ipiiPll:: : , \ (Kifrn! U jMlllUMtni m §\ i;i'i. iiiiniii' Columbia ^nibersiitp intteCitpof^etogorb LIBRARY GIVEN BY '(SWi: U...iJteu) ROBERTS WMKER SCARSDALE.NEWYOKK ^ HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON BY THE SAME author THE DESERT CAMPAIGNS BY W. T. MASSEY Oj^cial Corrtspondent "with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force Crou'H IIt'o 68. lut An Account of the work of the Imperial Forces in the Deserts of Egypt and Sinai. Illustrated with Drawings by Jamks M'Hey, taken on the spot for His Majesty's Government. ' This record, by the correspondent who was selected by the Chief London Newspapers to accompany the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, will serve to bring home to the British Public the great work done by our arms in keeping open the gateway between P'a^t and West." — Times Literary Supplement. 'Mr Massey . . . tells his story well and simply.' — The Observer. 'The admirable drawings by Mr James M'Bey, the official artist with the E. E. F., add greatly to the pleasure of reading this excellent little history.' — Morning; Post. OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO IMK IIOLV (TIV. (iKXFRAL ALLFNP.V RECEIVED BY THF Mn.rPARY dOYERXOR OF lERUSALEM. Dec. II, 1917 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON BEING THE RECORD OF ALLENBY'S CAMPAIGN IN PALESTINE BY W. T. MASSEY OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE LONDON NEWSPAPERS WITH THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 597-599 FIFTH AVENUE 1920 j ROBERTS WALKER |SCARSDALE,NEWYORK Ct/iA- £^ Printed* in Cfreat Britain . .* •• • • • • • • • • • t>l3?33 {^ PREFACE . This narrative of the work accomplished for civilisa- -^tion by Greneral Allenby's Army is carried only as far as the occupation of Jericho. The capture of that ancient town, with the possession of a Hne of rugged hills a dozen miles north of Jerusalem, secured the Holy City from any Turkish attempt to retake it. The book, in fact, tells the story of the twenty-third fall of Jerusalem, one of the most beneficent happen- ings of all wars, and marking an epoch in the wonderful history of the Holy Place which will rank second only to that era which saw the birth of Christianity. All that occurred in the fighting on the Gaza-Beersheba hne was part and parcel of the taking of Jerusalem, the freeing of which from four centuries of Turkish domination was the object of the first part of the campaign. The Holy City was the goal sought by every officer and man in the Army ; and though from the moment that goal had been attained all energies were concentrated upon driving the Turk out of the war, there was not a member of the Force, from the highest on the Staff to the humblest private in the ranks, who did not feel that Jerusalem was the greatest prize of the campaign. In a second volume I shall tell of that tremendous feat of arms which overwhelmed the Turkish Armies, drove them through 400 miles of country in six weeks, and gave cavaby an opportunity of proving vi HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON that, despite all the arts and devices of modern war- fare, with fighters and observers in the air and an entirely new mechanism of war, they continued as indispensable a part of an army as when the legions of old took the field. This is too long a story to be told in this volume, though the details of that mag- nificent triumph are so firmly impressed on the mind that one is loth to leave the narration of them to a future date. For the moment Jerusalem must be suthcient, and if in the telling of the British work up to that point I can succeed in giving an idea of the immense value of General Allenby's Army to the Empire, of the soldier's courage and fortitude, of his indomitable will and self-sacrifice and patriotism, it will indeed prove the most grateful task I have ever set myself. April 1919. CONTENTS CHAP. I. PALESTINE'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR II. OLD BATTLEGROUNDS . III. DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK IV. TRAINING THE ARMY . V. RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE VL PREPARING FOR 'ZERO DAY' . VII. THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY VIII. GAZA DEFENCES IX. CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT X. THROUGH GAZA INTO THE OPEN XI. TWO YEOMANRY CHARGES XII. LOOKING TOWARDS JERUSALEM XIII. INTO THE JUDEAN HILLS XIV. THE DELIVERANCE OF THE HOLY CITY XV. GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY XVI. MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE . XVII. A GREAT FEAT OF WAR XVIII. BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN XIX. THE TOUCH OF THE CIVILISING HAND XX. OUR CONQUERING AIRMEN APPENDICES .... INDEX ..... 1 7 18 26 32 42 53 67 81 96 112 126 137 158 19o 211 232 245 254 259 265 293 LIST OF MAPS FACING PAOK Plan of Southern Palestine ..... 7 Plan of Gaza-Beersheba Line .... 94 Plan of the Beth-Horon Country . . . 156 Plan of the Battle of Jerusalem . . . 194 Tiii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Official Entry into the Holy City. General Allenby received by the military governor of jerusalem, December 11, 1917 Frontisfiece FACING PAGE EIantara Terminus of the Desert Military Eailway . 20 ' East Force H.Q. Dug-outs near Gaza Wadi Ghuzze near Shellal .... Our Waterworks at Shellal .... On the Move in the Desert .... The Great Mosque at Gaza .... Turkish Headquarters at Gaza. Note the Crusader Lion in Wall A Desert Motor Koad near Shellal . - . Turkish Dug-outs at Gaza Beersheba Railway Station with Mined Rolling Stock Lieut.-Gen. Sir Harry Chauvel outside Beersheba Mosque, November 1, 1917 .... El Mughar. The Scene of a Yeomanry Charge Burial-place of St. George, Patron Saint of England (at Ludd) ........ Yeomanry Graves at Beth-horon the Upper, where Joshua commanded the Sun to remain still to enable the Israelites to overthrow the Philis- tines In the Judean Hills A Roman Centurion's Tomb, Kuryet el Enab 21 32 33 46 47 56 67 78 79 114 115 126 127 140 141 X HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON KACISO PAOIt One of King Solomon's Pools 162 A Typical New Zealandeii 163 Wadi Surar, crossed by London Territorials on the Morning of their Assault on the Jerusalem De- fences ........ 176 The Deib Yesin Position west of Jerusalem . . 177 Eastern Face of Nebi Samwil Mosque, showing De- struction BY Turkish Shell-fire . . . 192 Official Entry into the Holy City. General Allenby arriving outside the Jaffa Gate . . . 193 Officlal Entry. General Allenby receiving the Mayor of Jerusalem (a descendant of Mahomet) 208 Jerusalem from Mount of Olives .... 209 Jerusalem from Garden of Gethsemane . . . 216 Panel in the Chapel of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria. Hospice on the Mount of Oliv^bs . . . 217 Bethlehem 226 Church of the Nativity, Bethlehem .... 227 Ain Kartm, Part of the Jerusalem Defences . . 234 River Auja, crossed at Night by Lowland Territorials 236 Jerisheh Mill, River Auja, one of the Lowlanders Crossings Barrel Bridge over the River Auja Destroyed Bridge on the Jericho Road . The Wilderness, with a Glimpse of the Dead Sea Londoners' Bridge over the Jordan. The River is in Flood German Prisoners crossing the Jordan New Zealand Mounted Rifles at Bethlehem A Hairpin Bend on the Jerusalem Road . 242 243 248 249 252 253 258 259 CHAPTER I PALESTINE'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR In a war which involved the peoples of the four quarters of the globe it was to be expected that on the world's oldest battleground would be renewed the scenes of conflict of bygone ages. There was perhaps a desire of some elements of both sides, certainly it was the unanimous wish of the AUies, to avoid the clash of arms in Palestine, and to leave untouched by armies a land held in reverence by three of the great rehgions of the world. But this ancient cockpit of warring races could not escape. The will of those who broke the peace prevailed. Germany's dream of Eastern Empires and world domination, the lust of conquest of the Kaiser party, required that the tide of war should once more surge across the land, and if the conquering hosts left fewer traces of war wreckage than were to be expected in their victorious march, it was due not to any anxiety of our foes to avoid conflict about, and damage to, places with hallowed associations, but to the masterly strategy of the British Commander- in-Chief who manoeuvred the Turkish Armies out of positions defending the sacred sites. The people of to-day who have lived through the war, who have had their view bewildered by ever- recurring anxieties, by hopes shattered and fears realised, by a succession of victories and defeats on a colossal scale, and by a sudden collapse of the enemy, may fail to see the Palestine campaign in 4 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON service elsewhere, but to recruit a large force of Indians for the Empire's work in other climes. Bagdad was a tremendous blow to German ambitions. The loss of it spelt ruin to those hopes of Eastern conquest which had prompted the German intrigues in Turkey, and it was certain that the Kaiser, so long as he beheved in ultimate victory, would refuse to accept the loss of Bagdad as final. Russia's withdrawal as a belligerent released a large body of Turkish troops in the Caucasus, and set free many Germans, particularly ' technical troops ' of which the Turks stood in need, for other fronts. It was then that the German High Command conceived a scheme for retaking Bagdad, and the redoubtable von Ealken- hayn was sent to Constantinople charged with the preparations for the undertaking. Certain it is that it would have been put into execution but for the situation created by the presence of a large British Army in the Sinai Peninsula. A large force was collected about Aleppo for a march down the Eu- phrates valley, and the winter of 1917-18 would have witnessed a stern struggle for supremacy in Mesopotamia if the War Cabinet had not decided to force the Turks to accept battle where they least wanted it. The views of the British War Cabinet on the war in the East, at any rate, were sound and solid. They concentrated on one big campaign, and, profiting from past mistakes which led to a wastage of strength, allowed all the weight they could spare to be thrown into the Eg3^tian Expeditionary Force under a General who had proved his high military capacity in France, and in whom all ranks had complete con- fidence, and they permitted the Mesopotamian and Salonika Armies to contain the enemies on their fronts while the Army in Palestine set out to crush the Turks PALESTINE'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR 5 at what proved to be their most vital point. As to whether the force available on our Mesopotamia front was capable of defeating the German scheme I cannot offer an opinion, but it is beyond all question that the conduct of operations in Palestine on a plan at once bold, resolute, and worthy of a high place in mihtary history saved the Empire much anxiety over our position in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, and probably prevented unrest on the frontiers of India and in India itself, where mischief makers were actively working in the German cause. Nor can there be any doubt that the brilliant campaign in Palestine prevented British and French influence declining among the Mahomedan populations of those countries' respective spheres of control in Africa. Indeed I regard it as incontrovertible that the Palestine strategy of General Allenby, even apart from his stupendous rush through Syria in the autumn of the last year of war, did as much to end the war in 1918 as the great battles on the Western Front, for if there had been failure or check in Palestine some British and French troops in France might have had to be detached to other fronts, and the Germans' effort in the Spring might have pushed their line farther towards the Channel and Paris. If Bagdad was not actually saved in Palestine, an ex- pedition against it was certainly stopped by our Army operating on the old battlegrounds in Palestine. We lost many lives, and it cost us a vast amount of money, but the sacrifices of brave men contributed to the saving of the world from German domination ; and high as the British name stood in the East as the upholder of the freedom of peoples, the fame of Britain for justice, fair dealing, and honesty is wider and more firmly estabHshed to-day because the people have seen it emerge triumphantly from a supreme test. 6 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON In the strategy of the w orld war we made, no doubt, many mistakes, but in Palestine the strategy was of the best, and in the working out of a far-seeing scheme, victories so iniiucnced events that on this front began the fhial phase of the war — once Turkey was beaten, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary submitted and Ger- many acknowledged the inevitable. Falkenhayn saw that the Bagdad undertaking was impossible so long as we were dangerous on the Palestine front, and General Allenby's attack on the Gaza hne wiped the Bagdad enterprise out of the list of German ambitions. The plan of battle on the Gaza-Beer- sheba line resembled in miniature the ending of the war. If we take Beersheba for Turkey, Sheria and Hareira for Bulgaria and Austria, and Gaza for Germany, we get the exact progress of events in the final stage, except that Bulgaria's submission was an intelligent anticipation of the laying down of their arms by the Turks. Gaza- Beersheba was a rolling up from our right to left ; so was the ending of the Hun aUiance. Consiabi* k Co. Ltd, CHAPTER IT OLD BATTLEGROUNDS It was in accordance with the fitness of things that the British Army should fight and conquer on the very spots consecrated by the memories of the most famous battles of old. From Gaza onwards we made our progress by the most ancient road on earth, for this way moved commerce between the Euphrates and the NRe many centuries before the East knew West. We fought on fields which had been the battle- grounds of Egyptian and Assyrian armies, where Hittites, Ethiopians, Persians, Parthians, and Mongols poured out their blood in times when kingdoms were strong by the sword alone. The Ptolemies invaded Syria by this way, and here the Greeks put their colonising hands on the country. Alexander the Great made this his route to Egypt. Pompey marched over the Maritime Plain and inaugurated that Roman rule which lasted for centuries ; till Islam made its wide irresistible sweep in the seventh century. Then the Crusaders fought and won and lost, and Napoleon's ambitions in the East were wrecked just beyond the plains. Up the Maritime Plain we battled at Gaza, every yard of which had been contested by the armies of mighty kings in the past thirty-five centuries, at Akir, Gezer, Lydda, and around Joppa. All down the ages armies have moved in victory or flight over this plain, and General AUenby in his advance was but repeating history. And when the Turks had 8 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON been driven beyond the Plain of Philistia, and the Ck)mmander-in-Chief had to decide how to take Jerusalem, we saw the British force move along precisely the same route that has been taken by armies since the time when Joshua overcame the Amorites and the day was lengthened by the sun and moon standing still till the battle was won. Greography had its influence on the strategy of to-day as completely as it did when armies were not cum- bered with guns and mechanical transport. Of the few passes from the Maritime Plain over the Shephelah into the Judean range only that emerging from the green Vale of Ajalon was possible, if we were to take Jerusalem, as the great captains of old took it, from the north. The Syrians sometimes chose this road in preference to advancing through Samaria, the Romans suffered retreat on it, Richard Coeur de Lion made it the path for his approach towards the Holy City, and, precisely as in Joshua's day and as when in the first century the Romans fell victims to a tremendous Jewish onslaught, the fighting was hardest about the Beth-horons, but with a different result — the invaders were victorious. The corps which actually took Jerusalem advanced up the new road from Latron through Kuryet el Enab, identified by some as Kirjath-jearim where the Philistines returned the Ark, but that road would have been denied to us if we had not made good the ancient path from the Vale of Ajalon to Gibeon. Jerusalem was won by the fighting at the Beth-horons as surely as it was on the line of hills above the wadi Surar which the Londoners carried. There was fighting at Gibeon, at Michmas, at Beeroth, at Ai, and numerous other places made familiar to us by the Old Testament, and assuredly no army went forth to battle on more hallowed soil. OLD BATTLEGROUNDS 9 Of all the armies which earned a place in history in Palestine, General Allenby's was the greatest — the greatest in size, in equipment, in quality, in fighting power, and not even the invading armies in the ro- mantic days of the Crusades could equal it in chivalry. It fought the strong fight with clean hands through- out, and finished without a blemish on its conduct. It was the best of all the conquering armies seen in the Holy Land as well as the greatest. Will not the influence of this Army endure ? I think so. There is an awakening in Palestine, not merely of Christians and Jews, but of Moslems, too, in a less degree. During the last thirty years there have grown more signs of the deep faiths of peoples and of their venera- tion of this land of sacred history. If their insti- tutions and missions could develop and shed light over Palestine even while the slothful and corrupt Turk ruled the land, how much faster and more in keeping with the sanctity of the country will the im- provement be under British protection ? The graves of our soldiers dotted over desert wastes and corn- fields, on barren hills and in fertile valleys, ay, and on the Mount of OHves where the Saviour trod, will mark an era more truly grand and inspiring, and offer a far greater lesson to future generations than the Crusades or any other invasion down the track of time. The Army of General Allenby responded to the happy thought of the Commander-in-Chief and contributed one day's pay for the erection of a memorial near Jerusalem in honour of its heroic dead. Apart from the holy sites, no other memorial will be revered so much, and future pilgrims, to whatever faith they belong, will look upon it as a monument to men who went to battle to bring lasting peace to a land from which the Word of Peace and Goodwill went forth to mankind. 10 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON In selecting General Sir Edmund Allenby as the Palestine Army's chief the War Cabinet made a happy choice. General Sir Archibald Murray was recalled to take up an important command at home after the two unsuccessful attempts to drive the Turks from the Gaza defences. The troops at General Murray's disposal were not strong enough to take the offensive again, and it was clear there must be a long period of preparation for an attack on a large scale. General Allenby brought to the East a lengthy experience of fighting on the Western Front, where his deliberate methods of attack, notably at Arras, had given the Alhes victories over the cleverest and bravest of our enemies. Palestine was likely to be a cavalry, as well as an infantry, campaign, or at any rate the theatre of war in which the mounted arm could be employed with the most fruitful of results. General Allenby' s achievements as a cavalry leader in the early days of the war marked him as the one officer of high rank suited for the Palestine command, and his proved capacity as a General both in open and in trench warfare gave the Army that high degree of confidence in its Commander-in-Chief which it is so necessary that a big fighting force should possess. A tremendously hard worker himself. General Allenby expected all under him to concen- trate the whole of their energies on their work. He had the faculty for getting the best out of his officers, and on his Staff were some of the most enthusiastic soldiers in the service. There was no room for an inefficient leader in any branch of the force, and the knowledge that the Commander-in-Chief valued the lives and the health of his men so highly that he would not risk a failure, kept all the staffs tuned up to concert pitch. We saw many changes, and the best men came to the top. His own vigour infected the whole com- OLD BATTLEGROUNDS 11 mand, and within a short while of arriving at the front the efficiency of the Army was considerably increased. The Palestine G.H.Q. was probably nearer the battle front than any G.H.Q. in other theatres of operations, and when the Army had broken through and chased the enemy beyond the Jaffa- Jerusalem line, G.H.Q. was opened at Bir Salem, near Ramleh, and for several months was actually within reach of the long-range guns which the Turks possessed. The rank and file were not slow to appreciate this. They knew their Commander-in-Chief was on the spot, keeping his eye and hand on everything, organising with his organisers, planning with his operation staff, familiar with every detail of the complicated transport system, watching his supply services with the keenness of a quartermaster- general, and taking that lively interest in the medical branch whrch be- trayed an anxious desire for the welfare and health of the men. The rank and file knew something more than this. They saw the Commander-in-Chief at the front every day. General Allenby did not rely solely on reports from his corps. He went to each section of the line himself, and before practically every major operation he saw the ground and ex- amined the scheme for attack. There was not a part of the line he did not know, and no one will contradict me when I say that the military roads in Palestine were known by no one better than the driver of the Commander-in-Chief's car. A man of few words. General Allenby always said what he meant with soldierly directness, which made the thanks he gave a rich reward. A good piece of work brought a written or oral message of thanks, and the men were satisfied they had done well to deserve con- gratulations. They were proud to have the con- 12 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON fidence of such a Chief and to deserve it, and they in their turn had such unbounded faith in the miUtary judgment of the General and in the care he took to prevent unnecessary risk of life, that there was nothing which he sanctioned that they would not attempt. Such mutual confidence breeds strength, and it was the Commander-in-Chief's example, his tact, energy, and military genius which made his Army a potent power for Britain and a strong pillar of the Allies' cause. Let it not be imagined that General Allenby in his victorious campaign shone only as a great soldier. He was also a great administrator. In England little was known about this part of the General's work, and owing to the difficulties of the task and to the consideration which had, and still has, to be show^n to the susceptibilities of a number of friendly nations and peoples, it may be long before the full story of the administration of the occupied territory in Palestine is unfolded for general appreciation. It is a good story, worthy of Britain's record as a pro- tector of peoples, and though from the nature of his conquest over the Turks in the Bible country the name of General Allenby will adorn the pages of history principally as a victor, it will also stand before the governments of states as setting a model for a wise, prudent, considerate, even benevolent, administration of occupied enemy territory. In days when Powers driven mad by military ambition tear up treaties as scraps of paper. General Allenby observed the spirit as well as the letter of the Hague Convention, and found it possible to apply to occupied territory the prin- ciples of administration as laid down in the Manual of Military Law. The natives marvelled at the change. In place of insecurity, extortion, bribery and corruption, levies OLD BATTLEGROUNDS 13 on labour and property and all the evils of Turkish government, General Allenby gave the country behind the front Hne peace, justice, fair treatment of every race and creed, and a jQrm and equitable adminis- tration of the law. Every man's house became his castle. Taxes were readily paid, the tax gatherers were honest servants, and, none of the revenue going to keep fat pashas in luxury in Constantinople, there came a prospect of expenditure and revenue balancing after much money had been usefully spent on local government. Until the signing of peace interna- tional law provided that Turkish laws should apply. These, properly administered, as they never were by the Turks, gave a basis of good government, and, with the old abuses connected with the collection of revenue removed, and certain increased taxation and customs dues imposed by the Turks during the war discontinued, the people resumed the arts of peace and enjoyed a degree of prosperity none of them had ever anticipated. What the future government of Palestine may be is uncertain at the time of writing. There is talk of international control — we seem ever ready to lose at the conference table what a vaUant sword has gained for us — ^but the careful and per- fectly correct administration of General Allenby will save us from the criticism of many jealous foreigners. Certainly it will bear examination by any impartial investigator, but the best of all tributes that could be paid to it is that it satisfied religious communities which did not live in perfect harmony with one another and the inhabitants of a country which shelters the people of many different races. The Yilderim undertaking, as the Bagdad scheme was described, did not meet with the full acceptance of the Turks. The ' mighty Jemal,' as the Germans sneeringly called the Commander of the Syrian Army, 14 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON opposed it as weakening his prospects, and even Enver, the ambitious creature and tool of Germany, post- poned his approval. It would seem the taking over of the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force by General Allenby set the Turks thinking, and made the German Military Mission in Constanthiople reconsider their plans, not with a view to a complete abandonment of the proposal to advance on Bagdad, as would have been wise, but in order to see how few of the Yilderim troops they could allot to Jemal's army to make safe the Sinai front. There was an all-important meeting of Turkish Generals in the latter half of August, and Jemal stood to his guns. Von Falkenhayn could not get him to abate one item of his demands, and there can be no doubt that Falkenhayn, obsessed though he was with the im- portance of getting Bagdad, could see that Jemal was right. He admitted that the Yilderim opera- tion was only practicable if it had freedom for retire- ment through the removal of the danger on the Palestine front. With that end in view he advocated that the British should be attacked, and suggested that two divisions and the ' Asia Corps ' should be sent from Aleppo to move round our right. Jemal was in favour of defensive action ; Enver pro- crastinated and proposed sending one division to strengthen the IVth Army on the Gaza front and to proceed with the Bagdad preparations. The wait- and-see policy prevailed, but long before we exerted our full strength Bagdad was out of the danger zone. General Allenby' s force was so disposed that any suggestion of the Yilderim operation being put into execution was ruled out of consideration. Several documents captured at Yilderim head- quarters at Nazareth in September 1918, when General Allenby made his big drive through Syria, OLD BATTLEGROUNDS 15 show very clearly how our Palestine operations changed the whole of the German plans, and reading between the lines one can realise how the impatience of the Germans was increasing Turkish stubbornness and creating friction and ill-feeling. The German military character brooks no opposition ; the Turks like to postpone till to-morrow what should be done to-day. The latter were cocksure after their two successes at Gaza they could hold us up ; the Ger- mans believed that with an offensive against us they would hold us in check till the wet season arrived.^ Down to the south the Turks had to bring their divisions. Their line of communications was very bad. There was a railway from Aleppo through Rayak to Damascus, and onwards through Deraa (on the Hedjaz line) to Afule, Messudieh, Tul Keram, Ramleh, Junction Station to Beit Hanun, on the Gaza sector, and through Et Tineh to Beersheba. Rolling stock was short and fuel was scarce, and the enemy had short rations. When we advanced through Syria in the autumn of 1918 our transport was nobly served by motor-lorry columns which performed marvels in getting up supplies over the worst of roads. But as we went ahead we, having command of the sea, landed stores all the way up the coast, and unless the Navy had lent its helping hand we should never have got to Aleppo before the Turk cried ' Enough.' Every ounce of the Turks' supphes had to be hauled over land. They managed to put ten infantry divisions and one cavalry division against us in the first three weeks, but they were not comparable in strength to our seven infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. In rifle strength we outnumbered them by two to one, but if the enemy bad been well led and properly rationed he, being * See Appendices i„ ii., and m. 16 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON on the defensive and having strong prepared posi- tions, should have had the power to resist us more strongly. The Turkish divisions we attacked were : 3rd, 7th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 26th, 27th, 53rd, and 54th, and the 3rd Cavalry Division. The latter avoided battle, but all the infantry divisions had heavy casualties. That the moral of the Turkish Army was not high may be gathered from a very illuminatmg letter written by General Kress von Kressenstein, the G.O.C. of the Sinai front, to Yilderim headquarters on September 29, 1917.^ The troops who won Palestine and made it happier than it had been for four centuries were exclusively soldiers of the British Empire. There was a French detachment and an Italian detachment with General Allenby's Army. The Italians for a short period held a small portion of the line in the Gaza sector, but did not advance with our force ; the French detachment were solely employed as garrison troops. The French battleship Requin and two French destroyers co- operated with the ships of the Royal Navy in the bombardment of the coast. Our Army was truly representative of the Empire, and the units com- posing it gave an abiding example that in unity rested our strength. From over the Seven Seas the Empire's sons came to illustrate the mianimity of all the King's subjects in the prosecution of the war. English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh divisions of good men and true fought side by side with soldiers of varying Indian races and castes. Aus- tralia's valiant sons constituted many brigades of horse and, with New Zealand mounted regiments, became the most hardened campaigners in the Egyptian and Palestine theatre of operations. Their powerful support in the day of anxiety and trial, as 1 See Appendix iv. OLD BATTLEGROUNDS 17 well as in the time of triumph, will be remembered with gratitude. South Africa contributed good gunners; our dark-skinned brethren in the West Indies furnished infantry who, when the fierce summer heat made the air in the Jordan Valley like a draught from a furnace, had a bayonet charge which aroused an Anzac brigade to enthusiasm (and Colonial free men can estimate bravery at its true value). From far-away Hong Kong and Singapore came mountain gunners equal to any in the world, Kroomen sent from their homes in West Africa surf boatmen to land stores, Raratongas from the Southern Pacific vied with them in boat craft and beat them in physique, while Egypt contributed a labour corps and transport corps running a long way into six figures. The communion of the representatives of the Mother and Daughter nations on the stern field of war brought together people with the same ideals, and if there are any minor jealousies between them the brotherhood of arms will make the soldiers returning to their homes in all quarters of the globe the best of missionaries to spread the Imperial idea. Instead of wrecking the British Empire the German- made war should rebuild it on the soundest of f oimda- tions, affection, mutual trust, and common interest. CHAPTER III DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK General Allenby's first problem was of vital consequence. He had to pierce the Gaza line. Before his arrival there had been, as already stated, two attempts which failed. A third failure, or even a check, might have spelt disaster for us in the East. Tlie Turks held commanding positions, which they strengthened and fortified under the direction of German engineers until their country, between the sea and Beersheba, became a chain of land works of high military value, well adapted for defence, and covering almost every hne of approach. The Turk at the Dardanelles had shoAvn no loss of that quality of doggedness in defence which characterised him in Plevna, and though we know his commanders still cherished the hope of successfully attacking us before we could attempt to crush his hne, it was on his system of defence that the enemy mainly relied to break the power of the British force. On arriving in Egypt General Allenby was given an appreciation of the situation written by Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, who had commanded the Desert Column in various stages across the sands of Sinai, was responsible for forcing the Turks to evacuate El Arish, arranged the dash on Magdaba by General Sir Harry ChauveFs mounted troops, and fought the briUiant little battle of Rafa. This appreciation of the position was the work of a master military mind, taking a broad comprehensive view of the 18 DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK 19 whole military situation in the East, Palestine's position in the world war, the strategical and tactical problems to be faced, and, without making any exorbitant demands for troops which would lessen the Allies' powers in other theatres, set out the minimum necessities for the Palestine force. General AUenby gave the fullest consideration to this docu- ment, and after he had made as complete an examina- tion of the front as any Commander-in-Chief ever undertook — the General was in one or other sector with his troops almost every day for four months — General Chetwode's plan was adopted, and full credit was given to his prescience in General AUenby' s despatch covering the operations up to the fall of Jerusalem. It was General Chetwode's view at the time of writing his appreciation, that both the British and Turkish Armies were strategically on the defensive. The forces were nearly equal in numbers, though we were slightly superior in artillery, but we had no advantage sufficient to enable us to attack a well- entrenched enemy who only offered us a flank on which we could not operate owing to lack of water and the extreme difficulty of supply. General Chet- wode thought it was possible the enemy might make an offensive against us — we have since learned he had such designs — but he gave weighty reasons against the Turk embarking upon a campaign con- ducted with a view to throwing us beyond the Eg3rptian frontier into the desert again. If the enemy contemplated even minor operations in the Sinai Desert he had not the means of undertaking them. We should be retiring on positions we had prepared, for, during his advance across the desert, General Chetwode had always taken the precaution of having his force dug in against the unlikely event 20 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON of a Turkish attack. Every step we went back would make oui* supply easier, and there was no water difficulty, the pipe Hue, then 130 miles long, which carried the purified waters of the Nile to the amount of hundreds of thousands of gallons daily, being always available for our troops. It would be necessary for the Tiu"ks to repair the Beersheba-Auja railway. They had lifted some of the rails for use north of Gaza, and a raid we had carried out showed that we could stop this railway being put into a state of preparedness for mihtary traffic. An attack which aimed at again threateiung the Suez Canal was therefore ruled as outside the range of possibilities. On the other hand, now that the Russian collapse had relieved the Turk of his anxieties in the Caucasus and permitted him to concentrate his attention on the Mesopotamian and Palestine fronts, what hope had he of resisting our attack when we should be in a position to launch it ? The enemy had a single narrow-gauge railway hne connecting with the Jaffa- Jerusalem railway at Junction Station about six miles south-east of Ramleh. This line ran to Beersheba, and there was a spur line running past Deir Sineid to Beit Hanun from which the Gaza position was supphed. There was a shortage of rolling stock and, there being no coal for the engines, whole olive orchards had been hacked down to provide fuel. The Hebron road, which could keep Beersheba supplied if the railway was cut, was in good order, but in other parts there were no roads at all, except several miles of badly metalled track from Junction Station to Juhs. We could not keep many troops with such ill-conditioned communications, but Turk- ish soldiers require far less supplies than European troops, and the enemy had done such remarkable things in surmounting supply difficulties that he DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK 21 was given credit for being able to support between sixty and seventy battalions in the line and reserve, with an artillery somewhat weaker than our own. If we made another frontal attack at Gaza we should find ourselves up against a desperately strong defensive system, but even supposing we got through it we should come to another halt in a few miles, as the enemy had selected, and in most cases had prepared, a number of positions right up to the Jaffa- Jerusalem road, where he would be in a land of com- parative plenty, with his supply and transport troubles very considerably reduced. No one could doubt that the Turks intended to defend Jerusalem to the last, not only because of the moral effect its capture would have on the peoples of the world, but because its possession by us would threaten their enterprise in the Hedjaz, and the enormous amount of work we afterwards found they had done on the Judean hills proved that they were determined to do all in their power to prevent our driving them from the Holy City. The enemy, too, imagined that our progress could not exceed the rate at which our standard gauge railway could be built. Water-borne supplies were limited as to quantity, and during the winter the landing of supplies on an open beach was hazardous. In the coastal belt there were no roads, and the wide fringe of sand which has accumulated for centuries and still encroaches on the Maritime Plain can only be crossed by camels. Wells are few and yield but small volumes of water. With the transport allotted to the force in the middle of 1917 it was not possible to maintain more than one infantry division at a distance of twenty to twenty- five miles beyond railhead, and this could only be done by allotting to them all the camels and wheels of other divisions and rendering these immobile. This was in- 22 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON sufficient to keep the enemy on the move after a tactical success, and he would have ample time to reorganise. General Chetwode held that careful preliminary arrangements, suitable and clastic organisation of transport, the collection of material at railhead, the training of platelaying gangs provided by the troops, the utilisation of the earthwork of the enemy's line for our own railway, luck as regards the weather and the fullest use of sea transport, should enable us to give the enemy less breathing time than appeared possible on paper. It w^as beyond hope, however, whatever preparations were made, that we should be able to piursue at a speed approaching that which the river made possible in Mesopotamia. General Chetwode considered it would be fatal to attempt an offensive with forces which might permit us to attack and occupy the enemy's Gaza line but which would be insufficient to inffict upon him a really severe blow, and to follow up that blow with sufficient troops. No less than seven infantry divisions at full strength and three cavalry divisions would be adequate for the purpose, and they would be none too many. Further, if the Turks began to press severely in Mesopotamia, or even to revive their campaign in the Hedjaz, a premature offensive might be necessi- tated on our part in Palestine. The suggestion made by General Chetwode for General Allenby's consideration was that the enemy should be led to believe we intended to attack him in front of Gaza, and that we should pin him dowTi to his defences in the centre, while the real attack should begin on Beersheba and continue at Hareira and Sheria, and so force the enemy by manoeuvre to abandon Gaza. That plan General Allenby adopted after seeing all the ground, and the events of the last day of October and the first week of November DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK 23 supported General Chetwode's predictions to the letter. Indeed it would be hard to find a parallel in history for such another complete and absolute justification of a plan drawn up several months previously, and it is doubtful if, supposing the Turks had succeeded in doing what their German advisers advocated, namely forestalling our blow by a vigorous attack on our positions, there would have been any material alteration in the working out of the scheme. The staff work of General Headquarters and of the staffs of the three corps proved whoUy sound. Each department gave of its best, and from the moment when Beersheba was taken in a day and we secured its water supply, there was never a doubt that the enemy could be kept on the move until we got into the rough rocky hills about Jerusalem. And by that time, as events proved, his moral had had such a tremendous shaking that he never again made the most of his many opportunities. The soundness of the plan can quite easily be made apparent to the unmihtary eye. Yet the Turk was absolutely deceived as to General Allenby's inten- tions. If it be conceded that to deceive the enemy is one of the greatest accomplishments in the soldier's art, it must be admitted that the battle of Gaza showed General Allenby's consummate generalship, just as it was proved again, and perhaps to an even greater extent, in the wonderful days of September 1918, in Northern Palestine and Syria. A glance at the map of the Gaza- Beersheba line and the country immediately behind it will show that if a successful attack were delivered against Gaza the enemy could withdraw his whole line to a second and supporting position where we should have to begin afresh upon an almost similar operation. The Turk would stiU have his water and would be slightly nearer his supplies. 24 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON Since the two unsuccessful attacks in March and April, Gaza had been put into a powerful state of defence. The houses of the to^\^l are mostly on a ridge, and enclosing the place is a mass of gardens fully a mile deep, each surrounded by high cactus hedges affording complete cover and quite impossible for infantry to penetrate. To reduce Gaza would require a prolonged artillery bombardment with far more batteries than General Allenby could ever expect to have at his command, and it is certain that not only would the line in front of the town have had to be taken, but also the whole of the western end of the Turks' trench system for a length of at least 12,000 yards. And, as has been said, with Gaza secured we should still have had to face the enemy in a new line of positions about the wadi Hesi. Gaza was the Turks' strongest point. To attack here would have meant a long-drawn-out artillery duel, infantry would have had to advance over open ground under complete observation, and, while making a frontal attack, would have been exposed to enfilade fire from the ' Tank ' system of works to the south- east. It would have proved a costly operation, its success could only have been partial in that it did not follow that we should break the enemy's line, and it would not have enabled us to contain the remainder of the Turkish force. Nor would an attack on the centre have promised more favourably. Here the enemy had all the best of the ground. At Atawineh, Sausage Ridge, Hareira, and Teiaha there were defences supporting each other on high ground overlooking an almost flat plain through which the wadi Ghuzze runs. All the ob- servation was in enemy possession, and to attack over this ground would have been inviting disaster. There was Uttle fear that the Turks would attack us DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK 25 across this wide range of No Man's Land, for we held secure control of the curiously shaped heaps of broken earth about Shellal, and the conical hill at Fara gave an uninterrupted view for several miles north- ward and eastward. The position was very different about Beersheba. If we secured that place with its water supply, and in this dry country the battle really amounted to a fight for water, we should be attacking from high ground and against positions which had not been prepared on so formidable a scale as elsewhere, with the prospect of compelling the enemy to abandon the remainder of the line for fear of being enveloped by mounted troops moving behind his weakened left. That, in brief outline, was the gist of General Chetwode's report, and with its full acceptance began the preparations for the advance. These preparations took several months to complete, and they were as thorough as the energy of a capable staff could make them. CHAPTER IV TRAINING THE ARMY Those of us who were fortunate enough to witness the nature of the preparations for the first of General Allenby's great and triumphant moves in Palestine can speak of the debt Britain and her Allies owe not merely to the Commander-in-Chief and his Head- quarters Staff, but to the three Corps Commanders, the Divisional Commanders, the Brigadiers, and the officers responsible for transport, artillery, engineer, and the other services. The Army had to be put on an altogether different footing from that which had twice failed to drive the Turks from Gaza. It serves nothing to ignore the fact that the moral of the troops was not high in the weeks following the second failure. They had to be tuned up and trained for a big task. They knew the Turk was turning his natural advantages of ground about Gaza into a veritable fortress, and that if their next effort was to meet with more success than their last, they had to learn all that experience on the Western Front had taught as to systems of trench warfare. And, more than that, they had to prepare to apply the art of open warfare to the full extent of their powers. A couple of months before General Allenby took over command. General Chetwode had taken in hand the question of training, and in employing the know- ledge gained during the strenuous days he had spent in France and Flanders, he not only won the con- TRAINING THE ARMY 27 fidence of the troops but improved their tone, and by degrees brought them up to something approach- ing the level of the best fighting divisions of our Army in France. This was hard work during hot weather when our trench systems on a wide front had to be prepared against an active enemy, and men could ill be spared for the all-important task of training behind the front line. It was not long, however, before troops who had got into that state of lassitude which is engendered by a behef that they were settling down to trench warfare for the duration of the war — that, in fact, there was a stalemate on this front — ^became inspired by the energy of General Chetwode. They saw him in the front hne almost every day, facing the risks they ran themselves, complimenting them on any good piece of work, suggesting improvements in their defences, always anxious to provide anything possible for their comfort, and generally looking after the rank and file with a detailed attention which no good battahon commander could exceed. The men knew that the long visits General Chet- wode paid them formed but a small part of his daily task. It has been said that a G.O.C. of a force has to think one hour a day about operations and five hours about beef. In East Force, as this part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was then called. General Chetwode, having to look months ahead, had also six worrying hours a day to think about water. For any one who did not love his profession, or who had not an ardent soldierly spirit within him, such a daily task would have been impossible. I had the privilege of living in General Chetwode' s camp for some time, and I have seen him working at four o'clock in the morning and at nine o'clock at night, and the notes on a writing tablet by the 28 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON side of his rough camp-bed showed that in the hours when sleep forsook him he was planning the next day's work. His staff was entirely composed of hard workers, and perhaps no command in this war ever had so small a staff, but there was no officer in East Force who laboured so long or with such concentration and energy and determination as its Chief. This enthusiasm was infectious and spread through all ranks. The sick rate declined, septic sores, from which many men suffered through rough life in the desert on Army rations, got better, and the men showed more interest in their work and were keener on their sport. The full effects had not been wholly realised when the War Cabinet selected General Allenby for the control of the big operations, but the improvement in the condition of the troops was already most marked, and when General Allenby arrived and at once directed that General Head- quarters should be moved from Cairo, which was pleasant but very far away from the front, to Kelab, near Khan Yunus, there was not a man who did not see in the new order of things a sign that he was to be given a chance of testing the Briton's supremacy over the Turk. The improvement in the moral of the troops, the foundations of which were thus begun and cemented by General Chetwode, was rapidly carried on under the new Chief. Divisions like the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th, which had worked right across the desert from the Suez Canal, toihng in a torrid temperature, when parched throats, sun-blistered limbs, and septic sores were a heavy trial, weakened by casualties in action and sickness, were brought up to something like strength. Reinforcing drafts joined a lot of cheery veterans. They were taught in the stern field of TRAINING THE ARMY 29 experience what was expected of them, and they worked themselves up to the degree of efficiency of the older men. The 74th Division, made up of yeomanry regiments which had been doing excellent service in the Libyan Desert, watching for and harassing the elements of the Senussi Army, had to be trained as infantry. These yeomen did not take long to make themselves first-rate infantry, and when, after the German attack on the Somme in March 1918, they went away from us to strengthen the Western Front, a distinguished General told me he believed that man for man the 74th would prove the finest division in France. They certainly proved themselves in Pales- tine, and many an old yeomanry regiment won for itself the right to bear ' Jerusalem, 1917 ' on its standard. The 75th Division had brought some of the Wessex Territorials from India with two battalions of Gurkhas and two of Rifles. The l/4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry joined it from Aden, but for some months the battalion was not itself. It had spent a long time at that dreary sunburnt outpost of the Empire, and the men did not regain their physical fitness till close upon the time it was required for the Gaza operations. The 60th Division came over from Salonika and we were delighted to have them, for they not only gave us General Bulfin as the XXIst Corps Commander, but set an example of efficiency and a combination of dash and doggedness which earned for them a record worthy of the best in the history of the great war. These London Territorials were second-line men, men recruited from volunteers in the early days of the war, when the Coimty of London Territorial battahons went across to France to take a part on a 30 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON front hard pressed by German legions. The 60th Division men had rushed forward to do their duty before the Derby scheme or conscription sought out the cream of Britain's manhood, and no one had any misgivings about that fine cheery crowd. Tlie 10th Division hkewise came from Salonika. Unfortunately it had been doing duty in a fever- stricken area and malaria had weakened its ranks. A httle while before the autumn operations began, as many as 3000 of its men were down at one time with malaria, but care and tonic of the battle pulled the ranks together, and the Irish Division, a purely Irish division, campaigned up to the glorious tradi- tions of their race. They worked like gluttons with rifle and spade, and their pioneer work on roads in the Judean hills will always be remembered with gratitude. The cavalry of the Desert Mounted Corps were old campaigners in the East. The Anzac Mounted Division, composed of six regiments of Australian Light Horse and three regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, had been operating in the Sinai Desert when they were not winning fame on Galhpoli, since the early days of the war. They had proved sterling soldiers in the desert war, hard, full of courage, capable of making light of the longest trek in water- less stretches of country, and mobile to a degree the Turks never dreamed of. There were six other regiments of Australian Light Horse and three first- line regiments of yeomanry in the Australian Mounted Division, and nine yeomanry regiments in the Yeomanry Mounted Division. Tlie 7th Mounted Brigade was attached to Desert Corps, as was also the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, formed of yeomen and Austrahans who had volunteered from their regi- ments for work as camelry. They, too, were veterans. TRAINING THE ARMY 31 All these divisions had to be trained hard. Not only had the four infantry divisions of XXth Corps to be brought to a pitch of physical fitness to enable them to endure a considerable period of open fighting, but they had to be trained in water abstinence, as, in the event of success, they would unquestionably have long marches in a country yielding a quite in- adequate supply of drinking water, and this problem in itself was such that fully 6000 camels were required to carry drinking water to infantry alone. Water- abstinence training lasted three weeks, and the maximum of half a gallon a man for all purposes was not exceeded, simply because the men had been made accustomed to deny themselves drink except when absolutely necessary. But for a systematic training they would have suffered a great deal. The disposition of the force is given in the Appendix.^ ^ See Appendix v. CHAPTER V RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE To ease the supply problem a spur line was laid from Rafa to Sliellal, on the wadi Ghuzze. In that way supplies, stores, and ammunition were taken up to our right flank. Shellal was a position of great strategic importance. At one time it appeared as if we should have to fight hard to gain it. The Turks had cut an elaborate series of trenches on Wali Sheikh Nuran, a hill covering Shellal, but they evacuated this position before we made the first attack on Gaza, and left an invaluable water supply in our hands. At Shellal the stony bed of the wadi Ghuzze rests between high mud banks which have been cut into fantastic shapes by the rushing waters descending from the southern extremities of the Judean range of hills during the winter rains. In the summer months, when the remainder of the wadi bed is dry, there are bubbling springs of good water at Shellal, and these have probably been continuously flowing for many centuries, for close above the spot where the water issues Anzac cavalry discovered a beautiful remnant of the mosaic flooring of an ancient Christian church, which, raised on a hundred-feet mound, was doubtless the centre of a colony of Christians, hun- dreds of years before Crusaders were attracted to the Holy Land. Our engineers harnessed that precious flow. A dam was put across the wadi bed and at least a miUion gallons of crystal water were held up 32 RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE 33 by it, whilst the overflow went into shallow pools fringed with grass (a dehghtfully refreshing sight in that arid country) from which horses were watered. Pumping sets were installed at the reservoir and pipes were laid towards Karm, and from these the Camel Transport Corps were to fill fanatis — eight to twelve gallon tanks — for carriage of water to troops on the move. The railway staff, the department which arranged the making up and running of trains, as well as the construction staff, had heavy responsibihties. It was recognised early in 1917 that if we were to crush the Tm-k out of the war, provision would have to be made for a larger army than a single line from the Suez Canal could feed. It was decided to double the track. The difficulties of the Director of Railway Transport were enormous. There was great shortage of railway material all over the world. Some very valuable cargoes were lost through enemy action at sea, and we had to call for more from different centres, and England deprived herself of ro llin g stock she badly needed, to enable her flag of freedom to be carried (though it was not to be hoisted) through the Holy Land. And incidentally I may remark that, with the sohtary exception of a dirty Uttle piece of Red Ensign I saw flying in the native quarter in Jerusalem, the only British flag the people saw in Palestine and Syria was a miniature Union Jack carried on the Com- mander-in-Chief's motor car and by his standard- bearer when riding. Thus did the British Army play the game, for some of the AUied susceptibiHties might have been wounded if the people had been told (though indeed they knew it) that they were under the protection of the British flag. They had the most convincing evidence, however, that they were under the staunch protection of the British Army. 34 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON Tlie doubling of the railway track went on apace. To save pressure at the Alexandria docks and on the Egyptian State railway, which, giving some of its rolling stock and, I think, the whole of its reserve of material for the use of the military line east of the Canal, was worked to its utmost capacity, and also to economise money by saving railway freights, wharves w^ere built on the Canal at Kantara, and as many as six ocean-going steamers could be unloaded there at one time. By and by a railway bridge was thrown over the Canal, and when the war was over through trains could be run from Cairo to Jerusalem and Haifa. Kantara grew into a w^onderful town with several miles of Canal frontage, huge railway sidmgs and workshops, enormous stores of rations for man and horse, medical supplies, ordnance and ammunition dumps, etc. Probably the enemy knew all about this vast base. Any one on any ship passing through the Canal could see the place, and it is sur- prising, and it certainly points to a lack of enterprise on the part of the Germans, that no attempt was made to bomb Kantara by the super- Zeppelin which in November 1917 left its Balkan base and got as far south as the region of Khartoum on its way to East Africa, before being recalled by wireless. This same Zeppelin was seen about forty miles from Port Said and a visit by it was anticipated. Aeroplanes with experienced pilots and armed with the latest anti- Zeppelin devices were stationed at Port Said and Aboukir ready to ascend on any moonlight night when the hum of aerial motor machinery could be heard. The super- Zeppehn never came and Kantara's progress was unchecked. The doubled railway track was laid as far as El Arish by the time operations commenced, and this was a great aid to the railway staff. Every engine RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE 35 and truck was used to its fullest capacity, and an enormous amount of time was saved by the abolition of passing stations for some ninety miles of the line's length. Railhead was at Deir el Belah, about eight miles short of Gaza, and here troops and an army of Egyptian labourers were working night and day, week in week out, off-loading trucks with a speed that enabled the maximum amount of service to be got out of rolling stock. There were large depots down the line too. At Rafa there was a big store of am- munition, and at Shellal large quantities not only of supplies but of railway material were piled up in readi- ness for pushing out railhead immediately the advance began. A Decauville, or light, line ran out towards Gamli from Shellal to make the supply system easier, and I remember seeing some Indian pioneers lay about three miles of light railway with astonishing rapidity the day after we took Beersheba. Every mile the hne advanced meant time saved in getting up supplies, and the radius of action of lorries, horse, and camel transport was considerably increased. To supply the Gaza front we called in aid a small system of light railways. From the railhead at Deir el Belah to the mouth of the wadi Ghuzze, and from that point along the line of the wadi to various places behind the line held by us, we had a total length of 21 kilometres of light railway. Before this railway got into full operation horses had begun to lose con- dition, and during the summer ammunition-column officers became very anxious about their horses. The light railway was almost everywhere within range of the enemy's guns, and in some places it was un- avoidably exposed, particularly where it ran on the banks of the wadi due south of Gaza. I recollect while the track was being laid speaking to an Aus- tralian in charge of a gang of natives preparing an / 36 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON earthwork, and asked why it was that a trench was dug before earth was piled up. He pointed to the hill of Ali Muntar, the most prominent feature in the enemy's system, and said that from the Turks' observation post on that eminence every movement of the labourers could be seen, and the men were often forced by gunfire to the refuge of the trenches. When the railway was in running order trains had to run the gauntlet of shell-fire on this section on bright moonlight nights, and no camouflage could hide them. But they worked through in a marvel- lously orderly and efficient fashion, and on one day when our guns were hungry this little line carried 850 tons of ammunition to the batteries. The horses became fit and strong and were ready for the war to be carried into open country. In christening their tiny puffing locomotives the Tommy drivers showed their strong appreciation of their comrades on the sea, and the ' Iron Duke ' and ' Lion ' were always tuned up to haul a maximum load. But the pride of the engine yard was the ' Jerusalem Cuckoo ' — some pro- phetic eye must have seen its future employment on the light line between Jerusalem and Ramallah — though in popularity it was run close by the 'Bulfin-ch,' a play upon the name of the Com- mander of the XXIst Corps, for which it did sterUng service. The Navy formed part of the picture as well. Some small steamers of 1000 to 1500 tons burden came up from Port Said to a little cove north of Belah to lighten the railway's task. They anchored about 150 yards off shore and a crowd of boats passed backwards and forwards with stores. These were carried up the beach to trucks on a line connected with the supply depots, and if you wished to see a busy scene where slackers had no place the Belah RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE 37 beach gave it you. The Army tried all sorts of boat- men and labourers. There were Kroo boys who found the Mediterranean waters a comparative calm after the turbulent surf on their own West African shore. The Maltese were not a success. The Egyptians were, both here and almost everywhere else where their services were called for. The best of all the fellows on this beach, however, were the Raratongas from the Cook Islands, the islands from which the Maoris originally came. They were first employed at El Arish, where they made it a point of honour to get a job done well and quickly, and, on a given day, it was found that thirty of them had done as much labourers' work as 170 British soldiers. They were men of fine physical strength and endurance, and some one who knew they had the instincts of sports- men, devised a simple plan to get the best out of them. He presented a small flag to be won each day by the crew accomplishing the best work with the boats. The result was amazing. Every minute the boats were afloat the Raratongas strained their muscles to win the day's competition, and when the day's task was ended the victorious crew marched with their flag to their camp, singing a weird song and as proud as champions. Some Raratongas worked at ammuni- tion dumps, and it was the boast of most of them that they could carry four 60-pounder shells at a time. A few of these stalwart men from Southern Seas re- ceived a promotion which made them the most envied men of their race — they became loading numbers in heavy howitzer batteries, fighting side by side with the Motherland gunners. However well the Navy and all associated with it worked, only a very small proportion of the Army's suppUes was water borne. The great bulk had to be carried by rail. Enormously long trains, most of 38 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON them hauled by London and South- Western loco- motives, bore munitions, food for men and animals, water, equipment, medical comforts, guns, wagons, caterpillar tractors, motor cars, and other parapher- naha required for the largest army which had ever operated about the town of Gaza in the thousands of years of its history. The main line had thrown out from it great tentacles embracing in their iron clasp vital centres for the supply of our front, and over these spur lines the trains ran with the regularity of British main-line expresses. Besides 96,000 actual fighting men, there was a vast army of men behind the line, and there were over 100,000 animals to be fed. There were 46,000 horses, 40,000 camels, 15,000 mules, and 3500 donkeys on Army work east of the Canal, and not a man or beast went short of rations. We used to think Kitchener's advance on Khartoum the perfection of military organisation. Beside the Palestine expedition that Soudan campaign fades into insignificance. In fighting men and labour corps, in animals and the machinery of war, this Army was vastly larger and more important, and the method by which it was brought to Palestine and was supplied, and the low sick rate, constitute a tribute to the master minds of the organisers. The Army had fresh meat, bread, and vegetables in a country which under the lash of war yielded nothing, but which under our rule in peace will furnish three times the produce of the best of past years of plenty. A not inconsiderable portion of the front line was supphed with Nile water taken from a canal nearly two hundred miles away. But the Army once at the front depended less upon the waters of that Father of R-ivers than it had to do in the long trek across the desert. Then all drinking water came from the Nile. It flowed down the sweet-water canal (if one may be RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE 39 pardoned for calling ' sweet ' a volume of water so charged with vegetable matter and bacteria that it was harmful for white men even to wash in it), was filtered and siphoned under the Suez Canal at Kan- tara, where it was chlorinated, and passed through a big pipe line and pumped through in stages into Palestine. The engineers set about improving all local resources over a wide stretch of country which used to be regarded as waterless in summer. Many- water levels were tapped, and there was a fair yield. The engineers' greatest task in moving with the Army during the advance was always the provision of a water supply, and in developing it they conferred on the natives a boon which should make them be re- membered with gratitude for many generations. In the months preceding our attack Royal En- gineers were also concerned in improving the means of communication between railway depots and the front line. Before our arrival in this part of Southern Palestine, wheeled traffic was almost unknown among the natives. There was not one metalled roadway, and only comparatively light loads could be trans- ported in wheeled vehicles. The soil between Khan Yunus and Deir el Belah, especially on the west of our railway line, was very sandy, and after the winter rains had knitted it together it began to crumble imder the sun's heat, and it soon cut up badly when two or three limbers had passed over it. The sandy earth was also a great nuisance in the region between Khan Yunus and Shellal, but between Deir el Belah and our Gaza front, excepting on the belt near the sea which was composed of hillocks of sand precisely similar to the Sinai Desert, the earth was firmer and yielded less to the grinding action of wheels. For ordinary heavy military traffic the engineers made good going by taking off about one foot of the 40 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON top soil and banking it on either side of the road. These tracks lasted very well, but they required constant attention. Ambuhmces and light motor cars had special arrangements made for them. Hun- dreds of miles of wire netting were laid on sand in all directions, and these wire roads, which, stretching across bright golden sand, appeared like black bands to observers in aircraft, at first aroused much curi- osity among enemy airmen, and it was not until they had made out an ambulance convoy on the move that they reahsed the purpose of the tracks. The rabbit wire roads were a remarkable success. Motor wheels held firmly to the surface, and when the roads w^ere in good condition cars could travel at high speed. Three or four widths of wire netting were laced together, laid on the sand and pegged down. After a time loose pockets of sand could not resist the weight of wheels and there became many holes beneath the wire, and the jolting was a sore trial ahke to springs and to a passenger's temper. But here again constant attention kept the roads in order, and if one could not describe travelling over them as easy and comfortable they were at least sure, and one could be certain of getting to a destination at an average speed of twelve miles an hour. In sand the Ford cars have performed wonderful feats, but remarkable as was the record of that cheap American car with us — it helped us very considerably to win the war — you could never tell within hours how long a journey would take off the wire roads. Once leave the netting and you might with good luck and a skilful driver get across the sand without much trouble, but it often meant much bottom-gear w^ork and a hot engine, and not infrequently the digging out of wheels. The drivers used to try to keep to the tracks made by other cars. These were never RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE 41 straight, and the swing from side to side reminded you of your first ride on a camel's back. The wire roads were a great help to us, and the officer who first thought out the idea received our daily blessings. I do not know who he was, but I was told the wire road scheme was the outcome of a device suggested by a medical officer at Romani in 1916, when infantry could not march much more than six miles a day through the sand. This officer made a sort of wire moccasin which he attached to the boot and doubled the marching powers of the soldier. A sample of those moccasins should fuid a place in our War Museum. CHAPTER VI PREPARING FOR ' ZERO DAY ' About the middle of August it was the intention that the attack on the Turks' front hne in Southern Palestine should be launched some time in September. General Allenby knew his force would not be then at full strength, but what was happening at other points in the Turkish theatres of operations might make it necessary to strike an early blow at Gaza to spoil enemy plans elsewhere. However, it was soon seen that a September advance was not absolutely necessary. General Allenby decided that instead of making an early attack it would be far more profitable to wait until his Army had been improved by a longer period of training, and until he had got his artillery, particularly some of his heavy batteries, into a high state of efficiency. He would risk having to take Jerusalem after bad weather had set in rather than be unable, owing to the condition of his troops, to exploit an initial success to the fullest extent. How wholly justified was this decision the subsequent fighting proved, and it is doubtful if there was ever a more complete illustration of the wisdom of those directing war policy at home submitting to the cool, balanced calculations of the man on the spot. The extra six weeks spent in training and preparation were of incalculable service to the Alhes. I have heard it said that a September victory in Palestine would have had its reflex on the Itahan front, and that the Caporetto disaster would not have assumed 42 PREPARING FOR ' ZERO DAY ' 43 the gigantic proportions which necessitated the with- drawal to Italy of British and French divisions from the Western Front and prevented Cambrai being a big victory. That is very doubtful. On the contrary, a September battle in Palestine before we were fully ready to follow the Turks after breaking and rolling up their line, even if we had succeeded in doing this completely, might have deprived us of the moral effect of the capture of Jerusalem and of the wonderful influence which that victory had on the whole civilised world by reason of the sacrifices the Commander-in- Chief made to prevent any fighting at all in the pre- cincts of the Holy City. Of this I shaU speak later, giving the fullest details at my command, for there is no page in the story of British arms which better upholds the honour and chivalry of the soldier than the preservation of the Holy Place from the clash of battle. That last six weeks of preparation were unforget- table. The London newspapers I had the honour to represent as War Correspondent knew operations were about to begin, but I did not cable or mail them one word which would give an indication that big things were afoot. They never asked for news, but were content to wait till they could tell the public that victory was ours. In accordance with their practice throughout the w^ar the London Press set an example to the world by refraining from pub- lishing anything which would give information of the slightest value to the enemy. It was a privilege to see that victory in the making. Some divisions which had allotted to them the hardest part of the attack on Beersheba were drawn out of the line, and forming up in big camps between Belah and SheUal set about a course of training such as athletes undergo. They had long marches in the sand carrying packs and equipment. They were put on a short allowance 44 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON of water, except for washing purposes. They dug, they had bombing practice, and with all this extra exercise while the days were still very hot they needed no encouragement to continue their games. Football was their favourite sport, and the British Tommy is such a remarkable fellow that it was usual to see him trudge home to camp looking ' fed up ' with exercise, and then, after throwing off his pack and tunic, run out to kick a ball. The Italian and French detachments used to look at him in astonish- ment, and doubtless they thought his enthusiasm for sport was a sore trial. He got thoroughly fit for marches over sand, over stony ground, over shifting shingle. During the period of concentration he had to cross a district desperately bad for marching, and it is more than probable the enemy never beheved him capable of such endurance. He was often tired, no doubt, but he always got to his destination, was rarely footsore, and laughed at the worst parts of his journey. The sand was choking, the flies were an irritating pest, equipment became painfully heavy ; but a big, brave heart carried Tommy through his training to a state of perfect condition for the heavy test. To enable about two-thirds of the force to carry on a moving battle while the remainder kept half the enemy pinned down to his trench system on his right-centre and right, it was necessary to reinforce strongly the transport service for our mobile columns. The XXIst Corps gave up most of its lorries, tractors, and camels to XXth Corps. These had to be moved across from the Gaza sector to our right as secretly as possible, and they were not brought up to load at the supply depots at Shellal and about Karm until the moment they were required to carry supplies for the corps moving to attack. PREPARING FOR ' ZERO DAY ' 45 It is not easy to convey to any one who has not seen an army on the move what a vast amount of transport is required to provision two corps. In France, where roads are numerous and in com- paratively good condition, the supply problem could be worked out to a nicety, but in a roadless country where there was not a sound half-mile of track, and where water had to be developed and every gallon was precious, the question of supply needed most anxious consideration, and a big margin had to be allowed for contingencies. It will give some idea of the requirements when I state that for the supply of water alone the XXth Corps had allotted to it 6000 camels and 73 lorries. To feed these water camels alone needed a big convoy. We got an impression of the might and majesty of an army in the field as we saw it preparing to take the offensive. The camp of General Headquarters where I was located was situated north of Rafa. The railway ran on two sides of the camping ground, one line going to Belah and the other stretching out to Shellal, where everything was in readiness to extend the iron road to the north-east of Karm, on the plain which, because the Turks enjoyed complete observa- tion over it, had hitherto been No Man's Land. We saw and heard the traffic on this section of the line. It was enormous. Heavily laden trains ran night and day with a mass of stores and suppHes, with motor lorries, cars, and tractors ; and the ever-increasing volume of traffic told those of us who knew nothing of the date of ' Zero day ' that it was not far ofi. The heaviest trains seemed to run at night, and the returning empty trains were hurried forward at a speed suggesting the urgency of clearing the hne for a fully loaded train awaiting at Rafa the signal to proceed with its valuable load to railhead. Perfect 46 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON control not only on the railway system but in the forward supply yards prevented congestion, and when a train arrived at its destination and was split up into several parts, w ell-drilled gangs of troops and Egyptian labourers were allotted to each truck, and whether a lorry or a tractor had to be unshipped and moved down a ramp, or a truck had to be reheved of its ten tons of tibbin, boxes of biscuit and bully, or of engineers' stores, the goods were cleared away from the vicinity of the Une with a celerity which a goods-yard foreman at home would have applauded as the smartest work he had ever seen. There was no room for slackers in the Army, and the value of each truck was so high that it could not be left standmg idle for an hour. The organisation was equally good at Kantara, where the loading and making up of trains had to be arranged precisely as the needs at the front demanded. Those remarkable haulers, the caterpillar tractors, cut many a passage through the sand, tugging heavy guns and ammuni- tion, stores for the air and signal services, machinery for engineers and mobile workshops, and sometimes towing a weighty load of petrol to satisfy their voracious appetites for that fuel. The tractors did well. Sand was no trouble to them, and when mud marooned lorries during the advance in November the rattling, rumbling old tractor made fair weather of it. The mechanical transport trains will not forget the service of the tractors on the morning after Beer- sheba was taken. From railhead to the spot where Father Abraham and his people fed their flocks the country was bare and the earth's crust had yielded all its strength under the influence of the summer sun. Loaded lorries under their own power could not move more than a few yards before they were several inches deep in the sandy soil, but a Motor Transport "officer THE GREAT MOSQUE AT GAZA PREPARING FOR ' ZERO DAY ' 47 devised a plan for beating down a track which all lorries could use. He got a tractor to haul six un- laden lorries, and with all the vehicles using their own power the tractor managed to pull them through to Beersheba, leaving behind some wheel tracks with a hard foundation. A hundred lorries followed, the drivers steering them in the ruts, and they made such good progress that by the afternoon they had de- posited between 200 and 300 tons of supplies in Beer- sheba. The path the tractor cut did not last very long, but it was sound enough for the immediate and pressing requirements of the Army. Within a month of his arrival in Egjrpt, General Allenby had visited the whole of his front line and had decided the form his offensive should take. As soon as his force had been made up to seven infantry divisions and the Desert Mounted Corps, and they had been brought up to strength and trained, he would attack, making his main offensive against the enemy's left flank while conducting operations vigorously and on an extensive scale against the Turkish right-centre and right. The principal operation against the left was to be conducted by General Chetwode's XXth Corps, consisting of four infantry divisions and the Imperial Camel Brigade, and by General Chauvel's Desert Mounted Corps. General Bulfin's XXIst Corps was to operate against Gaza and the Turkish right-centre south-east of that ancient town. If the situation became such as to make it necessary to take the offensive before the force had been brought up to strength, the XXIst Corps would have had to undertake its task with only two divisions, but in those circumstances its operations were to be limited to demonstrations and raids. By throwing forward his right, the XXIst Corps Commander was to pin the enemy down in the Atawineh district, and on the 48 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON left he would move against the south-western defences of Gaza so as to lead the Tui'ks to suppose an attack was to come in this sector. That movement being made, the XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps were to advance against Beersheba, and, having taken it, to secure the valuable water supply which was known to have existed there since Abraham dug the well of the oath which gave its name to the town. Because of water difficulties it was considered vital that Beersheba should be captured in one day, a formidable undertaking owing to the situation of the town, the high entrenched hills around it and the long marches for cavalry and infantry before the attack ; and in drawing up the scheme based on the Commander-in-Chief's plan, the commanders of XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps had always to work on the assumption that Beersheba would be in their hands by nightfall of the first day of the attack. General Barrow's Yeomanry Mounted Division was to remain at Shellal in the gap between XXth Corps and XXIst Corps in case the enemy should attempt to attack the XXth Corps' left flank. Having dealt with the enemy in Beersheba, General Chetwode with mounted troops protecting his right was to move north and north-west against the enemy's left flank, to drive him from his strong positions at Sheria and Hareira, enveloping his left flank and striking it obliquely. While the XXth Corps was moving against this sec- tion of the enemy line. Desert Mounted Corps was to bring up the mounted division left at Shellal, and passing behind the XXth Corps to march on Nejile, where there was an excellent water supply, and the wadi Hesi, so as to threaten the left rear and the line of retreat of the Turkish Army. It was always doubtful whether XXth Corps would PKEPARING FOR ' ZERO DAY ' 49 be able to close up the gap between it and the XXIst Corps owmg to the length of its marches and the distance it was from railhead, and the scheme tlierefore provided that the XXIst Corps should confirm successes gained on our right by forcing its way through the tremendously strong Gaza position to the line of the wadi Hesi and joining up with Desert Mounted Corps. A considerable number of XXth Corps troops would then return to the neigh- bourhood of railliead and release the greater part of its transport for the infantry of XXIst Corps moving up the Maritime Plain. This, in summary form, was the scheme General Allenby planned before the middle of August, and though the details were not, and could not be, worked out until a couple of months had passed, it is note- worthy as showing that, notwithstanding the moves an enterprising enemy had at his command in a country where positions were entirely favourable to him, where he had water near at hand, where the transport of supplies was never so serious a problem for him as for us when we got on the move, and where he could make us fight almost every step of the way, the Commander-in-Chief foresaw and provided for every eventuaHty, and his scheme worked out abso- lutely and entirely ' according to plan,' to use the favourite phrase of the German High Command. When the Corps Commanders began working out the details two of the greatest problems were trans- port and water. Only patience and skiHul develop- ment of known sources of supply would surmount the water difficulty, and we had to wait till the period of concentration before commencing its solution. But to lighten the transport load which must have weighed heavily on Corps Staffs, the Commander-in- Chief agreed to allow the extension of the railway 50 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON east of Shellal to be begun sooner than he had pro- vided for. It was imperative that railway con- struction should not give the enemy an indication of our intentions. If he had realised the nature and scope of our preparations he would have done some- thing to counteract them and to deny us that element of surprise which exerted so great an influence on the course of the battle. General Allenby, however, was wilhng to take some risks to simphfy supply diffi- culties, and he ordered that the extension to a railway station north-east of Karm should be completed by the evening of the third day before the attack, that a Decauville line from GamU, not to be begun before the sixth day prior to the attack, was to be completed to Karm by the day preceding the opening of the fighting at Beersheba, and that a new Decauville line should be started at Karm when fighting had begun, and should be carried nearly three miles in the Beersheba direction early on the following morning. These new lines, though of short length, were an inestimable boon to the conductors of supply trains. The new railheads both of the standard gauge and light lines were well placed, and they not only saved time and shortened the journeys of camel convoys and lorry transport columns, but prevented congestion at depots in one central spot. A big effort was made to escape detection by enemy aircraft. For the first time since the Eg3rptian Ex- peditionary Force took the field we had obtained mastery in the air. On the 8th and 15th October two enemy planes were shot down behind our lines, and the keenness of our airmen for combat made the German aviators extremely careful. They had been bold and resolute, taking their observations several thousand feet higher than our pilots, it is true, but neither anti-aircraft fire nor the presence of our PREPARING FOR ' ZERO DAY ' 51 machines in the air had up to this time deterred them. However, just at the moment when air work was of extreme importance to the Turks, the German flying men, recognising that our pilots had new battle planes and were full of resource and daring, showed an un- usual lack of enterprise, and we profited from their inactivity. The concentration of the force in the positions from which it was to attack Beersheba was to have taken seven days, but owing to the difficulties attending the development of water at Asluj and Khalasa the time was extended to ten days. During this period the uppermost thought of commanders was to conceal their movements. All marching was done at night and no move of any kind was permitted till nearly six o'clock in the evening, when enemy aircraft were usually at rest and the light was suffi- ciently dull to prevent the Fritzes seeing much if they had made an exceptionally late excursion. All the tents and temporary shelters which had been occupied for weeks were left standing. Cookhouses, horse hnes, canteens, and so on were untouched, and one had an eerie feeling in passing at night through these untenanted camping groimds, deserted and lifeless, and a prey to the jackal and pariah dog. A vast area of many square miles which had held tens of thousands of troops and animals almost became a wilderness again, and the few natives hereabouts who had made large profits from the sale of eggs, fruit, and vegetables looked disconsolate and bewildered at the change, hoping and believing that the empty tents merely denoted a temporary absence. But the great majority of the Arniy never came that way again. When the infantry started on the march, divisions and brigades had allotted to them particular areas for their march routes, and all over that country. 52 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON where scarcely a tree or native hut existed to make a landmark, there were dotted small arrow-pointed boards with the direction ' A road,' ' B road,' ' Z road,' as the case might be. Marching in the dark hours when a refreshing air succeeded the heat of the day, the troops halted as soon as a purple flush threw into high relief the southern end of the Judean hills, and they hid themselves in the wadis and broken ground ; and on one unit vacating a bivouac area it was occupied by another, thus making the areas in which the troops rested as few as possible. The concentration was worked to a time-table. Not only were brigades allotted certain marches each night, but they were given specified times to cover certain distances, and these were arranged according to the condition of the gromid. In parts it was very broken and covered with loose stones, and the pace of uifantry by night was very slightly more than one mile per hour. The routes for guns were not chosen mitil the whole comitry had been recomioitred, and it was a highly creditable performance for artillery to get their field guns and heavy howitzer batteries through to the time-table. But the clockwork pre- cision of the movements reflected even more highly on the staff working out the details than on the in- fantry and artillery, and it may be said with perfect truth that the staff made no miscalculation or mistake. The XXth Corps staff maps and plans, and the details accompanying them, were masterpieces of clearness and completeness. The men who fought out the plans to a triumphant finish were glad to recognise this perfection of staff work.^ ^ See Appendix vi. CHAPTER VII THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY The XXth Corps began its movement on the night of 20-21st October. The whole Corps was not on the march, but a sufficient force was sent forward to form supply dumps and to store water at Esani for troops covering Desert Mounted Corps engineers engaged on the development of water at Khalasa and Asluj. Some of the AustraUan and New Zealand troops en- gaged on this work had previously been at these places. In the early summer it was thought desirable to destroy the Turkish railway which ran from Beer- sheba to Asluj and on to Kossaima, in order to pre- vent an enemy raid on our communications between El Arish and Rafa, and the mounted troops with the Imperial Camel Corps had had a most successful day in destroying many miles of hne and several bridges. The Turks were badly in need of rails for the line they were then constructing down to Deir Sineid, and they had hfted some of the rails between Asluj and Kos- saima, but during our raid we broke every rail over some fifteen miles of track. Khalasa and Asluj being water centres became the points of concentration for two mounted divisions, and the splendid Colonials in the engineer sections worked at the wells as if the success of the whole enterprise depended upon their efforts, as, indeed, to a very large extent it did. Theirs was not an eight hours day. They worked under many difficulties, often thigh deep in water and mud, cleaning out and deepening wells and installing 53 54 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON power pumps, putting up large canvas tanks for storage, and making water troughs. The results exceeded anticipations, and the Commander-in-Chief, on a day when the calls on his time were many and urgent, made a long journey to thank the officers and men for the work they had done and to express his high appreciation of their skill and energy. The principal work carried out by the XXth Corps during the period of concentration consisted in laying the standard gauge line to I mar a and opening the station at that place on October 28 ; prolonging the railway Une to a point three-quarters of a mile north- north-east of Karm, where the station was opened on November 3 ; completing by October 30 the light railway from the east bank of the wadi Ghuzze at GamU via Karm to Khasif ; and developing water at Esani, Malaga, and Abu Ghalyun for the use first by cavalry detachments and then by the 60th Division. Cisterns in the Khasif and Imsiri area were stocked with 60,000 gallons of water to be used by the 53rd and 74th Divisions, and this supply was to be sup- plemented by camel convoys. Apparently the enemy knew very Uttle about the concentration until about October 26, and even then he could have had only sUght knowledge of the extent of our movements, and probably knew nothing at all of where the first blow was to fall. In the early hours of October 27 he did make an attempt to interfere with our con- centration, and there was a spirited little action on our outpost line which had been pushed out beyond the plain to a line of low hills near the wadi Hanafish. The Turks in overwhelming force met a most stubborn defence by the Middlesex Yeomanry, and if the enemy took these London yeomen as an average sample of General Allenby's troops, this engagement must have given them a foretaste of what was in store for them. THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY 55 The Middlesex Yeomanry (the 1st County of London Yeomanry, to give the regiment the name by which it is officially known, though the men almost invariably use the much older Territorial title) and the 21st Machine Gun Squadron, held the long ridge from El Buggar to hill 630. There was a squadron dismounted on hill 630, three troops on hill 720, the next and highest point on the ridge, and a post at El Buggar. At four o'clock in the morning the latter post was fired on by a Turkish cavalry patrol, and an hour later it was evident that the enemy intended to try to drive us off the ridge, his occupation of which would have given him the power to harass railway construction parties by sheU-fire, even if it did not entirely stop the work. Some 3000 Turkish infantry, 1200 cavalry, and twelve guns had advanced from the Kauwukah system of defences to attack our outpost line on the ridge. They heavily engaged hill 630, working round both flanks, and brought heavy machine-gun and artillery fke to bear on the squadron holding it. The Royal Flying Corps estimated that a force of 2000 men attacked the garrison, which was completely cut off. A squadron of the City of London Yeomanry sent to reinforce was held up by a machine-gun barrage and had to withdraw. The garrison held out magni- ficently all day in a support trench close behind the crest against odds of twenty to one, and repeatedly beat off rushes, although the bodies of dead Turks showed that they got as close as forty yards from the defenders. Two officers were wounded, and four other ranks killed and twelve wounded. The attack on hill 720 was made by 1200 cavalry supported by a heavy volume of shell and machine- gun fire. During the early morning two desperate charges were beaten off, but in a third charge the 56 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON enemy gained possession of the hill after the detach- ment had held out for six hours. All our officers were killed or wounded and all the men were casual- ties except three. At six o'clock in the evening the Turks were holding this position in strength against the 3rd Australian Light Horse, but two infantry brigades of the 53rd Division were moving towards the ridge, and during the evening the enemy retired and we held the ridge from this time on quite securely. The strong defence of the Middlesex Yeomanry un- doubtedly prevented the Turks estabhshing them- selves on the ridge, and saved the infantry from having to make a night attack which might have been costly. Thereafter the enemy made no attempt to interfere with the concentration. The yeomanry losses in this encounter were 1 officer and 23 other ranks killed, 5 officers and 48 other ranks wounded, 2 officers and 8 other ranks missing. On the night of October 30-31 a brilliant moon lit up the whole country. The day had been very hot, and at sunset an entire absence of wind promised that the night march of nearly 40,000 troops of all arms would be attended by all the discomforts of dust and heat. The thermometer fell, but there was not a breath of wind to shift the pall of dust which hung above the long columns of horse, foot, and guns. Where the tracks were sandy some brigades often appeared to be advancing through one of London's own particular fogs. Men's faces became caked with yellow dust, their nostrils were hot and burning, and parched throats could not be relieved because of the necessity of conserving the water allowance. A hot day was in prospect on the morrow, and the fear of having to fight on an empty water-bottle prevented many a gallant fellow broaching his supply before daybreak. Most of the men had had a long acquaint- TURKISH HEADQUARTERS AT GAZA (Note the Crusader Lion in Wall) ^!: I < 1 1 m 1 ■^A THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY 57 ance with heat in the Middle East, and the high temperature would have caused them scarcely any trouble if there had been wind to carry away the dust clouds. The cavalry marched over harder and more stony ground than the infantry. They advanced from Klialasa and Asluj a long way south of Beersheba to the east of the town. It was a big night march of some thirty miles, but it was well within the powers of the veterans of the Anzac Mounted Division and Australian Mounted Division, whose men and horses were in admirable condition. The infantry were ordered to be on their line of deployment by four o'clock on the morning of October 31, and in every case they were before time. There had been many reconnaissances by officers vvho were to act as guides to columns, and they were quite familiar with the ground ; and the guns and ammuni- tion columns were taken by routes which had been carefully selected and marked. In places the banks of wadis had been cut into and ramps made to enable the rough stony watercourses to be practicable for wheels, and, broken as the country was, and though all previous preparations had to be made without arousing the suspicions of Turks and wandering Bedouins, there was no incident to check the progress of infantry or guns. Occasional rifle fire and some shelling occurred during the early hours, but at a Httle after three a.m. the XXth Corps advanced head- quarters had the news that all columns had reached their allotted positions. The XXth Corps plan was to attack the enemy's works between the Khalasa road and the wadi Saba with the 60th and 74th Divisions, while the defences north of the wadi Saba were to be masked by the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade and two battalions of the 53rd Division, the remainder of the latter divi- 58 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON sion protecting the left flank of the Corps from any attack by enemy troops wlio might move south from the Sheria area. The lirst objective was a hill marked on the map as ' 1070,' about 6000 yards south-west of Beersheba. It was a prominent feature, 500 yards or perhaps a little more from a portion of the enemy's main line, and the Turks held it strongly and were supported by a section of German machine-gimners. We had to win this height in order to get good ob- servation of the enemy's main line of works, and to allow of the advance of field artillery within wire- cutting range of an elaborate system of works pro- tecting Beersheba from an advance from the west. At six the guns began to bombard 1070, and the volume of fire concentrated on that spot must have given the Turks a big surprise. On a front of 4500 yards we had in action seventy-six 18-pounders, twenty 4-5- inch howitzers, and four 3 •7-inch howitzers, while eight 60-pounders, eight 6-inch howitzers, and four 4*5-inch howitzers were employed in counter battery work. The absence of wind placed us at a heavy disadvantage. The high explosive shells bursting about the crest of 1070 raised enormous clouds of dust which obscured everything, and after a short while even the flames of exploding shells were en- tirely hidden from view. The gunners had to stop firing for three-quarters of an hour to allow the dust to settle. They then reopened, and by half-past eight, the wire-cutting being reported completed, an intense bombardment was ordered, under cover of which, and with the assistance of machine-gun fire from aeroplanes, the 181st Infantry Brigade of the 60th Division went forward to the assault. They captured the hill in ten minutes, only sustaining about one hundred casualties, and taking nearly as many prisoners. A German machine-gunner who fell into THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY 59 our hands bemoaned the fact that he had not a weapon left — every one of the machine guns had been knocked out by the artillery, and a number were buried by our fire. The first phase of the operations having thus ended successfully quite early in the day, the second stage was entered upon. Field guns were rushed forward at the gallop over ground broken by shallow wadis and up and down a very uneven stony surface. The gun teams were generally exposed during the advance and were treated to heavy shrapnel ^e, but they swung into action at prearranged points and set about wire-cutting with excellent effect. The first part of the second phase consisted in reducing the enemy's main line from the Khalasa road to the wadi Saba, though the artillery bombarded the whole line. The 60th Division on the right had two brigades attacking and one in divisional reserve, and the 74th Division attacking on the left of the 60th likewise had a brigade in reserve. The 74th, while waiting to advance, came under considerable shell-fire from batteries on the north of the wadi, and it was some time before their fire could be silenced. As a rule the enemy works were cut into roclvy, rising ground and the trenches were well enclosed in wire fixed to iron stanchions. They were strongly made and there were possibihties of prolonged opposition, but by the time the big assault was launched the Turks knew they were being attacked on both sides of Beersheba and they must have become anxious about a line of retreat. General Shea reported that the wire in front of him was cut before noon, but General Girdwood was not certain that the wire was sufficiently broken on the 74th Division's front, though he intimated to the Corps Commander that he was ready to attack at the same time as the 60th. It still continued a 60 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON windless day, and the dust clouds prevented any observation of the wire entanglements. General Girdwood turned this disadvantage to account, and ordering his artillery to raise their fire slightly so that it should fall just in front of and about the trenches, put up what was in effect a dust barrage, and under cover of it selected detachments of his infantry ad- vanced almost into the bursting shell to cut passages through the wire with wire-cutters. The dismounted yeomanry of the 231st and 230th Infantry Brigades rushed through, and by half -past one the 74 th Divi- sion had secured their objectives. The 179th and 181st Brigades of the 60th Division had won their trenches almost an hour earlier, and about 5000 yards of works were in our hands south of the wadi Saba. The enemy had 3000 yards of trenches north of the wadi, and though these were threatened from the south and west, it w^as not until five o'clock that the 230th Brigade occupied them, the Turks clearing out during the bombardment. During the day, on the left of the 74th Division, the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade and two battalions of the 53rd Division held the ground to the north of the wadi Saba to a point where tho remainder of the 53rd Division watched for the approach of any enemy force from the north, while the 10th Division about Shellal protected the line of communications east of the wadi Ghuzze, and the Yeomanry Mounted Division was on the west side of the wadi Ghuzze in G.H.Q. reserve. The XXth Corps' losses were 7 officers killed and 42 wounded, 129 other ranks killed, 988 wounded and 5 missing, a light total considering the nature of the works carried during the day. It was obvious that the enemy was taken completely by surprise by the direction of the attack, and the rapidity with which we carried his strongest points was overwhelming. THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY 61 The Turk did not attempt anything in the nature of a counter-attack by the Beersheba garrison, nor did he make any move from Hareira against the 53rd Division. Had he done so the 10th Division and the Yeomanry Momited Division would have seized the opportunity of falling on him from Shellal, and the Turk chose the safer course of allowing the Beersheba garrison to stand unaided in its own defences. The XXtli Corps' captures included 25 officers, 394 other ranks, 6 guns, and numerous machine guns. The Desert Mounted Corps met with stubborn opposition in their operations south-east and east of Beersheba, but they were carried through no less suc- cessfully than those of the XXth Corps. The mounted men had had a busy time. General Ryrie's 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade had moved southwards on October 2, and on them and on the 1st and 2nd Field Squadrons Austrahan Engineers the bulk of the work fell of developing water and making and marking tracks which, in the sandy soil, became badly cut up. On the evening of October 30 the Anzac Mounted Division was at Asluj, the Australian Mounted Divi- sion at Khalasa, the 7th Mounted Brigade at Esani, Imperial Camel Brigade at Hiseia, and the Yeomanry Mounted Division in reserve- at Shellal. The Anzac Division commanded by General Chaytor left Asluj during the night, and in a march of twenty-four miles round the south of Beersheba met with only shght opposition on the way to Bir el Hamam and Bir Sahm abu Irgeig, between five and seven miles east of the town. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade during the morning advanced north to take the high hill Tel el Sakaty, a httle east of the Beersheba- Hebron road, which was captured at one o'clock, and the brigade then swept across the metalled road which 62 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON was in quite fair condition, and whicli subsequently ^ was of great service to us during the advance of one infantry division on Belhlcheni and Jerusalem. The 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade commanded by General Cox, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade under General Mcldrum, moved against Tel el Saba, a 1000-feet hill which rises very precipitously on the northern bank of the wadi Saba, 4000 yards due east of Beersheba. Tel el Saba is believed to be the original site of Beersheba. It had been made into a strong redoubt and was well held by a sub- stantial garrison adequately dug in and supported by nests of machine-gunners. The right bank of the wadi Klialil was also strongly held, and between the Hebron road and Tel el Saba some German machine- gunners in three houses offered determined opposition. The New Zealanders and a number of General Cox's men crept up the wadi Saba, taking full advantage of the cover offered by the high banks, and formed up under the hill of Saba. They then dashed up the steep sides while the horse artillery lashed the crest with their fire, and driving the Turks from their trenches had captured the hill by three o'clock. At about the same time the 1st Light Horse Brigade suitably dealt with the machine-gunners in the houses. Much ground east of Beersheba had thus been made good, and the Hebron road was denied to the garrison of the town as a line of retreat. The Anzac Mounted Division was then reinforced by General Wilson's 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, and by six p.m. the Division held a long crescent of hills from Point 970, a mile north of Beersheba, through Tel el Sakaty, round south-eastwards to Bir el Ha mam. General Hodgson's Australian Mounted Division had a night march of thirty-four miles from Kiialasa to Iswawin, south-east of Beersheba, and after the 3rd THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY 63 Light Horse Brigade had been detached to assist the Anzac Division, orders were given to General Grant's 4th Austrahan Light Horse Brigade to attack and take the town of Beersheba from the east. The orders were received at four o'clock, and until we had got an absolute hold on Tel el Saba an attack on the town from this direction would have been suicidal, as an attacking force would have been between two fires. The shelling of the cavalry during the day had been rather hot, and enemy airmen had occasionally bombed them. It was getting late, and as it was of the greatest importance that the town's available water should be secured that night, General Grant was directed to attack with the utmost vigour. His brigade worthily carried out its orders. The ground was very uneven and was covered with a mass of large stones and shingle. The trenches were well manned and strongly held, but General Grant ordered them to be taken at the gaUop. The Australians carried them with an irresistible charge ; dismounted, cleared the first line of all the enemy in it, ran on and captured the second and third system of trenches, and then, their horses having been brought up, galloped into the town to prevent any destruction of the wells. The first-line eastern trenches of Beersheba were eight feet deep and four feet wide, and as there were many of the enemy in them they were a serious obstacle to be taken in one rush. This charge was a sterUng feat, and unless the town had been occupied that night most, if not all, of the cavalry would have had to withdraw many miles to water, and subsequent opera- tions might have been imperilled. Until we had got Beersheba there appeared small prospect of watering more than two brigades in this area. Luckily there had been two thunderstorms a few days before the attack, and we found a few pools of 64 HOW JERUSALEI\I WAS WON sweet water which enabled the whole of the Corps' horses to be watered during the night. These pools soon dried up and the w ater problem again became serious. The Commander-in-Chief rewarded General Grant with the D.S.O. as an appreciation of his work, and the brigade was gratified at a well-earned honour. The 7th IMounted Brigade was held up for some time hi the afternoon by a flankmg fire from Ras Ghannam, south of Beersheba, but this was silenced in time to enable the brigade to assist in the occupation of Beer- sheba at nightfall. The 4th Light Horse Brigade's cap- tures in the charge were 58 officers, 1090 other ranks, and 10 field guns, and the total ' bag ' of the Desert Mounted Corps was 70 officers and 1458 other ranks. The loss of Beersheba was a heavy blow to the Turk. Yet he did not even then reahse to the full the significance of our capture of the town. He certainly failed to appreciate that we were to use it as a jumping-off place to attack his main line from Gaza to Sheria by rolling it up from left to right. In this plan there is no doubt that General Allenby entirely deceived his enemy, for in the next few days there was the best of evidence to show that General Kress von Kressenstein beheved we were going to advance from Beersheba to Jerusalem up the Hebron road, and he made his dispositions to oppose us here. It was not merely the moral effect of the loss of Beer- sheba that disturbed the Turks ; they had been driven out of a not unimportant stronghold. All through the many centuries since Abraham and his people led a pastoral hfe near the wells, Beersheba had been a meanly appointed place. There were no signs as far as I could see of any elaborate ruins to indicate anything larger than a native settlement. Elsewhere we saw crumbling walls of ancient castles and fortresses to tell of conquerors and glories long THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY 65 since faded away, ®f relics of an age when great captains led martial men into new worlds to conquer, of the time when the Crusading spirit was abroad and the flower of Western chivalry came East to hold the land for Christians. Here the native quarter sug- gested that trade in Beersheba was purely local and not ambitious, that it provided nothing for the world's commerce save a few skins and hides, and that the inhabitants were content to live the rude, simple lives of their forefathers. But the enterprising German arrived, and you could tell by his work how he in- tended to compel a change in the unchanging character of the peo^jle. He built a handsome Mosque — but before he was driven out he wired and mined it for destruction. He built a seat of government, a hos- pital, and a barracks, all of them pretentious buildings for such a town, well designed, constructed of stone with red-tiled roofs, and the gardens were nicely laid out. There were a railway station and storehouses on a scale which would not yield a return on capital expenditure for many years, and the water tower and engine sheds were built to last longer than merely military necessities demanded. They were fashioned by European craftsmen, and the sohdity of the structures offered strange contrast to the rough- and-ready native houses. The primary object of the Hun scheme was, doubtless, to make Beersheba a suitable base for an attack on the Suez Canal, and the manner of improving the Hebron road, of setting road engineers to construct zigzags up hills so that lorries could move over the road, was part of the plan of men whose vision was centred on cutting the Suez Canal artery of the British Empire's body. The best laid schemes . . . When I entered Beersheba our troops held a line of outposts sufficiently far north of the town to pre- 66 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON vent the Turks shelling it, and the place was secure except from aircraft bombs, of which a number fell into the town without damaging anything of much consequence. Some of the troops fell victims to booby traps. Apparently harmless whisky bottles exploded when attempts were made to draw the corks, and several small mines went up. Besides the mines in the Mosque there was a good deal of wiring about the railway station, and some rolling stock was made ready for destruction the instant a door was opened. The ruse was expected ; some Australian engineers drew the charges, and the coaches were afterwards of considerable service to the supply branch. CHAPTER VIII GAZA DEFENCES Meanwhile there were important happenings at the other end of the line. Gaza was about to submit to the biggest of all her ordeals. She had been a bone of contention for thousands of years. The Pharaohs coveted her and more than 3500 years ago made bloody strife within the environs of the town. Alex- ander the Great besieged her, and Persians and Arab- ians opposed that mighty general. The Ptolemies and the Antiochi for centuries fought for Gaza, whose inhabitants had a greater taste for the mart than for the sword, and when the Maccabees were carrying a victorious war through Philistia, the people of Gaza bought off Jonathan, but the Jews occupied the city itself about a century before the Christian era. Later on the place was captured after a year's siege and destroyed, and for long it remained a mass of moulder- ing ruins. Pompey revived it, making it a free city, and Gabinius extended it close to the harbour, whilst under Csesar and Herod its prosperity and fame increased. In succeeding centuries Gaza's commerce flourished under the Greeks, who founded schools famous for rhetoric and philosophy, till the Maho- medan wave swept over the land in the first half of the seventh century, when the town became a shadow of its former self, though it continued to exist as a centre for trade. The Crusaders m^^e their influence felt, and many are the traces of their period in this ancient city, but Askalon always had 67 68 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON more Crusader support. Napoleon's attack on Gaza found Abdallab's army in a very different state of preparedness from von Ivress's Turkish army. Nearly all Abdallah's artillery was left behind in a gun park at Jaffa owing to lack of transport, and though he had a numerically superior force he did not like Napoleon's dispositions, and retreated when Kleber moved up the plain to pass between Gaza and the sea, and the cavalry advanced east of the Mound of Hebron, or Ali INIuntar, as we know the hill up which Samson is reputed to have carried the gates and bar of Gaza. For nearly a century and a quarter since Napoleon passed forwards and backwards through the town, Gaza pursued the arts of peace in the lethargic spirit which suits the native temperament, but in eight months of 1917 it was the cockpit of strife in the Middle East, and there was often crammed into one day as much fighting energy as was shown in all the battles of the past thirty-five centuries, Napoleon's campaign included. Fortunately after the battles of March and April nearly all the civilian population left the town for quieter quarters. Some of them on returning must have had difficulty in identifying their homes. In the centre of the town, where bazaars radiated from the quarter of which the Great Mosque was the hub, the houses were a mass of stones and rubble, and the narrow streets and tortuous byways were filled with fallen walls and roofs. The Great Mosque had entirely lost its beauty. We had shelled it because its minaret, one of those delicately fashioned spires w^hich, seen from a distance, lead a traveller to imagine a native to^vn in the East to be arranged on an artistic and orderly plan, was used as a Turkish observation post, and the Mosque itself as an am- munition store. I am told our guns were never laid GAZA DEFENCES 69 on to this objective until there was an accident within it which exploded the ammunition. Be that as it may, there was ample justification for shelling the Mosque. I went in to examine the structure a few hours after the Turks had been compelled to evacuate the town, and whilst they were then shelling it with unpleasant severity. Amid the wrecked marble columns, the broken pulpit, the torn and twisted lamps and crumbling walls were hundreds of thou- sands of rounds of small-arms ammunition, most of it destroyed by explosion. A great shell had cut the minaret in half and had left exposed telephone wires leading direct to army headquarters and to the Turkish gunners' fire control station. Most of the Mosque furniture and all the carpets had been re- moved, but a few torn copies of the Koran, some of them in manuscript with marginal notes, lay mixed up with German newspapers and some typical Turkish war propaganda literature. That Mosque, which Saladin seized from the Crusaders and turned from a Christian into a Mahomedan place of worship, was unquestionably used for military purposes, and the Turks cared as little for its religious character or its venerable age as they did for the mosque on Nebi Samwil, where the remains of the Prophet Samuel are supposed to rest. Their stories of the trouble taken to avoid military contact with holy places and sites were all bunkum and eyewash. They would have fought from the walls of the Holy City and placed machine-gun nests in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Mosque of Omar if they had thought it would spare them the loss of Jerusalem. Gaza had, as I have said, been turned into a fortress with a mass of field works, in places of considerable natural strength. If our force had been on the de- fensive at Gaza the Germans would not have attacked 70 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON without an army of at least three times our strength. It is doubtful if the Turks put as much material in use on Gallipoli as they did here. Their trenches were deeply cut and were protected by an immense amount of wire. In the sand-dune area they used a vast quantity of sandbags, and they met the shortage of jute stuffs by making small sacks of bedstead hangings and curtains which, in the dry heat of the summer, wore very well. Looking across No Man's Land one could easily pick out a line of trenches by a red, a vivid blue, or a saffron sandbag. The Turkish dug-outs were most elaborate places of security. The excavators had gone down into the hard earth well beneath the deep strata of sand, and they roofed these holes with six, eight, and sometimes ten layers of palm logs. We had seen these beautiful trees disappearing and had guessed the reason. But an even greater protection than the devices of miHtary engineers had been provided for the Turks by Dame Nature. Along the southern outskirts of the town all the fields were enclosed by giant cactus hedges, sometimes with stems as thick as a man's body and not infrequently rearing their strong limbs and prickly leaves twenty feet above the ground. The hedges w ere deep as well as high. They were at once a screen for defending troops and a barrier as impenetrable as the w\aUs of a fortress. If one Ime of cactus hedges had been cut through, in- fantry would have found another and yet another to a depth of nearly two miles, and as the whole of these thorny enclosures were commanded by a few machine guns the possibility of gettmg through was almost hopeless. There were similar hedges on the eastern and western sides of Gaza, but they were not quite so deep as on the south. On the western side, and extending south as far as the desert which the GAZA DEFENCES 71 Army had crossed with such steady, methodical, and one may also say painful progression, was a wide belt of yellow sand, sometimes settled down hard under the weight of heavy winds, and in other places yielding to the pressure of feet. The Turks had laboured hard in this mile and a half width of sand, right down to the sea, to protect their right flank. There was a point about 4000 yards due west from the edge of the West Town of Gaza which we called Sea Post. It was the western extremity of the enemy's exceedingly intricate system of defences. The beach was below the level of the Post. From Sea Post for about 1500 yards the Turkish front Hne ran to Rafa Redoubt. There were wired-in entrenchments with strong points here and there, and a series of communication trenches and redoubts behind them for 3000 yards to Sheikh Hasan, which was the port of Gaza, if you can so describe an open roadstead with no landing facilities. From Rafa Redoubt the contour of the sand dunes permitted the enemy to construct an exceedingly strong line running due south for 2000 yards, the strongest points being named by us Zowaid trench. El Burj trench, Triangle trench, Peach Orchard, and El Arish Redoubt, the nomenclature being reminis- cent of the trials of the troops in the desert march. Behind this line there was many a sunken passage- way and shelter from gunfire, while backing the whole system, and, for reasons I have given, an element of defence as strong as the prepared positions, were cactus hedges enclosing the West Town's gardens. From El Arish Redoubt the hne ran east again to Mazar trench with a prodigal expenditure of wire in front of it, and then south for several hundred yards, when it was thrown out to the south-west to embrace a position of high importance known as Umbrella Hill, a dune of blazing yellow sand facing, about 500 72 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON yards away, Sauison's Ridge, which we held strongly and on which the enemy often concentrated his fire. This ended the Tui'ks' right-half section of the Gaza defences. Close by passed what from time im- memorial has been called the Cairo Road, a track worn down by caravans of camels moving towards Kantara on their way with goods for Egyptian bazaars. But there was no break in the trench system which ran across the plain, a beautiful green tinted with the blooms of myriads of wild flowers when we first advanced over it in March, now browned and dried up by absolutely cloudless summer days. In the gardens on the western slopes of the hills running south from Ali Muntar the Turk had achieved much spadework, but he had done far more work on the hills themselves, and these were a frame of fortifica- tions for Ah Mmitar, on which we once sat for a few hours, and the possession of which meant the re- duction of Gaza. By the end of summer the hill of Muntar had lost its shape. When we saw it during the first battle of Gaza it was a bold feature sur- mounted by a few trees and the whitened walls and grey dome of a sheikh's tomb. In the earher battles of 1917 much was done to rufile Muntar' s crest. We saw trees uprooted, others lose their limbs, and naval gunfire threatened the foundations of the old chief's burying place. But Ali Muntar stoutly resisted the heavy shells' attack. As if Samson's feat had en- dowed it with some of the strong man's powers, Muntar for a long time received its daily thumps stoically ; but by degrees the resistance of the old hill declined, and w^hen agents reported that the sheikh's tomb w^as used as an observation post, 8-inch howitzers got on to it and made it untenable. There was a bit of it left at the end, but not more than would offer protection from a rifle bullet, and the one tree GAZA DEFENCES 73 left standing was a limbless trunk. The crest of the hill lost its roundness, and the soil which had worked out through the shell craters had changed the colour of the summit. Old Ali Muntar had had the worst of the bombardment, and if some future sheikh should choose the site for a summer residence he will come across a wealth of metal in digging his foundations. To capture Gaza the Formidable it was proposed first to take the western defences from Umbrella Hill to Sea Post, to press on to Sheikh Hasan and thus turn the right flank of the whole position. That would compel the enemy to reinforce his right flank when he was being heavily attacked elsewhere, and if he had been transferring his reserves to meet the threat against the left of his main line after Beersheba had been won for the Empire he would be in sore trouble. Gaza had abeady tasted a full sample of the war food we intended it should consume. Before the attack on Beersheba had developed, ships of war and the heavy guns of XXIst Corps had rattled its defences. The warships' fire was chiefly directed on targets our land guns could not reach. Observers in aircraft controlled the fire and notified the de- struction of ammunition dumps at Deir Sineid and other places. The work of the heavy batteries was watched with much interest. Some were entirely new batteries which had never been in action against any enemy, and they only arrived on the Gaza front five weeks before the battle. These were not allowed to register until shortly before the battle began, and they borrowed guns from other batteries in order to train the gun crews. So desirous was General Bulfin to conceal the concentration of heavies that the wire- less code calls were only those used by batteries which were in position before his Corps was formed, and the volume of fire came as an absolute surprise to the 74 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON enemy. It came as a surprise also to some of us in cami3 at G.H.Q. one night at the end of October. Suddenly there was a terrific burst of fii-e on about four miles of front. Vivid fan-shaped flashes stabbed the sky, the bright moonlight of the East did not dim the guns' lightning, and their thunderous voices were a challenge the enemy was powerless to refuse. He took it up slowly as if half ashamed of his weakness. Then his fire increased in volume and in strength, but it ebbed again and we knew the reason. We held some big ' stuff ' for comiter battery work, and our fire was ejffective. The preliminary bombardment began on October 27 and it grew^ in intensity day by day. The Navy co-operated on October 29 and subsequent days. The whole line from JVIiddlesex Hill (close to Outpost Hill) to the sea was subjected to heavy fire, all the routes to the front line were shelled during the night by 60-pounder and field-gun batteries. Gas shells dosed the centres of communication and bivouac areas, and every quarter of the defences was made uncomfortable. The sound-ranging sections told us the enemy had between sixteen and twenty-four guns south of Gaza, and from forty to forty-eight north of the town, and over 100 guns were disclosed, including more than thirty firing from the Tank Redoubt well away to the eastward. On October 29 some of the guns south of Gaza had been forced back by the severity of our counter battery work, and of the ten guns remaining between us and the town on that date all except four had been removed by November 2. For several nights the bombardment continued without a move by infantry. Then just at the moment von Kress was discussing the loss of Beer- sheba and his plans to meet our further advance in that direction, some infantry of the 75th Division GAZA DEFENCES 75 raided Outpost Hill, the southern extremity of the entrenched hill system south of Ali Muntar, and killed far more Turks than they took prisoners. There was an intense bombardment of the enemy's works at the same time. The next night — November 1-2 — ^was the opening of XXIst Corps' great attack on Gaza, and though the enemy did not leave the town or the remainder of the trenches we had not assaulted till nearly a week afterwards, the vigour of the attack and the bravery with which it was thrust home, and the subsequent total failure of counter-attacks, must have made the enemy commanders realise on the afternoon of November 2 that Gaza was doomed and that their boasts that Gaza was impregnable were thin air. Their reserves were on the way to their left where they were urgently wanted, there was nothing strong enough to replace such heavy wastage caused to them by the attack of the night of November 1 and the morning of the 2nd, and our big gains of ground were an enormous advantage to us for the second phase in the Gaza sector, for we had bitten deeply into the Turks' right flank. Like the concentration of the XXth Corps and the Desert Mounted Corps for the jump off on to Beer- sheba, the preparations against the Turks' extreme right had to be very secretly made. The XXIst Corps Commander had to look a long way ahead. He had to consider the possibiUty of the enemy abandoning Gaza when Beersheba was captured, and falling back to the line of the wadi Hesi. His troops had been confined to trench warfare for months, digging and sitting in trenches, putting out wire, going out on listening patrols, sniping and doing all the drudgery in the hnes of earthworks. They were hard and strong, their health having considerably improved since the early summer, but at the end of 76 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON September the infantry were by no means march fit. Keahsing that, if General Allenby's operations were successful, and no one doubted that, we should have a period of open warfare when troops would be called upon to make long marches and midergo the priva- tions entailed by transport difficulties. General Bulfin brought as many men as he could spare from the trenches back to Deir el Belah and the coast, where they had route marches over the sand for the restora- tion of their marchuig powers. Gradually he ac- cumulated supphes in sheltered positions just behind the front. In three dumps were collected seven days' mobile rations, ammunition, water, and engineers' material. Tracks were constructed, cables buried, concealed gun positions and brigade and battalion headquarters made, and from the 25th October troops were ready to move ofi with two days' rations on the man. Should the enemy retire. General Hill's 52nd (Lowland) Division was to march up the shore beneath the sand cliffs, get across the wadi Hesi at the mouth, detach a force to proceed towards Askalon, and then move eastward down to the ridge opposite Deir Smeid, and, by securing the bridge and crossings of the wadi Hesi, prevent the enemy establishing him- self on the north bank of the wadi. The operations on the night of November 1-2 were conducted by Major-General Hare, commanding the 54th Division, to which General Leggatt's 156th Infantry Brigade was temporarily attached. The latter brigade was given the important task of capturmg Umbrella Hill and El Arish Redoubt. Umbrella Hill was to be taken first, and as it was anticipated the enemy would keep up a strong artillery fire for a considerable time after the position had been taken, and that his fire would interfere with the assembly and advance of troops detailed for the second phase, the first GAZA DEFENCES 77 phase was timed to start four hours earher than the second. For several days the guns had opened intense fire at midnight and again at 3 a.m. so that the enemy should not attach particular importance to our artillery activity on the night of action, and a creeping barrage nightly swept across No Man's Land to clear off the chain of listening posts established 300 yards in front of the enemy's trenches. Some heavy banks of cloud moved across the sky when the Scottish Rifle Brigade assembled for the assault, but the moon shed sufficient light at intervals to enable the Scots to file through the gaps made in our wire and to form up on the tapes laid outside. At 11 p.m. the 7th Scottish Rifles stormed Umbrella Hill with the greatest gallantry. The first wave of some sixty- five officers and men was blown up by four large contact mines and entirely destroyed. The second wave passed over the bodies of their comrades without a moment's check and, moving through the wire smashed by our artillery, entered Umbrella Hill trenches and set about the Turks with their ba.yonets. They had to clear a maze of trenches and dug-outs, but they bombed out of existence the machine- gunners opposing them and had settled the possession of Umbrella Hill in half an hour. The 4th Royal Scots led the attack on El Arish Redoubt. It was a bigger and noisier ' show ' than the Royal Scots had had some months before, when in a ' silent ' raid they killed with hatchets only, for the Scots had seen the condition of some of their dead left in Turkish hands and were taking retribution. Not many Turks in El Arish Redoubt lived to relate that night's story. The Scots were rapidly in the redoubt and were rapidly through it, cleared up a nasty corner known as the ' Little Devil,' and were just about to shelter from the shells which were to 78 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON answer their attack when they caught a brisk fire from a Bedouin hut. A phitoon leader disposed his men cleverly and rushed the hut, killing everybody in it and capturing two machine guns. The vigorous resistance of the Turks on Umbrella Hill and El Arish Redoubt resulted hi our having to bury over 350 enemy dead in these positions. The second phase was to attack the enemy's front- line system from El Aiish Redoubt to the sea at Sea Post. At 3 A.M., after the enemy guns had plentifully sprinkled Umbrella Hill and had given it up as irretrievably lost, we opened a ten-minutes' intense bombardment of the front line, exactly as had been done on preceding mornings, but this time the 161st and 162nd Infantry Brigades followed up our shells and carried 3000 yards of trenches at once. Three- quarters of an hour afterwards the 163rd Infantry Brigade tried to get the support trenches several hundred yards in rear, but the difficulties were too many and the effort failed. Having secured Sea Post and Beach Post the 162nd Brigade completed the programme by advancing up the coast and cap- turing the ' port ' of Gaza, Sheikh Hasan, with a considerable body of prisoners. The enemy's guns remained active until seven o'clock, when they reserved their fire tiU the afternoon. Then a heavy counter-attack was seen to be develop- ing by an aerial observer, whose timely warning enabled the big guns and warships to smash it up. Another counter-attack against Sheikh Hasan was repulsed later in the day, and a third starting from Crested Rock which aimed at getting back El Burj trench was a complete failure. After the second phase our troops buried 739 enemy dead. Without doubt there were many others killed and wounded in the unsuccessful comiter-attacks, particularly the BEERSHEBA RAILWAY S'lA HUN \\] TH MINKIJ ROLLING SIOCK GAZA DEFENCES 79 first against Sheikli Hasan, when many heavy shells were seen to fall in the enemy's ranks. We took prisoners 26 officers, including two battalion com- manders, and 418 other ranks. Our casualties were 30 officers and 331 other ranks killed, 94 officers and 1869 other ranks wounded, and 10 officers and 362 other ranks missing. Considering the enormous strength of the positions attacked, the numbers engaged, and the fact that we secured enemy front 5000 yards long and 3000 yards deep, the losses were not more severe than might have been expected. The Turks clung to their trenches with a tenacity equal to that which characterised their defences on Gallipoli, and officer prisoners told us they had been ordered to hold Gaza at all costs. That was good news, though even if they had got back to the wadi Hesi line it is doubtful if, when Sheria was taken, they could have done more than temporarily hold us up there. During the next few days the work against the enemy's right consisted of heavy bombardments on the Hne of hills running from the north-east to the south of Gaza, and on the prominent position of Sheikh Redwan, east of the port. The enemy made some spirited replies, notably on the 4th, but his force in Gaza was getting shaken, and prisoners reluctantly admitted that the heavy naval shells taking them in flank and rear were affecting the moral of the troops. The gunfire of Rear- Admiral Jackson's fleet of H.M.S. Grafton, Raglan, Monitors 15, 29, 31, and 32, river- gunboats Ladybird and Amphis, and the destroyers Staunch and Comet, was worthy of the King's Navy. They were assisted by the French battleship Eequin, We lost a monitor and destroyer torpedoed by a submarine, but the marks of the Navy's hard hitting were on and about Gaza, and we heard, if we could not see, the best the ships were doing. On one day 80 HOW JERUSALEIM WAS WON there was a number of explotsions about Deir Shield indicating the destruction of some of the enemy's reserve of ammunition, and while the Turks were still in Gaza they received a shock resembling nothing more than an earthquake. One of the ships — the Raglan, I believe — takmg a signal from a seaplane, got a direct hit on an ammunition train at Beit Hanun, the railway terminus north of Gaza. The whole train went up and its load was scattered in fragments over an area of several hundred square yards, an extraordinary scene of wreckage of torn and twisted railway material and destroyed ammunition present- ing itself to us when we got on the spot on Novem- ber 7. There was another very fine example of the Navy's indirect fire a short distance northward of this railway station. A stone road bridge had been built over the wadi Hesi and it had to carry all heavy traffic, the banks of the wadi being too steep and broken to permit wheels passing down them as they stood. During our advance the engineers had to build ramps here. A warship, taking its line from an aeroplane, fired at the bridge from a range of 14,000 yards, got two direct hits on it and holed it in the centre, and there must have been thirty or forty shell craters within a radius of fifty yards. The confounding of the Turks was ably assisted by the Navy. JHAPTER IX CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT Now we return to the operations of XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps on our right. After the capture of Beersheba this force was preparing to attack the left of the Turkish main hne about Hareira and Sheria, the capture of which would enable the fine force of cavalry to get to Nejile and gain an excellent water supply, to advance to the neighbour- hood of Huj and so reach the plain and threaten the enemy's line in rear, and to fall on his line of retreat. It was proposed to make the attack on the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems at Hareira on November 4, but the water available at Beersheba had not been equal to the demands made upon it and was petering out, and mounted troops protecting the right flank of XXth Corps had to be reUeved every twenty-four hours. The men also suffered a good deal from thirst. The weather was unusually hot for this period of the year, and the dust churned up by traffic was as irritating as when the khamseen wind blew. The two days' delay meant much in favour of the enemy, who was enabled to move his troops as he desired, but it also permitted our infantry to get some rest after their long marches, and supplies were brought nearer the front. ' Rest ' was only a comparative term. Brigades were on the move each day in country which was one continual rise and fall, with stony beds of wadis to check progress, without a tree to lend a few moments' grateful relief from a burning sun, and 82 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON nothing but the rare sight of a squahd native hut to reheve the monotony of a sun-dried desolate land. The troops were remarkably cheerful. They were on their toes, as the cavalry told them. They had drawn first blood profusely from the Turk after many weary months of waiting and getting fit, and they knew that those gaunt mountain ridges away on their right front held behind them Bethlehem and Jerusalem, goals they desired to reach more than any other prizes of war. They had seen the Turk, and had soundly thrashed him out of trenches which the British could have held against a much stronger force. Their confidence was based on the proof that they were better men, and they were convinced that once they got the enemy into the open their superi- ority would be still more marked. The events of the next six weeks showed their estimate of the Turkish soldier was justified. The 53rd Division with the Imperial Camel Corps on its right moved to Towal Abu Jerwal on November 1 to protect the flank guard of the XXth Corps during the pending attack on the Kauwukah system. The infantry had some fighting on that day, but it was mild compared with the strenuous days before them. The 10th Division attacked Irgeig railway station north-west of Beersheba and secured it, and waited there with the 74th Division on its right while the Welsh Division went forward to fight for lOiuweilfeh on November 3. The Welshmen could not obtain the whole of the position on that day, and it was not until the 6th that it became theirs. Khuweilfeh is about ten miles due east of Sheria, the same distance north of Beersheba, and some five miles west of the Hebron road. It is in the hill country, difficult to approach, with nothing in the nature of a road or track leading to it, and there was no element in the position to CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT 83 suggest the prospect of an easy capture. When General Mott advanced to these forbidding heights the strength of the enemy in these parts was not reahsed. Prisoners taken during the day proved that there were portions of three or four Turkish divisions in the neighbourhood, and the strong efforts made to prevent the Welsh troops gaining the position and the furious attempts to drive them out of it suggested that most of the Turkish reserves had been brought over to their left flank to guard against a wide movement intended to envelop it. It afterwards turned out that von Kressenstein believed General AUenby intended to march on Jerusalem up the Hebron road, and he threw over to his left all his reserves to stop us. That was a supreme mistake, for when we had broken through at Hstreira and Sheria the two wings of his Army were never in contact, and their only means of communication was by aeroplane. The magnificent fight the 53rd Division put up at Khuweilfeh against vastly superior forces and in the face of heavy casualties played a very important part in the overwhelming defeat of the Turks. For four days and nights the Welsh Division fought without respite and with the knowledge that they could not be substantially reinforced, since the plan for the attack on Hareira and Sheria entailed the employ- ment of all the available infantry of XXth Corps. Attack after attack was launched against them with extreme violence and great gallantry, their positions were raked by gunfire, whilst water and supplies were not over plentiful. But the staunch Division held on grimly to what it had gained, and its tenacity was well rewarded by what was won on other portions of the field. During the night of November 5-6 and the day of the 6th, the 74th, 60th, and 10th Divisions concen- 84 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON trated for the attack on the Kauwukah system. The enemy's positions ran from his Jerusalem-Beersheba railway about five miles south-east of Hareira, across the Gaza-Beersheba road to the wadi Sheria, on the northern bank of which was an exceedingly strong redoubt covering Hareira. The eastern portion of this line was known as the Kauwukah system, and between it and Hareira was the Rushdi system, all being connected up by long communication and support trenches, while a light railway ran from the Rushdi line to dumps south of Sheria. At the moment of assembly for attack our line from right to left was made up as follows : the 158th Infantry Brigade was on the right, south of Tel Khuweilfeh. Then came the 160th Brigade and 159th Brigade. The Yeomanry Mounted Division held a long line of comitry and was the connecting link between the 53rd and 74th Divisions. The latter division disposed from right to left the 231st Brigade, the 229th Brigade, and 230th Brigade, who were to march from the south- east to the north-west to attack the right of the Kau- wukah system of entrenchments on the railway. The 181st Brigade, 180th Brigade, and 179th Brigade of the 60th Division were to march in the same direction to attack the next portion of the system on the left of the 74th Division's objectives, then swing- ing to the north to march on Sheria. The 31st Brigade, 30th Brigade, and 29th Brigade were to operate on the 60th Division's left, with the Aus- tralian Mounted Division watching the left flank of XXth Corps. The Turkish Vllth Army and 3rd Cavalry Division were opposing the XXth Corps, another Division was opposite the 53rd Division and the Imperial Camel Corps with the 12th Depot Regiment at Dharahiyeh on the Hebron road, the 16th Division opposite our 74th, the 24th and 26th CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT 85 Divisions opposite our 69th, and the 54th against the 10th Division. Tlie 3rd, 53rd, and 7th Turkish Divisions were in the Gaza area. At daybreak the troops advanced to the attack. The first part of the Hne in front of the 231st Brigade was a serious obstacle. Two or three small outlying rifle pits had to be taken before the Division could proceed with its effort to drive the enemy out of Sheria and protect the flank of the 60th Division, which had to cross the railway where a double line of trenches was to be tackled, the rear line above the other with the flank well thrown back and protected by small advanced pits to hold a few men and machine guns. The Turks held on very obstinately to their ground east of the railway, and kept the 74th Division at bay till one o'clock in the afternoon, but the artillery of that Division had for some time been assisting in the wire-cutting in front of the trenches to be assaulted by the 60th Division, and the latter went ahead soon after noon, and with the assistance of one brigade of the 10th Division, had won about 4000 yards of the complicated trench system and most of the Rushdi system by half-past two. The Londoners then swung to the north and occupied the station at Sheria, while the dismounted yeomanry worked round farther east, taking a series of isolated trenches on the way, the Irish troops re- lieving the 60th in the captured trenches at Kauwukah. The 60th Division, having possession of the larger part of Sheria, intended to attack the hill there at nightfall, and the attack was in preparation when an enemy dump exploded and a huge fire lighted up the whole district, so that all troops would have been exposed to the fire of the garrison on the hill. General Shea therefore stopped the attack, but the hill was stormed at 4.30 next morning and carried at the point 86 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON of the bayonet. A bridgehead was then formed at Sheria, and the Londoners fought all day and stopped one counter-attack when it was within 200 yards of our line. On that same morning the Irish troops had extended then' gains westwards from the Rushdi system till they got to Hareira Tepe Redoubt, a high mound 500 yards across the top, which had been criss-crossed w4th trenches with wire hanging about some broken ground at the bottom. Here there was a hot tussle, but the Irishmen valiantly pushed through and not only gave XXth Corps the whole of its objectives and completed the turn of the enemy's left flank, but joined up wdth the XXIst Corps. The workmg of XXth Corps' scheme had again been admirable, and once more the staff work had enabled the movements to be timed perfectly. The Desert Mounted Corps was thus able to draw up to Sheria in readiness to take up the pursuit and to get the water supply at Nejile. This ended the XXth Corps' task for a few days, though the 60th Division became temporarily attached to Desert Moimted Corps. XXth Corps had nobly done its part. The consummate ability, energy, and foresight of the corps commander had been supported throughout by the skill of divisional and brigade commanders. For the men no praise could be too high. The atten- tion given to their training was well repaid. They bore the strain of long marches on hard food and a small allowance of water in a way that proved their physique to be only matched by their courage, and that was of a high order. Their discipline was admirable, their determination alike in attack and defence strong and well sustained. To say they were equal to the finest troops in the world might lay one open to a charge of exaggeration when it was im- possible to get a fair ground of comparison, seeing CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT 87 the conditions of fighting on different fronts was so varied, but the trials through which the troops of XXth Corps passed up to the end of the first week of November, and their magnificent accompHshments by the end of the year, make me doubt whether any other corps possessed finer soldierly qualities. The men were indeed splendid. The casualties sustained by the XXth Corps from October 31 to Novem- ber 16 were : killed, officers 63, other ranks 869 ; wounded, officers 198, other ranks 4246 ; missing, no officers, 108 other ranks — a total of 261 officers and 5223 other ranks. During the period after Beersheba when the XXth Corps troops were concentrating to break up the Turks' defensive position on the left, the Desert Mounted Corps was busily engaged holding a line eight or ten miles north and north-east of Beersheba, and watching for any movement of troops down the Hebron road. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and 7th Mounted Brigade tried to occupy a line from KhuweiHeh to Dharahiyeh, but it was not possible to reach it — a fact by no means surpris- ing, as in the light of subsequent knowledge it was clear that the Turks had put much of their strength there. A patrol of Light Horsemen managed to work round to the north of Dharahiyeh, a curious group of mud houses on a hill-top inhabited by natives who have yet to appreciate the evils of grossly overcrowded quarters as well as some of the elementary principles of sanitation, and they saw a number of motor lorries come up the admirably constructed hill road designed by German engineers. The lorries were hurrying from the Jerusalem area with reinforcements. Prisoners — several hundreds of them in all — ^were brought in daily, but no attempt was made to force the enemy back until November 6, when the 53rd Division, 88 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON which for the time being was attached to the Desert Mounted Corps, drove the Turks off the whole of Khuweilfeh, behaving as I have ah-eady said with fine gallantr}/ and inflicting severe losses. There were also counter-attacks launched against the 5th Mounted Brigade, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, but these were likewise beaten off with considerable casualties to the enemy. When the XXth Corps had captured the Khauwukah system, a detachment for the defence of the right flank of the Army was formed under the command of Major-General G. de S. Barrow, the G.O.C. Yeomanry Mounted Division, consisting of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, 53rd Division, Yeomanry Mounted Division, New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and two squadrons and eight machine guns of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade. The Australian Mounted Division marched from Karm, whither it had been sent on account of water difficulties, to rejoin Desert Mounted Corps to whom the 60th Division was temporarily attached. The Desert Corps had orders on November 7 to push through as rapidly as possible to the line wadi Jem- mameh-Huj, and from that day the Corps commenced its long march to Jaffa, a march which, though strongly opposed by considerable bodies of troops, was more often interfered with by lack of water than by difficulty in defeating the enemy. The scarcity of water was a sore trouble. There was an occasional pool here and there, but generally the only water procurable was in deep wells giving a poor yield. The cavalry will not forget that long trek. No brigade could march straight ahead. Those operating in the foothills on our right had to fight all the way, and they were often called upon to resist counter-attacks by strong rearguards issuing CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT 89 from the hills to threaten the flank and so delay the advance in order to permit the Turks to carry off some of their material. It was necessary almost every day to withdraw certain formations from the front and send them back a considerable distance to water, replacing them by other troops coming from a well centre. In this way brigades were not in- frequently attached to divisions other than their own, and the administrative services were heavily handicapped. Several times whole brigades were without water for forty-eight hours, and though supplies reached them on all but one or two occasions they were often late, and an exceedingly severe strain was put on the transport. During that diagonal march across the Maritime Plain I heard infantry ofi&cers remark that the Australians always seemed to have their supplies up with them. I do not think the supphes were always there, but they generally were not far behind, and if resource and energy could work miracles the Australian supply officers deserve the credit for them. The divisional trains worked hard in those strenuous days, and the ' Q ' staff of the Desert Mounted Corps had many a sleepless night devising plans to get that last ounce out of their trans- port men and to get that Httle extra amount of sup- plies to the front which meant the difference between want and a sufficiency for man and horse. On the 7th November the 60th Division after its spirited attack on Tel el Sheria crossed the wadi and advanced north about two miles, fighting obstinate rearguards all the way. The 1st Australian Light Horse took 300 prisoners and a considerable quantity of ammunition and stores at Ameidat, and with the remainder of the Anzac Division reached Tel Abu Dilakh by the evening, and the Australian Mounted Division filled the gap between the Anzacs and the 90 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON Londoners, but having been unable to water could not advance further. The 8th November was a busy and brilliantly successful day. The Corps' effort was to make a wide sweeping movement in order first to obtain the valuable and urgently required water at Nejile, and then to push across the hills and rolling downs to the country behind Gaza to harass the enemy retreating from that town. The Turks had a big rearguard south-west of Nejile and made a strong effort to delay the capture of that place, the importance of which to us they realised to the full, and they were prepared to sacrifice the whole of the rearguard if they could hold us off the water for another twenty-four hours. The pressure of the Anzac Division and the 7th Mounted Brigade as- sisting it was too much for the enemy, who though holding on to the hills very stoutly till the last moment had to give way and leave the water in our undisputed possession. The Sherwood Rangers and South Notts Hussars were vigorously counter-attacked at Mud- weiweh, but they severely handled the enemy, who retired a much weakened body. By the evening the Anzacs held the country from Nejile to the north bank of the wadi Jemmameh, having captured 300 prisoners and two guns. The Australian Mounted Division made an excellent ad- vance round the north side of Huj, which had been the Turkish Vlllth Army Headquarters, and the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade was in touch with the corps cavalry of XXIst Corps at Beit Hanun, while the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade had taken prisoners and two of the troublesome Austrian 5-9 howitzers. It was the work of the 60th Division in the centre, however, which was the outstanding feature of the day, though the Londoners readily admitted that CEUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT 91 without the glorious charge of the Worcester and Warwickshire Yeomanry in the afternoon they would not have been in the neighbourhood of Huj when darkness fell. The 60th were in the centre, sand- wiched between the Anzacs and Australian Mounted Division, and their allotted task was to clear the country between Sheria and Huj, a distance of ten miles. The country was a series of billowy downs with valleys seldom more than 1000 yards wide, and every yard of the way was opposed by infantry and artillery. Considering the opposition the progress was good. The Londoners drove in the Turks' strong flank three times, first from the hill of Zuheilika, then from the cultivated area behind it, and thirdly from the wadi-torn district of Muntaret el Baghl, from which the infantry proceeded to the high ground to the north. It was then between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, and maps showed that between the Division and Huj there was nearly four miles of most difficult country, a mass of wadi beds and hills giving an enterprising enemy the best possible means for holding up an advance. General Shea went ahead in a light armoured car to reconnoitre, and saw a strong body of Turks with guns marching across his front. It was impossible for his infantry to catch them and, seeing ten troops of Warwick and Wor- cester Yeomanry on his right about a mile away, he went over to them and ordered Lieut. -Colonel H. Cheape to charge the enemy. It was a case for instant action. The enemy were a mile and a half from our cavalry. The gunners had come into action and were shelling the London Territorials, but they soon had to switch off and fire at a more terrifying target. Led by their gallant Colonel, a Master of Foxhounds who was afterwards drowned in the Medi- terranean, the yeomen swept over a ridge in successive 92 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON lines and raced down the northern slope on to the flat, at first making direct for the guns, then swerving to the left under the direction of Colonel Cheape, whose eye for country led him to take advantage of a mound on the opposite side of the valley. Over this rise the Midland yeomen spurred their chargers and, giving full-throated cheers, dashed through the Turks' left flank guard and went straight for the guns. Their ranks were somewhat thinned, for they had been exposed to a heavy machine-gun fire as w^ell as to the fire of eight field guns and three 5*9 howitzers worked at the highest pressure. The gunners were nearly all Germans and Austrians and they fought well. They splashed the valley with shrapnel, and during the few moments' lull when the yeomam-y were lost to view behind the mound they set their shell fuses at zero to make them burst at the mouth of the guns and act as case shot. They tore some gaps in the yeomen's ranks, but nothing could stop that charge. Tlie Midlanders rode straight at the guns and sabred every artilleryman at his piece. The Londoners say they heard all the guns stop dead at the same moment and they knew they had been silenced in true Balaclava style. Having wiped out the batteries the yeomen again answered the call of their leader and swept up a ridge to deal efiectively with three machine guns, and having used the white arm against their crews the guns were turned on to the retreating Turks and decimated their ranks. This charge was witnessed by General Shea, and I know it is his opinion that it was executed with the greatest gallantry and elan, and was worthy of the best tradi- tions of British cavalry. The yeomanry lost about twenty-five per cent, of their number in casualties, but their action was worth the price, for they com- pletely broke up the enemy resistance and enabled CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT 93 the London Division to push straight through to Huj. The Warwick and Worcester Yeomanry received the personal congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief, and General Shea was also thanked by General Allenby. During this day General Shea accompUshed what probably no other Divisional Commander did in this war. When out scouting in a light armoured car he was within 500 yards of a big ammunition dump which was blown up. He saw the three men who had destroyed it running away, and he chased them into a wadi and machine-guimed them. They held up their hands and were astonished to find they had surrendered to a General. These men were captured in the nick of time. But for the appearance of General Shea they would have destroyed another dump, which we captured intact. I was with the Division the night after they had taken Huj. It was their first day of rest for some time, but the men showed few signs of fatigue. No one could move among them without being proud of the Londoners. They were strong, self-reliant, weU-disciplined, brave fellows. I well remember what Colonel Temperley, the G.S.O. of the Division, told me when sitting out on a hill in the twilight that night. Colonel Temperley had been brigade major of the first New Zealand Infantry Brigade which came to Egypt and took a full share in the work on Gallipoli on its way to France. He had over two years of active service on the Western Front before coming out to Palestine for duty with the 60th Division, and his views on men in action were based on the sound experience of the professional soldier. Of the London County Territorials he said : ' I cannot speak of these warriors without a lump rising in my throat. These Cockneys are the best 94 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON men in the world. Their spirits are simply wonder- ful, and I do not think any division ever went into a big show with higher moral. After three years of war it is refreshing to hear the men's earnestly ex- pressed desire to go into action again. These grand fellows went forward with the full bloom on them, there never was any hesitation, their discipline was absolutely perfect, their physique and courage were alike magnificent, and their valour beyond words. The Cockney makes the perfect soldier.' I wrote at the time that ' whether the men came from Bermondsey, Camberwell or Keimington, or be- longed to what were known as class corps, such as the Civil Service or Kensingtons, before the war, all battahons were equally good. They were trained for months for the big battle till their bodies were brought to such a state of fitness that Spartan fare durmg the ten days of ceaseless action caused neither grumble nor fatigue. The men may well be re- warded with the title "London's Pride," and London is honoured by having such stalwarts to represent the heart of the British Empire. In eight days the Londoners marched sixty-six miles and fought a number of hot actions. The march may not seem long, but Palestine is not Salisbury Plain. A leg- weary man was asked by an officer if his feet were bhstered, and replied : *'They 're rotten sore, but my heart 's gay." That is typical of the spirit of these unconquerable Cockneys. I have just left them. They still have the bloom of freshness and I do not think it will ever fade. Scorching winds which parched the throat and made everything one wore hot to the touch were enough to oppress the staunchest soldier, but these sterhng Territorials, costers and labourers, artisans and tradesmen, professional men and men of independent means, true brothers in arms and tk 1 « * \ |~'x^"^ I- '-'' m ■JC ^s 1 E OS * 1 (Q — Advance from Jerusalem OeOROE Philip & Son. lto CHAPTER XV GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY Jerusalem became supremely happy. It had passed through the trials, if not the perils, of war. It had been the headquarters and base of a Turkish Army. Great bodies of troops were never quartered there, but staffs and depots were estab- lished in the City, and being in complete control, the military paid little regard to the needs of the popu- lation. Unfortunately a not inconsiderable section of Jerusalem's inhabitants is content to live, not by its own handiwork, but on the gifts of charitable re- ligious people of all creeds. When war virtually shut off Jerusalem from the outer world the lot of the poor became precarious. The food of the country, just about sufficient for self-support, was to a large extent commandeered for the troops, and while prices rose the poor could not buy, and either their appeals did not reach the benevolent or funds were intercepted. Deaths from starvation were numbered by the thou- sand, Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike suffering, and there were few civilians in the Holy City who were not hungry for months at a time. When I reached Jerusalem the people were at the height of their excitement over the coming of the British and they put the best face on their condition, but the freely expressed feeling of relief that the days of hunger torture were nearly past did not remove the signs of want and misery, of infinite suffering by 195 196 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON father, mother, and child, brought about by a long period of starvation. That a people, pale, thin, bent, whose movements had become hstless under the lash of hunger, could have been stirred mto enthusiasm by the appearance of a khaki coat, that they could throw off the lethargy which comes of acute want, was only to be accounted for by the existence of a profound belief that we had been sent to dehver them. Some hours before the Official Entry I was walking in David Street when a Jewish woman, seeing that I was English, stopped me and said : ' We have prayed for this day. To-day I shall sing " God Save our Gracious King, Long Live our Noble King." We have been starving, but what does that matter ? Now we are liberated and free.' She clasped her hands across her breasts and ex- claimed several times, ' Oh how thankful we are.' An elderly man in a black robe, whose pinched pale face told of a long period of want, caught me by the hand and said : ' God has delivered us. Oh how happy we are.' An American worker in a Red Crescent hospital, who had hved in Jerusalem for upwards of ten years and knew the people well, assured me there was not one person in the Holy City who in his heart was not devoutly thankful for our victory. He told me that on the day we captured Nebi Samwil three wounded Arab officers were brought to the hospital. One of them spoke English — it was astonishing how many people could speak our mother tongue — and while he was having his wounds dressed he exclaimed : ' I can shout Hip - hip - hurrah for England now.' The officer was advised to be careful, as there were many Turkish wounded in the hospital, but he replied he did not care, and in unrestrained joy cried out, ' Hurrah for England.' The deplorable lot of the people had been made GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY 197 harder by profiteering officers. Tliose who had money had to part with it for Turkish paper. The Turkish note was depreciated to about one-fifth of its face value. German officers traded in the notes for gold, sent the notes to Germany where, by a financial arrangement concluded between Constantinople and Berhn, they were accepted at face value. The German officer and soldier got richer the more they forced Turkish paper down. Turkish officers bought considerable supplies of wheat and flour from mihtary depots, the cost being debited against their pay which was paid in paper. They then sold the goods for gold. That accounted for the high prices of foodstuffs, the price in gold being taken for the market valuation. In the middle of November when there was a pros- pect of the Turks evacuating Jerusalem, the officers sold out their stocks of provisions and prices became less prohibitive, but they rose again quickly when it was decided to defend the City, and the cost of food mounted to almost famine prices. The Turks by selling for gold that which was bought for paper, rechanging gold for paper at their own prices, made huge profits and caused a heavy depreciation of the note at the expense of the population. Grain was brought from the district east of the Dead Sea, but none of it found its way to civilian mouths except through the extortionate channel provided by officers. Yet when we got into Jerusalem there were people with small stocks of flour who were willing to make flat loaves of unleavened bread for sale to our troops. The soldiers had been living for weeks on hard biscuit and bully beef, and many were wiUing to pay a shilling for a small cake of bread. They did not know that the stock of flour in the town was desperately low and that by buying this bread they were almost 198 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON taking it out of the mouths of the poor. Some traders were so keen on getting good money, not paper, that they tried to do business on this footing, looking to the British Ai^my to come to the aid of the people. The Army soon put a stop to this trade and the troops were prohibited from buying bread in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. As it was, the Quarter- master-General's branch had to send a large quantity of foodstuffs into the towns, and this was done at a time when it was a most anxious task to provision the troops. Those were very trying days for the supply and transport departments, and one wonders whether the civilian population ever reahsed the extent of the humanitarian efforts of our Army staff. During the period when no attempt was made to alleviate the lot of the people the Turks gave them a number of lessons in frightfulness. There were public executions to show the severity of military law. Gallows were erected outside the Jaffa Gate and the victims were left hanging for hours as a warning to the population. I have seen a photo- graph of six natives who suffered the penalty, with their executioners standing at the swinging feet of their victims. Before the first battle of Gaza the Turks brought the rich Mufti of Gaza and his son to Jerusalem, and the Mufti was hanged in the pres- ence of a throng compulsorily assembled to witness the execution. The son was shot. Their only crime was that they were beheved to have expressed ap- proval of Britain's pohcy in dealing with Moslem races. Thus were the people terrorised. They knew the Turkish ideas of justice, and dared not talk of events happening in the town even in the seclusion of their homes. The evils of war, as war is practised by the Turk, left a mark on Jerusalem's population GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY 199 which will be indelible for this generation, despite the wondrous change our Army has wrought in the people. When General Allenby had broken through the Gaza hne the Turks in Jerusalem despaired of saving the City. That all the army papers were brought from Hebron on November 10, shows that even at that date von Kress still imagined we would come up the Hebron road, though he had learnt to his cost that a mighty column was moving through the coastal sector and that our cavalry were cutting across the country to join it. The notorious Enver reached Jerusalem from the north on November 12 and went down to Hebron. On his return it was reported that the Turks would leave Jerusalem, the immediate sale of officers' stocks of foodstuffs giving colour to the rumour. Undoubtedly some preparations were made to evacuate the place, but the temptation to hold on was too great. One can see the influence of the German mind in the Turkish councils of war. At a moment when they were flashing the wireless news throughout the world that their Caporetto victory meant the driving of Italy out of the war they did not want the icy blast of Jerusalem's fall to tell of disaster to their hopes in the East. Accordingly on the 16th November a new decision was taken and Jerusalem was to be defended to the last. German officers came hurrying south, lorries were rushed down with stores until there were six hundred German lorry drivers and mechanics in Jerusalem. Reinforce- ments arrived and the houses of the German Colony were turned into nests of machine guns. The pains the Germans were at to see their plans carried out were reflected in the fighting when we tried to get across the Jerusalem-Nablus road and to avoid fighting in the neighbourhood of the Holy City. 200 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON But all this effort availed them nought. Our dis- positions compelled the enemy to distribute his forces, and when the attack was launched the Turk lacked sufficient men to man his defences adequately. And German pretensions in the Holy Land, founded upon years of scheming and the formation of settle- ments for German colonists approved and supported by the Kaiser himself, were shattered beyond hope of recovery, as similar pretensions had been shattered at Bagdad by General Maude. The Turks had made their headquarters at the Hospice of Notre Dame in Jerusalem, and, taking their cue from the Hun, carried away all the furniture belonging to that French rehgious institution. They had also deported some of the heads of religious bodies. Falkenhayn wished that all Americans should be removed from Jerusalem, issuing an order to that effect a fortnight before we entered. Some members of the American colony had been running the Red Crescent hospital, and Turkish doctors who appreciated their good work insisted that the Americans should remain. Their protest prevailed in most cases, but just as we arrived several Americans were carried off. I have asked many men who were engaged in the fight for Jerusalem what their feelings were on getting their first glimpse of the central spot of Christendom. Some people imagine that the hard brutahties of war erase the softer elements of men's natures ; that killing and the rough fife of cam- paigning, where one is familiarised with the tragedies of life every hour of every day, where ease and comfort are forgotten things, remove from the mind those earlier lessons of peace on earth and goodwill toward men. That is a fallacy. Every man or officer I spoke to declared that he was seized with emotion when, looking from the shell- GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY 201 torn summit of Nebi Samwil, he saw the spires on the Mount of Ohves ; or when reconnoitring from Kustul he got a peep of the red roofs of the newer houses which surround the old City. Possibly only a small percentage of the Army believed they were taking part in a great mission, not a great proportion would claim to be reaUy devout men, but they all behaved like Christian gentlemen. One Londoner told me he had thought the scenes of war had made him callous and that the ruthless destruction of those things fashioned by men's hands in prosecuting the arts of peace had prompted the feeling that there was httle in civilisation after aU, if civilisation could result in so bitter a thing as this awful fighting. Man seemed as barbaric as in the days before the Saviour came to redeem the world, and whether we won or lost the war all hopes of a happier state of things were futile. So this Cockney imagined that his condition showed no improvement on that of the savage warrior of two thousand years ago, except in that civiHsation had developed finer weapons to kill with and be killed by. The finer instincts had been blunted by the naked and unashamed horrors of war. But the lessons taught him before war scourged the world came back to him on getting his first view of the Holy City. He felt that sense of emotion which makes one wish to be alone and think alone. He was on the ground where Sacred History was made, perhaps stood on the rock the Saviour's foot had trod. In the deep stirring of his emotions the rougher edges of his nature became rounded by feelings of sympathy and a behef that good would come out of the evil of this strife. That view of Jerusalem, and the knowledge of what the Holy Sites stand for, made him a better man and a better fighting man, and he had no doubt the first 202 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON distant glimpse of the Holy City had similarly affected the bulk of the Army. That bad language is used by almost all troops in the field is notorious, but in Jerusalem one seldom heard an oath or an indecent word. When Jerusalem was won and small parties of our soldiers were allowed to see the Holy City, their pohteness to the inhabitants, patriarch or priest, trader or beggar, man or woman, rebuked the thought that the age of chivalry was past, while the reverent attitude involuntarily adopted by every man when seeing the Sacred Places suggested that no Crusader Army or band of pilgrims ever came to the Holy Land imder a more pious influence. Many times have I watched the troops of General Allenby in the streets of Jerusalem. They bore themselves as soldiers and gentlemen, and if they had been selected to go there simply to impress the people they could not have more worthily upheld the good fame of their nation. These soldier missionaries of the Em- pire left behind them a record which will be remem- bered for generations. If it had been possible to consult the British people as to the details to be observed at the ceremony of the Official Entry into Jerusalem, the vast majority would surely have approved General AUenby's pro- gramme. Americans tell us the British as a nation do not know how to advertise. Our part in the war generally proves the accuracy of that statement, but the Official Entry into Jerusalem will stand out as one great exception. By omitting to make a great parade of his victory — one may count elaborate ceremonial as advertisement — General Allenby gave Britain her best advertisement. The simple, digni- fied, and, one may also justly say, humble order of ceremony was the creation of a truly British mind. To impress the inhabitant of the East things must GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY 203 be done on a lavish ostentatious scale, for gold and glitter and tinsel go a long way to form a native's estimate of power. But there are times when the native is shrewd enough to realise that pomp and circumstance do not always indicate strength, and that dignity is more powerful than display. Contrast the German Emperor's visit to Jerusalem with General AUenby's Official Entry. The Kaiser brought a retinue clothed in white and red, and blue and gold, with richly caparisoned horses, and, like a true show- man, he himself affected some articles of Arab dress. He rode into the Holy City — where One before had walked — and a wide breach was even made in those ancient walls for a German progress. All this to advertise the might and power of Germany. In parenthesis I may state we are going to restore those walls to the condition they were in before German hands defiled them. The General who by capturing Jerusalem helped us so powerfully to bring Germany to her knees and humble her before the world, entered on foot by an ancient way, the Jaffa Gate, called by the native ' Bab-el-Khahl,' or the Friend. In this hallowed spot there was no great pageantry of arms, no pomp and panoply, no display of the mighty strength of a victorious army, no thunderous salutes to acclaim a world-resounding victory destined to take its place in the chronicles of aU time. There was no enemy flag to haul down and no flags were hoisted. There were no soldier shouts of triumph over a defeated foe, no bells in ancient belfrys rang, no Te Deums were sung, and no preacher mounted the rostrum to eulogise the victors or to point the moral to the multitude. A small, almost meagre procession, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, with a guard of 204 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON honour, less than 150 all told, passed tlirough the gate unheralded by a single trumpet note ; a purely military act with a minimum of military display told the people that the old order had changed, yielding place to new. The native mind, keen, discerning, receptive, understood the meaning and depth of this simplicity, and from the moment of high noon on December 11, 1917, when General AUenby went into the Mount Zion quarter of the Holy City, the British name rested on a foundation as certain and sure as the rock on which the Holy City stands. Right down in the hearts of a people who cHng to Jerusalem with the deepest reverence and piety there was unfeigned dehght. They reahsed that four centuries of Ottoman dominion over the Holy City of Christians and Jews, and ' the sanctuary ' of Mahomedans, had ended, and that Jerusalem the Golden, the central Site of Sacred History, was liberated for all creeds from the blighting influence of the Turk. And while war had wrought this bene- ficent change the population saw in this epoch- marking victory a merciful guiding Hand, for it had been achieved without so much as a stone of the City being scratched or a particle of its ancient dust disturbed. The Sacred Monuments and everything connected with the Great Life and its teaching were passed on untouched by our Army. Rightly did the people rejoice. When General Allenby went into Jerusalem all fears had passed away. The Official Entry was made while there was considerable fighting on the north and east of the City, where our lines were nowhere more than 7000 yards off. The guns were firing, the sounds of bursts of musketry were carried down on the wind, whilst droning aeroplane engines in the deep -blue vault overhead told of our flying GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY 205 men denying a passage to enemy machines. The stern voices of war were there in aU their harsh discordancy, but the people knew they were safe in the keeping of British soldiers and came out to make holiday. General Allenby motored into the suburbs of Jerusalem by the road from Latron which the pioneers had got into some sort of order. The busi- ness of war was going on, and the General's car took its place on the highway on even terms with the lorry, which at that time when supplying the front was the most urgent task and had priority on the roads. The people had put on gala raiment. From the outer fringe of Jerusalem the Jaffa road was blocked not merely with the inhabitants of the City but with people who had followed in the Army's wake from Bethlehem. It was a picturesque throng. There were sombre-clad Jews of all nationaUties, Armenians, Greeks, Russians, and all the peoples who make Jerusalem the most cosmopoUtan of cities. To the many styles of European dress the brighter robes of the East gave vivid colour, and it was obvious from the remarkably free and spontaneous expression of joy of these people, who at the end of three years of war had such strong faith in our fight for freedom, that they recognised freedom was permanently won to all races and creeds by the victory at Jerusalem. The most significant of all the signs was the attitude of Moslems. The Turks had preached the Holy War, but they knew the hollowness of the cry, and the natives, abandoning their natural reserve, joined m loud expression of welcome. From flat-topped roofs, balconies, and streets there were cries of ' Bravo ! ' and ' Hurrah ! ' uttered by men and women who probably never spoke the words before, and quite close to the Jaffa Gate I saw three old Mahomedans clap their hands while tears of joy coursed down their 206 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON cheeks. Their hearts were too full to utter a word. There could be no doubt of the sincerity of this enthusiasm. The crowd was more demonstrative than is usual with popular assembhes in the East, but the note struck was not one of jubilation so much as of thankfulness at the relief from an insufferable bondage of bad government. Outside the Jaffa Gate was an Imperial guard of honour drawn from men who had fought stoutly for the victory. In the British Guard of fifty of all ranks were English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh troops, steel-helmeted and carrying the kit they had an hour or two earlier brought with them from the front line. Opposite them were fifty dismounted men of the AustraHan Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, the AustraUans, under the command of Captain Throssel, V.C., being drawn from the 10th Light Horse regiment, which had been employed in the capture of Jerusalem on the right of the London Division. These Colonial troops had earned their place, for they had done the work of the vanguard in the Sinai Desert, and their victories over the Turks on many a hard-won field in the torrid heat of summer had paved the way for this greater triumph. A French and an Italian guard of honour was posted inside the Jaffa Gate. As I have previously said, the Italians had held a portion of the line in front of Gaza with a composite brigade, but the French troops had not yet been in action in Palestine, though their Navy had assisted with a battleship in the Gaza bombardment. We welcomed the participation of the representatives of our Alhes in the Official Entry, as it showed to those of their nationaUty in Jerusalem that we were fighting the battle of freedom for them all. Outside the Jaffa Gate the Commander-in-Chief was received by Major-General Borton, who had been appointed GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY 207 Military Governor of the City, and a procession being formed, General Allenby passed between the iron gates to within the City walls. Preceded by two aides-de-camp the Commander-in-Chief advanced with the commander of the French Palestine detach- ment on his right and the commander of the Italian Palestine detachment on his left. Four Staff officers followed. Then came Brigadier- General Clayton, Pohtical Officer; M. Picot, head of the French IVIission ; and the French, Italian, and United States Military Attaches. The Chief of the General Staff (Major - General Sir L. J. Bols) and the Brigadier - General General Staff (Brigadier-General G. Dawnay) marched slightly ahead of Lieutenant- General Sir Philip W. Chetwode, the XXth Corps Commander, and Brigadier- General Bartholomew, who was General Chetwode' s B.G.G.S. The guard closed in behind. That was all. The procession came to a halt at the steps of El Kala, the Citadel, which visitors to Jerusalem will better remember as the entrance to David's Tower. Here the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff formed up on the steps with the notables of the City behind them, to Usten to the reading of the Proclamation in several languages. That Proclamation, telUng the people they could pursue their lawful business with- out interruption and promising that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer of whatsoever form of three of the great religions of mankind would be maintained and pro- tected according to existing customs and beliefs to those to whose faiths they are sacred, made a deep impression on the populace. So you could judge from the expressions on faces and the frequent murmurs of approval, and it was interesting to note 208 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON how, when the procession was being re-formed, many Christians, Jews, and Moslems broke away from the crowd to run and spread the good news in their respective quarters. How faithfully and with what scrupulous care our promises have been kept the rehgious communities of Jerusalem can tell. The procession next moved into the old Turkish barrack square less than a hundred yards away, where General Allenby received the notables of the City and the heads of religious communities. The Mayor of Jerusalem, who unfortunately died of pneumonia a fortnight later, and the Mufti, who, like the Mayor, was a member of a Mahomedan family which traces its descent back through many centuries, were pre- sented, as were also the sheikhs in charge of the Mosque of Omar, ' the Tomb of the Rock,' and the Mosque of El Aksa, and Moslems belonging to the Khaldieh and Alamieh families. The Patriarchs of the Latin, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian Churches and the Coptic bishop had been removed from the Holy City by the Turks, but their representatives were introduced to the Commander-in-Chief, and so too were the heads of Jewish commimities, the Syriac Church, the Greek Catholic Church, the Abyssinian bishop, and the representative of the AngUcan Church. A notable presentation was the Spanish Consul, who had been in charge of the interests of almost all countries at war, and whom General Allenby con- gratulated upon being so busy a man. The presenta- tions over, the Commander-in-Chief returned to the Jaffa Gate and left for advanced General Head- quarters, having been in the Holy City not more than a quarter of an hour. For succinctness it would be difficult to improve upon the Commander-in-Chief's own description of his Official Entry into Jerusalem. Cabhng to London GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY 209 witHin two hours of that event, General Allenby thus narrated the events of the day : (1) At noon to-day I officially entered this City with a few of my Staff, the commanders of the French and Itahan detachments, the heads of the Picot Mission, and the Mili- tary Attaches of France, Italy, and the United States of America. The procession was all on foot. I was received by Guards representing England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, AustraHa, India, New Zealand, France, and Italy at the Jaffa Gate. (2) I was well received by the population. (3) The Holy Places have had Guards placed over them. (4) My MiHtary Governor is in touch with the Acting Gustos of Latins, and the Greek representative has been detailed to supervise Christian Holy Places. (5) The Mosque of Omar and the area rotind it has been placed under Moslem control and a mihtary cordon composed of Indian Mahomedan officers and soldiers has been estab- hshed round the Mosque. Orders have been issued that without permission of the Mihtary Governor and the Moslem in charge of the Mosque no non-Moslem is to pass this cordon. (6) The Proclamation has been posted on the walls, and from the steps of the Citadel was read in my presence to the population in Arabic, Hebrew, English, French, Itahan, Greek, and Russian. (7) Guardians have been established at Bethlehem and on Rachel's Tomb. The Tomb of Hebron has been placed under exclusive Moslem control. (8) The hereditary custodians of the Wakfs at the Gates of the Holy Sepulchre have been requested to take up their accustomed duties in remembrance of the magnanimous act of the Caliph Omar who protected that Church. As a matter of historical interest I give in the Appendix the orders issued on the occasion of the o 210 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON Official Entry into Jerusalem, the order of Greneral Allenby's procession into the Holy City for the read- ing of the Proclamation, together with the text of that historic document, and the special orders of the day issued by the Commander-in-Chief to his troops after the capture of Jerusalem.^ * See Appendix vii. CHAPTER XVI MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE General Allenby within two days of capturing Jerusalem had secured a line of high ground which formed an excellent defensive system, but his XXth Corps Staff was busy with plans to extend the defences to give the Holy City safety from attack. Nothing could have had so damaging an influence on our prestige in the East, which was growing stronger every day as the direct result of the immense success of the operations in Palestine, as the recapture of Jerusalem by the Turks. We thought the wire- pulling of the German High Command would have its effect in the war councils of Turkey, and seeing that the regaining of the prize would have such far- reaching effect on pubhc opinion no one was surprised that the Germans prevailed upon their ally to make the attempt. It was a hopeless failure. The attack came at a moment when we were ready to launch a scheme to secure a second and a third hne of defences for Jerusalem, and gallantly as the Turks fought — they delivered thirteen powerful attacks against our line on the morning of December 27 — the venture had a disastrous ending, and instead of reaching Jerusalem the enemy had to yield to British arms seven miles of most valuable country and gave us, in place of one line, four strong lines for the defence of the Holy City. By supreme judgment, when the Turks had committed themselves to the attack on Tel el Ful, without which they could not move a yard 211 212 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON on the Nablus road, General Chetwode started his operations on the left of his line with the 10th and 74th Divisions, using his plan as it had been prepared for some days to seize successive hnes of hills, and compelled the enemy, in order to meet this attack, to divert the fresh division held in waiting at Bireh to throw forward into Jerusalem the moment the storming troops should pierce our hne. With the precision of clockwork the Irish and dismounted yeomanry divisions seciu-ed their objectives, and on the second day of the fighting we regained the initiative and compelled the Turks to conform to our dispositions. On the fourth day we were on the Ramallah-Bireh line and secured for Jerusalem an impregnable defence. Prisoners told us that they had been promised, as a reward for their hoped-for success, a day in Jerusalem to do as they hked. We can imagine what the situation in the Holy City would have been had our line been less true. The Londoners who had won the City saved it. Probably only a few of the inhabitants had any knowledge of the danger the City was in on December 27. Their confidence in the British troops had grown and could scarcely be stronger, but some of them were alarmed, and throughout the early morning and day they knelt on housetops earnestly praying that our soldiers would have strength to withstand the Turkish onslaughts. From that day onward the sound of the guns was less violent, and as our artillery advanced northwards the people's misgivings vanished and they reproached themselves for their fears. It will be remembered how the troops of the XXth Corps were disposed. The 53rd Division held the Hne south-east and east of Jerusalem from Bir Asad through Abu Dis, Bethany, to north of the Mount of Ohves, whence the 60th Division took it up from MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 213 Meshari, east of Shaiat to Tel el Ful and to Beit Hannina across the Jerusalem-Nablus road. The 74th Division carried on to Nebi Samwil, Beit Izza to Beit Dukku, with the 10th Division on their left through Foka, Tahta to Suffa, the gap between the XXth Corps to the right of the XXIst Corps being held by the 3rd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade of the Austrahan Mounted Division. Against us were the 27th Turkish Division and the 7th and 27th cavalry regiments south of the Jericho road, with the 26th, 53rd, 19th, and 24th Divisions on the north of that road and to the west of the Jerusalem-Nablus road, one division being in reserve at Bireh, the latter a new division fresh from the Caucasus. The 6th and 8th Turkish cavalry regiments were facing our extreme left, the estimated strength of the enemy in the Une being 14,700 rifles and 2300 sabres. Just as it was getting dark on December 11 a party of the enemy attacked the 179th Brigade at Tel el Ful but were repulsed. There was not much activity the following day, but the 53rd Division began a series of minor operations by which they secured some features of tactical importance. On the 13th the 181st Brigade made a dashing attack on Ras el Kharrabeh and secured it, taking 43 prisoners and two machine guns, with 31 casualties to themselves. It was about this time the Corps Commander framed plans for the advance of our front north of Jerusalem. There had been a few days of fine weather, and a great deal had been done to improve the condition of the roads and communications. An army of Egyptian labourers had set to work on the Enab-Jerusalem road and from the villages had come strong reinforcements of natives, women as well as men (and the women did quite as much work 214 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON as the men), attracted by the unusual wage payable in cash. In Jerusalem, too, the natives were sent to labour on the roads and to clean up some of the filth that the Turks had allowed to accumulate for years, if not for generations, inside the Holy City. The Army not merely provided work for idle hands but enabled starving bodies to be vitaHsed. Food was brought into Jerusalem, and w^ith the cash wages old and young labourers could get more than a sufficiency. The native in the hills proved to be a good road repairer, and the boys and women showed an eagerness to earn their daily rates of pay ; the men generally looked on and gave directions. It was some time before steam roUers crushed in the surface, but even rammed-in stones were better than mud, and the lorry drivers' tasks became lighter. Greneral Chetwode's plan was to secure a line from Obeid, 9000 yards east of Bethlehem, the hill of Zamby covering the Jericho road three miles from Jerusalem, Anata, Hismeh, Jeba, Burkah, Beitun, El Balua, Kh. el Burj, Deir Ibzia to Shilta. The scheme was to strike with the 53rd and 60th Divisions astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road, and at the same time to push the 10th Division and a part of the 74th Division eastwards from the neighbourhood of Tahta and Foka. The weather again became bad on Decem- ber 14 and the troops suffered great discomfort from heavy rains and violent, cold winds, so that only light operations were undertaken. On the 17th the West Kent and Sussex battalions of the 160th Brigade stalked the high ground east of Abu Dis at dawn, and at the cost of only 26 casualties took the ridge with 5 officers and 121 other ranks prisoners, and buried 46 enemy dead. One battalion went up the hill on one side, while the Sussex crept up the opposite side, the Turks being caught between two MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 215 fires. The 53rd Division also improved their position on the 21st December. As one leaves Bethany and proceeds down the Jericho road one passes along a steep zigzag with several hairpin bends until one reaches a guardhouse near a well about a mile east of Bethany. The road still falls smartly, following a straighter hne close to a wadi bed, but hills rise very steeply from the highway, and for its whole length until it reaches the Jordan valley the road is always covered by high bare mountains. Soon after leaving the zigzag there is a series of three hiUs to the north of the road. It was important to obtain possession of two of these hills, the first called Zamby and the second named by the Welsh troops ' White- hill,' from the bright limestone outcrop at the crest. The 159th Brigade attacked and gained Zamby and then turned nearer the Jericho road to capture White- hill. The Turks resisted very stoutly, and there was heavy fighting about the trenches just below the top of the hill. By noon the brigade had driven the enemy off, but three determined counter-attacks were dehvered that day and the next and the brigade lost 180 kiUed and wounded. The Turks suffered heavily in the counter-attacks and left over 50 dead behind them ; also a few prisoners. At a later date there was further strong fighting around this hill, and at one period it became impossible for either side to hold it. By the 21st there was a readjustment of the line on the assumption that the XXth Corps would attack the Turks on Christmas Day, the 53rd Division taking over the line as far north as the wadi Anata, the 60th Division extending its left to include Nebi Samwil, and the 74th going as far west as Tahta. As a prehminary to the big movement the 180th Brigade was directed to move on Kh. Adaseh, a hill 216 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON between Tel el Ful and Tawil, in the early hours of December 23, and the 181st Brigade was to seize a height about half a mile north of Beit Hannina. The latter attack succeeded, but despite the most gallant and repeated efforts the 180th Brigade was unable to gain the summit of Adaseh, though they got weU up the hill. The weather became bad once more, and meteorological reports indicated no im- provement in the conditions for at least twenty-four hours, and as the moving forward of artillery and supplies was impossible in the rain. General Chetwode with the concurrence of G.H.Q. decided that the attack should not be made on Christmas Day. The 60th Division thereupon did not further prosecute their attack on Adaseh. On the 24th December, while General Chetwode was conferring with his divisional commanders, information was brought in that the Turks were making preparations to re- capture Jerusalem by an attack on the 60th Division, and the Corps Commander decided that the moment the enemy was found to be fully committed to this attack the 10th Division and one brigade of the 74th Division would fall on the enemy's right and ad- vance over the Zeitun, Kereina, and Ibzia ridges. How well this plan worked out was shown before the beginning of the New Year, by which time we had secured a great depth of ground at a cost in- finitely smaller than could have been expected if the Turks had remained on the defensive, while the Turkish losses, at a moment when they required to preserve every fighting man, were much greater than we could have hoped to inflict if they had not come into the open. There was never a fear that the enemy would break through. We had commanding positions everywhere, and the more one studied our line on the chain of far-flung hills the more clearly DC p b > < " o 5 o MAKING JERUSALE]\I SECURE 217 one realised the prevision and military skill of General Chetwode and the staff of the XXth Corps in preparing the plans for its capture before the advance on Jerusalem was started. The ' fourth objective ' of December 8-9 well and truly laid the foundations for Jerusalem's security, and reUeved the inhabitants from the accumulated burdens of more than three years of war. We had nibbled at pieces of ground to flatten out the line here and there, but in the main the line the Turks assaulted was that fourth objective. The Turks put all their hopes on their last card. It was trumped ; and when we had won the trick there was not a soldier in General Allenby's Army nor a civilian in the Holy City who had not a profound beUef in the coming downfall of the Turkish Empire. Troops in the hne and in bivouac spent the most cheerless Christmas Day within their memories. Not only in the storm- swept hills but on the Plain the day was bitterly cold, and the gale carried with it heavy rain clouds which passed over the tops of mountams and rolled up the valleys in ceaseless succession, discharging hail and rain in copious quantities. The wadis became roaring, tearing tor- rents fed by hundreds of tributaries, and men who had sought shelter on the lee side of rocks often found water pouring over them in cascades. The whole country became a sea of mud, and the trials of many months of desert sand were grateful and comforting memories. Transport columns had an unhappy time ; the Hebron road was showing many signs of wear, and it was a long journey for lorries from Beersheba when the retaining walls were giving way and a foot-deep layer of mud invited a sldd every yard. The Latron-Jerusalem road was better going, but the soft metal laid down seemed to melt 218 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON under the unceasing traffic in the wet, and in peace time this highway would have been voted unfit for traffic. Tlie worst piece of road, however, was also the most important. Tlie Nablus road where it leaves Jerusalem was wanted to supply a vital point on our front. It could not be used during the day because it was under observation, and anything moving along it was liberally dosed with sheUs. Nor could its deplorable condition be improved by working parties. The ground was so soft on either side of it that no gun, ammunition, or supply limber could leave the track, and whatever was required for man, or beast, or artillery had to be carried across the road in the pitch-black hours of night. Supplies were only got up to the troops after infinite labour, yet no one went hungry. Boxing Day was brighter, and there were hopes of a period of better weather. During the morning there were indications that an enemy offensive was not far off, and these were confirmed about noon by information that the front north of Jerusalem would be attacked in the night. General Chetwode thereupon ordered General Longley to start his offensive on the left of the XXth Corps line at dawn next morning. Shortly before midnight the Turks began their operations against the line held by the 60th Division across the Nablus road precisely where it had been expected. They attacked in considerable strength at Ras et Tawil and about the quarries held by our outposts north of that hill, and the outposts were driven in. About the same time the 24th Welsh Regiment — dismounted yeo- manry — made the enemy realise that we were on the alert, for they assaulted and captured a hill quite close to Et Tireh, just forestalling an attack by a Turkish storming battalion, and beat off several determined counter-attacks, as a result of which the enemy left MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 219 seventy killed with the bayonet and also some machine guns on the hill slopes. The night was dark and misty, and by half-past one the Turks had developed a big attack against the whole of the 60th Division's front, the strongest effort being delivered on the line in front of Tel el Ful, though there was also very violent fighting on the west of the wadi Ed Dunn, north of Beit Hannina. The Turks fought with desperate bravery. They had had no food for two days, and the commander of one regiment told his men : ' There are no English in front of you. I have been watching the enemy lines for a long time ; they are held by Egyptians, and I tell you there are no English there. You have only to capture two hills and you can go straight into Jerusalem and get food. It is our last chance of gettmg Jerusalem, and if we fail we shall have to go back.' This officer gave emphatic orders that British wounded were not to be mutilated. Between half -past one and eight a.m. the Turks attacked in front of Tel el Ful eight times, each attack being stronger than the last. Tel el Ful is a conical hill covered with huge boulders, and on the top is a mass of rough stones and ruined masonry. The Turks had registered well and severely shelled our position before making an assault, and they covered the ad- vance with machine guns. In one attack made just after daybreak the enemy succeeded in getting into a short length of line, but men of the 2/1 5th Londons promptly organised a counter-attack and, advan- cing with fine gallantry, though their ranks were thinned by a tremendous enfilade fire from artillery and machine guns, they regained the sangars. For several hours after eight o'clock this portion of the Une was quieter, but the Turk was reorganising for a last effort. A very brilliant defence had been 220 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON made during the night of Beit Hannina by the 2/24th Londons, which battahon was commanded by a captain, the colonel and the majors being on the sick list. The two companies in the line were attacked four times by superior numbers, the last assault being delivered by more than five hundred men, but the defenders stood like rocks, and though they had fifty per cent, of their number killed or wounded, and the Turks got close to the trenches, the enemy were crushingly defeated. The morning lull was welcome. Our troops got some rest though their vigilance was unrelaxed, and few imagined that the Turks had yet given up the attempt to reach Jerusalem. We were ready to meet a fresh effort, but the strength with which it was dehvered surprised everybody. The Turk, it seemed, was prepared to stake everything on his last throw. He knew quite early on that morning that his Caucasus Division could not carry out the role assigned to it. General Chetwode had countered him by smashing in with his left with a beautiful weighty stroke precisely at the moment when the Turk had compromised himself elsewhere, and instead of being able to put in his reserves to support his main attack the enemy had to divert them to stave off an advance which, if unhindered, would threaten the vital communications of the attackers north of Jerusalem. It w^as a remarkable situation, but all the finesse in the art of war was on one side. Every message the Turkish Commander received from his right must have reported progress against him. Each signal from the Jerusalem front must have been equally bitter, summing up want of progress and heavy losses. With us, Time was a secondary factor ; with the Turk, Time was the whole essence of the MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 221 business, so he pledged his all on one tremendous final effort. It was almost one o'clock when it started, and it was made against the whole front of our XXth Corps. It was certainly made in un- expected strength and with a courage beyond praise. The Turk threw himself forward to the assault with the violence of despair, and his impetuous onrush enabled him to get into some small elements of our front line; but counter-attacks immediately organ- ised drove him out. Over the greater portion of the front the advance was stopped dead, but in some places the enemy tried a whirlwind rush and used bomb against bomb. He had met his match. The 60th Division which bore the brunt of the on- slaught, as it was bound to do from its position astride the main road, was absolutely unbreakable, and at Tel el Ful there lay a dead Turk for every yard of its front. The enemy drew off, but to save the rem- nants of his storming troops kept our positions from near Ras et Tawil, Tel el Ful to the wadi Beit Hannina under heavy gunfire for the rest of the day. The Turk was hopelessly beaten, his defeat irretrievable. He had delivered thirteen costly attacks, and his sole gains were the exposed outpost positions at the Tawil and the quarries. All his reserves had been vigorously engaged, while at two o'clock m the afternoon General Chetwode had in reserve nineteen battahons less one company still unused, and the care exercised in keeping this large body of troops fresh for following up the Turkish defeat undoubtedly contributed to the great success of the advances on the next three days. Simultaneously with their attack on the 60th Division positions the Turks put in a weighty effort to oust the 53rd Division from the positions they held north and south of the Jericho road. Whether in their wildest dreams they imagined 222 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON they could enter Jerusalem by this route is doubtful, but if they had succeeded in driving in our line on the north they would have put the 53rd Division in a perilous position on the east with only one avenue of escape. The Turks concentrated their efforts on Whitehill and Zamby. A great fight raged round the former height and we were driven off it, but the divisional artillery so sprinkled the crest with shell that the Turk could not occupy it, and it became No Man's Land until the early evening when the 7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers recaptured and held it. The contest for Zamby lasted all day, and for a long time it was a battle of bombs and machine guns, so closely together were the fighting men, but the Turks never got up to our sangars and were finally driven off with heavy loss, over 100 dead being left on the hill. The Turkish ambulances were seen hard at work on the Jericho road throughout the day. There was a stout defence of a detached post at Ibn Obeid. A company of the 2/lOth Middlesex Regiment had been sent on to Obeid, about five miles east of Beth- lehem, to watch for the enemy moving about the rough tracks in that bare and broken country which falls away in jagged hills and sinuous valleys to the Dead Sea. The little garrison, whose sole shelter was a ruined monastic building on the hill, were attacked at dawn by 700 Turkish cavalry supported by mountain guns. The garrison stood fast all day though practically surrounded, and every attack was beaten off. The Turks tried again and again to secure the hill, which commands a track to Beth- lehem, but, although they fired 400 shells at the position, they could not enter it, and a battalion sent up to reheve the Middlesex men next morning found that the company had driven the enemy off, its casualties having amounted to only 2 killed and MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 223 17 wounded. Thus did the ' Die Hards ' live up to the traditions of the regiment. Having dealt with the failure of the Turkish attacks against the 60th and 53rd Divisions in front of Jerusalem, let us change our view point and focus attention on the left sector of XXth Corps, where the enemy was feeling the full power of the Corps at a time when he most wished to avoid it. General Longley had organised his attacking columns in three groups. On the right the 229th Brigade of the 74th Division was set the task of moving from the wadi Imeish to secure the high ground of Bir esh Shafa overlooking Beitunia ; the 31st Brigade, start- ing from near Tahta, attacked north of the wadi Sunt, to drive the enemy from a hne from Jeriut through Hafy to the west of the oUve orchards near Ain Arik ; while the left group, composed of the 29th and 30th Brigades, aimed at getting Shabuny across the wadi Sad, and Sheikh Abdallah where they would have the AustraUan Mounted Division on their left. The advance started from the left of the Hne. The 29th Brigade leading, with the 30th Brigade in support, left their positions of deployment at six o'clock, by which time the Turk had had more than he had bargained for north and east of Jerusalem. The 1st Leinsters and 5th Connaught Rangers found the enemy in a stubborn mood west of Deir Ibzia, but they broke down the opposition in the proper Irish style and rapidly reached their objectives. The centre group started one hour after the left and got their line without much difficulty. The right group was hotly opposed. Beginning their advance at eight o'clock the 229th Brigade had reached the western edge of the famous Zeitun ridge in an hour, but from this time onwards they were exposed to incessant artillery and machine-gun fire, and the 224 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON forward movement became very slow. In five hours small parties had worked along the ridge for about half its length, fighting every yard, and it was not until the approach of dusk that we once more got control of the whole ridge. It was appropriate that dismomited yeomen should gain this important tactical point which several weeks previously had been won and lost by their comrades of the Yeomaiu-y Mounted Division. Descendmg from the ridge the brigade gave the Turk httle chance to stand, and with a bayonet charge they reached the day's ob- jective in the dark. At two o'clock, when the Turks' final effort against Jerusalem had just failed, the 60th and 74th Divisions both sent in the good news that the Turkish commander was moving his reserve division from Bireh westwards to meet the attack from our left. Airmen confirmed this immediately, and it was now obvious that General Chetwode's tactics had compelled the enemy to conform to his movements and that we had regained the initiative. At about ten o'clock the 24th Ro3^al Welsh Eusihers of the 231st Brigade captured Kh. ed Dreihemeh on the old Roman road a mile east of Tireh, and at eleven o'clock advanced to the assault of hill 2450, a httle farther eastward. They gained the crest, but the enemy had a big force in the neighbourhood and counter-attacked, forcing the Welshmen to with- draw some distance down the western slope. They held this ground till 4.30 when our guns heavily bombarded the summit, mider cover of which fire the infantry made another attack. This was also unsuccessful owing to the intense volume of fire from machine guns. The hill was won, however, next mornmg. The night of December 27-28 w^as without incident. The Turk had staked and lost, and he spent the night MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 225 in making new dispositions to meet what he must have reahsed was being prepared for him on the following day. It is doubtful whether there was a more successful day for our Army in the Palestine campaign than December 27. The portion of our line which was on the defensive had stood an absolutely unmovable wall, against which the enemy had battered himself to pieces. Our left, or attacking sector, had gained all their objectives against strong opposition in a most difficult country, and had drawn against them the very troops held in reserve for the main attack on Jerusalem. The physical powers of some of our attacking troops were tried highly. One position captured by the 229th Brigade was a particularly bad hiU. The slope up which the infantry had to advance was a series of almost perpendicular terraces, and the riflemen could only make the ascent by climbing up each others' backs. When dismounted yeomen secured another hill some men carrying up suppUes took two hours to walk from the base of the hill to the summit. The trials of the infantry were shared by the artillery. What surprises every one who has been over the route taken by the 10th and 74th Divisions is that any guns except those with the mountain batteries were able to get into action. The road work of engineers and the 5th Royal Irish Regiment (Pioneers) was magnificent, and they made a way where none seemed possible ; but though these roadmakers put their backs into their tasks, it was only by the untiring energies of the gimners and drivers that artillery was got up to support the infantry. The guns were brought into action well ahead of the roads, and were man-hauled for consider- able distances. Two howitzers and one field gun were kept up with the infantry on the first day of p 226 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON the advance where no horses could get a foothold, and the manner in which the gunners hauled the guns through deep ravines and up seemingly unclimb- able hills constituted a wonderful physical achieve- ment. The artillery were called upon to continue their arduous work on the 28th and 29th under con- ditions of ground which were even more appalling than those met with on the 27th. The whole country was devoid of any road better than a goat track, and the ravines became deeper and the hills more pre- cipitous. In some places, particularly on the 10th Division front, the infantry went forward at a remarkable pace ; but guns moved up with them, and by keeping down the fire of machine guns dotted about on every hill, performed services which ei^rned the riflemen's warm praise. The 9th and 10th Mountain Batteries were attached to the 10th Divi- sion, but field and howitzer batteries were also well up. On the 28th the 53rd Division bit farther into the enemy's line in order to cover the right of the 60th Division, which was to continue its advance up the Nablus road towards Bireh. The 158th Brigade captured Anata, and after fighting all day the l/7th Royal Welsh Fusihers secured Ras Urkub es SufEa, a forbidding-looking height towering above the storm-rent sides of the wadi Ruabeh. The 1/lst Herefords after dark took Kh. Almit. In front of the 60th Division the Turks were still holding some strong positions from which they should have been able seriously to delay the Londoners' advance had it not been for the threat to their com- munications by the pressure by the 10th and 74th Divisions. The Londoners had previously tested the strength of Adaseh, and had found it an extremely troublesome hill. They went for it again — the 179th Brigade this time — and after a several hours' struggle MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 227 took it at dusk. Meanwhile the 181st Brigade had taken the lofty villages of Bir Nebala and El Jib, and after Adaseh became ours the Division went ahead in the dark and got to the line across the Nablus road from Er Ram to Rafat, capturing some prisoners. The 74th Division also made splendid progress. In the early hours the Division, with the 24th Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 24th Welsh Regiment at- tached, secured Juf eir and resumed their main advance in the afternoon, the 230th and 231st Brigades co- operating with the 229th Brigade which was under the orders of the 10th Division. Before dark they had advanced their line from the left of the 60th Division in Rafat past the east of Beitunia to the hill east of Abu el Ainein, and this strong line of hills once secured, everybody was satisfied that the Turks' possession of Ramallah and Bireh was only a question of hours. Part of this line had been won by the 10th Division, which began its advance before noon in the same battle formation as on the 27th. Soon after the three groups started the heavy artillery put down a fierce fire on the final objectives, and before three o'clock the Turks were seen to be evacu- ating Kefr Skyan, Ainein, and Rubin. The enemy put up a stout fight at Beitunia and on a hill several hundred yards north-west of the village, but the 229th Brigade had good artillery and machine-gun assistance, and got both places before four o'clock, capturing seventy prisoners, including the commander of the garrison, and a number of machine guns. The left group was hotly opposed from a hill a mile west of Rubin and from a high position south-west of Ainein. The nature of the ground was entirely favourable to defence and for a time the Turk took full advantage of it, but our artillery soon made him lose his stomach for fighting, and doubtless the sound 228 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON of many shell -bursts beyond Ramallah made him think that his rock sangars and the deep ravines in front of him were not protection against a foe who fought Nature with as much determination as he fought the Turkish soldier. Six-inch howitzers of the 378th Siege Battery had been brought up to Foka in the early hours, and all the afternoon and evening they were plastering the road from Ramallah along which the enemy were retreating. The left group defied the nests of machine guns hidden among the rocks and broke down the defence. The centre group had been delayed by the opposition encoun- tered by the left, but they took Skyan at six o'clock and all of the objectives for one day were in our hands by the early evening. An advance along the whole front was ordered to begin at six o'clock on December 29. On his right flank the enemy was willing to concede ground, and the 159th Brigade occupied Hismeh, Jeba, and the ridges to the north- west to protect the flank of the 60th Division. The 53rd Division buried 271 enemy dead on their front as the result of three days' fighting. The 181st Brigade made a rapid advance up the Nablus road until they were close to Bireh and Tahunah, a high rocky hiU just to the north-west of the village. The Turks had many machine guns and a strong force of riflemen in these places, and it was impossible for infantry to advance against them over exposed ground without artillery support. The 303rd Field Artillery Brigade was supporting the brigade, and they were to move up a track from KuUundia while the foot-sloggers used the high road, but the track was found impassable for wheels and the guns had to be brought to the road. The attack was post- poned till the guns were in position. The gunners came into action at half-past two, and infantry MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 229 moved to the left to get on to the Ramallah-Bireh metalled road which runs at right angles to the trmik road between Nablus and Jerusalem. The 2/22nd and the 2/23rd Londons, working across the road, reached the Tahunah ridge, and after a heavy bom- bardment dashed into the Turkish positions, which were defended most stubbornly to the end, and thus won the last remaining hill which commanded our advance up the Nablus road as far as Bireh. On the eastern side of the main highway the 180th Brigade had once more done sterling service. There is a bold eminence called Shab Saleh, a mile due south of Bireh. It rises almost sheer from a piece of comparatively flat ground, and the enemy held it in strength. The 2/1 9th and the 2/20th Londons attacked this feature, and displaying great gallantry in face of much machine-gun fire seized it at half-past three. Once again the gunners supported the infantry admirably. The 2/1 7th and 2/1 8th Londons pushed past Saleh in a north-easterly direction and, leaving Bireh on their left, got into extremely bad country and took the Turks by surprise on a wooded ridge at Sheikh Sheiban. The two brigades rested and refreshed for a couple of hours and then advanced once more, and by midnight they had routed the Turks out of another series of hills and were in firm possession of the line from Beitin, across the Nablus road north of the Balua Lake, to the ridge of El Burj, having carried through everything which had been planned for the Division. RamaUah had been taken at nine o'clock in the morning without opposition by the 230th and 229th Brigades, and at night the 74th Division held a strong fine north of the picturesque village as far as Et Tireh. The 10th Division also occupied the Tireh ridge quite early in the day, and one of their field batteries and 230 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON both mountain batteries got within long range of the Nablus road, and not only assisted in shelling the enem}^ in Bireh but harassed with a hot fire any bodies of men or transport seen retreating northwards. The Flying Corps, too, caused the Turks many losses on the road. The airmen bombed the enemy from a low altitude and also machine-gunned them, and moreover by their timely information gave great assistance during the operations. By the 30th December all organised resistance to our advance had ceased and the XXth Corps consolidated its line, the 60th Division going forward slightly to improve its position and the other divisions re- arranging their own. The consolidation of the line was not an easy matter. It had to be very thor- oughly and rapidly done. The supply difficulty compelled the holding of the line with as few troops as possible, and when it had oeen won it was necessary to put it in a proper order in a minimum of time, and to bring back a considerable number of the troops w^ho had been engaged in the fighting to hold the grand defensive chain which made Jerusalem abso- lutely safe. The standard gauge railway was still a long way from Ramleh, and the railway construc- tion parties had to fight against bad weather and washouts. The Turkish line from Ramleh to Jeru- salem was in bad order ; a number of bridges w^ere down, so that it w^as not likety the railway could be working for several weeks. Lorries could supply the troops in the neighbourhood of the Nablus road, though the highway was getting into bad condition, bat in the right centre of the line the difficulties of terrain were appalling. The enemy had had a pain- ful experience of it and was not likely to wish to fight in that country again ; consequently it was decided to hold this part of the line with light forces. MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE 231 In this description of the operations I have made little mention of the work of the Australian Mounted Division which covered the gap between XXth and XXIst Corps. These Australian horsemen and yeo- manry guarded an extended front in inaccessible comitry, and every man in the Division will long remember the troubles of supply in the hills. They had some stiff fighting against a wily enemy, and not for a minute could they relax their vigilance. When, with the Turks' fatal effort to retake Jerusalem, the 10th Division changed their front and attacked in a north-easterly direction, the Australian Mounted Division moved with it, and they found the country as they progressed become more rugged and bleak and extremely difficult for mounted troops. The Division was in the fighting line for the whole month of December, and when they handed over the new positions they had reached to the infantry on the last day of the year, their horses fully needed the lengthened period of rest allotted to them. CHAPTER XVII A GREAT FEAT OF WAR From the story of how Jerusalem was made secure (for we may hope the clamour of war has echoed for the last time about her Holy Shrines and venerable walls) we may turn back to the coastal sector and see how the XXIst Corps improved a rather dangerous situation and laid the foundations for the biggest break-through of the world struggle. For it was the preparations in this area which made possible General Allenby's tremendous gallop through Northern Pales- tine and Syria, and gave the Allies Haifa, Beyrout, and TripoU on the seaboard, and Nazareth, Damascus, and Aleppo in the interior. The foundations were soundly laid when the XXIst Corps crossed the Auja before Christmas 1917, and the superstructure of the victory which put Turkey as well as Bulgaria and Austria out of the war was built up with many difficulties from the sure base provided by the XXIst Corps line. The crossing of the Auja was a great feat of war, and this is the first time I am able to mention the names of those to whom the credit of the operation is due. It was one of the strange regulations of the Army Council in connection with the censorship that no names of the commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, or battahons should be mentioned by correspondents. Nor indeed was I permitted to identify in my despatches any particular division, yet the divisions concerned — the 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 60th, and so on — had often been mentioned 232 A GREAT FEAT OP WAR 233 in official despatches ; the enemy not only knew they were in Palestine but were fully aware of their positions in the line; their commanders and briga- diers were known by name to the Turks. On the other hand, in describing a certain battle I was allowed to speak of divisions of Lowland troops, Welshmen and Londoners, allusions which would convey (if there were anything to give away) precisely as much information to the dull old Turk and his sharper Hun companion in arms as though the 52nd, 53rd, and 60th Divisions had been explicitly designated. This practice seemed in effect to be designed more with the object of keeping our people at home in the dark, of forbidding them glory in the deeds of their children and brothers, than of preventing information reach- ing the enemy. Some gentleman enthroned in the authority of an official armchair said ' No,' and there was an end of it. You could not get beyond him. His decision was final, complete — and silly — and the correspondent was bound hand and foot by it. Doubtless he would have Uked one to plead on the knee for some httle relaxation of his decision. Then he would have answered ' No ' in a louder tone. Let me give one example from a number entered in my notebooks of how officers at home exercised their authority. In January 1917 the military railway from the Suez Canal had been constructed across the Sinai Desert and the first train was run into El Arish, about ninety miles from the Canal. I was asked by General Headquarters to send a cablegram to London announcing the fact that railhead was at El Arish, the town having been captured a fortnight previously after a fine night march. That message was never pubhshed, and I knew it was a waste of time to ask the reason. I happened to be in London for a few days in the following August and my duties took me 234 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON to the War Office. A Colonel in the Intelligence Branch heard I was there and sent for me to tell me I had sent home information of value to the enemy. J reminded him there was a G.H.Q. censorship in Egypt which dealt with my cablegrams, and asked the nature of the valuable information which should have been concealed. ' You sent a telegram that the railway had reached El Arish when the Turks did not know it was beyond Bir el Abd.' Abd is fifty miles nearer the Suez Canal than El Arish. What did this officer care about a request made by G.H.Q. to transmit information to the British public ? He knew better than G.H.Q. what the British public should know, and he was certain the enemy thought we were hauHng supplies through those fifty miles of sand to our troops at El Arish, an absolutely phy- sical impossibility, for there were not enough camels in the East to do it. But he did not know, and he should have known, being an InteUigence officer, that the Turks were so far aware of where our railhead was that they were frequently bombing it from the air. I had been in these bombing raids and knew how accurately the German airmen dropped their eggs, and had this Intelligence officer taken the trouble to inquire he would have foimd that between thirty and forty casualties were infficted by one bomb at El Arish itself when railhead was being constructed. This critic imagined that the Turk knew only what the English papers told him. If the Turks' knowledge had been confined to what the War Office Intelligence Branch gave him credit for he would have been in a parlous state. While this ruling of the authorities at home prevailed it was impossible for me to give the names of officers or to mention divisions or units which were doing exceptionally meritorious work. Unfortunately the bureaucratic interdict continued A GREAT FEAT OF WAR 235 till within a few days of the end of the campaign, when I was told that, 'having frequently referred to the work of the Australians, which was deserved,' the mention of British and Indian units would be welcomed. We had to wait until within a month of the end of the world war before the War Office would unbend and realise the value of the best kind of propaganda. No wonder our American friends con- sider us the worst national advertisers in the world. The officer who was mainly responsible for the success of the Auja crossing was Major-General J. Hill, D.S.O., A.D.C., commanding the 52nd Division. His plan was agreed to by General Bulfin, although the Corps Commander had doubts about the possi- bihty of its success, and had his own scheme ready to be put into instant operation if General Hill's failed. In the state of the weather General Hill's own brigadiers were not sanguine, and they were the most loyal and devoted officers a divisional com- mander ever had. But despite the most unfavourable conditions, calling for heroic measures on the part of officers and men alike to gain their objectives through mud and water and over ground that was as bad as it could be, the movements of the troops worked to the clock. One brigade's movements synchronised with those of another, and the river was crossed, commanding positions were seized, and bridges were built with an astoundingly small loss to ourselves. The Lowland Scots worked as if at sport, and they could not have worked longer or stronger if the whole honour of Scotland had depended upon their efforts. At a later date, when digging at Arsuf, these Scots came across some marble columns which had graced a hall when ApoUonia was in its heyday. The glory of ApoUonia has long vanished, but if in that age of warriors there had 236 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON been a belief that those marble columns would some day be raised as monuments to commemorate a great operation of war the ancients would have had a special veneration for them. Three of the columns marked the spots where the Scots spanned the river, and it is a pity they cannot tell the full story to suc- ceeding generations. The river Auja is a perennial stream emptying itself into the blue Mediterranean w^aters four miles north of Jaffa. Its average width is forty yards and its depth ten feet, with a current running at aDout three miles an hour. Till we crossed it the river was the boundary between the British and Turkish armies in this sector, and all the advantage of ob- servation was on the northern bank. From it the town of Jaffa and its port were in danger, and the main road between Jaffa and Ramleh was observed and under fire. The village of Sheikh Muannis, about two miles inland, stood on a high mound com- manding the ground south of the river, and from Hadrah you could keep the river in sight in its whole winding course to the sea. All this high ground concealed an entrenched enemy ; on the southern side of the river the Turks were on Bald Hill, and held a Une of trenches covering the Jewish colony of Mulebbis and Fejja. A bridge and a mill dam having been destroyed during winter the only means of crossing w as by a ford three feet deep at the mouth, an uncertain passage because the sand bar over which one could walk shifted after heavy rain when the stream was swollen with flood water. Reconnais- sances at the river mouth were carried out with great daring. As I said, all the southern approaches to the river were commanded by the Turks on the northern bank, who were always alert, and the move- ment of one man in the Auja valley was generally A GREAT FEAT OF WAR 237 the signal for artillery activity. So often did the Turkish gunners salute the appearance of a single British soldier that the Scots talked of the enemy ' sniping ' with guns. To reconnoitre the enemy's positions by dayhght was hazardous work, and the Scots had to obtain their first-hand knowledge of the river and the approaches to it in the dark hours. An officers' patrol swam the river one night, saw what the enemy was doing, and returned unobserved. A few nights afterwards two officers swam out to sea across the river mouth and crept up the right bank of the stream within the enemy's lines to as- certain the locality of the ford and its exact width and depth. They also learnt that there were no obstacles placed across the ford, which was three feet deep in normal times and five feet under water after rains. It was obvious that bridges would be required, and it was decided to force the passage of the river in the dark hours by putting covering troops across to the northern bank, and by capturing the enemy's positions to form a bridgehead while pontoon bridges were being constructed for the use of guns and the remainder of the Division. Time was all-important. December and January are the wettest months of the season at Jaffa, and after heavy rains the Auja valley becomes little better than a marsh, so that a small amount of traffic will cut up the boggy land into an almost impassable condition. The XXIst Corps' plan was as follows : At dawn on December 21 a heavy bombardment was to open on all the enemy's trenches covering the crossings, the fire of heavy guns to be concentrated on enemy batteries and strong positions in the rear, while ships of the Royal Navy bombarded two strong artillery positions at Tel el Rekket and El Jelil, near the coast. 238 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON When darkness fell covering troops were to be ferried across the river, and then light bridges would be constructed for the passage of larger units charged with the task of getting the Turks out of their line from Hadrah, through El Mukras to Tel el Rekket. After these positions had been gained the engineers were to build pontoon bridges to carry the remainder of the Division and guns on the night of the 22nd- 23rd December, in time to advance at daylight on the 23rd to secure a defensive line from Tel el Mukhmar through Sheikh el Ballatar to Jelil. On the right of the 52nd Division the 54th Division was to attack Bald Hill on the night of 21st-22nd December, and on the folio wmg morning assault the trench system covering Mulebbis and Fejja ; then later in the day to advance to Rantieh, while the 75th Division farther east was to attack Bireh and Beida. TTiis plan was given to divisional commanders at a con- ference in Jaffa on December 12. Two days later General Hill submitted another scheme which pro- vided for a surprise attack by night with no naval or land artillery bombardment, such a demonstration being hkely to attract attention. General Hill sub- mitted his proposals in detail. General Bulfin gave the plan most careful consideration, but decided that to base so important an operation on the success of a surprise attack was too hazardous, and he adhered to his scheme of a deliberate operation to be carried through systematically. He, however, gave General Hill permission to carry out his surprise attack on the night of December 20, but insisted that the bombardment should begin according to programme at daylight on the 21st unless the surprise scheme was successful. A brigade of the 54th Division and the 1st Aus- tralian Light Horse Brigade relieved the Scots in A GREAT FEAT OF WAR 239 the trenches for three nights before the attempt. Every man in the Lowland Division entered upon the work of preparation with whole-hearted en- thusiasm. There was much to be done and materials were none too plentiful. Pontoons were wired for and reached Jaffa on the 16th. There was Uttle wood available, and some old houses in Jaffa were pulled down to supply the Army's needs. The material was collected in the orange groves around the German colony at Sarona, a northern suburb of Jaffa, and every man who could use a tool was set to work to build a framework of rectangular boats to a standard design, and on this framework of wood tarpaulins and canvas were stretched. These boats were Hght in structure, and were so designed that working parties would be capable of transferring them from their place of manufacture to the river bank. Each boat was to carry twenty men fully armed and equipped over the river. They became so heavy with rain that they in fact only carried sixteen men. The boat builders worked where enemy airmen could not see them, and when the craft were completed the troops were practised at night in embarking and ferrying across a waterway — for this purpose the craft were put on a big pond — and in cutting a path through thick cactus hedges in the dark. During these preparations the artillery was also active. They took their guns u.p to forward positions during the night, and before the date of the attack there was a bombardment group of eight 6-inch howitzers and a counter battery group of ten 60-pounders and one 6-inch Mark vn. gun in con- cealed positions, and the artillery dumps had been filled with 400 rounds for each heavy gun and 700 rounds for each field piece. The weather on the 18th, 19th, and 20th December was most unfavour- 240 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON able. Rain was continuous and the valley of the Auja became a morass. Tlie luck of the weather was almost always against General Allenby's Army, and the troops had become accustomed to fighting the elements as well as the Turks, but here was a situa- tion where rain might have made all the difference between success and failure. General Bulfin saw Greneral Hill and his brigadiers on the afternoon of the 20th. The brigadiers were depressed owing to the floods and the state of the ground, because it was then clear that causeways would have to be made through the mud to the river banks. General Hill remained enthusiastic and hopeful and, the Corps Commander supporting him, it was decided to proceed with the operation. For several nights, with the object of giving the enemy the impression of a nightly strafe, there had been artillery and machine-gun demonstrations occurring about the same time and lasting as long as those planned for the night of the crossing. After dusk on December 20 there was a big movement behind our lines. The ferrying and bridging parties got on the move, each by their particular road, and though the wind was searchingly cold and every officer and man became thoroughly drenched, there was not a sick heart in the force. The 157th Brigade proceeded to the ford at the mouth of the Auja, the 156th Brigade advanced towards the river just below Muannis, and the 155th Brigade moved up to the mill and dam at Jerisheh, where it was to secure the crossing and then swing to the right to capture Hadrah. The advance was slow, but that the Scots were able to move at all is the highest tribute to their determination. The rain-soaked canvas of the boats had so greatly added to their weight that the parties detailed to carry them from the Sarona orange orchards found the A GREAT FEAT OF WAR 241 task almost beyond their powers. The bridge rafts for one of the crossings could not be got up to the river bank because the men were continually slipping in the mud under the heavy load, and the attacking battalion at this spot was ferried over in coracles. On another route a section carrying a raft lost one of its number, who was afterwards found sunk in mud up to his outstretched arms. The tracks were almost impassable, and a Lancashire pioneer bat- talion was called up to assist in improving them. The men became caked with mud from steel helmet to boots, and the field guns which had to be hauled by double teams were so bespattered that there was no need for camouflage. In those strenuous hours of darkness the weather continued vile, and the storm wind flung the frequent heavy showers with cutting force against the struggling men. The covering party which was to cross at the ford found the bar had shifted under the pressure of flood water and that the marks put down to direct the column had been washed away. The commanding officer reconnoitred, getting up to his neck in water, and found the ford considerably out of position and deeper than he had hoped, but he brought his men together in fours and, ordering each section to link arms to prevent the swirhng waters carrying them out to sea, led them across without a casualty. In the other places the covering parties of brigades began to be ferried over at eight o'clock. The first raft-loads were paddled across with muffled oars. A line was towed behind the boats, and this being made fast on either side of the river the rafts crossed and recrossed by haulage on the rope, in order that no disturbance on the surface by oars on even such a wild night should cause an alarm. As soon as the covering parties were over, light bridges to carry infantry in 242 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON file were constructed by lashing the rafts together and placmg planks on them. One of these bridges was burst by the strength of the current, but the delay thus caused mattered little as the surprise was complete. When the bridges of rafts had been swmig and anchored, blankets and carpets were laid upon them to deaden the fall of marching feet, and during that silent tramp across the roUing bridges many a keen-witted Scot found it difficult to restrain a laugh as he trod on carpets richer by far than any that had lain in his best parlour at home. He could not see the patterns, but rightly guessed that they were picked out in the bright colours of the East, and the muddy marks of war-travelled men were left on them without regret, for the carpets had come from German houses in Sarona. How per- fectly the operation was conducted — noiselessly, swiftly, absolutely according to time-table — may be gathered from the fact that two officers and sixteen Turks were awakened in their trench dug-outs at the ford by the river mouth two hours after we had taken the trenches. The officers resisted and had to be killed. Two miles behind the river the Low- landers captured the whole garrison of a post near the sea, none of whom had the slightest idea that the river had been crossed. An officer commanding a battalion at Muannis was taken in his bed, whilst another commanding officer had the surprise of his life on being invited to put his hands up in his own house. He looked as if he had just awakened from a nightmare. In one place some Turks on being attacked with the bayonet shouted an alarm and one of the crossings was shelled, but its position was immediately changed and the passage of the river continued without interruption. The whole of the Turkish system covering the river, trenches well iiA-/-4..i*' A GREAT FEAT OF WAR 243 concealed in the river banks and in patches of culti- vated land, were rushed in silence and captured. Muannis was taken at the point of the bayonet, the strong position at Hadrah was also carried in absolute silence, and at dayhght the whole line the Scots had set out to gain was won and the assailants were digging themselves in. And the price of their victory ? The Scots had 8 officers and 93 other ranks casualties. They buried over 100 Turkish / dead and took 11 officers and 296 other ranks prisoners, besides capturing ten machine guns. The forcing of the passage of the Auja was a magnificent achievement, planned with great ability by General HiU and carried out with that skill and energy which the brigadiers, staff, and all ranks of the Division showed throughout the campaign. One significant fact serves to illustrate the Scots' dis- ciphne. Orders were that not a shot was to be fired except by the guns and machine guns making their nightly strafe. Death was to be dealt out with the bayonet, and though the Lowlanders were engaged in a life and death struggle with the Turks, not a single round of rifle ammunition was used by them till daylight came, when, as a keen marksman said, they had some grand running-man practice. During the day some batteries got to the north bank by way of the ford, and two heavy pontoon bridges were constructed and a barrel bridge, which had been put together in a wadi flowing into the Auja, was floated down and placed in position. There was a good deal of sheUing by the Turks, but they fired at our new positions and interfered but Httle with the bridge construction. On the night of the 21st- 22nd December the 54th Division assaulted Bald Hill, a prominent mound south of the Auja from which a magnificent view 244 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON of the country was gained. Stiff fighting resulted, but the enemy was driven off with a loss of 4 officers and 48 other ranks killed, and 3 officers and 41 men taken prisoners. At dawn the Division reported that the enemy was retiring from Mulebbis and Fejja, and those places were soon in our hands. H.M.S. Grafton, with Admiral T. Jackson, the monitors M 29, M31, and M32, and the destroyers Lapwing and Lizard, arrived off the coast and shelled Jehl and Arsuf, and the 52nd Division, advancing on a broad front, occupied the whole of their objectives by five o'clock in the afternoon. The 157th Brigade got all the high ground about Arsuf, and thus prevented the enemy from obtaining a long-range view of Jaffa. A few rounds of shell fired by a naval gun at a range of nearly twenty miles fell in Jaffa some months afterwards, but with this exception Jaffa was quite free from the enemy's attentions. The brilliant operation on the Auja had saved the town and its people many anxious days. By the end of the year there were three strong bridges across the river, and three others substantial enough to bear the weight of tractors and their loads were under construction. The troops received their winter clothing ; bivouac shelters and tents were beginning to arrive. Baths and laundries were in operation, and the rigours of the campaign began to be eased. But the XXIst Corps could congratulate itseff that, notwithstanding two months of open warfare, often fifty to sixty miles from railhead, men's rations had never been reduced. Horses and mules had had short allowances, but they could pick up a httle in the country. The men were in good health, despite the hardships in the hills and rapid change from summer to winter, and their spirit could not be surpassed. CHAPTER XVIII BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN We have seen how impregnable the defences of Jerusalem had become as the result of the big advance northwards at the end of December. As far as any mihtary forecast could be made we were now in an impenetrable position whatever force the Turk, with his poor communications, could employ against us either from the direction of Nablus or from the east of the Jordan. There seemed to be no risk whatever, so long as we chose to hold the line XXth Corps had won, of the Turks again approaching Jerusalem, but the Commander-in-Chief determined to make the situation absolutely safe by advancing eastwards to capture Jericho and the crossings of the Jordan. This was not solely a measure of precaution. It certainly did provide a means for preventing the foe from operating in the stern, forbidding, desolate, and awe-inspiring region which has been known as the Wilderness since Biblical days, and doubtless before. In that rough country it would be extremely difficult to stop small bands of enterprising troops getting through a line and creating diversions which, while of small military consequence, would have been troublesome, and might have had the effect of unsettling the natives. A foothold in the Jordan valley would have the great advantage of enabling us to threaten the Hedjaz railway, the Turks' sole means of communication with Medina, where their garrison was holding out staunchly against the troops 246 246 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON of the King of the Hedjaz, and any assistance we could give the King's army would have a far-reaching effect on neutral Arabs. It would also stop the grain trade on the Dead Sea, on which the enemy set store, and would divert traffic in foodstuffs to natives in Lower Palestine, who at this time were to a consider- able extent dependent on supplies furnished by our Army. The Quartermaster- General carried many responsibilities on his shoulders. Time was not the important factor, and as General Allenby was anxious to avoid an operation which might involve heavy losses, it was at first proposed that the enemy should be forced to leave Jericho by the gradually closing in on the town from north and south. The Turks had got an immensely strong position about Talat ed Dumm, the ' Mound of Blood,' where stands a ruined castle of the Crusaders, the Chastel Rouge. One can see it with the naked eye from the Mount of Olives, and weeks before the operation started I stood in the garden of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria hospice and, looking over one of the most inhospitable regions of the world, could easily make out the Turks walking on the road near the Khan, which has been called the Good Samaritan Inn. The country has indeed been rightly named. Gaunt, bare mountains of limestone with scarcely a patch of green to relieve the nakedness of the land make a wilderness indeed, and one sees a drop of some four thousand feet in a distance of about fifteen miles. The hills rise in continuous succession, great ramparts of the Judean range, and instead of valleys between them there are huge clefts in the rock, hundreds of feet deep, which carry away the winter torrents to the Jordan and Dead Sea. Over beyond the edge of hills are the green wooded banks of the Sacred River, then a patch or two of stunted trees, and finally the dark walls BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN 247 of the mountains of Moab shutting out the view of the land which still holds fascinating remains of Greek civilisation. But there was no promise of an early peep at such historic sights, and the problem of getting at the nearer land was hard enough for present deliberation. It was at first proposed that the whole of the XXth Corps and a force of cavalry should carry out opera- tions simultaneously on the north and east of the Corps front which should give us possession of the roads from Mar Saba and Muntar, and also from Taiyibeh and the old Roman road to Jericho, thus allowing two cavalry forces supported by infantry columns to converge on Jericho from the north and south. However, by the second week of February there had been bad weather, and the difficulties of supplying a line forty miles from the railway on roads which, notwithstanding a vast amount of labour, were still far from good, were practically insuperable, and it was apparent that a northerly and easterly advance at the same time would involve a delay of three weeks. New circumstances came to light after the advance was first arranged, and these demanded that the enemy should be driven across the Jordan as soon as possible. General AUenby decided that the opera- tions should be carried out in two phases. The first was an easterly advance to thrust the enemy from his position covering Jericho, to force him across the Jordan, and to obtain control of the country west of the river. The northerly advance to secure the Une of the wadi Aujah was to follow. This river Aujah which flows into the Jordan must not be confused with the Auja on the coast already described. The period of wet weather was prolonged, and the accumulation of supplies of rations and ammunition 248 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON did not permit of operations commencing before February 19. That they started so early is an elo- quent tribute to the hard work of the Army, for the weather by the date of the attack had improved but little, and the task of getting up stores could only be completed by extraordinary exertions. General Chetwode ordered a brigade of the 60th Division to capture Mukhmas as a preliminary to a concen- tration at that place. On the 19th the Division occupied a front of about fourteen miles from near Muntar, close to which the ancient road from Beth- lehem to Jericho passes, through Ras Umm Deisis, across the Jerusalem-Jericho road to Arak Ibrahim, over the great chasm of the wadi Farah which has cliff-like sides hundreds of feet deep, to the brown knob of Ras et Tawil. The line was not gained without fighting. The Turks did not oppose us at Muntar — the spot where the Jews released the Scape- goat — but there was a short contest for Ibrahim, and a longer fight lasting till the afternoon for an en- trenched position a mile north of it ; Ras et Tawil was ours by nine in the morning. Tawil overlooks a track which has been trodden from time imme- morial. It leads from the Jordan valley north-west of Jericho, and passes beneath the frowning height of Jebel Kuruntul with its bare face relieved by a monastery built into the rock about haH-way up, and a walled garden on top to mark the Mount of Temptation, as the pious monks believe it to be. The track then proceeds westwards, winding in and out of the tremendous slits in rock, to Mukhmas, and it was probably along this rough line that the Israel- ites marched from their camp at Gilgal to overthrow the Philistines. On the right of the Londoners were two brigades of the Anzac Mounted Division, working through the most desolate hills and wadis down to * BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN 249 the Dead Sea with a view to pushing up by Nebi Musa, which tradition has ascribed as the burial place of Moses, and thence into the Jordan valley. Northward of the 60th Division the 53rd was extend- ing its flank eastwards to command the Taiyibeh- Jericho road, and the Welsh troops occupied Rummon, a huge mount of chalk giving h. good view of the Wilderness. This was the position on the night of 19th February. At dawn on the 20th the Londoners were to attack the Turks in three columns. The right column was to march from El Muntar to Ekteif , the centre column to proceed along the Jerusalem- Jericho road between the highway and the wadi Farah, and the left column was to go forward by the Tawil- Jebel Kuruntul track. The 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade were, if possible, to make Nebi Musa. The infantry attack was as fuie as anything done in the campaign. I had the advantage of witnessing the centre column carry out the whole of its task and of seeing the right column complete as gallant an effort as any troops could make, and as one saw them scale frowning heights and clamber up and down the roughest of torrent beds, one realised that more than three months' fighting had not removed the ' bloom ' from these Cockney warriors, and that their physique and courage were proof against long and heavy trials of campaigning. The chief ob- jective of the centre column was Talat ed Dumm which, lying on the Jericho road just before the junction of the old and the new road to the Jordan valley, was the key to Jericho. It is hard to imagine a better defensive position. To the north of the road is the wadi Farah, a great crack in the rocks which can only be crossed in a few places, and which 250 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON a few riflemen could cover. Likewise a platoon distributed behind rocks on the many hills could command the approaches from all directions, while the hill of Talat ed Dumm, by the Good Samaritan Inn, and the height whereon the Crusader ruins stand, dominated a broad flat across which our troops must move. This position the 180th Brigade attacked at dawn. Tlie guns opened before the sun appeared above the black crest line of the moun- tains of Moab, and well before long shadows were cast across the Jordan valley the batteries were tearing to pieces the stone walls and rocky eyries sheltering machine - gunners and infantry. This preliminary bombardment, if short, was wonderfully effective. From where I stood I saw the heavies pouring an unerring fire on to the Crusader Castle, huge spurts of black smoke, and the dislocation of big stones which had withstood the disintegrating effect of many centuries of sun powder, telling the Forward Observing Officer that his gunners were well on the target and that to live in that havoc the Turks must seek the shelter of vaults cut deep down in the rock by masons of old. No enemy could delay our progress from that shell-torn spot. Lighter guns searched other positions and whiffs of shrapnel kept Turks from their business. There are green patches on the western side of Talat ed Dumm in the early months of the year before the sun has burned up the country. Over these the infantry advanced as laid down in the book. The whirring rap-rap of machine guns at present un- located did not stop them, and as our machine-gun sections, ever on the alert to keep down rival auto- matic guns, found out and sprayed the nests, the enemy w^as seen to be anxious about his line of retreat. One large party, harried by shrapnel and machine- BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN 251 gun fire, left its positions and rushed towards a defile, but rallied and came back, though when it reoccupied its former line the Londoners had reached a point to enfiilade it, and it suffered heavily. We soon got this position, and then our troops, ascending some spurs, poured a destructive fire into the defile and so harassed the Turks re-forming for a counter- attack as to render feeble their efforts to regain what they had lost. By eight o'clock we had taken the whole of the Talat ed Dumm position, and long-range sniping throughout the day did not disturb our secure pos- session of it. Immediately the heights were occupied the gims went ahead to new points, and armoured cars left the road to try to find a way to the south- east to protect the flank of the right column. They had a troublesome journey. Some of the crews walked well ahead of the cars to reconnoitre the tracks, and it speaks well for the efficiency of the cars as well as for the pluck and cleverness of the drivers that in crossing a mile or two of that terribly broken mountainous country no car was overturned and all got back to the road without mishap. Throughout the night and during the greater part of the day of February 20 the right column were fighting under many difficulties. In their march from the hill of Muntar they had to travel over ground so cracked and strewn with boulders that in many parts the brigade could only proceed in single file. In some places the track chosen had a huge cleft in the mountain on one side and a cHff face on the other. It was a continual succession of watercourses and mountains, of uphill and downhill travel over the most uneven surface in the blackness of night, and it took nearly eight hours to march three miles. The nature of the country was a very serious obstacle 252 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON and the column was late in deploying for attack. But bad as was the route the men had followed during the night, it was easy as compared with the position they had set out to carry. Tliis was Jebel Ekteif, the southern end of the range of hills of which Talat ed Dumm was the northern. Ekteif presented to this column a face as precipitous as Gibraltar and perhaps half as high. There was a ledge running round it about three-quarters of the way from the top, and for hours one could see the Turks lying flat on this rude path trying to pick off the intrepid climbers attempting a precarious ascent. Some mountain guns suddenly ranged on the enemy on this ledge, and, picking up the range with remarkable rapidity, forced the Turks into more comfortable positions. The enemy, too, had some well-served guns, and they plastered the spurs leading to the crest from the west, but our infantry's audacity never faltered, and after we had got into the first lines on the hill our men proceeded methodically to rout out the machine guns from their nooks and crannies. This was a somewhat lengthy process, but small parties working in support of each other gradually crushed opposition, and the huge rocky rampart was ours by three o'clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile two brigades of the Anzac Moimted Division were moving eastwards from Mun- tar over the hills and wadis down to the Dead Sea, whence turning northwards they marched towards Nebi Musa to try to get on to the Jordan valley flats to threaten the Turks in rear. The terrain was appaUingly bad and horses had to be led, the troops frequently proceeding in Indian file. No guns could be got over the hills to support the Anzacs, and when they tried to pass through a narrow defile south of Nebi Musa it was found that the enemy covered the approach with machine guns, and progress was GERMAN PRISONERS CROSSING THE JORDAN BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN 253 stopped dead until, during the early hours of the following morning, some of the Londoners' artillery managed by a superhuman effort to get a few guns over the mountains to support the cavalry. By this time the Turks had had enough of it, and while it was dark they were busy trekking through Jericho towards the Ghoraniyeh bridge over the river, covered by a force on the Jebel Kuruntul track which pre- vented the left column from reaching the cliffs over- looking the Jordan valley. By dawn on the 21st Nebi Musa was made good, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and the New Zealand Brigade were in Jericho by eight o'clock and had cleared the Jordan valley as far north as the river Aujah, the Londoners holding the line of cliffs which absolutely prevented any possibility of the enemy ever again threatening Jerusalem or Bethlehem from the east. This suc- cessful operation also put an end to the Turks' Dead Sea grain traffic. They had given up hope of keeping their landing place on the northern shores of the Dead Sea when we took Talat ed Dumm, and one hour after our infantry had planted themselves on the Hill of Blood we saw the enemy burning his boats, wharves, and storehouses at Rujm el Bahr, where he had expended a good deal of labour to put up buildings to store grain wanted for his army. Subsequently we had some naval men operating motor boats from this point, and these sailors achieved a record on that melancholy waterway at a level far below that at which any submarine, British or German, ever rested. CHAPTER XIX THE TOUCH OF THE CIVILISING HAND It is doubtful whether the population of any city within the zones of war profited so much at the hands of the conqueror as Jerusalem. In a httle more than half a year a wondrous change was effected in the condition of the people, and if it had been possible to search the Oriental mind and to get a free and frank expression of opinion, one would probably have found a universal thankfulness for General Allenby's deliverance of the Holy City from the hands of the Turks. And with good reason. The scourge of war so far as the British Army was concerned left Jerusalem the Golden untouched. For the 50,000 people in the City the skilfully applied- military pressure which put an end to Turkish misgovernment was the beginning of an era of happiness and content- ment of which they had hitherto had no conception. Justice was administered in accordance with British ideals, every man enjoyed the profits of his industry, traders no longer ran the gauntlet of extortionate officials, the old time corruption was a thing of the past, public health was organised as far as it could be on Western lines, and though in matters of sanita- tion and personal cleanliness the inhabitants still had much to learn, the appearance of the Holy City and its population vastly improved under the touch of a civihsing hand. Sights that offended more than one of the senses on the day when General Allenby made his official entry had disappeared, and peace 254 THE TOUCH OF THE CIVILISING HAND 255 and order reigned where previously had been but misery, poverty, disease, and squalor. One of the biggest blots upon the Turkish govern- ment of the City was the total failure to provide an adequate water supply. What they could not, or would not, do in their rule of four hundred years His Majesty's Royal Engineers accompHshed in a little more than two months, and now for the first time in history every civilian in Jerusalem can obtain as much pure mountain spring water as he wishes, and for this water, as fresh and bright as any bubbling out of Welsh hills, not a penny is charged. The picturesque, though usually unclean, water carrier is passing into the Umbo of forgotten things, and his energies are being diverted into other channels. The germs that swarmed in his leathern water bags will no longer endanger the lives of the citizens, and the deadly perils of stagnant cistern water have been to a large extent removed. For its water Jerusalem used to rely mainly upon the winter rainfall to fill its cisterns. Practically every house has its underground reservoir, and it is estimated that if aU were full they would contain about 360,000,000 gaUons. But many had faUen into disrepair and most, if not the whole of them, required thorough cleansing. One which was in- spected by our sanitary department had not been emptied for nineteen years. To supplement the cistern supply the Mosque of Omar reservoir halved with Bethlehem the water which flowed from near Solomon's Pools down an aqueduct constructed by Roman engineers under Herod before the Saviour was born. This was not nearly sufficient, nor was it so constant a supply as that provided by our Army engineers. They went farther afield. They found a group of spring-heads in an absolutely clean 256 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON gathering ground on the hills yielding some 14,000 gallons an hour, and this water which was running to waste is lifted to the top of a hill from which it flows by gravity through a long pipe-hne to Jerusalem, where a reservoir has been built on a high point on the outskirts of the city. Supplies of this beautiful water run direct to the hospitals, and at standpipes all over the city the inhabitants take as much as they desire. The water consumption of the people became ten times what it was in the previous year, and this fact alone told how the boon was appreciated. The scheme did not stop at putting up standpipes for those who fetched the water. A portion of the contents of the cisterns was taken for watering troop horses in the spring — troops were not allowed to drink it. The water level of these cisterns became very low, and as they got emptied the authorities arranged for refilling them on the one condition that they were first thoroughly cleansed and put in order. The British administration would not be parties to the perpetuation of a system which permitted the fouling of good crystal water. A householder had merely to apply to the Military Governor for water, and a sanitary officer inspected the cistern, ordered it to be cleansed, and saw that this was done ; then the Department of Public Health gave its certificate, and the engineers ran a pipe to the cistern and filled it, no matter what its capacity. Two cisterns were replenished with between 60,000 and 70,000 gallons of sparkling water from the hills in place of water heavily charged with the accumulation of summer dust on roofs, and the dust of Jerusalem roads, as we had sampled it, is not as clean as desert sand. The installation of the supply was a triumph for the Royal Engineers. In peace times the work would have taken from one to two years to complete. THE TOUCH OF THE CIVILISING HAND 257 A preliminary investigation and survey of the ground was made on February 14, and a scheme was sub- mitted four days later. Owing to the shortage of transport and abnormally bad weather work could not be commenced till April 12. Many miles of pipe line had to be laid and a powerful pumping plant erected, but water was being dehvered to the people of Jerusalem on the 18th of June. Other mihtary works have done much for the common good in Palestine, but none of them were of greater utility than this. Mahomedans seeing bright water flow into Jerusalem regarded it as one of the wonders of all time. It is interesting to note that the American Red Cross Society, which sent a large and capable staff to the Holy Land after America came into the war, knew of the lack of an adequate water supply for Jerusalem, and with that foresight which Ameri- cans show, forwarded to Egypt for transportation to Jerusalem some thousand tons of water mains to provide a water service. When the American Red Cross workers reached the Holy City they found the Army's plans almost completed, and they were the first to pay a tribute to what they described as the ' civilising march of the British Army.' Those who watched the ceaseless activities of the PubUc Health Administration were not surprised at the remarkable improvement in the sick and death rates, not only of Jerusalem but of all the towns and districts. The new water supply wiU unquestion- ably help to lower the figures still further. A medical authority recently told me that the health of the community was wonderfully good and there was no suspicion of cholera, outbreaks of which were frequent under the Turkish regime. Government hospitals were estabhshed in all large centres. In this country where small-pox takes a heavy toll the ' conscientious 258 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON objector ' was unknown, and many thousands of natives in a few months came forward of their own free will to be vaccinated. Typhus and relapsing fever, both lice-borne diseases, used to claim many victims, but the figures fell very rapidly, due largely, no doubt, to the full use to which disinfecting plants were put in all areas of the occupied territory. The virtues of bodily cleanliness were taught, and the people were given that personal attention which was entirely lacking under Turkish rule. It is not easy to overcome the prejudices and cure the habits of thousands of years, but progress is being made surely if slowly, and already there is a gratifying improvement in the condition of the people which is patent to any observer. In Jerusalem an infants' welfare bureau was insti- tuted, where mothers were seen before and after childbirth, infants' clinics were established, a body of health was formed, and a kitchen was opened to provide food for babies and the poor. The nurses were mainly local subjects who had to undergo an adequate training, and there was no one who did not confidently predict a rapid fall in the infant mortality rate which, to the shame of the Turkish administration, was fully a dozen times that of the highest of EngUsh towns. The spadework was aU done by the medical staff of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. The call was urgent, and though labouring under war-time difficulties they got things going quickly and smoothly. Some volun- tary societies were assisting, and the enthusiasm of the American Red Cross units enabled aU to carry on a great and beneficent work. t .. k.i. CHAPTER XX OUR CONQUERING AIRMEN The airmen who were the eyes of the Army in Sinai and Palestine can look back on their record as a great achievement. Enormous difficulties were faced with stout hearts, and the Eoyal Flying Corps spirit surmounted them. It was one long test of courage, endurance, and efficiency, and so triumph- antly did the airmen come through the ordeal that General Allenby's Army may truthfully be said to have secured as complete a mastery of the air as it did of the plains and hills of Southern Palestine. Those of us who watched the airmen ' carrying on,' from the time when their aeroplanes were inferior to those of the Germans in speed, climbing capacity, and other quahties which go to make up first-class fighting machines, till the position during the great advance when few enemy aviators dared cross our lines, can well testify to the wonderful work our airmen per- formed. With comparatively few opportunities for combat because the enemy knew his inferiority and declined to fight unless forced, the pilots and observers from the moment our attack was about to start were always aggressive, and though the number of their victims may seem small compared with aerial victories on the Western Front they were substantial and im- portant. In the month of January 1917 the flying men accounted for eleven aeroplanes, five of these 259 260 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON falling victims to one pilot. The last of these vic- tories I myself witnessed. In a single-seater the pilot engaged two two-seater aeroplanes of a late type, driving down one machine within our line, the pilot killed by eleven bullets and the observer wounded. He then chased the other plane, whose pilot soon lost his taste for fighting, dropped into a heavy cloud bank, and got away. No odds were too great for our airmen. I have seen one aeroplane swoop down out of the blue to attack a formation of six enemy machines, sending one crashing to earth and dis- persing the remainder. In one brief fight another pilot drove down three German planes. The airman does not talk of his work, and we knew that what we saw and heard of were but fragments in the silent records of great things done. Much that was accom- plished was far behind our visual range, high up over the bleak hills of Judea, above even the rain clouds driven across the heights by the fury of a winter gale, or skimming over the dull surface of the Dead Sea, flying some hundreds of feet below sea level to interrupt the passage of foodstuffs of which the Turk stood in need. All through the Army's rapid march northwards from the crushed Gaza-Beersheba line the airmen's untiring work was of infinite value. When the Turkish retreat began the enemy was bombed and machine- gunned for a fuU week, the railway, aerodromes, troops on the march, artiUery, and transport being hit time and again, and five smashed aeroplanes and a large quantity of aircraft stores of every description were found at Menshiye alone. The raid on that aerodrome was so successful that at night the Germans burnt the whole of the equipment not destroyed by bombs. Three machines were also destroyed by us at Et Tineh, five at Ramleh and one at Ludd, and the OUR CONQUERING AIRIVIEN 261 country was covered with the debris of a well-bombed and beaten army. After Jerusalem came under the safe protection of our arms airmen harassed the re- tiring enemy with bombs and machine guns. The wmd was strong, but defying treacherous eddies, the pilots came through the valleys between steep- sloped hills and caught the Turks on the Nablus road, emptying their bomb racks at a height of a few hundred feet, and giving the scattered troops machine- gun fire on the return journey. A glance at the list of honours bestowed on officers and other ranks of the R.F.C. serving with the Egyp- tian Expeditionary Force in 1917 is sufficient to give an idea of the efficiency of the service of our airmen. It must be remembered that the Palestine Wing was small, if thoroughly representative of the Flying Corps ; its numbers were few but the quahty was thgre. Indeed I heard the Austrahan squadron of flymg men which formed part of the Wing described by the highest possible authority as probably the finest squadron in the whole of the British service. This following list of honours is, perhaps, the most eloquent testimony to the airmen's work in Palestine : Victoria Cross Distinguished Service Order Military Cross Croix de Guerre . Military Medal . Meritorious Service Medal Order of the Nile 1 4 34 2 1 14 2 The sum total of the R.F.C. work was not to be calculated merely from death and damage caused to the enemy from the air. Strategical and tactical reconnaissances formed a large part of the daily 262 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON round, and the reports brought in always added to our Army's store of information. In Palestine, possibly to a greater extent than in any other theatre of war, our map-makers had to rely on aerial photo- graphs to supply them with the details required for mihtary maps. The best maps we had of Palestine were those prepared by Lieutenant H. H. Kitchener, R.E., and Lieutenant Conder in 1881 for the Palestine Exploration Fund. They were still remarkably accurate so far as they went, but ' roads,' to give the tracks a .description to which they were not entitled, had altered, and villages had disappeared, and newer and additional information had to be supplied. The Royal Flying Corps — it had not yet become the Royal Air Force — furnished it, and aU important details of hundreds of square miles of country which survey parties could not reach were registered with wonderful accuracy by aerial photo- graphers. The work began for the battle of Rafa, and the enemy positions on the Magruntein hill were all set out before General Chetwode when the Desert Column attacked and scored an important victory. Then when 12,000 Turks were fortifying the WeU Sheikh Nuran country covering the wadi Ghuzze and the Shellal springs, not a redoubt or trench but was re- corded with absolute fidelity on photographic prints, and long before the Turks abandoned the place and gave us a fine supply of water we had excellent maps of the position. In time the whole Gaza-Beersheba line was completely photographed and maps were continually revised, and if any portion of the Turkish system of defences was changed or added to the commander in the district concerned was notified at once. To such perfection did the R.F.C. photo- OUR CONQUERING AIRMEN 263 graphic branch attain, that maps showing full details of new or altered trenches were in the hands of generals within four hours of the taking of the photo- graphs. Later on the work of the branch increased enormously, and the results fully repaid the infinite care and labour bestowed upon it. The R.F.C. made long flights in this theatre of war, and some of them were exceptionally difficult and dangerous. A French battleship when bom- barding a Turkish port of military importance had two of our machines to spot the effect of her gunfire. To be with the ship when the action opened the airmen had to fly in darkness for an hour and a half from a distant aerodrome, and they both reached the rendezvous within five minutes of the appointed time. The Turks on their lines of communication with the Hedjaz have an unpleasant recollection of being bombed at Maan. That was a noteworthy expedition. Three machines set out from an aerodrome over 150 miles away in a straight line, the pilots having to steer a course above country with no prominent land- marks. They went over a waterless desert so rough that it would have been impossible to come down with- out seriously damaging a plane, and if a pilot had been forced to land his chance of getting back to our country would have been almost nil. Water bottles and rations were carried in the machines, but they were not needed, for the three pilots came home together after hitting the station buildings at Maan and destroying considerable material and suppHes. The aeroplane has been put to many uses in war and, it may be, there are instances on other fronts of it being used, in emergencies, as an ambulance. When a little mobile force rounded up the Turkish post at Hassana, on the eastern side of the Sinai 264 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON Peninsula, one of our men received so severe a wound that an immediate operation was necessary. An airman at once volunteered to carry the wounded jnan to the nearest hospital, forty-four miles away across the desert, and by his action a Hfe was saved. APPENDICES The following telegram was sent by Enver Pasha to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, at Supreme Army- Command Headquarters, from Constantinople on August 23, 1917 : The news of the despatch of strong enemy forces to Egypt, together with the nomination of General Allenby as Com- mander-in-Chief on our Syrian Front, indicates that the British contemplate an offensive on the Syrian Front, and very probably before the middle of November. The preservation of the Sinai Front is a primary condition to the success of the Yilderim undertaking. After a further conversation with the Commander of the IVth Army (Jemal Pasha) I consider it necessary to strengthen this front by one of the infantry divisions in- tended for Yilderim, and to despatch this division im- mediately from Aleppo. With this reinforcement the defence of the Sinai Front by the IVth Army is assured. General von Falkenhajm takes up the position that he does not consider the defence assured, and that the further reduction of Yilderim forces is to be deprecated under any circumstances. He consequently recommends that we on our side should attack the British, and as far as possible surprise them, before they are strengthened. He wishes to carry out this attack with four infantry divisions, and the 'Asia ' Corps. Two of the four infantry divisions have stiU to be despatched to the front. I cannot yet decide to support the proposal, nor need I do 80, as the transport of an infantry division from Aleppo to Rayak requires twenty days. During this period the 267 268 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON situation as regards the enemy will become clear, and one will become better able to estimate the chance of success of an attack. I must, however, in any case be able to dispose of more forces than at present, either for the completion of Yilderim, or for the replacement of the very heavy losses which will certainly occur in the Syrian attack. I must consequently reiterate, to my deep regret, my request for the return of the Vlth Army Corps [which was operating at that time in the Dobrudja] and for the despatch of this Corps, together with the 20th Infantry Division, commencing with the 15th Infantry Division. In my opinion the Army Corps could be replaced by Bulgarians, whose task is unquestionably being lightened through the despatch of troops (British) to Egypt. Should this not be the case, I would be ready to exchange two divisions from the Vth Army for the two infantry divi- sions of the Vlth Army Corps, as the former are only suited for a war of position, and would have to be made mobile by the allotment of transport and equipment. If these two infantry divisions were given up, the Vth Army would have only five infantry divisions of no great fighting value, a condition of things which is perhaps not very desirable. For the moment my decision is : Defence of Syria by strengthening that front by one infantry division, and prosecution of the Yilderim scheme. Should good prospects offer of beating the British de- cisively in Syria before they have been reinforced I will take up General von Falkenhayn's proposal again, as far as it appears possible to carry it out, having in view the question of transport and rationing, which still has to be settled in some respects. — Turkish Main Headquarters, Enveb. APPENDICES 269 II Von Falkenhayn despatched the following telegram from Constantinople on August 25, 1917, to German General Headquarters : The possibility of a British attack in Syria has had to be taken into consideration from the beginning. Its re- percussion on the Irak undertaking was obvious. On that account I had already settled in my conversations in Con- stantinople during May that, if the centre of gravity of operations were transferred to the Sinai Front, command should be given me there too. The news now to hand — reinforcement of the British troops in Egypt, taking over of command by Allenby, the demands of the British Press daily becoming louder — makes the preparation of a British attack in Syria probable. Jemal Pasha wishes to meet it with a defensive. To that end he demands the divisions and war material which ^ were being collected about Aleppo for Yilderim. The natural result of granting this request will be that true safety will never be attained on the Sinai Front by a pure defensive, and that the Irak undertaking will certainly fritter away owing to want of driving power or to delays. I had consequently proposed to the Turkish Higher Command to send two divisions and the ' Asia ' Corps as quickly as possible to Southern Syria, so as to carry out a surprise attack on the British by means of an encircling movement before the arrival of their reinforcements. Rail- ways allow of the assembly of these forces (inclusive of heavy artiUery, material and technical stores) in the neighbourhood of Beersheba by the end of October. The disposable parts of the rVth Army (two to three divisions) would be added to it. In a discussion between Enver, Jemal, and myself, Enver decided first of all to strengthen the IVth Army by the inclusion of one division from the Army Group. This division would suffice to ward off attack. The Irak under- 270 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON taking could be carried through at the same time. Judging from all former experiences I am firmly convinced as soon as it comes to a question of the expected attack on the Sinai Front, or even if the IVth Army only feels itself seriously threatened, further troops, munitions, and material will be withdrawn from the Army Group, and Turkey's forces will be shattered. Then nothing decisive can be undertaken in either theatre of war. The sacrifice of men, money, and material which Germany is offering at the present moment will be in vain. The treatment of the question is rendered all the more difficult because I cannot rid myself of the impression that the decision of the Turkish Higher Command is based far less on military exigencies than on personal motives. It is dictated with one eye on the mighty Jemal, who deprecates a definite decision, but yet on the other hand opposes the slightest diminution of the area of his command. Consequently as the position now stands, I consider the Irak undertaking practicable only if it is given the necessary freedom for retirement through the removal of the danger on the Syrian Front. The removal of this danger I regard as only possible through attack. v. Falkenhayn. APPENDICES 271 III Here is another Grerman estimate of the position created by our War Cabinet's decision to take the offensive in Palestine, and in considering the view of the Grerman Staff and the prospect of success any Turkish attack would have, it must be borne in mind that under the most favourable circumstances the enemy could not have been in position for taking an offensive before the end of October. Von Falkenhayn wished to attack the British ' before the arrival of their reinforcements.' Not only had our reinforce- ments arrived before the end of October, but they were all in position and the battle had commenced. Beersheba was taken on October 31. This apprecia- tion was written by Major von Papen of Yilderim headquarters on August 28, 1917 : Enver's objections, the improbability of attaining a decisive result on the Sinai Front with two divisions plus the ' Asia Corps ' and the difficulty of the Aleppo -Rayak transport question, hold good. The execution of the offensive with stronger forces is desirable, but is not practicable, as, in consequence of the beginning of the rainy weather in the middle of November, the British offensive may be expected at the latest during the latter half of October ; ours therefore should take place during the first part of that month. The transport question precludes the assembly of stronger forces by that date. Should the idea of an offensive be abandoned altogether on that account ? On the assumption that General AUenby — after the two unsuccessful British attacks — ^will attack only with a marked superiority of men and munitions, a passive defence on a thirty-five kilometre front with an exposed flank does not appear to offer any great chance of success. 272 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON The conditions on the Western Front (defensire zone, attack divisions) are only partially applicable here, since the mobility of the artillery and the correct tactical handling of the attack division are not assured. The intended passive defensive will not be improved by the theatrical attack with one division suggested by General von Kress. On the contrary this attack would be without result, as it would be carried out too obliquely to the front, and would only mean a sacrifice of men and material. The attack proposed by His Excellency for the envelop- ment of the enemy's flank — ^if carried out during the first half of October with four divisions plus the ' Asia Corps ' — will perhaps have no definite result, but will at all events result in this : that the Gaza Front flanked by the sea will tie down considerable forces and defer the continuation of British operations in the wet season, during which, in the opinion of General von Kress, they cannot be carried on with any prospect of success. The situation on the Sinai Front will then be clear. Natur- ally it is possible that the position here may demand the inclusion of further effectives and the Yilderim operation consequently become impracticable. This, however, will only prove that the determining factor of the decisive opera- tion for Turkey during the winter of 1917-1918 lies in Pales- tine and not in Mesopotamia. An offensive on the Sinai Front is therefore — even with reduced forces and a limited objective — ^the correct solution. Papen. APPENDICES 273 IV Letter from General Kress von Kressenstein to YiU derim headquarters, dated September 29, 1917, on moral of Turkish troops, A question which urgently needs regulating is that of deserters. According to my experience their number will increase still more with the setting in of the bad weather and the deterioration of rations. Civil administration and the gendarmerie fail entirely ; they often have a secret understanding with the population and are open to bribery. The cordon drawn by me is too weak to prevent desertion. I am also too short of troops to have the necessary raids undertaken in the hinterland. It is necessary that the hunt for deserters in the area between the front and the line Jerusalem -Ramleh -Jaffa be formally organised under ener- getic management, that one or two squadrons exclusively for this service be detailed, and that a definite reward be paid for bringing in each deserter. But above all it is necessary that punishment should follow in consequence, and that the unfortunately very frequent amnesties of His Majesty the Sultan be discontinued, at least for some time. The question of rationing has not been settled. We are living continually from hand to mouth. Despite the binding promises of the Headquarters IVth Army, the VaU of Dam- ascus, the Lines of Communication, Major Bathmann and others, that from now on 150 tons of rations should arrive regularly each day, from the 24th to the 27th of this month, for example a total of 229 tons or only 75 tons per diem have arrived. I cannot fix the blame for these irregularities. The Head- quarters rVth Army has received the highly gratifying order that, at least up to the imminent decisive battle, the bread ration is raised to 100 grammes. This urgently necessary improvement of the men's rations remains illusory, s 274 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON if a correspondingly larger quantity of flour (about ont wagon per day) is not supplied to us. So far the improve- ment exists only on paper. The condition of the animals particularly gives cause for anxiety. Not only are we about 6000 animals short of establishment, but as a result of ex- haustion a considerable number of animals are ruined daily. The majority of divisions are incapable of operating on account of this shortage of animals. The ammunition supply too is gradually coming into question on account of the deficiency in animals. The menacing danger can only be met by a regular supply of sufficient fodder. The stock of straw in the area of operations is exhausted. With gold some barley can still be bought in the country. Every year during the rainy season the railway is inter- rupted again and again for periods of from eight to fourteen days. There are also days and weeks in which the motor- lorry traffic has to be suspended. Finally we must calculate on the possibility of an interruption of our rear communica- tions by the enemy. I therefore consider it absolutely necessary that at least a fourteen days' reserve of rations be deposited in the depots at the front as early as possible. The increase of troops on the Sinai Front necessitates a very considerable increase on the supply of meat from the Line of Communication area, Damascus district. APPENDICES 275 The troops of General Allenby's Army before the attack on Beersheba were distributed as follows : 29th Brigade. 6th R. Irish Rifles. 5th Con. Rangers. 6th Leinsters. 1st Leinsters XXth corps. 10th Division. SOth Brigade. 1st R. Irish Regt. 6th R. Munst. Fus. 6thR.DubHnFus. TthR.DubUnFus. 31s^ Brigade. 5th R. InniskilUngs. 6th R. Inniskillings. 2nd R. Irish Fus. 5th R. Irish Rifles. l5Sth Brigade. l/5th R.Welsh Fus. l/6th l/7th 1 /1st Hereford. 53rd Division. 1 59th Brigade. l/4thCheshires. l/7th l/4th Welsh I/5th „ I60th Brigade. l/4th R.Sussex. 2/4th R. West Surrey. 2/4th R. West Kent. 2/lOth Middlesex. 11 9th Brigade. 2/13th London. 2/14th 2/15th 2/16th 60th Division. ISOth Brigade. 2/1 7th London. 2/1 8th 2/19th 2/20th 181s^ Brigade. 2/21st London. 2/22nd „ 2/23rd 2/24th „ 229th Brigade. 16th Devons (1st Devon & R. N. Devon Yeo.). 12th Somerset L.I. (Yeo.). 74th Division. 230th Brigade. 10th E. Kent (R. E. Kent & W. Kent Yeo.). 16th R.Sussex (Yeo.). 2315^ Brigade. 10th Shrop. (Shrop. & Cheshire Yeo.). 24th R. Welsh Fus. (Denbigh Yeo.). 276 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON 74:th Division (continued). 22dth Brigade. 230/ A Brigade. 2315/ Brigade. 14thR.Highrs.(Fife 15th Suffolk (Yeo.). 25th R. Welsh Fua. & Forfar Yeo.). (Montgomery Yeo & Welsh Horse). 12th R. Scots Fus. 12th Norfolk (Yeo.) . 24th Welsh Regt. (Ayr & Lanark (Pembroke & Gla- Yeo.). XXIsT CORPS. morgan Yeo.). 52nd (Lowland) Division. 155^^ Brigade. 156//i Brigade. 157/;* Brigade. l/4th R. Scots Fus. l/4th Royal Scots. l/5th H.L.I. l/5th l/7th l/6th „ l/4th K.O.S.B. l/7th Scot. Rifles. l/7th „ l/5th l/8th l/5th A. & S. Highrs. 54th (East Anglian) Division. I6l8t Brigade. lQ2nd Brigade. l6Srd Brigade. l/4th Essex. l/5th Bedfords. l/4th Norfolk. l/5th „ l/4th Northants. l/5th l/6th „ 1/lOth London. l/5th Suffolk. l/7th „ 1/llth „ 75th Division. l/8th Hampshire. 232nd Brigade. 233rd Brigade. 234/71 Brigade. l/5th Devon. * l/5th Somersets. l/4th D.C.L.I. 2/5th Hampshire. l/4th Wilts. 2/4th Dorsets. 2 /4th Somersets. 2 /4th Hampshire. 123rd Rifles. 2/3rd Gurkhas. 3/3rd Gurkhas. 58th „ IstA.L.H.Bde. 1st A.L.H. Regt. 2nd 3rd DESERT MOUNTED CORPS. Anzac Mounted Division. 2nd A.L.H. Bde. N.Z, Mtd. Rifles Bde. 5th A.L.H. Regt. Auckland M. Rifles. „ Canterbury M. Rifles. „ Welhngton M. Rifles. 6th 7th APPENDICES 277 Australian Mounted Division. 3rd L.H. Brigade. 4ih L.H. Brigade. 5th Mtd. Brigade. 8th A.L.H. Regt. 4th A.L.H. Regt. 1/lst Warwick Yeo. 9th 10th nth 12th l/lst Gloucester Yeo. 1/lst Worcester Yeo. Yeomanry Mounted Division. Ml Mtd. Brigade. Sth Mtd. Brigade. 22nd Mtd. Brigade 1/lst City of London 1/lst Bucks Hussars. 1/lst Berkshire Yeo. 1/lst Dorset Yeo. Yeo. 1/lst Co. of London Yeo. l/3rd Co. of London Yeo. 1/lst Lincolnshire Yeo. 1/lst Staffordshire Yeo. 1/lst E. Riding Yeo. 7th Mounted Brigade (attached Desert Corps). 1/lst Sherwood Rangers. 1/lst South Notts Hussars. Imperial Camel Brigade. 278 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON VI There can be no better illustration of how one battle worked out ' according to plan ' than the quotation of the following Force Order : FORCE ORDER General Headquabtees, 22nd October 1917. It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to take the offensive against the enemy at Gaza and at Beersheba, and when Beersheba is in our hands to make an enveloping attack on the enemy's left flank in the direction of Sheria and Hareira. On Zero day XXth Corps with the 10th Division and Imperial Camel Brigade attached and the Desert Mounted Corps less one Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel Brigade will attack the enemy at Beersheba with the object of gaining possession of that place by nightfall. As soon as Beersheba is in our hands and the necessary arrangements have been made for the restoration of the Beersheba water supply, XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps complete will move rapidly forward to attack the left of the enemy's main position with the object of driving him out of Sheria and Hareira and enveloping the left flank of his army. XXth Corps will move against the enemy's defences south of Sheria, first of all against the Kauwukah line and then against Sheria and the Hareira defences. Desert Mounted Corps calling up the Mounted Division left in general reserve during the Beersheba operation will move north of the XXth Corps to gain possession of Nejile and of any water supplies between that place and the right of XXth Corps and will be prepared to operate vigorously against and round the enemy's left flank if he should throw it back to oppose the advance of the XXth Corps. On a date to be subsequently determined and which will probably be after the occupation of Beersheba and 24 to APPENDICES 279 48 hours before the attack of XXth Corps on the ELauwukah line, the XXlst Corps will attack the south-west defences of Gaza with the object of capturing the enemy's front-Une system from Umbrella Hill to Sheikh Hasan, both inclusive. The Royal Navy will co-operate with the XXIst Corps in the attack on Gaza and in any subsequent operations that may be undertaken by XXIst Corps. On Z— 4 day the G.O.C. XXIst Corps will open a systematic bombardment of the Gaza defences, increasing in volume from Z— 1 day to Zx2 day and to be continued until Zx4 day at the least. The Royal Navy will co-operate as follows : On Z— 1 and Zero days two 6-inch monitors will be available for bom- bardment from the sea, special objective Sheikh Hasan. On Zero day a third 6-inch monitor will be available so that two of these ships may be constantly in action while one replenishes ammunition. On Zxl day 6-inch monitors will discontinue their bombardment which they will reopen on Zx2 day. From Zxl day the French battleship Requin and H.M.S. Raglan will bombard Deir Sineid station and junction for Huj, the roads and railway bridges and camps on the wadi Hesi and the neighbourhood. The Requin and Raglan will be assisted by a seaplane carrier. From Zero day one 9-2 monitor will be available from dawn, special objective Sheikh Redwan. From Z— 1 day inclusive demands for naval co-operation will be conveyed direct from G.O.C. XXIst Corps to the Senior Naval Officer, Marine View, who will arrange for the transmission of the demands so made. XXth Corps will move into position during the night of Z— l=Zero day so as to attack the enemy at Beersheba on Zero day south of the wadi Saba with two divisions while covering his flank and the construction of the railway east of Shellal with one division on the high ground over- looking the wadis E[l Sufi and Hanafish. The objective of XXth Corps will be the enemy's works west and south- west of Beersheba as far as the Khalasa-Beersheba road inclusive. Desert Mounted Corps will move on the night of Z— l"«Zero 280 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON day from the area of concentration about Klhalasa and Asluj so as to co-operate with XXth Corps by attacking Beersheba with two divisions and one mounted brigade. The objective of Desert Mounted Corps will be the enemy's defences from south-east to the north-east of Beersheba and the town of Beersheba itself. The G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will endeavour to turn the enemy's left with a view to breaking down his resistance at Beersheba as quickly as possible. With this in view the main weight of his force will be directed against Beersheba from the east and north-east. As soon as the enemy's resistance shows signs of weakening the G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will be prepared to act with the utmost vigour against his retreating troops so as to prevent their escape, or at least to drive them well beyond the high ground immediately overlooking the town from the north. He will also be prepared to push troops rapidly into Beersheba in order to protect from danger any wells and plant connected with the water supply not damaged by the enemy before Beersheba is entered. The Yeomanry Mounted Division will pass from the command of the G.O.C. XXth Corps at five on Zero day and will come directly under General Headquarters as part of the general reserve in the hands of the Commander-in- Chief. When Beersheba has been taken the G.O.C. XXth Corps will push forward covering troops to the high ground north of the town to protect it from any counter movement on the part of the enemy. He will also put in hand the restora- tion of the water supply in Beersheba. The G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will be responsible for the protection of the town from the north-east and east. As soon as possible after the taking of Beersheba the G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will report to G.H.Q. on the water supplies in the wells and wadis east of Beersheba and especially along the wadi Saba and the Beersheba-Tel-el- Nulah road. If insufi&cient water is found to exist in this area G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will send back such of his troops as may be necessary to watering places from which APPENDICES 281 he started or which may be found in the country east of the KJialasa-Beersheba road during the operations. A preUminary survey having been made, the G.O.C. XXth Corps will report by wire to G.H.Q. on the condition of the wells and water supply generally in Beersheba and on any water supplies found west and north-west of that place. He will telegraph an estimate as soon as it can be made of the time required to place the Beersheba water supply in working order. When the situation as regards water at Beersheba has become clear so that the movement of XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps against the left flank of the enemy's main position can be arranged, the G.O.C. XXIst Corps will be ordered to attack the enemy's defences south-west of Gaza in time for this operation to be carried out prior to the attack of XXth Corps on the Kauwukah line of works. The objective of XXIst Corps will be the defences of Gaza from Umbrella Hill inclusive to the sea about Sheikh Hasan. Instructions in regard to the following have been issued separate to all corps : Amount of corps artillery allotted. Amount of ammunition put on corps charge prior to opera- tions. Amount of ammunition per gun that will be delivered daily at respective railheads and the day of commencement. Amount of transport allotted for forward supply from railheads. The general average for one day's firing has been calculated on the following basis : Field and mountain guns and mountain howitzers . . .150 rounds per gun. 4* 5-inch howitzers . . . .120 rounds per gun. 60-pounders and 6-inch howitzers . 90 rounds per gun. 8-inch howitzers and 6-inch Mark VII. 60 rounds per gun. This average expenditure will only be possible in the XXIst Corps up to Z X 1 6 day and for the Desert Mounted Corps and XXth Corps to Zxl3. After these dates if the 282 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON average has been expended the daily average will have to drop to the basis of 100 rounds per 18-pounder per day and other natures in proportion. Aircraft, Army Weno. — Strategical reconnaissance in- cluding the reconnaissance of areas beyond the tactical zone and in which the enemy's main reserves are located, also distant photography and aerial offensive, will be carried out by an Army squadron under instructions issued direct from G.H.Q. Protection from hostile aircraft will be the main duty of the Army fighting squadron. A bombing squadron will be held in readiness for any aerial offensive which the situation may render desirable. Corps Squadrons. — Two Corps squadrons will under- take artillery co-operation, contact patrols, and tactical recon- naissance for the Corps to which they are attached. In the case of the Desert Mounted Corps one flight from the Corps squadron attached to XXth Corps will be responsible for the above work. Photography of trench areas will normally be carried out daily by the Army Wing. APPENDICES 283 VII ORDERS FOR THE OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO JERUSALEM 1. The Commander-in-Chief will enter Jerusalem by the Bab-el-Elhalil (Jaffa Gate) at 12 noon, 11th December 1917. The order of procession is shown below : Two Aides-de-camp. (Twenty paces.) O.C. Italian Palestine Commander -in- O.C. French Pales- Contingent (Col. Chief. tine Contingent Dagostino). (Col. Piepape). Staff Officer. Two Staff Officers. Staff Officer. (Ten paces.) M. Picot (Head of French Mission). French Mil. Brig. -Gen. Italian Mil. Att. American Att. (Capt. Clayton. (Major Caccia). Mil. Att. St. Quentin). (Col. Davis). (Five paces.) Chief of General Staff (Maj.-Gen. Su^ L. J. Bols). Brig. -General Greneral Staff (Brig. -Gen. G. Dawnay). (Five paces.) G.O.C. XXth Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Philip W. Chetwode, Bart., D.S.O. Staff Officer. Brig. -Gen. Bartholomew. (Ten paces.) British Guard. AustraHan and New Zealand Guard. French Guard. Italian Guard. 2. GuAEDS. — The following . guards will be found by XXth Corps : Outside the Gate — British Guard : Fifty of all ranks, including English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh troops. 284 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON Australian and New Zealand Guard : Fifty of all ranks, including twenty New Zealand troops. These guards will be drawn up facing each other, the right flank of the British guard and the left flank Australian guard resting on the City Wall. The O.C. British guard will be in 'com- mand of both guards and will give the words of command. Inside the Gate — French Guard : Twenty of all ranks. Itahan Guard : Twenty of all ranks. These guards will be drawn up facing each other, the left flank of the French guard and the right flank of the Italian guard resting on the City WaU. 3. Salute. — On the approach of the Commander-in- Chief, guards will come to the Salute and present arms. 4. The MiHtary Governor of the City will meet the Com- mander-in-Chief at the Gate at 12 noon. 5. Route. — The procession will proceed via Sueikat Allah and El Maukaf Streets to the steps of El Kala (Citadel), where the notables of the City under the guidance of a Staff Ofi&cer of the Governor will meet the Commander-in-Chief and the Proclamation will be read to the citizens. The British, Australian and New Zealand, French and Itahan guards will, when the procession has passed them, take their place in column of fours in the rear of the procession in that order. On arrival at El Kala the guards will form up facing steps on the opposite {i.e. east) side of El Maukaf Street, the British guard being thus on the left, Italian guard on the right of the line, and remain at the slope. The British and Italian guards will bring up their left and right flanks respectively across the street south and north of El Kala. On leaving the Citadel the procession will proceed in the same order as before to the Barrack Square, where the Com- mander-in-Chief will confer with the notables of the City. APPENDICES 285 On entering the Barrack Square the guards will wheel to the left and, keeping the left-hand man of each section of fours next the side of the Barrack Square, march round until the rear of the ItaHan guard has entered the Square, when the guards will halt, right turn (so as to face the centre of the Square), and remain at the slope. The procession will leave the City by the same route as it entered and in the same order. As the Commander-in-Chief and procession move off to leave the Barrack Square the guards will present arms, and then move off and resume their places in the procession, the British guard leading. On arrival at the Jaffa Gate the guards will take up their original positions, and on the Commander-in-Chief's de- parture will be marched away under the orders of the G.O.C. XXth Corps. 6. Police, etc. — The Military Governor of the City will arrange for policing the route of the procession and for the searching of houses on either side of the route. He will also arrange for civil officials to read the Proclamation at El Kala. 286 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON vni The Proclamation read from the steps of David's Tower on the occasion of the Commander-in-Chief's Official Entry into Jerusalem was in these terms : To the inhabitants of Jerusalem the Blessed and the people dwelling in its vicinity : The defeat inflicted upon the Turks by the troops under my command has resulted in the occupation of your City by my forces. I therefore here and now proclaim it to be under martial law, under which form of administration it will remain as long as military considerations make it necessary. However, lest any of you should be alarmed by reason of your experiences at the hands of the enemy who has retired, I hereby inform you that it is my desire that every person should pursue his lawful business without fear of interruption. Furthermore, since your City is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great rehgions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of those three religions for many centuries, therefore do I make it known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, tradi- tional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three rehgions, will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and behefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred. APPENDICES 287 IX No story of the capture of Jerusalem would be complete without the tribute paid by General Allenby to his gallant troops of all arms. The Commander- in-Chief's thanks, which were conveyed to the troops in a Special Order of the Day, were highly appreciated by all ranks. The document ran as follows : SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY G.H.Q., E.E.F., I5th December 1917. With the capture of Jerusalem another phase of the operations of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force has been victoriously concluded. The Commander-in-Chief desires to thank all ranks of all the units and services in the Force for the magnificent work which has been accompHshed. In forty days many strong Turkish positions have been captured and the Force has advanced some sixty miles on a front of thirty miles. The skill, gallantry, and determination of all ranks have led to this result. 1. The approach marches of the Desert Mounted Corps and the XXth Corps (lOth, 53rd, 60th, and 74th Divisions), followed by the dashing attacks of the 60th and 74th Divi- sions and the rapid turning movement of the Desert Mounted Corps, ending in the fine charge of the 4th AustraHan Light Horse Brigade, resulted in the capture of Beersheba with many prisoners and guns. 2. The stubborn resistance of the 53rd Division, units of the Desert Mounted Corps and Imperial Camel Brigade in the difficult country north-east of Beersheba enabled the preparations of the XXth Corps to be completed without interference, and enabled the Commander-in-Chief to carry out his plan without diverting more than the intended 288 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON number of troops to protect the right flank, despite the many and strong attacks of the enemy. 3. The attack of the XXth Corps (10th, 60th, and 74th Divisions), prepared with great skill by the Corps and Divi- sional Commanders and carried out with such dash and courage by the troops, resulted in the turning of the Turkish left flank and in an advance to the depth of nine miles through an entrenched position defended by strong forces. In this operation the Desert Mounted Corps, covering the right flank and threatening the Turkish rear, forced the Turks to begin a general retreat of their left flank. 4. The artiUery attack of the XXIst Corps and of the ships of the Royal Navy, skilfully arranged and carried out with great accuracy, caused heavy loss to the enemy in the Gaza sector of his defences. The success of this bombard- ment was due to the loyal co-operation of the Rear- Admiral S.N.O. Egypt and Red Sea, and the officers of the Royal Navy, the careful preparation of plans by the Rear- Admiral and the G.O.C. XXIst Corps, and the good shooting of the Royal Navy, and of the heavy, siege, and field artillery of the XXIst Corps. 5. The two attacks on the strong defences of Gaza, carried out by the 52nd and 54th Divisions, were each completely successful, thanks to the skill with which they were thought out and prepared by the G.O.C. XXIst Corps, the Divisional Commanders and the Brigade Commanders, and the great gallantry displayed by the troops who carried out these attacks. 6. The second attack resulted in the evacuation of Gaza by the enemy and the turning of his right flank. The 52nd and 75th Divisions at once began a pursuit which carried them in three weeks from Gaza to within a few miles of Jerusalem. 7. This pursuit, carried out by the Desert Mounted Corps and these two Divisions of the XXIst Corps, first over the sandhills of the coast, then over the Plains of Palestine and the foothills, and finally in the rocky mountains of Judea, required from all commanders rapid decisions and powers to adapt their tactics to varying conditions of ground. The APPENDICES 289 troops were called upon to carry out very long marches in great heat without water, to make attacks on stubborn rearguards without time for reconnaissance, and finally to suffer cold and privation in the mountains. In these great operations Commanders carried out their plans with boldness and determination, and the troops of all arms and services responded with a devotion and gallantry beyond praise. 8. The final operations of the XXth Corps which resulted in the surrender of Jerusalem were a fitting climax to the efforts of all ranks. The attack skiKuUy prepared by the G.O.C. XXth Corps and carried out with precision, endurance, and gallantry by the troops of the 53rd, 60th, and 74th Divisions, over country of extreme difficulty in wet weather, showed skill in leading and gallantry and determination of a very high order. 9. Throughout the operations the Royal Flying Corps have rendered valuable assistance to all arms and have obtained complete mastery of the air. The information obtained from contact and reconnaissance patrols has at all times enabled Commanders to keep in close touch with the situation. In the pursuit they have inflicted severe loss on the enemy, and their artillery co-operation has con- tributed in no small measure to our victory. 10. The organisation in rear of the fighting forces enabled these forces to be supplied throughout. All supply and ammimition services and engineer services were called upon for great exertions. The response everywhere showed great devotion and high miHtary spirit. 11. The thorough organisation of the lines of communica- tion, and the energy and skill with which all the services adapted themselves to the varying conditions of the opera- tions, ensured the constant mobility of the fighting troops. 12. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the admirable conduct of all the transport services, and particularly the endurance and loyal service of the Camel Transport Corps. 13. The skill and energy by which the Signal Service was T 290 HOW JERUSALEJM WAS WON maintained under all conditions reflects the greatest credit on all concerned. 14. The Medical Service was able to adapt itself to all the difficulties of the situation, with the result the evacuation of wounded and sick was carried out with the least possible hardship or discomfort. 15. The Veterinary Service worked well throughout ; the wastage in animals was consequently small considering the distances traversed. 16. The Ordnance Service never failed to meet all demands. 17. The work of the Egyptian Labour Corps has been of the greatest value in contributing to the rapid advance of the troops and in overcoming the difficulties of the com- munications. 18. The Commander-in-Chief desires that his thanks and appreciation of their services be conveyed to all officers and men of the force which he has the honour to command. G. Dawt^ay, B.G.G.S., for Major-General, Chief of the General Stafi, E.E.F. APPENDICES 291 X The men of units forming the XXth Corps were deeply gratified to receive this commendation from their gallant CoT-ps Commander : SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY BY Lieutenant-General Sir Philip W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., commanding XXth Corps Headquabters, XXth Corps, \Uh December 1917. Now that the efforts of General Sir E. H. H. Allenby's Aimy have been crowned by the capture of Jerusalem, I wish to express to all ranks, services, and departments of the XXth Army Corps my personal thanks and my admiration for the soldierly qualities they have displayed. I have served as a regimental officer in two campaigns, and no one knows better than I do what the shortness of food, the fatigue of operating among high mountains, and the cold and wet has meant to the fighting troops. But in spite of it all, and at the moment when the weather was at its worst, they responded to my call and drove the enemy in one rush through his last defences and beyond Jerusalem. A fine performance, and I am intensely proud of having had the honour of commanding such a body of men. I wish to give special praise to the Divisional Ammunition Columns, Divisional Trains A.S.C., Supply Services, Mechani- cal Transport personnel, Camel Transport personnel, and to the Royal Army Medical Corps and all services whose con- tinuous labour, day and night, almost without rest, alone enabled the fighting troops to do what they did. 292 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY Headquabtkrs, XXth Corps, '31 St DtoemJjer 1917. I have again to thank the XXth Corps and to express to them my admiration of their bravery and endurance during the three days' fighting on December 27, 28, and 29. The enemy made a determined attempt with two corps to retake Jerusalem, and while their finest assault troops melted away before the staunch defence of the 53rd and 60th Divisions, the 10th and 74th were pressing forward over the most precipitous country, brushing aside all op- position in order to relieve the pressure on our right. Their efforts were quickly successful, and by the evening of the 27th we had definitely regained the initiative, and I was able to order a general advance. The final result of the three days' fighting was a gain to us of many miles and extremely heavy losses to the enemy. A fine three days' work. INDEX Abu Shushe, 121. Adaeeh, 216. Ain Arik, 151. Karira, 1G2. Air Force honours, 261. Akir, 110. Allenby, General, 10. administration, 12. American Red Cross Society, 257. Arsuf, 235. Askalon, 104. Auja, River, 232. Baker, Colonel Sir Randolf, 116. Bald HUl, 243. Barrow, Major-General G. de S., 88. Bartholomew, Brigadier-General, 207. Bayley, Colonel, 189. Beersheba, Anzac march on, 61. battle of, 53. German preparations, 65. Beit Hannina, 192. Iksa, 172. Izza, 145. Jala, 175. ur el Foka, 149. ur et Tahta, 150. Beitunia, 149. Bethany, 193. Beth-horons, 149. Bethlehem, 186. Biblical battlefields, 8. Biddu, 145. Bireh, 151. Bols, Major-General, 207. Borton, Major-General, 206. Bulfin, Lieutenant-General, 18. Bulteel, Captain, 115. Burkah, 109. Butler, Brigadier-General, 134. Chauvel, Lieutenant -Greneral, 18. Chaytor, Major-General, 61. Cheape, Lieutenant-Colonel H., 91. Chetwode, Lieutenant -Greneral Sir P., 18. thanks to XXth Corps troops, 291. Clayton, Brigadier-General, 207. Colston, Brigadier-General, 109. Cox, Brigadier-Greneral, 62. Cripps, Colonel Hon. F., 113. Dammers, Captain, 116. Dawnay, Brigadier-Greneral, 207. Deir Sineid, 102. Yesin, 172. de Rothschild, Major, 117. Desert railways, 35. pipeline, 38. Dukku, 145. Ektelf, 252. El Jib, 145. El Kala, 207. Enver, 199. Farah, wadi, 249. Force Order, General Allenby 's thanks tc troops, 287. Ful, Tel el, 192. Gaza, plan of attack on, 47. Ali Muntar, 72. defences, 69. El Arish redoubt, 77. ■ Great Mosque, 68. • naval gunnery, 79. ■ Outpost Hill, 75. Sea Post, 78. 293 294 HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON Gaza. Sheikh Hasan, 78. Umbrella Hill, 77. German Hospice, 143. Gilgal, 248. Girdwood, Major-General, 59. Godwin, Brigadier-General, 112. Good Samaritan Inn, 246. Grant, Brigadier-General, 64. Hadrah, 157. Hanafish, action on wadi, 54. Hebron, 187. Hill 1070, 58. Hill, Major-General J., 141. Hodgson, Major-General, 62. Hong Kong and Singapore battery, 148. Huj, 91. Ibn Obeid, 222. Imperial Service cavalry, 100. Jackson, Admiral T., 244. Jaffa, 236. Gate, 198. Jebel Kuruntul, 248. Jelil, 238. Jericho, 247. Jerisheh, 240. Jerusalem, battle of, 175. civil administration, 258. Memorial to Army, 9. — — Official Entry, 195. order of procession, 283. Proclamation to people, 286. water supply, 254. Jordan, 245. Jezar, 123. Junction Station, 119. Katrah, 110. Kuntara, 34. Kauwukah, 84. Khurbet Subr, 172. Khuweilfeh, 82. Kressenstein, von, 64. Kulonieh, 172. Kuryet el Enab, 138. Kustul, 141. Latron, 129. Laweon, Captain, 116. Lifta, 158. Longley, Major-General, 218. Ludd, 126. M'Call, Brigadier-General PoUak, 110. Maclean, Brigadier- General, 142. Mejdel, 104. Meldrum, Brigadier-General, 62. Mott, Major-General, 186. Mount of Olives, 192. Mughar, 112. Mukhmas, 248. Mulebbis, 236. Nablus road, 212. Nebi Musa, 249. Nebi Samwil, 141. Nejile, 90. O'Brien, Colonel, 119. Palestine Army, composition of, 275. Palin, Major-General, 99. Patron, Captain, 113. Pemberton, Colonel, 188. Perkins, Lieutenant, 113. Primrose, Captain Hon. Neil, 115. Ramaxlah, 151. Ramleh, 126. Raratongas, 37. Ras et Tawil, 218. Rushdi trenches, 84. Ryrie, Brigadier-General, 61. Saba, Tel el, 62. Sakaty, Tel el, 62. Saris, 137. Sarona, 239. Shea, Major-General H., 59. Sheikh Muannis, 157. Sheria, 84. Sherifeh, 187. Shilta, 154. Smith, Rifleman, 180. Soba, 174. Solomon's Pools, 175. Strategy in Palestine, 6. the German view, 271. INDEX 295 Suffa. 154. Supplying the front, 36. Surar, wadi, 173. Sukereir, wadi, 127. Talat ED DUMM, 246. Temperley, 93. Thornhill, Corporal, 180. Train, Corporal, V.C, 180. Turkish line of communications, 15. moral, 273. Watson, Brigadier-General, 178. Whines, Corporal, 180. Whitehill, 215. Wingfiold-Digby, Captain, 116. Wire roads, 40. Yebnah, 110. Yilderim undertaking. 13. von Falkeniiayn's doubts, 269. Zamby, 215. Zeitun ridge, 149. / Printed by T. and A. Constablk, Printers to His .Viajeaty at tlie Edinburgh Univeraity Prc^s \ DUE DATE APn ^v'ii 2 i mz MAYI 8 1992 t» •.^. L ivvU Printed in USA COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY |iiii|iiii"iiiii'in'im>'iii 111 I 0026768330 ( 3 A-o ."3 \ \^^'?,"3kS in»m