vjll 
 
 
 
 
BIMETALLISM. 
 
 ip. ■■ _„ i 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 BY 
 
 SAMUEL SMITH, Esq., M.P., 
 
 IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 June 4th, 1889. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 THE BIMETALLIC LEAGUE, 
 
 Haworth’s Buildings, 5, Cross Street, Manchester ; 
 
 AND AT 
 
 2, Princes Street, Great George Street," Westminster, S.W. 
 
HEAD OFFICES: 
 
 Ilaworih’s Buildings, 0, Cross Street, Manchester. 
 
 SECRETARY: 
 
 HENRY M ( .'NIHL, F.S.S. 
 
 CENTRAL AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEE: 
 
 , Princes Street, Great George Street, Westminster, S. W. 
 
 HON. SECRETARIES: 
 
 RICHARD DAWSON and A. W. JARVIS, M.P. 
 
BIMETALLISM 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 BY 
 
 SAMUEL SMITH, Esq., M.P. 
 
 IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 June JJL\ 1889. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 THE BIMETALLIC LEAGUE, 
 
 Haworth’s Buildings, 5, Cross Street, Manchester ; 
 
 AND AT 
 
 2, Princes Street, Great George Street, Westminster, S.W. 
 
S«N X CoVv^VA 
 
BIMETALLISM 
 
 SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 June 4th, 1889. 
 
 Mr. SAMUEL SMITH: Mr. Speaker, Sir—I rise to 
 ' second the motion of. my right honourable friend (Mr. 
 Chaplin), and I think I may congratulate the House of 
 Commons upon the clear, the luminous, and the compre¬ 
 hensive manner in which he has dealt with a very large 
 and a very difficult subject. (Hear, hear.) Perhaps the 
 House will allow me to say that I am no new convert to 
 the doctrine of bimetallism. It is as long ago as the year 
 1876 that I was led to give my adhesion to what is generally 
 called the bimetallic theory. I was educated on this question 
 by means of my connection with the cotton trade of Lancashire, 
 and as a merchant dealing with India. I was brought into 
 contact with the suffering and the misery of a large mass of 
 our people, caused by the heavy fall in the rate of exchange, 
 and by the great check given to the industries of Lancashire. 
 I was led in the course of my studies to perceive clearly that 
 the rupture of the bimetallic system of France was the chief 
 and radical source of all the sufferings and confusion that 
 ensued. I propose to-night to deal with this matter mainly 
 from the commercial and the industrial point of view, and to 
 set before the House my view, as a business man closely 
 
4 
 
 connected with the great trade of Lancashire, why it is most 
 desirable that we should take part with other nations to 
 re-establish the state of things under which our commerce 
 flourished up to the year 1873. Now, the first proposition 
 that I wish to lay before the House is this -that grave injury 
 was done to this country by the destruction of the old par of 
 exchange between gold and silver. I say “the old par of 
 exchange ” because it is altogether undoubted that for the 
 seventy years during which the French system lasted, we 
 had practically a fixed par of exchange. Gold and silver 
 exchanged against one another at 15£ to 1 with almost 
 infinitesimal fluctuations, the highest and the lowest ratios 
 during that long period in the London market being about 
 15*30 on the one side, and 15*80 on the other side, to 1 of gold. 
 Now, let me mention for the edification of those gentlemen, 
 some of whom I see beside me, who are of opinion that the 
 relations between the two metals were wholly decided by 
 natural laws, and that artificial law was totally incompetent 
 to influence them ; let me point out to those gentlemen that 
 during the long period when there was this fixity of value 
 between gold and silver, the yield of the two metals fluctuated 
 in the most surprising manner. We had at one time a yield 
 of gold of two millions a year, at another time of thirty 
 millions a year. We had a yield of silver at one time of 
 three millions a year, at another time of eighteen millions a 
 year. We had at one time a yield of silver three times the 
 value of gold, and at another time a yield of gold three times 
 the value of silver. We had, in fact, the conjunction of every 
 circumstance which could naturally be expected to destroy the 
 legal ratio. Yet the legal ratio existed in spite of all these 
 fluctuations, to the enormous advantage of the world. We 
 had, Mr. Speaker, what I will venture to call identical money 
 in the world of commerce; we had, broadly, one standard 
 throughout the whole world. Gold and silver were tied 
 
together at a fixed ratio. It was a matter of enormous 
 importance to a country like this, with commercial relations 
 over the whole world, and especially with the silver-using 
 countries, to have uniform money. It mattered nothing 
 whether our merchants sold their goods for dollars, or rupees, 
 or taels, or francs; they always got back the same money. 
 They had only to send their silver across to Paris to get a cer¬ 
 tain weight of gold, and it mattered nothing to the merchant 
 whether he sold his goods for gold or silver. Let me 
 point out to this House another advantage. A great part 
 of the wealth of England has been amassed by the invest¬ 
 ment of superfluous capital in the silver-using countries. 
 The silver-using countries of the world are poor countries; 
 they are the undeveloped countries, they are the countries 
 that require capital. England again is the great owner of 
 capital; she is the great lending country. In tte course 
 of legitimate trade the superfluous wealth of England ought 
 to go to develope and open up the poor countries of the 
 world. Let me point out this—the poor countries of the 
 world are mainly silver-using countries. They are only able 
 to offer silver loans, with interest in silver. Down to the 
 year 1873 English capital went as freely to the silver-using 
 countries as to the gold-using countries, and it accepted 
 interest in silver with as much safety as interest in gold. By 
 means of that the great railway system of India was constructed, 
 and a vast number of other industries were built up in silver¬ 
 using countries. Now, all this has been checked since 1873. 
 No longer was it safe for a capitalist in England to lend to 
 silver-using countries, with the interest to be paid in silver. 
 No longer was it safe for silver-using countries to borrow, 
 with interest to be paid in gold. If I were to use a simile, the 
 railway guage became broader in some places than in others, 
 and in place of having one guage for the traffic of the whole 
 world, there were two guages : there was an interruption at 
 
6 
 
 the point where gold and silver met, which caused an immense 
 disturbance to trade. The banks no longer could safely invest 
 their funds in silver-using countries. The time was when 
 the India banks and the China banks lent out large sums of 
 money in India and China, payable in silver; that they can 
 do no longer, and you have the phenomenon that in Calcutta 
 interest was recently 12 per cent., while in London it was 
 2 per cent. Yet the bankers in London dare not avail of 
 this, because they never knew how soon a fall in the exchange 
 might sweep away all their profit and turn it into a loss. An 
 immense difficulty thus has arisen in making railways with 
 capital, lent by this country with interest payable in silver 
 No capitalist now would venture to make such a contract. 
 On the other hand, India and China, countries which ought 
 to spend unlimited sums in opening up communications, are 
 virtually cut off from borrowing from the gold-using countries. 
 The fact is, an immense disturbance has occurred to the great 
 stream of wholesome trade that took place between England 
 and the silver-using countries of the world. But I do attach 
 the most importance of all to the argument which my right 
 honourable friend has already elaborated. I refer to the injury 
 inflicted on debtors by the appreciation of the gold standard. 
 After studying this question for several years in all its phases, 
 I am more and more convinced that the greatest of all injuries 
 to the gold-using countries has been the appreciation of the gold 
 standard in consequence of the demonetisation of silver over 
 a large area, and a corresponding fall in the relative value 
 of the silver standard. Now, I know there are some who deny 
 that there is any appreciation of the gold standard—I will not 
 therefore say “appreciation I will call it instead “ increase 
 of purchasing power.” Now, nobody can deny that the gold 
 standards of the world have an immense increase of purchasing 
 power as compared with the period prior to 1873. That is a point 
 no one will contest. The average fall of prices is 30 per cent. 
 
as compared with 1873 ; at one time it was 35 per cent.—at 
 the lowest depth—but we have slightly recovered since, and I 
 think I may fairly now put it at 30 per cent. The meaning of 
 that is this—a fall of 30 per cent, in prices means an increase 
 in the purchasing power of gold of about 43 per cent. Let the 
 House realise this. I will quote a Cobden Club pamphlet in 
 support of my statement. The Cobden Club writes as follows 
 in the present year: “To obtain a pound sterling in 1873 a 
 quantity in other commodities had to be given for it, which may 
 be represented by the figure 100. In 1889, owing to the fall in 
 prices, the quantity to be given in exchange is, say, 145.” I 
 call it 143, in order to correspond with the 30 per cent, fall 
 of prices. If anyone will take the trouble to make the 
 calculation, he will find that commodities then worth £100 
 can now be bought for £70. That means the £100 possesses 
 43 per cent, more purchasing power—it will exchange fo. 
 143 of those commodities. Now, the House is aware of the 
 intolerable depression felt in all branches of trade in England 
 during the time that this fall was taking place. This fall 
 went on almost without interruption, from 1873 to 188G-87. 
 We are all familiar with it; and it would be a mere waste of 
 time for me to go over this ground again. But there are some 
 persons who hold that the masses are gainers by this great 
 fall, and therefore I wish to call attention to the evidence of 
 Mr. Fielden, of Manchester, who is one of the best authorities 
 upon all questions relating to the working classes. His 
 opinion was that the loss to the working classes of the United 
 Kingdom, through the fall of wages and irregularity of employ¬ 
 ment and total loss of occupation, amounted to no less than 85 
 millions sterling annually. That was his estimate at the worst 
 point of depreciation, about 1880 and 1887. All that he com¬ 
 puted that the working classes gained in cheaper commodities 
 was 40 millions, leaving them annual losers to the extent of 45 
 millions. The great trade societies were nearly on the point of 
 
bankruptcy at the end of 1886. Their funds were exhausted 
 and they had to support a larger number of men out of work than f 
 had ever been known before in their history; but trade began to 
 improve in 1887. No doubt it has improved—I am very glad f 
 that it has—very materially, but I hold this: that, but for this | 
 demonetisation of silver and the corresponding appreciation I 
 of gold, the crisis would have come to an end many years I 
 sooner, and several years of suffering would have been saved I 
 to the people of this country. (Hear, hear.) Now, the right I 
 lion, gentleman opposite has pointed out the great loss to this I 
 country, the industrial class of this country, by the rise in the I 
 weight of the fixed charges. Let me say to the House, that I 
 have paid some attention for some years past to this subject of 
 the amount of fixed payments under which the industiy of this 
 country is carried on, and the more I examine it the larger 
 those payments seem to grow. We have, for instance, interest 
 on the National Debt, local and municipal debt, railway bonds, 
 preference shares, mortgages on land, on house property, on 
 factories and ships, and industrial plant; then we have ground 
 rents, royalties on mines, annuities, pensions, and life interests. 
 Now, I am greatly mistaken if the total of these charges 
 comes to little, if at all, short of tv;o hundred million 'pound* 
 sterling annually. For the most part they run for long 
 periods of time; some of them are perpetuities. And so 
 the process of adjustment is very slow. Now, £200,000,000 
 sterling, if taken at 25 years’ purchase and capitalised, repre¬ 
 sents £5,000,000,000. Let me point out that the interest on ’ 
 this enormous amount of fixed charges is ultimately paid 
 out of the products of industry—that is the sole fund out 
 of which ultimately all interest is paid. As £100 will now 
 purchase 143 of commodities as compared with what it would 
 have done in 1873, it amounts to this: 43 per cent, more of 
 the products of the industry of this country have to be sur¬ 
 rendered to the holders of these fixed charges. That is a 
 
9 
 
 most weighty consideration—43 per cent, of the wheat of the 
 country, of the cloth of the country, of the coal and iron of the 
 country, of all the products of the country, have to pass out 
 of the hands of the hard-working, toiling classes, into the 
 hands of the money-lending, rent-receiving, mortgage-holding 
 classes—(hear, hear)—what I may call the idle, non-working 
 capitalist class. That is the final effect of this very heavy 
 fall in prices, and I commend it to my hon. friend in front of 
 me (Mr. Maclean), who in a short time will have to meet 
 those arguments. The great authority of Mr. Giffen may 
 be quoted. Mr. Giffen states that: “ Appreciation is a most 
 serious matter to those who have debts to pay—it prevents 
 them gaining by the development of industry as they would 
 otherwise gain; there may be compensation in different 
 directions, as by the lowering of the rate of interest which 
 seems to take place as the result of appreciation; but, on 
 the whole, the balance is against the debtor, as compared 
 with what it would be if there were no appreciation.” 
 That is the testimony of Mr. Giffen, who, as you all know, is 
 an opponent of the bimetallic theory. Now, as it is more 
 difficult perhaps to comprehend a question of this kind when we 
 are dealing with hundreds of millions than it is when you are 
 dealing with smaller figures, will the House permit me to 
 give one instance out of many of those which have come 
 under my own notice in Lancashire during the last few years. 
 We will suppose in the year 1873 a capitalist built a cotton 
 mill for £50,000, £20,000 of which was his own capital, and 
 £30,000 on mortgage. That is something like what usually 
 takes place—the amount borrowed is usually rather more than 
 half the capital supplied. Very well. The property is 
 depreciated 30 per cent.—that is the average depreciation of 
 property since 1873. What is the effect of that? His mill is 
 now worth only £35,000. His borrowed capital is £30,000, 
 and his own capital of £20,000 has, therefore, shrunk to 
 
10 
 
 £5,000. There are tens of thousands of cases of that kind in 
 this country in the last fifteen years. There are multitudes 
 of cases where the mortgagee has become the owner of the 
 property; in fact, the result of this depression has been to 
 transfer a large part of the industrial plant of the country to 
 the mone}--lending interest. Take another instance: take 
 the case of a large land-owner, whose gross income was 
 £10,000 a year in 1873, subject to claims of various kinds 
 amounting to £5,000 a year, leaving him £5,000 a year of 
 net income; but his rents have gone down 30 per cent., 
 and his net income now is diminished from £5,000 to only 
 £2,000 a year. Indeed there are multitudes of cases where 
 the net income is swallowed up entirely by the fall of rent, 
 combined with the maintenance of the old scale of charges. 
 The same thing has happened in all gold-using countries. 
 It is not confined to England. It holds equally in France, it 
 holds equally in Germany. I have looked into the scale of 
 mortgages in those countries, and I believe at the present 
 time more than half the land of France, and more than half 
 the land of Germany, belongs to the mortgagees; and, I believe, 
 three-quarters of the land of Ireland. I believe the real reason 
 why the Irish Land Act of 1881 has been a comparative failure 
 was the appreciation of the gold standard, and the very heavy 
 fall in prices which destroyed the judicial character of the rents, 
 and required the House to amend it. But for that appreciation 
 of gold, and the corresponding fall of prices, we would have 
 escaped one-half of the Irish agrarian troubles of the last 
 ten years. I believe one-half of all the troubles of Egypt 
 have arisen from the same cause. The debts were borrowed 
 in Egypt several years ago, when prices were very high, and, 
 in consequence of the fall in prices, they have had to pay 
 virtually a half more. I have not a doubt that the suffer¬ 
 ings of the Egyptian people, in order to meet the claims of 
 the bond-holders, largely arose from this cause, namely, 
 
11 
 
 the appreciation of gold, which quite falsified the basis on 
 which those debts were contracted. (Hear, hear.) I venture 
 to state that much of the socialism that has arisen in Europe 
 during the last fifteen years is attributable to this cause. 
 We have seen a contemporaneous growth of socialism along 
 with the commercial distress arising from the appreciation of 
 gold. I venture also to state that the protective tariffs which 
 have been imposed of late years in most gold-using countries 
 except England, arise from very much the same cause. Everyone 
 knows that in France, in Germany, and in Italy, the tariff' has 
 been increased in the last fifteen years. The reason for that is 
 obvious. They have been suffering acutely, and as their pro- 
 ^ ducing classes have been exposed to increased competition 
 and falling prices, they have persisted in putting on higher 
 and higher tariffs. My belief is that the general effect of the 
 demonetisation of silver has been a return to a more protective 
 policy throughout the world than existed before. My belief is 
 that if we had never had the demonetisation of silver at all, we 
 would have had much freer trade with the world than we have 
 at present. (Hear, hear.) Now, Mr. Speaker, let me ask 
 what the opinion of all the best economists is as to 
 the advantage to a country of a depreciating compared 
 with an appreciating standard. I say all the best economists 
 hold that it is much better for the real interests of a country 
 that the standard money should depreciate rather than 
 appreciate. Jevons is one of the very best authorities on 
 all currency questions. (Hear, hear.) Well, Jevons says: 
 “ I cannot but agree with MacCulloch that, putting out of 
 sight individual cases of hardship, if such exist, a fall in the 
 value of gold must have, and, as I should say, has already a 
 most powerfully beneficial effect. It loosens the country, as 
 nothing else could, from its old bonds of debt and habit. It 
 throws increased rewards before all who are making and 
 acquiring wealth, somewhat at the expense of those who are 
 
12 
 
 enjoying acquired wealth. It excites the active and skilful 
 classes of the community to new exertions, and is, to some 
 extent, like a discharge from his debts is to the bankrupt long 
 struggling against his burdens. All this is effected without 
 a breach of national good faith, which nothing could compen¬ 
 sate.” That opinion was given during the influence of the 
 gold discoveries of Australia and California. Mr. Jevons 
 pointed out the great advantage to the community of a depre¬ 
 ciating standard; but since that time a reverse has taken place 
 and we are suffering from the evils of an appreciating standard. 
 Now, our opponents meet us very generally by saying that 
 we want dear prices, and they say the only thing the country 
 requires is cheap prices. I do believe that cry is very much 
 exaggerated. There are ways of getting cheap prices which 
 cannot be defended. Cheapness of price produced by con¬ 
 tracting the currency is purely evil. (Hear, hear.) I will point 
 to one instance. After the great Napoleonic wars, in which 
 this country had contracted a gigantic debt, which the 
 right honourable gentleman the member for Midlothian (Mr. 
 Gladstone) estimated, I believe, not long ago to represent 
 about one-third of the entire capital of the country—that debt 
 of £900,000,000 was contracted in a depreciated standard at a 
 time of very high prices. We afterwards adopted a sole gold 
 standard in this country. A prodigious fall of prices occurred. 
 Prices fell 55 per cent, between the year 1810 and the year 
 1849, and the meaning of that was the burden of the National 
 Debt was doubled; the £900,000,000 became as heavy a 
 burden as £1,800,000,000 would have been at the old scale of 
 prices. To pay the interest of that debt twice as much of 
 the produce of British industry had to be sold as was the 
 case at the higher standard. The same applied, of course, to 
 all the other debts of the countiy. The effect of this pro- 
 digious fall of prices after 1810 was really to confiscate a great 
 portion of the property of the industrial classes of this country 
 
13 
 
 for the benefit of financiers, of the fund-holders, and the bond¬ 
 holders. That was the real effect. We never had a period of 
 greater misery amongst all classes of the people than in the 
 period between 1815 and 1849, and the misery was always 
 greatest when the prices were lowest. Then, the House 
 knows there was an entire swing of the pendulum. We had 
 the gold discoveries in Australia and California. We had 25 
 years of rising prices. I ask the House, was there ever a time 
 when there was such general prosperity in this country as 
 during that period of high prices ? Prices rose 40 per cent, 
 between the year 1849 and the year 1873, but wages rose 
 far more than 40 per cent. The average earnings of the 
 working classes rose about 75 per cent. I suppose the 
 profits of capital were never so large in this country. I 
 want to know who suffered-none suffered—except the 
 holders of fixed charges? No doubt they suffered—the 
 bond-holder and mortgagee and the pensionnaire, and all 
 that class of people—no one else but them suffered ; but 
 the vast bulk of the people—95 per cent, of the people 
 —were undoubtedly gainers by the depreciation of the 
 standard that took place between 1849 and 1873. Now, I say 
 that for us to remonetise silver now is to repeat in a smaller 
 degree the effect of the gold discoveries, it is to prevent the 
 constant wearing-out effect of an appreciating standard. But 
 some will tell me, and I know this is an argument that will be 
 used, England is a creditor of foreign nations; England has a 
 large amount due annually, and, therefore, it is to her interest 
 to appreciate gold, which means to enlarge the payments due 
 to her. Let me deal with this for one moment. It is quite 
 true that England receives on an average about £100,000,000 
 sterling annually as a surplus of imports over exports, but a 
 small part of that one hundred millions is in payment of gold 
 interest; much the larger part of that surplus is payment 
 for freights, which amount, I suppose, to £50,000,000 annu- 
 
14 
 
 allv. Another large portion comes from industrial enter¬ 
 prises, such as mines, tea and cofiee plantations, and fifty 
 other things, the interest upon which will come all the same 
 whether the currency was gold or silver. The amount of gold 
 interest is a limited sum, and it is balanced by a very consider¬ 
 able amount of silver interest—(hear, hear)—and when one 
 is deducted from the other, I question whether out of that 
 £100,000,000 sterling annually which England receives from 
 abroad, more than £25,000,000 can properly be reckoned as 
 gold interest, and that £25,000,000, or whatever it may be, 
 wholly goes into the pockets of a very small class—it is a gain 
 to a very small class, probably not more than 1 per cent, of the 
 whole population. Now I am going to deal with one of the 
 objections to the theories I have just stated. It is alleged by 
 many that there cannot be an appreciation of gold because 
 the rate of interest has been very low. That objection was 
 laboured very greatly before the Royal Commission by certain 
 London witnesses. I am quite sure I may appeal to the 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer whether of all arguments it is 
 not one of the emptiest and hollowest to say that there can 
 be no appreciation of gold because the rate of interest 
 has been very low. The fact is that it is just the opposite. 
 (Hear, hear.) Nothing is more conclusively proved from all 
 currency history than that a period of rising prices usually goes 
 along with high interest—(hear, hear) ;—and that a period of 
 falling prices goes along with low interest; because, of course, 
 no one would invest in industrial enterprises more than he could 
 help. Speculation is restrained and discouraged; money, so 
 to speak, is a drug, to use the language of the market. 
 Compare, for instance, the period between 1850 and 1873, 
 when gold was flowing into the world in an immense mass. 
 Compare the rate of interest then with the rate of interest 
 which has since prevailed. We had a much higher rate of 
 interest during the period of the large gold discoveries than 
 
15 
 
 we have had since. Surely that conclusively proves that the 
 amount of gold has nothing whatever to do with the rate of 
 interest except this, that when prices are rising trade is active 
 and interest is always higher, when prices are falling interest 
 is always lower. Were we to close up all the gold mines 
 in the world for 100 years, and the prices were to fall 50 
 per cent., I venture to make the prediction that the rate 
 of interest would be lower in this country than ever was 
 known before. Another of the objections made to our theory 
 about appreciation, which has been laboured very much 
 by my right hon. friend the member for Leeds (Sir Lyon 
 Playfair), is, that the great fall in prices was purely owing 
 to economies in production, to cheap transit, and to inven¬ 
 tions. Now, the reply to that is, we had all those economies 
 and inventions in as active operation before 1873 as since 
 1873. 
 
 An HON. MEMBER : Nothing like it. 
 
 Mr. SAMUEL SMITH: My hon. friend says “Nothing 
 like it.” Well, I would venture to differ from him. I say the 
 period between 1850 and 1873 was the great period of dis¬ 
 covery ; it was a period in which the steamboat, the railway, 
 and the telegraph all came into operation, and, according to 
 all natural causes, prices ought to have fallen. In place of 
 that prices rose to about 40 per cent., and there is no 
 explanation that can be given except that the rise was caused 
 by the gold discoveries and depreciation of the standard, while 
 the fall which has since occurred is the result of the opposite 
 process. (Hear, hear.) It applies quite as much to real estate; 
 the fall has been as great in land and house property, and all 
 other kinds of property, as it is in commodities at large. If we 
 had been a silver-using country, should we have had this fall ? 
 We should have had no fall at all. The silver-using countries 
 have escaped the fall; they also have had the benefit of 
 these improvements in production; they also have had the 
 
16 
 
 benefit of cheap transit. Why did not prices fall in the 
 silver-using countries? Prices have remained practically 
 stationary in the silver-using countries. If England had 
 been a silver-using country, we should have escaped the 
 fall in prices. No one can deny that if England had been a 
 silver-using country, we should not have had a Royal 
 Commission on Depression in Trade: it would not have been 
 needed. We should have had prices just the same, and trade 
 would have remained quite as active since 1873 as it was 
 before. If England had been a silver-using country, there 
 would have been no enhancement of this tremendous burden 
 of £200,000,000 sterling of fixed charges. Think of the 
 difference that that would have made to this country! 
 If England had had a silver standard, the result would 
 practically have been that the debtor class would not have been 
 mulcted by the creditor class by some £8 0,000,000 sterling 
 annually, or whatever the amount is, as is now the case. That 
 is an extra tax which is imposed on the debtor class of England 
 in consequence of the appreciation of gold; surely this is a very 
 serious question. Now, the next objection I would deal with 
 is that there is no scarcity of gold. We are told that gold is 
 just as abundant as ever it was ; consequently it is impossible 
 that there can have been any appreciation. I say there 
 never will be a scarcity of gold in the strict sense of the 
 word. Prices will adjust themselves correspondingly. (“No, 
 no.”) Yes, they will adjust themselves, and if we shut up the 
 gold mines for a hundred years, there will be no scarcity of 
 gold ; but, with the prices 50 per cent, lower, and all those fixed 
 charges which I venture to put at £200,000,000, doubled in 
 weight, the industrial classes will be in fact ruined. That will 
 be the effect. I do not know whether that will satisfy my hon. 
 friends around me, who still seem to think that cheap prices 
 are the sole panacea for all evils. Then we are told that the 
 forms of credit have multiplied, and that we could dispense 
 
17 
 
 with gold, or at any rate that we require it much less than 
 before. I will simply make this statement—that it is the 
 metallic basis on which credit rests that determines the scale 
 of prices. (Hear, hear.) But there is one most weighty argu¬ 
 ment which I shall lay before the House, and it is one which 
 we in Lancashire feel most keenly. I assert, without fear of 
 contradiction, that since 1873 we have given an immense 
 stimulus to the competing industries of India as against our 
 own. Let me tell the House ■what the rate of increase has 
 been in Lancashire in regard to the cotton trade. In India 
 the increase in cotton spindles in the ten years ending 1887 
 is 105 per cent.; the increase in looms 91 per cent. The 
 increase in Lancashire in the ten years ending 1885 was 
 only 7 per cent, in spindles, and 21 per cent, in looms. 
 There is one very large branch of trade, the export of cotton 
 yarn to China and Japan, which has almost been wrested 
 from Lancashire. Within the last ten years the exports from 
 India to China and Japan have increased three-fold over the 
 exports from Lancashire. That is a change that has taken 
 place in the last ten years, and that change is going on every 
 year. These are undoubted facts, and I attach enormous value 
 to them. Anyone can see the reason why this is so. Anyone 
 who reflects for five minutes will see that the reason is that 
 those enormous burdens I have spoken about are always 
 growing heavier in England, but they are growing lighter in 
 India. Just let me give an illustration how it acts—it 
 happens every day. Two men start a cotton mill, one in Lan¬ 
 cashire and the other in India. We shall suppose that the 
 start was made before the fall of silver, about 1873, when 
 the rate of exchange was practically 2s. to the rupee. Each 
 of them possessed a capital of £20,000; each of them built a 
 cotton mill costing £50,000, the one in Lancashire and the 
 other in India. The one in Lancashire took a mortgage of 
 £30,000 with interest at 5 per cent, payable in gold, and the 
 
18 
 
 other got a mortgage of £30,000 payable in silver in India. 
 Supposing they both started together in 1873, how would they 
 stand now ? The man in India has had good trade all the 
 time, and no exchange difficulties, no increase of burdens, no 
 quarrels with his workmen. But the man in Lancashire has 
 had to encounter twelve years’ continual fall in prices, and 
 either loss, or scarcely any profits, every year. The man in 
 Lancashire would have had to pay £1,500 annually, payable 
 in gold, upon his mortgage. The man in India has got the 
 same amount payable in silver, the value of which is con¬ 
 tinually diminishing; so that to-day the one man pays £1,500 
 in gold ; the other pays as much silver as is equal to £1,000 
 in gold, and yet the two mortgages were equal in 1873, and 
 the interest was equal; but now that the rupee is only worth 
 one shilling and fourpence instead of two shillings, the weight 
 upon the Indian manufacturer is one-third less than it is in 
 Lancashire. One more point in the comparison between gold 
 and silver. I have shown that the Indian manufacturer 
 benefits by the lightening of burdens, just as the Lancashire 
 manufacturer suffers from their enhancement. Now let us 
 look at the effect with respect to the mortgages. The Lanca¬ 
 shire manufacturer has a property which has depreciated 30.per 
 cent. His mill is only worth £35,000, although it was at first 
 worth £50,000; but he has a mortgage still of £30,000 ; his 
 own capital has been reduced to £5,000. The man in India 
 has sustained no loss since 1873. His whole capital remains 
 intact. He has all the benefit arising from having to make 
 his payments in silver in lieu of gold. Anyone can see at a 
 glance the enormous bonus the one man has against the other, 
 and the reason why is evident. The same thing is happening 
 with reference to the jute trade, which is leaving Scotland 
 and going to the Valley of the Ganges. It will always 
 be the same wherever we have competing together a silver¬ 
 using country and a gold-using country. You will find 
 
19 
 
 that the gold-using country is handicapped with a growing 
 weight, and that the silver-using country is buoyant and 
 light. I have no manner of doubt in my own mind that if 
 this question is not settled, and if the rupee in ten years falls 
 to a shilling, that you will see such a transfer of our manu¬ 
 facturing industries to India as very few persons contemplate 
 at present. It is hopeless for our manufacturers to compete 
 against such enormous odds, as they have in the case that I 
 am assuming. I do not want to do an injustice to India. I 
 simply want fair play. (Hear, hear.) We all want fair play. 
 We do not begrudge India her rights. All we say is, we ought 
 not to load the dice against ourselves. But bear in mind that 
 every decline in exchange imposes on the Indian Govern¬ 
 ment the necessity of levying additional taxation. The salt 
 tax in India was raised to a most exorbitant rate to make 
 up for this loss by exchange, and year by year, as the rate of 
 exchange goes down, so the Indian Government is in an 
 increasing dilemma, and must add more and more to harsh 
 and tyrannical taxation. So I say, when you put every¬ 
 thing into the scale, India as a whole is no gainer by the 
 process—we are losers, and India is no gainer. Some will 
 meet me with the objection that trade now is good upon the 
 whole. I grant that upon the whole it is pretty good. Then 
 they will say, “ If matters have settled down, why should we 
 unsettle them again ? ” I reply, we are not yet upon a stable 
 basis ; we have reached no permanent stage on this question. 
 If we had reached a permanent stage there might be a good 
 deal said, perhaps, for letting things alone ; but unfortunately 
 we are upon an inclined plane; we are sliding down from stage 
 to stage, and although we have had several resting places since 
 1873 (we have had recently a temporaiy pause in the downward 
 progress) I see no reason whatever why the history of the last 
 fifteen years should not be repeated in the next fifteen years 
 unless the nations of the world agree to cure the source of the 
 
20 
 
 evil. Unless the nations of the world agree to remonetise 
 silver, there is no alternative but continued demonetisation. 
 There ought to be an international arrangement with the 
 object of re-establishing silver. Unless this is done, one 
 country after another is sure to go in the direction of 
 demonetisation, and the first great country, I believe, will 
 be America. The first great step in the downward process 
 will be the repeal of the Bland Act. She has had that 
 Act for several years, and so she, to a large extent, has 
 aided in holding up the price of silver. But the Bland 
 Act was only adopted in America as a temporary expedient. 
 (Hear, hear.) It was only intended to bridge over the time 
 when an agreement could be arrived at amongst leading 
 nations to remonetise silver. The Bland Act could not have 
 been carried on any other understanding. It never would 
 have been carried except under the belief that the nations 
 of Europe in their own interest would agree to remonetise 
 silver. All the efforts of the United States to bring about 
 an agreement failed. The United States and France have 
 twice made the attempt; they have twice offered to join 
 in an international arrangement and to open their mints to a 
 free coinage of silver, but all their attempts have failed. I 
 cannot doubt that before long a very strong movement will 
 arise in America for repealing the Bland Act, and if that 
 succeeds we shall have a great cataclysm; we shall have all 
 the miseries repeated in this countiy which we had between 
 1876 and 1886. All other silver-using countries will follow 
 the example of Germany and adopt a gold standard. Austria 
 and Russia are both talking of reverting to specie payments, 
 and they will do so in gold when they are able to do it unless 
 we have this international arrangement to re-establish silver. 
 If we have this international arrangement to re-establish 
 silver, no doubt Russia and Austria and all silver-using 
 countries will join in the arrangement, and remonetise on the 
 
21 
 
 bimetallic basis, and not upon the gold basis. At last 
 this country will be driven step by step, and however much 
 it may resist, it will find it cannot help it—it will ultimately 
 be driven to give India a gold currency. The intolerable 
 loss to the Indian Government from these fluctuations will 
 become so great that bankruptcy may seem to be imminent, 
 and silver will become so totally unstable as a standard of 
 value that there will be no alternative except giving India 
 a gold standard, and when that happens silver will become 
 finally degraded. It will never again be remonetised as a 
 standard metal when India adopts a gold currency. You 
 might name any price you choose for silver, it will be a 
 degraded metal; it will sink to the position of tin or iron; it 
 will no longer be standard money, and the world as a whole 
 will be thrown upon gold alone ; and if the world as a whole 
 is thrown upon gold alone, you will certainly have another 
 prodigious fall in prices in all gold-using countries. You 
 will have a prodigious aggravation of all the evils we have 
 pointed out; all these fixed payments will become immensely 
 heavier than they were before; you will give a great impetus 
 to socialism and disorder of all kinds, and no one will be able 
 to say what the consequences of such a madcap policy will be 
 in Europe. Let me remind the House of a few weighty 
 words spoken by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. I 
 wish to call the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 to his own words spoken ten years ago—prophetic words I 
 think I may call them. At the Conference in Paris, in 1878, 
 the Chancellor of the Exchequer said: “ I believe that it 
 w T ould be a great misfortune if a propaganda against silver 
 should succeed, and I protest against the theory according 
 to which this metal must be excluded from the monetary 
 systems of the world; a campaign against silver would 
 be extremely dangerous even for countries with a gold 
 standard.” Those are the words of the Chancellor of the 
 
22 
 
 Exchequer—and I ask him to do something to prevent his 
 prediction from becoming true. His words are undoubtedly 
 becoming true. At the time he spoke those words no person 
 living then thought that the price of silver could fall as low 
 as it is now. I think silver was 54d. then—at all events it 
 was very much higher than it is to-day. No one dreamt 
 then that silver would fall so low; all the wise men 
 said it was preposterous; the London Economist and all 
 our instructors in London told us so. It was 54d.; it is 
 now 42d. Why should it not fall still further? Why should 
 it not fall oOd. during the next ten or twenty years ? I see 
 no reason, and no one can assign a reason why it should not 
 unless we go back to remonetisation. It is generally believed 
 by our opponents that legislation cannot maintain the ratio. 
 They say that all the facts are against the ratio, but we say 
 they are all in favour of it. The ratio remained during the 
 last century at nearly 15 to 1, and during this century the 
 ratio of 15^ to 1 was maintained, I may say, with perfect ease 
 during the seventy years that it was extant. Can anyone 
 believe that, if the four great commercial powers were agreed 
 together upon the fixed ratio, they would not be able to 
 maintain it now? I quite admit that there was occasionally 
 a slight premium on gold when France alone was bimetallic. 
 The reason of that is simply this. France lay between two 
 competing systems—a silver system on the one side and a gold 
 system on the other—and at one time a vast sum in silver 
 was being sent to France, and at another time a vast amount 
 of gold. If we had had a general bimetallic arrangement, 
 even these slight variations would have been avoided. Many 
 think that if we were to adopt a bimetallic system gold would 
 disappear and leave this country. I believe that is a perfect 
 delusion. The four great States that would compose the Union 
 hold £000,000,000 sterling in gold. Where would the gold go 
 to ? Has anyone been able to guess where the gold would go 
 
23 
 
 to ? There is no place where it is largely wanted besides these 
 four great nations. It is held by nations in whose favour there 
 is a large balance of trade, and there is no possibility of the 
 poorer countries of the world draining away the gold from 
 the proposed international area. I feel that I am detaining 
 the House too long, and I will bring my remarks very speedily 
 to an end. I assert that the Royal Commission states unani¬ 
 mously and most clearly that it is in the power of a combina¬ 
 tion of nations to tie together gold and silver. That opinion has 
 been arrived at by men who have approached the subject for 
 the most part with a strong prejudice to the contrary—(hear, 
 
 j iear ^_ w l l0 with the greatest reluctance accepted it, and 
 
 nothing but an exhaustive study of the facts convinced them. 
 We say that it is not a new thing that we are seeking; it is 
 an old thing. We wish to go back to what I may almost say 
 has been an immemorial practice, namely, to use both gold 
 and silver; it is a case of quod semper, quod ubique, quod 
 ab omnibus; we wish to go back to what has been the rule 
 of Christendom in former ages. We do not look with the 
 smallest degree of complacence upon any of those currency 
 schemes which are identified with soft money. We stand 
 on hard money, upon the money of the world that has 
 existed from the earliest ages. As to the ratio, we leave 
 that to the Conference. It is not a subject which any nation 
 can deal with alone. (Hear, hear.) I do not know why my 
 right hon. friend should cheer that. I think it shows that 
 we approach the matter with an open mind. I, for one, have 
 no particular desire to go back to the old ratio. I quite admit 
 it would be very difficult to do so. I allow that a great many 
 contracts have been made during the last fifteen years which 
 would have to be dealt with, though I cannot forget the pro¬ 
 digious contracts that were made upon the old ratio; I cannot 
 forget also that £4,000,000,000 sterling of national debts were 
 borrowed upon that ratio, and I believe in strict justice we 
 
24 
 
 would be acting more honestly by going back to the old ratio 
 than by adopting any other even now; but I admit there are 
 great difficulties, and I, for my own part, would put up with 
 some inconvenience, and would be content with an intermediate 
 ratio. I think that is entirely a matter for the International 
 Conference. I do not think we ought to bind ourselves to any 
 particular view of the subject, but should be prepared to 
 accept whatever ratio the Conference might determine. The 
 House must remember that whatever ratio was agreed to 
 by the International Conference, it would be subject to 
 the approval of Parliament. We are merely asking you 
 to go into the Conference keeping our hands free. We 
 do not bind you beforehand to an absolute decision. What¬ 
 ever decision may be come to, it would be subject to the 
 approval of the various parliaments concerned. Now, Mr. 
 Speaker, I will say in conclusion that this subject is surrounded, 
 I well know, with great difficulties ; but the end we aim at is 
 one of immense importance both to this country and to the 
 world at large. I feel that its consideration will well repay 
 the time and attention of Parliament; it cannot be shirked 
 any longer. It is one of the burning questions of the day, 
 and I trust it will be discussed with impartiality and with a 
 sincere desire for truth, and that it will not be engulfed in 
 the muddy stream of party politics. I thank the House for 
 the attention it has given me. (Cheers.) 
 
BIMETALLIC LEAGUE. 
 
 “ The object of the League is to urge upon the British Government the- 
 necessity of co-operating with other leading Nations for the establishment, by 
 International agreement, of the free coinage of Gold and Silver, at a fixed ratio.” 
 
 President. 
 HENRY H. GIBBS. 
 
 Chairman of General Council. 
 
 H. R. GRENFELL. 
 
 Vice-Presidents. 
 
 The Duke of Abercorn. 
 
 The -Marquis of Abergavenny, K.G. 
 John Addison, Q.C., M.i’. 
 
 Sir James Allport. 
 
 George W. Alien, C.I.E. 
 
 Lord Basing. 
 
 Gerald \V. Balfour. M.i*. 
 
 Sir Thomas S. Baxley, Bart, 
 j. Baxley-White, M.r. 
 
 William'W. B. Beach, M.I’. 
 
 William J. Beadcl, M.I’. 
 
 The Buke of Beaufort. K.G. 
 
 Gilbert Beith. 
 
 Lord Henry Bentlnck, M.I’. 
 
 Lord Chas. Beresford, C.B.. M.I’. 
 Right Hon. G. A. Cavendlsh- 
 Bentlck, M.I’. 
 
 G. H. Bond, M.I’. 
 
 Col. the Hon. F.C.Brldgeman.M.l’. 
 Lord HenrvBrudenell-Bruce, M.I’. 
 Rev. H. F.'Burnaby, M.A. 
 
 Alfred L. Cohen. 
 
 Sir G. Campbell, M.I’., K.C.S.I., 
 D.C.L. 
 
 The Marquis of Carmarthen, M.P. 
 Lord Castletown. 
 
 Right Hon. H. Chaplin, M.i’. 
 Lleut.-Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke, 
 G.C.M.G., C.B., C.I.E. 
 
 Admiral Sir J.E. Commerell.K.C.B. 
 A. L. Cameron Corbett, M.I’. 
 
 J. Corbett, M.P. 
 
 F. s. W. Cornwallis, M.P. 
 Alderman Cotton. 
 
 Joseph Cowen. 
 
 The Earl of Crawford and Balcarres. 
 
 LL.D., F.R.S. 
 
 E. S W. He Cobain, M.I’. 
 
 Sir H. F. de Traftord, Bart. 
 
 Baron Dimsdale, M.P. 
 
 The Earl of Ellesmere. 
 
 Lord Klcho, M.P. 
 
 sir J. Whittaker Ellis, Bart., M.P. 
 
 K. L. Everett. 
 
 The Marquis of Exeter. 
 
 Sir A. On- Ewing, Bart., M.P. 
 
 Hon. Algernon Egerton. 
 
 Hon. A. J. F. Egerton, M.P. 
 
 The Earl of Keversham. 
 
 The Earl Fortcscue. 
 
 Sir Charles Forster, Bart., M.P. 
 Thomas Fielden. M.P. 
 
 G. II. Finch, M.P. 
 
 Professor II. S. Fox well, M.A. 
 Moreton Frewen. 
 
 Hon. J. B. Gathorne-Hardy, M.P. 
 Lord Gerard. 
 
 Sir Lepel II. Griffin, K.C.8.I. 
 
 The Marquis of Granby, M.P. 
 
 C. W. Gray, M.P. 
 
 Professor K. C. K. Conner, M.A. 
 Sir Edward Green, Bart., M.P. 
 
 H. R. Grenfell. 
 
 W. II. Grenfell. 
 
 James Guthrie. 
 
 Sir Henrv A. Hoare. Bart. 
 
 Lord Claud J. Hamilton. 
 
 Lord F. Hamilton. 
 
 Frank Hardcastle, M.P. 
 
 Sir Hector M. Hay. 
 
 A. Raymond Heath, M.P. 
 
 Right Hon. E. Heneage, M.P. 
 Alfred Hickman. 
 
 A. Staveley Hill. M.P. 
 
 Samuel Hoare, M.P. 
 
 SirT.C. Hope, K.C.S.L, C.I.E. 
 Sir \V. II. Ilouldsworth, lit., M.P. 
 l>aac Hoyle, M.P. 
 
 Henry II. Howorth, M.P. 
 
 George Howell, M.P. 
 
 F. Scager Hunt, M.P. 
 
 Sir Guyer Hunter, M.P..K.C.M.G. 
 J. Hennlker Heaton, M.P. 
 
 W. Jacks. 
 
 a. Weston Jarvis, M.P. 
 
 A. Johnstone-Douglas. 
 
 J. Jordan, M.P. 
 
 Lt.-General R. H. Keatlnge, V.C.. 
 C.8.I. 
 
 H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, M.P. 
 
 J. lioyd Klnnear. 
 
 SirRainaldKnightley,Bart., M.P. 
 Edward Langley. 
 
 SirEd. A. H.Lechmere, lit.,M.P. 
 Elliott Lees, M.P. 
 
 I Sir Roper Lethbridge,M.1’.,C.I.E. 
 Evan W. Llewellyn, M.P. 
 
 Frank Lockwood, Q.C., M.P. 
 
 The Marquis of Londonderry. K.G. 
 Sir Alfred Lyall, K.C.B., K.C.I.E. 
 J. C. Lawrance, M.P. 
 
 Leonard I,veil, M.P. 
 
 The Duke of Manchester, K.P. 
 John Wm. Maclure, M.P. 
 
 Right Hon. Sir Louis Mallet, C.B. 
 J. H. Manners-Sutton. 
 
 The Duke of Marlborough. 
 
 E. P. Mulhallen Martini, M.P. 
 Admiral R. C. Mavne.M.l’. 
 
 Sir H. M. Meyscy-Thompson, lit. 
 T. Mil vain, M.P. 
 
 Earl Manvers. 
 
 A. B. Freeman Mitford.C.H. 
 Guildford J. Molesworth. 
 
 John Musgrave. 
 
 Samuel Montagu, M.P. 
 
 D.Bl 
 
 Viscount Newark, M.P. 
 
 Ernest Noel. 
 
 T. O’Hanlon, M.I’. 
 
 Edward Howley Palmer. 
 
 Herbert H. Praed. 
 
 Sir Richard H. 1’aget, Iiart., M.P. 
 Lieut.-General Sir Louis l’clhv 
 M.P., K.C.B., K.C.S.L 
 J. Pinkerton, M.P. 
 
 W. Pomfret l’omfret, M.P. 
 
 The Duke of Portland. 
 
 A. D. Provand, M.P. 
 
 Sir John II. Puleston, M.P. 
 
 The Duke of Richmond and 
 Gordon, K.G. 
 
 The Earl of Radnor. 
 
 Lord Rowton. 
 
 Major F. C. Rasch, M.P. 
 
 Lord Rendlesham. 
 
 Sir G. K. Rickards, K.C.B. 
 
 E. M. Hutton Riddell. 
 
 Thomas Roe, M.P. 
 
 Sir George Russell, Bart, M.P. 
 James Rankin, M.P. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. T. M. Sandys, M.P. 
 
 Sir Albert A. David Sassoon, C.S.I. 
 Right Hon. Sir H. J. Selwin- 
 Ibbotson, Iiart., M.P. 
 
 Sir George H. Sitwell, Hart. 
 
 Lord Sherborne. 
 
 II. Seton-Karr, M.P. 
 
 T. H. Sldebottom, M.P. 
 
 Samuel Smith. M.P. 
 
 Lord Suffield, K.C.B. 
 
 J. E. Spencer. M.P. 
 
 Mark J. Stewart, M.P. 
 
 Thomas Sutherland, M.P. 
 
 Cant. C. W. Selwyn, M.P. 
 
 T. K. Tapllng, M.P. 
 
 Sir Rivers Thompson. K.C.S.I. 
 
 W. K. M. Tomlinson, M.P. 
 
 (;. E. Howard Vincent, C.B., M.P. 
 Viscount Valentla. 
 
 Professor Robert Wallace. 
 Edmund Waller. 
 
 ! Colonel Cornwallis West. M.P. 
 Stephen Williamson, M.P. 
 
 The Marquis of Winchester. 
 
 Col. Mildmay Wilson. 
 
 ; R. Grant Webster, M.P. 
 
 1 Sir George O. Wombwell, Bart. 
 
 ; Thomas Wright. 
 
 George Wvndham. 
 
 The Earl of Yarborough. 
 
26 
 
 Trustees of Guarantee Fund. 
 
 HENRY H. GIBBS, S. SMITH, M.P., ABRAHAM HAWORTH, ROBT. BARCLAY, GILBERT BKITB. 
 
 Executive Council. 
 
 Chairman : ROBERT BARCLAY, Manchester. 
 
 John A. Beith, Manchester. 
 Thomas Bell, VVhickham (County 
 Durham). 
 
 Rt. Hon. Henry Chaplin, M.P. 
 Henry Coke, Liverpool. 
 
 Geo. B. Dewhurst. Manchester. 
 Geo. Handasyde Dick, Glasgow. 
 John S. Dods, Manchester. 
 
 R. L. Everett, Ipswich. 
 
 Fredk. J. Faraday, Manchester, 
 j. C. Fielden, Manchester. 
 
 F. B. Forbes, London. 
 
 II. T. Gaddum, Manchester. 
 
 Robert Gladstone, Liverpool. 
 
 C. W. Gray, M.P. 
 
 Edward H. Greg, Manchester. 
 
 H. R. Grenfell, London. 
 
 .1. H. Gwyther, London. 
 
 K. A. Hague, Manchester. 
 
 Frank Hardcastle, M.P.. Bolton. 
 John Hargreaves, lUackhum. 
 Ralph Heaton, Birmingham. 
 John Holliday, Manchester. 
 
 Lewis Haslam, Bolton. 
 
 Sir W. H.Houldsworth, Bart., M. P. 
 Isaac Hoyle, M.P., Manchester. 
 Henry Lathburv, Manchester. 
 Samson S. Lloyd, London. 
 
 Capt. F. C. Loder-Symonds, Far- 
 Ingdon. 
 
 Charles Macdonald, Manchester. 
 Sir H. M. Meysoy-Tliompson.Uuit. 
 
 Samuel Montagu, M.p., Lornim, 
 W. R. Moss, Bolton. 0,li 
 
 John Muir, Glasgow. 
 
 Samuel Ogden, Manchester 
 James Parlane, Manchester 
 
 r' v'<Tnnu • M!,,,ch ’ est «h 
 
 J. I-. S. Rolleston, Leicester. 
 Edward Sassoon, London 
 I. Seligman, London. 
 
 T. H. Sidebottom, M.P. 
 
 Chester. 
 
 Wm. Taylor, Blackburn. 
 
 T. (’. Taylor, Hatley. 
 
 John Thomson, Manchester. 
 William Westgarth, London. 
 Thos. Willson, Ryde, Isle of Wight. 
 
 , Man- 
 
 Hon. Treasurer. 
 
 ABRAHAM HAWORTH, Manchester. 
 
 Bankers. 
 
 Bank of England, Manchester. 
 
 Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, Hatton Court, London, E.C. 
 Secretary. 
 
 HENRY Me NI EL, F.S.S., Haworth’s Buildings, 5, Cross Street, Manchester 
 
 Central Agricultural Committee. 
 
 London Offices: 2, Princes Street, Great George Street, Westminster .W. 
 Hon. Secs.: Richard Dawson and A. Weston Jarvis, M.P. 
 
 Hon. Secretaries. 
 
 Glasgow, Wm. Ewing, 7, Roval Bank Place. 
 Bradford, J. M. McLaren. Canal Road. 
 Bolton. Lewis Haslam, Ravenswood. 
 Blackburn, John Hargreaves, Higher Bank. 
 Walsall, W. H. Dcignan. 
 
 Southport, S. Hardman, 191, Lord Street. 
 Conglcton, A. C. Conder, Bath Yale Mill. 
 
 Birmingham, Frederick Asn, Snow Hill. 
 Bristol, J. II. Howell, Castle Green. 
 Swansea. Frederic S. Bishop, Glaurafon. 
 Batley, T. C. Taylor. Sunny Bank. 
 
 Ipswich, R. L. Everett. Rushmere. 
 
 Brecon, W. S. Miller, Forest Lodge. 
 Chorley, A. C. Smbthlrst, Charnock House. 
 
 Ke* 
 
 Oxfordshire and Berkshire, Captain F. C. Loder-Stmonds, Hinton Manor, Farringdon, Berks. 
 
27 
 
 STATEMENT. 
 
 Until the year 1873 the ratio at which Gold and Silver were 
 interchangeable was steady, because the Mints of France and 
 other European countries were open to all the world for the 
 unlimited coinage of both metals on the fixed basis of 15£ Silver 
 to 1 of Gold. 
 
 * It may be stated generally that during the last century the 
 national unit of coinage Avhich constituted the standard of value 
 in the principal countries practically rested on both metals, silver 
 being usually the nominal standard with gold rated to it, at the 
 discretion of each Government. 
 
 In the United Kingdom, from 1717 to 1816, this system pre¬ 
 vailed, the ratio of gold to silver having been fixed at 1 to 15-21. 
 
 In the United States of America the double standard was 
 originally adopted in 1786 with a ratio of 1 to 15-25; changed 
 in 1792 to 1 to 15, and in 1834 to 1 to 16. 
 
 In 1803 the double standard, with a ratio of 15£ to 1, was 
 definitively adopted by France, and in 1865 the formation of the 
 Latin Union, ultimately consisting of France, Italy, Belgium, 
 Switzerland, and Greece, extended and confirmed it. 
 
 Owing to this, the par of exchange between Gold and Silver 
 Standard countries kept practically uniform, and Silver, as fully 
 as Gold, performed the functions of money throughout the world. 
 
 The action of England in 1816, in adopting the single Gold 
 Standard, did not disturb the steadiness of the ratio between the 
 two metals, so long as the Continental Mints remained open to 
 Silver; but when Germany in 1873 decided to adopt the single 
 
 * This and the following paragraphs are from the Note appended to the Final Report of the 
 oyal Commission on Gold and Silver, by the Right Hon. Sir Louis Mallet, C.B.,one of the Royal 
 
28 
 
 Gold Standard the old equilibrium was destroyed, because France 
 and the other Bimetallic countries, in view of the heavy sales of 
 Silver made by Germany, suspended their free coinage. 
 
 This action caused the price of silver, as quoted in Gold, to 
 fall, and it has since fluctuated violently, affecting all interna¬ 
 tional exchanges between Silver Standard and Gold Standard 
 countries. In the case of India the Rupee, formerly worth about 
 2s., has gradually dropped below Is. 5d. in English money, with 
 increasing uncertainty as to its prospective exchangeable value as 
 against Gold. 
 
 The substitution of Gold for Silver, and the greater amount 
 of exchange work that is in consequence thrown upon Gold, has 
 led to the appreciation of that metal, and to a fall in prices of 
 commodities, as measured in Gold, which is everywhere visible, 
 and everywhere baneful in its effects upon commerce, upon 
 manufacturing and agricultural industry, and upon the growth 
 of employment necessary to provide work for our rapidly increas¬ 
 ing population. 
 
 Convinced of the evils resulting from existing conditions of our 
 Monetary System, and of the hindrance to trade and agriculture, 
 which are largely due to the disturbed relation between Gold and 
 Silver, we appeal to everyone for co-operation in carrying out the 
 objects of the League. 
 
 There is every encouragement to press the matter, seeing that 
 the United States of America, France, Germany, and Holland are 
 willing and eager to co-operate. 
 
 These Powers, it is known, will not move without England, 
 and under an erroneous conception of the advantages of a single 
 Gold Standard, this country has hitherto stood aloof. 
 
 The Final Report of the Royal Commission on Gold and 
 Silver is however of a character so favourable to the Cause of 
 Bimetallism that the question is now thoroughly ripe for settle¬ 
 ment. 
 
 It is advisable, therefore, that the facts of the case may be 
 made widely known throughout the country, in order to bring 
 the force of public opinion to bear upon Parliament and upon the 
 
29 
 
 Government, so that England, instead of being a barrier in the 
 way of an International convention, may take her due share in 
 the settlement of a question so vital to the well-being of the 
 Empire, so essential to the interests of British and Irish Agri¬ 
 culture, and of commerce everywhere, and to the financial 
 stability of India. 
 
 Any further information concerning the League may be obtained 
 from the Secretary, Mr. Henry M<? Niel, F.S.S., Haworth’s 
 Buildings, 5, Cross Street, Manchester, who will also acknowledge 
 Subscriptions and Donations. 
 
 The League comprises Members and Associates, the Annual 
 Subscription of the former being One Guinea, and the latter 
 2s. 6d. Cheques to be made payable to the Secretary. 
 
30 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL 
 COMMISSION ON GOLD AND SILVER, 1888. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 (Signed by all the members of the Commission.) 
 
 Sec. 115.—“ The Remedy which has been put before us most prominently and 
 as most likely to remedy the evils complained of to the fullest extent possible is 
 that known as Bimetallism.” ’ s 
 
 Sec. 190.—“ Prior to 1873 the fluctuations in the price of silver were gradual 
 in their character,and ranged within very narrow limits. The maximum variation 
 in 1872 was gd., and the average not quite T 5 e d., while in 1886 the maximum was 
 2 I 5 s d., and the average nearly l|d. It has not been, and indeed hardly could be 
 suggested that this difference can be accounted for by changes in the relative 
 production or actual use of the two metals.” 
 
 Sec. 191.—“ The explanation commonly offered of these constant variations 
 in the silver market is that the rise or depression of the price of silver depends 
 upon the briskness or slackness of the demand for the purpose of remittance to 
 silver-using countries, and that the price is largely affected by the amount of the 
 bills sold from time to time by the Secretary of State for India in Council. * 
 “ Rut these causes were, as far as can be seen, operating prior to 1873 as well 
 ns subsequent to that date, and yet the silver market did not display the 
 sensitiveness to these influences from day to day and month to month winch it 
 
 Sec. 192.—“ These considerations seem to suggest the existence of some 
 steadying influence in former periods, which has now been removed, and which 
 has left the silver market subject to the free influence of causes, the full effect 
 of which was previously kept in check. The question, therefore, forces itself 
 upon us: Is there any other circumstance calculated to affect the relation of 
 silver to gold which distinguishes the latter period from the earlier ? 
 
 “Now, undoubtedly the date which forms the dividing line between an eooch 
 of approximate fixity in the relative value of gold and silver and one of marked 
 instability, is the year when the bimetallic system which had previously been in 
 force in the Latin Union ceased to be in full operation; and we are irresistibly 
 led to the conclusion that the operation of that system, established as it was in 
 countries the population and commerce of which were considerable exerted a 
 material influence upon the relative value of the two metals. 
 
 “So long as that system was in force we think that, notwithstanding the 
 changes in the production and use of the precious metals, it kept the market 
 price of sflver approximately steady at the ratio fixed by law between them 
 namely to 1. 9 
 
 Sec. 193—“S or does it appear to us a priori unreasonable to suppose that the 
 existence in the Latin Union of a bimetallic system with a ratio of 1 oh to 1 fixed 
 between the two metals should have been capable of keeping the market price 
 of silver steady at approximately that ratio. 1 
 
 “ The view that it could only affect the market price to the extent to which 
 there was a demand for it for currency purposes in the Latin Union, or to which 
 it was actually taken to the mints of those countries is, we think, fallacious. 
 
 The fact that the owner of silver could, in the last resort, take it to those 
 co “ verte d »nto com which would purchase commodities at the 
 
 ratio of 15£ of silver to one of gold, would, in our opinion, be likely to affect the 
 price of silver in the market generally, whoever the purchaser ancf for whatever 
 country it was destined. It would enable the seller to stand out for a Sce 
 aCthat pS.”^the legal com, and woidd tend to keep the market steady at 
 
31 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Signed by six members of the Commission :— 
 
 oec. .., , . J w ™ camjui ui uie evu 
 
 arising from the increased difficulty winch a fluctuating exchange interposes, we 
 do not think its reality is open to question.” 
 
 Sec. 101.— ‘ There cannot be two opinions as to the very serious effect which 
 the continued fall in the gold price of silver has had on the finances of the 
 Government of India.” 
 
 Sec. 102.—“ We are fully impressed with a sense of the difficulties which 
 surround the Indian Government, and of the serious questions to which any 
 proposed additional tax must give rise. It is not only the embarrassment which 
 lias already been caused to the Government of India that has to be borne in 
 mind, but the impossibility of foreseeing to what extent those embarrassments 
 may be increased and their difficulty augmented by a further depression in the 
 value of silver.” 
 
 See. l<(7.—“ We think that in any conditions fairly to be contemplated in the 
 future, so far as we can forecast them from the experience of the past, a stable 
 ratio might be maintained if the nations we have alluded to* were to accept and 
 strictly adhere to Bimetallism, at the suggested ratio. We think that if in all 
 these countries gold and silver could be freely coined, and thus become exchange¬ 
 able against commodities at the fixed ratio, the market value of silver as measured 
 by gold would conform to that ratio, and not vary to any material extent.” 
 
 Sec. 119. —“ Apprehensions have been expressed that if a bimetallic system 
 were adopted gold would gradually disappear from circulation. If, however, the 
 arrangement included all the principal commercial nations, we do not think 
 there would be any serious danger of such a result. 
 
 “ Such a danger, if it existed at all, must be remote. It is said indeed, by some, 
 that if it were to happen, and all nations were to Ire driven to a system of silver 
 monometallism, the result might be regarded without dissatisfaction. 
 
 “We are not prepared to go this length, but at the same time we are fully 
 sensible of the benefits which would accrue from the adoption of a common 
 monetarv standard by all the commercial nations of the world, and we are quite 
 alive to the advantage of the adoption by these nations of an uniform Bimetallic 
 Standard as a step in that direction.” 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Sinned by the other six members of the Commission :— 
 J l. Sir D. Bars 
 
 !. Sir B. Barbour, K.O.S.I. 
 r. Sir W. 11. Holldsworth. 
 
 r. Sir W. 11. Hocukwortii, Ba 
 t.P. Mr. Samukl Montagu, M.l\ 
 
 Bart., M.P. 
 
 Sec. 2S. —“We think that the above remarks upon the evils affecting both 
 the United Kingdom and India, if taken in connection with the more detailed 
 statement in Part I. of the Report, will sufficiently indicate our view as to their 
 nature and gravity; and that they are largely due to the currency changes which 
 have taken place in the years immediately preceding and following 1873. 
 
 *• We think that too much stress cannot be laid upon the novelty of the 
 experiment which has been attempted as the result of the above changes. That 
 experiment consists in the independent and unregulated use of both gold and 
 silver as standards of value by the different nations of the world. 
 
 “ We are strongly of opinion that both metals must continue to be used as 
 standard money; the results of using them separately and independently since 
 1873 have been most unsatisfactory, and may be positively disastrous in the 
 future. 
 
 “ It cannot be questioned that until 1873 gold and silver were always effec¬ 
 tively linked by a legal ratio in one or more countries. 
 
 “’it is equally indisputable that the relative value of the two metals has been 
 subject to greater divergence since 1874 than during the whole of the 200 years 
 preceding that date, notwithstanding the occurrence of variations in their relative 
 production more intense and more prolonged than those which have been 
 experienced in recent years.” 
 
 * The United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, and the Latin Union. 
 
32 
 
 O., •>!) _«In 1873-74 the connecting link disappeared, and for the first time 
 the system of rating the two metals ceased to form a subject of legislation in any 
 
 C0U “ xihe law of supply and demand was for the first time left to operate inde- 
 
 PROPOSED REMEDY. 
 
 $ ec 30.—“ It appears to us impossible to attribute the concurrence of these 
 two events to a merely fortuitous coincidence. They must, in our opinion, be 
 regarded as standing to each other in the relation of cause and effect. 
 
 *< We cannot, therefore, doubt that if the system which prevailed before 1873 
 were replaced in its integrity, most of the evils which we have above described 
 would be removed; and the remedy which we have to suggest is simply the 
 reversion to a system which existed before the changes above referred to'were 
 brought about—a system, namely, under which both metals were freely coined 
 into legal tender money at a fixed ratio over a sufficiently large area. 
 
 “ The effects of that system, though it was nominally in force only within a 
 limited area, were felt in all commercial countries, whatever their 'individual 
 systems of currency might be; and the relative value of the two metals in all 
 the markets of the world was practically identical with that fixed by the legis¬ 
 lation of the countries forming the Latin Union. 
 
 “ As regards the possibility of maintaining such a system in the future, we 
 need only refer to the conclusion at which our colleagues have arrived in 
 Sec. 107, Part II. (see above), and with which we entirely agree.” 
 
 Sec. 3 //.—“ No settlement of the difficulty is, however, in our opinion, possible 
 without international action. 
 
 “ The remedy which we suggest is essentially international in its character, 
 and its details must be settled in concert with the other Powers concerned. 
 
 “ It will be sufficient for us to indicate the essential features of the agreement 
 to be arrived at, namely— 
 
 (1) Free coinage’of both metals into legal tender money; and 
 
 (2) The fixing of a ratio at which the coins of either metal shall be avail¬ 
 able for the payment of all debts at the option of the debtor.” 
 
 Sec. 35.—“ The particular ratio to be adopted is not, in our opinion, a necessary 
 preliminary to the opening of negotiations for the establishment of such an 
 agreement, and can, with other matters of detail, be left for further discussion 
 and settlement between the parties interested. 
 
 “ We, therefore, submit that the chief commercial nations of the world, such 
 as the United States, Germany, and the States forming the Latin Union, should 
 in the first place be consulted as to their readiness to join with the United 
 Kingdom in a conference, at which India and any of the British Colonies which 
 may desire to attend should be represented, with a view to arrive, if possible, at 
 a common agreement on the basis above indicated.” 
 
 Sec. 36 .—“ We have indicated what appears to us to be the only permanent 
 solution of the difficulties arising from the recent changes in the relative value 
 of the precious metals, and the only solution which will protect this and other 
 countries against the risks of the future.” 
 
 Manchester 
 
 “Guardian” Printing Works, Blackfriars Street. 
 
 1889. 
 
PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 The Silver Pound and England’s Monetary History 
 since the Restoration, together with the History 
 of the Guinea. By Hon. S. Dana Horton. Price 14/-. 
 Macmillan & Co., London. 
 
 A Treatise on Money, and Essays on Monetary 
 Problems. By J. S. Nicholson, M'.A., D.Sc., Professor 
 of Political Economy in Edinburgh University. Price 
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 The Theory of Bimetallism. By Sir D. Barbour, 
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 The Bimetallic Controversy. By H. H. Gibbs and H. 11. 
 
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 The Silver Question and the Gold Question. By 
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 The Silver Question in its Social Aspect. By Hermann 
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 The Bimetallic Question. By Samuel Smith, M.P. 
 
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 Gold and Silver Money. By Paul F. Tidman, C.M.G. 
 
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 Prices and Employment. By Professor H. S. Foxwell, 
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 Misconceptions in Regard to the Bimetallic Policy 
 of a Fixed Ratio. By Professor H. S. Foxwell, M.A. 
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 Proceedings of Manchester Conference, April, 1888. 
 
 Free. Bimetallic League, Manchester. 
 
 Synopsis — Gold and Silver Commission. By George 
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 Deputation to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor 
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 Bimetallism -Speech by the Right Honourable Henry 
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