MICROFILMED 1991 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the •'Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" founded by the NATION.AL ENDOWMENT FOR TFIE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: TITLE: SCOTTISH METAPHYSICS PLACE: EDINBURGH DATE: 1887 Restrictions on Use: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITr' LIBRARIE PRESERVATION DEPARTM ENT Master Negative # IMBJLjaGRAPiiiC_ M I C R O FO R M T A R G ET Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record mmf^mmmmm-'Mm^ NYCG91-B101i21 Acquisitions NYCG-PT PC:r MMD: 040 ? ? A0:12-09-91 U0:12-09-91 « • « ???? MEI:? BKS/SAVE Books FUL/BIB Record 1 of - SAVE record ■f I0:NYCG91-B10il21 RTYP:a ST:s FRN: MS CC:9668 BLTiam DCF:? CSC:? MOD: SNR CPznyu L:eng INT:? GPC:? GIO:? FIC PD: 1991/188? REP:? CPI:? FSI OR: POL: DM: RR: COL: EML: GEN: NNCt^cNNC 245 10 Scottish metaphysicSrhffTiicrof onn Jrbreconstructed in accordance with th e principles ot physical science. 260 Edinburqh,t^bWilliafn Blackwood and Sons,|cl887. 300 xiv, 244 p. LDG ORIG QO 12-09-91 EL ATC CON ILC EML II:? BSE: TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA FILM SIZE: ^CS^jnooa. RiiUUCTiON RATiO: IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA @ IB IIO D ATE FILM E D : i-Jllz^\A I N 1 T I A IS__^\:2^__^ FILM.EDBY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS. INC VVOOIlfH^IfiniL CT ' .Ik c MM Association for information and image IManagement 1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 12 3 4 12 13 14 15 mm Inches 1.0 Li 1.25 ■ 71 2.8 32 3.6 14.0 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 MflNUFfiCTURED TO flllM STPINDfiRDS BY fiPPLIED IMflGEp INC. Columbia (Mnitiew^itp mtljeCttpofi^rtttgork THE LIBRARIES %* SCOTTISH METAPHYSICS ■ I SCOTTISH METAPHYSICS RECONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE " The genuine method of Metaphysics is at uottom identical with that which Newton introduced into Physical Science." — BY THE WRITER OF 'FREE N0TE3 ON HERBERT SPENCER'S FIRST PRINCIPLES' -» «' WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS EDINBURGH AND LONDON MDCCCLXXXVII ^ ' ' /i' >'lh ' « fff'tTVC'l y i: PEE FACE. • i 5^0 ? ?^ ? :% Vr- irn Our Scottish Metaphysics may with advantage be restated or reconstructed somewhat in correspondence with the lines of Physical Science, taken in its widest sense as including organic nature as well as inorganic. This would lead us to deal with the mind and its opera- tions, as we do with the body and its actions, by view- ing the mind as having its hyperphysical environments and being active therein, even as the body is active in the midst of its physical environments. As Physiology or Biology is the science of the living organism and its functions, so Psychology is the science of the mind and its functions; but as we have Physics or Physical science, which embraces the former and goes beyond it, so we have Metaphysics, which embraces Psychology and goes beyond it. And as we would not study physical nature by limiting ourselves to only an organ- ised portion of it— viz., the body— so we should not pretend to study moral or hyperphysical nature by confining ourselves to only an organised portion of it o O O ^/ w 4 vi • \ Preface. Preface. Vll 11 — viz., the mind. We cannot understand the bodily organism and its functions without observing its activ- ities in the extra-organic field, and indeed without marking the mutual relations subsisting between organ- ism and environment ; neither can we comprehend the mental organism and its functions without observing its operations in the extra -mental field, and indeed without considering the mutual relations existing be- tween the mind and its moral environment. But is there a moral sphere or environment connate with the mind, and in which it is active, as the body is in its connate physical environment ] If there be such a hyperphysical sphere for the mind, as there is a physical for the body, it cannot be that that moral sphere should inhere in or issue out of the mind, any more than that the physical sphere should inhere in or be developed from the body; it must be a positively objective sphere, and not a subjective sphere for the mind to expatiate in. The analogy promises the dis- covery, that as the body derives its substance, mainten- ance, and growth from its surroundings, so the mind must obtain its substance, nourishment, and develop- ment, not from itself, but from its moral surroundings ; it must see and breathe in the light and air of Intelligence, feed upon the substance of Goodness, and work under the effectiveness of Causation. This may be deemed a poetic way of stating the alleged facts ; but the follow- ing pages are an attempt to show that there is a hyper- physical or moral world as well as the physical world, W and even that such is the necessary suggestion and implication afforded by our current systems of Meta- physics. Following the Scottish views on metaphysical ques- tions as the most practical of the current systems, we may take Hamilton's exposition of it, with his illustra- tions from other sources, and draw our parallel lines alongside of it, to exhibit, by contrast more vividly, the objective nature of the hyperphysico-moral sphere where- in the mind exists and works. By this means we may succeed in doing what Chalmers seems to have desired — viz., " to clear away idealism (with certain * a priori notions ') from the regions of the understanding, even as the old 'ideas' were cleared away from the region of the senses." The process may also help the progress of Science, by *' connecting tJiought with the other pheno- mena of the universe, and suggesting inquiry into the nature of those physical conditions or concomitants of thought, which may assist us to exercise similar control over the world of thought as we already possess in respect of the material world" (Huxley adapted). It would save us from Hegel's ludicrous notion of a philo- sopher viewing things with his head down and feet up, or Heine's comical reflection upon subjective philosophy — viz., *' The ego is to investigate its own intellectual acts under the process of thinking ; thought is to play the spy on itself whilst it thinks, whilst it grows gradually warmer until at last it is boiling. This operation reminds us of the monkey seated on the hearth before a copper 1 1 f . i Vlll Preface. Preface, IX kettle boiling its own tail, it being of opinion that the true art of cookery consists, not merely in the objective art of cooking, but also in the subjective consciousness of the process of cooking." For the scheme here pro- posed not only exhibits the distinction between the mind and its moral sphere of action, but emphasises that distinction by further revealing the personal Ego or Self as connate with a higher nature— viz., the Spiritual realm— and as consciously overseeing and being effective in the mental operations, and through them with the moral sphere, as weU as in the physical organism and its sphere. This outstanding fact of man's spiritual nature dominating his mental constitution and physical organ- ism, and bringing him into direct correspondence with the highest Personality— that is, with God— also serves to accentuate the utter difference between man and brute animals, which otherwise partake of his mental and physical nature. If this restatement of metaphysics in a new light be accounted equivalent to a reconstruction, it is no more than what other sciences are undergoing in a return to more natural systems than formerly prevailed. Science seeks unity in the objects of knowledge, and declares, for instance, that the mbstance of every **body," atom or mass, organic or inorganic, natural or artificial, is derived from existing universal Matter. But every such body has forin, consistency, and succes- sion of parts; whence are these derived] We should rightly reason that these qualities of body are likewise derived from existing universals— namely, " forms," ex- tensions, &c., from SjMce; "consistency," coherences, &c., from Force; and ''successions," rhythm, &c., from Time. The qualities of bodies, then, are the modes of universal Space, Force, and Time, manifested according to the constitution or composition of bodies and their mutual relations. Here emerges the double question, Whence this constitution and these relations of material bodies, and what is this "matter"] If we adopt and adapt H. Spencer's definition of " matter, substance, or body," as consisting of three elements— viz., " coexistent resisting positions," or " extended and resistant atoms," or " masses extended and resistant," wherein " coexist- ence " belongs to Time, " resistance " to Force or Energy, and "position" to Space— we have the combined or fused modes of hyperphysical Time, Force, and Space. Whether this matter be in atoms or molecules or masses, each is a combination of the said modes ; and as modes they are limited, changeable, and exhaustible, by merg- ing into their fundamental primaries, and we are thus saved the " unending controversy regarding the infinite divisibility of matter." Then whence come the partic- ular composition of bodies and their manifold correla- tions ] Do they not imply selective, arranging, and beneficent agency 1 Science avers that atoms as well as masses — indeed that all nature shows marks of being a "manufactured article," and that all are conducive to the wellbeing of animated creatures (Herschel and others). They thus declare and manifest the presence X Preface. of universal Intelligence, universal Goodness, and uni- versal Causation which effects these intelligent and beneficent results. Now as man's mental constitution is connate in nature with the said moral universals, we rightly conclude that its substance is derived from the moral triad, and in particular the composition of the intellectual faculty chiefly from Intelligence, the emo- tional capacity from Goodness, and the voluntary power from Causation. And as the relations of these moral beings among themselves, and in the midst of their physical and moral surroundings, are under the pervad- ing influence of their fundamental primaries, the out- come of such relations and influence is the intellectual, sesthetic, and ethical laws that help to illumine, sustain, and sway the psychic nature in its native sphere and in its working therein (note 58). Lastly, the unity of the above fundamentals and their modes is found in univer- sal Existence. But as these are all impersonalities— as there is nothing of personality in the moral universals, nor in the mental nature and its operations— man's spiritual personal nature cannot be satisfied with them, but claims derivation and sustentation from and inter- course with Personalities ; and this he finds in its perfect adequacy in the Infinite, Eternal, and Omnipotent Per- sonal God, in Whom he lives, and moves, and has his spiritual being. Philosophy and Science, however, have no place in this spiritual realm. I think these are some of the legitimate conclusions to be derived from the practical parts of our current Preface. XI metaphysics, and that this proposed reconstruction will bear much greater elaboration and application in details than has here been attempted. It will certainly afford greater scope and freedom for inquiry in a field of know- ledge where we have hitherto been much restricted, and in which we have made little progress. It is at least worth while to endeavour to trace the true unity and basis of Nature, and to show that we have objective supersensuous and moral realities to deal with, as well as objective sensuous facts ; and that we may also attain to a still higher objective knowledge of spiritual realities in a spiritual realm. If Darwin's oft-repeated argument, that the fitness of his theory to the facts served to establish it, be a fair one, then we may venture to appeal to the evident correspondence existing between man and Nature, as supporting the views here stated of a complete correlation between man's whole nature and all objective existence, between his organism and Phy- sical nature, between his mind and objective Moral or hyperphysical nature, and between his personal spirit and objective Personal-Spiritual Nature. Edinburgh, 1886. i f i *^* Authors referred to are so well known that they are simply named in encyclopaedic fashion, and summary-quotations are given from their works as necessary to the due exposition of the parallel views here offered for adoption. The term "moral" is used as including mental and ethical, and all that is hyperphysical, but as exclusive of the spiritual or religious. Figures within brackets usually refer to the section numbers. NOTE. This condensed review of Scottish Philosophy with its suggested reconstruction may serve to revive interest in that philosophy, which has of late years been so neglected by our Colleges for the study ap- parently of the idealism of Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel. Those theories are attractive by their elaborate systematisation ; but to the Scottish mind, addicted from youth to seek for -principles behind facts they otfer no objective substantiality, and afford no hope of progress. Such -artifices of intellect" will not supply the " light and leading in Metaphysics for which Scotland was once renowned. We must re- vert to our own native standards, readjusted by the indications furnished in the recent reconstructions of the Physical sciences. These declare for instance, that force is any cause which produces a change in a body s state of rest or motion, and that physical forces are objective reality as much as matter (Tait) ; that the word cause may be used as meaning antecedent forces, which are all correlative, and any one ^^ ^^u^^^^^ produce any of the others, each merging itself as the force it produces becomes developed ; hence we must recognise a reality m force, and the various forces as the exertion of one force, as the modes of action of one pervading Force (Grove) ; that all the powers (forces) ^^^n pro- ducing their peculiar effects are expended in the same proportion as these effects are produced, and the various forms under which t^e forces are made manifest appear to have on^ common ongrtn (Faraday). That - one common origin," source, or base,-that " one pervadmg force out of which any modal force, chemical, electric, &c. can be Produced and into which it can again merge when its work is done or condiUons change, that which forms the unity and conservation of all the modes of fore;, is universal hyperphysical Force, which manifests its various physical modes under certain conditions of the constitution and mutual relation of bodies. This ends the old controversy about ^aus^ and effect " Again, all the shapes, sizes, positions, and distances of objects in Nature, extensions in lines, circles, squares, and angles appearing and disappearing, naturally and artificially produced, are aH Ukewise derived from one common source or base wherein they find their unity and conservation-viz., universal hyperphysical Space, which manifests its various physical modes under conditions of specific natural plasticity and artificial manipulation of matter. So again, the success wns of Tarts n bodies, durations and periods in existences, the number and measures in sound, the series of related things, are all derived from one f I1 ^^y» ^ Note, common source or base, wherein they find their "-t^ .-^/""f ;;;«°", viz universal hyperphysical Time, which manifests its various XsicalZde under appropriate condUion. of natural dispos.ngs and S:l — ments 'o^ matter. Ustly, as the P^ys^al mod^ are sensuously known, and their hyperphysical -"^'^^ .^'"'^'Jl^^Z tuitionallv known, as both equally objective or apart from the minn, so "™ that both find their ultimate unity and conservation as exist- rncetTuniversal E:cisU■,^ce, o. what Spencer calls "general existence and " ultimate of ultimates." ..»!„„. „f r,w«cta In like manner Science sees in the manifold a Consciousness in Relation to Intellect. 53 and its operations, and through them of the organism and its activities. It is a solecism to say, " consciousness and attention are not different faculties." Hamilton thinks ** consciousness is limited by (1) its knowledge being confined to present facts, (2) or by a present memory- representation of past or absent things, (3) by being obliged to discriminate one thing from another, (4) and to judge, ?.e., affirm or deny, something concerning it, (5) by memory holding fast our mental states and refer- ring them to Self, which is recognised by memory as per- manent and identical throughout all its successive and varied states — in short, the 7iotion of self is the result of memory, and both are involved in consciousness." Upon this Veitch remarks, " Succession of various states has regard to my identity, but I know myself really when I know any state of consciousness; memory is grounded on consciousness, for memory presupposes the Self, and a permanent identical self capable of so knowing the succession and variety in contrast to itself." Yes, the function of personal consciousness is not to judge or to imagine or to remember, &c., but to know all these mental operations and their objects; and, there- fore, it is not bound or limited by them, so that " an act of consciousness is only possible under those conditions." We do not say that the mind's operation is conditioned and limited, and only possible under certain organic states and acts. As to the particulars : (1.) The conscious- self knoivs the past and future event or object, the for- mer as a memory-object and the latter as a hope-object, through the proper mental faculties — e,g.^ imagination pictures the object in Space, where intuition beholds it, and memory responds " like past," and hope responds '' ex- il 54 Scottish Metaphysics Ecconstructed, U ' pected" in future — volition acting in attention, choice, &c., and feeling in liking, &c., and belief in assent to the fact, &c. : consciousness may attend all these mental acts, or be solely engaged with their object ; but to be known as mental acts, the self must be conscious of them as apart from itself. (2.) Through the imaged representation intuitively beheld, and the memory's response " like past object," Self knows the remembered -past -object. Yet memory is not percipient when saying with comparison "like past," only intuition in these cases is percipient, as perception is of a real object, and memory may respond to that likewise. Thus consciousness seems directly en- gaged with the memory-object as a past real thing, and with the image as a present intuited thing, and with the real object as with a present perceived thing ; so like- wise about believed objects. Perhaps this may serve to satisfy the dispute between Hamilton and Mill. (3.) Through the comparing or discriminating faculty, differ- ence between objects is discerned, and the Self knows the discriminated-objects. (4.) Through judgment affirm- ing or denying something of an object, the Self knows the adjudicated-object. (5.) Through memory echoing "like-to-past," or its negative, as to former mental or organic successive states when recurring afresh or ima- gined, whilst intuitive, voluntary, comparing, and judg- ing processes accompany memory and imagination, the Self knows the remembered- successive-states as belong- ing to the same mind and body; but neither memory nor other mental faculty or operation can reach up to or declare the identity of the Self, which self-affirmation is the prerogative of ever- during self-consciousness alone. 19 (lee. 12, p. 206-21). As Eeid, Hutcheson, Stewart, Consciousness in Relation to Intellect. 55 and Bro^vn held that consciousness is only engaged upon the present operations of the mind and not on its objects^ Hamilton sets forth the " principle that the knowledge of a mental act necessarily involves the knowledge of its object " thus : — Tlie knowledge of relatives and of opposites, as virtue and vice, husband and wife, is one — i.e., involves the conception of one another; to be conscious of perceiving a book and not to be con- scious of the book perceived, is impossible ; to imagine a centaur as a modification of mind and not to be conscious of the act of imagin- ing and the modification or centaur, is impossible likewise ; the object-centaur and the imaging-act are identical and indivisible. Again, an immediate knowledge is only of the now existent and not of the past existent ; the art of memory is a present state of mind which represents a former state of mind accompanied with a heUef that the former state is now represented as formerly existent ; thus certain present imaginations involve the conviction that these ima- ginations now represent ideally the past actual object or event ; and yet we may doubt the representation as being true to the original, which we could not do if our knowledge of the past were immediate. Says Veitch — Still I know the object as existing; it is even the object of my thought, though I only know it through the mental image, and it is the object of thought in that a reference to it is involved in the act of representation (43). Belief seems to take the place of memory here ; ima- gination pictures the past object or event, and belief gives the conviction of its being like the past. Mansel converts imagination into memory when the object is of the past, and into hope when it relates to the future. But to say that the act of imagining and the 'picture imaged are "identical," is to contradict common-sense and previous statements, such as " it is impossible to be conscious of an act without being conscious of the ol:^ect to which that act relates." The very terms imply a dis- tinction between the consciousness and the mental act and the object in every case. I am conscious of now 56 Scottish Metaphysics Eeconstructed. Consciousness in Relation to Intellect. 57 * perceiving and not imagining an object which is separate from my perceiving act, or of imagining and not per- ceiving an object separate from my imaging act, or of similarly remembering, &c. Some place is required for the imaged object, so it is placed in the mind or in the memory and converted into a mental modification ! instead of being pictured as a supersensuous object in Space. The process of these acts has been referred to in notes 5, 17, 18, &c. Take the case of Eeid's imagin- ing St Paul's of London : he saw the cathedral yester- day as a perception of a real object, to-day he imagines or pictures it in hyperphysical Space, and memory says like yesterday's object, whilst belief says yes, and thought by inference says the real still exists ; and thus Reid in- ferentially now knows it as existing, and belief echoes yes. Observe, 1st, that the simultaneous operation of various mental faculties, whilst requiring the unifying presence of consciousness or the conscious-self, causes the difficulty of distinguishing their individual action, and hence we are apt to attribute the quality of per- cipiency to imagination, memory, hope, and belief, whereas the concomitant action of intuition^ like per- ception in sensuous knowledge, should suffice to illumine their operation in the supersensuous sphere. 2d, When St Paul's was originally seen, many associated operations of mind were aroused to activity ; among these imagina- tion pictured the object instantaneously in Space : when again the cathedral comes in sight, like associated opera- tions take place, intuition views the pictured object before left in Space, comparing powers operate, and memory strikes the note *'same as past." At another time I wish to remember the building I before saw r imagination comes into fresh play with sketches or out- lines which perhaps hit a likeness which memory notes as " like past " ; or rather my voluntary powers convey my mind through a line or path of associated objects in Space, formerly pictured, till intuition views the first pictured cathedral, and attendant memory echoes " like past." With every seen object probably a copy is photo- graphed by imagination in Space, and comparisons go on with that and attendant associations. This, though a tentative explanation of perhaps insoluble questions, has the advantage of indicating an actual object apart from the mind, a tridy " retained object of knowledge " in cases of thought as well as of perception. 20 (lee. 13, p. 222-31). Objecting to Reid's making " consciousness " the faculty of knowing the ego and its modifications, and " perception " the faculty of knowing the non-ego, Hamilton says, *' The ego and the non-ego are known and discriminated in the same act of know- ledge, and therefore by the same acting faculty^ other- wise a special faculty for each could not discriminate both ego and non-ego and comprehend them together in the unity of knowledge " (17). The Self is conscious of the unity of the mental operations as in the mind, and the unity of perceived objects as in Nature, and of both in the unity of Existence (36) ; whereas if consciousness were merely a " general mental faculty," it might only act as " intuition " does among supersensuous objects, and as '' perception " does among sensuous objects ; so that both Reid's and Hamilton's views desiderate the supervision of consciousness as a personal factor in knowledge. Perhaps this suffices for the knowledge of the relative and correlative separately or together, 58 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. I Consciousness in Relation to Intellect. 59 of the mental act and its object separately or together — explaining also the case of "latent thought " (28). To speak of a " common cognisance of self and not-self," of the " ego and non-ego being known and discriminated in the same act of knowledge," rather implies a direct consciousness of outer nature without mental perception, without the intervention of the mental act of perceiv- ing, which would be tantamount to being conscious of sensible things without the senses, or of supersensible things like Space, &c., without mental intuition. (This seems to have puzzled Mill, who charged Hamilton with irreconcilable views of consciousness.) The implication seems admitted when he adds, "it undoubtedly sounds strange to say I am conscious of the inkstand, instead of saying I am conscious of the perception of the inkstand." If so directly conscious of physical and hyperphysical things, what use were there of mental faculties and organic senses, of an animal nature at all 1 The spirit- self might as well be soulless and bodiless, and wander amidst a temporal state of things, a physical plus hyper- physical world, without any interest in such a world ; in which case we should not be called "man," with "body, soul, and spirit," but be like angelic spirits, who, however, have put on the animal nature, and again have shed it when their temporal work was done, and have returned to their native or spiritual realm. Eeid and others seemed to wish to express mediate knowledge or consciousness of things outside the mind, and mmediate knowledge of mental operations. To this Hamilton objects, "An act of perception is in relation to its object, and the act is only known through the object to which it is correlative; therefore to know the act exclusive of its object is impossible : e.g.yl see an ink- stand ; how do I know it is a perception of sight and of an inkstand only, if my consciousness do not comprehend within its sphere the inkstand ? Abolish the inkstand and you abolish the perception ; or abolish the conscious- ness of the inkstand and you abolish the consciousness of the ac^." Stay, Eeid might say, we may know the inkstand and yet not know the perceiving act through which alone we could know it. This is common with all our sensuous knowledge. If consciousness can be so engaged with the object and neglect the mental act, as easily as we may neglect the telescope through which we see the star, then possibly consciousness may be absorbed in the perceiving act without knowing the object. Ad- mittedly there are many unconscious mental and or- ganic acts — inferred from their results — and there may be also unconscious mentally perceived objects and latent thoughts. I am conscious directly of perceiving or thinking, and indirectly or mediately through those acts of their objects, otherwise I cannot be conscious of any sensuous object, and therefore my consciousness does not " comprehend within its sphere an inkstand " — except as perceived. Here are two acts — the act of the Self's consciousness or knowing, and the act of the mind's perceiving. The former is in direct relation to the latter, and only in indirect relation to the latter's immediate object — viz., the inkstand ; therefore it seems the reverse of the fact to say, " the act of per- ceiving is only known through the object." Again, the acts of perceiving may be many and various as their objects, while the act of consciousness of them is one throughout. A series of perceivings and one sensuous 60 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstmcted. Consciousness in Relation to Intellect. 61 object after another may be perceived and passed or "annihilated/' but the perceiving faculty may, auto- matically or otherwise, continue on the stretch, and as thus in exercise may be under the view of conscious- ness; so with thinkings and thoughts. 21 (p. 231-38). Attention and Eeflection are said to be " contained in consciousness " (35) ; and as Eeid and Stewart have viewed both as one and as belonging to will, applying attention to present knowledge and reflec- tion to the memory of the past, Hamilton insists that " attention is not a faculty diff'erent from consciousness, for it adjusts consciousness to its object as the tubes of a telescope do in adjusting its focus, it is consciousness and something more — i.e., it is consciousness voluntarily applied to an object, or consciousness concentrated." This is as incongruous as to say that the mind is con- strained by the hand, or the will by the muscles. The self's consciousness cannot be so directed or controlled by a lower mental nature; attention is simply a will- action, one form of volition, as choice and resolution are other modes; and why this mode of attention rather than the other modes of volition should be selected and allied to consciousness, is inexplicable. Attention acts chiefly with the intellectual powers by fixing them upon their objects, and also accompanies the feelings. 22 (p. 238-45). Can we attend to more than a single object at once 1 is answered thus : " Attention being but the concentration of consciousness on a smaller number of objects than constitute its widest compass of simid- taneous knowledge, we can attend when we converge consciousness on any smaller number than that total complement of objects which it can embrace at once." This just means that we can attend to several objects, limitedly or as forming a whole, at once (9, 11). Stewart and Brown think otherwise, holding that difi'erent acts of attention are so rapid as to appear coexistent — e.g., as the different points or minima visible of objects, or parts of music, are by memory gathered together as a whole and realised. This implies that a visible object manifests itself only in successive visible minima of colours and form, and a musical harmony in like suc- cessive audible minima of sounds, instead of in one combined stream or volume of coexistent colours and form, and likewise of sounds — which, perhaps, suffi- ciently answers Kant's "part by part perceived and afterwards reproduced manifold." Besides, Perception and Intuition are in themselves /?ivoluntary states of mind directly realising the presented objects, the former sensuously perceivir^ the physical colours, forms, and sounds, the latter intuiting the supersensuous whole- ness, beauty, and music thus expressed — voluntary attention helping perception and intuition in noticing more intently or particularly the whole object or its several parts, in different instants of time. Hence Hamilton says, " All the sounds of voices or instruments forming the harmony reach the ear at the same moment ; if we could attend only to each minimum of sound sttc- cessivelj/y in that minimum of time many coexisting minima of sound would perish unattended to and the harmony would be lost," &c. ; and adds, aa against J. MiU's association of parts in sensation giving wholes of ideas of objects, " This implies that we know the parts always better than the wholes, whereas the reverse 62 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. Consciousness in Relation to Intellect. 63 is the case — e.g.^ tlie face of a friend in person or picture " (vol. ii. p. 144-49). Without professing to explain how a multitude of air-waves with attendant sounds unite to form a wholeness or unity of sound which affects as a whole the sense-perception, we may suppose that though the individual and combmed physical sounds may perish, the hyperphysical music or harmony may still float in hyperphysical Time as a rhythmic movement, and so be reverted to ever and anon through the rhythmic response of our emotive nature. In this view the imagination does not and cannot represent time-measures (except in the form of notation), nor does the memory retain in itself such harmonic movements, though when the emotive capacities are again directed to the floating measure, or to a similar musical piece newly awakened by voice or instrument, memory wiU respond '' same as past" or "like the past," whilst imagination may picture the instruments or persons or written notes which may serve to direct the emotional power to the already exist- ing or newly awakened harmonies. So far as there are supersensuous spacial extensions and potential quantities, in extent of subject and pitch, &c., of tone, in the music, the intellect and the will are concerned with the particular supersensuous measure; but the main appreciation of all music lies in the feelings (64). As to visual objects and their beauty, &c., see notes 9, 11, 15, 43. 23 (lee. 14, p. 246-48). Much of the confusion here as to " our being determined to an act of attention in- dependently of our volition," and being " unconscious of interruptions to thought without voluntarily withholding our attention," and of there being "no consciousness without concentrated-consciousness," &c., — as if there were two consciousnesses or two wiUs, one active and the other quiescent, or one-half of a will acting and the other half not — arises from ignoring the distinct domin- ance of the conscious-self over voluntary activity as well as over other mental operations, the ultimate determining power lying in the Self, or, as Mansel says, "Myself determining my own volitions," &c. (16). 24 (p. 248-63). Eeverting to the number of objects the mind can attend to at once — viz., six or seven objects or groups, seen or imagined — it is added, " \vithout tliis one indivisible consciousness of different objects " no com- parison and discrimination of them would be possible, and " no judgment could be possible were not the subject and predicate of a proposition thought together, although expressed in language one after the other ; as Aristotle says, a ^syllogism forms in thought one simultaneous act," &c. This suggests that the materials of thought, in forming syllogisms or mathematical demonstrations, are not found in the constructing mind, but are gathered by it from without, from hyperphysical nature, in the axiomatic and other truths with and upon which we build our "systems of thought," as surely as "houses composed of single bricks " are gathered and formed and built up in physical nature. Without disputing that subject and predicate are thought together, or that a syllogism involves an act of thought or rather one series of thoughts, we might find that in reasoning the " sub- ject " is a complete thought in itself, so is the " predi- cate," and so is the " conclusion," and yet these several thoughts or parts form a syllogistic ichole, and it is by intuition we view that whole in Space (12, 47-49). In \ 64 Scottish Metajphysics Beconstructcd. Consciousness in Relation to Intellect, 65 such thought - constructions volition is active, and its mode of attention accompanies other mental opera- tions in forming the thought - system, hut attention is not emphasised in the process over conception, &c. Thinking is " relationing," or rather thinking is constructing an objective thought-system in which re- lating part to part occurs, wherein intellections are more directly engaged than volitions and feelings; but even as all sensuous acts are accompanied by muscular action and nervous sensibilities, so the intellectual operations are attended with voluntary activities and emotional susceptibilities. So much for the process of construc- tion in which all the mental faculties and capacities have been jointly employed. But is the " whole " and its " parts " of the thought-structure now completed, and in view of intuition, known in "one act of know- ledge " % Can we actually attend to the whole and to its parts together at once, at the same time] Admit that the structure is not too great for one view, and that its wholeness and parts are simultaneously presenting them- selves to our mind, even as with the whole and parts of a physical structure or a scene in nature (11, 12), still I think attention cannot be fixed at once on the whole object and on its parts, but only upon each by turns — ^.e., we can attend to the whole as a whole, and in another instant or instants to each part successively as parts of the whole. How then compare and dis- criminate between objects, or between parts and the whole of objects, physical or hyperphysical ? Why should they not be comparable by turns, by instan- taneous views of each successively ] Must they be held in view together in order to know difi'erences and like- % v.: nesses between them % In that case they must together be attended to, which we have seen can scarcely be. Is there any corresponding mental action to holding up objects in each hand, and iceiglnng them against one another, and looking at them also at the same time 1 This would correspond to the acts of intuition and volition in attention which work together, and consciousness would know the two dififerent mental operations and also their objects, being what Hamil- ton calls one "indivisible consciousness of different objects"; but mere mental comparison between two weighments or between two visual perceptions, as well as between two intuitions and between two actions of the " exertive faculties," could not be without attention turn- ing from one to the other object. Doubtless imaged pic- tures or notioned models of each object or conceptual structure, whole or part, helps in comparison, as in the case of memory (18); still attention must turn from the picture or model to the other object for comparison, as was done with the original objects. Attention is perhaps more active or intense as regards parts than as regards wholes ; yet either way it must be successive in action upon two or more objects — i.e., we cannot attend to two things at the same time. How far the fact of consciousness overseeing and knowing at once the action of mental faculties and also their objects will solve the problem, is not quite clear. E 64 Scottish Metajphysics Eeconsttiictcd. such thought - constructions volition is active, and its mode of attention accompanies other mental opera- tions in forming the thought - system, but attention is not emphasised in the process over conception, &c. Thinking is " relationing," or rather thinking is constructing an objective thought-system in which re- lating part to part occurs, wherein intellections are more directly engaged than volitions and feelings; but even as all sensuous acts are accompanied by muscular action and nervous sensibilities, so the intellectual operations are attended with voluntary activities and emotional susceptibilities. So much for the process of construc- tion in which all the mental faculties and capacities have been jointly employed. But is the " whole " and its " parts " of the thought-structure now completed, and in view of intuition, known in "one act of know- ledge " 1 Can we actually attend to the whole and to its parts together at once, at the same time 1 Admit that the structure is not too great for one view, and that its wholeness and parts are simultaneously presenting them- selves to our mind, even as with the whole and parts of a physical structure or a scene in nature (11, 12), still I think attention cannot be fixed at once on the whole object and on its parts, but only upon each by turns — i.e., we can attend to the whole as a whole, and in another instant or instants to each part successively as parts of the whole. How then compare and dis- criminate between objects, or between parts and the whole of objects, physical or hyperphysical ? Why should they not be comparable by turns, by instan- taneous views of each successively 1 Must they be held in view together in order to know differences and like- Consciousncss in Eelation to Intelled, 65 I w I nesses between them 1 In that case they must together be attended to, which we have seen can scarcely be. Is there any corresponding mental action to holding up objects in each hand, and weighing them against one another, and looking at them also at the same time 1 This would correspond to the acts of intuition and volition in attention which work together, and consciousness would know the two different mental operations and also their objects, being what Hamil- ton calls one "indivisible consciousness of different objects"; but mere mental comparison between two weighments or between two visual perceptions, as well as between two intuitions and between two actions of the " exertive faculties," could not be without attention turn- ing from one to the other object. Doubtless imaged pic- tures or notioned models of each object or conceptual structure, whole or part, helps in comparison, as in the case of memory (18); still attention must turn from the picture or model to the other object for comparison, as was done with the original objects. Attention is perhaps more active or intense as regards parts than as regards wholes ; yet either way it must be successive in action upon two or more objects — i.e., we cannot attend to two things at the same time. How far the fact of consciousness overseeing and knowing at once the action of mental faculties and also their objects will solve the problem, is not quite clear. E 6d CHAPTEK V. . CONSCIOUSNESS, ITS AUTHORITY — UNCONSCIOUS STATES OF MIND. 25 (lee. 15, p. 264-84). Hamilton declares we muse "evolve our doctrines or systems out of consciousness, which is the source of all philosophy, and its authenti- cation and authority." The strange thing is, that he insists on evolving out of consciousness such emphatic- ally objective realities as universal Existence, Space, Time, Causation, &c., which he will have to be subjec- tive a priori principles. But he admits that no concept can be formed of them, for "we can form no concept but of the limited, for thinking is limiting," which shows they are not thought -knowledge, but intuitive knowledge, and as such believed in; and therefore he speaks of them as inconceivable, though not incognisable, as Mill seems to have thought him to mean, says Veitch (41). Consciousness involves the assurance of itself and of mind's actings, but not directly of the objects of the mind, regarding which mental " belief " or assent to outer facts assures; the Ego or I am conscious of mentally perceiving and believing an outside object, but the Ego does not perceive and believe, &c. Suppose, Conscious and Unconscious Mental States. 67 however, we said, I remember having had this mental emotion, or having made this mental resolution, or having seen this tree before; but it could be proved that I never before had such a feeling, or formed such a resolve, or had seen the tree : in this case I am con- scious of the memory acting along with the imagination — i.e., of remembering the facts alleged; yet the mistake lies not with consciousness but with the mind or memory, even as when the mind, perceiving through a diseased eye, mistakes a bush for a man. This affords another proof, surely, that as the physical not-me is a separate object to the mind, so the mental not-me is a separate object to the consciousness or conscious me, because in both "objects" mistakes may alike occur. But we can- not say, I am conscious of yestenlai/s self-consciousness, for we are ever self-conscious without note of time, and memory cannot testify of facts ahove its own nature ; we are conscious and self-conscious apart from and unlimited by Time, Space, or Force, which are directly connected with the mind as their modes are with the body ; nevertheless we can say, I am conscious of enter- ing or being in this temporal sphere by virtue of my being in or connected with a temporal-spacial-potential mind and body, by virtue of which also in the exercise of "memory" I can say, I was or continued to be in such a past hour or day or year, and in the exercise of "hope" will continue to be in a future time (27); otherwise I or me is not an object to I or me, the ego is not an object to the ego, at least not as the mind and its operations, or nature and its activities, are. Hamilton objects to Brown appealing to consciousness or belief about the personal self's identity, since, as he , I' 1 68 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed, " mistakes self for not-self, he may mistake not-self for self ; for if the object perceived is only a mode of the percipient subject, how can the mind be simple, one, and indivisible, when its modes are plural and different and opposed % " — which tells rather against his own equiv- ocal statements, especially his mistaking the not-self of the universals for self and its issues (6, 9, 14, 15, 20, 30, 39, &c.) But really it is time to reverse his precept and say. We may anticipate a steady progress for phil- osophy when we cease to " evolve our doctrines or sys- tems out of consciousness," and find our materials and rules for philosophy out of the objective facts and realities of the physical and hyperphysico-moral world. 26 (lee. 16, p. 285-309). He declares that all false systems, such as Hume and Fichte's nihilism, and Berke- ley, Clarke, Kant, and perhaps Locke's denial of know- ledge beyond the mind, though admitting an unknown external world, and Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin's view that mind and matter are only phenomenal modifications of the same substance, " arise from not accepting the reve- lation of consciousness — viz., that we are conscious in perception of an ego and a non-ego, known together and yet in contrast to each other, in the same mdivisible intuition of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived — this is natural realism; a fact of consciousness being a fact of common- sense, all men have a knowledge of two worlds, of mind and matter." Again his rebuke of others may tell against himseK. 27 (lee. 17, p. 310-37). We are said to be always con- sciously active even in sleep, dreaming, somnambulism, &c., though there is not always a memory of our conscious- \ Conscious and Unconscious Mental States. 69 ness. Abnormal cases are not to the point, and to speak of a memory of consciousness is unmeaning (25). The next lecture dwells on the mind " exerting energies and suffering modifications without our being coriscious of them," which suggests that in states of dreaming and som- nambulism, mental activities are generally wwconsciously performed. All this serves ratner to prove that the self's consciousness and the mind's impersonal operations are as distinct from each other as the body's activities are from both, and that entire series of mental and organic movements go on together, normally and abnor- mally, without our consciousness of them, or conscious- ness being active in them. There are also automatic movements of the mental faculties, as well as of the senses of the body. 28 (lee. 18, p. 338-51). Notwithstanding, it appears that the mind energises and suffers modifications without our being conscious of them, thus : — The mind contains far more latent furniture than consciousness testifies : (1.) the infinitely greater part of our mental treasures lies always beyond the sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure re- cesses of the mind — e.g., a science, a language, which I can use and apply when and how I will ; (2.) the mind contains whole systems of knoioledge (? knowledge not known), or habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of possessing, but which are revealed to con- sciousness in extraordinary' exaltations of its powers — e.g., in abnor- mal states of madness, fever, somnambulism, extinct memory of languages being suddenly restored ; (3.) in ordinary mental modifica- tions there are activities, &c., of which we are unconscious except by their effects — nay, what we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of ; our whole knowledge, in fact, is made np of the unknown and the incognisable ! There are modifications of mind which are not of themselves phenomena of consciousness, for we have no general consciousness (?but "general faculty," notes 16, 18) ; and as consciousness supposes a special mental modification as its object, we can only be conscious, as we are conscious of a deter- 1 70 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstmcted. „i„ate Stat, snch as perception, «n'«>»l'-"''»' ™*te^^^^^^^^^ which again involves a change from one state to another , ana asjv e have only a consciousness of a pre^erU state, we can have no con- sciousneil of its rise or awakening (?or changinf for tha^wak n ins is also the awakening of consciousness. Thus the sphere oi our l^rSd states beyond consciousness, then consciousness is not tod speusab : t mental activity, it is not an essential condition of a mS energy: are these latent mental energies the same m char- Xtirth"^ conscious ones? and if different, are they yet m<^(an They dWer by opposites, even contradictions, for the conscious and fte unconscious II so, aid yet they are reganled as of the same genus vi" mental. Mental modiflcations not originally conscious ex- ;^a"n nofttag to call unconscious modifications "know edge, .s to contradtet the' statement that consciousness is all knowledge, or all kno^Te s consciousness." It implies that the Self s consciousness fs ofadfstinct nature from the mind's operations and that objects of knowledge are really objective or outside the mind. But can we soberly think that the mind contains as "latent furniture" whole systems of knowledge withm itself! The system of Astronomy, buOt up gradually in hundreds of years by Copernicus, Kepler, Gaiaeo, New- ton, and others, is "hid in the obscure recesses of the mind " of some modem student ! Did he observe the system in those astronomers' minds 1 No ; he read their books-;.e., by means of certain words he understood their meaning, their Bystem. But where is that meaning lodged, that system contained 1 Not in the words or books, for it must be "in a mind"; then he must have himself given the words their meaning by forming the system afresh in his own mind : there it lies hid m a recess called memory-in memory, and yet not remem- bered but forgotten ; unknown to himself or consciousness this vast system remains hid in the "profundities of his mind, until dragged out by a hand called " reprodue- Conscious and Unconscioiis Mental States. 1 tion," and with the help of another hand called " repre- sentation," it is, or a copy is, presented in imagination to consciousness ! Kow, why not allow Nature's analogies to teach us something in this matter 1 why not learn from the lower actions of the body among its physical environ- ments, how to view the higher operations of the mind in the midst of its hyperphysical environments 1 Here is a beautiful palace, a fine town, an extensive city, built at once or in long periods of time by many human organs and organisms, singly and collectively, out there in Space, and with nature's materials ; while visitors are led by paths, roads, and streets to the constructions, which they view and enter and use, and it may be they improve upon, or even build others like them. Minds, too, have been en- gaged in planning the structures, as well as in directing the organisms in their handiworks : in the spacial lines and forms given to the buildings, in the temporal successions and rhythmic flow and harmony of parts, in the energetic counter-resistances and weights assigned throughout, in the unity and wholeness of the combinations achieved, the mind has used materials existing outside of itself in the outflow of the modes of universal Space, Time, and Force (Appendix, and 58). In this mental work the mind has no more " evolved " out of itself, or out of con- sciousness, the materials employed and applied, or dug them out of its psychic faculties and capacities, than it drew out of itself the bodily organs and their physical working materials, or than that the bodily organs in the physical part of the work used materials drawn from its own bones and sinews. So, in constructing thought- systems, sciences, the mind does not find the materials in itself or evolve them out of itself, much less build the 70 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstmcted, minate state such as perception, remembraiice, imagination, feeling, which again involves a change from one state to another ; and as we have only a consciousness of a prescTU state, we can have no con- sciousness of its rise or awakening (? or changing), for that awaken- ing is also the awakening of consciousness. Thus the sphere of our conscious modifications is only a small circle in the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion of which we are only conscious through their effects. Veitch remarks, '*If there be truly mental acts and states beyond consciousness, then consciousness is not indispensable to mental activity, it is not an essential condition of a mental energy : are these latent mental energies the same m char- acter with the conscious ones? and if different, are they yet mental t They differ by opposites, even contradictions, for the conscious and the unconscious are so, and yet they are regarded as of the same genus —viz., mental. Mental modifications not originally conscious ex- plain nothing ; to call unconscious modifications ' knowledge,' is to contradict the statement that consciousness is all knowledge, or all knowledge is consciousness." It implies that the Self s consciousness is of a distinct nature from the mind's operations, and that objects of knowledge are really objective or outside the mind. But can we soberly think that the mind contains as "latent furniture" whole systems of knowledge within itself % The system of Astronomy, built up gradually in hundreds of years by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, New- ton, and others, is " hid in the obscure recesses of the mind " of some modern student ! Did he observe the system in those astronomers' minds ? No ; he read their l30oks— I.e., by means of certain words he understood their meaning, their system. But where is that meaning lodged, that system contained? Not in the words or books, for it must be " in a mind " ; then he must have himself given the words their meaning by forming the system afresh in his own mind : there it lies hid in a recess called memory— in memory, and yet not remem- bered but forgotten; unknown to himself or consciousness, this vast system remains hid in the " profundities " of his mind, until dragged out by a hand called " reproduc- Conscioits and Unconscioiis Mental States. 1 tion," and with the help of another hand called " repre- sentation," it is, or a copy is, presented in imagination to consciousness ! Now, why not allow Nature's analogies to teach us something in this matter 1 why not learn from the lower actions of the body among its physical environ- ments, how to view the higher operations of the mind in the midst of its hyperphysical environments ? Here is a beautiful palace, a fine town, an extensive city, built at once or in long periods of time by many human organs and organisms, singly and collectively, out there in Space, and with nature's materials ; while visitors are led by paths, roads, and streets to the constructions, which they view and enter and use, and it may be they improve upon, or even build others like them. Minds, too, have been en- gaged in planning the structures, as well as in directing the organisms in their handiworks : in the spacial lines and forms given to the buildings, in the temporal successions and rhythmic flow and harmony of parts, in the energetic counter-resistances and weights assigned throughout, in the unity and wholeness of the combinations achieved, the mind has used materials existing outside of itself in the outflow of the modes of universal Space, Time, and Force (Appendix, and 58). In this mental work the mind has no more " evolved " out of itself, or out of con- sciousness, the materials employed and applied, or dug them out of its psychic faculties and capacities, than it drew out of itself the bodily organs and their physical working materials, or than that the bodily organs in the physical part of the work used materials drawn from its own bones and sinews. So, in constructing thought- systems, sciences, the mind does not find the materials in itself or evolve them out of itself, much less build the ' 'I 72 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. science-structures within itself ; but under the dominant efficiency of the conscious-self the mind uses the hyper- physico-moral truths and principles which lie outside of itself, and builds therewith and in the midst of the universal realities of Existence, Space, &c. Language, vocal, written, or printed, indicates and leads visitors or other minds to view the objective hyperphysical struc- tures, to use them, to add to them or break them down and build afresh, to imitate them and improve upon them, all in the supersensuous sphere (9). " Knowledges " then are not stored up " in the mind," but, as objects out- side the mind, are consciously known through the mental exercises of sensuous perception in regard to physical things, and psychic intuition in the case of hyperphysical things, whether these be nature's — i.e., natural objects, or artificial constructions in either sphere, material or immaterial. True, there is the conscious knowledge of the mind and its operations as objects to the Self's con- sciousness, and this includes mental volitions and emo- tions as well as intellections — i.e., the acts and passions of willing, feeling, and thinking, which are consciously known in their main operations. But the products of thinking in thought, in imagination picturing objects, or conception forming wholes of thought — volitions and emotions attending and helping in these operations — are apart from the mind, and are objects to it in the hyper- physical sphere. In that sphere they are laid up or stand where constructed ; there they are to be sought and found : the voluntary powers direct or hold intuition to the view, or convey the mind through a path of asso- ciated objects, real or artificial, to the desired imaged or conceived structures, and memory echoes " same as or ri Consciaus and Unconscious Mental States. 73 like to pastj'^ and belief responds " yes " (39). This explains the recovery of forgotten facts and events — the recollection of such, better than making memory a re- ceptacle for forgotten things and supposing a "repro- ductive " faculty, knowing somehow where they are, draw them out. Memory's function is thus not to " re- tain knowledge in the mind," but only to yield the sense of sameness or likeness of an object to the past, and therefore there is no need for a reproductive hand to draw forgotten things out of memory's recess, seeing, too, that imagination "represents" past individual ob- jects, scenes, and events, by way of sketchings for mem- ory's assent or dissent as to their likeness to the past real objects, scenes, or events. In shoi-t, memory notes " past," hope notes " future," and imagination pictures for both. In regard to " habits of action " being " con- tained in the mind," it would be better to say habits are acquired aptitudes of action or passion, organic and mental, automatic and otherwise, of the various faculties and capacities, organs and senses : they may be exception- ally spurred into extraordinary activity by exceptional circumstances ; but that we should not be consciously aware of such " capabilities " of mental action till they energise, nor even then ofttimes, is no more strange than that we are not mindful of the organic ones till they are manifested in action. In the case of abnormal recurrence of a forgotten or unknown language, the mind unconsciously may automatically or otherwise picture the letters or the persons and circumstances under which cer- tain sounds were heard, and that excites the associated nervous and muscular action so as to result in imitative speech. But while it is certain that many mental and 'i 74 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. organic movements are, in normal as weU as abnormal states, unconsciously pursued, that there are " modifica- tions of mind which are not phenomena of conscious- ness," on the other hand, it is a contradiction to say " our whole knowledge is made up of the unknown and the ^cognisable " (25). It seems as extravagant as the statement about our " not being conscious of the rise or awakening of consciousness," and of the minimum or half unseen of an object, which, if it make any impres- sion on the organ, makes none on the mmd, or it would be perceived. 29 (p. 351-55). Referring to "association," by which one thought suggests another, as " A, B, C being three associated thoughts, A sometimes suggests C without B coming into view, in which case B is a latent thought ; " thus " one idea suggests another, the suggestion passii^g through one or more ideas which do not rise into con- sciousness "—e,g., thinking of Ben Lomond, the thought of the Prussian system of education arose, the inter- mediate unconscious thought being a German once met with on the hill, and conversed with upon that system. This might be explained as in note 28 : the mind turns to a former imaged picture of the scene and persons, which leads to the original thought -construction or « system " before directed to by language, or an ideal copy of it, or notioned model of it— conscious attention being given only to the first and last object, and not to intermediate ones. Stewart thinks the intermediate ideas are for an instant in view, and then forgot ; Ham- ilton rejoins there would then be memory of them, for " acts of consciousness cannot be without memory' and the degree of consciousness and of memory agree." Conscious and Unconscious Mental States. 75 Perhaps this confuses attention and consciousness, as in 21 ; for it is the degree and length of attention, and not of consciousness, which measures the degree of memory (22, 25). 30 (p. 355-63). On " acquired dexterities and habits," Eeid and others say accustomed voluntary movements become automatic, or " without will and intention or thought;" Stewart holds them to be "always volun- tary " — though we cannot recollect every different voli- tion, and we may, while reading aloud, at the same time be employed on a " separate train of thought." Hamil- ton allows a " conscious volition over the sei'ieSy but not over each separate movement, which would involve that our acts of knowledge are made up of an infinite number of acts of attention, and would not permit of a separate train of thought." Referring to Leibnitz having first propounded the doctrine of "latent modifications, or unconscious activities of mind," he objects to his speak- ing of " perception without apperception or conscious- ness," since " perception, idea, and representation involve the notion of consciousness, as there cannot be a percep- tion not perceived," &c. But as already shown, con- sciousness is not commu table with perception, &c., any more than with the object perceived, imagined, thought, &c. ; or where were " latent thought," &c. ? There are automatic and instinctive movements of mind as well as of body, of mental faculties and physical organs — auto- matic as habits, instinctive as impulses ; and habits and acquired dexterities are generally without consciousness (28). Yet that does not mean " without will and inten- tion or thought," for there are automatic movements of WZ/, as of thought or thinking, which may form part of 76 Scottish Meta'physics Reconst'ntcted. a whole series of habitual or automatic movements — nay, the essence of habits is volitional, for as they originate by the energy of the will, that energy prevails through- out habitual activities, though attention and choice as modes of volition can scarcely be included therein ; for as Hamilton elsewhere says, "conation is a striving either to maintain the continuance of the present state or to change it " (vol. ii. p. 433). Perhaps Stewart meant this mental energy or will-force as running through or accompanying every physical and mental habitual dex- terity of action, as well as every ordinary movement. The compound operation of volition is seen in its auto- matic exercise without attention in the physical acts of playing a musical instrument and of reading aloud, and in its simultaneous exercise of attention to the hyper- physical music educed, and the meaning of the book read; this is like Hamilton's "conscious volition over the series" though consciousness may or may not be present. When some speak of voluntary and involun- tary action, as if the former contained some personal consciousness or percipiency in its nature, while the latter was only an instinctive movement, they confuse personal attributes with an impersonal will and volitions, and intellectual or sensuous perception with conative force. Both movements are in their own nature without purpose or design, for that belongs to personality ; and since volition is not connatural with consciousness, and has nothing even of percipiency in it, it is inept to speak of one mode of volition — viz., attention — as " concentrated consciousness " (16). More or less intensity may consist with acts and passions of the mental faculties, but scarcely 80 with consciousness. Does not volition, or the " striv- Conscious and Unconscious Mental States. 77 ing faculty," so co-act with the intellectual faculties and emotional capacities as to form indeed their pitch and strain and energy, their greater or less intensity of action in particular cases? The general tone and strength of the whole mind, it is true, including the emotional and intellectual faculties as well as the will, must depend upon and be derived from universal Causa- tion always present, yet specially so of volition, which becomes the particular mover and actor upon and with the other mental powers, as the flexor muscles in the body (42, Q^), 31 (lee. 19, p. 364-75). In notes 17, 18, 25, the following points have been noticed; but Hamilton accentuates them thus : " (1.) Mental existence or self- existence or substantiality is declared by all thinking, (fee, being accompanied by the conviction that / exist ; hence Descartes meant to prove that loersonal existence consists in consciousness^ and not in tliouglit (16); (2.) Mental unity or individuality is shown by the Ego being ever conscious that it is itself a self-subsistent entity, and something diff'erent from all mental modi- fications — which excludes Hume's idea of a bundle of impressions and ideas forming the notion of a whole ego, and Kant's idea of its being a ' necessary illusion, since the datum of individuality is a condition of our having thoughts and feelings;' (3.) Mental identity or person- ality consists in our conscious belief of our thinking ego being essentially the same person during all its ceaseless modificationa This affords the basis of moral responsi- bility and hope of immortality — though Kant requires scientific certainty for this, as d, feeling of identity yields only a condition for thought.'' We must follow our 78 Scottish Mdajpliysics Reconstructed, leader througli the maze: (1.) Self-consciousness being self-affirmation, is equivalent to " I am " : " I exist " is better expressed by "■ I am in Existence," as I am in Time, or in Space, or in Force (25) ; for this '' existence " is a created one, connate with mind, but not with the Self or spirit which is connate with eternal realities (4). Only thus would Descartes' asserted position be valid. If the phrase " I think, therefore I exist," asserts that something called " I exists, somethmg called thought exists, and the thought is the result of the act of I " (Calderwood), then it compares with " I eat, therefore I exist, &c." J whereas the phrase might properly run, " I mentally think, or I am conscious of mentally thinking or forming thoughts, &c., as I organically eat, &c." (16, 18). (2.) Is there anything in thinkings, feelings, and volitions of the nature of Self or like to the Self, or to self-consciousness, or the Self's consciousness of them and of organic states, that should entitle the mental states to be called its or the Self's modifications "? its issues, and yet often " latent " or unconscious or unknown to itself % The assertion of modifications, states, and faculties for the Ego, would give some countenance to Hume's and Kant's " organised whole ego" (28, 30). If " self -subsistence " means independent of other lower natures, then the ego is so of moral and physical nature, but not of the Per- sonal God in whom man's personal spirit subsists. (3.) Mental ''belief" does not reach to the personal Self, which is ever self-conscious, and needs no assurance of itself from the mind. The fluctuating and evanescent character of the mental and organic states and acts afifords no hope of the permanence or non-dissolution and disintegration of their respective substantive con- i I Conscious and Unconscious Mental States, 79 stitutions — e.g,^ of animals; whereas the very nature, personal and spiritual, of the Self in its abiding un- changeableness, simplicity, and identity, affords the promise of its ' continuance in personal consciousness beyond the existence of the mind and body — although Revelation alone can assure us of its immortality or everlastingness as a God-breathed personal spirit (18). As to " moral responsibility," so far as it regards the mind in its relation to the objective ethical laws of the moral sphere which sway the mutual conduct of men in the rights and wrongs of earthly temporal life, and which awaken a mental response of conscience to that sway in respect to our duties in social life, that ceases with the earthly life. But inasmuch as these ethical laws and earthly life are penetrated by the spiritual and eternal, and man is a personal spirit having direct relation to the Personal God, he is responsible for the use he makes of this earthly life and the ethical laws which are ordained of God for the guidance of human conduct in this temporal life ; there- fore, when his spirit is quickened to know this, then the personal obligation is realised as that of eternal respon- sibility and accountability to the Creator and Redeemer of our spirits (4, 69). 32 (p. 375-83). The ** difficulties of consciousness studying its own phenomena " are dwelt upon. Let us attempt to meet them as enumerated : (1.) Mental intui- tion can observe and guide many of the movements of the other faculties in their outer moral products, thought- systems, &c., even as perception does in sensuous and organic workings ; while the Self " as a spectator " over- sees and. commands. (2.) The old assumption about all 80 Scottish Metaphysics BecoTistructed. such things being in the mind is utterly negatived by the facts. The universal and fundamental realities of Existence, Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation, Space, Time, and Force, mathematical axioms, &c. ; the modes and relations of these in mental productions ; the intelli- gent extent of subject, the agreeable rhythm of measure, the force of character, expressed in poetry, painting, and sculpture; beauty, music, and harmony, natural and artificial, the aesthetic and ethical laws, and the psychi- cal applications of all these objective supersensuous realities; and minds themselves of man and animals, and their moral and physical workings and works, — are not all these a world of outer realities to be observed and described and wrought amongst by numerous ob- servers and workers'? (3.) The evanescent nature of mental " modifications " would preclude memory and " reproduction " of them, if it were not for imagination momentarily picturing and fixing in Space the objects or products of the mental acts, and so much of the mental acts themselves as may be picturable ; hence memory, comparison, &c., can operate as between the past and present — though feelings or emotions cannot be so imaged or pictured, but recur faintly or vividly as the objects associated with former feelings appear again either in reality or as imaged. (4.) The mind must needs be in the here and there of Space, the now and then of Time, and in the how and thus of Force, and as an existence in Existence; and for its operations to appear in " rows " implies space, &c. ; much more so the outer products of the mind — e.g,^ an imagined picture of a scene or of an event in history, a conceptual con- struction of a system or science. (5.) As with organic Conscious and Unconscious Mental States. 81 acts, so with mental operations,— to will, or to choose, or to resolve, are as distinct from thinking, imagining, or conceiving, as these are from any feeling, or as they all are from any sensuous perceiving. We may then assign distinct faculties to the psychic acts, as there are distinct organs for the bodHy acts ; and as the diff'erent senses are accommodated to their distinct physical ob- jects, so the several mental faculties are accommodated to their separate hyperphysical objects,— the will to other wills, and as allied to conscience to the demands of duty, of response or resistance to others' wills and to the pressure and balance of the ethical forces (69) ; the emotions to the rhythm and harmony of social life, to things of Taste hyperphysical and moral (64) ; the in- tellect to the principles and laws of thought, of reason, of the true (49). (6.) As there is sensuous enjoyment in perceptions of physical thmgs, so there is psychic plea- sure in observing and dealing with objective moral existences ; but if our observation were forcibly confined to our own organism instead of expatiating over Nature, only experts in anatomy or physiology could enjoy such a limited study ; so if our moral observation were con- fined to our own minds and what takes place therein, instead of freely ranging over the moral realities of the hyperphysical sphere, which are as manifold, various, and interesting in their sphere as physical things in theirs, it would indeed be a cramped and uninteresting study for the general inquirer, and would only serve to repel him from the study. p 82 CHAPTEE VI. INTELLECTIONS. Perception and Sensation^ Intuition, 33 (lee. 20, vol. ii. p. 1, 2). Having discussed the relation of consciousness to intellections, those operations of the Intellect are now separately treated of. Yet the old statements are repeated. " Consciousness constitutes all the faculties of knowledge ; it is the general faculty out of which the special faculties of imagining, remember- ing, &c., are evolved; they are, in fact, its modifica- tions" — thereby excluding Feeling and Will from the " constitution," though they are loosely " superadded to cognition." The idea seems to be, that as these have no percipiency or intelligence in them, only Intellect or intellections may be evolved out of consciousness. But we have seen that some of the intellectual modes or operations, such as imagination, memory, &c., have no percipiency; and we have shown, from the peculiar functions of consciousness, that it is transcendently above aU mental operations. There seems also to have been a want of recognition of Intuition as the eye of the intellectual faculties for supersensuous things, as Perception is for sensuous things, and so percipiency Intellections, Perception^ etc. 83 ^ or intelligence is attributed to imagination, conception, &c. (16, 31). 34 (p. 3-10). Warning us that "mental powers are not like organs in the body, distinct constituents of the mind — for, as Aristotle says, the soul is all in the whole and all in every part of the body — Hamilton adds, it is only by an ideal analysis the mental powers can be dis- criminated in order to find the primary threads whicL in their composition form the complex tissue of thought." These terms themselves, as well as much gone before, sufficiently imply distinctions to warrant the use of the analogy that as the bodily organism acts by its different sense-organs in relation to different objects, so the mind as a moral organism operates by its different faculties in relation to diverse objects. Moral dis- tinctions and characteristics do not of course imply any- thing like physical divisibilities of wholes and parts, though in note 17 Hamilton speaks of "the whole divisible mental phenomena." Even the analogy of bodily disabilities, disease, and death may find a counter- part in intellectual imbecilities and aberrations, loss of memory, paralysis of will, morbidity of afifections, seared- ness of conscience, moral disorganisation, and destruction of mind (16). 35 (p. 10-17). Enumerating the Intellectual faculties of Perception, Memory, Imagination, Comparison, Associa- tion, Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, Hamilton arrives at last at the " Regulative faculty," by which is really meant the objective, universal, and necessary truths discussed in notes 51, &c. "The Regulative faculty, says he, is the mind's power of manifesting the pheno- mena of necessary knowledge, not derived from expe- 84 ScoUish Metaphysics Reconstructed, rience but what we must think, thought's fundamental condition, cognitions native to the mind, necessary laws or primary conditions of intelligence which we must generalise or collect into a class, like Aristotle's * intelli- gence,' Kant's * reason,' or Eeid's and Stewart's 'com- mon sense,' its synonism is Intellect, not properly a faculty or capacity, but the complement of the funda- mental principles or laws of thought." This is a terrible solecism in science, the attributing to a faculty of the mind and its operations the most obvious of objective facts, which are independent of the mind, and within which it exists and works. A passing notice will suffice for other points here raised. As incompatible with the relative nature of the two things as was the assertion that " consciousness concentrated is attention," so is the statement that " self-consciousness concentrated is reflec- tion," for self-consciousness is simply self-knowledge; while as attention is a mental act of volition, so reflec- tion is a complex mental act, or the result of several mental acts — as imagination picturing past events, memory with comparison echoing like past, and intui- tion beholding them, while judgment decides regarding them, and past feelings and volitions recur (18, 19, 22). Memory could not withhold anything from conscious- ness unless the latter were merely another mental faculty, since memory is said to be consciousness in one relation, imagination in another, and so on. " Ee- production" is not necessary when imagination, acting along with voluntary choice, represents the object and memory responds to it; or if the object be thought- constructions which are too complex to be imaged, then the voluntary energies convey the mind by the path of } Intellections, Perception, etc. 85- associated objects to the sought-for ones, and memory responds to that. When this is done with particular choice and attention, it may be called " reminiscence " or "recollection" — otherwise "suggestion." Imagina- tion is misrepresented when it is made to " hold up " and " keep " before the mind its pictures, that being the function of voluntary attention. Comparison cannot be the " highest function of mind " which " elaborates know- ledge," since it only compares one object with another, while the other functions of intellect are far more im- portant — such as conceiving, judging, and reasoning. 36 (lee. 21-23, p. 18-85). ]S"ow taking up Perception and Sensation, Hamilton says : — Perception is an immediate knowledge of an external non-ego— not an internal image of it, though different from the mind as some hold, or as others hold a mental modification. Reid mistook these two views, and also Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes' views, for Plato really meant that the sensible world is the shadow of the archetypal sub- stantial world (? hyperphysical and intelligible world). Locke held that the '•' secondary qualities " are only sensations or mental states, but not so of the "primary qualities" of extension and solidity, for he says, "when I see white or black, hear singing, feel heat, taste an apple, all at the same time, can the mind have Wie^Q perceptions as so many different modifications of itself? or must we suppose distinct parts in the mind, one for black, another for white, as so many ideas distinctly perceived, which yet we may feel at the same time "—so that Reid was right in thinking that Locke maintained that ideas are objects either in the brain or in the mind itself. Perception then makes us percipient of present external objects ; Imagination by a mental mode represents or images to the mind those objects when they are absent. So Reid says, "The universal opinion of all men is that the objects which we immediately perceive by our senses are not images in our minds, but external objects, and that their existence is independent of us and our perception." Veitch adds, "Hamilton held that the extension perceived is in the consciousness as an object during perception, and distinct from and independent of the per- cipient act; but he is not explicit as to whether the extension so per- ceived subsists exactly as perceived after the act of percipiency, ox 86 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. only in some form of potency to be revived ; for after all, extension is with him only a quality, not a substance, of an unknown material substance : then what is meant by the object ? is it a subjective sensa- tion, or a percept, the quality of a non-ego ? Mankind believe that the perceived object is a real thing, and independent of the act of perception " (compare an imagined object with a real one, 43). Fraser says, " Why do I believe in sensible things ? The weight, colour, hard- ness, taste, and smell, which constitute a sensible thing, are found to be conjoined independently of my will. The world of sensible things is a world made up of bundles of perceptions (? percepts or objects of perception), each bundle receiving a name, and the uniformity in which its constituent phenomena coexist making it possible to apply the same name to each reappearance of them. It is true that I (? do not) unite in my own consciousness the bundle or synthesis of attri- butes, but the fact of the synthesis being what it is, is external to, because independent of, my thought and volition. It is not formed, but only recognised by me ; my individual imagination does not create the physical universe." These are equivocal voices. Their consilience may be found thus : Sensation and Perception are usually con- comitant, one or the other being at times more obtrusive or attended to more than the other. Sensation belongs to the Feelings of the mind, " subjective," a feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness, more or less definite, arising in connection with the perception of physical objects, organic or extra-organic. This is distinct from the emotions arising on the intuition of supersensuous objects, such as beauty and music. Perception belongs to the Intellect, yet acts in a complex manner with intellectual elements in relation to spacial objects, or emotional elements in relation to temporal objects, or volitional elements in relation to potential objects — and its objects or percepts, "objective," are physical, and perceived by means of the senses or bodily organs. This is distinct from the intuition of supersensuous objects such as unity and wholeness, or imagined and Intellections, Perception, etc. 87 conceived fabrications. Perception is exercised in see- ing, touching, hearing, tasting, and smelling. Let us suppose a thing, an object, presenting colour and figure to be seen as before described (15), solidity to be handled, sound to be heard, flavour to be tasted, odour to be smelled ; call these the different qualities, or attri- butes, or constituents of one complete object; how is this imity and wholeness known 1 Is there any specific organ for perceiving them ] No, they are not physical attributes, and therefore not sensuously perceived ; they are hyperphysical, and known through intuition (9). Then is the unity and wholeness given by the mind to the several sensuous qualities perceived, or whence do they come] They come from the same source whence the physical qualities are derived — viz., Nature — and the mind intuites them as objective. Perception works through different senses, and intuition works alongside of perception, both being evolved operations of Intellect, which, with Feeling and WiU, exist in the unity of the Mind, and that with its faculties and operations is known to the conscious Self (17, 20, 22, 28). Locke certainly calls colour, sound, &c., perceptions, though only entities in the mind, and their images and notions he caUs ideas, yet both as distinct from sensations ; for he adds, "sensations are states or modifications of the mind, but such are not these perceptions." Indeed, however they may follow scholastic or traditional psy- chology, all treat these " secondary qualities " as percep- tions and not as feelings or sensations, for they never say Ifeel a colour, a sound, &c., but 1 perceive a colour, a sound, &c. We cannot speak of a green or red feel- ing, a loud or low feeling, a hard or long or short feeling, 88 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. any more than of a green or long or loud thought, de- sire, or resolution; but we can speak equally of a coloured, odorous, savoury, sonorous, extended, or solid object. A " sensation is a feeling of pleasure or pain," and may accompany or attend every one of these "per- ceptions" of colour, sound, &c. If we have banished the "idea" from the subjective sphere, we ought to banish the " modification," " state/' or " sensation " when speaking of such objective things as colour, sound, &c. ; it can only have crept in from the " notion of unreality which attaches to our visual and other perceptions rather than to our tactual perceptions" (H. Spencer), and hence we mistake real objects for states and workings of mind. Let us try to sift the subject further, although we may be anticipating some points. If light, with its varieties of colour, be an outer quality elicited by the action of Force chiefly in a set - of - conditions — viz., agitated ether — then sound may be a quality elicited in a set-of-conditions — viz., agitated air ; savour, and odour, likewise qualities elicited in a set-of-conditions — viz., chemically affected bodies ; figure likewise elicited in a set-of-conditions — viz., mechanically aff'ected bodies ; hard- ness, heat, &c., qualities elicited by the action of Force chiefly in a set-of-conditions — viz., bodies of certain composition and relations. There are distinct perceiv- ings of each of these objects, as well as distinct attend- ant sensations or feelings of the mind. This view of objective existences sufficiently disposes of the scholas- tic idea of primary and secondary qualities of matter — hardness, &c., as known by the tactile perceptions, being called primary and objective, while colour, sound. Intellections J Perception, etc. 89 &c., were viewed as sensations because not tangible, and called secondary and subjective; so that a rose, its figure and solidity, were deemed really objective, but its colour and odour were deemed merely subjective sensa- tions added and attached by the mind to its form and solidity. Consequently, tangible things were esteemed as the only real outer things, and all the rest were evan- escent states of mind ; the perceived object was thus made up in part of psychical stuff, and in part of physical stuff" — of mind and matter combined — forgetful or oblivious of this fact, that as no sensation or feeling can be imaged, whence could the colour, odour, &c., if mere sensations, be obtained, so as to be applied to the extended object, real or imagined 1 This difficulty, per- haps, led to the impossible idea of sensations, &c., being mentally projected and objectified, which consciousness repudiates. For common -sense perceived only outer physical objects ; and so, whatever were their theories, they all spoke, not of feeling a colour, or feeling a sound, <^c., but of perceiving a colour or sound, just as they perceived hardness, solidity, &c. The objects of vision, of hearing, smelling, and tasting, are as much outside of the mental perceptive acts as the objects of touch are ; colour, sound, odour, and savour are per- ceived, as well as extension and solidity, and each yields its attendant sensation. The confusion about these things arose from mistakes as to how mind can know and deal with matter, therefore all was made ideal and in the mind ; or again, mind may know about its own organism, but nothing beyond that, therefore it was made to invest its body, or parts thereof, with mental qualities, and to call that pseud compound the object, 90 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstructed. Intellections, Perception, etc. 91 and finding some impression of outer resistance to the body, it inferred an extra-organic something ; above all, from not recognising the fundamental outer realities of Force, Space, and Time, the actings of forces were called " cause," an idea, and they talked of " occasional " causes and " efficient " causes, which common - sense translates as ^^ conditions" and ^'forces acting"; and as Space and Time were viewed also as ideal or as mental forms or frames, and since every object must be known as in Space and in Time, all things were packed into these mental frames, and were therefore held to be either wholly mental or mainly so. Let us further endeavour to see how the physical world and its constituents are adapted to the bodily organism of man — i.e., to his senses — and become objects to the mind for information and for use. Extension) in all varieties of forms and figures, is chiefly a mode of Space, with modes of Time in succession of parts, and of Force in cohesion of parts ; it is perceived by muscu- lar adjustments of the eye, and by the mobility of the hands and other extensors, and its colour by the visual power. Solidity is chiefly a mode of Force in resist- ance, with modes of Space, Time, and Force forming the resisting body — its hardness, strictly speaking, is the resisting force connected with the body ; it is perceived by touch or muscular pressure, with some cutaneous and muscular sensation in relation to roughness, &c., and muscular straining for testing weight, &c. Light with colours is an entity or quality emerging on the excita- tion of ether by the modal action of Force, having modes of Space for the extent of colour seen, of Force for the coherency, and of Time for the gradations of ^ colour ; it is perceived by the visual power, with rhythmic action of the sense-organ for the gradations and successions of colour, involving also spacial and potential activities for their extent and coherency. Sound is a quality elicited by the modal action of Force on the air, having modes of Time in its pulsations, with some potential coherency and spacial extent ; it is per- ceived by hearing with rhythmic action of the sense- organ, &c. Savour is a quality elicited by chemical action on bodies according to their composition, with some coherency and extent in its varieties; it is per- ceived by the power of taste, with sub-activities of the gustatory organ. Odour is likewise a quality elicited by chemical action on bodies according to their composi- tion, with like connections ; it is perceived by the olfac- tory sense. Heat, Electricity, Chemical affinity. Gravity, &c., are severally modes of Force manifested according to the composition or constitution and mutual relation of bodies; and perceived by means of the senses pro- perly adapted to these objects, or by a combined action of several of the senses. But this very fact of the accommodation of the diff'erent senses to distinct objects in Nature, the correspondence of things to diff'erent acts of sensuous perception, the adaptation of the object to the subject, emphasises all their mutual distinction from one another; the mind in its sensuous activities and operations is thus declared to be truly percipient of real objective physical things. 37 (lee. 24, p. 86-108). Comparing perception and imagination, it is said " the mental image is the o})ject of knowledge, and at the same time the cognitive act of imagination itself ; it is called a representation, an 92 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstriicted. object, an image, an idea." Even if imagination were percipient, which it is not, how could it see its own act or form itself into an image of, say, the High Church, any more than the hand could see or become its own handiwork ? We can image forth the Church as large as or larger or smaller than the real Church, with vary- ing shades or colours, and with more or less detail of parts; thus the imaged object must have lengths, breadths, and heights, with diverse shapes and out- spread colours; and is all this to be included in the zfwextended and indivisible mind, or in its indivisible faculty or modification? and are the universals of Space, &c., to be stored up in the non-universal mind in order to make a place for the imaged Church 1 Surely this compels us to see that the products of imagination and of conception are objective pictures and structures out in hyperphysical Space, and so may possess all the requisite spacial - temporal - potential qualities. Hence Hamilton is forced to say of the mental image and concept, "the mind projects from itself the subject- object, views it at a distance, and thus objectifies it " (2, 43). Then he repeats, "perception is a special mode of Knowledge (meaning of inteUection), and sensation is a special mode of Feeling," but adds, "sensation is the affection of the organ as acted on by an object, and caUed organic affection, organic pleasure and pain," which Veitch renders as " sensation is an affection not of the mind merely but of the bodily organism as sentient or mind-pervaded (36), and perception is the apprehension of the locality of the sensations and of their likeness and unlikeness, and of a resisting some- thing external to the organism ; the sphere of sensation Intellections, Perception, etc. 93 and perception is limited to our bodily organism, for by none of our senses do we get any direct knowledge of an external world." There seems no sense in an " organic sensation " ; so treat it as Reid does, as an " affection of the mind," and then there is no " locality " for the mind's feeling, but it points to or indicates the locality in the organism which is abnormally affected and which becomes the object of the mind's perception. Sometimes Hamil- ton speaks, as a "natural realist," of perceiving extra- organic things; but whenever the shadow of Aristotle falls over him, saying "the object of perception is an affection of the composite formed by the union of mind and body," then he falters in his exposition, and echoes "our sensitive cognition is of something different from the external realities — our sensible cognition is reduced to touch, and we are not percipient of distant objects, as Eeid and philosophers in general think; the object of perception is an affection of the composite formed, &c. — we only infer an extra-organic world from the affections it determines in our organs, by our locomotive energy being resisted by a resisting something external to our organism." Veitch objects, " how and why do we come to refer our sensations to extra-organic causes? why should a sensation be counted an affection of the organ- ism, since a sensation spread over a surface is hardly congruous with the indivisibility which a sensation proper undoubtedly possesses ? " He doubts if there is pressure or locomotive effoi-t in simple contact, or even in the outer body's pressure on the organism; nay, "resistance" may be from a bodiless /orce — viz., elec- tricity (30, 36). As to the degrees of sensation and quantums of perception alluded to, the force of attention r II 91 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstructed. is to be taken into account in our apprehension of one or the other element of knowledge, for by attention concen- trating perception or intuition upon its respective object, it may serve to qualify or even neutralise the sensuous or the psychic feeling awakened by the sensuous or super- sensuous object. Whether any form of volition such as attention can act directly upon Feeling or its modes — e.g., sensation — as it can in connection with Perception and Intuition, is questionable; we cannot will to feel one way or another, though we can will to perceive or intuite this or that object, and so indirectly awaken or change the feelings. We can say, I am Conscious of a sensation of pain from the perception of that physical object of sight or hearing; and we can also say, I am conscious of a painful emotion from the intuition of that supersensuous object of imagination or conception, &c. (43). 38 (p. 108-15). Reverting to the subject of the primary and secondary qualities of body, Hamilton sums up the characteristics of the former in extension and solidity — or, as Mansel says, extended - resistance ; Descartes, Locke, Reid, and Stewart find the superiority of the primaries over the secondaries to consist in their clearness and distinctness, or in their inseparability from body, or in their externality— all which, we have shown in note 36, characterise the secondaries also ; each afi'ords that "recurrence or uniformity in the percepts which assures of a permanent non-ego" (Veitch). If it were not so, the Idealist could not find an equally subjective place for hoth^ for he can say extension and solidity or resistance imply only an effort of mind. . Hamilton adds, "divisibility^ motion, and number are not data of Intellections, Perception, etc. 95 sense," which we would qualify thus : divisibility im- plies a whole and parts, and is sensuously perceived in the dividing of, say, an apple, and supersensuously in- tuited in dividing an imaged object ; motion is simply a mode of Force, and sensuously measured by the flexor muscles in the movement from place to place of a natural object, or supersensuously measured by volition in the movement of an imaged object ; and nmnber is a mode of Time, sensuously or supersensuously scaled or computed by the rhythmic play of the nerves and pulsations of emotion for the successions in natural and supersensuous objects. The remarks on Space, Time, and Cause will be noticed hereafter (53-55). 39 (lee. 25, 26, p. 116-50). On such objections as that, owing to difi'erence of nature, mind cannot know matter J but mentally represents it by " ideas " or " phe- nomena " or " states," which Malebranche and Berkeley held to be of a nature similar to the mind, and w^hich Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and Brown, and others, held to be of the same nature as the mind, while Eeid and Stewart held that " certain iinpressions produced on our sense-organs by external objects are followed by seifisa- tionSy which are again followed by perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies, to which the sensations bear no resemblance " — Hamilton argues, "consciousness informs us that the mind feels at the finger-points (37), and that we actually perceive at that point the material reality — i.e., the non-ego modified, as made up of so many parts, say six, contributed by the external reality (? ' inferred cause '), three by the sense- organ (? * nervous afi'ection '), and three by the mind (^ * space, unity,' &c.) ; thus we do not perceive distant 96 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. ^' objects, but only what is in immediate contact with its organ, &c."— which would be only half the "object," though Mansel compares it to the chemical fusion of an acid and alkali resulting in a neutral salt ! It would be endless to quote Hamilton's equivocal statements on Perception: how any representation or mental image can be formed of such semi-objective things as a tree made up of mental stuff and physical stuff, is a puzzle ; the external world or non-ego is, after aU, only the bodily organism known as a fusion of mind and matter, and all beyond it called extra-organic is only something inferred or believed from a resistance ! That " scandal to philo- sophy and to human reason," which Kant charged as attaching to our acceptance of the existence of external things on mere belief, still remains. Why we should know this organism and distant points in it, and not know other organisms and things amongst which and upon which our organism moves and subsists, is inex- plicable. Consciousness, at all events, thoroughly dis- o^\ms the allegation. It denies the asserted "fusion," and that we do not know extra-organic things as weU as our own organism, and that we know things only by touch ; it denies that we are conscious of the rays of light as touching the retina, or of the image there, or of the retina itself, when perceiving that extra - organic tree as weU as when looking at this organic hand or foot. How do I know the extension and solidity of my organism ? Much as I know the like qualities of extra- organic bodies— by measuring with the eye or otherwise, and by the mobility and pressure of fingers, &c. How do I know the place and position of an abnormal physical state of my body which awakens a sensation of pain in IntellectioTis, Perception^ etc. 97 I \ i i my mind, but by viewing with the eye, or by imagina- tion, or by touch, the separate spots ; the uneasy feeling of pain is the "' sensation," and the wrong state of the body is the " perception " or percept. We can measure distance indefinitely with the eye — e.g., the form and dimensions of a room — and equally perceive sound, colour, savour, odour, as organic or extra - organic. Fichte's curious question and Hamilton's answer sug- gest more than the terms imply; there is a voluntary activity, perhaps, in every perception and intuition of sensuous and supersensuous objects, as well as in the operations of imagination, conception, &c. Fichte would confine the will within the mind, and make it embrace imaged objects there ; Hamilton thinks it may reach out as far as the organism, and perhaps to its outer surface. By the movements of the eyes we meas- ure sizes and distances ; by the mobility of hands and arms we do the same and move objects about ; by the lower Umbs our whole organism is conveyed from place to place, so as to work amongst physical things. Then, has the mind any corresponding activities in the midst of its connate moral surroundings, since it is not con- fined within the body though connected with if? It may have psychical, not physical, outstretchings and gomgs forth in hyperphysical Space, in voluntary efforts accompanying the operations of imagination, conception, &c., when engaged in objective moral fabrications, in attending to, evolving, or developing objective aesthetic and ethical principles and laws, for constructing the arts and sciences, which are applicable to our social relations with other minds (28). 40 (lee. 27, 28, p. 151-89). Lastly, comparmg the 98 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. 99 senses, all are resolved into touch, for it is insisted that the " external object " is always in contact with the organ of sense. These points have been sufficiently- discussed in the preceding notes; outness or exter- nality has been admitted in acknowledging the outness of the organism from the mind, and distance is but degrees of outness, as in the outer surface of the body, in the pressure of outer something against that surface, in the perception of separate localities in the body laterally and linearly measured, in the adjustments of the eye for measuring the varying distances from it of outer objects — all this is confessed ; and yet Yeitch says, " Hamilton finally denies any perception of external or extra-organic objects through any sense, except that of locomotive-effort yielding us resistance and extension : externality is given in any form of contact, and is the essential condition of our even conceiving its varying degrees — i.e., distance in a linear relation to the bodily organism." Touch, by the sliding contact and pressure of finger-ends and other parts of the organism against external objects, tells of solidity, roughness, &c. ; but it is the mobility of the fingers, hand, &c., and rhyth- mic movements of the eyes, which tell of the figure, position, distance, &c., of objects. Experience and asso- ciation help in the exercise and perception of all the senses. 41 (lee. 29, p. 189-204). This treats of "self-conscious- ness," and has been transferred to its proper place under Consciousness, note 16 J. CHAPTEE VII. MEMORY, ASSOCIATION, IMAGINATION, COMPARISON, ETC. 42 (lec. 30-32, p. 205-58). Memory appears simply to remember past events or things or operations of the mind, and only notes past, while comparison adds same or like to past events, &c.; it accompanies perception, intuition, imagination, conception, &c. (28, 35). Hamil- ton describes it as "retaining beyond the sphere of con- sciousness a treasury of knowledges, which are reproduced by reproduction, and represented by imagination in Con- sciousness, yet is it assumed to be in memory, and im- plies that the whole of our forgotten knowledge, including feelings and volitions, from childhood onwards, still lies in our memory ; as Schmid says. Activities of the mind continue in a latent state of forgetfulness, whilst more prominent series of activities become objects of con- sciousness, and thus the whole complement of all our knowledge still lies in our memory, &c." If we are to compare the "vital activity of mind" to that of the body, we ought to make mental force draw its supplies not from itself but from without. The bodily forces are not conserved and used up repeatedly within itself, but are drawn continually afresh from universal hyperphysical 100 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed, Force, and particularly from food and air, or rather the forces connected therewith, which substance also supplies the waste of used-up substance of the body itself. So the will-force and the general activities of the mind must draw theu: supplies of psychic force from without, as fast as they expend forces in mental work — i.e., in intellections, feelings, volitions, &c.; such mental forces are supplied and drawn from universal moral Causation, and particularly from intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic objective nourishment, and the forces therewith con- nected, which substance also supplies the waste of used- up substance of the mind (30, 58, 64). As the true conservation of the organic dnd physical forces lies in hyperphysical Force, so the true conservation of the mental forces resides in moral Causation. It would be as wdse to say that the sum of all the activities of the body amounts to the quantity of force present in the organism at any one time, and that all the bodily activi- ties of an entire past life are at present latent in the or- ganism, and may now be roused and be made vivid, as to make the parallel statement about the mind here made — and to add that these mental activities are themselves the objects upon which the activities are engaged, as if the picture I am painting and the house I am building are the very activities of my bodily organs which have been engaged in the acts of painting and building the said objects. As to the function of memory, and as to latent thought, see notes 19, 27-30. Association is said to " embrace not only simple con- nection of thoughts, feelings, and volitions, but the train or succession is regulated by laws of contiguity in time and place, resemblance and contrast (Aristotle), which Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 101 sums up in simultaneity and affinity: thus thoughts suggest each other as they formed part of a total act of cognition in immediate succession and affinity," which Hamilton explains by another extravagant idea of Schmid's— " The unity of the mental energies belongs to the one activity of the ego, whose modifications are so associated that every thought, feeling, or de- sire which is excited, excites other previously existent activities, and spreads its excitation over the whole activities of the mind, becoming fainter and fainter as do receding circles in water, &c.;" and Hamilton adds, " As in reading a book the letters, words, and lines have each its effect in the result, so the mind may look over its book of memory and search among its latescent cognitions for the notions it is in want of, awakening these into consciousness and allowing the others to remain in their obscurity." This is unnatural, and therefore unscientific —see note 28. The old " ideas " as entities in the mind was better. Certain mental "activities" are made to agglutinate into centres and spheres within one all- embracing sphere of mental activity, and the smaller agglutmations are drawn out together like a viscous fluid, and these activities are called "association" of objects (35). Suppose that aU our bodily activities engaged aforetime in seeing, handling, or constructing objects in nature were still abiding activities pulsatmg somewhere in the organism, and were called forth anew in clusters by some fresh activities— and all these com- bined organic activities themselves constituting the objects upon which the activities had been engaged ! 43 (lee. 33, p. 259-76). Imagination, or the faculty of representation, is said to " hold up vividly before the 102 . Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed, mmd tlie thoughts which reproduction has recalled into consciousness." Then, if there, why represented] To represent is to picture, image, idealise, as usually stated ; while to "hold up" is a voluntary act, an act of atten- tion, holding the ohject up to intuition or fixing intuition to the view (37). " Thoughts " are whole constructions by conception out in Space, and there viewed by mtuition, and may there be pictured also by imagination, and so remembered. Hamilton describes its work : " Imagina- tion first exhibits the phenomena called up by Associa- tion, as helper to Reproduction, which calls up the con- geries of these phenomena, which are then analysed and compounded by Comparison, and then Imagination exhibits this elaborated result of comparison to Con- sciousness." And if the whole process be various "activities" of the mental faculties, what is the result] Objects and events as dull memory-activities are made lively by another activity called reproduction, which is moved thereto by other unnamed activities ; and then a third activity called imagination, moved somehow, makes the memory-activities more vivid to consciousness, and to a fourth activity called comparison, which is somehow moved to separate and recombine the memory- activities in new ways, which new activities are anew revivified by imaginative-activities in consciousness, which is itself some extraordinary faculty-activity (9, 35). In fact, however. Imagination is primarily concerned in imaging visible objects or those corresponding to ob- jects of vision, be it a tree, a house, a forest, a city, a single object or a cluster of objects— an imitation of a particular object or scene in nature as a definite copy, or a fancy-picture of such objects when it will be an in- Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 103 definite picture ; even in geometrical figures the image may be of a definite scalene triangle, or an indefinite three-angled figure, as when we see various triangles without measurement and discern their three -angled forms. This is apart from the notion of triangularity derived from comparison, abstraction, and classification of triangles out of various geometrical figures, natural or imaged. The faculty can change the imaged colour of the^ame figure, or the forms under the same colour^; but it cannot image a "class" or " class - qualities," which belong to the acts of classification and notioning, and to generalisation and conceiving (45-47). The super- sensuous objects, events, or thought-systems are pictured by imagination, or modelled by notions, or constructed by conceptions, under the view of intuition, in Space where they abide ; volitional activities of choice, atten- tion, resolution, &c., accompanied the acts of imagi^ig, notioning, and conceiving; generalisation also, and abstraction, in selecting, separating, and gathering the supersensuous materials for those mental fabrications- answering, perhaps, to the above "reproduction" and " comparison," while " elaboration " seems to answer to conceivings, &c.— with simple Comparison, which only helps to compare materials and objects, parts and wholes, &c., with one another ; Association and Habit, which give tendencies to the fabricating in such or such com- binations and series or order ; Judgment, which decides as to the fitness of the materials used in the operations, of the due proportions of parts, and of the application of means to ends ; Reason, which gives method and order to the processes and fabrication, and suggests their further extension ; whilst Emotions of pleasure, desire, 104 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. hope attend them, and Taste in reference to their beauty and harmony of parts and proportions : then as to Mem- ory of these things, voluntary activity leads the mind by the way of associated objects, helped by language in voice or book, to the particular object or series of objects previously fabricated as above described, intuition be- holds them afresh, emotions and taste recur afresh, and memory responds " same or like past.^* Some crucial questions here follow. "We are told " Imagination represents ideas in three orders : (1.) natural, according to the impression received of exteimal objects, and as our thoughts spontaneously group them- selves ; (2.) logical, representing deductively the general before the particulars contained under it, or inductively the particulars before the general which they consti- tute C?) — both yield us notions in which the antecedent explains the subsequent ; (3.) poetical, grouping circum- stances so as they might be offered naturally by the senses. Dreaming, reverie, somnambulism are effects of imagination determined by association." Surely im- agination deals with individual whole objects, and not with classes or general qualities. Nor can class-qualities, or general qualities derived therefrom, be " constituted " or composed of particular qualities of single objects, whether natural or imaged. Class-qualities as a whole are not seen in individual objects : these but show indi- vidual or particular qualities or properties. The class- qualities are therefore not a gathering or summing up of particular qualities of single objects (49) : they form either a floating hyperphysical entity in nature, emerging on the presence of the abstracted supersensuous resem- blances or resembling qualities of individuals, natural or Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 105 imaged, and overclasping the individuals seen "under it " or are formed there by the classifying or notionmg process of the mind. Hence Logic states it thus : " Ab- straction is the separation of the points of agreement from those of difference, that they may constitute a new nature different from yet including the single objects; the attributes of this nature may none of them be peculiar to it when taken dngly, provided that the whole of them do not concur in any other conception or notion (W. Thomson, 45, 46). Then Hamilton offers a speculation : " Imagination employs the same sense-organs in the internal representation of visible objects as act in the external perception of those objects; hence, when the eyesight is destroyed, visible objects cannot be imagined. So also as to the organs of hearing, touch, taste, and smell. So voluntary motions are imitated in and by imagination with the feelmg of tension in the same nerves as act in moving the muscles. While in perception the sense-organs are determmed to action from without, in imagination they are determined to like action from within the mind." Rather, during the operation of imagination, organs used in sensuous perception may be automatically or sympatheticaUy ex- cited, and the same may occur in all mental operations, with responsive movements of the brain and nervous system; but this does not prove, or even imply, that imagination or any mental faculty v.es the physical organs or the senses in imaging, notioning, or conceiving any supersensuous object. How can a physical or or- ganic sense be used in a mental or hyperphysical region and that to produce a mental or supersensuous object] If we could image emotions and volitions, then what 106 Scottish Metaphysics IleconstrTicted, organic sense would we use in imaging love or hate, a resolution or attention, or when imagination is em- ployed in connection with thoughts and thought - systems ? Strictly speaking, no lower nature can act upon a higher, a physical thing upon the mind or its faculties, though the higher can appreciate or be sensible to the actings of the lower nature, and can act upon it ; but what wonder if, after looking at a physical object and then imaging it, with repeated such processes, the mental acts and organic movements should be so associated as to appear to be necessarily connected 1 At all events, there is a great difference between the seen- object and the imaged-object, a real sovereign and an imaged one, and we know and believe that the one is materially real and the other is only ideal ; but why this difference, if the same sense-organ is used in both cases *? Besides, there is no sensation in connection with the imagination and imaged object as there is with perception and the percept, unless possibly there is a simulated sensation through reflex action. In the case of perception we clearly realise the sensation and the perceiving act as connected with a certain organ. In imagination we do not so connect it or its acts with any organ ; we image and intuite the imaged object in super- sensuous Bpace. We perceive a tree or a forest before us, and at the same time imagine a person or a multi- tude behind us ; we are quite conscious of the exercise of the sight-organ in the former case, but have no such consciousness in the latter case; our attention may be divided between the two successively, but we do not for an instant mistake the difference in the mental acts of imagining without sight and of perceiving with sight. Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 107 So with all the other sense-actions of hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, though sound, odour, savour, hardness, cannot indeed be imaged, as these are appre- ciated by chiefly the emotional capacity and the volun- tary power, and not by the intellect (36, 40). Forms and colours, or coloured forms, can be imaged, and that when sight has vanished for ever, as in the case of Milton; and it may be doubted whether the entire destruction of the sight-organ immediately incapacitates from imagining objects heretofore seen, or new forms of such, though the power may ultimately become feeble, and fail for want of exercise. On the hypothesis of perceptive - activities and imaginative - activities being stored up in the mind, reproduction of these should never cease, whether with or without organic senses ! But Veitch, in correcting Mill, explains that the "mental image"— the "mental picture "—consists of " mental qualities " which " represent material qualities of objects," and adds, " there is no analogy here like that of a (painted) picture to its origmal ; memory rep- resents to me a scene in Space, but the image or mode of mind is not extended (figured), while the (painted) picture is necessarily extended." This is said because no supersensuous object is allowed to be out of the mind, but only in the mind. If there is no outline or figure in the image, why require a perception or percept before a representation, if it were not to image a likeness of that percept, a " faint " copy of a " vivid " real object —each separate from the mind, the one supersensuous and supersensuously known, the other sensuous and sensuously known, each emphasising the difference and - true externality of the other ^ We ask, why does Ham- 108 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed, ilton speak of an "imagined extended object" (16)? What is the mental image of St Paul's Cathedral? Has the image no coloured figure ; and without such, how can it "represent" the original? Suppose it to be a state or modification of mind merely, a certain kind of ac- tivity of a faculty, which somehow is a symbolic repre- sentation of the Cathedral ; still this assumes some kind of figured building now in the mind's view, and some- where as an entity in Space, an image " in the form of Space " (53). What kind of an " image " of a tawny lion, a bay horse, a grey donkey, a green parrot, can imagination " picture," if the " representation " of such creature has no size, figure, and colour ? What says the Artist to his imagining beautiful objects which he after- wards endeavours to express on canvas or in marble, if his ideals possess no kind of " form, colour, and motion " until he gives them material expression with physical labour and substance? Again we ask, what can an ideal representation of a physical object mean but some- thing hyperphysical, and equivalent to a likeness, resem- blance, image, portrait, model, of the extended and coloured object? How else can we say the ideal de- scription or painting is not like or is like the original seen ? There is no question here of " similarity in existence " — i.e, in substance or being or essence — but " similarity in representation " of the visible object, as Hamilton distinguishes it. We need not mind his mental "modification," since he calls the image a "fabrication of the intellect," and therefore a distinct entity somewhere, an idea with idealists, a supersensuous object in supersensuous Space, as now suggested (37). Aristotle is quoted : " We must conceive the affection Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 109 determined in the soul or its bodily organism to be a sort of portrait of which memory is the retention ; for the movement excited stamps a kmd of impression of the total perception on the soul or its organ, as a signet applied to wax. Supposing there be a resembling some- thing such as a victure in the mind, why should we remember another thing, besides the cognition of thi something, and how is a resemblance possible of what is not present ?-or is it so, as in a portrait the thing painted is an animal and at the same time a representa- tion of an animal, at once both, so the phanta,svz or i^utge in us is a phenomenon in itself, aiid at the same time a representation of something different from itself- ^ . , a recoUective image which the soul views for a rep- resentation of, say, Coriscus, who is remembered here in a painted representation "?-^.e., imagination pictures the object with form, outline, &c., intuiUon views it and memory echoes " like past." The difficulty cannot be met in a subjective way, but may be met in^ an objective way, for which we too offer a speculation Imagination's pictures have no sensuous or physical colour and form, for they yield no sensation and per- ception as sensuous objects do ; but they have some kind of figure and colour, and therefore could not be fabricated in the mind, or out of mental states, modifi- cations, or activities, or with the substance of a mental faculty-therefore the imaged objects must be extra- mental and supersensuous in nature. Suppose, then, that the mind derives the refined elements, for imagina- tion's use in picturing, from the supersensuous qualities of Space-Time-Force, distilled by some mental alembic (or under appropriate moral conditions) from that urn- / ilO Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. versal hyperphysical base, which also affords to Nature's crucible of physical conditions its cruder sensuous or physical material of colour and figure fitted for its grosser physical sphera This puzzling question prob- ably led Herbert Spencer to talk of " faint " and " vivid manifestations " when referring to the difference between imagined and perceived objects, as if the difference was only in degrees of vividness, and not in their nature faHing to observe that the " faint" yielded no sensation or perception, while the " vivid " did. So the perplexed J. S. Mill seems to have conjured up ^' permanent possi- bmties of sensation " to explain imagined unseen-objects as the impalpable ghosts pointing to other things tangible which might yield the actual sensations and perceptions —though he failed to see the plain difference between sensation and perception wi^h their concomitance. Adapting Tyndall's remark, ^' In the study of :N-ature the coarser phenomena which come under the cognisance of the senses, often suggest to us the finer phenomena which come under the cognisance of the mind;' we say the coarser phenomena are perceived, the finer intuited ; or, as expressed by Herschell, " we witness facts with the eije of reason, and discover new laws and establish new branches of science; by an intellectual sense we scrutinise the arrangements of those structures which na- ture builds up by her refined and invisible architecture " 44 (lee. 34, p. 277-81). Companson is said to em- brace aU the other inteUectual faculties under it; it elaborates, relates, is discursive, and judges of knowledcre • "recognising and affirming the relation of two terms^ it constitutes thought, and its acts result in a judgment— as when it affirms naked Existence and also attributes Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 111 qualified existence to objects; in short, every act of mind is only an evolution of comparison, &c." Such elaborations are vain; the act of comparison simply notes differences and Ukenesses in objects and facts, and of ratios and degrees amongst them, and it need not be mixed up with distinct and more complex acts of mind. When it is said " comparison cannot judge without something to compare," it implies that judg- ment follows comparison— as seeing a tree, we compare its parts with parts or with the whole, and then decide OT judge regarding it, as that the branches are too long or that the tree is in a wrong place, or even decide nothing about it, but go on with other perceptions and comparisons, just knowing the facts and the comparative points about tbem. Such judgments are no more part of the comparis* ns than of the perceptions, or mce versa; they may be ^.lsccpssive or simultaneous acts, yet each is distinct. Comparison and judgment apply to the modes of universal Existence, or " qualified " or " determinate " existence, but not to the universals (52). To say an object exists equals an object in existence, and is no judgment but a simple perception and intuition of a fact^; the physical object is perceived and Existence is intuited ; the object is known as a mode of and in Exist- ence, without any process of comparison or judgment, thoucrh you may next form any number of judgments and "comparisons regarding it (48). Comparison runs alongside of and helps other operations of the mmd ; it accompanies intuition as it does perception, but seems to have no percipiency of its own, any more than ima- gination, memory, and belief have. 45 (p. 284-87). Abstraction is malyds : "the compo- 112 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. site objects of thought are analysed by a separation of parts for imagination to recombine in new forms for art or poetry, and by abstracting constituent quaHties for science : attention fixed on one object is tantamount to a withdrawal or abstraction of consciousness from every other ; and this implies an act of will, a choice or prefer- ence, and therefore of comparison and judgment. At- tention and abstraction are the two poles of the same act of thought " (Logic). The process seems rather to be this : attention being directed to the several objects, parts or wholes, qualities, attributes, and by comparison resemblances being marked, abstraction gathers out or abstracts these resemblances for classification or general- isation's work, preparatory to notioning of notions and conceiving of concepts; indeed it is added, " we abstract their points of resemblance, and by these points gen- eralise them into a higher class." These abstracted " resemblances » are not physical things, as if the sen- suous agreemg features of physical objects were mate- nally separated and formed into class-qualities which shaU cover the sensuous or the imaged individuals ; they are the supersensuous qualities which emerge upon the comparing and abstracting process being applied to the sensuous objects ; and probably the like process may likewise be applied to supersensuous notions or concep- tions. Hence Logic says ; " Abstraction is the separation of the points of agreement, that they may constitute a new nature different from yet includmg the sin-le objects " (W. Thomson) (43). "" 46 (p. 281-84). Classification and Notioning, or syn- thesis, is said to "grasp and assort the common qualities of a variety of objects into classes; collective notions are Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 113 made up of the repetition of the same constituent notion — such as an army, a forest, a town, which are names of classes of repeated notions of a soldier, a tree, a house ; but general notions are of army, forest, town. It is difficult to form a class of identical constituents, because we cannot conceive a multitude by embracing in one act more than 6 or 7 units, without depending on language to bind them up in a collective name ; so in arithmetic we proceed from units to tens, hundreds, &c." A col- lection of the same or like objects called a forest, a town, is not a class ; the trees or houses have not been picked out of diverse objects and '* assorted " ; they are there, natural or imaged, as a clustered whole of like indi- viduals which are not seen or known "under" class- qualities, and the collection as imaged may be called a collective-idea. Classification surely goes beyond this ; it depends upon abstraction or picking out of resembling objects, qualities, &c., from differing ones, the former of which in their supersensuous form it assorts into a class or classes of hyperphysical class-qualities, which either emerge spontaneously on the resembling qualities being abstracted (45), or are formed in Space by the classifying process, as imagination forms its images (43). Then it seems that the process of notioning or forming notions is by the unifying and combining of such assorted-class-qualities so as to form or help in forming limited thought-models preparatory to or as summary- views of the extended thought-systems of conception. If so, then generalisation should be like forming or using the genera of the species represented by classifica- tion, while imagination represents the individual ; wherein class-qualities are compared with class-qualities, and by H 114 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. an abstraction of their chief resemblances the generalised results are used by conception in forming concepts, and in combining these with compatible axioms in the con- struction of entire thought-systems of science. The work of classification can scarcely be applied to Arith- metic, which, so far as it is based on Time, can admit of no intellectual images or ideas, notions and concep- tions, to be formed of it or its constituents. Funda- mentally, number is just s^iccessions of units — one, one, one; the further process of addition or subtrac- tion, &c., the more or less of sums of units, belongs to quantitij, which is an exponent of Force, and as such cannot be intellectually imaged, notioned, &c. We may form artificial signs, numerals, and algebraic symbols, and make mental images of these, to indicate measures of Time and of Force, but the meaning is emotionally and volitionally appreciated, not intellectually. With geometry it is difi'erent ; it is based on Space, and its relations are with extensions, with figures, and of these we can form images or ideas, notions and conceptions. So long as we deal only with such modes of Space, we can use intellectual forms and pictures — e.g., of trees and forests, houses and towns, as well as depths or distances of these and of planets ; but the moment we deal with measures of size or distance in inches or miles, of weights and densities, &c., we fail in picturing such measures, though we may picture their artificial signs in numerals which we attach to the imaged object — say a tree, as 60 yards off, 70 feet high, 30 inches broad — and comparisons may be made between such. Hence the symbolic method of algebra, though giving easier answers, does not afford the same command and Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 115 comprehension of mathematical subjects as the geometri- cal method ; and so Newton's explanations of the system of the heavenly bodies are more successful than those of Legrange or Laplace. Hence arises the puzzle about " motion," another exponent of Force. So far as there is succession of steps in it, there is an element of Time ; but as it mainly consists of speed, acceleration, increment of advance or progress, it is a mode of Force — for there is motion-force as well as chemical-force and vital-force. We can image the line traversed by a body, but not the actual motion of the bird or planet. That experience is gained in this way : in intellectually imaging the line, the emotional faculty helps in the " succession " of its parts, then imagination pictures the (travelling) body and its positions, here and there, in successive advances, whilst emotion and volition pulsate and act in the " succession " and " advance " of the imaged body and its varying positions, under view of intuition. As w/^intellectual elements subordinately help in the intel- lectual operations, so intellectual comparison, &c., attend emotional and volitional measurings in comparing de- grees of qualities and quantums, of the higher or lower, nearer or further, heavier or lighter, in objects (56). Reverting to Hamilton's ideas, notions, and concep- tions, he says, "The notion of the figure of this desk is an abstract idea which makes part of the total notion of the desk ; " and " a complex or collective notion is made up of the repetition of the notion of an army, &c.," while the "general notion of soldier, &c., is formed by abstracting attention from the differences, and seizing on the resemblances in a number of objects and view- ing them as a unity." Again, "intellectual notions are 116 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstructed. different from sensible representations " — i.e., images or ideas ; and lastly, " primative or a priori notioTis" such as Space, which "as universal and necessary notions are to be distinguished from generalised or derivative notions, which are of our own fabrication. Conception, then, is the taking up in bundles or grasping into unity; it is the notion of classes of objects — i.e., general ideas. Imagination represents ideally the past; it is an act which involves the grasping up, comprehending, the manifold as a single whole" (19, 43). Rather, let idea and image, ideal and imaginary, be taken as identical, and as a mental picturing in Space of objects in parts or wholes — a desk or part of it, a copy of a particular tree, forest, or scene, or a purely fancy-object, the copy being weU defined, the latter not so. The faculty may imi- tate nature, or form novel combinations such as a centaur; and even in the representation of higher and more complex objects, as in the science of geography or astronomy, it may form an imaged map of the earth or of the heavens, necessarily indefinite ; in aU, a sur- face-process, the sketching or outlining, colouring and decorating, the main points and lines of the subject of meditation, either before or after the more substantial conceptual structure has been built. As imagination works in a hyperphysical sphere, it must use super- sensuous elements to form its pictures with, as de- scribed in note 43 ; so also with classification a^d generalisation, notioning and conceiving (9). Let notions and notioning be the plastic modelling and shaping in Space of the floating hyperphysical class-qualities or attributes of objects in nature, as above, and the forming therewith of a summary or synopsis of a body Intellections, Memory, Imagination, etc. 117 of knowledge, moulding such either as a limited and tentative system, or as a model-view of an established and developed system or science (47). Lastly, let con- ception be the forming of wholes of thought in Space, by the use of the results of generalisation, &c., and the combining of them with appropriate axioms into sub- stantial structures or systems of thought, a science, a philosophy. In all these processes the various faculties and capacities of the mind co-operate. 118 CHAPTEE VIII. THOUGHT PROPER, CONCEPTION, JUDGMENT, REASONING. 47 (lec. 35, 36, p. 288-332). Conception and Generalisa- tion are treated as identical : " Conception seizes on the resemblances in a number of objects, and gives a name to our notion of that circumstance in which they all agree. This is a general notion which makes known a quality or property common to many things viewed as a unity. Thus, generalising class from classes, we at last reach the highest class of Being, &c. The concept formed by abstraction of the resembling qualities of objects, is made permanent by language, which is the sign of things ; for the knowledge denoted by a word must have preceded the symbol or word, which then gives stability to our intellectual progress, by forming a new starting-point for our advance to another step beyond." As to Existence, it is the ultimate of the universals, none of which can be reached by classifica- tion (52, 15, 44). Viewing classification from indi- vidual objects as preparatory to forming notions, and generalisation from classes as preparatory to forming concepts, we find that from many classes of mental facts generalisation educes the laws of thought, or rather Intellections, Conception, Judgment, etc. 119 of thinking, in building up science ; or from classes of astronomical facts it elicits the law of gravitation, act- ing according to the inverse square of the distance; or^'fron. classes of chemical facts it extracts the law of chemical affinity, acting according to the character of elements and their relation in certain equivalent pro- portions ; or from classes of biological facts it finds the law of special vital force, acting in the sustentation and adjustment of the organic physical to the extra-organic physical relations (56). Such laws and principles thus educed, as objective facts, are combined by conception with the objective axioms relative to each science, and finally built up and based upon the "universal and necessary truths " or realities, in the moral sphere of InteUigence, Goodness, and Causation, and the hyper- physical plane of Space, Time, and Force. Thus, as JSTotioning uses the results of classification in forming limited wholes of thought, expressed in such terms as category, absolute, quantity, quality, order, identity, divisibUity, similarity, &c., also in aphorisms, phrases, and metaphors, and in forming model views and sum- maries of complete conceptual structures of thought; so Conceiving uses the results of generalisation, with notions also, in constructing enlarged wholes of thought or concepts, combining them, and with the union of axiomatic principles, forming a system of thought or science (9, 48, 56). The question, " What is the object in view when we employ a general term-cm we form an abstract idea of HI the Kominalists, such as Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Adam Smith, and Stewart, answered. No, we cannot form an idea corresponding to the general term, as we 120 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. cannot represent the class-object by an equivalent notion or idea, but only some individual image of the object, and view it as representing the generality ; or as Veitch says, a concept is an image plus the knowledge of rela- tion to other resembling objects, real or possible. The Conceptualists, such as Locke, Reid, Brown, held that we can form notions corresponding to general terms i.e., to the classes expressed by those terms ; we form a gener- alised notion of the reserahlance in several objects, and give that notion a name. Hamilton objects to "resem- blance " constituting the general notion, for resemblance is a relation which is not thinkable, and cannot be conceived apart from the resembling objects; for the resemblance being in particular qualities, is as individual as the objects, and not general. Resemblance is a rela- tion, and the notion of it cannot be a general notion. Kotions cannot be imaged, but are intellectually formed, and the one should be called sensible representation, and the other intellectual notion ; but the general notion con- tains under it particular notions, and is formed by con- sidering similar qualities in objects as the same ; and to this common quality we give a name, which can apply to all and each of the resembling objects, and so consti- tutes them into a class:' Broadly viewed, this implies that resemblance is something not physical, nor ideal, but a notion, as relation also is; and that the former may be viewed apart from the objects, and so is an abstract simple notion, emerging or "arising" on be- holding their resembling qualities, even as relation and suchlike simple notions emerge on the related objects being viewed together, both notions being extra-mental. The distinction between a class-notion and a general- Intellections, Concejption, Judgment, etc. 121 notion has been already described. Brown seems to mean the former, but attempts no hnage of his resem- blance-notion. Hume said, "Objects are placed under I a general term in view of their resemblance," and he "^ might have added, that as the name means something, that something is here the common-quality under which the objects are seen; for, as Logic says, "If proper names raise up in our minds the images of particular things, like the sun, &c., general names should raise up general notions'' (Jevons) ; and Grammar adds, "In every case of abstract nouns the thing to which the name is given is regarded as though it had an inde- pendent existence of its own, and on that account the noun has been called a substantive " (Morell). Campbell and Stewart say, " Perceived resemblance is the principle of classification ; " and Hamilton himself, " We abstract the points of resemblance, and by these points generalise them into a higher class— it is to the notion of resem- blance we give the general name." Summarily, resem- blance is either a mentally formed notion or a super- sensuous entity which emerges upon the comparison and abstraction of resembling qualities of objects, so forming " a new nature different from yet including single objects " (45), and which is used by the notioning process, as above stated. Indeed, are not relations, qualities, attributes, as abstractions, though connected with and as emerging from physical or imaged or conceived objects, in themselves hyperphysical entities rather than mental fabrications, such as images and concepts are 1 To view them thus would perhaps save us from some puzzles, such as Kant's a priori subjective /orT/i^ of Space and Time, and sub- jective notions or categories of unity, plurality, &c. It I 122 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. As akin to the above question it is asked, Does lan- guage originate in general terms or particular ? Locke, Smith, Brown, and others, held that the names for individuals are extended to generals ; Aristotle, Leibnitz, Scaliger, and others, held the opposite view. Leibnitz says : " It is natural to note every kind of similarity and to employ general terms of every degree, which, though more extensive in application, are less complex than the particular, embraced by proper names, and the more easy to form, and most useful ; hence children and learners of a new language employ general terms, as thing, plant, animal, instead of using proper names." HamUton, after Aristotle, adds, " We first know an object as a whole, and then its parts and their relation to each other and to the whole ; all analysis supposes a foregone composition " (22, 28). 48 (lee. 37, p. 333-37). Judgment "not only affirms the existence of phenomena, but includes the comparison of one notion with another, and the enouncement of their agreement or disagreement; we try whether two or more thoughts will or will not coincide and blend into one, and if they do, we judge or enounce their compatibility: e.g., we compare the water, iron, and rusting, find them congruent, and connecting them into a single thought— viz., water rusts iron— we thus form a judgment ; or technically, we find the * subject ' by asking, what is the thing of which something else is -affirmed or denied? and the 'predicate^ by asking, what is affirmed or denied of the thing % Thus judg- ment involves two notions at least, comparison of these, recognition that one contains or excludes the other' and we acquiesce in this recognition." Judgment is Intellections, Conception, Judgment, etc, 123 not needed to affirm the existence of what we know by perception, intuition, &c. ; comparison precedes judg- ment, and we must know the things as existing before we can compare them and judge ; as is said further on, <' a book before me gives a perception, but not a thought,'' and " without reasoning we should have knowledge of what is given by immediate intuition, and of self-evident truths." Two or more things or facts or thoughts must be weighed or balanced in opposition for judgment's act of decision between and amongst them ; as incident- ally said, that after "comparison of one notion with another" judgment's "enouncement of agreement or disagreement" follows. And what is added of the growth of concept's and of judgment's work,— viz., " the vague notion becomes more determinate and enlarged by new accessions, our conception waxes fuller, and with this conception we compare the last previous notion— i.e., a part with other parts and with its whole— and finding they are harmonious and dovetail and assort together, we acquiesce in this union, which is an act of judgment,"— accords with the objective view of thoughts being built up, as already stated— viz., whilst concept is being bound to concept, and " concatenated into a sys- tem " by being built up with the axioms of the appro- priate science, and affiliated with other concatenated and coherent structures, judgment proceeds in weighing and deciding on the fitness and congruity of two or more concepts to be so united and built up, as well as to the fitness of the materials used in the operation, and of the due application of means to ends in the enlarged con- struction (9, 2B, 42, 43, 47). 49 (p. 337-47). Reason, reasoning, "recognises that 124: Scottish Metaphysics Eeconstructecl. Intellections, Conception, Judgment, etc. 125 two notions stand to each other as a whole and its parts, through a recognition that these notions severally stand in the same relation to a third — founded on the self- evident principle that a part of the part is a part of the whole : as judgment has to do with two notions, one contained in the other, so reasoning has to do with a third— e.^., take the notions ABC; the first A contains B, and B contains C, therefore A also contains C ; if we do not know at once that C is contained in A, we cannot compare them together and judge of their relation ; we then compare B with A, and C with B, and then C with A through B, and finding B is part of A, and C part of B, we conclude C is part of A. Without reasoning we should have been limited to a knowledge of what is given by immedipte intuition, and been unable to draw any inference from this knowledge, and have been shut out from a multitude of truths which are not self-evi- dent " (Logic). On this Mill remarks : " By the theory the concept is made to stand for a normal notion, as if a concept floats in the air, and we can by reasoning find out something in it which we cannot find in the concept in our mind, and that concept becomes to me as much an external fact as a sense-object can he "—and a great advantage it is to have it apart from the mind. As we have suggested, Reason is the faculty which guides the combinations of notions and concepts, and especially in their union and extension with appropriate axioms, by directing the mental structure according to the end in view, and laymg down the lines or courses of the build- ing as it advances upon the solid basis of the universals already noticed, and by giving method and order and finish to the entire construction of the particular science. And though in the foregoing passages Hamilton speaks of Eeason only in its relation to Logic, he has before defined it thus: *' Reason, intellect, concatenates thoughts and objects into system, tending always from particulars to general laws, from these to universal principles, still advancing till it consummates all conditional knowledge in the unity of universal Existence " (9). In thinking, Reasoning pervades all the parts of the whole syllogism as a tripartite argument, and applies not only to the ''inference" or conclusion derived from the premises. As notions and concepts form the body of thought, and judgments proceed throughout, so reason attends upon all the processes. Accordingly, in the union of the three propositions of the syllogism, in the process of one pro- position being derived from another, and the third from the two others, with the three axiomatic laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, and others as of wholes and parts, reason also directs the course of think- ing so as that the product shall be the construction of true thoughts, and to the detection and avoidance of false ones. In like manner, iu the further sequences and expansions of thought, in the advance and progression of the building up of thoughts into a system, reason guides in the choice and union of the concepts with the proper axioms of the particular science — e.g., of mineral- ogy, chemistry, &c. In all this Reason gives arrangement, method, and order to the inquiries and processes con- nected with the construction of the scientific system (9). How, then, stands the natural state of the question about thinking and its product in thought ? Let Logic be the laws of thinking, the process in natural course of intellectual acts or actings when engaged in constructing i!i 1 » 126 Scottish Metaphysics Eeconstructed. a thought-object or a thought-system. It is sometimes called the "gymnastics of the mind," but of course it is more than that when the mind is employed in working with objective hyperphysical materials and forming an objective hyperphysical structure, say a science ; and this may, perhaps, be expressed by the term " appHed logic." Indeed Logic is, strictly speaking, only the Art of apiily- ing the laws of thinking to the production of thought ; it instructs in the best use of the thinking faculties in correct thinking; but it does not discover those laws, nor educe them from the operations of the faculties, any more than it furnishes the materials with which the thinking faculties form objective thought. Metaphysics and Psychology discover and educe the laws of the mental operations as well as the hyperphysical and moral materials for the mental fabrications. Logic may stand in relation to these as the art of Building to mechanical science, and so it has been called the Architectonic art. Usually its exposition includes a good deal that does not strictly belong to it, but to the above mental sciences, because principles and laws are referred to from which its rules are drawn. Every one reasons naturally, but to do so artistically and effectively he must learn the rules of reasoning or argument; just as every man is capable of athletic exercises — e.g., boxing or fencing, but the art of pugilism and fencing teaches how to use the proper members and instruments effectively, and with the least expenditure of strength. Hence Hamilton says, " The whole of pure logic is only a development of the modes in which the laws of thought are applied;'^ and Whately, " l^o truth can be elicited by any process of reasoning, since all reasoning may be resolved into Intellections J Conception ^ Judgment , etc. 127 syllogisms in which the premises do virtually assert the conclusion ; " and Mill, " Logic is the theory of valid thought, not of thinking but of correct thinking ; it is an art borrowing its grounds from Psychology ; its province is to make precepts or rules for thinking." The mind then may form and use instruments like language, and rules of practice like the syllogism with subsidiary rules, for working in the moral sphere, even as the builder does in the physical sphere ; but both architects must use the faculties and organs in conformity to their respective natures and to their respective environments; and as there are laws of organic action, so there are laws of mental action, and these laws or orderly processes of thinking may be systematically stated and methodically used. Taking, then, the main processes of thinking and thought, in what appears to be their natural order or law of consecution as already traced — Comparison having compared objects and noted the likeness and difference amongst them, sensuous or supersensuous. Abstraction selects and separates the supersensuous resemblances or resembling qualities which emerge on the act or acts of comparison, and Classification gathers together or assorts these resembling qualities into a class-quality or class- qualities, which Notioning unifies and rounds off into distinct notions in combination with notions of relation, &c., for model-structures or summary-thoughts, while Generalisation gathers the results of comparison and abstraction in deriving general-qualities from the former class-qualities, and the laws and principles collected from classes of facts, which results again Conception unifies and uses, along with notions, in forming extended wholes of thought, concatenated into a system by being built up I 128 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstmcted. with their appropriate axioms, while Judgment decides on the due equivalence of the combinations and unity of the structure, and Eeasoning guides and gives method and order to the processes, and arrangement, plan, expan- sion, and finish to the construction. Once more, these mental processes and their laws of action, which depend partly on their native tendencies and partly on their surroundings and the materials they work with or upon, may be called the " laws of thinking " ; and this should be clearly distinguished from the objects and jyroduct of their activities — i.e., comparing and imagining are distinct from the objects compared and imagined, abstract- ing from the qualities abstracted, classifying from the class-qualities gathered together, generalising from the general-qualities and the laws and principles collected, notioning from the abstract notions framed, conceiving from the concepts formed and concatenated, judging from the balanced and adjudicated results, and reasoning from the planned and inferred issues. It may, however, be that the mental activities and manipulations in the think- ing or syllogistic process are skilful and accurate — i.e., correct and valid thinking, and yet that the fabrication is unsound from the materials chosen and combined being defective, in which case the faculties of observation or elaboration will prove to have been in fault, and not those of construction ; so that logic is not a criterion of truth, but a subordinate process to those described above, which indeed provide and establish evidence upon which every proposition must rest. All this suggests that there exists what Plato might have called an objective " In- telligible world " ; that all Science and Philosophy are hyperphysico-moral structures in that world, built up by Intellections J Conception , Judgment , etc. 129 the mind with supersensuous mat( rials ; and that there may be an Art acquired of building them, to be taught and practised by Logic. 50. As the subject of thinking and thought is the most important part of Psychology, I had summarised some of the statements made by Mansel and J. S. Mill, but space will not admit of their insertion here. 128 Scottish Metaphysics Eeconstmcted, witli their appropriate axioms, while Judgment decides on the due equivalence of the combinations and unity of the structure, and Reasoning guides and gives method and order to the processes, and arrangement, plan, expan- sion, and finish to the construction. Once more, these mental processes and their laws of action, which depend partly on their native tendencies and partly on their surroundings and the materials they work with or upon, may be called the " laws of thinking " ; and this should be clearly distinguished from the objects and product of their activities — i.e., comparing and imagining are distinct from the objects compared and imagined, abstract- ing from the qualities abstracted, classifying from the class-qualities gathered together, generalising from the general-qualities and the laws and principles collected, notioning from the abstract notions framed, conceiving from the concepts formed and concatenated, judging from the balanced and adjudicated results, and reasoning from the planned and inferred issues. It may, however, be that the mental activities and manipulations in the think- ing or syllogistic process are skilful and accurate — ^.e., correct and valid thinking, and yet that the fabrication is unsound from the materials chosen and combined being defective, in which case the faculties of observation or elaboration will prove to have been in fault, and not those of construction ; so that logic is not a criterion of truth, but a subordinate process to those described above, which indeed provide and establish evidence upon which every proposition must rest. All this suggests that there exists what Plato might have called an objective " In- telligible world " ; that all Science and Philosophy are hyperphysico-moral structures in that world, built up by Intellections, Conception, Judgment, etc, 129 the mind with supersensuous materials ; and that there may be an Art acquired of building them, to be taught and practised by Logic. 50. As the subject of thinking, and thought is the most important part of Psychology, I had summarised some of the statements made by Mansel and J. S. Mill, but space will not admit of their insertion here. 130 CHAPTER IX. UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY TRUTHS. We now come to the central facts of Metaphysics. The fundamental hases of all Nature being the created hyper- physico-moral and impersonal universals of Existence — Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation ; Space, Time, and Eorce or Energy (1, 4, 5) — they necessarily environ con- dition and regulate all individual things and minds, and must be taken into account in any philosophy. So, in the too subjective philosophy of the text room is found for them in the mind! thence they dominate everything ; m percepticm, things must be perceived in this mental- existence, in mental-space, in mental-time, and under mental-cause or force; in thought^ images, notions, con- cepts must be formed in these mental-laws, categories, conditions. As " necessary " and " self - evident " uni- versals they must be mental, for all necessity is declared to be subjective ! They are said to belong to the Cogni- tive or intellectual faculty of the mind, and are called the " regulative faculty," and are explicated in the next three lectures as mental laws, forms, &c. 51 (lee. 38-40, p. 347-413). The last of the cognitive faculties is the Regulative, which is the power thejmind has of being the native source Universal and Necessary Tilths. 131 of necessary or a priori cognitions, which are the very conditions, the forms, under which our knowledge in general is possible, and constitute the fundamental laws of our intellectual nature. They are called first principles, self-evident or intuitive truths, native notions, innate cog- nitions, ultimate laws of thought, fundamental laws of belief; and are distinguished from the adventitious, derivative, and generalised notions which are fabricated by us (42-49), by being universal and necessary and primitive facts hid in the profundities of the mind until drawn out by the mental activity when employed upon materials of experience ; they are the root of all principles, the foundation of the whole edifice of science. Descartes and Leibnitz are quoted. Let necessity go with universality in the case of these truths ; but the individual mind is not universal that it could contain or fabricate anything universal, much less several universals ; therefore no thought or mental notion can be universal : it may be general as an objec- tive general notion or concept, which, as a mental fabri- cation, is limited. Necessity belongs to objective reality as well as to mental action. Assuredly we are not con- scious of any mental action or passion issuing in the universals in question, while we are vividly conscious of Existence, Space, &c., being independent of us as objective universal realities, and of our necessarily be- holding or intuiting them as such, even as we consciously know all Nature to be universal, because indeed therein we and our conceptual constructions abide; they are necessities of intuition because they are necessities of Nature. How do I know that this Nature is a perma- nent existence, or that the sensible things of nature, though changing and varying constantly, are permanent] Why, by always psychically intuiting the ever-abiding presence of theiy base or hyperphysical universal-Exist- ence ; and in and through that *' ultimate of ultimates " intuiting other universals, and sensuously perceiving its 132 Scottish Metajphysics Reconstructed. manifestations in physical existences; likewise whilst intuiting supersensuous universal - Space, Time, and Force, also perceiving their sensible modes manifested in ever-varying sensuous forms. It is unscientific to speak of " native cognition or belief," " native notion or conviction," as if the feeling of belief were the same or like to knowing or to thinking, as if feelings were cogni- tions or issued from the " cognitive faculty " or intellect, for it is again said, " primitive notions have their origin in the intellect," and that Existence, Space, &c., are "thought" and ''conceived" (17); yet Hamilton caUs them ''original beliefs," "a priori beliefs," adding, "they manifest themselves less as cognitions than as facts of feeling or belief," and " they certify their own veracity by being elements of our mental constitution ; and we must seek out, purify, and establish them by intellectual analysis and criticism" — unmindful of the incongruity of an intellectual analysis of feelings. But elsewhere he places belief in its right place — " In sensible perception I am conscious of myself and an external reality ; of the existence of both I am convinced, because I am conscious of knowing each of them immediately in itself as existing ; of their mutual independence I am no less convinced, because each is apprehemled equally at once and in direct contrast to the other " (on Eeid) ; and this is the counterpart of intuitive knowledge of the uni- versals and belief in them. Aristotle's dictum should be read thus : " What appears to all (or is known to all), that we affirm (believe) to be, and he who rejects this belief (founded on knowledge) will assuredly advance nothing better worthy of credit." Austiu's "we know what rests upon reason, we believe what rests upon authority," Universal and Necessary Truths. 133 refers to spiritual faith with spiritual knowledge of truths revealed by God's Word, and does not warrant " philosophic belief " or mental assent to facts and testimony resting on authority without any knowledge, as he insists " reason itself must rest at last, for its original data, upon authority of what is beyond itself — viz., beliefs or trusts." In answer to Mill's objection, Veitch explains that reason rests ultimately on intuitive truth (self-evident), which is believed (because known) but cannot be proved, " in fact we believe in an outer world in space, because we know an outer world there ; the object is first of all apprehended as a fact of our direct experience, and on the ground of this knowledge we believe." But no, it is not so simple a matter, says Hamilton, the universals must be thought under the " laws of thought," as thus : — The grand law of thoioght is, That all that is concmaJZe lies between two extremes, which as contradictory (not contrary) of each other cannot both be true (law of contradiction), but of which as mutual contradictories one must be true (law of excluded middle); thought as possible, one or other must be admitted to be necessary — e.g., Space must either be bounded or not bounded, but we cannot conceive it as finite nor as infinite, yet by a higher law we view one alternative as necessarily true ; so also of Time. This law of mind that the con- ceivable is in every relation bounded by the t'wconceivable, I call the Law of the Conditioned ; the conditioned or thinkable, therefore, is that which is alone conceivable or cogitable, the wwconditioned is that which is inconceivable or incogitable. The law of the conditioned, applied to the judgment of Causality, shows it is derived from an impotence of mind, for when I perceive, imagine, or think an object to exist, and to exist in time, I find I cannot conceive its absolute com- mencement — i.e., creation— or its absolute termination— i.e., annihila- tion—since I cannot suppose the complement of existence to be in- creased when an object phenomenally commences, but only that this effect must have previously existed in its causes ; this is the category of the Conditioned as applied to the category of Existence under the category of Time, which thus yield the principle or law of Causality 134 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed, (7, 11, 55). Veitch explains, Tlie Unconditioned is not a positive thought at all, but simply its negation as conditioned or relative ; in it you transcend the positive sphere of thought, and Kant's "ideas " are merely negations hypostatised when clothing his unaccomplished hypotheses in Platonic nomenclature ; but Hamilton's irrelatives as contradictory extremes must be, one or the other, held to be real, though which of them is so is to be determined by considerations drawn from our actual experience, intellectual and moral. If Hamilton is right, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin's methods and assumptions are bad intellectually, as they are contradicted morally and theologically on grounds as ultimate as anything alleged for them can be. As to Causality and Substance, Hamilton's argument is not satisfactory, &c. (54^, 55). How unpractical all this is, is shown in the admission that " of the unconditioned, absolute, and infinite we have no conception at aU " ! the terms really implying nothing in Metaphysics or Philosophy. Well might Mill and others say of such views, " we are trying with common sense to understand wwcommon sense " — the lowest depths of which are exposed by E. Caird in an article on Metaphysics in the new * Encyclopaedia Brit- annica.* But we can practically know universal objective Existence, and under it forms of existence comprising universal Space with its special modes, universal Time with its temporal modes, and universal Force with its potential modes, as also universal Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation, with their manifestations in minds and moral laws. If the " law of the conditioned " is confined to thinkings and conceivings, then it has nothing to do with the aforesaid universals, which are not thought- objects, but supersensible objects to supersensuous in- tuition. The laws of thought do not apply to such self-evident truths. All thinkings and thoughts, all imaginings and images, aU conceivings and concepts, all notionings and notions, are necessarily limited, relative. . Universal and Necessary Truths. 135 and conditioned. These products of intellectual opera- tions are fabrications and constructions of thought, and as such must have commencements and endings; and therefore there can be no inconceivable extremes about them. The universals are fully discussed in the follow- ing seven notes. Existence, Space, Time, Cause or Force, 52. Existence may be viewed as the isness or being of all the created universe, moral and physical ; Space as the expanse of the universe pervading it; Time as the duration of the universe pulsating throughout it; Force as the stability of the universe prevailing through- out it. All these are intuitively realised by our mind, the first two intellectually, the third emotionally, the fourth volitionally ; they have each their manifestations or modes — (1) existences, (2) extensions, (3) successions, (4) changes. In the text they are explicated thus : — Existence is " a form or category of thought. In perception I think and must think that I and something different from me exist, that my act of perception as a modification of the ego exists, and that the object perceived as a modification of the non-ego exists: here I pronounce existence to be a native cognition, because I find I cannot think except under the condition of thinking all that I am con- scious of to exist; therefore I cannot but think existence, and I am conscious of this thought as an act of power or intellectual force ; and so the notion of Existence and its modifications in identity, con- tradiction, and excluded middle, in Space, Time, &c., are all positive exertions of the mental vigour and positive necessities of thought ; but the notion of Causality is an impotency or negative necessity of thoug/d. Existence in itself, or absolute existence, is no object of knowledge, but only cognisable in special forms or modes of being ; we cannot acquire knowledge or represent it without attributing existence to the object aud ourselves. Existence contains under it 136 Scottish Metaphysics Bcconstructed, every class of being, and by abstracting from differences, and attending to resemblances, we arrive at the notion of naked or pure Being, or undifferenced Existence " (15, 44, 47). We really do not and cannot thinJc Existence, for that would admittedly be to condition and limit it. We cannot " think it out " as an " exertion of mental vigour," which would only produce a limited thought or growing notion, and without the quality of univer- sality and necessity which is allowed to belong to Existence. We are not conscious of any such process of thinking and product of thought in respect to it, nor are we conscious of its being in the mind as a " native notion"; indeed we must banish these innate notions as we banished innate ideas long ago : we cannot judge or affirm it, or attribute it to things ; and if we know its modes, we must know their primary or base, for correlatives are known together. We cannot derive it, or any other self-evident universal, from a process of classification. We are positively conscious of Existence as a self-evident objective reality in which we and ail else exist, independent of the mind and all its actings, and of all other things. We know it by intuition as a primordial universal, environing and penetrating all other universals and their modes, as the ultimate of ultimates, the ground of the fundamental realities of Intelligence, Space, &c., and of all things. Universal Being or Existence is as the ethereal breath or air of all physical and hyperphysical things, in which they move and act. The being or isness of all things is at once and directly intuited by all men, so that we are always conscious of the ever-presence of Being which no mental effort can either form or suppress, any more than can be SpacCy Time, Cause or Force, 137 done with the other universals. We cannot, therefore, talk of Existence " beginning to be," for that would require us to go "out of existence," or "out of our mental constitution," and the created mind cannot reach beyond created Existence ; it can but reason within it, and witness to beginnings and endings of things within it; it could not even conjecture "creation," which is a great revealed truth to be only spiritually realised. Thus, after tracing all things in the physical world as modes of their fundamental and hyperphysical base of Space, Time, and Force, and all the mental, ethical, and esthetic realities as modes of their fundamental moral base of Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation, we arrive at the ultimate base of all these— viz., universal Exist- ence— as the first and last utterance in the created Universe; for it is a continued utterance lasting for all Time, expanding through all Space, efi'ective in all Cause or Force. It is the ground and unity of all existences, of the other universals and all their modes. But who utters the Be of all creation] The answer is found in the spiritual, in Kevelation ; it is He who is the Personal Voice or Word of the Personal God (4). 53. Space is a positive and necessary /orm of thought, for we cannot but conceive it, and we cannot even imagine anything out of Space ; but we have no positive notion of absolute or infinite Space, for it must either be bounded or not bounded, and as these are contra- dictory alternatives, by the laws of thought one must be true ; yet we cannot conceive either its being finite or infinite, a whole beyond which there is no further Space or as without limits, for imagination may stretch into empty Space yet never get beyond the finite, or attain only the indefinite, which is always the finite. Then try Space as a minimum, the smallest portion of Space ; it is necessarily ex- tended, and may bfe subdivided ad infinitum ; hence we cannot con- ceive an absolute minimum of Space nor its infinite divisibility. But if Space be thus a native, apriori, necessary Twtion, a mere subjective m 138 Scottish Metaphysics Rcconstmictcd, state, are we not thrown back into idealism ? The only answer, the only solution, is that, besides this mental notion, we have also an empirical knowledge of extetision, and we reserve the term Space for the former, and the term extension to the notion derived from exter- nal extended objects. We must think Space as a necessary notion, and we do perceive the extended in Space as an actual fact. The objects of perception are all perceived in (subjective) Space and Time, which are thus the two conditions, the two fundamental forms, of external perception. By the forms or condition of a faculty, I mean that/mw«, that setting, out of which no object can be known ; we only know through perception the phenomena of the external world under Space ; those phenomena having no bond of union among them- selves, this is supplied to them by the form of Space, out of which they can neither be perceived nor imagined by the mind (43). What a waste of ingenuity all this seems ! for if Space be, as insisted, a mere mental state, there need be no discussion about its being finite or infinite, and of a portion of it, &c., any more than of applying such measures to love, or volitions, or other mental states. There is, however, an incipient admission of its exter- nality in saying such things as "body is that which occupies Space and is cmdained in Space." What equiv- alence is there in the teims used to define Space — viz., a priori notion, a priori Space, innate notion, a con- dition of thought, a law of thought, a form of thought, worked into a frame, setting, or network, to " project " over or around "extended objects'"? Notions are usually treated as "fabrications of the intellect," but this notion is native-born, possessed "anterior to ex- perience." Does it not show conspicuously the con- fusion which comes from ignoring the hyperphysical objective sphere wherein Space is one of the most manifest of objective universal realities, intuitively known, and "extension" is only one of its modes sensuously known in the physical sphere] We are Space, Time, Cause or Force, 139 not conscious of any form or notion of Space being in the mind, " like our inclinations, dispositions, habits," as Leibnitz says, but we are perfectly conscious of Space with its modes being outside and independent of the mind; and therefore we repeat, let us banish these pseud "innate forms and notions," as we did of old the supposed "innate ideas." Then to talk of it as "thought" makes it positively limited; for thinking and conceiving are limited acts of forming limited thought. If Space were "conceived" as "thought," it would certainly be limited and conditioned, and there would be no need to speak of its " illimitability or infinity." " Contradictories " being a law of thought or thinking, applies only to the limited and conditioned. To say, then, that the "conceivable in thought lies between two extremes." only means that we can con- struct concepts or wholes of thought, not illimitably, but only within modal limits, and according to the power of our limited faculties and limited available materials in the hyperphysical sphere, even as we con- struct from physical materials limited buildings in the physical world. But Space is not " conceived " or built up, but is intuited as an existing universal reality— ?'.e., as an expanse throughout created Existence, known as neither with nor without limits, except in its modes, which are known to be limited. The term " infinite " is no more applicable to Space than "Eternal" is to Time (4-6, 15, 41, 42, 44, 47). 54. Time is a notion even more universal than Space ; for while the energies of mind cannot occupy Space, they do occapy Time (? the where and when are inseparable, and we must think in both) ; every, thing mental and material is in Time, yet we cannot conceive Time either in whoU or in part (? Time has no parts any more than Space \) 140 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstructed. has, only their modes may be divided). Take the whole ; here we have a past period bounded by a present period (? both modes of Time), the past cannot therefore be infinite or eternal ; but we cannot conceive Time as commencing, though we may represent it under a relative limitation (? a representation of a 7node of Time, for past, present, and future time are only modes of Time, certain successions, durations, periods, connected with certain modes of Space, &c.); but it is impossible to think of an absolute commencement or termination —i.e., a beginning or end— beyond which Time is conceived as non- existent ; it is equally impossible to think of a past time without limit— i.e., without commencement ; we cannot conceive the infinite regress of Time, for this would require an infinite addition in thought of finite tim^, which would require an eternity to accomplish (? rather say, no addition of 7nodes of any universal will increase or diminish or change such universal, even as not one or all the modes of mental operation will be equivalent to, make up, or change any faculty or the mind itself ; in short, no single mode of Time, or all its modes put together, would be equivalent to that universal ; so also as to Space with its modes, and Force with its modes) ; the concept of an infinite progress of Time is equally inconceivable ; while the infinite regress and infinite progress, taken together, involve the triple contradiction of one infinite concluded, one commencing, and of two infinites which are not exclusive of each other (? modes may exclude one another, but universals do not ; and as to the context, the universalist may say I stand at one moment or mode of the "regress and progress," and intuite Time as the universal when of all existences, including your regressive and progressive duration). Take the parts ; we cannot con- ceive a moment to be divisible to infinity or to be reducible to an absolutely smallest part, yet one is necessarily true, though neither can be conceived possible (? all inodes are exhaustible and merge into their primaries, as they emerge therefrom). Hence Zeno argued against the possibility of conceiving motion (? a mere puzzle ; from its nature as a mode of Force no intellectual notion or concept can be formed of motion, see App. and Free Notes). The unconditionals of the Absolute, or finished, or complete, and of the Infinite or inter- minable and not concluded, their notions are negative— i.e., each can only be conceived as a negation of the thinkable, in short we have no conception at all of them// We must believe in the infinity of God but the infinite God cannot be comprehended or conceived by us &c. On the first part of this we remark that we cannot intellectually conceive even the modes of Time and Force, much less conceive those universals themselves; Space, Time, Cause or Force. 141 and though we can image and conceive modes of Space, we cannot do so of that primary itself, for, as often said, the universals are self-evident and known by intuition. Even H. Spencer says : " Of Time and Space you cannot assert either limitation or the absence of limitation;'* the law of " excluded middle " being a law of thought or thinking, does not apply to universals or the intuition of them; while the puzzles involved in Hamilton's "absolute whole" and "absolute part," and "relative whole" and ''relative part," of Space and Time, arise from trying to assert those very things of these univer- sals and from straining to force them under conditions of thought which has really nothing to do with them ; for as we have seen, they are not known by thought, notions, conceptions, representations, or imaginations, the inherent limitations of all which indeed serve to origin- ate the contradictions, which are not in the objects them- selves and their relations, and do not apply to those ever-present necessary and universal objective truths that are self-evident and intuitively discerned (56). The attempt to apply a mental and temporal infinite or a pseud infinity to the personal God, compels the remark. Is it a spacial or temporal or potential infinite that is meant ^ and is it physical, moral, or spirituaH The limitations o- illimitations of the one may be utterly inapplicable to the others ; as physical limitations cannot be appUed to moral facts— e.^., how long or broad is justice "J— so neither may moral limitations be applied to spiritual realities. It is presumptuous and worse to say we cannot know and understand God, when our blessed Lord has Himself said, '' I wiU give them an heart to know me, that I am the Lord." " No one kjwweth who the Son M 142 Scottish Metaphysics Rcconstructal. is, save the Father ; and who the Father is, save the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals Him." "The Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding^ that we may know Him that is true ; and we are in Him that is true (or the Truth), even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life." " This is life eternal, to hiow Thee the only true God, and (or in) Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent." There are many like passages in Holy Scripture, which make it a fundamental require- ment to know God in order to believe in Him, to love Him, and to serve Him. God is Spirit, and they that worship Him must know Him spiritually to be able to worship Him in spirit and in truth. Mental belief as well as spiritual faith is impossible without knowledge of some kind; knowledge by mental intel- lections, feelings, or volitions produces mental assent to their objects ; knowledge by spiritual apprehension pro- duces spiritual faith in God. It is not mental intuition or thought that knows God, for their range as well as that of mental belief extends not beyond the created and moral sphere, and therefore He is not as we may " think " Him, for that would be a conceived and limited God ; but the conscious Self or spirit of man being spiritually illumined, spiritually knows and has faith in God as He manifests Himself to us in Christ Jesus our Lord. How a human personal spirit can even now thus know or apprehend the Infinite, Eternal, and Almighty personal God, no intellectual definitions can explain ; it is there- fore vain to attempt to reduce and measure spiritual realities to the level and by the compass of moral rules. As a faint analogy we may illustrate this spiritual knowledge by the mental intuition of hyperphysical Space, Time, Cause or Force, 143 Universals, an indefinable process or act of mind, which may serve at least to make us pause in denying the spiritual intuition of spiritual, infinite, and eternal Keal- ities (4, 7, 57). 54J. Substance is treated parenthetically with Cause, as both are " intellectual principles, and applications of the conditioned; substance is absolute existence, and pointed to by our primary belief as the unknown ground or cause of known phenomena ; by a law of thought we are obliged to infer that .he phenomena are the qualities of something— z.e., thinking, feeling, willing are known qualities of unknown mind -substance, and extension, solidity, &c., are known qualities of unknown matter- substance" (4, 15). But if the "knowledge of relatives and correlatives is one," both the qualities and the substance ought to be known ; and if the " native notions " of Space and Time are known, why not that of Substance] Yeitch says, "Do we actually perceive in the qualities of extension and resistance, body as body, as that which exists whether we perceive it or not] Hamilton says no; but what more can we ever make of the essential and actual in body than those qualities] Their permanency and uniformity is for us the true reality of things." 55. Cau^e or Force. — Under the term Cause or Caus- ality is mixed up hyperphysical Force with its modes, and also moral Causation : — The notion of Causality arises when we are aware of something which begins to he, and we are constrained by the necessity of our intelligence to beli&ve that it has a cause, which simply means that we cannot conceive any new existence to commence ; we think any new appearance has had an existence under a prior form (? the question is, what changed the prior form to the new one ? Mere antecedence 144 Scottish Metajphysics Reconstructed. Space, TimCy Cause or Force. 145 and sequence, as Brown held, is denied. What then changes the acid and alkali into a neutral salt ? why, the action of chemical force. As Mansel puts it, "to say that B previously existed in the form of A is not to explain why A became B ; " even Empedocles required a principle to explain change, and set beside matter a moving force ; and Aristotle added to Space and Time motion^ which is a force). We cannot think it possible that the complement of existence can be either increased or diminished, nor conceive nothing becoming some- thing, or vice versa (? in the sphere of things or modes, these can and do increase and decrease perpetually : they emerge and retract from and into their primaries or universal 8—«.gr., matter as the fused modes of Space-Time-Force from and into those primaries ; exten- sions, figures, &c., into Space ; successions, durations, &c., into Time ; vital, mechanical actions, &c., into Force ; and we do not feel any necessity to go further than these universals, for, in fact, our created mind cannot go beyond created Existence). When God is said to create out of nothing, we construe this to thcnght by supposing that He evolves existence out of Himself , and thus view the Creator as the cause of the universe (?can we suppose any physical thing to be "evolved" out of our own spirit, or even out of our mind— the evolved thing should partake of the nature of its source ; but creating is a spiritual act, and inexpressibly above and beyond all created evolutions; and not only above our mental ken, but beyond our spiritual reach and experience: it is intolerable to talk of created impersonal existence being evolved out of the spiritual personal God, and of the personal Creator as a cause or causer— " Through faith we' understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God ; so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. xi. 3). We thus conceive the causes to contain all that is con- tained in the effect, and the effect to contain all of the causes— «.^., a neutral salt as the effect of the conjunction of an acid and alkali, in which no new existence is added or taken away (? as said above' the ** cause" here is chemical force, and the "conjunction" is only a certain condition for universal Force coming out in chemical action, and the " effect " or neutral salt was not before nor afterwards " con- tained " in that cause or force, which, after its work is done, merges into its primary ; and while there is no increase or diminution of primary Existence, there is of its modes or existences, which are con- stantly changing inform and also in amount). It is not necessary to the notion of Causality that we should know the particular causes of the particular effect, which is only a datum of experience ; but the principle that every event has its causes, is necessary and universal, is a condition of our intelligence itself (? rather say, we are always conscious of the presence of self-evident and universal Force, and when we observe any change in Nature, we know and believe Force is acting in some particular mx)de, and then search for the particular mode of Force which caused the particular change, by finding out the "conditions ": it would be an odd thing to say our " native notion " or mental "principle " of cause exhibits itself in this or that physical force or change). Brown thought the question did not "regard causes themselves, but solely the idea of cause in the mind," saying, " The tendency of our constitution is to believe that the same ante- cedents will invariably be followed by the same consequents ; when we ascribe to one substance a power of affecting another substance, all we mean is that where it is present a certain change will uniformly take place in that other substance ; power, in short, signifies the ' in- variable antecedent ' which is called cause, and the * invariable con- sequent ' is called effect." Upon which Wilson remarks, " Brown ex- cludes the idea of necessity, but we have more than belief that the change has taken and will take place, we have the conception of a fixed constitution of their nature which determines the event, which makes the event necessary ; there is power and susceptihility of change " (this is nearer the truth than Hamilton's subjective view ; the constitution or composition of bodies and their mutual relation, are the conditions which " determine " the particular form or mode of Force manifested, whether chemical, electric, gravitating, &c, ; but it is not in any case the body or matter which exerts or puts forth its force, as if it exerted some impulsion ; the modal force in action is connected or associated, as Grove says, with the body or bodies, but its origin or source is universal Force, with which lies the necessity — or call the universal " potential " and the modes "kinetic " energy, instead of the old terms static and dynamic). H. then dis- cusses eight theories of Causality: the first, "that we perceive ex- ternal causal agency as we perceive the existence of external objects " is true in that we sensuously measure force-modes; another, "that we find in our will acting the notion of cause, which we transfer to the changes in the external world," which, though the transfer is a figment, yet the analogy of the will -force acting points to the fact of organic-force and other forces acting, and their respective sources of supply — viz., universal moral Causation for the will, and hyper- physical Force for the others. Hamilton needlessly puzzles about "connection," as if the mii.d must touch the body or the limb to make it move, and as if there were no organic, i.e., vital, mechanical, and other forces in or in association with the body and its organs, which can be set ija action by the voluntary power when the mind wills the limb's motion. We do not know that even any physical force touches its object — e.g., the attraction of gravitation acting be- tween near or far objects — much less need we suppose the mental & 146 Scottish Metaphysics RecoTistructcd. force to do so. As to intervening things and movements going on without our knowledge, it is no more than what takes place in most of our perceptions of organic or extra-organic things. But we are perfectly conscious of our mental power acting, and of the dependence of the desired mental and bodily movements on that action, as we are also aware of the physical forces acting, a:i«1 the dependence of physical movements thereon ; the abnormal condition of organs is itself a sufficient reason for their not responding to the forces in quastion. The action of the mental powers as well as of the organic and physical forces are but modes of action of their primaries, mental power acting under universal Causation or Potency, and the physico- organic forces under universal Force or Energy, while these funda- mentals are the always prevalent and always known changeless realities of the universe. Hamilton, after objecting to all the other theories, restates his own views summarily. "Existence and existence in Time is a necessary form of thought ; Existence is thus conditioned in Time, and the terms 'existence,' 'conditioned,' and 'time' ex- press the three categories of thought which in combination afford the principle of Causality— e.g'., I perceive, imagine, or think a thing to exist, and that in time, and I cannot think it to be non-existent in the past, or annihilated in future time, nor can I conceive its in- finite non-commencement nor infinite non-termination ; therefore, when an existence commences, we are obliged to think it must have previously been, and that the present effect, or its new appearance, must have previously existed in its causes (?like the neutral salt which must have once been in the chemical force, and may be re- stored to it — an illicit way of saying sequents are merely in the an- tecedents, and come out somehow "n this new order, and there is no action of force anywhere). This is the principle or law of Causality, an impotence ot the mind to conceive either of these opposites." In an appendix, Hamilton adds: **Ido not neglect change nor power ^ for I proclaim that cause is identical with change — i.e., change of power into act ; power is the property of something, and creation is the existing in act of what previously existed in power — creation must be thought as the evolution of God's productive power into energy, and this power must be in being before creation, which therefore ex- cludes the commencement of being or existence ; and if it be said God created Existence itself, then either existence is created by an ex- istent God or by a non-existent God, &c." — the obvious answer being that God is Spirit, spiritual and eternal, and creates this wwspiritual impersonal and temporal existence, as before said and again pointed out (57). In the foregoing argument there is evinced a complete Space, TimCj Cause or Force. 147 ahsence of the perception of physical forces causing physical effects. It seems to have been the defect of the time, for all the philosophies of the day exhibit it. Causes are described as something unknown, or as agencies, or as laws, or as antecedents, or as transferred notion of mental volition to external changes (65). Thus even Reid says, " Xewton in discovering the law of gravitation knew that he discovered no real cause^ but only the law or rule according to which the unknown cause operates, Natural philosophers only mean by the cause of any phenomenon of nature a law of nature of which that phenomenon is a necessary consequence ; but they have never discovered the efficient cause of any one phenomenon, although when we say the laios of nature are the rules according to which the effects are produced, we know there 7nust be a cause which operates according to these rules — there must be an agent, but the agency is hid: only in human actions we know the agent, for we have 2)ower to give certain motions to our bodies, and a certain direction to our tJwughts." And ^fansel adds, " The impression of j^otver in the ante- cedent to effect the sequent is derived from the personal causality manifested in volition — this is the origin of the idea of power and of causation^^ — as if the physical forces were not real entities when one of them is per- ceived in every touch of an object — viz., resistance. If we now recognise cause in the physical sphere to be just physical forces acting and producing effects there, we have yet to clear it of the idea that matter or bodies exert such forces, and that these forces can be transformed or transmuted into one another — though how or by what other transforming force is not explained. Cause or 148 Scottish Metaphysics RecoTistructed. Causality is a word rightly used as a common term to signify both physical forces and moral forces — the former as the action in some mode of universal Force, and the latter as the action in some mode of universal Causation. Of the latter, we will speak in note 58 ; of the former, we have further to say that the modes or forces are vari- ously manifested in action according to the existing con- ditions — i.e., the composition, constitution, and mutual relations of bodies and their surroundings, in mechanical, chemical, electric, vital, or other actions. These force- actions, as they emerge from, so they merge again into their primary base when their specific work is done, and are constantly renewed therefrom, in new or old forms, according to the requirements of every new condition — such conditions being in the power of man's will to bring about so as to enable him to elicit any mode or amount of force he pleases. In the trite example of the neutral salt as the effect of the action of chemical force upon or in connection with the acid and alkali, brought together by man's hand, the force after action and so far changing the character of the original elements, re- tracts into its fundamental base, whence new modes of the like or other forces are constantly issuing as " con- ditions " arise. This is the true " conservation of forces." So with all physical chanr/es^ organic or extra-organic ; the action of diverse physical forces effects the diverse changes ; while the source of all these modal-forces is known as ever-prevalent in I^ature — viz., universal Energy or Force, with or without its modal actions and their effects. All the modal-forces existing at any one time in the world may be diminished or augmented with- out interfering with one another or their base, as they Space, Time, Cause or Force, U9 all spring from one common universal source ; and this implies that possibly under other " conditions," in the past or in the future, human "life" may vary greatly in period of longevity or other respects from the present. It is only in this sense that the physicist can truly say, "The equivalence of heat and work shows the exact amount of heat which a definite expenditure of mechani- cal force can originate — I say originate^ not drag from any hiding-place, but actually hring into existence, so that the total amount of heat in the universe is thereby augmented " (Tyndall) ; though he only means, " forces which seem to be lost are transformed into their equiva- lents of other forces, and forces that become manifest do so by disappearance of pre-existing equivalent forces" (Spencer) ; or as more scientifically stated by Davy and Joule, " When equal quantities of mechanical effect are produced by any means whatever from purely thermal sources, or lost in purely thermal effects, equal quan- tities of heat are put out of existence or are generated ; " and W. Thomson showed that " only a fraction of the heat employed in any engine is converted into useful work, the remainder being irrecoverably lost" — which statements we should translate as meaning that forces are generated or originated — i.e., elicited — from uni- versal Force, and lost or dissipated by merging again into said Force; that equivalents are corresponding ratios of forces to forces and to their effects or work done, apparent transformations or conversions being merely the ceasing of the action of one force and its withdrawal into its base, and the emerging of another equivalent force under changed conditions. If any one doubts this, let him answer by what force the 150 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. change or conversion of one force into another is caused (see Appendix). Eeverting to some other points of the text, the idea that "our utter impotence of conceiving the absolute commencement of Existence constitutes the whole pheno- menon of Causality," appears to be a mere " artifice of in- tellect," and really not worthy of its place in the argument. It forgets the emphasis laid by Leibnitz, Eeid, Brown, Wilson, and others upon the chief exponent of Force- viz., change— ih?it "every change in existing nature has a cause," and Hamilton's own term " event " implies it. And yet both he and Mansel lay stress on our know- ledge by inference of external things as derived from our sense of " resistance " or extended resistance, which is modal-force along with modal-space. When it is so crassly said that the creation must be conceived as an evolution from the Deity, the obvious correction is that evolution belongs to creation, is within creation, and plainly implies development out of some previous form of created existence, finite from finite and universal, until you reach the fundamental base of all evolved existences — viz., created universal and impersonal " self- less " Existence. And since such existence cannot be evolved out of spiritual existence, which is essentially personal and above and beyond all created existence and evolutions, therefore the Divine fiat or word and the creating act are spiritual and above the region of evolutions and mental definitions. Even H. Spencer says, " Between the creating and the created there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions ex- isting between divisions of the created; that which is uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is caused ; Space, Time, Caiise or Force, 151 the Infinite cannot be grouped along with something that is finite, the Absolute with the relative;" and Veitxjh, '' There, above Time, lies the mystery for mere inteUigence, the mystery of the absolute beginning and of the infinite regress of things ; yet it is not inexplicable how this is a mystery to us when we analyse what our thought is, and how it is subject to time and relations ; " and Whewell, "The Deity's operation in the material world is so altogether different from ours— man can con- struct exquisite machines, call in vast powers, form ex- tensive combinations, to bring about results which he has in view ; but in all this he only uses laws of nature which already exist, he applies to his purposes qualities which matter akeady possesses. Kor can he by any effort do more ; he cannot establish any new law of nature which is not a result of existing ones, he cannot invest nature with new properties. But the Divine operation includes something much higher ; we must therefore, in our conceptions of the Divine purpose and agency, go beyond the analogy of human contrivances : He is the Author of the laws of chemical, physical, and mechanical action, and of such other laws as make matter what it is ; and this no analogy of human inventions or powers at all assists us to embody or understand. While science dis- closes the mode of instrumentality employed by the Deity, it convinces us of the impossibility of com^eiving God's actions by assimilating them to our own " (4). The last point noticed in the text is " the law of duty and morp.! accountability," which does not lie with the Will, but with Conscience as aUied to the will, of which Ethics treats. The operations of the .will or volitions should be distinguished from the * I 11 I ■I 150 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. change or conversion of one force into another is caused (see Appendix). Reverting to some other points of the text, the idea that " our utter impotence of conceiving the absoUite commencement of Existence constitutes the whole pheno- menon of Causality," appears to be a mere " artifice of in- tellect," and really not worthy of its place in the argument. It forgets the emphasis laid by Leibnitz, Eeid, Brown, Wilson, and others upon the chief exponent of Force — viz., change — that " every change in existing nature has a cause," and Hamilton's own term " event " implies it. And 3^et both he and Mansel lay stress on our know- ledge by inference of external things as derived from our sense of " resistance " or extended resistance, which is modal-force along with modal-space. AVhen it is so crassly said that the creation must be conceived as an evolution from the Deity, the obvious correction is that evolution belongs to creation, is within creation, and plainly implies development out of some previous form of created existence, finite from finite and universal, until you reach the fundamental base of all evolved existences — viz., created universal and impersonal "self- less " Existence. And since such existence cannot be evolved out of spiritual existence, which is essentially personal and above and beyond all created existence and evolutions, therefore the Divine fiat or word and the creating act are spiritual and above the region of evolutions and mental definitions. Even H. Spencer says, " Between the creating and the created there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions ex- isting between divisions of the created; that which is uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is caused : Space, Time, Cause or Force. 151 the Infinite cannot be grouped along with something that is finite, the Absolute with the relative;" and Veitch, " There, above Time, Hes the mystery for mere intelligence, the mystery of the absolute beginning and of the infinite regress of things ; yet it is not inexplicable how this is a mystery to us when we analyse what our thmight is, and how it is subject to time and relations ; " and Whewell, "The Deity's operation in the material world is so altogether different from ours— man can con- struct exquisite machines, call in vast powers, form ex- tensive combinations, to bring about results which he has in view ; but in all this he only uses laws of nature which already exist, he applies to his purposes qualities which matter akeady possesses. Kor can he by any effort do more; he cannot establish any new law of nature which is not a result of existing ones, he cannot invest nature with new properties. But the Divine operation includes something much higher ; we must therefore, in our conceptions of the Divine pmyose and agem^y, go beyond the analogy of human contrivances : He is the Author of the laws of chemical, physical, and mechanical action, and of such other laws as make matter what it is ; and this no analogy of human inventions or powers at all assists us to embody or understand. While science dis- closes the mode of instrumentality employed by the Deity, it convinces us of the impossibility of conceiving God's actions by assimilating them to our own " (4). The last point noticed in the text is " the law of duty and moral accountability," which does not lie with the Will, but with Conscience as allied to the will, of which Ethics treats. The operations of the will or volitions should be distinguished from the ^ !' J* I 1 ! I .'■I 152 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. moral sense or conscience, which will be discussed hereafter (69). There is, besides, a spintual account- ability to God, which again is far above the level of moral obligation. But as far as Hamilton's argument has gone, it has dealt almost entirely with physical causes; and if in that sphere his view of "mental impotence" explaining the "principle of Causality" has been so entirely beside the mark, it cannot be used in the moral question, and will prove helplessly insufficient to answer the "necessitarian" who asserts that man's free-will-acts are " mere links in a series of effects and causes." What has "absolute commence- ment," or some recondite thought about the " origin " of things or of "existence," to do with the modal beginnings and endings of modal existences, such as bodies and minds and their acts and passions ? There- fore that idea does not in the least apply to " free volition" or a free act of the Will, of which we are quite conscious as a simple fact, even as we are conscious of the free operations of the Intellect and of the Feel- ings. These faculties are limited in their nature and in their operations, but not forced or under mechanical- like necessities; they are free within law, or possess lawful freedom within their natural scope, and in harmony with their environments. But the physical part of these surroundings certainly cannot act upon the mind or its faculties as these can act on the former, so as to force them contrary to their natural tendencies and scope, much less to make their operations "mere links in a series of effects and causes ; " and as to their moral environments, there is the like harmony of action between the subjective and objective, and the special Space, Time, Cause or Force. 153 function of conscience to discern the right and loroncj of conduct, and in aUiance with the will to strive for the one and against the other-of which more hereafter. Even man's bodily organism has its free action, within limits, amongst extra-organic forces, either to harmonise with their actions, or to overcome their disintegrating effects by virtue of its special vital force, which, m respect of its adjusting function, we sometimes compare to the Conscience in the moral sphere. 154 i{ I CHAPTER X. MANSEL, KANT, M^COSH, SPENCER, CALDERWOOD ON THE FOREGOING. 56. As the subject of these Fniversals is the most important question in Metaphysics, we quote some statements bearing on it made by the above-named authors. Viewing Metaphysics as embracing both Psychology or the science of the faculties, operations, and laws of the mind, and also Ontology or the science of Being, and the objective realities comprised therein, we find that the universals of Existence, Space, Time, and Eorce, Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation, are the only true foundation for philosophy and the sciences. Mansel follows Hamilton. Space is the form or mental condition of our perception of external objects, such as ' ' extension"-the condition m fact, of their existence as objects, which are contained in it and not under it as with " general notions." Time is like Space, but includes also our mental states in successive modes of consciousness They are both universal and necessities of thought, in that we must think them. Thus every phenomenon of consciousness consists of two elements-a matter derived from experience and a/om derived from the OTigrinal constitution of the mind, the forms being Personality Space. Time, Unity, Plurality, Totality. As to Substance, it is a representative notion derived from "myself," and applied to other phenomena. Causality is likewise the transference of ray own deter- Mansel and Others on the Foregoing. 155 minations and volitions to other phenomena, and is the origin of the idea of power and causation. Whether Space and Time have any real existence apart from the mind which gives those "forms to objects of its consciousness, since they are involved in our mental constitution, to explain their generation we must go out of our con- stitution • we may regret the limitation of our faculties, and sigh for a knowledge of a hyperphy^cal world, but all our sighing will not make our faculties capable of conveying such knowledge. -(M eta- ulivsics I ^aw/proclaimed the existence of both empiric and ideal in the Ego itself; experience gives the irmtter of knowledge, and idealism gives the apHori factor or notions which are provided in the mind All cognition is the product of the two factors, the subject and the ob- iect • the latter contributes the imttter, the former contributes the f(ynk or those notions by which connected knowledge or a synthesis of individual perceptims into a whole is possible. Were there no external world there were no perceptions, and were there no a prion notions the perceptions would be only an indefinite plur^ity and maniness without connection in the ^tnity of an understood whoU ; perceptions without notions are blind, and notions without percep- tions are void : cognition or knowledge is a union of both, in that it fills up i\yt frames of the notions with the matter of experience, or disposes the matter into the net of the notions. We do not know things as they are in themselves, for we add from the forms or categories native to the mind-such as unity, totality, &c.-to the manifold of perception our own notions as liBform, thus Producing some change in the objects which appear to us only as nwdified by categories ; and we also add another subjective element to the objects thus/ra;.i^-viz., Time and Space, which are mental /om. for all objects of sense, these forms being no less native to the nund than the apHoH notions or categories of unity, &c.-(Stirling s ' bchwegler. ) All this is as strange to common-sense as if a man who, standing in the midst of heaven's light and the ambient air, should insist that both light and air were thrown out, were constitutional exhalations, from his own body ; that all objects were perceived in and under these native and necessary organic exhalations; that these vapours were the conditions, the laws, the forms, the categories of perceiving objects, the frames, settings, nets for enclosing and uniting objects— nay, that the 156 Scottish Metajphysics Reconstructed. causes of things or the forces that move them are the outcome of the organic vapours ; for besides air and light there is a third and more refined organic exhalation — viz., ether — which enwraps and penetrates the luminous and ambient vapours, and without which they could not exist ; and as the body or its organs cannot reach beyond the ethereal or luminous vapours, unless it could go out of its constitution, these become the two " conditions " of perceiving objects ; and so when a new object appears or moves, it and its movement cannot be conceived as beginning or ending beyond or without the said organic vapours, and therefore therein is its cause or forces, the conception being a felt organic impotence of reaching beyond the vapours ! M'Cosh says Hamilton's method is not the inductive, but that of Kant's critical analysis ; he fails to observe that the mind in intuition looks at objects ; he makes the mind's conviction in regard to such objects as Space, Substance, Cause, to be impotencies, and their laws to be laws of thought and not of things ; he calls ultimate primary and universal principles " facts of consciousness." It is thus, accord- ing to Kant, that the mind sets out with certain " forms " which it imposes on phenomena, two being Space and Time; whereas our native cognitions declare that these have a reality out of and inde- pendent of the mind, quite as much as the i^henomena, and that •'cause and effect" have an existence quite as much as the events which they connect ; we believe in these having an existence alto- gether independent of the contemplative mind.— (Intuitions.) Spencer asks. Shall we say with Kant that Space and Time are "forms" of the intellect, " a prion laws or conditions of the con- scious mind"? The proposition cannot by any effort be rendered into thought, and stands merely as a pseud idea. To assert that Space and Time are subjective conditions is to assert that they are not objective realities ; if they belong to the ego, then of necessity they do not belong to the non-ego. Now it is absolutely impossible to think this ; the very fact on which the hypothesis is based testifies as much— viz., that the consciousness of Space and Time cannot be suppressed, for the consciousness which we cannot rid ourselves of is the consciousness of them as existing objectively. It is needless MaTisel and Others on the Foregoing. 157 to reply that such an inability must be if they are subjective forms, for the question is, What does consciousness directly testify ? and that testimony is that Time and Space are not loithin but without the mind, and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot l>e conceived to be non-existent even were the mind to become non- existent—of them we cannot assert either limitation or the absence of limitation. Besides, it is not simply that we cannot combine the thought of space with the thought of our own personality, and con- template the one as a property of the other— though our inability to do this would prove the inconceivableness of the hypothesis— but it is that the hypothesis carries in itself the proof of its own inconceiv- ableness; for if Space and Time are "forms" of thought, they can never be thought of, since it is impossible for anything to be at once the " form " of thought and the " matter " of thought. That Space and Time are objects of consciousness Kant emphatically asserts ; how then can they at the same time be conditions of consciousness ? If they are the conditions under which we think, then when we think Space and Time themselves our thoughts must be jmconditioned, and if there can thus be unconditioned thoughts, what becomes of the theory ? (Notwithstanding this energetic protest, Spencer's views of these universal are not sound nor scientific. Misled partly by '' traditional " teaching, but chiefly through a superstition about the ultimate of both science and religion being the '' unknown," he calls the modes of Space, Time, &c., " relative space," which he says " in some sort represent their causes— viz., unknovm absolute Space, Time, &c "—See ' Free Notes on his First Principles.') Caldertcood, in his Philosophy of the Infinite, first argued that the conception of Time involves a recognition of the Infinite, for by the very constitution of our mind we must have a conception of Time, we must think Time ; we cannot think it as finite, therefore we must think it as infinite. But what is Time, of which we have such a con- ception ? Hamilton and Cousin have not attempted a clear answer ; is it only in our thought, or has it an objective and external exist- ence ? The nature of our conception of it seems to recognise Time as something external, something existing without us and apart from us and independent of us ; it is no product of the mind, but exists even though man were not ; therefore to maintain that Time is subjective contradicts consciousness and overturns the basis of philosophy : it is an objective reality as Substance is, and at the same time its concep. tion is a necessary conditim of thought. As to space, parallel argu- ments apply ; though not j^erceived, our cmception of it leads us to recrard Space as an external reality as much as Time and Substance ; it°is always thought as infinite, though our knowledge of it is an indefinite knowledge of it as infinite. As to Cause, we think a cause 158 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. for every existence apart from all change, and not only for everj'- change in the form of existence ; nor do we think it for continuance of existence, or that we cannot think a thing beginning to exist, and so must think it previously existed in another form, which we call the Cause, for we think a time when this object did not exist. Thus the conception of infinite Space and Time and that of Cause intro- duces us to the higher conception of a Supreme and Infinite Being as filling all Space, as existing in all Time, and as the First Cause of all things. Hamilton answered this, The Infinite I mean is considered only in thought; the Infinite beyond thought being an object of belief but not of knowledge. The sphere of belief is much more extensive than that of knowledge ; and therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I do not deny that it is, must, and ought to be believed. You maintain that thought, conception, knowledge must he finite, while the object of thought may be infinite; whereas it can only be an object of thought as it is thought: a thing may be partly thought, known, &c., and partly unknown, but that part only which is thought can be an object of thought, and the rest is to thought as zero. The Infinite, therefore, can be no object of thought, knowledge, &c., for it is self-repugnant to say we know the Infinite through a finite notion, or have a finite knowledge of an infinite object (? the only Infinite is spiritual, of whom there is no mental appre- hension : setting aside thought-knowledge of universals, and therefore "finite notions "of such, as needless when we have intuitions of them, we may have spiritual knowledge of the spiritually Infinite by the use of mental and finite notions or conceptions as symbols, even as we use physical signs to mean moral truths — e.g., an upright char- acter). I never denied that the Deity, though infinite and uncon- ditioned, could act in a finite relation ; but that in thinking God under relation we do not then think Him as Infinite; and whilst always believing Him to be infinite, we are unable positively to conceive His attribute of infinity; the infinite being subjectively inconceivable does not derogate from our belief oi'xi^ objective reality. But as to Causality, to say that " creation is conceived only as the on'igin of existence by the fiat of the Deity " is contradictory, for was the Deity not existent before the creation ? or did the non-existent Deity at the creation originate existence ?(? a mere puzzle; "crea- tion " refers strictly to the t?/ipersonal universe ; the everlasting Spiritual and Personal God created that existence, which may there- fore be called "created existence" ; while personal spirits are God- breathed, and "live, and'move, and have their being in Him," n. 4). Calderwood thereafter retracts ; I abandon the position I formerly maintained, and now hold that Time is our consciousness oi continued succession in our mental states; from this springs up within us the Mansel and Others on the Foregoing. 159 conception of Time which we apply to objective existence, for we also observe a succession in external objects and events and their changes. We have also the consciousness of continued personal existence through all the changes in our mental states, and of duration in existence measured by the succession of changes ; Time then is the duration or continuance of changeable existence, which began when " changeable existence " was originated by the Creator, and will con- tinue as long as that existence continues. Time is a condition or law of mind only in the sense that its operations are in continued suc- cession ; but the Deity is not subject to the law of time, for He is unchangeable. As, however, the mind does not impose its own con- ditions on external objects, and can know them without such changes, as in a still stone, so the mind can know the unchangeable God. I give up the recognition of an Infinite in pure Time, since it does not come before the mind as a distinct object of thought, or as a separate existence ; and as (modal) time consists only in the order of suc- cession among things, I cease to speak of infinite time or of such a conception, and only insist that we have a belief in the everlasting existence of the Deity and an indefinite knowledge of that eternity of duration (? time-duration and Eternity have no connaturalness nor commensurableness ; as Delitzsch says : ' * We may speak of Eternity as that which was before Time, and shall outlast Time, yet not as though the Time that lies between were a portion of Eternity ; Eternity underlies the source, and the being, and the future, and the ultimate end of Time "). Further, I no longer plead for the Infinite in Space, nor for such a conception ; Space is not like extension which is sl perceived quality of objects, but is raXhex emptiness, and we call it distance or nothing between bodies. Space being the relation of extended bodies, does not apply to the mind, or to the Deity, who is spiritual and non-extended ; but Time being a law of mind as well as of external objects, we are conscious of the relation of time to both our knowledge and our thought. All too subjective and artificial. 'Tis to confess a complete failure to conclude that " our conce^ition of Time and Space implies the conviction of their existence as external realities ; our conception as a necessity of thought constrains us to think that there are external realities which harmonise with our conception." As long as only notions or conceptions of those universals are professed, mere subjective things are known, all 160 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstntcted. necessarily limited and conditioned, for they are only "mental states, modes, or actions," or rather mental fabrications from the modes of the universals, such as extensions and successions ; and these must be limited, as the mind can no more construct or contain unlimited things than the hand can. The " belief " in an Infinite beyond these " conceptions " is therefore founded only on inference or guess derived from the known modal-forms, and will partake of their limitations ; for all belief in an object must be based on some intuition or thought, and as he does not claim intuitive knowledge of Space, Time, or the Infinite, it must be a thought-knowledge, and that is always limited, because it is a mental construc- tion. IS'o " stretchings beyond " these notions will yield an Infinite harmonising with them, for it would only be imagining further images or conceiving further con- cepts, indefinite and necessarily limited. In passing, some of the above statements suggest a curious view of the mind as a circle or orb, and Time and Space as filling its circumference, the latter as an all-pervading swell, and the former as a perpetual tide, and thoughts or objects or events ever rising and moving in them as ripples, wavelets, or bubbles ; the act of thought which causes these bubbles in Time and Space and their movements, answering to ever-energising Cause or Force. Here is the " inner " or mental world, the all-pervading where, the ever-during ichen, and the ever- acting hoic of things or bubbles ! You cannot measure the abidin^r, but only the extension between the bubbles, and their successions, and their motions. The abiding when-where- how, though mental, is " the Infinite," for we can never arrive at its beginning or ending; therefore it is not Mansel and Others on the Foregoing, 161 finite ; necessarily, therefore, it is Infinite. But this Infinite does not restrict the finite bubbles, nor do they restrict it, even though they are correlated so that neither is realised separately, the bubbles being the changing element, and "the Infinite" being the un- changing element, of the two terms composing the one relation; but this mental Infinite constrains the con- viction of the existence of an external Infinite harmon- ising with the mental Infinite. . . . But, says an opponent, that conviction is not thought-knowledge, the believed-Infinite is not under the conceived Space or Time or Cause, which, as conceived, must be limited, for they are all restricted to the circle of the mind, and to its necessary limitations of thought, and cannot get beyond ; they ai-e thus restricted by one another, and by the thought-bubbles, idthoid ivhich they are admittedly not realised, and they are only measured by a series of such bubbles, w^hich go round and round the circum- scribed limit of tlie mental orb; while, whenever you begin to think and believe, or cast up fresh bubbles, of the believed -in -Infinite, you have only a limited or conditioned Infinite, or an indefinite non-finite within all the aforesaid limitations : this is but negative thought and belief, derived from the iiositive thought or con- ceived and believed finite and limited objects or endless bubbles of something unknown and inconceivable, and therefore unbelievable, beyond thought or conceivings or bubbles, in a limited yet endless mental orb ! 57. Now, referring to Hamilton's concluding sentence, we have to say there is a vast difference between created impersonal Existence and spiritual existence or Person- ality. The former is the isness^ the being of all created 162 ■ Scottish Metaphysics EecoTistructed. things, and sustains them, and they live and move and have their being in that universal moral Existence, which is the uttered Be of or by the Eternal Personal Word. Therein is the first and chief est of existence — viz., uni- versal moral Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation, with their outcome or modes in human and animal minds, ethical laws, &c. ; and next the fundamentals of uni- versal hyperphysical Space, Time, and Force, with their modes or manifestations in physical things. All these may be viewed as developed out of the original created Existence. But this created Existence is not connatural with, nor does it support or sustain, spiritual personal beings who are the breathed-spirits, say procreated, of God, and who live and move and have their spiritual being in Him. They may enter, or be placed in con- nection with, created Existence and existences ; they may take up or be allied with moral and physical natures ; but that connection is but temporary, their native element being the Eternal-Personal " 1 believe that at the first the soul (spirit) of man was not pro- duced by heaven or earth, but was breathed immediately from God, so that the ways and proceedings of God with spirits are not included in Nature — ^.e., in the laws of heaven and earth — but are reserved to the law of His secret will and grace, wherein God continueth working to the end of the world " (Bacon). It is therefore expe- dient not to speak of the Eternal, Infinite, and Omnipo- tent God in the same terms as we do of created Existence, and so not to apply the term Infinite to Space, &c., nor Eternal and Omnipotent to any such impersonal exist- ences (4). The term Universal may rather be appro- priated to such ultimate of ultimates as Existence, and Mansel and Others on the Foregoing. 163 to the fundamentals of Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation, and of Space, Time, and Force, and other objective necessary Truths — " universal," as expressive of the all-pervading presence of the aforesaid funda- mentals throughout the created universe, and as intui- tively and universally known by man. If this be allowed, then it may be easy to unravel the tangled skein of Hamilton and Calderwood's statements. Cause or Causation, then, does not belong to the spiritual- personal sphere, but to the created impersonal sphere. The Deity is not a " selfless " Cause, but the Personal Creator. Creation or creating is a personal spiritual act, above and beyond all created existence and causes, and all moral definition and physical analogies. As all imaginations, notions, and conceptions are formed by the mind after original intuitions of objective hyper- physical things and perceptions of objective sensuous things, so conceptions of God are commonly formed by man from the intuition of moral objects and perception of physical objects, the result being a kind of anthro- pological Being with moral and physical relations such as animal-man has. But when there is a spiritual in- tuition — ^.e., direct consciousness or knowledge of the only true spiritual-personal-God — then true mental con- ceptions might be formed of Him ; but this spiritual insight being lost to man at his fall — i.e., on his spiritual death from the spiritually living God — it behoved that a special spiritual Inspiration and Revelation should be bestowed upon man, which has been done through chosen instruments, for the conceptual expression of eternal verities concerning God and His relation to man. This was necessarily embodied in earthly language and 164 Scottish Mctajpliysics Reconstructed. conceptions, which, though never adequate, may be suf- ficient to express heavenly things. It is through or by means of these infallible and true conceptions that God reveals Himself to us in Christ, and opens or quickens our heart or spirit to spiritually know and understand Him, to love and serve Him. Until so quickened, Ave grope in the letter, and so only know the true concep- tions of God, and worship that conceived Deity, if not some of our own gross conceptions. Measured by mental calipers, or by logical definitions, inconsistencies and con- tradictions will be found in the truest conceptions of God and His acts, as surely as when moral characteristics are tried by physical things or images which we are yet obliged to use, as when an "upright," and "straight- forward," and " meek," and " lowly " man is measured by the physical images of a perpendicular figure, ad- vancing in a hnear direction, and yet prone or grovelling in the dust. How irreconcilable ! how contradictory ! But in fact spiritual truths are beyond the scope of philosophy ; therefore, to talk of " the Absolute," " the Unconditioned " — which after all are admittedly some impossible thought-conceptions — in this connection is inept (4, 55). Whenever we find Hamilton or others saying " belief is or may be without knowledge," it should be repudiated as contrary to common-sense. Mental belief in or of a thing, fact, or statement, is belief in the knoiun thing, fact, or statement, known by or through perception, intuition, or thought, known also by volition and emo- tions ; otherwise it is null, it is belief in zero (20). He admits that "belief" has in itself no percipiency, in- tuition, or thought, no " knowledge " ; for it is a mere Mansel and Others on the Foregoing, 165 assent to the affirmation of objects by those operations ; it has no object of its own apart from that made known by them ; it attends them as memory does. " The measure of our knowledge is the measure of our faith ; knowledge is the basis and the measure of belief ; we believe because we understand, and so far as we under- stand and no further" (Young). Animals believe in somewhat like manner. Hamilton may have an oblique reference to spiritual faith in God, which equaUy implies knowledge ; it is briefly a personal apprehension or possession of God as revealed in Christ Jesus our Lord ; in its fuU sense it is a " life of faith in the Son of God." Hamilton recognises a distinction between " belief " and "faith" in saying, "the Germans have only this one word *glaube' for philosophical belief and theological faith " (on Reid). Even Faraday asserted " an absolute distinction between religious and ordinary belief," or, as we say, between spiritual faith and mental belief, the former being the special "gift of God." It might be " self-repugnant to say we know the Infinite (God) through a finite notion," if it meant as an object viewed through a telescope, or that the notion limited the object, but not if it were used only by way of analogy, as when we speak of an "upright man," and by means of a physical symbol or perpendicular figure understand the distinct moral object ; it is like using letters and other symbols for intellectual and moral meanings. We must use physical images to express the moral realities known, even as we use sounds and language ; and so, also, we must use moral conceptions to express spiritual truths (14, 54). Much of the conflict of opinion on this subject arises 166 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed. Mansel arid Others on the Foregoing. 167 from the one party limiting itself to thought-knowledge, subjective, while the other struggles between that and intuitive-knowledge, objective. When Hamilton speaks of "causes" and of "spaces" and "times," we may translate him as meaning inodes of the objective uni- versals— viz., (1) Moral Causation and hyperphysical Force ; (2) Space ; (3) Time : hence his theory of causa- tion applies to both mind and matter — i.e., to new voli- tions or thoughts, and new physical phenomena, which are only changes of previous forms. (1.) As to Change : it is the true general exponent of Force, and undoubtedly, on seeing a change has occurred or is occurring, as well as its action in keeping forms from changing or in stable equilibrium, we at once intuite universal Force, and seek its particular mode or modes of action in the case ; so in moral things as in volitions under Causation. It is not every " event," or, as Calderwood thinks, every " exist- ence," that calls up this intuition and observation. A new event or new object within existence, as well as the stability of old forms— 2. e., the preventing of new forms — implies change or resistance to further change, and exhibits Force and its modes of action ; but the mere " existence " of a thing or objects would not imply force or power, apart from the static (potential) forces of co- herence and stability manifested in them. The still engine or watch standing or lying there is at once seen to be a manufactured article— ie., to have been made to undergo changes in its original materials, and in its continuing to manifest forces in its fittings, cohesions, stability, &c. But the " existence " of ^ture, as a non- artificial object, does not suggest any change from non- existence to existence, and only exhibits past and present changes with coherences and stabilities as the modal- action of Force mthin Existence. Then, as admittedly there are no changes in pure Space, Time, or Force, no force or power can be supposed to change them ; and lastly, what change in pure Existence shall imply force or power] The created mind would have to go " out of existence " to see the change from non-existence to ex- istence ; but the mind cannot get beyond created Exist- ence, within which it and all else temporal live and move and have their existence. As Veitch says, " Change is always within Existence ; there is previous (forms of) existence implied in change." And so the question of the origin of Existence and all else within it cannot arise in the mind except in a pseud-thought of a temporal beginning. " To ascend to the origin of things, and speculate on creation, is not the business of the natural philosopher" (J. Herschel), or rather is not to be found in science or philosophy or their objects. (2.) As to Succession : it being the general exponent of Time, whenever we observe a succession of events or objects as having occurred or occurring, we at once intuite uni- versal Time, and seek the particular mode or modes of its rhythmic movement in the case ; so in moral things, as in the rhythm of emotions under universal Goodness. But Hamilton speaks of " Time or succession," and of Time " past, present, and future," which is only a meas- uring of duration in Time, and he further speaks of a " regress of Time," and of the " addition of finite Times," all which only implies modes of Time or duration. Ko addition of modes, of number, rhythm, or duration, will make up Time, as if this universal were composed of finite and limited modes. So, when Calderwood speaks 168 Scottish Metaphysics Reconstructed, of ''Time stretching between and beyond events or objects," and of its "stretching beyond any point we reach," he is only dealing with time-modes which may be thus measured ; and it is not '' object after object," or " event after event," or " succession of changes," or a *' dividing of events," for the " afters " assume the "between" and "beyond," and it is thus succesdons and durations, and not the objects and events and changes, that constitute the time-modes to be measured, of the remembered past, of the perceived present, of the hoped-for in a prefigured future. How are we conscious of past time — how do we measure it ? The difficulty in precisely explaining it arises from our not being able to image time-modes or force-modes as we can space-modes (see notes 18, 19, 22, 28). We are conscious of sequence of events, of one event after or before another, of a series of events ; we are now conscious of successive past events, by imagination picturing the " events," whilst emotions pulsate the " successions," and memory responds " past." The whole duration between the now and the past is thus emotionally though indefinitely measured. For the expected future a similar process occurs, with hope m place of memory being active, and we foresee and measure future successive events ; yet in both cases all is embraced in one universal Time— for the time-modes necessarily imply and are known under or in the uni- versal, and the successions or sequences as continued, and remembered as continued, is duration. As in every visible or imaged object there is succession of parts, as well as extension and coherence, which succession is measured by rhythmic sensuous or emotional movements Mansel and Others on the Foregoing. 169 of the mind, so hehceen events or objects, actual or imaged, there are durations measured by like pulsations, sensuous or supersensuous, even as the pauses between beats of the pendulum, shorter or longer, measure time ; and we may make artificial divisions of such time-modes into hours, days, years. To say, I was in that past time, I witnessed that past event or scene, may be explicated thus : I who am in this present duration picture myself, in virtue of my being in a modal form of mind-and-body (25), in connection with the event or scene, also imaged, which memory says is like the past objects, and my emotional faculties now respond, with a retrospective memory, to a ocries of durations— amid other imaged objects intermediate to the main ones— intervening be- tween now and then, and with the artificial help of numbers, &c., I realise indefinitely the past time. Or rather, since others' experiences and historical accounts are also to be realised, we may first say that the scenes and events of our own experience have been in past time photographed by imagination and left in Space, and the mind is now voluntarily and recollectedly led through a series of associated objects likewise imaged, till we reach the original pictures sought for— the emo- tional response to the regressive steps, with attendant memory, measuring the duration between now and then, Kext, in similar ways led by their language, we may visit and behold the scenes and events portrayed or con- structed by others, and measure durations connected therewith, helped in both cases artificially by symbols, numbers, &c., as above stated (18, 19). So that there seems to be a way of measuring "duration" backward 170 Scottish Aletaphysics Reconstrmted. and forward, but not universal Time, which is known in the very modal measurements to persist throughout the measured durations. Modes of Time may not be realised withou events and objects, actual or imaged, as "land- marks ; but this cannot be said of Time, under which as a universal always in view of the mind, all time-modes and events and objects are comprehended and appre- hended The mind may intuite all the universal' re- ferred to without necessarily dealing with their modes, &c at the same time, even as we must be conscious of the light and air and gravitation we see and breathe and move m without attention to the objects within them. Imie exhibits the now and then as sequences : but Time can scarcely be described as the "everlasting now "or the everlasting present," for it has a then in it as well as a «o«,-the now and then of Time,-even as the here and there of Space cannot be called the all-extendin.. here, or as this-action and that-action of Force cannot be called the all-prevalent-thus or this-wisa Even such a term as the " everness " or the ever-duringness of Time would be preferable. (3.) Lastly, Extension being the general exponent of Space, wherever we observe exten- sion m or between object, we at once intuite universal ^pace and seek the particular mode, line, figure, angle. &c of Its manifestation ; so in moral things, as in Intel! lections under universal Intelligence. GenemUy, parallel exphcations apply to Space as to Time ; the " relative hmitation or "portion" of Space "between and be- yond objects" is not a "limitation of ohjects," but it is !!d r'\°l^^*«"«'°"' ^^ in a line, between objects and beyond them ; the puzzles of wholes, and parts, and Mansd and Others on the Foregoing. 171 divisibility show that limited thowjhts of limited modes of Space are in debate, and not the universal reality itself. It seems to be of the nature of universals that we universally behold or intuite them as objective realities throughout Existence, in some such way as we intuite the subordinate "necessary tmths" of Mathematics. 172 CHAPTEE XL INTELLIGENCE, GOODNESS, AND CAUSATION. 58 Having intellectually realised the universal expanse of Space, which expresses itself in the multifarious forms and figures of visible and tangible objects as well as in the minutest of invisible sensuous things, natural and artilicial, also in the ideal constructions of the mind in the axioms and demonstrative propositions of Geometry m Its primary figures and those derived therefrom, in the boundlessness of the heavens and the vastnesses traversed by the solar and stellar bodies therein; havin- emotionally realised the universal rhythm of Time, which expresses itself in the innumerable successions of parts of natiiral and artificial objects, sensuous and supersen- suous, in the numerical computations of Arithmetic and symbohcal calculations of Algebra, in the measures of music and the harmonies of Mature and Art, in the numbers and rhythm of poetry, &c. ; and having voli- tionaUy realised the universal potency of Force, which expresses itself in the coherences, stabilities, and motions of bodies, natural and artificial, in sensuous and super- sensuous objects, in the actions of chemical, electric mechanical, gravitating, and vital forces, in the resist- Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation. 173 ances, weights, and quantums of energies,— we are finally introduced by the hyperphysical triad to the moral side of the hyperphysical— viz., universal Intelligence, Good- ness, and Causation. We have before said (4) that Ave intellectually realise universal Intelligence as pervading the physico- moral sphere, and expressing itself in the manifold adaptations of means to ends seen in Mature, and the varied balanced relations between life and environments, which call forth our intellectual appreciation and approval; and that we emotionally realise universal Goodness as persisting throughout Nature, and expressing itself in the order and fitness of things for the welfare and enjoyment of man and other intelligent creatures, which move our emotional admiration and aesthetic pleasure ; and that we volitionally realise Causation or moral potency as prevailing through all existence, and expressing itself in effecting the aforesaid adaptations and correlations, order and fitnesses, and in further producing the ethical and social relations and regulative principles subsisting amongst men, which quicken our voluntary and con- scientious compliance. It was added, that as we say of physical organisms that they are constituted of the modes of universal Space, Time, and Force, so we may say that minds or moral organisms are constituted of the modes of universal moral Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation ; and as the physical organisms do not imply any similar organisation of their primary, so neither do the moral organisms imply any sunilar organisation of their native source— i.e., there is no universal moral mind, any more than a universal physical body. Even if we could discover such a universal Mind, that would 174 Scottish Metaphysics Secmstructed. not satisfy the problem of the Creation ^r.A n of TSTatiirp fn, ti, <-reation and Government JNature, for these are personal acts, and there i« nn personahty in mind, since we find none in ou V;! animals. So far as man partakes of the nature of iZ brute creation, he and they have bodies and r^^ds W man has a much higher nattire besides-name ra God breathed spirit, a personality, a personal sTf 1 ^ Hence Science, in speakin^r of ^^hir^ . a -. cesses, uses terms that imply th sense ^ the , '"," presence of Intelligence, G^Wr^d cI^Lr^^"^ highest admiration for ttCmZontr''"f'^.^"'' '"' ^^^'^ "■« and an Intelligence superior T,h ' "°°'='P"°'""' a Power arougl^ut creation.. 8^^ ami '""' ' ^' ^''''' Intelligence deportment under like "^tanZ^ "T """^^ *■"* '- ^heir the essential character of a l"°I.f '^ ''* °' ""^'^ "'<""" Clarke-Ma.well, and also by M^TifrB S^ "tf '^^^^™«> ^7 tm.se the arra„p«„«< of those wondJ'ir'y*'- ^" ""y ''^™- inme up by her refirud ZinlmkaLrT''' ''^" ^"""-^ and with a syr.,netry and iZ^XTZZ: ""* "^ ^'''"'^^ adm.nng.-So /-arorfay, who also Tl !u TJ °^'" ^^^"^ "^ Presence above the mLlorde* and !f . ^' 'P'"'"'" P^^^al prevailing evcywhere • When T Toll ^fP'"''""* and coherences forces which ^ aiJuJ'ZLlr^^ '"^^ ^^^^'^-i^ ot ossociaM of their energies, wUch enabkr i^ *'' "•' '™'"i''" *«'«»«»^ in themselves to dwell assoftedtS '"'??' """^ destructive -.ser Of -.-nf ?;S1X -arra'^rra^:;: Intelligence, Goodness, and Causation. 175 though in a diflFerent spirit : The harmonious relations of life to the conditions of life which' is incessantly presented to the student of natural science, the mechanism of the ultimate particles of matter, the general adaptations of means to ends in Nature, excite in the profoundest degree the interest of the natural philosopher. It was V)onderf\d to think of, as well as beavtiful to behold ; surely, such an exhibition of power, such an apparent demonstration of a resident intelligence; there was a nobility in the glacier scene, a strength of nature and yet a tenderness which at once raised and purified the soul— nature rained down beauty, and had done so here for ages unseen by man.— So Helmholiz speaks of the greatness of the uni- verse and the wisdom displayed in it— Cuvier dwelt on the great principle of comparative anatomy, that in every animal the several parts have such a mutual relation, both in form and function, that if any part were to undergo an alteration in even a slight degree, it would be rendered incompatible with the rest; if any part were changed, all other parts must be correspondingly changed : and thus any separate part is an index of the character of all the rest ; this laio of the correlation of parts is indeed so defined, that even a por- tion of a bone may serve to verify the species to which the animal belonged.— Owew further accentuates this view in his treatise on Osteology, by the use of such special terms as type, archetype, homo- logue, and by such common terms as the structure and uses, the arrangement and system, the unity of plan and adaptation to ends, the size, form, proportions, and modifications of the organism and its parts being conformable to functions and surrounding conditions : The ^jkM of structure which prevails, and the laio that governs the departure from a certain type ; the final intention of these beautiful structures which are common to the genus ; in another genus the limb shows a cm-responding complexity or perfection of structure, the trunk is adjusted to accord unth the action of such instruments, and the brain is developed in proportion to the power of executing so great a variety of actions and movements as the structure gives capacity for, and lastly, in the skull are seen indications of a con- comitant perfection of the outer senses : it is in the construction of this system that the most interesting and beautiful evidences of unity of plan as well as adaptation to end have been discerned. To show how or according to what law the bones are arranged in the skull of the fish, and why or to what end they are modified from that law or archetype, will next be our aim— for these points yield the key to the understanding of the composition of the skull in all vertebrata; as the gifted Oken says, "without knowing the lohat, the how, and the why, we may stand for weeks before a fish's skull, and our contemplation will be little more than a vacant stare at its 176 Scottish Metaphysics Becomtructed. complex stalactitic form : " developments have been prearranged witl, orfopfeci to the element m which it lives and moves. A retrospect of ^lJ-7lfr ™' "■"* Proportions of the skeletons of anin.Is whether m» aphase of Time, whereas prevalence better expresses the phase ; efe^ ^'in Tate?, Tf^r"^ ^^^"^ implying'the sense o'th TrT.l^t^ ''',-^^^^'^ «^ Intelligence, &c. : The rekUions everywhere traceable between organic forms and the various forces • thlnrZ. 01 comitions ; the general connections of mind and life a„H ti,.,- «^aft<,« to other modes of the unknowable (Uhe un h'emk) t I rrfrrvoura":r„^':i:f rr'-'r'' --form-nrtoti;^!: MiZMf ^! action , the eqmhinum between constitution and c'f UrTnirthos human conduct, to every relation and transaction of life 0^1> ^^^ Zior^ are virtuous and deserve moral approbation which are right, 2^ we approve also of benevolence, gratitude, and other primary virtues, without asking whether they proceed from a sense of duty When we judge an action to be good or bad, it was so ^n ^^ own ZZe be/ore'the judgment. Hume thought ''no -tn^n -rt^u or morally good unless some motive (affection) produced it distinct fromthe sense of its morality ; " whereas a judge is most jus who udges from no other motive than a regard to justice and a good con- Science : nor is it true, aa he thinks, that " public utility " i. the only 8 Indard of justice, since justice is antecedent to political societies 216 Scottish Metaphysics Beconstructed. i'udJ.entMT;'""* ^"' ^"'"'^ ^™» "• T» ""ribute moral tobe n fh„ w" 'T'^i""''""'' '"''""■' '"'^ty- «"=•' which we perceive from the 'act tftf <^;"\'^'^"T'''' *'"' "^^'"^ ^''™' ^^ich we judge jXmeutslI r , '" J"'^^'"?' ^°d f««Ii-g« ™ay be uuited with ohiective ZfT.Ji I . (Queries-As the sciences rest on o ject ve facts and laws, and not on our faculties or their dicta so Iec«v:' dictel T °" "'J'""™ ""'^^' f^^'^ -'i '-^. and not on sub! as te sensed do oT'"""' 1','°'^ '"'* " '^'^' ^"^ t^«««^^ '» «>em. guilt because of LI ^K *'"''«''• Conscience convicts of ethica Lite w:i.';tr : r >^;,fe i:ir:fTr^b^tr^"' or conwit, th» ,! ^^'^.r '"' '^'''^PP^o^'^^ of the conduct, acquits restra°ns wh W,f V, **" ^"'' "■=*'"» ^'"' ^^^cience, acts or tempo^l' sphere of riihr""","""' "' '""'''^ = ^" ^"'^ "^ -""- *»e as in ,^itt!f "^"f ""'"S- ^°- fVPR 2 5 1255 :a . n '^^r^' ■ •. . . 'i-iVii^m^' ' /. • • • . ■* .• *. . ■I'M. '^'_- ' -■ 'ir-:-*l^ ^i^p:^: pfl*' 4 s ^ •>.■'>■ • I > • hi '^^Ub^i _ - I ' i. -J - '.•■'■a. " _ '.1. il > ( ^1 "*. I •.:,S?v^O.M,J';l.^. lili