 their own benefit; 
 
 (c) The repudiation of repressive measures which, under the 
 pretext of isolating or combating communism, may facilitate the 
 appearance or strengthening of reactionary doctrines and meth- 
 ods which attempt to repress ideas of social progress and to con- 
 fuse truly progressive and democratic labor organizations and 
 cultural and political movements with Communist subversion; 
 
 (d) The affirmation that communism is not the way to achieve 
 economic development and the elimination of social injustice in 
 America. On the contrary, a democratic regime can encompass 
 all the efforts for economic advancement and all of the measures 
 for improvement and social progress without sacrificing the funda- 
 mental values of the human being. The mission of the peoples 
 and governments of the hemisphere during the present generation 
 is to achieve an accelerated development of their economies and 
 to put an end to poverty, injustice, illness, and ignorance as was 
 agreed in the Charter of Punta del Este; and 
 
 (e) The most essential contribution of each American state in 
 the collective effort to protect the inter-American system against 
 communism is a steadily greater respect for human rights, im- 
 provement in democratic institutions and practices, and the 
 
 43-947—65 4 
 
40 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 adoption of measures that truly express the impulse for a revo- 
 lutionary change in the economic and social structures of the 
 American Republics. 
 
 APPENDIX 3 
 
 CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION TO THE III COMMUNIST 
 
 INTERNATIONAL 
 
 (Approved by the Second Congress of the III International, 
 Moscow, 1920) 
 
 The Second Congress of the Communist International rules that 
 the conditions for joining the Communist International shall be as 
 follows: 
 
 1. The general propaganda and agitation should bear a really 
 Communist character, and should correspond to the program and 
 decisions of the Thu-d International. The entire party press should 
 be edited by reliable Communists who have proved their loyalty to 
 the cause of the proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the 
 proletariat should not be spoken of simply as a current hackneyed 
 formula, it should be advocated in such a way that its necessity 
 should be apparent to every rank-and-file workingman and working- 
 woman, to each soldier and peasant, and should emanate from every- 
 day facts, systematically recorded by our press day by day. 
 
 All periodical and other publications, as well as all party publica- 
 tions and editions, are subject to the control of the presidium of the 
 party, independently of whether the party is legal or illegal. It 
 should in no way be permitted that the publishers abuse their 
 autonomy and carry on a policy not fuUy corresponding to the policy 
 of the party. 
 
 Wherever the followers of the Third International have access, and 
 whatever means of propaganda are at their disposal, whether the 
 columns of newspapers, popular meetings, labor unions, or coopera- 
 tives, it is indispensable for them not only to denounce the bourgeoisie, 
 but also its assistants and agents, reformists of every color and shade. 
 
 2. Every organization desiring to join the Communist International 
 shall be bound systematically and regularly to remove from all the 
 responsible posts in the labor movement (party organization, editor- 
 ship, labor unions, parliamentary factions, cooperatives, munici- 
 palities, etc., all reformists and followers of the "centre," and to have 
 them replaced by Communists, even at the cost of replacing at the 
 beginning "experienced" opportunists by rank-and-file workingmen. 
 
 3. The class struggle in almost every country of Europe and 
 America is entering the phase of civil war. Under such conditions 
 the Commxmists can have no confidence in bourgeois laws. They 
 should create everywhere a parallel illegal apparatus, which at the 
 decisive moment should be of assistance to the party to do its duty 
 toward the revolution. In every country where, in consequence of 
 martial law or of other exceptional laws, the Communists are unable 
 to carry on their work legally, a combination of legal and illegal work 
 is absolutely necessary. 
 
 4. Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be 
 carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 41 
 
 every military organization. Wherever owing to repressive legislation 
 agitation becomes impossible, it is necessary to carry on such agitation 
 illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should 
 be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause, and in- 
 compatible with affiliation to the Thii-d International. 
 
 5. A systematic and regular propaganda is necessary in the rm^al 
 districts. The working class can gain no victory unless it possesses 
 the sympathy and support of at least part of the nu-al workers and 
 of the poor peasants, and imless other sections of the population are 
 equally utilized. Communist work in the rural districts is acquuing 
 a predominant importance during the present period. It should be 
 carried on through Communist workmen of both city and country 
 who have connections with the rural districts. To refuse to do this 
 work, or to transfer such work to untrustworthy half reformists, is 
 equal to renouncing the proletarian revolution. 
 
 6. Every party desirous of affiliating to the Third International 
 should renounce not only avowed social patriotism, but also the false- 
 hood and the hypocrisy of social pacifism: It should systematically 
 demonstrate to the workers that without a revolutionary overthrow 
 of capitalism no international arbitration, no talk of disarmament, no 
 democratic reorganization of the League of Nations will be capable of 
 saving mankind from new imperialist wai's. 
 
 7. Parties desirous of joining the Communist International must 
 recognize the necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with 
 reformism and the policy of the "centrists," and must advocate this 
 ruptme amongst the widest circles of the party membership, without 
 which condition a consistent Communist policy is impossible. The 
 Communist International demands unconditionally and peremptorily 
 that such rupture be brought about with the least possible delay. 
 The Communist International cannot reconcile itself to the fact that 
 such avowed reformists as for instance Turatti, Modigliani, Kautsky, 
 Hilferding, HUlquit, Longuet, Macdonald, and others should be 
 entitled to consider themselves members of the Third International. 
 This would make the Third International resemble the Second 
 International. 
 
 8. In the colonial question and that of the oppressed nationalities, 
 there is necessary an especially distinct and clear line of conduct of 
 the parties of countries where the bom-geoisie possesses such colonies 
 or oppresses other nationalities. Every party desirous of belonging to 
 the Third International should be bound to denounce without any 
 reserve all the methods of its own imperialists in the colonies, support- 
 ing not in words only but practically a movement of liberation in the 
 colonies. It should demand the expulsion of its own imperialists 
 from such colonies, and cultivate among the workmen of its own 
 country a truly fraternal attitude toward the working population of 
 the colonies and oppressed nationalities, and carry on a systematic 
 agitation in its own army against every kind of oppression of the 
 colonial population. 
 
 _ 9. Every party desirous of belonging to the Communist Interna- 
 tional should be bound to carry on systematic and persistent Com- 
 munist work in the labor unions, cooperatives, and other organizations 
 of working masses. It is necessary to form Communist nuclei within 
 these organizations, which by persistent and lasting work should win 
 over labor unions to communism. These nuclei should constantly 
 
42 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 denounce the treachery of the social patriots and of the fluctuations of 
 the center. These Communist nuclei should be completely subordi- 
 nated to the party in general. 
 
 10. Any party belonging to the Communist International is bound 
 to carry on a stubborn struggle against the Amsterdam "International" 
 of the yellow labor unions. It should propagate insistently amongst 
 the organized workers the necessity of a rupture with the yellow 
 Amsterdam International. It should support by all means in its 
 power the International Unification of Red Labor Unions joining to 
 the Communist International. 
 
 1 1 . Parties desirous of joining the Third International shall be bo und 
 to inspect the personnel of their parliamentary factions, to remove all 
 unreliable elements thereform, to control such factions, not only 
 verbally but in reality, to subordinate them to the Central Committee 
 of the party, and to demand from each Communist representative in 
 parliament to subject his entire activity to the interests of real revolu- 
 tionary propaganda, and agitation. 
 
 12. All the parties belonging to the Communist International should 
 be formed on the basis of the principle of democratic centralization. 
 At the present time of acute civil war the Communist Party will only 
 be able fully to do its duty when it is organized in a sufficiently cen- 
 tralized manner; when it possesses an iron discipline and when its 
 party center enjoys the confidence of the party membership and is 
 endowed with complete power, authority, and ample rights. 
 
 13. _ The Comm.unist parties of those countries where the Communist 
 activity is legal should clean out their members from time to time, as 
 well as those of the party organizations, in order to systematically 
 free the party from the petty bourgeois elements which penetrate 
 into it. 
 
 14. Each party desirous of affiliating to the Communist Inter- 
 national should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the 
 Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counterrevolutionary 
 forces. The Communist Parties should carry on a precise and 
 definite propaganda to induce the workers to refuse to transport any 
 kind of military equipment intended for fighting against the Soviet 
 Republics, and should also by legal or illegal means carry on a propa- 
 ganda amongst the troops sent against the workers' republics, etc. 
 
 15. All those parties which up to the present moment have stood 
 upon the old social democratic progi-ams should within the shortest 
 time possible draw up a new Communist program in conformity with 
 the special conditions of their country, and in accordance with the 
 resolutions of the Communist International. As a rule the program 
 of each party belonging to the Communist International should be 
 confirmed by the next congress of the Communist International or its 
 Executive Committee. In the event of the failure of the program of 
 any party being confirmed by the Executive Committee of the Com- 
 munist International, the said party shall be entitled to appeal to the 
 congress of the Communist International. 
 
 16. All the resolutions of the congresses of the Com^munist Inter- 
 national, as well as the resolutions of the Executive Committee are 
 binding for all parties joining the Communist International. The 
 Communist International, operating under the conditions of most 
 acute civil warfare, should be centralized in a better manner than the 
 Second International. At the same time, the Communist Inter- 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 43 
 
 national and the Executive Committee are naturally bound in every 
 form of their activity to consider the variety of conditions under which 
 the different parties have to work and struggle, and generally binding 
 resolutions should be passed only on such questions upon which such 
 resolutions are possible. 
 
 17. In connection with the above, all parties desiring to join the 
 Communist International should alter their names. Each party 
 desirous of joining the Communist International should bear the 
 following name: Communist Party of such and such a country, section 
 of the Third Communist International. The question of the party 
 name is not only a formal one, but is a political question of great 
 importance. The Communist International has declared a decisive 
 war against the entire bourgeois world, and all the yellow Social 
 Democratic parties. It is indispensable that every rank-and-file 
 worker should be able clearl}^ to distinguish between the Communist 
 Parties and the old official Social-Democratic of Socialist Parties, 
 which have betrayed the cause of the working class. 
 
 18. All the leading organs of the press of every party are bound to 
 publish all the most important documents of the Executive Committee 
 of the Communist International. 
 
 19. All parties which have joined the Communist International as 
 well as those which have expressed a desire to do so are obliged in as 
 short a space of time as possible, and in no case later than 4 months 
 after the Second Congress of the Communist International, to convene 
 an extraordinary congress in order to discuss these conditions. In 
 addition to this, the central committees of these parties should take 
 care to acquaint all its local organizations with the regulations of the 
 second congress. 
 
 20. All those parties which at the present time are willing to join 
 the Third International, but have so far not changed their tactics in 
 any radical manner, should, prior to their joining the Third Inter- 
 national, take care that not less than two-tldrds of their committee 
 members and of all their central institutions should be composed of 
 comrades who have made an open and definite declaration prior to the 
 convening of the second congress, as to their desire that the party 
 shoidd affiliate to the Third International. Exceptions are permitted 
 only with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third 
 International. The Executive Committee of the Communist Inter- 
 national has the right to make an exception also for the representatives 
 of the center as mentioned in paragraph 7. 
 
 21. Those members of the party who reject in principle the condi- 
 tions and the theses of the Third International are liable to be ex- 
 cluded from the party. 
 
 This applies also to the delegates at the special congresses of the 
 party. 
 
PAPER PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL 
 COMMITTEE ENTRUSTED WITH THE STUDY OF THE 
 TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 FOR SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES, THE FLOW OF SUBVERSIVE 
 PROPAGANDA AND THE UTILIZATION OF CUBA AS A BASE 
 FOR TRAINING IN SUBVERSIVE TECHNIQUES 
 
 The Secretary of the Council of the Organization of American 
 States, in accordance with the decision reached at the last meeting of 
 the Special Committee To Study Resolutions II. 1 and VIII of the 
 eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and in 
 compliance with its instructions, reports that in making this study 
 public it should be clearly understood that it is a technical advisory 
 document prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on Se- 
 curity, whose members act in an individual capacity. This document 
 will be at the service of the Special Committee To Study Resolutions 
 II. 1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of 
 Foreign Affairs as an element of judgment in preparing the report and 
 recommendations it will submit to the Council of the Organization in 
 compliance with the mandate entrusted to it at the meeting held by 
 the Council on October 24, 1962. 
 
 Febeuahy 20, 1963. 
 
 Inteoduction 
 
 The Council of the Organization of American States, at the meeting 
 held on October 24, 1962, agreed "to entrust to the Committee to study 
 Resolutions II. 1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of 
 Ministers of Foregin Affairs an urgent study of the transfer of funds to 
 the American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive 
 propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in 
 subversive techniques, presenting to the Council the pertinent reports 
 and recommendations. In carrying out this task, the Committee 
 could make use of the advice of the Special Consultative Committee 
 on Security * * *." 
 
 Availing itself of this permission, the first-mentioned Committer, in 
 a note from its Chairman dated November 1, 1962, requested from the 
 Special Consultative Committee on Security "technical advice in 
 carrying out its study of the three aspects set forth above." 
 
 With a view to providing this advice, the Committee has been 
 meeting at the Pan American Union since January 7 of this year. 
 Initially only the following members attended: Mr. Manuel Campos 
 Jimenez, chairman of the committee; Gen. Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez, 
 vice chairman; Prof. Joaquim Canute Mendes 'de Almeida; Lt. Col. 
 Julio Cesar Vadora Rozier; and Lt. Col. Joaquin Zaldlvar. 
 
 Owing to the resignations presented by Gen. Thomas D. White and 
 Lt. Col. Francisco Marcelo Ramirez, the Council of the Organization, 
 at the meeting held on January 16, 1963, elected Mr. Paul C. Daniels 
 and Col. Carlos Maria Luna as new members, and they joined the 
 Committee on January 21 and 26, respectively. 
 
 45 
 
46 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 At the first sessions, the Committee considered its plan of work, 
 which was presented to the Committee To Study Resolutions II. 1 
 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation at the joint session held 
 on January 15, 1963. 
 
 In accordance with that plan of work, the Committee has prepared 
 the study requested of it and wishes to make the following explanation 
 with regard thereto : 
 
 (a) Owing to the short time the Committee has had to complete its 
 work, it has not been possible to study all the problems included in the 
 three general aspects that the Council's Committee is to examine. 
 Consequently, this Committee has limited itself to presenting ideas 
 and suggesting recommendations on those problems it considers of 
 greatest urgency. 
 
 (b) The information from official sources that has been made 
 available to this Committee by the Council's Committee has been 
 most valuable in carrying out the study. However, this information 
 was for the most part not only of a very general nature, but only that 
 provided by five countries reached the Committee, and it has there- 
 fore been obliged to use information from other sources. 
 
 (c) The initial general report, prepared by the Committee in April 
 1962, already presents several aspects of Communist subversive 
 activity and may be used by the Council's Committee in the study 
 it is to make and in preparing the reports and recommendations that 
 are to be presented to the Council of the Organization. This should 
 also be pointed out with respect to the studies and resolutions of the 
 Emergency Advisory Committee for the Political Defense of the 
 Continent (Montevideo, 1942-48) and the document, "Strengthening 
 of Internal Security," published by the Pan American Union in 1953. 
 
 (d) The specific recommendations the Committee suggests in this 
 study do not refer to any particular country. They include the adop- 
 tion of certain measures that, in the abstract and without prejudice 
 to other measures that may be better adapted to circumstances 
 within each country, are considered technically necessary to counter- 
 act, at least in part, the subversive activity that international com- 
 munism is carrying out in the Western Hemisphere, especially through 
 Cuba. 
 
 It also presents them with complete awareness that the Govern- 
 ments and peoples of the Americas have the right, the capacity, and 
 the interest to confront the subversive action of international com- 
 munism, and that if these recommendations are adopted, they will 
 be applied taking into account the statements made in the initial 
 general report, chapter V.A. 9, 10, and 11. 
 
 (e) The appendix to this study illustrates, with specific cases, the 
 techniques of subversive activity employed by communism in America 
 and to which reference is made herein. 
 
 The facts and situations noted were compiled from information 
 presented by the governments that replied to the request of the 
 Council's Committee; from public statements of authorities of various 
 countries, including Communist countries, especially Cuba; and from 
 other sources, since these facts are well known and generally accepted. 
 
 These facts and situations are noted without any attempt to pass 
 judgment upon or to qualify the information and statements received 
 from the governments and other sources. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 47 
 
 (/) The Committee, in its initial general report, stated that Com- 
 munist techniques vary constantly and only by studying them con- 
 tinuously and comparatively is it possible to come to any conclusions 
 and to formulate suggestions according to the circumstances. Con- 
 sequently, this study should be considered only as the first step of an 
 examination that requires continuity. 
 
 I. Communist Subversion 
 
 A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 In its initial general report the Committee stated : 
 
 Communism operates on a Worldwide scale. Its methods and procedures are 
 adapted to the local conditions that will most favor its development, and they 
 vary from simple infiltration for subversive purposes to the use of violence, 
 according to the objective, the direction of the action, and the resistance that 
 may be encountered. 
 
 A chapter of the report was devoted to one of the basic techniques 
 of Communist subversion, deceit. 
 
 In this report the Committee wishes to present, in summary form, 
 other techniques employed by Communist subversion, which will 
 make it possible to analyze better the subversive action that inter- 
 national communism is carrying out through Cuba and also to assess 
 the degree of danger that it represents to the member states of the 
 Organization of American States. 
 
 In the initial general report it was also stated that : 
 
 * * * The world is virtMally at war — an atypical kind of war, which is being 
 waged by international communism and suffered by the democracies. In this 
 sense it is undeniable that the Marxist dialectic has changed the saying of Clause- 
 witz that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," to the assertion 
 that "peace is only the continuation of war by other means." 
 
 In a speech delivered January 6, 1961, Khrushchev pointed out 
 three kinds of war: "world wars, local wars, and wars of liberation 
 or popular insurrections." He said that this classification made it 
 "necessary to devise tactics that are correct for each of these types of 
 wars." With respect to world war he declared that "Communists are 
 the strongest opponents of such wars" and that "we can prevent the 
 conflagration of a world war." He said that it was possible that in 
 the future local wars could flare up, but that they would be extin- 
 guished "because they might turn into wars with thermonuclear 
 missiles." 
 
 With respect to the "war of liberation" or "popular uprising" he 
 said: "they will come about as long as imperialism exists * * * such 
 wars are not only acceptable but inevitable. * * * We accept such 
 wars. We are supporting and we will support the peoples in their 
 struggle for independence." 
 
 Krushchev then continued by asking and answering a series of 
 questions about this kind of war. "Can wars of this kind break out 
 in the future? Yes, they can. Can there be this kind of uprising? 
 There can be. * * * In other words, can conditions be created that 
 will stir a people to lose patience and take up arms? Yes, they can 
 be. What is the Marxist position on these uprisings? It is one of 
 strongest support. * * *" Then, after a description of the horrors 
 of thermonuclear war, Krushchev came to a very significant conclu- 
 
48 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 sion: "The victory of communism throughout the world is close at 
 hand," but "war among states is not necessary to gain this victory." 
 
 Thus, the leader of communsim declares that a world war is danger- 
 ous as a means of spreading his doctrine, but at the same time main- 
 tains the threat of a thermonuclear war as a means of intimidation 
 and a type of blackmail to keep the free world from resisting Com- 
 munist invasion . What Khrushchev describes as a ' 'war of liber ation' ' 
 or "popular uprising" is really hidden aggression: subversion. 
 
 Exploiting the desire of the democracies to avoid war, particularly 
 under present circumstances, in which arms of great _ destructive 
 power might be used, the design of Communist expansion finds in 
 subversion the least costly way of acquu'ing peoples and territories 
 without exaggerated risk. 
 
 Subversion, the techniques of which vary from simple infiltration 
 to violent intervention, is conceived, developed, and perfected by the 
 leaders of communism, who utilize it to carry forward their world 
 revolution. Its aim is to replace the political, economic, and social 
 order existing in a country by a new order, which presupposes the 
 complete physical and moral control of the people. 
 
 That control is achieved by jjrogressively gaining possession of 
 bodies and minds, using appropriate techniques of subversion that 
 combine psychological, political, social, and economic actions, and 
 even military operations, if this is necessary. 
 
 B. SOME TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED 
 
 1. Recruitment and training 
 In 1900, Lenin wrote: 
 
 We must train men and women who will dedicate not only their free afternoons 
 to the revolution, but their entire lives. 
 
 I. J. Peters, in his Organization Manual of the Communist Party, 
 explaining what Lenin meant by a professional revolutionary, said 
 that such a person is a highly skilled comrade, trained in the theory 
 and practice of revolution, tested in battle, who gives his whole life 
 to the struggle for the interests of his own class. A professional of 
 the revolution, he said, is ready to go wherever and whenever the 
 party orders him and, if the class struggle requires it, he must leave 
 his famdy for months or even years. 
 
 Communism, through an appropriate system of selection, chooses 
 the most capable individuals for the ends it seeks. Then, in schools 
 or training centers, these individuals are prepared as activists of all 
 kinds: leaders, orators, and propagandists; experts in sabotage, 
 espionage, and terrorism in all its forms ; specialists in the handling of 
 arms and radio equipment, in guerrilla warfare, et cetera. Recruitment 
 is carried on preferably among students, teachers, workers, artists, 
 and writers. 
 
 The chief objective in training personnel selected to serve the ends 
 of communism is to instill in them a mystique, subordinated, naturally, 
 to the interests and decisions of the party. This training begins with 
 primary courses, which are established and operated in all countries in 
 which the party is organized, whether or not their existence is 
 authorized. 
 
 After a selection, made according to individual circumstances and 
 the results obtained in the primary courses, the individual is sent to 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 49 
 
 an advanced school, where courses lasting a maximum of 3 years are 
 given. These schools operate principally in Communist countries, 
 and their aim is to train party members in all the techniques of sub- 
 version, as weU as to occupy administrative posts in the party, or in 
 unions or institutions of various kinds. This is apart from the 
 existence in non-Communist countries of underground schools, where 
 the same instruction is given. 
 
 At an even higher level, special academies operate in the Soviet 
 Union and in other countries within the Communist orbit. These, 
 such as the social science academy in Moscow, are devoted chiefly to 
 training personnel in the higher echelons, who will occupy key posts 
 in the party or in allied agencies. 
 
 2. Infiltration 
 
 Through this technique, activists are infiltrated into previously 
 selected organizations and institutions in order, progressively and 
 methodically, to gain absolute direction and control of them. To 
 do this, the activist studies the problems of the group and takes 
 advantage of those that are sources of agitation, exploiting them in 
 such a way as to gain the group's adherence to party interests. In 
 other words, the activist avails himself of all circumstances enabling 
 him to attract non-Communists in the vicinity. 
 
 His next step is to establish contact with and to attract those 
 persons whom he may use as a cover for gaining his ends; that is, he 
 takes advantage of "useful fools," working freely through them, and 
 thus insuring his own safety. 
 
 He carries out his work of agitation through conversations with 
 various elements of the group, to whom he explains the need to fight 
 for the objective and aim being sought. He takes advantage of these 
 conversations to introduce disguised Communist propaganda and 
 techniques and tries progressively to carry on such discussions in 
 the midst of small groups. 
 
 Infiltration is undertaken in any social class, in government agencies, 
 social and cultural centers, student groups, labor unions, and even 
 in the armed forces. The priority and magnitude of that infiltration 
 will depend upon the facilities found, the environment in which action 
 is taken, and the aim being sought. 
 
 3. Psychological impregnation 
 
 The individual action of the activists is complemented by well 
 planned and developed psychological action. An effort is made to 
 attract and convert indifferent people by exploiting the contradic- 
 tions present in every organized society and the justified longings to 
 resolve them. For this purpose, attractive material, easily accessible 
 to the masses, is drawn up or prepared. 
 
 This tactic is called "psychological impregnation," and is carried 
 out through the constant utterance and repetition of slogans adapted 
 to the situation, as well as of affirmations and of carefully chosen 
 topics. For this purpose, every means of dissemination is used. 
 
 International communism makes extensive use of all the techniques 
 of psychological action. Propaganda, one of the most effective tech- 
 niques and one that continues to be used, will be studied a little further 
 on. 
 
50 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 4. Dislocation 
 
 The object of dislocation is to weaken the social structure. Just as 
 with psychological impregnation, dislocation skillfully exploits existing 
 contradictions, student or labor conflicts, religious or social differ- 
 ences, and so forth for the purpose of creating disorder and provoking 
 violence. Thus, the people's discontent and justified aspirations are 
 taken advantage of by the Communists to serve as a useful, and in 
 some cases, highly effective means of creating disorder and driving 
 the authorities to rigorous law enforcement and the consequent use 
 of police measures. Freedom to congregate, the right to strike, and 
 other liberties granted by democracy are abused; laws are labeled as 
 antidemocratic or dictatorial, and the authorities are criticized and 
 attacked as being solely responsible for the situation. With disorder 
 thus stirred up, all kinds of arms are employed and offenses are 
 perpetrated against individuals and also against public and private 
 property, thereby inciting violent action on the part of the police, 
 which serves the Communists' ulterior ends. If necessary, the Com- 
 munists themselves eliminate some of the demonstrators, in order to 
 present them as "victims of brutal repression" and "heroes of the 
 fight for liberation of the people." 
 
 In a parallel way, by means of the propaganda available to them, 
 they undertake a campaign to misrepresent and discredit the govern- 
 ment, the authorities, and all non-Communist individuals of any 
 influence in society. 
 
 Finally, an effort is made to hinder or paralyze the development of 
 trade and the national economy; to put to the test lawful means of 
 internal security and to invent new actions to frustrate them; in 
 short, to create uncertainty and chaos, in order to demonstrate the 
 inefficiency of the power controlling the situation through lawful 
 procedures. A propitious atmosphere is thereby created for total 
 subversion. 
 
 5. Process of militarization 
 
 Through a process of proper organization, a military apparatus of 
 growing complexity is created. 
 
 First, action or shock teams are created. These are small in number 
 and are usually used for hand fighting, sabotage, or acts of terrorism. 
 
 When properly trained and prepared military groups are available, 
 with a sufficient number of people acquainted with the use of arms 
 and explosives and having the necessary equipment, local bands are 
 organized. To put these into action, areas are chosen that, because 
 of their geographic situation, offer facilities for hiding, moving, and 
 supplying these bands, and at the same time present difficulties for 
 action by the forces of order. The support of the people of these 
 areas is sought, either voluntarily or by intimidation. The type of 
 operations carried on is called guerrilla warfare. 
 
 When the area selected has been totally conquered and the people 
 converted or vanquished, militia groups are organized to control and 
 defend the area. 
 
 The personnel of the militia, chosen for their combat experience and 
 proven ideology, are strategically quartered to make up regional units, 
 which, according to the way in which the revolution progresses, are 
 converted into regular imits, organized along more or less classic lines. 
 These will constitute communism's army or principal force. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 51 
 
 II. Cuba as a Base for Subversion in America 
 
 A. CUBA AS A TRAINING CENTER 
 
 The different media of information often describe subversive activ- 
 ities in different American countries and point to Cuba as center for 
 training in the techniques of Communist subversion. Such reports 
 are being furnished or corroborated at the present time by several 
 governments that have experienced most directly and intensely the 
 impact of subversive action. 
 
 An effort will be made in the following pages to present concrete 
 data that will make it possible to reach conclusions on this subject. 
 1. Training centers 
 
 There can be no doubt that the creation and maintenance of a 
 Communist government in Cuba facilitates to an extraordinary degree 
 the subversive action of international communism in America. This 
 is true not only with respect to the spread of the Communist ideology, 
 but also — what is more dangerous — because it constitutes a center 
 quite nearby for training agents of every kind whose function it is to 
 develop subversion in the countries of the hemisphere. 
 
 It is an obvious fact that as the Communist regime became con- 
 solidated in Cuba, a series of schools and centers of training in the 
 techniques of Communist subversion were organized, in which instruc- 
 tion is being given not only to Cubans but to many other Latin Ameri- 
 cans for carrying on subversive activities in various countries of the 
 hemisphere. 
 
 Among the many training centers that now function in Cuba, 
 mention may be made of the following: 
 
 Bias Roca School, in Los Pinos, Havana Province. 
 
 Marcelo Salado School, in the Luyano section of Havana. 
 
 El Cortijo School, in Pinar del Rio Province, especially for military 
 personnel. 
 
 La Cabana Fort, in Havana, especially for young people. 
 Minas Rio Frio School, for training guerrillas. 
 
 San Lorenzo School, in the Sierra Maestra, Oriente Province, for 
 training guerrillas. 
 
 Ciudad Libertad School, in Marianao, Havana Province, under 
 Russian instructors. 
 
 Boca Chica School, in Tarari, Havana Province, Director General 
 Alberto Bayo. 
 
 Julio Antonio Mella School, in Mar Bella, Havana Province, for 
 training and instructing leaders of the Confederaci6n de Trabaj adores 
 de Cuba Revolucionaria (CTCR) (Federation of Workers of Revolu- 
 tionary Cuba). 
 
 A large number of Latin Americans attend these training centers, 
 where they receive instruction not only in Marxist-Leninist theory, 
 but also in propaganda techniques, the use of arms and explosives, 
 sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and so on. 
 
 It should be pointed out that the corps of instructors in these 
 schools is made up not only of Cubans or other Latin Americans, but 
 also of instructors from other Communist countries; these speak 
 Spanish. 
 
 The fellowship program announced by Fidel Castro in his speech 
 of June 9, 1961, which included the granting of 1,000 fellowships for 
 
52 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 students of the various American countries, gives an idea of how, from 
 its very first years, the Cuban Communist regime gave primary im- 
 portance to the indoctrination and training of American youths in 
 Communist techniques. By means of this and other programs, 
 hundreds of American young people have received that kind of 
 instruction. 
 
 2. Organizations devoted to the spread oj subversion in America 
 
 In addition to the training centers, there are in Cuba some organiza- 
 tions whose purpose it is to carry subversion to America. There is 
 knowledge that the following are functioning: 
 
 Jimta de Liberaci6n para Centro America y el Caribe (Board of 
 Liberation for Central America and the Caribbean). Plans sub- 
 versive acts and controls the sending of agents to that region of the 
 Americas. 
 
 Junta de Liberaci6n para America del Sur (Board of Liberation for 
 South America). Has the same purpose as the foregoing organiza- 
 tion; its action is planned for South America. 
 
 Organizacion Latino am eric an a de la Juventud (Latin American 
 Youth Organization). It principal aim is to organize and train young 
 people in subversive tactics. 
 
 Asociaci6n "Latinoamerica Libre" ("Free Latin America" Associa- 
 tion). Its aim is to place obstacles in the way of trade with the 
 United States and to encourage trade with the Communist bloc. 
 
 Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (Cuban Institute of 
 Friendship with Peoples). Its chief aim is to organize meetings and 
 conferences of various kinds and to facilitate travel to Cuba for the 
 purpose of giving instruction to students, workers, professional people, 
 etc. 
 
 3. Congresses and meetings 
 
 Concurrently with the systematic preparation of Communist 
 subversive agents a series of meetings, conferences, congresses, and so 
 on are being held in Cuba, attended by the Communist elements of 
 America and by sympathizers, the real purpose of which is to discuss 
 plans, fix objectives, and issue directives that must be observed by the 
 different groups, with respect to Communist subversive action of every 
 form. 
 
 These congresses, conferences and meetings bring together persons 
 linked to the different fields of human activity: workers, students, 
 intellectuals, athletes, etc. 
 
 In order to illustrate the foregoing it might be of interest to list 
 in chronological order the various international meetmgs that took 
 place in Cuba between January 1961 and January 1963: 
 
 Latin American Conference of Plantation Workers, March 1961, 
 Havana. 
 
 Celebration of Latin American Solidarity Day, April 1961, in San 
 Antonio de los Banos. Participating were Latin American and 
 European delegates who attended the Latin American Conference on 
 National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and World Peace, 
 held in Mexico City from March 5 to 8, 1961. 
 
 Congress of Central American Students, May 1961, Havana. 
 
 Seventh Congress of the International Students' Union, May 1961, 
 Havana. Topic: "Latin America Against Yankee Imperialism." 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMXJNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 53 
 
 International meeting of voluntary workers, June 1961, Havana; 
 sponsored by the International Students' Union. 
 
 International seminar on illiteracy, June 1961, Havana; sponsored 
 by the International Students' Union. 
 
 Meeting of Latin American trade union leaders, July 1961, Havana; 
 to exchange ideas regarding the World Trade Union Federation Con- 
 gress, which was scheduled for December 1961, in Moscow. 
 
 Meeting to plan for the Congress of Women of the Americas sched- 
 uled for July 1962, July 1961, Havana. 
 
 vSecond meeting of Construction Workers of Latin America, August 
 1961, Havana. 
 
 Congress of Writers and Artists, August 1961, Havana. 
 
 Fifth Congress of the World Trade Union Federation, November 
 1961, Havana. 
 
 Fifth Congress of the International Newspapermen's Organization, 
 January 1962, Havana. 
 
 Latin American Cultural Congress, January 1962, Havana. 
 
 Conference of Peoples (coincided with the Conference at Punta del 
 Este), January 1962, Havana. 
 
 Congress of Women of America, July 1962, Havana. 
 
 Latin American University games, and seminar on sports in Latin 
 America, October 1962, Havana. 
 
 First National Congress of the Cuban Federation of Women, Oc- 
 tober 1962, Havana. 
 
 Latin American music festival, October 1962, Havana. 
 
 Solidarity with Venezuela Week, November 1962, Havana. 
 
 Congress of Women of America, January 1963, Havana. 
 
 Mention should also be made of the numerous meetings held by 
 the Cuban Government to celebrate this or that national event, to 
 which delegations from the Latin American countries are also invited. 
 In this connection, mention may be made of ceremonies held in cele- 
 bration of January 1, May 1, and July 26. 
 
 If.. Conclusions 
 
 It is clear that Cuba is being used as a base for training in com- 
 munism and its spread in America. 
 
 That activity of international communism, and particularly on the 
 part of the Cuban Government, is greatly facilitated by the lack of 
 suitable measures, and of cooperation among the American countries, 
 to check the constant and heavy stream of travelers to and from Cuba. 
 The importance of this problem makes it necessary to devote a special 
 section to it. 
 
 B. CONTBOL OF TRAVEL 
 
 1. General considerations 
 
 The nations that maintain normal and friendly relations recognize 
 that it is desirable and even necessary to facilitate travel by their 
 nationals across their borders as a means of strengthening cultural 
 and economic ties, becoming better known, and becoming qualified 
 and ready to support one another in the solution of their problems. 
 
 For this reason the documents necessary for crossing international 
 borders have become less in number, the period of validity of entry 
 and departure permits has been extended, procedures for obtaining 
 passports and other travel documents have been simplified, the obliga- 
 
54 
 
 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 tion to secure visas has been removed, the securing of foreign exchange 
 has been faciUtated, and so on. 
 
 These facilities are used by communism so that its agents may 
 circulate freely and in this way introduce propaganda and move the 
 money needed in planning, encouraging, and carrying on subversion. 
 It has already been pointed out in this connection that it is of public 
 knowledge that many individuals of antinational and communistic 
 tendencies travel to Cuba for various reasons connected with sub- 
 version. Cuba is also utilized as the point of departure for trips to 
 the Communist countries of Europe or Asia for the same reasons. 
 
 The need for guaranteeing national security in the face of this threat 
 has obliged some governments to place controls upon the travel of 
 their nationals to certain countries with which they do not maintain 
 diplomatic relations, and in which, due to the lack of their diplomatic 
 representatives, they cannot provide the usual protection or assistance, 
 or to which they travel for reasons that might endanger the security 
 of the country. 
 
 The nature, degree, and effectiveness of this control vary from 
 country to country, and it is influenced very greatly by the degree 
 of cooperation between countries in carrying it out. Many States 
 have no control over travel to Cuba; in others such control has been 
 attempted, but the means adopted are not effective; while in others 
 control is limited to declaring travel illegal. Many control measures 
 lose their effectiveness through lack of suitable equipment, deficient 
 technical preparation, and the negligence or complicity of the person- 
 nel in charge of their execution. 
 
 No matter what degree of control may be attempted, this can 
 become null when the national crosses the border of his country and 
 remains outside of its territorial jurisdiction. Hence the importance 
 of international agreements and mutual cooperation between countries, 
 so that the laws on travel of a country are not flouted by its nationals 
 when they enter another. 
 
 How are control measures flouted? 
 
 The majority of Communist agents who enter a non-Communist 
 country use false passports and documents in order to hide their 
 identity as well as the purpose of their trip. 
 
 The nationals of a country who wish to travel to Cuba request 
 travel documents to be sent to another country, where they make 
 contact with the Cuban Ambassadors or special agents, who provide 
 them with identification documents and permits to travel to Cuba, 
 either to remain there or to go to another Communist country. In 
 this way they avoid the marking of their passports with visas or 
 notations referring to their trip. 
 
 In brief, the lack or ineffectiveness of control is due to legal causes, 
 deficiencies in the administration of, or compliance with, control 
 measures, and the lack of international agreements for extending this 
 control beyond national borders. 
 
 2. Recommendations 
 
 The effective control of travel to Cuba must include both national 
 and international procedures, 
 (a) National 'procedures 
 
 1. Make provision for every person who crosses an international 
 border to have in his possession some travel document — whether a 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 55 
 
 passport, safe conduct, or migration card — and enforce control over 
 such documentation. 
 
 2. Prohibit travel to Cuba, as a general rule, and regulate the same 
 so that only those persons may go who have valid reasons, such as 
 those of a humanitarian nature. It would be well, in the correspond- 
 ing stipulations, to consider the following aspects, among others: 
 
 (a) To limit the use of passports or other travel documents by 
 means of an inscription stating that these are not valid for travel 
 to Cuba. 
 
 (6) To declare any trip not authorized by the terms of the 
 travel document to be an infraction of the law. 
 
 (c) To provide that every person desiring to travel to Cuba 
 present a request to that effect at the passport office, and prove 
 that he has a valid reason for making the trip. Permits should 
 not be issued on the basis of such casual reasons as vacation, 
 study, etc. 
 
 (d) To give wide publicity to the laws and regulations of each 
 country in relation to travel to Cuba, and to send copies of them 
 to the travel agencies and transport companies for due compliance. 
 
 3. Provide the immigration officers at the ports, border crossings, 
 and airports with a list of persons known to be agents or members of 
 the Communist Party, and of those who have traveled to Cuba, for 
 such control action as they deem necessary. For this purpose close 
 cooperatioji is required between police and immigration authorities. 
 
 4. Make a note in the passports or other travel documents author- 
 izedjby the government of the traveler the date of departure, date of 
 entry, destination, and place of origin. 
 
 (b) International procedures 
 
 1. Study must be given to the best form of procedure to bring about 
 close intergovernmental cooperation in order to exercise effective 
 control over travel within the Western Hemisphere. To this end the 
 signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements could be encouraged. 
 It would be well to consider the following aspects in such agreements : 
 
 (a) Each government must observe the limitations imposed 
 upon travel by the other governments. For example, country 
 "A" must take the steps necessary to prevent the departure for 
 Cuba of a national of country "B" whose documentation specifies 
 that it is not valid for making such trip. 
 
 (6) Each government must inform the other governments, 
 especially those of countries that are used regularly for travel to 
 Cuba, regarding its laws and regulations on travel, in order that 
 such laws and regulations may not be violated. 
 
 (c) When the government of country "A" refuses to allow the 
 departure for Cuba of a traveler from country "B", it must so 
 inform the diplomatic or consular authorities of the latter country. 
 
 (d) The officials responsible for controlling the entry and 
 departure of travelers must examine minutely all of the travel 
 documents in order to prevent violations of the terms of those 
 documents. 
 
 2. A system for the exchange of information on known Commimists, 
 subversive agents, and persons who travel to Cuba must exist between 
 the governments. 
 
 43-947—65 5 
 
56 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMITNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 III. Transmission of Subversive Propaganda 
 
 A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 Considering the primary importance of propaganda or publicity in 
 the lives of nations, and the development it has now attained, it is 
 advisable to point out that this means of so directly influencing the 
 people is very efl'ectively used by international communism. 
 
 This Committee, in its initial general report, fully pointed out the 
 need for the democratic peoples to fight against the techniques of 
 Communist deceit, a deceit that is practiced intensively through 
 propaganda. It is therefore necessary to deal again in a general way 
 with this subject, in order to point out the danger propaganda in- 
 volves and to prompt the American governments to take urgently 
 needed measures to cancel out or weaken its effects. 
 
 Pursuing this line of thought, it is desirable, in the first place, to 
 point out the forms and the instruments that propaganda uses, in 
 order to determine what measures could be recommended for counter- 
 acting it. 
 
 Obviously, the international Communist movement is constantly 
 endeavoring to increase its propaganda. That increase and the 
 danger represented by such propaganda can be measured, in part, by 
 the number of organizations that are at its service; the circulation of 
 newspapers and magazines, books, pamphlets, leaflets, posters, and, 
 in general, all kinds of publications presenting Communist ideology; 
 the number of radio broadcasts and shomngs of motion pictures; the 
 organization of an attendance at festivals, congresses, meetings, 
 lectures, and so on; the establishment and operation of training and 
 indoctrination schools; trips to or from the Communist countries; 
 and so on. 
 
 The degree of this danger can also be measured by the resources 
 that international communism invests to maintain the propaganda 
 apparatus in the Western countries. But what best gives a true 
 measure of it is the fact that the Communists themselves consider 
 propaganda as one of the essential means of prime importance to the 
 success of their political action. 
 
 The aim of this propaganda is to provoke social and economic chaos, 
 weaken the governments, and bring the masses of the people into a 
 prerevolutionary situation from which the Communists can launch 
 their attack on the seats of power. Each Communist Party, through 
 its agitation and propaganda section, sows hate, doubt, and confusion, 
 which carry with them the seeds of political and economic decay. 
 Through these agitation and propaganda sections, the members 
 receive, from the international headquarters or from the executive or 
 central committee in their respective countries, precise mstructions 
 on the general topics they should develop. Then they adapt them 
 to the local or national situation and exploit them, making use of all 
 known media of dissemination of information. 
 
 Thus, the propaganda activities are carried on by groups of activists 
 who are disciplined to the maximum degree and work tirelessly to 
 influence the decisions of the governments; of the political parties; of 
 the labor unions and farmworkers' organizations; of the student, 
 women, and youth groups; of the intellectual, cultural, and sport 
 centers; of centers representing racial minorities; in short, to influence 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 57 
 
 all manifestations of the life of a country, capitalizing on legitimate 
 national aspirations. 
 
 The tactics frequently change, but the objective remains un- 
 changing: To dissolve or undo the democratic system in order to 
 replace it with the dictatorship of the Communist Party. 
 
 B. SUBJECTS OF THE PROPAGANDA 
 
 The subjects of the Communist propaganda in America vary from 
 country to country and from region to region, according to circum- 
 stances. Nevertheless, this variation is more one of form than of 
 substance, since in all cases the particular approach is in accordance 
 with the general program of Communist propaganda for America 
 planned from abroad. 
 
 During the last few years the Communist propaganda has empha- 
 sized subjects of a general nature applicable throughout the world, 
 such as disarmament, "peaceful coexistence," the ending of colonial- 
 ism, and the material and scientific progress made by the Soviet 
 Union; and special topics applicable to the specific conditions in the 
 American countries, such as agrarian reform, local economic and social 
 conditions, nationalization, "Yanqui imperialism," "the example of 
 Cuba," "national liberation," and others. 
 
 In dealing with all these subjects. Communist propaganda uses the 
 well-known method of deceit as a major element, especially the use of 
 words stripped of their legitimate meaning. 
 
 C. INSTRUMENTS OF PROPAGANDA 
 
 1. Diplomatic and consular missions 
 
 The informational activity carried on by countries through their 
 diplomatic and consular missions is well known and accepted. How- 
 ever, the use of these missions for purposes of political and ideological 
 propaganda as a means of favoring subversion is relatively new. 
 
 To develop their subversive campaign, the Soviet Union and its 
 satellites abuse, in ever more alarming fashion, the prerogatives that 
 the countries grant to diplomatic missions. 
 
 Connivance with local Communist Party members and the inter- 
 vention and direct participation of diplomatic and consular agents 
 of the Communist bloc and of Cuba in the internal affairs of the 
 American countries have been publicly revealed on many occasions. 
 
 This Committee, in its initial general report, fully pointed out this 
 problem, citing examples that clearly demonstrate the improper use 
 of Communist diplomatic missions. The Inter-American Peace 
 Committee has also called attention to this subversive activity and 
 its consequences.^ 
 
 2. Trade and technical assistance missions 
 
 Just as in the case of their diplomatic and consular missions, the 
 Communists make use of their trade and technical assistance missions 
 that have been established in certain American countries as one more 
 instrument for spreading their subversive propaganda. Through 
 these missions, the coimtries of the Communist bloc introduce tech- 
 niques for sabotage, agitation, and propaganda in various countries. 
 
 1 Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers o£ 
 Foreign Affairs, January 1962, Punta del Este, Uruguay, Document OEA/Ser.L/IlI, CIP/1/62. 
 
58 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 In this connection, we should mention the formation of bodies or 
 agencies to promote cultural exchange with the countries of the 
 Communist bloc, most of which constitute centers of subversion and 
 of infiltration of activists. 
 
 S. Binational centers and associations for friendship or culture 
 
 Since 1945, international communism has employed a great pro- 
 fusion of front organizations to promote actions favoring its efforts 
 and as a means of infiltrating democratic society. Among these we 
 may mention the binational centers and associations for friendship 
 or culture, which currently make a practice of organizing activities 
 such as film festivals, artistic performances of various kinds, trips, 
 lectures, congresses of writers and intellectuals, and so on, all of 
 which serve the ends of Communist propaganda. 
 
 4. Radio. 
 
 Radio is one of the means commonly used for the dissemination of 
 Communist propaganda not only because of its efl'ectiveness but also 
 because it is inexpensive in relation to the number of people it is able to 
 reach. 
 
 One of the means that could be used to block radio propaganda 
 would be interference. This is done with equipment known as 
 "jammers," which interfere with the transmission by means of noises 
 transmitted at the same time on the same frequency (or wavelength) 
 from points equidistant from the offending transmitter and from the 
 listeners, with power equal to or greater than that of the offending 
 transmitter. 
 
 Now, the cost of such interference is approximately 10 times the 
 cost of the transmission. In addition, it is only partially effective, as 
 is shown by the well-known fact that the Soviet countries, the only 
 ones that use this system, only manage to intercept 50 percent of the 
 transmissions, at the most. Moreover, the interference not only 
 affects the transmitter it is intended to interfere with but also others 
 that are within its radius of effect. 
 
 The above considerations indicate that for technical and economic 
 reasons this system is not an effective obstacle to the Communist 
 propaganda that is spread by means of radio. 
 
 {a) Local broadcasts 
 
 The use of longwave (broadcast band) transmission for broadcasts 
 of this sort makes it possible for the programs to be received on the 
 ordinary sort of receivers that most of the people have. In regions or 
 places where the literacy rate is low, this constitutes the most effective 
 propaganda medium. 
 
 It is obvious that with these advantages local broadcasts become the 
 most appropriate instrument for spreading subversive propaganda. 
 Their use makes possible the establishment of a large radio audience 
 over which the broadcasts can exercise an influence on their morals as 
 well as their opinions and in which, thereby, it can give circulation to 
 the rumors or theories that best suit the Communist tactics. 
 
 Equipment of amateur radio operators and clandestine stations are 
 also used for purposes of Communist propaganda. 
 
 (b) Transmissions from abroad 
 The shortwave bands are usually used for this kind of transmissions, 
 sometimes in prearranged combination as a network with longwave 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 59 
 
 stations. Although the reception conditions are usually poor, from 
 a technical point of view, the use of shortwave radio receivers has 
 become common in the Americas. 
 
 On May 1, 1961, Cuba officially inaugurated its international broad- 
 cast service known as Radio Havana, Cuba, with intensive propa- 
 ganda programs in Spanish, Portuguese, English, and Franch. The 
 large number of hours that both this station and those of the other 
 Communist countries devote to Communist propaganda for the 
 Americas is a matter of common knowledge. 
 
 (c) Telecommunications 
 
 Telecommunications are frequently used by the Communists to 
 transmit directives and instructions or as a valuable source of non- 
 secret information. 
 
 It may be mentioned by way of information, in connection with 
 the utilization of these services, that all the communications companies 
 that extended telegraph and telephone services to Cuba prior to 1961 
 are stiU maintaining those services, which permits that country to 
 use those means for its subversive purposes throughout the Americas, 
 as well as to obtain valuable information. 
 
 Because of its geographical position, Cuba is a center for telegraphic 
 communications from the United States to the Caribbean region, and 
 Central and South America. A cable message via Western Union 
 Telegraph Co. for San Juan, P.E., is sent from Miami to Havana, 
 whence it is automatically transmitted to the lines of Cable & Wire- 
 less, Ltd. That company can transmit the message either by land 
 lines via Batabano to Santiago, Cuba, or by submarine cable from 
 Bataband to Santiago via Cienfuegos, and from Santiago the message 
 goes by submarine cable of Cable & Wireless, Ltd., to Kingston, Ja- 
 maica, whence it is automatically transmitted, once more by cable, 
 to San Juan or Ponce, P.R. 
 
 B. Printed propaganda 
 
 Printed propaganda is one of the media most often utilized by the 
 Communists to spread their doctrine and carry on their subversive 
 activities. _ For these purposes they make use of both foreign and 
 local publications. 
 
 (a) Foreign publications 
 
 This kind of propaganda is spread through news services, mail, 
 travelers, diplomatic, consular, and commercial missions, and by 
 clandestine means. 
 
 The introduction of these publications by travelers is another 
 method commonly used by the Communists to disseminate their 
 propaganda. While it is difficult for ordinary travelers to transport 
 large amounts of propaganda of this sort, this is not true of those 
 who travel under the protection of official or diplomatic passports, and 
 this is an important channel for the entry of subversive propaganda. 
 
 The introduction of propaganda by taking advantage of diplomatic 
 and consular privileges is the major method of introducing printed 
 propaganda to the American countries. 
 
 The entry of propaganda by clandestine methods is accomplished 
 in the most varied ways. Since it is a form of contraband, it is 
 necessary to maintain extreme police and customs vigilance with 
 respect to it. 
 
60 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Communist activity in the field of printed propaganda is constantly 
 increasing. Publications of the Sino-Soviet bloc, as well as Cuban 
 ones, are distributed in enormous quantities in the Americas. Their 
 entry is faciUtated by the diplomatic relations that some American 
 countries maintain with Cuba and other Communist countries. 
 
 Communist publications are often freely sold in various American 
 countries. More than 100 periodicals of the Sino-Soviet bloc circu- 
 late in America, most of them printed in Spanish, some in French, 
 Portuguese, English, and Eastern European languages. In addition, 
 many publications of international Communist front organizations 
 circulate. Translations and editions of many books of Communist 
 propaganda are printed in Communist publishing houses that exist 
 in certain American countries. Most of them now are published 
 by the National Press of Cuba, from which country they are distrib- 
 uted to the rest of America. In addition, it is pertinent to point out, 
 in 1961 alone Cuba unported 250,000 copies of works of Mao Tse-tung 
 in Spanish, and these, as well as the books "Guerra de Guerrillas" 
 ("Guerrilla Warfare") by Ernesto Guevara and "Ciento Cincuenta 
 Preguntas a un GuerrUlero" ("One Hundred and Fifty Questions to 
 a Guerrilla Fighter") by Gen. Alberto Bayo, circulate extensively in 
 America. 
 
 The Cuban news service Prensa Latina, which maintains direct 
 contact with all the news services of the Communist countries, operates 
 legally or illegally in several American countries. 
 
 (6) Local 'publications 
 
 In the majority of the American countries, local Communist pub- 
 lications are published clandestinely and can be reproduced without 
 formal printing equipment, which makes control of them more difficult. 
 This propaganda takes the form of pamphlets, bulletins, leaflets, 
 weeklies, posters, and so on, which are distributed in large volume at 
 moments that the Communists consider most opportune. 
 
 Their effectiveness and danger are greater because they exploit local 
 topics and problems immediately, endeavoring to stir up the feelings 
 of the people in order to provoke disorders and incite revolts. 
 
 6. Motion pictures and television 
 
 Motion pictures and television are utilized as a very valuable instru- 
 ment for spreading Communist propaganda, since the combination 
 of the visual and the auditory stimulus assures a degree of concentra- 
 tion of attention not achieved by other media. Films produced in 
 Czechosolvakia, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Communist 
 China, almost all of them propagandistic in nature, are constantly 
 being shown in the Americas, as are film stories and documentaries on 
 the Cuban revolution, produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion 
 Pictiu'e Art and Industry, which contain propaganda clearly intended 
 to exploit the topic of the "example of Cuba." This type of propa- 
 ganda, which is usually of a concealed variety, shows deceitful images 
 of the Communist regime, presenting accomplishments and ways of 
 life intended to attract adepts from among gullible spectators. 
 
 Mention should also be made of the Communists' use of the re- 
 sources of art in general. The theater, particularly, serves the ends 
 of their propaganda in an outstanding way by bringing together a large 
 number of national artists of the American countries who sometimes 
 tmknowingly become active propagandists by performing Communist 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 61 
 
 works. The so-called "free theaters" are a typical example of this 
 kind of activity. 
 
 D. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The Communist propaganda from Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc 
 is constantly increasing and radiates to all the countries of the Western 
 Hemisphere, taking maximum advantage of all means of dissemina- 
 tion. Essentially, the aim of this propaganda is to destroy the 
 foundations of democracy, fomenting and exploiting for its own 
 benefit the social, religious, political, economic, and racial problems 
 that exist, to a greater or lesser degree, in the American countries. 
 
 Commimist propaganda constitutes a form of subversive action 
 that is just as dangerous to the internal security of the American 
 nations as any other form subversion takes, and, likewise, represents 
 a serious threat to the peace and security of America. 
 
 It must be recognized that, so far, there is no real awareness in the 
 American countries of the danger to their seciu-ity that lies in adopting 
 a passive attitude toward the activity of Communist propaganda. 
 
 E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 This Committee submits the following recommendations (on action 
 to be taken by the governments) for corsideration by the Committee 
 of the Council: 
 
 In general, that each American country should have the agencies 
 needed to enable it to plan, direct, and carry on the psychological 
 action (propaganda and counterpropaganda) to counteract, weaken, 
 or cancel out the Communist propaganda that is carried on through 
 any medium. 
 
 In particular, with regard to the use of the various instruments, and 
 in the order in which they have been dealt with in the preceding pages: 
 
 1. Diplomatic and consular missions 
 
 (a) The governments of the American countries that still maintain 
 diplomatic relations with the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc and 
 Cuba should establish, with respect to the members of the missions of 
 those countries, the same limitations that are imposed on the members 
 of their own missions in the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, particu- 
 larly as regards their movement and circulation and the exercise of 
 privileges. It would likewise be advisable to take measures to limit 
 the number of officials making up the missions of those countries. 
 
 2. Trade and technical assistance 
 
 (a) To establish strict supervision of the trade and technical mis- 
 sions of the countries of the Communist bloc. 
 
 (b) To keep careful watch over the national organizations for trade 
 with the Communist countries. 
 
 S. Binational centers and friendship and culture societies 
 
 (a) To exercise control over the various entities of this nature whose 
 programs or activities tend to carry on propaganda or subversion of a 
 Communist nature. 
 
 (&) To limit all activities (lectures, festivals, art and sport missions, 
 congresses, dramas, exhibitions, et cetera) that tend to favor Com- 
 munist propaganda. 
 
62 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 J+. Radio propaganda 
 
 (a) To exercise strict control over the broadcasts of the legally 
 established radio stations for the purpose of severely punishing those 
 guilty of carrying on propaganda activities of a Communist nature. 
 
 (6) To locate and suppress clandestine transmitters, punishing the 
 owners. 
 
 (c) _ To regulate the activities of amateur radio operators and to 
 exercise strict control over their transmissions by appropriate tech- 
 nical means. 
 
 (d) To regulate the importation, purchase, and installation of radio 
 transmitter equipment and supplies. 
 
 5. Telecommunications 
 
 (a) To control and reduce to a minimum the traffic conducted 
 from and to the countries of the Communist bloc. 
 
 (6) As regards telecommunications that must be made via Cuba, it 
 would be advisable for technical experts in the subject to make a study 
 of means to reroute the traffic that now goes that way. 
 
 6. Printed propaganda 
 
 (a) To proceed to exercise control and seizure of printed propaganda 
 of a subversive nature coming from abroad. For this purpose, to 
 estabHsh a postal control of printed matter entering or leaving a 
 country and to exercise stricter vigilance over travelers. 
 
 _ (b) With regard to the propaganda that is introduced through the 
 diplomatic and consular missions of the countries of the Sino-Soviet 
 bloc and Cuba, measm-es should be taken to prevent this practice from 
 being continued. 
 
 (c) Circulation of any publication containing subversive propaganda 
 of a Communist nature should be prohibited. 
 
 (d) The interested governments should request the countries that 
 still_ maintain diplomatic relations with the countries of the Sino- 
 Soviet bloc and Cuba to exercise the necessary control in order to 
 prevent the propaganda that enters through Communist embassies 
 from being sent to their territory. 
 
 7. Motion pictures and television 
 
 (a) To prohibit the showing of films produced in the countries of the 
 Communist bloc and those others produced in other countries which, 
 in the judgment of the governments, favor Communist propaganda. 
 
 (6) To exercise control over television programs that favor Com- 
 munist propaganda. 
 
 IV. Transfer of Funds to the American Republics for 
 Subversive Purposes 
 
 a. general considerations 
 
 It is an indisputable fact that Communist or pro-Communist groups 
 in the American countries must necessarily have a large amount of 
 money to carry on their subversive activities. 
 
 If it is considered that these groups, in addition to being a minority 
 in their respective countries, are mainly composed of individuals of 
 limited economic resources, it may be concluded that they do not have 
 the means for financing themselves. Since it is pubfic knowledge 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 63 
 
 that they are actually spending large sums of money every year, it is 
 not difficult to understand that a large portion of their expenditures 
 are financed from abroad. 
 
 Among the aspects to be mentioned that best support this assertion, 
 the following may be cited: 
 
 Communist Parties have a large quantity of equipment and 
 material available to print their propaganda; 
 
 Their prominent leaders, accompanied by some delegations, 
 make frequent trips to Cuba, the Soviet Union, China and other 
 Communist countries, spending large sums of money in travel and 
 living expenses; 
 
 Many Communist leaders, although they have no known means 
 of work, are able to live without financial worries ; 
 
 The American Communist Parties finance, with no major 
 problems, the expenses arising from the manifold activities they 
 carry out, both inside and outside their respective countries. 
 _ Financial aid for the subversive purposes of communism is very 
 difficult to verify, owing to the secretive and disguised manner in 
 which it is practiced. Nevertheless, according to information supplied 
 by some American countries and news that has appeared in news 
 organs of proved seriousness it can be affirmed that it is the present 
 Cuban Government that is responsible for providing, directly or 
 indirectly, a large portion of the financial support received by the 
 Communist Parties in the other American Republics. 
 
 Cuba, when the Castro-Communist government was first installed 
 in Havana, gave its moral, material, and financial support to a series 
 of invasions, organized within its territory, into different countries 
 in the Caribbean region. Since 1959 this form of activity was sus- 
 pended through fear that these flagrant acts of intervention would 
 give rise to a collective inter-American action. This did not mean 
 that Castro-Communist interference in the affairs of the Americas 
 had ceased to exist; on the contrary, her subversive activity was 
 intensified in many other ways, among them, through abundant and 
 continual financial aid. 
 
 B. OBTAINING OP FUNDS 
 
 The American Communist Parties, in order to obtain the necessary 
 funds for their subversive purposes, have two main sources available: 
 the collection of funds in their respective countries and the receipt 
 of funds coming from abroad. 
 
 1 . Funds collected in each country 
 
 They are obtained through the following procedures: 
 
 (a) Organization of periodic campaigns by the party and collateral 
 and front organizations to collect funds by means of such social 
 activities as banquets, balls, bazaars, festivals, and the like. 
 
 (b) Through compulsory contributions from all the members of the 
 party and sympathizers; 
 
 (c) Sales of all kinds of Communist publications, printed especially 
 for this purpose in clandestine printing offices, and compulsory sub- 
 scriptions to newspapers, periodicals, or weeklies published by the 
 party; 
 
64 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 {d) Eeceipt of profits derived from artistic, cultural, and athletic 
 events for the general public, utilizing national or foreign groups 
 hired for this purpose. 
 
 (e) Contraband in general, particularly in narcotics; 
 
 (j) In those countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with 
 the Communist countries, the diplomatic representatives of the latter 
 take advantage of the exemptions they enjoy to bring in articles that 
 are later sold to national consumers. 
 
 {g) Organization and operation of different kinds of commercial 
 entities. 
 
 2. Funds received from abroad 
 
 These funds constitute the major part of the income of the Com- 
 munist Parties. The instrument most frequently used to receive and 
 distribute such funds is the Communist diplomatic mission in those 
 countries with which their countries maintain relations. They receive 
 the quantities assigned to the national Communist groups and those 
 of the other countries, and from their respective headquarters they 
 distribute financial aid to the addressees through their agents, the 
 postal service, and the banks. 
 
 In some cases the remittances are made in person. For example, 
 a Communist agent of country A travels to Cuba and receives a certain 
 amount of money in cash. On his way back through country B, he 
 converts the money received, either into a bank draft to be sent by 
 mail to a given addressee or into travelers' checks to be carrier per- 
 sonally or by other agents. 
 
 Mention should also be made here of transfers of funds intended for 
 imaginary or real business concerns, which are utilized in subversive 
 Communist activity once they have been brought into the country. 
 
 C. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The movement of funds from Communist countries to the American 
 Republics for use in subversive activities is extremely difficult to 
 control, not only because of the difl^erent methods used to carry it out, 
 but owing to the facilities that exist for making transfers of money. 
 
 There is complete evidence that this transfer of funds is being 
 carried out intensively from Cuba and from other countries of the 
 Communist bloc to the American Republics. 
 
 As long as there are diplomatic relations between some of the Ameri- 
 can countries and the Communist nations, particularly Cuba, and as 
 long as the movement of travelers to and from the latter country is 
 permitted, the transfer of funds for subversive purposes will continue 
 to be even more difficult to control. 
 
 D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 In addition to the recommendations already given in the chapter 
 about Cuba as a base for subversion in the Americas, particularly 
 with reference to travel control, the Committee presents to the Coun- 
 cil's Committee, for consideration, the following measures that might 
 control the transfer of funds to a certain degree — 
 
 (1) To inspect Communist entities and persons, as well as 
 Communist suspects, in the different countries in order to de- 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMXTNIST SUBVERSION 65 
 
 termine the origin of the funds that permit them to develop 
 Communist subversive activities. 
 
 (2) To control contraband, particularly of narcotics, which, as 
 is known, is one of the most effective means employed by com- 
 munism to obtain funds. 
 
 (3) To consider the possibility that experts in the matter, 
 within the respective legal systems of the American countries, 
 might study the means that would make it possible to control 
 the entry of money or securities that it is believed are intended to 
 serve the ends of Communist subversion. 
 
 (4) To exercise strict control over the national procedures used 
 by Communists to obtain funds, as pointed out in this chapter. 
 
 With respect to the effectiveness of these measures, it is worth 
 repeating the comment that as long as there are diplomatic relations 
 between the American Republics and the countries of the Communist 
 bloc, particularly Cuba, these countries will continue to avail them- 
 selves, as they have done up to now, of their diplomatic representa- 
 tions to introduce funds into the American countries, intended for 
 Communist subversion. 
 
 v.. General Eecommendations 
 
 In the light of the analysis made in this study, the Special Consulta- 
 tive Committee on Security makes the following general recommenda- 
 tions : 
 
 1. To repeat in full the recommendations contained in its initial 
 general report of April 30, 1962. In this respect, the Committee 
 considers it advisable that the CouncU of the Organization of American 
 States, pursuant to Resolution II. 1 of the eighth meeting of consulta- 
 tion, urge the Governments of the member states to implem.ent the 
 recommendations that have been adopted repeatedly since 1948 at 
 the different inter- American conferences and meetings of consultation; 
 and, in accordance with their constitutional precepts, to bring up to 
 date and supplement their legislation so as to make the various 
 recommendations set forth in the preceding chapters of this study 
 applicable, provided they are adopted. 
 
 2. That the American Governments be asked to devote particular 
 attention to their intelligence services, creating or improving them, 
 in order that they may have the means that will enable them to plan, 
 coordinate and carry out effective action against Communist sub- 
 version; and, likewise, to organize, equip and train their security 
 forces so that they may be in proper condition to repress the sub- 
 versive activities of international communism. 
 
 3. Along the same lines, and in order to establish real and effective 
 collaboration among the services or organizations in charge of action 
 against Communist subversion in the different American countries, 
 it is considered advisable to recommend that a specialized conference 
 be held that will be attended by the heads of the security and inteii- 
 gence services or organizations. The Special Consultative Committee 
 on Security could at the proper time prepare the draft agenda for 
 such meeting. 
 
 4. That the American Governments be urged to provide the Special 
 Consultative Committee on Security with all the information on 
 subversive acts that take place in their respective countries, in order 
 
66 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 that the Committee may give appropriate and timely advice when it 
 is so requested. 
 
 VI. Final Consideration 
 
 Since the time of its initial general report, the Committee has 
 observed that the establishment of a beachhead on American terri- 
 tory, achieved by the Communist offensive, "poses a threat of the 
 utmost gravity to the security of the hemisphere." The events that 
 have taken place since that time, particularly the military strength- 
 ening of Cuba by the Soviet Union, by greatly increasing the capacity 
 of the Cuban Government to send arms into neighboring countries 
 and to intensify other subversive activities, render the threat to 
 hemispheric security much more serious, a threat that assumes an 
 urgent character with respect to the security of the countries of the 
 Caribbean region. This has become evident, sometimes in a dramatic 
 manner, in the recent wave of terrorism, sabotage, and other subver- 
 sive activities that Castro communism has unleashed in some of the 
 Latin American countries. 
 
 Without wishing to detract importance from the measures that 
 have been recommended dming the course of this study, the Com- 
 mittee believes that present circumstances demand that such measures 
 be supplemented with others of greater scope. The degree of develop- 
 ment attained by the political-military apparatus that has been estab- 
 lished in Cuba is rendering the system of security against subversion 
 increasingly inadequate and ineffective, based solely on the isolated 
 measures that each country might adopt. Holding this conviction, 
 the Committee has wished to assume responsibility for expressing it, 
 in view of the present state of events, in order that the American 
 governments may effectively confront the subversive action of Castro 
 communism. 
 
 _ Under these circumstances, the Committee believes that the situa- 
 tion justifies consideration by the American governments in accordance 
 with the pertinent provisions of the Inter- American Treaty of Recip- 
 rocal Assistance. In the opinion of the Committee, recent events, 
 particularly the repeated statements by the principal Cuban leaders 
 of their intention to subvert the American governments by violence, 
 constitute a situation of such gravity and urgency that it can be ade- 
 quately and effectively dealt with only by adopting the measures 
 provided for in the treaty. 
 
 _ In this respect, it is also pertinent to recall the urgent recommenda- 
 tion made by the eighth meeting of consultation to the governments 
 of the member states "to take those steps that they may consider 
 appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to co- 
 operate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity 
 to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dan- 
 gers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention 
 in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the 
 obligations estabhshed in treaties and agreements such as the Charter 
 of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American 
 Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance." To this effect, the Committee 
 believes that because of the increasing gravity of the subversive 
 threat posed by Castro communism, recourse to such measures of 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 67 
 
 individual and collective self-defense as are considered necessary to 
 remove it, may not be postponed. 
 
 Manuel Campos Jim^ines, 
 
 Chairman of the Committee. 
 Julio Cesar Doig SInchez, 
 
 Vice Chairman of the Committee. 
 Paul C. Daniels. 
 
 JoAQUiM Canuto Mendes de Almeida. 
 
 Carlos Maria Luna. 
 
 Joaquin Zaldivar. 
 
 Julio Cesar Vadora Rozier. 
 
 February 8, 1963. 
 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON 
 SECURITY ON THE WORK DONE DURING ITS FIRST 
 REGULAR MEETING 
 
 September 24 to October 18, 1963 
 
 I. Intboduction 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security, in accordance 
 with article 10 of the statutes approved by the Council of the Organi- 
 zation of American States on April 23, 1963, decided to hold its first 
 regular meeting at the headquarters of the Pan American Union 
 during the period from September 24 to October 18, 1963. 
 
 This first meeting was attended by the following members: Gen. 
 JuHo Cesar Doig Sdnchez, of Peru; Dr. Carlos Angulo Eueda, of 
 Colombia; Col. Carlos Maria Luna, of Argentina; Col. Rodolfo Her- 
 rera Pinto, of Costa Rica; Mr. Paul C. Daniels, of the United States; 
 and Lt. Col. Luis W. Cicalese Zignagho, of Uruguay. Lt. Col. 
 Joaquin Zaldivar, of El Salvador, was unable to attend. 
 
 At the first session, the Committee elected Gen. Julio Cesar Doig 
 Sdnchez as its Chairman and Dr. Carlos Angulo Rueda as Vice Chair- 
 man. 
 
 The principal work accomplished by the Committee during this 
 meeting was the following: 
 
 (1) It drew up and adopted its regulations, in accordance with 
 the provisions of article 14 of the statutes ; 
 
 (2) It began to prepare the general work program that it is 
 proposed to carry out at future regular meetings; and 
 
 (3) In the light of prior reports, especially the initial general 
 report, it made a brief analysis of the present situation in the 
 hemisphere in relation to the subversive activities of international 
 communism. 
 
 In the belief that it has a duty to report on its activities, the Com- 
 mittee has prepared this document in order to give an account of the 
 work done at the present meeting, and has requested the General 
 Secretariat to distribute it among the members of the Council of the 
 Organization of American States for their information. 
 
 II. Work Done Previously by the Committee 
 
 INITIAL general REPORT 
 
 Inasmuch as a year and a half has passed since the Special Consulta- 
 tive Committee on Security was installed, it is well to analyze briefly 
 the activities carried out, in order to draw some conclusions with 
 respect to progress made in the fight against the action of international 
 communism in the Americas. 
 
 In the period from April 2 to 30, 1962, the Committee held its first 
 meeting in order to prepare the initial general report referred to in 
 
 69 
 
70 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 paragraph 2(c) of Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation. 
 That report was submitted to the Council of the Organization on 
 April 30, 1962. 
 
 The said report included a short statement on the international 
 Communist movement and its incidence in the American Hemisphere, 
 an analysis of deceit as the basis of the objectives and methods of 
 communism and some recomanendations of a general nature. 
 
 On that occasion, after analyzing the measures agreed upon in the 
 inter- American system from 1948 up to the date of the report, the 
 Committee stated that it "has not considered it necessary, in this 
 initial stage of its work, to examine the measures intended to counter- 
 act subversive activities. It considers that, at least for the moment, 
 it has the vast experience acquired through the measures adopted 
 during World War II. However, the Committee does consider it 
 desirable — and an unavoidable duty — owing to the nature and scope 
 of its terms of reference, to point out to the Council of the Organiza- 
 tion the urgent need for each and every one of the American govern- 
 ments to give the greatest possible application to the measures that 
 have been adopted since 1948 by the Inter-American Conferences and 
 Meetings of Consultation." 
 
 In relation to subversive activities, it referred to : 
 
 {a) The Bogota Conference (1948), at which the American republics 
 resolved : 
 
 3. To adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance with their 
 respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary to eradicate and 
 prevent activities, directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign governments, 
 organizations, or i'ndividuals tending to overthrow their institutions by violence, 
 to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of 
 pressure, subversive propaganda, threats, or by any other means, the free and 
 sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their 
 democratic aspirations. 
 
 4. To proceed with a full exchange of information concerning any of the afore- 
 mentioned activities that are carried on within their respective jurisdictions. 
 
 (6) The fourth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
 Affairs (Washington, D.C., 1951), convoked specifically because 
 "the growing threat of international Communist aggression has 
 demonstrated the urgent necessity, that the free nations of the world 
 determine the most effective methods for preserving their freedom and 
 independence," where it was decided: 
 
 1. To recommend to the Governments of the American States: 
 
 (a) That, mindful of their unity of purpose and taking account 
 of the contents of Resolution VI of the second meeting of consulta- 
 tion in Havana and Resolution XXXII of the Ninth International 
 Conference of American States in Bogota, each American Repub- 
 lic examine its respective laws and regulations and adopt such 
 changes as it may consider necessary to assure that the subversive 
 activities of the agents of international communism, directed 
 against any of them, may be adequately prevented and punished; 
 
 (b) That, in accordance with their respective constitutional 
 provisions, they enact measures necessary to regulate in the 
 countries of America transit across international boundaries of 
 those foreigners who there is reason to expect will attempt to 
 carry out subversive acts against the defense of the American 
 Continent; and 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMXJNIST SUBVERSION 71 
 
 (c) That, in the application of this resokition, they bear in 
 mind the necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most 
 efficacious means the rights of the human person as well as their 
 firm determination to preserve and defend the basic democratic 
 institutions of the peoples of the American Republics, 
 (c) The 10th Inter- American Conference (Caracas, 1954) which 
 insisted on the need to adopt and carry out measures to counteract the 
 subversive activities of the international Communist movement, 
 recommending that the American governments, without prejudice to 
 such other measures as they might consider desuable, give special 
 attention to the following steps for the purpose of counteracting such 
 activities within their respective jurisdictions: 
 
 1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, and 
 sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the inter- 
 national Communist movement or who travel in the interests of that 
 movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf. 
 
 (2)_ The exchange of information among governments to assist in 
 fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter- American 
 Conferences and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding 
 international communism. 
 
 After listing the resolutions and agreements referred to and recom- 
 mending their applications, the Committee stated the following: 
 
 9. Along the same line of thought, the Committee would also like to recommend 
 that, in adopting and applying internal measures, the governments act with the 
 necessary vigor which is required to combat subversive action. In making this 
 recommendation, the Committee has kept in mind especially two fundamental 
 considerations: the first is that the agents of international communism, as the 
 fourth meeting of consultation stated, are attempting to destroy the democratic 
 institutions, "utilizing for this purpose the exploitation and the abuse of these 
 self-same democratic liberties"; and, secondly, that the measures adopted by the 
 competent authorities to counteract the subversive action, whatever its nature and 
 scope, are not by any means inconsistent with the internal and international 
 obligation of the state to respect human rights and fundamental liberties. 
 
 10. In connection with this second consideration, the Committee wishes to add 
 that the subversive action of international communism presupposes the perform- 
 ance of acts directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign powers or governments and 
 that therefore, they constitute grave acts against the public order and the security 
 of the state, especially when the, agent carrying out the subversive action is a 
 national or citizen of that state. Under the laws of all the countries of the world 
 and the mternational instruments governing the matter, the enjoyment of human 
 rights and fundamental liberties is subject to the limitations and restrictions that 
 the state is expressly authorized to impose for reasons of internal security or other 
 reasons that are considered vital to the welfare of the nation. It can be easily 
 understood, therefore, what a legal and political mistake it would be to tolerate 
 subversive activity or fail to combat it adequately, out of fear that human rights 
 and fundamental liberties would not be respected. 
 
 This initial general report was submitted to the governments of the 
 member states of the Organization, and communications were received 
 from the Governments of the United States and Argentina stressing 
 the importance of the report and the advantages of giving it wide 
 distribution. 
 
 The General Secretariat ordered the report to be published in 
 Spanish (50,000 copies), English (4,500 copies), and Portuguese 
 (10,000 copies), and distributed it throughout the member countries 
 of the Organization through the Pan American Union Offices. 
 
 Some of the recommendations contained in the initial general report 
 have already been carried out by some of the member countries of the 
 
 43-947—65—6 
 
72 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Organization, and this constitutes a step forward in the fight against 
 the subversive action of international communism. However, one of 
 the recommendations on which it is necessary to insist is that referring 
 to the exchange of information among the American countries. In 
 fact, this exchange is of vital importance in the struggle in which these 
 countries are engaged, since no matter how great the individual 
 efforts being exerted, they will not have the desired effect unless there 
 is the necessary coordination and cooperation in carrying out the 
 measures that are adopted. 
 
 EEPOET PEEPAEED AT THE EEQUEST OP THE GOVEENMENT OP THE 
 
 DOMINICAN EEPUBLIC 
 
 On July 31, 1962, the Government of the Dominican Kepublic 
 informed the Council of the Organization about the existence of a 
 situation in which it was sought to subvert order in the Dominican 
 Repubhc through a typical action of international communism, and 
 denounced the campaign of propaganda, directives, and watchwords 
 being carried out for this purpose by the present Government of Cuba 
 over radio broadcasting stations operating in Cuban territory. The 
 Dominican Government also requested the Special Consultative 
 Committee on Security to provide such advisory services as might be 
 necessary under the circumstances. 
 
 In response to this request from the Dominican Government, the 
 Committee met in Washington, D.C., on September 4, 1962, and on 
 the 28th of that month presented its report on the matter to the 
 Government of the Dominican Republic. According to paragraph 2b 
 of Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers 
 of Foreign Affairs, the aforementioned report may not be distributed 
 without the express authorization of the Government of the Domin- 
 ican Republic. 
 
 STUDY PRESENTED ON PEBRUARY 8, 1963 
 
 This work was prepared at the request of the Special Committee To 
 Study Resolutions II. 1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation 
 of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to which the Council of the Organiza- 
 tion entrusted "an urgent study of the transfer of funds to the 
 American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive 
 propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in 
 subversive techniques, presenting to the Council the pertinent reports 
 and recommendations." The Council agreed also that "in carrying 
 out this task the Committee could make use of the advice of the 
 Special Consultative Committee on Security. * * *" 
 
 Availing itself of this authorization, the first-mentioned Committee, 
 in a note dated November 1, 1962, requested from the Special Con- 
 sultative Committee on Security "technical advice in carrying out 
 its study of the three aspects set forth above." 
 
 The Security Committee met at the headquarters of the Pan 
 American Union beginning on January 7 and presented the study 
 requested on February 8, 1963. In the introduction to this study, 
 the Committee stated the following: 
 
 The specific recommendations the Committee suggests in this study do not 
 refer to any particular country. They include the adoption of certain measures 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 73 
 
 that, in the abstract and without prejudice to other measures that may be better 
 adapted to circumstances within each country, are considered technically neces- 
 sary to counteract, at least in part, the subversive activity that international 
 communism is carrying out in the Western Hemisphere, especially through Cuba. 
 
 In addition, chapter V contained the general recommendations, 
 which the Committee considers it of interest to transcribe, as follows : 
 
 1. To repeat in full the recommendations contained in its initial general report 
 of April 30, 1962. In this respect, the Committee considers it advisable that the 
 Council of the Organization of American States, pursuant to Resolution II. 1 of 
 the eighth meeting of consultation, urge the governments of the member states 
 to implement the recommendations that have been adopted repeatedly since 1948 
 at the different inter- American conferences and meetings of consultation; and, in 
 accordance with their constitutional precepts, to bring up to date and supplement 
 their legislation so as to make the various recommendations set forth in the pre- 
 ceding chapters of this study applicable, provided they are adopted. 
 
 2. That the American governments be asked to devote particular attention to 
 their intelligence services, creating or improving them, in order that they may have 
 the means that will enable them to plan, coordinate, and carry out effective action 
 against Communist subversion; and, likewise, to organize, equip, and train their 
 security forces so that they may be in proper condition to repress the subversive 
 activities of international communism. 
 
 3. Along the same lines, and in order to establish real and effective collaboration 
 among the services or organizations in charge of action against Communist sub- 
 version in the different American countries, it is considered advisable to recom- 
 mend that a specialized conference be held that will be attended by the heads of 
 the security and intelligence services or organizations. The Special Consultative 
 Committee on Security could at the proper time prepare the draft agenda for such 
 meeting. 
 
 4. That the American governments be urged to provide the Special Consulta- 
 tive Committee on Security with all the information on subversive acts that take 
 place in their respective countries, in order that the Committee may give appro- 
 priate and timely advice when it is so requested. 
 
 On the basis of this document the Special Committee to Study 
 Kesolutions II. 1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of 
 Ministers of Foreign Affairs prepared its report of June 4, 1963, and 
 submitted it to the CouncU of the Organization. 
 
 The study prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on 
 Security received special consideration in the U.S. Senate, whose 
 Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
 Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws published it, recom- 
 mending it as an important reference document for the Members of 
 Congress and all others interested in the Communist threat to the 
 United States through the Caribbean area. 
 
 The recommendations contained in this study were considered by 
 the Ministers of Government, Security, and Interior of Central 
 America, Panama, and the United States when they met in Managua, 
 Nicaragua, April 3 and 4, 1963, and several of them were included 
 among the resolutions they approved. Likewise, the governments 
 of other member states of the Organization have adopted measures 
 aimed at controlling the movement of Communist propaganda, of 
 agents of international communism, and of persons traveling to Cuba 
 to receive training in the techniques of subversion. 
 
 The Committee repeats that for the greater success of the measures 
 that are adopted it is essential that there be proper coordination and 
 exchange of ideas regarding them. For this reason it will insist later 
 upon the need for holding a specialized conference of the heads of the 
 security and intelligence services or organizations of the member 
 states of the Organization. 
 
74 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMITNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 III. Communist Activities in the Western Hemisphere 
 
 A. GENERAL PANORAMA 
 
 1. Present situation 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security is of the opinion 
 that, since the date of its last report (February 8, 1963), the sub- 
 versive activities of international communism in the American states 
 have continued to such an alarming degree that measures must be 
 taken immediately to end this danger to the peace and security of 
 the hemisphere. 
 
 2. Principal manifestations 
 
 The present line of conduct being followed by the Communists in 
 carrying out their strategic plan for achieving their ultimate objectives 
 primarily takes the form of — 
 
 (a) Subversive acti^nties (agitation, strikes, guerrilla warfare, 
 et cetera), which in some countries have reached the point of 
 open insurrection; 
 
 (6) Acts of sabotage and systematic terrorism, carried out by 
 small, but perfectly trained and equipped groups, following pre- 
 established plans and intended to create a climate conduce to 
 general insurrection; 
 
 (c) Infiltration into governmental spheres, including the armed 
 forces, which endangers institutional stability itself; 
 
 {d) Penetration into information agencies and media (press, 
 radio, and television) with personnel especially trained in Com- 
 munist propaganda; and 
 
 (e) Growing participation in the educational field, particularly 
 at the university level, seeking, among other things, to create a 
 rapprochement between professional people, students, and work- 
 ers, not for purposes of trade union improvement but only to 
 develop their own subversive activities. 
 The following sections will deal with the matters mentioned in 
 paragraphs (c), id), and (e), since they are considered to be of most 
 current significance. 
 
 3. Infiltration into governmental spheres 
 
 Communist infiltration into governmental spheres, particularly 
 in public administration or civil service, has increased considerably 
 of late. In some American countries such infiltration is made easier 
 by laws governing the hiring, tenure in office, and job security of the 
 employee. These laws, whose purpose is to protect competent and 
 honest employees, should be of such nature as to preclude that under 
 their protection Communist elements infiltrate and maintain them- 
 selves in office, thereby making a mockery of the purpose of these 
 laws and threatening the very democratic essence of the state. 
 
 It should also be pointed out that in some cases this infiltration 
 has even affected the armed forces, and its consequences have threat- 
 ened the very stability of the established government. 
 
 J).. Information media 
 
 Another manifestation of the activities of Soviet imperialism that 
 the Special Consultative Committee on Security feels it should 
 mention is the use of important organs of the press, through Com- 
 munist agents and puppet writers, to express Communist ideas. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 75 
 
 Needless to say, freedom of the press is a basic principle in demo- 
 cratic countries. In defense of that principle, then, it is important 
 to point out that organs of the press must exercise strict vigilance to 
 make certain that this freedom is not used by communism for the 
 purpose of destroying it. 
 
 Similar observation and vigilance are recommended for the other 
 information media, since they are essential in the development of the 
 propaganda activity of Communist imperialism. 
 
 5. The problem in the universities 
 
 This aspect deserves special consideration, in view of the important 
 role of the university in preparing the leaders of a country. 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security believes that the 
 degree to which communism has infiltrated various university insti- 
 tutions in the American States is of the utmost seriousness. This is 
 being done mainly in the following ways: 
 
 By attempting to gain teaching and administrative control of 
 the universities; 
 
 By appointing Communist or pro-Communist professors for 
 activities connected with teaching; 
 
 By using university funds for Communist propaganda activi- 
 ties; 
 
 By organizing university federations, associations, or com- 
 mittees, fostered and directed by Communists, or by taking 
 advantage of existing ones; and 
 
 By promoting public functions, lectures, demonstrations, etc., 
 in support of Communist regimes and leaders and the ideas 
 advanced by them. 
 
 6. International communism and Castroism 
 
 Subversive acti^dties in the American Hemisphere are typical of 
 international communism, although in some instances it waves the 
 flag of the Castro regime in Cuba, presenting it as if it were a regional 
 or an American movement. Actually, Castroism is nothing more 
 than a collateral movement that obeys extracontinental instructions 
 and directives and is used principally for the purpose of confusing 
 public opinion. 
 
 By any concept. Castroism is a movement completely alien and 
 contrary to the values traditionally accepted by the peoples of the 
 Americas. Furthermore, its subversive activities are in flagrant 
 violation of the principle of nonintervention. In this connection, it is 
 of interest to quote the following statement made by Fidel Castro 
 last July 26: 
 
 We know by experience and by conviction that every people who do what the 
 Cuban people have done wiU have the decided support of the Soviet Union and 
 of all the Socialist camp. 
 
 In his turn the Minister of Industries, Ernesto Guevara, in a state- 
 ment to the press in Algeria on July 23 of this year, declared: 
 
 Cuba must assist the peoples of Latin America * * * their struggle for 
 liberation * * * and we are helping them with aU the means at our disposal. 
 
 At this moment one can say that there are two countries in Latin America 
 where the revolutionary fight has assumed a strength which already assures its 
 development toward a revolution which will take over power and which will bring 
 about great changes in the political and social structure of these countries: they 
 are Venezuela and Guatemala. A wall of sUence surrounds the activities of 
 
76 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Venezuelan and Guatemalan patriots but this does not change the fact that 
 they exist. In Guatemala there are four columns of guerrillas, two or three 
 different movements which are fighting together, and, despite the latest coup 
 d'etat, Government forces are not able to control the situation, and one can say 
 that things are going well. 
 
 7. "Coexistence" 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security believes that in the 
 fight against Communist activities throughout the hemisphere it is of 
 basic importance that the American people not allow themselves to be 
 deceived by the frequent use of the word "coexistence." 
 
 It repeats that in no case is it possible to accept "coexistence," 
 particularly so long as there persists a policy of intervention and 
 aggression on the part of Communist imperialism. It is evident that 
 at the same time the Soviet leaders speak of "coexistence," they are 
 actively pursuing their efforts to substitute Communist dictatorship 
 for the institutional order in our countries. Nor is it possible to 
 accept conformity with the philosophical and ideological principles of 
 communism, which are totally foreign to and incompatible with 
 American ideals. 
 
 In this connection, the Committee points to the tremendous danger 
 of accepting "coexistence" as though it represented a lessening of the 
 continuous efforts of communism to achieve world domination. 
 
 8. The Sino-Somet conMct 
 
 Recently the schism between Chinese and Soviet communism has 
 been publicly displayed and admitted by both parties. 
 
 It is too early to come to any conclusion regarding the influence of 
 this conflict upon the conduct and development of Communist 
 activities in the Americas. For the time being, what can be said is 
 that these activities are still largely inspired by Soviet imperialism and 
 are in the hands of leaders who obey its dictates. 
 
 This conflict is being used by some leaders fighting for power within 
 the party by seeking to displace the leaders of the other persuasion. 
 
 In any case, it is interesting to note that the conflict has not affected 
 the action of international communism in the Americas, since, as has 
 already been observed, its activities are incessant and become more 
 serious every day. 
 
 B. CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 In summary, it is necessary to stress the need — 
 
 (1) To keep close watch on the development of Communist 
 action in the universities and other educational centers. 
 
 (2) To pass suitable legislation for keeping Communists out 
 of Government agencies and the Armed Forces. 
 
 (3) To conduct a suitable information campaign on the 
 methods and techniques of deceit employed by Communist 
 propaganda, particularly in connection with its use of the pre- 
 tended example of the Castro revolution and of the terms "nation- 
 alism" and "coexistence." 
 
 (4) To seek the cooperation of information organs in the task 
 of combating and counteracting Communist propaganda. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 77 
 
 IV. General Conclusions 
 
 In the light of the facts and background information set forth in the 
 preceding sections of this report, the Special Consultative Committee 
 on Security wishes to express the following conclusions: 
 
 (a) The recommendations contained in its first report (April 30, 
 1962) and in the third report (February 8, 1963) should continue to be 
 considered by the American Governments. 
 
 (6) As an aid to improving antisubversive legislation, the Commit- 
 tee reiterates that, if possible, the General Secretariat should bring 
 up to date the publication entitled "Strengthening of Internal Se- 
 curity," published in 1953. 
 
 (c) It is stUl essential to coordinate the measures adopted or that 
 may be adopted in the various American countries to meet the sub- 
 versive activities of international communism. In this connection, 
 the Committee repeats that it would be advisable to hold a meeting 
 of chiefs of intelligence or security services, as mentioned in its report 
 of February 8, 1963. 
 
 (d) The activities of international communism in the Americas con- 
 tinue on an intensive scale and become increasingly violent and serious. 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security therefore believes 
 that, in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth in the 
 applicable inter-American instruments, the efforts to eliminate this 
 open and undisguised intervention by extracontinental powers in the 
 hemisphere should be continued and intensified. 
 
 October 18, 1963. 
 
 Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez, 
 
 Chairman of the Committee. 
 Carlos Angulo Rueda, 
 
 Vice Chairman of the Committee. 
 Luis W. Cicalese Zignagho. 
 Paul C. Daniels. 
 RoDOLFO Herrera Pinto. 
 Carlos Maria Luna. 
 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE 
 ON SECURITY ON THE WORK DONE DURING ITS THIRD 
 REGULAR MEETING 
 
 November 16 to December 11, 1964 
 
 I. Meeting 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security held its third 
 regular meeting from November 16 to December 11, 1964. 
 
 Since the Committee had accepted the kind invitation of the 
 Government of Costa Rica, it met initially in San Jos6 and remained 
 there until November 27, 1964. Subsequently, the Committee 
 traveled to its permanent headquarters at the Pan American Union 
 to continue its work. 
 
 II. Participants 
 
 The entire Committee, composed of the following members, at- 
 tended the meeting: 
 
 Carlos Angulo Rueda, Chairman. 
 
 Rodolfo Herrera Pinto, Vice Chairman. 
 
 Tomas Berenguel BiKgos. 
 
 Luis W. Cicalese Zignagho. 
 
 Paul C. Daniels. 
 
 Carlos Maria Luna. 
 
 Joaquin Zaldivar. 
 
 III. Activities 
 
 The following activities were carried out in accordance with the 
 work plan previously drawn up by the Committee : 
 
 Meeting with the chiefs of Central American security agencies ; 
 
 Study of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its influence on Com- 
 munist activities in the Americas; 
 
 Study of the desirability of strengthening inter-American co- 
 ordination aimed at the more effective control of Communist 
 activities in the Western Hemisphere; 
 
 Setting the date and preparing the draft agenda for the fourth 
 regular meeting; 
 
 Election of Chairman and Vice Chairman. 
 
 A. MEETING WITH THE CHIEFS OP CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY 
 
 AGENCIES 
 
 Since part of the third regular meeting was held in San Jose, Costa 
 Rica, the Committee was able to establish personal contact with some 
 of the chiefs of Central American security agencies. 
 
 The discussions were held in accordance with the following agenda: 
 Activities of international communism in each Central Ameri- 
 can country; 
 
 79 
 
80 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Measures of coordination taken by the Central American 
 countries and Panama and their effectiveness; _ _ 
 
 Influence of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Communist activity 
 in each country; , 
 
 Other problems related to communism presented by the cJiiels 
 
 of security agencies. •. j. + 
 
 The aforesaid discussions made it possible for the Committee to— 
 
 1. Confirm and extend the studies carried out previously m con- 
 nection with the matters under discussion. 
 
 2. Gain a more thorough and detailed knowledge of the naeasures 
 of coordination taken by the governments of Central America and 
 Panama to meet the threat of international communism, and of the 
 effectiveness of such measures. 
 
 In this respect, the Committee considers it appropriate to express its 
 satisfaction with the results obtained up to now in the region and, to 
 this effect, maintains the statement made in its report of June 18, 1964, 
 regarding the advisability that "this joint attitude of the Central 
 American countries and Panama should be imitated insofar as possible 
 by the other countries of the hemisphere." 
 
 3. Confirm the need for the American governments to have security 
 and intelligence services, especially trained in anti-Communist action, 
 which in the opinion of the Committee should be organized along the 
 
 following lines : , „ . . , n , -j j f 
 
 (a) Their organization and fuctioning should be provided tor 
 in specific and adequate legislation ; 
 
 (6) They should have sufficient status to enable them to act 
 with authority and promptness and, insofar as possible, under the 
 direct supervision of the chief of state; 
 
 (c) They should be at the exclusive service of the government, 
 and refrain from involvement in the party politics of the country; 
 
 (d) They should be staffed by specialized technical and non- 
 political personnel; and • i i. 
 
 (e) They should be organized, equipped, and provided with the 
 necessary means to develop their inherent activities, such as those 
 involving information, security, psychological action, intelligence, 
 planning, and coordination. , i- . i 
 
 To this effect, the Committee wishes to express its firm behel that, 
 in principle, effective cooperation and coordination between the 
 American countries in their fight against the activities of international 
 communism can be hoped for only on the basis of well organized 
 security services. 
 
 B. STUDY OF THE DESIRABILITY OP STRENGTHENING INTBR-AMBRICAN 
 COORDINATION AIMED AT THE MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OP COM- 
 MUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE AMERICAS 
 
 At various inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation 
 of ministers of foreign affairs, the American governments have ex- 
 pressed their intention to adopt joint measures to counteract the 
 activities of international communism. 
 
 The Committee considers that, up to the present time, these expres- 
 sions have been limited in scope and, in practice, have resulted only 
 in total or partial compliance by some governments with the recom- 
 mendations made in this regard. 
 
COMBUSTED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 81 
 
 Therefore, and in view of the increased activities of communism in 
 the hemisphere, the Committee considers that the time has come to 
 adopt or strengthen effective measures of coordination between all 
 the American countries, and has prepared a study with this purpose 
 in mind (app. I). 
 
 C. STUDY OF THE SINO-SOVlET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON 
 COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE AMERICAS 
 
 A great deal has been said and written about the apparent or real 
 causes of the aforesaid conflict, but very little on its effects, particu- 
 larly in reference to its influence on the activities of international 
 communism in the Americas. 
 
 The form of presentation of the dispute, which, briefly, consists in 
 the choice of means "to bury the free world" — whether through the 
 application of so-called "peaceful coexistence" on the part of Russia, or 
 through the "use of force" on the part of Communist China — may have 
 created a falsely optimistic concept of its consequences for the 
 Americas. 
 
 The influence that the Sino-Soviet conflict may have had, is having, 
 or may have on Communist subversive activities in the Americas has 
 been a constant source of concern to the Special Consultative Com- 
 mittee on Security. For this reason it was considered necessary and 
 opportune to make a study of the problem, which is attached hereto 
 as appendix II. 
 
 D. DATE AND AGENDA OF THE FOUKTH REGULAR MEETING 
 
 The Committee set May 3, 1965, as the tentative date for the 
 opening of its fourth regular meeting. 
 
 The following provisional agenda was drawn up:_ 
 
 1. Recent Communist subversive activities in the hemisphere. 
 
 2. Legislation in the American countries to limit or curb Com- 
 munist action. 
 
 3. Study of the causes for the development of communism in 
 the hemisphere. 
 
 4. Possibility of proposing amendments to the statutes of the 
 Committee in order to improve the performance of its function. 
 
 5. Practical results of the various studies and recommendations 
 made by the Committee since it was created. 
 
 E. ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN 
 
 At the final session, the Committee reelected Dr. Carlos Angulo 
 Rueda and Col. Rodolfo Herrera Pinto as Chairman and Vice Chair- 
 man, respectively. 
 
 Carlos Angulo Rueda, 
 
 Chairman oj the Committee. 
 RoDOLFO Herrera Pinto, 
 
 Vice Chairman of the Committee. 
 Luis W. Cicalese Zignagho. 
 Carlos Maria Luna. 
 ToMAS Berengubl Burgos. 
 Paul C. Daniels. 
 Joaquin Zaldivar. 
 
 December 11, 1964. 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 DESIRABILITY OF STRENGTHENING INTER-AMERICAN 
 COORDINATION AIMED AT THE MORE EFFECTIVE 
 CONTROL OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE 
 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 I. Object of the study. 
 
 II. International cooperation and coordination. 
 
 A. Means. 
 
 B. Methods. 
 
 III. The organization of American States and the Communist problem. 
 
 IV. The Organization of American States and cooperation among the member 
 
 states. 
 
 V. Conclusion. 
 
 Appendix: Resolution I of the ninth meeting of consultation of Ministers of 
 Foreign Affairs, "Application of Measures to the Present Government of 
 Cuba." 
 
 I. Object op the Study 
 
 At the ninth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
 held in July 1964, important decisions were made in connection with 
 the request by the Government of Venezuela that, in accordance with 
 the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the organ of 
 consultation considered measures that should be taken to deal with 
 acts of intervention and aggression on the part of the Government of 
 Cuba against the Republic of Venezuela. 
 
 In brief, the aforesaid meeting adopted a series of measures tending 
 to isolate the Cuban regime in order to nullify or attenuate its in- 
 fluence as a center for the dissemination of communism in the hemi- 
 sphere (appendix) . These resolutions brought to completion another 
 stage in the defensive action of the American countries against the 
 subversive activities of the present Cuban regime. Nevertheless, 
 the Communist danger having been fully recognized by the American 
 nations, it should be understood that self-defense action against 
 subversion — whether it emanates from Cuba, Moscow, or Peiping — 
 does not end with the measures taken up to now, and that it is neces- 
 sary to continue in permanent capability to fight against international 
 communism. 
 
 Each American country, aware of the need to defend itself, has 
 adopted a series of measures ranging from the creation or improvement 
 of intelligence and security agencies to the passing of laws to counteract 
 or nullify Communist activity. 
 
 It is important for the purposes of this study to recall that com- 
 munism, owing to its international character, does not act in an 
 isolated manner in each country, but involves a network, regulated 
 and conducted from a central point, which is revealed through connec- 
 tions that go beyond national boundaries. Consequently, any action 
 taken locally by the governments against Communist subversion 
 
 83 
 
84 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMllDNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 cannot be made more effective until there is close collaboration and 
 cooperation among them. 
 
 It is of interest to note that in an attempt to protect themselves 
 against the activities of organized crime, the various American 
 countries cooperate with the International Pohce organization, 
 "Interpol," created to combat such activities. However, in the fight 
 against communism — whose subversive activity is equally or more 
 dangerous— the American countries have not yet adopted a coordi- 
 nated action, even though their respective governments have recog- 
 nized, since the Ninth International Conference of American States 
 (1948), that communism represents a danger to the hemisphere and 
 that measures must be taken to counteract it. 
 
 Since the need for such measures of cooperation and coordination 
 has been determined, the purpose of this study is to analyze the means 
 and methods that could be used to implement them, as weU as the 
 role the Organization of American States should play in achieving this 
 goal. 
 
 II. International Cooperation and Coordination 
 
 A. MEANS 
 
 When the various governments wish to coordinate any given mutual 
 activity of an economic, cultural, military, or other nature, they 
 usually avail themselves of the national agencies that are responsible 
 for the development of such an activity. In the fight against inter- 
 national communism, the specific agencies are the security and 
 intelligence services, which are generally regulated and coordinated 
 by a central organ in charge of the overall action. Consequently, it 
 is logical that these are the agencies that should cooperate with one 
 another at an international level. 
 
 Unfortunately, these specialized agencies have not yet been created 
 in some countries, wMle in others their structure and operation are 
 deficient, thereby hampering seriously effective coordination among 
 states. 
 
 B. METHODS 
 
 Some of the methods for achieving international cooperation in 
 anti-Communist action are the following: bilateral, multilateral, and 
 overall coordination. 
 
 Bilateral cooperation consists of agreement by two countries to 
 approach Communist activities jointly. This is the simplest method 
 and it can be the first step toward agreements of wider scope. 
 
 The multilateral method presupposes the concurrence of three or 
 more countries that, like the above, succeed in coordinating their 
 efforts for the same ends. _ As a rule, this method is feasible because 
 of the special characteristics that are common to the countries in- 
 volved, and it can in practice be regional. It should be noted in 
 this respect that although communism is a common enemy of the 
 hemisphere, its tactics vary from one country to another and from 
 one region to another, according to the various socioeconomic factors. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the multilateral method is better 
 adapted than the bilateral for counteracting Communist activities, 
 since action on a broader scope results from coordinating the individual 
 efforts of a larger number of countries. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 85 
 
 An example of its application is furnished in the case of the countries 
 of the Central American isthmus, which were forced by the direct 
 threat of Castro communism to coordinate their efforts in order to 
 meet it promptly and appropriately. 
 
 The overall method assumes the participation of all the countries 
 affected by the same problem, and iu the case of the Americas this 
 includes all the countries of the hemisphere. Generally, when this 
 method is adopted it is advisable, in view of the number of entities 
 that must be coordinated, to centralize the functions of the system 
 under the direction of one organ that coordinates the technical and 
 specialized services of each country. 
 
 In order to have a better understanding of the importance of this 
 procedure, it should be remembered that communism succeeds in the 
 world because, among other reasons, it is based on a centralized 
 action, its strategy and tactics resulting from decisions taken at 
 various congresses, meetings, and conferences that give rise to the 
 directives that channel its activities. 
 
 An enemy that conducts itself in this manner can only be effectively 
 combated by a coordinated front, in an overall manner, ranging from 
 an exchange of information to planned joint action. Such a front 
 has not yet been presented in the Americas owing to several factors, 
 among which mention can be made of the countries' zeal for their 
 autonomy and their natural nationalistic sentiment. 
 
 At the present time action against the Communist danger cannot 
 be delayed, and it is therefore necessary for the American countries 
 to confront it and, as they have done in the case of socioeconomic 
 and cultural problems, create the technical organ that is capable of 
 providing overall coordination to anti-Communist action in the 
 hemisphere. 
 
 III. The Organization of American States and the Communist 
 
 Problem 
 
 The Organization of American States was created as the expression 
 of a feehng of continental solidarity, in the understanding that the 
 welfare of all the countries, as well as their contribution to the progress 
 and the civilization of the world, would increasingly require "intensive 
 continental cooperation" in order, as the Charter of the Organization 
 states, "* * * to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their 
 sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence." 
 
 Within those basic principles and with a view to facing the fight 
 against communism, the Organization of American States has de- 
 veloped an action that was first determined at the Ninth International 
 Conference of American States (Bogota, 1948). That Conference 
 declared "That, by its antidemocratic nature and its interventionist 
 tendency, the political activity of international communism * * * ig 
 incompatible with the concept of American freedom * * * ." 
 
 The 10th Inter-American Conference (Caracas, 1954), in Resolu- 
 tion XCIII, condemned the activities of the international Communist 
 movement as constituting intervention in American affairs and, 
 among other things, recommended "the exchange of information 
 among governments to assist in fulfiUing the purpose of the resolutions 
 adopted by the inter-American conferences and meetings of ministers 
 of foreign affairs regarding international communism." 
 
86 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Some years later, in August 1960, at the seventh meeting of con- 
 sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the delegation of Argentina 
 presented a draft resolution that contained the following request : 
 
 To convoke, through the Council of the Organization of American States and 
 within a period of 90 days, a specialized conference of plenipotentiaries for the 
 purpose of drafting and signing a treaty that would determine — 
 
 (a) the rights and duties of states participating in the struggle against 
 communism; and 
 
 (6) the methods best suited for the prevention and eradication of the 
 Communist movement in the hemisphere, creating, if it should be deemed 
 necessary, an inter- American speciaHzed organization. 
 
 By the terms of Kesolution VI of that meeting, the above draft 
 resolution was transmitted to the Council of the Organization of 
 American States; however, no measures have been taken up to now 
 in this respect. 
 
 In January 1962, the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers 
 of Foreign Affairs, in Resolution II, agreed upon the following: 
 
 1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain 
 all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, 
 subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, 
 resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, 
 and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with 
 regard thereto. 
 
 2. To direct the Council of the Organization to establish a Special Consultative 
 Committee on Security, composed of experts on security matters, for the purpose 
 of advising the member states that may desire and request such assistance * * *_ 
 
 In short, the American countries expressed their concern over the 
 Communist problem by directing the Council of the Organization of 
 American States to create a technical organ — the Special Consultative 
 Committee on Security; however, they limited its functions to pro- 
 viding_ advisory services to the member states or to the Council of the 
 Organization, and only at their request. 
 
 Subsequently, a Special Committee To Study Eesolutions II. 1 and 
 VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
 Affairs was set up and entrusted by the Council of the Organization of 
 American States with a study of the transfer of funds to the American 
 Republics for subversive pm-poses, the flow of subversive propaganda, 
 and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in techniques of 
 subversion. That Committee, in collaboration with the Special 
 Consultative Committee on Security, prepared the required study 
 (Doc. OEA/SerG/IV/C-i-605, Rev. 3), which was sent to the various 
 American governments by the Council of the Organization. 
 
 In reference to this study, it is important to stress the following 
 conclusions contained in recommendation 6 : 
 
 To urge the governments of the member states in accordance with the provisions 
 of paragraph 2 of the declaratory part of Resolution VI of the eighth meeting of 
 consultation, to provide information on Communist subversive activities on a 
 continuing basis, in order that the Council of the Organization may effectively 
 discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it in Resolution II. 1, of the same 
 meeting of consulation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 It is important to point out that, up to the present, the aforesaid 
 recommendation has not been properly carried out. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 87 
 
 IV. The Organization of American States and Cooperation 
 Among the Member States 
 
 The present status of cooperation among the American States in 
 their fight against international communism is as follows: 
 
 1. The Organization of American States, at various inter- 
 American conferences and meetings of consultation of Ministers 
 of Foreign Affairs, has repeatedly made recommendations regard- 
 ing the need for an exchange of information among the govern- 
 ments, as well as the need for them to furnish such information 
 to the Council of the Organization. 
 
 2. There is some cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, 
 among certain governments. 
 
 3. It is desirable that such cooperation be extended to include 
 aU of the American countries. 
 
 4. Certain obstacles have been present, and still exist, to pre- 
 vent a greater measure of cooperation up to now; but it is be- 
 lieved that these can be overcome by setting up a system for 
 cooperation and coordination within the institutional framework 
 of the Organization of American States. 
 
 5. The proper organizations in the various countries for estab- 
 lishing the necessary cooperation are the security and intelli- 
 gence agencies specializing in anti-Communist action. 
 
 In the preceding chapter we have noted the principal efforts made 
 by the Organization of American States in the fight against inter- 
 national communism. The question arises as to whether the OAS 
 has yet done all that it can at the level of international cooperation 
 or whether it still should continue its efforts toward this end. The 
 Committee beUeves that the Organization could do much more to 
 achieve this goal. 
 
 In fact, up to the present its efforts have been directed only toward 
 encouraging cooperation among the American countries, as it has 
 stated on a number of occasions. It is now up to the Organization 
 of American States to direct the action that will permit the realiza- 
 tion, on the widest possible scale, of this necessary goal. 
 
 The Special Consultative Committee on Security has constantly 
 borne in mind the advisability of holding a meeting of the heads of 
 security and intelligence agencies specializing in anti-Communist action, 
 under the auspices of the Organization of American States, in order 
 to establish the basis for real and effective collaboration and coopera- 
 tion among the said states. Analyzing the problem again in the light 
 of recent manifestations of communism, and being familiar with the 
 organization and operations of certain intelligence services, the Com- 
 mittee now believes that it would be highly advisable to call, at the 
 earliest possible date, a meeting at the ministerial level, in order to 
 establish the basis for obtaining the required cooperation and to 
 insure that the measures adopted in each country are fully effective. 
 
 V. Conclusion 
 
 In view of the foregoing, the Special Consultative Committee on 
 Security considers it a duty to make known to the Organization of 
 American States that it would be advisable to convoke a specialized 
 inter-American conference at the ministerial level, through the proper 
 
 43-947—65 7 
 
88 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 organ and as soon as possible, for the purpose of establishing the most 
 appropriate methods for increasing cooperation among the American 
 countries in their struggle against the international Communist 
 movement and, if it is deemed necessary, creating a specialized inter- 
 American organization responsible for the coordination of the individ- 
 ual action carried out by the various governments. 
 
 Application of Measures to the Present Government of Cuba 
 
 The ninth meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs, serving as 
 organ of consultation in application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
 Assistance. 
 
 Having seen the report of the investigating committee designated on December 
 3, 1963, by the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally 
 as organ of consultation, and 
 
 Considering: 
 
 That the said report establishes among its conclusions that "the Republic of 
 Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the 
 Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to 
 overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, 
 assault, and guerrilla warfare," and 
 
 That the aforementioned acts, like all acts of intervention and aggression, con- 
 flict with the principles and aims of the Inter-American system. 
 
 Resolves: 
 
 1. To declare that the acts verified by the investigatiing committee constitute 
 an aggression and an intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba in the 
 internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of the member states. 
 
 2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of Cuba for its acts of 
 aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, 
 and the political independence of Venezuela. 
 
 3. To apply, in accordance with the provisions of articles 6 and 8 of the Inter- 
 American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures: 
 
 (a) That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic 
 or consular relations with the Government of Cuba; 
 
 (6) That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, 
 whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and 
 medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and 
 
 (c) That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transpor- 
 tation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as 
 may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature. 
 
 4. To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States, by an 
 affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted 
 in the present resolution at such time as the Government of Cuba shall have 
 ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere. 
 
 5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out 
 acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or 
 more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve 
 their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individ- 
 ual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such 
 time as the organ of consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and 
 security of the hemisphere. 
 
 6. To urge those states not members of the Organization of American States 
 that are animated by the same ideals as the inter-American system to examine 
 the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the pur- 
 poses of this resolution. 
 
 7. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to 
 transmit to the United Nations Security Council the text of the present resolution, 
 in accordance with the provisions of article 54 of the United Nations Charter. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 89 
 
 APPENDIX II 
 
 THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON 
 COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE AMERICAS 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 I. Object of the study. 
 II. Summary of background facts. 
 
 III. The Chinese Communists in America. 
 
 A. Their general activities. 
 
 B. Influence of the conflict on certain Communist Parties in the 
 
 Americas. 
 
 C. Considerations. 
 
 IV. Reflections on the effect of the conflict on international Communist activities, 
 
 particularly subversive activities. 
 V. General conclusion. 
 
 I. Object of the Study 
 
 For several years there has been worldwide interest in the Sino- 
 Soviet conflict, but in recent months that interest has increased owing 
 to the intensity that has characterized the dispute, which reached its 
 climax with the events in Soviet Eussia that put an end to the 
 "Khrushchev Era." 
 
 The development of the conflict, which has been commented on 
 fully in various publications, has created a climate of optimism in 
 certain parts of the West, including the Americas, that is promoting 
 the advance of communism. 
 
 Most assuredly, recent events in Russia can have a great effect on 
 the future development of the conflict. However, at this time, the 
 situation is at an impasse, which it is deemed will not soon be over- 
 come owing to the intensity of the conflict and the need of the Soviet 
 Government now in power to consoHdate its position both at home 
 and in its relations with the Communist Parties of other countries. 
 It is natural to think that so long as the impasse exists, the activities 
 of the groups in both camps wiU continue in all their intensity, inas- 
 much as each one will want to establish itself on a more solid base 
 awaiting the time when the impasse is broken. 
 
 In view of this situation, it has been considered desirable and 
 opportune to study the influence the conflict is having on the activities 
 of international communism in the Americas, particularly Latin 
 Arnerica, owing to the special characteristics of the countries of that 
 region. 
 
 Therefore, the Special Consultative Committee on Secm-ity wishes 
 to call attention to the problem, to point out its possible consequences, 
 and hopes that this paper will serve as a basis for the continuing study 
 of the efl'ects and manifestations of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 
 Americas. 
 
 II. SUMMAKY OF BACKGROUND FaCTS 
 
 It would take too long to enumerate the factors that have helped 
 cause the Sino-Soviet conflict to materialize. However it would be 
 well to mention that from the beginning, its origin has been especially 
 economic, historical, and racial. It is not the purpose of this paper 
 to list the various aspects that have caused its present form nor to 
 indicate what its future development will be, since the real and positive 
 fact is that the conflict does exist. 
 
90 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 The dispute is expressed chiefly in what appear to be ideological 
 terms and is focused on difl^erences in the methods that should be used 
 to impose communism on others. Basically, however, it involves 
 matters of greater importance within the international Communist 
 movement. These matters involve, in particular, the alleged right 
 of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to maintain its hegemony 
 over the Communist Parties of the world, intervene in their internal 
 affairs, and exercise control of those parties in order to impose its 
 decisions on the congresses and meetings of international communism 
 and obtain ex post facto approval by the other parties of actions 
 taken unilaterally by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
 
 With reference to the methods of subversion, a topic that is spe- 
 cifically within the Committee's terms of reference, Russia recognizes 
 that violent revolutions may be inevitable in certain situations, but 
 at the same time it maintains that the revolutionary objectives may 
 be achieved at less cost and with less risk if other tactics are used. 
 To that end, it is skillfully exploiting so-called peaceful coexistence, 
 along with constant agitation and infiltration in all spheres of activ- 
 ity of each country, as well as making constant efforts to strengthen 
 the ranks of the Communist Parties and their effectiveness. 
 
 This does not by any means prevent the Soviet Union from carry- 
 ing out its own clandestine campaign of violence in many countries 
 to supplement the subversive activity being carried on by the "local" 
 Communists in those countries. 
 
 For its part, China maintains that violence is the most effective, 
 immediate procedure for establishing communism in the world, and, 
 consequently, it urges the application of all the tactics of Communist 
 struggle in accordance with that principle. 
 
 The specific criticism that Communist China aims at the policy 
 of the Soviet Union may be summed up in two accusations: 
 
 (a) "Soviet flexibility" will, in the long run, deprive the Com- 
 munists of the trust and determination needed for an effective 
 revolutionary work; and 
 
 (b) Soviet policy oscillates dangerously and erratically between 
 risky maneuvers and shameful withdrawals before the determi- 
 nation of the West. 
 
 In this connection and as far as any speculation about the future 
 is concerned, we should bear in mind one of the thoughts expressed 
 by President John F. Kennedy, in referring to the dispute between 
 China and the Soviet Union, when he stated as follows: 
 
 What comfort can we take from the increasing strains and tensions within the 
 Communist bloc? Here hope must be tempered with caution. For the Soviet- 
 Chinese disagreement is over means, not ends. A dispute over how to bury the 
 West is no grounds for Western rejoicing. 
 
 III. The Chinese Communists in America 
 
 A. THEIR GENERAL ACTIVITIES 
 
 In recent years, the Chinese Communists have been intensifying 
 their independent operations in Latin America, gradually eliminating 
 or replacing those efforts that had been initiated in cooperation with 
 Moscow. 
 
 Their activity is characterized chiefly by an intensive propaganda, 
 political, and subversive nature, which also tends to weaken the posi- 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 91 
 
 tion of Moscow within the Communist Parties and other leftist circles 
 of Latm America. For that purpose, in May 1960, China set up the 
 Sino-Latm American Cultural & Friendship Association in Peiping, 
 which IS also used by the Castro movement to carry out its own sub- 
 versive program in the Americas. The New China News Agency and 
 the pro-Chinese persons who make up the international front organi- 
 zations supplement its action. 
 
 Beginning in 1963, the activity of the Chinese Communists in- 
 creased, and it IS worth noting that in December 1963, the assistant 
 director of the department of propaganda of the central committee of 
 the Communist Party declared that Latin America was one of the 
 places in the world where poUtical parties that truly represent the 
 proletariat wUl necessarily arise. The pro-Chinese Communist 
 groups were therefore urged to seize the leadership of their various 
 parties. 
 
 Parallel with that activity, economic support was given those groups, 
 and an intensive campaign was begun to strengthen cultural ties, 
 characterized by trips by Communist elements and Chinese sympa- 
 thizers to Peiping. In this connection, invitations for "cultural" 
 purposes were issued to parliamentarians, poUticians, newspapermen, 
 writers, artists, labor leaders and students, and, at the same time, 
 their program of sending thek own "cultural" missions to various 
 Latin American countries was intensified. This Chinese Communist 
 penetration program was especially well received by the Communist 
 and intellectual youth groups. 
 
 In their efforts to penetrate these countries, the Chinese Com- 
 munists have used these sympathizers and with their help have 
 established and developed a number of "binational" organizations. 
 Up to the present, the following are known: 
 
 Argentina: Sociedad Cultural Chino-Argentina (Chinese-Argentine 
 Cultural Society) . 
 
 Bolivia: Centre de Amistad Boliviano-Chino-Sovietico (Sino- 
 Soviet Bolivian Friendship Center) . 
 
 Brazil: Sociedad Cultural Chino-BrasUena (Chinese-Brazilian Cul- 
 tural Society) . 
 
 Colombia: Asociacion de Amigos de China Popular (Association 
 of Friends of the People's Kepublic of China) . 
 
 Chile: Institute Chileno-Chino de Cultura (Chinese-Chilean Cul- 
 tural Institute). 
 
 Mexico: Sociedad de Amistad con China Popular (Society for 
 Friendship With the People's Eepublic of China). 
 
 Peru: Asociacion de Amigos de China Popular (Association of 
 Friends of the People's Eepublic of China). 
 
 Uruguay: Sociedad para la Amistad y el Intercambio con China 
 Popular (Society for Friendship and Trade with the People's Republic 
 of China). 
 
 Venezuela: Sociedad de Amistad Chino-Venezolana (Chinese- 
 Venezuelan Friendship Society). 
 
 The above list, which covers only the period since Communist 
 China began giving added impetus to its relations with Latin America, 
 clearly shows the intensity of its efforts at penetration. However, in 
 some cases, the above-mentioned organizations are actually dominated 
 by Communists and other leftist elements sympathizers of Moscow. 
 
92 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 It should be pointed out that in 1963-64, Communist China has 
 made progress in its efforts to increase trade with various countries. 
 It has held trade fairs in several of them, and has set up commercial 
 representatives in others. In this way it has even succeeded in 
 establishing official relations with Latin American countries. 
 
 B. INFLUENCE OF THE CONFLICT ON CERTAIN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 
 
 THE AMERICAS 
 
 ^Argentina 
 
 With respect to the conflict existing between the Soviet Union and 
 the People's Republic of China, the Argentine Communist Party 
 ofBcially announced that it favored the policy supported and upheld 
 by the Soviet Union, through its Secretary General Victorio Codovilla, 
 and outlined its position in the leaflet entitled "Open Letter From the 
 Argentine Communist Party Regarding the Sino-Soviet Ideological 
 Conflict." 
 
 Among the considerations given in favor of "world Communist" 
 leadership by Russia, the following are deemed important: 
 
 The "Chinese comrades uphold positions that have nothing to do 
 with Marxism-Leninism." 
 
 Russia has established its "pro-peace, peaceful coexistence, and 
 disarmament" policies throughout the world. 
 
 The Argentine Communist Party is completely in agreement with 
 the statements of the Communist workers parties in 1957 and 1960 
 and the documents of the XX, XXI, and XXII Congresses of the 
 Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
 
 However, this pronouncement did not have the unanimous support 
 of all Communist elements. Therefore, the party is now attempting 
 to find a solution to the problem which, while not serious, is already 
 causing divisions that are making party unity difficult. 
 
 The Argentine Communist Party has accused the People's Republic 
 of China of conduct and attitude "that are inadmissible owing to its 
 interference in the affairs of the sister Communist Parties." 
 
 Support for the position of Communist China has grown within the 
 Argentine Communist Party and, even though its sympathizers are 
 not numerous there are various groups who favor it, among them: 
 
 Communist youth groups, who are considered very important, 
 not because of their total number, but because they constitute the 
 party's reserve. 
 
 Infiltrated Trotskyites who support the Chinese policy in the present 
 ideological dispute and are attempting to win over other dissident 
 groups, in order to rise to higher positions within the party. 
 
 "Luis E. Recabarren" school, directed by three former members and 
 composed of about 60 persons, most of whom are students, expelled 
 from the party for misbehavior and because they favor Red China. 
 It is believed that this school may try to form a parallel Communist 
 Party as was done in a similar situation in Brazil. 
 
 In view of the situation caused by party elements who disagree 
 with the pro-Russian line, the Argentine Communist Party decided to 
 take a number of measures to neutralize the activities of the dissident 
 sections that were aggTavating the existing conflict. They, therefore, 
 adopted several measures, the most important of which are the 
 following: 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 93 
 
 Strict control of the propaganda material being circulated in Com- 
 munist circles, especially that coming into Argentina from Cuba, 
 which supports the line of the People's Eepublic of China; 
 
 Authorizing the youth segment to discuss basic problems existing 
 in the leadership of world communism from the ideological standpoint, 
 permitting it also to form "revolutionary organizations, but under 
 strict party control in order to prevent any excesses or violence that 
 might develop or any departure from the policy Une laid down by 
 the party; 
 
 The top party leadership, forced by the pressure of a dissident 
 group (that had the support of Brazilian pro-Chinese elements), 
 authorized the use of violence during "agitation week" (August 1963), 
 using certain elements of the Communist Youth Federation. This 
 shift in policy had been ordered to satisfy the dissident elements who 
 advocate violence and who, if controlled, may be used in those violent 
 actions that tactically are favorable to the Communist Party and also, 
 because it was considered that in this way, the revolutionary fervor so 
 often preached by the top party leaders would not be lost; 
 
 A campaign of reeducation in order to prevent party moral decay, 
 which would bring with it the disciplinary relaxation of leaders, 
 members, and sympathizers; 
 
 Expulsion of several members owing to their "provocative, disinte- 
 grating" activities. This resolution, adopted by the Central Com- 
 mittee of the Federal Capital, was intended to neutralize action by 
 pro-Chinese sympathizing groups; 
 
 Wide distribution of the letter addressed by the Soviet Union to 
 Communist China, through its party organs, supplementing the letter 
 with doctrinary concepts for the purpose of making the position of 
 the Argentine Communist Party clear, thereby rechanneling and 
 stabilizing future party activity; 
 
 With respect to the policy existing between the Soviet Union and 
 the United States, to spread propaganda to show that such a policy 
 is a necessary tactic for "the time being," and that the Soviet Union 
 is pursuing the same objectives as China, and that therefore the 
 unity of the two is perfectly insured. 
 
 Bolivia 
 
 The Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) continues to follow the 
 Moscow line. At the Second National Congress in March and April 
 1964, the Party confirmed pro-Soviet figures as leaders of the Central 
 Committee against a pro-Chinese minority and approved a resolution 
 condemning the dissention of the Chinese Communists. The new 
 Central Committee is made up chiefly of followers of Mario Monje 
 Molina, First Secretary of the pro-Soviet party. Although there is a 
 strong tendency in favor of violent action among Bolivian Communists, 
 which is contrary to the desires of their leader Monje, only a few 
 persons and small groups, both within the party and the Conununist 
 youth organization, openly support the Chinese. 
 
 The Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party (PGR) favors the 
 Chinese position. One faction of that badly spht group, the "Masas," 
 headed by Guillermo Lora, has made a public statement of open sup- 
 port of the Chinese attitude. Another group of the POR, headed by 
 Hugo Gonzalez, is allied with the European Fourth International, 
 which tends to approve, on a selective basis, certain aspects of both 
 
94 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 the Soviet and Chinese lines. Several other youth groups also 
 strongly support a violent strategy for gaining power. Although they 
 are considered Communist organizations, they are not part of the 
 Bolivian Communist youth organization. 
 
 Brazil 
 
 The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) has traditionally main- 
 tained very close ties with Moscow, and its leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, 
 has constantly alined the party with that position. However, there 
 are great differences of ideology and tactics between the PCB and the 
 Brazilian dissident Communist Party (CPB). The leaders of the 
 dissident party maintain that "revisionist concepts" have come to 
 dominate the PCB, and that Prestes and his followers commit sins 
 of "rightist deviationism." In turn, the Prestes group calls the 
 dissident party "divisionist" and "antiparty." The dissidents 
 maintain that they are fighting revisionism and are promoting the 
 class struggle as the only means of "crushing the domination of the 
 present ruling class" in Brazil. They are wholeheartedly opposed to 
 any collaboration with "bourgeois" elements and have accused 
 Khrushchev of being a revisionist, since his doctrine of peaceful co- 
 existence contradicts Marx and Lenin. 
 
 The dissidents have systematically attempted to avoid the "error of 
 leftist opportunism, which would isolate the proletariat" and to support 
 the concept of a united front with other revolutionary organizations, 
 while they establish ties with the masses. In this, they, as well as 
 other genuine pro-Chinese Communists, have attempted to separate 
 themselves from the Trotskyites and, as a political tactic, from the 
 leftists as well, even though these latter have supported the revolu- 
 tionary tactics, and even the basic ideas, of "Che" Guevara. Unlike 
 the PCB, which attributes importance to elections "as a means of 
 attracting the popular forces," the dissidents maintain that the peace- 
 ful road, even though desirable, is not possible. To them, the solution 
 of national problems cannot be found through the polls, and elections 
 can be useful in attaining the goals of the revolution only when the 
 appeal to the masses can be made "at a time when the masses are 
 seeking political solutions." 
 
 Cuba and Communist China have encouraged the dissidents in 
 different ways, promoting guerrilla attacks, acts of violence in rural 
 areas, and agitation among the masses in the cities. In addition, the 
 CPB cooperated with the peasant leagues organized by Francisco 
 Juliao. 
 
 Toward the end of 1963, it was announced that the dissident party 
 had declared complete, all-out loyalty to the Chinese line and had 
 released a document harshly criticizing the Soviet attitude. The 
 document stated: 
 
 The concessions made by Soviet revisionism and that of the workers' parties 
 compelled to follow this erroneous policy are a halt in the struggle being waged 
 by the peoples of the world to obtain their social emancipation and national 
 freedom. Such concessions are in truth a betrayal of the working class and in 
 Latin America represent, in the last analysis, a contribution to the conservative 
 and reactionary forces against the spontaneous revolution of the masses. 
 
 The Chinese Communists have demonstrated that they are willing 
 to accept the Brazilian dissident Communist Party and the official 
 Chinese news organ, People's Daily recently published an article 
 recognizing the leaders of the CPB as the Marxist leaders in Brazil. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 95 
 
 It is believed that the article in question was utilized by Prestes, the 
 leader of the PCB, who declared that a crisis had arisen in the relations 
 between his party and the Chinese Communist Party. Earlier, in a 
 communication to Mao Tse-tung, Prestes had emphasized the need 
 for the Communist movement to remain united, as an essential con- 
 dition for Communist victory, and that measures should be taken to 
 reach an understanding between Brazilian and Chinese Communists. 
 
 Reports of the results of recent contacts between Communist China 
 and the leaders of the CPB indicate that Prestes' efforts failed. 
 During those visits undoubtedly the strategy that the CPB ought to 
 follow with respect to the Goulart government and its relations with 
 Prestes' PCB was discussed. Apparently, that was when the decision 
 was made to concentrate the efforts of the dissident party on buUding 
 an organization of the masses and trying to undermine the PCB 
 position in the leftist movement. That being the case, the Chinese 
 may have repeated the advice they had been giving the leaders of the 
 Communist Parties since 1959, urging them to concentrate a good part 
 of their efforts on organizing a secret apparatus, parallel to this party, 
 which would operate clandestinely along with the regular party under 
 legal or illegal conditions. 
 
 The founders of the Communist dissident organization were several 
 ex-members of the Presidium and the PCB Central Committee who 
 were expelled from the regular party for having questioned the leader- 
 ship of Prestes and the gradualist policy of the PCB. When the new 
 party was organized, the name Brazilian Communist Party was re- 
 tained and it was proclaimed to be the true Communist Party. In 
 February 1962, the dissident party held a national conference and 
 elected a central committee of 13 members; a little later, a monthly 
 publication, A Clase Operaria, was established. This publication has 
 been engaged in a sharp dispute with the PCB official organ, Novos 
 Rumbos. 
 
 The dissidents are stronger in the States of Sao Paulo, Rio Grande 
 do Sul, and Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro) , which are the bases of opera- 
 tions of the party leaders. The CPB has about 1,000 members, and 
 its leaders are dyed-in-the-wool revolutionaries, convinced that 
 Prestes will be rejected in due course, and that they will be asked to 
 lead the Communist movement in Brazil. The CPB has called atten- 
 tion to events relating to the fall of President Goulart and the ineffec- 
 tiveness demonstrated by the PCB at that time as proof that its policy 
 is the only one that can succeed. The most important leaders of the 
 CPB are Cain Chadde, Joao Amazonas, Mauricio Grabois, and 
 Pedro Pomar. 
 
 Colombia 
 
 The problems arising from the Sino-Soviet conflict began to appear 
 at the Third National Communist Youth Conference, held on Septem- 
 ber 29 and 30 and October 1, 1961, in the course of which two tenden- 
 cies, the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet, developed. The former pre- 
 vailed in the resolutions of the conference, as was reflected in a wave 
 of violence in the rural areas and against North American companies. 
 
 This situation reached a crisis at the Fifth Communist Youth 
 Plenary where the pro-Chinese elements demanded that those mem- 
 bers who had been expelled as "fractionalists" by the dominant pro- 
 Soviet elements in the leadership of the Colombian Communist Party 
 
96 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 be vindicated and reinstated and that the official policy of the Com- 
 inunist Party, both domestic and international, be reformed. The 
 disagreement reached such a point that the fractions held two separate 
 meetmgs. The result was a division of the officers of the youth organi- 
 zation into two groups: 
 
 1. The pro-Chinese Colombian Communist Youth (JCC), which 
 appointed its own authorities and announced its complete separation 
 from the leadership of the Communist Party, which it accused of 
 havmg betrayed the Marxist-Leninist principles and having pre- 
 vented the young people from playing their primary role in the 
 revolutionary and "liberation" process of Colombia. 
 
 The resolutions of this fraction proclaim their full support of the 
 Chinese in their dispute with the Kussians and urge the revolutionary 
 organizations and movements to join their ranks in order to form the 
 national hberation front whose goal would be "power for the popular 
 classes." This document was widely distributed through the New 
 China News Agency, while the Soviet press did the same with the 
 charges by the Communist Party against the dissident group. 
 
 2. The Colombian Communist Youth Organization (JUCO), which 
 was headed by orthodox Communists, who hastened to confirm that 
 they were the legitimate representatives of youth and appeal to the 
 fractions to remain loyal to its directives. The four officers of the 
 JCC were expelled and removed from their positions on the Central 
 Committee. 
 
 The conclusions of the fifth plenary confirm repudiation of the 
 methods used by the Chinese comrades, affirming that "they are not 
 in Une with either the spirit or the letter of the declaration of 81 Com- 
 munist Parties" and, in addition, they attempt to interfere in the 
 internal afl^airs of the foreign parties, stimulating divisive activity. 
 However, with respect to the domestic level, despite the fact that 1964 
 had been announced as "the year of self-defense," Communist youth 
 was encouraged to move from the defensive to the ofl^ensive. 
 
 This is a good example of how, if necessary, the Soviet line can be 
 interpreted to justify preparation for violent struggle. 
 
 At the end of February 1964, the national plenary held in Colombia 
 unequivocally affirmed party loyalty to Moscow. 
 
 Costa Rica 
 
 The conffict between China and the Soviet Union has caused differ- 
 ences in the Communist ranks and the division into two camps, 
 headed by Adolfo Herrera Garcia and Manuel Mora Valverde, the 
 former in support of the Peipmg leadership and the latter, the leader- 
 ship of Moscow. 
 
 At its plenary session in August 1963, the People's Vanguard Party 
 (Partido Vanguardia Popular) came out officially in favor of the Soviet 
 Union, accusing the Chinese of trying to hide the consequences of a 
 thermonuclear war and of leading the "Socialist camp" into economic 
 isolation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the magazine China 
 Today is being circulated in Costa Kica, and in a short time has ob- 
 tained more than 1,000 subscribers. 
 
 Chile 
 
 In the conffict between China and the Soviet Union, the Communist 
 Party of Chile categorically adopted the Moscow line, issuing a num- 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 97 
 
 ber of statements and accusations against the Chinese Communist 
 Party and reiterating its full support of the Khrushchev line. 
 
 Luis Corvaldn, secretary of the Communist Party, made a number 
 of statements to the effect that the party was unquestionably in accord 
 with the Soviet position, and that it is a firm supporter of peaceful 
 coexistence, thereby seeking to maintain a national climate that would 
 enable the Communist Party to continue the political struggle for 
 power. 
 
 In a celebration of the anniversary of the Chinese revolution, sev- 
 eral events were held with the support of dissident sectors of the 
 Communist Party and leaders of the revolutionary popular action 
 front. The central committee reacted violently, stating that such 
 acts would have repercussions on AUende's candidacy and ordered 
 party militants not to attend other similar events. Disobedience of 
 this order led to the expulsion of several activists. 
 
 Undoubtedly, in view of Chile's political situation and the oppor- 
 tunities afforded the Communist Party by that situation, it will not at 
 present shift its line of full support of Moscow and so called peaceful 
 coexistence. Although the defeat of the presidential candidate of the 
 Communist Party at the last elections provides the pro-Chinese dissi- 
 dents with new and convincing arguments that they can use in their 
 struggle against the leadership of Corvalan, the Communist Party is 
 firmly determined to demonstrate by deed, rather than by polemics, 
 that its general strategy is correct and advantageous. 
 
 Ecuador 
 
 There is profound dissension in the Communist Party of Ecuador 
 (PCE) between the group that favors the gradualist traditional leader- 
 ship, which follows Moscow, that is to say, the secretary General of 
 the party and the national executive committee with its headquarters 
 in Guayaquil, and the group that favors violence whose principal 
 nucleus is the Provincial Committee of Pichincha in Quito. Personal 
 and regional rivalries contribute to the differences between the two 
 groups, but the principal point of friction stems from the differing 
 concepts of the tactics the party should employ. The gradualist 
 group alleges that good results can be attained by peaceful means 
 through penetration of leadership circles and mobilization of the 
 masses, whUe the group that favors violence insists on the need for 
 immediate armed insmrection. Both groups maintain that they are 
 the legitimate Communist Party, and each one has expelled the other. 
 
 The group that favors the "hard" line is composed at present of a 
 sizable minority of the PCE and has obtained the support of the 
 principal Communist and pro-Communist youth and or student groups 
 as well as of other extreme leftist revoluntionary groups. The 
 Soviet group has, for its part, been active for several years in the 
 labor movement, in student and teacher organizations, in universities, 
 and in cultural institutions. 
 
 The leaders of the group that favors violence, who began to appear 
 in 1959 and 1960, have been visiting Communist China ever since 
 1956 and possibly even earlier. In May 1963, an Ecuadoran Com- 
 munist leader was arrested in Quito, upon his return from Communist 
 China, with $25,000 that he was attempting to bring into the country 
 apparently for subversive purposes. Despite the insurrection aims 
 they pursue, the activities of the group have thus far been limited. 
 
9Si COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 iV. 
 
 They appear to have participated in sporadic sabotage actions in the 
 cities of Quito and Guayaquil. The former office of the New China 
 News Agency in Ecuador served as a means of communication be- 
 tween China and the Ecuadoran Communists untU it was closed by 
 order of the military junta in 1963. 
 
 British Guiana 
 
 In this country the Popular Progressive Party, of Communist 
 tendency, in general maintains a neutral line with respect to the 
 Sino-Soviet conflict. 
 
 According to the policy of Jagan, his platform is in harmony with 
 the Soviet thesis of "united fronts," including the middle class, through 
 which a "national democratic government of national liberation," 
 as the Soviet doctrine indicates, should be established. There is a 
 sector of marked pro-Chinese tendency, which is promoted by Jagan's 
 own wife, Janet. 
 
 Guatemala 
 
 Two trends stand out in the Guatemalan Communist picture, that 
 is to say : 
 
 1. The "Maoist," which agrees with the position of Havana and 
 supports the use of violence; 
 
 2. The "Khrushchevist," which, although it agrees with the 
 above, advocates strengthening the party, through its "leftist 
 front" program with the various sectors. 
 
 The conflict was the subject of special attention during the prepara- 
 tions for the fom-th congress, which according to party regulations 
 should have been held in 1963, but the tactical line of the party has 
 adapted itself faithfully to the development of local events. An 
 indication of this is the declaration of the Central Committee in April 
 1963 regarding the need to give all possible assistance to the armed 
 struggle, which was followed (after the coup d'etat against Ydigoras 
 Fuentes) by an appeal for moderation, based on the fact that the 
 guerrilla operations were not yet sufiiciently strong to bring success to 
 a revolutionary movement. 
 
 In commenting on the nuclear test ban treaty, the Guatemalan 
 Labor Party (Communist) followed the example of other similar 
 Central American parties, condemning the "disgraceful position of the 
 Chinese" in their dispute with the Soviet Union. In September 1963, 
 Communist propaganda stated that all the avenues to peace were 
 closed to the Guatemalan people, and that there was no way out except 
 to flee to the mountains and continue their struggle there. 
 
 It should be noted that in that same month of September, a "week 
 of solidarity with the Guatemalan people," was celebrated in Havana, 
 followed by a seminar headed by Jose Manual Fortuny, a member of 
 the Central Committee of the party, where a combination of the two 
 theses was achieved : The impetus of revolutionary action through the 
 unity of leftist opposition. 
 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Nicaraguan communism fully identified itself with the general line 
 that advocates the desirability of supporting peaceful coexistence as a 
 means of accelerating and creating a local atmosphere favorable to a 
 possible revolution. It severely criticized the Chinese argument, but 
 in the last analysis, its activities are aimed at the seizure of power by 
 violent means. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 99 
 
 Panama 
 
 Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have demonstrated 
 that they are very much interested in Panama. The Soviet Union, 
 m particular, has provided training and guidance facihties for members 
 of the People's Party and other Panamanian extremists. Soviet 
 propaganda has consistently alleged that the Panama Canal treaties 
 are an example of imperialist exploitation. Both Communist coun- 
 tries wasted no time in allying themselves with Panama during the 
 anti-U.S. demonstrations in January 1964. Moscow pointed out the 
 ''great danger" to world peace constituted by the imperiaUst military 
 bases on foreign soil. Peiping mobilized all its propaganda forces to 
 denounce alleged acts of aggression by the United States in Panama 
 and to make known China's support of Panamanian demands regard- 
 ing sovereignty in the Canal Zone. 
 
 The People's Party (PDP) has been a strong supporter of the Mos- 
 cow pohcy, and its relations with Communist China have been 
 diminishing as the split between China and the Soviets has widened. 
 Loyalty to Moscow has placed the party in a situation of bitter rivalry 
 with the National Action Vanguard (VAN), a Marxist Party that 
 favors Cuba. Both groups have attempted to influence the extremist 
 elements that have been advocating a revolution in Panama for more 
 than 3 years. The PDP resents the fact that VAN has obtained more 
 help from Castro than it has, even though both groups cooperated in 
 the anti-U.S. riots in January 1964. Afterward, these groups joined 
 forces with extremist elements to exert pressure on President Chiari to 
 stand firm in his requests for renegotiation of the basic Panama Canal 
 Treaty signed with the United States. 
 
 VAN considers revolution by force and violence the only way to get 
 the United States out of the Canal Zone and overthrow the "oligarchy." 
 A firm supporter of Cuba and Communist China, it also favors the 
 estabhshnaent in Panama of a government of the Castro type. Many 
 of its activities are concentrated on obtaining and training converts 
 for the "inevitable revolution." VAN is composed, for the most part, 
 of young Marxist extremists. It lacks a complete administrative 
 structure, but that fact has not caused it any insuperable obstacles. 
 Like PDP, although VAN attracts students and the organized worker, 
 it also has the support of the farmers. 
 
 Paraguay 
 
 The Chinese-Soviet split has caused a division in the Paraguayan 
 Communist Party (PCP). Although the major forces of the party 
 support the Soviet Union, a group that supports Peiping has formed 
 the so-called Paraguayan Leninist Communist Party, which has a 
 base in Montevideo and possibly in Argentina and which is trying to 
 extend its operations to its own country. 
 
 Peru 
 
 A section of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), which favors the 
 Chinese Communist line, since it advocates violent revolution and 
 also supports Cuba, has caused a spHt in the party. At a so-called 
 national congress held by this group in January 1964, it "expelled" 
 nine orthodox members of the PCP, including Secretary General 
 Radl Acosta, on the grounds that they were political traitors and im- 
 moral pel-sons. Acosta immediately called the dissidents "antiparty 
 
100 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 rebels" and accused them of usurping the name of the Central Com- 
 mittee. The new self-appointed leader of the dissident PCP, Satur- 
 nino Paredes, has declared that his group will adopt a severely inde- 
 pendent line in the policy to be followed with the present government. 
 He has also stated that the National Farm Confederation, of which 
 he is the legal adviser, has ordered the farmers to invade large land 
 holdings. 
 
 It is not yet clear what support the pro-Chinese group in the PCP 
 has, but it is likely to have increased its influence on the leaders who 
 favor the Soviets. Although it is difficult to appraise the exact 
 strength of the rival factions, there are indications that the pro- 
 Chinese group is dominant in almost all the regional organizations of 
 the partj^, including the Departmental Committee of Lima. Probably 
 the bulk of the members of the old guard of the urban area of Lima and 
 Callao itself remains loyal to the orthodox Moscow-oriented leaders. 
 This last group can probably count on almost all the Communist 
 element in the large organizations. However, the faction that favors 
 Peiping and is under the control of Paredes appears to be more active 
 at present, whether or not it speaks for the majority of the party 
 members. The orthodox party leaders appear to be having difficulty 
 in taking effective measures to prevent being removed from office by 
 those who propose to seize power by violent means. 
 
 Nearly all the other Peruvian extreme leftist organizations favor 
 violence, defined according to Peiping policy. The Communist youth 
 group is following that line. These forces have pledged to use guerrilla 
 and terrorist methods against the Government and to wage the social 
 revolution. The activist approach appears to be directed toward 
 creating unstable situations in the rural areas to destroy the established 
 institutions. The Castro model and Cuban and Communist Chinese 
 support in the form of economic aid and training are important to 
 this group. 
 
 Dominican Republic 
 
 The Dominican Communist leaders are in exile in Cuba and are 
 spreading the pro-Soviet line. Within the country, the 14th of June 
 Party and the Dominican Popular Movement adhere to Chinese 
 policy, while the Popular Socialist Party and the Revolutionary 
 Nationalist Party follow the Moscow line. 
 
 Uruguay 
 
 The Communist Party of Uruguay has traditionally followed the 
 general line issuing from Moscow. This was categorically reaffirmed 
 at the annual departmental conference in Montevideo, held by the 
 Communist Party in the first half of August 1964, at which time it 
 condemned the "revisionist positions of Marxism-Leninism upheld 
 by the Chinese leaders * * *." 
 
 It should be emphasized that the activities of terrorist groups have 
 already been manifested in thefts of weapons and explosives, and 
 armed attacks on banking institutions which, when discussed, have 
 been defended by political, labor, and student groups. An important 
 role in these activities has been played by the Revolutionary Labor 
 Party, a Trotskyite movement that does not yet have a political 
 organization of any significance, but does have abundant economic 
 resources, and, in its organization, a number of cells that ^re deter- 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 101 
 
 mined to carry on acts of terrorism and sabotage, apparently following 
 the violent tactic favored by the Peiping Communists. 
 
 Consequently, although the Communist movement ia Uruguay 
 continues to follow Moscow, the sporadic acts of violence reveal the 
 existence of Communist currents that support the Chinese line or 
 show that the Uruguayan Communist Party has found it desirable at 
 this time to use violent methods as part of its tactics, which, however, 
 does not in a^y way contradict its traditional support of Moscow. 
 Venezuela 
 
 The Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), which now has three 
 divergent currents of opinion, began the policy it is now following at 
 the end of 1960 when the Chinese-Soviet differences had just begun 
 to affect other parties. The policy of armed conflict, which is being 
 carried out through the National Liberation Front at the political 
 level and the Armed Forces of National Liberation at the combat 
 level, was adopted by the party at its third congress in 196L 
 
 Like certain other parties (the Indonesian and Vietnamese, for 
 exainple), the PCV is concerned lest a widening of the Chinese-Soviet 
 rift injure its revolutionary prospects, its local alliances, and its 
 internal unity. Dedicated since 1961 to violent conflict, the PCV 
 and its principal ally, the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) 
 did not experience any serious internal problems until it became 
 obvious that there was ve^'y little likelihood that their efforts to 
 overthrow the Government would succeed. 
 
 Especially enlightening are the conclusions reached by the Central 
 Committee of the PCV as expressed at a meeting on April 26, 1964, 
 between representatives of the PCV and the MIR: 
 
 (a) The primary objective of the Venezuelan Communist Party 
 is to regain the support and cooperation of the masses. To that 
 end, all terrorist acts in the cities will be suspended for the time 
 being, while an intensive campaign of propaganda and recruitmg 
 is carried out. In the rural areas, the primary task of the guer- 
 rillas will be to win the support of the farmers. 
 
 (6) The suspension of the terrorist campaign wUl pave the way 
 for the rehabilitation of the party. Consequently, weapons will 
 be used only to repel aggression without provoking the police or 
 security forces. 
 
 (c) Nevertheless, the fundamental method of conducting the 
 revolution in Venezuela continues to be armed conflict. The 
 inembers of the party should be prepared to resume armed con- 
 flict whenever the conditions are favorable. This may be in 
 "15 days or 15 years." In the meantime, the bands of guerrillas 
 in the rural areas will be reinforced, and their lines of communica- 
 tion improved. 
 
 Despite the existence of three divergent currents of opinion within 
 the PCV, there has been no public split up to the present, nor has any 
 disciplinary action been taken. One group, the one in favor of the 
 "soft line" or "peaceful coexistence," which is present in both parties 
 (PCV and MIR), is anxious to remove the National Liberation Front 
 from armed struggle at any cost and, if necessary, going back on 
 decisions made previously, separate those leaders who are definitely 
 identified with that policy. The second and, up to now, the dominant 
 group continues a pohcy of urban terrorism and active guerrilla 
 
102 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 fighting on the premise that this kind of action is the only means 
 whereby a revolutionary situation will be created. This group is 
 particularly strong owing to its support of the Castro regime and its 
 subversive program, especially as formulated by "Che" Guevara. 
 The third group, whose attitude is the closest to the Chinese views, 
 argues that armed conflict may be suspended but not repudiated, 
 and that there should be no letup in efforts to strengthen the FLN 
 among the farmers and laborers. To that end, they advocate in- 
 tensifying agitation to obtain local economic demands in order to 
 create a chmate favorable for the reconstruction of their basic organi- 
 zation and thus later the resumption of frankly political agitation. 
 
 It is significant that the PCV — the only party in Latin America that 
 has refused to take a position on the Sino-Soviet dispute and that 
 follows closely the attitude of the Castro Communists — has not thus 
 far revealed any open internal splits or expulsions. Of equal im- 
 portance is the evidence that the dissension and factional currents 
 noted within the PCV and the MIR are caused by the urgent need to 
 adopt new pohcies in view of the defeats suffered at the hands of the 
 Venezuelan people and Government. Lastly, the case of Venezuela 
 demonstrates that it would be an oversimplification to conclude that 
 the pro-Soviet elements exclude armed conflict as an appropriate 
 course of action, and that the pro-Chinese are dedicated to a pohcy of 
 immediate armed action everywhere and at any time. 
 
 C. CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 The study of the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict, especially among 
 the members of the Communist Parties mentioned, leads us to the 
 following considerations : 
 
 1. The majority of the top leaders of the Communist Parties 
 in the Latin American countries continue to favor the Soviet 
 position. 
 
 2. The efforts of the pro-Chinese Communists to seize the 
 leadership of the Communist political forces have been most 
 successful in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. 
 
 3. Division and damage to unity within the Communist Parties 
 have been most evident when the party leaders have taken sides 
 in the dispute. 
 
 4. The Chinese argument that the violent revoluntionary 
 struggle is still the only realistic way to overthrow existing 
 regimes has been widely accepted among young Communists 
 and intellectuals. 
 
 5. The most convincing Chinese Communist arguments relating 
 to the best means of preparing the groundwork for establishing 
 the "dictatorship of the proletariat" are being used in a long- 
 range effort within and against the Communist Parties to discredit 
 and eliminate the pro-Soviet leaders of the Communist movement 
 in Latin America and, ultimately, obtain the support of those 
 parties for the Chinese viewpoint in the international movement. 
 
 It should be mentioned that, up to now, only the effect of the Sino- 
 Soviet conflict on the Communist movement has been analyzed. It 
 would be interesting to be able to reach conclusions concerning how 
 that influence, in turn, affects the activities — particularly the sub- 
 versive activities — of international communism in the Americas. 
 The following chapter deals with that subject. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 103 
 
 IV. Keplections on the Effect of the Conflict on Interna- 
 tional Communist Activities, Particularly Subversive Ac- 
 tivities 
 
 It should be borne in mind, in the course of the reflections herein set 
 forth, that although the conflict is manifested primarily in two well- 
 known catch phrases: "peaceful coexistence" by Russia and the "use 
 of force" by Communist China, there is only one objective — to 
 establish the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. 
 
 It should also be remembered that within the group of countries 
 that make up the Organization of American States, a marked distinc- 
 tion should be made, when discussing the possible consequences the 
 conflict between China and the Soviet Union may have on Communist 
 subversive activity, between the United States and the Latin American 
 countries, where the Communist Parties have, for many years, had 
 greater possibilities for development. 
 
 As a matter of fact, it should be pointed out that the United States, 
 in addition to being a member of the Organization of American 
 States, is in a very special situation because it bears the heaviest 
 responsibility in the confrontation with international communism. 
 This special situation of the United States will not be analyzed here, 
 since it is beyond the hmits of this paper. However, it should be 
 noted that this situation may indirectly influence the effects of the 
 confhct on the rest of the American countries. 
 
 The United States of America is politically, economically, and 
 socially established on firm bases. The very national character of its 
 people rejects the ways of communism. However, even though there 
 are U.S. citizens who are active Communists, the people are not 
 a favorable receptacle for the Communist action they attempt to 
 carry out, whether on the basis of the Soviet policy or the Chinese 
 thesis. 
 
 That is to say, because of this situation of greater internal im- 
 munity, it is feasible for the United States to conduct its own policy 
 toward the Communist bloc, whether represented by the Russian 
 policy or the Chinese policy, since neither one appears to represent any 
 immediate danger on its home front, as stated above. 
 
 This special position of the United States, and its independence 
 in developing its own policy, can have an effect on the rest of the 
 American countries by contributing to the formation of a false concept 
 of the "peaceful coexistence" advocated by Russia. 
 
 In effect, the Soviet line, by opposing the Chinese Communist line 
 in favor of the use of force, would appear to imply that Russia has 
 renounced the use of force, whereas the truth is that Russian commu- 
 nism continues its efforts toward world domination regardless of 
 methods. This is an aspect that favors communism politically, since 
 in countries not politically and legally constituted so as to cope with 
 the present world situation, Russia finds that its well-known policy of 
 "united fronts" facilitates penetration. 
 
 Likewise, we must bear in mind, in this analysis of the effects of the 
 Sino-Soviet conflict in the Americas, the manner in which interna- 
 tional communism has consistently acted. In this connection, its 
 activity has always been manifested by an open party action and by 
 a parallel clandestine action definitely subversive in character. Even 
 accepting in good faith the Russian line of "peaceful coexistence,": 
 
 43-947—65 8 
 
104 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 we find that in practice communism acts in accordance with that 
 policy, on the one hand, and, on the other, in a subversive manner by 
 the use of force in all its forms as advocated by Communist China. 
 Does this change the picture of Communist activities in Latin 
 America? The daily account of the violent action perpetrated by 
 communism in this part of the world makes the answer unmistakable. 
 
 We must consider that, in general, in Latin America there exists a 
 socioeconomic situation whose deficiencies form substantially one of 
 the basic aspects of the problem. The result of this situation is that 
 there is a large mass of discontented people ready to accept any ap- 
 parent solution of their problems, including the Communist solution, 
 often presented in a "sugar coated" form, with a claim of obtaining 
 better living conditions on the basis of an elementary, though errone- 
 ous, rationalization that any change will bring these people more favor- 
 able living conditions. Considering both the Chinese and Russian 
 formulas for obtaining solutions, the apparent road selected by Russia 
 may be longer for them and, consequently, the Chinese line has 
 already won over groups of opinion and action, as stated in the 
 preceding chapter. 
 
 We have seen in that chapter Communist China's great interest in 
 Latin America. Basing ourselves on the premise that Russia has by 
 no means ceased to maintain its hegemony over the Communist 
 movements of the various countries, we find ourselves facing the fact 
 that Latin America will continue to be a vast arena in which both 
 Peiping and Moscow will continue fighting for supremacy. It is be- 
 lieved that this power struggle will create new factors of disturbance, 
 especially in labor circles, where both groups wUl continue a compe- 
 tition characterized by revolutionary action, each one trying to dem- 
 onstrate that it is capable of obtaining greater benefits and creating 
 labor problems that, in the last analysis, have nothing to do with the 
 workers and their true needs. 
 
 In line with these arguments, we must also consider what the mani- 
 festations of Communist activities, especially subversive activities, 
 in Latin America are. Could it be said that they obey Moscow or 
 Peiping? Or are such manifestations usually Castro-Communist in 
 character? 
 
 The Sino-Soviet conflict has philosophical facets. The vast ma- 
 jority of the Latin American masses are still living, politically and 
 culturally speaking, in the "caudiUo" era, and it is not being rash to 
 say that the confhct, with its problems of Marxist dialectics, has not 
 yet had any impact on them. The fact that the Chinese Communist 
 effort is directed chiefly toward the intellectual and youth element 
 and toward the leaders of the Communist Parties corroborates this 
 affirmation. 
 
 What has been said concerning the "caudillo" tradition of the Latin 
 American masses has, since the beginning, been understood by Russia, 
 which has skillfully exploited the figure of Fidel Castro, exalting his 
 image through its extraordinary propaganda machinery, to such a 
 point that in Latin America conimunism is acquiring another name, 
 "Castro communism." The dominant role that Castro communism 
 is playing in the Americas permits one to predict that at the meetings 
 of international communism, Cuba and its United Party of the So- 
 ciaUst Revolution may have a unifying effect on the tendencies that 
 have thus far appeared within the Communist movement in this 
 hemisphere. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 105 
 
 V. General Conclusion 
 
 In the preceding chapters certain considerations and reflections 
 have been set forth that implicitly contain their own appropriate con- 
 clusions. As a corollary, after establishing that Communist subver- 
 sion continues to increase in Latin America, the Special Consultative 
 Committee on Security deems it advisable to state as a general con- 
 clusion that the dispute between China and the Soviet Union has not 
 diminished the subversive activities of international communism in 
 the Americas, but that, on the contrary, it has, and does, constitute, 
 in many countries, a greater incentive for the use of methods of 
 violence. 
 
FIRST REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
 TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS 
 OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN STATES 
 
 Submitted at the Fourth Plenary Session (closed) held on 
 May 7 and 8, 1965 
 
 I. Intkoduction 
 
 On May 1, 1965, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
 of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics adopted a resolution 
 establishing a special committee, composed of representatives of 
 five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and 
 Panama, for the purpose and with the powers set forth by the resolu- 
 tion in the following terms [the Tenth Meeting of Consultation]: 
 
 2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the city of Santo 
 Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain the reestablishment of 
 peace and normal conditions, and to give priority to the following 
 two functions: 
 
 (a) To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups 
 and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the 
 purpose of obtaining urgently: 
 
 i. A cease-fire; and 
 
 ii. The orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken 
 asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who 
 desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and 
 
 (b) To carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation 
 in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this 
 meeting; 
 
 3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the Meeting on the 
 progress of its work, including the conclusions and recommendations 
 that it may consider appropriate, in the shortest time possible; 
 
 4. Requests the American governments and the Secretary General 
 of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation 
 in order to facilitate the work of the committee; * * * 
 
 The Special Committee referred to in the resolution of May 1, 1965, 
 quoted in part above, was made up as follows: 
 
 MEMBERS 
 
 Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of. Ar- 
 gentina. 
 
 Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho, Representative of Brazil. 
 Ambassador Alfredo Vdzquez Carrizosa, Representative of 
 Colombia. 
 
 Ambassador Carlos Garcia Bauer, Representative of Guate- 
 mala. 
 
 Ambassador Frank Morrice, Jr., Representative of Panama. 
 
 107 
 
108 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 CIVILIAN ADVISERS 
 
 Dr. Federico Carlos Barttfeld, Argentina. 
 Mr. Regis Novaes de Oliveira, Brazil. 
 Mr. Julio Merida, Guatemala. 
 Mr. Miguel Corro, Panama. 
 
 MILITARY ADVISERS 
 
 Col. Juan Gird Tapper, Ai-gentina. 
 
 Col. Lannes de Souza Caminha, Brazil. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Cesar A. Cabrera, Colombia. 
 
 Maj. Federico Abundio Maldonado, Guatemala. 
 
 Col. Francisco Aued, Panama. 
 
 SECRETARIAT 
 
 Dr. Roberto E. Quiros, Adviser of the Secretary General of 
 tbe Organization of American States. 
 
 Mr. Miguel Aranguren, Director, Department of Public 
 Infoimation. 
 
 Mr. Modesto Lucero, Secretary. 
 
 Mr. Jorge Zamorano, Assistant. 
 
 Mr. Orlando Garcia, Assistant. 
 In accordance with the aforementioned resolution of the Tenth 
 Meeting of Consultation, and in view of the urgency of the situation in 
 Santo Domingo, the Special Committee decided to install itself im- 
 mediately and unanimously elected as its Chairman Ambassador 
 Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina. The Committee 
 also decided to depart for the capital of the Dominican Republic that 
 same night, in order to lose no time in beginning its difficult work. It 
 therefore left Washington, D.C., at 5 a.m. on Sunday, May 2. 
 
 II. The Situation in Santo Domingo 
 
 From the moment it arrived in Santo Domingo, the Special Com- 
 mittee was deeply moved and saddened at the sight of this city on a 
 war footing. The streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses and 
 stores were closed, including those selling foods of prime necessity. 
 Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general, the 
 city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees and 
 other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the various American 
 countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally told 
 us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the 
 premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there was an 
 evident lack of security and of authorities having effective control of 
 the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including the 
 most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The 
 atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish. 
 Rumors and other unverifiable reports were circulated regarding 
 bloody incidents in various parts of the city. 
 
 The Special Committee set up its center of activities and its secre- 
 tariat in the Hotel Embajador, and early Sunday afternoon. May 2, 
 it began to make contact with the diplomatic corps and the various 
 authorities and military commands existing in the capital, in order to 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 109 
 
 obtain more precise information on what had happened and to achieve 
 a cease fire. 
 
 III. A Primary Objective 
 
 The Special Committee unanimously decided to lose no time in 
 taking steps to obtain a cease-fire and to comply with the objectives 
 of its mission set forth in the resolution of May 1, 1965. 
 
 According to telephone conversations between the Secretary General 
 of the Organization and the Pan Ameiican Union, as reported in 
 document OEA/Ser.G/V/ C-d-1312 (English) of_ April 30, 1965, the 
 Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo, 
 Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, was in contact with many leaders of 
 all factions. He had spoken to Colonel Benoit of the Dominican 
 armed forces, headquartered in San Isidro, and with Colonel Caamano, 
 chief of the "Comando MUitar Constitucionalista"; with other groups 
 in the New City, with Mr. Jose Rafael Alolina Uruefia, and with 
 Mr. Juan Bosch, the latter in Puerto Rico. 
 
 The dean of the diplomatic corps acted promptly on the anxious 
 request of the Council of the Organization, contained in its cable of 
 AprU 29, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/VJ/C/INF-571 (English)], which read: 
 
 To His Excellency Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio, Dean of the Diplo- 
 matic Corps, Santo Domingo: 
 
 Deeply disturbed by the intense struggle that has desolated the sister Dominican 
 Republic and desirous of preventing a further shedding of blood, the Council of 
 the Organization has instructed me to convey to you, as dean of the diplomatic 
 corps in that capital, and through you to the diplomatic representatives of the 
 American Republics, to the Dominican authorities, to the political parties of 
 whatever tendency, and to the Dominican people, its strong desire that all armed 
 action or hostilities be suspended. 
 
 The Council has requested me to make this humanitarian message known, in 
 the assurance that it will be possible for the Dominican people to decide their 
 national destinies in peace and with the protection of the institutions of the Inter- 
 American System. I request that, in view of the urgent circumstances, you advise 
 me as soon as possible regarding the situation in the country and the prospects 
 for achieving an immediate cease-fire, for the purpose of informing the Council of 
 the Organization, which remains attentive to the development of events. 
 
 Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration. 
 
 Dr. Jos£ A. Mora, 
 Secretary General of the Organization of American States. 
 
 On April 30, a preliminary cease-fire agreement between the two 
 conflicting factions was negotiated by the Papal Nuncio, cean of the 
 diplomatic corps, on the following terms : 
 
 1. [That] assurance is given to save the lives of all persons, regardless of their 
 ideology or of the faction they are defending, including prisoners and asylees. 
 
 2. That an Organization of American States commission shall agree to serve as 
 arbitrator in the conflict [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1312 (Enghsh)]. 
 
 Nevertheless , in spite of this preliminary agreement signed by the two 
 conflicting factions, the situation on the afternoon of May 2 continued 
 very serious in the Dominican capital. 
 
 This was the judgment of the Special Committee, and it v/as shared 
 by the dean of the diplomatic corps and by the Ambassadors and 
 charges d'affaires of the American states in Santo Domingo. No one 
 in that tortured city had any doubt whatsoever that it was essential 
 to conclude another agreement, more comprehensive than the earlier 
 cease-fire agreement. The action of the Special Committee was 
 hopefully anticipated and willingly accepted by all who had been 
 awaiting our arrival. 
 
110 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 The Special Committee thus lost no time in making contact with 
 the two conflicting factions, the one in the New City and the one 
 headquartered in San Isidro. This was extremely difficult because 
 of the complete lack of communications in the city and because the 
 Committee had no guarantee of safety in its travel through the 
 streets. Consequently, it had to use a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter 
 to go to San Isidro and then ask the dean of the diplomatic corps to 
 take the Committee in his car to the New City, where it met with 
 the command then headed by Col. Francisco Caamano. These inter- 
 views took place on Monday, May 3 ; it was physically impossible to 
 hold them on Sunday night, because in addition to the lack of trans- 
 portation, the capital city had no telephone service, and the interviews 
 had to be conducted by emissaries of each of the factions of the strife- 
 ridden city. 
 
 IV. Conferences With Both Sides 
 
 On Monday morning. May 3, the members of the Special Committee 
 went with the dean of the diplomatic corps in his car to the general 
 headquarters of the forces under the command of Col. Francisco 
 Caamano in the New City. 
 
 All the Committee members and the Secretary General of the 
 Organization of American States attended the conference. Attending 
 for the command were Col. Francisco Caamano, Dr. Hector Aristy, 
 Lt. Col. R. Augusto Gimenez Herrera, and other individuals, who, with 
 the ones named, claimed to represent the "Comando Militar Con- 
 stitucionalista." The conference began at 11 a.m. and was held ia 
 the place designated by that command. The meetiag was held in a 
 tense atmosphere, and continual firing could be heard through the 
 windows. 
 
 The Special Committee explained its terms of reference as set forth 
 in the resolution of May 1, 1965, adopted by the Tenth Meeting of 
 Consultation, and, manifesting intense concern for the Dominican 
 people, it said that it was absolutely necessary to reaffirm the initial 
 cease-fire, which had been agreed to but only incompletely carried out. 
 
 Dr. Hector Aristy explained the position of the command, making 
 the following principal points : 
 
 (a) The command headed by Col. Francisco Caamano complained 
 that it had not been consulted regarding the establishment in the city 
 of Santo Domingo of a zone guarded by the Armed Forces of the 
 United States. 
 
 (6) This command believed that the Armed Forces of the United 
 States were constantly expanding this zone and penetrating the city 
 further and further. 
 
 (c) The command believed, according to Dr. Hector Aristy's own 
 words, that "General Wessin's troops and those of the CEFA (Training 
 Center of the Dominican Armed Forces) are entering the city close 
 behind the American troops." 
 
 (d) The command attributed the incidents that had occurred in the 
 last few days to snipers of General Wessin's forces. 
 
 (e) Above all, the command wanted a clarification and a guarantee 
 regarding the zone occupied by the Armed Forces of the United 
 States. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 111 
 
 The Special Committee immediately made, the following explanation 
 to Colonel Caamano and to his spokesman: 
 
 (a) The zone guarded by the Aa-med Forces of the United States 
 was the same as the one referred to in the resolution adopted by the 
 Council of the Organization on April 30, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1310 
 (English)], and had the purpose defined in paragraph 2 thereof, which 
 reads as follows: 
 
 To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and 
 forces on both sides to permit the immediate estabhshment of an international 
 neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo 
 Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the 
 inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which 
 nationals of all countries will be given safehaven. 
 
 (b) The aim of the Special Committee was to come to agree with 
 the interested parties on a precise demarcation of the zone, including 
 therein _ all the diplomatic missions, in order to prevent incidents 
 due to ignorance of its boundaries. 
 
 As spokesman for Col. Francisco Caamano and his command, Dr. 
 Hector Aristy, raised the question of the establishment of an access or 
 communications corridor between the zone and the San Isidro sector, 
 which cut the command's forces into two parts. Indeed, on the 
 night of May 2, the Armed Forces of the United States had felt it 
 necessary to establish a communications route, using San Juan and 
 Teniente Amado_ Garcia Streets up to the right bridgehead of Juan 
 Pablo Duarte Bridge, for the purpose, they said, of transporting food, 
 medicine, and provisions from the base at San Isidro to the center 
 of the city. 
 
 The Special Committee explained to Dr. Hector Aristy the reasons 
 that, in their understanding, existed for the establishment of that 
 communications route. Dr. Hector Aristy said that the command 
 he represented wanted that corridor or communications route, if 
 maintained, to be under the supervision of a military police guard 
 made up of men from its own forces and from United States forces. 
 On behalf of the command, he expressed the wish that if this proposal 
 were not accepted, then the U.S. Armed Forces should place no 
 personnel other than military police there. 
 
 This request regarding supervision of the corridor or access route 
 was also transmitted by the Special Committee to the Ambassador 
 of the United States. 
 
 Finally, during the course of this conference on the morning of 
 May 3, Dr. Hector Aristy, as spokesman for the command headed 
 by Col. Francisco Caamano, made a specific request: That in no 
 event should the new cease-fire agreement or any other agreement 
 sponsored by the Special Committee be signed on behalf of the 
 Military Junta led by Colonel Benoit with headquarters at San Isidro 
 by any of the following seven generals: 
 
 1. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin. 
 
 2. Gen. de los Santos C&pedes. 
 
 3. Gen. Belisario Peguero Guerrero. 
 
 4. Gen. Salvador Augusto Montez Guerrero. 
 
 5. Gen. Atila Luna. 
 
 6. Gen. Marco Anibal Rivera Cuesta. 
 
 7. Comodoro Rivera Caminero. 
 
112 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 The command headed by Col. Francisco Caamano emphatically 
 and specifically excluded General Wessin y Wessin from any under- 
 standing whatsoever. 
 
 In the com-se of the interview Col. Francisco Caamano and his 
 companions furnished additional information. The forces of this 
 command had taken 500 prisoners of the combat forces of General 
 Wessin y Wessin. These prisoners were mainly soldiers and police 
 agents, some of whom, according to Colonel Caamano, wanted to 
 fight in his own units. He had opposed this in order that it might not 
 be said that it was on his orders, adding that if the Organization of 
 American States wished to take charge of those prisoners he would 
 accede to that. He also reported that the same units had captured 
 21 tanks during the course of the fighting in the city of Santo Domingo 
 that occurred on the preceding days. 
 
 Three additional questions were cleared up during this interview 
 with Colonel Caamano : the acceptance by that command of complete 
 protection to the embassies, with enlargement of the safety zone 
 sufficiently to include the premises of the diplomatic missions in the 
 city of Santo Domingo; similar acceptance of the departm'e of the 
 asylees or refugees in the various embassies of that city who wished 
 to leave by their own decision ; and of the facilities of every kind that 
 should be agreed upon for the Special Committee and the International 
 Red Cross for the distribution of food and medicine and the installa- 
 tion of hospital equipment for the Dominican people without distinc- 
 tion of any kind. 
 
 The Special Committee was witness during that interview with the 
 so-called Constitutional Military Command to one detail that could 
 not pass unnoticed. This was the presence of a uniformed person 
 carrying arms, who said he was part of the command and who spoke 
 Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The Secretary General 
 of the Organization of American States interrogated him in a loud 
 voice before everyone, asking him: "Who are you? What are you 
 doing here?" The person replied: "I am Andre Riviere; my nation- 
 ality is French; I fought in the French Army in Indochina; and I 
 am working in Santo Domingo. I have joined this command." 
 While he took no part in the conversations, Riviere was in the dis- 
 cussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority 
 with which he gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and 
 the door where we were was quite obvious. Some information 
 obtained later regarding this soldier was to the effect that he was an 
 instructor of frogmen who had arrived at Santo Domingo during the 
 Trujillo regime. 
 
 The interview ended with the promise by Col. Francisco Caamano 
 and his companions to accept the mediation of the Special Committee 
 of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and by the Committee that it 
 would maintain the contacts to reach a specific cease-fire agreement 
 after learning the conditions and reasons of the Military Junta of 
 Colonel Benoit. 
 
 Meanwhile the situation in the capital was becoming more acute 
 and threatening as the afternoon wore on. From both parties reports 
 reached the Committee regarding incidents that each attributed to its 
 adversary, and the chiefs of mission of the embassies accredited in 
 Santo Domingo were becoming anxious for prompt ratification of the 
 cease-fire. All of this gave a decisive character to these conversations. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 113 
 
 The Special Committee, for physical reasons of communication with 
 the San Isidro base, was unable to get as far as the headquarters of 
 the Military Junta headed by Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit until the 
 night of Monday, May 3. That night the Special Committee and the 
 Military Junta held a conference, attended on the part of the J unta 
 by its members: Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, President of the Junta, 
 Col. Enrique A. Casado Saladin, and Navy Captain Olgo M. Santana 
 Carrasco. During the last part of the interview, General Wessin y 
 Wessin was present, at the request of the Committee. 
 
 The Special Committee, in the presence of the dean of the diplomatic 
 corps and of the Secretary General of the Organization of American 
 States, opened the interview in the same way and in the same terms 
 as those used with the command of Colonel Caamano ; that is, by refer- 
 ence to the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Con- 
 sultation and to the concern caused to it by the state of the strife in 
 Santo Domingo. 
 
 The Military Junta directed by Colonel Benoit is installed at the 
 base of San Isidro, where at the time of our interview a considerable 
 part of the U.S. military force also was located. 
 
 Throughout the interview its President, Colonel Benoit, spoke on 
 behalf of the Military Junta, while his two companions remained silent. 
 No other officer or person except the members of the Junta was present. 
 
 Colonel Benoit spoke at length of the happenings that befell the 
 Junta of Government presided over by Mr. Donald Reid Cabral, and 
 told how the insurrection of April 24 had been suddenly shifted from 
 its initial objectives to degenerate into the most complete anarchy. 
 The initial authors of the military coup against Mr. Eeid Cabral lost 
 control of the movement and were without authority and without 
 power of any kindl. Therefore, Colonel Benoit stated, the movement 
 that was aimed at restoring former President Bosch or, failing this, 
 Dr. Eafael Molina Urena to power had failed, but that what remained 
 was a situation fraught with danger and that demanded a prompt 
 solution. 
 
 Colonel Benoit likewise said he had not wished to order an attack on 
 the city of Santo Domingo, where the forces commanded by Colonel 
 Caamano were located, out of respect for the lives of innumerable 
 persons, but that he had enough forces to do so. In the same manner, 
 he stated that the junta he headed accepted the security zone, with 
 expansion of it so as to include all the diplomatic missions ; the meas- 
 ures essential for the protection of those missions in Santo Domingo 
 with the extension of that zone; and, likewise, cooperation in the 
 distribution of food and medicine and the establishment of health 
 teams. 
 
 The Special Committee endeavored to ascertain whether it was true 
 that the action of U.S. miUtary forces in Dominican territory had been 
 requested. To this end, during the interview held on the night of 
 Monday, May 3, it requested any information on the matter that 
 Colonel Benoit or the members of the junta that he headed could 
 supply. 
 
 Colonel Benoit explained that the deterioration of public order in 
 the city of Santo Domingo, which started on the day that the move- 
 ment against Mr. Reid Cabral began, and the conditions of anarchy 
 and complete disorder that prevailed in the capital of the coun try had 
 led him to request the aid of U.S. armed forces in order to give pro- 
 
114 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 tection to the diplomatic missions and foreign persons and entities in 
 general. Colonel Benoit added that he had received an urgent request 
 from the diplomatic missions for protection that he was not able to 
 provide. 
 
 Colonel Benoit also stated that the request had been made to the 
 United States in a note, a copy of which was transmitted later to the 
 Special Committee, which read literally and in full, as follows: 
 
 Seal of the Dominican Republic 
 Dominican Republic 
 Dominican Air Force 
 Office of the Chief of Staff 
 Base Aerea "19 de Noviembre" 
 San Isidro, Distrito Nacional 
 
 April 28, 1965. 
 
 The Ambassador of the United States, 
 United States Embassy, 
 Santo Domingo. 
 
 Dear Mr. Ambassador: Regarding my earlier request I wish to 
 add that American lives are in danger and conditions of public disorder 
 make it impossible to provide adequate protection, I therefore ask you 
 for temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order in this 
 country. 
 
 Truly yours, 
 
 Pedro Bartolome Benoit, 
 Colonel, Presidente de la Junta Militar del 
 
 Gobierno de la Bepublica Dominicana. 
 
 The result of this interview was a promise made by the Military 
 Junta, composed of Colonel Benoit, Col. Casado Saladin, and Navy 
 Capt. Santana Carrasco, to accept the authority of the Special Com- 
 mittee, primarily for the essential and undelayable purpose of obtain- 
 ing a cease-fire. 
 
 The Special Committee informed Colonel Benoit and the persons 
 accompanying him of the decision of the other side, that is. Colonel 
 Caamafio's command, not to enter into any agreement in which the 
 seven generals mentioned earlier in this report participated in any 
 manner whatsoever. 
 
 V. Ratification and Expansion of the Cease-Fire 
 
 In accordance with the resolution adopted on May 1, 1965, by the 
 Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and on the basis of conversations 
 held with the two factions involved in the conflict, the Special Com- 
 mittee made a careful study of the conditions under which a new 
 agreement supplementary to that of April 3, might be reached, for 
 ratifying and expanding the cease-fire. 
 
 To this end, it convoked the authorized representatives of the two 
 conflicting factions for the purpose of informing them of a draft 
 agreement prepared by the Committee, whose principal points were 
 as follows: 
 
 (a) Acceptance of an act that would expressly ratify the cease-fire 
 agreement signed on April 30, 1965. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 115 
 
 (b) Acceptance of a safety zone marked off within the limits that 
 would be indicated in a map officially agreed to by both parties and 
 appended to that act. 
 
 (c) Eespect for the safety zone and a guarantee of adequate pro- 
 tection for any persons within that zone. 
 
 (d) Facilities needed by the International Ked Cross, or the inter- 
 national agency designated by the Organization of American States, 
 for the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equip- 
 ment for the Dominican people. 
 
 (e) Guarantees for the evacuation of asylees in the foreign embassies 
 or diplomatic missions in Santo Domingo. 
 
 (■f) Eespect for the diplomatic missions, their staffs, and for any 
 persons who have taken refuge or asylum in those missions. 
 
 ig) Full and explicit recognition of the competence of the Special 
 Conamittee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of 
 Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 In order to prepare the fulfillment of the agreement — as soon as the 
 conflicting parties consented thereto — the Special Committee, through 
 the dean of the diplomatic corps, convoked the chiefs of missions for 
 the purpose of asking them which of them were interested in obtaining 
 the evacuation of asylees or refugees. This meeting took place in the 
 Papal Nunciature on Tuesday, May 4, around noon. The Special 
 Committee received an oral report from the chiefs of missions on this 
 matter. The Committee informed the members of the diplomatic 
 corps of the conversations held with the two parties on this matter, 
 and of the mandate it had received from the Meeting of Consultation 
 of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and requested them to provide a list 
 of their asylees and refugees in order to help solve the problem of the 
 evacuees. As a result of the action of the Special Committee, several 
 embassies began to make arrangements for the departure of refugees 
 and asylees who wished to leave under the guarantee of the Organiza- 
 tion of American States. At the same time, the Special Committee 
 was informed of the imminent arrival of hospital teams, medicine, and 
 food supplies that had been requested, as an aircraft had arrived from 
 Colombia on May 5. We understand that many asylees and refugees 
 who were at the Colombian Embassy in Santo Domingo left for that 
 country on the same aircraft. 
 
 Moreover, the Special Committee requested the military advisers 
 of each of its members to make a reconnaissance visit to the safety 
 zone and to arrange with the military authorities of the United States 
 in Santo Domingo the details of the expansion of that zone to include 
 all the embassies. This task was completed and the military advisers 
 immediately began to prepare and draw up an official map. 
 
 Likewise, in order to prepare all the measures for the application of 
 the cease-fire, the Special Committee informed the President of the 
 Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the urgent need for obtaining a 
 shipment of food, medicine, and medical personnel immediately. The 
 following cable was sent for the the same purpose: 
 
116 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Santo Domingo, May 3, 1965. 
 Ambassador GtriLLERMO Sevilla Sacasa 
 President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, 
 Washington, D.C. 
 Number One. 
 
 The Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation 
 wishes to extend emphatically, through you, to the Tenth Meeting and 
 to each of the member states, a most urgent appeal that cognizance 
 be taken of the dramatic situation existing in this country because of 
 the armed strife, and to emphasize the urgent necessity for them, 
 within the spirit of fraternity and solidarity with the Dominican 
 people, immediately to send foodstuffs, medicine, and medical per- 
 sonnel. 
 
 The Committee is convinced that this is the most urgent of the 
 serious problems being faced, in order to prevent the possibility of 
 epidemics and other calamities that could make the situation of the 
 Dominican people even more difficult. 
 
 Ambassador Colombo, 
 Chairman of the Committee. 
 
 We have learned that the Meeting of Consultation approved a 
 resolution on this matter, based on the hmnanitarian gesture of the 
 Special Committee. 
 
 VI. Reports to the Tenth Meeting op Consultation 
 
 On May 4, 1965, the Special Committee reported to the President 
 of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation concerning the status of nego- 
 tiations for agreeing upon the cease-fire and replied to a telephone 
 message from the General Secretariat in Washington concerning vari- 
 ous aspects of its labors. _ ^ 
 
 The cablegram from the Special Committee to the President of the 
 Tenth Meeting of Consultation mentioned above reads: 
 
 Santo Domingo, 4 May 1965. 
 Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, 
 President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, 
 Washington, D.C. 
 Number Two. 
 
 Replying telephone commimications received today, I wish to report 
 the following : 
 
 First: All contacts have been made with groups represented by the 
 following persons: Constitutional Military Command : Col. Francisco 
 Caamano, Lt. Col. Manuel Montes Arache, Maj. Hector E. Lachapelle 
 Diaz, Mr. Hector Aristy, Maj. Fabio C. Restano, Lt. Col. Augusto 
 Jimenez, and Lt. Col. Pedro Alvarez Olguln. Members of the Mili- 
 tary Junta: Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, President; Col. Enrique A. 
 Casado; Navy Capt. Olgo Manuel Santana Carrasco, and Gen. Elias 
 M. Wessin y Wessin, Director of the Armed Forces Training Center. 
 Likewise, with m.embers of the diplomatic corps, especially all those of 
 Latin America, the Papal Nuncio, and the Ambassador of the United 
 States. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 117 
 
 Second: Committee, in addition to interviews mentioned above, has 
 been in constant touch with the aforesaid groups, and at present, 
 the Committee is awaiting the formalization of the points that have 
 already been accepted by both parties, which are: Confu-mation 
 cease-fire, demarcation and enlargement of secm-ity zone to include 
 all embassies, evacuation of asylees and refugees, and distribution of 
 food, medicine, and medical equipment to all sectors of the population 
 without regard to parties. We have thus far encountered a good 
 attitude on the part of both parties. 
 
 Third: Committee wUl return as soon as it obtains the results of 
 the negotiations it is conducting. Possibly tomorrow. 
 
 Fourth: Both parties have accepted the enlargement of the security 
 zone to include all Latia American embassies and we are working to 
 fix a boundary for it. U.S. forces established an access corridor 
 between San Isidro and the security zone. 
 
 Fifth: We consider that it would be useful, in order to aid in bring- 
 ing a return of the Dominican situation to normality, for the member 
 states that are in a position to do so to establish a combined inter- 
 American military force under the Organization of American States 
 to achieve the objectives that are set by the Meeting of Consultation. 
 
 Sixth: With reference to the question by the Ambassador of 
 Colombia, the only airport capable of receiving planes is the one at 
 the San Isidro airbase, which is under the authority of the Military 
 Junta presided over by Colonel Benoit. 
 
 Ambassador Colombo, 
 Chairman oj the Committee. 
 
 VII. Act of Santo Domingo 
 
 As a result of the conversations held by the Committee with the 
 parties an agreement was finally reached referring to the points covered 
 in this report. 
 
 The text of the document kaown as the "Act of Santo Domingo," 
 signed on May 5, 1965, is as follows: 
 
 ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO 
 
 The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the 
 capacities mentioned, respectively, the Military Junta of Government 
 and the "Constitutional Government" hereby place on record that 
 they have reached the following agreement as a result of the discus- 
 sions held with the two Parties by the Special Committee of the Tenth 
 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, whose mem- 
 bers also sign the present Act as a guaranty of its compliance and 
 execution, functions that both Parties agree the Committee may carry 
 out. 
 
 1. The Parties who sign the present Act ratify the cease-fire 
 agreement signed on April 30 last. 
 
 2. The Parties accept the establishment of a safety zone in the 
 city of Santo Domingo, demarcated within the boundaries in- 
 dicated on the map attached to this document and signed by the 
 same Parties who sign the present Act. 
 
 3. The Parties bind themselves especially to respect this safety 
 zone, within which there is guaranteed, in the manner that the 
 
118 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 Organization of American States may deem appropriate, adequate 
 protection and safety for all persons found within that zone of 
 refuge. 
 
 4. The Parties undertake to give all necessary facilities to the 
 International Red Cross or to the international agency that the 
 Organization of American States may designate to carry out in 
 any part of the city of Santo Domingo or of the Dominican 
 Republic the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and 
 hospital equipment that are being sent as a result of the appeal 
 made by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
 Foreign Affairs. They also undertake to provide all facilities re- 
 quired by the Organization of American States so that medical 
 and sanitary personnel sent by the governments can be transported 
 to any point in the city of Santo Domingo or Dominican territory, 
 to perform their services. 
 
 5. The Parties undertake to provide all necessary safety 
 measures for the evacuation of asylees in foreign embassies or 
 diplomatic missions who so request of them. 
 
 6. The Parties undertake to respect the diplomatic missions and 
 to offer all cooperation necessary to guarantee the safety of all 
 personnel of those missions and of asylees or refugees therein. 
 
 7. The Parties declare that they accept and recognize the full 
 competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth 
 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for 
 purposes of the faithful observance of what is agreed to in this 
 Agreement. 
 
 In witness wheeeof the present document, which shall be known 
 as the Act of Santo Domingo, is signed in four original copies, of which 
 one shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization 
 of American States, one shall be for each of the Parties, and one shall 
 be for the files of the Committee. 
 
 The Secretary General of the Oi-ganization of American States shall 
 transmit certified copies to each of the member states. 
 
 May 5, 1965 
 
 For the Military Junta of Government : 
 Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit 
 
 Dominican Armed Forces 
 Colonel Enrique A. Casado SaladIn 
 
 National Army 
 Captain Olgo N. Santana Carrasco 
 
 Navy 
 
 For the Constitutional Government: 
 Colonel Francisco Caamano Deno 
 
 Constitutional President 
 Lieutenant Colonel Dr. R. Augusto Jimenez Herrera 
 Colonel Ram6n Manuel Montes 
 Major Hector Achapell 
 Dr. Hector Aristy 
 
 Minister of the Presidency 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 119 
 
 For the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation 
 of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States : 
 Ambassador Eicardo Colombo 
 
 Representative of Argentina 
 
 Chairman of the Committee 
 Ambassador Ilmar Penna Mabinho 
 
 Representative of Brazil 
 Ambassador Alfredo VXzquez Carbizosa 
 
 Representative of Colombia 
 Ambassador Carlos GarcIa Batter 
 
 Representative of Guatemala 
 Ambassador Frank Morrice, Jr. 
 
 Representative of Panama 
 
 VIII. Exchange of Notes With the United States 
 
 Before reaching an agreement with the conflicting parties concerning 
 the ratification and expansion of the cease-fire, the Special Committee 
 studied the question relating to the cooperation of the armed forces 
 of the United States in the Dominican Republic with the Committee 
 withm the objectives indicated by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation 
 m the resolution of May 1, 1965. 
 
 On the night of May 3 the Special Committee had an interview with 
 the Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador of the United States 
 to the Dominican Republic. The results of this interview and the 
 precise opinion of the Special Committee were set forth in a memoran- 
 dum delivered personally to that diplomatic representative, which 
 read as follows: 
 
 MEMORANDUM 
 
 As a result of the meeting that was held on the night of May 3, 1965, 
 the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of 
 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, has the honor 
 to state the following to the Ambassador of the United States to the 
 Dominican Republic: 
 
 1. The Committee has had the steadfast purpose of attaining 
 the confirmation and effectiveness of the cease-fire agreement 
 already agreed upon. 
 
 2. To achieve this end, the Committee has today held long 
 conversations with the commanders of the Command headed by 
 Colonel Caamano and of the Military Junta headed by Colonel 
 Benoit. Both have given their consent to participate jointly 
 with the Committee in formal negotiations, for the purpose of 
 arriving at a supplementary and amplifying agreement on the 
 cease-fire, which the Committee believes indispensable and 
 which should include among its principal clauses, in addition 
 to others: 
 
 a. The demarcation and enlargement of the safety zone 
 to include the embassies that are present outside this zone. 
 
 b. The cooperation of both parties with a Committee of 
 the Organization of American States for supervising and 
 applying the cease-fire. 
 
 c. Cooperation for humanitarian aid. 
 
 43-947—65 9 
 
120 COMBESrED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 d. Departure from the country of Dominican refugees or 
 asylees in the embassies who wish to leave. 
 
 3. The Committee would like to know whether, in the event 
 that a supplementary and amplifying agreement of this nature 
 can be signed by both parties, the United States military forces 
 in the Dominican Republic could receive precise instructions for 
 cooperating in carrying out the agreement. 
 
 4. The Committee feels that without the essential cooperation 
 of the United States, the aforementioned agreement could not 
 be carried out. 
 
 5. The Committee believes that the foregoing corresponds to 
 the terms of its instructions contained in the resolution of May 1, 
 1965, of the Meeting of Consultation, especially with what is 
 stated in paragraph 2. a, concerning the cease-fire, and the content 
 of paragraph 4, which states: 
 
 [The Tenth Meeting of Consultation:] 
 
 "requests the American governments and the Secretary General 
 of the Organization of American States to extend their full 
 cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee." 
 After the Act of Santo Domingo was signed, by which the cease-fire 
 of April 30, 1965, was ratified and amplified, the Special Committee 
 sent to the Ambassador of the United States in the Dominican 
 Republic a note in which it expressly requested the cooperation of the 
 government of that country in applying the stipulations of that 
 document. The note from the Special Committee and the reply from 
 the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, are transcribed below: 
 
 Santo Domingo, May 5, 1965. 
 
 Sir: 
 
 I have the honor to transmit to you, Sir, under instructions of the 
 Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
 of Foreign Affairs of the Am.erican States, a certified copy of the Act 
 of Santo Domingo signed today by the parties who entitle themselves, 
 respectively, "Military Junta of Government" and "Constitutional 
 Government." 
 
 As item 4 of the Resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of 
 Consultation "requests the American governments to extend their full 
 cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee," this 
 Committee hopes that your government will cooperate with it in 
 observing the stipulations of the Act of Santo Domingo. 
 
 Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. 
 
 RicARDO M. Colombo, 
 • Representative of Argentina, 
 
 Chairman of the Committee. 
 The Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, 
 
 Ambassador of the United States of America to the Dominican Republic, 
 Santo Domingo de GuzmMn, Dominican Republic. 
 
COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 121 
 
 The Secretary of State, 
 ^ Washington, May 7, 1966. 
 
 Excellency: 
 
 I have been advised by the United States Ambassador to the Domin- 
 ican Republic of Yoiu- Excellency's communication to him of May 5, 
 transmitting a certified copy of the "Act of Santo Domingo" and 
 expressing the hope that the United States Government will cooperate 
 in its observance. Since the Commission has now returned to Wash- 
 ington, I am taking the liberty of replying directly to you. 
 
 I have the honor to express my government's gratitude for and 
 support of the work of the Commission in Santo Domingo. The 
 United States will cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions 
 of the Act of Santo Domingo. I do not have before me the map 
 attached to the Act of Santo Domingo, but I assume that the bound- 
 aries of the International Safety Zone coincide with those that now 
 exist and that the line of communication crossing the Duarte Bridge 
 as it now exists is shown on the map. 
 
 _ Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest considera- 
 tion. 
 
 Dean Rusk. 
 
 His Excellency Dr. Ricardo M. Colombo. 
 
 Representative of Argentina on the Council of the Organization of 
 American States. 
 
 IX. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 In presenting this report to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of 
 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Special Committee has desired only to 
 give an account of its activities from May 1 to 6, 1965, that is, during 
 the visit to the city of Santo Domingo. 
 
 The Special Committee achieved, under truly dramatic circum- 
 stances, the m.ain objectives set forth in the previously mentioned 
 resolution with respect to cease-fire, the orderly evacuation of persons 
 who have taken asylum or refuge, and humanitarian assistance to the 
 Dominican people without any distinction as to parties or conflicting 
 factions. The Special Committee also achieved the demarcation of a 
 safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo in accordance with the map 
 officially drawn up by its military advisers. This map was transmitted 
 to both parties, and the original is at the disposal of the Tenth Meeting 
 of Consultation. 
 
 As the representatives wUl note, the Act of Santo Domingo and the 
 results thus far obtained by the Special Committee constitute the 
 first stage of a process of restoring peace and normality in the Domini- 
 can Republic, which requires the Inter-American System to take 
 several steps toward consolidation. 
 
 Among the measures we believe could be adopted at once by the 
 Tenth Meeting of Consultation, we suggest the following: 
 
 1. Designation of a permanent technical military group in the city 
 of Santo Domingo to supervise the cease-fire and other measures 
 agreed upon by the parties in the Act of Santo Domingo. 
 
 2. Designation of another qualified group to organize humanitarian 
 aid to the Dominican people and evaluation of the most urgent needs 
 with regard to food, medicine, and hospital equipment. 
 
122 COMBINED REPORTS ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
 
 3. Study and planning of the Inter-American Force created by the 
 Resolution of May 6, 1965 of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, in 
 order to assure it the best conditions of operation and efficiency. 
 
 4. To empower the Special Commission to establish coordination 
 among all these elements and activities in the Dominican Republic 
 in order to attain the goals set forth in the resolutions approved by 
 the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. 
 
 Washington, D.C, May 7, 1965. 
 
 RiCAEDO M. Colombo 
 Ambassador of Argentina 
 Chairman 
 
 Ilmar Penna Maeinho 
 Ambassador of Brazil 
 Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa 
 Ambassador of Colombia 
 Carlos Garcia Bauer 
 Ambassador of Guatemala 
 
 HUMBERTO CaLAMARI G. 
 
 Ambassador of Panama 
 
• 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
 to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization 
 m this index. 
 
 A 
 
 Page 
 
 Acosta, Raul 99 
 
 Afro- Asian-Latin American front bloc 11,12 
 
 Algeria ... 9 
 
 AUende .IIIIII " 97 
 
 Alliance for Progress .V.-V. Yv," VI, 28, 29 
 
 Amazonas, Joao . 95 
 
 Amsterdam "International" "111 I ' . 42 
 
 Angola 9 
 
 "Application of Measures to the Present Government of Cu'ba""."r II .'I 83 
 
 Argentina . 1^ 71, 86, 93 
 
 Communist Party of 92, 93 
 
 Association of Friends of the People's Republic of China . 91 
 
 Australian Royal Commission on Espionage 17 
 
 B 
 
 Bayo, Gen. Alberto 60 
 
 Betancourt, ex-President Romulo III 25 
 
 Betancourt-Copei government 25 
 
 Bias Rocas School 51 
 
 Board of Liberation for Central America and the Caribbean 51 
 
 Board of Liberation for South America 51 
 
 Boca Chica School 51 
 
 Bogota, Ninth International Conference of American States in 32, 70 
 
 Bolivia 25, 26 
 
 Communist Party of (PCB) .. 93 
 
 Brazil .Wl, 92, 102 
 
 Communist Party of (PCB) 94, 95 
 
 Brazil, Natal 21 
 
 Buenos Aires II g 
 
 Bulgaria I III. I I 28 
 
 Burgos, Tomas Berenguel .1.1... I llllll 79, 81 
 
 C 
 
 Cable & Wireless, Ltd 59 
 
 Cali 8 
 
 Camaano (Deno) Col. Francisco v 
 
 Castro, Fidel _ iiiv 
 
 6, 16, 17, 19, 22-24, 51, 63, 66, 75, 76, 85, 89, 99, lOO', 102, 104 
 
 Castro, Raul 16 
 
 Central American Students, Congress of. 51 
 
 Central Labor Office 12 
 
 -Chadde, Calil 95 
 
 Chauffers Union (of La Paz) 26 
 
 Chiari, President Roberto F 99 
 
 Chile, Communist Party of 96 
 
 China, People's Republic of 92, 93, 103, 105 
 
 China, Communist 23, 25, 28, 60, 81, 89-92, 94, 99, 100, 103, 104 
 
 Chmese-Argentine Cultural Society 91 
 
 Chinese-Brazilian Cultural Society 91 
 
 Chinese-Chilean Cultural Institute 91 
 
 Chinese Colombian Communist Youth (JCC) 96 
 
 123 
 
124 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Page 
 
 Chinese Communist-Party , 95,97 
 
 Chinese- Venezuelan Friendship Society 91 
 
 Chou En-lai, Premier 23 
 
 "A Clase Operaria" (publication) 95 
 
 Clausewitz 5, 47 
 
 Codovilla, Victorio 92 
 
 Colombia 96 
 
 Colombian Communist Party 95 
 
 Colombian Communist Youth Organization (JUCO) 96 
 
 Cominform 14 
 
 Comintern 7, 8, 14 
 
 Common Market: 
 
 European 28 
 
 Latin American 28 
 
 Communist and Workers' Parties 25 
 
 Communist International, Second Congress of - 40, 41, 42, 43 
 
 Communist Party (of USA) 25,63 
 
 Communist Party, Organization Manual of the 48 
 
 Communist Youth Conference, Third National 95 
 
 Communist Youth Federation 93 
 
 Conference of American States, Ninth International 37, 70, 84, 85 
 
 Conference of Peoples 53 
 
 Conference of Un-alined Countries 9 
 
 "Constitutional Military Command" v 
 
 Copei 25 
 
 Corvalan, Luis 97 
 
 Costa Rica 1, 79, 96 
 
 CTAL- 8, 12 
 
 Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) 28 
 
 Cuidad Libertad School 51 
 
 Cuba III, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 
 
 38, 45-47, 51-55, 57, 59-64, 66, 72, 75, 83, 86, 88, 93, 94, 100, 104 
 
 Cuban Federation of Women, First National Congress of the 53 
 
 Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples 51 
 
 Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry 60 
 
 Czechoslovakia 9, 60 
 
 Communist Party Central Committee 16 
 
 D 
 
 Daily Worker 25 
 
 Daniels, Paul C 45, 67, 69, 77, 79, 81 
 
 Dari, Laszlo 17 
 
 De Almeida, Prof. Joaquim Canuto Mendes 1, 36, 45, 67 
 
 "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of Political Integrity of 
 American States Against the Intervention of International Commu- 
 nism" 33 
 
 Dimitrov 8 
 
 Dominican Popular Movement 100 
 
 Dominican Republic 72 
 
 Report of OAS Special Committee, May 8, 1965 107 
 
 Dubois, Jules 16 
 
 E 
 
 Ecuador 102 
 
 Communist Party of (PCE) 97 
 
 El Cortijo School 51 
 
 El Salvador 1 
 
 Eredel, Janos 17 
 
 Establecimiento Frigorifico del Cerro, S.A. (EFCSA) 20 
 
 Estenssoro, President Paz 26 
 
 P 
 
 Fedepetrol - 21 
 
 Federal Capital, Central Committee of the 93 
 
 Federation of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba 51 
 
 Fortuny, Jose Manual 98 
 
INDEX 125 
 
 FaE« 
 
 France, Communist Party of 11 
 
 Congress of the 11 
 
 "Free Latin America" Association 51 
 
 Fuentes, Ydigoras 98 
 
 G 
 
 Garcia-Amador, Dr. F. V 1 
 
 Garcia, Adolf o Herrera 96 
 
 Germany, East 20 
 
 Germany, West 25 
 
 Goulart, Joao 95 
 
 Gonzalez, Hugo 93 
 
 Gouzenko, Igor 17 
 
 Grabois, Mauricio 95 
 
 Guatemala 75, 76 
 
 Guatemalan Labor Party. 98 
 
 Guevara, Ernesto ("Che") 16, 22-24, 60, 75, 94, 102 
 
 H 
 
 Hetzel, Joan 2 
 
 Hilferding 41 
 
 Hillquit 41 
 
 Hungarian Trade Mission to Brazil 17 
 
 Hungary 9, 16, 28, 60 
 
 Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) 19 
 
 Inter- American Conference (10th, Caracas, 1954) 33, 71, 85 
 
 Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation 70 
 
 Inter- American Conferences and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 71 
 
 Inter- American Development Bank 25 
 
 Inter-American Peace Committee 17, 57 
 
 Report of 18 
 
 Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 35, 37, 38, 66, 83, 88 
 
 International, European Fourth 93 
 
 International Newspapermen's Organization 53 
 
 International PoUce ("Interpol") 84 
 
 International Students' Union 51 
 
 Seventh Congress of the 51 
 
 "Interpol" 84 
 
 J 
 
 Jagan, Cheddi . 98 
 
 Jagan, Janet 98 
 
 Jiminez, Manuel Campos 1, 36, 45, 67 
 
 Jornado 20 
 
 Juliao, Francisco 94 
 
 Julio Antonio Mella School 51 
 
 K 
 
 Kautsky 41 
 
 Kennedy, President John F 90 
 
 Khrushchev 11, 14-16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 47, 48, 89, 94, 97 
 
 Kosak, J 16 
 
 Kudriatzev, Sergei 17 
 
 L 
 
 La Cabana Fort 51 
 
 "La Fedepetrol" (Federation of Oil Workers).. 20 
 
 "La Historia Me Absolvera" ("History Will Absolve Me") 23 
 
 La Nacidn 26 
 
 La Revoluoion Cubana 16 
 
 Latin America, Confederation of Workers of 8 
 
 "Latin America Against Yankee Imperialism" . 51 
 
 Latin American Conference 9 
 
126 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Page 
 
 Latin American Conference of Plantation Workers 51 
 
 Latin American Conference on National Sovereignty, Economic Emanci- 
 pation and World Peace 51 
 
 Latin American Communist Parties, Conference of 9 
 
 Latin American Congress of Students, Fourth (PLCS) 21 
 
 Latin American Cultural Congress 53 
 
 Latin American Solidarity Day 51 
 
 Latin American Trade-Union Confederation 8 
 
 Latin American University 53 
 
 Latin American Youth Organization 51 
 
 Lazar, Gyorgi 17 
 
 League of Nations 41 
 
 Lenin 16, 19 
 
 Libre, Gramialismo 20 
 
 Lima, Departmental Committee of 100 
 
 Longuet 41 
 
 Lora, Guillermo 93 
 
 Luccro, Modesto 2 
 
 Luna, Col. Carlos Maria 45, 67, 69, 77, 79, 81 
 
 M 
 
 McCarthy, Senator Joseph 30 
 
 Macdonald 41 
 
 Manuilsky 8 
 
 Mao Tse-tung 6, 60, 95 
 
 Carcelo Salado School 51 
 
 Marshall plan 5, 28 
 
 "Masas" 93 
 
 Mater et Magistra 29 
 
 Meat Workers' Federation 20 
 
 Mexico City 8, 9 
 
 Minas Rio Frio School _ _ 51 
 
 Ministers of Foreign Affairs 2, 3, 31, 33, 37-39, 45, 83, 87 
 
 Washington, D.C., 1951 _ . . . 70 
 
 Washington, D.C., 1960 86 
 
 Eighth Meeting of Consultation of 57, 72, 73, 86 
 
 MNR Government 25, 26 
 
 Modigliani 41 
 
 Molina, Mario Monje 93 
 
 Montevideo 8-10 
 
 MPD (movimiento Dominicano Popular) 22 
 
 Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Leftist Revolutionary Move- 
 ment) 24 
 
 N 
 
 National Action Vanguard (VAN) 99 
 
 National Congress, Committee of the 24 
 
 National Farm Confederation 100 
 
 National Liberation Front 101 
 
 National People's Congress 23 
 
 National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace, Latin Ameri- 
 can Conference on 12 
 
 New China News Agency 96, 98 
 
 Nicaragua 98 
 
 Novos Rumbos (PCB official organ) 95 
 
 O 
 
 "One Hundred and Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla Fighter" 60 
 
 "Open Letter From the Argentine Communist Party Regarding the Sino- 
 
 Soviet Ideological Conflict" (leaflet) 92 
 
 "Operacion Triangular (triangular plan) 25 
 
 "Operation America" 12 
 
 Organization of American States iii, iv, vi, 1, 3, 47, 83, 85, 87, 103 
 
 Charter of 28, 35, 38, 66, 85 
 
 Council of 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 45, 48, 65, 69, 70, 72, 73, 86, 88 
 
 Secretary-General of the v 
 
INDEX 
 
 127 
 
 ■DA. P Paee 
 
 i'an American Union 33, 34, 38, 45, 46, 69, 71, 72, 79 
 
 Legal AflFairs, Department of . . . 33 
 
 Panama __ . _ _ I 80 
 
 Panama Canal treaty.mi I' 1" I .1 "I". I '_ 99 
 
 Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) . _ . I' . 99 
 
 Paredes, Saturnine . ___ 100 
 
 Peiping, Congress of _. . ' S ' . /_ 11 
 
 People's Daily _ ______ _ _ _I " _II_ "_ 94 
 
 People's Party (PDF) __ _"""." "'__""!" __ I' ' 99 
 
 People's Vanguard Party __ 11'/ " "~ 96 
 
 Peru _ _ _. . __ _ " 1 102 
 
 Communist Party of (PCP) _ ' __ ""_ "_ " "_ '__I_"1"__1 ' ' ' 99 
 
 Peters, I. J _ _ ________ II' 43 
 
 Petrov, Vladimir IIII__I III_II_III_I__II__I__I_I__I 17 
 
 Pinto, Col. Rodolfo Herrera ________ _ __ __ 69 77" 79 81 
 
 Poland _"__I.__V_I.__"_V_V_ ___'__.' 28', 60 
 
 Political Defense of the Continent, Emergency Advisory Committee for the 
 
 (Montevideo, 1942-48) :_____ _ __ _ __ 46 
 
 Pomar, Pedro I_ _ "I ""HI 95 
 
 Popular Progressive Party 1 -II. 1111 /I. /I. II. 11 /III! 98 
 
 Popular Socialist Party "__"__"_ """"_I"_IIII " 100 
 
 Popular Socialist Party of Cuba IIII II IIIII " _ _ " 19 
 
 Pravda _ _"II_III"" 15 21 
 
 Prensa Latina (Cuban news service) 1111 11.1.1 1.1.11 ' 60 
 
 •S Prestes, Luis Carlos _ _ 94 95 
 
 ^ Punta del Este Conference II III_I IIIIIII_I '22 
 
 Charter of _ II 39 
 
 Quadragesimo Anno ^ 29 
 
 Quanta Cura ...1 I__IIIIIII.I_I II 29 
 
 •V) 
 
 R 
 
 Rakosi, Matyas _ _ _ _ _ j^g 
 
 Ramirez, Lt. Col. Francisco Marcelo 111.1.111.11. 11" _"i 36 45 
 
 Reoabarren, Luis E " ~_ ' '92 
 
 Rerum Novarum I " H __I"I 29 
 
 Resolutions II.l and VIII, Special Committee to Studyri__III 45I46 72 73 86 
 
 Revolutionary Armed Forces ' ' '23 
 
 Revolutionary Labor Party I" __I _II"" loO 
 
 Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) 111. ..11. "lOl 102 
 
 Revolutionary Nationalist Party ""_ ' 100 
 
 Riviere, Andre I_"" _~1_1 y 
 
 Roca, Bias ^ IIII_III__III__I_I__ 19 
 
 Royal Commission, Report of the I I " I7 
 
 Rozier, Lt. Col. Julio Cesar Vadora ..... " 1, 3^ 45 67 
 
 Rueda, Dr. Carlos Angulo "69' 77' 79' 81 
 
 Rumania '_ ' '23 
 
 g 
 
 San Lorenzo School __ 5^ 
 
 Sanchez, Gen. Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez _ i,"36l45" 67 69 77 
 
 Santiago, Chile ' g' 10 
 
 Santo Domingo H " II_ jy v 
 
 Secret Police, Hungarian I__I__III __ '17 
 
 Security Against the Subversive Action of International Communism, 
 
 Special Consultative Committee on _ ___ _ _____ m 
 
 „ , , , „ , IV, 1, 31, 37, 38, 45, 65, 69, 72-77, 79, 81, 86, 87, 89, 105 
 
 bchools ot Revolutionary Instruction, National Congress of the _ 17 24 
 
 Smo-Latm American Cultural & Friendship Association __ 91 
 
 Smo-Soviet Bolivian Friendship Center _ _ _ 91 
 
 Social Democratic parties ._ _ _ "_"I 43 
 
 Socialist Revolution I "I I I"II_ HI "IH 'IH "I_ 104 
 
 Society for Friendship and Trade^with the"People's'Rep"uV^^^^ 91 
 
 South Atlantic Committee _______ _ _ 10 
 
 South Pacific Committee II_III_I_ " _"" I _I"_" 10 
 
128 INDEX 
 
 Fast 
 
 Soviety Embassy at Ottawa 17 
 
 Stalin 14 
 
 "Strengthening of Internal Security" (document) 33, 36, 46, 47 
 
 Suslov, M. A 14 
 
 T 
 
 Third International 7, 8 
 
 Seventh Congress of the (1935) 8 
 
 Tibet e 
 
 Trade Union Federation of Uruguay (Conf ederacion Sindical del Uruguay) . 20 
 
 Trade- Union International, Red 8 
 
 Trotsky 7 
 
 Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party (FOR) 93 
 
 Trujillo, Generalissimo 22 
 
 Tunisia 9 
 
 Turatti 41 
 
 U 
 
 United Nations, Security Council of 88 
 
 Charter of the 28, 88 
 
 Uruguay, Communist Party of 100, 101 
 
 U.S.S.R., Communist Party of 10, 12, 14, 15, 18,ll9, 24, 29, 92 
 
 Presidium of the 14 
 
 First Secretary of the 15 
 
 Central Committee of the 18 
 
 V 
 
 Valverde, Manuel Mora 96 
 
 Venezuela _ ___ ___ 20 22 25 
 
 Communist Party 'of (PCV) r__.V//.".'///_ /_ 24A75',583788, 101, 102 
 
 Secretary for International Relations of PCV 25 
 
 Verde Olivo 23 
 
 W 
 
 Western Union Telegraph Co 59 
 
 White, Gen. Thomas D 1, 36, 45 
 
 Women of America, Congress of 53 
 
 Workers' Confederation of Venezuela (CTV) 20 
 
 World Federation of Trade Unions 8 
 
 World Peace Council, Latin American ofHce of 12 
 
 World Trade Union Federation Congress 53 
 
 Writers and Artists, Congress of 53 
 
 Y 
 
 "Year of Planification" 23 
 
 Youth Plenary, Fifth Communist 95 
 
 Z 
 
 Zabotin, Colonel 17 
 
 Zaldivar, Lt. Col. Joaquin 1, 36, 45, 67, 79, 81 
 
 Zignagho, Col. Luis W. Cicalese 69, 77, 79, 81 
 
 o