THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 OF AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 IN RELATION TO THE FAR EAST 
 
 ADDRESS BY 
 
 STANLEY K. HORNBECK 
 Department of State 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 NINTH CONFERENCE 
 ON THE CAUSE AND CURE OF WAR 
 
 Washington, January 18, 1934 
 
 UNITED STATES 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 WASHINGTON : 1934 
 
 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. - Price 5 cents 
 
Publication No. 667 
 
 This address was originally issued by the 
 Department of State as a mimeographed press 
 release, for publication January 19, 1934. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN POLICY— 
 IN RELATION TO THE FAR EAST^ 
 
 Your committee did me the honor to ask that 
 I give you a "factual statement on the foreign 
 pohcy of the United States as it relates to the 
 Far Eastern situation. " I replied that I would 
 be glad to attempt to make a statement with 
 regard to principles of American policy — ^in 
 relation to the Far East. The reason for my 
 making what might be called in the language of 
 business or diplomacy a "counter proposal" 
 was that, having tried many times to do so, I 
 find it quite impossible to describe the policy 
 of the United States as it relates to the Far 
 Eastern situation as a thing apart. Moreover, 
 the so-called "Far Eastern situation" is con- 
 stantly changing. 
 
 Policy has to be considered either from point 
 of view of principles or point of view of execu- 
 tion. It is necessary to distinguish clearly — 
 although it is not possible at all times and in all 
 connections to draw a line — between principles 
 of policy and execution of policy. "Policy" 
 is a term designative of attitude, desire, 
 objective, and intention. Execution of policy 
 is a matter of expression: it relates to, and 
 involves, plans, courses of action, agencies, 
 instruments, strategy, and tactics: operations. 
 In principles of policy we have something 
 more permanent, something broader and deep- 
 er, something on which policy rests and by 
 which it is guided. 
 
 For those reasons and for others which will 
 be apparent as we proceed, it seems to me more 
 practicable and useful to try to indicate what 
 are the principles of a policy than to attempt to 
 give an account of "operations" in relation to a 
 constantly changing situation. 
 
 1 Address delivered by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief 
 of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of 
 State, before the Ninth Conference on the Cause and 
 Cure of War, at the Washington Hotel, Washington, 
 D.C., Jan. 18, 1934. 
 
 (1) 
 
I. 
 
 2 
 
 I do not come as nor would I pose as one able 
 to speak with "authority" or with any degree 
 of finality. I am studying this subject — just 
 as you and others are studying it. In what I 
 shall say, I am not speaking for the Govern- 
 ment, nor am I expressing views as from, of, or 
 for the Department of which it is my privilege 
 to be an officer. For what I shall say, I alone 
 will be responsible. I shall make some affirma- 
 tions to which there may not be universal 
 assent. I shall suggest some questions to 
 which only the future can give the answers. I 
 would ask that you keep in mind the subject. 
 I shall try to keep to it. I shall try to make 
 my statement objective. It follows that as far 
 as possible I shall avoid expressing opinion, 
 especially opinion within the realm of moral or 
 political appraisals. 
 
 Think, then, of policy, and in particular of 
 principles of policy. 
 
 On the basis of a good deal of consideration 
 of the subject I have long been of the opinion 
 that the principles of American policy in rela- 
 tion to the Far East are in no way separate or 
 distinct from those which underlie the foreign 
 policy of the United States in general. 
 
 It therefore seems necessary to ask what are 
 the principles of our foreign policy in general. 
 And to know and understand these we must 
 ask first: Wliat are their sources? 
 
 I. SouECES OF Policy 
 
 1. Foreign policy is a living thing. It""grows. 
 It is not unlike a tree. It has roots in the soil 
 from which it springs. It has ^^a trunk, 
 branches, and leaves in the atmosphere in 
 which it becomes visible and where it afiiects 
 and is affected by the thousand and one factors 
 of its environment. From the soil it draws 
 most of its substance. From the atmosphere 
 and its general environment above ground it 
 derives factors which contribute to the determi- 
 nation of its size, its shape, and other qualities. 
 
3 
 
 In this country, policy has its roots in the 
 minds and hearts of the people who constitute 
 the Nation. Thence it draws most of its sub- 
 stance. The Nation is an aggregation of 
 125,000,000 persons. The thought, the atti- 
 tude, and the objectives of the Nation are 
 products of heredity and environment. Not 
 all of the people are articulate, but every one 
 of them has some influence upon the making of 
 policy. The influence of many of us, at any 
 moment, may be, it is true, merely or almost 
 negative, but nevertheless, even so, it has an 
 effect. 
 
 Under our Constitution sovereignty resides 
 in the people. The people elect the legislators 
 who make the laws and the principal executive 
 officials who administer them. The Govern- 
 ment, any administration, may lead or may 
 follow pubhc opinion; but it does not go far 
 ahead of, it does not lag far behind, and it 
 cannot in any major matter proceed in disre- 
 gard of the attitude or inclination of the Nation 
 as a whole. 
 
 It is the first business of the Government of 
 the United States to safeguard and promote the 
 interests of the people of the United States. 
 These interests are both domestic and foreign, 
 they are both national and international. 
 Who decides what they shall be? Who de- 
 cides what the attitude of the United States 
 toward their safeguarding and promotion shall 
 be? Who decides what agencies shall be em- 
 ployed in expression of that attitude? Who, 
 by control — through the legislature — of the 
 purse and of the power to declare or to refuse 
 to declare war, decides what strength and what 
 authority these agencies shall have and in what 
 direction and how far they shall move? The 
 answer to each and all of these questions is, 
 it seems to me: The American people. 
 
 Mr. Kellogg said aptly several years ago: 
 
 "Let us get it clearly in mind, then, that 
 the foreign policy of a country is a slow 
 growth. * * * 
 
4 
 
 '*If you want to know what it is at a given 
 moment, you must take into account * * * 
 the whole history of the country as far as its 
 international relations are concerned. For 
 there cannot be a bit of doubt that we do have 
 a foreign policy * * * ^^isit is not the 
 
 work of any individual or of any Administra- 
 tion, simply the traditional and historically 
 developed policy of the United States which 
 every Secretary of State strives faithfully to 
 interpret and to apply." 
 
 2. What, then, has been the history of the 
 United States? It has been that of several 
 streams of emigration from European countries 
 into a land of vast extent and great resources; 
 of the occupation of that land and the develop- 
 ment of its resources; of the making of a new 
 Nation ; of the taking by that Nation of a place 
 in the family of nations ; and of advance by that 
 Nation into a place among the leading nations 
 of the world. 
 
 This Nation is made up of men and women 
 descended from ancestors within whom, for 
 one reason or another, there developed the 
 urge to seek a greater measure of freedom and 
 larger opportunities than were afforded them 
 in the lands of their birth, who were willing to 
 take the risks and endure the hardships of 
 leaving the soil and the society in which they 
 had grown up, who sought and found a new 
 environment, who had the courage and the 
 capacity to create and to maintain a new 
 society. 
 
 For the most part, the people who came as 
 colonists to central North America came with 
 no thoughts of conquest. They came to 
 found homes; they sought opportunity to live 
 in freedom and, if possible, in comfort. They 
 wanted peace. Yet they fought. They con- 
 quered men and they conquered nature. 
 They took lands; they built; they created 
 commonwealths. Their descendants fought — 
 for their national independence. They made 
 of the States which their fathers had created a 
 Union. The next generation fought — to enforce 
 respect for the rights of their country as an 
 
n5 
 
 independent member of the family of nations. 
 A later generation fought— to decide whether 
 the Union should endure. Our own genera- 
 tion has fought — on behalf of the principle 
 that states and peoples shall be permitted to 
 live their own lives in security and in peace. 
 
 The American people have fought — for 
 opportunity, for national existence, for prin- 
 ciples, for peace. Otherwise, however, they 
 have been very busy for 3 centuries with 
 problems relating to the creation and main- 
 tenance of an independent state and a free 
 citizenry. Until recently, their chief concerns 
 have been agriculture, transportation, mining, 
 manufacturing, trade — and education. Their 
 chief interests have been domestic. 
 
 However, having as a nation rounded out 
 their continental frontiers, having made of 
 their country a world power, and having 
 during the last 3 decades overcome or been 
 deprived of their national aloofness, the 
 American people have been brought in the 
 present generation right up against certain 
 age-old problems in international relations. 
 
 It is a habit of the American people, when 
 they come in contact with problems, to try to 
 do something about them. Already the Ameri- 
 can people have taken a position in the fore- 
 front among the nations in the desire to con- 
 tribute constructively to the solution of some 
 of these problems. And one of those problems 
 is that of world peace. 
 
 3 . Judge John Bassett Moore has emphasized 
 the point that the keynote of the foreign 
 policy of the United States from the outset 
 was "freedom founded on law". There has 
 prevailed among the American people the 
 concept that, whether or not all men are "born 
 free and equal", all men should have free 
 opportunity for self-realization. Translated 
 into the political field, this means that laws 
 should not be discriminatory, that laws should 
 in fact provide for and as far as possible 
 insure equality of opportunity. Projecting 
 this concept into the field of international 
 
6 
 
 relations, the American people have believed 
 and continue to believe in principles which 
 are expressed in the formulae of "sovereignty", 
 "independence", and "equality of oppor- 
 tunity". 
 
 Thus American foreign policy in general has 
 been shaped by the belief of the American 
 people that free states should remain free, that 
 peace is or should be the norm in human rela- 
 tionships, and that important among the condi- 
 tions essential to enjoyment and maintenance 
 of peace are respect by all states for the rights 
 of other states and fair treatment by every 
 state of those who live within or come within 
 its jurisdiction. In the realm of formulated 
 effort, the principal major objectives of Ameri- 
 can foreign policy since the earliest days of the 
 Republic have been, first, to safeguard this 
 country's position as a free and sovereign state 
 and, second, to obtain for American nationals 
 and American trade assurance of equal oppor- 
 tunity and fair treatment in every place to 
 which American citizens, American ships, and 
 American goods may choose to go. 
 
 In recent years, however, there has been 
 added a new objective. This Nation, now 
 potentially stronger than any other, has become 
 deeply impressed by the concept of world peace. 
 Be this attributable to inherited liberalism or to 
 acquired conservatism, to expanding altruism 
 or to change of circumstances; whatever the 
 hows and wherefores; whether for good or for 
 bad, for better or for worse, this is, apparently, 
 a fact. 
 
 4. The contemporary effort to deal with the 
 problem of peace is one of the great develop- 
 ments of the post-war period. Nations are 
 talking peace. Statesmen are endeavoring to 
 create machinery for maintaining peace. How- 
 ever, that effort can have little effect unless at 
 the same time the conditions of life of men and 
 nations be so altered, so improved, that the 
 irritants and incentives which occasion resort 
 to force disappear. Statesmen may devise all 
 
7 
 
 sorts of macliinery; but the conditions which 
 wUl make it possible for peace machinery to 
 function effectively must be produced by the 
 common effort of many peoples. That problem 
 is a world problem. It has caught the imagina- 
 tion — if not yet the hard thought — of the 
 American people. And to the challenge of that 
 problem the people of this country are more 
 and more turning their attention. 
 
 Hence the American Government during 
 recent administrations has directed toward that 
 objective much of its thought and effort in the 
 realm of foreign policy. 
 
 5. The makers of this country fought for a 
 national existence and national security. Do 
 the American people in the present generation 
 understand that these can be maintained only 
 at a price? Are they willing to pay the neces- 
 sary price for their assurance? They now wish 
 for world peace. Do they so ardently desire it 
 that they will be willing to contribute their 
 share of a fair price for its attainment? We 
 were told in 1918 that we were fighting to ''make 
 the world safe for democracy". Would this 
 country be willing to fight again — and perhaps 
 repeatedly — toward that end? Can it by sheer 
 moral force, intelligently directed, so conduct 
 itself and so influence other nations as to attain 
 that end without further fighting? To these 
 questions the answers lie in the future. 
 
 6. In these facts and in the answers which 
 may be given to these questions there is to be 
 sought, in my opinion, knowledge and under- 
 standing of the principles which underlie the 
 foreign policy of the United States. 
 
 II. Evolution and Content op Policy 
 
 Probably the most common error made by 
 those who discuss policy is that of failure to 
 distinguish between principles and execution. 
 Principles are a reflection of the thought and 
 the desires of the Nation. Execution relates to 
 application, in action, of principles. The gov- 
 ernments, the administrations, the officials 
 
 43265—34 2 
 
8 
 
 responsible at any given moment for the con- 
 duct of affairs, find a great body of principles 
 and a collection of practices in eft'ect. Here 
 they may make alterations — of addition, of 
 subtraction, destructive or constructive. They 
 may or may not make declaration of the prin- 
 ciples and practices which will be employed in 
 the conduct by them of foreign relations. For 
 the most part, however, their task is that of 
 execution. This involves formulation of plans 
 of action, putting plans into operation, and 
 meeting and dealing with situations and prob- 
 lems in existence or which arise. Incidentally, 
 in political matters, what we call "action" may 
 or may not involve activity. The making of a 
 decision is a matter of action, whether the exe- 
 cution thereof requires activity or inactivity. 
 In the latter case we have what is called "nega- 
 tive" action. 
 
 The "foreign policy of the United States" 
 and the principles thereof are matters the gen- 
 eral outlines and content of which are well 
 understood by a considerable number of stu- 
 dents. The attitude and the objectives of the 
 Nation do not change greatly from month to 
 month or from year to year; nor do they often 
 change abruptly. Less well understood — and 
 all too often confused with policy — are what 
 may be called the strategy and the tactics by 
 which officials endeavor, during the compara- 
 tively short periods for which, in succession, 
 they are in office, to execute policy. Here there 
 is variety, here there may be substantial and 
 often comparatively abrupt changes, from ad- 
 ministration to administration, or even during 
 one administration. 
 
 For present purposes we are not considering 
 strategy and tactics. Often, however, not 
 only principles of policy but substantial ele- 
 ments of strategy and tactics are disclosed in 
 public statements or in communications which 
 are made public, 
 
 I should Hke to ask that you look with me at 
 a few documents, or parts thereof, which, 
 
9 
 
 though drafted by or uttered or issued by 
 individuals, are expressive of the attitude and 
 intent of the American people in the field of 
 foreign relations. There will be apparent indi- 
 cations not only of the sources but of the con- 
 tent of our foreign policy, together with some 
 examples of strategy and tactics. 
 
 For this purpose we must begin, naturally, 
 by referring to Washington's Farewell Address. 
 In his "Last Words to the People of the United 
 States", on September 27, 1796, Washington, 
 addressing "Friends and Fellow Citizens", 
 said, in part: 
 
 "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard 
 to foreign nations, is, in extending our com- 
 mercial relations, to have with them as little 
 political connection as possible. * * * 
 
 "Europe has a set of primary interests, which 
 to us have none, or a very remote relation. 
 Hence she must be engaged in frequent con- 
 troversies, the causes of which are essentially 
 foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it 
 must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by 
 artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
 politics, or the ordinary combinations and 
 collisions of her friendships or enmities. 
 
 "Our detached and distant situation in- 
 vites and enables us to pursue a difi^erent 
 course. * * * 
 
 "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a 
 situation? * * * 
 
 "'Tis our true policy to steer clear of per- 
 manent alliances, with any portion of the for- 
 eign world; * * * 
 
 "Taking care always to keep ourselves, by 
 suitable establishments, in a respectable defen- 
 sive posture, we may safely trust to temporary 
 alliances for extraordinary emergencies. 
 
 "Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all 
 nations are recommended by policy, humanity, 
 and interest. But even our commercial policy 
 should hold an equal and impartial hand; 
 neither se§king nor granting exclusive favors or 
 preferences; * * * constantly keeping in 
 view, that it is folly in one nation to look 
 for disinterested favors from another; that it 
 must pay with a portion of its independ- 
 ence for whatever it may accept under that 
 character; * * *" 
 
10 
 
 How much have we, in the course of a hun- 
 dred and thirty-seven years, added to and how 
 much have we subtracted from facts underlying 
 and the idea expressed in that statement? 
 
 a. In his annual message of December 2, 
 1823, President Monroe made, after prompting 
 from various quarters and on the basis of a 
 Cabinet discussion, certain pronouncements in 
 declaration of policy — whence the so-called 
 "Monroe Doctrine". In the course of these, 
 there appeared statements as follows: 
 
 * * the occasion has been judged 
 proper for asserting as a principle in which the 
 rights and interests of the United States are 
 involved, that the American continents, by the 
 free and independent condition which they have 
 assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to 
 be considered as subjects for future colonization 
 by any European powers. 
 
 * * We owe it, therefore, to candor, 
 and to the amicable relations existing between 
 the United States and those powers, to declare 
 that we should consider any attempt on their 
 part to extend their system to any portion of 
 this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
 safety. With the existing colonies or depend- 
 encies of any European power we have not 
 interfered and shall not interfere. * * * 
 
 * * Our policy in regard to Europe, 
 which was adopted at an early stage of the wars 
 which have so long agitated that quarter of the 
 globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, 
 not to interfere in the internal concerns of any 
 of its powers; to consider the government de 
 facto as the legitimate government for us; to 
 cultivate friendly relations with it, and to pre- 
 serve • those relations by a frank, firm, and 
 manly polic^f , meeting, in all instances, the just 
 claims of every power, submitting to injmies 
 from none. * * *" 
 
 In what I have quoted we find an almost 
 complete statement of the fundam^tal prin- 
 ciples of the Latin American policy of the 
 United States; and more even than that: a 
 fairly broad statement of the fundamental 
 principles of what might be called our "Euro- 
 pean policy" and even of our foreign policy in 
 general. All of this was an enunciation by one 
 
11 
 
 man — the man, however, who was at the mo- 
 ment the President of the United States — of 
 views which had developed among and which 
 were held by the people whose spokesman 
 he was. And these views appear still to be 
 held, for the most part, by the people of the 
 United States. 
 
 b. Now turn to another part of the world, the 
 Far East. 
 
 That which is called "American Far Eastern 
 policy" has grown from and has been shaped 
 by the belief of the American people that free 
 states should remain free — in the Orient as 
 elsewhere — and that nations should live and let 
 Uve with due respect for the rights and interests 
 of one another. In regard to all parts of the 
 Far East, the American people have viewed 
 with disapproval tendencies — ^where mani- 
 fested — toward imperialistic angling in troubled 
 waters. Also, they naturally have assumed 
 that they themselves have there, as elsewhere, 
 certain rights and in connection with them cer- 
 tain obligations. These conceptions the Amer- 
 ican Government has translated into state- 
 ments and action, in one administration after 
 another, and the resultant policy has grown 
 consistently. 
 
 When our diplomatic relations with China 
 began, the first and principal positive objective 
 of American official action in regard to China 
 was — as it had been and has been elsewhere — 
 to assure for American nationals a fair and 
 equal opportunity to trade, but with due re- 
 spect for the rights of the Chinese as an or- 
 ganized nation in a sovereign state. In 1842 
 Commodore Kearny, of the U.S.S. Constella- 
 tion, addressed to the Governor of Canton a 
 communication in which he asked that citizens 
 of the United States in their trade should "be 
 placed upon the same footing as the merchants 
 of the nation most favored." In 1843, in his 
 letter to the Emperor, President Tyler said, 
 among other things: "Our Minister, Caleb 
 Cushing, is authorized to make a treaty to 
 
12 
 
 regulate trade. Let it be just. Let there be 
 no unfair advantage on either side. * * *" 
 The most important provision — although not 
 the most distinctive — in the treaty which 
 Gushing concluded with China, in 1844, was 
 the provision for most-favored-nation treat- 
 ment. 
 
 In the period of the Taiping rebellion, Hum- 
 phrey Marshall, American Commissioner, took 
 the position: "* * * it is my purpose to 
 perform, punctiliously, every obligation as- 
 sumed by the United States under the treaty, 
 and to refrain from embarrassing the public 
 administration of Chinese affairs by throwing 
 unnecessary obstacles in the way." The 
 American Government was of the same mind: 
 its pohcy became that of respecting China's 
 sovereignty and helping the Chinese authorities 
 to maintain the integrity of the Empire. 
 
 Shortly thereafter, although Americans in 
 China, including officials, merchants, and some 
 missionaries, urged that the Um'ted States 
 cooperate with certain other countries in the 
 use of force against Imperial China, the Amer- 
 ican Government refused to do so. Sixty years 
 later, in 1927, this country declined to take 
 part in a proposed joint show of force by sev- 
 eral powers in support of demands upon the 
 newly created Nationalist Government of the 
 Republic of China. 
 
 In 1868, in the so-called Burlingame Treaty, 
 for the negotiation of which the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment had chosen as its plenipotentiary a 
 distinguished American, the American Govern- 
 ment expressly agreed that the sovereign rights 
 of China and the principle of equal opportunity 
 "in trade or navigation within the Chinese 
 dominions" were to be respected. 
 
 It remained for John Hay to formulate in 
 1899 the proposal that, in reference to their 
 "spheres of interest" in China, the powers 
 should follow, with regard to each other and to 
 the world in general, the principle of equality of 
 commercial opportunity; and to suggest in 
 
13 
 
 1900 that the powers pledge themselves to re- 
 spect China's territorial and administrative 
 entity. 
 
 In September and November 1899, Hay, then 
 Secretary of State, sent to the diplomatic repre- 
 sentatives of the United States at London, 
 Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, and Eome 
 instructions to advise the governments to 
 which they were respectively accredited of the 
 hope that they would make "formal declaration 
 of an 'open door' policy in the territories held 
 by them in China." Certain express pledges 
 of self-denial were sought. In due course 
 favorable replies were received from all the 
 governments addressed. Having in hand and 
 having compared the replies. Hay, on March 
 20, 1900, sent instructions to each of the above- 
 mentioned representatives of the United States 
 to inform the government to which he was ac- 
 credited that, inasmuch as it had accepted the 
 declaration suggested by the United States and 
 as like action had been taken by all the various 
 powers concerned, the condition of common 
 acceptance having been complied with, the 
 United States Government would consider the 
 assent given as final and definite. In other 
 words. Hay declared that in his opinion each 
 of these six powers had entered with the United 
 States into a mutual declaration of intention to 
 preserve the commercial status quo in China 
 and to refrain, each in what might be its sphere 
 of interest, from measures calculated to destroy 
 equality of commercial opportunity. 
 
 But there was more to follow. In the spring 
 of 1900 the Boxer movement threw the affairs of 
 China and the possibilities as to her immediate 
 future into the melting pot. While the attack 
 on the legations was still in progress. Hay, on 
 July 3, 1900, sent a circular telegram to the 
 diplomatic representatives of the United States 
 at 11 capitals, declaring: 
 
 ''In this critical posture of affairs in China 
 it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude 
 of the United States as far as present circum- 
 
14 
 
 stances permit this to be done. We adhere to 
 the poHcy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with 
 the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful 
 commerce, and of protection of lives and prop- 
 erty of our citizens by all means guaranteed 
 under extraterritorial treaty rights and by the 
 law of nations. If wrong be done to our 
 citizens we propose to hold the responsible 
 authors to the uttermost accountability. We 
 regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual 
 anarchy, whereby power and responsibility are 
 practically devolved upon the local provincial 
 authorities. So long as they are not in overt 
 collusion with rebellion and use their power to 
 protect foreign life and property, we regard 
 them as representing the Chinese people, 
 with whom we seek to remain in peace and 
 friendship. The purpose of the President is, 
 as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently 
 with the other Powers; first, in opening up 
 communication with Peking and rescuing the 
 American officials, missionaries, and other 
 Americans who are in danger; secondly, in 
 affording all possible protection everywhere in 
 China to American life and property; thirdly, 
 in guarding and protecting all legitimate 
 American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to 
 prevent a spread of the disorders to the other 
 provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of 
 such disasters. It is of course too early to 
 forecast the means of attaining this last result; 
 but the policy of the Government of the United 
 States is to seek a solution which may bring 
 about permanent safety and peace to China, 
 preserve Chinese territorial and administrative 
 entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly 
 Powers by treaty and international law, and 
 safeguard for the world the principle of equal 
 and impartial trade with all parts of the 
 Chinese Empire. 
 
 ''You will communicate the purpose of this 
 instruction to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Hay." 
 
 In that note we have mention of "attitude", 
 ''policy", "purpose", and "means". The 
 basic principles in that statement were (1) 
 protection of American lives, property, and 
 legitimate interests; and (2) respect for the 
 territorial and administrative integrity of 
 China. Could one find a more succinct state- 
 ment — ^in terms applicable not only to the 
 
15 
 
 situation and problems of that moment but to 
 a progressively troublesome situation and an 
 enduring problem? 
 
 In various ways each of the powers addressed 
 indicated or intimated that it intended to be 
 governed by the same or similar principles. 
 
 The "Hay notes" thus carried a step further 
 the idea which had been expressed by repre- 
 sentatives of the American Government from 
 time to time during a period of 60 years pre- 
 ceding. Also they added an idea, that of co- 
 operation among the powers in a course of self- 
 denial and self-restraint in pursuance of those 
 principles. And they committed to these 
 principles the United States and those of the 
 other principal powers most concerned. 
 
 c. Twenty-two years after the Hay notes, 
 there came action whereby there were given to 
 some of the fundamental principles of the Far 
 Eastern policy of the United States greater 
 definition and more positive general subscrip- 
 tion. At the Washington Conference, with 
 the American Government playing a leading 
 part and its Secretary of State, the present 
 Chief Justice, Mr. Hughes, wielding a great 
 influence, the powers principally concerned com- 
 mitted themselves in formal treaties and 
 resolutions to certain prescribed courses of 
 action, some positive and some negative, in 
 regard to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 In one of these, the "Treaty relating to 
 Principles and Policies concerning China", we 
 find in the preamble a statement that the nine 
 countries engaged in conference, "Desiring to 
 adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions 
 in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and 
 interests of China, and to promote intercourse 
 between China and the other Powers upon the 
 basis of equality of opportunity ; Have resolved 
 to conclude a treaty for that purpose * * *. " 
 In the articles of the treaty we find a solemnly 
 concluded multilateral pledge on the part of 
 the United States and (now) 13 other powers to 
 respect China's integrity, to foster the principle 
 
16 
 
 of equality of commercial opportunity in 
 China, and to practice self-denial and self- 
 restraint in relations with China. 
 
 In 1931 and 1932 another administration, 
 that of President Hoover, vigorously cham- 
 pioned the spirit and the letter of the pledges 
 made in 1922, Whatever may be the analyst's 
 view of the strategy and tactics which that 
 administration employed, the statement of the 
 Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, in declaration 
 and exposition of the views and objectives of 
 the United States, made public in the letter in 
 reply to an inquiry from Senator Borah, based 
 in considerable part on the Washington Con- 
 ference treaties and another treaty of later date, 
 was widely approved in this country and evoked 
 very favorable comment abroad. 
 
 d. Now, to another chapter. In the period 
 between 1922 and 1931, statesmen of this and 
 other countries had brought into existence a 
 comprehensive multilateral agreement, the 
 Pact of Paris, the "Peace Treaty" of 1928, to 
 which 63 states are now parties. 
 
 In this treaty we have an enunciation of a 
 new principle, a declaration by the governments 
 of the world, "in the names of their respective 
 peoples", condemning recourse to war for the 
 solution of international controversies and re- 
 nouncing it as an instrument of national policy; 
 together with an agreement that the settlement 
 or solution of all disputes or conflicts which may 
 arise among the parties shall "never be sought 
 except by pacific means." 
 
 What does this combined declaration, renun- 
 ciation, and pledge mean? 
 
 First of all, the text of that treaty must be 
 viewed not by itself but in connection with the 
 explanations made by or exchanged among the 
 negotiators and with the reservations made by 
 various governments in giving their ratifica- 
 tions. Already hundreds of articles and several 
 whole volumes have been written in comment 
 upon and exposition of the two substantive 
 articles of this pact. 
 
17 
 
 This much is certain: The tendency in this 
 country is to take this treaty seriously. The 
 desire for peace is generally prevalent in this 
 country. The wish to see the spirit of the 
 Pact of Paris prevail, together with the fact 
 that we are favorably circumstanced, will prob- 
 ably render this country comparatively "strict " 
 in its interpretation and application of its obli- 
 gations under this pact. It may be assumed 
 that the people of this country will not lightly 
 resort to or approve of "war" or use of force in 
 ways approximating war. It may further be 
 assumed that they will be adversely disposed 
 toward any proposals tending toward involving 
 this country in commitments contemplating 
 use of force. 
 
 Speaking of the proposal to add sanctions to 
 the Pact of Paris, President Hoover said, on 
 April 14, 1930: 
 
 "The nations of Europe, surrounded by the 
 dangers and problems of which we in the West- 
 ern Hemisphere have but little appreciation, 
 and beset by inherited fears, hold to the view 
 that, aside from the World Court, the pacific 
 settlement of controversies and the mainte- 
 nance of peace should be backed by potential 
 coercion through pooling of either military or 
 economic strength. We do not question their 
 right to come to such conclusions as they see fit 
 to follow, arising as they do from their terrible 
 experience and their necessities. But the in- 
 stinct of the vast majority of our people is that 
 our contribution is not to be based upon com- 
 mitments to use force to maintain peace. 
 * * * We have come to the belief that our 
 contribution can best be made by our good 
 ofl&ces and a helpfulness based upon independ- 
 ence from any combination pledge to use force. 
 I believe it is clear that the United States can 
 more effectively and wisely work for peace 
 without commitments to use coercion to enforce 
 settlements." 
 
 e. But what and how, if and when other 
 countries choose to pursue courses which con- 
 travene what we consider to be our rights under 
 the provisions of the Pact of Paris or other 
 treaties? 
 
18 
 
 For one answer to that question turn to a 
 group of diplomatic communications and see a 
 declaration of attitude, a policy, a doctrine in 
 the making. I refer to the evolution of the so- 
 called "doctrine" of "nonrecognition". I 
 shall not go into that subject, for I understand 
 that it has a place at another point in your 
 program. I need only, for present purposes, 
 call attention to the fact that the formula of 
 nonrecognition has been employed by the 
 American Government on several occasions, by 
 several administrations, and in connection not 
 only with developments in the Far East but 
 with developments in Latin America. This 
 formula gained world-wide attention when it 
 was invoked in the identic notes addressed by 
 the American Government to the Chinese and 
 the Japanese Governments on January 7, 1932, 
 in connection with developments in Manchuria. 
 Soon thereafter it was seized upon by the 
 League of Nations, and it has been made by it 
 the basis of several expressions of the attitude 
 and intent of the League toward the use of 
 force and situations brought about thereby. • 
 
 Evidence in the field of action during the 
 past year indicates that both the United States 
 and the members of the League are acting — the 
 type of action being that of refraining from 
 certain acts — in conformity with the "non- 
 recognition" formula and the declarations of 
 intent which have attended its affirmation. 
 
 /. Turning to the question: What is the 
 attitude of the United States with regard to 
 the League of Nations? I am convinced, on 
 the basis of considerable study of that question, 
 that an adequate working conception can be 
 gained by careful perusal of official correspond- 
 ence made public during the past 3 years and of 
 recent public utterances of President Roosevelt. 
 In these there is evidence of the thought that 
 the United States is willing and happy to co- 
 operate with the League in pursuance of 
 common objectives, but acting independently 
 and through its own agencies, thus avoiding 
 
19 
 
 involvement of this country in the functioning 
 and processes of the League as such. 
 
 g. Now let us look at certain statements and 
 acts of the present administration. 
 
 ^-1. In his inaugural address on March 4, 
 1933, President Roosevelt touched upon foreign 
 policy in a paragraph which reads: 
 
 "In the field of world policy I would dedicate 
 this na tion to the policy of the good neighbor — 
 the neighbor who resolutely respects himself 
 and, because he does so, respects the rights of 
 others — the neighbor who respects his obliga- 
 tions and respects the sanctity of his agree- 
 ments in and with a world of neighbors." 
 
 g-2. In an address delivered on Pan Amer- 
 ican Day, April 12, 1933, President Roosevelt 
 referred to the statement in his inaugural ad- 
 dress with regard to "the policy of the good 
 neighbor" and continued: 
 
 "Never have the need and benefit of neighborly 
 cooperation in every form of human activity 
 been so evident as they are today. 
 
 "Friendship among nations, as among indi- 
 viduals, calls for constructive efforts to muster 
 the forces of humanity in order that an atmos- 
 phere of close understanding and cooperation 
 may be cultivated. It involves mutual obliga- 
 tions and responsibilities, for it is only by sym- 
 pathetic respect for the rights of others and a 
 scrupulous fulfillment of the corresponding ob- 
 ligations by each member of the community 
 that a true fraternity can be maintained. 
 
 •i^ ^ ^ ^ iji 
 
 "Your Americanism and mine must be a 
 structure built of confidence, cemented by a 
 sympathy which recognizes only equality and 
 fraternity. It finds its source and being in the 
 hearts of men and dwells in the temple of the 
 intellect." 
 
 g-2,. On May 16, 1933, President Roosevelt 
 addressed directly to the heads of all countries 
 a circular telegram, the opening sentence of 
 which reads: 
 
 "A profound hope of the people of my coun- 
 try impels me, as the head of their govern- 
 ment, to address you and, through you, the 
 people of your nation. This hope is that peace 
 
20 
 
 may be assured through practical measures of 
 disarmament and that all of us may carry to 
 victory our common struggle against economic 
 chaos." 
 
 There are in that message statements 'of 
 theory, statements of fact, and suggestions for 
 a common course of action. Scrutiny of that 
 message suggests that the people of the United 
 States, President Roosevelt being now their 
 spokesman, feel that the nations of the world 
 must "supplement individual domestic pro- 
 grams for economic recovery, by wise and con- 
 sidered international action"; feel that world 
 peace is desirable; feel that disarmament will 
 contribute toward the achievement of world 
 peace; feel that the conference method is the 
 practical method by which to proceed ; feel that 
 the use of force in international relations should 
 be restricted to use in self-defense ; feel that the 
 nations should be committed to such a restric- 
 tion; and feel that international cooperation is 
 desirable and can be brought about. 
 
 g-4. On October 10, 1933, President Roose- 
 velt sent a communication in the form of a 
 letter to Mikhail Kalinin, President of the All 
 Union Central Executive Committee, Moscow. 
 On October 17, President Kalinin replied. On 
 November 16, 1933, in Washington, there were 
 exchanged between the President of the United 
 States and Maxim M. Litvinoff, People's Com- 
 missar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet 
 Socialist Republics, a group of communications, 
 in one of which President Roosevelt stated: 
 
 "I am very happy to inform you that as a 
 result of our conversations the Government of 
 the United States has decided to establish 
 normal diplomatic relations with the Govern- 
 ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 and to exchange ambassadors. " 
 
 The communications exchanged in this con- 
 nection should be read and scrutinized by all 
 who wish comprehensively to understand the 
 broad implications of the dedication of this 
 country to the "policy of the good neighbor". 
 
21 
 
 g-5. In President Roosevelt's Thanksgiving 
 proclamation, on November 21, 1933, there 
 appeared a paragraph as follows: 
 
 "May we recall the courage of those who 
 settled a wilderness, the vision of those who 
 founded the nation, the steadfastness of those 
 who in every succeeding generation have fought 
 to keep pure the ideal of equality of opportunity 
 and hold clear the goal of mutual help in time of 
 prosperity as in time of adversity. " 
 
 g-Q. On November 24, 1933, President 
 Roosevelt issued from Warm Springs, Ga., a 
 statement with regard to Cuba. Among other 
 things he said: 
 
 "* * * we have followed the course of 
 events in Cuba with a most friendly concern 
 and with a consistent desire to be of help to the 
 Cuban people. 
 
 * * * * 4: 
 
 "We feel that no ofl&cial action of the United 
 States should at any time operate as an obstacle 
 to the free and untrammeled determination by 
 the Cuban people of their own destinies. 
 
 "We have been keenly desirous during all 
 this period of showing by deed our intention of 
 playing the part of a good neighbor to the 
 Cuban people. * * * 
 
 ((* * * ^j^g Government of the United 
 States * * * ^jjj welcome any provisional 
 government in Cuba in which the Cuban people 
 demonstrate their confidence. * * * " 
 
 g-7. On the same date, November 24, 1933, 
 the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, in a statement 
 made upon his arrival at Rio de Janeiro, said, 
 among other things: 
 
 a* * * Peace must be our passion. Its 
 cost cannot be too great in the light of the 
 frightful cost of war. * * * So we must 
 take stock of all our blessings in this favored 
 part of the world * * * and bring them 
 to bear, by united efforts, to help right a topsy- 
 turvy civilization. * * * ^gjng ^he 
 best of good neighbors let us offer the finest 
 possible example for a jaded and disillusioned 
 world." 
 
22 
 
 g-8. At the Montevideo Conference, on 
 December 19, 1933, there was introduced a 
 proposal declaring: "No state has the right 
 to intervene in the internal or external affairs 
 of another." The American Delegation voted 
 in favor of this along with other proposals, 
 subject to the terms of a statement and declara- 
 tion in which Secretary of State Hull said, in 
 part: 
 
 "The policy and attitude of the United 
 States Government toward every important 
 phase of international relationships in this 
 hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear 
 and definite than they have been rnade by both 
 word and action, especially since March 
 4. * * * Every observing person must by 
 this time thoroughly understand that under the 
 Roosevelt administration the United States 
 Government is as much opposed as any other 
 government to interference with the freedom, 
 the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or 
 processes of the governments of other nations, 
 
 << * * * ^Yie United States Government in 
 all of its international associations and relation- 
 ships and conducts will follow scrupulously the 
 doctrines and policies which it has pursued 
 since March 4 which are embodied in the differ- 
 ent addresses of President Roosevelt since that 
 time and in the recent peace address of myself 
 on the 15th day of December before this Con- 
 ference and in the law of nations as generally 
 recognized and accepted." 
 
 g-9. In his address before the Woodrow 
 Wilson Foundation on December 28, 1933, 
 President Roosevelt said, in part: 
 
 "In that speech in Mobile, President Wilson 
 first enunciated the definite statement 'that 
 the United States will never again seek one 
 additional foot of territory by conquest.' The 
 United States accepted that declaration of 
 policy. President Wilson went further, point- 
 ing out with special reference to our Latin 
 American neighbors that material interests 
 must never be made superior to human liberty. 
 ***** 
 
 "It therefore has seemed clear to nie as 
 President that the time has come to supplement 
 and to implement the declaration of President 
 Wilson by the further declaration that the 
 
23 
 
 definite policy of the United States from now 
 on is one opposed to armed intervention. 
 
 u* * * -g Q^Yy if and when the failure 
 of orderly processes affects the other nations of 
 the continent that it becomes their concern ; and 
 the point to stress is that in such an event it 
 becomes the joint concern of a whole continent 
 in which we are all neighbors. 
 
 ***** 
 
 "Today the United States is cooperating 
 openly in the fuller utilization of the League of 
 Nations machinery than ever before. 
 
 "I believe that I express the views of my 
 countrymen when I state that the old policies, 
 alliances, combinations, and balances of power 
 have proved themselves inadequate for the 
 preservation of world peace. The League of 
 Nations, encouraging as it does the extension 
 of nonaggression pacts, of reduction of arma- 
 ment agreements, is a prop in the world peace 
 structure. 
 
 "We are not members and we do not contem- 
 plate membership. We are giving cooperation 
 to the League in every matter which is not 
 primarily political and in every matter which 
 obviously represents the views and the good of 
 the peoples of the world as distinguished from 
 the views and the good of political leaders, of 
 privileged classes, or of imperialistic aims. 
 ***** 
 
 "I have said to every nation in the world 
 something to this effect: 
 
 (At this point the President repeated 
 certain of the suggestions which he had 
 made in his circular telegram of May 14, 
 1933, to the heads of states. He suggested 
 elimination of weapons of offense and a 
 general declaration that "no nation will 
 permit any of its armed forces to cross its 
 own borders into the territory of another 
 nation." And he continued:) 
 
 "3. It is clear, of course, that no such 
 general agreement for the elimination of 
 aggression and of the weapons of offensive 
 warfare would be of any value to the world 
 unless every nation, without exception, 
 entered into the agreement by solemn 
 obligation. If, then, such an agreement 
 were signed by a great majority of the 
 nations on the definite condition that it 
 would go into effect only when signed by 
 all the nations, it would be a comparatively 
 
24 
 
 easy matter to determine which nations in 
 this enlightened time are wiUing to go on 
 record as belonging to the small minority 
 of mankind which still believes in the use 
 of the sword for invasion of and attack 
 upon their neighbors. 
 
 "I did not make this suggestion until I felt 
 assured, after a hard-headed practical survey, 
 that the temper of the overwhelming majority 
 of all men and women in my own country as 
 well as those who make up the world's popula- 
 tion, subscribes to the fundamental objective 
 I have set forth and to the practical road to that 
 objective. * * *" 
 
 ^-10. In the course of his message to Con- 
 gress on January 3, 1934, President Roosevelt 
 said: 
 
 "The delegation representing the United 
 States has worked in close cooperation with 
 the other American republics assembled at 
 Montevideo to make that conference an out- 
 standing success. We have, I hope, made it 
 clear to our neighbors that we seek with them 
 future avoidance of territorial expansion and of 
 interference by one nation in the internal 
 affairs of another. Furthermore, all of us are 
 seeldng the restoration of commerce in ways 
 which will preclude the building up of large 
 favorable trade balances by any one nation at 
 the expense of trade debits on the part of 
 other nations. 
 
 "In other parts of the world, however, fear 
 of immediate or future aggression and with 
 this the spending of vast sums on armament, 
 and the continued building up of defensive 
 trade barriers, prevent any great progress in 
 peace or trade agreements. I have made it 
 clear that the United States cannot take part 
 in political arrangements in Europe but that 
 we stand ready to cooperate at any time in 
 practicable measures on a world basis looking 
 to immediate reduction of armaments and the 
 lowering of the barriers against commerce." 
 
 Summary 
 
 In the light of this survey, it seems to me 
 possible to suggest that the outstanding prin- 
 ciples of American foreign policy in general. 
 
25 
 
 and therefore of our policy in relation to the 
 Far East, are substantially as follows: 
 
 {a) In regard to rights and obligations, re- 
 spect for the rights of other states and peoples — 
 with expectation of respect by them for our 
 rights; and performance of our obligations 
 toward other states — with expectation of per- 
 formance by them of their obligations toward 
 us; 
 
 (6) In regard to American nationals and in- 
 terests abroad, safeguarding of life and protec- 
 tion and promotion of legitimate interests — by 
 lawful, appropriate, and practicable methods; 
 
 (c) In the field of political method, absten- 
 tion from action and from commitments in- 
 volving or tending to involve the United States 
 in situations, controversies, or conflicts in which 
 the rights, obhgations, and interests of this 
 country are not at stake ; but cooperation with 
 other powers when and where, for the safe- 
 guarding of a common interest or toward attain- 
 ment of a common objective, cooperation seems 
 appropriate, practicable, and lawful; 
 
 {d) In the field of diplomatic endeavor, re- 
 liance upon processes of discussion, negotia- 
 tion, agreement, arbitration, and adjudication; 
 
 (e) In the field of military action, use of force 
 only for the purpose of preventing or combating 
 unlawful use of force by others imminently 
 imperiling the lives and legitimate interests of 
 American nationals or the integrity of American 
 soil, and then only under authority of and as 
 prescribed by law — including national and in- 
 ternational law and treaties and recognized 
 common convention; and 
 
 (/) In all connections, conscious and constant 
 effort to be a "good neighbor". 
 
 O