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W? Head; frince consort j dissertation, 1900. Cambridge, University press, 1901. .\ xi, [1], 3oG p. 19J^». (Cambridge historical essays, no. 12) 1-25190-M 8 ui'^m rary of Congress, no. u Restrictions on Use: Master Negative # ^91- 60616- a TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA REDUCTION RATIO: //A IB IIB FILM SIZE: vZ4j21^ _. IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA ^^ DATi: FILMED: z/^-IJ^ INITIALS rZ2>2_. HLMED BY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS. INC WOODBRIDGE, CT 1 r Association for information and Image Management 1 1 00 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1 1 00 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 1 2 3 iiii milmihmlmj^^ ^11 I 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 llllllllllllllllMMllllllllMlllllllllllllllllllillllllllll llllllMllllllllllllMlH^ 4 5 ' m m imimmn I II I I TTT TTT TTT 15 mm T Inches 1.0 I.I 1.25 |4.5 2.8 1^ IP:.^. 1^ 1 3.6 4.0 1.4 2,5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 MFINUFRCTURED TO FIIIM STRNDflRDS BY APPLIED IMAGE, INC. S42.06 H34 ttt tUe ©its of a^cw Borli 1901 I 1 J — I THE FALLEN STUAETS I ijm^jjgDHijm,;, ■■^^■fc■--»■■■^MiLai^iAjlifiiar■-^illfrl^■^lliW^^ Cambnliffe i^isJtorital essiaps. ^o» xiL y V THE FALLEN STUARTS I ILontJon: C. J. CLAY and SONS, CAMBRIDGE UNIVEKSITY PllESS WAREHOUSE, AVE MARIA LANE. ©laggotB: 50, WELLINGTON STREET. IfipMfl: F. A. BROCKHAUS. i^fto gork: THE M ACM ILL AN COMPANY. Bombajj: E. SEYMOUR HALE. BY F. W. HEAD, M.A. »« » FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE PRINCE CONSORT DISSERTATION, 19(X) {All Rights reserved] Gtambn'tJge AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1901 ^3 CambriUfic : PRINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. TO E. M. C. 317553 PREFACE. ri^HE following Essay obtained the Prince Consort -L Prize and the Seeley Medal in 1900. Since then by the kindness of the Electors it has been in parts cut down and in some places added to. Its method requires some explanation. With a subject touching upon the intricate threads of European history for roughly three quarters of a century, know- ledge throughout at first hand was impossible in so small a compass. The plan adopted was therefore to obtain, so far as may be, first-hand information for the occasions in which the Stuart House came pro- minently forward in the diplomacy and wars of the time. For the rest, I have tried to show how far the great Courts of Europe were busy in different parts of the Continent, in order to explain why they made use of the fallen dynasty at the particular times that they did. But this has required the use of well-known authorities rather than original work. Vlll PREFACE. These chapters are however only the links connect- ing the Stuart crises. The chief authority upon which the Essay is based is the Gualterio Manuscripts at the British Museum. An Appendix gives typical extracts from them. I gratefully acknowledge my thanks for advice and criticism throughout to Lord Acton, who first suggested the Gualterio Manuscripts and many of the other books quoted ; to Mr Figgis of St Catha- rine's College, who revised my proof-sheets for me and made many valuable suggestions ; to Dr Braun- holtz of King's College for correcting the Italian of the Appendix, and to my cousin Dr Barclay Head for much kindness during the time I spent at the British Museum. Emmanuel College, May^ 1901. CONTENTS. Introduction PAGE 1 CHAPTER I. The Importance of the Fall of James II : 1660-1688. 1. Balance of Power on the Continent 2. Balance of Power at Sea . . 3. Balance of Power in Religion 4. Meaning of the Fall of James II. 15 26 37 49 CHAPTER II. The Stuarts as the Tools of France: 1689-1713. A. James II before the Vacancy on the Spanish Throne 1. A Crusade in the West 2. The Struggle for the Channel 3. The Crusade in the East 4. Balance of Power on the Continent 5. The Imi>ortance of the Stuarts . 59 59 67 79 81 92 CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. The Time of the War of the Spanish Succession : 1701-1713. B. James II after the Vacancy on the Spanish Throne 1. The Period of the French advance : 1701-1704 2. The History of the other Claimants : 1 704-1 707 3. The Meaning of the Attempt of James : 1708 i. Sea Power ii. The Religious Balance . iii. The Importance of 1707 iv. James's Expedition 4. The Peace of Utrecht 1708-1713 i. Balance of Power by Land ii. The Equilibrimn of Religion iii. Sea Power PAGE 98 98 102 111 111 118 136 137 142 142 143 153 CHAPTER IV. The House of Stuart and the Utrecht Settlement: 1713-1740. The Unsettlement after the Peace : 1713-1717 i. Religious EquiliV)rium . ii. Political Equilibrium . iii. The Expedition .... iv. Conclusion ..... Spain as Champion of the House of Stuart 1717-1731 A. Alberoni B. Elizabeth Farnese i. Spain and France ii. Spain and Austria iii. The Influence of Religion . iv. Spain and England . 161 163 172 174 186 187 187 217 218 224 232 236 CONTENTS. XI Cardinal Fleury and the Stuarts : 1731-1740 i. The Family Compact . ii. The Anglo-Spanish War iii. Sea Power iv. The Influence of Religion . page 242 242 250 253 256 CHAPTER V. T. The Austrian Succession War: 1740-1748. 1. The Balance of Power on Land A. The Inheritance of the Emperor Charles VI B. France and her Pretenders in 1744 . C. France and her Pretenders: 1745-1748 . 2. The Influence of Religion .... II. After the Austrian Succession War . III. The Fallen Stuarts and the Internal De- velopment OF England .... 262 262 267 278 291 297 303 Appendix 314 Index 351 CORRIGENDA. p. 9, half way down the page — " To their strength or weakness teas largely due the successes" should be *' iccre largely due." p. 15. Title—" The Importance of the Fall of James II. 1660— 1668" should be "1660—16^5." p. 49, line 3.— "3." should be "4." THE FALLEN STUARTS. INTRODUCTION. Romance has always cast its halo over the fallen House of Stuart. The attempts at its restoration have been thought exciting but disconnected. Yet in reality they are but links in the long chain of cause and effect which the history of the Continent was forging in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some of these links are more noticeable than others. James II's ill-fated expedition to Ire- land in 1689, 1690, and the famous rebellions of 1715 and 1745 are specially important. Yet there were others less well-known. And for more than sixty years after the flight of James II the exiled House was the one element of danger to England which was constant. From the time of the Restoration to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle is a short century (1660-1748). During this period European policy revolved round the Balance of Power under three different aspects —that on land, that of the sea, and that of religion. These three aspects varied in importance. The question of power on land was the greatest, and to 1 2 THE FALLEN STUARTS. the Continental nations was throughout the primum mobile of their policy. The balance between the two great faiths of Christendom was of decreasing importance in politics, and was the relic of an earlier age. Supremacy at sea was a new and hardly realised subject of international struggle. Together they shape the current of European history at this time. (1) The Balance of Power on Land. Out of the chaos of Europe had emerged first the power of the House of Hapsburg, and then that of the House of Bourbon. The Thirty Years' War had made France an arbiter in Europe, and the old rivalry of Louis XI and Charles the Bold was destined to revive under new conditions. The peace of 1648 settled the relations between France and the German House of Hapsburg. The bounds of the two were laid down, but between them lay a number of sovereign princes, who might be used by either against the other. In 1659 the rivalry of the two royal lines was ended by the alliance of Louis XIV with Maria Theresa, the Infanta, who renounced her claims to the Spanish throne. The mutual relations of these royal lines is the key to the events that followed. The first battle-ground was Germany, where both the rivals claimed to be the heirs of Charlemagne. Louis, who had aspired to the Imperial Crown at the time of Leopold's election in 1658, made more INTRODUCTION. 6 than one attempt afterwards to secure it at the next vacancy, and meanwhile made use of the indefiniteness of certain terms in the treaty of Westphalia to secure much of the borderland, and gained over many of the German princes to his cause. But Spain throughout acted like an un- dercurrent, drawing Louis' German policy out of its natural course. After 1659 he always meant the House of Bourbon to succeed, if the sickly Charles II died without an heir, while Leopold was as resolute to maintain the inheritance of his House. The struggle, however, was not to be a duel. In his policy of obtaining parts of the Spanish inherit- ance as pledges of the whole, Louis advanced into Flanders in 1667, and then in alliance with England made war on Holland in 1672, whose rights under the treaty of Westphalia lay like an incubus on its neighbour. When this process seemed about to be repeated in a more violent way, with a Catholic bigot on the English throne, England and Holland joined hands and William of Orange became the centre of the opposition to Louis, and James an exile. Louis had raised up his greatest enemy in his rear. He had a mighty weapon in the person of the banished King, but with his eye fixed on Spain he made insufficient use of him, and in the end William and his successor Marlborough had France at their mercy. In the same way Louis had an enemy he could raise up in the rear of Leopold — Hungary backed by Turkey, and he called them forth more than once with terrible effect. Thus the struggle of the 1—2 THK FALLKN STUARTS. INTRODUCTION. two great Houses for Germany was never fought out. Leopold did not die as Louis hoped, and the inheritance of Charlemagne never fell to the House of Bourbon. In 1700 the battle-ground shifted to Spain, at the death of Charles IL Now the struggle of Louis and Leopold ceased to be for themselves, for each had a Pretender to the inheritance, round whom the bulk of the strife centred. But Louis' policy was to maintain other Pretenders in order to create diversions elsewhere, and like a master chess-player he moved about Max Emanuel of Bavaria, James III of England, and Ragoczy in Hungary. In the end Louis' main object was I'ulfilled and Spain passed at the Peace of Utrecht, though shorn of many of its dependencies, from the Hapsburgs to the Bourbons. Henceforth the number of Pretenders increased, for the deaths of Anne and Louis XIV each opened up questions of the succession. Before Europe had really settled down to the new peace, James of England made a futile attempt to wrest the throne from George, and the failure of this threw England and France together to maintain the new settlement and the existing successions. But, thanks to Alberoni, the old struggle of Hapsburgs and Bourbons was maintained, this time in the very dependencies of Spain, wrested from her in 17L3. His adopted country became a sort of Cave of Adullam for all the Pretenders of Europe, and Charles XII of Sweden, James of England, the sons of Elizabeth Farnese and the King of Spain himself were all worked into his plans. However, the House of Bourbon was weak because divided against itself, and Alberoni had to be dropped. At last in 1732 and 1734, partly by diplomacy and partly by war, two of Elizabeth's sons obtained Parma and the Two Sicilies ; the Spanish House of Bourbon thus regained much that it had lost at Utrecht, and the two branches reunited in the Family Compact of 1733. In the American de- pendencies, too, a struggle was preparing with England, who disputed the Spanish monopoly. Germany became the scene of the last stage of the duel. In 1740 Charles VI died and Maria Theresa, his daughter, became a mere claimant to his Crown, though it was secured to her by the promise of all Europe in the acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction. Charles of Bavaria, husband of the daughter of the Emperor Joseph, was the rival, and received the support of France and Prussia. He fared badly, and to create a diversion in his favour and also to aid Louis' designs on Flanders, Prince Charles Edward was supported in an expedition against England in 1744. But owing to a storm it fell through ; in January 1745 Charles VII died and his son Maximilian Joseph made peace with Austria. With the Imperial claimant no longer available, and owing to difficulties experienced in 1744 with some of the Protestant German princes, Louis XV did not support Charles Edward's second expedition in 1745 as he had done the year before. Despite its momentary gleam of success, then, this expedition was doomed to failure for want of support. With the death of Charles VII, i 6 THE FALLEN STUARTS. too, ended tbe real strife of Hapsburgs and Bourbons, which dragged on till the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Austria remained to the Hapsburgs, and Parma and the Two Sicilies to the Bourbons, who were unmolested now in Spain. Henceforward the combatants changed. The House of Hapsburg found its rival in Prussia, and the House of Bourbon, with its three branches in France, Spain and Italy, united in a family alliance, found its rival in England. (2) The Balance of Power at Sea. Each of the four European seas, the North Sea with the English Channel, the Atlantic, the Baltic, and the Mediterranean, was connected with a phase in the history of the fallen House of Stuart. With the discovery of the Atlantic began England's great- ness, and the defeat of the Armada in 1588 was her first certificate of sea-power. From that time the history of the struggle among the maritime nations, though fitful for another century, begins to weave itself round the development of England. France, too, had a vital interest in the sea, and Richelieu saw it. But Louis XIV turned east rather than west till the English fleets were without a rival and the French navy had dwindled to inferiority. The seas round England were the first battle- ground. The question of the supremacy of the English Channel is the kernel of the policy of Louis towards England and Holland from 1660- INTRODUCTION. 1688. But his fatal mistake lay in not seeing that England was his rival, Holland his ally. Instead of this, he dallied with England and threatened the Dutch, till William's expedition was brought about, and the French King was confronted with one mighty power resting on either side of the Straits of Dover. The coronation-gift of England's first foreign King was the secure pos- session of the Channel. Ireland was still disaffected, and with the powerful weapon of the Catholic King James, the Irish Channel might have been used to break up William's triple-headed kingdom. But despite Tourville's victories the chance was lost, and with the battle of La Hogue in 1692 the French dominion of these Channels was lost. The North Sea was still left. One great, though perhaps unrealized, object of the struggle of William and Marlborough with Louis, was the possession of the east coast of this sea, for which the Dutch barrier was an outpost. The treaty of Utrecht was a declaration that these objects were secured. The west coast was still a debateable ground so long as Scotland inclined to the cause of the exiled family. But with the Union in 1707 the last danger from this sea was removed and when the Pretender tried to land the next year his attempt failed. All the while the English navy, having swallowed up the Dutch power, was steadily growing. But the French fleets from the time of La Hogue and the death of Seignelay, the son and successor of the great Colbert, fell into decay. In 1689 James was supported by a French fleet. In 1708 8 THE FALLEN STUARTS. INTRODUCTION. 9 only a flotilla accompanied his son. In 1715 the fugitive escaped to Scotland by himself as best he could. The seas round England were lost to him and he had to fly to more distant ones. With the War of the Spanish Succession opened up a struggle for the Atlantic. England first asserted her power in the victory at Vigo Bay in 1702, which helped to bring about the priceless alliance of Portugal in 1703. Later on, Alberoni tried to resist the intruder and built the naval station of Ferrol. But the attempt in 1719 to send off the Pretender from this coast only ftiiled, and this, followed by the destruction of the Port du Passage in the same year, meant the triumph of the English fleet in the eastern Atlantic. On the American shore of this ocean a similar process was gradually going on and the Spanish power being undermined till the flame of war was lit up in 1739. The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 showed that James of England could find no maritime help from the Atlantic. The Baltic was long a sea apart with rulers like Charles XI of Sweden. Charles XII threatened to make the Baltic a new power in Europe, but turned eastward to Russia. Before he returned a great change had come. The coronation-gift of England's second foreign King was the control of the Baltic. Georcre I as defender of Hanover and Charles XII as restorer of Sweden struggled for the Baltic. In 1715, thanks to the English fleet, Charles was blockaded in Stralsund and could not help James' expedition. In 1717 Gyllenborg's plot failed, and in 1718 Alberoni's scheme was shattered by the death of Charles. He was the last King who could have troubled England's naval power from this Northern ocean, for Prussia avowedly was a military and not a naval state and Russia was still un- organized. The Peace of Nystadt in 1721 was the knell to James's hopes from the Baltic. The Mediterranean was at first the scene of the struggle between the fleets of France and Spain with the Barbary pirates as common foes. But with the War of the Spanish Succession appeared the English fleet as the ally of the Archduke Charles. With Gibraltar won in 1704 and Port Mahon in 1708 as bases of operations the English soon made their power felt. To their strength or weakness was largely due the successes or failures of Charles in Spain, while the sieges of Barcelona, Toulon, and other places showed their power in the Western Mediterranean. The treaty of Utrecht, too, left the Italian peninsula in the hands of allies, so that the whole sea was friendly and the Pretender could be more safely banished there than anywhere else. But Alberoni disturbed all, and the English had again to assert themselves by shattering their new rival's power for ever at Cape Passaro in 1717. After this James could look for no help from the Mediterranean, for France had no navy, Spain, in spite of braggarts like Ripperda, was very weak, and Italy was divided. English fleets rode the sea till in 1742 they could force Naples to neutrality by mere threats. III! 10 THE FALLEN STUARTS. INTRODUCTION. 11 li i (3) The Balance of Power in Religion. Religion was, from the Reformation up to the middle of the seventeenth century, the great motive of politics. The advances of Protestantism gave birth to the Counter-Reformation, and the Thirty Years' War saw the contest settled at the point of the sword. After 1648, religion retired into the background of politics, yet still remained, like the groundsvvell after a storm, as a strong power dis- turbing the surface of events and sometimes coming forward into the first place. Roughly speaking, the treaty of Westphalia left Central and South Europe Catholic, with a fringe of Protestant States all round it. Disturbances soon arose in the Catholic body, from the ambition of Louis XIV in religious matters. An ardent Galli- can, he wished to make France largely independent of the Pope. This led to long and bitter struggles with Pope Innocent XI. Soon greater disturbances than this arose in the Protestant fringe of states, and West, East and North were struggling for or against the religious settlement of the middle of the century. At the Western extremity of Europe was Protestant England. But her dynasty, restored in 1660, was at heart Catholic. Charles II was more of a statesman than a convert and under him no change was made, but the nation showed its convictions in the outburst against the Popish Plot. James was a bigot and meant to bring England into the Catholic body. His accession, however, was the moment chosen by Louis to compel all Frenchmen to become Catholics by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The English hatred of Louis' tyranny, coupled with the same feelings in Holland, only made their common hatred of Ca- tholicism greater. The two nations united, the Catholic King flies before the storm and under a Protestant King the old balance is maintained, with the difference that England became more definitely Protestant than ever. About the same time a struggle, the reverse of this, was going on at the Eastern extremity of Europe. Hungary was mainly Protestant, and since 1526 had been nominally under the sway of the Catholic Hapsburgs. Beyond Hungary lay a power that was neither Catholic nor Protestant — Turkey. After a century and a half of civil strife in Hungary, Tekely, the leader of the Protestant Magyars, called in Turkish aid and advanced to Vienna in 1683. The House of Austria recovered itself by the might of John Sobieski and then took vengeance by shocking persecutions in 1687, which only roused the Magyars to further resistance. The balance here too was unchanged, for the country still maintained its religion. Scandinavia then became the champion of the ring of Protestant states. Charles XII of Sweden held Europe in suspense while choosing between an attack on Germany or Russia. Before he started against Peter he forced the Emperor to grant relief to the Protestant Churches of Silesia, whom he had 12 THE FALLEN STUARTS. INTRODUCTION. 13 persecuted (1707). The same cry was caught up by Frederick of Prussia as his excuse for his seizure of Silesia in 1740. And behind these two powers stood a third, which, like Turkey on the South, was outside the two contending faiths. The growing importance of Russia could not fail to weaken the old religious duel. At the South of Europe was the head of the great Catholic body — the Pope. Though far weaker now than in former days, the Papacy was still strong in moral influence, and Innocent XI by his struggle against Gallicanism had increased this pres- tige. The breach with France was healed, though rather from Louis' fear of William than from any real obedience to the Pope. But in 1700 the Spanish Succession raised a new difficulty. The essence of the moral power of the Pope lay in his supposed impartiality. The essence of his political action was now unavoidably partizanship. Clement XI had to choose between two Catholic states, and after a spirited effort to be a mediator he chose France and Philip V. When France grew weak, therefore, he fell before the might of Austria and from 1709 became a mere tool in her hands. This, again, led to a breach with Spain, and as the Spanish princes obtained Italian crowns, the Papal weakness and poverty continued to increase. France only complicated matters by her extortion of the Bull " Unigeuitus," whose object was to make the Catholic France of 1685 into a Jesuitical one. Instead it only revived the bitterest of persecutions. But with the Papal weakness grew the iuiportance ii S of the chief pastorate in the Catholic countries. The Cardinal's hat was demanded by the great clerical statesmen as the badge of a sort of patri- archate, and by it Rome could still largely rule a Dubois, an Alberoni, a Fleury, or a Tencin. Failing in power, then, in the countries nearest to him, the Pope had also to look at the Eastern and Western extremities of Europe. In distant England in the West was a strong Protestant dynasty in close alliance with his master the Emperor. In Turkey on the East lay a danger to himself, far closer and more aggressive, against which the Emperor himself organized the resistance. Ever since 1715 there was in the Papal dominions as an honoured guest the Catholic claimant to the distant English throne, which he had lost for the sake of his faith. Previously to his humiliation before Austria the Pope had helped him by gifts of money and support. But it was little Avonder if in his poverty he turned with the oft-repeated cry of a crusade not west but east, where his very exist- ence was at stake. All the three elements of European policy thus meet in the fallen Stuarts — the legitimist heirs to the throne round which rallied all the opposition to the House of Bourbon ; the exiles whose return depended on the overthrow of that growing power on each sea ; the converts whose faith had cost them their throne. Driven back from sea to sea, sup- planted by claimants to more useful thrones, resting on the broken reed of a religious head who could not save himself, they are a golden thread to guide ■■I 14 THE FALLEN STUARTS. h us through the maze of European history from 1660- 1752, for Charles Edward's hopeless attempt to rouse disaffection in that year may be taken as the end of their gradually decreasing political importance. But they played no mean part. They bore, like the scapegoat, the burden of a mighty change in the national self-consciousness of England — the change from loyalty to patriotism. With Charles II and James II there is the island power centring round its King. Divine Right was weakened, but loyalty to the person of the sovereign was never greater. But when this royal line became the tool of our enemies and the champion of a dreaded faith, when the nation came to rest upon its growing sea-power and the Crown passed on to the heads of two foreign princes, then the object of the national sentiment turned from the King to the Empire. Throughout this period the country's dangers and fears and the enemies of the new order of things found a personal rallying point in the fallen House. Round it the vague dangers in solution would always crystallize. But at last the new-found patriotism could itself crystallize round a man. That man was Pitt, and with his appearance the work of the fallen Stuarts was done. CHAPTER I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES IL 1660-1668. (1) The Balance of Power on the Continent. The central question of Continental politics for Import- the first quarter of a century after Louis XIV as- imperial ' sumed the reins of government in 1660 was his ^"^«''o». relation to the Empire. Behind this lay the con- tiogency of a claim on Spain although the marriage treaty of Louis and Maria Theresa had stipulated for the absence of any such claim. But the Imperial question was all-important and present. Louis him- self states his position. " When Charlemagne by his victories had brought this dignity into our House, it meant the rule over France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and most of Spain.... The Germans excluded the princes of our blood and immediately afterwards possessed themselves of this dignity, or rather substituted another in its place. ...For in justice one can only regard them as the chiefs or Captains-general of a German republic ^" On 1 Oeuvres de Louis XIV, i. 72 — 74. 16 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES IL 17 attempt. the other hand the Emperor Leopold was as much the champion of his rights, for " in place of the lost power of the German kingdom as the basis of the Roman Empire the Hapsburg set that of his own House as its basis'." Three times over do we find Louis making treaties to secure himself this throne, and as his strength grows he backs his claim by seizing German territory in time of peace, till at last the abortive attempts at an alliance against him prepare the way for the Grand Alliance. Louis' first Louis' first candidature was at the vacancy of the Imperial throne in 1658, but the partisans of Austria worked hard, and despite his bribery and promises, the Electors had no wish for such a power- ful lord, and Leopold was elected. Louis, hov/ever, had some compensation in the formation of the Kheinbund, which was a fusion of two separate leao-ues of Protestants and Catholics under the protection of the King of France ^ as a bulwark against Austria. This was important, for it opened Louis' eyes to the disunion of Germany, and he learnt that one part could be attacked without rousing the whole. The second attempt of the French King to win the crown of Charlemagne was in 1670, when a treaty for that purpose was concluded with Ferdinand Maria, Elector of Bavaria. It was agreed that, "If the Empire becomes vacant by the death of the Emperor, both the contracting parties will strive with all their power to dispose ^ Klopp : Fall des Hauses Stuart, i. 76. 2 Revue Historique, Sept. 1897, p. 18. Louis' second attempt and its Reaction. the Electoral College in favour of his Most Christian Majesty as Emperor and his Electoral Highness as King of the Romans ^" The danger at once drew the princes in Northern Germany together. The Elector of Brandenburg made a treaty with the Emperor^. Though little was done, it was none the less a step in advance, and it led to more; for William of Orange had been called to the helm in Holland in its despair at the union of England and France by the treaty of Dover, and he appealed to Leopold for help. Leopold in his weakness at first refused, but when Louis, em- boldened by the withdrawal of Brandenburg from his alliance of 1672, advanced into Franconia, the Emperor was at last forced to action in spite of himself, and the first of the series of leagues of princes threatened by Louis was made at the Hague (August 30, 1673) between the Emperor and the Republic of Holland, between the King of Spain and the Republic, and between all these powers and the Duke of Lorraine I "For the first time for 130 years the Empire stood united for its Emperor*." Yet the hope of action was still premature. Disunion grew up between the allies, rebellion broke out in Hungary, and Leopold was forced to make peace with his rival ,at Nimeguen in February 1679^ In a word, Louis, while busy ^ Revue Historique^ Sept. 1897, p. 23. 2 Klopp, I. 306. ^ Koch and Schoell, Histoire abregee des Traitis de Paix. * Klopp, I. 376. ^ Koch and Schoell, i. 151. H. 2 iiimitiliiniililiiiii 18 THE FALLEN STUARTS. houis* third attempt : (a) Brari- denhuTif. in the North against Belgium and Holland, was keeping the central idea of the Imperial Crown before himself. But the determination of the Emperor had called up some shadow of resistance in the Empire. It was round the third attempt of Louis that the real battle was to be waged. In 1677 the childless Emperor had married again, and in July 1678 the future Emperor Joseph was born^ This was Louis' time to act, or he might lose the chance for ever of winning the inheritance of Charlemagne which this Austrian House had usurped. He had not long to look for a seconder. The Great Elector of Brandenburg was eager to secure Pomerania, and felt that the King who could obtain the Peace of Nimeguen was the best ally he could have'. A secret treaty between them at St Germains in October 25, 1679, was the result. "If," said Article XIII, "in the order of divine Providence, the death of the Emperor happens be- fore there be a King of the Romans, his Electoral Highness undertakes... to use all his power to secure the"* election of his Most Christian Majesty as being more capable than anyone else... by his great vir- tues and by his power to maintain the Imperial Crown and the Empire... in all its dignity and de- fend it against the dangerous enterprises of the Turk^." By this time the general drift of Louis' German policy was sufficiently obvious for an oppo- 1 Klopp, II. 53, 54. 2 Ibid. II. 138. 3 Revue Historique, Sept. 1897, pp. 38, 39. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 19 sition to be formed to the object of this treaty, though the treaty itself was secret. But the im- petus to resistance came from without. William of Holland was developing a scheme whose object was, as Avaux understood, directed to an alliance with England which should be the beginning of a general alliance by the participation in it of the two branches of the House of Hapsburg in Germany and Spaing But, under the treaty be- tween Louis and the Great Elector, " the services of Brandenburg were real. The Emperor hung back through mistrust of England, and the great plan of the Prince of Orange from January, 1680, by which he sought to lead his uncle of England along a better path, miscarried principally through the opposition of Brandenburg^." In 1681 came another attempt to keep Louis out of the Empire. The initiative was due to Charles XI of Sweden, who won over William of Orange to his idea of an association to guarantee the Peace of Nimeguen. If only England would join, the Triple Alliance of 1668 would come again. But Charles of England was not likely to break with his settled French policy, and refused to join the enemies of his patron. The Swedish Associa- tion therefore became the treaty of the Hague of March 18, 1683, whose object was to fix contribu- tions of men, ships and arms, for the maintenance of the treaty of Nimeguen^, and from this England was excluded. 1 Klopp, II. 216. - Ibid. ii. 327. ^ Koch and Schoell, iv. 161 ; Klopp. ii. 380. 20 THE FALLEN STUARTS. (b) Re- unions. Louis had provoked this alliance by a new form of aggression on the Empire. While his attempts upon the Imperial throne were necessarily secret, till the death of Leopold or an effort to make Joseph King of the Romans occurred, or at least till France was still stronger than she was now, and Germany weaker, the way for such a step could be prepared by attempts upon the Imperial territory. This is the meaning of the famous "R«5unions." On the principle that the throne of Charlemagne had been usurped, "what once be- longed to France, continued to be by right the inalienable possession of the French Crown, though it had been sold, exchanged, or given away'." The Courts of Justice of Besan9on, Metz, Breisach and Tournai were, therefore, declared to be Courts oi Reunion. Before them the King's Procurator brought his claims, and anything on Alsatian ter- ritory which belonged to the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul or Verdun, was held to have been ceded to the King of France at the treaty of Westphalia. What was not actually ceded was held to be a " dependency " of what was, and places which came under neither designation were seized as " equiva- lents" for places which Louis offered to give up^ It was this system and its attendant consequences that connected the Continent with the Revolution of 1688. , . , Luxemburg was the first place seized as a "dependency" of the County of Chiny (August, I Oevvres de Louis XIV, n. 375—393. « Klopp, II. 317. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES IL 21 1681). Soon after this, on October 1, the Imperial city of Strasburg was delivered up to France^ "By means of these two cities the French King would so have the four Electors of the Rhine and the three spiritual Electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Treves, as well as the Elector Palatine in his power, that he would be able himself, by means of them, to carry through his election to the Kingship of the Romans in legal form. Then would Louis XIV be the rightful successor of Leopold-." It was little wonder if the treaty of the Hague was the reply to this policy of French aggression for the sake of the Imperial Crown. One last appeal was made by Spain to Charles of England, under their treaty of 1680, to help the allies to stop Louis. But Charles refused, with the excuse that "internal affairs do not allow itV The second treaty of the Hague in 1683 was (c) The doomed to be as impotent as that of 1673, for the ,/4r '^ ^ Klopp, II. 343, 348. '■^ Ibid. II. 318. A treaty made between the Landgrave of Cassel and the Elector of Brandenburg was typical of the attitude of the North German princes towards the Reunions : ' * so viele herrUche importirende Stucke seien dem Reich durch die Reunionen entrissen : der ganze Rheinstrom stehe in Gefahr : es gelte Coblenz, Coin, die vereinigten Niederlande zu schiitzen und die evangelische Religion zu retten, die auf Anstiften auswartiger Machte, namentlich Frankreichs und Englands, in Gefahr sei : mit alien Kraften, mit Daransetzung Guts und Bluts sei dem entgegenzutreten : zu dem Ende wolle man sich bemiihen, alle Evangelischen Fiirsten heranzuziehen, den Hader zwischen Re- formirten und Lutheranern moglichst beizulegen." Droysen, Preussische Politik, iv. i. 22. =^ Klopp, II. 433. Cf. Foxcroft, Life of Lord Halifax, i. 339—342. 99 THE FALLEN STUARTS. attention of Leopold was turned east, not west. Tekely in Hungary, driven away in 1681, had found help in Turkey, and now there followed the memor- able siege of Vienna. But this was no mere struggle of Leopold and Mahomet IV,— it was another link in the chain of Louis' attempts on the Imperial Crown. " After the break-up of the Austrian power it could scarcely happen otherwise than that Louis should take up the task of defence against the further aggressions of the infidels. Who would then have been able to refuse to the Bourbon King the dignity of the Western Imperial Crown > ? But all these calculations were upset, because, while the fate of Europe hung in the balance, John Sobieski came forward and Vienna was saved (September, 1683). Accordingly Louis changed his tactics. He had suffered the first check in his onward career, and had lost the support of his ally in the east. Germany, on the other hand, was not yet united or self-conscious enoiigh to put her paper alliances into action. But her time was come, for in the crucible of this crusade was fashioned the conscious- ness of nationality, such as had not existed before. "The great interest which all Europe had in the struo-gle with the barbarous power of the infidels awoke to new life, and Austria came forward as the centre of the movement so pregnant with victory'-." But while thQ struggle was going on in the east she wanted rest in the west. The rivals therefore agreed to a compromise and "on August 15th, 1684, an 1 Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichtc, 1648-1740, i. 894. - Ibid. I. 695. ■X 1 % THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES XL 23 armistice for twenty years was signed at Ratisbon, between the Emperor and the Empire, on one side, and the King of France on the other. By it the King of France remained for this period in posses- sion of Strasburg, and all that he had ' re-united ' before August 1, 1681. This meant an eighth part of the Empire, the whole left bank of the Rhine'." Henceforward this armistice became the centre The armis- of the strife. It was Louis aim to have it con- 1334, and verted into a permanent peace and meanwhile to ^['^'?"^^^" continue his aggressions on Austria's weakness. It was Leopold's aim to allow no contravention of the agreement and maintain it as an armistice and not a permanent peace. Once again all depended on England. If Charles would guarantee the armistice, Europe was secure. If not, Louis was at least safe from any attack in the rear, if he continued his aggressions. Charles refused to guarantee it, be- cause he was secretly in Louis' service. He little knew the momentous effect this was to have four years later. Germany, however, would at least se- cure herself against her western foe while struggling with the eastern one, and for this purpose Leopold sought allies in the Empire. Such a security offered itself in the person of the Great Elector^. He had begun to find his alliance with the Catholic King of France a mistake and now turned round to Holland by making an alliance to secure William in the rear, if he went to England to save Protestantism (February, 1685) \ It was but a preliminary to a 1 Klopp, II. 438. '^ Ibid. in. 218. 2 Droysen, Prem. l)C- o tweeriEast the victory of Mohacz in 1687 was followed by the and West. ^.^^ ^^ Presburg, which declared the Hungarian throne hereditary in the Hapsburgs and Joseph King (December, 1687). And a different kind of crusade was going on in the west with very different of Brandenburg in securing the support of the Emperor for William in 1688. p. 61, note 1. 1 Klopp, III. 220. 2 Ibid. III. 223. 3 Hawkins, Medallic Illustrations of the History of Great Britain, ii. 99. •» Klopp, III. 302. i THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 25 results. William of Orange watched the prose- lytizing zeal of James with dismay. " By the action of Louis the secret treaty of Dover had become known since 1682. It seemed patent that, as regarded England, James II was going the way already marked out by the treaty of Dover. But could the other side of that treaty be separated from this action, that, namely, which turned against the Republic and threatened it with annihilation through the united power of both Kings^" ? Wil- liam felt his difficulty in his isolation. But, since the older abortive alliances of the Hague, had come two changes of vast importance. The two great Electors in the French interest had become each a nucleus for a revival of German patriotism. Maxi- milian Emanuel, who had succeeded his father as Elector in 1679, had come over to Leopold and w^as headinof the crusade in the east. Frederick William of Brandenburg had changed sides, and was the one link between William of Orange, on the one side, and Leopold and the Augsburg Alliance on the other. Everything in 1688, in the west of Europe, import- depended on the armistice of 1684. Louis stood England. waiting, with none of the old claims to the Imperial Crown or territories given up. The opportunity for aggression was great, yet the feeling of united Christendom was still strong enough to make any movement against an absent crusader almost im- possible. As yet Louis' three attempts to become the successor of Charlemagne had ended only in the 1 Klopp, III. 426. 26 THE FALLEN STUARTS. seizure of some lands, which, though considerable, were but a fraction of what remained, while the two Electors with whom he had made treaties in 1670 and 1679, to secure the Imperial throne, had gone over to his rivaP. There seemed to be only one security for Europe— England. If England broke her silence of more than thirteen years and guaran- teed the armistice, all might yet be well. But this was a hope which the state of affairs in the Channel seemed little likely to fulfil. E lenient >< of the Maritime Question. (2) The Balance of Poioer at Sea. The discovery of the Atlantic and America had made Spain the great sea-power. But the independ- ence of the United Provinces and the defeat of the Armada had been mortal blows. With the seven- teenth century three maritime nations had grown up on the ruins of Spain— France, Holland, and England. The point where these three touched one another was the English Channel and part of the North Sea, which perhaps may, for brevity, be all included in the word " Channel." It was obvious, therefore, that the history of the balance of power at sea would be the history of the struggle for the supremacy of these waters, as a prelude to struggles further off, when this was decided. " In spite of the ambition of Britain, as exaggerated as it was precocious, at the time when Richelieu began his career as minister, no European nation ruled the seas. The splendour 1 Cf. above, pp. 16, 18, 1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES XL 27 of the Spanish and Portuguese fleets had just been eclipsed under the dark and bloody reign of Philip II, whilst England and Holland w^ere as yet only in the dawn of their maritime power, the development of which was so rapids" This great minister at once saw his true policy. On the eastern shore of the Channel lay France at the south, the Spanish Netherlands in the centre, and Holland on the north. On the western shore lay England. Riche- lieu's aim, therefore, was to unite the eastern shore against the western, by an alliance wdth Holland, while Spain was too weak in Belgium either to help or hinder. This was the meaning of the treaties between the two countries in 1624, 1630, and 1635-. Within Holland itself were two parties whose rivalry had most important results — the Oligarchs wdth de Witt at their head and the Republicans who rallied round the House of Orange. De Witt w^as triumphant in the time of Cromwell and con- cluded the treaty of Westminster of 1654 wdth him. But when in 1660 that restoration took place, the hopes of the Republicans revived and de Witt felt himself insecure. From this time the Orange party looked hopefully to England. De Witt sought support in Louis XIV. While Holland and France were thus joining hands, England was not backward in asserting herself. The Navigation Act was one of the greatest ^ Eugene Sue. Introduction to La Correspondance de D'Escou- bleaii de Sourdis, viii, ix. - Koch and Schoell, Histoire abregee des traites, i. 63. Klopp, I. 103. 28 THE FALLEN STUARTS. i. Friend ship loitli Holland. 1660— 1668. measures of Cromwell's reign, and was at once renewed by Charles II in 1660. But the key to the politics on the Channel from the time when Louis assumed the Government himself in 1660, is that, except for the first eight years, he gave up Richelieu's policy, and aimed at making this strait a mere cipher in Europe by pitting the power on the one side against that on the other. In this he seemed to meet with great success, for the House of Stuart became merely the dupes of France. At sea as on land the English dynasty was found wanting. For the first eight years of Louis' personal oovernment he remained in alliance with Holland. It was Louis' object to isolate the Netherlands, and for this purpose he worked on Charles of England through his mother, Henrietta Maria, so that in February 1667 it was promised that England would not enter into any alliance hostile to France for a year and would prepare for a treaty with France ^ With the security of this agreement and of the Anglo-Dutch War, Louis proceeded to assure him- self of the middle part of the eastern coast and the Channel by the War of Devolution in May, l(j67_on the ground that his Queen, as Infanta of Spain by Philip IV's first marriage, was heiress of Flanders in preference to Charles II, the son of the second marriage. The campaign in Belgium was merely a military promenade, and Tournai, Douai, Oudenarde, and Lille taken at once, though Dendermonde resisted'. It seemed as if the whole 1 Klopp, I. 147, 156. 2 Ibid. I. 162—174. ^^; THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 29 country w^ould be annexed without any difficulty. England and Holland at once realized that their common interest in Belgium w^as greater than their common differences, and the result was the Triple Alliance of January 23, between them and Sweden, to check the French advance*. Louis saw that he must yield. This he did at Aix-la-Chapelle in May of the same year, when he accepted the con- quests he had made the previous year in Flanders and demanded nothing more. The Triple Alliance had a double importance. It showed Louis, that in order to rule the Channel by the possession or friendship of all the east coast as a basis, he had only alienated the north in Holland by grasping at the centre in Belgium. A second result followed from this. It was Holland that had stopped the French King's onward career. Henceforth his aim was to take a terrible revenge. "The way to the full possession of the Spanish Netherlands led, for Louis, over the ruins of the Republic. Instead of the bombast of the King, his minister Louvois set forth the object of the war, which he planned with the King after 1668, in the brief words : first to annihilate the Republic, then to take Belgium 2." Neither Minister nor King saw^ that they were abandoning the true policy of Richelieu for the rule of the sea, and were volun- tarily sacrificing it in the end to the third of the three competitors— England. "Blinded by his furious and jealous ambition (of Colbert, the naval minister), 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 139. •i Klopp, I. 224. i 30 THE FALLEN STUARTS. wanting war at any cost, Louvois did not foresee that in joining with England to wipe out the Seven United Provinces, he was thereby destroying the only counterpoise which could one day hold in check the all-embracing power of England at sea. Still more, he never imagined or rather disdained to imagine that to strike the French party in Holland was to prepare the Revolution of 168(S, which made an English province of this Republic and delivered England for ever of its most dangerous enemy and its most deadly rivaP." ii. 1668— For ten years, then, Louis changed his plan and j^nmitv called in England on the west to help him destroy ivith his neighbour on the eastern coast of the Channel — Holland. The internal conditions of England were (a) Treatij most helpful for such a policy. Charles and James had returned to England at the Restoration con- vinced Catholics. But the deep hatred of the nation for Popery had convinced them that there could be no better way for the carrying out of the great work of the conversion of England than in alliance with, and by the help of, the King of France. Beyond this, came Charles's desire for ab- solute power after his and his father's experience of Parliaments. But his continual want of money made him dependent on these Parliaments to supply his wants. Louis, however, w^as rich and by his aid the summoning of the dreaded Assembly might be avoided-'. Under these circumstances it was not ^ Eugene Sue, Introduction to Correspundance de d'Escauhlean de Sourdis^ xxi. - Seelcy, (irowth of British Policy, ii. 218. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 31 difficult to come to an agreement. There were two objects for any treaty which should be made, to secure the conversion of England and the war of annihilation against the Republic. On June 1, 1670, the secret treaty of Dover was made, by which Louis promised 6,000 men and two million liures for the conversion of England, and Charles promised to support Louis in all advances against Holland, for which he received three million livres as a subsidy — in other words, to break the Triple Alliance and attack Holland. A treaty was made public at the same time, and called the treaty of Dover, but with this important difference from the real one, that the clause for the conversion of England was suppressed, the money being massed with that given for the Dutch War\ Louis had now secured his helper and proceeded to make him his dupe. The religious question was gradually shelved and the military one carried out, till, for a time, it seemed as if the east coast of the Channel, north and centre alike, would submit to France. The only result of Charles's missionary fervour seemed to be his helpless de- pendence on Louis for fear of the publication of the terms of the real treaty. After two years Charles in April, 1672, published 0) Treauj his second Declaration of Indulgence for the sake of^i^^J^j.' the Catholics, and a few days later his Declaration ^^74. of War against the Dutch, as also did Louisl But Louis' part in the treaty of Dover only called into being the resistance of William of Orange, and 1 Klopp, I. 262, 272. 2 Ibid. I. 300. 32 THE FALLEN STUARTS. \ [ Charles's part only produced the Test Act to secure Protestantism. The war dragged on, but Louis, with his eyes turned eastwards, left a large part of it to Endand. who had little heart in it, and was defeated more than once. At length, after negotiations had been going on some while, the treaty of Westminster, 1674. on February 9, 1674i, was signed between England and Holland. But the English King had missed his opportunity of taking his true position at sea. In February, 1676, he made another treaty with Louis, promising to make no alliance with Holland or any other power, unless in common with France'^. (7) Treatti Charles now thought of a solution to his difficul- ofNime- ^-^g ^^ i^Qj^g ^^^ i^jg obligations abroad. Ever since 1678*. 1674 he had wished to marry William to one of the daughters of the Duke of York. William eagerly assented and himself came over to England in October, 1677, and after conquering the scruples of her father, was married to the Princess Mary. It was a momentous act. William was now in the direct line of succession to the one country which, he saw, could save Europe. Henceforth, two out of the three rivals for the supremacy on the Channel were united in a common interest, and the result upon the third could be only a question of time. Yet Charles at once nullified the effects of the marriage by a treaty with Louis in May, 1678, by which he promised the prorogation of Parliament, and the disbanding of his army. All this was for six million livresK William was therefore forced into a sepa- 1 Koch and Scboell, i. 146. •^ Klopp, II. 31. '^ Ibid. II. 129. % THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 33 rate peace at Nimeguen on August 10, 1678\ by which Louis restored his conquests in Dutch terri- tory, but shattered William's hopes of combination. Louis seemed as strong as ever, but he was not. For the next ten years he turned eastwards into Germany, and, deserting the naval traditions of Richelieu and Colbert, tried to maintain the Channel as a mere cipher in European politics by duping the House of Stuart. It was W^illiam's aim to unite England on the west with his own nation on the east and so to give the Strait between them its due weight in Europe. The next ten years were to show which policy was to succeed. It is round W'illiam that the interest of the iii. The , , n , 1 1 Tx- ^i Channel as Channel henceforth gathered. His niotto was ex- ^^ cipher. pressed in his own words — '' It is from England that \^^^^— • 1 T^ 1 1 I60O. the salvation of Europe must come : without Lngland, ^^^ she must fall under the yoke of France'." Yet to ^Viliiam make any practical use of this maxim was a hard task. Charles had spent the years 1678 to 1681 in the struggle ending in his own victory over the Exclusion Bill. William came over to England in 1681, full of surprise at the dissolution of the Par- liament of Oxford, and while here heard the news of the seizure of Luxemburg. But Charles, bound by his secret obligations to Louis, refused to take any steps against him. William's mission had failed. Early in 1684, a Congress was sitting at the Hague to consider the question of compelling France to adhere to the Peace of Nimeguen. But Charles 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 150. 2 Klopp, III. 425. H. 3 I I 34 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 35 William balanced (Kjaimt Loui't. refused to join them, and so only widened the breach with his nephew ^ At length, in August, Leopold accepted Louis' proposition of an armistice on the basis of uti possidetis for twenty years. Yet even this Charles refused to guarantee'. This was the first great turning point. For when four years later, Louis broke this truce by attacking Germany, England, with no ties to the other guarantors, was left isolated, to meet the Dutch alone. But, tor the moment, William had again failed. The death of Charles in 1G85 opened up new^ hopes. William saw^ the safety of his country bound up in friendship with James. The new King's great desire was for peace that he might turn his attention to the conversion of England. For this reason he desired the friendship of Holland. Then came the second great turning-point in this time of William's waiting— the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1(385. The English held it to be the typical Catholic form of proselytism and trembled for the future. The refugees in England and Holland added fuel to the flame of the ardour for Protestantism and of the embitterment against France. A time for James to show his true position occurred before the year 1685 was over. The forcible conversion of Orange, the possession of William, was undertaken. The prince appealed to his uncle to interfere but James steadily refused, so as not to disturb the general peace=\ By the beginning of 1686, then, England and Holland were still unconscious of their conunon need, but 1 Klopp, II. 427. - Above, p. 'I'd. ^ Klopp, III. 149, 102. William had his first definite grievance against James. Rumours of an alliance between France and ^^.^^.^^^^ England were meanwhile growing up, mainly based .secwre at on the reports of Van Citters, the Dutch envoy in |:^^';;^.;;; England. James in vain denied them\ His nephew, Ms duty. by the middle of the year 1686, began to see that negotiation was vain, and that the only security for his native land lay in the use of force against the King of England, which, backed by the support of the nation, should force the King to break with France. The opposition in England, too, began definitely to see in him their leader. Meanwhile, the rift between James and his subjects was ever widening, and the Declaration of Indulgence in March, 1687, roused the bitterest opposition. It was a triumph for Louis' wishes for disunion in England. But still William stood alone. The estates of the United Provinces held aloof But two events now roused them. James demanded the recall of the ^English troops in the Dutch service. As he had 'enough soldiers in his own service at home for all he needed in peace, this could only mean that a war with Louis against Holland was intended^. Louis, on the other hand, alienated Amsterdam by forbidding the import of herrings into France^^. This touched the Dutch in their most tender part— their commerce. These measures, confirming the reports of Van Citters, roused the Province of 1 Klopp, III. 228—235. •^ Ibid. III. 391, 392. ^ Cf. Macaulay, History of England, i. 541. 3—2 m THE FALLEN STUARTS. (5) William readi/. Holland. Military preparations were hurried forward everywhere. William's plans against England had become the plans of Holland. Yet these plans were not laid for the substitution of the Prince for the King. It was rather meant to force the King himself to save Europe, since he would not do it voluntarily \ Meanwliile James was hurrying to his ruin. By one action after another he frightened his subjects into summoning William of Orange to their aid. Then came the final link in the chain of events. On September 9, Avaux, the French minister at the Hague, appeared before the States General with the Declaration— " The King is convinced that these preparations here are meant against England. There- fore I am to declare in the King's name that, by virtue of the friendship and alliance which he has with the King of England, he is not only bound to stand by him, but also will consider the first act of hostility which may come from you against the Kmg of England, as an open breach of the peace against, his own Crownl" This was decisive for Holland. The Dover treaty of 1670 had evidently come back again and it must be a struggle for existence. The 1 Klopp, IV. 447, 448 ; ix. 490 ; xiii. 894. *-• Ibid. IV. 117. Am H September hatte Ludwig XIV durch seinen Gesandten im Haag erkliiren lassen, dass er die grosse Seerustung des Prinzen mit Bewunderung sehe, dass sie offen- kundig gegen England gerichtet sei, dass er die erste feindliche Action gegen den Konig, seinen Verbiindeten, als Friedensbruch ansehen werde. Eine Drohung, die wohl dazu angethan war, an die Schrecken von 1672 zu erinuern und den Muth zu lahmen. Droysen, iv. i. 27. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 37 two necessary elements of a maritime power had awaked to self-consciousness— a nation in England, and a leader in William. It seemed as if the days when the Channel was to be a cipher in Europe were over. But an undertaking against England required as a condition the command in person by the Prince of Orange. The Prince dared not attempt this, as long as Holland was menaced from the Meuse and the Rhine by France. Hence the under- taking was visionary. But then, what if the menace ceased ? This was a question, whose answer largely depended on the state of religious politics in 1688. 3. The Balance of Power in Religion. Since the Thirty Years' War, religion as a The political force, had been falling into the background, ,,,g q^^^^. and the settlement of creeds at the treaty of West- ^^o"- phalia was becoming stereotyped. In the Middle Ages, Christendom had been agitated with questions of the limits of jurisdiction between a priesthood and a secular power who professed a common faith. The Reformation had raised the deeper question of the truth of that faith, and since 1648 the old problems of a united Christendom had become the problem of Church and State in each nation. This evolution offered no difficulty to Protestantism, for the Creeds, born of the Reformation, were cham- pioned by princes who effected the change till the phrase '' Cujas regio ejus religio'' became the watchword. The new-found national self-conscious- ness of the sixteenth century found expression in 38 THE FALLEN STUARTS. national religions. But with Catholicism this was not so. At the head of all the nations was still the one Pope. Alongside of the new national questions of Church and State were left the old ones of the temporal and spiritual power of the Papacy. And these two problems together came into remarkable prominence at a time when the most powerful monarch of Europe was trying to revive the old power of Charlemagne's Empire. In 1685 and the three following years a second Counter-Reformation seemed to have come, as three Catholic sovereigns vied with one another as champions of Catholicism against the reformed faith — Leopold in Hungary, Louis in France, and James in England. Yet though the nominal object was the same, the methods and results were widely different, till, resting on the Catholic King of England, the movement ended with his fall. A. Church and i:^tate. \. Hungary. — In I52G, by his marriage with Anne, heiress of Hungary, Ferdinand, the future Emperor, became elective King of Hungary. But the country was too much split up into different races and religions for any peaceful government to follow. On one side were Austria, the Greek Catho- lics, the Latin Catholics, the Croatians and the Servians : on the other, the German and Magyar Protestants, the one struggling for their religious liberty, the other for their religious, national and political independence, which, in the event of its THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES H. being violated, had allowed rebellion as a right ever since 1222. Ever since Ferdinand, the Magyar and Protestant element had elected their own princes in opposition, as Kings of Hungary, princes of Transylvania, Calvin ists, for the most part, allies of France or Sweden, and calling in by turns the Austrian against the Turk or the Turk against the Austrian^ Such was the state of things when the devout Catholic Emperor Leopold was King of Hungary. He met his discontented subjects with concessions, and, at the Diet of Odenburg in 1681, made a declaration for the freedom of public worship for the Protestants of both schools of thought-. But Tekely, the rival-kino-, was not satis- fied, and calling the Turks to his aid, led them on to their repulse by John Sobieski at Vienna, and the Austrians overran Hungary till the last Magyar hopes w^ere buried in the fall of the fortress of Munkacz in 1687 and in the defeat of Mohaczl A terrible revenge followed under the Austrian general, Caraffa, who carried out a long series of judicial murders at Eperus. This Leopold stopped, but the influence of the Government was all exerted on the side of Catholicism, so that the discontented Protestants still rallied round Tekely. 2. France. — About the same time, another movement in fixvour of Catholicism was going on in ^ Moret, Quinze avs de regne de Louis XIV, ii. 14. Histoire des Bevolutions de Hongrle, i. 44, ii. 38—44, 60. 2 Klopp, III. 96. Histoire des Revolutions, i. 95—98. 3 Moret, II. 15. Histoire des Revolutions, i. Ill, 125. Klopp, III. 361. >' 40 THE FALLEN STUARTS. France. On October 22, 1685, Louis revoked the Edict of Nantes. This was but the climax of a system of enforced conversion, which had been going on since the death of Mazarin, for at that moment circumstances favoured the clergy. They found in Louis a prince disposed to listen to them with so much the more favour that his ignorance of religious matters was great. The more Louis yielded, the more the clergy demanded. Projects for the reimion of the two Creeds were contemptuously given up, and at last in 1685 the Assembly of the Clergy declared that " the Edict of Nantes could not any longer serve as a general law, by reason of the modifications and interpretations which had been made on different occasions." The time was ready for the last step. Driven into a few corners of the country, or to foreign lands, prevented from all ad- vancement by oppressive laws, small in numbers and importance, French Protestantism must not be allowed to destroy the unity of the French kingdom. On October 22, 1685, therefore, the Edict of Nantes was revoked, and the reformed faith proscribed in France. Here, at any rate, the Counter-Reformation was complete, and there was no weak yielding to the wishes of the heretics as was the case with Leopold at Presburg two years later. Yet Inno- cent XI did not seem enthusiastic about it. He certainly did praise the pious eagerness of the King and his intention to root out heresy, but not the cruel methods which he followed*. The main result 1 Brosch, GescJdchte des Kirchenstaaten, i. 442. De Felice, Histoire dea Protestants de France (edit. 1801), in, xvii. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 41 of the measure was its effect on Protestant countries. To the Huguenots who fled and to those who re- ceived them, the words " Louis " and '' Catholicism " were terribly synonymous. The synonym did not augur well for the new King of England. 3. E7^qland.—T\\Q two sons of Charles I returned (a) ^ , , , . , , . p Charlet< II. to England after their banishment as champions ot Romanism, but with both success was indissolubly bound up with Louis. Yet the difference between the two cases is interesting. Charles loved his throne more than his conscience, and when it came to a question of politics or principle he followed the course dictated by policy. The whole course of his action for the conversion of England is therefore (Governed by a political action — the secret Dover treaty of 1G70. Charles had to follow Louis' lead or be lost before a Parliament which would make an enquiry into his proposals for reintroducing the Catholic faith into England. The attempt to revive Catholicism found alike its birth and its death in the treaty of Dover, which would reveal the true object of the Declaration of Indulgence. In 1G85, at the death of Charles, the succession (J>) of the Catholic heir, James, followed. He loved his conscience more than his throne. He would do nothing that would make him ashamed of what he felt to be his duty. Yet had he had the eyes to see, he would have seen that already at the outset of his reign his conscientious purposes were ruined, as those of Charles had been, by an action of Louis. That action was the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. When James proceeded to force Catholi- X 42 THE FALLEN STUARTS. cism on his pec^ple after this, they looked beyond their own borders into Europe. For them tlie Counter-Reformation of Hungary and France was definitely being brought to England, and must be resisted. As the Dover treaty doomed Charles's attempts at their very start, so, though James and most of England did not realize it at once, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes meant that the conversion of England must be stillborn. The first step was the first Declaration of Indul- gence in February, 1687 ^ Other steps followed in rapid succession. Magdalen College, Oxford, was to become a Jesuit seminary of priests for England, the army to be officered by Catholics, Parliamentary elections to be managed for the King, and the Houses to be transformed into his obedient in- struments. In 1688 came the second Declaration of Indulgence and the trial of the Seven Bishops for refusing to read it. Popular excitement was at its height when the birth of an heir to the throne was announced. The result was immediate in the send- ing of an invitation to William of Orange to save the liberties and the religion of England, and the terror of the passion for violent conversion was confirmed by the Declaration of Avaux-. If this ^ Schwer genug zogen sich die Wetter zusammen. Seit Jacob II gewiss war, dass seine Gemahlin guter Hoffnung sei, in der Zuversicht dass Gott ihm einen Sohn gewiihren werde mit dam dann die katholische Succession gesichert sei, ging er mit seinen Massnahraen rascher und energischer vor. Droysen, Vreusslsche Politik, iii. iii. 564. 2 Above, p. 36. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES IL 43 produced its due effect, and William came to save Enoland and Holland from conditions similar to those introduced by the Dover treaty, it might well be that the whole work of this incipient Counter-Reformation would be undone. Yet the attitude of the Pope, and of the Catholic sovereigns of Europe towards the fate of their champion in England was far colder than might have been ex- pected. This was owing to the relation of this religious movement to the position of the Pope in Catholic Europe. B. The Pope and the Second Counter- Reformation. To the Protestant States the danorer of the violent subversion of tlieir religion naturally seemed great. But in reality this was far less the case than they imagined. The renewed impetus to Catholi- cism appeared at the two extremities of Europe, but the form assumed in either case was very different. That in the west was Gallicanism, that in the east orthodox Catholicism, and the results of this differ- ence were momentous. 1. Gallicanisru. — Louis, starting from the stand- point of Charlemagne, went back beyond him to the Pagan Emperors for his theory of Church and State. To him Kings were born to possess and com- mand all things. And from this fact the young King drew the inference which mankind had cast back into heathendom, that absolute obedience to 44 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE LMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES IL 45 the law of the State is necessary. In his eyes, there- fore, the great unifying force in the State was the Christian religion, or in its later name, Catholicism, but necessarily, in that shape which he lioped to give it. From this standpoint it is not the Church or what the King considers as the Church that is his object, but it is only a means to his own supremacy^ This was the essence of Gallicanism. the form which the Counter-Reformation took in France and England, (a) France. In France a distinct religious position was taken up both for affairs at home and for those abroad. At home the Assembly of the Clergy laid down four oreat Articles in 1682 as the basis of French Catholicism'-. These postulated the independence of the secular power from interference by the spiritual, the superiority of a General Council over the Pope, the fallibility of the Pope, and the ne- cessity for the agreement of ecclesiastical canons with the laws of France. To Rome these Articles were unacceptable : Innocent XI condemned them without hesitations^. But the results of the Gallican principle were also seen outside France. For on the principle that religion was but a means to advance the French monarchy, the interests of religion were naturally put in the second place. Of this there were two great examples. The exterritoriality of ambassa- dors' houses at Rome had become a great abuse, so 1 Klopp, I. 46, 48 ; iii. 401). 2 Mirbt, Quellen znr Ge.^chichte des Fapi^ttum, i. 209, 210. 3 Brosch, Geschichte des Kiichenataates, i. 442 ; Michaud, Louis XIV et Innocent XI, iii. xix, iv. iv. that all criminals could escape punishment by going to one of these houses for protection. Other nations had agreed to put a stop to this, but in November, 1687, in answer to a request for the obedience of the French ambassador to the law, the Marquis Lavardin came to Rome with 800 armed men and increased the lawlessness. He was excommunicated, and this only widened the breach further, for Louis seized the Papal- State of Avignon in revenged The second example was still more serious. That same autumn of 1687 the Archbishop of Cologne required a coadjutor, and Louis forced his puppet, the Cardinal Furstenburg, Bishop of Strasburg, on the Chapter. In June, 1688, the Archbishop died, and Furstenburg was elected Archbishop by Louis' influence and against the wishes of Innocent XI, to wdiom an appeal was made on the ground of an invalid election. He acquiesced in the appeal by appointing the rival candidate, Joseph Clement of Bavaria-. It was obvious that the struggle w^hich bi'oke out then was a struggle between right and might, between the freedom of the Church and the tyranny of the secular power. Just at the time then when Protestants were dreading the advancing wave of Catholicism, that w^ave itself was being held back by this struggle of principle between the Pope and the French King, as evidenced by the Articles of 1682, and by the questions of the ambassador at Rome and of the Archbishop of Cologne. ^ Brosch, I. 443, 444. Michaud, ii. Chap. viii. and iii. Chaps, ii. and vii. - Klopp, III. 423, IV. 35, 67. 46 THE FALLEN STUARTS. (b) En5- =< Brosch, I. 444. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 47 Europe as the notorious tool of Louis ^ It was little wcmder that, in the eyes of the Pope, the King of England was a convert who seemed scarcely likely to advance the cause of true religion. Very dif- ferent must have been his feelings as he turned from tlie western to the eastern borders of Europe^. 2. CatJiolicism and the Cr'usade. — The Emperor Leopold had no theories of the State, subversive of the religion to which he was devoted. He was eager to proselytise like his colleagues in the west, but by his attitude at the Diets of Odenburg and Presburcr, showed that he was not a fanatic nor a despots Caraffa was punished for his cruelties, and the probability of the spread of Catholicism by peace- ful means in Hungary was increased. But just as 1 Klopp, IV. 182 ; Droysen, iv. i. 23. - Im October, als Fuchs (the envoy of the Elector of Branden- burg to the Prince of Orange) nach dem Haag reiste, hatte ihm der hessische Kanzler von Gorz im tiefsten Vertrauen mitgetheilt : er sei in Wien gewesen, mit dem geheimen Auftrag Oraniens, dem Kaiser ein neues und enges Biindniss mit Holland anzutragen : aufangs sei man ihm sehr kiihl begegnet : man konne nicht mit Ruhe znsehen, dass der Prinz die katholische Kirche in England liber den Haufen werfen wolle : dann habe die Invasion der Franzosen den Kaiser stutzen gemacht; aber der Ausschlag sei von einer Seite gekommen, von der man es am wenigsten vermiithen konne: der Papst habe geschrieben, dass er Jacobs II. Actionen und Desseins gar nicht gut heisse, dass ihn nicht der Eifer fiir die Kirche, sondern Frankreich treibe, Frankreich, das ganz Europa, also England niederwerfen wolle : darauf habe der Kaiser jeden Scrupel aufgegeben, von der Saclie der Kirche nicht weiter gesprochen, sofort zwei seiner Minister beauftragt, mit ihm in Conferenz zu treten : der Vertrag sei im Entwurf fertig. Droysen, IV. i. 33. » Above, p. 39. 48 THE FALLEN STUARTS. was the case with the two monarchs in the west, so it was in the east. Leopoki came into even closer touch with the Pope by his religious action abroad than at home. For he was now the central figure in the fultihiient of one of the grandest ideas of the mediaeval Papacy— a crusade. Ever since 1G82 it w^as inevitable that a Turkish war must come, on account of the complications in Hungary. And as Leopold rose to meet it, the Pope gave him all the moral support of his great position. Here was foreign action of a Catholic sovereign which was of the very essence of true Catholicism, and the more success crowned its efforts, the more eagerly did Innocent XI identify himself with the movement in the east, rather than with that of the west. The struggle began with the raising of the siege of Vienna in 1683 by Sobieski, followed by other successes, till in 1687 came the victory of Mohacz, crowned by the Diet of Presburg, which made the Hungarian throne hereditary in the House of Haps- burg'. While this fulfilment of the true work of the secular head of Christendom was going on, the armistice of 1684 secured his western borders from any attack by any Christian foe. It would be deci- sive against Louis if he pushed his advantages as a Christian foe against Leopold while engaged in the crusade. To Europe it seemed morally impossible. To the Pope, no point could better raise the question of the French King's declared loyalty to the Church. The question of the religious future of Europe, as of its future by land and sea, seemed to have reached » IlUtoire des llevolutions, i. 112, 119. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 49 a place where two ways met, in the summer of 1688^ 3. The Meaning of the Fall of James: 1688. — LomiV The mouth of August, 1688, was thus in a very ^'^'''''^"• remarkable manner a time of universal uncertainty as to what each power had to expect from its neigh- bour. It was with Louis that action rested. East- wards Germany was bound to peace by an armistice for twenty years, but France had lost her old allies, for the Elector of Bavaria was heading the crusade, and the Elector of Brandenburg had made his friend- ship with the Emperor and William of Orange. In the far East the Emperor's hands were tied by his Turkish war. To the south Spain was growing weaker under her childless King, while northwards the two opposite shores of the English Channel were kept apart by the success of the French policy. It was a critical moment. Would Louis act at all ? If so he might turn northwards to Holland or east- wards to Germany. Now it seemed clear that the combatants on the Channel might safely be pitted aofainst each other. James declared himself so secure that he refused alike Louis' help and his alliance'^ William was making preparations, but would prob- 1 The general opinion of Europe as to Louis' relations with Turkey in 1689 is thus given by Droysen, Preussische PoUtik, IV. i. 41, "Nur die Unglaubigen blieben dem allerchristlichsten Konige zur Waffengemeinschaft. Es wurde gesagt und geglaubt, dass demnachst die Lilienflagge, mit der der Korsaren Nord- afrika's vereint, in See erscheinen werde, gegen die hollandisch- englische Flotte zu kampfen. Daher das Anagram auf 'Ludovicus decimus quartus': Ludovicus quid es? Sum Turca." 2 Klopp, IV. 63, 126. H. 50 THE FALLEN STUARTS. ably meet with the fate of Monmouth. Louis there- fore turned away from the north, where a siege of Maestricht — a town belonging to the Archbishop of Cologne as Bishop of Liege — on behalf of his ally, Furstenburg, would have checked any move- ment by William, by rendering Holland insecure^ Instead, he turned east. There was indeed an armistice binding him to abstain from action in Germany, but then the opportunity was exceptional! For on the borders of Europe the Emperor and the Turks were already involved in war ; the Turks were Louis' allies, and they were being steadily worsted. Between the combatants and himself lay much territory w^hich it was his life's work to try and secure. The decision was, therefore, taken to go eastwards-. It would only be a repetition of the aggressive movement in time of peace, which had succeeded so well after the treaty of Nime^uen, and there need be no war at alP, for Germany was still not united. But it was a 1 St Simon's Memoires (edited Cheruel), vi. 265; Campana de CavelU, ii. 283. 2 Louis' attitude is explained, Droysen, iv. i. 27. *' Mochte Oranien seine Expedition versuchen, Konig Jacob II. war mehr als stark genug, ein Abenteuer der Art abzuvveisen ; ja es war wiinschenswerth, dass die staatische Kriegsmacht sich in das englische Unternehmen vertiefte, damit Frankreich desto sicherer gegen Ostreieh vorgehen konne. Den Tiirken musste gebolfen werden, ehe sie vollig erlagen : es gait durch einen energiscben Stoss auf das Reich einen Tbeil der Streitkrafte die sie erdriickten, abzuzieben, den Stoss dabin zu ricbten, wo er fiir Ostreicb am Empfindlicbsten war." 3 Klopp, IV. 143, 192. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 51 momentous mistake. It did not take account of the hatred that Louis' own grasping had inspired in the two northern states of Holland and England, till the synonym of " Louis " and " Catholicism " had made their interests one, and the destruction of James* relation with France a necessity. It neglected the colour which the stories of the refugees from the Edict of Nantes would lend to the fears for the existence of liberty and Protestantism. It ignored the union which the Turkish war was beginning to create in Germany \ It proved that Louis pre- ferred the interests of Gallican France to those of Catholic Europe. It showed the world that no faith could be put in the promises of Louis when they conflicted with his interest. Events followed one another rapidly. On Sep- tember 6th came the news of the fall of Belgrade before the Christians-. Then came Louis' declaration of war against Germany. The French hurried to the Rhine, and Philipsburg was besieged and fell on October 28rdl William, relieved of all pressure in his rear, at once embarked on October 29th, and after one failure landed at Torbay on November 15th. So far all had succeeded according to Louis' wishes. But an unexpected opposition to his ad- vance in Germany was met in the formation of an alliance at Magdeburg on the 15th of October, between the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony 1 Erdmannsdorffer, i. 695. 2 Klopp, IV. 123 ; Droysen, iv. i. 28. 3 Klopp, IV. 192. 4—2 52 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES IL 53 The English Revolu- tion. and the Duke of Bruuswick, to maintain the peaces Without noticing this Louis promised Furstenburg armed help in Cologne, and advanced into the Pala- tinate. The conquest of this territory, based on some indefensible claims of Elizabeth Charlotte, Duchess of Orleans, who was, according to Louis, heiress of the House of Wittelsbach in the Pala- tinate, would just make the necessary link between Strasburg, Philipsburg, Cologne and Luxemburg. But the German army furnished by the Magdeburg Treaty soon showed the French that they could not easily hold the Palatinate. Under Louvois' guid- ance, therefore, Louis began a systematic devasta- tion of it. " Custom and the Law of War allow a country to be made 'useless' to an enemy," said the Kino-. On the 18th of December the orders were given, and the territory systematically laid w^aste by fire and sword, till in March, 1689, Heidelberg was sacked, and Mannheim, Speyer and Worms soon after **. Meanwhile William had landed at Torbay on the loth of November. England was not bound by the armistice of 1(38:3, and could, therefore, claim no immunity from attack-'. The Imperial Ambassador wrote, "James II does not see that France has sought to favour this expedition of the Prince by her invasion of Germany, hoping to see the power of Holland make a diversion in this kingdom at justi the ricrht time, while she strikes her blow else- 1 Koch und Schoell, i. 159. 2 Klopp, IV. 198. 3 Above, p. 26. where\" But the essence of this diversion was that James must be strong enough to resist William. To Louis' mind the haunting alternative to resistance was reconciliation. His first effort was, therefore, directed against this. He subsidized the English King, but on condition of no compromise with the invader*^. But the rapid advance of William was more than he had expected. Exeter received the Prince on November 19; James came to Salisbury, where Churchill deserted him on December 8rd. The King retreated towards London, and the Prince advanced till, after a pause at Hungerford, he entered the capital on December 28. Meanwhile he was negotiating and began to see that substitu- tion, not forcible suggestion, was his duty. A new possibility therefore became obvious to Louis — the yielding of the King to the demands of William. But this would be a serious blow to the French plans in Germany. There was but one means that could secure Louis his old position in England in that case— the retention by him of a pledge for its dependence upon France. Yet it was James him- self who desired to give and gave this pledge in the person of his Queen and his son^ and finally of himself. Lord Dartmouth, to whom the order was given to carry the Prince to France, saw the true meaning of the act, and refused*. It is extraordinary that James should have been wdlling to give a security to France for the future dependence of England upon Louis. He declared his preference 1 Campana de Cavelli, ii. 356. 3 Campana de Cavelli^ ii. 413. 2 Klopp, IV. 173. ^ Klopp, IV. 253. ■■'^5W^;ii^^;*^^^;^;;j..!,^^«^^;3^;^„-^;^^^^ 54 THE FALLEN STUARTS. for France over England in the eyes of all by the act. Lanzun, a French gentleman, was entrusted with the charge of the Prince of Wales, and Calais was reached on December 2lst^ "Louis was so greatly pleased at this, that he said in public that after having: received from Lauzun such a service, he could not do less than... see him'-." The King was already on his way to follow his son, when he was stopped and brought back to London. Louis at once saw that he must retain the Prince of Wales as a guarantee against any reconciliation in London, as well as against William, if James became a neglige- able quantity. If civil war was not to be had now, the pledge of it for the future must be kept. Lauzun's orders in Calais are therefore instructive. On no account could the Queen be allowed to stay on the coast, lest she and her son should return to England if the King's power revived. "You are to under- stand," said Louvois, " that the King's intention is that the Queen be made to come to Vincennes with the Prince of Wales by all the most honourable pretexts that you can imagined" Slie came and scarcely realized she was really a prisoner. But James had no wish to stay in England in fear of his life, and, probably with his enemy's coimivance, he again fled and reached Ambleteuse on January 4, 1689. For William now saw he must be King and 1 Klopp, IV. 269. 2 Lauzun had hitherto been in disgrace with Louis. This service was felt to be great enough to restore him to favour. Campana de Cavelli (Rizzini's letter), ii. 461. ^ Campana de Cavelli, ii. 454. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF JAMES II. 55 have both the securities for Louis' interference out- side, not one inside and one outside, the kingdom \ Louis had now the surest pledge for the helplessness of England to stop any future plans of his. With the Kincr and his heir he could launch civil war on her when he would. Quietly and without a blow struck the House of Stuart had fallen. Louis' policy seemed victorious in Germany, which he had cowed by terror, and in England, which he could cow by terror in the future. Yet he had n«)t realized the meaning of one great fact. He had won the King of England, but he had lost the kingdom on which his power rested. The fli^^ht of James was the turning-point in the import- o r ' - on condition that "the Roman Catholic religion remain in its present state in the places so restored.*' This was the famous "Ryswick Clause" by which Louis meant to keep open a door to interference in the inner affairs of the Empire^. This alienated Catholic and Protestant Germany ahke at a time when the peace was disposing some to befriend the Catholic exile. It was a great blow to any move- ment for the restoration of James on the ground of his relisrion in the time of Innocent XII, for it was only too evident that Louis, not Catholicism, would benefit if ever the fallen House were restored. But religion was not the only ground on which the restoration of James was important. Louis had found that he could not use liis protege, like a wedge, to split the union of William and Leopold. But he was all the time concentrating his forces on William as the western party iu the European alliance of which he saw him to be the movins^ spirit. And the struggle with William meant the struffc;le for the control of the Channel. In this James was a tool of the first importance. ^ Klopp, VI. 3G7; vii. 457. 2 Koch iind Schoell, i. 170. \ THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 67 2. Struggle for the Channel. Instead of secret treaties and the outlay of so many millions of livres for success in nullifying the importance of the Channel in European politics, the King of France was now to learn that a land battle, a naval battle and eight years' dreary warfare on the eastern coast of the all-important waters only meant failure in the end. The gift of England's new foreign King was the control of both coasts of the Channel. It was a gift, the possession of which meant the se- curity of his dynasty against the exiled House, and on the maintenance of which William directed all his energy. Yet Louis was strangely oblivious of its importance. But " France nurtured her greatest enemv in herself. This was Louvois, the author and soul of all the land wars, because he was minister for war and because, in jealousy of Colbert, he wished to ruin him in exhausting the finances and upsetting his power^" Colbert was minister for the Navy as well as for finance and accordingly naval interests suffered from this jealousy of Louvois both of him and of his son, the Marquis of Seignelay, who succeeded him in 168*3^ By the flight of James, Louis was now confronted with a power consisting of three territories separated by two pieces of water. Between Ireland and Eng- land was the Irish Channel, and between England and Holland the English Channel. On the control of these two straits, therefore, the maritime power and with it the triple empire, as a whole, depended. 1 Saint Simon, Mdmoires (edit. Cheruel), xii. 25. 2 Guerin, Histoire Maritime de France, iii. 384, 471. 5—2 68 THE FALLEN STUARTS. (a) Irish Channel. ii But Holland was not an island, but lay open to a land attack through Belgium. Security from the side of Belgium was thus as essential to this empire as the control of the seas. For the next eight years there was a nominal struggle for the English throne between the exiled Kiug, supported by the King ot France, and the Stadtholder of Holland, who had added England to his sway. But the real struggle goes deeper than this. It is a duel between William, struggling for the supremacy in these two straits. and°for the inviolability of Belgium, in order to preserve the bulwark of his dominion— Holland, and Louis struggling for security on the Channel and masking his efforts under a guise of large- heartedness towards James. That the foe of William was Louis, and not James, is obvious at once. James naturally wished to attack his enemy in England and regain his Crown. Louis, on the other hand, wished to avoid any opportunity for opposition to his plans in his rear by using James as a means to weaken, but not destroy, his enemy. England would thus be lamed by internal troubles. Already in 1666, Louis had received an offer from some Irish Catholics of the submission of their country if they were helped to throw off the Protestant yoke of Eng^and\ Now, at the advice of Tyrconnel, the Viceroy, he again saw the usefulness of Catholic Ireland. It was not to England, therefore, that James was sent, but to Ireland, where the French interest was served by the prospect of a long-continued and desultory 1 Guerin, iii. 171. y THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 69 warfare, rendering William incapable of action in Europe, and the Channel still a cipher i. Kinsale was reached with an escort of light ships of the line on March 22, 1689. Louis had promised to send 6,000 French troops with James, but they were not ready when that King started, and two months later the French King, " reflecting that those same Catholics of Ireland might have feared that he wished to put the French in possession of that Kingdom, said that he would only give two thousand soldiers'." The continual cry was for more men, arms and money, and so long as communication with France along the Irish Channel was kept open, James might well expect continual help. On the arrival of the 2,000 French troops, a naval battle was fought off Bantry Bay, and here the French fleet had the upper hand (May 5), but did not pursue their advantaged In spite of his great needs, James was overrunning the country, and Louis' aim of laming England seemed likely to be fulfilled. But the French King's craftiness only ruined its own ends. James looked to the conquest of Ireland as a stepping-stone to England, and accordingly expected a French squadron in the St George's Channel to support him. But to Louis the essential point was to keep the struggle in Ireland, as being further removed from his own field of action. No French fleet, therefore, stopped the arrival of General Schomberg with 6,000 men at Carrickfergus on August 30. This event had been preceded on the 1 Klopp, IV. 461, 462. ^ Campana de Cavelli, ii. 526. 3 Guerin, iii. 439. v» 70 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 7tli of August by the relief of Londonderry, the one town that resisted all James's efforts to take it. The tide had begun to turn. But for the following winter, the two opposing forces remained watching each other. With 1690 came the crisis, for William himself, backed by a grant from Parliament, had determined to come and finish the Irish War, in order to join the continental forces against Louis*. Nothintr could be more in accordance with Louis' plan, than the removal of his great enemy to the further island, and the prospect of a long war sus- tained by a Catholic King and nation against him. Again, therefore, no French fleet stopped the passage of William, who landed on June 24 at Carrickfergus. And now both the rivals confronted each other. Each was eager for a decisive battle and the time of the French councillors who urged James to pro- crastination in Louis' interest, was over. On July 11, was fought the decisive Battle of the Boyne. James was utterly beaten, and urged by the advice of Lauzun, fled to France. The effects of this battle were permanently engraved in the history of the nations. For the war in Ireland required William's presence no longer, and he was free to turn forward with a united kingdom in his rear, to work for the salvation of Europe. But the immediate cause of the victory at the Boyne was the neglect of Louis to sever the communication of England and Ireland by a fleet in the Irish Channel. And together the two events were links in a chain which bound Ireland and England together, so that after the fall 1 Klopp, V. 44, 93. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 71 of Limerick in 1691, Ireland was never again to be a means of creating a diversion against England. Louis had learnt the importance of naval power by a bitter experience, and James had forfeited one means of entrance to his lost kingdoms. Yet it was peculiarly easy for Louis to have i^) Eng- secured the chief maritime influence at this time, channel had he realized the value of the counsel of Seignelay as against that of Louvois. For on the day before the battle of the Boyne, on July 10, a fleet of 75 French men-of-w^ar which had collected at Brest and put out to sea under Admiral Tourville, met the combined fleets of England and Holland off Beachy Head and utterly defeated them^ Seignelay meant this to be the prelude to a naval supremacy in the English Channel like that contemplated by Richelieu, and wished to destroy the English com- merce and coast towns. This was in accordance with the object James had in view by his flight after the battle of the Boyne, which was to make a dash for England while William was still in Ireland. The time was ripe for it, with this victory off Beachy Head and that of the French over the Dutch at the Fleurus on July 1. But Louis with his usual miscalculation of the importance of naval affairs and with his eye fixed on Belgium rather than England, let his greatest chance of ruling the Channel slip by, in requiring a preliminary condition before he helped James. " The plan of a landing in England was certainly present in the minds of Louis and his counsellors, but undeveloped and incomplete ^ Guerin, iii. 453. r? » 72 THE FALLEN STUARTS. and dependent on the essential condition of a previous Jacobite rising in England itself. This was the great point of difference between the two Kings. James expected the rising would follow as soon as he set foot on English soil. Louis required the rising firsts" The victory of Tourville, there- fore, secured no lasting naval advantages to Louis, and James's flight from Ireland failed of its one excuse, while the sack of Teignmouth made him abhorred in England. Li 1G91, Tourville cruised about the waters off the south of England, and refused to give Russell the opportunity of a battle, or to follow up his victory of the year before'"^. With 1692 came the final decision for the mastery of the straits dividing England and France. Louis entered into the plans of James for a descent upon England ^ but again with the condition of a previous rising in England. The repetition of this condition showed Louis' misconception of the issue at stake. To him it was the mastery of the two islands of England and Ireland which must be kept under his control, while he went on with his continental plans, to which the importance of those islands was secondary and dependent. The real point was, not the islands, but the water that flowed round them to maintain their security, and could create a new form of power which in the future might have the final decision on European questions. But Seignelay, the one man who saw this, died in 1 Klopp, V. 1(32. - Gu6rin, iv. 5, 6. ^ MacPherson, Original Papers, i. 400. ! THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 73 1691, and Louis was left with second-rate naval ministers like Pont-Chartrain and Philippeaux'. Preparations for an invasion with the required con- dition were pushed forward. The Toulon fleet was ordered up under d'Estrees to meet the Brest fleet under Tourville and troops were posted in Nor- mandy'. But d'Estrees was checked by a tempest, and on the news that the Dutch and English fleets were about to unite, Tourville was ordered to prevent it at once by engaging the English. Before he could hinder them, they had united and he with 44 men of war had to meet their fleet of 99, off Cape La Hogue, and was utterly defeated on May 29, 1692'. The immediate result was the abandonment of the enterprise on England. The abiding result was that Louis gave up all idea of maintaining an effective fleet in future, and trusted to the damaging attacks of his privateers on English commerced The control of the English Channel as well as that of the Irish Channel was in the hands of William. This meant that before James could come to his own ao-ain, he must beat or evade the fleets that had conquered his patron. But the third bulwark of this triple sea-power of William was still unsecured— the Netherlands. The war here was only the struggle on the eastern coast, for what had already been fought out in the 1 Guerin, iii. 471 ; iv. 4. 106. 2 Ibid. IV. 14 ; Klopp, vi. 63. 3 Gu6rm, iv. 16 ; Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History, 189. * MacPherson, i. 570. 1 74 THE FALLEN STUARTS. (7) The Nether- lands. western and central parts of the Channel, and the return of James no less than the ambition of Louis was checked by the result of this war — the formation of the Dutch Barrier. Of all the political blunders of Louis XIV, none was more serious than his alienation of Holland, ever since 1G72. After this, he found all his schemes thwarted by Holland and the most typical Dutch- man — William — for the Dutch not only hated Louis : they feared him. The words of William in 1684 were equally true in 1689. " The Republic cannot lose Belgium, its proper bulwark; for with its loss... we are left open to the daily menaces of the French \" The effect of this feeling on the Grand Alliance was decisive from the first. The King of England ex- pressed his fear that France meant to occupy Belgium and its defence would devolve upon Holland, for " It is to be regretted," he said, "that Spain can do nothing, and can neither go nor stay-." This was a most heavy burden on the Republic. But though it is a great question what would have happened to the coalition without her, Holland never threatened it with her withdrawal. She bore the heavy burden primarily for herself but also for others. So she deserves the credit for having done most to save the freedom of Europe. The vital importance of the Netherlands to Holland, and its equal importance to Louis as a means of coercing Spain and separating William and liis allies, made the struggle for this third defence of William's empire the longest of all. In 1691, the town of Mons was besieged and fell to 1 Klopp, II. 428. 2 ii^ifi^ V, 256. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 75 the French in April, and in 1682, Namur, to the east, suffered a similar fate. This town was held to be the safe outpost for Brabant, Liege, for the Dutch Republic itself, and for part of North Germany. William tried to recover it, but was met by Luxem- burg at Steinkirk, and though the action was indecisive he could not accomplish his purpose. The next year Louis advanced westwards by the seizure of Furnes, but soon after came a change. For the whole vast plan of Louis for this war in Belgium was discovered by the English King. The French, under Luxemburg, were to seize Brussels, and from there 20,000 men were to be despatched to seize Breda and Hertogenbosch, which would serve as supports for a rising in Holland. The final object was the town of Rotterdam'. The whole danger to the incipient Channel power was at once clear. With William beaten in Holland, and James in England, a new treaty of Dover would follow. Louis, in disgust at the discovery of this plan, returned to Versailles as William advanced to meet him. The anger of his army at this action was only surpassed by the satire of a Dutch coin, which celebrated it by the emblem of a cock and hens issuing from a wood at the sight of a fox'. Luxemburg, left alone, met and defeated William at Landen on July 28, 1698, but with great loss. For that year the advance against the eastern territory of the triple sea-empire was stopped. In the beginning of 1694, James' hopes were 1 Klopp, VI. 203. 2 Saint Simon, i. 85; Hawkins, Medallic History, 11. 81. 76 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 77 strong, and an emissary named Cross was sent to England "not only for our own information, but at the desire of the most Christian King, to inform him of the state of the Kingdom ^" But at the same time, negotiations had been begun by the Kings of France and of England. Louis declared that the recognition of William would offer no hindrance to a peace, and that he had no obligations or treaties with James^ But the negotiations fell through on other grounds. They marked, however an important step. For the first time, Louis de- clared himself willing to sacrifice James to William. On January 7, 1695, Queen Mary died, but attention was directed to Belgium, rather than to England, by William's recovery of Namur on September 1. The importance of this lay, even more than in the place itself, in the moral consequences of the conquest for the two nations, who bore the chief burden of the war. The cry for peace was silenced. These two events turned Louis' mind to the opposite side of the Channel In May, 1695, the Jacobites had despatched an envoy named Charnock to urge James to come over with a French force. But when Louis was appealed to, he made the usual stipulation of a rising in England first. The Duke of Berwick was, therefore, sent to England to. see how far this rising seemed probable. He found that it was impossible for a reason which was very rele- vant to the ground of struggle, ''for when the Prince of Orange had discovered the re volt... he would ^ MacPherson, i. 476. = Klopp, VI. 262. i 4 immediately have... blocked the seaports of France... and the insurgents would have found themselves obliged to risk a battle against tried soldiers^" The Duke returned with this message. But another scheme contrived at Versailles rather than St Ger- main's promised brighter success. Already in 1692 a plan to murder William by a man named Grandval had been taken up by Louis, but miscarried owing to the seizure of the intended murderer. Now, w^ith the death of Mary, the advantage of such a crime increased. Accordingly Sir George Barclay was sent to England, against the wishes of James, to assassin- ate the King'. This was the solution of the ditiiculty of combining a revolution in England with an army from France. Louis saw that this would throw England into utter confusion, and remove his great enemy for ever. The murder was fixed for February 29, 1696. James was summoned to Calais and troops and ships were moved up to Normandy in expectation of the event. But the plan failed, for William was informed of the event, and the conspira- tors were seized. James was the chief sufferer, for his apparent desire for a criminal revenge on his rival, though unreal, increased William's popularity, as was shown by the formation of the association for his protection. The preparations for the invasion were stopped by the appearance of an English fleet off Calais and the burning of the ammunition and arms placed at Givet^ 1 Memoirs of the Duke of Berwick (edit. 1779), i. 130, 131, 132. Klopp, VI. 77 ; VII. 170. 3 Guerin, iv. 57. 78 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 79 For some time, too, the English had been showing their new sea-power in a particularly violent way. With the collapse of the French fleets in 1692, began a series of bombardments of French naval ports. In 1694 unsuccessful attempts were made on Brest, Havre and Dunkerque, while Dieppe was burnt to the ground. In 1G95, St Malo and Dunkirk were attacked without success, and in 1696 several towns in Brittany, Normandy and French Flanders were threatened \ Thus the strength of William at sea and in Belgium made him an increasingly dangerous enemy. And the need for security on the north was increasing daily with Louis, for his main attention was being more and more taken off Holland on the north and Germany on the east to be fixed on Spain on the south with her sickly King. It was obvious that William's friendship must be secured at any sacrifice. Overtures were made for a general Peace Con- gress at Ryswick in 1697, but William, finding peace also to his advantage, hastened it by a meet- ing between the Earl of Portland and Marshal BoufHers. This was the conclusion of the maritime struggle, for Louis recognized William as K'\u(r of England in writing, and " promised never to support in any way anyone, whoever he might be, who should rise up against William III of Great Britain-." A pension was proposed by William for his fallen rival, with his removal from Fiance, but James refused it, and so only threw himself more into Louis' arms than ever. William, however, only excluded the ' Guerin, iv. 42-57. 2 Koch und SchoeU, i. 168. i removal from the terms of the treaty out of feelings of delicacy for James, and expected Louis to fulfil \t\ But to Louis it served as a convenient method for keeping William to his alliance and James as a thorn in the side of England. The head of the triple sea-empire was recognized, and his rival, even if not expelled from France, was to receive no help. The English fleets in the Irish and English Channels encountered no rival. The Peace of Ryswick, there- fore, shut out the fallen House from access to their throne, by the waters that flowed round their king- dom. The battles on the Boyne and off La Hogue had driven James away from the western side of the Channel. Nor was the eight years' war in Belgium any less decisive against him, for, in order to stem the torrent of the French armies, the States- General obtained the right of guarding the Spanish Netherlands against France themselves. Charles II of Spain granted them the right of garrison in seven of those places which bordered the French frontier — Luxemburg, Namur, Charleroi, Mons, Ath, Ouden- arde and Nieuport. Holland gave them the name of ' the Barrier.' This meant that the eastern side of William's dominion w^as secured to him, and that, if the treaty were kept, James was driven away from both sides of the Channel, for the vague dread of a repetition of the Dover treaty, w^hich had inspired Holland in 1688, had now found definite expression in the Dutch veterans in those seven frontier towns. 3. Crusade in the East While William was 1 Klopp, VII. 250, 254. 80 THE FALLEN STUARTS. thus laying the foundations of his sea-power as the mightiest barrier to a change in the balance of European power by a return of the Stuarts, his ally, Leopold, had been vindicating the position of the enemies of the fallen House as champions of religion. The crusade in the east was a very different thing from that desired by James and Louis in the west. After the Diet of Presburg in 1687, the advance a^>^ainst the Turks was for some time doubtful, led as they were by the discontented Hungarian Prince, Tekely*. Li 1689 the defeats of Batotschina and Nissa humbled the Emperor, and in 1690 Belgrade was retaken by the Sultan. Louis of Baden, the Imperial General, therefore, made a great effort to turn the tide and succeeded by his victory at Szlan- kamen in August 1691, which exhausted both com- batants for some years. With the appointment of Prince Eugene of Savoy as Imperial General in 1697, the active crusade was renewed, and the victory of Zenta in September of that year was decisive. With Louis and William at peace, and Charles II of Spain slowly dying, it was becoming more and more imperative for Leopold to be free to act in the west, and the Peace of Carlowitz was signed by him with the Sultan Mustapha in Jan- uary, 1699. Transylvania w^as to belong to the Emperor, with all Hungary up to the Theiss, but Belgrade was to remain to Turkey. The Sultan further promised to give no refuge or protection to rebels and malcontents^ The championship of ^ Histoire des Revolutions de Hongrie, i. 129. 2 Koch und Schoell, iv. 356, 357. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 81 Christendom had received its reward, for in the fifteen years since 1683 a new State had been built up — the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a new and truly great power. Yet there were already signs that this success was producing its own reaction for towards the end of his Pontificate the Pope, Inno- cent XII, made an important change in his policy. He turned from the Emperor and in the Spanish Succession question took steps decidedly in the direction of France. It was largely fear of the extraordinary growth of the Hapsburg power that drove the Pope to the side of Louis ^ 4. Balance of Power on the Continent. — During these years, the great question to Louis was not the growth of England's power at sea, nor the results of Austria's championship of Christendom, but the peaceful succession of his House to the throne of Charles II of Spain. The present claims of the Stuart were secondary to the preparation for the claims of the Bourbon, Pretender. The French King (a) The . . . 1 1 . 1 i. J Claimants had found that his aggressions had at last roused ^^ the Europe to active resistance in the formation of the ^^^^^^ Grand Alliance. The aim of his policy was, there- fore, to stop any interference by the allies with his designs on Spain. For this purpose there were two possible means. A successful war against all Europe was one. But this would have meant endless expense and loss to a King who was no general. The other was a means that Philippe de Commines, the chronicler of Louis XI, had noticed as the 1 Brosch, I. 455. \ H. 82 THE FALLEN STUARTS. advantage possessed by the French over the English. "The English," he says, "often win in battle, but the French always win in diplomacy ^" It was by negotiations for separate treaties with the allies that Louis meant to separate them. He had already tried to prevent an alliance of Leopold and William, by negotiating with the Emperor for a Cath(^lic crusade to restore James, but had failed. He had now a more powerful weapon to divide up his ene- mies—the conflicting claims to the throne of Spain. In 1685 Maria Antonia— the daughter of the Emperor Leopold and his first wife Margaret Theresa of Spain— had married the young Maxi- milian Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, who had justified his betrothal by a victorious war against the Turks. Leopold had no other child but Joseph, whom he wished to become King of the Romans, and Charles of Spain was childless. Maria was thus next heir to the Spanish Crown, if the renunciation made by Maria Theresa, sister of Charles and wife of Louis, held good. At the Bavarian marriage, therefore, a proviso was made, that Maria and her descendants were to renounce their claims to Spain, if a second son were born to the Emperor. Maxi- milian promised this, and received from Charles and Leopold the Governorship of the Netherlands. In 1686, the condition was fulfilled by the birth of a son, Charles, to Leopold. But from the first, the King of Spain declared that he did not allow the renunciation and considered Maria Antonia his 1 Memoires, iii. viii. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 83 heir^ On the other hand, though Maria Theresa, the wife of Louis XIV, had renounced her claims to Spain at her marriage, Louis never meant that the renunciation should hold good. His claimant was the second son of the Dauphin, Philip, Duke of Anjou. After the election of Leopold's son, Joseph, as King of the Romans in 1690, Louis' attention was turned wholly to Spain. But in 1689, unknown to him, the claims of the Hapsburgs haurg were united in resisting the clanns of the House of Bourbon, and were the alhes ot Louis n.ost active enemy, William of Holland. There was only one point on which the French King could appeal to stronger motives than dynastic interests, and that point was the Spanish Netherlands. Maximilian had had a personal present right to the governorship of this province ever since his marriage^ His claims to Spain were only for his wife and son, and Charles II might still have heirs, while the promise of renunciation to Leopold also held good. Holland, too. was interested in the rights of Maxi- milian to the Netherlands since it was to her interest to have a weak rather than a strong neighbour between herself and France. The posses- sion of the Netherlands, then, would serve as an apple of discord, not only among tlie allies, by drawing xMaximilian and William together as against the stronger Austria, but also among the Hapsburg claimants to the Spanish throne, by precipitating the Bavarian claims. In other words, the defensive war against William and the championship of the claima^'nt James, was to give way to a system of negotiation with William and the championship of the more useful claimant Maximilian. The first effort was in some negotiations held in 1694 at Maestricht, when Louis affirmed that he was ready to declare his renunciation as well as that ^ Klopp, III. 42. of the Dauphin to the Spanish Netherlands, if Charles II died childless, with all the necessary formalities, on condition, however, that they passed to the Elector of Bavaria and his heirs, and to none other, and that the Emperor made a similar conces- sion. The attempt failed, not owing to the problem of Belgium, but to another which took its place. This was the cession of Luxemburg and Strasburg over which William and Leopold could not agreed The seed of dissension had been sown by the very fact that William had allowed negotiations, and for the present, Louis dropped both Maximilian and James for a still more useful tool. In 1695 William declared to the Imperial ambassador, " I cannot tell you strongly enough that I am convinced that all safety and success depends on the mutual friend- ship" of the Emperor and myself-. Yet by the beginning of 1696 the breach between them was widening when the King allowed the French ambas- sador to propose terms of peace. For Leopold dreaded lest William should make a separate peace and leave him in the lurch. But while the negotiations which had begun (7) yj<^tor with the question of Belgium, and were continued ^j^avoi/. by the question of Strasburg, were still ineffectual to separate William and Leopold, there appeared a new and more effectual means of dissolving the alliance. This was the question of the neutrality of Italy raised by the secession of Victor Amadeus 1 Klopp, VI. 264. 2 Ibid. VII. 45. 86 THE FALLEN STUARTS. M of Savoy from the allies and his union with Louis'. For in their treaty of Turin in August, 1(596, the Duke of Savoy had promised the French King that he would strive to make the Powers respect the neutrality of Italy. If Spain, for the sake of Milan, agreed to this, Leopold, who had no possessions in Italy, must follow suit, and then the French troops in Italy would be free to go against William. This decided the English King. "The King and the Dutch," wrote the Austrian ambassador, " have made up their minds. They will go forward (with peace) even without us and Spain," and on September 2nd negotiations began, and the Emperor, who still wanted to hold to the alliance, had to listen to proposals for separate peaces-. It was not James of England, nor Maximilian of Bavaria, but Victor of Savoy, who had worked out Louis' purposes. By him William had been alarmed into making terms, so that France could threaten a refusal of the recog- nition of the English King. But the question of the Spanish Succession was becomino- imminent and the Grand Alliance o 1 Schon seit dem Herbst 1695 war ganz ins Gebeim der Herzog von Savoyen mit grossen Zugestiindnissen gewonnen: mit dem Anfang der neuen Campagne forderte er die Neutralitat Italiens: als die Verbiindeten sich weigerten, fiibrte er seine Truppen dem franzosischeii Heere zu. Prinz Eugen hielt es fiir unnuiglich hier gegen die so verdoppelte Macbt des Feindes den Kampf furtzufiibren : Spanien fiircbtete den Verlust Mailands. So wurde von Spanien und dem Kaiser die Neutralitat Italiens angenommen: nun konnte Marscball Catinat und sein Heer gegen den libein oder die Niederlande vervvandt vverden. Droysen, Preussiiiche PoVitik, iv. i, 107. 2 Klopp, VII. 272. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 87 still held good. Louis now made a discovery, which made him give way. By some means he learned the existence of the secret article in the Grand Alliance^ He at once saw that so long as this bound William and Leopold, he could make no use of Maximilian, but must see the direct heirs of the Emperor in Spain as well as Germany. Peace with William he must therefore have. William, dis- trusting Leopold and seeing the need of peace in Holland, was equally determined. General negotia- tions had been opened at Ryswick, but William brought the Earl of Portland and Marshal Boufflers together, and by them an alliance between France and England was made and ratified in September, 1697. The recognition of William was the main article in it, and, as we have seen', the aban- donment of James was its correlative. But the main point to Louis was that the Grand Alliance was ended, and therefore, as he considered, its hated secret article. William had been secured by the betrayal of James and the beguiling of Victor Amadeus. He himself was now to be used, as these two had been, to further Louis' plans for his great claimant, Philip, Duke of Anjou. Nor was the lesser claimant James long to remain unused. The great question now was, of course, the future ^^^^['^^^ of Spain. Louis' object was to secure the whole Treaties. inheritance for Philip. William's attitude was governed by his patriotism and desire for the safety of Holland as guaranteed by her Barrier in 1 Klopp, VII. 354 ; above, p. 2 Above, p. 76. 83. ) i! 88 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 89 Belgium. In 1G98 the Earl of Portland was sent on an embassy to Paris, ostensibly to secure the removal of James from France as required in William's view of the treaty of Ryswick. This Louis avoided by the statement that he could not force his guest to leave him, and that no stipulation for this had been laid down in the previous year. But the real object of the Portland embassy was to sound Louis on the question of Spain. In this matter, there was a more important House than that of Stuart— that of Bavaria. Now it was that Louis, having de- tached William from his friends, could work on his patriotism with more effect than in 1694, so as to make Maximilian the means of sundering William and Leopold, the father of Philip of Anjou's other rival. "Beyond the general interest of Europe," hinted Louis, " there is this special one for England and Holland, which lies near King William's heart, that the Netherlands should be independent of every other Crown, under the government of its own prince." Accordingly, if Philip succeeds to Spain, Belgium should be given to Maximilian, and Holland be safe. It was too much for William. He inwardly freed himself from his obligations to the Emperor (who considered the secret article of 1689 binding, as it said, till Charles II died) without hinting a single word of it to the Emperor who trusted him\ The result was the secret signature of the. first Partition treaty in 1698, when Louis and William parcelled out the dominions of Spain. Maximilian was to have not only Belgium, but also Spain itself, and the Indies ; and the Archduke Charles merely Milan. This was a great triumph for Louis, who had now effectually sundered William and Leopold and annulled the provision of the Grand Alliance. The French King let the treaty become known in Spain, and trusted to the patriotism of King Charles and the Cortes to make a declaration of the heir who was to receive the whole Spanish inheritance. He had no intention of observing it, but by its conclu- sion he had separated William and Leopold, and by its publication he would separate Charles II and Leopold. In November, 1698, a will of Charles, declaring Joseph Ferdinand, the son of Maximilian and Maria Antonia, universal heir, fully justified Louis' schemes. The Emperor still held firmly to the rights of his second son, and the secret article of 1689\ The use of the young Electoral Prince as a French tool ever since his birth seemed likely so to split up the two branches of the House of Hapsburg, that Louis would be able to secure the candidature of Philip in the end. Then suddenly Joseph Ferdi- nand died (February, 1699). Again France drew England to her side, and a second Partition treaty was secretly made, by which Spain and Belgium were to go to the Archduke Charles, but the Spanish possessions in Italy to France (March, 1700). This again Louis allowed to be published, in order to work on Spanish patriotism. 1 Klopp, VIII. 72, 116. 1 Klopp, VIII. 160; above, p. 83. 90 THE FALLEN STUARTS. This time there was no sheltering behind a House that was neither Hapsburg nor Bourbon. It was a question which of the two couhl best preserve the integrity of Spain, and the Spanish Council declared that its self-preservation consisted simply and solely in the "mighty and glorious" House of Bourbon. The result was the last will of Charles, declaring Philip of Anjou his universal heir, in October, 1700, and in November the King died. The triumph of all the negotiations to secure Spain and break up the Grand Alliance without war, seemed to have come. For this James had been sacrificed to William to stop resistance in the north, Victor Amadeus raised up to stop resistance in Italy, the House of Bavaria brought forward to set the two branches of the House of Hapsburg against each other. But the acceptance of the will which would crown Louis' efforts meant that the Partition treaty would be broken. It was accepted, however, and the last act of Louis in securing Spain for his House was also the first act in calling up a new union of Eurof)e to overthrow his plans, (e) Re- William at once saw he had been duped, and newal of ^|^.^^ ^\^q treatv of Rvswick was onlv the pivot on the Grand • -' , " ., . Alliance, which turned the Bourbon succession to Spam. He at once drew closer to the Emperor again, whose instructions to his ambassador show his attitude. " You are to maintain," they ran, " that our alliance of 1689 with its secret article holds with its former force, and that accordingly assistance should be rendered to us to the greatest possible extents" ^ Klopp, IX. 18. I THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 91 Louis soon saw that the friends he had separated were a<»-ain finding: their common interest. As his great aim now, as ever, was to secure his objects by peace and not war, he determined to forestall the allies. Freed as Leopold was by the peace of Car- lowitz from his Turkish w^ar, Louis saw that an alliance now might mean far more danger from Germany than before. His method of meeting the difficulty was characteristic. In December, 1700, he declared that the Dutch troops must be immedi- ately removed from the Barrier towns of Belgium in order to stop any resistance by them to the new King of Spain, owing to fears of a repetition of the French invasion of Holland in 1672. On February 19, 1701, French soldiers were let in to the seven towns and the Dutch garrisons disarmed ^ At once Holland was roused. She realized that with the possession of the Netherlands, her fate lay in the hands of Louis, who could cause her ruin whenever it pleased him. Leopold had never wavered in his desire for a renewal of the alliance against the Bourbons in Spain, and since Louis' faithlessness over the Partition treaty, William had been equally eaoer. But hitherto the attitude of William's domini(nis had been peaceful. Now Holland was for war unless the Dutch garrisons were restored and satisfaction were given to Leopold for his claims on Spain. All depended on England and Parliament now took a decisive step by declaring it would stand by 1 Klopp, IX. 73, 139; St Simon, ii. 432, 433. 92 THE FALLEN STUARTS. the Dutch demands, and would support the Partition treaty, but not Leopold's full demands^ (April, 1701). The interested Powers came together at the Hague, and there on September the 7tli gave effect to their wishes in the renewal of the Grand Alliance between England, Holland and Austria. This time the object wa^ not the same as in 1089. It was "to obtain satisfaction for the Emperor for his claims on the Spanish inheritance, and a sure and far-reaching security for England and Holland, for their posses- sions and trade^" This did not necessarily involve war, and it seemed likely that Louis would obtain the prize of his life by negotiations, as he wished, if he would only satisfy the reasonable requirements of the allies. Even though the allies had united, the interest of England was only secondary, and the championship of Holland and the Emperor was not vital enough to rouse the nation to great enthusiasm for war. Indeed, at the beginning of September, 1701, while he was still in ignorance of the new coalition, Louis stood at the heiglit of his power— the lord of France and Spain, whose peaceful pos- session seemed secured. 5. The Importance of the Stuarts. The House of Stuart had quite fallen into the background. As the claims of Louis' great claimant Philip grew more likely to be realized, the claims of 1 Klopp, IX. 202. 2 Koch und Schoell, i. 183. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 93 the minor Pretender James had been sacrificed. These had been useful to weaken the power of William at home at first, but as time went on, Louis found that he might win the English King from enmity to friendship, and to secure this, James was given up. But this was done in such a way, that, though harmless, James was still kept in France. William, the ally of Ryswick, had become the means of dividing the two Houses of Hapsburg by the Partition treaties. But now in 1701, though Louis did not know of the new Grand Alliance, he realized that William might become dangerous. His attention was, therefore, turned back from the claimant \vhom he had secured in Spain to the claimant who wished to be secured in England. Ever since Mary's death, in January, 1695, the question of the succession in England had become serious, and was now in a critical state. The Bill of Rights had entailed it on Anne and her heirs. But Anne's children all died except the Duke of Gloucester, who was born in 1689 and was a very weak child, while the attempted murder of William in 1696, showed the danger if the succession were tampered with. Anne turned to St Germains and asked her father's consent, as early as 1692, to her accession if she would restore the Crown to him when opportunity allowed. James, however, refused to be thus shelved. William, on the other hand, had turned to Hanover, and made proposals to the Electress Sophia, the granddaughter of James I, in 1698. But she did not welcome the proposal in the least, and for a time the matter dropped. On 94 THE FALLEN STUARTS. August 6, 1700, the danger of the existing state of the^uccession was emphasised by the death of the young Duke of Gloucester. The Princess Anne was, therefore, the only legal heir to William. The hopes of the Court of St Germains naturally rose, not merely for the succession of Prince James, but also for the restoratfon of the old King, who wouhl not hear of his son supplanting him. William again turned to Sophia, but her answer was not reassuring _"I am afraid that after my death my son will be treated as a foreigner. Besides, he is far more accustomed to be despotic than the poor Prince of Whales, who is still too young to take his model from the King of France." She therefore refused the offer and pointed to James' son as the true heir^ William's eagerness increased with her indifference, for he needed the succession of the House of Han- over as security for his life's work, as security for Enoland and Holland. Indeed its legal settlement he must have at once. Envoys were sent to persuade the Electress, and the powers of Leibnitz were enlisted to show her the danger to Europe of a vassal-King of France in England, as well as in Spain, till she at last agreed to let Parliament decide-. In May, 1701, this decision was made in the Act of Settlement, which enacted "that the most excellent Princess Sophia... be and is hereby declared to be the next in succession in the Pro- testant line, to the Imperial Crown, and dignity of the realms of England, France and Ireland." ^ Klopp, VIII. 554, 568. 2 Ibid. IX. 149, 150. MB'JMaaiatt'HiK'rjfcf. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 95 Four months later, James II lay dying at St Germains. Louis, in the Hush of his success in Spain, realizing the weak health of William and doubtless informed of Anne's proposal to restore her father, thought the opportunity had come to restore the old state of things in the Channel. Coming to the dying King, he told him that he would recognize his son as King of England. On September l(i, James II died, and James III was proclaimed in France as King of England. But Louis found this the crowning mistake of his career. It insulted the sovereignty oi' the nation, which, a few months before, had been expressed in the Act of Settlement and "embittered their public opinion more and more against the young prince and against France, who wished to give them a King and adiudcre their Crown in spite of them, though the French King had no more means at his disposal for the restoration of the Prince of Wales, than he had had in the case of his father. And then he had not had, as he now had, to dispute the succession to the Spanish monarchy for his grandson^" It brought the interest of England in the Grand Alliance from the second to the first place, for it turned the Dutch Barrier to a guarantee against a repetition of the treaty of Dover, and the lukewarm championship of the Emperor's claims in Spain to the maintenance of a necessary counterbalance on the continent to France. In a word, the country which must be the cornerstone of European resistance to Louis was 1 St Simon, iii. 190. 96 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE STUARTS AS THE TOOLS OF FRANCE. 97 forced into its right place. Charles II and James II had stifled its power of action. Wilhani had fought his duel for England on Dutch sod, so that the nation scarcely realised the issue at stake. But now its national consciousness was fired with a spirit of resistance. Louis had overreached himself. The struggle for Germany of 1660-1688 had yielded to a preparation for the succession in Spain and Louis had fulfilled his desires. But the end of the religious war which had occupied the Emperor hitherto, had just set him free to take up his own cause in the west. The English sea-power had been steadily asserting itself since the Revolution and that of France had correspondingly dwindled. A time of suspense like that of August, 1688, had come again\ For the second time the structure of Louis' ambition rested on the House of Stuart and for the second time it fell. In 1689 it was the lack of support from France in the right quarter that overthrew James II and made possible the first Grand Alliance which cliecked Louis' advance eastwards. In 1701 it was the uncalled-for support of James III that gave life to the renewed Grand Alliance, which was again to check Louis eastwards, and for some time southwards. The French King had kept the claims of the fallen House to England second to those of his own House to Spain ever since the catastrophe of 1688, till from 1697 it seemed as if he had for- gotten them. But when, for the sake of the Bourbon 1 Above, p. 49. claimant, he changed his negative attitude to the Stuart Pretender to a positive championship of his cause, he was to find that he had thrown down his last barrier against the pent-up enmity of Europe. His greatness was to be swept away by the rush of changes in the balance of power, by the influence of religbn in politics, and by a new force in Europe— the dominion of the sea. H. ' I I THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 99 CHAPTER III. THE TIME OF THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: 1701-1713. B. James II after the Vacancy on the Spanish Throne. 1. The period of the French advance: 1701-1704. On May loth, 1702, the Grand Alliance of the previous year took a practical shape in a Declaration of War against the King of France', and Em-ope was plunged into the last war with Louis XIV. The central figure is again the monarch at Versailles, and the key to his action is to be found in his purpose of securing' the House of Bourbon in Spam. Philip of Anion was now King Philip V and he must be maintained in this dignity, for the Court of Versailles wished to rule the Court of Madrid, and Philip in particular, whose elevation was its great work. But it was obviously impossible to resist the whole of Europe if it were once really roused to stop this undue extension of French influence. The means Louis used to prevent this were characteristic. 1 Flassan, IlMoire diplomatique, iv. 217. i I There were Pretenders or claimants with just or unjust claims to the thrones of his adversaries, and one by one he used these as his tools. But the vast attempt failed, and the Pretenders came back to France to find refuge, till she was wittily named "the hospital for the princes she had ruined ^" The great question, then, was the maintenance (a) Spain. of Philip in the whole of the Spanish dominion. He had arrived in Spain in February 1701, and was recognized by the Pope^. But it was not in Spain itself that the chief (^)^^«^^- ^ „ nulian of interest of these years lay. In the former war ot Bavaria. the Grand Alliance the Emperor had been busy with a crusade, which Louis had fostered. Now another method of diverting the attention of Austria was found by raising up two Pretenders— Maximilian Emmanuel of Bavaria and Prince Ragoczy — who attacked the Emperor on the western and eastern sides of his dominions at once. The aim of the Elector of Bavaria lies before us in his own words. He wished to overthrow the House of Hapsburg, to break up the old Empire, and found a new one by fire and sword for the House of Wittelsbach, with himself as its head, as Emperor by the grace of the King of Francel For this purpose he had broken with Austria at the outbreak of the war, sided with France and recognized Philip. With him went his brother, Joseph Clement, Elector of Cologne. 1 Histoire des Revolutions de Hougrie, ii. 100. 2 Klopp, IX. 169 ; St Simon, ii. 402. 3 Klopp, X. 130. 7—2 ^Hflaw (7) Hungary. 100 THE FALLEN STUARTS. Maximilian, in fact, was Louis' Becond Pretender, 1- „* ,.f tl.P House of Wittelsbach and the aggrandizement of the Hoi»eoi was only of less importance than that of the House of Bourlon. The plan of the Elector was to pene- trate into the heart of Austria along the Danube. Villars, the French General sent to co-operate with him, wished to advance straight on Vienna. Louis therefore recalled Villars, who had made hin.self hated by his cruelties'. The prospects for the coming campaigu looked brigl,t, for the Emperor had lost Lan-^.>.-^<..««t.ri^.tfjiiM.iit fffirrtiiiiiiwiiMtfiii ii "ii 118 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 11. There were two elements in the importance of ^tlancT James III in the eyes of Louis, which differentiated him from all the other instruments of that world-wide ambition. The first was James's relation to Great Britain, as an apple of discord between Scotland and England. Scotland had had a great grievance against England ever since the failure of the great Darien Scheme in 1698 and 1699, and she dreaded that some modification of Presbyterianism was threatened, while other commercial and political grievances widened the breach. The Act of Settle- ment, passed in the English Parliament in 1701, gave the Scotch Parliament a chance of speaking out. It was declared that certain stipulations must be made in favour of Scotland if she passed a similar measure, or otherwise she would make her- self independent under a different King from that of England. This could only mean that the House of Stuart should exclude the House of Hanover. The importance of the relation of James to Great Britain was thus potentially very great. But the second element in the English claimant's usefulness to his patron was his relation to the Continent and specially to the Pope. To them the House of Stuart could always be held up as the martyr House which had preferred its religion to its Crown. The cry of a crusade was always sure of some support at Rome now that the dread wdiich Innocent XI had of Galli- canism seemed to be yielding to the dread which Clement XI had of the Austrian Power. The state of religious affairs, too, on the Continent were all on the side of the French King, who gradually knit the \ . THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 119 two important elements together into the expedition of James III in 1708. The beginning of the eighteenth century saw a if)^^^''^^'^^^ revival of the importance of Protestantism. In 1701 ^^^ the work of the Great Elector of Brandenburg had Prussia. been completed by the coronation of his son Frede- rick as King of Prussia. This event showed the greatness of the new power which was rising in the north. But it also showed its essentially Protestant character. January 18th, 1701, was the coronation day. It had been hoped that the new King would commit the actual coronation to the (Catholic) bishop Zaluski of Ermland, for then the title of "sacred royal majesty" would secure the sanctity of the blessing of the*^ Church. But Frederick had refused the proposal. He would not even allow any evangelical bishops to perform the ceremony, but placed the crown on his own head and on that of the Electress, and only then did he enter the Court Church, when there followed the ecclesiastical cere- mony of anointing at the hands of two Protestant bishops. Pope Clement XI at once gave vent to his anger, by refusing Frederick his new title and calling on others to do the same. " Although we are persuaded," he- wrote to Louis in April, 1701, " that your Majesty will never approve of the action of Frederick, Marquis of Brandenburg, in presuming publicly to usurp the name of King... yet we would make certain by beseeching you not to allow him the honours of royalty \" He spoke in the same 1 Mirbt, Quellen zur Geschichte des Papstthums, 210, 211; Droysen, iv. i. 154. 120 THE FALLEN STUARTS. Siveden. way to the cardinals. Yet in spite of these violent appeals, Catholic and Protestant Europe alike grad- ually recognized the new King. But the antagonism of the great northern kingdom to the Catholic faith was marked from the first and was to bear bitter fruits afterwards. For the present, Prussia stood as a new Protestant power in Europe, without any attempt at propagandism, but quietly receiving the Protestant refugees from other lands. The northern neighbour of Prussia, Sweden, had more missionary zeal for Protestantism under her young King Charles XII. His successes against Russia and Poland had brought him into Saxony in 1706^ Now the Emperor had followed a policy of repression towards the Protestants of Silesia and had taken from them several of their churches, and the oppressed Lutherans appealed to Charles on the ground of an infraction of the treaty of Westphalia^ At first he refused, but in 1707 he made tlie resto- ration of these churches one of his conditions of peace ^ The Emperor, with his eyes turned towards Italy, saw the danger even though he did not yield to it. The result was the conclusion of the Conven- tion of Alt-Ranstadt between Charles and Joseph on September 1, 1707, which stipulated that the Em- peror's Protestant subjects in Silesia should be reinstated in the possession of their rights under the treaty of Westphalia. The schools and churches which had been taken from them should be restored, and in future no Protestant church should be seized, 1 Above, p. 105. ^ gt Simon, v. 302. 3 Klopp, XII. 431 ; Droysen, iv. i. 11)8. t^^;^^M THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 121 while a commission of Swedes and Austrians should see that these provisions were carried out\ This was a direct attack on Catholic preponderance in the east of Europe. Charles of Sweden himself intended more. His alliance was sought by Louis, but it was refused on the ground of religion. To join hands with the persecutor of the Huguenots, the framer of the Ryswick Clause, was impossible. Instead, he proposed to Marlborough a Protestant alliance between Sweden, England, Prussia and Hanover, for the protection of the interests of their common faith^. A still vaster plan was in his mind. Torcy writes that "this prince has certainly the project, of which so much has been talked, of making the Empire alternative between the Catholics and Protestants^" But in September, 1707, the Swedish King started for Poland and his plans for Protestant- ism in Europe had to wait. Nor was it only in the north of Europe that the (jj^T^^^ reformed faith was making its influence felt. Lan- guedoc was now making one despairing efTort against the Catholic France instituted by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. For seventeen years these Protestants had suffered in silence, trusting in turn to the clemency of the King, to the Protestant princes and to William III. But it was all in vain, and even the Peace of Ryswick brought no change in the lot of the French Calvinists. During the last few years of the seventeenth century, prophets began to appear among the Cevennes mountains 1 Koch und Schoell, iv. 197. 3 Gualterio, 20318. 180. 2 Droysen, iv. i. 198. 122 THE FALLEN STUARTS. rousing the members of the reformed faith, till in 1702 they took up arms and were given the name of Camisards^ In spite of cruel punishments, they increased in numbers till the plan of the Intendant Baville was adopted. This was the repetition in France, his own country, and in the province of Lano-uedoc, witli whose administration he was charged, of the horrible destruction of the Palati- nate, which had been accomplished under the orders of Louvois, his protector and his master. In 1703, accordingly, the High Cevennes were devastated. But the Camisards were only driven to the courage of despair. In 1704 Villars came to suppress the fanatics as they were called. He followed a system of clemency and stamped out the rebellion by grant- ing an amnesty to all who laid down their arms, but showing no mercy to the few who continued to resist '^. In 1705 Marshal Berwick succeeded Villars, and with him appeared the European importance of the whole movement. A vast plot was hatched by four leaders named Rayanel, Jonquet, Catinat and Vil- lars, to seize Berwick and Baville and surprise Alas, Nimes and Montpellier at once, to place all the rescued prisoners on the English fleet which was to come to the aid of the insurrection, and to take Cette in order to receive the vessels of the Grand Alliance there. But within a few days of the date arranged for the execution of the plan, it was be- 1 Moret, I. 2i)G— 303. - St Simon, iv. 112 ; De Felice, Histoire des Protestants de France, iv. iv. THE V^AR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 123 trayed to Berwick. The ringleaders were seized at Nimes and many executions followed (April, 1705). It was the last attempt of the Camisards and it had failed. The English dared not disembark and the Piedmontese remained beyond the Alps, and so the fearful plot which was to have roused half the kingdom to rebellion came to nothing^. This reli- gious rising was an additional element in the esti- mation of success for Marlborough's plans against Toulon. But by 1707, when the plan was actually carried out, the Huguenots had been driven into submission, and their time for helping was gone by. The Protestant element, however, was still in exist- ence and there was for some time the latent possi- bility that it might be used as an auxiliary to any movement tending to upset the religious equilibrium of Europe. Very different seemed the position of Catholicism (^)J^f'- at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The old difficulties of Gallicanism had been outwardly healed by Innocent XII, and the crusade in the east was ended at Carlowitzl But the harmony M^f ^ was apparent rather than real. The influence of the Papacy itself upon Catholic Europe had long been growing weaker owing to the development of the use of the veto of the four Catholic Powers at the Papal elections. By means of it the Pope lost all effectivr^ control and initiative. It had gradually grown up out Of the political conditions of the election, and at this time reached a settled form and recognition. It was used by Austria according 1 Moret, II. 125-140. '" Above, p. 80. 124 THE FALLEN STUARTS. to the rights of the Holy Roman Empire : by France since the time of the Papacy at Avignon : by Spain as a consequence of her rule over Italy in the sixteenth century, and specially of the possession of Naples by Charles V : by Portugal because of the rich incomes which the Pope drew from her. At each conclave some cardinal was secretly entrusted with a list of those cardinals whom the Power friendly to him wished to exclude from election, as being displeasing to it. If such a man were chosen, the cardinal in question declared the veto, and no one dared to carry through an election. The result was that from 1644—1750 no great personality suc- ceeded to the throne of St Peter, who, as such, might have had any important influence upon its fate^ With heads of Christendom chosen under conditions such as these it is not to be wondered at that the Catholic princes should have felt little compunction in treating them as dependents rather than as superiors. Louis, as we have seen, had been trying to do this till his expulsion from Italy by the treaty of Madrid in 1707^ For the present, the Pope had succeeded in keeping the Emperor away. As long as Leopold lived, too, his piety was too real to allow him to do anything to injure the interests of the Holy See. Apparent harmony reigned between France and Rome as between a master and a subordinate. But there was nuich friction between them over the temporal question of the French troops in the Papal States"'. But ^ Cf. Hase, Yorlesungen, iv. 120, 121. - Above, p. IIG. ^ Ibid. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 125 there was also the more spiritual problem of the Papal jurisdiction in France. The cause of this trouble was Jansenism, and (^) Jan- 1 1 r xu 4-' senism. the circumstances were the result ot the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. That measure had made France a Catholic unit. But in that Catholic unit were two main parties whose differences had hitherto disappeared in their common antagonism to the heretics. After 1685, however, these two parties in the Church were left to struggle for the mastery of the religion of France. The kernel of the Jesuit doctrine was the assertion of Free Will, that of the Jansenist creed was the Augustinian doctrine of Grace. Struggles between them had gone on before, and some Popes, especially Urban VIII and Innocent X and Alexander VII, had con- demned Jansenism, while Clement IX had promul- gated a Bull declaring a compromise which went by the name of the Peace of Clements But the essen- tial difference now was that the independence of the Gallican Church from the Pope had been declared in 1682, and though this was professedly annulled in 1693, yet the religious autonomy of France was still a cardinal point with all French Catholics. In other words, the question was whether Jan- senism or Jesuitism was to wield the power trans- ferred from Rome to Paris in 1682. For the present this was scarcely realized. It seemed rather the time now for the Pope to be making a great struggle to maintain the authority granted to him in 1693. But the Gallican spirit of the French nation was 1 St Simon, vii. 13^—136. 126 THE FALLEN STUARTS. ao-ainst him and disliked his attempted interferences in the struggles of Jesuit and Jansenist. The solution of these difficulties would have been a Papal Bull declaring what was right and what was wrong. And this the Jesuits determined to secure for themselves, and Cardinal Noailles would support it because he was no Jansenist. It seemed time to settle the questions which Clement IX's Peace had once postponed. The Nuncio wrote in July, 1703, " I know that the King, with his acknowledged feel- ings of piety, is inclined to receive as good news the oracles of the Holy See as to the errors of Jansenism. My idea is to proceed now and keep back any points which cannot be decided at present or which may provoke difficulties or start controversies ^" The cause of these timid counsels is obvious. In May the Parliament of Paris had refused to register a Papal Bull', because it conflicted with the principles of Gallicanism. The Pope complained bitterly. "The King had this brief printed and sent the letter accompanying it to all the friendly bishops of the kingdom. ' Feed my sheep ' is the command to Peter, and the King's authority is attacked as well as ours by this action of the Parliament, which must be due to the Jansenists^" But it was Gallicanism rather than Jansenism that had done it. " With all sincerity," said the Nuncio in June, "I will repre- sent to your Holiness that it is not merely the Jansenists or their opponents who are resisting all the action of Rome, but even a very large number 1 Gualterio, 20242. 242. 2 jtjrf. 20318. 71. a Ibid. 20241. 79, 80. I THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 127 of those persons who are otherwise good Catholics, because of the great eagerness every one has here to uphold the Gallican prerogatives and liberties which are, so to speak, the very apple of the eye of this nation, and for the maintenance of which it is always determined to sacrifice everything else^" At length in August a draft of the expected Bull against Jansenism seems to have been sent to the Nuncio, who received a promise of cooperation from the King which augured well*^. But with 1706 came a violent complaint by the Pope against the French clergy. The ecclesiastical assembly had just drawn up certain rules condemning Jansenism with- out consulting Clement, who therefore vented his anger at this Gallican usurpation of the Papal rights not merely of jurisdiction but also of authority in matters of doctrine. "We can no longer, without neglect of our pastoral office, refrain from laying our complaints against our venerable brothers, the Arch- bishops, Bishops and other ecclesiastics who were there assembled, and by that same archiepiscopal authority which we hold by God's grace and will maintain by His help, we warn them that the fulness of this power was given by the will of God to the chair of St Peter alone, and they must not dare to usurp it, but reverence our decrees for the Catholic faith and carry them out, but not presume to discuss or judge themselves V It was a strong declaration of the Papal claims and showed the great gulf fixed between them and the claims of Gallicanism. Late 1 Gualterio, 20242. 230. ^ Ibid. 20242. 292. 3 Ibid. 20243. 38. 128 THE FALLEN STUARTS. The Crusade in 1707 Torcy voiced the general wish when he said, " Those who love the general good of the Church, grow sad at the sight of the way in which the Pope is hurried into complaints against France \" But in spite of the widening rift between Crusade Qjement and Louis up till the expulsion of the for James. . ^, h. i • - French from Italy in 1707, there was one tie to bind them increasingly closer together. This was a crusade for the sake of the Catholic refugee, Prince James. In July, 1701, the chances seemed favour- able. There was still peace, and William was grow- ing weaker and weaker. Gualterio declared that " Providence had no other greater object in view than the universal reduction of the Protestants to the Church, a work which will render the memory of your Holiness's Pontificate immortal in the Church'^.'* It was a grand ambition and now that the eastern crusade with the Turks had closed, the new Pope, Clement XI, clung to this possibility of a western crusade with a desire for holy fame. He advised that nothing should be done till the death of Wil- liam, for the sentiments of Anne towards the exiled family were well known to be favourable ^ Louis' recognition of James III in September, 1701, gave Clement the opportunity to show his enthusiasm. " Your Eminence," he wrote to Gualterio, " will go and congratulate the King of France in our name, together with the new King of England and the Queen his mother.... It is to be hoped that the other Catholic princes will follow the French King's Gualterio, 20318. 192. 2 Ihid. 20242. 55. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 129 example ; nor have we been remiss in writing to our Nuncios, telling them to give all the encouragement that may be needed to such a policy^" Nor was the help to James to be confined to mere titles, for '•' in order to restore the legitimate King of England to his throne," wrote the Pontiff, "we would give not only all that we have to spend but even life itself." But incomes were now depreciated in value and so though he would like to help the prince, " We conclude that little or nothing can be done by us. Yet this (crusade) being of such importance, we wish even now to do something," and accordingly a sum of 20,680 francs was placed to the credit of Clement's private account at Paris, to be drawn on for any expedition which might bring about the return of James'-^. As soon as the Act of Settlement had been passed, the advantage of acting through Scotland was seen, and the grievances of the Scotch^ were turned to good account. Louis, with his usual ability, used the political grievances of Scotland in connection with the religious ambition of the Pope in order to have his last instrument, the claimant to the English throne, ready for his use when his own plans required. The ffrowinff weakness of William made his Prepara- ■^"'^ 6 & . f, tiojisatthe probable death the most obvious opportunity tor ^e^ith of the restoration of James, and in the meantime the William. Scotch Parliament was the means ready to hand. "As everything will be lost in those kingdoms," wrote the Nuncio, "if the consent of the Scotch Gualterio, 20241. 22^. 3 Ibid. 20241. 20. 2 Ibid. 20241. 18, 19. H. 3 Above, p. 118. 130 THE FALLEN STUARTS. nation is given to the English resolutions as to the succession, and the exclusion of the Catholic line, or at any rate its restoration could only come under the most difficult circumstances, no more useful or effective event could happen than that the two peoples should be separated in sentiment, and this should be declared by a public law of the Parliament for the maintenance of a policy contrary to that which the English have adopted. The Marquis of Torcy has assured me that the King, knowing the importance of the fact and the advantages which may result from it, is not neglecting the opportunity, and though impeded at present by vast expenses, he will not fail to furnish all the necessary sums in order that the well-intentioned party may have the upper hand in the next Scotch Parliaments" But as he could not do this alone, he asked for the help of Clement by a subsidy of 30,000 francs'^. The Pope's gift of 20,680 francs was, therefore, devoted to this purpose, and distributed by the leader of the Scotch autonomy party, the Duke of Hamilton ^ who belonged to a family related to the Stuarts, was powerful in wealth and position, and was dis- satisfied with the Prince of Orange. Beyond Scot- land lay Ireland, where the Catholics were ready to rise whenever the opportunity was given to them, and in England there were many malcontents who would join the army of the French King if ever it appeared in the island in great strength*. But between the British Islands on one side and the 1 Gualterio, 20242. 11. 3 Ibid. 20242. 33, 34. 2 Ibid. 20242. 11. * Ibid. 20242. 24. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 131 eager Pontiff on the other stood Louis, with his own plans to work out. He had recognized James as King, but William was not dead, and for the present there was still peace between them^ Yet it was as well to be ready for all emergencies, and 'therefore it was advisable not to delay preparations, for the death of the Prince of Orange might come sooner than was expected. And if once that happened or war broke out the King would have no reason to keep him from action' against England'^ With words like these Torcy held out hopes without committing France to anything, and the crusade waited for the death of William and the disturbed state of England which would follow^ This occurred in March. 1702, and in April Clement wrote : " We believe we are doing injustice to the zeal of the most Christian Kino- in urdn^ him to profit by the present grave crisis, in order to act practically and prudently on behalf of the King of England, and there are signs that your Eminence (the Nuncio) has, at this oppor- tunity, taken those steps which you have found suitable to your office, with the most Christian King, and the King and Queen of England. We pray God with all our heart to aid your cause*." The draft of a treaty between Philip, Louis and Clement for the restoration of James, though un- dated, seems to belong to this year, and some of its articles, even though not signed, throw light on the nature of this crusade. " § 2. The contracting par- ties agreed to leave wholly to his most Christian 1 Gualterio, 20242. 22. 3 Ibid. 20241. 20. 2 Ibid. 20242. 26, 22. 4 Ibid. 20241. 40, 41. 9—2 132 THE FALLEN STUARTS. Majesty the choice of the time at which it shall be most suitable to begin the enterprise. § 18. In consideration that to publish the name of his Holi- ness at once as a party to the expedition, could not fail to make it more difficult because of the aversion which the Protestant peoples have towards the head of the Catholic religion.... His Holiness wishes that his share in it should for the present remain a secret Therefore all that he contributes shall pass under the name of the most Christian King. § 20. The war in which the Catholic King finds himself engaged on so many sides does not permit him to take his share of the burden of the expense of this enterprise out of his ordinary revenues. His Holiness, therefore, in consideration that the re- sources of the Church cannot be better employed than in a work of such merit, condescends to allow his Catholic Majesty a tenth from the ecclesiastics of his States to cover the great necessities of the expensed" At the same time, two plans for the crusade were suggested. The first was for a descent on England. For this the Pope was asked for 20,000 crowns a month and 200,000 to start the enterprise. Queen Maria Beatrice and the Duke of Berwick counted wholly on it. It was said that "as Inno- cent X had spent 500,000 crowns to assist the Irish Catholics when they had no leader, so Clement XI would surely not refuse a sum of far smaller amount to put the King and the Catholic religion back in Ensjland*." The chances now were wonder- Gualterio, 20294. 4, 8. 2 Ibid. 20242. 127. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 133 fully good. " We have to do," said Gualterio, " with a Princess weak in body and mind, with a husband less capable than herself... and in the hands of a faction...." But before the Courts of Spain and France would move they required the security of the financial aid of Rome. Besides this, the favour- able sentiments of the '' Princess " Anne were well known and promises of assistance had been received from the ministers Godolphin and Marlborough i. The alternative plan was for the management of Scotland. " The design is to gain as many votes in the Parliament which is to open in a few weeks as shall suffice to reject the succession, which the English heretics desire to establish in the Prince of Hanover, to the prejudice of the royal family. If this succeeds, it is proposed to go further and with this majority of votes to secure that Scotland shall revive the old treaties of friendship and commerce with France, while the King offers every facility for this end, on his own part and on that of the Catholic King^" Scotland should remain neutral in the present war, and this Parliament should tell Anne that " it would recognize the King, her brother, as her lawful successor, in which case it would recog- nize her as sovereign for her life, or otherwise it would withdraw its obedience altogether and accept as sovereign now King James III, in independence from Englandl" But this plan too needed the Papal subsidy, for " in these countries, where every vote has its price, nothing can be done without 1 Gualterio, 20242. 128, 129. ^ jfo/^. 20242. 137, 138. 3 Ibid. 20242. 137, 138. 134 THE FALLEN STUARTS. bribery, and so I have a command to beseech your Holiness, in the name of the King, to be willing to contribute some more adequate amount, since there is this good excuse in favour of the plan, that those heavy expenses which a military expedition requires are avoided ^" Louis' action was characteristic. *' His maxim is to listen and accept all that is sug- gested, yet without stopping his other practical measures^" But it was in effect the second plan that was followed. And this was a decisive blow to the crusade, for its essence was peaceful bribery and not war. It harmonised so much better with Louis' plans for his other Pretenders in Spain, Germany and Italy. The Holy War, therefore, became a political intrigue with Papal money to support it. Even this was insecure, because the Pope's resources were being exhausted by his struggles to maintain his own existence. In April, 1703, he told his Nuncio that "to tell the truth, we cannot give much, since our poor house is reduced to the depths of poverty, but we will gladly relieve his most Christian Majesty to the small extent that we can 3." This promise called up much admiration from the King of France, who dragged the religious side into prominence by saying it " was an effort of great import to religion ^" Yet it was scarcely religion that caused this activity. It was the completion of the alternative political plan by the passing of the Act of Security in the Scotch Parliament of May, 1 Gualterio, 20242. 138. 3 Ibid. 20241. 72, 73. 2 Ibid. 20242. 129. * Ibid. 20242. 224. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 135 1703. This stipulated that on the death of the Queen without issue the Estates should meet to name a successor who should not be the same as the person who should succeed to the Crown of England unless certain privileges were secured to Scotland first. The Royal Assent to this Bill was given in July, 1704. But for Blenheim in the following month the time of the Pretender James might have come four years earlier than it did. The Court of St Germains urged the restoration of James on the unpatriotic ground that " a Catholic King of Great Britain must be always dependent on France^" Even in July, however, there was little hope of an enterprise in Scotland that year because the French troops were so spread about elsewhere that none could be sent over^ and after that battle Louis had to concentrate himself on defence rather than offence. It was in vain in 1705 that the Nuncio Gualterio made an elaborate comparison of France as Rome, with Eng- land as Carthage, to impress Louis with the need of action ^ Queen Mary Beatrice expressed her desire to be at Fontainebleau to second a Jacobite mes- senger, for she was persuaded that it was " the last chance' before the peace^" Louis, for the present, would not act. The rift between France and Rome was dividing the two partners to the war for religion and the time of James as a Pretender was not yet 1 MacPherson, Original Papers, ii. 682. 2 Gualterio, 20318. 112. 3 Ibid. 20311. 77—84. 4 Ibid. 20293. 38. 136 THE FALLEN STUARTS. come. But in 1706 the time for the union of Scot- land and England had come. Throughout the year the battle was waged over the details, but at last, in March, 17()7, the Act of Union was ratified. Just before this, in July, 1705, the Stuart cause had suffered a loss in the removal of Cardinal Gualterio, the Papal Nuncio at Paris, to Rome\ And this same March, 1707, really saw the end of any chance of a crusade. For this was the date when the treaty of Milan in Italy left the Pope alone in Italy to meet the triumphant Austrians-. If Louis was to act at all on behalf of James, the idea of the crusade must give place to the rule for all Pretenders — the interest of France, iu. Im- Again, as in 1688 and in 1701, a time of tension portanceof^^ Europe was reached. In the struggle for the balance of power on land Italy had just been lost to the two crowns, but Almanza had secured Philip in Spain. The Diet of Onod had shown Ragoczy's strength in Hungary, and beyond Austria hovered Charles of Sweden, of whose attitude none could be certain. In the struggle for the sea-coast Maximilian had come forward only to be beaten at Ramillies. On the sea itself England had become mistress of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. But she had just received a check at Toulon. And now a chance of attacking her on the Channel itself was opened up by the breach between the two countries on its western coast — Scotland and England. The religious balance of Europe, too, was unsteady. Protestantism 1 Gualterio, 20293. 52. 2 Above, p. 110. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 137 had advanced in the north under Frederick of Prussia and Charles of Sweden till a response had been awakened in the south of Fiance. The Catholic princes themselves were at war and the Pope had become the partisan of France. But her support had failed him and the alliance had only brought to light the unavoidable breach between the two forms of the one faith. For the third time the House of Stuart bore the burden of the fate of the western world, and for the third time it failed to accomplish the mission for which the French King strove— the hegemony of the House of Bourbon in Europe. In the beginning of the year 1708 a great plan '^^'/^^^f' was taking shape. The Duke of Che v reuse had just ^^ow. become the most influential minister at Versailles and wished to signalise his ministry by a brilliant success^ The means lay ready to hand. Throughout 1707 there had been going on intrigues with Scotland, the object of which was to throw off the hated union with England. But the old condition was again declared needful — the Scotch must rise before the French would help. Louis had sent a Colonel Hawke to Scotland, with the object of "inducing the mal- contents to take arms, without subjecting the French King to any engagements on his side^." Minute enquiries as to the strength of the Scotch and their need of outside help were made, and James summed up his position by saying to Hawke, "As soon as they appear in arms, and have declared for us, we design to come in person to their assistance, with 1 St Simon, v. 402. 2 MacPherson, Original Papers, ii. 74. 138 THE FALLEN STUARTS. (a) The double plan. the succours promised us by the most Christian King, which cannot be obtained till they have given that evidence of their dispositions^" Throughout 1707 these intrigues had little result. But with 1708 the evidence furnished began to be used. Hough, a dependent of the Court of St Germains, showed to Cailli^res and the Duke of Chevreuse the importance of the opportunity brought about by the Act of Union. The minister gave his adhesion to the plan, and persuaded the King. An attempt to restore James was a means of making a powerful diversion, of depriving the allies of the help of England, who would be occupied at home, and of incapacitating them from helping the Archduke in Spain. But there w^as to be a further development. It was proposed to profit by the despair in which their treatment by the Austrians had thrown the Spanish Netherlands since the battle of Ramillies, and to make them revolt at the same time that the Scotch expedition startled the allies and deprived them of aid from England''. The two opposite coasts of the Channel were to be roused at the same moment. At last the time of the Stuart Pretender had come. A most able man undertook to rouse the Netherlands — the Count of Bergheck, who had been employed in the finances of those provinces at the end of Charles II's reign, and the Elector of Bavaria had continued the appointment. Unfortunately the head of the French forces — Marshal Vendome — was not equally capable. But for the present the plan i MacPherson, ii. 83. ^ st Simon, v. 406. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 139 promised well. Bergheck, after due consideration, believed that he could so work on the authorities in the towns, that in the first excitement of the Scotch enterprise everything would succeed without diffi- culty. With the help of an upheaval in England and of the French armies in Flanders, supported by an expedition on the Rhine at the same time, the enemy would be held at all points in uncertainty and suspense \ In France great preparations began to be made as secretly as possible. Louis armed thirty vessels at Dunkirk and the neighbouring ports, including the transports. The Chevalier de Fourbin was commander of the squadron: four million francs were sent to Flanders for the payment of the troops, of whom six thousand were ordered up to the coast by Dunkirk. At length, when all was ready, on March 6, 1708, James left St Germains for Dunkirk. At once the loss of the supremacy over Great if\Jhe Britain on the sea became apparent as an obstacle Scotland, to Louis' plans. A messenger came with the news that Admiral Leake, who was thought to be off Portugal, was blockading Dunkirk. The French troops, who had been placed on board the fleet, were therefore promptly disembarked'. Further delay was caused by an attack of measles from which the Prince suffered; however, on March 19, in spite of the doctors, he started from Dunkirk. But England had now had time to put her supremacy of the Channel to good use. Admiral Byng had put to sea from Portsmouth on March 14, and as soon as he A St Simon, v. 407, 408. ' Ibid. v. 411. 140 THE FALLEN STUARTS. heard of the starting of the French ships he at once pursued them to the Firth of Forth to prevent them from hringing the Prince to Edinburgli. When the French saw him, not only was the plan of a landmg given up but only flight was thought of. The cables were cut and the fleet made for Dunkirk pursued by the English ships. The anger of the Scotch vented itself on Louis, '' who," they said, " merely treat(-d the Pretender as a tool to bring confusion into England^" This was true, but not the whole truth. For Louis' immediate object as in 1G90, 1G92, and 1696 was a rising in the country before his troops appeared. This had not happened, and therefore, when Byng appeared, Fourbin, in obedience to Louis' orders, seems to have withdrawn the 6,000 Frenchmen, who might be better used elsewhere. The sea-power of England had stopped the enter- prise. But the religious aspect of Louis' support of James found almost too much favour at Rome. In May, 1708, Torcy therefore wrote angrily to Cardinal Gualterio, now at Rome, "It seems to me that it would be well to moderate the demonstrations which the Pope wished to make, by instituting a public Jubilee for the success of the Scotch atl'air. Our enemies were already anxious to regard this war as a war of religion, the object of which was to re- establish the Catholics in the kingdom of Great Britain. But nothing could be more prejudicial to the interests of the King of England or more likely to alienate those subjects who are favourable to hi '> im . 1 Klopp, XIII. 46—50. ' Gualterio, 20318. 265, 266. I THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 141 There was still the Belgian part of the V^^^ ^.^^^f.^ to be carried out, but the success of this was de- the Nether- pendent on the enterprise in Scotland, by which a ^^'^f- ^ * , , - . . 11 Ouden- beginning had to be made before any rising could «,.^g^ take place in Flanders. If therefore the Pretender failed, it was merely a chance whether anything could come of the schemes and negotiations of Bergheck. Yet he did not give up his attempt, but tried every means to secure something out of what remained of the great plan which was so well conceived and would have succeeded had the Scotch affiiir answered to its expectations. Intrigues began with Ghent and Bruges and the French entered both cities in July, 1708. The next step was to profit by these tw^o conquests and cross the Scheldt, burn Ouden- arde, keep the enemy out of the country by making subsistence difficult, while the French provisions came by water and their camp was made impreg- nable. But Marlborough cut short these plans by a brilliant victory over Vendome at Oudenarde on July 11, when Prince James fought as a volunteer against his countrymen^ This was the sequel to the flT, t i " 1710, 1717. "^y clmt ot iron and hre-. Industry and trade were revived, the defences stren<^thened, taxes liorhtened and the burden of the recent wars removed as far as possible^ The navy especially was developed. Al- beroni expected by the spring of 1718 to have thirty battleships at sea with a complement of 12,000 men. Spain had a most specious pretext for all her military measures. " The Pope since the summer of 1715 was dying of fear of the Turks. He turned to Spain and Portugal to obtain help, as well as to France*. In February 1716 Alberoni promised that the King of Spain would help the Pope against the Turkish invasion that he dreaded, with six battleships, four galleons, and twelve battalions, consistino of 8000 men, including officers and 1500 horsemen. These troops were to ^ Coxe, Bourbons in Spain, ii. 254. - Alberoni, Lettres Intimes, 540. ■^ Coxe, Bourbons in Spain (1815), 376—380. ^ St Simon, xiii. 11. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 193 serve under the Pope's banner and be maintained at his expensed The Courts of Spain and Rome began to draw together. Ever since in 1709 the ^-J^^^^^J^^^ Pope had been forced to recognise Charles of Austria cardinal- as King of Spain, there had been neither Papal «^^- Nuncio at Madrid, nor Spanish Ambassador at Kome'-. The Pope was very eager for the renewal of diplomatic intercourse and for the termination of other outstanding difficulties with Spain. The opportunity seemed to be now come. But Alberoni also had a darling wish. That was for a Cardinal's Hat=\ The crusading fleet and army thus became the link between the Pope and Alberoni. To each it was of vital importance. Throughout 1716 and the beginning of 1717 the negotiations went on. Alberoni would promise no crusading fleet for 1717 without the Cardinalate. Clement feared to dis- please the Emperor and shock Rome and the Sacred College and therefore sought to find excuses to delay it. But this very deadlock was the opportunity of another Catholic of importance, the Pretender James. Three years before, in 1714, Gualterio had given his master some wise advice. " I venture to recommend your Majesty to do all you can to unite more and more with King Philip. It is the policy which is best for you and from which you will draw most advantage on all occasions, the more so as it appears that England is allying herself more and more with 1 St Simon, xiii. 17. 2 Muriel, Translation of Coxe, ii. 382. 3 St Simon, xiii. 204 ; Muriel, ii. 396, 397. H. 13 194 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 195 2. Sardinia seized. him^" It was now just the time when the arrest of Gyllenborg had made the Jacobite cause weaker than ever. Yet Cardinal Aquaviva who acted for Spain at Rome " never ceased to urge the King of Spain to make a strict alliance with the Pope for the good of religion. They would re-establish James in England and Philip in France-." Now James himself came forward with one of the few prerogatives he could still claim and urged the nomination of Alberoni to the Cardinalate. He saw no help anywhere but in Spain ; he therefore wished to flatter Alberoni, and in an audience with the Pope he pressed for his promotion. At length, in July 1717, an agreement was signed between the Courts of Rome and Madrid. The Nunciature was re-established, but the Pope was dissatisfied at the conditions attached, though he soon yielded, and on July 12 the Spanish minister became a Car- dinal. The next day Gualterio wrote to James's mother to tell her of the promotion. " It can truly be said," he remarked, " that it has come about, thanks to the King (James), to whom therefore his Catholic Majesty and the new cardinal owe all the gratitude"*." Alberoni secured his object, but he had linked himself with a new force, the claimant to the throne of England. The preparations for the crusade were all the 1 Gualterio, 20294. 181. 2 St Simon, xiii. 313, 314. Cf. Coxe, Bourbons in Spain (1815), II. 316. ^ Lafuente, Historia de Esjiana, xviii. 520. •* Gualterio, 20295. 151. while going on in Spain, and the price for the purple seemed about to be paid. Under cover of it the military and naval resources of the kingdom were being developed. On the day of his promotion Alberoni explained his policy in a letter to Count Rocca. " In order to recreate a new Spain, capable of aiding Italy to revive, I do not ask for an eternity, I only Tsk for three years\" But already his work had been undone behind his back. The Grand Inquisitor of Spain, Molinez, had been arrested in the Austrian territory of Milan at the end of May, while travelling from Rome to Madrid-. The Em- peror had doubts (^f the religious object of all these Spanish preparations. He saw that the squadron being fitted out was not designed against the Turks, but against himself as the tyrant of Italy, and the longer his crusade lasted, the better for the plans of the new Cardinal. The arrest roused the wrath of Philip. He determined on war at once, and informed the Duke of Popoli, an important noble, of his intention. Charles was far away in Hungary, besieging Belgrade. The opportunity seemed fo- v.mrable. But Alberoni in a letter to Popoli showed the folly of such a step. If an attack were made on Italy, " as soon as the Court of Vienna heard of it, it would either at once make peace with Turkey or act on the defensive in Hungary and send a detachment of 18,000 men to Italy. Without •allies, the Catholic King cannot dream of conquests in Italy, specially in a time when he has no money. 1 Alberoni, Lettres Intimes, xli. 2 St Simon, xiv. 70. 13—2 \ 196 THE FALLEN STUARTS. no troops, no generals to command against king- doms which are more disatfected than ever, with the people rebellious and the nobility discontented, when in short we are without help, human or divine \" The wisdom of this appeal was neglected by Philip, who was determined on war. Alberoni never had the three years he wanted, for on August 9, 1717, the fleet left Barcelona. The object was then found to be, not the defence of the Papal States against the Infidel, but the seizure of the Imperial possession of Sardinia, which was quickly overrun. Spain seemed to have succeeded. But in reality Philip's hurry had ruined his minister's hopes of a national revival, for this seizure was the casus foederis contemplated by the Anglo- Austrian treaty of Westminster. The time was come for England and Spain to struggle for the Mediterranean, (b) The By the treaty of Utrecht France and England Anlance,'^ had become guarantors of the neutrality of Italy-. 1717,1718. On the seizure of Sardinia, therefore. Cad ogan was sent to Madrid to try and mediate between Spain and Austria. Liberal terms were offered. The recognition of Philip as King of Spain and the reversion of Tuscany and Parma to the sons of Philip and Elizabeth, were the main points. They were foolishly refused. Philip knew that under the treaty of Westminster England was bound to inter- fere by force, if the possessions of Charles were attacked. This was the guarantee of eastern Europe. 1 Gualterio, 20425. 27, 28; Coxe, Bourbons in Spain, ii. 157—161. 2 Flassan, Histoire diplomatique , iv. 462. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 197 Already the Triple Alliance had been formed at the beginning of the year to maintain the provisions of Utrecht. "^ This was the guarantee of western Europe. The one common factor was England. But as yet in 1717 and early in 1718 there was no European concert. The first difficulty was Spain itself The Emperor would not join the Triple Alliance because a treaty which secured Philip on his throne neces- sarily shut out the claims on Spain of the House of Hapsburg. If he yielded that, the next difficulty was Sicily. This island had belonged to Victor Amadous of Savoy since 1713, when Sardinia had been given to the Emperor. Now Charles declared that Victor Amadous might have Sardinia, at present seized by Spain, but that Sicily must be an Imperial possession^ The union of the eastern and western guarantees of the Utrecht settlement into one great European peace hung fire. But the solution of the difficulty arose out of the precipitancy of Philip. He contemptuously refused all proposals to come to terms about Sardinia. " Never," said Alberoni, "will King Philip give up Sardinia. If once Sicily is given to the Emperor, he will be master of all Italy V Suddenly all Europe was startled by hearing that on July 1 a Spanish expedition had cut the Gordian knot by seizing Sicily. This might have been in ordinary times a good stepping- stone to the conquest of Italy. In 1718 it was a political mistake, because Spain thereby irrevocably drove Savoy, to whom the island still belonged, into the arms of the allies. 1 Michael, i. 780, 78S. 2 Ibid. 805, 807. 198 THE FALLEX STUARTS. With this new disturbance to peace, Stanhope's mission to unite the east and the west succeeded. One commoD treaty between England, France and Austria was signed at London on August 2, 1718, and called the Quadruple Alliance, though Holland did not accede to it till the following February, nor Savoy till November. By it Spain was to remain to Philip, Naples, Sicily and Milan to Charles, Parma and Tuscany to revert to Philip's sons by Elizabeth, and Sardinia to go to Savoy \ This had now to be upheld. An English fleet ot twenty large ships under Admiral Byng had left Portsmouth on June 12, nominally to defend the neutrality of Italy, really to find the Spanish fleet and destroy it. On August 10 the fleets met off Cape Passaro, and the utter defeat of the Spaniards gave the death blow to Alberoni's hopes for Italy-. One hundred and thirty years before the same two sea-powers had met, but the place was different and the conditions were reversed. In 1588 the Armada had attacked the English fleet in its home waters, the Channel. Now in 1718 the English fleet sought out the Spaniards in the centre of the Mediterranean. The meaning of the victory was obvious. Alberoni's crusade eastwards had failed in its real object. The English fleet had won the Mediterranean. Not only was the Italian peninsula in the hands of the Emperor, the supporter of the Hanoverian succession, and the Pope, the champion of James in his power too, but now the Hanoverian fleet had established 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 235, 236. 2 Michael, i. 811, 812 ; Armstrong, 112. 1 THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 199 its control on the sea between Italy and Spam. The process begun at Gibraltar and Minorca was complete. Nor had Alberoni alone suffered James the Pretender was driven back from the Mediter- ranean. But the Atlantic, south of the Channel, and the Baltic were still left. While Alberoni as a Parmesan looked east to3^PW.p^ Italv, Philip V, as a Bourbon, looked north ^o ,,,,t /„r tfte France All the time that the cardinal was ^.--^_ scheming for Elizabeth and her sons, anotheri718. minister? the Prince of Cellamare, was working for the Spanish King at Paris. The struggle for the supremacy of the Mediterranean Sea had been fought and won by England. The struggle for the succession to the Bourbon Empire of Loms XIV was now to be waged. Linked with this was the question of the Channel. For Philip, as a possible claimant to the regency and succession in France, was at the head of the partv which found its traditions m the days of the Grand Monarque, when France and Spain were united against England and Germany. The result of the success of this party and its policy w<,uld be the old weakness of Holland and England The attempt to nullify the influence of the Channel on Europe would be renewed. With Orleans as Regent and heir to the throne was secured the new policy of the treaty of Utrecht and of the Quadruple Alliance, where the interests of the House o Bourbon were sacrificed to the aggrandizement of a cadet branch and the Channel left to the supremacy of England without a murmur, in order to retain the friendship of George. I 200 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 201 The Spanish party in France was composed of the various elements of discontent against Orleans. These various elements found a common bond of union in the signature of the Quadruple Alliance in August, 1718, which would secure to the present government the advantage of foreign support. It was only by threats of dismissal that d'Huxelles could be made to sign it, and his opposition was caused by the influence of the Spanish party and of public opinion ^ The Prince de Cellamare saw that his opportunity had come. He had struggled in vain to prevent the conclusion of the Alliance. He would now go further. " His plan was nothing less than the revolt of the whole kingdom against the government of the Duke of Orleans. The King of Spain was to be put at the head of affairs in France, with a Council and ministers nominated by him, and a Viceroy under him, who was to be none other than the Duke of Maine-." The person of the Regent was to be seized on Christmas Eve, at the midnight Mass, by three hundred persons disguised as body-guards, and he was to be carried off to Spain, to be incarcerated in a state prison. But the whole plot was ruined through information of it being given to Dubois, Orleans' trusted minister, by a conspirator named Buvat, and on December 10, a fortnight before the day arranged for the comple- tion of the plot, Cellamare was himself arrested and his papers seized =*. Philip's first attempt as a 1 Michael, i. 802. 2 St Simon, xvi. 130, 131 ; Droyseu, iv. ii. 228. ^ Flassau, iv. 473, 474. m claimant to the French throne had failed, and the failure only based the safety of France more firmly than ever on the friendship of England. This in- volved the maintenance of the English supremacy ot the Channel, just as the failure of Alberoni's attempt to save Italy from Austria only more firmly riveted the supremacy of England upon the Mediterranean East and north, Spain had been unsuccessful. She had found that the final hindrance to her plans lay in the sea-power of England. But there was one instrument ready to hand for the downfa of that power, and one sea where Spain could still think herself mistress. The time of James of England had come, and the Atlantic, south of the Channel, should give him entrance to his kingdom^ While Spain was busy with working out at the i.Jhe^^ expense of European peace the plans for Philip ^nd J«„„. „,,d the sons of Elizabeth, the question of the support of ;|- -{"g- James, the less important claimant for a throne, had („, j- ,,, not come into practical politics. After dallying with « m6. the rival candidates for the throne of Anne, Spam had definitely pledged herself to the House ot Hanover by the commercial treaty ot 171.d'. After the Jacobite failure of 1715, 1716, James had had a secret meeth.g with Cellamare in the Bois de Boulogne at Paris. "He pointed out that his retreat at Kome would greatly prejudice his affairs in England : that he had no hope that the Duke oi Lorraine would receive him any more, and hinted his desire to find a refuge in Spain. He ended up 1 Above, p. 191. !'i 202 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 203 1717. with a demand for 100 000 crowns from the Spanish (/3) Arrest But Spain was busy elsew^here, and on friendly of Lord ^ • , ^ , , . "^ Peter- terms With (jreorge, so the appeal was rejected. ^^owugh, James found his support not at Madrid but at Rome, though even the Pope dared not maintain him at Avignon against the wishes of the Triple Alliance longer than an illness rendered absolutely necessary 2. In the spring of 1717 James had come to Italy and was making up his mind where to live. While at Rome he reversed the position in the Bois de Boulogne by conferring a benefit on Alberoni. He, at least nominally, became the means of securing him the Cardinalatel He had become the link between Spain and Rome. An event then occurred which brought James into great prominence. He had been received into the Papal States with royal honours^. He now chose to use his prerogatives in a way that was very embarrassing to the Pope. Cardinal Origho, the governor of Bologna, wrote on September 11, 1717, to James to tell him some startling news. " If I venture to write to your Majesty, it is to inform you that the rulers in England have formed very wicked and violent projects against your Majesty, consisting in your ruin and death." An anonymous letter had come to him saying that Peterborough and a disguised monk had set out with that object. They had been traced to Gibraltar and had now arrived in Italy ^ ' St Simon, xiii. 17. ^ Above, p. 194. 5 Ibid. 20312. 26, 27, 32. 2 Gualterio, 20295. 54—56. ^ Gualterio, 20295. 127. The Pretender at once took alarm. He may have thought the plot of Gyllenborg was to be avenged. At any rate he ordered the arrest of Peterborough, who was now at Bologna (September)^ Ihe Pope though much afraid of England continued his prevrous policy and declared that James might with his full consent do exactly what he would do if he were on his throne at London with an accused criminal before himV The recognition of royalty was allowed to lead to an wipenum ^n i^nperio. But this permission once given, Clement became alarmed. There were rumours that it Fetei- borough were not released Civitavecchia would be bombarded by an English fleet and the Papal S ates overrun. Yet the Pope only worried and took no measures to defend his dominions, but in no measured terms expressed his wish that James would withdraw the arrest^ Peterborough had meanwhile conclusively proved his innocence ^ James saw that he was in the wrong, and m October the Earl was released^ The whole incident only showed that the royal pretensions of the House of Stuar were not vet diminished. They were now put forward in a still more remarkable way i^^ames^s Alberoni was finding the need of a diver^on for (7)^-- the forces of Europe while he busied himself with schemes. Ids plans for Italy. The great need was to win over the northern powers so as to take his enemies in the rear One political marriage had already bound 1 Gualterio, 20295. 161. 3 Ibid. 20295. 181, 184, 193. 5 Ibid. 20312. 91. 2 Ibid. 20295. 166. ■» Ibid. 20312. 61—65. 204 THE FALLEN STUARTS. Spain to the regeneration of Italy. Another now might win the north to his side. A royal bride- groom was waiting in the exiled King of England. It became a part of the scheme of Alberoni to find him a bride. For some time the necessity of James's marriage had been felt by all his supporters. The attempt to unite him with the House of Neuburg and so bind Catholic Germany to a crusade for him had failed^ After the failure of 1715, 1716, the need of a good marriage became more pressing than ever. " All those interested expect your Majesty to marry soon, for many of your Majesty's followers will have more confidence in you when they see your descendants l" It was also said that the sup- porters of the House of Hanover like to have a continued dynasty with which to threaten their own King=*. More than one bride had been suggested. A daughter of Frederick Augustus of Saxony was proposed in 1717 by Cardinal Albani, and an amusing list of necessary encjuiries made out. The lady's height, stature and face were to be described, as also her age, humours and inclinations^ Another princess proposed was the daughter of the Duke of Modena. She was Alberoni's first proposal. James should be used to turn Modena from an enemy to a friend. The Pope entered into the proposal and wished to celebrate the marriage at Loretto and give the nuptial blessing himself ^ " But it is well known that the Duke of Modena regulates his action 1 Above, p. 168. 2 Gualterio, 20294. 256. 3 St Simon, xiv. 254, 255. ■» Gualterio, 20242. 413, 414. » St Simon, xiv. 254, 255. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 205 according to certain rules and his principal thoughts turn tovvards the Emperor, with whom he considers his interest chietly lies\" The Emperor was not likely to allow a marriage that would check his plans in Italy and would help the rival of his ally, King George. This project therefore fell through. A second proposal of Alberoni's was more suc- cessful. Already in the summer of 1716 the name of the Princess Clementina Sobieski had been sugcrested^. The Spanish minister realised the advantages of such an alliance. The memory of John Sobieski, the defender of Vienna in 1683, had never been forgotten in Poland. His Queen, Maria Casimira d'Arquien, of a French private family, had been estranged from France by the refusal of royal honours and retired to Horned One of the children of this pair, Cunigunda, had become the second wife of Maximilian of Bavaria, and mother of the future Emperor Charles VII. Another, James, was attached to the Imperial cause and lived m wealth at Olav in Silesia as governor of Styria^ This was the father of Clementina. Alberoni saw the connection this would give James with the north and with the House of Bavaria, always the rival of the House of Hapsburg. The Duke of Ormond had crone to Russia to rouse the Czar to aid the Hous'e of Stuart against Hanoverian England with her Baltic fleet, and all looked welP. In April, 3 St Simon, v. 2912. 1 Gualterio, 20295. 157. 2 Ibid. 20295. 50. * Ibid, XVI. 107. 5 Dickson, The Jacobite Attempt of 1719, xxiii. ^'m ii m m }f!m m' ^ . 206 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 207 1718, Gnalterio could congratulate his master on the prospects of his alliance with Clementina^ After August 10 the marriage was to be a revenge for the defeat otf Cape Passaro. It had become a matter of certainty and the only (piestion was the regulation of details. There were great difficulties in the way of James going into Imperial territory to fetch his bride and equally grave diffi- culties if the marriage w^ere performed by proxy. "If the Emperor for his own private reasons should think fit to prevent the bride from coming into Italy and place her under some form of arrest," wrote Gualterio, " the Kino- mioht be bound to the marriage without possessing his wife. Thus the destiny of the royal fiimily would depend on the will of another-." At length it w^as decided that the ceremony was to be *'a simple betrothal for the future and the King was thus only to be bound by it on the supposition that the Princess had her liberty." Murray, a Protestant, was to be the proxy and no priest was to be present so that the betrothal might be only conditional. For all this a Papal dispensation was granted^. (d) Clemen- But the enemies of Spain had begun to discover that James's marriage project was only part of a larger plan. The parties to the scheme betrayed this by their fears that the Princess might be hindered from coming. The main plot, of which the marriage was a part, was being carried out. This was done by the conferences between the Swedish 1 Gualterio, 20295. 244. 2 j^/^, 20312. 150. 3 Ibid. 20313. 623. find's Arrest, 1718. minister Gortz and the Russian minister Ostermann in one of the islands of Aland, for the pacification of the north. The negotiations lasted from May to November, 1718. The first difficulty was over the Swedish provinces on the east of the Baltic. The proposal of Gortz was to give up Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria and Carelia for Finland. But the patriotic Swedes objected strongly to this sacrifice. The next point to be decided was the fate of Poland. Here the agreement was cordial. " Their Majesties the Czar and the King of Sweden are agreed to force the King Augustus to renounce the crown ot Poland, and replace King Stanislas on the throne\" The third point was Bremen and Verden. "As his Majesty the King of Sweden is resolved to go into Germany with a large force next spring to retake Bremen anitoria de Espaua, xviii. 431, 432. -i Dickson, 250, 253. 3 Gualterio, 20313. 1-39. .<5 'a 216 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 217 5. James and Alheroni, massed on the Spanish frontier, while an English fleet advanced to the Spanish coast. He thought his presence would bring the soldiers, the repre- sentatives of the Spanish party with its military traditions, to his side. But he failed ignominiously. The French under Cilly advanced and, at the in- stigation of the English, demolished the new naval Port du Passage, when some men of war in process of construction and naval ammunition and stores were burnt\ Alberoni had been unsuccessful all along the line. His removal was required by the triumphant invaders. On December 5th he was dismissed, and on January 26th, 1720, Philip of Spain joined the Quadruple Alliance^ James was in a different position after his con- nection with the fallen Cardinal from that which he had occupied before. A new power had espoused his cause — a maritime power. And the result was naturally to be seen on the seas of Europe. The Channel had been won before, and the security of the Quadruple Alliance was not to be disturbed by the machinations of Cellamare. Spain herself had now agreed that James should be shut out from these waters, by acceding to that Alliance. The Mediterranean had been won for England at Cape Passaro, and the contribution of Spain to the Alliance in 1720 was that James, shut up in Italy, could find no escape by the sea. The re- viving power of Spain on the Atlantic was shat- 1 Stanhope, i. 339, 340. 2 Ibid. I. 350, 352. Droysen, iv. ii. 282. For the accusations against him of. Coxe, ir. 384, 385. tered by the destruction of the Port du Passage. There could in future be no highway along these waters for a Jacobite restoration. Even on the Baltic, the triumph of Hanoverian England was conspicuous. With Sweden united to her by the Peace of Stockholm in 1719, she aimed at dividing the allies. Prussia made a separate peace with Sweden in 1720 and was followed by Denmark. England and Russia stood face to face. But England, because of her weakness in the South Sea Bubble crisis', could go no further and Sweden was left in the lurch. The Peace of Nystadt in September, 1721, completed Russia's struggle to reach the sea ; she was now a full member of the European family of nations. But for the next half century Russia and England moved in separate orbits. The Czars would not need an instrument against England as Sweden had done. With Charles XII fell the Jacobite hopes. The result of these three years, then, was that the English naval supremacy, guaranteed by the agreements of the Powers in the unsettled years after the Peace of Utrecht, had been converted into facts, and thereby the House of Stuart had been driven back step by step from each of the European seas in turn. For the next decade the disturbing element mB.^^^Eliza- Europe was still Spain. But the leadership there ^amese. had passed from an ambitious statesman to an 1720- Elizabeth. 1 England zog sich von der nordischen Frage, so gut es gehen woUte, zuruck. Der Zaar behielt das Feld. Droysen, iv. ii. 307, 308. 218 THE FALLEN STUARTS. ambitious woman. Elizabeth Farnese looked north and already seemed to see her husband King at Versailles. She looked east and foresaw her sons dividing up Italy amongst them. There was, how- ever, this difference between her and Alberoni. He had worked for the good of Italy and of Spain as subservient to it. He had therefore made great plans, and involved all Europe in them, that he might save Italy. Elizabeth was rather working for the good of her dynasty. To her even the oppressors of Italy might become friends if they would advance the claims of her sons. The basis of the struggle, too, had changed. Alberoni had struggled to convert the English naval supremacy into a balance of power at sea, and had instead seen it advance step by step into what had been Spanish seas. With Elizabeth the real question was the balance of power on the continent, for Spain had lost the seas. Yet the exhaustion of the wars of Louis XIV was not yet ended. The result was that the struggle was now fought, not by arms, but by diplomacy. Behind her husband as a claimant for the throne of France, and her sons as claimants for princi- palities in Italy, stood James, the Pretender to England. It seemed not unlikely that a diversion against King George might become necessary for the advancement of her plans, i. Spain The downfall of Alberoni seemed to leave Europe France ^^ profound peace. The Quadruple Alliance had now 1720— absorbed Spain, and the treaties of Stockholm and Nystadt settled the differences of the north. The 1725. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 219 Emperor, freed from his crusade by the triumphant Peace of Passarowitz was free to turn to European affairs. But it was rather a general pause in the struggle than a lasting peace. Spain was not yet satisfied, and on her rested the decision for peace or war. The starting-point for the Queen's policy was the treaty with France and England, signed at Madrid in June, 1721. It contained guarantees for the maintenance of the treaties of Utrecht, Baden, and London, including the succession of Elizabeth's sons in Parma and Tuscany. For the present, then, the Spanish Queen could leave Italy till the succes- sions became imminent. The Court of Spain therefore turned its eyes to ^^Jhe France Philip the claimant would strengthen his Marriage connection with France by marriages. The union Scheme. between the two countries was described as eternal and indissoluble. The French ambassador was in- formed by the minister that the King asked for Mademoiselle de Montpensier, daughter of the Duke of Orleans, for the Prince of Asturias, the Spanish Infant, and proposed the marriage of his own daughter, Maria Anne, with Louis XV. On Aucrust 4th, 1721, the Regent wrote to express his deUcrht at the prospect of the double marriage. The Infa^'nta was in the winter despatched to France, and on January 20th, 1722, Mademoiselle de Montpensier was married to the Infant, Don Luis. The old Bour- bon power seemed to have revived. If Orleans and Philip came to sink their rivalry in marriages which would unite Spain and France in their old greatness under Louis XIV, the peace would be dearly bought. 220 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 221 b. Alter- To the third great western Power, England, the pIo? ^722 prospect looked particularly dangerous. The year 1720 had just overwhelmed her in the great cata- strophe of the South Sea Bubble. The South Sea Company, formed to carry out the provisions of Utrecht, made extravagant offers to clear off the national debt in return for privileges in American trade. Bubble Company followed Bubble Company till the inevitable reaction brought ruin in its train. The ministry was involved and fell. The influence of England abroad was shaken to its foundations^ " But it is a striking instance of the good fortune which at this time attended the Whig Party, that a schism, which had occurred between Stanhope and Townshend with his kinsman Walpole, over the signature of the Triple Alliance in 1717, had with- drawn a certain proportion of its leaders from the Government, and consequently from all responsi- bility for the disaster. Had it been otherwise, the whole party might have fallen beneath the outburst of popular indignation, and a party which was now purely Jacobite might have been summoned to the helm^" As it was, Walpole was called upon to save the State, and he forged the weapon which was to give the Stuart cause in England its death-blow — a policy of peace. But in 1722 a great effort was made by the adherents of James in England under Atterbury, Bishop of Kochester. Already, in June, 1721, James had made an urgent appeal to Innocent XIII, who 1 Coxe MSS. (Brit. Mus.), 9128, 182. 2 Lecky, i. 374. had the month before succeeded Clement XI as Pope, for help by a gift of 100,000 crowns or his adherents would desert him, and the cause of the Church in England be for ever lost\ But nothing came of it. In 1722 the great object of Atterbury and the other leaders was to obtain a foreign force of 5,000 troops to land under Ormond. Failing in this, owing to the engagements of the English Government with almost every continental Court, they determined, nevertheless, to proceed with only such assistance in arms, money and disbanded officers or soldiers, as could be privately procured abroad. One of their applications was to the Duke of Orleans, who told the English Government. On the strength of this the conspirators were seized and the plot Itifled at its birth in May. The attainder and banishment of James's one great Counsellor, Atterbury, was its only result'^ But there was an essential difference between this and the previous attempts to restore James. The plot of 1722 took its rise in England and failed. On the other occa- sions the initiative had come from abroad. Atter- bury failed because, in 1722, James was wanted by no foreign power as a tool against the reigning dynasty, for at present England was at peace with all'. It proved that, unless the claims of James could 1 Gualterio, 20292. 228—234. 2 Stanhope, ii. 34—39. 3 Walpole laid before the House some particulars of the con- spiracy • " This wicked design was formed about Christmas last (1721)- that the conspirators had at first made application to some potentates abroad, for an assistance of 5000 men : that being denied, they afterwards about April (1722) made further 222 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 223 serve the purpose of some continental Pretender, his throne was lost for ever, c. Philip's Yet had the plot not been opportunely dis- tk>f%24. covered, the necessary condition might have been fulfilled. The growing union between France and Spain was involving strained relations with England. The Pretender's servants were in high ftivour with Patino, Spanish minister of the Marine in August, 1722. A ship was seized in September, 1723, which was to have conveyed the Pretender to Ireland and Scotland. In August, 1723, died Dubois, who had been the soul of the policy of an Anglo-French Alliance. But in December the Regent himself died suddenly and with him the growing tendency to a united House of Bourbon suffered a severe blow. Had he lived, an Orleanist Family Compact might have even forestalled that of the later Bourbons^ With him fell the reviving importance of James as a po- litical tool, for his death brought Philip's position as claimant to the throne of France into stronger relief than ever. There was no one now, thought the Queen, to contest his claim to succeed Louis XV. The pro&pect of the success of Cellamare's designs of 1718^ seemed to follow, with no other disadvantage than that of breaking Philip's promise application and earnest instances for 3000 : that being again dis- appointed in their expectations from foreign assistance, they resolved desperately to go on, confiding in their own strength, and fondly depending on the disaffection of England : and that their first attempt was to have been the seizing of the Bank, the Exchequer and other places where the public money was lodged. Coxe's Walpole, i. 168, 169. St Simon, xix. 15. 1 Armstrong, 136, 137. - Above, p. 200. at Utrecht and in the Quadruple Alliance to re- nounce the throne of France \ Suddenly, in February, 1725, Europe was startled at the news that Philip had abdicated his throne in favour of his eldest son. Luis, and had retired in deep religious melancholy to St lldephonse^. The real cause was a sudden and severe illness of Louis XV. Elizabeth meant nothing less than a very crafty manoeuvre to obviate the difficulties of the treaties. The Spanish King was thus made free to succeed to the throne of France if Louis XV died^ All was ready at St Ildephonse for the journey into France, if the throne became vacant. Then came an unexpected event. In August, 1724, not Louis of France, but Luis of Spain died, and Philip returned to Madrid as King of Spain. For mean- while it had become clear that Philip's chances in France were declining, that he was the subject of some ridicule even among the Legitimists, and that, in the event of a vacancy, the succession of the 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 214, 237. 2 Armstrong, 137. 3 Oncken, Zeitalter Friedriechs des Grossen, 145, Coxe, Bourbons in Spain, iii. 52. This view is however rejected by others. En cambio discurren otros, en nuestro entender con menos apasiona- miento y mejor sentido, quo no era probable que un hombre de maduro juicio dejara lo que con seguridad poseia por la incierta esperanza de succeder a un nifio de catorce aiios, con la declarada oposicion de tantas potencias que le harian la guerra immediata- mente, y despues de tan esplicitas, repetidas y solemnes renuucias como habia hecho....Par^cenos que es escusado buscar los motivos de esta determinacion en otra parte que en la profunda melan- coUa, en cierta debilidad de cerebro. Lafuente, Historia de Espana, xviii. 477, 479. 224 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 225 ii. Spaiii and Austria, 1725— 1729. cadet line of Orleans would be unquestioned. With the Duke of Bourbou who had in 1723 succeeded the Duke of Orleans as Regent, came a distinct return to the friendship with England. *' He was a man made on purpose for the fortunes of England. The English, well posted in the internal affairs of France, made haste to win him over, and, by means of the same pension that Cardinal Dubois had had, all was arranged between theml" A step was now taken which showed Philip the weakness of his claims. On March 8, it was determined that, owing to the King's illness and the need of his instant marriage to ensure the succession without waiting till his intended bride was old enough, the Infanta should be sent back to Spain \ In four months Louis married Maria Leczinski, daughter of Stanis- las, ex-king of Poland. The Spanish Court was furious, and at once planned revenge. But for another four years Philip did not cease to be the Pretender to the French throne. In September 1729, however, a son was born to Louis and Maria. This was the end of Philip s claims. The return of the Court to Madrid on the death of King Luis in 1724 seems to mark a turning-point in the plans of Elizabeth. She turned from her husband's declining position in France to make good the position of her sons as candidates for thrones in Italy. The one power whose assistance was necessary for this end was Austria, the rival of the Spanish Bourbons for a quarter of a century. An alliance with Austria meant a revolution in 1 St Simon, xv. 317. ^ Armstrong, 177. the traditional hostility of Spain. But Elizabeth felt a growing need for it. And with the need came the man to meet it. This was Baron Eip- perda. He meant to revive the greatness of Spain which Alberoni had begun. He wanted to secure Elizabeth's sons in Italy, and overthrow the naval supremacy of England. He saw that the first step must be an alliance with Austria. He therefore went to Vienna in November 1724, but at first Austria was slow to break with France and he met with little success. Then came the rejection of the Infanta. At once the Court of Madrid was ready to go to any lengths to win the Emperor. Austria was eager to consolidate her power over Germany, especially on the French border, and was utterly exhausted by all her wars. Ripperda pro- mised boundless subsidies, and in April and No- vember 1725 the secret treaties of Vienna were signed. The claims of Philip and Charles were restricted to the territories they now held. Elizabeth received a promise of what was to her the chief point of all, the hand of Charles's heiress, the Archduchess Maria Theresa, for Don Carlos ^ Plans on a vast scale fioated before the minds of the Queen and Ripperda, with a fairer prospect of success than in the time of Alberoni, when Spain stood alone. England and France were threatened by the new alliance. France was hated for her insult in the matter of the Infanta. The martial ardour of Spain rallied round the King, and warlike 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 241, 242. H. 15 226 THE FALLEN STUARTS. preparations were actively carried forward. England was hated for her possession of Gibraltar and her encroachments on the American trade \ Feehng against her found expression in the support of James. The centre of Ripperda's schemes was a trade-war to the death with England in order to wrest from her what she had won from Spain by her commercial and naval power. A peremptory demand for the restoration of Gibraltar was made in July and the refusal only exasperated Elizabeth. The Pretender's restoration became a prominent feature of the programme of the allies of Vienna. It was not included in the secret treaty, and the Imperial ministers were substantially accurate in stating that they should only utilise him in the event of war. The Queen, however, was unques- tionably in earnest^ Stanhope obtained through the agency of the Bavarian minister a detailed project of Ripperda and Liria for an invasion in the Pretender's interest. Ripperda's confessions to Stanhope after he fled for refuge to his house revealed these plans. " The Duke (i.e. of Ripperda) began with the secret treaty of Vienna, consisting of five articles and three separate ones... the 2nd separate article was that the Emperor and King of Spain do solemnly engage to assist the Pretender with tlieir forces, in order to the putting him in possession of the crown of Great Britain.... The article for the settling the Pre- tender on the throne was to take its course after 1 Armstrong, 183, 184. 2 Ibid. 183, 189 ; llanke, in. 44. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 227 the greater enterprises were begun : but they changed their resolutions and were to begin with a project entered into in his favour by the Emperor, Spain and Muscovy. By this scheme, the Czarina was to furnish the Pretender with ten thousand men, and arms and transports in proportion, which are designed for Scotland, where the late lord marischall is to be ready to receive them, and spirit up the highlanders, in order to join with the Muscovites. The King of Spain is to send eight thousand men from the coast of Galicia, which are to land in the west of Europe with the late Duke of Ormond (or any other Catholic general his Catholic Majesty thinks proper) at the head of them, and one Morgan has given in proposals by the Duke of Liria to provide six ships out of Brittany and one he has at Cadiz, upon the King of Spain's advancing 60,000 piastres " The Emperor on his part is to have 6000 men ready at Ostend for the Pretender's service, to be made use of when necessity may require : and is also to send a considerable body of troops in the Low Countries, to intimidate the Dutch and prevent their sending any forces to England. " The time the Muscovites were to make their descent was calculated to be during the absence of the British fleet. In this project, Wharton de- clares that the Jacobites in England and France have two millions sterling ready to promote this affair and have 20,000 arms in France. " The Pretender in return is to restore Port Mahon and Gibraltar to the King of Spain and to 15—2 228 THE FALLEN STUARTS. be guarantee for tlie Ostend Company, and to lay open our commerce in England and the foreign plantations to their ships with the same privileges as the English themselves enjoy. " By this scheme, the Pretender was immediately to leave Rome and go incognito to Vienna, there to have the articles drawn up, in form, for the substance was already agreed upon. From Vienna he was to proceed to Petersburg, from thence to Archangel, and to embark from tliat port to avoid the inconveniences of passing the Sound. '' The Duke of Ripperda said that Wharton was sent to Madrid by the Emperor to communicate this project to the King of Spain as what he (the Emperor) had agreed to\" One of Ripperdas papers, too, found after his arrest, "contained in substance the whole of the Duke of Liria's plan, with the several particulars set forth of a secret treaty between the Emperor, Spain and the Pretender, which said project (Rip- perda assured Stanhope) had been absolutely ap- proved of by the Courts of Vienna and Madrid-." Yet apparently all this great scheme was of small practical value. It was merely a means by which Ripperda was to unite the Emperor to him- self, just at the period when the Imperial trading schemes wanted a unifying force against the one great commercial nation. This was James's value to Charles. By Ripperda himself James was to be 1 Coxe: Walpole ii., Original Correspondence. Period iv. Keene to Newcastle. June 15, 17'26. 2 Ibid. Keene to Newcastle. July 30, 1726. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 229 caressed or repudiated at will. While the schemes were at their height he told Stanhope, in answer to some pertinent questions on the point that, " as for the Pretender, he must own to his having talked both here and at Vienna in his favour, but that in his interiour he was as sincerely in his Majesty's (i.e. George I) interests and in that of his royal family as the best subject he had, of which he would give the most efficient proof upon every occasion that should present itself: that his talking in the manner he had done proceeded from his opinion of making his court to their Catholic Majesties by so doing, but more especially to appear zealous in his religion, which was much suspected in this country \" Early in 1726 the support of Spain for the House of Stuart was withdrawn. " Ripperda assures me," wrote Stanhope, "that he has taken advantage of their Catholic Majesties' resentment against the Pretender, upon his late ill-usage of his wife, to persuade them to take away his pension, which is actually done: and as he positively assures me shall never be renewed'^." By March James's chances seemed hopeless. " The late Duke of Ormond is as assiduous as ever at Court," said the English ambassador, "though I don't find that any of his projects have been hearkened to, much less approved of; and Ripperda told me the other day, that to remove all jealousies upon his account, in case I insisted upon it in his 1 Coxe, II. Stanhope to Townshend. December 27, 1725. '^ Ibid. Stanhope to Newcastle. February 11, 1726. \ 230 THE FALLEN STUARTS. Majesty's name, he would immediately make him quit Spain\'' The danger was passing but it was not without its result. For the treaty of Vienna produced a corresponding alliance of the threatened powers in the treaty of Hanover between England, France and Prussia in September 1725, for purely defensive purposes*. Nor was this the only reason which weakened the Spanish support of the exiled House. Once again the English supremacy of the sea asserted itself, for the chief obstacle to the success of Ripperda was Admiral Hosier's squadron, which blockaded the treasure fleet at Porto Bello. Austria grew tired of empty promises and the arrival of Marshal Konigsegg as Imperial ambassador in 1726 led to mutual explanations between the two Courts and the downfall of Ripperdal Elizabeth began to look with friendly eyes to Louis, to help her against England. France now became the pivot on which all turned. It was a critical year for her. At home there was the struggle between the Duke of Bourbon and the King's tutor, Cardinal Fleury. Abroad there was the question of adherence to the treaty of Hanover or entrance into the treaty of Vienna. The siege of Gibraltar was opened by Spain in March 1727, but was seen to be impossible from the first. Fleury was able to drive Bourbon from power and to stand by England and the treaty A Coxe, n. Stanhope to Newcastle. March 25, 1726. Lafuente, Historia de Espana, xix. 55. 2 Koch and Schoell, i. 242. =* Armstrong, 195, 197. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 231 of Hanover. But he was not able to give England the aid she expected : the opposition was not strong enough to draw France over to Spain in despite of Fleury. Peace therefore became feasible, a con- ference was held at Vienna in May 1727 and pre- liminaries of a general peace were signed by France and Austria*. Elizabeth, in March 1728, also acceded to these preliminaries. Spain had had three years of alliance with the Emperor, yet the stipulations of the treaty of Vienna were not fulfilled. Carlos was not the husband of Maria Theresa. And now the Emperor be^mn to hanor back. Elizabeth wrote as soon as peace was made, demanding the fulfilment of the marriage. A reply was drafted in the Imperial Council. "It was pointed out that the betrothal of Maria Theresa to Don Carlos would alarm all Europe and alienate some of the Emperor's most faithful supporters in Germany. It would be prudent therefore for the Emperor to keep his hands com- pletely free with reference to the marriage of the Archduchess'." It was a great blow to Elizabeth. She realized that her Austrian alliance had been useless to procure her the wish of her life, the security of her son as claimant to the Italian duchies. Peace had come again to Europe after the perturbed time of tiie alliance of Austria and Spain. But with it came a new development. The Queen had experienced that it was impossible to attain her ends in Italy without the help of the 1 Armstrong, 215, 216. 2 von Arneth, Prinz Eugen, iii. 561. 232 THE FALLEN STUARTS. XI. western powers. It was fully time that she should reconsider her relations to France and Encrland. iii. Infiu- One power in Europe had taken little part in ^Religion ^^^ these changes. The inHuence of the Pope was 1727. dechning but still great. His position in the eyes of all the great countries had been weakened during the last years of Clement XI. The Duke of Savoy &.yiement had become King of Sicily in 1718. Clement thought it a good opportunity to revive the feudal claims of the Holy See over Sicily and the clerical immunities. Resistance was met by excommuni- cation and the abolition of the Apostolic Legation. Matters were little better by the time that Sicily passed to Austria in 1720. Austria was very angry at the Pope's conduct in regard to Alberoni. The Emperor, before going upon his crusade, had re- ceived a promise that his territories in Naples and Sardinia should be safe. The Spanish descent upon Sardinia showed the value of the Papal promises. The breach with Spain dated from the time of the recognition of Charles as King of Spain in 1709. The gift of the purple to Alberoni in 1717^ had seemed to reunite the two countries, but the de- velopment of the crusade into an attack on Sar- dinia had revived the old animosity. Philip nomi- nated Alberoni to the archbishopric of Seville, but Clement refused to confirm the appointment, and the nunciature lapsed ^ France was thrown into great difficulties by the Jesuit Bull Unigenitus, and the opponents of the ruling Order were bitter against ^ Above, p. 194. 2 Brosch, Geschichte Kirchenstaates, ii. 53. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 233 the author of the BulP. Even England had had good ground for offence in the arrest of the Earl of Peterborough, and had threatened a descent upon the Papal dominions I But though the Roman Court had thus given umbrage to most of Europe, it still possessed one very strong power. This was the time when Prime Ministers were taking the place of kmgsl In Catholic countries the Church still supplied the most suitable subjects for many of the higher po- litical dignities. For such men the badge of their position and the seal of their security was the Cardinal's hat. The great instances of Richelieu and Mazarin were ever before their eyes. As long as men like Father Petre, Alberoni, Dubois and Fleury were eager for the purple, the Court of Rome still wielded great power in Europe. But in this, as in all else, the Pope was no loncrer his own master. The difference in the influence exerted on him by his neighbours was very marked. That of France had greatly declined, b. France. In 171G the illness of the Pope had made the question of a conclave possible. A memorial as to the chances of a French Pope was sent to the Duke of Orleans. The only way to counterbalance the German influence would be by the strictest alliance with Spain*. In 1719, as Clement grew feebler, the question came up again. Gualterio showed Dubois 1 St Simon, x. 120. 2 Above, p. 203. 3 St Simon, xv. chaps. 16, 17. * Gualterio, 20581. B. 89, 90. 234 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 235 the weak position of France in the Sacred College. "The Emperor has such an interest in the affairs of Italy, and especially just now, in having a Pope who is a friend and a dependent of ins, that he would sacrifice everything to attain this objects" On the other hand the French faction was very weak. Only three Cardinals belonged to it. And if France was weak, Spain was even weaker, " for she is reduced to one Cardinal onlyl" It was little wonder that the Imperialist Cardinal Conti became Pope Innocent XIII in 1721. But the French Government bought the friendship of Rome by its adhesion to the Bull Unigenitus. Dubois' hat was given him in 1721 by Innocent on this ground. "Those who like to hear of no compromise in the matter of the Bull," wrote Gualterio, " have bound the Pope to promise that he will not give this hat until he sees that everything has been duly settled as regards such a compromise^" James thought he saw his opportunity here, as he had done with Alberoni, to use his prerogative of nomination for the purple. He was desperately poor for he had just failed in the Spanish expedition. He thought this action might secure him a continuance of the French pension his father and mother had had*. But Clement would not change his Imperialist policy even for the sake of his own Bull. " He launched forth into terrible anger against the King of England, saying he was under great obligations to himself and, instead of showing gratitude, he only caused 1 Gualterio, 20321. 33. 3 Ibid. 20321. 172. 2 Ibid. 20321. 35, 37. * Ibid. 20231. 121. trouble.... The Pope had already allowed him one nomination, which was more than his father had when on the throned" It was not till Clement had been succeeded by Innocent that the promotion came. The relations between Dubois and Rome were continued by Fleury whose great measure of internal policy was the maintenance of the Papal BulP. Yet France never regained her influence over the Holy See. Spain was fervently Catholic in spite of the c Spain. rupture over Alberoni and the nunciature. When the Cardinal fell, the two Courts drew together again^ With the treaty of Vienna, the union be- came cordial. The proposals of Elizabeth for James took the old religious form of a crusade. This prince, when Atterbury's plot had failed, had even thought of going himself as a crusader against the Turks'. Now he was to become the centre of a crusade against the heretic power of the west^ But the lifelessness of the treaty of Vienna involved the failure of this plan. Austria was as strong as ever in the counsels d. Coscia. of Rome. Gualterio had spoken of her strength in 1 Gualterio, 20321. 167. 2 St Simon, xi. 69 ; Flassen, v. 167. 3 Apres le second mariage de Philippe V, I'esprit du gouverne- ment (d'Espagne) cliangea tout-a-fait la direction des affaires eccl^- siastiques....Le parti ultramontain put encore une fois relever la tete sous la protection d'Elizabeth Farn^se....Le concordat de 1737 termina les disputes entre le Saint Siege et I'Espagne a I'occasion des 6v6nement8 dltalie. Muriel, Translation of Coxe, III. 528, 530, 531. Cf. Lafuente, Historia, xviii. 524. 4 Gualterio, 20295. 375. ^ Armstrong, 188, 192. 236 THE FALLEN STUARTS. the Sacred College in 1719, and he again referred to it in 1720^ Benedict XIII, who became Pope in 1724, followed the path his predecessors had marked out. " He cannot doubt that his Holiness is wholly in the power of the Emperor, the interests of his House being wholly in his hands. He does not wish to displease other nations, provided they are not opposed to the interests of the Emperor^" But he could not have offered resistance had he wished it, for by 1725 it was "found impossible to represent the disorder which exists in the finances of the Apostolic Chamber. His Holiness, by his generosity beyond all bounds, has put them into a most pitiable state, for which it seems doubtful if they can find a remedy ^" It was the time of the maladministration of Cardinal Coscia. Into this man's hands Benedict committed the whole internal and external administration of Papal affairs. The recklessness and extravagance of the favourite at once brought the Papacy to financial ruin. In three months Coscia spent on himself alone 11,000 crowns. Taxes were increased, and creditors of the state defrauded, but the increase of the revenue by these means only reached 115,000 crowns while the expenditure was reckoned at 400,000 annually*. Yet Coscia's power remained unbroken till the death of Benedict in 1730. iv. Spain The position of Rome was thus unlikely to help lan/''^ or to hinder the attempts at peace in 1727. Yet 1728— the attitude of the Pope was of great importance. 1731. 1 Gualterio, 20321. 156—158. 3 Ibid. 20322. 103. 2 Ibid. 20322. 28. * Brosch, II. 65. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 237 There were two candidates for thrones in Europe and with both of them the Pope was closely linked. He was the protector of James, Pretender of England. He was neighbour to Tuscany and Parma, the duchies to which Carlos was claimant. But the initiative for action in either case lay with (a) James. the Court of Madrid. Within the next few months both James and Carlos had opportunities of as- serting their claims, but with very different results. As the prospect of peace became more settled, a new future rose up before Gualterio. "The sig- nature of these preliminaries of peace," he wrote in June 1727, "is a great event. It seems to me that we must believe that if France draws close to the Emperor, and Spain, she thereby separates off from England, and England becomes an object of suspicion to her. In that case these three powers would unanimously unite on behalf of King James, who has always justice and heaven's favour on his side^" Suddenly, on June 9th, 1727, George I died. An opportunity for the claimant to the Eno-lish throne had come-. But Gualterio's dream was scarcely realized, for James's chances were being damaged at the fountain-head of his support, Rome. Not only had Coscia so ruined the Papal finances that no help could have been forthcoming to help the Pretender regain his throne, but a former friend had become an enemy and was working against him at the Papal Court. This was Cardinal Alberoni, of whom it was said at 1 Gualterio, 20304. 185, 186. 2 Droysen, iv. ii. 441, 443. 238 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 239 the end of 1726, " He always does as much harm as he can, and it appears that he has formed the most evil designs to malign King James as much as possible even before his Holiness. Cardinal Ben- tivoo-lio has found out that Cardinal Alberoni is seeking to threaten King James and do him the unkindest offices with the Court of Spain. In fact it would be well for the King to inform the Duke of Parma of these machinations and of his sup- posed intelligence with the Court of London... for he is thinking of nothing else but his elevation to the Papacy \" Alberoni, then, was sacrificing the cause of James at the Papal Court in order to secure the support of the House of Hanover for his own can- didature for the throne of St Peter. He had found good means to alienate the Pope. In 1725 James had made Colonel John Hay a Peer with the title of Earl of Inverness, and James Murray, Earl of Dunbar. They became his confidential advisers I Alberoni used this to alienate Clementina, on the ground that her importance was being undermined^ and the Pope, on the ground that they were Pro- testants and that Dunbar was tutor to Prince Charles Edwards Notwithstanding all this, the Pope gave James his support on the death of George. He showed himself most eager to contribute to the success of any undertaking for the Pretender. He ordered public prayers in all the Cardinal churches. 1 Gualterio, 20304. 24, 25. ^ stanhope, ii. 88, 89. 2* Gualterio, 20322. 131 ; 20304. 111. 4 Ibid. 20304. 113; 20322. 132. He could not promise more than 25,000 crowns, however, because of the difficulties in which the ApostoHc Chamber was placed'. On the strength of this support and in the hopes of a rising in England, James left Italy and reached Avignon". But all hope of success was cut off by the news that the Prince of Hanover was proclaimed King without any opposition'. Then James ahenated France by staying at Avignon and so provoking the remonstrances of England. The folly of such action was obvious, for it would turn France away from those good intentions which she had towards him and might lose him those subsidies which were so necessary*. Fleury and Chauvelin tried all means of persuasion to remove the Pretender in vain, and it was not till force was threatened that he would return to Italy ^ Even more important than the attitude of Fleury, [?]^^^^^^ the allv of England, was that of Elizabeth, still hovering between peace and war. But the question was soon decided. The Spanish Queen had a more important claimant than James in her son Carlos. The experience of the treaty of Vienna had shown her that she must look to the western powers and not to Austria, to secure her house in Italy^ In March 1728 the Convention of the Pardo meant that James was sacrificed to Carlos. This was oidy the first step towards a full peace with England, 1 Gualterio, 20304. 202—204. 3 Ibid. 20304. 209. 5 Coxe, MSS. 9219. 185—191. « Above, p. 231. 2 Ibid. 20304. 213. 4 Ibid. 20304. 215, 216. 240 THE FALLEN STUARTS. which was signed at Seville in November 1729^ On the one hand it was a brilliant triumph for the House of Hanover. There was no mention of Gibraltar or Minorca. The Imperial Ostend Com- pany lost its privileges in America. All the ad- vantages of the Austrian commerce and all the disadvantages of the English in Spain were can- celled. On the other hand Elizabeth succeeded in her aim of securing Don Carlos in the Italian duchies, while she would have revenge on the Emperor by the introduction of Spanish garrisons till the vacancies occurred'. In 1781 the tinal goal was reached, for in January Duke Antonio of Parma died and Carlos was proclaimed Duke. The Em- peror who saw that he was isolated and could not stop the House of Bourbon from obtaining this foothold in Italy, yielded at the price of the recog- nition of his Pragmatic Sanction, guaranteeing the succession of Maria Theresa to Austria. The result was the treaty of Vienna in March 1731, between the Emperor, Spain, England and the United Provinces. Carlos was recognized as Duke of Parma and heir of Tuscany. The Emperor consented to the intro- duction of (iOOO Spanish troops in the duchies. The Pragmatic Sanction was guaranteed^. Elizabeth Farnese had won her first substantial triumph. Her House was settled in Italy. The object for which Alberoni had struggled and developed the resources of Spain, and for which Elizabeth had negotiated 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 245. 2 Armstrong, 233. 3 Koch and Schoell, i. 247. Droysen, iv. iii. 127, 128. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 241 with the enemies of her adopted country, had been paHly won. But there was much of Italy which had once belonged to the Crown of Spain still to be secured. The fourteen years during which the Court of Madrid was the primum mobile of Europe had thus seen the cause of the House of Stuart decline. Under Alberoni James had been driven back from sea to sea before the all-powerful fleets of England. Under Elizabeth he had become a useful aid for readjusting the balance of power on the Continent, by diverting attention from the superior claims of Philip to France and of Don Carlos to the Italian duchies. But when the Spanish Queen found that the best means to advance the principal object she had in view was to ally with the hereditary foe of the less important Pretender, James realized that the treaty of Vienna was but the second in- stalment of the Triple Alliance. In 1717 he had been driven from France across the Alps. In 1731 he was driven from Spain back to the Pope. It was the very weakness of the Papacy that made a residence there harmless to the Protestant Suc- cession in England. Dependence upon the Emperor and a bankrupt treasury were scarcely calculated to make the Pope rouse Europe to a crusade for the House of Stuart in the west. Some grounds of hope for a restoration of the fallen dynasty did still remain. Yet the next eight years seemed to cut even these away from it. H. 16 242 THE FALLEN STUARTS. i. Family Compact. 1732— 1736. (a) The Pragmatic Sanctio7i. 3. Cardinal Fleury and the Stuarts, 1731-1740. There now followed a period marked by the balancing of two opposing forces, the desire for a present peace and the desire for aggrandizement. The desire for peace was represented by the policy of three great ministers, Fleury, Walpole and Patino in the west and the Emperor Charles in the east. The desire for aggrandizement was evidenced in the advocacy of the claims of aspirants to different thrones and the first conflicts of colonial expansion. It was only a question of time when the patrons of these aspirants would themselves meet to settle their ambitious desires by war. This uneasy state of things lasted some ten years, and during them the mainspring of action in Europe was once again the Court of Versailles rather than the Court of Madrid. Cardinal Fleury became the arbiter of Europe. In 1731 all Europe was again at peace, but the rival ambitions of the different monarchs soon be^an to appear. The great problem was the future grouping of the nations. In the east a disputed succession had long threatened the Austrian throne, as it had already threatened and upset the thrones in the west. The Emperor Charles spent his life in trying to secure the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa by the Pragmatic Sanction. To Europe the difhculty was that even if Maria Theresa succeeded to the Hapsburg dominions, no woman THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 243 could succeed to the Imperial crown. But the hereditary states of Hapsburg accepted it in 1720, Spain in 1725, Russia in 1726, Prussia in 1728, England at the peace of 1731, and now after it, the Empire as a whole in 1732. One country with- held its recognition, France. Fleury reserved his acceptance as a winning card to play against Austria if opportunity offered^ In the west the triple friendship of France, (/3) The Spain and England, proclaimed by the treaty of compact Seville, could scarcely last. Spain in 1732 became 1. Spain. the scene of a diplomatic struggle for the mastery between England and France. At first the rela- tions of the two Bourbon Courts appeared to be unfriendly and Patino leaned to England. Then as Spain began to realize that her own development must bring her into opposition with the Emperor in Italy and with England in America, she turned tovvards France. At the same time Spanish com- mercial disputes with England again became acute. Attacks on the Spanish g uarda-costas'^ began to be reported, and the trade rights granted to England at Seville were found to cause great difficulties. Elizabeth, turning east, saw danger to the suc- cession of her sons in Italy unless the Emperor were forced by war to fulfil his promise of 1731, and turning west, saw the danger from the entrance of England into the further Atlantic. She drew close to France and determined on war. 1 Erdmannsdorffer, ii. 406—408. - Spanish ships set to guard the American coast and uphold the Spanish monopoly. 16-2 244 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 2. The Family Compact, Suddenly an unexpected opportunity occurred. On February 1st, 1733, Frederick Augustus I, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, died. At once eastern and western Europe ranged themselves on the sides of the two rival claimants to the throne. Stanislas Lesczinski, the puppet of Charles XII, was now the candidate of France. Frederick Au- gustus, son of the late King, was the candidate of Germany, and of the new northern power, Russia, to gain whose help he pledged himself to the Pragmatic Sanction, in spite of the claims of his own wife, and promised Curland to the Czarina. In September 1733, Stanislas was elected King, and in October Frederick Augustus. A double election meant war, but not necessarily war only in Poland. Charles seemed to think that a permanent peace had come both to Germany and to Italy. The Emperor was mistaken. The Polish difficulty was destined to involve him in war both in Germany and Italy. Throughout 1733 Fraiice and Spain were coming nearer and nearer to an offensive alliance, which at length took shape in two treaties. The first was the treaty of Turin in September between France and Sardinia. The second was the treaty of the Escurial between France and Spain in November, better known as the first Family Compacts The western group had formed itself The first rift in the imion of France and England since 1713 and the first return towards the Bourbon power of 1 Kocli and Schoell, i. 254. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 245 Louis XIV was made. ''The alliance was directed as much against England as against the Emperor. Spain, while striking at Italy with her left hand was guarding her American colonies with her right\" As far back as 1727 Gualterio had foreseen this and pointed his master to it with hope. " In the future the reunion of the two crowns will come and will be fatal to the alliance of France with England, for their aims are too diverse^" The policy against which William III had called on England and Europe to arm at last came into existence I France and Spain had thus been united in arms 3. Lor- by the event of the disputed succession in Poland. This decided the direction of their attacks and decided little else. It was not to be westwards bv sea against England, but eastwards by land against the Emperor. Each nation had its separate aim. Each had a territory to win and a claimant to support. Each succeeded in its object. France gave Stanislas little support in Poland though she had declared war against the Emperor in conse- quence of his aid to the Elector of Saxony. By the end of the year the overwhelming strength of Russia and Austria made Louis drop the cause of his father-in-law, who retired to France. Fleury now had a Pretender. And the war which had been begun on his behalf opened up an oppor- tunity to acquire a far more useful dependency than Poland. It was time to seize Lorraine. Its 1 Armstrong, 299. 2 Gualterio, 20304. 228. 3 Mahau, Injluence of Sea Poiver oh History, 248. 246 THE FALLEN STUARTS. incorporation had always been one of the favourite dreams of French statesmen, though even Louis could not retain it. But now the question had become one of vital importance. How great then was the danger for France, if the Duke of Lorraine became the husband of the future mistress of Austria, and Emperor as well. In the struggle for the Polish succession, the question of Lorraine must be decided against the Emperor and for the security of France. By the end of the summer of 1733, therefore, Lorraine had been overrun and was wholly in the power of France. Fleury had secured the new territory he desired on behalf of the Pretender, whose cause he had professed to espouse. 4. Naples. Spain, too, had turned east. The state of Italy offered a wonderful chance for the advance of Don Carlos, the Spanish candidate for the throne. The possibility of a new dominion opened up before him in Naples. In 1733 his rear was secured by the successful expedition of the Sardinians and French in Lombardy, by which the Austrians were driven out of Milan. In 1734 a single campaign from Parma into Naples was enough. But now the inherent difficulty of the war became obvious. An alliance between the two Bourbon powers and the King of Sardinia was found to be impossible. The treaties of Turin and of the Escurial involved conflicting claims in Italy. The aggrandizement of Savoy was no part of the Bourbon programme, and the two Kings of that House had accomplished at least in part their separate purposes. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 247 France was the common element in the two 5. Prelim- alliances, and she was mistress of tlie situation. In yieniia. November 1735 Fleury saw his opportunity. With- out consulting his allies he signed the prehminaries for a peace with the Emperor at Vienna. He de- manded for his royal refugee the territory he had just seized. Stanislas should become Duke of Lor- raine, which, at his death, should pass to the crown of France. As a quid pro quo the Cardinal was willing to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction. France and the Emperor had secured the crowns they wanted. But the possible career of the Spanish would-be King, Don Carlos, was sacrificed. Naples and Sicily were indeed to go to him, but the Emperor was to be indemnified by Parma and Piacenza for himself, and by the succession in Tus- cany for the dispossessed Duke of Lorraine ^ In May 1736 even Spain acceded to the Preliminaries of Vienna. Fleury had successfully used the Family Compact for the advance of the Bourbon power by land eastwards, though to secure the full triumph of France tlie Spanish triumph had been rendered partial. But Carlos and Stanislas were not the only {y) other claimants to thrones. Between the House ot Haps- ^^^^^^-^ * burg in the east and the House of Bourbon in the west lay the House of Wittelsbach in Bavaria. The Elector of Bavaria, Charles Albert, had married Maria Amelia, the younger daughter of the Emperor Leopold. By the regulation of her father Leopold in 1703 she had a better title to the Austrian 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 256. 2. James. 248 THE FALLEN STUARTS. possessions than her niece, Maria Theresa, whose claim dated from the later Pragmatic Sanction of 1713. Charles Albert had indeed guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. But it was a time when re- nunciations of pledges were not uncommon. Eugene realized the danger to Austria from a claimant like this at a time when all the strength of the Haps- burgs seemed exhausted, vvhen the want of money was pressing because the usual rich revenue from the Italian dominions was cut off, while the army suffered from the general poverty. And by the army alone was the State upheld. He therefore came forward in 1735 with a statesmanlike proposal. This was that the Emperor should come to an understanding with the House of Wittelsbach and give the hand of the Archduchess, Maria Theresa, to the Electoral Prince, Maximilian Joseph, and so bring about a permanent union between Bavaria and Austria. But Charles refused, and on February 12th, the heiress of Austria was married to Francis Stephen, the dispossessed Duke of Lorraine \ It was a great opportunity to unite the east of Europe against the House of Bourbon. But it was not taken, and five years later the error was realized. Beyond the House of Bourbon to the west lay England with her claimant James. Since the peace of 1731 James's importance had suffered in several respects. Gualterio had prophesied that a reunion of the Bourbon crowns would bring good fortune to the Stuart caused But the Bourbon House in * von Arneth, Prinz Kugen^ iii. 479. '•J Above, p. 245. '\ THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 249 1733 had different ends in view from those of Louis XIV. Spain concentrated herself on Don Carlos, to the exclusion of all else, and a land march from Parma to Naples did not involve a conflict with England, with the need of a diversion for James. This not only meant that Spain did not want the Englisli Pretender, but indirectly weakened any support which the Pope might have been able to give. For the quarrels which now arose between Naples and Rome increased the finan- cial difficulties of the Papacy. France was, however, the new power which since the reunion of 1733 might have been expected to look favourably to- wards James. But Fleury was looking east, not west. He held fast by Walpole while he advanced against Charles. He wanted a Pretender, but had found a new and more useful one than the old client of Louis XIV. Stanislas, as claimant to Lorraine, liad, in the eyes of France, taken the place of James the claimant of England. Nor was this all. The Stuart cause had lost ground in England. Disunion had broken out be- tween George II and Frederick, Prince of Wales. This had existed ever since Frederick came to England in 1728. Round the Prince had collected all the great leaders of the opposition to George and Walpole. In the year 1737 a public outbreak with the King took place on the question of the income of the heir apparent, who had now married, and the Princess was hurried awav from the Court at the birth of her first child\ "Yet strano-e as 1 Coxe, Walpole (1798), i. 533. 250 THE FALLEN STUARTS. ii. The Anglo- Spanish War. 1736— 1740. it seems, this quarrel, so unanimously deplored by the friends to the dynasty, as a heavy blow to it, tended, in fact, in no small degree, to its security. The Tories, who had hitherto considered their party as under a perpetual exclusion from office and power, who saw no glimmering of light for themselves, except through a restoration of the Stuarts, had been ready to join the Jacobites in their most desperate designs. Many of them now saw with pleasure a far easier and safer avenue to power open in the favour of Frederick, became reconciled to the dynasty and began to await the death of George II instead of his dethronements" France began to see that even if she should want to coerce England, she had an easier means at hand than a Jacobite rebellion. " To-day if the King of England is at all insecure on his throne, it is because his son is more popular than he is," said an influential French politician, "but this does not mean the rejection of the entire Protestant family in order to substitute in its place a Papist family educated at Rome'." In fact, Frederick, Prince of WaleS; was beginning to take the place of James in the eyes of England. The Stuart cause had lost ground as a factor in the balance of power on land, while Fleury was turning his attention to Lorraine. The centre of gravity was now gradually turning more and more westwards, from the continent to the sea. The 1 Stanhope, History of England, ii. 207. Cf. Coxe, Pelham, II. 138. 2 D'Argenson, edit. Ratherg, MemoireSj ii. 224. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 251 Emperor realized that he had been beaten by (a) The Fleury. He determined to try and make up for the East. his losses in Italy and Lorraine by a successful war against the Turks. But he had no allies and no money. Instead of concentrating their armies as Louis of Baden and Eugene had done, the generals fought in detachments and were overpowered. Nissa, after being captured, was lost again in October 1737. In 1789 Belgrade capitulated to the Turks, and the Peace of Belgrade in September ceded it, with Servia and part of Wallachia, to the Sultan. The Em- peror's attempt to recover his position had only added to liis weakness. The whole national life of Austria appeared to be declining in the last years of Charles VI. It seemed as if the uncer- tainty as to the future fate of the dynasty and of the monarchy had brought on a general paralysis\ The power of France was thus increased by the (^) The ^ . Juliers- weakness of the Emperor. An opportunity now Berg occurred for Fleury to become the arbiter of Ger- dispute. many. Since 1718 a new power had been quietly finding its level in Europe. Frederick William I had been building up Prussia. The great Elector had attempted to make his Electorate a colonizing and maritime power. But King Frederick William had seen the hopelessness of this attempt, and in 1721 had sold the last Prussian factory on the West African coast and turned to the internal organi- zation of his kingdom. A great centralizing policy was carried out and a "General Directorium" founded to control all the departments of govern- 1 Erdmannsdorffer, ii. 460 etc. 252 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 253 ment. Internal trade and industry were regulated, the army was reorganized and the regiments made directly responsible to the King and not to their officers. Prussia became more and more a central- ized governments The inevitable result was that she now came into contact with other nations. Her rivalry with Austria was in the germ. Fleury, master of Lorraine, with Austria wasting herself in the east, and Prussia growing up into the conscious- ness of power, stepped in between them with a voice of authority. An opening was afforded by a dispute as to the duchies of Juliers and Berg, which be- longed to the Neuberg branch of the House of Wittelsbach. The reigning prince had no son, and King Frederick William claimed the duchies under a succession treaty signed in 1660. This claim was resisted by the collateral branch of Sulzbach. In 1728 the Emperor had taken up the claim of Prussia at the treaty of Berlin and promised to support it. But he had since done nothing to advance this claim and in 1788 he even joined with the western powers in a treaty to put the House of Sulzbach into possession. This was Fleury's op- portunity. In January 1739 he made a secret treaty with Austria, that, as soon as the Prince Charles Philip of Neuberg died, the House of Sulz- bach should succeed. This would naturally have offended Frederick William. A second treatv was therefore made between France and Prussia in April 1739, by which Prussia was not indeed to have all Berg, for a strip along the Rhine containing Dussel- 1 Droyseu, iv. ii. 347—352. dorf was to go to the Sulzbach line. But the rest should go to Frederick William ^ It was a master- stroke of unscrupulous diplomacy. Fleury held the future of eastern Europe in his own hands. But the triumph was not as great as it seemed. For France had by her dealings in Lorraine and Berg turned eastwards to the continent. She scarcely realized that she was turning her back upon a crisis of vast consequence to Europe, which had now to be decided westwards on the sea. The fall of Alberoni had been the corollary to iii. Sea the English supremacy of the Mediterranean and of ^w^^^ the European side of the Atlantic. Ever since, the Spain and balance of power on land had been the all-absorbing ^/^ element of European politics. This was only be- l. Out- cause the element of the English sea-power had ^/,^ War. been developing, unseen, away from Europe. Its importance was now prominently thrust forward. England and Spain met to decide who was to be the mistress of the American side of the Atlantic. During the eighteenth century Europe had done little to check the maritime development of Eng- land. The Emperor had tried to nitike Austria a rival by his encouragement of the Ostend Company. But after a precarious existence it was in 1731 abolished at the treaty of Vienna. England had crushed out a new rival. Very different was the inactivity shown by France. Cardinal Fleury and Maurepas continued the policy of the Pontchartrain. " He sacrificed all the naval resources of his country ^ Droysen, iv. iii. 24. 254 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 25; to his desire to live in peace with P^tigland. The existing ships were not kept in repair and no new ones were built^" By 1738, however, the need of a French navy, in the presence of the growing desire for war against Spain in England, became more and more apparent. '' We need a Heet," wrote D'Argen- son ; " M. Maurepas assures me that I shall this year see a squadron of 14 or 15 large battleships in the lagus . But a navy could not be created in a day and before anything could be done the crisis came. For while Fleury was turning towards Germany, matters had come to a climax between Spain and England on the American question. The more enlightened Spanish statesmen definitely resolved to adopt the Mercantile System to which the fortunes of England and Holland were believed to be due. The colonies were intended to be the outlet for native industries and the intrusion of other nations must be jealously watched. Much attention was paid to better means of communication with the colonies ; monopolies and State bounties were granted to colonial companies^ The action of the English was directly antagonistic to a spirit like this. Ever since 1713 they had extended and abused their right of the "annual ship!" This was always bringing them into conflict with the guar da- cost as. Complaints to the British 1 Gu^rin, Histoire Maritime, iv. 211 ; above, p. 134. 2 D'Argenson, Memoires, ii. 307. ^ Armstrong, 34G, 354. * Koch and Scboell, i. 215. By the Assiento Treaty, 1713, England was allowed to send one trading vessel a year to America. Government became increasingly numerous. The centre of the whole dispute was the right of search. But this was only the outward and visible sign of the deeper principle which was at stake — the right of England to enter the one sea which was still unmastered by her. Negotiations were entered into, but from the time when the famous Jenkins in 1731, on the loss of his ear, committed his soul to God and his cause to his country, England had been gradually growing more and more eager for war\ Her position was very strong. " She had increased her navy while those of all other countries had died out'^." She could intercept the Spanish galleons and cause bankruptcy, stop the coasting trade between France and Spain, seize the French colonies in Canada. France and Spain could only retaliate by letters of marque ^ Such was the position when, in January 1739, an agreement as to the disputes was arrived at, at Pardo. But this treaty could not be maintained against the popular clamour for war. Walpole therefore yielded and on October 19th war was declared against Spain by England. England had lodged her claim to rule the 2- Position western Atlantic. Ihe second halt oi the naval struggle which had been begun under Alberoni had come. As then, the support of the House of Stuart was the obvious way to weaken her enemy. As James was now over fifty, Charles Edward was summoned to Spain, and a fleet, whose destination 1 Armstrong, 348. ^ D'Argenson, i. 331. 3 Ibid. II. 224. 256 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 257 iv. Influ- ence of Religion. was unknown, fitted out at Cadiz during the spring of 1740. Admiral Haddock was drawn away to the Mediterranean bv an attack on Minorca, and the Spanish ships, 28 in number, were free to leave Cadiz; Charles Edward was believed to be on board and the destination was to be Ireland \ The Heet then passed to Ferrol, but the English ships were now waiting for them, and far outnumbered them. The Spaniards dared not yet attack the mistress of the eastern Atlantic and the Channel, and their fleet waited^ Nor was the Stuart cause in the same position as it had been in 1719. "There was no hope for a successful divergence for the Pre- tender during a war so popular in England ^" Spain found that she was no match for England. If the struggle remained a duel, the cause of the eastern Atlantic seemed lost. But by the Family Compact France was bound to aid her ally. Fleury had to decide between his treaty obligations and his love of peace. He had attempted to combine both by otfering his mediation*. But this had been un- successful. When the war broke out, he declared that France remained neutral*. Without her, the sea-power of Spain could not meet the navies of England and the cause of James was lost. Nor was there any expectation of help from the one Court that had as often stood by the Stuarts. The old spirit of the Thirty Years' War was not yet quite dead. Various schemes for the violent con- ^ D'Argenson, ii. 413 ; m. 59. 3 Armstrong, 359. * D'Argenson, iii. 102. '^ Ibid. III. 78, 152, 228. * Stanhope, ii. 281. I version of heretic Europe still flitted before the minds of the Cardinals. Rumours of leagues be- tween Protestant powers gave an added motive. But the days of such combinations were now over^ One great means, however, which Rome had till now had of keeping her influence over the Catholic States seemed to be passing away. The race of clerical Prime Ministers was yielding to a race of laymen. With it passed the importance of the Cardinal's hat as a factor in politics. Fleury was the last to whom it meant everything. As long as he lived, the connection between France and the Papacy was kept up. The link was the maintenance of the Bull Unigenitus. Quesnel had himself re- ferred slightingly to Fleury when bishop of Frejus, in an examination of the Bull. Fleury never for- gave it". And this early hatred of the opponents of the Bull was developed by the circumstances of his later position. Orleans and Dubois had upheld it in order to gain the support of the Jesuits and in order that Dubois might obtain a Cardinalatel Fleury as Cardinal and continuer of their policy also upheld it. There was a stronger motive, too, binding Fleury to Rome. The Cardinal hoped to become Pope at the death of Clement XII. " This," it was well said, "explained many enigmas. It is this possibility which maintains the royal favour. His Majesty flatters himself with the glory of making his tutor Pope as Charles V did^" When 1 Cf. Droysen, iv. iv. 406. 2 St Simon, xi. 69. ^ D'Argenson, ii. 158. H. 3 Ibid. xm. 341, 363. 17 •Mf**^ ■ 258 THE FALLEN STUARTS. in 1740 Clement died, Fleury's chances seemed good. " He was agreeable to the Sacred College, Spain would willingly support him and he had only to go to Ronie^" The election, however, did not fall on Fleury. But Benedict XIV was an old man, and Fleury still kept his eyes on Rome and France in friendship with the Pope. In Germany, the development of Prussia meant the growth of a force hostile to Catholicism, though as yet she had not shown herself a Protestant missionary. But one action was significant. The Archbishop of Salzburg carried out a series of cruel persecutions against the Lutherans in his diocese and in 1731 published an edict of expulsion. Frederick William at once issued a declaration of welcome and the refugees came by thousands to Prussia. About 15,000 were sent to colonise the waste districts of East Prussia'^. To the Pope, how- ever, this appeared as a triumph of Catholicism. Other parts of Germany showed progress in the direction of the old creed. The Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus I, had become a Catholic in 1697 before becoming a candidate for the Polish throne, and in 1717 his son, Frederick Augustus II, followed his father's example. Yet the headship of the Protestant Princes of Germany, the Corpus Evangelicorum, remained in their house. In the Rhenish Palatinate the Ryswick Clause, according to which the Roman Catholic religion was to be left in the state in which it was in 1697, had enabled the Elector, John William, to bring the 1 D'Argenson, ii. 426. ^ Droysen, iv. iii. 160. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 259 country largely under the dominion of the Jesuits ^ The Pope might hope that Catholicism was still getting the. better of heresy. The Emperor Charles, too, embarked upon a crusade against the Turks which would have revived the strength of Catholi- cism in Germany. But it failed and destroyed all hopes of a return of the heretic princes to the obedience of the Pope. In the west of Europe events were leading up to what might be used as a crusade under the leadership of Spain for the Catholic Prince James. In the bickerings between England and Spain, Protestantism was naturally in a nervous, irritable condition ; and though the re- ligious question was not put prominently forward till the Seven Years' War, it is an accessory not to be overlooked in the war of Jenkins' Ear. Hostility to heresy had played no slight part in the pacifi- cation of Vienna in 1735, while the Blood Bath of Thorn and the persecution of Protestants at Salz- burg were merely extreme manifestations of a common tendency to a Catholic levival^. But it was just this very Spanish power that really weakened Pope Clement XII most of all. The utter financial ruin brought on by Coscia was not healed under Clement^. And to this was added the loss of revenues caused by the breach with Naples and Spain. With Don Carlos as Duke of Parma in 1731 there arose dithculties as to the ^ Godeke, Die Politik Osterreichs in die spanische Erhfolge- frage, i. 141. '^ Armstrong, 348. 3 Above, p. 236. 17—2 :"t!!«i'' 260 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT. 261 suzerainty, for the Prince received the duchy from the Emperor and Clement claimed the right of investiture. But with Carlos as King of Naples in 1734 the Pope found he had no dutiful son as a neighbour. Levies were made in the Papal States, the right of nomination to the sees and the patron- age of all benefices, the diminution of bequests to the Church and the abolition of the Court of the Nuncio, followed. At last, in 1738, the Pope had to concede full sovereignty to Carlos^ Spain backed up the claims of Naples by forbidding any revenues to pass out of the country to Rome, and let a large number of benefices fall vacant rather than have them filled up by the Pope. The loss of these revenues to the Pope was enormous. A still greater obstacle to any movement requiring concerted action among Catholics was the want of harmony between the three Courts of Naples, Madrid and Rome. The state of Catholic Europe, in fact, was not helpful to any support of James or Charles Edward in 1739. In spite of some sentiment for a Catholic union in Germany, and in spite of the influence of the ecclesiastic Fleury on France, there was little opportunity for a crusade in the west. Germany was still the friend of the House of Hanover and Prussia was very powerful. Fleury 's usefulness to James as a Catholic was more than negatived by his love of peace. Spain, the very country which was at war with England and had sent for Charles Edward, was at strife with the Pope and with- holding his revenues, while Philip's son Carlos in 1 Brosch, II. 78 — 81 ; Ranke's Papacy (Austin), in. 129. Naples carried the breach still further. The ruin in the Papacy itself deprived it of all power of initiative, for the extravagance in the days of Benedict XIII was not remedied by wise policy under Clement XIP. The state of religion in Europe did not offer James any better prospect of help in 1739 than did the balance of power at sea. There was one, and that, perhaps, still the most (e) France important factor of European politics with which the Stuart cause had not yet been brought in con- tact. Cardinal Fleury had made France the pivot on which everything turned'^. In 1739 France lay between the combatants, Spain and England, as a neutral power. For any success to come to the Stuart cause, some event was needed which should draw France herself into the contest. This event was not slow in coming. On September 20th, 174?0, the Emperor Charles VI died and left his daughter Maria Theresa as heiress of Austria. On January 29th, 1743, Cardinal Fleury died and the influence which had so long held France back from war was removed^ In the general upheaval of Europe which followed, it would have been indeed extraordinary if no Power had found a need for the claimant to the throne of England. 1 Brosch, II. 83, 84. ^ Die Geschicke Deutscblands, Europas lagen in des alten Cardinals Hand : nur er noch liielt den Ausbruch des allgemeinen Krieges auf. Mit seiner Friedenspolitik libte und gewann Frank- reich grosseren Einfluss, als es selbst in den glanzenden Tagen Ludwigs XIV. gehabt hatte. Droysen, iv. iii. 406. ^ D'Argenson, iv. 49. I 'tiy. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 263 CHAPTER V. I. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR : 1740-1748. 1. The Balance of Power on Land. (A) The Inheritance of the Emperor Charles VI. 1. The In 1740 the male line of the House of Hapsburg, tolheln-^ which had already ended in Spain, became extinct heritance. 'm Austria. The internal condition of the country was very dantrerous and the attitude of foreign Powers foreshadowed ruin, for in every part of the Empire arose rival claimants. The Imperial throne itself was claimed by the House of Austria as repre- sented by Francis, Duke of Tuscany, husband of Maria Theresa. Maria Theresa claimed the here- ditary dominions of the House of Austria by the Pragmatic Sanction which every Court in Europe had at last recognized. To contest this claim the House of Wittelsbach came forward in the person of Charles of Bavaria who, as husband of the Emperor Joseph's daughter Maria Amelia, upheld the Pact of 1703\ In the south of Europe, the Italian question was entering on a new phase. 1 Above, p. 247. A feeling that Italy should belong to the Italians was taking shape and centred in Charles Emanuel of Savoy, King of Sardinia^ On the other hand, Elizabeth of Spain saw in Charles VI's death a golden opportunity for the reassertion of the Spanish claims in Italy, which had always been cherished. She therefore determined that her youngest son Philip should win for himself a prin- cipality in the peninsula. In the east, Frederick of Prussia took the opportunity to put forward claims to Silesia, and in the west the fondness of George II of England for his Electorate of Hanover gave a new vantage-ground for any enemy of En^^land. The House of Stuart still lived in petty pomp on the bounty of the Pope in Italy, and its hopes revived as the probability of a European conflict increased. It was, however, scarcely pos- sible that, in the presence of other greater Pre- tenders than James, his cause could be anything but secondary to the furtherance of claims in Germany or Italy or the Netherlands. Marshal Belleisle represented the war-party in 2. Attitude France and became the spokesman of a vast scheme, ^po^^crs. " This was no less than the execution of the famous plan of Henry IV, to expel the House of Austria from Europe and confine it to Hungary. France was to become distributor of the Hapsburg heredi- tary states by a new Partition treaty which should equalise the possessions of the third party in Europe without taking anything for herself-." The principal aim of France then became that 1 D'Argenson, Memoires, iv. 273. 2 Ihid. IV. 223. 264 THE FALLEN STUARTS. of making the Imperial crown pass to the House of Bavaria, or failing that, to the House of Saxony ^ Cardinal Fleury wished to avoid war because of "the losses of men in previous wars, the bad state of the finances, the weak condition of the navy, the stagnation of commerce and the famine which afflicted the southern districts^." But Belleisle carried his. point, and a French army accom- panied the Bavarian claimant in his march to the Austrian capital. The championship of the House of Wittelsbach, however, occupied the at- tention of the war-party, and Fleury continued to maintain amicable relations with England till his death. The House of Stuart could find no support from him. Elizabeth Farnese still ruled Spain. This now involved two questions of policy— the Italian and the American. To the Queen, American matters were secondary to the advancement of her son Philip, and to this object all the power of Spain was made subservient. England was just passing from the grasp of Walpole. When he fell, in 1742, "it was not the fall of an ordinary minister, but the fall of a political system based upon the first union of the House of Hanover with the Regent of France. It was a return to the policy, then abandoned, of war against France and the Bourbon interest in Europel" But at first the link with war on 1 Flassen, v. 408. 2 7^/^, ^ 405 3 Lord Carteret ergriff sofort das entgegengesetzte System. Es war einfach genug. Hatte man einmal den Krieg, so gait es ihn THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 265 ■ar. the Continent was Hanover. This only brought into clearer prominence the foreign character of the dynasty. Charles Edward Stuart thought he saw his opportunity as the champion of the in- sular and popular feeling of the country. He was only to find that his dynasty had ceased to be the centre of that feeling. It was not long before the avowal of these 3. Out- various claims led to war. In the winter of 1740 ^; Frederick of Prussia overran Silesia, and in 1742 the treaty of Berlin secured it to him\ The centre of gravity in European affairs henceforward moved eastwards. The ambition of Louis XIV had been an influence underlying all the politics of the later seventeenth and earlier eighteenth centuries. The ambition of Frederick II was similarly to colour all political events for the next forty years. A new candidate for the headship of North Germany had asserted himself'-. Charles of Bavaria, with Belleisle, had now marched into Austria, and town after town fell im grossen Styl zu fiihren. Hing noch das balbe Schottland, das ganze Irland an den Stuarts, so musste man Frankreich auf dem Continent so fassen, dass es nicht daran denken konnte, dem Pratendenten zu neuen Abenteuern hiilfreich zu sein. Droysen, V. iii. 79. Ranke, History of England, v. 405. 1 Koch and Scboell, i. 279. 2 Die Bedeutung Preussens war, dass es aus den Kuinen des dreissigjabrigen Krieges sieb aufricbtend, zu einem in sicb geord- neten Staat geworden war, zu einem deutscben Staat innerhalb des kernlos gewordenen Reiches, nicbt dynastiscb sondern mon- arcbiscb, nicbt standiscb sondern militariscb, nicbt confessional sondern in voller Gewissensfreibeit, alien Bekenntnissen zu gleicbem Recbt und Scbutz. Droysen, v. ii. 4, 5, 8. 266 THE FALLEN STUARTS. into his hand.«. Belleisle became alarmed at the success of his puppet. " If we reach Vienna, he will have no further need of us, and that would altogether upset our reckoning," he said\ The Elector was prevailed upon to turn north into Bohemia and then, marching towards the Rhine, he was crowned Emperor at Frankfort in February, 1742. Belleisle seemed to have secured his end. But it was only the shadow of the Empire. For the substance still remained with the House of Hapsburg. In the north-west of the Empire was Hanover. But for the present this was secured by the vigi- lance of George II. In 1741 a French army under Marshal Maillebois threatened it, and at once the English King concluded a treaty at Hanover in October, vvhicli promised to maintain the neutrality of tlie Electorate-. This left England free for her maritime war against Spain, which had been going on since 1739. When, therefore, the year 1743 began, the powers of Europe were ranged in two hostile camps. Spain and England were carrying on a naval war in the western hemisphere, and in the east of Europe Prussia and Bavaria, with their objects gained, fronted the weakened House of Austria. France watched the combatants and committed herself to neither. But on January 29th in that year Cardinal Fleury died. The words of Louis XV at the news of his death were significant of a 1 Oncken, Friedrich der Grosse, i. 358. 2 Koch and Schoell, i. 276 ; d'Argenson, iv. 226. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 267 change in French policy, " My lords, I am the first Minister." (B) France and her Pretenders in 1744. Louis at once committed himself to the support 1. Ger- of the House of Wittelsbach. The Electorate of "'^''^' Mainz was now vacant, and the rival candidates were Clement, brother of the newly crowned Emperor, and Coimt Ostein, the Austrian nominee. France gave her support to Clement, The result of this was unforeseen. For the English and Hanoverian army, which had been stationed in the Austrian Netherlands, suddenly began to move S(mthwards towards Mainz. This was in direct violation of the treaty of Hanover^ King George himself therefore joined his forces at Aschaffenburg, and at length a battle followed at Dettingen (July 27, 1743). The French were defeated and their championship of Clement failed. On the same day the House of Wittelsbach failed them, for the Bavarian Field- marshal, Seckendorff, concluded a treaty of neu- trality with the Austrians, which separated Bavaria from France and put Prince Charles of Lorraine in a position to unite with the victors of Dettingen 2. For a time the ground in Germany seemed to be crumbling away beneath the feet of the French. Louis therefore turned from the support of a land- less Emperor to the alliance of a doubtful friend, ^ Above, p. 266. 2 Oncken, i. 385. 268 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 2. Italy and and the Kings of France and Prussia made common cause. But France was not confined to her schemes in England. Germany. There were two Princes whom she could (o) Louis use to advance her power in Italy, Charles Emanuel and Italy. ^^ g^^^^ ^^^ pj^-j-^ ^^ g^^.^ Unfortunately for her, their claims were mutually exclusive. While France waited, her power of choice between them was lost. For in September, 1743, Austria, Sardinia and England concluded a treaty at Worms. The treaties of Utrecht and of the Quadruple Alliance were guaranteed, and England undertook to sup- port any attempts of her two allies at conquest in Italy \ Frederick trembled for Silesia and drew closer to France, Elizabeth Farnese feared for the aggrandizement of her son Philip, and she too drew closer to France. France saw that she was now committed to Don Philip as her Italian Pretender, and she at once became his champion. On the 25th of November, 1743, the famous Family Com- pact was secretly signed at Fontainebleau. France bound herself to declare war on England and Sardinia, and to continue it till Don Carlos was secure in his possession of Naples and Sicily, and till Milan, Parma and Piacenza were conquered for Don Philip; Spain was to regain Gibraltar and, if possible, Minorca, and her new colony of Georgia was to be taken from England. Till then there would be no peace, even under the most favour- able conditions^ But this involved a question which the support of Charles of Bavaria did not 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 285. ' Ibid. I. 287. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 269 the command of the sea. England ruled the sea, and therefore England's power must be destroyed. Georore had shown his faithlessness as to the neu- trality of Hanover by his victory at Dettingen. The punishment for this, and the security for the schemes of Don Philip in Italy, must therefore be the championship at the same time of another, thoucfh secondary, Pretender — James Stuarts In a letter to his uncle on December 10th, 1743, (^) The Louis declared his policy. " Sire, I wish to delay no ^jf/^ longer in communicating to your Majesty a project J^ngland. that I have formed in the greatest secrecy, in order to destroy, at a blow, the league of enemies to the House of Bourbon and secure the purposes of your Majesty as to Italy, which is to-day my principal object.... My project can only succeed in so far as it is unexpected. The least delay may ruin every- thing. There is, therefore, not a moment to lose. Everything is ready : the squadrons that have been armed to fulfil my engagements with your Majesty have made the way easy. I only await your reply to give my last orders^" In a memorial attached to this letter, Louis shows the relationship of the Stuart cause to this project. "All the chiefs of the Jacobites in England have unanimously de- clared that they require only thirteen battalions, a regiment of dragoons and 10,000 arms, in order to secure a general rising at the moment of dis- embarkation.... They would have wished that their lawful master, or one of the princes his sons, might 1 Coxe, Bourbons in Spain (1815), iii. 342. 2 Flassen, v. 276, 277. 270 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 271 have crossed over, at the same time, at the head of the forces which France sent to help them. But they did not consider this necessary, and have decided that, surrounded as he is by spies, his departure from Rome, which could not be kept secret, would betray the whole project and work its ruin. It seems to them enough that the person who has his orders should be possessed of a declara- tion in his name.... A Scotch gentleman has been sent to Rome to explain the circumstances to the Chevalier de St George... and orders have just been given for the embarkation of the troops to take place at Dunkirk on January 15, 1744. The ships which are to escort them are to leave Brest on the 1st of the same month.... (Many difficulties may arise, but if a landing is once effected) the least that can result will be a civil war which will mean the recall of the English troops from the Low Countries. The Courts of Vienna and Turin will receive no more subsidies from England, and if we act vigorously on all sides, at this critical juncture, these two Courts, abandoned to their own resources, will yield to our demands ^" In fact, the claimant of the House of Stuart was to be' the cat's-paw for the claimant of the Spanish House of Bourbon. The real link between Louis and James was the minister Tencin, who owed his Cardinalate to the intervention of the Stuart prince, and was eager to show his gratitude'"'. ^ Flassen, v. 277—280. 2 Ewald, Life of Prince Charles Edward Stuart, 49 • cf GualterioMSS. 20393 passim; Reumont, Die Grafinn von Albany, S2. \ At once the preparations were pushed forwards (7) ^'/je The English Ambassador, Thompson, was puzzled, jj^^^^ "The report of orders being sent to the ports of France," he writes, " for fitting out and arming all the men of war that are in a condition to put to sea, is confirmed. The letters from Brest say the orders are arrived there to have everything in readiness by the 1st of January.... It is not doubted that this is for the service of the Court of Spain and to oblige Mr Matthews to retire from the coast of France and in the hopes to carry and convoy troops to Italy ^." This states the w^hole difficulty. The great point was to get rid of the English Mediterranean squadion under Matthews. On this depended, immediately, the success of Don Philip and indirectly that of the Stuart cause. Time passed and on the 22nd of January Thompson again wrote, " The ships of Brest are said to have sailed... to intercept any reinforce- ments we might think of sending to Mr Matthews^" Similar activity was meanwhile being displayed at Dunkirk. Marshal Saxe was placed at the head of this expedition, which was to draw off attention from Italy. His instructions show the greatness of 1 Aber wie trostlos war die Lage Englands. Von der eng- lischen Armee staud der beste Theil 21,000 Mann in Flandern, audere 10,000 in Gibraltar, Port Mahon, den Colonien.,..Man brauchte vor AUem Soldaten und diese hatte man uiciit. Noch trostloser war die Lage Hollands.... Da begannen jene Bewegun- gen der franzosischen Flotte im Canal, jene Einschaffungen bei Diinkirchen : das hatte niemand moglich gehalten, niemand vorbedacht; man zitterte fiir Irland, das vollig unbewahrt war. Droysen, v. ii. 245, 246, 248. ^ Record Office, State Papers, France, 438, 1743, xi. 23. 3 Ibid. 1744, I. 22. 272 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 273 the project. " His Majesty King Louis has under- taken to embark the troops and arms demanded at Dunkirk, with an escort under the Lord of Baraille. Another squadron has been sent into the Channel under the Count of Roquefeuille to keep the English vessels from stopping the embarkation.... As it is important that the disembarkation should take place as near London as possible, His Majesty has ordered the Lord of Baraille to convoy the expedition as far as possible up the Thames, even to Blackwall, un- less insurmountable difficulties are met.... When the French troops have been introduced into the city of London, where they will march immediately on landing, the principal object of Marshal Saxe must be to maintain his position, in order that if a civil war breaks out, he may uphold the interests of King James^" The expedition consisted of 334 officers and 9695 men 2. The preparations were hurried forward. On February 29th the Comte de Saxe arrived at Dunkirk with several English lords and all the colonels of the expedition. The same day they received orders to be ready to start next day. At eight in the morning an embargo was laid on all light vessels for the sake of embarkation and in order to convey the troops to the large vessels. At 11 o'clock, just as the light vessels had been loaded, there arose so violent a gale that it was impossible to place the men on board the transports, and they had to wait in the roadstead at the mercy of the waves till next morning. On the ^ Memoires et Lettres du Marechal de Saxe, i. 49 — 63. 2 Ibid. I. 54. 2nd of March the light vessels were requisitioned again. But only two and a-half battalions could go on board, for want of enough light vessels, and because of the wind. On the 3rd further vain attempts were made. By the 5th some wreckage was caused in the harbour by the wind. It was only by the 8th of March that the wind abated sufficiently to allow of any further attempts to continue the expedition^ But now came a difficulty. The preparations at (5) The Brest had been going on under the Count of^^^^* Roquefeuille. Louis had meant everything to be ready at Dunkirk by January Ist^, but this fleet had not yet appeared. The preparations had been delayed and " according to the final scheme every- thing ought to have been ready in February. And now at Dunkirk no one knew what had become of Roquefeuille^" The explanation was simple. The Brest fleet had been cruising about in the Channel to wait for a favourable opportunity to convoy the forces at Dunkirk. It reached the Isle of Wight and was already preparing to communicate with Saxe, when suddenly the English fleet appeared from Portsmouth, twenty-one vessels strong. Night drew on and by morning the French fleet had fled. A few days after, w^hile Saxe was waiting for news and for the abatement of the storm, Roquefeuille died^. The Brest fleet had lost its opportunity. Yet the 1 Record Office, State Papers, France, 438, 1744, iii. 21. 2 Above, p. 270. 3 R. 0., France, 438, 1744, iii. 25. * Gu^rin, Histoire Maritime, iv. 257. H. 18 274 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 275 (e) The failure. activity was not confined to France. In spite of Louis' desire to maintain secrecy, Tencin wrote to James to urge him to send Charles Edward, his elder son, to lead the expedition. The King scarcely trusted the proposaP, but Charles at once escaped by a ruse while out hunting and hurried to Paris and to Dunkirk early in February*. But Toulon, not Dunkirk, was the great object of interest at the French Court. And on the 22nd of February the whole project of Louis fell to the ground. For the French squadron which had been blockaded there by Matthews attempted to break out. Though they partially succeeded, owing to a quarrel between Matthews and his colleague Lestock, yet any attempt at a large expedition for Don Philip was rendered impossible =^ The interest taken in the expedition at Dunkirk at once abated. It had become well known in England, and the secrecy which was its essence was gone. As early as the middle of February the English ambassador had sent home reports of the arrival of Charles in France, and on the 25th he had audience with Louis, who sarcastically remarked that "when His Britannic Majesty made satisfaction for several unjust captures made at sea, he would make an explanation as to Prince Charles^" Tencin and Amelot, the ministers, endeavoured to deny all 1 Ewald, Life of Prince Charles^ 49. 2 Ewald, § III. Pichot, Histoire du Charles -Edward I, 291. 3 R. O., France, 438, 1744, iii. 10. Coxe, Bourbons in Spain, III. 346. * R. O., France, 438, 1744, ii. 25. connection with the arrival of Charles. But the secrecy of the expedition, on which, as Louis had rightly said in his original letter to Philip of Spain, all depended, was gone, and England began to prepare. A new difficulty had also arisen in an unexpected 3. Ger- quarter. While Louis had fixed his attention mainly '"^'"^• on Italy, his ambassador to the Empire, Chauvigny, had been safeguarding the interests of France in Germany. In October 1743 he had gone to Frank- fort and "assured himself that several German princes were ready to unite against the Queen of Hungary, in return for subsidies." In January 1744 he returned to Versailles, and with the Marshal de Noailles drew up a plan for a league to uphold the claims of the Emperor Charles VII. The plan was adopted by the royal council, and Chauvigny re- turned to Germany to bring about an alliance among the various German princes. The confederates agreed to maintain the constitution of the Empire, restore the Emperor his estates, and give a mutual ouarantee for their own. Fifteen hundred thousand florins were the means which were to accelerate these resolutions. But suddenly the whole scheme seemed likely to fall through, because the expedition in favour of the Catholic Stuart prince became known. This roused the Protestant party in Germany, and the Prussian and Hessian ministers especially declared in the loudest terms their dissatisfaction to Chauvigny, who at once wrote off to the King^ 1 Flassan, v. 207, 208. 18—2 276 THE FALLEN STUARTS. This was a new danger. The Stuart prince had already lost much of his usefulness because of the defeat at Toulon. For the present he could not be used to further the cause of Don Philip and the naval power of France on the Mediterranean. Now his interest was found to clasli with that of the more important head of the House of Bavaria, who, though he had failed once, had a far wider influence than Charles Edward. The support of a Catholic crusade was not to be weighed against the support of an Emperor. Louis found that on religious as well as naval grounds it was best to withdraw his support from the Stuart cause. The expedition had indeed failed before the religious objection found vent. 4. The This news only came in time to confirm Louis in dmwalof ^^^^ determination to sacrifice Charles Stuart. The support, failure at Toulon, the high wind at Dunkirk, and the naval preparations in England had already produced a change in the orders which Marshal Saxe received. " In order to guide you," wrote D'Argenson to the Count on March 6th, " in the present embarrassing circumstances in which you are now placed, you are ordered to continue the embarkation which you have begun, but without being in a hurry with it. You are to bring to it only such zeal as seems fitting, in order to show that the King has not abandoned his project, the execution of which depends on the succours promised by the supporters of King James in England, but of which he has heard no newsV* Louis threw the ^ Memoires du Comte de Saxe, i. 59. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 277 blame on the Prince, by adding, "His Majesty is anxious to mark as strongly as possible that the enterprise which was originally undertaken on the basis of secrecy was ruined by the publicity given to it by the arrival of the Prince of Wales ^" The final orders followed on March 10th, and the Marshal at once repeated them to Charles. " Sir, the King my master orders me to give your Royal Highness to understand that the trying circumstances which have arisen necessitate a suspension of the enter- prise for the present, and a postponement to a more favourable time'^." On March 15th the despatch of Chauvigny brought the news of the objections of the Protestant princes in Germany, and Noailles wrote back to quiet them and assure them " that the attempt had only been planned to serve the common caused" It had failed, and once more the Stuart history had repeated itself — the English royal refugees had been taken up by France, but sacrificed when their interests clashed with those of more useful claimants elsewhere. On May 22nd the Union of Frankfort between ^' ^''f •^ Campaign. ^ Memoires du Comte de Saxe, i. 64. 2 Ibid. I. G8. 3 Frederick, referring to his own attitude, says, "Le roi de Grande Bretagne qui ne se trouvait pas encore dans une surete assez grande avec ce secours (of COOO Dutch troops), reclama le contingent Prussien. Je lui repondis que j'attendais a le voir attaque pour le lui donner et que s'il s'agissait de sa conservation, je ne m'en tiendrais pas a mon contingent ordinaire : mais que je me mettrais moi-meme a la tete de trente mille Prussiens pour passer dans cette ile : George trouva ce secours trop fort." Frederic II, Histoire de vion temps, edit. Posner, 315. Cf. Droysen, V. ii. 250, 252. Flassan, v. 210. 278 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 1. Ger- many. the Emperor, Prussia, the Elector Palatine, and the Count of Hesse Cassel was made and on the 6th of June Louis acceded to it. Maria Theresa was to be overpowered and the Emperor restored in triumphs But for this, the great necessity was to act in concert. Frederick of Prussia phmned for French support along the Rhine and the Danube, and Louis' hurried triumph in Flanders, followed by his illness, caused the failure of the scheme-. Then, when on the 20th of January, 1745, the Emperor died, the whole question of the succession to the Empire was revived. France had once more to reconstruct her policy towards her various Pretenders. (C) France and her Pretenders from 1745-1748. The great question at the beginning of 1745 was, of course, the election of the Emperor. The treaty of Frankfort had limited the Bavarian party, and the treaty of Warsaw had bound Austria, England, Holland, and Saxony together to support Francis of Tuscany, husband of Maria Theresa^ Much depended on the action of Maximilian Joseph, the late Emperor's son. He disconcerted his father's allies by concluding a treaty with Maria Theresa at Fuessen near Augsburg on April 22nd, which he was driven to do, for his troops were dispersed and his states invaded^ The main support of France in 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 290, 321 ; Droyseu, v. ii. 272. 2 D'Argeuson, iv. 233 ; Droysen, v. ii. 286, 314. '^ Koch and Schoell, i. 294 ; Oncken, i. 408. ^ Koch and Schoell, i. 295. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 279 Germany was lost to her, and Francis was elected Emperor. Yet the French connection with the House of Wittelsbach was not broken. In the winter of 1745 a subsidy treaty was negotiated with the Elector Palatine, who refused to acknowledge Francis as Emperor, and resisted Austria in every possible way. " But the most important service that he rendered to France was his undertaking to work upon the two Electors of ids House, those of Bavaria and Cologne, in her interests^" With Bavaria he failed, for Maximilian Joseph held to the treaty of Fuessen. With Cologne he succeeded. "I was sure of the Elector of Cologne," wrote D'Argenson in 1745, " for he signed in a few months not only a family agreement with the Elector Pala- tine, but a promise to the King to advance his projects, in return for a subsidy which I obtained for him-." France had lost a puppet Emperor, but she was secure along the centre of the Rhine. She was mistress of western Europe ; Frederick waited his opportunity in the east, while in Italy Don Philip was winning victories against the King of Sardinia. Louis came to the campaign of 1745 with a irreat probability of success. Unfortunately he started with a mistaken policy, ^j- ^;,^ He burned for military glory. D'Argenson therefore Frerwh sent him a memorial urging the fact that the prin- ^^^ ^^^ cipal attack must be made against Germany I The Two Seas. King however saw that the Austrian Netherlands \.^^^^^^^^^ ^ Flassan, v. 303. 2 D'Argenson, iv. 394. 3 Flassan, v. 243. 280 THE FALLEN STUARTS. lay open before him and possession of them would complete his power on the Rhine. In spite of D'Argenson's entreaties, he hurried there and left Frederick unaided to meet the Austrians. His im- mediate object was secured by the victory of Fontenoy in May. It seemed as if France would succeed in her old attempt to dominate the eastern shore of the Channel, for at once all Belgium fell into her hands, and the weakness of Holland was very great. But the very success produced its own reaction in the two countries most interested — England and Holland. *'An immediate consequence of the defeat of Fontenoy was the Jacobite rebellion in Scotland^" But Louis was too wise this time to give the Stuart cause open support, and in July Charles Edward left France with seven followers without encouragement from the French Court, and raised his standard in Scotland in August. Louis' own object was to be sure of Flanders, beyond which lay Holland. In the previous year the Jacobites had not risen, and he, like his great-grandfather before him, would spare no troops till the civil war had been begun from within. But as Charles Edward's cause advanced in Scotland the interest of France in him increased. The entrance into Edinburgh and the victory of Prestonpans on October 1 had an interesting effect upon the policy of the Court of Versailles. Louis was unwilling to help Charles openly, but he was willing now to help him through another state, the country of Sweden. 1 Lecky, XVIII Century, ii. 20. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 281 " I am to acquaint you," writes Lord Harrington ii- . Siccdcn. to Guy Dickens, English ambassador at Stockholm, on October 20, "that His Majesty has received advice that about the 13th instant a Swedish officer whose name is Nagel was to set out from Paris for Stock- holm with orders to the French ambassador there to make a new levy of officers under pretence of their being to serve d la suite of the Swedish regiment belonging to France, but whose real destination is to be employed under the Pretender's son in Scotland in support of the present rebellion. The plan consists of the following particulars. About one hundred and eighty officers of the rank of captains, lieutenants and ensigns are to be raised, to have a number of servants allotted to them and Major Lesly of the Swedish regiment is to go to Sweden to receive and conduct them. They are to be told upon embarking that they are to serve in Flanders and to be carried for that purpose to Dunkirk : b\it when at sea they are to be let into the real secret and to be landed in Scotland. Nagel has a brevet of lieutenant-colonel for this expedition, and Lesly is to command them\" Dickens remonstrated at the Court as soon as the French ambassador had made the demand. But the answer was not clear enough to satisfy him as to the sincerity of King Frederick, who declared he had no sympathy with rebels and had ordered the officers enrolled that " in case they were cast on the Scotch coasts by wind or tempest they were to declare that their sole intention was to join their regiment in 1 R. 0., Sweden, 118, 1745, x. 25. 282 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 111. Dunkirk. France^" Dickens felt that this did not afford a sufficient check. On November 19 an East Indiaman arrived at Gothenburg and Dickens declared that it was the intention of the French ambassador " to buy it for the transportation of the Swedish officers-." At length all the wheels of the plan were set in motion, " All the Swedish officers," wrote Dickens on the 24th of December, "are now set out for Gothenburg, from whence my advisers say that the ship preparing for them will be ready to sail by the 1st of January... They make in all a body of between four and five hundred men... Let them go where they will, they can be considered as no other than our declared enemies-^" By January 1st Prince Charles's failure had become complete. Had help been forthcoming from abroad when he entered Derbv on December 6th a rush upon London might have succeeded. But no help came and the Scotch angrily turned back to Scotland. Yet the French preparations in Sweden were not their only ones. An expedition was being formed at Dunkirk under the Duke of Richelieu, who was joined by the Duke of York^. " The Duke of Richelieu," Marshal Saxe was informed, " is pre- paring to make use of the tide on the 7th or 8th of January to make the crossing, though I fancy the passage will encounter many difficulties owing to the number of English vessels at sea^" Then the 1 R. O., Sweden, 118, 1745, xi. 15. ^ Ibid. 1745, xi. 19. » Ibid. 1745. xii. 24. * Memoires du Comte de Saxe, ii. 7 ; Droysen, v. iii. 84. ^ Memoires du Comte de Saxe ii. 14. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 283 date was changed to the 9th of January and the Marquis d'Avaray was sent up to see that the convoying fleet was in readiness. Even now, had the Swedish and French expeditions landed in Scotland and England, Charles's unconquered army mitrht have retraced its steps. ''But the French King was trying to secure a iv.^ ^^^^^'^i/ more important Pretender than Charles. Hitherto Uediter- the French support in Italy had been eagerly given »-««^«"- to Don Philip, when once the treaty of Worms in 1743 had ranged Sardinia on the Austrian side^. But in 1744 the Marquis d'Argenson had become Foreign Secretary. To him the aggrandisement of a Spanish prince was folly. His maxim was, " Live with Spain as with a brother whose character is different from ours, but never give in to their wars of ambition as in the case of their designs on Italy V He had a hearty objection to feeding the ambition of Elizabeth at the expense of the interest of France. To him not Don Philip but Charles Emanuel of Savoy was the real French ally in Italy. "Certainly," he writes, " I was absolutely sure that the greatest mistake we could make was when we fell out with the King of Sardinia, in our wars with the House of Austria. Sardinia is to Austria in Italy what Prussia is to her in Germany: Sardinia can only increase at the expense of Austria: and it is only the insatiable greed of Spain and our kindhearted- ness that have alienated Charles EmanueP." 1 Above, p. 268. 2 D'Argenson, iv. 330. « Ibid. IV. 278. 284 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 285 But D'Argenson went further than this He would revive the old wish of Louis XIV for the neutrality of Italy, in the guise of an Italian federation under the leadership of Sardinia. His idea was " to form a republic or lasting association of the Italian powers," as there was one in Germany, in Holland, and in Switzerland ^ This project seemed now likely to be realized. For Louis was convinced of its advantage. It would change an enemy into an ally, it would secure France from any attack or need of attack on the south, and it would rid her of the inconvenient ambition of Elizabeth Farnese as the price of any support in Italy. Louis even rounded uptiu the Family C(»mpact by saying ** he had only signed it against his will and that under it we were pledged to impossible conquests on Spain's behalf ^" Negotiations were therefore opened at Turin, and it was to his supporter there rather than to the one in Scotland that Louis was looking for the advancement of his policy. Never had the King shown so much interest in anything. The proposed treaty was entirely the work of Louis and perhaps the only one of his reign which he made himself -^ Savoy was to have all the Milanese on the left bank of the Po, and Don Philip, so as not to alienate Spain, was to have the right bank with Parma and part of Mantua^ Preliminaries were signed on 26th of December, 1745. A brilliant 1 D'Argenson, iv. 267. 2 Flassan, v. 237. * D'Argenson, iv. 285. * Ibid. IV. 287. campaign in Germany for France flanked by Sar- dinia, opened up before Louis. It was little wonder that Louis should forget Charles Edward, the claimant to England, while seeking to win Charles Emanuel, the claimant to Italy. The cause of the Stuarts was manifestly on the decline when once the retreat had been begun, and as the armaments at Gothen- burg and Dunkirk waited they received no urgent orders from Versailles to advance. At last to start became impossible. For a terrible frost set in and the ships were frozen up\ While this dehiv was ffoing on and Louis was v- Failure trying to harmonize the claims of Elizabeth and seas. Charles Emanuel, the cause of both the instruments of French ambition was lost. On April 27th the battle of CuUoden ended the Stuart cause for ever ; the Swedes were disbanded'-, and already in February Richelieu abandoned his attempts When Charles Emanuel saw that Spain would not yield he felt that he was safer as he was and therefore broke off the negotiations at Turin". The result was disas- trous. Louis and d'Argenson were right in valuing the importance of the King of Sardinia very highly. On it the use of the Stuart prince rightly depended. For the year now beginning — 1746 — saw the expul- sion of the Gallo-Spanish armies from Italy after the battle of Piacenza in June^ The hopes of the 1 Memoires da Comte de Saxe, ii. 26; R. 0., Sweden, 119, 1746, II. 25. 2 R. O., Sweden, 119, vi. 13, 1746. 3 Memoires du Comte de Saxe, ii. 84. "* D'Argenson, iv. 305. 5 Oncken, i. 432 ; Droysen, v. iii. 103. 286 THE FALLEN STUARTS. treaty of Fontainebleau were shattered. The under- hand and half-hearted support of Charles Stuart had helped to make his rebellion dangerous, so that even the apathy of England was overcome, and the throne of the Hanovers was strengthened by Charles's failure rather than weakened by his early success. Had France realized the condition of England she would either have given Prince Charles the support he needed for the last time when the Hanoverian throne misrht have tottered, or she would not have given him such hopes of help as lured him and his army right on to Derby. But for his attention to his ally at Turin Louis could scarcely have made the mistake. As it was, he helped to create the panic of Black Monday which was the prelude to the national awakening under Pitt. (j3) The The romantic circumstances of the rebellions of 0/1744^"^ 1745 and their partial success have given it an undue 1745. importance. The great danger was not the expedi- tion of 1745 which started without French aid and which Louis could not be induced heartily to support, while he was turning eastwards towards Turin and northwards through Belgium to Holland on the more secure eastern side of the Channel. It was rather in 1744 that England was imperilled, when the young French King, fresh from the tutelage of Cardinal Fleury, determined on war on both sides of the Channel, in order to create a diversion in favour of Philip in Italy. But the delay caused by the bad weather, and the diplomatic difficulties, coupled with the ill-success at Toulon put an end to the success of the attempt. The essence of Richelieu's expedi- THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 287 tion in 1745 was different from that of Marshal Saxe. It was the negative attitude of a defender of France, not the positive attitude of an invader of England, for the King "considers that the troops under his command should always serve to keep back the English troops on the south coast, by threatening a landing, the execution of which might be renewed again if circumstances allowed of it\" In fact, the English rising in 1744 depended on the successful landing of the French. The French land- ing in 1745 depended on the successful rising of the English. In both cases the attitude of France was inspired by her relations with the other nations of Europe on her eastern frontiers, not by the action of the Jacobites or Charles in the w^est. The attitude towards the House of Stuart was the outward and visible sign of an unsuccessful movement in France — the attempted revival of naval power'^. As we have seen, the French navy had seriously (7) French declined under the administration of Cardinal j ^'.^^ . Fleury\ As the struggle of England and Spain the Fleets. tended more and more to involve France, the need of a French navy increased. "If war comes," said the future Foreign Minister of France, "the only enemies in the world whom we have to fear are the ^ Menioires du Comte de Saxe, 11. 102. - An interesting despatch from Chambrier to the Prussian King is quoted by Ranke, Preussische Geschichte, in. 173, and Droysen, v. ii. 526. " Argensen m'a dit qu'il ^toit question de la part du roi son maitre de quelque nouvelle entreprise sur I'Angle- terre, pour tScher par le trouble int^rieur que cela causera de faire baisser les fonds publics et forces la nation k desirer la paix." 3 Above, p. 253, 254. 288 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 289 two naval powers, England and Holland \" As the power passed from Fleury's hands, renewed efforts were made by Maurepas to restore the French fleets. But the attempt was vain. " After the affair at Vigo in 1702, M. de Ponteohartrain turned all that remained of the royal navy into cruisers and priva- teers : by this means he damaged the English and largely helped on the peace of 1712. But his son Maurepas wished to show off fleets of men-of-war and of convoys, with the result that from the year 1745 onwards our privateers and our merchantmen have never dared to leave our ports^" The English navy in European waters had for some time been resting on its past laurels. Dis- cipline and administration had been sapped by the long peace : the inefficiency of the armaments sent out was notorious. On the other hand, the French ships, so far as they were replaced at all, were replaced by a few vessels, each of which, because more modern, was better armed and equipped than the English ones. Yet in 1744, when France and England went to war, there were ninety ships of the line in the English fleet, while all Mau- repas' efforts could only produce forty-five^. It was this naval revival which made the diversion in favour of the Pretender possible. But the de- struction of these hopes soon came. Already in 1742 Martin had forced Carlos of Naples to with- draw from the Bourbon alliance by a threat to ^ D'Argenson, iii. 345. - Ibid. IV. 88. 3 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, 259, 264. bombard Naples. Now, in 1744, the battle of Toulon, indecisive though it was, had decisive re- sults. The maladministration and incompetence in the English fleet was revealed, and England dis- covered she was becoming mistress of the seas rather through the weakness of her enemies than through her own disciplined strength. France on the other hand gave up the vain attempt to revive the navy. The battle of Toulon at the very outset of the war had decided against a revival of French naval power and with it against the real hope for the return of the Stuarts. The result was imme- diate. "In 1747, near the end of the war, the royal navy of Spain was reduced to twenty-two ships of the line, that of France to thirty-one, while the English had risen to one hundred and twenty- six }> On each sea England reasserted herself. The "• ^^^ . . Three measure of her power in the Channel was the his- seas. tory of Dunkirk. D'Argenson had urged Louis in 1744 to offer to give up his conquests in Flanders if England would let him keep Dunkirk. But Louis' momentary passion for war was too strong. The town was however fortified on the landward side. At length when peace was made at Aix-la- Chapelle a provision was made in favour of England. " Dunkirk shall remain fortified on the landward side in the state in which it is at present, but on the side towards the sea it shall remain in the condition prescribed by the old treaties." It was indifferent now to England whether Dunkirk was 1 Mahan, 259. H. 19 290 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 291 fortified or not on the landward side, but by this clause the pride of Louis was soothed \ In the Mediterranean the House of Hanover re- asserted itself by the failure of France to win over the King of Sardinia from the alliance of Worms. His refusal to make a treaty at Turin was the sequel to the battle of Toulon. Nor was the naval power of Spain at the disposal of France after the death of Philip V in 1746. For the new Queen was a Portuguese, and all her influence was excited in favour of a cessation of the naval struggle, and the English " flattered themselves that they could attain their ends through the medium of Lisbon where they are dominantV Even in the Baltic the English supremacy was reasserted, though in an unfortunate way. The famous case of the Si- lesian Loan grew out of the treatment accorded by England to some French and Prussian ships. No opposition could be offered by Frederick or France at sea, and recourse had therefore to be had to commercial oppression on land^ But on the Euro- pean seas England had only to reassert, not to build up, her power. And this was made the more easy by her triumphs on the further Atlantic in South America and by the beginnings of a struggle with France for the Indian Ocean. For the fallen House of Stuart, however, the result was final. Unless France could take the supremacy of the sea from the House of Hanover, her Pretender could not hope for real success. In- 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 315. - D'Argenson, v. 14. 3 Hall, International Law, 260. stead of this, the abortive attempts of 1744 and 1745 worked to his disadvantage. For the renewed attempt to struggle against English naval power on his behalf only meant renewed failure, and the attempt was never made again. Charles Edward himself seemed to divine his own position when he said to the Prince of Conti, who had remarked that the British navy was no good friend to him, " That may be; but I am nevertheless the friend of the fleet against all its enemies. The glory of England I shall always regard as my own, and her glory rests on her navy^" 2. Influence of Religion. The great question of religion in connection with i. Catho- the Stuart cause was very largely settled at the ^proustalu time of the war of the Austrian Succession. Pro- tisvi. testantism was brought into prominence by the action of Frederick of Prussia. Himself a free- thinker he did not scruple to use Protestantism for political ends. In 1740 he appeared in Silesia not only as the asserter of his own rights, but as the champion of the oppressed Protestants. Per- secution had been very severe and already in 1707 Charles of Sweden had interfered 2. With its re- union to Prussia, a great impetus was given to the power of Protestantism in North Europe. Nor was this all. For Frederick proposed to George II that a league of Protestant Princes should be formed as against the Catholic Powers of southern Europe. 1 Lockhart PaperSy 11. 591. ^ Above, p. 120. 19—2 I 292 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 293 George refused, but the community of interests was becoming obvious and was to bear fruit in time\ Protestantism as a political fixctor had received a new impulse from the rise of Frederick. Catho- licism on the other hand was growing weaker. The evil effects of the Bull Unigenitus were increasing. This had marked the climax of the Jesuit triumph in France. To it the crown had committed itself, for Louis XIV had authorized persecutions to en- force it and the Regents of Louis XV had followed in his steps. But the Parlement or supreme ju- dicial tribunal of Paris was Jansenist, and with it followed, in opposition to the Bull, all the forces opposed to the clergy and the absolute power of the crown^. With Louis XV's own advent to power, any real support of either side was out of the ques- tion, and Franco settled down to a religious apathy, where religious terms became party labels and the way was prepared for a national life which denied the existence of religion. The last champion of the Church who held great power in France was Car- dinal Tencin. He was indissolubly linked with the Stuart causO; for he owed his hat to the efforts of James IIIl His period of power from 174-t-l750 was however the last attempt of the Church to 1 Cf. Droysen, v. iii. 99. ' When in 1728 an illness of Louis XV gave Philip of Spain a chance of the succession to France, he remarked, " there was one party of which he was apprehensive, the Jansenists. And they had reason to be against him, for if ever he came to be in possession of the crown of France, he would drive them out of the Kingdom." Coxe, Bourbons in Spairiy iii. 229. ^ Frederick II, Histoire de mon tempSy edit. Max Posner, 315. rule in France. With his disgrace in 1750 the political power of Catholicism received a severe shock. It is noteworthy that with this last Cardinal ".^«P«^y •^ . and the Minister should be associated the representative ot stuarts. the House of Stuart as the last hope of a crusade in the west. With the end of the war Charles Edward was driven from France. Spain would not accept him, Catholic to the core though she was, for the Portuguese influence was too much on the side of England to help the Stuart caused One champion of the Catholic House of Stuart alone remained — the Pope. But the relations between them now changed. For on the third of July 1747, Charles's brother, Henry of York, became a Cardinal of the Roman Church 2. Charles at once saw how this compromised the whole future of the Stuart cause. For the English nation, however inclined to receive him before, would never accept a House so irrevocably bound to Catholicism. In vain Charles went to the other extreme and in 1750 declared himself a Protestant. It was too late to change the impression which had been given I But to Pope Benedict XIV the position was advantageous. The Holy See had always felt bound to maintain the cause of the Catholic line of England. Yet it had ever proved an embarrassing duty^ especially since Austria and Hanoverian England had drawn closer together. The Cardinalate of Henry solved the 1 Ewald, Life of Prince Charles, 315. 2 Ibid. 317. ^ Ibid. 347. * Cf. Ranke, Pojyes (Eng. trans. Kelly), 522. 294 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 295 difficulty. For James was always acknowledged with royal honours, and now the heir to the title after Charles became a Cardinal with royal honours. By his brother's elevation two mutually ex- clusive alternatives lay before Charles. The re- nunciation of his best chances in England in return for complete impotence under papal protection, or the renunciation of all papal favour in return for the bare chance of a return to England. By his attitude of complete abhorrence of Henry's act, Charles put himself in the wrong in the eyes of the Pope, and Benedict had freed himself of the one troublesome member of the fallen House. But by the acceptance of the dignity Henry renounced the possibility of marriage and with it the con- tinuance of the embarrassment to the Holy See. The act, which committed the Stuart cause irre- vocably to the Papacy, also involved the extinction of the line itself. Benedict had completed the policy of Clement XI and his successors, for now the day of crusades was over. Indeed the maintenance of the Stuart cause was found to hinder the cause of Catholicism in England, and at length the two became dissociated in Benedict's mind. The last hope of help from Bome was extinguished by the Pope in 1753. "The Pontiff," says a despatch, "has regulated the Catholic missions in England by new rules. They include exhortations, and also pro- hibitions to all the English orders against taking part in, or speaking for, the party of the reigning family or of the Stuart family. The Pretender was so angry that he appeared at the audience of the Pope and remonstrated that he was thus deprived of a means whereby he had been able to maintain his own cause and animate the minds of those families who were inclined to his cause. His Holi- ness was much more angry and made him under- stand how much more important were the interests of religion, for the sake of which they must stop these discourses so hateful to the Government, and so remove the dangers which the missionaries ran for so little provocation, enduring exile and casti- gation\" With this separation of the fallen House from the propagandism of the Catholics, the last connection of the Stuarts with religion as a political factor was gone. It was almost a mockery for the Pope to continue to treat James with marks of royalty. But even this empty honour was refused to his son Charles^ The battle of Fontenoy had not merely had 'f^f^^^^^l"^- results upon England'. The failure of the Stuart ^^^ ^^^. cause had revealed the impotence of France to land. regain control of the Channel, or, in consequence, to win a foothold on its western shore. But the way to the control of the eastern shore lay open before Louis. The successes of 1744 were repeated in 1745. Holland trembled for its safety. In 1746 Antwerp fell and the victory of the French at Rocoux placed Belgium at the feet of France. The next year saw the French enter Holland itself. At once the horrors of 1672 came to the minds of the 1 Broseh, Kirchenstaat, ii. 108. 2 Stanhope, The Decline of the last Stuarts, 21. 3 Above, p. 280. 296 THE FALLEN STUARTS. {$) The Stuarts. Dutch. They had already made proposals for peace in 1745. But they were the allies of England, " the excellent and zealous ambassadors of England," as D'Argenson styled them^ Louis refused to have peace so long as Charles Stuart might still prove useful, and would not abandon him, as the Dutch required. But by 1747 the Stuart cause was lost and the Dutch made a last desperate appeal. Wassenaer opened negotiations at Paris and at Breda^ But it was in vain. In despair the Dutch revived the long disused office of Stadtholder in the person of William IV of Orange I The Dutch nation, weak though it was, found a new strength in the consciousness of a person round whom their loyalty could centre. William was to Holland what Pitt became to Eng- land, and Louis' own action had helped to bar his way to either side of the Channel. But at present Holland could offer no resistance. Still, elsewhere the supports of France failed her. Frederick of Prussia had in December 1745 ended his feud with Maria Theresa for the time by the Peace of Dresden*, while Spain had turned to the side of England through the Portuguese influence of the new Queen. France was therefore glad to make terms, and the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 closed the war and with it all the French attempts at aggres- sion on either side of the Channel. It was the end of the political importance of that House which had so long been put forward by the Powers of Europe 1 D'Argenson, iv. 333. » Oncken, i. 436. * Koch and Sclioell, i. 303 ; Droysen, v. ii. 639. 2 Ibid. IV. 351. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 297 to aid their political, naval, and religious ambitions. The nineteenth clause of the treaty declared that "the guarantee of the succession to the throne of Great Britain in favour of the House of Hanover, already established by article 5 of the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, is renewed ^" It was the last time the guarantee was necessary. The refusal of Charles to leave France was followed by his for- cible expulsion^. Twice, in 1750 and 1752, he went over to England but found the attempt was vain. Spain would not receive him. Frederick of Prussia would only give him sympathy for his wanderings^. The House of Stuart had ceased to consist of Pretenders whom the enemies of the House of Hanover could use in order to create diversions for the other more important instruments of their political interests. II. AFTER THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. The forcible expulsion of Charles from France ij^^«^JJf« was the end of the international importance of his on Land. House. As the century went on, European questions jj^j^^"^-^^ grouped themselves round the new and as yet Prussia. scarcely understood problem of the existence of Prussia. In the war of the Austrian Succession the fate of Silesia had been the great question for eastern Europe. In the Seven Years' War the existence of Prussia herself was the question for the 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 316 ; cf. Droysen, v. iii. 499. 2 D'Argenson, v. 309. 3 Lyon in Mourning, iii. 253 ; Droysen, v. iv. 36. 298 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 299 (iS) Alli- ance of Pmssia and England. whole of Europe. This involved as a consequence that the centre of gravity of European politics shifted more and more eastwards. The attention of the world was more and more drawn off from England and the west, and Pitt's dictum that he would conquer America in Germany might have equally applied to an intention of conquering by the expulsion of the Pretender from England. In the uneasy years after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle the old combination of states completely broke down. The change was due to the Austrian policy of Kaunitz and Maria Theresa. In their eyes Prussia must be destroyed, and a splendid opportunity for this would be given if only France would hear reason on the point. An attack from their here- ditary enemy must not be waited for, nor must the revenge of the conqueror confine itself to the re- covery of Silesia. For a long time France refused to join hands with the Power whom it had always been the aim of the Bourbons to crush. But a second great force in Europe tended to draw attention to the east. Russia under Elizabeth began to assert the position for which Peter the Great had prepared her. To Frederick especially the danger was very great, for the rivalry between them for power in the north-east was beginning to take the shape of Russian armies on his borders. Prussia however saw an opportunity for escape in the existence of her western neighbour — Hanover. It was here that France and England joined issue on the continent. The Peace of 1748, which settled matters in Europe, had left the American and Indian la:'*-' rivalry unquenched, and struggles went on though war was not declared. George, in terror lest reverses like that of General Braddock in 1755 might be the prelude to hostilities in Europe, at once turned his attention to secure the neutrality of the Electorate as the place most open to French attack. Austria, dallying with France, refused to guarantee it. The only other Power was Prussia. And to Frederick an alliance with George was very acceptable because George and Elizabeth of Russia had in 1755 made an alliance. The whole position of the Prussian King was expressed in two lines which he wrote : " How can I avoid an invasion from Russia ? By making with England the treaty of neutrality which she proposes : therefore I must make it\" The treaty of Westminster in January 1756 was the result. The news of this decided Louis. France and Austria concluded the treaty of Versailles in May 175G^ The whole face of Europe was thus changed. (7) The -r4 1 • 1 TT changed The two northern Powers, England with Hanover ^^^^^e. and Prussia, stood opposite to Austria and France. It was a re-opening in far vaster proportions of those profound issues of the new religion and the old which had been postponed and not permanently settled by the great peace of Westphalia. Frederick maintained himself by means of his own valour and English supplies till he brought Prussia from a con- dition in which her very existence was threatened to one in which she was the equal and rival of 1 Oncken, 11. 73; Droysen, v. iv. 487. 2 Koch and Schoell, i. 334. \ .300 THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 301 THE FALLEN STUARTS. Austria for the headship of Germany. This led to the triple struggle of Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the headship of the east of Europe, and the struggle was ended by the sacrifice of the state that lay between them — Poland. But this was not all. As the attention to eastern affairs more and more drew these Powers away from the west, they were brought face to face with the old question which had played an important part in the affairs of Austria earlier in the century — the attitude towards Turkey. But what had been an eastern crusade for Austria had now become, owing to the development of her two neighbours, the Eastern Question for all Europe to consider. Step by step the Powers of Europe were being drawn away from the questions of the west. And with the questions of the west the fate of the House of Stuart was bound up. ii. In- The special link which had bound the Stuart Religion, cause to the monarchs of Europe had been religion. But since Louis XIV and the outburst of Alberoni, this motive for the restoration of the fallen House had been more and more declining till even the Popes had ceased to champion it^ The time was now come for the Popes themselves to tremble for their power in Catholic Europe. In 1759 Pombal expelled the Jesuits from Portugal, and their expul- sion from Spain and France led Clement XIV to condemn the Order in 1773*. Catholicism was a house divided against itself. To champion a dynasty 1 Above, p. 295. 2 Coxe, Bourbons in Spain (1815), chap. lxv. ; Ranke, Papacy, VIII. § 18. as devoted to the cause of the Jesuits as was that of the Stuarts would have been impossible now, had the Popes desired to do so. But the great cleavage in religious Europe was becoming more and more not that of Catholics and Protestants but that of Christianity and Rationalism. The influence of Voltaire made the religious championship of the Stuarts by any country an impossibility, and, in the case of France, an absurd it v. The cause of the exiled dynasty had always iii. Bal- finally rested on the control of the sea, and the Poy^er at power vindicated by England in the war of the '^^^• Austrian Succession was not lost in the later strug- xr^,^^ (jles. Once acjain France tried to revive her naval ^^l- power in the Seven Years' War, and Choiseul took up the mantle of Richelieu and Colbert. The issues had now widened. It was not a question only of the three European seas, it was a question of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans too. But the power of England which had secured the seas round Europe led her successfully to secure the others. The naval successes under Pitt's administration in 1759 were links in the chain of maritime supremacy under William III and George I. Once again an attempt was made to invade England by the preparation of a lar^e fleet at Brest in 1759. Charles Stuart was invited to come and hoped much from the promises of the French Court, though the idea of Louis seems to have been to make Charles King of Ireland^ Charles published a manifesto declaring he was coming to London and calling on the English to 1 Pickle the Spy (Lang), 301-305. 302 THE FALLEN STUARTS. rise. Two fleets were hurriedly got together for the purpose by Choiseul. But the total defeat of that of Toulon off Lagos in August and that of Brest at Quiberon Bay in September 1759 put an end to the attempt. Once again England was mistress of the Channel and the eastern Atlantic. The capture of Louis- burg in Cape Breton Island and the seizure of Quebec made England mistress of the western Atlantic as well. The Indian Ocean had already been secured by the failure of France to support Dupleix or Labourdonnais. The victory of Plassey in 1757 was made productive of further results by rendering possible the maintenance of a naval con- nection with India. But this supremacy of England was doomed to failure. With the outbreak of the American revolt France once again saw her oppor- tunity. She could not bring back the House of Stuart over the Channel, but she might use the Americans to regain her power over the Atlantic. The treaty of Paris was therefore signed with the Americans in 1778. The colonists were to take the place of Charles Edward, as a tool for French interests against England. It was the French naval assistance that led to the surrender of Yorktown in 1781 \ but America not France reaped the benefit. For with the accession of Louis XVI the internal difficulties made a strong foreign policy impossible. Maurepas could not renew the attempts of Choiseul. (j3) Joseph One further event might have led to changes on the eastern side of the Channel — the attempt of II. ^ Mahan, Infiuence of Sea Power on History. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 303 Joseph II to open the mouth of the Scheldt to Belo^iimi, for Austria would thus have had an outlet to the sea and the rivalry of the Ostend Company with English trade have been renewed. But the treaty of Fontainebleau in 1785 put an end to the attempts England remained without a rival at sea till the outbreak of the Revolutionary wars, and then she only strengthened herself. Driven back as he had been from the Channel, the Baltic and the Mediterranean, the Stuart representative had to see this naval power extend to the seas of other continents, and in that very extension strengthen the prestige of the royal House which had succeeded to his throne. Neither as Catholic, nor as Pretender, nor as tool against the naval tyranny of England was there any hope for James or Charles Stuart after 1748. Twelve years afterwards the one re- maining ground for the expectation of help in England itself was removed from him. For with the accession of George III the Tory sentiment of loyalty could find its satisfaction in the first really English king of the House of Brunswick. III. THE FALLEN STUARTS AND THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLAND. It is an element in the international politics of i. General PI p n TT r, importance Europe that the history of the fallen House ot of stuarts Stuart has been traced. But the influence of that \l;^/f^l House upon the internal development of England ternally. 1 Koch and Schoell, i. 488. 304 THE FALLEN STUARTS. (a) Senti- ment. was also momentous. But for the " King over the Water" the results of the Revolution of 1688 could scarcely have been so complete as they were, while the repeated attempts at restoration only ended in securing the rival dynasty more firmly on the throne. There are three special ways in which this influence mav be traced. The continuance of the fallen House of Stuart maintained a separation between the national senti- ment of enthusiasm and the utilitarian basis of national life. Round the old monarchy with its his- torical associations the national feeling had wreathed itself The doctrine of Divine Right had given it expression and the Restoration had brought back the monarchy to at least its sentimental hold on the nation. But with the flight of James all this had been weakened, and at the accession of George I a new theory for royalty had to be found. The King became the official of the nation bound by the original contract. The antipathy of the nation to foreigners, which exhibited itself so strongly against William III and the German house, strengthened the new theory. The basis of royalty in England had changed from sentiment to utility. But the old feelings, which reached their height under Anne, were still strong and clung to the exiled House, with whom the majority of the nation sympathised. The former loyalty to the reigning line became a passionate reverence for the exiles, and to it was attracted much of the best feeling in the country. It seemed a dangerous thing for the new order of society when the object of the sentiment of the THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 305 nation was removed, and its place had to be filled by a substitute, whose highest claim to reverence was expediency. Yet in the end it was this very separa- tion of sentiment from the Crown that made the existence of the fallen House so vital to the best interests of England. The great essential of the country was peace. For that the best security was the divorce between the loyalty of the nation to the throne and the military ambition of the monarch. Nor was this all. The spirit of toleration pro- {^)Gradual . . . • 1 J. change. duced the desired change without any violent up- heaval of order. The fall of the House of Stuart effected a re-formation not a revolution. The essential character of the change was that it was gradual. The strain was felt on the different ele- ments of society at different times and could be borne. Each element as it was changed gave strength to the others as their turn came. It was not so in the case of France, where the need for change in all the elements of society had gone on unsatisfied. A violent break with the past became necessary, so that even now the new order of things is scarcely stable. In England the re-formation of the nation went on slowly for a century and a half But during the beginning of that period the great reason for this slow process was the existence of the House of Stuart. Linked with every part of the national life, the connection between the dynasty and the nation could not be severed at once. Yet when all danger from that dynasty was past, every part of the national life had been changed as the need came, without fear of a reaction in the whole. 2^ ii. Par- ticular Cases. (a) Mate- rial change. 306 THE FALLEN STUARTS. The most obvious feature of the time of Walpole was the development of material prosperity. After all the wars of William III and Marlborough there followed a time of peace and recuperation. But a great change was going on — the change from land to trade as the basis of wealth. The Tories who had the land and who formed the majority of the nation were for James. The Whigs who formed the mercantile classes and numbered a fe^v great families were in a minority, but had the power. To the landed proprietors there clung the sentiment of feudalism, culminating in the divinely-appointed King. The merchant looked to no historic past, but saw that his wealth depended on the maintenance of the more useful form of government. The change from the old to the new was personified in Walpole. Gradually the two classes blended. The wealthy tradesman became a landowner for the sake of the social status which it gave, and the landlords engaged in mercantile undertakings. The old sentiment of lord and vassal which feudalism had engendered gradually yielded before the mere bargaining of thing for thing. Much depended on the peaceful working of this change, which came about because of the existence of the banished House, whose throne had been the security of the landlords of the Tory party. For moderate measures towards landowners were made necessary, in order to obviate their opposition to the government. Gradually resistance became acquiescence, until the landlords saw their complete safety under the new order of things. With Walpole the change came and the result I THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 307 was the enormous development of industry and trade which followed in the later part of the century, owing to the inventions of the textile trades. And with this was linked another change — that of the basis of finance. When the national income was all drawn from land, the owners of land were of course very closely linked with the reigning House. But the new dynasty was forced to depend on the trading classes for sudden emergencies and all special needs. The use of loans grew up and the whole system of finance and taxation was reor^^anised on a basis of credit. Yet this too was a gradual process and the mistakes of the South Sea Bubble and the East India Company were not soon forgotten. The material wealth of England, then, changed from one class to another and the reason of its gradual and harmless transfer was largely due to the need of the support of all classes for the new- dynasty. Had not the fear of the Stuarts been present in all the mercantile and financial measures of Walpole, their moderation might have been less conspicuous and the great industrial development of the later part of the century retarded. The connection of the fallen House with the (^s) PoUti- political development of the country was still more c«^^'*«"^«- marked. It marked the change from loyalty to i. Patriot- patriotism. The revolution of 1688 had sealed the '["^y^t fate of the doctrine of Divine Right and in 1714 the new King could be nothing but an official. But the sentiment of loyalty did not die. A decreasing number maintained their adherence to the fallen House. To the majority there was no object for 20—2 \ 308 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 309 loyalty. Government was necessarily a matter of convenience. But this was a doctrine which entailed bad consequences. For the want of sentiment in politics made possible the system of corruption by which the government was maintained. On the continent absolute monarchs still held sway. In England the Whig oligarchy maintained itself during the\ge of Walpole, from the fact that the return of James III seemed the greater evil. But the senti- ment of loyalty which had been the dominant senti- ment of politics was lost. Nor was this fact due to the change of dynasty only, but rather to the con- tinuance of the exiled line. For so long as the sentiment of loyalty existed at all, it had to turn to the Stuart representative while his cause was stdl active. Except for his existence this feeling might have rapidly found its satisfaction in the House of Hanover. But with the representative of the banished House still maintaining his claims, the element of enthusiasm could not exist between the ruling House and the nation. Nor was the long peace with its corruption and want of display likely to foster it. Still more did Walpole dread a war. For war he knew would rekindle the national enthusiasm which would be centred in the banished Prince. Meanwhile the new political order was being consolidated and the new dynasty proving its utility. Yet sentiment in politics was avoided at all costs. At length this policy justified itself. For the war of the Austrian Succession broke out and in 1745 the House of Stuart tried to make use of it in order to regain the Crown. But the day for loyalty to the Stuart was over, and the rebellion was unsup- ported. Fourteen years later there was another war and at length the old spirit of enthusiasm was revived by the victories of the British arms. But it was not now the sentiment of loyalty to the dynasty. It was a new feeling of loyalty to the growing Empire— the feeling of patriotism. The old senti- ment had been narrow and insular. The new sentiment could expand with the expanding Empire. It wreathed itself round the man who called it into being, and William Pitt's great gift to the nation was the restoration of sentiment into politics. The following year George III ascended the throne and once again the nation was conscious that the King was an Englishman. The ideal of a Patriot King was fitted to call up the new spirit of loyalty to the Empire. Yet it was no small service that the House of Stuart had rendered to the nation. For it had withdrawn the spirit of enthusiasm from the nation just at a time when its absence was most needed. It was peace that England wanted, and had a spirit of loyalty towards the House of Bruns- wick been evoked, the military tastes of the first two Georges might have made the continuance of peace impossible. When the war did come, the peace had done its work, and the result of the war of the Austrian Succession was the conversion of the narrower sentiment of loyalty to the person into the wider one of patriotism for the country. With the return of sentiment to politics the day of cor- ruption was past. 310 THE FALLKX STUARTS. 2. The Navy. 3. Moder ation. The means by which this change had been made possible was the navy, and the navy was essentially linked with the new feeling of patriotism. At first it was popular as the means of defence against France and the Pretender whom France championed, but with the wars of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War the foundations of Greater Britain were laid or strengthened. With that Greater Britain the Stuart House had no link, and its development involved no increase in the strength of the ties between them. But there was not only the transference of sentiment. The presence of the Pretender also involved a tolerance in politics which would other- wise have been impossible. The Whigs could not push their advantage to extremities. The abolition of the law for the censorship of the Press in 1695 gave the discontented a means by which to give expression to their opinions while the power in the hands of the government made such expression harmless. At the same time this secured the country against the dangers of a doctrinaire revo- lution, for opinions were not repressed till, as in the case of the French Revolutionists, they had to be put into practice in their extremest form. Thought and action could grow up side by side till reform, urged by the elder and younger Pitt, but repressed by the dread of revolutionary France, could achieve its bloodless victory in 1832. Yet, but for the check of the older dynasty upon the Whig oligarchy, the development must have been far less peaceful. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 311 Perhaps the greatest influence of the fallen (7). ^^- House was in the sphere of religion, ihe essential change. feature of the Church under the earlier and later Stuarts was its national character. It was essentially bound up with the King as the head of the nation by its doctrine of passive obedience. Its tendency was to become an affair of the State rather than a matter for the individual. With the flight of James in 1688 the link of Church and King was severed, for the Church could not take back its own doctrine and accept a usurper in place of the Lord's anointed. Beside this, the true King was a Catholic. The Church therefore, like the State, had to find a utilitarian basis for its connection with the State. But the old sentiment of obedience to the King as a part of religion was gone, and instead of it Christian- ity became a system of morals based on a rational self-interest. To this result the continued presence of the Pretender largely helped. For it was felt that any recurrence of religious enthusiasm was sure to culminate in the recall of the legitimate King. The case of Sacheverell had supplied a precedent, which Walpole never forgot. All parties, except the Catholics, were conciliated, but the Test Act was not repealed. Toleration without enthusiasm was the religious policy to be followed. As a result, the relit^ious part of the nation was reconciled to the new dynasty, but the life of religion died out. But this was really only the preparation for a better change. For meanwhile, as the industrial power of the country was developed, a new popula- tion was growing up who were beyond the reach of 312 THE FALLEN STUARTS. THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. 313 the old religion or of its attachment to the anointed King. The masses had begun to exist. In France it was the masses which brought about the ferocity of the Revolution. But in England the new difficulty was met by a religious revival, and the Methodists brought back religion to the lower classes before they had become politically dangerous. Nor was this all. For one of the doctrines preached by Wesley was loyalty or obedience to the powers that be. But this meant loyalty to the House of Hanover and not to the House of Stuart. A second doctrine was intolerance of Catholicism, which further weak- ened any connection with the fallen dynasty. The result was that a violent revolution was avoided, for the masses had been imbued with a spirit of religion and respect for the existing order of society. Yet that the old religious enthusiasm and bitterness should be followed by a time of spiritual apathy was needed before the reaction of Methodism could gain the hold. And that period of apathy was the result of the continuance of the exiled House. To it therefore is largely due the fact that in England there was a gradual re-formation of the body politic, not a violent revolution as in France. {dj^Georoe Perhaps the influence of the House of Stuart upon England may be best seen by a consideration of the efforts of George III to revive the personal power of the monarch and the doctrine of Divine Right. Backed up by a strong party he tried to rule as well as govern, but he failed. That he failed was due to the strength of the polity which Walpole and Chatham had built up. Yet at the back of the f tolerance and moderation of the one, and serving as a precedent for the enthusiasm roused by the other, the existence of the fallen House was an influence, secret though strong, ever-present though often not avowed. If that influence conduced to the more gradual and therefore the more stable development of the English nation, the Stuart Pretenders might be absolved from much that is laid to their account. They had done their work in 1760 and had been succeeded by a King who was destined to be at the head of the nation, while the neighbouring country of France, with no Stuart dynasty to temper the violence of the shock, passed through the horrors of the Revolution. r ■^ APPENDIX. 315 APPENDIX. 1. List of the Gualterio Manuscripts quoted. 20292. Letters of Jame.s III. 1700-1726. 20293. Letters of (^iieen Mary Beatrice to Gualterio. 1700-1718. 20294. 20295. Letters of Gualterio to James and ]\Iaria Beatrice. 1700-1728. 20297. Letters of Gualterio to Middletoi). 1711-1714. 20304. Letters of Gualterio to Dunbar, James and Inver- ness. 1726, 1727. 20312, 20313. Papers on England and Scotland. 1701- 1727. 2031 8, 203 1 9. Correspondence with Torcy. 1 701 -1 7 1 3. 20321. Letters of Gualterio to Dubois. 1719-1723. 20322. Letters of Gualterio to Fleury. 1725-1727. 20241. Letters from Pope Clement XL 1700-1719. 20242. Diplomatic Correspondence of Gualterio with Clement XL 1700-1720. 20243. Some of Clement XFs Bulls. 1700-1720. 20245. Letters from Alberoni. 1717-1721. 20359. Letters of Abbe d'Estrees to Gualterio. 1703- 1718. 20327. Letters of Cardinal de la Tremouille to Gualterio. 1706-1718. 20581 a, b. Various Papers. 2. Abbreviations used in the Manusmpts. V.M., S.M. Votre Majeste (Vostra Maesta), Sa Majeste (Sua Maesta): generally James III : sometimes Louis XIV. V.E. Votre Eminence or Vostra Eminenza: generally used in addressing Gualterio or some other Cardinal. S.S., S.V. Sua Santitk or Sa Saintete, Santita Vostra: the Pope. S.M.T.C. Sa ]\rajest(5 Tres Chretienne : the French king. S.M.C. Sa Majeste Catholique : the Spanish king. S.A.R. Son Altesse Roy ale : the Duke of Orleans. 3. The Text. 20292. 1.- 1714 iii Tout ce que je puis vous dire de certain, c'est que ie n'abandonnerai jln.ais la Religion Cathohque et que je suis prest ii tout sacrifier pour elle. "* 1715 iii Ce n'e«t pas Unt un fils qui Ini (the Pope) est tres somuis mai« oppri.ne ^ present uar |^>"J"«^^-« ^'^^^X cnnemis qu'uneoglise persecutee qm reclame la protection ae s nXne ontifel.Et si l'£gli«e a des tresors, k quelle autre hnles^a^elle que pour Ctre employes \ son soutemi et a celui des tidfcles persecutes ? 1718 ii. (James to Cardinal Imperiale.) Vous ^;ous souv endrez sans doute de ce qui s'est pas.se pendant non vova^? Rome au suiet de la demande que j'ay faite au Pape rtSs en mTlie eius, la seule difficulte etant e nmyen de ?executer....Je ne demande pas avon- ardent dans >nes proprcs mains pourvu que je soi.s assure If"" _''«' '*, V^ 1^'*;^,^^^ prest toutes et quant fois que je le demanderais, en mfoimant S.S. de I'usage auquel il sera employe. ix. (.James to Cardinal Aquaviva ) Les avantages cVune alliance entre le Roy d'Esp.agne et '^^^^''-^'^Hotten^r b sont bien n,anifestes, et le seul moyen efficace d^ ?«>'*«""^^^ ;.roe.Ss avec I'Andeterre avec bonheur et proht. 11 ne Zmart ent U de luy (Alberoni) prescrire des ri^gles pour t^Ifttt a sonmie qui a ete promise en mon nom est de foo^tres saXr-^s je n'ay f ---ce maintenaiH pour retrouver cette sonmie que dans la generosite de S.&LU ^^^ ,718 viii 30. La Paix (i.e. of Aland) est entierement fait et conclue....Le Czar continuera d'^*- -^^^ {J^^.ti Pni Mames-i mais il est necessaire que le Roy ait 1 argent ^r^st^-S t^etfpromis en son nom sans leque .^sera.t m. :;X la P^ix dins tout ce qui pourroit etre propo^^ l.our le rLblissement de S.M.B. (James). 208, 209 ; 316 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 20293. 1705. xi. Habbio timore che il soccorso della Spagna possa impedire quello di Scozzia. 74 xii. Je dois beaiicoiip k M. de Torcy d'avoir enfin per- suade le Roy a faire quelque chose (en ficosse) niais je suis convaincue que jamais il n'aurait fait cela, si vous ne I'aviez preniitjrement persuade. 76 1706. i. Depuis que j'ay reyu que I'on ne voulait plus envoyer un Fran9ois et (jue Ton voulait innnediatenient envoyer I'argent, je crains extrtjmement. 78 V. Madame de Main tenon dit — Le Roy escrira au Pape comme vous le desires : M. de Torcy vous en rendra compte. 80 iv. Lo Papa ha operato in questa occasione veramente da buon Padre. 81 20294. 1702. (Draft of a secret treaty between Louis XIV, Philip V and Clement XI to restore James III.) § 2. Sono convenuti di lasciar pienamente alia scelta di S.M. (Louis) 1' elezione del tempo in cui sarh, i)iu proprio di cominciar la im})resa. § 18. Considerandosi che il far apparire su gli principii il concorso di S.S. (Clement) non potrebbe che difficultarla merce alia alienatione che li populi protestanti hanno verso il Capo della religione cattolica, S.S. vuole la sua concorrenza resti per ora occulta agli huomini ;...quindi tutto quello che contril)uisce alia im})resa, passi sotto nomine del Re Christi- anissimo. § 20. La guerra in cui da tante parti si trova implicato il R^ Cattolico non permettendogli di poter supplire al dis- pendio di questa intrapresa con le sue rendite ordinarie, S.S. considerando che i bisogni da Chiesa non possono essere meglio impiegati che in una opera di tanto merito, con- discende ad accordare a S.M.C. una decima sopra gli ecclesi- astichi di suoi stati per la somma necessaria alle spese. 8 1707. iii. Adosso convengo che non sia esj^ediente di muovere tale negotio (i.e. money from Rome) perch 6 da un canto la cosa non servirebbe a niente, e dall' altro facendo strepito, 1' istanza })otrebbe suscitare qualche persecutione contro i ben afietti alia ftimiglia Reale e i)erdere molti innocenti. 25 APPENDIX. 317 iv. In ordine al denaro del Papa, lo mi daro 1 on ore d dire con strettissima confidenza alia M.V. (Queen Mary) ch' e-li h ancora a Parigi in tanti biglietti pero che ad una occasione se non potrebbero fare capitale. ^1 ^ xi 17 Godo infinitamente di sentire che J' affare de Vescovati d' Irlanda sia in stato megliore e che M.V (James) habWa luogo di sperare di cio quello che domandava^con tanta giustizia. 1711 vi 3 Gli altri Re tutti scielgono liberamente i Protettori degl' aftari de' loro Regni, ne il Papa ^^ niescola di dare loro Breve alcuno : lo facevano gh antichi Re d Inghil- ?eiTl e solamente ha preso questo jus La Sede Aposto ica quando i medesimi si separarono della Chiesa, onde sarebbe ra-ionevole che lo rendesse ai R6 medesimi divenuti Catto- lici. , , . . . ix 2 Con r ultimo ordinario recevo la bemgnissima lettera con cui la M.V. si degna l^.^.^^^^r^J^^f^^^ d' Inc^hilterra • si ritrova molta difticolta in b.b. m unitoi- Lrsfsci'a di cio alia questa che le MM.V. (James and Mary) si sono degnati di farmi. ' ix 17 S.S. credava che non convenisse dare a me un tal carattere per ragione che essendo ^^^^^^/^./^f /^^^^^^^^^ tianissimo, gli Inglesi che vengono a Roma tanto Cattoiici qlanto ErUi averebbero difficolta di trattar meco, merc6 r inimicizia che corre presentemente tra le due nationi....La veritk 6 che pochissimi' Cattoiici o Protes1.xnti hanno bisogno di venire a Roma per trattare con il Protettore. /9, 89 1712 ii 13 Replicai supplicando S.S. a riflettere che contestandosi a V.M. alcune sue Reali prerogative gli si con- testava il tutto peroche nello stato del e cose pi-esenti cio non importava meno che il possesso della sua Real dignitk.... Respose S.S. che i vescovi (the Irish Catholic bishops whom James desired to nominate) non potrebbero entrare nella Gran Bretagna se si sai>esse che sono nonimati e dipendono di V M (As to the appointment of Vicars Apostolic for Endandrinsiste S.S. sempre che gli si proi)onessero piu sogltti, sicch5 non veggo che habbia f^PO^etione di accettare la raxxjommandatione della M.V. assoluto. 119, 124, 1^7 ii 27 Si havesse S.S. gelosia che V.M. volesse acqiilstare diritti di nomina su tali Vicarii i quali, asseri, essere offiziali temporanei e ammovibili della Santa Sede...(Gualterio said) che senza il consenso della M.V. si correva rischio di vedere qualche scandolo grave. Perch^ i Cattolici d' Inf^^terra pieni di fedelta alia sua Persona (i.e. James) non vedrebbero 318 THE FALLEN STUARTS. volontieri un Prelato che sai)essero essere entrato in quel Regno con poco gradimento della M.V....S.S. disse che de- siderava sapere qiiali sogetti potessero es.sere grati e quali ingrati a M.V. per till niinistero, e procurcrebbe d' incontrare la sua sodi.sfazione....Ma il Papa vorebbe l>ene fare un sogetto che fosse di sodisfazionc alia M.V. ma in nianiera che fosse diretteniente proposto da lui ; il che distrugge totalmente il diritto Reale. 133, 134, 146 vi. 9. lo ho preso il titolo di Protettore e lo iK)rto come Protettore Regio. 159 1712. ii. (Cipher.) Je dois commencer, Monsieur (James), pour vous rendre compte que M. Raisin (Queen Mary) m'ayant charge de prier M. Parton (Clement XI) qu'il voulftt laisser encore pour un an en Frieul (^ Paris) les marchandises (the money) pour votre ser\'ice, je n'ay pas retrouvc Mr. Parton si dispose a cela que j'auray voulu, mais il n'a pas refuse absolument....J'ose vous raccomender encore de vouloir faire votre possible pour vous unir de plus en plus avec M. Rem- mon (Philip V). 181 1714. ii. 20. Tan to per cio che risguarda...la somma di dieci mila scudi tante volte promessa alia M.V. e tante volte ancor deferita, il primo ministro di S.S. dubita che gl' Aus- triaci e altri avversarii ne [)rendano sospetto e gliene facciano querele. 11 S. Cardinale mi disse subito che prevedera della difficolta perch6 sapeva che il Papa haveva destinato in ultimo luogo questo denaro ad altro uso, e si come si ritrova scarso, cos\ non havrebbe come suplire d' altronde. lo repli- cai che questa era la prima destinatione di esso...esser questo la causa di Dio, non del R6...Mi disse che S.S. era anzioso di soldare questa partita con il banco Cameralc.ma quando vedesse S.S. in disposizione di ritirarlo, me lo farebbe sapere accio io j)otesse premere per nuova dilazione. 186 — 189 iii. 15. S.M. b stata giustosamente sorpresa in sentire che S.S. siasi disposta finalmente a renderli giustizia circa la nomina de' Vescovi d' Irlanda. 193 iv. 17. II me revient que son (Clement's) intention est de vous (James) fouruir tant seulement environ les deux tiers des marchandises (money) qu'il vous avoit promises d'abord. 196 vi. 26. Le Pape souhaite les occasions de luy (James) marquer ces sentiments de tendresse et d'estime. Mais, il s'est mis dans une telle dependance de certains gens (i.e. Austrians) qu'il n'ose pas de fiiire la moindre partie de ce que son bon caair lui inspire. 207 APPENDIX. 819 (Undated.) J'ai parle enfin au Roi (Louis XIV) :je lui deinandai ce que vous aviez h faire en cas que la Princesse rAnne) vint a mourir. 11 me repondit...qu'on dit que si en pareil cas vous passiez la mer tout seul, vous seriez sans doute restabU. Je respondis que pourtant cetait a peu^F^s votre vue. viii 21 (As to appointment of Irish bishops.) Confesso che la strada additata da S.M. h la piii dritta e la pi u reale... ma sara sempre necessario ritrovare qualche mezzo termme T)er la paura che ha S.S. di ritrandosi. Brevi con lespres- sione di tal nomina appresso il Vescovo, se n eccite una per- secutione. 1714 ix 4. Fui Sabato passato all' udienza di S.S. e mi parld con tutta la tenerezza sopra questi emergent! (Anne s death) in ordine a i quali assicura che non manca di pregare Dio con tutto il suo cuore: benche lo faccia senza apparenza per non dar luogo a i clamori degl' avversarii. 233 ix 2 Je I'iii (Clement) trouve de tout temps tr^s bien intentionne pour ce qui regarde V M et pour tout pour son retablissement. S'il n'a pas contribue autant qu il auroit ete k proi)os, cela est arrive par une forte craiiite quii a de s'embarrasser lorsqu'il entreprend des grandes affaires et sur- tout estrang^res, pour lesquels il n'a pas le mesme go^t que pour les petites choses de ces pais icy auxquelles il a ete accoutume des ses premieres annees. 241 xii 4 Tous les marchands (those in sympathy with James) ici s'attendent que vous (James) vous mariez bien tost Mr Parton (the Pope) en a parle. 11 se laissa echapper comiue s'il avait songe a la tille de Prince Charles de Iveu- berg. 256 1715 i 29. Lorsque je le (the Pope) pressois de nous aider etde concourir a nous remettre dans la compagnie du comerce et de vous raccomoder avec M. Rigaut et M. Preston a e James' Reestablishment and Passage into England) il me rdpondit qu'il falloit que cela vint naturellement et qu a force de pressions on gasteroit nos affaires. II fallait attendre et nous etablir par un mariage convenable. Je luy repartis qu il devoit s'empresser Ik-dessus. 11 me repondit qu il le faisait de tout son pouvoir mais qu'il ne trouvoit pas aprfes la mort de M Antoine (Anne) les memes facilites dans le p5re de la fille (Prince of Neuberg) qu'il avoit remarquees. Q.uil ne doutait pas que ce raftroidissement vint de la crainte que M. Epinois (the Emperor) et pent estre I'oncle de la fille (Prince ? William of Neuberg) avoient de deplaire h M. Herman 820 THE FALLEN STUARTS. (George I)...qu'il ii'estoit pas croiable jusciu'a quel point la deference (et lacha nieme le mot) de vassal que M. Epinois et tons ses associez avoient pour U. Herman. 264, 265 iii. 2. As to the money (marchandises) M. Parton (the Pope) me parut pen dispose h les donner a moins pour le present, prevenu conmie il est qu'elles seroient i)erdues dans le comerce (James' restoration)... mais c'est I'exemple de M. Lambert (Duke of Lorraine) qui le tout-he le plus. Je le laissay finalement dispose de vous donner le reste des mar- chandises qui sont cliez Mr. Nemon (Cardinal Tremouille) h condition que M. Richard (Louis XIV) approuvcra....J'eus beau representer que M. Richard ne pouvait pas se mesler d'une telle affaire et qu'il ne voudroit non plus. 11^ persista toujours. 279, 280 iii. 19. Non posso nh pure negare a V.M. che m' inquieta anche non i)Oco il vedere la persistenza di 8.S. a volere esigcre, prima di fare alcun passo, il consiglio et il consenso della Corte di Francia mentre la contingenza de' tempi o tale che la medesima non puo rispondere su tali matiere. 292 (Undated Memorial from James to the Pope.) A I'egard de la quantite de cet argent que deux lettres^ (of the Poi>e's ministers) reduisent i\ 10"™ ecus seulement,'je ne syais pas comment le Pape et ses ministres puissent s'imaginer que 10"™ ou mesme 40"^ ecus suffiroient pour Faffaire en question. 303 iv. 30. Cardinal Albano me dit que M. Epinois luy (the Pope) a fort blame le comerce (James' restoration) et luy a dit qu'elle etoit impossible h reussir et que vous vous perdriez absolument et votre negoce en entreprenant ce comerce. II faut que ce mauvais office ait fait beaucoui) d'impression sur I'esprit de M. Parton (the Pope). 310 vi. 25. Je suis persuade qu'au fond S.S. a beaucoup d'amitie et d'attachement pour vous mais il pense si petite- ment et surtout il est tellement craintif qu'on n'en sauroit esperer une resolution. II aurait aussi toujours peur que I'envie que vous avez d'entrer dans le comerce ne vous am6ne trop loin. II croit que vos correspondants vous trompent et il demande toujours qu'on ne fasse rien que de I'avis de M. Richard (Louis). II craint effectivement de s'engager d'aucun plus grand comerce avec vous. 318 Mr. Columban (Prince Charles of Neuburg) avoit paru avoir si grand' envie de I'affaire (marriage) lors qu'il esperoit que I'heritage de Mr. Arthur (England) vous deut appartenir: il paraissait estre fort rafroidi apr5s avoir vu le changement qui estoit arrive chez Mr. Arthur. 321 APPENDIX. 321 I X. 22. Quant h I'affaire de M. Columban je crains fort qu'il ne soit tout a fait rorapu. '^31 xi. 12. Elle (S.S.) propose que celuy qui a presentement charge du negoce de M. Richard (Louis) vous payera du sien une somme qui estoit due audit Mr. Parton (the Pope) dans la banque k Paris... qu'il vous cederoit de bon coeur cette somme qui est assez considerable et qui fait le prix de 80 ballots^de marchandise ( = 80,000 livres). 337 xii. 10. Scriverebbe S.S. in Spagna per esortare quel clero a soccorrere ancor essi il Rti. 354 xii. 17. S.S. si fonda nel presupposto che il S. Uuca d' Orleans vorrk dare tutte le possibili facilita in quello che puo risultare in beneficio del R^, massimamente che S.S. crede che S.A.R. (Orleans) possa farlo senza alcuna apparenza. 365 20295. 1716. ii. 11. GHe (to S.S.) ne parlai di nuovo stretta- mente nel Consistoro, ma non ne ritrassi altra risposta che delle sue angustie e de' stimoli che haveva ancora degl' Alemanni per havere denari da impiegare nella guerra contro i Turchi senza poterli sodisfare. Questa in effetto h una cattiva congiuntura che si frapone: benche a bene con- siderare la cosa, molto pin si possa guadagnare per la Chiesa, aiutando la causa del R^, che non si puo perdere dalla banda del Turco. ^^ iv. 14. S.S. mi disse che volontieri servirebbe il R^ ne' suoi Stati e darebbe tutti gV ordini necessarii sopra di cio a quel Vice-Legato d' Avignone, che egli offeriva al R^^ non solamente Avignone ma qualunque altra Citta del suo Stato, e Roma medesima per suo soggiorno. 37 Partecipo il di lui (James') arrivo in detta cittk d' Aji- gnone. ' iv. 28. Tutto quello che S.S. ha creduto di poter fare h stato d' augmentare il sussidio destinato a S.M. d' altri mille scudi. 42 vii. 25. (As to James' stay at Avignon.) S.S. me pro- teste qu'il ne consentiroit jamais k rien faire qui fust contre les interets de V.M....mais elle se trouve agitee entre le desir de plaire h V.M. et la peur d'estre pressee et peut-estre maltraitee des Anglois et de voir mesme tomber en quelque risque la personne sacree de V.M. ^6 21 322 THE FALLEN STUARTS. APPENDIX. 323 h viii 25 M. Parton tiene questo negotio (maiTiage with Princes, of Neuberg) per iun>ossibile....Onde f^^^^^^_ ^empre a proposito di revoltare 1 ammo altro ^, e smgo^ar mente renso la famiglia di M. Sobinay (bobieski). 59 X 27 Mi pare che i loro (the Triple Allies) i>ensieri .iano bene diffJrenti 1' m.o dall' altro M. H--- (^^^^^^^^^^^^ essendo obligato per i «uoi propni mteressi ad ^;^^/^J« f ^^^^^ risguardi i)er M. Epinois (the Emi>eror) et a non fare cos\^»-'^^d^«^^7"f Vp >nt d' oro volontaria di Francia sari\ portata a fargli il Ponte d oio. fUiidated) Mi ha commandato S.S. d' iissicurarc la ^eri mai violenza alcuna a M.V. i^^r farlo uscire de «uo. rSi quali vuole che gli «iano tutti e sempre ugualmente aperti. 1717 iii 2 or ha S.S. offerto qualunque luogo che S M vorr^ scegliere senza voler far minima restri/zione. Ma Ss'vedrebbe il lib molto piii volontieri in Pessano che m Bologna, i>erche giudica cio maggiore decoro sicurez>^^ e servigio. , „ ,. ix 14 M. Parton (the Pope) b entrato della megliore grazfa del* mondo in quest' aftare e si 6 ^sibi^ch^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ tutto cio che fosse necessario per sostenere Mr. Robert (James) e rendere inutili i maligni progetti che s' erano fatti contro di X 2 (As to Peterborough's release, James) puo ftire con tutta sua riputatione quello stesso che f^re^>^' f/Hulle suo Trono in Londra con un reo per condannare il quale mancassero prove giuridiche. xi 1 6 II Papa n' b (as to Peterborough) allarmato, deside- rando d' incontraVe le sodisfazioni di S.M. bench^ veramente vorrebbe vedere quest' huomo (Peterborough) fuori "on sola- mente del suo Stato ma d' Italia. ^^^ xi 30 II Governo di Londra vuole richiederli sodisfa- zioni grandi di questo fatto e, non accordandoglisi, mandare quindici vascelli di guerra su questa costa per esigerle con la forza ed in caso di resistenza bombardare Civita Vecchia, e fare una discesa nelli Stati Ecclesiastichi. Le condizioni sono — i. Che milord si riponga m totale hberta. ii. Che S.S. disapprove cio che il S. Cardinale di Bologna ha fatto nel ritenerlo. iii. Che promette S.S. che nessuno Inglese sara moles- tato nello SUito Ecclesiastico per risguardo e sodisfatione del R^. 184, 185 xii. 1. In ordine alia Nomina Cardinalizia, vedo con dispiacere che il farla, massimamente in persona d' un Inglese, possa cagionare mali effetti in Inghilterra. 189 1718. ii. 2. Credo che S.S. sia hora trauquillo per quello che risguarda I'affare di Milord Peterborough. 213 ii. 9. Posso accertare V.M. d' aver scosto in S.E. (Albe- roni) tutto il buon desiderio di fare riuscire quello che V.M. brania. II suo dubio consiste nello stato delle cose presenti, in cui S.M.C. havendo spese eccessive, potra forse havere qualche difficoltk ad impegnarsi i>er una somma grossa, e dovendo manegiar 1' Inghilterra per non tirarsela su la traccia nel tempo che fa la guerra all' Imperatore....Ma ha cercato di demostrarli che il vero niodo d' assicurarsi d' Inghilterra e il mutarne il Dominio e lo impegnarla nelle cose sue proprie onde non habbia a pensare all' esterne. S.E. n' b persuasa e fark tutto il possibile per renderne la sua Corte conviuta. 218 iii. 16. (Letter from Philip V to James.) Un poco di tempo e vedranno che si prenderanno accertate misure ijer servirlo. V.M. duiique sia contenta nel vedere cosl nel Ke (Philip) che ne' suoi ministri tutta la meglior volontk di »ervirla senza attendere le occasioni piii sicure per I>en rius- cire. .^^^ iii 29 Peroch6 se i principi si dividono fra di loro, potranno considerare che qualcheduno san\ anche per proprio interesse. S.S. ha di grandissimi imbarazzi e si ritrova tra i duoi fuochi ; poco bene con la Corte di Vienna, et in pericolo di rompere con quella di Spagna a cagione dell' Archivescovato di Siviglia che fin ora nega al Cardinale Alberom. iv 27. S.S. vuol dare la consaputa somma (i.e. 300,000 scudi,* cf. 20292) ma sotto due conditioni. Una d' esser egli preventivamente informato dello impiego il quale deve farsene per giudicare se detto impiego sia sicuro. L altra di essere assicurato che in questo progetto non entri il Ub di Spagna. 21—2 324 THE FALLEN STUARTS. APPENDIX. 325 S S dice che cio essendo, 1' Imperatore prenderebbe quesU ^me una unione do S.S. e della M.V contro di Im c ne farebbe seco una inimicizia che gli potrebbe far perdere la raetk dello State Ecclesiastico....Sicch6 m questo ca.so riciisa di dare il denaro. vii. 2. Le rotture fra questa Corte (Rome) e q^^"'^^^ Spagna sono sempre piii aspre. vii 20 II S. Cardinale Albani disse che la <^^rte di Vienna prendesse in mala parte qualunque cosa che b.J5. farebbe in favore di V.M. nelle congiunture presenti. ^^^ vii 30 II S. Cardinale Aquaviva (Spanish Ambassiidor at Rome) ha fatto comprendere che era necessario d' havere risposta poBitiva di iMr. Remmon (Philip) sopra i progetti fatti di medesimo (the Cz^ir) per ben concertarsi et accio Mr. Robert (James) possa ftire dal canto suo se si desidemnno le dispositioni necessarie. ix 10 11 matrimonio per mezzo d' un Protestante darebbe un grave dispiacere al Papa S.S. approverebl)e molto pill che V.M. senza prevalersi di Procurattore, se non puo maiidare Cattolico, fareblx3 il matrimonio ella 8tesser Lgione degr Alemanni i quali teme che siano per farghene uua querela. ix 6 Un ministro disse clie il Papa havesse somma .epugnan^x alia veimta di V.M. in Ron>a, e che la st,mava contraria tonto a suo proprio servigio che a quelle di ^ .M.^ 20297. 1711 ix 29. E indubitato che nella Congregatione di Propaganda non si ritrova quella disposizione verso il R6 et i suoi diritti che dovrebbero esservi. 1712 ii 13. Su 1' affare de i vicarii d' Inghilterra io ve4o S.S. assai titubante su 1' anmettere le raccomandat.om dal R^ Non vi disix>ro per6 ancora e vi usero tutte e dtLeite iK,ssibili ma 6 necessario di trattare V affare con la n Ke desterita perche S.S. ha sempre t.more di dare a il Kverchia autorita su le cose ecolesiastich. : vive d. c o JelosSo et h sua massima di dirainuire quanto puo queste prerogative in vece d' accrescerlc. " iii 8 Ua piii parti si dice che la Sicilia possa essere date a S Ri. per Jo ricovero fino a tanto che piacerk a Dio d. richianiarlo al suo herediterio trono. "" W 10 Allorche io sentii che S.M. haveva il van.olo, credetti che Yusse bene d' insinuare a S.S. il far fare i^er lu, publiche orationi...peroch6, essendosi usata la n^edes.ma at- to tione allorchi; il fu Imperatore fu sorpreso della ste.ssa h/coXlitK^mi pare necessario di procurare che non ^^ne facesse meno per S.M. .,,.•• . V 21 Non lasciaro di rappresentare il d.spiaoment. h Juto in vedere che tra i nominati dall' altre Corone non .-na state compiSo quello di S.M. E vero che ognuno qm credo chf si^'Ja i riservati in petto, non potendo dubitare^d. questa giustizia dovuta al du-itto del Re. IW _ vii 9. S.S. ha dichiarato che M. de Polignac e-a uno de riservati in i.etto et havere anche fatto assicurare S.M.T^^ vii. 30. Io sostengo il titolo di Protettore e credo di Mo con fondamento mentre il R^ mi 1' ha dato. UO 826 THE FALLEN STUARTS. APPENDIX. 327 I I I I X. 29. (S.S. promised) che offerisse a S.M. di ricevere le nomine del R^ e di ammetterle liberamente, facendo un sol breve che sar.\ qiiello il quale conterra detta nomina senza collusione alciina e nella persona di quelli che piacerk al R^ di liberamente nominare. 187 1713. i. 21. (As to Irish Bishops) S.M. viiol non dare orecchio ad alcuno mezzo termine il quale possa diversificare in inimica cosa 1' uso delle sue })rerogative da quelle che hanno tutti gl' altri Re... (but Gualterio deprecates this) vedendo la grande ripugnanza di S.S. ad accordargli tale giustizia. 256 i. 30. S.S. ha fatta finalmente questa matina la pro- mozione di M. de Polignac al Cardinalato : egli tj stato creato a nomina di S.M. e ciu b fuori di controversia. 221 iv. 2. (Gualterio rejoices to hear) dal felice arrivo di S.M. a Bar-le-duc. 246 viii. 1. II S. Cardinale Fabroni non e molto favorevole per le prerogative de' Principi, come che gli para che sian© una dimimizione della Giurisditione della. Santa Sede, et e di singolar peso appresso S.S., peroch6 che egli b il capo di quella picciola Congregazione a suggestione di cui si pro- vedono da S.S. i Vicariati d' Inghilterra e le Chiese d' Irlanda senza molto risguardo alia nomina regia. 260, 261 20304. 1726. xii. 14. In questa congiuntura nella quale il Papa ha dimostrato di voler diminucre le pensioni solite a darsi della Sede Apostolica a S.M., il R6 potesse dimostrare qualche risentimento della cosa ma senza inoltrarsi a passi totalmente positivi, essendo molto incerti gl' affari del mondo. ' 1 7 xii. 28. II Cardinale Alberoni fa sempre tutto il peggio che puo, e habbia pessima intenzione di malignare il R6 (James) quanto puo con S.S. medesima...et cerca di minarlo e di rendergli semi)re jxissimi offizii appresso la Corte di Spagna, che sarebbe bene che il R6 rendesse consapevole il Puca di Parma di questi maneggi e della suppost^i intel- ligenza di lui con la Corte di Londra, accio potesse avvertirne la Regina di Spagna e metterla in attenzione dovuta contro quest' huomo sospetto, il quale fa certe pratiche presenti- mente nel Collegio che possono significare non punto meno che pensieri della sua elevazione al Pontificato. 24, 25 1 727 ii 1 Milord Duca de Barwick, nel participarmi la destinazione'del S. Duca di Uvia all' -^^^^-^ff.^^'^'^'' la Czarina, mi haveva significato che verrebbe per lUlia. ^ iii 1. II Cardinale Bentivoglio mi ha detto che (two letter's from King Philip V) concernano la 3^^;^^?— ^^^^^ V.M. con la Regina (i.e. Clementma), stn^^ndo che la dis unione fosse pregiudiziale agl' mteressi della M. V. /t> iii 15 II Cardinale Bentivogho mi disse che non la (Clementina) haveva ritrovata in assai buona positura n^ Sosta ad entrare in mezzi termini d'accomodazione come egli gl' aveva proposto vev parte del R5 Cattohco. 88 iv 9 (It is said that M.V.) erasi "^^^^rata risoluta di contlmLe a, tenere e di soffrire che uno ^ei Jredi^^^^^^^ 20313, 236) fax^esse al solito gl' esercizn della I^hgione West.xnte...S.S. era afflittissima sopra di cio.... 108, 109 Credo che sara l>ene di non ostinarsi contro la volontk del Papa (so that) S.M. non perda questo Paese, se non quamlo S precisa necessity di ritirarsi in un altro sogiorno. 113 vii. 5. La Maesta della Regina h in stato d' intraprendere il suo viaggio per riunirsi col R^. vii 7 II S. Cardinale Corradini mi ha mandato a dire Papa a contribuirlo. n u d' haver ordinato che si scrivesse a *""' ' ^7' ' ; >f;„ «olleciUre in «uo ^-^f^.^—Jl^f^^'^^^^l^.Z mi ha mostrato gran facility d niandare -i' J«- '" ■ Jimando che tra i 25"- scudi che ha dato, e quel lUU cue ...stimanao ciii. iju. 1 uotesse essere sut- ne havea dato Innocencio XUl il Ke poiebse ficientemente provisto iK^r .1 biBogno. ,^„„'ZU^ vii 23 Quando potesse venire a questa Corte una notizia di q alche nuova felice che risguardasse le cose del R5 d PapTfar^bbe ogni sforzo per dargli qualche soccorso^ 207 '- f.'-^t^ ttiif^h'ne e^a'^guiti '^^Z^Z^ ir<^u:r i^^i'stro, 'stimaiidosi che sus- \ 328 THK FALLEN STUARTS. APPENDIX. 329 I sisteva aiicora quel trattato che fu preso su 1' anno 1717 e che obliga la Francia a persiatere nelle oppositioni fatte a V.M. per la sua diniora in quella cittii ; onde vengo com- inandato d' impegnarrai a supi)licare la M.V. di prendere un* altra dimora, dichiarandosi if Ke di Francia di non avanzarsi a tal istanza se non che con dispiacere e per la forza che gli fanno V impegni contratti. 214, 215 Crederei che fosse espediente a S.M. di non far una rottura con la Corte di Francia, della quale sola puo attendere per hora i sussidii che gli sono necessarii et in avvenire qualche cosa di piii iniportante, parendo che la Francia dovrea unirsi senipre con la Spagna e per conseguenza entrare negl' impegni che la niedcsinia ha contro 1' Inghil- terra. 226 ix. 30. Sento che il S. Cardinale Fleury habbia fatto egli niedesimo istanza alia M.V., accio si risolva a lasciare il soggiorno d' Avignone. 237 xi. 1. I niiei riscontri non sono che la Francia si aniollisca nell' inipegno preso di desiderare che il Re parta dal Con tado... (though it is kindly meant) il S. Cardinale Fleury havendo dimostrato sempre primo rispetto i^jer 8.M. et intenzione di volerlo ser\ire tanto piii possa. 260 20312. 1717. ix. 29. Les officiers ayant pris toutes les lettres et papiers de ce Seigneur (Peterborough) et examine tons ses serviteurs, ont dc'clari' qu'ils n'ont rien trouve qui pent donner le moindre soui)yon. 61 xi. 13. Le Cardinal Ovigho auroit souhaitc de i>ouvoir donner conge a milord Peterborough, voyant que tons les princes voisins faisoient du mcme h cause qu'ils n'ayment point de le retenir dans ses etats, afin de ne donner a la Cour de Vienne des souj)9ons de s'entendre avec lui sur les intrigues contre les interesses des Allemans. 114 xi. 24. (Sheldon to Lord Peterborough.) S.M. veut bien vous decharger de votre parole d'honneur c^ I'egard de votre sejour h Bologne, le Pape le luy ayant demande. 121 xi. 27. (If James marries Clementina by proxy and she is then captured)— se venisse il caso che 1' Inq)eratore, per suoi particolari interessi giudicasse h propositi) d' impedire alia sj)osa il venire in Italia e di farla porre in una s^HJcie d' arresto, ne succederebbe uno inconveniente gravissimo, dob di ritrovarsi il Kc obligate al matrimonio senza possedere il consorto. Sicch^ il destino della Reale famiglia dependercbbe dair arbitrio altrui. 150 1718 iii. 3. Richiese S.M. a S.S. 1' impronto di scudi trecento mila; non intendeva d' havere ^^^^^\^f}^ll^^l fine da quel punto nelle sue mam, ma solamente brama^a l>er allora di potere ritrare da V.S. una sicurezza Feci^ ^eU kistenza effettiva del medesimo, sulla hducia della q^^^ ^ ha S.M. continuato i suoi negotiati ed ha promesso a f^f^^^'] i quali li tiene che fatte le altre disposiziom, q^^^^^^a somma non mancherebbe al bisogno. ^^^' f' ' xi. 11. On ne pent jamais croire I'Empereur capable de vouloir persister du sangfroid d'empecher un Pnnce Catho- lique, (u i est le seul reste d'une si ancienne race ^oyalle de se\.;rier pour avoir une succession Cathohque ^^\l^^''^^ contribuer un jour a ramener au sien de IF^ghse aes Royaumes qui estoient autrefois Catholiques. ^^4 xi 1 (It is said) II motivo che ba havuto 1' Imperatore di fare arrestare la Princessa sia stato che il matrnnonio sia stato trattato dal R6 di Spagna. ^^< 20313. 1719 V 9 Comme notre mariage avec S.A.R. la Princesse Clementina Sobieski...a ete solennise comme ^Mariaire de futuro,'...lequel mariage nous permettons de r!tYSnaisaucas'que?adite Princesse soit en.p ch^ violence de nous joindre apres que n^t^e marmge sera solemnize par notre Procureur, alors notre mariage ne ^sera d'aucun elt'et. 172fi i '4 Essendo stato rai)i>resentato a S.S. che nel Palazzo habit;*, della Maiesta del Rfe 'lVI"fhmerra s, s.ano fatto lociti alouni Protestant, de la sua Corte di fore n con culto itni.rovato gV eserc.tu della loro setta sotto '^ «l"-^z zione di mi Predicante, mi ha commandato b.S. di aare questo cenno a V.E. (Gualterio) affinchb con -lo ^oj^no Ael suo carattcre, s' interessi per toghere questo disoi-du^e da una cittk che b hi sede della Religione. -'^'^ 20318. 1708 iii L'aftaire d'Eccosse s'acconiplit. Le Roy d'- Angllterre "Lt parti de St. Germain hier. II s'ag.t d^av^ir des secours du Pape. iv T PS vaisseauv du Roy ont etc suivis de si pr6s par ia flot oangSse^J^'l ne leur a^ etc P^-^f^:^%^ Rnv d'Ancrleterre ni les troupes qu'il conduisit a\ec lu}, Snii nt'^S- ^te question f de f^'^-rer leuj^- o^ qm estoit devenu difficile par la superiorite considerable^^ des forces des ennemis. 830 THE FALLEN STUARTS. V, On a, h ce qui me serable, bioii fait cle moderer les demonstrations que le Pape voulait donner, en accordant en public un Jubik' pour le succcs de I'affaire d'ficosse. Les enneniis voulaient dej^ feire regarder cette guerre comme guerre de religion et connne a dessein de rc'tablir les Catholiques dans les royaiunes de la Grande Bretagne, et rien ne seroit plus contraire aux inti'rets du Roi d'Angleterre et i)lus cai)able d'affoiblir les sentiments de ceux de ses sujets qui lui sont favorables. 265, 266 20319. 1710. ii. Je ne puis croire que le Pape veuille ajouter de nouveaux sujets de mecontentenients k S.M. (Louis XIV), en suscitant des embarras k V.E. et je suis persuade que la demarche qu'elle (V.E. Gualterio) a fait en se mettant pub- liquement sous la protection du Roy les fera enfin cesser. 48 La declaration publique (pic le Cardinal Gualterio aura presentement faite, de vouloir dcsormais vivre sous ma pro- tection et lever, comme national, mes armes sur la porte de son Palais (is confirmed by Louis XIV). 50 1711. iii. Les Princes d'ltalie, interesses a traverser les desseins de la maison d'Autriche n'osent faire le moindre mouvement...et le Pape ne songera qu';\ se rendre la Cour de Vieime favorable par le moyen d'Amiibale. vii. J'ai parlc plusieurs fois an Nonce de I'estrange difference que Ton remarqueroit dans le traitement que la maison de France et celle d'Autriche recevoient du Pape, la premiere le trouvant contraire en tout ce qui la regarde et la seconde toujours favorable. 184 1712. iii. Le Roy (Louis) a fort approuv/' la disposition que V.E. (Gualterio) a faite pour placer les amies et le portrait de S.M. (Louis). II convient de placer dans le second appartement les portraits du Roy et de la Reine d'Angleterre. 207 iv. Le procede de la Cour de Rome a I'egard du Roy d'Angleterre commence a aigrir ce Prince qui certixinement a beaucoup de merite et que je suis pei*suade qu'on verra regner un jour sur le trone de ses ptires si Dieu luy conserve la vie. 213 1713. i. V.E. (Gualterio) juge avec beaucoup de raison les avantages qu'on pourra tirer dans la suite d'avoir establi le droit de nomination du Roy d'Angleterre : il est necessaire APPENDIX. 331 de se preparer les moiens d'avoir sujet dans !« ^ac^^^^^^^^ et de contrebalancer le credit que la maison d Autriche^aura desormais k Rome. 1719 vi L'arrivee de cette Princesse (Clementina) qui se fait nommer Madame de St. George, son ^^0<^^\\^^^^^^^ necessite et I'embarras d'en servir, vont ^^P^^^^^^^^^^^ dans toutes les peines dont S.S. ,V^^^;;;:^^.,^??f^^^"/''^'^ delivre par le depart secret du Chevalier de bt. George. 20321. 1719 viii 9. (In answer to a series of questions as to French policy at the coming Conclave Gualterio writes) : 1 Que Douvons nous faire de mieux pour la France ? Crederei nche lecessario prima di condiscendere alF elezione, Che dove;^^^^^^^^^ n Papa novello, e^sendo i medesimi m un certo modo il consiglio di (iabinetto del Papa. 2. Que pouvons nous conjointement ayec ^'Empereur ?. L' Imperatore ha s\ graiide interesse per le cose d Italia e mn^sime nresenti, ad havere un Papa amico e dipenaente 7:^^6l^re dubitare che sia per sagrificare ogn' altra couveuieuza a quest' ett'etto. •? One iiouvons nous foire «xns lui ? Credo debolissime le nostre forze a risguardo del fnturo Cone ave. Tre soli Caritiu sull qui del Partito francese I n g^-de jl>s^ avantagio havcn\ la fazioue ^ancese nel fo mo Cone^^^^^^^ auello delle controversie vertenti a cagione dclla Costituzione . Dr"", apparisee una necessi^ positiva d' andare eollegati eon altra fazione potente. ^?ro mezzo chl quello del denaro per renders, considerab.h. 5 Quel sujet vous paroit plus convenable k la Couronne A. Fvnu^e ' 11 partito del Cardinale Paulucci pare si forte ^L^ioT^stal^^tte le altre opposizioni, vi k son„n_a ap- parenza che egli possa essere fatto Papa. iv 26 Per bene esplicare a V.E. la mia situazione, venni nnn^o h. Francia in t^mpo che il R^ e la Regina d' Inghil- Crd:fon"erano nella^^ii. «tretta un^.ie con la Corte Questo stato di cose aggiunge a mei nupulsi per cercare ai APPENDIX. 383 332 THE FALLEN STUARTS. contrarre servitircon le MM. loro, per dimostrare ossequio e premura verso due principi die Unto pativano per la Religione Cattolica...Essendo pcis.sato all' altra vita, il Cardinale (Japrara, il quale sostene\a in questa Coi'te il carattere di Ministro ed era Protettore d' Ingliilterra, io fui .sostituito al ministero e nominato alia Protezione. La quale carica accettai non yolaniente con peniiissione del fu KtJ, nia con tale .sodisfazione del niedesinio, che essendo nate col Papa gravi controversie alia Sede Apostolica circa il Dritto di conferire tale Protezione, che S.S. pretendeva devoluto alia Sede Apostolica doppo la prevaricazione di quel Regno, il Re niedesinio voile entrare nella querela del iih d' Ingliilterra,... accio tale opposizione cessasse. Egli e l)en vero die in ricevere tale carattere mi dichiavai sempre die cio non sarebbe, se non che conservando la niia interiore e total dipendenza della Corte di Francia. Di die un arguniento evidente e die io inalzassi con le armi di Francia che gi{\ havevo su la niia porta anche quella d' Inghilterra ; nia didiiarandonii di volere piii tosto lasciare qualunque servigio del Re d' Inghilterra die diniinuire un punto cio che diniostrava la niia totale dependenza di Francia. L' anno passato, [)oi essendosi deterniinato il R6 d' inghilterra di venire a stabilire qui la sua diniora, quantunque si portasse a discendere a dirittura nella mia casa, io sul solo dubio di qualche manegio politico, prescelsi d' abandonnare pill tosto r habitazione. Se S.A.R. (Orlei\ns) crede suo servi'no 1' havere un suo servitore con qualche credito appresso d' un°Princii)e che ne' tempi a venire pu6 anche haver parte alle contiiigenze publiche,...star6 attentissimo a non trascen- dere i limiti del dovere et a non ingerirmi in cosa che possa havere il minimo rapporto contrario alia Francia Se i)er il contrario S.A.R. giudica che io debbia disciogliermi dal niedesinio Priiicii)e sono prontissimo ad ubbidii-e. 90—93 1720. ii. 28. La nostra Corte (France) ha ragione di domandare la sodisfazione d' un Cai>ello (Cardinal's Hat), (so the easiest way is) di i)revalersi a tal fine della nomina del R6 d' Inghilterra Non mi periiiette d' astenermi dal porgere a V.E. le piii vive suppliche accio voglia considerare le grandi angustie di S.M. e procurargliene il piii pronto e largo sollievo S.A.R. allorche egli hebbe a pai-tire di Francia e precisamente di A^•ignon si degno prometterli non solamente la continuazione della Pensione che fino dal tempo dal Rb defonto soleva pagarsi al R^ suo Padre e successiva- mente alia Regina sua Madre ma di aumentargliela di altri scudi cinquantiimila di cotesteUo^e -^pret: che sopravenendo questa, V E. siira fatta Card "ale presso che immediamente o senza iudugio : (this ,s all d"e to James grande attacamento che ha alia persona et al '^enigio^ai S.A.R. 1721. (Undated.) Austrian demands on the Pope are i Havere le Decime sopra tutti i Beni eccles.astichi, secoiari e regolari, dentro i proprii stati. ii Che S.S. somministri denaro della sua Borsa. iii Che rinovi la lega fatt^ in quel tempo di Innocenzio XI e prometto di spo.sare gl' interessi dell' Imperatore. 236 (Undated ) 11 Duca di Parma deplora i pericoli * Italia (UnaaLeu. /_ , , „, imperatore... Per nparo di tale 334 THE FALLEN STUARTS. APPENDIX. 335 attaccato...Aggiiinge poi che stinierebbe necessario die la Francia assistesse segretamente ma iion meno validamente U R5 Giacomo i)er motterlo nel Troii(>...il tutto a fino di tog|iere air Iiiiperatore 1' appoggio di detto R6 Giorgio. 239, 241 20322. 1725 viii. 15. II ne faut pas doiiter que S.S. iie soit tout h fait h I'Empereur, les iiiterets de sa niaison etant entre les mains de S.M.I., ot toute apparence de lagraiidir ne dt'pendant que de 1<\. Mais je ne crois pas qu il ait dessein de desobliger les autres nations, pourvu qu'elles ne soient pas opposees aux interets de I'Empereur. 2H ix. 7. Le Pape qui vcTitablement est un saint liomme d'un trcjs bon ca'ur qui ne desire mome que le bien, est toutefois si pen verse dans les aftaires du gouveniement et tenement obside par ceux qui soit par ignorance soit par interet lui sugg^rent des choses contre le bon ordre, qu on voit paroltre tr6s sou vent des choix qui ne font pas honneur k S.S. 40 X. 3. Pour nous (France) il ne faut pas se flatter d'avoir une grande autorite dans ce conclave. 91 xii 5 II n'est pas ^wssible de repn'senter suflisament le desordre* qui rc'gne dans les finances de la Chambre Aposto- lique S S par inie gencrosite au deh\ de toutes bornes les a mises dans un etat pitoyable et si cela dure quelque tenips, je doiite qu'on puisse trouver de remt^de. 103 1726 i. 2. La faction Imperiale augmente toujoui-s et si le Pape vit quelque temps, et qu'il suive la route qu'il a prise, elle devient toujours plus puissante, car il est probable qu une partie des Cardinaux qu'il fera...auroient promis h la Cour de Vienne d'appuyer les sentiments de S.M.I. 118 i 16 Le Roy y donneroit les mains (i.e. James is ready for a reconciliation with Clementina). Mais on ne voit pas encore que la Reine flecliisse, k moins d'etablir des conditions auxuuelles le Roy est fort contraire. On accuse deux dames qui sont aupr6s d'elle et M. le Cardinal Alberoni. Le grand commencement est une pique qui s'est niise entre la Reine et Milord Inverness, confidant et k present Secretaire dMat. La Reine voudroit le chasser. Le Roy y est extremement contraire par la contiance qu'il a en lui. 131 Quant h I'exercice de la religion protestante, on leur a toujours x)ermis de faire leurs prieres dans une chambre. Clement XI en eut quelque peine au commencement mais il le permit ensuite, ou plutot il fit semblant de ne le S9avoir pas. ^^^ 1 ii 20 II seroit trfes n^cessaire de penser au Conclave a l^avenir bien sfrieusement, car il s'achemine d'une mani^re a to que nous n> ayons aucune part et d'e re les temoins d une election qui ne nous sera i>eut-etre agreable. 14.5 20241. 1-01 viii 9 Per ristabilire nel Trono il legitinio R6 d- lliitc - vo^ressi^o „on solo — ^^^^ ehe rnS:o'X:;\M:r chVtWtS^ Che uon pure d' «no rdoTo'^iam. f l.er'dir.megU.. vogU.^.o d.porre ^^-^^^^^^^^ uVj. ut '.Xmopure presentemeute far qualche cosa...(and LT^^SO iire dl cUestl u.oueta (to be pa.d to «>- account at Paris). Che si spenda ora questo denaro per mantenere in fede gl' prudenza del Rfc Christia.uss.mo, che tutto ^-^^^o '^;P^^^^^^^^ me'ntreTf vert u. Xt che una volta ci fu data m stretta S:.'! do6 che ,a Prinoi^ssa di l^-J-ca „on fo^ ietSS^>^ conservasse quest! medes.mi sent.menU d. giustizia verso Giacomo. „,TTT^ X 8 (The Pope's feelings at Louis' >^og"!t'°",'j'"f "i"^ ^ ,.« vita, rsei ^lym^ / mnrfp facemmo celebrare P^ZZl sTpoLVr :>ef iJ ai luT^iJa .n tutte le ch^. **' ^T Ella (V E ) vada a complimentare in nostro nomine col nuovo r" IngWi erra e con le Regina, sua madre. \ ogl.asi coinuovone s Princioi Cattolici seguiranno il suo '<^:^:^ty't:^io!X:^.m.mo mancito di scrivere a 336 THE FALLEN STUARTS. nostri nuuzii, che in ca.so di bisogno ne dano loro opportuno eccitamento. 170' iv 4 Vogliamo speiare che la morte seguita del Pri. cipe d- Oranges romi>er;i del tutto le inisure fe po^^""" aver wise gV InSesi e g ' 01ar.de«i di raandarv. la loro flotU reuErtneo^ ci aftenghiamo l--'' t t'i Scon 1' ,.,.o..i«i, ri^nosta al prosetto contidenteniente a lei tatto con i L^rarCoiH'I-hese di Torcy .rca Orb.tel o J altre iiiazze maritime della Toscaiia. quale, a dir u \ero, S,lle assai fa«tidios vii 14 (French troops in Italy.) Quanto pui noi si affit ghiamo in tutte le occasioni, per dare prove contmue dd a Wra e paterna e distinta predilez.ione verso lid>.eKfe^ tniito t>iii all' mcoutro siamo mal corrispo.sti...Abbiamo pieno IT FerrCese di trupi>c Francesi, entrati c'ione ne' Kegi.i della Oran Bretagna. '» viii 29 (Louis XIV told Gualterio after a desuatcl. from Clem ntaix.ut Jau.es III) che se uon se 'f-^V^f^^^ rmn.oa,atau,onte V i.nvresa et a l«-o«ederc i.b o . ese cutionc ai essa, era ver tanto f ^'g''"X^^rreUrgh 1. t-.sto o'^'T l^alTr in etr otella sua n.orte. Che i.. quauto al Oranges, 1 ''•.f ' , " ^'7',^^^,.^ intrai.roudere cosa alcuna per primo caso, il He ' >' l'^;^^ J" J ^ r'l„.hilterra: essere ycrb £,,„„„„ .i.i«» -"•„*' ?r s ' L»s ,.^-«5'« bantita...cne o.iu. ^^^^ , •, t»v legitimo s h vantato '^^■'Xldtat^^f thtrXt:;^^ malcontents in England APPENDIX. 339 dentro dell' isola in forma di superiorita I catolici d' Irlanda esse re pronti a moversi ogni volta che se ne presenta la facoltk In Scotia esservi un' apertura anche migliore. Esservi un tal Duca d' Hamilton, di famiglia appresso la Stuarda Questi havere fatto fare di se medesimo istanza a S.M. Christianissima II vantaggio sera grandissimo di poter ritrovare un partito gia formato e tale che abraccia una considerabile parte di Scotia Oltre, il vantaggio della situatione, tanto a risguardo della nmltiplicita de' porti per ricevere i soccorai stranieri, che delle montagne per ritrovarsi in evento di successi sinistri. 22 — 24 (If William III dies) da un canto si renderebbe necessario di cogliere subito 1' occasione per non perdere il momento pill favorevole che e quello della vacanza del trono......Dair altro pare impossibile di poter havere alia mano pronti, in si poco spatio, truppe e vascelli e tutto cio che richiedesi ad una tanta espeditione: ed il tenerle sempre pronte, fosse per riuscire di spesa imraensa, di distrattione infinita e di, presso che necessariamente, discopimento al segreto. Queste sono, Padre Santo, le difficoltk che tin hora ci si presentano, 26 X. 31. (The Papal money, having arrived at Paris, will be used) di rendere il Parlamento di Scozia dissenziente da cio che 6 stato risoluto nelP Inghilterra, in ordine alia successione del Regno e questo puo essere facilmente il fondamento della restitutione del Rt; legitimo del Paese Si e proposto uno sbarco, ma si trova difficile all' esecutione in presenza d' una gran flotta e questo non venga favorito delle genti del Paese.... Si e pensato che forse sarebbe maggiormente opportuno di invadere qualche posto capace di fortificatione per sosten tarsi non solamente ma adunarvi in piii riprese le forze necessarie.... (Torcy, in a three hours' conversation, said) che i popoli non sono in couto alcuno affettionati al nome del principe d' Oranges, e che solamente lo sofrono per tiraore che hanno altramente d' essere spogliati della liberta e del esercitio della religione nativa: che non \ede ostaculo a favore del giovine R6 ogni volta che si dissipi questo terrore. 27, 28 xi. 28. II Marchese di Torcy mi assicuro che il Bh (i.e. Louis) n' era piii tisso e piii attento che mai......Veggo S.M.^ sempre maggiormente irreconciliabile contro il Principe d' Oranges da cui unicamente riconosce tutti i pregiuditii e tutte le turbulenze presenti. ^^ vii. 11. Non mancano colk a S.M.B. (James III) defensori in gran numero: il Principe d' Oranges b caduto in odio e disestimationc.e in questo Parlamento ha preso la supe- 22—2 340 THE FALLEN STUARTS. APPENDIX. 341 • -^N lo «^f+n Aiidicaiica altreUnto avvcrsa a lui quanto !" ortafe alia Cl.iesa la memoria del P.mt.hcato della SaiitiU Vostra. ' Tl AHrchese di Torcy mi disse che se bene durando preiLte— 1a% J. 1' InghiUerra non n' era luogo a Portar 1' -". j" ^^ -^'cl^l^r^^ verranno cos\ vicine alia guerra, cue lum i • .^^.^.^j^^ere 1' tra ])oco il Kb non si trovasse in state d "^Y'H^\^lXys che S.M. lo farebbe validamente. 1702 i 23. (Itivly): In mal piuao sonogiunti...i van- tac< i doll' anni Inn^eriali in Itolia, lK.ioh6 ci6 rende quella Corte vicpi altiera e ditticile e per conseguenza tanto n.eno ^^^l dar ..recchio alia Pace, ingo,a.,do d. g.^ co^ a sneranza il doniinio della n.aggiore parte d Italia-.^(^len'«''t writes to inform Louis of this and to rcmn.d him oO 1 aftetto mterno verso le due Corone (France and Spam) et n.s.eme la ah^taapprensione che la Santit^i Vostra ha di vedere le ffiic e del lo Htato ecclesiastico desolate dal j^a-ssagio degl esercili stnu eri (Louis orders Torcy) ass.curare la bantitk vlSa 01^1' inteiitione sua e del R6 Cattolico fe d entrare ui una wrfetta e strettissima contidenza con esso lei, di coni- nmniS i suoi consigli...a quello scopo che sanno haver* H sS V<.stra ciof* dolla liberta e tranqmllit,\ d' Italia . Le ^e Coro e non pretendevano di porre per cmo m a..gustje H Santitfi Vostra, ina di unii-si a suoi ottnn. hm con quella conhden'a che se deve tra Padre amoroso e hgl. devoti Es"ere intentione de i d.ve K6 di rendere Padrone la Sant^.tk Vostra doUe loro forze. 11 Rfc posponendo i iHinsieri di tutte le altre frontiere a cotesta guS^i, era risoluto di farvi un forzo straordmano per C:':Jv. intieramente e sca^ciare ^^^ -""-j,^ J k sue Tlono di cui non brama altra cosa che di ritnare 'e s'le Er 1' in tentione del R6 essendo d' haver sempre m Ite .a S'ioila francesi di pii. di quelli che possono essere ni qual si sia modo le truppe Alemanue. Le cose erano in tal state che la Santita Vo«tra senza espoi-si ad alcuno pericolo e senza uscire del ^anittere che si comiene alia dignita sua, puo havere m mam la so'te d Itelia, esercitarvi^m' autoritJi supenore a q»«"^^^^<^,^^]^^\^i mai havuta alcun altro Papa e suiierare la gloria di ^^tti gl' altri Pontifici. • - ir i. II R6 (Louis) voler sempre consigliare la Santita \ostra a sostenere le parti di Padre commune ..ma V^fl^ehT'^uol Christiana va sossopra, per colpa d' u. ^gl^ "''" ^f^^^ invadere, la ligatura dovuta ag ' altn f'versi attendere da questo mcdesimo Padre ch' nitraprenda 1 autoriti sua . e costringa 1' altro a contentersi d. quella portione dell eredita che gli appartiene. iii 27 (On death of WilUam III Louis) haveva di- nJlrato ma^ior desiderio cl.e mai d' anf ^^^^^^^^^^^ e di far ogni sforzo i>er venire a capo dell mtrapresa ii M^hese di Torcy in effetto mi mando il progetto clie qne^ta Corte voglia applicare efficacemente. iv 10 II Signior Marchese di Torcy (came) richieden- donTa supplicarU (the Pope) a voler entrare ancore«^^^^^^^^ il terzo della spesa a parte con i due ^^^ t.'^"^* f "f ^sse Cattolico. (Gualterio hav ng deinurred to *'^) f S\\^^' "^^ alia richicsta di venti mila scudi il mese e di duceiitomiia sulcomhiciL dell> Impresa...(he added), c^e se Imiocenzo X hweva spesi cinque cento mila scudi per assistere i son Catto ci d' rltand-x soUevati, per cosl due senza capo, eraiio sicmi che Clemente XI non havrebbero ricusata sonima di molio miiurre per rimettere il Re e la religione Cattol,ca_in tutta la Grau Bretagna. In quanto alia situatione delle cose fe certamente la piu favorlv^le che sperare si possa, haveudole a fare con m.a Princ^ uesla delK.le d' animo e di corpo...in Scotia, cessando il pSiento colla morte del defouto ^--f^.^.'^^^ft^'ZZ facile di iruadai'iiare il Popolo gia mai sodisfatto dell Lnione coU' InghdterS. e branioso d' allontanarsi a «oll«-"?> "^ Lore di Giacomo 3», quai.do vengnno assicurat d V^l" ' ^ indubitati scK.corsi-(so I beseech) V.S che ^"^ ^iclu-m le sue intenzioni, perch6 questa Corte non fara il passo di spwire colk senza haverle prima sapute. Le massime per tanto della Regina, quanto del minist';« di rfJcL sono Si ascoltare et accettare tutto cio che v.ene Lennato, ma senza iutermettere le altre misare piu solide. V 1 Riscaldandosi questa Corte sopra gl' aflari della Gran Bretagna, a misura che crescono le apparenze di guerra f II 342 THE FALLEN STUARTS. APPENDIX. 343 con quel Regno, si applica serianiente a promovere il progetto di Scotia.... Lord Boyn ripassa per pronioverlo appre-sso il duca d' Hamilton. II disegno e di procurare di guadagnai;e tante voci nel Parlamento che deve aprirsi fra poche setti- niane, che vaglino a rigettare la .successione che gl' eretici Inglesi braniano di stabilire nel Principe d' Hannover a pregiuditio della Reale Faniiglia. Se cio riesce, pretendono di passare piii oltre e coll' istesso favore de' voti procurare che la Scotia reintegri gl' antichi trattati d' intelligenza e di comniercio con questo Regno, otferendosi il Re di dargli ogni f;icilit.\ per sua parte e di farse la dare dal Rb cattolico ; che questa nazione si dichiari di non voler participare nella *uierra presente contro le due Corone...(that the Parliament would propose) alia Principess^x di Danimarca che voglia riconoscere il Re suo fratello per suo legitimo successore, nel qual caso la riconoscerano per principale sovrana sua vita durante, altrimente di toglierli aftatto 1' ubbedienzii et ac- cettare per loro signore il R6 Giacomo Terzo separatamente deir Inghilterra. ^^T, 138 Sarebbe per6 desiderabile che riuscisse piu tosto 1' ultima idea che la prima (i.e. the c«)rruption of the Scotch Parliament rather than a direct attack on England) p<)rch6 con meno dispendio e senza dispendio di sangue. Ma seccome m quei Paesi ove ogni voto e venale, non si {nil) ottenere cosa alcuna senza prezzo, ho commissione di supplicare la V.S. (i.e. the Pope), a nonie del Re, a volere contribiiir qualche .somma, quale parerk alia sua somma generosity maggiormente adequata. 138 vi. 7. (Torcy tells me so far as risguarda I' affare d' \inerica) et in i pericoli che possono correre insieme la Religione et il dominio del Re Cattolico. Mi fc conoscere 1() stesso ministro che non puo dubitarsi V ogetto principale dell armi Olandesi et Inglesi essere la conquista delle stesse nazioni di trarre a se sole tutto 1' oro e tutto il commercio del mondo... (France cannot resist) distratta com' h a vegliare con le sue forze maritime alia sicurezza delle proprie coste, di quelle di Spagna, d' Italia et al soccorso del Portogallo, (so the maritime Powers seeing the rich Churches with their tre^isures in America) giungono a fermare il mini mo piede in quelle Provincie, la prima cosa che faranno surh d' imposessarsi d' un tal mobile e fame moneta. Con ci6 senza haver piu bisogna d' Europa, si troveranno in stato di proseguire la guerra e d' aumentare le loro forze... (so Philip V ask.s the Pope) che sia permesso a S.M.C. di far ridurre una parte de' detti ornamenti in moneta e servirsene a difesa de' suoi dominii contra gl' eretici. 143 145 X. 23. II Marchese di Torcy mi parlo circa i «ogetti che possono essere proprii a ^omandai^ l armi di V S nelle contingenze presenti, (and proposes) il Duca di Barw ck il quale veraminte h lieutenante generale delle Armate delR6 Christianissimo, percht\ trovatosi ^^l'^^ }'^V'^^l,l'''''^™ non poteva prendere altro ricorro fuori di quello a cui^era ricorso il R6 suo padre. ^ • • xi 7. La determinazione di V.S. di non voler soflfrire in conteratore, coll' ofterta di speciosi et apparenti vantaggi anche in favore della giiiris- dittione ecclesiastica. ^•^'^ (In reply to 20241, 82.) Soi)ra I'ingresso dell' arniata di questa Corona nello Stato ecclesiastico et i danni cagionativi S.M. (Louis) (apologized) ascrivendo il successo agl' accidenti impensati della guerra. Mi assicuro che 1' esercito era fuori di cotesti confini e credo che V.S. possa essere presso che sicura che non sia per piii ritornare da quella banda dentro la presente campagna....Che non erasi trattato di bagatelia, ma di materia gravissuiia quant' era 1' espulsione di un vescovo (i.e. Sorento) fatta con mano armata. Essere questo tras- APPENDIX. 345 corso gravissimo in ogni luogo, lo era maggiore m ^apoh dove lo Stato Ecclesiastico godeva da tanti secoli il suo mtiero possesso. Che il principio della differenza non era divenuta da V.S. ma dal Vice-Rk 238, 239 viii 6 II Signior Marchese di Torcy parl6 frequente- mente 'dell' affare dell' Inquisitore Generale di Spagna, acci6, secondo il concerto gia preso, venga terminato colla possibile brevity, mi richiese a nome del Rt\ di voler supphcare segretamente la S.V. a degnarsi di andar concedendo qualche dilatione all' ultimatione di tale negotio. ^^^ viii 29. (Gualterio having asked for a promise from Torcy) che non vi far>i da questa parte difficoltk alcuna ad accettare la Costitutione (i.e. Bull condemning Jansenism), ricus5 asso- lutamente il S. Marchese di darmi tale scrittura, (adding) essere impossibile di ritenere i magistrati che non persuades- sero alia conservatione degl' usi paterni. 24», Z4y 1704 vi 16. Havendo io premuto...per 1' uscita delle tnnme dal Ferrarese,...il Marchese mi alleg6 un trattato f^tt tra la S V et il Re e stipolato sotto 19 Decembre l702 con cui in caso d' invasione dello Stato Ecclesiastico si concede agl' eserciti delli due R5 1' ingi;esso libero nel medesimo i^v difenderlo e discacciarne gl invasori...che si sarebbe fatto assolutamente il possibile per ottenere un tal fine ma che bisogna riportarsi a i generali circa il moda X 5 Nelle nazioni straniere e sopra tutto nelle Corti de' gran principi vi sono delle massime false . pensano che la Corte di Roma voglia distendere sempre la P^-opria giuris- dittione e diminuire quella del R^ onde ne -«-- ^^^^^^^^^^^ le quali si incontrano....Le massime pubhcate dal Parlamento di Digione sono communi di tutta la nazione e massime dei tribunali, n^ vi h alcuno tanto nel ^^rojuantonella Corte anche tra i mrticolari anzi nel clero medesimo il quale non venisse ad ogni rottura et estremitk per la difesa e sostenta- mento di ess°e....ll R^ h di tutti gl' altri il meno attaccato a Srmaterie tuttavia si crede obligato a difendere le massime del Regno. 1705 i 5. (Gualterio tells the Pope it is wrong to preiudice the minds of the French clergy against paying their Lxes ) Merc^ a i gravissimi bisogni dello Stato nella guerra che il R^sostiene e da cui viene assolutamente costretto a domandare dar sussidii dal clero e gl' ecclesiastichi largiti, Sndosi dello mantenimento della Rehgione mentre si combTtte con gl' eretici...non solo non pu5 sperare che habbia 22-5 346 THE FALLEN STUARTS. a seguire alcun vanUggio alV ordme -^Jf «^*;f Xdi ' coto"^ „.ediin,o sarcbl. il vnmo ^XtZl^Se' l'^ k S-Z da cendo ciaschediino che b.3i. neiie uuiuauvA ^^^ una necessith, precisa. 1719 vii 18 11 Cardinale Gualterio in "^n^^/^l ^^ X« esterni forse anche dominati da pmiciin i-rotcstont.) il Sgt deir altere portabile nella f,>rma pn. amp.a, «ohto Ll accomodarsi alle teste coronate. • iv •2'5 Prendo 1' ardire di rinovare hunnlmente alia Js.V. • „ Hi ^ \l R fTimcs III) le i.iii vive e rispcttose istaiizc m norae di S.M.B. (;'.'""f I' V ,■',.,„ -j ^ as Cardinal), dalla per la pro.notmne di Mr, 1. Pol^nac ue a ^^^^^ ^.^^.^^^^^ We;"sv'"re i olo\edlre'^^^^^^ nomine degli altri RTn'elUx ultima crLtionc di Cardinali, e trala.c:ata la s.u. ha riempito lo cuorc di S.M. d' amarezza. di i, .^i^ 1714 ix -^0 Mi conmianda la Maestfi del Hfc Britanmco rimanerJi ricompensaU larganiente con 1 acquisto ae^^ Regiii di Gran Bretagna. I71fi ii 29 II R^ (James III) ba per se la giustizia P Jro';" : ' tU Ln J:2'do' santi Padri che si IK^tesscro d^I" U- rcdi.nere un regno altra volta ftMlol^"»o -aUa Chiesa,..'.per sottrarre alia l-'-ec;.™>ne > Cattohu nma^^ com... ; IH^r togliere a «'U.e"ona f « g\„^^,^'^ ^^ jella ^£r rU^^rparSU |.^^^^^^^ difensoi* contro tutte le opposiziom delle quali 6 minaccmta la Sede Apostolica. •, , • ,i> „,„ iii 5 II R6 (James) ha perduto quindic. mila l»"g> ^ "ro che gli erano stati si«,diti....Esso rai nece.ss.ta a portarle nuove suppliche per qualche .soccorso. APPENDIX. 347 1717 iii. 25. (Memorial sent to James III.) Uno de^ piu imvK,rtent nteressi che S.M. (James) habb.a m questa Corte ITel^ di con.servare il suo diritto alia "«-"- ^-'^"^^^^ quando si da luogo alia promozione <5<=»^ .^X"S J.^; ei6 steto non solamente opi«rtimo ma necessano d P™ «'^^ a S.S. s' ella medesima non havesse prevenuto il I^^^gU^ ^j^^^ materia. 20243. 1700 xii 28 (A Brief from Clement to Louis XIV on ai'ae Reipublicae ac universae Europae tranquill.tatem, com plexum fuisse. 1714 V 29 (Clement XI to James III.) Cum nos ab ip«o i>ntifica?a; uttri primordio usque in present^m^iem, vCibus cathedralibus ecctesiis, qua^ m ^PY'^''?^'^^^^ Storalis solatii destitui contigit, plures f dem in ep^co^^ ^.a^fecimus, pastoralem '^-^-^^^^ZrtnM^^h^- earundem ecclesiarum co>»™>"endo. • •;^™^» f „„„,i„^tionum mmmwm is St:^esT=m^^:^.:aro„um huiusmodi mentio facta fuisset. 1717 vii 11. (Clement XI to James III.) Sire^ ce ^afLnleigneu^Wa^ rendre compte k Votre Majesw. 4^^« d'Alberoni, et que sistoire pour nommer Cardnial le Conte a Aiix3ruu ' i nonobstint de toutes les representations faites a ^^J^^^^^l Votre Majeste quoy qu'ils menacent ae lermei ic ^^ APPENDIX. 349 » 348 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 1706 viii. 31. (Clement XI to Louis XIV on Galilean Chul'r and JansenLn.) Quae sub nonnne l^f-^'^Co- vpntus Cleri Galilean typis vulgata (as to Janseni.sm are Condemned . Quamobre/n' absque P-*"-'- -""--..^Tn neclieentia, oniittcre diutius non potvumus, quin eas quas m e^em coetu assertis acti«que ">"««P-'^""-',.re,d.™"«' f'^'^^.'^'V^j nioneitls ut plenitudinen. potestotis huic uni B. letn Cathedn!e divinitus attributam, usurpare non aud.mnt, et eildem de Cattolica fide deoreta venerari, et exsequ, d.Hcant, non discutere aut iudicare audeeror LeoiK-ld, to stop innlh of German troops into Italy.) .^^- ^^^^t^n: consideriamo 1' infelice Italia a diven.r t«atro d un on- b e guerra ed in conseguenza deplonamo il l'<;'^° /j""„^"<=^i^ niediazione che havevamo ofterta con tante l.igr me. . . lo pregbo M V. (Leopold) colla presente littera scntto di nostro pul o a on pennettere ehe le sue truppe habb.ano -.A essere aw rtTtrici in Italia di si formidabili sciagure. Mentano ques i p^^li, in recompensa di quella iKvss.one ehe hanno sen>l!ie'nrnfcstata verso la sua august.ss.ma Casa >aenta a Santa Sede nierita la Chiesa, merita Dio che la Maesta Vosto. ^.^feiisca la s.vlve...a publica ad ogn' altro r.sgi,a,^o. 1717 viii 25. (Clement to Philip V to stop the use of the cnisadins;' fleet for Sj^mish puri«)se.s.) Quis enim non vMet™mnUs"fieres apud 'Regem regum ratio..bus obnoxius si consiliarii tui id ab .se exstorquere potuissent ut l'"W>^°^ causam desereres, et arma aliunde converteres et a te ipso muMiamodo alien'es, datam iten.m ac »xepnis nobis hdcm, imo potius omnii)otenti Deo, non praestares i 4» (Brief of Clement nominating Gualterio Protector vii. 6. of England.) ti 20245. 1720 iii (Cardinal Alberoni and some of the charges brought' against him.) La principale accusa che ho inteso venir portaU contro di me consiste m che lo, abusando della CO Menza di cui venivo honorato dalla Maestk Cattolica, habbia eccitato V incendio d' una cosl grave guen-a in Europa in tempo che 1' armi delV Imi)eratore erano impegnate contro il Turco che io wi ne sia stato il mantenitore di questa N f^ S S. pretend que les Catholiques qui sont qui sont bien '"t^"i.''^""l^^„f "J^j. le faire paroiti-e, n'osent pour le .^rvice du R^y sans -^^^^^^^J ^^ ..^oit .sujet recourir d;^"^ 1°"'? '^^^°'"*'s g . ,ose que M. le Cardinal ou du part de *'!?;.„ Hp Protecteur d'Angleterre selon Gualterio e.U seal le ^f f^f^^^J^ .'^^^^^^^^^^ de tout ce la nomination du Roy et lut cnai^t y pourroit qui regarfe les mtejs^s d S^I-^;^; «-^^ ^:-:Uea dlnne au r^i*^"*! S^crta ti comme Protecteur d'feosse, jusques en Cardinal Sacripanti, >-"' "^ -^ ^ Protecteur de ce Angleterre, sans lui donner le uuic ^.^ ^"^sHisse che la Maesta Sua poteva dare 1' onore della a J .7 ,.hi crli uareva : ma la carica di Protettore rerR:g^rireceLir fosse data a «n Cardinale^non fattionario. 20581 a. gran parte del governo all arbitrio ^^ J^^^'^^' ^^^^^j^^e de' bt^''trS:^ t'^^o i^Huper- ^ quail iicnieaa o/,'*'" , ,. ^cretto de' loro pensieri sarebbe '''^ro illibera'^'l' Uardelich^ in^cui 1' ha ridotta rS^a'd- tSHa! e i.r6.certi.ssimo che il Papa pr^sente^non entrerk in que.sta grande impreaa. 350 THE FALLEN STUARTS. 20581 b. 1716. Per contrabalanciare la prepotenza degl Alemanni ...J\uiinm et indissolubile unione cou la Corte di Spagna ^rVi? Xadalti^^^^^^^ ordinc a cio che risguarda Corte ha le stesse buone intenzioni die puo havere la beae Apostolica. 1724 V 28 II nuovo Papa (Benedict XTII) h buono in se stisso e ha dimostrato sempre sentiinenti di nspetto verso i Prhicmi dentro i termini della moderazione rehgiosa e d' un gm^"distaccamento delle cose secolan habbia havuto Tie "e molta divozione verso la Casa Reale di Francia. INDEX. Aix-la-Chapelle 1, 6, 289, 296 Aland 207, 208 Alberoni 4, 8, 9, 176, 188-216, 237, 238, 253 America 264, 290 Atine94, 133, 155, 157,165 d'Argenson 254, 276, 279, 283, 284, 287 Armada 6, 26, 198 Armistice of 1684: 23, 25, 34, 56 Assassination Plot 77 Atlantic 26, 113, 114, 255, 290 Atterbnry 220, 221 Augsburg Alliance 24 Austria 81, 224 Avignon 179, 239 Baltic 182, 183, 184, 186, 213, 217, 290 Barrier 78, 87, 91, 95, 154, 156 Barrier Treaty 155, 156, 158, 180, 181 Bavaria Charles Albert, see Emperor Charles VII Clement 267 Ferdinand Maria 16 Joseph Clement 45, 99 Joseph Ferdinand 83, 89 Bavaria Maximilian Emmanuel 25, 82—85, 88, 99, 101, 102, 111, 112, 136 Maximilian Joseph 278, 279 Beachy Head 71 Belgium, see Netherlands Belgrade 251 Belleisle 263, 264, 265, 266 Bergheck 138, 139 Berwick 103, 122 Blenheim 101 Boiingbroke 173, 174 Bourbon 224 Boyne 70, 79 Brandenburg,FrederickWilliam of 17, 18, 19, 23, 25 see kings of Prussia Bremen 183—186, 207 Camisards 121—123 Cardinalate 13, 151, 194, 202, 233, 257, 292, 293 Carlos, Don 225, 231, 239, 240, 241, 247, 259, 260, 268 Carlowitz 91, 123, 164 Cellamare 200, 201, 222 Cevennes 121—123 Channel, The 6, 7, 26, 30, 32, 33, 66, 67—78, 113, 136, 141, 154, 180, 182, 188, 199, 210, 216, 289, 295, 296 352 INDEX. Charles II (England) 19, 21, 23, 33, 41 Charles II (Spain) 24, 79, 80, 81, 83 Charles XII (Sweden) 8, 11, 105, 106, 120, 121, 13G, 14(i, 147, 183, 184, 212, 213, 217, 291 Charles Stuart, see Stuart Clementina 205, 210, 215, 238 Cleves 252 Cologne 45, 52, 279 Coscia 236, 237 Counter Reformation 38—49 Crusades 13, 59—63, 79—81, 118, 128, 129—136, 149, 166, 169, 194, 198, 235, 241 CuUoden 285 Dettingen 267 Devolution War 28 Divine Right 14, 304, 307 Dover Treaty 30, 31, 41, 79 Dresden 296 Dubois 181, 222 Dunkirk 139, 159, 181, 270, 272, 273. 274, 276, 281, 282, 289 Elizabeth of Spain 189, 218, 223, 256, 264 and her sons 224, 225—232, 239—241, 243, 244, 253, 268, 283 and the Stuarts 235 Emperor Leopold and James Stuart 17, 34, 60, 61, 62 and Hungary 38, 39, 47, 48, 80, 81 Emperor Leopold and the Spanish Succession 82-85, 99, 104, 247 and the Pope 108, 124 Emperor Joseph I 18, 104, 105, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 146, 262 Emperor Charles VI and James Stuart 168, 225— 231 and the Pragmatic Sanction 162, 240, 242, 243, 248, 261 and the Pope 209 and Spain 197, 225—231 and the Spanish Succession 82, 88, 102, 115, 143, 144, 146, 155, 157 Emperor Charles VII 247, 265, 266, 275, 278 Emperor Francis I 246, 248, 278, 279 Emperor Joseph II 302, 303 Eugene 80, 107, 165, 248 Family Compacts 244,256, 268, 284 Fleets (French) 73, 112, 116, 253, 254, 287, 288 Fleury and France 230, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 251, 252, 253, 256, 257, 258, 261, 264, 266 and James Stuart 239, 249 Fontenoy 280, 295 France 142, 233 Frederick I 119 Frederick II 265, 278, 290, 291, 296, 297, 298, 299 Frederick Prince of Wales 249, 250 INDEX. 353 Frederick William I 161, 182, 251, 252 Fuessen 278, 279 Gallicanism 10, 39—41, 43— 49, 63, 65, 66, 125, 126, 127 George I 65, 94, 174, 181, 183, 184, 237, 238, 304 George II 249, 266, 267, 291, 299 George III 303, 313 Gibraltar 103, 115, 190, 226, 230, 240, 268 Glenshiel 214 Gothenburg 184, 281, 282 Grand Alliance 63, 64, 83, 87, 88, 90, 95, 98, 154 Gualterio 108, 126, 128, 134, 135, 140, 149, 150, 152, 167, 169, 179, 194, 234, 237, 245 Gyllenborg 185, 194 Hague 17, 19, 21 Hanover 65 Hanover, Treaty of 230 Hogue, La 7, 11, 73, 79 Holland 27-32, 35, 36, 67, 68, 74, 79, 91, 295, 296 Huguenots 39, 40, 121 see Nantes Hungary 3, 38, 39, 47, 80, 101, 104, 105 Indulgence, Declaration of 31, 35, 42 Infanta 219, 224, 225 Ireland 68—71, 72, 130, 150 Italy, War in 107—111, 143— 145, 198, 199, 284 and Spain 246 Italy and Independence 144, 145, 263, 284 James II (as King) 24, 35, 36, 41, 46, 49-58 in France 64, 65, 66, 76—79, 84, 87, 94, 95 in Ireland 68—70 James III (see Stuart) Jansenism 125, 148, 163, 292 Jenkins 255, 259 Jesuits 46, 61, 125, 126, 148, 300 see Unigenitus Juliers 252 Kaunitz 298 Lauzun 54, 70 Londonderry 70 Lorraine 245, 246, 250, 251 Louis XIV and his Pretenders 2, 3, 4 and the Empire 15—19, 52 and the Reunions 20 and Holland 27, 49, 50 and the Papacy 39-41, 43-45 and the English Revolution 49-58 and the Crusade 59—63 and James II 65, 66, 67, 77, 79, 84, 87 and Ireland 68—73 and the Spanish Succession 81—90, 155—160 and James HI 95, 96, 118, 130—136, 137—141, 142, 147 and Hungary 146 death 162, 164, 173 354 INDEX. Louis XV 174, 219, 224, 267, 268, 269, 279, 280, 284—286, 295, 296 Louvois 29, 30, 67 Loyalty 14, 304, 305, 307, 309 Luxemburg 75 Maine 200 Malaga 116 Malplaquet 143 Maria Beatrice 60, 132 Maria Theresa 225. 248, 261, 262, 278, 298 Mary 76, 93 Mediterranean Sea 180, 182, 210, 216 Milan Treaty 110, 136 Namur 76 Nantes, Revocation of Edict of 34, 40, 163 Naples 141, 247, 260, 288 Navigation Act 27 Netherlands 28, 68, 71, 73—79, 82, 84, 88,111,138, 180,279, 280, 295 Nimeguen 17, 18, 32 Nystadt 217 Orleans, Philip of 163, 170, 174, 175, 177, 179, 181, 199, 200, 214 Ormond 176, 211, 214, 229 Ostend Company 227, 228, 240, 253 Oudenarde 141 Palatinate 52 Papacy 12, 38, 123, 124, 160, 300 Parlement 292 Partition Treaties 87—89 Passaro 9, 198, 206, 209, 210 Passarowitz 165, 219 Patino 242, 243 Patriotism 14, 309 Peterborough 202, 203 Philip V as claimant 87, 88, 90 as King 98, 290 in the Spanish Succession 102, 103, 107, 109, 131, 132, 144 and Alberoni 189-216 and James Stuart 211—216, 235, 269, 270, 275 . and Elizabeth Farnese, see Elizabeth and Italy 268, 290 Philip, Don 263, 269, 271, 279, 283, 284 Pitt 14, 286, 296, 298, 301, 309, 310 Poland 106, 244, 258, 300 Poutchartrain 112, 288 Popes Innocent XI 40, 44, 46, 48, 57, 60, 61, 63 Alexander VIII 64 Innocent XII 65, 81 Clement XI 107—110, 119, 125—128, 129-136, 144, 145, 149—153, 166, 167, 169—172, 192, 203, 208, 209, 232—236, 295 Innocent XIII 235 Benedict XIII 236, 238, 239 Clement XII 258, 259, 260, 261 Benedict XIV 293—295 Clement XIV 300 Portland 78, 88 Portugal 115, 300 INDEX. 355 Pragmatic Sanction 162, 240, 242, 243, 247, 262 Presburg 24, 80 Protector 149, 150 Protestant Germany 62, 119, 136, 275 Quadruple Alliance 198, 199, 216 Bagoczy 99, 100, 101, 104, 105, 136, 145, 146 Bamillies 136 Batisbon 23 Reunions 20, 23 Bichelieu (Cardinal) 26, 27 (Duke of) 282, 286, 287 Bipperda 225, 226—230 Rome 45 Russia 106, 227, 245, 298 Ryswick 66, 79, 87, lU, 121, 258 Sacheverell 147, 148, 155, 311 Salzburg 258, 259 Sardinia 196, 197 Victor Amadeus I King of 85, 86, 90, 107, 110, 116, 197 Charles Emmanuel I 246 268, 283—286, 290 Saxe, Marshal 271, 272, 273, 276, 282, 287 Scotland 118, 133, 137, 171 Sea Power 153, 253, 269, 301, 310 Security, Act of 134 Seignelay 7, 67, 71 Septennial Act 179 Settlement, Act of 94, 95, 118, 154 Seville 240 Sherififmuir 175 Sicily 197, 247 Silesia 120, 121, 263, 291 Sophia 93, 94 South Sea Bubble 217, 220, 307 Spain 113, 114, 187, 191 Spanish Succession Question 81—90, 96, 98—160 Stanislas Leczinski 106, 244, 245, 246, 249 Stralsund 183 Stuart James the Pretender 1, 95, 111, 118, 249, 263 till 1708: 128—136,137— 141, 142 till 1713 : 147, 148, 149— 153, 158, 159, 160 in 1715: 171, 175, 177, 178, 186 and the Popes: 166, 167, 234, 237, 238, 239, 293— 295 and Spain : 190, 193, 199, 201—215, 222, 226—229, 239, 241, 249, 255, 256, 260, 270, 272, 296, 297 and marriage 168, 204 — 205, 215 and Atterbury 221 and Louis XV 269, 270, 272, 274—276, 287, 288 Charles Edward, the Pre- tender : 5, 238, 255, 256, 260, 265, 274, 275, 276, 277, 280, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287—291, 296, 297, 300, 301, 302 House of and England 303— 313 3.-G INDEX. Sweden 182, 184, 280, 281 see Charles XII Swedish Association 19 Tekely 11, 101 Tencin 270, 274, 292 Torcy 130, 131, 140, 156, 169 Toulon 117, 154, 271, 274, 289 Tourville 71, 72, 73 Triple Alliance (1668) 29 (1717) 179, 181, 182, 185, 187, 191, 197, 241 Turin 244, 246, 284—286 Turks 39, 48, 80, 81, 165, 172, 251, 259 Tyrconnel 68 Unigenitus 12, 164, 257, 292 Union of Scotland 136 Ursins, Priucesse des 189 Utrecht, Treaty of 142, 151, 159, 160, 161, 172, 181, 186, 187, 196, 197, 199, 217 Vicars Apostolic 151 Vienna, siege of 22 Treaty of, 225, 231, 240, 247, 253 Villars 100 Walpole 220, 242, 255, 306, 307 Wesley 312 Westminster, Treaty of— (1674) 32 (1716) 180, 181, 191 (1756) 299 Westphalia, Treaty of 10, 120 William III as Stadtholder 3, 27, 33, 50—57 as King against Louis XIV 66, 70—79, 84, 245 and Spanish Succession 84—91 and James Stuart 129, 130, 131, 150 Worms, Treaty of 268, 283, 290 J rAMBRIDOR: PRINTKD BY J. AND C. P. CLAY, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. \ / i 9h2.o6 H3U COLUMB AUNIV ERSITY 0032257538 « A.