JED Hf FORTN1QHTLT NUMBERS. m PENNY : HISTORYo^WAR iERMANY THE AGGRESSOR By ARTHUR J. IRELAND (Author of "Daring Deed* in Peace an! War," " Vanguarduuea," etc.) WITH DOUBLE-PAGE MAP. ONE PENNY. ublished by " Geogrnphla " Ltd., 55, Fleet St., I .C ■ V A powerfully-written History of the World War for One Penny.— Marvellous ! ! 1— Yet here it is— written by a well-known writer— printed in good, clear type on a paper of excellent quality, illustrated with first-class maps ; and all beauti- fully produced in a style hardly equalled by many considerably higher priced publications. Although a literary production in the full sense of the word, there is no wrestling with a dictionary about this History ; it is carefully written in good, plain language for the Nation- Man, Woman, and Child; in fact, a Standard Work on the War for One Penny. How can it be done ? You may well ask ! ! ! One thing is certain, there can be no margin for advertising expenses ; but we know that when you have read and appreciated this number, you will ask for the next ; all we request is that you earn the gratitude of your friends by drawing their attention to this wonderful series; and thereby assist in the deserved success of this History of the War on its own merits. This History will appear in fortnightly num- bers, and, as before stated, the value given in these books precludes advertisements and an- nouncements of issues, so please make a point of giving an order to vour Newsagent, Book- stall, Bookseller, or Stationer, to deliver each number of the Penny History of the War, as it is published ; and thus make certain of ob- taining a complete set of the best of all Wa Histories. EfVENTS WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THE WAR IN EUROPE. FOREWORD. M any years must elapse before the final hi story of the World War of 1914 can be wiitten — if ever such a stupendous task is achieved. State documents, at present ie. ilously locked away from prying eyes, must be calmly and dispassionately examined and analysed by strictly historical methods; an'd they must be judged according to their reed value, before anything approaching a con- sidered verdict can be pronounced. And, not less important — perhaps more enlightening — 'he diaries, memoirs, and secret communica- { .ons in the possession of the chief actors in tie terrible drama must also be available, so t iat the directions of the political under- 1 urrents may be traced, and an opinion of nheir influence upon the course of events prmed. Naturally, it will be a long time iefore all this essential evidence can be .(roduced ; a generation, or two — or even a rentury — may very easily come and go be- Ipre it is all given to the world. And, indeed, gigantic will be the task of weighing, con- idering, and deciding all the aspects of the ase with absolute impartiality, that the final ■erdict of the world may be indefinitely )ostponed ; for already it is quite clear that, GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. from the tangle of conflicting evidence, the absolute truth is well-nigh inextricable. That this should be so is, of course, by no means surprising. Historical events of far less importance, as regards both their effects and their dimensions, are still the subject of heated discussion, although cen- turies have elapsed since many of them took place ; and, indeed, the wonder will be if ever a definite conclusion is arrived at con- regards the rights and wrongs— of the great world war of 1914. However, this is a matter which the future must decide for itself, and the difficult task may very well be left to posterity. Sooner or later, probably within a few years of the conclusion of the war. the official histories which will be issued by the nations concerned will be given to th e world ; and although each will, no doub t, present the case from a special point of vie\^, they will be valuable evidence — evidenc e which will help the peoples of the world t o form a just opinion, and to assign the blan .e and the praise where they are due. 1 Meanwhile, all that the contemporary chronicler can do is, to set forth what is already known, and to record the evenfs about which it is possible to express opiniorL — even though they are based, as the] • must be, only upon what has taken place Finality is impossible — impartiality is dim cult — but the contemporary historian musi cerning the causes, the 2 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. e:deavour to see things in their true per- fective, to keep an unbiased mind, and to cirb his own prejudices, in order that his \v>rk may possess a little more value and be a little more permanent than the day-to-day records of events which appear in the news- papers and reviews. Such, at least, is the spirit in which this very brief account of the causes and events wluch led to the outbreak of the world war has been undertaken ; and the degree of its success will depend upon the extent to which national feelings and prejudices can be sub- dued, in order that something remotely ap- proaching historical aloofness and detachment inay be attained. CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT. I. Event succeeded to event with such be- vvildering rapidity during the last half of July, 1914, that it was very difficult to follow them intelligently, or to assign to each its proper degree of importance as a contributing factor elf the world conflict, which was begun by tjhe Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, po many and so complex were the interests at stake, that, even when the facts available were known, it was almost impossible to disentangle the truth from the hopelessly involved skein of conflicting statements, claims and rumours. One thing only was clear — 3 i GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. namely, that the attitude of Germany in luhr negotiations with Russia, France, and England was so uncompromising, not to say provo- cative, that the efforts to maintain the peacpe which were made by all the other countries were from the very outset doomed to failurje. In fact, they were doomed almost before they were begun ; and negotiation is hardly the word to be applied to the one-sided en- deavours which were made by the Powers of the Triple Entente to avert the horrors of war. ' J If there was evidence available which showed that Germany— or, at least, her ) rulers— desired to arrive at a pacific solution!' of the difficulties which had arisen, it certainly' was not produced. And failing the production of such irrefutable evidence, the responsibility for having precipitated, if not of having actually brought about, the greatest anal most hideous war the world has ever wit- nessed, rested — and still rests — upon the: shoulders of Germany alone. By departing; from all pre-conceived notions of diplomatic : procedure, France, Russia and England proved to the world that they had made every effort tc preserve peace — and that they did not desist until the futility of their endeavours was\ finally shown by Germany's unwarrantable I aggression. The official correspondence which), passed between the responsible members of. the Governments of each of these countries j and the German officials was published to 4 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. the world with admirable promptitude-and be it added, at a price which enabled everv- ♦i? V n , aI1 the countries to buy and read the official account of the proceedings Every body was, therefore, in a position to form an independent and considered opinion of the motives and methods of the Powers of the Triple Entente, almost directly the war broke out ; and their action was vindicated by the almost unanimous verdict of the peoples of the world. Germany alone failed to justify herself. She did not remain silent it is true; but the campaign of lies' she conducted through her official press bureau— lies which were disseminated, for the most part, by wireless telegraphy- failed ignominiously. Nobody was con- vinced of Germany's innocence ; for if she possessed any, she withheld the only evi- dence that could be regarded as conclusive —the correspondence which had actually passed between her representatives and the representatives of the other countries con- cerned, showing that she desired and strove to maintain the peace. All the other countries engaged in the war havmg taken this course— and cleared them- selves—the German statesmen should, if they could, have adopted the same policy. But Germany did not refute even a single word that was published by England, France, or Russia— she contented herself by circu- lating statements which were obviously un- GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. true— and so it was not strange that the world held her responsible for what took place during those momentous days, as well as for the unparalleled horrors which were per- petuated during the early stages of the war. All these statements can be substantiated beyond a shadow of doubt by consulting the official publications referred to— and as they are historical documents of first-class import- ance and absolute reliability, they should be consulted in their full and original form by everybody who desires to come to an im- partial and sound conclusion, as regards the causes of the war. Their outstanding value is due to the fact that they are in the form of letters, telegrams, reports, and despatches, that were written while the events with which they deal were actually taking place — not in the form of documents, which can be manufac- tured after the thing has happened, and made to fit and support any arguments or excuses which it may be deemed advisable to advance. Such a course as this is not without precedent — it may happen again. But if it should be attempted, in the hope of explaining away the truth, the effort would be futile — as far as the events which led to the outbreak of hostilities in July, 1914, are concerned. Germany was given her opportunity. She could have explained her position satis- factorily — certainly she would have done so if she had been able to disprove any of the accusations which were made against her by 6 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. her enemies. Instead of doing so, however, she preferred to resort to the fabrication of lies, to the production of the most pitiful outbursts of world hatred — and to a campaign of " f rightfulness " which was without a parallel in the history of the world. So, the only logical conclusion to be drawn now is, that Germany wanted war , but whether she would have precipitated the conflict, had she been able to foresee the formidable com- bination of powers by whom she would be opposed, is quite another question. As it seemed to the German statesmen, the moment was cleverly chosen, but the improbable happened — the duty of facing a common danger rose superior to internal petty differences, and Germany's plans were up- set. England, France, and Russia had serious internal troubles occupying their attention at the time, but they dis- appeared in the hour of national danger ; and Germany — with her sleeping partner, Austria — found herself confronted by the Powers of a determined and united Triple Entente, which was speedily solidified into a solemn Alliance. This is not the place in which the old, outstanding, deep-rooted differences between Germany and Austria, on the one hand, and England, France, and Russia, on the other hand, can be examined in detail. They will be fully dealt with in due course, when their influence upon the various stages of 7 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. the great conflict will be shown; here it is only possible to review very briefly the prin- cipal events which immediately preceded the war. But even this very cursory summary of the events which took place between the assassination of the Archduke Francis Fer- dinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohen- berg, at Serajevo, on Sunday, the 28th of June, 1914, and the outbreak of the general European war during the last days of July and the first days of August, will suffice to show that Germany, if not the instigator of hostilities, was the only obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the original dispute. For the sake of clearness, the course of events must be traced independently, in so far as they do not overlap. And for this reason, while they are nearly inter-dependent, they can be most easily understood when dealt with separately, as distinct aspects of the crisis. II. In order of date, the first of the string of events which led to the outbreak of the great European war — a conflict which affects every part of the world — occurred on Sunday, the 28th of June, 1914 ; for it was on that day that a young Bosnian student, named Prinzip, shot at, and killed, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Heir-Apparent to the Austro- Hungarian throne, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, in the streets of Serajevo, the 8 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR capital of Bosnia. Comment upon this crime is unnecessary. It was a dastardly outrage and its perpetrator should have been suitably punished ; but the fact that it should have been made the excuse for creating an inter- national situation of such gravity that war was the only solution is, in the light of subse- quent events, most significant. Widespread indignation was aroused by the assassination, even beyond the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary Everywhere deep sympathy was felt with the aged Emperor Francis Joseph, the closing years of whose long reign and life were thus saddened by still another domestic tragedy • but very few people, even among those in diplomatic circles, dreamt that the fatal shot fired by a young fanatic in the streets of Serajevo was destined to echo through the world. Still fewer could have imagined that it would take its place amongst the fateful trivialities which have determined the des- tinies of empires and peoples. These reserva- tions are, however, necessary— how necessary will be seen when the story of that eventful day is told in the detail which is essential owing to the supposed influence of the crime upon the course of events— for it is absolutely certain that the assassination, if not actually part of a devilish plot, fitted in very well with the schemes of a powerful political party in Austria, by whom the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was regarded as an in- 9 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. surmountable obstacle. However, for the moment, only the actual sequence of events can be referred to in the briefest possible manner. . As often happens, a tiny stray spark is responsible for a mighty conflagration. Thou- sands of burning brands and matches may fall— even amongst inflammable material— and smoulder out harmlessly ; but the fatal stray spark, falling at the psychological moment, will set the fire going furiously— often more effectually than a carefully planned effort. And all the efforts which may then be made to extinguish it will prove to be in vain, when once it has been properly started. So it was in the case of the Serajevo murder. Whether the crime was part of a pre- arranged plan or not the result was the same. Carefully fanned by political intriguers in Austria-Hungary, for the furtherance of their own ends, the flames leapt up, consuming everything before them, until, finally, the fire got beyond all control. Outside the Austro- Hungarian Empire the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg was quickly forgotten— at least, it ceased to occupy the attention of the public, whose minds turn rapidly and capriciously from subject to subject. But within the Dual Monarchy political use was being made of the tragedy. It was stated, apparently without any justification, that the murder 10 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. was the outcome of a plot which had been hatched, as part of a great Serbian campaign for the advance of the Pan-Slavonic ideal, by the politicians of Belgrade ; and the Austro-Hungarian Government openly charged the Serbian Government with being the instigators of the movement, with the idea of making a direct attempt to undermine Austrian influence in the recently acquired provinces of Bosnia and Herzgovina. The justice of the charge was never estab- lished, although a number of instances were cited in support of the statements which were made. Indeed, it is more than likely that Austrian jealousy of Serbia's growing power and importance was the real explanation of the bitterness which was felt in Vienna. But the truth or justice of the accusation was a trifling consideration with the men who were responsible for the situation which was created. Many things combined to make Austria-Hungary irritable ; and when irrita- bility is the normal condition of the temper of a nation, anything may happen —and it may happen very quickly. So it was in this case — and when the people of other countries had almost forgotten about the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, the world awoke to find that a grave international complica- tion had arisen, for the existence of which the crime was being made the pretext. The Serbian Government denied all know- ledge of the plot of which the Serajevo murder ii GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR was said to be a manifestation ; but every satisfaction that could justly be demanded was offered to the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment. What are diplomatically known as " conversations " ensued between Belgrade and Vienna ; but very soon it became evident that Austria wanted war, and intended to make her conditions of peace so severe that no sovereign state which desired to maintain its independence could accept them. Finally, after a series of communications, which reflect little credit upon anybody con- cerned, had passed between Vienna and Belgrade, the Austrian Government presented an ultimatum on Thursday, the 23rd of July. The terms imposed were all severe — as a whole, they were unacceptable — and a very short time was allowed for the reply. It was clearly stated that an unconditional acceptance of the terms set forth in the ultimatum, which really amounted to a tacit admission of Austria-Hungary's suzerainty, must be delivered within forty-eight hours ; and that failure to comply with this request would entail war. The arrival of the Austrian note stirred up the war spirit throughout Serbia. The people clamoured for a declaration of war. But, acting under Russian advice, the Belgrade Government returned a reply accepting all the conditions except two — which, it was suggested, should be referred to the Hague Tribunal— by the appointed time, six o'clock 12 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. in the evening of Saturday, the 25th of July. Evidently, the Austro-Hungarian minister in Belgrade had been prepared for this situation; for he at once replied that, as the unconditional acceptance was not forthcoming, he must ask for his passports. Indeed, in the light of subsequent events, the indecent haste shown by the Vienna Government on this occasion is most signi- ficant. It is more than suspected that the terms of the Austrian note to Serbia had been secretly approved by Berlin — it has even been suggested that the ultimatum was pro- duced in collaboration ; and there has not been any denial of the charge — but whatever else had been done in anticipation of a Serbian rejection of terms laid down, drastic measures had evidently been decided upon by Austria-Hungary. Nothing that can be said will disprove this assertion ; and, as a matter of fact, Austria's attitude towards Serbia was an open diplomatic secret. And her subsequent attempt to temporise, when the fearful consequences of her policy became evident, was only inspired by a feeling of anxiety, which even the pressure from Berlin could not quite counteract — nor did the fair promises of German support altogether allay Austria's fears. Unfortunately for the peace of Europe, this awakening came too late ; and although Serbia cannot be held altogether guiltless, the real responsibility for having precipitated 13 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. the conflict rests upon the shoulders of Austria — even though, in fact, she was acting under German compulsion. By accepting all the terms contained in the Austrian note, Serbia would, as already stated, have virtually sold her freedom in order to secure temporary peace ; and this would have been a course which would have been both undignified and undesirable. In fact, when Serbia agreed to accept all the conditions except two, she made the greatest concession that could be expected of her ; and Austria's refusal to accept the proposal that the two disputed demands should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal showed the weakness of her case. More than this, the Austro-Hungarian attitude through- out was frankly provocative. And the eagerness with which Serbia's failure to present an unconditional acceptance of impossible terms was made an excuse for the breaking of diplomatic relations leaves no room to doubt that the statesmen in Vienna had already decided upon the course they intended to follow. The uncompromising attitude of the Austro- Hungarian minister in Belgrade showed how clearly his instructions had been given. Apparently, he was not allowed even to exercise his discretion ; for any man in his senses, unless the contingency had already been discussed and settled, would have asked for further instructions from his Government before leaving his post after receiving the 14 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR Serbian reply. Instead of doing so, however, his anxiety to get away — to shake the dust of Belgrade off his shoes — was so great that an urgent request for his passports was pre- sented directly he became aware of the nature of the Serbian reply ; and half-an-hour later he was in the train, on his way to Vienna. Actually, the time-limit ordained by Aus- tria-Hungary expired at six o'clock ; and by that hour the Serbian reply was in the hands of the Austro-Hungarian minister in Belgrade. Hardly had the document reached the Austro- Hungarian Legation, when the formal demand for the passports was presented to the Serbian Foreign Ministry ; but, apparently, on both sides what followed had been foreseen. The passports were at once handed over, in compliance with this request ; and the same evening the Austro-Hungarian minister and the Legation staff left Belgrade. To be precise, the Serbian answer was presented at six o'clock, and the Austro-Hungarian minis- ter and his staff left Belgrade by the half- past six o'clock train. It looks very much as though, bags and baggage, they had been ready to start even when the Serbian reply was presented. And yet, while these events were taking place — while the appeal to arms was being made inevitable by a provocative policy — the re- presentatives of the other nations, fully realising the gravity of the situation, were striving to prevent the crossing of the rubicon. 15 GERMANY and her COLONIES I ! BEFORE THE WAR COLONIES RULED THUS '////////. | ■ : • : rv- Wast o f Greenwich Cart of Greenwich 3Q 6q "" ""*' " ' if COPYRIGHT I GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. On this same day, Saturday, the 25th of July, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna made a formal request for an extension of the time- limit which had been set ; and Sir Edward Grey suggested that the representatives of the Great Powers should offer their services as mediators. So, even at this late hour in the proceedings, it seemed possible that peace might be preserved ; and the stupendous efforts which were made to avert a conflict which, under ordinary conditions, would not have involved any countries except Austria-Hungary and Serbia, only show that more was known in diplomatic circles, as regards the gravity of the situation, than was generally suspected at the time by the peoples of the countries concerned. What that " something " was may be deduced from the hostile attitude which had been taken up by Germany from the very outset ; and it is probable that but for this opposition from Germany, the peace could, and would, have been kept. As it was, Austria-Hungary, whatever her reasons may have been, refused to prolong the time-limit. She also declined all offers of intervention from the representatives of the Powers. And on Tuesday, the 28th of July, the Vienna Government issued a formal declaration of war against Serbia, to take effect from the moment the note was received in Belgrade. IS GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR III. While the momentous '■ conversations " were taking place between the Austro-Hun- ganan and Serbian Governments, portentous events were happening in other parts of Europe; and it soon became evident that an acute international crisis, of the first magnitude, and of the utmost gravity in- volving the destinies of at least four great nations, was developing with alarming rapidity Exactly what took place during these critical days cannot at present be stated with absolute certainty, although the official publications to which reference has already been made throw a great deal of light upon the situation, and enable the reader to form a correct idea of the general course of events. Obviously diplomatic considerations will not allow the publication of everything that was known to the members of the innermost governmental circles even at this time ; for, undoubtedly, in the Chancelleries of Europe there must have been secret information received which it has not been deemed expedient to publish to the world. But whatever else remains obscure it is quite clear that the attitude adopted by Germany constituted the only obstacle to a clear understanding between the nations which were still actively engaged even when Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, in trying to avert the impending disaster of a big European war. Had this understanding been arrived at, the war area 19 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. would most probably have been limited ; and certainly the terrible conflagration which began to devastate Europe during the early days of August would not have taken place. It is, indeed, a plain statement of fact that Germany's attitude was not only un- approachable, but actively provocative. And the indecent haste with which she forced matters to a climax leaves little room for any conclusion, save that she wanted war. Therefore, the responsibility for the war must remain upon her shoulders until— as already stated— she establishes the assertions she has made, as regards her intentions and desires, by the production, of conclusive proof that she honestly strove to maintain peace. Even if the situation be judged by the strict letter of the English legal maxim— that the accused must be regarded as being inno- cent until his guilt has been proved— Germany cannot claim acquittal. The correspondence of her representatives, published in the official reports issued by the nations which are at war with her, would secure her conviction, if allowed to remain unrefuted. No refutation has been forthcoming ; and so, as Germany's guilt has been established by her failure to bring forward rebutting evidence, it only remains to show, in some detail, how she so effectually prevented a peaceful settlement of the grave questions at issue. Her reasons for acting in this way must be separately, and very fully, examined. She 20 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. evidently thought that a propitious moment had arrived for striking the blow which was to establish as a world power ; and many of the happenings which immediately preceded the outbreak of hostilities will supply a clue to some of the arguments upon which she acted. Meanwhile, it is necessary to follow the course of events in Europe, and to explain the part which was played by each of the nations concerned in the drama which was being unfolded. At a very early stage of the Austro-Serbian dispute Russia frankly declared her policy, should war break out, in terms which left no room for doubt or speculation. She would not, and could not, stand by inactive while Serbia was being ruthlessly crushed by a powerful adversary ; and she told Austria- Hungary this in plain, straightforward lan- guage. In adopting this attitude, Russia was quite justified — and, what is somewhat rarer in international politics, she was acting quite consistently with her declared position, as the champion of the little Slavonic peoples. But for some reason or other, the Vienna Government paid no heed to this declaration of policy ; perhaps the promise of armed support from Germany made Austria-Hungary feel that the Russian threat might safely be set at nought. Be that as it may, the Russian warning was ignored, and war was declared against Serbia ; and it says much for her patience, and for her desire to keep the peace, 21 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. that, even on the eve of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war, Russia proposed direct conversations between Petrograd and Vienna, with a view to finding some way of settling the dispute upon terms acceptable to both. Austria-Hungary's reply to this proposal was a flat refusal to negotiate about the terms of the Serbian answer ; and this refusal was almost instantly followed by the declaration of war against Serbia. The Russian Govern- ment boldly asserted — and based the asser- tion upon what appear to be adequate grounds — that Austria-Hungary's uncom- promising reply was due to the evil influence of Germany. This statement, needless to say, was denied, but it was not refuted by evidence; and subsequent events only too clearly show that the Berlin Government did not in any way attempt to arrest the impending disaster. On the contrary, Germany fanned the smoul- dering embers into a flame, while pretending that she was endeavouring not to become involved in a matter which did not concern her ; and only when it was quite evident that the fire had obtained such a hold that it could not be extinguished, did she make any open move. But it is beyond all doubt that, while pretending to keep sternly aloof from a discussion in which she did not wish it to be thought that she had any interest, all the time she had been playing the part of the evil genius behind the scenes ; and when, at length, she spoke, it was to 22 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. declare her intention of arming, in order to prevent the aggression of which, she declared, it was evident that she was to be the innocent object. Until there was no longer any hope of averting the rupture between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Russia took no active steps. In fact, it was not until Wednesday, the 29th of July — the day after the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia was pub- lished — that mobilisation of the Russian army in the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan was ordered. And this step was taken merely as a necessary pre- caution, to enable Russia to discharge her obligation to Serbia should the need arise. Even at this serious juncture, the war area could — and would — have been limited, had not Germany made the maintenance of peace impossible, by her indefensible attitude to- wards Russia. It was an attitude which Russia could not tolerate ; and she could not have ignored the significance of the prepara- tions which were at once made in Germany, without losing her position as a great and independent Power, and without sacrificing her self-respect. When Russia ordered the partial mobilisa- tion of her army as warning to Austria- Hungary, on the 29th of July, the international situation was, admittedly, very grave. But even still there was a possibility of arresting a general conflagration in Europe ; and even 23 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. had matters gone to the extreme length of a declaration of hostilities between these two countries, the war area could have been strictly limited. If Germany had remained neutral, undoubtedly France would also have re- mained neutral ; and, certainly, England would not have become involved in the struggle. Moreover, it must be clearly borne in mind that mobilisation— even a general mobilisation does not necessarily mean that war will follow ; it is a grave step to take, but it is one which may be taken as a precautionary— and even as a pacifying— measure. However, when international affairs have become so acute that mobilisation is con- sidered necessary, the diplomatists of all nations must tread cautiously. One false move may precipitate matters, and bring about the horrors of a war— even a war on the scale of the outbreak which was impending during these critical days, when from hour to hour nobody knew what would happen. So, it will be seen that the weight of the responsibility which rests upon the shoulders of statesmen and diplomatists at such a time is very great ; for everybody realised that a war m Europe would be a most disastrous thing. And it may truthfully be asserted that nobody would have left anything undone which might have helped to make a pacific settlement possible— nobody, that is to say except the intriguers in' Berlin. The fatal false move was made by Germany; an d 24 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. stupid as the German statesmen have shown themselves to be, it is impossible to believe that they acted in good faith, and without realising what their attitude would entail. Absolute proof of Germany's re- sponsibility in this matter is available ; for it is known that two days after the Russian mobilisation had been ordered, the Petrograd and Vienna Governments were willing to enter into conversations, which might — and very probably would — have arrested the great European war altogether. At least, for a time, it would have been postponed ; for there can be very little doubt that Germany intended, sooner or later, to demonstrate that her great army was really invincible, and that her new toy — the navy — was more than a showy and costly plaything. IV. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the significance of Austria-Hungary's change of attitude ; and it is quite a justifiable con- clusion to draw that it augured well for the preservation of peace. Whatever the ex- planation of the change, the fact remained that diplomatic means had not been quite exhausted ; and the concession made by the Vienna Government was most encouraging, and gave rise to hopes of a peaceful settlement of the dispute. In short, to have brought about the re-opening of diplomatic " con- versations " between Russia and Austria- ^5 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. Hungary was a triumph ; and no small share of the credit for the achievement must be given to Sir Edward Grey, whose policy throughout was as masterly as his attitude was irreproachable. But the hopes of a pacific solution of the questions at issue were of short duration ; and they were shattered by Germany's insane action. The improved relations between the Petrograd and Vienna Governments, from which so much was hoped, were restored on Friday, the 31st of July ; and what followed was extremely significant — not to say damning evidence against Germany. At the very least, in the light of what has since happened, it is a curious coincidence that when the chance of peace once more appeared Germany should have suddenly awakened to the danger of her position. However, the facts must speak for them- selves. While there was every reason to hope that a war in which the Powers of Europe would be involved could be averted, Germany re- mained inactive, if not actually obstructive. Then when the chances of maintaining the peace seemed to have disappeared, she as- sumed the pose of the peacemaker ; and not until the untiring efforts of genuine peace- makers had almost succeeded, did she change her attitude once more. On that very day, however, Friday, the 31st of July, Germany hurled her defiant demands at the heads of the Russian and French 26 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. Governments ; and they were so framed that only one answer could be expected. And so, by one fell deed, was the possibility of peace dissipated. It looks very much as though the Berlin statesmen were afraid to risk the chance that peace would be pre- served, and that for this reason they decided to make war inevitable. Either this is the explanation ; or else the men who were re- sponsible for the conduct of the negotiations must have been criminal lunatics. The course of the negotiations, as they were conducted by each of the countries involved, will have to be further traced in greater detail. Here it is only necessary to state very briefly how the conflict was pre- cipitated by the unwarrantable assumption on the part of Germany that she was being menaced by the Russian partial mobilisation ; and rapidly though the survey of the events may be given, it will not convey any idea of the indecent haste which marked the German efforts to eliminate all possibility of a pacific settlement. As already stated, the partial Russian mobilisation was ordered as a warning to Austria-Hungary, on the 29th of July ; and on the same day the Tsar telegraphed to the Kaiser, and the Kaiser replied. The Tsar's message was a transparently candid state- ment of the position, and contained an appeal for German mediation in Vienna ; but the Kaiser's reply was, like so many of the German 27 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. statements which have since been issued, fair-sounding but crooked. Almost the same may be said about the other communications which passed between Petrograd and Berlin — about those which were sent from minister to minister, as well as about those which the two Emperors exchanged — for the German unwillingness to conciliate, or to keep the door of the Temple of Peace open, was apparent throughout the correspondence. Finally, on Friday, the 31st of July, Ger- many despatched a haughty ultimatum to Russia, demanding complete and instant de- mobilisation. A so-called time of grace of twelve hours was allowed for compliance ; but had twelve minutes or twelve days been the time stated, the result would have been the same. Russia would not accede to a demand couched in such terms ; and her irri- tation must have been further increased by the fact that, at this very time, Vienna was willing to resume conversations concerning the Serbian trouble. It is a most significant fact, as further testi- mony to Germany's attitude, that the ultima- tum to Russia did not leave Berlin in solitary state ; for a note, amounting in effect to an ultimatum, was despatched to France at the same time. France was asked to define the attitude she would adopt in case of an out- break of war between Germany and Russia, and an instant reply was demanded. East and west they flew along the wires 28 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. each of them practically a declaration of war ; and so insanely anxious was Germany to strike the first blow in each direction— blows which were intended to be paralysing— that she could not wait until the usual formalities which regulate civilised warfare had been performed before beginning hostilities. Never in the history of the world has a civilised country shown such an uncontrollable desire to be at the throat of her enemy. But then it must be remembered, that never until modern Germany arose, had any nation claimed the possession of such high, broad, and deep culture— culture about which she continually boasted as though she alone enjoyed a world-wide monopoly of the attri- bute. Even German insolence and arrogance could hardly go further than they did during these eventful days, every hour of which was fraught with dreadful developments. Neither France nor Russia could send any reply, save one, to the bullying notes they received ; and from both her eastern and western 'neighbours Germany received the expected and desired answers. Russia not only declined to demobilise, but immediately ordered a general mobilisation of all her huge army ; France replied, through her Ambassador in Berlin, that she would take whatever steps were considered necessary to safeguard her interests. Confronted by powerful foes on the east and on the west— foes by whom she was 29 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. entirely hemmed in by land — Germany ordered a general mobilisation of her gigantic and highly trained army. And such was the reputa- tion of this army as a great fighting machine, that its mobilisation caused world-wide con- sternation. Indeed, it is not too much to say, that many people imagined that such a war- like demonstration alone would suffice to bring France and Russia to their senses. Perhaps the Germans thought so, also ; for if the people of other countries believed in the efficiency of the Geiman army, the Germans themselves were convinced of its invincibility. But far from producing panic in France or Russia, the warlike preparations of Germany called forth an ominous outburst of patriotism in both countries ; and Germany found herself face to face with a task of such appalling magnitude, that she might well have paused to reconsider her position — before it was too late. Modern Germany, it is true, had been built up by the sword ; but the Kaiser, at any rate, realised the truth of the world-old maxim, that those who live by the sword frequently die by the sword, and he cannot have failed to apply this profound truth to himself and to his country. Germany pos- sessed what was generally regarded as the most perfect war machine the world had ever seen ; but even this terrific, national force was no guarantee of security. Against any Power which becomes a menace to the peace of the 30 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. world a formidable combination of peoples is certain to arise sooner or later ; for a tyrant cannot be allowed to exist. Individually, the nations composing the self-defending Alliance may be very much weaker in military strength ; but when united by the bond of a common danger, they become invincible. So it has always been in the past, so it is at the present time, and so it will be for ever in the future — the natural law of existence demands that the weak should combine against the strong who become aggressive and oppressive. And it is an immutable law, that the end of the disturber of the peace and prosperity of the nations of the earth must, inevitably, be destruction. The final declaration of war against Russia was made by Germany on Saturday, the ist of August, and hostilities began at noon. And although the final declaration of war against France was not delivered until the next day, overt acts of aggression, and the violation of the French frontiers by German troops took place on Sunday, the 2nd of August. Thus did Germany declare war on both her immediate neighbours ; and it is a statement of plain fact, that she deliberately set herself to bring about the conflict because she was under the erroneous impression that neither France nor Russia was ready to meet the emergency. How completely mistaken this idea was, events soon showed ; and that the abstention of Great Britain could be 31 GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. reckoned upon, owing to the serious internal problem which the Irish situation had created, was another of the miscalculations which, at the very outset, seriously upset the German plan of campaign. On the very day on which war was declared against France, Monday, the 3rd of August, Germany presented an insolent ultimatum to Belgium, in which the unmolested passage of the German troops through Belgian terri- tory was demanded as the price of peace. The terms of the Belgian reply were what might have been expected. Belgium stated that she would defend her neutrality to the utmost of her ability, and by armed resistance; and how well she kept her word, the stirring events of the succeeding days showed. But this act of unwarrantable aggression — this miserable treachery and breach of contract — this contemptible attempt to make war on a small country in the erroneous belief that its people were weak and defenceless — had the effect of producing still another unexpected result. Great Britain's internal squabbles were instantly stilled by the clarion call of duty — and the British Empire arose in its might to resist the oppressors and to punish the traitor. And never was a campaign under- taken from purer or more exalted motives — never was a war waged in a more just cause. 3« The Penny History of the War starts from the time when the first filmy war clouds gathered on the horizon, and will continue until the last shot has been fired and Peace declared. It is important that a copy of each one of these series should be bought and collected in order to ensure a complete, clear, and unvarnished History of the War at a surprising cost of id. per copy. The following are the titles of the first four instalments : — No. i. Germany the Aggressor, No. 2. Why We went to War. No. 3. Secrets of the Kaiser's Reign. No. 4- Millions in Arms. Order these immediately from your Newsagent, Bookstall, Bookseller, or Stationer, to save dis- appointment, and at the same time place a standing order for all subsequent numbers. not omit to save this Copy. It Is Talnablc. by " 0«0|r»phi»," Ltd . 86. Fle«t BtrMt. London, I.e. ' GeograpMa f Two Miles to One Inch Map of ENGLAND and WALES. Published in 18 Sheets, each Sheet SOi-io. * 40*ia. in Sixe. BY ALEXANDER GROSS. F.R.O.S. K2 INDEX MAP OF ENGLAND & WALES i "Geographia" Two Miles to One Inch Maps havs the following great advantages over other Maps: — 1. They are absolutely up-to-d