PROBLEMS of The Pacific and The Far East By Sidney L. GULICK, Secretary COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND GOOD-WILL OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA 105 East 22nd Street New York Foreword HRISTIANS have special reasons lor interest in the success of the 1 Conference on Limitation of Armament. For the success or failure of the Christian movement in the Far East is inextricably bound up with ^ Its results. If causes of irritation between America and Japan are not removed, if unregulated rivalry in China continues as in the past ^ between powerful nations for special privilege and control, if jealousy and fear are allowed to grow and spread until they lead at last to armed conflict, not only would we all be plunged into the unspeakable evils of every war, suffering enor- mous economic losses and incurring inconceivable financial expenses, but such con- flict would sound the death-knell of the great missionary enterprise in the Far East. The value of this enterprise, however, cannot easily be overstated. Through many decades of unselfish service, it has been breaking down the barriers of race, bringing the great peoples of the East and the West into relations of mutual understanding and good-will, and building up a real international brotherhood. The one real and only hope of bridging the age-old chasm between the East and the West lies in the practice of that spirit of service and brotherhood which consti- tutes the center and essence of the Christian way of life. Capitalistic, commercial and political contacts of East and West often tend to deepen the natural gulf between the great and powerful races and widely differing civilization of these two streams of human history. It is the spirit of Christ alone that can reconcile the races, overcome and annul their ancient grudges, banish their inherited prejudices and bring peoples and nations into such relations of mutual confidence and good-will that their commer- cial and financial relations can permanently go forward to their mutual advantage. Wide-awake American Christians, therefore, who through their great Church M ission Boards are maintaining in Japan a thousand Christian missionaries and 3,600 in China, regard the Conference in Washington from a standpoint quite dis- tinct from that of the capitalist and the trader. The Conference at Washington is, in fact, fraught with the gravest possibilities for weal or woe, for world prosperity or for world disaster, for reconciling or embroiling the yellow and the white races. The most “vital interest” America has in the Pacific is indeed the establishment of right attitudes of mind and heart between America and the Far East. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America has for many years maintained a Com- mission on Relations with the Orient, for the sole purpose of promoting these “vital interests. It is not too much to say that Christian interests in the Washington Conference far exceed in intrinsic and permanent importance those of all bankers, manufactur- ers and traders cortibined. Christians in all parts of America should realize the true significance of their interest and be not slow nor reticent in holding the Conference to the adoption of those high moral ideals in international life which can alone save modern civilization from destruction. The discussion of the following pages has been prepared especially for young people and for busy men and women in our churches who desire to understand the real situation in the Far East, but who have not the time for extended reading of many large volumes. The necessary brevity has prevented elaboration of any single topic. Effort has been made, however, to give sufficient statement of the most sig- nificant historical events to enable the student to know what the situation has been and is today, and to form his own judgments. Introduction S ECRETARY HUGHES’ courageous and concrete proposals for reducing the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan have already relieved much international tension. Their actual acceptance will show that the three nations con- cerned are determined to settle the difficulties by methods of reason, justice and good- will. It is important, however, that Americans should familiarize themselves with the main elements of the Far Eastern Problem. For although the proposal to reduce all navies creates the right psychological background, it does not of itself alone solve this intricate and difficult question. Its solution will require the utmost skill and patience. To understand the Pacific and Far Eastern Problems, one needs to know both a wide field of historical and geographical background and also the nature of the forces at work creating those problems. There are four principal centers to the exceedingly complicated situation that exists today in East Asia. China with her vast homogeneous and industrious population, her fabulous and undeveloped natural resources, her enormous possibilities of industrial and commer- cial development together with her impotence and her ignorance, incites the natural desire of enterprising interests of other lands to possess themselves of as large a share as possible of the opportunities and privileges to be secured. Alert and aggressive interests of England, Russia, France and Germany in the front rank, and those of Holland, Spain, and Portugal in the second rank have for many decades been establishing points of contact and control. They have developed a large number of vested interests, “rights,” “concessions,” “settlements” and the like. Japan, a latecomer among the modernized, industrial, militaristic nations, chal- lenges the European domination of China and indeed of all East Asia. The United States, though an early trader in China, is the latest to make vigor- ous claims which she believes to be her right and also to be for the real interests of all. She is asking for justice and fair treatment of all by all. Her claims, nevertheless, disturb the accustomed ideas, methods and diplomacy of all the other nations in their relations with China. In general terms the fundamental element in all these problems is economic — conflicting desires, policies and ambitions for trade, for special rights, or for exclu- sive control of opportunities for the acquisition of wealth and power. The friendly solution of these intricate problems is a vital necessity for the en- tire world. It ean be found, however, only by mutual general agreements among all the powers, ineluding China herself. Methods must be adopted for insuring justice, fair-dealing and unhampered opportunity for all. And above all, China’s own welfare must stand supreme above all other considerations. 3 I* China’s Problems F or a century China has been slowly changing under the impact of modern, occi- dental civilization. Her national Government has completely collapsed. Her recent efforts to establish a new one, fitted to the new age, have not yet succeeded. China’s national political life and institutions are in ruins. By the adoption in 1905 of the Occidental system of education, China began to adapt herself to modern world conditions. She is at least fifty years behind Japan. This is why China is a world problem. She is ignorant and impotent. She is open to the greed and cupidity of foreigners. She cannot control them nor protect her- self. They accordingly have been taking what they could and imposing upon her all kinds of conditions and restrictions, securing “rights,” “concessions,” and “settle- ments” and even takina’ more or less control of her territory and her governmental administrative functions. Some of these foreigia aggi’essions have been contemptible and treacherous beyond measure. But the final cause of the trouble has been China’s own ignorance of the modern world, her backward government, national pride, corrupt officials, and her consequent incompetence in dealing with the outside woidd. Until the new China arises, able to take ef- ficient control of her own affairs, both internal and international, she will inevitably be either an international danger zone for rival nations, or an international ward. From the standpoint of intelligent and patri- otic Chinese, what then are Cliina’s principal problems? Internallv, they are such as these: establish- ment of a real and effective national Govern- ment ; maintenance of order ; an adequate sys- tem of railroads ; development of natural re- sources, mines, water power and afforestation ; control of the rivers ; a comprehensive educa- tional system ; an adequate finance system ; eco- nomic development ; a proper budget and an effective system of taxation. Internationally they include such items as the following: — recovery of tariff and judicial au- tonomy ; recovery of administrative control of the customs, salt gabelle, post office, etc. ; politi- cal and economic recovery of Shantung, Man- churia, Mongolia, Thibet and other areas ; abolition of “foreign settlements” with foreign police and foreign invasion of Chinese sover- eignty; recovery to Chinese ownership of all special concessions for railroads and mines which menace her sovereignty and the integrity of her territory; overthrow' of corrupt and traitorous officials who sell out to foreign seek- ers of rights and concessions. China’s achieve- ment of a stable, intelligent and efficient na- tional Government is manifestly the essential prerequisite for the attainment of all these quite legitimate and commendable purposes. At the Paris Peace Conference the Chinese delegates formulated their desires in the fol- lowing seven important particulars : — 1. Spheres of inflioence and special interests. “The Powers are to declare that they neither possess nor claim” any of these, and “are ready to revise all treaties, agreements, notes and contracts establishing such.” 2. Troops and police. “All foreign troops and police on Chinese soil to be immediately withdrawn,” especially Legation guards. 3. Foreign post-offices, wireless stations and telegraphs. “All the foreign post-offices to be suppressed before January 1, 1921, and no tel- egraphic installation to be established after- ward.” 4. Consular jurisdiction. On China’s prom- ulgation of five new codes by end of 1924, and creating new tribunals, extra-territorial juris- diction is to be abandoned. 5. Leased territories. “These are to be re- stored to China.” 6. Foreign municipal Concessions. “All such are to be restored to China at the end of 1924.” 7. Autonomy in respect of customs tariff. “After a time to be agreed upon mutually, China is to have the right to fix her own tariffs.” 4 II* Europe’s Far Eastern Interests HISTORICAL BACKGROUND E ach of the expanding nations of Europe has established intimate relations with China. These relations have sometimes been due to treaties honorably secured. But too often they have been secured as the result of aggressive traders, cunning diplomacy, subtle intrigue, bribery, threats of war and even war. The rival world policies of Russia, Great Britain and France have had potent influences for evil in China. While we condemn and deplore the evdl, no fair-minded student can fail to rec- ognize many important gains that have come to China through her growing contacts with the Occident. A new China is being born, with pain and much confusion no doubt, but who can doubt the ultimate advantage to herself and to all the world? British aggressions began in 1823 when Burma was separated from China and by war (1852) and continued diplomacy became a full British dependency (in 1886). British traders, moreover, insisted, against China’s will, in importing opium into China proper. This with several other co-operating factors led to two so-called opium wars (1842 -and 1857) by which Britain forced her trade on China, se- cured Hongkong as a permanent possession, provided for open ports and foreign settlements' at several “treaty ports” (now numbering some 75 all told), established “extra-territorial rights” for foreigners, opened the Yangtse river for foreign trade and secured recognition of the “most favored nation” principle. It is com- monly though mistakenly believed that England forced China to open the door for opium; the fact is that although Chinese destruction of some $12,000,000 of opium which British mer- chants had brought into China contrary to Chinese law, was the chief cause of the first war, when the treaty of 1842 was in process of for- mulation the British representatives told those of China, that they might themselves write the clauses relating to the trade in opium and that the Chinese representatives, in view of the finan- cial profits (personal and public) thought best to permit the traffic under certain regulations. France united with Great Britain in the war of 1867-1860. They captured Tientsin and Pekin and burned the Chinese Imperial Sum- mer Palace. After repeated conflicts, by 1883 France made Cochin China a part of her Far Eastern domain. During the world war France forcibly annexed a half square mile of the Chi- nese City of Tientsin to her “settlement.” Russia early in the last century adopted the policy of expansion in Asia. After her defeat by France and England in the Crimea (1854), this policy was pushed with increased vigor. Step by step she gained Siberia. The entire annexa- tion to her Empire of a million square miles north of the Amur River, which had belonged to China, including Vladivostok and six hundred miles of coast line, was accomplished by 1860. But even this did not bring her to the goal of her ambition, a warm water outlet for her in- ternational commerce. Hence followed further aggressive schemes in Manchuria and Korea which finally resulted in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5). Japan, successful in her wars with China (1894-5) and Russia, became one of the world powers. She annexed Formosa and took over from Russia her leases of Port Arthur and South Manchuria. She also at the same time gained control of Korea (formerly under China). This country she annexed in 1910. Spain and Portugal and Holland have had trading posts and colonies in the Far East for more than two centuries. Spain lost all her holdings in the Pacific in 1898 first by the war with the United States which deprived her of the Philippines, and then by sale of all her Islands to Germany. Portugal took (1557) and still possesses only Macao, an Island and a port near Hongkong, while Holland contented her- self with important Islands of the Malay Archi- pelago, having an area of some 600,000 square miles. The United States, by her war with Spain (1898-9), came into possession of the Philippine Islands, for which nevertheless she paid $20,- 000,000 to Spain as a consolation. 5 THE SCRAMBLE FOR SPECIAL RIGHTS The China-Japan War (1894-5) disclosed the military impotence of China. European partition of Africa was just then completed. Europe’s big business and imperialistic politics saw the great opening in China. Then began a fresh assault upon China, each European na- tion desiring to gain as large a portion as pos- sible of the “luscious melon” that was waiting for partition among the powers. The rival nations watched with jealousy each others’ steps. The prime movers in the drama of China’s pitiful collapse were Russia and Ger- many, followed soon by Great Britain, France and Japan. The first step was taken jointly by Russia, Germany and France, apparently at the invita- tion of China’s most illustrious diplomat, Li Hung Chang. They sent an ultimatum (1895) to Japan to restore Port Arthur and the Liao- tung Peninsula to China which she had ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The real purpose of that act, however, as disclosed by later events, was to prevent Japan from having any share in the big “melon,” and to clear out of the way both geographically and metaphorically a dangerous competitor. Germany took the next step by seizing Kiao- chow (1897) and forcing upon China a treaty granting to Germany private rights to build railways and open mines in Shantung. This was the beginning of “special interests” and “rights” and “spheres of influence.” That treaty (1898) was a monument to subtle and far-reaching diplomacy. China made many pledges, among them one to pay Germany for all her investments and to give her some other more desirable place in China, if for any rea- son Germany should hand back Kiaochow and lier rights in Shantung. Few Americans under- stand the part this provision has played in recent history. Russia promptly occupied (1898) and then leased Port Arthur for twenty-five years and secured special railroad and mining rights (some of them secret) in Manchuria (400,000 sq. miles) and Mongolia (1,300,000 sq. miles). Her great Trans-Siberian railway was rushed to completion to Vladivostok, to Port Arthur, to Dalny and to Newchang and a great com- mercial city was built at Dalny (Japanese Dairen). Thus did Russia at last secure her dreams of more than a century to gain unre- strained access to an ice-free port. Great Britain, seeing what huge slices of the melon had been secured by Germany and Russia, and realizing that Russia would soon dominate the government of China and threaten her In- dian Empire, unless duly checked, secured (1898) from China without violence and only by diplomacy, a naval base, Weihaiwei, between Kiaochow and Port Arthur ; she also enlarged her controlled area opposite Hongkong (Kow- loon) and got China to recognize the great central region through which China’s largest navigable river flows, the Yangtse basin, as a British “sphere of influence,” some 260,000 square miles of territory. No private conces- sions in that region should be made by Peking to any but Britishers. France, seeing how rapidly the other nations were getting their big portions of the “melon,” applied for and secured (1898) an important naval base, the bay of Kwanchow, in south China, not far from Macao, and also acknowl- edgment by China of a large section of south China as her special “sphere of influence” with railroad and mining rights. Italy, seeing what others were getting, entered a demand for something too — but China dared to say no ! THE “OPEN DOOR” PROPOSAL The United States saw that unless something effective was done, China would soon be com- pletely divided up among the “powers,” and her treaty rights of trade on the basis of the “most favored nation” would amount to noth- ing. This led to the famous proposition by Secretary Hay (1899) to all the powers ask- ing them to agree to maintain the “integrity of the Chinese Empire” and to practice the principle of the “open door” for the trade of all, even within the special “spheres of influ- ence.” His proposal did not seek to annul those “spheres,” nor to secure any special opportu- nity for American traders, but only to prevent the further closing of the doors against Ameri- can trade, by asking equality of trade oppor- tunity for all. All the nations agreed to these proposals. This “open door” policy has been popularly misunderstood as including equal opportunity for all kinds of financial investment in the eco- nomic development of China. The policy itself has been reaffirmed in many treaties and inter- national “understandings,” such as the “Anglo- Japanese Alliance” (first made in 1902 and twice renewed with important modifications) and the Lansing-Ishii “Understanding” (1917). 6 In its original form and meaning, however, it is no longer pertinent or adequate. The “open door” policy and the principle of the “spheres of influence” have been given a new slant — even an important modification, by the communication recently sent to the Chinese Minister by Secretary Hughes. “The Government of the United States has never associated itself with any arrangement which sought to estab- lish any special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly States; and I am happy to assure you that it is the purpose of this Govern- ment neither to participate nor to ac- quiesce in any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of foreign interests any superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic de- velopment in designated regions of the territories of China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly or prefer- ence as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or industry, or from participating with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise.” This important declaration of our Govern- ment would seem to annul the Lansing-Ishii Agi'eement, certainly as interpreted by many. THE BOXER UPRISING , The repeated and rapid aggression of for- eigners brought on resentment and opposition among the Chinese people. This culminated in the effort of the “Boxers”' (1900) to drive all foreigners out of the country. Over 250 for- eigners were killed. But it was a vain attempt. It was too late in history, too ignorant of the forces it was opposing and too unorganized from a military standpoint. The “Powers” imposed on China the “Boxer Indemnity,” (£67,500,000, approximately $337,500,000) payable in installments for thirty-nine years, with 4 per cent interest. This helped to bring China into the clutches of European bankers, who made heavy loans to China, secured by various guarantees. This experience revealed, however, to the “Powers” that the “melon” could not be so eas- ily sliced up and partitioned as they had sup- posed, and led, during the fifteen years that followed, to a more cautious procedure in their * So named because of certain boxer-like gestures which were supposed to have magic power against Occidental bullets and bayonets. dealings with China, with the Chinese, and with one another. The rival interests of Russia, Great Britain, Germany and France began to make terms with each other to their common benefit and also to that of China. They saw the impossible vastness of the task of ruling China against her will. But a new factor entered the tangle. Rus- sia, not satisfied with what she already pos- sessed, proceeded to acquire Korea and especial- ly her two principal ports for additional naval bases. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-5) Japan had been watching with dismay Euro- pean aggressions in Asia. For European dom- ination meant exclusive rights for occidentals and diminishing opportunity for Japan. They were hedging her in with an iron wall. Her part in putting down the Boxer Uprising showed her how excellent was her military equip- ment and morale. Russia’s continued course in Manchuria and especially in Korea, if suc- cessful, meant, as they all well saw, the throt- tling of Japan. This was the real cause of the Russo-Japanese War. Japan’s success hurled Russia back to her ice-bound ports, restored Port Arthur to Japan and secured for her the South Manchuria railway and all Russia’s rights in that part of China (about 150,000 sq. miles). Thus Japan became one of the powerful predatory powers, reaping benefits from policies of militaristic imperialism. Her success in fighting Russia was largely due to British backing by means of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance (1902). By this Alliance Great Britain secured powerful help in check- ing Russian menace to her Indian Empire. The Alliance prevented Germany from coming to the support of the tottering Russian Armies. Germany was not ready in 1905 for conflict with Great Britain. After her war with Russia, Japan began to press her “special” rights in the province of Fukien, because it lies just across the Channel from Formosa. THE DOWNFALL OF THE MANCHU DYNASTY Japan’s victory over Russia gave a mighty impulse to the modernizing movement in China. Fear of the foreigner led to the popular de- mand for their expulsion or at least for recov- ery from them of the rights, powers and con- cessions wrung from helpless or corrupt officials. The rulers themselves also saw that China must follow in Japan’s footsteps and must develop t her own resources and power, if she was to hold her own against the foreigner. Japan had shown how it could be done. This insight of China’s principal leaders resulted in the official adoption of occidental education (1905), the beginning of w'estern military methods and the demand for an occidentalized government. Her achievements, however, along all these lines, leave much to be desired. The centuries-old Manchu Dynasty was over- thrown (1911) and for ten years China has been in the throes of revolution after revolu- tion and of civil war, in efforts to establish a Democracy. THE CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT IN CHINA During these succeeding decades of increas- ing political and international turmoil a factor was at \vork that long received scant recogni- tion whether from foreigners or from Chinese. Modern Christian Missions began in China with the arrival of Robert Morrison in 1807. A generation passed wdth little apparent success. From 1842, however, and onward till 1900 Christianity slowly gathered headway, although almost entirely among illiterate Chinese. When the “Boxers” attempted (1900) to drive out all foreigners and exterminate Christianitv, some ten thousand Chinese Christians lost their lives ; but it was then discovered that Chris- tianity had taken so firm a hold in China that its extermination was practically impossible. The persecution but tested the faith and deep- ened the belief of scores of thousands. Again it Avas proved that the blood of martyrs is the seed of the church. From 1900 and onward the Christian move- ment developed steadily and rapidly. Especial- ly since the doAvnfall of the monarchy and the Avide introduction of occidental education, Christianity has been Avelcomed by scholars and political leaders to a degree that is a constant amazement. Many of the leaders of the Re- public are professed Christians, Avdiile few' of them have not in one Avay or another come un- der its influence. Many of China’s outstanding statesmen today are looking to Christianity as the one hope for the future of the nation. During the past decade foreign missionaries have exceeded 5,000 in number, while Chinese pastors and other workers have exceeded 20,- 000. The Christian community in China now' exceeds one million. The by-products of the Christian movement in China are many and great. Shallow' observ- ers are apt to prize these more highly than the direct AV'ork — admiring the fruits but caring little for the roots. Among them may be mentioned China’s rapidly developing though still very imperfect occidental school system and many higher institutions of learning; nu- merous hospitals Avith the croAvning Medical In- stitute recently established by the Rockefeller Foundation; the return by America of the “Boxer Indemnity” by Avhich several thousand Chinese students have already been enabled to study in America ; repeated flood and famine relief benevolences ; and above all tens of thou- sands of personal friendships knit together be- tAveen Chinese and Christians of other lands, by Avhich Chinese are learning really to under- stand and believe in foreigners and foreigners to understand and really believe in Chinese. The hope of bridging the great chasm between East and West, betAveen white and yellow, lies in these personal friendships, and this mutual confidence. THE WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST Confusion in China became still AA'orse with the World War (1914). Both England and Japan were glad to eliminate Germany from the Far East. This they did in a six weeks’ campaign ( September-November, 1914). They captured KiaochoAV. Japan took over the Shan- tung railway and enforced a control on certain sections of the province more complete and drastic than Germany had ever attempted. From the standpoint of power, Japan be- came the predominant nation of the Far East and the Pacific Ocean. Japan saw her oppor- tunity to play a masterful role in China, be- cause of the turmoil, preoccupation and inevi- table post-war weakness of Europe. She im- posed her will on China by means of many “de- mands” put through by an ultimatum. China Avas ill-prepared for the unequal game, and apparently had no international friends. Japan from being a teacher and a model to be folloAA'ed by China, began to be feared and hated as the most ruthless and dangerous of the for- eign aggressors. In the vicissitudes of the great European war, Russian autocracy completely vanished. In an- ticipation of the Allied victory, Japan secured (early in 1917) assurances from Great Britain, France and Italy that they would support her claims at the Peace Conference to all German rights in Shantung and in the Pacific. Then America entered the war (April, 1917) and also, reluctantly, China ( September, 1917). While the Allies and America were completely absorbed in the great struggle, 8 Japan was busy consolidating her position and her interests in the Far East. Her tradesmen and her merchant ships displaced all others. By large loans to China, made with corrupt Chi- nese officials, Japan secured a powerful grip on China’s internal administration and natural re- sources. By her possession of Kiaochow and exclusive control of the customs and post-office of Shantung, Japanese adventurers were able to flood and debauch large sections wuth opium and vice. By her military treaties with China’s corrupt generals and viceroys, whether inten- tionally or not, she fostered the political tur- moil in China. Because of these various meth- ods of aggression, Japan has aroused against herself the suspicions and fear of most patriotic Chinese and the hostility of most foreign trad- ers in China. For they see nothing but disaster and defeat ahead, unless in some way Japan can be forced or led to play the international game on new lines. The collapse of Russia and the presence in Siberia of scores of thousands of Russia’s pris- oners, German and others, created a new' factor of fear in the Occident and led to the Allied military expeditions to Siberia (1918). Japan took the lead, but the policies of Japan’s Gen- eral Staff and the character of diplomacy caused serious friction between American and Japanese troops and officers in Siberia. The strong anti-Japanese feeling that now pervades the American Legion is due in large part to the experiences of the American army in Siberia during those months. Although in 1919 all other forces withdrew from Siberia, Japanese troops are still there, a cause of much doubt and suspicion in the Occident and deeply re- sented by Russian residents. THE SHANTUNG QUESTION The industrial nations of Europe are eager now to re-establish full relations with China and to recover their lost commerce. But they find the Government and traders of Japan entrench- ed and in their way. Japan has prospered greatly during the world war through her enormous foreign trade. This she wdshes to re- tain. Patriotic Chinese indignantly resent the Japanese grip upon their land and especially on the province of Shantung. They fear and hate Japan. The Chinese delegates at Paris repudiated the Shantung clauses of the Treaty of Versailles as unjust and illegal. German v. they insisted, had lost all rights in China, can- celled by Cliina’s own declaration of war against Germany. The Allies at Paris, therefore, had no right, China claims, to give non-existing so- called German rights to Japan or to anybody. Japan could not become legal heir to Germany’s rights in China merely by seizing Kiaochow and the railway. Germany herself could not, with- out China’s consent, transfer them to Japan. To be a legal heir to those rights Japan must herself receive them from China. It w'as absurd, therefore, for the Treaty of Versailles to re- quire Germany to hand over her rights in Shan- tung to Japan, and for Japan to think that she can now return them to China. Consultation with China and her consent to arrangements about Shantung were essential before the Peace Conference had any right to deal witli that question. Since the signing of the Versailles Treaty Japan has proposed three times to confer with China regarding the restoration of Kiaochow, but China has steadily refused to enter such a conference, contending that there is nothing to confer about. All Japan has to do, China maintains, is to restore stolen goods. Euro- peans, no less than Chinese, are eager for Japan to get out and to keep out forever. BRITISH DOMINATION IN TIBET In spite of her vigorous prosecution of the war. Great Britain did not overlook affairs in the Far East, especially as they might affect her Indian Empire. Since the seventeenth century, Tibet has been under the suzerainty of China — like Man- churia, Mongolia, Anam and Burma. Begin- ning in 1888 troubles arose betw'een China and Great Britain in regard to Tibet. Treaties and conventions w'ere repeatedly made. In 1906 Great Britain acknowledged China’s suzerainty over Tibet but denied her sovereignty. In 1914 fresh difficulties developed, which grew' worse, culminating in 1917, when a number of “de- mands” were made on China. The author of “Peking Dust,” writing about these “demands,” says : “Over here it is not customary to think or speak of anything but Japanese aggression. Japan, you see, offers the only stumbling block to the complete domination of the Orient by Europe. But for Japan, China might possibly become another India.” 9 Ill* Japan’s Problems J APAN’S experiences with Europeans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in spite of early friendly reception, led in time to fear and later to their expulsion. Every effort was made to exterminate Christianity. From about 1620 until 1854 Japan would have nothing whatever to do with Westerners. But in this year (1854) through fear of complete disaster she made a treaty with the United States and soon after with the Governments of Europe, and in 1868 she definitely decided to adjust her life to that of the world that could no longer be resisted. She set aside her feudal system (1871), sent her young men to study in every western land, imported many foreign teachers and gradually adopted occidental methods in every department of her life. Not only did she establish an army and navy on western patterns, German and British, but popular schools on American models, universities on German, and railroads and factories, dock-yards and ship- ping companies. In 1871, after more than 250 years of abso- lute opposition to Christianity, Japan adopted the principle of religious liberty, welcomed missionary and foreign teachers and permitted her people to drink freely of western culture and religion. From extraordinary anti-Chris- tian fear and anti-foreign prejudice, in a very few years her people began to admire and to learn from the West. The lives of missionaries (now exceeding one thousand) living in all parts of Japan from which the ordinary foreigner was excluded until 1899, convinced the masses of the people that foreigners were not “demons” but were men and women, worthy of confidence and friendship. The result of this last half century is a new Japan, educated, intelligent, ambitious, sophisticated and determined to be, and to be recognized as being one of the world’s great nations with corresponding rights. Japan has become a great industrial and trad- ing nation and thanks to her adoption of occi- dental medicine and hygiene, her population, already heavy, has doubled in sixty years (now about 55,000,000 in Japan proper). She is increasingly dependent for food and for raw material on her international trade. She now needs extensive markets for her industrial prod- ucts. There remains in Japan proper scant room for her increasing millions. Her natural resources in coal and iron, the essential founda- tions of modern industrial nations, are very slight. Japanese leaders claim that the nation is doomed unless adequate supplies of food and raw materials are assured and also markets for her products. Her mountainous islands afford only limited areas for cultivation. It has been estimated that for every square mile of arable land there are 2,688 people to feed, more than four to an acre. The population is growing by 500,000 to 700,000 annually. These are the two physical facts — population and food — that make Japan’s problem a world problem. Japan’s problem is particularly difficult be- cause relief by emigration is not practicable. Japanese laborers cannot compete with Chinese, Koreans or Manchurians. They will not go to Formosa because it is too hot, or to Manchuria or Siberia because it is too cold. The countries to which they would like to go are closed to them — ^Canada, the United States, Mexico, Aus- tralia and New Zealand. The possibilities of South America are still uncertain but not hopeful. JAPAN’S RELATIONS WITH CHINA Japanese statesmen have long held that China and Japan form a single economic unit, even as the peoples also belong to essentially tbe same race. They begin to see that Japan’s per- manent welfare and existence, even, are indis- solubly bound up with that of China. This is why they have watched with anxious alarm China’s impotent diplomacy by which her re- sources have been continuously and too often unscrupulously bartered away to Europeans. Japan felt that in fighting Russia she saved not only herself but also all of East Asia from immediate European domination. When, therefore, the great war came, because of the extraordinary opportunity it gave her, Japan proceeded so to adjust her relations with China that she herself might have the lead and 10 that the fear of Europe would be pei'manently removed from the Far East. Her procedure, however, was so tactless, selfish and “militar- istic,” that she offended China, whom she should have befriended. China has now begun to fear and hate Japan, apparently worse than any other foreign people. The anti-Japanese boy- cott initiated by Chinese students has disclosed to the Japanese their frightful mistake. Pro- gressive Japanese leaders now begin to see that militarism cannot secure for them what they want and must have in China — permanent, un- interrupted trade. But Japanese leaders also fear European and American influence in China — to the detriment of their trade, their access to raw materials and their market. These things she must have or perish, yet she sees European and American influences of enormous financial and naval pow- er closing down upon her, threatening to dom- inate the regions whence for ages to come she must get her food, her iron, her coal and many other essentials for her industry, and where she must maintain her markets. THE SHANTUNG QUESTION- JAPAN’S VIEWPOINT Japan feels that Germany was nothing more than a new plundering robber in the Orient when she seized Kiaochow and imposed upon China that cunning treaty of 1898. When the chance, therefore, came in 1914 to drive her out of the Ear East and to retaliate for the humiliation she (Japan) had received at the hands of Russia, Germany and France in 1895, she was only too glad to do it. Although Japan stated in her ultimatum to Germany (1914) that she would give Kiaochow back to China, her purposes apparently vacil- lated for a while. She soon saw that she could not give it back until the end of the war, be- cause of that subtle article of the German- Chinese treaty about China’s obligations in case Germany returned it. And in any case the per- manent settlement of captured German terri- tory could not be properly made until the Allies should jointly agree to the common terms and Germany should give her assent. In those in- tervening years Japan thought wise to make certain her gains of the great war and to stake out large claims for the future. She wanted definite engagements with China by which the terms of the final disposal of German rights would be certainly hers. Japan also wanted to make sure that when returned to China, China would not be free either to give Kiaochow back to Germany or to allow any other country to get a foothold there — a procedure that was easily thinkable in view of what had happened to Port Arthur after Japan returned it to China in 1895. Hence came the “twenty-one demands,” im- portant sections of which were finally agreed to by China though under threat of an ultimatum. Japan regards herself as having been very le- nient with China, for she permitted these negoti- ations to drag along for more than three months, and in fact she accepted many changes suggested by China. She withdrew for the time being all of group V, the most objectionable proposals. In view of the mutual agreements that had been reached by the end of March in regard to nearly all the points, it is often asked why Japan issued an ultimatum. The answer given by Japan is that Yuan Shih Kai was al- ways shifting, agreeing and then withdrawing his agreements. Another statement made by important Japanese is that Yuan Shih Kai him- self arranged for the ultimatum, for he feared a revolt against him if the people felt that he had easily yielded to Japan’s mere diplomatic demands. It should also be noted that Japan included nothing in the terms of her ultimatum that the Chinese representatives had not already agreed to in their prolonged negotiations. Having thus by treaty with China secured recognition of her succession to all German rights in Kiaochow and Shantung, and having promised to return all sovereign rights to China as soon as practicable after the war, retaining all the economic rights and having confirmed her claims by the so-called secret treaties of 1917 with Great Britain and Italy and France, Japan was amazed to find at Paris that China was virtually repudiating her agreements, main- taining that her declaration of war against Germany (in 1917) had annulled all German rights in Shantung and that therefore her (China’s) treaty of May, 1915, with Japan re- garding Shantung was null and void. Japan has steadily declined to take that view. She it was, she insists, who drove Germany out. She held and still holds those properties. China agreed in 1915 to such possession. If they go back into Chinese hands, it will be because she wrested them from Germany and of her own free will restores them to China. Japanese contend that the decisive reason why the Versailles Treaty gave all German rights in Shantung unconditionally to Japan was because the Allies doubted whether Germany would actually restore to China all the rights which her treaty of 1898 had secured, unless some power required it. China herself could 11 not be trusted to insist on German fulfillment of the requirement. Of course, the Allies were under the obligations of their own pledges to Japan of 1917. The Allies were also eager to liave German economic competition in the Far East eliminated just so far as possible. Japan on the other hand wanted both China and the western nations to know that, so far as she could enforce it, the era of European domination in China had ended ; that even China herself might not dispose of important privi- leges and territories to any foreign people, for such disposal vitally affects Japan’s own interests in the decades ahead, and perhaps even her very existence. Japan unanimously and insistently maintains that her geographical relations to and economic dependence on the continental regions of East Asia create and justify her in demanding in- ternational recognition of her “special inter- ests” and her inalienable rights in regard to the doings of western nations in that area. As for Clffna’s claims that Germany’s rights in Shantung lapsed back to her when she (China) declared war, Japan insists that those claims are nullified by the fact that China had already by the treaty of Ma}', 1915, made full agreements with Japan in regard to them. Japan does not admit that China’s declaration of war had any effect on her possession of the German rights under consideration. And this view seems to have been accepted by the Su- preme Council in Paris that made the Versailles Treaty. Such perhaps are the chief considerations that should be borne in mind in studying Japan’s viewpoint regarding the Shantung question. Because of Japan’s methods in Shan- tung and apparent duplicity in announcing to the western nations the nature of her “twenty- one demands,” which at first she spoke of as “fourteen,” America lost confidence in her straightforwardness and sincerity. JAPANESE RIGHTS IN MANCHURIA When Russia acquired Port Arthur and the hinterland in 1898, it was on a twenty-five year lease. Her construction of railways and forti- fications, however, indicated plans for perpetual control. When Japan recovered Port Arthur, by the terms of the Portsmouth treaty (1905) she secured it for only the balance of the Rus- sian lease, that is, until 1923. Japan, how- ever, like Russia, had no expectations of re- storing Port Arthur to China at the end of the period. When, therefore, in 1915 Japan presented her “twenty-one demands” and later her ultimatum, she included an extension of that lease to 99 years like the German lease. Japan also secured several fresh rights for Japanese residents in Manchuria which they had not be- fore enjoyed. Japan is therefore today very firmly entrenched in Manchuria with civil and economic rights which place her above every other foreign nationality in that region. JAPAN’S DESIRES IN REGARD TO SIBERIA Japan’s anxiety about Siberia has been due not only to her desire to have unhampered eco- nomic opportunity there for her people — al- though no considerable Japanese emigration to Siberia is regarded as at all likely — but also to two causes for fear ; first, fear of the de- structive doctrines of Bolshevism which she wishes to exclude from Japan; and second, fear lest Russia, regaining possession of Siberia, may in some future decade return to the policy of getting a port free from ice the year through — which would mean another war with Japan. Japan, therefore, prefers to see established in Siberia, east of Lake Baikal, a Government quite independent of Russia — a “buffer state.” Japan would have no fear of such a Govern- ment. Mutually helpful and therefore friendly relations could easily be established. Many Americans hold that Japan desires to annex East Siberia to her own dominions. This would seem to be a mistake. Japan knows full well that if she annexed East Siberia, so that her western frontier would be Russia’s eastern frontier, friction would surely develop between the two countries and in the end probably war. A buffer state between Japan and Russia is, therefore, Japan’s manifest need and desire. JAPAN’S DOMINATION IN KOREA Japan does not regard Korea as any part of her international problem. She considers that peninsula to be indissolubly a part of her Empire even as England regards Ireland to be an inseparable part of her Empire. Japan would resent any effort to introduce the “Kor- ean Question” into the Washington Conference as indignantly as Great Britain would resent the raising of the Irish question. A few facts however about Korea may not be inappropriate. For 2,000 years Japan and Korea have been neighbors. The culture of China and of India first blessed Korea and then passed through Korea to Japan. But for centuries, Korean- Japanese relations have not been pleasant. In 12 1600 Japan invaded Korea and inflicted untold damage. From 1870 and onward China and Japan pushed rival claims in Korea, for her backwardness, corruption and incompetence made her a problem for both China and Japan. Matters came to a head in 1894!, resulting in the Chino-Japan war for which each party was in part to blame. Japan’s victory established her leadership. She assured Korea indepen- dence. This was, however, misused. By 1903 it became clear that Korea would surely become part of Russia’s Oriental Empire unless annex- ation by Russia were forcibly restrained. This produced the Russo- Japan War. Even then Japan, though victorious, left Korea a large amount of autonomy. Again Korea failed to use aright her opportunity, resulting in Japan’s act of complete annexation (1910), acquiesced in by all the powers including the United States under President Roosevelt. But Japan’s attempt during the past de- cade by rough, military pressure to “assimi- late” the Koreans and make them very rapidly into loyal Japanese, speaking the Japanese language and worshipping the Japanese Em- peror, has proved a tragic failure. Although the physical development of Korea has been rapid and is admitted by all impartial observers, the rulers have alienated the Koreans by extra- ordinary cruelties and injustices. Whep in 1919 simple-minded Koreans by the thousand assembled to shout forth their patriotic desire for independence, they were treated by Japan- ese soldiers and police as dangerous revolution- aries. Japan’s blind and foolish militarism, by torture and floggings innumerable, only fanned the fires of Korean desire for complete separa- tion from an alien government that could be so inhuman. Critics of Japan, however, should acknowl- edge that liberal Japanese deplore these deeds as truly as liberals of any land. The Kara Cabinet took rather prompt steps to apply a remedy. The military Governor General was required to resign and in his place a Civil Gov- ernor was appointed. Many reforms have been begun and some progress has been made in spite of the opposition of many lower officials and the implacable attitude of ardent Korean patriots. Japanese liberals do not fail to condemn the doings of their militarists in Korea and many are saying that Korea should at least be given complete autonomy as soon as possible. THE YAP CONTROVERSY Newspaper writers have made much commo- tion over this tiny island, some 4*00 miles west from Guam. It was bought by Germany from Spain in 1899 and made a center for her cable lines, of which one went to Shanghai, one to Guam, and one to German New Guinea. When Japan drove Germany from the Pacific in 1914! she seized this along with many of Germany’s Islands in the Pacific Ocean ; the end of the cable reaching Shanghai she cut and connected with Japan. The sudden interest of America in Yap has been due, first to President Wilson’s plan to “internationalize” it, a plan not accepted by the allies, for they were already under expressed obligations to give it to Japan; and second, to Secretary Hughes’ use of it as the fulcrum for his diplomatic attack on the proceedings of the League of Nations. He contended that neither the allies nor the League of Nations could dis- pose of Germany’s captured territories without the consent of the United States by whose aid Germany had been overthrown, and that there- fore Japan could not claim exclusive possession of Yap nor of any of the north Pacific Islands, even though given to her by the allies. Japan’s reply to these contentions has been first that Britain, France and Italy agreed in 1917 before America entered the war, that Ger- many’s possessions in the north Pacific should come to her at the final peace settlement ; sec- ond that there is no record of President Wil- son’s reservations or plans regarding Yap in the minutes of the Paris Peace Conference ; third, that all mandated areas had been regu- larly assigned in the regular procedures, America having failed to attend the Commis- sion on Mandates though invited; the fault therefore is with America, not with the League ; fifth, that nevertheless she was willing to make special arrangements with the United States in regard to the Yap-Guam cable, and sixth, that it would be better and much cheaper to lay a new cable from Guam to Shanghai and give it to the United States than to come to blows about so trivial an affair. According to newspaper report the two Gov- ernments have I’eached an understanding, but just what it is has not yet been authoritatively announced. Its formal acceptance has appar- ently not yet taken place. 13 How trivial the issue has been from an eco- nomic standpoint is evident to one who notes that Yap entirely aside, America has cable con- nections through HaAvaii and Guam Avith China via the Philippines and Avith Japan through the Bonin Islands. EMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES Many Americans expect Japan to raise the question of Japanese emigration to the United States. This expectation is based on misappre- hension. For Japan regards the immigration question betAveen America and Japan as closed by the Gentlemen’s Agreement Avhich has been in effective operation for the past thirteen years. The Japanese Government became satisfied in 1907 that further immigration of Japanese laborers into the United States Avould jeopard- ize the friendly relations of the tAAm countries. She preferred that such immigration should be stopped by her OAvn action rather than by anti- Japanese legislation similar to that enacted and enforced against the Chinese. These Avere the considerations that led to the famous “Gentle- men’s Agreement.” She has enforced the Agree- ment made Avith President Roosevelt so faith- fully that in these thirteen years some 17,000 more Japanese males have left the United States (including HaAvaii) than have entered. Such increase as there has been, about 18,000, con- sists chiefly of Avomen and children who have come to join their husbands and parents. Japan has no desire to abandon the Gentle- men’s Agreement. Indeed in response to the earnest suggestion of Japanese in California the Japanese Government has recently voluntarily made the administration of the Agreement more rigid by refusing, since February, 1920, to grant passports to so-called “picture brides.” EQUALITY OF RACE TREATMENT Although Japan aa'111 not raise the question of immigration to California — because, as just noted, she does not recognize any problem in connection Avith it — it is by no means certain that she will not raise the question of anti- Japanese, discriminatory legislation in some of the western states. This she regards as a mat- ter that affects her status among the nations — for it affects her honor. Japan does not ask that her people shall be allowed freely to migrate hither; but she does ask that those who are here shall enjoy the same rights and receive the same treatment as are given to foreigners of every other people residing in the United States. She insists that such equality of race treatment is essential to the maintenance of right and friendly relations betAveen the nations. She cannot rest content with a treatment that implies inferiority of her race as such. It affects her very self-respect. This is a question wholly apart from all eco- nomic questions. It concerns national ideals and sense of honor and respect. AMERICA’S NAVAL MENACE A matter that has begun to AAmrry Japanese statesmen and people alike is the American men- ace; seen in her recent sudden enlargement of her navy in the Pacific and in the heavy expend- itures for the four naval bases on the Pacific Coast, and the three in Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines. Japanese writers claim that since 1898 the United States has expended on tAvo naval bases in the Philippines $29,356,000 ; in Guam $18,922,000; in HaAvaii $18,998,000, and on various bases on the Pacific Coast and in Alaska other vast sums, bringing the total for naval bases during the past tAventy years, the most of it since 1909, up to the total of $214,459,000. They quote at length the belligerent utterances of outstanding Americans. Admiral Knight is quoted as say- ing that “we should develop Guam as a naval base resembling the bases at Heligoland and at Malta,” and Senator Lodge as saying that “the United States ought to notify Japan that she is prepared to spend billions of dollars to safeguard her interests in the Pacific.” Why does America send her biggest and heav- iest battleships to the Pacific, Japanese are be- ginning to ask.? Why is she expending scores of millions on her numerous naval bases.? What is the significance of the belligerent utterances of many of her leading politicians, outstanding legislators and editors of important newspa- pers.? Is it possible that America is planning to attack us.? Is her big fleet intended to be a make-weight in her diplomacy.? What does it mean.? And what should Japan do.? Such are the questions that thoughtful Japanese are now asking — those even who have long been noted as friends of America. 14 IV* America’s Pacific and Far Eastern Problem A merica approaches the Problems of the Pacifie and the Far East from an angle quite different from that of any other nation. Our intrinsic interests in China are much less than theirs, our history has made our relations with China much less unpleasant, our vested rights are much less complicated, and our desires are very simple. America has just now a rather sentimental interest in China. Our people always sympathize with the “under dog” in any struggle, and China certainly seems to be in that position at present. We earnestly desire that she may not be dismembered; that her sovereignty which has been more or less abridged by the aggressions of the nations may be truly preserved and that her territorial and administrative integrity may be restored and permanently maintained. American traders and shippers very keenly desire the complete maintenance of the “open door” — namely'' absolute equality of trade opportunities for all alike — re- gardless of “spheres of influence.” American politicians and legislators have much to say about the safety of our Island possessions, especially the Philippines, Guam and the Hawaiian Islands, which they claim are menaced by Japan’s ambitions and her powerful navy. While we want full and free opportunity for Americans in the Far East we are quite de- termined that there shall be no Asiatic immigra- tion to the United States. Some western states have by legislation restricted the equality of economic opportunity of Asiatics. The Fed- eral Government allows no Asiatics to become American citizens by naturalization. Americans hardly know what to think of Japan. Many are convinced that she has vast militaristic plans for the domination of East Asia and the creation of a Far Eastern military Empire ; that she now has practically at her feet the entire natural wealth of China and ere long will get control of her illimitable, docile and efficient man power. With these, and with her mastery of occidental science and technical skill, Japan, they tell us, can now create an empire surpassing in power anything the world has ever seen, and that she is planning to con- tend with the white race for world domination. Those who picture this spectre insist that just as German ambition and power could be overthrown only by matching power with su- perior power, so the only hope for the world as it faces this rising military menace is to over- throw it before it becomes too strong. America is the nation on whom this duty rests. We must crush Japan or she will crush us and all the West. The only hope of success lies in over- throwing her before she masters and dominates China. America’s own existence as a free na- tion is at stake, they insist. This, they hold, is America’s supreme prob- lem of the Pacific and the Far East. The true purpose of the Washington Conference, they hold, is to combine the nations into a single solid body to draw the fangs of Japan at once. THE SITUATION AS SEEN BY MANY AMERICANS Careful students of Far Eastern problems entirely reject the lurid pictures of violent anti- Japanese agitators. They do, however, see a most difficult situation that may easily culmi- nate in a tragic struggle. The factors the}' see are such as these : 1. China possesses untold natural resources and almost unlimited man power of the very highest order of capacity for industrial pro- duction. 2. When China starts her industrial evolu- tion she will call for fabulous amounts of ma- chinery and capital which only the West and especially America can supply. “Spheres of in- fluence” and “closed doors” will prevent Ameri- can enjoyment of these w'onderful opportunities and will also seriously block China’s own de- velopment. 3. Each progressive industrialized nation naturally desires to stake off as large a portion of China as possible as its special preserve, on the theory that such exclusive rights will in- sure that nation’s share in China’s development. 15 4. Japan is especiall}^ entrenched in China, having followed during the last few years the diplomatic and military methods of Europe in their dealings with that unhappy land. Japan has now raised an iron ring around large sec- tions and has a firm military grip. 5. Japan not unnaturally looks askance at America’s proposals for an “open door” policy in China because she has found herself rigidly excluded from opportunity in many lands and especially in America, where she would like to share in economic opportunity. 6. Japan not unnaturally thinks that her only hope of opportunity for raw materials and for markets in China during the long future, depends on her establishing and maintaining her “Asiatic Monroe Doctrine” which provides for exclusive economic privileges. American capital and American enterprise in an “open” China, Japan fears, would completely monop- olize every opening and completely destroy her opportunity in China. Just as California fears the free inflow of Japanese labor, so Japan fears the free inflow of American capital in the Far East. For in the opinion of Japan, though America’s imperialism is not indeed militaristic, being economic and capitalistic, it is none the less imperialistic and dangerous. 7. Siberia, likewise, is a vast country, like the American northwest, bound to develop a large population in the near future and bound to demand those materials which America is peculiarly fitted to supply. It will become an incalculable “economic vacuum” which Japan cannot supply. She appears to plan, however, to take control of the channels of approach, to control the development of that area and to take a toll on all materials entering that region from other lands. This, Americans believe, will not only delay the development of Siberia, but will block America from deriving any large ad- vantage from or proper share in its develop- ment. 8. In short, an incalculable and increasing “economic vacuum” is certain to develop in the Far East in the near future in proportion as China and Siberia develop. This economic op- portunity Japan desires to control to her own advantage. Other countries, however, also eagerly desire to share in it. Japan is build- ing her economic barriers around these countries which, however, the economic laws of demand and supply will inevitably sweep away, peace- fully if not resisted by military force, violently if so resisted. 9. Japanese as yet fail to see that Japan’s . own real advantage in the long run is to have all the doors to East Asia thrown open to all the world. A prosperous, friendly and rapidly developing China and Siberia, aided by the cap- ital and the brains of all the nations, will bring far more benefit to Japan than a China and Siberia closed against all but Japan and there- fore relatively undeveloped and inevitably hostile to her. 10. Moreover, a market in China secured by Japan through honest and straightforward competition with the nations of Europe will be in fact far more worth-while for Japan than a market preserved from competition by artificial military power. Japan’s workmen will learn to produce first class goods fitted to compete with goods from the West. This will be intrinsically and in the end better for Japan, than forever to go on satisfied with the manufacture of in- ferior products. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS Mighty conflicting interests are, thus, mani- festly at work in the Far East. Their recon- ciliation will tax the skill of the world’s best statesmen. But this reconciliation is vital. Unless they are reconciled, the nations are headed sooner or later for another frightful orgy of fire and bloodshed. America, Great Britain and Japan now hold the keys to the situation. China is the center of the possible cyclone. Japan has imperative vital necessities. China, however, stands above all others in her right to be freed from the dangers coming down upon her through the ri- valries of foreign powers for economic opportu- nities in her land and among her people. The first essential step, therefore, in finding a solution is a frank conference between the interested powers. They should each lay upon the conference table all their respective claims, real and supposed. This will disclose how far they are indeed rivals ; whether or not they are conflicting and how far they are dangerous to China’s real interests. China herself should be asked to state how much of these claims she recognizes. Plans should then be jointly formed for such adjustments and common agreements in regard to policies and procedures as will secure for each the largest and fullest opportunity con- sistent with like opportunity for all, always subject to China’s own best interests. In this adjustment, Japan’s imperious necessities should receive full consideration, and adequate provision should be made for their satisfaction. 16 The nations, moreover, should not forget that in these modern days, war between great nations cannot be short. The costs of war, however, of even a short war, would be far greater than any possible profits from the trade thus secured by the victor. The van- quished Avould lose his trade and also have the costs of war to pay. Economically speaking, it would be better for America to have no trade whatever with the Far East than to have it at the expense of a war with Japan, or even at the expense of the billions for armaments, which Senator Lodge declares we are willing to pay. Americans should remember that if Japan is “feverishly preparing for war with America” it is only because she suspects that America is preparing “feverishly for war with Japan.” THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT IN JAPAN Americans should, however, remember that there is an important liberal movement in Japan. Two forces are at grips, the militar- istic and the democratic. The liberal movement that was so powerful for two decades (1870-1890) gave way to mil- itarism because of the military menace in the Ear East of the European powers. But a new liberal movement is now powerfully affecting the entire nation, particularly during the past three years. Militarism is manifestly losing ground rapidly. The catastrophy to Germany brought on by her militarism is proving to be a niost salutary object lesson to Japan. The assassination of Premier Hara (Nov. 4, 1921) was the work of an unbalanced youth and had apparently no political significance. The new Premier, Takahashi, continues the same liberal program with the same cabinet. The surest way to strengthen Japan’s mili- tarism is to present a threatening military dan- ger to Japan’s life. This would rally the entire nation to the side of the militarists. The be- ginning of war between America and Japan would be the signal for Japan’s attempt at military domination of considerable sections of China. This she would feel herself forced to undertake in order to secure food and raw ma- terial for her people, who would devote them- selves to the production of submarines, battle- ships and munitions. A decisive naval battle between the two countries, however, would be difficult if not impossible to bring about. The writer confidently believes that the true policy for America in dealing with the prob- lems of the Pacific and the Far East is the out- spoken adoption of an attitude of friendship, trust and good-will, absolutely free from any taint of militarism or navalism. A militaristic effort by America to protect China and at the same time establish our own economic oppor- tunities and rights would have disastrous re- sults. Only the growth of liberalism in Japan can overthrow Japanese militarism. Japanese militarism will vanish when Japan sees that she faces no military menace and that, therefore, there is no ground for heavy military or naval expenditures. China has begun to discover how to protect herself from Japan’s militarism, namely by the economic boycott. Persistent refusal by scores of millions of Chinese to buy anything made in Japan so long as Japan plays the part of the bully in China, will ultimately and inevitably induce the overthrow of militarism in Japan. It is already having that tendency. A Summary Review ^’T^HE Far Eastern Problem consists of three principal elements. 1. China and her stabilization. 2. Japan with her necessities and policies. 3. Occidental rivalry for commercial and capitalistic opportunity in the Far East. These three elements are inextricably intertwined. Unsolved, increasing chaos in China, increasing domination of China by Japan, and ruinous rivalry among the powers are certain, and another world-war is altogether likely, the outcome and con- sequences of which none can foretell. No real solution is possible that does not grapple with the whole situation in a single comprehensive plan. Fortunately many careful students have long been study- ing this vast and intricate problem. The main outlines of the general policy now needed are fairly clear. VL Constructive Suggestions A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES C ERTAIN fundamental principles need, first of all, to be accepted by the nations interested in the Far East, such as the following : I. Abandonment by all the powers of their rivalry for private opportunity^ in and control of Chinese territory and national resources. 2. Agreement by all the powers that in all their dealings with China and Chinese interests, they will act together. 3. Agreement by all the powers that China’s own welfare and rights must take precedence of all other considerations in deteimiining what they shall do for and ask of China. 4. Recognition by all, of Japan’s rightful position of special interest and special responsi- bility in the Far East. 5. Joint adoption of peaceful methods for the settlement of every dispute that may arise between the western nations and China, between the western nations and Japan and between the western nations themselves. 6. Repudiation of the principle of militar- istic coercion as a means for economic expan- sion or control. B. SOME CONCRETE APPLICATIONS There must, of course, be concrete applica- tion of these principles. They might Avell take such forms as the following: — 1. The formation by the nations of an In- ternational Far Eastern Commission in which all the powers having interests in the Far East shall be suitably represented, namely, China, Japan, the United States, Great Britain, France and perhaps two or three others. 2. The transmission to this Commission by all the powers of full information regarding every treaty and every transaction between China and such powers in virtue of which they are making claims of special rights, conces- sions, privileges and the like. 3. The adoption of plans and methods by the Commission by which as soon as may be practicable, all foreign troops and foreign police shall be withdrawn from Chinese soil and actual sovereignty shall be restored completely to China. During the period in which China is qualifying herself for taking over these re- sponsibilities, the Commission might well organ- ize an international police force consisting of Chinese whose highest officers alone might per- haps for a time have to be foreign. 4. Abolition of “extraterritoriality” and restoration to China of complete judicial, ad- ministrative and tariff autonomy, as soon as China qualifies herself to take over these duties and responsibilities. 5. Adoption of methods of amortization by which China may in time recover complete own- ership of all mines, railways and other prop- erties in China thus protecting and rewarding every honest investment of foreign capital in China. 6. Rejection of alignment with partisan pol- itics in China. No foreign intervention by military or financial assistance should be granted or allowed to any Chinese party or faction. China should be allowed to settle her own problems of national government without hindrance or help from foreign powers. 7. Acceptance and honest enforcement of the principle of the “open door” in the largest sense. No part of China should be held by any foreign government or interest as a private pre- serve for its own products or investment of capital. China’s own laws dealing with inter- national trade should be absolutely free from international partiality or favoritism. C. NAVAL POWER IN THE PACIFIC But in addition to the creation of an Inter- national Far Eastern Commission, the Powers should give occular evidence of their honest de- termination to abandon the use of naval power in the Pacific to coerce either China or Japan or one another in regard to Far Eastern mar- kets, trade routes or political interests. The manifest way to do this is to permanently \vith- draw from the Pacific their super-dreadnoughts and battleships and to agree that under no cir- cumstances shall they be allowed to enter cer- tain specified areas, described by latitude and longitude. A large reduction, moreover, of the naval bases of occidental nations in the Far East would go far to convince Japan and China of the honesty and good-will of their new pol- icies, to allay suspicion among themselves and to inaugurate the new regime under the most wholesome psychological conditions. Occidental nations should recognize that the military and naval coercion of the Far East 18 can have only one final result — the development of piilitary and naval power in the Far East by which to protect themselves from Occidental aggression and oppression. As a recent writer has aptly stated the case — “If the Western Powers attempt to ‘isolate’ or ‘encircle’ Japan, they will only succeed in Prussianizing her.” And this same principle applies also in the relations of Japan and China. If Japan continues to hold and increase her domination of China by her superior military power, she will finally succeed in militarizing her. D. LAWLESS NATIONS The chief obstacle to the foregoing proposals is the dread suspicion that some nation may not play fair ; that its unprincipled diplomats by secret arrangements with unprincipled Chinese officials — as has often happened in the past — may secure advantages for their nationals to the detriment of the rest. Such a danger may not be ignored. Human history is full of such experience. Treacherj" and intrigue almost seem to be ineradicable elements of human nature. The remedy, however, for such a situation is for all law-abiding nations by joint action to VII* Advantages of the T he advantages of the policy and program presented in the foregoing pages are many and great. They are in truth of vital importance to China, to Japan, and also to all the nations. To China. By these means and probabl}' by them alone can China hope to secure complete recovery of her sovereignty, of her territories and of her judicial and tariff autonomy. Pro- tected from danger of foreign invasions or sin- ister peaceful penetration, fear would be re- moved and the moral and practical energies of the nation could be devoted to the establish- ment of a stable government and to the solution of her economic, industrial and other problems. China would thus secure safety and justice with- out being compelled to arm herself heavily as every modern State has been compelled to do. Her vast resources could then be expended wholly upon productive enterprises rather than upon armaments. To Japan. All the justifiable objectives that Japan has been struggling for in the Far East would be guaranteed to her by the joint action bring the culprit into court as soon as dis- covered, try it, judge it and inflict an appro- priate penalty by process of law. In the exe- cution of a judgment so reached the united power of the Powers should be utilized. The same principles should be and can be applied for maintaining security and justice between nations as have been found to work quite well among individuals. It will not do for all nations to become law- less merely because one has broken the law. That road leads only to chaos, tragedy and destruction. Law-abiding nations must estab- lish international law, provide for national security and international justice and must be prepared to enforce international law when necessary. Under such circumstances the dan- ger of deliberate breaking of international laws and agreements by any one nation is ex- ceedingly slight. We are beginning to see that the modern or- ganization of society and of international rela- tions has created a new possibility of interna- tional coercion neither military nor naval — namely, the “economic boycott.” A lawless nation can now be effectively penalized without resort to the destructive procedures of war- fare and wholesale slaughter of fellowmen. Policy Here Proposed of the nations. No longer would she need to maintain her expensive arm}^ and navy to as- sure safety, justice and economic opportunity. Stability" and orderliness of government in Cliina would give to Japan opportunity for that large trade with China which her geo- graphical proximity, her knowledge of the Chinese language, and her industrial efficiency make certain and winch her own industrial and economic needs make necessary'. She would have unhampered access to raw materials in China and also to the enormous markets of China for her industrial products. AVith China developing securely as an industrial and com- mercial nation having no need of nor tendencies toward militarization, a profound apprehen- sion would be removed from the mind of every thoughtful Japanese. Japan would, moreover, secure courtesy of treatment and equalitv of status which are essential to the maintenance of good-will and friendship between her and the nations of the West. To Other Nations. The policy and program proposed above would prevent the dangerous competition in China of powerful rival nations. 19 Each would have its fair opportunity and would not fear unfair competition. Confidence between the nations would develop with growing experience ; the abandonment of large navies and expensive naval bases in the Pacific would inspire still further mutual con- fidence, promote more cordial co-operation and lead to still further reduction of armament — - a circle of reactions, in this case, not vicious, but beneficent. The danger of another world war, because A p p e On November 16, 1921, the Chinese Delega- tion to the Conference on Limitation of Arma- ments gave to the press the following statement : “In conformity with the agenda of the Con- ference, the Chinese Government proposes for the consideration of and adoption by the Con- ference the following general principles to be ap- plied in the determination of the questions re- lating to China : Principles to Be Applied “(la) The Powers engage to respect and ob- serve the territorial integrity and political and administrative independence of the Chinese Re- public. “(b) China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any por- tion of her territory or litteral to any Power. “(2) China, being in full accord with the principle of the so-called open door or equal op- portunity for the commerce and industry of all the nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept and apply it in all parts of the Chinese Republic without exception. “(3) With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers agree not to con- clude between themselves any treaty or agree- ment directly affecting China or the general peace in these regions without previously noti- fying China or giving to her an opportunity to participate. “(4) All special rights, privileges, immuni- ties, or commitments, whatever their character of rivalry for the possession of China and her boundless wealth, would be averted. All the nations would share in the prosperity of a wholesomely developing, peaceful and prosper- ous China. In carrying out and putting into effective operation the broad principles of justice and humanity that are essential to right interna- tional relations, none should be more interested and active than the Christians and Churches of America. n d i X or contractual basis, claimed by any of the Powers in or relating to China are to be de- clared, and all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities, and commitments, now known or to be declared, are to be examined with a view to determining their scope and validity, and, if valid, to harmonizing them with one another and with the principles declared by this Conference. “(5) Immediately, or as soon as the circum- stances will permit, existing limitations upon China’s political, jurisdictional, and administra- tive freedom of action are to be removed. “(6) Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be attached to China’s present commit- ments, which are witliout time limits. “(7) In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights, or privileges, the well established principle of construction that such grants shall be strictly construed in favor of the grantors, is to be observed. “(8) China’s rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in future wars to which she is not a party, “(9) Provision is to be made for the peace- ful settlement of international disputes in the Pacific and the Far East. “(10) Provision is to be made for future conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of international questions relative to the Pacific and the Far East, as a basis for the determination of common policies of the signa- tory powers in relation thereto,” Price, 25 cents per copy. 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