THE SLATE TRADE, 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON, 
 
 MR, IIUTT’S COMMITTEE. 
 
 'By THE HON. CAPTAIN DENMAN, K. N. 
 
 [REPRINTED PROM THE “COLONIAL MAGAZINE.”] 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PUBLISHED BY JOHN MORTIMER, 
 15, BEAUFORT BUILDINGS, STRAND. 
 
 Price One Shilling 
 

 3 ) 3-3 
 
THE SLAVE TRADE, 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON, 
 
 MR. HUTT’S COMMITTEE. 
 
 Report of the Lords' Committee on Slave Trade. 1849. 
 
 The Niger Trade Considered in connexion with the African 
 Blockade. By Sir George Stephen. Simpkin and Marshall. 
 Two Reports of the Slave Trade Committee of the House of Com¬ 
 mons. 1848 and 1849. 
 
 Lord Denmans two Letters to Lord Brougham, Hatchard. 
 
 A Few Words on the Encouragement given to Slam Trade and 
 Slavery, §'c. By Stephen Cave, Esq. Murray. 
 
 The Case of our African Cruizers, §~c. By the llev. G. Smith. 
 Hatchard and Son. 
 
 West Indian Interests, African Emigration and Slave Trade. By 
 the Hon. Captain Denman. Bigg and Son. 
 
 The African Squadron. By Capt. Matson, K.N. Fourth edition. 
 Ridgway. 
 
 Free Trade in Negroes. Ollivier. 
 
 The Cruizers; a Letter to the Marquis of Lansdowne, |-c. By 
 James Richardson. 
 
 Letter from Sir George Stephen to Sir E. F. Buxton on 
 the Proposed Revival of the English Slave Trade. Simpkin 
 and Marshall. 
 
 Analysis of Evidence before the Committees on the Slave Trade. 
 “ Patriot” Newspaper. 
 
 According to the promise in our August Number, we have 
 devoted much attention to the question of the suppression of the 
 slave trade, and the squadron on the coast of Africa—an inquiry 
 of great difficulty, not only from the magnitude and importance 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 of the subject, but also from the studious care -which has been 
 taken to keep the facts and arguments urged in their behalf 
 entirely out of the public view. The greater part of the pam¬ 
 phlets at the head of this article are totally unknown to the 
 public in general, and yet, to any candid investigation, their 
 consideration would be absolutely essential. The resolutions of 
 the committee of the House of Lords have been also kept entirely 
 out of sight, while those of the House of Commons have been 
 reported and urged on the public attention, as bearing a cha¬ 
 racter the very reverse of that which truly belongs to them. 
 Who takes the trouble to wade through the "blue-books, or even 
 to notice the numbers bn each side in the divisions on each 
 resolution ? For one who gives himself the pains to reckon 
 even the latter with his own eyes, ten thousand take the leading 
 article of the Times as if it were Gospel truth. Thus it is not 
 the report of Mr. Hutt’s committee which has so powerfully 
 aided Mr. Hutt’s own views, but it is the Times' account of that 
 report; and as regards its true weight and value, as bearing on 
 the question, two things could scarcely be more different, or 
 even opposite. 
 
 For a long period, the Times has devoted itself to the bit¬ 
 terest hostility against the various measures of justice towards 
 the negro, which have done honour to this country. The 
 great and holy principles of right which dictated these measures 
 have "been utterly put out of sight, and we have had, instead, per¬ 
 petual attempts to create envy of the condition of the emanci¬ 
 pated negroes, by comparing it with that of our own working 
 classes, and a constant strain of taunting ridicule at the folly 
 which threw away the profits of slavery and the slave trade. 
 
 Our connexion with the colonies led us to observe, with the 
 deepest interest, the course pursued by the Times on the Sugar 
 Duties Bill of 1846. We have read, over and over again, its 
 laboured statements of the cruel condition of the West Indian 
 colonies, first deprived of slave labour by the ruthless stupidity 
 of the Buxtons, the Clarksons, and the Wilberforces, (which 
 would appear to be the act most hateful to the Times), and then 
 cut off by the more congenial economists from the protection 
 assured to them when their slaves were enfranchised, and with¬ 
 out which, it was as well known then as now, they could not 
 compete with slave-trading and slave growing countries. This 
 dilemma has been repeated month after month, and year after 
 year, in the columns of the Times ; but we have looked in vain, 
 amidst all its assurances of pity, for one single practical sug¬ 
 gestion for the benefit of the sufferers. 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 For a short time, indeed, the Times encouraged the delusion 
 that unlimited African Emigration was the remedy ; but this 
 nostrum, already proved by Lord Sandon’s committee of 1842 
 to be out of the question, received its coup-de-grace from Lord 
 George Bentinck’s committee in its report in 1848. That com¬ 
 mittee’s opinion, that a 10s. protection could alone save the West 
 Indies, received no support from the Times, which still continued 
 harping on West Indian depression and African slave trade, in 
 a succession of articles as unworthy of the “leading journal of 
 Europe” in talent as in morality, and placing the British people, 
 whose sentiments it professes to speak, in a most unenviable 
 light before the civilised world. 
 
 At length, deprived, as the Times has so often told us, first of 
 slavery, and then of protection, the colonies became awakened 
 to the truth, viz., that their continued cultivation depends on 
 the suppression of the slave trade. Put down the slave trade, 
 they say, and we may yet prosper. Slavery we can compete 
 with, but not with slavery perpetually recruited by fresh im¬ 
 portations, where the slaves are forced, by the most appalling 
 cruelties, to yield the largest possible amount of labour in the 
 shortest possible time, and are maintained on the principle that 
 it is “ cheaper to import than to breed,” This crime, say the 
 colonists, has been*denounced by the civilised world in congress 
 —it is condemned by the laws of every state. Two states alone 
 still give it a surreptitious sanction, though it is condemned even 
 by their own municipal codes, and though they are both pledged 
 to England, by the most solemn engagements, to put the traffic 
 down. These are the rivals whose competition is destroying 
 the colonies, and it is the stimulus of slave trade alone that gives 
 them such an overwhelming advantage. Accordingly, public 
 meetings assembled in the West Indies, unequalled in the num¬ 
 ber and respectability of the attendance, in the moderation 
 and propriety of their language, in their singleness and honesty 
 of purpose, and, we may safely add, in the reason and justice of 
 their demand. The slaves had been enfranchised, the pledge of 
 continued protection broken, but the pledge to suppress the 
 slave trade remained, measures for the purpose were in operation, 
 though with imperfect success. The perishing colonies stretch 
 forth their hands, and implore the mother country to act with 
 increased vigour. The slave trade, they say, will complete out¬ 
 ran ; every slave voyage is a breach of treaty; this monstrous 
 pursuit at an end, and we can yet raise our heads and prosper; 
 leave it to itself, and we are lost. We implore you, then, as a 
 duty of justice and mercy towards us—whose wrongs you 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 acknowledge—to enforce your compacts, and to suppress this 
 horrid traffic. 
 
 We waited with anxiety for the notice the Times would give 
 to this touching and powerful appeal. We find the following 
 
 “Concurrently with the exercise of these tactics, another 
 scheme of agitation was recently introduced. It was resolved, 
 at large public meetings, to demand of Great Britain the per¬ 
 formance of her compacts relative to the slave trade. It is un¬ 
 necessary to state that the real purport of these resolutions was 
 not enunciated in their expressed terms. The spirit in which 
 they were carried was less that of philanthropy than faction ; 
 but it would be vain to deny that they were plausibly couched, 
 and not unsoundly based. Our obligation to suppress slavery 
 with the strong hand was the complement of our abrupt dealings 
 with our colonies. Could we really have fulfilled it, the West 
 Indians would have been placed once more on a fair footing 
 with their commercial rivals. . . None know better than the 
 
 inhabitants of Jamaica that this failure was inevitable, and that 
 the most desperate efforts have not been wanting on our part to 
 ol der matters otherwise; but they choose to forget this fact, and 
 to avail themselves of the letter of the compact to embarrass 
 or convict. Nor are they without warrant for such proceeding. 
 They can, undoubtedly, demand at our hands the fulfilment of 
 terms, to enforce which would cost us in one year all that 
 slave-grown sugar could save us in ten.”— Times, Aug. 10. 
 
 Yes, this is the reply of the sympathising Times, after all its 
 friendly assurances : having pronounced ex cathedra against the 
 squadron, on grounds so unsatisfactory that the meanest shifts 
 must be resorted to to support the dictum, it now declares this 
 touching and powerful appeal to be mere faction ! 
 
 Small is the gratitude due to the “leading journal” on the 
 part of the unhappy colonists. In their name, we ask, what are 
 the remedies it would apply to the cruelty and injustice it has 
 so perpetually denounced to the country ? What is the nostrum 
 it has so long shrunk from prescribing? It has refused to sup¬ 
 port renewed protection. The suppression of the slave trade is 
 a request so absurd that nothing but faction could urge it. Is 
 it, then, restored slave trade ? or is there some other resource ? 
 or, while we confess and deplore our injustice, are we to refuse 
 all redress? It is due to the colonies—to the public at large— 
 to its own high pretensions, that after years of mysterious tliun- 
 derings, the Oracle should speak forth ; or shall we still be left in 
 silence and Cimmerian gloom, until the difficulty is past, and 
 

 CAN' SQUADRON'. 
 
 tlic ruin of the colonies a fait accompli ? In common with thou¬ 
 sands of expectants, we await the answer, which can scarcely be 
 longer postponed. There may he some difficulty, however, in 
 finding terms which will not shock what the Times probably 
 considers the yet remaining delusion of that infatuated stupidity 
 which shut out Englishmen from the gains of slavery and slave 
 trading. 
 
 While the Times has thus left its real objects hitherto unde¬ 
 clared, the Daily News has at length stood forward the avowed 
 advocate of slave trade, to be prosecuted as a duty to God and 
 man, by England and the world at large! Yes, England has 
 hitherto “ laboured against the providential course of events.” 
 She is then of course, to repair the wrong by a proportionate 
 activity in slavc.trading. 
 
 In the Daily News of September 10, we are first told that, 
 “ it must be admitted to have been amongst the designs of Pro¬ 
 vidence, that a large proportion of the labouring classes of the 
 new world, and at least those destined to cultivate its equatorial 
 regions, should be supplied from the African continent. There 
 alone is to be found a race capable of braving the sun of such 
 regions, and of undergoing the labours of agricultural industry 
 beneath it. We have heard and seen irresistible tides of emigra¬ 
 tion, but never was tide more irresistible than that which bears 
 the negro from a land where labour is valueless to a land where 
 it is of all value.” Then we are informed that £i we have been 
 labouring during the last half century both against the natural 
 and the providential course of events, in striving to stop alto¬ 
 gether the negro emigration to America.” If we had not inter¬ 
 fered, it seems that “ we should be spared the odium and the 
 expense of struggling against nature, as well as against our best 
 political friends and commercial connexions, in obedience to a 
 most noble, indeed, but a most mistaken, policy of humanity.” 
 And our present difficulties and future prospects are disposed of 
 thus:—“The ruined planters of our West Indian possessions 
 taunt us with our fickleness and their ruin. We, no doubt, have 
 wherewithal to answer these reproaches; but it is a dire and a 
 bootless recrimination. Besides, to open the trade in labour to 
 Brazil and Cuba, and limit it to Jamaica and Dcmcrara, is add¬ 
 ing the wrong of present injustice to that of past ignorance. We 
 hear of schemes for licensing the trade to Rio and to the Havana. 
 But this forms but half the difficulty, but a portion of the ques¬ 
 tion. We have the labour question in our own colonies to settle 
 at the same time that we negotiate its arrangements with Spain 
 and with Brazil. Wc have been guilty, in the name of humanity, 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 of very great ignorance and very gross injustice. If we resolve 
 to make amends, let it be done on all hands evenly, honestly, 
 and sincerely.” 
 
 We thank the Daily News for thus bringing the matter to a 
 point. We see now fairly brought to light what has been the 
 object in view, after all, of those who have set this movement 
 going. Hundreds of thousands of excellent persons have been 
 deceived, and led to believe the squadron has done pure harm. 
 They conscientiously demand its withdrawal, because they have 
 been persuaded it aggravates suffering, and has no other effect 
 on the slave trade. The public and a large portion of the press 
 have in short been fooled to the top of their bent, by a small, 
 but compact body, whose object from the first has been a restora¬ 
 tion of an unlimited slave trade, and at last- the cloven foot 
 appears. 
 
 If we reflect on the subject, we shall see that there is no single 
 class whose money interests would be immediately advanced if 
 the slave trade were put an end to. Interest and prejudice 
 combine powerfully on the other side. First, there is an inordi¬ 
 nate anxiety for increased exports to Brazil. An open slave trade 
 would soon double the profits of the mines in which so much 
 English capital is invested. English capital is also known to 
 be largely laid out directly in slave trading transactions, as has 
 been repeatedly stated in Parliament and elsewhere, and never 
 denied or even questioned. Wherever the interests of the mo¬ 
 ment appear all on one side, it is pretty certain that the argu¬ 
 ments on the other will have scarcely fair play; but that the 
 interests of individuals may be very different from that of the 
 country at large, is singularly exemplified in the question we 
 are considering, for in Brazil the present money interest of every 
 class would insure a vast increase of slave trade if England with¬ 
 drew her squadron, although it is on all hands acknowledged it 
 would be highly detrimental, and probably entirely destructive, 
 to that country in the long run. So also with respect to England, 
 a calm and full inquiry proves that, however numerous classes 
 might profit by the opposite course, the true interest of the country 
 imperatively demands perseverance in that policy against which 
 an hostility so bitter and unscrupulous lias been excited; for 
 it has been proved beyond all doubt, that an open slave trade 
 would drive all other commerce from the shores of Africa, while 
 its suppression, as has been already shown in several parts, will 
 be followed by a steady growth of lawful trade. Can there be a 
 comparison in their true value to this country, of Africa, a howl¬ 
 ing wilderness, and Brazil unnaturally developed, but only by 
 
receiving into its vitals the elements of certain and speedy de¬ 
 struction ; or of a temporary check to the productive power ol 
 Brazil, which would at the same time insure an ultimate and 
 prolonged condition of health and prosperity, while Africa, once 
 relieved from the curse of slave trade, would every hour advance 
 in the scale of civilization, and soon take its place amongst the 
 most valuable commercial countries. 
 
 To the adverse money interests of the moment must be added 
 the scarcely less powerful impulses of prejudice; the Peace So¬ 
 ciety rules paramount in the councils of the self-styled cham¬ 
 pions of the Negro, the Anti-Slavery Society. 
 
 These visionaries declare that, even in the tropics—in the West 
 Indies, as compared with Brazil, free labour will beat slave trade 
 and slave labour—that free labour will effect, first, the suppres¬ 
 sion of the slave trade, and then the abolition of slavery itself. 
 They also contend that all attempts to suppress the slave trade 
 by the application of force arc wrong and reprehensible, and 
 moral influences alone are justifiable. In the mean time they 
 see the West Indies perishing in the struggle, though the price 
 of a Negro in Brazil has been quadrupled, and the number intro¬ 
 duced in the same degree diminished by the efforts of the squad¬ 
 ron ; though the women, being as one to ten to the men, no 
 possible means exist by which the slave population can be main¬ 
 tained except by continual importations; and while they know 
 that the ruthless system of “ the largest amount of labour in the 
 shortest time” wrings eighteen hours’ work out of the twenty-four 
 from its victims, and consumes annually five per cent, of the 
 whole number, they still adhere obstinately to their theories, and 
 have giveri the whole weight of their title to the cause of perpet¬ 
 ual slave trade. Their title is indeed their only weight, but still 
 all-powerful when perverted to betray the interests of the Negro, 
 who has no means of making his protest heard. To these va¬ 
 rious parties, by a strange perversity, the free traders have 
 allied themselves—free trade—which is to unite all mankind in 
 peace and amity—which now joins the Peace Society, and then 
 talks of “crumpling up” Russia—which now talks of buying in 
 the cheapest and selling in the dearest market as the first duty of 
 mankind, and then would frighten and abuse the capitalists who 
 lend money to Austria. These men will talk of the rights of man¬ 
 kind in Hungary and Italy, yet, such is the magic in the colour 
 of a skin, would apply to the purchase and sale of Negroes 
 the principles of free trade, under which they assure us every 
 sort of commerce will increase, as surely as two added to two 
 
10 THE FRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 makes four ! From this assertion they have never swerved, and, 
 abhorrent as it may he to call this hateful crime commerce, there 
 cannot be a doubt of the truth of the axiom as applied to it, if 
 the experiment should unhappily be tried. The result of these 
 various causes is to place the subject before the public with only 
 one side displayed to view. On scarcely any other have the 
 people of England deeper reason to feel interest, or a stronger 
 claim for the fullest and fairest information, for on no other has 
 public opinion been brought to bear more powerfully or with a 
 more direct and general responsibility, in establishing a great 
 national course of action. Public opinion, in spite of the utmost 
 efforts of the powerful interests on the other side, has obliged 
 successive governments to carry all the various measures bearing 
 on slave trade or slavery. Public opinion enforced the regu¬ 
 lation of the English Colonial Slave Trade in 1788, its final 
 abolition in 1807, and again the Emancipation Bill in 1834. 
 Public opinion urged on an unwilling government all the efforts 
 against the traffic at the Congress of Vienna; which, in declar¬ 
 ing it a crime against humanity and universal morality, spoke 
 the sentiments of the people of England. The same power has 
 dictated all the subsequent negotiations with foreign states : it 
 compelled an unwilling ministry to adopt the existing system 
 more than thirty years ago, and has ever since perpetually urged 
 increased vigour and perseverance. But while the public trea¬ 
 sure has been scattered broadcast, the public will has never been 
 supported by any concentration of purpose, any energy or 
 systematic action upon the part of any single government. 
 Above all, there has been a total absence of union between 
 the several departments, on the joint efforts of which suc¬ 
 cess necessarily depends; and the result has been imperfect, 
 though far less so than might have been expected from the 
 manner in which the struggle has been conducted. The partial 
 failure, exaggerated by interest and prejudice, has now been 
 made to appear not only a total failure of effecting the slightest 
 good, but as having in all respects aggravated every evil; and 
 on a subject on which public opinion must be all-powerful, and 
 where the right to know the truth, and the duty of each man 
 to examine for himself, is so obvious, the combination we have 
 described opposes peculiar difficulties to the honest inquirer. 
 We have been much struck with the unfairness with which the 
 question has been stated to the public, and step by step as we have 
 proceeded in our investigations, our convictions have become 
 the more firmly enlisted on what now appears to be the unpop¬ 
 ular side. But what has finally confirmed our opinions in 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON'. U 
 
 favour, not of the present system (for the evidence proves the 
 astonishing absence of all system), but in favour of maintaining 
 the African squadron, to be henceforward employed for clearly- 
 defined objects, steadily and consistently, has been the reports 
 of Mr. Hutt’s committee. 
 
 It will be remembered that, early in the session of ’48, Mr 
 Ilutt moved for this committee in a speech in which he declared 
 that the squadron had aggravated the sufferings, while it had 
 wholly failed to effect the slightest diminution of the ; lave trade, 
 and in which he emphatically declared his own mind to be made 
 up to withdraw the squadron, and abandon the attempt—in his 
 own words, “ to leave the slave trade to itself.” The majority 
 of the committee, at the outset of the inquiry', were undoubtedly 
 of Mr. Hutt’s way of thinking; but the reports record a per¬ 
 petual decrease of that majority, until the final report, in 1849, 
 when Mr. Hutt’s resolutions were adopted for consideration by 
 ■his own castuiq vote . and when nearly every resolution, as pro¬ 
 posed severally to the committee, was carried in the same 
 manner. Such is the result, after a prolonged inquiry, con¬ 
 ducted of course, most favourably to Mr. Hutt’s own views, 
 in the selection of witnesses, and in the general line of 
 examination. The committee was appointed to consider “ the 
 best means of suppressing the African slave trade ”—it was 
 entirely directed to Mr. Hutt’s object of “ leaving it to itself” 
 —it was confined to the object of condemning the means 
 actually in operation, without even a pretence of inquiring 
 whether those means could be made more effectual, or whether 
 any others could be devised. The total silence on this subject 
 shows that the committee despaired of finding any substitute, 
 and that the alternative of the present system would be slave 
 trade perpetual and unlimited. This being the result of such 
 an inquiry, the utmost weight it should have with the public is, 
 the proof it affords that Mr. Hutt remains of the same opinion, 
 but has failed to convince his committee. And yet this report 
 has been put forward by the opponents of the squadron as if it 
 settled the question for ever ; and the public are invited to 
 believe that, instead of Mr. Hutt’s solitary voice, we hear the 
 decision of a triumphant majority'. 
 
 “If we had any inclination to magnify our own triumphs, 
 we should point with considerable satisfaction to the second 
 report of the select committee on the slave trade which we 
 yesterday published. Many months have elapsed since we com¬ 
 menced our strictures upon the existing system of prevention, 
 during which interval an inquiry, instituted with all the fairness, 
 
12 
 
 AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 and conducted with all the intelligence which the subject de¬ 
 manded, has been incessantly directed to the elucidation of those 
 practical truths which should govern the policy of a practical 
 people.” After mentioning the concluding sentences of the 
 report, condemnatory of. attempts to repress the slave trade by 
 force, the writer proceeds —“ That these, and no other conclu¬ 
 sions were, in point of fact, absolutely imperative upon those 
 who had to decide upon the evidence before them, is what we 
 conceive no person, except a certain noble antagonist of ours, 
 would venture, after a careful perusal of the report in question, 
 to gainsay or deny.”— Times, July 7. 
 
 No hint is here given of a divided committee—no possible 
 suspicion would arise of the true state of the case. We ask, is 
 this honest, or is it likely that a cause, good in itself, and able 
 to bear the light, would be supported by such advocacy? 
 
 In the discussion of a topic of immediate home interest, it 
 would be superfluous to animadvert upon the ephemeral mis¬ 
 representations of the Times, or other newspapers. On such 
 occasions the thunder of the press may indeed astonish the minds 
 of the multitude; but all the attention and intelligence of society 
 is instantly enlisted on the other side, mis-statements are exposed, 
 and false reasonings detected, and the community is protected 
 from any practically mischievous results. We may cite, as an 
 instance, the hopeless war long waged by the leading journal 
 against the New Poor-Law. The constant reader may have been 
 melted by the eloquent appeals addressed to him day after day, 
 but the rate-payer reflected, and was obdurate. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to observe that the present question is 
 of a different class. It is apparently extraneous to the ordinary 
 duties and occupations of the life of most men. Its patient in¬ 
 vestigation is, therefore, declined, as involving an unnecessary 
 outlay of mental labour, and if the public business of the country 
 requires that some resolution should be taken, the generality of 
 men gratefully adopt the course of action suggested by any one 
 who will relieve them from the trouble of reflecting and deciding. 
 Should, moreover, the conclusion so attained be made to tally in 
 appearance with any current theory, there is an additional 
 inducement to adopt it, as a step in the right direction, without 
 much forethought as to the ulterior result, or any inquiry as to 
 the motives, of the adviser. At present it is the fashion to take 
 a narrow mercantile view of questions involving the most im¬ 
 portant principles of politics, and even morals. Our generation 
 is taught to complain that our fathers bequeathed us liberty and 
 empire, burdened with a heavy mortgage, and that, in behalf of 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 10 
 
 the parsimony thus rendered indispensable in our impoverished 
 condition, everything hitherto thought requisite to the power 
 and character of a great nation should be sacrificed without 
 regret, and without delay. The fatalist theory, too, of a certain 
 section of political economists, contributes to reconcile the country 
 to the dereliction of its duties, and the surrender of its inheri¬ 
 tance. It is expensive, it may be dangerous, to retain colonies, 
 says the mercantile politician; it is the necessary course of 
 things, says the theorist, that the colonies should part company 
 with the mother country. A precisely analogous line of 
 argument is taken with respect to the slave trade. Political 
 philosophy offers to relieve us from an uneasy sensation of shame 
 when we descend to parley with pusillanimity and avarice. To 
 that portion of the public mind which has become mean and 
 enervated under such instruction, nothing could be more accep¬ 
 table than for the Times to insinuate that the report of Mr. 
 Hutt’s committee resulted from the deliberate and unanimous 
 conviction of fifteen intelligent and impartial inquirers. 
 
 Facts, however, cannot be talked away. The Blue Book 
 before us attests that, on the question, whether Mr. Hutt’s 
 draft should be taken as the basis of their report, the com¬ 
 mittee divided, seven against seven; and then, on every one 
 of his several resolutions against the squadron there was again an 
 equal division—so that Mr. Hutt’s opinions were carried by Mr. 
 
 The resolutions which show a larger majority were all, more 
 or less, deprecatory of Mr. Hutt’s views. Thus the fourth reso¬ 
 lution proposed by the Chairman,—■“ Your Committee are, 
 therefore, constrained to believe that no modification of the 
 system now in force can effect the suppression of the slave trade, 
 and they cannot undertake the responsibility of recommending 
 the continuance of that system,”—was carried by bis own 
 casting vote; while Mr. Denison's amendment, added thereto, 
 deprecating the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the 
 squadron was carried without opposition: so also was Mr. Hutt’s 
 resolution about avowing unabated hostility to slave trade ; and 
 the last resolution, urging the duty of encouraging commerce 
 and missionary labour, for the purpose of civilising and im¬ 
 proving Africa, was carried by eleven to three. These form 
 the only exceptions to the general rule that in the final report, 
 the majority consisted of Mr. Hutt solus. 
 
 We earnestly entreat attention to the reports of this com¬ 
 mittee, and to the evidence on which they are professedly 
 founded, for these will convince the most prejudiced that the 
 
minority who so gallantly fought the battle in the committee 
 had the right on their side, and that slight as must be the weight 
 of reports thus carried, their intrinsic value is, if possible, even 
 less worthy of influencing the judgment of parliament, or of the 
 public. 
 
 The main grounds Mr. Ilutt and those who think with him 
 have striven to establish, and on which they demand that the 
 squadron shall be recalled, and the slave trade henceforth left to 
 itself are—first, that the squadron has produced an immense 
 increase of suffering and mortality; secondly, That it has wholly 
 failed, and must fail, to diminish the amount of the traffic. 
 
 In support of these propositions, the first resolution laid before 
 the house at the close of the session of 184S, embodies a formal, 
 elaborate, tabular statement, purporting to be an authentic his¬ 
 tory of the statistics of the slave trade from 1788 down to the 
 3 'ear 1848. The third column professes to show the mortality 
 on the passage across the Atlantic, for each year, on the whole 
 number embarked from Africa; and from 1788 to 1815 this 
 mortality is stated to amount to 14 per cent. 
 
 But in the year 1815 the first treaty for the suppression of the 
 foreign slave trade, by means of a British force, was signed, and 
 then the tables inform us the mortality instantly increased to 
 25 per cent.—a truly marvellous effect of putting pen to paper, 
 for no steps u-cre taken to enforce this treaty for upwards of tiro 
 years. But let that pass. Parliament is informed by its com¬ 
 mittee that from the moment England interfered, 25 per cent, 
 perished on the voyage, instead of 14 per cent., and these tables 
 pretend thus to establish that the squadron has caused a vast 
 increase of horrors. 
 
 These statistics form the very groundwork of the reports of 
 the committee; they were presented to Parliament as the result 
 of its inquiry in 1848, and when the committee met to agree 
 to its final report, its first step was to approve and confirm the 
 resolutions of the previous session by a majority of 8 to 5. 
 
 We give these tables in extenso , because without their assist¬ 
 ance it will be almost impossible to convince the public of their 
 real value, coming, as they do, in a form claiming the peculiar 
 character of official authenticity. We are especially anxious that 
 they should speak for themselves, as it is upon them that the 
 conclusions of the committee adverse to the squadron are based. 
 
16 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 But what if those authentic tables prove to be altogether un¬ 
 supported ? What if the evidence taken before this very com¬ 
 mittee should prove them to be wholly untrue, and opposite to 
 the truth ? Startling as the assertion may appear, we pledge 
 ourselves to make it good. 
 
 Nothing can be more perfectly established than that the mor¬ 
 ality of the voyage during the regulated slave trade of England 
 was 14 per cent. That trade was abolished in 1807, and the 
 traffic, in general, was left to itself until 1815 ; during this 
 period the committee’s table gives a mortality still of 14 per cent. 
 But, as wo said before, with the first treaty the mortality of the 
 slaves exported from Africa, whether to Cuba or to Brazil, is 
 stated to have instantly sprung up to 25 per cent., and this 
 average is gravely applied to each year, from 1815 down 
 to 1848. 
 
 For fifteen years from the commencement of the struggle the 
 efforts of England consisted in sending five or six most unsuit¬ 
 able vessels to the coast of Africa, “ to cruize for the suppression 
 of the slave trade,” and until the year 1824 the vessels were 
 removed from the coast during the rainy season, several 
 months of each year, when the ship-sloops, and gun-brigs went 
 to some distant port, while the commodore returned to England, 
 reporting an enormous and undiminished slave trade. 
 
 For the whole of this time all the treaties restricted the power 
 of seizure to cases of vessels met with after their slaves were 
 shipped, and every vessel, though obviously and avowedly a 
 slaver, was perfectly safe until this final act was committed. 
 Applying, then, to the tables for the alleged effect of these 
 five vessels, armed with such powers against a commerce so 
 enormous, it is on the very face of it absurd to attribute to them 
 any such result; but if we extend our inquiry', wc shall see that, 
 as regards one-half of the slave trade (and this estimate is applied 
 to the whole), such an effect was simply impossible, inasmuch as 
 the slave trade of Brazil, was by express treaty, entirely protected 
 from all question or interference from British cruizers; for not 
 only were the powers above described limited by the treaty with 
 Portugal to north latitude ; but by distinct stipulations the un¬ 
 molested continuance of the Brazilian slave trade, and the per¬ 
 fect freedom of Portuguese slave ships under every possible cir¬ 
 cumstance, south of the line, were guaranteed by provisions as 
 distinct, stringent, and complete as those for the suppression of 
 the traffic in north latitude were feeble and insufficient. No 
 slave could be legally imported into Brazil except from the 
 African colonies of Portugal, which all lay in south latitude; 
 the great bulk of the Brazil slave trade was, therefore, absolutely 
 
untouched, and incapable of being touched, by the British 
 squadron. Not a cruizcr was ever stationed south of the equator, 
 and if occasionally Portuguese slave vessels came to the Bight 
 of Benin for their cargoes, in order to evade the duties levied on 
 slaves exported from the colonics of Portugal, this voluntary 
 exposure to the risk of capture, which would arise as soon as 
 slaves were thus shipped north of the equator, strikingly proves 
 how trifling that risk was, and how utterly incapable such a 
 force, acting under these restrictions, must have been to produce 
 any effect whatever, even on that, port of the slave trade which it 
 was nominally permitted to assail. These facts arc taken from the 
 evidence printed by the committee, and if this were all, it would 
 be enough to deprive its conclusions of all value; but what 
 follows is yet more crushing. 
 
 In 1839 the squadron obtained the power to seize the equipped 
 slave vessels of every slave-trading nation ; and then, also, the 
 protection of the Portuguese treaty, which had hitherto covered 
 the slave trade of Brazil, was swept away, and, for the first time 
 it became possible for British eruizers to assail the traffic south 
 of the equator. It then (however untrue) ceased to be utterly 
 absurd to suppose that the squadron might increase the ratio of 
 mortality in the voyage across the ocean, and indeed as applied to 
 the period subsequent to 1839, some evidence (though it was highly 
 unsatisfactory and suspicious) was certainly given, accounting in 
 some degree for the tables presented to Parliament by the com¬ 
 mittee in 1848. In April, 1849, however, the committee sum¬ 
 moned before it Sir Charles Plotham, who had just returned 
 from the command on the coast of Africa, and whose evidence 
 has been cited as strongly supporting Mr. Hutt’s opinions, 
 though a careful consideration of his whole evidence will produce 
 a very different conclusion. On this question of the increased 
 mortality caused by the squadron, his statement is worthy of 
 being extracted at length. He says, in answer to question676, 
 “ I have proved that the mortality under the worst measures, 
 which I consider are while the slaves are under our control, only 
 amounts to nine per cent.” “ With Dr. Cliffe’s evidence I have 
 no concern; with respect to the evidence of the other officers, I 
 trust they will pardon me, if I say they have no grounds for 
 arriving at any thing approaching to a correct calculation. Only 
 the commander-in-chief of a large squadron is competent to form 
 a fair opinion, and he does that from returns from the Ad¬ 
 miralty Court, checked again by returns from officers in charge 
 of eruizers.” Sir Charles Hotham then gives in an authentic 
 return, which proves thatof near 14,000 slaves captured during the 
 two years and a-half of his command, the mortality up to the 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUAI 
 
 date of adjudication was nine per cent.; and he estimates the 
 mortality in those vessels that escape at five per cent. Sir E. 
 Buxton asks, (question 680), “ Considering as far as we are able 
 to learn that under Sir Wm. Dolben’s act,” (under which the Eng¬ 
 lish slave trade was first regulated in 1788) “ the mortality was 
 14 percent, and that it is now only 5 per cent., do you imagine 
 if the slave trade were allowed for a certain period, any great 
 diminution in the mortality would take place ?” Sir C. Hotham 
 answers,— 
 
 “I anxiously hope that the slave trade may never he allowed; 
 if you i oere to remove all restrictions and take your squadron 
 entirely away, small speculators would spring up and undersell 
 those who are now in the market; the slave trade would he greatly 
 increased in its horrors, and it would he impossible to calculate the 
 calamities ivhich would ensue; besides this, pirates would abound , 
 and in my opinion it toould be impossible for a legitimate trader to 
 conduct his operations upon that coast.” We beg to remind our 
 readers, parenthetically, that this is ihe evidence the Times pre¬ 
 tends to fludsoabsolutelyeonclusive against theAfriean squadron! 
 
 Mr. Gladstone tries his hand at getting this awkward opinion 
 qualified, we shall see how successfully. “ Q. 688.—You have 
 said the withdrawal of the squadron would lead to a great ex¬ 
 tension of the trade, to a great increase of suffering, and to hor¬ 
 rors unexampled ; do you think that opinion to be quite con¬ 
 sistent with the one you are understood to have expressed before; 
 that in the main, the supply of slaves was actually regulated by 
 the demand in Brazil, if that be so, would it not follow 
 that the supply of slaves would still be regulated by the 
 demand in Brazil after the squadron was withdrawn ?” Answer: 
 “I apprehend the slave trade is now regulated by men of 
 considerable capital, and that slaves are conveyed across with 
 comparative ease and comfort ; if you remove the restriction 
 men of a less amount of capital—small speculators, would embark 
 in the trade, and then I think the trade would greatly increase 
 in horrors.” To the next suggestion that if the slave trade was 
 left to itself the Brazilian government would regulate it, and 
 
 E it its horrors, the reply is, that “ the government of 
 is wholly powerless.” To the next cast, whether if the 
 present system were abandoned, the government would still be 
 powerless on the subject, the answer seems to have at last satisfied 
 the inquirer. “ Not equally powerless certainly, but still powerless.” 
 
 Here we have the undoubted fact established before the com¬ 
 mittee, that the mortality even on board captured slave ships 
 on all hands admitted to be greater than in those that escape, 
 is only 9 per cent. 
 
AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 Sir Charles Hotliam's statement of the mortality in captured 
 vessels is no matter of opinion, it is plain matter ot fact entirely 
 within the personal knowledge of the witness : it utterly destroys 
 the very foundation of the arguments and statements by which 
 public opinion had been worked upon, “ to leave the slave trade 
 to itself.” This evidence was given on the 25th of April 184!), 
 and while it was still ringing in their ears, a majority of 8 to 5 of 
 Mr. Hutt’s Committee deliberately confirm and repeat these 
 fabulous statistics of 1848! these facts are not easily to be 
 matched, and we trust they may be equally without precedent 
 or imitation in the annals of Parliament. 
 
 We anticipate a natural doubt of the correctness of this state¬ 
 ment, and have taken the trouble to go through the returns of 
 Severy .year from 1839 to 1848, and wo find that the average 
 Annual mortality from all causes between capture and emanci¬ 
 pation during the whole of that time is just 9i per cent., blit 
 this easy mode of satisfying themselves of the truth, was not re¬ 
 sorted to by the committee, and the assurance that 25 per cent, 
 have perished on the middle passage since 1815, subsequent to 
 as well as before 1839, stands in judgment on the fidelity and 
 trustworthiness of the committee, though in their report it is 
 established upon incontrovertible evidence that the squadron 
 has caused a great diminution of suffering and mortality even 
 compared with the regulated slave trade of Great Britain ! It 
 may be necessary to observe that all evidence and experience 
 proves that the mortality in our hands after capture is greater 
 than when vessels escape, though we doubt whether the dif¬ 
 ference is so great as Sir Charles Holham estimates it at; it 
 is, however, undoubtedly less than 9 per cent.; but whatever it 
 may be below even 14 per cent., must be, even by the showing 
 of the committee, the direct effect of the squadron; 
 
 The statements of the committee are so extravagant that even 
 t)r. Clifte dreads the effect of their exposure on his cause, and 
 before the Lords he ungratefully turns round on Mr. Hutt and 
 his committee, and tells us how these statistics were compiled. 
 After asserting that formerly Brazilian vessels carried a surgeon 
 and a priest ! he is asked if he has any present average of deaths. 
 We give his reply at length. “ Yes : 1 mention it from some 
 papers which 1 drew up. Mr. Bandinel copied it into a lot of 
 statistics which he has made: but he copied it erroneously, or I 
 did not describe it sufficiently clear for him to comprehend.” 
 The public will now see the whole history. These authentic 
 statistics took their birth from Dr. Cliffe ! ” We think we need 
 add no more to complete a case of the most flagrant carelessness 
 
 to use the mildest word—against Mr. Hutt and his majority-. 
 
20 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 But utterly as we repudiate the general evidence of this interested 
 witness, it is obviously of great value wherever it contains an 
 admission adverse to his own case. He states that, counting 
 from the first capture of the Negroes in the interior to the period 
 at which they are considered seasoned in Brazil—viz., two 
 months after landing, the whole mortality m the slave trade 
 amounts to 30 or 33 per cent This mortality, in former times, 
 has been estimated at above three-fourths, and the lowest com¬ 
 putation placed it at one-half. So we have here, from another 
 source, additional proof that the squadron has caused a great 
 decrease of suffering and mortality in the slave trade. 
 
 We think we may safely leave our case here, but we would 
 yet recommend one more authority on this point to public notice, 
 in the shape of an extract from a despatch from Mr. Kennedy, 
 judge of the slave court of Havannah, dated 20th December, 
 1848, and received at the Foreign Office 26th January 1849, 
 and, therefore, probably in the hands of Mr. Hutt. It is 
 printed in the Appendix to the Lords’ Report. This despatch, 
 had it stood alone, should, we think, have induced the committee 
 to pause for further information in support “ of their lot of statis¬ 
 tics" before they were formally repeated and confirmed in 1849. 
 
 “ Another over-statement seems to me to be made respecting 
 the miseries of the passage. There are, no doubt, cases of 
 shocking mortality and misery; as also we hear of such in 
 emigrant vessels to America—for instance, the Virginias, from 
 Liverpool, where 158 out of 467 passengers died on the voyage, 
 and the Naomi, which sustained a loss of 110 out of 334, em¬ 
 barked at the same port. I do not believe that such mortality 
 has occurred on board any slave ship to this port during the last 
 twelve years that I have known it, from the western coast of 
 Africa, and of six cargoes I have seen, a very large majority 
 of each appeared to have suffered no inconvenience whatever 
 from the voyage; in the Columbia, which arrived here in 
 July last, though only a miserable boat of 29 tons, we have 
 evidence that only five were lost out of 155 embarked; and in 
 the case of the Jesus Maria, a vessel of about 35 tons, British 
 measurement, condemned here, there were only 26 lost out of 278 
 put on board, and of these several had jumped overboard; yet 
 these were the cases in which we might have expected the greatest 
 loss of life, as having been the most crowded, though they might 
 be accidentally favourable in the other extreme. It is the interest 
 of the parties to bring them over as well as possible, and there 
 is no doubt that this has its effect. It is much more probable 
 that overflowing cargoes and concomitant misery tvould be found if 
 a free trade in slaves were permitted . when the vessels would be 
 
the a 
 
 SQUADRON'. 
 
 filled without any possible restraint, and when the life and comfort 
 of the slave would he of less consequence than now, when a full 
 earyo can seldom be obtained .” 
 
 Before quitting tins branch of tlie subject, there is one fertile 
 source of error which requires notice. In 183!), a new scale for 
 admeasurin' the tonnage of ships came into force, which, in 
 order to encourage the building of better models, gave a great 
 advantage to the finer description of vessels, as the mode of cal¬ 
 culation reduced their nominal size far below their real capacity 
 of stowage; and the dues which are, for the most part levied on 
 the registered tonnage, thenceforth fell much more lightly on 
 sharp vessels. The Cowes yachts, for instance, were thus, by a 
 stroke of the pen, cut down to less than two thirds their former 
 tonnage, in some cases to less than one half. The Alarm, Mr. 
 Weld’s famous yacht, by the old scale, 193 tons, was now regis¬ 
 tered as 95 tons. 
 
 By the same process, slave ships, when captured, become nomi¬ 
 nally half the size they would have been called previously, the 
 bounties on tonnage due to the captors being paid by the new 
 scale, to the great disadvantage of the cruizers. In two cases, 
 the Reglano and Vanguardia, condemned in 1840, the surveyor 
 happened to furnish the court with their tonnage by both scales. 
 By the new scale, the Reglano, which had been seized with 350 
 slaves on board, measured 48 tons,—an unheard-of number to 
 such a tonnage, looking to the old scale; but by the old scale, 
 the burden was 116 tons; thus showing exactly the former 
 average of three slaves to a ton. So, what appears at first sight 
 a new era—in which near twice as many slaves to a ton were 
 carried as before—was, in point of fact, merely an arbitrary- 
 change in the mode of admeasurement, expressly intended to 
 give an advantage to a certain class of merchant vessels. Thus, 
 also, the Vanguardia, a very old vessel, which would have been 
 in previous years, if captured, considered 194 tons burden, was 
 condemned in 1840 as of only 81 ! These are the only two 
 cases in which, as far as we know, the tonnage of slave vessels 
 has been given according to both scales. 
 
 It is now time to consider the question of the comparative 
 extent of slave trade, and how far Mr. Hutt, the Times, and the 
 British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society are borne out in their 
 assertions that the Squadron has, in this respect, entirely failed 
 to produce any good effect; but it is necessary to observe here, 
 that the Anti-Slavery Society grounds its arguments on Mr. 
 Hutt’s “lot of statistics.” 
 
 To do justice to the subject, we should calculate the amount 
 the trade would have grown to but for the efforts of England ; 
 
SQUADRON. 
 
 22 THE AFRICAN 
 
 and even if we admitted for a moment the assertion of our oppo¬ 
 nents that its amount is now exactly what it was formerly, we 
 might ask with triumph, why has it not, in common with every 
 other trade, more than doubled itself? Every increase of the 
 slave population of Cuba and Brazil, far from tending to dimin¬ 
 ish the slave trade, must inevitably give a fresh impulse hi it, 
 since of the slave population only ten per cent, are females, and 
 only three per cent, are carried in the slave ship, as we are 
 assured evenby Dr. Cliffe. We have the following facts in Dr. 
 Thompson’s evidence, a witness opposed to the Squadron. He 
 states before Mr. Hiitt’s committee (vide Q. 5129-30-31-32): 
 ‘‘The number of births compared to the number of women is 
 also remarkably small.” “ Indeed; the number born in Brazil is 
 extremely small; it is a very rare thing to See a woman with a 
 child.” But even the highest known ratio of births, with such 
 a disparity between die sexes, would go but a little way to keep 
 up numbers, since we learn from the concurrent testimony of all 
 persons acquainted either with Ciiba or Brazil, that under the 
 awful atrocities of this hideous systeril, there is an annual de¬ 
 struction of five per cent, of the whole slave population. We 
 learn, also, from Mr. Bandinel’s work on Slave Trade, (p. 65,) 
 that in former times “ the English imported annually at least 
 one-sixteenth part of the existing negroes (in the colonics) to 
 keep up the stock;” thus proving that at all times the combined 
 curse of slavery and slave trade must produce the same con¬ 
 sequences. 
 
 We know further, that vast tracts of the finest virgin soil in 
 the world lie waste in Brazil, and that the Government anxiously 
 seeks for persons to accept these as a free gift. What are die 
 possible present means of cultivation, apart from a commensu¬ 
 rate increase of slave trade? A glut of the slave markets 
 in such a country is a contradiction in terms, when used as an 
 argument that the slave trade left alone would thus cure itself) 
 for this is obviously impossible even while the land already 
 occupied continues to be cultivated. Mr. Bandinel himself 
 (whose authority appears to have had so much weight with Mr. 
 Hutt’s Committee as an opponent to the Squadron,) published his 
 elaborate work, j list referred to, in 1842, when his forty years’ official 
 experience was fresh in his recollection, and with every document 
 at his elbow; and he there states the following facts, as entirely 
 the result of the Squadron (vide pages 286 and 287 of “ Bandi¬ 
 nel on the Slave Trade.”) After proving his facts by numbers, 
 he sums iip his statements as follows:— 
 
 “ So that the number of slaves imported into Cuba in 1840 was only 
 half the number imported in 1838, and only about one-third the number 
 
TIIE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 imported before the treaty of 1835 came into operation” and as regards 
 Brazil, “In 1839 the importation of slaves had diminished upwards of 
 one-third since the preceding year, and in 1840 the number imported was 
 only rather more than one-fourth part of those imported in 1839, and not 
 one-sixth of the number imported in 1838. 
 
 The diminution in tho importation of slaves, does not, however, 
 arise from a slackening in the demand for them, for in Porto Kico a 
 newly imported negro used to sell for 200 dollars; the price now is 450 
 dollars. In Cuba such negroes sold in 1821 for 100 dollars; the price 
 now varies from 425 dollars to 480 dollars. In Brazil a newly im¬ 
 ported negro used to sell for 100 milreis; the price is now 400 milreis.'’ 
 
 These high prices are still fully maintained, while in Africa 
 the price of a slave is seldom so high as 5/., or about 20 dollars, 
 Remove the Squadron, and the price in Brazil and Cuba infalli¬ 
 bly must fall to what it was in 1821,—one-fourth of what it now 
 is. But does any reasonable man suppose that less money will 
 he spent in the purchase of labour than at present! if not, then 
 nothing can be much more certain than that for one slave now 
 landed, four victims will be consigned to the terriblcliving death of 
 the slave vessel, and the plantation, By all the horrors of such a 
 fate to millions yet unborn, we implore attention to these con¬ 
 siderations, but, though they are so important in their bearing on 
 the question, we have proofs so distinct of the fallacy of the 
 assertion we are combating (which is, indeed, overthrown by 
 the very tables on which it professes to be founded), that we will 
 boldly accept battle on the narrow and unfair field chosen by our 
 opponents. We undertake to prove, even by those very tables, 
 which we have given at p. 15, that the Squadron lias actually 
 effected a great diminution of slave trade from the period when 
 it attained its present powers, and that what is wanting of perfect 
 success arises from causes so palpable, and so easy of remedy, 
 that instead of justifying discouragement, the discriminating 
 consideration of those very causes gives the best assurance of 
 eventual triumph, by surely guiding our efforts to the best course 
 of action, and teaching us to avoid the errors which have as yet 
 prevented complete success. 
 
 But, before we return to these Tables, there is one acknow¬ 
 ledged and undeniable fact worthy to be hailed with rejoicing by 
 all who do not exult in the belief that the efforts of their country 
 in a cause so righteous have utterly and miserably failed. In spite 
 of temptation as great to each and all of them as to Brazil, every 
 South American State has abstained from this lucrative crime, 
 entirely owing to the efforts and example of Great Britain, who, 
 by her steady maintenance of the righteous principles of relio-ion 
 and morality, and by her urgent persuasions and remon¬ 
 strances, has thus saved millions of victims, and rescued those 
 
States themselves from degradation and depravity, and also from 
 the terrible eventual retribution which must sooner or later await 
 every nation that resorts to this sin as a means of precocious and 
 unnatural development. 
 
 If the Tables of the Committee were to be received at once 
 without challenge they would refute the Report which is founded 
 upon them, for they show from 1798, until first checked by the 
 Squadron, a constant increase of the only slave trade that still 
 exists, and from the moment the Squadron was enabled to act 
 with effect, a diminution as marked. 
 
 The Tables inform us that in 1798,15,000 slaves were imported 
 into colonies of Spain, which then included several possessions 
 since lost. In 1835, Spain possessed only Cuba and Porto Rico, 
 into which 40,000 slaves were, according to these tables, imported. 
 But in a note to his tables, not given by the Committee, Mr. 
 Bandinel states that in 1798 only 6,000 slaves were imported 
 into Cuba, so that the only existing Spanish slave trade in 
 thirty-seven years, has multiplied itself by seven. 
 
 In 1798 we see it stated that 20,000 were imported into Por¬ 
 tuguese colonies, consisting then of other possessions in the West 
 besides Brazil. From 1835 to 1839 inclusive, the tables state 
 that 65,000 per annum were imported into Brazil alone! the pro¬ 
 cess of increase having been gradual and progressive, except from 
 1830 to 1835, when the treaty with Great Britain declaring the 
 trade piracy came into force, and for a time the slave dealers 
 were supposed to be terrified from the prosecution of their crime. 
 The increase, even according to the Tables, is much more than 
 three-fold, or if we deduct 5,000 for the other Portuguese colonies, 
 from the numbers in 1798, between four and five times as many 
 were carried into Brazil in 1839 as there were forty years before, 
 so that instead of the aggregate importation into Cuba and Brazil 
 amounting to 21,000 as in 1798 (14,000 being devoted in that 
 year to other Spanish and Portuguese colonies, and 38,000 to 
 other countries), we have, in the year 1835, when both trades 
 continued unchecked by the Squadron, an aggregate, by the Com¬ 
 mittee’s own tables, of 105,000 1 
 
 The statements as regard Cuba, though we do not entirely 
 concur in them, we do not intend to question ; hut as regards the 
 numbers said to be imported into Brazil in 1835, and the four 
 following years we are compelled to notice a discrepancy in the 
 anthority whose calculations the Committee have made their own. 
 Mr. Bandinel, in the work we have already quoted, states (at p. 
 287) “ the total number of slaves supposed to be imported into 
 Brazil in 1838 amounted to 94,000.” The whole context proves 
 that this was considered no extraordinary number compared with 
 
AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 former years, indeed the statement of decreasing slave trade 
 which we have extracted takes tins as the basis of the calculation, 
 and 56,000 in 1839 is the number specified as proving that in 
 that year “ the importation of slaves had diminished upwards of 
 one-third since the preceding year.” Referring to Mr. Bandincl’s 
 evidence before Mr. Hutt’s Committee, (Q. 3313,) lie says, “ the 
 greatest number imported (into Brazil) in one year was 87,000. 
 This occurred in 1837.” These statements, though somewhat 
 conflicting, agree better with each other than with the Tables, and 
 justify us in stating our own firm conviction that the book was 
 right and the Tables wrong, and that in 1835-30-37-38, respec¬ 
 tively, at least 90,000 slaves were landed in Brazil, which, with 
 56,000 in 1839, gives an average of above 83,000, instead of 
 65,000—a number still short of one-sixteenth of the slave 
 population, a proportion shown to have been necessary to keep up 
 numbers m the British slave colonies formerly. It would appear 
 then, that instead of an increase from 21,000 to 105,000, we 
 should read for the year 1835, before Brazilian and Cuban 
 slave trade were affected by the cruizers, that they numbered 
 134,000 victims landed on their respective shores, while probably 
 near 10,000 more perished on the voyage. It will be observed 
 that our grand total does not very largely exceed the Tables, 
 which give 135,000, as the number exported from Africa for 
 each of the five years in question, but reduce the number 
 landed, by the extravagant proportion of 25 per cent, mor¬ 
 tality; and it approximates closely to Sir Fowell Buxton’s more 
 correct estimate of 150,000. 
 
 We must now, at the risk of some repetition, show the cir¬ 
 cumstances under which the Spanish and Brazilian slave trade, 
 respectively, became subject to the effective interruption of our 
 cruizers. In 1835, the new treaty with Spain enabled the 
 Squadron, for the first time, to seize equipped slave-ships, 
 hitherto secure until after slaves were on board. We have read, 
 in the extract from Mr. Bandincl’s work (p. 492), the effect of this 
 treaty; but, after the first blow was struck, the Spanish slave 
 trade was carried on in Portuguese ships, which were secure 
 from capture on account of equipment, under the following 
 clause of the treaty with Portugal:—“Ships, on board which 
 no slaves shall be found intended for purposes of Irallie, shall 
 not be detained on any account or pretence whatever.” Thus 
 screened, the slave trade of Cuba was rapidly springing up, and 
 would have soon gone on increasing at the same ratio as before, 
 but for the measure of 1839, by which equipped Portuguese 
 vessels were rendered liable to seizure and condemnation. 
 
 As regardsBrazil, we have already shown that, until 1839, 
 the whole importation of slaves was protected from the English 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 cruizers, also by the use of Portuguese vessels. Eighteen 
 hundred miles of the Brazilian coast lie in south latitude, and 
 an ample supply of negroes can he obtained from the African 
 shores lying in the same latitude. This slave-trade was protected 
 by this article of the treaty with Portugal“ No Portuguese 
 merchantman, or slave-ship, shall, on any pretence whatever, ho 
 detained, which shall be found anywhere near the land, or on the 
 high seas, south of the Equator.” By this treaty Portugal was 
 bound to abandon all slave trade not directed to her colony, 
 Brazil; this clause was framed to cover the supply of this her 
 colony; but, though Brazil became independent in 1824, yet 
 Portugal still insisted, for fifteen years, on the letter of her 
 treaty, though now defeating its whole spirit and intention. It 
 was hot only a breach of faith, forming a just casus belli, but it 
 was a gross fraud, in the ordinary sense; for England had made 
 large payments in return for the pledges given by Portugal. At 
 length, finding all protests vain, the British Government, in 
 i839, ordered the seizure of all Portuguese slave-ships wherever 
 met with, and whether with slaves on board, or only equipped; 
 and this order was soon followed by an Act of Parliament, 
 authorising the Vice Admiralty Courts to try and condemn such 
 vessels. The power of suppressing the slave trade was now, for 
 the first time, obtained by Great Britain ; for the first time the 
 traffic to Brazil could be touched; and in all quarters the vessels 
 of every state, still implicated in the slave trade (each having 
 armed Great Britain with the requisite authority, and the flag of 
 Portugal being no longer available), became subject to capture, 
 when met with equipped for the crime. 
 
 Referring to the Tables we see from 40,000 per ann. in the 
 five years before 1835, the Spanish Slave Trade, sheltered by 
 Portugal, decreased only to 29,000 in the five years ending in 
 1839, whereas the asgrcirate of the next eight years only exceeds 
 by one fourth, the amount of a single year previous to 1835; 
 and for the last three years of the eight the average is only 1,517 ! 
 We see here the legitimate influence of the change in 1839. 
 
 As regards Brazil we read in Mr. Bandinel’s work of 1842, 
 that in 1838, 94,000 slaves were imported ; in 1839,56,000; and 
 14,244 he considers an overstatement for 1840. He says, “only 
 7,122 were imported into Rio (de Janeiro) ; and the diminution 
 at the outports was even still more marked ; for at Para, during 
 the last halt'year of 1840 not one slave was imported. So that 
 taking for the outports the same importation as for the capital, 
 tod much will probably be taltcn, and yet on this calculation only 
 14,244 were imported into Brazil during the year 1810.” Turn¬ 
 ings the Committee’s Tables, supplied by Mr. Bandinel, we 
 read with astonishment the statement that 30,000 slaves were 
 landed m Brazil in 1840, and this without a syllable of explana- 
 
THU AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 27 
 
 tion ! We ask if it is possible not to prefer the statement we 
 have quoted, but even adopting these obviously incorrect Tables, 
 we have for the six years following the eventful 1839, an im¬ 
 portation of -23,233 for each year against 65,000. This is no tri¬ 
 fling reduction : but, applying the corrections we have proved to 
 be so necessary for the five years ending in 1839, we have 
 83,000 instead of w5,000; and for the next six years, including 
 1845, but 20,600 ! It is also to be remarked that during these 
 six years 378 slave ships were captured, which would otherwise 
 have carried off 130,000 slaves, and that though the Committee 
 declares, in a note to its report in 1848, that it was desirous to 
 publish the whole number of captures since 1839 in one of its 
 resolutions, yet when this report was received in 1849 and showed 
 a total number of 594 captures from 1840 to 184S inclusive, 
 this desire expressed in 1848, was not carried into effect in the 
 Report of 1849, hut the important fact was consigned to the ob¬ 
 scurity of the appendix ! 
 
 It is true that an increase of imports to Brazil took place 
 in 1846-7 and probably in 1848. But we are always de¬ 
 pendent on the slave dealers themselves for accounts of 
 the numbers, and though these may be generally trusted 
 when there are no motives for concealing or exaggerating them, 
 as soon as interest suggests deceit, we arc utterly at fault; wit¬ 
 ness the ridiculous notion shown in the tables that the alarm in 
 1830 was sufficient of itself to keep the imports down to 15,000 
 for five years—less than a fourth part of what would have been 
 required only to maintain the numbers of the slave population. Do 
 we suppose the cry of the last three or four years in this country 
 did not reach those so strongly interested as the Brazilians ? 
 How the heart of every slave dealer must have leaped for joy, to 
 find the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society joining with 
 the press to clamour against coercive measures, just as those 
 measures were for the first time making havoc on their traffic ! 
 Can we doubt that they instantly devoted themselves to exag¬ 
 gerate their success, and so play into the hands of their simple, 
 unconscious dupes and interested accomplices, here? We suggest 
 these considerations to every thinking person ; for our own part, 
 we are persuaded that the numbers latterly landed in Brazil have 
 fallen far short of that which seems generally believed. But taking 
 the Committee’s Tables, it would seem that 52,600 were landed 
 in Brazil in 1846, and 57,800 in 1847 : certainly a startling in¬ 
 crease. But, can anything be more grossly unfair, than to take 
 these two years and to sink the six preceding years ? or can we 
 conceive a more flagrant breach of duty than for a Committee, 
 appointed for such a purpose, failing to seek to discover whether 
 any specific causes for a change so extraordinary existed, even by a 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 single question ; but equally without hesitation or inquiry, attri¬ 
 buting it at once to the inherent impossibility of suppressing, or 
 even materially reducing, slave trade by force ! The causes 
 were repeatedly suggested to the Committee in answer to other 
 questions; but the subject was avoided. The causes are:— 
 
 1st. In 1845, for several months the cruizers abstained from 
 capturing Brazilian slave ships, because the courts to adjudge 
 them were broken up, the Government of Brazil having asserted 
 the treaty to be at an end; and the Act of Parliament treating 
 this breach of faith in the same manner as that of Portugal in 
 1839, did not reach the coast for several months. This is 
 established by the report of the Sierra Leone Commissioners for 
 that year, in their annual despatch, dated Dec. 31,1845 :—“ With 
 the exception of the Adelaide , detained on the 12th of Aug. and 
 subsequently given up, no vessel furnished with Brazilian papers 
 was taken by any of Her Majesty’s cruizers, between the 23rd 
 of July and the 22nd of October, in consequence of the expira¬ 
 tion of the Convention of 1817, and the Act 8 and 9 Victoria, 
 cap. 122, not having come into operation.” 
 
 2nd. From Commodore Jones, (probably because he, for a 
 time, was unable to capture these vessels,) leaving all the coast 
 of the African Colonies of Portugal, five hundred miles in ex¬ 
 tent, to the sole charge of Portuguese cruizers. These causes com¬ 
 bined to give a great impetus to the slave trade; and when 
 after the lapse of more than a twelvemonth the British cruizers 
 were again stationed on this part of the coast, in a very few 
 months a single vessel, the Styx, captured 26 slave ships! 
 
 3rd. The admission of slave-grown sugar in 1846, which, 
 though not in itself able to maintain (a successful and remunera¬ 
 tive slave trade under ordinary circumstances, as proved in the 
 case of Cuba, found a great impetus already given to the traffic 
 of Brazil by the events of 1845, and as regards 1846, 1847, 
 and 1848, a change in the mode of employing the Squadron 
 in the highest degree favourable to slave trade. 
 
 4th. The change of system from preventing the shipment of 
 slaves, and closely watching the Slave Factories, to a return to 
 the old plan of desultory cruising in the offing, in vogue 
 before the power to capture equipped vessels existed. 
 
 As this last is a matter of vital moment, and requiring more 
 attention than can be devoted to it at present, we must con¬ 
 tent ourselves with merely stating the fact, deferring until our 
 next number, its full investigation. But for the causes specified, 
 we have not the slightest doubt that the reduction of the Bra¬ 
 zilian trade would have been as striking, and as utterly beyond 
 the reach of the denial even of the slave dealers themselves, as 
 that of Cuba. 
 
TIIE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 29 
 
 With respect to Cuba, we read in the tables of the Committee 
 that in 1845, 1350; in 1846, 1700; in 1847, 1500 slaves were 
 landed; and from the return of Mr. Kennedy, (vide appendix to 
 Lords Report, p. 94,) 1500 were also landed in 1848, which 
 agrees with every other statement. He says, in his despatch, 
 dated January 1st, 1849 : “ It appears to me, therefore, that if 
 the trade be, as I consider it, in a depressed state, the cause of 
 this depression must be sought elsewhere, than in the measures 
 of the” (Spanish or local) “Government.” He states if the slave 
 trade were again set free, the planters could then get slaves at 
 one-third or one-fourth of the present prices, and would take 
 20,000 or 25,000 annually for some years, and he adds, “ The 
 high price then is and must be a check to the trade, and this 
 high price is owing to the blockade on the coast.” 
 
 The Gallinas has long been the great depot of Cuba slave 
 trade. Destroyed in 1840, it was partially restored in 1843, 
 owing to the confidence inspired by the unfortunate publication, 
 and indistinct language of the Queen’s advocate’s opinion in 
 1842. Since 1844, in the expectation of the immediate with¬ 
 drawal of the Squadron, raised by the press in this country, 
 enormous establishments have been maintained at a dead loss. 
 In February in the present year, those factories were again 
 destroyed in fulfilment of the treaty of 1840, and had Mr. Hull 
 thought fit to inquire into the extent of property there embarked 
 in the slave trade, he rvould have discovered ample proof of the 
 efficacy of the “ blockade,” on the only part of the coast where 
 it has been carried out. The value of the goods was enor¬ 
 mous, but by some utterly unaccountable oversight, Sir Charles 
 Holham did hot enforce the principal provision of the former 
 treaty, Art. 4. “ King Siacca binds himself in the most solemn 
 manner, that no white man shall ever for the future settle in 
 his country for the purpose of slave-dealing.” Near sixty such 
 persons were in the country, and held, by Sir Charles Hotham’s 
 reports, near 3,000 slaves, and not only were the slave-dealers 
 left in the country, but their unfortunate victims were left to 
 perish! It appears by Sir C. Hotham’s reply to the Lords’ 
 Committee (Q. 1893-94), that it was proposed he should exchange 
 the goods in the factories for the slaves, which was properly de¬ 
 clined ; but the whole country was at his feet, and it would have 
 been easy to accomplish their deliverance, by the slightest show 
 of determination to effect this grand object. It appears, 
 however, that Sir Charles entertained an over-sensitive fear 
 lest the rescue of these unhappy wretches from misery worse than 
 death, might be attributed to a desire to obtain prize money. It 
 is deeply to be lamented that he was not aware that, under no 
 existing Act of Parliament, would any such claim have accrued 
 
30 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 from the liberation of these 3,000 unfortunates: that such an 
 award could only be given by a special grant from Parliament; 
 and that, therefore, this imputation, which, under any circum¬ 
 stances, Sir Charles Hotham could well afford to treat with con¬ 
 tempt, was, after all, a mere shadow. As a further proof of the 
 efficacy of blockade, not one of those victims was carried off up 
 to October of this year, when, we rejoice to state, that by the 
 ability, zeal, and energy of Capt. Dunlop, of the “ Alert,” their 
 delivery has been at last accomplished, the white slave-dealers 
 expelled, and, at length, the treaty of 1840 has been fully carried 
 into force. The same accounts report the total extinction of the 
 slave trade from Cape Verde to the Bight of Benin, an extent 
 of near 1,500 miles of coast. 
 
 With such establishments maintained for the Cuba slave trade, 
 having at one time 3,000 slaves ready for export, while only 
 1,500 slaves have, for several years past, been landed in the 
 twelvemonth in that island, there can be no question of the 
 efficacy of the system which, as we said before, has nowhere 
 else been steadily acted on. We ask, why do not these facts ap¬ 
 pear in the Committee’s report? 
 
 We must once more return to the “ lot of statistics,” for the 
 benefit of the British and Foreign Anti Slavery Society, as well 
 as for Mr. Hutt and his seven supporters. Referring to the 
 returns from 1798 to 1805, we find the whole number imported 
 stated at 73,000, of which 15,000 are given to Spanish, 20,000 to 
 Portuguese colonies, and 38,000 to other countries; for 1805 to 
 1810 we have the same general return, but 5,000 are taken from 
 “other countries” and added to Portuguese colonies. But Mr. 
 Bandmcl s book, quoting the best, and indeed the only, 
 authorities—for no new information can have been obtained on 
 the subject—says that, from 1795 to 1805, the amount of the 
 whole importation “ was computed at rather less than 100,000 P 
 
 Can the Committee be ignorant of the fact that, in 1807, 
 both Great Britain and the United States abolished their re¬ 
 spective slave trades; that both these ceased before 1809 ex¬ 
 pired, and that, at the lowest estimate, they together amounted 
 to 40,000? We ask with astonishment, how the column 
 headed “other countries,” from 1798 to 1810, can be reconciled 
 with the cessation of this enormous portion of the traffic? 
 Neither does the average given from 1810 to 1S15 solve the 
 difficulty; as for this period. 20,000 are given as the number im¬ 
 ported into “other countries.” 
 
 If the Anti-Slavery Society pretends that the whole amount 
 of Slave Trade in 1846 and 1847, equalled that which existed 
 just after the English and American Slave Trade ceased in 1807, 
 they might perhaps be not very far from the truth, but to support 
 
THE AFBICiN SQUAD110N. 
 
 31 
 
 the proposition that the squadron has failed, and always must 
 fail, on such a foundation, is obviously as unfair as it is absurd. 
 The year 1835 is obviously the period at which the comparison 
 . 'should be made, when one of the only two existing Slave Trades 
 was first struck—or 1839, when both fell within the reach of the 
 Squadron. The most unfair of all periods to take as the basis of 
 such a calculation is obviously when British Slave Trade was 
 suddenly swept away. We would, however, advise the Society to 
 reconsider conclusions founded on the “ lot of statistics’’ 
 
 If we go back to an earlier date we learn from MJCulloch’s 
 Commercial Dictionary in 1846, in the article “ Slaves and 
 Slave Trade,” “ between 1700 and 1786,610,000 Africans were 
 imported into Jamaica only ; to which, adding the imports into 
 the other islands and continental colonies, and those who died on 
 the passage, the number carried from Africa will appear im¬ 
 mense. The importations by other nations, particularly the 
 French and Portuguese, were also very great.” To a single 
 island 70,000 slaves imported annually for 86 years, and this 
 on the undoubted authority of Bryan Edwards! 
 
 We are justified not only in taking 73,000 as a great under¬ 
 statement for the period from 1798 to 1805, but even in regarding 
 the statement of “ rather less than 100,000 ” as probably much 
 below the mark, but this, adding 14 per cent, mortality would give 
 114,000. We only beg the Anti-Slavery Society to specify the 
 period at which an equal amount of Slave Trade in past times 
 proves our efforts in recent times to be fruitless. We defy them 
 to deny that the Squadron has produced an immense decrease 
 of Slave Trade since 1839, or that the diminished success since 
 1845, has not arisen from causes palpable, notorious, and capa¬ 
 ble of remedy. 
 
 The efficacy of the Squadron after 1839 we find established 
 by a totally independent authority, M’Culloch, who, in the 
 edition of his Commercial Dictionary, published in 1846, (in 
 which he carries his accounts of Brazil down to the middle or 
 end of 1843,) states “ but the exports (of sugar) have not in¬ 
 creased during the last few years; and now that labour is 
 becoming scarcer and dearer in consequence of the increasing 
 difficulties thrown in the way of the importation of slaves, it is 
 doubtful whether it can be maintained." This can only mean 
 the British Squadron, for no one pretends any other check what¬ 
 ever existed. 
 
 A short summary of our previous statements of the number 
 of slaves landed on the continent and islands of America at 
 various periods may be useful; the deaths on the voyage and 
 the numbers captured by cruizers beimr omitted from the cal¬ 
 culations. 
 
TIIE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 It is admitted that from 1795 to 1805 there was very little 
 variation in the amount of slave trade; at this time every state 
 possessing American colonies practised and encouraged the 
 traffic, excepting Denmark alone, who, highly to her honour, had 
 abolished it in 1792. The first-period, therefore, we select is 1798. 
 
 gy’ | Colonic: 
 
 This maybe taken as the amount of slave trade down to 1807, 
 when England and the United States passed laws against the 
 traffic, and entirely abandoned it before the end of 1809. The 
 calculation as regards these countries is probably much below 
 the truth, being less than any contemporaneous estimate. 
 
 France abolished the trade in 1815, but did not affix penalties 
 sufficiently severe to give effect to this prohibition until 1827 : 
 it is now near twenty years since an instance has occurred of a 
 French vessel engaged in the slave trade. 
 
 Holland abolished the trade in 1814, and by the treaty of 
 1823, subjecting equipped vessels to capture by the British 
 squadron, the Dutch slave trade was totally put down. 
 
 The slave trade of these several nations, amounting in 1798 to 
 65,000 per annum, has, therefore, entirely ceased for many years. 
 That directed by Spain and Portugal to other colonies besides 
 Cuba and Brazil, is also at an end. The slave trade for several 
 years has been carried on solely to Cuba and Brazil; but until 
 the British squadron was enabled to interpose an effectual check, 
 by capturing equipped slave vessels, the importations to those 
 parts alone exceeded the whole slave trade of the world in 1798, 
 and had themselves increased sixfold between those dates. 
 
 No. of slaves landed in Cuba ^ 
 
 1798—(Note to tables sub- ! 600Q 
 raitted to Commons’Com- f * 
 raittee by Mr. Bandinel, / 
 
 Ditto landed in Brazil in 
 1798, taking the Cora-\ 
 mittee's tables, and de- 1 
 ducting 5,000 from the /15,000 
 Portuguese slave trade in 
 that year for other colo- } 
 
 40,000 • 
 
 94,000 
 
 in Brazil in 1S3S, before 
 2nd & 3rd Vic., c. 73, 
 came into force—(Vide 
 Sir. Bandinel on slave 
 trade, p. 287.) 
 
 Total number of slaves 
 landed in Cuba and Bra¬ 
 zil in 1798 .... 
 
 134,0 
 
 Total number of slaves 
 landed in Cuba & Brazil 
 in 1835 and 1838 respec* 
 
33 
 
 Checked in 1835, the slave trade of Cuba was rapidly reco¬ 
 vering itself under the flag of Portugal; thus the Act of 1839 
 was almost as important with respect to Cuba as to Brazil. In 
 the words of Mr. Bandinel, p. 225, “ that Act has accomplished 
 the purpose intended by it; for its effect has been to sweep the 
 sea almost entirely of slave traders under the Portuguese flag.” 
 Under no other flag could they escape the equipment articles 
 without incurring still more serious dangers, and a large propor¬ 
 tion of the 594 slave vessels captured since 1839, have been con¬ 
 demned in the appropriate character of piratical vessels “ not 
 belonging to any state or nation.” 
 
 For the six years immediately succeeding this important mea¬ 
 sure we witness the following remarkable decrease of the slave 
 
 Average number of si; 
 ported into Cuba in o 
 from 1S40 to 1845, 
 
 (Mean of numbers given 
 | Committee's tables. 
 
 Ditto ditto i 
 
 
 500, (Cot. Mag. Dec.) ap 
 1 to the year 1840. 
 
 JDo. by Ct 
 
 Total annual number of slaves, 
 landed in Cuba and Brazil for L 28,738 
 six years, after 1839 . . . J 1 ‘ v ”'‘ v “ 
 
 Do. 24,469 Do. by Foreign office returns 
 
 The Committee’s tables for 1846 and 1847 show almost tl 
 complete extinction of the slave trade of Cuba, but a large i 
 crease on that of Brazil, compared with the above. 
 
 Mean of tl 
 
 
 an of years 1846, 47 
 wage for o years, eni 
 
 The Committee’s own tables 
 show, as regards Cuba, 
 since 1S35, a reduction of 
 With this our estimate 
 agrees. _ 38,800 Do. by our estimate. 
 
 By our calculation, therefore, the amount of slave trade even 
 in 1846 and 1847 was reduced, compared with 1835 and 1838, 
 by 77,200 in each year. 
 
 Even Mr. Hutt’s own tables show, in the yerrs 1846 and 1847, 
 compared with the same periods’ (no correction whatever being 
 applied), a reduction of 48,200 in each year ! 
 
 For the six previous years, as compared with the slave trade 
 of Cuba in 1835 and that of Brazil in 1838, our calculations 
 show a reduction amounting to no less than 105,262 in each year. 
 
 For the same periods (no correction being applied) the Com¬ 
 mittee’s tables show a reduction of no less than 73,629 in each 
 year. 
 
34 
 
 AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 We leave our readers to choose between these figures; but we 
 are at a loss to understand how those, even of Mr. Hutt uncor- 
 rccted, support the conclusions cither of his own majority, or of 
 the Anti-Slavery Society—viz., that the only limit of slave trade 
 is the demand for slaves; that the slave trade is larger than it 
 ever was, and rages wholly unchecked by the squadron. Both 
 declare the Sugar Bill of 1846 to be an additional stimulant 
 that never before existed; how then, we ask, is it that Mr. Hutt’s 
 own statement shows a reduction in the total annual amount of 
 slave trade, compared with the periods when the squadron could 
 not act with effect, of more than 48,000 ? Or, going back to 
 the years 1835 and 1838, is it utterly unworthy of notice that, 
 subsequent to those periods, the same tables uncorrectcd show 
 that an aggregate of 538,174 victims have been saved from the 
 horrors of the slave trade by prevention ? We have, rve think, 
 proved the amount of success to have been even yet more consi¬ 
 derable, and shall now show first how it was attained up to 
 1846 ; and then for the following years why, though still keep¬ 
 ing down the traffic to less than one half its former amount, our 
 efforts have been less effective as regards the hlave Trade of 
 Brazil. 
 
 When the Act of 1839 came into force the officers in command 
 of the several cruizers, having for the most part long experience 
 of the inefficacy of the former system, immediately recognised 
 the advantage arising from the power to capture equipped slave 
 ships, and adopted the measures necessary to give effect to this 
 power. They knew by experience that, cruizing at a distance 
 front the shore, a large proportion of vessels must always escape 
 with slaves; as the result, therefore, of their own observation, the 
 old system of distant cruizing was very generally abandoned, and 
 the vessels, for the most part, were thenceforth employed close to 
 the shore. 
 
 The squadron was at this time too small to effect complete 
 suppression, and a part of it (there being no orders on the sub¬ 
 ject) still adhered to the old plan, and cruized out of sight of 
 the land; but this partial adoption of the system of preventing 
 the embarkation of slaves was aided by the partial adoption of 
 other measures which struck at the root of the evil—viz., the 
 destruction of the slave factories. 
 
 In November 1840 the slave factories at Gallinas, which had 
 long exported at least 12,000 slaves in each year to Cuba, were 
 destroyed. Eight different establishments existed of great ex¬ 
 tent, employing 60 white men, and at these one thousand tons of 
 goods, exclusively destined to purchase slaves, had been landed 
 during the previous nine months, to the certain knowledge ol 
 the officers employed in watching this depot. These depots 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 35 
 
 were moled out in consccjucncc of tlic slave-dealers of Gall‘mas 
 having habitually bought and sold British subjects from Sierra 
 Leone as slaves for export, and this blow was struck in virtue of 
 a treaty with the native chiefs, under which the slave factors 
 were expelled, and prohibited from returning, the slaves were 
 given up, amounting to near 900, and the factories were rased 
 to the ground. These measures were entirely approved bv the 
 Government, as was expressly recorded by the Foreign Office, 
 the Colonial Office, and the Admiralty, and orders were sent 
 out to act generally against the slave factories in the same manner. 
 
 Early in 184:2, pursuant to these orders, Captain Matson was 
 directed bv the Commodore to destroy the factories of Ambriz 
 and Cabenda, thus striking a blow as severe against the slave 
 trade of Brazil as that of Cuba had received fifteen or eighteen 
 months before. Had these measures been followed up, the force 
 then on the coast would have been amply sufficient to put an end 
 to the slave trade, for without such depots it cannot he continued. 
 
 Nothing can more remarkably show the amount of prejudice 
 on this subject than the repeated statements (though ten times 
 refuted) even of disinterested persons, as to the effect of the 
 destruction of slave factories. These various reiterated assu¬ 
 rances are entirely opposite to the fact. No loss of life has ever 
 arisen amongst the crews of Her Majesty’s ships thus employed, 
 no bloodshed among the natives; the slave factories have 
 neither been established at a distance inland, nor has the trade 
 sprung up on new parts of the coast. . We are still told it docs 
 harm rather than good, by driving away lawful commerce; 
 though it has been proved, by the prolonged experience of a 
 host of officers, that no shadow of lawful commerce had existed 
 for a long course of years. It is true that Mr. Jackson, in his 
 maiden speech, stated that he had himself known a cargo of pro¬ 
 duce shipped from Gallinas; but he forgot to add, or the re¬ 
 porter omitted, the essential fact—viz., that it was 25 years before. 
 
 As regards Ambriz and Cabenda, Captain Matson has re¬ 
 corded the delight with which the lawful traders witnessed the 
 rooting out of their rivals, the truth being that in every part 
 slave trade and innocent commerce are enemies and antagonists; 
 in all its old haunts, wherever the former has not been banished 
 by the squadron, it is preferred by the chiefs, and as long as 
 there is a slave ship to supply, lawful trade is neglected and 
 despised. 
 
 Still, however, we hear all these imaginary results of destroy¬ 
 ing the depots, and it has been even asserted that such measures 
 are totally without any effect whatever on the slave trade itself. 
 But the slightest consideration must satisfy any unprejudiced 
 person of the tremendous actual losses they inflicted, to say 
 
36 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON'. 
 
 nothing of the prospects of enormous gains they destroyed! In 
 proportion to the severity of the blow would he the anxiety to 
 deny or conceal its effect. The terror it must have struck among 
 the slave dealers of Cuba and Brazil, who had tens of thousands 
 of capital similarly invested, can be no matter of doubt; but so 
 powerfully did such motives operate, that the British Commis¬ 
 sioners in Cuba and Brazil made no allusion to these proceed¬ 
 ings, and appear not to have even known that they had taken 
 place, until the intelligence had arrived from England! Dr. 
 Cliffe himself, we might suppose, was entirely ignorant of these 
 events, even when he tells the Sugar and Coffee Planting Com¬ 
 mittee of their effect on the slave trade of Brazil—vide answer 
 to question 1490. “I once bought a little chap just like a 
 dolly; he could not, from his teeth, have been more than six, 
 perhaps not so much; lie was too small to work: I gave 850 
 milreis for him.” 
 
 These facts may possibly suggest some doubts to the minds of 
 those who have implicitedly trusted the slave dealers, when 
 assured by them that the squadron is highly beneficial to their 
 interests 1 We really expect soon to be told that the uprooting 
 of slave factories, by the very losses inflicted, only encourages 
 the inveterate spirit of gambling excited by the traffic, which (it 
 has been asserted) would keep the hateful pursuit alive in the 
 face of any penalties, and in spite of any losses 1 
 
 Others, again, seem to suppose that a rise in the price of slaves, 
 however great, would only give increased stimulus and enlarged 
 profits to the slave dealer; but such an. increase of price could 
 arise only from proportionably aggravated losses and diminished 
 numbers, and there must be plainly a limit to the price a Brazi¬ 
 lian planter can give for a new slave. Unless we are to believe 
 a similar insanity will induce him still to purchase slaves, though 
 the price should far exceed the value of their labour, we must see 
 that the slave trade was almost at an end when a boy of six years 
 old cost 850 milreis! 
 
 But in August 1842, the fear of such sweeping measures was 
 removed by the unfortunate publication of Lord Aberdeen’s 
 letter to the Admiralty, stating that the Queen’s Advocate “could 
 not take upon himself to advise that all the proceedings described 
 as having taken place at Gallinas, New Cestos, and Seabar, arc 
 entirely justifiablethat, under certain circumstances, (describ¬ 
 ing indeed the course actually pursued at Gallinas,) the Queen’s 
 Advocate was of opinion such measures would be lawful, but 
 adding, “ that if, in proceeding to destroy any factory, it should 
 be found to contain merchandise, or other property, which there 
 may be reason to suppose to belong to foreign traders, care 
 should be taken not to include such property in the destruction 
 
N SQUADItOX. 
 
 of the factories.” This passage seemed to ensure perfect im¬ 
 punity to the Spanish and Brazilian slave dealers as “ foreign 
 traders,” and was read in this sense alike by them, and by Her 
 Majesty’s officers. 
 
 The importance of this letter in the minds of the slave dealers, 
 and their deep anxiety on the subject, may be conceived from 
 the eagerness witli which they seized upon it. A few days after 
 its appearance in the Report of a Committee of the House of 
 Commons, in August 1842, three actions were commenced 
 against Captain Denman, in the names of the slave dealers of 
 Gallinas and the Havanah, with damages laid at above 300,000/., 
 including a barefaced claim for the loss of 4,000 slaves ! 
 
 The Commissioners at Sierra Leone report, in Dec. 1842, 
 that “at Gallinas the slave trade, which had been paralysed for 
 a time by the sweeping destruction of the slave factories and 
 barracoons, is stated to have partially revived.” Thus this 
 opinion had already begun to produce its effect in Dec. 1842, 
 and in Dec. 1843 the Commissioners report, “theGallinas slave 
 trading establishments have all been restored, and are in active 
 operation.” 
 
 As regards the Southern coast, Captains Butterfield and Mat- 
 son state, in their evidence, how completely the slave trade in 
 that quarter was laid prostrate, and that the slave dealers were 
 actually returning to Brazil in despair, when, thus re-assured, 
 they established themselves attain, and commenced their opera- 
 
 Captain Matson says, in answer to Q. 1330, ( Vide Commons’ 
 Report,) “ Before I left the coast, in the leginning of 1843, the 
 vessels were leginning to come over full of goods, and the very 
 same men that had left the coast of Africa the year before I met 
 returning from Brazil - men I was very well acquainted with, and 
 who had relinquished the hope of carrying on the slave trade.” 
 
 In 1845 the slave dealers at Gallinas were again detected 
 dealing in British subjects. The Spaniard, who had branded 
 the flesh of one of these victims with his mark, (one of the plain¬ 
 tiffs at the time in the pending action,) set the British Commo¬ 
 dore at defiance, told the natives he would “ be protected in 
 London,” and escaped with perfect impunity, inasmuch as his 
 goods, found in the building where this outrage had been com¬ 
 mitted, were “carefully removed to a place of safety,” (with which 
 he probably bought more British subjects,) while the materials 
 of the buildings (belonging to the native chiefs, and worth per¬ 
 haps 50 dollars) were carried to a distance and burnt! Thus 
 were the slave dealers encouraged, and the hands of British offi¬ 
 cers tied by this opinion: he who runs may read its consequences 
 in these facts. 
 
TIIE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 But the stimulating effect of this document was for a time 
 neutralised by the increase of the squadron, and by orders from 
 home to adopt the system of in shore cruizing, in order to prevent 
 the embarkation of slaves; wherever this system has been car¬ 
 ried out its success has been remarkable, and wholly beyond 
 question. On the parts of the coast from whence Cuba derives 
 her slaves it has been steadily acted upon; on the parts from whence 
 Brazil is supplied it has never been carried out since the year 1845. 
 Accordingly, in the year 1846 and 1847 we find the slave trade 
 of Cuba but 1,600 in eacii year, taking the mean; while that of 
 Brazil reached a mean amount of 55,200 ! 
 
 The system of preventing the shipment of slaves, and keeping 
 the squadron in shore, instead of cruizing in the offing, had been 
 adopted on the recommendation of Captains Denman and Mat- 
 son, as was stated in the House of Commons on more than one 
 occasion by Sir Robert Peel in 1844; and, subsequently, the 
 same system was urged by Captains Trotter, Adams, Butterfield, 
 and Sprigg, as well as by the French officers examined before 
 the Due de Broglie and Dr. Lushington. 
 
 Having learned that, on some parts of the coast at least, the 
 old plan of cruizing at a distance from the land had been re¬ 
 sumed, Captain Denman stated the fact before Lord George 
 Bentinck’s Committee, and attributed the alleged increase of 
 slave trade to this change. 
 
 To this evidence Sir Charles Hotliam alludes in the following 
 despatch:— 
 
 Vcnclopc, in Elephant Bay, Vlth August, 1848. 
 
 “ Sir,— 
 
 1. “I request you will lay the accompanying letter from Commander 
 Dixon, of Her Majesty’s ship “ Rapid,” before my Lords Commis¬ 
 sioners of the Admiralty. 
 
 2. “ After the opinion delivered by Captain Denman before the 
 sugar and coffee Committee, that proper principles are not pursued by 
 this squadron in their endeavours to suppress the slave trade, I feel 
 that I am not needlessly troubling their lordships in requesting you to 
 lay before the Board the opinion of an officer who for some time com¬ 
 manded the Sierra Leone division. 
 
 3. “ Should it be necessary to pursue this subject any further, I 
 can, without difficulty, procure sufficient evidence to overturn remarks 
 which appear to have been made without due reflection. 
 
 4. “ In the mean time I may add, that Commander Dixon’s infor¬ 
 mants are the slave dealers themselves, and the neighbouring chiefs, 
 who to obtain their annual stipend, are deeply interested in the sup¬ 
 pression of the slave trade. 
 
 “ I have, &c., 
 
 (Signed) “ Charles Hotham, 
 
 “ Commodore and Commander in Chief. 
 
 “ The Secretary of the Admiralty.” 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 “ Her Majesty’s ship ‘ Eapid.’ 
 l: 1« June, 1848. 
 
 “I have tlio honour to inform you that, to the best of my belief, no 
 vessel has escaped with slaves from the Gallinas or Seabar from the 
 1st of November, 1847, to the 12th of May, 1S4S. 
 
 1 have, &c., 
 
 (Signed) “ Edward Dixon, 
 
 “ Commander, late Senior Officer, 
 
 “ .Sierra i.cjne Diiision. - 
 “ Commodore Sir diaries Hotliam, Iv.C.13., 
 
 Coiiuuauder in Chief.” 
 
 But it appears that even in the northern division what thes 
 officers considered were “proper principles,” were acted on, 
 not by the Commodore’s orders, and that on the South coast 
 the very opposite course was pursued; but at present we must 
 show the success of this system on the Northern coast and on 
 the slave trade of Cuba. 
 
 In a despatch, dated December 5th 1840, (vide appendix to 
 Commons Report 1849) Sir Charles Iiotham says:—“ The slave 
 dealers at Gallinas, Seabar, and the North, formerly supplied 
 the Iiavannah trade, during 1840 and 1847 few, if any, slaves 
 were exported from those mans.” 
 
 Sir C. Hotliam states, in evidence before the lords, the following 
 facts as to the means by which this result was attained; Q. 1883, 
 “ Does not. the Gallinas trade almost exclusively go to Cuba 1” 
 —A. “I have always been informed so.”— Q. 1884: “What 
 mode of cruising was adopted by Commander Dixon, in charge 
 of that station?”— A. “lie kepi his vessel constantly cruising 
 near the shore.'’ 
 
 Q. “1885: Was it entirely optional with him to do the one or 
 the other , as he thought best?”—A. “ Quite so.” 
 
 Q. 1886: “Did the other divisional officers keep their ships 
 cruising in shore ?”■— A.“ I believe ( 1 W iId 
 
 had been on that station eighteen months under my orders, has 
 invariably done the same.” ■ 
 
 It is perfectly clear that, even on the Northern coast, the sys¬ 
 tem, to carry out which the squadron had been increased, 
 has been persevered in by mere accident; the officers who were 
 in command having had' a discretion left to them, which they 
 ably turned to account; had Commander Murray not estab¬ 
 lished this system, or had Commander Dixon not continued it, 
 instead of 1,500 slaves per annum landed in Cuba, the result 
 would have been an increase of slave trade, such as we have now 
 
40 TIIE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 from the cessation of demand, is proved by the fact that in 1843 
 all the slave factories were re-estabiislied by Cuba slave mer¬ 
 chants, and were maintained at a vast expense down to February 
 1849, when they were destroyed by Sir Charles Hotham, as ex¬ 
 isting contrary to the Treaty' of 1840. The great extent of 
 these establishments, may be learned from Sir Charles Hothani’s 
 evidence (vide Lords’ Report from Q. 1875 to Q. 1888). It is 
 clear these factories were long maintained at a dead loss, in the 
 hope of reaping a rich harvest when the withdrawal of the 
 squadron took place, an event the slave dealers were taught by 
 the English press to expect as certain and immediate. 
 
 Great however as was the success of this system on the North 
 coast, Sir Charles Hotham still adhered to the opinion that the 
 cruisers were most effective when stationed out of sight of land. 
 He states that the other system is applicable only to the Northern 
 coast; but Captains Matson, Adams, Butterfield, and Sprigg, 
 who have the longest experience of the Southern coast, and who 
 have actually in their own practice had means of testing the 
 inefficiency of distant cruising, compared with operations in 
 shore, have proved the reverse. 
 
 We have before stated that the African squadron was increased 
 for the object of preventing the embarkation of slaves; but as 
 regards Brazil, before this system could be fairly tried, viz.: to¬ 
 wards the end of 1845, Brazilian slave vessels were allowed to pass 
 unmolested, owing to the pretended lapse of the Treaty; and soon 
 afterwards, when the Act supplying its place came into force, 
 the English cruisers were withdrawn from several hundred miles 
 of the African coast, comprising the Portuguese possessions, 
 whence Brazil has alwaj's obtained more than half her slaves; 
 and this district was left unguarded by British cruisers for up¬ 
 wards of twelve months. 
 
 In January, 1847, shortly after Sir C. Hotham assumed the 
 command, the squadron was again replaced upon this coast, 
 and the following extracts will show that a system was pursued 
 diametrically opposite to the one, to fulfil which the squadron 
 had been increased. Captain Lysaght states that he was cruiz¬ 
 ing off Ambriz and Bcnguela about fourteen months, during 
 which time he was ordered to cruize front 70 to 100 miles from 
 the shore, Vide Lords’ Report, Q. 4142. Captain Chads, who 
 was one of the first officers stationed off Ambriz when the 
 cruizers were replaced, and who captured twenty-six vessels in 
 this quarter, does not state at what distance from the shore he 
 was ordered to cruize; but lie says (Vide Lords’ Report, Q. 
 4057), “ I had various orders from*time to time; but whenever 
 I was left to my own operations, which I frequently was, I 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 almost invariably cruized in shore; I found that to answer best. 
 By cruizing in shore I did not take a single full vessel, but I 
 captured a great many empty ones. I considered that prevention 
 teas better than cure.” (We recommend this to the attention of 
 all those who have read Mr. Hutt’s resolution of 1848, showing 
 as a proof of failure, that only 4 per cent of the number of 
 slaves landed across the Atlantic were captured, and who have 
 not discovered in his appendix that 594 slave vessels, the great 
 majority without slaves, were captured during the same time.) 
 
 Captain Sprigg, who had a long previous experience of this 
 very coast, shows the ‘‘immense effect” produced by the small 
 force employed in 1842, consisting of three vessels besides his 
 own. These were commanded by officers of long African ex¬ 
 perience, Captains Matson, Butterfield, and Adams, to whose 
 opinion we have already referred. In the Lords’ llepori, 
 Answer 3656, Captain Sprigg describes the different measures 
 pursued under Sir Charles Hotham’s command. After showing 
 the importance of being able to inspect the boats passing back¬ 
 wards and forwards along the coast, he says:—“ Now in the 
 former part of the time, it was the duty of the officers to acquire 
 information, and they did acquire great information. When 
 the subsequent orders came out of Commodore Ilotham, to keep 
 off the coast, they were so stringent, that although as an officer 
 I had three years’ experience on the coast at that time, the order 
 tied me up as if I had none. It is also to be observed, that it 
 was not only tying us up from obtaining information on shore, 
 but it actually tied us up from communicating with the cruizcrs 
 which were stationed next or near us. It was headed ‘ Confi¬ 
 dential,’ and by this means w’c were actually tied up from com¬ 
 municating so as to co-operate with officers who might come in 
 sight of each other. ‘ Confidential.’ Copy of sailing orders, 
 by W. Edmonds, Esq., Commander of H.M.S. Heroine, and 
 Senior officer of the Congo division. ‘ Mem. I am directed by 
 Sir C. Hotham to inform the Commanders of the respective 
 ships belonging to this division, that their sailing orders are to 
 be considered by them strictly private and confidential;’ so 
 that in case of any senior officer asking me for this order, I was 
 to tell him of this preamble, and withhold the order. ‘ 2. You 
 will take up your station between the river Settc and Banda 
 point, cruizing between those latitudes thirty miles off the land, 
 until the 31st of August. Then cruize between the same lati¬ 
 tudes sixty miles, till the 30th Sept .; then resume your former 
 distance of thirty miles, and so alternately until you receive 
 further directions, gee.’ ” Captain Sprigg adds : “ This order 
 continued in force for a period of eight or nine months. I met 
 with three Commanders, and each officer said ‘ where arc your 
 
AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 orders?’ The answer was: ‘ mine arc confidential.’&c. ‘The 
 consequence was, that instead of gaining information from each 
 other, and assisting each other to intercept slavers, or planning 
 any mutual efforts to hear upon a point, there could be no 
 mutual aid or concert.” 
 
 Q. 3663. “Are the committee to understand that in your 
 opinion the distance at which the cruisers were ordered to keep 
 was fatal to the success of the blockade ? ” A. “ I consider it 
 decidedly so.” 
 
 Sir Charles Hotliam himself declares his opinion repeatedly 
 hi favour of distant cruizing. Lords’ Report, 2062. “Had 
 you any means of ascertaining what their general plan of pro¬ 
 ceeding was in coming over from Brazil to the coast of Africa; 
 when they near the coast what do they do ? ” A. “ I believe 
 that when they arrive at a certain distance, say 100 miles from 
 their point, they send a boat on shore, communicate with the 
 factors, and arrange the horn- at which they will arrive; they 
 arrive at the very hour, the wind being always at their command, 
 and ship (their slaves). The greater part of our captures, asi 
 have been told by the dealers, have been made during the time of 
 their waiting off the coast. They say if they could arrange any 
 system to prevent that, they should not care a farthing for the 
 blockade.” 
 
 It is surprising that the British Commodore should thus 
 trust to the slave dealers who had such an interest in deceiving 
 him! This reads to us as the strongest proof in favour of the 
 blockade system. The chart given in the Lords’ Report which 
 shows the spot where each capture was made by Sir C. Hotliam’s 
 own squadron, sufficiently marks the reasons why the slave dealer 
 should desire the Commodore to entertain this opinion. The 
 chart, in fact, shows that of 164 captures, only 37 were made 
 60 miles and upwards from the coast, and that, notwithstanding 
 these orders, upwards of 80 vessels were taken within 20 miles 
 of the shore. 
 
 This fact established, the reader will be not a little surprised 
 at the reply to the next question, 2063. “Had, therefore, in your 
 opinion, vessels cruizing 70 miles from the land, as good a 
 chance of catching more before they got their slaves on board, 
 as if they were inshore V’ A. “ They had a better.” 
 
 Q. 2064. “And could they as well prevent shipment?” 
 A. “Yes.” 
 
 It becomes necessary now to remark that Sir C. Holham’s 
 opinions are formed upon the reports of others rather than upon 
 his own actual observation.— Vide questions and answers from 
 1721 to 1730, inclusive, Lord’s Report. 
 
 But unsatisfactory as must be opinions collected from the 
 
4.3 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 conflicting reports of twenty or thirty difl'erent sources, under 
 even the most favourable circumstances, Sir Charles Hothatn 
 states at 1752, 3, and 4, that lie consulted no one who happened 
 to he serving under his orders at the time, excepting Captain 
 Mansell, whom he relieved from the temporary command. After' 
 stating his opinion to be in favour of keeping the cruizers out of 
 sight of land, in order to frustrate the movements of the 
 slave dealers, and prevent the position of the cruizers being 
 known, he gives the following answer to question 895 (Commons’ 
 Report):—“ Such, therefore, being the position of your ships, it 
 was utterly impossible for you, or any captain under your com¬ 
 mand, to ascertain the precise position of the places where the 
 slave dealers had established their factories ?” A. “ II"c could 
 form some conjectures of their movements in the Bight of Benin , 
 hut oil no other part of the coast.” Therefore, had Sir C. Hotham 
 been anxious to avail himself to the utmost of the experience of 
 others, the information collected wherever his own views were 
 carried into effect, could have been of small value. And this 
 answers one of Sir Charles Hotham's objections to Captain Den¬ 
 man’s memorandum as to the best mode of proceeding (nV/c p. 27, 
 First Report of Mr. llutfs Committee) viz., that the depots of 
 slave trade arc not known; how can they be known to the 
 squadron when cruizing out of sight of land ! 
 
 How little actual personal experience Sir Charles had obtained 
 of the south coast, where his own views appear to have been 
 most stringently enforced, appears in the following part of his 
 evidence (vide Lords’ Report). 
 
 Q. 1716. “ To which of the .-lave stations on the south coast you have 
 mentioned were you yourself able to give the most personal observation V’ 
 A. “ I cannot say that I gave any one spot more personal observation 
 than another; my duty did not consist in that: my duty consisted in 
 superintending the whole station, instead of directing mysolt to any par¬ 
 ticular pointthat task fell more on the shoulders of the captains under 
 my orders, and to them I looked for the duty.” 
 
 Q. 1717. “ Then, in point of fact, it did not fall within your duty, as 
 commanding the whole squadron, personally and actually, to observe, for 
 any time, any of the principal slave posts yourself?”— A. I cruized off 
 them from time to time, when I had nothing else particularly to do. 1 
 did not confine my attention to any one post. Still, if I did name a 
 point, I should sap Amiris." 
 
 Q. 1718. “ But you were not able, consistently with your other 
 duties, to stay long enough before any one of the principal slave posts 
 to be able, personally, and by your own actual presence, to satisfy your¬ 
 self as to the carrying on of the slave trade r”— A. “ In answer to that 
 question, I may say I was long enough off Ambriz to be able to deter¬ 
 mine as to the trade being carried on to a very considerable extent. 
 Beyond that I can <live the committee no particular information:’ 
 
44 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 Q 1719. “Bo you happen to recollect how long you were able to 
 stay actually oif Ambriz in a posture of observation.'’— A. “ Cruizing oil' 
 
 Q. 1720. “ At what distance were you cruizing from the shore?”— 
 A. “I was generally, I thinkfforty or fifty miles from the shore.” 
 
 Sir Charles Hotham (Lords’ Report, Q. 1,690)— 
 
 Q. “ Had you yourself any previous knowledge of Africa, before you 
 undertook the command of that squadron on the African coast ?”— A. 
 “ None whatever. I am almost ashamed to say that I had never even 
 directed my attention to the subject; therefore, I came upon the coast 
 as unprejudiced as any officer could be, except as far as I was actuated 
 by the desire to do my duty, and please my employers.” 
 
 It appears also by other parts of Sir Charles’s evidence, that 
 he had no instructions whatever as to the mode in which he was 
 to employ his force, nor had he the advantage even of meeting 
 the commodore he succeeded. Thus, a coast extending 3,000 
 miles, every part of which was equally unknown, the arrange¬ 
 ment of a large squadron, and a duty of acknowledged difficulty, 
 entirely new to him, were committed to Sir Charles Hotham, and 
 with every thing to learn, he was thus left to grope his way in 
 the dark towards the suppression of the slave trade. The various 
 complicated duties of his command appear to have absorbed his 
 attention, and he obviously had no means of forming opinions on 
 his own actual observation. Sir Charles Hotham has attributed 
 the former success of the squadron to the slave trade south of the 
 line having been then “in its infancy but would it not be more 
 just to say that the suppression of the slave trade was in its in¬ 
 fancy when an officer, however talented, had such duties imposed 
 upon him under such conditions? That England should succeed 
 in the struggle while she thus conducts it, is simply impossible. 
 Each new commodore is much in the same position as if he were 
 the first officer ever employed on this service; and so long as 
 officers arc thus sent out, without either previous experience or 
 spedfie instructions, the country is perpetually commencing the 
 struggle de novo in the person of the new commodore, without a 
 prospect of bringing it to a successful issue. 
 
 It has been absolutely necessary to show that the strong opin¬ 
 ions expressed by Sir Charles Hotham are not founded on actual 
 experience; had lie been sent out with orders to ascertain the 
 places xvhence slaves were exported, and to devote his efforts 
 to prevent the embarkation of slaves from them, we have not 
 a doubt of his success. As it was, no responsibility for the 
 failure of this system can attach to those who recommended it. 
 On the north coast, where (owing to the accidental circumstances 
 detailed), it has been tried, it has perfectly succeeded. On the 
 southern coast it has been entirely abandoned, and, although the 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 45 
 
 squadron still materially kept down the traffic, we have, in 
 consequence, to regret a considerable increase in the slave trade 
 of Brazil compared with the average of the six years following 
 1839. 
 
 Sir Charles llotham has also specified some facts in support of 
 his opinions. He estimates the coast on which the slave trade is 
 actively pursued at 2,195 miles; but this is nearly twice the 
 real extent of the slave trading coast, as proved by evidence be¬ 
 fore the Lords’ Committee (vide question 2,128—4,460, evidence 
 of Captains Matson and Denman), and on no other parts do 
 the peculiar characteristics essential to success under present 
 
 rivers run parallel with the sea, which “ may be considered the 
 railways of Africa; by them slaves arc transported from point 
 to point, and shipped, not at any fixed point, but according to 
 the position of the cruiser,” and that where these do not exist, 
 the slaves are treated like post horses, and run from spot to spot; 
 with his despatch of December 5th, 1848, stating these facts, he 
 transmits a chart to establish them, printed in the appendix to Mr. 
 Hutt’s Committee, in which such a water communication close 
 inside the beach is shown as extending all the way from Cape St. 
 Paul to Loango, 1,300 miles—and again to the south a road is 
 drawn as stretching to the south from Cabenda, between 400 and 
 500 miles; but the chart shows this road to run from 50 to 
 100 miles inland, and therefore it would not afford this supposed 
 facility, even if it were an easy matter to drive about 400 or 500 
 ironed slaves like post horses. As regards the tvater communi¬ 
 cation, it is proved to have no existence for more than three- 
 fourths of its supposed extent, viz., from the Quorra to Loango, 
 by the concurrent testimony of several officers thoroughly ac¬ 
 quainted with every part of this district. The only part where 
 this lagoon really exists is along the Bight of Benin, where it 
 can never be of the slightest use to the slave dealers in enabling 
 them to ship a single slave, so long as the part of its shores alone 
 available to the slave dealers (only 200 miles), is guarded by 
 the constant presence of five active cruisers, ordered to keep 
 close to the shore and prevent slave trade. It appears that lat¬ 
 terly a discretion has been left to the commanding officer of that 
 division, and Captain Hastings, of the “ Cyclops ” has ordered 
 his vessels to keep always within six miles of the shore. 
 
 We have been most reluctant to enter into these errors of Sir 
 Charles Hotham; but they are supported by his high reputa¬ 
 tion as an officer of acknowledged skill and ability, and should 
 all Ins recommendations be adopted, they would involve, in our 
 opinion, consequences so disastrous and deplorable, that we have 
 no choice. Sir Charles Hotham’s squadron was in a state of dis- 
 
46 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 ciplinc that reflects high credit upon him; it is also to be ad¬ 
 mitted that it would have been desirable to have had fora time 
 a greater number of vessels. He had, however, enough to watch 
 all the principal slave depots, and had his squadron been gene¬ 
 rally thus employed he would have effectually cheeked the suc¬ 
 cess of the slave dealers, and would have at least succeeded in 
 keeping the slave trade of Brazil down to the average to which 
 it was reduced during the six years after 1839, for most of the 
 time, by a force scarcely half as large as his, and without steam 
 vessels; as it was, appointed to the command under the disadvan¬ 
 tages we have described, it was scarcely possible that any amount 
 of talent, or of zeal could have taught him the best course 
 of action, and destitute alike of previous knowledge and 
 of specific instructions, no other result could be expected but 
 failure. We have purposely abstained from referring to the 
 plan Sir Charles Hotham suggested in his despatch of December 
 5th, as a substitute for the present measures, as the tenor of his 
 evidence on this subject shows that it was made without sufficient 
 consideration, especially, as in his various examinations Sir 
 Charles Hotham declined to specify the period for which he 
 would allow the trade of Brazil to continue, or to fill up any 
 details of the scheme he sketched out. 
 
 The consideration of the question whether or not measures for 
 the suppression of the slave trade shall be abandoned, would be 
 obviously imperfect without a reference to the views of the British 
 and foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which has long and loudly 
 joined in the demand for the withdrawal of the squadron. 
 
 The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society was first 
 founded in 1839,-when the old society, having carried the aboli¬ 
 tion of the slave trade, and of slavery in the colonies, had ceased 
 to take any active part as a body, though it never was dis¬ 
 solved. This new society, early in its history, condemned the 
 use of force in tolo, as a means of suppressing the slave trade. 
 But it is equally undeniable that these views were not adopted 
 by the late Sir Powell Buxton; and that Lord Brougham, Lord 
 Denman, Bishop Wilberforcc, Dr. Lushington, Sir Robert Inglis, 
 Sir Thomas Acland, Sir Edward Buxton, Mr. Evans, and many 
 other of the staunchest and most distinguished friends of the 
 cause entirely repudiate them. 
 
 We regard several of the persons who form the Committee 
 of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society with sincere 
 respect; still we have great doubts how far any body of men, 
 however well meaning, are justified in holding this title while 
 advocating views which are unreservedly condemned by those 
 public men, who are generally regarded as the representatives 
 of anti-slavery opinions. When the country is told that the 
 
E AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 47 
 
 Anti-Slavery Society urges the removal of the squadron, these 
 are the names suggested to every mind, and the great majority, 
 who have not followed up the subject with attention, believe 
 this to be the authoritative dictum of all these eminent men, 
 instead of the opinion of a few persons in general wholly unknown 
 to the public. 
 
 It is to be deplored that persons honestly devoted to such a 
 cause should find themselves in a state of discord and opposition, 
 but the Anti-Slavery Society’s opinions are so perverted, as to 
 be most powerfully aiding the interests of the slave dealer, and 
 tending towards an unlimited and perpetuated slave trade; 
 anxiously then as we would deprecate divisions, here there ap¬ 
 pears to be no option: but by every motive which urges so 
 powerfully those who have thought long and deeply on the sub¬ 
 ject, it becomes imperative to combat opinions so fraught with 
 mischief. 
 
 Deeply as the subject roots itself in the hearts of those who 
 have been long devoted to it, some warmth of language is scarcely 
 to be avoided in dealing with nominal friends who have thus 
 been led astray so far, as to support the machinations of the 
 enemy; but we wotdd anxiously deprecate all angry feeling, 
 and attempt to bring back a part at least of those who now sup¬ 
 port the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, by means 
 of friendly argument and remonstrance. 
 
 The society has, moreover, in common with a portion of the 
 press, and with the public at large, been in some degree misled 
 by Mr. Hutt's Committee; an authority on wdiich it would 
 naturally place great reliance, and which has doubtless power¬ 
 fully contributed to confirm its opinions. The Anti-Slavery 
 Reporter of last May, referring to Mr. Bright’s attack on the 
 accuracy of the society as to the alleged increase of slave trade 
 says:— “ The honourable gentleman would have acted more 
 fairly had he attacked the Select Committee on. the slave trade 
 on irhose authority its statements were made. Bill neither 
 the adroitness, nor the eloquence of the honourable gentleman 
 can alter the facts of the case; they are patent to the eyes of all 
 but those who arc resolved not to sec , or are so hlindcd hj their 
 theories that they will not sec .” 
 
 Mr. Bright was referring to an elaborate statement of the 
 society, strongly urging the withdrawal of the squadron, and this 
 was founded on Mr. Iiutfis tables, the utter fallacy of which we 
 have already exposed. If the society still refuses to reconsider its 
 position, it will become justly obnoxious to the charge its organ 
 makes against others, “ of being resolved not to sec,” of being 
 “ so blinded by theories that they will not see.” 
 
 In the document entitled “The Slave Trade and its Remedy” 
 
THE AFRICAN 
 
 
 all Mr. Hutt’s resolutions of 1848 are recapitulated. The Society 
 does not appear aware that they were opposed by all the mem¬ 
 bers of the Committee connected with the anti-slavery cause, and 
 who might have been supposed of some influence with the So¬ 
 ciety; viz., Sir II. Inglis, Sir E. Buxton, and Col. Thompson. 
 There, however, stands a summary of the fabulous statistics as 
 the basis of the Society’s as well as the Committee’s conclusions. 
 The alleged small proportion of Negroes captured is prominently 
 urged—the 594 vessels captured since 1839 unnoticed. The 
 slave trade in 1846 and 1847, instead of being merely an in¬ 
 crease, as compared with the six years previous, is put forward 
 as if it were unexampled in amount at any former time. The 
 slightest hint of the great success of those six years is omitted, 
 and so are the palpable causes for this partial increase. The 
 Anti-Slavery Society, like the rest of the world, has been de¬ 
 ceived by the report of Mr. Hutt’s Committee, and cannot be 
 blamed for having trusted to a document apparently so authentic. 
 
 It appears also that the Society had been powerfully influenced 
 by the belief, that while the cruizers only aggravated every evil, 
 the mortality among the crews was also appalling to humanity. 
 But Sir Charles Hotham, whose statements of facts within his 
 own knowledge are wholly beyond question, distinctly informs 
 both Committees that the mortality during the two years of his 
 command was only 14 per cent.!—less than that in the fleet in 
 the East or West Indies. He distinctly declares, that ho con¬ 
 siders the African station more healthy than the West Indies, 
 and that vessels may be kept there two years, (the present term 
 of service,) without any fear. (Vide Questions 732, 913, 914, 
 Commons Report, 1849; Questions 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 
 Lords Report.) This change has arisen from the power of 
 seizing equipped vessels, by which the slave trade has been 
 driven from the rivers to the open coast, which is perfectly 
 healthy; and the good discipline in which Sir Charles Hotham 
 kept his squadron undoubtedly contributed to this result. 
 
 We think we have sufficiently proved here, and in former 
 parts of these papers, how fallacious the grounds arc on which 
 the Anti-Slavery Society has been induced to demand the with¬ 
 drawal of the squadron. It is time now to consider the remedy 
 it proposes. The fundamental principle is this: “ So long as 
 slavery exists, slave trade will continue; and therefore the only 
 way of putting down slave trade is to put down slavery itself.” 
 
 There can be no doubt that if slavery was at an end, slave 
 trade would cease; but that slavery may continue when the slave 
 trade has ceased, is proved by the case of our own West India 
 colonies from 1807 until 1834, and by the slave states of America, 
 where slavery still continues, though the slave trade became 
 
AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 49 
 
 illegal also in 1807. We therefore deny the correctness of this 
 dogma of the Society; but, even if it were admitted as true, we 
 should entirely differ as to its practical application. It would be 
 far more true to say, “ Ignorance is the parent of crime,” or, 
 “Crime is incompatible with true Christianity.” So far we 
 agree, and join in urging the necessity of spreading Religion 
 and Education; but we should be mad to dismiss the police, 
 throw open the gaols, and trust our property and all we hold 
 dear to the anticipated future effects of these influences. Where 
 our own interests are concerned, there is no danger of running 
 into such wild excesses in the practical application of even the 
 most undoubted truths. But the unhappy Negro is the victim 
 of the theories of his self-styled friends: he can enter no pro¬ 
 test; and as the consequences will be remote from our own 
 hearths, we shall probably endure them (vicariously) with infi¬ 
 nite equanimity. There is an old proverb, “ It is easy to bear 
 the misfortunes of our friends.” 
 
 As for this dogma of the Society, we answer, the slavery of 
 foreign countries in general, we cannot assail; we deplore it; 
 we may in our hearts condemn it as a sin—as an evil fraught 
 with dangers to those countries which countenance it—but it 
 is beyond our control. 
 
 On the other hand, the slave trade is already condemned by 
 every state, though two countries yet countenance it. These are 
 pledged to England to put it down. They have supplied Eng¬ 
 land with the right, and she possesses the power, requisite. We 
 know that slavery may and does exist where the slave trade has 
 ceased, but we know moreover that it is this hideous traffic that 
 gives the last bitterness to human existence, in this, its most 
 wretched condition. When the slave trade is put down, the first 
 step is made towards eventual freedom, and from that moment 
 the condition of the slave improves, and ever must improve. The 
 condition of a slave in our own colonies, and now in the United 
 States of America, was and is, beyond all comparison, more 
 tolerable than that of his wretched brethren in a Cuba plan¬ 
 tation or in a Brazilian mine, where, urged by the perpetual 
 lash, the largest amount of labour in the shortest possible time 
 is the maxim, and the labourers are thus worked off to be re¬ 
 placed by fresh imports; in other words, by fresh outrages and 
 horrors on the African continent, where, after all, the supreme 
 misery of this scourge of mankind is inflicted. We urge 
 these considerations as no palliation of slavery. We believe it to 
 be a violation of every principle, by which we ourselves claim to 
 be free—a blow aimed at the very foundation of human society; 
 for what title to any mere external possession can hold good if 
 the natural right of freedom is denied ? The wretched pre- 
 
so 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 tence, that slavery is sanctioned by Scripture, is the very cli¬ 
 max of blasphemy and hypocrisy. 
 
 Still, we ask, where is our right, where is our power, to oblige 
 other nations to set their slaves free ? If we have not the power, 
 the right will avail us little; but slavery in general being ut¬ 
 terly unassailable by us (to say nothing of the obvious mis-state¬ 
 ment of fact involved in their proposition), we more than doubt 
 the wisdom of putting forth such an axiom as the fundamental 
 doctrine, governing the efforts of this Society. 
 
 At present the application is made to the slavery of Cuba and 
 Brazil, on the ground that all the slaves landed in the one since 
 1820, in the other since If 30, have been introduced in violation 
 of the treaties with Great Britain, which would probably include 
 at least three-fourths of the slaves in those countries. As regards 
 Cuba, possibly it would be within the power of the mother 
 country to enforce the enfranchisement of the slaves, and when 
 enfranchised, to protect the white population; hut Cuba now 
 sends a large revenue to Spain, which in such an event would 
 cease. If, then, England made this demand in such terms as the 
 case would require, Cuba would throw itself into the arms of the 
 United States, and Spain would be glad to relinquish it to the 
 Republic, and rejoice in at once baffling England, and shaking 
 off a dependency about to be converted into a burden instead of 
 a support; the only result would be a breach with the United 
 States. 
 
 But in Brazil the Government is utterly powerless, therefore 
 no dependence could be placed on its assurances; and even if it 
 really wished to fulfil its pledges, no result could follow. The 
 terms of the existing treaty are as strong as words can be, but 
 they are mere words, and must remain so, since the great mass 
 of the people are interested in the slave trade. The power, 
 however, it imparts to England is all-sufficient, if it were carried 
 out on the shores of Africa with energy, consistency and resolu¬ 
 tion. But suppose this demand to emancipate three-fourths of 
 the slave population were made, the answer would be, that if 
 agreed to, the white people would he placed in the utmost jeo¬ 
 pardy, and the country would pass out of cultivation. There is 
 no mother country or other external force to maintain order, and 
 to set free a population recently landed from the shores of Africa, 
 w'ould be to renew the horrors and calamities of St. Domingo. 
 The cessation of the African slave trade for some years is an in¬ 
 dispensable preliminary to emancipation ; and much as we abhor 
 slavery, we should deplore such an event, as involving terrible 
 sufferings and excesses at the moment, and as holding forth no 
 promise of future improvement. For these reasons every white 
 jnan in Brazil is bound by every motive of interest, and even by 
 
F. AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 the principle of self-preservation itself, to resist to tlic last a 
 measure so fatal to him and all connected with him; and the 
 Government would be manifestly powerless to enforce it. 
 
 We believe nothing but the conquest of the country could 
 effect this object; but how does the British and Foreign Anti- 
 Slavery Society propose to compass it ? The remedy pro¬ 
 posed by the society, the “Reporter” tells us, after one-of its 
 tirades against the squadron, “is simple in its character,’' “direct 
 in its operation it is also “ eminently practical in its character,” 
 and“ only needs to be supported by the weight of public opinion 
 to be successful in its results.” The Reporter then launches forth 
 some energetic denunciations about Brazil and Spain “ trampling 
 underfoot the most solemn treaties,” “mocking the English 
 Government,” “ treating with dishonour the people of this 
 country,” and after talking about “pressing home upon Brazil 
 and Cuba with vigour,” See., “ the plan suggested by the Anti- 
 Slavery Committee” adds— “ lie do not ask eocn to succour op¬ 
 pressed humanity, or to ensure the fuijilmcnt of treaties, that the Go- 
 comment should send armed vessels to Rio de Janeiro or Havana, and 
 at the cannon’s mouth demand the liberation of the slaves, and repara¬ 
 tion for the indignities inflicted on our country; but we do ask that if 
 thejust rights of Great Britain are not conceded, and the Afri¬ 
 can made free, that measures be taken to exclude the produce of 
 those countries from the British markets, until such time as they 
 consent to do justice and honourably fulfil their engagements.” This 
 is truly “roaring like any sucking dove”—“ a most lame and 
 impotent conclusion.” But we forget the Reporter has told us it 
 is “ eminently practical,” and “ ONLY” requires to be supported 
 by public opinion to be effective ! The suggestion of excluding 
 allslave grown produce from our markets—is it truly extremely 
 practical ?—then we have not read the signs of the times aright. 
 Yet we must admit the extreme simplicity of the Reporter, if not 
 of his plan; but whether this proposition is the more practical, 
 or the expectation that when it is carried into effect, Brazil will 
 abolish slavery, is matter of doubt. It may be otherwise put 
 thus—exelusiou from our markets will press so severely on the 
 Brazilians, that they will destroy all future means of production to 
 regain them! We have, however, some reason to think, from expe¬ 
 rience of the past, that slavery and slave trade would still exist and 
 continue, even if our markets were closed both to Brazil and 
 Cuba, for down to the year 1846, when that deplorable measure 
 was passed, they were hermetically sealed to those countries; yet, 
 until the squadron could oppose an effectual check, the slave 
 trade of Brazil grew from 15,000 to 94,000 ; that of Cuba 
 from 6,000 to 40,000, in the year ! Do these facts tempt us to 
 join the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in demanding 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 the removal of the squadron, or encourage us to credit the assur¬ 
 ance that to prohibit slave grown produce, would he to put down 
 slavery and slave trade for ever ? Is it possible that grave and 
 thinking men, anxious to do right, can have had the simplicity 
 to regard these measures as “ eminently practical,” and to 
 sacrifice the perfectly efficacious’ mode of action at our com¬ 
 mand, for one so utterly unattainable, but which, if attained, 
 would be absolutely fruitless of the effects anticipated. No one 
 can doubt that such expectations can be entertained by those alone 
 who are so “ blinded by their theories that they will not see.” 
 
 It has ever been an object of great moment with those who have 
 calmly considered the question, that after the great meashre of 
 emancipation, the West Indian colonies should yet prosper and 
 i emain in cultivation; and especially with respect to this “ emi¬ 
 nently practical ” remedy of the British and Foreign Anti- 
 Slavery Society, it requires little consideration to convince us 
 how important it is that the enfranchisement of the slave and 
 the ruiu of the planter should not be proved practically to be 
 synonymous terms. It was essential that our colonies should 
 hold out an example to the slave-holding world, tempting them 
 to the same great tribute to justice through their interest, or 
 at least not scaring them from its contemplation by a spectacle 
 of ruin and misery. Moreover every generous mind (the battle 
 once won) would regard with sorrow the evils which may have 
 fallen on those who were placed by circumstances in the adverse 
 ranks, and on whom, though the country at large was respon¬ 
 sible, the brunt of the punishment fell. It was essential, we say, 
 to raise up the stricken colonies, but unhappily the bitterness of 
 the strife has outlived the actual conflict, and now the interests 
 of the West India body and of the Negro race have become 
 identical, both appear to suffer under the old law “ odisse 
 quern latseris.” 
 
 How can we suppose Brazil will voluntarily set free her slaves 
 with our West Indian colonies prostrate and ruined ? Referring 
 however to a memorial, addressed by this Society to Lord John 
 Russell, in 1846, it seems “ That the committee earnestly trust 
 Her Majesty’s Government will recall the cruizers.from the coast 
 of Africa; and the committee would urgently recommend, that 
 the funds which will be saved thereby, may be applied to the 
 development of the resources— of British India /” as the only 
 pait of the world able to compete with slave labour. If the 
 squadron should be withdrawn, this recommendation will be 
 proved to be just as “eminently practical” as the rest of the 
 views of this society, but the proposal equally violates justice 
 to the West Indies, and sound policy as regards the object ol 
 giving freedom to the slaves of Brazil and Cuba. The very idea 
 of competition on the part of our colonies is thus repudiated: 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 those colonies being however obviously in an infinitely better 
 condition than Brazil could be if her slaves were suddenly set 
 free. A third rival is thus to be stimulated to the utmost to 
 swallow up the other two, for a successful competition with the 
 slavery of Brazil, would be manifest destruction to her after her 
 slaves are emancipated. 
 
 The only favourable symptom we can discover through the 
 columns of the J Reporter is the fact it has itself admitted, and 
 the uneasiness it betrays at finding itself actually fighting side 
 by side with the slave dealers. Having made the disagreeable 
 discovery that they are all of one mind as regards the squadron, 
 the Reporter of last September says :— 
 
 “ In uniting with others in the belief the cruizors should bo with¬ 
 drawn, we distinctly disavow the objects and motives which seem to in¬ 
 fluence them. Many of them, we fear, care little whether the slave 
 trade flourish or decay; nay, some of them we know advocate the renewal 
 of slave trade hy this country, in order that their commercial schemes 
 and agricultural speculations might be advantaged thereby. We regret 
 that by the force of circumstances we should be found in such company, 
 or appear to give the slightest countenance to their sordid and inhuman 
 projects. We repudiate their doctrines and their practices in toto. They 
 would withdraw the squadron, and find no substitute for it. We would 
 withdraw it, and find an efficient one.” 
 
 We doubt how far this disclaimer will absolve the society 
 from the awful responsibility it is rushing upon with such obsti¬ 
 nacy. So eager are its efforts, that a list appears in several 
 Reporters showing forty or fifty country towns in which its emis¬ 
 saries have been employed in disseminating these fatal theories. 
 Again, in the same article, the Reporter says :— 
 
 “We ask our friends to discriminate; to look at the subject in the 
 light of facts; and not to condemn us because men of questionable cha¬ 
 racter choose to place themselves in our company. There are some who 
 call themselves freetraders, that advocate the withdrawal of the squadron, 
 because it interferes, say they, with the liberty of commerce. They 
 overlook the moralities of the case. We are not of that class. There are 
 merchants and manufacturers who demand the suppression of the squadron 
 because it interferes with their commercial operations in Bio and Havana; 
 but we are not of that class. There are West Indians who ask for the 
 withdrawal of the squadron in order that the money saved thereby may 
 be devoted to African emigration; but we are not of that class. Neither 
 are we of the parties represented by the Times and the Daily News." 
 
 The allusion to the slave dealers of Cuba and Brazil, masters, 
 Mates, merchants, and super-cargoes, is rather faint and indis¬ 
 tinct j but there is no mincing the matter. These and the 
 British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society are all in the same 
 boat, and a strangely compounded crew they appear. Mr' 1 
 Scoble takes the helm, and we look on with consternation, trust- 
 
54 
 
 AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 ing that they may he upset before their slave- trading enterprise 
 be consummated; but right glad shall we be to help our mis¬ 
 guided friends to reach, land again, trusting we shall find them 
 somewhat sobered by experience. 
 
 But while the oldest and mostdevoted friends of the anti-slavery 
 cause have watched the proceedings of this Society with grief 
 and alarm, the Times has been loud in praise of its proceedings, 
 though, throughout, treating all notion of suppressing slavery or 
 slave-trade as utter humbug. On the 30th of November last, 
 it stated that in consequence of the statements of the British 
 and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, the French Government had 
 given notice to Great Britain of its intention to withdraw from 
 the treaty of 1845; and next day appeared a flaming article, 
 which did for once shed some new light on its readers. Hitherto 
 we thought that pure harm in all respects was the only effect 
 produced by the squadron ; but on December 1st, the Times 
 says:—“We confess we are inclined to hope that if the slave 
 trade toere not checked by our cruisers, the excess of the evil 
 would rapidly work its own cure !” Thus we learn two new 
 things in the teaching of the Times —first, that the squadron 
 does check the slave trade; secondly, that if withdrawn, the evil 
 would grow up to a great excess. 
 
 The constant reader who has hitherto placed implicit faith in 
 the Times must have been rather staggered; but still, in 
 spite of this admission, the Times confesses to a hope that this 
 excess of the evil, (which it justly regards as certain,) may work 
 its own cure; and farther on it says, “ in five years.” This is 
 highly consolatory. But why should it cure itself in five years, 
 when, raging equally withotit limit or restriction, it failed to do 
 so in two hundred years ? How can the slave trade cure itself, 
 since it furnishes no inherent means for the maintenance of the 
 number to which it swells the population ? With the increase of 
 such a population an increased number of victims is required to 
 supply the annual waste of human life. We have already been 
 told that in our own colonies, during unrestricted slave trade, an 
 import amounting to one-sixteenth of the whole slave population 
 was required in every year to keep up numbers, 
 
 But as for the 'paeans of the Times, on the supposed with¬ 
 drawal of France from the treaty, and the anticipated excess of 
 slave trade, they were as unfounded as the hope that such excess 
 would, if it occurred, work its own cure. France had given no 
 notice of the sort; and if she had, it was nothing to the purpose. 
 Ho slave trade pollutes the flag of France; and until treated in 
 its true character of piracy, France cannot interfere with the 
 slave ships of Spain and Brazil, having engaged in no treaties 
 for the purpose. If a cargo of slaves were found under the flag 
 of France, the fact would be discovered by virtue of the right to 
 visit to verify the flag by the papers, formally recognized as a 
 
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 55 
 
 principle of maritime law in the treaty of 1845. The fraudulent 
 assumption of the flag, and the forgery of the papers to baffle 
 English cruizers, would be the necessary presumption, if such a 
 case occurred. The vessel would be seized; and should it appear 
 that she were bond fide Erencli, she would be delivered over to 
 the French authorities with a proper explanation: the master 
 and crew, then, instead of getting free as Spaniards or Bra¬ 
 zilians, would thus, by their own act and choice, be transferred 
 to the galleys for life; such would be the advantage of assuming 
 the flag of France. 
 
 With respect to the assistance the French squadron is able to 
 afford, Sir Charles Hotham states, (vide Lords Report, 2074),— 
 “ They (the French) have not made a single capture during the 
 period of my command; they were unable to interfere with any 
 vessels except their own.” It would be no impediment to the 
 suppression of the slave trade if the French further reduced their 
 squadron. It is only surprising that they maintained twenty-six 
 vessels without making the proposal sooner. We hope, how¬ 
 ever, soon to see France enabled to take an active part in the 
 struggle, and have reason to believe that many of her officers 
 would show equal zeal and judgment in the service. 
 
 We do not know whether the British and Foreign Anti- 
 Slavery Society has really endeavoured to influence the French 
 Government in this matter, but we earnestly trust before taking 
 any farther steps, it will re-consider these doctrines ; and if its 
 efforts are approaching their consummation in the withdrawal of 
 the squadron, that it will seriously inquire, each member for 
 himself, whether he has not acted on mistaken premises ? whether 
 the advocacy of the proposed remedy has made the slightest 
 progress? whether the prohibition of slave grown produce is 
 probable? whether the money saved from the squadron will go 
 to grow sugar in the East? whether, if it does, the ruin of the 
 West Indies, and the successful competition of the East, would 
 operate to tempt Brazil to reduce herself to the condition of 
 Jamaica, by emancipating her slaves ? and, lastly, whether the 
 various conflicting interests, which have united with the So¬ 
 ciety to remove the squadron (but one and all having formed 
 opposite conclusions as to the result, and having opposite ulti¬ 
 mate objects in view), do not of themselves afford valid ground 
 for doubting whether a safe course has been thus far pursued ? 
 
 But if the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society obsti¬ 
 nately continue thus to sacrifice the interests of humanity to 
 an obstinate adherence to their theories, it will then become 
 an imperative duty on all who are attached to the cause, and 
 who have maintained sound opinions, to regard this Society as 
 irreclaimable, to class them, in spite of their protest, with the 
 various parties with whom they w'ould repudiate fellowship; it 
 will then become a matter of consideration what measures shall 
 
56 
 
 THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. 
 
 lie taken to neutralize the effect of efforts so perverted, and to 
 repair the mischief ere it is too late. 
 
 Earnestly deploring and condemning the Sugar Act of 1846, 
 we should rejoice if we could effect its total repeal; but this we 
 believe to be hopeless. ' But might not a powerful union be 
 effected on the basis of arresting the sugar duties at their present 
 point in the sliding scale, until the slave trade is suppressed P 
 This would be a moderate claim as regards the West Indies, 
 and none but the most violent and reckless of the free trade 
 party would be disposed to refuse so scanty a measure of justice 
 to the unfortunate colonies. 
 
 This horrid traffic may be put down in a few months, from 
 the day on which England resolves to undertake the work in 
 earnest, and grapples with it on the shores of Africa; but “a 
 consistent and uniform course of proceeding,”—“a well con¬ 
 sidered system, complete in its arrangements; and carried into 
 effect with judgment and perseverance,” are obviously indispen¬ 
 sable : we have shown how little these essential conditions of 
 success have been observed. 
 
 With regard to the destruction of slave factories, the squa¬ 
 dron is again free to act. The Queen’s advocate did not intend 
 to draw any distinction between the goods of the slave dealers 
 and the building containing them. The opinion was intended 
 to apply to the goods of “ legal" traders, but the word “ legal" 
 was omitted ; and, owing to this unlucky error, for eight years 
 the slave traders have been encouraged , and the hands of the British 
 Commanders tied. 
 
 The only true wisdom—the only real economy—compels us 
 to persevere in the task we have undertaken. No foreign 
 enemy—no treason at home—could strike a blow more serious 
 in’ its ultimate effects on the well-being of England, than she 
 would inflict on herself, if, wilfully blind to the truth, she should 
 yield to the clamour of the slave trade interest, swelled by in¬ 
 fatuated theorists, and withdraw the squadron from the coast of 
 Africa. 
 
 The truth is not to be disguised—with that measure England 
 abandons the cause; she leaves Africa to her fate, and that fate 
 is “ the excess of the evil,” the slave trade recognised, unlimited, 
 and perpetual. 
 
 LONDON; D. M. 
 
 
 FLEET STREET.