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This Institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order If, In Its judgement, fulfillment of the order would Involve violation of the copyright law. A UTHOR: MALKIN, FREDERICK TITLE: THE HISTORY OF PLACE: LONDON DATE: [1841] COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBHOGR APHIC MTCRnF ORM TARHFT * Master Negative # Restrictions on Use: Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record 884 M291 E^nr^wHH^ Malkin, Erodoriok ... The history of Croooo, fton the earliest tinea to its final Bubjection to Rone, by Predericl Malkin... London, Baldwin, [1841,. vll, 288 p. table 22 cm. (Library of use^ ftil knowledge, v. 20) u ——J FILM SIZE: 3.Sf^£=, TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA REDUCTION RATIO: '^^ IMAGE PLACEMENT: lACjIA^ylB/ IIB DATE FILMED: ^/Z3__ INITIALS /?^ HLMEDBY: RESEARCH PI I BLICATIONIS INC WOOnfiRriS ^p"rT j n Association for Information and Image Management llOOWayne Avenue. Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 ^ Centimeter I 23456789 10 11 iiilim TTT [imlMiilimliiiiliiiiliililuMlm^^^ 12 3 4 12 13 14 15 mm iii|li|iili i iiliiiiliiii iiii[im| Inches 2 3 1.0 I.I 1.25 SA mil 3-2 63 I 71 no ■lii u^ lUUia. 3.6 4.0 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 MflNUFflCTURED TO flllM STRNDfiRDS BY flPPLIEO IMflGEp INC. i. J . 'IEtt. jag-mM ^J^ ir^ ■s#i ■\ ,^?*ii ,' "'^i < - • Ai, -■>:>; * < ■■Z^**^J--'''-\ Cfl. ^^ \,gi r 5. ' i^^ ^<<^ t>:y^'' m^mmi < 1. 884 ma f in ttije ®ttg of ^etu '^arli iferargi ii */ "? I f i 41 U 'M" »•/;» iw^ r" Jfi< I!'. V V ,* / / f* :U TOtm fXCHANOCi ' ^ i h i LIBRARY OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE. X >• THE HISTOEY OF GEEECE, \^ FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO ITS FINAL SUBJECTION TO ROME. BY FREDERICK MALKIN, A.M. \ PUBLISHED UNOXR THB 8UPKRINTXNDSNCJB OF THE SOCIETY FOR THB DIFFUSION OF USEFUL KNOWLEDai. LONDON:— ROBERT BALDWIN, 47, PATERNOSTER ROW. LONDON : ©lORGE WOODFALL AND SON, AVamV COURT* skinnsr strebt. CONTENTS. Chap. I. Of Greece before the Trojan War. p, 1. Geographical position and nafnral dirisions of Greece. Its first inhabitants. Pelasgians and Hel- lenes, lonians, Cohans, and Dorians. Barbarism of the early Greeks. Improvement began by Egyp- tian and Phoenician colonies, Cecrops. Foundation of Athens. Foundation of Argos. Danaus. Pelops, Atreus, Agamemnon. Great Phoenician migration, settlement of the Cadmeians in Boeotia, and foanda- tion of Thebes. Legislation of Minos in Crete. Pre- datory habits of the Greeks. Minos forms s navy, and represses piracy. Rapid growth of Athens, and early political state of Attica. Thesens. Union of the Attic towns. Origin and character of Grecian religion Arts of the Egyptian priesthood. Double religion in Egypt, thence commtinicated to Greece. Orgies or Mysteries. Mysterious discipline in philo- sophy. Orpheus and Pythagoras. Auguries and oracles. Dodona. Delphi. Chap. II. Of Peloponnesus, from the Trojan War to the end of the second Messe- nian War. p. 8. A rgonautic expedition. Rape of Helen. Power of Agamemnon. Trojan War. Iliad and Odyssey. Grecian manners in the Homeric age. Return from Troy, and revolutions ensuing. Ulysses. Agamem- non murdered by Clvtamnestra. Orestes. Return 0f the Heracleidae. Institution of the Olympian fes- tival ; also of the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals. Governments established by the Hera- cleidse. Political changes. Abolition of royalty. Lacedaemon. Legislation of Lycurgus. First Messe- nian War. Second Messenian War. Amtomenes. Chap. III. Of Athens, from the Trojan War to the political Alterations of Cleis- thenes, and the first Interference of Persia in the Affairs of Greece ; and of the general Transactions of Greece, during the latter Part of the same Period, p. 18. Increase of Athens. War with the Peloponnesian Dorians, Codrus. Medon perpetual archon. Emi- gration of Athenians to Asia. (Ionic migration.) Previous emigration of iEolians to Asia. (jEoHc migration.) Various other Grecian settlements. Chirops first decennial archon. Institution of annual anhons. Sedition of Cylon. Legislation of Dracon. Revolt, re-conquest, and second revolt of Salamis. Kpimenides. Legislation of Solon. PeisLvtratus. Hippias and Hipparchus. Harmodius and Aristo- geiion. Death of Hipparchua. Expulsion of Hippias. Disputes between Isagoras and Cleisthenes. Violent interference of Cieomenes king of Lacedaemon. Cleo- menes expelled from Athens. Embassy to Sardis. War with Lacedaemon, Boeotia, and Chalcis. Corin- thians refuse to join. Boeotians and Chalcidians chastized by Athens. Hippias canvasses the Pelo- ponnesians unsuccessfully. Prevails on Artaphemes, satrap of Lydia, to require his restoration. Athe- nians refuse to submit. Government of Athens be- comes substantially democratical, under the lead of Cleistbenes and the Alcmaeonidae. Chap. IV. Of Greece and its Colonies, from the first Persian Conquest of Ionia, to the Defeat of Xerxes' Invasion of Greece, and the Establishment of Athens as a leading State, p. 26. 33, Sect. I. Persian conquest of Lydia. Croesus. Cyrus. Conquest of Ionia Emigration of Phocaeans and Teians. Entire subjugation of Asia Minor. Death of Cyrus. Cambyses. Darius the son ot Kystaspes. Invasion of Scythia. Histiaeus tyram of Miletus. Aristagoras. Revoltof Asiatic Greeks. Burning of Sardi*. Reconquest of Asiatic Greeks and taking of Miletus. Mardonius establishes demo- cracies in the Ionian and iEolian cities. Fails in ap expedition against Greece. Earth and water de- manded by Uarins of all the Greeks. Refused by Athens and Lacedaemon. Cieomenes in ^Egina. Deposition of his colleague Demaratus. Defeat of the Ariyians bv Cieomenes, and insurrection of the slaves. Suicide of Cieomenes. War between Athens and iKgiiia. Persian invasion of Greece. Miltiades. Battle of Marathon. Attack of Miltiades on Paros. His trial, and death in prison. Sect. II. Pi-eparations of Darius for asecond inva- •iooof Oresce. Geueial weakness of great einoires formed by conquest. Revolt of Egypt. Death of Darius. Xerxes. Submission of Egypt. Second Persian invasion of Greece. Sperlhias and Boalis. Themistocles. Gelon tyrant of Syracuse. Battles at Thermopylae. Self devotion of Leonidas, with the Spartans and Thespians. Sea-fights offArtemisium. Euboea overrun by the Persians. Stratagem of The- mistocles. Repulse of the Persians from Delphi. Unworthy conduct of Lacedaemon. Taking of Athens, disputes in the fleet, and conduct of Themistocles. Aristeides. Battle of Salamis. Return of Xerxes. Mardonius commander in chief. Themistocles. Operations of Mardonius. Resolute fidelity of the Athenians, and backwardness of the Lacedaemonians. Battle of Plataea. Battle of Mycale. Athens re- built. Lacedaeir-onians oppose the rebuilding of the walls. Crafty policy of Themistocles. Pausanias. Beginning of Athenian empire. Flight of Theini»> tocies. His death. Transactions in Sicily. Victohet over the Carthaginiaas. 284962 if CONTENTS. Chap. V. Of Greece, from the Establishment of Athens as a leading State to the Beginning of the Peloponnesian War. p. 46. Growth of literattire and art. Expedition to Egypt, Reconciliation ofCimon and Pericles, Third long wall. Athenian cavalry restored. Athenian settW Oi^nizatioD of the Athenian confederacy Assess- ment of Aristeides. Qnarr-'ls of Athens with the allies. Con«|aest of Naxos. B tttle of the Kurymedon. Contjuesit of Th;t»os. E»rihgress of Grecian philosophy. Demo- critus. Pythagoras. Sceptics and sophists. Prota- fforas. SfK'rates. Plato. SicT. II. Rebellion of Cyrus. Battle of Cunaxa, Return of the Ten Thousand. Xenophon. War of Lacedaemon with Persia. Dercyllidas Chsracter of Lacedaemonian dominion. Democracy established in Thebes and Corinth. Sedition of Cinadon at Sparta. Agesilaus, king of Lacedaemod, sent inio^ Asia. Alliance of Athens, Argos, Thebes, and Corinth, against Lacedaemon. Recall of Agesilaus, and victory at Coroneia. Lacedaemonians defeated at sea by Conon and Phamabazus. Bloody revolution m Corinth. Union with Argos. Athenian long walls lebuilt by Conon and Phamabazus. Iphicrates. Death of Thrasybulus. Peace of Antalcidas. Boeotian towns declared independent, and Corinth separated from Argos. Mantineians attacked by Lacedajinon. Their dispersion. Olynthian league. Attacked by XiAcedsemon. Seizure of the Cadmeia. Conquest of Olynthus. Phlius. Ritvolution in Thebes. Pelo- «ida». Epaminondas. Misconduct of Sphodrias. Vmt between Athens u>ar with Carthage. Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. Dio- nysius the younger. Dion. TimoUon. CONTENTS V Chap. VIII. Of Greece, from the Peace which fouowed the Battle of Mantineia, to the Destruction of Thehes by Alexander the Macedonian, p. 121. 127 133 140. ^ Sect. I, Comparative view of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian institutions, as affecting national strength and prosperity. Athenians gradually de- generate. Change in the nature of party contests. Revival of Athenian empire. Revolt of Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and Byzantium. Revolt and recovery of Kubnea. Affairs of Macedonia. Archelaus. Amyn- tas and his sons. Accession of Philip. Disputes M'ith Athens. Revival of the Olynthian league, Philip settles the affairs of Thessaly. Chares. Death of Chabrias. Exile of Timotheus. Athens makes peace with the revolted allies. Skct. II. Council of Amphictyon.s, Sacrert war against the Phocians. Philomelus. Onomarchus. Wars of Philip with Athens and with Phocis. Vic- tories of Onomarchus. His defeat and death. I>ace- daemon at war with Megalopolis. Troubles of Eubcea. Phocion. Alliance of Olynthus with Athens. Demos- thenes. Fall of Olynthus. Peace between Philip and the Athenians. Conclusion of the Sacred War. Sect. III. JS.schines accused by Demosthenes. Extensive influence of Macedonia. Disputes with Athens. Diopeithes. War commenced. Adminis- tration of Demosthenes. Peace made. Affairs of Eubcea. Callias and Taurosthenes. Amphissian war. Philip, genera] of the Amphictyons. Antiphon. Violent conduct of Demosthenes. Amphissians sub- dued. Struggles in Thebes. Alliance with Athens. Battle of Chaeroneia. Submission of Thebes to Philip. Peace granted to Athens. Murder of Philip. Sect. JV. Alexander, king of Macedonia, chosen capiaingeneral of the Greeks. His nortliern cam- paign. Revolt of Thebes. Us capture and destruo tion. Chap. IX. Of the Conquests of Alexander in Asia, and of the Affairs of Greece, from tlie Time when that Prince set out on his Enterprise to his Death, p. 143. Affairs of Persia. Artaxerxes II. Artaxerxes III. (Ochus.) Reduction of Phoenicia and Egypt. Darius Codumannus. Alexander enters Asia. Battle of the Granicus. Con({uest of Asia within Taurus. Memnon. Battle of Issus. Siege of Tyre. Conquest of Egypt. Foundation of Alexandria. Visit to the temple of Am- mon. Battle of Gatigamela. Persian intrigues in Greece. War of Lareiiaeinon with Macedonia. Murder of Darius. Persian empire entirely conquered. Diffi- cult situation of Alexander. Character of his policy. Deaths of Philotas, Parmenion, and Cleitus. Inva- sion of India. Projects of improvement. Voyage of Nearchus. Return to Babylon. Political arrange- ments, and death of Alexander. Exile of Jischines. Exile of Demosthenes. State of philosophy. Antis- thenes and the Cynics. Academics and Peripatetics. Aristotle. Chap. X. Of Greece, and of the Macedonian Empire, from the Death of Alex- ander, to the Deaths of Ptolemy and Seleucus, and the Invasion of Greece by the Gauls, p. 153. Disputes about the sticcession to Alexander. Arrhi- daeus king, Perdiccas protector. Distribution of provinces. Insurrection of Grecian settlers in Upper Asia. War of Antipater with Athens. (Lamian War.) Second exile and death of Demosthenes. Alliance of Antipater and Craterus with Ptolemy against Perdiccas. Craterus defeated and killed by Eumenes. Perdiccas attacks Egypt. His murder. Antipater protector. Rise of Antigonus. Polysper- chon protector. Cassander. Troubles of Athens. Death of Phocion. Polysperchon repulsed from Me- galopolis. Olympian. Deaths of Arrhidaeus and Eurydice. Victory of Cassander. Death of Olym- pias. Cassander lord of Macedonia. War between Antigonus and Eumenes. Death of Eumenes. Expul- sion of Seieucns. League of princes against Antigonus. Seleucus recovers Babylonia. Demetrius, son of Anti- gonus, m Athens. Naval victory of Demetrius. Arti- ^onus and other potentates declare themselves kings. Siege of Rhodes. Battleof Ipsus. Antigonus slain, and his kingdom divided. Fortunes of Demetrius. Athens surrenders to him. Death of Cassander. Demetrius king of Maced nia. His expulsion, wanderings, and death. Pvrrhus, Lysii^achus, Seleucus, successively kings of Macedonia. Deaths of Ptolemy, Lysima- chus, and Seleucus. Ptolemy Ceraunus king of Macedonia. Migrations of the Gauls. Invasion of Macedonia. Invasion of Greece. Antigonus Go- natas king of Macedonia. Affairs of Sicily. Aga- thocles tyrant of Syracuse. Chap. XI. Of the Rise of the Achaian League ; and of the Affairs of Greece from the Invasion by the Gauls to the End of the War between the Achaians and Cleomenes, King of Lacedaemon. p. 170. 172. 176. SSECT. 1. Achaian union revived. Aratus. Sicyon jomea with the Achaians. Surprisal of the Acroco- rinthus Corinth, Megara, and other states join the J.«ngue. Athens under the pxiwer of Antigonus Go- I atas. Genera, policy of Aratus. Sect II. Pyrrhus returns from Italy. Attacks l*ceda8«non. Attacks Argos. His death. State of Vacedanion. Political reform attempted by king Agis, and opposed by Leonid.-.s his colleague. Death of Agis. Cleomenes. Achaian war. Revolution e* fect*d by Cleomcne* in Sparta. Sect. III. Achaian League oppo.sea by Antigonus Gonatas and bv Demetrius his son. Joined by Mega- lojwiis. Death of I)einetriu.s. Achaians joined by Argos. Victories of Cleomenes. Alliance of the Achaians with Antigonus, protector ©f Macedonia Successes of the allies. Alantineia t-ikeii by them. Megalopolis by Cleomenes. Gallant condue* of the Megalopolitans. Battle of Sellasia. Cie'^nienes flies to Egypt. Submission of Sparta. Dcain of Aw tigonus. ▼I CONTENTS. Chap XII Of the first War maintained by the yEtolians a^^^^^^^^ Chap. Xll. ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^g^^her with the Achaians. p. 179. 186. Sect. L «tollan« iirpattent of ^»«»' ^^'^^.^^i '^^ to the Achidanii. Dorimachus. S<"0Pa«- ,^f ''JJ "vwion of Messenia. Impudence f .Aratus, and con»e.mcnt defeat. Strangre conduct of »*•« *^«M;"«- Capture of Cyn«tha. Philip arnves at Com h. sSiSZ in Sparta. War declare.! agamst the Co- hans by the Acha.an. and the.r » r*;. ^^^^^^^l^t •iition in Sparta, and alliance wtth the Atol'^"*- Death of Cl£>mene9. Agesipoli. and Lycnr^is oho- JTn kings. War between Rhodes and Byzantmrn. ^sllcT^n^Stdian, repulsed from iEjreira. .In- n,?ds':f sLSinto Mace\onm and f Ph^^^^ »nto AStolia, Sadden arrival of Ph.lip at Connth, and successes in Peloponnesus. Apel es. ^f^'/'on «/ Chilonin Lacedamon. Fresh intr.Rues of Apelles, Leont"us, and Megaleas. Philip invades Cephallen.a. Invades iEtolia, and pillage, ther.num. /ovements in Peloponnesus. Deaths of Leontus, Apelles and Meiraleas. VVeakness of the Achaian general Epe- ratus. Measures of Aratus upon succeeG.ng him. Disputes in Megalopolis. Philip takes tne Phth.an Thebes SkeSlaidas. Wars l^tvveen Rome and Carthaee Hannibal. Peace concluded in Greece. Phil p Sies himself with Carthage Changes h.s general conduct. Foments the trouble, of Me».e«a. Death of Aratus. CH*P. Xin. Of the ^^rs^^:ZnSZZ^ns^oXi Stryr'aT^^^? as r SXl:^^^ rJi'byTe^t^r thXt Macedo„.an wL. p. 193. 202. Sect. 1. Alliance of the Romans with *}'• «to- lians Lacedaemonians, and Atialus king of Perga- mus Serrate resolution of the Acanianians. Successes ofPhiUp. Misconduct of Philip at Argos Further P^frress of the war. Machan.das tvrant of lllXS PhUopcemen Machanidas defeated Md slain by PhilopcBmen. Geneml )*ace SvcT li Cios sacked by Philip. War oegan iJinsIhin by Attains and tie Rhod\ans. Iroub « S^ itolia Lague against Philip joined by he ^the^Cand by'the Romans. Destruc^on ot A y- dos. Chalci;i surprised by the Romans, t-hmp ravaires Attica. Nabis tyrant of Lacedasmon. » ar Euvf ea Nabis and the Achaians. Messena attacked S; he li^d«monians and relie^-ed ^^ PJilovj^men Philopcemen goes into Crete. M^«*l°"'*; *1^^*""/, declined by the Achaians. Philip again ravages itt cI Romans demand aid of the .«tolians. Ma- SSinia invaded by the R-^mans, and by the J^. "f ri»ns and Daidanians. iBtolians invade Thessaly. Sir»« overtUwn by PbUip. Mercenane. raised in «tolia for Ptolemy. Decrees of the A then ant against Philip. Conciliatory measures of Ph l.p. Flamininus arrives in Greece. I-orces his way into Macedonia. Enters Thessaly. Repulsed at Atrax. IrisLnus general of the A.haians. Achaians a ly themselves with Rome. Argos recovered for Philip. Serecces between Philip and Flamininus Argos betrayed by Philip to /ab.s. Cruelties of Nabis Flamlninus gels possession of Thebes ^«haastioa of Macedonia by continued wars. Battle of i^Y^os- cephalaj. Negotiations for peace. Beginning of ill will between the Romans and ^tolians. Peace con- eluded Disputes in Acamania. Uncommon mode- ration of the W«- Siege of Le^icas. .Subinission of Acamania to the Romans. Dardamans mvad- ing Macedonia, overthrown by Philip. Jjf be- tween Antiochus and Ptolemy. Interference of the Rhodians. Murder of Brachyllas. Arrival of the R*man Commissioners in Greece. Proclamation ot liberty to Greece at the Isthmian festival. r. viv nf fh«» War of Antiochus and the i^tolians against the Romans ^l^^^I'me^"^^^ of Greece until the Submission of the ;EtoUans to Rome. p. 21 8. 222. 226. Sec- I Antiochus rebuilds Lysimacheia. Roman JC^'y to him. Flamininus consults ^^^ «rV\° •U^, as to war with Nabis. Advance to Argos. SivanS into Laconia. Cruelties of Nabis. Attacks onSp"rta. Taking of Gythium. Nabis r^^ust,^ conference. Terms of peace proposed, and rejectea bv Nabis Siege of Sparta. Peace concluded. Li- SrS of ArgS. Settlement of the affairs of Greece. mnd departure of Flamininus. between »si,-rT II Intrie'ies of the -Etolians. waroeiwrcH Nabis and the A^chaians. Naval defeat of Ph.lo- o^uin His su.-cessesby land. Flammmus at Deme- Rfu, FHght of Kurvlochus. ^^tohans invite Antio- /hsinio Greece. Demetrius l«'.rayed to them by chus nfo ^'^•^^ , f ^r , i^ Philopcemen joins K™ to-rl^hl;^ AtSTrnpt of the '^S^;rm.*'Htnib:il at the court of Antiochus. AntSu. lands at Demetrius, and is aPP.o>"ted coiiv- .anderTn chief by the ^toliaus. Achaiaus adhere to the Romans. Antiochus gains Chalcls, and win- ters there. Disorders of the Boeotians. 1 hey join Antiochus. Campaign i" Thessaly. Second winter at Chalcis, and marriage of Antiochus. Antiochus g:ii,is some towns in Acamania. Philip takes part with the Romans, and conquers Athamania. Defeat of Antiochus ai Thermopyi*. Submission of Phocis, BoBOtia, and Euboea to the Romans. Heracleia taken Ke Romans. Philip compelled to ^uit the siege of Lamia. Aitolians sue for peace. Driven to war by theTarshness of the Romans. Messene beMe^fed by Ee Acha..ins. Surrenders to J7^'»"»"'»^' *"'!,;?" united with the Achaians. Conquests of Philip. Siege of^N.,.pactus. Fiamiuiuus obtains a iruce^ War renewed Second truce. Romans pass into Asil Pausistratus, the Rhotlian, deceived by Poly xeiidas de eated and slain. Defeat ot Antiochus -orthe Romans*- P"**^* concluded. Distribution ot conquered countries. Phibp driven from AthamHuia. Sian war renewed. Submission of the iKtolun. J / \' \ CONTENTS. VII Chap. XV . Of Greece, from the Submission of the ^^tolians to Rome, till the Roman Conquest of Macedonia, p. 234. 239. 244. Sect. t. Revolt of Lacedaemon from the Achaians, Embassies to Rome. Submission of Lacedaemon to the Achaians. Authors of the revolt put to death. Abolition of the laws of Lycurgus. Achaians decline the gifts of Euraenes. Restoration of the Lacedae- monian exiles required by the Romans. Embassy of Metelltis. Embassy of Appius. Negotiations at Rome, and final settlement. Intrigfue of Flamininus and Deinocrates. War between the Achaians and Messenians. Death of Philopcemen. Submission of Messena. Messeiia reunited with the Achaians. Sect. II. Rising ill will between Philip and the Romans. Massacre of the Maronifes. Demetrius sent as ambassador to Rome. His excessive favour with the Romans. Intrigues of Perseus and Deme- trius against each other. Demetrius put to death on the accusation of Perseus. Death of Philip. Dar- dania invaded by the Bastamae. Popular conduct of Perseus. Perseus seeks to be reconciled with the Achaians. Callicrates. Offensive decree against the Macedonians not repealed by the Achaians. Troubles of ^^tolia. Breaking out of war between Perseus and the Romans. Perseus attempts to pro- cure the assassinationof Eumenes, kingof rergatnus. Sect. III. Romans declare war. Q. Marcius makes a truce with Perseus. Troubles of Boeotia. Restoration of Zeuxippns demanded in vain by Flamininus and the Achaians. Alliance of the Boeotians with Perseus. Marcius breaks up the union of the Boeotians. Lycians refuse submission to Rhodes. Supported by the Romans. Macedonian embassy to Rhoues. Commencement of war. Suc- cesses of Perseus. Obstinacy of the Romans, and weakness of Perseus. Haliartus taken by the Ro- mans. Misconduct of the Roman generals. En- couragement given by the senate to traitors among the Greeks. Lyciscus. Charops. Defection of Cephalus. Embassy sent to the Grecian states. Counsels of the Achaian leaders. Campaign of Perseus in lllyria, and negotiation with Gentius. Q. Marcius consul. Enters Macedonia. Declines the aid of the Achaians. Disputes among the Rho dians. Embassies to the senate and to the consul. Rhodians endeavour to mediate between the belli- gerents, and are roughly repulsed by the senate. Alliance of Perseus and Gentius. lllyria conquered by the Romans, .ffimilius Paullus consul. Battle of Pydna. Eclipse predicted by C. Gallas. Conquest of Macedonia. Capture of Persens. War of Antio* chus Epiphanes in Egypt. Chap. XVI. Of Greece, from the Conquest of Macedonia to the Conquest of Achaia by the Romans p. 253. Violence of the Romans against the Rhodians. SnbmissLm of Epirus. Settlement of Macedonia. Violences of the Roman party in ^tolia confirmed. Achaian patriots transported to Italy. Further mea- sures of iSmilius in Macedonia. Seventy cities ruined in Epirus. Tyranny of Charops. Mission of Gallos into Greece. Athenians plunder Oropus. Oropians apply for aid to the Achaians. Corrup- tions and quarrels of Menalcidas, Callicrates, and Diaus. Fresh disputes between the Achaians and Lacedaemonians. Revolt of Macedonia under Andris- cas. Achaians make war on Lacedaemon against the prohibition of the Romans. Suspension of arms. Romans require that Lacedaemon, and four other cities, should be separated from the Achaian league. Ill usage of the Roman ambassadors. Unsuccessful mission of S. Julius. Conduct of Critolaus. Re- conquest of Macedonia. The Roman general Metel- lus oflFers peace to the Achaians. Defeats them. Submission of northern Greece. Siege of Corinth. Violence of Diaeus. Metellns superseded by Mum- mius. Defeat of the Achaians, and taking of Corinth. Greece reduced to a Roman province, under the name of Achaia. Return of Polybius into Greece. Chap. XVII. Of the State of Greece under the Roman Dominion, p. 261. 270. SccT. I. General remarks on the effects of the con- quest. War in Greece between Mithridates and the Remans Aristion tyrant of Athens. Athens besieged and taken by Sylla. Peace concluded. Conduct of Sylla in Asia. Rhodians still comparatively free. They stand a siege against Mithridates. Roman sys- tem of 'provincial government Degradation* impo- rerishment, and gradual depopulation of Greece. Sict. II. Athens still preeminent as a seat of lite- rattire. State of philosophy. Peripatetics and eld Academy. Pyrrhon and Arbtion. Stoics. New Aca- demy. Arcesilas and Cameades. Cyrenaics and Epicureans. Aristippus. Epicurus. Progress of ma- thematics. Thales. Pythagoras. Plato and his fol- lowers. Science flourishes at Alexandria. Euciid. Archimedes of Syracuse. Eratosthenes. Apollooios. Hipparohos. Ptolemy. Conclusion, p. 279. Chronological Tabla p. 280. BtBll GREECE. Chapter I. Of Greece before the Trojan War, Greece is a country included between the thirty-sixth and forty-first degrees of northern latitude, and surrounded by »ea«. except upon the north, where it borders on Epirus and Macedonia. These provinces were anciently inhabited by a people of kindred origfin and language, similar manners, and similar religion; but the Greeks did not consider them as forming a part of their own body, prin- cipally in consequence of their less ad- vanced civilization, and the incongruity of their political order, they having re- tained the rude monarchy of early ages, while Greece was parcelled into small re- publics. What is known of their history will, however, in great measure, be in- cluded in that of Greece. The most northern province of Greece was TTies- saly, an extensive vale, of singular ferti- hty, surrounded on every side by the lofty ridges of Olympus, Ossa, Pelion, CEta, and Pmdus. The other provinces of continental Greece were Acamania and iEtolia, on the western coast; Doris, Inland, and Phocis principally so, with a jcanty strip of coast on the Corinthian Gulf; eastern and western Locris, the oneon the Corinthian Gulf, the other on the Buripus. These are rugged territo- ries, intersected with numerous branches from Pindus and (Eta, and theu- inha- bitants were generally behind the rest of Greece in civilization, wealth, and power. Next came Boeotia, a rich vale, abound- ing in lakes and streams, stretching across from the Corinthian Gulf to the Euripus, and in other parts inclosed by mountains, by Parnassus and Helicon on the side of Phocis, Citharon and Pames on that of Attica. Last is Attica, a rocky province of triangular forin, bounded on the north by Boeotia, on the other sides by the ^Egean Sea and the Saronic Gulf, which lies between it and the peninsula of Peloponnesus. The island of Euboea extends from near the coast of Thessaly to that of Attica, and is divided from the main land by the narrow channel called Euripus. The great mountain chain of Greece is continued through the isthmus of Corinth into Pe- loponnesus, (naw cail«d the Morea.) and there expands itself into the cluster of mountains which forms Arcadia, the central province of the peninsula; and hence ^o branches towaixis the sea, which divide the maritime territory into tiie provinces of Achaia, Argolis,Laconia, Messenia, and Eleia. But we shall after- wards speak of them more particularly. The first inhabitants of all these regions appear to have been a people called Pelasgians, of whose origin but little is known, though their tril>es are l)elieved to have settled extensively both in Europe and in Asia. The name Hellenes, which afterwards was adopted as the general denomination of those whom we, from the Latin, call Greeks, was originally that of a small people in the north of Thessaly, which grew early powerful, and became the ongin of many leading Grecian states. Whether the original Hellenes were a Pelasgian tribe, or a tribe of a different though kindred stock, is a question ad- mitting much discussion. The reader may find it ably treated in the Roman History of Niebuhr, who decidedly con- demns the supposition that the Hellenes were Pelasgian. But of those com- prised under the name of Hellenes, or Greeks, after it had become the dis- tinguishing appellation of a great na- tion, at least half were Pelasgians by origin, and perhaps considerably more ; nor can we auffirm that Greece owed more of its manners, language*, or civilization to the Hellenic than to the Pelasgic portion of its people. Afterwards the Grecian nation became divided into two races, the Ionian and iEolian: and of the latter, a portion afterwaitis, under the name of the Dorians, attaining great power and importance, that name, as .v*.^"*''', **"?* ''*' *^" **•<* on **»« circumstapc* that (jreek writers cooimonly speak of the Pelaseie ianguagre as barbarous. But the Greeks andoabtedly whether Pelas^rians or not, early separated them- telres from the less improved Pelasgic tribes. Sop- posmj' the basis of the language entirely Pelawnc. the admixture of Egyptian aad Phaenician words in IKK- ^8re»her with tlie alterations prodaced in both by time and change of manners, may rery well have occasioned the Greek language to differ as much from that of the other Pelasgians, as the modem English from the Doteh, which, like it ii derived from the old Anglo-Saxon. If, however.'the Hellenes were a separate race, it is no less possible tt?M ^' l«»«ro»gre may have prevailed; ©ragain, that the Greek language may have been a compf -md 1r:^:Zl\^. *'"' ** ^ whoUy uncertain 'whicU GREECl?. umlied to them, superseded the -^olian, and this being still retained by the other braflches of the same family, the great divisions of the Greeks were three, lonians, i^olians, and Dorians. The earliest traditions of Greece carry back the mind to a periwl of poverty and ignorance scarcely exceeded by the rudest savages now known. They tell of the institution of marriage, the first planting of the vine, the first sowing of com ; though, in those eastem countries, from which Greece, like the rest of the world, derived its population, all these were known long before its first inhabitants quitted their original abodes. This is not a thing to be wondered at. The earUest settlers of every country, unless sent out as a colony by public authority, or com- pelled to emigrate in numerous bodies by political commotions, are commonly stragders from the mass of persons without property or regular employment, who abound in every fully-peopled dis- trict; men of restless and irregular ha- bits, who, when placed in forest tracts, abounding with game, but requiring great labour to fit them for cultivation, and cut off from intercourse with more fre- quented regions, are likely to lose the civilization of their birth-place, and, neg- lecting all the arts of settled life, to be- come mere hunters. This is the case, in «ome degree, in the back settlements of America, though the rapid spread of ci- viliiation, and the easier intercourse with cultivated districts, have much curtailed the operation of these causes. In Greece, divided from the then inhabited world by seas and mountains, the barbarising pro- cess went so far, that husbandry seems to have been forgotten, and men were obliged, if their hunting failed, to feed on mast and berries, or other spontaneous products of the earth. In such a state, an extensive tract would support but few, while those who found themselves in want of subsistence, having no im- moveable property, no laborious im- provements to attach them to the spot, would readily seek a place where men were scarcer, and game more plentiful Thus inhabitants would be thinly spread over the country with great rapidity, and, tin the land was pretty generally occu- pied, they would scarcely feel the want of more productive employment. But, when this time came, the difficulty of subsistence must have been great. In a nation of hunters, the supoly of food, in- stead of increasing, would decline with the inci-easing number of persons to be fed. Cattle might be bred, to some ex- tent, in the rich valleys of Boeotia and Thessaly; but that could be but a limited resource in a country so rugged as most of Greece. Each tribe, on find- ing its own hunting-ground and pastur- age insufficient, would endeavour to in- crease it by encroachment on its neigh- bours ; and war would therefore be con- tinual, occasioned, not by ambition, as elsewhere, but by need. In this state of hopeless barbarism was Greece when visited by those Egyp- tian and Phoenician colonies which gave it the first rudiments of civilization. The Egyptian' Cecrops, coming to Attica, found the rude natives without union or regular government, infested, on their northern border, by the Boeotians, their only neighbours, and from the sea by the Carians, a piratical people widely established in the islands of the JEgean, and on the south-western coast of Asia Minor, whose object, probably, was the procuring of slaves, since the poverty of Attica could offer no other temptation to the plunderer. Having occupied the rock which afterwards became the Acro- polis, or citadel of Athens, Cecrops pre- vailed on the inhabitants of the country to submit to him as their chief. He di- vided the province into twelve districts, and established a principal town in each, where the affairs of the district were to be transacted ; instituted marriage, and appointed laws for the administration of justice ; and arranged a system of united defence against the Boeotians. The strong hold in which he had fixed his re- sidence was peculiarly consecrated to the Egyi^tian goddess Neith, whose name was changed by the Greeks into Athene, and who was worshipped by the Romans under that of Minerva, Around this rock arose a city, first named, from its founder, Cecropia, but afterwards Athe- nae, from the goddess, or, as we have comipted it, Athens. About the same time we may proba- bly place the founding of Sicyon and Argos, though both claimed a higher antiquity. Of the early history of Si- cyon little is known, and that little is not important Of the settlement of Ar- gos two traditions are preserved ; the one ascribing it to Inachus the son of Ocean ; the other to Phoroneus son of Inachus. By those who hold the latter opinion, Ina- chus is mostly considered as the name not of a man but of a river. Both relations seem to mark out an unknown man from beyond the sea, who landed in the river GREECE. I I which received its name firom him, or from which the other tradition supposes him sprung. The founder of Argos ap- pears to have been a wanderer from the East, and probably from Egypt, who, by the influence of suj^erior knowledge, having induced the rude Pelasgians to obey him, gave them some degree of re- gular government and a more settled mode of life. At an after-time we find the Argians governed by Gelanor, a prince apparently of Pelasgian blood, when Danaus arrived with a fresh colony from Egypt. The Argians were often distressed for want of water ; he first taught them to dig wells ; and, by this and similar services, he won sucn fa- vour that he was encouraged to claim the kingdom. He declared himself de- scended from lo, an Argian princess of the line of Inachus, and one of the most singular personages in Grecian fable. It is said that Jupiter, being enamoured of her, to deceive the jealousy of Juno, transformed her into a cow ; that in this form she travelled into Egypt, and there became a goddess. Herodotus, the earliest and one of the most trust- worthy of Grecian historians whose works- remain, explains the fable by sup- posing that she was enticed on ship board and carried away by some Phoe- nician merchants, to whom women were very profitable articles of trade. The popularity of Danaus made up for the weakness of his claim ; he was chosen king, and such was his power and fame that, long after his death, the southern Greeks still went by the name of Danaans. An adventurer from Phrygia in Asia Minor founded a dynasty which was destined to succeed that of Danaus, and to rule more widely. This adven- turer was Pelops, who attained such in- fluence, chiefly by the riches which he brought from Asia, that the southern peninsula was ever after called by his name, (Peloponnesus, the island of Pe- lops.) He obtained Eleia by his marriage with Hippodameia, the daughter of CEno- maus, king of Pisa in t£at province : and one of his daughters, being given in marriage to the king of Argos and the neighbouring city Mycenae, was the mother of Eurystheus, the last prince of the Danaan race. He, leading an army against the Athenians because they pro- tected the children of liis enemy Her- cules, left his mother's brother Atreus regent Eurystheus fell in battle, and Atreus, being powerful and popular, was ahoscn to succeed him by the Myce- nseafis, the more readily because they wanted an able leader to protect them against the sons of Hercules. He was succeeded by his son Agamemnon, whose power extended over all Pelopon- nesus and many of the Grecian islands. The seat of his royalty was Mycenae, to which the supremacy had been trans- ferred from Argos by Perseus, the great grandfather of Eurystheus. But it is time to return to an earlier period, and to re- late the second great Oriental coloni- sation of Greece. About thirty years after the founda- tion of Athens, some extensive troubles took place in Palestine, which caused the emigration of numerous bodies of Phoenicians. Newton's conjecture seems highly probable, that this took place in consequence of the taking of Sidon by the Philistines, united with the Edomites, who were expelled from their homes by the conquests of David. The fugitives settled in Phrygia, in the islands of Rhodes, Crete, and Euboea, and in several parts of Greece, under various names, as Curetes, Corybantes, Idaei Dactyli, and others ; they brought with them letters, music, the art of working in me- tals, and a more accurate method of computing time than had hitherto been adopted; and they first taught those mystical ceremonies which formed a very remarkable part of the religion of Greece. A division of them under the name of Cadmeians occupied Boeotia, and either driving out the natives, or imiting with them, founded there the celebrated city of Thebes. Cadmus, the leader of this colony, has the fame of introducing letters into Greece ; but the merit of tfis, and all the improvements which took place at the same period, belongs to him only in common with the other chiefs of the Curetes. One of these Phoenician set^ tlements deserves particular attention, both from its early eminence and power, and from its offering the most ancient specimen recorded of a political system, arranged with great art and forethought, and calculated to combine the liberty of the citizens with regular government. The institutions which Minos established in Crete at a time of general anarchy and barbarism, continued to be admired by political speculators in the most po- lished ages of Greece, and became the model by which Lycurgus, at a subse- quent period, formed the constitution of Sparta, which, with all its vices, is un- rivalled as an instance of sagacity, in adapting laws to certain objects. 3 2 GREECE. GREECE. like most i^^ legislators, Minos en- deavoured to heigfhten the authority of his institutions by laying claim to divine inspiration. He called himself the son of Zeus, or Jupiter, the principal deity of the Greeks ; and having retired into a cave, on coming out he declared that he had received from his father the laws which he promulgated, and which formed the basis of the Cretan commonwealth. The leading principles of his legislation were the equality of the citizens, the community of the lands, and the subjec- tion of the daily life of individuals to mi- nute reflation by law. The education of the children was appointed, and was prin- cipally directed to make them soldiers. They were made to sit on the ground, to wear the same coarse garment in winter and summer, to wait on the tables of the men, and frequently to exercise their courage in combats among themselves. The elder boys were divided into troops {agelof) ; of eai h of which one of them- selves was chosen as chief, while a su- perintendent was appointed from the men, to lead c»ut the troop to the chase and to exercise, and to correct the disor- deriy. These troops were maintained at the public expense, and on certain days were accustomed to engage with each other in battle, to the sound of music, fighting with their fists, and even with weapons. On arriving at manhood, they were obliged to contact themselves in marriage, ai.d at the same time they left the agelae to enter into the clubs or messes of the men, where they lived in perfect equality on the produce of the land, which t)elonged to the state, and was eultivated for it by numerous slaves. Herein Greece saw nothing to disap- prove. Ancient politicians considered ■laves as absolutely necessary, and their happiness or misery as very imimpor- tant. The object in view was to sup- port the citizens in leisure and freedom ; while the number and wretchedness of the servile elass were never considered, unless so far as their discontent m^ht •adanger the tranquillity of the free. The powers of the Cretan government were concentrated in the council of elders, and ia tea magistrates called Cosmi: and both these appointments were held for Hfe The assembly of the people was only allowed a silent vote on such pro- positions as were submitted to it by the vlderhood and Cosmi. The military command was at firat in the kmg, but •n the abolition of royalty was entrusted |o the C#»mi. Wliile Crete was flourishing under a government singularly reirular, though avowedly calculated to train up the citi- zens in the habits of a well disciplined army, rather than in those of a peaceful commonwealth, the continent of Greece was yet in a state of great disorder. The Cadmeians and Curetes had brought to their settlements in Boeotia, i^tolia, and Eubcea, much useful knowledge, and a more settled mode of life : and nearly at the same time, com and the art of tillage were made known to Attica by Ceres. She is generally supposed to have been a Sici- lian woman : but, from the resemblance of the religious mysteries she introduced at Eleusis to those, which were elsewhere celebrated by the Phoenicians in honour of the same goddess, under many names, as Rhea,Cybele, and others, it is probable that the benefits attributed to her were due to the Phoenicians, and that Ceres was either a priestess of the Phoenician goddess, or perhaps a name of the goddess herself. But improvement was retarded by continual rapine, war, and emigration. If a tribe was attacked by a stronger enemy, they all quitted their homes with little reluctance, to seek a new abode in the seats of any whom they in their turn might be able to master. There was no traffic, no safe intercourse by land or sea : the towns were unforti- fied, and no one thought of providing more than would suffice for his present wants, being uncertain when he might oe pillaged or driven from his dwelling. Having nothing valuable, and expecting any where to get such necessary suste- nance as might serve them from day to da)r, they were easily induced to change their abodes ; and hence there was litSe increase in the greatness of cities or the wealth of their inhabitants. But the richest soils were always the most sub- ject to these changes ; for the goodness of the land, by increasing the riches, and thereby the power, of some particular men, both caused seditions within the communities, and tempted strangers to attack them. Besides, with the growth of navigation, the people on the coast, and in the islands, both Greeks and others, betook themselves to piracy, sending out ships under the command of their most powerful men, much like the Northmen who ravaged England in the reigns of Alfred and some of his succes- sors. This was then deemed honour- able, as robbery has at some time l)een held in every barbarous nation ; but it IS a singular fact, that this feeling lasted not only to the time of Homer, but in some of the less civilised parts of the Gre- cian continent, even to that of Thucydides. These evils were checked hy the power of Minos, whose wise institutions, together with the happy situation of his island, had made him the greatest potentate of Greece. He first built a navy for the protection of commerce and the enlargement of his empire ; conquered many of the Cyclades, (islands in the ^gean), and cleared the sea, as far as was practicable, of pirates. In the period of tranquillity thus afforded, many cities increased in wealth and power so far as to surround themselves with walls, and to feel safe in their own strength ; and the towns which were subsequently founded were not, as of old, placed far away from the sea for se- curity from the sudden incursions of pi- rates, but were usually fixed upon the coast for the convenience of trade, and made defensible by fortifications. From a very early period, when the rest of Greece was in the troubled state just described, Attica alone was compara- tively tranquil, a blessing due to the ap- parent disadvantages of its situation. It is, like most of Greece, a tract inclosed and intersected in every direction by mountain ridges ; but it is one in which the productive valleys and plains bear even a smaller proportion than usual, to the rugged and sterile barriers which sur- round them. The soil is thin and light, highly favourable to the growth of figs and olives, but offering a very moderate return to the labour of tillage, and still less suited to the pasturage of cattle, the chief riches of that age. Hence, since no one coveted their territory, the inha- bitants enjoyed it undisturbed ; and the population not having been changed within the limits of tradition, the Athe- nians in afler-times were able to boast their favourite title of Autochthones, or cliildren of the soil. The peace and se- curity of Athens made it a refuge to wealthy and powerful men, who were driven out from other places by war or sedition ; and its population was thus so far increased that it early relieved itself by sending colonies to Asia. Its prospe- rity was aided by an early reform in its institutions. Under the successors of Cecrops, the twelve cities into which he had assembled the Atticans, retained each its separate magistrates and pryta- neum (town hall) : and though they owned a superiority in the king of Athens, they never consulted him unless in case of danger, but were governed independently by their several councils, and sometimes even made war on each other. The di- vision of Attica did not cease, till The- seus coming to the throne completely remodeUed its political state. Theseus was the son of iEgeus king of Athens, by ^thra the daughter of Pittheus, king of TrcBzen, a small town of Peloponnesus, opposite to Attica. He was bred at the court of his father-in- law, and when grown to manhood was sent by his mother to Athens. Though advised to go by sea as shorter and safer, piracy being about that time sup- pressed by Minos, he chose the more hazardous journey by land. ** That age,** says Plutarch, "produced men of un- common strength, dexterity, and swift- ness, who used these natural gifts to no ^ood purpose, but placed their enjoyment in outrage and cruelty, esteeming the praises of equity, fair dealing, and bene- volence, to proceed from faintness of heart and the dread of injury and little to become the powerful and bold." The fame of Hercules was principally founded on the destruction of such marauders, and Theseus aspired to a similar re- nown. He took his way through the isthmus of Corinth,a tract most favourable to plunderers, abounding with mountain fastnesses, and the only passage between Peloponnesus and Northern Greece. All who attacked him were slain or de- feated, and he arrived at Athens, having delivered the country from some of its greatest scourges. He was there acknow- ledged by -^geus, and welcomed by the people, prepossessed in his favour by the fame of his exploits. Some commotions were raised by the nephews of iligeus, who had expected to succeed him ; but these were defeated and the faction quelled. The Athenians, in a war with Minos, king of Crete, had purchased peace by a yearly tribute of seven youths and seven virgins as slaves. The burden was borne with much uneasiness. The poets relate that the victims were thrown to be devoured by the Minotaur, a mon- ster half bull, half man: and possibly such a report may have been current at the time amon^ the ignorant many. The captives had hitherto been drawn by lot from the people: Tlieseus offered himself as one. The history of his going to Crete is much disguised by fable, but it would seem that Minos received him honourably, remitted the tribute, and finally gave him his daughter Ariadne in marriage. She returned with him, and it is fabled that he deserted her on the OKBEOjs GKEECE ill HI iiUuid of Naxos. Prabably she sickened io the voyage, and died on the island. "Die success and patriotic boldness of bis enterprise raised Theseus to the highest popularity. Sacrifices and pro- eessions were instituted to commemo- fite it, and the ship in which he returned was yearly sent to the sacred island of Delos, carrying a mission to i>erform thanksgiving to Apollo. About this time, on the death of ^geus, Theseus succeed- ed unopposed ; and possessing a degree of influence which enabled him to effect a great political change, he went through the several towns, and persuaded the inhabitants to give up their separate councils and magistracies, and submit to a common jurisdiction. Every man was to retain his dwelling and his property as before, but justice was to he adminis- tered and aU public affairs transacted at Athens. The mass of the people came into his measures; and to subdue the reluctance of the powerful, who were loth to resign the importance accruing from the local magistracies, he gave up much of his own authority, reserving only the command of the army, and the care of watching over the execution of the laws. Opposition was silenced by his Mbe- rality, together with the fear of his pow^r, ability, and courage ; and the union of Attica was effected by him and made lasting. To bind it closer, without dis- turbing the religious observances of the several towns, he instituted a common festival in honour of Minerva, which was called the feast of union, and the least of all the Athenians (Panatheneea.) To his wise measures Athens owes its early prosperity and civilisation, its sub- sequent eminence in all the arts of peace ana war, and its importance in history, so utterly disproporUonale to the extent and value of its territory. The quiet and good order produced by the union in Attica are proved by the fact that the Athenians .were the first in Greece who left off the habitual carrying of amCis, and adopted a peaceful garb. Even in these early ages the religion of Greece, though somewhat less com- plex than in after-times, was an intricate tissue of fable and superstition. . It seems to have been chiefly derived from Egj^pt, but partly also from Phoenicia, and partly firom the old belief of the Pelasgians. The latter worshipped nameless gods, which makes it probable that theii an- cestors had quitted the regions of Asia, that formed the cradle of mankind, be- lore the commencement of polytheism (the worship of many ^ods ;) though, m the barbarism into which they fell, they could not long raise their minds to the contemplation of the one supreme and invisible God; and therefore began to adore the inferior spirits, whom they supposed to be the immediate movers of nature. But when they met with stran- gers far their superiors in knowledge and intelligence, who professed to de- clare the names, order, different powers and mutual relations of the gods, the means of learning their will, and of averting their anger ; they naturally re- ceived with joyful acquiescence a com- munication which gave them definite notions where all seemed vague, dark, and uncertain. Such instructors they first found in the Egyptian settlers, and accordingly nearly all the names of Gre- cian gods were Egyptian. The PhcBni- cians afterwards settled more exten- sively; but their religion so much re- sembled tiiat of Egypt, that it is difficult to discover from which nation many tenets and practices of Grecian worship were derived. In Egypt, a numerous hereditary priesthood were the sole de- positaries of all rehgious and historical knowledge, and they chiefly studied to improve their ascendancy by practising on the ignorance and superstition of the people. For this end tney veiled their doctrines and traditions under fables and allegories unintelligible to the many, and worshipped the Deity with different rites appropriate to all his different at- tributes, assigning liim a separate name and symbol as considered under each: thus gratifying by their ritual the popu- lar love of variety and splendour, and working powerfully on the imagination by dim ghmpses of a hidden meaning in the mysterious celebrations. The mul- titude, as might be expected, soon came to consider these different names as belonging to so many independent dei- ties ; and the priests were not solicitous to undeceive them. Hence there arose in Egypt, and subsequently in Greece, a double religion, the one for the learned, the other for the ignorant. The latter acknowledged a plurality, and dealt in monstrous and frequently immoral fables, which have been reprobated by the wisest Greeks, as ascribing to the gods actions of which an ordinary man would be ashamed. The former was taught at the solemnities called Orgies, or Mysteries, at which those who were present were bound to secrecy as to what they saw, and were supposed ever after to lje invested with peculiar sanctity. Among the most noted of these in Greece were the orgies of Ceres at Eleusis. Their general object seems to have been to teach the unity of the highest God, and to communicate such fragments as had been retained of the primitive religion. The spirit of mystery which prevailed in religion, extended itself also mto phi- losophy ; and the object of the earliest Grecian moralists was not so much to instruct the people, as to compose, for a narrow circle of scholars, a discipline which should raise them above the com- mon level of mankind. Such were the instructions of Pythagoras, who imposed a long and arduous probation before a man could be admitted as his disciple ; and many philosophers made a distinc- tion between the doctrines which they publicly taught, (exoterica^ or the doc- trines for those witliout,) and those re- served for a few more favoured hearers Cesoterica, or the doctrines for those within.) This is not wonderful, consi- dering that Greek philosophy originated from Egypt, where it was inseparably united with theology, and was, like it, the exclusive patrimony of the priest- hood. Orpheus, who lived before the Trojan war, the first noted teacher of wisdom to the Greeks, preserved the union ; and instituted orgies, which were at once a religious solemnity and a course of philosophical instruction. Py- thagoras, in a later age, could not give his discipline the character of sacredness ; but yet so closely did the purifying cere- monies enjoined by him, agree with the religious mysteries, that they are paral- leled by Herodotus with the Orphic orgies, and those of Bacchus, both of which were sacred and derived from Egypt. Pythagoras, Plato, and many other eminent philosophers of Greece, travelled into Egypt, and it is probably to remnants of primitive tradition there picked up, that we owe the dim shadow- ings of some mysterious doctrines of Christian belief, which are occasionally found in heathen writers. The unity of the supreme Godhead, which was maintained by most of the wisest Greeks, is a truth too congenial with human reason to need any tradition to account for its existence ; but there are other notions, which, far from t)eing obvious, have been always the most difficult to be received, and these can be accounted for on no other supposition. The popular religion of Greece in the age precwiing the Trojan war, differed little from that in after-times ; except that its scattered fables had not been embo- died, as was afterwards done by the early poets, Homer and Hesiod, whom Hero- dotus names as the fathers of Grecian mythology ; and that hero-worship does not seem to have been practised. Mortals had indeed been deified, as Bacchus ; but their mortality was put out of sight, and in the legends relate! of them, tney are throughout considered as gods ; whereas the heroes are, in all their ac- tions, represented as men, till the history closes with their death and elevation to the rank of an inferior divinity. No sign of this practice is found in Homer or Hesiod ; but it afterwards became so common, that every town had its par- ticular heroes, and new ones were con- tinually added to the list. The greater gods took then* rise chiefly from Egypt : many other more fanciful inventions were of native growth, as Muses, Graces, nymphs of mountains, woods, and waters. Greece had never an order of priesthood. There were indeed priests of particular divinities, but when not engaged in their religious duties, there was seldom any thing to separate them from the rest of the community. In early times all sa- cred functions belonged to the king, ex- cepting some rites of peculiar sanctity, which had priests specially appointed to perform them ; and even when royalty was generally abolished, in many states the title was continued to the person who performed those religious offices which had belonged to the king. Facility in crediting pretenders to a knowledge of the future, a weakness common to half civilised countries and half educated men, was very prevalent in Greece. Their predictions were of two kinds: in the one case drawn by rules from the state of the entrails in a sacrificed victim, from the flight of birds, the occurrence of thunder, and numberless accidents and natural ap- pearances ; in the other, by direct com- munication from deities supposed to be resident in certain spots. The first kind was so prevalent in Homers time, that in his poem we scarcely find an action done, or plan proposed, which is not accompanied by some portent of its good or ill success. We hear little from him of local oracles, the consulting which was too troublesome and expensive to be practised except on important occa- sions. Many existed, though none had arrived at that commanding influence and celebrity, which was afterwards at- GREECE. l\ \\\ tatned by the oracle atDebhi, but which hardly could arise till the aiiferent states had come into more frequent mutual iu- teroourse, and larzer connexion in peace and war. The oldest oracle was at Do- dona in Epirus, and was established by a woman stolen by some Phoenicians fifom the temple of Jupiter at Thebes, in £gypt. Other oracles arose in various places, but the greatest celebrity was gained by that of Apollo at Delphi in Phocis. Here was a cavern, whence came exhalations producing convulsions and temporary phrensy, which were sup- posed to be symptoms of divine inspira- tion. The mode of conducting the oracle was this ; the person who received the supposed inspu-ation was a priestess exclusively devoted to that office, and called Pythia, from Pytho, the ancient name of the place. She being placed over the cavern, the words which fell from her in her delirium were arranged and connected by the attending priests, and an answer framed from Uiem, till a late period always in verse. The in- terpreters thus could modify the answer at pleasure, and in doubtful cases they generally made it ambiguous, and such as at once to gratify the questioner, if powerful and liberal, and to avoid being convicted of falsehood. Hence, when many less prudently managed lost their credit, the Delphian oracle maintained its character for superior trust-worthiness, and, as we shall find in the subsequent history, continued for ages powerfully to influence the politics of Greece. Chaptsr II. Of Pelnponnemu, from the Trojan War to the end of the 9econd Messenian War, Piracy, as we have seen, in early times was a common, and was held an honourable practice among tlie people inhabiting the coasts and islands of the ^gean sea. The famous voyage of the Ai^nauts was nothing more than a piratical expedition to the eastern shores of the Euxine, remarkable for its un- usual extent and boldness, and the num- ber of men of distinction engaged in it, in which Jason, the commander, carried away with him Medea, the daughter of the Colchian king. A similar outrage, done to Greece in the next e:enera- tion, was followed by wider mischiefs. Paris, the son of Pnam, king of Troy, m the course of a marauding expedition, being hospitably entertained at Sparta, by Menelaus, the l)rother of Agamem- non, ended his visit, with stealing Helen, the wife of his host. The kings of My- cense had long been commonly the lead- ing potentates of Greece, and Agamem- non was more powerful than his greatest predecessors. Achaia and Argolis, with Corinth, l)elonged to the original domi- nion of Mycenae ; Agamemnon inherited Eleia from Pelops ; Laconia, with most of Messenia, formed the kingdom of Mene- laus; and what remained of Pelopon- nesus was governed by petty chiefs de- pendent on Mycenae. Beyond the isth- mus, Agamemnon had no authority, but his power was dreaded and his influence felt; and by his ascendancy, together with resentment of the aggression, with the love of war, and the nope of booty, all Greece was united for the over- throw of Troy. (B. C. 914.)* The combined fleet was assembled at Auhs in Bceotia, where it was so long detained by contrary winds, supposed to be occa- sioned by the anger of Diana, that Aga- memnon is said to have been compelled by his army to sacrifice his daughter Iphi- geneia to the goddess. This story wants the authority of Homer and Hesiod, but it is related by many very ancient writers, and is not without parallel in that age. Human sacrifices, as we know from scripture, were much used by the nations of Palestine, and hence they were carried by the Phoenicians into Greece, as into aH the places where they settled; and though never there, as among the Ca- naanites, an ordinary rite, they were oc- casionally employed in great emergencies, and when the anger of some deity was believed to be unusually excited. The people against which the voyage was directed, differed httle from the Greeks in origin, habits, language, or civilisation. The extent and power of the Trojan kingdom were considerable, but not sufficiently so to keep the field against the united strength of Greece; and had the si^e been prosecuted with vi- gour, it would probably have been short But the resources of Greece being un- equal to the maintenance of the army, it was obliged to support itself by plunder gathered from the neighbouring cities, * The chruDology of these early times is very an- certain. The dateu here adopted are those of Newton, whose system, though far from being satisfactory, appears, on the whole, to tally better with the course of events than any other. We have pot the means of attaining more than a very imperfect approximation to the tnith. All the other systems, where they differ from Newton's, assign to each event a higher auli* (^uity than he does. GREECE. and by cultivating the opposite Cherso- nese, or peninsula, from which it was separated by the Hellespont ; and while much of its force was always thus em- ployed, the remainder barely sufficed to keep the enemy within his walls. Thus ; the war was protracted through ten years, at the end of which, Troy was taken, and suffered all those miseries, and that destruction, which, to the dis- grace of human nature, continues, even now, to be the usual fate of captured towns. Of the aggregate evil caused by the war, some conception may be formed from the statement, that, in different plundering expeditions, twelve towns were ruined by Achilles alone; the chiefs and soldiers mercilessly butchered, the women and children carried into bond- age, and those of the women who were so unhappy as to please the eye of their conquerors, reduced to live in a miserable concubinage with the slaughterers of their kindred. This war is the subject of the noblest poem of antiquity, the Iliad of Homer ; and the greatest moral merit of that poem is, that it does not gloss over the horrors of war, but gives such pic- tures as that just exhibited, broadly and plainly, without disguise or palliation. Yet this very poem stimulated Alex- ander to a wider career of devastation ; so much less powerful is sympathy with suffering, than the desire of a spurious and malignant renown. - We have in the Iliad, and its sequel the Odyssey, an admirable picture of Grecian manners at this early j)eriod. The chief riches of the age were slaves and cattle, horses, arms, household uten- sils and furniture. The slaves were often taken in plundering expeditions, in which chiefs and princes thought not shame to be engaged: but however unjustly and violently obtained, their condition was better than in later times. They might be as liable to arbitrary chastisement as afterwards : but they were ordinarily treated more as members of the family, and some old and trusty servants would even be placed by their masters on a footing approaching to familiar friendship. Handicrafts and menial ser- vices could not be felt as degrading in an age when princes often performed them : as we find it related that Achilles cooked the dinner for the ambassadors who were sent by Agamemnon to visit mm m his tent ; Ulysses carved and <*?;"a™ented the bedstead for his bridal chamber; and Nausicaa, daughter to the king of Phaeacia (Corcyra or Corfu), went to her father, when sitting in the conned of his chiefs, to ask that she might go down to the river with her handmaids to wash the linen of the household. Hospitality was held a sa- cred duty ; and so strictly was it ob- served, that when a stranger appeared at a banquet, it was usual not to ask his name till the feast were over, lest his welcome should be injured, if he proved to be a person at deadly feud with his entertainer. Hospitality, strong family affection, and cordiality in the relations existing between master and servant are vutues belonging to a simple state of society : but with them the early Greeks had also the vices common to half-civihsed nations. They were given to piracy and robbery ; and their wars were often wantonly undertaken, and always cruelly conducted, httle quarter being given, and aU prisoners becoming slaves. Man's life was held so cheaS mat half the most famous heroes of Greece were persons guilty of murder : and though these were generally obliged to quit their country by the fear of ven- geance from the kindred of the slain they were elsewhere freated less as cri- minals, than as men unfortunate, as well m their banishment as in its cause. The Grecian chiefs returning from Troy found every thing changed during their absence. Governments had then but little of established law or perma- nent system ; and the power of princes depending entirely on their personal in- fluence and energy, when they and their bravest adherents were absent, the aged and infant members of their family, far from exercising any authority, were un- able even to protect themselves from spoliation and outrage. During the ten years war, a new generation growing to manhood, had adopted leaders of its own, and the returning chiefs found then- places occupied by strangers, fre- quently their private property usurped, and theu- families destitute and exposed to mdignity. Struggles ensued, in which many princes were compelled to reim- bark their followers, and seek for set- tlements elsewhere, while others obliged their opponents to a sunilar migration. Ulysses, the king of the small island of Ithaca on the western coast of Greece, met with shipwrecks and various acci- dents on his return from Troy, which de- layed his coming home for many years after that of the other chiefs, it was supposed in Ithaca that he had perished, and all the neighbouring chiefs came i7 1 1 GIv£i£v/£* It woo hb wife Penelope, a paragon of beauty, virtue and discretion. Telema- chus, the young son of the wanderer, and Laertes his aged father, could not resist the powerful intruders ; and Pe- nelope herself could not decidedly refuse to make her choice, thoujfh she contnvwl to delay it At length Ulysses arrived, and stood unknown on the threshold of his father. He saw the suitors reveUing in his halls, devouring his sheep and oxen, and wasting his substance in not, insulting his family, and domineering over his servants and his people. In the disgmse of a beggar he ministered to their amusement, endured their inso- lence, and partook of their churlish hos- pitality : but their measure was now full, and with the aid of Telemachus and two fluthfiil servants he destroyed them. This itory is the subject of the Odyssey : and though embellished, no doubt, by the fancy of the poet, we may be sure that it contains a groundwork of truth, and that whatever is added, tallies with the manners of the age. Agamem- non was murdered on his return by his wife Clytaemnestra and cousin iEgisthus, for whom she had con- ceived an adulterous passion ; the con- spirators were strong enough to pos- sess themselves of the government, but some of the friends of Agamemnon es- caped the slaughter, carrying with them his infant son Orestes. The character of Agamemnon appears to have been popular, and the wickedness of his as- sassins could not but be generaUy de- tested ; and the prevalence of these sen- timents enabled Orestes, on arriving at manhood, to recover the throne, when he put to death both Clytaemnestra and ^gwthus. It was the general belief that this tissue of horrors arose from the curse entailed by a crime of Pelops on his race, which, after occasioning deep guilt and misery in the intermediate generation, was consummated in a mother slain by her son for the miurder of his father: a strong instance of a ten- dency universal in Greece to ascribe any remarkable crime or calamity less to the character of the immediate agents, than to the power of Destiny, urging them on actions they abhor, in ven- geance for some former misdeed of themselves or their ancestors. In the reign of Tisamenus the son of Orestes, a change took place in the ruling population through the greater part of Peloponnesus. Hercules, the most renowned of Grecian heroes, was GREECE. great grandson to Perseus king of Ar- gos, the founder of Mycenae. Some of his posterity were pnnces of Doris, a small and rugged tract in the mountains of (Eta and Parnassus ; and here they never ceased to claim the royalty of Argos, from the time when it passed from the ♦ Perseid line to that of Pelops. Twice they were repulsed from Pelopon- nesus ; but the third attempt was more successful, when, eighty years after tlie Trojan war, (B. C. 824.) the Dorians invaded the peninsula under Temenus, Oresphontes,and Aristodemus, all sprung from Hercules. Tisamenus, driven from his other possessions, made a stand in Achaia ; Arcadia was not attacked ; but all the rest was parcelled among the in- vaders. Temenus had Argolis ; Cres- phontes Messenia; and Anstodemus dying, his twin sons Eurysthenes and Procles were made joint kings of Lace- daemon, of Sparta, or of Laconia ; the first of these bein^ the name by which the state or people is generally described, the second the name of the capital, the third of the province. Eurysthenes and Procles were each the founder of a royal house ; and from their time there were constantly two kings of Lacedsemon, one from each family. Eleiawas allotted to Oxylus, an ^tohan chief associated in the enterprise. The Pelopid kings had, probably, lost much power and popularity by their bloody family quarrels, and hence the conquerors had a favouring party in many places. But whatever be the plea of hereditary right by which the in- vasion is defended, whatever the pro- mises held forth to allure the natives to submission, a government of conouest must ever be oppressive. The chiefs were obliged to recompense their follow- ers, and their demands could only be satisfied by the general spoliation of the old inhabitants. Great numbers emi- grated, the rest were mostly made slaves, and the Dorians remained sole masters of the soil, except in Messenia, where much was left to its rightful owners. From this revolution, commonly known as the Return of the Heracleidae, or sons of Hercules, the Dorian name began to be powerful in Greece. Civilisation, which had previously made some pro- gress in the peninsula, was Uirown 11 • Pereeid line.— The d«>sM?endant8 of Perseus vren called Perseidae, those of Pelops PelopiJ» ; and gene- rally the members of every consjdnr.ible family were ' -■ .. .!-_r -* :- nsiniilifinanQer ancestor. rally the members of every consmnniuie denoted by an appellation formed in asn from the name or some distinguished ai back by Ihe uruptlon of the rude moun- taineers, and the country was unceas- mgly torn with disputes arising from the pi^tion of the territory won. A common bond of union between Grecian towns, connected with each other by blood or alliance, was the institution of periodical meetings for religious ob- servances and social festivity. These meetings were usually made attractive by splendid ceremonies, and by prizes offered to competition in athletic exer- cises, in poetry and music. A legend existed, that Hercules had instituted such a festival at Olympia, an Eleian town peculiarly consecrated to Jupiter ; and Iphitus, king of Elis, the grandson of Oxylus, projected the making this re- port a means to soften the mutual en- mities of the Peloponnesians, and to pro- vide, at least, a periodical interruption of strife and bloodshed. The oracle at Delphi was now generally reverenced, and especially by the Dorians, whose race had come from its vicinity. Iphitus procured from the oracle a command that the Olympian festival j^hould be re- stored, and a cessation of arms immedi- ately proclaimed for all cities desirous of partakinjs: in it ; and the Peloponnesians, sending: to inquire into the authenticity of the mandate, were ordered to submit to the direciion of the Eleians in re- establishing the ancient customs of then* fathers. Olympia was made the scene of a festival open to all Greece, which consisted in sacrifices to Jupiter and Hercules, and in contests exhibited to their honour. (B. C. 776.) Every fourth year was the period appointed for the recurrence of the celebration ; and to prevent the at- tendance from being interrupted by war, a general armistice was ordered through Greece for some time, both before its beginning, and after its close. An olive garland was the only prize of victory in the different exercises ; but this became a very envied distinction, and the in- terest taken in the contests, with the splendour and sanctity of the religious ceremonies, drew together an enormous concourse of spectators, and made the festival a fit occasion to communicate, readily and solemnly, wnatever it con- cerned the Greeks in general to know. Hence, treaties were often by mutual agreement proclaimed at Olympia, and engraved on columns there erected, as a public and generally accessible record. The presidency of the festival was as- sured to the Eleians, with other remark- able privileges. A tradition was current that the Heracleidae, on making Oxylus king of Elis and guardian of the temple of Ol^pian Jupiter, had consecrated aU Eleia to the god, and denounced the heaviest curses against all who should invade it, or should even suffer its in- vasion. Iphitus procured the acknow- ledgment of the tradition, and for many ages it was almost uniformly observed ; and this made the Eleians singularly prosperous, and strikingly different in habits from the other Greeks. In gene- ral the smallness of the Grecian states, and their frequent mutual hostihties, made the citizens reside in fortified towns ; their lands were cultivated by slaves, and on every alarm, the moveable property was brought within the walls, whUe the fixtures were destroyed by the invader, unless the force of the city were sufficient to repulse him. The Eleians, on the con- trary, enjoyed a security which enabled them habitually to reside on their lands, and in building, plantmg, and every species of expensive improvement, to rest assured that they would not be robbed of the fhiit of their labours ; and hence they became remarkable for their opu- lence, for the perfection of their hus- bandry, the comfort and substantial character of their country-houses, and their strong attachment to a rural life, which all their institutions were directed to encourage. The advantages produced by the Olympian festival, to Elis and to Greece, excited attempts to imitate that institution, and three similar meetings were established, each to be held on one of the years intervening between two successive Olympiads. These were the Pythian, held at Delphi, the Isthmian, near Corinth, and the Nemean, in the territory of Argos; all which attained considerable celebrity, and contributed to maintain some sense of national union in Greece, interrupting annually its con- tinual warfare by mtervals of truce and friendly communication, between the most hostile states. The government established by the Heracleidae was tlie same which then was universal in Greece, an irregular mixture of monarchy and oligarchy*, with a slight infusion of democracy. In a people recently emerged from barba- rism, the power is always chiefly in the landholders. If the lordships be large, the proprietors are sovereign on their own estates ; and though, for the military • Oligarchy, the government of a few : democraei; that of the people IS vrIiKKC£» GREECE. IS I advantages of union, they may acknow- ledge a king, he is little more than the head of a confederacy. But when the lordships are too small for independent defence, the proprietors are obliged to stricter union ; they assemble therefore in towns, and the king is the chief magis- trate as well as the military leader ; the power being principaUy m the land- holders, but exercised by them as a body over the people, and not as lords over their respective vassals. This was the first pohtical order of Greece. The judi- cial power, with the general regulation of affairs, was in the council of the principal persons, under the titles of elders, chiefs, or princes : the king was military com- mander, president of the council, and priest The assembly of the people had little to do with the ordinary direction of the state, being paramount indeed when called together, but only called on unusual occasions, and principally to decide the contests of the king and chiefs. The king was weak, the people scattered; the great proprietors were strong and imited, and gradually monopolised the powers of the state, till the towns almost universally passed into oligarchical re- publics. There was little wealth but what arose from the land, and that was d^y more concentrated in the ruling families by constant intermarriages, and by their support of each other's oppres- sions and encroachments. Manual la- bour being performed by slaves, in states that were not commercial, there was no means to eke out a scanty inheritance but the borrowing of money at exorbitant interest, with little prospect of repayment ; the loan was readily offered by the wealthy, and in the end the land was sold to satisfy the creditor : andtlie small proprietors being thus destroyed, the city was divided into {Ktor and rich, of whom the former were regarded by the latter at once with jealousy and with con- tempt, as persons to be kept down by every means, and proper subjects for every outrage ; while they, on tlieir part, were looking for an opportunity to enrich and avenge themselves by the spoliation of their oppressors. Such an opportu- nity frequently was given, when the oligarchy was divided within itself, and the weaker party made common cause with the peope against its opponents; and hence a series of bloody commotions which runs through all the liisttry of Greece. In some states the growth of commerce fostered a middle class, divided from the landed oligarchy by the different nature and less cdncentration of tlieir wealth, who had property which in- terested them in regular government, and intelligence and union which made them a check on the oppressions of the pow- erful. Where this was the case, it com- monly produced a comparatively mild and regular oligarchy, and sometimes a permanent democracy ; without this class, a permanent democracy rarely arose, as the lower people had not steadi- ness to conduct it, and the only change in such a state was from a tyrannical oligarchy to the arbitrary ascendancy of demagogues no less tyrannical. In the age which followed the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, the causes de- scribed were in full operation. In most states the power of the king diminished gradually, and at length was abolished ; all authority being engrossed by the wealthy landholders, who abused their ascendancy so as to incur the bitterest hatred of the poor. Hence arose per- petual contests between poor and rich, and governments constituted by the pre- vailing faction for the most effectual de- pression of the other. Besides these sources of internal dissensions, 1 here were cotitiiiual wars between city and city. In every district the smaller towns had exercised each its municipal iroverninent under the general superintendence of the king. When royalty was abolished, they would not own any supremacy in the capital ; the king had their obedience, not as the head of a superior common- wealth, but as the common chief magis- trate of all the cities in the province ; and the claim of authority enforced by the capital was resisted with arms by the towns. Argos was the first to abolish royalty, or to reduce it to a cipher ; but it was not happy in the government es- tablished in its place. The hostility be- tween the rich and poor was there at its height, and seditions were uncommonly frecpent and violent, in w hich the mastery was gained at different times by each ; while its dominion, anciently the most extensive in Greece, was curtailed by the revolt of numerous towns, of which many succeeded in maintaining indepen dence, Corinth, though suffering seve- ral revolutions, was commonly the quiet- est of the Peloponnesian republics, and that which was ruled with most of equity and moderation. Its site on the isthmus made it the great thoroughfare between Peloponnesus and Northern Greece, and gave it the commerce both of the eastern and western seas ; and the flourishing of trade produced a middle class, which in some degree protected the poor against oppression, and the rich against the con- sequences which might have ensued from their own excesses if unrestrained. Besides the ordinary sources of dissen- sion, Lacedaemon had one peculiar to itself in its divided royalty. The two kings were ever at variance, and in a contest where no poUtical principle was at stake, the only motive to side with either was his personal influence and the hope of profiting by his favour. Hence partisans could only be secured by de- fending them through right and wrong : every powerful delinquent was sure to be backed by one or other of the kings ; and between connivance at excesses, and the courting popularity by receding from pre- rogative, the regulating power of the go- vern iient gave way to an anarchy, pro- ducing unmitigated oppression to the many, and to the few a tyranny un- checked by law, but rendered dan- gerous by the violence of rivals and the despair and hatred of the poor. Such was the state of Lacedaemon, when the death of Polvrdectes, the fifth from Procles, gavt the crown to Lycurgus his brother, who soon after, discovering the late king's wid w to be pregnant, imme- diately declared that he held it only as protector for the infant, if a boy, as it proved. Tlie prudent and upright mea- sures of Lycurgus to secure his nephew on the throne, greatly raised his cha- racter, which was already high ; and though his enemies were aftervv^ards strong enough to occasion his retirement from Sparta, he was looked on as the only person able to settle the distracted commonwealth, and at length was in- vited back by kings and people to legis- late for the state. (B.C. 708.) Havinjj pro- cured the sanction of the oracle at Delphi, he returned with his plan already formed, its leading principles being adopted from Crete, where much of his exile had been passed. Some time was spent in orga- nising a party ; and then he summoned an assembly of the people, where, partly through persuasion, and partly through fear, his scheme of government was car- ried. The entire direction was given to a senate of thirty persons chosen for life, twenty-eight of them from those leading men whom he most trusted, with the two kings as presidents. Future senators were to be elected by the people, from such as had passed their sixtieth year. AH laws originated in the senate, and the assembly of the people was confined to the simple approval or disapi^roval of the decrees sent down to it, being pre- cluded from all discussion, and even from stating the reasons of the vote. The kings had the priesthood, and the command of the army. Bitt in after-times the most important magistracy was that of the Ephori, who are said to have been either instituted or first made con- siderable by king Theopompus, above 100 years after Lycurgus. They were five in number, taken annually from the people, and their office was to watch over the delinquencies and ambitious projects of any, whether magistrates or private persons. They were empowered to fine, imprison, depose from office, or bring to an immediate trial any person from tlie king to the poorest citizen, and this acting by their own discretion, un- restrained by any precise law. In the course of time they gained a power al- most despotic, and the more intolerable because, as the method of election is stated to have been bad, though we are not informed of its nature, they were often persons of little character or ability. The most pressing evils were those arising from excessive inequality of for- tunes. Lycurgus struck at the root of the mischief, by first equalising pro- perty, and then removing alike the mo- tives and the means to accumulata He made a law for the equal division of the lands ; forbade the coining any metal more precious than iron ; allowed men to borrow any utensil they wanted even without consulting the owner ; and adopted the Cretan institution of public messes, at which every citizen was ob- liged to five. His object was that all the Spartans should enjoy equality and competence, and being free from the necessity of gainful labour, and the vices generated by the love of gain, should devote their time to improving their ca- pacities for the public service ; a noble scheme, if its practicability had not been built on gross injustice. Agriculture and handicrafts must fall to some, and if the Spartan people were relieved fi^m them, it was because the people formed a scanty portion of the inhabitants, and the rest were slaves condemned to hope- Jess labour, and not considered as a part of the community. The great de- fect of Grecian morality was the ac- knowledging no duties between man and man, except as linked by some specific bond of blood, law, or treaty. The pa- triotism of each was generally confined to his particular state ; but his most ex- li 14 GREECE. <5ttEECE. IS I I tensive philanthropy only reached to the Grecian race, and held as laudable erery injury to * barbarians, which gra- tified the pride, or glutted the avarice of Grreeks. It was in this spirit that many philosophers doubted the lawfulness of enslaving Greeks ; but all approved of en- slaving barbarians, and considered slaves as almost without rights : and it was in this spirit, too, that tne Lacedaemonians, holding their bondmen under heavier oppression than was practised in any other Grecian state, conceived their boast of universal equality to be warranted by the unjust and insolent denial, that they were a portion of the people, who com- posed the mass of the population, and nourished the whole. Tne effect of the system even on the citizens was far from being entirely favourable. The mind may sometimes be degraded by a life of money- making labour, but not so certainly as by Kvmg on the compelled and un- rewarded toil of others : and if the love of gain was excluded, the love of tyranny was called into unprecedented activity, every citizen l)eing empowered to com- mand and punish all the slaves, as well those of others as his own. The brutal treatment of the t Helots produced in them a rancorous hatred, which fre- quently endangered the existence of Sparta and in their masters a jealousy that led to further oppressions, practised expressly to break their spirits, and bring them nearer to beasts : and these cruel precautions frequently went even to the ■ecret murder of any who were marked by superior natural gifts of body or mind. Having banished the desire of gain, the object of the legislator was to fill the void with love of praise and emulation in patriotism and courage, and to bring the citizens into the best training for war. The education of the children and the habits of the men were equally re- gulated by public authority, and care was taken that all family ties should be w€»ker than that which bound the citizen to the commonwealth. The boys were reckoned as belonging less to their pa> rents than to the state, and were taken from the former to be educated in bands * Barbarians, tlie oame under which the Greeks ineloded all people not of Grecian blood. t Helot«, the roost nameroos and most iniportaut ela«s of slaves among the Lacedaemonians. Afri- enltnre was eatirelv committed to them, and those who were emplojed in it, paid to the owners of the laad a stated qaantity of produce, which, according *» Plata rck, it was forbidden to increase. In other tker vera at the iMrejr of tkair masters. under appointed governors: th^ weie bred to military exercises, and tne un- complaining endurance of hardships ; practised in combats with each other; and kept on scanty fare, but encouraged to mend it by whatever they could take undiscovered from the messes of the men. By this they were formed to en- terprise and circumspection, being liable, if detected, to heavy punishment for their awkwardness. In the absence of their governor they were subject to the authority of any citizen who chanced to be present, and were chastised by him for ill behaviour or disobedience. It was an usual amusement with the men to be present when the boys were at their meals, and to propose to them ques- tions to be answered as shortly and pithily as they could: and hence the Spartans were remarkable for readiness in reply, and a brief and pointed style in speaking, which from them has been called Laconic. The maturer youths were under a discipline but slightly dif- ferent; and both were obliged to pay to the men unlimited obedience and great respect, and to maintain an unexampled rigour in the decorum of outward be- haviour. Emulation was promoted by every method both in men and boys, and in some instances at the cost of cnerish- ing an envious watchfulness over each other's failings. This system produced in the Spartans a most exact obedience to the laws, and made the love of their country in a wonderful degree a ruling principle ever present to their minds : but tiie constant publicity of their lives gave little scope to those domestic af- fections which might have tempered their hardness of heart, and taught them to feel as men for men, and not exclu- sively as citizens of Lacedaemon, utterly careless of the general interests of man- kind. On gaining manhood they were required to marry ; but it was disre putable for a young man to be seen in company with any woman, even with his wife : and as the end of marriage with Lycurgus was not domestic happiness, nor mutual affection, but to raise up soldiers for the state, he destroyed the sanctity of the marriage bed, encourag- ing the old to procure themselves children by inviting some younger friend to in- tercourse with their wives. The educa- tion of women was governed by the same principles as that of men. Their constitutions were strengthened by gym- nastic exercises, that they might bear more vigorous children; they were t) taught to rival the men in patriotic ar- doiu" and the love of martial glory, that the hope of their applause, and the dread of their scorn, might more powerfully stimulate to daring ; but Lycurgus cared little for domestic virtues, and rather discountenanced as inconvenient that purity of thought and tenderness of feel- ing, which are elsewhere the peculiar grace of the sex. Courage, hardihood, and obedience, strong love of praise, and fear of shame, directed entirely to war, made the Lace- dsemonians a most formidable people. A Spartan was disgraced for ever, who gave way to fear in the most hopeless situation ; and after a defeat, amidst the general mourning, the kindred of those who had fallen were required to wear a face of joy, because their rela- tions had not shared the reproach of flight. Surrounded and overmatched, they would perish rather than yield, and the surrender of a Lacedaemonian de- tachment to whatever odds, was a won- der to Greece. To this invincible spirit, they added a decided pre-eminence in discipline and skill. The fate of Grecian battles usually depended on the heavy- armed foot, who had each a helmet and breastplate, a large shield and long spear, and a small sword rarely used. They were formed with levelled spears in a close body, among the Lacedaemo- dians most commonly eight deep. The phalanx, so this order was called, while it kept its array, was irresistible, except by a similar body : but it was slow in movement and liable to be harassed se- curely with missiles, and disordered by unequal ground; and, once broken, it was defeated, the long spear and heavy shield being, in a mingleid scuffle, more incumbrances than aids. To preserve the order in all circumstances, great readiness and regularity in evolution were required ; and for this the Lacedae- monians were distinguished, as well as for a remarkably well organized system of subordinate command. All the sol- diers were waited on by Helots, who acted as light- armed troops, a service so despised, that the light troops are gene- rally omitted by Greek writers, m stating the numl)er8 of an army. They had a few cavalry, whose principal use was to disperse the light troops of the enemy, but who never ventured to attack his phalanx; and this was a service little cultivated by the Lacedaemonians. To increase their alacrity, the camp was made to them a place of comparative ease, the severe discipline enforced in the city bein^ there considerably relaxed : and that their reliance might be entirely on their superiority in the fteld, Lycur- gus forbade the city to be fortified, stig- matizing walls as the defence of cowarcis. The Lacedaemonian character proves at once the ability of Lycurgus in suiting his laws to the ends he proposed, and the presumption of overstepping the true province of a legislator, wnich is not to fashion the popular mind by a factitious standard, but to check its wanderings from nature and reason. The law was made the only rule of right, and to ques- tion its wisdom, the greatest of offences ; and hence its faults were perpetuated in the character of the citizens, while, where it was silent, there was no general prin- ciple of morality to guide them. The excellence aimed at was very Umited, and almost entirely warlike ; and every institution tending to increase the mili- tary efficiency of the population was reaidily adopted, whatever vices of a different nature it might involve. The system succeeded ; the behaviour of the citizens towards each other and towards the state was completely regulated ; and the Lacedaemonians, as a people, were remarkable for the strict observance of their very limited moral code. But in their relations to all without their com- monwealth, "they were neither governed by their own laws nor by the principles held sacred through the rest of Greece." In foreign command, with a few brilliant exceptions, they were harsh, unjust, and tyrannical ; towards the wretched Helots uniformly cruel, and sometimes most basely treacherous ; while their external policy, always grasping, selfish, and un- generous, often profligate in the extreme^ is best described in the words of Thucy- dides, " That most remarkably of all we know, they hold things pleasant to be honourable, and things profitable to be just" Yet however vicious and un- natural as a whole, the Spartan character stands alone in the exaltation, perma- nence, and universality of fortitude and patriotism ; and the degree in which these quahties were displayed by nearly every individual in that republic, may make us hope for the noblest effects of education on mankind, whenever a sagacity like that of Lycurgus in the choice of means, shall be directed to the teaching a purer and more comprehensive morality. The increased strength and excited am- bition of Lacedaemon were soon felt by all the bordering states,but by none so fatally ti GRKRCAa GKKKCK* II W ir (I as by Messemt. Inflamed by wrongs both done and siiffered, in the second generation after Lycursriis, (B.C. 652) the Lacedaemonians resolved to make a sud- den attack on that province without any dedaration of war, and bound them- selves by oath never to abandon the en- terprise, and even never to return to th<5r families till Messeniawas subdued. They surprised Ampheia, a frontier town, the srates being open and unguarded as in time of peace; and that treachery mi^t not be unaccompanied with cruelty, all found there were put to the sword. Euphaes, the Messenian king, had wis- dom and courage; and, aware of the La- cedaemonian superiority in the field, he protracted the war, avoiding battles and defending the towns. In the fourth year, however, a battle was fought with great slaughter and doubtful success. But the Messenians were suffering from garri- son confinement and the constant plun- dering of their lands. New measures were taken. The people were collected from the inland posts at Ithome, a place of great natural strength, and open to fupplies by sea, the Laoedaemonians havmg no fleet. Meanwhile they asked advice of the Delphic oracle, which bade them sacrifice to the infernal deities, a virgin of the blood of ^Bpytus, son of the Heracleid Cresphontes. Impelled by patriotism or ambition, Aristoderaus olfSered his own daughter ; and when it was intended to save her by falsely de- nying her virginity, in his rage he slew her with his own hand. The fame of the obedience paid to the oracle so far dis- heartened the enemy, that the war lan- guished for five years : in the sixth an invasion took place, and a battle, bloody and indecisive like the former. Euphaes was killed, and left no issue, and Aristo- demus was elected to succeed him. The new pnnce was brave and able, and the LacedaBinonJans. weakened by the battle, confined themselves for four years to predatory inclusions. At last they again mvaded Messenia, and were defeated: but in the midst of his success, Aristo- demus was so possessed with remorse for his daughter's death, that he slew himself on her tomb, and deprived his country of the only leader able to defend her. Ithome was besieged. The fa- mished inhabitants found means to pass the Lacedaemonian lines, and fled for shelter and subsistence, some to neigh- bouring states where they had claims of hospitality, others to their ruined homes, and iibout their desolated country. Ithome was dismantled ; and those who remained of the Messenians were allowed to occupy most of the lands, paying half theproduce to Sparta. Tne absence from home to which the Lacedaemonians had bound themselves, became, by the protraction of the war, an evil tnrealening the existence of the state, no children being bom to supply the waste of war and natural decay. The remedy said to have l)een adopted was a strange one, highly cha- racteristic of Lacedaemon, and such as no other people would have used. The young men who had come to maturity since the l)eginning of the war, were free from the oath, and they were sent home to cohabit promiscuously with the mar- riageable virgins. But even at Sparta this expedient, in some degree, ran coun- ter to the popular feelings. When the war was ended, and the children of this irregular intercourse grown to manhood, though bred in all the discipline of Ly- curgus, they found themselves generally slighted. Their spirit was high, their discontent dangerous ; and it was thought prudent to offer them the means of set- tling out of Peloponnesus. They willingly emigrated, and under Phalanthus, one of then* own number, they founded the city of Tarentum in Italy. During forty years Messenia bore the yoke. But the oppression of the inha- bitants was grievous, and embittered with every circumstance of insult, and the Grecian sphit of independence was yet strong in them; they only wanted a leader, and a leader was found in Aristo- menes, a youth of the royal line. Sup- port being promised from Argos and Arcadia, allies of his country in the former war, Aristomenes attacked a iKxiy of Lacedaemonians, and, though not completely successful, did such feats of valour that the Messenians would have chosen him king; but he declined it, and was made general-in-chief. His next adventure was an attempt to practise on the superstitious fears of the enemy, Sparta having neither walls nor watcn, he easily entered it alone by night, and hung against the Brazen House, (a sin- gularly venerated temple of Minerva,) a shield with an inscription declaring that Aristomenes from the spoils of the Spar- tans dedicated that shield to the goddess. Alarmed lest their protecting goddess should be won from them, the Lacedaemo- nians sent to consult the Delphian ora- cle, and were directed to take an Athe- nian adviser. The Athenians, though fai from wishing tiie subjugation of Mes- senia, yet feared to offend the god if they refused compliance ; but in granting what was asked, they hoped to make it useless, and sentTyrtaeus, a schoolmaster, poor and lame, and supposed to be of no ability. The choice proved l)etter than they intended, since the poetry of Tyrtaeus Deing very popular, kept up the spirit of the people in all reverses. The Messenian army had now been reinforced from Argos, Elis, Arcadia, and Sicyon, and Messenian refugees came in daily : the Lacedaemonians had been joined by the Corinthians alone. They met at Caprusema, where by the desperate courage of the Messenians, and the conduct and extraordinary per- sonal exertions of their leader, the Lace- daemonians were routed with such slaugh- ter, that they were on the point of suing for peace. Tyrtaeus diverted them from this submission, and persuaded them to recruit their numbers by associating some Helots, a measure very galling to Spartan pride. Meanwhile, Aristomenes was ever harassing them with incursions. In one of these he carried off from Caryae a number of Spartan virgins as- sembled to celebrate the festival of Diana. He had formed a body-guard of young and noble Messenians who always fought by his side, and to their charge he gave the captives. Heated with wine, the young men attempted to violate their chastity, and Aristomenes, after vainly remonstrating, killed the most refractory with his own hand, and on receiving their ransom, restored the girls unin- jured to their parents. Another time, in an assault on i^gila, he is said to have l>een made prisoner by some Spartan women there assembled, who repelled the assault with a vigour equal to that of the men ; but one of them who had previously loved him favoured his escape. In the third year of the war, another battle took place at Megaletaphrus, the Messenians being join^ by the Arca- dians alone. Through the treachery of Aristocrates, prince of Orchomenus, the Arcadian leader, the Messenians were surrounded and cut to pieces, and Aristo- menes, escaping with a scanty remnant, was obliged to give up the defence of the country, and collect his forces to Eira, a strong hold near the sea. Here he sup- plied the garrison by plundering excur- sions, so ably conducted as to foil every precaution of the besiegers, insomuch that they forbade all culture of the con- quered territory, and even of part of Laconia. At last, falling in with a large body of Lacedaemonians under both their kings, after an obstinate defence he was knocked down and taken, with about fifty of his band. The prisoners were thrown as rebels into a deep cavern, ant all were kiUed by the fall except Aris. tomenes, who was wonderfully preserved and enabled to escape, and returning to Eira, soon gave proof to the enemy of his presence by fresh exploits equally daring and judicious. The siege was protracted till the eleventh year, when the Lacedaemonian commander, one stormy night, learning that a post in the fort had been quitted by its guard, si- lently occupied it with his troops. Aris- tomenes flew to the spot and commenced a vigorous defence, the women assisting by throwing tiles from the house tops, and many, when driven thence by the storm, even taking arms and mixing in the fight. But the superior numbers of the Lacedaemonians enabled them con- stantly to bring up fresh troops, while the Messenians were fighting without rest or pause, with the tempest driving in their faces. Cold, wet, sleepless, jaded, and hungry, they kept up the struggle for three nights and two days ; at length, when all was vain, they formed their column, placing in the middle their women and children and most portable effects, and resolved to make their way out of the place. Aristomenes demanded a passage, which was granted by the enemy, unwilling to risk the effects of their despair. Their march was towards Arcadia, where they were most kindly received, and allotments were offered them of land. Even yet Aristomenes hoped to stnke a blow for the deliverance of his country. He selected 500 Messe^ nians, who were joined by 300 Arcadian volunteers, and resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta, while the army was in the farthest part of Messenia, where Pylos and Methone still held out But the enterprise was frustrated by Aristo- crates, who sent word of it to Sparta. The messenger was seized on his return, and the letters found on him discovering both the present and former treachery of his master, the indignant people stoned the traitor to death, and erected a pillar to commemorate his infamy. The Messenians, who fell under the power of Lacedaemon, were made Helots. The Pylians and Methonaeans, and others on the coast, now giving up all hope of further resistance, proposed to their coun- trymen in Arcadia to join them in seek- G I GREECE. 1 1' I I In^ some fit place for a colony, and re- quested Aristomenes to be their leader. He sent his son. For himself, he said, he would never cease to war with Lace- dmnon, and he well knew that, while he lived, some ill would ever be happening to it. After the former war, the town of Rh^um in Italy had been partly peopled by expelled Messenians. The exiles were now invited by the Rhegians to as- sist them against Zancle, a hostile Gre- cian town on the opposite coast of Sicily, and in case of victory the town was offered them as a settlement. Zanele was besieged, and the Messenians having mastered the walls, the inhabitants were at their mercy. In the common course of Grecian wuf are, they would all have been either slaughtered or sold for slaves, and such was the wish of the Rhegian prince. But Aristomenes had taught Kb followers a nobler lesson. They re- fused to inflict on other Greeks what they had suffered from the Lacedaemo- nians, and made a convention with the Zanclmans, by which each nation was to live on equal terms in the city. The name of the town was changed to Mes- sene, which with little variation it still retains, and it has ever since been among the greatest cities in Sicily. Aristomenes vainly sought the meant of further hostilities against Sparta, but his remaining days were passwi in tran- quillity with Damagetus prince of Ial3r- sus in Rhodes, who had married his daughter. His actions dwelt in the me- mones of his countrymen, and cheered Jiem in their wanderings and sufferings : and from their legendary songs, together with those of the Lacedaemonians, and with the poems of Tyrtaeus, the story of the two Messenian wars has been chiefly gathered by the learned and careful anti- quary Pausanias, from whose work it is here taken. The character of Aristome- nes, as thus represented, combines all the elements of goodness and greatness, in a degree almost unparalleled among Grecian heroes. Inexhaustible in re- sources, unconquerable in spirit, and resolutely persevering through every extremity of hopeless disaster, an ardent patriot and a formidable warrior, he yet wis formed to find his happiness in peace : and after passing his youth un- der oppression, and his manhood in war against a cruel enemy, wherein he is said to have slain more than 300 men with his own hand, he yet retained a singular gentleness of nature, insomuch that \m is related to have wept at the fate of the fraitor Aristocrates. The origi- nal injustice and subsequent tyranny of the Lacedaemonians, with the crowning outrage in the condemnation as rebels of himself and his companions, might have driven a meaner spirit to acts ot like barbarity : but deep as was his hatred to Sparta, he conducted the struggle with uniform obedience to the laws of war, and sometimes, as in the case of the virgins taken act Caryae, with more than usual generosity and strictness of morals. Chapter III. Of Athens, from the Trojan Wary to the political alterations of C/eisthenei, and the first interference of Persia in the affairs of Greece ; and of the general trantaciions of Greece, during the latter part of the same period. Athens had been early civilised and flourishing beyond the rest of Greece, and particularly since Theseus had given to its institutions a regularity which seems to have kept it tranquil, even amidst the general convulsions which followed the return of the Greeks from TVoy. When Tisamenus was driven into Achaia, that province was unable to support its increased population, and many of the old inhabitants being com- ^ pelled to emigrate, went to Athens as ft safe and eligible refuge ; and the more willingly, as they, hke the Athenians, were of the Ionian race. The reception of these and other refugees provoking the jealousy of the conquerors, Attica was invaded by a powerful army from Pelo- ponnesus. The Delphian oracle had promised victoiy to the Dorians if thev did not kill the Athenian king ; on whicn Codrus, the king, resolved to devote himself for his people, and entering the Peloponnesian camp disguised as a pea- sant, provoked a quarrel in which he was killed. Alarmed at learning who had been slain, the invaders hastily retreated : but Megara, a town which had been founded by the Dorians on the Athenian territory near the isthmus, re- mained independent Medon the eldest son of Codrus was lame, and his younger brother took advantage of this to dispute the succession ; while a third party, adverse to both, declared that they would have no king but Jupiter. An answer was procured from Delphi in favour of Medon, and the dispute was compromised, it being determined that after Codrus none could be worthy of the title of king; that Medon should GREECE. be first magisfrate, with the title of Archon; that this honour should be hereditary, but that the Archon should be accountable to the assembly of the people. These things happened B. C. 804. Attica being overpeopled through the multitude of refugees, a colony was sent to Asia Minor under Androclus and Neleus sons of Codrus. The most restless spirits emigrated, and long: quiet ensued. The coast of Asia from Cyzicus on the Propontis to the river Hermus, with the island of Lesbos, had already been colonised by Greeks. This tract was called A'olis, the settlers being mostly yEolians from Peloponnesus, driven thence at the Dorian conquest, and partly also in some preceding commo- tions. The emigrants from Athens occu- pied the coast extending southward from the Hermus, with the islands Chios and Samos. They founded twelve cities, of which the greatest were Ephesus, where Androclus resided, and Miletus, the most southern point of Ionia, the resi- dence of Neleus. The authority of Androclus at first extended over all the cities, but the kingly power being soon abolished, each became a separate re- public, though all were connected by a confederacy, with a general congress called Panionion, or &e meeting of all the lonians. Yet further south, some Dorian colonies were established in Caria. The island of Rhodes had long been Grecian, and settlements were soon after made on the northern shore of the iEgean sea, along the coasts of Ma- cedonia and Thrace. Nor did the Greeks confine themselves to the ^gean. At dift'erent times, they settled most of the large and fertile island of Cyprus, at the eastern comer of the Mediterranean ; founded Cyrene and other flourishing towns in Africa ; occupied many places on the Euxine, more than half the coast of Italy, and of that of Sicily nearly the whole. The Greeks rarely coveted in- land territories, and these were left to the natives, while the settlers established themselves along the sea, which enabled them to communicate with each other, and with the Grecian nation, of which they still esteemed themselves a part. Twelve hereditary archons followed Medon. The last was Alcmason, at whose death, about 160 years after that of Co- drus, Charops was made archon for ten years, and six more succeeded under the same limitation. Afterwards the dura- uon of the office was reduced to a year 19 and its duties divided among nine per- sons, taken, at first by suffrage, and afterwards by lot, from the eupafridae, oi nobles. One was chief among them, and by his name the year of his magistracy was distinguished, whence he was called archon Eponymus, or naming archon ; but oftener simply the archon. The second had the title of King, and like the kings of old, the function of high priest. The third was called Polemarch, and was originally, as his name imports, the military commander. The other she were called Thesmothetae, or setters forth of the laws : they presided as judges in the courts, and the six formed afribunal which had a peculiar jurisdiction. The nine together formed the council of state. Legislation was in the people, but almost the whole administration rested on the archons. All power being confined to the eu- patridsB, it was to be expected that Athens should be torn by the clashing ambition of factious nobles. The strongest family was that of the Alcmaeonidas, descended from the last perpetual archon, and through him from Codrus. Cylon, a man of great nobility and power, could ill brook the predominance of that house. Elated by his marriage with the daughter ofTheagenes, the chief of Megara, and by victories in the chariot race at Olym- pia, (an honour highly valued, and con- ceived to carry with it something of fa- vour from the god of the festival,) and further encouraged by a favourable answer from Delphi, he attempted to make hunseK tyrant of Athens ; the name by which the Greeks denoted a man, who had brought under his dominion a state, of which the legal government was re- publican. With the aid of some troops supplied by Theagenes, Cylon and lus friends seized the citadel of Athens. They were besieged by the people imder Me- gacles, the head of the AJcmaeonidae, ,. who was chief archon ; and after a time, ' being pressed by famine, Cylon escaped, and his deserted followers quitted their arms, and fled for safety to Uie altars, it being deemed impious to kill them there, or force them thence. Induced by the promise of life to leave the altars, thw were notwithstanding put to death : but so deep was the impression made on the ' Athenians by the perfidy, and still more by the impiety of the action, that all con- cerned in it were banished. They re- turned indeed, but though many of their descendants were men of high consider- ation, an ever ready and effectual method C2 GREECE it for their adversaries to cmbarrj»ss them, was by reqmring their expulsion as in- heriting the curse of saeril«»ge. These uid similar disorders requirod a remedy, and Dracon was caUed t< legislate for Athens. The political constitution he did not alter, but he estj»l)lished a penal code absurdly severe ; eveiy crime, great or small, being made capital, on the E-ound, that every breach of a positive w was treason to the state. The neces- aary consequence was. that few would either prosecute or con\ ict, and all crimes went unpunished, except the greatest Meanwhile Salamis. an island in the Saronic Gulf, till then subject to Athens, wvolted, and allied itself with Megara. After many attempts to recover it had fidled with loss, the people in then- dis- gust, for the first time, united in oppo- sition to the oligan^hy. Assembhng, they voted death to any who should pro- pose again to lead them against Salamis. But Salamis, connected with Megara, was a troublesome neighbour, and the people were soon dissatisfied with their act, though none dared to propose its re- ¥e«aL Solon, a young man of noble iMTth, had hitherto been remarkable only ms a lover of learning and a poet. Having spread a report that he imd occasional its of phrensy, he ran out into the as- sembly, and mounting the herald's stone, he recited a poem fitted to rouse the people to renew the war. Some of his friends were prepared to applaud ; the decree was enthusiastically reversed, and Solon, being appointed to lead another expedition against Salamis, reduced the island. The government again became settled in the hands of the party ol Me- Sicles. But Athens was subject t< all e evils of oppression by the rich, and misery in the poor, which natura.ly spring from oligarchical government an.l slave-labour : and its convulsions were exasperated by the Megarians taking Nisaea, (an Attic town on the coast, which was afterwards the port of Megara,) and drawing Salamis again to revolt ; and also by the enmities and religious fears lemaining from the affair of Cylon. Epimenides, a Cretan philosopher, with whom Solon is said to have concerted the fcom of government he afterwards introduced, was invited to point out the means of restoring harmony and avert- ing the anger of the gods ; and having ^^ed the popular mind by religious ceremonies, he departed with great credit, leaving behind him a temporary quiet, and refusing all rewards^ except a 9 branch of the sacred olive which grew in the Acropolis. But the people were still split into clashing parties. The demo- cratical interest was strong in the moun- tains, the oligarchical in the valleys.which were mostly the property of the eupatridae ; the people of the coast favoured the mixed government. AU eyes were turned to Solon, as the only man capable of set- tling the distracted commonwealth, and in the year B. C. 562 he was appointed archon with peculiar powers of reform ing the state. He was popular among the poor, for his benevolence and equiersuaded to vote a ^ard to Peisis- tratus, and soon after, with his guard, he seized the Acropolis. His party sup- ported him, and of his opponents, those who would not submit to him were forced into exile ; and from this time he was generally considered as tyrant of Athens. The word tyrant, among the Greeks, admitted various shades of meaning. In its sfrictest and most odious sense, it de- noted an usurper of arbitrary dominion in a commonwealth ; and to make the character complete, it was requisite that he should be supported against the ha- tred of the citizens by a mercenary guard. But there were more question- able applications of the word. The per- sonal authority of a party-leader would often reach beyond the law, and enable him, with little violation of its provisions, to influence its adminisfration according to his will ; and particularly in govern- ments where the rule of law was seldom precise, and much was left to the discre- tion of judges and adminisfrators. Such a man would generally be charged by his adversaries with tyranny, especially if the contest had been decidwi by arms. By the common artifice of Grecian fac- tions, appropriating to their own party the nanae of the people, they would complain that the people was kept down by force ; and every unlawful proceeding of their enemies in the contest would be seized on as a proof of violence and usurpation, while similar acts on their own side would be excused by the opmion prevalent in Greece that every thina: was allowable against a tyrant. Peisisfratus was a chief of the latter kind. He had established, by illegal violence, the predominance of his party, and while that was predominant, his personal ascendancy was complete ; and accordingly his enemies called him ty- rant. His friends denied the charge, for the constitution was unaltered, and so far was he from overruling the ordinary magistracies, that he himself obeyed a cuation from the Areiopagus on a charge of murder. But we must remember that It was an easy virtue to let the law take its €3 course, when he knew that it was wholly admmistered by his own friends ; and he would probably have been less forbearing If he could have feared an important decision against him. As it was, heat once enjoyed the reality of power, and avoided, in great measure, the odium of usurpation. Grecian party warfare was generally unscrupulous ; and the violence by which his ascendancy had been gained was too common a thing much to mjure his character, at least among his fnfends. His sway was not, however, uninterrupted. He was twice expelled, and twice returned : at last he died at an advanced a^e, in the administration of Athens, having exercised it with great ability, and, in aU his struggles, with unusual liberality and moderation to- wards his opposers. He encouraged learning and the arts ; he is said to have founded the first public library known to the worid, and first collected and di- gested the poems of Homer, which had been brought by Lycurgus into Greece, from the Grecian colonies in Asia where they had long been popular. Hippias and Hipparchus, sons of Peisistratus, inherited the influence of then- father. Their government, like his, was mild and steady, and successful in peace and war. Many good laws were passed, the taxes were lightened, and the forms of the constitution were adhered to : and it was under Peisisfratus and his sons that Athens first became remarkable for the splendour of its public buildings. Hippias chiefly con- ducted the civil administration, while Hipparchus was employed in measures for enhghtening the minds and cultivating the tastes of the citizens. For this end he invited to Athens the poets Anacreon and Simonides : and that he might ex!- tend a degree of instruction to those who, in an age when books were few and expensive, had neither means nor leisure for study, he erected in the streets and highways marble columns crowned with heads of Mercury, with short moral sentences engraved on the sides. But a power above the laws is a dangerous gift, and seldom fails to nourish, even in the happiest natures, a degree of insolent disregard to the feelings of others. Half the oligarchies and tyrannies of Greece were overthrown through outrages done to individuals by the rulers in the wan- tonness of power. Enraged at a denial which a degrading passion had impelled him to incur, Hipparchus allowed himself 1 GKEECE. I lit t4 miblicly to insult the sistar of the refuser. Hinnodius, the injured man, engaged in nis quairel his friend Aristogeiton, and fteyploltedthe death of both the brothers, and the overthrow of the frovernment. Hropaichus was slain at the Panathenaea, but Hippias survived, and both Harmo- dius and Aristogeiton perished m the tumult. From fliis time forward the government of Hippias became jealous and severe. He renounced all trust m popularity, and endeavoured to secure fcmself by the death of any whom he suspected ; while he provided a refuge, m case he should be expeUed, by marrying his daughter to the son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, on the Hellespont. His ;tyranny lasted but four years after the death of his brother. The AlcmaBonidae, ejected by Peisis- tratus on his second restoration, were numerous and wealthy, and unceasingly watchful for an opportunity to return. The temple of Delphi having been biurnt, Ihey had contrauted to rebuild it, which they had done with a splendour far beyond their agreement. Hereby they both increased their reputation, and se- cured an interest with the managers of the oracle, which they were suspected to have made yet firmer by bnbery. How- ever that might be, the responses given, on whatever subject, to the Lacedaemo- nims, always terminated with the com- mand to Uberate Athens ; till at length, Ihoueh bound by friendship and alhance to the Peisistratidae, they were induced to succour their opponents. A smaU force being first sent into Attica was de- fied, and the leader slain. But the AlcmfiPonid party was gaining strength; the severities ot Hippias drove numbers to join it : and Cleomenes, the Spartan kine. advancing with alarger army, was joined by the exiles. Hippias lost a battle, and was besieged at Athens. Here he might have held out beyond the patience of the Lacedaemonians, but for the fear of internal revolt, which induced both him and his principal partisans to concert measures for removing their rhildren to a place of safety. These were intercepted by the besiegers, and the lyhers consented to surrender Atijens iwid quit iU territory in five days. They fetired to Sigeium on the Hellespont. (B.C. 410.) hafing held the ascendant in Athens for fifty years smce Peiais- tratus occupied the citadel ^ , , The death of Hipparchus had been thieay caused by revenge for a private wrong : but nevertheless, on the oyer- throw of the tyranny, the slayers were honoured as the most deserving of pa- triots. Their statues were conspicuously erected in the Acropolis ; their descend- ants had various immunities and pnvi- leges, including exemption from most pubUc burdens ; a song in theu- praise was regularly sung at all feasts and en- tertainments ; and in all the works of the Athenian orators, if an example of the highest patriotism, and the greatest merit towards the commonwealth be wanted, the names first mentioned, are generally those of Harmodius and Aris- togeiton. . ^ , . ... The lead was now disputed m Athens between Isagoras and Cleisthenes, son of Megacles, the head of the AlcmaeonidaB. Finding the interest of his opponent su- perior among the rich and noble, Cleis- thenes betook himself to cultivate the favour of the lower people, and by this having gained the ascendant, he made some changes in the constitution tending to render it more democratical. He opened public offices to all the citizens, and it was he who increased to ten tne number of the wards, and enacted that fifty persons should be taken from each to serve in the council, which was hence- forth frequently distuiguished m the council of five hundred, or simply the five hundred. .. For the recovery of his lost supenonly , Isagoras placed his hope in Laced«mon» then by far the greatest power in Greece. Since the conquest of Messenia, it had been first in the extent and richness of its territory, as well as in the militanr excellence of its population. Connth, and many cities of Arcadia, were strictly bound to it in the sort of alliance common in Greece, where the weaker confederate was wont to furnish troops to be used at the discretion of the stronger : and it had effectively the com* mand of all Peloponnesus, except the powerful and generally hostile state of Argos. But the Lacedaemonians had views beyond the peninsula, and were ever eager to interfere as mediators m the wars and seditioas of all Greciw states. Thev had hitherto acted in such matters with a considerable show of wisdom and moderation, and sometimes very beneficially, as in overthrowing the tyranny of Hippias. But the end pur- sued was always to acquire a command- ing influence for Lacedaemon, under the specioas pretext of protecting Uie liber. CrtvEElCE. I tics of Greece. Above all, their fa- vourite policy was, in every city where they had the opportunity, to establbh the ascendancy of the oligarchical fac- tion, which then depending upon them for support, would keep the city in no- minal alliance, and real subserviency. With such views, they readily* listened to the solicitations of Isagoras, and the more so as Cleomenes was biassed in his favour by personal regards. The sacrilegious murder of the par- tisans of Cylon had been the act of the Alcmeeonidae, of which house were the now leading men of Athens. At the suggestion of Isagoras, Cleomenes re- quired the expulsion of all descended from the murderers ; the demand was backed by the power of Sparta, and had much support in the religious feel- ings common to Greece ; and Cleis- thenes with his principal partizans with- drew. But not content with this, and confident that no one would venture to dispute the will of the Spartan king, Cleomenes went with a small band of soldiers to Athens, commanded the banishment of 700 Athenian families, as concerned in the sacrilege, and then proceeded to abolish the council, and consign all the authority of the state to 300 of the friends of Isagoras. But Athens was not fallen so low as to en- dure this insolence of usurpation. The council refused to resign its authority, and the people flew to arms in its sup- port. Uleomenes and Isagoras were besieged in the Acropolis, and on the third day it was surrendered on the terms that Cleomenes and the Lace- daemonians should be allowed to depart, ^sagoras contrived to steal away among them, but his followers were cast into ^prison, and all condemned to death; the generally cruel spirit of Grecian party warfare being in this case embittered by great and just provocation. Cleisthenes and the exiles, immediately returning, resumed the direction of the common- wealth. A war with Lacedaemon seemed unavoidable, and they anxiously looked Cor any aid which might enable them to Support it The Persian empire had now extended over nearly the whole of Asia Minor; and the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sardis, the capital of one of its provinces, to propose an al- liance. The satrap, or governor, asking the ambassadors who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, when he had heard the answer, scornfully re- jected the proposed alliance with so insignificant a state, unless theywoukl give earth and water to king Darius in token of subjection. The ambassadors complied ; but on returning to Athens, their conduct was blamed, and their act disavowed. Meanwhile Cleomenes entered Attica with a powerful army from Pelopon- nesus, fully bent on punishing the Athe- nians, and setting up Isagoras as tyrant ; while the Boeotians and the people of Chalcis in Euboea made a concerted invasion on the other side. Neglecting these, the whole force of Athens went against the more dangerous enemy : but when a battle was expected, the Corin- thians withdrew their troops, refusing to co-operate in a war so unjust; and like sentiments being expressed by De- maratus, the brother king of Cleo- menes, dissension ran high between the colleagues, and the army was hastily broken up. The Athenians, being novr at liberty to chastise their other in- vaders, defeated the Boeotians, and the same dav, passing into Euboea, reduced the Chalcidians to submission, and ex- acted from them a tract sufficient to support a colony of 4000 Athenian families. Unable by their own strength to maintain the war, the Boeotians asked assistance from ^gina, an island in the Saronic gulf, which had early attained a wealth and consideration disproportionate to its extent, by the commercial activity and maritime skill of its inhabitants. This people had an ancient quarrel with Athens, and now, without warning, ravaged the coast. The Athenians were preparing for re- venge, when their attention was diverted by news from Lacedaemon. The fraud had been discovered, by which the Alcmaeonidae had procured the help of the Lacedaemonians against Hippias; and finding that the gratitude expected from the Athenians had been turned into enmity by the arbitrary violence of Cleomenes, and that Athens was rapidly growing in power and spirit, thev began to wish the tyranny restored But they had seen that, without obtain- ing the consent of the allies, they could not be sure of their support ; a meeting therefore was called, and Hippias in- vited to be present ; and here they kkl open the arts, which had been used to persuade them to make war upon an old ally, complained of the ingratitude of Athens, and invited the assembly to concur in the restoration of the banisned chief. But the Corinthians, dwelling on 3e« GREECE. GREECE. the iniquity of the proposal and its in- consistency with the character assumed by the Laoedcmonians as liberators of Greece, prevailed on the assembly to reject it Hippias returning to Sigeium went thence to Sardis, and persuaded the satrap Artaphemes to make war upon his country, that himself being re- itored to the sovereignty might hold it as a vassal of the Persian king. The Athenians on hearing this, sent ambas- sadors to Artaphemes, to dissuade him from following the suggestions of tlicir exiles ; but received for answer an im- perious order to submit at their peril to Hippias; and refusing to obey, they thenceforth considered themselves as at war with Persia, By the events which followed the ex- pulsion of Hippias, the government of Athens had become at length substan- tially popular. All its former revolu- tions were but changes in the ruling portion of the nobihty : sometimes, in- deed, the weaker party called the people to its aid ; but the people, though it might determine the struggle, gained little by it beyond the hojje of better masters. No lasting security for good government was obtained, and any im- mediate improvement of administration depended on the personal character of the new rulers, and the degree in which they yet needed popular support against their beaten opponents. Such might again have been the result, if Cleisthenes had enjoyed his first victory undisputed ; but by the strength of his enemies, and the determination of Cleomenes to set up an oligarchy with Isagoras for its chief, his cause was permanently iden- tified both with that of democracy, and of Athenian independence. Tlie middle and lower people, hitherto powerless through inexperience, inertness, and dis- union, had numbers that might have made them superior both in votes of the assembly, and in trials of force : they wanted leaders whose personal influence eould keep them united, whose political experience might dh-ect their conduct, and who might be obliged, instead of using the people as instruments to serve a temporary purpose in raising a faction, to rest their hopes on their continued activity. Such leaders were the Alc- maeomdae ; and while they were bound to the commonalty by the strongest ties of common interest and danger, the other party of the nobles was broken and disgraced by its unsuccessfid trea- son. ContinuaDy appealed to by their present leaders, the people became versed in public affairs, and were hence- forth practically, as well as legally, su- preme. The result was increasing vigour and spirit in the government, and a great improvement in internal quiet and security. Though jealous and violent in troublous times, and some- times hurried into acts the most foolish and iniquitous ; though always defective as a means of discovering truth; the popular courts were honest in intention, and did justice between the rich and the poor, with an impartiality elsewhere little known in Greece : and of the value of this distinction, some notion may be formed from the atrocious cases, occur- ring in all the oligarchical republics, of oppression exercised with certain im- punity by powerful individuals upon the weak. 'Ihe faults of the Athenian go- vernment were many and great : but of its superiority to most in Greece, and of the wiUing acquiescence in it of all classes, there needs no stronger proof than this, that from the tune of Cleis- thenes, till its constitution was nearly fallen mto decay, no instance occurs of a contention by arms within its walls, excepting only those occasioned in the close of the reloponnesian war, by the external dangers of the commonwealth, and after that war by its temporary subjection to Lacedsemon. Chapter IV. 0/ Greece and its Colonies, from the first Persian Conquest of Ionia to the Defeat of Xerxes' Invasion of Greece, and the Establishment of Athens as a Leading State, For a long time, the greatest part of Asia Minor was subject to the kings of I^dia, an extensive region, on the coast of which the Ionian colonies were situ- ated. Croesus, the last of the Lydian kings, an able and popular, but ambi- tious prince, had made tributary the Grecian cities of the Asiatic coast, and his power had become, to Greece itsdf, an object of fear, as his wealth and splen- dour were of wonder. His prosperity was not, however, to be lasting. In aU ages, Asia has been remarkable for the sudden growth and . apid decay of mighty empires. When the Median monarchy, after overrunning most of the interior of Asia, was now giving way to the rising fortunes of the Persians*, Croesus lent hii| aid to prop the falling power, and incurred the vengeance of the conquerors. Cy- rus, the Persian chief and founder of the empire, having overcome the Medes, marched against Croesus, subdued his kingdom, and made him prisoner in his capital of Sardis. (B. C. 546.) He had before invited the Grecian cities to revolt, but they refused, and now, when they wished to submit to him on the same terms as formerly to Croesus, he would Usten to none but the Milesians; and sent an army, under Harpagus, a Mede, to reduce the others. Harpagus first attacked Phocaea, an Ionian town, early famed for maritime enterprise and skill. When hard press- ed, the Phocaeans feigned fo listen to proposals of surrender, and took advan- tage of a suspension of arms to embark their households, and quit the city. Having sought in vain for a settlement among the Grecian isles, they resolved to sail for Corsica, where they had al. ready a colony established. But first de- siring revenge on the authors of their ca- lamity.they surprised and slaughtered the Persian garrison of Phocaea ; then sailed for Corsica, having called down curses on any of their number who should stay behind, and sworn that they never would return, till a lump of iron, which they oast into the sea, should appear upon the surface. More than half, notwithstand- ing, returned, unable to live out of their native land. The rest arrived in Corsica, and dwelt there for five years ; till, by their piracies provoking an unit«i attack from the Carthaginians and Tuscans, though victorious, they suffered such a loss in ships and men, that they were agun obliged to quit their dwellings. The larger part went to Gaul, and there founded Massilia, now Marseilles, which, with the advantage of an excellent har- bour for the vessels of that age, became a rich and powerful commonwealth, and extended its dominion vridely on the Gallic coast, and even to some places on that of Spain. The Teians being next attacked, fol- bwed the example of Phocaea, and, sail- ing to Thrace, founded there Abdera. The other cities, finding that their waUs would not enable them to hold out singly, resolved together to risk a battle. Being defeated, they submitted to the conqueror en his own terms. The islands remained • free, as the Persians had no navy. Har- An account of the early monarchies of AgiJL' and especially of the Median and Per»ian empires, may be tound in the seventh chautcr of the Uuthne of Gaoeral Hiatorr. pagus proceeded through Lycia into Caria, and completed the conquest of Asia Minor. Meanwhile, Cyrus conquered Babylon, which having done, he applied himself, with ability equal to his military genius, to order the government of his vast em- pire, and unite it, as far as possible, into one. On his death, he was succeeded by his son Cambyses, who conquered Egypt, and died there, in the eighth year of his reign, while vainly attempting fur- ther acquisitions in Africa ; but not be- fore he had given proof that his natural violence of character had been fostered by despotic power into actual madness. After a short period of confusion, the throne was occupied by Darius, the son of Hystaspes, a monarch whose attention was principally turned to improve the internal administration, and increase the revenues of the empire. But though not by inclination a warrior, it was neces- sary for Darius to find an enemy against whom he might employ the turbulent spirit of the military portion of his sub- jects, thus avoiding the contempt which, in Asia, has always been the lot of un- warlike sovereigns. Under pretence of re- venging an invasion made a hundred years before, he turned his arms against the barbarians of Scythia, a wide waste re- gion, including with Tartaiy, most of the present empire of Russia, He crossed the Hellespont and advanced along the western coast of the Euxine sea, receiv- ing the submission of all the nations in his way, till he passed the Danube, and entered Scythia. The Scythians had neither towns nor cultivated fields, but lived like the modem Tartars, in move- able camps, upon the milk and flesh of their numerous herds. Having nothing, therefore, which it was necessary to defend, they retreated before him, avoid- ing a battle, to which it was impossible to force them, being entirely cavalry. In a wilderness, and far from all supplies, the army suffered severely from want ; it was obliged to retreat, and its retreat was harassed by a superior cav^ry ; and it was not without great loss and hard- ship that it reached the Danube. But though Scythia was not subdued, the bounds of the empire were widened by the submission of Thrace and Macedonia; and the expedition seems, on the whole, to have increased the power of Darius, and his reputation with his subjects. The usual policy of Persia towards the Grecian cities of its empire, was in each to set up one of the citizens as chief, or GR£ECE. 6REEC& IH I I I fyrnnU whose interest was then to keep his city in obedience to the king, on whom he depended for the maintenance of his authority. Histiaeus, the tyrant of Miletus, was high in favour with Darius, and had obtain^, as a reward for service done in the Scythian expedition, the grant of a territory on the river Strymon, m Thrace ; a very eli^ble situation for a Grecian colony, as it abounded with ship timber, and had silver mines. Miletus, which he governed, was the richest and most popidous city of Ionia ; and it was represented to Darius that, by means of his new colony, so favourably situated to gain ho\h wealth and maritime power, he might be able to revolt, and unite against Persia the whole naval force of the Asiatic Greeks. To prevent this danger, it was pretended that the king had need of his advice and assistance at Susa, his capital ; and thither he went, while the government of Miletus was committed to his kinsman Aristagoras. About this time, there was a contest of factions in the rich and populous island of Naxos, and the democrati- cal party being victorious, manv of the wealthiest men were expelled. These ap- plied to Aristagoras for aid, which he was inclined to grant, as knowing that, if he restored them, he would be able, through them, to govern Naxos. His own force, he said, was unequal to the enterprise ; but he had influence with the satrap of the province, Artaphemes, the brother of Darius, and with the power which he commanded, their restoration would be easy. The exiles consented, luid Artaphemes approving the proposal, a fleet was equipped of 200 galleys, with a land force in proportion ; and Mega- bates, a Persian of the royal blood, was joined with Aristagoras in the command. A report was spread that the fleet was intended for the Hellespont; but the commanders having quarrelled. Mega- bates betrayed to the Naxians its real destination, and they were found prepared for defence. After a fruitless siege of four months, ttie armament quitted the island, having consumed the sums allowed by Arta^emes, and much of the private fortune of-Aristagoras. Aristagoras, sure of the enmity of Megabateji, and justly fearing the re- sentment of Artaphemes for the failure of his promises, now expected the loss of his government, as the least evil which could ensue. He had already conceived the idea of revolt, when a messenger doming from Histiaeus confirmed his wavering resolution. That chief was mieasy in his detention at Susa, which he now began to see was meant to be perpetual, and he resolved on the dan- gerous measure of exciting a revolt among the Greeks of Asia, in the hope that he would certainly be sent to quell it, and might thus return to Miletus. Aristagoras assembled his friends, and Isdd before them his own sentiments, and the messasre of Histiaeus ; and having ob- tained thar approbation, he proceeded to call an assembly of the people, in which he resigned the tyranny, and proclaim- ed the re-establishment of democracy. The armament from Naxos was en- camped at Myus, under the command mostly of the tyrants of the several cities. The commanders were suddenly arrested by a Milesian commissioner, sent for that purpose, and were given up to the people of their respective cities. Most of them were banished, but Goes, the ty- rant of Mitylene, was put to death. De- mocracy was eveiywhere established, and all Ionia and i£olis engaged in the twoft. (B. C. 500). Meanwhile, Aristagoras went to ask assistance from Greece, and first from Lacedaemon. But the cautious elder- hood who directed that city refusing to engage in a war so distant and danger- ous, he next applied to Athens, where he arrived at the moment when the haughty command of Artaphemes, to restore the tyranny of Hippias, had filled the citi- zens with anger and alarm. Miletus, and many others of the endangered cities, were colonies of Athens ; and anxiety for their fate united with resent- ment and with the lavish promises of Aristagoras, to induce the Athenians to grant his request Twenty ships were voted to assist the lonians, and they ar- rived at Miletus with five besides, from the Eretrians of Euboea. The combined fleet sailed to Ephesus, and the forces debarking, marched to Sardis, a distance of about sixty miles. Artaphemes was taken by surprise, and fled into the castle, and the Greeks, entering the town unopposed, fell to plunder. But a house being set on fire, the flame spread ra- pidly through a town mostly built of timber and reeds. The inhabitants were driven by the conflagration to assemble in the market, and in the bed of the tor- rent Pactolus, which ran through it, in such numbers, that they found them- selves strong enough for defence ; and the Greeks retiring to mount Tmolus, at night pursued their retreat towards theii f§ ihips. To avenge the insult, troops were collected from the jE^eater part of Asia Minor, and the Persian army, following the enemy, found him under the walls of Ephesus. A battle ensued, in which the Greeks were entirely defeated, with the •loss of many of the principal command- ers, and the dispersion of the army. The Athenians now recalled their ships, and refused any further part in the war. The lonians pursued the war by sea, and, sending thither a fleet, engaged in their alliance Byzantium, and the other towns about the Propontis ; and thence going southward, the fleet was no less successful with the cities of Caria. At the same time Onesilus, king of Salamis, in Cyprus, had persuaded aS that island to revolt from Persia, except the city of Amathus, which he besieged. Being informed that a Persian force was coming against him, he sent to ask assistance from the lonians. They sent their fleet, but it did not arrive till the hostile army had been landed. Two battles followed on the same day — ^byland between the Cy- prians and Persians, and by sea between the Ionian fleet and that of the Phoeni- cians, who were subject to Persia, and chiefly composed its naval power. The lonians were victorious ; but by land the Cyprians were defeated, and Onesilus slain, and the Island was quite reduced to subjection. Meantime Ionia and ^Eolis were overrun by the superior land force of the enemy. One Persian army, after two great victories, was surprised in a defile, and destroyed by the Carians ; but the other divisions were more successful, and after reducing most of -^olis, with the important town of Cuma, and taking Clazomenae in Ionia, Artaphemes con- centrated his forces, to besiege Miletus. Aristagoras, now despairing of success, and knowing himself marked for ven- geance by the Persians, resolved to quit the city, and sailed to Myrcinus, the colony of Histiaeus. Here he was killed, in besieging a Thracian town. Histiaeus had been dismissed from Susa, and sent to Sardis to assist in quelling the revolt ; but finding himself tuspected, he fled into Ionia, and passed to Chios. The Milesians refused to re- ceive him, but he found friends in Les- l)os and at Byzantium, from which places he exercised piracy, both against Greeks and Persians. At length, in a descent on Asia, he was taken, and being sent to Sardis, was there cmcified. Miletus was l)esieged by land and sea, and the Panionian assemoly being con- vened, determined to make no attempt by land, but, collecting all the ships of the confederacy, to hazard a sea-fight. The assembled fleet was of 353 triremes, long sharp-built galleys, carrying each nearlv 200 men. The number of the hos- tile ships is stated at 600, being chiefly Phoenician, but partly also Cyprian, Cilician, and Egyptian. Tlie Greeks appear to have been already unequalled for skill and boldness in naval action, and, with all their superior numbers, the Persian leaders feared a battle. They had with them many Grecian tyrants ex- pelled at the beginning of the revolt, and, through them, they secretly offered to each squadron promises of impunity, if they would desert the common cause, and threats of utter destruction to their cities if they refused. The rest stocd firm, but the Samian commanders, dis- couraged by the disorder of their own fleet, and the vast resources of the enemy, were prevailed on to comply. When the battle was beginning, they gave the signal of flight. Eleven ships out of sixty disobeyed, and stood their ground, in reward for which the names of the captains were afterwards lecorded on a pillar by their commonwealth. The rest fled, and were followed by many others. The Chian squadron of 100 ships fought gallantly against an over- whelming force, but tiie battle was irre- coverably lost. Dionysius, the Pho- csean commander, had but three ships, so small was the remnant of that state. With these he took three vessels from the enemy, and, when the fight was lost, returned no more to Phocsea, but, sailing to the coast of Phoenicia, made prize of many merchant- ships, and thence pro- ceeded to Sicily, whence issuing, he plun- dered the Carthaginians and Tuscans. The Persians now pressed the siege of Miletus, and took it by assault in the sixth year of the war. Most of the men were killed : the rest, with the women and chil- dren, were led to Susa, and presented to Darius, who settled them at Ampe, on the Tigris, near where that river falls into the Persian Gulf. The rich vale of Miletus was divided among the Persians, .^aces, the tyrant of Samos, was restored to his government ; but the Samian people had not approved the treachery of their admirals, and a large proportion of them emigrated to Sicily. The islands Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, submitted at the approach of the Persian fleet, and at the same time the army proceeded against the Ionian towns. All the ^ li 6HEECE* • GREECE 31 it <«) threats of the Persian leaders were folfiUed: the handsomest boys were made eunuchs ; the most beautiful girls earned as slaves to the king ; the towns, with the temples, were burnt. The de- vastation was spread to the shores of the Hellespont, of which the Persian army ravaged the Asiatic, and the Phcsnieian fleet the European side. After this, the Persian government turned its attention to the internal regulation of the country, with a liberality as conspicuous as its cruelty in avenging the revolt. Advising with deputies assembled from the cities, Artaphemes made many useful regula- tions to prevent the petty warfare so uni- versal among the Greeks, and to esta- blish a course of law by which all dis- putes between cities were to be deter- mined. At the same time, he appointed the tribute from each, which was not heavier than before the war; and the sama assessment remained in use long after. In the second spring after the reduc- tion of Miletus, Artaphemes was re- called, and Mardonius succeeded him, a young man of high rank, who had lately marred a daughter of Darius. He biought with him a large army and pow- erful fleet, avowedly to punish Athens and Eretria for the burnmg of Sardis. To acuuire popularity among the lonians and ^olians, and gain their willing •ervice, he deposed Si the tyrants, and established democracy in the Grecian cities : a measure very opposite to the usual policy of Persia. Having received from them a consideraWe reinforcement, he crossed the Hellespont. Thrace was already subject to the Persians, excepting some hordes of savage mountaineers ; and Macedonia had formerly submitted to deliver earth and water, and now, when tribute was demanded, did not venture to refuse. But the fleet, in doubling the promontory of Athos, lost, by a storm, 300 ships, and above 20,000 men ; and the army suflered much by a night attack from the Brygian Thracians, in which Mardonius himself was wound- ed. The Brygians were attacked and aulxlued ; but the season was then so far advanced, and the fleet so shattered, that it was tiiought best to return, and winter in Asia. The following year heralds were sent Into Greece, to demand of every city earth and water in token of subjection. Many towns on the continent obeyed, and most of the islands. The Athenians and I^cedsismonians indignantly refused. C„ and disgraced their refusal with a cruel violation of the law of nations : the he- ralds being, at one place, thrown into a cavern, in tiie other into a well, and told there to take their earth and water. Among the cities which submitted were Thebes and Mginsu i£gina was an ancient enemv of Athens, and the Athe- nians immediately sent ministers to Sparta, to accuse the ^Eginetans of treason to Greece. Lacedaemon had re- cently been at bitter enmity with Athens, but, in the common danger, it was re- joiced to find that city disposed to unite with it in vigorous defence. Cleomenes, with his usual violence, went himself to iEo:ina, for the purpose of seizing the principal authors of the submission. He was opposed and prevented, but not without a remarkable acknowledgment of the authority of Lacedaemon, since it was answered that the ^ginetans would have obeyed, if they had been assured that he was properly authorised by his commonwealth. During the absence of Cleomenes, his colleague, Demaratus, having long been at variance with him, endeavoured to excite the leading men against him. There were circumstances attending the birth of Demaratus, which threw sus- picion on his legitimacy, and Cleomenes encouraged and supported Leotychides, the next in succession, in claiming the crown; the question was referred to the Delphian oracle, and Cleomenes bribed the Pythia to declare his rival illegitimate. Demaratus was deposed, and soon after fled into Persia. Leoty- chides being appointed in his place, ac- companied Cleomenes to iEgina, and that state submitting to their authority, ten of the principS men were sent to Athens as pledges of its fidelity to the common cause. Cleome»e9^*wwards leading an army against the Argians, surprised and routed them with great slaughter. Many took refuge in a sacred grove sur- rounding a temple, which, as such groves were highly venerated, Cleomenes hesitated to profane. Enticing out about fifty successively, by the promise of ran- som, he put them to the sword, and when the rest, discovering his treachery, refused to come out, he then fired the grove, and burnt them all. In the battle and massacre, so large a portion of theAr- gian people perished, that the slaves,over- powering the remainder, governed the city, till at length, the sons of those whc had been slain growing up to manhood^ they were exjielled from Argos, but maintained themselves awhile in Tiryns. Cleomenes. it was thought, might have taken Argos, but his caprice led him another way. Dismissing the rest of his army, he went with a dhosen escort to sacrifice in the temple of Juno, near Mycenae. 7 he high priest remonstrating that such an intrusion was unlawful in a stranger, Cleomenes caused him to be scourged by the Helots, performed the sacrifice himsell, and returned home. Not long after, evidence was produced of his having corrupted the Pytnia, and, in his alarm, he fled into Thessaly ; but, thence returning into Peloponnesus, he obtained the support of a party in Arca- dia, and was there exciting war against his country, when his friends in Lace- daemon, regaining the ascendant, recalled him to the throne. He did not long enjoy it, his habitual extravagance being at length converted into positive mad- ness. He was plaoed in confinement, when obtaining a sword from a Helot who guarded tum, he cut himself piece- meal. The suicide of Cleomenes was gene- rally attributed to divine vengeance for some one of his many crimes. By most of the Greeks it was ascribed to his sacrilegious collusion with the Pythia; by the Argians to the cruel and treache- rous massacre of their fugitives ; but more confidently to the burning of the sacred grove, the violation of the temple of Juno, and the outrage to the priest. The Lacedaemonians imputed it to his frequent drunkenness ; a vice at Sparta rarely seen and highly reprobated. The restoration of the -^ginetan hostages being agreed to by Lacedaemon, was still denied by Athens. A war en- sued. The oligarchical faction was pre- valent in JE^msiy and Nicodromus, a leader of the opposite party, had been expelled. Nothing was more common in Greece than for the weaker in civil strife to connect themselves with the enemies of the state. According to a plan concerted with the government of Athens, Nicodromus, with his friends in the island, seized on that called the old town of iEgina. The Athenians, un- equal in naval force to the ^ginetans, nad borrowed from Corinth twenty ships. These came a day too late ; the project failed; and Nicodromus, with many of his friends, escaped to Attica, where, being settled on the promontory Sunium, they made continual predatory war upon the ^^^inetans ot the Lsland. The prevailing party took a cruel re- venge for the attempt which had been made, and 700 citizens at once were executed. They were afterwards defeated by the Athenians, first by sea, and then in a descent on the island. While Greece was in the state of turbulence which has been described, Persia was again preparing for its conquest, and for the chastisement of Athens and Eretria. Mardonius was recalled, and his command given to Ar- taphemes, son of the former satrap, joined with Datis, a Median nobleman probably more experienced. To avoid the circuitous and dangerous route by Thrace and Macedonia, it was deter- mined to cross the ^gean, reducing the islands on the way. Naxos, where the Persians had before been foiled, was first attacked; the inhabitants fled to the mountains, and the town, with its temples, was burnt. The other islands submitted, and gave hostages, till the fleet arriving at Carystus, in Euboea, the Carystians refused, but were obliged to yield by the investment of their city, and the ravage of their land. The Eretrians were now assailed, who, applying to Athens for succour, the 4000 Athenians who had been settled on the territory of Chalcis, were ordered to assist them. But the Eretrians were divided and dis- heartened : some were for flying to the mountains, others were inclined to betray the city; and yEschines, a principal citizen, seeing no hope of defence, ad- vised tlie Athenians to reserve them- selves for the protection of their native country. They crossed into Attica. The Persians formed the siege. For six days Eretria held out, but on the seventh was betrayed by two of the leading citizens. The town, with its temples, was burnt, and the inhabitants made slaves. The Persians, now masters of Euboea, crossed into Attica, and landed, at the suggestion of Hippias, on the narrow plain of Ma- rathon. (B. C. 490.) Athens had a commander equal to the emergency, in Miltiades the son of Ci- mon. His uncle, Miltiades the son of Cypselus, being invited by tlie natives of the Thracian Chersonese to found in it an Athenian colony which might assist in their defence, had agreed to the pro- posal, and had been made tyrant of the Chersonese. On his death, as he left no children, his authority passed to his ne- phew Stesagoras. He also died, and in tlie hwe of KMSceedmg him. MUtiades. his tactics as weU as the Gredan. CM SoSmw S^CT^raittoini Athens to machuswas persuaded, and the army ?hpf^W^^ MUtiade3hadnot,Uke marched to Slarathon, where, on his Stes^^S^ntiesteSsheddilring ovm day of command, Milhades led rt ftfh^f lirp^Esor. and the Cher- into action The Athemans were jmned !»n^ WM Mt ^aw an hereditary by the whole strength of Plat«ea. a httle rZ^T,»W^- but bv a mixture of fraud commonwealth of Boeotia, which had Hf^^MflSi^^X tyranny, thrown itself on their protection agams^ ^3 ^^Vrt^ened Wmself in it by kee6- Thebes, and had ever since lieen their wfin^SgSXandbyUi^- most faithful «lly-Jhf combined for^ ^ttedS^^Olo^s. athraciin ^^ ***'* J'TL"**** ^.h'Tw » mfnce. wien Darius marched aga^st heavv-armed troop. ^^A at le^ta„ the Scythians. MUtiades subnutted to e^ual ""'"^e' "fJ'S^'r™- ** ^"^ h m Md followed in his train, and was sian army is stated at 100,000 men. teft wwf tte S Gr«:ian chiefs of the Of the infantry in the invading arn^ ..Iv fn I^aT&e bridge of boats by the Persians and Sac« only wore good S. SipSiins c?^ss!d the Danube^, in close fight, and these were inferior to Wp theT D^^ to break up the the Greeks in the length of their spears, K 2»d^S the^g and'^army the goodness of their defensive armour, tV^h br^ Scythiansf to secure and the firmness of their array. The Gr^Mid^lWer Ionia from the Per- rest of the foot were on y o be feared ST^^ka ffissuggestion was iqected, for their skill in using missUes, bu the n^forHttreacherTbut because Persia cavalry was numerous and exceUent. ^Lto^f^^ twants his surest The ^und was "dmirah'r chosen for Tu^rt ^^t ttespS of freedom in the Athenians. In the hills their heavy thF^oX^ut nS met with ap- phalanxwould have been unable tokeep ?UuS^T^oi^ Grecian writers, gen^ Ss ranks unbn,ken and avaJable agams IX ardent palioU, but somewhat lax the arche^' of Asia ; m a ''■de Pla^^n 't mo^ts. Soon after Miltiades was would have »>««" ^H-™""^.??, ^^ ""°1; ^Soi bv the Scythians, but recalled bers, and harassed without the power of Kir retiremortby the people : but retaUation by the horse ; but m the nar- he WhiS obniious^to Ihe Per- row plain of M'^aj°\the gro"nd fa- ^aa and when on the reconquest of voured the movements of the phalanx. 1^'tS flert approached ll^ace he while its small extent precluded the evo- ■rftoAAens. The Athenian lawswere lutions of the hostile cavalry, andobhged s^ere ^tast tyrants, even of foreign all to receive the Greeks in front, instead S-^ Mfedes on arriving wis of annoying them on the flanks or rear. KorWsUfeTbuthewonthefivour StUl. confined as was the space. MU- X people si far, that he was not tiades could only present a front equal only acSuitted. but anointed one of the to that of the enemr by weakening some tet Mnerals who regSarly directed the part of his hne. He weakened the cen- iS^ M th^^^and^o conscious tre and strengthened the wings and then, ?^^ coUea^e of his superior abi- toleave as Uttle opportunrty of actaon as B^ttatfourTthem made over to him possible to the enemy s horse and «r^ SSr days of chief command. chery. he ordered the troops to advance The generals being equally divided in ninnmg, and engage at once n clo«e opWonfwhShertolisSabatUeorde- fight. The conflfct was obstinate. The f^Ttoe city, the decision rested with Persians and Sac», who wwe m fte the polemaiih Callimachus. Miltiades eenhe, »>r«ke the weak centre of Ae pointed out to him that a siege by so Athenians, and pursued it up the coun- wwerftd an enemy would di^de wd try; but the rest were routed by the msettle the minds of the people ; that Athenians of the wmgs. who being im- Xver W any leaning tSwSds Hip- mediately recaUed from pursuit, and led S^o^d^ determined in his favouJ^; "^"'"he «onquemgPer«ans defeated 8iat others, through despondence, would Uiem, and P""»<^«»«J^ "f" »™P*- propose surrendef, and make their own Seven ships were taken »" the sho^ beaie bv betrayinc the city ; but that, and the mvaders lost 6400 men, the SdSllJwS^yef united iid hopeful, Athenians and PlataansorUy 192 among ftev mieht win a battle, an assurance whom, however, was the polemarch wWchMihiades was the better able to Callimachus, with many other emment give, being acquainted with the Persian officers. GREECE. I ..^...^1 Tlie Persian army on its embarkation sailed immediatel)^ towards Athens, hopina: to surprise it during the absence of its defenders ; but Miltiades guessing their design made a hasty march, and arrived in the city before the enemy was in sight. The invaders now returned to Asia, carrying with them their Eretrian prisoners, who were sent to Susa. Da- rius had borne them bitter enmity for the burning of Sardis; but when he had them at his mercy he treated them with considerable humanity. According to a favourite practice of his, he established them as a colony on an estate of his own, where they were long after distinguish- able by their Grecian speech. The Athenians on the fall of Eretria had applied to Lacedaemon for aid, which the senate promised, but alleged a super- stition which prevented its being sent till after the full moon. They then dis- patched 2000 men, who marched with such haste to atone for the apparent slackness of their commonwealth, that they arrived in Attica on the third day. They were nevertheless too late for the battle, but they went to Marathon to see the dead, and departed giving due praise to the Athenians, as the first to stop the victories of Persia. Herodotus remarks that *' the Athenians first of the Greeks advanced running on their enemies, and first endured the sight of the Median dress and the men who wore it ; for hi- therto the very name of the Medes had been a terror to Greece." Miltiades now rose to the utmost Height of popularity and influence, inso- much that when he requested a fleet of seventy ships without declaring how he meant to employ them, but merely pro- mising that he would bring great riches to Athens, the people readily agreed. He led them to the isle of Paros, under the pretence of punishing its people for their compelled service m the Persian fleet, but really to revenge a personal injury of his own. He demanded one hundred talents as the price of his retreat, but the Parians refused, and resisted him bravely, and in an attempt to enter the town he received a wound, and was obliged to withdraw his army. On his return he was brought to trial for his life by Xanthippus, a man of high con- sideration, on account of the failure of his promises made to the people. His wound disabled him from defending him- self, but he was brought into the assem- bly on a bed, while his friends defended him, principally by recalling his former services. The memory of these, with pity for his present condition, prevailed on the people to absolve him from the capital charge ; but they fined him fifty talents, about 12,000/. He died soon after by the mortification of his wound, but the fine was paid by Cimon his son. The treatment of Miltiades has been with little reason alleged as a gross in- stance of popular ingratitude. In truth, the most blameable act of the Athenians on this occasion is one which can onl^ be excused by the fervour of their grati- tude — the entrusting an armament en- tirely to the pleasure of a man who, however eminent as a warrior, seems to have given little proof of probity or mo- deration. His attack on Paros was an atrocious abuse of public authority to the gratification of individual revenge ; and it would have been most unjust that such misconduct should go unpunished ; though it is to be feared that the popular resentment was excited less by the ini- quity committed than by the failure of the promised riches. With respect to the fine, it seems little likely, consi- dering the enormous wealth of Cimon, that it could materially injure either him or his father ; and it was probably owing to gratitude and compassion that Miltiades escaped a heavier punishment, which his recent conduct certainly de- served. Sect. n. — Darius's anger against Athens rose yet higher when he heard of the defeat at Marathon. He ordered to be made ready a mightier armament for the conquest of Greece, and for three years all Asia was disturbed with warlike preparation. But happily for man- kind, there is generally a limit to the growth of empires formed by con(juest, on passing which they either fall to pieces, or at least become feeble through the want of a steady control over the distant provinces. These were to the successors of Darius a source of weakness more commonly than of strength ; since, though they might swell the royal armies with lukewarm or doubtful adherents, they were ever liable to revolt ; while the Persian governors were frequently en- coiu-aged, by the remoteness and magni- tude of their commands, to conduc* themselves as independent princes rather than as officers under a common mas- ter. The first symptom that the empire had reached its greatest height was the revolt of Egypt, which happened in the fourth year afler the battle of Marathon •* GREECE. |Kl|d divided the attention of Darius with llie purposed conquest of Greece. While preparing for both objects, he was di- verted by the contending claims urged to the succession by his eldest son Artabazanes, and Xerxes the eldest bom to him, after his accession, of Atossa the daughter of Cyrus. After some delay, he decided in favour of Xerxes ; but he died before completing his pre- parations against either enemy. Xerxes succeeding Darius, in the se- cond year brought Egypt to submission, and then resolved on th6 invasion of . Greece. To this he was stimulated by Mardonius, and by many Grecian re- fugees, particularly the Peisistratidae. Four years passed in preparation, and inthefifthhe moved towards the Hel- lespont, with an army gathered from all Asia, between the borders of India and the Mediterranean. A bridge was formed of ships across the Hellespont, a difficult undertaking, from the breadth of the strait and the rapidity of the current ; and when this was broken by a tempest. He- rodotus tells us that Xerxes, in the mad- ness of absolute power, commanded that the workmen should be all slaughtered, and the sea scourged for disobedience to its lord. Another being made, the army passed over, and seven days and seven Whts were occupied unceasingly m its pSsage. The foot is stated at 1 ,700,000 men. the horse at &0.000. Some time before, to avoid tlie dangerous naviga- tion round the promontory of Athos, where the fleet of Mardonius had been rained, a canal had been dug across the igthmus which joins that mountain with the mainland; a work of which the enormous labour and expense appeared so far to exceed the utiUty. that it was thought to have been chiefly done as a proof and memorial of Xerxess power. The army advanced, unresisted, through Thrace and Macedonia. Every Grecian eity on its way had been commanded to ^epare it a meal hi the most splendid manner, and many towns were almost ruined by the expense. The fleet moved along the coast to the Therm aic bay, where it was rejoined by the land force ; 1^ while the armament paused here, the heriOds returned, whom Xerxes had sent t«i demand earth and water from the cities df Greece. Of those who ffave it. the most et)nsiderable were the Thessaliaus, and the rhebans. with ail the Boponans. ex- wmi those of Thespiae and Plataea. To Attiens and Sparta no heralds were sent, 00 account of the murder of those sent by Darius. The atonement demanded for this crime, by the religion of the age. gave occasion to a splendid instance of patriotism. Proclamation being made m Lacedaemon, that there was ne«l of some to die for the commonwealth, Sper- thias and Boulis. two noble Spartans, offered themselves as the sacrifice, and were delivered to the Persians. Otters were made to them of high preferment, if they would enter the royal service, but they refused, and being brought to the kino-, they declared that they came to pav'the penalty of murder for the Lace- daemonians. Xerxes replied, that though the Lacedaemonians had broken the uni- versal law of nations, by murdering he- ralds, he would not imitate the cruelty he abhorred, nor would he take the lives of two individuals, as a satisfaction for the national guilt. He accordingly dis- missed them, and they returned home. Alarm was great among the Grecian states which had refused submission. The Athenians consulted the oracle at Delphi, and received a most threatening answer. Sending again, to beg for one more favourable, they received an ami- biguous answer ; in a part of which they were told, that when all else was destroyed, the wooden wall might pre- serve them. Some interpreted this of the AcropoUs. which had been anciently surrounded by a palisade; others, of the navy. A young man, by name Themistocles, had recently become a leader in Athens. When it was pro- posed to distribute to every citizen ten drachmae (a silver coin about ten-pence) from the produce of the silver mines at Laureium, Themistocles had prevailed on the assembly to reject the proposal, ana to spend the money in building ships for the war with iEgina. These were now ready, and he urged his coun- trvmen to build more, and to rely for safety on their naval power ; and the adoption of this counsel saved Greece. At a meeting of deputies from all the cities which had refused submission to the invader, a general reconciliation was effected of all quarrels, and particularly of that between Athens and iligina. Two embassies were sent, the one to invite the concurrence of Argos, which was refused, whether from fear or from jealousy of Sparta ; the other to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse in Sicily, and then the greatest Grecian potentate. Gelon was of a noble family in Gela, a Rhodian colony in Sicily. He had been of the guard of Hippocrates, tyrant >ian^ who had waited for the move- ment of their allies, went by the plain. Mardonius. on seeing the Greeks, as it seemed, retreating, was filled with ex- uJtation, and immediately led the Per- sians after them, while the other Asiatics followed tumultuously, thinking the day won. The Lacedaemonians, on the ap- proach of the cavalry, sent to the Athe- nians for assistance, begging that if they were unable to come, they would at least send the archers ; but the Athe- nians, when preparing to comply with the summons, were prevented by the attack of the Greeks m the Persian service. _ , The battle was now joined on both sides. The Persians fought with great bravery ; but neither bravery nor vast superiority in numbers could compensate their inferiority in arms and discipline, and they were at length defeated with great slaughter, Mardonius being killed. The other Asiatics fled immediately, when they saw the Persians broken. Of the Grecian auxiliaries, opposed to the Athenians, many were slack in their exertions as not being hearty in the cause ; but the Boeotians, who formed the strongest body, were zealous for the success of Mardonius, and they fought long and hard before they were de- feated. The Boeotians fled towards Thebes, the Asiatics to their entrenched camp, their flight being in some degree protected by the Asiatic and Bceotiaji cavalry. On hearing that their friends were victorious, the Greeks of the centre returned m haste and disorder to the field, and the Megarians and Phlia- sians going by the plain were charged and broken with considerable loss by some Theban horse. The fugitives who escaped into the camp were in time to close the gates and man the walls against the Lacedae- monians and Tegeans ; and the assail- ants being unskilled in the attack of fortifications, they made a successful defence till the arrival of the Atheniar^, who went about the work more skilfully, and soon gained entrance. The pas- sions of the Greeks were inflamed to the utmost by long distress and danger, and no mercy was shown. Of tl^ 300,000 men who were left with Mar- donius, 40,000 had been led fi-om the field by Artabazus when it first became evident that the Persians were losing the battle ; but of the others not 3000 are said to have survived the battle and the subsequent massacre. The mind revolts from such sweeping destrudUoD, GREECE i 42 even amidst its exultation on viewing the deliverance of a great people from unprincipled aggression. It were indeed to be wished that an outraged nation would remember mercy in the moment of vengeance, and refrain from need- lessly visiting on the miserable tools of despotism the crimes of their employers. But though such ma2:nanimous huma- nity may be sometimes taught by reason and religion to an individual, it can never be expected from a body of men, and least of all from men flushed with victory, and burning with all the fierce passions necessarily engendered in a bloody strusde for hfe or death, how- ever just and holy the motive of the fray. Few victories are free from the stam of unnecessary bloodshed, even when won by mere professional soldiers, un- provoked by personal wrongs, and care- less of the quarrel in which it pleases their rulers to employ them. The Athe- nians were men whose houses had been burnt, and whose families had suffered all the evils of a sudden emigration, while any who remained behind were undistinguishingly slaughtered. The other Greeks, if they had not endured it, had lived in fear of the like treatment at the hands of enemies whose warfare was habitually merciless. Assuredly, there- fore, it is not a subject of wonder, or of harsh and unmitigated reproach, if the cruelties of the Persian soldiery were retaliated in kind. Artabazus arrived in safety at Bv- lantium* on the Bosporus, whence he passed into Asia ; but not without many of his followers being cut off by the Thracians, and many dropping on the way through fatigue and hunger. Mean- while the army of the Grecian con- federacy marched against Thebes, and compelled that city to purchase its safety by dehvering up the pnncipal authors of its defection from the com- mon cause, who were sent to Corinth by Pausanias, and there put to death. Another battle was fought in Asia on the same dav with that of Plataea. The Samians, without the knowledge of their tyrant or the Persians, had sent messengers to invite the Grecian fleet at Delos to pass over to Ionia, assuring the commanders of thefr superiority to the Persian force in those seas, and of the disposition of the lonians to revolt. The Greeks complied ; and on their ap- proach the Persian leaders, feeling them- jelves too weak for a sea-fight, sent away • Byiuntiuin, the modern Con&tantiaopie. GREECE. the Hioenician ships, and bringing the others to the promontory of Mycale, near Miletus, where the land army was encamped, drew them upon the beach, an easy thing with the light vessels used in ancient war, and surrounded them with a rampart. The chief commander of the Greeks was Leotychides, a Spartan of one of the royal houses. On arriving, he repeated, with a similar double purpose, the stratagem of Themistocles at Arte- misium. Sailing along the shore he made proclamation by a herald to the lonians, bidding them remember that the Greeks were fighting for their liberty. The Persians were already jealous of the Samians, because they had ransomed and sent home some Athenian prisoners: and their suspicions being strengthened and made more general by the procla- mation, they disarmed the Samians, and sent the Milesians to guard the passes, under pretence of profiting by their knowledge of the country, but really to remove them from the camp. The Athenians advancing along the beach commenced the action, followed by the Corinthians, Troezenians, and Sicyom- ans. After some hard fighting they drove the enemy to his entrenchments, and then forced the inclosure, on which the mass of the array fled, the Persians only still resisting. It was not till now that the Lacedemonians came up, hav- ing been impeded by steep and broken ground. On seeing the Greeks prevail- ing, the Samians, though unarmed, did what they could in their favour, and the other lonians followed their example, and sided with the Greeks. The Mile- sians, who had been sent to guard the passes by the Persians, turned against them and slaughtered the fugitives. Ah Ionia now revolted. The fleet proceeded to Samos, where a consultation was held on the fate of that countrv. It could not protect itself unassisted, and its defence was a burden the Greeks were loth to support. The Peloponnesians proposed to remove the inhabitants, and settle them on the lands of those states that had joined the common enemy: but the Athenians were averse to the deso- lation of Ionia, and jealous of the inter- ference of others with their colonies ; and when they urged the reception of the lonians into the confederacy the Pelo- ponnesians gave way, and the Samians, Chians, and other islanders who had jomed the fleet, were admitted. The fleet now sailed to the Hellespont to destroy tlie bridge, but found it broken ; on which Leotychides with the Peloponnesians returned home, while the Athenians remained and formed the siege of Sestos on the Hellespont, where the Persians from all the other towns of the Chersonese had collected. The siege was continued till the Persians were reduced to the extremity of famine, and then they escaped by night out of the place, but many were slain or taken in the pursuit. The Athenians having cleared the Chersonese of the invaders, returned home. Immediately after the battle of Pla- taea, the Athenian people had begun to bring back their families and to rebuild their city and ramparts. But the jea- lousy excited in the Peloponnesians by the power a.id spirit which Athens had displayed, was far stronger than their gratitude for what it had done and suf- fered in the common cause. An em- bassy arrived from Peloponnesus to urge the Athenians not to go on with the fortifications, but rather, as far as in them lay, to demolish the walls of all other cities out of Peloponnesus, that the enemy, if he again returned, might have no strong place to fix his head quarters in, as recently in Thebes. If the demand had been complied with, Athens would have become entirely subject TO Lacedaemon. At the same time it was dangerous to refuse, since, from the past conduct of Lacedaemon, there was little ground to expect that gratitude would prevent it from any action prompted by jealousy or ambi- tion ; while it was vain to hope that the military force of Athens, always inferior to that of Lacedaemon, and now further weakened by the number of citizens absent with the fleet, would be able to maintain itself without the aid of walls against the united strength of Pelopon- nesus. In this difficulty Themistocles advised them immediately to send away the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, to raise up the walls with the utmost pos- sible celerity, men, women, and children all joining in the work ; and chusing himself and some others as ambassadors to Lacedaemon, to send him thither at once, but to detain his colleagues till the walls had attained a sufficient height for defence. He was accordingly sent to Lacedaemon, where he put off his audience from day to day, excusing himself by saying that he waited for his colleagues, who were daily expected, and wondered that they were not come. But when reports arrived that the walls were gaining height, he bade the ma- gistrates not trust to rumour, but send some competent persons to examine. They sent accordingly, and at the same time Themistocles secretly di- rected the Athenians to detain the La- cedaemonian commissioners, but with the least possible show of compulsion, till himself and his colleagues should return. The latter were now arrived, and brought news that the walls had gained the height required: and The- mistocles declared to the Lacedaemo- nians that Athens was already suffici- ently fortified, and that henceforth if the Lacedaemonians and their aUies had anything to propose, they must do it as to persons able to judge both of the common interest and their own; that when it seemed best to abandon the city, the Athenians had determined and done it for themselves, and that in the deliberations of the confederacy they had appeared in judgment inferior to none; that they thought it best for themselves and for all, that their city should be fortified, since there could be no equality nor freedom of debate on the concerns of the alliance, without such an approach to equality in deien- sive means as might ensure to each a certain degiee of independence and se- curity. The Lacedaemonians were se- cretly mortified at their failure, and probably not the less so from the con- sciousness that the attempt had been an unhandsome one ; but their discontent did not break out openly, and the am- bassadors on each part went home un- questioned. The following year Pausanias being appointed to command the confederate fleet, reduced most of Cyprus, and then proceeding to the Bosporus besieged and took Byzantium from the Persians. But his mind was drunk with glory and power, and he now aspired to hold under Persia the dominion of Greece. He fa- voured the escape of the prisoners taken in Byzantium, and with them he sent a letter to Xerxes, in which he asked his daughter in marriage, and promised to eft'ect the subjugation of Greece. On re- ceiving a favourable answer his pride swelled yet higher, and letl him to con- duct not more profligately arrogant than absurdly impolitic. He assumed the Median dress and mode of life, and took a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians ; and he daily treated the allies with ex- travagant haughtiness and severity, in- somuch that the lonians already pre- 44 '"..TJ'ifHf'IP'ilPD'i'lj' GREECE. 46 f.ti ferrins: as leaders the Athenians, their kinsmen and most active liberators, now urged them to take the command, and, if necessary, to resist Pausanias. At this crisis Pausanias was called home under a charge of treason, and forthwith the whole fleet, excepting the Peloponnesians, took the Athenians for leaders. Doreis was sent out to replace Pausanias, but the allies refusing him obedience, he withdrew with his squa- dron from the fleet : and the Lacedse- monians acquiesced the more readily in the change, from weariness of the war, from fear lest their officers should, like Pausanias, be corrupted into disobedi- ence to the laws, and from holding the Athenians equal to the command and now friendly co themselves. This be- ginning of Athenian ascendency took place in the year B. C. 477. (Clintons Fast. Hellen.) Pausanias, on his return, bemg ac- quitted of the charge, but not reinstated in his command, went out agsdn without pubhc authority, pretending a wish to be present on the scene of action, but really purposing to carry on his practices with Persia. But fresh information ar- riving against him, the ephori again re- called him, and he obeyed, trusting for security to money and friends. There were strong grounds of suspicion, but not proof enough to procure the con- demnation of a man of high rank and pure Spartan blood, says the historian ; implying, apparently, that against a meaner man slighter proofs might have sufficed. Complete evidence was at length supplied. A slave entrusted by Pausanias with a letter to Persia, was alarmed by observing that no former messenger had ever returned. He opened the letter, and found that it di- rected his death ; and he immediately carried it to the ephori, who not yet \mng fully satisfied with the proof, con- trived with him a plan through which they overheard an avowal of the treason from the mouth of Pausanias himself. They now proceeded to arrest Pausa- nias, but he being forewarned, took refuge in a building belonging to the temple of Minerva, called the Brazen House. The sanctity of the place for- bade them to force him out or kill him there, but they walled him in and let him perish by hunger. They were not, however, thought to have preserved themselves by the evasion from the guilt of sacrilege. The Lacedaemonians sent ambassa- dors to Athens to declare that they \iM found evidence implicating Themistoclel in the treason of Pausanias. It seems very unlikely that he should really havef concurred in it, bat not improbable, con-- sidering his intriguing character, that! he may, to serve some purpose of his^ own, have tampered with Pausanias in^ a manner that might countenance the^ suspicion. He was now banished by ostracism and hving at Argos, and hi-; ther Athenian and Lacedaemonian com-; missioners went together to arrest him.» He fled at their approach, and went[ to Corcyra ; and thence he was conveyed to the opposite continent by the Corcy- rueans, who owed him kindness, but feared to protect him. "Whithersoever he went, he was followed by those who* were sent to apprehend him, till he was' obliged to commit himself to the gene-' rosity of a personal enemy, Admetus, the king of tne Molossians. Admetus being absent, Themistocles addressed himself to his wife, and was instructed* by her to take her child in his arms and| seat himself on the hearth, as the most^ prevailing manner of supplication. On the return of Admetus, he declared who he was, and prayed that if, in the as- sembly of the Athenians, he had spoken anything against the interest of Admetus, it might not be visited upon him in his ba- nishment: •' For he was now an easy prey to any one much weaker than Admetus ; but a generous spirit would only avenge itself on its equals, and in equal contest.**^ The Molossian prince was moved, and* received him to hospitality ; and when he was demanded by the messengers of Athens and Lacedspmon, he would not give him up, though he did not venture to retain him. Themistocles wished to go to Asia, and he was sent by Adme«i tus to the Macedonian port of Pydna^T where he embarked in a trading vess^li bound to Ionia. He was driven by cro«# winds to the island of Naxos, where anl Athenian armament was besieging th» city. (B.C. 466. See the next chapter). In this emergency he made himself known to the master of the ship, and threatened that, it taken, he would de- clare to the Athenians that the master had knowingly carried him for the sake of gain. The only means of safety, he said, was, that none should quit the ves- sel; and if in this the master would comply with him, he should be largely rewarded. Accordingly, the vessel wai kept in the offing for a day and a night, and then, as soon as tlie weather al^ }\ towed, it proceeded to Ephesns. On arriving in Asia, Themistocles wrote to the king Artaxerxes, the son and suc- cessor of Xerxes, beginning his letter thus: — " I, Themistocles, come to thee, who have done thy house most ill of aU the Greeks, while I was of necessity repelling the invasion of thy father ; but yet more good, when I was in safety and his return was endan- gered." He mentioned the warning he gave before the battle of Salamis of the intended flight of the Greeks, and the breaking of the bridge, which at the time he professed to have prevented : declared that he was able to do great service to the king, and was now ex- pelled for friendship to him ; and said, that at the year's end he would in per- son explain the purpose of his coming. The king bade him do so, and after a year spent in learning the Persian lan- guage and manners, he went to Susa, and was there received into the highest favour, as well on account of his repu- tation and the ability which appeared in his discourse, as for the promises he made of reducing Greece under the Persian yoke. The revenues of three cities were assigned for his support, and he lived in great splendour till he fell sick and died, according to some ; ac- cording to others, he poisoned himself when Artaxerxes was preparing an in- vasion of Greece, whether from con- scious inability to fulfil his promises, or from unwillingness to assist in enslaving the country he had preserved. It is said that he directed his bones to be carried to Attica, and secretly buried, since the laws forbade the interment there of one banished for treason. He left an unecjualled reputation for readi- ness, decision, and rectitude of judg- ment, fertility of resource and acuteness in conjecture, for foresight of the good and evil results of every measure, and for eloquence in enforcing his conclu- fions. Had he joined U) these high powers of mind a clear integrity and singleness of purpose, his fame would have been purer, and his latter days perhaps more happy. It is true his double policy served him well in secur- ing so splendid an asylum in Asia, but a more straightforward line of conduct might have prevented his exile. In all his exertions for the good of his country he endeavoured at the same time to pro- mote his private profit, and to keep up an interest with the public enemy, by which. he might he able, if it should be convenient, to separate his fortunes from those of Athens. Such a man, whatever be his services, can never be frusted : and however innocent he may have been of the freason of Pausanias, it was the natural consequence of his habitual doubledealing that the charge should readily be believed. During part of the war just described, a sfruggle no less critical had taken place among the Grecian settlements in Sicily. The Phoenician colony of Car- thage, in Africa, remarkable no less than its mother country for maritime and commercial enterprise, was begin- ning to attain a degree of military power to which Phoenicia had never aspired. It possessed a part of the northern coast of Sicily, and the opportunity was in- viting to subdue the whole, while all as- sistance from Greece was precluded by the Persian invasion. A pretext was furnished by a quarrel with Theron, ty- rant of Acragas, or Agrigentum, a co- lony from Gela, and, after Syracuse, the most powerful state in Sicily: and an enormous armament was sent out, strengthened, according to the usual practice of Carthage, with mercenaries from many barbarous nations, the fleet being by treaty joined with that of the Tuscans. Gt'lon, however, marched with the force of Syracuse to the assist- ance of Theron, leaving the command of his fleet to his brother Hieron : and Hieron defeated the Carthaginian and Tuscan fleet, while, about the same time, the Carthaginian land force was com- pletely broken at Himera by the united armies of Syracuse and Acragas. It is said, by some authors, that Gelon's victory took place on the same day with the battle of Salamis. No fur- ther conquest was attempted in Si- cily by Carthage tor many years after ; but we are not sufficiently acquainted with the history of that city to deter- mine the cause of its inaction. Shortly after his victory Gelon died. His ability and popularity are shown by the fact, that 1 3 years after, when a vote was passed to remove all statues of kings and tyrants, Gelon's alone was excepted. He was succeeded by Hieron, also a prince of considerable ability, and remarkable foi^ the encouragement of letters. In Ih^ following rei^ of his brother Thrasy- bulus, who is accused of cmelty and arbitrary conduct, a civil war took place, which ended with the establishment of democracy in Syracuse. . ^ii.'. to fr^ 4# GREECE GREECE. 17 Chapter V. 1 1 I jl 1! 111^ ( OJ Greece, from the establishment f\f Athfifis as a leading state, to the be- ginning of the Peloponnesian War, The Athenians, being acknowledged as leaders by the Greeks of Asia and the islands, proceeded reo:iilarly to organise the confederacy. Aristeides was, by common consent, appointed to make the assessment determining how much each city was to contribute in ships or money to the support of the war. This he exe- cuted with the greatest impartiality, and in such a manner, that the justice of the proportions appears to have been ques- tioned by none. The whole annual amount of the tribute was 460 talents, about 1 01 ,200/. Athenian officers were appointed to receive it, under the title of of HellenotamiaB, stewards or treasurers of the Greeks. The common treasury was established in the sacred island of Delos, and here the assembly of dele- gates was held which directed the opera- tions of the leagrue. The whole arrange- ment was marked by an equity and moderation uncommon in Greece, and very opposite to the after conduct of Athens : and this may probably be as- cribed partly to the circumstance that the power of Athens was yet incom- pletely established, and depended much on the good will of its allies, and partly also to the wisdom and virtue of some of the present leaders there, especially Aristeides. The war was successfully earned on under Cimon, the son of Miltiades, against those places in Europe which still held for the Persian King. But the allies grew weary of it, and many agreed to pay a sum of money in lieu of the ships which they were bound to furnish. By this Athens was at once obliged to build and employ more ships, and sup- plied with the means, while the navy of the allies proportionally declined. The Athenians feeling their strength became haughtier in their conduct, and more harsh in enforcing the same services which grew to be less punctually ren- dere^L Hence rose wars with the de- faulters, in which Athens uniformly pre- vailing, the fleet of the conquered city was taken from it and a heavier tribute levied: and since every such contest brought fresh power and wealth to the predominant state, and diminished the resources which could be at the com- mand of any combination among iti dependents, Athens, from the leader, became the mistress of her allies. The first state so subjected was the island Naxos, which revolted and was con- quered in the twelfth year of the Athe- nian command. In the following cam- paign the forces of the Athenian league under Cimon won two great victories on the same day from the Persians, by sea and then by land, at the mouth of the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia. Some time after the Athenians had a quarrel with the islanders of Thasos about some mines on the opposite coast of Thrace, and alK)ut the revenues of the ports in the same region; when the Thasians, after a defeat at sea, and a siege of three years, submitted to give up their ships of war, to demolish their walls, and to pay a heavy tribute, resign- ing: the disputed revenues. (B. C. 463.) The Lacedaemonians being appealed to by the Thasians, were secretly preparing to invade Attica in their behalf, when they were prevented by an earthquake, in which great part of Sparta was over- thrown, and 20,000 persons perished The Helots, who were nearly all of Gre- cian blood, and chiefly descended from the conquered Messenians, took the opportunity to revolt, and were joined by some of the Perioeci, or people of the towns, who, though personally free, were politically enslaved, being excluded from all share in the government, obliged to unlimited obedience to Lacedaemon, and liable to insolent and arbitrary indignity both from the ofiicers of the state and from individual Spartans. An attempt to surprise the city was foiled by the ready prudence of the King Archidamus, and the revolters occupied Ithome, the strong hold of their ancestors in the first Messenian war. They were here besieged by the Lacedaemonians, who called in aid from their allies, and particularly from the Athenians, on account of their superior skill in sieges. But the Athe- nians were proud of the rising greatness of their country, and little disposed to acknowledge the pre-eminence still as- sumed by Lacedaemon. Disagreement took place, and the Lacedaemonians be- came suspicious, considering the bold» restless, and somewhat capricious cha- racter of their allies, that the Athenians might possibly be induced in the course of the siege to turn against them. They therefore dismissed them, saying th.vt as the siege was converted into a blockade they had no further need of them: out thev still retained their other allies. The Atnenians perceived the cause, and were deeply offended, insomuch that they immediately renounced the alliance, and contracted one with the hostile state of Argos. Ithome was surrendered in the tenth year of the war, under the condition, that the besieged should for ever quit Peloponnesus, and that any who re-entered it should be a slave to the finder. The Athenians received them, and established them at Naupac- tus on the Corinthian gulf, which had been lately taken from the Locrians. A quarrel taking place between Me- irara and Corinth, the former revolted from the Lacedaemonian confederacy and allied itself with Athens, giving it the command, not only of the city, but of its two ports, Nisaea, on the Saronic, and Pegae, on the Corinthian gulf. (B.C.458.) The Athenians now built between Me- gara and Nisaea what the Greeks called long walls, that is, fortified lines securing the communication between a city and its port ; a valuable defence to a state allied with Athens against Pelopon- nesus, since no danger coidd be feared from a land blockade as long as suc- cours could be thrown in unopposed from the powerful navy of its ally. A war en- sued against the Peloponnesians, in which Athens gained many successes both by land and sea ; its most active enemies being by land the Corinthians, by sea the ^ginetans. In one instance its power and energy were most emi- nently shown, when a large part of its forces being employed in ^«gina, and another in Egypt, in an expedition which will afterwards be mentioned, the Corinthians with their allies marched against Megara, thinking that the Athe- nians could give it no assistance with- out abandoning the enterprise of ^Egina. The Athenians, without recalling a man, sent against them Myronides, an able commander, with those who remained at home, being chiefly old men and boys ; and with these they won a decisive vic- tory. About the same time they began their long walls. Their port of Peiraeeus, with the two smaller, Phalerum and Munychia, had been fortified at the sug- gestion of Themistocles, with even greater care than the city itself, and he advised them, if they should ever be miable to maintain both, to abandon the city, and establishing themselves in the Peiraeeus to hold out with their ships and their ramparts against all as- sailants. The city and the port were now connected by fortifications, in such sort that as long as they could com- mjfhd the sea and defend the waDs, the most superior land force could endanger neither. The Phocians having invaded Doris, the original country of the Lacediemo- nians, the strong mutual regard which generally subsisted in Greece between a mother country and her colonies, im- pelled the Lacedaemonians to send an army against them. Having effected it« object, the return of the army was op- posed by the Athenians, who, holding Megara and Pegae, commanded the passes of the isthmus ; and it was led into Boeotia to wait the discovery of some safe way to return, and also' the result of some overtures from Athenian malcontents, made desperate by the building of the long walls. In every Grecian state, the cavalry being com- posed of the richest men, and the heavy armed foot of citizens mostly in easy circumstances ; while the fleets, where they existed, were principally manned by the poor, who were elsewhere con- demned to insignificance among the despised crowd of light-armed ; the pos- session of a navy was necessarily fa- vourable to the importance of the com- mon people. Hence maritime power was always the wish of the democratical party ; whereas those who favoured oli- garchy preferred depending on the land force, of which the more substantial citizens were the strength. The safety and the present greatness of Athens had been won by the patriotic exertions of all its people, both poor and rich, and chiefly in that mode of warfaie wherein all were called into important and decisive action. Accordingly, from the Persian war the government of Athens began to be practically demo- cratical : the supremacy of the general assembly, always acknowledged, now came habitually into play; that body gradually engrossed all the powers of government ; and rank and wealth lost all political power, save what they must always exert by influencing the conduct of individuals. The importance of the richer classes was, however, maintained by whatever made the safety of Athens depend on the army it could keep in the field; and hence they would dislike a measure which ensured, without the protection of an army, a safe communi- cation with all its possessions. Besides^ 18 QRpKCE, in every democracy the oligarchical however, been removed from Delos to malcon^nts lookedL aid to Laced*- Athens -the assessment ^^ "^u-h mon, as did henceforward the popular raised; tiie affairs of the lea^e were party in oligarchical states to Athens : entirely directed by the Athenian as. Sd W wis a fresh motive to attempt sembly, and any disputes which might a revolution before the completion of anse among its members were deter- LwXwh^h would so mSch dimi. mined in the Athenian courts ; the idsh tiie ii)wer of L«ced«mon to help meeting of deputaes from the different Sem TrilSg against the democracy cities, which U ^^ee^^eld at Delos seems to have been contemplated, but was indeed contmued at Athens, but rrme to nothing. The Athenians it no longer had any effective power, its ma^ch^ out to Tan^ in Boeotia, and boldest exertion being humble sugges- were the^ defeated?some Thessalian tion or remonstrance to the Athenians, ho^e whS^w^ with them deserting in Besides, the power of Athens was ex- the action. The present policy of Lace- tensive on the continent of Greece. It daemon was to ?aise up^ Thebes as a directed Megaris, B«otia, Phocis, and cheTk on Athens, and L army on re- the Opuntian Locns ; from Pegae and tiring kft Boeotia subject to that city. Naupactus it commanded the Corinthian On?y sixty-two days'' afterwards the gulf; in Peloponnesus. Troezen was Atheni«is\mderMyfonides defeated the subject to it ; its influence was predo- Boeotians at CEnophyta. Tanagra was minant in Achaia, and Argos was con- taken in all the towns tiie dem^ratical nected with it by necessaiy interest and party,' ever hostile to Lacedaemon, was common hostUity to Laced«mon. ffi into activity, and all Boeotia, ex- While Athens was nsing to its i>re. c^t Thebes, came into alliance witii sent greatness changes not less im- Atiiens Mvronides next advancing into portant took place in its internal go- pS where the democratical party, vemment. Where slave- abour prevails, oSse tiie stronger, had been kept there can be little employment for the unde7by Thebes and Lacedaemon. re- poorer freemen; and hence m Greece stored ascendency to the friends of that class was usually degraded and Ath«^s ^d then proceeded to enforce miserable. The great destruction of pro- rti submission of tfie eastern or Opun- perty in the Persian war >^ould increase tiMi Locrians, who were generaUy at- the number of poor m Athens; th«r tached to Lacedamon. About the same bravery and services would much en- time ^gina submitted to give up its hance their claim to consideration. But flSt demolish its walls, and pay a tri- whence were tiiey to be maintained? bute • and Athens ceased to suffer from This question was answered by success- »n island which, from its situation, its ful and lucrative war. and the rap^ maritime sti-ength, and its ever active growth of empire. These gave tiie citi- Sostility, was caUed tiie eyesore of Pei- zens both employment and maintenance ; ^us The war continued about four in the intervals of service they lived at ^'longer, generally in favour of leisure on the fruits of pay and plunder. Athens. It WM then interrupted by a and occasional donations from the state five years' taiice with tiie Peloponne- and from wealthy individuals ; and hav- sians T B C 450 ) i^g ^^^^^ pnwaXe busmess they were the The empire' of Atiiens had now at- more ready to attend the assembly when tained its greatest magnitude. It ex- any interesting question was to be de- tended over most of thi islands of tiie bated. The poorer citizens were superior iEgean. including Euboea; over the mnumbertoaU.andto most of tiie middle Grecian towns of Thrace and Mace- class m leisure and frequency of attend- donia. and those of Asia. The terms ance : and hence rose two effects appa- of subjection were various : some were rently inconsistent ; the regular increase deprived of ships and fortifications, of power m the lower orders, witii tiie obliged to pay a heavy tribute, and ahnost uniform success of every mea- liable to what further exactions it might sure tendmg to gratify them ; and the please the Athenians to make ; others great influence accruing to vj ealthjr indi- ^hose obedience hitiierto had given no viduals if tiiey .^^^ out tiieir nch^^ pretence to oppress them, or whose witii politic hberahty on feasts, theatri- power made it a dangerous attempt, cal representations, and other methods retained their navy, and were only of contributing to tije amusement and bound to a li.^hter tribute and to ser- comforts of those who were unable to in war. fhe common treasury had. command the means of pleasiu^. G-REECE. 4S 1 - ' After the fall of Themistocles, Ciraon was long the first man in Athens, by his abilities, integrity, and popular manners, and by the splendidly liberal ase of his great wealth. He threw down the fences of his gardens and orchards near Athens, and permitted all to partake of their produce ; spread a table daily for the poorer citizens, parti- cularly those of his own ward ; and was always ready to give or lend money to the indigent. His magnificence was also displayed in public works. He adorned the city with splendid porticoes, groves, and gardens, in which it was the delight of the Athenians to assemble and pass their time in conversation. Most of this was done at his private expense: but other important works were executed under his direction, from the riches which his victories had brought into the treasury. In particular, the de- fences of the Acropolis were completed in this manner. ^ In his political bias Cimon was aris- tocratical, and desirous of friendship with Lacedaemon, and it was chiefly owing to him that so long a time elapsed before a breach with that power. There was, however, a strong opposing party whose influence rose with the rising dislike of Lacedaemon ; and when the Athenians were provoked to renounce its alliance, Cimon was banished by os- tracism, and the opposition came into power. Ephialtes was the ostensible leader .but Pericles the son of Xanthippus was rapidly gaining the chief influence ; a young man of noble birth and great abilities, with some military distinction, but principally noted as an accomplished statesman ami speaker. His high na- tural gifts had been improved to the utmost by education and by converse with philosophers and men of letters : his mind was penetrating and compre- hensive, his oratory most forcible, with a polish and elegance before unknown. The new government was strengthened by the gaining of Megara, and the en- suing victories ; but the people missed the bounty of Cimon ; it was necessary togi-atify them, and the means of the present leaders were inadequate. The expedient adopted was to apply to this purpose a part of the public revenues ; and at the same time it was deemed essential to that speedy and brilliant success in the war without which the administration could not stand, to con- duct the operations on a great and ex- pensive scale. But all issues from the treasury were controlled by the council of Areiopagus, which being mostly aristocratical and friendly to Cimon, was tliought not likely to sanction the ex- penditure demanded by the views of the new rulers. Ephialtes proposed to cur- tail the powers of that body, giving to the assembly the cognizance of the most important causes reserved by Solon to the Areiopagus, and the power of directing issues from the treasury without control. The motion was sup- ported by Pericles, who, after it was carried, obtained a law giving* pay for attendance in the assembly and in the courts. The religious festivals were increased in number and magnificence, and thus, on days of business the many were fed by their pay, on holidays feasted by the victims of the sacrifices. Since the Persian war, Athens had become the seat of philosophy and art, which had long flourished in the earlier quiet, riches, and civilization of Ionia, but had hitherto been littie cultivated in Greece. Their growth had been liberally encouraged under the administrations of Themistocles and Cimon, and that of Pericles went yet further in the same career. The city was adorned with master-pieces of sculpture, painting, and architecture. The religious festivals were accompanied with contests in poetry and music. Tragedy, from a rude ode in honour of Bacchus, had been raised by Thespis, Phrynichus, and others, to a delineation ot human action and suffering ; had been clothed by .(Eschylus with the utmost loftiness of thought and expression, and set forth with all the aids of scenic effect ; and was still most successfully pursued by Sophocles, Euripides, and others not meanly gifted, though inferior to these. Comedies were exhibited, disgraced in- deed with licentious ribaldry and gross personal abuse, but rife with wit and humour, lively painting of character, and keen political satire. Many dis- tinguished philosophers were resident in Athens, and the citizens flocked to hear them discourse in porticoes and other places of public resort. With such amusements, the people must needs have been unusually pure of taste and active in mind ; but theu- time was given to little but amusement, and hence they were, like other idlers, light-minded and capricious. Secure of subsistence • This is the statement cfAriatotle; a-Jconlinr f« some others, ther« was a suiai' pay given befurt which Perici«« mcreas- raeans were defeated, and driven to tlie shore; and, in tPie pursuit, hostilities passed between the Corinthians and Athenians. The Corinthians then si.'t themselves to collect the wrecks and make pi isomers of tlie men who were found on them ; most of whom they slew, and among them, ignorantly, some of their own friends, whose vessels had been destroyed by tlie Corcyraeans. In the evening, they again advaiiced ; anj ,»■ X I S-l GREECE GREECE. Si (^' fearing a landing, the CorcvTajans led out their shattered fleet, with the Athe- nian ships, which would now have gciven more decided aid : but the Corinthians were deterred from joining battle by the approach of a squadron which proved to be of twenty Attic triremes. The aext day. the Corcyraeans, with the thirty Athenian ships, offered battle. Unwilling now to fight, and unable to maintain themselves in their station, the Corinthians resolved to try the dis- position of the Athenians ; and sent to them, in a boat without a herald, mes- sengers who accused them of breaking the truce by obstructing the movements of the Corinthians, and bid them treat themselves as enemies if they intended to commence a war. The Corcyraeans within hearing called out to kill the mes- sengers, which, considering them as enemies without a herald, would have been within the Grecian laws of war : but the Athenian leaders answered that they were not breaking the truce, but protecting their allies ; and that the Corinthians might go whithersoever hey would, if it were not against any )lace belonging to Corcyra. Hereupon he Corinthians went home, as did also he Athenian squadron to Athens. Potidaea, a town on the Isthmus con- necting the Peninsula of Pallene with the confines of Thrace and Macedonia, thous^h a tributary ally of Athens, was a colony of Corinth, and still so far con- nected with its mother city as to receive thence annually magistrates. It was now urged to revolt by the Corinthians, and by Perdiccas king of Macedonia, who was also endeavouring to stir up a revolt among the other subjects of Athens in his neighbourhood, the Chal- cidians and Bottiaeans. TliJ Athenians being informed of this, sent a requisi- tion to the Potidteans, to give hostages of fidelity, to demolish their walls on the side towards Pallene, to send away the Corinthian magistrates, and thence- forward to receive none. The Potidaeans gent to sohcit a reversal of the order, and, at the same time, in conjunction with the Corinthians, secretly negotiated for the support of Lacedajmon. The Athenians refused to relax, and the Spar- tan administration promising to invade Attica in case the Athenians should endeavour by arms to enforce their demands, the Potidaeans engaged in a league with the Chalcidians and Bot- tifieans, and all revolted together. The Chalcidian Peninsula beiig open to the fleet of Athens, Perdiccas proposed to the inhabitants to destroy their towns and abandon their lands; to make Olynthus their one strong-hold; and during the war to remove to a territory, which he would assign for their support, all then- people beyond what the defence of the citv might require. This measure was adopted, and the greatness of the sacrifice shows that the Athenian sway had been most galling. (jL.*^ The Athenians sent 30 ships to Thrace, and 40 more with 2000 Athe- nian heavy- armed, when they learnt that the Corinthian Aristeus, with 1600 heavy armed, was on his way to Po- tidaea. They first attacked Perdiccas, but having soon concluded a treaty with him, they went against the re- volted allies. These they found before Olynthus, commanded by Aristeus, and with 200 horse from Perdiccas, who had turned against the Athenians as soon as the pressure of their arms was re- moved. The Athenians were victorious, their enemies mostly flying to Olynthus, but Aristeus, who had broken and pur- sued too far the wing opposed to him, taking refuge in Potidaia. They sat down before Potidaea, and being rein- forced by 1600 heavy-armed, they were enabled to complete tlie blockade. Ari- steus, having settled matters within, es- caped out of the citv, and takmgthe com- mand of the Chalcidians, gave the be- siegers some annoyance, and at the same time pressed the Peloponnesians for aid. The Corinthians now called more loudly for war, and were supported by others, particularly the iEginetans, who secretly, since they dared not openly, complained of their subjection. The Lacedaemonians being met in assembly to hear any charge which might be made against the Athenians, the Me- garians, among otliers, alleged that they were unjustly excluded from the Attic market and the subject ports. Last of all, the Corinthians blamed the general tardiness of Lacedaemon ; set forth the dangers arising to Grecian liberty from the insatiable ambition and restless enterprise of Athens; c"om- plained of their own particular griev- ances, and called for assistance to their friends shut up in Potidaea. It hap- pened that Athenian ambassadors were then in Sparta ; and they, hearing their city thus accused, demanded a hearing. They would not, they said, answer par- ticularly to charges made before those in wltom no right resided to judge between them and their allies ; but they wished to admonish the hearers against lightly determining so great a matter, and to show their city not unworthy of its empire. They spoke of the merits of Athens in both Persian invasions, and the voluntary submission of the allies ; and said tliat, as their sway was ho- nourably won, so in the present temper of Lacedaemon it could not safely be relinquished. They endeavoured to palliate the harshness of their rule; deprecated all breach of the existing truce, and offered to submit all disputes to arbitration, according to the treaty. The foreign ministers being dismissed, Archidamus, the aged king, a wise and moderate man, addressed the assembly. He justified the habitual caution of La- cedaemon, and set forth the dangers and certain evils of war with a state so far superior in wealth and in naval skill and power. In land force, he said, it was true the Peloponnesians had the advantage ; but they could only ravajje Attica, while the Athenians would be constantly supplied with all they needed from possessions far beyond the reach of their enemies. Finally, since the Athenians were willing to submit to a judicial decision, the appeal to arms would be unjus* The question was put, and the assembly decided that the treaty was broken, and that the allies should be called to deliberate whether war were to be commenced. This took place in the fourteenth year of the thirty years truce, and the forty-ninth after the battle of Salamis. It was followed by a meeting of the allies, which re- solved on immediate war. It is the opinion of the discerning Thucydides, that the Lacedaemonians were less de- termined to hostility by the complaints of their allies than by their own jealousy of the power of Athens. Unprepared for action, the Lace- daemonians wished to delay the begin- ning of the ' war : they also wished to throw on the Athenians the refusal of peace, and, if possible, to throw dis- sension among them. With these views they sent an embassy to Athens on a subject totally unconnected with the pre- sent quarrels, but likely to engage on their side the superstition of Greece. Fit atonement, they said, had not been made for the sacrilege of the Alcmaeonidae in the sedition of Cylon; and since the curse of sacrilege was held to cleave to all descendants' of the guilty, they re- quired that the wrath of the gods should be averted fi-om Greece by the total expulsion of the polluted race. Of these V as Pericles, through his mother ; and though they could not hope to obtain his banishment, they yet ex- pected, by alarming the people, to embarrass his administration. It would have been vain to allege the antiquity of the crime, or the innocence of those on whom it was now to be visited ; for in the popular faith of Greece, blind fear was predominant over reason and justice : but the demand was easily re- pelled by recrimination. The Lace- daemonians had two more recent sacri- leges unatoned, the starving of Pausa- nias in the Brazen House, and the execution of some Helots forced from the temple of Neptune on Mount Taena- rus, to which last the great earthquake at Sparta was popularly ascribed. They were therefore required first to expel the accursed families from among themselves. A second embassy came with a dif- ferent commission. It required that the siege of Potidaea should be raised and JEgmsi made free ; but chiefly that the decree against Megara should be reversed. The first demands were little pressed, and decidedly rejected ; to the third, and principal, the i\thenians re- phed by alleging misconduct on the part of the Megarians, who had cultivated the sacred land on the borders which ought to be inviolate, and received the fugitive slaves of the Athenians. A third em- bassy, neglecting the former requisitions, demanded, as the one condition of peace, the independence of all Grecian sub- jects of Athens. The assembly being divided in opinion how to answer, Peri- cles addressed them. He exhorted them resolutely to withstand the imperious demands of the ambassadors, since one concession to fear would embolden the Peloponnesians to dictate new sub- missions without limit ; and he showed that the war was more to be dreaded by Lacedaemon than by Athens. Infe- rior in shipping, and still more in sea- manship, the Peloponnesians never could cope with them at sea ; they might ravage their lands, but the Athenians could retaliate, and the ravage of all Attica would be a smaller calamity than that of a part of Peloponnesus. " If we were islanders, who," he asked, " would be so proof against attack ? Let us then be islanders in our policy, giving up our lands and houses, and only solicitous to defend tlMi city and i ^ GRK£C£U GREECE. if III command the sea: and let us not squander the lives of men, on whose exertions oiur empn-e depends, in a doubtful attempt to preserve for a time a territor>' of which the loss is little im- portant, and to repel an invasion which, if repelled, will soon be repeated with no less a force. 1 have many other grounds to hope success, if you be but wilhng not to seek fresh conquests dur- ing the war. To the embassy let us answer. That we will admit the Mega- rians to our markets and ports, if the Lacedaemonians will abrogate, as far as respects ourselves and our allies, the law excluding strangers from their city ; for neither of these points is provided for in the treaty : That our subject cities shall be independent, if they were inde- pendent at the making of the treaty ; and if at any time the Lacedaemonijins shall permit their allies to settle their re- spective governments in their own fashion, and not in that most agreeable to Lacedaeraon : That we are willing, according to the treaty, to submit our disputes to a fair arbitration : and that we will not commence a war, but we will resist, if others commence it." The - foresight of Pericles is worthy of remark, since we shall find thai Athens was with difficulty prevented from triumphing by gross errors of conduct, and particu- larly by that rashness and wild thirst of conquest which he deprecated. The answer was framed according to his suggestion : That the Athenians would do nothing on command ; but that they were wiliinc to abide by a judicial deci- sion g to the treaty. eloponnesian War, Sect. I.— Thebes had ever been accus- tomed, as the leading city of Boeotia, to claim political and military command over all the rest. The Plataeans had refused submission,and stood upon their independence as a separate state ; and. at an early period, finding themselves ^nuble to resist the overwhelming power of the Thebans, they had sued 4o Lace- daemon for aid. It did not then agree with the views of the Lacedaemonians to engage in the concerns of a region SI distant as Boeotia, and they there- re advised the suppliants to make Iheir request to the Athenians, who were a powerful people and near at hand. The Plataeans did so, and met with prompt and effectual aid from Athen« : in return for which they gave theai heartiest service in all the wars and dangers of their protectors. The The- bans were now sure of war with Athens ; they had often been annoyetl by the hostility of the Plataeans, 'and alw^s had ill brooked their assertion of inde- pendence; and, hoping to secure the town before the genertU struggle broke out, they Ustened to some Plataean mal- contents, who offered to introduce their troops into the city. 1 hree hundred were^ sent, who entered by night the more easily, as no watch was set, for it was considered a time of peace. Their in- troducers wished them to proceed to the massacre of their chief enemies; but they preferred to gain the city peaceably if possible, and taking ground in the market place, they made proclamation that those should join with them, whor wished to be leagued with all the Boeo- tians according to the custom of their fathers. Dismayed at the sudden attack^ the Plataeans listened to their proposals, till they discovered the small number oC the invaders ; but, finding this, they as- sailed them while perplexed by the dark- ness in their ignorance of the streets. The Thebans were defeated, and most of the survivors obliged to surrender at discretion. A Theban army following to support the detachment received, while on the march, the news of its destruc- tion ; and when the leaders were deter- mining to seize on any Plataeans found without the walls, as pledges for the captured Thebans, a Plataean herald ar- rived to rebuke their treacherous aggres- sion, and to declare that, if they did any injury, the prisoners should instantly be put to death. The Thebans retired ; bu|^ the Plataeans, in the violence of their re»ft sentment, proved false to the promise, which, if not expressed, was implied in their threat, and all the prisoners were executed, in number one hundred and eighty. A messenger had been sent to Athens with the news of the surprise, and the Boeotians in Attica were airested: a second to tell of the capture of the The- bans; and directions were relumed to keep the prisoners safe till the Athenians should determine of their treatment. Un- fortunately, they were already dead. An Athenian army now conducted to Plataea a convoy of provisions, and having left a detachment to assist in the deience, brought away with it the women and children, and* men unfit for war. The Lacedaemonians were exei*ling themselves to the utmost in preparation. Ambassadors were sent to Persia, chiefly in hope of pecuniary aid. A fixed money contribution was appointed to be paid by each of the allies, and it was pro- posed that five hundred triremes should be raised for the maritime states, besides those expected from the Italian and Si- cilian Greeks, who mostly favoured their cause. The league included all the Pe- loponnesians, except the Argians and Achaians, who were neutral; and nearly all the states of northern Greece, except the Thessalians and Acamanians. These sided with Athens, the former coldly, but the latter more heartily; and by their friendship, with that of Corcyra and Zacynthus, and with the town of Naupactus held by the Messenians, who owed their very existence to Athenian protection, the Athenians were enabled to carry on the war m the western seas. Corcyi-a, Chios, and Lesbos, furnished ships to Athens, and were treated as in- dependent : the remaining islands of the ^gean, except Melos andThera, with all the Greeks of Asia, and all in Thrace but those who had recently revolted, were tributary subjects, deprived of ships of war, and Hable to unlimited control. In spite of a more cultivated humanity of manners, and a religion so pointedly opposed to violence and bloodshed, that by some it has been construed to forbid even necessary defence, nearly every war has been popular in the outset, even in the states of civilized and Christian Eu- rope. The Greeks were ardent lovers of military fame, and little imbued with universal justice and philanthropy. The utmost extent of their political morality went no further than patriotism and fidelity to contracts ; few even of deep thinkers held it a duty to respect the happiness of mankind, or felt the wicked- ness of unnecessary war. It is not then wonderful that the call to arms should have been generally welcome, when, in fourteen years, the youth had grown up inexperienced in the sufferings of war, but proud of the glory of their fathers, and eager to emulate their deeds. All Greece was in anxiety ; oracles and pre- dictions without number were circu- lated ; and every uncommon natural phe- nomenon was made a presage of the event. The general wish was favourable to the Lacedaemonians, who professed to uphold the liberty of Greece. The sub- jects of Athens were eager to be libe- rated, and those who were yet free were fearful of bemg subjected ; and thus as she rose to empire through the tyranny of Pansanias, she seemed likely to fall from it through her own. The Peloponnesians advanced under king Archidamus, but, before they en- tered Attica, a Spartan minister was sent to try whether the Athenians would yet recede in their prf tensions. The messenger was not admitted to a hear- ing, but was sent away with the decla- ration that, if the Lacedaemonians wished to make any proposal, they must first withdraw their army. Having received this answer, Archidamus crossed the Attic border. Pericles was one of the ten generals of Athens. His office enabled him to. call at his discretion extraordinary assem- blies of the people; and this, with the power of guiding their proceedings by his eloquence and popularity, gave him, in effect, the supreme direction of the state. In an assembly held while the Peloponnesians were gathering, he en- deavoured to prepare the people for the war. Apprehending that Archidamus might spare his lands, either for private friendship which existed between them, or by command of the Lacedaemonians, to make him suspected in Athens ; he declared that if his estates met with any distinguishing forbearance he would resign them to the public. He ex- horted his hearers to secure their move- able property in the city, and avoiding a battle, to look to the maintenance of their naval strength and foreign com- mand, the chief sources of their great- ness. He then stated the amount of then* means. Besides other revenues, the yearly tribute from the allies was now six hundred talents, about one hundred and fifty thousand pounds. The treasury contained six thousand talents in coined money, and there was uncoined gold and silver in sacred vessels, offer- ings, Persian spoils, &c. to a vast amount. The native heavy- armed troops were twenty-nine thousand men. The ca- valry, with the horse bowmen, were twelve hundred ; the foot bowmen, sixteen hun- dred. Besides there would be numerous light armed, chiefly slaves. The triremes fit for service were three hundred. It is not stated what additional force was supplied by the allied. The Athenians brought into the city their families and funiiture, and sent their cattle to Euboea and the other neighbouring islands ; reluctantly, for they were beyond all other Greeks at- tached to a country life. The ravages of GREECE. GREECE. WW the Persians had been repaired, the liouses rebuilt, and many with expen- sive improvements, all which would now again be ruined. They regretted the temples, and the old religious obseijan- oes of the several towns, inherited from times before the union effected by Theseus. The actual distress was great. Many fell from competence to poverty by the cessation of income from their estates. The city was filled with a mul- titude far greater than the houses could eontwn: some found shelter in the temples, some in towers of the walls ; the rest were hutted in open spaces of the city and the Peiraeeus, and on the ground between the long walls. Never- theless, they applied themselves vigor- ously to warUke preparations, and a fleet of one hundred ships was made ready to act aajainst Peloponnesus. The advance of Archidamus was re- tarded by the hope that the Athenians, while their property was yet undamaged, might offer concessions to preserve it. No offer coming, he proceeded to Eleu- sis, and sitting down there, wasted the rich Thriasiaii plain ; then to Achamae, the largest parish of Attica, and withm six miles of Athens. The Achamians were a numerous and powerful body, and furnished alone three thousand heavy armed ; and he thought that tliey might prevail with the people to risk a battle, or if not, when they had lost their property, they would be less warm in defending that of others, and he might pursue his operations more securely. Athens was all confusion. The Thria- sian plain had been ravaged by Pleis- toanax ; but never before, since the Per- sian war, had an enemy come in sight of Athens. Some cried out for battle, particularly the Achamians ; others op- posed a measure so perilous; but all agreed in censuring Pericles as the cause of their evils. Pericles stood firm, and would not call an assembly, since it would probably have voted to risk an immediate engagement ; but he sent out parties of cavahV to cut off stragglers, and to prevent the extension of ravage to any distance from the camp ; and in an action with the Boeotian horse, the Athenians had the advantage. Having wasted the Achamian vale, and vainly sought a batUe, the invaders earned de- vastation to Oropus, at the eastern ex- treniity of Attica, and thence passing into BoBotia, returned home. Meanwhile, the one hundred Atho- tiian sliips, witli fifty Corcyrwan, and a few from other allies, sailed round Pelo- ponnesus, and wasted much of its west- ern coast. Passing on, they took As- tacus, in Acamania, expelled its t3rrant, and estabUshing democracy, admitted it to alliance; and without hostility brought over to theu- interest the large island of C^halonia. The Athenians voted to set aside one thousand talents as a reserve for extre- mity, and denounced death to whoever should propose to touch it unless the city should be attacked by sea; an event implying the prior ruin of the Athenian navy, and the only thing, as it was thought, which could destroy the com- monwealth. One hundred triremes were set aside for the same emergency. The ^i^inetans were known to have been active in kindling the war, and their in- veterate hostility was peciOiarly danger- ous from the situation of their island. By a harsh measure but one which seems, according to Grecian maxims, not to have exceeded what the provoca- tion might justify, the whole free popu- lation was expelled, and a colony of Athenians occupied the lands and houses. Thus the island was garrisoned without expense, and the city relieved of part of the multitude which crowded it. Most of the iEginetans were established by the Lacedaemonians at Thyrea, on the confines of ArgoUs and Laconia. The Athenians had successfully negotiated with Sitalces, the powerful king of Thrace, who became their ally, and ef- fected peace and alliance between them and Perdiccas. Winter setting in, all Greece was quiet, except the western coast, where a Corinthian squadron restored the tyrant of Astacus. At Athens, the funeral of those who had fallen in battle was, ac- cording to custom, publicly solemnized, and Pericles being appointed to pro- nounce their funeral oration, delivered a speech which has been reported by Thu- cydides. As this and some other speeches of Pericles are the earliest extant speci- mens of Grecian eloquence, so they may justly take their rank among its greatest masterpieces. In the first campaign, the ravage of Attica had been retaliated with not less effect, and with far smaller expense and trouble. But in the following year, just as the Peloponnesians had commenced a second iiu-oatl, Athens was visited with a scourge more tenible tlian they. A pestilential fever, originating in AiXhxO' pia, had been felt in Egyt)t and many parts of Asia, when it fell on Athens with fiiry Ixjfore unknown. It besran with heats in the head, and inflammation in the eyes ; the tongue and throat were bloody, the breath fetid; then came sneezing, then laborious coughing ; then excessive evacuations in all ways, fol- lowed by violent hiccups and spasms. The skin was reddish and full of ulcers, but not outwardly hot ; though the in- ternal fever was such that the patient could not bear the lightest covering, and many threw themselves into the wells for relief. Thirst was unquenchable, and sleep there was none, yet the suffer- ers were less weakened than might have been expected. The fever lasted from seven to nine days ; but many who sur- vived it perished by the ulceration of the bowels, and the flux which followed. The disease passed from the head through the whole body, and finally fixed in the extremities, which many lost. Some were totally deprived of memory, and recovered, not knowing their nearest friends, nor even themselves. Birds and beasts of prey would not touch the corpses, or, tasting them, they perished. No remedy was found for the disease. Its virulence was increased by the uni- form despondency of the sufferers ; and they died neglected, or if any ministered to them, he caught the infection. Those only who had passed through the ma- lady, could attend with safety on the sick, since they were not again liable to it in a fatal degree. The evil was in- creased by the crowded state of the city. Dying men lay heaped in stifling huts, or in the streets, and about the foun- tains, whither they thronged to drink. The temples were filled with corpses, and means were wanting for the burial of the dead. The worst effects of the calamity were imbounded licentiousness and desperate thoughtlessness. Men said in their hearts *• Let us eat, drink, and revel, for to-mor- row we die : why spare health or fortune, which we shall not live to enjoy ? " Rich houses were made desolate, and poor men, suddenly enriched, abused their wealth hi riot and de'^'auchery. Men's affections were blunted, and their natures brutalized, by tumultuous revelry, when all were perishing around them, and when the riches they squandered were derived from the recent death of those who had been most dear to them. No fear of God, or the laws, deterred from crimes that promised the means of im- mediate pleasure. Untaught by their religion to look to the Divinity for aught but worldly blessings, they saw no dis- tinction between the righteous and the wicked, when the pestilence was fatal to both ; and the laws were impotent, since no one expected that he would live to suffer their sentence. At this time of misery, Pericles ad- hered to the policy he had chosen. He would not hazard a battle, but suffered the Peloponnesians to ravage Attica, while their own country was wasted yet more extensively than before by the Athenian fleet. But the spirit of the Athenians was broken : they made pro- posals of peace, which were haughtily refused ; and the shame of failure con- curred with previous suffering to raise their anger against Pericles, as the au- thor of their misery. Pericles called an assembly to encourage them, and justify himself. He re-stated the reasons for war, which had before determined them, and which now had lost no force ; re- minded them that he had warned them of all their present sufferings, except the pestilence, which no human wisdom could foresee; repeated that, if they now gave way, they must be subject to Lacedaemon, and on harder terms than if they had yielded at first ; and showed that, with firmness, they might still pre- vail. His arguments persuaded them to maintain the war, but their anger for their individual losses did not subside till they had fined him heavily ; vet so convinced was the capricious multitude of his superior merit, that they soon re- elected him general, and put everything under his direction. In the autumn, there fell into the hands of the Athenians some Pelo- ponnesian ambassadors sent to Persia. Among them was Aristeus, who had chiefly managed the revolt of Potidaea ; and the fear of further damage from him was a leading motive in the cruelty which followed. The ambassadors were put to death unheard, under the plea of retalia- tion for the atrocious conduct of the La- cedaemonians, who, since the war began, had massacred the crew of every mer- chant ship they met with, whether of the Athenians or tneir allies, or even of neu- trals. In the ensuing winter, Potidaea surrendered, on the terms that the gar- rison and people should be dismissed in freedom. The territory was occupied by a colony of Athenians. Pericles died soon after through the pestilence ; and after his death, Thucy- dides observes, liis foresight was mad« II «# GHKiiCE. GRKECE ^t I manifest. " For he said that the Athe- nians would prevail in the war, if they at- tended to their navy, made no new eon- quests, and incurred no needless dan- gers : but they did just the contrary, and besides committed many other faults. both among themselves and asjainst their allies, at the persuasion of ambitious and interested men. And the reason of the difference was, that he being powerful by ability, reputation, and pre-eminent integrity, was not obliged to humour the people, but able to direct them ; whereas those who followed being more on a level with each other, and each aspiring to be first, courted favour by advising not what was best, but what was most agree- able. Yet the Athenians, after squan- dering unprofitably the best of their strength, and provoking new and power- ful enemies, were with difficulty over- come when weakened by internal strife ; so more than verified was the assertion of Pericles that, with prudence, they were a match for the Peloponnesians." In two invasions of Attica, the Pelo- ponnesians, with ^eat expense, had caused much individual sutfering, but had failed to provoke a battle, and had Uttle weakened the adverse state. Tlie next summer they entered not Attica, but laid siege to PlataBa. The Plataeans remonstrated, urging the merit of their commonwealth in the Persian war, and the perpetual protection assured to them by Pausanias, in the name of Greece. Archidamus, who commanded the Pelo- ponnesians, offered neutrality ; and when they said they could not trust the The- bans for observance of the terms, his answer was, " Entrust to us your lands and houses, show us the boundaries of the lands, and numljer the fruit trees ; and sojourn where you please till the war is over, when ail shall be restored ; till then, we will cultivate the land, and provide for your subsistence." The PJa- tacans consented, provided the Athenians were willing ; but deputies being sent to Athens, brought a requisition to abide by the terms of their alliance, and a promise of aid. They, therefore, de- clared themselves unable to comply with the demands of the Lacedaemonians; and Archidamus, solemnly protesting that the breach of faith was on the side of Pktfea, commenced the siege. '1 he mode of attack was rude and unskilful, the garrison active and vigilant; and the besiegers were obliged to resort to olockade. All useless mouths having lieen sent to Athens, there were in the place but four hundred Plata-ans, eightjf Athenians, and one hundred and tei| women, to make bread. Meanwhile, an Athenian army had been beaten by the Chalcidians of ThracCii and an attempt had been made againal| the power of Athens in Western Greece. The Ambraciots, a Corinthian colony t<:j the north of Acarnania, with the Leuca-| dians and Ar^actorians, one thousand Peloponnesians, and some of the neighiy bouring barbarians, invaded Acarnania^ but the barbarians, rashly separating, themselves, were defeated, and the ex- pedition failed. Of one hundred ships equipped last year by the Peloponne- sians, forty-seven being sent firom Co- rinth to co-operate with the force in Acar- nania, were intercepted by Phormion, who was stationed with twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus. Confident in his own ability, and the skill of his crews, he met them, and confounded them with his manoeuvres, sunk their admiral, and routed them, taking twelve ships. The Peloponnesians sent out seventy- seven ships to retrieve their defeat, yet, with these, they feared to meet the small squadron of Phormion in the open sea. At length, they entrapped him in the en- trance of the bay, where there was not room for his superior manoeuvring. Nine Athenian ships were taken or forced aground, some of which were recovered by the Messenians on the shore, dashing into the water, and fighting from the decks: eleven fled towards Naupactus, pursued by the Peloponnesian advanced squadron of twenty ships. The hindmost of these eleven was nearly overtaken by & Leucadian trireme, when it turned round a large vessel at the entrance of the port, struck its pursuer on the side, and sunk it. The Peloponnesians stopped in con- fusion and alarm, and the eleven Athe- nian ships, advancing in order, had an easy victory. The Athenians took six ships, and recovered all which had been taken from them, save one. A project was suggested to the Lace- daemonian commanders, by which they might partly cover their disgrace. Being told by Uie Megarians that the Athenian government, secure in naval superiority, left Peiraeeus little guarded, they deter* mined to surprise it. A body of seamen crossing the isthmus, launched forty tri-^ remes laid up in Nissea, and stood to- wards Attica ; but a contrary wind aris* ing, they feared they might be too late for surprise, and, instead of sailing for Pvineeus, they landed ou Salamis, and MVfiged it. The time thus wasted saved Peiraeeus. The alarm in Athens was ex- cessive, at sight of the beacon tires, which annoimced the presence of an enemy. All hurried in arms to the port, the ships were launched and manned, and stood for Salamis ; but the Pelo- ponnesians, not awaiting them, returned to Nisaea with much booty, some pri- soners, and three empty triremes, not without fear that their leaky vessels might founder on the way. Hencefor- ward, the Athenians kept better guard in their harbour. The Peloponnesian fleet having dispersed, the winter was spent by phormion in strengthening the Athenian interest in Acarnania, by con- firming the power of the friendly party in the towns, and banishing the most ob- noxious men. Perdiccas of Macedonia had again changed sides, and Sitalces attacked him, at once to fulfil his engagements with Athens, and to punish a breach of faith to himself. The Thracians were a barbarous, but bold and hardy race; and however inferior in discipline and skill, their numerical superiority was such that the Macedonians could not keep the field. Sitalces overran and wasted Macedonia and Chalcidice ; but his army suffered through hunger and wintry weather, and he retired without making any permanent conquest. The next summer Attica was again invaded by the Peloponnesians ; and soon after all Lesbos but Methymne re- volted from Athens. The island was di- vided into six republics, of which Mity- lene and Methymne were far the most powerful. Methymne was zealous for democracy and Athens ; but in Mitylene the oligarchical party was strong ; and this, wfth the hope of undisputed rule in the island, and the fear that they might be like others deprived of their fleet and reduced to subjection, disposed the Mi- tylenaeans to revolt. They increased their navy, strengthened their defences, and laid m stores for a siege; they had already influence in the smaller states, fend they now improved it to a strict union. But before their preparations were completed, the Athenians being informed by the Methymnaeans, and some of the democratical Mitylenaeans, commanded them to desist : and their refusal brought an Athenian squadron iif 40 triremes. The Mitylenaeans en- deavoured to gain time by negotiation : but the only terms of pardon now were the surrender of their navy, and the de- molition of their walls. All Lesbos df^' claredfor Mitylene, except the Methym- naeans, who joined the Athenians with their whole force. After an indecisive engagement in the field, the Mitylenaeans retired within their walls, and the siege was formed. Ambassadors from Mitylene, amving at Sparta, were sent to sound the allies at the Olympian meeting. At a confe- rence held after the solemnities, it was resolved to aid them by again invading Attica : and the fleet which lay in the Corinthian gulf was carried across the isthmus, to co-operate with the land force. Dispersed in the Grecian seas as was the navy of the Athenians, it was thought they could not meet the attack but by withdrawing the squadron from Lesbos ; but they launched 100 triremes which lay ready in Peiraeeus, displayed their force before the astonished enemies, who ventured not to quit theu- ports, and made descents where they would on Peloponnesus. The Peloponnesians were busy with their harvest, and weary with fruitless inroads ; and intelligence coming that an Attic squadron was ra- vaging Laconia, the invasion was given up, and the Lacedaemonians went home. The armament in Lesbos being so in- adequate to its purpose that the Mity- lenaeans kept the field, Paches was sent with 1000 heavy-armed to take the com- mand, and his arrival again confined them to their walls. The Athenian treasury was exhausted with the war, and a contribution was now first collec- ted from the citizens, apparently as a free gift. At the same time ships were sent to levy money from the allies. In the following summer, the fifth of the war, the Peloponnesians ravaged Attica more destructively than in any invasion but the second, and sent Alci- das with 42 ships to Mitylene. In the winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, had brought assurance of such an aid ; but as the year advfinced, even he began to despair of it. He thought that by giving the armour of the phalanx to the lower people, who, as in most oUgarchical states, were only allowed to act as light- armed, the Mit> lenaeansjnstead of starv- ing in their walls, might keep the field. The thing was done — but the people, no longer awed by the monopoly of arms and discipline in the privileged class, claimed a part in the government, de- manded a public and equal distribution of food, and threatened, if refused, to make their own terms with the besicgeiSti I 0RSKGB. GREECE. 63 i! The leaders be'm^ alarmed capitulated for all on these hard terms :— That the Mitylenaeans should surrender them- selves to the pleasure of the Athenian people— that the Athenian army should immediately be admitted into the city— and that none should be put into bonds, enslaved, or killed, till the wiU of the people was known. ^ ,v* i When Alcidas heard that Mitylene was taken, some advised him to attempt its recovery, by surprising the Athenians while ignorant of his arrival ; others to seize some city in Ionia, and issuing thence to win that country from Athens. But Alcidas was only anxious for a safe return. Instead of going on to Lesbos, he coasted in the opposite direction, tak- ing many merchant vessels, which fear- lessly approached, the crews supposing that any ships of war in those seas must be Athenian. AU the prisoners he mas- sacred, according to the savage practice of the Lacedaemonians from the beginning of the war, till, at the remonstrance of tome Samians, he changed his conduct. But as soon as he found that the Athe- nians in Lesbos had heard of him. he sail- ed dfrectly for Peloponnesus. The alarm of his presence had been great in Ionia, as the towns were kept unfivtified lest they should assert independence. Paches pursued, but coiUd not overtake him, and returned to Mitylene, whence he sent to Athens the chief promoters of the revolt. The Athenians were highly enraged against the Mitylenaeans, both because they had revolted, being exempt froni the galling voke imposed on most of the allies, and because they had first brought a Peloponnesian fleet on the coast of i\sia. In their first fury they voted death to all the grown up citizens, and slavery to the women and children. On the morrow, the people seeming dis- satisfied with tlieir vote, at the instance of some friends to the intended victims, a second assembly was called. The chief supporter of the vote was Cleon, a profligate demagogue, with little ability in the conduct of affairs, a coarse but ready speaker, and skilful in flattering the worst passions of the populace. He dwelt on the mischiefs of lightly chang- ing purpose, and the necessity of a ter- rible example to check the spirit of re- volt already prevalent in the subjects of Athens; and laboured to inflame the people by setting forth the privileges which the Lesbians had enjoyed. His opponents argued that no severity of punishm^mt could prevent rev >lt when inclination and opportunity concurred , that revolttrs shut out from pardon would be the more obstinate ; that it was unjust to visit the fault of the ruling few on the people, who, when arms were given them, had compelled sub- mission ; and that such an act would destroy the good will of the common- alty, in every state the main prop of the Athenian interest. The friends of mercv prevailed, and a trireme being sent with a countermand, arrived just as Paches had read the first order and was about to execute it The men whom Paches had sent were put to death, in number near 1 000. The walls of Mitylene were razed, the ships of war given up ; and the lands of aU the Lesbians except the Methymnaeans, being divided into lots, were assigned to Athenians, but were occupied by the Lesbians, paying each a yearly quit-rent to the lot holders. In the preceding year provisions had begun to fail the Platseans ; and seeing that Athens would not venture an at- tack on the besieging army backed by all Boeotia, they planned an escape. Full half were discouraged, but by the rest the plan was gallanUy executed as it had been ably conceived, and passing the lines by night with the loss but of one man, they came safe to Athens. In spite of the relief thus given, the re- maining garrison were now brought so low by famine that they could not defend the walls. The Laceda?monian general had been ordered to win the place by capitulation, if possible, that so Plataea might be retained, though all conquests made by force should, at the peace, be mutually restored. He there- fore sent a herald to propose to the Platseans, that they shoidd surrender their city and submit to the jitstice of Lacedaemon. so that the guUty should be punished on trial, but none other- wise. The Plat»ans consented, and commissioners were sent from Lacedae- mon to try them ; who without stating any accusation, asked each whether in the war he had done any good to the Lacedaemonians or their allies. The Platseans requested to answer more at length : they stated the ancient merits of their city, the ties of necessity and irratitude which bound it to Athens, the treacherous attack of the Thebans which forced it into war. The Thebans re- plied, asserting that the Plataeans had wrongfully deserted Boeotia for Athens ; they justified their late interference as a friendly act invited by the best of the Plataeans ; and complamed of tlie faith- less massacre of their prisoners. As if to make it evident that the fate of the Plataeans had been predetermined, the judges, without weighing the arguments, merely repeated their question. None could say yes, and all were led to death. Thus perished 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians, by an act which, though less extensively bloody than others m this same war, can scarcely be paralleled in any history for deliberate baseness and impudent mockery of justice. The women were made slaves, and the town demolished by the Thebans. Meanwhile attention was called by the troubles of Corcyra. Many noble Corcyraeans, prisoners in Corinth, had been won by kind treatment, and set free under a secret engagement to re- concile their country with the Corin- thians. Through their intrigues the assembly voted that the Corcyrseans, re- taining the alliance with Athens, would yet remain at peace with the Pelopon- nesians. They went on to prosecute Peithias, the head of the democrat ical party, as enslaving Corcyra to the Athenians ; but he being acquitted, and retaliating on his accusers with an im- probable charge of sacrilege, the five richest were condemned to a ruinous fine ; and hearing that the influence of Peithias withheld all mitigation, and that he was persuading the people to an alliance, offensive as well as defensive, with Athens, the party suddenly collect- ed, and entering the council-hall with dag- gers, killed Peithias, and about sixty of his friends. Then assembling the people, they declaied that what had been done was the only method of preserving free- dom to Corcyra, and, under the terror of the recent massacre, obtained a vote of neutrality in the war. Ambassadors being sent to make their apology in Athens, were there arrested as rebels. To confirm their insecure ascendency, the oligarchical Corcyr jeans attacked their opponents. Both offered freedom to any slaves who would join them, but most took part with the people, who, strong in numbers and position, and in xeal so vehement that the very women were active in the fray, on the tliird day prevailed so far, that their opponents could only cover their retreat by firing the quarter of the town where they dwelt. The next day the nobles were saved from massacre by the coming of Nicostratus, the Athenian commander in Naupactus. who mediated an agree- ment, on the terms that ten ."^nly who were named should be brought to trial, and the rest should live as citizens undei a democracy. Even the ten excepted were suffered to escape, and all seemed quieted without further bloodshed, when, as Nicostratus was departing, the popu- lar leaders requested him to leave, for greater security, five of his twelve tri- remes, taking instead as many Corcy- raean. He consented, and they named their enemies to go in the vessels ; but these refused, fearing, in spite of the as- surances of Nicostratus, that they would be sent to Athens. Their obstinate mis- trust raised suspicion in the people, who rose and searched their houses for arms , and, alarmed at this, four hundred ot the nobles took sanctuary in the temple of Juno. Four or five days after came a Pelo- ponnesian fleet of fifty-three ships, un- der Alcidas. The Corcyraeans put forth sixty triremes, two of which deserted, and in some the crew went to blows among themselves. The Peloponnesians seeing their confusion, sent twenty ships against the Corcyraeans, and opposed with all the rest the Attic twelve. Ni- costratus nevertheless had siink one ship, and was acting with advantage against the rest, when the other twenty came to aid them ; and he then retreated in order, covering the flight of the Corcy- raeans, who had lost thirteen triremes. The Corcyraean people, now in fear lest the enemy should attack the city, endea- voured to accommodate matters with their party opponents, and prevailed on some to serve in the fleet ; but Alcidas wasted his time in indecisive measures, till finding that an Athenian fleet of sixty ships was approaching, he hastily departed. The democrat ical Corcyraeans now prepared a horrid revenge for their tei - rors. The ships were ordered to sail round from one harbour to the other, and in the voyage all who were in them, of the oligarchical party, were thrown overboard ; and at the same time a mas- sacre was commenced in the city. The case of the suppliants of Juno gave more difficulty; treachery and cruelty cost but little, but to violate a temple was a serious thing. About fifty were persuaded to come out and standa tiial. All these were condemned to death, and their fate completed the despair of those who had remained. Some stabbed themselves, some hung themselves on the trees ; others mutually killed each €4 GREECE. GREECE. other: oil perished in the temple. Un- like Nicostratus, Eurymedon, the new Athenian admiral, lay a quiet spectator in the harbour, while the Corcyraeans, for seven days, were hunting out and murdering all whom they held their ene- mies. Under colour* of treason to the democracy, many were slain by their private enemies, and many debtors wiped out their score with the blood of their creditors. In the words of Thu- cydides, whatever is wont to happen in such cases took place, and yet more. About five hundred of the persecuted party escaped to the continent, and after the departure of Eurymedon, seizing the forts there belonging to Corcyra, kept up a predatory war so successfiilly as to cause a famine in the city. Afterwards, with a few auxiliaries, they passed into the island, burning their vessels that their only hope might be in victory. They fortified themselves on Mount Istone, and thence commanded the country. The pestilence in Athens, after raging two years unabated, had slackened for a while ; but this winter it renewed its fury, and continued it for another year. In its whole course it cost Athens no ess than 4400 heavy-armed soldiers, and 300 horsemen, and of the remaining multitude a number not to be reckoned In the next summer the Peloponne- sians, preparing to invade Attica, were detent by earthquakes, an ill omen according to the superstition of the age. Various actions took place with no decisive result. In the west Demos- thenes, the son of Alcisthenes, com- manding thirty Athenian ships, was joined bythe Acamanians and other allies, and marched against Leucas. He ravaged the territory unopposed, and the Acar- nanians wished him to wall in the town, thinking that when that was done thry could reduce it by blockade, and be de- livered from a neighbour always hostile The Messenians of Naupactus urged him to attack tlieir constant enemies the iEtolians, whose reduction would make easy the extension of Athenian influ- ence through all western Greece. De- mosthenes was led to adopt the sugges- tion of the Messenians both by the fa- vour due to their zealous service, and by the hope that the conquest of ^Etolia would open away into Phocis, by which the force of the western allies might be brought against Boeotia. The Acama- nians left the army in disgust, but with the rest he pursued his project. The iEtolians were a rude but nume- rous and warlike tribe, dispersed in un- walled villages, and too poor to use the arms or cultivate the discipline of the phalanx, but formidable in their own rusrged country from their skill in han- dling the dart, and activity in skirmish- ing. Some of the Ozolian Locrians, neighbours of the ^tolians, and trained in a like mode of fighting, being allied with Athens, were appointed to meet the army of Demosthenes ; but they did not arrive in time, and by their failure, and the defection of the Acamanians, whose light -armed troops were numerous and excellent, his men were few, and almos* entirely heavy-armed. He advanced, meeting nothing that could stop his march ; but the ^tolians had assem- bled on the heights, and gave great annoyance, running down and throwing their darts, retiring when the enemy advanced, pursuing when he retired, and having in both, with their light armour, certain advantage. The few Athenian bowmen kept them off awhile, till, weary with long exertion, their arrows nearly spent, and their commander slain, they took to flight. The heavy-armed, left a prey to enemies whom they could not reach, were broken, and fled. Incum- bered with their armour, and pursued by active men, numbers were killed. Their guide fell early. Many strayed into impassable ravines, and a large body entering a wood, the ^Etolians fired it, and all were destroyed. Of 300 Athe- nians, heavy-armed, 120 were slain, the prime of all the Athenian youth who fell in the war. uf the allies a large proportion perished. The fleet sailed home, but Demosthenes remained at Naupactus, fearing to meet the people. The Lacedaemonians were now per- suaded by the yEtolians to attempt the conquest of Naupactus, and 3000 heavy- armed of the allies were sent against it, under Eurylochus, a Spartan. The Ozolian Locrians were easily brought to submission, and through them the army passed into the territory of Naupactus. The town was in danger, being large, and the defenders few ; but Demosthenes had gone to the Acamanians, and though ill received at first on account of Leucas, had prevailed on them to send 1 000 heavy-armed, whose entrance saved the place. Eurjiochus retiiing was in- vited by the Ambraciots to assist them in conquering the Amptnlochian Argos, as the first step towards the reduction of Acamania : and till the time came, he quartered his army in i£toha. •• f Late in autumn 3000 heavy armed Ambraciots entering the Argian terri- tory seized the hill fort of Olpae. The Acamanians, feehng that their own citi- zens wanted large political and military experience, offered Demosthenes the chief command, in spite of their late de- feat, and their variance with him. Eury- lochus havins: joined the Ambraciots, the combined army was decidedly supe- rior ; but an ambush ably planned by Demosthenes gave him the victory. Two of the three Spartan generals being slain, MenedaBus the third, unprovided for a siege, and without a way of escape, pro- posed on the next day to treat ; but all he could obtain was, that the Pelopon- nesians might depart with speed and secrecy, leaving the others to their fate. By this Demosthenes and the Acama- nians hoped to have the Ambracii)ts at their mercy, and to make the Pelopon- nesians odious for selfishness and treach- ery. The Feloponnesians went out in small parties as for herbs and firewood ; but when they were at a distance the others followed in alarm. Both were at first pursued by the Acamanians, some of whom, when the generals interfered, were on the point of killing them, think- ing the public betrayed. When the matter was explained, they let pass the Feloponnesians, but killed the Ambra- ciots. About 200 were slain, the rest escaped. The Ambracian people leamins that their troops held Olpae, had followed with their whole remaining strength. Demosthenes surprised their camp at day break, and but few returned to Ambracia. Could Demosthenes have led the allies at once against Ambracia, it must have fallen: but they well knew that were there no western city connected with the Feloponnesians, their friendship would cease to be necessary to Athens, and they would be oppressed. Demosthenes now returned with confidence to Athens. After his departure the Acamanians made peace and alliance with Ambracia for a hundred years, on the terms tliat neither the Ambraciots should be re- quired to act offensively against the Felo- ponnesians, nor the Acamanians against the Athenians ; the Ambraciots should give up whatever they had taken from the Amphilochians, and should not assist the Anactorians, who were hostile to Acar- nania. This moderation established to the Acamanians for a long time a degree of quiet unusual in Greece, and contri- M buted to the character of benevolence and upnghtness which long distinguished them. The greatest cities of Sicily were Dorian, and allied with Lacedaemon. In the fifth year of this war, the Ionian states, attacked l)y Syracuse and the Dorian league, had besought aid of Athens. The request was recommended by kindred and old alliance, and by the wish to employ the Sicilian Dorians at home, that they might not send supplies to Peloponnesus, Twenty ships were dispatched, which at first commanded the sea ; but the Athenians hearing that Syracuse was raising a navy, sent forty more in the seventh spring. Eurymedon and Sophocles, the commanders, were directed on the way to succour Corcyra against the exiles, to whose aid a Pelo- ponnesian fleet was known to be going ; and Demosthenes, embarking without any regular command, was authorized by the people to employ the fleet as he might think best, as it coasted Pelopon- nesus. Demosthenes requfred the generals to land at Pylos* in Messenia; but heanng that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra, they refused. A storm forced them into that port, and Demos- thenes bid them fortify the place, for this was the end of his commission. The harbour was excellent, though hke all the neighbouring country it had been deserted since its conquest by Lace- daemon ; and Demosthenes wished to garrison it with Messenians from Nau- pactus, who would zealously maintain it as by right their own, and whose Doric speech gave great advantage for in- cursions into Laconia. The generals ridiculed the project, and he appealed to the soldiers ; but vainly, till, foul weather continuing, for amusement they took to building the fort. They had no tools, but they picked up stones and laid them together, using clay for mortar, which, for want of better means, they carried on their backs, stooping foi-ward, and clasping their hands behind them. Much of the fort was strong by nature, and in six days they rudely walled the rest. The generals now proceeding left five tri- remes with Demosthenes, The news was heard at first with scorn in Lacedaemon ; but the army, which had invaded Attica, hastened • Pylos. The modem Navarino, a scene of 4C- bon equally remarkable iii aucieut and in very i«ce>t history. cs GREECE. GREECE. home in alarm, having been but fifteen days in the enemy*s country. On its return a force was sent against Pylos, the fleet was called from Corcyra, and Demosthenes was blockaded by land and sea, having just time to send to Eurymedon. The fort was attacked on both sides, but towards the land the ground was strong, and, on the.side to • wards the sea, by skilfully using the difficulties of the shore, he was enabled with his handful of men to prevent a landing. On the third day the Athe- nian fleet came in sis^ht. The har- bour was shut in by the woody island Sphacteria, which left a narrow entrance on each side. In this the Lacedaemonians had placed a body of troops, proposing to block up both the inlets, and post troops in every spot where the Athenians could land. After- wards they resolved to engage in the harbour, favoured by the narrow space and the surrounding army. But on the fourtl" day, while they were getting out their ships, thd Athenians entering at both the mouths, attacked those under way, took five, and chased the rest to the shore. The Lacedaemonians dashed into the water, and, after hard fight- ing, the Athenians drew off with only the five first taken. Eurymedon now became master of the sea ; and occupy- ing the strait, kept strict watch on those in the island, being four hundred and twenty Lacedaemonians with their attendant Helots. Alarm rose high in Lacedaemon ; for an extraordinary value was there attached to every citizen of pure Spartan blood, and among the destined pnsoners were men from most of the chief families. Rescue seeming impossible, it was determined to treat for peace: and a truce was made on these terms ; that the LacedsB- monians should give in pledge to the Athenians the ships whioh had fought in the late action, and all ships of war lying in any Laconian port; that a ftated measure of food should be sent Egina. About the same time, by the exer- tions of Hermocrates, a distinguished Syracusan, the Sicilians were brought to agree among themselves, and the Athenian fleet sailed away. Elated by present success to think every thing within their power, the people would not believe bii< ^hat their generals might f9 •3 GREECB. hare conquered Sicily, and that they had been prevented by bribery. In this Cersuasion they lined Eurymedon, and anished two others. Though Megara was democratically governed, old hatred of Athens had bound it to the Lacedaemonians ; who fearing to lose it, let the Megarians chuse their constitution, while a Peloponne- sian garrison held their port of Nisaea. The Athenians were wont twice a year to ravage the lands ; and the city was continually harassed by its oligarchical exiles holding Pegae, the other port. Distress exciting discontent in the peo- ple, the friends of the exiles were em- boldened to propose their recal; and the popular chiefs, foreseeing ruin to themselves should their enemies be restored and backed by Lacedaemon, treated secretly with the Athenian ge- nerals Hippocrates and Demosthenes. To cut off from Megara the Pelopon- nesians in Nisaea, the long walls were first betrayed tc the Athenians. Mea- sureswere next taken for admittingthem into the city, but these being fnistrated, the Athenian generals blockaded Nisaea, Which was soon obliged to capitulate. The spirit of Lacedaemon was broken •by continued ill-success ; but one man still kept heart and hope, and now ob- tained an opportunity of partially retriev- ing her affairs. This was Brasidas, the only 8partan who had given proof of talent in the war. He v/as young, and youth in his country was a bar to emi- nence ; but though never placed in the highest command, he had shown in subordinate posts such daring activity, that the Chalcidians, on requesting a force from Lacedaemon to complete the revolt of the Thracian subjects of Athens, asked Brasidas for the leader. Their suit was granted, but the Lace- daemonians, however desirous to find wcrk for Athens at a distance, feared to lessen the force at home, where the Helots were more than ever objects of jealousy since Pylos was held by Messe- fiians. The detestable precaution taken seems incredible, but is yet true. Such Helots as thought they had done most service in war were invited to stand a scrutiny of their conduct, and freedom was promised to the most deserving. Two thousand being chosen were crowned with garlands as freemen, and ■olemnly marched round the temples. Soon after, all disappeared, and no one knew how each was murdered. Being fid of those who seemed most able to head an insurrection, the government was willing to send seven hundred Lace- daemonians with Brasidas. This leader was at Corinth preparing for his march, when he heard the danger of Megara. He summoned the neigh- bouring allies, and being joined by the Boeotians, his army outnumbered' that of Athens. Both armies offered battle, but neither would make the attack ; and the Athenians retiring to Nisaea, Brasidas was admitted into Megara. Having there confirmed the Lacedae- monian interest, he dismissed the allies and returned to Corinth. The most active favourers of Athens in Megara immediately fled, but the rest thought that they might safely make terms with the oligaichical party. The exiles were restored under an oath of .universal amnesty. They took the oath ; but their chiefs being placed in the magistracies, anested one hundred of their principal enemies, accused them before the people, and by terror com- pelling the assembly to condemn them executed them all. After this foul per- jury and murder, Megara was long go- verned by a very few. The successes of Athens had en- couraged the democratical Boeotians to plan a revolution. It was agreed that Demosthenes, with the weste/n allies, should land in the west of Boeotia, while, on the same day, Hippocrates, with the force of Athens, fortified Delium in the east. But the day was mistaken, and Demosthenes, arriving on the coast, found that the intended diversion had not been made, and that the Boeotian government, informed of his purpose, had brought all its forces to oppose him, and taken such measures that his friends in the town dared not stir. He accord- ingly reth-ed ; and after his departure, when Hippocrates came to Delium, the whole strength of Boeotia was at liberty to act against him. The armies were nearly equal, and the fight was long and bloody ; but in the end the Boeotians prevailed. The defeated army fled to Delium, and, leaving there a garrison, went home by sea. Soon after Delium was taken by the Boeotians, Meanwhile Brasidas with 1 700 heavy- armed troops had pursued his march to Thrace. The country was friendly as far as the border of Thessaly. Most of the Thessalian towns were nominally democratical, and the many were every where devoted to Athens ; but in most places the interest of a few powerful GREECE. 69 men directed affairs. Having prociu-ed some distinguished Thessalians to ac- company him, he proceeded ; and partly preventing opposition by the influence of his guides, and by his own concilia- tory conduct, and partly avoiding it by the rapidity of his march, he passed through into Macedonia. Being joined by the Chalcidians he went to Acanthus. Some leading men favoured his pur- pose, and as the many, though attached to Athens, had fears for their harvest, it was aajeed that Brasidas should be ad- mitted to address the assembly. He was eloquent in speech, and liberal in his policy, uncommon gifts in a Spartan ; he promised independence, and impar- tial justice to men of all parties ; and his arguments being seconded by his army at the gates. Acanthus joined the Lacedaemonian alliance. Amphipolis, on an island in the Stry- mon, was the most valuable of Athenian possessions in Thrace, by its rich plain and noble river, forests of ship-timber, and mines of silver and gold. It was settled by Athens, during the adminis- tration of Pericles, after two former colonies had been cut off by the Thra- cians. Brasidas having intelligence with some in the city, surprised the bridge and entered the island. Few of the Am- phipolitans were Athenians by origin ; most were Chalcidians or connected with Perdiccas: and when Brasidas pro- claimed that both Amphipolitans and Athenians might take their choice, whe- ther to remain enjoying equal rights, or to depart with their effects ; his unusual moderation, with the wishes of many and the fears of all, disposed the people to accept the terms and receive his army. Thucydides the son of Olorus, the his- torian, being stationed at Thasos, had brought up his squadron as soon as he heard that Amphipolis was attacked. Too late to save it, he secured Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, which was next attempted. The Athenians, vexed that a way was found to possessions which they had thought protected by their navy, vented Iheir rage on Thucy- dides for that loss which not all his activity could prevent. He was banished for twenty years, during which, by in- tercourse with the Peloponnesians, he extended his knowledge of Greece and completed his fitness to write its history. Many other cities joined with Bra- sidas. He professed to fight for Gre- cian freedom, and his mild and liberal conduct supported the claim. The general was taken as a sample of his countrymen, and an opinion rose of Lacedaemonian equity and moderation, from which men were afterwards bitterly undeceived. He projected creatina: a fleet at Amphipolis, and asked a rein- forcement to his army from Lacedaemon. But this was withheld, for his superiority of talent excited jealousy in the govern- ment, unaccustomed to recognize indi- vidual pre-eminence in persons not of royal race. The Athenians now repented their rejection of peace, and the Lacedae- monians, harassed from Pylos and Ci^thera, and eager to recover their prisoners, still were anxious to treat As a step to peace, a truce was concluded for a year, each party keeping what it held, but the use of ships of war being for the time forbidden to the Pelopon- nesians. Scione, in the peninsula of Pallene, had revolted to Brasidas ; but the Athenian commissioners, who an- nounced to him the truce, declared that people excluded, the vote of alliance with Lacedaemon not having passed till after the articles were signed. Brasidas in- sisted that their revolt had taken place before, and refused to give them up. The Athenian people were highly en- raged at finding even those almost in the situation of islanders revolt in re- liance on the land force of Lacedae- mon ; and they voted, at the instiga- tion of Cleon, that Scione should be taken and its people put to death. Mende too revolted, and Brasidas re- ceived it, denying that the treaty forbade him to accept an alliance spontaneously, offered. The Athenians thought dif- ferently, and supported their claim by a powerful armament under Nicias and Nicostratus, Having provided for the defence of his new allies, Brasidas accompanied Perdiccas against the province of Lyn- cus. A large body of Illyrians, hired by Perdiccas, turned their arms against him ; and the Macedonians retreated in sudden panic, leaving their allies in the utmost danger. Brasidas saved his army by an able retreat; but the soldiers, in their anger, committed violences which exasperated Perdiccas, already offended with the Spartan leader for his wish to return to Mende before Lyncus was subdued. From this time Perdiccas sought to join with Athens, which h9 soon did, and by his influence in Thes- saly, passage was denied to a reinforce- ment sent to Brasidas. »© 6R.KECE* i I Before the return of Brasidas, Mende was lost. The leading men had caused the revolt, but the people favoured Athens. When the Lacedaemonian go- vernor called out the Mendaeans to battle, one of them declared that he would not go out, and that there was no reason for war. The governor, as- suming the arbitrary authority which Lacedaemonians on foreign command were wont to exert, seized the speaker, and was dragging him from the assem- bly ; when the democratical party flew to arms, routed the Peloponnesians and their adherents, and admitted the Athe- nians. The Athenian generals directed the restoration of democracy, and de- clared that they would not inquire into the past, but would leave the Mendaeans to their own measures with respect to the authors of the revolt. They next laid siege to Scione. The Thespians having suffered greatly at Delium, the Thebans, who had long wished, by razing their walls, to compel their unqualified subserviency, now en- forced that humiliating measure. The pretence was imputed attachment to Athens ; the occasion, the weakness of the Thespians, crippled in supporting against Athens the allies who oppressed them. Such are the justice and decency of the strong. Cleon's success at Pylos had raised his credit higher than ever. Aristo- phanes shook it for a moment, when, according to the practice of the Athe- nian stage, where living men were sa- tirized by name, and the politics of the day contmually introduced, he brought out a comedy entirely levelled at the vices of Cleon, and the levity and folly of the people, his dupes*. The satire succeeded ; Cleon was ridiculed and reviled, and being prosecuted for em- bezzling the public money, he was heavily fined. But he soon recovered his ascendancy; and having deluded himself into the belief that he could com- mand armies without the assistance of Demosthenes, in the tenth year of the war, when the truce expired, he per- suaded the Athenians to send him as ge- neral into Thrace. Through his rashness, ignorance, and cowardice, his army was routed under Amphipolis ; but both he and Brasidas were killed — a double ad- vantage to Athens, which might nearly compensate for the loss of the battle. * This comedy is still in existence. Its title is The Knights. It is one of the plays of Arittophanei pteently translated by Mr. Milcheu. The death of Cleon leaving Nicias without a rival in power, peace was soon made. Plat aea was left to Thebes, Nissea to Athens ; all other conquests were mutually given up. Amphipolis, as an Athenian colony, was to be re- stored unconditionally ; the other Thra- cian towns were only to pay the tribute assessed by Aristeides. Scione was left at the mercy of Athens. All prisoners were to be mutually restored, and any dispute arising between the contracting parties was to be settled judicially. Should any alteration in the treaty seem desirable, it might be made by consent of Athens and Lacedaemon. The Boeo- tians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Mega- rians, protested against the terms ; but the majority of the allies consenting, the Lacedaemonians ratified them in the name of the whole confederacy. (B. C. 421.) Sbct. IL — In Greece a war was thought to be justified, if it promised advantage, and if no express treaty for- bade it Peace was seldom made except for a term of years, and the expiration of the period was sufficient reason for hos- tility. The peace just made was for fifty years, and a pressing motive of Lacedae- mon to conclude it was the approaching close of a thirty years' truce with Argos, which that state had refused to renew. In power the second among the Pelo- ponnesian states, Argos still looked back with pride to its ancient pre-eminence, and cnerished the hope of disputing with Sparta the command of Peloponnesus. Its comparative wealth and population were now unusually high, for during ten years of surrounding warfare it had thriven in peace ; and the Lacedaemo- nians, fearing to stand alone against Argos, united either with Athens, or with their own offended allies, hastily formed a defensive alliance with Athens. Lace- dicmon was to be first in the restitutions stipulated in the peace; but the only article yet executed was the liberation of Athenian prisoners. The Athenians, however, on making the alliance, set free the prisoners taken at Pylos. One article of the alliance is worthy of no- tice ; that the Athenians should assist with all their strength in quelling amy insurrection of the Helots. A like sti- pulation never was made by any other Grecian state ; but it was fit that the greatest guilt of Lacedaemon should be the source of its peculiar and ever ore- sent terror. This alliance completing the estrange" GREECE. 71 . ment of Corinth from Lacedaemon, some leading men proposed to the Ar- gians to league for the defence of Pelo- ponnesus against the ambition of the new confederates. The government of Argos being democratical, all proposals of treaty were regularly made to the popular assembly ; but in the present case, lest any who might endeavour to connect their cities with Argos should De endangered by the publicity of the attempt if it failed, the Argian people empowered twelve commissioners to conclude alliance with any Grecian state but Lacedaemon or Athens. FrSm either of these the assembly alone could receive proposals. The alliance of Argos was soon embraced by Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth. The Megarians and Boeotians stood aloof. Dissatisfied with Lacedaemon, and inveterately hostile to Athens, their oligarchical govern- ments were yet unwilling to connect themselves with a powerfiS democracy Uke Argos, As soon as the peace was made, the Lacedaemonians had ordered their gene- ral Clearidas to restore Amphipolis, and required the other Thracian towns to submit to Athens on the terms pre- scribed. They all refused, and Cleari- das saying that he could not compel them, was directed to bring away all the Peloponnesian troops. On the return of the army, the Helots who had fought in it were rewarded wiih freedom. About the same time a violent precau- tion was taken against the restored prisoners from Pylos, who found them- selves held cheap on account of their surrender, an act before unknown in Lacedaemon, but which, to save them from certain destruction, the government had authorized. Disturbance was feared from their discontent, and the more as some were in high employment ; where- fore they were voted incapable of office, and, what seems more strange, incapa- ble of buying and selling. Some time after, the disqualification was removed. In the course of the summer Scione was taken by the Athenians, and, according to the cruel decree proposed by Cleon, the men were slaughtered, and the women and children made slaves. The land was given to the remnant of the Plataeans. The Athenians had begun to mistrust the Lacedaemonians, who, instead of restoring Amphipolis, had left it in the hands of the armed citizens ; and who, when required, always promised but had hitherto delayed, to join in compel- ling thefr allies to perform their part in the treaty. The Lacedaemonians said that they had done what lay in them, and would use their endeavours to induce the others to concur ; in return they claimed the restoration of Pylos, or, at least, that it should be garrisoned with Athenians, and not with their implacable foes the Messenians and Helots. After much dispute, the last proposal was granted. The Lacedaemonians then re- quested the Boeotians to give up to them the Athenian prisoners who were in Boeotia, and the border fortress of Pa- nactum, which, according to treaty, was to be restored to Athens. In return for Panactum and the prisoners, they hoped to recover Pylos : but to obtain them they were obliged to form a separate al- liance with the Boeotians, though it was stipulated in their alliance with Athens, that neither party should make war or treaty without the consent of the other. This measiure, therefore, did not concili- ate the Athenians, but rather gave them fresh offence ; especially when it was found that the Boeotians, instead of re- storing Panactum, had demolished it The Allans supposing Boeotia leagued with Athens and Lacedaemon, at first had wished to treat with Lacedaemon ; but when they found that those two states were more at variance than before, they broke oft* the treaty, and sent am- bassadors to Athens. Ambassadors were also sent by Lacedaemon to defend her conduct, and demand the restora- tion of Pylos. This occasion introduces to us one of the most remarkable cha- racters of Greece. Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, a youth of the highest birth in Athens, became early master of a vast inherit- ance. His talents were brilliant, his ambition unbounded ; his wealth and high political connexions surrounded him with flatterers, by whom his confl- dent temper was so far inflamed, that he meditated speaking in the assembly before his twentieth year. From this he was diverted by Socrates, the first and greatest Grecian teacher of moral wis- dom to mankind. He saw the powers of Alcibiades and the danger of their perversion; he desired to curb his wild passions, and direct his love of praise to worthy objects. The young man had an inquiring mind, which led him to value the instructions of Socrates, and a dis]^osition generous enough to venerate his character ; and an intimate GREECE. M friendship took place between them, which was confirmed by Socrates saving his pupil in a battle in Thrace, a service repaid by Alcibiades in the rout of De- lium. But the influence of Socrates could not permanently overcome the temptations which beset his young disci- ple. His love of pleasure was excessive ; and his uncommon beauty of person made him the object of adulterous pas- sion to many women of rank in Athens. He was courted by numbers who hoped to profit by his wealth, and by his means of arising to power. Greedy of pre-eminence in every thing:, he gloried in a lavish magnificence before unknown in Athens, and offensive to many, as outraging the due equality of citizens in a democracy. And in his political career we shall find him no less unable to separate true glory from mere distinction ; admirable indeed for ingenuity and boldness, but the slave of an ambition utterly estranged fi-om public spirit, and as selfish in its ends as unscrupulous in its means. The family of Alcibiades had an- ciently been hereditary public guests of Lacedaemon ; by which connexion they were bound to entertain and do good offices to all its envoys ; and in return, if ever they went thither, were honoura- l>ly received at the public expense. Such public guests considered the state to which they were attached as a second country, took care of its interests, and laboured to preserve it in amity with their own ; and the favour they there enjoyed, being sometimes useful to their country, contributed to their influence at home. Indignant at the attempt to restore the Peisistratidae, an ancestor of Alcibiades had renounced the friendship of Lacedaemon, with all the ceremonies prescribed by Grecian religion for the dissolution of a bond so sacred as was that of hospitality, whether public or private. Alcibiades, wishing to renew the connection, had shewn kindness to the Spartan prisoners ; but the Lace- daemonians, who liked neither his youth nor his hal)its, preferred to communi- cate with Nicias on the subject of peace ; whence Alcibiades became hos- tile both to Nicias and Lacedaemon. The ambassadors of Argos and La- cedaemon, met at Athens. The latter having told the council that they came with full powers to conclude on all dis- puted points, Alcibiades persuaded them that it would be for their advantage to profess their powers limited, and pro- mised, if they did so, to support them. Accordingly, in the assembly, they declared themselves restricted ; where- upon their treacherous adviser attacked them more violently than before, taxed them with double dealing, and pro- posed an immediate junction with Ar- gos. The offended people would have voted it, but the assembly was adjourned on account of an earthquake. Next day, their anger having cooled, they listened to Nicias, and contented them- selves with sending to require that the Lacedaemonians should restore Am- phipolis, and renounce the alliance of Boeotia, unless Bceotia would join the common league. The demand was re- jected by Lacedaemon, and they con- cluded an alliance with Argos. In this Corinth did not concur, inclining rather to rejoin Lacedaemon. Epidaurus, besieged by the Argians, was reinforced from Laconia by sea. The Argians complained to Athens, that, by allowing this, it had broken the treaty, which provided that neither state should suffer enemies of the other to pass through its dominions. This strange remonstrance, acknowledging that the sea was the dominion of Athens, would seem to have been prompted by the in- fluence of Alcibiades ; who proposed and obtained the compliance of Athens with the no less strange demand, that, in reparation to Argos, and punishment for the imputed aggression of Lacedae- mon, the Messenians and Helots should be re-established in Pylos, and thus Laconia should be exposed to plunder, though still nominally allied with Athens. In ttie next summer, the fourteenth from the beginning of the war, the La- cedaemoniajis made an effort to succour their distressed allies of Epidaurus, and to recover their influence in Pelo- p.onnesus. They marched out with all their force under king Agis, the son of Archidamus, and were joined by their remaining allies, including the Corinthians. Agis manoeuvred so suc- cessfully that the Argian army was surrounded, and exposed at great disadvantage to the attack of a superior force. Two Argians saw the danger, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of Argos, and Alciphron, a public guest of Lacedaemon. They went privately to Auis, and pledging themselves to recon- cile their state with Lacedaemon, pre- vailed on him to grant a four months truce, on his own auttionty. The army of Agis heard with astonishment the or- der to retreat ; but so far were the Aixi&n GREECE. f$ people fVom rightly valuing their escape, that they ignorantly thought they had lost an opportunity of destroying the Lacedaemonians, and their anger ran so high that Thrasyllus saved his hfe by flying to an altar. Tlie Athenian force was not yet come ; and when it came the Argian leaders were unwilling to break the truce. Alcibiades, however, arriving as an ambassador, persuaded the people that the truce was void, being made without authority ; and the allied army being put in motion reduced Orchome- nus in Arcadia, and advanced onTegea, an ancient, faithful, and most valuable ally of Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemo- nians from the first had disapproved the retreat of Agis, but hearing that the truce was renounced, and Orchomenus taken, they called him to account, with a violence unusual in them. They were on the point of heavily fining him, and demolishing his house ; but he prevailed on them to try him further, and was suf- fered to resume the command, but under a restriction before unknown, ten coun- sellors being appointed, without whose concurrence he might not lead the army beyond the borders. Tegca was secured by a hasty march of the Lacedaemonians, and being joined by the Arcadian allies, they entered the territory of Mantineia. After some ma- noeuvring, the Lacedaemonians, when they least expected it, found themselves suddenly in front of the enemy, who were advancing in good order. Their alarm was considerable, but their ex- cellent training enal^led them rapidly to form for battle ; and the day was won by their superior discipline and steadi- ness, notwithstanding some considerable errors of their commanders. This battle restored the credit of Lacedaemon, and gave to the oligarchical Argians the nope of concluding a peace, and then an alliance, and finally by that means overthrowing the democracy. In spite of the great influence of Alcibiades, who was then present in Argos, the people consented first to peace, and then to alliance with Lacedaemon, —an example which the Mantineians were compelled to follow ; and at the close ot the year, by the aid of a force fi-om Lacedaemon, oligarchy was established in Argos. This did not last long. The Many taking heart, attacked and overcame the ruling party. The Lacedaemonians pre- pared to march against them ; but delays took place, during which the Argians renewed their alliance with Athens, and began to build long walls to their port. The unfinished walls were demolished by the Lacedaemonians, but little further was gained. By the arbitrarj' interference of Lacedaemon the Argian people had been driven to throw themselves so entirely on Athens, that when Alcibiades came next year, with twenty ships, he was supported in arresting, and imprisoning in different islands, three hundred persons suspected of wishing well to Lacedaemon. Melos, an island on the coast of Pe- loponnesus, was independent of Athens ; which could not endure that, when all the other islands were its subjects, one of the weakest should withhold obedience. *' Tell us not," said its ambassadors, ** that, though colonists of the Lacedae- monians, you have not joined them in their wars against us ; tell us not that you have done us no wrong, but exa- mine our respective forces, knowing that equals only dispute about justice ; but the mighty do their pleasure, and the weak must submit." Such in all ages has been the principle acted on by powerful oppressors, though never, at least in modem times, so explicitly avowed, as both here and in some other speeches occurring in Thucydides, which, if not always correct reports of what was ac- tually said, are yet specimens of the lan- guage which the public ear could endure. The Melians refusing submission were besieged ; no effort was made for them by Lacedaemon ; they were reduced to surrender at discretion, and, for defend- ing their independence against an un- provoked and most unjust attack, all the men were butchered, and the women and children sold as slaves. Next spring, the Athenians, hoping to effect the conquest of Sicily, which was again torn by petty wars, prepared a fleet to aid the Egestans against Selinus, which was backed by Syracuse. Alcibiades, Ni- cias, and Lamachus.were chosen to com- mand. Nicias attempted to dissuade the people from wasting their resources in distant warfare, and multiplyingtheir ene- mies ; Alcibiades replied, enhancing the value of the conquest ; and the assembly approving it, voted one hundred triremes, and five thousand heavy-armed troops with archers and slingers in due proper- tion, and whatever further the generals might think expedient. The citizens ea- gerly enlisted, from the love of enterprise, from curiosity, from the hope of enriching 1 74 6R£l!iC£* GivEGCE. rs !i themselves by successful war, and in^ creasing the public treasure, which fur- nished subsistence to the poor, and amusement to all. It was an ancient and venerated cus- tom in Athens to place at the entrance of temples and houses a block of square stone, crowned with a head of Mercury. Most of these one night had the faces mutilated. This incident, apparently so trifling, dismayed all Athens. It was thought ominous of ill to the intended expedition ; it was thought to prove a design to overthrow the democracy; though how it could contribute to such an end is inconceivable. All efforts failed to discover the perpetrators ; but it was found that Alcibiades had before, in a drunken frolic, been concerned in some similar irregularities, and his many enemies laboured to fix the charge on him. His guilt is most improbable, fur the business was evidently concerted, and very injurious to the favourite project of ambition in which he was now embarked ; but his ostentatious extravagance had raised a suspicion that he looked far above democratical equality; he had shown that he little regarded things esteemed most sacred ; and many were easily persuaded that his overweening disposition had led him to insult the religion of his country, and to plot against its liberty. Alcibiades demanded an immediate trial. It would be unjust, he said, to receive accusations against him when absent, and imprudent to keep a man in high command, with such charges hang- ing over him. But his accusers dreaded his popularity in the array, and feared to alienate the Argian and Mantineian aux- Uiaiies procured by him. When he was gone they might work on the passions of the people, aggravating every unfa- vourable circumstance, while the ac- cused was not present to contradict them. They procured a vote that Alci- biades should proceed on the expedition. The preparations were completed, and the fleet set sail under the anxious gaze of all Athens, assembled to witness the departuie of the most splendid arma- ment ever sent by a Grecian state on distant service. The Ionian interest in Sicily had been quite overborne, and none were ready to join with Athens, except the Egestans, who were on the brink of ruin, and the remnant of the Leontines expelled from tlieir city by Syracuse, and now occupy- ing two fortresses in their ancient ter- ritory. The (generals differed how to proceed. Nicias proposed to reheve Egesta, and then return home, unless the Egestans should fulfil their promise to furnish pay for the fleet, or some readier means should occur than now appeared of restoring the Leontines. Al- cibiades was for negotiating with all the cities but Syracuse and Selinus, begin- ning with Messene, as the most conve- nient harbour and station whence their army might commence its operations, and when they knew what cities would be with them, then attacking Syracuse. Lamachus, who appears to have l)een a mere soldier, full of spirit and enterprise, but little versed in intricate poUtical speculations, wished to fall on Syracuse, while unprepared ; but being overruled, he concurred with Alcibiades, and Nicias was obliged to yield. Alcibiades per- suaded the Messenians, not indeed to join in the war, but to furnish a market to his army. He obtained the alliance of Naxos and Catana, and sent ten triremes to the port of Syracuse, to proclaim that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines, their kinsmen and allies, and that any Leontines would be received in the armament as friends. Meanwhile, as often happens when the popular mind is possessed with unrea- sonable terror, the Athenian people had overleaped all bounds of justice, huma- nity, and common sense. From the affair of the Mercuries, a plot was in- ferred for the establishment of oligarchy or tyranny, and the irritation was che- rished by continual discourses of what Athens had suffered through the Peisis- tratidae. On the slightest suspicion — on the most discreditable evidence — men, the most respected, were imprisoned; alarm increased with the number of ac- cusations, and each found easier credit than the last. At length Andocides, one of the imprisoned, seeing no other hope of escape, and hoping by the sacri- fice of a few to save the rest, and to tranquillize the city, confessed the crime, and accused some others — whether truly or falsely, is not known. The people received the information with joy, and setting free the informer and those whom he had cleared, tried and executed the others. The proof was very inadequate, and the condemnation most unjust ; but the panic was in great measure abated* Though Alcibiades was not included in the information, the people, in their pre- sent temper, were easily stirred to in- quire into his former impieties. He was proved to have profaned the mysteries of Ceres, by celebrating them in mock- ery in a private house ; and this was easily connected by the malice of his enemies, and the excited suspicions of the people, with a charge of con- spiring against the democracy. The accident of a small body of Lace- daemonians approaching the Isthmus, raised suspicion so high that the people passed a night under arms. In Argos, also, the Many became jealous of the friends of Alcibiades ; and though Alci- biades himself had placed in custody the oligarchical Argian chiefs, these un- happy men were given up by Atliens, to be put to death by the Argian people, as if conspirators with Alcibiades. The death of Alcibiades was resolved, but it was thought unsafe to anest him in the army. He was simply summoned home ; but suspecting his danger, he fled to Peloponnesus, and was capitally condemned m his absence. The plans of Alcibiades were given up, no man remaining capable of exe- cuting them ; nor was any decided course of action substituted. The armament went to Egesta, and, returning thence, lay at Catana; while the Syracusans, who had lately been in dismay, grew so confident, that they obliged their leaders to conduct them to that city. Of this the Athenian generals took advan- tage, and sailing by night for Syracuse, took up a strong position under the walls. The Syracusans hastened home, and lost a battle ; but the Athenians returned on the morrow to Catana, without pursuing their success. The Syracusans, alarmed at their defeat, were now willing to be directed by Hermocrates, their ablest commander. They made him the first of their gene- rals, and reduced the number from fif- teen to three ; they passed the winter in disciplining their forces, strengthening their city, and confirming their allies , and sent to ask the aid of Corinth, their mother city, and of Lacedaemon. The prayer of Syracuse was supported in Lacedaemon by Corinthian ministers, as well as by Alcibiades, who had gone thither with the unworthy purpose of tak- ing revenge upon his country by foreign arms. He declared that the Athenians hoped to conquer, not only Sicily, but Grecian Italy, and Carthage ; to obtain firom Italy ship-timber in abundance, and firom Spain numbers of excellent mercenary soldiers ; and then, with re- «ources thus increased, making war on Peloponnesus, to become lords of all the Grecian race. He therefore ad- vised the Lacedaemonians, both to send a Spartan general, with troops, into Sicily, and to make a diversion at home ; and for the latter purpose, he recommended garrisoning Deceleia, in Attica. The assembly approved his plans; Gylippus, a Spartan of royal blood, was appointed to command in Sicily, and directed to consult with the Corinthians and Syracusans how best to carry thither troops ; but these were to be gathered as they mi^ht from the aUies, Lacedaemon furnishing none. In the spring the Athenians, after some unimportant movements, formed the siege of Syracuse. Their operations were ably conducted ; they were superior in every skirmish, and the circumvalla- tion (walling round) was rapidly all but completed. Hermocrates seems to have acted judiciously ; but the Syracusans, undisciplined, and frequently insubordi- nate, could not resist the skill and expe- rience of their enemies. The friendship of Athens was generally courted ; sup- plies came in both from Sicily and Italy ; the Syracusans themselves began to talk of capitulation, and even sent proposals to Nicias, who was now alone in command, since Lamachus had fallen in a skirmish. Suspicion arose of the treachery of psu*- ties, the common dread of Grecian cities when besieged ; and the people vented their discontent in cashiering their ge- nerals. Gylippus, arriving in Sicily with seven hundred heavy armed infantry, by his own activity and the reputation of Lacedaemoti increased his numbers to above three thousand in all. He passed the Athe- nian lines unopposed, and joined the Syracusans ; and to the astonishment of the besiegers, who were busied in a dif- ferent p^ of the works, the combined forces appeared as offering battle. Gy- lippus halted while retreat was in his power, and sent a herald to the Athe- nians, to say, that if they would quit Swily in five days he would make a truce for the purpose. The messenger was received with scorn, and sent away un- answered. Gylippus observed that the Syracusans could not keep their order on diflScult ground ; but Nicias, not at- tempting to profit by this, let them retire at leisure. The next day Nicias conti- nued inactive, while Gylippus took the fort where the Athenian magazines were chiefly deposited, and which commanded f6 GREECE. I 1| the hei-rhts of Epipolx, on the inland side of the town. The Athenians, though still superior in the field, had lost all hope of taking the city, and were daily suffering hy the swampy nature of their ground. Gylippus carried' out a wall from Epipolae, so as to intersect the lines of the besiegers and se- cure a communication with the country beyond. Twelve ships arrived from Co* rinth and its allies, and the Syracusans, strengthened both by land and sea, pre- pared to act offensively. Ministers were sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon: Gy- lippus went round the Sicilian cities to gather reinforcements, rouse the luke- warm, and win the neutral or adverse. Nicias communicated to Athens his danger. His men were wasting by sick- ness, desertion, and the sword ; his ships perishing for want of repairs, since all were continually needed to keep open the sea, by which alone he could get supplies. He declared it necessary to recall the army, or else to double its force ; re- quested that he might be superseded, as msqualified by ill-health for command ; and that former honourable services might excuse his present ill-success. The people would neither give up their plans of conquest nor accept the resio^ia- tion of their general ; and Demosthenes and Eurymedon were appointed to lead a powerful reinforcement. The Lacedaemonians, attributing their previous ill-success to their own injustice in supporting the aggression of Thebes on Plataea, and in refusing the arbitra- tion proposed by Athens, now considered that the Athenians had placed them- selves in the wrong, by refusing in their turn a judicial settlement of the dif- ferences which had arisen since the truce. They therefore renewed the war in the nineteenth spring from its beginning, (B. C. 4 1 3,) trusting now that the gods would be on their side. They entered Attica and fortified Deceleia, a town not fifteen miles from Athens, and commanding its richest lands. The works proceeded without an attempt at opposition ; yet the Athenians persisted in their plans of dis- tant conquest, and Demosthenes sailed for Sicily with most of their dispos- able force. Meantime Gylippus and Hermocrates prevailed on the Syracusans, disregard- ing the skill and fame of their opponents, to make an effort for maritime supe- riority. A combined attack was planned by land and sea. By sea the Syracusans were defeated, though superior in the number of ships ; but while the Athe- nians were watching the battle, their forts on the headland closing in the harbour were attacked and taken, with most of their provisions and stores Triremes were stationed under protec- tion of the forts, and no Athenian con- voy could now come in without fighting. But however successful in straitening the enemy, the Syracusan generals were anxious to strike a decisive blow befor«» the reinforcement arrived. The port giving little scope for the manoeuvring of the Athenians, enabled the Syracusans to meet them bow to bow, instead of suf- fering their transverse stroke. Gylippus strengthened the bows of his ships to give them the advantage in the shock. He gained first a slight advantage, next a victoiy, but before he could further pursue it, the force under Demosthenes arrived. Tlie natural indecision of Nicias, in- creased by ill-health and dislike of his command, had been a principal cause of failure. Demosthenes, desirous to a"oid a similar error, resolved to act while hi» force was unimpaired ; to make some attempt which might determine the probability of success ; and either to pur- sue the war with vigour or abandon it without delay. He attacked the heights of Epipolae, the possession of which would give the means of renewing the blockade; but failing, he proposed to withdraw while retreat was open. The safety of the army was more important than any conquest it could now achieve, and it was better to hazard the popular displeasure than to waste the best strength of the state when most wanted at home. But Nicias would not risk an unauthorised return, and he had secret grounds of hope arising from communi- cation with Syracusan malcontents. The opportunity was lost, matters daily grew worse, sea-fights took place to the advantage of the Syracusans, in the last of which their naval superiority was completely established. To remain was now impossible, and the Athenians be- gan their retreat, leaving their wounded to the mercy of the enemy. They were yet strong in regular foot, and able to overbear all direct opposition, but the march was long, and the enemy far superior in horse and light troops. Fatigue and want, and constant harass- ing, thinned their ranks and broke their spirit, and the mass of the army was either killed or reduced to surrender in- dividually or in bodies. GREECk. 77 Nicias had shown throughout the re- treat a fortitude and energy strongly con- trasted with the feebleness of his pre- ceding conduct. Both he and Demos- thenes were taken by the Syracusans, and both put to death by order cf the people. The humbler captives were im- prisoned in the stone quarries, where numbers miserably perished through want and hardships of every kind. The deliverance of Syracuse must be gra- tifying to all who rejoice in the failure of unprincipled ambition ; but our sympathy with that people cannot but receive a check when we view the de- fiberate cruelty with which they abused their triumph. The Athenians were long before they would beheve the complete destruction of an armament containing all the flower of their citizens and the greatest part of their navy. When convinced, they vented their anger on the orators who had advised the expedition, as if them- selves, who so readily voted it, were not equally to blame. Their situation seemed almost desperate. There was litttle money in the treasury, and few ships in the harbour ; their enemies were supe- rior by land and sea, and would pro- bably be joined by the navy of the Sicilians, and further strengthened by extensive revolt among the allies of Athens. The remedial measures of the Athenians were, however, energetic and judicious. The spirit of the people still was high, and they were schooled by misfortune into compliance with their wiser counsellors. They set themselves vigorously to the building of ships and the raising of money ; retrenched the expenses of feasts and shows, and took measures to secure the obedience of the allies, particularly of Euboea, the most important. It was, nevertheless the opinion prevalent in Greece, that the Athenian power could not outlast another summer. The allies of Lacedaemon w ere confidently looking to relief from a long and difficult war, and those of Athens mostly to deliverance from a hard sub- jection ; while Lacedaemon itself, which had lately been warring against an enemy decidedly superior, now enjoyed tlie prospect of undisputed ascendancy in Greece. Sect. TIL The Persian kings, instead of aspiring as formerly to the conquest of Greece, now lived in fear and jealousy of the single state of Athens ; so far superior arc courage and intelligence to mere ex- U'lit of territory and amount of subject population. Many allies of Athens were contending which should fu-st be enabled b)r Lacedaemon to revolt ; and with their ministers came ambassadors from two great Persian officers, the powerful sa- traps of Lydia and of the Hellespont, each of whom solicited alliance, and urged the Lacedaemonians to make his govern- ment the scene of their earliest opera- tions. It was determined to assist the intended revolt of Chios and Erythrae, according to the wish of the Lydian satrap Tissaphernes. The Chians had sixty ships of war, and forty were voted to support them ; but while the sailing of the squadron was delayed by the wonted tardiness of Lacedaemon, the Athenians, suspecting its destination, sent to charge the Chians with their purpose. The design was that of the oligarchical party, and had not been communicated to the assembly nor to any favourer of democracy ; the leaders, taken unprepared, denied the wish to revolt, and the requisition of seven ships to join the Athenian fleet was obeyed. Summer came, and a Peloponnesian squadron sailed for Chios, but it was attacked, chased to the shore, and there blockaded by the Athenians. So much were the Lacedaemonians discouraged, that they scctually meditated giving up the splendid prospects opening in Asia. Alcibiades, however, prevailed on them to send five ships to Chios, and to allow him to accompany them ; and ar- riving before the news of the Athenian success, he persuaded the Chians to join the Peloponnesian league. The example soon was followed by Erythrae, Clazo- menae, and Miletus. An alliance was formed with Tissaphernes, on terms little honourable to Lacedaemon ; for it was stated that all should belong to the king which had been possessed by his pre- decessors; which, strictly interpreted, would include all the Grecian cities of Asia, with the islands. On hearing the revolt of then* most powerful ally, the Athenians brought into use the thousand talents set aside in the beginning of the war as a reserve for extremity. Through the vigour of their own, and the feebleness of the Lacedaemonian administration, they were soon again advancing to maritime su- periority. The Samian commonalty rose upon the nobles, who were probably ar- ranging a plan of revolt.; and banishing four hundred they reduced tJie rest to complete aepression. The Athenians, now sure of the fidelity of Samos. voted 7i GREEwK* GREECE. 19 I its independence, it having since the former reMlion been held under strict control. Leslx)s revolted, but was soon reduced ; Clazomen» returned to obe- dience, and the Athenians, now masters of the sea laid sie^e to Chios, and re- duced it in the course of the winter to great distress. Alcibiacles, far from wishing: Lacedae- mon completely triumphant, had princi- pally sought to gain an influence over Tissaphemes, by which he might detach him from the Peloponnesians when he should see cause. About this time the adverse party, gaining the lead in Lace- daemon, refused to ratify the treaty made with Tissaphemes. Suspecting the in- sincerity of Aloibiades, and fearing his genius, they sent private orders to assas- sinate him, which he prevented by quitting the army. He now successfully laboured to put the satrap at variance with Lacedaemon, and dispose him to connection with Athens ; and he secretly negotiated with some of the Athenian 'eaders at Samos, where the army had its head-quarters, for his own recal. The exertions of Athens had of late been prodigious, but in its exhausted state they could not long hold out against an enemy supplied by the wealth of Persia; yet if those supplies could be transferred to Athens, it might still be victorious. Alcibiades well knew that if he should be restored there could be little esteem for his character, and that, when the immediate need of him was past, he might fall by the first breath of suspi- cion : he saw that his surest support would be a party who owed their su- periority entu^ly to him, and he knew that the fate of the commonwealth was so completely in his hands, that he could attach to his services what condition he would. The price he set on them was the establishment of oligarchy. On this condition, coupled with the return of Alcibiades, it was declared in the army that the king would furnish money for the war ; and such was the general sense of the public danger, that a majority decided to accept the terms. Delegates were sent to Athens to pro- pose the change ; and the people, though unwillingly, were yet induced by their desperate situation to acquiesce. Pei- •ander, the chief of the deputation, was sent with ten others to treat with Tissa- phemes, and empowered to conclude whatever should seem best. Having organised a faction Peisander sailed, but his mission was frustrated by unexpect- ed difficulties. The Satrap was unwil- ling quite to break with Lacedaemon ; and Alcibiades fearing that his influence might appear to fail, desired to make the Athenians the refusers, bjr asking extravagant concessions to Persia. The negotiation was broken off, and Tissa- phemes concluded a treaty with the Lacedaemonian admiral on terms more moderate than before. Oligarchies were set up by Athenian commissioners in several subject towns, and most of these in consequence revolted to Lacedajmon. Peisander, retuming to Athens, found the revolution much advanced. Mamr of its chief opposers had been murdered, no one dared to ask by whom ; the po- pular party were dismayed and disunited, and mutually suspicious through re- peated desertions. All opposition being silenced by the fear of assassination, the oligarchical leaders swayed the assem- bly to their will. But though certain to carry at the moment whatever it pleased them to propose, they felt that some degree of moderation was necessary to secure the continued obedience of the people, and particularly the acquiescence of the armament in Samos, which they could less intimidate or coerce. The scheme adopted was, that the sovereignty should be placed in an assembly of five thousand citizens, chosen for their pro- perty and bodily abihty : but while this body was nominally supreme, the whole dh-ection of the state was effectively vested in a council of four hundred, and it was only when summoned by them that the larger assembly was to meet. The people^ ratified the new consti- tution, and the existing authorities gave way to it without a struggle. The change was brought to pass with singular ability, and with a quietness and freedom from extensive bloodshed almost unparalleled among Grecian re- volutions ; but though not accompanied with battie or massacre, it was deeply stained with the baser practice of secret assassination. In the measures which led to it the chief actor was Peisander : but the contriving and directing mind was that of Antiphon, a man of the highest character both for capacity and virtue ; who, both by his advice and by his talent for composition, had assisted many who had occasion to appear in the courts and in the assemblies ; but had kept himself as far as possible aloof from both, through fear of the jealousy which often attended the reputation of ability, especially when the fortune habits, and temper of the possessor ap- peared to connect him with the favourers of aristocracy. Peisander had left the oligarchical interest predominant among the Athe- nians at Samos, and approaching to su- periority among the Samians. But the Athenian generals with most of the soldiers favoured democracy, and had only renounced it as the price of Per- sian aid, which seemed not \\ke\y to be s^iven. The oligarchical Samians meditating an attack upon the Many, the latter craved the support of the generals, and of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, two distinguished Athenians of the popular party. These canvassed the soldiers with so much effect, that nearly all de- clared for democracy, and agreed in the. resolution not to suffer the Samian peo- ple to be oppressed. The attack was made, but the Samian Many being supported by the Athenians easily prevailed. The victory was used with uncommon mode- ration. About thirty of the conspirators were killed in the tumult, but not a man was put to death by way of punishment ; only three were banished, and the rest were pardoned and admitted to live in perfect equality under the democracy. A ship was sent to Athens with these tidings, which it was supposed would be well received there, for the Athenian revolution was yet unknown at Samos. On arriving, some of the crew were thrown into prison ; while the com- mander escaping to Samos reported the change, and passionately exaggerated the violences of the new rulers. In the debates ensuing in the army, Thrasybu- las and Thrasyllus took the lead. An oath was imposed on all that they would be faithful to democracy, zealous in the war, and perseveringly hostile to the Four Hundred. The Samians also took the oath, and were admitted to the Athenian councils, as men embarked in the same cause. The soldiers now assumed to their assemblies the authority of the general assembly of the people, consider- ing the commonwealth as overthrown in the city, and only existing in the camp. Their first act of power was to supersede all suspected officers, appointing Thrasy- bulus and Thrasyllus to the chief com- mand. Alike at war with the Pelopon- nesians and the Athenians of the city, they encouraged themselves with the considerations that they were the strength of the commonwealth, and the new rulers comparatively weak; that having the fleet, the subject states were theirs, with the revenues thence arising; that Samos was no contemptible home ; and that far from looking to Athens for subsis- tence, they had both larger resources than those in the city, and the command of the sea, which placed at their mercy the supplies of their opponents. They trusted to the goodness of their cause, which was the vindication of their ancient constitution ; they hoped for Persian aid in bringing the war to a happy issue , and in the worst event, with the force which they possessed they could gain both lands and cities to inhabit. The Peloponnesians, being disunited and ill commanded, did not move against the Athenians till their differences were settled. On approaching Samos they found all quiet and orderly, and with- drew, avoiding offered battle. It was necessary to find some means of sup- porting the expenses of the fleet, which were scantily supplied by Tissaphemes, always sparing of his treasure, and now uncertain which party to sup- port. They listened therefore to Phar- nabazus, the satrap of the Hellespont, who offered to maintain them if they would come to his province. But as they would not move with their whole force at the hazard of fighting the Athenians, a small squadron only ar- rived in the Hellespont, avoiding obser- vation by a circuitous route. Meantime an assembly being held of the Athenians in Samos, Thrasybulus obtained the recal of Alcibiades, and went himself to invite him to the island. Alcibiades arriving, harangued the assembled army, lament- ing his exile, and magnifying the benefit to be expected from his return ; which he represented as certainly bringing with it the support of Tissaphemes. He was immediately chosen commander-in-chief. Hope and confidence rose so high that the soldiery were eager to sail to the Peiraeeus, and put down the Four Hun- dred. Alcibiades checkedthe rash design. The nearer enemy, he said, must not be left at liberty to,seize unopposed on the richest possessions of the state ; and it was necessary for himself, since he was chosen general, to communicate person- ally with the satrap on the necessary arrangements of the war. The assembly being dissolved he went immediately to Tissaphemes. anxious at once to impress upon the Athenians his close connexion with the satrap, and to confirm his in- fluence over the latter by displaying his power among the Athenians ; and thus he obtained from both what his viev^B M GREECE. required, by alarming alternately the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tis- saphernes with the Athenians. Ambassadors from the Four Hundred arriving at Samos, the popular fury rose so high that the multitude were again on the point of voting: to go straight to Athens. The influence of Alcibiades again prevented a measure which would have been certain ruin to both parties, but which only he was capable of hin- dering. He framed a moderate answer to the ambassadors, encouraging those in the city to hold out against the com- mon enemy ; for while, he said, the city was safe, there was hope of accommo- dating the dissensions of the citizens ; but were either party cut off, whether those in Athens or in Samos. there would soon be no commonwealth with which the enemy could treat. Already divisions had arisen among the rulers at Athens. Peisander and the thorough-going oligarchists were bent on confining all real power to the Four Hun- dred ; and rather than compromise with their countrymen al Samos, or admit into the government any leaven of demo- cracy, they were ready to lay their country at the feet of Lacedaemon. They would make peace if possible as an independent state ; but peace must be made on any terms : and they would rather, if it were necessary, govern Athens like so many other oligarchies as the lieutenants of Lacedaemon, than permit the return of their feared and hated opponents, and sink into private citizens under a govern- ment to which they could not but be objects of suspicion. But there was also a party headed by Theramenes, which upheld the authority of the Five Thousand, and opposed undue submis- sion to Lacedaemon. This consisted of those whose real for oligarchy was less than their desire of union and national independence ; of the friends to a mixed government; and of the democratical party, who, not as yet daring to avow themselves, threw theiy weight into the scale of those whose principles were least opposite to their own. The answer of Alcibiades breathed a spirit of com- promise and mutual accommodation, which gave new hope to the moderate party ; while Peisanders party, fearing more and more, pressed on the negotia- tion with Lacedaemon, and instructed their commissioners to lower their de- mands, and conclude the peace in haste on any tolerable terms. At the same time they built a fort which commanded the entrance of the Peiraeeus. Its pur- pose, they said, was the defence of the harbour in case of attack by the fleet from Samos ; but their adversaries maintained that its real object was to enable them to admit the fleet of the Peloponnesians. The approach of the latter so near as iKgina strengthened the suspicion, and the people rose in tu- mult to destroy the fort. Theramenes went as one of the generals apparently to suppress the tumult ; but as soon as he had ascertained that he would be supported he assumed the direction of the insurgents. The cry was to uphold against the Four Hundred the govern- ment of the Five Thousand ; and thus the punishment of treason, which would have been incurred by appealing in terms to the entire people, was avoided by calling on a boay acknowledged as sovereign by the existing constituiion. Next day the aimed people held an assembly, and marched into the city. The Four Hundred sent a committee to confer with them. They said that the Five Thousand, who had not yet been nomi- nated, should be immediately declared ; that the Four Hundred now in office should resign their authority in due time ; that the Five Thousand should settle the manner of appointing their successors ; and that on a stated day the people should meet to consider the means of a perma- nent reconciliation. On the appointed day the people were assembling, when news came that a Peloponnesian fleet was at Salamis. All ran to the harbour, and, without waiting tor orders, each did what seemed to him to be required. Ships were launched and manned, and all prepared for defence ; but the enemy passed by towards Kuboea. Fresh alarm arose ; for the people being deprived of the produce of Attica by the gairison of Deceleia, the loss of Eubcea would leave them scarcely the means of sulv sistence. A squadron was sent to the protection of the island, but it was sur- prised and defeated ; and Eubcea, which had before been inclined to revolt, im- mediately declared itself. If the Peloponnesians had now sailed to Peiraeeus, they might have entered unopposed, and the city could only have been saved by the return of the fleet from Samos, whereby its foieign domi- nion must have been lost. But the op- portunity t)eing neglected, the Athenians had time to settle their internal govern- ment, and arrange their measures of defence. It was decreed that the coun(£ GREECE. ii j%. of four hundred should be immediately dissolved, and the supreme authority vested in five thousand, who should be taken from those citizens now in Athens, who were enrolled for service among the heavy-armed troops. Thucydides declares that the constitution was esta- blished on a better footing than at any time within his memory, with a moderate and beneficial distribution of powers between the Many and the Few. Im- mediately on the change most of the oligarchical leaders fled to Deceleia. A vote was passed for the recal of Alci- biades, and information of the late transactions was sent to the armament at Samos, with an exhortation vigo- rously to continue the war. The Lacedaemonians had now begiin a course of operations in concert with Phamabazus, who supplied their force with a liberality, and supported them with a decision, wnich present a strong con- trast to the cunning, timid, and avaricious conduct of Tissaphernes. But the Athe- nians, under the able conduct of Alcibia- des, vigorously seconded by Thrasybulus andThrasyllus, were entering on a course of victories,* which continued till they had completely destroyed the hostile fleet, recovered much of their lost domi- nion, and without intrigue or solicitation, by the mere force of their successes, in- duced Pharnabazus to make peace, and stopped those inexhaustible supplies on which the enemy had depended. Having done all this, in the twenty- fourth year of the war, and the sixth from his ba- nishment, Alcibiades determined to re- visit his country ; and as winter was approaching, he proposed to gratify the greater part of his forces with the oppor- tunity of seeing their friends, and attend- ing to their domestic concerns. He returned, and was received with the greatest favour, being immediately ap- pointed commander-in-chief with greater powers than had ever been intrusted to any such officer. He had soon an op- portunity both of gratifying the people, and increasing his reputation in Greece. Since the garrisoning of Deceleia, the Athenians had never ventured to con- duct by land the customary procession to Eleusis in honour of Geres. Alcibia- des, with the forces from Asia, added to • In one of these battles the Spartan commander, Mindarus, was slam, and nearl)r every ship of his squadron taken. The dispatch, in which these tid- ings were announced to the Lacedaemonian govern- ment, has been preserved entire by Xenophou. It runs thuias "The luck is gone: Mindarus is dead; tb« men hunger; we know not what to do." the former strength of the city, now undertook to protect them in the full performance of every rite ; and the train went and returned escorted by the army, without an attempt at disturbance. No nation is recorded to have long preserved an efficient control over large and distant provinces, unless by a de- cided superiority in character, institu- tions, and civilization. Such, at least in a political and military view, was the case with the Romans ; and such is yet more strikingly the case with the English government in India: for as the extent of the empire is here yet more dispro- portionate to the foreign controlling force ; so the disadvantage is balanced by a more universal superiority, not more in the arts of peace and war, than in the tone of public morals ; and, in spite of many errors and many crimes, in the general honesty of intention toward the governed, which, to the Romans, as to former Indian governments, was a principle unknown. In the numerous empires which have risen and fallen in Asia, the ruling race has seldom been of a character to attach its subjects be beneficence, or to awe them by pre- eminent courage and skill. They have generally been created by an able leader rising in a warlike tribe. They have rapidly increased; for among nations that saw in the sovereignty not a trust for the good of the people, but a prize for the boldest ruffian or the craftiest be- trayer, there could be neither public spirit nor determined attachment to an- cient institutions, to stand up against the thirst of conquest and plunder, in a successful army, under a popular com- mander. But as empire was acquired by force, so by force only it could be preserved. When the first career of victory was over, and the influence of personal character in the founder of a dynasty was gone, his feebler successors gradually lost all hold on the obedience of their officers ; while the soldiery in the provinces became devoted to their im- mediate commander, and careless of the distant head of the empire. Accordingly, in the Persian monarchy, since the time of Xerxes, the provincial governors had gradually assumed a considerable dejjree of independence. They paid tribute in- deed to the king, and owned a nominal allegiance; but they made separate treaties with foreign states, as we have seen in the cases of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes ; sometimes they made war on each other, each professing to remain G GREECE. m obedience to the sovereifrn ; and oc- casionally, when visited with the royal displeasure, a refractory satrap would retain his government by arms. Darius, the present king, appears to have felt that his empire was weakened by its unwieldy extent, and to have con- templated detaching from it the pro- vinces bordering on the Grecian seas, to form a separate kingdom for Cyrus, his younger son, a youth of spint and abi- Uty. The prince was sent into those Erovinces as his father's lieutenant, and oth Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes were subjected to his command. Lysan- der. who had recently been appointed the Spartan admiral, on heanng that Cyru . was arrived in Sardis, where his court was to be held, immediately has- tened thither. Unlike his countrymen in general, Lysanderwas a supple cour- tier and a dexterous politician. The prince's favour had already been won by an embassy from Lacedaemon, and it was raised to the highest pitch by the insinuating manners of the Spartan commander. He now joined unreser- vedly in the war, and supplied full pay to all the sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet. This turn of things lowered the credit of Alcibiades, whose restoration had chiefly been procured by the promise of Persian assistance. His fleet was still the stronger, but with his limited re- souices and the inexhaustible supplies at the command of Lysander, it could not long continue so without decisive action. Accordingly, he led his fleet to a station in view of the enemy. But during a short absence ot the general, by the folly of one of his lieutenants, a battle was provoked against orders, and lost. The defeat in itself was little im- portant, but the news set all Athens in a flame. The enemies of Alcibiades took advantage of the popular rage — he was accused of haughtiness, negligence, and inditference to the welfare of the people ; and the only man who seemed capable of extricating the commonwealth from its dangers was dismissed from his com- mand, without inquiry or defence. The popular fury once excited, spent itself in vague chai-ges of disaft'ection, and many who had supported the Four Hundred were variously punished with death, confiscation, exile, or disfranchisement Alcibiades did not venture to return to give an account, according to custom, of his conduct in office, but retired to a lordship he poeaeMsed in the Thracian ChersoneM. The history of Alcibiades is a striking instance how httle true merit can be measured by temporary popularity. When he had wilfully inflicted on his country deeper wounds thi n had been given by the ablest servants of its enemy, he was recalled, received with unex- ampled joy and favour, and appointed to a station of unusual power an'' splen- dour. When by able and faithful ser v ice he had nearly retrieved the injuries he had done, he was for a trifling error, and that not his own, ignominiously dis- placed and driven into banishment. Yet let not his life aftbrd a lesson of encou- ragement to unprincipled poHticians. Though popular opinion in a free state be offer ?ll-judging in a moment of ex- citeraen , it ecmmonly settles into jrstice as the passion cools and the ferment sub- sides. Pericles was fined and Cimon banished : but both these great men ended their days the most beloved and trusted favourites of the people. The present charges against Alcibiades were tnvial and unjust ; but his previous cha- racter gave them weight, and deprived him of the confidence to challenge in- quiry, and trust to the calmer judgment of his countrymen. It is frequently a part of the punishment of guilt to be shut out from the opportunity of atone- ment. The glory of saving his country was too great tor the man who had so profligately brought it near destruction ; but in the circumstances his condem- nation was unjust as well as ruinous; and it should seem as if the injustice and folly of the Athenians had been made at once the instrument to punish the trea- sons of Alcibiades, and the cause ot not unmerited ruin to themselves. In place of Alcibiades, ten generals were appointed, of whom the first was Conon, a man cf great ability. I-ysan- der was soon after superseded by Calli- cratidas, according to the custom of Lacedajmon, which sutfered no man to be admiral tor more than a year. The new commander was a man of decision, plain good sense, and honesty, and a rigid disciple of Lycurgus. He first collected reinforcements, which made his fleet decidedly superior. But find- ing That the friends of Lysander were caballing against him, and exciting dis- content at so frequent changes ot com- mand, he called together the Lacedaj- monians of the armament and spoke thus. ** I could be well content to stay at home, and if Lysander or any other pretends to be a Mter seaman, he may GREECE. 83 \\ m be so for me. Being, however, ap- pointed admiral, I must do my best in that capacity. Will you support me, or shall I sail home, to tell how things stand here ?" The cabal was silenced. Calli- cratidas then went to the court of Cyrus to ask a supply ; but he was not a cour- tier, and it did not occur to him to smooth his way by compliments, or to guard against any ill offices which might have been done him by Lysander. He was coldly received, and put off from day to day ; till, disgusted at his treatment and at ail he saw. he departed, exclaiming that the Greeks were most wretched who would so truckle to barbarians for money, and that if he returned he would do his utmost to end the necessity of doing so, by reconciling Athens and LacedaRmon. He obtained a loan from the Milesians and Chians, and sailing to Lesbos, took Methymne by assault All goods were given up to pillage, but the slaves were collected and sold. Callicratidas was urged by the allies to sell the Methymnaean citizens also, but he declared that, under his com- mand, no Greek should be made a slave. We have here a noble example of the power with which, in moral ques- tions, a sincere, upright, and benevolent nature, can enlighten the judgment and clear it from the prejudices of an illiberal education. Callicratidas was a plain straightforward man, of moderate capa- city, and not likely to seek for maxims of policy more refined than those of his country ; he was a zealous and even bigoted adherent of the institutions in which he had been bom and bred, which, beyond all others, produced in men con- tempt of human suffering, and indifler ence to the welfare of all communities but their own. Yet his heart was right, and he was led by native integrity to avow and act on a principle of generous humanity, which, though fitted to benefit all Greece by diminishing the miseries of war, was never proclaimed before or after by the most enlightened and liberal of Grecian statesmen. Callicratidas obtained an opportunity of attacking Conon with superior force, defeated him, and having taken thirty triremes, besieged the rest in Mitylene. The Athenians, on hearing Conon's dan- ger, manned a powerful fleet, on which all embarked who were bound to naval service, and many even of the cavalry, who were generally exempt. This was not enough, and the deficiency was made up with slaves, who were rewarded with their freedom. Eight of the ten generals were on board. The hostile armaments engaged near Arginusae, a knot of small islands between Lesbos and the main- land. The Athenians were so far supe- rior in force that Callicratidas was ad- vised to decline an action : he answered that his death would be a small loss to Sparta, but that flight would be dis- graceful. The reply was spirited, but singularly injudicious, since he hazarded not his life aJone but the fleet which he commanded, and perhaps the issue of the war. Yet the superstitious rigour of his obedience to the precepts of Lycurgus, sets in a stronger light the virtue which could lead a mind so little distinguishing to depart from the habits of his country where they were un- generous and inhuman. The battle was long, but it ended in the complete de- feat of the Peloponnesians Callicratidas perished and seventy ships were taken. The generals proceeded to the relief of Conon. leaving a squadron under Thera- menes and Thrasybulus. who were then captains of triremes, to collect the dead and save the men who were floating on the wrecks. This was prevented by a storm, and the crews of twelve Athenian ships, that had been wrecked in the battle, perished. Six of the generals returned to Athens, leaving the other two with Conon at Samos. On arriving, they were im- prisoned by the council of five hundred, and being brought before the general assembly, they found themselves accused by Theramenes, of having neglected those wrecked in the battle. Their death was evidently predetermined by a power- ful faction, for they were not allowed to conduct their defence in the usual form, but each was permitted only to make a short speech. They had left the care of the wrecked, they said, to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, men confessedly suf- ficient for the charge. If the duty had been neglected, those who now accused them were to blame ; but the fact was that the weather haH made it impossible, and this they brought many witnesses to prove. It was plain that if the ques- tion were now put, the generals would be acquitted ; but the accusers having on their side the presidents and the majority of the council, the former declared that there was not light to judge of the show of hands : the decision was referred to the next assembly, and it was resolved that the council should determine the 'manner of judgment Meantime persons were procured to o 2 »l GREECE show themselvt»s in deep mourning:, as for relations lost after the battle ; and a man was suborned to state to the assembly that he had saved himself on a flour barrel, and had been conjured by his drowning comrades to tell the Athenians how the ffenerals had abandoned those who had deserved so well of their countr}'. The council resolved that the people should decide by ballot, whether or not the 2:enerals were criminal in suffering those to perish who had conquered in the bal tie. This mode of proceedina: was as illesral as unfair ; and on this ground it was opposed by Eun'ptolemus, who threatened to impeach Callixenus, the author of the resolution. But the mul- titude cried out, that it was intolerable if the people were not allowed to do its pleasure ; and one of Theramenes's faction was emboldened to declare, that whoever should presume to. check the assembly, he would move that his fate should be decided by the same ballot with that of the generals. Euryptolemus was obliged to retract his threat ; but the prytanes refused to put the question on the illegal decree. Callixenus accused them of contumacy, and the multitude indignantly called for those who resisted the orders of the people. One yet stood firm, and this was Socrates the philosopher, who persisted that he would not act otherwise than according: to law : the other pry- tanes consented to propose the resolution of the council. Euryptolemus, compelled to withdraw his opposition to the decree, as one which could not regularly be even taken into consideration, still resisted it as unjust and inexpedient, and proposed to trv the geaerals separately, according to established law. The question was put, and the motion of Euryptolemus declared to be carried ; but the show of hands being repeated at the demand of one of the faction, was now declared to be for that ofCaUixenus. The people proceeded to ballot, according to the decree; the eight generals were condemned by one vote, and the six present executed. Such was the gratitude and justice of Athens to those who had won for it the greatest victory obtained in the war. The measure of this people's iniquity now was full, and the victoiy of Argi- nus«, which ought to have saved the commonwealth, proved the prelude to its ruin. The government did not recover its steadiness after the late violent over- bearing of law and justice. The people repenting their fury, bound five of the instigators to answer for their conduct. These escaped before trial, and Callix- enus, who was one of them, made his peace in an after revolution; but he lived, hated and avoided, and perished by hunger in a time of scarcity. The banished were recalled, the disfranchised restored to their political rights, and oaths of concord taken by the people; but nothinff could bring back union or energy. Yet a powerful fleet was in- trusted to Conon, and five others ; whUe Lysander again commanded for Lace- daemon, and by his able, active, and con- ciliatorv conduct, retrieved her affairs. At length the hostile fleets were watching each other,— the Peloponne- sians in the harbour of Lanipsacus, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, a defensible station, with a market close at hand; the Athenians, on the open beach of iEgospotami, precisely opposite, the nearest market being that of Seslos, two miles off. It is pleasing to find in a character, which we have frequently had reason strongly to condemn, one instance of disinterested patriotism at a time when he had recently been ill treated by his country. Alcibiades was living at his castle in the Chersonese, and saw the disadvantageous position of his countrymen. He went to the gene- rals, and suggested the expediency of removing their forces to Sestos, where they would, equally with the enemy, have the advantage of a town and harbour, and would be able to choose when to fight. The admonition was treated by some of the generals with unmannerly disdain, but its wisdom was soon made manifest. For four days the Athenians had off'ered battle daily, which Lysander declined ; and afterwards the sailors had wandered to Sestos, and about the country, to seek provisions. Every day's inaction on the part of Lysander in- creased their confidence, and consequent disorder. But on the fifth day Lysander, waiting till the Athenians were dispersed according to their custom, suddenly pushed his fleet across the bay, and surprised their ships before the seamen could be collected. Nine vessels, all belonjring to the division of Conon, had their complete crews aboard, and these escaped; but all the rest were taken, in number one hundred and seventy. Conon sent one ship to Athens, to carry the news of the defeat ; and thinking that the war was now desperate carried the rest to Salamis in Cyprus. The greater part of the Athenians, with five of the generals, were made GREECE. 65 ,1 prisoners, and Lysander assembled the allies to deliberate what was to be done with them. The Athenians were accused of many flagrant violations of the laws of war. Among other charges it was said that they had determined, should they win the battle, to cut otf the right hands of all their prisoners ; and Phi- locles, one of the generals, was particu- larly accused of having thrown down a precipice the entire crews of two cap- tured triremes. It was voted that all the Atlienian prisoners should be put to death, excepting Adeimantus, one of the generals, who it was said had opposed the inhuman decree respecting the prisoners. Lysander, asking Philocles what he deserved, who had been first to violate the laws of Grecian warfare, began the execution by killing him with his own hand; and all the Athenian citi- zens were put to death, to the number of three thousand. The retaliation of cruelty for cruelty is a measure of very pernicious example, and to be justified, if ever, only by the most pressing ne- cessity of self-defence. That plea would in the present case be absurd. The inten- tion imputed to the Athenians, with their former conduct on many occasions, was a fit object of abhorrence, not of imita- tion ; but to justify their massacre on the ground that they had set the first example of lawless cruelty to Greece, required surely more than ordinary effrontery in the officer of a power, which in the beginning of this very war, while yet unprovoked by any barbarities of the enemy, had continued for many years habitual military execution, not on enemies taken in arms, but on peace- ful merchants and unoffending neutrals. The navy of Athens being totally destroyed, Lysander could take posses- sion, unopposed, of its dependencies. From each he allowed the Athenian garrisons to depart to Athens, but thi- ther only. He knew that against the uncommon strength of that city famine only could avail, and therefore the more numerous the persons in it, the surer and speedier would be its reduction. He soon blockaded Athens with his fleet, while by land it was besieged by both the kings of Lacedaemon, with the whole strength of the Peloponnesian allies. The news of the defeat at ^gospo- tami carried dismay to Athens. The people remembered the fate of the mi- serable Sciona^ans, the iEginetans, and many others ; but, above all, of the Melians, the colonists of Lacedaemon, whom they had slaughtered without a shadow of just provocation in the mere wantonness of power. Expecting such mercy as they had shown, they prepared to endure to the utmost, blocked up all the ports but one, and made all ready for defence. No assault was made, but famine soon began to be felt, and many died of hung:er before capitulation was proposed. To the necessary evils of defeat and blockade, there were added those of internal dissension. Tlie go- vernment had been long unhinged by factious struggles, which were now em- bittered by the irritation of suffering, and the suUenness of pride contending with despair. Long resistance was impos- sible ; concession only could save the city, and it was doubtful whether the most abject concessions would be accepted — yet, the Athenians, doggedly refusing to acknowledge what they inwardly felt to be true, passed votes of punishment on any who should pro- pose such sacrifices. The popular favourite of the day was Cleophon, a warm opposer of all concession : and his power being commensurate to the violence of the passions by which he was supported, he was enabled to sur- pass all former demagogues in insolence and arbitrary conduct ; till, in a subse- quent fluctuation of the popular mind, he was accused, and put to death. At length ambassadors were sent with the offer, that the Athenians would be sub- ordinate allies of Lacedaemon, retaining the Peiraeeus, and all the fortifications. On the border of Laconia the ambassa- dors were met by a message from the Ephori, informing them that the terms they brought were known at Lacedaemon, and that, if they wished for peace, they must come better instructed, i his re- Eulse raised the consternation to the ighest pitch, the Many now expect- ing nothing less than to be sold into slavery. The ferment was increased by the not unreasonable suspicion that the oligarchical party would willingly make terms for their own exclusive advantage. It was understood that a principal de- mand of Lacedaemon would be, the demolishing ten furlongs of the long walls. This was a tender point with the Athenians, and a vote was passed for- bidding even the proposal ot such a concession. In this state of hopelesR and aimless agitation, Theramenes de- 6Ii££CB» GREECE. 87 clared that, if he were lent to Lysander, he would ascertain whether the purpose of the Lacedaemonians, in requiring the demohtion of the walls, was to make slaves of the people, or merely to insure their political subjection as a subordi- nate state. Being sent to Lysander, he abode with him more than three months, awaiting the time when the increasmg pressure of famine might have so far broken the spirit of the Athenians, as to induce them to entrust the business un- reservedly to him. At len2:th returning, he said, that Lysander had hitherto de- tained him, and now referred him to Lacedaemon; and the assembly was persuaded to send him whh nine others to Lacedaemon, fully empowered to act according to their discretion. The Lacedaemonians, hearing that the ambassadors now came with unrestricted powers, held a congress of the allies, to determine the fate of Athens. The Corinthian and Theban deputies vehe- mently urged its total destruction ; but the Lacedaemonians adopted a wiser as well as more generous policy. Peace was made on the conditions that the long walls and the walls of the Peiraeeus should be demolished ; all ships of war, but twelve, given up ; the exiles restored ; and that the Athenians should follow, by land and sea. wherever the Lacedaemonians might lead. Thus de- pressed and oligarchically governed, Athens, it was thought, might be a valuable dependency of Lacedsemon, and perhaps an useful counterpoise to the ambition of Thebes orArgos. The terms were unwillingly but unavoidably accepted by the Athenians ; Lysander entered the harbour ; the exiles returned, and the demolition of the walls was be- gun to the sound of festive music : for that day, says the Athenian historian, Xenophon, was thought the beginning of freedom to Greece. We shall find that the general opinion was erroneous, and that the weaker states gained little by the change of masters. The war had lasted nearly twenty- seven years. (From B.C. 431 to B.C. 403.) Alcibiades was not amon^ the exiles restored. He remained on his Thracian lordship, an object of j^^alousy both to Lacedyemon and to the new government of Athens. At last, to escape the per- secution of Lacedaemon, he went mto Asia. When residing there, his house was attacked by a tumultuous assem- blage of people, at whose instigation is uncertain. The house was set on fire. Alcibiades sallied with his servants, and none dared to meet him hand to hand ; but he was overwhelmed from a distance with darts and arrows, and thus slain, before he had reached his fortieth year. Chapter VII. Of Greece^ from the termination of the Peloponnesian War, to the peace which followed the battle of Monti- tuna : and of its Colonies in Stctly, from the destruction of the invad- ing Athenian army, to the death of Timoleon, Sect. I.— Before the Peloponnesian army quitted Athens, the chief power was vested in thirty persons nominally elected by the people, though at this mo- ment there could be little freedom of choice. The pretended object of theu* ap- pointment was to reform the laws and remodel the government on its ancient principles: but the new constitution being still kept back, while they disposed of the existing magistracies according to their pleasure, it grew manifest that they aimed at perpetuating their own dominion. At first their acts were popu- lar, and continued so while confined to the prosecution of those who had been malicious informers under the democracy. For their further pro- jects foreign support was needed : com- municating, therefore, with Lysander, they obtained throut:h him a Lacedae- monian guard. The^ pretext for sending it was to protect them m clearing the city of disreputable persons, and in set- tling the state ; but when strengthened by it, the thirty proceeded without scruple to the arrest of every citizen of crwiit who seemed likely to oppose their usur pations. The most eminent of the Thirty were Critias and Theramenes. Critias had great abilities, high rank, And ample fortune, with a haughty and violent temper, embittered by a banishment inflicted on him by the people. He now proposed to secure to the Thirty, and to himself as their chief, the despotic rule of Athens under Lacedaemonian protec- tion. By extensive executions he thought at once to gratify his revenge, and remove all suspected opponents ; and diminishing the number of citizens sig- nified little, for all necessary laboun might be done by slaves, and foreign at- tacK was prevented by the power of Lace- ^' daemon. The views of Theramenes were very different. That bold and dexterous intriguer, though selfish, trimming, and unscrupulous, was not tyrannical like Critias. He was naturally mild and moderate, a lover of popularity, and averse from needless bloodshed : though in the prosecution of the generals, after the battle of Arginusae, he had shown that no crime would stop him in the pur- suit of his ends. He had successively assisted in raising and overthrowing every party which had lately risen in Athens ; and from his frequent change of sides he was popularly known by a name denoting a sort of shoe, that miirht be drawn on either foot indif- ferently. The most remarkable features of his character were the acuteness with which he judged when the predomi- nant faction was about to fall, and the decision with which he changed his side, before to common eyes the change seemed prudent. The measures whifh alarmed him as impolitic had commonly disgusted him by their vio- lence, and enabled him to justify on public grounds his abandonment of the falling party ; and this, with his bold- ness in taking his part while it seemed yet hazardous, had preserved to him in all his turnings some degree of popular esteem He now vainly remonstrated with his colleagues. Without a party, he said, no oligarchy could stand ; and by these proceedings all parties were offended and alarmed. But Critias, having secured most of the Thirty in his interest, was eager to nd himself of his only rival in ability and influence ; of a man whose views were inconsistent with his own, and who, finding himself powerless among the Thirty, would probably be ready, able, and bold to work their overthrow. The danger most feared was a rallying of the people round Theramenes, such as had already taken place against the Four Hundred. To obviate this, a cata- logue was formed of three thousand citi- zens, to whom only the sovereign power jn assembly, with exclusive egilibility to magistracies, was given. All other citi- zens were to be under the absolute do- minion, not of the Three Thousand only, but of the Thirty. A rviview of arms was ordered, of the Three Thousand in the market-place, of the other citizens in smaller divisions in different places of the city. The Thirty then sending their own confidential adherents, supported by the Lacedaemonian troops, disarmed in detail all the citizens except those of the Three Thousand ; and the arms being carried to the temple of Minerva, in the Acropolis, were placed in the keeping of the Lacedaemonian garrison. Having thus prevented all effectual opposition, the Thirty did their pleasure. Many were put to death through per- sonal enmity, and many for their wealth : and it was actually voted that each of the Thirty should select one man, ac- cording to his pleasure, from the foreign sojourners in Athens ; and that all, so chosen, should be put to death, and their properly carried into the treasury. With the produce of confiscation they fur- nished pay for the Lacedaemonian troops, and rewards for the most forward of their own adherents ; but as means were want- ing to attach by favours a number suffi- cient to support them against the just hatred of the rest, they adopted the abominable expedient of compelling men to execute their most tyrannical orders, that, being invoked in the same guilt, and liable to the same resentment, they might support the present government as their only chance of protection. Among those on whom this policy was practised, Socrates is a solitary instance of determined resistance. He was com- manded with four others to apprehend and bring to Athens Leon of Salamis, a man whose life had been blameless, but whose wealth was a tempting prey. This order Socrates disobeyed as illegal ; the other four performed it, and Leon was executed. The life of the philoso- pher was saved by his poverty, and by the speedy downfai of the tyrants whom he had offended. We have already seen the conduct of Socrates at the impeach- ment of the six generals ; and it is re- markable that the only occasions, on which his name appears in the political history of Athens, should both be in- stances of bold resistance to the injus- tice of powers which none other dared withstand ; both proofs that his actions were governed by the favourite principle of his ethics, that no outward violence could make the virtuous man either criminal or unhappy. Thus far the council had been readily subservient to the Thirty, but the next attempt was harder. Theramenes had grown more decided in opposition to his colleagues as their tyranny grew more violent : his destruction was resolved on, but the council was not yet prepared to concur in it. Persuasion was used with some of the members, menace with S8 GREECE. GREECE. 89 others. Matters were arranged with those whom the tyrants most trusted— the council was summoned— young men with hidden daggers siurounded the hall —the Thirty attended, and Theramenes among them, when Critias rose and accused him of treason against the exist- ing government. Theramenes defended himself with readiness, eloquence, and skill, and so showed the expediency of the measures he had recommended, and the iniquity and danger of those pursued by Critias, that he disposed a majority of the council in his favour. But Critias knew that now either he or Theramenes must fall, and after short conference with the Thirty, he went out and directed his armed attendants to show themselves, TTien returning, he addressed the council thus :— ** I hold it my duty as president of the Thir^ to prevent mjr associates in the government from being misled. These men before you, say, that they will not endure the acquittal of one who is known to be undermining the olisjarchy. In the new constitution it is enacted, that the Three Thousand of the catalogue shall be liable to death only by the judgment of the council ; but ail others by that of the Thirty. I then, with your unanimous approval, strike out this man from the catalogue, and we, the Thirty, condemn him to death." Theramenes sprang to the altar, and thence appealed to the sacredness of the place, as well as to the protection of the laws, reminding the councillors that if they did not protect him their names might be erased from the cata- logue with as little ceremony as his own. He was, however, dragged from the altar to prison, and compelled to drink the fatal cup of hemlock, the common punishment for state criminals at Athens. His courage did not fail. He calmly drank the poison, and, dash- ing the remainder on the floor, as was the custom of revellers, " Be this," he said, " for Critias !" The Thirty now tyrannised without restraint. Lands and country-houses were seized for themselves and their ad- herents, and the owners executed. All citizens not of the catalogue were com- ' manded to quit Athens, and most took refage in Peiraeeus ; but as many con- tinued to be taken thence and executed, they fled, chiefly to Mesrara and Thebes. Thrasybulus, who was then residing in Boeotia, was encouraged by the multi- tude of exiles to strike a blow against tlw despots. It was mid- winter, about six months after their establishment, when, with seventy companions, he occu pied Phyle, a border-fortress of Attica. The Thirty led their forces against the place, and assaulted it without success ; and when they thought of blockading it, a heavy fall of snow obliged them to re- treat. To prevent, however, the plun- dering of their lands, they sent the greater part of the Lacedaemonian auxiliaries with a body of their own horse to a sta- tion near the place; but Thrasybulus having now collected seven hundred heavy-armed soldiers, surprised their camp, and defeated them. The tyrants now resolved to secure a refuge in Eleusis, in case they should be driven from Athens. The cavalry, being composed of the wealthiest famQies, was generally favourable to oligarchy, and the Thirty had laboured to attach it to them by favours, and considered it as the trustiest part of their force. They went with it to Eleusis, and arresting all the townsmen who were suspected of disaffection, brought them to Athens. The citizens of the cata^ logue, both horse and foot, were assem- bled to pass sentence on the prisoners, and the Lacedaemonian troops were pre- sent in arms to discourage opposition. Critias then addressed the assembly thus : — " The government which we are establishing is formed for you no less than for ourselves. It is fit that as you share its advantages you should alsc share its dangers. You must, therefore, condemn the arrested Eleusinians, that your fears and hopes may be the same with ours." The votes were secretly given, not openly as was usual in Athe- nian criminal proceedings, and three hundred prisoners were condemned at once. Not long after, Thrasybulus, with about one thousand heavy-armed troops, entered Peiraeeus unopposed, by night. In the morning the Thirty attacked them with very superior numbers, but were, nevertheless, defeated, and Critias slain. A truce was obtained according to cus- tom, by the defeated, for the burial of the dead, and while it continued many fi-om both sides assembled in conversa- tion. The party of Thrasybulus pro- fessed all willingness to be reconciled to the Three Thousand, and imputed the evils suffered to the Thirty only, " who, for their private interests, had destroyed as many Athenians in eight months, as the Peloponnesians in ten years, and had forced on this most hateful and unholy civil war." It was manifest that the Athenians from the city were ini- pressed by what they heard, and their leaders anxiously hurried them away. Next day the Thirty met to deliberate what was to be done, while the Three Thousand were in altercation in various parts of the town. Those who had been forward in the late violences urged resist- ance to the utmost ; while others, who thou2:ht they had not sinned beyond for- giveness, wished for accommodation. In the end the tyrants were deposed, and a committee of ten appointed to negotiate peace with the party in Peiraeeus. Two of the Thirty were placed in the committee, the rest retired to Eleusis. But the Ten, instead of treating with Thrasybulus, endeavoured to secure to themselves the power from which the Thirty had fallen. Many of the Three Thousand were on their side, and nearly all the cavalry, and they looked for aid to Lacedaemon. Meantime the late exiles becoming supe nor, as well in number as in zeal and union, commanded the country, and pre- pared to blockade the city. Lysander now being appointed to command for Lacedaemon in Attica, made ready to besiege Peiraeeus. No prudence or bravery in Thrasybulus and his followers could withstand the power of Lacedaemon ; but the state of parties in that city gave them hope. Many, among whom was Pausanias, one of the kings, were jealous of Ly- sander, and, above all, of the com- manding influence which he seemed likely to gain in Attica. The assembly was persuaded to decree that the busi- ness of Athens required the presence of a complete Lacedaemonian army; and such an army being sent thither under Pausanias, the appointment of Lysan- der sunk into a subordinate command. One smart but indecisive skirmish took place, but the real purpose of the Spar- tan king was to settle matters by nego- tiation, not by battle. A treaty was arranged, by which all Athenians, the Tliirty excepted, and some few others of the most guilty, were restored to their rights, under an oath of universal am- nesty. Eleusis was given as a residence to the excepted, and to all who might fear to live in Athens. Pausanias then led away the Peloponnesians ; and Thra- sybulus, with his foUowers, marched in procession into the city, and offered a thartksgiving sacrifice to Minerva. A general assembly then was held, in which, by the advice of Thrasybulus, the old constitution was entirely re-established The people soon after, being alarmed with the news that those in Eleusis were hiring mercenary troops, marched out against them with their whole force. The leaders in Eleusis were murdered in a conference ; a great crime, but the only one which disgraced the restoration of liberty to Athens. Peace and am- nesty were offered and accepted; the refugees returned ; the people kept their oaths, and the government was carried on with concord. Thus the Athenian commonwealth was completely restored, and Attica reunited. The vices have already been remarked which were produced in the Athenian peo- ple, by so large a portion of them living as pensioners on the state. This evil was necessarily increased by the recent series of revolutions, which had completely interrupted the course of peaceful labour, made many poor who had formerly been rich, and many idle who had been indus- trious. At the same time the poorer citizens had been increased in number by the admission of slaves and foreigners, in reward for services against the Lace- daemonians, and against the Thirty. The number of pensioners being, therefore, increased, while the foreign sources of revenue were cut off, the extortions, which had formerly been practised on the subject-states, were now directed against wealthy men at home. It is probable, however, that the total amount of wealth thus levied was not immode- rate ; for, with the foreign command, the expenses of fleets and armies had passed away, and it was far less easy to bear hard on those who were present and possessed of extensive influence, than to plunder the defenceless tributa- ries. But cases occurred of great indi- vidual hardship ; and there is reason to fear that the public indigence sometimes appeared in a shape peculiarly odious, and that the judges might be biassed against a state defendant, by the magni- tude of the confiscation. Other evils arose : so many violent revolutions had necessarily created numerous personal enmities, and confirmed a tendency, al- ways too strong in the Athenians, to suspect in the most trivial occurrences a plot against the government. But none of these evils can fairly be traced to the conduct of Thrasybulus and his follow- ers, which was singularly prudent and moderate. They were the natural result of the previous history of Athens, of the wars it had waged, the dominion it had 9V GREECK GREECE. 91 'ii held, and the revelations it had under- gone ; and, thx)ugh in some degree they may justly be regarded as a testimony against its unbalanced democracy, it is probable that no other government known to Greece would have stood so fearful a trial without yet greater mischiefs. About three years after the restoration of democracy, Athens was disgraced by the condemnation of the most excellent man she ever produced, the philosopher Socrates. But before relating his death, we will look to the state of moral science before his time, and the revolution he worked in it. The early Grecian philo- sophers fall into two great classes, the plwsical speculators, and the ethical and theological. Of the former the most eminent was Democritus, the author of the atomic philosophy ; which considers the world to be made up of atoms, or indivisible particles of matter similar to each other, and all natural appearances to be results of their different posi- tions and motions. In explaining sen- sible phenomena, Democritus shewed perhaps more knowledge and acute- ness than any other Greek: but not content with this, he pushed his atoms into subjects where they had no place ; represented thought and sensation as modifications of matter and motion; declared that there was no God nor spiritual being ; and that the order and harmony of the world were produced by bhnd chance, amidst the infinite com- binations of moving atoms. He had many followers, as well in his atheism and materialism, as in his physical principles. For a specimen of the ethical and theological philosophers we may take Pythagoras, a Samian, but the founder of a sect very prevalent in Gre- cian Italy. His morality and religion were purer than those current hi Greece. He had travelled into Egypt, and brought apparently from thence some remnants of primitive tradition ; but he had also brought a fondness for the arts of Egyp- tian priestcraft He aimed at enhghten- ing, not the many, but a privileged few ; who, by superior intelhgence, becoming rulers in their several cities, were to go- vern them with humanity and justice. Accordingly, admission into his sect was made difficult, and his doctrines were veiled with a mystical language, calcu- lated to foster a blind reverence m the disciples towards their master, and, m the vulgar, towards the disciples. Some practical conclusions were published to aU, but the principles were accessible only to the most instructed. Here, then , we have two principal classes of philo- sophers,— those busied in physical spe culations, which were often tainted with atheism and materialism ; and those who chiefly studied morals and theology in many instances not unsuccessfully, but always studiously veiling their re- searches from the many. After these arose the sceptics (doubters) and so- phists—the last, a name not marking any particular doctrines, but describing a class of men whose profession was to cultivate the talents of youth. It will readily b^ supposed that with common minds the object of such cultivation was not the highest absolute moral and in- tellectual excellence, but the best training for the pursuit of wealth and power. In Grecian communities eloquence was the talent most available to the aspiring ; and. accordingly, it was what the sophists chiefly undertook to teach. They pro- fessed to possess and impart the power of recommending successfully any side of any question : from habitual inditter- ence to truth in discourse, the passage to mental doubt was easy ; and most of the sophists became sceptics in philoso- phy. Of this Protagoras was an exam- ple, perhaps the niost eminent among them, who held that knowledge was no more than sense or opinion; that to every man what he felt or beUeved was true ; and what he disbelieved, false ; that there was no absolute truth, but the same thing might be true to one man, and false to another. Scepticism naturally leads to looseness of morals ; for no man who doubts the existence of certain princi- ples, will sacrifice his present inclinations to the supposition of their truth. Accord- ingly, the practical precepts of most of the sophists were hi^lily favourable to the corrupt propensities of their pupils. As opinion was the measure of truth, so inclination was the measure of good; and that man was the happiest, who had power and will to gratify his desires with- out restraint or regard of others. Justice was sometimes a name for the interest of the strongest, sometimes a mere crea- ture of law without foundation in nature ; a scarecrow set up by the weak to deter the strong fi-om taking those advantages to which they were naturally entitled. Socrates attended but little, except in early years, to physical science ; but he turned all the powers ot his mind against the atheists and materiahsts, the sceptics, and those who set up plea- sure as the only good. Against the first he maintained most ably the being of a God, the incorporeal nature and immortality of the soul. In his disputes with the sophists and sceptics, he availed himself of a readiness and dexterity in argument superior to their own; and drawing them by an artful series of questions into inconsistencies and absur- dities, at once exposed their arrogance and the falsehood of their views. He delighted in humbling insolent pretenders to superior knowlede:e, and he confessed and dwelt on the imperfections of the human understanding, as an instrument for the investigation of truth: yet he aid not, like most of the sophists, make that imperfection a reason for denying existence to the truth which he was un- able completely to fathom ; but rather a motive to greater humility and candour in the search, and to a modest reliance on divine assistance, to guide man's judsrment on points important to his welfare, where nis own unassisted facul- ties were inadequate to the task. He stated and enforced a system of morality and religion, purer and loftier than that of the Pythagoreans ; but, unlike them, he was accessible to all, always clear in his statements as far as possible, and ready to explain whatever was not un derstood. Hence, he was said to have brought down philosophy from the clouds, and made her converse with men. Ever earnest in recommending temperance, benevolence, piety, jus- tice, and showing that man's happiness and dignity are determined by his mind, and not his fortunes, by virtue and wisdom, not by rank and wealth, his own life was the best example of his precepts. We have seen his unbending uprightness when forced into public office, and his private conduct was no less exemplary. Barefooted and poorly clad, he associated with the rich and gay as with the needy, in the same spirit of cheerful good- will : his advice and instructions were given to all without fee or reward, for his spirit was rigidly inde- pendent, and, if he possessed little, he wanted less. This excellent man was impeached oefore the popular court of reviling the gods which Athens acknowledged, of preaching other gods, and of corrupting the youth. The latter charge was princi- pally supported by the conduct of Alcibi- ades and Critias, both of whom had been his pupils. He triumphantly repelled the accusations ; but his accusers were powerful, his judges prejudice I, and his danger was increased by the manner of his defence. It was usual for accuse*? persons to supplicate favour with tears, and endeavour to move pity, by exhibit- ing theu- children. By this the pride of the judges was gratified, when they saw sometimes the most considerable persons obliged to descend to supplication. But Socrates considered this as equally un- worthy of himself, and disrespectful to the tribunal, which ought to be directed by justice, not by favour ; and the judges were offended at his denying them the accustomed homage. He was con- demned to death. He again addressed the court, declaring his innocence, and observing that the charges against him, even if proved, did not amount to a ca- pital crime. " But," he said, in conclu- sion, " it is time to depart ; I to die, you to live ; but which for the greatest good, God only knows.'* The condemnation took place on the eve of the day when the sacred ship of Theseus * was sent with offerings of thanksgiving to Apollo at Delos. All executions were forbidden till its return, and thus the death of So- crates was respited for thirty days, during which his friends had free access to him in prison. Means were concerted for his escape ; the jailor was bribed, a vessel prepared, a retreat in Thessaly provided. But Socrates had always taught the duty of obedience to the laws, and he would not set an example of breaking them. He waited the return of the ship, spent his last morning in calmly rea- soning with his friends on the immortality of the soul, and the happiness derived from virtue, took the fatal cup of hem- lock, and died. The philosophy of Socrates was wholly promulgated in conversation, not in writing ; but his doctrines and character have been handed down to us by two of his most gifted pupils. Plato, the greater of them by far, possessed a mind almost unrivalled for its completeness at all points ; and uniting the greatest acute- ness, vigour, and comprehension of un- derstanding, with a most glowing and poetical imagination, and matchless dig- nity, power, and beauty of style. But his genius was too original and pecuhar to fit him for the mere reporter of ano- ther s opinions, and much of what he has written under the name of Socrates, must be considered as his own. The bias of his mind was to abstract specu- lation ; to the discovery of the principles • S9epa«e6. 92 GREECE of morality, rather than the application of its precepts to particular cases. In his fondness for lofty contera})lations, he sometimes slides into mysticism and obscurity, — a tendency which is not ob- servable in the discourses of Socrates, as delivered by his other celebrated disciple, Xenophon. Tlie acuteness of Plato's Socrates in confounding the arrosrant falsehood of the sophists, and his skill and patience in developmg the reasoning powers of his younger asso- ciates, are probably faithful copies from the great original : but his deep and subtle speculations on the nature of moral beauty and goodness, however admirable in themselves, appear to b6 characteristic of the writer, rather than his master ; whose turn of thought seems more truly expressed by the sobriety of mind and practical good sensewhich are every where visible in the Socrates of Xenophon. Sect. XL— About the end of the Pelo- ponnesian war, the death of Darius had left the throne of Persia to his son Ar- taxerxes. Mutual jealousy and quarrels ensued between the new kmg and Cyrus, which ended in the latter leading an army to dethrone his brother about four years after his accession. The principal trust of Cyrus was in a body of above 1 0,000 Grecian mercenaries, who did their part so \vell, that in a great battle at Cunaxa, near Babylon, they defeated all opposed to them. But Cyrus, being roused to fury at the sight of his brother, made a violent charge on the body in which he was posted, wounded Artaxerxes with his own hand, and was himself killed in the encounter. All the Asiatic followers of Cyrus now submitted to the king. The Grecian leaders were invited to a con- ference, and treacherously murdered ; and the army was left without commanders in the heart of Asia, separated from Greece by vast tracts of hostile territory, and obliged to begin its march tlirough extensive plains, in the face of innumer- able light cavalry. An assembly was held to choose new leaders, and among those who came forward was Xenophon, a young Athenian, who has just been mentioned as the biographer of Socrates. Xenophon was elected one of the gene- rals, and it was in a great measure by his superior ability that the army overcame all the obstacles which beset it. He has given an account of the expedition, eaually interesting as a narrative, and admirable as a specimen of composition. He has also written the most authentic history of the times now in question. Few persons have been equally remark- able for the union of literary and warlike ability ; but thoue independent. The complete ratification, however, of the treaty depended on the king and the Lacedaemonian government. Since the end of the Peloponnesian war, Lacedaemon had been little lessthan all- powerful in Greece. The change was in some respects a happy one, but not upon the whole. The smaller states were in- deed released from the grinding tributes, which had been wrung from them to sup- port tlie navy of Athens, and to feed and amuse its idle and luxurious people. But the democratical governments were generally changed into oligarchies of the narrowest kind, dependent for existence, not on the willing acquiescence of the people, but on Lacedaemon ; and we have already seen, in the conduct of the Athenian Thirty, the abuses to which such a power was liable. Many states were made the residence of Spartan governors, who were generally oppres- sive and arbitrary. Bred up in con- tempt for all mankind, except their own fellow-citizens, they considered as rebel- lion all opposition to the will of a Spartan officer. Their tempers were harsh, their manners rude. Their no- tions of law were entirely derived from the institutions of Lacedaemon ; and as popular complaint was never there allowed against any measures of persons in authority, they would put down all remonstrance, however moderate and lawful, by the most violent means. GREECE. 93 Athenian officers were commonly men of milder temper and more polished manners, and more accustomed to re- spect the feelings of the persons under their command. A proverb was current in Greece, that the Athenians were bet ter as individuals, the Lacedaemonians as a government ; and it illustrates the conduct of the two states towards their subjects. The Athenian government was an expensive, the Lacedaemonian, a frugal one; and therefore the former oppressed its subiects with extortions, from which those ot the latter were ex- empt. In case of revolt, the passionate revenge of the Athenian people was frequently more bloody than the un- feeling, but deliberate policy of its rival. The occasional sufferings of the allies of Athens were, therefore, greater ; but they had more freedom of speech and of remonstrance, were less exposed to daily vexatious interference with their domestic government, and less given up, individually and collectively, to the self- willed tyranny of officers in command ; and the authority of the Athenian go- vernors, such as it was, was commonly exercised with more forbearance. It was usual, as we have seen, in the different provinces of Greece, for the leading city to claim an authority, which the smaller towns were unwilling to allow. This pretension was usually discouraged by the imperial states, which wished to depress the larger cities, and to bring the smaller into dependence on them- selves. To make the Boeotian towns independent ot Thebes had always been a favourite object with Athens ; a line of conduct which had ensured to that state the determined enmity of Thebes. While Athens was powerful, the Lace- daemonians were glad to maintain the claim of Thebes to the dominion of Boeotia, and thus to favour a valuable ally, and to keep in friendly hands a power which would otherwise have fallen to Athens. But when Athens was de- pressed, the case was altered, and Lace- daemon began to favour the indepen- dence of the towns. The Thebans were offended, and the enemies of Lacedaemon in that state gained strength; and as these were always the party friendly to democracy, the Theban oligarchy was changed into a popular government. Democrac} also gained ascendancy in Corinth — so that the two principal allies of Lacedaemon were alienated. These changes appear to have taken place very soon qfter tne Peloponnesian war : how- ever no actual quarrel ensued ; but dunng the Asiatic command of Dercyllidas, the Lacedaemonians put down by arms th«? pretensions of Elis to command over the neiehbouring towns. King Agis died, (b. c. 398,) and was succeeded by his brother Agesilaus, whose first year was signalised by the dis covery of a plot to effect a change of go- vernment. Lycurgus had allowed no distinction of rank among his people, except such as arose from age or merit ; but in the course of ages all the powers of government had been ingrossed by certain families peculiarly distinguished as Spartans. The origin and nature of this distinction are not ascertained : but the most probable opinion seems to be that of a very acute and searching his- torian (Niebuhr), that the Spartans were those legitimately descended from the oria:inal citizens ; whereas, the com- mon Lacedaemonians had insensibly grown up, till they formed the most nu- merous portion of the people, from mar- riages contracted by Spartans with aliens, and from the association of stran- gers and vassals as members of the community, but upon an inferior footing. At the battle of Plataea, the Spartans were five thousand, each of whom was attend- ed by seven Helots ; while the other Lace- daemonians, who were also five thousand, had each only one attendant. But the Spartans, never admitting new asso- ciates, had lessened in number, till they formed, even in Sparta itself, only a small part of the population. Their pride and privileges had increased as their number lessened : the ephori, the senate, and all the higher officers, civil and military, were taken from their body, and they were now scarcely ever sent on foreisni service, except in some com- mand. These privileges were haughtily exercised, and naturally gave great offence to the excluded classes ; and Cinadon, a young man in spirit and abilities inferior to few among the Spar- tans themselves, conceived the project of exciting a revolt against their sway. To engage others in his views, he was wont to bid them count the Spartans in the full market-place. There might be, besides the kina:, the ephori, and the senate, about forty. ** These," he would say, " are your enemies — but all the rest your friends. Again, m each town and village of Laconia, you will find one enemy and many allies; the first, the Spartan magistrate ; the second, the un- privileged Laconians. All the Helots," 94 GREECE. GREECE. 95 he proceeded, ** all the newly admitted citizens, the lower people in the capital, and the inhabitants of the other towns, universally are of our party ; for, when- ever any mention is made of the Spartans, all these are unable to conceal that they woidd gladly eat them raw." When such were the feehngs on which it rested, the revolution planned by Cina- don would probably have been a bloody one ; and thus it is that excessive mis- government begets a bitterness of feeling in the people, which vents itself at the moment oHiberation in cruelty and out- rage. Such acts may justly raise ab- horrence for the perpetrators, and com- passion for the mdividual victims : but to be influenced by them, so as to think tiie more favourably of the old govern- ment, is a great, though common error ; for the violence of the people's resent- ment is generally a testimony that their oppressions have been intolerable. In the present case the conspiracy was discovered in time ; Cinadon was exe- cuted with tortures ; and the Spartans retained their exclusive privileges. Soon after this the news arrived that the Persian court refused to ratify the treaty of Dercyllidas, and the united force of the empire would be turned against the Asiatic cities, which were un- der the protection of Lacedaemon. Agesi- laus was sent to command in Asia. He had much of the moderation and wisdom of his father, Archidamus,with far greater activity, enterprise, and military talents. By prudence and liberality he conciliated the cities, and having found them torn with factions, he restored quiet and union ; while, by his warlike ability, he not only repelled the apprehended attack, but found himself in a condition to look for further successes. His project was not to conquer, and annex to Lacedae- mon any provinces of the Persian em- pire, but to favour their erection into mdependent kingdoms, which would form a barrier to the Grecian states against the dangerous neighbourhood of Persia. The success of the scheme would probably have been beneficial to Lacedaemon, to Greece, and to the re- volting provinces; which would have been Detter and more vigorously go- verned as separate kingdoms than as portions of the vast Persian empire. The design was favoured by the increasing d^union of that monarchy. Many of the satraps had l)€en implicated in the lebelUon of Cyrus, and most of those who remained faithful were inclined to hold their governments as a matter of right, and to renounce their allegiance, if deposed or treated unworthily ; whilo the return of the ten thousand had shown how small a body of Greeks could brave the power of Persia, even in the heart of its dominions. But before his design could be executed, Agesilaus was recaUed by troubles in Greece. We have seen the rise of enmity to Lacedaemon in some of the most power- ful Grecian states. The manifestation of that spirit appears to have been has- tened by Persian gold in Argos, Thebes, and Corinth ; but in Thebes the feeling was strongest, and it was between Thebes and Lacedaemon that war first rose. The 'Diebans alone could not hope to stand against the enemy they had pro- voked ; but they knew that the Athenians bore impatiently their present depres- sion ; and that the same pretence of zeal for Grecian liberty, which had served the Lacedaemonians so well against Athens, might now be no less available to those who withstood the dominion of Lacedaemon. The Thebans asked and obtained the alliance of Athens. Ly- sander was sent with an army into Bceotia; he professed to vindicate the independence of the towns, and the gates of Orchomenus were opened to receive him : but, soon aftei*wards, he was killed in battle, and, by the feeble conduct of king Pausanias, who replaced him, the army was obliged to quit Boeotia, with- out further action, under a dishonour- able truce. Athens led Argos into alliance with Thebes, and Argos Corinth, now demo- cratically governed, and closely con- nected with Argos. The league was joined by most of the northern states. Instead of allowing the supremacy of any commonwealth, it was agreed that a congress of deputies from each should meet at Corinth, to direct the conduct of the confederacy. The Lacedaemonians now resolved to recall Agesilaus ; and, in the mean time, the allies sent an army avowedly against Laconia. " The Lace- daemonian state," said the Corinthian deputy, " resembles a river ; which, near its source, is easily forded, but the far- ther it flows, the more it is swollen with tributary streams. Thus, tlie Lacedae- monians march from home with their own troops only ; but, as they proceed, their army grows formidable with rein- forcements from the cities. I hold it, therefore, best to attack them as near as possible to Lacedaemon.** The confe- derates were met near Corinth by the Tiacedaemonians and their allies. Though greatly superior in number, they were disunited and ill-commanded, as often happens in such bodies; the Boeotian generals, in particular, showing a strong mclination to throw upon their associ- ates all the peril of the day. By these errors, and their own superior discipline, the Lacedaemonians were victorious. Agesilaus was enjoying, in Asia, ho- nours and power such as had never fallen to the lot of any Greek. His popularity was universal ; his hopes of success and glory brilliant ,* and nothing could be more mortifying than the summons to quit his present splendid situation, and to live at home under the harsh control of the ephori. When about to depart he assembled the allies, stated the ne- cessities of his country, and assured his audience that he would never forget them, but would return as soon as pos- sible to do his utmost for their welfare. The assembly burst into tears, and unanimously voted powerful succours to accompany Agesilaus ; who divided all his care between measures for the security of the Asiatic Greeks, and tlie providing a numerous and well-ap- pointed army to lead into Greece. He crossed the Hellespont, and marching through northern Greece, he entered Boeotia, and met the forces of the hostile league near Coroneia. The numbers were nearly equal; but the Asiatic troops, who formed a large part of the army under Agesilaus, were reckoned very inferior to the European. Their behaviour, however, did great credit to Agesilaus, who had trained them, and his victory was complete. Little further was attempted before the army went into winter quarters, (b. c. 394.) It has been mentioned that Conon, after the battle of iEgospotami, fled to Salamis in Cyprus. The Cyprian cities were, for the most part, governed by their several princes or tyrants, under the para- mount sovereignty of Persia ; but as that feeble government did little to protect its distant dependencies, or to restrain their mutual dissensions, the defence of these cities chiefly rested on the vigour of their several administrations, and the connexions which they formed either with independent powers or with tlie satraps of the continent In this view, no alliance could be more desirable than that of the first maritime power of the age ; and accordingly Euagoras, the present ruler of Salamis, an able, just, and popular prince, had anxiously and successfully cultivated the friendship of the Athenians, insomuch that he was, as an honorary distinction, made a citizen of Athens. Conon was honourably re- ceived by Euagoras, and soon became his most confidential minister. The eight triremes which he brought with him were a valuable addition to the naval strength of Salamis ; and he had mih- tary and political ability, and experience in communication with Persian officers, all which made him highly useful to Euagoras. Conon negotiated with Phar- nabazus, and won his friendship for the prince of Salamis ; who, being counte- nanced by the satrap, added several towns of the island to his dominion, without of- fending the court. But when Agesilaus was warring in Asia, Conon suggested to Pharnabazus to make a diversion by sea, A Phoenician fleet was at the satrap's orders ; it might be joined by that of Euagoras : the Athenian interest was yet considerable in the cities of Asia and the islands, and the personal credit of Conon was high, especially among the seamen. Pharnabazus adopted the suggestion, equipped a powerful fleet, and commanded it m person, leaving, pro- bably, the effective direction to the more skilful Conon. The result was complete defeat to the Lacedaemonians ; of which the news was brought to Agesilaus shortly before his victory at Coroneia. The command of the isthmus was an important object both to the Lacedae- monians and their enemies, and, in con- tending for it, the Corinthian territory necessarily became the habitual seat of war. The Corinthians, of course, were the principal sufferers among the allies ; the war became unpopular, and the oli- garchical party seemed likely to regain the ascendent. To prevent this, the democratical leaders planned the mas- sacre of their opponents, and the Atlie- nian, Boeotian, and Argian administra- tions are accused of having been privy to the plot. The time chosen was a religious festival, when, all the people being assembled, the business might be more readily and completely performed ; but the part of the whole design most shocking to the Greeks was the pro- faning with a series of murders a season at which not even the execution of con- victed criminals was held allowable. Many were slain before they knew their danger, some wliile engaged in conver- sation, some at the theatre, some even sitting as judges. Those who fled to the Stars were murdered there with- li GHJBtECE. i out scruple ; " so that some pious men,** says Xenophon, " even of those who were not stricken, died of hor- ror at seeing such impiety." Those who fell were mostly elders of the prin- cipal families, the youth of which had been assembled in another place by Pasimelus, one of their number, who suspected the plot. On hearing the outcry, Pasimelus and his companions immediately seized the Acrocorinthus, or citadel of Corinth ; but they were induced to leave it by the fall of a capital from a pillar, which, to their supersti- tious mmds, seemed an omen of ill. They had fled beyond the border, when they were induced to return by the per- suasions of their friends, the lamenta- tions of their mothers, and the assurances given on oath by some of the rulers, mat they should suffer no harm. The democratical leaders had adopted ft measure unprecedented in Greece: they had united their city with Argos, removed the boundary stones, abolished the Corinthian assemblies, and declared by law solemnly enacted, that the two peoples should henceforth be all Argians. The returned fugitives could not endure the change: they found the power of their opponents completely established by union with the democratical people of Argos, while themselves, who had formerly been important in Corinth, were now of little consideration in the united commonwealths. They had, in- deed, the rights of Argian citizens, which they did not desire; but any change was usually unpopular which, increasing the number of citizens in a state, dimi- nished each man's share of the sove- reignty; and here, not only was the number of citizens more than doubled, but the name of their country was abo- lished, and the seat of government re- moved. On a smaUer scale, the same feelings were at work which made the union with England at first unpopular in Scotland ; and their violence was exasperated by resentment at the bloody means used to effect the change. The minds of many were thus inHamed, till they thought that life was not worth having on such tenns. In the words of Xenophon, ** They resolved to make their country Corinth, as it had been firom the first ; to establish it in inde- pendence and good government; to purify it from murderers ; and thus to oecome its saviours, or, if they should fail, at least to meet the most glorious death in pursuit of the greatest bless- ings." Pasimelus and another nego- tiated with Praxitas, the Lacedaemonian commander in Sicyon, and promised to introduce his troops within the long walls between Corinth and its port, Lechaeum. The scheme prospered, and the army of Praxitas being admitted, and joined by the Corinthians hostile to the government, defeated the Corinthian and Argian forces which attacked it. Lechaeum was next taken, and a breach was made in the long walls, so as to leave an open passage for Lacedaemonian troops along the isthmus. During the winter, Phamabazus had diligently augmented his fleet ; and em- barking in the spring, with Conon as his vice-admiral, he sailed among the islands of the ^Egean. Following Co- non's advice, he did not attempt their subjection to Persia, but contented him- self with expelling the Lacedaemonian governors, and making them indepen- dent. On these terms, all readily re- ceived him. The following year he sailed again, and landing in Laconia, ravaged the country, then overran Cy- thera, and placed there a garrison under an Athenian officer. He next sailed to the Corinthian isthmus, where the con- gress of the league was assembled, and exhorting the leaders there to carry on the war with vigour, left a sum of money for its support. The satrap was pro- voked to these exertions Ly ravages which his territory had sustained from the arms of Lacedaemon ; but the ex- pense pressins: heavily on his treasury, he gladly adopted the proposal of Conon to relieve him from the burden, and at the same time to strike the most effective blow against his enemy. The Athenian commonwealth, Conon said, would be willing to undertake the support of the war ; but, for this, it must be enabled to maintain its navy by the tributes from the islands. If Phamabazus would allow his fleet to be used in en- forcing those tributes, and would assist in rebuilding the long walls and the walls of Peiraeeus, he might trust the rest to Athens. The satrap consented ; he placed his fleet at Conon's disposal, and assisted liberally with money and workmen in rebuilding the waUs. The neighbouring democratical states co- operated zealously, particularly the Boeotians, so lately the remorseless ene- mies of Athens. Tims Conon, after thirteen years' absence, returned to Athens with the present of a fleet and fortifications ; with the means, in short, of re-establishing for his country little less than its former importance. I GREISCB. 97 The Spartan government, though vic- torious by land, carried on the war with little vigour, being cramped by the loss of its foreign revenues, and by the necessity of watching the disaffected Laconians. The war was waged, not by battles, but by incursions and sudden expeditions, and it was with a view to these that Iphicrates, an Athe- nian officer, raised and disciplined a body of troops, of a kind before un- known in Grecian warfare. Light troops, in Grecian armies, and espe- cially in Peloponnesian, were little valued, and commonly made up of un- trained slaves ; though it had appeared in the ^Etolian expedition of Demos- thenes, and on many other occasions, how fatal the want of them might be to the cumbrous, though irresistible phalanx. Athens had good bowmen, and had often profited by them ; and Iphicrates raised a body of light troops, regularly armed and disciplined, and trained to act in the Thracian manner, with target and dart, instead of shield and spear, whence they were called Peltastae, or targeteers. To the undi- sciplined skirmishers of the Peloponne- sians, the targeteers were more to be dreaded than the phalanx; for they were equally formidable to them in attack, and far more so in pursuit ; and even against the phalanx itself they might be employed with advantage, for, though quite unable to support its charge, they were trained to harass it in flank and rear, — to retreat, when pur- sued, and instantly to rally, and again attack the pursuers as they retreated. Thus Iphicrates defeated several bodies of heavy-armed foot, belonging to the al- lies of Lacedaemon, and, at length, a con- siderable detachment of the Lacedaemo- nians themselves. The last blow, being received from a kind of troops which they affected to despise, contributed more than any other reverse to humble the pride and damp the hopes of Lacedaemon. The war went on in Greece with great distress to all the parties, and wiUi no important result ; but Thrasybulus, be- ing sent with an Athenian fleet to the coast of Asia, gained some considerable advantages. A revolution had taken place in Rhodes, in favoiu* of demo- cracy; but the refugees, being succoured by a Lacedaemonian fleet under Teleu- tias the brother of Agesilaus, disputed with their adversaries the command of the island. Thrasybulus on his arrival secured the superioritv of the Rhodians in the city, after which he sailed for the Hellespont. He succeeded in restoring democracy and alliance with Athens in the important city of Byzantium, in Mi- tylene, and the greater part of Lesbos, and in most of the cities on the Asiatic coast, which yet favoured Lacedaemon. The Byzantine people, in their joy at the re-establishment of democracy, made no objection to the restoration of the toll which Athens had formerly imposed on all vessels passing the Bosporus, on which Byzantium stood. Thrasybulus then proceeded to the collection of tri- bute from the towns ; in the course of which the people of Aspendus were so exasperated by some irregularity of his soldiers, that they attacked his camp by night, and he was killed in his tent. Thus fell a man of tried honesty and patriotism, who had shown uncommon ability in very trying situations, and had been the chief instrument of restoring freedom and happiness to his country. The only cloud that rests upon his me- mory is an appearance of his having concurred with Theramenes in the ac- cusation of the six generals, if not actively, at least by withholding the testimony which might have saved them : but the evidence we have is not sufficient, to warrant us in decidedly fixing so dark a stain on a character otherwise so pure. It was in the eighth year of this war, and the nineteenth after the taking of Athens (b. c. 387), that Lacedaemon ob- tained the intervention of Persia in its be- half, and thereby a peace highly favour- able to itself. Antalcidas, who was chosen to command in Asia, and to negotiate with Persia, had before been sent to Tiri- bazus, the present satrap of Lydia, and had gained his favour ; insomuch that he arrested Conon, who had come to him as ambassador from Athens, and it is uncertain whether Conon ever escaped from the confinement into which he had so faithlessly been thrown. An- talcidas was successful in war against the Athenians, and recovered tiie com- mand of the sea ; but he still adhered to his purpose of making peace. The first proposal came in the tbrm of a requisition from Tiribazus, for a con- gress of ministers from all the states which were willing to receive the tenns of peace that the king should dictate. The congress met, and Tiribazus showed the order from the king, which ran thus : "Artaxerxes, the king, holds it just, that all the cities of Asia should be his, H :i GREECE. I • II i Mid the islands of Clazomenap* and Cy- prus: that all other Grecian cities, smdl and great, should be independent, except the islands Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which may be subject to Athens, as of old. Whoever shall not receive these terms, against such I will join in war with those who accept them, by land and sea, with ships and money.*' The belligerents consented to the terms proposed. The Thebans, how- ever, required that the oath of their ministers should be taken as the repre- sentatives of BoBotia. Agesilaus de- clared that he would not accept their oath, unless made in strict conformity to the king's order, which required the inde- pendence of every city, small and great. The Theban ministers said that they had not authority to make any such conces- sion. Agesilaus bid them go and ask their employers, warning them that if they did not comply, they would be excluded fix)m the peace. They went ; but Agesilaus, in his enmity to the The- bans, who had on a former occasion personally insulted him, persuaded the ephori to resort at once to coercion. IVeparations were hastily made, but be- fore the army marched, the Theban ministers returning announced the ac- quiescence of their city: the oath of Thebes was taken for itself alone, and the Boeotian towns became independent. The Corinthians and Ai]gians were still for preserving their union ; which could not be done, so powerful was the adverse party in Corinth, without keep- ing Argian troops there. This Agesi- laus held a breach of the treaty, and he threatened immediate hostility, unless the troops were withdrawn. The demand was reluctantly complied with, and on the departure of the Argians the opposite party became superior: the exiles re- turned; the principal promoters of the late revolution emigrated, particularly those concerned in the massacre ; and Corinth and Argos became, as for- merly, distinct republics. Their separa- tion, and the independence of the Boeo- tian towns, which broke the power of Thebes, were the objects most to be * Thus tlie passage stands in Xenophon, but itii eorrectness has been tUsputed, en the ground that ClaiomensB was a city on the continent of Asia. It seems, however, that although the city was origi- nally built there, the inhabitants afterwards moved oVer to the island, from fear of the Persians. At a later period than that now treated of, Alexander the Maceaonian nnited the island to the mainland by a ■ole, which was sti>l risible when Chandler visited tk« place. See Sekmeider'i note on Xenophon, Bdltm, V. i. 31.. desired by Lacedaemon. Accordingly, the influence of Lacedsmon was more effectually established by the peace of Antalcidas, than by that which ended the Peloponnesian war ; though in the latter it had been completely triura' phant, and in the former had suffered not less of evil than it had inflicted. In both, however, that state incurred no slight discredit by giving uj) the Greeks of Asia to the Persian dominion. The Lacedaemonians did not delay to abuse their power. Some of their allies, it was said, had wished success to their enemies, and these must be chastised. They first required the demolition of the walls of Mantineia, declaring that they could not trust the fidelity of that peo- ple. " For we know," they said, ** that when we were at war with Argos, the Mantineians sent corn thither ; that they have sometimes pretended a truce, to excuse them from joining the army ; that when they have joined it, they have served grudgingly ; that they repine at our successes, and rejoice at our de- feats." The Lacedaemonians appear to have trusted little to the justice of these pretences, for they added that the thirty years' truce was just expiring. We have seen that the Greeks acknow- ledged no duties to those who were without the pale of existing covenants ; and, accordingly, the expiration of a truce between Argos and Lacedaemon, in the Peloponnesian war, had been held to justify tne renewal of hostilities with- out fresh provocation, after thirty years of peace. But even this would not have prepared us for the present conduct of Lacedaemon, in threatening war to Man- tineia after a similar period, not of sus- pended hostility, as in the case of Argos, but of actual friendship and alliance. It is true, the Lacedaemonians com- plained that the Mantineians had failed in their duty as allies ; but had the vague pretences alleged been sufficient to jus- tify hostility, they would have justified it, independently of the expiration of the truce. It is probable that one motive of the Lacedaemonians, in thus oppressing Mantineia, was their dislike of her democratical government, which they had unwillingly permitted, while they feared to drive her from their own alliance into that of their enemies. Agesilaus, disapproving the expedition, excused himself from leading, by alleg- ing some obligation of his father to the Muitineians. Agesipolis, the other king, GREECE 99 sat down before the city : he flooded it by damming the river which ran through it, and the fortifications being built with unbumt bricks soon began to give way. The Mantineians now capitulated, and the only terms allowed them were, that they should abandon their city, and settle themselves in villages. The po- pular leaders, fearing the vengeance of their opponents, obtained from Agesipolis a safe conduct to de- part. The street was lined with Lace- daemonian troops, while sixty of the most obnoxious passed out ; " and though hating them," says Xenophon, *• they were kept from harming them more easily than the best of the Man- tineians," meaning the oligarchical lead- ers ; ** a great instance of subordination." This passage exemplifies the bitterness of Grecian party and national enmity, while its language shows the oligarchi- cal bias of the historian. He proceeds : •• After this the Mantineians were dis- tributed into four villages, as they had anciently lived. At first they disliked it, as they had new houses to build ; but the men of property soon became pleased with the change, as they lived near their estates, and directed the government aristocratically without be- ing thwarted by troublesome dema- gogues. The Lacedaemonians sent an officer to each village, and the people served in their armies much more readily than under the democracy." That is, Lacedaemon governed by means of the nobility, who, depending on its support, were zealous in its service ; while the disunited and enfeebled people, as has happened in all ages, submitted, without remonstrance, to waste their blood in quarrels wherein they had no interest. Three years followed of unusual tran- quillity; and when it was interrupted, the alarm came from a new quarter. Olynthus, the most powerful among the Chalcidian cities of Thrace, had adopted the unusual policy of associat- ing, in all the civil and political rights of its people, the citizens of some small neighbouring towns. This was very adverse to the common temper of the Greeks, who generally guardcKi their separate governments with so much jealousy as not even to suffer intermar- riage. The system prospered, and some of the larger towns joined the associa- tion. Among these was Pella, the largest town of Macedonia. The rising power had attracted the attention of Athens and Thebes as a valuable ally; and overtures of friendship had ah^ady taken place between those states and Olynthus. The Olynthians had invited the neigh- bouring towns of Apollonia and Acan- thus to join their confederacy, and had added a threat of war in case of refusal. The rulers of those states sent ambas- sadors to Lacedaemon, who represented this Olynthian system of association as an ill boding novelty. They declared that negotiation was already commenced with Athens and Thebes, and advised the Lacedaemonians to take care lesT they should no longer find that part of Greece easy to manage. ** You are very anxious," the ambassadors conti- nued, *' to prevent the union of Boeotia : how, then, can you suffer to rise a greater power than Boeotia, and that not by land only, but also by sea." They went on to state the great resources now possessed by the Olynthians, and the far greater which they expected to attain ; and finished by saying, that many of the towns were yet unwilling associates, and the confederacy might now be easily dissolved ; but if tiie union were once confirmed by intermarriages and intermixture of possessions, it would be very difficult to break it. Their argu- ments prevailed. Eudamidas was sent with two thousand Laconians, while his brother Phoebidas remained to collect the troops which were to follow. Though Eudamidas could not face the enemy in the field, his small force and the fame of Lacedaemon preserved several towns which were on the point of joining Olynthus ; and the important city of Potidaea, the key of the peninsula of Pallene, opened its gates to him, though it was already a member of the Olyn- thian league. Phoebidas arrived at Thebes on his way to join his brother. Parties there were so nearly balanced, that Isme- nias and Leontiades, contending chiefs, were together in the office of pole- march, the chief magistracy. Isme • nias, a warm opposer of Lacedaemon, avoided Phoebidas ; but Leontiades courted him The party of Ismenias prevailed so far as to carry a vote, which forbade that any Theban should join the army under Phoebidas ; on which Leontiades offered to introduce a Lacedaemonian garrison into the ci- tadel, whereby his party would be enabled to overbear their opponents^ and Phoebidas might carry with him a powerful Theban force into Thrace. H 2 lOu GREECE. GREECE* 101 Phobidas caught at the treacherous jiroposal; the troops were introduced. and Leontiades going to the council, declared that the LacedaBmonians were in possession of the citadel, but that there was no need for alarm, for they dis- avowed all hostility. Being authorized. however, as polemarch, to apprehend all persons suspected of treason, he commanded the guards to seize Isme- nias. Many of the friends of Leontiades were present, and forewarned: the op- posite party were completely surprised. Some fled immediately, some went home to prepare for departure ; but, as soon as it was known that Ismenias was lodged in the Cadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) four hundred persons fled to Athens. A new polemarch was chosen from the party of Leontiades, and he himself then hastened to Lacedaemon. (b. c. 382.) On most occasions, the conduct of Agesilaus had been just and liberal beyond the wont of Lacedaemon ; but we have once ahready seen him hurried into precipitate violence by his hatred of the then ruling Thebans ; and the same feeling now induced him to exert his influence in favour of the perfidious measure which had effected their down- fal. The way had been smoothed by him, when Leontiades addressed the Lacedaemonian assembly. He enlarged on the enmity which the democratical Thebans had often shewn to Lacedaemon, and especially in their recent alliance with Olynthus ; and mentioned the con- stant anxiety of Lacedaemon to prevent the subjection of Boeotia to Thebes. " Of this," he said. " there is now no danger; you need not fear the Thebans; for, if you but provide for our security as we shaU for your interests, a simple order will ensure obedience to all your wishes.'* The assembly resolved to keep the citadel, and to bring to trial not Phoebidas but Ismenias. Three judges were sent from Lacedaemon, and one from each of the allies, and the late chief magistrate of an independent state was brought to answer before a foreign tribunal for his conduct in that magis- tracy. Ismenias was accused of seek- ing foreign connexions ; of pledging himself in hospitality to the Persian king for the injury of Greece ; of having partaken of the money sent from the king ; and of having been a principal author of the late troubles. The chief part of the charges, it is to be observed, referrfd not to any separate machina- tions of Ismenias, but to the public conduct of the party to which he be- longed; and that not at any recent period, but during the troubles which had been concluded by a peace solemnly made and sworn by Lacedaemon with that very party as the government of Thebes. Such, however, as the charges were, Ismenias refuted them ; but being, nevertheless, unable, says Xenophon, to persuade his judges that he had not entertained great and evil projects, he was condemned and executed. His fate, it is plain, had been determined before the trial began. This mockery of justice, more loathsome than the most barefaced murder, is an abomina- tion peculiar in Greece to Lacedaemon, and of which we have already seen an instance in the judicial massacre of the unfortunate Plataeans. Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, an able and highly popular commander, was now sent with a powerful army against Olynthus. But that state, by the liberality of its policy, and the bene- fits resulting to those who united them- selves with it on the terms it offered, had acquired, without war or violence, a power which made it no easy con- Suest. After some trifling successes, le army of Teleutias was completely defeated and the leader slain. A fresh army was sent under king Agesipolis, a young man of promise, who carried on the war with advantasje till he died by sudden illness. The Olynthians, how- ever, had probably depended on the support of Thebes and Athens, of which the former, instead of aiding them, was now at the command of their opponents. The Lacedaemonians prevailed against them ; they were blockaded and pressed by famine ; and they submitted to be- come dependent allies of Lacedaemon, and to follow in arms whithersoever the Lacedaemonians should lead. Thus fell a power which appears, as far as very imperfect knowledge can enable us to judge, to have been more likely than any that had yet arisen to promote the peace and general hberty of Greece. Meanwhile, Agesilaus was employed near home. After establishing demo- cracy, the people of Phlius had conti- nued allies of Lacedaemon ; which had, with unusual moderation, refrained from interfering to change the government, and only exerted its authority to secure fair treatment for the depressed party. At length it was provoked to arms by the continued injustice of the Phliasian government towards those who were held more particularly the friends of Lacedaemon. Agesilaus besieged the city, and, after a most resolute defence, reduced it to extremity ; and his mode- ration was shown in the terms which he granted, by which the settlement of its affairs was refen*ed to one hundred Phliasian commissioners, chosen fifty from each party. The Lacedaemonians were now at their highest pitch of power ; Boeotia was completely theirs, Corinth firm in their friendship, Argos brought low, and Athens without allies ; when a change, the beginning of a train of mis- fortunes, which broke their power for ever, was brought about by means ap- parently so trifling, that Xenophon, an exile under the patronage of Lacedaemon, and particularly of Agesilaus, can only account for it by ascribing it to the divine anger at the iniquity of his pa- trons, who had seized the citadel of Thebes. This perfidy and violence in- deed well deserved punishment, for it was a flagrant breach of that treaty, establishing the independence of all Grecian towns, to which they had so- lemnly sworn, and of which they had so rigorously enforced the strict construc- tion on all others. In the winter of the year (b. c. 379), seven Theban exiles, resident in Athens, conspired with the secretary of the polemarchs Archias and Philippus, to overthrow the government of Thebes. They went secretly thither, and being introduced by the treacherous secretary to the presence of his masters, assassinated first the polemarchs, and afterwards Leontiades. Some of them then went to the state prison, and, ob- taining admission by pretending an or- der from the polemarch, released the prisoners, and procured them arms from a neighbouring temple. Then, fully trusting in the general hatred to the existing government, they proclaimed that the tyrants were no more, and in- vited the citizens to assemble in arms. When day broke, and what had passed was certainly known, the citizens joined them horse and foot. In the course of the day the refugees arrived from Athens, and a body of Athenians. It was resolved to assail the Cadmeia ; but the Lacedaemonian garrison, being weak, surrendered the fortress on condition that they might depart with their arms. The ThebMns (gladly consented, and the Lacedaemo- nians were allowed to depart ; but all who were seen among them ot the oligarchical Thebans were seized and put to death, excepting some who were saved by the humanity of the Athenian auxiliaries. Not content with taking vengeance on the guilty, the popular fury extended itself to the massacre of the innocent, and the children of those who had been executed suffered death. These crimes were probably not de- signed by the leaders, but produced by the violent passions commonly arising in Grecian seditions, and provoked in the present case by more than ordinary guilt. But this shocking cruelty, and the treachery and assassination with which the enterprise was begun, form dark blots on a revolution otherwise to be admired for the justice of its cause, the boldness of its conception, and the pru- dence as well as the daring vigour which marked both the plan and the execution. The Lacedaemonians put to death the late governor of the Cadmeia, who had thus easily surrendered a possession so important, and so disreputably acquired ; and they sent an army against Thebes. Agesilaus had probably repented of coun- tenancing the treachery of Phoebidas ; but it is plain that he was now unwilling to be connected with the prosecution of a business, which had begun in iniquity, had fallen into increased discredit through the tyrannical conduct of the Theban rulers established by Laceds}- mon, and had ended with complete ill success. He excused himself from the command, on account of his age, which had reached the term after which, by the laws of Sparta, no man was obliged to go on foreign service ; and the army was led by his colleague, Cleombrotus, the brother of Agesipolis. The object, how- ever, of the expedition appears to have been rather to protect the Lacedaemo- nian party in the Boeotian towns, than to recover dominion in Thebes. The array carefully avoided all injury to the Theban territory, so that men doubted whether it was to be war or peace ; and finally it withdrew, leaving Sphodrias to com- mand in Thespiae, with a third part of its force. The display of the Lacedae- monian power so near them had pro- duced in the Athenian people a terror, which showed itself in unjust severities towards those who had advised assisting in the deliverance of Thebes. The Thebans, if left to struggle alone with Lacedaemon, could scarcely hope for any peace, but such as would leave lOS GREECE* GREECE. 103 !t their independence very precarious, and probably bring ruin to the authors of tiie la*e revolution. But they had now as leaders men of superior talent, of niiom Pelopidas and Epaminondas were the chief. Pelopidas, itctive, prompt, and daring, with great dexterity and ready invention, had been an exile, and one of the seven conspirators who began the revoration. Epaminondas, his most in- timate friend, was a man of consummate ability, but of retired and studious habits and limited fortune: he had hitherto taken Uttle part in public affairs, and had remained undisturbed in Thebes under the usurping government; and even from this time he appears for a considerable interval to have assisted the administration chiefly with his ad- vice. The views of these men were directed to the recovery of Iheban supremacy in Bceotia ; and accordingly Pelopidas and two of his associates were made chief magistrates, with the title, not of polemarch, or military com- mander, but of Boeotarch, or commander of the Boeotians. As this made peace more distant, it was necessary to pro- vide the better for war; and Athens was again engaged on the Theban side, through an intrigue of Pelopidas, who found means to Induce the Lacedaemo- nian general, Sphodrias, to commit an aggression, so absurd in its conduct, as well as unjust and impolitic in its pro- fessed design, that it was universally ascribed to bribery. He entered Attica by night, ostensibly to surprise Peiraeeus. At Thria, day broke on him, and he re- tiuned; but, instead of attempting to disguise the hostile intention, he plun* dered houses and drove off cattle. The Athenian government complained to Lacedaemon, and Sphodrias was brought to trial. But Cleonymus, his son, was the intimate friend of Archidamus, the ion of Agesilaus, who fully shared in his distress; and Agesilaus suffered his public integrity to be so far overborne l>y his private affections, that he used his influence in procuring the acquittal of Sphodrias. The consequence was the violent resentment of the Athenians, who immediately joined heart and hand with Thebes. Agesilaus now took the command. In two successive years he entered Boeotia, with a force superior to the united strength of Thebes and Athens, and Thebes was greatly distressed by the ravaging of its territory. An army mam kept continually at Thespiee.. to support the Lacedemonian party in the Boeotian towns ; all of which were now governed by narrow oligarchies, that could not maintain themselves unas- sisted ; while the favourers of demo- cracy, including apparentljr in many towns a full half of the citizens, took refuge in Thebes. Thus completely changed was the state of parties in Boeotia, since the series of actions which closed with the Peloponnesian war ; when Thebes was oligarchically governed, when Athens was the enemy and Lace- daemon the protectress of its supremacy, and when it was the democratical party which supported the separate inde- pendence of the towns. One incident is worth recording in the second campaign of Agesilaus. In Thespiae it would ap- pear that the emigration htid been less than in many places, and that though no acknowledged enemy of Lacedaemon could remain there, there was a party ranged against those who claimed to be pre-eminently its friends. The latter modestly requested that Agesilaus would allow them to put their less zealous fel- low-citizens to death; but he refused, and mediated between the factions so successfully, that he effected at least a temporary reconciliation, and, binding them to each other by oaths of concord, left Thespi« in peace. Next year, Agesilaus being disabled by sickness, the young king Cleombrotus led the army ; but the intended invasion was foiled, tlie mountain passes being occupied by the Athenians and Thebans. Disgusted at the protraction of the war, the allies of Lacedaemon proposed equip- ping a fleet. By this the supplies of foreign com, which chiefly supported Athens, might be cut off; and the army might be transported at pleasure into Boeotia, without depending on the free- dom of the passes. In pursuance oi" the first object, a fleet was posted to intercept the Athenian corn ships ; but this was met and defeated near the isle of Naxos by the Athenian Chabrias, the completest officer of the age. Another fleet was prepared to transport an army across the Corinthian gulf into Boeotia ; but, at the request of the Thebans, Timotheus, the son of Conon, coasted Peloponnesus, and the intended expedition was prevented, the Peloponnesians being detained to protect their homes against the threatened at- tack. The Thebans thus had leisure to proceed against the Boeotian towns, and aided by the popular party in each, tl.ey established every where democratical government, and Theban supremacy. Timotheus proceeded to Corcyra, and with the aid of a friendly party brought it to submission. He permitted none of the usual severities towards the con- quered party : no selling into slavery — no banishment ; he made no change in the constitution of the state ; but exerted all his eloquence and prudence in com- posing differences and reconciling quar- rels ; and his reward was a general good will, in that part of Greece, to himself and his country. After this he defeated a Lacedaemonian fleet sent against him, and gained the command of the sea. Nevertheless, the Thebans invading Phocis, a Lacedaemonian army crossed the gulf, and defended that country. The Lacedaemonians were now losing ground, when an overture of peace was made from Athens. The enmity of Thebes and Athens was old, their friendship recent ; and though the Athe- nians had helped in securing Thebes from subjugation, they were far from wishing success to its rising ambition. They were also not unreasonably dissa- tisfied with a war in which the exertions and sacrifices had been chiefly theirs, and the profit that of Thebes. They were burdened with taxes, infested with ^ginetan cruisers, and harassed with watchfulness ; while the Thebans, whe- ther unable or unwilling, contributed nothing to the support of that fleet, which had saved them from invasion, — perhaps from ruin — and enabled them to gain the mastery of Boeotia. Influ- enced by these considerations, they offered peace to Lacedaemon : it w^as accepted, and Timotheus was ordered home with his victorious fleet. Timotheus, in returning, landed some Zacynthian exiles on their island, of which the Zacynthian rulers complained to Lacedaemon, as a gross injury. The Athenians evidently were unconscious of having done any thing to provoke a re - newal of war, for they had laid up their fleet, and dismissed the crews, when it was voted by the Lacedaemonians that the Athenians had acted wrongfully, and redress should be sought by arms. At best this resolution was unjustifiably in- temperate; but the time and circum- stances lay it open to a worse suspicion. The pressure was removed from Lace- daemon ; the fleet, which had com- manded its coasts, was broken uj), and probably could not be quickly reassem- bled on the scene of action The trifling business of Zacynthus furnished a pretence for annulling a treaty, ot which the benefit had already been re- ceived ; and the laying up of the ships, while it proved the confidence of good faith on the part of the Athenian ad- ministration, gave to the Lacedaemo- nians a fair cnance of reducing Cor- cyra, before it could be succour^.^. The Lacedaemonians sent Mnasippus against Corcyra, with a powerful arma- ment, much of which was composed of mercenaries. The island had been little troubled with internal dissensions since those seditions which had given it so bad a notoriety in the Peloponnesian war; and being commonly protected from hostile ravage by its situation and naval power, it was now remarkable for its high cultivation, and the splendour of its countiy houses. All this became the prey of the invader, and so rich was the plunder that even the common sol- diers learned to be nice, and refused to drink any but the choicest wines. The Corcyraeans were blockaded and pressed by hunger, before their complaint reached Athens, and when it was resolved to as- sist them, there were neither ships nor seamen ready. An Athenian general, however, and a small body of froops, were sent over land to assist in the de- fence ; and Iphicrates being appointed to collect and command a fleet, hastened the levy by all the means in his power. As soon as it was completed he set out, and making his progress principally by rowing, with Uttle use of sails, he won great credit by the manner in which he contrived at once to perform the voyage in not more than the ordinary time, and to exercise his newly-gathered seamen so that they might, immediately on their arrival, be fit to do battle with the practised crews of the Peloponnesians. On reaching Cephallenia, he found that Corcyra was already safe. The suf- ferings of the besieged had become so severe, that when Mnasippus had pro- claimed that any persons coming as deserters from the town should be sold for slaves, they still deserted. He scourged them and sent them back ; and admission being denied to such as were bondmen, many died of hungei under the walls. Encouraged by the distress of his enemies, the Spartan commander, thinking victo^ certain, had resolved to make it cheap. For this, he dismissed some of his mercenaries, and withheld from others their pay, when due. The army naturally became dis- 6REKC£« contented and disorderly, and an op- portunity was soon given to the besieged, which was ably improved, and led to the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Tlie besieging array, discouraged by this discomfiture,' and fearful of the speedy arrival of Iphicrates, was hastily re- embarked, leaving behind it much of its spoil, and many wounded soldiers. Iphicrates, now master of the sea, proposed to ravage the T.aconian coast, and to reduce those western cities, which still were hostile to Athens ; but for this a fresh supply of money was needed. When iirst appointed he had requested to have as colleagues Callistratus, the most popular speaker, and Chabrias, the best general of the time, both hitherto his opponents. His reasons may not im- probably be conjectured. He was going rn a difficult and important service, and as the expense of the fleet would be heavv, and the treasury was low, it was hkely that the people would be severe in exacting the greatest results from so costly an exertion. The presence of in- telligent and unfriendly witnesses would be the severest trial of his conduct, but their approval would be its most tri- umphant vindication ; and he probably relied upon his own ability and energy to merit their good report, and upon their candour not to withhold it, if deserved. He might hope to conciliate his asso- ciates, by the trust he had placed in their honour, and by his behaviour to them, while serving with him. Approving his conduct, they would be jointly responsi- ble for its success ; and thus he would be supported by the eloquence of Cal- listratus, and the high fame of Chabrias. In every respect the plan succeeded. Callistratus became his friend, and when money was wanted, offered to be messen- ger to the people, and either to procure a supply, or set on foot a negotiation for peace. Iphicrates approved, and Cal- listratus went to Athens. The Athenians had been alarmed by the growing ambition of Thebes, and offended by the attack on their ancient friends the Phocians; and they were now more deeply disgusted by a recent act of tyranny. The Plataeans and Thespians had shown unwillingness to admit the dominion of Thebes in the full extent to which it was claimed ; and for this their towns were demolished and their whole people expelled. They fled to Athens, and were there received with ready sympathy. It was not for- gotten that their citits had been true to Greece when all the rest of Boeotia had strengthened the hands of the Persians ; nor that the Plataeans had been long the most devoted allies of Athens, and at one time almost a part of its people. These recollections heightened the pity which was naturally felt for the home- less fugitives; while indignation rose higher at the thought that the The- bans themselves, when lately victims of oppression, had mauily owed to Athens their deliverance, and their elevation to the power which they now abused in contempt of Athens, and to the injury of its friends. Any further support of Theban ambition appeared both dis- creditable and perilous ; and on the arrival of Callistratus, in spite of just resentment against Ijacedaemon and the prospect of brilliant success, it was re- solved to make peace. The Thebans were first invited to concur, and then an embassy was sent to Sparta. The Lacedaemonians were too severely pressed by Iphicrates not to wish for peace on any moderate terms ; they, therefore, gladly called an assembly, and summoned the deputies of their al- lies to hear the proposals. One Athe- nian ambassador spoke to this effect :— ** You always declare, O Lacedaemo- nians, that the cities shall be indepen- dent ; and yet yourselves are the greatest hinderers of independence. For you bind your allies to follow whithersoever you shall lead, and you engage in wars without consulting them ; so that your confederates, who are said to be inde- pendent, are often compelled to war against their best friends. Again, you do a thing must inconsistent with inde- pendence, establishing in different cities arbitrary ruling bodies of thirty or of ten ; and your care is, not that these shall govern righteously, but that they shall always have a force at hand to keep down the citizens by violence ; so that you seem to delight in tyrannies rather than free governments. When the king commanded that the cities should be in- dependent," (such was the common lan- guajje in speaking of the peace of An- talcidas,) *' you declared that the Thebans would violate the order, if they did not suffer every city to govern itself by what laws it would :* yet when you seized the Cadmeia, you suffered not the Thebans themselves to be self- governed. But no friendship can exist with those, who ex- pect fair dealing from others, while themselves are catching at every unfair advantage.'* Callistratus followed in a GH.££iCE« 105 moie conciliatory tone. The Lacedae- monians agreed to peace on the terms proposed ; their governors were to be withdrawn from the cities, and every city to be independent ; armies were to be disbanded, fleets laid up ; if any city violated the treaty, it should be lawful for every other at its pleasure to assist the injured, but none should be compelled to join in hostility. The terms of the treaty were in perfect unison with the wishes of Athens, but adverse to those both of Thebes and La- cedaemon, neither of which was willing to give up its dominion. But the Lacedae- monians trusted to ancient habits of au- thority and obedience to retain their allies without the forbidden coercion ; whereas the Thebans would inevitably lose the command of Boeotia, which was recently gained, and could only be supported by Force. The latter, therefore, complying, would be enfeebled, and might fall when- ever Lacedaemon should find a pre- text for hostility, or feel herself strong enough to act without one: refusing, they would be abandoned by Athens, without whose support, it was believed, they could not stand even now ; and then the Lacedaemonians, having crushed their rivals by means of an illusory resig- nation of dominion, might resume their empire, and re-establish it on a firmer basis. The same considerations which prompted the apparent moderation of Lacedaemon were to the Thebans reasons for embarrassment and alarm. To re- ject a treaty so equitable in its provi- sions would be matter of offence and suspicion to Greece, and they would have no allies, while Lacedaemon would be backed by its Peloponnesian confede- rates. Acquiescence would have been wise and patriotic, could they have trusted Lacedaemon ; but believing, as they well might, that its real intention was to exaot a permanent and substan- tial, in return for a temporary and no- minal sacrifice, the command of the force of Boeotia seemed necessary not only to greatness, but to independence and se- curity. The Theban leaders were able and daring ; they boldly stood the ha- zard ; and grounds were found to vin- dicate them from the charge of ambi- tiously and obstinately rejecting a safe and honoiurable peace. The Athenians and their alHes by their respective ministers had severally sworn the observance of the treaty : the Lacedaemonian representatives took the oath for themselves and their allies. The Theban ministers had sworn on the part of Thebes, but they now required that the Boeotian name should be lub- stituted. The demand was inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty, yet not more so than the privilege just assumed by Lacedaemon. It was refused, and the Thebans renounced the treaty. The Athenians scrupulously did their part, withdrawing their garrisons and recall- ing their victorious fleet : the Lacedae- monians withdrew their governors and garrisons, but instead of recalling their army from Phocis, they ordered Cleom- brotus to lead it against the Thebans, unless they allowed the Boeotian cities to be independent. Here then was an open violation of the treaty, according to which the army ought to have l)een dissolved, and a fresh one gathered, if necessary, from those cities only which voluntarily joined in the war. This in- cident went far to justify the conduct of the Thebans; for it showed that the specious moderation of Lacedaemon had been only a decoy ; and that now, as after the peace of Antalcidas, that power would strictly enforce on all others their engagements, but would observe its own no further than suited its convenience, Cleombrotus entered Boeotia. The Theban leaders, knowing that decisive action only would secure the fidelity of the towns, though inferior in force, ad- vanced to meet him. Under the present generals their military system had been much improved ; their heavy- armed foot and their cavalry had always been among the best in Greece ; but now the foot were scarcely inferior to the Lacedae« monians themselves, while the horse were very far superior, the Lacedaemo- nian cavalry being of little reputation. But their greatest advantage was the genius of Epaminondas their comman- der, and the skill and daring activity of his associate Pelopidas. To increase their confidence the generals used every resource of Grecian superstition. An oracle was circulated, importing that Lacedaemon was to be worsted near the tomb of the virgins, who were said to have slain themselves after being vio- lated by some Lacedaemonians. This tomb was near to Leuctra, where the battle took place : and before engaging, it was dressed and ornamented by the Thebans. News was brought from the city that all the temples had opened spontaneously, and that the sacred arms had vanished from the shrine of the Theban hero Hercules, which plainly IOC GREECK. showed that he was going to the war. These marvels were not lost upon the many, though there wanted not those who doubted their genuineness: and th(^ effectually braced up the spirit of the soldiery to encounter the old fame and often tried prowess of their adversariesy Tlie original and masterly plan of action devised by Epaminondas on this occasion was long remembered as an unportant improvement in the Grecian science of war ; and the his- torian mi^ht be allowed to dwell on it with unmixed satisfaction, had it never betn employed except for the only law- ful purpose of hostilities — self-defence. The entire fronts of contending armies had commonly been brought into action at once, and the contest decided in every part of the line by superior numbers or ▼alour. Tlie Thebans had sometimes charged in column, when unable other- wise to break the opposing phalanx ; but it was reserved for Epaminondas to choose from the first one point on which to make the decisive attack ; and while he withheld the weaker parts of his line from immediately closing, to unite in the attacking column such a body, that though weaker in numbers on the whole, he might be greatly stronger on the de- cisive point. The battle was begun on both sides by the horse, and that of the Lacedaemonians was quickly driven back on the infantry. Their phalanx was formed twelve deep; and Epaminon- das directed his Theban column fifty deep against the right wing, where stood the king with most of the Spartans, considering that, if this were routed, the rest would be an easy conquest The chosen band around Cleombrotus awhile maintained the unequal struggle; but the pressure was too great ; the king was slain, vdth many of the noblest Spartans ; the wing gave way, the rest of the line speedily followed ; and the I.acedaB- monians with astonishment saw them- selves overcome in a pitched battle by inferior numbers, a thing unknown for ages. (B. c. 371.) When th« news of the defeat at Leuc- tra was brought to Sparta, the people were celebrating one of their chief reli- gious festivals. The ephori did not allow a moment's interruption of the solem- nity ; they only sent to the kindred of the slain information of their fate, and com- manded the women to abstain from cla- mour and tears. Such power was yet in the institutions of Lycargus. that the interdiction was universally obeyed ; all bore their losses in silence ; and on the following day the friends of the dead went about with cheerful countenances, whUe those of the survivors kept theii houses, or, if obliged to show themselves, appeared with every mark of sorrow and shame. Prompt action, however, was necessary to prevent a greater calamity, the loss of tiie defeated army, which was now besieged in its camp. To bring it off, the whole remaining strength of the commonwealth was ordered to march ; and Agesilaus being still disabled, his son Archidamus was appointed to the command. But rehef had come to the blockaded Lacedaemonians from an un- expected quarter. Jason, of Pherae in Thessaly, a man of uncommon powers both of body and mind, an able general and a skilfid poli- tician, had not only become the lord of his own city, but had brought most of Thessaly into subordinate alliance. At the head of the opposing cities was Pharsalus, which after violent struggles of faction had been tranquillised by an extraordinary agreement. Polydamas was a Pharsalian eminent by birth and riches, and by splendid hospitality, for which the Thessalians were noted ; but most of all by spotless integrity, in which all parties placed such confidence, that they at length agreed for their mutual se- curity to entrust him with the command of their citadel, and the exclusive ma- nagement of their public revenues. He had been raised to this station with- out intrigue or violence by the free choice of his feUow-citizens ; but the discre- tionary nature of his authority, and the absence of all provisions for examina- tion and control, while they would have given to a dishonest man unbounded means of abuse, appeared to open a wide field to calumny against the most up- right, and to witlSiold the means of vindication. Nevertheless, Polydamas executed his difficult office without in- curring a breath of suspicion, and ap- parently to the satisfaction of all. He could not, however, equally succeed in opposing the power of Jason, which becsLxae daily more an overmatch for the Pharsalians and their allies. But Jason, though extravagantly ambitious, was pohtic and Uberal: he respected the character of Polydamas, and wished his friendship ; and he was wise enough to prefer the voluntary adherence of Pharsalus to its compelled subjection. He invited Polydamas to a conference, and urging the value of his own alliance GREECE. 107 and the danger of his enmity, prevailed on him to advise the Pharsalians to compliance. The states of Thessaly had always acknowledged some common bonds of union, and had occasionally appointed a captain-general of the whole nation with the title of Tagus. This of- fice was the object of Jason's ambition^ and with the support of the states con- nected with Pharsalus, he readily ob- tained it. He had now at his command eight thousand horse, twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers innu- merable. He had extensive coasts, large revenues, and forests of excellent ship- timber, and he looked to dominion by sea as well as by land. With these re- sources he aspired to the supremacy of Greece, and further than that, to the conquest of Persia. Wild as these pro- jects seem, he had means and abilities which might probably have realised them could his life have been sufficiently pro- longed ; but they were too vast for the ordinary duration of a single human hfe, and Jason was cut off in his prime, when hardly entered on his career. At the battle of Leuctra, Jason was already Tagus; he was allied with Thebes, and the Thebans invited him to come and aid in the overthrow of Lacedaemon. He came; but, consi- dering that the ruin of its enemy would make Thebes mightier than suited his designs, he bent his mind to save the remnant of the beaten army. He counselled peace, and obtained a truce, under favour of which the Lacedaemo- nians decamped by night. Arriving in Megaris, they met the army under Ar- chidamus, and aQ now dispersed to their homes. Jason, returning into Thessaly, levied from all his cities oxen, sheep, goats, and swine, to sacrifice at the approach- ing Pythian festival. Though the rate of the impost was very moderate, it brought together a thousand oxen, and of the smaller cattle more than ten tJiou- sand. He also commanded the Thessa- lians to assemble in arms at the time of the solemnity, with the purpose, as was universally believed, of assuming the presidency to himself. But before the period came, he was assassinated by seven young men, who approached him, under pretence of having a difference to settle, while he was sitting after a review of the Pheraean cavalry to listen to such as needed his advice, authority, or assistance. The issue of the great contest still was doubtful. The success of Thebes had been glorious, but the Peloponne- sians were bound by it more firmly to Lacedaemon, whose power secured to them collectively a pre-eminence which would be lost by the ascendency of a state beyond the peninsula. Tne Athe- nians, jealous alike of both the rivals, wished to balance them; and their aim was, before either people had the game in its own hands, to make peace on the principle of independence to the cities, which seemed to give the best chance of lasthtg quiet, and least to favour the ambition of the dreaded powers. Accordingly they invited to Athens a congress of all who wished for peace on the terms established by the treaty of Antalcidas. The congress met, attended by ministers from nearly every state of Greece ; the Athenians proposed, and the meeting approved an oath to this effect : " I will abide by the terms of peace which the king sent, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies ; and if any state having sworn this oath shall be attacked, I will succour it wirh all my strength." The oath was taken by all, except ihe Eleians, who objected to the indepen- dence of some subjects of their own. The Mantineian people, now consi- dering Lacedaemon as barred from inter- fering, decreed that they would re- assemble in one city, which should forthwith be fortified. This was oft'en- sive to Lacedpemon; but to hinder it forcibly, would be so gross a breach of the recent treatj^ that all Greece could not fail to resent it, Agesilaus had great personal and family interest in Manti- neia, and he was sent to negotiate ; but the leaders, fearing his popularity, re- fused to call an assembly, and he went away in anger, yet holding the appeal to arms impossible under the treaty. The success of the popular party in Mantineia animated their friends in Tegea, and they conceived the project of uniting Arcadia under a general as- sembly from all the states, to whose decisions each particular city should be subject. The plan was Ukeiy to be widely beneficial ; but it was dangerous to the aristocratical rulers of Tegea, whose power could hardly stand when entirely divorced from sh connexion with Lacedaemon, andjoinedin aleague, of which the Mantineian democracy would be a leading member. By their influence the measure was thrown out in the assembly; and the proposers 108 GK££oJE* attempted to carry it by arms. But the sway of the present governors had been liberal and equitable ; their adherents were not less numerous than their op- ponents, and they prevailed in the battle. Stasippus, their chief, a man of unusual humanity, forbade pursuit. The fugitives collected at the gate to- wards Mantineia, and entering into conference with the victors, prolonged it till the arrival of the Mantineian forces, which they had sent for before the contest began. Thej^ then opened the gate, and attacked their imprudently merciful conquerors. Stasippus and some of his friends escaped by the op- posite gate, and, being closely pursued, took refuge in a temple ; but their ene- mies, uncovering the roof, and pelting them with the tSes, compelled them to siurrender. They were tried by a court of democratical Tegeans and Mantineians, and were condemned, and executed by the enemies whom they had spared. About 800 Tegeans then fled to Lace- daemon. The Mantineians now had clearly put themselves in the wrong ; and the La- cedaemonians sent an army under Age- silaus to punish them, and to restore, if possible, the Tegean ex iles. Meantime, the project of union had become exten- sively popular in Arcadia, and it had been agreed, almost universally, that a new city should be founded, with the name ot Megalopolis, (Great City,) to be the common capital and place of assem- bly of the Arcadian people. The force of nearly every state was collected to oppose Agesilaus ; but the Arcadians did not hazard a battle ; and the cam- paign was closed without any important result, except that the spirit of the Lace- daemonian people was somewhat raised by the display of its superiority in the field. The victory aiLeuctrahad been very grati^ing to the pride of the Boeotians ; and the consequence was a wilhng sub- mission throughout the province to the supremacy of Thebes, a general attach- ment to the successful leaders, and a warm concurrence in their projects of ambition. Those able statesmen had so skilfully improved their rising influ- ence and reputation, that they had found the means of inducing the Phocians also to submit to their dominion, without the use of any violence contrary to the treaty. By the war of Lacedaemon and Arcadia, they had a pretext for hostility tgainst the former, and an opportunity of procuring powerful allies within the peninsula; so that no opportunity, as it seemed, could he fitter to strike a blow for empire. It is true that, in strict justice, they had no suflftcient ground for hostility, since the Manti- neians and not liie Lacedaemonians had been the aggressors; but, in the general imperfection of information, the violence of party spirit, and the pre- vailing laxity of political principle, it was not difficult to make out a case against Lacedaemon which would satisfy great part of Greece ; and accordingly they were reinforced from many neighbour- ing states. In the middle of winter their am^, marching under the com- mand of Epaminondas, passed through the Corinthian territory into Pelopon- nesus. The Corinthians had professed and kept a strict neutrality ; yet, be- cause they would not take arms against Lacedaemon, their ancient ally, to sup- port the violence of Mantineia against Tegea, their lands were ravaged, their cattle driven off, and their houses burnt The Boeotian army joined the Arcadians, Argians, and Eleians near Mantineia ; the Lacedaemonians had quitted Arca- dia ; and Epaminondas was advised by his Peloponnesian allies to lead his army into Laconia. In spite of opposition, he passed the rugged frontier moun- tains, and advanced along the left bank of the Eurotas, plundering and burning. He found the bridge which led to Sparta too strongly guarded for him to attempt the passage ; but he proceeded farther down the river, and crossing it at Amy- clae, bent his march towards the un- w ailed capital. The confederate force was far greater than any that Lacedaemon could assem- ble, had aU her subjects been zealous in her cause. But the greater part of the Laconians regarded as friends the enemies of the Spartans; many had already joined the invaders, and in the rest no confidence could be placed. The Spartans only coidd be safely trusted, and their small number seemed lost in the extent of the city. It was resolved to offer freedom to any Helots who would assist in the defence. More than 6000 were enroUed, and then the admi- nistration became fearful of the strength it had created. Succours, however arriving from some of the allies, they now thought they could command the fidelity of the new levy. Agesilaus showed his ability in an imposing dis- position for defence ; and by this, to ^.7/ ^^ U GREECE. 109 gether with the fame of Lacedaemon, the opportunity, while they were masters the enemy was deterred from an attack, of the field, to establish a permanent which might, not improbably, have sue- check on the rival state. They invited ceeded. Epaminondas again proceeded all the scattered relics of the Mes- down the river, pillaging and burning senians to return and repossess the every unfortified town, and laid siege to country of their fathers, to which, in all Gythium, the port of Lacedaemon. But, their wanderings and sufferings, they though he kept strict discipline among had ever looked with love and fond his Boeotians, he could not equally regret. Epaminondas was patron of manage his Peloponnesian allies. They the new city of Messene, built at the were tired of winter warfare, laden with foot of Mount Ithome, on which the booty, and tempted by the nearness of citadel was placed. The work was com - their homes; and their dropping off pleted without interruption; and thus diminished his army till he thought it the Thebans, in restoring the inheritance prudent to quit Laconia. of a brave and injured people, deprived The ferment was great in Athens on Lacedaemon of half its territory, and hearing the imminent peril of Lacedae- established on its frontier an inveterate mon, less from friendship to that power adversary that formed a rallying point than from apprehension of Thel)es. for its disaffected subjects. Few states- The council summopei an assembly, mej^have ever been able so well to It was addressed bjJRi^iadors therw^sTObine in one measure the furtherance present, from Lacedam««^^'its allies,^f ambitious projects and the gratifi- who magnified the danger. j^X^i§^^^ cation of a benevolent disposition, ambition, and the benefit s^fHMenOship Next year, the Thebans, invading between Lacedaemon and Athens. A Peloponnesus, were obhged to return murmur arose, that the Lacedaemonians home before they had done any thing talked of friendship when they were in considerable, by the hostihty of the distress, but that when they were pros- ThessaUans under the Tagus Alexander perous, their conduct had ever been of Pherae. Meantime, a schism was overbearing. " Yet," f was said, ** at rising in their confederacy. They had the end of the Peloponnesian war, when not, like the Athenians and Lacedaemo- the Thebans urged our utter ruin, they nians, any superiority in ancient fame, prevented it." " Besides, we are bound in political institutions, or in the cha- by oath to aid the Lacedaemonians, ^j^ter of their people, which could make who ai*e not attacked for any injustice,Trtfcir allies consider obedience as their but for the just succour given to the due. They had only numbers, courage, Tegeans when attacked by the Manti- and discipline, with an extraordinary neians contrary to the oaths." This man at their head; in the former respects argument worked on most, though the Arcadians were little inferior, and some were blinded by party violence so they had now a chief of no common far as to justify the Mantineians. But ability. Lycomedes of Mantineia, was when the Corinthian ambassador called noble and wealthy, an active promoter on them to avenge the unprovoked of the Arcadian union, and distinguished ravage of his country, to which not even both in council and in arms. He advised mahce could impute any breach of the his countrymen no longer to make treaty, the cry that he had spoken well themselves the blind instruments of was general ; and the result was a vote Theban ambition. " As soldiers," he that the whole strength of the common- said, " you are notonously among the wealth should march under Iphicrates best in Greece. Without you, tlie to the relief of Lacedaemon. The army Lacedaemonians never invaded Attica, marched; but Iphicrates, apparently, nor wUl the Thebans now invade Laco- was not zealous in the cause ; for he nia. If you are wise, you wiU insist on incurred great blame by a dilatory con- equality with Thebes. You have tor- duct very unUke his usual activity. He merly raised the LacedKmomans, you did not reach Arcadia tiU the Thebans are now raising tiie Thebans ; and were quitting Laconia, and he let them shorUy you will find the Ihebans but return home unopposed. other Lacedsemomans." The Arcadian The invasion was over, but it had people submitted themselves entirely to broken the power of Lacedaemon. A the direction of Lycomedes, and und^ large part ofthe unprivileged Laconians him they were active and successfiiU remained in revolt, and nearly all the insomuch that they be^an to be heW Helots. The able Theban leaders took the best soldiers of the time. But their i f lU GREECE. GREECE. Ill strength and success were far from being grateful to the Thebans, when coupled with their rising spirit of inde- pendence. The distress of Lacedaemon had now been considerably alleviated by the grow- ing disunion of its enemies, and by cordial support from Athens, principally directed by the skill of Chabrias. Ad- ditional assistance was derived from an emissary of Persia, who had been sent to mediate a peace on the condition that Messenia should return to subjection ; and who.whenthis stipulation was reject- ed by the Thebans, had employed a large sum of money in raising mercenaries for Lacedaemon. Soon after, the Argians, Arcadians, and Messenians, were de- feated by Archidamus, the son of Agesi- laus, without the loss of a single Lace- daemonian, a circumstance from which this action l>ecame celebrated under the title of the Tearless Battle. At the same lime the Thebans were pressed by the war with Thessaly ; they, therefore, be- gan to wish for peace, and they turned their eyes to Persian support as the likeliest means of enabling them to make it on their own terms. Pelopidas was sent to Susa, accompanied by ministers from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia: his manners were pleasing, his conduct dexterous, and he won the king to the side of Thebes. A Persian of rank ac- companied him to Greece with a written mandate, requiring that Messene should be independent; that the Athenians should lay up their fleet ; that war shoidd be made upon them if they re- fused ; and declaring that, if any city refused to join in such war, the king would direct his first hostility against it The Thebans now assumed to be the arbiters of Greece, and their summons for a congress to meet at Thebes was generally obeyed. But when, on the Persian rescript being read, the Tliebans demanded that those who wished to be friends of the king and of themselves, should immediately swear to the terms proposed, the deputies from the cities generally answer^ that they were sent not to swear to any propositions, but to hear and report them to their constitu- ents. The Arcadians were more de- cided in their opposition. Pelopidas h ad spoken of ^em contemptuously in Per- sia, and the court had consequently slighted their ambassador ; who returned irom his mission in high wrath, and re- ported to the assembly that the king had makers, cooks, cup-liearers, and door- keepers in plenty, but men to fight with the Greeks he had searched for and could not find. The address of their envoy was well suited to bias them against any settlement of Grecian af- fairs to be made under the authority of Persia : and it probably contributed much to the same effect, that the dele- gates sent to the general congress were mostly taken from the party opposed to Theban ascendency. Lycomedes was one of these, and he not only declined the oath, but said that the congress ought to have been heltl oh the seat of war, and not in Thebes. The The- bans angrily exclaimed that he was acting as an incendiary in the league: whereupon he declared that he would sit no longer, and went home, accompanied by all the other Arcadian deputies. The meeting broke up. The Thebans sent to every city separately requisitions to accept the terms, exptcting that none would venture to incur the united enmity of Thebes and Persia: but Corinth first refusing, and adding that it wanted no interchange of oaths with tl.e king, most others followed the example ; " and thus," says Xenophon, "this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans to acquire the empire of Greece came to its end." The Achaians were fortunate in then* ancient institutions, and free from the seductions of empire ; and hence their character for probity stood high, and they had been less vexed than most of their neighbours with bloody dissension. They had parties, and we have seen in Athens that the same ground- work of law would uphold a very different fabric of govern- ment, as principles were applied by the Many or the Few ; but we have also seen that the existence of acknowledged prin- ciples was a common safeguard to all, since it narrowed the field of oppression when parties were unequal, and of contest when they were balanced. The Achaian constitution seems to have kept its form, though administered by the nobles or the people, as Lacedaemon or Athens preponderated . Since the Peloponnesian war the rulers had been aristocratical ; but now the democratical party looked for support to the imperial democracy of Thebes. Epaminondas led an army into the province. The men of rank threw themselves on his liberality, and he did not disappoint them ; for while he trans- ferred the administration to their oppo- nents, and took pledges of fidehty to Thebes, he neither changed the constitu- tion, nor suffered the banishment of any mdividual. But his moderation offended the high democratical party throughout the league ; the Arcadians complained that he had settled Achaia according to the interest of Lacedaemon, and the com- plaint found support in Thebes. The Theban people decreed that regidators should be sent to the Achaian cities ; and these, concurring with the multitude, expelled the nobles, and established un- qualified democracy. It soon appeared that the wise liberality of Epaminondas had been best for Thebes, for Arcadia, and for the Achaian Many themselves ; for the exiles making common cause, and attacking each city separately, reco- vered all ; and, instead of remaining neutral, as before, they became bitter enemies to the Theban league, an^ most troublesome neighbours to Arcadia. The city of Sicyon had commonly been in alliance with the Achaians, and under similar laws. The predominance of Lacedaemon had preserved its govern ment in the hands of the rich and noble ; and they had kept it faithful to their pa- troness, till very recently, when it had yielded to the growing strength of the Theban league. This change took all power from Euphron, who had previously managed the affairs of the commonwealth ; but he wished, as he had been first of the citizens under Lacedaemon, to become so now under her enemies. For this pur- pose he persuaded the Argians and Ar- cadians that, if authority rested in the wealthy, they would talce the first oppor- tunity of renewing the alliance with Lacedaemon ; whereas, if democracy were established, the city would adhere to its present connexion. The Argians and Arcadians entered into his views, and sent soldiers to support him : he assem- bled the people in the presence of these auxiliaries, and obtained a vote to esta- l)lish democracy. He was chosen general with four others ; his son was placed in command of the mercenaries ; and, henceforward, he advanced with rapid strides on the highway of tyranny. He lavished on his mercenaries the public treasure and that of the temples, besides the private property of many persons, whom he drove into banishment as friends of Lacedaemon. When he thought him- self strong enough, he turned against his fellows in office, assassinated some, and drove out others, tiU he ruled without a rival. In all these violences the allies were induced to acquiesce, partly by money, and partly by the ready service of his troops. JEneas of Stymphalus, on being elected general of the Arcadians, resolv^ to put down this oppressor. He marched to Sicyon with his army, and entering the acropolis he called together the principal men, and sent for those who had been driven into exile without a legal sentence. Euphron fled to the harbour, which he found the means of delivering to the Lacedaemonians ; and by this he obtained a favourable hearing, though probably no real belief, for the assertion that, in spite of appearances, he had ever meant fairly towards them. Meantime strife had risen in the city between the nobles and the commonality ; and Euphron, having hired a band of mercenaries in Athens, offered his services to the latter, and found acceptance. He mastered all the city except the acropolis, where Mneas had placed a Theban governor and garrison. He then went to Thebes with large sums of money, in the hope of persuading that government to expel the nobles from Sicyon, to withdraw the garrison, and to leave the city in his hands. The recalled exiles also went to Thebes to urge a counter petition : but they saw their enemy received in a man- ner which made them think that his suit would be granted, and some of them, driven wild by the fear of renewed op- pression, fell upon him publicly and slew him. The assassins were carried before the council to be judged ; but they were acquitted on the ground that tyrants and traitors were already condemned by the universal judgment of mankind, and that, Euphron being both, his slayers were entitled to honour, not to punish- ment. Since the last settlement of Phhus by Agesilaus, that little state had been the active, faithful, and dauntless ally ol Lacedaemon, throughout its greatest dis- tress, and had done service out of all pro- portion to its population and strength. Its situation on the Argian border, and in the line of march from the isthmus to Laconia, gave it great facility of annoy- ing the enemy, but peculiarly exposed it to suffer by his hostility. During the second invasion of Peloponnesus by Thebes, the exiles, who had been driven into banishment after the siege of Phlius by Agesilaus, having intelligence in that city, surprised the acropohs, wnile the Eleian and Arcadian forces, by con- cert with them, assailed the walls. Both were beaten off by the prompt and energetic resistance of the besieged, aiid the PhUasians continued the steady 112 GREECE. GREECE. na friends of I^acedaemon, though sur- rounded with watchful enemies far more powerful than themselves. Their power was not sufficient to make their nistory important in the general outline of Grecian politics, hut their loyalty to their engagements, and singular spirit, activity, and prudence in de- fence, form the subject of a very inte- resting narrative in Xenophon, of which the English reader will find the substance in Mr. Mitford's History of Greece (c. xxviii. s. ] ). Oropus, an Attic port on the border of Boeotia, being seized by some Athe- nian exiles, the whole force of Attica was marched against it ; but no assist- ance came from any of the allies, and the Athenians were unable to reduce it They became, in consequence, discon- tented with their allies, and the know- ledge of this gave to Lycomedes the hope of advancing his favourite project of emancipating Arcadia from Theban in- fluence. He obtained a decree from the Ten Thousand, the name by which the general assembly of Arcadia was desig- nated, authorising him to negotiate an alliance with Athens, whither accordingly he went. The proposal was exclaimed against by many as contrary to the treaty with Lacedaemon : but when it was represented that any thing which loosened the connexion of Thebes with Arcadia would be beneficial no less to Lacedaemon than to Athens, the alliance was accepted. Lycomedes, in returning, unfortunately landed at a port which was full of Arcadian exiles, and by them he was murdered. The Corinthians, cut off from Lace- daemon, had become accustomed to rely in great measure on Athenian auxiliaries for their defence. A suspicion arose that the Athenians cherished designs against the independence of Corinth, and the government dismissed the Athenian troops, saying that it had no further need of them. Without them, however, it was unable to withstand its powerful enemies, and persons were sent to sound the Theban government, and to learn whether an application for peace would be successful. Being encouraged to ex- pect it, the Corinthians asked that they might first communicate with their al- lies, so that those who desired peace might be parties ; and this being granted, they sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon. They represented the difficulties of their situation ; expressed their willingness to persevere in the war, if the Lacedaemo- nians could point out any hope of safety, and if not, tneir wish that the Lacedae- monians would join with them in making peace: but if this might not be, they requested the Lacedaemonians to allow of their making a separate peace ; ** for if we are saved," they said, ** we may serve you hereafter ; which if we be now ruined, we never can." The conduct of the Lacedaemonians in this instance was generous ; they encouraged the Corinth- ians to make peace, and released from their engagements any others of their allies who might wish to be relieved from war. For themselves, they said, they never would submit to lose Messe- nia, which they had received from their fathers. The Corinthians sent an em- bassy to ask for peace ; the Thebans proposed alliance, but this the Corinth- ians refused. The Thebans then, admir- ing their resolution not to take part, though pressed with danger, ai^ainst their friends and benefactors, granted them peace with neutrality. The same terms were also given to the Phliasinns, In Orchomenus, the second city of Boeotia, the oligarchical party was the strongest, and it bore the sway of Thebes with great reluctance. An oligarchical party was still numerous in Thebes itself, but the chiefs were in exile ; and these plotted with their friends in tlie different cities, and particularly in Or- chomenus, to effect a revolution which might restore them. The conspirators mostly served in the cavalry, and a gene- ral review of the cavalry of Boeotia was the occasion chosen for the execution of the plot. The secret had been be- trayed to the BoBotarchs ; the conspira- tors of the smaller towns were pardoned, but all the soldiers of the Orchomenian cavalry were brought in chains before the assembled Theban people. From the earliest period an inveterate hatred is said to have subsisted between The- bes and Orchomenus ; and never was a feud more bloodily terminated. Not only were the cavalry put to death, who had in some sense provoked vengeance, but it was decreed that Orchomenus should be levelled, and the whole people sold into slavery. The decree was of course resisted. The Thebans marched in arms to Orchome- nus, and having taken it, slaughtered all the men, and sold the women and children. After this an army was sent into Thessaly . The Tagus Alexander, sdready mentioned as a ^oublesome enemy to Thebes, was an able man. but a rapa- cious, oppressive, and faithless ruler. His tyranny provoked resistance, and the Thebans had already sent Pelopidas with an army to support the revolting cities. That expedition had ended un- prosperously ; but fresh oppressions raising fresh revolts, the Thessalian friends of Thebes again requested a supporting army, and Pelopidas for the leader. Both suits were granted. Pe- lopidas fell in the first battle ; but, ne- vertheless, the presence of a Boeotian force relieved the opposers of the Tagus, and the end was an accommodation between Alexander and the Thessalian cities, and his alliance with Thebes. Elis was oligarchically governed, but its democratical opposition was patron^ ised by tiie Arcadians. Hence arose war between the two states ; and Elis returned to the Lacedaemonian alliance. The people of Pisa, near Olympia, had ever claimed the right of presid- ing at the Olympian festival, and tlie Arcadians now backed them. The Ar- cadians seized Olympia, and the Pisans commenced the solemnity under their protection ; but it was interrupted by the Eleian forces, and at the time when all war was usually suspended, the sacred fO'ound itself became a field of battle. The Eleians were generally despised as soldiers, but this day, through zeal to vindicate their sacred character, and anger at what they deemed a shocking profanation, they proved themselves equal to the bravest of Greece. The day was theirs, but they could not retake the temple. The emplojnnent of mercenary sol- diers — ^vagabonds without a country of their own, who hired themselves out to states with which they had no other connexion, for the detestable work of war — was already common in Greece. We have now the first example of an ap- proach to the modem use of standing armies embodied from the people. The Arcadian Eparites were a select militia of citizens from every state of the Union, who were to be always ready for ser- vice. They had contributed much to the successes of Arcadia, but their establishment involved a danger which soon became manifest The present chiefs considered that, by making sure of the Eparites, they might controul all opposers, For this purpose, the Eparites must be kept embodied, and in pay, which seemed also necessary to the pre- servation of their conquests and the protection of their uew allies. ITieir own resources were insufficient, but the Olympian treasury was in their hands, and they resolved to brave the abhor- rence of Greece by using it. The source of the pay, now regularly issued to the Eparites, could not be concealed. The Mantineians condenmed it by a vote of their assembly, and sent a sum of mo- ney to the general government as their share of the pay now wanted for the Eparites. Their leading men were cited before the Ten Thousand, to answer a charge of treason to the Union ; and not appearing, they were condemned. A body of Eparites was sent to apprehend them, but the Mantineians shut their gates, and refused to give them up. Meantime shame and horror at the sacn^- lege prevailed in the general assembly of Arcadia, insomuch that a vote was passed forbidding further trespass on the sacred treasury. The situation of the rulers was criti- cal They had blackened then* charac- ter ; they had lost the majority in the assembly; they had lost beyond reco» very the command of the Eparites ; for those who could not serve without pay, daily left that body, and were succeeded by men of competent fortune, who en-o listed for the purpose of weaning it fronj its present attachments. Grown despe-r rate, they sent to Thebes, and assunng that government that Arcadia was on the point of joining Lacedaenion, urged the march of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. The application was favourably received. Meantime, their opponents becoming decidedly superior in the assembly, ambassadors were sent to remonstrate at Thebes against the intended march of Theban forces into Arcadia, uncalled for by its government. It was next resolved that the temple at Olympia neither belonged to Arcadia, nor ought to be coveted by it, but that it would be both just and pious to restore it to Elis. On such grounds the Eleians gladly treated for peace, and deputies from all the Arcadian towns assembling in Tegea, received the ministers of Elis, A Theban officer ajso came to the con- gress, attended by three hundred Bceo* tian heavy armed foot The Arcadians now abandoned them-r selves to festivity, all but the principals in the sacrilege, who knew themselyes not only excluded from power by th§ present change, but liable to the severest punishment They oomipunicated with the Theban, and found him ready tti i 114 GREECE OREECE* 115 •upport them. Some of the Eparites were stm their own. and, backed by these and by the Boeotians, they shut the town-gates, and sent parties to seize the leading men of every Areadian city. The persons arrested were far more than Qie prison could contain ; but many escaped, and among these the greater part of the Mantineian leaders, whom it nad been most wished to secure. Man- tineia was only twelve miles off. A he- rald was sent thence to Tegea, to demand thelibertyofthearrestedMantineians; to remonstrate against the execution or im- prisonment of any Arcadian, without due trial; and to offer security, that any Mantineian, who might be accused of treason, should appear to answer. The Theban, perplexed and disconcerted, re- leased his prisoners, and apologized for what he had done, misled, as he pre- tended, by false intelligence of a plot for betraying Tegea to the Lacedaemonians. He was suffered to depart ; but ministers were sent to Thebes to accuse him. They were roughly repulsed, and Epaminon- das, who was then commander-in-chief, told them that the officer had done much better when he seized the men, than when he released them ; •* For," said he, " when we are engaged in war on your account, your m&ing peace, without consulting us, is a manifest treason. Be sure, then," he added, " that we will march into Arcadia, and there, with our firiends, we will continue the war." The interference of Thebes in the go- vernment of Arcadia had been insoleiitly arbitrary, and the pretence to justify the threat of war was evidently futile. Had Arcadia made peace singly with Lace- daemon, there might have been reason for complaint ; but the war with Elis was a separate matter, involving no Theban interests, and in which Thebes had taken no part. The act may have been prompted either by the wish to support at all hazards an administration which could only stand by keeping the country dependent on Thebes, or else by suspi- cion that the change had originated in Lacedaemonian intrigue, and would end in alliance with Laceidaemon. If by the latter, it made necessary the very mea- sure which it was intended to prevent. In effecting the recent change, tne entire oligarchical party had concurred with the greater part of the democratical — with nearl^r all, indeed, who were not implicated in the sacrilege. The oligar- chical party would naturally lean to- wards LaCedemon; the democratical would prefer the friendship of Thebea, while it could be retained with inde- pendence. That hope being withdrawn, both parties concurred in the measures to be taken. They conferred with the Eleians and Achaians, and sent for Athenian succours, according to the treaty made by Lycomedes. Ambassa- dors were sent to Lacedaemon, and an alliance made on terms that marked the hnmbled state of that commonwealth ; for it was agreed that the chief command should rest with the city in whose ter- ritory at any time the army might be. Epaminondas advanced into Pelopon- nesus, and was joined by his allies there, namely, the Argians and Messenians, and four towns of the Arcadians. The rest of the Arcadians were assembled at Mantineia, with their Athenian, Achaian, and Eleian allies, and a part of the La- cedaemonians, the rest of whom remained with Agesilaus, at Sparta. The Theban general seeing no opportunity of ad- vantageous action, remained quietly in Tegea, till he heard that his opponents had pressed Agesilaus to join them, and that the remaining Lacedaemonians were actually on their march. He then sud- denly marched for Sparta, and had well nigh taken it empty ; but Agesilaui was informed of his movement just in time to hasten back, and arrive before him. Though his numbers were very scanty, the able disposition of Agesilaus secured the town against a sudden as- sault ; and a strong Theban detachment having seized a commanding height, Arehidamus advanced over very diffi- cult ground, with less than one hundred men, and — such was the power of despe- ration — drove them from it. Expecting that the forces collected in Arcadia would come to the ud of Lacedaemon, Epamin- ondas would not await them, but returned to T^ea, and sent forward his Theban and Thessalian horse, to plunder the Mantineian territory. It was harvest time, and the Mantineians believing that the enemy was gone, their servants and cattle were all in the fields. A body of Athenian cavalry was just arrived ; they had travelled far, and men and horses were without refreshment; nevertheless, they did not refuse their assistance, though greatly outnumbered, and that by the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, esteemed the best in Greece. An ob- stinate conflict ensued, in which the Athenians had the advantage, and the Mantineians got in tlieir property with- out loss. sacre of the Orchomenians, it may be doubted whether Epaminondas was to blame ; and the rather, as we have seen in the settlement of Achaia an Decisive action now was necessary to pletely indecisive. Such was the cele- Epaminondas, for the period of hii brated battle of Mantineia. (b. c. 362J command was drawing to its close. He Epaminondas has been ranked by had hitherto met with little but failure in many as the first and purest of Grecian an enterprise, by the undertaking of worthies. There is much in his cha- which he had united all the most power- racter to support the praise ; but it must ful states of Greece against his country, be taken with considerable abatement. If he withdrew without a victory, the He was a man of the most command- allies whom he came to aid would be be- ing genius ; a devoted Theban patriot ; sieged by the enemy, and his own repu- and, as far as we can judge, singularly tation probably ruined : " so that it free from mere personal ambition, ana seemed to him," says Xenophon, " im- its attendant vices of envy and ill will, possible not to fight, considering that if His steady friendship with Pelopidas is he were successful it \>ould cancel all alike honourable to both. But we can - complaints, and that nis end would be not award him the rarer praise of love glorious if he fell in the attempt to of peace, of extended regard to the wel- give to his country the dominion of fare of Greece, of scrupulous political Peloponnesus." In spite of the checks morality, or even of sound views of his which had been received, his genius country's true interests. Under his di- Had kept up union and mutual con- rection the administration of Thel)es fidence in all the various tribes that was insatiably ambitious and over- composed his host. His force exceeded bearing. In some particular acts of that of his adversaries, and the more as tyranny, such as the expulsion of the they did not venture again to leave La- Plataeans and Thespians, and the mas- conia unprotected. His evolutions led them to believe that he would not fight before the morrow ; and then he wheeled his army upon them, while their minds were no longer strung, nor their batta- instance where his own measures were lions arrayed for immediate action. In liberal and moderate, while his influence the battle which followed, instead of could not support them. But the bent engaging Uke former commanders along of his policy was to make Thebes, at the whole extent of the ranks, he exhi- whatever cost of blood or suffering, the bited a most perfect and refined applica- mistress of Greece ; and the last aggres- tion of the principles which ha!d won sion on Arcadia, which was undoubtedly him the victory at Leuctra. He formed his measure, and might vie with the his line obliquely, strengthening to the worst deeds of Sparta herself, shows utmost the point which was nearest to that he was little scrupulous in the the enemy ; while he placed his weaker choice of means for effecting his pur- divisions in the parts which sloped off pose. The manner of his death has backwards ; so that they mi^ht come up been the theme of general applause. in time to complete the victory when Yet he was cut off in the perpetration of the hostile line had been broken through a great crime, by measures which, no by their fellows, but not soon enough to doubt, displayed much talent, but were enter at the first into a doubtful contest, the certain cause of misery to unoffend- and perhaps by their defeat to dishearten ing thousands ; and those last words, the rest The event did not belie his which have been so famous, seem, if in- expectation : but just at the critical deed they have been truly reported, to moment of the fight, he fell. He lived to have proceeded less from an enlightened know that his army was victorious, then love of his country, than from a personal fainted, on the extraction of the weapon, and patriotic vanity, altogether heedless and died, as it is said, with an expres- of the cost mankind might have to pay sion of joy that he had not lived to taste for its gratification. of defeat. No one attempted to improve With the life of Epaminondas the the victory ; the heavy armed infantry energy ceased which had maintained stood upon the spot, the cavalry quitted union and activity in the Theban con- pursuit, and rejoined the phalanx ; and federacy ; and with it ended also the the light armed troops and targeteers, fear which had united so many states crossing the field as conquerors without in opposition. A general accommoda- looking for support, were charged and tion soon ensued, in which the allies out to pieces by Uie Athenian horse, of Lacedaemon consented to the demand, Tho whole result of the day was com- that the Messenians shouUl remain in* 116 GREECE GREECE* 117 i 14 , H dependent ; and Lacedsmon, which alone refused, remained nominally at war with all the states allies of Thebes. The weariness of all parties, however, produced a practical cessation of hos- tilities, during which the attention of Agesilaus was invited to Egypt. That country had revolted from rersia, and taken to itself a king, to whose assistance Agesilaus, at the age of eighty years, led an army. He hoped, according to his frknd and historian, to punish the Per- sian monarch for the support he had given to the enemies of Lacedaeraon, and once more to free the Greeks of Asia from his yoke. Another motive which would probably weigh both with him and with the Lacedaemonian government, was the hope of acquiring wealth to support a war for the recovery of Messenia. Civil troubles arose in Egypt, and it was in them, not in war against Persia, that the Grecian army was principally em- ployed. The king, to whose support Agesilaus had originally come, was deserted by his subjects ; and the suc- cession to his throne was disputed. Agesilaus established on the throne the candidate whom he supported, and, sailing for Greece, died on the voyage. He left a high reputation as an able, though not a fortunate statesman, and one of the few who, in promoting the Aggrandisement of their communities, did not lose sight of the common wel- fure of Greece. This part of his cha- racter was strongly shown, when the means of taking Corinth by assault l)emg offered to 1dm by some Corinthian re- fugees, he refiised, observing that it might be fit to chastise Grecian cities, but not to destroy them. But his affec- tions were violent, whether in friendship or animosity ; and he sometimes suffered them to overl)ear his better judgment, and even his integrity, as in the two most culpable actions of his life, his support- ing the seizure of the Cadmeia, and ex- cusing the aggression of Sphodrias. His character is strongly contrasted, ho\h in its worse and better features, with that ot his great opponent Epaminondas, whose noblest quality was his magnanimous superiority to personal interests and pas- sions, whose greatest fault, *he disposi- tion to pursue the aggrandisement of his own commonwealth, careless of any injury which might follow to others. The old Grecian system of confederacy was now entirely broken up. Lacedae- aion was fallen, and the ascendency of Thebes did not survive its author. One might expect that the following period would be comparatively peaceful and happy, since the smaller states were no longer obliged to serve the ambition of the greater. Far from it : with the ha- bits of the Greeks, lasting quiet was impossible, and a general war was only exchanged for a complication of petty quarrels, many of which, while the con- federate system was in vigour, would probablv have been referred to thejudg- ment of the superintending state. Ri- volutions were more frequent, govern- ments more jealous. The protecting power, by assuring*st ability to the sub- ordinate administrations, had enabled them to relax the suspicious vigilance of fear ; and the authority of its officers had often been employed to compose dissensions and moderate revenge. But now the only security of the ruling party was the complete depression of their adversaries, and this they sought by more unsparing massacre and banish- ment. Cfruelty provoked retaliation ; every feud still increased in bitterness ; and it was observed that there were now more exiles from single cities than for- merly from all Peloponnesus. Argos has lately been little mentioned ; and its inactivity is accounted for by the weakness resulting from a sedi- tion and train of executions almost un- paralleled. Some leading men, finding that their popularity had been over- thrown by calumnies, and that their situation was growing dangerous, plot- ted the overthrow of the democracy: the design was discovered, and some of the culprits arrested and put to the tor- ture. The chiefs of the conspiracy de- stroyed themselves ; but one of the tor- tured having accused thirty other per- sons, all these were put to death without examination. It was now acknowledged that a plot had existed, and it was thought that the guilty were far more numerous than those who had suffered ; fresh accusations were brought, and, in the present temper of the people, accusation was equivalent to conviction. The po- pular alarm and suspicion rose to abso- lute frenzy, and increased with every new charge, till above 1200 of the principal citizens were executed, and the people still called for more. The accusers now became alarmed; they knew not how to feed the fury they had raised, nor how to quiet it ; their hesi- tation seemed suspicious, and they themselves were put to death. After this, says the author from whom we Have the relation, the multitude became calm ; but he makes no attempt to account for the restoration of tran- quillity. In reflecting upon such revolt- ing passages of Grecian story, we may well condemn the excesses incident to the immediate government of a multi- tude. But our censure of the indi- viduals composing it should be mitigated by the consideration that, even when possessed of specious accomplishments, they were unenlightened by a sound education, and unaided by a rational system of jurisprudence. With the habits of mind produced by the one, and the regularity of proceeding secured by the other, the horrid excesses we have been surveying could never have taken place : the want of these prime blessings must be called in to explain them. Sect. III. — For a short time after the overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, Hermocrates kept the lead in S}Tacuse. At his proposal, ships were sent to assist the Lacedaemonians against Athens; he was himself the commander of the squadron and his men were remarkable for courage and discipline, and especially for good conduct in quarters. Meantime, his opponents prevailed in Syracuse ; he was displaced and banished; and after exhorting his seamen cheerfully to obey their new leaders, he departed, deeply re- gretted both by them and the allies. Some changes had been made by the opponents of Hermocrates in the Syracusan con- stitution, which made its democratical character more unqualified, but tended to lessen the energy of its administra- tion. It had been enacted that most of the magistracies, hitherto elective, should be filled by lot ; a measure likely to be popular, as opening equally to all the chance of office, but certainly not fa- vourable to the able discharge of its duties. While things were yet un- settled, the Carthaginians invaded Sicily, for the first time since their defeat by Grelon, seventy years before : there was neither union in the Sicilian cities nor vi- gour in the Syracusan government, and Selinus and nimera were quickly taken. At this time Hermocrates arriving, was received at Messene. Phamabazus had given him money to aid in effecting his restoration, and he was thus enabled to build five triremes, and raise a thou- vand mercenary soldiers ; he was joined by many Syracusan exiles and fugitive Himeraeans, and he first employed his force against the common enemy with gieat activity and success. His fame spread wide ; he grew daily more popu- lar in Syracuse, till his friends there thought the time was ripe for his return. At their invitation he entered Syracuse with a band of his followers ; but a contest ensued in which the ruling party was victorious ; Hermocrates fell, and his surviving friends were condemned to banishment. Indecision and disunion increased among the cities, and no vigorous effort was made to check the arms of Car- thage. Acragas, or Agrigentum, fell, the second city of Sicily, which had enjoyed an overflow of prosperity scarcely credible, were not the testimony of his- torians confirmed by the magnificent remains of its public buildings. In this crisis, Dionysius came forward in Syra- cuse. Though a partisan of Hermo- crates, he had escaped the doom of banishment, and had since distinguished himself by his gallantry in the war. He now, at the age of twenty-four, com- menced his political career by violent invective against the generals, and pre- vailed so far with the people, that they were displaced ; and he was among those appointed in their room. After this, he obtained a decree to recall the exiled friends of Hermocrates. There was yet a large opposing party; but every attempt to overthrow him failed, and failing, made him stronger. He was appointed autocrator-general conjointly with Hipparinus, the first in birth of the Syracusans ; and both were conti- nued in office till the death of Hippari- nus, after which Dionysius was elected alone. This office, which was usually confined to rare emergencies, united the powers of first minister and commander- in-chief, and gave a constitutional form and mode of exercise to the authority held by the favourite of the people, or, at least of the prevaiUng party. But, where civil war was only prevented by decided superiority of force in one of the factions, the preservation of the laws was to the ruling party so much less pressing an object than the preservation of their own ascendency, that their leaders were often encouraged to a vigour beyond the law. In Grecian party language, the friends of the peo- ple were to be supported even in some- what arbitrary dealing with the people's enemies. But the opposite party also claimed to be the people, and complained that they were kept down by the violence of a faction ; and by them any man de- cidedly pre-eminent in the ruling party, 118 GREECE. GUEECE. H9 I i 'I ii I wotild be called the Tyrant. In the case of Dionysius, there was much to justi^ the epimet. He was continued through life in an office rarely filled, and usually for a short term ; and, though all great questions were decided by the people, he exercised, in the ordinary course of public business, a wider and more dis- cretionary authority than was commonly trusted to officers under a democracy. A great mark of a tyrant was to depend for his support on mercenary troops. Dionysius entertained a large body of mercenaries for his wars with Carthage, and though his chief trust was not in them but in the Syracusans of his party, the mercenaries served him well in some civil contests, and added much to the strength of his government. The effect of all this was. that not his enemies only, but the Greeks in general habitually Styled him Tyrant of Syracuse, and sometimes of the Sicilian Greeks, all of whom were latterly under his influence. But it is to be remembered that his power in Syracuse rested on the favour of a majority among the citizens, and that his command over the Sicilian, and many also of the Italian cities, was like to that of Athens or Lacedaemon over their subordinate allies. Dionysius chiefly prevented all Sicily from falling under the yoke of Carthage ; he sustained and repelled with the greatest ability and bravery, the attack of an overwhelming force, and gave itnion and security to the Grecian mte- rest in the island. He brought under his command the greater part of Sicily, and much of Italy ; all which, for sixteen years after tlie last peace with Carthage, he governed in very remarkable quiet, prosperity, and abundance. These facts prove him an able and liberal politician ; his moral character is more question- able. It has l)een his fortune to be known to us only through his bitterest cnemief, who have striven to represent him as a monster of cruelty and rapa- eity ; and some have sought to make him an object of contempt as well as hatred by describing him as a slave to the weakest vanity and the most unmanly •uspicion. Such imputations are irre- concilable with admitted facts ; and Mr. Mitford has gone so far in his defence, as to discredit, soften, or explain away eyery story which bears against him, and to set him up as a model of gene- rosity and political virtue. The truth probably lies in the middle. The sway i>f Dionysius was evkiently popular and beneficial, and in some actions he showed a humanity very unusual in his age. We may willingly lielieve that his nature was kind, when no political interest opposed it ; but he was ambitious and unscru- pulous; and there is little appearance that pity ever stopped him in the prose- cution of a favourite design. Two op- posite anecdotes shall be given, and let it he remembered that both are taken from an unfriendly witness. The cities of Naxos and Catana being betrayed to him by their generals, he sold as slaves nearly all the citizens of both, and gave up the towns to be plundered by his soldiery. On the other hand, in Italy he defeated an army of his bitterest enemies, and reduced a body of 10,000 men to surrender at discretion, all of whom he dismissed without ransom. Policy, doubtless, had much to do in prompting both his cruelty and his generosity ; but it is fair to state, that the latter was not out of harmony with his general con- duct, and that m his victories he seems to have been habitually anxious to spare unnecessary bloodshed. Dionysius died about the time of Epaminondas's second invasion of Pe- loponnesus (b. c. 367). Though the form of his government was demo- cratical, the authority gained by his popularity and abilities, m the general looseness of Grecian law, was greater than that of kings in a well-regu- lated monarchy. He had strengthened his ascendency by intermarriage with the first houses of Syracuse ; and such was the combined effect of per- sonal popularity and family influence that, on nis death, his son, Dionysius, was elected autocrator-general, and stepped unopposed, as if by hereditary title, into the full authority of his father. Thus it is that, in turbulent times, or in an ill-constituted democracy, a popular leader passes gradually into a monarch. The case of Dionysius runs parallel with those of Gelon and Peisistratus among the Greeks, and of the Medici in Flo- rence ; and it is to be observed that, in these three cases, but particularly the last, the power which originated in pub- lic favour became, before its fall, a grind- ing tyranny under the successors of the founder. The younger Dionysius was indolent and dissolute, and his government, though it lasted undisturbed for twelve years, became before the end of that period l>oth weak and unpopular. It was then overthrown by the revolt of the Syracusans, under Dion the son of Hipparimis, a man of great courage and abOity, and of cultivated taste for literature and philosophy ; but haughty, violent, and arbitrary ; not indeed desti- tute of patriotism, but far more governed by ambition. He had been in high trust and favour with the elder Dionysius, who had married his sister ; but after his death disagreements had arisen between his son and Dion, which ended in the banishment of the latter. Rehmiing with a small band of followers, Dion was welcomed as a deliverer by the greater part of the Syracusans, and elected autocrator-general without opposition; while Dionysius was l)esieged in the citadel, and both he and his followers were in the end obliged to retire into Italy. But Dion soon became almost universally unpopular, and when, after great struggles, he succeeded in holding his office, his reliance was not on the citizens, but on a band of foreign mer- cenaries. His mind was full of pro- jected reforms, but his rigid and haughty character was little fitted to work their adoption by gentle measures, though persuasion or conviction. In all he was opposed by Heracleides, his principal coadjutor in the outset, and now his rival in authority, who was appointed autocrator-general in coni unction with him, and intrusted with the command of the fleet. Heracleides had made himself highly popular by unbounded indulgence to the multitude, and Dion, unable to cope with him in favour, en- deavoured to supply the deficiency by force. Urged on partly by his temper and partly by the difficulty of his situation, and exasperated by the galling change in the public feeling, he became daily more tyrannical. He removed Hera- cleides by assassination, and confiscated the property of others among his adver- saries, to pay his soldiers ; till at length his most trusted friend plotted his murder, and he was assassinated in the hearing of his guards, no man moving to assist him. Thus perished Dion four years after his return from exile (b. c. 353). It is diffi- cult to say why the name of tyrant, uni- versally given to the elder Dionysius, has been refused to Dion, whose power appears to have been latterly both more arbitrary in its tenure and more severe in its exercise. Much probably is to be ascribed to the party bias of the histo- rians, and much to the wide extent and long duration of tiie power held by the Dionysii, and the shortness of Dion's, which has made his name more re- markable as the overthrower. than aa the holder of a tyranny. In justice it must be observeia, that the state of Syracuse, after the expulsion of Diony- sius, was one of great confusion, where faction was violent, law unsettled, and the difficulty was very great to reconcile liberty with authority. Many of Dion'a earlier unpopular measures may have been prompt«i by the opinion of public duty m a man, whose principles were adverse to democracy, and whose habit of mind revolted more from weakness and disorder in a government than from excessive rigour; but it seems likely that the changes which he projected were not the best, and it is certain, that his manner of enforcing them was altoge- ther unjustifiable. For eight years after the death of Dion, Syracuse was ever changing one hrrant for another, till it became half oeserted through the multitude of its calamities. Of the other cities, some were utterly ruined and made desolate by war ; others filled with a mixed crowd of unpaid mercenaries, Greek and bar- harian, incapable of peaceful industry, and ready to lend their swords to any revolution which promised pay or plun- der. At length a Syracusan party cast their eyes to their mother city, and re- quested a Corinthian general, whose authority might command respect from all, and repress the ambition of those who desired to be tyrants. Meantime the party friendly to Dionysius invited back their leader, and he a^^ain became the lord of Syracuse; while his most active opponents fled to Hicetes, the tyrant of Leontini, and with him made war on Dionysius. Timoleon was a Corinthian of noble birth, and distinguished ability as a war- rior and statesman. His brother hav- ing, partly by popularity and partly by the aid of a mercenary force, made him- self tyrant of Corinth, Timoleon, after vain remonstrances, slew him. When the Syracusan ambassadors arrived, the deed was recent, and all Corinth was in a ferment, — some extolling Timoleon, as the most magnanimous of patriots ; others execrating him as a fatricide. The request of the Syracusans offered to the Corinthians the means of calm- ing their dissensions, by the removal of the obnoxious individual, and to Timoleon a field of honourable action, in which he might esca]^ from the misgivings of his own mind, and tlie IfO GkEECJB* GREECE. ISi i i feproachis of his mofher, who never for^&ve him. Timoleon proceeded to S^iljr, with a small band of mercenaries, prindpallv raised by his own credit, pn amYing he received considerable rein- forcements, and soon gained a footing m Syracuse. The greater part of the city had already been taken by Hicetes fipom Dionysius, and the whole was divided between three parties, each hos- tile to both the others. Timoleon was in the end successful. Hicetes with- drew to Leontini, and Dionysius surren- dered, himself and his friends retiring to Corinth ; while two thousand mer- cenaries of the garrison engaged in the service of Timoleon. This final expul- sion of Dionysius took place fifty years after the rise of his father, and four after the landing of Timoleon in Sicily. (b. c. 343.||||». Timoleon remained master of a city, the largest of all in the Grecian settle- ments ; but almost a desert through the multitudes slain, or driven into banish- ment in successive revolutions. So great, it is said, was the desolation, that the horses of the cavalry grazed in the market place, while the grooms slept at their east on the luxuriant herbage. The winter was passed in assigning de- ■erted lands and houses as a provision to the few remaining Syracusans of tlie Corinthian party, and to the mercena- ries instead of pay, which the general had not to give. In winter, when Gre- cian warfare was slackened or inter- rupted, the possession of good houses would, doubtless, be gratifying ; but to men unused to peaceful labour, lands without slaves and cattle were Uttle worth, and it was necessary in the spring to find them some profitable employ- ment. Unable sufl^iently to supply the wants of his soldiers from any Grecian enemy, Timoleon sent one thousand men into the territory belonging to Cartha^, and gathered thence abundance of spoil. The measure may seem rash, but he probably knew that an invasion was preparing, and that quiescence would Aot avert the storm, while a rich booty would make his soldiers meet it better. The Carthaginians landed in Sicily. Their force is slated at seventy thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; while Timoleon could only muster three thou- sand Syracusans, and nine thousand mercenaries. Nevertheless, he advanced to meet them in their own possessions, and, by the union of admirable conduct with singular good fortune, won a glo- rious victory, which was soon followed by an honourable peace. Timoleon, professing to be the libe- rator of Sicily, next directed his arms against the various chiefs or tyrants, who held dominion in the towns. In this he may probably have been actuated by a sincere hatred of such governments ; but he frequently seems to have little consulted the wishes of the people, whose deliverer he declared himself. Most of the smaller chiefs withdrew ; the more powerful resisting, were conquered, and being given up to their political adver- saries, were put to death, — in some cases with studied cruelty. Among the vic- tims was Hicetes, who was submitted, with his whose family, to the judgment of that mixed multitude, now called the Syracusan people, and all were put to death. There is much appearance that Hicetes deserved his fate; but what shall we say of the people, which doomed to death his unoffending wife and daughters; and what of the ge- neral who, holding little less than ab- solute authority over his followers, re- ferred such a matter to the decision of such a body ? Having every where established for Syracuse and for himself a superin* tending authority, which rested on the support of a prevailing party, like the controul of Athens or Lacedaemon over their allies, Timoleon sought to restore good order, abundance, and population, to the long afflicted island. Syracuse was still very thinly peopled, and it was torn by mutual jealousy between the remnant of the ancient Syracusans, and the nu- merous mercenaries and foreign adven- turers, who had been rewarded for their services with lands and houses, and ad- mission to all the rights of citizens. At one time the struggle ripened to a civil war, of which we know not the cir- cumstances or the bsue, but, probably, it was suppressed without the ruin of either party. At once to supply the void in the city, and to strengthen his government by a body of adherents who owed their all to him, Timoleon invited colonists from Greece, and settled at one time four thousand families on the Syracusan territory, and on a neigh- bouring plain of great extent and fer- tility no less than ten thousand. Similar measures were adopted in many of the other cities, under his controul. He revised the ancient laws of Syracuse, and restored them with amendments skilfully adapted to the altered state of the com- monwealth. But to amalgamate into an united people so many bodies of men of various interests, and mostly trained to war and violence, was a work only to be accomplished by the enei^ of one able man; and in accomphshmg that work, Timoleon was both enabled and obliged, by the lawless habits of his followers, to exercise an authority not less arbitrary than that of any tjrrant he had overthrovra. In one most im- portant particular, he is superior, not only to those chiefs, to Gelon and Dio- nysius, and to all who ever held like power in Sicily, but perhaps, to all, with the single exception of Washington, who has ever risen to the highest power in times of tumult : for he appears to have directed his endeavours honestly and wisely to the object, not of establish- ing a dynasty of princes, but of so settling the government, and training the people, that they should be able after his death to govern themselves without an arbitrary leader. He died highly honoured and generally beloved, and for many years after his death the whole of Sicily continued in unusual quiet and growing prosperity. Yet, in doing justice to the great qualities of Timoleon, and the sincerity of his leal for the public good, we cannot but own, that he was unscrupulous in the choice of means, even beyond the ordinary laxity of poHtical morality in Greece, and that his fame is tarnished by some acts of afrocious cruelty, and of gross injustice. Chapter VIII. Of Greece^ from the peace which fol- lowed the battle of Mantineia, to the destruction of Thebes, by Alexander the Macedonian. Sect. I. — ^The institutions of Lycurgus had impressed on his people a com- pletely artificial character. By stimu- lating some feelings and principles to excess, and almost eradicating others, it had turned every thought and pas-» sion to the one pursuit of national aggrandisement. The sagacity of the author was great, and the scheme for awhile attained its end. But man's vsris- dom is foolishness, when, instead of tak- ing his fellows as their Maker formed them, and endeavouring to favour the nappy development of their whole na- ture by reason and conscience, he under- takes to make them the mere creatures of a system, and determines by an arbi- trary standard what virtues he will cul- tivate, and what vices admit. In its best times the system of Lycurgus promoted neither happiness nor goodness. But when foreign command and distant war- fare had rendered large communication with strangers unavoidable, the Spartan virtues gave way to foreign vices, but the Spartan vices kept their hold ; avarice and corruption were no longer aliens, but pride, cruelty, contempt of man- kind were as prevalent as ever. Nay, the latter feeling had a wider field than when the system was new ; for the same disdain and jealousy, with which the early Lacedaemonians were wont to view the wretched Helots, were lavished by the few who latterly monopolized the Spartan name on all their unprivileged fellow-citizens. Hence the internal weak- ness which, when Lacedaemon was at the highest, enabled a people hitherto undistinguished, to strike her down never more to rise. The greatness of Athens rested on a diffJerent footing. Favoured by circumstances and situation, she had early outstripped her neighbours in peace- ful arts, in civilization and intelligence. The wisdom of Theseus had laid the foundation of good government, which was built upon by Solon. Less inge- nious, less original, less elaborately sys- tematic, the views of Solon were juster and more sober than those of Lycurgus. He did not attempt to new create his people, but simply to moderate their dissensions, restrain their injurious pas- sions, and open a fair field to the growth and exercise of ability and virtue. Good order was so far established that civil disturbance was more rare, and life and property secured, though very imper- fectly, yet better than in any other Gre- cian city ; both speech and action were singularly free ; the career of ambition was open to all, and its prizes splendid. The fruits of this system were con- siderable mitigation of party-rancour; humanity of manners greater than was usual in Greece, and extending even to the kinder treatment of slaves ; an un- paralleled development of the national intellect, displaying itself in every channel both of action and speculation ; a patriotic pride and attachment, less bigoted and less founded in contempt of others, but not less warm than that of the Lacedaemonians. These merits rested not, like those of the Lacedaemo- nians, on unvarying conformity to the institutions which had nursed them, but rather on the habits resulting from free I9f GIv£<£C£« GIvRECE* 1«S i' . ■Bd reeukr government yti not identi- fied with any ptrticular form ; and, above all, on this «me great safeguard against gross abuse, that the people were accus- tomed to exercise a legal, peaceable, and effectual control over the administration. The city was twice taken ; the first time abandoned and destroyed; the second, entliralled to a tyrannical oligarchy, that purchased the privilege of unlimited op- pression by keeping it subject to La- oedsmon ; yet, on both occasions, it soon recovered freedom and greatness. When the might of Lacedaemon once was broken, and her hitherto inviolate territory invaded, though the occupa- tion was short, and the city was not taiken, she never recovered from the blow. The one state may be compared to an engine of vast {wwer, but limited to a single mode of action, and unable to restore itself when the springs are strained, or its play impeded : the other to a living body, containing an energy which enables it to repair the damage of accident or disease, and adapt its con- stitution to every change of circumstance. When Thebes had humbled Lacedaemon, it seemed as if its task were done : it had risen to empire by the accidental pro- duction of one great man, with some able coadjutors, and it sunk with the master- mind which had raised it But great men were the constant growth of Athens, and by the ability of its statesmen, and the intelligence and resources of its peo- ple, it became again, and long continued, the first city of Greecellh But though Athens had now recovered its importance, in so many changes the character of its government and people had grievously suffered. The most perfect state of the Athenian con- stitution was probably that which fol- lowed the reform of Cleisthenes : ajl after changes seem to have been for the worse. In every country there are certain ad- vantages of education and habits which tend to foster that general liberality of conduct and feeling, which is emphati- cally said to mark the character of a gentleman. It is not, however, where excessive privileges are attached to rank and wealth, that this character is chiefly found ; for in such states the privileged caste, thinking their superiority enough attested by the accidents of situation and the outward polish of manners, are apt to neglect the more essential ornaments of courtesy, generosity, and tandour, or, observing those virtues to- wards their equals, are yet prone to treat their poorer countrymen with harshness and injustice. Of Grecian oligarchies by far the best regulated was the Lacedaemonian ; and here we have seen the tyranny of the Spar- tans as a body : but in most others, besides the general oppression of the go- vernment, the people suffered without redress, from the rapine, or brutal licen- tiousness of powerful individuals. The case was different in Athens. The law was equal, and the courts were popularly constituted; and though personal and family interest might sometimes screen an ordinary delinquent, it seldom pro- tected a criminal whose trespass was of a nature to provoke extensive indignation. The only road to greatness was through the favour of the people, by commu- nication with whom all important public business was transacted ; and thus controlled by law, by opinion, and by frequent intercourse with all classes, the noble Athenian was prevented from indulging a tyrannical haughtiness. The same causes which checked in him the besetting vices of over-powerful nobih- ties, were stimulants to exercise the vir- tues becoming his station ; for being un- able to enforce deference by terror, and equally unable to decline the jurisdiction of public opinion, and rest his credit on the suffrage of a narrow circle of equals, the only way to make his rank respected was by a suitable superiority in accom- plishments and dignity of character. To men thus prepared distinguished birth was a ready introduction to political suc- cess ; for the Athenians dwelt too fondly on the ancient glories of their country, to be without partiality towards the de- scendants of their heroes. Hence, lone after the highest offices were open to all, we find political leaders mostly men of family, and universally of liberal educsr tion. But a chan^ became visible after the death of Pencles. The prevailing character of the poor citizens who lived idle on the bounty of the state has l)een described, (p. 50,) and these, by their numbers, and frequent attendance, held far too great a weight in the assembly. As pensioners on the public they were eager to promote a large revenue and a larg« expenditure : as light-minded idlers, they were ever watching for amusement : as coarsely educated persons, they were little solicitous about the refinement of the sources whence that amusement came. For them the veiy orator was t man like Cleon, who would squeeze the tributaries, lavish the produce in addi- tional shows and sacrifices, and raise laughter alternately by his railings against the most respectable characters, and by his own detected presumption and folly. It is probably from the preva- lence of such as Cleon, that we are to date the formation of an aristo- cratical party in Athens, completely dis- tinct from the old oligarchicaJ. By the oligarchical party may be understood those who wished for a constitution placing all power in the high-bom and wealthy Few ; and their last con- siderable efforts were in the govern- ments of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. By the aristocratical, those are meant who, without hostility to the democratical constitution, wished to keep the administration, as formerly, in men whose influence rested on rank, ability, and character, and who were fitted to advise and lead, instead of flat- tering and following the people. The earlier struggle was between the rich and the not rich, and the object was to determine the constitution; the latter, between the poor and the not poor, the educated and tlie uneducated, and the object to settle the administration. The present application of the word aristo- cratical is not according to the most popular usage, in which it is made nearly synonymous with oligarchical; but it comes nearer to the original meaning of the word, and it also enables us to express a distinction which other- wise we could not convey in a single termjjk. OHne aristocratical party thus under- stood the first decided head was the un- fortunate Nicias. His opponent Cleon had many successors, but in the latter part of the Peloponnesian war the strug- gle between the aristocratical interest and the demagogues gave way in great mea- sure to the revived contest between oli- garchy and democracy. After the war, when democracy was re-established, it still slept for a considerable time. While Thrasybulus lived, his merit was so great, his services so recent, and his attachment to the interest of the people so unques- tioned, that no permanent opposition to his influence could be maintained. Even after his death the situation of Athens was long so critical as to check the ca- pricious temper of the Many, and incline them to be guided by men of ability and character. Among these, the principal were Conon, Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias, who were generally employed in the most important commands, and whose conduct brought to the Athenian government the reputation of liberality and moderation, as well as capacity. Of this we have seen an instance in the measures of Timotheus at Corcyra. The states of Greece were never able to maintain themselves securely in indepen* dence, and tiie maritime and commercial cities especially suffered from the want of a powerful superintending govern- ment ; for the JEge&n sea swarmed with pirates, and not only with individual plunderers, but with the vessels of pira- tical states. From these the coasts and islands had formerly been guarded by the fleets of Athens, but they had been made to pay so dearly for their safety, that they gladly fransferred their obem- ence to Lacedaemon. Its protection how- ever proving full as oppressive, and appa- rently less effectual, it was not without satisfaction that they saw the command of the sea again transferred from Lace- daemon to Athens. The power of Athens deterred resistance, and promised pro- tection ; and the liberal conduct of its officers invited confidence. The evils of Lacedaemonian supremacy, and of inde- pendence, had been more recently felt than those of Athenian empire ; which, accordingly, revived with the willing consent of most of its subjects. But the Athenian people, though schooled by past misfortune and present danger, to temporary good l)ehaviour, were at bottom yet more unfit for domi- nion than before. In so many revolu- tions the class of gentlemen had been much diminished, by death, by confisca- tion, and by gradual impoverishment. Many, who had previously only struggled to preserve the legitimate influence of superior education, and habits formed by exemption from the necessity of con- stant attention to gain, had now become decided oUgarchists, perhaps accom- plices in the enormities of the Thirty; while those on whom the proscription of these despots had fallen heaviest, were the men. of all the most valuable in a state like Athens, who united popular man- ners and principles favourable to equa- lity, with distinguished birth, fortune, breeding, and accomplishment. The number of the poorer citizens had been increased, and the standard of their taste and intellect lowered, by the large admis- sion of slaves and foreigners, after the fall of the tyrants : the remembrance of past sufferings exasperated their indis- criminate je^ousy of all who claimed superiority on the ground of talents or 124 GHSECE* GREECE. 126 i '[ t ■ '■ « Mrviccs, or on any but the mere arbi- trtiy favour of the people. The field was, therefore, more open than ever for new Cleons to arise, to flatter the people DV professions of unlimited devotion, and to rail at those as disaffected, who strove to guide and really to serve it. Awhile 8u5i pickthanks were kept in check by the dangerous situation of the common- wealth ; but when the fear of Thebes «nd Lacedaemon was over, they played their part more boldly and suocessfully. They were eagerly heard when they asked why it was that the fleets brought home no treasure, and why any city was allowed to have ships and commerce that would not pay tribute as of old. Extortion rose higher than ever ; persons of no ability or character were often sent out with unlimited powers as commissioners to levy money ; complaints from the allies ensuing without end, were disregarded, till, at length, about five years after the battle of Mantineia, the states of Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, and Cos, the first tl»ee among the most powerful allies of Athens, joined in declaring that they would henceforth protect their commerce with their own fleets, and wanting no help from the Athenian navy, would pay no tribute for its support, (b. c. 358.) This declaration was received by the Athenians with mingled anger and alarm, and war was voted against the rebellious allies : but little had been done in pur- suance of this decree, when the people heard the still more alarming news that Euboea had revolted, the most important foreign dependency of Athens, and the principal source from which its inhabi- tants were fed. A petty war had been going on in the island, and one of the parties had called in Theban aid : a Boeotian force had been welcomed in Chalcis and Eretria, the two principal towns; and though there was everywhere an Athenian party, the revolters were clearly the stronger throughout the island. In the general dismay Timothcus came forward : " What ! " he said, " When the Thebans are in the islands, do you dehberate ? Will you not fill the sea with your ships ? Will you not break up the assembly and hurry on board ? '* ifie people were roused. Only five days after the Thebans landed m Euboea the Athenians were there, and within thirty the Thebans capitulated to quit the island. No executions followed, and the affsdrs of Euboea were wisely and liberally settled, probably by Timo- fheus. It was agreed that every town should acknowledge as formerly the su- premacy of Athens, and pay a stated tribute ; that each should keep a minister resident in Athens, to represent it in the congress of the allies, and to b€ its organ of communication with the Athenian assembly ; but that for its in- ternal affairs each should preserve its former constitution, and its independent administration. The rejoicing in Athens was scarcely over when a memorable opposition arose from a new quarter. .. Macedonia had early been united in a kingdom of considerable extent. Here, as at first in the states of Greece, the chief power had been in the landholders, with the king as their military leader and political head , but both the whole country and the lordships into which it was divided being larger, the pro- prietors, instead of assembling in cities, had separately ruled their vassals on their own estates. This gave a com- pletely different character to the go- vernment and its revolutions. The great men felt their importance more as individuals and less as members of a class ; they had less facility of combi- nation, and less disposition to combine ; and when they did so, it was rather as allies united to promote each other's se- veral objects of ambition, than as persons bound together by a common interest, and pursuing a common end in the aggrandisement of their order. Hence, amidst much turbulence and many con- tests for the crown, the form and spirit of the government altered little. In its leading features,the Macedonian govern- ment was like that established through- out Europe by the northern conquerors. It is that into which rude nations natu- rally fall, with more or less of freedom and good order according to the temper of the people ; and it is one in which rude nations only can continue. As civifization advances, and large cities are formed, a popular power necessarily arises, in opposition to the great proprietors. In the kingdoms of Europe, the monarch has frequently united with the commons to beat down the excessive power of the nobles ; and, when this was accom- pHshed, has again joined the fallen nobility to crush the spirit of freedom which was rising in the people. In England the same game was played, but unsuccessfully; for, by the time when the crown had triumphed over the nobility, the spirit and power of the commons had struck root so deeply that in the long and perilous struggle which ensued, a settlement favourable to popular liberty was effected after many revolutions. The Macedonian Kingdom was not ripe for such a series of changes. The people were yet dis- persed, and little civilized; the only large trading towns were Grecian colo- nies, whose inhabitants exercised repub- lican government within their own ter- ritories, and held themselves aUies rather than countrymen of the Macedonians, and tributaries rather than liege subjects of their king. The manners of the Macedonians continuing to suit their government, the government stood un- changed. *„ ,. V, A Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, had much increased the resources of his kingdom, and prepared the way for Us advance in civilization ; but in the four- teenth year of his reign (b. c. 399), he was assassinated, and the fhuts of his able administration perished in seven years of confusion which followed. The crown was bandied from one to another, and most of the claimants perished by assassination ; at length Amyntas gained the kingdom, and held it for twenty- four years. During this period, he was once expelled by the lUyrians, a predatory nation on his western border, and re- stored by the Thessalians ; another time, but we know not whether before or after, he was nearly expelled by the Thessa- lians. He died a year after the battle of Leuctra, leaving three sons, Alexan- der, Perdiccas, and Philip. Then came another period of war and disputed suc- cession. Alexander was murdered; Perdiccas fell five years after in battle against the Illyrians ; and when the reign of Philip began (b. c. 359), the Illyrians commanded the country, the Paeonians were threatening invasion, and two rival claimants were preparing to renew the struggle for the throne, Pausanias by Thracian, Argseus by Athenian support. The young king (he was only twenty- three years old) was not unequalto the difficulties of his situation. The powers of his mind and the graces of his person were both uncommon ; and his natural gifts had been improved to the utmost by an excellent Grecian edu- cation, his boyhood having been passed at Thebes, and, as it is said, in the house of Epaminondas. His eloquence was al- lowed, even by the Athenians, to be both pure and forcible, and his manners sin^- larly polished. Phihp vigorously applied himself to reanimate his disheartened subjects ; he called frequent assemblies of the Macedonian people, and roused their courage by eloquent exhortations ; he reviewed and exercised his forces ; and introduced the Grecian discipline of the phalanx, which had hitherto been unknown among them. Having pro- cured by negotiation a suspension uf the other attacks, he went against the Athenian troops, who had marched to set up Argaeus. These he defeated, and reduced them to a capitulation, by which they agreed to deliver to him the Macedonian exiles whom they had brought with them, and to retire. To win the favour of Athens was most im- portant ; and the temper of Phihp as well as his policy was favourable to con- ciliation. He treated all the Athenian prisoners who had been taken in the battle with the greatest kindness, dis- missed them unransomed, recompensed their losses, and provided conveyance for them to Athens. He voluntanly abandoned all claim to Amphipolis, which, since they lost it, had ever been coveted by the Athenians ; and he thus obtained peace with Athens*. He then attacked his other enemies, reduced the Paeonians to submission, and compelled the Illyrians to accept of peace on terms dictated by himself. All this he accom- plished before he had reigned a year. ^ We have seen that at the peace be- tween Athens and Lacedaemon, in the tenth year of the Peloponnesian war, it was agreed that Amphipolis should again be subject to Athens, but the Amphipolitans refused submission. Since that time the city had generaUy continued independent, though the Athe- nians always claimed dominion over it In the year before Philip's accession, it was connected with Olynthus, and the Athenian general, Timotheus, failed in an attempt to recover it Next year, we find it, apparently, under the power of Macedonia. That it should have been forcibly conquered during the interval, either by Philip or his brother, is Utile likely, considering the then condition of their kingdom. But Amphipolis was divided by hostile factions, severally devoted to Athens, Olynthus, and Mace- donia ; and it may be that the Mace- donian party, supported, perhaps, by timely aid from Philip, had gained the upper hand, and then proceeded to • It has been supposed, that Philip not only made peace with the Athenians, but entered into amanM with them a^in«t Olynthus ; but there seems to bf no sufficieat authority for this belief. 126 GREECE. GREECE. 127 J it by maintaining a body of lus troops in the city. To remove a su^ect of quarrel with (he Athenians, who sup- ported Argaeus chiefly in the hope of recovering Amphipolis, Philip declared that city independent. The garrison being withdrawn, the friends of Mace- donia could no longer maintain them- selves, and the Olynthian party reco- vering the ascendant, employed the resources of the state in annoying the neighbouring kingdom. In consequence, Philip, after his lllyrian campaign, be- sieged and took Amphipolis. The con- duct of the conqueror was milder than usual in Greece ; his most decided op- ponents only suffered banishment, and the constitution of the commonwealth remained unaltered, while the adminis- tration passed into the hands of the Macedonian party. But a quarrel arose between Philip and the Athenians for the sovereignty of Amphipolis. Philip urged that he had fairly won it ; that the Athenians, not possessing it, had suffered no injury ; and that it was just that he and not the Athenians should enjoy the fruit of his toil and dan^r. The Athenians contended that PhUip had procured their friendship at a critical moment by renouncuig all claim to Am- phipolis ; that tlie renunciation was illusory, unless made in their favour, and intended to bind him to assist them in its recovery, or, at least, to debar him from impeding them ; and that if he had conquered it for any purpose except to restore it to the Athenians, he had made its recovery not only difficult, but, while they continued in friendship with him, impossible. A compromise was at- tempted. The Macedonian town of Pvdna had revolted to the Athenians. The time of this revolt is quite uncer- tain. If it took place, as Mr. Mitford supposes, during the continuance of friendship between Philip and the Athe- nians, it was enough to put them entirely in the wrong, and to deprive them of all claim to the restoration of Amphi- polis. But there appears to be no evi- dence which can fix it to that particular period, or exclude ihe supposition of its having happened l)efore the peace. However, it was secretly proposed that Philip should ^ive up AmphipoUs, and receive Pydna m return. The arrange- ment was not concluded, and finally war ensued, soon ^er the reduction of Euboea. (b. c. 358). The Olynthian confederacy had re- vived since the decline of Isc^dadmon. Most of its towns were founded on ter- ritory originally belonging to Macedo- nia, and all had, at a former time, been subject to Athens ; its further extension could take place only at the expense of one power or the other ; and it was only from the navy of Athens or the land force of Macedonia that any present danger could be feared. There was ground enough for jealousy and rivalry with both ; and in the approaching con- test between Macedonia and Athens, it was uncertain what part Olynthus would take, but certain, that its friend- ship would be highly valuable to either. Both negotiated with the Olynthians; but Philip obtained their favour by the Eromise that he would take Potidaea 'om the Athenians and give it to them. Accordingly, the Olynthian forces pro- ceeded with liim against Pydna and Potidaea, both of which were in the pos- session of the Athenians. Both towns submitted, and Potidsea was added to the Olynthian league ; but Philip pro- tected the Athenian garrison, and after treating them with the greatest courtesy, sent them home. In the next spring, Philip's attention was occupied by the affairs of Thessaly. The Tagus Alexander of Pherae had re- cently ^en assassinated by his wife's brothers, Tisiphonus and Lycophron. Since the settlement of the affairs of Thessaly by Thebes, which has already been rmted, the Tagus had again suc- ceeded in assuming tyrannical power ; and his government was so hated, and Grecian morality so loose, that his mur- derers became for the moment generally popular, and succeeded unopposed to his office. Their sway, however, though less able, soon grew to be as arbitrary as his. Discontent became general, and the opposing party called in Philip, whose family had ancient connexion in Thessaly ; *' and he,** says the historian, " entering Thessaly, overcame the ty- rants, and, lestonng freedom to the cities, gave proof of great good will to the Thessalians ; wherefore, in his after actions, he had them always as his zealous auxiUaries, and not only he, but Alexander his son." (Diodorus.) Meantime, the Athenians had carried on the war against their revolted allies with Uttle success. The chief com- mander was generally Chares, a bold and active officer, but of Umited capacity, careless, dissolute, and corrupt Pubhc money and private fortune he squandered alike in his own licentious pleasures, and in bribery to the most popular ora- tors, and to tne poor citizens who sub- sisted by attending the courts and the assembhr ; and so strong was the party which by such arts he managed to retain, that he was able, as if in defiance of public opinion, to carry about with him, when in command abroad, a train of musicians, dancers, and harlots. The Athenians now would rarely consent to go on foreign service: those who had property or lucrative concerns would attend to their business at home ; those who had not would live at the expense of the state in idleness, or with no em- ployment but sitting in the courts. The Athenian armies were, therefore, prin- cipally mercenary, while the wasteful, expenditure at home left but little money for their support ; and we may easily imagine the degree of obedience and efficiency which could be expected from a hired army of strangers, with supplies at best very insufficient, of which a great part was usually lavished on the private pleasures of the general. Chares made an unsuccessful attack on Chios, in which Chabrias, who was serving under him, fell. On another occasion, Iphicrates and Timotheus were joined with him in command, and when his rashness would have brought on an action by sea under very disadvantageous circumstances, they overruled him. Chares, on his return, accused his col- leagues of corruption, and it seems that they were both displaced, and Timotheus was fined so heavily that he was obliged to retire from Athens, and passed his remaining years at Chalcis in Euboea. Chares remained alone in command, but without the means of paying his soldiers. In this emergency, though Athens was at peace with Persia, Chares accepted the offers of Artabazus, the rebel satrap of Bithynia, and, joining him with all his forces, enabled him to defeat the royal army. By this the present wants of the armament were supplied, but Athens incurred the enmity of Persia; and, hearing that a powerful Phoenician fleet was preparing to assist the revolted allies, the Athenians, in the third year of the war, hastily concluded a peace, resign- ing all claim to obedience and tribute from Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and Byzan- tium. (B. C. 355.) Sect. II.— The institution of the Council of Amphictyons was one of the earliest events in Greek histor}'. It is impossible now to ascertain the date of its origin ; and even the name and nation of its founder have been dif- ferently represented by conflicting tra- ditions. One account attributes the institution to Amphictyon, a Thessalian prince ; another to Acrisius, a king of Argos. It originally consisted of depu- ties from twelve Thessalian tribes ; and (as it seems, though there is some diffi- culty and confusion on this point) the modem states of Greece possessed no direct power in it, beyond the vote to which tney might happen to be entitled as descendants of some of the original constituents. Thus the Dorians were entitled to representatives in the Coun- cil ; but in tlie election of these repre- sentatives, several Dorian states con- curred on equal terms, Lacedaemon possessing no direct power beyond that which was enjoyed by the insignificant towns of Dorium and Cytinium, in Doris. The number of tribes repre- sented had probably varied ; the pri- vilege having been, at different times, taken away from some, and bestowed on others. If the Council was at first an independent Thessalian confederacy, its existence is a remarkable proof of the ascendency of the Thessalian and Hellenic tribes at the time : but, if the institution be really owing to Acrisius, it can be considered as no more than a political engine, devised by a powerful monarch of the Peninsula, for the pur- pose of consolidating his influence in the North. The Council met at Delphi in the spring, and at Anthela, near Thermo- pylae (or Pylae) in the autumn. Ori- ginally the meetings were held at the latter place only. The jurisdiction of the Council extended to the national reUgion, and, in particular to inforcing due reverence to Apollo, the Delphian god, as well as to disputes connected with international law. The deputies took an oath, the substance of which is still preserved in an oration of iEschines. They swore " never to raze any of the Amphictyonic cities, nor to prohibit them from fountains, in war or peace ; and, if any one transgress this, to make war upon him, and to raze his cities : and if any one despoil what belongs to the god (the Delphian Apollo), or be privy to or devise aught against that which is in the temple, to punish him with foot, and hand, and voice, and all my might." There was annexed to the oath a heavy curse on those who trans- gressed it. That part of the oath which r 128 GRKECS. I; k, Klates to the property laid up in the temple, derived its importance from the circumstance that many princes and ■tates, in early times, deposited rich offerings there, retaining nevertheless some mterest in these deposits, and posteMuig distinct treasuries in the templ^ lijjrof the tribes sent two deputies, m Hieromnemon and a Pylagroras. The former, whose peculiar office was to attend to the questions connected with religion, was appointed by lot for the whole year. The Pylagoras was chosen for each meeting, and had more uncon- fined functions. Each of them however ▼oted on all matters supposed to be of general interest In early times, the tribes sent only a Pylagoras. It is not very easy to reconcile the different ac- counts we obtain from Greek authors who mention these details incidentally: but it seems most probable that the states composing a single tribe, as for instance the Ionian, sent each their deputies, and that these deputies elected from among themselves the one Ionian Hieromnemon and Pylagoras. It seems certain that none but the Hieromnemon ■nd Pylagoras voted : the other depu- ties probabW joined in the debates. One of the Hieromnemons presided in the Obuncil. The only individual said to have been punished by the Council was Ephialtes the Malian, who guided the Persians over the mountain-pass by which, in Xerxes's invasion, they turned the position of Thermopylae. Athens, as a member of the Ionian, and Lacedaemon, as one of the Dorian tnhe, were represented in the Council of Amphictyons : but, while they had been paramount, the poUtical power of the Amphictyons had been but small, since those proud commonwealths would not be controlled by the votes of obscure tribes in the North of Greece. But the Thel)ans, holding, at their rise to empire, a leading influence in Thessaly, appear to have considered that they might di- rect the Council and make it an useful instrument. Accordingly, they prose- cuted Lacedaemon for the seizure of the Cadmeia, and obtained a decree con- demning that state to a fine of 500 talents, upwards of 1 00,000/. Had this award been made at the time, its justice could not have been disputed: but, being deferred till the crime was old, when arms had been appealed to in the inter- val, and signal vengeance taken on the aggressors ; suid pronounced by a body which, when the guilt was unpunished and the power of tl>« guilty unbroken, had not ventured even to remonstrate, — ^it was neither just, wise, nor manly. The Lacedaemonians refusing payment, after a certain time the fine was doubled, according to the Amphictyonic law, and it still remained unpaid. The Phocians were next attacked. To hold them in obedience had ever been a favourite object with Thebes, and had been warmly resisted by the Pho- cians, protected sometimes by Athens, sometimes by Lacedaemon. TheThebans now hoped to obtain a decree of the Amphictyons which might enable them to gratify their ambition under the dis- guise of religion, and which might de- prive the Phocians of those allies who, otherwise, would arm in their cause. The pretext was furnished by a doubtful tradition, that the rich Cirrhaean plain, a most valuable tract in the rugged country of Phocis, had anciently been consecrated by the Amphictyons to the Delphian Apollo, under a heavy curse on whoever should convert it to any human use. The Amphictyons met at Delphi ; the direction of the temple was theirs; and they were considered the especial protectors of the worship of the god. But the truth of the consecration was uncertain; the land in question had been used, time out of mind, by the Phocians, and was necessary to the support of the existing population ; and, though every Amphictyon was bound to demand the execution of the Amphic- tyonic law, more especially against im- piety, no notice had ever been taken of the alleged profanation. Nevertheless, the Thebans being supported by the Thessalians, inveterate enemies to the Phocians for ages, a decree was passed, importing that the Phocians must im- mediately cease to use the sacred land, and must pay a heavy fine. Philomelus was the first among the Phocians by the union of birth, riches, and capacity. He excited his country- men to vigorous resistance, impeaching the justice of the sentence, and showing that it was beyond their means to comply with its exactions. He further asserted that the superintendence cH the temple at Delphi belonged of right to the Phocians, and not to the Am- phictyons : and he declared that if they would make him autocrator-general, he would not only repel the present aggression, but vindicate their ancient rights. Being elected to the office ha GREECE. 129 desired, he immediately went to Lace- daemon, which was interested, as well as Phocis, in opposing the Amphictyons, and he obtained from that state a sum of money which enabled him to raise a powerful body of mercenaries. He made himself master of the city and temple : the Boeotians and Thessalians exclaimed against his impiety ; but he proclaimed to all that his purpose was to recover the rights which had been usurped from his countrymen, and that he was resolved scrupulously to respect the sacred trea- sury. The Athenians, Lacedaemonians, and some other states, declared them- selves in favour of the Phocians: the Locrians were the first to act against them, and they were supported by the Brjeotians and Thessalians. Philomelus maintained the war with great ability, and most commonly with success, till he fell in a partial defeat of his army, in the second year of the contest. Philomelus was succeeded by his brother Onomarchus, a man not his inferior in talent or energy, but appa- rently of a more violent and unscru- pulous character. His administration l)egan with the execution of many poli- tical adversaries and the confiscation of their goods ; on what provocation and with what degree of justice does not ap- pear. The native strength of Phocis vva^ very inadequate to its defence against the Thebans ; a mercenary force was necessary, but money was want- ing to support it ; the scanty resources of Phocis were nearly exhausted, and the Delphian treasury was at hand. Onomarchus yielded to the tempta- tion, and trespassed largely on the sacred treasury for the pay of his mer- cenaries ; and the governments both of Athens and Lacedaemon are accused of having shared in the robbery. He soon carried his arms successfully into Boeotia, and won there the town of Orchomenus, which had been restored since its destruction by the Thebans. Meanwhile the power of Philip had been increasing. The Thracian, Paeoni- an, and Illyrian princes had combined to attack him ; but Philip, anticipating their purpose, had fallen on them un- prepared, and reduced them to submis- sion. An Athenian armament, how- ever, being sent to the Hellespont, Kersobleptes, the Thracian king, again revolted. He was, probably, little friendly either to Athens or Macedonia, but ready, in the weak and divided state of his kingdom, to take part with which- ever seemed at the moment most able to protect or to annoy. He now ceded to Athens all the towns of the Thracian Chersonese except Cardia; and to secure their acquisition, and at the same time to provide for a number of citizens, the Athenians sent colonists to each. Met hone was the only Macedonian port which now acknowledged the au- thority of Athens. It was therefore the general refuge for the Athenian party expelled from Pydna, Potidaea. and the other towns recently united to .Macedonia and Olynthus; it was also the only town on a wide extent of coast, whose commerce was protected by the Athenian navy from pirates, or even safe from the depredations often com- mitted by the Athenian commanders themselves ; and w ith these advantages it had grown populous, rich, and strong. Relying on its strength, it ventured to provoke ihe king of Macedonia by re- ceiving and abetting his enemies. Philip besieged the town : the resistance was vigorous, but in the end the place capi- tulated, and Philip granted a safe con- duct for the people to depart, carrying each only the clothes he wore. He then demohshed the town, and portioned out the territory to Macedonians. In the course of the siege Philip lost an eye by an arrow shot. He next proceeded to the assistance of his Thessalian friends against Lyco- phron, the tyrant of Pherae. The party which Philip supported was that con- nected with Thebes, and Lycophron, therefore, naturally looked for aid to the rising power of Phocis. Phayllus, the brother of Onomarchus, being sent to his assistance, was defeated by theThes- saUans, under Philip ; but Onomarchus himself, being assisted by Athens, en- tered Thessaly with a force, which, when joined by the adherents of Lycophron, was far supenor to that opposed to him. Philip was twice defeated, and reduced to such difficulty that it was only by the greatest exertions of military talent that he could effect his retreat into Macedo- nia. Onomarchus next invaded Boeotia, where he won a battle, and took the city of Coroneia. Soon after, Philip again entered Thessaly to assist his friends, and Onomarchus to aid Lycophron ; and a great battle was fought, in which the Phocians were completely defeated and their general slain. Three thou- sand were made prisoners, all of whom were executed as temple robbers, and the dead body of Onomarchus was GliEECE. I < t (I '. 110 ignommiouslv suspended on a cross. Mr. Mitford Thas discredited these cruel- ties, merely on the ground that they are not mentioned by any of the contempo- rary orators hostile to Philip. This, however, only proves that the Phocian cause was now unpopular, and that the most bloody vengeance on the profane and sacrilegious was rather considered a merit than a reproach. Philip was not cruel either b)^ character or by habitual policy ; but his humanity could some- times give way to his convenience, and in the present case the motives are ob- vious. The execution of the prisoners would be loudly called for by the Thes- salians of his army, who hated the Pho- eians as ancient enemies, as supporters of their tyrants, and as perpetrators of sacrilege ; and, while it gratified his warmest adherents, it would give to the Greeks in general a testimony of his zeal for religion, and incline them to ascribe to pietjr rather than ambi- tion his further interference in the affairs of Phocis. Lycophron surren- dered Pher» ; the influence of Philip prevailed through all Thessaly; his fame and popularity as the avenger of the gods became general in Greece; and to both these results there is reason to fear that the massacre of the Phocian prisoners much contributed, (b. c 352.) Phayllus succeeded his brother Ono- marchus ; and dying of disease within a year, was followed in his office by PhalaBCUs,the son of Onomarchus : but both parties were much exhausted, and the war went on languidly and indeci- sively. A diversion was occasioned for a while by a contest in Peloponne- sus. Megalopolis, originally founded by a party hostile to Lacedaemon, with the view of uniting all Arcadia against her, had ever since continued her enemy, and had t>een fitted by situation for a curb on her exertions, and a rampart of pro- tection to Messenia. The internal politics of this commonwealth may be illustrated by referring to some transactions already related oi Mantineia(p. 98 and 107). The city had been formed by collecting the in- habitants from many scattered villages, and uniting them in a democratical go- vernment ; a measure highly gratifying to the multitude, but displeasing to the landholders, who had been accustomed to hold dominion over them, when scattered. The landholders looked to Lacedaemon for restoration to their country-houses and their ancient ascen- dancy: the Many were devoted to Thebes, in veterately jealous of Lacedae- mon, and peculiarly bound by common interests and dangers to their neigh- bours of Messenia. The dispersion of the Megalopolitans was a necessary step to the reduction of Messenia, and the Lacedaemonians were the more encou- raged to the attempt by the knowledjje that they had a party among the Mesra- lopolitans. To procure tlie support of Athens to their design, they proposed to combine with it some other measures for the humiliation of Thebes, mostly just and beneficial. Such were the re- storation of Thespiae and Plataea, and the restitution of Oropus to Athens. The Athenians, allied with Lacedaemon and at war with Thebes, made no active opposition to the attempt; but they neither assisted it nor wished it success. The Lacedaemonians were aided by the Phocians, the Megalopolitans by the Thebans, Argians, and Messenians, and an active campaign ensued, but with no decisive result. New troubles had arisen in Euboea, and a Macedonian party was gaining ascendancy in the island. An Athenian force was sent thither under Phocion, a man remarkable in a corrupt age for singular integiity. He had risen to eminence as an officer under Chabrias, who, on one occasion, commissioned him to collect the tribute from the al- lies, and placed twenty triremes under his orders for that purpose. Phocion objected : "To meet enemies," he said, '* the force was insufficient; to visit friends, it was needlessly great." Chabrias allowed him to go with a sin- gle trireme. Such visits were dreaded by the subject states ; for, besides the tribute, the Athenian commanders com- monly exacted large presents both for themselves and their crews, who, if not gratified with a share in the spoil, would, on returning home, be formi- dable to their commanders as wit- nesses against them, and very possibly as judges. Phocion, probably, took little or nothing for himself. Assured of his own innocence, he had the less need to indulge the rapacity of his men ; and, even if gratified to the full, the ap- petite of a single crew was more easily glutted than that of twenty. Altoge- ther, he made his mission unusually acceptable, and numerous vessels of the allies voluntarily attended him home, bearing the full amount of tribute. He had since come forward as a speaker in the assembly ; though not eloquent, he GREECE. 131 was a singularly ready and acute debater, and his opinion carried weight from the known soundness of his jiidifment and the excellence of his character. On the present occasion, the favour of the higher classes towards Phocion was proved by their willingness to promote the success of his expedition, as well by money as l)y personal service. Many freely ensjagfed themselves as soldiers under him, both in the cavalry, which was their own peculiar province, and also in the heavy-armed foot ; and now, for the first time within memory, the expense of equipping ships of war was voluntarily undertaken by individuals. A battle was won, and' Euboea was, for the present time, secured to Athens. Since his successes in Thessaly, Philip had been employed, partly m repressing the turbulence of the sur- rounding barbarians, and brinjjing them completely under his dominion, partly in raising a naval force. In the latter effort he had succeeded so far, that he plundered the islands Imbros and Lemnos, the constant possessions of Athens, carried off a rich fleet of mer- chant vessels from Geraestus in Euboea, and even insulted the coast of Attica itself. The Olynthians, now becoming jealous of Philip's growing greatness, made a separate peace with Athens, in violation of theu* alliance with Mace- donia. Phihp made war on them, and they naturally sought the alliance of Athens. In ancient times, the first minister of Athens had commonly been the chief commander of her armies. Such were Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Thrasybulus. But now, though war continued to be almost as eonstant as before, it was not so univer- sal an occupation. Besides, in the course of the changes which we have been contemplating, the influence of personal consideration was much lessened, and that of oratory increased ; and hence a class of men arose who devoted all their attention to the cultivation of elo- quence and the art of managing the people, and who, being constantly pre- sent, could improve every opportunity, when the generals were on foreign ser- vice. The first specimen which we have seen of this class was Cleon ; and in his time the system was so imperfectly established, that he thought his eminence mcomplete till he had attained to mili- tary command, for which he was noto- nously unfit. But, in after times, the same line was taken by men of high ability and character, such as Caliistra- tus, whom Iphicrates requested to have for his colleague in command, that he might be assisted and supported by his eloquence and political capacity. Hence the connection described by Demo- sthenes, when there was " an orator Commander-in-chief, and a general under him ;" that is, an orator as political leader, directing the entei-prise to be undertaken and the officer to be em ployed, defending the conduct of his military friends, and providing supplies for the armament; while the general executed whatever project the assembly was persuaded to command. And hence it was necessary that every party should include both orators and military men ; for even when a commander was, like Phocion, an able speaker, he still wanted friends to support him in his absence. Demosthenes, who has been almost universally allowed to be the greatest master of eloquence in ancient or mo- dern times, was now a young man rising to eminence as a professional orator. In early youth he had inherited from his fa- ther a considerable fortune, but this he rapidly dissipated, and then, at the age of twenty-five, betook himselfto a profession by which many had risen to wealth and importance in Athens, that of writing speeches for suitors in the courts of Judicature. At the time now in ques- tion, he had become a leading speaker in the assembly, and had embarked himself in the party most hostile to Philip ; and, in spite of a disadvantageous voice and person, and an unamiable temper, he became, by the force of industry and ability, the first man of Athens, her most consummate orator, and most pre- vailing political leader. When the Olynthian ambassadors came, he was foremost in urging the people to ac- cept their alliance, and to assist them with promptitude and vigour. Large succours were voted, and embassies were sent to the different states of Peloponnesus to excite their fears of Philip's ambition, and to rouse them to resistance. These embassies were gene- rally unsuccessful ; and, thougli some troops were sent from Athens to Olyn- thus, it was long before the body of the succours voted arrived there. Mean- time, Philip had taken by force seme towns of the Olynthian confederacy, received the submission of others, and laid siege to Olynthus itselt The Olyn- K2 132 GK.£<£«(.yE* thians now expressed a wish to treat ; but Philip declared that either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia. If the Olynthians had been united, their force was amply sufficient for defence ; but there was in the town a strong Macedonian party, as was evidenced by five hundred horse, more than half the effective cavalry of the state, de- serting in a body. After some un- successful assaults, Philip was ad- mitted into the town by Euthycrates and Lasthenes, the leading men of the Macedonian party. Demosthenes im- putes their conduct to bribery ; but an opposition more friendly to a foreign enemy than to their ruling fellow-citizens was no new thing hi Grecian history ; and as there is much appearance that such a faction existed in Olynthus, it is pro- bably to party enmity that the conduct of Euthycrates and Lasthenes is to be ascribed; though, perhaps, as known friends of Philip, they may have pre- viously received from him favours which might give a pretext for the accusation of Demosthenes. Philip destroyed the town, and sold the greater part of the people into slavery. Tlie annihilation of a state command- ing the greater part of the Macedonian coast, and the acquisition of its rich pe- ninsulas and commercial towns, formed a great addition to the wealth, strength, and security of the conqueror. He was now at liberty to proceed either against the Athenian dependencies in Thrace, or against Eubota, where fresh troubles had broken out. Alarm was great in Athens. But Philip, with all his ambition, had much of pru- dence m his character, and something even of moderation. He had already extended his dominion far beyond its ancient limits ; and he was at present less anxious to push it further than to consolidate it, so that it should not fall to pieces on his death, or on any acci- dental reverse. He wished to civilize his old subjects, to accustom his new to obedience and attachment ; and to these objects peace would be highly conducive. There was a decree of the Athenians forbidding the reception of any herald or ambassador from Philip ; but he nevertheless found means to intimate that he was willing to make peace, and the offensive decree was reversed. It should seem that this took place rather before the fall of Olynthus, but Philip's conduct was not altered by that event The conclusion of peace was, however. delayed by new hopes arising to the Athenian war party from affairs in Phocis. By the long maintenance of an over whelming force of mercenaries, which was entirely at their command, the Pho- cian generals had attained a power al- most unlimited, insomuch that the con- temporary orators frequently style them tyrants. But the sacred treasury was now beginning to fail, and Phalaecus being unable to keep up to their former standard the zeal and number of his soldiers, an opposing party reared its head. Phalaecus was displaced and pro- secuted for sacrilege. The new admi- nistration sent ministers to Athens, and as an inducement to support them, they offered the possession of three small Phocian towns, valuable, not from their revenues but from their situation, which commanded the pass of Ther- mopylae, the readiest entrance for Philip into Southern Greece. The Athenian government had been aUied with the Phocian under Phalaecus ; but Phalae- cus had been also connected with La- cedapmon, while the new rulers, if they stood, would l)e solely dependent on Athens. Besides, if Athens took the part of Phalaecus, the administration might throw itself on the mercy of Philip or Thebes: whereas, if the offers made were accepted, the resources of Phocis would be at the disposal of Athens, and Thermopylae commanded by its troops. A force was sent to oc- cupy the towns ; but in the mean time Phalaecus recovered the ascendancy. Not unreasonably offended at the de- fection of his ally, he refused to give up the towns, and declared war against Athens. This news ended the hopes of the war party in Athens, and all con- curred in voting an embassy to treat of peace with Philip. The embassy was sent, consisting of ten persons, all distinguished either by rank or talent, one of whom was De- mosthenes. It brought back a very favourable report of Philip's disposi- tion towards peace. A negotiation would naturally tend to throw the ad- ministration into the hands of those who had originally been adverse to the war : but these were chiefly led by men of moderate character ; while Phocion, the most eminent of them all, was as rigid and unbending, as Demosthenes was pliant and unscrupulous; and hereon Demosthenes founded his plan for taking the business out of the hands GREECE. 133 \ of his opponents, and making his own party the peace-makers. Accordingly he now urged on the pacification with the greatest eagerness ; and magnifying to the utmost the danger of the state, he liastened the negotiation in a manner on which the timid among his ad- versaries would not venture, and to which the rigid would not stoop. Am- bassadors had previously been sent to the allies of Athens, to invite a oongress to deliberate on the conduct of war or negotiation with Philip ; and, before the return of the ambassadors, or the arrival of the deputies from the allies, Demosthenes obtained a vote, appoint- ing a day when the Athenian people were separately to debate on the terms of peace. The Synedri, or resident de- puties of the subject allies, met to con sider the matter : they voted a resolu- tion to be offered to the Athenian as- sembly, which strongly marks the sub- mission to which- they were reduced, and, in the present case, the sense of in- jury which they dared not more plainly express. " Since," it said, "the Athe- nian people are deliberating on a peace with Philip, but the ambassadors are not returned whom they sent through Greece to exhort the cities concerning the freedom of the Greeks, — it is re- solved by the allies, that, when the am- bassadors shall be returned, and shall have made their report to the Athe- nians and their allies, and two assem- blies shall have been held according to the laws, in which the Athenians may deliberate about the peace,— whatever the Athenian people may decree shall be as the common decree of the allies." The Macedonian ambassadors, how- ever, arrived, and without waiting for the return of the ministers from the cities, peace was made with Philip, and not only peace, but alliance. The allies of both parties were included in the treaty, each by name : but neither Pho- cis nor Lacedaemon were mentioned, nor Kersobleptes, the king of Thrace, who had been led, or forced, into war with Philip entirely by Athens. The last omission the Athenians afterwards wished, as well they might, to remedy ; but the treaty was already concluded, and Philip had immediately overrun the kingdom of Kersobleptes, and reduced that prince to entire submission. An Athenian embassy was sent to take Philip's oath to the treaty which had been concluded. Its return was followed l)y a letter from Philip, invit- ing the Athenian people as Amphic- tyons, and as his allies, to join with his other allies, and the whole Amphic- tyonic league, in putting an end to the Phocian war, and restoring the temple at Delphi to the Amphictyons. The Athenians did not comply, and Philip, advancing through the pass of Thermo- pylae with a powerful army of Macedo- nians and Thessalians, and being joined by the Theban forces, prepared to act against the Phocians. They submitted without resistance ; the principal fami- lies stipulating for leave to emigrate with their effects. The like permission seems to have been obtained for the en- tire people of the Boeotian towns, which had taken part with the Phocians. The middle and lower classes of the Pho- cians surrendered their towns to Philip, trusting that he would save them from the vengeance of the Thebans and Thes- salians. To determine their fate, Philip summoned the Amphictyons at Ther- mopylae, inviting the attendance of mi- nisters from every state of Greece. The congress met : the Thebans and Thes- salians were urgent for severity; but even their animosity was surpassed by the savage mountaineers of CEta, who insisted that the full punishment allotted to sacrilege by the Amphictyonic law should be inflicted, and that the whole Phocian people should be precipitated from' the clift's of the sacred mountain. A more moderate sentence was ap- proved by the majority. All the Am- phictyonic rights of the Phocians were declared to be forfeited : it was directed that the three principal cities of Phocis should be dismantled, and the other towns destroyed; that the people should live in villages, not less than a furlong one from another, and none containing more than fifty houses ; that they should surrender all heavy armour and horses, and possess none till the debt to the god were paid ; for the liquidation of which a yearly rent of sixty talents, about 12,000/., was assessed on the Phocian lands. Thus ended, in its tenth year, what was called the Sacred War against the Phocians. The right of suffrage in the Council of Amphictyons, which the Phocians had possessed, was given to Macedonia, (bc. 346.) Sect. III.— The result of the Sacred War was generally displeasing to the Athenians, and each party made it a matter of heavy charge against its oppo- nents. The most eloquent speaker of the party adverse to Demosthenes, was iE»» \M GREECE. ■If chines, who had gone, as well as Demo- sthenes himself, onbolhthe embassies to Macedonia. Demosthenes declared that vEschines had sold himself to Phi- lip, and had persuaded the Athenians that Philip would settle the affairs of Phocis to their wish, and not to that of the Thebans; whereby the Athenians had been prevented from interfering to save the Phocians. A'schines, in his turn, declared that Demosthenes had been corrupted by the Thebans, and that he, not iEschines, had caused the ruin of the Phocians , that Philip had wished to grant to the Phocians more favour- able terms, and in order that he might be able to do so, had invited the Athe- nians to join the Amphictyonic army ; that Demosthenes had prevented the Athenians from complying, and that the Boeotians and Thessalians in Phi- lip's army far outnumbering the Ma- cedonians, and the Athenians not being there to balance them, Philip was obliged to comply much further than he wished with the Thebans and Thessa- lians. The merits of the dispute seem very doubtful : the accusations of cor- ruption, on both sides, are probably false, for such charges were among the commonest weapons of party war- fare in Athens ; and, shameful as must have been the state of political morality, when corrupt subserviency to a foreign power was so ordinarjr an imputation, it IS not to be fixed on an individual without better warrant than an adversary's word. On the other points, the balance of pro- bability may seem to be rather in favour of iiCschines : for, by acting as the allies of Philip, the Athenians might, per- haps, have moderated the proceedings of the confederacy, while, by opposition in arms, they would have forfeited a peace which they had sacrificed much to obtain, and that with little hope of success, since the then ruling Phocians were more inclined to trust Philip than them. By Philip's success in thePhocian war, and by the reputed holiness of the cause wherein he had been engaa:ed, his fame and popularity spread wide in Greece. The Thebans especially were loud in his praise, and so were their constant allies, the democratical commonwealths of Peloponnesus. These cities, especially Argos, Megalopolis, and Messene, ever needed protection against their dangerous neighbour Lacedaemon : they had pre- ferred the alliance of Thebes to that of Athens ; and now, when Theban energy was failing, there arose in friendship with Thebes a protector more effectual by his power and activity, and less dangerous, as was thought, to their in- dependence, both on account of his liberality, and the remoteness of his situation. The Theban everywhere became the Macedonian party; and Macedonia, already recognised as a member of the Grecian nation by its admission among the Amphictyons, seemed likely to attain a similar su- premacy to that which had at different times been exercised by Lacedsemon, Athens, and Thebes. It would appear that, since the conclu- sion of peace, the party of Demosthenes had engaired in intrigues, for which they apprehended Philip's vengeance on their country. If this impression was well founded, prompt precautions would be necessary, for the Thebans and Thessa- lians were sure to second him : if not, at least the power of the war party would be promoted by exciting jealousy of Philip. Immediately on hearing that the Phocian towns had surrendered to Phi- lip, a vote of the people was obtained, commanding all Athenians in the coun- try to withdraw their families into the fortified towns. No hostile act was done by Philip, probably none had been meditated; but there may, perhaps, have been grounds for apprehension, and at any rate the party purpose of the movers was answered in the alarm ex- cited. Soon afterwards ministers came to Athens from Philip, to announce his admission as an Amphietyon, and to request his acknowledgment as such by the Athenians. Demosthenes, professing the greatest enmity to Philip, and de- claring that he disapproved the peace which had been concluded, still dis- suaded the renouncing it on the present question. The more violent orators prevailed, and it was voted that the Athenian people did not acknowledge Philip as an Amphietyon. Nevertheless, peace lasted for a considerable period, during which intrigue w as busy through- out Greece between the Macedonian party and the Athenian. The Athenians sent ambassadors into Peloponnesus, to rouse into jealousy of Philip the states inclined to his alliance; and Philip, intriguing more successfiilly in Euboea, drew most of the island from the Athe- nian interest to his own ; yet, before war broke out, the ascendancy of Athens was again established, and the Macedonian party suppressed. On either side it was GREECE. 135 i [ not friendship, but suspended hostility ; and if Athens first decidedly broke the treaty, it must be remembered that in the secrecy of Philip's negotiations, and the publicity of all important transac- tions among the Athenians, it was easy for him, and very difficult for them, to violate the substance of the covenant, without expressly contravening its terms. Philip's conduct was regular in form, and that of Athens most blameably ir- regular; their comparative merits, in spirit and principle, it is more difficult to estimate. One point is very remark- able in the conduct of the Athenians ; — the extravagant notion which they en- tertained, that they were at liberty to recal any concession which they deemed unadvised, and that the king of Mace- donia was bound to consent, if he called himself their fiiend. Above three years after the conclusion of peace, when Philip had been ten months warring in the northern wilds of Thrace, and on the borders of Scythia, those events took place which led to renewed hostility with Athens. Byzan- tium, which had been included in the treaty as an ally of Philip, we now find at war with him, and supported by Athens. Perinthus and Selymbria, towns closely connected with Byzantium, were in the same situation. We have little means of judging who was chiefly to blame, but ill faith was imputed by both parties : by the Athenians to Philip as attacking their allies ; by Philip to the Athenians as supporting his enemies. Here the blame is doubtful ; in the next instance it belongs decidedly to Athens. An Athenian colony was sent into the Chersonese under Diopeithes, a zealot in the war party, and to him was given the Thracian command by land and sea. A fleet was readily voted to accompany him, but for the land force the people would neither serve nor pay. Diopeithes offered to raise and pay a sufficient body of mercenaries; his oft'er was accepted ; he employed his troops against some towns belonging to Philip, and supported them by piracy, and by levying contribu- tions from the allies, both of Macedonia and of Athens. Complaints poured in, but Demosthenes defended him. The injuries done to Macedonia, the orator justified on the ground that Philip, hav- ing previously committed aggressions, was to be treated as an enemy ; a false and pernicious principle, since breaches of treaty, even if undisputed, are to be punished by declared hostility and by public exposure, not by other acts of ill faith, which, however excused under pretence of retaliation, are really nothing better than fresh offences of a similar kind. The wrongs of the allies he ex- cused by the plea of necessity. ** I must speak out,"' he then proceeded, " and I pledge myself that every commander who sails fVom your harbours takes money from the Chians, the Erythraeans, and from whomsoever he can, of those, I mean, who inhabit Asia. And this is not given for nothing, but that their merchant vessels may be protected, and not plundered. They call it, how- ever, a gift of friendship." Demo- sthenes prevailed : Diopeithes was con- tinued in command, and Callias, the commander on the Thessalian coast, was encouraged to conduct yet more violent He attacked and took the cities on the Pagasaean bay, allies of Philip, and named as such in the treaty : he stopped all vessels bound for Macedonia, and condemning the crews as enemies to Athens, sold them for slaves. Induced by these and other provocations, Philip, in a letter to the Athenians, set forth his complaints, and declared that he would redress them by arms. The style of this document is temperate and manly, and its statements are confirmed by the fact that Demosthenes declined to answer them. It proves that the treaty had been repeatedly and grossly violated by Athens, and that whatever grounds of jealousy may have arisen from other parts of Philip's conduct, his beha- viour in his direct intercourse with Athens had been moderate and con* ciliatory ; that he had offered to refer all disputed points to arbitration, and had yielded some things which could not in strictness have been required. Never* theless the adverse orators persuaded the people not only that Philip was their de- termined enemy, but that he had broken the treaty so far as to justify them in totally disregarding it. The war began, and Demostiienes became the effective chief minister of Athens ; apparently the first who ever held that eminence entirely without military command* The confederacy against Philip was a powerful one. The Chians, Rhodians, and Coans were strong at sea, and closely connected with Byzantium : the power of Athens was singly most formidable ; and supplies abounded, for the Athenians had secured the alliance of Persia. Their armament in the Hellespont was at first commanded by Chares and under 136 GREECE. him it sustained a defeat ; but Pho cion superseding him, restored the face of affairs by his ability against the enemy, and his justice and liberality to- wards the allies. The system of opera- tions, ably projected by Demosthenes, was as ably carried into effect by Pho- eion, and the success of his measures was materially facilitated by the weight of his character : Philip, abandoning the hope of reducing the adverse towns of the Thracian shore, came to a compo- sition with his enemies, and another in- terval of peace ensued. Callias and Taurosthenes of Chalcis were brothers, and the leaders of a party which desired to unite the cities of Eu- boea under a general government. In the former troubles of the island, they had rested on the support of Thebes or Macedonia; but, during the last, they had quarrelled with Philip, and it was therefore necessary to resort, to Athens. Their proposals were made through De- mosthenes, with whom Callias had be- fore been connected ; and so important did the willing alliance of Euboea seem to him, that he obtained the consent of the people to a decree resigning all claims of dominion and tribute from the island. A body of Athenians, under Phoeion, crossing the strait, expelled all Theban and Macedonian troops, and gave ascen- dancy to the friends of Callias ; and this revolution restoring the influence of Athens in Euboea took place shortly be- fore the breaking out of war between Philip and Byzantium. When the Hel lespontine war was over, Callias was still in power, and Demosthenes trusted much to him in the attempt which he now made to form a new league against Philip. The Byzantines and Perinthians testified to Athens the warmest gratitude for its late assistance ; Acamania was friendly ; and Demosthenes himself be- came ambassador to confirm the Athe- nian interest there, and to establish it in Peloponnesus. Returning before the business was completed, he left its fur- ther prosecution to Callias, who came to Athens, and was introduced by Demosthenes to the people, to report his success. He had effected, he said, the desired alliance : a powerful armament would be raised from hluboea, Acarnania, and Peloponnesus ; the chief command would be yielded to the Athenians ; and a congress of deputies would meet at A- thens. These promises, however, failed, from what cause is uncertain : no war ensued, and the year passed quietly away. Amphissa, the chief town of the Ozolian Locrians, overlooked the Cirrhaean plain, and their teiritory bordered on the ** ac cursed land," for using which the Pho- cians had so been punished. In the Phocian war, the Ozolian Locrians, a? being the most zealous allies of Thebes, had been the greatest sufferers ; and trusting to the influence of Thebes among the Amphictyons, they hoped for the allowance of that body, while they remunerated themselves by silently occu- pying the accursed land. No notice was taken, till, emboldened by conni- vance, they even fortified the devoted Cirrhaean port, and exacted duties from all passengers to Delphi. It happened that ^schines, being chosen as an Am- phictyonic representative of Athens, was provoked by some proceedings of the Amphissian deputies against his country : he called on the council to judge and punish the profanation of the Amphis- sians; and a decree was passed requiring that all s:rown up Delphians, tree or slaves, should meet on the morrow at daybreak, with spades and mattocks; that all members of the council should attend, or, if any failed, their state should be excluded from the temple. The decree was obeyed. The multitude assembled, and descending into the plain, under the command of the Amphictyons, destroyed the port, burnt the houses, and returned. The Amphissians met in arms, too late for prevention, but not too late for revenge. The unarmed Delphians fled, but many were wounded, and some members of the council were seized and stripped. Next day the Amphictyons met, and resolved on those regular measures which ought to have preceded their late hasty and violent act. It was decreed that before their next regular sitting, an extraordinary meeting should be held, when a decree should be proposed for punishing the offences of the Amphissians against the god and the council. Demosthenes had already formed con- nexion with a party in lliebes, who de- sired to withdraw their country from its alliance with Philip ; and there is reason to think that the Amphissians had been encouraged to resistance by hopes of support not only from Thebes, but from the party of Demosthenes in Athens. Accordingly, he prevailed on the Athe- nians to decline all part in the pro- ceedings of the Amphictyons, and neither Athenian nor Theban deputies attended the meeting. War was declar^id, and an army collected, by the Amphic- GREECE. 137 i I tyons ; the Amphissians were brought to submission ; a fine was imposed on the state, some leading men were ba- nished, and some exiles restored. But as soon as the army was withdrawn, the Amphissians refused to pay the fine, recalled those whom the Amphictyons had banished, and banished those whom they had recalled. War was again de- creed against them, but troops were not duly furnished by the states, and nothing was effected. The Amphissians were weak, but it was known that they would not be unsupported ; and at the next Amphictyonic meeting it was resolved to give vigour and union to the league, by inviting Philip to become its general. This measure sanctioning a fresh in- terference of Philip in Greece, and en- suring him the support of powerful allies, made greater activity necessary to his opposers ; and Demosthenes made use of every engine for stimu- lating the people and intimidating his adversaries. One part of his conduct strikingly shows the oppression which sometimes may be exercised among a })eople, however generally zealous for liberty, who do not duly feel the para- mount importance of regular proceeding and the sacredness of law. Antiphon, an Athenian exile, had returned illegally, and was living secretly in Peiraeeus ; and Demosthenes, unable to procure such precise information of his residence as might enable the officers of justice to ap- prehend him, assumed authority to search private houses, discovered the delinquent, and carried him into the city. The fact of his illegal return made him liable to death, but would not warrant the arbi- trary conduct of Demosthenes in arrest- ing him. Demosthenes accused him of having plotted with Philip to bum the arsenal : such charges were commonly received far too readily in Athens, and if this were now believed, the importance of the arrest might be expected to ex- cuse its irregularity. From the silence of Demosthenes as to the evidence for this accusation, we may probably pre- sume that it was but weakly supported; and yEschines inveighing bitterly against the illegal conduct of his rival, de- termined the assembly to release the prisoner. But the danger of Antiphon was not yet over ; the council of Arei- opagus sometimes exercised the privi- lege of reversing the decisions of the people, and though it is improbable that such a reversal could be maintained if the people were determined to support their act, it might be risked in the present instance, when the people were divided and the majority accustomed to follow the lead of Demosthenes. His influence in the Areiopagus was com- plete, and Antiphon, though already dismissed, was by order of that court, in flagrant violation of all law and jus- tice, again arrested, tortured, and exe- cuted. While Demosthenes was thus over- bearing all opposition at home, he was negotiating abroad with great ability and unwearied perseverance to raise a power- ful league against Philip. His success would chiefly depend on the disposition of Thebes, where a strong party existed adverse to that which had maintained the state in alliance with Macedonia. Demosthenes went himself to Ihebes, and negotiated with such effect that when Philip, as the Amphictyonic gene- ral, sent a requisition to the Thebans to join his army, they refused compliance. Yet shortly after the Macedonian party again prevailed so far, that a body of Theban troops was sent to the confede- rate army. The Amphissians were re- inforced from Athens with 1 0,000 mer- cenaries; but notwithstanding, they were soon reduced to submission. The moment was critical. Philip was in the heart of Greece, in command of the Amphictyonic army, which if he wished to direct against Athens,, the support given by that state to the Amphissians furnished a ground for requiring it to follow him as in an Amphictyonic quarrel, and not a parti- cular one of his own. Peace yet ex- isted, nominally, between Macedonia and Athens; but it had been ill ob- served, and pretexts for a rupture abounded : the unfriendly disposition was certain on the part of Athens, and on that of Philip highly probable. Ac- cording to the result of the present crisis Macedonia or Athens would be mistress of Greece : if Thebes were warm in favour of Philip, Athens probably could not resist him ; if Thebes took part with Athens, he might himself be in no small jeopardy. Both, therefore, ear- nestly courted Thebes ; and each being there supported by a powerful faction, the contest was violent and doubtfuL After much wavering, the Thebans solemnly renewed the alliance with Phihp, which they had nearly broken oft'; but the Athenian party, though defeated, was not eftectually suppress^ when Philip took a «t^ which hastened 138 GREECE. the crisis. He fortified the Phocian town of Elateia, commanding the passes Irom Delphi, where he was stationed, both towards Thermopylae and into Boeotia. For this his motives mig:ht be various. If the Thebans turned against him, and he found himself unsafe in Phocis, it secured his retreat into Thes- saly : if he wished to fall on Attica, and the Thebans opposed him, it grave a ready entrance intoBceotia; and Thebes, while doubtful, might perhaps be de- terred from declaring against him by his commanding position. Whatever were his purpose, on hearing that he had occupied Elateia, alarm rose as high in Athens as if he were in march against the city. It was evening when the news was brought to the Prytanes : they immediately rose. Some went to the generals, and ordered the trumpets to sound ; others hastened to clear the market-place, and set fire to the booths as the speediest method of removal. The whole city was in tumult and consterna- tion during the night. When day broke the council met, but before they could prepare a decree, the people were as- sembled and clamorous for their ap- pearance. They came in without having determined on any measure to propose for the adoption of the assembly. The Prytanes made their report : the crier re- peatedly proclaimed that any Athenian might speak. Still none came forward. At length Demosthenes arose and pro- posed a decree severely airaigning Philip, and ordering that ambassadors should straightway be sent to Thebes to offer strict alliance and friendsliip. The de- cree was carried. It is a circumstance which strongly marks the intimacy of the union proposed, that intermarriage, rarely allowed between the citizens of different states, was to be permitted be- tween those of Thebes and Athens. The Athenian ambassadors, of whom Demosthenes was the chief, were re- ceived by the assembled Theban people, and, at the same time, those of Philip were heard in reply. Python, the leader of the latter embassy, was no common orator, but the eloquence of Demo- sthenes and the largeness of his offers prevailed. The Athenians had long been protectors of the Boeotian towns claim- ing independence, pai-ticularl)r Plataea and Thespiae. These were given up; and it was agreed that Thebes should have an equal vote in directing the measures of the confederacy, as well by sea as by land; that Athens should bear the whole expense of the fleet and two thirds of that of the army ; that a Theban general should command in chief ; that all political measures should be concerted with the Boeotarchs in the Cadmeia. The eloquence of Demo- sthenes was powerful with the multitude, and his political ability and commanding influence in Athens were necessary to the leaders who had pledged themselves to stand or fall with their new ally. He quickly attained great power in Thebes, and became the channel of communi- cation between the two states and the effective director of both. An Athenian army was sent into Boeotia, and being joined by the forces of Thebes, the combined host encamped itself at Chseroneia, a few miles dis- tant from Elateia. A few skirmishes took place ; but winter, as was usual in Greece, prevented decisive action. Meantime Philip negotiated for peace, both with Thebes and Athens. At Athens his overtures were principally supported by Phocion ; but they were rejected by the people, full of ambitious hopes, and bold in the knowledge that Boeotia lay between them and the enemy, and that Thebes would bear the first brunt of the attack. Thus far Demosthenes was triumphant; but his task was more diflScult at Thebes, where the danger was nearer, and the party stronger that wished for peace. A decree that the proposals of Philip should be considered had already passed the assembly, when Demosthenes hastened to Thebes. The people were summoned, and he ad- dressed them ; he praised to the utmost those who adhered to the resolution of war, and inveighed against all who spoke in favour of Philip, as corrupt and trai- tors. When he found that tne passions of the multitude were sufficiently ex- cited, he proceeded even to threats, and exclaimed, that if any should dare to speak of peace with Philip, he would himself seize him by the hair, and drag him as a traitor to prison. That such a sally should have been ventured, and that it should have been unresented, and even successful, strongly shows both the ascendancy which Demosthenes had at- tained in Thebes, and the power of his eloquence in stimng the passions of his audience. But his objects were not yet secured; the Boeotarchs were divided, and at length they resolved again to lay the proposals of Philip before the people. The assembly was called ; Demosthenes addressed it, and after arraigning the GREECE. 199 Boeotarchs as traitors to Greece, he concluded with declaring that if the Thebans, deceived by their leaders, so shrunk from the common cause, he would return immediately to Athens, and move for an embassy to Thebes, to ask a passage through Boeotia for the Athenian army, which would then 'go alone against the common enemy. The Boeotarchs gave way, and war was finally resolved on. This, the greatest triumph perhaps of the orator and of his political system, ended certainly in the most signal discomfiture of both. The Athenian and Theban army had been joined during the winter by troops from the allies of Athens, Euboea, Megara, Corinth, Achaia, Corcyra, Leucas, and Acarnania. The aggregate force appears to have considerably ex- ceeded that of Philip ; but the advantage was balanced by the latter being united under one able commander. The Athe- nian generals were Chares and Lysicles; the names of the Theban commanders have not been preserved. The battle took place near Chaeroneia ; it was hard fought and decisive, and the victory of Phihp complete, (b.c. 338.) The news filled Athens with dis- may. Nothing less was now expected than the advance of the conqueror into Attica, the ravage of the country, per- haps the siege of the city. The re- sources which had formerly enabled Athens to disregard the devastation of her territory, were lost by the revolt of some aUies, and her own impolitic relin- quishment of authority over others. The time was past when every Athenian was a soldier ; for the wars of Athens had lately been carried on by mercenary troops, while the citizens had been idling at home, incurring the guilt of warfare, without participating in its dangers or its glories, such as they are. From violent fear to violent resentment was an easy passage, and the late advisers of war might not unreasonably expect the se- verest treatment from the people, whe- ther in anger at the situation into which their counsels had brought the city, or as an intended peace-offering to the king of Macedonia, whom they had so vehe- mently opposed. Demosthenes had borne arms in the battle, and for speedier flight had thrown away his shield, — an action deemed the most disgraceful proof of cowardice. The sense of his political failure, and his military dishonour, deterred him from showing himself in the first burst of popular indignation, and he procured a mission, which with- drew him a while from Athens. No pro- ceedmgs were immediately commenced against the leaders of the war party, and they profited by the moderation of their adversaries to divert the popular fury from themselves against the generals. Lysicles was the victim chosen, probably because he was not, Hke Chares, highly popular or powerful. He was accused by an orator of the war party, con- demned, and executed. The rage of the multitude was satisfied, and never doubt- ing that their vengeance had fallen on the real culprit, they again were willing to listen as before to their late advisers. The Athenians now sent ^schines to Philip, to learn his purposes, and to soften his resentment. But before his arrival, Demades, an eminent orator, who was among the prisoners, had already been set free, and directed to assure the Athenians, that the Macedonian king was disposed to be their friend. Soon after, all the Athenian prisoners were released, and a supply of clothing given to such as were in want of it His con- duct had been similar in every victory, which had given a body of Athenian citizens into his hands ; and it is worth considering what could have been the motive to such sustained generosity to- wards his most inveterate enemies, in a man, who, though not sanguinary by nature, and generally more merciful than most Grecian warriors, had been known to act with harshnes* on less provo- cation. Some reasons for the diffe- rence may be found both in his interests and his character. The greatness and security of Macedonia were to be pro- moted by the total destruction of Olyn- thus, as a state. When this act was done, no personal forbearance would avert from the conqueror the general hatred of the citizens ; and to reduce them to slavery, therefore, seemed a measure of security, as well as of revenge and profit. But the destruction of Athens was not in his wish ; its subjection had not hitherto been in his power ; and even now, if he pushed the war to extremity against it, there might be some doubt of his allies supporting him. Athens remaining independent, to conciliate it might be politic ; and Philip's prudence would here concur with the natural kindliness of his disposition, which in the other case had been overborne by different interests and feelings. Besides, as a man of letters and accomplish- ment, Philip respected the chief seat of 140 GREECE. GREECE 141 ii philosophy and art ; as a lover of fame and popularity, no less than of power, he was anxious to appear advantage- ously in his dealings with a people the most conspicuous, as well as the most intelligent, in Greece. His conduct in these instances was most honourable, and it is but just and candid to suppose that it sprang in a great measure from honourable feelings ; but we cannot give him the same credit for real generosity on the present occasion, which we might, if hb proceedings had Iseen consistently humane, when the temptation to cruelty was stronger, and there were fewer rea- sons of policy to prevent him from yielding to it. The conquerors went from the field to Thebes, where they found a ready sub- mission. The government passed into the hands of the Macedonian party, and to make sure their ascendancy, the Cadmeia was garrisoned with a detach- ment from the army under Philip. The revolution now ettected was not dis- graced with executions, banishments, or confiscations. The Boeotian towns were made independent, the numerous exiles restored, and all prisoners, both Thebans and others, set free, unran- somed. Philip next proceeded to show to Athens a still greater lil)e- rality. When it was known there that favour might be expected, an embassy had immediately been sent to wait on him. Meanwhile he had caused the IxKlies of the Athenian slain to be burnt, and the bones to be sent to Athens ; and he committed the procession to the charge of his principal minister. Anti- pater, whom he also appointed his am- bassador to the people. He freely offered the renewal of peace and aUiance on the former terms ; and to testify his dispo- sition, as general of the Amphictyons, to do impartial justice between state and state, he procured the restoration of Oropus, which, belonging to Athens, had long been forcibly held by the Thebans. Philip was now beyond dispute the first potentate of Greece. His kingdom was flourishing ; his enemies depressed ; his allies many and powerful, and com- pliHely under his direction. Henceforth, at least, he might safely devote himself to increase the happiness of his king- dom, by peacefully cuhivating its re- sources and improving its government. But the rarest, as well as the most ex- cellent of patriots, is he who, bred to war and accustomed to victory, has yet the wisdom and virtue rightly to value the blessings of peace. Only one winter had elapsed after the battle of Chseroneia, when Philip was preparing to attempt the conquest of Persia. There can be little doubt that his principal motives were ambition, and the hateful love of war ; but his determination may very probably have been aided by a persuasion com- mon among the most liberal Grecian statesmen, that the turbulent spirit of their countrymen wanted a vent, and that the only effectual method of pre- serving tranquillity at home, was by uniting them against the barbarian, whom they were wont to consider as their natural enemy. At the proposal of Philip a general congress was assem- bled at Corinth. His views were ap- proved, and he was elected captain- general of Greece. In the midst of his preparations Philip was assassinated by a young Macedonian of rank. But his plans of conquest did not perish with himself, like the similar projects of Jason the Thessalian ; for he left a son, the celebrated Alexander, of talents not inferior, and more unbounded ambition. Sect. IV. — The party of Demosthe- nes had recovered its predominance in Athens, and the news of Philip's death was received there with the most un- manly exultation. The murderer had been slain, but high honours were voted to his memory. To reward the assassina- tion of an enemy, especially if a king or tyrant, was a common measure, which however detestable to the better taught morality of modern times, appears in Greece to have been extensively ap- proved. But, in the present case, the conduct of Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia stamps the act with a cha- racter of ingratitude, which has shocked some of his warmest enemies. A sacri- fice of thanksgiving was ordered by the people, as if they had heard the news of a great victory ; and Demosthenes, though he had recently lost his only child, and fhough custom, deemed sacred, for- bade all persons under such a loss to show themselves except in mourning, appeared at the ceremony in a robe of white, and with a crown of flowers on his head. The high natural gifts of Alexander had been improved by the best instruc- tions which the age could supply. As a patron of letters, Philip was both li beral and discerning ; his court was the resort of many eminent philosophers, but the education of his son had been chiefly intrusted to Aristotle, the most eminent of them all. The murder of Philip seems to have been connected with a plot to set another member of the royal house upon the throne ; but all disturbance was prevented or suppressed by the promptitude of Alexander and the prudence of the counsellors by whom he was surrounded ; and the young king then turned his attention towards Thes- saly, his father's surest and most valu- able ally. The Thessalian states were readily persuaded to elect him as the chief of their confederacy, and to support him in claiming the later and loftier ac- quisition of Philip, the political and military leadership of all Greece. He then went to Thermopylae, took his seat among the Amphictyons, and obtained from that body a vote which constituted him captain-general of the Greeks ; an important sanction to his claim, though not by itself sufficient to confer the de- sired authority without the consent of a more general congress of the states. Opposition was apprehended from Athens and Thebes, of which the former had abundantly shown a hostile temper, while in the latter, though the admini- stration was yet in the hands of Alex- ander's friends, the opposing party were fast recovering strength and boldness. Alexander suddenly entered Boeotia with an army. His presence confirmed the tottering power of his Theban friends, and deterred the Athenians from mani- festing their enmity in open opposition to the meeting which it was now pro- posed to call at Corinth, to consider the claim of Alexander to the leading of Greece. The meeting was called, and its debates would seem to have been free from the present terror of an over- awing force, though influenced no doubt by the fear of after-resentment from the powerful Macedonian. The vote which gave the command to Alexander was nearly unanimous ; the Lacedaemonian deputies alone protested, saying, ** that their national inheritance was not to fol- low, but to lead." The Grecian states were generally making ready to war against Persia under Alexander, who had himself re- turned into Macedonia to complete his own preparations, when his kingdom was threatened by an extensive combi- nation of the barbarians on its northern and western borders. He broke their measures by his energy and rapidity, defeated them, and then proceeded to take vengeance ; nor during a long and every where successful campaign, in which he carried his arms even beyond the Danulie, did he fail to enforce the entire submission of every tribe that had provoked him. His return was has- tened by alarming news from Greece. We have often seen the riches of Persia employed in fomenting the dis- sensions of Greece, and supporting the parties which seemed at the moment, whether from weakness or from what- ever cause, the least to be dreaded. Such a policy seemed now more than ever necessary, when the greater part of Greece was united avowedly against Persia ; and, accordingly, the treasures of the king were largely dispensed in aid of the party hostile to Macedonia. The agent in these transactions was Demo- sthenes, the determined enemy of Philip and Alexander, and now all-powerful in Athens ; and his detractors accused him of embezzling much of the wealth which confessedly passed through his hands. The ascendancy of the Macedonian party in Thebes had been protected by a garrison in the Cadmeia, under the joint command, apparently, of a Mace- donian officer and a Theban party chief. Both were assassinated by some The- ban exiles who secretly returned. An assembly was hastily summoned; the ruling party were surprised and dis- heartened ; the friends of the exiles full of hope and alacrity ; and to heighten both these feelings, a report was spread that Alexander had perished in lllyria. The assembly voted that the liberty of Thebes should be asserted against Ma- cedonian dominion, and siege was straightway laid to the Cadmeia. The Theban revolution appears to have been part of an extensive scheme concerted at Athens. A large supply of arms was furnished by Demosthenes, probably at the expense of Persia ; and on his proposal the Athenian assembly voted succours to the Thebans. Troops were also voted by the Argians, Arca- dians, and Eleians ; but the Pelopon- nesian succours were detained at the Isthmus, and the Athenian at home, through the wish to gain some insiglu into the probable event of the war be- fore taking part in it. Such was the state of things when the Theban leaders learnt with dismay that Alexander, by a rapid march through a difiicult moun- tain region, had unexpectedly made his way into Boeotia in a time almost incredibly short. Their danger was great, not only from the Macedo- us GREECE. GREECE. 143 man force, but from ihe reviving hopes erted any influence on his subsequent of their fellow-citixens of the oppo- career, (b. c. 335.) site party. They ventured the bold Other Grecian cities had been rumed assertion that the son of Philip was cer- not less completely than Thebes, but in tainly dead, and that it was another none had the sufferers been so many ; Alexander, the son of Aeropus, who was and the extent of the calamity struck come against them ; and hereby they deep awe into all who heard it, thoutrh succeeded in silencing all proposals of few regretted the downfall of a power, accommodation. Alexander advanced which had rested almost entirely on towards Thebes, but did not immediately force, and little on good will or superior attack it, being willing to leave an open- reputation. Its sudden and apparently mg for peace, and trusting to the strength accidental capture gave strength to the of his party within the walls. opinion, extensively prevalent, that After Alexander had been for some Thebes was labounng under a divine time l)efore the city, a skirmish, begun retribution ; and men's minds ran back without orders by one of his officers, through various deeds of oppression brought on a general engagement. The and bloodshed, which had stained the Chapter IX, besiegers were victorious, and their van- guard, pursumg the enemies to the gates, broke in with them. The city was taken, unexpectedly alike to the conquerors and the conquered ; and terrible was the destruction which ensued by the short period of Theban empire, to the treacherous seizure of Plataea, and the old but unforgotten crime of alliance with the Persian against the freedom of Greece. Those states, which had j)re- pared for Thebes an aid too tardy to save hands, not so much of the Macedonians, it, but prompt enough to expose them to as of the Boeotians and Phocians, who the vengeance of the conqueror, had were numerous in the invading army, more pressing subjects to consider than These had deep wrongs to avenge ; and its guilt or its calamity. Alarmed at the Thebans now drank to the dregs the the perils which their miserable and bittercup which they had held to the lips treacherous policy had brought near of the Plataeans, Thespians, and Orcho- their own doors, they mostly acted with as menians. Old men, women, and children much meanness as before. The Arcadi- were slaughtered in the streets, in the ans put to death their late advisers ; the houses, and at the altars. When the butchery was over, the fate of the sur- vivors and of the city was referred by Alexander to the common decision of the confederate Greeks. It was decreed Eleians restored the banished friends of Macedonia ; but the danger was greatest to Athens, as the nearest state, and the most offending. When the news came that Thebes was taken. that the city should be levelled with the the Eleusinian mysteries were in cele- ground, and all the inhabitants sold as bration ; but they were immediately in- slaves, save only the priests and priest- terrupted, and all hands employed in car- esses, and such as were known friends rying every thing valuable within the of Macedonia. It was also voted that walls. An embassy was sent to Alexan- Plataea and Orchomenus should be re- der, chiefly made up of the friends of stored. Alexander, an ardent lover of Phocion ; but it is probable that De- literature, is said to have procured that mosthenes accompanied it, and that we the house of Pindar, the great Theban may refer to this occasion the story told poet, should be spared, and his posterity of him by iEschmes, — that, being sent exempted from the doom of slavery, ambassador to Alexander, he went no Otherwise the decree was fully executed, farther than the Boeotian border, but It is reported that Alexander bitterly returned in fear, either of Alexander regrettecf the destruction of Thebes, not or of his republican Greek allies. Alex- only for the amount of misery occasioned ander demanded that Demosthenes, and by it, but also because that city was the nine others, should be given up to him, birth-place of Hercules, the boasted as authors of the battle of Chaeroneia, and founder of his race. If, indeed, there of all the succeeding troubles of Greece, was mingled with this fanciful motive A second embassy was sent to deprecate for sorrow any real and lively concern this severity ; and Alexander, whethei for the calamities inflicted, his repentance through respect to the fame of Athens, or is a rare phenomenon in the history of through the desire to settle Greece with- conquerors : but even in this case little out delay, and proceed against Asia, con- importance is to be attached to a vain tented himself with requiring the banish- and transitory feeling, which never ex- ment of Charidemus, one of the number. Of the conouesfs of Alexander in Asia, and of the affairs of Greece, from the time when that prince set out on his enterprize to his death. The long reign of the second Arta- xerxes had closed with a shocking tissue of family dissension and bloodshed. To secure the succession to Darius, his eldest born, the old king had made him a partner in the sovereignty : but he was rewarded with presumptuous in- gratitude, and a quarrel ensued, which ended in an attempt by Darius to assassi- nate his father, and in his death by the hand of the executioner. The few re- maining years of Artaxerxes were full of troubles : he took for his first minis- ter Arsames, his bastard son ; Arsames was murdered, and the deed was im- puted to the jealousy of Ochus, the only then living le^timate son. The same year an extensive revolt broke out in the western provinces ; and Arta- xerxes died in the following year, which was that of the battle of Mantineia. Ochus took the throne, but according to the bloody policy which has ever prevail- ed in Asiatic monarchies, he did not deem it secured tiU all his illegitimate breth- ren had been assassinated, in number eighty. He then first made known his father s death, and proclaimed himself king, taking the name Artaxerxes. The reign of Artaxerxes Ochus was a troubled one. The great western re- volt was speedily suppressed, and the king then setting himself to re-conquer Egypt, sent thither several armies, which failed disgracefully. Artabazus, the satrap of Bithynia, revolted, and, by the aid of Grecian mercenaries, he maintained himself against all the strength of Asia, till his treasury failed, and, unable longer to supply his Grecian troops, he fled to the court of Philip. The Phoenicians too revolted. They had been, Uke the Grecian subjects of Per- sia, allowed to govern themselves by their own republican institutions, under the controul of a Satrap, who levied from each city its stipulated tribute, and commanded the armies of the province. They were rich and prosperous through commerce ; they had ever been courted and respected by the sovereign, for as their ships and sailors mainly consti- tuted the naval strength of the empire, it was most important that their ser- vice should be willing. The present satrap, jealous probably of their grow- ing power and rising pretensions, had attempted, injudiciously, to tighten the bands of authority. He was accused of arrogance and tyranny, and the Phoe- nicians revolting allied themselves with Egypt. Ochus went in person ao;ainst them, and reduced them to submission ; but his triumph was disgraced by a series of cruel and treacherous acts, which ended in the utter destruction of Sidon by the despair of its inhabi- tants*. He next subdued the island of Cyprus, which was also in rebellion ; and then prepared an expedition against Egypt. He assembled an oven^nelm- ing force of Grecian mercenaries, and placed a division under Mentor, a Rho- dian soldier of fortune, who being sent by the King of Egypt to assist the Phoe- nicians, had deserted to the Persians with 4000 Greeks, whom he com- manded. To his second employer Men- tor was more faithful : Egypt was con- quered, and so great were Mentor's services, and such the opinion which Ochus entertained of his ability, that he was set in command over all the mari- time provinces of Asia Minor. His sister was wife to the rebel satrap Ar- tabazus ; and, at his intercession, Arta- bazus was pardoned, and restored to his command. For twelve jrears the west- em provinces enjoyed unusual quiet un- der the vigorous rule of Mentor and his brother Memnon, the confidential friend and minister of Artabazus. At the end of that period, in the year after the battle of Chaeroneia, Artaxerxes Ochus died. It was believed that Ochus had been poisoned by the eunuch Bagoas, his chief minister and favourite, who, still retaining his power, gave the diadem to Arses, the youngest son of the late king. The other sons were murdered, and Ar- ses also perished in the third year of his reign, by the act of his all-powerful minister, whom he had dared to thwart. Codomannus, a descendant of the second Darius, and a man of tried valour and considerable military experience, was chosen as the successor. On ascending the throne he took the name of Darius. Bagoas died soon after ; and it was ru- • This is Diodorus's account. It most, however, be takeu with some qualitication, as we shall lind the Sidonians again conspicuous about, twenty yean after in the wars of Alexander. Probably, the conflagration related by the historian only extended to some particular quarter of the city, in which the most determined of the Sidonians may have main- tained themselves, when the rest of the town had submitted to the conqueror. ■1 144 GREECE. moured that dissension had arisen be- tween the king and minister ; that Bagoas had prepared a poisoned draught for Darius, and had been himself compelled to drink it. Soon after the death of Ochus, Philip had undertaken to deliver the Greeks of Asia from the Persian yoke, and had sent an army into iEolis, under Parme- nion, his ablest general. Parraenion was opposed by Memnon, with force enough to check, but not to crush him. The attention of the court was elsewhere oc- cupied, and it was not till Alexander was preparing to cross the Hellespont in per- son, that the Persian government began to gather any considerable force by sea or land. Two years had passed since Phi- lip's death, and four since the battle of Chaeroneia, when Alexander, at the age of twenty- two, commenced the expedition which was to change the dynasties, and remodel the political state of half Asia. On the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, was the territory of ancient Troy, the stage of the principal actions cele- brated by Homer. The imagination of Alexander was naturally Uvely ; he was deeply tinctured with love of letters, and reverence for antiquity. Of this we have seen some instances in his conduct after the taking of Thebes. The Iliad of Homer was especially gratifying both to his poetical tastes and to his warlike propensities, and he is said to have made it his constant companion in his journeys and campaigns. But when he stood on the scene of his favourite story, his ad- miration of the poet and his heroes was exalted into passionate enthusiasm ; and while his army passed the strait unop- Eosed. under the direction of Parmenion, e was visiting the village and surround- ing fields, where the fallen city once had stood, and sacrificing to the deities of the place, and the chiefs and princes there entombed. The foot in the army some- what exceeded thirty thousand, of whom twenty-four thousand were heavy-armed, and about half of these Macedonian : the horse were nearly five thousand, chiefly Macedonian, Thessalian, and Thracian. In proceeding towards Ionia, it was resolved to skirt the eastern highlands of Ida. The neighbouring satraps gathered their forces to oppose him, as soon as they learnt the direction of his march, and they were joined by Memnon, who had till now been en- gashed in protecting the coast. The assembled army consisted of twenty thousand Persian horse, and as many mercenary Grecian heavy-armed infan- try, with light troops whose number is uncertain. Thus inferior in regular foot, it was Memnon's wish to avoid a battle, but to hang on the advancing enemy with a numerous cavalry, wliich should let him neither eat nor rest» to destroy the harvest in his way, and even the towns in which he could shelter. This mode of defence would probably have been the most effectual ; but it carried with it an amount of public loss and private suffering, to which the Persian officers would not consent. It was therefore rejected, and a stand was made in a very advantageous position, at the ford of the Granious, a rapid river, run- ning northwards from Ida to the Propon- tis. Alexander forced the passage, and completely defeated the enemy, but not without a severe struggle, in which his person was exposed to imminent danger. This victory opened to him all Asia Minor. Sai'dis submitted without re- sistance, and he went into Ionia. The people of Ephesus had risen on the oligarchy supported there by Persia, and Alexander arriving confirmed the ascen- dancy of the democratical party, re- stramed their violence, and established good order. Most Grecian cities readily allied themselves with him, and in all these he set up democracy. Miletus and Halicarnassus holding out for Per- sia were taken by force. The successes of Alexander were brilliant, his policy was liberal towards bai'barians as well as Greeks. He won the Lydians by re- viving their ancient laws, which had been overborne by the Persian satraps ; and the Carians, by restoring the govern- ment to the legitimate heir, who had been deposed in favour of a Persian. In the course of a year by force and conci- liation he had made himself the master of Asia within Taurus, the vast mountain chain extending from the Mediterranean to the Euxine sea ; that is, of all Asia Minor, save the narrow maritime pro- vince Cilicia. Meanwhile Memnon had returned into the iEgean sea with a fleet far outnum- bering any which Macedonia and its confederates could support, and had raised a powerful body of Grecian mer- cenaries to co-operate v\uth it. He had reduced the important islands of Chios and Lesbos, and struck a terror into the enemies of Persia, as far as Euboea ; and negotiating with the Grecian states unfriendly to Macedonia, he had per- suaded many of them, and among others GREECE. 115 fl »t l>aceda>mon, to aily themselves with Persia. His intention was, after com- pleting the conquest of Lesbos, to pro- ceed to the Hellespont, when his irresis- til)le fleet would cut off from Alexander all communication with Europe. The small army of the invader might then be crushed by the collected forces of Asia, while Memnon himself, with his Grecian allies, would overrun and con- quer Macedonia, and thus, in the lan- guage of the party hostile to Alexander, secure the liberty of Greece. In the midst of these projects Memnon died, and with him his designs. The land force of his armament was summoned to join the king in Syria. With the arrival of spring, Alexander, crossing Taurus, overran Cilicia. That province is separated from Syria by a branch of Taurus, on the opposite side of which the vast host of Darius was now assembled. For some time each army waited for the other to advance ; for it was the wish of the Persians to engage in the plains of Syria, where their numerous cavalry might range at will, while the smaller and more stationary forces of the Greeks and Macedonians would have acted to advantage in the confined valleys of Cilicia. At length Alexander led his forces through the pass which opened into Syria. Darius immediately crossed the mountains by a different pass into Cilicia, and thus placed himself in Alexander's rear. His object was probably, by occupying the passes, to prevent his enemy from re- turning into Cilicia, and at the same time to cut off from him all supplies and reinforcements; so that his army, de- barred from retreat, and deprived of all provisions, but what it could find in the country, might perish by want, and by the continual harassing of a superior ca- valry. But Alexander, though surprised by the movement, was prompt enough to secure the command of the principal pass, and he led back his army to attack the Persians, near Issus, at the entrance of Cilicia. Besides the light-armed sol- diers, they had thirty thousand heavy- armed Greeks, and a greater number of Asiatics armed and trained in the Grecian manner. The horse were thirty thousand. The whole was ad- vantageously posted along the bank of a river, and extending from the mountains to the sea. Nevertheless, after a hotly contested action, Alexander forced a passage. The slaughter was great both in the battle and in the pursuit. Darius escaped with a portion of his cavalry, but his wife, mother, and sister, and two daughters, were taken in his camp. They were treated by Alexander with kindness, and even with delicate respect ; and so great it is said was the effect produced on Darius by a genero- sit}^ little usual either in Grecian or in Asiatic warfare, that when he heard it he prayed to have no other successor but Alexander, if it were God's will that he should no longer be king of Asia. Having taken possession of Damas- cus, the capital of Syria, Alexander soon turned his eyes to the narrow, but rich, populous, and powerful country of Phoenkiia. The small states of that pro- vince were popularly governed, though mostly with a single chief at the head of the administration ; and they seem to have been very subject both to internal dissension and to mutual quarrels and jealousy. Tyre, the wealthiest and most powerful, was also the most favoured b) the Persian government, to a degree which gave offence in Sidon, its mother city, and the nominal capital of the pro- vince. The Sidonians invited Alexander, and he took possession of their city unop- posed. Others also submitted ; but the Tyrians, the most favoured of the favour- ed Phoenician nation, refused to transfer their allegiance to the conqueror. They professed their willmgness to be strictly neutral, admitting within their walls nei- ther Persians nor Macedonians ; but this did not satisfy Alexander, and he be- sieged the city. Tyre was built on an island, strongly fortified, and vigorously defended. The assailants attempted to cairy out a mole from the main land, for the support of towers and battering en- gines, such as were used in that age. These were burnt by the Tyrians from their shipping, and Alexander found that he could not succeed as long as they com- manded the sea. He raised a navy from such of the Phoenicians as were friendly to him, from the Cyprians, whose sup- port had been engaged by his successes, and from some of the maritime Greeks. His fleet was now too strong for the besieged, so that he soon confined them within their walls, and finally took the city by assault. Eight thousand Tyrians perished in the storming, the remainder of the i>eople were sold into slavery ; and of this great calamity it is nowhere stated that it ever disturbed the tran- quillity of the victor. Alexander next proceeded to Egypt, which submitted without resistance. He w^ r 146 GREECE. gratiiiecl his new subjects by magnificent sacrifices to the gods of the country, and held a splendid festival after the Gre- cian manner, with contests in athletic exercises, poetry, and music. He then commeni.ed a more permanent and more useful monument of his greatness. The singularly rich and populous country of Egypt was without a convenient haven ; and Alexander having selected a spot on the shore near the western branch of the Nile, where there was every advantage of situation for a great commercial town and port, resolved to make it the Gre- cian capital of Egypt, the seat of go- vernment, and the centre of trade. He gave the name of Alexandria to the new city, which was largely colonized by Greeks, and soon became and long con- tinued wealthy, populous, and flourish- ing. It retains, even now, the ancient appellation, and though fallen from its former greatness is still a consider- able town: but its decline must be progressive ; for its excellent harbour is fast verging to ruin from the changes of the coast, and the constant gathering of shoals. While engaged with his new capital, Alexander leaint that the Per- sian fleet had been completely broken up through the defection of the Phoeni- cians and Cyprians, and that all the Grecian islands allied with Persia had returned to the Macedonian confede- racy, (b. c. 332.) During his stay fn Egypt he undertook an expedition of no political or military importance, but yet too singular to pass unnoticed. In the sandy desert which stretches westward from the boundary of Egypt, there are scattered spots, like green islands in the waste, wl .ere springs of water give fertility to the elsewhere barren and burning soil. On one of these stood the ancient and far-famed oracular temple of Jupiter Ammon. The difficulty and danger of approaching it diminished the number of votaries, but ■unrounded the shrine wit)* a more mysterious sanctity. In sending Alex- ander thither, we may well believe that religion had a share ; but it was prol>a- bly combined with curiosity, with the habitual love of extraordinary things, with the vanity of imitating Perseus and Hercules, his boasted progenitors, both of whom were said to have visited the Oracle, perhaps with some project of discovering a communication with the interior of Africa for purposes of trade. He se: out with a detachment of his army, reached the land of Ammon, con- sulted the oracle, and returned in safety ; but not without experiencing the perfls and sufferings which arise, in crossing the deserts, from the intolerable heat, the want of water, and the shifting nature of the sands. In the next spring he went against Darius, crossed the great rivers Eu- phrates and Tigris unopposed, and found the enemy at Gaugamela near Arbola, on the eastern bank of the latter. The country was favourable to caval- ry, in which the Persian army was stronger than that defeated at Issus ; it had also elephants, and scythe-armed chariots, but it was weak in Grecian foot. A hard fought battle ensued: great gallantry was shown by the Per- sian leaders, and some skill ; but they could not withstand the superior disci- pline of the Greeks and the ability of their commander, whose conduct on this occasion gave the highest proof of military science, and original genius for war. Their army was completely destroyed : Darius fled tow-ards the northern provinces, the most warlike and the most attached to himself; and Alexander seized on the rich provinces of the south almost unresisted. Darius was now at Ecbatana, the capital of Media; and his only hope was to maintain himself in that and the adjoining provinces, till Alexander might be called away by troubles at home. Of this there was no small prospect, for an important contest had indeed arisen, but it was decided about the time when Alexander was conquering at Gau- gamela. The Lacedaemonians had ever disallowed the claim of Macedonia to the supremacy of Greece, and had laboured to place themselves at the head of a hostile league. Their hopes had been weakened by the death of Memnon, by the breaking up of the Persian fleet, and by the battle of Issus ; but their party was still powerful, especially when se- conded by the gold which the agents of Persia still supplied in considerable abundance. Three hundred talents (up- wards ot 60,000/.) were offered to the people of Athens, to induce them to join the confederacy. The offer was re- fused ; but there was still in Athens a powerful party headed by Demosthenes, which though unable to induce the people to side with the enemies of Alex- ander, was yet strong enough to prevent them from efi'ectually supporting his friends. Eleia, Achaia, all Arcadia, ex- cept MegalopoUs, took part with Lace- GREECE. daemon ; and their army was strength- ened with ten thousand mercenaries, probably supported by Persia. On the opposite side were Argos and Messenia, the constant enemies of Lacedaemon, with most of the states north of the Isthmus. Athens stood aloof from the contest; but the intriguing policy of Demosthenes was successfully employed in exciting a revolt among the Thes- saJians. Antipater, one of Philip's ablest mi- nisters, had been left by Alexander as his vicegerent. He quelled the dis- turbances in Thessaly, and then suc- ceeded in obtaining from the states of the confederacy a force which, when joined with such of the Macedonian troops as could be spared, might enable him to meet the hostile league with ad- vantage. The Lacedaemonians and their allies had already formed the siege of Megalopolis, and its fall was expected daily, before Antipater could enter Pelo- Eonnesus to relieve it. It held out, owever, till his arrival. A well fought and bloody battle ensued, but the Lace- daemonians were overborne by superior numbers. Agis their king fell fighting after his phalanx was broken. The Lacedaemonians sued for peace, and Antipater referred their ministers to a congress which was held at Corinth. It was decided that the fate of Lace- daemon should be decided by Alexander, and that fifty of the noblest Spartans should be given as hostages that their state would submit to his determination. Meanwhile Alexander had advanced into Media with the bejrinning of spring. Surprised by his rapidity, and disap- pointed of expected succours, Darius was again compelled to fly, and the Median kingdom yielded to the con- queror. Darius escaped into Bactria, where Bessus, the satrap of the province, and some others, conspired against him, niade him prisoner, and finally murdered him. When overtaken by the cavalry of Alexander, the body was found by the Macedonian prince, and taken up and sent to be buried in the royal sepulchre in Persia. Bessus declared himself the king of Asia, but he soon was driven from his satrapy, and dehvered by his followers to the mercy of Alexander, who put him to death as a murderer and traitor. But the resistance of the nor- thern provinces under different chiefs was long continued and frequently re- newed ; and it was not till the third year after the battle of Arbela, that the Per- 147 sian empire was entirely suDdued. The dominions of Alexander then reached to the Caspian sea, and the river lax- artes (the Sirr), which divided them from the wilds of the wandering Scythians. There was little temptation to cross the river with any view of conquest ; and though Alexander once carried his arms against the Scythians, it was only to chastise their turbulence. But the sub- jugated provinces included nearly all the rnost valuable districts and principal cities of central Asia. Sogdiana, the most northerly, had for its capital Mara- canda, which will easily be recognised as the still flourishing Samarcand. In the city of Bactra we find Balkh, and Can- dahar in Alexandria, a Grecian colony founded by Alexander, and named, like his Egyptian capital, from himself. These names will show how far the empire extended towards the north-east; its southern and western limits have been indicated sufficiently in describing the course of the Macedonian conquests. The difficulties of Alexander's situa- tion were great. In a few years he had made himself the lord of many nations of various manners, but all widely dif- fering from the comparatively scanty band of Greeks and Macedonians, by whom all were to be held in subjection. The very rapidity of his progress had precluded the growth of any habitual principle of loyalty, so that nearly his whole empire was in the state of a newly conquered province, only kept in obedience through force and fear. It was necessary to conciliate his new sub- jects, lest his small army should be harassed and worn out with continual service : it was necessary to retain the affection of his Grecian followers, since it was by their power only that he could secure a single province. These objects he endeavoured to reconcile, by distri- buting oflSces of trust and favour both to Europeans and to Asiatics, retaining, however, the sword almost entirely in the hands of the former, while the civil administration was principally com- mitted to the natives of the country. A more questionable part of his policy was the adoption of the Median dress, and the exaction from all ahke of the Asiatic homage of prostration, which seemed to the Greeks an act of de- grading servility when tendered to any mortal. To justify the demand, his flatterers asserted that Alexander was really more than man ; that his deeds had far exceeded those of the ancient Li I 11 148 GREECE. heroes, his own ancestor Hercules, and Bacchus the conqueror of India, who were worshipped as ^ods by all ; and the fable was spread, that he, like them, had something of divinity in his origin, as well as in his actions, and that he was really the son, not of Philip, but of Ammon, the great divinity, to worship m whose temple he had already under- gone so much toil and danger. These extravagant pretensions were far less shocking to the Greeks than to persons educated in a purer religion : for even those who most condemned them wor- shipped mortals not more distinguished than Alexander, and having only this advantage, that they had lived in a dis- tant age. The result, however, was ge- neral dissatisfaction, and heart burn- ings between Alexander and some of his trustiest followers, it is probable, that views of policy were less the mo- tive to his present conduct than the ex- cuse by which he coloured to himself a weakness, of which he would otherwise have been ashamed ; and that he was really actuated by the overweening spirit, which unparalleled successes had fos- tered in a youth of temper naturally ve- hement and ambitious. The Persians had, indeed, been accustomed to honour their kings almost as divinities, and Alexander might fear that their respect for him would be lessened by observing that others acted ditferentlv. But the Persian great well knew that Grecian manners ditt'ered from their own, and they were prepared, by repeated expe- rience of Grecian superiority in policy and war, to respect the peculiarities of their conquerors, and associate them with the ideas of power and ability With regard to them, the present claims of Alexander could not have been ne- cessary, but might, perhaps, if unre- sisted, have been advantageous : to the Greeks and Macedonians they were deeply disgusting ; but to all the king must have been degraded, by appearing as the eager claimant of a homage which was either refused, or extorted with difficulty. Fresh matter was given for dissension, already too prevalent in the camp. The republican Greeks and the Macedonians were mutually jealous, and the latter were again divided into tactions among themselves. These dis- cords had recently been much exaspe rated. Philotas, the son of Parmenion, was an excellent officer, and high in trust, but boastful, profuse, and extra- vagant in self-opinion. He was accused of treason, and condemned to death by the assembled Macedonians, under cir- cumstances, if not of proved guilt, at least of strong suspicion. His father was also put to death on slighter evi- dence, and without the opportunity of making a defence. This most unjust preci- pitation was probably occasioned by the fear, that if time and warning were given to the accused, his power and popu- larity might enable him to resist the authority of the government; but it leaves a deep stain on the character of Alexander, especially as both he and Philip owed more gratitude to Parme- nion than to any other individual. The ferment caused by the ruin of the se- cond family in Macedonia had scarcely subsided, when fresh heats were kin- dled by Alexander's demand to be ho- noured after a manner wholly alien ti-om the habits and principles of the Greeks. Among those who saw with displea- sure the rising arrogance of Alexander, and his growing preference of oriental customs, was Cleitus, the companion of his youth, and now one of his most fa- voured generals, who had saved his life in the battle of the Granicus. It hap- pened at a banquet that some flatterers of the king, after pursuing their accus- tomed theme of the superiority of his exploits to those of Bacchus, went on further to pay their court to him by de- preciating the actions of his father — an unworthy homage, equally disgraceful to those who ottered, and to him who accepted it. Cleitus rebuked their base- ness with honest resentment, took up the praise of Philip, and drew a com- paratively disparaging picture of the actions of Alexander ; but he was un- fortunately heated with wine, and after replying to the courtiers, he addressed himself to Alexander, with intemperate and unmannerly violence. The prince, mad with wine and anger, attempted to rush upon him, but was held by some of his companions, while others forced Clei- tus out of the room. All was vain ; he snatched a weapon, and following Cltj- tus, who returned to brave him, killed him on the spot. The deed was scarcely done when he was seized with the bit- terest repentance. For three days he kept his chamber, and would neither eat nor drink; but his friends at length per- suaded him to resume the duties of his station. He never seems to have formally renounced the extravagant pretensions which led to this murder, and to other mischiefs, which are recorded by hii GREECE. 149 historians ; but he seems to have found the dislike of the Macedonians to the new ceremonies insurmountable, and to have felt it necessary no longer to insist upon their universal observance. Scarcely had the empire of Darius en- tirely submitted, when the odious lust of war and conquest was already driving Alexander to more distant enterprise. South-eastward lay the wide and fertile India; and into it he advanced, fully bent on subduing the whole. For his previous course of action, some excuse may be found m the enmity subsisting between Greece and Persia. It might concern the security of the Greeks, or at least of those in Asia, that Darius's power should be curtailed ; though, assuredly, no lawful object could demand the entire subj ugation of his empire. B ut the pre- sent expedition was neither prompted by provocation, old or recent, nor covered even with the flimsiest pretext of political necessity ; it was undertaken avowedly in the spirit of the robber, who seizes every thing indifferently which his eye covets and his hand can master. He carried his arms with uniform success to the great river Indus, and consider- ably beyond. But his soldiers were weary with toils and dangers, and alarmed at the prospect of warfare end- lessly renewed by the Wild ambition of their chief: their discontent at length broke out in open remonstrance; and Alexander, after a passionate attempt to change their resolution, was obliged to ^ve way. He returned to the Indus, which he intended to make the Eastern boundary of his dominions, and pro- ceeded down the stream to the Indian ocean, reducing all on the right bank who still refused obedience. The most praiseworthy point in Alex- ander's character was his attention to the welfare of the conquered nations ; and his capacity was most commendably shown in the originality and wisdom of some of his plans for their improvement. This does not remove the guilt of his am- bition. It is injustice for any, with- out lawful authority, violently to force upon a nation even what may be for its good ; it is fearful presumption to kill, bum, and pillage through a continent, in the hope of outweighing the certain miseries of war by the benefits of wiser administration in the chance of victoiy. It is not for a prince to judge whether his neighbours would be happier under their existing government or under his Qwn ; nor can his territories in anywise be rightfully extended, except by the free consent of his new subjects, or some- times when, by a most rare combination of circunistanees, conquest has become necessary to protect his people from ag- gression. The original iniquity of Alex- ander s invasions is not excused by any merit in his government, and can be extenuated only by considering the loose morality of his age and the misfortune of a princely education. Even consi- dering his career in the most favourable light, we cannot but look with horror at a boy rushing headlong upon the work of devastation and blood, to make him- self to be talked about; yet it must not be denied that he showed a more liberal ambition and thoughts more enlarged than form the ordinary character of a mere conqueror. Notwithstanding the vast extent of his subject provinces, and the short time allowed to the re- gulation of each, his officers were mostly well chosen, while he was himself ever ready to hear complaints and punish oppressions; so that Asia, during his brief reign, appears to have enjoyed considerably more than its usual por- tion of quiet and good order. He founded many Grecian colonies in va- rious regions, with the double purpose, probably, of securing the obedience of the people and advancing their civilisa- tion. He sedulously encouraged com* merce, and first conceived the idea of opening a communication between India and Europe. Near the mouth of the Indus, he had fortified a place for a principal haven and trading station ; and from hence a fleet was sent to explore the coasts of the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, and finally to proceed up the gulf to the Euphrates. Great hard- ships were endured, and great diffi- culties overcome, by the crews of the exploring squadron ; but the voyage was completed, and knowledge gained that might facilitate bringing the mer- chandise of India to Babylon and the central part of Asia by the Persian Gulf, or by the Red Sea to Egypt. Goods landed in Egypt might be brought by canals into the Nile, and dovm the Nile to Alexandria, and thence dispersed through Europe by the Medi- terranean and its communicating seas. Both these became and long continued important channels of trade — the for- mer, as long as the countries round the Euphrates were flourishing and wealthy ; the latter, till the bolder spirit of modem navigation had explored t I J I I IftO GREECE I it i passage round the continent of Africa. The latter traffic especially enriched every people engaged in conducting it, and made Alexandria long one of the greatest cities on the earth. Before the sailing of his fleet from the Indus, Alexander had commenced his march towards Persia. That he might provide for the relief of his crews at various stations along an unknown and inhospitable coast, he led a division of his troops through the dry and barren desert which stretches from the confines of India along the sea, the grave of every army which had hitherto at- tempted to cross it. The perilous march was not completed without the loss of many by fatigue and thirst; but the spirits of the soldiers were kept up by the fortitude of their commander, who took his full shnre in every hardship ; and, instead of riding among his cavalry according to his usual custom, dis- mounted, and walked in full armour, beneath the burning sun, at the head of the infantry. It happened once, when all had long been suffering from thirst, that some soldiers found a small pool, and tilling a helmet with water, brought it to the king. Alexander thanked them, but declared that he would have no relief in which all the army could not share, and taking the helmet, poured the water on the ground. The effect, we are told, was as if every man had drunk the water. Thus cheered and supported by the example of their leader, the troops completed their march into the fertile country beyond, where they were re- joined by their comrades, who had been sent by the safer and easier route through the higher regions. The attention of Alexander was now directed to the punishment of satraps and other officers, who had abused their authority in his absence, and to the bet- ter internal administration of his empire. He wisely strove to establish harmony between the different races of his sub- jects, and to throw into the shade, as far as might be, the distinctions of European and Asiatic, the conqueror and the conquered. The very highest offices of trust and favour were still in the hands of Macedonians; but, in general, the administration was shared in such a manner between the nations, as to tes- tify the impartiality of the sovereign, and his desire of ensuring equal protection to all his subjects. The army was exten- sively recruited with Asiatics, trained in the Grecian discipline, many of whom were admitted into the choicest and most distinguished bodies, both of foot and horse. Intermarriage between the dif- ferent races was encouraged, and the king himself, who had already been united with a Bactrian princess, con- tracted a second marriage with one of the daughters of Darius. These things were not done without opposition. The pride of conquest and of Grecian blood ill brooked to be associated on equal terms with vanquished barbarians ; and though much of Alexander's conduct only showed a just and liberal impar- tiality, there were parts of it which overstepped that boundary, and seemed to show an unworthy preference given to the more servile principles and more submissive manners of his Eastern sub- jects. Peucestas, being made satrap of Persia, learnt the Persian language, and habitually used it to the people of the country. He was justly praised by Alexander, and most unreasonably censured by the Macedonians. But he also took the Median dress, as had been done long since by Alexander himself ; and this was complained of, not unjustly, both in the king and the satrap. By learning the language and manners of Persia, Peucestas could address himself both to Asiatics and Europeans, with equal convenience and equal respect. By the change of dress, he seemed to be disowning the countrv of his birth, and affecting to consider himself rather as a Persian than a Macedonian. The offence which had been given by Alexander's adoption of Eastern manners was re- vived by his approval of similar conduct in his officer. All these causes swelled the murmur which had now begun to prevail, that Alexander had subjected, not Asia to Greece, but Greece to Asia ; and the result was a most perilous mutiny, and the threatened desertion of nearly all the Macedonians in the army. The commotion was however quelled by the energy and eloquence of Alexander, and his unbounded personal popularity among the soldiers. The short remainder of his life was chiefly spent in the improvement of Babylon, the ancient capital of the Ba- bylonian, Chaldaean, or second Assyrian empire, which he chose for the seat of his government in preference to Susa or Ecbatana, the capitals of the Persian and Median monarchies. The reasons for the selection were manifold. A wide and fruitful plain, and two mighty rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris, on the on j GREECE. ■ of which the city was built, while with the other it commanded a ready com- munication by numerous canals, made it a spot singularly fit for the support of a great collected population, and for all the purposes of trade, both inland and foreign. It was further recom- mended by its more central situation, and especially its lying nearer than the other capitals to Lower Asia and Europe. Babylonia, like Egypt, owed its extraor- dinary fertihty entirely to the overflowing of its river ; and to regulate this overflow the old monarchs had constructed chan- nels, dams, and various other works, of great extent. These had fallen into decay under the Median and Persian kings, who resided in the upper pro- vinces, and comparatively neglected the Babylonians ; but Alexander ap- plied himself vigorously to the work of restoration, and was rapidly bring- ing back the province to its ancient fruitfulness and prosperity, when, in the second summer of his residence at Ba bylon, as he was overlooking the works, with his wonted activity and careless- ness of his person, in an open boat among the unwholesome marshes, he was seized with a fever, and shortly after died, in the thirty-third year of his a^e, and the thirteenth of his reign. By some writers it has been represented that his sickness was rendered fatal by intemperance ; and a report was after- wards current among the Macedonians, which imputed his death to poison. But neither of these statements is counte- nanced by the most authentic records existing with respect to his last moments. (B. c. 323.) During the latter years of Alexander, Greece was generally quiet, and little remarkable occurred, except some con-- siderable party struggles in Athens. Before the battle of Chaeroneia, when strife ran highest in that city, Ctesiphon had proposed a decree, to honour Demo- sthenes with a golden crown, for his eminent public services. The crown he'mg voted, ^Eschines arraigned the decree, as irregular in form, and false in statement. It was passed, he said, while Demosthenes was accountable for an office, which he held, though the law expressly forbade the crowning any man while he had an account to render ; it appointed that the crown should be pre- sented at a time and place other than that which the law prescribed ; and it declared, that Demosthenes merited re- ward for eminent services ; whereas. Ml m truth, he was justly punishable for gross misconduct. On these grounds, yEschines impeached Ctesiphon, the pro- poser of the decree, and instituted proceedings against him for a penalty of fifty talents, upwards often thousand pounds. Soon after its commence- ment the prosecution was dropped, and slept for many years, till at last, while Alexander was warring in eastern Asia, it was resumed as a ready method of attacking Demosthenes, who then held the lead in Athens. The speeches of iEschines for the prosecution, and of Demosthenes for the defence, are the most elaborate works of their respective authors; and the latter in particular, which is commonly known as the Oration on the Crown, might alone prove De mosthenes the first of orators. The charge of informality may be considered as established; but that was, as well with the judges as with the advocates, a question very subordinate to the compa- rison instituted between the characters of the rival orators, and the merits of their respective systems of policy. Ctesiphon was acquitted, and the acxjuser failing to obtain a fifth of the votes, became liable to a heavy fine ;— so far had he under- rated the power of his opponent's elo- quence or interest. Unable to pay the fine, or perhaps unwilling to live under his triumphant enemies, ^schines quitted Athens, and retired to Rhodes. Not long before the death of Alex- ander, Demosthenes also went into ba- nishment. The circumstances which led to his retreat were these : Harpalus. an early and favoured friend of Alexan- der, being left at Babylon as satrap of the province, and treasurer over a more considerable portion of the empire, had abused his trust so grossly that on the king's return he was driven to rebellion by the fear of punishment. He had gathered six tJiousand soldiers, and with those he landed in Laconia, in the hope, it may be supposed, of engaging the La- cedaemonians to renew their opposition to Alexander. Failing there of support, he left his army, and went to Athens as a suppliant, but carrying with him money to a large amount. His cause was taken up by many eminent orators, hos- tile to Macedonia; and Demostlienes himself, who had at first held back, was prevailed on to espouse it. It failed, however ; the Athenians adhered to the existing treaties ; and Harpalus, being obliged to quit Athens, carried his troops into Crete, and there perished by assas- il i H i IS2 GREECE. aanahon. It was said that his gold had been largely distributed among his Athe- nian supporters, and a prosecution was instituted against Demosthenes and his associates, as having been bribed to miscounsel the people. Demosthenes, tindmg probably the popular current strong against him, and wishing, there- fore, to take his trial before a more dis- passionate tribunal, procured a decree to refer the matter to the Areiopagus. The court pronounced against the accused ; and Demosthenes, being fined in the sum of fifty talents (upwards of 10,000/.), withdrew to iEgina. The age of Philip and Alexander is remarkable no less in the philosophical than in the political history of Greece • and It is pleasing to turn from those two great idols of the vulgar, the fury of the conqueror, and the busy keenness of the state-intriguer, to energies more guilt- less and triumphs more lasting. The death of Socrates was soon repented by the Athenians; and so general was the admiration of that excellent man, that there were few succeeding philosophers who did not own his teaching as the fountain from which their doctrines were ultimately derived. His careless- ness of outward splendour and patience in hardship were imitated bv his scholar Antisthenes ; but that which was in the master a genuine indifference to all but moral and intellectual pre-eminence, and an equal estimation of wisdom and vnlue, whether in rags or in puri)le, became in the pupil an ostentatious pre- ference of poverty. Antisthenes was the head of a sect which made it their boast to discard all prejudices, all ar- bitrary hkmgs and dislikings, and to hve by the dictates of pure reason, with- out regard to the habits and opinions of men. But they who glory in freedom of thought are sometimes misled as far by the love of paradox as others by preju- dice. The followers of Antisthenes ri- diculed those who placed their hai)piness in the ostentation of riches; yet they were no less vainly boastful in the dis- play of their filth and raggedness • they ridiculed all who lived according to other men's opinions, and not to the? own; and they pursued their maxims even to the disregard of the most na- tural and necessary decencies. In speak- ing of the business, pomps, and pleasures of the world, they were apt to use a satiri- cal bitterness, that savoured more of spleen than of philosophical contempt rtom their rude and slovenly manner of life, Hnd their snarling moroseness, thev were known by the name of Cynics, or dog-philosophers. Of this sect was the celebrated Diogenes. Far more important are those phi- losophers who grew up in the school of Plato; the Academics, headed by Speusippus, Plato's nephew, and Xeno- crates, the Chalcedonian ; and the Peripatetics (walkers), the followers of Aristotle, who was bom at Stageirus a Grecian city in Thrace. The former were named from the hall and grove of Academus, where Plato, and, after him, Speusippus, usually discoursed : the lat- ter from Aristotle's manner of delivering his instructions while walking in the gardens of fhe I ycaeum. The doctrines of both were nearly the same, for though Aristotle often opposes his master, Plato, It IS commonly in points to which the Academics held but lightly, or which they entirely gave up. But the different character of the teachers variously af- fected their followers. Among many eminent names, the Academy had none ^ J^™ could rival those of Socrates and Plato ; the first of whom was wont to say that, when the oracle styled him the wisest of men, it was because he knew that he knew nothing, while others thought that they knew much. These words have been interpreted by many as directing them to acquiesce in universa scepticism : but it is plain, from the ge- neral tenour of his discourses, that So- crates rather meant to produce in his disciples a patient search for truth a due distrust m themselves, and a willing- ness to amend their most favourite con- clusions, should subsequent inciuiry prove It needful. However understood, the declaration betokens, both in the speaker and in the approving reporter a disposition very different from that of AristoUe, whose vast and varied erudi- tion and wonderful subUety and acute ness were joined with a somewhat do--- matical temper, and a strong desire to ^ve to his treatment of every subject an air of scientific completeness. Hence it comes that while the individual reputa- tion of Aristotle was almost unrivalled, his school was comparatively barren of eminent men: whereas most of the greatest Grecian philosophers in after times are found in the Academy and its many off-sets. For among the fol- lowers of Aristotle, improvement has ever been trammelled by the opinion that they had m his works a ])erfect system of human knowledge ; this made GREECE theni consent to expfam and enforce his conclusions, without pursuing them far- ther or inquiring into their evidence; and sometimes rendered them loth to examine a questionable position of their master, lest by loosening a single stone of the connected fabric they should disjoint and weaken the whole. The faults of Aristotle have probably contributed, as well as his merits, to the astonishing influence which his writings have exercised over ages so various and nations so widely scattered, as those in which his name has been regarded with an almost idolatrous veneration. He was, however, a man of understanding, at once the most comprehensive and the most discerning ; the father of philoso- phical criticism ; the ablest of Grecian speculative politicians; an acute and curious observer of all remarkable phe- nomena, whether in the material or in the intellectual worid. In attempting to demonstrate the conclusiveness of de- monstration, his logical works are essen- tially unphilosophical; but they are acf mirable as a classification of the forms which arguments may take, and the conditions necessary to render them conclusive. His power of systematic arrangement was indeed extraordinary, and the talent was accompanied by the disposition to riot in its exercise. This IS peculiarly striking in his ethics, in reading which we can hardly fail to be impressed with the idea that, while Plato teaches men to feel and act, the object of Aristotle is rather to instruct them how to define and classify their actions. On abstract questions, es- pecially of morals, he wants Plato's liveliness and distinctness of conception ; and hence his treatment of such subjects IS comparatively dry and barren. Inac- curacies are pointed out, and language and arrangement improved ; but lit- tle is done to open the mind to the reception of truth. It is where out- ward observation furnishes the materials on which reason is to work, that his superiority appears; and the more in proportion to the complexity of the con- siderations embraced in the question. And here he is as pre-eminent, as Plato IS, where the premises and the reason- ing process are both from within. But these unfortunately are not the passages which have chiefly attracted his undis- cnminating adorers : and hence, in those times when his authority has been most bUndly reverenced ; though his writings have often excited some degree of in- 153 tellectual activity among those whose minds would otherwise have slept in contented ignorance, they have often also misdirected that activity to unprofitable subtleties and idle verbal disquisitions. Chapter X. 0/ Greece, and of the Macedonian Em» pire,/rom the death of Alexander, to the death of Ptolemy and Seleucus, and the Invasion of Greece by the Gauls. The sudden death of Alexander seemed to leave his diadem as a prize to be fought for by his generals. A contest was threatened between different bodies of the army, but the wider heads suc- ceeded in effecting a peaceable settle- ment. Alexander had left two infant sons by Persian mothers, and a brother, Arrhidaeus, whose weakness of mind un^ fitted him for rule, but whose claim was nevertheless supported by the body of the Macedonian infantry. It was agreed that Arrhidaeus should take the kingly title, with the name of Philip, while Per- diccas, an eminent general, held, as protector, the ac'kial sway. The sa- trapies were distributed among the prin- cipal leaders, and mostly according to Alexander's appointment. Ptolemy was made the viceroy of Egypt, Antipater of Macedonia, I.ysimachus of Thrace, An- tigonus and Eumenes of diff'erent pro- vinces in Asia Minor; all men of note in Alexanders wars, and about to be- come yet more remarkable in those which were waged to acquire distinct kingdoms for themselves. The first commotion which disturbed the Macedonian empire arose from the Grecian colonies established by Alexan- der in Upper Asia. The settlers were mostly disabled soldiers, or such as, weary of a seemingly interminable war- fare, which carried them daily into re- gions more remote, preferred a grant of lands, with immediate quiet, to the chance of one day revisiting their native country with the fruits of their successful valour Many soon began to regret their choice, and to pine for Greece and Grecian customs and modes of hving • and it was only the fear of Alexander which prevented their return. On hear- ing of his death, they generally quitted their dwellings, assembled in a body of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, and began their march. They were met by Pithon, who had been commanded by Perdiccas to oppose *l 114 GREECE. them, and had gladly undertaken it, hoping to win them to his interest, and to make himself powerful by their means. With the aid of treachery m one of their chiefs, he vanquished ihem in battle : and then he offered them permission, laying down their arms, to return to their dwellings. Oaths were mutually given and received, and the disarmed and defenceless Greeks mingled fear- lessly among the Macedonians. But Perdiccas, suspecting the secret purpose of Pithon, had strictly charged him to slaughter them, and to distribute the spoils among his soldiers : and the Ma- cedonians, whether through obedience to the protector, or for the sake of the booty promised, fulfilled to the letter his bloody command, in defiance of their leader's wish, and of the faith just pledged. Antipaterwas soon at war with a con- federacy headed by the Athenians and iEtolians. The cause of quarrel was a promise given by Alexander, and en- trusted to Antipater for fulfilment, to restore all Grecian exiles to their several cities. In many states this would shake the government, in some would overturn it : and suspicion and resentment were the more excited, as there could be no doubt that whatever power was vested in the restored exiles would be exercised by them in entire subserviency to Mace- donia. Among those offended were the Athenians, who had recently colonised a part of Samos, which, if the measure of Antipater were carried through, they would be obliged to give up to the former owners. The richer part of them dis- liked the war, but the majority of the people approved it, and a vote was passed that the Athenians would assert the liberty of Greece, and free the cities which were held in awe by Macedonian garrisons. Fleets and armies were levied, and am- bassadors sent to rouse the Greeks into action ; and the iEtolians, Thessalians, Argians, and many others engaged in the enterprise. The Boeotians were bound to Macedonia by the possession of the Theban lands, which had been parcelled among them when the city was destroyed; and their defeat was the first exploit of Leosthenes the Athenian commander. Antipater, unable to raise an army equal to that of the hostile confederacy, tried one battle unsuccessfully, and then retir- ing to Lamia, a town of Thessaly, was there besieged by Leosthenes. In the course of the siege Leosthenes was killed, and Antiphilus succeeded him. The place was strong, and well de- fended, but the garrison was already starving, when the eminent Macedonian general Leonnatus raised the siege. Having thus far attained his object, in the battle which ensued he was defeated and killed ; and Antipater effected a junction with the beaten army, but still was weaker than his enemies. The scene was changed, when another armv came up, under Craterus, the best, in Alexan- der's judgment, of all his commanders since the death of Parmenion. The Ma- cedonians had already been twice victo- rious by sea, and they now attained a decided superiority on the land. Ambas- sadors came from the Grecian league to ask for peace ; but Antipater refused a general treaty, and required that each state should negotiate separately; and the war being pushed on briskly, fear drove all the cities successively to make terms for themselves, leaving the Athe- nians and iEtolians alone in opposition. Antipater led his host to Athens. While he was shut up in Lamia, peace had been denied him on any terms but un- conditional surrender. It was now the turn of the Athenians to sue for a capitu- lation, which Antipater refused to grant. Alike unable to stand a siege, and to ob- tain conditions, they gave themselves up to the conqueror's mercy, and their treat- ment was milder than they had reason to expect. They were left in possession of the city and its territory, and of all pro- perty, both public and private : but the democracy was abolished, and the poorer citizens entirely shut out from the powers of government. To such as wished to quit the city, Antipater offered lands in Thrace, and more than twenty-two thou- sand persons accepted the proffer. The rest remained untouched in person and property, but politically subjected to the privileged class of about nine thousand citizens, whose fortunes reached the standard fixed by Antipater. The laws of Solon were again adopted, as the rule of government, and all subsequent changes annulled. To guard against a counrer-revolution, a Macedonian garri- son was placed in Munychia, one of ihe ports of Athens : and Antipater having done these things returned into Mace- donia. Thus ended what was called the Lamian war, in the year after the death of Alexander, (b. c. 322.) The recovered ascendancy of the party hostile to Macedonia had led to the recal of Demosthenes : but Antipater'g victory and approach to Athens again GREECE. ISf ' "1 obliged him to retire. A decree of the people was passed in his absence, con- demning to death both himself and those associates who had fled with him. In ordinary cases this would only have operated as a sentence of perpetual ba- nishment ; but Antipater had been deeply and repeatedly offended by the fugitives, and his character was unforgiving. He sent emissaries to seize them in all the cities whither thev had fled, and all who were arrested were brought to him and put to death. Demosthenes had taken refuge in Calauria, an island sacred to Neptune, near the port of Troezen ; and being found there, that he might not fall into the hands of Antipater, he swallowed poison. Of the many states so lately leagued against Antipater, the iEtolians only had not submitted ; and they still held out, when the Macedonian leaders entered their country at the head of an army such as they could not cope with in the field. The weaker towns were abandoned, the stronger garrisoned and provided for a siege, while the mass of the people retired to the mountains, where bold and active men, acquainted with the country, might readily foil the powerful but cumbrous phalanx of the enemy. The Macedoni- ans attempting to drive them from their fastnesses were repulsed with loss ; but Craterus prudently gave up the endea- vour, and prepared to quarter his troops for the winter in the open country. The case of the -/Etolians now seemed hopeless. Remaining among the bairen and snowy heights, unprovided and un- sheltered, they might perish with cold and hunger : coming down into the plain they must fight and be beaten, for their enemies were far superior in numbers as well as in discipline and in the ability of their commanders. Submission, there- fore, seemed inevitable, till they were unexpectedly relieved by news arriving from Asia. Perdiccas seeking, while his ascendancy was doubtful, to connect himself closely with Antipater, had asked and obtained his daughter in marriage. His ambi- tion, however, had risen with his fortunes, so that he now aimed at nothing less than the royalty of Macedonia and its conquests ; as a step towards which he wished to put away his wife, and marry Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander. Aware that Antigonus, a friend of Antipater, and an able soldier and statesman, had penetrated his design, and was likely to oppose it, he endeavoured to destroy him by false accusations. Antigonus escap- ing to Europe, carried his tale to Anti- pater and Craterus, who made a hasty peace with the iEtolians, and prepared for war with Perdiccas. They allied themselves with Ptolemy, who was no less threatened than themselves. Per- diccas went in person against Ptolemy, but he sent a powerful army against Antipater, under Eumenes, an excellent officer, who had formerly been Alexan- der's confidential secretary. Eumenes found the enemy already in Asia, but he succeeded in falling on the division of Craterus when separated from the rest. Craterus fell in the bat- tle, and his army was defeated ; but this success came too late to benefit Perdic- cas. That commander's Egyptian cam- paign had been tedious and unsuccessful, and time was given for his troops to scan the characters of the rival leaders, and to draw conclusions far from being fa- vourable to their own. Perdiccas was violent, arbitrary, and often cruel ; Pto- lemy, mild and affably kind to his fol- lowers, and, at least by comparison with Perdiccas, liberal to his enemies ; he was also, like Alexander, remarkable for prowess as a combatant, and habi- tually profuse in the exposure of his per- • son, qualities ever highly conducive to the popularity of a general. The result was discontent in the army of Perdic- ' cas, which increased with every new delay and failure, and rose at length to such a height that Perdiccas was assas- sinated in his tent. The troops trans- ferred their obedience to Ptolemy, and the news of Eumenes's victory, which arriving sooner would probably have prevented their revolt, now only pro- duced a vote of death to Eumenes, and to fifty of his officers. For a short time after tliis, Eurydice, the wife of king Arrhidaeus, and niece of Philip, contended for power with Pithon, whom the soldiers had chosen protector in conjunction with another general. Pithon, finding himself the weaker, resigned his office ; but Antipa- ter, being: elected sole protector, quelled the intrigues of Eurydice. He then made a new allotment of various satra- pies, whereby Babylonia was entrusted to Seleucus, and Susiana added to the former commands of Antigonus, who was also appointed to conduct the war against Eumenes, with the authority of captain-general of Asia Minor, while Antipater, with ArrhidaBus, fixed his residence in Macedonia. Antigonus de- feated Eumenes in a great battle, and 11, ISC GREECE. !l obliged him to take refuge with a scanty band of followers in the strong hold of Nora, where Antifi:onus besieged him, having first suppressed the remaining friends of Perdiccas. The siege was lon^ protracted by the resolution and ability of Eumenes, and still continued, when the death of Antipater gave a wider field to the ambition of Antigonus. (B.C. 318.) Antipater left the regency to Poly- sperchon, one of the oldest of Alexan- der's surviving generals. This was highly displeasing to Cassander, Antipater's son, who had himself expected to suc- ceed to it ; but his party being too weak for open resistance, he escaped into Asia, and besought the aid ot Antigonus. Both Antigonus and Pto- lemy promised their assistance, pro- fessedly through friendship for his father, but really to promote their own ag- grandisement and secure their indepen- dence bv embarrassing Polysperchon, and weakening the general government. In the Grecian towns which had been garrisoned by Antipater, or in which the constitution had been altered and the ruling party changed by him, the leading men mostly favoured Cassander. Polysperchon therefore undertook to make these states his own by undoing all that Antipater had done. He pro- claimed himself the patron of universal independence; re-established democra- cies in place of the oligarchies set up by Antipater, and recalled the exiles ba- nished for opposing him. Moreover, he procured that the chief partisans of Antipater, in each state, should suffer exile, confiscation, or death, though it was to Antipater chiefly that he owed his present greatness. His party was strengthened by the accession of Eu- menes, and of Olympias, the mother of Alexander, a violent woman of some ability, and an inveterate enemy of Antipater and his son. Since Athens submitted to Antipater, a Macedonian garrison had constantly held Munychia, We have seen several instances of a like proceeding, and par- ticularl}^ in the occupation of the Athe- nian citadel by the Lacedaemonians during the tyranny of the Thirty, and of that of Thebes, after the treachery of Phcebidas. In both these instances, the object was at once to ensure the ascen- dancy of a ruling party, friendly to the foreign power, which maintained the J^arrison, and to keep the city not only m alliance, but in a kind of subjection. Accordingly the troops were command- inffly posted in the Acropolis, and all political measures were concerted with the Lacedaemonian commander, and carried through by his support. But the present government of Athens was on a different footing. The chief au- thority remained with Phocion, who was recommended ])y his superior cha- racter and talents, and by the high esteem in which he was known to be held by Antipater. He was not a per- son likely to aim at power by holdino- his country in subjection to foreigners ; but It is probable that the mildness of the terms which were granted to the city was chiefly produced by respect to Phocion, and by ,*he wish to settle affiiirs in- such a manner, that he and his friends might honourably ex- ercise the powers of government. The party of Phocion was the weaker in numbers, and that weakness was the more dangerous, as in the turbulent times which had just been passing, both the authority of the laws had been considerably shaken, and the cha- racter of the people deteriorated. In these circumstances the greater part were probably not unwilling that a force should be at hand, which might en- courage their friends, dishearten their enemies, and, perhaps, turn the scale, should it be necessary, in case of se- dition or civil war. And if Phocion himself, or any others of the sterner patriots among them, disliked an ar raniiement which trenched so far on the independence of their country, they would nevertheless be obliged to submit to it as the only means of giving to Antipater that confidence in the stability of their government, which would induce him to abstain from harsher measures of coer- cion. But the Macedonian force was posted neither in the city, nor in Peiraeeus, but in one of the inferior ports; its commander was not consulted in 'any measures of the government, nor were his troops employed in carrying them into effect ; and their presence was only designed as a security to Antipater against the danij:er of hostility on the part of the government, and to the go- vernment, against that of popular in-^ surrection. r Immediately on the death of Antipater and before it was known at Athens' Cassander had sent Nicanor. an officer entu-ely devoted to him. to take the command of the garrison in Munychia. When the breach with Polysperchon GREECE. 157 had become decided, Nicanor urged the Athenian people to remain in friendship with Cassander ; but the support of the new protector had again given courage to the democratical party, and the an- swer made was a requisition to withdraw his troops, according to the royal pro- clamation. He persuaded them to grant a few days respite, during which he secretly gathered strength to stand a siege. The Athenians sent ambassadors to ask for aid of the king and Poly- sperchon, and held repeated assemblies to deliberate on the conduct of the war ; but Nicanor in the mean time raised a powerful force of mercenaries, and, issuing one nig:ht unexpectedly from Munychia, made himself master of Peiraeeus. The Athenians now ap- pointed an embassy, with Phocion at its head, to require that Nicanor would desist from his aggression, and restore to them their independence, as the king had commanded. Nicanor at first re- ferred them to Cassander, under whose authority he was acting ; but when their demand was backed by letters from Olympias, and by the approach of an army under Alexander, the son of Poly- sperchon, he became alarmed, and promised to evacuate the place. He delayed, however, to perform his pro- mise, and Alexander arriving, soon proved that his intention was not to restore their ports to the Athenians, but to retain them for himself. Meanwhile the Athenian people held an assembly, with every circumstance of tumult and confusion, in which they voted the com- plete re-establishment of democracy, and the death or banishment of all who had borne office in the oligarchy, of whom the most conspicuous was Phocion. The exiles fled to the camp of Alexan- der, and were sent by him to his father's court, and recommended to his favour. They were followed thither by an Athe- nian embassy, sent to accuse them, and to demand their surrender. Polysper- chon had now repented the treachery which he had meditated against the Athenians, but which shame and fear had prevented him from fulfilling, and he hoped by a second act of baseness to soften the resentment excited by the first. He gave up the fugitives, in words, to stand theu* trial, but, in truth, to perish by the party fury of their bit- terest enemies. When the victims were brought before the assembly, their voices were drowned by the clamour of their judges, who were mostly of the persons newly restored to a share in the govern- ment, from which they had been ex- cluded after the victory of Antipater. Every one was hooted down, who at- tempted to speak in favour of the ac- cused, and a tumultuous vote was passed, condemning all the prisoners to death. The}^ were for the most part men of distinguished rank and respectable character, and while their hard fate affected many with pity and consternation, there were others who vented in insults that envious ma- lice which, while its objects were in prosperity, had been prudently sup- pressed. One of these wretches is said to have spit on Phocion, as he was led to prison; but the outrage failed to ruffle the composure of the captive, who only looked towards the magistrates, and asked—** Will no one stop this man's indecency ?" Before he drank the hemlock, he was asked if he had any message for his son ; he replied—** I bid him cherish no resentment aeainst the Athenians." Thus perished a statesman and warrior of eminent ability ; but far more remarkable for the rarer gift of determined uprightness. The Athenians soon repented of their deed ; they erected to him a statue of brass, and honoured with a public funeral his remains, which had at first been cast out unburied. His principal accuser was put to death, and the others driven into exile ; the people hoping, as in many other instances, to atone for their crime by punishing their advisers. Shortly afterwards Cassander landed in Peiraeeus, with four thousand soldiers. He was there besieged by Polysperchon, who soon, however, found himself in want of provisions to maintain his army; and therefore, leaving a division of his forces at Athens, he proceeded with the greater part into Peloponnesus, in the hope of enforcing the obedience of the Megalopolitans, who were warm sup- porters of Cassander. Meanwhile Cas- sander sailed against the ^ginetans, and readily brought them over to his party. The Salaminians, refusing com- pliance, were besieged and brought to extremity, when Polysperchon sent an armament, which obliged Cassander to retire. The protector then returned into Peloponnesus, and called a meeting of the cities, and to such as did not attend it he sent ambassadors. He offered alliance to all, on the conditions that they should establish democracy, and put to death their oligarchical il \ 4Ji lit ;M rulers established by Antipater. The greater part immediately entered on a course of bloody executions ; the friends of Antipater were slain or banished ; democrac;r was eveiywhere embraced, and with It the alliance of Polysperchon. me Megalopolitans alone firmly clunff to the party of Cassander ; they secured their moveables within the city, stren^h- ened their walls, enrolled and numbered me inhabitants, both slaves and free and appointed to each his particula^ province in the defence ; they did all. m short, which befitted resolute men when preparing to be besieged by an enemy of overwhelming force. The Macedonian host was highly formidable both by numbers and discipline : and it was well provided with skilful engineers. A breach was effected, and desperate attempts made to carry it ; but all were foiled by the courage of the besieged, and the able conduct of their leader. Ihe besiegers had elephants, which are now first mentioned als used in Greece, though they had long been common in the wars of Asia. The approaches to the brewh were levelled, and it was attempted to force a passage with the elephants ; but spikes had been set to pierce their feet, and prevent their ad- vancing while they were plied with darts till many feU, and the rest recoil- ing trampled down their employers.— a danger which has always attended the use of such uncertain auxiliaries. In tfte end Polysperchon was obliged to raise the siege, and attend to matters of deeper interest His failure determined most of the Grecian cities to seek the friendship of Cassander. The Athe- nians, unable otherwise to recover their ports, negotiated for peace, and peace was made on the terms that they should enjoy their city and territory, with all their ports, except Munychia, which Gas- sander should hold dunng the war ; that he should nominate an Athenian citizen to be at the head of the administration ; and that all, whose property feU short of ten minae (about 34/..) should be ex- cluded from the government. The conduct of Polysperchon had been but weak, and the queen Eurydice appears to have succeeded in that which was her constant endeavour, to supplant him in the management of her feeble husband, and the government of Mace- donia. To recover his lost power he Drought Olympias into play. He 'ad- vanced with her into Macedonia, and Eurydice and Arrhidaeus led their forces GREECE. !2f^.^^?» but the Macedonians refused to fight against the mother of ;^«J^ n*'^ and Eurydice and her bus- baad fell into the power of Olympias. She mercilessly abused her success' tt*e royal captives were put to death with circumstances of studied cruelty* and the chief friends of Cassander were CfK^ ^'"lu^' slaughter, including his brother with a hundred of the most emment Macedonians. But the hour of vengeance was not far off. Cassander had been umted with Eurydice, by the closest fnendship certainly, and, if pre- vailing report be trusted, by unlawful love. He was now hastening to avenge her death, and that of his brother and friends By vast activity he made his way into Macedonia, though great en- deavours had been made by the friends of Polysperchon to occupy the passes. TTie barbanty of Olympias had dis^sted the Macedomans. and she now obtained from them but little support. She was besieged through the winter in Pydna. and in the spring the town was oblicr^ to submit, and Olympias surrendered, onjy stipulatmg for her life. The sequel is an abominable tissue ni K*!?^''^.^'^ ™"^«''- Amphipolis only by her bidding that Aristonous. the commander was induced to surrender the place. The high character of Aris- tonous excited apprehension in Cassan- der who had adopted the base policy of destroying all whose ability was such that their opposition might be dange- rous. He procured the death of Aris- tonous ; and then proceeded by dark and crooked ways to fulfil his revenge against Olympias. Some of the kindred of those whom she had murdered were prevailed on to accuse her in the Mace- donian assembly ; she was absent, and had none to speak for her ; and the as- sembly condemned her to death. Cas- sander sent some of his own friends to advise her to secret flight; he offered to provide a ship which should convey her to Athens ; and this he did that, by her flight, she might appear to acknow- ledge the justice of her sentence, and might then be put to death in the course of the voyage. She refused to escape, and demanded to be heard in her defence before the assembled Macedonians ; but Cassander. dreading the effect of her presence, withheld his consent. He then selected two hundred soldiers to dispatch her ,^ they entered the house, but on see- mg her their resolution failed, and they GREECE* 159 retired. At length the execution was performed by the kindred of her victims. She died with the greatest firmness. (B.C. 3 15.) Cassander was now the undisputed lord of Macedonia, and, to confirm his ascendancy, married Thessalonica, the daughter of Philip, and half sister of Alexander. As a permanent memorial of his greatness he founded a city in the peninsula of Pallene, and named it Cassandreia. He transported thither the inhabitants of Potidaea and of se- veral neighbouring cities, and there he olanted the remnant of the unfortu- nate Olynthian people. The territory allotted to the settlement was large and fruitful; it grew and flourished, and became the most powerful of the Mace- donian cities. Cassander also rebuilt Thebes in the twentieth year after its destruction by Alexander, many Grecian states, and especially Athens, assisting in the work. On learning the death of Antipater, Antigonus had attempted to win over Eumenes to his interest, and had offered as the price of his support to restore his safrapy and to grant him yet higher honours than he had before enjoyed. While the negotiation was pendmg, Eumenes escaped from Nora, and again made head in Cappadocia: and when Polysperchon had been declared pro- tector, and Antigonus had openly dis- claimed the royal authority, Eumenes, having declared himself in favour of the king ArrhidaBus, and of Polysperchon who then governed in his name, was appointed commander in chief of the royal forces, and soon found himself again at the head of a powerful army His situation was still very difiicult and dangerous. Eumenes was a Thracian Greek, of Cardia in the Chersonese, and the pride of the Macedonian offi- cers and soldiers ill brooked to be commanded by a foreigner ; nor was it likely to be forgotten, in any time of discontent, that he had already been condemned to death by a vote of the army. The means which he took to mitigate the envy attaching to his station curiously illustrates the character of the age and of the people. He declined a present of five nundred talents offered by the king, on the ground that he did not need it, for he wished not to be placed in any situation of power or splendour, but had unwillingly accepted his present command in compliance with authority which he was bound to obey. He then related a remarkable dream. He had thought, he said, that he saw king Alexander sitting oa his throne, and issuing orders to his generals : and from thence he gathered the direction that a golden throne should be set forth, with the diadem, and sceptre and other en- signs of royalty; that sacrifice should be performed to it, as if the deified spirit of the departed hero were actually there present ; that all councils of war should be held before the throne, and all com- mands issued in the name of Alexander, as if he were living. The proposal was adopted. The load of envy that weighed on Eumenes was greatly lightened when the orders ran not in his name, but in that of Alexander. The affections of the Macedonians were gratified and their superstitious hopes excited by the imagination that they were warring under the patronage and guidance of their late invincible king: and the ad- vantage which Eumenes had gained by adroitly practising on the superstition of his followers, was so improved by his uniform affability and courtesy, both to chiefs and soldiers, that he soon brought the army into a temper favourable to cheerful obedience and zealous service, and long maintained them in it, in spite of several attempts to stir up mutiny which were made both by Ptolemy and Antigonus. The war was continued through several campaigns, with various success, and with signal proof of ability in both the opposing leaders. But Eumenes was surrounded with chiefs who were inclined to dispute his autho- rity, and whose influence in the army was greater than his own ; and not all his skill could for ever convert jealous rivals into obedient lieutenants. By the desertion of one of his principal officers, he lost a battle when the victory seemed within his grasp : and in the following night, while he was urging the division of his troops which had been victorious to try the fortune of another struggle, they secretly negotiated with Antigonus, and made their peace by betraying their commander. He was delivered to Anti- gonus. and soon after put to death. This happened in the same year with the death of Olympias. The grasping desires of Antigonus now knew no bounds, and to gratify them he spared neither treachery nor blood. Pithon, the satrap of Media, lured into his power by professions of friendship, was accused, condemned, and executed. Seleucus the ruler of Baby- «.!. _l J' Iff GREECE. f' Ionia had served him eminently in the wai*, but this did not prevent Antigonus from seeking to despoil him. He led his forces to Babylon, where they were en- tertained in the most friendly manner. On arriving he demanded an account of the revenues arising from the province. Seleucus replied that he owed him no account for the government which had been freely given to himself by the Mace- donians in reward for his services in the wars of Alexander. A quarrel ensued, and Seleucus, warned by the fate of Pithon, saved himself by flight. He arrived in the court of Ptolemy, who received him with dl kindness; and a league was quickly formed between Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Cassander, and Seleucus, to curb the threatening ambi- tion of Antigonus. It is needless to dwell on wars in which there was no political principle in question, nor any object even of national ambition : in which the lust of personal ag^andisement deigned not even to veil its gross features with the flimsy cover of narrow and exclusive patriotism; but subject millions were only considered as the counters and the stake in the game of conquest, and pro- vinces with their inhabitants were lost and won, as if they had been estates with the live stock required for their cultiva- tion. In Greece, indeed, disorganized as it had been by the frequent interference of Macedonian kings and generals with its political relations, it was still necessary to make pretence of some attention to the public good. Each contending po- tentate proclaimed aloud to the Greeks that he fought to free them from the tyranny of his opponent ; each found a party to support him in various ci- ties : for in every state there was war without and strife within, with the certainty that whether the friends of Cassander prevailed or those of Anti- gonus, they would be equally bound down in unlimited subserviency to their too powerful ally. Hostilities were actively carried on by land and sea, in Europe and in Asia, and many battles fought with various changes of success and defeat. The party of Antigonus gained ground in Greece; and in Peloponnesus paiticu- larly, as well as in Boeotia and Locris, it became decidedly superior. Mean- while, Antigonus bemg employed in pur- suing the war in Greece and in Asia Minor, the defence of Syria was entrusted to Demetrius his aon, a you*h of great spirit and ability. In the thini year of the war, (b. c. 312.) Demetrius was com- pletely defeated at Gaza by the forces of Ptolemy and Seleucus. The opportu- nity was inviting, and Seleucus resolved to attempt the recovery of his satrapy. He had been, like Ptolemy, honourably remarkable among the chiefs of his time for mildness of character and attention to the welfare of his subjects : and so confident was he in his popularity among the Babylonians, that if Ptolemy had been unwilling to furnish troops for the enter- prise he would have gone up attended only By his sons and personal friends. As It was, he carried with him but eight hundred foot and two hundred horse; but the people flocked from all sides to his standard; he soon became master of the province, almost without resist- ance, and then went on to conquer the neighbouring satrapies of Susiana and Media — so rapid and easy was his change from a destitute wanderer to a powerful prince, from a mere dependant of Ptolemy to a valuable ally ! At the time when the Athenians ^eed to receive as their governor a citizen of their own who should be nominated by Cassander, Demetrius of Phalerum, one of the smaller ports of Athens, was chosen to the office, which he exercised with great moderation and benevolence. The government continued in the form in which it was then esta- blished till the year B. C. 307, when Demetrius the son of Antigonus arriving in Greece with a powerful fleet and army, and with a commission to hberate all the cities, but especially Athens, com- menced his operations by making him- self master of Peiraeeus. The majority of the Athenian people was already fnendly to Antigonus, from whom they expected the restoration of democracy : it was vain to resist, and Demetrius the Phalerean consented to go at the head of an embassy to the son of Antigonus. He stipulated according to his instruc- tions for tlie independence of the com- monwealth, and personally also for safety to himself: and both demands being granted, he retired with a safe-con- duct to Thebes, and afterwards to the court of Ptolemy, where he employed himself in literary pursuits during the remainder of his life. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, bemg admitted into Athens, "invested Munychia, which was still held by the soldiers of Cassander. An accom- plished commander in every respect. i he was especially remarkable for in- ventive genius as an engineer, and skill in conducting sieges, in^omnch that he was popularly distinguished by the title Munychia, thousfh a place of ^reat strength and well defen^ded, was S wo,l ^of ^"- ^'r*r ' completed his Tr^ni- l^''!!!^/^^^^^™ *o Athens by demohshmg the fortress which had held It in subjection. The democracy was re- established m the fifteenth year after its suppression by Antipater : and the people went on to express their gratitude by extravagant honours paid to Deme- trius and his father. Golden statue^of fhoS bjth were set on chariots near to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton • massive golden crowns were voted to them, and altars erected at which thev were honoured as gods, and with the title of saviours : and as every Athenian ward (phyle) had its protecting hero after whom It was named and to whom its members paid a peculiar worship, two new wards were added to the ten already existing, and were named respectivelV alter Antigonus and Demetrius. Demetrius now, in. obedience to in- structions sent by his father, called a meeting of deputies from the allied cities to take counsel for the interests of Greece and himself proceeded to dis- lodge the forces of Ptolemy from Cyprus. He had defeated the opposing army «iere, and shut it up in the city !f Sala^ mis, when Ptolemy came in person with a powerful armament to the aid of his officers. A great and well contested sea fight ensued, m which Ptolemy being de- feated withdrew to Egypt,andgave upthe island. On receiving the news of this «-eat success, Antigonus and his son assumed the kingly diadem, and the example was foUowed by Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, (b. c. 306.) In the follow- ing year Antigonus attempted to decide the war by invading Egypt : but the ma- I'T x??^^^ ^"^ *^^ b^'^nks and mouth ot the Nile were so strongly guarded and actively defended, that his fleet could not make good a landing nor his army force the passage of the river, and he was obliged to retu-e with loss. The island of Rhodes had anciently been divided among three cities, Lin- dus. lalysus, and Cameinis; but to- war ?hl- uuf °^ *^ Peloponnesian war the inhabitants had united them- name of the island. They were oW- chicaUy governed, when ^under lice- GREECE. 161 da-monian supremacy; democraticallr when under Athenian; bTtTe S' flourished under both. When Rlin!?i! combined with Chios and ByzanHum fn revolt against the Athenians! the demo eracy seems to have been stH main tamed: but after the termination oHhat war It was overthrown by an insurrec ion of the wealthy Few Ind ihewZhe- rents assrsted by Mausolus the king of Caria. Under its new government Rhodes continued to increase i^S Sectef h '^T "^^^^ '' ^^y be in- terred that the administration vvas not inattentive to the wishes and interests o he people ; for maritime power ahvavs strengthened the popular \,arty, and ^f inerefoie have discouraged rather than favoured the gi-owf h of tlfe navTwe te told, indeed, in one fragment of a concern! porary historian (Theopompus, quoted by A hen^us.) that there was a tune when all power was in the hands of a small e^c^h l^^^-^fl^^^^^te men, who suppoHed each other in every outrage which their fierce passions or brutal Caprices could ^TX .V' '^^^'^ that they actua y played at dice for the chastity of vir- gins and matrons, and that the condition of the game was that all should assist he winner to gratify his lust either by persuasion or violence. But what- ever chances may have enabled a small faction to exercise for a while so hateful Vrf^""^' '^ """'* ^^^^ quickly faUen. and the government have reverted to ^fn ^^^,^ body of citizens having cer tam qualifications of birth and property. In the ordmary state of the Rhodian aristocracy its conduct was moderate ana upright ; so we are told by ancient writers, and their testimony is confirmed by the prosperity of the commonwealth, and by its contmual increase in com- mercial wealth and naval power. When ail me Lrrecian seas were swarming with pirates, the Rhodians alone for the com- mon good undertook and effected their suppression. They were highly re- spected by Alexander, though he kept a garrison m their city, which, on receiving the news of his death, they immediately expelled. As the Macedonian supre- macy appears to have been generally favourable to oligarchy, notwithstanding the patronage which Alexander, in the outset of his career, found it expedient to bestow on the democratical interest in Asia Mmor. it is probable that this change was accompanied with an in- crease of power in the great body of the M im 6RE£C£ people. The Rhodians stood aloof from the quarrels of the chiefs who divided the empire of Alexander, and kept friend- ship with them all, thus enjoying peace when every other state was at war. This could not last for ever. Their habits and interests especially inclined them to close connection with Ptolemy and Egypt: and though they avoided giving any just cause of offence to Anti- gonus,his violent spirit would be satisfied with nothing short of unqualified sup- port. This being refused, he commis- sioned officers to seize the Rhodian traders bound for Egypt ; and when the execution of the order was resisted, he prepared an armament against the island. The Rhodians endeavoured to pacify him by compliments and submissions, but finding him inexorable they made ready for defence. In the year which followed the attack of Antigonus on Egypt, (b. c. 304) Demetrius laid siege to Rhodes. The Rhodians sent to solicit the aid of Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, and took measures to increase to the utmost their military force, and to unite the hearts and quicken the zeal of all who were in the city. Strangers and foreign residents were invited to join in the defence, but all unservice- able persons were sent away. It was voted that slaves, who fought with courage and fidelity, should be purchased from their masters, emanci* pated, and made citizens ; that every citizen, who fell in battle, should have a public funeral ; that his surviving parents should be supported, and his children educated by the state; that marriage portions should be given to his daughters, and a suit of armour publicly presented at the feast of Bac- chus to each of his sons on coming of age. The rich men freely gave their money, the poor their labour, the artificers their skill; all strove to surpass each other in zeal and exertion. The besieging army was numerous and disciplined, well supplied, and well ap- pointed, and provided with every variety of warlike engines which the science of the age and the mechanical genius of the commander could furnish. Assaults were made by land and sea, in various fashions and with various success ; but no decisive advantage could be gained over the resolute and active defenders of the city, who not only kept the walls, hnt made several vigorous saUies, in . some of which they succeeded in destroy- ing many ships and engines of the be- siegers. Demetrius at length gave up the hope of successfully attacking them from tne sea, and turned all his atten- tion to his operations on the side towards the land. The Rhodians, taking advan- tage of this to employ their ships in distant cruizes, made prize of many vessels belonging to Antigonus, and in- tercepted some convoys, which were coming to the enemy's camp. Mean- time the siege was pressed by land, and the walls were shaken in many places, all which the Rhodians made good by new defences built within ; and just as they were beginning to be discouraged by the power and perseverance of their adversary, their confidence was renewed by the arrival of an Eofj'ptian fleet, with supplies in great abundance. The siege was protracted for a year. A second fleet was sent by Ptolemy, which brought large supplies, and a considerable reinforcement of troops. Ambassadors came from Athens, and from many other Grecian states, to in- treat that Demetrius would be recon- ciled with the Rhodians. He yielded so far as to grant a suspension of arms, and commence a negotiation; but the terms could not be agreed on, and the war was renewed. He then attempted a surprise by night. Under cover of the darkness, a chosen body of soldiers en- tered the town through a breach which had been made ; and the rest of the army supported them at day-break oy a general assault on the walls. But the Rhodians were cool and firm. All who were defending the ramparts remained at their posts, and made them good against the enemies without ; while the rest of the citizens, with the auxiliaries from Egypt, went against those within the city. In the violent contest which ensued the townsmen were victorious, and few of the storming party escaped out of their hands. Letters now came from Antigonus, directing his son to make peace with the Rhodians, on what conditions he could ; and Demetrius accordingly wished for an accommodation on any terms that would save his credit. The Rhodians were no less anxious for peace ; and the more so, as Ptolemy had written to them, promising further aid in case of need, but advising them to put an end to the war on any reasonable conditions. Peace was soon concluded on the terms that the Rhodians should be indepen- dent, and should retain all their reve- . i GREECE. 163 nues; but that they should assist Antigonus in all his wars, excepting against Ptolemy, and should give one hundred hostages, in pledge of fidelity to their engagements. Thus released from danger, the Rhodians proceeded to fulfil their promises, and reward those who had served them well. Fit honours were bestowed upon the bravest combatants among the free inhabitants, and fi*eedom, with citizenship, given to such of the slaves as had deserved it. Statues were erected to Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, all of whom had assisted them largely with provi- sions. To Ptolemy, whose benefits had been by far the most conspi- cuous, more extravagant honours were assigned. The oracle of Ammon was consulted, to learn whether the Rhodians might not be allowed to worship him as a god ; and, permission being given, a temple was actually erected in his honour. Such instances have already occurred in the case of Alexander, and in that of Antigonus and Demetrius at Athens; but it must be remembered that such a practice would not bear, in Grecian eyes, the same unnatural and impious character which it does in ours, since the step was easy from hero- worship, which had long formed an important part of their religion, to the adoration of distinguished men, even while alive. Demetrius sailed to Greece to op- pose Cassander, expelled his garrisons from Sicyon and Corinth, and from many other important places, and as- sembled a congress at the Isthmus, by which he was elected captain-general of the Greeks. He had generally the people in his favour; so that his conquests were easy and sure, and he had seldom occasion to weaken his army by garrisons. Meanwhile Cas- sander and Lysimachus plamied an expedition against Antigonus, and Ly- simachus, leading an armament into Asia, gained considerable successes; while Cassander remained in Thessaly to check the progress of Demetrius, Lysimachus was obliged by the approach of Antigonus to act on the defensive, while Seleucus was coming down from Upper Asia to help him ; but he con- trived at the approach of winter to with- draw his army firom the camp in which it was besieged by Antigonus, and Anti- gonus declining to follow him, the three kings dispersed their forces into winter- iiuarters. In the following year (b. c. 301 ) the three kings again took the field, and Demetrius having been recalled from Greece to join his father, a decisive action took place near Ipsus in Phry- gia. The armies were nearly equal, and the victory was hotly contested ; but in the end Antigonus was slain, and his army completely defeated. The victors proceeded to divide the possessions of Antigonus; but Demetrius escaping, marched to Ephesus with five thousand foot and four thousand horse, and thence embarked for Athens, where he had left the chief part of his navy and his treasure. To the gratitude of the Athenians he trusted for a refuge, and for assistance in the recovery of his for- tunes ; and the most bitterly felt of all his present mortifications was when he was met by Athenian ambassadors, who requested that he would not approach their city, since the people had voted, not to receive within it any of the con- tending monarchs. But he suppressed his resentment, and sent to request the restoration of his ships and money, which having obtained, he employed them m a desultory warfare against Lysimachus. Seleucus had now transferred to Lysi- machus the jealousy, of whwh the fallen fortunes of Demetrius could no longer be the object ; and hearing that Lysi- machus and his son had each received in marriage a daughter of Ptolemy, he thought it would conduce to his security to marry Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrius. He also reconciled Deme- trius with Ptolemy, and procured that he should marry Ptolemy's daughter, but the concord existing between Seleu- cus and his father-in-law was soon de- stroyed by a quarrel relating to Cilicia, which Demetrius had recently con- quered from Pleistarchus, the brother of Cassander, and which Seleucus wished to purchase from him. Since the Lamian war the Athenian government had been completely disor- dered by the number of revolutions through which it had passed, and which had mostly been effected by foreign in- terference. There had recently been struggles within the city, in which one Lachares had obtained the supremacy as tyrant ; and through the present confu- sion and weakness of the state Deme- trius hoped to make himself its master. Having failed in his first attempt, he gathered powerful reinforcements, again blockaded the city, and reduced it to M 3 iS4 GREECE. extremity by famine. He defeated a fleet which Ptolemy, who was now again at variance with him, had sent to relieve the place, and obliged the Athenians to sub- mit themselves to his mercy ; but he made use of no severities, and contented himself with securing their obedience by a garrison. He defeated the Lacedaemo- nians near Mantineia, and penetrated to Sparta; but in the midst of his suc- cesses he received the alarming news that all his cities in Asia had been taken by Lysimaehus, and all in Cyprus, excepting Salaniis, by Ptolemy. Another field of action now was open- ed by the death of Cassander (b. c. 296) and the quarrels of his sons, Antipater and Alexander. The mother, Thessa- lonice, favouring Alexander, was mur- dered by Antipater; but Alexander called to his aid both Demetrius and Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus, and Antipater flying to the court ot Lysima- chus, whose daughter he had married, was, notwithstanding their connexion, put to death by him. Before the ar- rival of Demetrius, Pyrrhus being nearer had performed the service, and had rewarded himself with a consi- derable portion of the Macedonian king- dom. Demetrius's coming was now unwelcome to his ally ; and jealousy arising between them, Alexander at- tempted his life, but was counterplotted and slain, and Demetrius obtained the kingdom of Macedonia. Most of Greece was already in the in- terest of Demetrius, and he twice con- quered the Boeotians, who were hostile to him, and twice took the city of Thebes, though not without a vigorous resistance, in the course of which he was severely wounded. But his most formidable enemy was Pyrrhus, a restless prince, but a brave and skilful commander. He was a descendant of Achilles, and a kinsman of Alexander ; and his greatest ambition was to emulate the deeds of those celebrated blood- shedders. His signal proofs of warlike ability had won him the hearts of the Macedo- nians, which Demetrius had forfeited by haughtiness, licentiousness, and insolent contempt of the feelings of his people. Yet so dreaded by the other monarchs were the talents and spirit of Demetrius, that Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimaehus combined with Pyrrhus to crush him. In the sixth year of his reign, his king- dom was at once invaded on different sides by Lysimaehus and Rolemy. He found that he could not trust his soldiers against Lysimaehus, and he, therefore, led them against Pyrrhus ; but they soon broke out into' open mutiny, and Demetrius was obliged to steal away in the habit of a common soldier, while Pyrrhus, coming up, received the sub- mission of his army, and easily occupied his kingdom, (b. c. 287.) Demetrius sailed into Asia, hoping to gain some of the provinces of Lysimaehus, but his forces were insufficient, and after a toil- some campaign he was driven into Cili- cia, which belonged to Seleucus. Hence he wrote to Seleucus calling to mind their affinity, and intreating pity for his fallen condition : but after considerable hesitation Seleucuss compassion yielded to his fears and jealousies, and he led an army against his father-in-law. De- metrius defended himself with the fury of despair, and in most encounters had the advantage ; but he was at length de- serted by his soldiers, and made prisoner. He was closely confined, but otherwise honourably treated, for the rest of his lite, which was shortened by intemperanct*. Such was the end of a man, whose ta- lents, courage, and natural generosity of disposition, if chastened by temperance, and directed by philanthropy, would have made him truly glorious ; but whose rare gifts were alternately drowned in bound- less debaucheries, and perverted to tlie purposes of selfish and wasting ambition. Pyrrhus was driven from Macedonia, after seven months' possession, by Ly- simaehus, who held it five years and a half, at the end of which he fell in battle against Seleucus. Both Ptolemy and Demetrius had died in the year preceding this event, and in that which followed it Seleucus was assassinated by another Ptolemy sumamed Ceraunus, who had fled to his court from that of Lysima- ehus, and had been most kindly enter- tained. The year of Seleucus's death (b. c. 280) was also that when Pyrrhus passed into Italy, to assist the Grecian colony of Tarentum against the Romans, and it was the same in which the Achaian league first revived, a portion of history which will form the subject of part of the next chapter. Seleucus was killed in the course of an expedition to take possession of the kingdom of Lysimaehus : and the mur- derer seized on Macedonia, and held it till he was slain in battle by the Gauls, which took place sixteen months after the death of Lysimaehus, and nine after that of Seleucus.* • See Cx.iNToN'8 Fast. Helltr, GREECE. 1€S These barbarians were sprung fi-om that vast portion of the European con- tinent, which extends from the Rhine to the P)Tenees, and firom the Alps to the ocean, and comprises France and the Netherlands. They were a turbulent and warlike race, little skilled in the arts which minister to human subsistence. If such a people outgrew their territory, their resource was not to increase its fertility by more artful and laborious culture, but rather to supply their wants at the expense of others, by rapine, con- quest, or emigration. When their tribes were mutually unconnected, the result must have been a state of continued disquiet, like that of early Greece already described. Large bodies of men were seeking for abodes ; the fugitives from one place were the conquerors in ano- ther ; and the commotion lasted till the sword had destroyed the excess of popu- lation, or till some channel was opened for its removal. Such a vent was often found in the military service of foreign states ; and Gallic mercenaries were much employed, especially by Carthage. But the spirit cf migration took a dif- ferent form, when large tracts were united under a single government. If an outlet were then to be provided for an overflowing population, wider con- quests were necessary, and greater power was collected to achieve them. From every neighbouring state the needy and the ambitious flocked to the hope of brilliant enterprise and eligible settlements ; and all were poured in one gathered stream upon remoter and more cultivated regions. Many instances of this are to be found both in Oriental and in Roman stor} ; but the most memorable of all are contained in the history of those northern hordes, by whose invasions the Roman empire was finally overthrown. Such a crisis is said to have arrived in Gaul about the year b.c. 588, when the largest part of it was subject to the tribe of the Bituriges and their king Ambi- gatus. Two mighty hosts of emigrants were formed, under the king's two sons, Bellovesus and Sigovesus. Bellovesus crossed the Alps. Fresh swarms of ad- venturers quickly followed, and all the north of Italy was conquered, and re- ceived the name of Cisalpine Gaul, or Gaul on the hither side of the xVlps. About two centuries after, when the Gauls again found their territory too narrow, and sought to enlarge it with part of Etruria, being provoked by the Romans to march against them, they destroyed the greater part of the city, and obliged the inhabitants to purchase their retreat with money. Such is the historical fact, when stripped of the fables with which it has pleased the Roman writers to embellish it. Sigovesus followed a course very dif- ferent fi:*om that of his brother. He penetrated into Hungary, and settled on the Danube, in the country called by the Romans Pannonia ; and the courage, fierceness, and rapacity of his colonists, were long the dread of surrounding na- tions. The Pannonian Gauls were those who marched against Ptolemy Cerau- nus, and fought the battle in which he perished with his army. They overran all Macedonia, afflicting the country with every kind of waste and cruelty ; and in the next year they invaded Greece, and advanced to the pass of Thermopylae, where a powerful Grecian army was assembled to oppose them. The Gauls were by far the more nu- merous ; they were taller, larger, and stronger than their adversaries, and they were full of impetuous courage ; but they were inferior in arms, skill, and discipUne, and in that deliberate valour, which ensures to the soldier of a civilised people his superiority over the savage. They had no defensive armour except a shield ; their weapons were a javelin and a large pointless cutting sword ; their mode of fighting was irregular : and they vainly strove to penetrate the firm bar- rier of Grecian spears, that stretched entirely across the narrow valley. To add to their distress they were plied un- ceasingly with missiles from an Athenian fleet, which was brought as near to the shore as the shoals would admit ; and they suffered much, and effected little, till their leaders gave the signal for re- treat, which soon became a disorderly flight, so that many were trampled to death in the narrow passage, or buried in the morasses. The chief command in the confederate army had been given to the Athenians, in deference to their ancient fame; which in this day's work they supported so well, that their merit was acknowledged to be the greatest in the action. Brennus,* the Gallic chieftain, now be- thought himself to weaken his opponents • From thri frequent occurrence of this nsiine, aa Kpplic'l to {Jailic leaders, it seems probable tbat U was not an appellative, bat u title of coinmaad. !•• 6R£EC£* by drawing off the iEtolians, who were a numeroQs body, to the defence of their homes. A division of his forces crossed the mountains into iEtolia, and sacked the town of Callion, slaughtering all the males, and brutally abusing the women. The news was brought to the camp ; the i^tolians hastened home- wards, and were joined by those whom they had left in the towns ; the very women were roused to arms by the enormities of the invaders ; and the motley assem- blage received an important addition of strength in the Achaians of Patrae, an excellent body of heavy-armed soldiers. The retumins: Gauls were met in front by the Pati ian phalanx, and harassed on the flanks by the li ss regular forces of the iStolians : and the blood that was shed, and the sufferings that were in- flicted at C allien, were avenged, for not half of the perpetrators escaped to rejoin their countrymen in Thessaly. Meantime the Gauls had opened Ther- mopylae. By the track which the Per- sians had used to a like purpose against Leonidas and his band, a division of forty thousand men under Brennus now crossed the mountains to place itself on the rear of the Greeks. The resistance of the Phocians, who guarded the pass, gave time for their allies to escape by sea ; they were safely embarked in the ships of the Athenians, and then dis- persed to their several homes. The pass was clear ; but Brennus and his followers not waiting for their fellows pressed on towards Delphi, in the hope to engross the rich plunder of the temple. Alarmed at their approach, the Del- phians consulted the oracle ; and they were answered, as before, when the tem- ple was threatened by the Persians, that they should not fear, for the god would protect his own. The townsmen had been joined by the rest of the Phocians, by the Amphissians, and by some of the iEtolians, the greater part of whom had gone against the main body of the inva- ders : they were animated by religious zeal as well as patriotism, and further encou- raged by thunders, lightnings, and va- rious phenomena which they considered as si^s that heaven was fighting on their side. The Gauls were beaten back. In the following night they suffered «ireadfully by the cold and the fall of snow : and at day-break they were at- tacked in front by the main body of the Greeks, while the Phocians protited by their knowfedgeofthe mount ams to come round upon their rear. They were driven to flight, and it was not till night-fall that they halted and encamped. The impiety of their enterprise, which struck the Greeks with horror, was probably not without its effect on the imagination of the barba- rians: for in most forms of ancient heathenism there was a striking likeness of character, and every people acknow- ledged divinity in the gods of other na- tions, even in those whom it did not worship.* The consciousness of guilt, brought home to them by unexpected and overwhelming calamity, made them feel as men devoted to destruction. In the dead of the night a few of them thought that they heard a horse-tramp as of an approaching enemy : the alarm soon spread, and the whole camp was in commotion. They thought the Greeks were among them ; and so wild were they with terror, that they slew each other, not distinguishing their native language and habit. Encouraged by this new disaster of their enemies, the Phocians pressed them closer, and famine soon followed to complete their miseries. In the battles against the Greeks but six thousand Gauls had fallen ; but upwards of ten thousand are said to have perished in the stormy night, and in the panic terror, and as many more in the succeed- ing famine. The miserable remnant of the army under Brennus arrived at last in the en- campment of their countrymen ; when their leader, who had been dangerously * The natioDB of CanaAo allowed that the God of Israel was a grreat divinity, but they trusted that their ow-n would prevail against him. When they were defeated in the hills, "The God of Israel," they said, " is a God of the kills:" and if they fought in the valleys they hoped for victory. Again, when the ark had bet-n taken by the Philistines, and placed in the temple of Dagon ; " When they of Ashdod arose early on the morrow, behold Dagon was fallen upon his face to the earth before the ark of the Lord. But the hand of the Lord was heavy upon them of Ashdod, and he destiuyed them, and smote them with emerods, even Ashdod and the roasts thereof. And when the men of Ashdod saw that it was so, th»^y said. The ark of the God of Israel shall not abide with us; for his hand is sore upon ns, and upon Dagon ourgod." 1 Sam. V. 3-7. Accordingly, after carrying it toother cities with a likeresult,the Philistines sent it back to the children of Israel with a trespass-offering ; but still Dikgon, and not the God of Israel, continued to be the object of their ordinary worship. Nebuchad- netzar also did not renounce his belief in the deities of the Babylonians, when he was convinced that tht God of ijhadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego was mightier than they. " Therefore I make a decree, that every people, nation, and language, which speak any thing ami.ss against the God of Shadracb, M«. shach, and Abed-nego, shall be cut in pieces, and their houses shall be uiaue a dunghill ; because there is oc other god that can deliveratter this sort. "Dan. iii.29. The Persians form the only exception to the genera] willingneM to acknowledge the |p>ds of other 4iaticr.i>, GREECE. 167 ' y ' wounded, is said to have wilfully has- tened his death through shame. Dimi- nished and disheartened by the ruin of their detachments, the Gauls now com- menced their retreat: but they were harassed by the reassembled forces of the Greeks, especially by the iEtolians ; and on reaching the river Spercheius, they found the passage beset by the Thessa- lians and Malians. They are said to have been here cut off to a man, in the second year of the invasion, (b. c. 278.) By their utter destruction, and by the defeat of another division in Macedonia, through a stratagem practised by Anti- gonus, their countrymen were deterred from any further attempt on Greece: l)vit a body soon after crossed into Asia, invited by Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, and made themselves masters of the province which was called from them Galatia. (From Galatai, the Greelc form of their national appellation.) For three years after the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus, the Macedonian diadem was disputed by various pre- tenders. It finally remained with Anti- ironus, the son of Demetrius, or Anti- gonus Gonatas, as he is frequently called, from the town of Goni, in Thes- saly, where he was brought up. But before proceeding, we must shortly touch on the affairs of Sicily. There was quiet in Syracuse for many years after its tranquillisation by Timo- ieon : but at length the commonwealth became disordered, and a revolution took place, which established oligarchy. Among those who fled at the time of the change was Agathocles, a young man originally so poor that he Uved by the trade of a potter ; but his personal ac- complishments won him a patron, who enriched him and procured him a mili- tary command ; and he quickly made himself considerable by ability in war and fluent boldness in the assembly of the people. Provoked by a personal wrong, he had warned the Syracusans against Sosistratus, who headed the party of the Few : he could not, there- fore, safely tarry in Syracuse after the revolution, but he went to Italy, and there subsisted as a soldier of fortune. Another change re-established denao- cracy in Syracuse ; and Sosistratus, with his friends, being driven into banish- ment, Agathocles was enabled to return. The Carthaginians took up the cause of the exiles, and a war ensued, in which Agathocles distinguished himself emi- nently both in subordinate and principal commands, till his conduct giving rise to a suspicion that he was aiming at the tyranny, he was again obliged to quit the city. The exiled friends of Sosistra- tus were readmitted into Syracuse, while Agathocles remaining in banishment gathered an army which made him formidable both to Carthage and to Syracuse. The fear of his power pro- cured his recall, and he returned under an oath that he would not injure the democracy: after which he professed himself the champion of the Many, and courted them so dexterously, that he was chosen general and guardian of the public tranquillity, till the lately discordant factions now united in the city should be brought to dwell to- gether in harmony and confidence. He still wanted a force more subservient to his purposes than the body of armed citizens. Having, therefore, obtained a commission to levy troops according to his discretion, he embodied the soldiers who had followed him in his last exile, men devoted to himself, and hostile alike to the S} racusan Many and the Few ; and he added such of the poorer citi- zens, as were embittered by envy or made desperate by want, so as readily to join with any adventurer, or take part m any revolution, if they might thereby better their own condition, without regard to the form of government to be established or overthrown. Six hundred principal Syracusans had shared in the oligarchy established by Sosistratus ; and against these the at- tack was first directed. Agathocles in- vited their leadei s to a conference, ar- rested them and tried them before his army, alleging that the six hundred had plotted to seize him because of his zeal for the popular cause. The multitude cried out that he should straightway pu- nish the offenders, and he gave the word to march to Syracuse, to slay the guilty and plunder the houses of the six hun- dred and their adherents. The thing was done, and the city given up to bloodshed and pillage. Unprepared for attack and unconscious of provocation, many were killed when running out unarmed to learn the cause of the disturbance. Ihe slaughter was not confined to those against whom it was professedly directed but avarice and private hatred ranged at will, and where riches were to be gained, the plunderers made little dis- tinction between friend and foe. For two days the Syracusans endured, in the bosom of peace, and at the hands of fel- 't us GREECE. low-citizens, or of soldiers employed by the state, the worst that could have been inflicted by enemies exasperated with a wearisome siege and a perilous assault. Four thousand persons were murdered, six thousand escaped by flight ; and on those who fled, the cruelty of their enemies was satiated by brutal ill usage of their wives and children. When the wholesale butchery was over, Agathocles collected the prisoners, and putting to death the most hostile to liim, drove "the rest into banishment. The author of these horrors now call- ing an assembly of the people inveighed against the Six Hundred, and against the oligarchy which they had formerly esta- blished; declared that he had cleared the city of all who aimed at power be- yond the laws, and entirely secured the freedom of the people ; and professing that he wished to rest from his labours, and to be as a private individual, he threw off the ensigns of military com- mand and retired from the assembly. He well knew that his hearers were mostly deep in blood, and that the con- tinuance of his power was their only safeguard against retribution; while those who had been unwilling spectators of the massacre would be silenced by fear. Being loudly pressed, as he ex- pected, to retain his office, he consented on the condition that none should l)e joined with him in command. On these terms he was appointed general auto- crator, and thenceforward he exercised the power of a monarch, though without assuming the external state. "His usur- pation was effected in the year b. c. 317. Agathocles had risen as the champion of the poor ; and as such he had pro- mised what he now fulfilled, the abolition of outstanding debts, and a distribution of lands. In ordinary cases his rule was mild as well as able ; and by benefits done to many, and affable behaviour to all, he grew widely popular in spite of his crimes, till fresh jealousies and dif- ficulties drove him to fresh executions, which made him hated by all. Unlike most other tyrants, he kept no guards about him, and was easy of access. But his ambition was the scourge of Sicily, and to further it he spaied nei- ther treachery nor blood : nor could his grasping spirit be satisfied with less than the dominion of the island. The power of the Syracusan tyrant spread daily wider, till all ttie Sicilian Greeks were brought to own it, except the subjects of Cartilage. But their obedience rested on fear, and was un- stable through hatred ; and when large reinforcements from Africa had enabled the Carthaginians to defeat him with ^eat slaughter, his unwilling subjects gladly revolted, and Agathocles was obliged to defend himself in Syracuse, while the rest of the island submitted to Carthage. In this extremity he boldly resolved to attack his enemies at home ; and in the year after his defeat (b. c. 3 1 0) he passed into Africa. But money was (irst to be raised, and provision to be made against the danger of revolution ; and these things he managed with his usual mixture of ability and wickedness. From every suspected family a brother or a son was chosen to accompany him, to be a pledge for the fidelity of the rest. Knowing well that the rich were mostly his enemies, he professed to pity the sufferings of the citizens, and proclaimed that any who shrunk from the hardships of a siege should quit the place with all their property. The wealthiest men, and those most hostile to the tyrant, availed themselves of this permission ; but Aga- thocles sent his mercenaries to slay them, and to seize their goods. By this abominable treacheiy he gained the needful treasures, and cut off those whom he most feared to leave behind him. Agathocles played out his desperate game with suitable desperation. He crossed the sea, eluding the enemy, whose fleet was far superior; and on landing he burnt his vessels, that his soldiers might place all their hopes in victory only, and that his small force might not be weakened by the necessity of guarding the ships. For a while he was almost uniformly victorious against an immense disparity of force ; and he commanded the country, and captured the towns of the Carthaginians, his suc- cesses being aided by the hatred which the subject provinces bore to their harsh and arbitrary rulers. Meantime the Syracusans defeated the besieging army by a well-planned ambuscade, and the commander, being taken, was cruelly tortured and put to death. The loss of the general caused dissension in the besieging camp ; for the Syracusan exiles and other Greeks, being numerous in the host, proposed their own leader to succeed him, in opposition to the Cartha- ginian who had been second in com- mand. Nevertlieless, the blockade was continued, and the besieged were suf- fering both by famine and by political GREECE 169 disorders ; for so insecure was the go- vernment of Agathocles, or so jealous the temper of those whom he had left in authority, that the latter had recently deemed it necessary to make another clearance of their enemies, and driven from the city eight thousand of those whom they considered as friends of the exiles. Encouraged by the exhaustion both of the Carthaginians and Syra- cusans, the people of Acragas (or Agri- gentum) offered themselves as leaders to the Sicilians, inviting them to free- dom from the dominion of both. The call was gladly answered, and many cities revolted from the Carthaginians; while the Acragantine army actively helped them to expel the garrisons which had held them in awe, and protected their lands against ravage by the forces whether of Carthage or of Syracuse. In this state were matters, when Aga- thocles quitted his victorious army, and returned to look after his interests in Sicily. He anived as his generals had just defeated the Acragantines, and im- mediately proceeded against divers of the cities which had asserted indepen- dence. Several quickly yielded; but the rest united their forces under the command of Deinocrates, a Syracusan exile, who had led the Greeks in the Carthaginian array; and the confederate army was too strong for Agathocles, though he found an opportunity of se- parately defeating the Acragantine forces. In returning to Africa, he w^as obliged to leave his Sicilian enemies unsubdued; and as he feared that the SjTacusan people in his absence might call in Deinocrates and the exiles, he endea- voured to prevent tlie danger by another massacre of five hundred persons. Not long before at a public rejoicing lie had mingled with the crowd, and drunk and jested unreservedly, being gifted by na- ture with a singular talent for pleasan- try. In tliis he was partly prompted by the wish for popularity ; but he had also a deeper and darker purpose, for, when all hearts were opened by wine and mer- riment he had been diligently noting who appeared to be his enemies ; and all those who were of any consideration perished in the massacre. The affairs of the Carthaginians had recovered in great measure while Aga- thocles was away, nor could his return eft'ectuaUy arrest the current of their for- tune. The revolted subjects of Car- thage, who had swelled his forces, all rttui-ned to their original allegiance ; he saw that to preserve his conquests was impossible, and he, therefore, determined to abandon Africa. But he wanted ves- sels to transport his army, and if he had possessed them, the enemy commanded the sea : to force a passage was hopeless, and he despaired of obtaining one on any moderate terms of capitulation. He fled secretly, deserting his soldiers, who revenged themselves by killing his sons who were left behind : a cruelty which Agathocles most bloodily retaliated, by slaughtering all the kindred of all those who had served with him in Africa. (b. c. 307.) This event happened nearly four years after he sailed for Africa. Agathocles found, on returning to Sicily, that his principal general had revolted to Deinocrates with the troops and the cities entrusted to his care. His dismay was such that he offered to recall the exiles and resign the tyranny. But the proposal came to nothing through the intrigues of Deinocrates, who coveted monarchical power, and hoped that in the confusion of war he might attain it ; while in the mean time he preferred his present situation to that of a private citizen under a democracy in Syracuse. Agathocles accused Deinocrates to the exiles, as having been the obstacle to the liberation of their country ; and then made peace with the Carthaginians, allowing them to hold whatever they had possessed before the war. Being freed from their hostility, he pursued the war against the exiles, defeated them, and treacherously slaughtered seven thousand, who had laid down their arms under assurance of safety. After this fie received Deinocrates into friendship, and appointing him his general continued his favour to him to the end : a wonder- ful thing in one who was commonly as jealous as he was faithless, but who now put all trust in a reconciled enemy, and that a man of no integrity. Agathocles soon reconquered most of Sicily ; after which he warred in various regions, and fully ma:intained the cha- racter of an eminent, prosperous, and powerful scourge of mankind. A daugh- ter of his was married to Demetrius Poliorcetes. In his latter years his chief ambition was to make his kinir- dom a first-rate maritime power ; and this was nearly accomplished, when he was poisoned by Maenon one of his intimates, in concert with his grandson, (B. c. 289.) The Syracusans forth- with re-established democracy, confis- cated their tyrants property, and over- J* GREECE. I 170 threw his statues. Meanwhile M«non aspiring to sovereign power, assassinated the grandson of Agathocles. gained the mercenaries to his interest, and with them made war on the Syracusans. Ihe Carthaginians aided Maenon, and the Syracusans were obliged to receive the mercenaries into their commonwealth : but fresh quarrels arose between the old citizens and the mercenaries, and it was finally settled that the latter should sell their property and quit the island. The departing mercenanes arrived at Messene ; where being received as fnends in the houses of the inhabitants, they conspired to murder their hosts and seize theh- wives and their possessions. Democracy endured not long m Syracuse, but both this and the other cities fell again under tyrants ; and shortly after- wards the unhappy island became a battle field for the Carthaginians and the Romans. Chapter XI. Of the rise of the Achaian League ; and of the affairs of Greece from the tn- vasion by the Gauls to the end of the war between the Achaians and Cleo- menet.King of Lacedismon. Sect. I.— The Achaians were eariy distinguished among the Greeks for pro- bity and good faith. So generally was this acknowledged, that at a time when the Grecian cities of Italy were full of bloody tumults and revolutions, the Achaians were called in, by common consent, to settle all quarrels, and ap- point the terms of a general peace ; and again, in certain disputes which arose after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans ' and the Lacedaemonians agreed to abide by their arbitration. But the charac- ter of the Achaian states was un- ambitious, and they were surrounded with neighbours stronger than them- selves ; and hence, though widely re- spected for peaceful virtues, they are little conspicuous in history tUl the latter times, when tlie good fortune of Greece brought them forward to take the lead. The constitution of the Achaian cities was by law democratical, and it is highly praised by the judicious historian Poly- bius, as affording freedom of speech and action, and equal Justice to all. While they were under the Lacedaemoman su- premacy the commonwealth was admi- nistered by a privileged claas of wealthy men : but the temper of the Achaians was quiet and orderly, and their attach- ment strong to their ancient institutions ; and it is probable that the ruling few, for the most part, confined themselves to the functions of administration, with- out encroaching on the civil rights of in- dividuals, or on the authority of the po- pular assemblies to regulate, and of the popular tribunals to ascertain and en- force them. The cities of the province were twelve; and they acknowledged some degree of political union, having common sacrifices in a common temple, and congresses assembled at intervds from all the states to consult for the good of the Achaian nation. It is worth remarking that a similar connexion ex- isted in early times between the Achaian colonies in Italy. Croton, Sybaris, and Metapontum. But the bond of con- federacy was sUght, for we occasionally find particular states engaging in wars when the rest were neutral; and in- stances are not wanting in which dif- ferent Achaian cities were battling against each other either as auxiliaries or as principals. ... After Alexander's death the Achaian league was broken up. and the cities became disunited and internally dis- ordered. Most were garrisoned either by Demetrius or Cassander, and after- wards by Anti2:onus, the son of Deme- trius, who succeeded at once to his fa- ther's ascendancy in Greece, and, finally, as we have seen, recovered his sove- reioTity of Macedonia. Some had tyrants, especially those under the power of Antigonus, whose favourite policy was to establish a petty monarch in every state. But at the era when Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, the last surviving princes bred in the school of Alexander, were swept from the stage, a brave attempt was begun for the free- dom and union of Achaia. In the year b. c. 280, the inhabitants of Patrae, (the modern Patras,) Dyme, Tritaea, and Pharae, combined for the purposes of reciprocal defence and common regulation. Nearly five years after, the citizens of iEgium expelled their Macedonian garrison, and those of Boura killed their tyrant, not with- out assistance from the Achaian states already associated. Both of these were forthwith received into the league. The next admitted were the men of Ca- rynia, whose tyrant Iseas took warning from the fate of the tyrant of Boura. and on receiving an assurance of safety from the Achaians, voluntarily gave up the sovereignty, and brouglit his people into GrKEEC£* 171 JP ( the confederacjr. During a considerable period the union comprehended these seven cities only. The common con- cerns of the league were administered by two generals and a secretary, elected yearly, and taken from all the cities in rotation. But in the twenty-fifth year of the confederation it was resolved that the presiding authority should thencefor- ward be entrusted to a single general. In the fourth year after this change (b. c. 251,) the Achaians were joined by the important state of Sicyon, a city not be- longing to the province, but far exceed- ing all the proper Achaian towns in riches, extent, and population. The Sicyonian commonwealth had long been unsettled, and tyrants were continually rising and falling there ; the power which was cemented with blood being commonly ended by violence, to make way for another equally op- pressive. Shortly before the union with the Achaians, Nicocles was tyrant of Syracuse ; but Aratus, a noble youth, whose father had been murdered in a former usurpation, was living an exile in Argos, and cherishing the hope to hberate his country. A few fellow exiles concurred in his purpose, and he was meditating the seizure of some strong hold in the Sicyonian territory, when a recent fugitive from Sicyon told him of a place where he might scale the walls of the city itself. The attempt was made with singular boldness and address. Aratus and his little band passed the ramparts undiscovered, and going straight to the tyrant's palace, sur- prised and made prisoners his guard. Notice was sent to the friends of Aratus, who thronged to him from all quarters, while the rest of the citizens gathered in the theatre, fidl of anxiety as to the occasion of the tumult. But procla- mation being made that Aratus the son of Cleinias offered liberty to the peo- ple, they joyfully crowded to fire the gates of the tyrant. The palace was plundered, while its master fled by se- cret passages. Such was the good for- tune attending the enterprize, that not a drop of blood was shed in it, whether of friend or foe. In ordering the commonwealth, Ara tus, at the age of twenty, displayed wis- dom not inferior to his ability and daring in the surprise. He established a demo- cracy on the Achaian model, which had been the object of his early admiration : and he provided a safeguard against at- tacks from without and revolutions with- in, by bringing Sicyon into the Achaian league. He restored almost six hundred exiles ; but as their lands had mostly been given to others, his hardest task was to settle the disputes between the old and new proprietors. Fortunately the king of Egypt was his friend, and sent him large sums of money, which enabled him to settle the business with little dis- tress to either party ; and being ap- pointed arbitrator, he adjudged matters to general satisfaction, and brought back peace and mutual good- will to the distracted city. The Acrocorinthus, or citadel of Co- rinth, one of the strongest fortresses in Greece, was the most important of all to any seeker of empire, being set on a lofty mountain in the Isthmus ; which gave to its possessor not only the com- mand of the rich and populous Corinth, but also the power of interrupting or im- peding all land-passage between the pen- insula and continent of Greece. Anti- gonus had long coveted, and finally gained it ; but in the eighth year after the deUverance of Sicyon, Aratus being, for the second time, chosen general by the Achaians, undertook to win it from him by a nightly surprize. The plot was managed ably and boldly, and se- conded by singular good fortune ; and by day-break he was master of the for- tress, though not without great diffi- culty and danger. The Achaian army now approaching the city was joyfully admitted by the Corinthians, and Aratus came down from the citadel to the thea- tre, to address the Corinthian people there assembled. He dehvered to them the keys of their gates, which had been long kept from them by their tyrants, and proposed to them to join the Achai- an confederacy, which they gladly did. He garrisoned the citadel with four hun- dred soldiers. He gained Lechaeum, the port of Connth. and in it he took twenty- five ships and five hundred horses l)e- longing to Antigonus. Before the expu-- ation of his office he had prevailed on the Megarians also to associate themselves with the Achaians : the Troezenians and Epidaurians soon followed the example ; and the confederacy was further strength- ened by alliance with the king of Egypt. The Athenians were then under the power of Antigonus. He had invaded their territory and besieged their city : and though they were succoured by an Egyptian fleet, and an army under Areus, the king of Lacedaemon. ol the race of Eurysthenes, yet no effectual 172 GREECE. relief was p:iven. They still held out lor a considerable time after Areus had withdrawn his forces : but they were at length obliged to receive a garrison within the city, which Anti- goniis, however, soon after withdrew, conceiving, probably, tli^t he could re- tain them in obedience less offensively by garrisons which he seems to have held in Peiraeeus, and other important posts. Aratus, after his success at Co- rinth, turned his views to Athens. He displayed the power of the Achaians by plundering Salamis, and endeavoured to conciliate the Athenians by settina; free, without ransom, all his Athenian pri- soners: but nothing important imme- diately followed. Henceforward Aratus was chosen ge- neral of the Achaians as often as the law allowed, and even when out of office he guided their counsels. His aim was to put down all the tyrants in Pelopon- nesus, to exclude from the peninsula the Macedonians who supported them, and to unite all the Peloponnesian cities in one great confederation, such as that of the Achaians. In this he was continually opposed by Antigonus Gonatas, and his son Demetrius ; and very often by the iEtolians, a rude, but numerous and warlike people. The struggle of the Achaians with the power of Macedonia continued till after the death of Deme- trius, and then gave way to a contest with Cleomenes, king of Lacedaemon, assisted by the ^tolians. Sect. II. — Cleonymus, the uncle of Areus, kin^' of Lacedaemon, had op- posed his nephew unrsiiccesstully as a rival claimant of the throne ; and sub- ordinate honours and commands, which were largely b. stowed on him, could not satisfy his ambition or quiet his craving for vengeance. In the thirty-seventh year of the reign jf Areus (b. c. 2/2,) Pyrrhus returntd from Italy. In his first campaigns there he had commonly been victorious, but never without considerable difficulty and loss. The war was resolutely maintained against him, and every battle weakened his army, while that of Rome was inex- haustibly recruited from a warlike peo- ple. Unsteady and impatient,, he was easily wearied 'with a protracted struggle where the prospect of success was daily becoming more distant ; and being in- vited by the Syracusans and other Sici- lian Gree s. lo assist them against the Carthaginians, he gladly caught at the hope of speedier victory on a new scene of action. His success in Sicily was at first most brilliant, and he had nearly expelled the Carthaginians from the island, when his tyrannical conduct provoked revolt in the Grecian cities, and finally united them against him. Driven out of Sicily, he returned to Tarentum, and resumed his war against the Romans : but he was defeated and obliged to quit the country ; and straight way, returning to Epirus, he made war upon Antigonus Gonatas, won a great battle, and nearly mastered all Macedo- nia. Cleonymus now saw in the restless character of the victor the means of glutting his ambition and revenge ; and he asked for aid to place him on the throne of Lacedaemon, which Pyrrhus willingly granted, beholding in the pro- posal an opening to the conquest of Pe- loponnesus. He invaded the peninsula, pretending that he came to free the cities from the yoke of Antigonus ; but he soon gave the lie to his professions of upright intention, by ravaging: Luconia unprovoked, and without declaration of war. He next advanced against the city. The Lacedaemonians were taken at great disadvantage, for the best of their strength was absent with Areus, who was warring in Crete ; but those w ho remained were diligent and resolute in preparation for defence under the command of Acrotatus, the son of Areus. It was resolved to send the women into Crete, but they remonstrated against it ; and the queen Archidamia,* beins: ap- pointed to speak for the rest went into the council hall, with a sword in her hand, and said, *' That they did their wives great wrong, if they thought them so faint- hearted as to live after Sparta were de- stroyed." In the night before the assault the approaches to the city were fortified with trenches, and with waggons set fast by the wheels, which were sunk in the iirouiid. The women, with the old men, laboured on the works, while the young men rested to prepare themselves for battle ; and when the encounter was begun, the women were active in bring- ing arms and refreshments to such as needed them, and in carrying off the wounded. The struggle lasted through two days, though small hope remained for the third, so many were the slain, and so few were those unhurt in the action ; but in the course of tiie night • She seems to have been wife to Archidiimiis, one of Ihe Procleiil line, who was alrc-vdy reigning twenty-three years before. He was prubably now tlead, and his sou a minor; for.oiherwi>e, Arrotiittu would hardly have ht-ld the chirl voiuuiaud. the defenders were reinforced by a body of mercenaries in the service of Antigo- nus, and also by Areus, who arrived from Crete with two thousand Lace- daemonians. The women and old men now retired to their houses. On the morrow Pyrrhus was beaten off, and soon after went to Argos, being invited by one of two leaders, who were there contending for superiority. He was here opposed by Antigonus and the Lacedae- monians. The Argians wished to be neutral, and requested that neither mo- narch would enter their city. Antigo- nus, being the weaker, consented, and gave hostages ; Pyrrhus professed com- pliance, but refused all pledges to ensure the fulfilment of his word, which, in- deed, he did not mean to keep. A gate bemg opened by the friends of Pynluis he entered the city, and Antigonus was caUed m to oppose him ; the troops of Pyrrhus were overmatched and broken, and in endeavoiiring to cover their re- treat he was killed by a tile from a house-top, thrown, as it is said, by a poor and aged Argian woman, who saw tier son in combat with him, and almost overcome. Areus, falling in some obscure war before Corinth, left the kingdom to his son Acrotatus, who had been mainly instrumental to the repulse of Pyrrhu-^ Acrotatus died in battle against Aris- todemus, the tyrant of Argos: and Leonidas, the son of Cleonymus go- verned as protector, in the name of the late king's infant son, for eight years at the end of which the infant died, and Leonidas became king. The manners and government of La- cedaemon had long departed widely from the pattern set by Lycurgus. The equa- lity which he established among all the members of his commonwealth had been early confined within a privileged class who engrossed all public honours, and claimed, as exclusively their own, the name of Spartans. (See page 92.) At the battle of Plataea, in a Lacedaemonian army of ten thousand soldiers, the Spar- tans had formed one-half ; but in the time of Agesilaus tneir number was comparatively small, and in that of which we are now treating there re- mained not above seven hundred Spar- tan families. This change had been unforeseen, and unprovided for by the lawgiver; but another had taken place ^et more repugnant to the spirit of his institutions. Expensive wars, and va- rious mtercourse with strangers, had GREECE. 173 banished the old severity of manners and brought back the idolatry of gold.' Those disorders had revived which the laws of Lycurgus had been chiefly di- rected to eradicate. The poor were burdened with debt-the rich were liv- ing m luxury and pomp ; discontent and envy were ranged on the one side, and pride and licentiousness on the other • the influence of wealth was completely restored, and that influence was centred m about one hundred of the seven hun- dred Spartan heads of families. Among the most determined con- temners of the institutions of Lycurgus was the king Leonidas, whose habits had been formed in the court of Seleu- cus. His colleague Agis was of a dif- ferent stamp. From boyhood upwards he had endeavoured to emulate the ancient plainness and austerity of life and when he became king he forthwith undertook to reform the commonwealth according to the model of Lycurgus As the departure of the state from its original principles was entire, it was necessary that its return should be effected by changes proportionably sweeping and violent ; and the measures adopted by Agis to this end were the abolition of all debts, and the equal di- vision ot landed property, two of Ly- curgus's measures, but probably even more difficult to cany into execution now, than when Lycurgus succeeded in introducing them. On sounding the people to determine the chances of success, Agis fouad that tlie younger and poorer would be mostly on his side. The honest hoped to re- form the commonwealth ; the needy and profligate to cancel their debts and repair their losses; and the extreme concentration of properly had so much lessened the number of those who were interested to defend it, that the revolu- tionary party were sure to be victorious, « It should come to a trial of force. Having ascertained his strength, Agis proposed his intended laws to the council of elders. His purpose was to abolish the distinction between the Spartans and the common Lacedaemonians, re- taining that between the Lacedaemonians and the Periceci, or people of the towns. The number of the citizens was to be filled up from the Perioeci and from strangers, and all these, as well as the original Lacedaemonians, were to be trained in the strictest discipline of Lycurgus ; and among the citizens was to be distributed the proper territory 174 GREECE. of Sparta, being divided into four thou- aand five hundred equal parts, while the remaining territory belonging to the state was to be divided into fifteen thousand parts, and distributed among the Perioeci. When the proposal had been broached in the senate, and warmly contested, the Ephor Lysander assem- bled the people, and laid it before them. He was followed by other favourers of the measure ; and Agis, rising last, ad- dressed the assembly, and said, that he would himself contribute largely to the reformation of the commonwealth ; for he would make common all his lands, and add six hundred talents in money ; and so should his mother, grandmother, kinsmen, and friends, all of whom were the wealthiest in Sparta. The offer was warmly applauded by the multitude; but it was opposed by the rich men, with Leonidas at their head. The previous approbation of the senate was necessary to the validity of any decree which might be pas ed by the people ; and Leonidas and his party prevailed so far that, by a single vote, that approbation was with- held. An ancient law forbade that any of the race of Hercules should marry a stranger, or should dwell in a strange land. Leonidas had done both; and being now accused by Lysander, he fled to a sanctuary. As he did not appear when he was cited, he was deposed, and his son-in-law, Cleombrolus, being also of the royal race, was made king. Meantime Lysander's office expired, and the new Ephori, taking part with Leonidas, accused Lysander and his friends of overthrowing the laws. The reforming party now despaired of car- rying their point by peaceable measures; and Agis and Cleombrotus going with their friends into the place of assembly, plucked the Ephori from their seats, and put others in their room. They armed their younger partisans, and opened the prisons ; their enemies feared that a massacre would follow, but no man had any hurt. Leonidas fled to Tegea. Agesilaus, the uncle of Agis, had laid men in wait to kill Leonidas on the way ; but Agis hearing of it sent some trusty persons to accompany him, who brought him safely to his place of refuge. The reformers now had the mastery, and their scheme of government might probably have been established, had all its supporters been sincere. But Agesi- laus being a great landholder and deeply indebted, his wish was to cancel his debts but keep his land. Accordingly he persuaded Agis that he could not cany all at once without a violent com- motion ; but that if he first won the land proprietors by annulling their debts, they then would easily and willingly agree to the division of the lands. If the landholders would allow of the spoli- ation of others, but would not sacrifice to the common good any interest of their own, it surely argued gross credulity to imagine that such corrupt and selfish persons would consent to a change in- jurious to themselves, in consideration of one already made which was bene- ficial. The bait was swallowed, how- ever. Tt was first decreed that all debts should be cancelled, and accordingly every bond and obligation was publicly burnt. But when the people called for the division of lands, Agesilaus still found some pretext for delay, till king Agis was sent on a military expedition to aid the Achaians against an ^tolian invasion. The host of Agis was principally composed of the poorer sort, who were gainers by the revolution, and who natu rally felt a strong attachment to its author ; and Agis was the better enabled to preserve strict discipline without im- pairing his popularity, since every rule which he enforced upon others was rigidly observed by himself. No soldier could for shame be disorderly or luxuri- ous, when his commander lived more regularly and fared more plainly than any in the camp. The army recovered its old temper of exact and cheerful obedience ; and though the over caution of Aratus allowed no opportunity for brilliant achievement, the conduct of the Lacedaemonian troops inspired in the allies an unwonted respect both towards their leader and his commonwealth. But on returning to Sparta he found that his work had gone to ruin during his absence. Agesilaus being one of the Ephori, while none was present whose authority could control him, had abused his power to every purpose of extortion and oppression. To prevent all danger from private revenge or general insur- rection, he went always strongly guarded by soldiers. He openly professed to make no account of king Cleombrotus, and to pay respect to Agis less for his office than because he was his kinsman ; and he gave out that he would be Ephor the next year, as well as the presents The Many were disgusted at the ex GrlvEEClli* 175 ! •v. cesses of Agesilaus, and angry that the lands had not been divided according to promise ; and hence they willingly suf- fered the enemies of Agis to recall Leoni- das and to reinstate him in the kingdom. Agis fled to the Brazen House, Cleom- brotus to the Temple of Neptune ; and Leonidas being more especially offended with Cleombrotus went first against him. He sharply taunted him that, being his son-in-law, he had conspired to depose him and drive him from his country. Cleombrotus made no answer : but his wife Chelonis, the daughter of Leonidas, who had quitted him on account of the injury done to her father, and had gone to serve the latter in his adversity, now became an humble suitor in his favour.* At her intercession Leonidas spared his hfe, but banished him from the city. He removed the Ephori, and substituted others ; and then he plotted to get Agis into his power. First he urged him to quit the sanctuary, and to take his part in the regal authority; and declared that the citizens had forgiven him all • The details of this transaction, as given bv Plutarch, are too interesting to be altogether omitted, though they do not rest on the highest authority. The scene, however, baring taken place in public, many of it^ particulars may have been recorded at the time ; and hence we may reasonably give more credit to the biographer on this, than on many other occa- sions, when he professes to give a minute account of tilings spoken or acted in darkness and privacy. The extracts are taken from the old translation by Sir Thomas North, whose language is livelier, and bet- ter expresses the character of the original, than any modem English version. Chelonis, we are told, sat down by her husband, and embraced him, having her two little sons on either side : " All men wondering, and weeping for pity to see the goodness and natural love of this lady, who shewing her mourning apparel, and hair of her head flaring about her eyes, bare- headed, she spake in this manner to her father :— » O father mine, this sorrowful garment and counte- nance is not for pity of Cleombrotus, but hath long remained with me, lamenting sore yonr former misery and exile ; but now which of the two should I rather choose, either to continue a mourner in this pitiful static, seeing you again restored to your king- dom, having overcome your enemies; or else patting on my princely apparel to see my husband slaine, unto whom you married me a inaide ? who, if he cannot move you to take compassion on him by the teares of his wife and children, he shall then abide more bitter paine of his evil counsel than that which you intend to make him sutfer. For he shall see his wife die before him, whom he loved more dearly than anything in the world. Also with what face can I look on other ladies, when I could never bring my father to pity by any intercession I could make for my hnsband, neither my husband intreat him for my father ; and that my hap is to be born a daughter and a wife most unfortunate and despised of my owner Wherefore Leonidas commanded Cleom- brotus to get him thence, and to leave the city as an exile: and prayed his daughter for his sake to re- Siaine with him, and not to forsake her father, that id so dearly love her, that for her sake he had saved her husband's life. This notwithstanding;, she would not yeeld to his request, bat rising up Avith her hus- band, gave him one of her sons, and herselfe took the other in her armes ; and then making her prayer before the altar of the goddesse, she went as a ba- nished woman away with her husband." that was past, well knowing that he had acted from patriotism and honourable ambition, but had been deceived and mis- led by the craft of Agesilaus. Agis was not deceived by this, but he was after- wards entrapped, and thrown into prison. ** Then came Leonidas incontinently with a great number of soldiers that were strangers, (mercenaries) and beset the prison round about The Ephors went into the prison, and sent unto some of the senate to come to them, whom they knew to be of their minde : then they commanded Agis, as if it had been judi- cially, to account of the alteration he had made in the commonwealth. The young man laughed at their hypocrisie. But Amphares (one of the Ephors) told him that it was no laughing sport, and that he should pay for his folly. Then another of the Ephors seeming to shew him a way how he might escape the condemnation for his fault, asked him if he had not been enticed unto it by Agesilaus and Lysan- der. Agis answered that no man com- pelled him. but that he only did it to follow the steps of the ancient Lycurgus, to bring the commonwealth unto the former estate of his grave ordinance and institution." — (Nortks Plutarch.) Being asked again if he did not repent of it, he answered that though he should die for it he would never repent of so wise and virtuous an enterprise. He was con- demned to death, and hastily executed, lest he should be rescued by the people ; and he was the first Spartan king who was put to death by order of the Ephori. His mother and grandmother were also strangled. The latter was that Archi- damia, who had already played a distin- guished part when Pyrrhus besieged the city. His brother Archidamus only saved himself by a hasty flight : his widow was forcibly taken by Leonidas out of her house, and married against her will to his son Cleomenes, though he was yet in extreme youth, (b. c. 240.) Four years after the death of Agis, Leonidas died, and Cleomenes became king. He caught from his wife's con- versation a love for the memory of Agis, and a strong desire to effect his attempted reforms. Cleomenes exceeded Agis in ability and daring, but his ambition was greater and less purely patriotic; and far from hazarding his success, Uke Agis, by impolitic mildness, he was rather willing to fulfil his project by whatever methods seemed the most effectual, and to trust that any violence J 176 GREECE. GREECE. 177 would be excuseil by his need and his good meaning. His ambition was turned to military fame, no less than to that of a reformer ; and his wish to play a leading part in Peloponnesus was quickened by the hope that the power and glory thus acquired would promote his purposes at home. Accordingly he undertook to wrest from the Achaians and restore to the Lacedaemonians the lead in the peninsula. About the tenth year of his reign (b. c. 226,) he commenced the war; and shortly afterwards he found the means of accomplishing his political changes. He deluded his banished colleague Archidamus by the promise of recon- ciliation, induced him to return to Sparta, and treacherously murdered hun : either fearing that he would be an instrument in the hands of the party adverse to reform, or through mere am- bition, and the wish to rule without a rival. In this matter Cleomenes acted in concert with the Ephori ; bat he secretly intended their destruction, and it was not long before he effected it. Having found a pretext to leave the Lacedsemonians of his army encamped in Arcadia, he went suddenly to Sparta with the mercenaries. He surprised the Ephori at supper, killed four of them, and wounded the tifth ; and several per- sons besides were slain, who attempted to defend them : but those who stined not were not harmed, nor was any one hindered from leaving the city. The next morning Cleomenes banished eighty citizens by sound of trumpet ; and then assembled the people, and declared what he had done. He said that Lycurgus had entrusted the government to the king and to the senate, and that the Earamount authority which the Ephori ad exercised was a mere usurpation. He proclaimed the abolition of debts and tne equal division of lands ; and he first gave up his possessions to the pub- lic, and was followed by all his friends. The division was then made, and Cleo- menes directed that a share should be assigned to each of the men whom he had banished, declaring that he would receive them into the city as soon as the government was settled. The race of Procles was not extinct by the death of Archidamus, who had left two children ; but their rights could not resist the power of Cleomenes, who took his brother Eucleides for his colleague, so as nominally to preserve the double royalty, without substantially clogging his own authority. He increased the number of the citizens ; improved their arms and military training; and fully re-established the discipline framed by Lycurgus to resxulate the education of youth and the diet and habits of men His own life was plain and temperate, his conversation pleasant, his manners courteous and dignitied ; and the influ- ence of his personal qualities combined with the feeling, that his measures had invigorated the commonwealth, to make him highly popular in spite of his vio- lence and ambition. Sect. IIL— The Achaians had with- stood the attiicksof Antigonus Gonatas though assisted by the i^tolians, and had given protection to the ^^tolians themselves against Demetrius, his son. Their power had extended far beyond the limits of the province. While Demetrius was living, Lysiadas, the tyrant of Me- galopolis, had voluntarily given up the dominion of that city, and had brought it into the Achaian league ; and his ab- dication being made, whether through policy or public spirit, at least at a time when there was no immediate tenor to constrain him, he was rewarded with the highest popular favour, and with fre- quent election to the chief offices of the confederacy. In the year b. c. 229, after a reign of ten years, Demetrius died ; and now the prop was removed which had mainly supported the tyrants of Peloponnesus against the Achaians. Many yielded to the time, and followed the example of Lysiadas ; and among those who did so was Aristomachus, the lord of the powerful city of Argos. When the war with Cleomenes began, the Achaians had received into their as- sociation all the states of Peloponnesus, except the Lacedaemonians, the Eleians, and some of the Arcadians. The war was boldly and ably conducted on the part of the Spartan king, and his first campaigns were very generally success- ful. He defeated the Achaians near the mountain Lycaeum, in Arcadia, and again in the territory of Megalopolis. In this latter battle Lysiadas was killed ; and it was shortly after that Cleomenes accompUshed the revolution in LacedaB- mon. He then won a third and a more decisive victory near Dyme ; after which he ranged for a while unopposed, per- suading some, and compelling others to revolt from the Achaians to himself. He thus became master of Argos, and of most of the cities recently admitted into the hostile confederacy ; and his { career of conquest did not stop till Co- rinth was added to the number of his allies. The Lacedaemonian arms were now decidedly superior, and their preponde- rance was likely to be increased by union with the forces of ^tolia. Some foreign aid was necessary to the Achaians ; and Aratus had foreseen this emergency, and provided to meet it. He now considered Grecian liberty to be threatened less by Macedonia than by Lacedaemon ; and instead of further seeking to depress the Macedonians, he wished to use them as a balance to the more formidable power. He had, therefore, secretly smoothed the way to reconciliation with Antigonus, who was regent of Macedonia, in behalf of Philip, the infant son of Demetrius ; but he was himself unwilling to appear in the business ; for he feared to break the courage of the Achaians, if he seemed so far to despair of conquering unaided, as to fly for succour to the an- cient enemies of the commonwealth. The Arcadian chiefs of the Theban party, who presided at the founding of Megalopolis, had chosen its situation with a view to make it an effectual check on Lacedaemon. It commanded the Erincipal roads by which an army could e marched from Laconia into Arcadia or Messenia ; and hence in war its pos- session was most desirable both to La- cedaemon and its enemies. This circum- stance, together with that of their proxi- mity to the adversary, had thrown on the Megalopolitans far more than their share in the burden of this war. They had ancient friendship with ther Macedo- nian government ; and it was, therefore, thought that a negotiation undertaken by them with Antigonus, under the pressure of their own particular suft'er- mgs, would not be liable to the same ob- jections as if it came from the general administration : for it would not imply the same distrust as to the issue of the war, nor hazard the reputation of the confederacy in case of failure ; and if it should yet appear that the Achaians were able to change the fortune of the contest by their own exertions, they would not be pledged to invite the inter- ference of Macedonia, though the appli- cation of the Megalopolitans should b2 favourably received. Aratus dealt with two of the friends whom he most trusted in Megalopolis, that they should propose to send an embassy to Antigonus, provided the as- sent of the Achaians could be obtained. The decree was passed, and the movers were appointed to go as ambassadors, first to the congress of the allien, and then, having got permission, to the re- gent of Macedonia. Permission was given, and the ambassadors proceeded on their errand. When they came be- fore Antigonus, they briefly executed their commission, as directed by the Megalopolitans, and then laid open the views of Aratus, and showed the dangers to be apprehended both by Greece and Macedonia, should the rapacity of the* ^tolians be united with the ambition of Cleomenes. As long, they said, as the ^tolians were quiet, the Achaians would maintain the war against Cleomenes ; but if success went against them, and their enemies were joined by the ^to- lians, there would be need of Macedonian assistance ; and Aratus would point out the proper season to give succour, and would suggest such assurances, as should satisfy both parties, of a grateful return for the benefit conferred. The proposals were favourably received, and Antigonus wrote to the people of Megalopolis, to the effect that he would come to their assistance if it should be agreeable to the wish of the Achaians. In the next meeting of the confederates the Megalopolitans proposed to call in Antigonus, and the suggestion was ge- nerally w ell received. Aratus then rising commended the conduct of the embassy, and expressed his pleasure in hearing the favourable disposition of the Mace- donian ruler : but before proceeding in the business, he advised the Achaians to make further trial of their strength, and not to ask the help of their friends, till they had lost the hope of otherwise pre- vailing. His opinion was approved, and the matter rested till the Achaians were determined by their defeat near Dyme to apply forthwith to Antigonus. One ob- stacle existed to the conclusion of any treaty ; which was, that the Acrocorin- thus had been taken from the Macedo- nians, and was guarded by a body of Achaian troops. Antigonus required that the fortress should be restored, which could not be done vrithout a breach of faith pledged to the people of Connth. The Corinthians, however, removed the difficulty, by revolting to Cleomenes; and the Achaians then gave up the cita- del to Antigonus. Cleomenes, on hearing that the Achai- ans had obtained the alliance of Mace- donia, took a position on the Isthmus, intending to dispute the passage. Th« ■ 7b GREECE If iBtolians also declared to Anti^onus that if he came within Thermopylae they would oppose them by arms;' but he nevertheless advanced through Thessaly and EubcBa to the Isthmus. Meanwhile Aristoteles, an Argian leader of the party friendly to the Achaians, made insurrec- tion against the friends of Cleomenes, who were then in possession of the go- vernment. The Achaians sent an army to Argos to support him, and Cleomenes also quitted his encampment on the Isthmus, to go to the succour of his par- tizans. An obstinate struggle took place within the city, but Cleomenes was in the end obliged to retire, and he then returned to Sparta. The Argians were re-admitted into the Achaian confederacy. Aristomachus, their former tyrant, on resigning the sovereignty, had been re- ceived into the highest favour by the Achaians, and had been chosen their general. But his abdication had been caused by fear ; and the rise of Cleo- menes giving him the hope of recovering his power, he had been the chief mover in the defection of the city. At the counter-revolution he was taken by the Achaians, and his infidelity was pu- nished with death ; but no other execu- tion seems to have taken place. Antigonus advanced unopposed to Argos, and thence into Arcadia, where he took several places garrisoned by Cleomenes, and delivered them to the Megalopolitans. He then went to iEgium to confer with the congress of the Achaians, and was chosen by them commander-in-chief of the confederate army. He now laid up his troops in winter-quarters ; but at the coming of spring he invested Tegea, and reduced it to surrender, after which he invaded Laconia. Some slight skirmishes had taken place between his troops and those of Cleomenes, which were posted for the defence of the country against him, when he heard that the forces of Orchomenus, in Arcadia, were newly come to the Lace- daemonian camp. He straightway led his army to Orcnomenus, and took it by assault ; and then he laid close siege to Mantineia. Before the present war this city had revolted from the Achaians, and allied itself with the iEtolians, and afterwards with Cleomenes. Since that it had been surprised and taken by Ara- tus : who, as soon as he was master of the place, issued an order to restrain his soldiers from plunder, and calling toge- ther the Mantuieians in assembly, de- clared that their goods and persons were safe, and that all he required was their re-union with the Achaians, on the same footing as before. The unexpected cap- ture of the city, exposing it to pillage and ruin, together with its no less unexpected release fi-om danger by the humanity of the victor, must have raised a strange conflict of passions in the breasts of the inhabitants ; but neither fear nor grati- tude could permanently keep down the favourers of the ^Etolians, nor those of Lacedaemon. The ruling party requested a garrison of the Achaians, to strengthen them against their enemies both within and without ; the garrison was sent, but it could not hinder a party-contest from arising, in which the Lacedaemonians came in, and gave the victory to their adherents. The conquering faction slaughtered all the Achaians in the city ; and this bloody deed, when Mantineia was besieged by the Achaians under Antigonus, provoked a degree of seve- rity, which would else have been little consistent with the character of that people or of their leader. The siege was pushed till the inhabitants were re- duced to an unconditional surrender, and all were sold for slaves. After the taking of Mantineia, Anti- gonus broke up his army, retaining with him the mercenaries, but dismissing the Macedonians to winter at home. Cleo- menes took advantage of the respite thus allowed him for the surprisal of Megalo- polis. That city was difficult to defend, beinsr large and'thinly peopled ; for the Megalopolitans had suffered greatly in the former battles of this war, m which they had ever been the most forward. The gates were opened to Cleomenes in the night by some Messenian exiles living in the place, whom he had bribed. At day -break the citizens heard of his en- trance, and immediately flew to arms. Three months before this he had gained admittance into Megalopolis, but had been driven out, and had narrowly escaped the ruin of his army. The re- sistance of the townsmen was now no less determined ; but they were greatly outnumbered, and the most commanding situations were preoccupied by the as- sailants. Driven out from their homes, they retired into Messenia ; and hither Cleomenes sent messengers with the offer, that, if they would henceforth be his allies, their ci^ should be restored to theni unharmed. They, nevertheless, continued stedfast in their engagements to the Achaians ; and Cleomenes, find- ing that he could not win them, razed 1 GREECE. 179 X t ,. Megalopolis to the ground. It was, however, afterwards restored under the patronage of Antigonus. At the approach of spring Cleomenes took the field, and approaching towards Argos, where Antigonus had wintered, ravaged the country under the walls. He hoped that his adversary would be compelled by the clamours of the people to fight at a disadvantage ; or if not, that his credit would be lowered by suf- fering the property of his allies to be wasted before his face. The Argians demanded battle, and reviled Antigonus, who steadily refused to lead them out ; and Cleomenes returned in safety to Laconia, with his army highly gratified and laden with spoil. But as the season advanced, Antigonus, having gathered from their several homes, remote and near, the Achaians and Macedonians, was once more in a condition to take the field with superior force. He ad- vanced to the frontier of Laconia, where he found Cleomenes posted at Sellasia to defend the pass. The battle which ensued was obstinately contested, with great skill and courage shown on both sides ; but at length the Lacedaemonians were irrecoverably broken and put to rout. Cleomenes now gave up all thought of further maintaining the war. He fled to Sparta, and thence to Gy- thium, where he embarked for Alexan- dria; while Antigonus advanced from the field of battle to Sparta, and took possession of it unopposed. Thus the war of the Achaians with Cleomenes was ended, three years after its com- mencement, (b. c. 222.) Antigonus used his victory with libe- rality and moderation. He contented himself with restoring the Lacedaemo- * nian government to the state in which it existed before the changes made by Cleomenes ; and having done this, he left the people independent. From Sparta he went to Tegea, and settled that commonwealth according to its ancient constitution; and thence he pursued his way by Argos towards Ma- cedonia, whither he had been called by the news of an iJlyrian invasion. He came to Argos during the Nemean fes- tival, and was welcomed with joy and thanks unbounded ; and the highest honours were voted to him, as well by the general congress of the Achaians, as by the people of each particular state. On arriving in Macedonia, he found the Illyrians still in the country, and defeated them ; but in the course of the fight, while eagerly cheering and exhorting his soldiers, he broke a blood- vessel, in consequence of which he sickened and died. He was much re- gretted by the friends of Macedonia; for he was generally thought to have given fair promise, not only of ability in the field, but of prudence and benevolence. Chapter XII* 0/ the first War maintained by the jEiolians against Philip, king of Ma- cedonia, together with the Achaians. Sect. I. — ^Thb peace which followed the victory of Antigonus was grievous to the -^tolians. This people, though numerous and brave, had ever been powerless through ignorance, poverty, and disunion, tUl the time when the political system of Greece was broken up by the Macedonian kings and leaders. It was then that the iEtolian tribes united in a league, which soon l)e- came a formidable power, and one of a spirit new to Greece. The ^tolian warrior usually aimed less at empire than at plunder, and looked for his reward to the continuance of war, and not to its termination. His victories led to the gathering of booty, which was quickly consumed, and only whetted his appetite for more ; and not to the acquisition of permanent sources of revenue, which would have flowed with riches in time of peace, but which war would have inter- rupted and put to hazard. The law had ever been weak, the people rude ; rob- bery, the vice of uncivilized nations, had prevailed unrestrained: and the effect of the union was not to destroy the pre- datory habits of the ^EtoUans, but sim- ply to make them hunt in concert, in- stead of preying on each other. Since their harvest time was the time of trouble, they little valued the provisions agreed on by civilized nations to abridge and soften war, and give security to peace ; they were therefore careless of the laws of arms, and the sanctity of covenants : and they were bloody as well as faithless, their moral sensibilities being coarse and dull, as their views of expediency were narrow. The growing riches of the Achaian confederacy had moved the envy and tempted the rapacity of the iElolians: its rising power alarmed their jealousy and the more as its conduct was gene- rally favourable to peace and order, and adverse to that predatory warfare io N 2 180 GREECE I which they delighted. They were there fore always ripe for hostility to the Achaians. except when they needed their help against more dangerous foes. Ac- cordingly it was not difficult to bring them into combination with Antigonus Gonatas for the destruction of the league. The joint attack was repulsed ; and after the death of Antigonus, when the ^to- lians were in danger from Demetrius his son, the Achaians were not prevented by the wrongs received from etfectually aiding them. Nevertheless, the ^to- lians retained their ill will ; and after the death of Demetrius they eagerly took part with Cleomenes against the Achaians. After the defeat of Cleomenes there was an interval of quiet, which the^to- lians did not venture to disturb, as long as they were awed by the power and ability of the third Antigonus. His death emboldened them again to follow their habitual propensity to war and rapine : for they set at nought the unripe age of Philip, the young king of Macedonia, and they deemed themselves a match for the Achaians single-handed. Dorimachus, a bold and turbulent young man of ^tolia, had been sent by his nation to Phigalea. on the iMes- senian border, professedly to govern and defend tlie city, wliich was a sub- ordinate ally of theirs. He had ga- thered about him robbers and pirates, whom in the general peace he knew not how to support or employ : he therefore suffered them to plunder the Messenians, though friendship subsisted between them and the iEtolians. At first the plunderers confined their de- predations to the flocks and herds that fed about the border ; but as they grew bolder, they advanced into the country, and nightly pillaged and destroyed farm- houses. Dorimachus shared in the spoil, and disregarded all remonstrances, till they came so thick that he could not wholly pass them by ; and then he said that he would go to Messene, to satisfy the complainants. He went accordingly ; but when the injured persons came before him, he laughed at some, and others he threatened and reviled. Whde Dorimachus was in Messene, the pirates attacked a house close by the city, killed all who resisted, and binding the rest of the servants led them away, together with the cattle. The Ephori, who were the principal magistrates of the Messenians, summoned Dorimachus to answer for his conduct; aad iiiiron. an Ephor, and a man of high character and mfluen«e, advised that ne should be detained in the city till the property taken should be restored, and the murders atoned for, by giving up the guilty to justice. The proposal being generally approved, Dorimachus took fire. He exclaimed that they were insulting, not himself, but the ^tolian community, and that they should sutfer accordingly ; and he behaved so arrogantly, that Sciron was provoked to call him by the name of Babyrtas, a Messenian of the vilest cha- racter, whom he singularly resembled in person. The taunt was never forgiven : Dorimachus yielded for the present to necessity, promised satisfaction, and was released, but the insult of Sciron mainly determined him to do all in his power to kindle a war. Dorimachus could not propose to the ^tolians to go to war for a word of con- tempt addressed to himself by an indi- vidual, and in the original quarrel he had been evidently and grossly in the wrong. But he hoped to gain his end through his kinsman Scopas, who chiefly directed the administration of the commonwealth. He reminded him that little was to be feared from the Macedonians, who had now a boy for their ruler ; that the La- cedaemonians were always enemies to Messene, and the Eleians friends of iEtolia; and that the Messenian territory, having remained unmolested throughout tlie war of Cleomenes, was rich in every kind of booty, so that the war would certainly be gratifying to the Many. It was made the pretext of hostility, that the Messenians had entered into alliance with the Achaians and Macedo- nians — a strange subject of complaint on the part of a nation at peace with both. The arguments of Dorimachus were ad- * dressed to a spirit as restless as his own ; and so great was the eagerness ot Scopas for the war, that he commenced it on his own authority, without awaiting the sanction of the people. The iEtolian leaders first sent out corsairs, who did not confine their attack to the Messenians, but captured a ves- sel belonging to IVIacedonia, and ravaged the coasts of Acai-nania and Epirus. This took place while Timoxenus was general of the Achaians ; and at the end of his administration Dorimachus and Scopas undertook the invasion of Mes senia, considering this to be the period when the Achaians were least likely to oppose them, while Timoxenus was on the point of going out of office, anJ GREECE, Ifil i his successor had not entered it The iEtolians passed through the territories of the Achaian cities Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea. Their generals professed that they meant no wrong to the Achaians ; but the cupidity of the soldiers could not be restrained when booty was in view, and they pillaged the country in passing through it, till they came to Phigalea, From Phigalea they entered the Messe- nian territory, and ravaged it in safety, since the Messenians did not venture to take the field. At the next general meeting of the Achaians, the deputies of Patrae and Pharae complained of the ravages com- mitted in their country, and the Messe- nian embassy requested aid against the unprovoked and most unjust attack of the ^tolians on a people allied with them trom of old. The assembly took part in the particular wrongs of the com- plainants, and all were hke wise indignant on behalf of the confederacy, that the ^tohans should have presumed to vio- late its territory by marching an army across it without leave. It was voted that help should be given to the Messe- nians ; that the general should assemble the Achaians in arms ; and that when so assembled they should determine what was to be done. Timoxenus the general was slack in preparation : for he feared misfortune, considering that the Achai- ans, since the peace, had neglected exer- cise in arms. But Aratus, who was ap- pointed to succeed him, was enraged at the presumption of the ^tohans : where- fore he urged on the levy by all means in his power ; and receiving the public seal from Timoxenus five days before the legal time, he wrote to the cities, and collected the youth in arms at Megalo- polis. When here assembled, the Achaians were met by ambassadors from Mes- sene, who requested admission into the alliance which had been formed, with the Macedonians and others, during the war of Cleomenes. The Achaians an- swered that this could not be done with- out the consent of the rest ; but that they would succour the Messenians, only requiring hostages that the Messenians would not make peace with the iEtolians without their consent. Aratus then sent to require of the ^Etolians that they should withdraw from Messenia without trespassing on Achaia ; and Scopas and Dorimachus, knowing that the forces of the Achaians were collected, i -epared to obey, and passed into the territory of Ehs, their closest ally. Aratus, trusting that the ^tolians would depart in the vessels which had been sent from home to convey them, broke up his army, and only kept with him three thousand Achaian foot, and three hundred horse, with the soldiers of Taurion, who commanded a Macedonian garrison in Orchomenus. With these he watched the ^tolians. Too weak to bind them by fear to their engagements, he was just strong enough to raise in their jealous minds the suspicion that ill faith was purposed: and Dorimachus and Scopas, partly fearing that they might be attacked in embarking, and partly vyishing at any rate to kindle war, put their booty on shipboard, but instead of accompanying it, they led their forces ay;ainst the band that remained with Aratus. An action took place near Caphyae in Arcadia ; in which, Aratus very unskilfully omitting to join battle while their opponents were crossing the plain, the fight commenced on steep and broken ground, which impeded the Achaian phalanx, and favoured the more desultory forces of the -^tolians. The Achaians were defeated, and the ^to- lians retiring unmolested through the midst of Peloponnesus, made an attempt on Pellene and ravaged the territory of Sicyon. At the next congress of the Achaians, the Many were loud against Aratus. He had gone into office before his time to take the conduct of a campaign, though in the open field he was known to be neither fortunate nor skilfiU. He had dismissed his army while the .^tolians were in Peloponnesus, though he knew the turbulent character of Scopas and Dorimachus; he had needlessly given battle with a scanty force, when he might have waited and reassembled the Achaians ; and in the action itself he had let slip the opportunity of fight- ing on the most favourable ground, and had engaged on that which was most disadvantageous. Aratus endea- voured to show that the late disaster had not been suffered by his fault, and begged that, if in anything he had erred, he migiit be censured with forbearance for human infirmity. The faults of his conduct could not be denied; but his remembered merits and services over- came them ; he was quitted from blame and continued to hold the leading influ- ence among hif^ people. ■PPM lit GREECE. Itie Achaians resolvwl that ambas- sadors should be sent to their allies, to require assistance according to the treaty, and to propose that the Messe- nians should be admitted into the alli- ance. That they might be ready to succour the Messenians, if necessary, ♦hw voted a levy of five thousand foot and five hundred horse; and they di- rected the general to settle with the La- eedsemoniahs and Messenians how many troops they should severally furnish to the confederate army. Each state was rated at half the contingent of the Achaians ; so that the whole amounted to eleven thousand horse and foot. On hearing this, the ^Etolians were anxious to throw division among their enemies ; and with this view, in their next assem- bly, they came to a most extraordinary decree. Their original quarrel was with ihe Messenians, not with the Achaians ; and they had before been allied with both : yet they voted themselves friends of the Lacedemonians and Messenians, but enemies of the Achaians, unless they would renounce the Messenian alliance. The Epirots, and Philip, king of Macedonia, who were among the chief allies of the Achaians, having heard the Achaian ambassadors, consented to re- ceive the Messenians into the league. •*They were little surprised," Polybius observes, ** at the conduct of the iEto- lians, who had done nothing unexpected, but only acted after their usual manner. Wherefore also, they were not much enraged, but voted to remain at peace with them : so much more easily is par- don given to habitual injustice, than to unusual and unexpected delinquency." Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, not- withstanding the liberality with which they had been treated by Antigonus and the Achaians, were secretly negotiating to revolt fi-om their alliance, and to join with the iEtolians. Skerdilaidas also, an lUyrian chief, who commanded forty piratical vessels, agreed with the -^to- hans, for half the spoil, to join them in an invasion of Achaia: and the business was managed, and the expedition con- ducted, by Dorimaehus and Scopas, while Ariston, the nominal general, re- mained at home, pretending ignorance, and professing to be at peace with the Achaians. Cynaetha, in Arcadia, had long been troubled with great and inextinguishable •editions, full of mutual expulsions. bloodshed, pillage, confiscation, and division of lands. The friends of the Achaians had at length prevailed, and held the city, under the protection of an Achaian garrison and general ; when the exiles sent an embassy to supplicate reconciliation and re- admission into the city. The prevailing party took com- passion on them, and requested the consent of the Achaians to their restora- tion, which was readily granted. The garrison was withdrawn, and the exiles returned ; but the solemn oaths which con- firmed their reconciliation were scarcely out of their mouths, when they began to plot the ruin of their restorers, by calling m the iEtolians. Dorimaehus and Sker- dilaidas, having entered Peloponnesus, came before Cynaetha ; and some of the principal military officers of the city, who had been chosen from among the exiles, opened the gates to them by night. These traitors were duly re- warded for their ingratitude; for the ^tolians, on entering, slew them first, and then carried pillage and slaughter through the city. They next proceeded to a wealthy temple near, which was only ransomed from plunder by a heavy contribution — and hence departing, they encamped before the city of Cleitor. They invited the Cleitorians to revolt from the Achaian league to their own : but their overtures were rejected, and the attack which followed was gallantly repelled. After this defeat they prepared to quit Peloponnesus. They offered Cynaetha to the Eleians, who declined to receive it ; and the iEtolians then determined to hold it for themselves. But hearing that an army was on its way fi-om Macedonia, they gave up this project, and burnt the town ; and then, reluming to the Corinthian gulf, they passed into iEtolia. Meantime Philip arriving at Corinth, but too late for en- terprise against them, sent messengers to summon a congress of the allies ; and wliile they were assembling, he led his forces towards Tegea, with the purpose of settling some violent dissensions which had arisen among the Lacedaemonians. This people, long accustomed to the regal authority, had been without a king since the expulsion of Cleomenes ; and the frame of their government had been in a great measure disjointed by the loss of its chief magistrate. The Ephori were paramount, but they were at va- riance among themselves. Two had hitherto left their party uncertain ; the UHEECE. 183 \ > I other three were favourers of the -^to- lians, and had shared in all their recent counsels, fully trusting that no effectual opposition could be made by so young a ruler as Philip. Their views were changed oy his approach, and by the retreat of the iEtofians. They distrusted Adei- mantus, one of their two colleagues, who had been privy to all their intrigues, and was little satisfied with them ; and fearing that when Philip came near he might disclose the whole, they resolved to cut him off' beforehand. They called together the people in arms, as if the Macedonians were coming against the city. Adeimantus remonstrated that the time for such a summons had been at the coming of their enemies, the ^Etoli- ans, and not at that of the Macedonians, their fi-iends and saviours. While he was yet speaking, he was attacked and slain, with many of his supporters, by some young men who had been tutored for that purpose. The massacre pro- ceeded to a considerable extent, and many who feared to be involved in it fled to Philip. The authors of the slaughter immedi- ately sent to the king of Macedonia, to accuse the murdered persons, to pray that Philip would delay his visit till Ihey had restored tranquillity to the city, and to assure him that their meaning towards him was peaceful and friendly. He an- swered that he would make his encamp- ment at Tegea, and bid them send thither commissioners to treat with him : and ten persons were accordingly sent, who laid the late commotions to the charge of Adeimantus and his friends, and pro- mised on behalf of their employers that they should faithfully and actively per- form all the duties of allies. It was much suspected that Adeimantus had perished for his friendship to Macedonia, and that the Lacedaemonians had se- cretly been tampering with the ^Etolians. Some of Philip's counsellors advised that he should treat them as Alexander had treated the Thebans; others that he should content himself with punishing the guilty persons, and placing the ad- ministration in the hands of his friends. The answer given to the ambassadors, Polybius thinks, was dictated by Ara- tus : it cannot probably be supposed to have been framed by the king himself, who was scarcely come to the age of seventeen. It imported that wrongs done within a confederate state by one party to another, could not properly be the subject of forcible interference on the part of the league ; and that since the Lacedaemo- nians had not flagrantly violated the common alliance, and now were willing to fulfil its duties, no great severity ought to be used against them. Accord- ingly the oaths of alliance were renewed with the Lacedaemonians, and Philip returned with his forces to Corinth, where the representatives of the confe- derate states were now assembled. The call for war was universal, for all had been outraged. A vote was passed by the assembled deputies, in which, after reciting the injuries of their several constituents, they agreed to co- operate in recovering whatever cities or territories the iEtolians had taken from any of the allies since the death of De- metrius the father of Philip ; and further, in restoring to those states, which had been forced into union with the iEtolians, independence, freedom from tribute, and the undisturbed enjoyment of their ancient constitution. Philip then wrote a letter to the offending people, inviting them even yet, if they had any plea to justify their conduct, to a peaceable meeting for the purpose of discussion. Their leaders fixed a day and a place for such a meeting, thinking Philip would not attend it ; but when they found that he came, they excused themselves on the ground that they could settle nothing till authorized by the approaching assembly of the nation. The intention of hostility was still disavowed; — \Nith how much sincerity, became apparent by the next election of a general ; for the choice fell on Scopas, the chief author of every violence. After the congress at Corinth, minis- ters had been sent to every community included in the league, to procure fi*om its general assembly the confirmation of the decree already voted by the repre- sentatives of all. The Achaians ratified it without hesitation, and declared war against the iEtolians ; and when Philip came to their great council to consult with them on the common interests, they received him very favourably, and re- newed with him the friendship which they had maintained with Antigonus. By the other allies the decree was variously re- ceived. It was approved and firmly supported by the Acarnanians, thougli, as neighbours of the iE^tolians, and far inferior to them in strength, they were liable to, and had recently experienced, the greatest sufferings from their hostility. The Epirots played a double part, for they promised war to the ambassadors 1H4 GREECE. ' of the allies, and neutrality to those of the i^tohans. The Messenians were especially bound to be heart}^ m a war that was chiefly waged for their protec- tion, and the people in general wished to fulfil the obligation : but the government was in the hands of a timid and selfish minority, unused to hazard any thing for honour or for duty ; and their caution overruling the more generous movement of the multitude, the ambassadors were told that the ^lessenians would not ven- ture to take pai-t in the war, as long as the i^^tolians held the town of Phigalea on their border. The Lacedaemonians could not agree on an answer to be given to the ambas- sadors of the allies, and at last they sent them away without any. The authors of the late massacre were still active, and still pursuing the same objects as before. They procured that an envoy should be sent by the yEtolians to Lacedaemon : they pressed the Ephori to grant him a hearing before the assembly of the people. They also demanded the appointment of a king, that they might be governed ac- cording to the custom of their fathers : and the Ephori, disliking Ixjth proposals, yet fearing altogelher to oppose them, put off to another occasion the question of the re-establishment of royalty, but admitted the ambassador to a hearing. He filled the popular ear with praises of his countrymen, and extravagant invec- tive against the Macedonians. His cause had many warm suppoiters ; but some of the elder citizens, reminding the rest of their liberal treatment by Antigonus, and contrasting it with former injurious conduct on the pai't of the .^^tolians. prevailed on them to maintain their alli- ance with Philip, so that the ambassador departed without success. The defeated party now resolved to carry their purpose by violence; and they effected it by the ministry of some young men, who fell on the Ephori, while engaged in a sacrifice, and shed their blood upon the altar. They then pro- ceeded to clear the senate of all who were adverse to the ^Etolians, putting some to death, and banishing the rest. After this they easily procured a decree to exchange the alliance of the Achaians for that of their enemies : a measure to which they were partly moved by regret for Cleo- menes, and hatred of those who had con- tributed to his fall. Cleomenes had passed three years as a banished man at the court of Egypt, expecting aid to re-establish him on his hcB-editary throne, which the king wa* bound, as his ally, to furnish. That pe- riod had been marked with the death of the prince who had contracted the alli- ance ; and his son, who succeeded him, looked coldly on the claims of the royal exile. Meanwhile the death of Antigonus, the quarrel between the Achaians and -.^tolians, the increasing disposition of the Lacedaemonians to league themselves, according to his own original policy, with the latter, all seemed to offer him the fairest hopes of success in his enterprise. Accordingly he pressed the king to send him out with the requisite supplies of men and provisions; and this request being disregarded, he next begged to be dismissed with his servants only. But his talents and daring temper were formi- dable to the administration. If they sent him out with fit equipments and supplies, they feared that he might become the lord of Greece, and a too powerful rival of their master. If they dismissed him unattended, he might possibly even then be successful in his enterprise ; and if he were so, he would be not only a rival but an enemy. By detaining him in Alexandria these dangers were avoided, but another not less serious was incurred : for all the Grecian mercenaries in the Egyptian service were known to be at his beck, and it was feared that he might use them to overthrow the government, being provoked by ill usage, and embol- dened by contempt for the weakness of the monarch. As the safest course, it was resolved to destroy him. There was then in Alexandria Nica- goras of Messene, an hereditary friend of Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon, and his entertainer during his banishment; who had forwarded the treaty of reconci- liation between him and Cleomenes, had become a surety to it, and had accompa- nied him on his return. After the mur- der of Archidamus, Nicagoras had pro- fessed himself thankful that his own life, and those of his companions, had been spared: but he secretly cherished an abiding desire of vengeance for the per- fidy which had made him the unwitting betrayer of his friend ; and though his resentment had been grounded on ho- nourable feelings, he was now ready to gratify it by the most dishonourable means. Cleomenes had welcomed him on his landing as a friend, and had vented to him in terms of bitter satire his disgust at the effeminate and profligate manners of the court. These expressions he re- poi ttd to Sosibius, the chief minister I GREECE. 18S ytho soon perceived in him the instru- ment he wanted, and urged him on with gifts and promises to the ruin of his enemy. It was agreed that Nicagoras should write to Sosibius, and accuse Cleomenes of plotting an insurrection, in case his demands of aid were not complied with. The minister received the letter, and laid it before the king ; and Cleomenes, in consequence, was shut up, and closely guarded in a house which was given him to inhabit. Having now no hope from the friendship of the government, he resolved to strike a blow against it ; yet less with the expectation of any prosperous result, than with that of a death becoming his courage, and conducive to his renown. He lulled to sleep the vigilance of his guards, and sallying at the head of his few friends, he met and made prisoner the governor of the city. He ranged the streets inviting the multitude to liberty, but no man an- swered to his call ; he then endeavoured to break open the public prison, but found it too strongly guarded, and too well made fast. This last hope having failed, both he and his companions immediately slew t hemselves. Thus perished, says the nearly contemporary historian, Polybius, w ho was not his friend, " a man of most agreeable conversation, of great ability in the conduct of affairs, and altogether chief-like and kingly in his nature." To this may be added the praise of a pa- triotism, which, though not untainted with more vulgar ambition, was yet mainly directed to real reform in government and public morals. But on the other hand it must be owned that the fame of Cleomenes is blotted with many a stain of blood, and some of treachery. The memory of Cleomenes was fondly cherished by the people whom he had governed, and w hile he lived they never gave up the hope of his return, nor ad- mitted the thought of appointing another to be king in his room. About the time of the last-mentioned commotions, they were assured of his death ; and they then proceeded to the choice of two kings. One of these was the lawful heir of the Eurystheneid house, Agesipolis, the grandson of that Cleombrotus, who had been made king when Leonidas was banished. Of the Procleid house there were many living, among whom were two sons of Archidamus: but all these were passed over to make loom for Lycurgus, a stranger to their blood, "who, by giving to each of the Ephori a talent, became a descendant of Hercules, and king of SpsLrta.:'— Polybius. Machatas, the late ^tolian ambassa- dor, now returned to Lacedaemon, and exhorted the kings and the Ephori to im- mediate hostility against the Achaians, as the only means oif disarming the work- ers of disunion between his people and their own. His advice was followed : Lycurgus entered the territory of Argos. and took several towns the more easily, as his attack was unexpected. The Eleians also were persuaded by Macha- tas to declare against the Achaians ; and thciEtolians were now full of confidence, the Achaians of anxiety — for Philip was engaged in preparation, the Epirots were dilatory, and the Messenians quite inac- tive. But before beginning the story of the war, w^e will shortly advert to some important transactions which took place about the time of its breaking out Byzantium was so placed on the nar- row channel, by which the Euxine sea communicates with the Propontis and the ^gean, that a vessel could hardly make the passage without being carried by the current to its port. Its situation was most advantageous for its traffic with either, as well as for the protection or hinderance of the trade which the Greeks carried on with the countries round the Euxine for various necessaries, especially grain, which their country produced very insufficiently. As a set-off against the maritime advantages of its position, it was entirely hemmed in on the landward side by hordes of fierce barbarians, from whom its inhabitants were obliged to suffer an unceasing predatory war, or to buy a doubttui peace by heavy pay- ments. Almost worn out by the cease- less struggle, they had craved assistance from the states of Greece, but unsuccess- fully, though it was important to all that Byzantium should be held by a Grecian people. The Byzantines then availed themselves of their commanding situation to take the relief which their petitions had failed to procure. They levied a heavy toll on every vessel which passed the straits. I^oud complaints were made ; the Rhodians were called on to redress the grievance, as the leading maritime power of the age; their ambassadors went to Byzantium to remonstrate against the impost, accompanied by ministers from their allies; but the Byzantines maintained their claim as just and rea- sonable, and war broke out between the slates. The Rhodians were the stronger, \w Givl!<££* II and they were assisted by Pnisias, king of Bithynia; while the hopes were dis- appointed which their adversaries had placed in some other potentates of Asia. The Byzantines, therefore, were soon obliged to submit; and peace was granted to them on the condition that they should cease to levy the offensive tolls. About this period some violent and bloody commotions took place in Crete, once the cradle of Grecian civi- lization, but long since distinguished only as the dwelling-place of a lawless and faithless people, or as a wasp's nest of freebooters and mercenary sol- diers. Two cities, Cnossus and Gor- tyna, had combined for the subjugation of the rest, and had brought under their dominion all save Lyttus, which they attacked with the determination of de- stroying it altogether, that it might serve for a warning and terror to the disobe- dient. The Lyttians were besieged by an army gathered from all the states of the island, when dissension arose in the leaguer from some trifle, as Polybius ob- serves, *• according to the manner of the Cretans," and several townships sud- denly revolted from the Cnossians to their enemies. Even in Gortyna itself, while the elder citizens clove to the Cnossian alliance, the younger part were mostly favourable to the Lyttians. To aid in recovering their ascendancy, the Cnos- sians procured a thousand auxiliaries from iEtolia. The elder Gortynians occupied the citadel, introduced mto it the Cnossians and iGtolians, killed some and banished others of the young men, and placed the city at the disposal of the Cnossians. Soon afterwards, hearing that the people of Lyttus had gone out with all their forces to the war, the Cnossians surprised the unguarded city, and burnt and wholly demolished it, carrying away with them the women and children. The returning Lyttians saw the ruin, and could not bear to come within the circuit of their desolated home. They marched all round it with bitter wailings, then turned their backs on it, and went to Lampe, a city allied with them, where they were most hospitably received. Converted in one day from citizens to lojoumers, they still made war upon the Cnossians, and perhaps more ac- tively, as they had more to avenge. As the Cnossians had strengthened them ■elves by alliance with the iStolians, the Lampapans and their confederates ap plied to the Achaians, and obtained an auxiliary force. Thus assisted, they were able to compel the revolt of se- veral towns from the hostile confede- racy. They then in their turn sent five hundred men to the assistance of the Achaians. The Cnossians had already sent a thousand to the iEtolians ; and to the end of the war both parties were strengthened by troops from Crete. Sect. IL — ^The quarrel between the iEtolians and the Achaians had ripened from a tissue of desultory hostility and intricate negotiation to a regular war, in which each party knew on whom it might reckon both for friends and ene- mies. Philip now advanced through Thessaly and Epirus, with the purpose of invading iEtolia. Meantime a plot was laid by Dorimachus and another iEtolian leader, to surprise The Achaiati city of iEgeira on the Corinthian gulf. The iEtolians crossed the gulf by night, and landed near the place. Twenty men went before with a deserter from the garrison, who led them over crags and along a watercourse into the city. They seized a postem,slew the watch, and opened the gate to their countrymen, who poured in eagerly, and straightway fell to plunder. This indiscreet avidity saved the town ; for while they were scat- tered confusedly through the houses, the inhabitants gathered in force on a height which, though unfortified, served the purpose of a citadel. Dorimachus we it against them, and a desperate struggle ensued, the townsmen fighting for their homes and children, the intruders for their lives. At length the iEtolians be- gan to give way, while their oppo- nents increasing in confidence press- ed on them yet harder, till they drove them precipitately down the hill. Many fell by the sword, many perished trodden down in the throng and struggle round the gates ; many who escaped this danger were tumbled from preci- pices in the hurry of their flight A scanty remnant gained the ships, and these dishonoured by losing their arms; and the fleet set sail to recross the guU in discomfiture and disgrace. About the same time Megalopolis was attacked by Lycurgus, king of Lacedae- mon ; and Euripides, who commanded for the /Etolians in Elis, ravaged the lands of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea. He was attacked on his return by the united forces of these states, but he de- GREECE. 137 . feated them and re-entered the territory of Dyme. The three towns then ap- plied for succour to the Achaian gene- ral, the younger Aratus, son to the de- liverer of Sicyon; but their message found him in an embarrassing situation. In consequence of a failure on the part of the Achaians to pay to their merce- naries all that was due for their service in the last war, he was now unable to raise a body sufficient for the present need. This difficulty being added to considerable sluggishness and timidity which he shewed in conducting opera- tions, his distressed confederates re- mained without relief, till they were driven to a measure of very pernicious example. They agreed to withhold their contributions from the league, though they had been among its original pro- moters, and to employ the money in support ina: a body of mercenaries, to be used for their own protection. As soon as Philip entered Epirus, he was joined by all the forces of that coun- try. If he had advanced forthwith into the land of the Etolians, without allow- ing them time for preparation, he might probably have ended the war : but he suffered himself to be diverted from this by the persuasions of the Epirots, who wished him first to lesiege a fortress, by gaining which they hoped to be enabled to recover Ambracia from the Etolians. Meanwhile Scopas assembled the forces of his countrymen, and led them through Thessaly into Macedonia. They ravaged the country widely, and coming to the town of Dium, which the inhabitants abandoned at their approach, they burnt and destroyed it, not sparing even the buildings or ornaments of the temples, or the erections for the convenience of the worshippers who assembled there in great numbers at the periodical festivals. They went home triumphant, laden with spoil, and confident that no one would hazard the invasion of their country: but Philip, having taken and delivered to the Epirots the place which he was besieging, pursued his march into iEtolia. He was reinforced by the Acarnanians in passing through their territory ; after which, encamping near the river Ache- lous, he wasted the lands of the enemy unopposed. Ambassadors now came to him from the Achaians, to request his presence and aid in Peloponnesus : but he, replying that he would consider on their wishes, detained them with him, wh.le he led his army deeper into ^tolia. He there took and demolished several towns and strongholds, and lastly mas- tered the important city of CEniadae, at the mouth of the Achelous. This place he carefully fortified for a naval arsenal, and a port from which to pass into the peninsula. While he was engaged in these works, there came news from Ma- cedonia that the Dardanians, a neigh bouring barbarous people, were prepar- ing for an inroad. He hastened home ; the Dardanians, hearing that he had returned, broke up their army, though they were already on the frontiers ; and Philip, when he found that the danger was over, dismissed the Macedonians to gather in the harvest. The time now came for the annual election of a general by the iEtolians, which took place near the autumnal equinox. Dorimachus was chosen, who went out forthwith on an inroad into Epirus, in which he not only ravaged the country in a manner more than usually destructive, but flagrantly out- raged all that his age deemed holy, by burning the oracular grove and temple of Dodona, one of the oldest and most venerated seats of Grecian religion. The i^tolians had returned to their homes, and winter had set in, when Phi- lip suddenly arrived in Corinth, at the season when friends and enemies least expected him. The city gates were shut, the ways were guarded, while messen- gers were sent to the Achaian states to appoint a rendezvous ; and so well was the purpose of these precautions an- swered, that Philip, in advancing towards the place of meeting, fell in with and entirely defeated the iEtolian general, Euripides, who was entering the Sicyo- nian territory, with a considerable body of Eleians and mercenaries, in perfect ignorance that a Macedonian army was so near. After this success he joined the Achaians, who increased his forces to ten thousand. Several towns were taken by the confederate powers, all which Philip gave up to the Achaians ; and the army being led into the country of the Eleians, enriched itself with the plunder of a region unrivalled for the perfection of its culture : for the lot of this people had fallen in a naturally goodly, fruitful, and pleasant land ; and they had enjoyed it for many ages un- disturbed by war, under the protection of their sacred character, as the servants of Olympian Jove, and managers of his festival. Thus ensured against aggres- sion, instead of fixing their dwellings, like the other Greeks, in the shelter of a !•• 168 GREECE. Ill I" III town, they lived among their fields, and spent their incomes in embellishing their country-hou«es, and improving their estates : inasmuch, that there were wealthy families among them, which, for two or three successive generations, had never set foot within the city. The sacredness of their territory was in- fringed, as we have seen, in a quarrel with the Arcadians, in the course oi which the presidency of the Olympian festival became itself a subject of dispute by arms. The immunities then violated tney never attempted to recover; madly preferring, as it should seem, the hazard and the excitement of war, to the safe enjoyments of tranquillity. But their rural attachments and habits still con- tinued, thou£:h deprived of the securit} which had nursed them ; and the losses to which they were liable from invasion were therefore peculiarly great. Philip's behaviour as general of the confederate army had hitherto been mo- derate and popular ; and b)r these (jua- lities as well as by the military talent which he had shewn, he had placed him- self high in the srood opinion of the Pe- loponnesians. He had, however, ad- visers who prompted him to a different line of conduct ; among whom was Apelles, lately one of his guardians, and still his most favoured and trusted friend. He wished to reduce the Achaianstothe same condition with the Thessalians, who were governed indeed in outward show as an independent peo- ple, but in fact as subjects of Macedonia. To bend them gradually to the yoke, he began by treating them on all occasions as inferior to the Macedonians, whom he suffered to take what quarters they would, even though they pitched on those already occupied by Achaian sol- diers ; and, more than that, to take from their allies the booty which they had gathered. He next directed his atten- dants for trifling causes to lay hands on the Achaians, and punish them with stripes, tliough none but their own of- ficers had legal authority to arrest or chastise them ; and if any complained of the injury, or defended the injured persons, he came in person, and led him away to prison. This was speedily checked : some young men of the Achaians made complaint against Apelles to Aratus (the father), who brought them to 1 hilij) ; and he, on re- ceiving their remonstrance, assured them that these things should not be repeated, and charged Apelles to lay no com- mand upon the Achaians unless with the approval of their general. Philip next invaded Triphylia, a ma- ritime district, bordering on Messenia and Eleia. He was here opposed by an Eleian army, with an auxihary body recently sent by the j^tolians, the whole being under Philidas, the iEtolian com- mander This leader at first divided his forces, to defend the several towns ; but when one of the strongest of these had been taken by Philip, he resolved to gather all together in the city of Lepre- um. In abandoning the town which he had himself undertaken to defend, he plundered several of his own friends before he quitted it ; and this may pro- bably have completed the rising dislike of the iEtolians, as oppressive masters and faithless allies, which seems to have co-operated with the terror of the Mace- donian arms in moving all the Triphy- lians to renounce them. Even the Le- preates themselves, though they had in their city nearly three thousand soldiers, including mercenaries, of the ^Etolians, Eleians, and Lacedaemonians, resolved to quit their present confederates, and join themselves with the Achaians. They took up a position hi the city, and re- quired the garrison to depart. Philidas refused at first, confiding in his force, and in the possession of the citadel ; but when he fersonal conference. On this he set sail, and landed at a port in the tenitory of Naupactus, where he pitched his camp. The iStolian multi- Ui4eeaia« smarmed, ^nd assembled at the distance of two furlongs ; and the treaty was soon commenced on the footing that each party should retain what it then possessed. It was much promoted by the arguments of Agelaus the Naupa'ctian, who forcibly urged the necessity of union, to enable the Greeks to defend their independence against Rome or Carthage, whichever should be victorious. Peace was soon concluded, and the delegates returned to their several homes, (b. c. 21 7.) During the period of quiet which fol- lowed, the Peloponnesians employed themselves in repairing the damage which their property had suffered during the war, in carefully cultivating their fields, and in restoring the old religious and festive meetings, which continual warfare had drawn mto disuse and al- most into oblivion. The iEtolians too rejoiced at first in the peace, and showed their satisfaction by choosing for their general Agelaus, who was thought to have contributed most to its conclusion. But their native turbulence and rapacity could not long remain inactive, and they soon began to blame him, because by making peace with all the Greeks, and not with some only, he had cut them off firom present plunder and from the hope of future conquests. The general, however, was not to be diverted from maintaining the treaty, and they were obliged against their nature to continue at rest. As soon as the peace was concluded, Philip returned to Macedonia, where Skerdilaidas had taken several cities. All these he soon recovered, and esta- blished besides them some other garrisons on the Illyrian frontier. He then dis- missed his army for the winter, which he spent in preparing means for his passage into Italy; an enterprize which now engrossed his waking thoughts and nightly dreams, so completely had his fancy been fired by the promptings of Demetrius of Pharos, an lUyrian chief expelled by the Romans. He needed a fleet, but deemed it im^ssible to provide one sufficient to cope with that of Rome ; and, therefore, resolving to make it such as should be fittest for speedy transpor- tation of soldiers, and ready escape from superior strength, he caused a hundred light vessels to be built on the Illyrian construction. In the spring he rounded Peloponnesus, and came to Cephalonia and Leucas. Being informed that the Roman fleet was at Lilybaeum, the far- thest western headland of Sicily, he sailed on confidently towards ApoUonia, on the Illyrian coast. But when he was just arriving, a report was brought to him that a Roman squadron had been seen at Rhegium, and that it was bound for Apolloniato assist Skerdilaidas. He immediately put out to sea in alarm and disorder, and returned with the utmost haste to Cephalonia. It was afterwards found that the squadron seen at Rhe- gium was only a detachment of ten ships from the fleet at Lilybaeum, which Philip, had he remained at Apollonia, might probably have taken ; and that by his mconsiderate flight he had lost the fairest opportunity of effecting all his purposes in Illyria, while the efforts of the Romans were engiossed by their defence against Hannibal About two years after this failure, he concluded an alliance, offen- sive and defensive, with the Carthaginian general, and with his commonwealth. In the following year he subdued most part of Illyria, the conquest of which he regarded as necessary to the attain- ment of his other designs ; but the Ro- mans, as we shall hereafter see, prevented him from joining Hannibal in Italy, by stirring up enemies to him in Greece. Hitherto, Philip had shown himself, in most instances, an excellent prince, at least according to the notions of his age. He was indeed ambitious, and ready to barter the blood of his people for his personal aggrandizement; but this great wickedness was common to him with the most admired of ancient war- riors, and carried with it neither guilt nor shaftie in the eyes of his con- temporaries. He had displayed a capa- city beyond his years for the management of men, and the direction of military operations ; had maintained the charac- ter of a faithful ally, a just and liberal ruler, and a common benefactor to all connected with him ; and these substan- tial merits being set off to the multitude by remarkable comehness of person, and majesty of demeanour, he was loved and honoured throughout Greece, both by subjects and allies. Of this a striking instance was afforded by the Cretans, who, having at length, after many bloody struggles, effected an union among themselves, chose Philip voluntarily for the head of their confederacy. But the time was now come when he discarded the counsels of Aratus, and gave himself up to those of Demetrius, the Pharian. Trie first blow that was aimed at the in- dependence of his confederates caused distrust between him and his better ad- viser, and drew him closer to the worsa One step in iniquity led to another, till the infamy was irretrievable; and Philip sunk from a popular orince to a hated tyrant Dissension had arisen in the common- wealth of Messene between the oligar- chical and democratical parties ; and Philip, hoping by this means to bring the city into dependence on himself, ap- proached it imder pretence of effecting a reconciliation, but secretly tampered with the leaders of both to exasperate their quarrels. The result was a bloody struggle, in which the commonalty were victorious, and nearly two hundred of the nobles and their adherents were massa- cred. In the measures which led to this catastrophe the king was guided by the counsels of Demetrius; and it is 1ri« opinion of Polybius that had Aratus arrived in Messene before the slaughter, as he did on the following day, his influ- ence over Philip was still sufficient to have hindered an act which blasted his character, and changed the complexion of all his after life. The habit of being guided by Aratus still stru^led with the vicious propensi- ties which were flattered by the sugges- tions of Demetrius, and shame restrained him from approving in the presence of the former those proposals which he knew would fall under nis censure. At a solemn sacrifice he was admitted into Ithome, the citadel of the Messenians : and taking the entrails of the victim into his hands, to examine what omens could be drawn from them, he asked those around him whether the auguries directed him to quit the citadel, or to seize it. Demetrius answered, ** To quit it, indeed, if your views be those of a soothsayer; but if of an able monarch, to retain it, lest, having slighted one opportunity, you should afterwards wish for another ; for thus," he said, " holding both the horns, you may keep the ox under con- trol ;*' implying Peloponnesus by the ox, and by the horns the two commanding and almost impregnable fortresses, Ithome and Acrocorinthus, Philip liked the counsel, but could not refrain firom asking Aratus whether he concurred in it. " I should," he rephed, " could you seize the place without breach of faith to the Messenians ; but if by gar, risoning this with soldiers, you are likely to lose all the other citadels, which were garrisoned for you by Antigonus with the confidence of the alUes, look whether it be not better to withdraw the 19a GREECE. troops, and leave the fortress in the ke^mg of confidence." The king was checked for the moment, but did not permanently give up his projects of trea- cherous ambition ; and finding that the Messenians could not be brought to re- sign their independence, he made war on them and ravaged their countiy . About the same time, to rid himself oi a trouble- some monitor, and a man from whom he probably apprehended effectual opposi- tion to his newly adopted courses, he basely procured the death of Aratus, by means of a slow poison. The crime, however, could not be hid, and the mur- derer was generally detested . T)ie buniK place of Aratus was a subject of conten- tion between Sicyon, his native city, and i^gium, where he died. The honour was adjudged to the former, and his re- mains were carried thither in solemn procession. He was venerated as a hero by the Achaians, and by the Sicyonians in particular as founder, father, and sa- viour of their city ; and the biographer (Plutarch) observes with much apparent satisfaction, that there was issue ot Aratus still existing in his time, after nearly three centuries had elapsed, while the race of his murderer became extinct in the following generation*. Chaftbr XIII. (y the Wars between the Romans and Philip; the rise of Roman influence in Greece; and the general trans- actions of that country J as far as the end of what was called by the Romans the first Macedonian war. Sect. I. — ^Thk time now came when war was to be rekindled throughout Greece, and a power to appear upon the stage, which was destined to over- whelm its national independence. In the eighth year of the peace (b. c. 210) Marcus Valerius Laevinus, the Roman officer appointed to act against Philip, having sounded the disposition of the ^tolians by private conferences with their leaders, attended a general meet- ing held to receive proposals of alliance with Rome. The lures held out were ttie depression of the Macedonians, and the compulsory re- union of Acamania with the iEtolian confederacy, of which the iEtohans maintained that it had an- ciently been a member ; though when- ever, on former occasions, the name of • Thit is not stiictly true. PerMnis, Um «» ot FkiHp, had ia*I< issue, wlto (lief* in e^mu^fHf •• Room the Acamanians has occurred in Gre- cian history, it has been as a separate and generally a hostile people. The alliance was concluded, and the JEio Uans straightway went to war with Macedonia. Lsevinus mastered the island of Zacynthus, and took (Eniadae and Nasus, cities of the Acamanians : all which he gave up to his new allies, according to previous agreement, by which the conquered cities and territo- ries were to fall to the ^Etolians, and the booty to the Romans. He then withdrew to Corcyra, fully trusting that he had provided employment for Philip, which would keep him out of Italy. These tidings were brought to the Macedonian prince when he was win- tering at Pella, He resolved to march into Greece with the beginning of spring, but first to strike a terror into the neighbouring barbarians, which he hoped would secure the quiet of Mace- donia during: his absence. He seems to have been thus occupied rather longer than he had expected ; and in the mean time Scopas, who was general of the ^tolians, prepared to invade Acama- nia with all his forces. The Acama- nians were far too weak in numbers for defence against so formidable an enemy: but they were strong in desperate reso- lution and deep abhorrence of iEtolian dominion. They sent into Epinis their women and children, and the men of more than sixty years of age ; but all the males between the ages of fifteen and sixty remained behind, and bound themselves by a solemn oath that they would not return alive from the wi*r, except as conquerors. If the battle were lost, and any escaped from it, they laid a heavy curse on every countryman who should receive the fugitives to his house or board, or even within his city ; and they solemnly intreated their friends and allies that they would use the like severity. Finally, they craved of the Epirots that they would bury in one sepulchre all those who fell upon their side in the encounter, and would write above them — ** Here are laid the Acar nanians who died fighting for their country against the violence and in- iustice of the ^Etolians." Thus pre- pared in mind, they pitched their camp on the very border of their country, ''ressing messages were sent to Philip, to call for aid without delay ; and he interrupted a prosperous campaign in Thrace to hasten to their support. But the iEtolians had heard ot the despe- GREECE. 199 ) ^k^ rate extremities to which their adversa- ries had bound themselves to proceed ; the news had abated their ardour, and slackened their preparations ; and they were not ready to commence the in- tended inroad, before the approach of Philip sectu-ed the Acamanians. They then retreated into the heart of their territory. The Macedonian, when he found that his allies were out of dan- ger, did not pursue his march, but re- turned to Pella. These things took place l)efore the close of winter. In the early spring Laevinus, with the iEtolians, took Anticyra on the coast of Locris ; after which Laevinus was called home to take the consulship, the chief magis- tracy of Rome, which was filled by two persons annually elected. Besides the Romans, the iEtolians were assisted by Lacedaemon, ever friendly to the enemies of the Achaians, and I y Attains, king of Pergamus in Asia Minor, who was partly moved by jealousy of Philip, and partly by the com- pliment which the ^tolians had paid him by electing him nominally their chief magistrate. Hostilities were carried on by land and sea with various success, till Philip met the yEtolians and their allies : lear Lamia in Thessaly, defeated them in two pitched battles and obliged tnem to keep themselves within the city. Ambassadors now came from the king of Egypt, from the Athenians, Rhodians, and Chians, to mediate a peace. A day was named for a meeting of the Achaians to consider the matter, and a truce was made for thirty days. Mean- while Attains arrived with his fleet at iEgina, and a Roman squadron at Naupactus. This put an end to all desire of peace in the minds of the iEtolians ; and their ministers, when brought before the assembly of the Achaians in presence of the ambassa- dors sent by the mediating states, de- manded terms which they well knew must appear to their opponents, in the relative state of the two parties, extra- vagant and intolerable : so that the treaty was broken off in mutual dis- pleasure. It was shortly after this, that Philip, when occupied with the Nemean festival at Argos, was informed that the Romans had landed from their ships, and were wasting the fruitful plain between Sicyon and Corinth. He issued from Argos with his cavalry, bidding the infantry to follow, fell unexpectedly upon the plun- derers, and chased them to their vessels. The joy of the festival was heightened by this victory ; and Philip, to add to his popularity, laid aside his diadem and his purple, and mingled among the citizens, wearing a habit like the rest But, at the very time when he was thus affecting democratical equality, he out- raged, by the most tyrannical licentious- ness, the people whose favour he was courting. Already infamous for covert adulteries, he now went on vdthout shame or fear to gratify his appetites by open violence. His change of garb, he thought, would render his excesses less conspicuous, white the knowledge of his station would deter the injured from resistance or revenge. If any woman pleased his fancy, he sent and com- manded her to come to him ; if she did not readily comply, he broke into the house with a party of his profligate t)oon companions; and any determined re- sistance was sure to be visited on her parents, husband, or children, by some frivolous and ill-grounded accusation. By such conduct as this he quickiy lost the small remains of his popularity among the Achaians; but they were obliged for a while to bear with him, for they were hemmed in bv enemies on every side, and without tne aid of Ma- cedonia it was hopeless to stand up against so powerful a league as that which was formed against ttiem. Philip led his army and that of the Achaians into the Eleian territory. He received a check near the river Larisus from the MtoMaxi, Eleian, and Roman forces ; but on the following day he made up for his loss by the capture of a fort, to which many of the country people had fled with their cattle. While he was dividing the spoil, he was sud- denly recalled by tidings of trouble in Macedonia. In chasing the Roman foragers near Sicyon, his horse had earned him under a tree, which had broken off one of the horns with which his helmet was ornamented. An iEto- lian had picked it up, and spread a re- port of his death. This encouraged the Dardanians to invade Macedonia, and some of Philip's officers were corrupted so as to join them. He repelled the in- vasion, and wintered in Macedonia. The Roman fleet and that of Attalus wintered at iEgina. At the beginning of spring Philip de- scended into Thessaly, where he was met by pressing calls for aid from all his alUes. The maritime states wer« in fear of the Romans and of Attains^ son GR££C£. f he inland of the ^tolians ; and the Adiaians in particular had both their frontiers to defend, — the one against the iCtoIians, the other against Lacedaemon. Macedonia was threatened by the lUy- rian Skerdilaidas» and by Pleuratus, a Thracian prince allied with the .iitolians, both of whom were ready to attack it, as soon as the king should engage him- self in any distant expedition. Besides, to prevent him from moving southward, the .-Etolians had fortified and strongly garrisoned the pass of Thermopylap. However, he manfully confronted his difficulties, sent away the ambassadors with a promise that he would do his best for all, and prepared to give active succour wherever it should be needed. He sent reinforcements to every place that was in danger from the hostile fleet, and made a counter movement to every movement of the enemy. Be- tween his head- quarters and the places most liable to attack he established lines of signal-stations, along which notice of any thing important was transmitted by means of torches variously arranged according to agreement. Polybius ob- serves, how inadequate this mode of communication must be to the variety and complexity of the accidents occur- ring in politics and war, and suggests, as admitting of more universal applica- tion, a method of his own very similar in principle to the modem system of telegraphic signals. At last the hostile forces landed at Oreus in Euboea, and invested the place. An assault was made, and vigorously resisted; but while the struggle was warmest, the Macedonian governor treacherously opened a gate to the Romans, and the city was taken. The victorious squadron then proceeded to Chalcis. That city was protected by strong fortifications, by a numerous garrison, under leaders of approved fidelity, and by the waters of the Euri- pus, ever dangerous to shipping from their rapid and uncertain currents, and from the frequency of sudden squalls. The attempt was not pursued ; the fleet proceeded to Opus, the chief town of the eastern Locrians ; and the place being taken with little resistance, was given up to Attalus, the spoils of Oreus hav- ing fallen entirely to the lot of the Ro- mans. Meanwlule Philip had routed the iEtoiians at Thermopylae, and was proceeding by forced marches towards Chalcis, when he learnt that it was out of danger, and the enemy was at Opus. He hastened thither r the Romans were gone, and Attalus, little thinkinja: of his danger, was employed in extorting mo- ney from the principal inhabitants. An accident only saved him from captivity, the approaching army being descried by some stragglers from his camp. He fled unarmed and in disorder to his ships, and had scarcely embarked when his enemy came upon the shore. He escaped, however, and rejoined the Romans at Oreus. He thence returned into Asia, hearing that his kingdom was invaded by Prusias, king of Bithynia, an ally of Philip. The Romans also re- turned to iEgina. Philip gained some further successes, and then went home to make war on the Dardanians, leav- ing his allies much relieved by his timely aid, and by the departure of Attalus. He also undertooK to build a hundred ships of war in the course of the ensuing winter ; for he hoped, with the help of a squadron already sent to him by the Carthaginians, to dispute with his enemies the command of the sea. Little is known of the revolutions which took place in Lacedaemon dur- ing the period of which we are treat- ing. Before the war began Machanidas had made himself its ruler. He was destitute of hereditary title to the sceptre, like his predecessor Lycurgus ; but in this they differed, that Lycurgus, though irregularly elevated, exercised his power under the control of the Ephori, and in some measure according to the ancient laws of Sparta ; whereas Machanidas appears to have governed according to his arbitrary pleasure, and to have supported his dominion by a mercenary force. He therefore is al- ways mentioned as the tyrant of Lace- daemon, while the other, in spite of his defective title, is described as king. But whatever may have been the character of his internal government, he seems to have been an active and troublesome enemy to the Achaians, till his career was stopped by their great commander Philopoemen. This distinguished person was a na- tive of Megalopolis, and born of one of the noblest families in all Arcadia. In his youth he had courted the society and instructions of Ecdemus and De* mophanes, disciples of the philosopher Arcesilas, and notttd enemies to the ty- rants who then governed most of the Peloponnesian states. They had de- livered Megalopolis from its tyrant Aris* GREECE 80} ; y todemus, and had taken part with Ara- tus in the liberation of Sicyon : and their political wisdom seems to have been as high in repute as their boldness and address, for they were afterwards sent for by the people of Cyrene in Africa, to preside over their common- wealth, and secure their liberty by pro- per regulations. Under their directions he had been remarkable for daring and endurance in the chase and in mmtary exercises, for plainness of garb and temperance in diet. He passed vnth the greatest honour through every sta- tion in the army. He 1^ a troop of horse at the battle of Sellasia: and there he won high praises from Anti- gonus, by venturing, without orders, to make a decisive charge at a critical moment, which contributed much to the defeat of Cleomenes. During the en- suing peace, to improve his military knowledge and talents, he engaged in the intestine wars of Crete as a captain of mercenaries : a hateful occupation, but one which was then, as it has been too commonly, regarded with such very undue respect and favour, that the blame of his adopting it is rather due to the perverted state of popular opinion than to individual depravity. War soon broke out afresh in Peloponnesus, and Philopoemen returning home was afterwards made general of the Achaian cavalry. This body, then undisciplined and disorderly through the corrupt neglect or indiscreet exertions of its officers, and spirit- quelled by frequent defeat and conscious inferiority, he converted into the best cavalry in Greece. He soon rose high in the confidence of his countrymen, as their ablest military leader : and he was enabled to reform the arms and dis- cipline of the infantry, by lengthening their spears, improving their defensive armour, and teaching them to pre- serve a closer and firmer array. A strict observer of discipline himself, he was no less strict in enforcing it on others. Austere in habits, simple in manners, plain, short, and pithy in speech, and undeviating in his ad- herence to truth, his character, as well as his abilities, was such as to make him entirely crusted and respected. In less perilous times; his proud and hasty temper might have damped his popu- larity: but now his country, if once assured of a prop that could support her, was not inclined to quarrel with it because it might be a rugged one. In tlie year after the departure of Attalus (B. c. 207) Philopoemen being general of the Achaians, prepared for a decisive contest with Machanidas. He laid his views before the general as- sembly, where they were received with entire approbation; and then going round to all the cities, he stirred them up to zeal and activity, and amended what- ever was amiss in their military arrange- ments. In about eight months from the first proposal of the enterprise, he gathered his forces at Mantineia, fiiU of courage, cheerfulness, obedience, and confidence in their commander. Ma- chanidas advanced against him from Tegea, where his army was then lying, and the battle took place between Tegea and Mantineia. The engagement was begun on each side by the mercenaries. Polybius observes that such troops would generally fight more resolutely in the service of a tyrant than in that of a free state : for the tyrant, depending chiefly on their support against domes- tic enemies as well as foreign, would retain them permanently, and make them sharers in his prosperity ; whereas, in serving a commonwealth, they could look to nothing more than their pay during the war and their dismissal at the end of it. In the present case the mercenaries of Machanidas entirely routed those of the Achaians, and pur- sued them towards Mantineia. Their chief joined with them in chasing the fugitives, instead of leading them against the standing enemy ; while Philopoemen, not dismayed by the retreat of his mer- cenaries, prepared to recover all by the firmness of his Achaian phalanx. He shifted his position so as to outflank the enemy, and awaited the attack. The Lacedaemonians advanced as men already victorious ; but their ranks were broken in crossing a ditch, which Phi- lopoemen had placed in front of his lines, and the Achaians then advancing in good order completed their confu- sion They were entirely discomfited, and great numbers slain. Philopoemen then directed his attention to intercept- ing the return of Machanidas and the mercenaries. He set guards on the bridge and at all the passages over the ditch, and commanded that no quarter should be given ; " For these," he said, " are they who maintain all the tyrannies in Sparta." He himself proceeded in pursuit of Machanidas, who was riding along the ditch, and seeking opportunity to cross it; the tyrant at length spurred GREECE. to the lekp, and was slain in the aet by Philopoemen. The Achaians BOW adYanced to T^ea, which sub- mitted at their approach; and on the following day they encamped on the Eurotas, and ravaged Laconia unre- sisted, though before this battle they had long been unable to keep the enemy from their own gates. Since the departure of Attains, the Romans, being occupied with Hanni- bal, had neglected their confederates in Greece. Deserted by two of their most powerful allies, and deprived of the third by the victory of Philopoemen, which had reduced the Lacedaemonians to inaction, the ^tolians,who hitherto had frustrated all overtures of peace, were driven to sue for it on such terms as they could obtain.. The treaty was just concluded, when a Roman general arrived on the coast, and vainly endea- voured to unsettle it. Philip offered him battle, which he declined ; and a short in- terval of languid hostility was followed by a general pacification, (b. c. 208.) Sect. II. — ^The ambition of Philip now turned towards the east He secretly •tinred up Crete against the Rhodians, of whose naval power he was jealous. The khipdom of Egypt having descended to an mfant, he conspired with Antiochus king of Syria to divide it ; though both had professed the warmest friendship towards Ptolemy Philopator, the father of the child. But the first occasion for war was furnished by Prusias, king of Bithynia, who had leagued himself with FhUip through common enmity to Atta- ins, and had tightened the bond by taking his daughter to wife. Prusias coveted Cios, a Grecian town of Asia, which was rich and conveniently lituated for him ; and though he had no daim on it, nor just matter of quarrel against it, Philip undertook to win it and give it him. While he lay before it, ambassadors came from Rhodes and other states, intreating him to forbear. He spoke them fairly, promised com- pliance, and kept them with him till he took the town, then sacked it in their presence, making slaves of all who escaped the sword. The iniquity of this deed raised general indignation, which was embittered in the breasts of the in- tercessors by the sense of mockery and insult The Rhodians especially were stung to the quick, for even when the Macedonian envoy was boasting of his inaster*s magnanimity, and saying that, though able to win the town at pleasure. he had yet forborne in friendship to them, at that moment came a mes- senger with tidings of the capture and attending cruelties. The iEtolians felt it as a wrong to themselves, for the Cians were their allies, and had received from them a garrison and governor; and this was the third city which Philip had withdrawn from their confederacy since the peace. Even Prusias was not satisfied at receiving, instead of a flou- rishing city, a desolate spot and a heap of ruins. The first to act against Philip was Attains, and the Rhodians readily joined him. A great sea fight took place near Chios, between their fleets and that of Macedonia: both parties claimed the honour of the day, but the advantage rested vnth the allies. Philip neverthe- less took some towns in Cana : but his enemies were too strong for him at sea, and he was obliged to retire to Mac^ donia. Attains had confidently reckoned on help from the yEtolians, who, besides the indignity with which they had been treated by his rival, owed himself some return for benefits rendered during the former war. But they were now en- during distresses, which had quelled their restless spirit In a long and ge- nerally unprosperous struggle their re- sources had been exhausted, till most of the citizens were deep in debt. This was, from causes which have already been indicated (p. 12,) a prevailing evil in the states of Greece, and a frequent cause of civil contests and revolutions. In the present case the debtors called for a change in the laws to relieve them ; and the business was committed to Scopas and Dorimachus, men prone to innovation, and deeply indebted themselves. The nature of the settle- ment they effected is not known, but Scopas seems to have founded on it some further schemes of ambition, in which beine foiled, he went to seek his fortune at the court of Alexandria. He was there placed high in trust and fa- vour, and liberally paid ; but his covet- ous temper still craved for more, and his rapacity being found more trouble- some to the administration than his ser- vices were valuable, they rid themselves of him by taking his hfe. It is long since we have lost sight of Athens, which, though still the favou- rite scat of philosophy and art, had become insignificant in Grecian po- litics. The character of human ant^ GREECE. ^3 nals IS too generally such, that the less a state is mentioned in them, the less matter it has for shame and for repent- ance. But the inaction of the Athenians did not proceed from love of peace, nor was it coupled with the peaceful virtues. The restless spirit of their ancestors was strong in them, though they had lost all their energy and courage, and though the acuteness of mind which still re- mained, was chiefly displayed in more ingenious methods of degradation. Their empire was gone, their commerce had decayed, and Uiey had nothing but the narrow territory of Attica, to support a numerous people nursed in habits of idleness and luxury. Some relief was found in large donations of money, com, and other necessary articles, which were made by many of Alexander's suc- cessors to purchase the good word of a people so renowned, and still so much distinguished for intelligence and accom- plishment. All favours so conferred were repaid by unbounded adulation; and the leaders of the multitude, instead of exhorting them to seek for manlier methods of support, and to recruit their finances by economy, self-denial, and laborious exertion, only vied with each other in devising new compliments to the potentates who would barter gifts for praises, and thus obtaining means to gratify the crowd at no expense but that of character. The Ptolemies were of all the Macedonian dynasties the most liberal in their donations to Athens ; and they were repaid by flatteries the most extravagant. Attains had follow- ed their example, and met with a like return. But circumstances arose which connected them vith him more closely ; and though little aid could be expected from their arms, to be able to join his cause with theirs was not without ad- vantage. It happened that two young men of Acamania inadvertently entered the temple of Ceres at Eleusis, during the celebration of the Mysteries. This was a great profanation, since the rites were directed to be performed in the strictest secrecy; and though there was reason to believe the trespass unintended, the intruders were nevertheless put to death. Their countrymen at home were much offended, and sought to revenge them- selves by war : they procured assistance from Macedonia, and entering Attica, wasted the lands and carried thence a large booty. The Athenians now were full of resentment, and looked to foreign power for redress, which they wanted power and courage to take fbr them- selves. In the former war they had been numbered among the allies of the Romans ; and to Rome, accordingly, they applied for. assistance against Philip. A like application had ah-eady been made by Attains and by the Rho- dians ; and the senate, which now had triumphed over the Carthaginians, and completely broken and ruined their power, was easily persuaded to embark in a war for which it only wanted a pre- text. Attains came to Athens at the invitation of the people, and brought with him ambassadors from Rhodes. The citizens went out to meet him in solemn procession, with their wives and children, and the priests with the en- signs of their function. An assembly was held, in which high honours were voted to Attalus and the Rhodians : and a new ward (phylej was added to those already existing, and was called after the name of the Pei^amenian monarch. We have already seen this compliment paid to the first Antigonus and his son. Attalus thanked them, promised further services, and exhorted them to declare against the Macedonian, for which little intreaty was necessary. There were Roman ministers already present, and alliance was quickly concluded among all the parties. Philip's courage did not fail when Rome was added to a league which he had already found well nigh too strong for him. While Attalus and the Rho- dians were engaged in their negotiation with Athens, and in an unsuccessful attempt to rouse the -ffitolians to arms, he took the field in Thrace, and reco- vered from his enemies many towns which had embraced their cause. After this he crossed into Asia and besieged Abydos. The townsmen held out be- yond their strength, supported by the hope of aid from Attalus and from Rhodes ; but the king only sent them three hundred soldiers, and the Rho- dians a single ship. Thus unaccount- ably neglected by their powerful allies, the besieged were soon reduced to extre- mity ; but not till the wall was breached and mines were carried to the inner rampart did they offer to surrender. They then proposed to capitulate for the safe dismissal of the soldiers of Attalus and the Rhodian galley with its crew, and leave for each inhabit- ant to depart with a single garment Philip required them to surrender a« 204 GREECE. discretion. This answer filled the city with rage and desperation. A vote was passed that all me matrons should be shut up together in the temple of Diana, and the boys and girls, and infants with their nurses in a public place of exercise ; that the gold and gBver, and valuable furniture, should be heaped in the market-place or lodged in the ships; that priests and victims should be brought and altars erected ; that a number of persons should be chosen, who, as soon as they had wit- nessed the destruction of their country- men who fought in the breach, should slay the matrons and children, throw the collected riches into the sea, and set fire both to public and private buildings in as many places as they could ; that these should bind themselves to perform their task by a solemn form of execra- tion ; and that the rest should swear that they would not quit the battle alive except as victors. The combatants well performed their part, for so obstinately did they fight, that when night was ap- proaching, the assailants were glad to withdraw from the contest But the principal persons, who had been in- trusted with the more revolting business of the massacre, when they saw that there were few survivors from the battle, and those weary and sore wounded, resolved to surrender the city, and sent the priests to Philip for that purpose. The gold and silver was accordingly given up to him, when a sudden fiiry fell upon the people. They exclaimed that those were betrayed who had fallen in the battle ; reproached themselves and their leaders with perjury, but especially the priests, who after devoting them to death, had themselves been the agents of surrender; they ran wildly al>out, and slaughtered the women, the children, and themselves. Philip viewed the whole with astonishment, but with- out pity. He forbade his soldiers to enter the town, observing coldly that he would grant the Abydenes three days to die in. It is said that not a man fell alive into his hands, unless through some unavoidable accident. About the end of autumn, a Roman armament arrived on the coast of Epirus, under Publius Sulpicius 6£dba,one of the consuls. He quartered his land forces for the winter at Apollonia, and stationed his fleet at Corcyra, Twenty triremes were detached to the assistance of the Athenians, whose lands were continually wasted by inroads from Co- rinth, and whose coast was infested by cruisers fi-om Chalcis. The squadron was further strengthened by the arrival of three Rhodian galleys of a larger size ; and three open vessels were added by the Athenians, being all which now remained of their once powerful navy. But the forces assembled in Athens were more than sufficient to keep the plunderers at rest both by land and sea ; and fortune offered to the Roman com- mander an opportunity of more impor- tant action. There came to hun some Chalcidian exiles of the party hostile to Macedonia, who reported that the town was neg- ligently guarded ; for the inhabitants trusted to the Macedonian garrison, and gave themselves no trouble about it, and the soldiers of the garrison were equally careless, having no enemy near enough, as they thought, to he dangerous. On this he founded a plan of surprisal. He sailed to Sunium, but kept his ships con- cealed l)ehind the promontory till night fall ; then crossed the Euripus, and landed at Chalcis undiscovered a little before the dawn. A few of his soldiers scaled the wall in places where the sen- tinels were absent or sleeping ; they ad- mitted their companions, and the city was taken almost without resistance. It was pillaged and partly burnt : and though the cruelty of the soldiery had not here the palliation of passions heated by a wearisome blockade or a perilous as- sault, a general slaughter was made of the townsmen, whether they fought or fled. The large and well-stored arsenal and granaries were burnt; the booty was carried to the ships : and the prison, which Philip had selected as a place of safest keeping for his most important captives, was broken open by Rhodians. To keep the town would have been most desirable, since it commanded the Euri- pus, the readiest passage between Thes- saly and southern Greece: but the Roman force was inadequate to the protection both of Chalcis and Athens, and it was therefore necessary to aban- don the foimer. As soon as Philip heard that Chalcis was taken, he hastened to the spot in the hope of revenge ; but he found the town destroyed, and the destroyers gone. He then pressed his march towards Athens to retaliate in kind. Sleep and negligence, which had ruined Chalcis, were equally prevalent there: and the city was only saved from a similar sur- prisal by a runner, who outstripped the GREECE. 20J royal army, and arrived about midnight with tidings of its approach. The walls were hastily manned, and all made ready for defence. Philip arrived before day- break, and, seeing that his first intention had been frustrated, he resolved to try an open assault. The Athenians, toge- ther with the auxiliaries furnished by Attalus, gave him battle. He bade his men take example by him, and charged at the head of a few horse. His bold- ness roused the spirit of his soldiers, and struck terror into his enemies ; he broke their ranks, slew several men with his own hand, and chased them into the city. After this they kept their walls, and Philip ravaged the country unop- posed. He bore an especial hatred towards the Athenians, and he showed it by defacing whatever was beautiful or sacred, not sparing even the tombs. On the following day, the city was se- cured by the arrival of the Romans. Philip unsuccessfully attempted Eleu- sis, and then retired to Corinth. From thence he went to Argos, where the Aehaian congress was assembled. Upon the death of Machanidas, the Lacedaemonians had fallen under the dominion of Nabis, a man surpassing all former tyrants in the monstrous and unheard of wickedness of his rule. From the first he deliberately grounded his power on a regular system of bloodshed and rapine ; he slew or banished all in Sparta who were distinguished either for birth or fortune, and distributed their wives and their estates among his mer- cenaries, to whom he entirely trusted for his support. These were chiefly made up of robbers and murderers, and other criminals of the blackest description, who entered his service as their only re- fuge from the hatred of mankind. Such instruments were the fittest for the work m which he employed them : for not content, like common tyrants, with ba- nishments and executions, he hunted out his enemies with assassins in the cities whither they fled for refuge. His extortions were boundless, and death with torture was the penalty of refusal. No source of gain was too mean for him or too iniquitous. He partook in the piracies of the Cretans, who were infa- mous for that practice; and he main- tained a sort of alliance with the most noted thieves and assassins in Pelopon- nesus, on the condition that they should admit him to a share in their gains, while he should give them refuge and protec- tion in Sparta, whenever they needed it. As soon as he deemed his power se- cure in Lacedaemon, he sought to enlarge it by war, and he soon found an occasion of quarrelling with the Megalopolitans. A favourite horse of his had been stolen at the instigation of two Boeotian travel- lers. The culprits were pursued to Me- galopolis, and arrested in the city. They protested against this violent proceeding, j^nd demanded to be carried before the magistrates of the state ; and no atten- tion being paid to their remonstrances, they called for help, and were rescued by the people. No injury was done to the emissaries of Nabis, nor were they pret'ented from carrying with them either (he norse or the groom who had stolen it : but the rescue of the Boeotians was provocation enough for the unscrupu- lous tyrant of Lacedaemon, who had long been seeking a pretext for hostility, and now commenced it by driving cattle from the lands of the Megalopolitans. Such was the beginning of war be- tween Nabis and the Achaians, in the fourth year of the general peace, (b. c» 204.) Messene first experienced the danger of the tyrant's hostility, being surprized by night, and all but the acropolis being taken. But on the following day, Philo- poemen came with an army to its relief, and the Lacedaemonian troops were glad, to capitulate for permission to withdraw. At this time, according to Plutarch, he was a private individual without autho- rity, save that which arose from his renown and from his talents: and the army which accompanied him to Mes- sene was composed of volunteers, who readily obeyed t^e call of Philopoeraen when their proper general had refused to lead them out. The account of Pau- sanias on the other hand implies that he was general of the Achaians. In the following year, however, not being chosen to any of the principal com- mands, he accepted an invitation from the Gortynians, and again passed over to Crete. For this he was generally blamed by his countrymen, and proba- bly with justice ; for it is difficult to conceive a motive which could palliate his abandoning his country in the time of peril to draw a venal sword in the service of strangers. So deeply was his conduct resented by the Megalopolitans, that they would have passed a vote of banishment against him, had not the general congress interceded in his fa- vour ; but the intended severity rankled in his haughty and violent mind, and in« fOft GREECB GREECE. 207 diiced him afterwards to take an unwor- thy revenge, by tampering with several dependant townships to make them dis- own the supremacy of Megalopohs. During Philopoemen's absence, Nabis was generally successful against the less able commanders who were then opposed to him. He ravagjed the coun- ty and threatened the cities; and the Achaians were deliberating on measures of resistance, when Philip appeared among them, and offered not only to protect their territory, but to carry the war altogether into that of Lacedaemon. The promise was received with vast applause; but when he proceeded to require that, while his forces were thus employed, the Achaians should garrison his towns of Chalcis, Oreus, and Co- rinth, the assembly perceived that the purpose of his liberabty was to entangle them in his war with Rome. Cycliadas, the general, alleged a law which forbade the treating of other matters than those for which the meeting was called ; not thinking it expedient to show that he had fathomed the drift of the proposal A vote was passed to raise an army a^nst Nabis; the assembly was dis- missed, and Cycliadas, who was a friend to the king, and had been reputed a flatterer, stood henceforth clear from the charge of undistinguishing subser- viency. Philip then proceeded to Attica, and after vauily attempting Eleusis, Peiraeeus, and Athens itself, he proceeded in the same savage and brutal spirit of hosti- lity which he had already shown, to destroy the monuments of art and pious magnificence which had before escaped. Every village had its temple and its separate religious observances ; and the beauty of the edifices every where bore witness to the taste and skill of the peo- I>le, favoured as they were by the plen- tiful supply of native marble. Philip broke the statues, demolished the tem- ^es, and even shattered the blocks of stone ; and only quitted the hostile territory when nothing was left which he could destroy. He then retured into Bqb- otia on his way to his own dominions. Meantime the Roman consul Sulpi- oius had gained some successes, little iiiq[X)irtant in themselves, but such as encouraged the barbarous tribes which bordered on Macedonia to flock to him with offers of assistance. He now ex- erted himself to the utmost in prepara- tion to wage the w^ar more vigorously : he sent to Attains, and to the Rhodians, to require their active c6-operation ; and his efforts were met by corresponding dili gence on the part of the Macedonian. But the point to which all eyes were turned with the greatest anxiety was th« approaching general meeting of the iEtolians, to whom Sulpicius had sent ambassadors requiring them to unite their arms with those of Rome. The assembly met, and the first to address it was the Macedonian ambas- sador. They ought, he said, to main- tain the peace, for Uie same causes still existed which had determined them to make it ** He prayed them to consider how the Romans had made show, as if their war in Greece tended only to the defence of the -^tolians ; and yet not- withstanding had been angry that the iEtolians, by making peace with Philip, had no longer need of such their pa- tronage. What might it be that made them so busy in obtruding their protec- tion upon those that needed it not? Surely, it was even the general hatred which these l)arbarians bore unto the Greeks." (Sir W. Raleigh.) He alleged many instances both in Sicily and Italy, where the specious pretence of Roman protection had prepared the way to a galling servitude ; and he added, " That in like sort it would happen to the JEto- lians : who, if they drew such masters into Greece, must not look hereafter to hold, as now, free parliaments of their own, wherein to consult about war and peace : the Romans would ease them of this care, and send them such a moderator as went every year from Rome to Syra- cuse. Wherefore he concluded that it was best for them, whilst yet they might, to continue in their league with Philip : with whom, if at any time, upon lignt occasion, they happened to fall out, they might as lightly be reconciled : and witn whom they had made the peace which still continued ; although the very same Romans were against it who sought to break it now." The Romans felt the force of these objections: and l)efore undertaking to answer them,theyendeavoured to weaken their effect, by putting forward the Athe- nians. They justly complained of the cruel wrongs which they had suffered, and called in the name of all the Gods for vengeance on the destroyer of their sanctuaries. ** Then spake the Romans : who excusing, as well as they could* their own oppression of all those, in whose defence they had heretofore taken arms, went roundly to the point in hand i They said that they had of late made war in the iBtolians' behalf, and that the iEtolians had, without their consent, made peace : whereof since the iEtolians must excuse themselves, by alleging that the Romans being busied with Carthage, wanted leisure to give them aid con- venient ; so this excuse being now taken away, and the Romans only bent against their common enemy, it concerned the -/Etolians to take part with them in their war and victory, unless they had rather perish with Philip." ** It might easily be perceived," says the eminent person whose words we have been using, *• that they which were so vehement in offering their help ere it was desired, were themselves carried unto the war by more urgent motives than a simple desire to help their friends, with whom they had no great acquaint- ance." He might have added, that to suffer their allies to be driven by their neglect to a separate treaty as their only hope of safety ; and then, as soon as it suited then* convenience to renew the war, to expect that those allies would be ready to disown the engagements so contracted, betokened but slight regard to their own obligations, and still less to the pledged faith of others. Such may probably have been the thoughts of Da- mocritus, the iEtolian general, when he shifted them off with a dilatory answer : for haste, he said, was an enemy to good counsel, and they must further deliberate before they could conclude. To his countrymen he said that he had weM provided both for safety and for profit : lor now they might watch the turn of events, and take part with the stronger side. The only measure actually taken was the passing a decree, whereby the general was empowered at his discretion to summon assemblies for the purpose of deliberating on peace and war, ques- tions ordinarily reserved by law for the great council of the iEtolians, when re- gularly called together at certain stated periods. The consul quitted Apollonia, and ad- vanced towards Macedonia through the country of the Dassaretians. Philip went to meet him, and some skirmishes took place to the advantage of the Ro- mans. Meantime news was brought that Macedonia had been invaded by a vast host of Thracians and Dardanians : on which the king decamped by night, and hastened to repel this new attack. The Romans advanced without opposi- tion, till tiiey came to a narrow and thickly wooded mountain passage, which Philip had fortified in the hope that it would stop them. But the strength of the Macedonian infantry lay in its impe- netrable hedge of spears : and on a path which wound through rocks and thickets, the close array could not be kept, nor the cumbrous weapons wielded. The Romans fought in looser order, and principally depended on the sword ; and this enabled them to force the passage with an ease which surprized them. Sulpicius then ravaged much of the neighlx)uring country, and fortified a post which lay conveniently for future inroads into Macedonia. Having ef- fected thus much, he returned to Apol- lonia. When Philip had arrived in Mace- donia he found the Dardanians retiring, and sent a strong detachment of horse and light infantry to harass their retreat, which was done to their no small annoy- ance and loss. His own attention was demanded by a more pressing occasion. The successful opening of the campaign on the part of the Romans ; the rising of so many among the barbarous border- tribes of Macedonia ; the arrival of the Roman fleet on the coast of Euboea which was now announced to have taken place, and which threatened that kingt dom with a maritime blockade, in addi- tion to the dangers which surrounded it by land ; aU these things concurring had overcome the hesitation of the ^tolians, and induced them to engage in the wan They had taken many towns belonging to allies or subjects of Philip, and now were ravaging the fruitful plains of Thessaly as confidently and carelessly as if they had no enemy to fear. Their camp was pitched without choice of ground wher- ever chance would have it ; little watch was kept ; and some of the soldiers were wandering about half armed in quest of plunder, others passing day and night alike in alternate drunkenness and sleep, when Philip came upon thenu A sally was made in such hurry and alarm, that some of the horsemen went out without their swords, and most without their breastplates. They were easily routed and chased to the camp by the cavalry of Philip, who prepared to assault the entrenchments as soon as his infantry came up. The troops arrived, and ad- vanced to the assault ; but the iEtolians fled through the opposite gate to the camp of the Athamanians, a neighbour- ing mbe who had accompanied them in the enterprise, but had encamped sepa- I3REECE. rately, and preserved a greater show of discipline. The day was too far gone for a second assault, and Philip rested for the night near the trenches of the Athamanians, which he proposed to as- sault on the morrow. But a second terror seized the iEtolians; they fled from this encampment, as they had from their own, and returned to their homes with shame and loss. These successes ended all present danger from iEtolian hostility, especially as the fighting men of the nation were soon afterwards much diminished in number, through the return of Scopas from Egypt to levy mercenaries for Ro- lemy. He brought large sums of gold, with which he raised a force of 6000 in- fantry, and horsemen in proportion : and the iEtolian character is strongly dis- played by the assertion of Livy, that but for the exertions of the general Damo- critus so laiige a proportion of the youth would have engaged for hire in the ser- vice of the stranger, as to leave their homes almost without defence, against the powerful enemy so recently pro- Meantime the Roman fleet, having joined with that of Attalus, entirely com- manded the iEgean sea. The hope of present succour now emboldened the Athenians to give free vent to their hatred of Philip, which fear had hitherto suppressed. Their method of attacking mm was easy at least, if it was neither dignified nor effectual They voted that his statues, and those of his ancestors, should be overthrown, and their names effaced from all honorary inscriptions : that the holidays and sacrifices should be abolished, and all the observances, in which religious rites had been prosti- tttted for the purpose of flattering them : that the priests, whenever they prayed for the Athenian people, and their allies, should pray for curses on Philip and his posterity, on his kingdom, his forces by land and sea, on the whole race and name of the Macedonians. If any man should propose an additional insult, they declared that they would pass it, what- ever it might be; and that the man might be justly slain who spoke against it They concluded by saying that whatever had formerly been voted against the Peisistratidae, the same should now hold good against Philip. Shortly after- wards Attalus and the Romans came to Peiraeeus, and honours were decreed to them no less extravagant than the ex- oressions of hostility to Philip. Prom Peiraeeus they sailed to the island of An- dros, which they conquered ; they ra- vaged many parts of Philip's dominions uid took the city of Oreus in Euboea.' They then returned about the autumnal equinox to Peiraeeus: whence Attalus went home, and the Romans to Corcyra. In the ensuing year little important was done in the war : but when leisure was given by the coming of winter. Phi- lip seeing that the contest would be long and perilous, applied himself to conci- liate his subjects and allies, and guard against the danger of defection. He promised to the Achaians the restoration of some cities which he held from them : and he quieted the discontents of the Macedonians in the usual manner of tyrannical rulers, by sacrificing his in- strument. Heracleides, his minister, was thrown into prison, and accused as the author of every unpopular measure: to the joy of the multitude, which gladly believed that the king, when freed from danger, would not renew his course of tyranny, or would not find subordinate agents as readily as before. The next year was marked with greater exertions on the part of Rome. A large reinforcement was sent to the army in Epirus, under Titus Quinctius Flamini- nus, one of the new consuls. Ambassa- dors arriving from Attalus to say that he was ready to give aid, by land and sea, according to his ability, wherever and however the consuls should direct, but that he could not do this unless his kingdom were protected against Antio- chus, king of Syria, who had invaded it, the senate gave an answer exemplifying the tone of superiority which that body afready assumed towards all foreign princes. They declared that they would send an embassy to Antiochus, requir- ing him to forbear all hostility towards Attalus, while his ships and soldiers were employed in their service : for it was fit that kings allied with Rome should live at peace among themselves. As soon as Flamininus arrived in his Erovince, he moved his army towards lacedonia. A difficult defile in his line of march had been fortified by Phi- lip, and was occupied by him with a powerfid army. Rather than pursue the circuitous route which had been taken bySulpicius, he resolved, if possible, to force it ; but how to do this was not obvious ; and forty days were spent in sight of the enemy before an attempt was made to dislodge him. This continued inaction encouraged the king to make GREECE. <0» I I" I overtures of freaty, which proved abor- tive. On the following day his position was attacked, but unsuccessfully. Such was the state of things when a shepherd was brought to the consul, who engaged to lead a detachment of his troops by secret paths to the heights above the Macedonians. A pick^ body of men was accordingly sent forward in the night, and took the required position uudiscovered. A general attack was made in the morning, and at the time when the contest was hottest in front, the detachment fell suddenly on the rear of the Macedonians, and they were en- tirely routed. Effectual pursuit was pre- vented, however, by the difficulties of the ground ; and Philip easily re-assembled his scattered forces, and retreated with them into Thessaly. In such parts of that province as were most exposed to immediate occupation by the conquerors, Philip removed the inhabitants, destroyed the towns, and wasted the country. After taking these cruel precautions, he retired into Ma- cedonia. The unhappy Thessalians were at the same time invaded by the ^Eto- lians and Athamanians, both of whom considered that they might plunder in security since the victory of their allies. The Romans lastly entered Thessaly, and took several towns by assault or capitulation ; while the king, unable to face them in the field, sat down beyond the valley of Tempe, the principal pass which led to Macedonia; and thence he sent assistance to each place which was threatened with attack. At Atrax, on the Peneus, the consul met with an un- expected repulse. His engines had ef- fected a breach in the wall, by which he thought he had ensured an easy capture of the place. But those within were brave, and they were now in a situation suitable to their weapons and mode of fighting. Their phalanx filled the breach ; the standing walls protected their flanks, so that they could not be attacked except in front ; and no move- ments were to be made which could disorder their array. The unarmed finger might as well attempt to thrust itself be- tween the bristles ot a hedge-hog, as the Romans to pierce the barrier of spears, or reach with their swords the men who bore them. At length Flamininus un- willingly gave up the attempt, and en- tered Phocis. He there took several towns, and was besieging Elateia, when nis attention was drawn by the hope of a more important adv^ntajce. Cycliadas had been banished by the Achaians, and their present general Aristaenus was friendly to Rome. The Roman fleet, underLucius Quinctius, the consul's brother, with the squadrons of Attalus and of the Rhodians, after taking Eretria and Carystus in Euboea, had come to Cenchreae, and was now pre- paring for the siege of Corinth. Before engaging in it, ambassadors were sent to the great council of the Achaians, em- powered by the consul to ( ffer Corinth as the price of their aUiance» The minds of that people were variously affected. They suffered daily from the hostility of Lacedaemon, and that of Rome was still more formidable ; they were bound by fa- vours, both old and recent, to the royal house of Macedonia ; but they held the present king in suspicion for his faith- lessness and cruelty, which they rightly deemed would become more intolerable when victory should have rendered conciliation unnecessary. Thus divided in feeUng they gave audience to the ambassadors. The Roman spoke first, then those of Attalus and of the Rhodians : the Macedonian envoys then replied, and were answered in their turn by a violent invective from the minister of Athens, after which the meeting was adjourned. On the following day proclamation was made in the usual form, that any who wished might address the assem- bly. Dead silence followed, which was broken at last by the general Aris- taenus. He set forth the dangers of their present situation, the weakness of Ma- cedonia, the strength of the Romans the ever troublesome hostility of Nabis. He dwelt on Philip's vaiious mis- deeds, especially those committed in Peloponnesus ; on the injuries of the Messenians, the murder of Aratus, the outrages perpetrated against virgins and matrons in friendly cities. These and other crimes, he contended, had can- celled every debt of alliance and grati- tude. He bid them second those who were ready to free them from the ty ranny of Philip ; and rather earn a merit with the Romans while their ser vices could be useful, than wait to be freated as time-serving neutrals, or perhaps as enemies. Vehement murmurs followed of ap- plause and disapprobation. Altercation was universal, and extended even to the ten presiding magistrates, five of whom declared that they would put the Roman alliance to the vote, while the rest main« H SIO GREECE. tained that the law forbade to treat of any thinj^ contrary to the league with -Macedonia. This day was spent in stormy dispute, and but one remained of three prescribed by law as the period of the meeting. Men*s minds were now 80 heated, that parents scarce withheld their hands from the blood of their children. A Pellenian deputy, whose son was one of those presiding magi- strates that refused to put the ques- tion, besought him long that he would not ruin his country by his obstinacy. Finding all was vain, he declared that he would slay him, and would hold him not as a son but as an enemy : and by this threat he prevailed on him to change his side, which turned the scale in favour of proposing the decree. It was proposed, and approved by the majonty, among the representatives of every state, excepting those of Dyme and Megalopolis. The latter city had been restor^ by Antigonus after its capture by Cleomenes ; the former had in the late war been taken by the Ro- mans, and its inhabitants made slaves ; but Philip had redeemed them wherever they were to be found, hp^d set them free, and re-established them in their country. When their deputies saw the turn the current was taking, they quitted the assembly, all around ap- proving their fidelity. Their example was followed by some, but not by all, of the Argian delegates. The question was put; alliance was voted with Attains and with the Rhodians; with Rome it was deferred till the re- turn of ambassadors, who were sent to procure the consent of the people, with- out which no treaty could stand good. Meantime ambassadors were sent to L. Quinctius, and the Achaian forces joined the army before Corinth. The besiegers had hoped that strife would arise between the citizens and the Ma- cedonian garrison, but they found them united in mind, and equally zealous in defence, — a proof that in that city, at least, the Macedonian commander had respected the laws, and kept order among his soldiers. They effected a breach in the wall, but were driven back when they attempted to pass it, and were in the end obliged to give up the siege, on the arrival of the royal general Philocles, with a reinforcement K) the garrison. Attalus retreated to Peir»eus, the Romans to Corcyra. Al>out the same time Elateia was taken by the consu^ Soon after Argos was recoveied for Philip. That state was attached to the Macedonian kings, whose race was be- lieved to be originally Argian ; and most of the chief citizens were also bound to Philip by personal friendship. It was customary for the generals in opening the proceedings of the as- sembly, to invoke the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hercules ; and to these, by one of those extravagant flatteries, now so disgracefully common in Greece, the name of Philip had by law been added. After the alliance with Rome, his name was omitted ; at which a murmur first arose among the multitude, then a shout demanding its recital, and, at last, the name was proclaimed in the customary form with vast applause. Encouraged by this proof of the popular disposition, Philocles came by night, and occupied a hill above the city. At daybreak he advanced in order of battle towards the market-place. There was in the city an Achaian garrison of five hundred picked men from all the states. Philocles sent a messenger to iEnesidamus, the commander, to warn him to retire ; for even without the Macedonians, he said, he would be overmatched by the towns- men who were on their side. Both the leader and his men were unmoved, till they saw a large body of Argians com- ing on armed ; and then, to save so choice a body of the Achaian youth from certain destruction, i£nesidamus agreed with Philocles for their safe retreat. Himself remained in arms on the spot where he stood, with a few of his own dependents ; and when the Macedonian sent to inquire what he wanted, he said that he would die in keeping the city intrusted to him. He was slain accord- ingly, with all those about him. The Romans went into winter-quar- ters in Phocis and Locris, after which Philip requested a conference with their leader. A place was chosen on the shore of the Malian Gulf, whither the consul repaired, attended by the gene- rals of the Achaians and iEtolians, and by some other principal persons among his allies. Philip came by sea, and re- fused to quit his galley. Flamininus asked what he feared : — " I fear no- thing," he answered, ** except the gods ; but 1 cannot trust to all around you, and least of all to the iEtohans." The other replied that the danger was com- mon : " But the reward of treachery," said Philip, " is unequal, for the iEto- lians may l)etter replace their general GREECE 2U than the Macedonians their king." They then proceeded to the business of the meeting, and Philip sought to know the terms of peace. The consul an- swered that he must withdraw all his garrisons from Greece, deliver up all pri- soners and deserters, restore to the Ro- mans what he had taken in lUyria since the former treaty, and to Ptolemy the cities he had occupied in Egypt. He then gave way to the ambassadors of Attalus, who craved reparation for losses and injuries in the war. The Rhodians called for the restitution of several places to themselves or their allies, the relinquishment of Sestos and Ab^dos, and of all towns and ports in Asia. The Achaians demanded Argos and Corinth. The ^tolians required the entire abandonment of Greece, and the restitution of all cities taken from themselves : and they strongly censured Philip's proceedings both in the war itself and in the transactions which led to it. The king replied to them, de- fending some of his worst measures on the plea of necessity, and others by al- leging their own example ; he exclaimed against their insolence in requiring him to relinquish all connexion with Greece ; a demand which sounded harshly from the Romans, but which from them was Suite intolerable. To Attalus and the Lhodians he answered that reparation was rather due from them, as aggres- sors, than from him : but yet he would Seld to much of what tney required, e closed with bitter complaints of Achaian ingratitude, but said that he would give up Argos, and would con- ault with the Roman general with re- spect to Corinth. The Achaians and iEtolians were preparing to reply, when night came on. The conference ended with a curious specimen of Roman plea- santry. In the course of the debate Philip had often assumed a tone of irony and sarcasm, to which he was very prone. At the end of it, he requested to have the proposals of the Romans in writing, that he might consult on them with his friends, since he was now alone : whereupon Flamininus, by way of shew- ing, says Polybius, that he, too, could be satirical, replied, *' You may well say that you are alone, since you have killed all your best advisers." On the following day Philip came not till evening, and then requested a private conference with the consul. This was dechned at first, but afterwards granted with the consent of the allies. Flamininus reported that the king would restore to the .^tolians Larissa and Pharsalus, but not the Phthian Thebes; to the Achaians both Ai^os and Co- rinth: to the Rhodians some, but not the whole, of his conquests in Asia : to Attalus, his captured ships and sailors : to the Romans, the places taken in II- lyria, with the prisoners and deserters. But all exclaimed against accepting any partial concession while the Macedo- nian held one garrison in Greece: the discussion was again adjourned; and on the morrow it was agreed, at Philip's suggestion, that he should send an embassy to Rome, and either per- suade the senate to grant his terms, or submit to such as they should dictate. In consenting to this, the consul did not expect that peace would follow; but he was glad to ascertain the wishes of the senate ; and it cost him little to suspend his operations at a season which would necessarily have slack- ened them. He granted a truce for two months, on the condition that the Macedonian garrisons in Phocis and Locris should straightway be with- drawn. Ambassadors were sent to Rome both from Philip and from his enemies. The latter were first heard by the senate. They brought very heavy charges against the Macedonians, but their most prevailing argument was drawn from the commanding position of the three strong holds, Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis, and Corinth, which Philip was wont to call the fet- ters of Greece. The royal ambassadors being then admitted, were beginning to speak at large, when they were cut short with the question, whether their Blaster would relinquish those three cities, and sent away, upon their an- swering that they had no specific in- structions on that head. The command of Flamininus was contmued to him, after the expiration of the year, with the title of proconsul, which signifies an officer with consular authority. The negotiation having failed, Pliilip sought to concentrate his forces for a decisive struggle, and for that end to diminish the number of his distant gar- risons. Of these, Argos was among the remotest, and the most exposed to at- tack : and the method he took to escape at once from the charge of keeping and the danger of losing it, is worth the con- sideration of all who put their trust in princes. The Argians nad struggled for ages against Lacedaemon, and losses P2 213 GREECK ittid sufferings had only embittered their mbhorrence of her dominion, even when it would have been exercised by hands less odious Ihan those of Nabis. Yet when for Philip's sake they had revolted from the Achaians, and he found it no longer convenient to keep them, lest they should return to the allies whom they had abandoned for him, he betrayed them to their worst enemy, the tyrant of Lacedaemon. Nabis refused at first to receive the city, unless invited by a decree of the people. Such a decree was proposed, and rejected with ex- pressions of scorn and detestation ; all which the tyrant treasured up as pre- texts for rapine. He then signified to Fhilocles, the chief agent in this wick- edness, that he was ready to take possession. His troops were intro- duced by night ; all commanding posts were occupied, and the gates were shut. A few of the leading citizens escaped, whose estates were forthwith given up to pillage. Those who re- mained were stripped of all their gold and silver, and heavy contributions le- vied from them besides ; and if any were suspected of concealing the amount of his property, he was cruelly tortured. An assembly was then called, and Nabis proposed a general abolition of debts and a distribution of lands ; which were to serve as bribes to the poor, to pre- vent them from opposing the spoliation of the rich. In resigning Argos, Philip had stipu- lated that if he were victorious, it should be restored to him. If he trusted to this assurance, he little considered the character of the man with whom he had to deal. The first thought of Nabis was to join the Romans, and thus jare- dude all demands of restitution. This was scandalous perfidy, but yet not worse than Philip's conduct towards the Argians ; and it is a strong instance of the natural proneness of mankind to rely entirely on the assmrances of their fellows, that he should have trusted to the promise of a man so infamous, even at the very moment vn hen himself was trampling under foot all bonds of faith to a people who had hazarded their all for his sake. The Roman general gladly listened to the overtures of the tyrant, and offered him friendship on the con- dition that he should make peace with Ihe Achaians, and should send an aux- iliary force to act against Philip. He promised to send the troops ; and, in- ' of a permanent peace, he made a truce with the Achaians during the Macedonian war ; and on these terms the treaty was concluded. A dispute arose about Argos, which Attains said that Nabis had gained by treachery, and now held by violence, while the tyrant asserted that the citi- zens had called him in for their defence. The king required that an assembly should be summoned, to ascertain whe- ther this were true ; the tyrant did not refuse ; but, to the further demand, that the Lacedaemonian soldiers should be withdrawn, so that the assembly might be unmixed with foreigners, and free to declare, without fear, the real wishes of the citizens, he denied his consent, and there the matter rested. On his return to Lacedaemon, he sent his wife, Apega, to Argos, to plunder the women, as he had plundered the men. This she did with cruelty surpassing even that of her husband. She sent for them sometimes singly, sometimes in families, and in- flicted on them every kind of indignity and torture ; and thus she extorted from them all their golden ornaments, and even the most costly of their garments. These transactions took place in the winter of the year b.c. 198. In the fol- lowing year, the Roman chief undertook to secure the adherence of the Boeotians, whose affections were much divided. This he effected by a trick, in which, though no express covenant may have been palpably broken, he certainly acted in a spirit very opposite to good faith. He pitched his camp five miles from Thebes : ambassadors came from every side : he set out for the city with them and with Attains, attended only by a handful of sokliers ; but two thousand more had orders to follow at the distance of a mile. The general of the Boeotians met him half way ; but few armed men being seen about him, and those who followed being hid by the inequali- ties of the ground, no foul play was apprehended; and as he neared the gates, the citizens crowded out to do him honour. Under pretence of re- ceiving and returning their welcomes, he loitered to let his followers come up, still carefully keeping all the townsmen before him, so tnat his own company might screen from their view the arme d body in the rear. The fraud was not discovered till he came to his lodging. It was then apparent that there could be no freedom of debate for the assembly of the Boeotians, which was appointed for the mcrrow ; but complaint was sup- GREECE. nil pressed by the conviction that it was vain and might be dangerous. The first who spoke in the assembly was Attains. He began with his own merits towards Greece and towards the Boeotians ; but he was too old and too infirm for the exertion of speaking, and a stroke of palsy cut him short When he had been carried out, Aristaenus ad- dressed to the Boeotians the same argu- ments by which he had already pre- vailed with the Achaians. Then followed Quinctius himself, who praised not so much the power of his countiymen as their good faith. His words were pro- bably unquestioned ; for the recent fact, which proved them false, had made it perilous to contradict them. The Roman alliance was voted with the unanimity of fear ; and the proconsul quitted the scene of his ill-gotten success, to turn his whole attention towards the war with Philip. That monarch also was not slack in preparation : but warfare unceasing for many generations had wasted the flower of the Macedonian youth, and the army which was to fight for the national in- dependence was filled up with boys and old men. Wars so constant and extensive as to lead to this result can seldom be without great blame to the people or its rulers ; and the weakness thence arising may perhaps be consi- dered at once as a natural consequence of ambitious turbulence, and as a wise {)rovision to limit and punish it. The ate war had ended with a sa.e and ho- nourable peace. If Philip then, instead of pursuing unjust aggrandisement in Asia, had quietly employed himself in recruiting the exhausted resources of his country, he might not have escaped attack from Roman ambition ; but his cause would have been clearer, his enemies fewer, his friends more nu- merous ; the brave men who fell in un- profitable battles against Attains and the Rhodians would have been standing armed to repel the invader; and the boys who feebly filled their places, and perished immaturely in unequal contest, would have grown up under their pro- tection to the strength of manhood. Even thus the Macedonians would per- haps have been overcome by the supe- rior military system of their adversaries ; but they would at least have maintained a long, hard, doubtful struggle, with the approving witness of conscience, and the wishes of all good men. By doing otherwise, Philip converted fl3 allies into neutrals, and neutrals into enemies ; gave his foes a pretext for attacking him ; made the friends of Grecian freedom doubt which party to support ; and through the same acts by which he forfeited all aid from without, he broke the strength of his own king- dom, and lavished its best blood before the time of need. The crisis soon came. The Roman forces entered Thessaly, where those of Macedonia were ah-eady stationed tc defend the province. After various movements, which it is needless to de- tail, the two armies came together near PheraB. In number, they were nearly equal : but the Romans, with their allies, were superior in horse, and they had elephants, which Philip had not. Seve- ral skirmishes took place between the cavalry and light troops, whom each sent out to discover the position and movements of the enemy. At length, the armies confronted each other, di- vided only by some hills called Cynos- cephaiae (Dog's heads). So thick a fog then prevailed, that neither knew of the other's approach till the outposts were engaged. The skirmish grew hotter, reinforcements arriving to either party when it seemed to be the weaker; and the contest ended in a general engage- ment, to the great disadvantage of Philip who, not expecting it, had sent out man) of his troops on foraging parties. In the beginning of the battle, the Macedonians seemed to be superior Their light troops had driven those of the Romans fi-om the top of the inter- vening hill, and the heavy-armed of the right wing quickly following, had form- ed undisturbedly on the ridge, and were now descending in perfect order, and with a weight and force too great to be withstood by the looser array and shorter weapons of their adversaries. W hate ver opposed them was overborne, and either destroyed or forced to retreat ; till the proconsul, seeing that here defeat seem- ed unavoidable, recovered the fortune of the day by a vigorous attack on the left of the Macedonians. Unexpectedly tempted to make a general attack, Philip had been unable to bring his forces si- multaneously into action; the greater part were still on the way to join their victorious companions, and the Romans found them in order of march, and not of battle. To make their confusion more complete, there was no commanding officer on the spot, and the ground was such as rendered it difficult to form in •14 GnJSi'W'Kv* phalanx* To be attacked at such a mo- ment was certain discomfiture, and they broke and fled at the approach of the elephants, without awaiting the onset of the infancy which followed them. The Romans generally were hot in pursuit* but one officer saw that the time was come for more important service, and quitting the beaten enemy, he hastened down the hill with a few hundred sol- diers to fall on the rear of the conquer- ing right wing. Unable suddenly to change their front, and unfitly armed for a mingled scuffle, the Macedonians had no defence against this unlooked-for attack. They were helplessly slaughter- ed till they fled, and then they were pur- sued not only by those in the rear, but by the men whom they had just been driving before them. The rout was complete and ruinous, eight thousand Macedonians being slain and five thousand taken, while the Romans only lost about seven hundred men. The king rethred from the field to Tempe. He stopped there for one day to collect the stragglers of his army, and sent a messenger to Larissa to destroy his memoranda which were Iving there, lest falling into the hands of tne Romans they should injure himself or endanger his friends. He then proceeded on his way into Macedonia. Flamininus ar- rived in Larissa, where he was met by a Macedonian herald, sent avowedly to ask a truce for the burial of the dead, but commissioned also to obtain per- mission that ambassadors should be sent to treat of peace. The proposal was favoiu^bly received; a truce for f fteen days was granted, and ambassa- dors came from Philip, one of whom was the Achaian exile, Cyoliadas. The conduct of the Roman general in this matter was not without reason dis< pleasing to the JEtolians. Before the victory every thing had been done in concert with the allies ; but in the an- swer given to Philip's messenger, and in most things that had happened since the battle, the proconsul had acted on his own opinion, advising only with those about his person, and nad studi- ously slighted the iKtolians in particular. The causes assigned by the historians are these :— he was offended with them for plundering the Macedonian camp while the Romans were engaged in the pursuit, and thus depriving the latter of their due share in the booty ; he was determined that he would not, after ex- pelling Philip, leave them lords of Greece in his place ; and he resented their boasts of supierior valour, and the la]]ge part which theyclaimed in the credit of the victory. These pleas were pretexts ra- ther than motives, and even as pretexts they were insufficient. If the i^tolians had defrauded his soldiers, he might complain, might threaten, might enforce redress ; but he had not a right to ac- quiesce in the particular injury, and then repay himself by assuming unlimited authority in the general conduct of the war, to the injury not only of the offen- ders but of the other allies. The vaunts of the i^tolians were a matter too insig- nificant for serious complaint They may have overstepped the bounds both of truth and modesty; but their services had really been eminent, especially those of the cavalry ; and there is reason to think that the real ground of offence was not the falsehood of their preten- sions, but their daring, whether justly or unjustly, to place theu* military merit in comparison with that of the Romans. These things are trifling ; but the whole proceeding may be explained from the second pretext, when compared with the uniform course of Roman policy. The iEtolians were not to be lords of Greece ; they had been courted as long as Mace- donia was formidable, but now that they had helped to win the battle, themselves would probably be the next attacked. The other allies, who dreaded and hated them, would gladly conbibute to their downfall, and m so doing would accus- tom themselves to follow the lead of the Romans. These professing to defend the liberty of Greece, and to protect the weak against the strong, would successively bring low all the greater states, and habi- tuate the rest to unlimited obedience. When the nation was irrecoverably di- vided and weakened, they would begin to exercise a more arbitrary power ; and would either break its spirit gradually to the yoke, or would goad it to insurrec- tion, and then punish its imputed ill faith and ingratitude by reducing it to a sub- ject province. It is not here meant that all these views existed fully developed in the mind of Flamininus ; but his conduct steadi- ly tended towards them, and the prospect opened as he proceeded ; while the same system of policy was so uniformly pur- sued by his successors, and by Roman generals elsewhere, as to prove that its principles were common to all, and only wanted occasion and circumstance to embody them. A day was appointed GREECE. 215 J for the conference with Philip, and the deputies of the confederate states being assembled at Tempe, the proconsul called on each for his opinion upon the terms to be granted. The iEtolians de- clared that they could be satisfied with nothing short of Philip's expulsion from Macedonia, This demand, unreasonable in itself, was very unwelcome to the Ro- man, who foresaw that he should want that kingdom as a balance to the ^to- lians. Besides, the custom of his com- monwealth was not to push its successes to the utmost ; but rather, by granting peace on easy terms, at once to make sure what had been won, and to affect the praise of generosity, secure that either by the progressive extension of protection and control, or by war renewed at greater disadvantage, the weaker state must ultimately fall under the dominion of the stronger. He resisted the wishes of the iEtolians, as well on the ground of becoming liberality, as on that of the utility of Macedonia as a barrier against the Thracians and Gauls. His conduct here was right, and his reasons sound ; but he betrayed the lurking spirit of am- bition and encroachment by the haughty and angry manner in which he inter- rupted the iEtolian Phaeneas, who still asserted that Greece could only be se- cured by the overthrow of Philip ; as if it were an offence against Rome for any of her allies to persist in an opinion virhich her officer had condemned. The king arrived on the following day, and came on the third into the meeting. He said that he consented to all which the Romans and their allies had previously required, and would wil- lingly refer all other questions to the de- cision of the senate. The ^Etolians de- manded several cities of Thessaly which they had lost ; and he answered that they might freely take them. But here Flamininus interfered : the Phthian Thebes, he said, should be theirs, since it had refused to yield, when summoned by the Romans; but not the other towns, which had surrendered. The ^tohans were highly indignant, the other allies proportionably gratified The treaty, however, proceeded: a truce was made for four months, during which the conditions of a last- ing peace were to be settled by the senate ; and it was agreed that Philip should pay forthwith two hundred ta- lents into the hands of the proconsul, and should give as hostages his son De- metrius, and others of his friends, on condition that both the money and the hostages should be restored if the nego- tiation were not successful. While the main issue of the war was determined in Thessaly, transactions not without importance took place else- where. The Achaians, after suffering grievously from the powerful garrison of Corinth, judiciously profited by their over -confidence to give them a decisive defeat. A deeper interest belongs to the dangers which now threatened the Acar- nanians, a nation too weak to be often mentioned in history, but whose name, when it occurs, is worth a welcome ; for it seldom fails to relieve the gloomy cast of the general narrative with some instance of courageous honesty, justice, or moderation. Before the battle of Cynoscephalae, when they alone, of all the Greeks, clung firmly to Macedonia, the Roman admiral L. Quinctius under* took to gain them, and persuaded many of their leaders to concur with him. A national congress was held at Leucas, and a decree of alliance with Rome was proposed. Many cities had no represen- tatives at the meeting, and those who came were much divided in opinion; but the chiefs and magistrates who fa- voured the chan^ prevailed on a ma- jority to approve it. This decree, when known, excited general indignation, as a breach of faith towards Macedonia. It was quickly reversed ; Archelaus and Bianor, the proposers, were condemned as traitors ; and the general Zeuxidas was deprived of his office, for putting such a question to the vote. The men condemned were advised to fly to the Romans at Corcyra; but, sb*ong in conscious purity of motive, they re- solved to trust their fate to their fellow- citizens. They entered the assembled congress. A wondering murmur first arose, which was hushed by respect for their former character, and pity for their fortune. They were patiently heard, while, after beginning m a supplicating strain, they went on to defend their pro- ceeding, and finally ventured to com plain that they had been harshly judged, and cruelly sentenced. The experiment was bold, and without a parallel in Greece ; but the issue showed that they had rightly estimated their countrymen. Every vote against them was repealed ; but the nation adhered, notwithstanding, to its old engagements, a sufficient proof that they were acquitted through the sit GREECE. i eandour of those who disagreed with them, and not through the renewed superiority of their partisans. These tiding being brought to L. Quinctius, he immediately prepared for the siege of Leucas. The place was open to attack by land and sea, and the walls were quickly sapped or shaken in many places. But the want of natural advan- tages for defence was supplied by the courage and industry of the besieged, who were daily and nightly employ^ in repairing the tottering ramparts, filling up the breaches, and making good with their weapons every passage which was opened for assault. The defence was maintained, till the citadel was betrayed to the Romans by some Italian exiles living in the town. The Leucadians formed in battle order in the market- place, and long withstood the soldiers who poured down upon Ihem from the liill; but in the meantime the walls were scaled in many places, and the Roman general entering the city with the main body of his army, they were quickly surrounded, and either slain or obliged to surrender. Soon after this the news arrived of the decisive battle in Thessaly, and all the states of Aeamania now submitted to the conquerors. About the same time the Uhodians defeated a Macedonian army, and recovered Pe- rsea, a tract on the opposite coast of Asia, which had formerly been theirs, and the occupation of wjfiich by Philip had been a principal subject of their quarrel with him. The weak condition of Macedonia now encouraged the Dardanians to invade and ravage it : but Philip, though every where unfortunate, was not so broken in spirit as patiently to endure this last insult. He hastily collected an army, and falling on them unawares, when scattered for plunder, cut to pieces a lar^ portion of them almost without resistance. The rest fled to their own country, and the king led back his sol- diersi cheered by this unwonted gleam of success. Flamininus had listened the more wil- lingly to proposals of peace, because he feared that a new ally might come to Philip. In the preceding summer, An- tiochus, king of Syria, had won the province of Coelesyria from Ptolemy, and now he had gathered forces by land And sea, at once to wrest from the Bame potentate the cities he possessed in Cihcia and Caria, and to aid the Macedonian monarch in his contet with the Romans. The Rhodians hear- ing of his levy, sent an embassy to warn him that they would forcibly oppose his fleet, if it passed the headland ol Nephelis, in Cilicia, not, they said, from any hostile feeling towards him, hut to prevent him from impeding the libera- tion of Greece. The king replied that he would send ambassadors to renew his ancient friendship with the Rhodians, and that they need not fear lest his coming should injure themselves or their allies, for his good disposition to- wards Rome had been proved by a recent embassy to the senate, which had been most favourably received. His envoys were at Rhodes when the tidings of the battle at Cynoscephalae arrived there, 'the Rhodians did not proceed against him, but they took measures to secure the cities allied with Egypt, and many states, among which were Samos and Halicamassus, were indebted to them for safety and freedom. Before the return of the Macedonian and other ambassadors from Rome, the Boeotians asked and obtained from the proconsul the restoration of such of their citizens as had been taken fight- ing for Philip. As soon as they re- turned, Brachyllas, the chief of them, was elected Boeotarch; and the friends of Philip were generally honoured and ad- vanced to leading situations, as before the commonwealth had been forced into alliance with Rome. For this perhaps the BcBotians may be excused, though it were to be wished that their inde- pendence could have been otherwise asserted, than by means of a favour obtained for the purpose of crossing the intentions of the grantor. Their next act was one of unqualified meanness ; for in order to take from the Roman general the credit of the obligation, they sent an embassy of thanks to Philip, as if it had been conferred through his in- tercession. These proceedings gave alarm to the partisans of Rome ; for they saw that their opponents were superior even now, and would carry all before them as soon as the controlling army was withdrawn. To avoid the humiliating and dangerous condition of a depressed faction in a Grecian state, they were ready to take the most violent measures. They sent a deputation to Flamininus, which bit- terly inveighed against the ingratitude of the multitude, and finished by sayinj^ GREECE* 217 f that there could be no security for the friends of Rome after the departure of the army, unless Brachyllas were re- moved out of the way, and the people intimidated by his fate. The proconsul replied that he would not be concerned in such a matter; but having quieted his conscience by the pitiful subterfuge of refusing direct participation, he bid them consult with Alexamenes, the iEtolian general. The latter made no scruple of selectmg fit ruflSans for the purpose, being six in number, three of his countrymen and three Italians. As Brachyllas was returning drunk from a feast, they fell on him and slew him, and escaped in the tumult. At break of day an assembly was called to inquu-e into this dark trans- action. The first who were openly ac- cused of the murder were some men of abandoned character, who had been with Brachyllas at the moment ; but far stronger suspicions were secretly at- tached to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, the heads of the Roman party, and the real authors of the deed. Zeuxippus endeavoured to outface his accusers, by arguing against the supposition that such a violence had been committed by persons so effeminate as the accused ; and he succeeded in persuading many of his innocence, for they found it hard to believe that, if conscious of guilt, he would have put himself heedlessly for- ward in the discussion, or laboured to remove the imputation from others. Meantime the companions of Brachyllas had been racked, and had named Zeux- ippus and Peisistratus as the contrivers of the murder. They were privy to nothing, and had only spoken at random, in compliance with what they knew to be the popular opinion ; but neverthe- less the heart of Zeuxippus failed him, and he fled. Peisistratus remained at Thebes, not fearing discoveiy, except from an accomplice ; but as Zeuxippus had a confidential servant, who had managed the whole transaction, he sent a letter advising that he should be re- moved. The success of this precaution was such as it deserved. The letter fell into the hands of the servant, who straightway fled to Thebes ; and on his evidence Peisistratus was convicted and executed. This deed most justly exasperated the Boeotians against the Romans; but wanting strength for open war, they pursued their revenge by more disho- nourable means. If any soldiers quitted the camp, fhey were cut off by hirking assassins, or decoyed into deserted halt- ing places, and there murdered. Five hundred men were thus destroyed ; and when the proconsul demanded repara- tion of the states, they denied that these outrages were authorized, but gave no further satisfaction. He then com- menced hostilities against them, and quickly made them sue for peace. At first, he refiised to receive their ambas- sadors; but the Achaians and Athe- nians interceded for them, and at their instance peace was granted, on con- dition that the Boeotians should deliver up the guilty persons, and should pay a fine of thirty talents. Ten Roman commissioners now ar- rived to settle the affairs of Greece, and brought with them the decree of the senate, granting peace to Philip. It pro- vided that all the Greeks not subject to Philip both in Asia and in Europe should be independent ; that Philip should deliver to the Romans the Greek cities subject to him, or in which he had garrisons, excepting several in Thrace and Asia which were named, and were to be left forthwith to them- selves; that Flamininus should write to Prusias for the liberation of the Cians; that Philip should restore all Roman prisoners and deserters, sur- render all his decked vessels of war, ex- cepting five of such as were commonly used, and one huge galley with sixteen banks of oars, which was only kept for parade, and pay a thousand talents, half forthwith, and the rest within ten years. This decree was generally well re- ceived; the ^tolians alone expressed dissatisfaction. They said that there were two articles about the cities held by Philip ; that those named were to be independent, which were mostly towns of Asia, but the rest would remain in the hands of the Romans. Now these were the strong cities of European Greece, Oreus, Eretria, Chalcis, De- metrias, Corinth. It was evident then that the Romans were succeeding: Philip in his hold upon the fetters of Greece, and that the nation had but changed its masters. These complaints were not ill founded ; for the senate had inten- tionally left to the discretion of the com- missioners the disposal of Chalcis, De- metrias, and Corinth ; and when flami- ninus advised them to make those cities independent, and thus rebut the charges of the iEtolians, they cnly comphed with respect to Corinth, which they re- el t 118 OIIEECE stored to the Aehaian leiufue. Even this, to which they were bound by treaty with the Achaians, they executed im- perfectly, retaining a garrison in the Acrocorinthus. When these things are considered, the reader will perhaps be of opinion that the mistrust of the iBto- lians, however condemned by the Roman writers, was not less reasonable than the boundless confidence and gratitude of the other allies. The Isthmian festival soon came, (B.C. 196) at which it was expected that the intentions of the Romans would be make known ; and the scene which ensued is one which cannot be viewed without gratification, even by those who have learnt how large a pro- portion of history is occupied by fair professions unfulfilled, and hopes un- worthily disappointeersons, he summoned by name about eighty the most distinguished of the youth, and those whom he most feared. Each as he answered was arrested ; and that night they were all slain. Some Helots being charged with attempting desertion were whipped through the streets and put to death. These exam- ples were effectual in quieting the mul- titude by terror. But he kept his forces within the city, for he neither deemed himself a match for the Romans in the field, nor dared to leave the people un- controlled by his presence. The confederate army entered Laconia, and passed under the walls of Sparta. Two warm attacks were made upon it from the town on two successive days ; but both were repulsed, and with these exceptions the march was unmolested. After ravaging part of the country, the Roman general sat down before Gy- thium, the naval arsenal of Lacedaemon. He was there met by the fleet, which had already brought most of the mari- time towns to submission. The siege of Gythium was vigorously commenced, and the works were pushed with great rapidity, by the aid of a multitude of hands from the shipping. The place was strong and well defended, but it was in the end obliged to submit. Nabis now requested a conference with Flamininus. When they met he com- plained that he was attacked in violation of existing treaty, and craved to know what provocation he had given. The Roman alleged his oppressions and cruel- ties, and various acts of aggression to- wards the neighbouring states, together with his own obligations as an ally of the Achaians, and as the professed de- liverer of Greece. But he could not dear himself from the charge of incon- sistency, for the principal acts of which he complained, and particularly the oc- cupation of Argos, were prior to the treaty of alliance which he had concluded with Nabis against Philip. The tyrant finally consented to give up Argos ; and requested that, if any thing further were required, he might have it in writing, to consult on it with his friends. They parted therefore, and Flamininus delibe- rated with his allies on the terms which were to be given. The greater part ad- vised that war should be continued till the tyrant were deposed. The proconsul wished for peace. Their hopes, he said, could only be realized by besieg^ing Lacedeemon; and it would be rash to embark in so difficult an undertaking at a time when hostility was much appre- hended from Antiochus. Besides this reason, which he publicly urged, he had a secret motive of his own, which often influenced the conduct of Roman lead- ers ; the fear that he might be super- seded by one of the consuls, and thus deprived of the glory of finishing the war. His arguments did not at first produce conviction, but he reached his object by a different road. Professing to come round to the opinion of his allies, he began to state the exertions and sa- crifices which would be necessary to the attainment of their wishes : and these appeared so great to all, considering the general poverty and inward disorders of the states, that they bade him do what he deemed best for Rome and for her confederates. Having gained their consent he pre- scribed the terms of peace, taking coun- sel as to the particulars with his officers only. He required that Nabis should give up Argos and its dependencies, with all slaves belonging to the state or to individuals : that he should restore all the ships he had taken from the maritime states, and should keep but two galleys of not more than sixteen oars each. To all the states allied with Rome he was to restore their prisoners and deserters ; to the Messenians aU such articles of property as the owners could identify ; to the Lacedaemonian exiles their effects, their children, and their wives, or such of them at least as wished to follow them into banishment He was forbidden to make war, to build new fortresses, and to contract alliances ; and specially precluded from all connec- tion with Crete, the great market for mercenary soldiers. Mi the cities which had already submitted to the Romans were to remain independent and unmo- lested. For the performance of these GREECE* 221 eonditions, he was to give five hostages, to be chosen by the Roman general, and among them his own son : and he was to pay a hundred talents of silver forth- with, and fifty annually for eight years. The only thing in these conditions satisfactory to Nabis was, that nothing was said about restoring the exiles. On the other hand he was very unwilling to surrender his fleet, and to resign the dominion of the maritime towns. With the first he had increased his revenues by piracy ; from the second he had drawn the best recruits for his army. He was inclined upon the whole to reject the demands, and to this he was encou- raged by most of his adherents, great part of whom, besides the general hardness of the terms, were personally touched by some particular conditions. Those who had taken the wives or the property of exiles were displeased with the call for restitution ; and the emancipated slaves of Argian masters were with reason averse from returning to them. The mercenaries in general, whose harvest time was in war, were of course unwil- ling to hear of peace ; and the more as any, who were dismissed from the ser- vice of Nabis, might have found it un- safe to return to their homes, since the hatred of the tyrant, which prevailed throughout Greece, extended to his in- struments. When Nabis saw the tem- per of his followers, he summoned an assembly, and laying before them the proposals of the Romans, with suitable comments on their exorbitance, he finally asked what answer he should make. Make none, was the cry, but continue the war ; and the war was ac- cordingly continued. Some skirmishes took place, in the last of which the Lacedaemonians were roughly handled and driven to their walls. They did not venture any further sallies, and nothing remained but to besiege the city. Sparta, unwalled, according to the command of Lycurgus, during the pe- riod of its strength, had, in after times, been fortified at the most accessible points. Flamininus prepared to as- sault it on all sides, having increased his force to fifty thousand men by the aid of the sailors firom the fleet. He thus hoped to confound and be- wilder the besieged, and prevent them from concenfrating their forces on the principal points of attack. This plan was not without effect The tyrant him- self was so distracted and dismayed, as to be unable to direct the defence : but his place was filled by Pythagoras, his son-in-law. At length a passage was forced against all opposition, and the town would unavoidably have been taken, had not Pythagoras ordered that the houses adjoming shoula be fired. This effectually stopped the Romans, and obliged them to retreat. Flamininus renewed the attack in various manners on the three following days, though his hope of success was chiefly grounded on the fear which he had inspired in the defenders. At length Pythagoras was sent to sue for peace. At first he was commanded to depart from the camp ; but by supplications he obtained a hear- ing, and peace was made on the same conditions whdch had before been offered and refused. The Argians had already been em- boldened by the danger of Lacedaemon, by the absence of Pythagoras with the best of his forces, and by the weakness of those who remained, to rise in arms and expel the garrison. They spared the life of the commanding officer, be- cause he had ruled them mildly. Dur- ing the general rejoicing Flamininus arrived, with the news that peace was made ; and the people then proceeded to celebrate the Nemean festival, which had been delayed beyond the usual time. Great joy was caused by the return of the citizens who had been driven into banishment by Nabis and Pythagoras. The Roman general, as the author of their liberty, was requested to preside at the solemnity. The only circumstance which damped the exulta- tion of the Argians and Achaians, was that Lacedaemon still remained under the power of the tyrant ; and of this the ^tolians availed themselves as a handle for complaint against the Romans. After the festival was over, the Ro- man army was led back to Elateia, to be quartered there for the winter : and the general spent that season, accord- ing to Livy, in doing justice within tlie states, and reversing the arbitrary acts committed by Philip and his officers to strengthen the hands of their friends and deprive their enemies of their rights. These transactions would doubtless have assumed an opposite complexion in the mouth of a writer friendly to Macedonia, who would have repre- sented Philip as protecting the laws, and Flamininus as overruling them. The simple fact is, probably, that each established and maintained his own party in power ; which the Roman may fX2 6REECB, perhaps have aone with less fiolence, since his habitual conduct seems to have been milder, and his superiority was less disputed. In the beginning of spring, before quitting the province, the proconsul summoned a meeting at Corintn. He re- lated the acts of his predecessors and his own, all of which were heard with ^at applause, till he came to the men- tion of Nabis ; whose escape from de- struction was evidently a general cause of dissatisfaction. He excused himself by arguing that the tyrant could not have been overthrown, except with the ruin of Lacedaemon. He then declared his in- tention of sailing for Italy, and carrying with him all his army. In ten days the garrisons should be withdrawn from Demetrias and Chalcis, and the Acro- corinthus should immediately be de- livered to the Achaians; so that he might see the good faith of the Romans and the falsehood of the iEtolians. He impressed on his hearers the necessity of concord, moderation, and firmness : by these virtues they must keep the liberty which had been given to them, and prove the benefits of Rome not ill be- stowed. His words were interrupted by the tears and applauses of the as- sembly; but when the tumult was hushed he went on to request that they would search out and redeem the Ro- man citizens who were in slavery among them. These were prisoners sold by Hannibal, and their number was very great. The hearers promised com Eliance, and thanked him for reminding im of so sacred a duty. Before the assembly broke up, the garrison was seen descending from the Acroco- rinthus ; and the general departed with them, amidst the acdamations of all present. He fulfilled his pledge with respect to Chalcis and Demetrias, and then proceeded to settle the affairs of Thessaly, which was much torn with continual seditions, by distributing the powers of government in every state ac- cording to a scale of property. He inally returned to Rome, and was ho- noured with a triumphal procession, the highest honour the commonwealth could bestow on a successful commander. Flamininus appears to have been really solicitous for the welfare of the Greeks, and even for their liberty, as long as it did not clash with the pride or interest of Rome. In its immediate effect, his administration was benefi- cial ; for he lea the country unusually tranquil, and many cities free which had lately been oppressed. Yet more arbi- trary conduct might in the end have been better for the Greeks, if it had weaned them from asking Rome to in- terfere in their quarrels, and united them, ere it was too late, in the determi- nation to resist that interference if ob- truded on them forcibly. To affect moderation and disinterestedness till a footing should be gained was a not un- freouent art of Roman ambition ; and such a policy was never so likely to succeed, as when the person chosen to carry it into effect was partly sincere in his professions. Flamininus, though not a man of nice or elevated morality, was an ardent lover of popularity, and one who coveted the fame of benefi- cence, as well as of talent and power. His character suited the purpose of his commonwealth, as long as opinion was to be courted; and sterner agents enough were to be found, when the times were ripe for violence. Sect. II. — The discontent of the -Ktolians did not slumber. Their am- bassadors were busy wherever there was hope of stirring up enemies to the Romans, and their views extended to a coalition with Nabis, Philip, and An- tiochus. They urged upon the first the weakness to which he had been reduced by losing the maritime cities ; and sug- gested that he might never again have so fair an opportunity for their re- coveiy, since no Roman army was now in Greece, and it was not likely that fresh legions should be sent on their account To Philip they spoke of his present humiliation, contrasting it with the triumphs of his predecessors, and asking whether he, who had so long alone withstood the Romans and iEto- lians combined, might not now defy the Romans, when he had both the iEto- hans and Antiochus on his side. To Antiochus they magnified their own forces and the advantages of their si- tuation, and assured him of support both from Philip and from Nabis. These promises appear to have been un- authorised, though the latter was veri- fied in the event. Nabis immediately began to stir up dissension in all the maritime towns of Laconia ; he won some of the leaders to his interest by bribes, and procured the murder of others. The Achaians sent ambassadors to remind him of the treaty, and others to Rome, with the news of its violation ; and as Gythium GREECE 2S3 was already besieged, they sent troops to assist in its defence. The Roman senate, on receiving their complaint, equipped a fleet for their assistance, . under Aulus Atilius, one of the prae- tors, officers next in rank to the consuls. Flamininus and three others were ap pointed commissioners to take care of the Roman interest in Greece ; and as the negociations with Antiochus were continually assuming a more unfriendly complexion, preparations were made in case it should be necessary to engage in war on a larger scale. Meantime Nabis pressed the siege of Gythium, and wasted the lands of the Achaians, in revenge for the succours which they had thrown into the place. Still they did not venture to engage un- reservedly in the war, until the return of their ambassadors from Rome ; a fact which illusfrates the nature of that inde- pendence which the Romans professed to have given to the states of Greece. The ambassadors returned, and the Roman commissioners with them ; and then the Achaians assembled their great council at Sicyon, and sent to Fla- mininus for advice. The voice of the assembly was for immediate war ; but some delay and doubt was caused by the letters of Flamininus, who recom- mended waiting for the Roman praetor and his fleet The multitude called for the opinion of Philopoemen, who was then chief magistrate. He replied that it was a wise enactment of the iEto- lians, that the general should not give an opinion on any question of peace or war. It belonged to them to make their choice ; and whatever they de- creed he would endeavour to execute in such a manner that they should have no occasion to repent of it. The im- pression of the assembly was, that his judgment was for war, and it carried the greater weight from his unwilling- ness to express it in a case where he might have been biassed by personal feelings. War was voted, and the time and manner of waging it left to the dis- cretion of the generjd. He thought it would have been better to wait for the Romans, if the time had admitted it : but fearing that Gythium might be lost in the interval, he resolved to make an' effort for its rescue. Nabis, at the end of the late war, had surrendered his fleet to the Romans, according to treaty ; but he had since collected three- decked gallies, and many smaller vessels, and these he was daily exercising, for he considered the fate of Gythium to depend on his success in excluding all relief by sea. Philopoemen went against him with the ships of the Achaians; but this great commander, bom and bred in the inland province of Arcadia, was a mere novice in naval warfare. He had taken for his own an old and rotten vessel, which went to pieces at the first shock. Philopoemen escaped in a skiff, but his crew were made prisoners, and on seeing the fate of the leading ship, the others took to flight. This failure on an element where he knew himself unskilful, did not dis- courage the Achaian general, but only made him more eager to prove his su- periority on the land. The tyrant had detached a portion of his forces to oc- cupy a post commanding the way by which, if the siege were to be raised, the relieving army would probably ad- vance. The soldiers had, for the most part, constructed their huts with reeds and branches. Philopoemen, having se- cretly collected a number of small ves- sels on the Argian coast, embarked with a body of troops, chiefly light armed, and came in the night to the encamp- ment. Before his arrival was known to any, he had fired the huts on every side, and the flames and the sword did their work so effectually, that but few escaped to the camp before Gythium. Having thus effaced whatever dis- couragement had been occasioned among his soldiers by his maritime dis- aster, Philopoemen advanced with his army to Tegea, where he had appointed a meeting of the Achaians, and their allies. He stated to them his purpose of advancing against Sparta, as the only method of removing the besiegers from Gythium. But the place was taken on the very day on which he entered La- conia, and Nabis immediately quitted it to take a position for the protection of Sparta. On the following day, as Philopoemen was advancing, in igno- rance that Gythium was lost, he unex- pectedly came upon the Lacedaemonian army, strongly posted in the way by which he intended to proceed. The sur- prise was not without danger ; for his forces were extended through a distance of five miles, on account of the narrow- ness of the way ; while the ground was such that light froops only could act with effect, and most of the light froops, as well as the cavalry, were in the rear. But Philopoemen had been accustomed in travelling, whenever he came to any 124 GREECE. difficult deiUe, to speculate on the man- ner in which, if passing through it with an army, he would repel every attack which could be made, expected or un- expected, in front, or flank, or rear. He had exercised himself with such pro- blems, till hardly any possible combma- tion of circumstances could take him al- together unprepared. He now quickly threw his host into such an arrangement, as gave it all the security which the case would allow. But darkness came on in time to prevent any considerable colh- sion between the armies, and they passed the night within five hundred paces of each other, but separated by a river. On the morrow an engagement took place between the horse and light troops on each side, and those of Nabis were drawn into an ambush, and de- feated. Philopoemen knew that his an- tagonist was fearful, and resolved to practise on his terrors while the im- wession of his discomfiture was fresh. He sent a soldier into his camp under the pretence of deserting, who persuaded him that the Achaians were about to cut him off from the city. On the fol- lowing day the tyrant hastily retreated. The way was narrow, steep, and rugged ; and the enemy attacked him vigorously in the rear- his troops were entirely routed, and the pursuit did not cease till three-fourths of them were slain or taken. Nabis escaped into the city ; and Philopoemen ravaged Laconia for thirty days, and then led home his forces. While these things passed in Pelo- ponnesus, the Roman commissioners were visiting the ciUes of their allies, lest the iEtolians should have prevailed on any to favour Antiochus. They went fi«t to Athens, then to Chalcis, then into Thessaly: and having ad- dressed the great council of the Thessa- lians, they proceeded to Demetrias, the capital of the Magnetes. They had here a more difficult game to play, for some of the Magnete leaders were decidedly alienated from the Romans on account of a prevailing suspicion that they meant to restore Demetrias to Philip. The conmaissioners wished to quiet the ap- prehensions of the Magnetes, without destroying the hopes of Philip ; and ac- cordingly they framed their language so as to convey the idea that Demetrias was to conthiue independent, but care- fully avoided giving any positive pledge of their intention. Upon this Eurylochus, the chief magistrate of the Magnetes, plainly stated the current report, de- clared that all extremities were to be endured before Demetrias should be surrendered to the Macedonian, and went so far as to say that even now it was but nominally free, since all was done in it according to the pleasure of the Romans. This last sally provoked Flamininus to anger, to which he may perhaps have yielded the more readily for the sake of avoiding to answer the suspicion alleged. He spread his hands towards heaven, and called the gods to witness Magnesian perfidy and ingrati- tude. All present were alarmed at this expression of indignation, and Zenon, a man of authority, and a constant friend to the Romans, besought him not to im- pute to the nation the madness of an in- dividual. 'Ihe multitude concurred in the request ; and Eurylochus privately withdrew, and fled to the ^Etolians. This nation was daily more and more decided in hostility to Rome. Thoas, its leading man, had just returned from a mission to Antiochus, bringing with him Menippus as ambassador from the king • who promised to aid them largely with ships and men, foot, horse, and ele- phants, and, what moved them most of all, with abundance of gold. The meet- ing of the ^tolians was at hand, at which Menippus was to have his audi- ence ; and Flamininus requested of the Athenians that it might be attended by ambassadors from them. When the day arrived, Menippus, being introduced -nto the assembly, lamented that his master had not been able to come to Greece till by Philip's defeat it had fallen altogether under the power of the Romans. He trusted, however, that with the aid of the -^Etolians Antiochus would be able to restore the ancient dig- nity of Greece ; which consisted in free- dom maintained by arms, and not en- joyed during the pleasure of foreigners. The Athenian ambassadors, who fol- lowed, made no mention of the king, but simply reminded the assembly of their alhance with Rome, and of the obliga- tions of all Greece to Flamininus ; and advised them, before they declared against the Romans, at least to hear their officers, who were not far off. Thus .much was obtained by the authority of the principal elders, though even this was against the inclination of the multi- tude. A vote was passed that the Ro- mans should be admitted to a heariuir and Flamininus accordingly went int'o iEtoha. But he could not withstand the influence of Thoas and his parly, or GREECE 225 I f prevent a decree from being carried in his presence, which invited Antiochus to liberate Greece, and settle the differences between the ^tolians and Romans. To this the general Damocritus added an insult of his own ; for when Flamininus asked for a copy of the decree, he re- plied that he had then more pressing business, but he would shortly give it him in Italy, in his camp on the banks of the Tiber. 'I'he Roman commissioners returned to Corinth, and the ^tolian leaders em- ployed themselves in devising some bold stroke for the beginning of the war. The result of their deliberations was, in- deed, such as showed a more than usual audacity; for they undertook at once to occupy Demetrias, Chalcis, and Lace- daemon. The first of these projects was committed to Diodes, the commander of the cavalry ; and Eurylochus the Mag- nete assisted him, in the hope of restora- tion. The part of Eurylochus, in this affair, was marked with scandalous trea- chery. He directed his kinsmen and partisans to bring before the assembly his wife and children in mourning habits with the ensigns of suppliants, and to beseech those present each and all that they would not suffer a man, uncon- demned and guiltless, to grow old in exile. The multitude was moved, and the general voice was in favour of his recall. He set out towards Demetrias, attended by Diocles with all his cavalry. When they came within six miles of the city, Diocles chose three troops to go forward with himself, and commanded the rest to follow at a distance. He left one troop at the gates, to secure an en- tranee for their comrades ; with the others he advanced through the streets leading Eurylochus by the hand, while all his friends were thronging to wel- come him. Meanwhile the horsemen filled the city, and occupied all com- manding posts ; and when this was done, persons were sent into the houses to murder the leaders of the adverse party. Thus Demetrias came into the hands of the ^tolians, by a trick not unlike to that which had made the Romans mas- ters of Thebes. To gain Lacedaemon it was considered that no force need be put on the wishes of the citizens, who would gladly join in friendship with any that should rid them of their tyrant. Nabis was continually urging the^tolians to send him aid in a war, in which they had mainly, prevailed on him to engage. Alexamenus was sent with a thousand foot, and thirty chosen horsemen ; and these latter were charged by Damocritus in the secret council of state, an institution apparently peculiar to the ^tolians, that they should not think that they were sent for war with the Achaians, or for any end which they could possibly guess ; but that whatever Alexamenus should do, however rash, however unexpected, they should un- doubtmglvconcur in it, as if they knew it to be the special purpose of their mis- sion. Alexamenus came with his soldiers to Nabis, and filled him with joy by his assurances of further support. At his suggestion the Lacedaemonian army was more frequently reviewed. At such times the tyrant's guards were posted in the middle of the line, and he himself was wont to ride about the field and visit the different divisions, attended only by two or three horsemen, one of whom was commonly Alexamenus. That chief, on the day which he had chosen for the execution of his plot, after riding awhile with the tyrant, returned to the right, where the ^tolians were posted. " Now," he said to his thirty horsemen, ** the deed is to be done, which you are commanded to execute under my direction. Prepare your hearts and hands, and do as I do. Who hesitates, can never return home." The tyrant approached. •* Be ready with your spears," said Alexamenus, and look on me." He paused to collect himself, then dashing forward killed the horse of Nabis, and threw the rider to the ground, where his followers dis- patched him. Alexamenus hastened to occupy the palace, with all the vEtolians, both those who had come with him, and others who had previously been engaged in the ser- vice of Nabis. If they had grounded their arms and called an assembly of the Lacedaemonians, and their leader had spoken to the people as suited the occasion, the happiness of the deliverance might have covered the foulness of the treason, so that no one would have stirred to avenge it. Insteaerating on the manner of conducting it. Among his counsellors was Hanni- bal, who was an exile at his court. Three years before he had been chief magistrate of Carthage. The state was then op- pressed by the order of judges, a stand- ing oligarchy, who held men's lives and fortunes at their mercy. They had hitherto l)een appointed for Ufe; but Hannibal broke their power by carrying a law to make their office annual. The public revenues had been wasted through remissness, or pillaged through corruption : he adopted a rigorous sys- tem of accounting, which enabled him at once to lighten the taxes, and amply to provide for the service of the common- wealth. But by these reforms he added, to his enemies, all those whose pride had exulted in power beyond the laws, or whose avarice had fattened on the public spoils. It was stated in letters to Rome that he corresponded with Antio- chus. The Roman government, which hated and feared him, unworthily pro fited by the malice of his enemies, and without further inquiry sent ambassadors to Carthage to arraign him. But as soon as they came he suspected their ob- ject, and secretly escaping fi'om Carthage he took refuge with Antiochus. Hannibal advised that he should be sent with a fleet and array first to Afi-ica, in the hope of stirring his countrymen to revolt ; and then should go to Italy and once more attack the Romans m the sources of their strength. Antiochus was nearly persuaded to com])ly, when his purpose was shaken by the envious suggestions of Thoas the'>Etolian. It was dangerous, he said, to trust an exile; and the military fame by which Hannibal was allured was in tact too great for a royal general. If Han- nibal lost a fleet or an army, the damage would fall upon the king ; if he gained a victory, the glory would be all his own; but if he conquered the Romans in the main issue of the war, the throne itself would not be safe from his ambition, Antiochus was prevailed on, unhappily for himself, to give up the attempts on Africa and Italy, and to make no use of Hannibal's abilities, except sometimes as an adviser. Near the end of the year b. c. 194, Antiochus sailed for Greece, and landed at Demetrias. The iBtolians forthwith passed a decree inviting him to come to them, and when he came he was wel- comed by the crowd with shouts, and with every mark of joy and favour. When he was brought into the great council, he began by excusing the small force which he had brought with him, which was but of ten thousand foot, six hundred horse, and six elephants. But, he said, it was the strongest proof of his good- will, that he had complied at once with the sum- mons of their ambassadors, without waiting till his preparations were com- pleted In the following spring, as soon 227 w as the season favoured navigation, he would cover the land with his armies, and the sea with his fleets. In the meantime he requested that plenty of com mi^ht be provided, and all other necessaries supplied to his soldiers at a moderate rate. When the king had quitted the assem- bly, a dispute arose between Ph apneas and ITioas, the two leaders of the nation. The former, who was the existing chief magistrate, was of opinion that Antio- chus should rather be employed as a mediator, to settle their diti'erences with the Romans, than as then- leader in the war. His name might probably, Phae- neas thought, be more serviceable than his arms ; and much might be conceaed to avoid a war, which coula not be gained if the war were begun. Thoas maintained that all peaceful methods had alretuly been tried, both by embassies to Rome, and by conference with Flamininus ; that nothing fair or just was to be thus ob- tained ; and that therefore they should not lose the opportunity which now presented itself of enforcing their claims by arms. This opinion prevailed , the ^tolians voted that Antiochus should be their commander, and appointed a committee of thirty, with whom he should consult. The first measure adopted by Antio- chus and the /Etolians was an unsuc- cessful attempt to draw the people of Chalcis to their interest They then sent ambassadors to the Achaians and Boeo- tians. The latter replied tliat, when the king arrived in Bceotia, they would then consider his proposals. In the Achaian assembly the envoy of Antiochus was first admitted to a hearing. He magni- fied his master s power and riches, and declared that, though he had come from the furthest east to liberate Greece, he did not call on the Achaians for any thing contrary to the faith which they had pledged to the Romans, but only for their neutrality. His request was supported by the iStolian aml)assador, who, moreover, enlarged in invective against the Romans, disparaging their part in the victory over Philip, and ex- aggerating that of his own countrymen. Flamininus followed in answer to both ; the question was put, and the assembly determined without hesitation to support the Romans, and voted five hundred troops to be sent to Chalcis, and five hundred to Peu-aeeus. The latter vote was occasioned by an attempt which had been made to win the Athenians for Antiochus. The Roman party had, however, prevailed ; they had sent for Flamininus ; and had accused the pro- poser of the revolt, and procured his banishment. The Achaian troops arrived at Chal- cis, with some from Eumenes of Perga- mus. Five hundred Romans, who were afterwards sent, found the ways beset, and stopped at Delium. The war had not been formally declared, nor had any actual hostility yet been committed ; and the soldiers, not expecting to be attacked, were wandering about the temple and the neighbouring shore, when they were sud- denly charged by one of the king's gene- rals Menippus, and most of them killed or taken. Antiochus then led his army to Aulis, and sent ambas .adors again to Chalcis, withbettei success than before. The people opened the gates to his army, and the friends of Rome went into exile. The Achaians, who were garrisoning a fort on tne continent, capitulated for permission to depait ; and the leading city of Eubcea being won, the others readily submitted. Antiochus passed the winter at Chai- CIS, and employed it in opening negotia- tions with some states, and receiving overtures from others. The Eleians, being constant allies of the iEtolians, expected attack from the Achaians ; and sending ambassadors, they obtained from the king a thousand troops to assist in their defence. The Epirots sent an em- bassy to ask that he would not rashly draw them into the contest, since they would be, in consequence of their posi- tion, the first to feel the hostility of Rome. If he, they said, had force enough to protect them, they would gladly receive him in their cities and ports ; if not, they prayed him to excuse their inaction. Antiochus answered that he would send ambassadors to consult with them further, and then he went into Boeotia. The Boeotians, in spite of all their na- tural advantages, had become a weak and degraded people. Long since, dur- ing the reign of Antigonus Gonatas, or of his son, they had suffered a great overthrow from the i£tolians. In their most flourishing times they had been less distinguished for intellectual activity, than for their easy, careless temper, and the homely plenty of their living. Illi- terate opulence is apt to be beset by in- temperance and sloth ; and these consti- tutional tendencies had recently been little counteracted by the poHtical organ- 218 GREECE. V ization of the province, disordered by repeated revolutions. These considera- tions may partly reconcile our under- standings to a change, wlvch loses much of its strangeness when viewed as the consummation to which a course of degeneracy had been gradually tending ; but which otherwise it might be difficult to believe, even on the authority of Po- lybius. So broken, he says, was the spirit of the Boeotians by that one un- fortunate battle, that thenceforth they never ventured to contend -for any ho- nourable prize, but gave themselves up to feasting and drunkenness, to the ruin alike of their bodies and their minds. Immediately after their discomfiture they abandoned the Achaian alliance, and joined themselves with the iBtolians. They adhered to their new engai?ements till war arose with Demetrius, the father of Philip ; but when the Macedonian forces entered their country, they sub- mitted with scarcely an attempt at resist- ance. From this time the government was in the hands of a faction supported by Macedonia, while the opposing party was just stronsT enough to make it neces- sary for the Macedonian kings to attend to the interest of their friends. In other respects the state of the commonwealth was as bad as possible. For twenty-five years, Polybius declares, there had been no administration of justice, the sittings of the courts having been continually interrupted by the summons of the ma- gistrates to engage in military ejcpeditions more or less considerable. That the cause alleged was adequate to the effect, will easily be understood by those who remember that, in the popularly con- stituted communities of Greece, the judicial body was always a numerous assembly of citizens. Many of the generals were ever making largesses from the public treasury to the multi- tude ; and by this, and by the suspension of legal proceedings, they made active partisans of all who profited by the distri- butions, and of all who had debts or of- fences to answer for. The disorders of the commonwealth were increased by a fa- shion then prevailing among individuals, who, dying childless, left their fortunes, and sometimes the greater part even when they had chUdren, to be employed in the establishment and maintenance of convi- vial clubs among their associates ; inso- much that many of the Boeotians, the historian declares, had more suppers in the month than there were days in it. Disgust at the public customs and pri- vate manners of the Boeotians induced the Megarians to depart from their con- fetleracy, and reunite themselves to the Achaians, whom they had formerly quit- ted by their own advice, when Cleomenes, by occupying the Isthmus, prevented free communication with them. The Boeo- tians marched out in high wrath with all their forces, and finding that the Mega- rians disreijarded their arrival, they un- dertook to besiege and assault the city ; but a panic fear arising among them, and a report that Philopcemen and the Achaians were coming, they fled to their own country, leaving their ladders before the walls. Notwithstanding the political disor- ders of the Boeotians, their fortune had hitherto carried them safely through a very critical period. Antiochus now sought to engage them in war with the Romans, and his purpose was favoured by the resentment, which had rankled in their minds since the murder of Brachyl- las, and the invasion of their country by Flamininus. He was received into their city with every mark of welcome, and he easily persuaded them to join in alli- ance with him. Antiochus consulted with the ^Eto • Hans about the manner of gaining the Thessalians ; and now, affer a long intermission, he asked the opinion of Hannibal. The Carthaginian replied that it was needless to concern himself about those who were ready to join the prevaiUng party, and who brought no real strength to either. He had always thought that the alliance to be courted was that of Philip, whose power was great, and for whom, if once he engaged in the contest, there could be no safety in retreat. The ^tolians, he proceeded, had repeatedly declared that Philip's hostility to Rome was only waiting for opportunity to show itself ; that oppor- tunity should immediately be given. His own sentiments with respect to the general conduct of the war were already known : he still held the same opinions, and urged the king to engage in it at once with all his forces, and to send an army into Italy. The advice of Hannibal was approved and neglected. Ambassadors were sent to the great council of the Thessalians at Larissa, and a day was appointed for the ^tolian forces, and those of Amy- nander, king of the Athamanians, who had also joined the league, to meet the king at Pherae. While waiting for them, Antiochus sent a party to collect the GREECE. 329 J i; bones of the Macedonians slain at Cy- noscephalae This was probably de- signed to court the favour of the Mace- donian people at the expense of their own king, who had omitted to do it. It failed to gratify them, and g:ave deep offence to Philip, who immediately sent to Marcus Baebius, the Roman comman- der in Greece, to inform him that Antio- chus was in Thessaly, and to offer ser- vice against him. The Thessalians adhered to their alli- ance with Rome, and Antiochus with his allies laid siege to Pherae, which after a vigorous defence was obliged to sur- render. Several towns were gained by force or by capitulation, and the army ad- vanced to Larissa. The inhabitants per- severed in resistance ; and the king was doubting whether to besiege them, when he was alarmed by the news of an ap- proaching Roman army. It was really but a detachment sent to garrison La- rissa : but the commander, by enlarging his encampment and kindling unneces- sary fires, had caused his troops to be mistaken for the whole Roman host, together with that of Philip. This need- less apprehension determined the allies to raise the siege. Amynander and the -^tolians returned to their homes, An- tiochus to Demetrias, and thence to Chalcis. He there fell in love with a maiden of the city, and prevailed on her father to give her to him in marriage, though much disliking so unequal an alliance. Forgetful of the arduous task he had undertaken, the driving the Ro- mans out of Greece, he gave all his thoughts during the rest of the winter to the festivities of his wedding: and the disordered state of his army at the open- ing: of the next campaign showed that officers and soldiers had too faithfully copied the negligence and self-indul- gence of their chief. The first important transaction of the spring was an attempt on Acarnania, conducted through Mnesilochus, a lead- ing man in the province, and Clytus, the then chief magistrate. Mnesilochus sug- psted in the national congress that the inland parts of Acarnania, especially the towns of Medeon and Thyrium, were in danger from Antiochus and fiom the iEtolians, and that it was time for all the people to take arms in their defence. Other persons were prepared to say that a general expedition was needless, for the places might be secured by rein- forcing them with five hundred men. Three hundred were accordingly sent to Medeon, and two hundred to Thy- rium: all of v^hora Mnesilochus in- tended should come into the power of Antiochus, and serve as hostages for the conduct of their countrymen. About that time ambassadors came to Medeon from the king, and the question arose what answer should be given. Some were anxious not to swerve from their engagements with the Romans, while others maintained that the friendship of Antiochus was not to be slighted : but a middle course was agreed on at the suggestion of Clytus, which was that an embassy should be sent to ask per- mission for the Medeonians to consult the great council of the nation. Care was taken that among the ambassad#rs should be Mnesilochus and others of his faction ; and they found excuses for de- laying their departure, till just after they quitted the city, Antiochus having been secretly summoned came with his army to the gates. While those ignorant of the plot were calling to arms in hurry and confusion, he was quietly introduced into the city by Clytus and Mnesilochus. His friends all thronged to him in good will, his enemies through fear ; and he gave to the latter such assurances as were fittest to quiet their apprehensions. Some less important places then sub- mitted, but Thyrium held out against him, and the friends of Rome were en- couraged by the arrival of a Roman squadron and a body of troops. It was moreover reported that a Roman consul had crossed the sea and entered Thessaly ; and this induced Antiochus to return to Chalcis. The consul Manius Acilius Glabrio had actually come with fresh legions into Thessaly. He had found there Philip and M. Bsebius, who had already recovered many of the conquests of An- tiochus : and when they were joined by the new comers, they found nothing which could resist them. Among the prisoners who came into the power of Philip were many of the Athamanians, all of whom he treated with the utmost kindness, and set free, in the hope of winning the affections of their country- men. He then led his army into Atha- mania. Amynander had fled from the country, in fear of Philip and the Romans : and the people, prepossessed in favour of the Macedonian by the liberated prisoners, readily submitted. Meantime the consul refreshed his army, and reduced to submission whatever was yet hostile in Thessaly. GRK£C£ Antiochus was beginning to repent having trusted to the promises of the iEtolians, and to wish that he had acted through the war on the counsels of Hannibal. He sent to call for a general levy of the iEtolian youth : but the chiefs only came with a few of their de- pendents, and said, that they had vainly laboured to rouse the multitude to arms. He was moreover disappointed in the amount of his own forces : for in spite of messengers sent into Asia to quicKen the preparations of his officers, no fur- ther reinforcements yet had reached him than filled up his numbers to the origi- nal ten thousand foot and five hundred horse. Too weak to contend in open field with the Romans, he intrenched himself in the pass of Thermopylae, in the hope of preventing their advance. The ^tolians were sent forward to the defence of Hypata and Heracleia. Being unable to hinder the ravage of the fields, they shut themselves up in the latter place. The consul encamped at the mouth of the pass. Antiochus, fearing that his flank might be turned, as had been done by the Persians against Leonidas, sent a message to the JEtolians requesting them to occupy the heights. They were divided among themselves whether to comply or refuse, and finally half of them did as they were required, the rest remained at Heracleia. Acilius ad- vanced to force the pass: but he met with a determined resistance from the Syrian Macedonians, the descendants of those who had conquered under Alex- ander. They were, indeed, borne back by superior numbers to their intrench- ments, but they formed behind them, and their pikes and close array pre- sented an impenetrable barrier. Mean- time a detachment commanded by Mar- cus Cato, (who had already been consul and was afterwards censor) had surprised and cut to pieces one division of the ^tolians on the ridge. Their appear- ance on the flank put the Macedonians to the rout. The king escaped to Chalcis with about five hundred men : the rest were mostly slain or taken. Acilius advanced through Fhocis and Boeotia. At the gates of every city to which he came, he was met by the inha- bitants in the guise of suppliants, for they feared to be given up to pillage in consequence of their revolt. He pro- ceeded, however, as in a friendly terri- tory, till he came to Coroneia. Here hb anger was kindled at seeing a statue of Antiochus in the temple of Minerva, and he gave his soldiers permission to plunder the country. Soon afterwards he recalled the order, remembering that the statue had been erected by the common decree of the Bceotians, and that their act ought not to be visited on the Coroneians in particular. He con- tented himself with rebuking the ingra- titude of the Boeotians, and went on to Chalcis, which opened its gates on his arrival, Antiochus having sailed for Asia. After receiving the submission of all Euboea, he led back his army to Thermopylse. A message was sent to the .lar form, on wiiich (\ie Roman magibtrates bul to adnnni^ter justice. Meantime there was strife in Thebes. The men of Coroneia and HaJiartus, who were devoted to Perseus, had gathered in the capital, and were earnestly sup- porting the Macedonian alliance. For some time the parties were equally matched : but at length the leader of the» Coroneians changed his opinion, and then the tide set strongly towards sub- mission to l^ome. A fresh embassy was sent forthwith to Marcius, to excuse the alliance with Perseus. The multitude then proceeding to the house of Neon, the head of the Macedonian party, and to those of his principal followers, and angrily calling them to account for their acts, made them think it prudent to go into banishment. After this they re- turned to the place of assembly, where they voted high honours to the Romans, and sent ambassadors to surrender the city to them and recall the exiles. The arrival oftheTheban ministers at Chalcis interrupted a warm discussion, in which the exiles were passionately arraigning Ismenias, Neon, and their friends. Marcius commended the The- ban people, and advised that the ambas- sadors should conduct the exiles home, and then that every city should send ministers to Rome, to make its own particular surrender. Neon escaped into Macedonia, but Ismenias and some others were thrown into prison, where they slew themselves. " Thus the Boeo- tian nation, after long preserving its union, and unexpectedly outhving many critical seasons, was broken up and re- solved into its several states, through inconsiderate haste in leaguing wiih Perseus, and vain and childish timidity, in suddenly shrinking from him»"-^Po- LYBIUS. Among the states whose support would be important to either party in the war, the Rhodians held a foremost place. At the end of the war with Antiochus, the Romans had bestowed upon them part of Lycia and Caria. But upon the arrival of the ten commissioners whom the senate appointed to settle the affairs of Asia, the Ilians interceded with them for the free- dom of the Lycians. The name of Ilium had belonged to ancient Troy ; and the town which now bore it had been built upon the te»Titory of the fallen city. The intercession of its inhabitants carried weighi as from the successors of the Trojans, from whom the Romans loved to think themselves descended: though the I bans were really an iEolian coU»ny, and in no wise of kin to the an- cient occupiers of their territory. Tlie 24% GREECE. GREECE. 247 h i Roman delegates, unwilling to disoblige either their pretended kinsmen or their valuable allies, gave a doubtful answer, which each understood as favourable to themselves. The Ilians sent to the Ly- cian cities, and said that they had pro- cured them libcrtv : and the Lycians sent ambassadors to khodes to treat of alli- ance, when the Rhodians were appoint* ing commissioners to settle the affairs of Lycia and Caria. The difference of in- tention did not immediately appear: but when the Lycians, being introduced into the assembly, began to speak of alliance, and the Rhodian chief magistrate plainly required their subjection, they declared that they would brave all dangers rather than do the bidding of the Rhodians. A war ensued, in which the Lycians were reduced to submission. But before their subjugation they had sent an em- bassv to Rome, to complain of the harshness used by the Rhodians: and the senate chose ambassadors to tell the Rhodians that the Lycians had been as- signed to them as friends and allies, and not as a free gift- Before the coming of the embassy the Rhodians had considered that they had settled the matter accord- ing to their wish : but now, on this fresh encouragement, they saw the Lycians again in commotion, and ready to hazard everythmg for independence. A sus- picion arose that the Romans wished to waste their strength and treasure in unprofitable contests. The reign of Perseus was begun in Macedonia, and the new king had married the daughter of Seleucus king of Syria, the son and successor of Antiochus. The Rhodians had fransported the bride into Mace- donia, and had taken this occasion to make a trial and a display of their maritime strength, by accompanying her ¥rith all their navy magnificently equip- ped. This courtesy had been returned by Perseus with largesses to the rowers, and a supply of ship-timber to the state. There was nothing here with which the Romans could reasonably be offended : but yet it was thought that their jea- lousy might have been excited both by the display of power and wealth, and also by the proof of readiness to cultivate independent relations of firiendship with others than themselves. Whatever might be surmised with respect to their intention, the Rhodians gave no sign of suspicion or anger. The arrangements with respect to Lycia stood unchanged, but ambassadors were sent to Rome to instruct the senate l>etter in those points in which the Lycians had deceived them ; and there the matter rested, all further prosecution of it being inter- rupted by the breaking out of the Ma- cedonian war. Ambassadors then were sent from Rome to exhort the Rhodians to fidelity: but they found on their arrival that exhortation was needless, for the people already, foreseeing the war, had refitted forty ships to be pre- pared for the service of trie Romans. This aid was afterwards offered to the Roman admiral in the Grecian seas, but was declined by him as unnecessary. Letters were sent by Perseus to the Grecian states, with an account of his conference with Marcius, and those to Rhodes were accompanied by ambas- sadors. These requested of the Rho- dians that they would be neutrals and peace-makers ; ** for this," they said, "was good for all, and becoming to the Rhodians, who, professing to value freedom of speech and to maintain the common liberty of Greece, ought espe- cially to avoid being drawn into any action contrary to these objects." These arguments were not without effect upon the Rhodians, but their minds were still pre-occupied with attachment to Rome, m spite of some particular reasons for displeasure; and they declined doing aught to compromise her friendship. They expressed however, in other re- spects, great good will towards the am- bassadors and their master. Another Macedonian embassy was sent into Boeotia. The only cities where it could hope for success were Thebes, Haliartus, and Coroneia: it was re- pulsed at Thebes, but welcomed at the other two. Ambassadors then were sent to Perseus from Haliartus and Coroneia, to ask succour for those states which embraced his interest against the Thebans, who were trou- blesome neighbouis to all that would not league themselves with Rome. The king replied that he could not then aid them, on account of the truce: but he advised them to defend themselves as well as they could against the Thebans, and to avoid giving occasion of hostility to the Romans. The time of truce ran out ; the Mace- donian ambassadors were haughtily repulsed by the senate, and ordered to depart from Rome forthwith, and within thirty days from Italy ; and the consul P. Licinius crossed the sea with his army. Perseus now assembled his forces for the war, to which they seemed not inadequate. Five-and- twenty years had passed since the peace with the Romans : and during all that period the kingdom had been recruiting its popu- lation and resources, undisturbed by wars, excepting some trifling contests with the bordering nations, which had kept the soldiers in exercise. The army was numerous, disciplined and well ap- pointed, and warlike stores and imple- ments of every kind were abundantly provided. Thus prepared, Perseus ad- vanced into Thessaly. Several of the smaller towns submitted at his approach, and Mylae holding out was taken and sacked, after a desperate resistance. The king then fixed his head-quarters upon the roots of Ossa, and near the opening of the pass of Tempe ; and from hence he sent out detachments to annoy and plunder the allies of Rome. Meanwhile the consul advanced through Epirus and Athamania into Thessaly. His way was through a very difficult country, and if he had been attacked in emerging from it, while his men were yet fatigued and disordered, he mi2:hthave been easiljr overthrown. But Perseus did not inherit the militaiy talents of his father, and this oppor- tunity was suffered to pass by. The consul advanced to Larissa, where he was joined by Eumenes with 4000 foot and 1000 horse, and by succours, mostly very scanty, from his Grecian allies. Perseus attempted to draw him to a distance from his camp, by sending troops to ravage the lands of Pherae : but Licinius did not hazard the attempt to protect them. Encouraged by this, the king repeatedly approached the hostile camp, and offered battle. An engage- ment of cavalry took place, in which the Romans were defeated : and it was thought that their army might have been destroyed, if Perseus had followed up his success with an attack on their camp. So fully was theu* general con- vinced of his danger, that in the ensuing night he silently transported his forces to the farther bank of the river Peneus. Perseus was now advised by many of his friends to offer peace on the same terms on which it had been made with his father. If it were accepted, the war would be honourably terminated with a victory, and the Romans would have received a lesson, which would make them less ready to encroach on the rights of the Macedonians : if it were refused, he would have gods and men to witness his moderation, and the ob- stinate pride of his enemies. The king agreed, and an embassy was sent. The consul called a council of war, and all unanimously resolved that the answer should be as harsh as possible. *' For this," Polybius observes, ** is a custom pecuhar to the Romans, to be haughty and obstinate in reverses, but moderate in success. That this is honourable, all will allow : but whether it be always practicable may be doubted." It is doubtless honourable to a state, when unjustly attacked, to suffer all things rather than compromise its character or its independence : but in a war of am- bition, to sacrifice its armies, and perhaps to hazard its national existence, rather than confess a failure and retire from the contest without an extension of empire, has more of obstinate perverseness than of magnanimity. If the Roman principle were acted on universally, no war could end, except by the destruction of one of the parties : and for a state to propound one rule of honour for itself and another for all with whom it comes into contact, is a common insult to mankind. The boast of moderation in success is of a better kind, though the claim of the Romans to it may well be disputed. It is true that they often granted terms far easier than those which they might probably have enforced ; but it is no less true that those terms were frequently ill kept, and that peace was the beginning of systematic encroachment on the rights of the vanquished people : and in all such cases, the apparent liberality can have been little better than crooked po licy or vain ostentation. This at least is an inference which we may reason- ably draw with respect fo the general conduct of a people, among whom such instances are continually recurring: though exceptions be sometimes to be made in favour of an individual com- mander, and even in favour of the na- tion itself, to the extent of a real, though transitory good intention, at the moment of contracting some particular engage- ment. . The message of Perseus was answered by a demand that he should surrender himself and his kingdom to the disposal of the senate. This insolence filled his counsellors with resentment ; and they advised him to negotiate no more. But he was the more alarmed by the apparent confidence of his enemies : and he con tinned to tempt them with higher offers, till he was at length induced by repeated failure, and by the indignation of his friends, to desist. The Roman arms were more successful 918 GREECE. GREECE. 249 in BoBOtia. The praetor Caius Lucretius, who had been sent with a fleet into the Grecian seas shortly before the setting out of the consul, had landed his forces and besieged Haliartus. The townsmen defended themselves with determined resolution, but with inadequate re- sources : the place was stormed, and all the inhabitants were either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The pictures, statues, and other valuable spoils having been carried to the ships, the city was rased to its foundations; and the Romans then, if the copies of Livy are correct, proceeded to Thebes. If so, there must have been some fresh revolt of the Thebans not mentioned by the historian. The people submitted at the approach of the praetor, who made over the city to the exiles and other friends of Rome, and sold the slaves and all the effects of the Macedonian party. He then re- turned to his ships. Perseus attempted unsuccessfully to fire the encampment of the Romans. A few days after he led out a party to cut off their foragers and surpnse an out- post In this he partly succeeded : but the soldiers of the outpost having formed upon a hill, defended themselves, though with difficulty, till aid arrived from the camp ; and then the king was over- matched and obliged to retire, with some loss and with great hazard. This action partly restored the confidence of the Romans. It was the last of the season, for the king immediately went into winter quarters in Macedonia, and the consul soon after in Boeotia. The next year's transactions are im- perfectly recorded; but they seem to have extended the influence of Perseus in Greece, an end that was much pro- moted by the cruelty and avarice of the Koman commanders, especially the con- sul Licinius, and the praetors, Lucretius and his successor Hortensius. The last demanded from the people of Abdera a large supply of com and money; they asked him for time to send to the then consul Aulus Hostilius, and to Rome ; but scarcely had their envoys reached the consul, when they heard that Hor- tensius had taken their city, beheaded the chiefs, and sold the other inhabi- tants. The senate ordered that all who had been sold should be sought out and released. The Chalcidians complained of both the praetors: and the urgency of their necessity was testified by the appearance of Miction as their principal ambassador, who had come to Rome for that purpose, though he was disabled in all his limbs, and was obliged to l^e carried into the senate house in a litter. He declared that to shut the gates against Lucretius and Hortensius was safer than to admit them : for those towns were for the most part unharmed, which had ex- cluded them ; while at Chalcis, where they had been received, all the temples were pillaged. Lucretius had freighted his ships with the spoils of sacrilege, and had carried freemen into slavery : and both he and Hortensius had quartered their seamen summer and winter in the houses of the citizens, and exposed their wives and children to the insolence of rude and profligate men, who cared not what they said or did. The senate sent orders to Hortensius to redress as far as possible, and not to repeat the wrongs complained of : and Lucretius being accused before the assembly of the com- mons, was condemned by all the tribes, and heavily fined. These outrages were imputable to particular magistrates, and not to the state, which condemned and punished them : there were other faults on which a different verdict must be given. Such was the disposition, already seen in the case of Callicrates and the Achaians, to favour those who flattered Rome by be- traying the liberty of their country, and to encourage their slanders against better men than themselves. Of this sub- servient crew was the jfEtolian Ly- ciscus, on whose evidence Eupolemus, Nicander, and others of his countrymen, were transported to Rome, under a fri- volous charge of treacherously causing the defeat of the Roman cavalry by Perseus. Another was the Epirot Charops. He set all engines to v^ork against Antinous and Cephalus, the men most respected in his nation, who had earnestly wished that peace might con- tinue, but who, since it was broken, advised the people to do their duty faithfully as allies of Rome, but without unbecoming subserviency, or forward- ness beyond. their covenant. Whatever they did in any wise conti'ary to the wishes of the Romans, Charops im- puted to infidelity. At first they de- spised the slander : but when they saw the credit given by the Romans to like accusations made by Lyciscus, they foresaw that they too might be sum- moned to Rome without a trial. They were thus induced for their own safety really to entertain the purpose of revolt : and by this and similar conduct, as Polybius observes on another occasion, the Romans became rich in flatterers, but poor in true friends. In the present mstance the defection of Cephalus car- ried with it that of Epirus. Early in the following year Hostilius, from his winter quarters in Thessaly, sent Caius Popillius and Cnaeus Octa- vius to visit the states of Greece. They carried with them a decree of the senate, that none of the allies should be requir- ed to furnish any supplies to the Roman officers, unless the demand had been sanctioned by the senate. They vaunted the kindness of the decree in each city of Peloponnesus, and went on to say that they knew the men who were not hearty in the cause of Rome, and to express as much displeasure towards them as to- wards their avowed opponents. It was believed that they meant to accuse Ly- cortas, his son Polybius, and Archon, in the great council of the Achaians : but failing to find any decent pretext for so doing, when the assembly met, they only addressed to it some words of com- pliment and exhortation^ and then went into iEtolia. Their object here was to take hostages from the nation, and it was supported by Lyciscus. The Romans, he said, had done well in removing the chief conspi- rators against them, meaning Eupole- mus and Nicander ; but these had left accomplices, who ought to be similarly treated, unless they gave their children as pledges for good behaviour. The persons chiefly hinted at were Archida- mus and Pantaleon, the latter of whom being with Eumenes, when the attempt to murder him was made, was the only one who had courage to stand by him and defend him. Pantaleon rising, shortly rebuked the sycophancy of Ly- ciscus, and then turned to Thoas, whom he deemed his more accredited calum- niator, from the absence of known en- mity between them. He called to his mmd the war of Antiochus, which he had kindled against the people whom he now unworthily flattered. He reproach- ed him with ingratitude towards Nican- der and himself, who, when he was given up to the Romans by treaty, had gone as ambassadors to Rome, and ob- tained his pardon. The indignation of the crowd broke out against Thoas : they would not hear him speak, and be- gan to pelt him. It was now no time to talk of hostages, and after slightly re- S roving them for pelting Thoas, the Lomans departed. They went next into Acamania, where they were advised by their warm- est partisans to put ganisons into the towns, and so to guard against the at- tempts of the Macedonian faction. The independent party protested against this, as the treatment due to con- quered enemies, and not to allies who had committed no offence. It was ma- nifest that the popular opinion went with the latter speakers ; wherefore the ambassadors thought it most prudent to agree with them, and after expressing themselves to that effect, they returned to Hostilius at Larissa. These transactions caused the Acha* ian leaders to deliberate on the line of conduct fittest for the times. Lycortas maintained, as he had done from the be- ginning, that they should not aid either Perseus or the Romans : for the power of the victor would certainly be too great for the freedom of Greece, and it there- fore was not the part of a patriot to con- cur in building it up. At the same time he advised them not to thwart the Ro- mans, for that would be too dangerous, especially to those whose independent conduct made many powerful enemies among them. ApoUonidas dissuaded direct opposition to Rome, but said that they should fearlessly check and censure those domestic traitors, who courted the Romans by sacrificing the liberties, laws, and common interests of the state. But the majority fell in with Archon, who recommended that they should yield to the times, and carefully avoid giving to their enemies any handle for slander, lest they should suffer the lot of Nicander and his fellows. It was agreed that Archon should be proposed for chief magistrate, and Polybius for general of the cavalry ; and they were elected accordingly. Perseus, secure at present against attack from the Romans, since the inter- vening mountains were impassable by reason of the snows, resolved to break the strength of the neighbouring Illy- rians, lest they should ravage his bor- ders when he was occupied elsewhere. This was not all : he had long sought the alliance of Gentius, who ruled over most of Illyria; and this display of power, he thought, might determine that prince to join him. His arms were every where prosperous : but Gentius answered his ambassadors that he was too poor to go to war with Rome, unless he received a large supply of money. This the Macedonian refused to furnish : and although he continued to solicit 1 ■■Bi 2S0 GREECE. GREECE. m Grentius by repeated embassies, he could not overcome his own habitually penu- rious disposition so far as to consent to the only terms on which the Illyrian could be induced to aid him. Spring; came ; Hostilius gave up his command to the new consul Q. Marcius, and with it an army which he had wean- ed from fijeat disorder and licentious- ness, and trained to vi£:ilance, obedience, and inofiFensive conduct in quarters. Marcius advanced into Macedonia, over heights which seemed insurmountable to an army. An active enemy might have ruined him. but Perseus let him pass with slight opposition, and then in blind terror retired to Pydna, lea^inif open the rich city of Dium, with the strong defile whieh it commanded, the only passage for the Romans from the narrow plain under the mountains into the open coun- try of Macedonia. The consul took possession of Dium, and advanced a little beyond it : but finding it difficult to supply his army at a distance from Thessaly, he soon retired within the pass, and suffered Perseus to reoccupy the city. The summer was spent in attempts on various places by the consul, and by the co-operating fleet of the Romans and of Eumenes. The towns were well de- fended by the Macedonians, and com- monly with success ; and the army went into winter quarters, after a campaign in which little had been won, except an entrance into Macedonia. The Achaians had decreed, at the sug- gestion of Archon, that they would aid the Romans with all their forces. Poly- bius and others being sent to the consul to sigpify their resolution, arrived when he was about to cross the mountains, and shared in the dangers of the pas- sage. They then declared their errand to Marcius, who thanked the Achaians for their good will, but said that he had no present need of putting them to such expense and inconvenience. The am- bassadors returned to Achaia, all except Polybius, who continued with the army ; till the consul, hearing that Appius Centho, who was then commanding a body of troops in Epirus, had asked five thousand soldiers of the Achaians to assist his operations, sent Polybius back to fhistrate his request, declaring that there was no necessity for the reinforcement, and that the Achaians ought not to be burdened with it. Whether this was done for the sake of the Achaians, or in jealousy of Appius, Polybius considered as very doubtful. However, he undertook the commission, and was placed by it in some perplexity. He had no written in- structions from Marcius to bear him out, and without them he felt it dangerous to oppose the wishes of Appius. He made use, however, of the decree of the senate, which relieved rhe allies from compli- ance with any demands of its officers, not authorized by itself. He procured a vote that the matter should be referred to the consul ; and by this he saved the nation from a heavy expense, but gave great offence to Appius. Perseus continued his endeavours to engage the Rhodians in his cause, and the city was full of contention between his favourers and those of Rome. When the decree of the senate arrived there, which relieved the allies from obedience to the unauthorized commands of the Roman officers, this act was kindly taken by the multitude : and the leaders friend- ly to Rome, availing themselves gladly of the existing impression, persuaded them to send ambassadors to the senate, to the consul, and to the praetor who commanded the fleet. The ambassadors to Rome were instructed to ask permis- sion for a purchase of com in Sicily; and all had orders to defend their com- monwealth against the charge of disaf- fection, and to renew all its engage- ments of friendship. Each of these mis- sions was favourably received. The consul, moreover, privately conferred with the leader of the embassy sent to him, and wondered that the Rhodians did not endeavour to make peace be- tween Perseus and the Romans. His purpose in this is not ascertained. A war had broken out between Ptolemy Philometor, king of Egypt, and An- tiochus Kpiphanes, king of Syria, on account of Coelesyria, which the former Antiochus, the present king's father, had wrested from Egypt. The consul may perhaps have feared the power of the Syrian, should he be enabled to conquer Eppt while the Romans were engaged with Perseus : he may have wished to stimulate the Rhodians to do something which the Romans might consider as a pretext for attacking their indepen- dence, when the Macedonian war should be ended. Polybius thought that the latter motive was the true one; he certainly deemed such crooked policy not inconsistent with the consul's cha- racter, and we shall hereafter find that the event at least corresponded with such a suspicion. The return of the ambassadors filled all parties with joy. Some exulted in the friendship of the Romans, others in their weakness, which they thought to be proved by their unusual earnestness in demonstrations of good will, and espe- cially by the suggestion that the Rho- dians should mediate between Perseus and the Homans. The people were easily persuaded to undertake the me- diation of peace. They voted an em- bassy to each of the belligerents, to declare that they could no longer en- dure the evils arising from the war, and that if either party refused to put an end to it on equitable terms, the Rhodians would consider what was to be done against him. Such a mes- sage was little fitted to conciliate the haughty spirit of the Romans. The bearers of it were roughly answered, and they parted from the senate in mutual anger. Perseus had at length concluded an alliance with Gentius, under the condi- tion of giving him three hundred talents. He defrauded him, however : for when he had paid but ten talents, the Illyrian was induced to offend the Romans irre- trievably by imprsonins: their ambas- sadors, and Perseus then withheld the rest of the money. The two monarchs jointly sent an embassy to Rhodes, to engaare that state as far as possible in their cause : and the hopes of their par- tisans were supported by the success of a fleet sent by Perseus to the coast of Asia, which dispersed a squadron of transports belonging to Eumenes, and slew or made prisoners a thousand Gal- lic horse*, whom that prince had dis- patched as a reinforcement to the Pergamenian troops, that were acting under his brother Attalus as auxiliaries to the Roman army. The Rhodians received the embassy with favour, again declared that they would make peace, and exhorted the two kings to throw no obstacles in the way. While these things were passing, the new consul Lucius iEmilius-Paullus arrived in Macedonia: and the praetor, L. Anicius, entering Illyria, soon put an end to all the hopes which had rested on Gentius, by reducing him within thirty days to surrender his kingdom and himself. The consul iEmilius was a warrior of tried ability. His coming filled his sol- diers with confidence and his enemies with alarm, both of which were increased • Probably •rom Gu'iatia in Asia. by the result of **je Illyrian war. Still his task was not an easy one/ for he had before him a gallant army, in a strong and a carefully fortified position on the rugged banks of the Enipeus. Some skirmishes took place in the bed of the river, rather to the advantage of the Macedonians : but in the mean time a detachment sent by ^Emilius had opened a passage over Mount Olympus, and surprised and cut to pieces the Macedonian guard. The king now quitted his position, and hastily retreated to Pydna : the consul followed, and found him ready for battle, and drawn up on ground which favoured the action of the phalanx. Both armies were eager to fight, but they were resfrained by the caution of their leaders, who wished to receive rather than to make the attack. Late on the second jday an accident brought on the engagement. At first the power of the phalanx bore down every thing that opposed it: but it could not long preserve the perfection of its array, and the Romans, penefrat- ing between the pikes wherever an open- ing was given, disordered and finally defeated it. In the battle itself, and in the butchery which followed it, 20,000 Macedonians are said to have been slain, (b. c. 169.) An eclipse of the moon had taken place on the eve of the battle. Such appearances were then superstitiously believed to be ominous of ill to states and kingdoms. C. Sulpicius Gallus, a Roman officer, had science enough to know their nature and foretell their oc- currence: and he, lest the soldiers should be disheartened by the echpse, called them together, declared that it would happen, and explained its cause. This changed the fear, which might otherwise have arisen, into wonder at the knowledge of Gallus : while in the Macedonian camp the appearance was apprehended by many to portend the extinction of the kingdom. This feel- ing, however, does not appear to have prevailed to such a degree as materially to diminish their readiness for battle. Within a few days after the victory, all Macedonia submitted to the consul. That this should have been the effect of a single battle, seems to mark that the monarch was generally unpopular, and may add some credit to the crimes and weaknesses here recorded of Perseus, and to the many others which are imputed to him by the Roman historians. His fate was a wetched one. After many "^' 25'i GREECE. GrIvEECE* 253 II I I !i 8! 'vanderinirs. he was obliprtd to put him- self into the hands of itlmiljus. He entered the camp in a mournino; habit, and would have thrown himself at his ccMiquerors feet. The consul made him Fit down, and then asked on what pro- vocation he had so violently attacked the Roman people, which had faithfully kept its treaty with his father. The Iwasl was as false as the insult was un- jjenerous : but a bolder man than Per- seus might have been deteired from reply, ifjmilius then, if Livy is to be trusted, declared, that the often tried clemency of the Roman people 2:ave to the con- quered monarch almost an assurance of safety. After this he earned him to Home, and exhibited him to all the people as a captive in his triumph. That brutal ceremony commonly finished with the death of the prisoners who were led in it. Perseus was not exe- cuted : but he was thrown into prison, wheie his life was shortened, according to some by his own despair, according to others by the cruelty of his treat- ment. While these things passed m Greece and Macedonia, some important events took place in Kgypt. Antiochus had overrun that country, and obliged the king to shut himself up in Alexandria. There were several Grecian embassies at the court of Ptolemy, from the Achaians, Athenians, and other states ; and these he sent to Antiochus to plead in his behalf. The Syrian received them kindly, heard and replied to their argu- ments, and promised to give his final answer upon the return of an embassy which he had sent to Ptolemy: for he wished, he said, that the Greeks should be witnesses of all his proceedings. \Vhatever may have been the further progress of the negotiation, it did not lead to peace: on the contrar>', the Egyptian monarch ventured a battle, was defeated, and taken. Hereupon the Alexandrians declared his younger brother king, who also bore the name of Ptolemy, according to the custom of the Macedonian princes of Eg>pt, but v-as distinguished by the addition of Physcon. Antiochus made peace with his pri- soner, and carried on the war against the Egyptians under pretence of rein- stating their rightful monaich. He won a victory at sea, took the sirong city of I'elusiuni, at one of the mouth* of the Mile, and laid siege to Alexandna. A Uhoxliaii embassy arriving to mediate. received for answer, that Anliochvis wat fully determined to restore the diadem to its proper wearer. Finding, however, that there was little hope of spredy suc- cess against Alexandria, he resolved to heave the brothers to fight it out, ex- pecting that, when they had weakened each other, the victor would fall an easy prey. He established Ptolemy Philo- metor as king in the ancient capital of Memphis, and gave up to him all Egypt, except Pelusium.wheie he kept a gar- rison, that he might be sure of a ready entrance into the kingdom which he pre- tended to restore. But Ptoleniy, well aware of his protector's insincerity, straightway opened a negotiation with his brother, which, by the common ap- prehensions cf both, and the good offices of their sister Cleopatra, was soon brought to a conclusion. It was agreed that both should reign conjointly, and the elder Ptolemy was re-admitted into Alexandria. But Antiochus, instead of rejoicing that the end was attained, for which alone he professed to war, now prepared for fiercer hostilities against the two. He sent a fleet to Cyprus, and himself proceeded towards Egypt. On his march he was met by ambassadors, who thanked him, in the name of Pto- lemy Philomel or, for his recovered in- heritance, and prayed him not to cancel his bounty, but rather to speak his wishes as a friend, than proceed by vio- lence as an enemy. Antiochus an- swered, that he would not cease from war, unless Cyprus, and Pelusium, with the country round it, were yielded to him. These demands were not com- plied with, and he advanced into Egypt The Achaians were bound to the house of the Ptolemies by alliance, by old friendship, and by benefits received. These piinces in their present difficulties had asked them for a thousand foot and two hundred horse, with Lycortas as leader, and Polybius to command the cavalry. Callicrates and Diophanes op- posed the grant, on the ground that the consul Marcius was wintering in Mace- donia, and the decision of the war was now at hand, and therefore the Achaians should keep in readiness, in case the Romans should want their help. To tl\is it was replied, that Marcius. a year liefore, had declined their ottered aid as unnecessary. It therefore appeared, said the friends of Lycortas, thai the mention cf the Romans was a mere pretence for persuading the Achaians to desert their benefactors in their utmost need, in con- tempt of obligations imposed by grati- tude, and bound upon them by the faith of treaties and the sanctity of oaths. The voice of the multitude was loudly in favour of sending the succour required : but Callicrates procured the adjourn- ment of the question, by alleging that a meeting, such as was then convened, was not legally competent to decide upon it. At the next meeting, which was a more general one, it was again brought forward. Lycortas and Po- lybius again proposed the sending troops : Callicrates, the sending am- bassadors to mediate. The sense of the people was manifestly with Lycortas ; but Callicrates carried his point by means of a letter from Marcius, recom- mending his proposal. Fortunately for the Ptolemies, a more powerful mediation came into play. Be- fore the reconciliation of the brothers, while Physcon and his sister were be- sieged by Antiochus, they had prevailed on the Romans to interfere in their favour. One embassy had been sent, which effected nothing: but a second followed, headed by C. Popillius, and bearing an express requisition on the part of the senate, that all prose- cution of the war should be forthwith given up. The conquest of Mace- donia had now been completed, and the increase of power thence result- ing to the Romans was more than matched by the increase of their pride. Antiochus, after compelling the rest of Egypt to submission, was on his march towards Alexandria, when Popil- lius met him within four miles of the city. The king saluted him, and offered his hand ; the ambassador bid him first read the decree of the senate. He read it, and said he would take counsel with his friends : Popillius drew a circle round him with his stick, and required his an- swer before he stepped beyond it. An- tiochus hesitated a while, and then said he would obey : whereupon the Roman took his hand, and hailed him as a friend. Antiochus withdrew his troops from Egypt, according to the mandate of the senate : and the ambassador, after visiting the Ptolemies in Alexan- dria, went to Cyprus, which the Syrian generals had well nigh conquered, but were now obliged to abandon. Chapter XVL 0/ Greece^ ^rom the Conquest ofMctce- donia to the Conqicest of Achaia, by the Romans. When the senate heard of the defeat of Perseus, they sent for the Rhodian ambassadors, who had not quitted Rome. Polybius seems to intimate that they had not before been admitted to a hearing ; but this is not expressed with precision enough to warrant us in set- ting aside the positive assertion of Livy. They said that their common- wealth had sent them to mediate a peace, considering the war as burden- some to the Greeks and chargeable to the Romans ; but now that it was ended as the Rhodians most wished, they shared in the joy of their friends. The senate replied that it well knew the Rhodians to have acted neither from good will to Greece nor to Rome, but merely from the wish to rescue Perseus from his fate ; and that therefore they must not expect the language nor the treatment due to fi*iends. This repulse was hardly needed to increase the terror which had already driven the Rhodians to acts unworthy of themselves. The master-work of tyranny is to make its victims accom- plices in their own degradation, and thus to render unmerited suffering no longer respectable. We may better bear to see a gallant struggle unsuc- cessfully maintained, for the pity due to suffering is absorbed in the higher sympathy with moral greatness. But to see a brave, a wise, a once free- spirited people, reduced to kiss the foot that spurns them without cause, and by tame, and even by criminal sub- missions, to sue for pardon where no wrong has been committed, this is in- deed a painful spectacle, and not more painful than humiliating. The Rho- dians hearing that C. Popillius was passing near their island on his way to the king of Syria, sent a deputation that with difficulty persuaded him to visit them. He came, but only to in- crease their fears and exaggerate their offences. His colleague Decimius, says Livy, spoke more moderately. He ad- vised the Rhodians to save themselves from punishment, by turning it on the heads of their evil counsellors. Ac- cordingly they voted death to all who had ever spoken in favour of Perseus or against the Romans. Some had al> f'S4 GREECE. 6REEC£i US I ^i ^ ready escaped, others slew themselves, but the decree was executed against the rest. Such was the mild atonement exacted for a few haughty words and suspected wishes, by those same tender- hearted Romans, who had been so much shocked, as we may remember, at the cruelty of the Achaians, in putting to death some principal Lacedaemonians for a flagrant breach of treaty and a massacre. Even after this propitiation the senate would hardly listen to the ambassadors whom the Khodians sent to plead for their pardon. The temper of the lead- ing men was generally unfriendly, and one of the praetors went so far as pub- licly to harangue the people, and ex- hort them to war. The ambassadors put on mourning attire, and besought forgiveness with prayers and tears ; but the greatest favour which they could obtam was an answer relieving them from the apprehension of war, but bit- terly reproaching their several delin- quencies, and declaring that but for a few tried friends of Rome, especially the ambassadors themselves, the senate well knew how they ought to be treated. On receiving the answer, the Rhodians voted to the senate a present of ten thousand gold pieces in the form of a crown, and sued to be admitted into confederacy, which they had hitherto avoided. For the Rhodians. trusting in their strength, like the ancient Cor- cyrasans, had ever declined such en- gajjements as could entangle them against their will in the quarrels of others, or prevent them from assisting any state when they saw cause. They were now reduced to beg for that which they would not formerly have accepted ; but that a decree might not exist among their records to shame them if they were refused, the mission was entrusted to their admu^, as the only person legally empowered to engage in any negotiation, without being authoriaed by a popular vote. A year or more passed before their request was granted. During the interval, the senate decreed the inde- pendence of those Lycians and Carians whom it had consigned to the Rhodians after the conquest of Antiochus. If the Romans were unjust and cruel towards the Rhodians. it is yet to be seen whether their conduct m Greece deserves a more favourable report. After the conquest of lUyria, Anicius led his forces into Epirus. Four towns alone held out against him under An- tinous. Cephalus, and other leaders in the revolt : but these, soon feeling the hopelessness of resistance, threw them- selves on the Roman outposts and died fighting; and the towns then opened their gates. ^Emilius meantime, while he waited for the ten commissioners appointed to assist him in settling: the affairs of the province, was travelling through Greece to visit its most re- markable places, carefully avoiding to inquire into the past conduct of the inhabitants. In returning he was met by a crowd of vEtolians in mourning raiment, who complained that Lyciscus and Tisippus, the heads of the Roman party, after surrounding the national congress with a body of soldiers ob- tained from Aulus Boebius, a Roman officer, had slaughtered five hundred and fifty of the leading men, driven others into banishment, and distributed to their followers the goods of the slain and the exiles. The proconsul bid them follow him to Amphipolis, where he was to appear on a stated day with the com- missioners, in order to settle the govern- ment of Macedonia. On the appointed day, his tribunal being set forth, he ap- peared in state with his ten assistants, and published the decree of the senate to the anxious multitude. He declared that all the Macedonians should be free, should enjoy their cities, lands, and laws, and annually elect their magi- strates ; that they should pay to Rome but half the tribute they had paid to the king ; but that their country should be parcelled into four cantons, having se- parate capitals, separate magistrates and congresses, and that no one should marry, or purchase lands or houses out of his canton. After this he called in the iEtolians : but his inquiries were directed to de termine, not who had done the wrong, or who had suffered it, but who had favoured or opposed the Romans in the war. He acquitted the murderers, con- firmed them in power, and ratified their sentences of exile and confiscation : and only condemned Bsebius for lend- ing Roman soldiers as agents of mas- sacre. This iniquitous decision gave new confidence to the servile tools of Rome in every state : the patriots gene- rally trave way to the season, and the betrayers of their country were ap- pointed without opposition to all magi- stracies and public missions. Callicrates, Charops, Lyciscus, and the rest, flocked in to mmilius in Macedonia; they vied with each other in slandering their more honest fellow-citizens ; and all whom it pleased them to accuse as secret ene- mies of Rome, were demanded by the proconsul, and sent to Italy to answer for their conduct. With the Achaians only the com- missioners went to work more indi- rectly ; for they feared lest they should refuse compliance, and perhaps put Callicrates and his fellow traitors to death. Besides, in examining the writings taken from Perseus, they found no letters from any Achaian. How- ever, they selected two of their number as ambassadors to the Achaians. These declared that some of the leaders ot the nation had assisted Perseus both with money and otherwise, required a vote condemning them to death, and said that when this was passed they would state their names. 1 he assembly cried out against the injustice of the proposal, and demande'd that the men should be named and tried before they were sen- tenced: whereupon the Romans an- swered, by the advice of Callicrates. that all who had recently been generals of the Achaians were involved in the charge. This called up Xenon, a man of high consideration: " I," he said, •* have lately been general, but I know myself guiltless towards the Romans, and am ready to answer for my conduct either here or at Rome." Tlie ambas- sadors caught at the unguarded ex- pression, and demanded that all who were accused should be examined be- fore the senate. Under this pretence they sent to Rome all those whom Cal- licrates pointed out, in number above a thousand. ^The senate without hear- ing them placed them under, guard in different cities of Etruria. To an em- bassy sent by the Achaians to request that the men might be either brought to trial at Rome, or sent back to be tried in their own country, the senate affected to consider them as already condemned by their fellow-citizens. Driven out of this subterfuge by a second embassy, which fully stated the true features of the case, the senate answered that they deemed it not tor the good of Achaia that those men should return. Many embassies were sent with no better success. At length, after seventeen years, when scarce three hundred of them were left, the rest having died in prison, or suffered death for attempting to escape, the survivors, among whom Wras Poly bins, were allowed to return. Such was the treatment vouchsafed by Rome to men, whose sole offence was fidelity to their country ; and such the paltry trickery by which her oppressions were facilitated. Emilias again assembling the Mace- donians bade them chuse their council of state, and then published a list of Macedonian chiefs, whom he required to go into Italy with their grown-up children. This, Livy says, though ap- parently harsh, was really a safeguard to the general liberty against men accustom- ed to obey the king, and domineer over his subjects. It is far more probable that they were dreaded, not as oppressors, but as leaders, who might unite their countrymen against oppression: espe- cially since the ordinary Macedonian government, though irregular, was far from being despotic. iEmilius gave out a code of laws for the province, of which the Roman historian speaks with high commendation. Lastly, he set forth a splendid feast from the spoils of Mace- donia, and then went out from the bosom of rejoicing to do a deed, perhaps the foulest in the black and bloody chroni- cles of Roman conquest. The fear of oppression, we may re- member, had driven most of the Epirots to revolt ; but they do not seem to have been active in the war. All however whom it pleased the Romans to accuse of any disaffection towards them, had already been arrested and sent into Italy. Nevertheless the senate, to gra- tify the soldiers without diminishing the Macedonian treasure, had resolved to give up all the cities of Epirus to pillage that had shewn anv favour to Perseus. iEmilius being ordered to execute the decree sent officers to each, who pro- fessed that they were come to withdraw the garrisons, so that the Epirots might be free hke the Macedonians. He sum- moned ten chiefs from every place, and charged them to deliver up the gold and silver in their towns. Troops were sent to the devoted cities, and their de- partures were so arranged that all might arrive on the same day at their several destinations. The commanding officers had secret orders what to do. On the appointed morning the treasure was collected, and then the signal for plunder was given. Each city was stripped of everything valuable, its walls were demolished, and its inhabitants made slaves. In one day seventy towns were ruined, and 150,000 persons sold into bondage. This was done in time 25€ GREECE GREECE. 2)7 i of peace, for a s%ht offence, and one for which the sufferers had been taught to believe that their excuses were ac- cepted : yet the bod^ which commanded it was wont to boast itself the only power on earth which never failed in faith, justice, or humanity; and the agent in the villainy esteemed himself, was esteemed by his countrymen, has been registered by annalists, and commemo- i*ated by ora'tors, as a spotless pattern of integrity. Contempt of riches was among the virtues which the Romans vaunted as peculiarly their own. Their oflBcers were commonly proof against personal corruption to a degree that surprised the Greeks; and ^Emilius himself, after larger revenues had passed through his hands than through those of any former Roman general, was obliged to sell a part of his lands for the purpose of procuring ready money. Yet the only motive to the desolation of Epirus was the wish to avoid diminish- ing a vast treasure newly won. How can these things be explamed? By that disposition, everywhere too common, which prevailed at Rome to a more than usual extent, to make national interest the measure of justice, and na- tional partiality that of truth: by the unexamining self idolatry, which looks inward only for matter of praise, and is therefore really unconscious of impuri- ties and inconsistencies, because it has never sought to find them out : by that wilful blindness and rooted unfairness of a mind, severe in its judgment of others, but unboundedly indulgent to its*:lf, which are the sins especially pointed at in the words, that " the heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked." The Roman generals now sailed for Italy, leaving Charops all powerful among the remaining inhabitants of Epirus. He quickly gathered about him a crew of plunderers and ruffians, and partly by their aid, and partly by the fear of Rome, he overbore all opposition. His enmity and his avarice alike required to be satiated by bloodshed. Men were slain in the public market or in their houses ; others were waylaid and assas- sinated in the fields and highways ; and confiscation ever followed on the heels of murder. The threat of banishment was another engine of extortion from the wealthy, — women as well as men. By this, Charops drew as much as he could from the principal persons in the city of Fhoniee ; and then, after receiving the price of forbearance, he nevertheless commenced the threatened prosecution. The charge he made was of enmity to the Romans ; and partly by persuasion, partly by fear, he prevailed on the peo- ple to doom the accused — not to exUe — but to death. They fled to avoid the execution of the sentence, and Charops went to Rome to get his act confirmed by the senate. Here he was disappointed. -/Emilius Paullus, though he had not re- fused to execute the worst decrees of his employers, had yet virtue enough to be displeased with the encouragement given to flatterers and false accusers. He marked his opinion of Charops, by refusing him admission into his house . and his judgment, thus expressed, pre- vailed with the senate to withhold their approbation of the proceedings that had taken place. They declared that they would send commissioners to inquire into the matter; but Charops sup- pressed the real answer, and forged one according to his wishes. He died soon after, probably on his return, for the place of his decease was Brundusium in Italy, the port from which the passage into Greece was commonly begim. Epi- rus thus was freed from an intolerable tyranny; and about the same time jEtolia was no less fortunate in the death of Lyoiscus. These deaths took place in the eleventh year after the de- feat of Perseus. We must return to the affairs of Pelo- ponnesus. The reward of the Achaians for their unfailing fidelity as allies of Rome, was that, as soon as the Romans were strong enough to dispense with their voluntary services, they strove to weaken them as much as possible, that they might be the less able to withstand oppression. Three years after the re- turn of iEmihus to Italy, C. Sulpicius Gallus was sent into Greece, and in- structed to sever as many cities as pos- sible from the Achaian league. Among those inclined to abandon the league was the ^tolian town of Pleuron ; and Gallus, according to his orders, sup- ported its defection. What other suc- cess his mission may have had does not appear. The Athenians were now in the deepest poverty : for they had been chief suf- ferers m the Macedonian war, and they had few resources for the recovery of their loss. Driven to extremity by want, they plundered their subjects of Oropus. The Oropians complained to Rome ; and the senate, judging that they had suffered wrong, commissioned the Sicyonians to lay a suitable fine upon the Athenians. The arbiters fined them six hundred talents ; but the senate remitted all but one hundred. The Athenians, however did not pay even this, but prevailed on the Oropians, by promises and trifts, to be reconciled to them, to receive an Athenian garrison into their town, and to give hostages to the Athenians, on condition that, if further wrongwere done to the Oropians, the garrison should be withdrawn and the hosta2:es restored. Misconduct taking: place on the part of the garrison, the Athenians were called on to evacuate the place. They denied the obligation ; for their commu- nity, they said, was not to blame, and they were ready to punish the offending individuals. The Oropians carried their injuries to the Achaians ; but they, through friendship to Athens, were loth to act against her. The complainants apphed to Menalcidas the Lacedaemo- nian, who was general of the league, and promised him a gift of ten talents, if he would prevail on his people to assist them. He offered half the bribe to Cal- licrates, and thereby secured his sup- port: and by their joint influence the Achaians were induced to undertake the cause of the Oropians. As soon as this was known to the Athenians they with- drew their ganisonfrom Oropus, having first plundered the inhabitants of every thing worth taking which they had spared before. The Achaians having come too late to save the Oropians from this mischief, Menalcidas and Calli- crates urged them to avenge it, by in- vading Attica: but this proposal was vehemently opposed, and the army finally broke up. Menalcidas had not earned his mo- ney, but he did not fail to exact it. He then began to grudge Callicrates his share, and after putting him off with excuses for a time, he ended with plainly refusing payment. Callicrates revenged himself by a capital charge against Menalcidas, as having gone to Rome on embassies against the Achaians, and done his utmost to sever Lacedaemon from their confederacy. Menalcidas was now in the utmost danger ; but he gave three talents to Diaeus of Megalopolis, who succeeded him as general ; and Diaeus exerted himself with such effect that he saved him. How this was done is not recorded, but it seems to have been bjr some illegal stretch of power; and Diffiiis, finding that he was generally condemned, thought it advisable to seek some topic of engrossing interest, which might divert the people fi-om inquiry into his demerits. There was some land upon the bor- ders of Argolis and Laconia which had been claimed fi*om ancient times as be- longing to each. The dispute had been lately brought before the great council of the Achaians ; but the Lacedaemonians had appealed from their decision to the Roman senate. That body answered that they must abide by the decision of the congress, except in questions of life and death : but Diaeus, in reporting this answer to the Achaians, omitted the ex- ception. The Achaians claimed autho- rity in matters touching life, as well as in all other ; the Lacedaemonians charged Diaeus with falsehood, and again appeal^'d to Rome : whereupon the Achaians quoted the law, that forbad each single state of the league to negotiate without the sanction of the rest. The quarrel broke out into a war. But the Lace- daemonians, knowing themselves the weaker party, began to treat with the Achaians and their general ; and Diteus said he warred not with Lacedaemon, but with certain men who disturbed her quiet. Being asked to name tliem, he pitched on four-and- twenty men, the principal in Sparta. Agasisthenes, a leading Lacedaemonian, advised the ac- cused, instead of staying and involving their country in war, to go to Rome, and trust to the Romans for their restora- tioa They departed accordingly, and were capitally c«>ndemned by the Lace- daemonians in their absence. Callicrates and Diaeus, were sent by the Achaians as ambassadors to Rome ; Callicrates died upon the way, but Diaeus came before the senate ; and vehement alter- cation ensued between him and Menal- cidas, as the spokesman of the exiles. The senate answered, that it would send commissioners to judge between the contending states : but while the com- missioners were journeying at their leisure, both Diaeus and Menalcidas returned in haste to Peloponnesus, and each reported to his own community that judgment was given in its favour. Thus fed with false hopes by their re- spective ambassadors, the Achaians and Lacedaemonians both prepared for war. About a year before, Macedonia had revolted from the Romans, under one Andriscus, a man of low birth who pretended to be a son of Perseus. He had invaded Thessaly, but had been H 25H GHtECE. GREECE. 259 I N '•J ] i I I repulsed by the Roman pr»tor Scipio Nasica, assisted by the Achaians and some other Greeks. Juventius Thalna, who succeeded Nasica, was defeated and killed, in an attempt to enter Macedonia: and about the time of which we have just been speakinoj, his place was filled by Q Caecilius Metellus. The latter sent to charge the Achaians that, instead of going to war with Lacedaemon, they should await the coming of the Roman commissioners. His messengers found the Achaian forces already entered into Laconia. Notwithstanding the mandates of the Roman commander, they fought and won a battle ; and it was thought, that if Damocritus, theur general, had pressed the pursuit, he might have taken their city, by entering with the fugitives. After this, instead of besieging the place, he carried on a petty warfare of mcur- sions and plundering expeditions; and when he led his army home, he was charged with treachery, and condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents, which ope- rated as a sentence of perpetual banish ment Diaeus, who succeeded him, paid more attention to the remonstrances, which were now renewed bj[ Metellus. He consented to a suspension of arms, and directed his policy in the mean time so as to win the voluntary adherence of the towns round Sparta. The truce was broken by the rashness of Meaalcidas, who had been chosen general of Lace- daemon. He suddenly attacked the town of lasus in Laconia, which was sub- ject to the Achaians. The popular voice was loud against him for thus needlessly renewing a hopeless contest, and in a despairing mood he ended his life by poison. At length the long-expected commis Moners arrived at Corinth, and declared tlie will of the senate : that Lacedaemon, Argos, Corinth, Hei-acleia, and Orcho- menus in Arcadia, should no more be- long to tiie Achaian confederation. Poly bins thought that the senate did not mean this mandate to be executed, but only held it out as a threat, to humble the pride and chastise the disaffection of tiie Achaians. If this be true, it little extenuates their injustice. The fidelitj of the Achaians, as allies, had been irre- proachable, and their errors had been on the side of undue submission, and not of unjustifiable resistance. They were accused of pride because they wished to be something more than the mere shadow of a nation; because they would not suffer their popular assemblies to be mere courts for registering the edicts of the senate. Their disaffection had not shown itself in any public action : but, granting its existence, it would have been war- ranted by foul wrongs repeatedly en- dured ; and the only just means by which (he senate could subdue it, would have been by endeavouring to merit kindlier feelings. To insult the nation with a threat of dismemberment was less atrocious in- deed, but not less absolutely unjustifiable, than actually to dismember it : and, after ail, the excuse wliich is made for the Ro- mans amounts to no more than this, that they would suffer the Achaians to con- tinue incorporated, provided that all the acts of the mcorporation might be wholly regulated by themselves. The resolution of the senate excited the Achaians to a burst of intemperate fury, such as often occurs when oppression is brought home to the feelings of the multitude. This is the more lamentable, since the good cause is apt to suffer for the sins of its fallible supporters. Where power is ar- rayed against right, it goes well with the oppressor if he can put his victim in the wrong in some particular instance ; for the greater part of mankind are fitter to scrutinize the details of a quarrel than to comprehend its general bearings; and there are many good men, but weak in goodness, who will scruple to contend for the better cause, unless they alto- gether approve of their associates. The Achaians in their anger arrested all the Lacedaemonians whom they found in the streets, and even tore from the houses of the Roman ambassadors such of them as had taken refuge there. The ambas- sadors, returning home, exaggerated their ill-treatment, and falsely imputed it to the deliberate will of the nation. The senate, however, did not proceed to ex- tremities, but sent Sextus Julius Caesar, a prudent and temperate man, to settle the matter peaceably, if possible. This unexpected moderation came too late. There were spirits among the Achaians that were madly bent on dragging their country into war, whether thi-ough mere turbulence, or through the fear that they might be the saerifice for peace. The old attachment of the people towards Rome had been turned into bitterness by repeated provocations, and they were now readiest to listen to those who spoke most harshly of the senate. When Julius came before the congress he addressed them mildly, extenuated the insult to the former ambassadors and while he exhorted them to forbear further breaches of friendship, said little of atonement for the past. This the tur- bulent party regarded as a proof, not of moderation, but of weakness ; for the Roman arms had suffered some reverses both in Africa and Spain. Nevertheless a friendly answer was given, and the ambassadors were asked to go to Tegea, to be present at a conference which should there be held with ministers from Lace- daemon for the purpose of settling the matters in dispute. Julius went to Pegea, and requested the Lacedaemo- nians to attend the conference, and to make arrangements for a peaceable dis- cussion of the existing differences, and for the suspension of all hostilities till the Romans should send commissioners to arbitrate between the contending par- ties. But Critolaus, who had succeeded Diaeus as chief magistrate of the Achai- ans, was determined that the meeting should be to no purpose. He went in- deed himself to Tegea, but he prevented the other delegates from repairing thither : and when the Lacedaemonians were ready to enter into the discussion, he professed that he could not decide on anything, but that he would submit their proposals to the Achaian congress, which would meet within six months. Julius dismissed the Lacedaemonians, and returned to Rome full of resentment Critolaus, in the course of the winter, visited the several cities, under the pre- tence of giving an account of the con- ference at Tegea. Whithersoever he came, he misrepresented the conduct of the ambassadors, and exasperated the multitude to the utmost against Rome. He also directed the magistrates to sus- pend all actions for debt during the war with Lacedaemon: and hereby he won the rabble to be entirely at his disposal. Metellus, by this time, had overthrown Andriscus and re-conquered Macedonia, On receiving news of the disturbances in Peloponnesus, he sent thither ambassa- dors instructed to pursue a conduct like that of Julius. Some few there were among the Achaians who supported the ai^uments of the ambassadors ; but the many derided them, and drove them from the assembly with shouts of insult Critolaus inveighed against the tyranny of the Romans, and accused his opponents of cowardice and treachery. A vote was passed for the renewal of war with Lacedamon; and the general, contrary to all the principles of the constitution, was mvested witJi arbitrary authority in the conduct of it The Thebans also, and the inhabitants of Chalcis, took part with the Achaians in the contest : the former, on account of a judgment given against them by the Romans, the latter, for some cause unknown. Metellus, wishing to have the credit of finishing the war before he was su- perseded by the consul L. Mummius, his appointed successor, again sent to offer pardon to the Achaians, if they would consent to the separation of Lacedaemon from their body, and of the other states which had been named by the senate. At the same time he advanced through Thessaly with his army. His overtures being rejected, he marched against the Achaian forces, then besieging Heracleia, because it would not adhere to their con- federacy. Critolaus, on hearing of his approach, retreated hastily. So blinded was he by terror, that he passed through the defile of Thermopylae without once offering to make a stand there. Metel- lus overtook the retreating army, and entirely defeated it, near Scarpheia in the eastern Locris. Critolaus was never seen after the battle, but he was sup- posed to have perished in a neighbour- ing morass. It was the custom of the Achaians, when their general died in office, that his authority should devolve upon his predecessor. Diaeus, therefore, took the place of Critolaus, and resorted, forth- with, to the most violent measures, in order to pro^^de the means of carrying on the war. He summoned all the able- bodied citizens to arms, and filled up his battalions with emancipated slaves. He recruited the exhausted treasury, by compelling the rich to make large contributions, which were nominally free gifts. The people now began to feel the evils of the war, and gloomily to anticipate its impending dangers. They were troubled at losing their slaves and their property; and the pride of free- men in a slave-holding community was wounded by seeing their bondmen put on a level with themselves. They praised the fortune cf the slain, and pitied those who were going to the war. The women lamented that they had contributed their money, as if it had been intention- ally, to the certain destruction of their sons. Yet, though every place was full of discontent and fearful expectation, no attempt was made to stop the measures of Diaeus ; but it seemed as if the people were possessed by a spirit of despond- ency, which alike unfitted them for 82 sto GREECE. n I »" timely lubmissicn and for vigorous re- sistance. Most jiraentable of all was the behaviour of the Patrians, and the men of certain towns associated with them, who had been discomfited in Phocis, after the battle of Scarpheia. Some slew themselves, others fled wildly from their dwellins^s, without knowing or thinking whither to bend their steps. Some seized their fellows and delivered them to the Romans ; some acted as sycophants and false accusers, though no sign had yet been given that such service would be acceptable ; some met the conqueror as suppliants, confessed that they had erred, and besought for- giveness, though their conduct had not yet been broiis^ht into question. Metellus meanwhile advanced to Thebes; for the Thebans had shared with the Achaians in the siege of Hera- cleia and the subsequent battle. The city was abandoned by the inhabitants at his approach. He entered it, but he would not suffer his soldiers to dama^ the buildings, nor to kill or make pn- soners the fugitives. From Thebes he went to Megara. The Achaian garrison retired at ms approach, and the gates were opened to him. He then advanced to Connth, where Diseus had shut him- self up. Still earnestly desiring to finish the war, he renewed his offer* of peace through some leading Achaians^ whether prisoners, or, which seems probable, ambassadors who had come to him on some mission from the nation. Thus he endeavoured by moderation to atone for the original injustice of his com- monwealth, while the Achaians, who had right upon their side in the outset, still continued to do their utmost to- wards putting themselves in the wrong. Yet the Romans were partly to blame ever for this ; for they had robbed the Achaians of their best and wisest patriots, and kept down any who might have worthily replaced them; so that now, when the servile flatterers of Rome had become a curse and a by- word among the people, there were few to tak§ the lead, save reckless incendiaries. The Achaian chiefs who came from Metellus waririly urged the acceptance of his terms, and they wanted not sup- porters within the city : but Diaeus and some others, who despaired of forgive- ness, were bent to stake their country's fortune and their own upon one cast. To raise an insuperable bar to reconcili- ation, they accused the ambassadors of traitorous dealings with the enemvi and threw them into prisoa Sosioratcs, tlie lieutenant-general, was joined in the charge. He had supported, it was said, the sending: an embassy to Metellus, and, in short, he was author of all the mis- chiefs — one of those convenient gene- ralities that serve to cloak injustice, when the trick is favoured by loose and arbitrary proceeding. He was con- demned and racked to death, without making any of those disclosures which his tormentors looked for. His savasje treatment produced a reaction in the popular mind in favour of the ambassa- dors ; yet their release was not obtained without a bribe to Diaeus, who could not forego his wonted venahty, even in this extremity of peril. Meanwliile, the consul Mummius, ar- riving with a jx)werfiil army, sent Me- tellus and his forces back into Mace- donia. He himself engaged in the sieee of Corinth. The Ijesiegers were careless through the confidence of strength, and the Achaians, making a sudden sally, drove in their outposts, and killed and wounded many of them. Encouraged by this success, they came out and offered battle. The consul was not slow to accept it. The Achaian cavalry fled at the first onset, but the foot main- tained the fight with desperate resolution, against an enemy very superior in force. At length they were broken by an attack in flank, and finally routed. If Diaeus now had retreated into Corinth, assem- bled the relics of the beaten army, and prepared for a resolute defence, he might probably have obtained some tolerable terms for his country, from the eager desire of Mummius to finish the war before his command expired. Instead of this he fled to Megalopolis, where he killed his wife to save her from captivity, and then ended his own life by poison. The Achaians who had escaped from the battle into Corinth, thus abandoned by their leader, made no attempt at defence. They silently withdrew in the following night, and most of the Corin- thians did the same. The gates were left open, but Mummius hesitated awhile to enter, for he feared an ambuscade. On the third day after the battle, he entered the city. He cruelly slaughtered most of the men whom he found there, sold the women and cldldren, and pil- laged and burnt the town, after selecting the most celebrated works of art, and shipping them for Rome. The pretence for all this destruction was the insult offered to the Roman commissioners: GREECE. 261 the true motive was the wish to deprive the Achaians of a fortress important both from its strength and situation. The senate had appointed ten com- missioners to assist the consul in set- tling the affairs of Greece ; but before they came he had already demolished the walls and disarmed the inhabitants of the cities that had sided with the Achaians. The commissioners abolished democracy in all the states, and dh-ected that the magistrates should be chosen according to a scale of property. They also put down the national assemblies, and for- bade tlie purchase of lands by any man beyond the boundaries of his state: though these two latter regulations were soon afterwards recalled. From this time forward Greece, with the exception of Thessaly, was reduced to a Roman province, under the name of Achaia, and a Roman magistrate was annually sent out to govern it. Epirus and Thessaly were included in the province of Macedonia, Shortly before the arrival of the ten commissioners, Poly bins returned into Greece. His qualities had won respect and favour from many distinguished Romans. He had been the most valued friend, adviser, and instructor of P. Scipio ^milianus, the son of ^milius Paullus, and the adopted grandson of Africanus. He accompanied Scipio when sent as consul into Africa, and was with him at the taking of Carthage ; after which he returned to his native country, in time to try how far his fa- vour with the Romans might enable him to mitigate its sufferings. Among other more serious insolencies of con- quest, some worthless fellow accused Philopoemen as an enemy to Rome, and urged the commissioners to break his statues, and abolish the honours paid to his memory. Polybius spoke in behalf of his father's friend. He did not dwell on the poorness of the pro- posed revenge, nor on the obvious fact that Philopoemen owed allegiance to the Achaian only, and not to the Roman commonwealth : these considerations, though true and just, would not have been well received. But he spoke of the trying and dangerous occasions on which the Achaian hero had played the part of a faithful ally to Rome; and either his person or his arguments were so acceptable to the commissioners, that they not only refrained from the suggested baseness, but at his request they restored some statues of Aratus and Pliilopcemen which had been taken out of Peloponnesus to be sent to Rome. For this the Achaians erected a marble statue of Polybius himself. Another mark of favour was shown by the commissioners to Polybius — the permitting him to fix on any thing, an(J take it freely, among the confiscated effects of Diaeus. However, he declined the offer, and dissuaded his friends from being purchasers at any sales of confiscated property. The commission- ers at their departure appointed Poly- bius to make a circuit among the cities, that he n;ight explain the laws and practice of the constitution which the Romans had given them, and might determine their controversies, until they were sufficiently accustomed to their new institutions to administer the go- vernment according to them. This commission he seems to have executed with great ability ; and high honours were conferred on him in the Achaian cities. Chapter XVII. Of the state of Greece under the Roman dominion. Sect. I. — For many ages after the fall of the Achaian contiederacy the history of Greece is that of an oppressed and degraded province. The states, indeed, retained, for the most part, a form of government nominally republican, but constituted according to the pleasure of the Romans, and not according to the v\ishes or interests of the people. All authority was placed in the hands of the wealthier classes ; and if any person were aggrieved by a decision of the ma- gistrates, the appeal was not to a more popular tribunal, but to the Roman go- vernor. Few, indeed, have been the cases in the history of the world where the moral superiority of the conquerors to the conquered has been such that an arrangement like this could be benefi- cial. In ordinary instances the effect must be, either that maladministra- tion would be without redress, the foreign officer being biassed in favour of the dehnquent by the love of ease and the habits of personal intercourse ; or else that frivolous complaints would be encouraged^ so that the magistrates, finding their lives and fortunes at the ■^^ 263 GREECE. Ill I proconsul's mercy, might be deterred from opposing his arbitrary will or checking hig rapacity. In truth, the oppressions of the Roman officers were fiEtr greater than any that would proba- bly have been exercised by the native aristocracy: for these, in the want of any immediate popular control, had the natural sympathy with persons allied to tfaem by manners, language, and blood ; and the wish, almost universal among men, to stand well in the esteem of those with whom their lives were to be passed : whereas the others were stran- gers, widely differing in manners from the Greeks, and despising all from whom they differed; sent out for a year, and intending in that time to im- prove a flourishing, or recruit a shattered fortune. These were evils of which the full de- velopement did not immediately follow the conquest ; for personal avarice and corruption were not yet prevalent vices among the Roman magistrates. But the destruction of national energy in Greece, and of all the bolder and man- lier virtues, were ends to which the po- licy of Rome had been continually tending, even before Achaia was re- duced to the state of a province. These "wtues and that energy were quickly stifled by the pressure of the Roman yoke, and by the exclusion of the Greeks from all important political action : but they had previously existed in a greater degree than was willingly admitted by the Romans, whose pride avenged itself for the older civilization of the Greeks, and for their acknow- ledged pre- eminence in the refinements of literature and art, and in the heights and depths of philosophical speculation, by proclaiming and exaggerating their inferiority in courage, constancy, and practical wisdom. It is a common error, arising perhaps from the evident degeneracy of the two most celebrated commonwealths, those of Athens and Lacedaemon, to suppose that the spirit of ii^eedom was extinct in Greece from the time of Alexander downwards. It was, indeed, violently overborne for a while by the power of his contending successors, assisted !)y the factious ani- mosities of their respective partisans in the several cities : but though it slept it was not dead, as was shown by the rapid growth of the Achaian league. This latter body needs not shrink from comparison with any that Grecian his- tory can show. If it was, as seems in- GREECE. separable from a federal community^ less prompt and energetic in its conduct than Athens, or even than Lacedsmon, it was superior to both in sound and liberal policy, in justice, and in modera- tion. Its circumstances, however, were by far less favourable. It had a difficult game to play between the ambition of the Macedonian and Spartan kings and the turbulence of the ^tolians: but from the time when Rome appeared upon the stage, its doom was sealed. The power of Rome might, perhaps, have been resisted by an union of the Greeks, such as was formed against the Persian; but her artful policy com- pletely ensured that no such union should take place: nor ought it to be made a charge against the Greeks, that they failed to withstand the most for- midable combination of force and craft which the world had ever seen ; espe- cially as in the first instance they want- ed the information which would have enabled them rightly to value the pre- tensions of the senate to disinterested generosity. As the coarse of history does not confirm their imputed political degeneracy, so it bears the most decided testimony to the preservation of their military courage. Philopcemen's sol- diers were no whit inferior in bravery, nor in aptitude for discipline, according to the practice of their nation, to those of Flamininus or -^milius Paullus. If a Roman army was for the most part a better instrument of war than an equal number of Greeks or Macedonians, the cause of the difference is to be sought in the nature of the phalanx, which, after triumphing over every previous system of tactics, gave way in its turn to the Roman le^on, as an organization but little inferior in force, and far surpass- ing it in pliability and readiness of adap- tation to different circumstances. We cannot, from the scanty notices remaining, completely trace the gradual decay of national energy and prosperity ; it may suffice to mention some particu- lars illustrating the condition of the Greeks, when the Roman empire had reached its greatest extent, and when its system of provincial government had been fully developed. But first we will briefly touch on the war which was waged in Greece before that period, between the Romans and the generals of Mithridates, king of Po ntus.* (b. c. 87.) • The word Pontiig, which sipfnifies the «ea, ib oona- monly wsed l»v Ore. lan wrifers for a fipecific desigiiM tion of the hiuiinr rcr. From ihe sea itself ii i» 163 When nearly the whole of Lower Asia had been brought under the im- mediate dominion of Rome, or under that of her vassal monarchs, a rival power arose in that of Mithridates, an able, brave, and high-spirited, but cruel and faithless prince, who had much enlarged and strengthened his kingdom at the cost of his weaker neighbours. War soon broke out between him and the Romans, wherein he vanquished several armies, and quickly mastered Asia Minor, with most of the adjoining islands. In his bitter hate to Rome he sent letters throughout Asia, com- manding the people, on a stated day, to massacre all Italians in the country The order was obeyed, as well through dislike of the Romans as through fear of the king ; and eighty thousand per- sons are said to have perished in the slaughter. Mithridates then laid siege to Rhodes with all his forces both by sea and land ; but the citizens defended themselves resolutely and successfully. After this Mithridates resolved to carry the war into Europe, and sent a fleet to Greece, and an army through Thrace into Macedonia. The Athenians, for some unknown cause, had been fined by the Romans, and their magistrates forbidden to exercise their functions. Aristion, an Epicurean philosopher, being sent by them on an embassy to Mithridates. persuaded them, upon his return, to side with the king, assuring them that he would restore democracy, and would confer the greatest benefits both on the public and on individuals. The people followed his suggestions, and the chief men retired to Italy. Archelaus, who commanded the Asiatic fleet, subdued the island of Delos, which had revolted from the Athenians, restored it to them and deposited his booty in their city. Under pretence of guarding it, he sent two thousand soldiers, by whose aid Aristion made himself tyrant of Athens, and slew or gave up to Mithridates all the fiiends of Rome. Archelaus, Uke- wise, gained the Achaians, Lacedaemo- nians, and Boeotians, and conquered the Cyclades, and other islands of the ^gean sea. firenuently transferred to the countries upon its shores, with which the Greeks had very important commer- cial intercourse ; and by the Romans it is made to denote a particular region, comprising the greater part of the Asiatic coast of the E.ixine »ea, and extend- inR from the skirts of Caucasus to the contines of Biihynia. It :■ m this last sense that the word is to be n-Ki.-stood whenever the kingdom of Pontus is spoken of. * In the following year (b. c. 86) the consul Lucius Cornelius Sylla came mto Greece. The command in the Mithridatic war had been disputed by arms between him and Caius Marius ; and after a most savagely conducted struggle, Marius being overcome had escaped with difficulty from Italy, and his victorius rival carried his forces into Greece. The Boeotians submitted at his approach, and the other states that had taken part with Mithridates sent ambassadors to offer their obe- dience. Athens only held out. Sylla left one of his officers to besiege the city, while he himself attacked Peirse- eus, where Archelaus had shut himself up. After vainly assaulting the place, he set himself to the construction of battering engines upon a vast scale. For timber he cut down the sacred groves of Attica, the trees of the Aca- demy, and those of the Lycaeum : for money to carry on his operations, he pillaged the temple of Delphi. When his engines were completed he returned to the siege of Peiraeeus, which he con- tinued through the winter: but all his attacks were baffled by Archelaus, and at last he desisted from the attempt, and turned all his forces against Athens. That city was alre^y suffering grie- vously from famine. Supplies were plentiful in Peiraeeus, for the fleet of Mithridates commanded the sea: but Sylla had taken and demolished the long walls that protected the communication between the city and its harbour, and his vigilance foiled every attempt of Arche- laus to throw provisions into Athens. The miseries of the besieged were enhanced by the insolent profligacy of Aristion and his intimates, who wasted the stores of the garrison in debauchery, while the citizens were feeding on dogs and horses, and even on shoes and leathern bottles. The tyrant wantonly insulted the people in their sufferings. He refused a little oil to feed the holy lamp in the temple of Minerva, and when the priestess begged of him half a bushel of barley, he sent her in mockery that quantity of pepper. At length the people sent the councillors and priests to entreat that he would capitulate with the Romans, but he drove them from his presence with blows. Nevertheless when SyUa came in person against the city, he sent some of his boon companions to treat for peace ; who, instead of coming directly to the point, began to harangue about Theseus and other ancient heroes, and l^=p 164 GREECE. ,,it the noble deeds of Athens against the Persian. The Roman cut them short by telling them that he came not to study rhetoric, but to punish rebels. Soon afterwards he took the city by a night attack, on a part of the wall that was unguarded. The soldiers by his order slaughtered all they met, till the blood ran out in streams through the gates : and many Athenians killed them- selves in despair, expecting the utter desolation of their country. However, at the entreaty of some Athenian exiles, and of all the Roman senators in his camp, the destroyer stayed his course, and said that he would spare the living for the sake of the long since dead. Nevertheless he took from the Athenians the power of choosing magistrates and making laws ; and he condemned Aris- tion to death, with his associates and ministers. After this he returned to the siege of Peiraeeus, and obliged Archelaus to abandon it, after a most resolute defence, and retire to Munychia. When Sylla had made himself master of Peiraeeus, he dismantled the ramparts, and burnt the store-houses and arsenal. Archelaus soon quitted Munychia, and went into Thessaly, where he was joined by the army in Macedonia. With these he again advanced into Boeoria, where Sylla met him In a great battle near Chaeroneia the steadiness and disci- pline of the Romans triumphed over a vast superiority of numbers. Some time after, a second Asiatic army was sent into Greece, and was likewise overthrown. Meanwhile the cruelties of Mithri- dates had driven Ephesus and many other Asiatic cities to revolt. For fear of a general defection, he proclaimed hberty to the Grecian cities, remitted debts, and gave civil franchise to slaves and strangers. On hearing of the second defeat in (Greece, he dwected Archelaus to make peace on the best conditions he could obtain. Sylla was no less anxious (o put an end to the war, for his enemies had regained the superiority in Italy. The terms, however, were not agreed on till Sylla had passed into Asia. 'Mithri- dates at length agreed to give up all his winnings in this war, to pay two thou- sand t lents, and to deliver seventy of his galleys to the Romans. Sylla then prepared for his return into Italy, to wrest the government cut of the hands of his adversaries, (b. c. b4.) Before embarking he stayed for some time in Asia, to settle the government. Mid to enrich himself and his scldiers. He commanded all slaves who had been freed by Mithridates to return to their masters. This gave rise to tumults ; some cities revolted, and the Romans gave a loose to confiscation and slaughter. The partizans of Mithri- dates were every where severely punish* ed, especially at Ephesus. Sylla then called a meeting of deputies at Ephesus, from all the cities of Asia. He re preached them with the benefits received from Rome, and with their ungrateful readiness to join Mithridates, and to execute his cruelties. For this he said they had in part been punished by the rapine and oppression of the master they had chosen ; and the chief authors of the mischiefs had already suffered jus- tice at the handsof the Romans. Never- theless some further chastisement was due ; but it should be tempered with re- gard to the Grecian name and to old friendship. He would only fine them to the amount of five years' tribute, besides his expenses in the war, and the usual taxes due from the province. He sent parties of soldiers into all the towns to collect the sums required from each. The people were obliged to l)orrow money at high interest, and to mortgage their theatres and other public buildings. Furthermore, they were given up to the insolence and covetousness of Roman soldiers billetled upon them, each nouseholder being obliged to pay to his unwelcome guest sixteen drachmae a day (about nine shillings), and to entertain him, and any number of his friends he might think proper to invite. Nor did the proconsul defend them against the pirates, whom Mithridates had encou raged till they grew to such a pitch of strength and boldness, that they not only infested the seas, but attacked the towns. While Sylla was in Asia, they took and plundered lassus, Samos, Clazomenae, and Samothrace. After thus adminis- tering the affairs of the province, he set sail for Italy. When the other Grecian states were brought under the dominion of Rome, the Rhodians alone retained their laws and liberties. They had indetd been obliged to lower their pretensions to ab- solute independence, and to become allies of Rome, which always implied a degree of subjection ; but their politica. institutions were unchanged, and they were free from the interference of Ro- man magistrates in matters of internal administration. They still kept up their navy, and continued the exercise ol GREECE. arras ; and that they still had much of their ancient strength and spirit was amply proved by their resistance to Mithridates, when they alone, unaide 1 by the Romans, withstood and repelled the fleets and armies of that monarch, directed by his eminent ability, and urged forward by his determined will. It was l)robably in reward of their services on this occasion that Sylla made the town of Caunus in Caria, and many of the islands, tributary to them. They seem to have continued in their then con- dition till the civil war in the Roman em- pire, which followed the death of Caesar ; in the course of which their city was taken bv Cassius, and plundered of nearly all its riches. The war with Mithridates was re- sumed and continued, with many changes of fortune, till that prince was entirely stripped of his possessions, and driven to kill himself that he might not fall into his enemies' hands ; but the supremacy of Rome over the Greeks, both in Europe and Asia, was not again brought into question. This supremacy was exer- cised by the provincial governors, who were usually taken from the principal magistrates of the foregoing year, and styled proconsuls or propraetors, accord- mg to the office they had borne. These governors commanded the forces, and directed the general administration ; they also exercised the judicial power, at least in all matters concerning the state, and in all wherein either party was a Roman. They were restrained by certain rules in the exercise of authority over their countrymen, whom they could not punish with death or stripes, unless con- demned after a regular trial, with all the forms of Roman law. But those who were not citizens of Rome, either by birth or by adoption, might be scourged or slain by the most summary and arbi- trary process. Add to this that though the private differences of the provincials were usually decided by their municipal courts, appeal might always be made to the governor, who could overrule the decision and condemn the judges ; but if any wrong were done by the governor, redress was only to be sought at Rome, at peat expense and even hazard, and with a strong probability that the culprit would be screened by tauiilv interest, or by the fellow-feeling of similar delin- quents. This system could not fail to be fruit- !."}»" abuses ; but all its evils were most tuily developed by the maunei in which 265 these offices were filled. In the then corrupted state ol Roman manners, the ordinary road to consulships and prae- torships was to squander money in bribery and public shows. lu so doing the candidates looked forward to the provincial governments, which always followed in the train of high offices m the city ; and calculated that, by squeez- ing the unhappy tributaries, they would more than reimburse themselves for the money which they had lavished on the gratification of the ruling people. We csannot then wonder at the general pre- valence of extortion and oppression, which a slight acquaintance with the history of the Roman provinces will lay before us. " It is admirable," says Cicero m a letter to his brother, " that you should so have governed Asia for three years, that no statue, no picture, no precious vessels nor rich tapestry, no slaves, no offers of money for the perversion of justice, should have turned you aside from the highest uprightness and purity of conduct. But what can be conceived so excellent or so desirable, as that that virtue, that contentedness, that freedom from covetous desires, should not lie hid in darkness, but should be set in the broad light of Asia, in the sight of a most conspicuous province, and in the hearing of all nations ? that men should not be frightened by your Journeys, ex- hausted by your expenses, disturbed at your arrival? that whithersoever you come there should be joy, both publicly and privately ; the city receiving you as a guardiai;, not as a tyrant, and the house where you lodge as a guest, not as a plunderer." A goodly picture of the feelings which usually attended the march and welcomed the arrival of a Ronian magistrate ; not to mention the special praise attached m the beginning of the passage to the abstinence from practices, of which the very suggestion would, in a purer state of morals, have been repelled as an insult. But if a par ticular instance be needed, hear what Cicero says, when sent into Cilicia, of the state in which his predecessor left the province. " I heard of nothing but complaints of the poll taxes, and that all were selling their estates ; I heard groans and mourning in the cities ; portentous actions, not of a man, but of a savage beast" Even when the governor was pei- sonally incorruptible, his officers, and even his servants, would often traffic on f f66 GREECE. the credit of their influence over him. peal or nretended. This is a danger in- Keparable from arbitrary government, and especially when administered by foreign and temporary residents. But the proconsul and his train were not the only privileged oppressors. Larg:e powers were given to the society of pubhcans,* or farmers of the revenue, who often abused them to a great extent. Of this the senate was not unaware, even so early as the conquest of Macedonia ; for in a decree of that period, quoted by Livy, it is observed, that wherever the publicans are employed, either the re- venues are cheated, or else the subjects are oppressed. The publicans were all from the class of knights, the second order in the Roman commonwealth: and it will readily be supposed that in any disputes between them and the pro- vincials, the interests and habits of the ffovemor would generally bias him in favour of those who were the most capable of serving or harming him. The list of bloodsuckers does not end here. There were certain officers at Rome (the aediles) to whose office it be- longed to exhibit shows for the gratifica- tion of the people ; and the display of more than usual magnificence in these was the readiest wav to popular favour. If an aedile had a friend m any of the provincial governors, he was generally supported in defraying a part of his ex- penses by forced contributions from some tributary city. Nay, so prevalent was this custom, that if any unfashion- ably conscientious proconsul refused to countenance such extortions, complaint was made as if of a breach of friendship, or a lawful right improperly withheld. Roman merchants and money lenders swarmed in the provinces, who generally took care to be provided with letters from Rome, recommending them to the governor, and trusted more to favour than to justice in their disputes with the native inhabitants. The money lenders in particular took advantage of the dis- tres ses into which the cities were plunged • These pablicang must not be confoauded with the low and dejrraded persons so called in the Enelish translation of the New TesUmenL The latter were tte actual tax-gratherers. mostly Jews of mean condi- lion, and despised by their countrymea for consent- ing to act as ministers of a foreign asorpation, and servants of a people hated as tyrants, nnd looked down on as strangers to the law and the promise, rhe proper publicans, Roman j^entlemen of wealth and rank, woald have been much surprised to find themselveb in the company in which the others ijene- r«ily appear; from whom, indeed, they differi^ as much as a coiuiBi«««n« of emcise from a common faoget. to make .oans at the most exorbitant mterest, giving little attention to the question of securities or ability to pay. On these points, instead of exercising an ordinary prudence, they too often con- fided in their influence with the go vernor, that he would support them in the most violent measures for the reco very of their dues. It was common to give them commands in the province, expressly with the view of enabling them to employ their official authority in en- forcing the satisfaction of their private claims. Of the length to which this abuse might be carried we have a scandalous instance in the case of one Scaptius, who having a heavy claim upon the city of Salamis, in Cyprus, for a loan bearins: interest at 48 per cent., obtained from Cicero's predeces- sor in Cilicia a command in the island. and a troop of horse to be at his dis- posal, with which he shut up the coun- cil in their hall till five of them were starved to death. Another instance of the tyranny exer- cised over the unfortunate provincials is, that they were not only deterred from transmitting complaints to Rome, but frequently compelled to send deputa- tions, at a vast expense, to bear witness to the moderation of their plunderers, and the benevolence of their oppressors. However shamefully a proconsul may have misconducted himself, when he quitted his government it seldom hap- pened but that he was followed by flat- tering embassies. It was thus even With C. Verres, propraetor Of Sicily, against whose unexampled atrocities the voice of the province was hfted almost unanimously, as soon as the people had an opportunity of safely venting their real sentiments. Having -specified some of the evils of Roman dominion, we have now to look for the countervailing advantages, such as they were. When the conquered nations were poor and rude, those ad- vantages were great, though even then apparently insufficient to outweigh the degrading effects of their subjection. They here comprised the introduction of better laws, more polished manners, greater mental culture, and altogether of a more advanced civilisation ; the esta- blishment of peace and order, at least to some degree ; the increase of riches ; the erection of noble works for public utility and magnificence. But few of these benefits could be needed by Greece, or by those countries which had GREECE. felt the influence of Grecian civilisation. In intellectual culture, in usefid arts and elegant accompHshments, the Greeks were not the scholars but the masters of the Romans. In politics and jurisprudence they may have been, to a certain degree, inferior to them, but assuredly not so far as to need that their errors should be set ri^ht by the arbitrary interference of a foreign gover- nor. With respect to the magnificence displayed in pubhc works, there is no doubt that many Grecian cities were largely benefited in this manner by the favour of the emperors ; but the sums thus spent in adorning particular places bore but a small proportion to those which were drawn from all the cities of the provinces; and when we consider the taste, the love of splendour, and the public spirit of the Grecian race in general, there can be little doubt, that if the people had been left to unfold and employ their own resources without constraint, the aggregate of beauty and convenience produced would have been far greater than that which resulted from the partial bounty of the distant sovereign. It appears that the benefits of Roman rule over Grecian cities are chiefly to be looked for in protection against foreign war and civil broils. There were draw- backs, however, even to this advan- tage. For the fierce debates in the popular assemblies, and bloody strug- gles which sometimes ensued, there was often substituted a war of slander and underhand intrigue. Power and riches were to be gained by the favour of the proconsul : that favour was to be courted by flattery and corrupt subserviency, and to be maintained m its exclusive- ness by defamation of rivals ; and thus calumny.falsehood, and all baseness, suc- ceeded, if not to virtues, at least to vices of a manlier cast, and less irretrievably degrading. The acute and versatile genius of the nation enabled them, as they had led the way in all more gene- rous arts, to be also preeminent in de- vising the most ingenious methods of self- debasement. At once depraved and impoverished by the manner of their government, they threw out swarms of adN^nlurers to seek their fortunes as buffoons, as parasites, as ready tools in every mean and contemptible service. For this they are severely lashed by the Roman satirists : though reaUy, in the time of Juvenal, the Romans appear to liave been but little less servile, however 867 their inferiority in suppleness and quick- ness of perception may have made their adulation less successful Even in respect of outward tranquil- lity, the sway of Rome was not produc- tive of unmixed advantage to the Gre- cian cities. They were, after the defeat of Mithridates, effectuaUy secured against attack from any foreign enemy of overwhelming power ; but they .seem to have been more exposed to the in- roads of robbers and pirates than while they trusted for their defence to their own energy and warlike spirit. Tlie protecting force was then on the spot, and prompt and vigorous action was en- sured by personal interest and danger. But the troops of the Roman governor might be distant, or might be employed against enemies from whom he expected more of profit and of glory ; and before they could be brought to the spot, the plunderers might be safe in their inac- cessible fastnesses. If the governor tailed in his duty, the cities were too much reduced in strength and spirit to be aLle to supply his deficiency. Ac- cordingly, the trade of robbery seems to have prospered to a vast extent imder the Roman government. In the rich and populous Sicily, where Syracuse and Acragas had defied attack from any force infenor to that of the mighty Car- thage, it was one of the charges ^inst Verres, that piratical fleets had infested the seas unopposed, and that the fleet of the propraetor had not ventured to face them. For the state of Asia, we may again refer to the praises bestowed by Cicero upon his brother. ** You restored many cities ruined and almost abandoned, among which were the no- blest respectively of Ionia and Caria, namely, Samos and HaJicamassus : you quelled the robberies in Mysia, put a stop to murder in many places, esta- blished peace throughout the province ; and not only did you repress the rob- beries in the fields and highways, but also the greater and more nu- merous depredations in the towns and temples." The evils here described were occa- sionally lightened by the prudence and humanity of a particular governor ; nor is it to be supposed, even under the worst administration, that human life was one unmingled tissue of wretched- ness and guilt. There is eating and drmking, and marrying, and giving in marriage, in the worst times as in the best; and there are ceitjun pleasui«s. S68 GREECi^. II ■fi *:•■ pains* afFections, and sensibilities, so closely inwoven in man's nature, that they never can be utterly severed from it. The strongest features are those which give then* character to the pic- ture As in the brightest ages of a commonwealth there is much of hidden seliishness and dishonesty, both public and private, which escapes the eye of the historian ; so in periods apparently teeming with nothing but tyranny, de- ceit, and shameless licentiousness, there may be many instances of humble inte- grity and contented industry in nooks and corners, far below the surface of society, condemned to obscurity by the very position which shelters them from the tide- way of national corruption. So far however as the characters of men are determined by the government under which they live, we need not doubt that the Roman conquest was most perni- cious to that of the Greeks ; nor that, even though we exclude the positive oppression and spoliation they so often suffered, the stagnation of energy result- ing from their servitude was more de- structive both to virtue and to happiness than all the storms of their turbulent independence. That this was so in Greece is proved by its progressive depopulation. The rate of increase is not a measure of national prosperity. In every fully- peopled country it must necessarily be slow, and it b most desirable that it shoidd be kept in check by habits of forethought. But in a happy and flou- rishing community, the multiplication of the people, however gradual, must go forward. A continued decline of the numbers of men is a proof of more rapid diminution in the means of their subsist- ence, and an index of long and painful struggles with want and wretchedness. Between the Persian wars and the death of Alexander, Mr. Clinton has inferred, from very careful investigation, that the average population of Greece was little less than that of Britain in 1821. Under the Roman dominion its state was very different. " Returning from Asia," says Servius Sulpicius, in his well-known letter of consolation to Cicero, upon the loss of his daughter, ** as I sailed from iEgina towards Me- gaia, I began to look out upon the regions round al)out. Behind me was vEgina, before me Megara ; Peuraeeus on the right hand, Corinth on the left ; all which towns, once so flourishing, now lay prostrate and ruined before my eyes." The towns of Laconia hi its flourishing state were nearly a hundred ; in the time of Augustus, Strabo tells us, they were thirty. The condition of Arcadia was not more flourishing. ** Mantineia, and Orchomenus, and He- rsea, and Cleitor, and Pheneus, and Stymphalus, and Maenalus, and Me- thydnum, and Caphyae, and Cynaetha, either are no more, or exist but in ruins and faint traces." At the same time Thebes was a miserable village, and the other towns of Boeotia were little more, excepting Tanagra and Thespia?. In short, the effects of the Roman conquest upon the condition of the Greeks tallied exactly with those of a similar change upon the Italian cities of the middle ages ; and they cannot be better described than in the eloquent language applied to the latter by an illustrious countryman of ours, Algernon Sidney. "Whilst Italy was inhabited by nations governing themselves by their own wiU, they fell sometimes into domestic seditions, and had frequent wars with their neighbours. AVhen they were free they loved their country, and were always ready to fight in its de- fence. Such as succeeded well, in- creased in vigour and power ; and even those that were the most unfortunate in one age, found means to repair their greatest losses if their government con- tinueJ. Whilst they had a propriety in their goods, they would not suffer their country to be invaded, since they could have none if it were lost. This gave occasion to wars and tumults ; but it sharpened their courage, kept up a good discipline, and the nations that were most exercised by them, always in- creased in power and number. They sometimes killed one another, but their enemies never got any thing but burying places within their territories. All things are now brought into a very different method by the blessed govern- ments they are under. The fatherly care of the king of Spain, the pope, and other princes, has established peace among them. The thin half-starved inhabitants of walls supported by ivy, fear neither popular tumults, nor foreign alarms ; and their sleep is only interrupted by hunger, the cries of their children, or the howling of wolves. Instead of many turbulent, contentious cities, they have a few scattered, silent cottages ; and the flerc-eness of those nations is sc tempered, that every rascally collector of taxes extorts, without fear, from GREECE. every roan that which should be the nourishment of his family. The gover- nors, instead of wearying their subjects in wars, only seek, by perverted laws, corrupt judges, false witnesses, and vexa- tious suits, to cheat them of their money and inheritance. This is the best part of their condition. Where these arts are used, there are men, and they have something to bse: but for the most part the lands lie waste, and they who were formerly troubled with the disorders incident to populous cities, now enjoy the quiet and peaceable estate of a wilderness. " Again, there is a way of killing worse than that of the sword ; for, as TertuUian says, upon a different occa- sion, prohiberc nasci est occidere (to hin- der birth is to kill). Those governments are in the highest degree guilty of blood, which, by taking from men the means of living, bring some to perish through want, drive others out of the country, and generally dissuade men from mar- riage, by taking from them all ways of subsisting their families. Notwithstand- ing all the seditions of Florence, the horrid factions of Guelphs and Ghibel- hns, Ncri and Bianchi, nobles and commons, they continued populous, strong, and exceeding rich ; but in the space of less than a hundred and fifty years, the peaceable reign of the Medices IS thought to have destroyed nine parts in ten of the people of that province. Machiavel reports, that in that time Florence alone, with the Val d'Arno, a small territory belonging to that city, could, in a few hours, by the sound of a bell, bring together a hundred and thirty-five thousand well armed men; whereas now that city, with all the others in that province, are brought to such despicable weakness, emptiness, poverty, and baseness, that they can neither resist the oppressions of their prince, nor defend him or themselves if they are assaulted by a foreign enemy. This is not the effect of war or pestilence : they enjoy a perfect peace, atid suffer no other plague than the government they are under. But he who has thus cured them of disorders and tumults, does, in my opinion, de- serve no greater praise than a physician, who should boast there was not a sick person in a house committed to his care, when he had poisoned all that were in it." — Discourses concemins Government, chap. II. sect. 26. Yet great as were the mischiefs springing from the triumphant ambition 269 of Rome, and unmixed as our reproba- tion ought to be of her unprincipled cru- elty, her .selfish and faithless policy, it does not therefore foUow that her con- quests were without an object in the moral government of the world. Our views of consequences are short and dim ; and when we see a mighty scheme of action carried through at a vast expense of blood and suffering, it is but reasonable to conclude, that some great end of a beneficent Providence may have been answered by it, or may be yet in pi ogress, though we are unable to know that end, and to trace the steps which lead to its fulfilment. The evils just described are natural results of a successful attempt at universal conquest — results which might have been, at least imperfectly, foreseen, and which now, with past ex- perience to aid us, may be confidently foretold as certain to recur, if ever tt-e like attempt shall be successfully rene /ved. These therefore are the consequences upon which we are to reason in deducing lessons of human conduct, and assigning to each actor in the story his proper meed of praise or blame ; about this there can be no doubt, and our judgment should be pronounced unhesitatingly and without any attempt to search into the collateral purposes of infinite wis- dom, which may have been unwittingly carried forward by the oppressor, and opposed by the defender of his country. Nevertheless, in viewing the history of periods when the spirit of evil was ap- parently predominant, it is gratifying to see and comprehend, instead of darkly guessing, that these things were not suf- fered in vain, under a system which can bring good out of evil, and make the greatest crimes of nations subservient to righteous ends. We cannot doubt that the successive conquests of Macedonia and Rome were the appointed, as they were the most effectual instruments, of preparing for the spread of the Christian revelation. A common language was fur- nished by the one, a common government established by the other; and, by the joint working of both, an easy and unre- stricted communication was ensured through the whole of the then civilized world. In one man's life the gospel was preached from Syria to Spain ; though it seems to have been in Grecian Asia that churches arose most rapidly and in the greatest number. Thus the very revolu- tion which poisoned the springs of hap- piness and virtue, so far as either depended on national institutions, local attachments, and ancient habits of S70 GREECE. thinking and acting, was made the means of introducing a new morality, both lof- tier in principle, purer in practice, and more powerfully operative up.3n the ■ctual dispositions of men. S«CT. II.— Though Athens had lost all pohtical importance, it was not the less, under the empire of Rome, the intellectual capital of the civilized world, the centre of art, philosophy, and litera- ture. Whatever excellence was attained in these departments by the Romans, may be traced, withfew exceptions, to the influ- ence of Grecian models. The Roman written drama was a copy of the Attic. The comic writers of the school of Aris- tophanes could not indeed be presented to a foreign audience, since their constant personal and political allusions, their al- legories, their mythology, their burlesque extravagance of incident, were insepa- rably connected with the government and religion of ancient Athens. Their place was partly filled by the satirists, perhaps as a class the most successful, as they are certainly the most original of Roman writers. But the later comedy, which painted domestic incidents and ordinary characters, was freely imitated bjr Plautus, and more closely by Terence. Even the scene was generally laid in Athens, and the persons, manners, and dresses were Athenian. The Attic tra- gedies were rendered into Latin by Na;- vius, Attius, Pacuvius, and others ; b-jt less happily, if we are to judge from the scanty fragments that have been pre- served to us. We find the traces of Homer and of Theocritus in every page of Vir- gil's ^neid and Bucolics; and in the Georgics, the most original as well as the most perfect of his compositions, the poet evidently had Hesiod in his eve, though here he has by far surpassed his master. Even the Roman metres, epic, lyric, dramatic, or whatever other, are all derived from Greece ; though there is reason to think that the metrical sys- tem of the more ancient times, as it ap- peared in inscriptions and legendary ballads, was of a kind entirely different. We will now consider the effect pro- duced by intercourse with Greece on Roman eloquence and philosophy. The first may be quickly dismissed. In a state which is governed by deliberative assemblies, oratory will always flourish, and Its style will be generally less deter- mmed by any foreign models which the speaker may have studied, than by the temper, tastes, and habits of the people ^large, or of the educated classes. From the Attic models, admirable as they are. the Roman orators probably gained less in persuasive effect than in grace and finish. But in philosophy the case is very different. The genius of the Ro- mans was by far more turned to war and politics than to abstract specula- tion. Before they had dealings with Greece they were utter strangers to phi- losophy, and when it was introduced there were many zealots for old times, who foretold much evil that would arise from it. Even in after years the height of their ambition was to comprehend, enforce, and explain the doctrine of some favourite Grecian teacher, and this in the Greek language more fre- quently than in their own. An opinion became current that the Latin tongue was unfit for scientific discussions ; though Cicero, in combating this pre- judice, went so far as to affirm that it was yet fitter for them than the Greek. Even he, for the most part, did not at- tempt to break new ground, or to enlarge the boundaries of science by his own inquiries ; but only to enrich his native speech with the doctrines and arguments of Grecian sages. Yet within these limits the study of philosophy came to be con- sidered as a highly b«'oming, if not as a necessary part of a liberal education: and the Roman nobility were wont to send their sons to Athens, as to an uni- versity, to pass a year or two in hearing the most famous masters. Athens, though the most celebrated seat of Grecian philosophy, was not its birth-place. A richer soil, a kind- lier climate, a greater freedom from formidable ' neighbours, had caused the Grecian cities on the coast of Asia to outstrip the mother country in the career of cultivation. The most ancient philosophers were chiefly from them, or from the Italian colonies, which rivalled them in early prosperity. But the growth of science in Ionia was checked by the calamities attending the Persian conquest, as it was in Italy by the widely spreading ruin which fell on the Grecian settlements, from the war in which Sybaris was destroyed by Croton, and the bloody revolutions that followed. Meanwhile in Athens we have seen what a burst of mental activity was pro- duced by the stirring events and glo- rious issue of the Persian wars, and by the rapid growth of the common- wealth in power and glory. Foreign talent also became plentiful there. Tiie imperial city was the natural resort of those among its subjects, who aspired to display ♦heir powers on a larger GREECE. stage than their own towns could fur- nish. Skilful artists of every kind were drawn together by the public and pri- vate wealth of the state, and the lavish expenditure of both on objects of popu- lar gratification. Rhetoricians and sophists flocked -s ^y Spelman. Diodorus the Sicilian. Arrian. Translated by Rooke. ?:,rr t™:„.X'CC "■• *'""" "" "'" ^^ '-"''"'™- Livy. Translated by Baker. Justin. Translated by Brown. II. Modem AutAors, who give the whale penod here treated «/• Ancient Universal History, vols. 6, 7, 8, and 9. 5irW. Raleigh's History of the World. Goldsmith's History of Greece. J* V^n m;-!!^'*!?^*""* ?r" '" *^« Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. RoH.nl Ani'^.u"''"'''*^ ^.T"^^ •" '^""^^ ^"'"'"«^- Translated from the German RoU.n s Ancient History. Written in French and translated. III. Modem Authors, who g^ve portions of the period here treated of. S'/.f*!l' "u-**""^ of Greece, (to the death of Alexander.) S u* ^"^'^'J^^^'"**"' (**» *^*^ ^^^^^^ «f Alexander.) ^^Gast s History of Greece, (from the accession of Alexander to it. subjugation by ihe Ro- mth respect to the Habits atd Customs of the Greeks. Robinson's Greek Antiquities. Newton's Chronology. Dod well's. iW the Chronology. Fr^rct. Blair. /n /^ Geograpkm D'Anville's Ancient Maps. ?r^ml')l'r ^""''"V^l'^^'^P'^y- .^""^" '" f''-^"^*' '^n*! t^nslated into English Sllnr R ^-^^f,"' ^^"^^ ?.°"'^";' incidentally much historical informJiL ^ Major Rennell's Geography of Herodotus. '"rniai.on. r^^^'l^:^^.''"'"^""-'' "" *»^»f hi, UanslaUon of Herodo.u, into French. There is much information besides, both historical and m;co«ii«„«^ . i . . the general body of the classic autho^. The mo valurbleTlS^ r^^^^^ be gathered from Aristophanes, Pausanias, Strabo and Athenl.T ThJl this respect are. Homer, Pindar, of Homer and Pindar, and L W l.e playt of Aristooh^l, "'t'."""" .^"^''^t *^^"^'^^'°"« latioD of Pausanias, by Taylor. ^ ^ Anstophanes. There is also an English trans. INDEX. Abydoi, 203. Academy, old, 152, 271. New, 273 Acarnania 60 64 183, 190, 193,215, 239. Achaia, 10, J 8, 110. Achaian League, 170. See heads of chapters and sections. Acharniaus, 58. Achilles, 9. Acilius Glabrio, Man. 229—232. Acropolis, 2. Acrocorinthus, 171, 177, 222 iEgina, 30, 31, 47, 58, 236. iEgospotami, battle of, 84. iEmilius Paullus, L. 251, 252—256 iEolis, 19. iEschines, 134, 139, 151. iEtolia and iEtolians, 64, 154, 179. See heads of chapters and sections. Agamemnon, 3, 8, 10. Agathocles, 167 — 170. Agesilaus, king of Lacedaemon, 93—95 98 100-102,107,114,116. ' ' Agesipolis, king of Lacedaemon, 99, 100. Agis, king of Lacedaemon, son of Archidamus, Agis, king of Lacedaemon, son of another Archidamus, 147 Agis, king of UcedaBmoii, son of Eudamidas, 173 — 175. Alcibiades, 71—75, 77—82, 84, 86. AIcidas,61, 63. ' Alcmaeon, 19. Alcmaeonidce, 19,24—26 Alexamenes, 217, 225. Alexander, king of Macedonia, son of Per- diccas, 39, 41. Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, 109, 113, 126 Alexander, king of Macedonia, son of Philip, Alexandria, 146,252,277. Ammon, land of, 146. Amphictyons, 127, 133, 136. Amphipolis, 69, 125. Amphissa, 136. Andocides, 74. Antalcidas, 97. Antigen us, 153, 155, 159—163. Antigonus Gonatas, 167, 171. Antigonus the regent, 177—179 Antiochus the Great, 202, 218, 224, 226— *<30, 233. Antiochus Epiphanes, 250, 252. Antipater, 145, 153—156. Antisthenes, 152. Antiphon, 78. Another, 137. Apelles, 188—193 ApoUonidas, 236, 249. ApoUoniui^ 278 f ^^"?' V», 177, 181, 189, 194, 196-198. Arcadia, 17, 107— 115. Arcesilas, 273. Archelaus, king of Macedonia, 125. Archelaus, Mithridates's general, 263. Archidamus, king of Lacedfcmon, son of Zeii- nidamus, 55, 57, 60. Archi^damus, son of Agesilaus, 106, 110, Archimedes, 278. Archon the Achaian, 243, 249. Archons, perpetual, decennial, and annual, Areiopagus, 21, 49, 137. Arginusae, battle of, 83. Argonauts, 8. Aristaenus, 209, 5l9, 236. Aristagoras, 28 Arisleides, 37, 40, 46. Aristeus, 54, 59. Aristion, tyrant of Athens Aristippu8, 274. Aristocratical party at Athens, 123. Aristodemus, 16. Aristomenes, 16 — 18. Aristophanes, 70. Aristotle, 152. Artaphernes, 25, 26, 28, 30. Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, 45 Artaxerxes Mnemon, 92, 97. Artaxerxes Ochus, 143. Artemisium, battle of, 36. Astronomy, 279. Athens. See heads of chapters and sectiont, Athenians, their character, 45. Atreus, 3. ^^olo'^' ^^"^ °^ Pergamus, 199, 200, 202, Babylon, 150. Bastarnae, 241. Boeotians, 41, 48, 51, 68, 71, 93,212, 227. ^45. Brachvllas, 216. Brasiclas, 68—70. Byzantium, 42, 97, 124, 127, 135, 18S. Cadmeia, 100. Cadmeians and Cadmus, 3 Callias and Taurosthenes, }3b. Callicrates, 242, 252, 255—257. CaUicratidas, 82, 83. Callistratus, 104. Cambyses, 27. Cameades, 273. ' 286 INDEX. ^m*^' ^^' "^' '^*^' 167-169, 195, Cassander, 156—163. Cecrops, 2. Ceres, 4. Chabrias, 102, 104, 127. Cbalcis, 25, 204, 227. Chalcidians of Thrace, 54. Chares, 126, 135, 139. Charops, 248, 250. Chersonese, Thracian, 31, 135. Chilon, 188. Chios, 29, 77, 124, 137. Cimon, 46, 49, 50. Cinadon, 93. Cios, 202. Cleisthenes, 24—26. Cleitus, 148. Cleombrotus, king of Lacedaemon, 101, 105 Cleombrolus II., king of Lacedaemon, 175 Cleomenes, king of Lacedajmon 24—26 30. Cleomenes king of Ucedaemon, son of Leo- nidas, 175—179, 184 Cleon, 62, 66, 70 Cleophon, 85. Codrus, 18. Comedy, 49, 270. Conon, 82, 84, 95, 96, 97. Corcyra, 9, 52—54, 63, ^7, 103. Corinth, 12,47, .52—54, 71, 84—96, 98 108,112,171,177,260. ' ' Coroneia, battle of, 48, second battle, 95. Craterus, 144, 145 Crete, 3, 4, 185. Critias, 86— «8. Critolaus, 259. Croesus, king of Lydia, 26. Ctesiphon, 151. Cycliadas, 206, 209, 214. Cylon, 19. Cynaetha, 183. Cynics, 152. Cynoscephalae, battle of, 213. Cyprus, 29, 50, 95. Cyrus, 27. Cyrus the younger, 83,92. Danaus, 3. Dardanians, 187, 216, 241. Darius, son of Hystaspes, 27, 33. Darius Codomannus, 143 147. Deceleia, 76. Delium, battle of, 68. Delphi, 8, 36, 166. Demaratus, king of Ucedaemon, 30. Demetrias,224, 225, 231. Demetrius Poliorcetes, 160—164. Demetrius, his grandson, 176. Demetrius the Phalerean, 160. Demetrius, son of Philip, 240. Demetrius of Pharos, 197. Democritus, 90. Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, 64—67, ^15^55*' *^* **"***"' ^^^^ '*^» ^^^' I>trcyUid«a, 92. Diaeus, 256. Dion, 119. Dionysius, 117, 118 Dionysius the younger, 118, 119 Diopeithes, 135. Diophanes, 231,235,236,252. Dodona, 8,187. Dorians, 2, 10—12. Doriraachus, 180—182, 186,187. Dracon, 20. 5«yP*»6,33, 50, 146, 252. Elateia, 138. Eleians, 11, 113, 187. Epaminondas, 102, 105, 108—110, 114 115. Eparites, 113. Ephesus, 19,28. Ephialtes, 49. Ephori, 13. Epicurus, 274 — 276. Epidamnus, 52. Epidaurus, 72. Epimenides, 20. ^S"* ^^' ^®^' ^^^' 'i'^^,'1^% 253, 255, Eratosthenes. Eretria, 28, 31. Euagoras, 95. Euboea, 31, 36, 51,124. Euclid, 277. Eumenes, 1.53, 155, 159. Eumenes, king of Pergamus, 233. 236, 244. Euphron ofSicycn, 111. Eurydice, queen of Macedonia, 155, 158. Eurymedon, battle of the, 46. Eurymedon, Athenian, 64, 65, ^7. Flamininus, T. Quinctius, 208—222,224 Gaugamela, battle of, 146. Gauls, 165—167. Gfelon, 35, 45. Gylippus, 75, 7^, Hannibal, 195, 226, 228. Harmodius and Aristogeiton, 24. Harpalus, 151. Helots, 14, 16, 40, 46, 68. Heracleida;, 10. Heracleides of Syracuse, 1 19. Hermocratesof Syracuse, 67, 75, 117. Herodotus, 3. Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus, 23 Hipparchiis the astronomer, 279. Hippias, son of Peisistratus, 23—26, 31. Histiaeus of Miletus, 28. Homer, 7, 9. Inaros, 50. Ionia, 19,27—30. India, 149. Iphicrates, 97, 103, 109. Isagoras, 24. Ismenias, 100. Ithome, 16,40,129, 197. Jason the Argonaut, 8. Jason of Pherae, 106, 107. Kersobleptes, 129, 133. Uced«mon, or Sparta. See heads of chapter* and sections. ' Laevinus, M. Valerius, 198. Lamachus, 73, 74. Lamian war, 154. Leonidas, king of Lacedaemon, 73, 74 I^ontius, 190 — 193. Lesbos, 61. Leuctra, battle of, 105. Long walls, 47. Lyciscus, 248, 252. Lycomedes of Mantineia, 109—1 12 Lycortas, 235, 236—239, 249, 252* Lycurgus, 13— 15. ' '?9T/92''rr' '"^^'""^'^' ^^^^ '««* Lysander, 82—86, 94. Lysimachus, 153, 160, 163. * INDEX. Nicostratus, 63. Olympia, battle of, 113. Olympian festival, 11. Olympias, 156, 157, 158. 01ynlhus,99, 100, 126, 131. Onomarchus, 129. Oracles, 7. Orchomenus in Boeotia, 51, 94, 112. Orestes, 10. ' ' Orpheus, 7 Ostracism, 37. S87 Macedonia, 124. See the two Philips. Perseus, and iEmilius Paullus Magn^^':,^l2^^^^^^ Ucedaemon, 200, 201. Manners of the early Greeks, 2, 4, 9 Mant,neia,71,98,107, 113- 15. Marathon, 31, 32. Mardonius, 30, 38 41. Maroneia, 239. Megabpolis, 108, 130, 158, 176«178. 194. Megara, 18, 47, 68. Melos, 73. Memnon, 143, 144. Menalcidas, 256—258 Mentor, 143. Mercuries, mutilation of, 74. Messene in Sicily, 18. *'!f-!!"« *" Peloponnesus, 109. 180 197 205,231,233. ' ' ^^' Messenia, 16—18, 47. Messenians of Naupactus, 47, 60. 64 Metellus, Q. Caecilius, 236 2581-260 Methone in Macedonia, 129. Miletus, 19, 28, 52, 77. Miltiades, 31—33. Minos, 3, 4, 5. Mithridates, king of Pontus, 263, Mitylene, 61. Mnasippus, 103. Monarchy in early Greece, 12. Mummius, L. 260. Mycale, battle of, 42. Mycenae, 3. Myronides, 47, 48. Mysteries, 4, 6, 7 '^21siJ225"' ^"^ Ucedaemon, 205, 212, Naupactus, 47. 60, 64, 231, 232. Naxos, 28, 31 40. Nicias, 66, 67, #3—77. Parmenion, 144, 148 ^'4^4^43,71!'''*"'' '" "^''^**^^'^^ ^'•^^'^i Pausanias, ki!ig of Lacedaemon, 89. Peiraeeus, 47, 60, 88. Peisander, 78—80. Peisistratus, 22. Pelasgians, 1, 6. Pelopidas, 102, 110, 113. Pelops, 3. Perdjccas, king of Macedonia, 34, 58, 61, ^^Is-lSsT"' ""^ '^^ Macedonian etnpire, Pericles, 49—52, 55—59. PerioBci,40, 173. Peripatetics, 152, 271. Perseus, son of Philip, 240—252 Persians, 27-42, 50, 81, 143—148. Phalaecus, 130, 132. Phalanx, 15. Pharnabazus, 81,95,96. Phi ip, son of Amyntas, 125, 129—140 Philip, son of Demetrius, 182—216 290 234, 239— 24L -^'o, iS^», Philomelug, 128. Phijopoemen, 200, 223. 224, 236, 238 Philosophy, 90 152, 270, to the ind. Phlius, 100, 111. Phoccea, 27. Phocion, 130, 136, 156, 157. p^K?i^V^»^^' 128-133, 166. Phoebidas, 99. Phoenicia, 143, 145. Phormion, 60. Piracy, 4, 8. PiagueofAthens, 59, 64. PlataBa,41,56, 60,62, 104. Plato, 91, 153, 277. Pleistoanax, king of Ucedamon, 51. Polybius, 249, 250, 254, 261. Polydamas, 156. Polysperchon, 156—158. Popillius, Cn. 249,252. Potidaea, 54, 59. Protagoras, 90. Prytanes, 21. Ptolemy, son of Ugus, 153, 155, 160— T64 ii77 » Ptolemy Ceraunus, 164. Ptolemy Philometer and Phys-on, 252. Ptolemy the astronomer, 279. Pylos, 65—67. Pyrrhu.s, 164 172. ««« INDEX. Fytha^ras, 7, 90, 277. Pythian festival, 1 1. Religion of the Greeks, 6—8. Rhodes, 124, 126, 161—163, 202, 233, 245, 250, 253, 264. Romans, 1*J5. See heads of chapters and sections. Salamis, 20, 37. Samos and Samians, 29, 42, 52, 77—81. Sardis, 25, 27, 28. Scione, 69,71. Scipios, P. and L. 232. Scopas, 180—182, 187, 208. Scythia, 27. Seleucus, 159 — 164. Sellasia, battle of, 179. Sicily, 35, 45, 65, 67, 73—77, 117—120, 167—170. Sicyon,2,lll, 171. Sidon, 143, 145. SiUlces, 58, 61. Skerdilaidas, 182, 195. Socrates, 71, 84, 88, 90—92, 271. Solon, 20 — ^22. SparUns, 93, 173. Sphodrias, 102. Stasippus, 108. Stoics, 272. Sylla, L. Cornelius, 263, 264. Synedri, 133. Syracuse. See Sicily. Tactics, Grecian and Roman, 307 Tearless batUe, 110. Tegeans, 40, 107. Thales, 277. Thaaus, 46. Thebes and Thebans, 3, 36, 42, 56, 62, 93. 94,98—115,138—142. Themistocles, 34—38, 43—45.^ Theramcnes, 80, 83, 86—88. Thermopylae, 35, 165,230. Theseus, 5, 6. ThesmothetaB, 19. Thespiae,36, 70, 104. Thessaly, 35, 68, 106, 113, 126, 141, 194, Thirty, 86—89. Thoas, 224, 226, 249. Thrasybulus, 79, 83, 88, 97. Thrasyilus, 79. Thucydides, son of Melesias, 51. Thucydides the historian, 69. Timoleon, 119— 121. Timotheus, 102, 124. Tissaphernes, 77 — 79. Triren^ps, 29. Tragedy, 49. Troy, 8. Tyrant, 23. Tyre, 145. Tyrtaeus, 18. Ulysses, 9. Xenoplion, 92. Xerxes, 34—38. Zaocle, 18. Zenon, Zei»ippas,|||^24|. ; 11 8?^ ^v Lai km His-I-. or AU91 ^r(se.ze. f ( ■y .■■-V^^ p^ ^4, ei- ?>^' I*,. 11-^ ;- r'>./i '■'^ii e^l ^'