THE BENEFITS rW BANK-NOTE CURRENCY By CHARLES A. CONANT, AUTHOR OF “MODERN BANKS OF ISSUE.” Reprinted from The Bankers’ Magazine, February and March , 1900. NEW YORK: BRADFORD RHODES & CO., 78 William Street. tations of merchandise. Securities often take the place of gold as payment, bills of exchange are sent to the country where they mature or are held in the creditor country pending maturity, according to the rate of interest in either country, and gold itself is loaned on credit where its rental is highest. This being the case, a special demand for gold is created on the one hand, which is not dependent upon the domestic transactions of any one country, and a ne¬ cessity is created on the other hand for a domestic medium of exchange which is not controlled absolutely by these temporary and almost arbitrary move¬ ments of the precious metals. Every community ought to take measures to maintain its solvency by retaining a certain minimum supply of the precious metals. This is a matter of sound banking policy or of government regula¬ tion, but it is very far from involving the requirement that the bank note shall be destroyed as an instrument of credit and that the surface of the 4 domestic circulation shall be swept by every tempest upon the stock ex¬ changes which affects the rental price of gold. The steadying and beneficial operation of a bank-note currency in these respects is thus set forth by Prof. Cauwes :* “ The entire community profits by issue, at first because the circulation of bills relieves it from the purchase of a great quantity of metallic money, and then because a mixed cir¬ culation (of bullion, coin and paper) is better regulated, according to the movements of foreign commerce, than a circulation exclusively metallic. If gold and silver were the only money, it would result that every time the importations of foreign goods were in excess of the exportations, money going out of the country would subject the domestic market to a crisis having the consequence of a sudden rise of prices. Paper money acting as an auxil¬ iary to metallic money in quantities varying according to the needs of business, averts the monetary crisis which the operation of the foreign exchanges might otherwise occasion and thus gives more stability to commerce.” The movements of a bank-note currency, therefore, do not and need not correspond precisely to the movements of the precious metals in order to in¬ sure healthy financial conditions. The advantage of such a currency will often be found in this very divergence from mathematical relations to the supply of metallic money. In one community the demand for tools of ex¬ change, perhaps for only a temporary purpose, may strain the note-issuing power to the maximum limit of safety. In such a community the power to issue notes will be of the highest value, because the desired service to trade can be rendered for a fraction of the cost of bringing coin or bullion into the community for the full amount of currency required. In another community the lethargy of transactions, or the preference for other forms of credit, may reduce the volume of outstanding notes to nearly the level of metallic re- “ Cours d'Economie Politique ,” II, p. 309. 26 serves or even below that level. Such a condition may permit the surrender of coin or bullion to a community where the supply is insufficient, but without destroying the power to expand the note issue within reasonable lim¬ its when there is an increased demand for the medium of exchange. The greatest use and highest value of the note-issuing function will be found on the margin where coin cannot go because it is too costly. If the blanket of a metallic currency will spread over only those portions of the community well equipped with surplus capital, the use of the note-issuing function will spread a useful fringe of benefits over a wider area and protect the entire community against the inconveniences of a sudden contraction of the metallic cover. Value of Note Issues in New Countries. There are two classes of conditions under which the privilege of issuing bank notes under the minimum of restrictions is of great service. The first class of conditions are those prevailing in comparatively undeveloped coun¬ tries-, where the supply of capital is not equal to the demand for it for creat¬ ing the machinery of production and means of transportation and where banking offices are widely separated. So pressing is the need for an economi¬ cal paper currency under such conditions, that it has sprung into being beyond the law and outside the law where no legal provision has been made for it. One of the most interesting cases of a successful currency of this sort, which was maintained for several years in the face of hostile legal enact¬ ments, was what was known as “ George Smith’s money,” an episode in the early history of Wisconsin. Wisconsin in 1838, like most of the newer Terri¬ tories of the United States, was without a sufficient metallic currency and without an organized system of banks of issue. The creators of the new money were two Scotchmen, George Smith and Alexander Mitchell, who had been educated in the efficiency of bank-note issues in their native country. George Smith obtained from the Territorial Legislature of Wisconsin a char¬ ter for the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company. The bill became a law on February 28, 1839, and authorized the company to ‘ ‘ make insurance upon life or lives and employ such capital as may belong or accrue to said company in the purchase of public or other stock, or in any other moneyed transaction or operations for the sole benefit of the said company.” There was a general clause, usually incorporated in charters, that ‘ ‘ nothing herein contained shall give the said company banking privileges.” This clause was practically ignored and the banking feature of the business done by the com¬ pany soon overshadowed the insurance feature. The company advertised to “ receive money on deposit and transact other moneyed operations, in which, by their charter, they are allowed to engage.” Certificates of deposit were issued in sums of $1, $3, $5 and $10, in the form of bank bills. These certificates met a popular want and they were soon found in people’s pockets all over Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri and Michigan. They were redeemed in specie at the central office in Milwaukee, and in New York exchange at the current rate through agencies in Chicago, Detroit, Buf¬ falo, Galena, Cincinnati and St. Louis. The success of “George Smith’s money ” was so great that the jealousy of other bankers was incurred and re¬ peated efforts were made to break down the bank. There was a fight running over several sessions of the Wisconsin Legislature to have the charter forfeited 27 or repealed, but in these debates no question was raised in regard to the solvency of the institution, and it was asserted without contradiction that its notes were as “good as gold.” When the other banks, the day after Thanksgiving in 1849, attempted to force the bank to suspend specie payments by gathering and presenting for redemption all the notes they could find, Mr. Mitchell directed that the bank be kept open until a late hour of the evening and that depositors and note holders be paid as rapidly as they presented themselves. Every note presented was redeemed even before the reserve sup¬ ply of cash arrived which was ordered from Chicago. The issues of certificates at this time had reached about $1,000,000, having steadily grown in amount from the organization of the bank. The people of Wisconsin voted down a con¬ stitution which prohibited bank-note issues in the State, largely because of their sympathy with the Mitchell bank. When finally Wisconsin was admitted to the Union in 1848, a general banking law was passed, under which the Wis¬ consin Marine and Fire Insurance Company reorganized. The advantages of this currency, the spontaneous outgrowth of business needs, have been graph¬ ically set forth by Mr. Root: * “It is obvious that ‘ George Smith’s money,’ which played so large a part in the early settlement of the Northwest, took the place of other kinds of money, and especially of specie, for which the products of the country would have otherwise been sold. On condition that the currency should always be redeemed in specie, this was a good thing for the holders of Smith’s money as well as for Smith ; that is, it was an advantage to the public. It was an advantage because it was more convenient to handle and carry and count, while it performed all the local exchanges equally well. It introduced the principle of barter on a large scale. Whatever work bank checks would do in the city of Milwaukee, George Smith’s money would do over the greater part of Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri and Iowa. It enabled the local exchanges to be carried on without specie. * * * In the fall, when the crops began to move, there was no lack of money for legitimate trade, because it was as easy to put out these certificates at one time as at another. In the winter, when lake navigation was closed, the certificates answered all the purposes of a local circulating medium. In the spring, when the steamboats began to move, bringing new set¬ tlers and cargoes of goods, the certificates came back to headquarters mainly for the pur¬ chase of New York drafts, after which they took their usual round again.” A like device for escaping the restrictions imposed by a too narrow note¬ issuing system is that of the Cheque Bank in England, which was instituted after the Bank Act of 1844. Money was received by this bank on deposit, and books of checks were issued for even denominations, which might be filled in for less than the denomination, but not for more. The face value of the checks issued did not exceed the depositor’s credit, so that the receiver of such a check had the assurance of the bank that the depositor’s account was not overdrawn. Such checks were made payable by the Cheque Bank only through some other banker and not at the counter of the bank, thereby escaping the prohibition of the law against promissory notes payable to bearer on demand. The checks passed between individuals for cash, and the Cheque Bank established relations with some 1,500 domestic and foreign banks which agreed to receive and cash its checks. Prof. MacLeod expressed the opinion that these checks, if not a violation of the letter of the law, were at least a violation of its spirit, and, if not interfered with, would open the door wide for any amount of issues of checks capable of circulating as money, * “ Sound Currency ” (April 15, 1898), V, p. 120. All the facts given are from Mr. Root’s paper. by any bank in the Kingdom.* In this view he is correct, and such a device would undoubtedly have been widely adopted if the education of the Eng¬ lish people in the use of other forms of credit had not made it comparatively unnecessary. The success of the Cheque Bank well illustrates the principle that the real needs of a community will usually And spontaneous relief along the lines of least resistance and will often circumvent repressive laws. The issue of bank notes under the minimum of restrictions is of peculiar value in periods of panic, even in countries otherwise well equipped with the mechanism of credit. The demand on such occasions is for some article which is readily exchangeable and which will be accepted in the fulfillment of contracts to deliver money. Such contracts under normal business condi¬ tions are so generally cleared against each other that their fulfillment is not often demanded. These conditions change when confidence is impaired, because a great void is then caused in the usual mechanism of credit, which bank notes are called upon to fill. The issues of bank notes which then occur are abnormal in their character, are not required beyond the period of acute pressure for currency, and may be issued by a sound institution without much regard to the exact proportion of notes to the metallic reserve, so long as the reserve is sufficient to meet all demands and inspire confidence in the solidity of the institution. It is the recognition of the peculiar character of this demand for currency in periods of panic which led to the provisions of the charters of the Imperial Bank of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Bank, and the Bank of Japan, that notes might be issued without the increase of the metallic reserves when they paid a tax to the Government at the rate of about five per cent, a year. The undue restriction of the normal note-issuing function in these countries has compelled resort to this power on many other occasions than those of actual panic, t but upon all these occasions the power to issue notes, even under a heavy penalty, has proved useful to the business community. The utility of the power to issue bank notes without fixed limits in meet¬ ing the abnormal demand of a panic has been clearly shown on all of the occasions of crisis which have swept the London money market within the present century. The Bank of England was strong enough, only a short time after its resumption of cash payments, to stay the panic of 1825 by the free issue of its own notes. The display of stacks of £1 notes upon the coun¬ ters of the Gurneys at Norwich was sufficient to arrest the run upon their bank 4 The Bank came to the rescue of the money market in a similar man¬ ner in the crisis of 1847, again in 1857, and again in 1866. There never was a question on any of these occasions of the value of the notes of the Bank as the equivalent of money. The only question which arose, under the charter of the Bank, after the restrictive act of 1844, was the authority to * “ There can be no possible doubt that these instruments, these crossed bank notes, are an utter and complete violation of the manifest purpose and intention, not only of the Bank Charter Act, but of all our monetary legislation for the last century. For what is easier than for the bank and its customers to agree to make these checks for £1, and put them into circulation? Then we have at once£l banknotes. So also the checks for 10s. and 5s. are the old silver notes back again. If the Cheque Bank may do this with impunity, why may not every other bank in the Kingdom do the same?”—“Theory and Practice of Bank¬ ing,” II, p. 376. + In Germany notes were issued subject to the tax during sixteen weeks of 1898, and such issues stood on December 31 at 282,955,280 marks ($70,000,000). $ MacLeod, “ Theory and Practice of Banking,” II, p. 118. 29 issue a sufficient amount of notes to meet the demands of the commercial community. The Bank Act greatly hampered the issue of notes, but author¬ ity was given to the Bank by the Government on each of these occasions to disregard the limits of the law and issue as many notes as might be required. The mere fact that the authority to issue notes was given, and that currency could be had by solvent borrowers, was sufficient to stay the tide of panic in 1847. Notes which had been hoarded, under the impression that the limit of issues fixed by the law would soon be reached, came pouring from their hiding places, gold which had been stored in deposit vaults was returned to the banks for deposit, and both the metallic and banking reserves of the Bank of England rapidly rose to safe proportions. A similar experience accompanied the crisis of 1857, when £2,000,000 in notes were actually issued above the legal limit. The crisis of 1866 was met in a similar manner. The Bank of England could hardly have continued to meet its liabilities for another day if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not announced in the House of Commons on the evening of May 11—“ Black Friday ”—that the Government had addressed a letter to the Bank authorizing the suspension of the note limit.* The panic was again checked by the knowledge that a medium of exchange could be obtained by solvent borrowers. The power to issue notes without a rigid limit, even if they are restricted to a fixed relation to the metallic reserve, is of value in periods of panic. It usually inspires confidence at such times for the great note-issuing banks to borrow gold from abroad. This was done by the Bank of England on the occasion of the Baring failure in 1890, when £3,000,000 was obtained from the Bank of France upon the security of exchequer bonds and £1,500,000 was obtained from St. Petersburg. The crisis of 1890 was prevented from degenerating into a panic by a combination among the leading banks,t so that there was not much special call for currency to fulfill money con¬ tracts, and there was no tendency to withdraw deposits from the banks because of distrust. If such a panic had occurred, accompanied by a demand for deposits'from the banks, the importations of gold would have proved a defec¬ tive as well as insufficient resource for meeting the demand. It would have been otherwise if the gold had been availed of under such circumstances as a reserve against note issues to the amount of twice or three times its value. The potency of the gold would then have been doubled or trebled in amount and its real efficiency would have been increased in a much greater ratio by reason of the general preference for notes over coin. Charles A. Con ant. * Gilbart, II, p. 354. One of the representatives of the joint-stock banks is reported to have said to the representative of the Bank of England, at a meeting of the leading bankers just before midnight, before the limit of note issue was removed, “ I can draw a couple of checks to-morrow morning which will shut you up at once.” t Mr. Lidderdale, the Governor of the Bank of England, secured an agreement among the joint-stock banks of London, the leading provincial banks, and the joint-stock banks of Scotland to guarantee the liquidation of the Baring indebtedness to the amount of £15,000,000. Vide MacLeod, “ Theory of Credit,” II, p. 836.