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AUTHOR: CURTEIS, ARTHUR MAPLETOFT TITLE: ...RIoc Or THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE PLACE: LONDON DATE: 1899 Master Negative # COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT -51iio_i3J-A DIDLIOGRAPHIC MICROrORM TARGET Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record Restrictions on Use: 1884.07 'C94 I B93G*8- Curteis, Arthur Mapletoft, 1833- ... llise of the Macedonian empire; by Arthur M. Cur- teis ... London, Longmans, Green, and co., 1877. 1899 • 2 p. 1., [viii-xvi, 216 p. maps, plans. 16"". (Epochs of ancient history) Q<>I>y-in-Oollege Study-r^Jew-YorkT-lSBQ. 1. Macedonia— Hist. Library of Congress 4-35513 DF233.C9 FILM SIZF: X£mJ^f^X^^^ TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA REDUCTION RATIO: //}j<^ IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA HIA) IB IIB HLMEDBY: RESEARCH ^PUBLICATIONS. INC VVOODBRIDGE, CT c Association for Information and Image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue. Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 V ' Centimeter 12 3 4 II iiiiliiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiliiiilii Inches I 1 iiiiiiiiiii m 6 7 8 9 iiilniiliiiiliiiiliiilllllllll 10 n 12 1.0 I.I 25 liiiilmiliiiliiliili[iiii|iili | ill 4 1^ 28 1^ 25 .. |32 2.2 It I'' t its, 2.0 1. 1.8 1.4 1.6 13 14 15 mm u Mill MRNUFPCTURED TO RUM STFINDRRDS BY RPPLIED IMRGE, INC. ^ ^,.zV' a'W'pi '=1 4^ :S'* rt. ** inU)f(!:innifJlrtu|>»jrk Tun i.iHRARirs i Epochs of Ancient H I STORY KniTKI) I!V ki:V. (i. W. (OX, M.A., Axn C. SANKEV, M.A. RISE OF THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE A. M. CL'RTKIS, M.A. EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY RISE OF TIIH MACEDONIAN EMPIRI r.v ARTHUR M. (T^RTEIS, M.A. FORMERLY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLIF(.F., OXFORD; AND LATK ASSISTANT-MASTIR IN SHERBORNE SCHOOL WITH EIGHT MAPS EIGHTH IMPRESSION LONGMANS, GREEN, AND 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 1899 CO. A II yigh t s rese rvcd. CONTENTS. L CHAPTER I. GEOGRAPHY AND INHABITANTS OF MACEDON. Effects of the climate and physical characteristics of Greece upon the Greeks Contrasts in physical characteristics . Contrasts between Hellas and Macedon . Valley of Haliakmon (Elimeia and Orestis) . Valley of Erigon (Lynkestis and Pelagonia) Valley of Axios (Paraxia and Amphaxitis) . Eordaia .... Emathia and Pieria . Aigai [JEgx) . Pella The maritime districts . Chalkidikfi .... Hellenic colonies . Amphipolis Thermd .... Contrasts between Hellenes and Macedonians . Divergence between Hellenes and Macedonians Hellenic (Dorian) immigrants into Upper MacedoTjia . PAOK I 2 2 4 4 4 5 ■» 5 S 6 6 7 7 7 3 8 9 Printed by H.VI.I.AN TVNE, HANSON &■ Co. At the Biillantyne Press CHAPTER II. KINGS OF MACEDON TO THE DEATH OF AMYNTAS TI., FATHER OF PHILIP (700-369). Dorian kings of Macedon. Perdikkas I. to Amyntas I., B.C. 700-498 • Alexander I. (498 -454) 10 10 Vlll Contents, Contents. IX Perdikkas II. (454-413) . , . . , Archelaos (413-399) Years of anarchy till Amyntas II. (393-369) . The marriage of Amyntas fails in its object The 01)mthian Confederacy and its relation to its neighbours Coalition against Olynthos and break-up of the Confederacy B.C. 383 By which Amyntas profits more than others . Decreasing influence of Sparta in Northern Greece (378-370) Rise of Thessalian tyrannies lason of Pherai (374-370) Assassination of lason CHAPTER III. MACKDON AND HELLAS AT PHILIP'S ACCESSION. Amyntas succeeded by his son Alexander (369) . Murder of Alexander and political confusion . Pelopidas in Macedon Philip, son of Amyntas, a hostage at Thebes (368-365) Perdikkas, King of Macedon (365-360) Confusion in Macedon on death of Perdikkas (360) Philip king (359-336) Importance of the last half of the fourth century B.C. Macedonian conquest of Greece Macedon and Greece together conquer Asia . Contrast between the state of Greece in the middle of the fifth century, and in the middle of the fourth century B.C. Corruption prevalent in Greece, as shown by Demosthenes Reasons of the failure of the second Athenian Confederation of378 CHAPTER IV. FROM THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP TO HIS INTERVENTION IN THE SACRED WAR. King Philip The Macedonian army, and Philip's reforms Position of Philip at his accession l*olicy of Philip in the matter of Amphipolis . , • PAGE II 12 13 14 16 18 18 19 19 90 21 22 22 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 23 30 32 33 33 37 37 TAGB Outbreak of the Social War, and difficulties of Athens (358) . 39 Policy of Philip in the matter of Olynthos ... 40 The Social War (358-5) 41 Philip's aggressions 4' C)utbreak of the Second Sacred War, and its causes (357) . 42 Successes of the Phokians under Philom^los and Ono- marchos 43 The Phokians and Philip face to face in Thessaly (352) . . 44 CHAPTER V. FROM PHILIP'S INTERVENTION IN TIiESSALY TO THE FALL OF OLYNTHOS. King Philip intervenes 44 Becomes master of Thessaly and seizes Pagasai ... 45 Hut is foiled by the .Athenians at Thermopylai ... 46 Sketch of Phokian affairs to 347 46 Philip's position in 352 and 347 contrasted .... 47 Growing jealousy between King Philip and Olynthos . . 47 Occasion of the rupture 4^ Rise and influence of Demosthenes at Athens ... 48 Olynthos appeals to Athens for help. First Olynthiac of Demosthenes 5^ Second Olynthiac 5^ Third Olynthiac 52 Troubles in Euboia fostered by King Philip .... 52 I.Ast days of Olynthos 53 Consequences of its fall 53 « CHAPTER VI. THE PEACE OF PHILOKRAT^.S. FALSA LEGATIO. THERMOPYLAI IN PHILIP'S HANDS. [The Thebans invite Philip's intervention against the Phokians 54 |Policy of Philip 55 state of feeling at Athens 55 Uhenian help rudely declined by Phalaikos at Thermopylai . 55 Embassy from Athens to Philip about peace ... Contents, Contents, XI Their report, and consequent proposals Terms of the peace proposed to tlie Assembly by Philokrat6s Difficulties with regard to the allies of Athens. Who were they ? False assertions of Philokrat^s and itschines The Athenians swear to the Peace of Philokratds Corrupt delay of Athenian envoys in administering the oaths to Philip— the so-called Falsa I^gatio .... King Philip at Pherai ; Thermopylai in danger Proposal of PhilokratSs as to the Phokians . ... * Phalaikos surrenders Thermopylai to Philip Terrible consequences to Phokis Panic at Athens Contrast between commanding position of King Philip and the degradation of Athens • • • • ■ CHAPTER VII. FROM THE PEACE OF PHILOKRAxfts TO THE BATTLE f»F CHAFRONEIA (346-338). Altered position of King Philip Fresh causes of quarrel between Philip and the' Athenia (346-340) ns counter-attack of the PAGI1 57 57 58 59 60 60 6a 63 6a 63 64 65 rAGK CHAPTER VIII. 66 66 Proof of embittered feeling ' ^g Preparations and declaration of war by Athens {340) . Comparative difficulties of Athens and Philip. Causes of the Third Sacred War (339) Intrigues in the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphoi Second destruction of Kirrha, and Amphissians • . . . , Extraordinary meeting of the Amphiktyonic Council * . * . King Philip in Phokis, as general of the Amphiktyons, seizes Elateia Panic at Athens and Thebes . Alliance of Athens and Thebes against Philip Vigour of the allies during the winter (339-8) Manoeuvres of Philip and their object Battle of Chaironeia (August 338) . 68 69 70 71 72 72 73 74 75 75 75 FROM THE BATTLE OF CHAIRONEIA TO THE BEGINNING OF ALEXANDER'S ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS. Behaviour of Philip to Thebes and Athens after his victory (338) 11 The Peace of Demadds 7^ Philip in Peloponnesos 7^ The Congress of Corinth (337) 79 Assassination of Philip by Pausanias (336) ..." 79 Estimate of Philip's character and reign 81 Early years and education of Alexander .... 82 Alexander secures his position as king 84 And then makes a progress through Greece ... 85 His campaign in the North (March to August 335) . 85 Revolt of Thebes during his absence 87 Sudden ret\u-n of Alexander 88 Fall and destruction of Thebes (335) ..... 89 Submission of Greece 89 Preparations for Asiatic campaign (335-4) .... 9^ CHAPTER IX. ALEXANDER IN ASIA MINOR. Contrast between the extent and the weakness of the Persian empire 90 Its geographical extent and characteristics .... 91 Plateau of Iran . 91 Continuous plateau from the Indus to the Egean . . 9a The four g^eat river basins 93 The Oxus 93 The Indus 93 The Euphrates and Tigris ....... 94 The Nile 94 Resources of the empire ....... 94 Contact of Greeks with Persians .96 Alexander crosses the Hellespont and visits Ilion , . 96 Counsels and tactics of the Persians 97 Battle of the Granikos 98 xn Contaits, Contents. xiu t!ie Results of the battle Alexander's treatment of'his prisoners ' ' ' Reduction of the coast of Asia Minor ' ' • • > CHAPTER X. "KOM THE S,F.GF. OF HAUKARNASSOS TO THE np issos. Preparations at Halikarnassos for defence Sege and capture of the city (,,4) * * . Alexander, circuitous ro„.:fo'Ldi;n. a'nd The cutting of the Go^dian knot' . " ' ' The march from Gordion to Tarsos . ' * i he Pass of Issos (portie Kiliki* et Syri^) C>.nus passes Afount Amanos to Issos ' ' Preparations on hoth sides for the battle' ' P'attle of Issos (November 333) * * Consequences of the victory . * . ' CHAPTER XI "OM THE BATTLE OF ,,,SOS TO THE BATTLE CAUGAMELA. Reasons for the invasion of Phcenicii n„H p Alexander inves anHi™ . "**"'"=• »"a Egj-pt . ConsiderationTAiel" H • '"™^' ^"""^ ^^^us . Desciption of Ty^^""''" '^^""»' "^ ">e Tynans . FZf°[he'<:^y'^^f-' '?^"'"'^' '°j"w ■ . ■ Second embassy from Darin's * ' * * Alexanderat Gaza and Jerusalem ' ' * fie arrives in Egypt * ' • Foundation of Aicxandri'a h,2) ' ' ' Visit of Alexander to the oasl of 7. \ * ' He returns to Egypt ^^ ^eus-Ammon And advances to the Euphrates * * " ' Alexand. and Darius face to face ;tGa;gam-e,a PAGB 100 lor lOI BATTLE reasons OP 102 103 106 106 107 107 108 no no 113 "5 116 116 117 118 120 122 122 123 124 124 126 127 128 129 CHAPTER XII. FROM THE BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA TO THE SACK (^F PERSEPOLIS. PAOB Conditions of the battle stated '3° Alexander's preparations ^3° Question of a night attack ^3^ Persian order of battle ^3^ Macedonian order of battle ^33 Charge of Persian cavalry on the Macedonian right flank and of chariots on their front ^34 Decisive charge of Alexander in person on the Persian centre . 134 Rout of the Persian left and centre ^35 Furious and evenly contested struggle on the Macedonian left f^ The pursuit ^^ Final result of the battle of Gaugamela ^37 Immediate results of the battle ^37 Babylon ^^^ c- . . . • 138 Susa "^ March from Susa to Persepolis ^39 Persepolis ^ The 800 mutilated Greeks ^4^ Sack of Persepolis. and burning of the palace ... 141 CHAPTER XIII. THE DEATH OF DARIUS.— REDUCTION OF PARTHIA.— EXECUTION OF PHILOTAS AND PARMENION. Plans of Darius after Gaugamela 14a Alexander at Agbatana ^4^ Alexander pursues Darius ^43 1 )ealh of Darius . • I44 Consequent change in Alexander's position .... 14S Difficulties of that position . ,,*.•• ^45 Alexander in Parthia ^ Kpisode of Satibarzan^s, satrap of Aria . . . . ^47 Description of Aria, Drangiana. and Arachosia (modem Affghanistan) '^S XIV Contents, Contents, Di^overy of a supposed plot against Alexander's life . Difficulty of ascertaining the truth Character and position of Parmenion and Phi'lotas' " ' oTl^hl^^al''^'" "'^^^ ^^"^ ^"--^ -- Trial and condenuiaiion of Philotas He is tortured to extract evidence against his father " * Execution of Philotas and Pannenion ' ' Summary of the whole question • • • . CHAPTER XIV. THK CAMPAIGNS IN BAKTRIA AND SOGDIANA. March of Alexander from Prophthasia into Paktria t^irsuii and capture of Bessos Episode of the firanchidai . March to the Iaxart(:'s .**'''• "^K^dr"':" "?'" "-^<>--- »' AlJxandn-a Escha.. Passage of the Ja'xanc;. and battle with the' Scyii.ians' ' Exploits o( Spitamencs . . . J""ans . In winter quarters at liaklra (329^) ' ' ' ' Measures for the subjection of the two p'rovini^es ' ' End of Spitamencs ... Capture of the Sogdian Rock* Marriage of Alexander to Roxana * ' * ' " Capture of the Rock of Choritnrs Reasons for a march into India Episode of Kleitos (328) ' • • • . Episode of Kallisthenes and the page Hem'iolao; (327) . ' CHAPTER XV. FROM THE OXUS TO THE HYPHASli March from Baktria to the Kopi.en The hill-fort of Aornos ...*** Capture of Aornos ...'*' The Gyroeans and their legends of Dionysos . ' VKQii 149 '53 ^53 155 156 158 159 160 161 162 163 163 164 164 165 166 166 168 170 171 172 «74 'lie Indus 'assage of the Hydasp^s aciics of Poros ind of Alexander .... [Battle of the Hydasp^s (j26) Poros a prisoner .... 'Passage of the Akesmfis and Hydraotfis Advance to the Hyphasis 1 The soldiers refuse to cross Return to Nikaia ... CHAPTER XVU THE RETURN FROM THE HYPHASIS TO SUSA. Alleviations of disappointment Preparation for the voyage down the Indus . The start The Mallians, Brachmans, and Oxydrakans . Campaign against the Mallians Attack of the capital and danger of Alexander I-roni the confluence of the five rivers to the sea . March of the king through Gedrosia and Karmania . Meeting with Krateros and Nearchos, and arrival at Susa Voyage of xNearchos from the Indus to the Euphrates . I'hins of Alexander for amalgamation of his subjects . Difficulties of the task . . • • Mutiny of troops at Opis, on the Tigris Dtspatches of Alexa:.der to the Greeks .... CHAPTER XVII. CLOSING SCENES, Febiivai at Agoatana . Deaili of Hephaislion . Subjection of the Kossoeans Omens of coming evil . Their effect upon Alexander < • • ■ XV rAGK 175 175 178 179 179 181 182 182 182 183 184 18 ^ 184 186 186 187 189 190 192 192 194 19s 196 1Q7 193 198 199 199 -200 iff XVI Contents. PAG I The entry into Babylon . . . . , , . aoi New plans 201 Illness and death of Alexamler 202 His personal characteristics 203 His conquests not inimonil in the eyes of the Greeks , .204 Greek freedom destroyed, because the Greeks hardly deserved to be free .20-1 Salutary influence of Alexander's conquest upon Asia . . 206 Conclusion 207 Chronological Table ....... 209 INDEX •••••••••, an MAPS. Macedon and Chalkidik^ , , , tc fact pagg I Central Greece ,, ^ Plan of Halikarnassos 103 The Pass of Issos 109 Plan of Tyre ^^^ Plan of Alexandria - 125 Field of Gaugamkla ....... 131 Campaigns of Alexandkk .... to face page 208 Athos Lorupiians . Green. A Co, London.. JT^:^ York- ABovnht^. £dw'^¥eiler THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE. CHAPTER I. GLOCkAl'IIY AND INHABITANTS OF MACKDoMa. * The history of a nation is by no means to be regarded solely as a consequence of the natural condition of its local habitations/ So wTites one of the latest of Greek historians in the midst of a graphic thedimale description of the climate and physical charac charSa'TnV tenstics of the shores of the Egean. But the ".*^^f stress which he lays on these characteristics, u^^'thc and the mferences which he draws from them, ^'^"''^^ show that he considers them to have been a strongly determmmg cause of the history of the peoples who dwelt upon those shores. It is indeed impossible to suppose that, had the Greeks been inhabitants of a level inland country they would have remained so long disunited, or would have shown (as they did) the restless activity characteristic of the seaman; and we shall have evidence m the following pages of the extraordinary endurance of Greeks amid sudden changes of climate, as well as of their superiority to Asiatics in bodily not less than mental vigour. That some part of this vigour was owing to the country in which they lived will hardly be denied. ' In its physical characteristics Greece %vas a land at A,//, „ The Macedonian Empire. CH. r. en. I. Geography, \ singular contrasts. A remarkable similarity of conditions Contrasts In bctwecn the eastern and western shores of charaaeris- ^^^ Egean was matched by a remarkable lies. difference of conditions between the eastern and western coasts of Greece itself, and still more be- tween its southern and northern provinces. I'he Egean was a highway between two halves of one country— a sea exceptionally suitable for commerce. The air is clear. Islands— that is, landmarks— are frequent. Bays and safe anchorages are innumerable. During a great part of the sunmier there are regular winds which blow daily from the north, so regularly indeed that Demos- thenes counted it among Philip's advantages that he lived at the back of the north wind. On the other hand, while the eastern side of Greece is rich in fertile lowlands . and has a deeply indented though accessible coastline, the western side consists of little but rocky ridges skirting a savage shore with few harbours. Hut the contrast between south and noiili is yet more striking than this. There is not on the entire surface of the globe, it has been said, any other region in which the difkrent zones of climate and llora meet one another in so rapid a succes- sion. The semi-tropical products of the Cyclades and the Pelopoimcsos have vanished in Hoiotia. The olives of Attica are not seen in Thessaly. Even the myrtle dis- appears on the northern shores of the Egean. If we go farther north, we only heighten the contrast , for the climate and products of Macedon resemble those Contrasts of Central Germany. It is a land of broad HeU^and "^^^^ ''^"^^ i*'^^*'^^ plains, far superior to Illyria Macedon. acToss the mountains in fertility, and boasting n seacoast of great extent. Yet seacoast and inland were strangely cut off the one from the other, so that the inhabitants of the interior until Philip's time were to a great extent a highland population secluded from the world. The reason of this lay in the peculiar ronforma lion of the mountain system of the country If we were to use the language of a cultivated Athenian, we should say that the range of the Kambounian (Cambunian) mountains, stretching from the lofty mass of Olympos in the east to Lakmon in the west, formed a natural barrier between Hellenes and Barbarians, between pure-breeds and half-breeds. This range was indeed ol no great height, yet it formed, roughly speaking, a sort of division between one kind of country and another, one kind ot people and another. The Hellenes to the south reached a high degree of civilisation, and emigrating from home and mingling with their neighbours in all directions, powerfully affected the history of surrounding nations. The Macedonians remained for a long while a half- barbarous people, because they were shut off not only from the outside world, but from mutual intercourse by lofty and numerous mountain chains. These mountains, in fact, were so lofty and difficult, that at most points they were higher than the Kambounian range, at many points even higher than Pindos itself. It was easier on the whole to pass from the adjacent lowlands into Thessaly or the valley of the Istros (Danube) than from one Macedonian valley to another. On the other hand, the rivers that rise in these mountain ranges gradually converge before falling into the sea after long and devious wanderings. The first outward expansion of these high- land tribes would needs follow the natural line marked out for them by their rivers flowing seaward, and their first natural meeting-points would be Aigai (i^gae) and Pella in the valley of the Axios, the successive capitals of Macedonian kings. In the widest extent of the name, Macedon included five tracts or provinces, singularly different from one an- other. Three of these were basins of large rivers, while a fourth (Emathia) was almost as directly a * gift' of the H 2 Tlu Macedonian Empire, CH. r. CH. I. Geography, singular contrasts. A remarkable similarity of conditions ContnLMsin between the eastern and western shores of chanlttcris- ^^ Egean was matched by a remarkable lies, difference of conditions between the eastern and western coasts of Greece itself, and still more be- N*ecn its southern and northein provinces. The Egcan was a highway between two halves of one country — a sea exceptionally suitable for commerce. The air is clear. Islands — that is, landmarks — are frequent. Bays and safe anchorages are innumerable. During a great part of the summer there are regular winds which blow V. ' daily from the north, so regularly indeed that Demos- thenes counted it among Philip's advantages that he lived at the back of the north wind. On the other hand, while the eastern side of Greece is rich in fertile lowlands . and has a deeply indented though accessible coastline, the western side consists of little but rocky ridges skirting a savage shore with few harbours. But the contrast between south and noith is yet more striking than this. There is not on the entire surface of the globe, it has been said, any other region in which the different zones of climate and flora meet one another in so rapid a succes- sion. The semi-tropical products of the Cyclades and the Peloponnesos have vanished in Boiotia. The olives of Attica are not seen in Thessaly, Even the myrtle dis- appears on the northern shores of the Egean. If we go farther north, we only heighten the contrast; for the climate and products of Macedon resemble those Contrasts of Central Germany. It is a land of broad (Ulku and "vers and great plains, far superior to Illyria Macedon. acToss the mountains in fertility, and boasting *> a seacoast of great extent. Yet seacoast and inland were strangely cut off the one from the other, so that the inhabitants of the interior until Philip's time were to a great extent a highland population secluded from the world. The reason of this lay in the peculiar conforma lion of the mountain system of the country- It we were to use the language of a cultivated Athenian, we should > say that the range of the Kambounian (Cambunian) mountains, stretching from the lofty mass of Olympos in the east to Lakmon in the west, formed a natural barrier between Hellenes and Barbarians, between pure-breeds and half-breeds. This range was indeed ol no great height, yet it formed, roughly speaking, a sort of division between one kind of country and another, one kind ot people and another. The Hellenes to the south reached a high degree of civilisation, and emigrating from home and mingling with their neighbours in all directions, powerfully affected the history of surrounding nations. f* The Macedonians remained for a long while a half- I barbarous people, because they were shut off not only ' from the outside world, but from mutual intercourse by lofty and numerous mountain chains. These mountains, in fact, were so lofty and difficult, that at most points they were higher than the Kambounian range, at many points even higher than Pindos itself. It was easier on the whole to pass from the adjacent lowlands into Thessaly or the valley of the Istros (Danube) than from one Macedonian valley to another. On the other hand, the rivers that rise in these mountain ranges gradually conve :ge before falling into the sea after long and devious . wanderings. The first outward expansion of these high- land tribes would needs follow the natural line marked out for them by their rivers flowing seaward, and their first natural meeting-points would be Aigai (i^gae) and Pella in the valley of the Axios, the successive capitals of Macedonian kings. In the widest extent of the name, Macedon included five tracts or provinces, singularly different from one an- other. Three of these were basins of large rivers, while a fourth (Emathia) was almost as directly a * gift' of the i I, R 2 The Macedonian Empire, CH. I. united rivers as E^^ypt was of the Nile, being formed, it would seem, out of the alluvial deposit brought down by them in the course of centuries from the lofty mountams of the interior. The valley watered by the Haliakmon was a narrow district, enclosed between the Kambounian and Skardos Valie of ranges on the south and west, and Mounui Hairakmon Bamos and Bermios on the north and east, il^d*"'^ Although it was not remarkable for fertility, Ore*tU) jj^e possession of this valley was yet a matter of importance to the kings of Macedon. At its northern end there was a remarkable gorge, cleaving the mountains from east to west, the only rent in the great mass of Skardos for more than 200 miles, through which a tributary of the Apsos flows from its source in Mount Bamos on its way to the Adriatic The Roman road of later days (Via Egnatia) was carried over a pass some thirty miles to the north ; but before the Roman con- quest of Macedon, this gorge of the Eordaikos must have formed the main line of communication between Illyria and Macedon, whether for commerce or invasion, and lent therefore an exceptional importance to the upper valley of the Haliakmon. To the north of Orestis lay the fertile uplands, watered by the river Erigon, as it pursues a winding course to Valle of J^^" ^^^ Axios. Though averaging a height of Rrigon.° 1,500 feet above the sea, the district boasted inrp"i-' * a fat rich soil,' capable of maintaining a large gonia). population. ^ The Axios was the chief river in Macedon, and iis Vallc of eastern boundary prior to the reign of Philip, Axios^ ° a river too of a different character to the pre- indAlipi.- ceding. In its upper course it flows through axitis.) j^ narrow cultivated plain, receiving the waters of the Erigon from Pelagonia. Presently it abruptly ?' CH. T. Geography, 5 changes its peaceful nature, forming at the so-called Iron Gates rapids for some considerable distance, where its waters begin to slide to the lowlands of Emathia. At the Gates the river cuts through the moun- tain range which joins Skardos to Orbelos, and having cleft for itself a passage through a precipitous gorge of more than 600 feet in height, gradually descends to the lower level, and so falls at last into the sea, close to the joint mouths of the Haliakmon and Lydias. In the very centre of the country, and entirely en- closed by mountains, lay the province of Eordaia— an almost circular basin, difficult of access, and . 1 r ^ • Eordaia. with no outlet except a couple of mountam passes. The water from the hills appears to drain entirely into the Lake Begorritis. Lastly, there was the irregular strip of alluvial land, stretching from Mount Olympos to the city of Therm^ (Thessalonica), at first a narrow plain, en- Emathia closed between sea and mountains and called ^^ ^**"*- Pieria, but widening out between the Haliakmon and Thenne into the fertile province of Emathia, watered by the great river already mentioned, and containing the two "> capitals of Macedon, Aigai (iEgae) and Pella. Aigai ' The former lay at the head of a valley of the (^e*>- Lydias, on a plateau 200 feet above the plain, an^ dominated the whole of Emathia as well as the passes from the seacoast to the interior. It was the * portal of the highlands,' the dominant < castle of the plain,' and remained to the last, as became its position and associa- tions, the burial-place of the Macedonian kings, the centre and hearth of the Macedonian tribes. ^^^^ Pella was a city of a different type. Archelaos was the first of the Macedonian kings to understand its value as a capital ; but it remained comparatively insig- nificant until it became associated with the glories 0/ I HI The Macedonian Empire. CH. 1. Philip's reign. It had two great merits. It was central and it was strong— as strong as Aigai, far stronger thar Pydna, and more central than either for a monarch i- whose long arm reached from Amphipolis to Pagasai. It was also in direct communication with the sea (distant about fifteen miles) by the marshes and the Lydias. In short, with no claims to beauty, or grandeur, or y healthiness, Pella formed a strong central useful capital, thoroughly characteristic of a common- sense monarchy whose right was might. So far we have been dealing solely with Macedon But there were large districts and many cities to the east of the Axios, which had been founded or colonised by Hellenes, and in which they were the dominant, if not the more numerous part of the population. These colonies fringed the whole coast of the Euxine Sea, the Chersonese, Thrace, and Chalki- dike : and as the extension of Macedonian power by Philip brought him into collision with many of them, it will be well to give a short account of the country lying between the Axios and Amphipolis. P The promontory of Chalkidike, with its three fingers or peninsulas, seemed formed by nature to be the maritime province of the inland country be- The mari- time^ districts. Chalkidike. hind it. Macedon might se'em to have a natural right to it, and we can hardly wonder that Philip was not content until he had won it. As com- pared with the western shores of the same latitude it had marked advantages. In place of a savage coast and precipitous cliffs, we have a broad mass of land reaching far into the Southern Sea, whose three great spurs abound in harbours, and were studded with flourishing colonies. The easternmost (Akte) runs forty miles into the sea, with an average breadth of four miles, and ends in the grand limestone cone of Athos, towering more than 5 *> CH. I. Geography, <' 6,000 feet above the level of the Egean, and casting its shadow even as far as Lemnos. The ;:entral and western peninsulas (Sithonia and Pallene) are not so mountainous as Akte, but were far more densely popu- lated. Each was fringed with a numerous Hellenic belt of colonies. Each boasted one city colonies. of first-rate importance. On the west coast of Sithonia lay Torone, the first home of the emigrants from Euboian Chalkis, who colonised Chalkidike and gave it their own name : while at the neck of land connecting Pallene with the country to the north was Potidaia, a colony from Dorian Corinth ; the near neighbour, rival, and sometime subject of the Chalkidian Olynthos. Nor does the Ust of ^ Hellenic colonies end here. Besides a host of minor towns, there were Methone, Thermc, Olynthos, Akanthos, Amphipolis, all colonised by men of Dorian race, and ^wo of them occupying positions of first-rate importance. Amphipolis, strongly situated in an angle of the Strymon, commanded the passage of the river and the road from west to east. To be master of I Amphipolis was to be master also of Mount Pangaios and its valuable gold and silver mines. Nor did Therme occupy a less important site. The gulf on which it stands is a splendid sheet of water, running inland 100 miles in a general direction fron south-east to north-west, and gradually narrowing at its 1 northern end. The town itself was of little consequence till Macedonian times ; but the moment that a great state arose on the northern shore of the Egean, Which swallowed up the pettier city-leagues of Chalkidike, y Therme at once assumed its natural importance as a' great harbour, commanding and guarding the approaches from the eastward. It lay close at hand to the plains of the Axios, and communicated by a pass with the vaUey of the Str)'Tnon. Amphipolis ITienne. 11, ■ \ % '1, V 8 The Macedonian Empire, CH. I. CH. I. Inhabitants, Contrasts between Hellenes and Mace- donians. The difference in the physical features of the countries lying to the north and south of the Kambounian range was not more remarkable than that between the inhabitants of these countries. Epeirots, Macedonians, Illyrians, and Paionians were not genuine Hellenes. Macedonians indeed were not the mere barbarians which cultivated Greeks like Demosthenes affected to believe them : yet neither were they Hellenes in the highest sense of the word. y Their civilisation was less developed, their dress and fashion were different, and their language, though similar, was yet not pure Greek. What we know of their govern- V, ment recalls the heroic times of the Iliad. Their national life was not that of the city (jro'Xir) but of the tribe. In Italy the kingship died out. In Greece it survived at Sparta alone, and even there was reduced by r the Ephorate almost to a mere form. But in Macedon I it retained its essential character to historic times, though ; limited, like the power of Agamemnon himself, by occa- j sional assemblies of the people in arms. Whatever may have been the precise relations of Macedonians and Hellenes, it is certain that the civilisa- Dive ence ^^^^ ^^ Macedon was kept stagnant or even between deteriorated by intermixture with Illyrians. and M^e- Hence Greeks and Macedonians were ever donians. tending to become more and more estranged. The higher the development of Hellenic civilisa- tion in the south, the deeper was the contempt felt by the genuine Hellene for the semi-barbarians of the north. * Philip ! cries Demosthenes scornfully, * Philip, who is not only no Hellene, or in any way con- nected with Hellenes, but not even a barbarian from a creditable country ! He is a worthless fellow from Macedon, whence in olden time it was impossible to get even a decent slave ! * This was of course the exagge- r y rated language of pride of birth, deepened by political hatred, and it was hardly true in any sense of the Mace- donian royal family : yet it expresses a partial truih, and N it was only from Hellas itself that the influence came which made a national life on a large scale possible to these rude highlanders. Hellenic colonies, it must be remembered, were not confined to the shores of the Egean. There were also important settlements on the Ionian Sea, on Hellenic the coasts of which the Dorian Corinthians ^^^^^ had founded several colonies, and through into Upper them opened up a mercantile connexion with the interior. Nor were the Corinthians alone in their adventurous pursuit of fortune north-eastwards. Other Dorians also, exiles from Peloponnesian Argos, followed in their track, and by the end of the eighth century had estabhshed themselves in the upper valley of the Haliak- mon. Among these wanderers, Herodotus tell us, were three brothers, of the royal family of Argos. After many adventures and hair-breadth escapes, they gradually won a leading position among the Macedonians in the midst of whom they were settled : and from this to kingship and conquest was an easy step. But the youngest brother, Perdikkas, was the most intelligent, or the most favoured by fortune. King in Orestis, with a new Argos for his capital, he pushed his victorious arms al-* most to the mouth of the Haliakmon, and finally trans- ferred the headquarters of his growing power to a more convenient capital in Aigai. Thus was founded the dy- nasty of the Argeads ; and thus were laid the foundations of that Macedonian empire which conquered Greece and overthrew the might of Persia. lO The Maccdonimi Empire. CH. II. t'li. 11. The Earlier Kings. II Dorian kings of Miicedon. Perdikkas I. to Amyntas I. B.C. 700- 498. Alexander I. (498- ♦54). CHAPTER 11. KINGS OF MACEDONIA TO THE DEATH OF AMYNTAS II., FATHER OF PHILIP (70O-369). The first two centuries of the Macedonian monarchy, covered by the reigns of six kings, were a period shrouded in obscurity, during which the rising king- dom had enlarged itself at the expense of its neighbours, and crossing the Axios had even reached the Strymon. This career of conquest had been scarcely arrested by the Persian invasions of Europe. Indeed Alexander I., son of Amyntas, was cunning enough to bow to the storm, and while cautiously doing his utmost to befriend the Greeks, affected to fall in with Persian ideas as to Macedon being the centre of a great vassal state, and thankfully accepted any extension of terri- tory which the Great King might be pleased to give him. By these means he gained a footing among the Thracian tribes as far as Mount Haemus, while he attained an object by which he set even greater store as a true- blooded Hellene ; for his claims to that title were publicly acknowledged at Olympia, and his victories in the Stadium celebrated by the Hellenic Pindar. Yet the difficulties of Alexander did not cease, but rather in- creased when danger no longer threatened Greece from the side of Persia. He had removed his capital from Aigai to Pydna, a step nearer to the Hellenes whom he admired so much. But close to Pydna lay Methone, an inde- pendent Greek city ; while to the eastward in Chalkidike, and as far as the Strymon, were numerous Hellenic colonies whose sympathies drew them naturally to the ?* south rather than the west — to Hellas, not to Macedon— and which, after the Persian wars, recognised in the maritime Athens their natural leader and protectress. It was a difficult position ; and for a century it tried to the utmost the skill of the Macedonian kings. On the one hand the expansion of the kingdom had outrun its internal cons- >lidation, and there were latent elements of discontent which more than once brought it to the verge of ruin. On the other hand, if the Macedonian monarchs were to be anything more than petty lords of half-barba- rous tribes, they could hardly put up with the permanent dependence of what was practically their own seacoast on a far distant and hostile power, any more than with its permanent independence. The kings of Macedon were forced by their position to choose between two alterna- tives, to make good their claim to Methone and Potidaia, Chalkidike and Amphipolis, and to win their way to the coast, or else to submit to a humiliating exclusion from the political affairs of Hellas. In such a case no able man hesitates in the choice of his alternative ; and we thus strike the key-note of the discords and jealousies, which for so many years troubled Northern Greece. Even before the Peloponnesian war, in the time of Perdikkas 1 1. (454-41 3), Athens and Macedon ^^^^^^^ were face to face, conscious of divergent 11. (454- interests. '*'^ The colonisation of Amphipolis had been the crown- ing stroke of the policy by which Perikles sought to keep a firm hold of Chalkidike and the Thracian coast, and so of the Egean. Perdikkas on the other hand, threatened at once by discontented neighbours in the west, by the formidable empire of the Thracian Sitalkes in the east, and by Athenian jealousy in Chalkidike, was forced to pursue a tortuous policy. Adroitly observant of the current of affairs, and quite devoid of scruples, he made Thdr Pnt^UfiV JCilKTC^ 12 Ttu Macedonian Empire, ch. n. CH. II. The Earlier Kings, n treaties and broke them; he waged war or bowed to the storm, with equal facility. In the field of diplomacy he must have been an exceptionally able man ; for every neighbour in turn was utilised to sen^e his purpose, and was neglected or attacked when the object of the moment was attained. Brasidas the Spartan he made use of against his private enemies the lUyrians. He skilfully fomented the revolt of the Chalkidic towns against Athens in 432 ; while in the next year we find him allied with his old enemies the Athenians, and showing his gratitude by attacking his old friends the Chalkidians Two years later — once more allied with Chalkidians and at war with Athens — he was attacked by Sitalk^s, and was within a little of being ruined. Yet from these and similar perils he escaped with unimpaired strength, or rather the stronger, in that the brilliant campaigns of Brasidas had undermined the power of Athens in the north. Nor was Athens ever again as formidable to Macedon as she had been ; for the disastrous issue of the Sicilian expedition (413) paralysed her influence -y everywhere, and probably Macedon reaped more advan- tage from the victor}' of Syracuse than Syracuse did herself. The policy of Perdikkas was continued with success by his illegitimate son Archelaos. He cUmbed to Archelaos power by a series of violent deeds, with which (413-399)- most barbarous societies are only too familiar : for he assassinated his brother, as well as his uncle and his uncle's son. Such were his crimes. His merits were not less marked as the great civiliser of Macedon. Thucydides goes out of his way to insist that Archelaos benefited his country more than all his eight prede- cessors put together, not only in his military improve- ments, but in building roads and founding cities. He transferred the capital from Pydna to Fella, while he ^ pacified Pieria by the foundation of a new city, Dion, dedicated to Zeus and the Muses, and reserved for festival celebrations. He gathered round him some of ) the most brilliant Greeks of the day— not sony perhaps to exchange the insecurity of their native cities for the lettered ease and secure patronage of a court. But these efforts, though praiseworthy, were not altogether suc- cessful. His clients seem to have been corrupted by the atmosphere around them ; and the premature attempt at artistic development was cut short by the forty years '^of disorder which followed his murder. It is an illustra- tion of the assertion that the history of Macedonia is the history of its kings, that this effort should have been thus fruitless, and that to the last the people should apparently have retained so many characteristics of barbarism. Hard fighters and hard drinkers, they were fine soldiers but indifferent citizens, and seem to have received only faint impressions from the civilisation for which they pre- pared the way in Asia. The murder of Archelaos was the signal for six years of bloodshed and disorder, until Amyntas, the father ot the great Philip, murdered his predecessor years of and seized the throne. Amyntas was nominal "^^^ll^""^ king for twenty-four years, but it was a reign 11. (393- full of romantic reverses of fortune. Ten 369). years of anarchy had given to the native nobility a long-coveted opportunity of revolt, against a culture and ordered peace which in their hearts they disliked, as well as against the tightening reins of despotism. It is a phenomenon often seen in political history, that the substitution of one strong will for a hundred con- flicting wills is a slow process, subject to ebb and flow, and often desperately opposed by those who have a per- sonal interest in a time of license. What Normandy suffered in the ninth and tenth centuries A.D., and H TJie Macedonian Empire, cii. ir. Cll. II. The Earlier Kings, IS \\ En'gJand in the twelfth, and France in the fifteenth, that Macedonia sutTered in the fourth century B.C., until Philip gained the throne. The nobility were insubordinate. Authority was set at nought. Each man fought for his own hand. Murder was rife ; and the anarchy was only temporarily allayed by a politic marriage. The union of Amyntas with Eurydike, a daughter of a leading family among the Lynkestai, was intended, like the marriage of Henry the Fifth of England with Katharine of France, to put an end to a series of exhausting struggles. , But the marriage failed in its object and only secured hifn a temporary respite from trouble. The Lynkestai iTie mar- ^^^''*^ "^^^ mollified by the union of a daughter riage of of their house with the royal family ; and the fails in its neighbours of Amyntas were eager to bene- objoct. fl^ by his difficulties. Illyrians, Thracians, Thessalians, in turn or in concert, poured into Macedon. He was even obliged to surrender the coast cf the Thermaic gulf to the Chalkidians of Olynthos. We might almost say that he was elbowed out of his own country by encroaching friends and powerful enemies, and for nearly two years was a king without a kingdom. But he was a dexterous diplomatist, who in the school of adversity seems to have learnt the art of playing off one foe against another, and of exciting them to mutual jealousy. If the Olynthians gained from him more than they gave, it would seem that they checked the further advance of the Illyrians. Against Olynthos itself, which was too near and powerful not to be disliked, a happy combination of circumstances gave him an irresistible ally m Sparta. For Olynthos also had enemies, whose enmity had arisen in the following way. Favoured by accident, Olynthos had become head of a considerable league of cities in and near Chalkidike. Indeed, the The Olyn- thian Con- federacy and its rela pen to its neighbours. 1-i w terms of confederation (as described by Xenophon, an unwilling witness) were so fair and generous, that it is hardly strange that the smaller and more exposed Hel- lenic cities in those parts gladly exchanged precarious independence for safety even if combined with partial dependence ; or that Macedonian cities, although as important as Pella, preferred comparative security within the hardly felt restraints of a fairly constituted con- federacy to being subjects of a despot who could not protect them from even the attacks of Illyrians. In the year 383 envoys appeared before the Spartan assembly from King Amyntas and the city of Akanthos — men who recounted to a sympathetic audience the political troubles which vexed themselves and their friends. A careful reading of the speech delivered on that occasion by the Akanthian envoy throws a flood of light on the feelings of the day, and the prejudices (to call them by no worse name) which blinded the eyes and tied the hands of free Greeks. For what was it they feared? Not yet the tyranny of a Macedonian king, not now the inroads of lUyrian savages, but the aggression of a great city, which invited all to combine for self-defence and to agree to adopt such singular notions as common laws and mutual citizenship, and intermarriage, and common rights of property ! To Amyntas it was only natural that such far-sighted justice should seem as dangerous as it was strange — a precedent to be if possible never repeated. But Greek cities also of size and importance, and notably Akanthos, sympathised with the king rather than the free city, and passionately tenacious of their narrow town life, actually joined Amyntas in petitioning Sparta to save them from their friends. For Olynthos by the offer of manifest advantages had gathered into its con- federation city after city, until but a few in Chalkidike were left independent. Of these the largest were i6 The Macedonian Empire, CH. II. CH. II. TJie Earlier Kings, i7 i^ Akanthos and Apollonia Being invited to join the league, they declined. Being threatened with compul- sion if they persisted in refusal, they appealed to Sparta, and their appeal was backed by Amyntas. * You seem not to be aware, O Spartans,* said the envoys, *of the great power growing up in Greece. City after city, Greek and Macedonian, has been won over or freed ' (the word must have slipped from their lips almost involuntarily), * by Olynthos. We have been invited to join, and unless some help reach us we shall have to do so against our wishes. They are already strong. They are opening negotiations with both Thebes and Athens. If these suc- i.eed, think of the strength of such a coalition ! Olynthos is strong by sea as well as land, having mines and forests and money. But as yet she is vulnerable, for her allies are not all reconciled to her rule. Therefore strike hard and strike soon.' This appeal was only too successful. The Spartan Eudamidas was despatched at once with 2,000 men to the scene of action, and his mere presence induced Potidaia to revolt from the league, and re- lieved Akanthos and Apollonia from all danger of absorp- tion. Eudamidas was to be followed by his brother Phoibidas with the residue of 10,000 men. It would be alien to the subject of this book to narrate the rash seizure of the citadel of Thebes by Phoibidas on his northward march ; though it will be neces- sary to explain its unexpected effect. Suffice it to say, that Phoibidas never reached Macedon. The reinforcements for Eudamidas, who as yet was only strong enough to maintain the status quo, were led by Teleutias, a brother of King Agesilaos, and comprised a considerable force of Thebans. Amyntas was urged to do his utmost in the way of getting mercenaries and money. And thus the dloim broke on the devoted city. The defence was little Coalition against Olynthos and break- tip of the Confe- deracy, B.C 383. \ short of heroic. For at this time (B.C 382), Sparta was at the height of her power, and her will was law in almost every part of Greece. The Olynthians at first fully held their own, though with varying fortune. In 381 they even defeated Teleutias in a pitched battle under their own walls, slew him and a large part of his force, and drove the rest to seek safety in Potidaia or whatever nearest city they could reach. For the moment the star of Olyn- thos was in the ascendant. For the moment Amyntas seemed farther from his throne than ever. But, whatever a city with less prestige might have done, Sparta had far too much at stake to acquiesce quietly in so rude a re- pulse. A second and more imposing force was despatched at once under King Agesipolis ; and once more the hopes of Amyntas rose when he saw the Olynthian territory ravaged, the city itself besieged, and its ally Tor6n6 taken by storm. Agesipolis indeed did not live to see the fruits of his vigorous attack, for he was carried off by fever. But his successor succeeded both to his throne and to his tactics. The siege became a blockade, more and more stringent. Com was not to be obtained either by land or sea. At last, the sufferings of the people con- strained a surrender, and the Olynthian confederacy was at an end, sacrificed to the fears of some and the jealousies of others. Each member of the confederacy, Olynthos included, was enrolled as a member of the Spartan league, and sworn to an offensive and defensive alliance. But Olynthos was no longer formidable. The neighbour- ing cities were independent and jealously watchful : while her maritime allies in Macedon were restored by Sparta to Amyntas. Amyntas indeed was the only one of the confederates who benefited in the long run. Sparta gained little but obloquy. The cities of Chalkidike won a short-lived in- dependence at the price of eventual subjection, la A.H. c l8 ;> ; f T- r T/ie Macedonian Empire. ClI. II. Greece in general the result was little short of ruin, by which Had Olynthos been allowed to consolidate a Amynus confederacy in the north Egean, it would have pronts more ' T /• t_ j r than others, formed a natural outwork for the defence of Greece against Macedonian encroachment. There might even have been no Macedon to encroach, con- fronted, as it would have been, by a compact league of cities, and cut off from all access to the sea. As it was, the same Sparta which had given up the Greeks of Asia to Persia, gave up the Greeks of the Egean to Macedon —a political blunder repeated afterwards by Athens, when she left Olynthos to the tender mercies of Philip. Amyntas was once more king in his own country. His difficulties, however, were not removed but only shifted from one quarter to another. If Olyn- Sfl^e^"o^f thos was no longer a danger, yet the influence I^AeJS °^ ^^^ Sood friends the Spartans began to Greece(378- wane, and before long he was so far shut off '^^ from communication with them as to be obliged to look for new allies. In Greece the balance of / power was perpetually shifting. With the fall of Olyn- thos Sparta might have seemed supreme ; but in fact it was the beginning of the end of her supremacy. Her haughtiness and high-handedness led to a revulsion of feeling which armed Athens and Thebes and their allies against her (378), and made many a good Greek rejoice in the humiliation of this tyrant city, the friend of the Great King, of the despot of Syracuse,^aHd of the King of Macedon. With the defeat of Leuktca (371), her influence in the north was at an end ; new combinations brought other powers to the front, and to Amyntas fresh troubles. The contest of seven years (378 371) between Sparta on the one hand and Athens and Thebes on the other, felt the field m northern Greece open to adventurers; CII. II. Tlie Earlier Kings, \ 4 r 19 and it was from Thessaly that Amyntas was next beset with danger. This vast plain— the largest and most fertile in Greece— was from time Th?s^lian immemorial as notorious for its political in- 'y^naies- stability as for the excellence of its horses, the luxury of its rich men, and the badness of its coinage. Accord- ing to the old proverb, * there was no relying upon any- thing in Thessaly ; ' and history confirms the proverb. The country was divided into four districts, sometimes united, more often the reverse : but when united truly formidable, being able to place in the field 6,000 cavah-y and 10,000 infantry. But this was a rare event. More often the three or four leading cities— Larissa, Krannon, Pharsalos— held their immediate neighbours in subjec- tion, and were at more or less open war with one another, their government being either a close oligarchy or a despotism in the hands of a single man. Towards the end of the Peloponnesian war (about 407), Pherai was added to the hst of leading cities by the energy of a man called Lykophron, who made himself Tyrant and did his best, though without success, to subject all Thessaly to himself. lason succeeded where Lykophron failed. He was strong and active, bold and prudent. He knew how to ensure the discipline and to secure the f devotion of soldiers. His head was full iST^ of magnificent ideas. With all Thessaly C374-370X at his back, and elected Tagos or generalissimo in 374> his dreams extended to a wide empire, based upon the subjection of Epeiros, Boiotia, Attica, and perhaps Lacedaemon, and lastly of Macedon : and the object of this great power was to be the humiliation of no less a potentate than the Great King himself— a fai easier task, as he professed to think, than the subjugation of Greece. These ideas of lason were no secret : and c 2 20 The Macedonian Empire. CH. II. as might have been expected, his immediate neigh- bours began to be uneasy. Boiotia, no doubt, had little to fear while Epameinondas and Pelopidas were at the head of affairs at Thebes : and Athens was too far off to be in immediate danger. But with Amyntas the case was very different. Restored only recently to his throne, and that by foreign help, he was too weak to resist much pressure, although he did his best to balance matters and to strengthen himself by keeping up friendly rela- ^tions with Athens and individual Athenians. Thus in 378 he adopted as his son Iphikrat6s, who was one of the ablest I soldiers at Athens, and had great influence in the north ! Egean. He sent deputies to the regular meetings of the Confederacy at Athens : and in the extraordinary meeting held at that city in the autumn of 371, he even publicly acknowledged the right ot Athens to the posses- sion of Amphipolis, her own colony. The city was not indeed his to give ; but however little trouble the Athenians may have taken to secure it, they were always eager that no one else should have it. This public re- cognition therefore of their right was highly gratifying, ' and no doubt was regarded as deserving of reward. *" All these schemes were, however, cut short by the un- expected deaths (370) of both Amyntas and lason. The Assassina- letter had announced his intention of being lion of present at the Pythian games at Delphoi, and '"**"• had further issued orders to his troops to hold . themselves ready for service. The political world of Greece was thoroughly uneasy, for he had recently seized and dismantled Herakleia, a fortified town near Thermopylai, fearing, as he alleged, that it might here- after bar the pass against him at some time when he was wishing to march into Greece. Was it that he meant to seize the presidency of the games ? Could it be that he meditated laying hands on the treasures of CK. III. Alexander II. ' Delphoi ? And, if so, what next ? Immense therefoi* was the relief universally felt, when (as the Delphic oracle had promised) * the God did take care for himself lascn was murdered, while reviewing his troops, by a band of seven youths, two of whom were overtaken and slain ; while the remaining five escaped, and were re- ceived everywhere with special honour, as those who had relieved the Greek world from a haunting fear. Thessaly was no more a danger to Greece. Of the two brothers who succeeded lason as Tagos, one was murdered by the other : and the latter in his turn was slain by a third brother, Alexander, a brutal and unscru- pulous tyrant. Once more the old proverb had come true, and in Thessaly all was uncertainty. CHAPTER III. Amjmtas succeeded by his son Alex- ander. (369)- MACEDON AND HELLAS AT PHILIP'S ACCESSION. Amyntas died in the same year as lason, and at the time of his death Macedon was undoubtedly in a stronger condition than she had ever been. Yet ten troubled years were still to pass, before Philip's strong arm could beat down opposition at home and make her formidable abroad. Alexander, son of Amyntas, had an uneasy reign of only two years. After the murder of lason, many nobles of Thessaly, especially from Larissa, crossed the border to escape death or imprisonment, and took refuge in Macedon. Alexander espoused their cause, invaded Thessaly, and seized Larissa and Krannon. But it was a premature step, taken without due consi- deration of consequences. Macedon was as yet weak ; and Thebes, at this time in the very heyday of prosperity, > 22 The Macedonian Empire, CH. ni. was too strong and too ambitious to brook interference with her cherished influence in the north. Pelopidas at once marched into Thessaly, and occupied Larissa and other cities in force. A year later (368^ he was in Macedon itself, and on a graver errand. Alexander had Murder of ^^^ assassinated by a certain Ptolemaios, and Alexander another competitor for power soon appeared cal confj- on the scene in the person of Pausanias, who "°"- had royal blood in his veins. Then began the scramble for power which was so common in those scenes. Besides the men, there was Eurydik^, widow ot Amyntas, with her young children, to be reckoned with or to be set aside : and the latter was no easy task, backed as she was by the support of the Athenian Iphikratcs, whom her late husband had adopted. There was yet a further complication in Theban jealousy of Athenian or indeed of any interference, save their own, in northern matters. Of these various competitors, Ptolemaios and Eurydike made common cause ; while Iphikratcs, moved by EurydikC's pressing entreaties, „ , . , attacked and drove Pausanias out of Mace- Pelopidas , _ , . . -r^ 1 • ^ in Mace- don. But at this juncture Pelopidas ap- **°°* peared upon the scene, compelled Ptolemaios to bow to Theban dictation, appointed him regent, and guardian of EurydikC and her sons, and carried off thirty Philip, son hostages for his good behavour to Thebes, one ofAmyntas, of whom was Philip, son of EurydikC and a hostage . - . . . i i • at Thebes. Amyntas. It is imperative to remember this (368-365). ^hree years' exile of Philip at Thebes, for it was the beginning of a new era in his own life and in that of his country, similar to that which resulted to Russia in the last century from the voluntary exile of the Tsar Peter. It was the development of the provincial into the man of the world. He enjoyed in Thebes, and ieamed how to use, all the advantages of a liberal educa- CH. in. Perdikkas III, n > tion and of good society. He became familiar with tiU the intricacies of Greek politics, and alive to the strorg and weak points of Greek city life. He was intimate with y Epameinondas, the ablest organiser and most scientific tactician of his day. In short, Philip left Macedon a boy, and he returned a man, full of energy and new ideas. Even Russia hardly made greater advances during the twenty-six years of Tsar Peter's reign than did Macedon under Philip's vigorous rule of twenty-three years, and his son's thirteen years of unbroken victory. Philip returned to Macedon in 365, and found the state of affairs considerably altered. His brother Perdikkas had overthrown Ptolemaios, in spite Perdikkas of the Theban settlement, and in order to Macedw?^ maintain himself against actual or possible (365-360). enemies, had once more made advances to Athens. To play off one enemy against another, until strong enough to cope with all at once, was the traditional policy of his house. Timotheos had superseded Iphikratcs in the north Egean (365-4). He had reconquered Samos, had obtained a footing in the Chersonese, and was in high favour at Athens. To him therefore Perdikkas turned as a useful ally upon the spot; and in concert with him he stripped Olynthos once more of a great part of the donrunion which she had recovered since the fatal blow of 383, and finally ruined all hopes that a Chalkidic Confederacy could ever curb successfully the power of Macedon. On the other hand, nothing could have suited Perdikkas better than that Timotheos, while helping him to humble Chalkidike, should fail to master Amphi« polis. Amyntas, it is true, had recognised the right of Athens to the city ; but that Athens should waste men and money in vainly trying to conquer an unwilling subject, could not but be a satisfaction .to a Perdikkas and a Philip. In this state of affairs, moreover, the > 22 Tlt€ Maya!onia9t lit up ire. cii. rtr. \ was toci strong nnd too nmlji'tious tf> brook interference with her rhcrishcd infliirncc in the north. Pclopidas at once marc hcd into Ihcssaly, and occupied Larissa an^^*'^s- It 's imperative to remember this ^ ^' three years' exile of Philip at Thebes, for it was the beginning of a new era in his own life and in that of his countr)', similar to that which resulted to Russia in the last century from the voluntary exile of the 'Jsar Peter. It was the development of the provincial into the man of the world. He enjoyed in Thebes, and learned how to use, all the advantages of a liberal educa- •:n. 11 r. Pcrdikkas III. 23 tioa and of good society. He became familiar with all the mtricacies of Greek politics, and alive to the stron- and weak points of Greek city life. He was intimate with Epamemondas, the ablest organiser and most scientific tactician of h,s day. In short, Philip left Macedonaboy. and he returned a man, full of energy and new ideas. Even Russia hardly made greater advances dm-ing the twenty-six years of Tsar Peter's reign than did Macedon under hilips vigorous rule of twenty-three years, and his son s thirteen years of unbroken victory .J^'^'J 'T'""^^ '° ^^'"'"^^^ ^" 365, and found the % A-y'f f'T ^^"^i^^'-ably altered. His brother Perdikkas had overthrown Ptolemaios, in spite Pe^dikHs ot the Theban settlement, and in order to ^"-Kingof maintain himself against actual or possible ^65-3^)" enemies, had once more made advances to Athens To play off one enemy against another, until strong enoujrh to cope with all at once, was the traditional policy of his Mouse Timotheos had superseded Iphikratcs in the north Egean (365-4). He had reconquered Samos, had obtained a footing in the Chersonese, and was in high favour at Athens. To him therefore Perdikkas turned Ic a useful ally upon the spot ; and in concert with him he stripped Olynthos once more of a great part of the dominion which she had recovered since the fatal blow ot 383, and finally ruined all hopes that a Chalkidic Confederacy could ever curb successfully the power of PeSr* K '^ '^' f"'' ^""^' ""^^^"^ ^«"^d h-ve suited Perdikkas better than that Timotheos, while helping him to humble Chalkidike, should fail to master Amphi! pohs. Ampitas, it is true, had recognised the right of Athens to the city ; but that Athens should waste men and money in vainly trying to conquer an unwilling and'^'p^"!-"^ "''r' ^"'^" ^ satisfaction. to a Perdikkas and a Philip. In this state of affairs, moreover, the 24 The Macedonian Umpire N CH. III. voiinK IMiilip was of ^;rcat service to his brother. Perdikkas jjave him a district to govern ; and there he raised and trained according' to the newest tactics a small army, the nucleus and ori^'in of that which for dearly two centuries was the model army and best fi^ht- ing machine in the world. In 360 Perdikkas also passed away whether killed in battle or murdered is uncertain. Once more the unhappy OmfiiM.m country was plunged info a vortex of con- mV^iV^;!,';;'; '""^•"^ '»"** ^'v*' ^••»'- ^lere were n., less »*^'|'klcM than seven candidates for the throne, the last '»'< "ot the least of whom was Philip— I'hilip, with all the a^iLnrrr'"r'^ '"^''""^ ^^^'^^^^^y ^^ ^^^ens was Spart^^^^^ ""^ ^^^^'^-'^^ oppression of Sparta. Happily for Greece, it lasted only thirty years • but they were thirty >ears fraught with evil, when the seeds were sown of a selfishness and corruption that bore ruit only too soon in humiliation and foreign conquest was not merely the policy of Spa.ta in Asia, and at >1> nthos, that was demoralising ; but the acts of indivi- ;ua Spartans, like Phoibidas at Thebes, or Sphodria at Athens spread a general spirit of suspicion which made naiona, union impossible and the triumph of Macedon comparatively easy. In the middle of the fourth century -eece had fallen back into its normal state of pe J ^^Z^ ''''^ ^"' '''^' ^"^ ^'^^-^ - ^eep that The evils of separatism are bad enough. They are r;" T: J'^" •"^'' ^J ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ corruptlon^nd ISr fThi"/'"L' which often follow upon pohtical ^espair. | The speeches of Demosthenes are so precise and severe in the charges which he brings ajai n'st ^^s io The Macedonian Empire en. III. Corrupt ion |ircvalciit in Greece, as »hown hy iheiics. countrymen, that we cannot help believin- that a great deal of wliat he bays is true, more particularly when we observe that the actual course of events corresponded exactly to the character assigned to the actors who took part in them. ^ * Athenians (says the orator) are indolent, sel- fish, suspicious, corrupt. 'J'he festivals they celebrate with great regularity, and there is money in plenty for them ; but their wars they starve. So enamoured are they of the comfortable refmements of home, that they hate to lift a finger, even in self-defence, and are like raw boxers, who parry but never return a blow.' '1 he cause of it all lies in the word, so often on Demosthenes' lips, ^«^;i/a, or the art of taking things easily. This it was, he adds, which led them to adopt the newfangled system of mercenaries, which made the city ridiculous and the city's allies (juake with fear. No force was less to be trusted, for they regarded only their own interest, not that of their employers. Nor could anything exceed the shortsightedness of ThessaJians and Thebans and Peloponnesians (unless it were that of the Athenians themselves) whom he compares to men in a hailstorm, praying earnestly that it may do them no injury, but taking no steps to prevent it ! Nor was this all. That Greeks should be selfishly supine and shortsighted in the face of a great danger was bad ; but it was far worse that they should have publicly sold off and disposed of a principle once valued—that it was shameful to take a bribe for the ruin of one's country, and to sympathise with her enemies. Such men he compares to sprains and fractures in the body, which make their presence felt as soon as anything goes wrong. Pure and old- fashioned patriotism was at a discount, and in its place had come in a vulgar importation * jealousy, if a man gained any advantage ; ridicule, if he confessed it : hatred err. HI. and Hellas. 3' of any man who blamed such doin-s ' f..i con.patible with a lofty tone and ^ft '^^^^^l^ ^ short, public opinion and public snirJ . ^" Athens were very differ^ r f '" ^''^^^^ ^"^^ ciL very uinerent from what thov h^ri k«^ hundred years before. There wis r .7 ^ f ^^^" "" strength in abundance ; but it wTs 2 ,7 "f T''''''' corruption. What the; needed w-islll T^'" ^^ '"^>^e acting. Again nnci Iv I ^^^^'"^ ^"^ Athenians i^ the Chi::^ ^1^^,^^^ \ ''^ the realities of the n.:« n^ i '^"'"PPics to awake to si. still, above a,rTo",i^^^^^^^^ and recri„,inations. As7o dec els aT'?' r'""'"' he cries ' are worth nothing wThout action "'I'""l^ ' appeals to their legitimate orido^n ,1 .^^'"' ^'^ •heir ancestors, who were ri.^h.o ZlH ^'"""f '''"'' "' u> defence of Greece agl "t Per"' tL "!; ,"'^ ''" but what of that > ■ De-..h rV ^ '^'^'^ '"''•="'' ".ou.h he sh,.t h- nself^^fdov^o" ■> a^dTt ir^'h"^" men to that of the enemy : and the success of his application of it is seen in the fact that the Macedonian formation remained in vogue as the fighting system of the world ^ until superseded by the Roman legion. The object proposed was so to strengthen the main line of infantry as to enable them to withstand and break any attacking force which they were likely to meet in the field. The ordinary- depth of Greek battle array seems to have been from eight to twelve files ; while the battle of Leuktra was won by the Theban left wing of fifty files crashing through the Spartans, only twelve files deep, and sweeping all before it. Now Thebans were of all others most likely to meet Philip in the field, and the . probljm was how to resist such a charge, how to meet the weight of a mass of men fifty deep. It was solved by the introduction of a new weapon, and by a change of tactics adapted to its use. The weapon was the sarissa ; and the new formation was the phalanx. The sarissa was a huge lance, held in both hands (unlike the Greek pike) and twenty-one feet in length ; the infantry soldier; cir. IV. T/ic Armj'. 35 wearing besides a short sword, a round shield, a breast- plate, and a sort of broad-brimmed helmet. But such i weapon as this lance was clearly fitted not for independent .ghtmg or single action but for close array. Hence arose he peculiar formation of the phalanx with its 4,096 mer Its smallest unit was the lochos, made up of sixteen inen standmg one behind the other at intervals of . feet the front rank man, or lochagos, being the mos^^ dis-' t.ngu.shed for experience and strength. Now the sarissa was held 6 feet from the butt, and projected therefore 15 feet before the body of its holder. It follows that the front man of each lochos was protected by a bristling mass of five p,kes-his own projecting ,5 feet before him, and the next 12, and the next 9, and the fourth and fifth respectively 6 and 3 feet. The remaining files added weight to the mass, but carried their lances sloping over the.r comrades' shoulders. Now let us take the more complete unit of the phalanx, the syntagma, nun.bering sixteen ochi-i.e. numbering sixteen men each way, or 256 m all. Two things are clear at once. Such a unit ^ was capable of indefinite multiplication ; and indeed 7 a quadruple phalanx of 64 syntagmata, or ,6,384 men was no uncommon thing. On the other hand, while a direct attack in front on such a dense mass of pikemen rear, ,f left exposed by the accident of battle, was fatal It wi!Lh '""r ^'"'"^^^' '^ ''^" P^^^^^-^"^ ^^^^^™^ ""Steady, whether from mequalities of the ground or from the necessity of changing front, to get inside the rows of projecting lances as the Romans found out at Pydna (B.C. 168), when the phalanx became at once a huddling mass of helpless wretches doomed to slaughter. Such cases, Houever, were quite exceptional. As against Greek hopl.tes and ordinary n.odes ol fighting the phalanx was 'rre.i.t.ble, the moral effect of awe and Intimidation I) 2 3<5 The Macedonian Empire. Q\\. IV. whi<;h it produced in an enemy predisposinll V .rtually independent. Olynthos was still ^'"" °J the hrst C tv in rhnU-, Mt * 1/ . , ♦>*issun Phihpathis ursc cit> m Lhalkidike. Potidaia, Pydna «^cesMon. Methone, and the shores of the Ther niir r„If siihiprf t,. AfU • ^ incimaic (julf were AlSon " I r'" '"""'"''^- '''""P ^^' strong in 10 tne sea, and did not seem l.kely to have. We mav r «l7;!L''r" '"' """'^ '"' •"^ «■■-' '^bHities cessors coniparafve obscurity of his prede- Philb" mtV"'i'l''''f "^' '''■P'"'"-'"''^ ^kill with which i ie "^ Hi" '^ y'' a< versaries, whether individuals or nt.es. H>s ea.l,est eftorts, while securing „ Macedon, were directed towards anticipating ^i!li |tny movement for co-operation between the fr^^'^' 1"!""" ^"LTT^- f- the moment thi ^^""■ was no very difficult matter, the Athenians bein<. .reativ exed at thcr repulse before An.phipolis in 3V4 and ready t„ pay almost any pnce for reven-e Since thn ..ne the city had admitted Macedonian troops as" iro . cuon agamst Athens (363), and indeed was befng Md at this very time by a Macedonian garrison Phihn ..^ l''s opportunity of soothin-. Athens ^n;i ^'"' P/.='"' Amphipohs at the same time" I ike h L hi T """^ befnr*^ h,-,« 1 I ., ^ ^ ^'^ lather Amyntas .0 Amp iTs T'"' '"'°''"'""' '"^ ''Sht of At'hen h°s1r.oo ' e ' T ''"• '''""' "'■ S«°^'-*" ^-'hdrew n s tioops, leaving the city for a while to itself (,cq) Amphipohs and Athens were equally flattered bv so '™ ZT. ^'^ '°™^'- ^^' -''--^ "" ' foreign .ariison.the latter was freed from a nervous fear tha" 3S The Maccdoiiian E))ipin\ CH. IV. Thilip meant to keep the city himself. IJiit even now the Athenians could not rouse themselves to the necessary sacrifices for securing what was all but in their grasp ; and actually hoping to play with Philip, began to cherish ideas of exchanging Pydna for Amphipolis, and so of gaining the coveted town by Macedonian help. Philip, however, was alive to Athenian failings, and saw through the motive which prompted their wish for negotiations. He had no mind to be a cat's-paw. If they were loth to act, he was not. Having settled matters with the Paionians and Illyrians (358), he resolved to take the first step towards e.xpansion by seizing Amphipolis, which commanded the communic.itions between Thrace and Macedon, and dominated the gold mines of Pangaios. To the dismay of the deluded inhabitants, it became suddenly clear that they had been beguiling themselves with fond hopes, and that Philip was rapidly advancing to attack them. Then at last, but all too late, a hurried embassy was despatched to Athens, imploring forgiveness for the past and immediate help. Athens at the moment was at the height of her power. Apart from the ordinary members of the Naval Confederation of 378 she had in this year succeeded in wresting Euboia from Theban influence and in adding the Chersonese to her empire (358). But she was also on the verge of the serious struggle of the Social War. To Athens, there- fore, in spite of pride and power, it was of prime impor- tance to maintain for the present peace and alliance with Philip. Simultaneously with the ambassadors from Amphi- polis an embassy arrived from Macedon, to assure the Athenians once more of Philip's regard for them, and to state that, although he was besieging Amphipolis, it was really in their interest, for that when he had taken it he should hand it over to them. Plinded by dislike of the CH. IV. Philip and A mphipolis, 39 obstinate city, which had so long held them at arm's length, and predisposed in Philip s fiivour by his politic uithdrawal of troops from the place in the previous year the Athenuins were unwilling to offend a valuable allJ merely to save an ungrateful colony from merited humi- hation, especially as it was to be theirs in any case. The ambassadors from Amphipolis were dismissed with a re- fusal, and the city was left to its fate. Thus the Athenians nnagmed they had tided over a difficulty and gratified a legitimate feeling ; whereas they had really struck a blow at their own prosperity and sown the seed of fi.ture rum. Philip laid siege to AmphipoHs, which fell before the energy of his attack combined with the treachery of his partisans within ; and once master of the place he was too well aware of its value to dream of giving it' ud even to Athens. Nevertheless he continued to hold out delusive hopes, with which the Athenians were fain to content themselves under the circumstances, thou-h uneasily conscious that they had been tricked. For, indeed, circumstances were very much against them hy their own act they had just thrown away Amphipolis: and now, in consequence of their own acts, four of their most important Phe'soct'' subject allies-Rhodes, Kos, Chios, and ^.f . and Hyzantion-renounced their allegiance and oSr revolted. They accused Athens of having ^^5^^* broken the treaty of 378 by appropriating her later acquisitions-Samos, the Thermaic Gulf, and the Cher- S()nese-to the exclusive benefit of her own citizens. They complained loudly of the exactions and want of ^lisciphne of the mercenaries, whom Athenian indolence was content to use but Athenian parsimony forgot to pay. The burden was all theirs, while Athens reaped all the advantage. They therefore fonnally seceded from the league (358). tl 40 Tlie MacedonuMi Empire. CH. IV. As if this were not enough to inspire uneasiness, an embassy arrived shortly afterwards from Olynthos. That w^v i°n ^''^ "'''' '''°''°"S'i'y alarmed by the Macedon- the maiur '-'n conqucst of Amphipolis ; for with a Mace- oioiyn.hos. donian garrison in that city she was between two fires, and Philip's ambition was seen to be growin>' In the crisis Olynthos turned naturally to Athens, Ionian like herself, and, as mistress of the Kgean, able to help if she would. But now, as before. I'hilip was alive to every move in the game, and the Olynthian deputies were met at Athens by an embassy from .Maccdon - were met and checkmated. As before, so now, the Athenians were assured of Philip's unchanging goodwill, and of his mtention to cede Amphipolis even yet. He had indeed, It was hinted, ground of complaint, in that they still held Pydna, which was more certainly Macedonian than Amphipolis was Athenian. He did not wish, however, to be hard on them, and was ready to negotiate for the e.-cchange of one against the other. But the negotiations were too delicate for the rough treatment of a public assembly, especially as the people of Pydna would pro- bably object to the transfer. The ambassadors therefore msisted upon secrecy. It was a trying dilemma for the unfortunate Athenians. They could not help distrusting Philip They could not avoid fearing for and with Olynthos. Yet open distrust or precipitate action might now disappoint them of Amphipolis ; and to offend Phihp, when they were at war with their allies, would be nothing short of madness. The ambassadors of Oh mhos therefore, like those of Amphipolis, could obtain neither promise nor prospect of support. Athens had saddled herself with another enemy, and Philip had gained another advantage. For the present, at any rate, Olynthos and Athens were at daggers drawn. Meanwhile, the mistress of the Egean ^vas in great CH. IV. The Social War. 41 straits The revolt of Byzantion threatened to stop not only the corn-tax levied on ships passing west- ^ wards from the Euxine but even the corn-ships l^^l,^^^ themselves. Chios was the head-quarters of 058^5). this inconvenient secession, and an Athenian attack on Chabnas, slam. Por some months Chios was supreme "d r.is?r"- ^"? "■'"" "'^ ^"'^"'- comma' ders m au ct -IT'""""" "^"'' ='"''' '■" "■•^" to divert tSen^I '"r.'-""'''^,''^.-'^^ f-m •'^--s, affected uccess " fjT \ "'',"■ '''=^«'-^""^'" "as fatal to ^rhome "";'":'"'■! '" '^''^•"'^ "-^'^ fo"°«-cd by indictment «as fiL '^'''l^'■'^'"7='^ virtually cashiered, Timotheos ts left' ?. "■"u'^'''' ^■■°'" ^"'«"^- ^"hares alone r A ' ^ '^"""""gh soldier but no general. It was in he midst of this trying series of failures and losserth" the last ray of hope in the northern Egean was rudely and finally extinguished. The difficulties of p,., Athens were Philip's opportunities. While a';'"j:SSo„. he former was struggling to avert defeat, the latter «as nnaking overtures of alliance to Olynthos, seeking Feelnf: "^^,/--h between her \nd ' Athens^ f-cehng sure that the Athenians had their hands qmte full and would endure anything rather than a rupture of the peace, he advanced without compunction and e.zed Pydna (357) which he kept for himself. Thence he proceded to attack Potidaia, which together with Anthen,ous was handed over to Olynthos as an earnest of i hihp s goodwill. But if the Olynthians were not blinded by resentment against Athens, they must have trembled at such a gift, even while they accepted it. How long would It be before their turn came ! Meanwhile they Here hopelessly estranged from their real ally, Athens as receivers o stolen goods in accepting Potidai; ! 1 hus Phihp stood out before the eyes of Greeks as a The Macedonian Empire. \ disturbing element in their political relations— a man of ener^, who wielded great resources and showed but few scruples in using them. His position has been compared to that of the Lydian Croesus towards the lonians of Asia Minor, or of [ason of Pherai towards the surrounding tribes. In fact his position was a far stronger one. He was a genuine Hellene ; and Crcjcsus was not. fie was a legitimate king ; and lason was not. He had at command greater resources than either. All that he needed in order to attain the goal of a not ignoble ambition, the leadership of Hellas, was a fair opening for interference in the affairs of Hellas. And this his proverbial good- fortune soon threw in his way. In 357 a war broke out in central Greece which is known in history as the Second Sacred War. On the Outbreak surface it looked like a struggle between the riiokians and their neighbours for the pos- session of the town and oracle of Delphoi ; in reality, its cause lay far deeper in national antipathy. The Delphians were Dorians, the Fhokians were not. The Delphians moreover were an intruding, if not a conquering, race, in occupation of what Phokians would regard as their own territory. More than once in Greek history this precious strip of land had been transferred to its rightful owners ; more than once it had been retransferred to the Delphians by some hateful Dorian intervention. The Phokians there- fore nourished a traditional hatred against Delphians in particular, and Dorians in general. The privileges and wealth attaching to the most famous oracle in The world, situated on Phokian soil, were in the hands of aliens, and the political sympathies of its priesthood were notoriously Dorian. But perhaps the strongest antipathy of the Phokians was reserved for Thebes, whose subjects they had been during the Theban hege-' cir. IV. The Sacred War. 43 of the Secot)J Sacred War, arj'l its causes (357)- mony (371-362), just as they maintained a warm regard for Athens, who had often stood their friend. These feelings of dislike were brought to a head, when the Thebans -ndeavoured to compel the Phokians to submit once more to their rule. They tried, however, to attain their object indirectly by bringing to bear the antiquated machinery of the Amphiktyonic Council, in which ai this time they were virtually supreme. On their motion the Phokians were condemned to pay a heavy fine on the pretext that they had cultivated some of the consecrated ground at Kirrha. This fine they refused to pay, and the council passed a resolution to oust them from their land and to consecrate it to the Dorian Apollo. But this was not so easily done as voted. The Phokians had friends as well as enemies. Their enemies were slow to move, and they themselves found an able leader in Philomelos. Delphoi was seized and held ; and under the pressure of circumstances a linger was laid for the first time on the vast accumulated treasure which had been silently growing for generations in the secret chambers of the temple. This money purchased mer- cenaries ; but its seizure forfeited what was much more valuable, the goodwill of Greeks, and compelled the Phokians as they became more and more isolated to lean more and more upon mercenaries. Hence it was necessary to make further requisitions on the treasury of the god, and what was at first decently styled a loan soon ended in naked spoliation. At first the Phokians more than held their own. In spite of the remissness of Sparta and Athens in sending the aid they had promised— the former as embittered enemies of Thebes, the latter as anti- Dorian sympathisers— Philomelos and his mercenaries deteated lae Lokrians, and gained some advantages over the Thebans and Thcssalians. Even when Philomelos Successes of the Pho- ki.ins under Philomelos and Ono- niarchos. The Macedonian Empire, ij *^T- - "- -'-^^^^f^wniLiu j^/njjire. CH. IV. was defeated and slain (354}, Onomarchos his colleacrue was equal to the occasion. It was too late for any hesita- .on as to the right or wroni; of appropriating the Delphic treasure. Ke increased his military force. He bribed tar and near, enemies no less than friends. He over- ran Dons, mvaded Boiotia, and actually made himself niaster of Thermopylai, opening negotiations with the inessahan despots ofPherai. It was this last step which brought Philip on the scene and led to his taking part in the Sacred War. He had successively reduced Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaia. In 354 he attacked Methone! which, unaided by Athens till it was too late struggled vainly against its fate, but was ,.f M r^' r ^ ^'"'^ "'''''^^' ''^ Macedon and secure of he neutnd.ty o Olynthos in his rear, he advanced in force mto I hessaly (353) to help the ruling family of Lanssa agamst the encroachments of the tyrant of I hera,, who m his turn appealed to Onomarchos. It was a tatal day for the liberties of Hellas ! cir. v. T/ie Sacred War 'i;he Pho- kians and Philip face to face in Thessalv CHAI'TER V. KRO.M I-HILIPS INTKRVKNTION IN THESSAI.Y TO TIIK FALL OK OI.YN'THOS. The I'hokian intervention in the affairs of Thess.-lv brouglu Philip upon the scene of Grecian pohtics Even PhiHp ghilip breathed more easilv for nevermore could Athens and Olynthos be leagued together against him. The delivery of this startling lesson to upstart cities was in Pluli,)'s most characteristic manner. He had succeeded in estranging Olynthos from ^ . Athens. He had lulled Olynthian suspicions j^XJ.? by an ostentation of friendship. He had vhu^Z^d robbed Athens to pay Olynthos, and had oiymhos. added to the Confederation J>otidaia and Anihemous He had won over individual Olynthiansby gifts and con- •essions,and had allowed their capitalists to grow rich by shares in his mines. There was apparently everything to gain by working harmoniously with Philip, everything to lose by making oneself disagreeable. For a while the pleasant delusion lasted. But when in 352 Philip was master of Thessaly, and when, returning thence, he was next heard of as pushing his conquests in Thrace to the very verge of Athenian possessions in the Chersonese tlien indeed the Olynthians must have felt that PhihJ was gradually encircling them, as the hunter draws his nets closer and closer round his prey. Before this, how- ever, a feeling of sympathy seems to have arisen between Olynthos and Athens, which led to a formal peace 111 III 48 The Macedonian Empire. cir. V. i between them, and to very strained relations between Olynthos and Philip. The latter indeed affected to think that it .vas impossible any longer for him and the Olynthians to hve quietly side by side. Either he or they must ^o ; and he resolved that it should be they. His tactics were of the familiar kind. Even so early as the First Philippic (351) we find Demosthenes referring to sudden raids made upon the Chalkidic Confedera"^ /(tion ; while, if accused of hostility, Philip was readv I with specious apologies. It was neither peace nor war, ( but it combined the disadvantages of both. Olynthos now, like Athens seven years before, saw herself stripped of dependent allies, one by one, yet unable to prevent it except at the price of instant attack ; while Macedonian gold and Macedonian compliments had won even in Olynthos partisans whose interest it was to defer a rupture. At this juncture it happened that two of Philip's half- brothers who had incurred his wrath took refuge in the Occasion of city. Glad of the pretext, he demanded their the rupture, surrender. The answer to that demand was an embassy from Olynthos to Athens, proposing an alliance offensive and defensive against Macedonian aggression -an appeal strongly seconded by Demos- thenes. The place occupied by this orator at Athens was so strange, and his influence in after days so remarkable. Rise and ^^^'^ it will be well to explain, before going Demos-*' ""^ further, some of the causes of his singular ihenesat character and exceptional position. For in talking of the struggle between Macedon and . Athens, we involuntarily think of Philip and of Demos- thenes, and of no others. Of what Philip was, we have already some notion : let us try and imagine his great antagonist, and that, not as he was m the prime of his CH. V. I^enwsthenes, 49 powers, when Athens recoL^nised if U.. k citizen, but rather as when \T^L r ?k a' ^''''''''' address the Athenian EkTlesfa.^Tvf ^ J^K'"^: " snnct With su;;.^^7:;z^ ?:r'hrs:^rd ^'^^ overcome by th o'to^ h Le^ n''' f ''^f '^^ ^^ ^^ had some sympathisers'^d^n nV ^is^ r ff tlierewas much vapourino- about .^/^^'^^ns^ where '^"t little zeal to mai'ntain ThatX i^e^h^e ^^'""' -bundanc::.rij::^:;::-^ no easy matter, but the task of y ar fl\"ir/ T Oemosthenes to gain the ear of the A ;embrv T ^^"' only half an Athpniin n. u- assembly. He was JLT i,- X . 5'ancimotner (if we rmx/ u^v •tsch.nes) had been a barbarian of the Ta^rt A "^ ncse (Crnnea) ; but the advanta-^es of% I ^""'" >lood are too well known to allow us ^o ,. ? °' "'" l>emosthenes for thtt U v """'' '""'^^ "^ :-.marria,es oV^ s-nii:; ^ ^ 'htet' T ■nvgorate the exhausted Athenian 2ck tin Z'"^ '" (.othtc and Vandal blood invic^orated fh. ^^'^' ^^^V^ e.rete Romans. Be that as Tt Cvlo^h ?'"P-'"-«"^*='y ■n his veins we n,ay reaso a^7'a ^ribe' Teh" f'^ '.e was siSS/'rrsr'L^Tas'rr-r ^:^J^ pooT co"" ^ ;'- --/an^faf^' •nen. Hen" 'l' "as T"' "^ '"' '''''"''''" ^^'"■'*=- --;;souredV!a:-.L-thist:s^r:i;: so The Macedonian Empire. CH. V. ClI. V. he was only seven years old, and his guardians squan- dered liis property. But misfortune proved a good schoolmistress. From an early age he set himself to correct the faults of nature, that he might be able, when the time came, to bring the law to bear upon the guardians who had ruined him. He mastered the ideas of Solon and Plato. He knew Thucydides almost by heart, and is said to have written out his history eight times. He studied under Isaios and watched and imi- tated Isokratcs. He condescended to learn dignity, action, and even play of features from actors on the stage. He declaimed aloud, it is said, with pebbles in his mouth or amid the roar of waves upon the shore, to im- prove and strengthen his voice. He would march uphill while repeating some speech, to open and fortify his lungs. In short, no trouble was too great if lie might attain the great object of his ambition, the power of per- suasive speaking. And by dint of perseverance he did slowly but surely attain it ; at first speaking against the whole current of Athenian feeling, and to almost unsym- pathetic ears, but little by little commanding attention, respect, admiration, and finally enthusiastic assent. At last, though unhappily too late, the policy of Demos thenes became the policy of Athens. Of the details of the war of Philip against Olynthos wc know next to nothing : but the speeches of Demos- oiynthos thenes enable us to infer the progress of evcsits almost certainly. The proffer of alli- ance was welcomed at Athens, until the question arose as to what was to be done ; and then the traditional caution of Athenian \ politicians led (as usual) to words and nothing else. * Olynthos, it was argued, was still a formidable power : and Philip's strength (as Demosthenes himself had pomtcd out) was more apparent than real. No slate apt>eals to Athens for help. Pe- inosthenes' I*irsl Olynthiac. The Olj/it/iian Orations. 5« could rest permanently on a basis of force injustice .nn perjury. No kin, could find permanent s^-^port in' cor rup parfsans, forced allies, and dissolute officers or ep i "'^S,°^'^-'- '-•" 'hat was noble and of g-ood -eport Ph l,p was not strong, and therefore to the Athe mans he ought not to be a source of fear.' Unfortun. elj rom the same pren>ises the orator and his aud ence d e mial Z Zr- '': ' M^ f™"^ " ^^<=-'' =»'■"-' pr- oper" nlhhn"! °"''* ''"'" ""^ opportunity of co- . lly w k The t '"' '■■"""=' •'*" '^"^'»>' ""- intrinsic, any »eak. The latter were only too happy to perceive Xce'''wr'°" "" "°' -^ "ccessity^'^Acco'^d ,S .he^alhance was contracted, but nothing further was The results of this fatal policy were soon apparent Id Th7fo;"f) •"''''' "" "•^^'^^'>' '"-"-'y. CO- CM leU that for the present he need fear <= . nothmg fro„, AU.ens. His agents within and Mac. " hout Olynthos became doubly active, even turning A eman abstention to their master's advantag At last the pressure became so stringent that further am '"ore urgent appeals for aid were made tn i?K an again Demosthenes stood iL^T.o'l^t^^ cal But this trnie his speech was at once more nointed and more earnest. It was a crisis, as he puts h tilt .--•'llmg on them with articulate voice to act at on^I rhe road to Athens lay through Olynho ° < f we leave hese men to their fate, who is so simple (he ask ) a nm - '" Flht'VhT "" "•'" '^ "'^"^^^-''^ from th . ce k.v, ■}\a ^ P "^ "'"''' «"her there or here • and ''liilip's difficulty is our opnortunitv ' h;. • r ' practinl Tki "Pponunity. His inference was flHav a in J ^ "^T' P'^P-'"'^ ^' °"ce and without federation the Tk^"'"""-"'^ °"« '° P-^^-e the con- eueration, the other to attack Macedon. But, to be of -e. these expeditions must be simultaneous : a'nd, abov^ £ 2 « C 5^ The Macedojiian Empire. eir. V. all, it must be a genuine Athenian army and tlcct, not a mere mercenary force without interest in the result. Shortly after the delivery of this speech some foreign mercenaries were sent by Athens to Chalkidike, but no ^i"j"«-J Athenian soldiers, and no money. However, ) yni .ac. j^^y ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ succcssful that there was quite an excitement at Athens, and a good deal of talk of takmg vengeance on Philip. Then Demosthenes for the thnd time came forward with the warning that as yet nothing was done, and that it was too soon, or rather much too late, to talk of vengeance. What was still at stake was tiie safety first of Olynthos, then of Athens. Their only hope of securing that safety lay in readiness to light, and to provide ade^iuate ways and means. '1 hey must act— and act at once. But Demosthenes was still a young man (only thirty-one), and Athenian fears were too easily set at rest by the influence of older and as yet more trusted politicians. It was some months before any real aid was sent to Olynthos. In the meanwhile Philip became alive to the trouble brewing at Athens, and tried to anticipate their inier- KTbd'r'" ^'^"^^O'^ by providing them with pressing foste?idby business nearer home (349). We have al- Phiiip. ready seen him in possession of Pagasai : and from Pagasai was but a few hours' sail to PZuboia. Trouble in Euboia might banish Olynthos from Athenian thoughts. For many years this unhappy island had been the centre of intrigues and conflicts. Stretching along the coast for 100 miles from Attica to Thessalv^ never able from first to last to form a united state, it was, by whomsoever held, a standing menace to some one else. Philip's intrigues in the island had begun even before the delivery of the First Philippic (351) : and now bestirred up a war between Chalkisand Kretria, in which Athens became involvctL This struggle led to a CH. v. Fall of Olynthos. large expenditure, a considerable expedition, a barren victory, and, as its only result, political exasperation • the very things which b «st s.rved Philip's purpose' as causing embarrassment at Athens. ' But at last even Athens seemed aware of her danger In 349 she not only intervened in Euboia, but actually sent a citizen force to Olynthos, which had j^,,^^ ^ some success, and averted the ruin of the city ofoiymhos. for another year. But it was only for a time. In spite of the efforts which, all too late, the Athenians were now ready to make (and we know from Demosthenes that Athens helped Olynthos, first and last, with as many as 4,000 citizens, 10,000 mercenaries, and 50 triremes)— in spite of all, Philip, by force of arms or corruption, gained step by step first one city, then another, until Olynthos the last hope of Hellenic freedom in the north, stood quite alone, and prepared to fight her last battle for indepen- dence with fruitless despair. Even Athens could now do little to help. The north wind, as usual, befriended 1 hilip ; and when the reinforcements from the south ar- rived It was too late. Olynthos herself had fallen. The gold of Macedon completed what Athenian remissness had begun. Two cavalry officers betrayed a large part of their force to the enemy. All heart was taken out of the besieged by the treason of the Philippizers within. \ urther resistance was impossible. And then there fell upon Hellas a blow perhaps more $^ue"nLc,f awful than anything in her previous history. '" ^"• A free city of 10,000 inhabitants and thirty-two of her free allies were so ruthlessly destroyed, that a chance traveller would not even have been aware of the ruins beneath hia feet. They vanished from the Hellenic world as though they had never been. Still worse was the fate which befell the inhabitants. They were exiled, or sold into slavery a is pathetic even now to read of the scene which The Macedonian Empire. 1/ '^ ..,..-...,.... ,,, moved ^Eschines himself to tears, «-hen • he met a cer- tarn Atrestidas cominj; from Macedon, and in his train were marchmg some thirty women and children ; and when he asked .n astonishment who the man was and he people w.th him, one of the passers-by answered that they were slaves from Olynthos, whom Philip had g.ven as a present to his friend Atrestidas.' If «e think fri H k"^^ .', """"= P"""" "e^'t'-^es, from the life of free and happy hberty to slavery and all that slavery in- sack of Olynthos gave to the Hellenic world. It was not so much that I'hilip became at once lord of an emp.re reachmg from the Chersonese to Thermopylai, dommatmg men's imaginations as Russia dominates them now ; but that it suddenly changed, as it were, the bahance of mens minds (as Russia's conquest of Con stant.nople might change it now), blinded their eves disturbed their judgment, and .urned even honou^ble Sne r 't b""'' " "°' ^"""P'' -shippers of th: ns ng sun Subsequent events can only be read aright m the light of the fall of Olynthos. CH. VI. Inaction at Athens. CHAPTER VI. THE PEACE OF PHII.OKRATES FALSA LEGATIO. THKRMOPYLAI IN PHILIP'S HANDS. In the same year in which Olynthos fell (347) Thebans cal ed in Philip to help them against the The'ba™ f "''<'«"5- and to sa^ e the Delphian land from i ;,, further sacrilege. It is probably true that .eiteSiir "^V ''"' ""t realise the result of such an invi- KsL's*" .T"? '' ■"" ■' '' "''" """^ that they thus took ritv^n^ .1 '; '"P '°""'^^ "^'^ ""■" ^-f their own cty and the enslavement of Hellas. Nothing could S5 better have seconded Philip's fast-growing ambition .- and ambition m Philip was ably ser^x■d by »„,- . diplomatic tact. To divide and so to engage PW'5^ his enemies singly was the key to all his policy. His present object was Thermopylai. But in order to gain 1 hermopylai it was essential to throw dust in Athenian eyes, and so to prevent their helping the Phokians to hold the pass against him. Accordingly all his efforts were bent towards raising possible hopes at Athens, soothing offended susceptibilities, himing at possible dangers, gaining possible friends-in short, towards paralysing Athenian resistance, until resistance would be useless. What the terror of his name and of the dread- ful fate of Olynthos failed to effect, courteous receptions winning manners, a magnificent court, splendid promises' and even more vulgar bribes succeeded in accomplishing' Secret agents and open friends worked for his cause hi every city in Greece-and not least in Athens. If we turn to Athens, on the other hand, we feel'''",, observe a marvellous blindness to facts. CJf Athens. the Athenians it might be said with singular truth, Populus vult decipi ; decipiatur ; ' deceived they were by 1 hihp, deceived yet more by their own leaders, and in each case willingly deceived. They declined to spend money. • 1 hey declined to serve in person. They eagerly caught at every pretext for postponing the evil day, when Philip must be faced and fought. Troubles seldom come singly. In 347 the disquieting news of the Theban appeal to Philip reached Athens, ana almost simultaneously envoys appeared from Phokis requesting instant aid at Ther- hclp™^d"ly mopylai against an expected Macedonian ft'^'i''^*' '>>' attack Now Thermopylai was in Athenian ^'n^^^.- eyes what Slrasburg is in German or Antwerp p"'^'- m English eyes-the door of the house, the gate of tlip 56 Yhc Macedonian Empire. I' I CH. vr, castle, the first outpost of defence. To look on at its seizure would be little short of madness. As five years before, so now all Athens was alarmed, and the Athenian commander at Oreos in ICuboia was ordered to join Phalaikos at the pass without delay, and to hold it at all risks. The alarm became a panic, when it was found that I'halaikos, apparently from jealousy, refused to admit their troops, and had even thrown into prison the Phokian envoys who had solicited aid. What could it mean ? Was Phalaikos intending to give up the pass, and make terms with Philip .? And if so, how could they prevent it .? Here was another reason, if reasons were needed, for peaceful negotiation to avert so great a calamity from Hellas. As the idea of peace was uppermost in Athenian mmds, so tiie word * peace 'had already been heard in Knibassy ^'^^ Athenian Assembly, and the same Philo- [uThuJp'"' ^^^^^S' ^^''^^ '^'^d first dared to utter the word, about now carried a decree that ten envoys should ^'*''*'- ascertain from Philip's own lips tlie terms on which he would agree to peace. .4ischines and Demos- thenes were of the number ; and they were accompanied by Aglaokreon, of Tenedos, representing their allies. Their business was to sound Philip: and justice requires us to remember, that up to the date of this embassy, so far as we can judge, each and all of the ambassadors were equally sincere and equally patriotic. But the success of Philip uas already casting a spell over Hellenic minds : and of tliose who went to Pella more than one returned to Athens not onlv deeply im- pressed with Philip's geniality and ready wit, with his wide knowledge and powerful memory, but over- awed by his self-possession and display of strength, or corrupted by his attentions, his promises, and even by his gold. Timidity and avarice in the * Philippizers' at rii. vr. Proposal of Philokrates. 57 Athens were Henceforth the main difficulty of Athenian patriots. The envoys returned about the ist of March 546- and at once laid the results of their mission before the Assembly, together with a letter from Philip ti • himself ; while the synod of allies, havin- von.I^i heard the report of Aglaokreon, agreed to p^S"' abide by whatever decision the Athenians should adopt recommending however that any Greek city, not there represented, should have the option of declaring its adhesion ^vithin three months. Philip's letter was couched in the true Philippic vein. He had favours he wrote, m store for Athens; indeed he would have mentioned them categorically, had he felt sure of the Athenian alhance. Meanwhile, he proposed as a basis of negotia- tion that each side should retain all that it then pos- sessed-which was, in fact, a proposal that Athens should confess herself defeated. Nevertheless, the highly- coloured reports of the Athenian envoys disposed tlie Assembly in Philip's favour; and when Ihe Macedonia' ambassadors arrived, they were received with more than ordinary cordiality, and found the general current of public opinion running strongly in the direction which i.oir master wished. Two special meetings of the Assembly were held without delay to l^^'^^i discuss the whole question. At the first of P^posedto these Philokrates again took the lead, and bt^.by'""- proposed a decree only too characteristic of '''^''°'<""^-»- the Athens of the day. It is no wonder that the charges of reason and corruption have clung to the names of I hilokrates and >Eschines, when the former proposed and the latter supported the proposition, that there should be pe-ice and alliance between Philip and l,is allies and Athens and her allies, but excluding the Phokians and the town of Halos in Thessaly, Athenian allies ! For 5S The Macedotiian Empire. \'\ CII. VI. what other reason could this exclusion of long-standing alhes have been sujjgested, save that Philip wished to of Athens have stooped to so base a desertion, save that ih.hps wishes, for some strong motive, outweighed in nnr .T',"k '"' •^'"•"" "^ "^^"""^"^ Demosthenes sup- ported the n>ot.on, bu, he protested against the excep- excemion h' 7^""'^ •''"' ^'' P^"'"^' ^^^^ ^ff^'^'"^''- The «a?nl.Th r""' "^■^'"^"^'i ""h the Macedonians. It \ZT)^^ '''""""' '° '^^ P^^^«- O" "'e other hand here was no alternative proposal before the Assembly ; and .f they were not prepared ' to march down straightway to I'eiraieus and go on board shi" an pay war taxes, and devote the Festival fund to war pi^- poses they must vote for the peace as proposed. The Assembly therefore voted for pe.,ce and alliance between Athens and Philip, bu, silently struck out the ride about Phokis and Halos, thus implicitly including then ■n .he hst of allies. Nothing was said concert^nl the confederate allies and the three months of gface mentioned above. Six days afterwards another assembly' treaty m the presence of Phihp's ambassadors; while it was arranged that the same ten ambassadors who had b fore represented Athens a, Pella, should return o Macedon and take the oaths of Philip and his allies. But at this assembly a critical question at once arose : who were the allies of Athens t Was Halos! DifficuUi« "[hich I'armenion, the Macedonian, was be- ro'lheXs" ^'^g'"f ;^hen the Athenian ambassadors had of A.htns. passed It on their way to Pella 1 Was Ker- ^^;r' sobleptes of the Thiakian Chersonese, ag.lst whom King Philip was about to march in person when the ambassadors were leaving Pella' Above all were the Phokians.' And to Athens, we „,ust rii. VI. PhilokiatL-s lies. 59 port^cr'tt' r,/"' ""'"' P°^=''°"=°' primary im- portance-the Hellespont, and safety of commerce • Thermopyla,, and safety from attack. Little objection was made to Kersoblept^s. About Halos no.hil was "Ih th r; 't^T'°"''''" -'^--'^-=. in accorllc .th their instructions, positively refused to admit the I hok,ans as parties to the treaty. And this in the face of he Lite vote o( the Assembly, ruling them ' to be allies! Was this then to be the rock, .ioXr"" on which the coveted peace was to be wrecked 1 T^f -fe^'« And what had Philokrates and his friends to ^^' urge in defence of such a proposal .? It was an embarrass- «g position, but they were equal to the occasion Ttf not easy to conceive of any motive save self-in e esi wi ch could h.n.e prompted men in their position, and on such an occasion, to deceive their fellow-countrymen w2 vrrerdii'so\*7 ■"" ''^'^ '^"°- ">" ^^•- > "h 1 e kin ' r*- ^ ^"^ •"" ^ P''"="'"'=d acquaintance i clia and seen him face to face. They ded-red .l,-,f h.s present relations with Thebes and 'Th":; w Td make it ungraceful for him to accept the Phokians at once as allies. At heart he was the Wend of PhokTs a of Athens, and the enemy of Thebes; and when once he obtained peace and was free to act as he chose he meant Ut Tnd "" ''°'"^" ^' '"^ '-""-' -'I '° "^S letter km .r,To''''''°'''' '° '"'''''^ Euboia and, 'etter still, the lost Oropos (in Boiotia) to Athens' Here was good news indeed, if true ; and Athenians fn heir present mood were so eager to think it true th" fn leahty they were false, and known to be false The Assembly shut its eyes to probabilities, and devoltly ' hoping that all would yet be well in the matter ^f pS ».^reed to tie Macedonian terms. The oaths were M 60 The Macedonian Empire. cir. VI. CII. VT. administered to the Athenians and their allies ; and it only remained now for the Athenian ambassadors on TheAthc ^heir side to obtain Philip's oath as soon riThepTac; ''^^ "^'^^'^ be. It was indeed high time, for oN^hiio- alarmmg reports were even now reaching Athens of Macedonian victories in Thrace, and that Kersobleptcs, her ally, was being rapidly stripped of his dominions. For this again was a further complication. The peace was to date from the day of its acceptance at Athens. Were these victories of Philip anterior to that date .> If not, was it at all probable that he would restore what he had won .? or that, if he refused, the Athenians would at the eleventh hour repudiate the peace.? It was of urgent importance, therefore, that Philip's adhesion should be obtained with the least possible delay. It is never an easy matter to decide disputes as to questions of fact, especially after an interval of three years. But when a man like Demosthenes is precise in details and dates, and an ytschines in his reply unmistakably slurs these precise details, it is hardly wrong to infer that the former is in the main a cred- ible witness. * These venal envoys' (Demos- thenes says) 'were so dilatory, that seven days after the vote of the Assembly they were still in Athens, and I had to obtain a decree of the Senate, bidding us depart at once, and enjoining Proxenos, the general in Euboia, to convey us wherever Philip might be. But when— full sorely against their will- we reached Oreos,and had joined Proxenos, they gave up all idea of a voyage, and made a circuitous journey by land, taking three and twenty days to reach Macedon. And the whole of the rest of the time, until Philip arrived ' (i.e. twenty- seven days) Mve remained quietly at Pclla.' During Falsa Lcgaiio. Comtpt delay of Athenian envoys in administer- ing the oaths to Philip -the so-called Falsa Le- gatio. 61 these fifty precious days what was the king doing' Again Demosthenes shall speak for himself. 'In this interval • (he says) 'Philip made himself master of Donskos, Thrace, and the castles on the Thracian coast,' m other words, gained command of the sea-line from the Hebros to the Propontis, and, in complete dis- regard of Athens, reduced Kersobleptcs. At last he returned to Pella, master of the situation. En^■oys were awajtmg hnn from Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Euljoia, and hokis-awa.tmg, it might seem, his fiat as to their destmy. Whatever were his will it could be done for a large army was massed, ready to march at a moment's nofce. His mtervention was requested as arbiter in Greek affairs. Thebans and their friends on one side, hokians and their allies on the other, clamoured in urn for h>s help. Even an Athenian ambassador, in the person of ^schines, was not ashamed to refer to Macedonian interference in central Greece as a foregone conclusion and to try to enlist his sympathies against Thc!,es. Philip meanwhile was bribing and cajoling, P^iy.ng off one against another, e.xciting hopes, refusing Mone-untd all his preparations were completed He then set out on his southward march with a formidable army, and carried in his train this jealous, bickering mob of Grecian envoys. At last he reached Pherai and there the Athenian ambassadors succeeded in ad- ministering the oath to Philip and his allies, not mention- ing Kersobleptcs, and formally excluding the Phokians They then returned to Athens, after an absence of seventy days, bearing also an affectionate letter from Ihilip, ,n ^vhich he took on himself all blame for the delay of the ambassadors. King Philip was within three days' march o( Thermo- pylai, and Athens was still dreaming ! Demosthenes 'vas able indeed to alarm the Senate; but the Assembly t» .1 7 he Macedonian Empire, would nc;t listen to him, for they were beguiled by the siren promises of .tschines ' Don't be alanned ' (lie Ki.-K' Philip ^^^^) * about Themiopylai. Thcbans, not 'iVlrnr^ Phokians, will shortly feel Philip's heavy pyuiin hand. And it is you whom Philip has pro- ^^'- mised to befriend. Euboia shall be yours, ancl-if I could speak freely— more besides.' Hut Philip was playing a dangerous game, and was well aware on what delicate ground he stood. Force was out of the question at Thermopylai, for the mere suspicion ol violent seizuie would probably be the one thin ^" ™ "'^s -ucn a juncture to avoid tlie extremes of l|um. ,at,ng acquiescence on the one hand, or of iirpru- dent brusqueness on the other ; and it wa^ well for t e Athenmns that at such a juncture they could fall back upon the practical wisdom of Demosthenes King Philip meanwhile was the central fi aire in ■, scene of festivity and triumph. He had put an end to the weary struggle of the Sacred '''"""" War He was a leading member of the Amphiktyonic Council. He was a kin" in an age when kings were becoming fashion- able-a man who could will and act while others were hesitating or quarrelling. He conduced he Pythian festival. He celebrated" his t iur^ph wi h hecatombs, gorgeous processions, costly offerings Uke Napoleon after Austerlitz or Jena, he was the'i bser ed of all obser^•crs, whether friend or foe-the min who held^m the palm of his hand the future and tl.e"!!;':: And if there was one city in Greece more than another whose selfishness and cowardice had made hdip's coui.e an easy one, that city was Athens Over the errors of her who was once ' eye ' and ' niisiress ' of r.reece we may well draw the veil of pity and sorrow between cofiunand- iii.a position of Philip aiul the tlegradation of Athen.s. CiiAPTER Vn. FROM THE PEACE OF PHILOKRATES TO THE BATTLE OF CHAIRONEIA (346-338). kra^l' 'J^ "P'7 ;f Amphipolis to the peace of Philo- S Kin *PhV ^T '"'' "' ^'''' ^"d half at war ^th King Philip. And now a sham war of ten years i i 66 The Macaioniaji Empire. cii. vii. was followed by seven years of a sham peace, the latlei equally with the former being a time of loss and humili- Ahered ation to Athens. Philip was already firmly g)suiun of j)l.inted in central Greece, president of the Amphiktyonic league, and protector of Del- phoi ; and as his power increased so did his ambition expand. But as yet the most important part of Greece was independent of him — afraid of his power or only anxious for his aid ; and if he was to be, as he hoped to be, leader and protector of an Hellenic confederation, it must be by skilful diplomacy rather than brute force. Open attack upon Hellenes — and specially upon Athens, the centre of Hellenic life — must be delayed as long as possible. Demosthenes describes the peace of Philokrates as a period during which Philip was at war with causes of Athens, but Athens was not at war with ilet^etn Philip — whcu he reaped at once the fruits of Phiiio peace and war. His object being to isolate and the a « i i • • Athenians Athcus, where ver there was uneasmess m (346-340) Greece, there were his agents and his gold secretly or openly at work. Hy slow degrees indeed this never-ending aggressiveness was arousing Athens to a keen sense of danger. Boiotia was now Theban ; and Thebes was as yet in alliance with Maccdon, and not unwilling to see Athens in difficulties. It became neces- sary therefore, however unpleasant, to maintain per- manent garrisons in the frontier forts of Drymos and Panakton, to conmiand the passes of Kithairon. And not only was the sense of insidious danger on ever)' frontier thus present to the Athenian mind, but petty ditlerences were perpetually arising on points where Athenian and Macedonian interests diverged. A dispute for instance arose with regard to the island of Halon- nesos, to the N.E. of Euboia, an irritating dispute about CII. VII. Fresh quarrels. 07 words. Philip had chastised a certain pirate, whose headquarters were in the island, and with some show ot justice had then placed a garrison there, for Athens had clearly failed in her recognised duty of maintainino- the police of the sea. Athens called upon Philip to give back to her her possession. Philip replied that he would give It gladly, as a free gift, but could not properly mve back what was his own. .4^schines professes to laugh at this quarrel about a word ; but none the less there was a real question at issue. Again, in 342, Philip was un- masking dangerous designs on a vital point of the Athenian empire, the Chersonese and Bosporos, as vital to Athens as Sicily or Africa was in after days to Rome • for Athens was fed to a great degree by the corn-growing countries of the Euxine. Demosthenes roundly asserts that no people in the world consumed so much im- ported corn as the Athenians; and it has been estimated that one-third of the annual consumption of Attica or 1,000,000 medimni (nearly a million and a half bushels) must have come from outside, and a large proportion of It trom the Euxine. It was as essential therefore to Athens to hold, as it would be desirable in Philip's eyes to wm, the key of this trade-in other words to conmiand lie Hellespont and Propontis. He had an excellent base of operations in the town of Kardia, which lay uithin the Chersonese and was ill-aflected to Athens • and from thence he proceeded to encroach upon and appropriate lands belonging to Athenian settlers. A lorce of mercenaries was at once sent out by Athens who executed reprisals in Thrace, while Philip's troops were engaged in the interior. Angry remonstrances toUowed on each side ; and matters began to look so serious, that in 340 Demosthenes was sent as ambas- sador to Byzantion to counteract Philip's intrigues, and bring about an alliance equally necessary to each city. F 2 68 The Macedonian Empire. en. vri. A sense of common dan^c,'cr obliterated the memory of the grievances of the Social War (358) ; and Byzantion and Perinthos concluded an alliance with Athens. This step was a grievous disappointment to Philip, which he tried to counterbalance by a sudden seizure of the two cities ; but in each case he was foiled, and his failure brought into relief the danger which they had barely escaped The bitter feelings aroused on both sides by this state of things found expression in contemporary documents. Proof of ^^ extant letter of Philip's ' to the Athenian embittered Senate and people ' sets forth nine indictments *■'*-• '"K- against them, partly frivolous and partly em- barrassing, whose collective weight however might seem to justify action on his part, if Athens still persisted in refusing reparation, or (as he suggested) arbitration. On the other hand a reference to the third Philippic of Demosthenes, delivered in 343, or to his so-called answer to Philip's letter in 340, will show that Philip's policy was diplomatic in a sense of the word which has often been illustrated in history, since the fable of the Wolf and Lamb was written. Demosthenes protested against further delay in prep:\ring for the inevitable struggle for liberty. But it was useless to hope for energy in others— useless to expect Chalkidians or IMegarians to move in defence of Greece, unless Athenians set the example of self-sacrifice. Shortly after midsummer, 340, Athens at last declared war against King Philip. A short respite was allowed Prepar.!- ^^^ ^^"^ preparation by a raid of the king into lions .-inj the country between Mount Haimos and the of wi^by " Danube in the spring of 339, whence he was (^340)"^ returning with many slaves and cattle when suddenly attacked by a tribe of Thracians, by whom he was defeated, stripped of his plunder, and en. VII. Athens prepares for War. 69 hunsclf wounded. The respite was wisely used-thanks to Demosthenes- in reforming the navy ; a reform, the details of which belong to Athenian rather than to Macedonian history, but the success of which was so marked that speaking nine years later when Athens was humbled to the dust by Philip's greater son, Demosthenes could boast that* under his law no trierarch had ever been obliged to appeal to the State for relief, or been thrown into prison by the Naval Board-no trirtme had been lost to the city at sea, or left behind in harbour unable to put out.' Such a boast, made in public and therefore open to contradiction, speaks well for the etfiaency both of ships and captains ; while it implies that such events were common enough under the older and less equitable system. About the same time Demos- thenes, in concert with friends like-minded to himself at last persuaded the Athenians to set aside the noxious law which had decreed that all the surplus of the State income should go to the Theorikon (Festival fund), and hat anyone who moved a different application of it should be put to death. The new law provided that any surplus should accumulate as a war fund. In this way, and not a moment too soon, the sinews of war were provided for the fast-approaching struggle. Yet the difficulties of the position were not so easily removed. There was still a Macedonian party in Athens, as UvTdT" in most other Greek cities— silenced for the aIh'*'"''^^ moment, but watchful, bitter, audacious. There Philip.' '"^ were no experienced generals to pit against Philip, and it was ciitncult to find a weak point for attack in Philip's empire. For a blockade goes but a little way towards enamg a war ; and landings on the coast, without some base of operations, would be mere temporary incon- veniences. Philip, on the other hand, had also difficulties ot his own, in that he could not afTord to stir up an 70 The Macedonian Empire, CH. VIL Hellenic war; while his allies, especially the Thebans, were not altogether trustworthy, and a direct attack upon Athens would probably at once bring about that very league which he feared. One coign of vantage, however, he had. If direct attack was to be avoided, intrigue was always possible. He was president of the Amphiktyons, and thereby guardian of the national sanctuary. His agents were everywhere. It was to be their business to find an opportunity for him to appear in central Greece at the head of an army, so that he might seem to come as a defender of the god Apollo rather than for aggressive purposes. Then whoever opposed him would have tc bear the odious part of seeming to oppose the god. This was the occasion of the Third Sacred War. At the head of a deeply-sunk bay in the Corinthian Gulf lay a small fortified town, Kirrlia, the port of Krissa Causes of and of Delphoi, distant about seven miles. A SaCTed War ^"^"^Z^ number of Delphian pilgrims came by C339). water, and of course landed at Kirrha, which was therefore prosperous and wealthy, and an object of envy to its neighbours. So early as the sixth century iJ.C. this jealousy had shown itself on the occasion of the First Sacred War, when Kirrha had been destroyed, and the whole plain as far as Delphoi had been consecrated to the god— in other words, pronounced * incapable for ever of being tilled, planted, or occupied by man.' But natural laws presently vindicated themselves. Men must eat and have the necessaries of life, even though land has been consecrated ; and as pilgrims did not cease to resort to Delphoi, and to come as heretofore by sea, it was found as impossible to maintain the desolation of Kirrha as it would be to leave in ruins Djidda, the port of Mecca. Kirrha was rebuilt and reoccupied by Lokrians of Amphissa — a usurpation which from its convenience was tolerated, if not condoned. During the Second Sacred z\\. vii. Third Sacred War, 71 War (356-347) these Lokrians had been staunch allies o! the Delphians and Thebans against the Phokians, and had suffered many things at the hands of Philomelos ; it follows that they were no friends to Athens, the friend ot Phokis and enemy of Thebes. It was on these long- standing feuds and secret jealousies that Philip worked by means of his agents. Tlie Philippizers in Athens, for the moment defeated, were still dangerous. The war party were busy with preparations, and, while keeping vigilant watch |,^^^j ^^^ ^^ on Philip's movements, forgot or despised pos- the Am- sible intriguers at Delphoi or in the Amphik- SiS^"a^ tyonic Council. Hence their opponents stole delphoi. an easy march upon them, when they succeeded in carry- ing at Athens the election of Philippizing representatives to the annual meeting of the council at Delphoi in 339, ^schines being one of the four. The Amphiktyons met in February ; and immediately, instigated by the Thebans, the Amphissians made a violent attack upon the Athenians for impiety in having dedicated afresh at Delphoi, before the temple was purified, a memorial of the battle of Plataia, in the shape of shields bearing the names of Persians and Thebans conjointly as defeated there. Nothing could have suited Philip's purpose better, for it seemed to make alliance between Athens and Thebe«5 less possible than ever. It happened that the chairman of the Athenian envoys at Delphoi was taken suddenly ill, and his duties devolved upon i^schines, who has left us his account of what happened. The Amphissian speaker (he tells us) was a violent and uneducated fellow, who not only made this sudden onslaught upon Athens, but vehemently declared that had the Greeks been wise they would have shut out the Athenians from the temple itself, as accursed for their alliance with the Phokians. * I was more angry' (says yEschines) 'than ever before in Second de- struction of Kirrha : and counter- attack of the Amphis- sians. 72 The Macedonian Empire, ^h. vii. my life . . . and standing up where I was (for the whole plain of Kirrha lay stretched at our feet) I pointed out to the Amphiktyons the cultivated plains, the build- ings, the sacred harbour fortified, and asked them how they could hope to pray and sacrifice acceptably to the gods, when they were forgetting their oaths and conniving at sacrilege.* The indignation of the council was at once diverted from the offending Athenians against the yet more guilty Am- phissians ; and next day the whole population of Delphoi, with the sanction of the council, trooped down to the sea to burn the accursed buildings and fill up the harbour. The deed was done, and the god perhaps appeased. But as they returned the Am- phissians fell upon them and drove them homewards in undisguised rout. Here was a further comphcation, calling for prompt and signal punishment. A second ind extraordinary meeting of the council was summoned at Thermopylai to discuss this new phase of affairs, and to arrange for the punishment of the now doubly guilty Amphissians. Meanwhile the deputies were to return to their several cities, to recount what had happened, and to receive instructions for the future. The first feeling at Athens was one of satisfaction at the vindication of the city by yEschines, and a resolve to send envoys to the extraordinary meeting. But before long, at Athens no less than at Thebes, there followed a sense of lurking danger, and at each city resolutions were passed to lake no part in the coming meeting. Nevertheless the Amphiktyons met in the summer of 339 under the presidency of a Thessalian ; but it was practically a packed meeting of Macedonian partisans only. The president was charged with the duty of punishing tlie Amphissians. But the half-heartedness of some and tlie Extraordi- nary meet- ing of the Ainphikty- onic Council. cii. VII. Philip seises Elatcia, jt^ corrupt abstention of others appear to have so effectually prevented success, that by the time of the usual autumnal meeting nothing had been done, and the council was obliged to discuss this burning question under a new phase. It was just for this crisis that Philip's agents had been working and were now prepared. When the alternative was boldly stated, that the league must either itself take up the matter more earnestly, or must appoint Philip their general, and let him do it for them, little hesitation was shown ; and the King of Macedon was formally invited into the heart of Greece to settle Greek affairs by those who were in reality most interested in keeping him out. Philip, on his part, gladly accepted an invitation which gave him a legitimate footing south of Thermopylai, and brought him nearer to his newly- declared enemies the Athenians (autumn, 339). He at once collected his forces and marched upon Thermopylai, as though to punish the wicked Amphis- sians. All Greece was expectant, and was not long kept in suspense. From the corner of the fs^geS^ral of Maliac Gulf threemain roadsled to the interior t^e Am- of Greece ; one running due south from Hera- ^7°"'' kleia to Amphissa through the defiles between ^''''^'*- Mounts Parnassus and Korax— the direct route therefore for Philip, if he desired to carry out honestly the duty im- posed on him. The other two ran at first together through the pass as far as Skarpheia, and then diverged south- eastward along the coast and southward over Mount Kalli- dromos to Elateia. Philip passed Thermopylai, seized and garrisoned Nikaia close to Skarpheia, having previously detached a small part of his army by the first-mentioned road ; and then advancing rapidly through the mountains halted and formed an intrenched camp at Elateia. It was a strong position on the southern slope of the moun- tain side, commanding the plain of the Kephissos, and 74 The Macedonian Empire. cii. vii. cH. VII. Alliance of Athens and Thebes. /:> favourable, therefore, for cavalry — commanding also tlie road to Boiotia, Thebes, and Athens. At the same time he could communicate by his right flank with the division operating against Amphissa, while his retreat in case of need was completely secured. This sudden blow fell like a thunderbolt both at Athens and at Thebes. The long-dissembled war was ^ . at their doors, and Philip's intentions stood Panic at /• t # r • • / t-^ Athens .-ind confesscd. * It was evening (says Demos- Thebes, thenes) * when the news arrived of the occu- pation of Elateia. Hereupon some of the prytaneis arose at once from supper and began turning out the occu- pants of the booths in the market-place, and setting fire to the barriers ; others sent for the generals, and the whole city was full of confusion.* Next morning at break of day fhere was a special session of both Senate and Assembly ; yet such was the general panic that no one had a word of advice to offer. Demosthenes at this moment was the sheet-anchor of Athenian hopes, and all eyes were turned on him. The most urgent question was as to the loyalty of Thebes. Was she in league with Philip ? Demosthenes strenuously denied it. Had she been so, Philip would have been not in Elateia but already on the frontiers of Attica. He was, where he was, because he wished to embolden his friends and overawe his enemies in Thebes. The Athenians, therefore, must follow Philip's example, and encourage their friends in Thebes by a show of force upon the frontiers. They must further send ten envoys to Thebes, not to haggle about conditions, but to promise nelp whenever and wherever it might be required. This advice was followed, but it was a delicate nego- tiation for the envoys to conduct. Thebes was nearer to the danger than was Athens ; and Macedonian envoys were already on the spot, reminding the Thebans of favours in the past, and hinting at favours to come. Thebes, too, had no special love for Athens. Thanks, however, to the eloquence of Demosthenes, the offered alliance was accepted. The major part of the Alliance of Athenian army joined the Thebans on the Athens and P>oiotian frontier ; the rest remained in garrison against at Thebes, which was to be the base of opera- ^"***p- tions. The command was shared equally by the two allies. Of the expenses Athens undertook two-thirds. To Philip, on the other hand, the alliance was seriously embarrassing. He had two foes before him instead of one — an enemy in Thebes where he had expected an ally. During the winter the allies held their own with considerable success. They were victorious vigour of in two minor engagements, and they achieved the allies a masterly stroke of policy in restoring the w'imef Phokian emigrants to their homes, and in for- (339-8). tifying some of their towns. Nor was the alliance against Philip confined to the two cities. The activity of Demosthenes secured further aid from various allies, amounting (including Thebans) to an auxiliary force of 15,000 infantry and 2,000 horsemen. But soldiers without generals are little worth, and, as Phokion was in the Hellespont, neither Athens nor Thebes had a general worth the name to oppose to Philip. Manoeuvres The decisive struggle took place in August, ^nd thefr 338. Philip was in position at Elateia with object. 30,000 infantry, and not less than 2,000 cavalry. He had already fixed upon his field of battle, and his immediate tactics were directed to securing it. The allies lay before him with about equal numbers, occupying the pass through the hills between the towns of Parapotamii and (^haironeia, which led into Boiotia. His first object was to gain this pass. Passing along their front, his vanguard crossed the border, more to the east, plundered some villages, and threatened the whole country south and east I 76 The Macedonian Empire. cii. vn. of the Lake Kopais. In short their flank was turned, and Thebes in danger. The allies were obliged therefore, against their wish, to leave a small garrison in the pass, and to fall back toward Thebes. This was exactly what the king desired. His chosen battle-field was the plain of Chaironeia ; and to gain it he must gain the pass. Returning by forced marches, he overpowered the garrison, passed the defile, and stood master of the Battle of situation on his chosen ground, the grave, as fAu'ust*^'^ Marathon was the cradle, of Hellenic liberty. 338). ' The allies returned also, and fiiced him in front of Chaironeia. The right wing was held by the Thebans ; in the centre were the allied contingents and mercenaries ; on the left and nearest to Chaironeia were the Athenians. Opposite to them Philip commanded in person ; Philip's son, Alexander, was to attack the Theban right. The battle began hopefully for the allied forces. While the Thebans sturdily held their ground against Alexander's vehement charges, Philip, whether from weakness or design, fell back before the vigour of the Athenians. * Let us pursue them' (shouted one of the generals) 'even to Macedon ! ' But this boasting was premature. After fighting all the morning, the brave Thebans were at last overpowered by the superior training and endurance of their enemies, and died where they fought. Charging over their bodies Alexander fiercely fell upon the flank of the centre, which gave way at once ; and having disposed of these he turned yet once more upon the flanks and rear of the Athenians, who after a too hasty advance were now slowly retreating before Philip's renewed attack. All indeed was lost save honour. For a short while making head against overpowering odds, the brave left wing at last broke and fled, leaving 1,000 dead upon the field, and 2,000 prisoners in the enemy's hands. The Theban CENTRAL GREECE to illustrate Philip's caiapai^;iis Greek. Stadia ^ y ae JE se JLangmans , OrcenJ^ Co, Londorv. JJTe**' lark ABomixj^. Edw4-W^aer cii. VIII. Result of Battle of Chaironeta. 77 loss must have been even greater. Nor was the moral elVect of the victory less imposing. It was a conquest rather than a victory. The army of the allies ceased to exist. There was no thought of any further resistance ; and Athens and Thebes must prepare for the worst— foi attack and siege— possibly for ruin. Behaviour of Philip r » Thebes and Athens aftei his victory (338). CHAPTER VIII. FROM THE BATTLE OF CHAIRONEIA TO THE BEGII, NING OF ALEXANDER'S ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS. IN spite of the collapse of all their hopes, energetic preparations for defence were made both at Thebes and at Athens. But there was no more possibihty of common action. The latter, indeed, was better off than the former, for she was not a faithless ally but an open enemy ; while her prestige was too great to admit of harsh treatment, and her power (at any rate at sea) still too formidable to make it safe to drive her to extremities. It was not strange, therefore, that Philip should have treated Athens with marked leniency, and Thebes with great harshness — selling his Theban prisoners as slaves, indulging freely in banishment and confiscations, filling the Kadmeia with Macedonian troops, establishing a packed oligarchy of 300 of his own partisans, and re- storing nominal autonomy to the smaller Boiotian towns. In his relations to Athens Polybius insists that Philip's conduct was marked, by extraordinary moderation, humanity, and gentlemanly courtesy. Diodoros tells us, in a very different strain, that Philip's head was turned by his success, and that he grossly insulted his Athenian prisoners, until rebuked by one of them, named De- I 78 The Macedonian Empire. ch. vm. mades, for playing the part of Thersites, when fortune had allotted him that of Agamemnon. Whichever account be true, his final treatment of Athens was un- questionably lenient. Demadcs had been released by Philip — perhaps in compliment to his plain-speaking — and shortly after his The Peace return home an embassy (including himself of Demadcs. ^cddi i^LSchines, and probably Phokion) was sent to the king, to sound his intentions. They found him, now at any rate, full of courtesy, and ready to make peace on terms, with one exception, both easy and wel- come. He agreed to restore his prisoners, and to trans- fer the border town of Oropos from Thebes to Athens. Dut one convlition was humiliating : Athens must ac- knowledge the Hegemony of the King of Macedon m Hellas. In other words, henceforth not Thebes, nor Sparta, nor Athens was to be recognised chief of Greece, but a barbarous, half-Hellenic king at Pella ! It has been said — and rightly — that the peace of Demades was a renunciation of a proud historical past, and that with it the connected history of Greece is at an end. Never- theless Athens had but little choice in the matter. The terms were accepted, and the peace concluded. And here we may observe once more the astuteness of Phihp. Not only had he bought his own recognition as the leader of Greece from the necessities of Athens, but by the price paid — the cession of Oropos — he had also secured perpetual jealousy between Thebes and Athens. The progress of the king's arms was now rapid and easy. He reduced Akarnania, and placed a garrison in . Ambrakia. In the Peloponnesos he had so Pelopon- many friends, who counted on his aid against "*****• Sparta, that he met with little or no resist- ance. It does not appear that he actually attacked Sparta itself; but he gratified Messenc, Megalopolis, CH. vm. Congress of Corinth, 79 Arkadia, and Argos, by lestoring to them severally tbe lands which had been torn from them by Spartan ag- gression; while he served his own purposes by thus con- stituting a number of small communities, all jealous of each other and all equally feeble. This com- The Con- manding position was further assured at a S.''^^s°[ general congress of Greek cities held at (337). Corinth (337). The king there publicly announced his intention of invading Persia, with the double purpose of freeing the Asiatic Greeks, and of avenging the in- vasion of Xerxes, and was formally accepted by a general vote as Commander-in-chief; but to some, and most of all to Athens, it must have been gall and wormwood to find themselves, not only stripped of subject allies, but enrolled along with them in the common herd of contribu- tory appendages to King Philip. Sparta alone held aloof, and was spared this humiliation. Preparations were at once begun, and cai ried on throughout the year, for the projected invasion of Asia ; and in the spring of 336 the first division crossed the Hellespont, under the command of Parmcnion and Attalos, father of Philip's last wife, Kleopatra. Philip himself was to follow with the main body. But the king was destined never to set foot in Asia. In the apparently unchecked career of this man of strong passions, who had led a joyous, active, master- . ful existence, there was an element of discord ti^f "*' and unhappiness only too common in the PaulLuL courts of despots. Philip had married ^36). several wives in succession : and the same jealousies and intrigues which distract the harem of an eastern sultan or haunted the court of a Louis XIV., disturbed also iho. palace of King Philip. The last favourite was Kleopatra, and at her solichation it was that Philip was said to have repudiated OI>Tnpias, the mother of Alexander, ir 80 The Macedonian Empire. ch. vut. ■wrho withdrew to her brother's court in Epeiros. Furious quarrels ensued between father and son, even at the marriage feast of Kleopatra. Cabals arose within the palace. So uneasy, indeed, did Philip feel at the pros- pect of leaving this hotbed of intrigue behind him, when he went to Asia, that he gave his own daughter in marriage to the brother of Olympias, to disarm if possible his hos- tihty. This marriage as well as the birth of a son to Kleopatra were celebrated at Aigai in August, 336, with the utmost magnificence. It was hoped that banquets and games, and scenic representations, might not only dazzle the minds of Greek deputies, but reconcile the jarring feuds of court cliques. But it was a vain hope. There was present at the feast a young man, Pausanias by name, who had a deadly insult to avenge upon Attalos, Kleopatra's father, or (in the absence of Attalos) on any connected with him ; for Pausanias had complained to Philip, and with no result but ridicule. He had already re- solved, therefore, to divert his vengeance from Attalos, who was in Asia, to Philip who had refused redress, when he fell into the hands of Olympias and her partisans, who artfully whetted his thirst for revenge, and instigated the deed of blood. On the festal day, by Philip's express invitation, hundreds were present from all parts of Greece, and so great was the crush that many flocked to the theatre before daylight to secure places. There were dubious rumours and curious oracles afloat, as on the fatal Ides of March, when Caesar fell before the daggers of the Liberators: but Philip, absorbed in his own greatness, or perhaps careless of danger, proceeded to the theatre on foot, and even bade his guards fall back, that all might see how safely he was defended by Hel- lenic goodwill and affection. At this moment Pausanias rushed forward, and, drawing out a hidden Keltic sword, plunged it into the king's side, who fell dead upon the en. viii. Death of Philip. 81 spot. His guards and friends were so paralysed with horror, that the assassin almost escaped their vengeance ; but was presently overtaken and slain. It was a moment of tumult and confusion, when, but for one man's presence of mind, Macedon might have been plunged into the horrors of civil war. Philip was no sooner seen to be dead than one of those who had been privy to the plot hastened to salute the young Alexander as king, helped him to arm, and accompanied him to the palace —a promptness which anticipated any action on the part of Kleopatra and her friends. From that moment Alexander was king of Macedon, and the successor to all his father's power and ambitious plans. So perished one of the world's great conquerors, in the 47th year of his age, and the 24th of his reign- great beyond question, if greatness consists Estimate of in having grand and definite aims, and in P^i^p'scha. ^ ,. , . ' racterand successfully adaptmg means to ends. To rfiign. Macedon, the reign of Philip was the passage from obscurity to empire, from barbarism to at least semi- civilisation. Arrian puts into the lips of Alexander a glowing eulogy on hjs father's benefits to his country. From mountain-shepherds clad in skins, hard pressed by wariike neighbours, he turned them, he said, into dwellers in cities, with laws and civilised habits. Illyrians, Thra- cians, Thessalians, he reduced to subjection. He added to the kingdom seaports and mines. Phokians, The- bans, Athenians he humbled, and set in order the affairs of the Peloponnese. Lastly, 'he^ was appointed Supreme Commander of United Greece for the invasion of Persia, and thus attached glory not so much to himself as to the whole of the Macedonian people.' Philip was great, but by no means of a fine or heroic nature. Judged by the moral standard of Greece, he was not so much immoral as devoid of moral sense altogether. To A.H, G 82 The Macedonian Empire. CH. \ni. gain his ends all means were alike— bribery, flattery, cruelty, reckless promises, audacious perjury. He had wives and mistresses on an almost Eastern scale. His court was the resort of good-for-nothing adventurers ; his bodyguard was a corps in which no decent man could live. And yet it was something that a character so un- governed should have been willing to endure so much for glory and power, and have been capable of even winning sympathy and admiration — that a man so violent should have preferred mild measures to strong, and have been sometimes (as in the case of Athens) generous and forbearing. He was pre-eminently fortu- nate both in his life and in his death. He fell upon times of confusion in Greece, when there was no able general, no leading city, no patriot army to oppose him. He died at a moment apparently premature, but in reality peculiarly happy, when the difficulties had been over- come with which his genius was most fitted to cope. To gain diplomatic triumphs, by fair means or by foul, was as congenial to Philip's character as the forced march or the din of battle was to Alexander's. A great man was succeeded by a yet greater son— one who ascended the throne before he was twenty, and Fariy years died at the age of thirty-two. The histor>' of .nndeduca- herocs is the history of youth, it has been tion of , , ,. / J re Alexander. said, and Alexander displayed not a few ot the qualities which the world agrees to call heroic. It would be premature to dwell at length upon the character and exploits which are to develope themselves in the following pages ; yet as Alexander resembled Napoleon and many another great man in the fact, that extraordinary success spoiled a really great character, it will be well to touch briefly on some of the stories which have come down to us of his early years, his habits, and his education. He was the son of the impetuous, fanatical Olympias, CH. VI 1 1. Childkoud of A lexandcr. 83 a fact which itself explains half the eccentricities and violent deeds of which he was guilty when his head was turned by adulation. Three successive messengers on one day (it was said) brought his father Philip the good news, that Parmenion had defeated the Illyrians, that his horse had been victorious at Olympia, and that his wife had given birth to a son. From early years the boy showed signs of a marked individuality, which was trained and cultivated by the best teachers of the day— notably, from the age of thirteen to sixteen, by the famoub Aristotle, from whom he gained a special taste for medical science and natural history, and a general Hiving for knowledge of all sorts. He was an adept in music, and when only eleven years old played the lyre in public before the Athenian ambassadors, who were at Pella in 346. Of books he loved the Iliad best, even keeping a copy by his side at night with his sword, and of all the characters he admired most that of Achilles. If he surpassed his compeers in general intelligence, he was not less manly than they, but loved hunting and fencing, and was so bold a rider as to manage even the spirited Boukephalos (Bucephalus) whom no man before had dared to ride. Indeed he had the tenderness for animals characteristic of all fine natures, loving dog and horse as faithful friends. Plutarch even asserts that when Boukephalos once fell into the hands of a tribe on the shores of the Caspian, Alexander was inconsolable, threatening fire and sword and utter extermination unless his favourite were restored ; and that he called a city by his name, when he died of fatigue after the battle with Poros. In person Alexander was of a fair and ruddy complexion, and of middle height ; he had bright, ex- pressive eyes, and a strange trick of holding his head on one side, which his generals and courtiers imitated. His temper, if hot, was generous, and found expression in G % 84 The Macedonian Empire. cii. viii. CH. VTIl. Royal progress. 85 remarks and repartees- often wise, sometimes witty, always frank. It is perhaps more remarkable that, con- sidering who he was and the atmosphere in which he lived, his life was singularly pure and simple, and that m circumstances of more than ordinary temptation his treatment of women was considerate and even chivalrous. To those around him he was, with rare exceptions, a constant and liberal friend ; and many a story is told of his magnanimous self-control both towards his enemies and his soldiers, graphic enough to account for the admiring affection which they often showed. On the whole we gather the idea of a young man, superior to his father both in character and abilities, frank, passionate, ambitious, yet singularly self-restrained; and all the more shall we lament, therefore, the downward progress of such a youth into a manhood disfigured by acts of caielty and by excessive vanity. On his proclamation, as king Alexander's first act was to issue an address to his Macedonian subjects, Alexander promising to maintain the dignity of the king- secures his ^Qj^ ^-^^ to follow out the Asiatic plans of his £?ng"°" ""' father Philip. This was necessary, to satisfy the statesmen and soldiers, who might be contrasting the youth and inexperience of the son with the experience and long success of the father. His next step may have appeared not less necessary, from the point of view of a successor to a disputed inheritance, whose mother had been repudiated, and whose half-brother and male rela- tions either had better claims than himself to the throne, or thought to make them appear better. Not only were all the associates of Pausanias in his father's murder but two put to death, but Amyntas,his first cousin, and Kleopatra, his stepmother, with her infant son and Attalos her father, were by Alexander's orders or with his connivance put out of the way. His position as king being thus assured, Alexander set out three months after his father's murder with an army of 30,000 men to make a progress through ^^^ ^j^^^^ Greece, and to assert his supremacy there, makes a Indeed the loyalty of Hellas was more than TEgh doubtful. Thanksgiving had been openly Greece, offered at Athens for the death of Philip. Anti- Macedonian sentiments were everywhere heard in Pelo- ponnesos. All such expressions, however, were discreetly hushed as soon as the king appeared. The Amphiktyonic League named him, as they had named his father before him, leader of Greece ; and a conciliatory embassy from Athens endeavoured by apologies to dispel the memory of recent indiscretions. After this a second congress was held at Corinth, at which all Greek states again were represented, excepting Sparta. A second time a king of Macedon was recognised as head of Greece, whom each city was bound to obey, while the cities were severally to be independent each of the other, and each was to retain its existing constitution. On paper it was a fair enough arrangement ; but beneath the smooth exterior a deep irritation was smouldering, which it needed but a spark to set in a blaze. At this juncture it was (March, 335) that Alexander was lost to the sight of the Greek world for five months. He was anxious to secure the submission of his restless neighbours on the north and west — oaign^i™ the Thracians, Triballians, lUyrians — before setting /^fJJch to out on his distant march to the East ; and to August secure it he must show himself in force among ' them. It was an expedition which fully served its pur- pose, and at the same time brought into relief the military genius of the great conqueror— specially his dashing audacity, his fertility of resource, his rapidity of move- ment. Starting from Amphipolis, he forced a difficull 86 The Macedonian Empire. CH. VIII CH. VIII. Revolt of Thebes. 8; !| H pass of Mount Haimos, and attacked and defeated the Triballians. He crossed the Istros (Danube) almost out of bravado ; and, recrossing it, executed a rapid march to the westward through Faionia and by the rivers Axios and Erigon into the country of the Illyrians, whom in the face of superior numbers he out-manceuvred, surprised, and defeated. If originahty may be defined as the power of striking out new thoughts at the right moment, nothing could have been more original than his device for baffling the Thracians of Mount Haimos. They had collected a number of chariots, or waggons, intending to launch them into the dense mass of the Macedonian phalanx as it approached, and so to make their own attack easier. Alexander ordered his men to open out their ranks wherever it was possible and let the waggons through, but if not, to lie flat upon the ground with their shields interlaced and slanted over their bodies, so that the chariots should run over and bound off them. Thus not a single Macedonian was killed. It was a piece of audacity to cross the greatest of rivers without a bridge and in the face of an enemy, the Getai, 4,000 strong : yet he accomplished it under cover of night by aid of canoes and rafts, and without the loss of a man. It showed not a little fertility of resource to extricate an army from a narrow gorge, where in some places only four men could march abreast, in the teeth of superior numbers, and then to turn upon them in the dead of night and inflict a crushing defeat. And the general who displayed this audacity, resource, and originality was only twenty years okl. Meanwhile no news of Alexander reached Greece. No one knew where he was or what he was doine. Presently rumours were rife of disasters and reverses; improved before long into authoritative statements thai he was dead. In truth, the wish was father Revolt of Thebes during his absence. lo the thought. Nevertheless such rumours were highly dangerous to Macedonian interests amid the general discontent of Greece. Of all Greeks, perhaps, the Thebans were the most ill-dis- posed to Macedon, suffering, as they did, from the constant surveillance of a foreign garrison in the Kad- mcia. As, forty-four years before, when a Spartan force had seized the citadel, so now there were exiles from Thebes in Athens, where they were encouraged by Athenian orators and subsidised by Athenian money. When reports of Alexander's death were bruited about and generally believed, these exiles conceived the design, which Pelopidas had devised and carried out, of recover- ing Thebes and of ejecting the Macedonian gamson— a design warmly seconded by Demosthenes and his friends. Accordingly they marched unexpectedly, and being welcomed by their partisans, seized the town, and sum- moned the garrison in the Kadmeia to surrender — a demand scornfully refused. Simultaneously they sent deputies to Peloponnesos, imploring immediate help both in men and money for what was essentially the cause of Hellas. But Greeks had almost forgotten how to act in concert. Sympathy was to be had in abundance. Pro- mises might be bought not to help the Macedonians. The Arkadians actually sent troops as far as the Isthmus Even the Athenians were over-persuaded by Demades and Phokion to wait until rumour was confirmed before they committed themselves. Thus the favourable moment was again let slip, when the passes into Greece might have been barred against the invader; and the Thebans were left to shift for themselves. Nothing daunted, they proclaimed themselves independent of Macedon, and drew lines of circumvallation round the garrison in the citadel, hoping to starve them out. Suddenly, like a thunder- bolt, while they were yet dreaming of fair weather and 8S The Macedonian Empire, ch. vm. i| I recovered freedom, Alexander was upon them. Hurried news had reached him of the Theban rising, while he was still west of Mount Skardos ; and, aware return of of the gravity of the crisis, without a thought Alexander. ^f ^^^^ £qj, himself or his troops, or of re- turning first to Pella, he started at once on a forced march of thirteen days for Boiotia. Following the valley of the river Haliakmon, he crossed the Kambounian ridge on the seventh day and reached the townof Pelinna ; thence in six days he traversed Thessaly, passed Thermopylai, hurried by Elateia, and was first heard of by the astounded Greeks as present in force at Onchestos, a few miles from Thebes. He moved up at once to the city and established his camp to the southward, in order to cut off all access to or from Athens, and to open com- munications with the Kadmeian garrison. After waiting a day or two, in hopes of their submission, he issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of the anti- Macedonian leaders, and inviting any Thebans who pleased to join him. The Thebans rejoined with a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of two of his generals, and inviting all who would assist the Great King and the Thebans in freeing the Greeks, and overthrowing the Tyrant of Greece, to join them at once. This was in fact to draw the sword and throw away the scabbard. Nothing remained but to fight it out to the bitter end. The city was assaulted and at last taken, after a desperate resistance which contested every inch of ground. Five hundred Macedonians were said to have fallen and 6000 Thebans, while no less than 30,000 men, women, and children were taken prisoners. The question at once arose as to what was to be done with the city and the captives. Nominally the decision was left by Alexander to the Phokians, Plataians, and other Greek auxiliaries, the bitterest foes of the Theban CH. VIII. Destruction of TJiebes, 89 name. But it is obvious that in reality it must have been known to coincide with Alexander's wishes, and that his wish was to bring home to the mind of every Fall and Greek citizen a terrible example of the conse- ^f xCitles" quences of disloyalty to Macedon. That de- (335). cision was a fearful one. Thebes was to be razed to the ground ; her territory was to be distributed among the Boiotian towns ; the prisoners were to be sold as slaves, excepting only priests and priestesses and personal friends of Macedonians ; and all Theban fugitives were to be out- lawed. It was an unimportant addition that Orchomenos and Plataia were to be rebuilt ; that a Macedonian garrison was to be permanently quartered in the Kad- meia ; and that the house of Pindar was to be spared. Arrian's account, the tone of which is certainly truthful, represents the whole transaction from first,ctoJast as un- expected, the result of accident rather than^talculation, and makes the revengeful fury of Phokians and Boiotians more responsible for the tragedy than the policy of Alexander. Taken at the worst, and viewed merely as an act of policy, we may set it side by side with the massacres of Drogheda and Wexford (1649), or the devastation of the Palatinate (1688), and say that Alex- ander's was a venial deed compared with the deliberate cruelties of a Cromwell and a Louis XIV. All further opposition at once collapsed. Arkadians, F.leians, ./ttolians, vied in their protestations of loyalty j while Athens which three short years before Submission had fought for freedom at Chaironeia, now of Greece, sank so low as to congratulate a king of Macedon on his safe return from the north and on his destruction of Thebes ; and she owed it to the intervention of a Demades that she was excused from the necessity of giving up ten of her most prominent citizens to the vengeance of Alexander. 90 The Macedonian Empire. en. Tx. tions for Asiatic campaign (335-4)- From Thebes the victorious king repaired to Corinth to preside over another synod, and to fix the contingents Pre ra- ^^ ^^^ various citics for his Asiatic campaign ; and thence returned by way of Delphoi to Pella, never to set foot again in Hellas. The winter (335-4) was spent in preparations, the ai-my for Asia being massed in early spring, in the dis- trict between Pella and Amphipolis. Antipater was left as governor of Macedon during the king's absence, with a force of 12,000 infantry and i,5f o cavalry, to maintain order there, and to keep down, if necessary, the cities of Greece Contrast between the extent and the weak- ness of the Persian empire. CHAPTER IX. ALEXANDER IN ASIA MINOR. The empire, which Alexander was about to attack, was the greatest in the world — the greatest which the world had ever seen. Hellas itself to the south of the Kambounian range was but little larger than Portugal ; while the empire of Darms Codomannus did not fall far short of the extent of modern Europe. From the Sahara to the Indus, from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, all nations were subject to the Great King, who could place a million of men in the held, and had often overrun provinces larger than Greece in a single campaign. To resist his will, and much more to invade his kingdom, might seem like madness. But the appearance of strength belied the reality. From the days of the first Darius to those of the third luxury and corruption, bloodshed and revolt, had been sapping the strength of the empire. The sinews of war were still abundant : and, among the multitude of subject races, in- i ClI. IX. Geography of Persia. 91 dividual nations were brave, and even formidable. But the organization was defective, and the tactics and arms were antiquated ; while the natural leader of the army was too often a spoiled child, with a spirit softened in the harem and a judgment blinded by adulation. Of course no one could have foreseen the issue of the cam- paign ; yet it is certain that some Greeks had already formed a shrewd estimate of the real strength of the empire ; and even seventy years before, Xenophon had ob- served that the vast distances, and the consequent isola- tion, of the imperial forces were a source of weakness. There was hardly a corner of this vast dominion to which Alexander did not penetrate : its capitals, with their rock-hewn tombs and marvellous palaces ; its g - its wide plateaus, its fertilising rivers, its graphical loftiest mountain passes. It will be well, charac-^"^ therefore, at the outset to gain a general idea ^^"^tics. of the countries whose inhabitants he visited or reduced, and so to apprehend more clearly the objects at which he aimed, and the difficulties in the way of his attaining them. The first thing to observe in the physical configura- tion of the empire is the relatively great extent of desert and plateau, and the way in which they split piateau of it up into thin strips and isolated patches of ^'"^• population. The teeming thousands of the Nile valley, and the Euphrates, and the Indus, were sundered from each other by vast tracts of uninhabitable rock and sand, and by a journey of several months' duration. The most remarkable of these plateaus was the table-land of Aria (Iran), rising more than 3,000 feet above the sea, and forming one link in the great chain of desert which runs from the west of Africa to the frontiers of China. It is itself only the southern portion of a yet vaster desert, arid and barren, which stretches in unbroken monotony if 92 The Macedonian Empire, CH. IX. ■C I I ji i 1 I from the Indian Ocean far to the north of the Sea of Aral — unbroken save by the narrow strip of valley and mountain which cuts it at right angles in the middle. For at this point Mount Tauros (Elburz), after skirting the Caspian, runs eastward to meet the Paropanisan mountains (Hindu Kush) in three or four parallel ranges, which average 200 miles in breadth, while the fertile plains which lie between them form the natural route of traveller or army from west to east. To the north- east of this plateau, as well as between it and the Indus, lay a considerable population (in modem Affghanistan and Turkestan), who were Persian subjects, but whose connexion with the empire must have always been pre- carious. Again, we may change our point of view, and regard this plateau in a way altogether different. Its general Continuous direction is from south-east to north-west, fhelndu^to ^^'^^'■^ ^^^^ greatest length is 1,100 miles ; theEgean. but at both the north-eastern and north- western corners it communicates immediately, in the former case with the higher table-land of Central Asia, in the latter with the lower plateau of Asia Minor through the mountains and uplands of Armenia. From the western borders of Phrygia, where the uplands sink into the fertile valleys of Ionia, to the tangled mountain systems of Arachosia (Affghanistan), there is continuous highland, whose fertility varies inversely with its elevation above the sea, from the abundant corn and flocks of Kappadokia to the utter absence of all life, whether animal or vegetable, in the loose red sands of Aria, or Khorasmia, * a country the image of death.' From end to end, moreover, this plateau, whether elevated or low, has one pervading characteristic. It is bordered on ever>' side by mountain ranges, in Pontus as in Karmania, in Kihkia as in Hyrkania, which slope more or less CH. IX. Rivers of Persia, 93 abniptly on the outer side, and have a comparatively narrow fringe of habitable country at their base. Once more we may change our point of view, and re- mark that, rich as was the empire in every sort of produce, this richness was confined within narrow and well-defined limits, especially to the valleys SSt^river of the four great rivers. Take out of the ^^'"^• empire the upper waters of the Oxus and the Indus, and the basins of the Euphrates and the Nile, and a glance at the map will show that we have taken away its fairest and most prolific regions. In the higher courses of both the Indus and the Oxus ^* ^"""^ irrigation still produces great fertility ; but in the case of the latter there is satisfactory evidence to show, not only that the valley was fertile enough to support a large population, as it does now, but also that a valuable trade was carried on by that route between India and the Euxine, the goods passing down the river, and by its western mouth now dry, into the Caspian, and thence by way of the river Cyrus (Kut) to Phasis. The valley of the Indus resembles that of tne ^^^ ^"''"^' Oxus, not only in the fact of the two rivers being almost exactly of the same length, 1,860 miles, but because the upper course of each is made up of numerous tributaries that help to fertilise a wide district. On the other hand, there is no comparison between the tributaries of the Oxus and the five rivers whicn make the beauty and the fertility of the Punjab. The desert, it is true, is near at hand ; but the bounteous rivers and laborious irrigation make the plain rich, wherever the rivers flow, with corn, and rice, and fruits ; and the people are among the noblest of India, But, though the valleys of the Indus and Oxus were sufficiently rich, they were as nothing compared to Babylonia or Egypt, the 'gifts' of the Euphrates and \t 94 The Macedonian Empire, CH. IX the Nile. Herodotus tells of the rare barley crops of Babylonia, never returning less than two hundredfold. The Eu- '^^^ ^^^^ palms were unparalleled elsewhere, phrates And this fertility was due to the abounding an igns. streams of Euphrates and Tigris, converging slowly through more than i,ooo miles of level country, and diffusing their superabundant waters by innumer- able canals. Nor is this less true of the Nile valley. Hardly more than 600 miles of the river's course was within the limits of the Persian empire, but that was the richest part. The annual inundations and subsequent irrigation secured a marvel- lous return, so that three crops in a year were not uncommon ; and the river itself was in those days, as it still is, the high road of a great commerce with central Africa. These four great river basins were sources of vast wealth and power to the ruler who controlled them, whoever he might be ; and we have probably here a satisfactory clue to Alexander's seemingly erratic course. He would make himself master of the great centres of life in the empire, one by one— first the Nile, then the Euphrates, then the Oxus, and last the Indus— reducing all alike to subjection first, that he might afterwards concentrate, regulate, and combine. The route which he followed from one river basin to another will find its ex- planation in the description given above of the deserts and plateaus in his way. Lastly, the resources of the empire were as various as its peoples and climate, and so boundless of the in both men and money, that had there empire. \i^^xi an Organizing brain, or a strong will at the head of affairs, its powers of offence and defence would have been equally irresistible. As it was, the vigour was gone ; and the vast fabric, externally so fonnidable, was ready to fall to pieces at a touch. CH. IX. Persian Resources, 95 The Great King was for the most part a tyrant or a cipher. The satraps were either too strong or not strong enough— tqo strong to be loyal to the central government; too weak to offer successful resistance to an invader. In the field the Persian t actic s were altogether out of date, for by these numbers were always presumed to be more than a match for discipline. Strategy there was none, the game of war consist- 3 ing merely in finding the enemy and tramphng him under foot. Moreover, a Persian army was i ll-assorted : ^ some nations were warlike, others were cowards ; some were well-armed, others the reverse. Even the best were armed les s well than the enemy whom they were about to b meet. TKe rifled gun is not more superior to the un- rifled than was the Greek spear to the Persian, the latter having only seven feet of length against the ten, or in the sarissa, the twenty, feet of the former. In short, the component parts of the Persian host were armed accord- ing to local habits or ancient tradition, not with a view to efficiency ; and a Persian army was httle better than a fortuitous concourse of atoms. A Macedonian army, on the other hand, was a finished machine, each part devised to supplement another, each arm equipped with a view to its special purpose. Hence disparity of numbers ceased to be of any importance ; and we are the less sur- prised to read of the calmness with which a Macedonian army would march to attack a Persian host ten times its own size, and of the terrible carnage among the latter which always followed defeat. With this immense empire Greeks had been re- peatedly in contact since the days of Xerxes, especially in Asia Minor and Egypt. Greeks had helped Cyrus the Younger to fight the battle of Cunaxa (b.c 401), and had been strong enough to make a treaty with the Great King (b.c 387). Greeks had been mixed up with the i ' 96 The Macedonian Empire. CH. IX. revolt of Egypt from Persia, and had fought on both sides when it was reduced to subjection (b.c 346). A Greek of Rhodes, Memnon by name, for his services Greeks with on that occasion, had been rewarded with a Persians. satrapy in Asia Minor. In short, Greeks were admitted behind the scenes, and were awaking to a sense of their own strength and of the weakness of Persia. At this crisis it was that a man of genius and energy arose on the horizon of Greek politics, who had the means at his disposal for attacking Persia, as well as the will to use them. That Alexander's career changed the whole current of subsequent history is certain : but it is impos- sible not to regret, in his case as in Hannibal's, the silence and stupidity of some who accompanied him all the way from the Hellespont to Babylon, and who might have told us how far that career was shaped or foreseen by Alexander himself, what opinions he expressed beforehand on the chances of the conflict, and what end precisely he had in view, as opposition ceased and half Asia was at his feet. Gossip has handed down to us isolated expressions, and a few chance conversations ; but our judgment of the man rests only on his deeds, uninterrupted by any thought or word of his own. Alexander crossed the Hellespont in the spring of ii4j j"st eleven years before his death, with a force of Alexander 3o,ooo infantry and 5,000 cavalry ; leaving crosses the Antipater to maintain the peace of Hellas and 2id"S^r Macedonia in his absence. The actual cross- liion. ing ^vjis superintended by Parmenion ; while the king with a few companions crossed lower down the strait for the purpose of visiting I lion. To his suscep- tible mind, familiar with Homer from his earliest days, such a visit would be a pilgrimage at once of duty and of pleasure ; and when he took down the arms hanging in the temple of Athene, or visited the barrow of the CH. IX. Persian Tactics 97 Hellenic Achilles, it was probably with feelings of exalta- tion, which may have been confused, but were certainly genuine. This pious duty fulfilled, he joined the army once more at Arisbe, and directed its march towards Priapos, along the lowlands lying between the mountains and the sea, throwing out light cavalry as he advanc ed to feel for the enemy. Meanwhile the Persian leaders were divided as to what was best to be done. They were three in council : Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, Arsites, satrap Counsels of Phrygia, and Memnon the Rhodian, high ofthe"*^'*^^ in favour at court for his services in the Egyp- Persians, tian war twelve years before. The counsel of the latter was bold and original. He proposed to avoid giving battle as long as possible, retreating and ravaging the country ; while the fleet in superior force should make a diversion in the rear, land troops in Macedon, and open communications with disaffected Greek cities. The plan might have saved the Persian Empire, and was easy of execution ; but it was overruled. The two satraps were jealous of Memnon ; and, having the command of some 20,000 Greek mercenaries and 20,000 Asiatic cavalry, they believed themselves a match for Alexander, and desired to end the struggle at once. They resolved, therefore, to occupy the right bank of the Granikos and to dispute the passage of the river, being aware of its extreme difficulty from the depth of the water here and there, from the numerous holes, and from the height and steepness of the banks. The crossing in itself was clearly no easy task, or Alexander's best general Parmenion would not have advised that it should be deferred for a day. But the king's judgment was against him. Delay before such a tiny brook would only discourage his own troops and encourage the Persians. Immediate action was the right thmg ; and the event proved that it was so. A. //. H 98 The Macedonian Empire, ch. ix. CH. IX. Battle oj the Granikos, 99 s Alexander, as usual, commanded the right wing, and Pannenion the left-an arrangement which was speedily observed by the enemy across the river, from The Gr^V the splendour of the king's armour and the ^o* respectful courtesy of his suite. Accordingly they at once increased the depth of the squadrons on their left flank. For a while there was silence as the two armies on either bank stood confronting one another, dimly conscious perhaps of the great issues staked upon that da/s battle. Then Alexander leaped upon his horse, and calling on those around him to show their courage, bade Ptolemy lead the advance with a squadron of cavalry and a division of the phalanx, while he himself, at the head of the extreme right, plunged into the river, the men shouting, and the trumpets sounding the charge. Both the left and right wings appear to have crossed the river obliquely to the course of the main body, partly to avoid the holes in the river bed, partly to reach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and so escape exposing the flanks of columns to the charge of the enemy's swarms of cavalr>'. As they neared the opposite bank the Macedonians met with a warm reception. Where the ground was higher than the river, the Persian cavalry kept up a constant shower of javelins from above ; where it was on the river level, there they advanced even into the river itself and barred the way in superior numbers, so that many of the Macedonians were cut down at once on coming within sword's reach, and all were for the moment confused, being annoyed by the enem/s missiles and finding great difficulty in keeping their own footing. But when they came to close quarters the action became a trial of strength, each side pushing desperately against the other ; and ere long weight and physical strength, discipline and tenacity, won the victory, even on these unequal terms, over men of light frame and inferior resolution, less stoutly armed. Hence it was not long before the whole Macedonian line had emerged from the river, and was establishing itself in the teeth of obstinate resistance on the banks above. But the fiercest fighting was round the king himself, on the wing where the best of the Persian troops were posted, and where most of the leaders had gathered, as if to the turning point of the battle. The reckless courage of Alexander often led him into peril and hair-breadth escapes ; but never perhaps but once was he in such instant peril of death as in this cavalry skirmish, which opened his campaigns in Asia. His spear broke in his hand at the first onset. Turning to a groom he asked for another ; but this man was already in the same plight as the king, and was reduced to fighting as best he could with the butt. At last a Corinthian supplied him with another. At this moment Mithridates, a son-in-law of Darius, was advancing to the charge at the head of a wedge-shaped squadron of cavalry. Alexander dashed out from his own line to meet him, smote him in the face, and brought him to the ground. At the same instant he was assailed by another general, who aimed a sweeping blow with his scimitar at the king's head, and broke off a piece of his helmet. Alexander retaliated with a javehn thrust, which pierced corslet and breastbone, and laid his assailant low ; but, while thus engaged in front, he was himself in imminent danger from behind ; for Spithridates, at the instant of his friend's fall, had raised his sword to aim a blow at the king's now only half-defended head But there were quick eyes and strong arms around. A timely and dexterous sabre-cut from Kleitos, Alexander's foster-brother, averted the danger, severing the Persian's sword-arm at the shoulder. Every moment brought to the king's side a fresh accession of strength from those who had succeeded in forcing the passage, so that the enemy ua 100 The Macedonian Empire. CH. IX. were more and more hardly pressed on their left flank and centre, until they broke before the pressure, and gave way at all points, in a headlong rout, leaving i,ooo dead upon the field. Their loss was comparatively trifling ; for there was but little pursuit of the broken cavalry, Alexander recalling his troops to join in the attack upon the mercenaries. The battle so far had apparently been as short as it was brilliant : for these mercenaries were still in the position which they had occupied at first, and were now paralysed with astonishment at the unexpected turn of events, and rapidly becoming demoralised by the sight of their comrades' defeat. Thus, troubled and irresolute, they found themselves suddenly surrounded, and that by foes whose prowess was known to them not only from the witness of their own eyes, but from their memory of what Macedonians had done in recent times. They were defeated even before they were attacked. Assailed in front and flank and rear, they speedily be- came a mere huddling mass of men with arms in their hands, and were butchered where they stood, only 2,000 being made prisoners, and of the rest not a man escaping, save a few lucky ones who were overlooked among the Results of dead bodies. It was a brilliant victory, and the battle. ^von at slight cost. The Persians had lost not only half their force of 40,000 men, and an extraordinary proportion of superior officers, but prestige as well. There were no more troops in Asia Minor to bring into the field— indeed no force existed except some isolated garrisons, and after the fall of Halikarnassos resistance in that quarter ceased. On the other hand the Macedonian losses are said to have been so slight as to amount to no more than twenty-five of the Companion cavalry, who fell at the first onset, about sixty of the other cavalry and thirty infantry soldiers, or less than 120 in all: a small price to pay for such immense results. They weie J CH. IX. Result of the Victory, loi buried with all military honours, the twenty-five Com- panions even receiving the extraordinary compliment ot brazen statues, carved by Lysippos, and set up in their honour at Dion. The wives and children of those who had fallen received the substantial boon of a remission of all taxa- tion and of personal service. The wounded Alexander's were treated with signal marks of favour, the '':<^')P«nt ^ ' ofhispn- king visiting them in person, and in kindly soners. conversation giving each man the flattering opportunity of telling his own story and recounting his own deeds. All his Greek prisoners Alexander sent in chains to Macedon, to be kept to hard labour. In his eyes they were guilty of treason for taking up arms against their rightful leader. On the other hand he strove to gain increased interest and sympathy for his cause in Greece by sending to Athens 300 suits of armour as an offering to Athene, with an inscription stating that they were taken by Alexander, son of Philip, and by the Greeks (excepting the Lakedaimonians) from the barbarians who dwell in Asia. The effects of the victory of the Granikos were seen at once in the surrender of Sardis and Ephcsus, as soon as the king appeared before them — a submis- Reduction sion of great value while the Persians were ^} ^^^ , o coast of masters of the Egean ; for at present his main Asia Minor, danger arose from the possible acceptance of Memnon's plan, and from insurrection and invasion across the sea. It was, therefore, of primary importance to secure the adhesion of the Asiatic Greeks, and by so doing to shut out the Persians from the harbours of Asia Minor. Miletos indeed attempted a brief resistance, being encouraged by the presence of a Persian fleet of 400 sail at Mykale. Alexander, however, had seized the island of Lade ; moored his fleet of 160 ships so as to bar ingress and I02 The Macedonian Empire, CH. X. CH. X. Halikarfiassos. 103 egress ; and, having made a practicable breach in the wall, stormed the town in the face of a languid resistance. There remained one strong fortress in those parts, Hali- karnassos, where the Persians had collected all their forces for a serious defence, and where Memnon was in chief command. Alexander therefore resolved to send away his fleet, which was at once expensive and numeri- cally weak, and to direct all his efTorts to the capture of that city, as a step to driving the Persians from Asia Minor. an Athenian, Ephialtes ; and the guiding spirit of the defence was Memnon, a man as versatile as he was brave. CHAPTER X. FROM THE SIEGE OF HALIKARNASSOS TO THE BATTLE OF ISSOS. HALIKARNASSOS was the strongest city of Karia. Built on the side of a precipitous rock sloping steeply to the Prepara- Southward and to the sea, it was doubly de- ??"rM^* fensible from the possession of two citadels, SOS for the chief one lymg at the northej^n and defence. highest point of the city. On the eastern face of the hill can still be traced remains of the famous tomb built by Queen Artemisia in memory of her husband Mau solos. There were two good harbours, the larger and safer lying to the north, its entrance being at once sheltered and protected by a fortified island. The whole city was surrounded with walls, and strengthened further by a ditch, 45 feet broad and more than 20 feet deep. Moreover the preparations for de- fence were on a scale adequate to the strength and importance of the place. The Persian fleet had been brought up from Mykal^. Besides native troops, there was a considerable garrison of Greek mercenaries under A. The citadel, Salmakis. li. Citadel No. 2. E. iSIausolenin. C. Great Harbour. D. ( Jate of M y lasa. The siege of Halikarnassos was the most arduous task which Alexander had as yet had to fate. Before he actually began the operations of the siege, he took care to render the attack as easy as possible, and to secure his communications by conciliat- siege and ing the nearer Greek towns with freedom capture of *-* the city and special immunities ; while he won the (334). goodwill of the Karians by restoring the kingdom to Ada, the popular representative of their ancient line o{ kings. He then sat down before the city, about half a mile from the walls. At first the proceedings on both sides were desultory. One or two sallies of the besieged were repulsed with ease ; and a night attack of Alex- andei-'s on the neighbouring town of Myndos was foiled. ( I 104 TJie Macedonian Empire. CH. X. But thenceforward both the attack and defence became serious. To get at the walls with battering engines, it was first necessary to fill up tne ditch ; and this was done by the soldiers under cover of three movable penthouses. The rams were then brought up, and ere long two towers with the intermediate extent of wall had yielded to the incessant shocks, and were in ruins. Meanwhile the besieged made repeated sallies, and busied themselves in raising a thick wall of brick in the shape of a crescent behind the city wall, and abutting on it at each end, in case, as actually happened, a breach were made. Before the wall was finished, how- ever, the breach was practicable ; .md an attack was inadvertently brought on by the drunken frolic of two Macedonian soldiers, who, to settle a disputed question as to their comparative valour, donned their armour, and boldly set out to storm the town alone. A few who saw them coming ran out to attack them ; but these they slew, and proceeded to throw their javelins at others more distant. Presently the first amazement of either side gave place to excitement ; and hurried reinforcements, two or three at a time, joined the two reckless Mace- donians as well as their opponents. The fight became general. The besiegers after a struggle drove back the besieged behind their walls, and (so great was the con- fusion) might probably have captured the city, then and there, had the assault been intentional and well-sup- ported. As it was, the half-moon was finished before Alexander was ready to deliver the attack. Moreover, when the engines were moved up, the troops, being thus as it were within the circle of the city walls, were exposed to a harassing cross fire in front and on both flanks, while the sallies of the enemy became more desperate and impetuous. Gradually, however, the attack, directed by Alexander in person, began to overpower the defence, CH. X. Fall of the City, 105 and the Persian commanders held a council of war. The end was clearly approaching. What was to be doner* Kphialtes was urgent that they should not tamely sur- render but at least make one more effort for victory, and by persistence obtained the consent of Memnon to his heading one more desperate sally. Two thousand men were chosen. Half he armed with torches to set fire to the engines ; half he drew up in a deep column to charge the enemy. At daybreak all the gates were thrown open, and the sallying parties dashed out. Some of the engines were soon in flames, while Ephialtcs and his cokimn steadily pressed onwards, overpowering all resistance and even putting some of the younger soldiers to flight. Hut the efforts of Alexander presently rallied them ; and yet more the disciplined courage of the veteran reserves, who, taunting them with cowardice, fell into the ranks of their own accord with a coolness learnt on many a battle-field, and soon checked and eventually swept back again their already triumphant assailants, Ephialtes being one of the first to fall. The loss of the besieged in this sally was heavy; and Memnon and his colleagues, aware that they could not hold out much longer, resolved to evacuate the city. Under cover of night they set fire to the engines and magazines, and carried off the stores and troops and some of the inhabi- tants, partly to the upper citadel, partly to adjacent islands. Alexander razed the city to the ground ; and left 3,000 infantry and 200 cavalry with Queen Ada to blockade and reduce the citadel, while he himself pur- sued his march eastward. Having detached Parmenion with the cavalry and baggage to meet him in the spring in Phrygia, he him- self led the rest of his army through Lykia and Pam- phvlia, Pisidia and Phrygna, to Gordion in Bithynia, At hrst sight this seems a strangely circuitous route for a I io6 . ! T/ie Macedonian Empire. en. X. circuitous route to Gordion, and the reasons for it. man whose next object was to reach Syria ; nor is it Alexander's lively that a man like Alexander would go so far out of his way merely to reach better winter -quarters, or to escape the difficulties of western Kilikia. Two things were of primary importance at this time. To protect the Greeks of the coast from annoyance in his absence at the hands of the satraps of the interior, and to secure his own communications with Macedon. It was a wise step, therefore, to make a display of his power, and to exact if it were only a passing submission in the highlands of Phrygia and Kappadokia ; while the position of Gordion would facihtate rapid overland communication with the west, as well as a ready control of the satraps to the north and east. Here he was joined once more by Pannenion and by reinforcements from Greece, to the number of 3,000 infantry and 650 cavalry. Here, too, Tn. ..• before he turned his face southward, he cut the 1 ne cutting ' oftheGor- famous Gordian knot. In the citadel of the dian knot. , .1 .^ i \ town (so runs the tale) was a waggon, in which, once upon a time, when the people were at strife, a certain Midas with his father and mother had entered the place. Now it had been revealed to the Gordians that a waggon would bring them a king, who should allay their strife. So they laid hands on Midas and made him king ; the waggon was dedicated in the Akro- polis, and a further oracle declared that whoever should loose the pole from the yoke was destined to be lord of Asia. Now the knot that tied it was of cornel bark, and had seemingly neither end nor beginning. But for the omen's sake, and for the comfort of his friends, it was needful that Alexander should do the deed ; so he went to the citadel and loosed the pole, either cutting the knot with his sword, or pulling out the peg. At any rate the conditions of the oracle were satisfied, and a thuntier- Q\\. X. March across Asia Minor, 107 storm the following night rendered assurance doubly sure. From Gordion he marched to Ankyra, and then straight for Mount Tauros and the Kilikian Gates. The folly of the Persians in disregarding Mem- The march non's advice, and in neglecting: to occupv in ?'!°'" ^"'"^ e J r M 1 . . ^ ^ aion to force so defensible a pass, is incredible, es- Tarsos. pecially when we remember that, not seventy years before, Cyrus the Younger had traversed it on an errand similar to Alexander's, and that Xenophon. who was in his train, calls it a carriage-road, impassable in the face of an opposing force. In one place there was no more room than for four armed men abreast. A resistance, possibly successful, might there have been made to invasion, which was attempted to no purpose at Issos, especially as Alexander had not, like Cyrus, a fleet with which to make a diversion in the rear. As it was, the Persians in their supineness seem hardly to have been aware of the king's approach. The scanty garrison of the pass fled at once without a blow. Scarcely able to credit his good fortune, Alexander marched without a day's delay into Kilikia, only to find that the satrap Arsames also had fled, and that Tarsos was his— a place then important as a great commercial centre, and since famous as the home of the Apostle Paul, and the burial-place of the Emperor Julian. It was near being famous also as the burial- place of Alexander himself. Having bathed ^, ,• , . , , , « ° Alexanders incautiously in the cold waters of the Kydnos magnani- when his blood was heated by his recent memdf*^'" exertions and forced marches, he was seized ^^^i'ippos. with fever, and presently was dangerously ill. The phy- sicians were quite baffled. One alone, an Akamanian named Philippos, undertook to give the king a medicine which would certainly cure him. Meanwhile a letter reached Alexander from Parmenion, warning him to io8 The Macedonian Empire. Cff. X. iM i. beware of Philippos ; as a nimoiir was abroad that he had been bribed by Darius to poison him. As yet the hero was untainted by success, and was as gene- rously above suspicion as he was chivalrously above fear. Having read the letter, he held it in his hand ; and when Philippos appeared, gave it to him as he handed him the cup. Then, as Philippos read, he drained the cup to the dregs. It is difficult to conceive of a more apt illustration of the virtue of high-mindedness, as conceived by the Greeks and described by Aristotle, which indeed (he says) is impossible without goodness and beauty of character. After celebrating his recovery by solemn sacrifices and games to Asklepios (/Esculapius), the king set out on liie Pass of his eastward march to find Darius, of whose Kmkix°et* approach with a vast host he had already heard. Syriae). The Macedonian army converged by different loutes upon Issos, where the sick and wounded were left behind ; and then marched southward through the Kilikian Gates, reaching Myriandros on the third day after leaving Issos. The bay and plain, called after the last-named place, are formed by the two diverging arms of Mount Amanos, a southern offshoot of Mount Tauros ; the bay running some 50 miles inland and having an average breadth of 25 miles. Its importance has been recognised from very early times, for the best and most natural route from Asia Minor to Syria and Mesopotamia runs round the head of the bay, and then passes along the narrow defile between the mountains and the sea, turning near Myriandros to the south-east, and passing over Mount Amanos by the Syrian Gates (or Beilan pass) to Antioch on the south, and to Thapsakos, the ford of the Euphrates, on the east. In parts the mountains approach very closely to the sea ; hence the pass is very easily defensible, and is the exact spot which a general would choose who had to \ CH. X. The Pass of Issos, 109 contend with an enemy superior in numbers, but inferior in discipline and courage. On the other hand the folly of Darius in not defending so strong a position, which, hke the Kilikian Gates of Mount Tauros, might have been made practically impregnable, was as fatal as the pride which led him and others to slight the advice of Memnon while he was alive, and to exchange his policy of defence for offence as soon as he was dead. The Great King had collected a vast host of 400,000 infantry, and 100,000 cavalry ; but the Athenian Charidemos (like Demaratos, the Spartan, in the days of Xerxes), warned him that these no The Macedonimi Evipirc, CH. X. p.isscs Mount Am.(nos to Issos. numbers were delusive, and worthless against the enemy whom he was marching to attack. The warning cost Chari- demos his life, and the neglect of it cost Darius his throne. While Alexander was in the defile of Issos, Darius was encamped in the Syrian plain, about two days' Darius march from Mount Amanos. He had brought his vast army, his courtiers, his harem, as for a triumphal progress : and now that his rash enemy, as he vainly imagined, was skulking behind the mountains, or lying sick at Tarsos, he would go and find him out. So the huge array, which had taken five days to cross the Euphrates, slowly made its way by the Amanian Gates over the mountain ridge (the heavy baggage and treasure being sent to Damascus), and cam.e down upon Issos only two days after Alexander had left it on his southward march. It was a singular chance which thus led two enemies, each in search of the other, to march on nearly parallel lines but in opposite directions, and to be so near without knowing it. At Issos were found the sick and wounded of the Macedonian army, whom Darius was persuaded by his courtiers to torture and put to death ; after which he turned south- Prcpara- ward in pursuit of his foe, and encamped on tions of the right bank of the river Pinaros, where the for the plain is only from two to three miles in breadth. ^"^^ Darius therefore could bring no more than 90,000 troops into line of battle. The king would scarcely believe the good news, when told that the Persians were actually within reach ; and sent off some of the Com- panions in a fifty-oared galley to reconnoitre and bring him back word. They soon returned with the tidings that Darius was close at hand. Alexander at once as- sembled his officers, and addressed them in words which were clearly intended to ser\'e as the text for each officer's address to his own division. They had every reason (he CH. X Preparations for Battle. Ill urged) for good hope. They and he had fought together betbre, and always with success. They were about to fight now with men whom they had conquered, and to whom they were as superior as warrior freemen always must be to unwarlike slaves. Moreover, it was Alexander pitted against Darius ; and the prize was the empire of Asia. He reminded each man by name of his former brilliant deeds— of the rewards now within his grasp— of the great things which Xenophon had done on a similar scene, but with vastly inferior means— and at last roused them to such enthusiasm that they begged him to advance at once. Sending forward a few cavalry and bowmen to feel for the enemy, and having offered sacrifice, he set out after the evening meal, and by midnight reached the narrowest part of the pass— the Kilikian Gates— where he halted for the night. At dawn he advanced once more, in column, until the pass widened as the mountains receded from the sea ; here he deployed his troops into fine of battle, and again moved forward in the usual order into the plain of the river Pinaros. Darius, meanwhile, had made his preparations, and they were such as by no means to encourage his men ; being rather those of one who expects not to attack but to be attacked, and who has a lurking distrust of himself. He posted 20,000 men in the mountains in the rear of Alexander's right flank. These, had they been worth anything, might have paralysed the Macedonian advance, or charged at a de- cisive moment on his rear. As it was, their real merit was soon discovered ; for at the first charge of some troops whom Alexander detached for the service, they retired to higher ground and were actually held in check during the rest of the battle by a mere handful of 300 horsemen. The interval of about two miles between the mountains and the sea Darius occupied with a con- tinuous mass of heavy -armed infantry— 30,000 Greek 112 The Macedonian Empire. CH. X. It II mercenaries in the centre, and on tlieir flanks troops called Kardakes (or Asiatics armed as hoplites) to the number of 60,000. The line ot troops followed the line of the river bank, which in parts was precipitous and, where it was not so steep, was defended by intrenchments. The mass of the Persian cavalry was on the right wing in advance of the Kardakes. Of the actual 500,000 men present, there was thus room for no more than 120,000 to fight, the residue being massed on the plain in the rear, by tribes and nations. Well might Alexander ex- claim that heaven itself was fighting on his side, when Darius had been prompted to entangle his overwhelming numbers in so narrow a space! Well might he believe the Persians to be cowed in spirit, and already as good as defeated, when he saw their preparations, not so much lor delivering a blow, or trampling the audacious invader under foot, as for resisting his attack as best they might. He advanced with the phalanx in six divisions, with the Hypaspists and Macedonian cavalry on the right Brittle of wing under his own command, and the Pelo- f November ponnesian and Thessalian cavalry on the left 333X under Parmenion. His idea of the battle was, as actually happened, that the right wing under his com- mand should charge the Persian left, and drive it off the field, and then fall upon the flank of the centre, which would be occupied in front with resisting the impact of the phalanx. The approach to the river was conducted slowly, so as to maintain the order of the ranks, the king all the while riding up and down along the hncs and en- couraging both officers and men, who answered him with cheers. Presently they came within bowshot of the enemy, and the Persian arrows began to fall among them thickly. Like Miltiades at Marathon, Alexander gave immediate orders for the charge at the double, that his men might be exposed to the galling fire lor as short CH. X. Battle of Issos, »I3 a time as possible ; and setting spurs to his horse dashed into the river at the head of the Hypaspists, charging furiously into the Asiatic troops opposite to him. Ill prepared and little accustomed to such stress of war as this, they began to falter and give ground almost from the moment of attack ; and presently, ovei borne by the tremendous energy of their assailants, they yielded to the pressure, broke, and fled. Alexander pursued them far enough to ensure their utter rout, and then returned to the relief of his centre, against which the Greek merce- naries of the Persian host were maintaining a fierce and not wholly unsuccessful struggle. Alexander's own rapid advance had made a gap in his array, and left his phalanx a Irttle behind him ; and as they pressed hurriedly into the water and surged up against the opposite bank, it was with ill-dressed ranks and a wavering line, while their right flank was open to attack. Such disorderly advance was fatal to the full efficiency of the phalanx ; and the Greeks opposed to them were quite aware of it, and were eager to win the honour of defeating them in fair fight for the first time. A desperate struggle ensued for the possession of the bank ; while on the flank between them and the sea an encounter no less desperate was going on between the Thessalian cavalry and the main body of the Persian horse, who had crossed the river to attack them. At this juncture Alexander, having driven the Persian left wing off the field, fell suddenly and furiously on the left flank of the Greeks, who were already engaged with the phalanx in front, and threw them into utter con- fusion. Even then the resistance might have been stouter than it was, had not Darius himself despaired of success, and with craven timidity set the example of flight As soon as his left wing was broken and scattered, fearing that his own sacred person in the centre was no longer safe, he leaped on his chariot, just as he was, and fled A. H, I r\ h il4 T/ie Macedonian Empire. CH. X. I away along the plain with a few of his suite. To an army like the Persian such an example was disastrous, and the flight of the Great King became the signal that all was lost. And all was lost, indeed, beyond recall. The Greeks, attacked on two sides at once, wavered and then gave ground, and at last broke up into a seething mass of struggling men ; while the cavalr)^ beyond the river, seeing what was going on behind them, hastily recrossed it, hotly pursued by the Thessalians, and strove to make good their own retreat, jostling and trampling on one another in their panic, and even riding down their own infantry. The whole length of the narrow plain from the Pinaros to Issos was now one scene of inde- scribable horror and confusion, the great multitude that had never struck a blow helping to swell the vast tide of terror-stricken fugitives. The slaughter was prodigious, and not only by the sword. The plain was in some places narrower than others, and here and there were watercourses, where the crush and pressure were so terrific that hundreds appear to have been suffocated, and Ptolemy, who himself took part in the pursuit, avers that he crossed a ravine by aid of the dead bodies with which it was choked. Of the cavalry 10,000 are said to have perished, and 100,000 of the infantry; 4,000 fugitives succeeded in reacliing Thapsakos and crossing the Euphrates ; 8,000 of the Greeks actually fought their way through the Macedonian army, and marching down to Tripolis seized some Phoenician transports, and crossed the sea first to Cyprus and eventually to Egypt. But with these trifling exceptions the rest of the vast host disappears from sight. Only after the lapse of two years could Darius gather another army wherewith to meet his enemy, and that was raised almost wholly from countries east of the Euphrates. The Macedonian loss was returned at 300 foot and 150 horse soldiers slain, znd about 500 CH. X. Results of the Victory, 115 wounded. Alexander himself was slightly injured in the thigh by a sword thrust. The pursuit was continued as long as the brief light of f. Nt)\eiiibcr day allowed. Darius himself escaped ; but his wife and sister and mother, his young son and two daughters, his tent and chariot, quences of his shield and bow, together with 3,000 talents '**^ '''^*°'^ of money, fell into the conqueror's hands. If we re- member what the ideas of those days were with regard to prisoners of war, it will seem to be no small part of Alexander's glory that he treated these ladies from first to last with unvarying courtesy and respect. When he returned from the pursuit, the king found that the Persian camp had already been plundered by his soldiers ; but the royal tent, and perfumed bath, and the royal banquet had been carefully reserved for his use— luxuries to which hitherto he had been a stranger, and which possibly occasioned the sarcastic remark, quoted by Plutarch, that this apparently v/as what was meant by being a king. The next day he celebrated his victory on the spot, erecting altars on the Pinaros to Zeus, Herakles, and Athen^ ; and sent Parmenion for- ward, with some Thessalian cavalry, to seize whatever treasure was to be found in Damascus. Its amount and varied character must have been almost embarrassing, for we are told that he became master not only of the military chest, but of a great number of Persian nobles and ladies of the highest rank, and of camp followers of every sort and description to the amazing number of 30,00a Such it was, it seems, to be a conqueror. II IJ ii6 The Macedojiian Evipire, CH. xr. h CHAPTER XT. FROM THE DAITLE OF ISSOS TO THE llATTLK OF GAUGAMELA. The victory of Issos not only gave Alexander prac- tically the command of Asia west of the Euphrates, but Reasons for relieved him of much anxiety as to any al- thc invasion ijance between Greeks and Persians in his 01 riKL-iiioa and Egypt rear. That alliance had been a possible and even threatening danger, and it was with a view to guard against its recurrence in the future that Alexander directed his next attack against Phoenicia and Egypt, the homes and recruiting-ground of the Persian fleet, rather than against Babylon or Persepolis. From the Pinaros, Alexander retraced his steps as far as Myriandros, and then, crossing the Syrian Gates, fol- lowed the valley of the Orontes to Arados and Marathos, which, like Byblos and Sidon immediately aftenvards, welcomed with acclamation the conqueror of Persia. At Marathos the king gave audience to two envoys from Darius himself. They were bearers of a letter of Alexander remonstrance at Alexander's unprovoked attack, and of a request that he would send back his wife, mother, and children. The king's answer was characteristic, and re- vealed the larger views that were now occupying his mind. After adducing a number of grievances, of which Greeks in general and he himself in particular had to complain, he repeated in other words what he had al- ready said to the mother of Darius, that the contest between them was for the empire of Asia. He bade the Great King come to his presence, as to one who was master of all Asia. * And in future ' (he adds), ' when thou en. XI. Embassies to Alexander, 117 gives audi- ence to en voys from Don us. sendest to me, send as to the King of Asia, and write not as an equal, and speak, if thou requirest aught, as to one who is lord of all thy possessions. If not, I will take counsel against thee as a wrongdoer. And if thou hast aught to object in the matter of the royal power, await my coming and do not flee, but try the issue of battle. 1 will come to thee wherever thou art.' These lofty words have to our ears an arrogant ring, but they defined exactly the relative position of the two men. From Sidon Alexander proceeded towards Tyre, hoping to find as cordial a welcome as he had just ex- perienced in the northern cities. He was considera- met by an embassy with valuable presents, t>on of , , . , . , ^ , T . Alcxaiuiers and with promises on the part of their city to treatment of do all that the king desired. The king's 'h«='iy"ans. answer was that he desired to enter Tyre, and to sacrifice to the Tyrian Heraklcs. The ambassadors replied, in the name of the city, that they would gladly accede to what- ever else the king might wish, but that they could not admit any man, whether Persian or Macedonian, within their walls. But the king (they added) could sacrifice equally well at Palai Tyros, the old town, on the main- land, where was a temple of Heraklcs, more ancient and more venerable than their own. Alexander was deeply oflended by their refusal, and at once called a council of war, at which it was resolved that, however difficult the siege might be, it was a task which could not safely be declined. It has been said that impatient pride on the king's part prompted this resolution ; but his own speech to his officers in council suggests three or four weighty reasons for the step, which amply justify it. The wording of the Tyrian refusal gave tiie impression of * trimming,' and of their wishing to remain neutral in a contest which seemed as yet undecided. Could Alexander safely leave behind him, unreduced, those who were either secret IiS f The Macedonian Empire, CH. XI. enemies, or at best lukewarm friends? The ihoenician fleet in Egcan waters was his greatest source of danger; but if Phoenicia were reduced, that fleet would be his. In that case the submission of Cyprus would be certain ; and, with Cyprus and Phoenicia as the base of operations' the conquest of Egypt would be no less certain. Then' and not till then, would it be possible to feel secure of Greece, and to turn his face resolutely towards Babylon. But ever>'thing depended on that first link in the chain— the complete reduction of Phoenicia. So great a military genius as Alexander, living amid his own ideas and not ours, could hardly be expected to admit such considera- tions as that Tyrians wished to remain neutral, or were *an ancient and intelligent community,' or fancied their position impregnable. It was an essential part of his policy that Phoenicia and Egypt should be wrested from Persia, and completely subdued. The city of Tyre (Tsur, Sur, the Rock) was built partly on the mainland, partly on a rocky island, twenty-four miles Description south of Sidon. This island was nearly three of lyre. v[\\\^^ in circumfcrencc, and separated from the continent by an arm of the sea seven-tenths of a mile in breadth, which was comparatively shallow near the mainland, but three fathoms deep off the island. The line of coast seems to have altered considerably from time to time, owing to the silting of sand and to volcanic a.,encies ; so that part of the island on the western side is now submerged, ruins of columns being still visible below the water, while the channel between it and the mainland, which is now one-third of a mile across, was in Strabo's time (about the Christian era) en- tirely blocked by an isthmus of sand, resting on the ruins of Alexander's mole. The city had two harbours, to the north and south of the island respectively, protected by sea-walls ; and the southern which was the more exposed CH. XI. Siege of Tyre. 119 was defended further by an immense breakwater, thirty-five feet thick, and now covered with six or eight feet of water. These harbours were connected by a canal running across the island, the outline of which is still traceable. All round the city ran a wall, which opposite the mainland rose to the stupendous height of 150 feet. Within this compara- tively limited area, it has been supposed that the popula- tion must in Alexander's day have amounted to nearly 50,000 ; but the narrowness of the area was compensated by the immense number of stories in which the houses A. North (Sidonian) harbour. B. South (Egyptian) harbour. C. Supposed extent of north har- bour. D. Canal connecting harbours. E. Submarine breakwater. F. Double sea-wall, too feet apart. (i. Ruins of harbour- wall, 25 feel broad. H. xMexander's mole a. Line of coast in Strabo's day. b. Old Tyre. were built, reminding us of the ' insulat^ ' at Rome or of the vast piles crowded within the fortifications of some foreign town. The Tyrians were masters of the sea, and Alexander had no fleet. It was necessary, therefore, in order to reach the city at all, to run a mole across the channel, by which the engines might be brought to bear upon the I20 The Macedonian Eniptre, CH. XI, ! wall At first the work was easy enough. There were stones in plenty at Old Tyre, abundance of timber was Siege of ^o ^^ had on Lebanon, and the piles were (T3A ^""^ without difficulty in the soft sand and December mud. But the further the work was carried the 'o Ju yX niore difficult it became : for the water grew deeper, and the Tyrian men-of-war could sail up from either harbour and molest the men at work, who ere long came also within range from the walls. When the Macedonian engineers erected mantlets and two wooden towers on the mole to protect their workers, the Tyrians were equal to this emergency also. They prepared a fire-ship, and having waited for a wind steered her skil- fully, so as to set alight the towers and everything in- flammable within reach ; the men on board the ships meanwhile k-pt up an incessant shower of darts and arrows, while volunteers from the city, pushing off in any boat that came to hand, eagerly joined in the work of . destruction, pulling up palisades and helping to spread the fire. Most of the engines and a large part of the mole were thus destroyed, and the destruction was completed by a storm. Alexander, however, nothing daunted, at once set to work to construct more engines, and to build another mole, broader than the first, and carried obliquely across the channel in a south-west direction to escape the force of the waves. At the same time it was clear that his task was doubly difficult while the Tyrians were masters of the sea. Accordingly, leaving his engineers to carry on the mole, he took some picked troops and marched to Sidon, to collect as large a fleet as possible. Here the wisdom of his policy in first reducing Phoenicia became evident at once, for he found there the fleets of Sidon and Byblos and Arados, which had left the Persian side as soon as they heard of the adhesion of their native towns to Alexander, as well CH. XI. Siege of Tyre, 121 as ships from Rhodes, and Lykia, and Cyprus, and 4,000 mercenaries from Peloponnesos. Fie tiius returned to Tyre with a fleet of more than 200 sail, and so formidable from its equipment and the skill of the sailors, that the Tyrians gave up all idea of fighting them, and merely blocked the entrances of the ports with a tightly-packed row of triremes. The fleet, however, was useful to Alex- ander, not more from giving him the command of the sea, than because the larger ships could carry engines and so multiply his means of offence. But even this was at first useless, for the Tyrians had thrown great stones into the sea to bar the approach, and their divers cut the cables of any ships that were moored there to pick them up. Next they organized and cleverly carried out a surprise, which was near proving fatal to the Cyprian ships on the north side of the mole. Getting ready a squadron of thirteen vessels behind a screen of sails set up for the purpose, at mid-day, when the Cyprian crews were ashore reposing in the shade, they sent them out silently and suddenly in single file to charge and destroy whatever they could reach. The surprise was complete. Alexander hastily manned a few ships, which he sent off at once to stop more from sailing out of the north harbour, and pushed off himself, with some half-dozen others, to round the island and help the Cyprians. The scene soon became exciting. Alexander's little squadron was straining every nerve to reach the scene of action, while the inha- bitants, who were lining the walls of their city, suddenly became aware of the danger of their own vessels, now busily engaged in the work of destruction. At first they shouted to attract their attention, but the din on shore drowned the shouts. Then they signalled them to come back, but it was too late, for, as they strove to regain the harbour, Alexander was upon them ; a few ships es- caped, but the majority were damaged and waterlogged, ff 122 The Macedonian Empire. cii. xr. 6 while two weic captured at the very mouth of the harbour. The failure of this gallant effort was tlie beginning of the end. The strength of the wall indeed resisted the Fall of the engines fur awhile, and the struggle became ^^^' daily more bitter, the inhabitants even going so far as to kill some prisoners on the walls in the sigln of the besiegers, and toss their bodies into the sea. But at last a breach was battered in the wall on the south side of the city, and three days afterwards Alexander took advantage of a calm to deliver the assault, which he led in person, while a simultaneous attack was made on both harbours. The resistance was desperate, but vain. The assaulting party m.ade good their footing at the breach, and gradually fought their way to the king's palace, while the harbours were forced and the ships sunk or driven ashore. The slaughter was merciless, for the Mace- donians were exasperated by the length of the siege, and the slaughter of their comrades on the wall ; so that 8,000 perished in the struggle at the breach and in the streets, while 30,000 are said to have been captured and sold as slaves. One author asserts that several thousand were carried off into safety by Sidonian triremes, of course with Alexander's connivance. The Macedonian losses during the siege are stated at the quite impossible total of 400, considering that it lasted nine months, and that there was very severe fighting from first to last. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the fall of the first city of Phoenicia was worth to Alexander whatever time, or money, or lives it may have cost. Before the siege was concluded the king had akeady isccond em. f^^^'^^^ ^ second embassy from Darius, offer- Wy from mg such Splendid terms of alliance that, at '^'"*- the council where they were discussed, Par- menion declared that if he were Alexander he should CII. XI. Results of the fall of Tyre, ^'2'1 accept them. * So should 1,' rejoined Alexander, * if I were Parnienion.* 'lliese terms were, the payment of 10,000 talents as the ransom for his family, the cession of all provinces west of the Euphrates, and the hand of his aaugnter in marriage. But, however tempting these oilers might be to the older man, who would not perhaps be sorry to return home, they had no attraction for the younger, who had schemes of an ever-widening ambition in his head, and was brimful of restless energy. Alex- ander replied almost exactly as before. These things which Darius offered were his already. Let Darius come and see him if he had anything to ask. Then the Great King (we are told) abandoned embassies as useless, and set about preparing for war. It was indeed time ; tur during the summer of 332, and while Alexander was besieging Tyre, his admirals in the Egean, relieved by tlie sudden withdrawal of the Phoenician contingents, had driven the Persian fleet from those waters, had recovered Chios and the other islands, and had taken prisoner Phamabazos, tlie Persian, with all his forces. Thus Persian influence in the Egean was destro) ed ; and wlien Alexander had reduced Egypt (as he would clearly do with ease) he would at once be free to attack the heart of the empire. From Tyre the king marched southward towards Egypt ; but he did not actually reach that country until quite the end of the year, being detained more than three months before the fortress of at G^a Ilid Gaza. It is needless to dwell on the details J^ru^em. of a siege, where operations were carried out similar to those at Tyre and Halikarnassos. The place was ex- ceptionally strong from the height of the artificial mound on which it stood, and of the walls which surrounded it, and it was under the command of a man of exceptional resolution. But Alexander was resolute also. In spite 124 The Maccdojtian Empire. CH. xr. of a desperate resistance the place was taken, every man falling where he stood, and the women and chiMren were sold as slaves. At this point it was, if we may believe Josephus, that the king retraced his steps, and visited Jerusalem, intending to punish the Jews for refusing him aid in the siege of Tyre; but was moved from his purpose by the high-priest, Jaddua, who, being warned of God in a dream, went boldly with the priests to meet the king outside the city. Like Attila before Leo the Roman pontiff, Alexander was awestruck before Jaddua, and bowed down before him ; and when Parmenion asked him why he did so, he declared that he had seen in a dream in Macedon, before he started, a figure like Jaddua's, which had promised to go before his army, and to give him dominion over the Persians. Then he entered the city and the temple, and offered sacrifice under Jaddua*s direction, bestowing both on priests and people whatever favours they chose to ask. At last the king was able to pu/sue his way to Egypt, and seven days after passing (;aza reached Pelusium! He arrives ^ willing Submission awaited him on the part in Egypt. of the Egyptians, who had suffered many things from their Persian masters. From Pelusium he marched to Memphis, and was there joined by the fleet ; and thence, after sacrificing to the god Apis and celebrating gymnastic games, he dropped down the river to the mouth of the western arm of the Delta, and, after sailing round the Mareotic lake, landed on the narrow neck of land separating it from the Mediterranean, Foundation ""^^^^^ ^^''''^ ^ ^^"^^ ^^"^^C Called Rhakotis. of Aiexan. The place had long been a haunt of Greek "^^^^^ and Phoenician pirates, particularly because the roadstead was sheltered from the Etesian wnnds by the island of Pharos, and was the only refuge along the coast for many miles. Alexander's eye seems to have CII. XI. J I Icxaiidria, I2S been caught at once by the possibilities of the place, and he began surveying and drawing plans without delay. The first and most important thing was to take advantage of the shelter of the island for constructing a harbour at once safe and large ; and this was done by means of a mole or causeway seven stades (Heptastadion) or three- quarters of a mile in length, which ran from mainland to island, and formed on either side a spacious harbour, along whose sides were presently built numerous quays and docks. The city of Alexandria itself— the first and greatest of that name— was laid out between the ports and the Mareotic lake in the shape of an irregular parallelogram, with broad streets crossing at right angles ; but although, no doubt, it rose at once even in Alexander's day to the rank of a fine and important city, its beauty and grandeur date from later days, when a succession of Ptolemies vied with each other in adorning it. Water in II 126 The Macedonian E^npire, en. XI. abundance was supplied by an artificial canal from ihc Nile; the soil was dry and the air healthy; and the annual inundation of the river, which was connected with the Mareotic lake at the back, prevented it from degene- rating into a lagoon. Indeed much of the commerce of Alexandria reached the city by the Canopic branch of the Nile, and by the various canals which led into the lake. The population of the place, thus favoured by position, climate, and royal patronage, like that of Con- stantinople six centuries later, increased rapidly ; and we know that 250 years afterwards it was estimated at 600,000 souls. It was certainly not the least of the glories of Alexander to have founded Alexandria, the granary first of imperial Rome and then of imperial Constantinople, the rival of Athens in intellectual life, the focus and highway of the commerce of the Middle Ages. It is hard to determine the motives which led Alexander's steps westward from Alexandria. His mind Visit of ^vas at once practical and romantic, and he fJthrolsis '"^y possibly have wished to emulate the of Zeus- deeds of a Heraklds or a Perseus, while satis- tying at the same time his thirst for know- ledge and adventure. He set out on the march along the coast, intending to follow the southward caravan route which led to the oasis of Ammon from Paraitonion, where he was met by a deputation from Kyren^, bringing presents, and wisely inviting a visit which they had certainly no power to prevent. But his mind was bent on other objects. A march of six days across the desert from Paraitonion brought him to the oasis— a march whose dangers only divine interposition (it was believed; enabled the army to surmount. At last they reached their goal, the most northerly of those wonderful * resting- places' in the ban en, sandy desert, whose green fertility CIL XI. Oasis of Zens- A mmon. 127 is the more striking from contrast with the endless stretch of red sand around, and which alone make travelling possible. Being dips or depressions in the limestone bed of the desert, they catch and retain in their spongy clay the moisture which runs from the limestone rim around or percolates through the sand, and which is the cause of their beautiful vegetation. The oasis of Zeus-Ammon is six miles in length and three in breadth, abounding in springs, and producing in profusion wheat, millet, and dates ; while the only animal which cannot flourish, probably because of the moisture of the soil, is the camel. The present population is 8,000 ; but ' in Alexander's day it must have been larger, when the oasis was not only a focus of commerce but the seat of a famous oracle as well, and therefore visited by numerous pilgrims. But never before had the shrine of Zeus been visited by so famous a pilgrim, or one to whom the god and his priests were more zealous to do honour. A grand procession of priests and virgins met the king and his army on the confines of the oasis, .tnd the answers re- turned by the god to the enquiring hero were (it is said^ all that he wished. The purport of these answers he does not seem to have made public till a later period ; but we can perhaps imagine how, even after Issos, and before Gaugamela, Alexander must have seemed both to himself and to others one ofthe greatest of earth's conquerors, almost more than human, and how the cun- ning suggestion of a priest or an oracle might give rise to the astonishing belief in his divine birth, or might at least inflame the vanity which gradually clouded the great qualities of a great genius. From the oasis the return was made to Memphis by the direct route ; and a short time was spent He returns there in settling the futurei government of the t® ^^yp^ province of Egypt, its loyalty being secured by letting 128 The Macedonian Empire. CH. xr. ta well alone, and by leaving the reins as far as possible in the hands of native rulers, while garrisons were placed in Memphis and Pelusium, with a small naval and military force to support them. Then at last the course was clear for that march to the east, which was to end in such unparalleled results. It is, perhaps, as useless as it is fascinating to speculate on the feelings with which men have entered on any course of action, which has definitely shaped and changed the thoughts, or habits, or political history of other men ; and, perhaps, Alexander's vision of the future, when he set his face towards the Euphrates, was not more defined than Ccesar's when he crossed the Rubicon, or than Luther's when he stood before the Diet of the Empire at Worms. Yet the exaltation of feeling, which at the entrance of a great task fires the imagination and kindles enthusiasm, amounts in some men to prescience of success; and what was true of Columbus may well have been true also of Alexander. In action, the genius is the man who gauges difficulties most correctly. Leaving Memphis in the spring of 331, and passing a short time at Tyre, the king there left the sea-coast, and, and ad- marching to the eastward of Anti-Libanus, reached the river Euphrates about the middle of August at Thnpsakos, the same ford which Darius had crossed in pursuit of Alexander him- self two years before, and by which Cyrus and his army had passed to the eastward in 401. Two bridges of boats were already being built, and only not finished because a body of 3,000 cavalry was posted on the further bank ; but when the Macedonians appeared in force from the westward these retired precipitately, and the crossing was efTected without opposition. From Thapsakos the army marched to the north-eastward, and crossed the Tigris likewise without difficulty, some dis- CH. XI. Gaugamela. 12.<^ /aiices to the Euphrates. tance above Nineveh, and then halted for a few days' rest prior to the impending struggle. Impending it cleariy was, for some Persian scouts had been taken prisoners, who announced that Darius was ., 1 1 J • 1 r- ^ Alexander close at hand with an army far larger than and Darius that which had fought and been routed at .S clSga-^ Issos, and more formidable because levied '"^^** from the more wariike tribes of Parthia and Baktria. Alexander rode forward in person with a few squadrons of cavalry to reconnoitre, and, having had a smart skir- mish with some outposts of the enemy, ascertained that Darius was immediately before him, encamped in the broad plain between the Tigris and the mountains of Kurdistan, at a place called Gaugamela (or the Camel's House), with a force estimated at the lowest at 2oOjOoo infantry and 40,000 cavalry, with 200 scythe chariots and 15 elephants. Every endeavour, moreover, had been made that the fight should be fought under cir- cumstances favourable to the Persian arms. There was ample room in the vast plain to deploy all the host There was neither sea nor mountain, as at Issos, to protect the enemy's flank and to prevent his being over- lapped ; and a part of the field had been carefully levelled and cleared to facilitate the charge of cavalry and chariots. It was indeed a critical moment for the invading army. In point of numbers they were at most as one to six, and defeat would probably mean utter destruction. Yet defeat was not dreamed of. The king himself slept soundly the night before the battle, and remarked to Parmenion, who woke him in the morning, that it was as good as a victory to have overtaken the enemy ! To a man of such a spirit, at the head of veteran and disciplined troops, victory was assured before a blow was struck. A.M. K I'i 130 TJic Macedonian Empire. en. XII. CHAPTER XII. FROM THE BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA TO THE SACK OF PERSEPOLIS. Once more Darius and Alexander were face to face, and this time the conditions were all in favour of the former. Conditions ^ ^^ ^^^ overwhelming numbers of the bravest ofihebatiic troops which the empire could furnish. They had been newly armed and equipped. The field of battle had been chosen by themselves. If they could not conquer now they would never conquer. Alexander, on the other hand, had no more than 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry ; and were it not that fighting men must be weighed as well as counted, they might have seemed doomed to certain destruction from combined attacks in front and flank and rear. After four days' rest, and having fortified a camp to contain his invalids, prisoners, and baggage, Alexander Alexander's advanced boldly to find his enemy. Starting shortly before midnight, he timed his march over the seven or eight miles that intervened oetvvecn himself and the Persians so as to reach them at the early dawn of a September day. Immediately in his front were a few low hills, entirely concealing each army from the other ; but, as he breasted the slight ascent and halted on the top, there in the broad plain below were marshalled, already in order of battle, the tens of thousands whom Darius had levied during the previous two years from every corner of his vast empire. At a distance of little more than three miles from the enemy Alexander halted, and called a council of war. It was a critical moment, and opinions were divided ; the majority of prepara tions. CH. XII. Parmenion's advice. 131 generals voting for instant attack with tacit reference probably to the king's supposed wishes. Not so Parme- nion, who was cautious as well as able, and who uro^ed that on such ground and against such odds, it was nec^'es- sary to reconnoitre the field before engaging the enemy His advice was adopted, and the rest of that day was spent by the king in riding about and carefully examining .\\(i\<> Ar^€la b» the ground In the evening he summoned his generals o receive their last orders, which were brief but impera- -ive. Then he dismissed them to their quarters to get supper and rest. ^ But Parmenion was not yet satisfied that the right course had been adopted. It was well not to risk all in impetuously giving battle at once ; ?nigli^ "^ was It equally well to risk all in fighting ^"^^''• K 2 132 The Macedonian Empire. cii. xii. when and where ihe enemy pleased ? So he returned to the king's tent and proposed to him a night-attack, when the foe would be off their guard, and easily panic- stricken. There were others present, and perhaps for their sakes the king's refusal was emphatic. ' It would be disgraceful ' (he cried) ' to steal a victory ; and the suc- cess of an Alexander must be manifest and beyond cavil' These were brave words, but there was also doubtless present to his mind the reflexion which Arrian makes, that night attacks are hazardous things, in which science is often checkmated by accident ; while, if Darius were to be defeated, it were well that he should recognise that his victor was really abler and stronger, not merely more lucky than himself. Accordingly, Alexander adhered to his original purpose. Strangely enough, Darius had expected the very thing which Parmenion proposed, and had kept his troops under arms all night in consequence. When morning dawned, they were in battle array and ready ; but it was the readiness of men who have waited till they are weary, and in whom the excitement of expectation is apt to pass into despond- ency. They were massed by nations all across the plain : the Baktrians on the extreme left under their satrap, Bessos ; the Syrians on the extreme right ; while Darius himself was as usual in the centre, with the Persian horse and foot guards and the Greek mer- cenaries. Behind, and supporting the main line, were dense columns of Babylonians, and other central nations of the empire. Resting on the left wing were the Scy- thian and 1,000 Baktrian cavalry, with 100 scythe chariots, designed, it would seem, to overlap and turn Alexander's right flank. Immediately opposite the place where Alexander himself usually took up his position were stationed fifty chariots, and the fifteen elephants, to serve CH. XII. Alexander's tactics. 133 Persian orilcr of battle. doubtless as ramparts and bastions in the fierce stress o! battle to be there expected. On the right wmg were posted the remaining cavalry and chariots. In the face of such a multitude of men, Alexander's tactics were of necessity slightly modified. As usual, in- deed, the flower of the cavalry was on his right flank, commanded by Parmenion's son order of Philotas, while the six divisions of the pha- **"^^- lanx were in the centre, and the allied cavalry on the left under Parmenion ; but in order to guard against the special risk of being outflanked and surrounded, he held a second line in reserve, ready either to support the pha- lanx, or to wheel round and resist an attack in flank or rear. A few squadrons of light cavalry and bowmen were thrown forward in advance, to deal by anticipation with the scythe chariots, and under special orders to watch the enemy's cavalry on their right, and if they at- tempted to ride round and overlap the Macedonian right, to charge them in flank at once. So great, however, was tlie disparity of numbers on the two sides, that at the outset Alexander, in command of his own right wing, found himself exactly opposite the Persian centre and Darius in person, while the Persian left stretched far be- yond him, and was ready at once to swing round and en- velope his flank and rear. To obviate this pressing danger, which was even greater than he had anticipated, he appears to have opened out the ranks of his right wing, deploying columns into hne, and throwing his right back, so that the Companion cavalry might advance ob- liquely, and somewhat repair the inequality. But it was clear to Darius that, if this movement were not stopped, it would soon be impossible for the Persians eitherto outflank the Macedonian right, or even to use against them the chariots, for which the ground had been artificially levelled. He therefore ordered the Scythian and Bak- 134 The Macedo?iia?i Empire. ch. xn. trian cavalry to stop the advancing Macedonians by riding round and charging them in flank, while at the same time the chariots were to dash in upon the front. Charge of It was a well-conceived, even possibly a de- Persian cisive movement, had scythe chariots been the Mace- really the terrible weapon which our imagina- flanifSiKfof ^^^'^ conceives them ; but in reality they had chariots on no terrors for disciplined troops. As at Kunaxa, so now the Macedonian skirmishers wounded the drivers and killed the horses, or seized the reins and turned the chariots round ; while if any succeeded in getting through, it was but a few here and there, and their attack was rendered harmless by the coolness ot the veterans of the phalanx, who opened their ranks and let them pass, or, striking spear upon shield, scared the horses into charging back upon their own line. In the meantime a far more desperate struggle had been raging on the extreme right, where the Baktrian cavalry had been met by some Greek squadrons, whom they drove in, and by reinforcements of both horse and foot which Alexander sent up in haste. It was of the first importance to check this flank movement ; and presently, by reason of the superior training and precision of the Greeks, the Haktrians and Scythians were stopped, pushed back, and at last swept off the field. Still the Persian left overlapped the Macedonian right ; and, as the main bodies of the two armies were on the point of coming into action, first one division of Persian cavalry and presently another, nearer to the centre, _ . . moved by their left with the apparent inten- Decisive • r • i charge of tion of repeatmg the manoeuvre attempted by i^'oeTson on ^"^^ Baktrians at the beginning of the battle, the Persian and of charging the Macedonian rij^ht flank centre. »-> tj o and real. But the movement left a gap in the line, of which Alexander was not slow to make use. CH. XII. Rout of Persians. «35 Ordering up the light horse in reserve to engage and occupy these cavalry, he formed his own squadrons of Companions into a pointed column or wedge, and charged boldly into the opening, the men shouting as they charged. Almost at the same moment the phalanx crossed spears with the enemy in the centre, and at the first contact bore back with irresistible weight even the Greek mercenaries opposed to them. Meanwhile, the Macedonian left had been outflanked, and was being hard pressed by the cavalry on the Persian right. But a temporary repulse on either flank was of little moment now, when Alexander and his cavalry, and four divisions of the terrible phalanx with its bristling hedge of spears, were battling vehemently on the front and flank of the Greeks and Persians in the centre, step by step and by dint of sheer determination forcing a way into their very midst. The Persian left and centre, in spite of their vast numbers, reeled before the shock, and the Rout of disorder had begun which presages a panic ; }^,^ Persian when the timid Darius, seeing the press of c^'ent're. battle drawing nearer to himself, and remembering only too well all the horrors of Issos, set a shameful example of cowardice, and hastily exchanging his chariot for horseback rode off the field to Arbela. Darius himself says Arrian, was the very first to turn and flee. Imme- diately, all in that part of the field was panic and con- fusion. Many of the officers followed the king. The troops rapidly lost cohesion, having no centre or com- mander to rally round, and presently became a mere mob, whose first object was personal safety. Thus the left wing and main body were soon in hopeless rout, nothing saving Darius himself from the relentless pursuit of Alexander's light horse, but the dense clouds of dust which went up from beneath the feet of the flying host. The destruction of life was immense ; it would have been 1^6 The Macedonian Empire. CH. XII. yet greater, had not Alexander been obliged to return in haste to the battle-field. It appears that the attempt to overlap the Macedonian flank with superior numbers, which had been foiled on „ . , the Persian left wing, had been made on their Funous and rr-i ^ i eveniv con- right With succcss. The Greek cavalry of Itrugjjleon ^^^ allies had been outflanked, and nearly ihe Mace- surrouudcd by the Armenian and Kappado- doniou left. , . .... kian horse. Two of the six divisions of the phalanx were brought up to their si'pport ; yet even so 1 armenion had much ado to hold his ground, while a gap was thus left in the phalanx itself. Into this gap the generals of the Persian and Indian cavalry on the Persian right centre led a furious charge, passing right through the Macedonian double line, and emerging in the rear of the whole amiy ; but, instead of wheeling round and falling upon Parmenion's rear, they galloped on to assault the camj), where the Thracian troops were wholly off their guard. Then it was that Parmenion sent a hasty message to recall Alexander from the pur- suit ; and the king was obliged to return with some of the cavalry to the aid of his own hard-pressed left. As he was riding hastily thither, he suddenly met the flying squadrons of Persians and Indians, who had been driven out of the camp by the reserves, and were now in full retreat. A furious combat ensued ; and only a handful succeeded in cutting their way out, while sixty of the Macedonians were slain, and Hephaistion and two other generals fell wounded. When the king at last reached the scene of fighting on the left the battle was practically over, the gallant efforts of the Thessalian horse having ^^ . extricated Parmenion from his danirer. The The pursuit, t^ . . , , , Persian right, now broken and routed, and aware of the issue of the day in other parts of the field, were following their companions in headlong flight. cir. XII. Results of the Victory. 1 37 Then Alexander at once turned upon his steps, and started again in pursuit of his unhappy rival. He halted on the banks of the Lykos till midnight, and then rode on once more, hoping to overtake Darius at Arbela. How hot was the pursuit, and how exhausting the strain, we may judge from the fact that during the day, partly from wounds, partly from fatigue, 1,000 horses were lost, 500 of which belonged to Alexander's own division. But at Arbela the bird had flown ; and the spoils were but a shield, a bow, and a chariot, money and baggage. The royal fugitive was far on his way, with a small escort, over the mountains to Agbatana. The battle of Gaugamela was decisive of the struggle between Greece and Persia— between Alexander and Darius. It was a battle as conclusive as that Final result at Issos in its immediate, and i^x more so in "fca^^^"'* its wider and final results. It gave to Alex- meu"^"*' ander not merely the command of western Asia, but the dominion of all Asia. It seated him on the throne of the Great King, and gave him that dubious, undefined posi- tion, half king of a free and warlike people, half despot of a subject world, in which he lost the regard of the best of the Macedonians, without welding the diverse nations of his empire into one homogeneous people. Hencefor- ward no such levy was any more possible as that of whose fighting powers Darius had made so poor a use. Con- tingents and detachments only were met with afterwards, who waged purely local and useless struggles. The oracle of Gordion was proved to have spoken truly, and Alexander was Lord of Asia. Nor were the immediate results less striking in their way. Other battles have been fought between Europeans and Asiatics, in which the disparity I'^ZS'T of numbers was greater, or the disproportion *^^ ^"'^*- of losses was more startling. Clive won the battle of n8 The Maccdorian Empire. CH. XII. Babylon. Plassy (a.D. 1757), and laid the foundations of our Indian empire, with a force of 3,000, of whom only 900 were Europeans, against 55,000 ; but his enemy, whom he routed, lost no more than 500 men. The Romans at Magnesia (B.C. 190), where Antiochus, king of Syria, was irreparably defeated, were as one to two, but they de- stroyed 50,000 out of 92,000 men, with a loss to themselves of only 324. At Gaugamela the numbers were not so disproportioned as at Plassy, nor the disparity of losses so overwhelming as at Magnesia. The forces of Alex- ander were as one to six instead of one to two : and at the lowest estimate 40,000 Persians were left hors de combat^ while the Macedonian loss was 500. Nor were the fruits of victory confined to the destruction of an army. Babylon and Susa opened their gates to the king wiihout resistance, who thus be- came master of almost fabulous treasures. Babylon, indeed, like Sidon and Egypt, had suffered under Persian rule. It was the less surprising, therefore, that Alexander was welcomed in the capital, and that his entry was in the manner of a triumph, amid songs and flowers and smoking altars. In this most splendid of Eastern cities the army was permitted to reward itself for past toils and dangers for nearly a month ; while the king was regulat- ing the government of his new provinces, utilising his vast treasures, or devising schemes for the improvement of Babylon as the destined capital of his new empire. At Susa, which was reached in twenty days, and which had already surrendered, were found treasures yet vaster — 50,000 talents of silver (equal to 11,500,000/. sterling) ; the rest of the royal baggage ; and various spoils which Xerxes had brought away with him from Greece, especially certain bronze statues of Hannodios and Aristogeiton, the Athenian * liberators,' which Alexander sent back to Athens, and which were Susa. CH. XII. Persepolis. 139 seen by Arrian in the Kerameikos. At Susa he received reinforcements from Greece — 13,500 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry, as well as fifty young Macedonian nobles who had come out to serve in his personal suite. Then, after celebrating games and distributing promotions and dona- tives, he set out on the difficult march from Susa to the more ancient and hereditary capital of ,, .... , T^ 1- . March from the Persian monarchs, Persepolis. It was Susa to a district of rugged mountains and narrow P^^^^-'Pol'^- passes, occupied by a fierce tribe called Uxians — so fierce that the Great King on his passage through the country had been always wont to pay them black-mail, which he disguised under the name of largess. At one point of the district, moreover, the Susian Gates, all roads converged, and in this almost impregnable pass the satrap of the province intrenched himself w^'th 40,000 troops to bar the way. But the Uxians were soon taught the rough lesson that times were changed ; while the satrap's position was turned, as that of Leonidas is said to have been at Thennopylai. For Alexander, with some picked troops, was guided by a shepherd over a precipitous path, which brought him into the Persian rear and flank. Resistance was hopeless, and the Persians, abandoning their intrenchments, fled or were cut to pieces. Perse poUs, like Susa and Babylon, fell into the conqueror's hands, with treasure amounting (it was said) to 120,000 talents or nearly 28,000,000/.— a sum not wholly incredible if we remember the Eastern passion for hoarding coin, and the love of Eastern potentates for amassing precious stones, and for displaying gold and silver ornaments on their persons. The glories of Persepolis dated from the days of Darius I. The capital of Cyrus had been Persagerd (Pasargadai), where the tomb of the great conqueror is still to be seen. But Persepolis was the centre and the 140 The ATacedofiian Empire. ciT. xir. PersejK)Iis. pride of the Persians, grander than Persagerd, more national than Susa or Babylon — a Moscow rather than a Petersburg. At this favoured capital were built temples and palaces, whose ruins still suggest both beauty and grandeur — vistas of columns, bright hangings, gorgeous colours ; while the city lay at the base of the rock on which the ruins stand. This rock (vas enclosed by a triple wall, the innermost and highest rising to 90 feet, and each of its four sides having a gate of brass. On the eastern side of the hill were the royal tombs and treasuries. The city and all its wealth were delivered up without a blow. A sad sight, however, awaited the army, as it _ drew near to the capital. A miserable body The 800 r o ^ , 1 . muiiiaicd of 8oo Greeks came out to meet them, in Greeks. suppliant guise, and with shame and confusion of face, every one mutilated in hand, or foot, or ear, or nose, and most of them stricken in years — men who for various offences had been brought up long years before to the capital and consigned to this wretched existence, in ac- cordance with that Eastern custom which, in our own days as in Xenophon's, looks on mutilation as the natural punishment of crime. The whole army was deeply moved at the hideous spectacle, and Alexander himself could not refrain from tears. He offered to restore them to their homes and provide for them in the future ; but to this they could not bring themselves for very shame, choosing rather to stay on the spot and to receive their satisfaction in Persian land and Persian money. This dreadful episode, however, helps to throw some light on an event, the motives for which are singularly obscure, and which is generally regarded as one of the greatest blots on Ale.xander's fair fame. That event was the sack of Persepolis, and the burning of the royal palace. If we may believe Arrian and Diodoros, it was an act of de- CH. XII. Sack of the Palace. 141 liberate state policy. The former asserts that Alexander had resolved to exact a vengeance similar in kind to the sack and burning of Athens by Xerxes, and that g^^j^ , he carried it out in spite of the remonstrances Persepolis, of Parmenion. When we remember that Alex- of fhe"""'"^ ander's imagination was singularly open to such P^'^ce- half-poetical, half-superstitious ideas (leading him, for instance, to visit Hion and Ammon and Gordion) it seems probable that their account is correct, and that the sack of Persepolis was a deliberate act of political ven- geance, embittered and aggravated by the dreadful sight of the mutilated captives, and occasioned by the drunken revel which Plutarch and Diodoros describe. At a great banquet (they say), given by the king before leaving the city, when the revel was at its height, one of the women present, an Athenian, remarked that it would be one oi Alexander's most notable deeds if he should burn the palace, and if women's hands should destroy as in a moment the boasted glories of the Persians. The idle words were caught up by young blood, heated with wine. Torches were lit. Shouts were heard for 'revenge for the Greek temples ! ' and cries that Alexander alone ought to do the deed ; until, carried away by the mad excite- ment, and led on by a crowd of reckless women, he cast the first torch among the cedar columns, others following his example, until the venerable building, witness of so many glories, was in a blaze, and the ruin of Athens was avenged by the counsel and the deed of an Athenian woman. The city itself also was sacked. The men were slain and the women sold as slaves ; and, amid the wild and unrestrained pillage, an amount past reckoning of robes and plate was wasted or destroyed. We are told that the king repented before the work of destruction was half accomplished, and sought to arrest it ; but from any point of view it was a deplorable mistake and 142 The Macedonian Empire, ch. xm. politically a blunder. It was an act at once cruel, wanton, and useless — a sad episode, whose incidents develop then\- selves naturally from the first romantic conception of revenge down to its brutal realisation in drunken revels and burning temples, in wasted property and ruined lives. CHAPTER XIII, THE nP:ATH OK DARIUS.— REDUCTION OF PARTHIA— EXECUTION OF PHILOTAS AND PARMENION. Darius, meanwhile, who had fled through the mountains to the eastward, was resting at Agbatana. There were still 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry with Darius^'Ifter him ; he had still the support of satraps, un- Gaugamela. jauntcd as Hcssos and loyal as Artabazos ; but all heart was gone fri)m his resistance, and his one thought was to flee from Alexander's face to the farthest corner of his empire. With this view the heavy baggage and the harem had been sent forward some days' journey in advance ; and when he learnt that his restless enemy, not content with being master of his finest capitals and of the fairest parts of his empire, was bent on having possession of his person also, he delayed no more but set out eastwards at once, intending to pass through Hyrkania and Parthia, and to hinder his pursuers' march by ravaging as he went (July, 330). Eight days afterwards Alexander was in Agbatana. At three days' march from the capital he was met by the news that Darius had set out five days before, atAgb^f"^ and taken with him all his treasures. When tana. ^|^g Macedonians, therefore, entered the city, it was only to make hurried preparations for a forced march in pursuit. At the same time a short delay was CH. Xlli. Pursuit of Darius. 143 inevitable, for some of his Greek troops were anxious to return home after their four years' service, and it was necessary to remodel the military organisation, which had so far served its purpose perfectly. Henceforth he was to deal not with regular armies, but with provincial levies ; and still more with vast distances, with moun- tains and deserts, where rapidity of movement might mean not victory only but hfe. Hence he needed archers, light troops, and flying columns, more than the massive weight of the phalanx. Lastly, he had to pro- vide for the safe custotly of the extraordinary amount of treasure which had fallen into his hands during the pre- vious nine months. This was lodged in the citadel of Agbatana, and entrusted to the care of Harpalos. Then once more he started in pursuit of the Great King. In eleven days he traversed 300 miles of the l)roken, difficult ground lying between the desert and Mount Tauros to the north, passmg pursues near the site of the modern Teheran and ^^""s. almost at the foot of the splendid peak of Demavend, rising 20,000 feet into the air. On the eleventh day he reached Rhagai, but only to learn that Darius had already passed the Caspian Gates, fifty miles to the eastward, and to find that a short rest was indispensable for his jaded men and horses. In five days he was again in the saddle. Before him were the Caspian Gates, a long and difficult series of defiles, where he had vainly hoped to intercept the fugitive. A day's march beyond the pass he heard the alarming tidings that Bessos and his friends had laid hands on Darius, and that his life was in danger. Headlong as had been the speed of the pursuit so far, there was clearly need of yet greater efforts. The eastern satraps, it appears, had resolved to seize Darius and surrender him to Alexander if it were necessary, but if possible to push on across Parthia, outstripping puisuit, 144 The Macedonian Empire. ch. xm. m I "I' and to organize a resistance on their own behalf in Baktria and Sogdiana. But Alexander was determined to cut them off. Taking with him only the Companion cavalry, the light horse, and some picked infantry, and leaving Koinos to bring on the rest by slower marches, he rode on all that night and the next day till midday. After a short rest they started again, and again rode all the night through, in the morning coming on traces of a camp recently occupied. Here further tidings reached them, to the effect that Bessos had actually superseded Darius, and that Artabazos and the Greek mercenaries, unable to prevent what they disapproved, had parted company with the others and turned off into the moun- tains. Darius, in short, was utterly in his enemy's hands. So fagged were both horses and men, that another forced march of a night and half a day only brought Alexander to a village where Bessos and his party had encamped the day before ; and, just when all leserve of energy in his own men seemed gone, he learned that the fugitives also were resolved to make a forced march all the next night. To overtake them was out of the question ; was it possible to intercept them ? Dc.ith of At this juncture, when his prey seemed about Darius. ^q slip from his grasp, some of the natives informed him of a route, shorter indeed but waste and waterless. Difficulties, however, were no bar to the im- petuous Alexander. Picking out the strongest and freshest both of horses and men, again he set out in the afternoon, and actually accomplished nearly fifty miles in the course of the night, coming suddenly about dawn upon the weary and bewildered fugitives, the majority of whom fled at once on sight of Alexander. Bessos and his friends tried vainly for a while to induce Darius to mount a horse and flee with them ; and as he again and again refused, they cast their javelins at their unhappy CH. XIII. Death of Darius. 145 victim and rode off, leaving him in his chariot mortally wounded, where, though presently found and recognised by a Macedonian soldier, he breathed his last before his indefatigable enemy could come up. So died Darius, the last of the Achiemenids, at the age of fifty, after a troubled reign of barely six years- hurled in that short time from the height of Consequent human grandeur to the depths of misfortune — ch.inge in , -11 1 , Alexanders a man who might have adorned more peaceful position, times with the gentler graces of a benevolent despot, but too feel le and apathetic to cope with so tremendous a crisis— a king who would have been happier had he never reigned. More fortunate in death than in life, he was honoured with the burial of a king in the sepulchre of his ancestors ; while his conqueror married his daughter, and provided for the education of his other children. But that Alexander was mortified at the result of his march cannot be doubted ; for the death of Darius left the hands of the Eastern satraps free, and forced him to pursue them if he meant to complete the subjection of the empire. It further changed Alexander's position entirely. The king of Macedon became transformed into the Great King. Pella ceased to be the first city of a petty kingdom, and became a second-rate town in a vast empire, whose capital was the splendid Babylon. But it was a special difficulty of this new position that, though perfect success was scarcely possible, an effort at least had to be made to unite two incompatible things — Alexander was forced to endeavour to be king ot Asia and king of Macedon ; to rule Macedonian freemen and Persian slaves at the same time and in the same way. It is to be regretted indeed that his premature S'lhat''"^ death cut short the plans which he initiated position. for the amalgamation of his diverse subjects ; but an Alexarder usually forms juster conceptions, and has 14^ The Macedonian Empire. ch. xiii. loftier aims than the courtiers and generals around him. We can perceive that he started from the sound basis of universal equality, which was so great a source of strength in after days to Rome ; and it seems probable that his adoption of Persian habits, and his plans for associating Persians and Macedonians in the army and elsewhere, were due to a desire to harmonise discordant elements, rather than to vanity. Without such harmony the government of so vast an empire was impossible. On the other hand it is certain that Macedonians had begun to be jealous of Asiatics even before Alexander's death, and were seriously annoyed by his assumption of Eastern customs and a state ceremonial, which he himself deemed to be only advisable concessions to prevalent ideas. And now Alexander was in Parthia— the Atak or * Skirt * of the desert— the beautiful tract of 300 miles of AicKandcr mountain, stream, and valley, which parts the IB Parthia. desert uplands of Iran from the still more awful desert of Chorasmia (Kharesm or Khiva), where the traveller may wander for weeks without finding a drop of sweet water, the home of a Tatar population encamped amidst alien Aryans, as Basques amid Teutons or Magyars amid Slaves, who less than a century later issued forth to subvert the conquests of Alexander's suc- cessors, and founded an empire which lasted for 500 years. From Hekatompylos, the capital, he crossed Mount Tauros in three columns into Hyrkania. There were barbarous tribes in that happy district (as Strabo calls it) too fierce and independent to be safely left unvisited ; the Greek mercenaries were there who had abandoned Darius, and who must be dealt with ; lastly, it was im- portant to secure the connexion between the provinces of the south and the Caspian. H} rkania itself was speedily reduced, and the Mardians were taught a bitter lesson. The Greek mercenaries also, 1,500 in number, came in. CH. XIII. Satibarzanis, 147 and made their submission. As after the battles o( Granikos and Issos, so now Alexander appealed to the resolutions of the Synod of Corinth as a test of their loyalty or treason. All who had taken arms in the service of Darius prior to the Synod he set free at once ; they had been within their rights in so doing. To the rest he used the language which he always held. They were traitors to the common cause of Greece against the barbarians, and might therefore think themselves happy to have no worse fate than to enter his service on their former pay. Alexander now set his face steadily eastwards for l^aktra (Balkh), and it seemed as if it would be none too soon. For news met him on the way to the Episode of effect that Bessos had assumed the tiara of ^^^n^s sa- royalty, together with the name of Artaxerxes, trap of Aria, that he had a large Persian and Baktrian force under arms, and that he was expecting Scythian auxiliaries from Central Asia. In fact his position on the upper waters of the Oxus and Jaxartes gave him the simultaneous advan^ tages of inexhaustible reinforcements from the tribes of the steppes and of inaccessible retreat in case of need. A rapid attack, therefore, seemed beyond all things neces- sary. And yet Bessos was fated to enjoy his ill-gotten power for another year. Alexander had passed the modern Meshed, the frontier town of Persia, and had crossed the Margus, the river of clear green waters, which further to the north creates the oasis of Merv (Margia) and then is lost in the sands, when he heard that the SJ»,trap of Aria, Satibarzanes, to whom he had committed the government of that provmce, had murdered the forty lancers whom he had attached to his suite, was gathering troops and money in his capital of Artakoara, eighty miles to the southward, and intended to jom Bessos in L2 148 TJie Macedonian Empire. ch. xni. attacking the Macedonians wherever they might be found. Alexander did not hesitate. A variety of motives would lead Bessos to await an attack ; but the treachery of a pardoned satrap could not be overlooked. Turning sharply to the south, and leaving the main body under Krateros to a more leisurely advance, he reached Arta- koana with some picked troops by a forced march in two days. But Satibarzancs had heard and fled. With a small body of horsemen he rode for his life, leaving the hapless villagers of his satrapy, whom he had beguiled, to the vengeance of the king and his flying column. Still Alexander was not satisfied, and he resolved, before turning northwards, to face a circuitous march of 800 miles and to teach the wild tribes of Drangiana and Arachosia — true forefathers of the restless AHghans — that they had better acquiesce in the will of the stronger. Speaking generally, these provinces are the southern slopes of a huge mountain bastion, thrown out from the Description lowering Paropanisos towards the lower level of Ana, of the Arian plateau. From time immemorial, Drangiana, *^ ' and Ara- and in spite of the pe.-petual barbarism of the Af^hanTs° population, this country has been of first-rate lan). importance as the easiest approach to India from the west. The climate is fine, though severe. Snow falls heavily throughout the mountain district in winter, and is even seen in the plains ; and in summer the heat in the lower lands, though oppressive in parts, is less intense than in India. The irrigation, which alone turns the parched country into a garden, diminishes the volume of the rivers, which are rarely full except after the melting of the winter snows. In Affghanistan there are four cities which boast of Alexander, if not as their founder, at least as the originator of their greatness. Kandahar (Alexandria) even tries to trace its name to the great Iskandar (Alex^u^der). That CH. XIII. Foundation of Herat. 149 Alexander passed through both Kabul COrtospana) and Kandahar is certain, as also that he spent some time at Furrah (IVophthasia). It is far from improbable that he actually founded the now important city of Herat (Alex- andria in Ariis), which for ages has been the centre of commercial intercourse between India, Persia, and Tartary. The mere site of this Gate of Central Asia marks it out as an object of contention to its neighbours, a prize for which Persians and Affghans fight, and which Russia desires to have. It lies in an immense plain on the north-eastern edge of the desert, destitute indeed of trees, but fertile and beautiful. There are numerous canals and scattered villages, watered and fertilised by the Heri-rood (Arius) and on all sides are ruins attesting former greatness. To the traveller fresh from the steppes of the north and the desert of the west, the plain of Herat is, as the Eastern proverb says, like Paradise. Its climate is one of the most delightful in Asia, and its products as plentiful as they are various. It would not be strange, therefore, that a man of keen and rapid judg- ment like Alexander should have fixed upon Herat as a link in his long chain of fortress-colonies, to reach from Babylon to the Indus ; or that he who stands there as a victorious invader from the north or west should be said to hold the key of India in his hand. From Herat Alexander marched southward to Pro- phthasia (Furrah) a place of sinister influence on his good name and character. For it was there that the terrible tragedy was enacted which ended in ofTsup-^ the deaths of Philotas and his father Parme- p"^"^ p'°' against nion, — * the first cloud that casts a shadow Alexander's over Alexander's heroic character — the first calamity that embittered his hitherto uninterrupted pros- perity.' It is difficult to ascertain exactly the precise share of I50 The Macedonian Empire. ch. xiit. guilt attaching to each actor in this tragedy, when the Difficult of "^^^^ trustworthy of our authorities, Arrian, ascertaining givcs Only a brief and guarded account, and ths truth. ^j^^ ^^jj^^ details are added by men like the Roman Curtius or the gossip Plutarch ; yet, granting this, it is certain that of all who were concerned in it, not one save, perhaps, the aged Parmenion himself, was wholly guiltless, while the conduct of some of the Macedonian generals was atrocious. The inherent difficulties of the king's position have already been briefly noticed. His great officers were strongly averse to his adoption of Persian customs, and Philotas, no less than others, was apt to ridicule in private his growing vanity ; they were also more spoiled than he by their marvellous successes, and were furiously jealous of each other. And if Krateros or Perdikkas were envious of the influence and weaUh of Parmenion and his family, Philotas himself was un- guarded in his language and insatiable in his claims. I! we wouM understand by what kind of men Alexander was surrounded, and how baleful an influence they might possibly exert on his susceptible mind, we have only to look forward a few short years, and to observe how, when his strong hand was removed, his generals fought for the power which they were neither worthy to gain nor able to retain. Philotas was the commander of the Companion cavalry, and therefore in daily, almost hourly, communi- ch.iracter cation with Alexander himself. He was the and position sole survivor of three brothers, sons of that nion^amT Parmcnion of whom Philip once said, that the Philotas. Athenians were lucky indeed to find ten generals every year, for he in the course of many years had never found but one. Next to the king himself, the father and son were perhaps the most important men in the empire. But they were not popular, nor even CH. XIII. Episode of Philotas, iSr wholly trusted. Parmenion, it is true, was left in chiel command at Agbatana ; but he was getting old, and was thought to have shown a want of energy and resource at the battle of Gaugamela. Philotas also was in bad odour with both officers and men — with the former for his arrogance and bluntness, and his very success ; with the latter for a supercilious selfishness, which showed itself in disregard for their comfort as compared with his own, and a studied contempt of their wishes and preju- dices. Even with the king himself for the past eighteen months his relations had been less cordial than before, owing to some disparagement of Alexander, which he had iet fall in conversation with his mistress, and which had been betrayed by her to Krateros, and by Krateros— only too willingly — to the king. In so perilous a position caution was needed ; and caution was a virtue of which Philotas was incapable. Now it happened at this time that a certain officer named Dimnos was accused by one of his bosom friends of a design against Alexander's life. This Betrayal of friend had imparted the secret to his own 'J^^p'^V® * Alexander ; brother ; and the brother in turn disclosed suicide of the plot to Philotas, as to one who would arrest^of certainly provide against the danger. The Ph»lotas attempt was to be made on the next day but one. On that day and on the next Philotas had long interviews with the king ; and on each occasion omitted to mention what he had heard. On the third day his informant, finding that nothing had been done, resolved to take the matter boldly into his own hands. He demanded ad- mission to the king's presence at once — even though he was in the bath — and told him all he knew. Orders were immediately issued for the arrest of Dimnos, who, however, either slew himself or was slain in resisting ; and thus the most important witness in the matter was 152 The Macedonian Empire, cii. xm removed by an act that appeared to prove his guilt. It presently came out that Philotas also had been aware of the plot two days before, and had said nothing. In so grave a matter silence would in any man seem strange. In Philotas, not unnaturally, it was taken to prove com- plicity ; while his defence, that the story seemed to rest on insufficient authority, was looked upon as an after- thought. The suspicions aroused in Alexander's mind were artfully inflamed by Krateros and other enemies of Phi- Trial and lotas. A council of officers was held, and t^k)n''of""*' ^^^y insisted that the only means of arriving Philotas. at the truth was to arrest and question Phi- lotas. It needs but little imagination to see how it all happened ; Alexander hurt, angry, suspicious ; the gene rals, one here and another there, hinting, arguing, or openly accusing ; the very absence of Philotas, who was not present at the council, perhaps being turned against him. That night the accused man was arrested ; and on the next day, according to the national custom, he was brought before an assembly of the Macedonian troops, where the king himself stated the charge against him, though he retired before the trial began. But there was little hope of an impartial hearing where the accuser was the idol of the generals who envied the accused, and of the soldiers who hated him. He was found guilty of the charge of being privy to the act. But this was not enough. If the son were condemned on evidence so slight, what view would the father take of the whole affair ? And if he chose to resent tured, to it, or took up arms in self-defence, the revolt evidemre ^^ ^® famous a man, master of all the vast ag.Vmsi his treasure stored at Agbatana, would be formid- able even to Alexander. Parmenion, therefore, must be involved in the fate of Philotas. Evidence must CH. XIII. Philotas and Par mention executed. 153 be gained against the father as well ; and that evidence must come from the Ups of the son. To us both the end and the means taken to achieve the end are equally odious. Philotas was tortured. But we must Execution not forget, if we wish to be just, that the ^Tpi*^^^** false notion of torture being the surest means menion. of eliciting truth has been common in nearly every age and nation, and was neither more nor less disgraceful in Macedonian officers than in Roman slave-masters or Christian inquisitors. However wicked the object may have been, we may be sure that the means used for its attainment seemed natural and suitable. Philotas was tortured, and confessed what was desired, that both his father and himself were guilty of a design against the king's life, and that he himself had purposely precipitated measures, lest death should remove his father, who was now seventy, from the command of the treasures which were necessary to success— a confession, the truth of which was said to be confirmed by the contents of a letter from Parmenion, seized among the papers of Philotas. On the next day this confession was read before the troops, and Philotas and others, his accom- plices, were executed ; while a hurried messenger was sent off to Agbatana, eleven days' march across the desert, with orders to Kleander, the second in command, to put Parmenion instantly to death. The command was obeyed ; and the old man was killed while reading a forged letter purporting to come from his son. An impartial consideration of the story just narrated leads us to the conclusion, that of all the persons con- cerned Krateros and his friends were the most guilty. V\ hether we assume that Philotas was tl!iThoiJ°' really privy to the plot, or without being privy ^"^^"on- to it would not have been ill- pleased to see it succeed, or tvas simply imprudent and forgot to speak— and either 154 The Macvdonian Empire. ch. xiii. of these as.sumptions is possible — it is clear that there was prhnd facie ground for suspicion, and that the generals used it to ruin Philotas. They might have usea their influence to pacify Alexander; they did in fact exasperate him against their enemy. It is hardly strange that the king himself should have suspected Philotas, when he knew that for two days he had been aware of a plot against his life and said nothing about it, while the very first man implicated had preferred death to facing investigation. Appearances were against Philotas. It is equally clear that the charge was not proven, and that, if the accused had had friends at court, there was much to be said in his defence ; while the actual way in which he was treated showed a passion, a suspiciousness, and a want of generous forbearance, not unnatural perhaps in a son of Olympias, but hitherto unexampled in Alexander. If we conclude, however, that it remains an open question whether Philotas was innocent or guilty, the same cannot be said of the fate of Parmenion. That the death of the son should have made the father's death an apparent necessity both for Alexander and his generals may be granted, but that is only saying that one false step often necessitates another. No man who admires the genius or respects the noble qualities of Alexander the Great can fail to deplore the odious crime which he allowed himself to commit in assenting to the assassination of his oldest and ablest general, or to condemn the wickedness of those who urged such a barbarous judicial murder. Philotas may have been guilty. Parmenion was almost certainly innocent CH. xrv. IS5 CHAPTER XIV. THE CAMPAIGNS IN BAKTRIA AND SOGDIANA. In the autumn of 330 Alexander set out from Pro- phthasia on his long march of more than 600 miles to Ortospana (Kabul), which he did not reach ^ , , until early in 329. The weather was severe, Alexander for snow had fallen and was lying on all the phthaST highlands ; the country was difficult, es- »"to . pecially the latter part of it, where the route was intersected by lofty ridges, deep gorges, and narrow passes. He met with no combined resistance from the tribes through which he marched ; although he was obliged to detach a division to return to Aria, which the indefatigable Satibarzanes had entered once more with 2,000 horse and was rousing to rebellion. This was soon crushed ; and two more military colonies were planted at Alexandria (Kandahar) and Ortospana to secure the peace of the province. But though his march was checked by no serious resistance, the soldiers suffered terribly from the intense cold and want of food, the snow (it would seem) being exceptionally deep. Yet, in spite of hardships, Alexander pressed on, being anxious to cross the central range before the melting of the snow. There are four passes over the Paropanisos from the country of the Gandarians to Baktria ; and it is probable that the army took the so-called Koushan Pass, 8,500 feet above the sea — a march of extreme difficulty, which con- sumed sixteen days and cost the lives of many both of the soldiers and the camp-followers. At the southern end of the pass, and twenty-five miles north-east of Ortospana, a new city (Alexandria ad Caucasum) was founded in I $6 The Macedonian Empire. CH, XIV. a commanding position at or near the site of the modern Bcghram, where vast numbers of Greek coins are still to be found. Thence the army struggled on its wear>' march, half-blinded by the dazzling brightness of the snow, half-buried in the drifts ; and all the more bitter was Iheir disappointment when, on emerging from the mountains at Adrapsa (Anderab), they found the whole country lying between them and the Oxus laid waste by order of Bessos ; and men who had been battling with cold and fatigue had now to battle with hunger also. It was not indeed a difficult country to ravage, for much of it is barren and hilly where the spurs of Paropanisos run northwards to the desert, and it is only the valleys of the tributaries of the Oxus that are fertile. In spite of difficulties, however, Alexander pressed onwards, taking at the first onset the two most important towns of Baktria; but Bessos himself he did not find, for, shrinking at the last moment from the colli- sion he had provoked, he had fled with 7,000 of his native troops and a few of his fellow-conspirators, and had placed the Oxus between himself and his pitiless pursuer, burning the boats in which he had crossed. Disunion, however, was already at work in the ranks of his adherents; for the Baktrian cavalry rather than accompany him broke up, and dispersed in all directions. Alexander left garrisons in Aornos— a great hill-fort whose name, like that of another Aornos in the Indus Pursuit and valley, imports inaccessibility even to the birds capture of of the air— and in Baktra or Zariaspa (the modern Balkh), where ruins that cover five leagues of country remain to prove the former greatness of what Orientals call the Mother of Cities, in the Middle Ages the rival of Bokhara and Samarkand and the capital of Mohammedan civilisation. Then he set out across the desert in pursuit of Bessos. The foresight CH. XIV. Pursuit of Bessos. 157 of Alexander in timing his march now received another confirmation. The Oxus was before him, and he had no boats. Even then it was a deep and rapid river, not far short of a mile in breadth. There was no wood near enough to use, and the bottom was formed of shifting, loose sand. So great, indeed, is the quantity of sand which its yellow waves hold in solution, that, although the water is proverbially sweet and delicious to drink, it grits under the teeth if taken straight from the river, and requires time for the sand to settle. Had Alexandei reached it in flood time, when the snows are melted in the mountains, and when its breadth is so great that both banks cannot be seen at the same time, the passage would have been hardly practicable. Nor would he have had an easy task, had Bessos chosen to dispute the pas- sage. As it was, Bessos was far away in Nautaka of the Sogdians ; and the army got across the river safely in five days, on tent skins stuffed with straw. Had he been able to seek safety in the boundless steppes of Scythia, Bessos, even if bereft of his shadow of a crown, would have kept life and liberty. But it was not so to be. Very soon after the king had crossed the great river, he received a message from Spitamenes and an- ocher of the companions of Bessos, offering to seize and give hrm up if a small force were sent to support them. He was already their prisoner, they said, though not in chains. Alexander's resolution was at once taken. Slack- ening his own pace, he ordered Ptolemy, son of Lagos, to take a division consisting chiefly of cavalry and light- armed troops, and to come up with Spitamenes by forced marches, and with as little delay as possible. In four days Ptolemy was so close upon the fugitives that he reached the camp where they had bivouacked the night before. There he heard that tne conspirators were hesitating. He instantly started with the cavalry, leaving II i| 158 The Macedonian Empire ch. xiv. the infantry to follow, and shortly reached a viMage where Bessos was resting, with a few soldiers — Spitamenes and his friends being ashamed (it would seem) at the eleventh hour to play the traitor, and having retired to a distance. Ptolemy posted his troops all round the village, which had walls and gates, and then summoned the inhabitants to give up the stranger under a promise of immunity from attack if they did so. They opened their gates to him, and Ptolemy with his own hand arrested Bessos, and set out again to rejoin the king. He sent, however, an officer before him to ask in what guise Alexander would have Bessos brought into his presence. For a man who had murdered his sovereign and usurped his place there was no room for mercy. The answer was that Bessos was to be bound naked in chains, with a collar round his neck, and placed at the side of the road by which the army would march. Then, as Alexander drew near to the place, stopping his chariot, he sternly asked how it was that he had dared to seize and bind and slay his master and benefactor, Darius. Bessos answered that he had not acted alone, and that the deed was done to propitiate Alexander. The king's only reply was to order the traitor to be scourged, and sent back a close prisoner to Baktra — shortly to die. The onward march to Marakanda (Samarkand) and the Jaxartes — undertaken, perhaps, in emulation of the Episode of ^^^^ Cyrus — was broken by a curious episode, the Bran- At a Certain village the army came unex- pectedly upon an isolated Greek population, said to be descendants of that priestly family of the Bran- chidai of Miletos, who, being guardians and treasurers of the great temple of Apollo near that city, had surrendered its treasures to King Xerxes 1 50 years before. Covered with odium for this treachery, and obliged to abandon their old home, they had been aetiled by Xerxes in Sog- diana, and their descendant? had continued to occupy the C7I. XIV. The Branchidai, 159 same place. Now they came out to meet their victorious brethren from Greece, doubtless with mingled feelings of pride and apprehension. They were not long left in doubt as to their treatment. Alexander had a special tenderness for the oracle, which had bioken silence for the first time since the days of Xerxes to pronounce that he was the son of Zeus ; and the sacrilege of the Bran- chidai against the god had involved treason against the fatherland, far baser than that of any Greek mercenaries who had fought for Persia since the Synod of Corinth. That the sins of the fathers were to be visited on their posterity was a common Greek belief ; and it is hard to assign any probable motive for the infliction of so awful a retribution as the destruction of the village and of all its inhabitants, men, women, and children, unless it were this belief, coupled with the desire to avenge the treason and sacrilege of which the Branchidai had been guilty against Hellas and the Hellenic god. If Alexander was not a conscious agent in what he conceived to be a work of righteous retribution, he was a merciless savage. Alexander was now in the fertile district, midway between the Oxus and Jaxartes, watered by the river Poly- timetos, or Zarafshan, * the scatterer of gold,' ^^^^ . which pours *ts waters into the Oxia Palus, or the jax- during the dry months is lost in the sands. *"^ Having repaired the loss in horses which the army had sustained in the march across the mountains and the desert, he advanced to Marakanda (Samarkand). In Alex- andei-'s day it seems to have had little of the importance which it gained in the fifteenth century as the capital and burial-place of Timour, and which is recalled by the Persian proverb, that styles it the focus of the whole globe. It is more truly said that it resembles Paradise, for no lapse of time or change 01 circumstance can efface ^he contrast between the terrible desert and its beautiful i J I i6o The Macedonian Empire. cn. xiv. position of the Mace- donians at Alexandna Eschate (Khojend). site, fine air and water, and luxuriant vegetation, which even in those days marked it out as the capital of Sog- diana. Here Alexander left a garrison, and it would appear from subsequent events that Spitamenes also re- tained at least a part of the power which he had held under Bessos. Hut the king himself still set his face steadily northwards, until he reached the left bankof the Jaxartes. Here, too, he founded another city or military colony, Alex- andria (Khojend), the position being suitable for making it Dangerous ^^ once a frontier fortress and a base of opera- lions against the Scythians of the right bank. It was not long, indeed, before the place be- came of vital importance in each character. For in this remote corner of the empire Alex- ander was unexpectedly assailed by enemies in front and flank and rear, not acting in combination though actuated by a common hostility. On the march from Marakanda he had reduced without difficulty a chain of seven forts, standing near to one another on the skirt of the hills and the desert, and intended probably as outposts against Scythian inroads. The largest and most important bore the ambitious name of Cyropolis. He now received tidings that the mountain tribes in his rear had taken all these forts, and put their Macedonian garrisons to the sword. And not only so ; they had been reinforced and assisted by Sogdian and Baktrian allies, only too certainly excited by the intrigues of Spitamenes, who, as he learned later, was even threatening Marakanda, while presently the right bank of the river became lined with a host of Scythian horsemen, either roused to action by the same intriguer, or fearing for an independence that might seem threatened by the erection of the new fortress. It was a serious crisis, exactly suited to try the king's judgment, and to call out his determined energy. The first and most important thing was to recover the seven foits. CH. XIV. 'Hie Jcixartes. i6i Accordingly he despatched Krateros to blockade the strongest, Cyropolis, which lay furthest but one to the east, and was held by 1 5,000 men, while he himself has- tened to attack the westernmost, Gaza. It was carried by storm and burnt, and the garrison was put to the sword. On the same day he stormed a second. On the next day three more were carried ; and the garrisons in their attempt to flee to the mountains fell into the hands of the Macedonian cavalry. The resistance at Cyropolis was more desperate ; but the dry bed of a torrent gave admittance to a forlorn hope headed by the king in person, while the attention of the besieged was engrossed by a fierce attack on the other side. Even so, however, with the gates open, and the enemy actually within the walls, the garrison fought bravely ; Alexander himself was wounded by a blow in the neck from a stone ; and it was not till 8,000 had fallen and the residue, shut up in the citadel, were fainting for want of water, that they thought of submission. The seventh and last fort surrendered at discretion. By this time the new colony of Alexandria was suf- ficiently advanced in building to sustain an attack; and after leavingagarrison there of combined Greeksand natives, and sending a force of 1,500 foot and 800 horse to the relief of Marakanda, he crossed the river under cover of showers of arrows from the engines on the bank, and at once attacked the Scythian horsemen, who had defied him to come over, and boasted of the different sort of enemy he would find in them. It was a new style of fighting, in which the enemy, so to say, eluded the grasp, but hovered on the flanks of the army and trusted to their missiles. Alexander's genius, however, was shown not least in coping with strange emergencies, and few generals, it any, have rivalled his rapidity of movement The A. H, M Passage of the Jax- artes, and battle with the Scy- thians. I '■I l62 The Macedonian Empire. ch. xiv. Scythians were compelled to fight in his way and not their own, and were finally driven off the field with a loss of I, GOO killed and 150 prisoners. A reverse so unexpected speedily led to apologies, submission, and pe«ice. Alexander at once recrossed the river; and, spurred by the intelligence of disasters in his rear, actually made the whole distance from the Jaxartes to Marakanda by a forced march in less than four days. His presence was indeed needed. It appears that on the approach of Exploits of the relieving force already mentioned, Spita- Spitamenes. menes, who was pressing the garrison of Marakanda hard, at once retired westward down the valley of the Polytimetos in the direction of the modern Bokhara and passed it to the very edge of the desert lying between Bokhara and Khiva. Here he was joined by 600 Scythian cavalry ; then, turning fiercely on the Macedonians, who had been pursuing him, and using cunningly those very tactics which had almost baffled Alexander himself, he harassed their advance with per- petual feints and unceasing showers of missiles, until they were driven to a retreat. At the river the retreat be- came a rout and simple massacre, so that less than 400 escaped to tell the tale. Then Spitamenes marched a second time to Marakanda to renew the siege. It was the first reverse of the Macedonian arms, the possible signal for a general rising against the intruders in accord- ance with the usual habits of barbarous tribes. Indeed it is in this light, and this light only, that a word of extenuation can be said for the pitiless vengeance which fell upon the inhabitants of this fertile valley ; for if it was not an act of military self-defence, it was an act of atrocious cruelty. Spitamenes, on hearing of Alexander's approach, a second time bowed befoie the storm and re- treated hastily in the same direction as before, this time mto the very desert itself. Alexander followed as far cn. XIV. Death of Besses, ^<^3 as he dared ; but to enter the desert would have been sheer madness. Baulked of his prey, he turned back up the valley, ravaging far and near as he went, reducing every fort, and putting all alike to death. After this he returned victorious into winter quarters at in winter Tiaktra (329-8), where he received reinforce- Era^ ^' nients from Greece and Syria. During the (329-8). winter, moreover, the unfortunate Bessos was brought before the assembled Macedonians to receive his final sentence. If Arrian is correct in saying that Alexandei ordered him to be mutilated in nose and ears, and then sent him to Agbatana for execution, the strictures are just which he passes on the king for this conformity to a hideous Eastern custom. On the other hand, Diodoros avers that Bessos was given over to the tender mercies of the brother and other kinsmen of Darius, as a politic concession, and that they insulted and tortured and finally put him to death, with ingenious refinements of cruelty only possible to Orientals. The events of the campaigns of ^iZ and 327 are so obscurely narrated that, while the rebults are intelligible, it is almost impossible to understand the de- Measures tails. It will be sufficient, therefore, to re- for the sub- count briefly the steps which were taken to lh?t^o°^ insure the subjection of Baktria and Sogdiana Provinces, and the defeat of Spitamenes. It became clear to Alex- ander during the winter of 329-8 that his work in these provinces was as yet only half done. There were many hill tribes still restless under the interference with their liberty. There were many independent chiefs whose submission was secure only so long as Macedonian troops were in their neighbourhood. There were several im- portant leaders at large, who might possibly become centres of formidable insurrection. And there was more than one almost impregnable hill-fortress still unreduced, M 2 1 64 The Macedonian Empire, cii. xiv. where an insurgent force might find shelter. He there- fore organized a series of flying columns, to act in several directions at once under himself and his lieutenants in Sogdiana, with orders to rendezvous at Marakanda. Krateros was left with a sufficient force to answer for order in liaktria. From the mountains of Nura in the far west, lying to the north of Bagae (Bokhara), to Mar- ginia in the north-east (Marginan in Ferghan), and Parcetakene in the south-east, the whole country seems to have been swept by these flying columns during the year 328, and the early part of 327. Meanwhile Spitamenes in their rear, ever on the watch, fell upon isolated de- tachments, and on one occasion boldly ravaged up to the very walls of Baktra. But it was an unequal stmggle ; Knd of «'ind at last, after a defeat at Bagas more crush- Spitamenes. jj^g \\y^^ usual, the Scythian allies, weary of the struggle and thinking the cause desperate, first plundered the baggage and then cut off the head of Spitamenes, and sent it to Alexander. Tlius fell the most obstinate, active, and courageous enemy that the Mace- donian troops had met in Asia, and his death unques- tionably relieved Alexander of a permanent source of anxiety. Of all the military operations the king, as usual, re- served the most difficult for himself This was an attack ^ - on two hill-forts of a similar character, stand- Capture of . u- 1- • 1 . J 1 • • 11 •he Sogdian mg on high, msulated rocks, precipitous on all "^^ ' sides, and surrounded by deep ravines— so lofty and apparently inaccessible that the taunting ques- tion of one of the chiefs seemed not amiss, whether the Macedonians had wings to fly with ! The difficult), moreover, of attacking the first of these forts — the famous Sogdian Rock — was increased to all appearances by the deep snow that lay on the ground at the time; though in the event it was the means whereby the place was taken. A en. XIV. Capture of Hill-Forts. 165 reward of twelve talents was offered to the first man who mounted the rock, and less in proportion to those who followed. Three hundred volunteers were soon forth- coming. Armed with ropes and iron tent-pegs, they made for the steepest and least protected side of the rock in the dead of night ; and, fixing the pegs in the crevices of the rock where possible, but chietly in the snow, which was frozen so hard as to bear the weight, slowly and with difficulty they made the dangerous ascent. Thirty of the number slipped and perished in the attempt, and their bodies were buried so deeply in the snowdrifts at the bottom that they were never recovered even for burial. Nevetheless the deed was done ; for the chieftain Oxyartcs, being summoned to surrender, ', however, now massed upon the left had a difficult N 2 i8o The Macedonian Empire, CH. XV. manoeuvre to perform, and that in the very face of the enemy ; for, being well in advance of their own centre, they were threatened on two points at once— by Alexan- der in front, and Koinos in the rear, and had, therefore, to face both rear and front. They were in the act of at- tempting this manoeuvre when Alexander gave the word to charge. Unsteady and hesitating, they wavered for a moment, then broke and rode for their lives towards the elephants :\s to the shelter of a friendly rampart, passing between them and through the intervals between the divisions of the infantry. The mahouts, it would appear, had already begun to urge their animals on to the charge and were supported by the infantry— a movement which might have been dangerous had it not been checked by a rapid advance of the phalanx. It was a fearful struggle such as even these veterans had never before experienced. The huge animals trampled down their ranks by sheer weight, or seized the men singly with their trunks, and, raising them aloft, dashed them to the ground ; while the soldiers in the howdahs plied them with arrows and javelins. The cavalry, moreover, had rallied, and pre- sently advanced once more to the charge. But they were no match for Alexander's troopers either in steadi- ness or bodily strength, and were speedily repulsed and driven in again upon the centre. By this time, too, the elephants, a force scarcely more dangerous to foes than friends, were becoming unmanageable. Some of them had been wounded, and many of the mahouts slain ; and being hemmed in by the close press of horsemen and in- fantry, distracted by the confusion, and maddened by pain, they kept up an incessant trumpeting, and began to turnaround, treading down the men of their own side, or to try and back out of the turmoil * like boats backing water.' Then the infantry also were thrown into con- fusion, foot, and horse, and elephants being hopelessly CH. XV. Capture of Poros. i8i intermingled ; whereupon the king ordering the phalanx to push steadily onwards in front, drew a cordon of cavalry, ns it were, round the flank and rear of the struggling, help- less mass, and completed the demoralisation and ruin by repeated charges. The loss was prodigious, including all the chariots. Two of the sons of Poros were slain, and a great number of the superior officers. If a pottion of the infantry and cavalry broke through and escaped, it was but to find themselves hotly pursued by a fresh and unspent enemy in the person of Krateros,who had forced the passage of the river during the battle ; so that 3,000 of the horse are said to have been slain, and 12,000 of the infantry ; while 9,000 prisoners were taken, and 80 elephants. The Macedonian loss was, as usual, trifling ; amounting to no more than 280 cavalry and 700 infantry — taking the highest estimate of the Macedonian, and the lowest of the Indian losses (July, 326). Poros himself fought like a brave man, not, as Darius, being the first to flee, but stoutly resisting to the last. But when he saw the day was lost, being him- Yoto& a self also wounded in the shoulder, he turned P"soner. his elephant and began to retire. Alexander was most anxious that he should be taken alive ; but Poros sullenly resisted all overtures for surrender, even attacking the officers whom the king sent after him. At last, weary and faint with thirst, he yielded to the appeals of a per- sonal friend, halted, and dismounted from his elephant. The king, it is said, when Poros was brought into his presence, was struck with admiration of his manly pre- sence and undaunted bearing, and, because he approached him as one brave man should approach another, Alexander asked him how he wished to be treated. * Like a king,' was the answer. ' That boon, O Poros,' replied the con- queror, * thou shalt have for my sake. For thy own sake ask what thou wilt.' But Poros answered that everything l82 The Macedonian Empire, en. XV. was contained in his request to be treated like a king. Alexander was so charmed with his reply that he restored to him his kingdom, and added to it largely, and thus se- cured a faithful friend. The army was now allowed to rest a month in the capital of Poros until the rains had somewhat abated. Passage of I n the interval Alexander founded two cities— the Ake- Nikaianear thefield of battle,and Boukephaha, Bines and , ^ , - -^ u Hydraotcs. which he named after the favourite horse which had carried him so gallantly through a thousand dangers, and was now dead. He further ordered timber to be felled in the forests of the Upper Hydaspes, and a fleet to be built for the navigation of the Indus. Then he crossed successively the Akesines and the Hydraotes, into the country of the warlike Katheeans whom he soon reduced, and added to the subjects of Poros. The Hyphasis (Sutlej), to which he next advanced, was the eastward limit of his conquering march. Beyond it, Advance to ^^^ ^"^^^ ^^^^» ^^^ ^ dcscrt of eleven days' march the^Hypha- as far as the mighty Ganges, whose valley was *^ the empire of a king greater than Poros. To Alexander's enterprising spirit such a vista of adventures was no doubt delightful. Indeed,if wecan credit the speech to the army put into his mouth by Arrian, he had some strange notion that * the great sea which encircles the earth,' was just beyond the Ganges, and that thence they might circumnavigate Libya to the pillars of Herakles, and so march through Libya homewards. But soldiers and officers alike were downcast and homesick, and at first only answered his appeals with an eloquent silence ; ^ , ,. until, being urged by him to speak, they ex- The sokliers ' , . ^ ,. . » • ^ u refuse to pressed their feelings m the curious speech "''**• assigned by Arrian to Koinos. * Our numbers are thinned,' he said ; ' we are longing to see our wives and children ; let us return, and afterwards, if thou wilt, oil. XV. Return from the Hyphasis, 183 lead other troops, fresher and younger than we are, to the Euxine, or to Carthage, or wherever thou wilt.' But Alexander was wroth, and dismissed the troops to their quarteis. Next day he tried a further appeal to their loyalty and devotion. Anyone who pleased, he said, should return ; he would take with him only volunteers ; the rest might go home and report that they had aban- doned their king in the midst of his enemies. And then he retired to his tent, deeply mortified. For three days no one was admitted to his presence. But gloom and silence still pervaded the camp, and the revulsion of feel- ing which he hoped for never came. On the fourth day he offered sacrifice preparatory to crossing the river ; but the victims were unpropitious. Then at last, overborne by all these adverse signs^ he summoned his friends and some of the Companions, and bade them make known to the army his Return to resolution to return. The universal joy was ^^^^^ attested by shouts and tears and blessings on their king, who had never known defeat but from them. Twelve huge altars were raised on the bank as a thank-offering for the protection of the gods, and as a memorial of his vic- tories ; and sacrifices were offered and games were cele- brated before he set his face finally westward. Then at last the army set out on its long march for home. The Hydraotes was passed, and the Akesines ; and at length they reached the new cities, Nikaia and Boukephalia, where the fleet was being built, and the preparations made for the voyage down the Indus. But one man at least was destined never to go further. Koinos died, and was honoured with a magnificent funeral ; although Alex- ander, having not forgotten nor, perhaps, forgiven his expostulations at the Hyphasis, could not forbear the cvnical remark, that Koinos had made his long speech to very little purpose. 1 84 TJie Macedonian Empire. ch. xvi. CHAPTER XVI. THE RETURN FROM THE HYPHASIS TO SUSA. However disappointed Alexander may have been to give up his schemes of adventure beyond the Hyphasis, „ . . there was quite enough of the marvellous and Alleviations . , . , r . i i • of disap- the unknown m the future to make him soon pouitinem. fy^gct the disappointment. He had seen aUigators in the Indus, and a lotus similar to that of Eg>'pt ; and a letter of his, written about this time to his mother Olympias, shows that he thought he had discovered the source of the Nile in the Indus, which he believed must flow by a circuitous course through the desert, and there, losing its name, pass through Ethiopia and Egypt under the new title of "Nile. His after discoveries, of course, and more particularly the adventurous voyage of his admiral Nearchos, who explored the whole coast from the Indus to the Euphrates, dispelled the illusion. The fleet built or collected for the downward passage amounted to 2,000 vessels, including eighty men-of-war. Pre araiion ^^^ ships were chiefly manned by PhcEnicians for the and Egyptians, and Nearchos was in com- mand. Of the troops, 8,000 were to be on board under the king's own command; the main body, with the elephants, under Hephaistion was to accompany the fleet along the eastern bank ; Krateros was to lead a smaller division along the opposite side ; while a fourth corps was to follow after three days' interval. On the appointed day at dawn the army began its embarkation ; and Alexander himself, after sacrificing to the gods, look his stand on the bows of his ship and poured a solemn hbation, with prayers, lo the river deities whose waters he was about to explore^ CH. XVI. Descent of the Hydaspes. 18S voyage down the Indus. ThestaiL and especially to his great forefathers Herakles and Ammon. Then, at a given signal, the oars were dashed into the water, and the fleet was under weigh, each division of horse transports, baggage ships, and men-of- war being ordered to keep at a safe and invariable dis- tance from the others. Never before— and probably never since — was such a sight seen on the Hydaspes. The banks rising high above the level of the water were crowded with natives, whom the splash of the oars and the shouts of the boatswains, re-echoing from the cliffs and surrounding woods, had drawn from every side to gaze on the unwonted sight. With childish delight they ran along the shore by the side of the fleet, and sang barbaric songs, keeping time with the measured sweep of the oars. Thus hour by hour the fleet dropped quickly down the stream, till on the fifth day they reached the confluence of the Akesincs and Hydaspes, a point of no little danger. For here the banks converged, and the greater mass of water, pent within a narrower space, formed an eddying, chafing rapid, the roar of which was heard from afar. Amazed at the sound, the sailors almost involuntarily rested on their oars, and the boatswains ceased their chaiit. They had barely time, indeed, to recover presence of mind iDefore they drifted into danger. The broader vessels suffered no damage ; but the long war-ships got athwart the current, which broke some of the oars and made them almost helpless. Two of the number fouled one another and foundered, losing most of the crews. At last, partly drifting, partly rowing, they reached the broader water below, and put in to the right bank to refit. As they were now approaching the country of a people from whom a fierce resistance was expected, Alexandei at this point made a new disposition of his forces. The people were the Mallians, whose name, perhaps, remains m that of the city of Multan. It is true that their ter- 1 86 The Macedonian Empire, ch. xvl ritory lay to the north of the Hydraotes, and that Multan now Hes considerably to the south of it ; but it is well known The Mai- that the Punjab Hvers often change their courses lians, Brach- in the present day, and geographers have Sxydra""* supposed that the Hydraotes (Ravi) and Hy- ^^^^ daspes in Alexander's time met far more to the south. In conjunction with the Mallians occur two other names, at once curious and interesting— Brachmans and Oxydrakans (Sudrakae). If we may suppose that these names represent what we know as Brahmins (high caste) and Sudras (low caste), it is not only of interest as con- firming the high antiquity of Indian castes, but will serve to explain why, powerful as they were, they failed to act in concert. The mutual jealousy of high and low caste was only suspended for a while by common hostility to the invader. Their forces, if united, are said to have numbered 80,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 700 chariots, but they do not appear to have dreamt of resistance in the field, but to have trusted rather to their walled towns and to the belt of desert which sheltered their northern frontier. Fearing lest they might seek to escape him by flight, Alexander organized four flying columns, as he had before done in Sogdiana, to sweep through the country. He himself intended to strike boldly across the desert, the side whence they would least anticipate attack, and thus to be upon them before they expected him. Nearchos was sent on with the fleet to the confluence of the Akesin^s and Hydraotes. This campaign against the Mallians reminds us in many points of the campaign of 329 in Sogdiana. Rapidity of action characterized both alike. The pre- iSunsTfhe parations of the natives were forestalled by MaiUans. ^^ king's dash across the desert. Town after town was taken with ease. Scattered bodies of their troops were intercepted and cut to pieces. Fugitives CH. XVI. Campaign among the Malli, 187 were pursued and destroyed. Little by little the miserable remnant of the population was driven in upon their chief town, where it was hoped that all further resistance mifjht be crushed at one blow. if we can overlook the inhumanity of an attack on /unoffending natives —and it can hardly be too often repeated that to a Greek the use of the term in such a connexion would seem quite out of place — we cannot but admire the king's skilful tactics, and the energy with which they were carried out. In attacking this town Alexander was within a little of losing what might have seemed a charmed life. At the first onset the defenders abandoned the Attack of walls and fled to the citadel. The Macedonians i^e capiiai burst in through a postern gate, Alexander of aIcx-^*^*^ leading the way. The rest followed, but in *"'^'^'- the hurry of the moment, or in the belief that the place was as good as taken, most of the ladders were left be- hind. It soon became clear that the walls must be scaled ifthe citadel was to fall; andtheking, seizing the first ladder that came to hand, planted it against the wall himself, and crouching behind his shield mountedand leaped to the top. Close behind him followed Peukestas, bearing the sacred shield from the temple of the Ilian Athene : be- hind Peukestas was Leonnatos. The veteran Abreas mounted by another ladder. At the foot were swarming the foremost troops, eager to be at their king's side, when suddenly both ladders broke beneath the weight of the climbing crowd, and Alexander was left with his three com- panions on the wall, a mark for every weapon. To clear a free space around him was the work of a moment; some of the enemy were slain, others pushed headlong from the wall. Then after a moment's hesitation, and with what even in Alexander was insane rashness, he leaped down among the enemy on the inside and, setting his back against the 188 The Macedonian Empire, ch. xvl wall, prepared to defend himself. At first they ventured to attack him at close quarters, thinking to kill him off- hand ; but when they saw their leader slain, and three others fall beneath his sword or by the stones which, like some Homeric hero, he picked up and dashed among them, they drew off and plied him from a distance with darts and arrows. By this time his three companions were at his side, but the position was becoming critical. Abreas was struck in the face and slain. The king him- self was wounded in the chest, and after fighting for a while began to faint from loss of blood, and sank upon his shield ; while Peukestas and Leonnatos, who sheltered him as best they could, were also wounded. Meantime the soldiers outside were in a state of fury at their king's danger. In the absence of ladders they improvised means of mounting by driving pegs into the earthen rampart, or climbing on each other's backs. Others burst a hole through one of the gates and so struggled in, a few at a time. A short, sharp conflict followed, ar.d then a terrible massacre, the enraged soldiers sparing neither man, woman, nor child to tell the tale. Alexander was carried out on his shield in a dead faint, and, when he came to himself, the barbed arrow was cut out of the wound ; but when from loss of blood he fainted again and lay as one dead, the rumour that he was dead spread even to the camp on the river, and was followed by an universal outburst of genuine sorrow and panic. Their heroic leader had fallen, it seemed ; and now who was to lead them back to Macedon through the thousand dangers which were before them? It is easy to imagine the general shout of joy, therefore, which welcomed Alexander, when he was sufficiently recovered to drop down the river to the camp, and was seen not only to wave his hand to the anxious crowds upon the bank, but to be able even to mount hib horse. They pressed CH. XVT. Descent of the Indus. 189 around him to touch his hands, his knees, his clothes, or crowned him with garlands and fillets. Before the camp on the Akesines was abandoned the Mallians made their submission. The king then sailed to the junction of the five rivers and founded, p^.^^^ ^^^ as usual, another colony, with docks and forts confluence to command the navigation ; and thence pro- ?ivers lo^the ceeded southwards towards the mouth, meet- ^^• ing with but little opposition except from the Brahmins, who seem to have been able in those days, as in these, to rouse a tempest of religious and political fanaticism against the * infidel,' and induced a certain king Mousi- kanos to revolt when Alexander had passed to the south. But such partial resistance was useless, and its punish- ment fearful. Mousikanos and his advisers v/ere at- tacked, seized, and crucified. Many of his towns were razed to the ground, and the inhabitants reduced to slavery. Others were occupied by garrisons. There was still a voyage of some 200 miles before the open sea could be reached ; but when the Rajah of the Delta of the Indus had surrendered his dominions, there washttle more hostility to be feared, and Krateros was detached with three divisions of the phalanx, the elephants, and some light troops, together with the invalids, to take the easier but longer road to Persia, by way of the Bolan Pass and the valley of the Etymander into Karmania. The king himself continued the descent of the river towards its mouth, accompanied by Hephaistion on the left bank. At the apex of the Delta, 130 miles above the sea, Hephaistion was left to turn the native town of Pattala into a strong fortress; and Alexander took only the swiftest ships of the fleet to face the unknown dangers before him. The shifting sand banks were presumably as great a source of peril then as now, and for the greater part of the distance he could obtain no pilots. igo Tfie Macedonian Empire. ch. xvt Near the mouth, moreover, his vessels were caught in the ebb and flow of a rushing tide (an experience quite un- familiar to Greeks) and somewhat roughly handled. All dangers, however, were happily surmounted ; Alexander sailed some miles out into the Indian Ocean and satis- fied himself of its true nature ; he explored the Delta and the Runn of Cutch ; and then returned to Pattala, to finish the preparations for his own march to the West, and for the voyage of exploration along the shores of the ocean, the direction of which was given to Nearchos. Although Alexander was in part aware of the difficul- ties of his intended march, he clearly did not know them all, nor the time which the march would re- March of t r 1 • 1 • 1 • • . the king quire. Yet his object m making it was precise GcdroJia ^^^ intelligible. If we suppose, with Arrian, aiid Kar- that he was eager to do what Cyrus and Semiramis had failed to do, we may be sure also that he wished to reduce provinces of the empire as yet unvisited, and to be near at hand in case the fleet were in need of help. He had set out from Pattala, with perhaps 50,000 men, towards the end of August, 325. The great heat, therefore, which lasts from March to Novem- ber, though beginning to subside, was still so terrific as to render night marches for the most part necessary. The nature of the country, too, is harassing and forbidding. There are ranges of mountains which form the southern fringe of the terrible central plateau before described, and which run parallel to the sea, but seldom nearer than ten miles. The ridges are bare, and even the valleys poor and barren. At intervals the desert seems, as it were, to intrude upon the mountains, and though here and there aromatic plants were found to relieve the bareness, the horrors of heat and thirst were aggravated by the numbers of poisonous herbs and venomous snakes ; while they were not a little annoyed by thorns, says ClI. XVI. Desert of Karmania. 191 Arrian, of such uncommon size and strength as to tear the horseman from his horse if they caught his clothes, and to hold an entangled hare as firmly as the hook does a fish. Sometimes they would come to stretches of fine soft sand, like untrodden snow, dazzling to the eye and hot to the feet, and swept by the wind into vast rolling billows. Men and beasts ahke sank under the toil of ascending and descending these yielding sand waves, so that the sick and weakly fell out of the ranks, while the chariots for their transport had been broken up to avoid the labour of dragging them through the sea of sand. To fall out, therefore, was certain death. But of all their hardships thirst was the most terrible, as it is of all human sufferings the most intolerable, the one torture which robs ordinary men of the spirit of self-sacrifice. Yet a fine and touching story is told of Alexander, which borders on the sublime. They were on the march, Alexander at the head ; all alike oppressed with heat and thirst. Some light troops had come upon some water in a shallow torrent bed, a priceless prize, which they gathered in a helmet and bore loyally to their king. Greedy, if loving, eyes were turned upon him ; yet it was too little to share with others. Who but a man of self-restraint, almost heroic, would have endured, as Alexander endured, to take the helmet and calmly pour the water on the ground ! And so refreshed was the whole army by this example (such is Arrian^s comment) that one might have thought that every man had drunk of the water poured out by Alexander. From the horrors of Gedrosia the army passed with joy into the fertile country of Karmania, and the king cele- brated games, and offered solemn thanksgivings for his victories over the Indians and for his safe return. Here also he was joined by abundant convoys, by troops from Media, iifi: 192 The Macedonian Empire, ch. xvi. and by Kiateros with his division. Some satraps and officers, who had presumed upon his long absence to misconduct themselves in office, were arrested with kL and put to death. Here, too, he met with tcrosand Nearchos, who, as we shall see presently, and arrival had passed through dangers and privations " ^"^ nearly as great as the king himself, and more trying because strange and novel. Then, dividing his forces, he bade Hephaistion lead the main body to Susa, by the shore of the Persian Gulf, where the climate was mild and provisions plentiful ; while he himself made for Persagerd and Persepolis. At the former place his special anger was aroused by the discovery that the famous tomb of Cyrus had been violated in his absence, the golden coffin chipped and opened, and the body of the great king gone. Having done justice on the offender, and having stopped for awhile to l?iment over the memorial of his own folly, the blackened palace of Persepolis, he went on his way to rejoin Hephaistion at Susa. A strange spectacle was there witnessed by the whole army. At Taxila Alexander had met certain Indian anchorites, whom the Greeks called Gymnosophists ; and one of them, by name Kalanos, had been persuaded to follow the king. This man, being advanced in years and threatened with disease, resolved to die while he was still in possession of his faculties, and so, mountmg an immense funeral pyre, he was burnt to death in the sight of all amid the screech of elephants and the blare of trumpets. 'Nearchos, meanwhile, had led the fleet in safety along the coast of Gedrosia and the shores of the Persian Gulf, and proved (if nothing else) that the NelXs Indus was not the Nile. Arrian's account of iXs' w tb« this memorable nautical enterprise in Grecian Euphrates, antiquity is a compilation from other and later authors, as well as from Nearchos himself; yet the CH. XVI. Voyage of Nearchos, 193 general accuracy of the details, and the frequent reference to the admiral's own words as the basis of them, prove that it must have been an epoch in the annals of Greek geography. If not the first, it was one of the first steps towards correcting the crude notions of earlier geo- graphers. The coast line was followed from the Indus to the Euphrates, and landings were made at various points ; while curious observations were recorded both in physical phenomena and in natural history. Quantities of crabs, oysters, and indeed fish of all kinds were met with throughout the voyage. Whales and porpoises were seen many times. One monster of the deep is described, which had been cast up by the sea, whose length was 50 cubits and its skin a cubit in thickness, and covered with limpets and oysters. In fact, the southern shore of Gedrosia was occupied by people who lived upon fish, partly eating it raw, partly drying it in the sun and then pounding it into a sort of pemmican or fish-bread, and who made their huts with fish-bones and their clothes with fish-skins — uncivilised barbarians, who had the claws of wild beasts rather than nails, wherewith they tore their fish asunder, and who supplied their ignorance of iron by the use of flints. But inside the Persian Gulf ihey reached less wild districts, where provisions were comparatively abundant, and every island was fertile with vines and palms. The approaches to the mouth of the Euphrates Nearchos described in terms which might be used now — shallows, not of sand but of deep, treacher- ous mud, in which a man would sink up to the shoulders, and where the channel, marked out by stakes, was only navigable for a single ship. Another observa- tion he made, which in the hands of a geographer eighty years later was the basis of the first measurement of the circumference of the earth. He observed, when they were in the open sea about latitude 25 north, as Eratos- A.H o iq4 The Macedonian Empire. ch. xvi. then^s observed at Sy6ne in nearly the same latitude, that the sun at midday cast no shadow. Facts like these, apparently unimportant, were m reality of the greatest value as items in the slowly grow mg mass of physical knowledge, which the philosophers o Hellas were accumulating and learning how to use. Nor were the observations of Nearchos the only scientific resul s of Alexander's reign. At the request of Aristotle, the king had been for some time employing agents, in many parts of Asia as well as Europe, to collect specimens of animals and send them to Athens ; and after examin- mg and comparing these, Aristotle vvTote down the results in the fifty volumes of his Natural History. Alexander also despatched three exploring squadrons along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf having clearly in his mind the reduction of Arabia, and the estab- lishment of a sea route between Egypt, Babylon, and India. But the leading idea, as well as the hardest task, which Alexander had set before him was the amalgama- tion of his diverse subjects into one people. Snier U was equally difficult to conciliate the Euro- for anwiga- p^an and to protect the Asiatic. T ne latter Kr' had been drilled by centuries of oppression '^^^ into abject submission to extortion and tyranny. The former had learned from years of free- dom and a long muster-roll of victories to despise the effeminate Oriental. How was it possible to combine elements so antagonistic? Nevertheless Alexander sec himself the task. It was before all things necessary to convince Asiatics that tyranny and extortion were not the principles of the king's government ; and with this view as has been already mentioned, many satraps and officers, who had presumed on his long absence, were banished or executed. The worst offender had been Harpalos, the Macedonian. Already convicted ot pecu- CH. XVI. Projects of A lexajidcr, \ 9 5 lation as treasurer before the battle of Issos, and a fugitive, he had been pardoned by Alexander, restored to his post, and afterwards appointed satrap of Babylonia. There, as lavish as he was grasping, his shameless luxuries in the king's absence had rivalled even those of a Sardanapalus. The fish for his table were brought specially from the sea. His gardens were filled with choice exotics. On Alexander's return he fled a second time to Athens with avast sum of money, and so escaped justice. But it was men like these, if any, Difficulties who would endanger the empire, and whose ofihetask. excesses, therefore, it was essential to punish. On the other hand, it was not less essential and much more difficult to induce the conquerors of these Asiatics to acknowledge the conquered as their equals under a common sovereign. Englishmen are only now beginning to find it possible, after 100 years of empire, to recognise Hindoos as fellow-subjects and equals. It is true that the gulf between the latter is greater than was that between Greeks and Persians; but such a fusion is impossible in the course of a few months or even years, and when forced on people against their will is often opposed with singular obstinacy. And so it was with Alexander's attempted fusion of Macedonians and Per- sians. He did his best, indeed, to bribe and flatter the former into acquiescence. He offered to pay the debts of every Macedonian in the army ; and when the soldiers hesitated to register their names lest it should be re- membered against them, heaps of gold were placed on tables, from which every man was allowed to help himself. Several of the generals were presented with crowns of gold. He himself married Statira, daughter of Darius, and neariy 100 of the officers to please him followed his example in marrying Persian women ; and when as many as 10,000 of the soldiers were found to have o 2 t' m i j„6 T/te Macedonian Empire. cii. xvi. already formed such connexions, or to be ready to do so, he presented each with a marriage portion, and the wed- d^^swe^e celebrated publicly, with the accompan.mento a erand banquet in a pavilion built for the occas.on. Hut thfrelusyof the Macedonians wasnotonewhulessened; Ind wTen on one occasion he had assembled the troops and when on o ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^,,. it-jr' band aky of them who were unfit to serve ?SSr "• from age or wounds, they, remembering that he had drafted thousands of Asiatics '7^^--^^'.,-^ choosing to suspect that he only wanted to get rid ot ^Lm bfoke out into open mutiny and, no longer awed Ito snence by Ws presence, bade him dismiss them al mto silence > f .^ j^, fother— meaning, of if: rufSn' a: outbreak was sudden, but told of' a deep current of feeling below. Another man ^ght have hesitated what to do ; but Alexander leaped £ at once among them with three or our of hs generals, and, pointing out the ""g^,«^f "^^J:" '^^,^,f,'; ordered them off to instant execution. They were at once seized and put to death, to the number of thirteen Tdeep^lence immediately followed among the vast lwd,'broken after a pause by the king's voice, who had \ A ,u^ r.1 itfnrm He was bitter and angry, ana rr U ^e s' S: .They to mutiny 1 Men who '^ed :i to his father and himself ! Men -ho once were ^de clowns dressed in skins, and now -^-^e^^^J^P^ ^"^''. r^nerals loaded with the wealth of Lydia and the trea fures of Persia and the good things of India^ They u 1,7 «.rhans he had spared himself, or kept too 2tfflf'? could a'nyman show rnore wouncls Tan he could? or accuse him o^ -^-f-^V-an ^.ards? "Vo-llj-jfX;^^^^^^^ yo- K°wh tad etyotVSrious from theGranikos tothe CH. XVI. Meeti7ig at Opts. 197 Hyphasis— ay, and would have crossed the Hyphasis had you not been laggards ! — to the care of barbarian guards ? It may be that such things are glorious in the eyes of men, and right in the sight of the gods ! Away ! '' With these words he hurriedly left the platform and shut himself up in the palace. For two days he saw no one. On the third he sent for the chief Persian officers, and gave them his orders. In future (he said) he would have Persian troops only, named and organized after the Macedonian model, but officered by Persians. This was the last drop in the cup. Repentant before, the soldiers were now in despair; and, rushing to the palace, they threw their arms at the gates, and, with cries and prayers for admittance declared that they would not depart by night or day till Alexander showed them some pity. Then the king relented, and came out to them in haste : and the recon- ciliation, soon effected, was sealed by a banquet at which 9,000 of the troops were entertained by Alexander. Soon afterwards 10,000 veterans were led home by Krateros— * the trusty friend, dear to the king as his own life * — each man receiving a talent above his Desoatches pay. At the same time he sent despatches to ^n^er to the Greece, bidding the cities receive back all Greeks, exiles who had not been guilty of sacrilege or murder, and requiring them to give himself divine honours. Of the two demands the latter seemed to Hellenes ridiculous, and the former intolerable. Alexander's speedy death, indeed, relieved the Greek cities from this direful prospect of having in fact to receive so many Macedonian garrisons in the persons of their exiled citizens ; while the general view, held on the question of divine honours, may be adequately summed up in the advice of Demades to the Athenians, not to lose earth while contesting about heaven, and in the reply of the Spartans that if Alexander would be a god, he might. I 198 The Macedonian Empire, ch. xvn. CHAPTER XVII. CLOSING SCENES. In the winter of 324-3 Alexander set out from Susa to Agbatana, passing on his way the famous rock monu- Festival at ments of Bdhistun. His object, no doubt, Agbatana. ^^s to gratify the Medes by a short stay in their capital, as he had already stayed in Babylon and Persepolis, and to retain what had been a yearly custom of the former kings of Persia. They were further grati- fied by a magnificent celebration of the annual festival of Dionysos. But the general joy was suddenly overcast Death of hy a great sorrow. Hephaistion, the * lover of Hephaiatlon. Alexander,' fell ill of a fever, which a foolish confidence in his own strength induced him to neglect. During the feast he became rapidly worse, and at last sank before the king could reach his bedside from the amphitheatre, whence he was hastily summoned. It was only natural that a man of strong, manly affection like Alexander should for three days shut himself up in sor- rowful isolation, and neither eat nor drink. It was only natural that he should bury a comrade, so dear and faithful, with extraordinary honours at Babylon, his capital, and that he should order a general mourning throughout Asia. But we may surely dismiss, as the mere gossip which gathers round every great name, such tales as that he cut off the hair of his horses and mules, or dismantled the town walls of their battlements, or killed the foolish physician who could not save his fnend's life, or razed to the ground the temple of Asklepios in Agbatana by way of revenge ; and may echo Arrian's verdict, that such barbarous * follies were CH. XVII. Omens. 199 not consistent with Alexander's character, though they might be natural enough in a Xerxes, who chastised the Hellespont with fetters for wrecking his bridge.* The king was roused from his deep dejection by that best of remedies, the necessity for action. The Kossaeans, a mountain tribe on the borders of Susiana . and Media, were up in arms. Taking with of the him the dead body for burial, he set out on his kossaeans. march to Babylon, about mid-winter 324-3, dividing his army into two corps under himself and Ptolemy respec- tively, and crushing the armed resistance of the moun- taineers as he went. He then came down from the mountains into the Tigris valley, and so passed on to the capital. It was his last march. Already omens and presages, we are told, of impending calamity were of frequent occurrence, and it would seem that even Omcnsof Alexander's strong mind was not a little im- coming evil, pressed. As he drew near to Babylon he was met by a body of Chaldean priests, who in private audience be- sought him to defer his entry into the city ; for their god Belus had revealed to them that an entrance into Babylon at that time would not be for his good. Then a strange story got wind about the Indian philosopher Kalanos. Before his death, it was said, he declined to take leave of the king, because he should soon meet him at Babylon. On another occasion Alexander was cruis- ing on the canal of Pallakopas, which had been dug to carry off the superfluous waters of the Euphrates at flood time. As the boat in which he was sailing passed by some tomljs of ancient Assyrian kings, it chanced that a sudden gust lifted from his head the kausia, or broad- brimmed cap, which fell into the water, while the diadem which encircled it lodged in the reeds that grew out ol one of the tombs. A sailor at once plunged in and swam ^ 200 TAe Macedonian Empire. ch. xvii. to recover it, but in returning placed it on his own head, lest it should be wetted. For this exploit he was re- warded with a talent, but afterwards flogged for being so thoughtless as to put on the king's head-dress. Some of the soothsayers were even so alarmed at the evil omen as to urge the king to put the sailor to death. By-and-by another event happened still more disquieting. It was at Babylon, and the king was holding a council about his intended campaigns. Feeling thirsty, he rose from his throne and left the council-room, followed by his officers, only a few attendants remaining behind. It was a moment of unguarded relaxation. On a sudden a man, a stranger to all, entered the chamber, and passing through the midst of the astonished slaves, before they had presence of mind to stop him, seated himself in the empty throne. The etiquette of the Persian court, as stringent as that of the French or Spanish courts in theii palmy days, forbade the laying of a finger on one who was sitting in the royal seat. So the slaves fell to rend- ing their clothes and beating their breasts, but had no- thing else that they could do. The news was presently carried to Alexander, who ordered the man to be seized ; and an attempt was made by torture to elicit his purpose or the names of his confederates. But the only thing that he could say was that it came into his mind to do and he did it— a statement from which the seers inferred that it was an inspiration from heaven, and must be re- garded as a warning. Our inference should be, perhaps, that he was mad. However little any of these omens singly might have affected so powerful a mind as Alexander's, it was inevi- table that their concurrence at a time when uDon^* ^ he was depressed, and when perhaps the AJcxander. geeds of fevcr were already in his system, should impress him not a little. The first warning of en. XVII. Alexander at Babylon. 201 the Chaldean priests he set aside with a jesting quota- tion from Euripides, and indeed shrewdly suspected that they had a personal interest in keeping him out of Baby- lon, fearing to be brought to book for peculation during his absence. But the recurrence of the omens and the increasing alarm of the seers seem at last to have made Alexander himself anxious, and to have inspired him with fears of a plot. Nevertheless, it became ixccessary to enter Babylon, and (owing to the morasses on the south and west) with his face turned towards the gloomy west, and by the very eastern gate against which into Bab]!- the priests had warned him. But it was a ^°^ splendid spectacle such as the city had seldom, if ever, seen. There were the veteran troops that had conquered Asia— the fleet of Nearchos, which had sailed in waters never but once navigated before. There were new ships from Phoenicia, and others building on the stocks of the new harbour. There was an army of work- men busy upon the splendid funeral pile of Hephaistion. Last, but not least, there were crowds of ambassadors, not only from Greek cities, but from Libya, from the Lucanians, the Tyrrhenians, and even, according to one author, from the Romans, from Scythia, Ethiopia, and Carthage— an imposing array, testifying to the wide- spread influence of Alexander's name. For the moment Babylon was the centre and capital of the world. But, as Arrian repeats many times over, with an almost dramatic iteration, the end was drawing near. All things indeed went on as usual. Reinforce- ments were coming and going. The Euphrates ^^ p «»• fleet was finished and its sailors were under constant drill The details of the Arabian voyage and campaign appear to have been settled, and a scheme for the exploration of the Caspian was so far arranged that a party of shipwrights 202 The Macedonian Empire. ch. xvii. was sent to that sea to build a fleet. Finally, a further step towards the fusion of the peoples of the empire was made by the incorporation of a certain number of Persians with the Macedonian infantry of the phalanx, each file of sixteen containing twelve Persians, while the places of honour and importance, the first three and the last in the file, were reserved for Macedonians. But the end was drawing near. A solemn sacrifice was celebrated for the success of the projected expedi- tion, at which wine and meat were distri- deaiTor'* buted to the troops ; and the king himself Alexander. ^^^^ ^ banquet to his friends, which was carried on far into the night. As he was leaving the feast, Medios, an officer of the Companion cavah-y, pressed him to continue the revel at his quarters, and Alexander complied. The next evening Medios renewed his invitation, and again a great deal of wine appears to have been drunk. On the following day the king felt the first symptoms of fever, and accordingly slept at the house of Medios, though still well enough to transact business. He was afterwards carried on a couch to the river side, and rowed over to a park on the other bank, passing the next day in retirement, and in conversation with Medios. But he now grew rapidly worse, and day by day became weaker, hardly mustering strength to perform the usual sacrifice ; until on the seventh day of the attack, feeling apparently that he was dying, he had himself carried back to the palace, and summoned the generals to his presence. He recognised them, but had no strength to speak. Four of them in despair passed the next night in the temple of Serapis, hoping for a sign. Thiee others even consulted the oracle as to whether it would be better to bring the king to the temple of the god. The answer was that he was better where he wms. Some of the soldiers meanwhile, from anxiety and CH. XVII. Characteristics, 203 affection, demanded to be admitted to see Alexander, and, being allowed to pass through his chamber, soon saw that all hope was gone. He lay speechless but sensible, recognis- ing them severally as they passed by his bedside with eloquent eyes, but hardly able to raise his head. Had he been able to frame articulate words, it is possible that he might have returned the answer ascribed to him in the story, and said that he left his kingdom * to the worthiest.' As it was, all he had strength for was to take the ring from his finger and give it to Perdikkas. Shortly after- wards he died in the 33rd year of his life, and the 13th of his reign (June, 323). It has been said that none of mortal birth ever went through such an ordeal as Alexander the Great; and Arrian insists on certain points which ought not to be forgotten in forming an estimate of chia^ter his hero. He was the son of the able and **'^^- unscrupulous Philip and of the violent Olympias. He was brought up in a court notoriously licentious. He was a king at twenty— the greatest monarch of the world before thirty. A general who never knew defeat, he was surrounded by men vastly inferior to himself, who in- trigued for his favour and flattered his weaknesses. Thus inheriting a fierce and ambitious temper, and placed in circumstances calculated to foster it, it would have been little short of a miracle had Alexander shown a character without alloy. To stand on a pinnacle of great- ness higher than man had ever reached before, and to be free at the same time from vanity, would have required a combination of virtues impossible before Christ, perhaps never possible. Alexander was beyond question vain, impulsive, passionate, at times furious ; but he had strong affections, and called out strong affections in others. A man of energy and ambition, he was the hardest worker of his day both in body and mind. In- ■I 204 The MacedoJiian Empire. en. xvn. capable of fear, he foresaw difficulties or combinations which others never dreamed of, and provided against them with success. Amid endless temptations this son of Philip remained comparatively pure. Unlike his fel- low-countrymen, he was (says Arrian) no great drinker, though he loved a banquet and its genial flow of con- versation. On one point in his character Arrian dwells with an admiration in which we may heartily join. Alexander, he says, stood almost alone in his readiness to acknowledge and express regret for having done wrong. That in his later days, and when he had suc- ceeded to the position of the Great King, he adopted the Persian dress and customs may be ascribed to the same motive which induced him himself to marry, and to press his officers and soldiers to marry, Asiatic women, a politic desire not indeed to ape the ways of foreigners, but to amalgamate his diverse subjects into one body. And if, over and above this^ he went so far as to claim divine honours as the son of a god, we may remember that of all men Greeks were most easily thrown off their balance by extraordinary prosperity, as were Miltiades and Alkibiades, Pausanias and Lysan- dros, and that few men of his day or country were more susceptible to the charm of heroic and legendary associa- tions than was Alexander. Elated, therefore, by success, and genuinely wrought upon by the legends which were as the air he breathed, he set an extravagant value on obtaining a public recognition of the super-human nature of his powers, in which, perhaps, he had even come to believe himself. It has been said in depreciation of Alexander that his conquests were needless and the bloodshed quests not wanton, that he gave the final stroke to the ifT^rTi if ruin of free Hellas, and that whatever benefits the Greeks, ^gj^ derived from its conquests by Greeks cH. xvn. Effects of Alexander s Conqz4esfs, 205 were due rathar to Alexander's successors than to him- self. These objections are as false in the spirit as they are true in the letter. For on the first of these points we shall go altogether astray unless we place ourselves at the point of view of a Greek of the fourth century. His view of the relations between himself and a barbariar. (and all who were not Greeks were barbarians), was some- thing similar to that of a mediaeval Christian towards a Mohammedan, or of a Mohammedan towards an infidel. The natural state of things between them was war ; and for the vanquished there remained death to the men, slavery or worse for women and children. Any milder treatment was magnanimous clemency. For years before Alexander, the idea of a war of revenge against Persia had been rife. That he should invade Asia, therefore, and put down the Great King, and harry and slay his subjects, would seem to almost every Greek right and proper. A few here and there indeed were clear-headed enough to see that the elevation of Macedon meant the down- fall of free Greece. It clearly was so. And q^^^j^ ^j.^^. yet, if we look the facts in the face, we ob- dom 89 Brachmans, 186 Branchidai, 158, 159 Brasidas, 12 Byzantion ((^ostantinople), 39» 4 x '54, 67, 68, 136 p^SAR (Julius), 80, i3ft ^ (^spian Gates, 143 Caspian Sea, 90, 93, 146 Chaironeia, 27, 36, 75, 76 Chalkidike, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14. '5» ■7» 23. 48, 52 Chalkis, 7, 52, 64 Chares, 41, 45 Charidemos, 109, 110 Chersonese (Tauric), 49 Chersonese ( Thracian), 6, 23, qS, y^, ^.47. 67 Chios, 3?. 39, 41, 123 Chorasmia ( Khiva), 92, 146 Clive (Lord), 137 Columbus, 128 Corinth, 7, 9, 27, 79, 90 CrcEsus, 42 Cromwell, 89 Cunaxa (Battle of), 96, X34 Cyprus, 114, 118, 121 Cyropolis, 160, 161 Cyrus (the Gieat), 190, 192 (the Younger), 96, 107, 128 (Riv.), 93 •pjAMASCUS. no, 115 *-' Darius (Codomannus), 90, 108. Ill, 113, 115, 116, 122, 129, 13a 132.. 133-5. 142-5 Delphians, 42, 72 Delphoi, 20, 21, 42, 43, 62, 63, 70, 71 Demades, 78, 87, 197 Demaratos, 109 Demavend, Mt., 143 - , Demosthenes, 2, 8, 25, 29,32, 34, 48, 49-52, 53» 56, 58, 60, 61, 64r6^r68, 69, 74. 75 Dimnos, 151 Diodoros, 77, 140, 163, 179 Dion, 13, loi Djidda, 70 Doab, 175 Dorians, 7, 9, 42 Doriskos, 6f DRA Draneiana, t«8 Hrogneda, 89 Drymos, 66 pGEANSea,2, 6, 7. 18. aS, 123 Egnatian Road, 4 Egypt, 94, q6. 118, 123 Ehteia, 73, 74 Elimeia, 4 Elis, 26 Emathia, 3, 5 Embolima, 171 Eordaia, 5 Eordaikos (Riv.), 4 Epameinondas, 20, 23, 26, 37 Epeiros, 19 Ephesus, loi Ephialtes, 103, 105 Eratosthenes, 194 Eretria, 52 Erigon (Riv.), 4, 86 Etymander(Riv.), 149, 189 Euboia 38, 45, 52, 53,59,61,62 hudamidas, 16 Euphrates, (Riv.) 91, 95. 94, 123, 201 Eurydike, 14, 22 Euxine Sea, 6, 67 KIR 41, »93. pLORENCE, 29 Furrah (Prophthasia), 149, 155 (RANGES (Riv.), 182 ^ Gaugamela, 129, 1^7 Gaul, 29 Gaza (Palestine), 123 (Jaxartes), 161 Gedrosia, 190-3 Genoa, 29 Getai, 86 Gordion. 105, 106, 137 Granikos (Riv.), 97, 167 Greece, i, 26-29, 78, 81, 82, 205, 207 Gyraeans, 174 l-IAIMOS. Mt., 10, 6P,86 *■ *- Haliakmon (Riv.), 4, 5. q. ?P Halikamassos, 102-105 Halonnesos, 66 Halos, 57-59 Hannibal, 96 Harmodios, 138 Harpalos, 143, 194 Hebros (Riv.), 6i Hekatompylos, 146 Hellas, 28, 42, 53, 90, SOS Hellenes, 3, 6, 8, 10 Hellespont, 59, 67, 9 Hephaistion, 136, 170, 184, 189, 19a, 198. 20I Herakleia, 20, 73 Herat, 149 Hermolaos, 169 Herodotos, 9 Hydaspes (Riv., Jhelum), 175, 177, 185, 186 Hydraotes (Riv., Ravi), 182, 183, 186 Hyphasis (Riv., Sutlej), 175, 182 Hyrkania, 146 JASON, 19-21,42 Ilion, 96 Illyria, 2 Illyrians, 8, 12, 14, 15, 24, 25, 38, 8e India, 166 Indian Ocean, 190 Indus (Riv.), 90, 91, 93, 175, 184 189, 190, 192, 193 Ionian Sea, 9, 25 Iphikrates, 20, 22, 41 Isaios, 50 Isokrate.s, 50 Issos, 108, no Istros (Riv., Danube) 68, 86 TADDUA, 124 J Taxartes (Riv.), 158-62 Jelalpoor, 175 Jenisalein, 124, 207 Josephus, 124 Julian (Emp.), 107 I^AFlRISTAN,i74 *■ Kalaiios, 192, 199 Kallidromos, Mt., 73 Kallisthenes, 168, 160 Kanibounian Mts., 3, 4. 88 Kajipadokia, 92 Kardakes, in Kardia, 67 Kar^nania, 189, xcj Karthage, 201 Kathffiaiis, 183 Kcrsobleptes, 58-61 Kirrha, 43, 70, 7a 2H Index, KIT Kithsdron, Mt., 66 Kleander, 153 Klcitos, 99, 167 Kleopatra, 79, 80, 84 Koinos, 144, 176, X79, 180, 182, 183 Korkyra, 32 Kos, 39 Kossseans, 199 Koushan Pass, 155 Krannon, 19, 21 Krateros, 148, i5o-3» »6i, 164, 171, 177, 181, 184, 189, 192, 197 Krissa, 70 Kydnos (Riv.), 107 Kyrene, 126 T AKMON, Mt.. 3 ^ Larissa, 19, 21, 22, 44 Lebanon, Mt., 120 Lemnos, 6 Leo (Bishop of Rome), 124 Leonidas, 139 Lewnnatos. 187, 188 Leuktra, 18. 33 Libya, 182, 201 Lokrians, 27, 44, 70, 71 Louis XIV., 79, 89 Lucanians, 201 Luther, 128 Lydias (Riv.), 5 Lykia, 121 Lykophron, 19, 45 Lykos (Riv.), 137 Lynkestis, 4, 14 TV/TACEDON. 2-6. 10, 14. 18. 19- ■'•■'■ 23. *5. 26. 29, 33, 36. 38. 44. 63, 81, 205-7 Macedonians, 3, 8, 9, 137, 146, 195 Magnesia (Battle of), 138 Manabunn (Aonios), 171 Maliac Gulf, 73 Mallians, 185, i86, 189 MarakanJa (Samarkand), 156, 15S, 162, i65 Marathon, 45. 76, ixa Marathos, n6 Mardians, 146 Mareotic Lake, 124-6 Margos (Riv.), i.,; Mausolos, I03 Medics, 202 Megalopolis, 78 Megara, 39 PAR Memnon, i,6, 97, 102, 103 Memphis, 124, 127, laS Messene, 78 Messenia, 26 Methone, 7, 10, 11, 37, 44 Midas, 106 Milan, 29 Miletos, 102 Mithridates, 99 Moscow, 140 Mousikanos, 189 Multan, 186 Myndos, 104 Myriandros, 108, 116 VTAPOLEON L, 65, 82 ^^ Nautaka, 157 Nearchos, 184, 186, 190, 193, 19V 201 Nikaia (Lokris), 73 (India), 182, 183 Nile (Riv.), 4, ai, 93. 94. 184 Nineveh, 129 Nysa, 174 O' iLYMPlA, 10 Olympias, 79, 80, 184, 203 Olyniuos, Mt., 3, 5 Olynthos, 7, 14-18, 23, 29, 37, 40^ 4» 44» 47» 48, 50-54 Onchestos, 88 Ononiarchos, 44, 45 Opis, 196 Orbelos, Mt., 5 Orchomenos, 89 Oreos, 56, 60 Orestis, 4, 9 Oropos, 59, 78 Ortospana (Kabul), 149, 155. '7° Oxus(Riv.), 93, 157 Oxyartes, 165 Oxydrakans, 186 pAGASAI, 6, 45. 52 -*• Paionians, 8, 24, 3-* Palatinate. 89 Pallakopas, iv9 P.i'iiei:e, 7 Panakton, 66 Pangaios, Ml, 7, 3* Paraitonion, 126 Parapotamii. 75 Paraxia, 4 Index, 215 PAR Paris, 29 Parmenion, 58, 79, 96, 97, 98, 105, 106, 108, III, 115, 122, 123, 124, "9, 131. 133. '36, 141, 149, »5o, i5». 152. 153. 154. 167 Paropanisos, Mt. (Hindu Kush), 92, 148, 155. 156, 170, 174 rarsageod(Pasargadai), 139, 140, 192 Parthia, 146 Pattala, 189, 190 Paul (the Apost'e), 107 Pausanias, 22, 24 80 Pelagonia, 4 Pella, 3. 5, 12, 15, 60. 6r, 145 relopidas, 20, 22 Peloponnesos, 26, 78, 85, 121 Pelusium, 124, 128 Perdikk.is I., 9 Perdikkas II., n Perdikkas III.. 23, 24 Perdikkas (Macedonian general), 150, 170, 202 Perikles, 11 Perinthos, 68 Persepolis, 139, 141, 192 Persia, 18 Persian Gulf, 90 Peter (Tsar), 22, 23 Petersburg, 140 Peukestas, 187, 188 Phalaikos, 56, 62, 63 Phamabazos, 123 Pharsalos, 19 Pherai, 19, 44, 61 Philip II. a hostage at Thebes, 22 ; returns to Macedon, 23 ; governor of a district, one of seven pre- tenders, 24 ; king, 25 ; position of, 32, 51; gives Macedon a sea-board, 2 ; extends boundaries, 4 ; re-or- ganises army, 33 ; policy towards Amphipolis, 38 ; takes Amphipo- ^is, 39 ; policy towards Olynthos. 40; compared to Croesus and lason, 42 : Second Sacred War, 44 ; master of Thessaly, 45 ; called in to end war, 47 ; quarrels with Olynthos, 48 ; intrigues in Euboia, 52 : destroys Olynthos, 53 : in- vited by Thebes to suppress Pho- kians, 55 ; Athenian embassy to, 56 ; letter of, 57 ; swears to Peace of Philok.ciies, 61 ; Thermopylai surrendered to, 62 ; cruel treat- ment of Phokis, 63 ; commanding SCY position, 65 ; quarrels with Athens 66: tries to seize Bosporos, 681 Athens declares war, 68 ; invitecl to end Sacred War- seizes Elateia 73 : threatens Thebes, 75 ; gains battle of Chaironeia, 76; treat- ment of Athens and Thebes, 78 ; at Congress of Corinth, 79 ; as- sassinated, 80 ; his character and influence, 81, 82, 167 Philippos, 107, 108 Phiokrates, 56, 57, 59, 62 (Peace of), 57, 60. 6r, 66 Pmlomelos, 43, 44 Philotas, 133, 149, 150, 151-4 Phanicia, 116, 118, 120, 201 Phoibidas, 16, 29 Phokians, 27, 42H5. 54, 57, 58, ;^, 62 63, 75, 89 Phokion, 75, 78, 87 Phokis, 29, 58, 61, 64 Phrygia, 92 Pinaros(Riv.), no, in, 114, ut Pindar, 10, 89 Pindos, Mt., 25 Pisa, 29 Plassy (Battle oQ, 138 Plataia, 71, 89 Plato, 50 Plutarch, 83, 115,141 Polybios, 77 Polytimetos, (Riv.), 159, 162 Porps, 166, 176, 177, 178, 181 Potidaia, 7. II. 16, 17, 37, 41, 47 Prophthasia (Furrah), 149, 155 Propontis, 25, 61, 67 Proxenos, 60 Ptolemaios, 22, 23 Ptolemy (Lagi), 98, 114, 157. ,,s 171-3. 199 Punjab, 93 Pydna, 10, 12, 35-8, 40, 41, 63 R^ HAKOTIS. 124 Rhodes, 32, 39, 121 Rome, 49, 63, 67 Roxana, 165, 168 Russia, 22, 23, 54, X49 CAHARA, 90 *;;^ Samos, 23, 39, 41 Sard.s, lui Satibarzanes, 147, 146 Scythians, 161 2l6 Index, SID Sidon, 1x6, iM Sitalkes, ii, I3 Sithonia, 7 Skardos, Mt. 4, 5 Skarpheia, 73 Sogdiana, 164, 186 Sogdian Rock, 164 Solon, 50 ,0 Sparta, 8, 14-18, 26, ag, 43, 01. 78, 79, 205, 206 Sphodrias, 29 Spitamcnes, 157, 158, 160. 162, 164 Spithridates, 97, 99 Statira, 195 Strabo, n3, 146 Strasburg, 55 Strymon (Riv.), 7 Sunium, 79 Snsa, 138, 139, 192 Syracuse, 12, 18 q^ARSOS, 107 ^ Tatars, 146 Tauros, Mt. (Elburz), ^t Taxila. 166, 175 Teheran, 143 Teleutias, 16, 17 Thapsakos, 108, T14, "3 Thebes, 16, 18, 22, 27, 29, 43, 46. 54. XER 59, 61-3, 66, 71, 74, 75. 77. 7«. 87,88 ITieorikon, 69 ITierme, 5, 7 Thermopylai, 29, 44, 46, 55, 59, 61- 63, 73. 73. 88 Thessalians, 14, 27, 112, 114, 115 Thessaly, 19. 21, 45, 59, 63, 88 Thirlwall (Bishop), 207 Thrace, 6. 47, 60, 61, 67 Thracians, 14, 68, 86 Thucydides, 12, 50 Tigris (Riv.), 94, 128 Timotheos, 23, 41 Timour, 159 Torone, 7, 17 Triballians, 86 Tripolis, 114 Turkestan, 92 Tyre, 116, 118 Tyrrhenians, 201 IJXIANS. 139 W EXFORD, 89 XENOPHON. 15, 91. »o7. '»» Xerxes, 26, 79. H^, 158, x