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AUTHOR: 
 
 CHRETIEN, CHARLES 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 ESSAY ON LOGICAL 
 METHOD 
 
 PL A CE : 
 
 OXFORD 
 
 DA TE : 
 
 1848 
 
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 •* 
 
AN ESSAY 
 
 ON 
 
 LOGICAL METHOD. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES P. CHRETIEN, M.A 
 
 FELLOW AND TUTOR OF ORIEL COLLEGE. 
 
 
 OXFORD, 
 
 JOHN HENRY PARKER; 
 AND 377, STRAND, LONDON. 
 
 1848. 
 
1^0 
 
 c4t 
 
 BAXTEU, PKiNTER, OXFORD. 
 
 ^ 
 
 O 
 
 TO THOSE 
 
 FROM WHOM THE AUTHOR HAS LEARNED MUCH 
 
 WHEN HE SEEMED TO BE 
 
 TEACHING 
 
 CO 
 
 -: 
 
 . vt 
 
 — / 
 
 180183 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 
 In the following pages I have endeavoured to 
 consult principally the wants of those, whose taste 
 for Logic has carried them beyond its simpler 
 technicalities. Such persons will naturally desire to 
 learn how it may be useful in practice. Havincr 
 studied the nature of its machinery, they will gladly 
 see it in operation. 
 
 It is almost beyond my hope that what I have 
 written may also be of service to some, whose distaste 
 for Logic amounts to a prejudice. Ordinary rea- 
 soning can scarcely remove the irrational opinion, 
 that the legitimate study of the way to knowledge 
 acts mainly as an encouragement to ignorance. 
 
 That the few examples I have employed are 
 intentionally popular, will hardly be considered a 
 defect by those who know how apt an abstruse 
 illustration is to rival, if not to surpass, its subject 
 in obscurity. 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The very simple division of Sciences wliich I have 
 adopted will excite a smile in some who have 
 approached the same subject from another quarter. 
 But it is perfectly defensible, if the principles of 
 this work be in other respects true. Without 
 being the best or the only scheme, it may yet be 
 valid and Logical. 
 
 To confess myself conscious of many faults in 
 this Essay, is a poor apology for leaving them un- 
 corrected. They would have been more numerous, 
 but for a reason which I have great pleasure in 
 being permitted to mention. Both the Essay and 
 its Author are under more obligations than can be 
 particularised, to his dear friends and brother-fellows, 
 the Reverend George Buckle, and Mr. John 
 William Burgon. 
 
 Oriel, 
 June 17, 1848. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION [ 
 
 CHAP. I. THE ANCIENT VIEW OF THE RELATION OF 
 
 LOGIC TO SCIENCE. ....... 13 
 
 II. THE MEDLEVAL VIEW OF THE RELATION OF 
 
 LOGIC TO SCIENCE QQ 
 
 III. NOMINALISM AND REALISM 52 
 
 IV. THE MODERN VIEW OF THE RELATION OF 
 
 LOGIC TO SCIENCE 79 
 
 V. ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF 
 
 I^OGIC 94 
 
 VL ON LOGICAL METHOD IN GENERAI 1-28 
 
 VII. ON THE METHOD OF SCIENCE \S2 
 
 Vni. ON SCIENTIFIC IDEAS 138 
 
 IX, ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. . . 150 
 
 X. ON THE GRADATIONS OF SCIENCE. ... 177 
 
 XI. ON METHOD IN ART 1^8 
 
 XII. ON METHOD IN MORALITV I90 
 
 Xni. ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS 197 
 
 XIV. ON THE CONNECTION OF METHOD WITH 
 
 FORMAL LOGIC t>IO 
 
 CONCLISION i>|(5 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The student of Logic, who takes in hand any 
 of the old compendia which still survive in partial 
 use among us, will observe, that, towards their con- 
 clusion, they all engage upon one common subject, 
 which is, as they differently phrase it. Method, or 
 the use of Logic. To this, all that has preceded 
 is meant to minister. It impHes the earlier parts 
 of Logic, as a building imphes the foundation. Its 
 existence assumes that Apprehension, and Judg- 
 ment, and Discourse, have made some considerable 
 progress, and accumulated a sufficient body of 
 knowledge to require methodical disposition. Thus 
 syllogism is considered as the unit, or, so to speak, 
 the atom of reasoning ; and with its combinations 
 method is concerned. To stop short at the con- 
 sideration of this most concise and simple form of 
 argument, without dwelHng on its methodical 
 arrangement, would be to neglect that application 
 of it, which mainly renders it worth consideration 
 at all. 
 
 Yet to this part of the subject incipient logicians 
 still want a guide. The able treatise of Archbishop 
 Whately terminates, for this purpose, just too 
 early. He teaches the recruits how each dialectical 
 
 B 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 weapon may be wielded to advantage ; not how 
 the whole armoury may be employed in concert 
 with good effect. 
 
 And without any disparagement to later labourers 
 in this field, it may be said, that such other 
 guides to the knowledge of method as are not 
 palpably superficial, start from first premises too 
 unlike those which we semi-scholastics of Oxford 
 still retain to be naturally adopted as instructors 
 in our school. Instead of extending the old line 
 of enquiry, they turn to one which is altogether 
 new, and, where we are expecting explanation, 
 give us contrast. Or their turn is physical rather 
 than logical : they insist more on the facts which 
 method embodies, than on the formal process of 
 their embodiment. 
 
 It would be wide of our purpose to discuss any 
 schemes of method, which are built on other than 
 a logical groundwork. However true and ex- 
 cellent they may be. Logic is not the porch through 
 which to approach them. And yet it is most 
 unlikely that no entrance lies to method through 
 this vestibule. When we owe to the schoolmen and 
 their successors so much of our scientific phrase- 
 ology, so many of the terms which hang loose 
 between exact and popular usage, and serve to 
 bridge over (for good or for evil, as the causeway 
 so formed is employed) the gap which separates 
 sciolism and science ; when we take so commonly 
 as our material the frasjiuents of their mosaic-work. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 it seems unnatural and unwise, not to say ungrate- 
 ful, to pay no attention to the plan according to 
 which they arranged them. Doubtless they were 
 fitted for their original use ; and we may learn 
 much from considering the nature of this use, 
 although we may not think proper to adopt it. 
 
 Possibly, then, the domain of logical speculation 
 is not so fully occupied, as to leave no room for 
 the following Essay. Our object is, to view Logic 
 at once by the light of the past and the present ; 
 to enquire, in the first place, what ideas respecting 
 its nature were formerly entertained, and what 
 questions originated fi'om their adoption : how one 
 race of thinkers profited both by the knowledge 
 and the mistakes of those preceding them, and 
 handed down the results of their labours to their 
 successors, not without a still abiding mixture of 
 error; — and, this done, to show, how truths ad- 
 vancing fi'om different quarters meet at last, and 
 unite peaceably, where we might have feared a 
 collision ; how, as Logic has always of her own 
 free will testified to the truth of Science, Science 
 in her turn bears unintentional but not involuntary 
 witness to the truth and utility of Logic. 
 
 The former part of this Essay, therefore, is 
 mainly historical; the latter regards rather the 
 present state of knowledge, and aims at illustrating 
 the close connection between logical and scientific 
 method. The general fact of their connection 
 one consideration alone would serve to establish. 
 
 b2 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It cannot be by a mere accidental coincidence that 
 Logic and Science both point to a deductive system 
 as the perfect type of metliod. This they do on 
 grounds perfectly distinct. The logician asserts 
 the supremacy of Deduction, because it exhibits 
 most naturally the powers of his favourite instru- 
 ment, the syllogism ; because it assigns with the 
 greatest definiteness and precision to the pro- 
 position and the term their respective places and 
 importance. The man of science also takes Deduc- 
 tion as the type of excellence, because he finds that, 
 as matter of fact, the deductive sciences are the most 
 perfect. It would not at first strike the logician 
 that Mathematics exhibited the full power of the 
 syllogism, or the mathematician, that his pursuits 
 illustrated the chief exercise of Logic. But a little 
 thought shows either party that there is a real 
 conformity, not only in the results, but in the 
 process by which they attain them. Each is 
 attracted by the same feature in a deductive system, 
 that is, as we shall see hereafter, the perfect 
 manner in w^iich it unites in itself subordination 
 and consequentiality. 
 
 Where then there is on the whole such general 
 agreement, we should expect to find it pervading 
 the details also. Here, however, it does not at 
 first appear. Science says little of universals and 
 particulars, of distribution and non-distribution, of 
 judgment and discourse. While on the peculiar 
 features and arrangements of each particular 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 science Logic is of course equally silent. But, on 
 reflection, another class of terms occur, which 
 Logic and Science use in common. Such are, 
 conception and idea, genus and species, analysis 
 and synthesis. The vague use of words like these 
 is an evil wliich we ought not unnecessarily to 
 tolerate. Metaphorical in some sense they must 
 be ; but the nature and extent of the metaphor 
 deserves to be considered. And the further ques- 
 tion naturally arises, not only from what they have 
 been transferred, but to whom. Their use in- 
 differently by logicians and men of science suggests 
 the supposition, that Science has taken them 
 improperly from Logic, or Logic from Science. But 
 it is satisfactory to discover, that some knowledge 
 of the nature of method renders either hypothesis 
 unnecessary ; that it is with regard to method that 
 the terms have gained their meaning, and pre- 
 serving that meaning, are derived, with equal 
 propriety, to Science on the one hand, and Logic 
 on the other. 
 
 The idea of method, indeed, is prior to that of 
 either Science or Logic. It is simpler, w^here they 
 are more complex. It enters into every thing 
 which admits of arrangement and order. There 
 is method in placing in a row a number of mine- 
 ralogical specimens according to their external 
 resemblance : though this is not a science. There 
 is method in grouping together a number of apho- 
 risms, or proverbs, or practical maxims, which refer 
 
-'JlS-.-JBSBW ..<j.J.„fr-T 
 
 6 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to the same subject : though this falls short of 
 
 Logic. There may be order, and therefore method, 
 
 where there is httle kno'wledge and no conse- 
 
 quentiality. Crabbe, with his usual truth and 
 
 usual bitterness, has observed of misers, heralds, 
 
 flower-fanciers, and one or two other respectable 
 
 rather than useful classes of men, that. 
 
 Order to these is armour and defence, 
 
 And love of method serves in lack of sense •. 
 
 To be methodical, is useful both to the professor 
 of knowledge, and to him who would acquire it; 
 but it is perfectly compatible both with ignorance 
 in the one, and apathy in the other. 
 
 Before, then, entering directly on our subject, a 
 few words may be said both on the use and abuse 
 of methodology. Some degree of method is ne- 
 cessary in every stage above the merest empiricism. 
 Without it, we could only observe detached facts ; 
 we could not couple them by any mental asso- 
 ciation, unite them indissolubly, and extract a 
 principle from them. We use an inartificial 
 method in the ordinary process of gaining know- 
 ledge by observation, and retaining it. As this 
 process becomes more elaborate, we require a 
 more elaborate apparatus for our aid. Our system 
 must expand together with that which we sys- 
 tematize. 
 
 But this, it may be said, proves only the im- 
 portance of method, not of studying it. An 
 
 * " The Learned Bov.' 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 eminent naturalist once insisted on the utility of 
 Chemistry, because sulphur, for instance, was a 
 constituent substance of the body, and Chemistry 
 taught the nature and properties of sulphur. The 
 answer was obvious ; — that however important 
 the element might be, it was not therefore of 
 equal importance to be aware of its existence. 
 Though the sulphur was useful, it did not follow 
 that the knowledge of its utility was useful know- 
 ledge. In like manner it may be argued: method 
 is indispensable ; but not therefore the study of 
 method. 
 
 And further, it is a common remark, that ordi- 
 nary systems of procedure are despised by those 
 minds which bear the impress of genius. They 
 travel a way of their own ; and '^ their justification 
 lies in their success." If they exhibit the perfec- 
 tion of method, it is unconsciously. Conformity 
 to rule would only have cramped them. Their 
 greatness depended on their perfect freedom from 
 restraint. 
 
 Allowing this to be true, which it is not in the 
 sense in which it is often taken, the study of 
 method may yet be abundantly useful. Granting 
 that it is not of service to the greatest of men, it 
 will quite suffice if it profits all below them. The 
 result of their spontaneous and almost unconscious 
 energies w^e must be content to attain by the aid 
 of rule. Others on system aim at that which they 
 attain unsystematically. Their very superiority 
 
8 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 makes their instinct, our model. With the earnest- 
 minded, to admire, is to imitate. And surely it is 
 better to attain the height of excellence which we 
 admire, though by a different road, than, in a vain 
 mimicry of the process, to fail of the result alto- 
 gether. 
 
 The study of method then has its use : it is also 
 liable to abuse. Its office is, to enable us to 
 arrange and combine facts, not to enable us to 
 dispense with them. Yet it may be, and has been, 
 thus perverted. If knowledge, and observation, 
 and experiment, are observed to go further with 
 method than without them, men may fall into the 
 misconception, that it can supersede them to so 
 great a degree, as to render them comparatively 
 unimportant. When possessed with this idea, 
 they endeavour to employ form as the staple of 
 their enquiries, to the neglect of matter. Such, it 
 will be presently seen, was the great error of the 
 schoolmen. They saw a possibility, which they 
 vainly endeavoured to realize. It may be possible, 
 that, from the perfect analysis of a truth, all other 
 truths may be inferred : it is highly impossible that 
 any one will ever be able to perfect the analysis, 
 and effect the inference. 
 
 But it would be premature to dwell at present 
 on the scholastic abuse of method. It will be 
 more to our purpose to mention some of its evil 
 results in a form with which we are more familiar. 
 For in an undue exaltation of methodology lies 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 9 
 
 the intellectual error of those, with whom specula- 
 tion and '' agitation of wit" stand in the place of 
 learning; who are content with nothing short of 
 system, and desire nothing more ; who make con- 
 sistency the one test of truth, or, if they avoid the 
 mistake of confounding what is with what might 
 have been, neglect the actual in the vain quest of 
 the ideal ; who devote themselves, in short, to '' that 
 idle and not very innocent employment of forming" 
 in philosophy, and rehgion, and civil govern- 
 ment, " imaginary models of a world, and schemes 
 of governing it." 
 
 There is, then, great danger in the exclusive 
 study of method. The mere collector of facts, 
 which he cannot arrange, and has no real notion 
 of using, cannot do much harm to himself or 
 others. If his labours are on a great scale, he 
 becomes a helot of hterature, toihng that others 
 may enjoy. In a smaller field, he terminates, for 
 the most part, as a dealer in ill-sorted anecdotes 
 and ill-digested propositions; while, in matters of 
 importance, he follows passively in the wake of 
 others, who govern him by the possession of a 
 little more tact and judgment. He has knowledge, 
 in some sense, without information. 
 
 But he who, unprovided with facts, and without 
 the intention of acquiring them, enters on the 
 study of methodology, has no such immunity from 
 danger. From a small foundation he hopes to 
 proceed to great and extensive knowledge. Re- 
 
I 1 
 
 10 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 11 
 
 search is not his occupation, but the exercise of his 
 ingenuity. On some few first principles, which 
 recommend themselves to his own mind, or are 
 taken on trust from those whom he admires, or, it 
 may be, have real external evidence in their 
 favour, he fastens his behef. But these lie far 
 apart from this common-life world and the domain 
 of ordinary practice. For the connection between 
 them he depends on certain slender intellectual 
 threads, spun out, spider-like, from within. That 
 which he thus invents, he believes : but this belief 
 rests, not on objective truth, or on the evidence of 
 his fellow-creatures, or on God, but on himself. 
 Unbelief sits at the right hand of such a faith. A 
 self-made Damocles, he sees the sword of scep- 
 ticism suspended over him by a hair. If events 
 do not fall out as he expects, if phenomena will 
 not harmonize with his system, if truth in some 
 painful and oppressive form thrusts itself upon 
 him, he becomes convinced, though against his 
 will, that things are not as they seemed to him. 
 He deserts his system; and what has he left? 
 Nothing but the ruins of a building which Iiad no 
 foundation, the material of those thin walls built 
 upon the sand which one blast of God's breatli could 
 overthrow. Mere love of method is self-worship, 
 and nothing more. The overthrow of the idol is 
 the best fate which we can wish to the idolater. 
 
 The true student of method is in an entirely 
 diff'erent intellectual position. He will labour 
 
 / 
 
 to preserve the analogy of truth — to keep the 
 world within in harmony with the world with- 
 out. Method itself will not be his ultimate object, 
 but some other branch of enquiry, to which he 
 applies his method, and which it is meant to 
 further. 
 
 Those who have really forwarded formal 
 science have been men of general science also. 
 Plato, that greatest of merely human names, was 
 no unpractical dreamer on abstractions, but did 
 every thing well that he attempted, from writing 
 Greek to wrestling. Aristotle was the most learned 
 of men. The best of the schoolmen were familiar 
 with Courts, and toiled in Councils, while they 
 methodized. Lord Bacon had an eye for facts of 
 almost preternatural acuteness. Descartes not 
 only wrote de niethodo, and wandered at large in 
 metaphysics, but was a mathematician, an anatomist, 
 and almost, in his way, a divine. 
 
 The dry metaphysician is the most useless of all 
 beings ; he handles truths of which he does not 
 know the preciousness. When he has once map- 
 ped out the country, he would be unconcerned if it 
 should sink under water. '' A reasoning self- 
 sufficing thing," he suffices for nothing but himself. 
 He is the usurer of intellect, and the miser. 
 
 Method is, as the name indicates, a way in 
 quest of something. It is intended to forward re- 
 search, not to be itself an object. He is sure to fall 
 short of his mark, who erects a means into an end. 
 
12 
 
 INTllO DUCT ION. 
 
 Let US now proceed, before insisting on the true 
 relation of Logic to Science, to consider the views 
 which have been previously entertained on the 
 subject; and to show how the thinkeis of ancient 
 and mediaeval times handed on the torch to their 
 successors. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 THE ANCIENT VIEW OF THE RELATION OF LOGIC 
 
 TO SCIENCE. 
 
 In considering the relation which, according to 
 the ancient and mediaeval philosophies respectively. 
 Logic bore to Science, it would be unwise to take 
 any very restricted notion of Logic itself, by which 
 to limit our enquiries, and test the opinions of 
 those who have preceded us. We must not look 
 for greater accuracy in the use of our terms than 
 was possible in the time of their early application. 
 We shall see more fully the bearings of our 
 subject, by taking Logic in its widest sense ; not 
 enforcing our distinctions on those who could 
 never have heard of them, but content, as is often 
 best at the opening of an investigation, to follow 
 the guidance of a name, and see whither it will 
 lead us. So we may be sure, that wherever we 
 find the word Logic, we are on our proper ground, 
 in whatever sense our authorities used it ; whether 
 they meant by it an art or a science, whether they 
 assigned to it as its province, language, or in- 
 ference, or thought in general. 
 
 And if, as can scarcely be doubted. Logic is to 
 
14 
 
 THE ANCIENT VIEW OF TUK 
 
 be considered rather an art than a science, this 
 alone would justify us in using the term somewhat 
 vaguely. Science is, as we shall hereafter see, the 
 development of an idea; and the definiteness of 
 this idea is a condition of the progi'ess of the 
 science. Not so with art, which deals rather with 
 phcenomena than with ideas, which aims at effecting 
 an end, not at exploring a certain sphere of know- 
 ledge. Arts contract and expand almost inde- 
 finitely. The bold projector widens their field 
 in theory, the skilful artificer enlarges them in 
 practice. On the other hand, the division of 
 labour often sphts one art into several, and limits 
 to a part the application of a name which once 
 extended to the whole ; or the advance of know- 
 ledge shows perhaps that it has attempted more 
 than it could well fulfil, and leads it to modify its 
 pretensions ; or some change in the circumstances 
 of social life causes it to fall into neglect and 
 desuetude. So that the history of an art, like that 
 of a kingdom, is to a great extent the history of its 
 boundaries. The capital remains unchanged, but 
 the extent of territory around it varies. We all 
 know what is meant by the art of Medicine ; yet 
 how Httle remains fixed in it when examined. At 
 first we have a scanty knowledge of simples, and 
 some empirical rules as to diet. Then the mineral 
 kingdom comes in to lend its aid to the vegetable. 
 Afterwards we find the art taking another turn, 
 and, not content with bare observation, deducing 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. I5 
 
 rules from guesses as to the nature of remedies in 
 general, some fanciful doctrine of signatures, for 
 instance, or a premature theory of vital action. 
 Ihen a better acquaintance with the laws of 
 Physiology and Chemistry comes to its aid We 
 must not forget its sliifting and uncertain sym- 
 pathies with otlier real or pretended systems- with 
 Alchemy, or Astrology, or Magnetism. Yet how 
 small a part of this array of subjects comes under 
 the notice of the ordinary practitioner! To enquire 
 mto the history of Medicine, confining ourselves to 
 our own views of its nature and province, would 
 lead us to rob the ancients without enriching the 
 moderns, and make one of the oldest of the arts 
 comparatively a creature of the day. 
 
 What place then did Logic, taken in its broadest 
 sense, occupy in the systems of the philosophers of 
 Greece ? 
 
 Philosophy was in existence some time, before 
 Logic arose by her side. The Ionian and Pytha- 
 gorean Schools had no Logic. It is not hard to see 
 the reason of this. The two Schools have this point 
 of resemblance, that the teaching of each was 
 /lomogeueous. They attempted no division of Phi- 
 losophy. The systems of the one were based 
 wholly on physical considerations, of the other 
 wholly on metaphysical. And they had the whole 
 world before them: their enquiries assumed the 
 form of curiosity ; they speculated without doubt 
 and concluded without hesitation. Men do not 
 
14 
 
 THr<: ANCIENT VIEW OF THK 
 
 be considered rather an art than a science, this 
 alone would justify us in using the term somewhat 
 vaguely. Science is, as we shall hereafter see, the 
 development of an idea; and the definiteness of 
 this idea is a condition of the progress of the 
 science. Not so with art, which deals rather with 
 phoenomena than with ideas, which aims at effecting 
 an end, not at exploring a certain sphere of know- 
 ledge. Arts contract and expand almost inde- 
 finitely. The bold projector widens their field 
 in theory, the skilful artificer enlarges them in 
 practice. On the other hand, the division of 
 labour often splits one art into several, and limits 
 to a part the application of a name which once 
 extended to the whole ; or the advance of know- 
 ledge shows perhaps that it has attempted more 
 than it could well fulfil, and leads it to modify its 
 pretensions ; or some change in the circumstances 
 of social life causes it to fall into neglect and 
 desuetude. So that the history of an art, like that 
 of a kingdom, is to a great extent the history of its 
 boundaries. The capital remains unchanged, but 
 the extent of territory around it varies. We all 
 know what is meant by the art of Medicine ; yet 
 how httle remains fixed in it when examined. At 
 first we have a scanty knowledge of simples, and 
 some empirical rules as to diet. Then the mineral 
 kingdom comes in to lend its aid to the vegetable. 
 Afterwards we find the art taking another turn, 
 and, not content with bare observation, deducing 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 15 
 
 rules from guesses as to the nature of remedies in 
 general, some fanciful doctrine of signatures, for 
 instance, or a premature theory of vital action. 
 Then a better acquaintance with the laws of 
 Physiology and Chemistry comes to its aid. We 
 must not forget its shifting and uncertain sym- 
 pathies with other real or pretended systems— with 
 Alchemy, or Astrology, or Magnetism. Yet how 
 small a part of this array of subjects comes under 
 the notice of the ordinary practitioner! To enquire 
 into the history of Medicine, confining ourselves to 
 our own views of its nature and province, would 
 lead us to rob the ancients without enriching the 
 moderns, and make one of the oldest of the arts 
 comparatively a creature of the day. 
 
 What place then did Logic, taken in its broadest 
 sense, occupy in the systems of the philosophers of 
 Greece ? 
 
 Philosophy was in existence some time, before 
 Logic arose by her side. The Ionian and Pytha- 
 gorean Schools had no Logic. It is not hard to see 
 the reason of this. The two Schools have this point 
 of resemblance, that the teaching of each was 
 homogeneous. They attempted no division of Phi- 
 losophy. The systems of the one were based 
 wholly on physical considerations, of the other 
 wholly on metaphysical. And they had the whole 
 world before them: their enquiries assumed the 
 form of curiosity ; they speculated without doubt, 
 and concluded without hesitation. Men do not 
 
1(3 
 
 THB-ANCIENT VIEW OF THE 
 
 RKLATION OF LOGIC TO SCIKNCR. 
 
 17 
 
 seek a canon of trutli till they feel the danger of 
 falling into error. Thales and Pythagoras had no 
 such misgiving ; they argued and dogmatized with- 
 out fear of contradiction, and were received with 
 an applause that bore witness to their success. 
 They were too sanguine to need a Logic. 
 
 The Eleatics, who were the first doubters, first 
 showed symptoms of a logical turn. They wit- 
 nessed the failure of the Ionian and Pythagorean 
 systems. When Xenophanes lived and philoso- 
 phized, water and chaos had each been advocated 
 as the principle of all things. By the time of Em- 
 pedocles, fire and air had each likewise aspired to 
 universal rule, and failed. The Pythagorean theory 
 of numbers had met with no better success. The 
 Eleatics, only half discouraged by these repeated 
 misadventures of others, formed a new scheme of 
 their own. We owe to them one of the funda- 
 mental antitheses of Philosophy, that of sense and 
 reason. Unhappily, they made this nice distinction 
 the occasion of an error, and, in distinguishing, 
 opposed them. They taught, not that reason and 
 sense were conversant with the different poles of 
 truth, but that the one was the source of truth, the 
 other of falsehood. Thus they introduced a vicious 
 dualism into their philosophy, in the form of an 
 antithesis between the cognizable and the sensible, 
 the ideal and the actual world. 
 
 These opinions of theirs introduced a new division 
 into Philosophy. To Physic (taken in its widest 
 
 sense as including Metaphysic) they added Logic. 
 The new feature developed itself by degrees. Em- 
 pedocles had a leaning towards Dialectic, which is 
 indicated by his inventing Rhetoric— an honour 
 which Aristotle ascribes to him. Nor was Par- 
 menides ignorant of this branch of thought. Zeno 
 enjoys the distinction of being styled the inventor 
 of Logic by Aristotle himself '\ And now Philo- 
 sophy displayed clearly the two divisions of Logic 
 and Physic. 
 
 Ethic had hitherto held quite a subordinate 
 place. It came in as a corollary attached to other 
 conclusions, and had no distinct principles of its 
 own. The ethical opinions of those old philoso- 
 phers followed naturally from their physical. Thus 
 Clemens Alexandrinus informs us, that Heraclitus, 
 the tendency of whose whole philosophy was to 
 annihilate the individual, very consistently made 
 the chief good consist in content, which is the 
 submission of the individual mind to the universal ; 
 while Pythagoras, (mathematical to the last,) placed 
 happiness in " the knowledge of the perfection of 
 the numbers of the soul ;" and Anaxagoras, who 
 
 • Sextiis Empiricus adversus Mathcmaticos, b. vii. cli. I . 'E^iTTf- 
 boKkfa fiev yhp o ' ApitrrorfXr^s (j>r)a\ trpdrov pr)TopiKr)v K€KivT)K€vaL. ^s 
 avTiCTTpoc^ov flvai Trjv 8ia\€KTiKT)v, rovTfVrti/, laoirrpotpov, hia to nepl 
 Trfv avTTjv vXrjv <rrpf(f)€crdai. as kqi avriOeov 6 noir}-njs €(f)Tj tov "Odva-trea- 
 OTTfp ?!/, IfToBfou. nappevlSrjs gc oIk &v 86$ai t^j StaXeAcrtAc^jr drrflpcos 
 €Xfiv, fVf (Vfp TToXti/ 'Apia-TOTfXris rov yvoypipov avrov Z^vcova diaXeKviK^s 
 dpxvyov vrr€iXT)(f)€v. The whole chapter, though not to be implicitly 
 followed in all its statements, will repay an attentive perusal. 
 
 C 
 
 1 
 
18 
 
 THK ANCIENT VIEW OF THE 
 
 lield, as his physical theory, that the j)rimitive 
 Chaos had been informed and shaped by intellect, 
 found the end of life in " contemplation, and the 
 freedom resulting therefrom ^" Detached opinions, 
 such as these, are all we can expect to find. 
 Scarcely a ray of moral light descends from the 
 abstract and metaphysical theology of Xenophanes. 
 Empedocles cannot claim the title of an ethical 
 teacher ; we must seek in his physical philosophy 
 the reasons of such tenets as the unlawfulness ot 
 depri\ing animals of hfe. Love and Hate, so 
 naturally principles of action, are with him the 
 elements of a physical theory, where they are seen^ 
 not moving men, but forming a world. There was 
 no independent ethical teaching, before the time 
 of Socrates. 
 
 The glorious mind of Plato, so sympathetic with 
 the thoughts of all he loved and honoured, and yet 
 so comprehensive of all truth, while it attached all 
 due importance to the Socratic doctrines, did not 
 venture to neglect the labours of the past. The 
 
 ** Stroiiiata, lil). i.. ]>. 416. Ovkow fVl tovtois dpKov^€Pois Kara- 
 ttava-TioVj <f)iXoTtfirjT4op fit, o>s ei/t /zoXtora, Koi ra np6s rSav <f)V(TiaaiV 
 SoyfxaTi^6p.€va TTfpl tov TrpoKafxivov napaOtaBai. * Ava^ayopav p.tv yhp 
 TOP KXa^opivtov TTjv Bfoipiav (j)dvat tov ^lov WXos cii^m, Kai ttjv airo 
 ravrqs i\ev3(piav,\€y(w(riv'HpdKkfiT6v t€ Tov*E(f)€(Ti()vrTfv (vaptanja-iv. 
 UvBayopav Sc o JJoirriKos HpaK\(iBT}s laropd tt}v eirKrrqfirjv rrjs TfXfiorr^ror 
 T(ov dpi6po3P T^s ^vx^s fvdaipopiap ft»/ai napade^coKCPaiy k. t. X. I have 
 ventured, it will be seen, to iniiodiico in the text, dpi0fia)p for dpfrayv, 
 the conjectural readiiiii ot Poiti r, who (juotes Theodoret to the same 
 effect. *0 8c Tro\v0pvX\i]Tos Ilv0ay6pas rqp TfXdordTrjp rap (ipi0fxa>v 
 €7ri<TTr]p.T]v €(T\aTOP VTTfXap^apcp dyaBop. 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 19 
 
 Ethic of Socrates was retained by him, but not in 
 its isolation. Endeavouring to transfer to his 
 master the praise which was justly his own, he put 
 him forward as the discoverer of the triple aspect 
 of Philosophy ^ And Socrates undoubtedly had 
 considerable pretensions as a logician ; his view of 
 method, so far as we can trace it, was admirable ; 
 and he so systematized definition and induction, as 
 to have been deemed their inventor \ But his occa- 
 sional speculations on the nature of the world and 
 the soul will not entitle him to the name of a 
 physical philosopher. Nor, granting their fullest 
 value to his researches, can we therefore fairly 
 assume his acquaintance with the scheme which 
 under his pupil's hands they illustrated. It is to 
 the systematic Plato that we really owe the division 
 of Philosophy, since so widely accepted, into Ethic, 
 Physic, and Logic \ 
 
 No ground-plan of Philosophy among the 
 ancients gained so wide a currency as this. Aris- 
 totle, though he did not employ it as his scientific 
 
 ' Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 1. 'o ,xeV y^p n\dTo>p ndpvos 
 fitpovs <pi\o(TO(t)las avT$ fifraSiSwcrt, toC fiep XoyiKov, nap Baop ir€p\ 
 opa>p Koi iiaip€<rfcop koi irvpdXoyias napeio-yKTai Ctjtcop, ajrep eori XoytKa* 
 Toif 5€ fjOiKOP, on n€p\ dpf-njs koI TroXirtias Koi pofiop SiaaKenTfrai roi 
 de (t)v(rLKov, on koi nepl Koafxov n Kal irfpl C<ooyopias Kai yjrvx^s necfyiXo- 
 <r6cf>T]K€P, h6(P Ka\ 6 Tip<op alndTm top HXarwra €7i\ tZ ovtco acoXXw- 
 TTi^dP TOP "2,u>Kpdrqp TroXXotf paBr]p.acnp. 
 
 *• Metaphys. xii. 4. Avo ydp iaTip, d tis dp dnodtor, 2coKpdT,i 
 SiKaitos, ToCs T enaKTiKoi/s Xoyov^y Kal to dpi(((T6ai Ka6oKov. 
 
 • See Dioi(. Laert. Prooein. Segm. 18. 
 
 c2 
 
20 
 
 THK ANCIENT VIEW ol THE 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 21 
 
 division, yet in practice adopts it ^ Epicurus 
 recognised it also, though he gave to the logical 
 section the name of '' canonic ^" The Stoics 
 accepted it without any such alteration of termi- 
 nology. So generally admitted was it, that it was 
 forced in some sense, by popular opinion, on those 
 who would not otherwise acknowledge it. Sects, 
 which denied its validity, or were ignorant of its 
 existence, were tried by its standard. Thus we 
 are informed, (of which more hereafter) that the 
 Cynics confined their attention to Ethic, and 
 neglected Physic and Logic'. 
 
 It is to our purpose to see, what prominence, 
 what place and office, the different schools assigned 
 to the logical limb of this division. A few pre- 
 paratory remarks will enable us the better to see 
 the real nature of the question on which they 
 
 ' Top. i. 12. §. 5. 
 
 8 Diog. Laert. lib. x. Seg. 29, 30. 
 
 *" Diog. Laert. vii. 40. 
 
 ' Diog. Lat'if. vi. 103. Far more out of place, and for that 
 very reason mon* strikingly illustraiive of the prevalence of this 
 division, is the statement of Philo Judiuus, (Quod omnis probus 
 liber) that the Essenes cultivated Ethic to the exclusion of Logic 
 and far the greater portion of Physic. It is startling to find 
 8t. Jerome applying it to Holy Scripture in the following passage. 
 " Quomodo Philosophi solent disputationes suas in Physicam, 
 Ethicam, Logicamquo partiri, ita et eloquia divina aut de natura 
 disputare, ut in Genesi et in Ecclesiaste : aut de moribus, ut in 
 Proverbiis et in omnibus sparsim libris : aut de Logica, pro qua 
 nostri theoricen sibi vindicant, ut in Cantico Canticorum, et 
 Evangeliis." Epist. ad Paulimi Urbicum de interpretatione Al- 
 phabeii Hebraici, ad init. 
 
 parted company, and the reasons which rendered 
 it incapable of a satisfactory solution. 
 
 The ancients used the term Logic in a much 
 wider sense than we do. As physical Philosophy 
 included all the phenomena of the outward world, 
 and, if we can allow a soul to brutes, those of the 
 "irrational soul" also; as Ethic considered all 
 questions of directly practical import, so the whole 
 world of mind came under Logic. It dealt with 
 mental laws, whether these laws were considered 
 as the means of investigation, or its object. If 
 the application of reasoning could solve a ques- 
 tion without appeal to observation or experiment, 
 its solution belonged to this branch of Philosophy. 
 If the nature of the rational soul was considered. 
 Logic claimed it as its province. If a system of 
 rules was to be constructed, fitted to aid in the 
 ordinary investigation of truth, here too Logic was 
 at home. 
 
 The word then was taken in too broad a sense 
 to be distinct in its meaning. Metaphysic, or the 
 science of thought as belonging to the rational 
 soul, in the first place fell within it. Then it 
 included Logic proper, or the system of rules for 
 reasoning grounded on the laws of thought. Lastly, 
 it included Logic applied — the concrete of these 
 rules, and the matter of any particular question 
 which they enabled the enquirer to determine. 
 
 The clear mind of Aristotle did not fail to 
 discern this equivocation. He saw the difference 
 
oo 
 
 THE ANCIUNT VIKW OF THE 
 
 between the metaphysical truths on which the 
 rules of reasoning are grounded, and the rules of 
 reasoning themselves. His usage of language on 
 this point is not however that to which we are now 
 accustomed. Logic is with him the more general 
 term; Analytic, the more restricted**. Our Logic 
 corresponds to the latter rather than to the former. 
 Thus, on the one liand, he calls it a logical ques- 
 tion, whether there be one science of contraries, 
 or not; on the other hand, he describes Rhetoric, 
 which we should characterize as the union ' of the 
 science of human nature, and Logic, as a com- 
 bination of PoHtic and Analytic"". The opposition 
 therefore between logical and analytical, in his 
 mind, would answer to that between metaphysical 
 and logical, in ours. There is of course nothing 
 implied in this antithesis, which could hinder him 
 from viewing Logic generical, including Analytic 
 and much more, as one great section of Philosophy, 
 in contrast both with Ethic and Physic. 
 
 Plato, on the other hand, it is well known, 
 courted of set purpose the fusion of these two 
 ideas — of the law, and the rule, of thought; of the 
 basis on which Logic is built, and the logical 
 building itself. Though a variety of authorities 
 attribute to him the threefold division of Philosophy, 
 he does not himself explicitly state it. And Dia- 
 lectic, rather than Logic, is the name by which he 
 
 ' Ton. I 
 
 ^ Posi. Anal. I. xxii. 21,2. 
 "* Rhet. I. iv. 
 
 xii. f). 
 
 I 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 23 
 
 
 
 distinguishes the third number of the division. We 
 know too, that his making those universals, which 
 were generally regarded as the creatures of Logic, 
 real existences, and identifying them with his 
 ideas, led him to include under one name the 
 formal and the real science °. His Dialectic was 
 not a mere intellectual discipline, or a bare organon 
 of truth, but a summary of the highest, and, in 
 some sense, the only real knowledge. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that these two great 
 authorities, however much they differ on other 
 points, agree in one. They both exalt Logic 
 above Physic and Ethic. Plato's reason was 
 obvious : Dialectic was the one great science to 
 which, in his opinion, other sciences owed not 
 only their apparatus, but their very aim and 
 purpose. And Aristotle, taking, as we have seen. 
 Logic in its broadest sense, made it include far too 
 much, to be at all tempted to vmderrate it. 
 
 The two great schools which succeeded in Greek 
 philosophy assigned Logic a far low^er importance. 
 The Canonic of the Epicureans was restricted 
 within very narrow bounds, and sometimes con- 
 fused with their Physic**. And the Stoics, who 
 also subordinated it to Physic, introduced also 
 Rhetoric and other extraneous matters into the 
 province which it seemed of itself no longer equal 
 to Hll P. 
 
 " Metaplivs. xii. 4. 
 ** Dioj;. Larrt. vii. 41. 
 
 " Diog. Laert. x. 30. 
 
24 
 
 THE ANCIENT VIEW OF THE 
 
 But, as two schools of Philosophy arose before 
 Logic had its origin, so also two, which were 
 almost contemporaneous with its most flourishing 
 days, shut their eyes and refused to acknowledge 
 it. One of these was that of the Cynics. We 
 have seen above'', that the rejection of Logic was 
 formerly laid to their charge. The accusation 
 which is so directly made might have been inferred 
 from their known opinions. Antisthenes and his 
 disciples denied the possibility of definition ' and 
 of contradiction ^ The one position is incon- 
 sistent with a behef in the accuracy of knowledge ; 
 the other even denies that it is attainable. For, 
 if there be no contradiction, there can be no 
 antithesis between truth and falsehood; if there 
 be no definition, truth may exist indeed, but with 
 such indistinctness and uncertainty of outline as 
 to defy a sure recognition. Li each opinion the 
 same tone of mind appears. To regard Truth as 
 something which the mind cannot really grasp, is 
 a long stage on the road towards disbelieving its 
 existence. 
 
 The Cynics indeed seem to have been a pitiable 
 sect of philosophers — pitiable too, perhaps, in the 
 sense of deserving our pity. First of all, they turned 
 their thoughts to virtue, which they thought both 
 attainable and necessary. On the ethical branch of 
 Philosophy they therefore cast no slight. But this 
 absorbed their wliole attention. On the cold un- 
 
 'i r 20. 
 
 ' Mcl;i|)hys. vii. 3. 
 
 ' Top. I. ix. f). 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 25 
 
 impassioned covmtenance of their ideal Virtue they 
 fixed their eyes, and forgot all besides. The laws 
 of the souls, and the phenomena of nature, they 
 alike despised. Beyond Virtue, all seemed un- 
 certain ; the sophists had overthrown their faith 
 in human knowledge, and Heraclitus had sapped 
 their trust in the outer world. Plato invented his 
 theory of ideas, that, by reposing all that was 
 precious upon them, he might preserve the con- 
 fidence of men both in knowledge and goodness. 
 The Cynics thought that their doctrine of im- 
 passibility saved Virtue from the general crash, and 
 calmly allowed the sea of doubt to sweep all else 
 away. 
 
 Very unlike paths lead different men to the same 
 conclusions. The Cyrenaics also were said to 
 resolve all Philosophy into Ethic'. Aristotle him- 
 self" tells us of the contempt with which Aristippus 
 regarded Mathematics as teaching us nothing of 
 the good and the beautiful. Morals were at any 
 rate the principal study of the Cyrenaics, whether 
 they entirely neglected the other branches of Philo- 
 sophy, or, as is more likely from their treatises on 
 " causes" and " proofs," only placed them in com- 
 plete subordination. Perhaps indeed there was 
 little in their whole system to claim the title of 
 philosophy. They were bound no more to any 
 severity of thought than of conduct. No strict 
 
 Dioi-. Lat'it. ii. 1)2. 
 
 " IVIelaplivs. ii. 2. 
 
26 
 
 THE ANCIENT VIEW OF THE 
 
 theory was needed to justify ease and sell-indulgence 
 to those who loved them. 
 
 As time passed on, the Schools, which at first 
 occupied independent ground, came into contact. 
 Questions, originated by each separately, were 
 discussed in common. And we find, at a period 
 long after the inventors of the respective systems 
 had ceased to write and live, their descendants 
 once more discussing points which seemed to have 
 been settled, and ruhng them anew. 
 
 In the time of Ammonius^the Stoics, Peripatetics, 
 and Platonists had long, he tells us, held their 
 distinct view as to the relation of Logic to Philo- 
 sophy. The Stoics, true to their old position, 
 made it a part of Philosophy. One of their argu- 
 ments is sufficiently terse and concise to deserve 
 mention. No Art, they said, made its own instru- 
 ment ; Logic therefore, which is the creation of 
 Philosophy, is not its instrument, but a part of it. 
 The title of Aristotle's logical works was the watch- 
 word of the Peripatetics, who held Logic to be only 
 an instrument. The argument which Ammonius 
 puts in their mouth, has certainly a tinge of a phi- 
 losophy foreign to that of their master. They 
 argued, he tells us, that every part must have the 
 same matter, and the same end, with the whole ; 
 but there was no such identity of subject and pur- 
 pose in Logic and Philosophy. For Philosophy, 
 
 ' The soil of Heniicas, who flourished circ. A.D. 470. Sec 
 his Treatise on the Cate^^ories, pp. 6—8. Ed. Vend. 151)5. 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 27 
 
 they proceeded, had things for its matter, and 
 asswiilatio7i to God for its end; while the subject 
 of Logic was Language, and its aid. Demonstration. 
 The conclusion at which they arrived was true ; 
 the way of attaining it, if it was really theirs, proves 
 how the school of Aristotle had degenerated in 
 those bad times. 
 
 The Platonic view, we are informed by the same 
 authority, was, that Logic was both a part and an 
 instrument of Philosophy. These Platonists, too, 
 argued rather childishly. A hand, they urged by 
 way of example, is an instrument of giving and 
 taking, a part of the whole body. Of course there 
 is nothing wonderful in the same thing's being 
 a part of one thing and an instrument of another. 
 There is something more philosophical in a dis- 
 tinction which they drew, with a like object, between 
 Logic when viewed as an independent system of 
 rules, and when actually applied to some particular 
 subject. Regarded abstractedly, as in the former 
 case, it seemed to them an instrument of Philo- 
 sophy ; taken in the concrete, as in the latter case, 
 it became a part. Thus, while they sided theo- 
 retically with the Stoics, their mode of expression 
 tended practically to that confusion of Logic and 
 Science, which afterwards prevailed among the 
 Schoolmen. 
 
 Thus much of the views which the principal 
 schools of ancient Philosophy held regarding 
 Logic. Their want of distinctness and consistency 
 
28 
 
 THE ANCIENT VIEW OF THE 
 
 is obvious. The reason of this deficiency has been 
 hinted at more than once. Falling short of a 
 definite conception of Logic itself, they could 
 attain no distinct statement of its relation to other 
 subjects. Human reason at large, and reasoning, 
 or the exercise of the inferential faculty par- 
 ticularly, and language, in which reason finds its 
 expression, may all be investigated like any other 
 subject, and therefore brought under one or more 
 sciences. Such science or sciences would of course 
 be a part of Philosophy. And the Greeks, employ- 
 ing a single word to express at once thought and 
 language, would naturally call such a science. 
 Logical, 
 
 This combination then of Metaphysic and uni- 
 versal Grammar, though scarcely deserving to give 
 a name to the most important division of Philo- 
 sophy, would nevertheless rank under it. Aristotle 
 and Plato were right in insisting on its claim to 
 this honour; the Stoics and Epicureans trod on 
 the verge of error, when they lowered the laws of 
 thought in their esteem to the level of the rules 
 which are gi'ounded on them, and the Cynics and 
 Cyrenaics were undoubtedly wrong when they 
 despised this branch of knowledge altogether. 
 
 But Logic, in the sense which we give to the 
 term, is not a Science, but an Art. Not directly 
 adding to our stock of abstract truths, but serving 
 to extend in all directions the domain of general 
 knowledge, it is not a part of Philosophy, but the 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 29 
 
 organon of Philosophy at large. And it was to 
 Logic proper, as an art, that the enquiries of the 
 later Schools which have been mentioned above 
 referred. The Peripatetic position, that it is an 
 instrument, is in this way perfectly correct. It 
 was an anticipation of the modern idea of the 
 subject, and was only too early to bear fruit. The 
 Platonic statement has the air of a verbal com- 
 promise, but agrees essentially with the Peri- 
 patetic. The Stoical opinion is indefensible. That 
 School held fast to its ancient dogma without 
 understanding it. Though it might be rash to 
 assert with Hooker, that they " accounted stupidity 
 the highest top of wisdom V' they certainly showed 
 for the most part more obstinacy in retaining a 
 position than skill in defending it. 
 
 The view of the later Peripatetics, we have said, 
 was alone correct. But it was planted among the 
 fragments of a ruined philosophy, and failed to 
 take root. The ancients, on the whole, sub- 
 scribed to the formula, that Logic is a part of 
 Philosophy. Turn we now to the Schoolmen, 
 and see, how through their researches we have 
 journeyed by a tortuous road to Truth. 
 
 y Eccl. Pol. VI, vi. §.6. 
 
CHAP. IL 
 
 THE MEDIEVAL VIEW OF THE RELATION OF LOGIC 
 
 TO SCIENCE. 
 
 The stream of knowledge, though it always 
 flows, never flows evenly for long together. It 
 often seems to divide, and its portions to take dif- 
 ferent courses. But the separation is seldom final. 
 The severed streamlets form an island, beyond 
 which they unite. The smaller body of water 
 flows perhaps straight onward, through a confined 
 and artificial channel. The main stream makes a 
 longer circuit, but both join at last. 
 
 We may apply our metaphor, and say, that 
 ancient Philosophy ran in a comparatively narrow 
 course after Aristotle. The late Peripatetics, we 
 have seen, kept and carried on, with regard to 
 Logic, the true doctrine of their master. But 
 Philosophy in general took a diflerent turiL Ari- 
 stotle himself, and not the opinions of his school 
 after him, formed the text which exercised the 
 commentatorial spirit of the middle ages. The 
 Schoolmen set a very different value on Logic from 
 the Peripatetics. It was fated to rise to a still 
 
 THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 81 
 
 greater height in the world's estimation, before it 
 sunk to its proper level. Aristotle and Plato had 
 made Logic a part; it is not too much to say that 
 the Schoolmen made it the whole, of Philosophy. 
 
 Aristotle, like many other great men, left behind 
 him a mighty idea, for the future, if possible, to 
 evolve. That idea was the great ruling science of 
 Wisdom, Towards this he pointed the aspirations 
 of all who would be good and happy. He thought 
 it unattainable, certainly to the majority of man- 
 kind, perhaps to all. Yet, in spite of his love of 
 the practical, he could not refrain from dwelling 
 on it. If ever he is enthusiastic, it is on this 
 subject ; some portions of the Metaphysics, read, 
 in consequence, like fragments of a philosophical 
 romance. 
 
 The Schoolmen caught from him the same idea, 
 and were enraptured with it. We shall not wonder 
 at this, if we consider how great were the promises 
 it held out, to those who thought it practicable. 
 
 Aristotle's Wisdom is nothing less than a deduc- 
 tive theory of the universe. The mind which has 
 attained it is represented as in some sense sovereign 
 over all that it surveys. The truly wise men, 
 unlike the mass of mankind, who are slaves to 
 sense, and see but consequents without the ante- 
 cedents, and touch only the last and lowest link of 
 the chain which connects heaven and earth, stands 
 at the source of all knowledge, and sees things in 
 their causes. His reason follows the order of the 
 
32 
 
 THE MEDIAEVAL VIEW OF THE 
 
 creative Mind. Whatever is first in nature, is first 
 also to him. 
 
 And the mental act which this Wisdom implies 
 is of the most perfect kind. All is calm contem- 
 plation. The turmoil of inference is over, and pure 
 intuition has succeeded. The mind's eye does not 
 wander here and there in quest of some worthy 
 object, but is fixed for ever in intellectual serenity 
 on the face of Truth. 
 
 Viewed only as a habit of the mind, it rose so 
 high in dignity and perfection. Nor were the 
 subjects with which it dealt unworthy of its own 
 elevated nature. It is depicted in a threefold 
 aspect, answering to the division of that which it 
 contemplates. Its highest phase is Theology, — 
 which dwells on the thought of the self-existing 
 Substance, a pure intellectual Being, ever active ; 
 the first Cause ; itself unmoved, yet the source of 
 all motion ; eternal, indivisible, omnipresent ; in a 
 word, the Aristotelian God. 
 
 Its two other divisions are Mathematic and Physic. 
 These words, to a great degi'ee, explain themselves. 
 Of the latter, however, we should observe, that it 
 took a much wider range with Aristotle than with 
 us, including, to a great extent, the laws of mind 
 as well as of matter, — the laws of all phenomena, in 
 short, which are not reducible to the formulae of 
 space and number. Under this broad sense of 
 Physic falls the Philosophy both of Morals and Art. 
 The wise man does not indeed descend from his 
 
 I 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 33 
 
 theoretic elevation to give rules for guiding con- 
 duct, and forming taste. To the lower parts of 
 Philosophy it belongs to train men to the love of 
 goodness and the perception of beauty. But when 
 art and education have not only brought forth 
 fruit in practice, but have also developed character, 
 and elicited Ideas which had else lain dormant in 
 the mind. Wisdom can then, without loss of caste, 
 regard them. She adds to her contemplation of 
 Absolute Being, and, in subordination to this, of 
 the laws which move the framework of the Uni- 
 verse, a knowledge of those principles also, on which 
 depend the Good and the Beautiful. 
 
 Such was Aristotle's wisdom, perfect in its 
 subject, which is co-extensive with law and order ; 
 perfect in its method, which is that of the cre- 
 ative Mind, starting with the simple idea of Being, 
 and descending thence in regular sequence through 
 the whole array of including and included universals ; 
 perfect in the nature of its contemplation, which 
 sums up in a single term the whole series of 
 causation, and grasps by a simple intellectual act 
 what has been called " the Mundane Idea," or the 
 '' Summary Law of Nature'." 
 
 The author of this mighty plan did not, of 
 
 References in detail are impossible, where so abstruse and 
 wide a subject is treated so summarily. But a fuller expansion 
 would have been out of place here. The following Chapters 
 of the Metaphysics contain manv of the nio.st ini])ortant passages. 
 Lib. I. 1.2. V. l.XI. 7— 10. 
 
 D 
 
S4 
 
 THE MEDLEVAL VILW OF THE 
 
 course, witness its completion. It cannot he fairly 
 said that he ever really attempted to carry it out. 
 We have indeed lahorious collections of facts, 
 difficult prohlems, subtle theories, handed down to 
 us in abundance from Aristotle. But thougli he 
 investigated almost every branch of knowledge, 
 there was no great system to which he endeavoured 
 to harmonize the whole. His separate treatises 
 have their own perfection, and generally need no 
 definite place in a more extensive arrangement. 
 Having put before the world a scheme for the 
 consistent organization of all knowledge, and col- 
 lected large materials for tlie work, he left tliem as 
 a legacy to posterity, to be arranged and con- 
 solidated, if it so might be, by others. 
 
 Nor did the idea fail to bear fruit in its season. 
 The Schoolmen found tlie design, and thought it 
 too striking to be neglected. Their theological 
 stores were a large addition to the material be- 
 queathed by Aristotle. So, with full confidence 
 in their resources, and a per[)etual reference to the 
 original sketch before them, they attempted to 
 rear the tem})le of Universal Knowledge. Where 
 Aristotle had laid the foundation, tluy built; his 
 facts, ready hewn to their hands, they incorporated 
 with the building : his Metaphysic supplied them 
 with the plan; and they took his Logic for their 
 scaffold. 
 
 To mention the Schoolmen seems at once to 
 trespass on the province of the unintelligible. The 
 
 RELATION OF LOOIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 35 
 
 term is vague enough ; can it be otherwise, when 
 we sum up under the title of scholastic philosophy 
 the whole mass of thought, vast in its extent if not 
 in its value, which occupied the minds of the 
 learned in its elaboration between the tenth and 
 the sixteenth centuries ? If it brings up any image 
 at all before most minds, it is a very incongruous 
 one, in which John Scotus and Dun Scotus are in 
 danger of losing their individuality, Roscelin and 
 Ockham, the nominalists early and late, blend 
 confusedly together, and Anselm and Lanfranc 
 come into contact with Albertus Magnus and 
 Thomas Aquinas. We are apt to think, that during 
 the long period of scholastic dominion there was 
 no true growth and progress ; ' that books increased 
 beyond number, and writer superseded writer, with- 
 out any corresponding, not to say proportionate, 
 increase of knowledge, or revolution of opinion ; 
 but that Aristotle was a uucleus round which hard 
 words innumerable attached themselves by accre- 
 tion like so much inorganic matter. But such a 
 tone of thought is an unnecessary wrong to an 
 extinct philosophy. Its unity of form, though 
 by no means so great as is generally supposed, 
 serves nevertheless to disguise from the care- 
 less observer very wide differences in substance. 
 The opinion that the thinkers of those days 
 must have been all very much like each other, 
 is too rapid an inference from the undoubted 
 fact, that they were all very unlike ourselves. If 
 
 d2 
 
36 
 
 THK MEDLEVAL VIEW OF THE 
 
 we identify, as is usual, the Scholastic and Me- 
 diaeval Philosophy, we must not forget, that 
 there were as truly within it subordinate schools, 
 as there had been in ancient, and are in modern 
 times, in spite of the greater resemblance of form 
 which they acquired, as, treating all subjects in a 
 single view and in a conventional language, they 
 expanded with difficulty, and often with danger 
 to their advocates, under the watcliful eye and 
 stern admonition of Church-authority. 
 
 The great point of similarity among the School- 
 men is indeed that feature of their writings with 
 which we are most concerned — the uniform j)re- 
 sence of a dialectical spirit. Some of the traits 
 which we should be most apt at first to select as 
 characteristic are by no means universally present. 
 Their devotion to Aristotle, for instance, is not 
 invariable. The master of sentences himself, Peter 
 Lombard, has been observed never to quote him ; 
 and with several of the early Schoolmen, the Neo- 
 platonic element preponderates over the Peripa- 
 tetic. The commentatorial spirit, again, prevailed 
 not so generally among them as it is said to do 
 now among the literati of China. It does not 
 distinguish, for instance, the scholastic works of 
 St. Anselm; and the master-pieces of school- 
 labour, the Book of Sentences, and the Sums of 
 Theology, are in the form of questions and distinc- 
 tions, not of comment. Some would make realistic 
 opinions a test of the Schoolmen; yet Roscehn 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 37 
 
 and Abelard are often reckoned in their number, 
 and no one denies Ockham that doubtful honour. 
 They are characterised more surely, as we have 
 said above, by their absorbing devotion to Dialectic. 
 This it is which keeps them poised in the region 
 of intellectual abstraction, equally removed from 
 the pleasing illusions of imagination on the one 
 hand, and the stern realities of observation and 
 experiment on the other. This is the principle of 
 unity, which assimilates to itself all the subjects of 
 which they treat, and reduces to a dreary same- 
 ness the widest and most varied range of discus- 
 sions. But our object is not to delineate the 
 scholastic Philosophy generally. The connection 
 it formed with the Aristotelian idea of Wisdom, 
 and its consequent identification with Logic, alone 
 concern us at present. Peculiarities such as these, 
 though they may be stated in the abstract, cannot 
 be described and rendered intelligible, without some 
 aid of example. And to none of the Schoolmen 
 should we so naturally turn, as to Thomas Aquinas. 
 Several reasons prove him particularly adapted for 
 this purpose. He is perhaps, of all his tribe, the 
 most complete and systematic : and the fact, that 
 when the day of his full power was over, he con- 
 tinued, and still continues, to exercise a real in- 
 fluence over students of a certain portion of 
 Philosophy, fits him still more for our object, when 
 we are treating of the scholastic doctrines mainly 
 with regard to the view which they forwarded on 
 
38 
 
 THE MKDl.EVAL VIEW OF THE 
 
 a single important question — the relation of Logic 
 to Science. Though, were we attempting a portrait 
 of the perfect Schoolman, we should still do best 
 to refer to him. He is, in many ways, the best 
 specimen of his class. He wrote at the time when 
 the School-philosophy seemed to have com{)letely 
 recovered from the attack which tln*eatened it with 
 destruction in its infancy, and which Ockham 
 afterwards renewed to its ultimate downfal. He 
 unites in himself to a remarkable degree the theo- 
 logical and philosophical traditions of former days; 
 Augustine was his acknowledged authority in 
 matters of religion, and Averrcies, to an extent of 
 which he was not himself aware, his leader in the 
 interpretation of Aristotle. The earlier Schoolmen 
 wrote in fear, often well-grounded, of the inter- 
 ference of the Church ; the later are thought to 
 have pressed the system to its utmost boundaries, 
 and to have seen glimpses of the coming reform- 
 ation. Aquinas, more than any of his fellow- 
 labourers, was fortunate in the reception of his 
 speculations : they were never deemed of unlawful 
 tendency, and gained for him the rare praise of 
 uniting orthodoxy and philosojihical acuteness. 
 We may add, that his writings, at the present day, 
 are still spoken of, if not consulted, and referred 
 to, if not read; and alone, of all the scholastic 
 volumes, show traces of a dubious vitality. 
 
 It will then be worth while, keei)ing Thomas 
 Aquinas steadily l)ef()re us as the type of the 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 39 
 
 scholastic Philosophy, to show briefly from his 
 writings the place which logical method held in 
 his system. Our position, be it remembered, is 
 this — that the Schoolmen took their ideal of 
 Science from Aristotle's Wisdom ; that, m the 
 endeavour to construct it, they began by ad- 
 mitting his Metaphysic ; that they adopted his 
 facts without enquiry, and placed them for pur- 
 poses of argument on a par with truths derived 
 from more sacred sources ; and that thus, with 
 premises ready to their hand, and a logical system 
 under which to combine them, they reared a 
 fabric of which the form was comparatively every 
 thing, and the matter comparatively nothing ; so 
 that the truth could not be distinguished from the 
 medium in which they exhibited it, and their 
 method became identical with their philosophy. 
 
 7^o proceed then to the first point — the co- 
 incidence of the Scholastic view of perfect Science 
 with the Aristotehan idea of Wisdom. 
 
 The great work of Aquinas is, as every one 
 knows, his '^ Sum of All Theology." Theology, 
 too, was, as we have seen, the title of the highest 
 division of Aristotle's Wisdom. This agreement of 
 language, even if unintentional at first, could not 
 remain unperceived ; and, when once perceived, 
 could not be passed over in silence. Either the 
 Theology of Aquinas was to be, like Aristotle's, 
 the highest wisdom, or it was not ; and a writer 
 so given to definition and distinction could not 
 
40 
 
 THE MEDIEVAL VIEW OK THE 
 
 leave a point of this nature luuleterniined. Ac- 
 cordingly, he meets the question, and answers it in 
 the affirmative. At the very opening of his great 
 work he declares, that the Sacred Doctrine is '* one 
 single science," ''speculative rather than practi- 
 cal," " transcending all other sciences whatsoever," 
 in a word, "absolutely and simply wisdom \" 
 
 The Christian Theology then w^ould, according 
 to Aquinas, approach very nearly in the terms of 
 its definition to that of the heathen philosopher. 
 This would indeed still leave room for a very wide 
 distinction between them. But it would lead us 
 to expect at least thus much, tliat the Schoolmen 
 would be very careful in drawing a line of de- 
 marcation between the Divine Wisdom and Aris- 
 totle's crowning Virtue. This, however, is not the 
 case. Thus in his connnent on Aristotle's Meta- 
 physics, he begins by assigning to his author's first 
 science the very title by which he distinguishes 
 his own. It bears, he tells us, the three names of 
 the Divine Science, or Theology ; Metaphysic ; and 
 the First Philosophy ^ And how thoroughly he 
 blends in his method of treatment the human and 
 the Divine Wisdom, how he considers them to con- 
 
 ' See Prima Priinae, Art. I. Qq. 2—6. where he predicates of 
 •* Doctriiia sacra" successively that it is " scientia," " una scientia," 
 " magis speculativa quum practica," " omnes alias scientias traii- 
 scendens turn speculativas quum practicas," " maxime sapient ia 
 inter omnes sapientias humanas, non quiilcm in aliquo generr 
 lantum, sed simpliciter." 
 
 ^ Comment, in Mctaphys. ad init. 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 41 
 
 
 nect themselves with the same subjects in the 
 same manner, may be seen in the following very 
 characteristic passage". "Those arts," he ob- 
 serves, " w^hich govern other arts are called archi- 
 tectonic or ruling arts ; and those who exercise 
 them are called architects, and claim the name of 
 wise. These artificers, however, as aiming only 
 at particular ends, reach not the universal end of 
 all things. They are therefore only called wise 
 on this or that particular subject. In this sense it 
 is said, ' as a wise master-builder I have laid the 
 foundation ^* But the name of absolutely wise 
 is reserved for him alone, whose speculations turn 
 on the end of the universe, which is also the 
 principle of all things. Wherefore, as the Philo- 
 sopher *" says, the wise man must consider the 
 highest causes. But the ultimate end of every 
 thing is that which is intended by its first author 
 and mover. But the first author and mover of 
 the universe is Intellect. Therefore the ultimate 
 end of the universe must be the good of Intellect ; 
 which is Truth. Truth must then be the ultimate 
 end of the whole universe ; and with the con- 
 sideration of this end must Wisdom be principally 
 occupied. Therefore, the Divine Wisdom cl^id in 
 flesh declares that He came into the world to 
 
 '' Proopm. ad Sum. contr. Gent. 
 
 •* I Cor. iii. 10. Aquinas quotes the Vulgate, " ut sapiens 
 archifecfus fundamentum posui." 
 ' Melaphvs. i. 2. 
 
42 
 
 THK MEDLtVAL VIEW OF THE 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 43 
 
 manifest the Truth, saying, ' To this end was 
 I born, and for this cause came I into the world, 
 that I'should bear witness unto the Truth? And 
 so the Philosopher^ determines, that the First 
 Philosophy is the Science of Truth, not however 
 of any Truth, but of that which is the origin of all 
 Truth." 
 
 Further proof cannot be necessary of the close 
 connection, not to say identity, which Thomas 
 Aquinas held to exist between Aristotle's First 
 Philosophy and the Christian Theology. We 
 must next show the importance he attached to 
 the principles of the Aristotelian Metaphysic. 
 
 Though Aristotle and the Schoolmen each 
 founded their great science on the same idea, that 
 of Being, it by no means necessarily followed that 
 their respective sciences should be identical. They 
 need not ever have been to any great extent 
 similar. The conceptions which they employed 
 to express and bring out at length the meaning 
 and force of that idea, might have been entirely 
 different. They might have endeavoured to por- 
 tion out the world of thought on some novel 
 principle, and have spent their chief labour in 
 discovering a range of metaphysical abstractions, 
 which should give their speculation an individual 
 and original air. In a word, as Aristotle had 
 divided being in one way, they might have divided 
 it in another. Had they undertaken to do so, the 
 
 ' John xviii. 37. « Mctapliys. ii. 1. 
 
 ' 
 
 most characteristic feature of their philosophy 
 would have disappeared, or rather, would never 
 have been called into existence. The endeavour 
 to decide for themselves, what was the best and 
 most natural division of Being, would have called 
 observation into play, and, by giving Induction 
 fair scope, liave destroyed the exclusive power of 
 Deduction. The course of Science might have been 
 more rapid than it has been, had the minds of men 
 been thus early turned to investigating new 
 universals, instead of drawing continually new 
 conclusions fi*om those wiiich w^ere old. But the 
 Schoolmen show^ed no tendency in this direction. 
 As they had taken the idea of their science from 
 Aristotle, they took from him the conceptions 
 which were to illustrate it also. Without any 
 exercise of the critical faculty, they followed him 
 unhesitatingly in his primary division. 
 
 At the very beginning of Aristotle's Organon 
 stand the Categories, or, in Latin guise, the Pre- 
 dicaments. They are the first broad philosophical 
 division which meets the student of the Aristotelian 
 method. Of what they are a division, is not so clear. 
 Aristotle himself is generally supposed to have 
 attained them by considerations half-logical and 
 half-grammatical; and then to have applied them 
 as heads under which to group thhigs. Thus the 
 question naturally arose — are the Categories to be ' 
 regarded as a scheme for the division of nature, or 
 of language ? Eitlier opinion had its advocates 
 
44 
 
 THE MEDIEVAL VIEW OF THE 
 
 among the ancients. Others preferred an inter- 
 mediate view, and considered them as referring to 
 the conception, which hes midway between the 
 name and the thing. Ammonias ^ who records 
 these different opinions, himself subscribes to a 
 misty formuhi, probably of Neo-platonic origin, 
 which blends them all, and asserts, that " the 
 Categories have to do with words, whicli signify 
 things, through the medium of conceptions." 
 
 The Schoolmen would have adopted this view, 
 had they exclusively followed tradition. It is 
 contained in their principal authority on the 
 subject, a commentary on the ten Predicaments, 
 erroneously attributed by them to St. Augustine \ 
 But they rejected as superficial and insufficient 
 the belief, that the Categories were mainly a 
 scheme for the division of words. It pleased them 
 rather to hold, that they met with their counter- 
 parts in the outward world. On them they would 
 willingly have constructed, if they could, the 
 classification of an universal science. So Aquinas 
 
 *• De Categ. p. 14, 15. 
 
 ' That Alcuiii had no doubt either of the aulhenticitv of this 
 work, or of the value of its contents, appears from the following 
 verses, in which he rc^commended it to the perusal of Charlemagne. 
 
 Continet iste decem naturie verba libellus 
 Quae jam verba tenent reruni, ratione stiipentld 
 Omne quod in nostrum poterit decurrere sensum. 
 
 • •••«•••• 
 
 Hunc Augustino placuit transfcne magislro 
 Do velcrum gazis Griucorum clave Latin^. 
 
 \ 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 45 
 
 
 tells us, that " perfect Being is that which exists, 
 external to the mind, through the ten Predica- 
 ments^;" and again, that '' Being must be portioned 
 out into different kinds according to the different 
 modes of predication; for different modes of pre- 
 dication are attendant on different modes of Beuij^''." 
 Or, as he elsewhere states his doctrine, " modes of 
 Being are proportional to modes of predication \'' 
 And far from making the Categories heads under 
 which to arrange conceptions, he expressly excludes 
 all such mental creatures from them ; for " nothinir 
 IS placed in any predicament, except what exists 
 external to the mind "\" Accordingly, he attempts, 
 with very indifferent success, to show, from con- 
 sidering the nature of existence, that these ten 
 heads amount to an exhaustive division of things'". 
 So high indeed did he raise their dignity, that he 
 sometimes ranges God under the Category of 
 Substance. Though here he speaks more doubt- 
 fully than usual, at one time denying that the 
 Predicaments at all relate to Him", at another 
 time allowing that tliey do % though in a different 
 manner from that in which they apply to other 
 existences^. 
 
 ^ in Metaphys. v. Leciio ix. 
 
 * In Phys. iii. Lectio v. 
 
 •" De Pot. Dei. Qu. vii. Art. ix. Rosp. 
 
 " Prima Summte, Qn, iii. Art. v. 
 
 " De Pot. Dei, Qu. vii. Art. iii. ad 7™. 
 
 ^ De Pot. Dei, Qu. ii. Art. ii. ]•". ad 1'". 
 
 Ii 
 
46 
 
 THE MEDLflVAL VIKW OF THE 
 
 It is clear, that were the Categories thus state- 
 ments of the real classes of things, a universal 
 science would be at once possible. Under such 
 a classification every thing might be duly ranked 
 and ordered, and a natural system, so to speak, of 
 the whole universe be constructed. And this was 
 the work which the Schoolmen thought they had 
 the power to accomplish. The Categories them- 
 selves indeed do not hold a very prominent place 
 in their general writings. Like other abstract 
 principles, when once enunciated and clearly laid 
 down as true, they are traceable mainly in their 
 consequences. They stand like so many land- 
 marks, seen from a distance indeed, but of most 
 continual use in guiding the mind to its decision on 
 questions which are very remotely and indirectly 
 connected with them. The bearings of truths 
 derived from very different sources, from Holy 
 Writ and the writings of the Fathers, were deter- 
 mined by them. This was a great misfortune to 
 the Schoolmen, that they never suspected the 
 existence of any discrepancy in their heterogeneous 
 material, or at least, if the suspicion unavoidably 
 occurred, never ventured to entertain it. Theo- 
 logians at the first, they began in the school of 
 faith, and carried their l)elieftoo far. Inspiration 
 itself could not receive more reverence than Aris- 
 totle. Where he evidently contradicts the revealed 
 Word, they shut their eyes to the real state of things, 
 and look about for some other exi)lanation. Thus 
 
 i 
 
 UELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 47 
 
 Aquinas wishes to persuade himself, that the Philo- 
 sopher did not actually hold the world to be eternal, 
 but was rather, like a subtle disputant of his own 
 times, urging in a dialectical spirit plausible argu- 
 ments against the position of an adversary*^. The 
 Schoolmen had never heard of destroying, with a 
 view to re-construct. Unhappy in the absence of 
 doubt, they fell short of the philosophic mind in 
 one respect at least — that they never learned to 
 reject. 
 
 Logic then, as the Schoolmen thought, had a 
 noble task before it. With so much inherited from 
 their predecessors, all new ap])eal to the world of 
 observation seemed on their part superfluous. 
 From certain given truths they hoped by a long 
 circumduction to infer all truth. For this purpose, 
 logical instruments were to suffice. But the in- 
 struments of Logic differ from those of most other 
 arts in a very marked manner. There is, in Art, 
 generally little similarity between the tool and that 
 on which it operates. And further, most arts 
 confine themselves in practice strictly to singulars. 
 The sculptor applies an individual tool to an indi- 
 vidual block of marble : it is a given portion of a 
 compound substance which a chemist analyses, and 
 that by means of tests themselves of a limited and 
 definite quantity. It is not so with the Logician. 
 His subject, and his manner of dealing with it, are 
 
 ^ Prima Suuiina^ Qu. xlvi. Art. 1. De Pot. Dii. Qu. iii. 
 Art. xvii. 
 
48 
 
 THE MEDLEVAL VIEW OF THE 
 
 alike general. He applies universals as the criterion 
 of other universals. This is his work — to test, 
 arrange, and, it may be, infer, general truths by 
 means of general formulae. 
 
 So thought the Schoolmen— and to a great 
 measure rightly. How then were they to discri- 
 minate, where there seemed so much risk of con- 
 fusion, between their method, and that on which 
 they employed it ? The conceptions, whether of 
 things or classes, which their enquiries presupposed, 
 and the apparatus of Logic itself, were alike modes 
 of intellect. Without some especial provision, 
 error and perplexity must ensue from their running 
 into each other. This danger was obviated by 
 drawing a distinction between First and Second 
 Intentions. '^ A first intention V' they taught, '^ was 
 the likeness of something existing external to the 
 mind; as, for instance, the conception which follows 
 on hearing the word man — a conception which is 
 founded immediately on the thing." Whereas a 
 second intention is '^not a likeness of any thing 
 existing external to the mind, but a conception 
 following on our mode of understanding such 
 things. These are invented by the intellect itself ; 
 as, for instance, the conception which is signified by 
 the word genus. Intentions of this kind have their 
 immediate foundation not in the things but in the 
 understanding : though the remote foundation is in 
 the thing itself." So that, to express the same 
 
 •^ Aquinas on i"". Lib. Sent. Dist. ii. Qu. i. Art. iii. 
 
 UliLATlON Ol LOGIC TO SCIKNCK. 
 
 49 
 
 truth still more clearly in the form of a distinction 
 not of things but of words, " nouns of the first 
 intention are those which are imposed upon things 
 as such, that conception alone intervening, by 
 which the mind is carried immediately to the thing 
 itself. Such are man, and stone. But nouns of the 
 second intention are those which are imposed upon 
 things, not in virtue of what they are in themselves, 
 but in virtue of their being subject to the intention 
 which the mind makes concerning them : as when 
 we say that man is a species, and animal a genus\" 
 The scholastic apparatus was now complete. 
 They had, as they thought, a primary classification, 
 external to the mind, in the ten Predicaments; 
 they had first intentions, or conceptions drawn 
 directly from things, to range under them; they 
 had, among other second intentions, the Pre- 
 dicables, which enabled them to show, how, under 
 the light of the natural classification, the first 
 intentions were related to each other. In other 
 words, they had, or supposed they had, both the 
 objective and subjective requisites of a perfect 
 system— a valid diWsion of existing things, and a 
 method according to which to group all notions 
 under this division. So, without any further 
 delay, they betook themselves to syllogizing; to 
 determining, that is, by means of their supposed 
 knowledge of the nature and force of terms, the 
 various relations which they might be supposed to 
 
 • Opusc. xlii. Art. xii. ad init. 
 
dO 
 
 THE MEDIEVAL VIEW OF THE 
 
 occupy to each other in propositions. Here they 
 were not likely soon to come to a stand: the 
 possible permutations of words are endless ; and 
 they did not think that they were dealing only 
 with words, and falling far short of things. Each 
 distinction which they drew brought forward new 
 questions; and the solution of each question 
 ehcited fresh distinctions. Philosophy separated 
 from a central trunk into numerous branches, 
 which again divided and subdivided till their ulti- 
 mate sections were as fine as hairs, or finer — 
 invisible even to the eyes of those who spun them 
 out. And, through the whole of the prolonged 
 system. Logic every where extended itself; drew 
 each distinction, stated each objection, answered 
 it when stated, summed up when it gave its de- 
 cision, crushed each enquiry into the same uni- 
 form shape, appealed over and over again to the 
 same universal premises, employed unnumbered 
 artifices to extract from these premises conclusions 
 they were never meant to give, cut into shreds the 
 scanty sheet of knowledge, as Dido did the hide, 
 that it might encircle the province which it could 
 not cover, governed absolutely all Philosophy, and 
 as in despotic governments there is no distinction 
 between the monarch and the constitution, was all 
 
 Philosophy itself. 
 
 No wonder then that the highest praises were 
 heaped upon it; that though it was confessedly 
 only " reductivelv" or '' indirectly" a part of specu- 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 51 
 
 
 lative Science, as supplying it with syllogisms, 
 definitions, and other instruments of like kindS it 
 was yet allowed to bear in common parlance the 
 title of " the Rational Science"," that as directing 
 the act of reason, from which all arts proceed, it 
 was called " the Art of Arts " ;" and that it was 
 held% '' all learning must begin from Logic, not as 
 being more easy than other sciences, (for having to 
 deal with second intentions it involves the greatest 
 diflSculty) but because it teaches the method of 
 procedure in all sciences, and therefore all other 
 sciences dejiend upon it^." 
 
 « Super Boet. de Triii. Qii. V. Art. 1. 
 
 " In Post. Analyt. ad init. 
 
 • Super Boet. de Triii. Qu. Vf . Art. 1. 
 
 ^ Old John of Salisbury gives an account of the proceedings in 
 a certain Dialectical school with which he was acquainted, which 
 will apply, in a less degree, to the scholastic use of Logic in 
 general. At any rate, we may better see the tendency of the evil, 
 by contemplating its more aggravated form. " It was the fashion 
 to talk of nothing but consistency (convenientia) and reason. 
 Argument was ringing in every one's mouth. To name an ass, or 
 a man, or any other work of nature, counted as a crime; at least 
 was out of place, and unpolished, and unworthy a philosopher. It 
 was thought impossible to act or speak consistently and reasonably, 
 unless express mention were made of consistency and reason. 
 Argument was quite out of the question, without the use of the 
 word argument. No distinction was made, between proceeding 
 according to an art, and treating of it. (Ex arte, et de arte agere, 
 idem erat.)*' Metalogicus, Lib. I. Ch. iii. 
 
 E 2 
 
NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 53 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 Before taking our farewell of the scholastic view 
 of Logic, it is natural to make some remarks on the 
 great question as to the nature of Universals, which 
 connected itself so closely with it. Though the 
 battle has long been fought, there is a great 
 historical charm, and even so^ne living interest, 
 associated with the once-prominent party-names of 
 Nominalist and Realist. 
 
 We may easily see the reason of the importance 
 attached to this question, and the zeal with which 
 it was contested. Logic, we have said, was in fact 
 the sum of scholastic Science. And this great 
 Science professed to deal with Universals. On these 
 depended the whole array of questions and ob- 
 jections, consequences and conclusions. Their 
 modahty, so to speak, determined that of the 
 whole system. And those who were not too 
 busily engaged in adding to it and elaborating it, 
 to find time ibr looking back, and seeing what had 
 been accomplished, and on what foundation it 
 rested, naturally came at last to the enquiry, what 
 these Universals were. 
 
 
 Of course, the originators of this question among 
 the Schoolmen were neither the first to ask it, nor 
 the last. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, not to 
 mention other authorities, had each their distinctive 
 theory of Universals. None of these were entirely 
 satisfactory : and modern Philosophy feels the old 
 difficulty to be still unsolved, to be lying at the 
 basis of almost every important doubt, and to 
 l)resent the great clieck to its rapid and confident 
 progress. In all probability, indeed, a compa- 
 ratively ancient source suggested the enquiry to 
 the Schoolmen. Porphyry, in his treatise on the 
 Predicables, states the problem, though he declines 
 attempting to solve it^ "' Whether," he says, 
 '' genus and species are substances, or exist in 
 bare thought alone; or, supposing thein to be 
 substances, whether they are material or im- 
 material ; and again, whether they exist separately, 
 or in composition with sensible objects, I must 
 dechne discussing. The subject is profound, and 
 needs a separate and more detailed enquiry." Its 
 due quantity of enquiry, at least, in after-times it 
 gained. 
 
 It is well known that Europe derived its know- 
 ledge of Aristotle from the Arabians ; and that, 
 among these, their principal authority Averroes 
 tinctured the Peripatetic philosophy with a strong 
 spice of a spurious Neo-platonism. Under his 
 hands, the doctrine of Universals assumed a form 
 
 * Fsagogo, clia])- i. 
 
54 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 something like that of Ideas. Genus and species 
 were held to be substances, not mere attributes, 
 much less words. Whether they existed abstract- 
 edly from matter, or were rather to be described 
 as always present in the concrete, was a subject 
 left for after-discussion. The theory of Averroes 
 himself was in fact an ill-disguised Pantheism ; 
 which, when apphed to certain subjects, led to 
 results which so displeased the Schoolmen, as to 
 prevent, even when such objections did not occur, 
 its formal and expHcit reception. Here their 
 theology came in as a safeguard to their philo- 
 sophy; they shrank as Christians from the view 
 which he held, that one common human intellect 
 existed, of which each individual intellect was 
 a part\ But they followed him so far as to 
 conceive, that the Universal was an actual thing; 
 and thus, before Nominalism was heard of, ReaUsm, 
 or a belief in the existence of Universals as sub- 
 stances, and not merely as attributes of the mind 
 of man, was the current belief of the early School- 
 men and their immediate predecessors. It suited 
 the feehngs of those, who, like Scotus Erigena, 
 
 •• "A view," Thomas Aquinas argued justly, (Opusc. xvi. contra 
 Averroistas,) ** which is repugnant to the truth of the Christian 
 Faith. For intellect appears to be alone, of all the parts of the 
 soul, incorruptible and immortal. Now supposing diversity of 
 intellect to be removed from all men, it follows, that, alter death, 
 nothing of human souls would remain except their intellectual 
 unity, and thus all retribution of reward and punishment would hi? 
 removed." 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 55 
 
 were mystically inclined; it could not be dis- 
 agreeable to those argumentative spirits, who were 
 anxious to maintain the honour of Dialectic. But, 
 though thus in possession of the scholastic mind at 
 the first, it did not establish its supremacy without 
 a struggle. The Nominalist attack showed at 
 once its strength and its weakness. It called forth 
 the hidden strength of Reahsm, by proving that it 
 was entwined with the very roots of the School- 
 philosophy, which could not ultimately but stand 
 or ftiU with it : it also betrayed its weakness, by 
 showing that it lacked the distinctness of a true 
 and consistent theory, and assumed very different 
 shapes in the minds of its different supporters. 
 
 The history of Nominalism divides itself into 
 two very marked periods. During the former of 
 /these, it was forcing by its attacks the scholastic 
 philosophy to assume a more definite form than it 
 had hitherto taken, and was so hurrying on its own 
 temporary defeat; during the latter, it was sapping 
 the strength of that mighty system, by introducing 
 into its inmost heart an element of doubt. In 
 both periods, it connected itself with theological 
 questions, in feeling and tendency, if not by the 
 links of strict consequence. Nominalism has often 
 been called, and justly, the precursor of the 
 Reformation. And as those who first aimed unsuc- 
 cessfully at a reformation were more violent in 
 their opinions than those who took up the work 
 afterwards, and succeeded ; so the earlier Nomi- 
 
66 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 nalists, doomed from the first to fail, were more 
 extravagant and far less philosophical in their 
 teaching, than the happier band whom Ockham 
 led on to victory. 
 
 Roscelin of Compeigne was confessedly the 
 founder of the sect of the Nominalists. The term 
 at first was meant to indicate that its adherents 
 bestowed their attention on language, and held 
 Universal to consist in na?Nes. Though it was 
 natural that the Realists should endeavour to give 
 it still further force, in applying it as an allusion to 
 what they thought the merely verhaf knowledge of 
 their antagonists. And so Aventinus, even when 
 looking back upon the past, explains it. " Roscelin," 
 he says, '' the founder of the new Lyceum, first 
 cultivated the science of words and phrases, and 
 discovered a new way of philosophizing. To him 
 we owe it, that the Peripatetics, or followers of 
 Aristotle, divided into two classes— the older, rich 
 in invention, and claiming for itself the science of 
 things, and therefore called the Real school ; and 
 the later, disturbers of this science, and called 
 Nominalists, because, niggardly of things, but 
 prodigal of names and notions, they appear to be 
 the partisans of words \" This is neither a very 
 
 »' Aniiales Boioiuin, lib. vi. p. 406. cd. Basil. 1580. Avoniimis 
 (lied about 1533. A reproach gi-ouuded on a name is of course 
 little to be trusted. " Who can confute a sneer ?" And praise on 
 like grounds is equally deceptive. Luther commends the later 
 Nominalists, on the strength «»f anoiher muw thev here, with 
 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 57 
 
 profound nor a very fair account of Nominahsm 
 in general. But it serves to show the feehngs 
 with which its advocates were regarded down to a 
 comparatively late date, as sceptics who would 
 lower the dignity of Dialectic, curtail the region of 
 Science, and suck out the very marrow of Philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 Roscehn himself, indeed, appears to have de- 
 served the name of Nominalist in its fullest and 
 most unfavourable signification. He advocated 
 the position that Universals were nothing but 
 names— a position which, as we shall see here- 
 after, has little to be said in its favour, and if 
 consistently maintained, is fatal to all true philo- 
 sophy. The error did not remain unrebuked : for 
 he drew upon himself the powerful opposition of 
 St. Anselm. This distinguished theologian and 
 dialectician had another hold upon his adversary. 
 Roscelin had been also guilty of heretical doctrine 
 concerning the Holy Trinity". St. Anselm in- 
 
 about as much reason as Aventinus condemns the earlier. " The 
 Terminisls, among whom I was, are sectaries in the high schools ; 
 they oppose the Thomists, the Scotists, and the Albertists ; they 
 are also called Occamists, from Ockham their founder. They are 
 
 of the newest sect, and are now strongest in Paris Thev are 
 
 called Terminisls, because they speak ol a thing in its own proper 
 
 words, and do not a])ply them after a strange sort Ockham 
 
 was an able and sensible man." Table Talk, pp. 540 — 2. 
 
 * Roscelin taujjht, " tres personas esse tres realitates di/Terentes." 
 Anselm's remarks are indignant enough. '* All," he says, " should 
 he warned to touch most cautiously on questions of Holy WriL 
 But these dialecticians of onr time, and heielics even in their 
 
 ' 
 
58 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 I 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 59 
 
 geniously couples the two mistakes together as 
 cause and effect. The bad dialectic accounts for 
 the false theology : and the false theology is proof 
 certain of the badness of the dialectic. The issue 
 of the contest was not long doubtful : Roscelin 
 was forced to retract his errors at the Council of 
 Soissons^ The victorious Anselm became next 
 year Archbishop of Canterbury. The defeated 
 innovator was banished both from England 
 and France*. In a few years, John of Salis- 
 bury informs us, his opinions were almost ex- 
 tinct ^ 
 
 Another ill-starred name, that of Abelard, follows 
 Roscelin in the history of dialectical innovation. 
 Whether Roscelin was his instructor in their com- 
 mon art is doubtful. On the one hand, there is 
 old authority for such a supposition; on the other, 
 Abelard is silent on the point in his account of his 
 own Ufe, in which he displays no disposition to 
 reserve. But perhaps a reason for the omission 
 may be found in his circumstances. He had 
 
 .dialeciic, men who take universal substances to be nothing but 
 
 word of mouth, should be altogether excluded from disputing 
 
 on spiritual things He who does understand in what way 
 
 several men are yet in species but one man, can such a one com- 
 prehend how, hi the secret depths of the Divine Nature, of seveial 
 persons each shall be perfect God, yet all be one (Jod ?" Dc 
 Incamatione Verbi, (otherwise, De Fide,) ch. ii. 
 
 " A. D. 109-2. 
 
 • Abelard, Epist. xxi. 
 
 ' His words are, ** alius consisiit in vocibus ; licet hacc opinio 
 cum Roscelinosuo fere omnino jam evanuerit." iMetalogicus, ii. 17. 
 
 himself to bear the imputation of heterodoxy, and 
 would naturally shrink from the weight of obloquy 
 which attached to another. Indeed he goes out 
 of his way to condemn in strong terms both the 
 logic and the theology of Roscelin^. There was 
 the more need for caution here, because their 
 opinions might by the careless or unskilful be 
 confounded. For Abelard, though not in the 
 strictest sense of the word a Nominalist, was at 
 least an Anti-realist. John of Salisbury thus 
 records the distinction between them^. '' The one 
 (meaning Roscelin) takes his stand on words ; the 
 other on propositions :" and he expressly ascribes 
 the latter view to Abelard. 
 
 It is hard to affix a very definite meaning to 
 this statement. The most probable interpretation 
 is that of Degerando \ that he believed Universals, 
 without having a strict independent and objective 
 reality, to be conceptions — conceptions, however, 
 which, to be formed and retained in the mind, 
 must rest upon the signs of language ; and that 
 
 « Epist. 21. "Hie sicut pseudo-Dialecticus, ita et pseudo- 
 Chrisiianus, cum in Dialectica sua nullum rem partes habere 
 aestimat, ita divinam paginam impudenter pervertit, ut eo loco, 
 quo dicitur Dominus partem piscis assi comcdisse, partem hujus 
 vocis, quai est piscis assi, non partem rei intelligere cogatur." 
 Fairness in dispute was no characteristic of those days. 
 
 •• Metalogicus, ii. 17. I have Englished " sermones" by '* pro- 
 positions," believing John of Salisbury to have had the Greek 
 Aoyouff in his mind. 
 
 ' Hist. Comp. de Philosophic. Vol. iv. p. 403. 
 
60 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 therefore he made them turn, not, like RosceUn, 
 on the simple term, but on the proposition, which 
 expresses the relation of subject and attribute, 
 as they are apprehended by the understanding. 
 Scarcely any other position indeed in the scale of 
 thought upon this subject remains for him to 
 occupy ; for while he dissented from the pure 
 Nominahsm of Roscelin, he fell short of pure Con- 
 ceptualism; those who placed Universals among 
 the creatures of the understanding, as the Con- 
 ceptualists do, being mentioned by John of Salis- 
 bury as a distinct sect : and his own writings 
 would prove, even in the absence of external 
 authority, his decided aversion to Realism ''. But 
 Abelard, with all his niceness of distinction, did 
 not escape from the dialectical field unwounded. 
 Like Roscelin, he had the honour of being defeated 
 
 ^ He relates with great gusto his contests with his old instnicior, 
 William of Compeigiie, and their successiul termination. " 1 
 forced him by most conclusive arguments to modify, or lather to 
 sunender, his old opinion concerning Universals. He had been of 
 thai mind with regard to their general nature, that he asserted the 
 same nature to be present at the same time essentiallv in each of 
 the individuals. It followed that among these individuals there 
 was no diversity of essence, but only a variety in the multitude of 
 their accidents. But afterwards he so reformed his opinion as to 
 say, that the same nature was present in them not essentially but 
 indifferently. " (i. e. as much in one hidividual, as in another.) 
 Abelardi Vita, cap. ii. A decision which leaves the question open 
 after all. Though the distinction meant to be drawn would seem 
 to be like that made afterwards in the disputes between Scotisis 
 and Thomisls between real and formal presence. 
 
 NOMINALISM AND UEALISM. 
 
 61 
 
 by a great antagonist. In this their lot differed, 
 that Roscelin fell by the hands of one who wielded 
 weapons like his own : while the brand of theo- 
 logical unsoundness was fixed upon Abelard by 
 one, whose mind, occupied by its own beautiful 
 mysticism, hated the philosophizing spirit of the 
 day. It is more an honour to him in our eyes, 
 than it was a consolation in his own, that he owed 
 his overthrow to St. Bernard. 
 
 But if in those days the imputation of Nominalism 
 was fatal. Realism was not always a protection from 
 error. A contemporary of Abelard, Gilbert de la 
 Poree, is an example of this. He was a Realist, 
 but a bold one. The extent of his boldness in 
 Dialectic has indeed been much overstated. His 
 treatise on the Six Principles has been described as 
 an endeavour to cut down Aristotle's Categories 
 to six. But he was guilty of no such presumption. 
 He only endeavoured to expand the six later 
 Predicaments, which Aristotle had passed cursorily 
 over, after the plan on which the Philosopher had 
 treated the first four. In introducing these in 
 their new shape, he goes so far as to hazard a 
 definition of form. " Form," he says, ^' is con- 
 tingent on matter, consisting of simple and in- 
 variable essence V and flatters himself that this 
 
 ' Fonna est comj)ositioni conlingens, simplici et invariabili 
 essentia coiisistens. — Erit ilaque terminus foiinaB dicta definitio, 
 iieque enim superflua neque dimiuuta, si quis subtiliter investi- 
 gaverit, reperietur." 
 
62 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 formula will endure a searching criticism. It 
 would have been happy for him if he had confined 
 himself to such harmless innovations. But the 
 same spirit led him wrong elsewhere ; he too was 
 condemned for departing from the doctrine of the 
 Trinity. 
 
 It was resei-ved for a pupil of Abelard to effect 
 what his master in common with others had so 
 unsuccessftilly attempted — the union of Philosophy 
 and Theology. Peter Lombard effected this end, 
 by reversing the procedure of previous scholastics. 
 They had first formed their dialectical notions, and 
 then applied them to things divine. He, taking 
 his ground on the received Theology of the time, 
 accommodated Dialectic to it, and so freed it from 
 suspicion. His cautious Book of Sentences became 
 in after times the basis of comments much bolder 
 than the text on which they were founded. Or- 
 thodox in faith and philosophy, he completed for 
 the time the victory of Realism. And, like all other 
 principles that are not sound at heart, though a 
 good watchword in a battle, it becomes un- 
 interesting and unprofitable, immediately on its 
 success. We will proceed at once to some con- 
 siderations, which will bear upon the history of its 
 fall. 
 
 Realism, though now, as it seemed, firmly and 
 finally established, was not really safe. There 
 were enemies within the camp from the first. 
 John of Salisbury, who died as early as A. D. 11 82, 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 63 
 
 recognises no less than six different sects of Realists. 
 These may be, however, fairly reduced to four ; — 
 those who adopted the Platonic doctrine of ideas, 
 and held that the names of genera and species 
 belonged properly only to those objectively ex- 
 isting Universals ; — those who considered that the 
 individual contained the whole essence of the class, 
 and was in fact, when viewed from a certain point, 
 itself the Universal, as when it is said that Plato 
 is, as to his manhood, a species;— those who 
 asserted that the whole aggregate of individuals 
 was identical with the Universal ; — and those who 
 regarded the Universal as a substance in some 
 way existing in the singular. These sects, it will 
 be seen, agree in nothing, except in all calling 
 Universals, ili'nigs. 
 
 The three former views, however, ultimately 
 gave way to the last, of which Aquinas was the 
 great advocate. It became a received doctrine, 
 that the one Universal existed in the many indi- 
 viduals. But this basis of agreement did not shut 
 out all dispute; the meaning of the formula was 
 not so clear, but that enquirers would ask, how the 
 Universal existed in the individuals ? 
 
 On this point, there was an ominous schism of 
 the Schoolmen. Dominican and Franciscan could 
 not agree even on the abstract questions of Phi- 
 losophy. Their differences extended from ques- 
 tions of free will and predestination to Logic. The 
 school of Scotists arose, and called into existence 
 
64 
 
 NOMINALISM AND UEALISM. 
 
 the rival school of Thomists as defenders of the 
 great Dominican authority. The followers of 
 Aquinas held, that the Universal existed really 
 in the individuals; the disciples of Duns Scotus 
 maintained that it existed only formally'^. The 
 latter went so far, as to abandon the old title of 
 Realists, and assume that of FormaUsts : in order 
 that their very title might protest against the 
 doctrine of their antagonists. And, without endea- 
 vouring to explain the subtle distinction between 
 Reahsm and Formalism, we may assume that the 
 innovators, in rejecting the old watchword, vir- 
 tually, though unconsciously, relinquished tlie cause 
 which it had symbolized so long. 
 
 The Scotists themselves wxtc, or thought they 
 were, still opposed to Nominalism. But the next 
 generation of thought showed the actual tendency 
 of their views. Out of their school rose Ockham, 
 and with him the opposition to Realism revived 
 once more. In impugning the doctrine of the ex- 
 istence of Universals as substances, he directed his 
 attacks especially against Scotus, under whom he 
 had studied. We must not confound his opinions 
 with those of Roscelin and his disciples. Ockham, 
 
 •" It should be obsened, ihat the two doctors did not themselves 
 come into contact. Thomas Aquinas died A. D. 1274. The 
 chronology of Duns Scotus is doubtful; hut taking the most 
 probable date of his death A. D. 1308, and following the account 
 which gives him ihe short life of 34 years, we should fix his 
 birth in the very year in which Aquinas died. 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 65 
 
 in asserting that Universals existed, but existed 
 only in the mind, answers exactly to a modern 
 Conceptualist. His teaching was on this point 
 clear, distinct, and sound, though expressed and 
 defended with a quaint and technical minuteness of 
 accuracy, which proves him every way a match for 
 any of his scholastic brotherhood. 
 
 '' " Every Universal," he taught, '' is really a Sin- 
 gular in itself, and therefore is only a Universal in 
 virtue of its signification, which is a sign of many 
 things. This is the doctrine of Avicenna, who 
 teaches, that a single form in the understanding is 
 related to a nmltitude of things, and is therefore a 
 Universal, because it is an intention in the intel- 
 lect whose operation does not vary to whatsoever 
 you apply it. It follows that this form, though in 
 relation to the individuals it is a Universal, yet in 
 relation to the mind on which it is impressed is 
 itself only an Individual, for it is one of the forms 
 which are in the understanding." This is a spe- 
 cimen of his positive reasoning : his negative goes 
 to prove generally that '' no Universal is any thing 
 external to the mind." It may be worth while to 
 show how he fought his adversaries with their 
 own weapons. '' ° No Universal," he urges, '' is a 
 singular substance, for, this granted, it would 
 follow that Socrates is a Universal : for there is no 
 more reason why one singular substance should 
 
 " Sumnia totius Logicfc, ch. xiv. 
 
 lb. ch. XV. 
 
m 
 
 NOMINALISM AiND REALISM. 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 67 
 
 be a Universal than another." This is rather an 
 endeavour to throw the weight of the proof upon 
 the adversary : the following is a more direct and 
 at the same time more complete argument. " If 
 any substance be, as is supposed, more things than 
 one, it must be either several Singulars or several 
 Universals. If the former be allowed, it follows 
 that a certain substance will be, e. g. several men ; 
 and then although the Universal will be distinct 
 from any one particular man, it will necessarily be 
 the same with all the particulars together. But if 
 we take the other alternative, that one substance 
 is several Universals, we must then ask the ques- 
 tion — is this Universal several things, or only one ? 
 If the answer be that it is only one, it follows that 
 it is really a Singular ; if the answer be that it is 
 several things, I enquire again whether it is several 
 Universals or several Singulars; and so on to 
 infinity." Theology too was l)rought to bear on 
 the point at issue. *' If the Realist opinion were 
 true, God could not annihilate one individual with- 
 out destroying all ; for to annihilate any individual 
 He must destroy all that is of its essence. Con- 
 sequently, He must destroy the Universal which 
 exists both in it and in other individuals ; and these 
 could not continue to exist, when deprived of 
 a part of their substance, such as the Universal is 
 supposed to be." We will not endeavour to follow 
 him, where, in discussing the Scotist opinion of 
 
 H ■ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 ♦ 
 
 -» 
 
 the formal presence of the Universal in the in- 
 dividual, he refines on a refinement ^\ 
 
 Opinions like these, not long after the opening of 
 the fomteenth century, were pubHshed by Ockham 
 from the Theological chair of Paris. They pro- 
 duced as much excitement as either friend or 
 enemy could have desired. And argument was 
 not the only means of discussing them employed. 
 Ockham himself, for the ready support which 
 he gave Phihp the Fair against the Pope, by 
 vindicating the rights of the temporal power, and 
 other like acts of insubordination, was rewarded 
 with the pontifical anathema. In more than one 
 University the new doctrines were contested with 
 blows and bloodshed. When we remember that 
 the opinions both of Scotus and Ockham were 
 probably formed within the walls of Merton, we 
 should be surprised if Oxford had been backward 
 in the dispute. Direct persecution was brought to 
 bear in Ockham's other University of Paris, and 
 
 P Another specimen of his theological reasoning, though curious 
 and characteristic, may be better thrown into a note, and preserved 
 in the Latin. " Item sequitnr quod aliquid de essentia Chrisii 
 erit miserum et danmatum: quia ilia natura communis existens 
 realiter in Christo et in damnato erit damnata,quia in Jud^. Hoc 
 autem est absurdum." Ockham here uses just the same kind of 
 argument against the Thomist supposition of a common human 
 nature, as Aquinas himself had employed against the Averroistic 
 lenetof a common human intellect. How hardily, and apparently 
 without any sense of their hardihood, did these men venture to 
 bring objective truths, and subjective convictions, into the most 
 direct collision. 
 
 f2 
 
«8 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 NOMINALISM AND IIRALISM. 
 
 69 
 
 elsewhere. Louis the Eleventh, by an edict whicfi 
 did not prove ultimately successful, condemned the 
 Nominalist teaching, and forbade the study of the 
 works of Ockham and his most famous disciples. 
 So the University of Leipsic ow^es its origin to the 
 expulsion of the Nominalists fi'om Prague. It is 
 said that the Universities of Vienna and Heidel- 
 berg '* were Nominalist from their foundation. 
 Aventinus, who flourished at the beginning of the 
 sixteenth century, mentions that the schools of 
 Paris, Erdfurt, Ingoldstat, and Vienna, were then 
 in Nominalist hands. The opinions of Ockham, 
 when for the time silenced in France, had thus, 
 after taking root deeply in their native home of 
 England, extended themselves to Germany. 
 Luther, Melancthon, and other reformers, pro- 
 fessed their allegiance to them. It would seem 
 the old Theolog)^ could scarcely have been assailed, 
 except with Nominalist arms. It would have stood 
 impregnable against any foes but such as were 
 acquainted with its form and devices, while they 
 had detached themselves from its spirit. 
 
 Enough has now been said on the history of this 
 great question of the mediaeval philosophy. We 
 have seen how Realism triumphed in the first great 
 contest of opinion ; and how, in the security which 
 followed on this triumph, diversities once more 
 crept in, till Nominahsm at last revived. Revive it 
 
 '^ The University of Vienna was founded A.D. 1365; that of 
 Heidelberi? A.D. 1346. 
 
 ( 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 needs must, after the speculations of Duns Scotus. 
 The belief had not strength and foundation enough 
 to exist without the symbol. When the Scotists 
 took the name of formalists, they virtually gave 
 up the cause to which they professed to adhere. 
 Ockham's claim to distinction lies in the skill and 
 perseverance with which he urged his opinions. 
 The course of things nmst have led many men 
 sinmltaneously with him to entertain them. 
 
 And now it may be asked — who were in the 
 right, NominaHsts or Realists ? The query deserves 
 an answer, for the question about the nature of 
 Universals is not merely one of words. More 
 importance, indeed, was attached to it in the 
 middle ages than it deserved. But men were 
 wrong in this matter, only because they were con- 
 sistent. They considered the question as a logical 
 one, and their Logic identified itself with their 
 Philosophy, and their Pliilosophy ran up into 
 Theology; and Theology was in those days a 
 subject of very direct and personal import. We 
 are indifferent to Universals now, because the 
 ruling of the point either way would not im- 
 mediately affect daily life, or the opinions of prac- 
 tical men. It is this, and not any superiority to 
 the difficulty, or successful solution of it, which 
 has allowed the cries of Nominalist and Realist to 
 die away. 
 
 We will endeavour therefore to bring the dis- 
 pute to an issue ; and, that we may tlie better do 
 so, will first define our terms. Here Etymology 
 
70 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 Iff ' 
 
 i 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 71 
 
 comes to our aid. Nominalism, in its strict sense, 
 indicates a belief, that Universals are only names. 
 Realism asserts that they are things. Convenience 
 suggests that we should adopt a third term of later 
 origin, Conceptualism, as expressing the opinion 
 of those, who hold Universals to be conceptions. 
 
 Nominalism then, in its strict sense of a belief 
 that Universals are only names, is indefensible. 
 Roscelin, who held it, deserved the censures which 
 were heaped upon him as the virtual destroyer of 
 Philosophy. More will be said upon this point, 
 when we come to the logicians of the verbal 
 school, the legitimate successors of the Nominalists. 
 Suffice it for the present to say, that they make, of 
 necessity, the operation of thought merely mecha- 
 nical, and invert the obvious facts of the case by 
 making reason a function of language, instead of 
 seeing in language a consequence of reasoning. 
 Formal argument against them is unnecessary. 
 Their own speculations sufficiently confute them, 
 which they would refuse to admit to have no other 
 subject than words. Like the dogmatical sceptics 
 who asserted positively that nothing could be 
 known, they are silenced, or should be, by their 
 own protestations. 
 
 It must be remembered, however, that other 
 opinions beside those of Roscelin bore the title of 
 Nominalism. It would be unjust to fix it in its 
 original meaning, in spite of his protest against 
 the doctrine, on Abclard. It became indeed syno- 
 nymous with anti-Realist, and descended toOckham 
 
 and his school as their natural heritage. But Ock- 
 ham was really what we should call a Conceptual- 
 alist. We have seen that he held Universals to 
 exist, and that really, in the mind ; to be, in fact, 
 mental forms, singular in themselves, but universal 
 in their apphcation. Thus every common term 
 would represent some individual conception in the 
 mind of the conceiver, which should be apphcable 
 indifferently, and without variation, to many exist- 
 ing things. This opinion, if it be not all the truth, 
 is true as far as it goes, and was, at the time, anta- 
 gonist to a mischievous error. For Ockham taught 
 also, as we have seen, negatively, that a Universal 
 is not a substance existing external to the mind. 
 This was the opinion of the Reahsts of his day. 
 Though realism in some of its modified forms had 
 not always necessarily imphed so much. At first 
 it was merely a protest against those who assigned 
 to Universals only a nominal existence. It was con- 
 cluded that they existed real/i/ ; — whether in the 
 mind or external to it, by themselves or in composi- 
 tion, was left as yet undecided. So if we refer to 
 the sects of Reahsts mentioned by John of Salisbury, 
 we find one division holding that the whole aggre- 
 gate of individuals was the Universal. There is 
 nothing extravagant, fanciful, mystical, or irrational 
 in this view ; it has been held very commonly by 
 hard-headed men in our own day ; it differs from 
 that of Ockham only by the omission of a step 
 which may easily be supplied. The two opinions 
 
72 
 
 NOMINALISM AND RKALlSM. 
 
 meet in the following formula — the common noun 
 represents an individual conception which is derived 
 from some known individuals of the class, and is 
 applicable to them all, known and unknown. 
 Against this form of ReaHsm, Ockham did not put 
 in a protest. 
 
 Neither do his arguments apply directly to the 
 second class of ReaHsts mentioned by John of 
 SaHsbury, who held, as he informs us, that the 
 Individual, as containing the whole essence of the 
 class, was, in a certain point of view, itself the 
 Universal. This opinion was declared to be obsolete 
 by the authority who has recorded it. It was very 
 probably the teaching of William of Compeigne, 
 whom Abelard prided himself on having subdued. 
 We cannot assign it any definite value, when 
 detached from the other opinions of those who 
 entertained it. Thus much only we can be sure of, 
 that it destroyed the strong and natural antithesis 
 between Individual and Universal, by a form of 
 speech in which they were represented as nearly, 
 if not quite, identical. The tendency of the error 
 would depend on circumstances. More than one 
 authority has endeavoured to connect with the 
 scholastic Realism the doctrine of Spinosa, that 
 God is the one substance of which all things are 
 modes. This is probably a mistake, but it suggests 
 an example to our present purpose. That doctrine, 
 always mischievous to the last degree, becomes 
 practically either Atheism or Pantheism, according 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 73 
 
 as he who adopts it, taking his notion of substance 
 from the world around him, degrades his conception 
 of God to suit it : or, on the other hand, starting 
 with some high theory of the First Being, interprets 
 all else by it, and raises all forms of existence which 
 meet his eye to a level which is inconsistent with 
 sense and reason. In like manner, he who should 
 assert that Individuals and Universals are the same, 
 would be a most unintelhgible mystic, if he took 
 the common view of a Universal ; an equally 
 unintelligible sensualist, if he adopted the ordinary 
 notion of an Individual. 
 
 The dominant Reahsm of the Schools was, as we 
 have seen, of another kind, and regarded the Uni- 
 versal as a substance in some way existing in the 
 Individual. The manner of its existence therein 
 was, it will be remembered, the point of dispute 
 between the Thomists and Scotists. Against 
 either shape of the doctrine Ockham has left us 
 little to urge. His arguments are to the point, 
 and conclusive; and have moreover this great 
 advantage, that he from education and familiarity 
 most likely understood, to a degree impossible to 
 us, the meaning of the position he aimed at over- 
 throwing. 
 
 The remaining kind of ReaUsm is that to which 
 nobler minds are naturally prone, and which owes its 
 origin to the divine Plato. That method of stating 
 his doctrine of Ideas, in which they are regarded as 
 existing in the mind of God, seems to admit of 
 
74 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 an easy defence. Surely, it may be argued, if the 
 creation was, as we know it was, orderly and 
 regular; if the clash of circumstances did not 
 develope the different gradations of Being out of 
 a primitive chaos, but class after class came into 
 existence at the bidding of the Divine Word ; 
 there can be no error in looking to that Eternal 
 Word as the seat of Universals. These are not 
 merely the aggregate of individuals, much less the 
 conceptions which we have derived from them, 
 still less that language which so imperfectly ex- 
 presses thoughts imperfect in themselves ; but abide 
 rather in that unchangeable Word, from whom 
 things, and conceptions, and language, alike pro- 
 ceed. 
 
 A few words on this view of the subject may be 
 said by way of conclusion. 
 
 We may observe, in the first place, that a state- 
 ment like this, however pious and true, does not 
 amount to Realism, unless coupled with some 
 further hypothesis. Realism requires that the 
 Universal shall exist as a substance, in the highest 
 category, and not merely as an attribute. So that 
 according to the Scholastic method of treating 
 such subjects, we must enter into the (juestion 
 how Ideas exist in the Divine Mind, and deteiTriine 
 that they inhere as substances in a higher Sub- 
 stance, before we can be Realists indeed. And 
 this was the opinion of most authorities, from 
 Boethius downward. But at present we shall 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 75 
 
 probably be of opinion, that such a question 
 cannot be answered one way or the other, without 
 considerable danger of carrying speculation beyond 
 the legitimate sphere of reason. 
 
 But, waiving this objection, a further caution is 
 necessary to those who think Realism thus con- 
 genial with their Theology. Granting that all true 
 and genuine Universals have their seat in the 
 Divine Mind, a further question arises — what are 
 true and genuine Universals ? Surely we cannot 
 boldly assume, that every common term, in the 
 present state of language, is true to its original 
 purpose. With all our ignorance of the nature of 
 things, all our mistaken speculations, all our con- 
 ventionalities of thought and language, can we 
 venture to think, that we have always exercised 
 the powers of abstraction and generalization aright ? 
 And, in default of such rightful exercise, who can 
 answer that the Universals on which we have 
 fixed are true? Who shall say, that the classes 
 which we have formed are in all cases grounded on 
 the nature of things, and correspond to the in- 
 tention of the Divine Author of the gradations of 
 the universe ? 
 
 We take for granted, and justly, the correctness 
 of our own involuntary and spontaneous clas- 
 sification. What we do insensibly, we generally 
 do rightly. We need not fear that we are wrong, 
 in classing all men, or all animals, or all virtues, or 
 all colours, or all sounds together. But when, by 
 
I 
 
 76 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 
 
 77 
 
 a laborious effort of the mind, we endeavour to 
 arrange these classes, which we gained without 
 such effort, in subordination to each other ; when, 
 for instance, we would ascertain the precise relation 
 in which the class man stands to the class animal, 
 we cannot answer for our success. Viewed as a 
 statement of abstract truth, if the zoological ar- 
 rangement of Linnaeus was right, that of Cuvier is 
 wrong. Only when we are assured on the best 
 evidence, that we have attained to the real order 
 of things, and understand their relative position in 
 the scale of creation, can we assert positively that 
 our class terms are valid, and represent any natural 
 Universal. To make the assumption at an eariier 
 stage, would be, in all probability, to fix ourselves 
 irrevocably in error. 
 
 We should begin, therefore, at any rate, in our 
 enquiries by adopting the Conceptualist, or, as we 
 might fairly call it, the Occamist hypothesis. We 
 should first of all ascertain that our terms are 
 definite, as representing some distinct mental 
 image, and if they be so, thus far be content with 
 them. But, this point ascertained, we come, if we 
 prosecute our enquiry, to another doubt. How 
 far do these conceptions, definite though they be, 
 find their correlatives in the nature of things? 
 What proof is there, that, when we arrange these 
 under some wider conception, or, on the other 
 hand, group lower classes and individuals under 
 them, our arrangement can claim the title of 
 
 t 
 
 natural? Unless we can claim this dignity for it, 
 we cannot set a high value on our class-terms. 
 They will stand at best as symbols of a provisional 
 classification, which greater research, or more skil- 
 ful analysis, may at any moment supersede. 
 
 To begin therefore by assuming that even the 
 most modified form of Realism is true on the exist- 
 ing state of things would be to begin with a mistake. 
 It stands in this respect on a par with the scho- 
 lastic system as a whole ; it is a great aspiration 
 which has never yet been verified. We may 
 cherish it as an ideal, but as nothing more. Our 
 knowledge is far too imperfect to allow us to assert 
 that we class the phenomena of the world at large 
 uniformly according to their natural classes. In 
 some provinces of science, the work has been 
 readily and satisfactorily accomplished. We have 
 no hesitation in aflSrming that, in Mathematics, the 
 divisions of figures according to the number of their 
 dimensions, of lines into curved and straight, of 
 angles into right, acute, and obtuse, of quantities in 
 general into equal and unequal, are really natural, 
 and give us the knowledge of natural kinds. On 
 other subjects, as in Botany, we seem to have 
 approximated to a true classification, though the 
 fine of demarcation between the several classes is 
 far from being, in all cases, accurately drawn at 
 present. Sometimes, as in the case with Zoology, 
 it seems doubtful if the problem has been solved ; 
 sometimes, as with Mineralogy, the work still re- 
 
78 
 
 NOMIiNALiSM AND REALISM. 
 
 mains to be accomplished ; if the chrystallographic 
 Idea be true, the arrangement of conceptions under 
 it is quite incomplete. On the whole, we must be 
 content to allow that the Conceptualistic view of 
 Universals is true at present : the Realistic view, 
 with some limitations and cautions, may be true 
 hereafter. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 THE MODERN VIEW OF THE RELATION OF LOGIC 
 
 TO SCIENCE. 
 
 The deductive method of investigation, though 
 theoretically the most perfect, has, when applied 
 to most subjects, important practical defects. Its 
 very ideal perfection destroys its actual utihty. 
 That it may be valid, there must be perfect 
 coherence among its parts, perfect dependence on 
 first premises. One probabihty, admitted, destroys 
 the certainty of the whole ; one falsehood anni- 
 hilates its value. No compensating apparatus can 
 make up for the presence of a doubt, or remedy 
 the consequences of a single error. Even omissions, 
 which are not positive errors, are equally fatal to 
 its pretensions : an element of calculation, left out 
 at the beginning, cannot be introduced afterwards. 
 There is no provision for accommodating fresh 
 principles when the reasoning has once begun. 
 There may be no doubt, no retraction ; all must 
 be unhesitating progress onwards. 
 
 The scholastic system, then, might naturally be 
 expected to fail. It was a mould far too fine and 
 exquisite for the material to be shaped in it. Had 
 all its premises been necessary truths, the scheme 
 
 \ 
 
80 
 
 THE MODERN VIEW OF THE 
 
 RELATION OF UXJIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 81 
 
 would have been unexceptionable. Proof might 
 have hung on proof in continual succession. But 
 neither Aristotle nor the Fathers were infaUible, 
 either in principles or facts. Nor can the words 
 of Scripture be taken always as expressing the 
 literal truth on subjects not religious. We allow, 
 for instance, the fallaciousness of the argument 
 from Holy Writ against Gahleo. The Schoolmen 
 would have asserted its validity, as their admirers 
 did. They over-rated in fact altogether the mo- 
 dality of their premises. They argued from data, 
 which were general rules at the best, and often 
 only probable in a low degree, and sometimes 
 capable of being proved false by very little enquiry, 
 as if they were absolutely true, and immutable laws 
 of the universe. We know how rapidly the value 
 of probabilities decreases when they are combined 
 deductively. One fraction multiplies into another, 
 and the thread of hkelihood spreads out into the 
 merest possibility. We soon become incapable 
 of affixing to conclusions thus gained any practical 
 value. The argument may serve as a clue to 
 guide us, but not as a chain on which we can 
 depend. If they relate to matters of experience, 
 we call in observation or experiment to confirm 
 them ; if they cannot be so verified, we corroborate 
 them by analogy, or example, or some other such 
 compendious aid to proof. If these fail us, we 
 must leave them without assigning them any im- 
 portance, till they are proved or disproved by some 
 
 process of reasoning less high in its character than 
 the deductive, but better suited to the matter in 
 hand. 
 
 The fate of the scholastic Philosophy may serve 
 to illustrate these remarks. Boldly did it proceed 
 at first, ramifying in all directions in dependence 
 on its central trunk. Descending by degrees from 
 broad Universals and elevated speculations, it 
 came at length to the region of practical truth. 
 And here the great mental defect of the Schoolmen 
 betrayed itself. Their perceptive powers were 
 quite sacrificed to the reflective. They neither 
 used observation on the creatures of the world 
 without, nor employed imagination in creating a 
 new world within. Therefore they seem to have 
 reasoned and written mechanically, and without 
 any object external to the process of reasoning or 
 writing itself. It would be hard to say at what 
 their Philosophy aims, except its own complete- 
 ness. When consequently in their course they 
 came to the line which marked the sphere of 
 actual life and conduct, no instinct bade them stop. 
 They traversed the level of ordinary thought 
 without heed or remark, only to descend below it. 
 A few steps sufficed for the passage from a question 
 as to the nature of the Divine understanding, or 
 the laws which limit the operations of God, to a 
 discussion of some minute metaphysical question, or 
 the discovery in some ordinary word of some half 
 dozen senses, which none but a master-schoolman 
 
 G 
 
 ^ 
 
8-2 
 
 THE MODERN VIEM OF THE 
 
 RELATION OK UHilC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 88 
 
 could then devise, and which now, without some 
 pupillage, it is very difficult to follow. 
 
 Accordingly, the predominant feeling of the 
 Schoolmen turned them away from the region of 
 Physic, which leaves least room for mere dwelling 
 upon terms, without affixing to them a meaning. 
 Aristotle's works on this subject as on others met 
 indeed with their share of comment. But deduc- 
 tions from his principles would have been apt to 
 bring a speculator full tilt against some obvious 
 and opposing fact, which would have pierced his 
 thin and airy system, and caused it in a moment 
 to colhipse. Hence arose the necessity of avoiding 
 this delicate ground, and either neglecting Physic 
 altogether, or running it up into metaphysical 
 questions about the nature, for instance, of the 
 principles of motion or causation, or the distinction 
 of matter and form. Those Schoolmen who had 
 the strongest physical turn seem aliens from their 
 brethren. Roger Bacon ranks with them in little 
 beside date. And the vast learning of Albertus 
 Magnus has had small hifluence on the world, 
 when compared with the acute and systematic 
 deductions of his great pupil Aquinas. 
 
 Thus the ultimate fortune of scholasticism 
 differed according to its subject. It naturally 
 failed first, when the independent observation of 
 facts caused its truth to be tested. Such dis- 
 coveries as those of Galileo with regard to the 
 falsity of the once-received laws of motion involved 
 
 ( 
 
 H 
 
 f 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 the system in disgrace. Consequences could not 
 be trusted where premises were so false ; and when 
 one set of premises had signally given way, httle 
 confidence could be placed on any other which 
 rested on like authority. 
 
 Botany again, which, as connected with Medicine, 
 was all along of great practical importance, and 
 which, to be cultivated with any reasonable hope 
 of success, evidently demands the attention of the 
 student not only to descriptions of plants but to the 
 plants themselves, was one of the first subjects on 
 which enquirers, laying aside useless comments 
 on Theophrastus and other authorities, betook 
 themselves, first of all, to the study of facts, and 
 those gained, to their classification and arrange- 
 ment. 
 
 So on a third and more important topic ; the 
 Schoolmen had fashioned Theology after their own 
 mind, and incorporated with it their own views of 
 Church authority, and a characteristic doctrine of 
 the Sacraments. These were something more than 
 speculative opinions; and these too received a 
 heavy blow at the Reformation. ' 
 
 But, in Morals and Metaphysic, and Method in 
 general, as distinct from its application, their 
 system long lasted on, to a great degree unques- 
 tionable. Ultimately it sank into neglect only on 
 account of its evident unprofitableness. It ex- 
 patiated at its own pleasure, and sufficiently widely 
 to prove itself migatory. Or, like a force expend- 
 ed 2 
 
84 
 
 THE MODERN VIEW OV Till 
 
 ing itself in a vacuum, it met with nothing on 
 which to act, and was therefore of no calcuhible 
 vahie. The walls and bulwarks stood entire, but 
 they were also undefended; the city was deserted 
 by its old inhabitants, and the enemy thought 
 demolition unn.ecessary labour''. 
 
 The endeavour then to work out the Aristotelian 
 idea of Wisdom had failed. Philosophy had made 
 the eff'ort, and, now^ that its ill success w^as evident, 
 seemed dispirited and remiss, unable to be satisfied 
 with the result of its labours, and yet with no 
 heart to I)egin them anew. She needed some 
 novel Idea to stimulate her exertions, to give a 
 fresh interest to her old field of S])eculation, and 
 serve ns a clue in her resumed researches. Such 
 an Idea was given by the virtual fatlun' of modern 
 philosophy, Lord Bacon. 
 
 His work was in many respects closely like that 
 of Aristotle. Neither the author of the old or of 
 
 ■^ Jt i^ cjinoiis to see, how, in luanv cases, the old lorni reiiiahied 
 vvhe)i tlic substance was dej)arled — how, for instance, Sanderson, 
 having treated at length of the Predicanjents in the earlier parts of 
 his Logic, crtvfs, toward^ i close, as examples of a poj)ular 
 arrar.gcnipnt ■ i cunnnon -places, the distribution of facts under 
 oitli " '^' ' ' ^^n»efjori»'<, oi ilie ten Comnumdnients. (Append. 
 Pos . in. 11. ' ): 1m»\v (iwillini, hcialdically faithiul to ihe 
 past, porliiuis o\u i, " <hari;es " according io ijjo division of the 
 catetrory of substance uhich he found in the Loj^ic of his school- 
 days, (Sc(. \\\. ad init.); and Divines, as late i- ilie Savoy Con- 
 ference, thought it worth whil' i«> throw arguments in actual dis- 
 putation, and not in mere school exercisej^, into the strict di;dectit 
 tbnn. (Cardwell, Hist. otCun ference-, p. MM.) 
 
 UELATION OF LuulC TO SCIENCK. 
 
 85 
 
 the new Organon elaborated the system of which 
 lie was to bear the honours hereafter. Each pro- 
 posed an Idea, which was left for others to adopt 
 and perfect. The collections of each in the way 
 of facts and materials were comparatively worth- 
 less. They were great generals, the labour of 
 whose hands w^as of little importance when com- 
 pared to the weight of their conmiands-. Each 
 displayed that boldness which is one of the surest 
 auguries of success; and, in his day, called the 
 attention of all, with a confidence which created 
 confidence in its turn, to his own Idea of Perfect 
 Science. 
 
 Nor was the form which this Idea assumed on 
 the respective minds of these great thinkers so 
 difi'erent as we are ai)t at first to hnagine. Lord 
 Bacon does not seem to have thought less highly 
 of the possible results of scientific research than 
 Aristotle. They both looked to the absolute unity 
 of all knowledge as its state of ideal perfection, 
 without declaring positively whether they thought 
 such state attainable or not. Thev both thouo'ht 
 that Philosophy would find its fidfilment in the 
 subordination and arrangement of many truths 
 under one. They differed mainly in the method 
 by which they thought this subordination and 
 arrangement was to be attained. They adopted 
 each his own mode and order of investigation, 
 while they looked to the c lul of investigation as 
 ojie itnd the same. 
 
86 
 
 THK MODKRN VIEW OF THE 
 
 The Aristotelians (perhaps it is safer and fairer 
 here to speak of the pupils than of the master) 
 made, as we have seen, the Many depend upon the 
 One. They took that order of Science, which, 
 though it be that of the Divine Mind, is one which 
 requires more perfect discernment and accuracy 
 in its application to general subjects than we can 
 command. One metaphor seems to have been con- 
 tinually before their minds, most suitable to the 
 whole aspect of their system, and recommended to 
 Christians still more by its use in Holy Writ — that 
 of the Tree of Knowledge. All the ramifications of 
 Truth were sui)ported actually by its single trunk, 
 as they had been contained virtually in the idea 
 of Being, its seed. Descartes (a man of such genius 
 that we the more regret the accusations of plagiarism 
 from the Schoolmen, and from every other acces- 
 sible source, which are continually l)rought against 
 him) draws out the figure rather happily. " The 
 whole of Philosophy," he tells us, "is as a tree whose 
 roots are Metaphysic, whose trunk is Physic, whose 
 boughs shooting forth therefrom are all the other 
 sciences, which reduce on the whole to the three 
 principal heads of Medicine, Mechanic, and Ethic— 
 I mean that most exalted and perfect Discipline of 
 Manners, which presupposes the perfect knowledge 
 of other sciences, and is therefore the last and highest 
 grade of Wisdom. Just then as fruits are gatliered 
 neither from tlie roots of trees nor from the trunk, 
 but only from the end of the boughs; so the chief 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCK. 
 
 87 
 
 use of Philosophy hes in those parts of it which are 
 necessarily the last to be learned \" 
 
 Appropriate as this figure is, expressing not only 
 the form and configuration, but the natural deve- 
 lopment and inward growth of a philosophical 
 system, the fiict could not at last be denied, that 
 the scholastic tree was withered, if not dead; 
 stretching forth bare boughs through the heavens, 
 and fixed, not by roots, but by its sheer bulk and 
 ponderosity. 
 
 Lord Bacon at once inverted the method, and 
 supplanted the metaphor. Just as Copernicus, 
 when he perceived the endless complexity in- 
 volved in the supposition that the sun moved 
 round the earth, tried, and successfully, to attain 
 a simpler expression of the facts of Astronomy 
 by supposing the earth to move round the sun : 
 just as, in later times, and with far more doubtful 
 success, Kant, acting on this earlier example, 
 endeavoured to reduce Metaphysic to a simi- 
 lar basis, by making our conceptions determine 
 phenomena, and not, as had been previously 
 assumed, phenomena determine our concep- 
 tions; so Lord Bacon, standing between the 
 two thinkers both in time and in intellectual 
 position, with a keen perception of either kind of 
 truth, curious both in facts and laws, in Physic 
 and in Metaphysic, ventured on tlie experiment, 
 from which so much good has resulted, of in- 
 
 '' Fridiil. ad Prificipia Philo!<o))hin\ 
 
88 
 
 THE MODERN VIKVV OF THE 
 
 verting, while he preserved, the old Idea of 
 Science; still holding a belief in its possible 
 ultimate reduction to a single head, insisting on 
 the necessity of its unity and order, but building 
 up the unity on the pluraHty, not deducing the 
 plurality as a consequence from the unity. 
 
 Accordingly, the figure by which he represented 
 the whole sum of Science was not a tree, but a 
 Pyramid. On this he insists in the well-known 
 passage which occurs both in the Advancement of 
 Learning and in the corresponding part of his great 
 Latin work. " It is the duty," he reminds us, 
 "and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the 
 infinity of individual experience, as much as the 
 conception of truth will permit ; and to remedy 
 the complaint of nta hrevis, ars longa : which is 
 performed by uniting the notions and conceptions 
 of Sciences ; for knowledges are as pyramids 
 whereof history is the basis. So, of Natural 
 Philosophy, the basis is Natural History, the stage 
 next the basis is Physic, the stage next the 
 vertical point is Metaphysic. As for the vertical 
 point, opus quod operatur Deus a princ'iplo usque 
 (idjinem, we know not whether man's agency can 
 attain unto it. But these three be the true 
 stages of knowledge, and are to them tliat are 
 depraved, no better than the giants' hills, 
 ' I'rr sunt conati imponcre Polio Ossain 
 Scilicet, attune Ossit; frondosuin iiivolverc Olviiipimi.' 
 Bui to those which refer all things to the Glory of 
 
 RELATION OF LOCilC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 89 
 
 God, they are as the three acclamations, ^ Sancte, 
 Sancte, Sancte;' holy in the description or dilata- 
 tion of His works, holy in the connection or con- 
 catenation of them, and holy in the union of them 
 in a perpetual and uniform law." 
 
 According to this view, also, it will be seen, the 
 culminating point of Science is Theology. The 
 difference is not in position, but in order ; though 
 first in nature, it is last arrived at. So in another 
 passage, higlily illustrative of the manner in which 
 he makes the fables of the ancients speak more 
 than their inventors meant, he expressly teaches. 
 " Horns," he tells us, " are attributed by the 
 ancients to Pan, or the Universe, broad at the 
 base, but tapering to a point. For the whole 
 nature of things is pointed like a Pyramid. The 
 individuals, over which the base of nature extends, 
 are infinite ; these are collected into species, them- 
 selves also numerous ; the species again rise into 
 genera ; and these too again contract into classes 
 still more general, till all nature at last seems to 
 unite in one : which is indicated by the pyramidal 
 figure of the horns of Pan. And no wonder that 
 his horns strike the very heavens. For the lofty 
 things of nature, or universal forms, in some sense 
 touch on Divinity. And therefore that famous 
 chain of Homer (the chain, that is, of natural 
 causes) was said to be fixed to the foot of Jupiter's 
 throne. And no one (as may be seen) has treated 
 of Meta[>hysic and the eternal and immutable 
 
90 
 
 THE MODERN VIEW OF THE 
 
 truths of nature, withdrawing his mind for a time 
 from the flux of things, without at the same time 
 touching on Natural Theology ; so ready and 
 natural is the passage from the vertex of the 
 pyramid to things divine V 
 
 This was the new turn which Lord Bacon gave 
 to Philosophy. Science appeared to him more 
 material, and less formal, than it had seemed to 
 his predecessors. They had regarded their method 
 as something like a principle of life, which super- 
 seded the ordinary conditions of inanimate nature, 
 and enabled them to widen out their knowledge, 
 as it were, from the basis upwards. Just as 
 organization brings about results which cannot 
 chemically be accounted for; just as the hiw of 
 crystallization seems for a time to suspend the 
 operation of the laws of gravity ; so it appeared 
 to them that the conditions of thought could 
 control and regulate the conditions of Being. 
 Reasoning was something more than the scaffold 
 by means of which the building was erected : it 
 was part of the building itself. 
 
 The fabric of knowledge presented itself to 
 Lord Bacon in a different light. He thought that 
 the tendency of former times had been to over- 
 rate the powers of reason. His apprehension was, 
 that the lawful construction of a Science might be 
 sacrificed to the love of method and consistency. 
 He reminds his reader that " it is natural for the 
 
 ■■ Do Aiifijin. Scicntianiii), lil). ii. ad. iiiit. 
 
 RELATION OF LOGIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 91 
 
 
 mind of man readily to imagine greater order and 
 equality in nature than it finds there '^;" that it 
 " needs not the addition of wings, but rather a 
 burden as of lead, to bar all leaping and flying ^" 
 He allowed no power to the intellect of antici- 
 pating observation and experiment. The instru- 
 ments of Science, he thought, had hitherto cor- 
 rupted Science itself. Plato had spoiled it with 
 Theology, Aristotle with Logic, Proclus with 
 Mathematics^. So he proposed to make know- 
 ledge a congeries of facts, which hke a pyramid 
 would hold together by the natural force of 
 cohesion. None of the apparatus employed in 
 raising it was ultimately to be incorporated with 
 it. Induction was to become a great engine, 
 which all could work, and all with equal success. 
 His method of investigation was to equalize all 
 intellects^, and this on every subject : for, he tells 
 us, "as vulgar Logic, which governs its subjects 
 by syllogism, pertains to all Sciences, and not to 
 physical Science only ; so likewise our Logic, 
 which proceeds by induction, embraces alP." 
 
 There is always a danger of riding a metaphor 
 to death, especially when it is so natural and true, 
 as to combine itself with the direct argument, and 
 become undistinguishable from it. Perhaps Lord 
 Bacon has been guilty of this mistake, not an 
 uncommon one with rapid and powerful minds, to 
 
 " Nov. Org. lib. i. §. 45. 
 '^ lb. §. 122. " lb. §. 127. 
 
 lb. §. 104. 
 
 ' lb. §. 96. 
 
 1 
 
1 
 
 92 
 
 THE MODERN VIEW OF Til! 
 
 whom it does not occur that their own energy of 
 thought may have found but an insufficient ex- 
 ponent, and that the tired Pegasus may cease to 
 answer to the spur. The thorough adoption of 
 this pyramidal theory of knowledge implies a 
 great assumption — nothing less than this, that 
 while the order and arrangement, which the facts 
 of Science fall into, is really essential ; that de- 
 pendence and consequence, that necessary con- 
 nection among them, which the mind can in some 
 cases trace, and is eager to trace in all, is not 
 essential. It implies, what, to say the least, has 
 never yet been established, that the Idea of a 
 Science, the nucleus around which all its facts 
 cluster, the principle of that unity wliich Lord 
 Bacon himself insisted upon, is itself merely a 
 generalized fact, true in no other and in no higher 
 sense than the phenomena which fall under it. 
 Thus reason is hnvered unnecessarily, and deposed 
 from the throne which observation is unfit to 
 occupy. The Schoolmen had thought to move 
 the world without a fulcrum for their intellectual 
 lever: Lord Bacon doubted the levei > >tiviigLh, 
 even were the fulcrum given. 
 
 We need scarcely remark, that neither idea ol 
 Science has prevailed exclusively since his time. 
 Men have not been every where hibouring like 
 Egyptian slaves at perfecting the pyramid of Truth 
 by the mechanical application of the engine called 
 Induction. Deduction is still extant in the world. 
 
 KKLATIOX or LO(iIC TO SCIENCE. 
 
 9:^ 
 
 I 
 
 and shows signs of vigorous life. Intellect, in 
 spite of all its idols, is still in request. There is 
 no innnediate probability that any organon will 
 succeed in obliterating the practical distinction 
 between ordinary and extraordinary minds. Mo- 
 dern Science is content to aim at that unity which 
 both the Schoolmen and Lord Bacon sought, by 
 the method of either indifferently. The subject 
 on which it is engaged determines whether it 
 shall follow^ out the idea to its consequences, or 
 arrange phenomena under an idea. In one 
 respect, we are less hopeful now% than the sage of 
 Verulam was. We do not hesitate to pronounce 
 the absolute unity of all knowledge impossible to 
 the human mind. Far less is it thought, that the 
 formal imity of Logic is at all equivalent to a real 
 unity of Science. Logic, as we shall presently 
 see, is held indeed to stand in a shghtly different 
 relation to induction and deduction ; but in neither 
 case is it supposed to give both matter and form, 
 or so to extend form, as to enable us to dispense 
 with matter. Its monarchy is now more sure, 
 because limited. From being, in turn, a part of 
 Philosophy, and the whole, it has descended to 
 the leV'cl of an instrument. 
 
 / 
 
ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 95 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 Logic, then, it is now generally allowed, is only 
 an instrument of Philosophy — an instrument as 
 contrasted with a part; not involved in the idea, 
 or necessarily hound up in its existence ; not even 
 an universal preliminary of Science, though it may 
 be indispensable to some minds, and highly useful 
 to all. Enough will be granted to show its im- 
 portance, if it be admitted, that scientific research, 
 and scientific statement, become more easy by its 
 means; enough also to attach interest to the 
 question, which we will now proceed to discuss — 
 how does Logic prove itself to be thus instrumental 
 to Philosophy ? 
 
 The correct answer to this enquiry is also the 
 obvious one. Philosophy, it is answered, is elabo- 
 rated by the mind of man; and correctness of 
 process is an ordinary though not an invariable 
 condition of correctness of result. It is by regu- 
 lating thought, or the act of the rational mind, 
 that Logic is instrumental to its end. It gives 
 neither facts, nor ideas under which to combine 
 them ; but by its analysis of the mental operations. 
 
 it enables us to test the correctness of the com- 
 binations of phenomena, the conclusiveness of the 
 consequences from an idea. 
 
 There is however more than one school of 
 thinkers, who regard Metaphysic (using that word 
 in the sense of a science of thought) as impossible ; 
 or at least as doubtful, and deceptive, and a fair 
 object of suspicion. These, while they allow 
 the utility of Logic, prefer accounting for it in 
 another way than that mentioned above. Un- 
 willing to speak of it as couversant with thought, 
 or conceptions, or inference, or mental operations 
 in general, they assert broadly that Logic deals 
 either with words, or with things. 
 
 Thus Logicians, at the very entry of their sub- 
 ject, begin to differ. They cannot agree in stating 
 with what they have to deal. The difference 
 among them is sometimes real, sometimes only 
 verbal ; but, even where it is verbal, it is sufficient 
 to prove a broad separation of tone in the contend- 
 ing parties. The point at controversy needs some 
 explanation; and, for convenience sake, a name 
 which involves no reproach may be given to the 
 advocates of the several opinions. We will then 
 divide Logicians into three schools, according as 
 they hold words, things, or conceptions, to be the 
 subject of Logic; and entitle them respectively, 
 the verbal, the phenomenal, and the conceptional. 
 
 These divisions find no exact counterpart in 
 ancient or mediaeval Logic. The connection of 
 
f 
 
 96 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOnrs oi I.OUIC. 
 
 thing, conception, and word, was at first much 
 more dwelt on than their antithesis. The disputes 
 as to the origin of language did not materially 
 affect the question. Even those who, like Aristotle, 
 derived it from convention, admitted this funda- 
 mental parallelism. They assumed, as perhaps 
 it were wiser for us to assume, that our mental 
 impressions adequately represent the outward 
 world ; that our language does sufficient justice to 
 these mental impressions. To decide in which 
 the province of Logic properly lay, was not a 
 point of practical importance. The regulation of 
 either portion of the realm would involve also the 
 proportionate adjustment of the other. 
 
 Neither again can the question slide back, as it 
 sometimes seems inclined to do, with that of 
 Nominalism, Reahsm, and Conceptualism. Though 
 some of the verbal school are, as we shall see, the 
 legitimate successors of the ancient Nominalists, 
 they should not be confounded with them. Mem- 
 bers of the three schools may be perfectly agreed 
 in their view of Universals. Besides, the dispute 
 is not, like that of old, really extra-logical. How 
 Logic furthers Science, is a question which may 
 be entertained without trenching on Metapiiysic ; 
 not so the other query — what it is that common 
 nouns signify. 
 
 Proceed we then to consider the respective 
 claims of these rival views to our regard. That 
 the conceptional opinion is on the whole correct. 
 
 } 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 97 
 
 will be best shown by our notice of the errors with 
 which it is contrasted. Our first remarks shall be 
 devoted to the verbal School. 
 
 Those who assert, that the regulation of Language 
 is the province of Logic, may be guilty only of an 
 awkward method of stating a truth. They may 
 not intend more than to insist on the intimate 
 connection between Language and Thought. Every 
 act of thought, they urge, and truly, is accompanied, 
 and figured to the mind, by some word, external or 
 internal. Thinking, as naturally seeks its expression 
 in language, as feeling does in inarticulate sound. 
 The relation of the sign to the thing signified is in 
 each case the same ; though the one is the expo- 
 nent of the act of the rational soul, the other of 
 the irrational. Just as brutes express pain spon- 
 taneously, by uneasy motion, or their natural 
 cries, so men spontaneously invest their con- 
 ceptions with an outward clothing. That the 
 word is not always articulated, matters not ; 
 enough, if it be understood, Li all probability, 
 however, were nature left to run wild, we should 
 think aloud for the most part, and make no more 
 secret of our thoughts, than children, before the 
 time of definite reflection, do of their feelings. It 
 is different in society : an instinct, easily developed, 
 teaches us, that to utter all that is conceived would 
 be unwise, as to give vent to all that is felt, would 
 be umnanly. 
 
 All this is true : but it does not nearly amount 
 
 H 
 
98 ON TIIK DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 to a proof that Logic must subserve to Science only 
 by regulating language. Such regulation is the 
 work not of Logic, but of Grammar. Grammar 
 looks to clearness of expression, as Logic to clear- 
 ness of conception. We may have logical accuracy 
 without grammatical. This is often the case with 
 reflective persons who have lived much alone. 
 They tliink methodically and correctly, but fail 
 in the attempt to communicate their meaning. 
 And if the endeavour to express one's thoughts 
 often shows their indistinctness, it does not follow 
 that the means which expose the defect, will also 
 serve as the remedv. 
 
 But, it may be urged in reply, though accuracy 
 of thought be really the aim of Logic, this is 
 practically identical with accuracy of language. 
 For it is only through language that thoughts 
 can be transmitted from one mind to another. 
 Thus, it is argued, the necessary medium becomes, 
 for ordinary uses, identical with that which it 
 conveys. 
 
 Here, however, there is twofold fallacy. Li the 
 first place, though language be essential to thought, 
 it does not follow that accuracy of thought will 
 always be attended with grammatical accuracy of 
 lan2:ua<i( . In fact, it is not found to be* so : an 
 idea may be, and often is, expressed in a calculus 
 far less elevated than itself. Mind overtasks its 
 machinery of words, anfl in so doing, injures it. 
 The servaiit suffers in the endeavour to do justice 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 a9 
 
 i 
 
 u 
 
 
 to his master. Thus strict thouglit is found un- 
 favourable to the perfection of speech; it wears 
 away a language, just as intense mental action 
 wears away the body; it decomposes it, so to 
 speak, breaking off its inflections, and substituting 
 particles in their stead ; its expressions often only 
 escape from being positively ungrammatical, by 
 declaring their independence of the rules of Gram- 
 mar altogether. So Mathematics have their own 
 verb of equality, their own substantives of number, 
 nullity, and infinity, their own prepositions of ad- 
 dition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, the 
 use of which they regulate on principles of their own. 
 So again all professional idioms and vocabularies 
 are by common consent pronounced inelegant and 
 awkward. Even the process of stating an argu- 
 ment syllogistically, or of converting a proposition, 
 involves the necessity, for the most part, of verbal 
 anomalies. Who can blame the Schoolmen for 
 inexactness in the details of thought? Yet who 
 like them ever frittered away, even to utter an- 
 nihilation, the expression, and genius, and, in 
 a great measure, the grannnatical structure of a 
 language ? 
 
 Secondly, it should be observed, that Logic, to 
 be useful, does not necessarily imply the contact 
 of one mind with another. It may be, and 
 often has been, used as an instrument of self- 
 education. Two disput<mts need an elaboration of 
 vocabulary, which the solitary thinker may dis- 
 
 h2 
 
\ 
 
 IF S^5- . - JJ— B „ * - — 
 
 100 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 pense with. Dialectic is not synonymous with 
 Analytic, nor Eristic with Logic. 
 
 In fine: when we speak of Logic as teaching the 
 accurate use of Language, two different things may 
 be meant. It may be asserted, either that Logic 
 arranges the parts of sj)eech accurately with 
 regard to one another, or that it so orders them,, 
 as that they shall correspond duly with the process 
 of thought. The former of these positions would 
 have few suj)porters, amounting as it does to an 
 absolute fusion of Logic and Grammar. The latter, 
 while it asserts the separate existence of thought 
 and language, allows also, that the language is 
 subservient to the thought ; that the conception is 
 final, where the word is instrumental. Is it not 
 then better to fix on thought as the subject of 
 Logic, than on that which only comes under 
 consideration as its vehicle and exponent ? 
 
 It is nuich to be regretted, that so many 
 symptoms of an adhesion to the opinions of this 
 moderate section of the verbal School are to be 
 found in the able treatise of Archbishop Whately. 
 His definition of Logic, as " the Art of employing 
 Language properly for the purpose of Reasoning," 
 is conceived quite in this spirit. To trace this evil 
 tendency in detail through his work would be 
 quite foreign to our present purpose. Two of its 
 more general features may however be mentioned 
 here, as illustrative of the turn of mind with which 
 this logical theory is associated. In the first 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC 101 
 
 place, he is led to attach far too much importance 
 to the mere arrangement of words, and to measure 
 the elasticity and pliability of thought by that of 
 the raw material out of which its finished repre- 
 sentations are fabricated. The most striking in- 
 stance of this defect is found in his way of treating 
 hypothetical and inductive arguments. He com- 
 pels methods of reasoning, which, when viewed 
 in the thinking mind, are clearly distinct from the 
 deductive process and from each other, to bow to 
 an artifice of language, and submit to the one 
 unvarying formula of syllogism. And, secondly, 
 he shows a continual disposition to underrate the 
 number of real questions at issue among mankind, 
 and to increase in proportion the number of 
 merely verbal differences. His common way of 
 dealing with contending disputants is to accuse 
 them of an equivocation ; to assure them, that 
 they either mean the same thing by different 
 words, or use the same word to signify distinct 
 things. Or, if this plan will not succeed, he 
 looks for some formal error in the argument of 
 one of the parties; and is ready to assign the 
 discrepancy to any cause except that which is 
 probably the real one — some broad difference of 
 principle underlying the whole discussion, and 
 forcing, as it were, the superficial strata of thought 
 from what would be else their level and unbroken 
 direction. This is in fact to assume that men can 
 
\t 
 
 102 ON THE DIFFKKKNT MODLRN SCHOOLS or I.OcaC. 
 
 with equal ease be made to be of one mind and of 
 one vocabulary. 
 
 The truth is, that the minds of men differ in 
 natural constitution as widely as their bodies. As 
 we do not all spontaneously move our limbs in the 
 same manner, so neither do we think alike. When 
 discipline makes men uniform and simultaneous 
 in their motions, it only sus])ends their natural 
 peculiarities, and does not destray them. Though 
 the effect of the drill-sergeant's labours may be 
 observable when the soldier is off parade, they 
 no longer produce an exact uniformity. Those 
 differences of gait and bearing then display them- 
 selves once more, which at the time seemed 
 obliterated. 
 
 So it is with Thought. Tlie clever arguer drills, 
 so to speak, the mind of those who follow him. 
 By a sympathy, voluntary or involuntary, as the 
 case may be, they throw themselves into the same 
 mental posture with their coryphaeus. Slowly, 
 with reluctance perhaps, and diflliculty, minds from 
 different regions of thought tend to the same 
 point, under the guidance, and by the attraction, 
 of a more powerful mind, and acquiesce in a 
 fornuila. It seems for the moment as if they were 
 really agreed. They cease to quarrel, while they 
 stand side by side in formal precision on the 
 platform of definition and syllogism. Yet, remove 
 the restraints of system, and they relapse into 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 103 
 
 individuality. They return to their own points of 
 view again, and choose their own classifications and 
 divisions. This implies as real a distinction be- 
 tween their opinions, as a difference on matters of 
 fact. Indeed their conflicting impressions as to 
 facts are more easily removable by testimony, 
 and evidence, and renewed observation, than their 
 diversities of theory. Here idiosyncrasies come 
 into play ; and Nature, which has been expelled for 
 the time by a logical bifurcation, returns. 
 
 It is therefore at best a short-sighted wisdom, to 
 exaggerate the power of Language in producing 
 agreement and correctness of Thought. We cannot 
 narrow the interval between the act of the mind 
 and its symbol. The clever logician indeed, who 
 has formed his own opinions, may state them in a 
 definite form of words, and find this form very 
 generally, though not very willingly, accepted. 
 He may thence argue, that others for the most part 
 differ from him only in consequence of the absence 
 of formal statement, and that, were their views as 
 distinctly stated as his own, the very shadow of 
 dispute would vanish. The delusion might last, 
 till men, from stating their opinions, came to act 
 upon them. It would then be seen, that those who 
 adopt a formula on intellectual compvdsion, reserve 
 to themselves the liberty of interpreting it. The 
 history of nations and of philosophies shows this 
 truth more clearly than that of individual minds. 
 Wliat nice forms of words can apprehend and per- 
 
 1 1 
 
1 
 
 • W" I ■■■ 'f^^»0l^^0li 
 
 104 ON THE DIFFEKhNT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 petuate the leading idea of a school, or the consti- 
 tution of a polity ? The nomenclature and outward 
 form of a system or a state may remain compara- 
 tively unchanged, when its inner life is completely 
 altered. 
 
 We have hitherto dwelt on what seems rather a 
 tendency to error than a positive violation of the 
 truth. But there is no reason for holding back the 
 most decisive condemnation of the extreme party 
 of the same school, who deny altogether the anti- 
 thesis between language and thought, and thus 
 make every question /n/rel?/ verbal 
 
 The three best known supporters of this doctrine 
 are Hobbes, Home Tooke, and Condillac. Of 
 these, Hobl)es seems to have struck out the opinion 
 for himself in the wanton exercise of his usual 
 perverse ingenuity. But Home Tooke and Con- 
 dillac, though later in point of time, were not 
 directly indebted to his teaching. Their con- 
 clusions were, as they thought, perhaps rightly, a 
 fair inference from the doctrines of Locke. This 
 is one of many instances, in which opinions have, 
 so to speak, fiUered through a system without being 
 incorporated with it : for Locke, though a studen't 
 of Hobbes, never himself adopted those opinions 
 from him, which he unintentionally comnumicated 
 to others. It was his lot to transmit the infection, 
 without suffering from it himself. 
 
 This erring triad, while they agree in theory, 
 differ somewhat in the subject to which thcT apply 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 105 
 
 it. Hobbes throws his remarks into a form directly 
 bearing on our purpose. Logic is with him " the 
 Art of Computation" — simply a peculiar kind of 
 mental arithmetic. " Logicians," he would have us 
 think, '^ add together two names, to make an af- 
 firmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism, 
 and many syllogisms to make a demonstration ; 
 and from the sum, or conclusion, of a syllogism, 
 they subtract one proposition to find the other V 
 And this is not meant to describe an accident of 
 the ratiocinative process, but its very substance. 
 For " Reason," he further tells us, " is nothing but 
 reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the 
 consequences of general names agreed upon, 
 for the marking and signifying of oiu' thoughts ^" 
 Home Tooke takes the grammatical turn, and 
 speaks principally of the nature of terms. It is 
 these, he says^ which are simple or complex, general 
 or abstract, and not the ideas which they signify. 
 While Condillac makes his view more a part of a 
 metaphysical system, and in connection with it 
 goes into the wide question of the origin of human 
 knowledge. We are familiar with his pointed 
 saying, that "Science is only a w^ell-assorted lan- 
 guage." 
 
 The difficulty of coping with this error on grounds 
 of pure theory, lies mainly in the impossibility 
 of really grasping its meaning. While at first 
 sight it appears an intelligible though paradoxical 
 
 " l,rviathan, ch. v. *' Div. of Piirlev, p. i. ch. 2. 
 
106 ON THE niFFKRENT MODERN SCHOOLS Oi- LOOfC. 
 
 proposition to assert that language and thought are 
 identical, yet, on the endeavour to apprehend and 
 handle it, it degenerates into simple nonsense. The 
 quotation, for instance, from the " Merry Wives of 
 Windsor'," whicli Home Tooke apjn'oves and 
 adopts, that ''the lip is parcel of the mind," is 
 most expressive as a metaphor, but absolutely 
 nnmeaning as a philosophical statement. We 
 should be ill-employed in the endeavour to give it 
 a sense which does not belong to it. It would be 
 a mischievous if not a vain attempt thus to make 
 error substantive. It will be better to devote some 
 space to the consideration, not of itself, but of 
 its results, and of the principles with which it is 
 associated. 
 
 This verbal philosophy, then, has a close, and 
 sometimes an avowed, connection with materialism. 
 Its founder, Hobbes, denied altogether the dis- 
 tinction between mind and matter ; and the sen- 
 suahsm of Locke has been usually supposed to 
 tend in the same direction. Thus to confuse word 
 and thought leads of course to the theoretical 
 annihilation of the latter. It becomes a con- 
 sequence of our bodily organization, the laws of 
 which it must necessarily follow. 
 
 Thus it leads from the lowest view of human 
 knowledge, to the lowest view of human nature in 
 general also. If thought be only a functioii of 
 language, man is ])etter characterized as a speaking 
 
 •■ Act. 1. sc. iv. 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 107 
 
 than as a reasoning being. For it is more natural 
 and more scientific to define by the cause than 
 the effect. And then, to draw any such inference 
 from man's possessing reason, as that his actions 
 are therefore probably free, or his thinking nature 
 immortal, becomes at once absurd. For none will 
 assert such liberty or immortality to be a con- 
 sequence of speech, of which reason itself is on 
 this theory a consequence. Lips and tongue ol)ey 
 universally physical laws, and are subject to phy- 
 sical decay. But how can the thought be perma- 
 nent, when that from which all thought originates,, 
 and of which it is a form, is no more ? 
 
 Indeed, the opinions on general subjects, to 
 which the verbal school of Logic naturally leads, 
 are equally narrow and absurd. Built upon a 
 fundamental proposition which is in the strict 
 sense of the word insigntficant, they resemble one 
 of those perspectives, which are distorted and 
 irregular to the eye of the beholder, who regards 
 them from any but one given position. To under- 
 stand them at all, the connection of thought with 
 language, which is part of the truth, must be 
 accepted as a whole. Thus a wrong-headed con- 
 sistency, a fallacious unity of idea, marks the 
 whole system, and the writings of those who sup- 
 port it. It is liable to nearly all the objections 
 which tell against the Schoolmen, and to many 
 more. It is as exclusive, as dogmatic, as con- 
 sequential, and, from the insecurity of its basis, as 
 
108 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 109 
 
 unsound. We are apt to overlook the connection 
 between the scholastic and the verbal method, 
 because they are employed for j)vnposes so very 
 different, because the advocates of the latter vehe- 
 mently opposed the supporters of the former, and 
 were as ready to destroy as those had been to 
 construct. Both however agree in asserting the 
 practical control of language over truth. The 
 Schoolmen erred in supposing that Science eould 
 be attained by a judicious use of their vocabulary 
 in the processes of defining and deducing. They 
 expected too much from their instruments, which 
 they exalted to the level of that of which they 
 treated; the verbal philosophers, esteeming their 
 great tool less highly, have another way of making 
 it equal to its work. Instead of making language 
 wide as truth, they pare down and narrow the 
 truth that it may be containable within tlie limits 
 of language. The one argued, " this follows from 
 the force of terms ; therefore it is true ;" the others, 
 *' this does not follow from the laws of laufjuaffe, 
 therefore it is not true :" the former mode of 
 thought is right in itself, though not necessarily in 
 its application ; the latter is false as a proposition, 
 and dangerous as a premise. The formula, how- 
 ever, does not unfairly represent the verbal school, 
 who are ever involved, if in nothing worse, in that 
 mean and odious form of error which arises from an 
 unwillingness to apprehend first truths, who meet 
 their adversaries* attempts at proof, only by de- 
 
 claring that which they would prove impossible, 
 and while the rest of the world is resolutely bent 
 on asserting, glory in the obstinacy of denial. 
 
 Enough has been now said of these arch-heretics 
 in the first Philoso])hy, who hold the same place 
 with regard to Logic that atheists do to Religion, 
 assuming the identity of cause and effect to escape 
 the difficulty of tracing their connection, and 
 obtaining great clearness, it may be, though not 
 depth, in their speculations, at the expense of posit- 
 ing an overwhelmingly absurd paradox as the basis 
 of them all. We will now pass to the phenomenal 
 school of Logicians, premising some remarks, which 
 may cast light on its tendencies and sympathies. 
 
 Authors of formal systems, and especially 
 those who exemplify them by applying them to 
 particular subjects, may be divided into two 
 classes, which we may be allowed to call the 
 Historical, and the Prophetical. They either trace 
 the part which a given Idea has played in some 
 great work already accomplished, or feel that they 
 themselves have a great work to do. They employ 
 some truth, which they consider to be eternal, 
 either in the explanation of what is already past, 
 or the development of what is yet to be. 
 
 The second of these classes, for many reasons, 
 exercises the greater influence over the mass of 
 men. They unite in their writings two elements, 
 which are often separated — the gratification both 
 of practical, and of speculative curiosity. The very 
 
 'I 
 
1 10 ON THF DIFFKIUINT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 form of tlieir speculations is for tlie most part 
 pleasing; it throws itself into the ideal world, 
 and gives us pictures of an imaginary state of 
 Social Life, or Science, or Art. Hence we have 
 the Repuhlic of Plato, the new Atlantis of Bacon, 
 the Wilhelm Meister of G(ithe. And this ima- 
 ginative impulse implies a hold confidence on the 
 part of the speculators in their own powers, which 
 excites a corresponding confidence in those who 
 follow them. 
 
 On the other hand, there is a comparative lack 
 of interest about the procedure of those, who dwell 
 mainly on the causes of the past. It is a lower ofKce 
 to discover the reason of a known fact, than to 
 deduce independently a fact before unknown from 
 a priori considerations of its reasons. The mass of 
 men are so apt to gain their conclusions first, and 
 their premises afterwards, that they suspect any like 
 conduct on the part of those who should be their 
 guides, as proceeding from the same false con- 
 fidence in their actions and wishes, and the same 
 want of confidence in their motives, which they 
 cannot help detecting in themselves. So we find 
 practically less results from the labours of these 
 historical thinkers. Aristotle has only proved so 
 great in his power over mankind by having his 
 system impregnated with a spirit most alien to his 
 own ; while the soul of Plato has at least thrice 
 since his own time lighted u{) the pile of his 
 glorious philosophy. For a similar reason ai)olo- 
 
 I ■ 
 * 
 
 ON TJIK DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. Ill 
 
 getic treatises weigh not so much with men as 
 those whicli act on the offensive. The positive 
 views which they imply are for the most part 
 their real attraction. It is when Hooker most 
 charms, that we least think of Cartwright. So 
 again physical researches are to most minds 
 more pleasing and attractive than moral, because 
 they render the discovery of other phenomena 
 probable, as well as account for those already 
 known. A discussion of the theory of Virtue could 
 only re-arrange old facts ; whereas a theory of 
 Light not only attempts this problem, but serves 
 as a guide in fresh experiments which are meant 
 to issue in new discoveries. One reason why 
 Casuistry has been despised as well as hated is, 
 because it sometimes attempts to state, as deduc- 
 tions of reason, propositions which a healthy mind 
 rules by an intuitive decision. In like manner the 
 endeavour which some logicians have made to 
 prove by reasoning truths which we know without 
 reasoning, such as the laws of Opposition, has 
 re-acted to their own discredit. 
 
 It will be found that the more successful school 
 of theorists flourishes most in times which seem 
 disastrous to other learning. Philosophical anarchy 
 affords them the greatest scope, if they have 
 genius equal to the emergency. Like' patriots, who 
 rise to save their country, the miserable posture of 
 things around them kindles their hopes and their 
 enthusiasm. There can be no doubt what is to be 
 
11^2 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 done ; how, is the only question. Popular support 
 too they can make more easily their own ; the 
 prospect of change is more agreeable, when ex- 
 isting circumstances have so little to encourage. 
 Thus Plato rose when the errors of the sophists 
 had spread to their widest extent, and were now 
 beating themselves into foam upon the shores of 
 thought; Lord Bacon constructed his Inductive 
 scheme when men were becoming sensible of the 
 absence of all sound philosophy ; Locke wrote the 
 more confidently, because he felt he was dealing 
 the death-blow to an already dying system of 
 Metaphysic ; and Berkeley, seeing the feeble cha- 
 racter of the scepticism which had originated from 
 materialist views, aimed his attack against the very 
 existence of matter. An error, which has been 
 nearly universal, and is showing general symptoms 
 of decay, affords the readiest opening for the 
 advancement of Truth. 
 
 On the other hand, general theories traverse a 
 more restricted circle, and in a more cautious 
 manner, when particular branches of knowledge 
 are expanding, readily, rapidly, and certainly. 
 There seems less occasion for novel speculations, 
 however ingenious and acute, when all is going 
 on well without them. Original considerations of 
 method, it appears, may be safely neglected, when 
 the old plan is working effectually. At any rate. 
 Logic and other formal systems come in this case 
 less prominently forward, and adopt a self-depre- 
 
 
 I 
 
 h 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 113 
 
 ciating tone, do not attempt to innovate, but are 
 content to follow ; assume the historical, not the 
 prophetical aspect, and, Hke humble panegyrists, 
 identify themselves, as much as is possible without 
 pretending to equal them, with the different 
 courses of investigation of which they commemorate 
 the triumph. 
 
 Perhaps we may thus account for some of the 
 least desirable peculiarities of Mr. Mill's able " Sys- 
 tem of Logic." It implies a submission and con- 
 cession on the part of formal science ; a surrender 
 at will, so to speak, of Metaphysic to Physic. The 
 favourite notions of Logic are transferred from the 
 inner to the outward world ; sequence, causation, 
 and the like, are held to be derived from pheno- 
 mena, and not to be conditions of our perceiving 
 them. The same temper of mind extends ftirther, 
 and influences the view taken, not only of the 
 manner in which Logic regards its subjects ; but 
 of the subject with which Logic is really conversant. 
 To represent it as deahng with conceptions, would 
 seem, in this view, to invest it with too much 
 metaphysical dignity; to make it sovereign, not 
 subsidiary ; and independent in a province of its 
 own. Accordingly, it is considered more safe and 
 practical to regard it, and, with it, other sciences, 
 as having to do with things. So words are con- 
 sidered as signs, rather of things, than of our con- 
 ceptions of them^; and in the same spirit it is urged, 
 
 " Vol. i. p. 28. 
 I 
 
114 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOiiUJ. 
 
 that the theory which regards a proposition as the 
 union of two ideas or conceptions, and not of two 
 things, is, when taken by itself, most meagre and 
 unsatisfactory*". 
 
 This view of Logic recommends itself to practical 
 persons who are not logicians, and have no wish to 
 become so, if for no other reason, at least for this, 
 that it lowers her pretensions in the greatest possible 
 degree, and leaves her the merest shadow of im- 
 portance. If we adopt it. Logic at once appears 
 to have no peculiar principles, no proper work of 
 her own. She is the slave, rather than the minister, 
 of Science, with just enough independent reason to 
 do as she is bidden, but with by no means enough 
 to assert any collateral authority. Being in her 
 nature wholly a posteriori, and dependent on phe- 
 nomena, it is they which really give her laws, not 
 she which fixes their value. 
 
 In the mind of more abstract thinkers, the same 
 view connects itself closely with a doubt, if not 
 disbelief, in the possibiUty of Metaphysic, or the 
 Science of Mind. It enables them to throw Logic 
 into a more external and objective form; to put 
 out of sight, for the time, all the difficulties which 
 arise from the consideration of our thinking nature, 
 and to make the student lean in confidence on the 
 facts of the outward world. 
 
 The difference, however, between this and the 
 conceptional theory is but verbal; and the relief 
 
 « Vol. i. p. 117. 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 115 
 
 which it gives to the student is the result of an 
 artifice of language, and can therefore be of but 
 temporary avail. Logic cannot deal with things 
 as contrasted with conceptions, though it can with 
 things as confused with them. In its most objective 
 aspect it is conversant with p/fe?f07?ie?ia, that is, 
 with things as they appear to us, not as they are 
 in themselves. This is quite enough to admit the 
 whole sea of doubts which are associated with such 
 questions as that of the existence of matter and 
 the nature of our perceptions. So, to say that in 
 a proposition we mentally unite two things, (and of 
 course a mental union only is possible) is to say by 
 imphcation that we unite our conceptions of them. 
 With due quahfications, the two opposed state- 
 ments melt into one. 
 
 The phenomenal School of Thought, though 
 liable to grave objections, holds a higher place in 
 intellectual dignity than the verbal. The latter, 
 without any real devotion to Physic, is, as we 
 have seen, of a materialistic cast ; the former need 
 not incline to Materialism, while its tendency to 
 further physical knowledge is undeniable. To 
 assert Truth to lie merely in language, is a step 
 toward denying its existence. But to the reality 
 of the truths of the outward world, the phenomenal 
 School begins by pledging itself. On these it 
 fixes its attention, observes their laws, and ex- 
 tracts its system from them. And in dwelling on 
 them it may steer clear of all Materialism, because 
 
 I 2 
 
IIG UN THE DIFFKKEM MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOdlC, 
 
 it regards them as lying, so to speak, at the in- 
 oscLihition of man and the Universe ; as being facts 
 of our perception, into the nature of which per- 
 ception it does not profess to enter. This is so 
 far a merit : but from the same source with this 
 merit flow great defects also. If its canon of 
 investigation were adopted, it would enlarge our 
 knowledge in one direction only. The facts of 
 consciousness it declines analysing, though it does 
 not object to combining them ; and the absence of 
 such analysis renders it, however at home it may 
 be in Inductive Science, a most incompetent and 
 unsafe guide in Deduction, or in the border- 
 territories of Morals and Art. For in treating of 
 each of these, there is a subjective element which 
 demands consideration. The fundamental Ideas 
 of Deductive Science are something more than 
 mere abstractions from the phenomena which are 
 grouped under them, and none of which in them- 
 selves adequately embody them. So again Moral 
 truth, if it is to stand in contrast with Physical, 
 implies the positing of an Idea which does not 
 conform to the laws of external experience — that 
 of the free will. And that theory of Art, which 
 would banish its intellectual aspect, and place its 
 perfection in imitation and execution only, is far 
 too imperfect and unsatisfactory, to recommend 
 itself either to the artist or the philosopher. 
 
 Religion, too, it is to be feared, is a subject 
 necessarily undreamt of in this Philosophy. Theo- 
 
 \ 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MOt)EUN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 117 
 
 logy rests, if not on the notion of a Mediator, at 
 least on that of mediation — a connection between 
 ourselves and God. Mere contemplation of the 
 highest form of excellence avails not, except it be 
 accompanied by a fiishioning, which with man 
 must always be a conscious fashioning, of the 
 contemplator, to the model of that which he con- 
 templates. An entire resting on the outward 
 would be only good, were it possible, where the 
 inward is perfect. And any continuous habit of 
 thought which turns an imperfect mind wholly 
 away from itself, prevents its progress towards per- 
 fection. The highest excellency which could 
 result from it would resemble that of Aristotle's 
 Wise Man. The merely '^ positive" philosopher 
 may be deeply cognisant of the physical world, 
 familiar with the sphere and power of Mathematics, 
 with a deep-seated enthusiasm as to the extension 
 of knowledge, and the possibility of new and more 
 perfect combinations in that wonderful social system 
 of which man is the monad ; but the existence of 
 God, as a first Cause, is not essential to his specu- 
 lations — far less, of God, as a moral Governor. 
 His temptation is, to regard the deeper instincts of 
 the heart as so many facts which would be useful 
 in an inductive Psychology ; not as principles of 
 
 action or feeling, with a final cause of their own 
 
 no less than the forming of man after the model 
 of his Creator. 
 
 The Concej)tional School, though it has the 
 
118 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 truth on its side, is not without its dangers. Its 
 tendency is, by passing from the formal to the pure 
 Science of Thought, to blend Logic with Meta- 
 physic. Thus it is apt to neglect facts, to which 
 it should legitimately apply itself, and, betaking 
 itself to general theories, work out the world of 
 thought without sufficient data, or any real guide 
 beside the very imperfect lest of its own intel- 
 lectual consistency. This defect is however a 
 perversion, and not a natural consequence of its 
 leading tenet. And such antecedent systematisa- 
 tion is a less evil than has been imagined ; being 
 often assumed only for the time by honest and 
 candid minds, as a clue by means of which to 
 conduct hypothetical enquiries. It is adopted at 
 first as best tallying with the known facts : and 
 further research may either corroborate, modify, 
 or overthrow it. 
 
 In quitting the subject of the different logical 
 schools, it may be useful to give an illustration of 
 the practical differences among them, in the various 
 senses in which they have employed the term 
 Category; much to the bewilderment of those, 
 who have expected, wherever it occurred, to 
 recognise in it a common meaning. 
 
 We naturally look to Aristotle in the first place 
 for the meaning of the word. A Category, if we 
 regard his use of the term as well as its derivation, 
 signifies a Predication; and is therefore primarily 
 connected with language. Accordingly, as has 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 119 
 
 been already hinted, the ten Predicaments are 
 gained by an analysis which is mainly grammatical ; 
 and answer to the leading parts of speech, and 
 certain modifications of them. The scheme may 
 be stated as follows. The Category of Substance is 
 appropriated to nouns substantive, which express 
 existence independently of time, or, as it may be 
 otherwise put, do not imply motion. To these 
 nouns adjective attach themselves, which, being 
 loosely and generally divided, give the three Cate- 
 gories of Quantity y Quality, and Relation. The verb, 
 on the other hand, as contrasted with the noun, 
 indicates existence which is in time, and connected 
 with motion. If the time which it implies is past, 
 our attention is called to a certain state which 
 results from some motion which has preceded ; 
 thus the past tenses of verbs come under the 
 Category of Habit. The remaining parts of the 
 verb are portioned out according to the nature 
 of the motion or change implied in the verb itself: 
 as this is active, passive, or neuter, they fall into 
 the Categories of Action, Passion, or Position. Ad- 
 verbs, which, so to speak, coalesce with verbs, 
 supply the two remaining Categories of Space and 
 Ti^ne. 
 
 This division, it is easy to see, is essentially 
 grammatical : far from being the only one possible, 
 probably not the best; yet recognising the classes 
 of words generally acknowledged, and, if confined 
 to the province of language, substantially true and 
 
 A 
 
120 ON THE DIFFERENT MODEKN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 correct. If therefore it has not been received, it 
 has not been vigorously opposed by the verbal 
 school. Home Tooke grounds his theory of 
 language on the same fundamental division with 
 Aristotle; and Hobbes, asserting, as in con- 
 sistency he is bound to do, that the Categories are 
 distinctions of words, and not of things, and ac- 
 knowledging that they are not a true or exact 
 ordination of names, passes them by (a rare cir- 
 cumstance with him) without any more positive 
 censure. • 
 
 Such are the Categories of Aristotle— in their 
 nature and use, as in the method of attaining 
 them, essentially verbal. We have seen, however, 
 that they have been used also as expressing a 
 division of things. For this purpose, they are 
 undoubtedly unfitted. They are a cro^s-division, 
 according to Aristotle's own admission ; QuaUti] and 
 Relation, for instance, running in to each other in 
 the case oi Habit, ar\A Posit ion falling under lie /at ion 
 as a species under a genus. Again, although in 
 a fundamental division we do not require equal 
 importance and extent in all the several members, 
 yet there is something unphilosophical in the dis- 
 proportion of the method, which lays so much 
 stress on the four leading Categories, and passes 
 so summarily over the other six. Gilbert de la 
 Poree met with little success in the endeavour 
 to raise these inferior castes to the level of their 
 more fortunate conquerors ; nor could we expect 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 121 
 
 great results for this or any other attempt at 
 altering so greatly the system as it was left by its 
 founder, without entirely overthrowing it. Further, 
 allowing the Categories for the time to be an 
 exhaustive division, they need not therefore be 
 a natural one ; like merely artificial classes, they 
 have the smallest possible number of distinguishing 
 attributes, as may be seen by Aristotle's weak 
 attempt at marking out the four principal of them 
 by their properties. These objections He against 
 the Categories on Aristotle's own hypothesis, with- 
 out any introduction of the distinctive teaching 
 of other metaphysical schools. When these are 
 brought to bear upon them, their position and 
 claim to notice are yet further altered. 
 
 It is one of the most usual and natural, perhaps 
 one of the most pardonable, errors of great thinkers, 
 to believe a far greater identity of aim and purpose 
 than really exists between former labourers in the 
 field which they are cultivating, and themselves. 
 Incidental traces of agreement gain undue im- 
 portance from their faith in the sympathy of soul 
 with soul, the unity of knowledge, and the pro- 
 gressiveness of truth. They explain the unknown 
 by the known ; and whatever is clear to them, is 
 taken to illustrate what appears obscure in others. 
 Writers who are devising original systems, and 
 touch only incidentally upon the opinions of others, 
 are remarkably given to this error. And even 
 among those w hose peculiar province it is to weigh 
 
122 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 and compare facts, the historian of Philosophy, as 
 of any other branch of knowledge, viewing as he 
 does the past by the light of the present, is apt to 
 over-rate the degree of excellency attained in 
 times gone by. An unintentional hint or uncon- 
 scious anticipation of a truth as yet latent is very 
 frequently mistaken for a discovery. Most men 
 whose inventions have benefitted mankind have 
 been robbed of some of their glory by some obscure 
 forerunner, from whom they are unjustly supposed 
 to have taken an idea which he had half seen, but 
 never clearly apprehended. And this over-esti- 
 mation of former enquirers sometimes reacts to 
 their discredit, when they are wrongly supposed to 
 have taken the same view with ourselves, and are 
 accordingly censured for imperfections which they 
 could not have discerned, and for the omission 
 of points which were really unessential to their 
 system. 
 
 We may thus account for the mistaken view 
 which Kant took of the Aristotelian Categories. 
 His metaphysical labours took a very different 
 turn from those of most of his predecessors. His 
 aim was to turn our thoughts mainly on ourselves, 
 and, leaving the nature of the external world 
 unexamined, to transform Metaphysic, from being 
 the science of the laws of Being, into the science 
 of Mind. He was anxious to discover how the 
 conceptions naturally inherent in our minds 
 affect phenomena, or things as they appear to 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC, 123 
 
 us. That he might be the better able to ascertain 
 this point, he attempted an enumeration of these 
 conceptions. He erroneously supposed, however, 
 that Aristotle had already made the attempt in his 
 Categories, and, being sensible of the imperfection 
 of the scheme, had endeavoured to make it more 
 complete by the addition of the post-predicaments, 
 or five supplementary Categories. But this mistaken 
 position, independently of its want of external 
 evidence, is confuted by internal. Inspection 
 sufficed to show, that the post-predicaments are 
 merely terms of wide and general appUcation, 
 but having several distinctions of meaning, which 
 Aristotle thought deserving enumeration. The last 
 of the five, for instance, is Habit, which, far from 
 being supplementary to the Categories, is in fact a 
 Category itself. 
 
 Supposfhg that we could think with Kant, that 
 Aristotle in his Categories had the design of inves- 
 tigating those conceptions, which dwell in the 
 pure understanding, his scheme would be indeed 
 imperfect, and abundantly liable to objection. 
 The arguments w^hich Kant brings against them 
 would be on this ground quite conclusive ; namely, 
 that our idea oi Motion (one of the five post-predica- 
 ments, which are Opposition, Priority, Simultane- 
 ousness, Motion, and Habit) is empirical, and not 
 derived from the understanding ; and that Action 
 and Passion are deduced, and not primary concep- 
 tions. Time and Space too, with the post-predica- 
 
Bmss 
 
 1*24 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 merits of Prionty and SiinultaNcousness, must (by 
 those who admit Kant's very questionable view 
 of Time and Space) be regarded as not belonging 
 to the class of conceptions at all, but as being 
 modes or conditions of our sensibility. Kant ac- 
 cordingly substituted for the old array of predica- 
 ments and post-predicaments, a new list, devised by 
 himself, of Categories, or, as he and his followers 
 define them, " subjective conditions of thinking," 
 " rules which the understanding, by means of its 
 own essential laws, lays at the foundation of nature, 
 foregoing all the given diversity of consciousness ;" 
 or, as we may less technically describe them, 
 conceptions under which alone we can conceive it 
 possible that two terms shall be united into a 
 proposition. And the result is the following list 
 of twelve Categories; Unitij, Pluralitii, Totality, 
 Affirmation, Negation, Limitation, I nd impendence. 
 Dependence, Interdependence, AciuaVitij, Possib'ilitij, 
 and Necessity, 
 
 Mr. Mill takes another view of the Aristotelian 
 Categories, which makes it necessary for him also 
 to devise a new set of his own. According to him, 
 Aristotle, as well as the Schoolmen, intended the 
 Categories to be an enumeration of all things 
 capable of being named — an enumeration by the 
 siimma genera, i. e. the most extensive classes into 
 which things could be distributed. This position 
 we have seen to be true with regard to the School- 
 men, but probably false with regard to Aristotle. 
 
 I 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOOIC. 125 
 
 Granting its truth, however, there is no difficulty 
 in proving that the Categories, though perhaps 
 valid as a division of names, are obviously invalid 
 when taken as a division of things. Mr. Mill easily 
 establishes this, by appealing to the fact which 
 has been admitted and illustrated, that they are, in 
 this light, a cross-division. And, this done, he 
 proceeds to give us his own Categories, which are 
 four in number. All nameable things, he tells us, 
 are either, I. Feelings or states of consciousness ; 
 II. Minds which experience these feelings; III. 
 Bodies or external objects which excite certain of 
 these feehngs, together with the powers or pro- 
 perties whereby they excite them ; and, IV. The 
 successions and coexistences, the hkenesses and 
 unlikenesses, between feelings and states of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Withoui pretending to discuss this scheme at 
 length, we may observe, that it should, at least, 
 be received with extreme caution. In the first 
 place, it does not seem to be exhaustive, seeing 
 that no Spiritual Existence, save human minds, 
 finds a place in it. Secondly, it appears to deny 
 the fact, and indeed the possibility, of spiritual 
 influences; since, according to its obvious tenor, 
 all feehngs or states of consciousness come either 
 from the mind itself, or from bodies external to it. 
 Thirdly, even were it an exhaustive division, this, 
 though it would imply its truth, would not establish 
 its importance. It need not be the natural division 
 
126 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 
 
 ON THE DIFFERENT MODERN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 127 
 
 which Hes at the base of all sciences. Its genera- 
 Hsations are of that kind which cannot fairly be 
 assumed, on Mr. Mill's own principles, to be scien- 
 tific, till Inductive Science has worked its way 
 almost up to the apex of Knowledge. In a word, 
 as Logical, it is out of place: as Metaphysical, its 
 correctness and usefulness are doubtful. 
 
 Lists of Categories, in point of fact, are foreign 
 to the nature of Logic altogether. Those of Ari- 
 stotle properly belong to Grammar ; those of Kant, 
 to Metaphysic hi the modern sense of the term ; 
 those of Mr. Mill, to Metaphysic in its older sense, 
 or, in Aristotehan phraseology, to general Physic. 
 So we find Categories quite independent of Logic, 
 as belonging to the apparatus of each Philosophical 
 School. Traces of similar schemes are found in 
 the Indian Philosophy, though there, it must be 
 confessed, in close union with Logic. 'J^he Pytha- 
 gorean, Platonic, and Stoic Schools among the 
 Greeks had each its corresponding tables. And 
 thus the w^ord has come to mean the distinctive 
 classification of each Metaphysician, whatsoever his 
 system leads him to discuss, or howsoever he divides 
 it. Thus Reid tells us*^, that the Categories of 
 Locke are three — Substance, Modes, and Relations ; 
 and those of Hume two— Ideas and Impressions. 
 And he adds, amusingly enough, that an excellent 
 Mathematician of his day desired to substitute for 
 
 the Peripatetic predicaments two only — viz. Data 
 and Qncesita. 
 
 And now we bid farewell to the Historical view 
 of Logic. Henceforth the labours of past thinkers 
 will come before us, only as bearing fruit at present, 
 in the consequences which have been traced from 
 them and from the ideas which they have involun- 
 tarily suggested. 
 
 ' Aristotle's Logic, ch. ii. sec. ii. p. 688. Ed. Sir W. Hamihoii. 
 
CHAP. VI. 
 
 ON LOGICAL METHOD IN GENERAL. 
 
 We now proceed to the direct consideration of 
 the nature and office of Logical Method. In doing 
 so, it will be prudent to recapitulate those as- 
 sumptions regarding it, which have been implied, 
 if not stated, in the previous pages. 
 
 Logic, then, is no part of Philosophy; or, in 
 other words, it is not a Science. The student of 
 pure Logic has, as such, no more speculative know- 
 ledge on any particular subject of in vestigation when 
 he concludes his course than when he began it. The 
 basis of Logic may show through indeed, and so 
 some insight into Metaphysic be gained ; or its 
 application by way of example may inform him of 
 physical tmths before unknown, or extend his 
 knowledge, as the case may be, in Art, or Morals, or 
 Theology. But this does not really affect its proper 
 nature as a system of rules implying previous 
 knowledge, and ministering to its further attain- 
 ment; but of little value in themselves as the- 
 oretic truths, and even assuming an Imperative 
 form more naturally than that of a Proposition. 
 
 This then is our main point of difference with 
 the Ancients. In another respect, we have seen. 
 
 ON LOGICAL MKTHOD IN GENEKAL. 
 
 129 
 
 we diflfer from the mediaeval teaching. For our 
 Logic, though co-extensive with Philosophy, is 
 not practically identical with it. It exercises no 
 supremacy over matter; rather, the subject to 
 which we apply it greatly modifies its nature. 
 It is not like a glass through which we look, and 
 which gives its own colouring to every thing seen 
 through it ; rather, like a mirror, it copies to the 
 mind's eye that which exists external to itself, and 
 its praise is to be faithful, not to be original. As 
 that which is presented to it varies, it, while it 
 preserves its identity and truthfulness, nevertheless 
 varies, or seems to vary also. 
 
 This we allow to be the case with Logic in 
 general. Abstraction, Division, Definition, for in- 
 stance, are not purely formal processes ; they can 
 only be considered with reference to a definite 
 subject, and cannot be applied to all subjects ; nor 
 will they adapt themselves to all which they include 
 with equal accuracy and perfection. Considerations 
 of Modality, again, have been introduced into tlie 
 second part of Logic ; they are generally, though 
 not universally, allowed to bear directly or in- 
 directly on the divisions of Propositions. In the 
 third part, again, it now seems nearly established, 
 that the Deductive and Inductive Syllogism are 
 two essentially distinct kinds of argument ; and that 
 the nature of the subject under consideration deter- 
 mines whicli is the more suitably employed. It 
 then the nature of the subject exercises such an 
 
WMHH 
 
 tmi 
 
 130 
 
 ON LO(;iCAT. MKTllOD IN fJKNKHAr- 
 
 ON LOGICAL MirniOl) IN (JFNFHAL. 
 
 131 
 
 influence, in the several parts of Logic, over Terms, 
 Propositions, and Syllogisms, it is only reasonable 
 to suppose that it extends to the whole conjointly, 
 and may be traced in the consideration of Method 
 also, which is their available combination. 
 
 If then, in considering the subjects to which 
 Method applies, and the manner in which it apphes 
 to them, w^e see certain broad divisions, distinct 
 not merely in their accidents but in principle, and 
 observe that its nature is greatly modified as one 
 or another of these is brought under it ; the same 
 law, which justifies us in considering Inductive 
 Syllogism as distinct from Deductive, because the 
 one leads us from singular to universal, the other 
 in the reverse direction, will justify also our dividing 
 Method into several distinct portions. And such 
 division appears, accordingly, to be both desirable 
 
 and necessarv. 
 
 For though all Logic, and therefore all Logical 
 Method, deals with conceptions, it does not deal 
 wdth them always in the same manner. Concep- 
 tions may be connected together on a large scale, 
 but with very different objects and on very dif- 
 ferent principles. Take, for instance, any Science, 
 w^hether deductive or inductive. Here we have a 
 multitude of conceptions grouped under one lead- 
 ing conception, which we call an Idea, on some 
 received principle of classification : an.d possessing 
 among each other, in a greater or less degree, 
 subordination and consrqucntiality. And the ob- 
 
 ject of this complicated intellectual structure is 
 not, directly, practical use, but Knowledge. It is 
 natural that the method here employed should 
 differ widely from that which is suitable to a case of 
 Practical l^vidence, in which certain conceptions 
 and combinations of them in the form of proposi- 
 tions, being posited, we go on to investigate some 
 particular fact, or some principle viewed as a fact, 
 as dependent on them ; the question being, not 
 /loza the whole fabric hangs together, though such 
 continuity is really indispensable, but whether 
 from these data such a fact does follow, the 
 ultimate law of conse^juence possibly remaining 
 unknown. And between Science and Practical 
 Evidence there lies another field, that of Art, in 
 which we do not bestow our attention exclusively 
 either on the fact, or on principles of subordination 
 and consequentiality; but endeavour, with a view 
 to practice, so to combine our conceptions, that 
 the principles may bear directly on the facts, and 
 facilitate our cognisance of them. 
 
 Method then, divides itself into these three 
 branches— the Method of Science, of Art, and of 
 Practical Evidence. Of these, the first will here- 
 after especially claim our attention, both as most 
 fully illustrating the laws of Logic, and as being 
 the Type towards which the inferior divisions tend, 
 and to which in proportion as they approximate, 
 they claim dignity and precedence. 
 
 k2 
 
CHAP. VII. 
 
 ON THE METHOD OF SCIENCE. 
 
 In all Science, then, when perfectly formed, we 
 have, as has been said above, a certain unity of 
 structure. We find a nuiltitude of conceptions 
 grouped together luider one leading Conception, 
 which we call an Idea, on some received principle 
 of classification ; these conceptions possessing 
 among each other, in a greater or less degree, sub- 
 ordination, and consequentiality. And the object 
 of this combination of conceptions is not directly 
 practical use, but Knowledge. This may be 
 illustrated from sciences of different kinds, the 
 distinctions between which shall be given here- 
 after; the points of resemblance are those which 
 claim our attention at present. 
 
 To take in the first place the science of Geometry, 
 which will serve as our type of the Pare Sciences. 
 Here we have the idea sufficiently definite, namely. 
 Space, or Extension. Under this, conceptions of 
 very different kinds are grouped together, such as 
 triangle, square, circle; equal, unequal; contained, 
 containing ; similar, proportional. Those whicli 
 have a more direct r'.^ference to the Idea of Space 
 
 f>N THE METHOD OF SCIENCE. 
 
 133 
 
 fall at once under certain elementary and received 
 principles of classification suitable to the science : 
 thus space itself divides according as it is simply 
 hnear, or bounded by lines or surfiices : and 
 geometrical figures in general divide according to 
 the nature of these lines and surfaces, as they 
 are straight or curved ; or again, according to the 
 uniformity or relative proportions of their parts, 
 as when we speak of certain triangles as equilateral, 
 and certain solids as regular. Further, when these 
 conceptions are arranged in order of formal proof, 
 there is of course a consequentiality existing 
 among them ; this dependence of part upon part, 
 and of the whole upon the Idea, being one of the 
 most remarkable features of Geometry. And this 
 consequentiality implies a certain subordination ; 
 for the different ))ropositions do not depend for 
 proof directly on the Idea, but admit among them- 
 selves of greater and less degrees of generahty. 
 Thus the Axioms, Postulates, and Definitions cover 
 very frequently a wider ground than the particular 
 Theorems and Problems ; and of these, some are 
 evidently wider in extent tlian others. Whatever 
 is proved true of triangles in general, for instance, 
 applies to equilateral triangles; while the converse 
 does not hold. 
 
 In the next place. Botany may stand as a 
 specimen of the ClasslJicaiorij Sciences. Here the 
 Idea may be differently stated, as being in the 
 abstract. Vegetable Life: or in the concrete, the 
 
' ■■r^.: 
 
 134 
 
 1 
 
 ON THE METHOD OF SCIENCE. 
 
 Vegetable Kingdom. The spontaneous observation 
 of mankind, even prior to scientific enquiry, had 
 supplied a vast number of conceptions to be 
 grouped under this Idea. The names of individual 
 trees, and shrubs, of different portions and organs 
 of the plant, exist prior to scientific arrangement. 
 These are duly grouped imder the Idea, by means 
 of certain intermediate conceptions, which belong 
 properly to the science of Botany, and may or 
 may not be distinctive of the different botanical 
 systems. And in this arrangement a Principle of 
 Classification is involved — the difference of this 
 principle, and not any diversity in the detailed 
 view of species, for instance, distinguishing a 
 natural from an artificial arrangement. And to 
 show that the principle adopted enables us to 
 arrange the conceptions in due relation and sub- 
 ordination to the Idea, is the task which each 
 advocate of a peculiar system undertakes. 
 
 Of another class of sciences, the applied sciences, 
 we may take Mechanics as an example. Here we 
 have one Idea, viz. that oi force. There are certain 
 principles, further, according to which we can 
 subdivide this idea. Thus the Idea of force com- 
 bined with the conception of Rest or Counterpoise 
 limits itself to S/atics, when combined with that of 
 motion, limits itself to Th/// amirs. In each of these 
 divisions there are other conceptions which enable 
 us to subdivide them ; such are implied, in Statics, 
 \n ttie laws of solid and fluid (Hpiilibrium, and, 
 
 I 
 
 ON THE METHOD OF SCIENCE. 
 
 135 
 
 in Dynamics, in the three great laws of motion. 
 These, when traced into their consequences, give 
 us certain combinations of conceptions, which are 
 su])ordinated to the main Idea, and connected with 
 it through them by a necessary dependence. 
 
 Lastly, a perplexed and complicated science, 
 like that of Asfronomij, in which Deduction and 
 Observation find place together: where different 
 parts of the results are gained by different pro- 
 cesses, and in the vast array of laws, and inferences, 
 and general facts, and details, the unity seems 
 almost broken; forms no real exception to the 
 notion of a science which we have adopted. The 
 only uncertainty is, in which of two w^ays it shall 
 be made to conform to our requisitions. In one 
 point of view, it must surrender its claims to the 
 dignity of a distinct science ; and rank only as the 
 application, on an enlarged scale, of an independ- 
 ent science to the explanation, or, it may be, pre- 
 diction, of a vast mass of previously arranged and 
 classified phenomena. Astronomy thus becomes 
 the Mechanics of the Heavens. And this is the 
 explanation of its nature which a Mathematician 
 would be likely to give. Or, again, the Physical 
 Philosopher might ask — what is it which enables 
 us to associate so readily in our minds phenomena 
 so different as an eclipse, and the com'se of the 
 planets, and the nature of nebulae, and the form of 
 the earth, and the distance and density of the sun, 
 but the presence of onc^ Idea — that of the Universe, 
 
136 
 
 ON THE METHOD OF SCIENCE. 
 
 or, in other words, of tlie interdepeiHlciice of all 
 material Nature ? May not Astronomy be regarded 
 as the science of the Universe, using, for different 
 purposes, the apparatus both of the classificatory 
 and applied sciences; and so aiming at the re- 
 duction to order and unity, under this Idea, of a 
 multitude of conceptions drawn from phenomena, 
 which seem at first likely to perplex as much from 
 their unhkeness as their multiplicity ? 
 
 If the foregoing be, as far as it goes, a true 
 account of the nature of Science, it is evident that 
 any view of Scientific Method will be in the highest 
 degree imperfect, which does not treat of Scientific 
 Ideas, of the conceptions which range under 
 them, and of the laws which regulate this ar- 
 rangement. To the first of these subjects we now 
 proceed. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 ON SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 
 
 A SCIENCE then, however much more it may be, 
 is at least thus much ; the union and grouping of 
 conceptions under an Idea. Hence arises a ques- 
 tion evidently deserving our consideration— what 
 the nature of such Scientific Ideas may be. 
 
 The difference between an Idea and a Conception 
 has often been drawn, by those who insist on the 
 distinction, with great care and deliberation. A 
 Conception, it has been said, is something derived 
 from observation ; not so Ideas, which meet with 
 nothing exactly answering to them within the 
 range of our experience. Thus Ideas are a priori. 
 Conceptions a posteriori ; and it is only by means 
 of the former that the latter are really possible. 
 For the bare fact, taken by itself, falls short of the 
 Conception, which may be described as the syn- 
 thesis of the fact and the Idea. Thus we have an 
 Idea of the Universe, under which its different 
 phenomena fall into place, and from which they 
 take their meaning ; we have an Idea of Goo as a 
 Creator, from wliich we dcM'ive the power of con- 
 
138 
 
 ON SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 
 
 ceiving that the niipressions produced upon our 
 minds throiigli the senses result from really exist- 
 ing things ; we have an Idea of the Soul, which 
 enables us to realize our own personal identity, by 
 suggesting that a feehng, conceiving, thinking 
 subject exists as the substratum of every sensation, 
 conception, and thought. Others go further in 
 the same direction, and argue, that Space and Time, 
 which they call conceptions, shadow forth dimly 
 the ruling Ideas of Infinity and Eternity; that the 
 Divine Attributes are Ideas, under which fall even 
 the highest conceptions ; that from Onmipotence 
 comes the conception of Power, from Omniscience 
 that of Knowledge, from the independent Essence 
 of God that of dependent Being, and so on. And 
 this brings us to another grade of opinion, adopted 
 by some; namely, that Equality, for instance, and 
 Similarity, nuist be Ideas, the pre-existence of 
 which enables the mind to recognise things as like 
 and equal; these too, it is said, having no exact 
 counterpart in experience, for we have never met 
 with phenomena which are absolutely like or abso- 
 lutely equal. And now we are evidently trembling 
 on the verge of the Platonic doctrine, according 
 to which each visible and perishable Phenomenon 
 corresponds to some intellectual and eternal Idea. 
 Although there niay be much truth in the general 
 impression which these views convey, they cannot, 
 with any distinctness, all bo held together. In- 
 deed, however true any, or, were it possible, all of 
 
 ON SCn-NTlFlC IDKAS. 
 
 139 
 
 ^. 
 
 them might be, they would nevertheless not be to 
 our purpose. For we are seeking a practical 
 rather than a metaphysical distinction; and are 
 investigating the nature, not of Ideas in general, 
 but of Scientific Ideas only. Sometimes, indeed, 
 that which a metaphysician would recognise as an 
 Idea, lies at the basis of a science ; thus Psycho- 
 logy (if that be at present a real science) refers 
 itself to the Idea of the Soul, and Theology to that 
 of God. In other cases, however, what is called 
 on the above theories a Conception, is really a 
 Scientific Idea. It is, for instance, on the Concep- 
 tion of Space, not on the Idea of Infinity, that the 
 science of Geometry has been raised. 
 
 It will be better, for our present purpose, to take 
 a different course from that which speculations 
 like those above suggest; and passing by all such 
 questions as concern the abstract nature of Scien- 
 tific Ideas, the manner in which they are attained, 
 their necessary connection with the human mind, 
 and the like, to regard them simply as a species of 
 conceptions— that is, definitely, as conceptions on 
 which sciences can be founded. Our question 
 then assumes a more practical shape, and may be 
 stated as follows— what attributes fit a Conception 
 to become the foundation of a Science ? 
 
 We shall escape one great danger by throwing 
 our enquiry into this form. The human mind is, 
 as we have l)efore observed, naturally disposed to 
 trust too mucli to method, to venture on this 
 
110 
 
 ON SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 
 
 presumption beyond tlie bounds of experience and 
 lawful proof, and, not content with ascertaining 
 what is, to detennine, as it thinks, what must be. 
 There have been a priori enumerations on almost 
 every subject from the planets downward; reasons 
 have been given why they, and the senses, and the 
 Categories, and the main divisions of the world, 
 and the primitive substances of Chemistry, should 
 be neither more nor less numerous than they were 
 supposed to be ; till further research has proved 
 the falsity of the suppositions for whicli these 
 reasonings were to account, in some cases; and has 
 rendered their truth uncertain in others. It is 
 well to avoid any risk of falling into this delusive 
 and untrustworthy mode of enquiry : and this end 
 will be effected by keeping the above question 
 steadily before us — by the presence of what at- 
 tributes do we distinguish Scientific Ideas from 
 other Conceptions ? 
 
 There is the more reason for taking this view of 
 the question, because there seems to be, on the 
 face of things, an absolute impossibility of con- 
 fining these Ideas, in our present state of know- 
 ledge, to any definite number. Sometimes con- 
 ceptions, which have been fated to become the 
 basis of sciences, have been long altogether un- 
 known, as was the case witli the Ideas of Galvanism, 
 Electricitv, and Mat^netism. Sometimes fresh dis- 
 coveries with regard to a Conception, wln'ch has 
 been long familiar, elevate it to the dignity of an 
 
 ON SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 
 
 IH 
 
 Idea. Tims the conception of Heat long preceded 
 the dawn of a science of Thermotics. Sometimes 
 the Idea, though it retains the same name, becomes, 
 from the association of new phenomena with it, 
 practically so far different, that it may be fairly 
 doubted whether it be really the same Idea as 
 before. Thus Optics assumed a new form when 
 the ray of colourless light was discovered to be com- 
 pound ; and Harmonics underwent a still greater 
 metamorphosis, when the properties of musical 
 notes came to be considered as dependent not 
 on the length of string, but on the number of 
 vibrations. 
 
 Indeed it would seem, that Science follows as 
 surely upon Practice in matter of fact as it pre- 
 cedes it in theory. Let ai^y set of phenomena 
 once be shewn to be of practical importance to 
 a large pait of society ; and human industry com- 
 bines with curiosity in the endeavour to show their 
 relation to each other. Science will soon be at 
 work to discover the principle which shall reduce 
 the mass of perceptions to order. Thus Medicine, 
 and Theology, win'ch appeal directly to the strong- 
 est and deepest cravings of human nature, have 
 been again and again systematized. On the other 
 hand, where the importance of a subject is of late 
 discovery, the corresponding science is of late 
 origin also. The science of Catallactic has only 
 arisen since the world has been comparatively 
 peaceful, and whole nations and continents have 
 
14-2 
 
 ON SriFNTIFir TDKAs. 
 
 felt their permanent welfare to depend on the 
 principles which regulate exchange. 
 
 As the world then grows wiser and busier, as 
 men expand the sphere of their operations. Sciences 
 will increase in number, and, with them, Scientific 
 Ideas. It does not follow, however, that, though 
 this be true in the long run, each advance of 
 human Science involves a corresponding increase 
 in the number of Ideas. On the contrary, their 
 number may diminish, when two or three ap- 
 parently distinct branches of knowledge are traced 
 back to a common stock, and are henceforth 
 treated as one. So a point of union has been dis- 
 covered in Galvanism, Electricity, and Magnetism. 
 And Cuvier has given some hints towards a Zoo- 
 logy, or Science of Life, of which Botany and 
 animal Zoology may prove ultimately to be mere 
 subdivisions. And attempts have been made to ac- 
 count for vital action in a manner, which, were it 
 correct, would bring it, according to the different 
 theories, under either Chemistry or Electricity. 
 
 Least of all, however, can we hope to have all 
 Sciences reduced to that unity, which is implied in 
 the Scholastic type of Deduction, or the Baconian 
 type of Induction. The thought of one vast 
 Science grounded on the Idea of Being, furnished 
 with its due array of subordinate principles, whether 
 we call them Categories, or by some other name, 
 including in itself all possible knowledge, assigning 
 its place to every producible phenomenon, may 
 
 
 ON SCI I- NTH IC I OKAS. 
 
 143 
 
 stand before us as a great Ideal, but one which we 
 must confess is unattainable. Though some con- 
 nected Sciences may show a disposition to fall into 
 each other, yet the lines of scientific enquiry must 
 in general be treated as parallel and independent. 
 If there be, as there seems to be in the Divine 
 Mind, a perfect pyramid of knowledge, yet the 
 apex is so far distant from us, that not only is it 
 itself invisible, but the sides of the pyramid have 
 no sensible inclination towards it. Like the vast 
 majority of the fixed stars, it has no ascertainable 
 parallax. 
 
 What attributes, then, we proceed to enquire, 
 fit a Conception to become an Idea, and be re- 
 garded as the basis of a Science ? 
 
 It is evident that every Scientific Idea must be 
 distinct, and that this distinctness should, if pos- 
 sible, be put beyond doubt by definition. But, 
 for reasons which shall be given hereafter. Scientific 
 Ideas can very rarely be defined. 
 
 Distinctness, however, though requisite to Sci- 
 entific Ideas, is by no means confined to them. 
 It is necessary in every Conception which we 
 employ, for whatever purpose, in Science, or Art, 
 or the conduct of life. Indistinctness is that defect 
 of conceptions in general, which Logic professes to 
 remedy. If it remain uncured, there can be no 
 trusting the second and third operations of the 
 mind, while there is such imperfection in the 
 first. 
 
1J4 
 
 ON SCIKNTIFIC IDKAS. 
 
 ON SCIKNTIFIC IDEAS. 
 
 145 
 
 Obviousness is another feature, which, though 
 essential to Scientific Ideas, is by no means con- 
 fined to them. But it is not, like distinctness, to 
 be sought in all Conceptions. We have a right to 
 expect it only in the Idea, and in those lowest 
 scientific Conceptions, which, in the classificatory 
 sciences (which perhaps exhibit this principle most 
 clearly) coincide with the phenomenon. Common- 
 sense, though not equal to forming Sciences, 
 exercises over them a kind of dominion when 
 formed. Thus the Deductive Method of investi- 
 gation requires that some obvious Idea, with its 
 attendant principles, wiiether gained intuitively or 
 empirically it matters not, should be assumed first, 
 and then traced into its consequences. During 
 this process, it may be allowed to disappear from 
 the surface of the speculation, to become abstruse 
 and complicated in the forms which it assumes, 
 so as to escape the ken of every mind but that 
 which is truly scientific; but it must issue again 
 at last into the light of day, and show the result 
 of its proceedings. Not the most abstruse Sciences 
 are exempt from this law ; they must l)e capable 
 of being made popular at either extreme. In 
 Geometry, for instance, the Idea of Space, the 
 Axioms and Definitions, on the one hand, and the 
 enunciations of the particular propositions, on the 
 other, are at once intelligible to many who find 
 the greatest difiiculty in perceiving how these pro- 
 positions depend for proof on their ultimate data. 
 
 The Idea of tliat most compHcated of all Sciences, 
 Astronomy, is perhaps the most obvious of all ; and 
 the results to which it leads are the most generally 
 interesting. And how many persons have just the 
 general Idea of Botany and Zoology, and a keen 
 sense of the beauty and wondrousness of individual 
 instances of animal and vegetable life, who on 
 these subjects find exceeding diflSculty in passing 
 the bounds of the merest empiricism, and entering 
 into the spirit even of the outlines of a really 
 natural system. 
 
 It was said above, again, that the practical 
 importance of a Conception is necessary in order 
 that it may become an Idea. This, however, 
 seems not quite the kind of test to suit our present 
 purpose. In this practical importance, indeed, the 
 reason lies, which leads the mind of the investigator 
 to dwell more upon the Conception, and found a 
 Science upon it. Still, it does not indicate a feature 
 which belongs to the Idea as such, but rather an 
 antecedent fitness in the Conception for its after- 
 wards becoming an Idea. 
 
 A more important mark of Scientific Ideas, and 
 one which belongs to them more properly as such, 
 may be found in what we may call their generality. 
 Every Science professes a certain breadth of range. 
 As there cannot be a Science of an individual, so 
 neither can there be of a narrow class. This is 
 evidently natural. We attribute such importance 
 to the unity of Science, simply because it enables 
 
 k 
 
14(i 
 
 ON SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 
 
 UN SCIKNI'IFIC IDEAS. 
 
 147 
 
 US to collect together much which would otlier- 
 wise be separate. Were its field so narrow, that 
 observation could thoroughly cover it, or memory 
 exhaust its details, or common sense decide upon 
 all its questions by the process of weighing each 
 particular case, we could much more easily dis- 
 pense with it. So we are always disposed to adopt 
 as an Idea that conception which gives the greatest 
 Generality, the widest possible Unity. So, as we 
 have seen, the early endeavours after systematic 
 Truth hit on the magnificent vision of a single 
 all-embracing Science. And, as knowledge pro- 
 ceeds, men are, as we observed, very ready to 
 diminish the number of Sciences by melting several 
 into one. Conjecture on this as on other points 
 even outstrips enquiry : as at present some enter- 
 tain the hope of discovering a single science of 
 all *' imponderables." The union of Statics and 
 Dynamics under the common name of Mechanics 
 illustrates the same tendency. And perhaps it is 
 to the same cause that we must refer the very 
 common, and, it must be allowed, justifiable 
 inclination for viewing Astronomy as a single 
 Science. 
 
 This generality, however, by itself does not 
 satisfy oiu' requisitions ; we must also have in a 
 Scientific Idea a quahty which we may be allowed, 
 by way of contrast, to call particnlarittj. Or, to 
 use a phrase more usual and striking, though 
 perhaps for our present purpose less correct. Unity 
 
 .:• 
 
 \ 
 
 in Science is not enough, unless there is also 
 Plurality. 
 
 Science, we have said, must have a certain 
 breadth : but in that breadth it must not be too 
 uniform. No Universals will serve its purpose, 
 however wide they may be, unless they are capable 
 of division and subdivision, and so can descend to 
 details. Any system, which is deficient either in 
 Generality or Particularity, can only half satisfy 
 our preconceived notion of scientific perfection. 
 A-priori principles of Physics, like those which Kant 
 has given, illustrate generally the former of these 
 defects. They are true enough, but, when ad- 
 mitted, they are too indefinite in their application 
 to be useful, and cannot be so combined as, by 
 hmiting each other, to descend to particulars. 
 The Idea of Being is thus shut out from the 
 number of Scientific Ideas. For we can invent 
 few propositions of which this can be the subject. 
 Scholastic ingenuity could not discover more than 
 three predicates which were suitable to it— Unity, 
 Goodness, and Truth. And, after its first division 
 into Substance and Attribute, the distinctions be- 
 came either empirical or arbitrary. Causality is 
 another conception, which has abundant breadth 
 for a Scientific Idea, but which yet is not the 
 foundation of a Science. Why is this? because 
 the number of propositions as to the relation of 
 cause to effect is exceedingly Hmited ; neither 
 does the Idea naturally subdivide, and so descend 
 
 l2 
 
 k 
 
148 
 
 ON SCIENTIFIC IDKAS. 
 
 to lower conceptions, which the mind can readily 
 embrace, and in which we feel a practical interest. 
 
 But a Conception may have both Generality 
 and Particularity, may associate itself with broad 
 Universals, and allow a nudtitude of Singulars to 
 be combined under it, and yet be unfitted for a 
 Scientific Idea, if it be incapable of consequen- 
 tiaUtij, Unless it be such, that the subordinate 
 conceptions and propositions seem somehow to 
 be connected with it as P'.ffect with Cause, unless 
 it be a kind of nucleus of which the whole Science 
 is a development, we cannot allow it to be really 
 an Idea. Hence, it would seem, certain Ideas 
 hav^ been supposed to be necessarily intuitive; 
 because, when they are once fully understood, 
 the main principles of the Sciences over which 
 they preside, thougli gained at first empirically, 
 assume the appearance of consequences tiom 
 them. Be this as it may ; thus nuich seems clear, 
 that every Science, and therefore every Scientific 
 Idea, implies some consequentiality. 
 
 This is evident in the ]nu*e deductive Science of 
 Geometry, which would fall to the ground, were it 
 not for the Definitions, Axioms, and Postulates flow- 
 ing naturally from the Idea of Space ; and the several 
 propositions which follow being only the legitimate 
 consequences of these data. The truth is least 
 obvious in the purely classKicatory Sciences. 
 Botany, for instance, or Gt3ology, appears at first 
 sight to be only the arrangement of phenomena 
 
 ON SCIENTIFIC IDKAS. 
 
 149 
 
 known by observation, according to a fixed plan, 
 and not to involve any notion of consequence. 
 It might be thought that any introduction here of 
 Antecedent and Consequent, Cause and Effect, was 
 quite out of place. Yet .it is not really so. A 
 purely artificial arrangement, in which the phe- 
 nomena are grouped according to an arbitrary 
 principle, has no claim to the name of a Science : 
 and we shall see hereafter, that in proportion as a 
 classificatory Science becomes natural, it approxi- 
 mates to the consequential Type. 
 
 All the Conceptions, then, of Science, the highest, 
 or Idea, as well as the intermediate and lowest, must 
 be distinct. The highest and lowest must both 
 possess a certain Obviousness which is not required 
 in the intermediate conceptions which are employed 
 to connect them. And further, the Idea, which will 
 always be a Conception of practical importance, 
 must possess the attributes of Generality, Parti- 
 cularity, and Consequentiality. And under this 
 the other Conceptions must fall according to a 
 certain system of classification. Into the nature 
 of that system we may now proceed to enquire ; 
 and this consideration will naturally lead us to 
 speak of Definition, which, besides being, as was 
 remarked above, highly conducive to Distinctness, 
 is of the greatest importance in connection with 
 several aspects of Science. 
 
CHAP. IX. 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 In considering the subject of Classification, it 
 will be of importance to keep constantly in view 
 the distinction between the principles on which we 
 classify, and the method which we employ in the 
 process. The most prominent point of difference 
 is, that the Principles are material, while the 
 Method is formal ; the former vary with the dif- 
 ferent Sciences, being the main Conceptions which 
 come to om* aid in establishing a connection be- 
 tween the lowest Conceptions and the Idea ; the 
 latter, when these principles are given, enables us 
 to estimate, and as it were to measure, the relation 
 of the various Conceptions included in the Science, 
 to the Idea and to each other. Thus the absence, 
 presence, and number of cotyledons point to the 
 principles of Classification in a natural system of 
 Botany; and absorption, assimilation, exhalation, 
 growth, and generation, occupy a corresponding 
 place in Zoology. The Method of Classification, 
 on the other hand, is the same for all the Sciences. 
 And of this we now proceed to treat. 
 
 The scheme of Predicables contains the Method 
 of Classification which Aristotle in |)art invented, in 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 151 
 
 part found ready to his hand, and which has 
 descended to us through the Schoolmen with 
 alterations which affect its form more than its 
 substance. Its most received terms have, how- 
 ever, escaped from the Schools, and become the 
 property of the world. Every one who pretends 
 to knowledge talks of Genus and Species, Property 
 and Accident, if not with logical accuracy, at least 
 in a sense of his own. And this renders it the 
 more desirable that we should retain its termi- 
 nology, and adopt its spirit, so far as we properly 
 can. The objections against innovations on received 
 systems apply here with more than usual force. 
 And it will appear, that, with some cautions and 
 modifications, we need not seek a new method of 
 Classification, but may let the Predicables stand. 
 
 It has been customary to attain the five heads 
 of Predicables in one of two ways — the one, more 
 generally known in consequence of its adoption 
 by modern logicians, according to which Species 
 expresses the whole essence, while Genus indicates 
 the common. Differentia the distinguishing part of 
 the same Essence ; and Property, something joined 
 necessarily. Accident, something joined contingently 
 to it ; — the other, more agreeable to Aristotle, and 
 more commonly employed by the Schoolmen, 
 which begins by separating Genus and Species, as 
 coming under the predicament of Substance, from 
 the other Predicables, which are predicated in 
 QuaHty. 
 
162 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 Now perhaps it would be unfair to object to the 
 term Essence, when taken barely and without ex- 
 planation, that it implies of necessity, as it certainly 
 does by association, an assent to the realistic 
 doctrine of inherent forms. At any rate, the 
 formula, which leads us to describe Genus by its 
 being predicated of things differing in species, as 
 Species is in its turn of things different in number, 
 is free from this imputation. But they are both 
 liable to another objection, which lies deeper — 
 namely, that they assume our possession of the 
 power to decide generally what attributes are really 
 part of the Essence or Substance of any given thing, 
 and what are not. 
 
 In other words, they assume, perhaps unwittingly 
 on the part of those who adopt them, the possibihty 
 of a science of Being. If we could, for instance, 
 satisfactorily answer the question, — what is the 
 essence of Man ; we should in so doing enumerate 
 fully all those attributes, in virtue of which the 
 name of Man is appHed to him. Granting that 
 he is according to his essence a rational animal, 
 all other attributes, beside those of animality and 
 rationality, must fall under one of the lower predi- 
 cables. We could not raise above the level of 
 Property or Accident his outward form, his position 
 in the animal and in the intellectual world, his 
 condition as a moral being, his capability of govern- 
 ment or other social relations. 
 
 The erroneous consequences which flow from 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 153 
 
 ' 
 
 
 this view are obvious. If we follow it, we must 
 allow, that, his definition once attained, no re- 
 searches, metaphysical, moral, religious, social, 
 physiological, of which Man is the subject, can 
 have a valid claim to the name of Science. They 
 are the investigations, not of the real nature of 
 Man, but only of certain secondary qualities belong- 
 ing to him. They misplace Man for the time, 
 throw him out of his proper rank in the scale of 
 things, and raise those features of his being which 
 are subordinate or collateral, to the place of the 
 highest dignity. Thus the unity of knowledge 
 would seem to be disturbed, and the natural arrange- 
 ment of Truth broken into, by a misplaced and 
 importunate ingenuity. 
 
 Such inferences of course cannot be correct. It 
 is impossible that any one view of Man's nature can 
 have such right to exclude every other. His phy- 
 sical organization is not to be neglected, because 
 we attach importance to his reason : his individual 
 being has no right to overpower his social ; and so 
 on. If the system of the Predicables is to stand, it 
 must be placed in a light which will admit of its 
 application to Sciences in general. If we show by 
 their aid the relation of a Conception to a given 
 Idea, this must not disparage our investigating, as 
 a separate question, its relation to another also. 
 
 In order then that the Predicables may occupy 
 their right position, we must be content to regard 
 the whole (juestion as one of relation ; and to 
 
 
154 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 admit, that any given individual cannot, on logical 
 grounds, be ascribed absolutely to any species ; but 
 in order to fix its species, and by consequence to 
 assign to its other attributes their proper place as 
 properties or accidents, we must view it in reference 
 to some Scientific Idea. 
 
 Our old example will not be the worse for being 
 the most obvious and most common. Suppose an 
 individual human being put before us, and the 
 demand made that we should fix his species, 
 genus, differentia, and so on. The problem is one, 
 which, with the individual alone given, even sup- 
 posing our knowledge of all the circumstances 
 concerning him to be most accurate and perfect, 
 will defy all attempts at solution. Let, for instance, 
 the given man be Nicholas, the Emperor of all the 
 Russias. The difficultv will be to ascertain his 
 
 ft- 
 
 species : if this is accomplished, all that follows 
 will be easy enough. But how is this first step to 
 be taken ? Of course, if we are considering Zoology, 
 or are content to assume, that the class to which 
 our first natural impulse would lead us to refer 
 him is really his species, there will be no diflSculty 
 in answering at once, Nicholas is by species a Man. 
 But supposing that we are dwelling rather on some 
 Idea which does not extend beyond the human 
 race ; that, to take a particular case, we are con- 
 structing a Science of Civil Government. We shall 
 then divide men, it may be, according as they are 
 governed or governors: and subdivide the latter 
 
 ON CLASSII K ATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 155 
 
 according as they govern in common with others, 
 or are governors sole ; and this subdivision may be 
 further subdivided, as they rule absolutely, or under 
 certain limits of law or constitution. In a scheme 
 of this kind, Nicholas will belong to the species 
 Despot, or sole governor without limitation of law. 
 So, under the Catallactic science, his species will 
 be Capitalist. And the moralist must investigate 
 the affair of the Nuns of Minsk, and other deaUngs 
 of the father of his people, before he decides under 
 which of his two exhaustive species, the good and 
 the bad, he must place the Czar of Russia. 
 
 A popular instance like this will serve our im- 
 mediate puri)ose, which is, as we have said, not to 
 construct a new theory of the predicables, but to 
 show, under what provisos we may acquiesce in 
 the old one. And, it now appears, that we are at 
 liberty to retain both the received scheme, and the 
 method of attaining it ; on the condition, however, 
 either of rejecting the word Essence, or interpreting 
 it as the union of those attributes which are con- 
 sidered to constitute a Class in relation to a given 
 Idea, 
 
 Adopting, then, this manner of regarding Essence, 
 our view of the Predicables follows as a matter of 
 course. Species will evidently be the expression 
 of all those attributes, which are considered as 
 constituting the Class relatively to the given Idea. 
 And the notion of Classification implies that of 
 order and arrangement. A Class necessarily 
 
156 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 157 
 
 suggests to the mind the existence of collateral 
 Classes — standing by its side, that is, as members 
 of the same division. With these, it will have 
 certain attributes in common. These will be re- 
 presented by the Genus, which may be defined, as 
 the Expression of those attributes which a Class 
 has in common with its collateral Classes. The 
 expression of those attributes in which the Class 
 differs from its collateral Classes will, in like 
 manner, be the Differentia. 
 
 But, supposing certain attributes to be con- 
 sidered as constituting a Class relatively to a given 
 Idea, it is evident that certain other attributes 
 might possibly be considered to constitute the 
 same Class, when viewed in relation to another 
 Idea. Thus the word Man indicates the same 
 Class, whether it comes from the lips of the 
 zoologist or the psychologist; though the one 
 looks to the form which animal life assumes in his 
 fellow-creatures, the other regards the peculiarity 
 of their intellectual constitution. A question 
 might indeed be raised, whether the Class was in 
 either case strictly speaking the same, or whether 
 we should not rather speak of two different Classes 
 including exactly the same individuals.* But this 
 doubt is quite foreign to our present enquiry ; and 
 the two Classes, if they are theoretically distinct, 
 must be allowed to be prnclicallfj the samp. And 
 the point which we have to decide is, in what 
 light we are to regard those attributes which are 
 
 B 
 
 observed uniformly to accompany a Class ; although, 
 when it was formed in reference to a given Idea, 
 they were quite foreign to that Idea, and therefore 
 were not taken into account in forming it. The 
 answer of the Logician here corresponds with the 
 common phraseology of educated men : both 
 would agree in calling them Properties ; and the 
 predicable " proprium" may accordingly be defined, 
 as the Expression of those attributes which are 
 observed uniformly to accompany a Class, though 
 they were not taken into consideration in form- 
 ing it. 
 
 Of the remaining predicable. Accident, little 
 need be said. Certain attributes are observed to 
 be associated with the Individual. The question 
 naturally arises, — are they also associated with the 
 Class? If this be determined in the aflfirmative, 
 further questions remain. Do they by themselves 
 constitute the Class ? If so, they find their ex- 
 pression in the Species, Should this not be so — 
 do they go to constitute the Class ? If so, they are 
 either shared by the collateral Classes, and so fall 
 under the Genus, ox distinguish the Class in question 
 from the collateral Classes, and are therefore ex- 
 pressed by the Differentia. If, though associated 
 with the Class, they neither in whole nor in part 
 constitute it, we have already seen that their ex- 
 pression is the predicable Properti/. If, on the 
 other hand, they neither, in whole or in part, con- 
 stitute the Class, nor are observed uniformly to 
 
158 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITIDN. 
 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 159 
 
 accompany it, they fall under the head of Accident : 
 and that predicable may be defined, as the Expres- 
 sion of such attributes as neither are taken into 
 consideration in forming the Class, nor are observed 
 uniformly to accompany it. 
 
 We are now in a position to enter on the subject 
 of Logical Definition. For, in common phrase, we 
 define the Species, by means of its Genus and 
 Differentia. On an accurate use of these terms 
 must depend the distinctness of our notion of 
 Definition. And, by a natural and common re- 
 action, we shall gain a clearer view of the nature 
 and importance of the Predicables, by viewing 
 them in this connection. They are part of the 
 apparatus and instruments of Logic, and cannot 
 be appreciated, unless we consider their use. We 
 shall learn much of them, by seeing them em- 
 ployed. 
 
 In the first place, then, a Corollary with refer- 
 ence to Definition naturally follows from the above 
 remarks. It is, that all Definition is necessarily 
 relative; and therefore that all attempts at absolute 
 Definition are from their very nature failures, and 
 may be rejected without individual examination. 
 To any one who assents to the previous theory of 
 the predicables, this is an evident consequence. 
 For if all correct Definition be, as it is commonly 
 granted to be, by means of Genus and Differentia, 
 and the predicables be in their very nature relative, 
 it will follow of course that Definition is entirely 
 
 I 
 
 r 
 
 r 
 
 relative also. But we may attain the same con- 
 clusion by a less technical method, and one better 
 adapted to convince the general reader. 
 
 What is Definition ? Most authorities would agree 
 in answering, that it is the statement in its fulness 
 of the meaning of a conception, or, as some would 
 prefer, of a term. Were then absolute Definition 
 possible, it would exhaust the meaning of the 
 thing defined. To take our old example, Man. 
 If he were capable of absolute Definition, every 
 conception that is necessarily associated with the 
 conception of Man, in the mind of the most 
 enlightened thinker and most extended enquirer, 
 must enter into it. He could not be defined 
 under a folio volume. Those attributes which 
 are observed in him by the Physician and the 
 Moralist have as good a prima facie right to enter 
 into his Definition, as those observed by the Meta- 
 physician and the NaturaUst. If one insists on his 
 possession of reason, another may dwell on his 
 possession of two hands, or his place in the scale 
 of moral beings, or the length of his intestinal 
 canal. So the Definition would needs prove in this 
 case an assemblage of most promiscuous and ill- 
 assorted matter. Or, to take another example, 
 that of atmospheric Air ; how shall this be defined ? 
 By the proportions of oxygen and azote which 
 enter into its composition ? or by its relation to 
 animal life ? or by its elasticity viewed as a fluid ? or 
 by its properties of refraction as an optical medium ? 
 
160 
 
 ON CLASSI I [CATION ANh DKFIMTIOS. 
 
 Those who hold that Definition is absohite, nnist 
 say, — By all of these. All of these conceptions, 
 and many more, enter into the notion which an 
 educated man entertains of Air. And to enumerate 
 any thing short of the whole, would be, on this 
 hypothesis, to define imperfectly. 
 
 An absolute Definition therefore is impossible, on 
 account of the prolixity and confusion of ideas 
 which it necessarily involves. It would resolve 
 itself at best into a long string of unconnected 
 epithets. However complete it might be as a 
 general summary of our knowledge on the subject, 
 it would be utterly wanting in clearness, and would 
 prove no remedy for indistinctness. 
 
 This being granted, an important consequence 
 follows. We must be content with relative De- 
 finition ; and therefore, a Conception will be 
 capable of at least as many Definitions as there 
 are Sciences, or, which is the same. Scientific Ideas, 
 under which it falls. 
 
 This, again, the Logician who has followed the 
 previous reasoning will not be slow to admit. If 
 all the Predicables imply a reference to a certain 
 Scientific Idea, the Definition, which is composed 
 of two of them, will imply such reference also ; and 
 as the Ideas nuiltiply, the Predicables increase, 
 and, with them, the Definitions also. But this 
 position, like the former, admits of being put 
 into a more practical form ; into which w^e proceed 
 to throw it. 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 161 
 
 All Definition implies Classification. In defining 
 a Class-conception, (and Class-conceptions alone are 
 definable,) we undertake to show the boundaries 
 which separate it from other Classes, with which 
 it might possibly be confused. But as each Science 
 has its own peculiar Classification, it necessitates 
 also a peculiar Definition, by which the Class in 
 question may be separated from all other Classes 
 which the said Science recognises. The same 
 formula which answers the purpose of distinction 
 in one case, will not serve in another. To keep to 
 our old example, — can any form of w^ords, suf- 
 ficiently concise to be recognised by common- 
 sense as a Definition, be devised, which shall at 
 once show how^ Man is to be distinguished from 
 Spirits, good and bad, and from other incorporeal 
 agencies; and the point at w^hich he parts com- 
 pany with the brute creation ? or, regarding that 
 physical structure which he has in common with 
 brutes, will sum up the features of resemblance 
 and those of difference, which he exhibits when 
 compared with such collateral Classes as the lion 
 and the hare ; and his relation to such more distant 
 Classes as the eagle and the ostrich; or, further 
 still, to the oyster and the crab ? What an entire 
 confusion would necessarily result from the at- 
 tempt to bring before the mind at once all these 
 various points of contrast! By one course only 
 can we avoid it. Man must be defined in one 
 way, if we would see his place in the Spiritual 
 
 M 
 
16-2 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 ON CLASS! FK^ATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 1()3 
 
 world; in another, if we would regard him in his 
 relation to Good and Evil ; in a third, if he is viewed 
 relatively to the Idea of Life. In many other cases 
 a like difficulty is evident, which must be met in 
 the same manner. We should feel a misgiving if 
 called upon suddenly to define feldspar, for in- 
 stance, or the diamond. The reason probably is, 
 that we should be doubting how to attempt the 
 Definition ; whether we should view them as 
 Minerals, or bring them under Chemistry — consult 
 their crystallography, or their analysis. And the 
 mind seems quite at a loss, and set afloat on a wide 
 sea of speculation, when called on to define some 
 Conception which does not fall naturally under 
 any formed Science. In the absence of a true 
 Science of ^Esthetics, we feel that it is vain to 
 attempt a true Definition of the Subhme, or the 
 Beautiful. 
 
 One remark remains to be made on this part 
 of the subject. It has been said above, that a 
 Conception may have as many Definitions as there 
 are Ideas under which it falls. We will now 
 observe, that it may have more. The same Idea 
 may be developed by means of different subordinate 
 Conceptions, which will lead of course to dif- 
 ferent Classifications, and therefore to different 
 Definitions. Linnaeus and Cuvier both bring 
 Man under the genus Mammalia ; though the 
 one finds his Differentia in the number of his 
 incisor and molar teeth, the other in his possession 
 
 I. -f/.:,* 
 
 ill 
 
 'W: 
 
 of hands. Aristotle, who makes his genus Biped, 
 completes the Definition by distinguishing him 
 from birds either by the absence of wings, or, 
 which comes to nearly the same thing, the restric- 
 tion of his motions to this vile earth we tread on. 
 If each of these accounts of Man distinguishes 
 him with suflScient accuracy from other animals, 
 none of them can well be called an incorrect 
 Definition. Yet one of them will of course be 
 superior to the others. This superiority depends 
 on the respective merits of the Classification 
 employed. And that Classification is to be pre- 
 ferred, in which the Idea, and the lowest Con- 
 ceptions, are connected by the most appropriate 
 intermediate generalisations. What constitutes 
 such appropriateness, it is not hard, in a general 
 manner, to see. Those have the advantage, which, 
 while they apply with sufficient obviousness to the 
 lowest Conceptions, flow at the same time most 
 naturally from the Idea. By their flowing natu- 
 rally from the Idea is meant, that either reason 
 shows a priori their connection with it, or observa- 
 tion and experiment abundantly establish the same 
 fact a posteriori. Thus in Geometry the division 
 of geometrical magnitudes into those of one, two, 
 and three dimensions is natural on the former 
 account: finite space implying possible measure- 
 ment; and length, breadth, and thickness being 
 obviously the three aspects of space which 
 admit of measurement. And Cuvier's arrange- 
 
 M 2 
 
1()4 
 
 UN CLASSIFICATION ANIJ hKHNlllUN 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 l(>5 
 
 nient of animals according to the nature of their 
 respiratory and circulating apparatus is an ex- 
 ample of the latter kind; it being amply proved 
 by observation, that according to the perfection of 
 the organs of respiration and circulation, the 
 various functions of animal life are more or less 
 perfectly performed. 
 
 It is evident that a Deiinition may in this man- 
 ner be reduced to those dimensions which custom 
 and reason have allowed it, and very frequently 
 to its ideal perfection of form, in which it consists 
 only of two words, one of which is the Genus, and 
 the other the Differentia. For, supposing a Class 
 to be viewed thus relatively to an Idea, it is not 
 necessary, in order to distinguish it from other 
 Classes which refer to the same Idea, to enumerate 
 all the attributes with which we know it is invested. 
 We only need to draw the line of demarcation 
 clearly between it and those other Classes. And 
 this will be done, if we show, first of all, how it is 
 related to them in the way of resemblance ; which 
 is expressed by Genus: and then, how it is dis- 
 tinguished from them by certain peculiarities; 
 which is expressed by Differentia. All its other 
 constant attributes come in as Properties ; its 
 inconstant as Accidents ; and those only, which 
 are prominent in the scheme of Classification, 
 enter into the Definition. If, for instance, to the 
 received Definition of Man as a bimanous manmuil, 
 it be objected, that many other attributes, 
 
 besides those of being viviparous and possessing 
 hands, are necessary to our Conception of Man, 
 such as reason, imagination, the erect posture, the 
 face divine ; the answer is simply, that, so far as 
 the functions of life are concerned, these attributes 
 are not essential, and that the Zoologist views 
 Man with regard to life, and to no other Idea 
 whatsoever. Linnaeus once went so far as to 
 describe the ourang-outang as Homo Simius ; and 
 the practical inconvenience of such a Definition 
 would not have been sufficient to overthrow it, 
 if the physical structure of the brute had borne 
 out, as it did not, the correctness of the Classifica- 
 tion. Indeed,^t present it may be doubted with 
 some plausibility, whether the word Man, as 
 employed in different Sciences, always indicates 
 precisely the same individuals. Thus an Idiot is 
 to the moralist no Man ; and one theory of capital 
 punishment assumes, that the culprit by the com- 
 mission of atrocious crime ceases to possess social 
 rights, in other words, to be a Man in the sense of 
 the Political Science. If this be true, the body of 
 the criminal who has been executed would never- 
 theless be that of a Man for every purpose of the 
 Naturalist. 
 
 But there is still room for objection left. It 
 may be argued, that, supposing the Definition to be 
 restricted to one Idea, it may still be a very long 
 affair indeed. The above Definition of Man, for 
 instance, does not express all his attributes which 
 
166 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 167 
 
 have reference to life. Why should his prehensile 
 organs be held to have such reference, if those of 
 locomotion are excluded ? The fact of his having 
 two hands either has no connection with the Idea 
 of Life, or, if it has, must impart a share of that 
 honour to the fact of his having feet also. 
 
 In spite of this objection, our definition of Man 
 may stand. It is valid, if it marks him off from 
 every other class of animal whatsoever ; if we are 
 prepared to say, as we are, that every animal 
 which is viviparous, and lias two hands and two 
 only, is entitled to the name of Man. 
 
 This seems the place to consider another ob- 
 jection to which this plan of concise Definition is 
 liable. It has been argued, that a Definition, which 
 does not enumerate all the attributes of a Class, 
 but only such as are assumed lo be distinctive, 
 though long accepted and approved, may fail at 
 last, and be convicted of falsehood. A bimanous 
 mammal, it is urged, may hereafter be discovered, 
 which shall be formed, in some respects, on quite 
 a different type from Man, and to which we should 
 refuse the name, though consistency would urge 
 us to grant it. Neither is it sufficient, taking 
 another point of view, to define him as a Rational 
 animal ; because, it is said, we should not grant the 
 name of a man to a fish or a quadruped, which 
 was found to possess reason. 
 
 Wc might reply to such instances as these, tliat 
 Definition is grounded on Classification, which con- 
 
 r 
 
 templates only existing things ; and that it is hard 
 therefore to object to it, that it neglects the 
 creatures of imagination, and makes no grave 
 provision for non-entities. But this would be 
 only to evade the difficulty. Cases something 
 like the imaginary examples given above, actually 
 occur. Existing systems of Classification are occa- 
 sionally broken into by apparent anomalies, which 
 are stubborn facts nevertheless, and must, ulti- 
 mately, have a place found them. The answer 
 which fairly meets the case, will also bring for- 
 ward another view of our subject. 
 
 Definition does not, with whatever it deals, 
 actually give Knowledge. It provides for the dis- 
 tinctness, not the discovery, of Truth. It has no 
 alchemical power of turning dross into gold ; but 
 serves as a touch-stone, by applying which to the 
 individual, we may ascertain the extent of our 
 general information on the matter in hand. We 
 shall soon discover this, if we make a few attempts, 
 which are by no means unprofitable as intellectual 
 exercises, at defining. We shall find, that, if we 
 fail, it is often not so much from ignorance of the 
 Conception we wish to define, as from our insuf- 
 ficient acquaintance with the Classes from which 
 we would distinguish it. A man possessing the 
 most thorough acquaintance with the ingredients, 
 and properties, and uses of Coal, could not there- 
 fore define it. He might describe it at length, but 
 this, we have seen, would be no logical Definition. 
 
 " ; ' ) 
 
 \ 
 
 V, 
 
168 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 169 
 
 If he attempted to select one or two distinguishing 
 attributes, he would most likely fail in the attempt ; 
 because he was ignorant, not of the substance 
 itself, but of the other substances from which it is to 
 be distinguished. To be successful, he must know, 
 not only the mineral in question, but other mine- 
 rals also, and a science of Mineralogy as well. 
 
 As then we can only classify phenomena which 
 we know, so we can only define on the supposition 
 that such Classification is correct, and based on a 
 sufficient observation of phenomena. The Defini- 
 tion of Man can only distinguish him from all 
 other known animals, or all other known rational 
 beings. According to the probabihty that other 
 rational beings, or other animals, in many respects 
 resembhng him, have, or have not, escaped our 
 observation, will be the probability that a Defini- 
 tion, which is certainly valid in the existing state 
 of our knowledge, will, or will not, continue valid 
 hereafter. 
 
 We are now close upon the great point of 
 difference between the ancient and modern views 
 of Definition. We have seen that it is a conse- 
 quence of regarding Definition as relative to an 
 Idea, to hold that, though it implies knowledge, it 
 does not give it. He who can define well must be 
 master of his subject : and to one who had not at 
 least a general acquaintance with it, his words 
 would convey no meaning. Only the proficient 
 can give a Definition : only the adviinced pupil 
 
 
 can follow it. Suppose, for instance, a hearer to 
 have no system of Classification under which the 
 diamond falls, or a different one from that employed 
 by him who defines it. The Definition will be 
 unmeaning to him in the former case ; it will seem 
 inelegant, irregular, or possibly even wrong, in the 
 latter. 
 
 This would not be the case, if Definition were, 
 as it was supposed to be, absolute. To define a 
 Conception, would not be in that case to assign it 
 a place in relation to a particular Science, but to 
 state its gradation in the great scale of things. 
 Definition would not appeal to a Classification with 
 which students only were supposed to be acquainted ; 
 but would regard all things by the common light 
 of human nature. On this hypothesis, it would be 
 intelligible to one who had no antecedent ac- 
 quaintance with the subject. Thus Definition was 
 formerly considered as one actual source of know- 
 ledge. Fresh information was to be extracted 
 from it by means of the syllogistic apparatus. By 
 its aid, the imperfections of sense were to be 
 remedied, and Science carried beyond the sphere 
 of observation. And hence the importance formerly 
 attached to the rule, which commanded that every 
 Definition should be composed of two parts, each 
 in itself '' better known than the thing defined." 
 
 There was a very intelligible sense attached to 
 the phrase in question. Those things were better 
 known in themselves, though probably less known 
 
170 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 171 
 
 to US, which were more universal. They held a 
 higher place in the deductive scheme, and ap- 
 proached nearer to those summary laws of Nature, 
 on which lower laws were founded. Thus they 
 were more cognisable by reason, just as things less 
 universal were more cognisable by sense. And 
 therefore the rule above given might be put in 
 other words as follows — the Genus and Differentia 
 must each of them be more Universal than the 
 Species to be defined. 
 
 This rule is evidently binding in the case of 
 Genus, if, as we have said above, it expresses the 
 attributes common to the group of collateral 
 Classes, of which the Species is one. Nor is it hard 
 to see the reason of Aristotle and the School- 
 men after him, for making the same demand with 
 regard to Differentia. They intended, as it has 
 been observed, that the Definition should give 
 knowledge. This it was to do, by enabling the 
 mind to combine two Conceptions, which it had 
 entertained previously, into a new Conception ; just 
 as in syllogism from the two premises we draw a 
 conclusion, which while it requires both, is distinct 
 from either. It would not be difficult to shew, 
 that this view assigns a power to the human mind 
 which it does not really possess, of combining its 
 Conceptions according to some certain and in- 
 variable law. Two Conceptions may indeed be 
 added mechanically one to another; but we can 
 no more^ predict, in Metaphysic, what will result 
 
 f 
 
 from their intimate union, than we can foretel, in 
 Chemistry, how the appearance and properties of 
 a protoxide will be altered, by its combination 
 with another volume of oxygen. In either case 
 we may make happy guesses, but we have no guide 
 to which we can trust implicitly ; nothing beyond 
 that tact in perceiving analogies and so anticipating 
 consequences, which experience developes if it 
 does not give, and the conclusions of which, in 
 their most perfect form, cannot, if unsupported 
 from without, rank very high in the scale of pro- 
 bability. 
 
 But, putting considerations of this kind aside, it 
 is clear, that if a Definition is, in accordance with 
 this hypothesis, to give knowledge, it must be 
 made up of Conceptions, each wider than the 
 Class to be defined. For, if either of its parts be 
 only co-extensive with the Class, no new range 
 will be gained by the mind, which must still be 
 fettered by the limits of observation. On this 
 theory, for instance, it would be unsatisfactory to 
 define Man by his having two hands. Whence, it 
 may be asked, has the mind derived this Concep- 
 tion of bimanous ? Since nothing except man is 
 two-handed, it can only be from man himself. So 
 the Definition is not really explicative, because, in 
 order to understand it, we must be acquainted 
 with man, who is its subject. We may define him 
 as an animal with two feet and without plumage, 
 and escape this objection. For though no other 
 
172 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 animal be both two-footed and destitute of plumage, 
 we may derive each of these notions, animal, biped, 
 and featherless, from other sources than Man. 
 
 In modern enquiries, where Definition stands 
 not as the source but as the registry of our 
 knowledge, no such restriction is required. We 
 are content that the Genus shall be often co- 
 extensive with the Species. Unambitious of exer- 
 cising the dangerous privilege of combining Con- 
 ceptions independently of experience, we only 
 claim that the Differentia be as clear and as 
 universal as the Class defined, and seek neither 
 greater clearness, nor a wider universality. 
 
 We have confined our considerations, hitherto, to 
 purely Logical Definition. We have seen, tliat, in 
 order to sustain its pretensions at all, it must allow 
 them to be considerably narrowed. In no suflficient 
 sense does it state the nature of the thing defined. 
 It implies no attempt at exhausting the attributes 
 of its subject. This it views, not as it is in itself, 
 but only in its relation to a certain Idea. Neither 
 do all the attributes which can be shown to refer 
 to the Idea enter into the Definition. Those only 
 are there admitted, on which the place of the 
 Conception with reference to the Idea turns— 
 those only, in other words, which enter into the 
 scheme of Classification. Thus it is not quite 
 correct to say, that a Logical Division expresses the 
 analysis of a Conception. It is grounded on such 
 an analysis, but does not wholly express it. We 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 173 
 
 ' 
 
 take an individual, and reject those attributes 
 which belong to it as such. Being thus rid of 
 the Accidents, we have gained the Conception of 
 the Species. Of this, the Attributes divide into 
 those which have direct reference to the Idea 
 under which it falls, as entering into the scheme 
 of Classification, and those which have not. Of 
 these, the former, portioned out into Genus and 
 Differentia, compose the Definition; the latter 
 take their place under the stricter or looser senses 
 of Property. 
 
 It would be foreign to our present purpose to 
 speak of Definitions other than Logical. SuflSce 
 it to say, that from Logical Definition they derive 
 their name, in virtue of a likeness and analogy 
 more or less cogent. But they are wholly un- 
 scientific, and are useful only as suggestive, or as 
 affording raw material, so to speak, for further 
 speculation. Thus Physical Definition is a con- 
 junction of words which has almost, if not quite, 
 disappeared from our ordinary phraseology. It 
 signifies only an enumeration of all the attributes 
 of the Class defined so far as they are known ; 
 without any selection, or scientific arrangement, 
 or grouping under an Idea. It is therefore prior 
 to Classification, as Logical Definition is posterior 
 to it ; and from its indiscriminate mass the Natu- 
 rahst selects what is fitted for his purpose. To 
 use a distinction of Lord Bacon's, it belongs, not 
 to Physic, but to Natural History. Thus it 
 
174 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 follows the analogy of Logical Definition, in being 
 grounded on an analysis ; but here it is the thing 
 which we analyse, and not the Conception. 
 
 Nominal Definition has held its place, but by 
 a very doubtful title. Its exact nature. Logical 
 writers find it hard to state. The most consistent 
 view of it is also the simplest, and that which rests 
 on the most ancient authorities. We define a 
 thing nominally, when we show, or rather attempt 
 to show, its nature, by examining the etymological 
 formation of the word by which we commonly 
 express it. This also is evidently named from the 
 analogy of Logical Definition, being founded on an 
 analysis, not, however, of the Conception, but of 
 the Word. Though often highly suggestive, it can 
 seldom be trusted, unless we are prepared to allow, 
 that, in forming compound words, men have always 
 regarded the most fimdamental and permanent 
 features of the objects to which they apphed them, 
 to the exclusion of those which are fleeting and 
 superficial. 
 
 Of all the spurious species of Definition, that 
 which is called Accidental, or, in one word. De- 
 scription, is at once of most common use, and least 
 nearly related to its Logical prototype. Without 
 any attempt at analysis, it merely takes those 
 attributes of the Class which appear most salient 
 and characteristic, and calls attention to them as 
 marks by which it may be recognised, quite inde- 
 pendently of its relation to other Classes. 
 
 I 
 
 1/ 
 
 ON CLASSIFrCATION AND DEFINITION. 175 
 
 These few remarks on tlie secondary kinds of 
 Definition are a digression from our main subject : 
 but they may be useful in showing, that one 
 Species only is recognised by Science ; that of this, 
 all others are, more or less, imitations ; and that, 
 in every case. Scientific and Logical Definition 
 coincide. 
 
 One possible diflSculty attendant on the previous 
 views, still remains to be obviated. It may be 
 objected to the practical working of this scheme 
 of Relative Definition, that it reduces all Sciences 
 to a dead level, and destroys their real distinctions 
 as to dignity and importance. Has Man, as such, 
 it may be asked, no Definition? Is it of no 
 consequence, whether we view him as mortal or 
 immortal, in his relation to the animal kingdom, 
 or to the spiritual world? Logic will do little' 
 service, if it thus violates Common-sense, and 
 overleaps a difference which we observe in every- 
 day life. 
 
 A little care in drawing a necessary distinction 
 will serve to meet this difficulty. Suppose the 
 same thing to be defined in reference to several 
 Ideas. It follows, that each Definition may be 
 equally con-ect, but not, of course, equally im- 
 portant. As the Ideas themselves rise and fall in 
 dignity, so will the Classifications and Definitions 
 which are founded on them. Thus the value to be 
 attached to the several Definitions will depend, not 
 on the degree of their correctness, (for all may be 
 
174 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 follows the analogy of Logical Definition, in being 
 grounded on an analysis ; but here it is the thing 
 which we analyse, and not the Conception. 
 
 Nominal Definition has held its place, but by 
 a very doubtful title. Its exact nature. Logical 
 writers find it hard to state. The most consistent 
 view of it is also the simplest, and that which rests 
 on the most ancient authorities. We define a 
 thing nominally, when we show, or rather attempt 
 to show, its nature, by examining the etymological 
 formation of the word by which we commonly 
 express it. This also is evidently named from the 
 analogy of Logical Definition, being founded on an 
 analysis, not, however, of the Conception, but of 
 the Word. Though often highly suggestive, it can 
 seldom be trusted, unless we are prepared to allow, 
 that, in forming compound words, men have always 
 regarded the most fimdamental and permanent 
 features of the objects to which they apphed them, 
 to the exclusion of those which are fleeting and 
 superficial. 
 
 Of all the spurious species of Definition, that 
 which is called Accidental, or, in one word. De- 
 scription, is at once of most common use, and least 
 nearly related to its Logical prototype. Without 
 any attempt at analysis, it merely takes those 
 attributes of the Class which appear most salient 
 and characteristic, and calls attention to them as 
 marks by which it may be recognised, quite inde- 
 pendently of its relation to other Classes. 
 
 1/ 
 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 175 
 
 These few remarks on the secondary kinds of 
 Definition are a digression from our main subject : 
 but they may be useful in showing, that one 
 Species only is recognised by Science ; that of this, 
 all others are, more or less, imitations ; and that, 
 in every case. Scientific and Logical Definition 
 coincide. 
 
 One possible diflficulty attendant on the previous 
 views, still remains to be obviated. It may be 
 objected to the practical working of this scheme 
 of Relative Definition, that it reduces all Sciences 
 to a dead level, and destroys their real distinctions 
 as to dignity and imijortance. Has Man, as such, 
 it may be asked, no Definition? Is it of no 
 consequence, whether we view him as mortal or 
 immortal, in his relation to the animal kingdom, 
 or to the spiritual world? Logic will do Httle 
 service, if it thus violates Common-sense, and 
 overleaps a difference which we observe in every- 
 day life, 
 
 A little care in drawing a necessary distinction 
 will serve to meet this difficulty. Suppose the 
 same thing to be defined in reference to several 
 Ideas. It follows, that each Definition may be 
 equally con-ect, but not, of course, equally im- 
 portant. As the Ideas themselves rise and fall in 
 dignity, so will the Classifications and Definitions 
 which are founded on them. Thus the value to be 
 attached to the several Definitions will depend, not 
 on the degree of their correctness, (for all may be 
 
 1 
 
176 
 
 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION. 
 
 equally correct) but on the comparative promi- 
 nence of the Ideas — a subject which shall be 
 mentioned, though not discussed, at the conclusion 
 of this Essay. 
 
 I 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 ON THE GRAUATIONS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 We will now once more recapitulate the com- 
 mon features which are possessed by all the 
 Sciences. In the first place, each of them is 
 grounded on an Idea. Next, under this Idea is 
 ranked a multitude of Conceptions. Thirdly, 
 these Conceptions have, amongst each other, an 
 Order and Arrangement, in which constant re- 
 ference is had to the Idea. Fourthly, beside this 
 Order and Arrangement, which either tends to, or 
 amounts to. Classification, there is some aim at, and 
 appearance of, Deductiveness, and consequentiahty, 
 wherever fonnal Deduction, and strict Conse- 
 quence, are, from the nature of the case, impossible. 
 
 Thus much for the common features of Sciences 
 in general. They will be indirectly illustrated yet 
 further in the following remarks, which are in- 
 tended, however, to answer directly a different 
 pui-pose, and to mark, not the Similarity, but the 
 Distinction of Sciences ; not their Uniformity, but 
 their Gradations. 
 
 The highest place in the scale is of course as- 
 signed to Pure Science. Of this we take Geometry 
 
 N 
 
178 
 
 ON Tin: CiUADATIONS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 as the type. Its peculiar and characteristic excel- 
 lency is, its entire dependence on its Idea. 
 
 The Idea, in this case, once given, all the 
 Science necessarily follows. It is the nucleus 
 round which all that is homogeneous with it 
 clusters by a natural law. When once Space is 
 conceived by the mind, mere cogitation, without 
 the aid of experience, would be able to draw fi*om 
 this Idea the Conceptions of Lines, Surfaces, and 
 Solids, and all the various species of these which 
 the Science of Geometry recognises. The prin- 
 ciples of Classification, also, are here exemplified. 
 They only escape attracting our attention, by 
 appearing in so natural and obvious a form. It 
 has been said above, that on Classification follows 
 Definition. Here, accordingly, a good Classifica- 
 tion lies at the very base of the Science, and a 
 corresponding series of accurate Definitions follows 
 it. We begin Pure Science by defining. In other 
 words, we commence by positing bur Species, and 
 stating their Genus and Difference. That result, 
 at which, as we shall see presently, lower ibrms of 
 Science aim, is attained before the main labour of 
 pure Science begins. 
 
 Being thus furnished with an Idea, and the 
 subordinate Conceptions, and the system of Clas- 
 sification, we apply oiu'selves to our new work, 
 that of drawing Consequences. And the con- 
 sequentiality is here Jis perfect as all that has 
 preceded it. There is no gap between our Data 
 
 ON THK (iHADAIlUNS OF SCIKNCE. 
 
 179 
 
 and our ultimate conclusions. The necessary 
 laws of inference, when applied to the Definitions, 
 Axioms, and Postulates, enable us to invest our 
 Species with Properties before unknown. Squares, 
 Triangles, Circles, become no clearer as we ad- 
 vance; for they were accurately defined before we 
 began our researches. But they do become fuller 
 Conceptions, as they are associated in our minds 
 with fresh Attributes. And all these Attributes are 
 Properties : they are proved to be inseparably 
 connected with the several Classes, though not 
 taken into consideration in forming them. In 
 this most perfect sphere of speculation. Accidents 
 have no place. 
 
 Such then are the distinctive excellencies of 
 Pure Science. It possesses the highest Unity, 
 being simply the development of a single Idea. 
 It begins with a perfect Classification, and following 
 on this, with accurate and perfect Definitions. 
 But these merits are comparatively eclipsed by its 
 most distinguishing excellency, an exact and per- 
 fect Consequentiality. From first to last, it flows 
 in one direction, from the Idea downwards. There 
 is no appeal to Experience, — no desire of confirm- 
 ation from without, — no endeavour, when the fact 
 has been derived from one quarter, to find the 
 reason in another. Every link of the chain of 
 knowledge holds : and, wherever the process stops 
 short, it is, as far as it goes, perfect; having perhaps 
 an unfinished air, but still enduring even in this 
 
 n2 
 
180 
 
 ON THi: GRADATIONS OF SCIENCK 
 
 intermediate Ibnii, aii^l capable of addition withont 
 alteration. 
 
 Next in place of dignity to Pure Science come 
 the Applied Sciences. Of these, we have before 
 taken Mechanics as an example. Here, too, we 
 have an Idea, and a number of conclusions flowing 
 from certain data according to a necessary con- 
 sequence. But the Applied Sciences are in- 
 ferior to the preceding Class in one important 
 particular. They have not the same absolute 
 Unity. Their main Principles, though closely 
 connected with the Idea, need not be deductions 
 from it, mere phases and aspects in which it 
 exhibits itself anew. They often need independ- 
 ent proof, and rest upon the testimony of Ex- 
 perience. Thought alone could not have extracted 
 them from the Idea. No one, by only pondering 
 the nature of Force, could arrive at the knowledge 
 of the laws of Motion. Thus therc^ is an interval, 
 so to speak, in the Applied Sciences, between the 
 Idea and the subordinate Principles, which ex- 
 cludes them from perfect Unity, lowers the student 
 from the sphere of pure Abstraction, brings him to 
 the border-land of the Intellectual and Sensible, 
 and introduces the contrast, though not in its 
 hardest outline, between Form and Matter. Thus 
 tlie province of Reason is somewhat narrowed, 
 and that of Experience expands. 
 
 In this respect their practical appHcation answers 
 to their theory. Though, the further they are 
 
 ON TUli GRADATIONS OF S(TKNCE. 
 
 181 
 
 pressed, the more power they display ; though they 
 admit, in ])ractice, of a minute elaboration to an 
 extent which beforehand would be simply in- 
 credible; though they transcend the limits of 
 observation, and become i)rophetic at the time, to 
 derive afterwards fresh credit from the verification 
 of their predictions; yet one important part of 
 their office is to account for the past. This is 
 seldom the case with Pure Science. That, for the 
 most part, gives at once the fact and the reason. 
 It does not usually derive the knowledge of a truth 
 from some extraneous source, and then account 
 for it in virtue of certain known laws; but, ft'om 
 these laws, reaches out to new propositions, which, 
 but for it, would have remained unknown. Not 
 so the Applied Sciences, which have generally, in 
 all their provinces, to account for facts which are 
 known from Observation and other independent 
 sources, before they are trusted in the field where 
 Reason supersedes Sense, and takes a free flight 
 beyond the regions of Experiment. 
 
 But if the Applied Sciences be thus deficient in 
 Unity, a more serious objection Hes against the 
 next Class of Sciences, which we call Classificalorij. 
 Of these, we may take Botany as an example. 
 They have indeed a sufficiently perfect Unity of 
 Idea. P^very fact of BotcUiy, for instance, bears 
 naturally on the Idea of Vegetable Life. The mind 
 is never in suspense, never seems wandering from 
 its subject. All the C'onceptions group themselves. 
 
182 
 
 ON THE GUADATlOiNS OF SCIKNCE. 
 
 whether readily or not, at least with obvious 
 reference to a single purpose. And therefore the 
 Classificatory Sciences exhibit, in their fullest 
 perfection, the system of Classification, and the 
 practical use of the Predicables. Accidents are 
 not excluded from their cognisance, as in the 
 higher forms of Science. Varieties, for instance, 
 or those modifications of the s])ecies which are not 
 necessarily permanent, though they seem prac- 
 tically to be so; the habitat of a plant, or its 
 ceconomic uses, though confessedly Accidents, find 
 their place in a Botanical treatise. Definition 
 also is perfectly exhibited, though its position here 
 is very different from that which it occupies in 
 Pure Science. There, as we have seen, the Species 
 are first defined, and then certain Attributes, which 
 we at once recognise as Properties, either in 
 the stricter or looser sense of the term, are affixed 
 to them by the process of inference. In the 
 Classificatory Sciences we begin at the other 
 extreme. A mass of Attributes is phiced before 
 us ; we have to arrange them in such a manner, 
 as to determine what constitute the Class (in other 
 words, enter into its Definition), and what do not. 
 And those Attributes which fall under the latter 
 head, according as they are permanent or not, 
 are distributed into the remaining classes of 
 Property and Accident. 
 
 But the great deficiency of thc.>L' Sciences, in 
 spite of their combining correct Classification and 
 
 ON THE (iUADATlONS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 183 
 
 Division with a sufiKcient Unity, lies in their lack of 
 Consequentiality. Let the facts be arranged in 
 the best possible manner ; the principle of cohesion 
 is still wanted. The facts must be taken on trust; 
 they bear Httle or no evidence to their own truth; 
 they resemble, when combined, some piece of 
 Mosaic work, which must be held together by a 
 frame, or it would fall to pieces ; they require 
 the check of evidence, and the support of observa- 
 tion. In Geometry, no position of Euclid can be 
 ignored or doubted by one who has paid due 
 attention to the treatise, without his exposing him- 
 self to the charge of folly or wilfulness. In the 
 Applied Sciences, when certain premises are granted, 
 all doubt as to the sequel is put out of the question. 
 But in Mineralogy or Botany, each separate asser- 
 tion admits of dispute ; the proof of any one will 
 not serve to estabhsh any other : all the internal 
 evidence of the truth of a system lies in the 
 natural air of its details, and the consistency of its 
 general features. 
 
 Is there then, it may be asked, no Consequen- 
 tiality in the Classificatory Sciences ? May we 
 not say here, as well as in Mathematics, that the 
 Properties are traceable to the nature of the Species, 
 as effect to cause ? When, for instance, monocoty- 
 ledonous i)lants are found to be endogens, while 
 dicotyledonous plants are exogens, may we not 
 say that these modes of growth are consequences, 
 respectively, of the single and double cotyledon ? 
 
184 
 
 ON THE GRADATIONS OF SCIENCt. 
 
 We answer, in the first place, that while it would 
 be rash to deny all consequentiality to the Classifi- 
 catory Sciences, we may safely assert, that, when 
 compared to the previous kinds of Sciences, they 
 prove in this respect greatly deficient. It is certain 
 that we have here no such knowledge of the laws 
 of consequence as to enable us to predict results. 
 No one could have told a priori, that mono- 
 cotyledonous plants are endogens; no one can 
 venture safely on hke predictions hereafter. All 
 attempts at anticipation on such subjects must 
 depend on Analogies, which often fail, and can 
 never be more than probable evidence. So that, 
 at best, Consequentiahty shows itself here in its 
 lowest form. We must be abundantly content, if, 
 having traced our facts first, we can discover the 
 reasons afterwards. 
 
 We should further observe, that it is by no 
 means the same thing to be sure that consequence 
 exists, that two phenomena are connected as cause 
 and effect : and to be able to investigate the stages 
 of the consequence, to have the history, so to 
 speak, of the causahty. One phenomenon may 
 invariably, so far as our observation goes, follow 
 and attend upon another; and yet we may perceive 
 such a gap in the nature of things between them, 
 as may serve to convince us that there must bJ 
 some remote law, as yet perhaps undiscovered, on 
 which their connection depends. To take our 
 former example: thus much seems clear, that 
 
 ON THE GRADATIONS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 185 
 
 endogenous growth is the consequence of the pre- 
 sence of but one cotyledon : but the fact of the 
 consequence does not explain its mystery; its law 
 is still unknown. Admitting that the phenomena 
 do accompany each other, we enquire zvliy ; and at 
 present, in vain. 
 
 We may now briefly state the sum of the previous 
 remarks on the gradations of Science. Pure 
 Science, we have seen, is the type which unites 
 perfections elsewhere separate, and in which Unity 
 of structure and complete Classification meet with 
 perfect Consequence. In the Applied Sciences, the 
 Consequence, when the premises are once given, 
 may be as perfect, but the Unity is of a lower kind, 
 and depends less entirely on the Idea. The Clas- 
 sificatory Sciences have a Unity nearly as perfect 
 as that of Pure Science, with a Classification as 
 perfect, and of yet wider range. But here the 
 parts are bound together by a loose tie, and the 
 scientific mind regrets the absence of Consequen- 
 tiality. 
 
 One observation remains to be made at this part 
 of our subject. Sciences are sometimes compli- 
 cated. Observation and Reason go together to 
 make up the whole. An inductive process, which 
 is mainly one of Classification, is to be gone through 
 before the premises are gained from which the 
 deduction begins. And this process is not always, 
 in the less exact Sciences, considered as antecedent 
 to the Science, but sometimes as a part of it. Thus in 
 
ISCy 
 
 ON THK GRADATIONS OF SCIKNCK. 
 
 ON THE GRADATIONS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 187 
 
 Harmonics the relation of theiniinber of vibrations to 
 sound, though a matter of experiment, is recognised 
 as part of the Science ; though it serves mainly as 
 the preHminary to other i)arts, which deduce hence 
 the laws of harmony and discord as dependent on 
 numl)er. 
 
 Sciences Hke these take their place according to 
 their predominant element. We nuist analyse 
 them, and rank them higher or lower, as the Em- 
 pirical or the Rational preponderates. 
 
 There is another Class of Compound Sciences, 
 such as Geology, and, especially of late. Astronomy, 
 which assume another form. First of all, a certain 
 set of phenomena are collected and arranged : a 
 number of truths are gained by inference, observ- 
 ation, or both. So far the ordinary procedure of 
 Science is observed. We state, after due consider- 
 ation, what is true at present. But another Class 
 of questions soon comes in. We ask, wliat condi- 
 tions of things in past time these present truths 
 presuppose. These are some of the most interest- 
 ing problems connected with Science. Who is not 
 anxious to know, what we can lawfully infer as to 
 the state of the earth in past ages, from the present 
 facts of its stratification and organic remains; — how 
 far celestial phenomena make the nebular hypo- 
 thesis probable ;— and whether the optical ])r()j)erties 
 of the diamond oblige us to assign it a vegetable 
 
 origm 
 
 ) 
 
 
 nomena that Science, in the strict sense, deals. In 
 attaining or arranging these, it occupies itself. The 
 further queries resulting hence, in deciding which 
 we must infer what has been formerly from what 
 is now, do not belong properly to Scientific Method. 
 There is here no subordination and arrangement, 
 but only a question, as to the practical connection 
 of fact with fact. We can only ask— does the 
 existing state of things necessitate the belief, that 
 another economy, differing in certain given respects, 
 existed at a certain given time ? Our facts are as 
 so many witnesses in a court of justice. To decide 
 whether they prove their point, appertains not to 
 Scientific Method, but to the ordinary laws of 
 Evidence. 
 
 In cases of this kind, it is with the present phe- 
 
ON METHOD IN ART. 
 
 189 
 
 J 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 ON METHOD IN ART 
 
 We should wander far from the direct hne of 
 our enquiry, were we to allow ourselves to enter 
 fully on the place of Method in Art. It would be 
 no trifling undertaking to attempt an Analysis 
 of the rapid glance of Invention, or the cooler 
 exertion of the critical faculty. The comparative 
 inexactness of Method in this province gives a 
 wider scope for speculation concerning it. The 
 two great divisions of Art, the mechanical and the 
 aesthetical, might put in separate claims for dis- 
 cussion. We should have to assign due place and 
 proportion to the skill which adapts means to ends, 
 the fine taste which discriminates results, the 
 broad general theories of beauty and fitness, which 
 the Artist is supposed, often unconsciously, to obey. 
 We might wander freely on the enchanted ground : 
 but should soon find ourselves far from the do- 
 minion of Logic. 
 
 Our task, with regard both to Art, and to 
 Morality, which in this point of view is closely 
 connected with it, is of a much simpler nature. 
 We are to avoid entering unnecessarily on their 
 
 i 
 
 , » 
 
 peculiarities, and content ourselves with consider- 
 ing those features in which their procedure is 
 identical with, or stands in intimate relation to, the 
 Logical Method of Science. 
 
 Art, then, like Science, has to consider the 
 relations of certain Conceptions to an Idea. There 
 can be no true Art when an Idea is altogether 
 absent. There may be much empirical skill, great 
 accuracy in imitation, close observation of detail, 
 but no genius, invention, or originality. 
 
 Yet, on the other hand, there seems to be truth 
 in the position, that Art does not deal with Ideas. 
 Its work is the production of actual individual 
 Things. It seems to wander beyond its province, 
 and confound itself as the case may be, with 
 Mechanics, or ^Esthetics, or some narrower Science, 
 when it quits individuals, and meddles with prin- 
 ciples at all. 
 
 These two sides of truth may thus be reconciled. 
 Art has, indeed, to do with individual things. But 
 each of these will fall not under one Idea only, 
 but under several, will bear a definite relation to 
 them, and be capable of receiving illustration from 
 them. In other words, the subject of a single 
 Art lies within the sphere of several Sciences. 
 And it cannot be expedient to neglect the light 
 which methodized knowledge may thus cast upon 
 it. These Sciences can be made practically useful, 
 if knowledge is really power. And how are they 
 to be brouglit to bear ? Not surely in an irregular 
 
w 
 
 fi": 
 
 190 
 
 ON METHOD IN ART. 
 
 0\ MKTIIOI) IN ART. 
 
 191 
 
 and desultory manner. This would be a con- 
 tradiction of their nature. The several Sciences, 
 which claim so nnich order and arrangement in 
 their respective provinces, cannot be in a state of 
 anarchy among themselves. One Science will be 
 dominant above the rest; and the Idea of that 
 Science will be the Idea of the Art. 
 
 Must, then, the Idea on which an Art is founded 
 be necessarily a Scientific Idea ? It would seem 
 not. After all the attention that has been devoted 
 to the Philosophy of Fine Arts, a real Science of 
 ^Esthetic has never been attained. We have not 
 been able to state satisfactorily in a deductive form 
 the nature of the Beautiful. But, though the 
 Science has been absent, the Art has gone on. It 
 is sufficient that there is no antecedent impossibility 
 of such an expansion of the/Esthetical Idea. Mean- 
 while, Art has lost little of its dignity and nothing 
 of its vmity ; though it has continued deficient in 
 certainty. Comparatively little fiiith has been 
 shown in general rules, and more reliance neces- 
 sarily placed in the individual sense of the Beauti- 
 ful. 
 
 Art, then, being like Science, conversant both 
 with Conceptions and Ideas, it is natural to enquire, 
 to what kind of Science it is most closely analogous. 
 In its perfect form it approaches closely to the 
 Apphed Sciences. To the type of Pure Science it 
 cannot at all approximate. Its constant appeal to 
 the outward world and experience, its endeavours 
 
 to m(*et particular wants and gratify particular 
 senses, separate it clearly from the range of i\ 
 priori truth. The empirical element, though not 
 always equally prominent, must be always present. 
 And if we can trace in Art, as we can in Apphed 
 Science, not only the subordination of the Con- 
 ceptions to the Idea, but the reason of that sub- 
 ordination, our approximation to scientific con- 
 sistency is so much the closer. Yet such syste- 
 matic completeness is quite unnecessary for prac- 
 tical purposes. And it is only when we can brin^- 
 the laws of number to bear on our subject, that it 
 can be really obtained. In other cases, we may 
 well rest content with the same comparatively 
 vague notions of consequence which we have 
 observed to exist in the Classificatory Sciences. It 
 will suffice us to infer from the unity of sequence 
 that it takes place in virtue of a law of causation, 
 without pretending to discover how that law 
 operates. 
 
 We shall soon have occasion, in treating of 
 Analysis and Synthesis, to mention some points in 
 which Art and Science are differently related to 
 Logic. Meanwhile, tliere seems a necessity for a 
 few remarks on the relation, with regard to Method, 
 of Morality to Science. 
 
 i 
 
II 
 
 '1/ 
 
 h 
 
 UN MKTHOn IN MORALITY. 
 
 193 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 ON METHOD IN MORALITY 
 
 Morality may stand to Method in two different 
 relations, between which it is important for our 
 present purpose to distinguish. In the first place, 
 it may be viewed as a Science — that great Science 
 of Human Conduct in general, which enters into 
 the springs of action, and the intellect and feeHngs 
 so far as they concern action. In this sense, it 
 forms the basis of Politics and Rhetoric, and to some 
 extent even of Poetry and the Fine Arts, as well as 
 of Morality in that second sense, which shall be 
 mentioned presently. But, important though it 
 be, it needs no separate discussion of its Method, 
 being in fact a Classificatory Science; more ele- 
 vated in its character indeed than any other of its 
 Class, and, as it deals with internal rather than 
 external phenomena, proportionably more difficult 
 of attainment ; but still, conforming to the same 
 laws, and arriving at its results by a similar 
 process. Morality, in its second and lower aspect, 
 is subject to the same conditions of Logical Method 
 as Art. It might indeed be defined as the Art 
 of Right Action, did not common usage restrict Art 
 
 to a narrower range, and assign to it some definite 
 end, short of the perfection of human conduct in 
 general. Assuming then that its Method is broadly 
 the same as that of other Arts, we will mention a 
 few peculiarities, which are intimately connected 
 with its nature. 
 
 It is, then, closely allied to those Arts, which are 
 grounded on some elevated Idea, not as yet made 
 the subject of a perfect Science. There is no 
 commonly recognised and admitted Science of 
 Goodness ; no system of arranging those phe- 
 nomena of human conduct which we call Good, 
 on which Philosophers in general agree. At such 
 a system we have seen many elaborate attempts, 
 but none successful. Thus the Art of Morality is 
 dignified rather than perfect; and, where it most 
 succeeds in accuracy of detail and practical co- 
 gency, is deficient in theoretic dependence on its 
 first principles. We allow the connection of the 
 phenomena in fact, rather than perceive the 
 reason. In this respect it is closely analogous 
 to the Fine Arts. Nor can we be surprised at any 
 extent to which the parallelism runs, when we 
 remember the close connection between the Ideas 
 of Goodness and Beauty. But this Art, however 
 complete, could scarcely be of great practical 
 utility to those who would become good. Its 
 advantageous exercise implies the full recognition 
 of the Idea of Goodness. And, in such recognition. 
 Moral Excellence is presupposed. Again, we are 
 
 o 
 
194 
 
 ON METHOD IN MORALITY. 
 
 ON METHOD IN MORALITY 
 
 195 
 
 incapable of using an Art aright, unless we are 
 familiar, not only with its rules, but with the 
 purposes for which it is employed. But the Art 
 of Morality aims at producing good action ; and 
 good action, pliilosophically viewed, is an internal 
 phenomenon, which can be known only by our.own 
 experience, and not by observation of others. 
 Therefore to apply the Moral Art advantageously, 
 we must be good already. 
 
 This seems a paradox, but it is not far from the 
 truth. The Art of Morality is practically identical 
 with that of Education. He who is acquainted 
 with it applies it not to his own case, but to that 
 of others. They are, if possible, to benefit by his 
 experience; and attain the same end, but by a 
 shorter and more direct process. 
 
 There is the more occasion for this remark, 
 because the misapplication of the Art in question 
 involves considerable danger. The object of its 
 rules is to enable those, for whose benefit they are 
 meant, to realise more vividly the Moral Idea in 
 general, and to attain clearer Moral perceptions in 
 detail. But the knowledge of a rule whicli they 
 think they can obey without hesitation and doubt, 
 may lead them to neglect the exercise of those 
 perceptive and reflective powers, by which alone 
 they can really apprehend tiie Moral Conceptions, 
 and combine them under the Idea. In a case of 
 this nature, the endeavour after systematic culti- 
 vation may thwart the very tendencies which it 
 
 I 
 
 seemed likely to forward. Thus a loose and 
 imperfect casuistry, or any casuistry out of its 
 place, does harm. In the former case, it degrades 
 the Moral sense which adapts itself to its standard; 
 in the latter case, it hinders its operation by seem- 
 ing to render it unnecessary. We should have 
 little hope of excellence in a painter, who followed 
 some general law of Beauty which he thought he 
 had discovered, in spite of the evidence of his eye 
 given to the contrary side. In like manner we 
 cannot hold him to be really good, who sacrifices 
 to some formula of Right and Wrong which he 
 thinks to contain the truth, the unbiassed verdict 
 of a reflective and uncorrupted Conscience. 
 
 What, then, are the points of resemblance and 
 difference, with regard to Method, between Art 
 and Morality on the one hand, and Science on the 
 other ? We have, it has been seen, in each an 
 Idea, and Conceptions ranged under it. We have 
 in each as much Subordination and Consequen- 
 tiality as the nature of the subject admits. But 
 in purpose and practical application, as well as in 
 form, there is a strong contrast between them. 
 All Science, as such, aims mainly at the illustration 
 or expansion of its original Idea. In this. De- 
 ductive and Inductive Sciences agree. Thus far, 
 the same impression is made by the successive 
 Deductions which follow in Geometry from the 
 Idea of Space, and the multiplied phenomena 
 
 n 2 
 

 196 
 
 ON METHOD IN MORALITY. 
 
 which we group under the Idea of Lite in Botany 
 or Zoology. The central unity is brought more 
 vividly before the mind by being traced and followed 
 through the plurality of detail. 
 
 Not so with Art. Its every-day work of pro- 
 duction keeps it from this continual tendency 
 towards an ideal centre. When the Idea can be 
 traced in the lower mechanical arts, it seems often 
 to be merely instrumental, and to discharge the 
 office, so to speak, of an intellectual fulcrum, 
 which may enable us to bring our Conceptions to 
 bear the better upon practice. The Critic may 
 trace the Idea in the Conception ; the Artist is 
 only careful to illustrate the Conception by the 
 Idea. This seems to be true even in the Fine 
 Arts and in Morals. How little need the Artist 
 be conscious of that theory of Beauty, which, were 
 he a philosopher, he would in strict consistency 
 adopt. And how wholly ignorant are many who 
 act in the spirit of the institutions under which 
 they live, or are pledged to the moral precepts of 
 the school in which they are educated, of the 
 really distinctive features of the system, which 
 they every day exhibit with sufficient success in 
 practice ! 
 
 One other point of difference, and that not un- 
 important, between the Method of Art and Science, 
 remains to be mentioned. It will find its place in 
 the following remarks on the nature and applica- 
 tion of Analysis and Synthesis. 
 
 <f) 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 We have hitherto considered Science and Art 
 from one point of view only. The question before 
 us has been, what form they assume, when they 
 have attained comparative perfection. The shape 
 which they take in earlier stages, the process they 
 go through on their way to a fuller development, 
 we have scarcely touched upon. Some remarks 
 on this point will bring us well nigh to the close 
 of our subject. 
 
 The method of attainment is indeed far from 
 prominent in Science. The reason of this is found 
 in the very meaning of the term. We cannot at- 
 tach the name of Science to any knowledge which 
 is confessedly very imperfect both in form and 
 matter, deficient in its parts, and unshapely in its 
 proportions. The task of elaborating it is in- 
 cumbent on a very few. Most men receive it from 
 some higher mind, which, in constructing it, 
 registered only its successes and results ; not its 
 doubts, much less its failures. We see only the 
 
198 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 finished work, not the rough side of the tapestry. 
 And thus, though Science of course imphes a 
 previous process, it does not suggest it to the 
 common observer, or call his attention to it. 
 
 It is very different with Art, which, as we have 
 seen, seldom, if ever, attains this pitch of systematic 
 perfection. At best, it is struggling towards the 
 type, itself not the highest, of Applied Science. 
 Here we are obliged to contemplate tendencies as 
 well as results, the nature and direction of mental 
 effort, as distinct from that which it effects. The 
 more so, because Art cannot, like Science, afford 
 (0 xmity in order to gain system. It is needed as 
 bearing directly on tlie actual work of Life. It is 
 a tool for certain purposes, which must be used when 
 its purposes require. If it be not perfect, we must 
 take it as we find it. We gladly use the indifferent 
 Physician who is at hand, while we dispatch the 
 messenger to summon some more skilful leech 
 from a distance. In k\\ then, the Method of 
 discovery is almost always as prominent as that of 
 perfect statement ; and often much more so. 
 
 It is this which is commonly expressed by the 
 formula, that Science is Synthetical and Art 
 Analytical, — a formula which, in its bearings on 
 our subject, will require some explanation. And 
 the first ste]) toward this is, to assign to the terms. 
 Analysis and Synthesis, a definite and accurate 
 
 meaning. 
 
 One ordinary manner of explaining tbem. 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 199 
 
 though true on the whole, is not satisfactory. 
 According to this view, all reasoning from part to 
 whole, is Synthesis; all reasoning from whole to 
 part, is Analysis. And this explanation tallies 
 sufficiently well with the connnon use of the terms. 
 Its imperfection is, that, practically, it is apt to 
 become indefinite. Our notions of Whole and 
 Part are liable to vary ; Genus is a whole in one 
 received sense, and Species in another. Thus 
 the distinction between Analysis and Synthesis is 
 made to rest on the uncertain foundation of a 
 shifting meaning. But it seems unwise to leave 
 the force of words so commonly received, liable to 
 a sudden inversion, and to oblige them to share 
 the ambiguity of other terms, with which they 
 have not any obvious connection. 
 
 Perhaps we shall find here our best guide to the 
 strict truth in following a Metaphor. For Me- 
 taphors we must use, in describing intellectual 
 operations. Our only choice lies between using them 
 in an ignorant and unguarded, and a conscious and 
 careful, manner. What then is the source of the 
 figure by which Analysis and Synthesis are applied 
 to acts of the mind ? If we regarded the Present 
 only, we should be apt to answer, from the Science 
 of Chemistry. But the history of the terms obhges 
 us to look for their origin further back, in the 
 language of the Ancient Mathematics. 
 
 Analysis, according to the old Mathematicians, 
 
200 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 was the exact reverse of Synthesis, to which it 
 was meant to mhiister. It was the indirect Method 
 by which a knowledge of the direct process of 
 proof was gained. Supposing our object to be, 
 to estabhsh the truth of a certain theorem, or 
 to discover the manner of solving a problem ; we 
 begin according to the Analytical Method, by 
 assuming that the theorem is true, or the problem 
 possible of solution. Without this primary as- 
 sumption, the Analysis could not proceed. But, 
 this being granted, the question follows — what 
 other suppositions are involved in supposing this 
 theorem to be true, or this problem to be possible ? 
 In the answer to this question the Analytical 
 process lies. We regard the assumption we have 
 made as implying certain prior assumptions. These 
 are again perceived to depend on certain more 
 elementary positions. And so we trace the chain 
 of consequence backward, till we arrive at those 
 data which the Science with which we are at 
 present concerned presupposes as its foundation. 
 The Analysis is then complete, and the Synthesis 
 forthwith begins. 
 
 We have here supposed the Analytical process 
 to terminate in success. This of course need not 
 happen. Our original assumption may have been 
 wrong. Or, if not absolutely and certainly false, 
 it may be wholly incapable of being established by 
 the aid of the Science which we have endeavoured 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 201 
 
 to bring to bear upon it. In the former case, if 
 we proceed far enough, the Analysis will suddenly 
 be brought to a stand. We shall find ourselves 
 involved in the contradiction of some axiom or 
 other fundamental position of the Science we have 
 been employing. In the latter case, the process 
 may be continued, till we arrive at certain posi- 
 tions, of which a further Analysis is impossible; 
 and these will prove not to be data of the Science 
 with which we are dealing. They may be very 
 possibly Propositions the truth or falsehood of 
 which we may not be able to ascertain ; and our 
 investigation will then have arrived at no satis- 
 factory termination. 
 
 But, supposing the Analysis to be successful, 
 the Synthesis follows as a matter of course. The 
 connection between our assumption and the data 
 of the Science holds; but it is viewed from the 
 contrary extreme. The same truth is now built 
 on a sure foundation, which before was poised for 
 the time, so to speak, in a vacuum. The same 
 steps are taken forward in certainty, which were 
 taken backward in doubt. And thus the whole 
 field which we have traversed in enquiry, we 
 traverse again in proof. 
 
 We can now see the especial propriety of taking 
 our explanation of Analysis from this ancient 
 source, rather than from more modern quarters. 
 For it enables us to regard pure Science as 
 supplying the perfect type of Analysis, as well as 
 
202 
 
 ON ANALYSIS ANL SYMUtSIS. 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 203 
 
 of Synthesis. Its hypothetical character, more- 
 over, is thus most strongly brought before us. 
 Whenever we are prepared ultimately to rest the 
 proof of our position on pure Deduction, it appears 
 that no Induction is necessary before making the 
 assumption which the Analysis presupposes. Facts 
 may suggest this assumption, but we do not expect 
 them to prove it. If it be based at last on any 
 other evidence than that of the Deductive process 
 itself, it can only be in a secondary sense a De- 
 ductive conclusion. It is not pure Science, but 
 Science in a lower form, which accounts for facts 
 which are known to be true already on evidence 
 other than its own. 
 
 Thus we are led to observe, that the Analytical 
 process is hypothetical, exactly in the same pro- 
 portion as the corresponding Synthetical process 
 is certain and complete in itself. It was in all 
 probability at first an unproved assumption on the 
 part of Pythagoras, that the square of the hypo- 
 thenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the 
 square of the two remaining sides. He had seen 
 this equahty, we may imagine, in a single instance 
 of a right-angled triangle, and supposed tliat it 
 apphed to all. When the Analysis consequent on 
 this assumption was attempted, the truth of the 
 Proposition remained doubtful, till every link 
 between the first principles of Geometry and the 
 wished-for result was obtained. But, tliis cliain 
 once formed, the case was altered. Each step 
 
 was certain in itself, and a sure basis for what 
 followed. Every intermediate position between 
 the data and the conclusion, as well as the con- 
 clusion itself, assumed, so to speak, a new Modality ; 
 and from being doubtful and contingent, became a 
 necessary truth. 
 
 In the Apphed Sciences, as we descend lower, 
 the Analytical process becomes less perfect. Here 
 we demand greater evidence before we make our 
 necessary assumption. For the most part indeed, 
 though not always, we require proof of it as a 
 matter of fact. The occurrence of any apparently 
 exceptional phenomenon does not at once set us 
 speculating as a matter of course about its causes. 
 We rather distrust appearances, and, if experiment 
 can give us information on the subject, have re- 
 course to it that we may learn whether the 
 seeming exception is only a mistake of our own. 
 Or, if it lie beyond the province of experiment, we 
 generally wait till time gives fresh opportunities of 
 observation, and so enables us to form a more 
 perfect judgment. The many new phenomena of 
 light, for instance, which were discovered by 
 chance, were carefully tested before philosophers 
 endeavoured to account for them. Here then, as 
 the Synthesis is of a less scientific character, the 
 corresponding Analysis is of a lower order also. 
 It is no longer the procedure from an uncertainty 
 to a certainty, but the procedure from one certainty, 
 through a series of uncertainties, to another and a 
 
 y 
 
w$ 
 
 204 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 205 
 
 prior certainty. While the Synthesis, in like 
 manner, only gives us, for the most part, the con- 
 nection between known laws and certain previously 
 known facts, without so often enabling us to pre- 
 dict facts in virtue of their dependence on laws. 
 
 It was before observed, that the ConsequentiaHty, 
 which in some sense is present in all Sciences, 
 appears in mere Classificatory Science in a very 
 imperfect degree, being traceable, indeed, only by 
 the aid of probabihties and general analogy. We 
 will further remark, that they exhibit Analysis in 
 a hke shadowy manner. Their object is, to arrange 
 certain phenomena under an Idea. This is effected 
 by means of intermediate generalisations, which we 
 interpose in order between the Idea and the phe- 
 nomena according to their degree of Universality. 
 But these generalisations are lawful, only so far as 
 they tally with the actual facts of Nature. Our 
 Classes must be such as she, by the regular dis- 
 tribution of their Attributes, shows that she re- 
 cognises. There is in their connection with each 
 other no definite ConsequentiaHty, which warrants 
 us in leaving any step for the time unverified, in 
 the confidence that it will receive at last sufficient 
 confirmation by being referred to some higher 
 truth as its authority. Each separate step nuist 
 be estabhshed by a separate observation. Thus 
 our Analysis becomes the faintest image of the 
 true Analytical process. We do not doubt the 
 certainty, either of the Idea, or of the facts, or of 
 
 7 
 
 J 
 
 t 
 
 the intermediate generalisations. All that we can 
 doubt, is their admitting of arrangement in a com- 
 plete and orderly series : and it is this only, that 
 the Analysis enables us to ascertain. Within this 
 comparatively narrow province, it still continues 
 highly useful. We have much more facility in 
 beginning from facts, and widening our Classes as 
 we ascend, than in thinking according to the 
 Synthetical Method, and narrowing our Classes in 
 regular gradation from the Idea. 
 
 It remains to mention the manner in which Art 
 avails itself of Analysis. The Method of Art, it will 
 be remembered, approximates to the type of Applied 
 Science. Analysis, then, will hold, theoretically, 
 a similar position in each ; though the practical 
 nature of Art has some effect upon its prominence 
 and importance. 
 
 Conscious Analysis, indeed, does not seem very 
 common in the Fine Arts. The Critic by his 
 researches often shows that principles are really 
 involved in the works of an artist, which the artist 
 himself has probably never reaHsed in their ab- 
 stract form. He exempHfies the laws of Science, 
 not in consequence of any intentional study of 
 them, but in virtue of that taste, that perception 
 of beauty in the concrete, which is developed by 
 increased observation, and the careful scrutiny of 
 particulars. 
 
 Perhaps in this field the most common use of 
 Analysis is in investigating the cause of defects. 
 
206 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTH KSIS. 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESFS. 
 
 207 
 
 Something offends, we know not why. In the 
 endeavour to refer it back to first principles, we 
 shall discover that some rule has been transgressed, 
 some harmony violated, some canon of consistency 
 broken. Thus very early attempts at Art often 
 fail at the first touch of Analysis ; they are de- 
 fective in consistency ; though the parts may be 
 right in themselves, on no possible hypothesis 
 could the whole be true. The same reason is 
 fatal to the attempt of a Chinese artist to depict 
 all six sides of an interior at once ; and to the 
 conventional Egyptian representation of a man, 
 in which the head, body, and lower members are 
 depicted in three incompatible positions ; and 
 to the head of Minerva on the archaic coins of 
 Athens, in which the full eye, which figures ap- 
 propriately in the front-face, is transferred without 
 modification to the profile. 
 
 In the earlier stages of the Fine Arts, this seems 
 to be the only use of Analysis. Even in their most 
 flourishing state there seems little of that doubt 
 and indecision which the Analytical process im- 
 plies. Great works are owing to the magic of 
 Genius, and not to any formal process of thought. 
 But when invention waxes cold, and thoucfht turns 
 less readily to the aspirations of the present than 
 to the glories of the past, then Analysis steps in. 
 It gives rules according to which Art has uncon- 
 sciously produced certain effects, with a view to 
 their reproduction ; and these rules will fall under 
 
 the Idea, so far as the nature of the case admits, 
 according to the ordinary Method of Science. 
 
 It has been before observed, that the Fine Arts, 
 in the absence of a Science of iEsthetics, do not 
 admit of a near approach to the Scientific Method. 
 This is not the case with many Mechanical Arts. 
 Some of these afford an opportunity for strict con- 
 sequence in the formation of the rules, which can 
 be deduced from certain empirical principles by 
 means of the laws of Space and Number. Of this 
 nature are many practical applications of the laws 
 of Hydraulics, .and Pneumatics, and Projectiles. 
 Here the Svnthetical arran«^ement is more than a 
 form : and the Method of Art, by coinciding with 
 its type, loses its individuahty, and melts into that 
 of Applied Science. 
 
 Our mention of Analysis has hitherto been con- 
 fined to cases, in which it is usual, when the 
 tentative process is complete, to adopt the Syn- 
 thetical Method of statement, as more scientific 
 and formal. Analysis, however, is not always thus 
 subordinate, as may be shown by any simple instance 
 from the Analytical Mathematics. In a common 
 Algebraic Equation, one or more unknown quanti- 
 ties are posited, and the consequences are traced 
 backward, till those quantities become known. It 
 is not considered necessary to reverse the process, 
 and so to show that the results attained actually 
 fulfil the conditions, which the unknown quantities 
 Were assumed to fulfil in the original formula. 
 
 /' 
 
208 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 Another instance in which Analysis is perfect 
 without any corresponding Synthesis is found in 
 the ordinary process of Dehberation, which has 
 sometimes gained, in consequence, the name of 
 practical Analysis. Those who deliberately desire 
 any object which they have reason to suppose is 
 within their reach, begin, as the first step towards 
 attaining it, to posit it as an end of action. This 
 is, of course, in most cases, a mere assumption. 
 Observation may have shown that the object is 
 attainable by some: but they cannot be sure, 
 without previous consideration of particulars, that 
 it is attainable by them. Nevertheless, they take 
 for the time this doubtful point for granted : and 
 thus make that venture, which all Analysis, in a 
 greater or less degree, requires. The question now 
 becomes, through what means their end is to be 
 attained. Here the Analytical procedure comes 
 in. They consider, what antecedent conditions on 
 their part the attainment of this object requires, 
 and to what conditions these in their turn are 
 subject. Thus they proceed, precisely as in Ma- 
 thematical Analysis, until they arrive at certain 
 elementary conditions which their own conscious- 
 ness tells them are w^ithin their powers — certain 
 acts of their individual will, and the natural expres- 
 sions of it in word or deed. The Analysis is perfect 
 when the agent can say — If I will and do this, as 
 I can will and do it, all that I desire will follow. 
 Then Deliberation ceases, and Choice begins. It 
 
 ON ANALYSIS AND SYNTHKSIS. 
 
 209 
 
 seems better to regard the Analytical process in 
 this case as complete in itself, because the subse- 
 quent act, although reversing the order of the 
 thought, can scarcely be regarded as answering to 
 it as its Synthesis. It is too different in kind, to 
 take its place in the same Method. Though the 
 desires flow to their end through the channel which 
 Intellect has shaped for them, this does not obhte- 
 rate the broad differences, which distinguish them 
 from the Intellect itself. 
 

 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 ON THE CONNECTION OF METHOD WITH FORMAL LOCIC. 
 
 Particular Logical (juestions have found a 
 place only accidentally in the foregoing pages. 
 We could scarcely descend to detail, in considering 
 the general relation in which, at different times, 
 Logic and Science have been thought to stand to 
 each other. When this disputed point had been 
 discussed in its various phases, it was natural to 
 weigh the subordinate questions which arose from 
 the different views concerning it. And, after 
 having determined what opinions, both on the 
 main subject and on the dependent queries, seemed 
 to have truth on their side, we proceeded to point 
 to Method as a ground of union for Logic and 
 Science; and to Pure Science especially as tlie 
 common type in which Logical and Scientific 
 Method are each most perfectly exhibited. 
 
 Meanwhile, the introduction of even well-known 
 Logical terms, when they were not absolutely 
 necessary, has been purposely avoided. Our object 
 was to show the natural tendency of knowledge to 
 
 ON THE CONNKCTION OF METHOD WITH FORMAL LOGIC. 211 
 
 fall into a Logical form, and not the power of the 
 human mind to press it by violence into the mould 
 of its technicalities. But, now that our main pur- 
 pose is fulfilled, it may further, rather than impede, 
 the general impression of these pages, to observe, 
 that the apparatus of Logic not only show^s a fit- 
 ness for exhibiting particular arguments, but dis- 
 closes differences in its various portions, which 
 indicate a connection with systematic thought and 
 methodical knowledge, when considered not as split 
 up into a nuiltitude of separated arguments, but as 
 consistent w holes. On this subject w^e will dwell 
 a little in detail. 
 
 It is generally allowed by Logicians, that Syllo- 
 gism, as the formal exhibition of the act of the 
 mind in reasoning, divides itself into three principal 
 heads, namely, the Inductive, the Deductive, and 
 the Hypothetical. Whether these three forms of 
 argument are really colUiteral Species of a single 
 Genus, or whether the two latter can be reduced, 
 without loss of their dignity or derogation from 
 their utility, to the type of Deductive Syllogism, is 
 a question of considerable interest, but not bearing 
 directly on our present subject. It suffices us, 
 that, for the ordinary purpose of inference, the 
 three modes of arguing are certainly distinct. 
 
 And further, it is commonly observed with regard 
 to them, that Deductive Syllogism proceeds from 
 the law downwards, from higher Universals to low'er; 
 that Induction, on the other hand, argues from the 
 
212 
 
 ON THE CONNECTION OF METHOD 
 
 WITH FORMAL LOGIC. 
 
 213 
 
 fact to the law, from lower Universals to higher ; 
 while the Hypothetical Syllogism, ignoring this 
 distinction of law and fact, only implies, that two 
 positions are connected as antecedent and con- 
 sequent, so that, under the sanction of its own 
 peculiar rules, the denial or assertion of one in- 
 volves the denial or assertion of the other, without 
 any regard to their relative extent or degree of 
 Universality. And, of these three forms of in- 
 ference, it is generally allowed, that the Deductive 
 Syllogism, if it be not the most powerful instru- 
 ment, is at least the most perfect. 
 
 It should then surely not pass unobserved, that 
 there is a real correspondence between Deductive 
 Syllogism, which is the type of Logical Inference, 
 and Pure Science, which is the type of Methodical 
 Knowledge. It is well known that Pure Science, 
 if logically analysed, resolves itself into a series 
 of Categorical Syllogisms of the simplest and most 
 perfect form. But taking the subjects of our 
 comparison independently of each other, we trace 
 in them several points of similarity. The highest 
 form of Science, it was before remarked, exhibits 
 both the most complete subordination and the 
 strictest consequence. So it is also in the highest 
 form of inference, the Syllogism in Barbara, Here 
 subordination is most fully displayed, for the terms 
 fall at once into their natural order, the major 
 including the middle, and the middle inchiding the 
 mhm\ Thus the terms observe tlie same grada- 
 
 tion in extent, and in their place in the argument. 
 And here also we have the most complete con- 
 sequentiality ; since the conclusion follows, as a 
 necessary and obvious consequence, from the law 
 on which, since the time of Aristotle, the validity 
 of the Syllogism has been held to depend ; with- 
 out any need of alteration in its form, or the check 
 of any derived rule whatsoever. 
 
 Again, there is a close practical connection 
 between the Inductive Syllogism and Classificatory 
 Science. They afford, too, their points of theo- 
 retical resemblance. Each of them recognises 
 and requires complete subordination. This is 
 implied in the very conception of Classification, 
 and scarcely less so in that of Induction, which 
 depends on the arrangement of facts under a law. 
 This feature it has in common with Deduction, 
 from which however it differs, by inverting the 
 natural order of consequence, and arguing upward 
 instead of downward. Again, it is well known 
 that an Induction, which shall enumerate all the 
 individuals of the Class, is seldom possible, and, 
 when possible, always useless ; that we should be 
 content, under certain checks, with a limited 
 number of instances, and, when we are materially 
 right, be willing to confess ourselves formally 
 wrong. Induction then, while it does full justice 
 to subordination, is for two reasons (its formal 
 inversion, and its material imperfection), deficient 
 in Consequentiality ; and thus it exhibits just the 
 
214 
 
 ON THE CONNKCTION OF MKTHOD 
 
 same excellency, and the same defect, which cha- 
 racterize the Classificatory Sciences, of which it is 
 the recognised organ. 
 
 Lastly, we observed that Analysis in its higher 
 form began with an unproved hypothesis, and 
 then, by a retrogressive course, it felt its w^ay 
 through doubt to certainty. Each step is sure in 
 one sense, uncertain in another. The connection 
 between the several proi)ositions is clear ; they all 
 stand firm together, if a basis in fact can be found 
 for that one with which the Analysis concludes. 
 There is, therefore, a strict Consequentiality among 
 them. But, in this merely tentative process, no 
 regard is had to subordination. If w^e are only 
 assured that one link binds with another, we are 
 careless of the law in virtue of which it binds. 
 This will be brought out in the Synthesis, if we 
 follow up our research with a formal statement. 
 Or, if this theoretically correct shape be uime- 
 cessary, the Analysis will stand valid and complete 
 for practical purposes without it. And what is 
 true in this respect of Analysis, is true also of its 
 instrument, the Hypothetical Syllogism. This too 
 has a practical validity, without any reference to 
 the bearing of laws upon facts, or the gradation of 
 Universal, and without reduction to a higher Loirical 
 form. In otlier words, its Consequentiality is valid, 
 thougli it makes no pretence to Subordination. 
 
 The three principal forms of Syllogism, therefore, 
 bear their testimony to the <\i»tenee of cone- 
 
 wfTH FointAT. r,OGie. 
 
 2I,-> 
 
 spondm- divisions in Method, and show a peculiar 
 fitness to be its organs. Similar coincidences are 
 traceable in other and minor parts of the Lo-ical 
 apparatus. These, however, it is not now neces- 
 sary to mention. They will occur naturally to the 
 Student of Logic, though they could not be 
 exhibited in this work without entering on minute 
 technicalities to a degree quite foreign to its 
 purpose. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 We have now concluded, so far as the phm of 
 these pages allows, our consideration of Logical 
 Method. Had they been far more perfect in their 
 design and more exact in their execution, this 
 would not have hindered that unsatisfied feeling, 
 that craving after further Truth, which strengthens 
 with the accession of Knowledge, and is one of the 
 strongest though not of the most pleasant motives 
 for })ursuing it. 
 
 It has been well said, that the quest, and not 
 the possession, of Knowledge, is the entertainment 
 of the mind. Truth indeed is the one object of 
 our search; but the pleasures of seeking it are 
 present and real ; the pleasures of finding it lie in 
 the future, and prove too often imaginary. Even 
 when no failure intervenes between us and our 
 end, the road is almost always longer and more 
 difficult than we expected. We think ourselves 
 near the top of the mountain ; and, as we make a 
 vigorous effort to scale what seems its highest 
 crag, perceive that we are but just making our 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 217 
 
 way over its first shoulder, and that its misty 
 ridges still rise before us in uncertain grandeur, 
 and retreat as we gaze on them. 
 
 The reader of these pages cannot be more 
 painfully sensible than their writer, that, after all 
 which has been said of Method, its culminating 
 point is not reached. That highest Unity which 
 would give a meaning to the whole is wanting. 
 Granting that all Knowledge which deserves the 
 name of Science naturally arranges itself, accord- 
 ing to certain rules, under definite Ideas, the 
 question yet remains — how are these Ideas them- 
 selves arranged? Have not they too their due 
 disposition and gradation? Can we suppose that 
 there is no standard by which we can decide their 
 relative dignity and importance ? Centres of unity 
 and sources of order as they are, are they in 
 disorder among themselves ? 
 
 It is hard to suppose that they are wanting in 
 this arrangement and subordination. And yet 
 how can we discover it ? We have surrendered as 
 a vain imagination that Science of Being, of which 
 the Ancients loved to speak. It seems that power- 
 ful minds were permitted by Providence to rest on 
 the thought of the absolute Unity of Knowledge, 
 till some parts of Science were so elaborated, that 
 they could bear, in contemplating their separate 
 perfection, to dispense with the thorough con- 
 solidation of the whole. We are almost reminded 
 of Alexander's attempt at universal empire, which, 
 
 Q 
 
•218 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 as such, failed ; but left, nevertheless, real and per- 
 manent power in the hands of his Generals, to be 
 exercised over their fragmentary Kingdoms. Many 
 Sciences we know^ there can be: we now know, 
 almost with equal certainty, that, while the human 
 mind retains its present constitution, they can 
 never all meet in one. 
 
 May there not however be, in the absence of 
 this Ideal Unity, some one Science, to direct the 
 rest, though it does not combine them ? As, in 
 Practice, Prudence, which is not an Art, much less 
 the union of all, applies and regulates all those 
 arts which tend, when rightly used, to our connnon 
 well-being; may there not be in Theory also, 
 some great Science, or something above a Science, 
 to assign our speculations their place, their im- 
 portance, their proportion, their relative bearing; 
 and make them, if not in fact, at least in tendency, 
 a Whole ? 
 
 One branch of Study there is, which, in virtue 
 of its very name, points to the Highest of all 
 subjects, which yet, in its application, reaches to 
 the most delicate thoughts and finest sympathies 
 of the heart of man; w^hich tells of Infinity and 
 Eternity, and yet exhibits truths of Infinite and 
 Eternal moment under forms which have reference 
 to Space and Time ; which distinguishes betw een 
 the Permanent and the Fleeting, — the Principle, 
 and the Economies or dispensations which are 
 founded on it; which teaches the importance of 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 219 
 
 all truths, the supreme necessity of some ; to which 
 a Heathen paid involuntary homage, when he 
 gave its name to what he deemed the highest 
 reach of human thought; and which Christians 
 have delighted to honour with the title of the 
 Mother of Sciences. 
 
 Much she can teach us directly of the relative 
 importance of truths; nuich more by the temper of 
 mind and frame of thought she inculcates. She 
 rules over Knowledge, if by no other right, by that 
 of conquest: she subdued it first, to protect it 
 ever after. 
 
 And liow far is this fair Mother of Sciences 
 like her children ? Do the same formal conditions, 
 which bind them, bind her also? If they do not — 
 has she another Method of her own ; her own laws 
 of investigation, and standards of truth and false- 
 dood ? If they do—how does the nature of the 
 high and mysterious subjects with which she deals 
 affect and modify their application ? If, again, she 
 neither conforms to the ordinary rules of specula- 
 tion, nor has extraordiuciry canons of her ow^n, 
 how can the body of truth which she presents be 
 fairly studied at all ? How^ can the human mind, 
 prone, not by its perverseness and obliquity, but by 
 a right instinct and a deep principle of nature, to 
 seek for order and system, find its highest occupa- 
 tion in resting on details which may not be com- 
 bined, statements which may not be compared, 
 examples from which no principles may be extracted. 
 
M F 
 
 2*20 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 facts which refuse to incorporate themselves with 
 doctrines ? 
 
 He will do a good service to Truth, and Chris- 
 tianity, and the Church, who shall face these 
 questions fairly; and, in grave earnest, and after 
 all due preparation, venture, in a strength not 
 his own, to treat of a subject which I have not 
 ventured to handle — the application of Method 
 to Theology. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 BAXTER, PRINTER, OXIOilD. 
 
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