MASTER NEGATIVE NO. 93-81184- MICROFILMED 1993 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library I COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or other reproduction is not to be *'used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.'* If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. A UTHOR: JAMESON, GEORGE TITLE: CAUSALITY, OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW PLACE: LONDON DA TE: 1872 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT Master Negative # BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROrORM TARCFT Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record J< amies on.i?air._Gcorc?e £ ^ tqate'ci. aasaucy^- or, Tlil pkU H'^/i O.S Ui2ns2 1^ 0^0 ^a V ^^l aca ,r^ Restrictions on Use: ->• — - - ^. TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA FILM SIZE: 3^_ IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA DATE FILMED: HLMEDBY: RESEARCH im 3 REDUCTION RATIO: INITIALS__^/^^ ATIONS. INC WOOD13R1DGE. CT iX V Association for Information and Image Management nOOWayne Avenue, Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 1 2 3 li iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiinii 4 1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 mm lIlllllllllllllilllllllllilMlllMlllMMlMlllMlllMllllllllMMlllllllMlllllllMlliMM «1 I r Inches rnTT 1.0 I.I 1.25 Lb I 2.8 1 5.0 ""'^^ 15.6 111113.2 1^ I 71 ■M I 3.6 14.0 1.4 TTT I I 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 MPNUFnCTURED TO PIIM STRNDPRDS BY APPLIED IMPGE. INC. Columbia (Mnit)frs!itp intljfCitpofilfajgark LIBRARY CAUSALITY, CAUSALITY OR THE PTl n.oSOPjfV OF LAW INVESTIGATED. BY THE REV. GEORGE JAMIESON, B.D., OF OLD MACHAR. SECOND EDITION: LONDON: LONGMANS, GREEN, L COMPANY. MDCCCLXXIJ., * I * > t • » » ■ » ,' a a , » •••»» tail »•• • »•* *•> jm ^ "TUM DEMUM SCIMUS CUM CAUSAM COGNOSCIMUS." • • • • • • I • > I • • • • • • » I < « ' > CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. THE FACTORS AND PRINCIPLES OF CAUSALITY. Sect. 1. The Difficulties of Mr. Hume. Sect. 2. Sir William Haiuilton on the Philosophy of Perception. Sect. 3. The Grounds and Rationale of Mental Operation. Sect. 4. The Rationale of Causality. Appendix IV. Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge. BOOK I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. CHAP. I. THE CONDITIONED AND UNCONDITIONED. Sect. 1. Sir William Hamilton on the Unconditioned. Sect. 2. Condition and Form. Appendix I. Mansel on the Philosophy of the Conditioned. CHAP. 11. THE GROUNDS OF CAUSALITY. Sect. I. Relationship. | Sect. 2. The Origin of Force. CHAP. III. CAUSALITY. Sir William Hamilton on Causality. Appendix II. Mr. John Stuart Mill on CausaHty. BOOK 11. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATTER. CHAP. I. THE FORCES OF THE INORGANIC ECONOMY. Sect. 1. Affinity. Sect. 2. Heat. Sect. 3. Electricity. Sect. 4. Magnetism. Sect. 5. Light. Sect. 6. Other Forces. IV CONTENTS. C H A P. 1 1. THE FORCES OF THE Ol.GANlC ECONOMY. Sect. 1. The Vegetable Departmeut. Sect. 2. The Animal Departmeut. CHAP. III. THE CAUSALITY OF STRUCTURE. Sect. 1. Crystallisation. I Sect. 2. Organisation. Appendix III. The Foundation and Characteristics of Matter. BOOK TIL THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. CHAP. I. CONSCIOUSNESS. Sect. 1. The Materialistic and Spiritualistic Schemes. Sect. 2. The Scheme of the Author. CHAP. II. intelligence. Part I. INTELLIGENCE AND IMAGINATION : THE COGNITION OF STATES. Sect. 1. Perception — the Cognition of States ah extra. Sect. 2. Imagination — the Cognition of States ab intra. Part II. APPREHENSION AND CONCEPTION : THE COGNITION OF CIRCUMSTANCES. Sect. 3. Apprehension — the Cognition of circumstances actual. Sect. 4. Conception — the Cognition of circumstances possible. Part III. intuition of DIFFERENCE BY COMPARING WITH A STANDARD. Sect. 5. Judgment— the Cognition of Character. CHAP. III. WILL. Sect. 1. Emotions. Sect. 2. Self-love. Sect. 3. Sympathy. Sect. 4. Conscience. Sect. 6. The Emotion which in all cases constitutes Will. Sect. 6. Volition. Sect. 7. Libei-ty and Necessity. CONTENTS. V BOOK IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSTRACT SCIENCES. CHAP. I. THE NATURE AND GROUNDS OP ABSTRACT SCIENCE. Sect. 1. The Origin and Classification of the Abstract Scieuces. Sect. 2. Intellectualism, the highest department of Logic. Sect. 3. The Causality of the Abstract Sciences. C H A P. 1 1. KANT ON SPACE AND TIME. CHAP. III. THE VIEWS OF PHILOSOPHERS AS TO THE SOURCE OF NECESSARY TRUTHS. Sect. 1. Tlieir d pnori Ego unwarranted. Sect. 2. The Formation and Constitution of the Ego. Sect. 3. The Process of acquiring Necessary Truths. BOOK V. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEOLOGY. CHAP. I. THE ABSOLUTE, (IMPERSONAL AND PERSONAL). CHAP. II. THE INFINITE, (IMPERSONAL AND PERSONAL). CHAP. III. THE ETERNAL RELATIVE WITH THE INFINITE. CHAP. IV. REASON IN THE ABSOLUTE. Sect. 1. The possibility of reaching the Processes of Reason in the Divine Mind. Sect. 2. Reason in introducing the Works of Creation. Sect. 3. Reason in the exercise of Divine Providence. § 1. Liberty, the Hinge on which Providence operates. § 2. The Origin of Evil. § 3. The Divine connection with the Origin of Evil. § 4. Difficulties met and obviated. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. The a 'priori School of Philosophy accepts " the facts given in consciousness, " as the inherent data of mind. Hence, no solu- tion as to the origin of these data is possible. Its fundamental principles of necessity lie unexplored : it defies a scientific Psychology : it marks Mystery on its very portal. The a posteriori School ecpially accepts said facts ; but only to trace them, if possible, to their cause. It regards all the states of mind as phenomena resulting from a constructed causality, and its effort is, by sound induction, to find what said causality is. The first and the fundamental facts of mind (apart from a mere sensation of bodily states) are obviously those of Percep- tion. It behoves us, therefore, first to account for our percepts. Accounting for these will help considerably to find an origin for our concepts. If we can account for our concepts, it will not be thought extravagant if we attempt to expound the hovj of "necessary truths," and the phenomena of Reason generally, and of Morals. Our maxim is to proceed from admitted principles — principles that are defined, and under an accumula- tion of facts to deduce their law of operation. The diffi- culty, of course, will always be where the lacts are not agreed upon. After years of relaxation from the special study of Philosophy —years during which the no less profound, but still more momentous questions of Theology, have been our ever-present and peculiar pursuit, we return to a re-examination of our posi- tion in respect of a true Philosophy, as the best handmaid of a sound Theology ; and, as prelimiuaiy and preparatory to the publication of a thesis in Theology, we have resolved to revise and reproduce our views in Philosophy. This we now do, with considerable additions, under a somewhat different title to our work. Vlll PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. As to the work itself, we are deeply conscious of its imper- fections : we have an ideal which is far from being reached. The subject of Causality is confessedly a thorny one ; but while its treatment can only be perfected by a repeated and re- repeated revision, with an honest bowing of the knee to truth, and, therefore, a ready retirement from pet-system and from mere human authority, we cannot help thinking that the day is not far off, when competent parties will arise to do justice to the great problem of Natural Law. We have endeavoured to propound the Formula of Causality, as indicating certain clear and unmistakable principles at the foundation of all phenomena, i.e., of all results, i.e., of all operation ; and, if these can be acknowledged, we contemplate a harmony in Psychology, which will be the harbinger of a still higher and happier harmony in Theology ; and this, not simply in the lofty themes of Deity and of Divine springs of action, but also on the great question of Sin.* The Author is not unaware that his views must be subjected to a severe ordeal, especially by the transcend entalists, before * The question of Sin, it is obvious, is directly involved in the problem of Psychology ; for if Psychology has for its object an inquiry into the modes and springs of mental operation, these must needs embrace the question of aberration from a recognised standard, which is Sin. So soon, therefore, as we are able to indicate the formations of thought and of will, with anything like scientific accuracy, we shall obtain an enor- mous leverage in applying these principles to the interpretation of Holy Scripture, which has for its object the treatment and disposal of the ques- tion of sin. As regards one important point in Natural Theology which, it must be allowed, has an important bearing on Revealed Theology, we may be permitted here to offer a brief illustration of the sanctions of Philosophy as bearing on judgments in Theology : e.g., It is perfectly well known that the schoolmen pronounced Eternity to be "one undivided now without beginning or end." This definition has been fostered by the o priori philosophy, and our modern divines have quietly and uninquir- ingly adopted it. Dr. Hodge, of Princeton, in his recent extensive work on Systematic Theology, after quoting the schoolmen and others on this theme, quotes also the views which we have in this work propounded on the nature of Space and Time ; and giving credit to the principles which we have there laid down as to the character of duration, defers to us, that the views of the schoolmen must be modified — that there must be succession in the thinking of God and in the operations of God — that the contrary is both inconceivable and impossible— (Vol. I. pp. 386-388). PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. IX they can be accepted. Be it so. If Reviewers will avoid an unmeaning and pointless invective, of which he has had some experience, he does not deprecate fair and legitimate scrutiny. The cause of truth demands that the maxim, principia non homines, should be maintained. None, perhaps, held that maxim more sacredly than the distinguished man whose phi*lo- sophy we have ventured to examine and criticise. On the ground that Sir William Hamilton may fairly be regarded as the coryphoeus of the school of thought which he represented, and that his learning, his genius, his name, have given weight and authority to views which, in point of fact, have retarded, and (so long as they are held) will retard, the march of science into the noblest, and, we hesitate not to add, the most pro- lific, field of human enterprize, we have given chief promi- nence to an analysis of his argumentation on the subjects be- fore us. We may just state that the Introduction now submitted, with the Appendices, contains the more important heads of our argument. We have felt it needful to fight our way through the heavy artillery of Hamilton " on the Philosophy of Percep- tion," and wx must leave it to others to say whether we have safely secured a basement for the doctrine of Representation. If so, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt that the theory of mind which we have espoused is essentially the sound one. It not only illustrates the whole scheme of Causality, but is other- wise, as we humbly think, less encumbered with difificulties, and more in harmony with facts, and with analogy, than any other scheme of Psychology we know. We admit that the problem of the Unconditioned has not yet received the justice it demands ; but, as contrasted and connected with the problem of the All-Conditioned, we believe a train of thought has been introduced which will yet receive its full investigation. We have revised this subject by a new section at the beginning of Chapter first, and also by a critique on Professor Mansel. We have added a chapter on the principles of Causality as advo- cated by Mr. J. S. Mill ; and we have re-written our analysis of Bishop Berkeley's principles of Human Knowledge. From the days of Hume, the problem has been to find out " the causal nexus" in a question of cause and effect ; and hence to point out what constitutes the phenomenon of necessity PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. which is allowed by all to subsist, as an irrepressible principle in that connexion ; and Hamilton intimates, that " this very question has been the cause or occasion of what is of principal value in the speculations of Scotland, Germany, and France." Be this as it may, it will no doubt be admitted that it has at least set speculative ingenuity at work ; and we have got into a huge labyrinth of metaphysics, terminating in what ? " hu- man imbecility I" It seems nothing less than presumptuous for an ordinary man now to entertain the hope of touching the key-note that shall supply the constant which systematically plays its part in the grand scale of Causality, and at the same time to indicate the contingent which is the direct source of na- ture's variations : yet we must be pardoned if we believe in the possibility of formulating Causality, and of accounting for the phenomenon of necessity, as the connexion of cause and effect. If the olla podrida of our pages shall have contributed to settle this question, our labours will not have been in vain. We may not close these prefatory remarks without taking notice of the great bugbear of materialism which has operated so powerfully in the Theological, as well as in the Philoso- phical world, in preventing, not a due investigation merely, but an entrance on the due investigation, of truth. That mate- rialistic elements should be regarded as concerned in the opera- tions of mind has been quite enough to drive hundreds from a due contemplation of the question ; but the pressure of facts is compelling us to review our tliinking on this subject. That the Brain, for example, constitutes the instrumentality by which Intellect operates, an instrumentality without which no mind is constituted in man, is proved by a multitude of facts ; and- farther, that the conditions of Brain go to define and to regulate the conditions of mind in every man, seems also to be proved by an endless variety of evidence. A narcotic will take away the power of thought, an infusion of alcohol will damage it, an attack of dyspepsia will weaken it. Is Intellect, therefore, a mere phenomenon of matter ? We think we have shewn that it is not. liNTliUnUCTHlX. THE PRINCIPLES OF CAUSALITY. Section I. — The Difficulties of Mr. Hume. The principles of Causality lie at the very foundation of Philosophy. In truth, philosophy, in any one branch, is but fairly apprehended as a science, only when we apprehend tbe rationale of those phenomena which happen for the time to be the subject of inquiry. That certain elementary factors operate, when in conjunction with other elementary factors, we observe as the eventualities of an unvarying experience ; the question, then, as to Causality, is not whether it be a law of operation, and therefore an operative fact : that is on all hands admitted ; but the question is, as to what may be termed the philosophy of the fact, the science of the phenomenon. 1. Whence come the factors ? 2. What is the Causal nexus of the factors ? " Whence comes the regulative operation, i.e., the law attending the Combination of the factors, under such a nexus ? In short, on what principle does the combination of factors bring forth a precise and definite result, — such, that it must of necessity be that result and no other ? These are the great questions which have to be solved ere we can pro- nounce upon Causality, and say what Cause is, and what Effect is, and what the Relation is between Cause and Efifect. Mr. Hume (than whom we have had no clearer or profounder metaphysician) tells us that the great object of his " Treatise on Human Nature" was to consider how Impressions and Ideas "stand with regard to their existence; and which are causes, and which are effects." His first conclusion was, that " all our simple ideas are derived from simple impressions ;" and he was right ! Yet in the stage at which philosophy had reached in his day, such a conclusion was of no value ; for all the distinc- tion he made betwixt Impressions and Ideas was, that the former had greater force and more liveliness than the latter ; Xll INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. • • • XIU he said nothing with respect to the origin of Impressions. If he derived Ideas from Impressions, the next and most natural question would be, Whence come Impressions ? It did not occur to him that Impressions are the delineation or represen- tation fundamentally made ab extra upon the organ of Sense, and carried to the Sensorium when, by correlation, as trans- fen-ed to a new ground, it becomes Idea ; and that an Idea, therefore, in Intellect, is but the correlation of Impression as lodged in the cerebral domain of sensation or feeling. It did not occur to him that, first of all. Impressions were radically the Images made at the external or outer terminus of the nerve (the external sense), and that when said impressions were car- ried to the inner terminus of the nerve, where the prerogative of sensation has it habitat, and where, therefore, sensation is awakened or aroused by the presence of an impression, that Impression therefore becomes what we call an Idea. His state- ment, that " the constant conjunction of our resembling percep- tions is a convincing proof that the one is the cause of the other, and the priority of our impressions an equal proof that our impressions are the cause of our ideas, and not our ideas of our impressions," indicated clearly that, while he had obtained a sound view of the relation of impressions to ideas, he had ob- tained no correct notion of what causation precisely is; for surely it is incorrect to speak of a thing as the cause of itself. But one thing may be the correlative of another, that is the imprint of that other, that is the reciprocal, the duplicate, the transcript; the difference being in the different medium in which one and the same representation is developed ; that whereas an Impression is a force upon a purely objective ground or substance or nerve which is without the property of sensation, an Idea is that very force earned into the more sub- jective ground which has this property. If we would trace the drift which the current of Philosophy has taken from the days of Locke, we must needs go back to the time of Mr. Hume, who assuredly gave it the bent which it has since taken, and from which it has never fairly recovered. Mr. Locke said that there were two sources of impressions, viz., Sensation and Reflection : Mr. Hume adopted this view ; but, in so doing, what do we find him asserting? He says, "im- pressions of Sensation arise in tJie Soul frorn unknown Causes" and impressions of Reflection are " derived in a great measure from our ideas." With him the order of origination stands thus : First, impressions of sensation ; Second, ideas which are copies taken by the mind after the impression ceases. Third, emotion, which he calls " the idea of pleasure or pain, producing the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may be properly called impressions of reflection ; Fourth, those again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas of memory or of imagination ; Fifth, these again give rise to other imprcssioTis and ideas : " so that the impres- sions of reflection are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas, but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them." The examination of our sensations, he thinks, belongs to anatomists. It would have been, however, only la3dng, or striving to lay, a logical foundation, had Mr. Hume studied the question of sensation, and sought out some natural source for the impres- sions of sense. " As to impressions which arise from the senses (says he), their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly in- explicable by human reason, and it will always be impossible to decide with certainty whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being." When Locke divided all our ideas into those of Sensation and those of Reflection, he failed farther to account for them ; he, therefore, may be said to have left the question pretty much as Des Cartes before him had introduced it, who grounded all in the principle of con- sciousness. It is impossible, indeed, to take the question out of the category of consciousness ; for an idea in its very definition is an object of consciousness. Here, then, has ever been the crux philosophorum. And probably when the question comes to be settled, as it will be, the wonder will be why so much difficulty should have been experienced, and so long experi- enced on this point. For what is consciousness ? What, but the attribute of all mental phenomena. We have no help but to lay down facts as our consciousness declares and decides them to be. This is the primary and fundamental law of our being : all men act, and must act upon it : all men trust, and must trust to it : there is no exception to this rule. XIV INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. X V The question is, Can we expound the phenomena of Con- sciousness ? Can we account for that consciousness which is characterized as the sphere of Perception, and of all mental exercise ? — of that which is characterized as acts of Rememh- rance, and of that which is characterized as exercise of the Ima- gination, and of that which is characterized as the intuitions of Reason, and of that which is characterized as emotion, or as expressive of some feeling, or some craving, terminating in Will ? The probability is, that so soon as we obtain a perfectly satisfactory scheme explanatory of the origin of the ideas of Perception, the process, whereby ideas of Imagination and of the other phenomena of Consciousness will develope themselves as the natural sequence of the mental organization thus fairly and properly opened up, will come to be ultimately completed in all its ramifications. Can we then exhibit a clear and con- sistent Philosophy of Perception ? Section II. — Sir William Hamilton on the Philosophy of Perception. The late Sir William Hamilton, who has given cliief celebrity to the discussion of " the Philosophy of the Unconditioned" — a subject which it behoves us particularly to consider, but which we shall postpone as a suitable theme for entering on the Philosophy of the Conditioned — has also written stringently, if not convincingly, on " the Philosophy of Perception." We feel it needful to call in question the principles which he has enounced, both for the sake of the deep importance of the sub- ject, and as illustrating the principles of Causality for which we contend. And here let us say, that our strictures evince no wrant of respect for that great man ; for his memory must long be held deservedly in high repute. Gifted in no ordinary desrree with those literary qualifications which always com- maiid respect ; conspicuous for his acquirements as a scholar ; and especially remarkable both for the extent and the accuracy of his knowledge of the history of Philosophy ; and a lover of truth for its own sake,— he was enabled to adjudicate the r I t'ctive claims of Philosophers with a terseness and discrimi- nation and decision and authority peculiarly his own. His analytic ability was of the highest order ; and, in virtue of this power, none were better fitted to pronounce (as from his own stand-point of course) on the amount of credit due to the pre- tensions of those who had cultivated the field of abstract thought : none more able than he to lay bare as with a scalpel the involved threads of human speculation. None could more powerfully demonstrate the spurious, or prove the inadmissible, or handle with unmerciful severity the pretensions of those whose conclusions did not follow from their premises, — at all events if his own principles were granted. At the same time, the ground, on which he took ]i\< own stand as a philosopher, involved principles which must give way under a powerful analysis : it led him not unfrequently into conclusions as extraordinary, if not as extravagant, as any which his powerful pen had so unsparingly pourtrayed. We shall by and by perceive how egregiously he failed in building up a clear and consistent scheme of thought (such as will abide the test of time with its impartial criticism) on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned. What we have now particularly to deal with is his criticism on the Philosophy of Perception. Sir William Hamilton divides the various theories of external perception into those of the Presentationists and of the Repre- sentationists. The former, he says, holding perception to be an immediate cognition, either abolish any subjective object, or they abolish any objective object. The one class he calls Fresen- tative Realists, as founding their doctrine on the datum of natural consciousness, or the common sense of mankind , the other class he calls Fresentative Idealists, as viewing the object of consciousness in perception, as a phenomenon purely in the mind, and are therefore Idealists denying any external object. The latter (the Representationists), he says, deny to consciousness the cognisance of aught beyond a merely subjective phenomenon, are likewise Idealists, yet, as positing the reality of an ex- ternal world, they must be distinguished as Comwthetic Idealists. At the same time, he adds they must be considered as hypothetical realists, since they do not, like the presentative or natural realists, accept the existence of an external world directly on the natural testimony of consciousness. He gives two classes of Representationists, one who makes tiiu represen- tation a mode of the percipient subject, and the otiu r who makes it a tertium quid distinct from the subject knowing. XVI INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. XVU and the actual object represented ^i? AVilllam tells us that " Natural Realism and Absolute Idealism are the only systems worthy of a philosopher ; for they alone have any foundation in consciousness." The scheme of ii}|juliietica] Realism Lc- pro- nounces to be " philosophically absurd, although the favourite scheme of philosophers." His grounds for such a judgment lie in this, that " it is not only repugnant to our natural beliefs, but in manifold contradiction with itself, to suppose that, behind the non-existent world perceived, there lurks a correspondent but unknown world existing." He refers to his article on the " Philosophy of Perception," originally contributed to the Edin- hurgh Review, for a confirmation of this statement. Let us examine the principles set forth in said article. " In the first place (he says), the hypothesis of representa- tion is unnecessary ;" for " in consciousness, as the original spontaneity of reason, are revealed the primordial facts of our intelligent nature," and " consciousness cannot be explained or redargued from without." But, secondly, he says, " a represen- tative perception annihilates itself ;" for "the truth of conscious- ness is the condition of the possibility of all knowledge. The first act of hypothetical realism is thus an act of suicide." " In the third place, it is the condition of a legitimate hypothesis that the fact or facts, for which it is excogitated to account, be not themselves hypothetical." But here, " to account for the possibility of an unknown external world, the hypothesis of representation is devised, and to account for the possibility of representation we imagine the hypothesis of an external world." " In the fourth place, a legitimate hypothesis must account for the phenomenon adequately and without violence ; but the hypothesis in question militates, or more properly destroys and recreates, the very phenomenon for the reality of which it should account. The supposition of a representative perception hews down the phenomena u of an existence different from self into two fragments, the existence and the intuition. The existence of external things, which is given only through the intuition, it admits : the intuition itself it rejects. But to annihilate what is prior and constitutive in the phenomenon is, in truth, to annihilate the phenomenon altogether." " In the fifth place, the fact which a legitimate hypothesis is devised to explain must be within the sphere of experience. But the existence of external things transcends, ex hypothesi, ail experience, and is a mere hyperphysical chimera." " In the sixth and last place, an hypothesis itself is probable in proportion as it works simply and naturally. But to explain at all, it not only postu- lates subsidiary hypotheses, but subsidiary miracles. It at- tempts to explain the knowledge of an unknown world by the ratio of a representative perception ; but it is impossible, by any conceivable relation, to apply the ratio to the facts. The mind either knows the reality of what it represents, or it does not. On the former alternative the hypothesis annihilates itself; for if the mind be admitted lu be cognisant oi ilie outer reality previous to the representation, the end towards which the hypothesis was devised as a mean has been already accom- plished. The mind would thus be supposed to know before it knew ; or it knows what it is not conscious of knowing. The other alternative remains, that the mind is determined blindly to represent the reality it does not know. Knowledge is thus supposed to be the effect of ignorance, intelligence of stupidity, life of death. The hypothesis of a representative perception thus presupposes a miracle to let it work." " The scheme of natural Realism is the only system on which the truth of consciousness, and the possibility of knowledge, can be mis- directed ; whilst the hypothetical Realist, in his effort to be wise above knowledge, like the dog in the fable, loses the substance in attempting to realize the shadow." We have considerably epitomised Sir William's arguments against the doctrine of representation m perception, but we have endeavoured to extract the pith of them ; and though ostensibly directed against Dr Brown, yet they must be hold as applicable to the scheme which they combat. Of w luit value then are these objections ? We shall briefly examine them, after making a preliminary remark or two. First. It may be at once admitted that the mind can properly he immediately cognisant of its subjective states only. At the same time, if, in examining these subjective states, we find that the very cognition of the idea (as an object in the mind) is tantamount to the direct cognition of the extema;l reality, then we have, and must have, immediate perception thereof. If we find that for wise reasons the representation, as a representation, IS not regarded, and is, therefore, lost sight of — lost as a secun- XVlll INTRODUCTION. TXTRODUCTION. XIX dum quid, distinguished from the reality of which it is the representation — lost as a perceptible impression distinct between the percipient Intellect and the external reality of which it is but the impression — lost as much as the nexus operation is lojt that takes place, as intermediate between the point of volition and the movement of the fingers : if we find that the represen- tation can alone give a sense of the reality, by reason of the fact that it is and cannot but be a representation, and as such, an expression of the reality of which it is the representation, then have we immediate perception of external reality. If it be proved that in order to know the reality of any thing whatever, the mind must have an expression of it conveyed to it, that it may be conscious of it, and that without said expression, as giving the precise characteristics, it can have no consciousness of the object ; and farther, that the mind is precisely conscious of what it receives ; then are we said to be directly percipient of externals. If it be nonsense to speak of the mind as dependent for its knowledge on pure Consciousness, in as far as there can be no consciousness unless there be an object of consciousness ; and if in perception the object of consciousness which we call an idea, be a representation, as the direct expression of some objective reality thus conveyed to the percipient subject, then that very expression necessarily implies the reality of which it is the attestation and the warrant. Second. We cannot consent to the dogma that knowledge and existence are convertible. Knowledge as applicable to man is the mental acquisition of the characteristics of existence, and is in its very nature subjective. Existence is the objective reality, the characters of which are conveyed to Intellect, that they may be represented in Consciousness, as the characteristic of Intellect, when it receives ideas ; or shall we more properly say, the consciousness of which. is aroused in Intellect when the representation is carried to Intellect. Knowledge is the corre- lative subjectively, of existence objectively, so far as we have had experience of existence. No doubt. Perception, which is the first and fundamental act by which we attain to the know- ledge of external objects, is the simple receiving by Intellect of the impression as it enters by the door of external sense, which impression becomes the idea or percept, as it passes through the territory of sensation, and is tantamount to the thing perceived ; for the idea or percept is to the mind s3nionyTnous with the thing itself, in as far as it is the only possible representation or expression of it to the mind. And there is no possibility of knowing the thing but through the representation of it. The thing, therefore, and the representation of it, thus become prac- tically one and the same to the mind ; for the bird I see, and the tree on which it is perched, are not thought of in the representation, but in the reality, of which the representation is the inforaiation, and nothing more. I do not give my attention to the information, as a mode of instruction, but I give my attention to the thing signified in said information ; and it is only in this, as the representation of the thing, that the thing itself or any of its characteristics can be known. It is only when we conie to inquire into the modus cognoscendi, that we know anything, or think anything, about representation. Yet repre- sentation is no less a fact, as the report to the mind of the reality outwardly existing. The fact then that the mind requires to have an announcement made to it respecting existence, is sufficient indication that knowledge and existence are two very difierent things — that the subjective is indeed one thing, and the objective another. Knowledge we pronounce to be subjec- tive : it is the mind's own acquired furniture : it is representation in all its varied characteristics built up on an intellectual ground, and comes therefore under the category of intelligence ; but the very fact that we have this accumulation under the name of knowledge, is of itself proof that the knoiuledge of a thing is different and distinct from the thing, just as the subjective is different and distinct from the objective. Third. We cannot consent to • the dogma, that there is in- tellectually a self apart from knowledge. Let us but inquire what the Ego fundamentally is. Fundamentally it is that which is indued with a capacity for consciousness as its peculiar characteristic. If there be no consciousness of aught, and there- fore no consciousness at all, there is intellectually no selfhood. If there be no consciousness, there is, of course, no object of con- sciousness in the soul, that is to say, there is no soul framed into a personality as such. There may be the naked Intellect ; but then, if naked, if said intellect is replenished with nothing, it IS without individuality : as Intelligence, it is nothing. Hence a very important doctrine follows. It is this : — that the primary XX INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. XXI law or condition of all knowledge is that before any intelligence can have cognisance of self, it must, as the ground or condition of this cognisance, have a cognition of existence, that is, of exteraal things. And we believe this to be practically the fact universally. Children and young people have a natural inability in thinking of self. They are thinking of what is around them, they are absorbed in the thought as having for its concern an outward object, but self, as such, is not an object before the mind. Self only conies before the mind under reflection, or when there is some felt want, and, therefore, some craving for the supply of that want ; but self does not ordinarily come before the mind as an object of thought. It cannot do so in perception. Yet the converse of this proposition lonns the basis on which the late Mr. Ferrier erects his whole edifice in his "Institutes of Metaphysic." He lays down the primary law or condition of all knowledge to be this, that " along with what- ever any intelligence knows, it must, as the grounds or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself." If this proposition be false, his whole superstructure is false ; and he himself acknowledges it must be so. And that it must be so we think is certain, in that he bases all upon self as an Intelli- gence before there is intelligence ! Whence comes intelligence ? He knows not. It is simply begged as a necessary preliminary on which to lay the various strata of philosophical truth. " The apprehension of self (he says) is essential to knowledge." What, we ask, a self without knowledge ! Can there be a mental self, if there be no mind ? Can there be mind if there be no know- ledge, that is no object of thought. The apprehension of self is a consequence of our knowledge and not an antecedent of it ; for self is made up of knowledge. In order to the constitution of self intellectually these three things are required : — 1st, A world of active existence with its operative laws ; 2d, A living animal economy adapted to the world ; and 3d, A naked Intellect in connexion with the animal economy, to receive the characteristics of that economy as the basis of its character, and the impressions from the world, as peculiarly the materials of thought, trans- mitt^ ihrough thiit «MX»oomy. 'i*hii.s th«*n,^-lf is iim huiu U>uI of our oognitiOTi* Kton&d up from the world; nod, all hii* expo- Tienoe combined, coD^tttutes Ibe unity or individualiHiu of each aefiamto perooiL We are now in position to proceed with Sir William Hamilton's " Philosophy of Perception." His first argument is that the hypothesis of Representation is " unnecessary." If so, what are ideas ? and whence come they ? And what is know- ledge ? what can we understand by it ? And whence comes self? and what notions can we form as to the constitution of self? We must have primarily some ground to rest upon, and some consistent views as to the laws of mind. What are they ? Sir William classes them under the names of Presentation ism and Representationism. Be it so. What notion can we form of Presentation as abolishing a subjective object ? Every idea and ever}'- thought is a subjective object. What can thinking be without an object of thought ? The notion is Kclf-cont radio- tory. " Unnecessary " ! wliy, wc cannot imiii^iM! to oanoelvo^ any rational theory of pLTCM:|)tion witiiout tlwi aid of reprwfciitu- tion : we cannot imagiikc how con^douKiicid; \% practiailly )x>9- sible unless by representntion. Sir William rcfiifK^ to iwk how Consciousness is possiblt.* ; lio takes the fact am inr«! ? Not 9a CoDSCtousDiSCS i8» no doubt, that fundamental tVjituro which plajs in eveiy poeaible cliaracteristic of mind ; b but to undentaod creation. When, therefore;, it XXll INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. XXlU he says that " asking a reason for the possibility of our intuition of external things, above the fact of its reality, as given in our perceptive consciousness, betrays an imbecility of the reasoning principle itself," this is neither more nor less than a method of locking the door against all inquiry ; and he assumes to himself the summary prerogative of throwing overboard the possibility of an expository realism. " Consciousness (he says) cannot be explained or redargued from without." From without ! What does he mean ? We explain consciousness upon the selfsame principles as we explain any other phenomenon of the mind, even by the help of those circumstantials whereby, as a fact, it is established as a pheTwmenon of thought Accordingly, we pronounce Consciousness to be that energy which cJiaracterises Intelligence, i.e.. Intellect under the presence of some represen- tation conveyed to it. We challenge a feature of consciousness that may not be accounted for, directly or indirectly, by representation. Hence we say representation is absolutely necessary. But, secondly. Sir William says, " a representative perception annihilates itself in subverting the edifice of knowledge. Belying the testimony of consciousness to our immediate perception of an outer world, it belies the veracity of consciousness altogether. But the truth of consciousness is the condition of the possibility of all knowledge." Or rather, we would say, the truth of con- sciousness is the foundation of all affirmation. Of course it is. But the doctrine of representation does not question this, and does not in the least infringe this great law : sed contra, it is founded thereon. We have already discussed this point in our first preliminary remark. We have seen that representation is the only possible efflux of the outer world conveyed to the soul ; and it is the only direct expression of the outer world upon the soul. The soul has no other, and practically knows no other direct line of communication ; and the beauty of this doctrine of representation is that it teaches how there is conveyed to the soul the full, precise, and exact truth. I have the representation of a stone wall before me by the sense of sight, accompanied with the impression that it stands some ten or a dozen yards distant from me. I measure the ground and I find it to corres- pond. I touch the wall, and I get a sense of the qualities of stone thereby. I find the representations of one s^nse to harmonize with, and to confirm, the representations of another. I have no other means of cognition. I have no other conscious- ness than what is thus conveyed to me by representation. How then can representation be said to conflict with, or to belie, con- sciousness ? What other consciousness have I but the con- sciousness of the wall as represented to my intellect ? And what is this but the consciousness of the fact itself; for what is the representation but the expression to the mind of the fact, and, therefore, the evidence of the fact ? The mind, accordingly, has the consciousness of the fact, and not simply the consciousness of the expression as distinguished from the fact ; for it has no means of distinguishing betwixt the fact and the expression of the fact, in as much as the expression alone gives the idea, and, consequently, the knowledge of the fact. Thirdly, Sir William says " the fact or facts of a legitimate hjrpothesis should not be themselves hypothetical." He says that the facts about which this hypothesis is conversant are two, the mental modification and the material reality : that the problem to be solved is their connexion : that there is a see-saw between the hypothesis of representation and the facts : that the facts are assumed as hypotheses, and the h3rpotheses ex- plained as facts : that each is established, and each is expounded by the other. " To account (he farther says) for the possibility of an unknown external world, the hypothesis of representation is devised ; and to account for the possibility of representation, we imagine the hypothesis of an external world." We cannot regard this as anything like a fair statement of the case. The question relates to the fact of an external world, and how to account for that fact. Upon Sir William's own showing, we are hound to assume it as a fact, otherwise (as he says) we " belie the veracity of consciousness." There is no man alive but believes in the fact of an external world. It is the strongest assertion of consciousness to every man; and it is only the philosopher, when he gets confounded among ideas, that ever doubted or ques- tioned the fact. And even the philosopher, when not following the ignis fatuus of his OAvn idealism, is yet practically obliged to acknowledge the fact, and to act on the fact of an external world. It is perfectly monstrous to proclaim that the fact of an external world is a hypothesis ; for there is no fact in being, if that be not a fact ; because there is no fact in being more per- XXIV INTRODUCTION. sistently forced on every mind, and more continuously proclaimed to every mind. We would ask any of the followers of Sir William Hamilton to say, what fact in consciousness can be proclaimed, if that fact is questioned ? We do not then concede that the existence of an external world is a hypothesis ; for an hypothesis requires some ground to support it ; but we shall go all the length which we think should satisfy such a mind as Sir William's ; and we shall lay our foundation upon this, viz., that ^ue have tJte consciousness of an external ivorld. Ulu problem then will be : this being given, to account for this consciousness. Oh ! says Sir William, as to consciousness, that is ultimate, that is inexplicable, let us not meddle to explain that ! For what purpose did he study philosophy, and what is philosophy as a science ? What, but an exposition of our states of conscious- ness ? No greater indignity can be, than thus to cut the cable and turn the ship adrift from her moorings, because thus to hold her fast gives her an inconvenient anchorage in the harbour of thought. , It is a fact that I have the consciousness of the room m which I am sitting, and that there is a picture on the wall. The nature of this consciousness is such, that it is characterised by the certitude that the picture, and the wall on which it hangs, are outside of me. This conviction forms a part of my con- sciousness. I may as well doubt the very fact of my conscious- ness, as doubt this assurance with which it is accompanied. T cannot separate the fact of my consciousness of the picture, from the very conditions of the fact, viz., that the picture is outside of me. Externality, in short, is the inexorable diagnostic as to the picture, which is the object of my consciousness ; and the externality is confirmed when I go forward, and, using another sense, touch it with my hands. But again: I contemplate myself as a thinking personality in connexion with this external object ; and I arrive at an equally strong conviction that the consciousness is a subjective state ; and that it must of necessity be separate and distinct from the external object which said subjective state indicates and proclaims. The problem, there- fore, necessarily assumes this form : — How am I to account for this subjective idealism in consistency with the assurance which accompanies it, and which it gives out, that the object of my consciousness is external ? I keep in view that I am funda- INTRODUCTION. XXV meu tally bound over to regard the object as external ; for that is an essential ingredient of my very consciousness. I repeat then, having this mentalization of an external object, How am I to account for it on the supposition that the conviction of my consciousness is correct ? I cannot go out of the arena of my consciousness : I keep to this : I keep to the fact which it intimates to me, that the picture is external to me, and, taking this announcement to be true, how am I to account for it ? I have to observe, that if true, my consciousness of it did not place it there : if true, the picture is not on the wall because I see it, but I see it because it is there. My consciousness is not ante- cedent to the picture, but the picture is antecedent to my consciousness. This is a point of enormous importance in this tickhsh controversy. It is just the question, Whether existence is antecedent or not to the knowledge of existence. And we think this question might be settled in a breath ; for how could we have the knowledge of existence if there were no existence ? It surely is because there is existence that the knowledge of existence is a possibility. Even upon the principles of a pure subjectivism, there must somehow be existence as the ground of the knowledge of it. We are constrained then to posit existence, as something primarily independent of our knowledge of it, and that we come to know of it because it exists, and because it is brought to us as an object of consciousness. We have narrowed the question, then, considerably. We examine into this state of consciousness, and we find first, that it is not simply the consciousness of an object in the mind, but that the very characteristic of this consciousness is, that the object, which is the subject of consciousness, is external to the mind ; and we find second, that the object must in itself neces- sarily be, as thus represented, independent of the consciousness ; for I am conscious of it because it exists ; I cannot be conscious ti it if it did not exist. What follows ? Why, as a thing of course, the representation of it comes to my mind. There is no other alternative. If there is, on the one hand, the eodernal object, as consciousness verily intimates ; and if there is, on the other hand, the Intellect separate therefrom, as the internal subject of consciousness, there must be some connexion betwixt the external object and me the internal subject. That coimexion we say is Representation. It is not needful here to go into the \''\ H I If XXVI INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. quomodo of Representation. It is enough for us to know that there is such a thing as representation. We see it in a thousand ways We see it in the image which alights on the mirror : we see it in the processes of photography : we see it in the telegraph and in the daguerreotype : we see it in the convection of sounds and scents : we see it in every example of correlation. We hold, then, that Representation is at once a legitimate and fitting hypothesis to account for the certified fact of consciousness, viz., that there is an external world. In the fourth place, Sir William says, " the hypothesis of representation only vindicates its utility by a mutilation, or more properly, the destruction and re-creation of the very phenomenon for the reality of which it should account, viz., the immediate knowledge or intuition of an existence different from self." His charge against it is, that " it hews down the simple phenomenon into two fragments, the existence and the intui- tion" that " it admits the existence of external things, and rejects the intuition, through the ratio cognoscendi, and, there- fore, the ratio essendi, of their reality." He holds that " the existence given in consciousness necessarily falls with the m- tuition on which it reposes," that " a representative perception is an hypothetical explanation of a supposititious fact ; and creates the nature it interprets." These are strong statements, and would require to be well authenticated. ^Vhen it is said that « the intuition of external things is rejected," there is in the statement nothing more than the intimation that the represen- tative theory is adopted : then it is assumed a»s indisputable that " the existence of external things is given only through their intuition," and building on this cool assumption, he exclaims, " to annihilate what is prior and constitutive in the phenomenon, is in truth, to annihilate the phenomenon altogether." What is\he intuition with Sir William Hamilton ? It is the assump- tion of the whole question at issue : it is tJi£ perception itself; and there the matter ends ! Any explanation pertaining to the TTwdus operandi of the perception he not only refuses to give ; but he will Dot lulinit thiU xuiy explanation is possibk. We say that in the cxre its actual dir covoiy aa a fact : it Li a qucsjtion purely a pofUrlori, such thiit having in actual poewcswion certain mental data, wc have to deal Willi thcw ihita. not as inatrtimontality for deducing any infer- ence of ncccHKity, but asc themaehrea objceta in thought to be explained how they came thearei In short, tW necessity of an external worUl is not the primary inquiry ; but the problem is to explain the fact Let Sir William take the cxiHjrience which he saya comes through aenae, or the experience which lie says eomca tlirxmgh what he calls sclf-conucionaneas, still he offers nothing but experience — tlifit ox]X!rioncM> which with him is tantamount to non-neeeasity. Sir William theo being arbit4-»r, we conclude tl^at experience, and experience only, can deal with this very quewtion^ vix., the phenomenon in condciousiMSS of an external world. Wo proceed to the snxth and la*t aipimcnt of Sir William Hauiilion, vix., that " an hypothesis itself is pn>l«hhj in propor- tion as it workH simply and naturally, that i«> in prop4>rtion aic it is dependent on no subskliaiy hypothesis— as it involve* no- thing petitory, occult, supernatural, as an element of its expla- Mtion." Now what is the cluurge of Sir Willmm Agmnst UifO ilocirine of a representative perception ? lie says : '' to cxpbin lit all it must not only poetAilato subsidiary hypothesos, but Mihsidiaiy mintclcac'* He says ** it is iui|Kjo«ible by any eon- oeivablo relation to ai)ply the ratio to the facta " — the ratio of ktumMife to the fact of an unknown vwrUL ** Tlie mental ttodiiicsition (he says) in this case repr99enis the reality of an oxienial world.*' * The mind cither knows the riuility wlcd>ce of external things which coiwdouaness affirms) if tlie mind be admitted to be cognisant of the outer reality in itself prvvioui toreprescntAtion, tlie end towanl whidi the hypothesis was iion : the repre8entanonij!.U dtaeaid intuition as regards p.rcoption, and say tliat the mind scea external reality hj representation. How, then, does Sir William come to hid Tusion ? " If the mind Ix! lulniitted to be cogtusant of tlie outer reality in itself, jmrviou^i (o rtpreseniaiunt" &a Ad- mitted :— the very thing that is not admitted. Anything more make-believe was never perpetrated. Sir Willinm will have an a priw. But Altogether th« langaago aoems to ub out of pUce, UakI Sir Willioin 8tiithing coiihi hare htHsn moff^ reaaoniibU* ; but wu have at every point to t4ikc exception to the principled aMeiimod, and to tlie ooDcluxioD}; iw^erted, by our Author. There is no room whatever for the use of the tenn " blind/' ax nppl!cAt>lc to the mind, fdifyin)( iIhmm^ fact's, but mu4f^ accept them pnxri.sLdy iis. ihvy are primonliidly given. It is thus we say that the mind bl^oom(Ml enlightened ; that is that it haa a knowled^ of the facts ; that is that the fact« are m> presented to the Intellect, and bj the representation of them, it heooiJi iind, or Iuls a eoiutctouttieBis of tliem. WliSit then becomes of Sir William » " hy|Kjthojnii of a repre- aentative penMtpticm presuppotting a miracif. to let it work.^ Where is the mimcle ? " To ^y nothing of less illustrious schemes (he sap) the uyxtema of Divine Assistance, of a Pre- cstahli«hod Harmony, and of tlie Visioo of all thingM in the Deity, aie only so many subsidiary hypotheMU^ so many attempts to bridge, by supernatural machinery, the chMm Ixtwcen tlu: INTRODIWTION. xxxix represeniatlon and the? rCdJit}/, which ull hnnwm ingenuity haii found by natural means to h<^ ins('{)arahl(.'. Th(' liypothoflis of a representative-perception thus pro8uppo.so8 a viiracle to let it work." Indeed ! Dook it follow that, because certain *' illuHtrious schemes," which ar<» \itterly beyond the range of natural law, and inadmissible, th<^r(rf<)rt; no sclienie wluiUver i» admitisibK* ? This would be tying u« with the ^ordion knot of mvsttery with a vengeance, in that bocsiu.se this man fuid that man'K plan haa failed, ergo, it says all poewbility of aji <^xplamltion w at an end ! Does it follow that ** we are in^ceiMurily ignomnt of tlie n»odc in whieh causation operates*' becsuse no xatiK&ctory e:Kplunation may have been yet given of its rationale of openition ? or does it follow, b«?c^U9e Sir William IIamiUtion ; it is tluK, that the Intellect on which the reiNresentatton must be regarded as thrown, being of the nature of ffpirit^ so it would be a confounding of the dis* tinction between matter and Kpirit to say that the reprew'ntatioiw of the former could be carried to, and impressed on, the laUer. Wc are persuiultMl that there i* nothing whatever in sudi an objection. In tlie first place this objection, if it proved anything vrould prove too niueh : for we know as a simpk fad of con- BciouKueod, that there \n a junction betwixt our souls and our boditt. In the second place, we know that bodily states affect tlie condition of our whUk, even as n-e know that our souls can operate on our bodies. In the third place, we have reason to believe that matter itself is ftindamentally bssed on spirit; while that which we call spirit, rau.'it yet be regarded rimply ns re6ncd e««onee or substaDce^ susceptible of quality, or of qualities >» cssSBtially ilK own : even as the qiuilitic^ of matter. There idi i I !■ ■|*,-?s' xl INTRODUCTION. therefore no antecedent improbability of that which we call Intellect or intellectual spirit, that is spirit endowed with the characteristic of consciousness on receiving impressions, being the recipient of representations from the maieiial world, when the mechanism or instrumentality whereby those representations may be laid hold of, and conveyed to said spirit, is duly con- structed and adapted for such a purpose. We have that mechanism first of all in the external senses which are fitted to lay hold of representations in light, and sound, and savour, and smell, and touch ; having, as the organs of our senses have, a series of nerves which constitute the conduits of impressions to the great nerve-centres, where it is proved sensation hath its habitat, and where therefore it is natural and necessary to suppose that Intellect must have its locale. In this way then, what may be called a material representation in the Brain becomes (if we may say it) an immaterial image in the Mind. Where is the antecedent improbability of this, if we have the experience that matter itself is reducible to immaterial states ? Or should we not rather say, if there is an antecedent probability of matter itself being originally produced from immaterial states, (as we term them,) that the impressions of colour for example, coming from matter, and carried through an immaterial medium (i.e., through the ether which conveys light) to the organ of sight, as the nerve-terminus adapted to receive said impressions, should through the nerve be transmitted to, and be marked upon, that medium (the Intellect) which is adapted to receive it as an object of consciousness; and that Intellect must thus have the consciousness of it when the representation is conveyed to it ? Every fresh lesson in psychology confirms this view. But it may be said that our strictures do not justly fall on Sir William Hamilton, in as far as he is arguing against the hypothesis of Dr. Brown. We reply, that in the first place, the argument of Sir William is broadly against the doctrine of representation, which he thinks is unworthy of a philosopher ; and in the second place, that it falls to a certain extent harm- lessly against Brown, in as far as he assuredly is no more to be placed in the category of the representationists than is Dr Reid himself. All the difference we can discover betwixt Reid and Brown is that the former makes Perception " a peculiar power " of whose mode of operation neither he himself nor any other can INTRODUCTION. xli give an explanation ; while Brown speaks of Perception " as the result of a common and more general principle of the mind," which principle he calls "sensation and the associated suggestion," leaving us little wiser with the explanation than without it. No doubt he says, by way of query, " What can matter be in its relation to the percipient mind but the cause or occasion of sensations or perceptions." What then ? why he tells us that perception is " a sensation followed by reference to an external cause." This reference he calls " the suggesting or associating principle." " We have no need (he says) to invent a peculiar power of the mind for producing perception, since the principle of association, and that of an experience of consequents and antecedents suggest the object." Was Dr. Brovni then a repre- sentationist ? Why, he as well as Dr. Reid held " the image in the mind to be the mere relic of an obsolete theory in perception." (Lect. 25). But we may not follow the theories of philosophers. We are satisfied if we have been able to defend the theory of representa- tion against what has been regarded as the most ponderous onslaught which it has ever received in the arguments of Sir William Hamilton ; and which has been thought at once the most unansw^erable and the most complete attack thereon known. We are bold enough to venture to think that we are entitled to hold, that the theory of representation has ground to stand on, and that the attack of Hamilton can be proved after all to be without point and powerless. We still keep to the theory of representation, as explanatory of our perceptions : yes I and of every cognition we have under association, from Memory, from Imagination, or under any of the processes of conception. Section HI. — The Grounds and Rationale of Mental Operation generally. Having obtained a theory of Perception under which we have the consciousness of an external world, the question once more returns to us. Can we expound the phenomena of consciousness which we obtain in the exercise of Perception ? We believe this can be done upon perfectly adequate principles. If it cannot be done then we are shut up to this, that no result in chemistry or in natural science can be explained. All that we WW xlii INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. xliii desiderate for the communication betwixt the veritable object and the organ of sense, is nothing more than what the ordinary man of science requires to explain the reflection of the face on the mirror, or the reflection of the image on the photographic plate. It is ascertained without any hesitation as to its truth, that as there is a medium (air) necessary for the conveyance of one kind of message (sound), so there is a medium (ether) necessary for the conveyance of another kind of message (light) ; and it would be difficult to imagine the conveyance of any kind of message without some kind of medium as the bearer of it It would be difficult to imagine a message, an image, an im- pression, a representation of any kind whatever, sent forth and absolutely resting on nothing, and inhering in nothing. It would be easy to shew that such a supposed message could have no being at all, as having no substratum, no basis or bottom whereon it might inhere, or have itself framed, formed and expressed as an impression or condition. It seems tolerably obvious that the utterance must go at once to nonentity for want of a medium to receive it, to hold it, to convey it. This principle is of vast importance, for it is fundamental to the whole question. Again, it is essential, not only that there be a medium to receive an impression, but also that there should be a medium to convey it to the object that is a receptacle for it, as being adapted for its final resting place. One medium may be adapted for receiving an impression ; but the impression lies for the moment transient or evanescent on the surface, as on a mirror. Another medium may be so prepared as to retain the impression made upon it, as in the case of a photographic plate. Another as a transmitting medium tranfers the impression received, the impression being weakened, inversely as the square of the distance, at least, when free as in the extension of light through ether. In other media, when insulated, this law does not seem to be realised, as in the case of the telegraphic wire. On what principle can we account for the fact of transmissibility ? We find a law existing, that whatever afifection we impose upon a part of a certain material, the same affection pei-vades that material within certain limits. We may call it the law of trans- missibility, or the law of penetrability ; but there must be some understood principle on account of which transmission exists. We have such a principle : we believe that it lies at the foun- dation of all operation : yes I at the foundation of all movement in the world of mind, as well as in the world of matter. That principle may be, and is, displayed in numberless forms of move- ment : it gives occasion, indeed, to all mechanical movements, while itself is not mechanical. That principle is indebted for its operation to two antecedent attributes of primary existence, which we are content to posit in this place as postulates, but which are not postulates in point of fact, in that both are the necessary conclusions deduced from an analysis of the present economy of things. One is the universal subsistence of what may be called primary substance in a negative condition, having potentiality as its fundamental, inalienable, and in- separable prerogative. The other is the fundamental subsistence of what may be called also primary substance in a positive con- dition, having all power, as being the absolute holder of those essential qualities from which all subordinate qualities are derived. As regards the former, we have what is properly the Unconditioned absolutely : as regards the latter, we have what is properly the All-CONDITIONEd absolutely : the absolute as negative, and the absolute as ijositive. When we break down or negative quality after quality in matter — when we annihilate all that is positive therein, all that is perceptible and contingent in substance, there must still remain the ultimate substratum or suhstans in which the quality or qualities inhered — a persistent negative foundation which cannot be removed, and whose essen- tial attribute, as we have said, is potentiality, i.e., the capacity of manifesting, or giving expression to, quality when imparted, i.e., the capacity of manifesting force, and, therefore, of exerting power when no longer in a negative, but in a positive condition. Again : when we examine into the state of things in creation, compounded and re-compounded as it is of secondary qualities, all traceable to a quality or qualities more primary in character, we are constrained inevitably to come to some ultimate pri- mordium, as the foundation of all that is positive in the world ; for it is utterly impossible to suppose the positive to spring from pure negation. Hence two things both inferring the doctrine of Ajffinity. One is that on the supposition of there being pri- mordially a negative? suhstans (i.e., wholly unconditioned), being intrinsicaOy without any quality, but receptive thereof as the xliv INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. Jv h wl positive, as something formed, it must have affinity, i.e., a ready receptivity for all that pertains to the positive, being the universal medium of transmitting the characteristics of quality wherever it is positively lodged. Another is, that on the supposition of primitive positive attributes of quality in uno, all the sub- qualities ultimately derived therefrom must of necessity have an affinity to the primary quality from which they are derived and more or less to one another ; and it is but rational to suppose that under potentiality, one quality must shew its affinity to another, according to the nature of the conditions, either by attraction, as marking a sympathy of one quality for another, or by repulsion, as marking an antipathy of the one to the other. Affinity, therefore, must be indefinitely various, and it is the principle by which we account for the convection in space of an impression or an image from one substance to another, when the conditions are favourable for that end, as in optics, &c. This principle of affinity is acknowledged in point of fact We have sought to point to the philosophy of the principle ; but there is not a writer on chemistiy but points to the fact itself, and points to it as illustrated under a variety of forms. Chemical affinity constitutes one of the fundamental questions whereby the laws of combination betwixt different chemical properties are established. Then apart from this, but doubtless in intimate connexion with this, we have the various forms of w^hat have been called mechanical attraction, in the attra vessels, while the foecal matter, as it is called, is gathered together as residue, and is thrown out by the large intestine at the other end of the alimentary canal ? The operation of every separate portion can only be explained by referring it to its own peculiar law of affinity ; and it is said to be peculiar, in as far as affinity operates in dependance on the precise conditions of the substances which come together. Whatever organ we choose xlvi INTRODUCTION. f'J to consider, whether the liver in its formation or excretion of bile, or the kidney in its power of eliminating water from the blood, or the skin in its power of drawing perspiration from the system, all is referable to the operation of affinity. Physiologists know of no other law. They see the fact : they see the elective law of affinity at work, and the repulsive law of affinity at work ; and with this law they are able to account for all the composition on the one hand, and disintegration on the other, which pervades the whole of the functions of the living struc- ture of the body. We ask for the same principle in psychology, to account for the operations of mind. We say the eye is made for seeing, and the ear for hearing, the nostril for smelling, and so forth. What is this but saying that the eye has an affinity for colours, the ear an affinity for sounds, and the nostril an affinity for scents ? And farther : what is this but sapng, that the eye with the nerve attached to it hath an affinity for, and a readiness to transmit, the images which alight on the retina ; and that the ear hath an adapta- tion to catch the impression of sounds, and that the nerve attached thereto hath a readiness, as a telegraphic wire, to transmit the same ; and that, correspondingly, the nerves of the nostril have a readiness to lay hold of, and to transmit, the quality known as scent or odour ? The nerve which is attached to the eye will not answer the purpose of the nerve which is attached to the ear : nor will that of the ear answer the purpose of the eye : nor will either the one or the other suffice for the purpose of smell. Each organ is fitted with its own peculiar apparatus, and constituted for its own individual function, which it is meant to fulfil ; and this it does fulfil, and no other. Now upon what principle does any one of these organs operate ? We see the fact of their distinctive operation : what explana- tion can we give of the fact ? What explanation can we possibly give beyond that of affinity ? We find the principle of affinity in operation in other departments of physiology : what other principle can we imagine to be at work in the department of the senses ? In physics we speak of conduction and non- conduction ; and we ascribe the conducting or non-con- ducting power of substances according to their different quali- ties as material substances : and what is this but ascribing it to their various affinities ? for affinity is found to differ, even I I INTRODUCTION. xj^jj as quality differs, and to vary as the temperature or condition ot quality vanes. Having, then, an external apparatus in the body, exposed to all that prevails m the world, and adapted for each department to catch the representation of all that prevails in the world • and to transmit the same inwardly, as by so many telegraphic media to a terminus within : what is required, as the terminating ground or receptacle of these varied phenomena, but a subject receptive of them all, and out of which shall be evolved the con sciousness of these separate freights or transfers, if we may so term them that have been conveyed through the separate senses ? and a consciousness of them, too, under th^ m-ecise characteristics ivith which they come. That there may be a substance receptive of all that is separately received by the eve and the ear, and the nostril, and the palate, and the touch of the body generaHy is obvious enough from what we experience in the world. Take, for example, the most refined of all sub- stances made known to us, viz., ether : we find it to be the recipient, as a connecting medium, of the conditions of matter For instance, it takes in that quality which links one body of matter into connexion with another body of matter, as exem- plified in the various phenomena of gravitation : It is the chain hat links them. Again, it takes in the phenomenon of luminosity generally, so that a lighted body will have its con- dition of light transmitted, even as the homologies of attraction are transmitted decreasing in intensity, like gravitation, as the square of the distance. Again, it takes in the images of mate- nal substance, when the condition of luminosity is present as we see by the numberless photographic experiments which 'are now in vogue. But let us take an example in the gross world ot matter, i.e., of highly positive substance : take the soil of the earth. It is a receptacle for all kinds of seeds, and yields nutri- men for them all Eyeiy kind of plant, whatever its own peculiar affinity, and however different from everv other plant hnds a maternal bosom in the receptive character of " mother- eartk Even so we beUeve, there is subjectively that substance ^h.ch we name Intellect, having as its essential attribute a gene- ral receptivity for aU that is transmissible by the five senses when the impressions so transmitted first become ideas, and are termed percepts, or things perceived, and second, cognitions as I "2-*^ xlviii INTRODUCmON. INTRODUCTION. xlix fi correlatives of ideas, and which are stored up in Intellect under the name of knowledge. We make a distinction betwixt the consciousness and the cognition ; although it is utterly impossible to separate the one from the other. There can be no cognition without conscious- ness ; that is, wherever there is perception there is a conscious- ness of the thing perceived ; that is, where there is the cognition of an outward object there also is the consciousness of it, aa aroused by the presence of the object. The selfsame distinction is applicable to all consciousness and cognition in Imagination, for example, as well as in Perception. In distinguishing betwixt the cognition and the consciousness, we introduce a most useful and most needful discrimination, as applicable to the nomen- clature which prevails in the science of mind. We have reason to be dissatisfied with the looseness with which different terms are employed to signify the same thing. We believe that most of the terms in use have a precise and peculiar signification ; and in such a pursuit, especially as psychology implies, it is particularly necessary that there should be an entire under- standing as to the exactness of its terminology, without which we get beclouded in misconceptions, and confounded by mis- apprehensions. We believe, then, that consciousness more immediately expresses the force which pertains to an exercise of the mind, while cognition ought properly to be confined to the form thereof. Let it be noted that there is no form in the world unaccompanied by some kind of force, and that there is no force unaccompanied by some kind of form. It is incon- ceivable that there should be so, w^hether we think of the question experimentally, or empirically, or philosophically. Philosophically we cannot imagine the exercise of force without some definite quality or qualities present in some form or an- other, as giving rise to the force, and as employed in it. We can, no doubt, imagine potentiality or the capacity of force y as in the unconditioned, w^here no positive quality is ; but we can- not, in these circumstances, imagine the actual exertion of force, because the purely unconditioned contains nothing which should bring out operation in any way — in one way more than in an- other ; for there is in utter emptiness no means of force, because there is no positive ground for disturbance, seeing there is no scope for the operation of the law of affinity. There can be no affinity where there is nothing positive, and, therefore, nothing that can be operative. It is under the positive, and the positive alone, that force is at all a possibility ; and where the positive is, there must in the very nature of things be some form or another attached to it. We cannot imagine the posi- tive without form. We say, then, that form and force are in- separable from one another ; and yet that they are not to be confounded. Particularly, they should not be confounded in a science where such deHcate and nice distinctions have to be made as in Psychology. Let us apply this doctrine of two inseparables to describe phenomena in the province of mind. We must say, of course, that every impression has necessarily its force and form : how,' then, are these distinguished and described as the impression comes to belong to the category of mind ? First of all the force becomes sensation, and the form becomes idea ; so that there is no sensation without its accompanying idea, and, of course, there is no idea without its accompanying sensation. Idea and sensation are, therefore, inseparable : the former indicating the formi of the impression as it enters the territory of mind ; and the latter indicating the force with which said form is a' "-Peaklble imp^rnce to weigh well ; for nothing has more impeded the march to a he H ffl ^^P°f' °.\°f '"^^.tal philosophy, and of theology, than he difficulty (which has kept the learned from receiving the dogma) that the soul is indebted for its acquisitions to material 5 U'. 51 Ix INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. bd y states; and this difficulty, moreover, has the rather prevailed, lest we should, by admitting this much, fall mto the doctrme of materialism. If a little reflection were but spent on this topic, it would be found that material states as such are one thing, and the representation of these material states in a different ground is quite another thing ; that material states as such, in their crass and literal composition, must needs go to coiTuption and decay, but that the representation of these, in a refined and attenuated element, whose unsullied forms (righteousness) are maintained by the sphere in which it comes to reside, need not go to decay ; but, while unquestionably it may lose certain representations when the means of retaining them, or the agency for maintaining them, is no longer available, that it may yet hold fast, world without end, those cognitions which the economy of bcino- it lives in, or comes to live in, is fitted to sustain. Our sketch of the economy of Intellect, and of its mode of operation, would be imperfect if we did not advert to what have been improperly termed " the active powers," as well as " the inteUectual." There is the e-notional in man as weU as the cognoscent Whence comes the emotional ? It is noticeable that it is a totally new force quite different, or at all events quite distinct, from mere sensation, or from the consciousness which is correlative with sensation ; and, farther, that it is absolutely dependent on certain pre-existing states. These pre- existing states may be briefly described as some special condition of self on the one hand as a base, and some idea or ideas on the other hand, as ingredients commingling with that base, and which thus have been brought into a particular relation to se t. As to self, it will be tolerably evident that it is fundamentaUy made up' of that which constitutes the representation of our bodily condition, which representation, as bearing along with it what is called temperament, is reflected on, and is therefore characteristic of Intellect. And, secondarily, this fundametital self comes to be modified or attempered by the principles which we receive imder educational training, and by the acquisitions of our varied experience in the world. Thus then self stands m direct relation to every idea which enters the sensorium ; and it becomes more or less a^ted upon by ideas, according to the particular relation in which they may happen to stand as affect- ing self. Consequently the idea which enters the sensorium !> to be regarded as forming with that temperament which con- stitutionally belongs to self, an emotion or new excitation more or less apparent, according to the character of the idea received. We see then that emotion is a new impulse or force, more violent as a rule than mere sensation ; and the character in which said force is manifested, whether as an appetite or a desire, or an affection so called, follows according to the precise idea or ideas through which the emotion happens to have sprung. It is not our purpose here to descant upon the variety and character of our Emotions. What we have to say is, that they are all of them produced on the territory of the sensational ; and of course InteUect is correspond ingly affected by them, not simply as having a cognition of them, for that would not be the proper term, but as having a correlative feeling of them. Hence we are disposed to say that Feelings express in pure Intellect what are indicated by Emotions as pertaining to the sensorium Emotions are frequently little else than the ebullition produced by the presence of some initating or disturbing idea or ideas ; and when they are carried to excess they are termed Passions •' and while there may sometimes be a contest of contending impulses among the inferior emotions, one of which only can terminate in volition, there is for the most part, at all events in all free spirits, a counteractive emotion under a moral or spiritual mtuition, which arises to control or to direct the inferior for the purposes of determination. Will is the name in Intellect correlative to the determinating emotion, and as there can be no determination without /o?^, in respect of some idea embodied, as well as force, so we would say Sentiment is the form with which Will, as a force, is inseparably conjoined. Section IV.—The Eationale of Causality. We have only to add on this important point that, apart from the exposition now offered, as to the fact of the Ego being, on the one hand, a purely subjective economy, made up of the knowledge which it happens to have attained ; and, on the other hand, as fundamentally receiving the material of its knowledge Irom a source objective to itself; and as preserving its operative character, through its cerebral instrumentality, in virtue of the mental furniture— the ideas and thoughts^with which it stands Ixii INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. Ixi 111 I) h 1 correlatively built up under the name of knowledge, we find in this connexion of body with intellect a thoroughly consistent scheme, harmonizing with all we know of the relationship of the body to the mind, and of its influence thereupon ; and, again, of the relationship of the mind to the body, and of its power over the same. Let us, as briefly as we can, look into these processes of operation ; and having before us certain clear, consistent, and well defined principles of Causality,— principles which have their validity maintained, not in one department only, but in a?/— not in the region of Physics only, but in that of Physiology also ; and not in Physics and Physiology merely, but in Psychology also : we can appeal to them as principles of causality, which have their universal application in all the developments of natural law. One principle of Causality to which we appeal as the founda- tion of all operation is Affinity. But why operation? We answer, out of affinity proceeds either attraction or repulsion as the expression of the phasis or feature presented by two or more distinctive qualities when they come together. Before affinity can operate, it is essential that there should preliminarily be that conjunction or contiguity externally, whereby the separate qualities are brought within the sphere of each other's influence. If the sphere of influence in gravitation and light, for example, operate inversely as the solid content multiplied by the square of the distance, it is obvious that the extension of the influence of a body must diminish as the square of the distance. In this case, the Ether, which underlies all positive material substance, taking on the characteristic affection of the material quality, constftutes the link of union whereby one quality touches and affects another, and consequently whereby the mutual action of the qualities is manifested. But again : in order to the free operation of different qualities of substance, or as we would popularily say of different substances in a combination, the continuity or conjunction must be much more immediate, much more'proximate and close, while of course, moreover, their opera- tion depends on the respective conditions of the qualities in question. In order, then, to the operation of any definite causality there must first be the ingredients in a certain determinate condition: second, the ingredients in a certain nearness or proximity to one another in a combination : and third, tlie Ingredients in a certain order of nearness ; fur according to the order or rank in which they stand to each other, that is according to the order of the external relation, so will they affect each other, and so will the result be accordingly modified. What then constitutes Cause ? We answer the external relation of the ingredients as having an internal affinity to one another The external relation consists in the conjunction or contio-uity of the factors, and the order in which they happen to be joined to one another. The internal relation lies in the precise character of the affinity which the qualities of the separate factors hold to one another, and which the conditions of those qualities may happen to modify. The operation of these con- chtions thus brought into combination, we call Cause; and the fuljilment of their function, we call Effect The effect is the phenomenon produced under the law of their operation Having thus briefly laid down what we regard as the Formula oi Causality, and, consequently, the principles of Causality we should proceed to apply them. But ere we do this let us pass briefly in review the doctrines which have prevailed on this deeply important topic by the views of Mr. Hume. Mr Hume was perplexed by the subject of Causality. He says, " were Ideas loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them • and tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly 'into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another." Yet he adds-" nor are we to conclude that without it, the mind cannot join two ideas " fepeakmg of Association, he says, "the qualities from which this association rises, and by which the mind is after this manner conveyed from one idea to another, are three, viz., resemblance, contiguity, and cause and efectr " 'Tis plain (he goes on) that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our Ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the ancy a sufficient bond and association. 'Tis likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to one another the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects." And as to his third power of 'l ^;i r : i I" ■. i; !* V n it )l«' Ixiv INTRODUCTION. association, he says, " there is no relation which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recal another than the relation of cause and effect be- twixt their objects." It is observable here that Mr. Hume sepa- rates resemblance and contiguity from the- category of causa- lity, whereas they are preliminary principles, without which there can be no csi\issi\ity— resemblance as an internal relation simply marking the similarity of condition, and, consequently, implying the principle of Affinity as existing betwixt two ideas, and in virtue of w^hich the one is attracted to, and therefore associated with, and so lays hold of, the other ; and contiguity marking the proximity essential, as an external relation, to this operation, and without which affinity cannot come into opera- tion, while the function is neither more nor less than an example of cause and effect While Mr. Hume erred in setting forth resemblance and con- tiguity as separate from causality, he says, " of the three rela- tions above-mentioned this of causation is the most extensive." Speaking of the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas he says, " here is a kind of attraction which in the mental w^orld will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and various forms." It is hence obvious that Mr. Hume had really got hold of the principle of Affinity, as comprehending attraction and its oppo- site repulsion ; but as to " the causes of attraction (he says) they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities of human nature which I pretend not to explain." Granting that we had no means of explaining this operation of Affinity, still it would be a matter of immense moment to be able to lav down the dogma, that there is an affinity betwixt the various qualities of substance, that out of this is effected that com- position which we find to exist in the world ; and that the composition which we find in the world is simply the pheno- mena or effects which arise from the operation of causality. Keeping to the connexion or association of ideas, Mr. Hume says, " those complex ideas which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning, and which arise from some prin- ciple of union among our simple ideas, may be divided into relations, modes and substances. Under the head of " Rela- tions " Mr. Hume comprehends resemblancey identity, space and INTRODUCTION. I XV tivie, quantity or number, degree, contraHety, cause and effect. Under the head of " Modes and Substances," Mr. Hume says, '' we have no idea of substance distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have w^e any other meaning when we cither talk or reason concerning it" Again, he says, " the par- ticular qualities which form a substance are commonly referred to an unknown something in which they are supposed to iuhera" Mr. Hume very closely touches the truth in these words, though he yet speaks of this " unknown something " as " a fiction " that might not be realized. We cannot enter here upon what might be termed the philosophy of substance, but we will venture to say, that every man who has the use of his .senses, has the idea of substance — an idea, as Mr. Hume pro- perly supposes, not gathered by one sense sjmply, but by means of all our senses combined, as conveying to us the various qualities of which positive substance is composed ; and sa>nng this, we will venture to affirm that, logically, Mr. Hume ought fundamentally to have settled the question of Substance, and of the modes or conditions into which it is disposable, before he discoursed on the Relations of substance. If we are ever to attain to a rational understanding of this great question, we must first of all attain to a clear definition of what is Substance. Without turning aside to examine the process of our principles here, we would say that Substance fundamentally is both nega- tive and positive— that negative Substance is not directly per- ceptible to our senses, and is only knowable from an examina- tion of positive substance, and that, by an abrogation of the contingent, we reach the uncontingent or the unconditioned, which has, as such, and can have, no self-operation of its ow^n, and therefore no inherent law of self-operation of its own, but that it has, as its absolutely inherent property, the capacity of operation, its two-fold attribute being potentiality and the sus- ceptibility of receiving positive qualities ; and so through these the faculty of giving expression to them. This unconditioned then is to be regarded as the foundation of positive substance, m other words, as the substratum in which positive conditions mhere. Hence positive substance is to be regarded, even as Hume points out, as " a collection of particular qualities," and we add, qualities inhering in this negative substance, as the absolute foundation of all positive substance. And if negative Ixvi INTRODUCTION. substance, as operative, is traceable to its one attribute, viz., potentiality or the capacity of force ; so positive substance, while of course derived from some more fundamental quality or qualities, Truiy he traceable to one positive attribute, viz., a Primary Quality, as the spring or source of all derived quality. What we say then is this, that if all the qualities of substance, cognisable by our senses, are derived from one original and fundamental quality, all these derived qualities, as the offspring of a primordial parent, must have a relationship, a blood relationship, and hence an affinity more or less proximate, — an internal relationship, in virtue of which, avS being a resevihlance more or less close, they must have an attraction for one another, according to the normal states or modifications in which they stand to each other. ^ Consequently, it is obvious, that as con- ditions or subconditions come to be imposed on an existing quality, it is but natural to suppose that there would arise an aversion, i.e.y a repulsion, in this condition to other qualities that had received a different process of generation. The multiplica- tion of qualities from one primordial quality, like the multipU- cation of races from one primordial family, would exhibit a general unity and inherent affinity in its composition ; and the likes and dislikes, — the preferences and aversions, w^ould con- stitute the natural basis of operation in the kingdom of nature. We find it to be even so. We find that according to the conditions which come together in any given combination, so is the law of operation defined which happens to prevail therein. And now a w^ord wnth respect to Mr. Hume's Relation's. He defines a relation to be " either that quality by which two ideas are connected in the imagination, or that particular circumstance in which we may think proper to compare them." We would not say that relation is a '* quality ; " and assuredly it is loose to speak of relation as " circumstance." Nor is it philosophical to speak of it as the connexion of two ideas in the imagination ; for though we cannot think of relation but under such a con- nexion, still it is proper to regard it, not as simply a mental state, but as an objective alliance, of which the mind has an apprehension. Relation may fairly be regarded as the incident, the hearing, the significance, which one quality has to another. But this definition fails to cover this important w^ord, or at all events to distinguish its separate departments. Relation belongs INTRODUCTION. Ixvii to two departments: the one internal, the other external. Internal relation is that kind of alliance, filiation, or family connexion which marks a quality as of the race, stock, or lineage of another; and having a derivation, indicates a resenihlance in brother-hood or generation to that quality w^ith which it is compared, and with which it claims affinity. To this category belongs what may be called the relationship of Condition, when the same quality may be manifested under a variety of different conditions as solid, liquid, gaseous, &c., and its operative affinity is changed accordingly. Exte^mal relation again indicates what we may call local adjustments, when one element is near to or distant from another or presents some attitude wdiich particularly affects the internal relation of one thing to another. The external relation has respect to the kind of outward combination which happens to be made to subsist betwixt two or more factors^ and which must always he foi*nud hefore the internal relations can operate. We would lay down this as a maxim, that Con- tiguity or Conjunction, as an external relation, is absolutely pre-essential to constitute the operation of any law, in that this constitutes the appliance of the particular internal relations, out of which all the activities of Causality are manifested. As Mr. Hume is at fault with respect> to his definition of Relation, so he is at fault with respect to his list of relations. This list we have seen comprises resenihlance, identity, space and time, quantity or numher, degree, contrariety, cause and effect. We admit that Reseinhlance is a relation; but w^herein does it differ from Degree, which points to the different shade of intensity in respect to the character of any quality ? We doubt whether Identity is properly to be termed a relation, though it be that foundation without which no relation could exist. Were there no other object but one in the universe, that object could have no relations, because relations imply something not of self. It may be asked how can identity be ascertained ; and in fact how can anything be known unless by its relations ? Identity is sameness in the relation of time and space : but the sameness is not a relation ; the wim(^nos8 is merely the continu- ance of a fact witlioui change. If then we make identity a relation, it after all sinks into the category of time, and does not touch the primary con.stituting of the fact. S^xice and Time are relations; but unlike to the relation of quality, thoy are Ixviii INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. Ixix purely abstract and external relations ; and because abstract, they therefore do not change the operation of causality in any respect ; for if condition remains the same ; and if local relation (that is contiguity) remains the same, the self-same result must always and everyivhere follow : that is time, or space, as abstract, enters not into the category. For what is mistakingly called time, as really involved in a question of causality, is but tlie change which has taken j)lace in the condition of tJte ingredients theni- selves, in comparing a combination of factors at two different periods. Again : as to calling Quantity a relation, just as to calling Quality a relation, there is in point of fact the relation of quantity, as when one bulk is compared with another ; just as there is the relation of quality when one essence is compared with another ; but then this sinks into the question of degree ; deo-ree, therefore, is a relation which pertains to the external and also to the internal category. We would not say, for example, that Number ^yer se is a relation ; yet it is that category out of which an infinite series of relations is formed. And so Quantity is properly that category out of which endless relations may be formed. We can abstract number and represent it symbolically, and out of it form a science perfect and exact ; and this because the extreme simplicity of the relation is, as far as it is a relation, one of number with number : this relation being affected by no other. We can in like manner abstract Quantity and represent it symbolically ; and out of it we can similarly form an exact science; exact because the symbols which represent the quantities are hampered or interfered with by no foreign elements: consequently there is present but one kind of relationship : consequently the results must of necessity depend on, and arise out of, that very degree and character of relationship which the Algebraic symbols hold to one another. In like manner we can abstract and sym- bolize Form, and so constitute an exact science of Geometry. But we cannot correspondingly symbolize Time, because time being dependent on motion, being the phenomenon arising fi'om the transition from one point to another, or from one state to another, as denoting change, we cannot procure a fundamental abstract symbol out of which to indicate the relationships of change which mark the points of Time. Therefore, in order to exhibit the manifestation of Time, we must always have a con- crete substance, indicating change of position with respect to ^ome other substance. The fundamental measure of time in this world of ours is the diurnal motion of the earth with respect to the sun, i.e., a motion indicating alternately a time of darkness and a time of light, the complete circuit of revolution being a fixed interval. This fixed inter^^al we are enabled to divide into twenty-four equal parts by the artificial movements of a well recmlated clock. Each of these parts, or subintervals of motion, we break up or apportion into sixty equal sections called minutes ; and again these minutes we similarly dismember mto sixty eoual parts called seconds : these being the smallest intervals we have practically any need for. As there is found no means of practically symbolizing Time, so there is found no means of svmbolizing Quality, so as to procreate for ourselves an exact science in this department, as we can for example m the depart- ment of Space, of which Geometr)^ furnishes an illustration. That there does exist such an exact science in creation no one can doubt who has observed the precise and definite hmitations where^nth the world generally abounds : limitations as curiously and beautifully illustrated in the framework of our o^vn bodies, as elsewhere in the different departments of nature : limitations which must have been imposed by the Omniscient Creator in adapting means to ends: limitations out of which the laws of substance, in its combination with substance, have their precise and necessary operation : limitations which thus go to constitute the foundation of the laws of nature: limitations therefore in virtue of which God fulfils the purposes or designs of his first thought for the world. That the concrete conditions of substance, as prepared and projected for the world in their multiform com- binations under which the laws of nature (a^ we call them) operate, are but the determinations of a j>reUmxnaTy science oi creation ere creation began, can hardly be questioned ; and that the laws of nature thus projected, as founded upon the definit<. combination of certain measured conditions, have their limitations thus assigned, cannot be questioned : and that whatever devia- tions should take place in consequence of the varying develop- ments of conditionamong thefactors of each different combination, (deviations which, by. the way, constitute the sources of our freedom, while they give interest and ever-recumng beauty to creation), these deviations, like the ever-varymg ^^es of the kaleidoscope, are after all hedged up and circumscnbed by the 1 • • ' Ixviii INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. Ixix purely abstract and external relations ; and because abstract, they therefore do not change the operation of causality in any respect • for if condition remains the same ; and if local relation (that is 'contiguity) remains the same, the self-same result must always and everyivhere follow : that is time, or space, as abstract, enters not into the category. For what is mistakmgly called time, as really involved in a question of causality, is but tJie change which has taken place in the condition of th^ ingredients them- selves, in comparing a combination of factors at two different periods Again : as to calling Quantity a relation, just as to callino- Quality a relation, there is in point of fact the relation of quantity, as when one bulk is compared with another; just as there is the relation of quality when one essence is compared with another ; but then this sinks into the question of degree ; decrree therefore, is a relation wliich pertains to the external and also to'the internal category. We would not say. for example that Number per se is a relation ; yet it is that category out of which an infinite series of relations is formed. And so Quantity is properly that category out of which endless relations may be formed. We can abstract number and represent it symbolically, and out of it form a science perfect and exact ; and this because the extreme simplicity of the relation is, as far as it is a relation, one of number with number : this relation being affected by no other We can in like manner abstract Quantity and represent it symbolically ; and out of it we can similarly form an exact science; exact because the symbols which represent the quantities are hampered or interfered with by no foreign elements: consequently there is present but one kind of relationship : consequently the results must of necessity depend on, and arise out of, that very degree and character of relationship which the Algebraic symbols hold to one another. In like manner we can abstract and sym- bolize Form, and so constitute an exact science of Geometry. But we cannot correspondingly symbolize Time, because timo being dependent on motion, being the phenomenon arising from the transition from one point to another, or from one state to another, as denoting change, we cannot procure a fundamenta abstract symbol out of which to indicate the relationships ot change which mark the points of Time. Therefore, in order to exhibit the manifestation of Time, we must always have a con- crete substance, indicating change of position with respect to some other substance. The fundamental measure of time in this world of ours is the diurnal motion of the earth with respect to the sun, i.e., a motion indicating alternately a time of darkness and a time of light, the complete circuit of revolution being a fixed interval. This fixed interval we are enabled to divide into twenty-four equal parts by the artificial movements of a well regulated clock. Each of these parts, or subintervals of motion, we break up or apportion into sixty equal sections called minutes ; and again these minutes we similarly dismember into sixty equal parts called seconds : these being the smallest intervals we have practically any need for. As there is found no means of practically symbolizing Time, so there is found no means of symbolizing Quality, so as to procreate for ourselves an exact science in this department, as we can for example in the depart- ment of Space, of which Geometrj'^ furnishes an illustration. That there does exist such an exact science in creation, no one can doubt who has observed the precise and definite limitations wherewith the world generally abounds : limitations as curiously and beautifully illustrated in the framework of our own bodies, as elsewhere in the different departments of nature : limitations which must have been imposed by the Omniscient Creator in adapting means to ends : limitations out of which the laws of substance, in its combination with substance, have their precise and necessary operation : limitations which thus go to constitute the foundation of the laws of nature : limitations therefore in virtue of which God fulfils the purposes or designs of his first thought for the world. That the concrete conditions of substance, as prepared and projected for the world in their multiform com- binations under which the laws of nature (as we call them), operate, are but the determinations of a preliminary science of creation ere creation began, can hardly be questioned ; and that the laws of nature thus projected, as founded upon the definite combination of certain measured conditions, have their limitations thus assigned, cannot be questioned : and that whatever devia- tions should take place in consequence of the varying develop- ments of condition among thefactors of each different combination, (deviations which, by. the way, constitute the sources of our freedom, while they give interest and ever-recurring beauty to creation), these deviations, like the ever- varying changes of the kaleidoscope, are after all hedged up and circumscribed by the Ixx INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. Ixxi nature and number of the combining ingredients, and therefore foreknown in their results. Whether man will ever come to understand the capacities of substance fundamentally, and to calculate beforehand what precise formula will represent the causal combination for fulfilling a given purpose, may perhaps, under the progressive efforts of the past, be regarded as by no means a hopeless expectation. In this great question he is as yet but a child learning, not exactly the use and application of the Alphabet, but the Alphabet itself. We have said that Degree must be regarded as a relation, in as far as it expresses the character of the resemhlance as near or remote, if it be an internal relation ; or the character of the association of the ingredients if it be an external relation. That Contrariety should be regarded as a relation seems at first not so certain, in as far as contrariety implies something foreign to the causality in question : yet as it does imply something antagonistic, something not simply on the negative side, but as positively on the reverse side, it may be regarded as the source of the affinity of repulsion as contrasted with the affinity of attraction. Mr. Hume brings in Causality itself as a relation. Why Causality is that category in which is comprehended the very constitution of relations : it is therefore out of all propriety to speak of cause and effect as a relation. Cause and effect (which two names together make what we understand by the term causality) represent but the phenomenon arising from the constitution of a relationship. It is a misnomer therefore to speak of these as implying relation. As recrards Relation then, we reduce this term as applicable only in two categories, the one bearing on what is external, and the other bearing on what is internal : the external relation having respect to the kind of association under which certain conditioned elements come together, and the internal having respect to the kind of affi^nity pertaining to the said combining elements, which affinity constitutes the operative or rwotiAje power in causality. We come now to consider Mr. Hume's views on what he calls " the idea of necessary connexion." " There is no question (he says) which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caused more disputes among philosophers." He asks " what idea we have of that eficacy which is the subject of the controversy ? " His belief is that it is derived from experience ; for he thinks " the supposition of an efficacy in any of the known qualities of matter is entirely with- out foundation." He thinks it " impossible in any one instance to shew the principle in which the force and agency of a cause is placed," and he challenges with defiance the discovery of " a power or operating principle." He oddly enough tells us that the essence of matter consists in extension ; but that extension properly " implies not motion, but mobility." " The Cartesians (he says) have had recourse to a Supreme Spirit or Deity, whom they consider as the only active being in the universe, and as the immediate cause of every alteration in matter." He refutes this supposition by saying that, if the idea of Deity be like every other impression, then it is impossible to discover an active principle in the Deity ! The same conclusion, he holds, is unavoidable as regards an efficacy attributable to second causes ; " for if we never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy, we never have any idea of power." Nor will he allow that the notion of power is acquired from the operations and volitions of the mind obeying the will ; for " there is no dis- coverable . connexion betwixt the cause and its effect, betwixt the act of volition and a motion of the body." The actions of the mind he regards as in this respect the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction, and can never reason beyond this. What Mr. Hume desiderates is the foundation of power : Whence does it spring ? Hence also he desiderates a comprehension of the connexion betwixt two objects, if operation be the result of their conjunction, so as to shew whence the operation comes, and so as to demonstrate the absolute impossibility for the consequent not to follow upon the antecedent. As he despairs of finding this, he concludes on the one hand that we deceive ourselves in imagining that we can form an idea of a being endowed with intrinsic force and energy ; and on the other hand that it is from a multiplicity of resembling interests that we gather the idea of a necessary con- nexion betwixt antecedents and consequents. " After we have observed the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant. This determination (he says) is the only effect of the resemblance, and therefore must be the same with power or efficacy, whose idea ^s derived from the Ixxii INTRODUCTION. resemblance." " Necessity thea is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another." In short, necessity (with Hume) is something that exists m the mind, not in the objects : it is but a determination to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes according to their experienced union. It belongs not to any energy in the causes, or in the Deity, or in the concurrence of these, but to the mind simply as considering the union of the objects in all past ex- perience. Hume was perfectly sensible of the paradox here proclaimed ; for it was ascribing as a cause that which he knew to be no cause, and making our nature a delusion in one of the most universal of its conclusions. Moreover, in declaring that no connexion whatever can be found betwixt causes and effects, he pronounced not only a paradox, but the utter impossibility of solving the problem of Causality. He defied the solution by denying the very datum on which alone the solution hangs. He held that " necessity is something that exists in the mmd, not in objects ; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it as a quality in bodies," He held that "^ the idea of necessity arises from some impression," because it is itself an impression ; but that " there is no impression conveyed by our senses, which can give rise to that idea." It is one of the most remarkable phenomena of our thinking that, on a subject of this sort, so much peq^lexity should exist. Hume puzzled himself ; and he has managed to puzzle others, in endeavouring to analyze the question. The dissertations of Kant and of Sir William Hamilton on this subject have only served to render confusion more confounded by the treatment which it has received. We have just quoted Hume affirming that it is " not possible to form the most distant idea of Tieces- sity considered as a quality in bodies." It seems to us strange that such an expression should have found utterance from so acute a philosopher ; and passing strange that the equally a