TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR ROBERT PEEL, Sir, I take the liberty of addressing you as one of the Repre¬ sentatives of the People in Parliament, on a subject so interesting to that People, that it requires a much more able pen than mine to bring it properly under your con¬ sideration. I allude to the decisions of the Board of Trade on the choice of proposed Railways. It is rumoured that Her Majesty’s Ministers intend to support those decisions, without giving the parties in¬ terested any opportunity of being heard in Parliament. With the greatest humility, but without any mistrust of my own judgment in the matter, I call upon you to pause, before you permit the House of Commons, of which you are the distinguished leader, to ratify that intention. But let us, as men of business, first state a case:— here then are two existing- Companies, each of whom has expended, under the sanction of Parliament, perhaps millions, in prosecuting their respective lines of railway. One of these Companies proposes to make a new branch line, which is calculated to utterly destroy the traffic on the other; that other, in self-defence, proposes a similar branch line to that of its adversary. Both plans are submitted in writing (perhaps hastily drawn up) to the Board of Trade, who, without that public inquiry common to all Courts of Justice, decide; their decision bringing ruin to the one and enrichment to the other. Now, as¬ suming that the jurisdiction is perfectly competent and entirely disinterested, I beg to ask whether decisions thus come to will be satisfactory to the public? If these two same companies were to dispute about a collision of engines, or the possession of a ragged piece of way-side land, what would be their course of proceeding? Why, they would apply either in writing to the Chancellor, or, viva voce, to the Common Law Courts at Westminster : but neither of those Courts would decide the matter, with¬ out giving to both parties an opportunity of being fully heard by themselves or their counsel, in the presence of each other. The Court of Chancery,—always presided over by learned, clever, and impartial men,—not even venturing to decide on matters of fact, without the inter¬ vention of a jury, before whom each party may explain the merits of his own case, and expose the errors of that of his adversary. I think I have already said enough to induce you to reflect on the matter; but I would remind you, that even the decisions of those eminent Courts, and the verdicts of these juries, are liable to revision ; and those high Courts do not consider their characters impeached, or their decisions degraded, when Courts of Appeal reverse their judgments. 4 But, let us put another, and by no means impossible Suppose only one of a Board of Trade interested ,— to be possessed, though perhaps not in his own name, of shares in one of the contesting Companies,—would you then permit the edict of this secret tribunal to be registered, as a matter of course, by the High Court of Parliament—hitherto considered the grand safe-guard of the people? I am convinced you would indignantly say—No. But I will venture to request your attention a little further in this direction:—Let it be supposed that a near relation of one of the Board of Trade might have speculated deeply in shares, would not a decision given under such circumstances be so liable to suspicion, as to be rendered utterly worthless in the just estima¬ tion of the public ? If you, and from your high position you may do so without offence, will ask the Judges of the land whether either of them would try a cause in which his brother (I mean brother by consanguinity, not by the black patch) was a party, I think I can anticipate the smiling answer you would receive—and 1 need not tell you, who, with so much pains, introduced the all-important Jury Act—that the officer, whose duty it is to summon a jury, is expressly forbidden by the law, to summon any person who shall be of kin to either of the parties in the suit. I pray you to consider this— I am not asserting, or even insinuating, that the fact is so with the present Board of Trade; it is sufficient for my argument that it may be so. The difficulty of obtaining justice at the hands of any but public tribunals is strongly illustrated in the case of the Baron de Bode, now before the Court of Queen’s Bench; which Court is, fortunately for the best interests of the country, presided over by one of the most constitutional, honourable, firm, and in¬ dependent Judges, which that or any other court ever witnessed. The Baron, it seems, very many years ago considered that he was entitled, to a sum amounting to nearly half a million sterling, which he contends had been paid into the hands of the then Sovereign of England. After numerous applications to different tribunals, all of which proved unavailing, the Baron laid his case before the present Sovereign, She, with that constitutional grace which lias hitherto attended all Her public steps; — not first secretly enquiring whether the money had been received, or, if received, what had become of it; but, more anxious for justice for Her subjects, than for the personal fame of Her predecessors,—without troubling Herself to ascertain whether the money (if received) had been expended in golden side-boards, or silver cellarets, the Queen of England said, “ Let right be done! ” But did She say, let it be done in secret? Did She say, let it be done by persons dependent on Her, or on Her ministers? Did She say, let it be done by the relatives of Her august family? (Although, from their high station, they might, perhaps, be trusted, where other persons might not.) No, She said, let right be done according to the Law of England. Now, mark the consequences—the Baron was heard in the Court of Queen's Bench,—presided over, on account ? of the magnitude of the stake and the nature of the enquiry, by four Judges, the Crown was also heard by its representatives in the presence of those Judges, against the claim, and a jury of the country gave their verdict in favour of the Baron. I call these facts to your attention to illustrate my position, that justice is never so satisfactorily administered, as when parties have an opportunity of being heard by themselves or counsel, in the presence of each other, and before public tribunals. I make no apology for addressing you on this im¬ portant subject, because, although I have not the honour of being one of your Constituents, I have the satisfaction of considering myself represented by you in Parliament. I have spent much of my life in Courts of Justice, and have seen a great deal of mankind in various circumstances, and I make bold to say, that any attempt to withdraw from the public tribunals questions in which private interests are at stake, although under such a cautious management as your own it may appear to be, or perhaps even for a time may be, successful, it will ultimately fail,—signally fail,—but the mischief which must of necessity be done in the meanwhile may not be easily remedied. I have the honour to be, Sir, With great respect, Your obedient Servant, ’