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M .， Sometime Fellow of Columbia University Published by the Chinese Patriotic Committee of New York City Baron Shimpei Goto in his secret document on ‘General Policies of Japanese Emigration” outlines his policy of the “Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness” and intends to make Manchuria a military colony of the Japanese Empire. ..-‘■< 0 云； ?: .^ '{!: 茳 0 穴 0 ^ 16 &嗳亨 ' 之 ^ 主體亿甘 « ±'扦 «: 在 6 \« -^云； 2 . -^ ( 2 : 極 ^ 0 戈譯 »3; ，先 '0 Is lg * 當時© 總理大 臣西園 寺侯， p 其他 Q 人 ％ 文裝的 ☆備 i 云 / 私 0 意見 4 r 容 n 6 n ' ^ i > & Tr i > - fv ^ v / s all 見 . VM Tr 文裝 的武備 ->0« 1 寸言 0 - C 見 5 t ' 文事 的施設 5 r 以 - C 他 Co 侵略 { C 備 ； f 一 且緩急 fe n ^ 武 斷的行 勸 5: 助<*0 0 便 5: 併苷<_」置<事 -?:- * -5 ^ 言、例之病 ^ 幻 ^ < -& | |1 ^ |^ (7) ! -^5炫軍 @' 病院忆使 七又鐵 ¥§鸾員 |£' 軍事 (- 彰无 <7) * st p : tc rr 5 货 »( { c 武官 0< AV 1 ?. 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Experts of military tactics have sur- veyed these regions thoroughly. Their southern route is indicated by a dotted line ( ), and their central route by a solid line -). Thirty -seven towns and villages in Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia now have resident Japanese military officers and reserve soldiers. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from Columbia University Libraries https://archive.org/details/japaneseemigratiOOchen % CONTENTS I Japan’s Emigration Policies for Manchuria and Mon- golia. 1) Baron Goto’s policy of the “Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness.” a) Definition. b) Emigrants and their equipment. c) Harmony in colonial administration in Man- churia. 2) Plan of the General Staff. A) A general scheme. a) To extend military influence. b) To make secret agreements with Mon- golian and Chinese officials. c) To open Japanese schools， charitable or- ganizations and hospitals. d) To supply arms and munitions. B) Methods of Emigration. C) Inducements to Japanese emigrants. II Japanese emigrants and their economic activities. 1) Population, density and Japanese emigrants in Man- churia. 2) Economic clash. 3) Social undesirability of Japanese in Manchuria. 4) Japanese emigration an economic failure. 5) Sino- Japanese joint enterprises. 6) Japanese monopoly of agriculture. 7) Japanese railways of political and military impor- tance. 8) Japanese emigration to Shantung. a) Economic competition. b) Strategical location of Tsingtao. 9) Japanese emigration to Fukien. III Demoralizing Influence of Japanese in China. 1) Opium and morphine smuggling. 2) The Opium Scandal in Port Arthur. 3) Comments by the Ryoto Shimpo. 4) America’s part in the anti-opium movement. 5) Opium affects Americans. IV Lack of Justification. 1) Agricultural situation in China. 2) Manchuria and Mongolia as outlets for Chinese emi- grants. 6 V Rejection of Fundamental Remedies. 1) Economic futility of emigration. 2) Birth control to check over-population. 3) Industrialization to solve Japan’s population prob- _ lem. VI New Tendencies of Japanese Emigration. 1) Japanese emigrants in various countries. 2) South America a new outlet. 3) Okuma on South America. 4) Japan’s emigration to Peru and Chile. 5) Japan’s emigration to Brazil. VII Economic Imperialism. 1) Japan’s recent acquisitions. 一 2) Emancipation of Asia. VIII Conclusions. THE ISSUE Japan has repeatedly contended that her policy of com- mercial and industrial expansion is based on an economic necessity, as she must find outlets for her surplus population. This short essay will refute her argument by showing: (1) That Japan’s emigration policies for Manchuria and Mongolia are dominated by military, political and territorial considerations. Japanese official documents, confidential re- ports and other authoritative declarations and statements are freely used in order to get evidence “out of their own mouths.” Such evidence is introduced into the English language for the first time. (2) That economic activities of Japanese immigrants in China are usually interwoven with politics to disturb peace and order. In purely commercial and industrial undertak- ings, many Japanese have not had great economic successes as they have emigrated to places of higher density and lower plane of living. (3) That immoral acts of Japanese in China are calculated to demoralize and to denationalize the Chinese people. I Japan’s Emigration Policies for Manchuria and Mongolia. 1) Baron Goto’s policy of the “Peacefully Disguised Mili- tary Preparedness.” Baron Shimpei Goto, for many years Civil Governor of Tai- wan and the most experienced colonial administrator of Japan, has laid the cornerstone of her emigration policies for the Far East in general and for China in particular. On ac- cepting the position as the first Director General of the South Manchuria Railway Administration, the Baron outlines his emigration policy known as the ‘‘Peacefully Disguised Mili- tary Preparedness” in a series of correspondence with Prince Yamagata, Saionji, (Prime Minister) Hayashi (Foreign Min- ister) Sakuma, (Governor of Taiwan) and Oshima (Governor General of Kwantung, Manchuria). This series is printed in a booklet for confidential circulation, and the printing “is only to save the trouble of copying •” Pages 55-56 of this booklet are reproduced in a photograph on the front page of this pamphlet. The booklet is entitled “General Policies of Japan’s Emi- gration” and portions of the Baron’s address at the Saiwai Club, an organization of the House of Peers, on June 5, 1914, are hereafter translated : (a) The Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness. “Prime Minister Saionji and other important officials of our government have approved my emigration policy to Man- churia, known as the ‘Peacefully Disguised Military Pre- paredness/ This policy advocates preparations for war in time of peace, so that when emergency rises military activi- ties may at once be ready. Such a scheme is very convenient for military operations. I will now give some examples. When we open hospitals in Manchuria, it should be planned that every one of them may be used as a military hospital. (On page 121 of his booklet, the Baron explains this by saying that there should be large porches to every hospital, so that a large number of beds for wounded soldiers may be placed on each porch. Today all Japanese hospitals in South Man- churia have extremely large porches.) Take another ex- ample. Railway employees in Manchuria should also be mili- tary officers. They should take orders from their superior officers to see to it that the internal organization of the rail- way administration is amply prepared for military emer- gencies. In fact, military preparedness is necessary in all parts of Manchuria and at all times. A third example refers to the ports in South Manchuria. The employees of the Bu- reau of Ports should be navy men, so that they can be of serv- ice in naval conflicts.” 1 “This policy has been approved by our government,” says the Baron, and it may be added that it is strictly enforced and enlarged to the present day. The only important change is that the Director General of the South Manchuria Railway Administration is not a military officer as the Baron first sug- gested. This change is made in order to avoid suspicion from other trading nations in the territory. (b) Emigrants and their Equipment. “Permanent victory in Manchuria,” declares Baron Goto, “largely depends upon an increase in population in Japanese General Policies of Japanese Emigration p. 55 ff. 9 colonies. German inhabitants in Alsace-Lorraine played no small part in winning for Germany the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. If Japan has 500,000 emigrants in Manchuria, and several millions of horses ， mules, and other domestic animals, they would be of great use in case of war. If in such a war ， opportunities are favorable to Japan, they can be armed at once to attack our enemy. If opportunities are unfavorable ， they can also be used to maintain strongholds for negotiating peace. The 'Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness’ thus forms my main policy in colonizing Manchuria and Korea. In brief, this emigration policy is ‘to practice the doctrine of Par in the name of Wong.’ ” 2 (The Baron is using a maxim of Chinese political philoso- phy. The doctrine of Wong stresses virtue, culture, and be- nevolence, while that of Par, force and conquest. For ex- ample, the enlightened Emperors of the Chow Dynasty were said to have practiced the imperial ways of Wong, whereas its usurping vassals that of Par. Baron Goto insists that in the name of virtue and culture, Japan should plan military conquests in China.) (c) Harmony in Colonial Administration in Manchuria. The Baron foresees possible conflict and friction between civil and military officers in Manchuria, and suggests methods, of “mediation and conciliation.” “Regarding the organiza- tion of the army and plans of mobilization, there are definite rules and regulations which must be strictly observed and en- forced by the South Manchuria Railway Administration. To avoid misunderstanding and facilitate co-operation, the head of the Japanese government and the Director General of the administration should have a thorough understanding of the Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness. They should be unanimous in their opinions and definite in their policies in order to assure a successful emigration to Manchuria.” 3 2) Plan of the General Staff. A) A general scheme. (a) To extend military influence. Recently, the General Staff of Japan has published a ^Spe- cial Number” for confidential circulation outlining its emi- gration policies in Manchuria and Mongolia. Important pas- sages are translated as follows: 2 General Policies of Japanese Emigration p. 65 ff. 3 General Policies of Japanese Emigration p. 108 ff. 10 “In North Mongolia Russia’s military influences is pre-domi- nant. The rapid increase in population in Japanese settle- ments near Cheng Chia Tun is also due to the Japanese mili- tary power in the territory. It must be clearly understood that Japan’s policy in dealing with Mongolia and China must be different from that with western nations. Since Tao-Nan, Kero, Lingsi, Chi-Fun and other towns are important for Jap- anese emigrants, Japan must at the earliest possible moment dispatch troops in the name of protecting Japanese consulates and its branches. “Besides, Japan may rely upon a noteworthy precedent for her military occupation, namely, the murder of German mis- sionaries in Kiaochow was seized by Germany as a pretext for the lease of Kiaochow. Recently, the killing of Japanese guards by bandits at Cheng Chia Tun is an excellent oppor- tunity for stationing additional troops there. “As Chinese troops and police are not sufficient to pro- tect the community from attacks by horse bandits, Japan may increase the numerical strength of the South Manchurian guards and send them to new places of Japanese emigrants .” 4 At another place, the General Staff deems it necessary to have resident military officers at Lingsi, and Chi-Fun in order to ‘‘demonstrate Japan’s national power to foreigners, Mon- golians and Chinese,” so as “to undermine their influence on the one hand and to build up Japanese influence on the other •” (b) To make secret agreements with Mongolian and Chi- nese officials. “As Chinese officials and Mongolian royalty are having financial difficulties, Japan should enter secret agreements and form an intimate relationship with them in order to pro- vide them with money for the development of commerce and industry. (c) To open Japanese schools, charitable organizations and hospitals. “These are necessary in order that the natives may be as- similated to Japanese culture gradually and unconsciously. (d) To supply arms and munitions. ‘‘Japan should decorate old rifles, guns and machine guns and sell them to Mongolians at reduced rates. This will strengthen her political influence there. Before the war Ger- Pp. 5-6. 11 many used to supply Mongolia with guns manufactured in 1888. This cunning policy should be adopted by Japan.，， 5 B) Methods of Emigration. Following general principles laid down by the General Staff, there is a certain definite procedure of Japanese emigra- tion to Mongolia. (a) ‘‘Let reserve soldiers be first dispatched to such places as Kero, Tao-Nan, Lingsi, Chi-Fun and neighboring communi- ties as emigrants, to be engaged in agriculture, pasturage, or industries. If they are attacked by horse bandits, they can defend themselves. (b) “In the name of protecting these emigrants, Japanese consulates should place reserve soldiers in strategical points. (c) “Chinese officials should be required to bear responsi- bility of protecting these emigrants. In case of murder or other important damages incurred to the Japanese, indemnity should be exacted from the Chinese.’’ 15 C) Inducements to Japanese Emigrants. To induce home seekers to Manchuria and Eastern Mon- golia, the Japanese Government gives them special privileges, which are far more liberal than those given by emigration companies to Slavic emigrants to the United States, or con- tracted Chinese laborers to the Transvaal in the Unionist Ad- ministration of England. The Japanese Government does it at a great financial sacrifice in order to gain political influence in Eastern Mongolia. (a) “The Japanese Government will loan money to farmers at a low rate of interest, give them lands, and special rates for transportation and lodging. In cases of necessity, the government will loan them farming implements, domestic ani- mals and arms for self-protection. (b) “Regarding commercial and industrial enterprises which concern national welfare or relate to international com- petition, loans will be made on applications at a low rate of interest. Without doubt, other government assistance will be given in order to assure commercial success of emigrants at an earliest possible moment. (c) “Koreans have low plane of living and low wages. Their experience and efficiency in rice growing almost equals to that of Chinese farmers. The Japanese Government should 5 Pp. 17-18. 8 P. 19. 12 induce Koreans to emigrate to Eastern Mongolia in order to resist Chinese emigration from the south and to give room for Japanese emigration to Korea. Up to the end of 1914, Korean emigrants in Mongolia already amounted to 300,000 and their number is rapidly increasing.” 7 Furthermore, Dr. Henry Chung, a Korean liberalist, has declared that Japan encourages Koreans to emigrate to Man- churia and Mongolia in order that “she may have a claim on these regions on the pretext of ‘protecting’ her Korean sub- jects and station her soldiers by what is known as ‘Infiltration Tactics’.，， 8 But the sufferings and hardships that the Korean emi- grants have undergone in this compulsory exodus are truly unbearable : “The untold afflictions of the Korean immigrants coming into Manchuria will, doubtless, never be fully realized, even by those actually witnessing their distress. In the still close- ness of a forty below zero climate in the dead of winter, the silent stream of white clad figures creeps over the icy moun- tain passes, in groups of ten, twenties and fifties, seeking a new world of subsistence, willing to take a chance of life and death in a hand-to-hand struggle with the stubborn soil of Manchuria’s wooded and stony hillsides. Here, by indefatig- able efforts, they seek to extract a living by applying the grub ax and hand hoe to the barren mountain sides above the Chi- nese fields, planting and reaping by hand, between roots, the sparse yield that is often insufficient to sustain life. “Many have died from insufficient food. Not only women and children, but young men have been frozen to death. Sick- ness also claims its toll under these new conditions of ex- posure. Koreans have been seen standing barefooted on the broken ice of a riverside fording place, rolling up their baggy trousers before wading through the broad stream, two feet deep, of ice cold water, then standing on the opposite side while they hastily adjust their clothing and shoes. “Women with insufficient clothing and parts of their bodies exposed, carry little children on their backs, thus creating mutual warmth in a slight degree, but it is in this way that the little one’s feet, sticking out from the binding basket, get frozen and afterwards fester till the tiny toes stick together. p 25. The Case of Korea, 1921, p. 115. 13 Old men and women, with bent backs and wrinkled faces, walk the uncomplaining miles until their old limbs refuse to carry them further. ‘‘Thus it is by households they come, old and young, weak and strong, big and little . . . . “In this way over 75,000 Koreans have entered during the past year, until the number of Koreans now living in both the north and western portions of Manchuria now totals nearly half a million.” 9 10 D) A summary. Hidden motives of Japanese emigration to Manchuria and Mongolia are thus revealed by a review of Japanese authori- ties. Japan aims at making Manchuria a military colony, as she is employing military men in the South Manchurian Rail- way Administration, as railway guards, and navy men at sea- ports. Special privileges are given to emigrants of military training. Recently, she has repeatedly insisted on spreading Jap- anese culture in her colonies, especially in Mongolia. This is to be done by three main methods: to extend her military power, to discredit and check Chinese influence and to enter into secret agreements with Mongolian nobility for the sole benefits of the Mikado. II. Japanese Emigrants and their Economic Activities. 1) Population, density and Japanese emigrants in Man- churia. Manchuria has an area of 92,000 square miles and 20,122,000 people of which 19,639,700 are Chinese and 473,- 500 foreigners. In other words, in a territory of a little larger than the State of Oregon live about 25 times as many inhabitants. The annual rate of increase of population in Mukden province is 3.5%, in Kirin, 8.8% and in Hei Lung Kiang, 4.5% ; whereas the annual rate of increase in Japan Proper is only 1.50% and in the United States, 1.90%. Obviously, Manchuria offers no great inducements to Jap- anese emigrants. In fact, the Bank of Chosen, under Jap- anese management and control, frankly states that "Man- churia is well inhabited, and does not leave much room for immigration. ,,10 9 Report to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. 10 Economic History of Manchuria, 1921, pp. 130-131. 14 Yet, the Japanese population in Manchuria has been on the increase in recent years, especially since the European war, as the following table will show: 11 Year Japanese in Manchuria 1910 62,627 1911 19,087 1912 38,357 1913 87,494 1914 95,352 1915 95,352 1916 102,759 1917 104,834 1918 112,474 1919 122,367 1920 156,079 The largest drop occurred in year 1911 which was due to a severe bubonic plague in Manchuria. Since that year the in- crease in numbers has been steady and continuous. In addi- tion, it must be added about 40,000 Japanese soldiers in va- rious parts of Manchuria. Regarding the question of density, comparisons are made between populousness in home communities of Japanese emi- grants and in their new homes in Manchuria. In Table 1, the Japanese Bureau of Colonization shows that eleven Jap- anese communities send their sons and daughters to Man- churia to the number of 500 persons or more per year. Most of them go to the Japenese settlements in Dairen, Port Arthur and neighboring villages. Table 2 shows the number of Japanese and Chinese in sev- enteen Manchurian towns and villages. The majority of the Japanese have come from some of the Japanese communities shown in Table 1. It is clearly seen that with the exception of Tokio-fu and Osaka-fu which have densities of 1,357 and 1,158 persons per square mile, the remaining Japanese have emigrated from places of relatively lower density to those of higher density. The Japanese argument that her emigration to China is to relieve her population pressure seems to have broken down completely. 11 Statistical Annual of the Imperial Cabinet of Japan. 15 Furthermore, Table 3 shows a Japanese estimate of the rate of increase in density in Manchurian and Mongolian com- munities up to 1928. This rate far exceeds the acreage of arable land that may be opened for cultivation. At present, the cultivated lands (in mow) 14 in districts where there are considerable number of Japanese are as follows: 15 Mukden 45,194,175 Kirin 85,985,768 Hei Lung Kiang 37,165,014 Shantung 127,097,587 Fukien 24,313,431 Jehol . 16,895,322 TABLE 1 DENSITY OF EMIGRANTS， HOME COMMUNITIES IN JAPAN 16 per year Density per sq. mile No. of emigrants Aichi 607 59.72 Oita 777 65.00 Ehime 591 108.45 Hiroshima 1,395 115.75 Kayoshima 730 105.08 Kioto 621 118.00 Kumamoto 861 78.95 Nagasaki 1,488 98.70 Okayama 530 100.00 Osaka 1,262 1,158.00 Tokio 1,557 1,375.00 14 One mow 二 1/6 acre. 1o The Sixth Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Com- merce, Peking. 16 Bureau of Colonization, Tokyo. 16 CDCr>C£>(MOOCOCDT-ICOO^CiT-HOCOCOt>ailC SCO 卜 00 寸卜 COLOCO 卜 COCO(MCOCOiO 寸 00 <^CDO^OOiOCO^C^C£>(Ml>rHiOCOiOiOl> t-H ^ t-H 00 (M THOrHCOCMLOrHrH CC 99,9I_ OSS rH s co oo • 寸 OS Cl oa ^ l-H i oo d o s 7— l o o M t- co ci Df 9rII co t- s T-r _ s od 6_ 1— l ci oi N cs ^^ rH co oo d eo co t> G5 °l rH eo sy 99,11 呀 o t- -^ g ai s w CO CO 06 6 I o s r-r g t> io i c3 Am c3 y; .2 .Inlpu a3 g l{ -t--i no CQ a> q -4 - > hq p> a> qs *r— ( s nd cs HO bo —UOJ\fJ a) UUJ UJa +J SB H 节 U c3 .2 jnq o u 03 § u *f— l s -(-> onpoJd { 03 ,3 -(-> 3 0 »|—| ,1 !50 03 力 11 芯勺 11 03 »— l c o -43 03 1 — — l ndod uo t od CD w 9FLS ^ § i i i uo -M xi U^IO SO. ^ T— I Lo oo i i i _ : ..lolpl 它 UB -S ffi 0 . 2 T 9T09 U 6 00 1 991 1 呀 1— I OO -TH T :• 30H 92/o co 寸 t- T-l O l-H w l— I co rH bfl u cc s bo unq -s ffi (suol) 99.99 CNI S lo lo «5 寸 C5 CO co co ■BJJnq c> u c3 ^ q -+J J 0 ^ (I U0 -43 39S) 00 9.S 8 M 3 019 寸 S9 O0 9 寸 s oo oo .2 JmpuB g 5J0 ^; o co d oa N co l—I _ _ o § 0 29 UO EH 96- oo co 寸 1C co l—l g 寸 2 lo t- TH § T-I g s o (guoias) OO S.SI s tr- b- IS co oo l— I og T— I g TH . 2 Jnq3UBP\I5nos ( 1 — I §rpas) SS.9I 903 Co t- ' T— I r-l o 寸 < 1 — I CO CO W I Z9 ^ T— I cs JJnq o u cs M q -M s OM 9SSJ3 .S ggsjau 'l- I oo s th i l-H 9J6I pu9 o J9d l as npoB hi H H vn Gf co H H d VHO o MOI\I NH3HSVH aNV VIHnw o NVMt NI AUSNHa m 3SVH« o NI fc o 3JLV S LLSW co sav EH 18 2) Economic Clash. The great influx of Japanese into Manchuria has intensi- fied the struggle for existence and has forced many Chinese out of various occupations. For example, the Great Guild of New- chwang, Mukden Province, embodies influential banks and commercial enterprises in the city, and controls labor and trade for decades. In recent years, Japanese of different professions have been displacing the Chinese at a rapid rate. Likewise, the Yalu Lumber Company was reorganized into a Sino-Japanese joint corporation by the Yuan-Komura secret agreement of 1905. The dividends of the company decreased year after year, and the Chinese stockholders were forced to sell their shares to the Japanse in order to escape an impend- ing bankruptcy. The Japanese in the company manipulated the company's finances, and also forced the Chinese employees out of employment. Economic competition in Manchuria ha^ resulted in the displacement of one people by another. 3) Social undesirability of Japanese in Manchuria. The Japanese in Manchuria constitute serious social prob 二 lems to the Chinese people. In Chang Chun, only the Japanese employees of the South Manchuria Railway, the Mitsui Com- pany and two or three other commercial enterprises have regu^ lar occupations. The remaining Japanese in the settlement are engaged in businesses of questionable character and make a total profit of about 1,000,000 yen per year. 12 Among the 156,079 Japanese in Manchuria in 1920, 2,813 had no occupations, and only 1,323 were engaged in agricul- ture, pasturage, forestry or fishery. 13 It is thus clear that the Japanese in constructive industries are strikingly few, conse- qnently they do not materially contribute social wealth to Chinese communities. Among those who have no occupations there is an enormous number of Ronin who frequently create troubles of various kinds to enable Japan to extend the sphere of Japanese consular jurisdiction and to infringe China’s sov- ereignty. 12 “Manchurian and Mongolian Affairs,” serial No. 5, p. 40, Governor General’s Office of Kwantung. 13 See table 4 on p. 19. 19 •§&f JO ^ .s q 坊 0 1 .S S P. 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i £* 1ap§ f v -laqo Bsosss -USSH -3UI3IK Is enH -M.oqaos -nBUJSX mis SUBS 3un}av s §6i) SNOIHVdilooo A9 N33IM GNV DNnHNVHS - VIHUHQNYW NI HIDIMls 3S3NVdV£ 对 an M VI, 20 When Papuchapa, a notorious Mongolian bandit, has re- cently assisted Prince Su in attempting to restore the Manchu Throne in China, many Japanese in Manchuria secretly helped him. When Okuma was at the height of his political activi- ties, the Japanese in Manchuria were ordered to assist horse bandits by supplying them with food, arms and munitions. The Japanese in Manchuria are disturbers of law and peace, and should not be permitted to live there permanently. But more Japanese are coming, and China must be prepared for the worst. Basing on an estimate of arable land in Man- churia, the Bureau of Colonization has recently planned to send 300,000 Japanese emigrants to Mukden Province, 3,- 500,000 to Kirin and 6,000,000 to Hei Lung Kiang. 4) Japanese emigration an economic failure. The South Manchuria Railway has recently made a cost-of- living survey of the farmers in about one hundred villages in the “railway zone” under Japanese consular jurisdiction. The study covers such items as food, clothing, fuel, education, heat and light and miscellaneous expenses. It is found that on the average, a small farmer in Manchuria spends 7.44 yen for food per year less than a farmer of the same class in Japan; and a middle class farmer in Manchuria spends 15.30 yen less than one in Japan. This relatively lower standard of living in Manchuria has worked hardship on the Japanese in that terri- tory and has given rise to the “pessimistic view of Japanese agricultural emigration to Manchuria.” 19 Besides, the Japanese emigrants to Manchuria have really moved from a relatively higher wage level to a lower level, as the following table will show : Occupations Dairen Japan (daily wage in yen) (average daily wage in yen) Blacksmiths .33 •91 Bricklayers .30 1.22 Carpenters • 50 •97 Day laborers •30 .70 Painters .40 .85 Stone cutters •50 1.11 Tile roofers •44 .99 Tailors .50 •79-97 The Keizai Ronso, vol. VIII, No. 3, 427-433. 21 Even giving some allowance to small differences in living cost in these two regions, the Japanese in Manchurian towns are receiving much lower wages than their brethren in the same occupations in the Island Empire. These facts again tend to show that Japanese immigrants in Manchuria are not improving their socio-economic condi- tions in any material way. How can it be seriously maintained that Japan’s policy of commercial and industrial expansion by means of a mass emigration can relieve economic pressure at home? In spite of strenuous efforts of the Japanese Government to induce her nationals to make homes in Manchuria and Mon- golia, the experiment is a failure. The Oriental Development Company, with a capital of 10.000,000 yen and a government subsidy of 500 ? 000 yen per year, is one of the largest emigra- tion companies for Manchuria and Mongolia. Yet in ten years, namely, from 1907 to 1916, the company has emigrated only 4,000 families. “It is clearly seen,” comments the General Staff, “that the argument of getting an outlet for our surplus population is farcial. 20 5) Sino - Japanese joint enterprises. In Manchuria and Mongolia there are 29 Sino-Japanese joint enterprises, each having a capital of 100,000 yen or more. Without a single exception, the Japanese shareholders in the company dominate and control its business. The reason for this state of affairs must be explained by the Japanese them- selves. Commenting on the large number of Chinese farmers who are cultivating lands near Jehol and in the valleys of the Sungari, the General Staff advises the Japanese to penetrate into the territory by first making friends with the Chinese. ‘‘Sino-Japanese joint enterprise must be encouraged. Practi- cally the Japanese always control them, but it is necessary to give the Chinese the name of their participation in order to as- sure a great success in agriculture. In Liao Tung peninsula and in Tsingtao, many cases of real estate are jointly managed by Japanese and Chinese. These contracts are invariably in favor of Japanese •” At another place, the General Staff advises the Japanese to be “tactful” in making joint contracts with the Chinese, especially after the pro-Japanese leader in the Chinese cab- Affairs in Eastern Mongolia, p. 21. 22 inet and other important officials have been denounced by the Chinese as traitors. “Indeed，” continues the General Staff, “public sentiment is so violently against Japan’s aggressiveness that the inhabitants of Chi-Fun and Kero of small means do not dare to cooperate with the Japanese in business, fearing that they too might be called traitors. But means must be found to form Sino-Japan- ese emigration bureaus.” 6) Japanese monopoly of agriculture. Military considerations of Japanese emigration have been sketched ; her economic motives will now be scrutinized. Chief agricultural products in districts which Japanese emi- grants are trying to monopolize are shown in Table 5. Be- fore long, Chinese farmers in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia will be driven out of employment by the Japanese competi- tors. On this point, let Japan speak for herself : 23 •spu§d =? l eo gl=lg & auo 3 • 0 s 6 l ^ mn 6 B ny 6 £ u 3 aJ .s {}all . 2 3 nd ar o Jalu -UI 0 u l}u c 3