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Author 
 
 U.S. President 
 
 (1909-1913: Taft) 
 
 Title: 
 
 Message of the President 
 of the United States... 
 
 Place: 
 
 Washington, D.C. 
 
 Date: 
 
 1911 
 
9f -^:Loi((o-l 
 
 MASTER NEGATIVE « 
 
 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES 
 PRESERVATION DIVISION 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET 
 
 ORIGINAL MATERIAL AS FILMED • EXISTING BIBLIOGRAPHIC RECORD 
 
 iBUSrNCSS 
 
 f 225 
 Un35 
 
 U. S. President, 1909-19\Z^ (Taft) 
 
 Message of the President of the United States, com- 
 niunicated to the two houses of Congress at the begin- 
 ning of the second session Sixty-second Congress, De- 
 cember 5, 1911, on the anti-trust statute. Washington 
 [Govt, print, off.] 1911. 
 
 43 p. 24i"". 
 
 "Appendix a. Suits brought and prosecutions instituted by the United 
 States under the Sherman antitrust law" : p. 19-43. 
 
 1. Trusts, Industrial — Law. 2. Sherman anti-trust law, 1890. i. Title 
 
 ^\ 11-35995 
 
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 MESSAGE 
 
 OF THE PRESIDENT OF 
 THE UNITED STATES 
 
 COMMUNICATED TO THE TWO HOUSES OF 
 CONGRESS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
 SECOND SESSION SIXTY-SECOND CONGRESS 
 
 DECEMBER S 
 1911 
 
 ON THE . . . 
 
 ANTI-TRUST 
 STATUTE 
 
 WASHINGTON: 1011 
 
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 av.351 
 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 School of Business 
 
m 
 
 MESSAGE 
 
 OP 
 
 THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Of 
 
 THE UNITED STATES 
 
 COMMUNICATED TO THE TWO 
 HOUSES OF CONGRESS AT THE 
 BEGINNING OF THE SECOND 
 SESSION SIXTY- SECOND CON- 
 GRESS : : : DECEMBER 5, 1911 
 
 ON THE ANTI-TRUST STATUTE 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 1911 
 
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 liill 
 
 ' T\ o\ os. iC 
 
 1 • 
 
 I" 
 
 MESSAGE. 
 
 To the Senate and House of Representatives: 
 
 j3 This message is the first of several which I shall send to Con- 
 ' gress during the interval between the opening of its regular 
 ii/l session and its adjournment for the Christmas holidays. The 
 ^ amount of information to be communicated as to the opera- 
 tions of the Government, the number of important subjects 
 calling for comment by the Executive, and the transmission 
 to Congress of exhaustive reports of special commissions, make 
 it impossible to include in one message of a reasonable length 
 a discussion of the topics that ought to be brought to the atten- 
 tion of the National Legislature at its first regular session. 
 
 THE ANTI-TRUST LAW — THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. 
 
 In May last the Supreme Court handed down decisions in the 
 suits in equitj'^ brought by the United States to enjoin the fur- 
 ther maintenance of the Standard Oil Trust and of the American 
 Tobacco Trust, and to secure their dissolution. The decisions are 
 epoch-making and serve to advise the business world authori- 
 tatively of the scope and operation of the anti-trust act of 1890. 
 The decisions do not depart in any substantial way from the 
 previous decisions of the court in construing and applying this 
 important statute, but they clarify those decisions by further 
 defining the already admitted exceptions to the literal construc- 
 tion of the act. By the decrees, they furnish a useful precedent 
 as to the proper method of dealing with the capital and property 
 of illegal trusts. These decisions suggest the need and wisdom 
 of additional or supplemental legislation to make it easier for 
 the entire business community to square with the rule of action 
 and legality thus finally established and to preserve the benefit, 
 freedom, and spur of reasonable competition without loss of 
 real efficiency or progress. 
 
 («) 
 
\ 
 
 NO CHANGE IN THE RULE OF DECISION — MERELY IN ITS FORM OF 
 
 EXPRESSION. 
 
 The statute in its first section declares to be illegal " every 
 contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
 conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev- 
 eral States or with foreign nations," and in the second, declares 
 guilty of a misdemeanor " every person who shall monopolize 
 or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any 
 other person to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
 of the several States or with foreign nations." 
 
 In two early cases, where the statute was invoked to enjoin a 
 transportation rate agreement between interstate railroad com- 
 panies, it was held that it was no defense to show that the agree- 
 ment as to rates complained of was reasonable at common law, 
 because it was said that the statute was directed against all con- 
 tracts and combinations in restraint of trade whether reason- 
 able at common law or not. It was plain from the record, how- 
 ever, that the contracts complained of in those cases would not 
 have been deemed reasonable at common law. In subsequent 
 cases the court said that the statute should be given a reason- 
 able construction and refused to include within its inhibition, 
 certain contractual restraints of trade which it denominated 
 as incidental or as indirect. 
 
 These cases of restraint of trade that the court excepted 
 from the operation of the statute were instances which, at 
 common law, would have been called reasonable. In the Stand- 
 ard Oil and Tobacco cases, therefore, the court merely adopted 
 the tests of the common law, and in defining exceptions to the 
 literal application of the statute, only substituted for the test 
 of being incidental or indirect, that of being reasonable, and 
 this, without varying in the slightest the actual scope and efifect 
 of the statute. In other words, all the cases under the statute 
 which have now been decided would have been decided the 
 same way if the court had originally accepted in its construc- 
 tion the rule at common law./ ^^ j 
 
 It has been said that the court, by introducing into the con- 
 struction of the statute common-law distinctions, has emascu- 
 lated it. This is obviously untrue. By its judgment every 
 
 contract and combination in restraint of interstate trade made 
 with the purpose or necessary effect of controlling prices by 
 stifling competition, or of establishing in whole or in part a 
 monopoly of such trade, is condemned by the statute. The 
 most extreme critics can not instance a case that ought to be 
 condemned under the statute which is not brought within its 
 terjns as thus construed. 
 6^ /The suggestion is also made that the Supreme Court by its 
 decision in the last two cases has committed to the court the 
 undefined and unlimited discretion to determine whether a 
 case of restraint of trade is within the terms of the statute. 
 This is wholly untrue. A reasonable restraint of trade at com- 
 mon law is well understood and is clearly defined. It does not 
 rest in the discretion of the court. It must be limited to accom- 
 plish the purpose of a lawful main contract to which, in order 
 that it shall be enforceable at all, it must be incidental. If it 
 exceed the needs of that contract, it is void^ r 
 
 The test of reasonableness was never applied by the court at 
 common law to contracts or combinations or conspiracies in 
 restraint of trade whose purpose was or whose necessary effect 
 would be to stifle competition, to control prices, or establish 
 monopolies. The courts never assumed power to say that such 
 contracts or combinations or conspiracies might be lawful if 
 the parties to them were only moderate in the use of the power 
 thus secured and did not exact from the public too great and 
 exorbitant prices. It is true that many theorists, and others 
 engaged in business violating the statute, have hoped that some 
 such line could be drawn by courts; but no court of authority 
 has ever attempted it. Certainly there is nothing in the deci- 
 sions of the latest two cases from which such a dangerous 
 theory of judicial discretion in enforcing this statute can derive 
 the slightest sanction. 
 
 FORCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF STATUTE A MATTER OF GROWTH, 
 
 We have been twenty-one years making this statute effective 
 for the purposes for which it was enacted The Knight case 
 was discouraging and seemed to remit to the States the whole 
 available power to attack and suppress the evils of the trusts. 
 Slowly, however, the error of that judgment was corrected, and 
 
only in the last three or four years has the heavy hand of the 
 law been laid upon the great illegal combinations that have 
 exercised such an absolute dominion over many of our indus- 
 tries. Criminal prosecutions have been brought and a number 
 are pending, but juries have felt averse to convicting for jail 
 sentences, and judges have been most reluctant to impose such 
 sentences on men of respectable standing in society whose 
 offense has been regarded as merely statutory. Still, as the 
 offense becomes better understood and the committing of it 
 partakes more of studied and deliberate defiance of the law, 
 we can be confident that juries will convict individuals and that 
 jail sentences will be imposed. 
 
 THE REMEDY IN EQUITY BY DISSOLUTION. 
 
 In the Standard Oil case the Supreme and Circuit Courts 
 found the combination to be a monopoly of the interstate busi- 
 ness of refining, transporting, and marketing petroleum and its 
 products, effected and maintained through thirty-seven different 
 corporations, the stock of which was held by a New Jersey com- 
 pany. It in eflFect commanded the dissolution of this combina- 
 tion, directed the transfer and pro rata distribution by the 
 New Jersey company of the stock held by it in the thirty-seven 
 corporations to and among its stockholders; and the corpora- 
 tions and individual defendants were enjoined from conspiring 
 or combining to restore such monopoly; and all agreements be- 
 tween the subsidiary corporations tending to produce or bring 
 about further violations of the act were enjoined. 
 
 In the Tobacco case, the court found that the individual 
 defendants, twenty-nine in number, had been engaged in a 
 successful effort to acquire complete dominion over the manu- 
 facture, sale, and distribution of tobacco in this country and 
 abroad, and that this had been done by combinations made 
 with a purpose and effect to stifle competition, control prices, 
 and establish a monopoly, not only in the manufacture of 
 tobacco, but also of tin-foil and licorice used in its manufac- 
 ture and of its products of cigars, cigarettes, and snuffs. The 
 tobacco suit presented a far more complicated and difficult 
 case than the Standard Oil suit for a decree which would 
 
 effectuate the will of the court and end the violation of the 
 statute. There was here no single holding company as in the 
 case of the Standard Oil Trust. The main company was the 
 American Tobacco Company, a manufacturing, selling, and 
 holding company. The plan adopted to destroy the combina- 
 tion and restore competition involved the redivision of the 
 capital and plants of the whole trust between some of the com- 
 panies constituting the trust and new companies organized for 
 the purposes of the decree and made parties to it, and number- 
 ing, new and old, fourteen. 
 
 SITUATION AFTER READJUSTMENT. 
 
 The American Tobacco Company (old), readjusted capital, 
 $92,000,000; the Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Company (new), cap- 
 ital, $67,000,000; the P. LoriUard Company (new), capital, 
 $47,000,000; and the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (old), 
 capital, $7,525,000, are chiefly engaged in the manufacture and 
 sale of chewing and smoking tobacco and cigars. The former 
 one tin-foil company is divided into two, one of $825,000 capital 
 and the other of $400,000. The one snuff company is divided 
 into three companies, one with a capital of $15,000,000, another 
 with a capital of $8,000,000, and a third with a capital of 
 $8,000,000. The licorice companies are two, one with a capital 
 of $5,758,300 and another with a capital of $2,000,000. There 
 is, also, the British-American Tobacco Company, a British cor- 
 poration, doing business abroad with a capital of $26,000,000, 
 the Porto Rican Tobacco Company, with a capital of $1,800,000, 
 and the corporation of United Cigar Stores, with a capital of 
 $9,000,000. 
 
 Under this arrangement, each of the different kinds of busi- 
 ness will be distributed between two or more companies with 
 a division of the prominent brands in the same tobacco prod- 
 ucts, so as to make competition not only possible but necessary. 
 Thus the smoking-tobacco business of the country is divided 
 so that the present independent companies have 21.39 per cent, 
 while the American Tobacco Company will have 33.08 per cent, 
 the Liggett & Meyers 20.05 per cent, the Lorillard Company 
 22.82 per cent, and the Reynolds Company 2.66 per cent. The 
 
 17808—11 2 
 
8 
 
 stock of the other thirteen companies, both preferred and com- 
 mon, has been taken from the defendant American Tobacco 
 Company and has been distributed among its stockholders. All 
 covenants restricting competition have been declared null and 
 further performance of them has been enjoined. The pre- 
 ferred stock of the different companies has now been given 
 voting power which was denied it under the old organization. 
 The ratio of the preferred stock to the common was as 78 to 
 40. This constitutes a very decided change in the character 
 of the ownership and control of each company. 
 
 In the original suit there were twenty-nine defendants who 
 were charged with being the conspirators through whom the 
 illegal combination acquired and exercised its unlawful do- 
 minion. Under the decree these defendants will hold amounts 
 of stock in the various distributee companies ranging from 41 
 per cent as a maximum to 28J per cent as a minimum, except 
 in the case of one small company, the Porto Rican Tobacco 
 Company, in which they will hold 45 per cent. The twenty-nine 
 individual defendants are enjoined for three years from buying 
 any stock except from each other, and the group is thus pre- 
 vented from extending its control during that period. All par- 
 ties to the suit, and the new companies who are made parties, 
 are enjoined perpetually from in any way effecting any com- 
 bination between any of the companies in violation of the 
 statute by way of resumption of the old trust. Each of the 
 fourteen companies is enjoined from acquiring stock in any 
 of the others. All these companies are enjoined from having 
 common directors or officers, or common buying or selling 
 agents, or common offices, or lending money to each other. 
 
 SIZE OF NEW COMPANIES. 
 
 Objection was made by certain independent tobacco com- 
 panies that this settlement was unjust because it left companies 
 with very large capital in active business, and that the settle- 
 ment that would be effective to put all on an equality would 
 be a division of the capital and plant of the trust into small 
 fractions in amount more nearly equal to that of each of the 
 independent companies. This contention results from a mis- 
 
 9 
 
 understanding of the anti-trust law and its purpose. It is not 
 intended thereby to prevent the accumulation of large capital 
 in business enterprises in which such a combination can secure 
 reduced cost of production, sale, and distribution. It is directed 
 against such an aggregation of capital only when its purpose 
 is that of stifling competition, enhancing or controlling prices, 
 and establishing a monopoly. If we shall have by the decree 
 defeated these purposes and restored competition between the 
 large units into which the capital and plant have been divided, 
 we shall have accomplished the useful purpose of the statute. 
 
 CONFISCATION NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE. 
 
 It is not the purpose of the statute to confiscate the property 
 and capital of the offending trusts. Methods of punishment 
 by fine or imprisonment of the individual offenders, by fine of 
 the corporation or by forfeiture of its goods in transportation, 
 are provided, but the proceeding in equity is a specific remedy 
 to stop the operation of the trust by injunction and prevent the 
 future use of the plant and capital in violation of the statute. 
 
 EFFECTIVENESS OF DECREE. 
 
 I venture to say that not in the history of American law has 
 a decree more effective for such a purpose been entered by a 
 court than that against the Tobacco Trust. As Circuit Judge 
 Noyes said in his judgment approving the decree: 
 
 "The extent to which it has been necessary to tear apart this 
 combination and force it into new forms with the attendant 
 burdens ought to demonstrate that the Federal anti-trust statute 
 is a drastic statute which accomplishes effective results; which 
 so long as it stands on the statute books must be obeyed, and 
 which can not be disobeyed without incurring far-reaching 
 penalties. And, on the other hand, the successful reconstruc- 
 tion of this organization should teach that the effect of enforc- 
 ing this statute is not to destroy, but to reconstruct; not to 
 demolish, but to re-create in accordance with the conditions 
 which the Congress has declared shall exist among the people 
 of the United States." 
 
10 
 
 COMMON-STOCK OWNERSHIP. 
 
 It has been assumed that the present pro rata and common 
 ownership in all these companies by former stockholders of 
 the trust would insure a continuance of the same old single 
 control of all the companies into which the trust has by decree 
 been disintegrated. This is erroneous and is based upon the 
 assumed inefficacy and innocuousness of judicial injunctions. 
 The companies are enjoined from cooperation or combination; 
 they have different managers, directors, purchasing and sales 
 agents. If all or many of the numerous stockholders, reaching 
 into the thousands, attempt to secure concerted action of the 
 companies with a view to the control of the market, their num- 
 ber is so large that such an attempt could not well be concealed, 
 and its prime movers and all its participants would be at once 
 subject to contempt proceedings and imprisonment of a sum- 
 mary character. The immediate result of the present situation 
 will necessarily be activity by all the companies under different 
 managers, and then competition must follow, or there will be 
 activity by one company and stagnation by another. Only a 
 short time will inevitably lead to a change in ownership of the 
 stock, as all opportunity for continued cooperation must dis- 
 appear. Those critics who speak of this disintegration in the 
 trust as a mere change of garments have not given considera- 
 tion to the inevitable working of the decree and understand 
 little the personal danger of attempting to evade or set at 
 naught the solemn injunction of a court whose object is made 
 plain by the decree and whose inhibitions are set forth with a 
 detail and comprehensiveness unexampled in the history of 
 equity jurisprudence. 
 
 VOLUNTARY REORGANIZATIONS OF OTHER TRUSTS AT HAND. 
 
 The effect of these two decisions has led to decrees dissolving 
 the combination of manufacturers of electric lamps, a southern 
 wholesale grocers' association, an interlocutory decree against 
 the Powder Trust with directions by the circuit court com- 
 pelling dissolution, and other combinations of a similar history 
 are now negotiating with the Department of Justice looking to 
 
 11 
 
 a disintegration by decree and reorganization in accordance 
 with law. It seems possible to bring about these reorganiza- 
 tions without general business disturbance. 
 
 MOVEMENT FOR REPEAL OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAW. 
 
 But now that the anti-trust act is seen to be effective for the 
 accomplishment of the purpose of its enactment, we are met 
 by a cry from many different quarters for its repeal. It is 
 said to be obstructive of business progress, to be an attempt to 
 restore old-fashioned methods of destructive competition be- 
 tween small units, and to make impossible those useful combi- 
 nations of capital and the reduction of the cost of production 
 that are essential to continued prosperity and normal growth. 
 
 In the recent decisions the Supreme Court makes clear that 
 there is nothing in the statute which condemns combinations 
 of capital or mere bigness of plant organized to secure economy 
 in production and a reduction of its cost. It is only when the 
 purpose or necessary effect of the organization and mainte- 
 nance of the combination or the aggregation of immense size 
 are the stifling of competition, actual and potential, and the 
 enhancing of prices and establishing a monopoly, that the stat- 
 ute is violated. Mere size is no sin against the law. The merg- 
 ing of two or more business plants necessarily eliminates com- 
 petition between the units thus combined, but this elimination 
 is in contravention of the statute only when the combination is 
 made for purpose of ending this particular competition in order 
 to secure control of, and enhance, prices and create a monopoly. 
 
 LACK OF DEFINITENESS IN THE STATUTE. 
 
 The complaint is made of the statute that it is not sufficiently 
 definite in its description of that which is forbidden, to enable 
 business men to avoid its violation. The suggestion is, that 
 we may have a combination of two corporations, which may run 
 on for years, and that subsequently the Attorney General may 
 conclude that it was a violation of the statute, and that which 
 was supposed by the combiners to be innocent then turns out 
 to be a combination in violation of the statute. The answer to 
 this hypothetical case is that when men attempt to amass 
 
12 
 
 such stupendous capital as will enable them to suppress com- 
 petition, control prices and establish a monopoly, they know 
 the purpose of their acts. Men do not do such a thing without 
 having it clearly in mind. If what they do is merely for the 
 purpose of reducing the cost of production, without the thought 
 of suppressing competition by use of the bigness of the plant 
 they are creating, then they can not be convicted at the time 
 the union is made, nor can they be convicted later, unless it 
 happen that later on they conclude to suppress competition 
 and take the usual methods for doing so, and thus establish for 
 themselves a monopoly. They can, in such a case, hardly 
 complain if the motive which subsequently is disclosed is at- 
 tributed by the court to the original combination. 
 
 NEW REMEDIES SUGGESTED. 
 
 Much is said of the repeal of this statute and of constructive 
 legislation intended to accomplish the purpose and blaze a 
 clear path for honest merchants and business men to follow. 
 It may be that such a plan will be evolved, but I submit that 
 the discussions which have been brought out in recent days by 
 the fear of the continued execution of the anti-trust law have 
 produced nothing but glittering generalities and have offered 
 no line of distinction or rule of action as definite and as clear as 
 that which the Supreme Court itself lays down in enforcing the 
 statute. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL LEGISLATION NEEDED — ^NOT REPEAL OR AMENDMENT. 
 
 I see no objection — and indeed I can see decided advan- 
 tages — in the enactment of a law which shall describe and 
 denounce methods of competition which are unfair and are 
 badges of the unlawful purpose denounced in the anti-trust law. 
 The attempt and purpose to suppress a competitor by under- 
 selling him at a price so unprofitable as to drive him out of 
 business, or the making of exclusive contracts with customers 
 under which they are required to give up association with other 
 manufacturers, and numerous kindred methods for stifling 
 competition and efiFecting monopoly, should be described with 
 sufficient accuracy in a criminal statute on the one hand to 
 enable the Government to shorten its task by prosecuting single 
 
 13 
 
 misdemeanors instead of an entire conspiracy, and, on the 
 other hand, to serve the purpose of pointing out more in detail 
 to the business community what must be avoided. 
 
 FEDERAL INCORPORATION RECOMMENDED. 
 
 In a special message to Congress on January 7, 1910, I ven- 
 tured to point out the disturbance to business that would 
 probably attend the dissolution of these offending trusts. I 
 said: 
 
 "But such an investigation and possible prosecution of 
 corporations whose prosperity or destruction affects the com- 
 fort not only of stockholders but of millions of wage earners, 
 employees, and associated tradesmen must necessarily tend to 
 disturb the confidence of the business community, to dry up 
 the now flowing sources of capital from its places of hoarding, 
 and produce a halt in our present prosperity that will cause 
 suffering and strained circumstances among the innocent many 
 for the faults of the guilty few. The question which I wish in 
 this message to bring clearly to the consideration and discus- 
 sion of Congress is whether, in order to avoid such a possible 
 business danger, something can not be done by which these 
 business combinations may be offered a means, without great 
 financial disturbance, of changing the character, organization, 
 and extent of their business into one within the lines of the 
 law under Federal control and supervision, securing compli- 
 ance with the anti-trust statute. 
 
 •* Generally, in the industrial combinations called * trusts,' 
 the principal business is the sale of goods in many States and 
 in foreign markets; in other words, the interstate and foreign 
 business far exceeds the business done in any one State. This 
 fact will justify the Federal Government in granting a Federal 
 charter to such a combination to make and sell in interstate 
 and foreign commerce the products of useful manufacture 
 under such limitations as will secure a compliance with the 
 anti-trust law. It is possible so to frame a statute that while 
 it offers protection to a Federal company against harmful, 
 vexatious, and unnecessary invasion by the States, it shall sub- 
 ject it to reasonable taxation and control by the States with 
 respect to its purely local business. ♦ * * 
 
 H 
 
Jnt 
 
 •• Corporations organized under this act should be prohibited 
 from acquiring and holding stock in other corporations (except 
 for special reasons, upon approval by the proper Federal au- 
 thority), thus avoiding the creation under national auspices of 
 the holding company with subordinate corporations in differ- 
 ent States, which has been such an effective agency in the 
 I creation of the great trusts and monopolies. 
 
 " If the prohibition of the anti-trust act against combinations 
 in restraint of trade is to be effectively enforced, it is essential 
 that the National Government shall provide for the creation of 
 national corporations to carry on a legitimate business through- 
 out the United States. The conflicting laws of the different 
 States of the Union with respect to foreign corporations make 
 it difficult, if not impossible, for one corporation to comply 
 with their requirements so as to carry on business in a number 
 of different States." 
 
 I renew the recommendation of the enactment of a general 
 law providing for the voluntary formation of corporations to 
 engage in trade and commerce among the States and with 
 foreign nations. Every argument which was then advanced 
 for such a law, and every explanation which was at that time 
 offered to possible objections, have been confirmed by our 
 experience since the enforcement of the anti-trust statute 
 has resulted in the actual dissolution of active commercial 
 organizations. 
 
 It is even more manifest now than it was then that the de- 
 nunciation of conspiracies in restraint of trade should not and 
 does not mean the denial of organizations large enough to be 
 intrusted with our interstate and foreign trade. It has been 
 made more clear now than it was then that a purely negative 
 statute like the anti-trust law may well be supplemented by 
 specific provisions for the building up and regulation of legiti- 
 mate national and foreign commerce, 
 
 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTS NEEDED TO AID COURTS IN 
 
 TRUST DISSOLUTIONS. 
 
 The drafting of the decrees in the dissolution of the present 
 trusts, with a view to their reorganization into legitimate cor- 
 porations, has made it especially apparent that the courts are 
 
 15 
 
 not provided with the administrative machinery to make the 
 necessary inquiries preparatory to reorganization, or to pursue 
 such inquiries, and they should be empowered to invoke the aid 
 of the Bureau of Corporations in determining the suitable reor- 
 ganization of the disintegrated parts. The circuit court and the 
 Attorney General were greatly aided in framing the decree in 
 the Tobacco Trust dissolution by an expert from the Bureau of 
 Corporations. 
 
 FEDERAL CORPORATION COMMISSION PROPOSED. 
 
 I do not set forth in detail the terms and sections of a statute 
 which might supply the constructive legislation permitting and 
 aiding the formation of combinations of capital into Federal 
 corporations. They should be subject to rigid rule§ as to their 
 organization and procedure, including effective publicity^ and 
 to the closest supervision as to the issue of stock and bonds 
 by an executive bureau or commission in the Department of 
 Commerce and Labor, to which in times of doubt they might 
 well submit their proposed plans for future business. It must 
 be distinctly understood that incorporation under a Federal 
 law could not exempt the company thus formed and its incor- 
 porators and managers from prosecution under the anti-trust 
 law for subsequent illegal conduct, but the publicity of its pro- 
 cedure and the opportunity for frequent consultation with the 
 bureau or commission in charge of the incorporation as to 
 the legitimate purpose of its transactions would offer it as great 
 security against successful prosecutions for violations of the law 
 as would be practical or wise. 
 
 Such a bureau or commission might well be invested also 
 with the duty already referred to, of aiding courts in the disso- 
 lution and re-creation of trusts within the law. It should be 
 an executive tribunal of the dignity and power of the Comp- 
 troller of the Currency or the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion, which now exercise supervisory power over important 
 classes of corporations under Federal regulation. 
 
 The drafting of such a Federal incorporation law would offer 
 ample opportunity to prevent many manifest evils in corporate 
 
 17808—11- 
 
16 
 
 management to-day, including irresponsibility of control in the 
 hands of the few who are not the real owners. 
 
 INCORPORATION VOLUNTARY. 
 
 I recommend that the Federal charters thus to be granted 
 shall be voluntary, at least until experience justifies mandatory 
 provisions. The benefit to be derived from the operation of 
 great businesses under the protection of such a charter would 
 attract all who are anxious to keep within the lines of the law. 
 Other large combinations that fail to take advantage of the 
 Federal incorporation will not have a right to complain if their 
 failure is ascribed to unwillingness to submit their transactions 
 to the careful official scrutiny, competent supervision, and pub- 
 licity attendant upon the enjoyment of such a charter. 
 
 ONLY SUPPLEMENTAL LEGISLATION NEEDED. 
 
 The opportunity thus suggested for Federal incorporation, it 
 seems to me, is suitable constructive legislation needed to facili- 
 tate the squaring of great industrial enterprises to the rule of 
 action laid down by the anti-trust law. This statute as con- 
 strued by the Supreme Court must continue to be the Ime of 
 distinction for legiUmate business. It must be enforced, unless 
 we are to banish individualism from all business and reduce it 
 to one common system of regulation or control of prices like 
 that which now prevails with respect to public utilities, and 
 which when applied to all business would be a long step toward 
 State socialism. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF THE ANTI-TRUST ACT. 
 
 The anti-trust act is the expression of the effort of a freedom- 
 ' loving people to preserve equality of opportunity. It is the 
 result of the confident determination of such a people to main- 
 tain their future growth by preserving uncontroUed and un- 
 restricted the enterprise of the individual, his industry, his 
 ingenuity, his intelligence, and his independent courage. 
 
 For twenty years or more this statute has been upon the 
 statute book. All knew its general purpose and approved. 
 Many of its violators were cynical over its assumed impotence. 
 
 17 
 
 It seemed impossible of enforcement. Slowly the mills of the 
 courts ground, and only gradually did the majesty of the law 
 assert itself. Many of its statesmen-authors died before it be- 
 came a living force, and they and others saw the evil grow 
 which they had hoped to destroy. Now its efficacy is seen; now 
 its power is heavy; now its object is near achievement Now 
 we hear the call for its repeal on the plea that it interferes with 
 business prosperity, and we are advised in most general terms, 
 how by some other statute and in some other way the evil we 
 are just stamping out can be cured, if we only abandon this 
 work of twenty years and try another experiment for another 
 term of years. 
 
 It is said that the act has not done good. Can this be said 
 in the face of the effect of the Northern Securities decree? 
 That decree was in no way so drastic or inhibitive in detail 
 as either the Standard Oil decree or the Tobacco decree; but 
 did it not stop for all time the then powerful movement toward 
 the control of all the railroads of the country in a single hand? 
 Such a one-man power could not have been a healthful influ- 
 ence in the Republic, even though exercised under the general 
 super\'ision of an interstate commission. 
 
 Do we desire to make such ruthless combinations and mo- 
 nopolies lawful? When all energies are directed, not toward 
 the reduction of the cost of production for the public benefit by 
 a healthful competition, but toward new ways and means for 
 making permanent in a few hands the absolute control of the 
 conditions and prices prevailing in the whole field of industry, 
 then individual enterprise and effort will be paralyzed and the 
 spirit of commercial freedom will be dead. 
 
 Wm. H. Taft. 
 The WnrrE House, December 5, iOll. 
 
 w 
 
kr 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 SufTS Brought and Prosecutions Instituted by the United 
 States Under the Sherman Antitrust Law. 
 
 President Harbison's Administration, March 4, 1889, to March 4, 1893. 
 
 1. 
 
 2. 
 
 [William H. H. Miller, Attorney General, March 5, 1889, to March 6, 1893.] 
 
 United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal Company, 43 Fed. 
 Rep., 898; 46 Fed. Rep., 432. 
 
 (Circuit Court, M. D. Tennessee. October 13, 1890; June 
 4, 1891.) 
 
 Suit against the members of the " Nashville Coal Ex- 
 change," composed of various coal-mining companies oper- 
 ating mines in Kentucky and Tennessee, and of persons and 
 firms dealing in coal in Nashville, formed for the purpose 
 of fixing prices and regulating the output of coal. 
 
 A preliminary injunction was denied on October 13, 1890. 
 Upon full hearing the court, on June 4, 1891, held the com- 
 bination to be in violation of the antitrust law and enjoined 
 the further carrying out of the agreement. 
 
 United States v. Greenhut et al., 50 Fed. Rep., 469. 
 (District Court, Massachusetts. May 16, 1892.) 
 A proceeding by indictment against the officers of the 
 Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. (Whisky Trust) for an 
 alleged violation of the antitrust law. 
 
 Indictment quashed, as allegations were held not to con- 
 stitute an offense under the statute. 
 
 2a. 
 
 In re Corning, 51 Fed. Rep., 205. 
 
 (District Court, N. D. Ohio. June 11, 1892.) 
 Application for a warrant of removal from Ohio to Mas- 
 sachusetts to answer to the indictment found in the Green- 
 hut case. Application denied and prisoner discharged. 
 
 2b. 
 
 In re Terrell, 51 Fed. Rep., 213. 
 
 (Circuit Court, S. D. New York. June 28, 1892.) 
 Application for a writ of habeas corpus to secure a dis- 
 charge from arrest and detention upon a warrant for re- 
 moval from New York to Massachusetts to answer to the 
 indictment found in the Greenhut case. 
 Petitioner discharged. 
 
 [19] 
 
 "Hp^J 
 

 20 
 
 2c. 
 
 3. 
 
 4 
 
 In re Greene, 52 Fed. Rep., 104. 
 
 (Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio. August 4, 1892.) 
 Petition for writ of habeas corpus to secure release from 
 the custody of the marshal, by whom he was held awaiting 
 an order for the removal of Greene to Massachusetts to an- 
 swer to the indictment in the Greenhut case. 
 Prisoner discharged. 
 
 United States v. Nelson, 52 Fed. Rep., 646. 
 
 (District Court, Minnesota. October 10, 1892.) 
 Indictment of a number of lumber dealers for conspiring 
 together to raise the price of lumber in violation of the anti- 
 trust law. 
 
 Demurrer to indictment sustained, the court holding that 
 an agreement between a number of dealers to raise prices, 
 unless they controlled nearly the entire commodity, could 
 not operate as a restraint of trade under the act. 
 
 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 53 Fed. 
 Rep., 440; 58 Fed. Rep., 58; 166 U. S., 290. 
 
 (Circuit Court, Kansas. November 28, 1892.) 
 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. October 2, 
 
 1893.) 
 
 (United States Supreme Court. March 22, 1897.) 
 Bill filed January 6, 1892, to enjoin the operations of a 
 combination of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, 
 formed for the purpose of maintaining " just and reason- 
 able rates," etc. Bill dismissed by Circuit Court; decree 
 of dismissal affirmed by Circuit Court of Appeals, and re- 
 versed by the United States Supreme Court on March 22, 
 1897. 
 
 21 
 
 5. 
 
 United States v. Worldngmen's Amalgamated Council of New 
 Orleans et a/., 54 Fed. Rep., 994; 57 Fed. Rep., 85. 
 (Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana. March 25, 1893.) 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. June 13, 1893.) i 
 Suit to restrain defendants, a combination of workmen, 
 from interfering with interstate and f oreign- commerce, in | 
 violation of the antitrust law. The injunction was granted! 
 and the law held to apply to combinations of laborers as 
 well as capitalists. 
 This decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 6. 
 
 7. 
 
 United States v. Patterson et a/., 55 Fed. Rep., 605; 59 Fed. 
 Rep., 280. 
 
 (Circuit Court, Massachusetts. February 28 and June 
 7, 1893.) 
 
 Cash register case. Indictment of members of a combi- 
 nation formed for the purpose of controlling the price of 
 cash registers. A demurrer was sustained as to certain 
 counts of the indictment and overruled as to others and 
 leave granted to file special demurrers to the counts which 
 were sustained. The special demurrers were heard on 
 June 1, 1893, and the demurrers overruled, the court adher- 
 ing to its former ruling. Letter of Attorney General dated 
 October 16, 1893, shows case was allowed to lapse because 
 of consolidation of complaining witness with defendants. 
 
 United States v. E. C. Knight Company (Sugar Trust), 60 
 Fed. Rep., 306; 60 Fed. Rep., 934; 156 U. S., 1. 
 
 (Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. January 30, 1894.) 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. March 26, 
 1894.) 
 
 (United States Supreme Court. January 21, 1895.) 
 Bill in equity to enjoin the operations of the Sugar Trust, 
 charged with a violation of the antitrust law. The bill was 
 dismissed January 30, 1894. Appeal was taken to the 
 Circuit Court of Appeals and the decree affirmed. From 
 this decision an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court 
 of the United States, where the decree of dismissal was 
 affirmed. 
 
 PREsroENT Cleveland's Second Administration, March 4, 1893, to 
 
 March 4, 1897. 
 
 [Richard Olney, Attorney General, March 6, 1893, to June 7, 1895; Judson Harmon, 
 
 Attorney General, June 8, 1895, to March 5, 1897.] 
 
 1. 
 
 United States v. Agler, 62 Fed. Rep., 824. 
 (Circuit Court, Indiana. July 12, 1894.) 
 Information charging contempt of court in disobeying 
 an injunction restraining Agler and others from interfering 
 with interstate commerce and obstructing the mails. In- 
 formation quashed. It was charged that Agler was a mem- 
 ber of the American Railway Union, the members of which 
 order were on a strike and had been enjoined under the 
 
 n 
 
^M 
 
 "1 
 
 2. 
 
 3. 
 
 22 
 
 antitrust law from interfering with the carrying of the 
 mails and from obstructing interstate commerce. This is 
 one of the " Debs " cases. 
 
 United States v. Elliott, 62 Fed. Rep., 801 ; 64 Fed. Rep.. 27. 
 (Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri. July 6 and October 24, 
 
 1894.) 
 
 Suit to restrain Elliott, Debs, and others, members of the 
 American Railway Union, from carrying out their unlawful 
 conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce and to 
 obstruct the carrying of the mails, in violation of the anti- 
 trust law. Preliminary injunction granted. A demurrer 
 to this bill was overruled. 
 
 United States v. Debs et aU 64 Fed. Rep., 724. 
 
 (Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois. December 14, 1894.) 
 Proceedings in contempt to punish Debs and others for 
 disobeying an injunction restraining them from interfering 
 with interstate commerce and with obstructing the mails, 
 by means of a conspiracy, in violation of the antitrust 
 law. Defendants found guilty and punished. 
 
 23 
 
 3a. 
 
 wlil 
 
 4. 
 
 In re Debs, petitioner, 158 U. S., 564. 
 
 (United States Supreme Court. May 27, 1895.) 
 Proceedings instituted July 2, 1894. Application for a 
 writ of habeas corpus to secure a discharge from imprison- 
 ment for disobeying an injunction of the Circuit Court for 
 the Northern District of Illinois, restraining Debs and 
 others from conspiring to interfere with interstate com- 
 merce, in violation of the antitrust law. 
 Petition for the writ denied. 
 
 United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. Rep., 698. 
 
 (District Court, N. D. California. April 1 and 2, 1895.) 
 Cassidy and others were indicted under section 5440, 
 United States Revised Statutes, for conspiring to commit 
 offenses against the United States, which acts consisted in 
 a combining and conspiring to restrain trade and com- 
 merce between the States, in violation of the antitrust law, 
 and grew out of the Pullman strike in California. The 
 trial lasted five months and resulted in a disagreement of 
 the Jury. 
 
 5. 
 
 6. 
 
 7. 
 
 Moore v. United States, 85 Fed. Rep., 465. 
 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. February 14, 
 1898.) 
 
 Indictment of the members of an association of dealers 
 in coal at Salt Lake City for entering into a conspiracy to 
 regulate the price of coal. Indictment returned November 
 4, 1895. Moore was tried and convicted in the District 
 Court of Utah upon this indictment. The Circuit Court of 
 Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, for the rea- 
 son that upon the admission of Utah as a State it was no 
 longer a " Territory " within the meaning of the antitrust 
 act, and the combination was not in restraint of interstate 
 commerce, and the court therefore had no jurisdiction 
 of the offense. 
 
 United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 76 Fed. Rep., 895; 
 89 Fed. Rep., 1020; 171 U. S., 505. 
 
 (Circuit Court, S. D. New York. May 28, 1896.) 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit March 19, 
 1897.) 
 
 (United States Supreme Court. October 28, 1898.) 
 Suit instituted January 8, 1896. Rill in equity to enjoin 
 the alleged violation of the antitrust law by. a combination 
 of railroads. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill, and 
 the Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the Circuit 
 Court. These judgments were reversed by the United 
 States Supreme Court. 
 
 United States v. Addgston Pipe and Steel Company, 78 Fed. 
 Rep., 712; 85 Fed. Rep., 271; 175 U. S., 211. 
 
 (Circuit Court, E. D. Tennessee. February 5, 1897.) 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. February 8. 
 1898.) 
 
 (United States Supreme Court. December 4, 1899.) 
 Suit instituted December 10, 1896. Rill in equity to en- 
 join the operations of the Cast-Iron Pipe Trust, which 
 attempted to control the price of cast-iron pipe. The bill 
 was dismissed by the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court of 
 Appeals reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and re- 
 manded the case, with instructions to enter a decree for 
 the Government. On appeal to the Supreme Court the 
 action of the Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed. 
 
24 
 
 8. 
 
 United States v. Hopkins et al., 82 Fed. Rep., 529; 84 Fed. 
 Rep., 1018; 171 U. S., 578. 
 
 (Circuit Court, Kansas. September 20, 1897.) 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. December 
 27, 1897.) 
 
 (United States Supreme Court. October 24, 1898.) 
 Suit instituted December 31, 1896. Bill to restrain the 
 operations of the "Kansas City Live Stock Exchange,'* 
 organized to control the shipments of live stock. The in- 
 junction was granted, but on appeal the Supreme Court 
 reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and remanded the 
 case, with instructions to dismiss the bill. 
 
 President McKinley*s Administration— March 4, 1897-September 14, 
 
 1901. 
 
 [Joseph McKenna. Attorney General, March 5, 1897, to June 25, 1898; John W. Griggs, 
 Attorney General. June 25, 1898, to March 29, 1901; Philander C. Knox, Attorney 
 General, April 5, 1901, to June 30, 1904.] 
 
 Jil* 
 
 Anderson v. United States, 82 Fed. Rep., 998; 171 U. S., 604. 
 
 (Circuit Court, N. D. Missouri. .) 
 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. .) 
 
 (United States Supreme Court. October 24, 1898.) 
 Bill in equity to restrain the operations of " The Traders* 
 Live Stock Exchange," of Kansas City, an association 
 formed for the purpose of buying cattle on the market. 
 This suit was instituted June 7, 1897, in the Circuit Court 
 of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. 
 Decree of temporary injunction was granted and the case 
 appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
 Circuit. From there it was certified to the Supreme Court 
 of the United States for instructions upon certain ques- 
 tions, under the provisions of section 6 of the act of March 
 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 828). The Supreme Court reversed the 
 decree of the Circuit Court and remanded the case, with 
 directions to dismiss the bill, holding that the acts com- 
 plained of were not a violation of the antitrust law. 
 
 United States v. Coal Dealers' Association, 85 Fed. Rep., 252. 
 (Circuit Court, N. D. California. January 28, 1898.) 
 Suit brought December 16, 1897. Bill for injunction to 
 restrain the operations of a combination of coal dealers 
 known as the " Coal Dealers' Association of California." 
 A temporary injunction was granted. 
 
 25 
 
 3. 
 
 United States v. Chesapeake and Ohio Fuel Company et aL. 
 105 Fed. Rep., 93; 115 Fed. Rep., 610. 
 
 (Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio. August 31, 1900.) 
 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. April 8, 1902.) 
 Bill filed May 8, 1899, to annul a contract and dissolve 
 a combination of producers and shippers of coal in Ohio 
 and West Virginia, engaged in mining coal and making 
 coke intended for " Western shipment," under agreement 
 to sell the same at not less than a memorandum price, to be 
 fixed by an executive committee appointed by the pro- 
 ducers. Defendants enjoined, contract declared void and 
 illegal, and the combination dissolved. 
 
 Affirmed by Circuit Court of Appeals. No appeal taken. 
 
 President Roosevelt's Administration — September 14, 1901-March 4, 
 
 1909. 
 
 [Philander C. Knox, Attorney General, April 5, 1901, to June 30, 1904; William H. 
 Moody, Attorney General, July 1, 1904, to December 16, 1906; Charles J. Bonaparte, 
 Attorney General, December 17, 1906, to March 4, 1909.] 
 
 1. 
 
 United States v. Northern Securities Co., Great Northern R'y 
 Co,, Northern Pacific R'y Co. et al., 120 F. R., 721; 193 
 U. S., 197. 
 
 (Circuit Court, Minnesota. April 9, 1903.) 
 (United States Supreme Court. March 14, 1904.) 
 This suit was brought on March 10, 1902, in the Cir- 
 cuit Court of the United States for the District of Minne- 
 sota, to enjoin the defendant, the Northern Securities Co., 
 from purchasing, acquiring, receiving, holding, voting, or 
 in any manner acting as the owner of any of the shares of 
 the capital stock of the two defendant railway companies, 
 and to restrain the defendant railway companies from 
 permitting the securities company to vote any of the stock 
 of said railways, or from exercising any control whatso- 
 ever over the corporate acts of either of said railway com- 
 panies, it being charged that the securities company was 
 formed for the purpose of acquiring a majority of the capi- 
 tal stock of the two railway companies in order that it 
 might in that way efTect practically a consolidation of the 
 two companies by controlling rates and restricting and 
 destroying competition, in violation of the Sherman anti- 
 trust law. 
 
m 
 
 26 
 
 The Circuit Court on April 9, 1903, entered a decree 
 in favor of the Government as prayed in the petition, 
 and this decree was, on March 14, 1904, affirmed by the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 «f* 
 
 United States v. Swift & Co. et a/., 122 F. R., 529; 196 U. S., 
 375. Suit brought on May 10, 1902, in the Circuit Court of 
 the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to 
 restrain the defendants (commonly known as the Beef 
 Trust), who are engaged in the buying of live stock and the 
 selling of dressed meats, from carrjang out an unlawful 
 conspiracy entered into between themselves and with the 
 various railway companies, to suppress competition and to 
 obtain a monopoly in the purchase of live stock and in the 
 selling of dressed meats. A preliminary restraining order 
 was granted on May 20, 1902. 
 
 The defendants having demurred to the bill, the court, 
 after hearing, on April 18, 1903, overruled the demurrers 
 and granted a preliminary injunction. The defendants 
 having failed to answer, the court, on May 26, 1903, entered 
 an order making the decree final and perpetually enjoining 
 the further operations of the trust. 
 
 The defendants, on August 14, 1903, appealed from the 
 final decree of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, where decree was affirmed January 30, 
 1905. 
 
 United States v. The Federal Salt Company et ah Suit 
 brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the 
 Northern District of California, on October 15, 1902, to re- 
 strain the defendants (known as the Salt Trust) from un- 
 lawfully combining and conspiring to suppress competition 
 in the manufacture and sale of salt in the States west of 
 the Rocky Mountains, in violation of the Sherman antitrust 
 law. A temporary restraining order was issued on that 
 date, and the cause coming on for hearing, the court, on 
 November 10, 1902, granted an injunction pendente lite, 
 thus, in effect, making the restraining order perpetual. 
 No appeal was taken from this order. 
 
 United States v. The Federal Salt Company. On February 28, 
 1903, the grand jury for the United States District Court 
 for the Northern District of California returned an indict- 
 
 5. 
 
 6. 
 
 7. 
 
 27 
 
 ment against the Salt Trust for having violated the anti- 
 trust law. 
 
 On May 12, 1903, the trust pleaded guilty, and the court 
 sentenced it to pay a fine of $1,000, which was paid. 
 
 United States v. Jacksonville Wholesale Grocers* Association. 
 A proceeding in equity, instituted on September 12, 1903, 
 in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District 
 of Florida, for the purpose of dissolving a combination of 
 wholesale grocers, operating in violation of the antitrust 
 
 law. 
 
 November 1, 1907, dismissed. 
 
 United States v. General Paper Co, et al December 27, 1904, 
 a bill in equity was filed in the Circuit Court of the United 
 States for the District of Minnesota against the General 
 Paper Co. and twenty-three other corporations engaged in 
 the manufacture and sale of paper, alleging that they had 
 entered into a combination and conspiracy to restrain trade 
 and commerce in the manufacture of news print, manila, 
 fiber, and other papers by making the General Paper Co. 
 their common sales agent. On May 11, 1906, the court 
 ordered judgment in favor of the Government, dissolving 
 the combination and affording all relief prayed in the bill. 
 (See also Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S., 92; Alexander 
 V. United States, id., 117.) 
 
 United States v. Armour & Co. et al. After the affirmance 
 by the Supreme Court of the decree of the Circuit Court 
 in United States v. Swift & Company (above referred to) 
 complaints from various quarters were made to the depart- 
 ment that the combination still continued. The department 
 thereupon began an exhaustive inquiry before the grand 
 jury for the northern district of Illinois, which resulted in 
 the return of an indictment on July 1, 1905, against Armour 
 & Co., J. Ogden Armour, president; Patrick A. Valentine, 
 treasurer; Arthur Neekler, general manager; Thomas J. 
 Connors, superintendent, and Samuel A. McRoberts, assist- 
 ant treasurer, of Armour & Co.; the Armour Packing Co., 
 and Charles W. Armour, president; Swift & Co., and Louis 
 F. Swift, president; Lawrence A. Carton, treasurer; D. 
 Edwin Hartwell, secretary, and Albert H. Veeder and 
 Robert C. McManus and Arthur F. Evans, agents of Swift & 
 Co.; the Fairbank Canning Co., and Edward Morris, vice 
 
a 
 
 8a. 
 
 28 
 
 president; Ira N. Morris, secretary of the Fairbank Canning 
 Co.; the Cudahy Packing Co., and Edward A. Cudahy, vice 
 president and general manager of the Cudahy Packing Co. 
 Against this indictment many preliminary objections 
 were urged. All were disposed of in favor of the Govern- 
 ment, except certain special pleas of immunity in bar, 
 based upon information concerning the matters for which 
 the defendants were indicted, which they had given to the 
 Department of Commerce and Labor. The court sustained 
 the pleas so far as the individual defendants were con- 
 cerned and overruled them with respect to the corporations. 
 
 United States v. MacAndrews <& Forbes Company et al 
 (149 Fed., 823; 212 U. S., 585.) In June, 1906, the grand 
 jury returned an indictment against the MacAndrews & 
 Forbes Co., the J. S. Young Co., a corporation of Maine, 
 and Karl Jungbluth and Howard E. Young, their respective 
 presidents, for illegally combining and conspiring to regu- 
 late the interstate trade and sale in licorice paste, an article 
 used in the manufacture of plug and smoking tobacco, 
 snuff, and cigars. Defendants entered pleas of not guilty, 
 with leave to withdraw or demur on or before July 9, 1906*. 
 July 9, 1906, demurrers filed by all of the defendants! De- 
 cember 4, 1906, demurrers overruled. December 19, 1906, 
 trial commenced. January 10, 1907, MacAndrews & Forbes 
 Co. was found guilty on first and third counts of indictment, 
 the J. S. Young Co. guilty on first and third counts; verdict 
 of acquittal as to individual defendants. MacAndrews & 
 Forbes Co. fined $10,000. J. S. Young Co. fined $8,000. 
 
 The Tobacco Trust Cases. (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S., 43; 
 McAlister v. Henkel, id., 90; 149 Fed., 823; 212 U. S., 585.) 
 These cases grew out of an investigation by a Federal grand 
 jury in the southern district of New York of the American 
 Tobacco Co. and the MacAndrews & Forbes Co., believed 
 to be violating the antitrust laws, the matter having been 
 brought to the attention of the grand jury by the officers 
 of the Department of Justice, special counsel having been 
 appointed for the purpose of investigation and prosecution. 
 Subpoenas duces tecum were served upon the officers of the 
 companies directing them to produce papers and other 
 documentary evidence belonging to the corporations. 
 They refused to obey the subpoena to answer questions 
 propounded to them. The Circuit Court adjudged them in 
 contempt and committed them until thev should produce 
 
 9. 
 
 29 
 
 the books and answer the questions. They applied to an- 
 other judge of the same court for writs of habeas corpus, 
 which, upon hearing, were discharged. Upon appeal the 
 Supreme Court affirmed the orders denying the writs. 
 
 United States v. Metropolitan Meat Company et al. Bill filed 
 in equity in October, 1905, in the United States Circuit 
 Court for Hawaii, to restrain the operation of alleged un- 
 lawful combinations in restraint of the trade in beef and 
 beef products. Demurrer to bill overruled October 2, 1906. 
 Pending. 
 
 10. 
 
 United States v. Nome Retail Grocers' Association. Novem- 
 ber 4, 1905, the department directed the United States at- 
 torney for the Second Division of Alaska to file a bill in 
 equity against the Nome Retail Grocers' Association, alleg- 
 ing a combination to fix prices and to suppress competition. 
 Suit was promptly instituted, whereupon the defendants 
 agreed to the entry of a decree granting all the relief prayed 
 for in the petition. A decree dissolving the combination 
 was entered accordingly. 
 
 11. 
 
 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis 
 et al. Petition filed in Circuit Court of United States for 
 the Eastern District of Missouri on December 1, 1905, to 
 enjoin the defendant railroads from continuing an unlaw- 
 ful combination entered into between them to operate 
 Eads Bridge and Merchants Bridge as a common agency 
 of interstate commerce. Upon disagreement of Circuit 
 Judges case was carried to the Supreme Court and was 
 remanded by that court for further proceedings. Govern- 
 ment then attempted to secure rehearing in the Circuit 
 Court and failed, and appealed to the Supreme Court, 
 where the case was argued and is awaiting decision. 
 
 12. 
 
 United States v. Allen & Robinson et al. Bill filed in Octo- 
 ber in United States Circuit Court for the District of Hawaii, 
 alleging unlawful combination to control the trade in lum- 
 ber in that Territory. Answers filed January 2, 1906. 
 Pending. 
 
 13. 
 
 United States v. Otis Elevator Co. et al. Bill filed March 7, 
 1906, in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern 
 District of California against the Otis Elevator Co. and a 
 number of other corporations and individuals, in which it 
 
•^^^^m^mr-z 
 
 14. 
 
 30 
 
 was alleged that they were maintaining a combination in 
 restraint of trade in the matter of the manufacture and 
 sale of elevators. June 1, 1906, a decree was entered by 
 consent dissolving the combination and granting the relief 
 prayed. 
 
 United States v. F. A. Amsden Lumber Company et aL In- 
 dictment returned in the District Court of Oklahoma May 4, 
 1906, for violation of the Sherman Act in restricting com- 
 petition and maintaining prices in the sale of lumber. May 
 13, 1907, change of venue granted to Grant County. Sep- 
 tember 25, 1907, pleas of guilty and fines imposed aggre- 
 gating $2,000, which were paid. 
 
 15. 
 
 United States v. National Association of Retail Druggists et al. 
 Bill in equity filed May 9, 1906, in the United States Circuit 
 Court for the District of Indiana against the National Asso- 
 ciation of Retail Druggists, alleging a combination in re- 
 straint of interstate trade in the sale of drugs and propri- 
 etary medicines. May 9, 1907, final decree entered by 
 agreement, giving the Government all the relief prayed for 
 in the petition. 
 
 16. 
 
 United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company et aL 
 May 25, 1906, the Federal grand jury for the Middle District 
 of Tennessee, upon information furnished by the Depart- 
 ment of Justice, returned an indictment against 31 corpora- 
 tions and 25 individuals engaged in the fertilizer business 
 in the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
 Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee, 
 charging them with engaging in a conspiracy in violation of 
 the Federal antitrust act and with conspiring to commit 
 an offense against the United States, viz, the aforesaid con- 
 spiracy, in violation of section 5440 of the Revised Stat- 
 utes. The fertilizer manufacturers combined to fix the 
 price of fertilizers in the territory mentioned and to appor- 
 tion the trade among themselves according to an agreed 
 percentage. July 11, 1906, all the defendants appealed to 
 the Supreme Court of the United States from an order of 
 the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Virginia deny- 
 ing the right of habeas corpus and remanding them to the 
 custody of the marshal for removal to the Middle District 
 of Tennessee for trial. The case before the Supreme Court 
 was argued on December 3, 1906, and on March 4, 1907, the 
 judgment of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
 
 17. 
 
 31 
 
 Virginia was reversed and the case remanded to that court 
 for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of 
 the Supreme Court. April 17, 1908, various motions, pleas 
 in abatement, and demurrers filed. July 3, 1908, certain 
 motions and demurrers overruled, plea in abatement 
 allowed, and indictment quashed. 
 
 United States v. American Ice Company et al. July 12, 1906, 
 indictment returned in the Supreme Court of the District 
 of Columbia, charging an unlawful agreement to control 
 prices and restrict competition in the sale of ice. Case 
 pending. 
 
 18. 
 
 United States v. Chandler Ice and Cold Storage Plant et al. 
 September 19, 1906, indictment returned in the District 
 Court for the Territory of Oklahoma against the Chandler 
 Ice and Cold Storage Plant and others, charging a combi- 
 nation to apportion territory in the matter of the sale of ice. 
 May 5, 1907, demurrer filed by defendant Groves and over- 
 ruled. May 20, 1907, demurrer filed by Chandler Ice and 
 Cold Storage Plant. Dismissed. 
 
 19. 
 
 United States v. Alfred M. Gloyd et al. September 21, 1906, 
 indictment returned against Alfred M. Gloyd and others in 
 the District Court for the Territory of Oklahoma, charging 
 a combination to maintain prices and restrict competition 
 in the sale of lumber. Dismissed. 
 
 20. 
 
 United States v. People*s Ice and Fuel Company, a corpora- 
 tion, and W. B. Lount. October 23, 1906, indictment re- 
 turned in the District Court for the Territory of Arizona, 
 charging a combination to control prices and restrict com- 
 petition in the sale of ice. January 5, 1907, trial com- 
 menced. Verdict not guilty as to People's Ice and Fuel Co. 
 and company held to next grand jury. Trial of W. B. Lount 
 continued over term. October 16, 1907, plea in bar filed. 
 October 17, 1907, plea in bar sustained. 
 
 21. 
 
 United States v. Demund Lumber Company et al. October 
 23, 1906, indictment returned in the District Court for the 
 Territory of Arizona, charging a combination to control 
 prices and restrict competition in the sale of lumber. Jan- 
 uary 2, 1907, trial commenced. Verdict of not guilty as to 
 Demund Lumber Co. January 7, 1907, cases against Cham- 
 berlain Lumber Co. and Valley Lumber^Co. continued over 
 
\r\ 
 
 22, 
 
 32 
 
 term. May 8, 1907, motion made to court to instruct for 
 acquittal. Motion argued and taken under advisement. 
 May 9, 1907, motion sustained and verdict of acquittal 
 returned. 
 
 United States v. Phoenix Wholesale Meat and Produce Com- 
 pany, a corporation, P. T. Hurley, and S. J. Tribolet. Octo- 
 ber 23, 1906, indictment returned in the District Court for 
 the Territory of Arizona, charging a combination to control 
 prices and restrict competition in the sale of meats. Jan- 
 uary 7, 1907, trial commenced. Verdict of not guilty as to 
 Phoenix Wholesale Meat & Produce Co. January 8, 1907, 
 indictment against Hurley dismissed. Verdict of guilty as 
 to defendant S. J. Tribolet. January 12, 1907, Tribolet sen- 
 tenced to pay fine of $1,000. January 9, 1907, case against 
 Phoenix Wholesale Meat & Produce Co. dismissed. Appeal 
 to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona. Su- 
 preme Court affirmed decision of lower court. Fine paid. 
 
 «tf* 
 
 United States v. Standard Oil Company of N. J. et al, 
 (United States Circuit Court En. Mo., 173 Fed., 177.) 
 (United States Supreme Court, 221 U. S., 1.) 
 
 November 15, 1906, bill in equity filed in United States 
 Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against 
 the Standard Oil Co. and others, in which it is alleged that 
 they are maintaining a combination in restraint of trade 
 in the manufacture and sale of petroleum. Case argued in 
 Circuit Court April, 1909; decision by unanimous court in 
 favor of the Government November 20, 1909. Appealed to 
 Supreme Court; argued March, 1910, reargued January, 
 1911, and judgment affirmed May 15, 1911. 
 
 24. 
 
 United States v. T. B. Hogg et al December 8, 1906, indict- 
 ment returned in the District Court for the Territory of 
 Oklahoma, charging a combination and conspiracy in re- 
 straint of trade and commerce in the sale of lumber. 
 March 25, 1907, plea of not guilty. Change of judge granted 
 on application of defendants. Dismissed. 
 
 25. 
 
 United States v. Atlantic Investment Company et al, Feb- 
 ruary 11, 1907, indictment returned in the United States 
 District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against 
 the Atlantic Investment Co. and others, charging a combi- 
 nation in restraint of trade and commerce in the matter 
 of the manufacture and sale of turpentine. February 18, 
 
 26. 
 
 33 
 
 1907, four corporations and two individuals, defendants to 
 this indictment, entered pleas of guilty, and the court im- 
 posed a fine of $5,000 upon each of the six defendants, 
 making a total of $30,000. 
 
 United States v. American Seating Company et al. March 
 12, 1907, indictment returned in the District Court of the 
 Northern District of Illinois charging a violation of the 
 Sherman antitrust law by engaging in a combination in 
 restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of school 
 and church furniture. April 1, 1907, defendant corpora- 
 tions entered pleas of guilty, with one exception. May 20, 
 1907, fines imposed aggregating $43,000. Defendant E. H. 
 Stafford Manufacturing Co. filed demurrer April 3, 1907. 
 May 31, 1907, demurrer overruled and plea of not guilty 
 entered. 
 
 27. 
 
 United States v. American Seating Company et al, March 
 12, 1907, bill in equity filed in the United States Circuit 
 Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the 
 American Seating Co. and others, in which it is alleged 
 that they are maintaining a combination in restraint of 
 trade in the manufacture and sale of school and church 
 furniture. August 15, 1907, decree entered granting per- 
 petual injunction against all defendants, except E. H. 
 Staff'ord Manufacturing Co., E. H. Stafford, E. M. Stafford, 
 and E. G. Bentley. 
 
 28. 
 
 United States v. Santa Rita Mining Company and Santa Rita 
 Store Company. April 4, 1907, indictment returned in the 
 district of New Mexico charging a violation of section 3 of 
 the Sherman antitrust law for engaging in a combination 
 in restraint of trade. Demurrer filed and overruled. Fine 
 of $1,0(K) imposed on each defendant; total, $2,0(X). Ap- 
 peal taken to the Supreme Court of the Territory of New 
 Mexico. 
 
 29. 
 
 United States v. The Reading Company et al. United States 
 Circuit Court, En. Pa., 183 Fed., 427. June 12, 1907, bill in 
 equity filed in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
 Pennsylvania to dissolve a combination among the anthra- 
 cite coal-carrying roads and others, alleged to be operating 
 in violation of the Sherman law. December 8, 1910, de- 
 cision dismissing petition, except as to Temple Iron Co., 
 
 1 1 
 
 ii 
 
 I 
 
■i^ 
 
 34 
 
 which was adjudged illegal. Cross appeals taken to Su- 
 preme Court, where case was argued in October, 1911. 
 Awaiting decision. 
 
 35 
 
 30. 
 
 United States v. National Umbrella Frame Company et al, 
 July 1, 1907, indictment returned in the District Court for 
 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charging a conspiracy 
 to restrain interstate trade and commerce in the manufac- 
 ture and sale of umbrella material, in violation of the 
 Sherman antitrust law and section 5440, R. S. Pleas of 
 guilty entered and fines aggregating $3,000 imposed. 
 
 31. 
 
 United States v. American Tobacco Company et al. 
 (United States Circuit Court, Sn. N. Y., 164 Fed., 700.) 
 (United States Supreme Court, 221 U. S., 106.) 
 
 Bill in equity filed July 10, 1907, by the United States 
 against the American Tobacco Co. and others, in which it 
 was alleged that they were maintaining a combination in 
 restraint of trade and commerce in the manufacture and 
 sale of tobacco. November 7, 1908, decision rendered in 
 favor of the Government, except as to individual defend- 
 ants and certain foreign and other corporations. Cross 
 appeals were taken to the Supreme Court, where case was 
 argued March, 1910, and reargued January, 1911. May 29, 
 1911, a decision was rendered sustaining the Government 
 on every point. 
 
 32. 
 
 United States v. E H, Stafford Manufacturing Company et al. 
 July 10, 1907, indictment returned in the District Court for 
 the Northern District of Illinois charging a violation of the 
 Sherman antitrust law by engaging in a combination in 
 restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of school 
 and church furniture. Case pending. 
 
 33. 
 
 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. July 
 30, 1907, bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court for the 
 District of Delaware against E. I. du Pont de Nemours & 
 Co. and others, in which it is alleged that they are main- 
 taining a combination in restraint of trade in the manufac- 
 ture and sale of gunpowder and other high explosives. 
 June 21, 1911, a decision was rendered holding combination 
 illegal and ordering its dissolution. Negotiations are now 
 under way for an agreement between counsel as to a form 
 of decree of dissolution and injunction, to be submitted to 
 the court for approval. 
 
 34. 
 
 35. 
 
 United States v. One Hundred and Seventy-five Cases of 
 Cigarettes. October 28, 1907, information filed in the Dis- 
 trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia covering the 
 seizure of 175 cases of cigarettes under section 6 of the 
 Sherman Antitrust Act. Case pending. 
 
 36. 
 
 United States v. H. D. Corbett Stationery Company et al, 
 November 1, 1907, indictment returned in the District Court 
 for the District of Arizona charging a combination in re- 
 straint of trade. November 4, 1907, demurrer filed. No- 
 vember 14, 1907, demurrers sustained and defendants 
 referred to next grand jury. October 28, 1908, reindicted. 
 November 6, 1908, verdict not guilty. 
 
 37. 
 
 United States v. Union Pacific Coal Company et al., 173 Fed., 
 737. November 20, 1907, indictment returned in the Dis- 
 trict Court for the District of Utah, charging a conspiracy 
 to violate and a violation of the Sherman Act. January 6, 
 1908, demurrer filed. March 2, 1908, demurrer sustained 
 as to first count and overruled as to second count. Decem- 
 ber 3, 1908, verdict guilty. March 29, 1909, fines aggregat- 
 ing $4,0(X) imposed. November, 1909, judgment reversed. 
 
 38. 
 
 United States v. Chas. L. Simmons et al. January 20, 1908, 
 indictment returned in the District Court for the Southern 
 District of Alabama charging a combination in restraint 
 of trade and commerce in the matter of the manufacture 
 and sale of plumbers' supplies. December 1, 1910, pleas 
 of guilty, and fines aggregating $265 imposed. 
 
 39. 
 
 United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Company et al. Feb- 
 ruary 1, 1908, a bill in equity was filed in the Circuit Court 
 of the United States for the District of Utah, charging a 
 combination and conspiracy in violation of the Sherman 
 Act on the part of the so-called Harriman lines. June 23, 
 1911, decision by Circuit Court to the effect that the roads 
 involved were not competing lines and hence the combina- 
 tion was not a violation of law. Hook, J., dissenting. The 
 Government has appealed to Supreme Court. Case set for 
 argument at January term, 1912. 
 
 United States v. E. J. Ray et al February 14, 1908, indictment 
 returned in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
 Louisiana against seventy-two laborers, charging a combi- 
 nation and conspiracy in restraint of foreign trade and 
 commerce, in violation of the Sherman Act. 
 
36 
 
 40. 
 
 United States v. E. J, Ray et al February 15, 1908, indictment 
 returned in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
 Louisiana against seventy-two laborers, charging a combi- 
 nation and conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade and 
 commerce, in violation of the Sherman Act. January 26, 
 1911, cases consolidated for trial. Verdict of guilty as to 
 three defendants and fines amounting to $110 imposed. 
 
 41. 
 
 United States v. Joseph Stiefvater et al. February 15, 1908, 
 indictment returned in the United States Circuit Court for 
 the Eastern District of Louisiana, charging a combination 
 in restraint of trade and commerce in the matter of the 
 manufacture and sale of plumbers' supplies. June 25, 1910, 
 dismissed. 
 
 42. 
 
 United States v. American Naval Stores Company et al. (151 
 Fed., 834; charge to grand jury, 186 Fed., 592). April 11, 
 1908, indictment returned in the United States Circuit 
 Court for the Southern District of Georgia, charging a com- 
 bination in restraint of trade and commerce in the matter 
 of the manufacture and sale of turpentine. May 10, 1909, 
 verdict guilty as to five individual defendants. Fines ag- 
 gregating $17,500 imposed and two defendants sentenced 
 to three months in jail. Appealed to Circuit Court of 
 Appeals and judgment affirmed. Certiorari granted to 
 Supreme Court, where case is now pending. 
 
 43. 
 
 United States v. New York, New Haven, and Hartford Rail- 
 road Company et al. (165 Fed., 742.) May 22, 1908, a 
 bill in equity was filed in the Circuit Court of the United 
 States for the District of Massachusetts, charging the New 
 Haven Co. with combining and attempting to combine 
 under one common control the various railroad and 
 electric railway systems in New England in violation of 
 the Sherman Act. 
 
 Dismissed June 26, 1909. 
 
 "J.. 
 
 United States v. John H. Parks et al. June 16, 1908, indict- 
 ment returned in the Circuit Court of the United States for 
 the Southern District of New York, charging a combina- 
 tion in restraint of trade in the matter of the manufacture 
 and sale of paper. June 19, 1908, defendants plead guilty 
 and sentenced to pay fines aggregating $50,000, which were 
 paid. 
 
 1. 
 
 2. 
 
 3. 
 
 5. 
 
 6. 
 
 37 
 
 President Taft's Administration, March 4, 1909. 
 
 [Geo. W. Wickersham, Attorney General, March 4, 1909.] 
 
 United States v. American Sugar Refining Company et al. 
 Indictment under Sherman law July 1, 1909. A plea of the 
 statute of limitations was interposed by the defendant 
 Kissell, which was taken to the Supreme Court, where it 
 was decided in favor of the Government. (See U. S. v. 
 Kissell 218 U. S., 601.) Pending. 
 
 United States v. Albia Box d; Paper Company et al. Decem- 
 ber 7, 1909, indictment returned in Southern District 
 of New York charging combination in restraint of trade 
 in paper board. February 7, 1910, all defendants plead 
 guilty and fines aggregating $57,000 were assessed. 
 
 United States v. John S. Steers et al. Indictment returned 
 in Eastern District of Kentucky February 17, 1910, charg- 
 ing conspiracy to restrain trade. This is the so-called 
 *'Night Rider" case where the restraint consisted in pre- 
 venting the shipment of tobacco in interstate commerce 
 by means of violence and intimidation. After the over- 
 ruling of demurrers and various pleas in abatement a trial 
 was had, and on April 16, 1910, a verdict of guilty was 
 returned as to eight of twelve defendants and fines aggre- 
 gating $3,500 imposed. Appealed to Circuit Court of Ap- 
 peals, argued November, 1911, and awaiting decision. 
 
 United States v. Imperial Window Glass Company et al. In- 
 dictment found in western Pennsylvania April 7, 1910, 
 charging combination and conspiracy to enhance the price 
 of window glass. Demurrers to the indictment were over- 
 ruled, and on November 10, 1910, pleas of nolo contendere 
 were entered and fines aggregating $10,000 and costs were 
 imposed. 
 
 United States v. National Packing Company et al. Indict- 
 ment returned in Northern District of Illinois March 2, 
 1910, charging combination to restrain trade in fresh meats. 
 Demurrer to indictment sustained June 23, 1910. 
 
 United States v. National Packing Company et al. Northern 
 Illinois. Bill in equity charging combination in restraint 
 of trade in fresh meats and praying for dissolution filed 
 March 21, 1910. Dismissed in order to facilitate the prose- 
 cution of later criminal case. 
 

 7. 
 
 8. 
 
 9. 
 
 10. 
 
 United States v. Armour Packing Company et al Indict- 
 ment returned at Savannah, Ga., in April, 1910, charging 
 combination to control prices and restrict competition. 
 Case now pending. 
 
 United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and 
 twenty-four other railroads. Petition to restrain violation 
 of Sherman law filed May 31, 1910, and temporary restrain- 
 ing order issued on that day enjoining advances in freight 
 rates in western trunk-line territory, which would have 
 become effective June 1, 1910. Thereupon the railroads, 
 after consultation with the President, withdrew their pro- 
 posed advances in freight rates, and after the passage of 
 the act of June 18, 1910, the matter was referred to the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission. Thereafter the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission enjoined the rate advances 
 which the temporary restraining order obtained by the 
 department on May 31, 1910, had prevented from going 
 into effect. 
 
 United States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' Association. 
 Bill in equity charging combination to regulate prices of 
 necessities of life, filed at Birmingham, Ala., June 9, 1910. 
 An agreement was reached between the Government and 
 defendant's counsel, and a decree prepared, submitted to, 
 and passed by the court October 17, 1911, perpetually re- 
 straining the association, its officers and members, from 
 doing any and all of the acts complained of. 
 
 11. 
 
 United States v. Great Lakes Towing Company et al. Peti- 
 tion filed in Northern District of Ohio on June 19, 1910, 
 against an alleged combination of towing facilities on the 
 Great Lakes. The taking of testimony is nearing comple- 
 tion, and the case will be assigned for an early hearing. 
 
 M.m» 
 
 United States v. Chicago Butter (& Egg Board. Bill asking 
 for dissolution, filed at Chicago June 13, 1910. A demurrer 
 to the petition was sustained with leave to amend. An 
 amended bill has been filed and the case is now pending. 
 
 United States v. Frank Hayne, James A. Patten et al, 180 Fed., 
 946. Indictments returned. New York City, against alleged 
 cotton-pool conspirators, August 4, 1910. Demurrers were 
 sustained as to certain counts of indictment and overruled 
 as to others, and the Government appealed to the Supreme 
 Court, where case was argued November, 1911. Awaiting 
 decision. 
 
 39 
 
 13. 
 
 United States v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Company 
 et al. Petition filed at Baltimore July 22, 1910, charging a 
 combination, under cover of a patent licensing arrange- 
 ment, to restrain competition and enhance prices of enamel 
 ware. Four volumes of testimony was taken, and case set 
 for argument at Richmond on June 15, 16, and 17, 1911. In 
 a decision rendered October 13, 1911, the court sustained all 
 the Government's contentions. 
 
 14. 
 
 United States v. Louis F. Swift et al. Indictment returned by 
 the grand jury at Chicago, in September, 1910, against ten 
 prominent individuals engaged in the meat-packing indus- 
 try. Defendants have filed numerous pleas in bar, de- 
 murrers, etc., all of which were decided in favor of the 
 Government, and an early trial will be had. Defendants 
 applied to Circuit Judge Kohlsaat for writ of certiorari 
 based on contention that antitrust law was unconstitu- 
 tional. Petition dismissed. Defendants appealed to Su- 
 preme Court and gave notice of motion December 4, 1911, 
 for stay of trial pending appeal. Trial postponed until 
 December 6, 1911. 
 
 15. 
 
 United States v. John Reardon <& Sons Company and Consoli- 
 dated Rendering Co. Indicted jointly by Federal grand 
 jury at Boston in October, 1910. Demurrer to indictment 
 sustained June 23, 1911. 
 
 16. 
 
 United States v. Ferdinand Sulzberger, doing business under 
 the name of John Reardon di Sons Company, and Horatio 
 W. Heath, of Boston, doing business as the Consolidated 
 Rendering Company. Jointiy indicted at Boston in Octo- 
 ber, 1910, for violation of the Sherman law. Demurrer to 
 indictment sustained June 23, 1911. 
 
 17. 
 
 United States v. Horatio W. Heath and Cyrus S. Hapgood. 
 Indictment returned in October at Boston, charging viola- 
 tion of the Sherman law. Demurrer to indictment sus- 
 tained June 23, 1911. 
 
 (Note. — In the last three indictments, which were found simul- 
 taneously, the Government charges that the defendants have 
 attempted to divide territory between themselves throughout New 
 England, so as to avoid competition and drive out competitors 
 in the hide and rendering business.) 
 
40 
 
 18. 
 
 United States v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Company 
 et al. In addition to the above suit in equity (No. 13, supra), 
 indictments were returned by grand jury at Detroit on 
 December 6, 1910, against the same corporations and indi- 
 viduals charging the same acts. Various demurrers and 
 dilatory pleas have been filed, argued, and overruled, and 
 the case will be heard during the present fall term of court. 
 
 19. 
 
 United States v. American Sugar Refining Company et al, 
 A suit in equity was filed at New York on November 28, 
 1910, against this corporation, its officers and agents, and 
 its owned and controlled corporations, attacking it as a 
 combination in restraint of trade and praying for its disso- 
 lution. Demurrers to bill set for argument December, 
 1911. 
 
 20. 
 
 United States v. General Electric Company et al. Bill in 
 equity filed at Cleveland, Ohio, on March 3, 1911, charging 
 a combination in incandescent electric lamps. This suit is 
 the outcome of an extensive investigation into the electrical 
 industry. Like the enameled-ware combination, it is 
 founded on a cross-licensing arrangement under patents. 
 
 A formal decree has been agreed upon between counsel 
 for the Government and the defendant companies, and was 
 submitted to and passed by the Circuit Court October 12, 
 1911. 
 
 21. 
 
 United States v. Purrington et al. Indictment returned in the 
 Northern District of Illinois September 14, 1910, charging 
 combination to restrain trade in paving bricks and paving 
 blocks. Pending. 
 
 22. 
 
 United States v. Hamburg- Amerikanische Packetfahrt Actien 
 Gesellschaft and others. Trans-Atlantic steamship pool. 
 Combination of steamship lines regulating steerage traffic 
 on the Atlantic Ocean. Suit filed January 4, 1911, at New 
 York City. Demurrers to bill set for argument December, 
 1911. 
 
 23. 
 
 United States v. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers* Asso- 
 ciation. Suit in equity filed at New York on May 19, 1911, 
 charging the Eastern States Lumber Dealers' Association, 
 
 41 
 
 its officers and members, with a conspiracy in restraint of 
 trade through the instrumentality of black lists and trade 
 agreements. 
 
 24. 
 
 United States v. Isaac Whiting, John K. Whiting, Charles H. 
 Hood, Edward J. Hood, and William A. Graustein. Indict- 
 ment returned by the grand jury at Boston, Mass, on May 
 26, 1911, charging a combination to restrain trade in milk 
 throughout the New England States. 
 
 25. 
 
 United States v. Isaac Whiting, John K. Whiting, Charles H. 
 Hood, Edward J. Hood, and William A. Graustein, and 
 William A. Hunter, Secretary of Producers* Co. May 26, 
 1911, indictment returned by the grand jury at Boston, 
 Mass., charging a conspiracy to restrain trade in milk 
 throughout the New England States. 
 
 26. 
 
 United States v. Lumber Secretaries* Bureau of Information 
 et al. Indictment returned June 23, 1911, in the Northern 
 District of Illinois, charging that the secretaries of 14 retail 
 lumbermen's associations, covering 23 States from Pennsyl- 
 vania to the Pacific coast, were in a conspiracy by means of 
 a central controlling bureau to control the marketing of 
 lumber by forcing the product through the retailer to the 
 consumer, and restraining the trade of the manufacturer, 
 wholesaler, and consumer, and eliminating competition for 
 the trade of the consumer. 
 
 27. 
 
 United States v. Philip H. W. Smith et al. Indictments re- 
 turned at New York City June 29, 1911, against various in- 
 dividuals, charging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the 
 antitrust law through the conduct and operation of the Un- 
 derground Power Cable Association, Telephone Cable Asso- 
 ciation, Fine Magnet Wire Association, Wire Rope Manu- 
 facturers, Horseshoe Manufacturers' Association, Lead- 
 encased Rubber Cable Association, and the Rubber-covered 
 Wire Association. To date nearly all the defendants have 
 appeared and pleaded, and fines aggregating $128,700 have 
 been imposed. 
 
 28. 
 
 United States v. Periodical Publishing Company. Bill in 
 equity filed in New York in June, 1911, against the members 
 of the so-called Magazine Trust. 
 
42 
 
 29. 
 
 30. 
 
 United States v. Jay B. Pearce et aL Indictment returned 
 against certain manufacturers and jobbers at Cleveland, 
 Ohio, July 19, 1911, for combination and conspiracy in the 
 manufacture and sale of wall paper. 
 
 United States v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. /?., 
 Chesapeake & Ohio R, /?., Hocking Valley R. /?., Toledo & 
 Ohio Central Ry., Kanawha <fc Michigan Ry„ Zanesville & 
 Western R. /?., and others. Bill in equity filed at Columbus, 
 Ohio, August 4, 1911, to enjoin combination and conspiracy 
 in restraint of trade. 
 
 31. 
 
 United States v. Edward E, Hartwick et al Petition filed at 
 Detroit, Mich., August 31, 1911, alleging conspiracy and 
 unlawful restraint of trade on the part of members of the 
 Michigan Retail Lumber Dealers' Association, The Scout 
 Publishing Co., and the Lumber Secretaries' Bureau of 
 Information. 
 
 32. 
 
 33. 
 
 United States v. Standard Wood Company et al. Petition 
 filed in the Circuit Court at New York City in September, 
 1911, against the members of the so-called Kindling Wood 
 Trust, praying for injunction against the further carrying 
 into effect of trade agreements and combination and con- 
 spiracy to monopolize trade. 
 
 04. 
 
 United States v. Hunter Milling Company, Blackwell Milling 
 and Elevator Company, and Frank Foltz, Indictment re- 
 turned by grand jury to District Court for the Western Dis- 
 trict of Oklahoma, September 10, 1911, on one count, charg- 
 ing violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
 35. 
 
 United States v. S. W. Winslow, Wm. Barbour, E. P. Howe, 
 Ed. P. Hurd, Geo, W, Brown, and Jas, J. Storrow, Two 
 indictments returned by the grand jury at Boston, Mass., 
 September 19, 1911, charging combination, conspiracy, and 
 monopoly in trade in shoe machinery. 
 
 United States v. The Colorado and Wyoming Lumber Dealers' 
 Association and The Lumber Secretaries' Bureau of Infor- 
 mation. Bill in equity filed at Denver, Colo., September 
 25, 1911, for injunction against defendants for conspiracy 
 to restrain trade in lumber and its products. 
 
 43 
 
 36. 
 
 United States v. Willard G, Hollis et al. Petition filed in 
 October, 1911, at St. Paul, Minn., in the United States Cir- 
 cuit Court, against the Lumbermen's Secretaries' Bureau of 
 Information, The Lumberman Publishing Company, and 
 certain individuals, alleging conspiracy and combination 
 in the lumber trade. 
 
 37. 
 
 United States v. United States Steel Corporation and others. 
 Petition fcir injunction and dissolution filed at Trenton, 
 N. J., October 27, 1911. 
 
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