SHALL WE HAVE A REAL ^AYY 
 OR A SHAM ^AVYI 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. ABRAM S. HEWITT 
 
 OF NEW YORK, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
 
 JUNE 29, 1883. 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 1882. 
 
Soy Sf 
 
SPEECH 
 
 OK 
 
 HON ABEAM S. HEWITT 
 
 The House, in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, having under 
 consideration the hill (H. R. No. 6616) making appropriations for the naval service 
 for the fiscal year ending Juno 30, 1883, and for other purposes — 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York, said : 
 
 I desire at the outset, Mr. Chairman, to express my thanks to 
 the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Robeson] for the courtesy of 
 allowing me to defer the delivery of my remarks from yesterday 
 till to-day. But I am sure he will he as sorry as I am that his courtesy 
 has heen in vain, for I feel less ahle to-day to engage in this discussion 
 than I was yesterday. 
 
 Mr. ROBESON. As the gentleman from New York is not well, I 
 hope order will he preserved in the House, so we may hear his voice. 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York. I do not know I will be ahle to 
 speak in any voice, hut I shall make the effort. I think the House, 
 Mr. Chairman, has some^ reason to find fault with the Committee on 
 Appropriations for the delay which has taken place in reporting this 
 bill. If the bill is intended only to support the Navy and to carry 
 on its current operations, there could have been no reason why it 
 should have been delayed until the last week of the fiscal year. If, 
 on the other hand, the bill was intended for general legislation in 
 addition to providing for the ordinary course of expenditure, then 
 the House certainly has a grievance that it conies in at the very tail 
 of the session, when no opportunity is afforded for the consideration 
 of these general provisions, or for determining the effect they are 
 going to have on the future of the Navy. 
 
 My own conclusion is, it must have been withheld for the latter 
 reason. I find in it provisions of a very extraordinary nature which 
 have never been in any naval appropriation bill at anytime within 
 my memory. 
 
 To two of these items I propose to give some attention. The first 
 is the provision for beginning the construction of two new vessels 
 of war. The second is the provision for the completion of the moni- 
 tors. 
 
 Those who will read the bill attentively will find there is a very 
 curious distinction made in the bill between the appropriations for 
 these two purposes. In reference to building the new vessels the 
 language is that the Secretary may use the money. There is no ob- 
 ligation imposed on him. The provision is permissive. While in 
 regard to the completion of the monitors the language is that he 
 shall expend a million of dollars, which is appropriated for their 
 completion. This provision is mandatory and not permissive. 
 
 Now, whether this be accident or design, it seems to me that it 
 gives the key to the delay which has taken place in reporting this 
 bill and to the peculiar i^rovisions of the bill. In other words, this is 
 a bill designed in fact to secure the completion of the monitors. 
 
THE MONITORS. 
 
 I have no wish to enter into a history of those vessels. The hu- 
 miliating story has often been told. What I desire to do is to call 
 attention to a very extraordinary fact in the history of these mon- 
 itors which is brought out by the provisions of this bill, and which 
 shows that they have no legal existence, and that the effect of this 
 appropriation is for the first time to give them a legal recognition. 
 
 The monitors existed in 1874. They were live vessels. No sug- 
 gestion was ever made from any quarter I can discover, and I have 
 endeavored to read every line referring to this transaction — no sug- 
 gestion was ever made except for the repair of these monitors. The 
 Secretary of the Navy refers to them in his annual report of 1874-'75, 
 and again in his annual report of 1875-'76 ; and in both cases he speaks 
 of the repairs of these monitors. In the investigation which took 
 place in the Forty-fourth Congress the Secretary made a personal 
 statement before the committee, and in that statement, as I have 
 read it from beginning to end and many times, in defense of his ac- 
 tion in regard to these monitors it was always put upon the ground 
 of repairs. There is no suggestion anywhere in any official report, 
 either of the Secretary or of any head of bureau, that any new vessels 
 were to be built. 
 
 The question for which the Secretary was called to account, if I 
 maybe permitted to use the language, in the Forty-fourth Congress, 
 was whether he was justified in using old materials of the Navy for 
 the repair of these monitors, not in the navy-yards of the United 
 States, for about that there was no controversy, but in the ship-yards 
 of contractors. I will do the Secretary the justice to say in his state- 
 ment he expressed grave doubts as to wttiether he had any such 
 authority. He says he consulted the Committee on Appropriations, 
 and the evidence shows that he did so ; and there the question is 
 always, May the old material be used for the repair of vessels which 
 are to be repaired in private navy-yards and not in the navy-yards 
 of the United States ? • 
 
 The Secretary took that authority. My own opinion is it was un- 
 lawful, but nevertheless it was the exercise of a discretion which if 
 properly exercised could have done no harm to the public interest, 
 and I should be the last man to call him to account for the exercise 
 of authority in excess of the law which he thought he had and which 
 was intended for the public good. 
 
 Now. bearing in mind that repair was the object of the transac- 
 tions which have resulted in giving us these five monitors now to 
 dispose of, here comes a very remarkable fact as to one of these ves- 
 sels unquestionably, and as to the others probably, but in what I 
 say now I shall refer only to monitor Puritan, now in the dock of 
 Mr. John Eoach, at Chester. 
 
 In his report of 1874 Secretary Eobeson says : 
 
 Of the iron-clad or armored vessels sixteen are of a class and in condition for 
 actual and efficient service. lour of the class of powerful douhle-turreted monitors 
 are actually in hand undergoing repairs, and the fifth is well worth the same at- 
 tention. [Xote — The fifth was the Puritan.] But the remainder may he counted as 
 really useless for any actual or efficient purpose. 
 
 Now, the Secretary sits in his office and accepts, as in the very 
 nature of things he must accept, as facts the reports of his heads of 
 bureaus. So I turn to the report of Mr. Isaiah Hanscom, dated De- 
 cember 3, 1874, to the Secretary, and from which undoubtedly the 
 Secretary himself made up his report, and find : 
 
 As yet no work has been done to the Puritan, owing to the want of funds ; hut 
 
"'a design is being prepared to make that vessel a powerful iron-clad with a high 
 rate of speed, to be armed with four 10-inch rifled guns, to be heavily plated, &c. 
 
 Now let it be remembered that' this was December 3, 1874, on the 
 very day when the letter of Mr. Hanscorn to Mr. John Roach, or 
 Mr.' Roach to Mr. Hanscom — I forget the exact order, but for the 
 present purpose it is immaterial — in regard to the Puritan is dated. 
 
 Now we come to the report of 1875-'76, and in this the Secretary- 
 says, under the head of " iron-clads:" 
 
 Five of them — 
 
 That, of course, means the other four and the Puritan, namely, the 
 double-turreted monitors Anrphitrite, Monadnojck, Miantonomoh, 
 and the Terror — 
 are in process of complete repair, — 
 
 Note the word "repair;" under repair always until the pending 
 bill, which now for the first time provides for their completion as 
 new vessels — 
 
 requiring from four to sis months to finish. 
 
 And I may state, in passing, that there is a strange discrepancy 
 in regard to the time that is allowed for the completion of this work 
 between the head of the bureau and the statement of the contractor, 
 Mr. Roach, who names eighteen months in his letter to the head of 
 that bureau. But there is no evidence to show that the Secretary 
 knew any thing of the correspondence between Mr. Hanscom and 
 Mr. Roach. 
 
 Now, in the report of Mr. Hanscom, which bears date November 
 17, 1^75, a few days before the report of the Secretary, he says ; 
 
 Plans for alteration and repair of the Puritan have been prepared by the bureau 
 and her repairs have been commenced. 
 
 Now remember, the official statement that the Puritan was under 
 repair is here made on the 17th day of November, 1875. This state- 
 ment appears not only in the report of the head of the bureau, 
 but in the report of the Secretary of the Navy himself. Now what 
 was the fact ? The Puritian, at the time when this report was writ- 
 ten, and for several months afterward, was not at Chester at all in 
 the yard of Mr. John Roach, but was lying at League Island, and 
 had never been away from League Island. The order for its removal 
 was not given until January 29, 1876, and it was not delivered at 
 Chester until February 3, 1876. 
 
 Yet here is the head of a bureau informing the Secretary of the 
 Navy, and the Secretary believing in his head of bureau, as he ought 
 to have done, informs the President and the President informs Con- 
 gress that repairs are going on upon the Puritan in the yard of John 
 Roach at Chester, when the Puritan was at League Island, twenty 
 miles off, and not one particle of work had ever been done upon her 
 in the way of repair. I believe that the Secretary was deceived. I 
 have known him too long and too well to believe that he would have 
 informed Congress and the country that a ship, upon which nothing 
 had been done, w r as under repairs when the ship being built from 
 the hull up was in one place and the ship said to be under repair was 
 twenty miles distant in another place. I have referred to this fact,. 
 Mr. Chairman, for only one reason. 
 
 I want this House to understand how dangerous is the system 
 which allows the public money to be expended by the heads of 
 bureaus, responsible to no one except to the Secretary of the Navy, 
 who from the very nature of the case must take their word as true \ 
 and who, being a civilian, is not expected and cannot know the nat- 
 
6 
 
 ure of the work going on in the various navy-yards of the country. 
 That same Secretary who Avas thus deceived, hood-winked, bam- 
 boozled — for there is no other word for it — by his head of bureau, 
 Mr. Isaiah Hanscom, now brings a bill in here and asks us to ap- 
 propriate money to finish this identical ship among others ; that is 
 to say, it may be one, for the Secretary has the right of selection, 
 and being so he will most probably take the Puritan as one of those 
 to be finished under this bill. I say this gentleman brings in a bill 
 without one single safeguard provided against the waste and ex- 
 penditure of the public money under a similar condition of affairs 
 which may arise at.any time. That is the moral I want to draw, 
 from this history of the monitors. I confirm every word that has 
 been said by the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in re- 
 gard to the importance of interposing between the Secretary and 
 heads of bureaus the supervisory board, that shall take charge of the 
 expenditures for the Navy Department. My purpose then to-day, 
 and it is my sole purpose, for I would not revive these scandals for 
 any mere iiersonal annoyance, but I revive them only now in the 
 public interest, that it shall be made impossible for any head of a 
 bureau, honest or dishonest, to deceive the Secretary of the Navy so 
 that he will be put into the humiliating attitude of saying to Con- 
 gress that a ship is under repair at one place, when the facts of the 
 matter are that it is twenty miles distant in a different yard, and no 
 work being done upon it at all, while an entirely new ship is being 
 built somewhere else. 
 
 VALUE OF THE MONITORS. 
 
 No safeguard is provided, then, against the wasteful expenditure 
 of this money. Whether these monitors were, as I believe, con- 
 ceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity, or whether they are 
 the fruit of lawful commerce between the contractors and the Navy 
 Department, which I do not believe, nevertheless we have got the 
 ships; we have paid three millions and a half of the public money 
 on them ; we are invited to spend four millions and a half more to 
 finish them ; and the question is presented to us as intelligent Rep- 
 resentatives whether we had better throw away the money which 
 has been expended, or cast good money after bad and lose that also. 
 If these ships will be good ships, valuable ships, such as my friend, 
 the chairman of the committee, would recommend this Congress to 
 build after his years of patient study of these questions, after his 
 honorable service in this House, to which I wish to bear testimony — 
 if they are such monitors as he, with his judgment, founded upon 
 the experience of the best minds in the Navy, will recommend this 
 House to build, then I say let us appropriate the money for building 
 them. But if they are of even doubtful utility they ought not to 
 be finished, because four million and a half of dollars will give us 
 two or three of those swift cruisers of which the gentleman has been 
 speaking this morning, and in the importance of which I absolutely 
 agree with him. They will give us two of those mighty rams that 
 will run down any ship that may seek to enter our harbors. 
 
 Therefore take the money, if we are going to spend it, and let us 
 xjease to cry over spilled milk ; let us use this money in doing some 
 good work which will satisfy the just expectations of the country. 
 For a navy we want, and a navy this country will always have. But, 
 as I said the other day, it is a real navy and not a sham navy that 
 the people of this country want. They are willing to wipe out the 
 past; they are willing to forgive the men who have wasted their 
 money, lawfully or unlawfully. But they say to us here, "let there 
 
7 
 
 be an end to this business ; now, go to work and give ns a navy." 
 And I go hand in hand with my friend, the chairman of the commit- 
 tee, in his efforts. They have been most intelligent. We owe him 
 a debt of gratitude for the manner in which he has pursued this busi- 
 ness from the beginning to the end, and for that vast amount of tes- 
 timony, most valuable and most suggestive, which he has taken in 
 the course of this investigation. And if I intervened at any point 
 in this matter, I want him to understand now that it was not my 
 purpose to obstruct him but to help him. 
 
 From the study I had given the subject I saw there was not infor- 
 mation enough for this House to proceed intelligently to pass upon 
 the bill of the chairman of the committee for which he wished to se- 
 cure discussion ; I say there is not information enough now. There 
 remain questions to be answered which I have formulated in a reso- 
 lution of the gravest consequence before we act intelligently on that 
 bill which he has drawn up so carefully with safeguards which re- 
 ceive my approbation, and which are in striking contrast to the total 
 absence of safeguards in this bill reported by the Committee on Ap- 
 propriations. 
 
 Now, how do the Appropriations Committee bolster up, so to speak, 
 in this House the recommendation which they make as to the com- 
 pletion of these monitors in their report which I hold in my hand ? 
 
 Mr. ATKINS. If it will not interrupt the gentleman I should like 
 to ask him, at the point he is at now, what would he do with these 
 ships if he would not finish them ? 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York. I know the gentleman asks the ques- 
 tion in good faith. 
 
 Mr. ATKINS. I do. 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York. If they are not going to make such 
 ships, the best possible ships, such as we want in this country, I 
 would sell them for old iron and begin again. But if they are good 
 ships, such as we want, I would go on and finish them. But I 
 will say to the gentleman from Tennessee that I disclaim entirely to 
 speak as an expert in this business. I have not so spoken. I am 
 only studying this subject, as I said the other day. But in my opin- 
 ion the best use to be made of the money proposed to be expended 
 on these monitors would be to build entirely new ships of the type 
 most approved by the best minds of the country, proceeding on the 
 knowledge we have got and the recent experience of other nations. 
 
 One would infer from this report that this application of money 
 to finish the monitors was approved by three parties ; first, the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy, Mr. Chandler, who writes a letter recommending it. 
 So far as I know, this is his first official act. I cannot say it is a very 
 good beginning. I ha ve great respect for the Secretary of the Navy, 
 for his ability, and, when he knows his business, for his capacity 
 to do work. I have experienced it myself in other spheres of action. 
 No man ever did more faithful work for his party than he did in 
 1876 ; and if he does as good work for the Navy as he then did for 
 the Republican party, he will be the best Secretarj' of the Navy we 
 have ever had in this country. [Laughter. ] He quotes Mr. Thomp- 
 son, who he says recommends it, while Mr. Thompson simply acted 
 upon the report of a board. He does not quote Mr. Hunt, who does 
 not recommend it. Now, I think the value of the opinion of Mr. 
 Thompson and Mr. Hunt and Mr. Chandler is just about equal, each 
 to the other, as to this business of finishing monitors. It is very 
 possible neither one of them ever saw a monitor ; I am not quite sure 
 about that, however. 
 
8 
 
 The next authority presented by the committee consists of an ex- 
 tract from the report of Admiral David D. Porter to the Secretary 
 of the Navy, dated November 6, 1874, in which the recommendation 
 is distinctly made that monitors of the kind which we now have 
 upon the stocks would be valuable vessels, and that they ought to 
 be built. 
 
 The first thing that struck me with surprise on reading that ex- 
 tract was the date of the letter, in 1874, about eight years ago. The 
 gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Harris] has told us what a revo- 
 lution eight years has produced in naval warfare. What was good 
 eight years ago is utterly worthless now. So I wrote a note to Ad- 
 miral Porter, telling him that I had found that recommendation in 
 the report of the committee, and asking him whether he still adhered 
 to it. I will read his answer : 
 
 1710 H STREET, XORTHWEST, 
 
 June 26, 1882. 
 
 Mr Dear Sir : I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your communication 
 of the 24th instant. 
 
 You will observe in iuy annual report for 1881, addressed to Mr. Secretary Hunt, 
 page 96 of Secretary of the Xavy's report, that I recommended these monitors 
 should be finished on the plan recommended by the late Chief Constructor Len- 
 thall, if finished at all. 
 
 I call the attention of the Committee of the Whole to the fact that 
 even Mr. Lenthall's recommendations, which are to be found in a very 
 elaborate document printed in 1880, and which I have here on my 
 desk — even Mr. Lenthall's recommendations as read this morning, 
 by the way, by the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Harris,] are 
 of the most qualified sort. He condemns the monitors on any plan 
 that had up to that time been adopted for their completion. He does 
 suggest in 1880 certain modifications which if made might make tLem 
 useful vessels of war. Admiral Porter further says: 
 
 Mr. Lenthall made a minority report on this subject, which report is referred to 
 by me in my annual report above mentioned. I inclose you a copy of Mr. Len- 
 thall's report which will give yon all the necessary information. 
 
 I think if the monitors are finished on the plan proposed by the board they will 
 not amount to much : finished on Mr. Lenthall s plan they would help protect our 
 ports against Spanish ships of war. as that power has not any very heavily plated 
 iron-clads. and is the country with whom we are most likely to have trouble. 
 
 Now, it is certain that any vessel that can take care of an English 
 or a French or an Italian iron-clad, can also take care of a Spanish 
 iron-clad, but any vessel that will only take care of a Spanish iron- 
 clad would be like a card-box against the vessels of the other great 
 naval powers. Admiral Porter concludes as follows : 
 
 As to finishing these vessels without a carefully devised plan, or without follow- 
 ing Mr. Lenthall's suggestions, they will be no better than the vessels they are 
 copied after. Many officers of the Xavy think the vessels should not be finished 
 at all ; but there is some good in them as far as they go, and if Mr. Lenthall's plans 
 are carried out they can he made serviceable for harbor defense, as I before re- 
 marked. 
 
 I think the reports I have mentioned will give you what you require in the way 
 of information. 
 
 Very respectfully yours, 
 
 DAVID D. POETEE, Admiral 
 
 Hon. A. S. Hewitt, M. C. 
 
 I think that disposes of the authority sought to be given to this 
 recommendation by the great name of Admiral Porter. 
 
 Mr. WH1TTHOKXE. Will the genth-man from New York [Mr. 
 HEWITT] just in that connection allow me to call attention to the 
 report made by the Committee on Appropriations, which purports 
 to give an extract from the report of Secretary Thompson, made to- 
 
9 
 
 Congress May 20, 1880 ? If the gentleman is going to refer to it him- 
 self, well and good; I will not interrupt him. 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York. The only reason why I have not 
 made larger extracts from that report is simply because I had so 
 little time that I thought I could not afford it. 
 
 Mr. WHITTHOKNE. If I do not interrupt the gentleman, I beg 
 leave to call his attention and the attention of the committee to the 
 wrong impression that would be made in that regard by the report 
 from the Committee on Appropriations, in that it quotes only apart 
 of what Secretary Thompson said, and fails to quote just what he 
 did say in connection with and in pursuance of the idea of Admiral 
 Porter as just now read, and of the report of the late constructor, 
 Lenthall. 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York. The next authority quoted by the 
 committee is from Rear- Admiral Worden in a recent letter dated 
 April 15, 1882. I addressed a similar letter to Admiral Worden, but 
 I have been informed that he is ill and out of Washington, and I 
 have received no answer. 
 
 Now, I beg to call the attention of the committee to the fact that 
 the letter of Admiral Worden simply contains an approval of the 
 monitor system. He approves of monitors, but is careful to refrain 
 absolutely from uttering one word of recommendation in reference 
 to these monitors of ours. So far as his authority goes, he simply 
 supports the general doctrine that monitors are good for vessels, but 
 says nothing iu favor of these monitors. 
 
 There is another significant fact, that the advisory board convened 
 by Secretary Hunt for the express purpose of considering what ves- 
 sels we should provide for a navy, never so much as gave an inti- 
 mation that these five monitors are of any value or ought to be fin- 
 ished. They light shy of them. The omission of the board, even 
 to refer to these vessels, I hold to be an absolute condemnation of 
 these ships, so far as any claim that they are such ships as this coun- 
 try wants us to provide for a navy. 
 
 More than that ; there was a conference held between the Com- 
 mittee on Naval Affairs of the House, the Committee on Naval Af- 
 fair of the Senate, this advisory board, and Secretary Hunt. I have 
 the documents here and will refer gentlemen to them. In that con- 
 ference not one word was uttered in regard to these five monitors, nor 
 was any recommendation made for their completion. 
 
 But at that conference there was the most absolute condemnation 
 of the methods upon which the money appropriated to the Navy De- 
 partment has been expended, that is to say, by the heads of bureaus, 
 irresponsible to no human being, unless it be to the Secretary of the 
 Navy, who from the very nature of his training is not competent to 
 pass upon their action, as I have already shown. 
 
 It is all summed up in the remarks of Commander Evans, and I 
 propose to read them as concluding all that is necessary to say on the 
 subject of providing an intermediary tribunal as contemplated in the 
 naval bill, and which has been urged so strongly by the gentleman 
 from Massachusetts, [Mr. Harris,] and for which I propose to pro- 
 vide by an amendment which I shall offer to this bill at the proper 
 stage : 
 
 The Chairman. Is not that the system that must be adopted in order to build 
 these ships successfully ? 
 
 Commander Evans. It seems to me so. The way that the work has cone on in 
 the Xavy heretofore has been, to say the least of it, ridiculous. The old plan was 
 this : When a ship was to be built the constructors would build her hull : when 
 that was done, and the engineers came to look at it. they would say : " Ilallo. there 
 
10 
 
 is no room here for the engines." So they would put her down a foot more in the 
 Wttter ; and then when the ordnance officer came along he would say the hatches 
 were too close to the water-ways, so that the guns couldn't he mounted ; then the 
 equipment officer would complain that he couldn't swing men enough to fight the 
 guns, and so on. I think it is time that system was stopped. 
 
 The Chairmax. Do you think it is possible to make auy progress until we have 
 a head to this business ; one executive and a board of advisers at the head ? 
 
 Commander Evaxs". Ithink that to build these ships successfully you must have 
 a board to do it, and the plans must be prepared by that board. The plans of the 
 engines must be given to the engineer to build ; and the plan of the hull to the 
 constructor, and so on throughout each department of the ship. You must say to 
 each, " There are yourplaus ; do not vary an iuch one way or the other ; " and then, 
 if the parts do not fit when the ship is finished, you had better hang some of these 
 people. 
 
 The Chairmax. Do you not know that in the Xavy in the past there has been a 
 strong hostility to an advisory board of this character ? 
 
 Commander Evaxs. Xo, sir"; not in the Xavy, Ithink. There has been, though, 
 in the Xavy Department. The bureau officers, naturally, will always be opposed 
 to any thing that cuts their power or authority. 
 
 The Chairmax. Do you not think that it existed among the line officers as well 
 as the staff ? 
 
 Commander Evaxs. Xo. sir ; I think not. I never heard a line officer express 
 that feeling in my life. On the contrary, I have heard a great many of the line 
 officers pray for "the day when we would have a board organized. You see the 
 ine officer is the man who suiters most from the evils we have been speaking of. 
 The line officer finds himself sent to sea in ships that cannot fight and that are 
 utterly unseaworthy. I have had some experience in one of them myself, the 
 Delaware, in China. That vessel rolled thirty-seven degrees each way, and if 
 you had cast a gun loose it would have taken charge of the whole concern. 
 
 The Chairmax. "Where is that ship now? 
 
 Commander Evaxs. She is now the hospital ship at Xew York. 
 The Chairmax. And worthless for any naval purpose ? 
 
 Commander Evaxs. Utterly so. She was commenced in the latter part of the 
 war and finished just about the close of the war. Her tonnage was about 3,200 
 tons. She went to China on one cruise, and that is about all she has ever done. 
 
 Nothing can add. to the force of a statement of that sort coming 
 from so accomplished an officer; hut there are confirmations from 
 all quarters, and I have collated a large number of just such speci- 
 mens of testimony. But I leave the matter there. 
 
 Now, waiving questions of order for the present, unless this bill 
 be amended so as to provide for practical supervision in the expend- 
 iture of this money, either upon the monitors or upon new ships, I 
 think I am justified in saying that it will be money absolutely thrown 
 away ; and perhaps it was intended to be thrown away. I do not 
 know how this may be, but at any rate I think I may a^meal to fair- 
 minded men on both sides to concede the necessity of adopting proper 
 safeg uards as to the expenditure of this money. 
 
 Now, I come to the value of these mouitors. I have shown you 
 that there is the very gravest doubt as to whether they will be of 
 any use when they are done. There is, however, one set of men who 
 have no earthly doubt about the propriety of finishing these moni- 
 tors — uo earthly doubt that they will be the best ships in the world 
 when finished ; and these men are the contractors. They had a hear- 
 ing on February 16, 1882, before the Committee on Naval Afiairs, of 
 which my friend from Massachusetts, [Mr. Harris, ] who has been 
 indefatigable in trying to get at the truth in this business, is chair- 
 man. Mr. Gause, of the Harlan & Hollingsworth Company, makes 
 the following assertion : 
 
 Opposition to these monitors has come from a certain quarter. It grows mainly 
 out of the fact that a monitor is the most undesirable ship for a line officer to go 
 to sea in that ever was constructed, because in a monitor they have to live com- 
 paratively under water. That is one of the great objections to these monitors 
 for line officers, and I do not blame them for it. The idea of cruising in a monitor 
 for months is something appalling to think of. 
 
11 
 
 This is the testimony of a contractor — that after yon have fin- 
 ished these ships the idea of putting a line officer on hoard, to say 
 nothing of the crew and the engineers and firemen, is simply appall- 
 ing. Do we want to hnild dungeons? Is that what we are after? 
 Surely some other type of ship will he devised free from these objec- 
 tions. Other nations do not huild such sepulchers, and we ought 
 not to huild them. I for one will not vote a dollar for the purpose 
 of sending a line officer, possibly a De Long or a Melville or a 
 Danenhower, to he sacrificed in a vessel which this contractor says 
 it is appalling to think of. 
 
 OPPOSITION' TO THE MONITORS. 
 
 Opposition to these monitors is not confined to line officers. It 
 comes mainly from the staif officers ; it arises from the fact that 
 they were begun before they were designed. They have been designed 
 many times since they were begun. Every new board or expert di- 
 rected to examine them finds grave defects in the various designs, 
 that must be corrected at the expense of the Government for the 
 benefit of the contractors. The money thus far expended on them 
 without authority of law has been thrown away, and further expend- 
 iture would be a further waste of money until the plans for com- 
 pleting them have been subjected to a critical examination, the 
 computations verified, and specific contracts for the work to be ex- 
 ecuted entered into with responsible men. Opposition on the part 
 of Congress and the public is based on the fact that these unfinished 
 monitors have no legal existence. 
 
 In regard to the Puritan, I understand — and I have given you the 
 evidence — that she was built as a new vessel from the word "go," 
 when the old vessel was twenty miles away. Is there a lawyer in this 
 House who will tell me that the Puritan in the yard of John Roach 
 is a legal structure to-day ? 
 
 Opposition must inevitably exist to the completion of these moni- 
 tors on the part of every law-abiding, honest man in this country who 
 examines into their origin and progress and who is not prepared to 
 sanction the assumption by a subordinate staff officer of the Navy 
 Department of the powers conferred on Congress alone. For let it 
 be remembered that the order to build that ship was not given by the 
 Secretary of the Navy ; I find no evidence of that ; the order was 
 given by Isaiah Hauscom, an ordinary bureau officer, in an ordi- 
 nary letter, without any contract being drawn by auy human being. 
 
 In the various documents which have been submitted to Congress 
 in relation to these unfinished monitors, in the testimony that has 
 been reluctantly given by the contractors themselves, there is abun- 
 dant proof that, with the exception of the Monadnock, they were 
 ordered to be built by the Chief of the Bureau of Construction, not 
 only without authority of law, but, so far as can be ascertained, 
 without authority from the President or Secretary of the Navy, and 
 in the case of the Puritan without even the knowledge of his asso- 
 ciates in the Department. 
 
 Curiously enough tenders were received for the Monadnock. It 
 is the duty of the Chief of the Construction Bureau to report annu- 
 ally to the Secretary, and to attach to the report a list of the tenders 
 he has accepted. There is no such report as to the Puritan, the Ter- 
 ror, the Amphitrite, or any of the others except the Monadnock. Iu 
 the case of the latter vessel there is attached to his report a state- 
 ment that tenders were opened and that the work was awarded to 
 the lowest bidder. Here is the confession of this man that there 
 was a legal obligation to give the work upon tenders to the lowest 
 
12 
 
 bidder. I do not know why lie made this confession; but plainly 
 there is a negative pregnant : in the one case he did it; why did he 
 not do it in the case of the other four ? If it was not a corrupt job, 
 why was no competition permitted? 
 
 I repeat that except in the case of the Monadnock they were or- 
 dered to be built by the Chief of the Bureau of Construction, not 
 only without authority of law, but, so far as can be ascertained, with- 
 out authority from the President or Secretary of the Navy, unless 
 the Secretary will tell us to-day that he gave the authority, and I 
 hope he will tell us when he takes the floor. There is nothing on 
 record to show that the Secretary ever gave such an order, and in 
 the case of the Puritan work was done without even the knowledge 
 of the officer's associates in the Department. Two of the bureaus — 
 the Bureau of Construction and Repair, headed by that honest and 
 able man, John Lenthall, and the Bureau of Steam-Engineering, 
 headed by Isherwood — did not know that the order had been given; 
 so these officers have stated. 
 
 Mr. ROBESON. Does the gentleman know that Lenthall and Isher- 
 wood had neither of them been in the bureau for five years before 
 that? 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York. I said " without the knowledge of his 
 associates in the Department." I did not say that they were heads 
 of bureaus at the time. I know that the place was made too hot to 
 hold those honest men. 
 
 ARE THEY LAWFUL STRUCTURES? 
 
 I say that Congress cannot appropriate money to complete these 
 monitors without tacitly acknowledging their legal existence and 
 admitting that a subordinate naval officer who happened to be on 
 duty as a chief of bureau in a Department was justified in involving 
 the Government in an expenditure of ten or twelve million dollars in 
 defiance of law and without regard to consequences. 
 
 Instead of appropriating money for the completion, Congress 
 should instruct the legal officers of the Government to institute 
 proceedings to recover what has been already spent on these ves- 
 sels. I do not know how much responsibility the Secretary may 
 choose to assume, but if ever I was clear on any subject I am con- 
 vinced by the evidence I have stated that there was a corrupt bar- 
 gain between Isaiah Han scorn and the contractors, who are there- 
 fore participes criminis, and entitled to no consideration and no in- 
 dulgence from this House. 
 
 In the statement which the Secretary made before the committee 
 in the Forty-fourth Congress, he very properly and carefully says 
 that all a Secretary can do is to approve of the general principle by 
 which the old material was to be used in the repairs of new vessels. 
 But he says the work must be done by the heads of bureaus, " ex- 
 perts," as he calls them; and he never issued an order himself in 
 reference to any of these details. And I think the Secretary tells, 
 as he always endeavors to tell, the exact truth. I cannot discover 
 the evidence of any such order, although I find plenty of orders is- 
 sued by his subordinates. 
 
 Now, let some one point out the specific or the general authority 
 of Congress for this expenditure on these monitors. I have pointed 
 out the peculiar manner by which the Secretary explains how he 
 came to take the responsibility ; that as he had the right to use the 
 old material in re pairs in the navy-yards, he thought by parity of 
 reasoning he might, if he made a contract with a contractor, take 
 the old materials and pay the contractor with them instead of money. 
 
13 
 
 "While the law and the practice is clear as to the navy-yard, but there 
 is no law and there was no precedent for paying a contractor with 
 any thing bat money, and there is no safety in any other course. I 
 often have occasion to say I am no lawyer, but there are some prop- 
 ositions which offend one's sense, that underlying sense, I suppose, 
 upon which all law is built up, and I cannot discover the slightest 
 justification by which these materials were turned over to the con- 
 tractors in payment for what .' In repair of ships? I "have shown 
 it was not repair, but for building an entire new ship, twenty miles 
 away from the ship that was said to be repaired. 
 
 It would seem impossible more forcibly to illustrate the need of 
 reform in our naval administration, but the worst remains to be told. 
 The origin of the new Puritan appears in an offer made to Mr. Hans- 
 com, dated December 3, 1874, by Mr. John Roach, of Chester. That 
 is the date when Mr. Hanscom signs his letter to the Secretary in 
 which he says that nothing is being done on the Puritan. On that 
 very date, and, I suppose, within five minutes after he signed his 
 name to that statement, Mr. John Poach, of Chester, makes his offer. 
 On the 12th of December, 1874, nine days after the above offer was 
 made, Mr. Hanscom accepts it with a statement that when the exact 
 dimensions of the new vessel were ascertained a further and more 
 explicit acceptance will be made. Think of contracting to build a 
 vessel, estimated to cost $'2,000,000, before her dimensions were de- 
 termined ? 
 
 Compare this with the years of study and the elaborate computa- 
 tions which are made preparatory to building an iron-clad in Europe. 
 Another board reported the hull of the Puritan at load-water line 
 ■would displace about 1,700 tons less than the weight of material the 
 contractor and this Chief of Bureau of Construction had finally de- 
 cided to put on it and in it. In other words, the Puritan would be 
 another of the " totally submerged" class of monitors designed byjthe 
 Bureaus of Steam-Engineering and Construction and their assistants. 
 In every case the weights to be carried have been reduced by the 
 boards appointed to investigate. 
 
 To overcome the difficulty compound armor instead of laminated 
 has been proposed, coal capacity and engine power have been re- 
 duced, and various other devices proposed that would enable these 
 vessels to float with the loads they must carry, in order to be worthy 
 the name of iron-clad. 
 
 Just how much dependence can be placed on the assertions of the 
 contractors who are here from time to time in person, and are always 
 represented by others in and out of office when this question is being 
 discussed, I will now demonstrate to the House. 
 
 On page 4 of their statement in relation to the unfinished monitors 
 Mr. Poach makes the following assertion: " In order to show vou 
 the caution and care taken in the designing of these vessels and their 
 fitness for the use intended for them, I will give you some little in- 
 formation." The " caution and care taken mthe designing of these 
 vessels" is aptly illustrated in the report of what is known as the 
 "Mullany board," convened in June, 1877, two years and six months 
 after the Puritan had been began. It is there recorded that it was 
 necessary for the board to prepare plans from which to compute her 
 displacement. There did not exist up to that time, three years after 
 she was contracted for, a plan from which her displacement could be 
 computed. 
 
 I will now read the conclusions of another board in relation to 
 the Puritan: 
 
 First. Neither plans nor specifications were drawn for the construction of the 
 
14 
 
 now Puritan, nor were any measures adopted to ascertain whether, when huilt, 
 she would sink or swim. "The failure or success of a first-class national iron-clad 
 was thus put to the hazard of mere chance. 
 
 Second. This vessel, as far as constructed, and if finished as contemplated, is a 
 total failure, nor can any changes now practicable make her efficient — meaning 
 hy that term equality with foreign iron-clads of the same size and type. 
 
 The Committee of Naval Affairs has been told by the present Sec- 
 retary of tbe Navy, •who quotes from one of bis predecessors, that 
 "the unanimity of opinion in reference to each of tbese vessels 
 would seem to leave no room of doubt," &c. Reading over all tbat 
 bas been reported by tbe several boards and experts wbo bave ex- 
 amined tbese vessels, tbere appears to be any thing but "unanimity 
 of opinion w except as to one point, which is tbat tbey cannot under 
 any circumstances be completed as originally contemplated, and 
 tbat tbey cannot under any circumstances be made efficient iron-clad 
 vessels compared witbtbose tbat bave been recently built or are now 
 under construction in tbe same state as tbese unfinisbed monitors are. 
 Tbere is not even " unanimity of opinion" as to the necessity of 
 iron-clads of their class at all. When we review the origin and prog- 
 ress, and compare the cost of iron-clads, and examine closely into 
 their achievements, we find that tbe few naval officers who lead in 
 the already rapid reaction toward unarmored vessels for fighting 
 have reasons and facts undisputed and indisputable as the founda- 
 tion of their objection. 
 
 THE PURITAN AND THE DEVASTATION. 
 
 As a further illustration of the attempt that has been made to 
 throw dust in the eyes of Congress in relation to the comparative 
 merits of these vessels, we find Mr. Roach recklessly declaring that 
 the British iron-clad Devastation " could not enter the ports of New 
 York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, or any of the other ports " ex- 
 cept Portland, Boston, and New London, owing to her great draught, 
 and that "she could not carry coal enough for the purpose of cross- 
 ing the ocean." He then proceeds to " compare the cost of the Puri- 
 tan with that of similar ships on the other side of tbe water," and 
 gives the cost of the Inflexible, Devastation, Ajax, and other British 
 vessels. 
 
 The Devastation was designed in 1869, before the compound engine 
 had been adopted ; completed in 1873, and has had seven years of serv- 
 ice. The Puritan was not designed at all, but commenced in 1874, five 
 yeans after the Devastation was designed, and one year after she was 
 completed, and the Puritan is still on stocks in embryo — not even an 
 egg — a shell merely, to which all the vast improvements in ma- 
 chinery, armor, and armament that have been made during the last 
 ten years may be applied with the result of increasing the resisting 
 power of her armor and penetrating power of her guns as much as 
 20 per cent., and the economy of her engines as much as 60 per cent. 
 
 Why should we compare the Puritan with the Devastation, the fu- 
 ture witb tbe past ! The only reason for such a comparison would 
 be to throw dust in the eyes of Congress, while we hurrah for the old 
 flag and secure a big appropriation. Mr. Roach's assertions that 
 the Devastation u eouldnotenterNew York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
 or any of the other ports, except Boston, Portland, and New London 
 at high tide," and that " she could not carry coal enough for the pur- 
 pose of crossing the ocean" are unqualifiedly false. 
 
 From the official report of Chief Engineer King, entitled "Euro- 
 pean ships of war, 1877," on pp. 37-45, you will find a complete de- 
 scription of this vessel; from which it appears that the Devastation 
 carries ordinarily in her regular bunkers 1,350 tons of coal, and 
 
15 
 
 extraordinarily in various places available for the purpose 250 tons 
 more. Steaming at the rate often knots per hour, she can with 1,600 
 tons of coal, her maximum capacity, complete a distance of 5,572 
 knots, or nearly double the distance from New York to Queenstown, 
 and nearly double that from Plymouth to Halifax, two British sta- 
 tions, one on each side of the Atlantic. 
 
 Steaming at her maximum sea-speed of twelve knots per hour, she 
 could go from Plymouth to New York in ten days, and have coal 
 enough left for an attack. The Devastation can keep the sea for 
 twenty-three days, steaming at the rate of ten knots an hour, and 
 yet Mr. Roach goes before a committee of this House and deliberately 
 states that "she could not carry coal enough for the purpose of 
 crossing the ocean." 
 
 The Devastation's maximum draught of water is officially reported 
 by the same authority as 27 feet and 1 inch. She would at this draught 
 displace 9,298 tons, having on board 1,350 tons of coal. Having 
 crossed the Atlantic at the rate of ten knots per hour, and consumed 
 two-thirds of her coal, (900 tons,) her maximum draught would then 
 be less than 26 feet. This depth of water is carried in and out of the 
 port of New York on an average of twice a month by regular trans- 
 atlantic steamers. 
 
 THE MIAXTOXOMOH. 
 
 The ignorance displayed by Mr. Roach in his statement is the only 
 excuse for his assertions. The qualities he ascribes to the ideal Puri- 
 tan and other vessels that he is buildin g exist only in his own imagina- 
 tion. It is impossible to compare a vessel that has never been designed, 
 although partly built, with others that have been designed and 
 built. Until some definite plans are formed for the Puritan, Terror, 
 Amphitrite, and Monadnock, discussing their comparative qualities 
 would be profitless. But the Miantonomoh has advanced to a stage 
 that permits a comparison between her and " similar" vessels cited 
 by Mr. Roach, the Ajax and Agamemnon among them. A compari- 
 son with these vessels would not have been made had it not been 
 provoked. Their draught is such that they may enter every one of our 
 important ports. They were very carefully designed about the same 
 time the new Puritan was ordered to be built by the chief construc- 
 tor of our Navy before he had quite decided on her dimensions. 
 Their keels were laid in 1676 ; they were launched in 1879, and are 
 now much nearer completion that the Miantonomoh. 
 
 The hull of this vessel is protected with a belt of solid iron armor 
 7 inches thick amidships, 5 inches and 3 inches at the ends, backed 
 by wood varying in thickness from 20 inches to 24 inches. The 
 Ajax and the Agamemnon have an armor belt around them com- 
 posed of two thicknesses of iron, one 10 inches, the other 8, and two 
 thicknesses of wood, one 10 inches, the other 9, or 18 inches of iron 
 and 19 inches of wood. The comparative resistance of these two 
 belts of armor may safely be stated as 3 to 1 in favor of the Ajax 
 and Agamemnon. The turrets of the Miantonomoh are not vet defi- 
 nitely designed ; they cannot exceed 10 inches in thickness of com- 
 pound armor, for she could not carry thicker in additiou to the 
 other weights still to be placed on board. The thickness of solid 
 armor of the English turret is 16 inches, composed of lOf inches of 
 iron faced with 5^ inches of steel and termed compound armor. 
 
 The resistance of the turrets of the Ajax and Agamemnon will be 
 nearly double that of the Miantonomoh. Guns will project from 
 the turrets. 
 
 The guns of the Miantonomoh are not yet built. Those designed 
 
16 
 
 for her, the heaviest she can carry, are four 10-incli breech-loading 
 rifles, weighing about 20 tons, that will throw a broadside of 1,600 
 pounds with a power capable of penetrating about 15 inches of iron 
 armor at 1,000 yards. These guns ;ire purely ideal. The guns of the 
 Ajax are 12^ inches in diameter, breech.-load.ing rifles, weighing 38 
 tons each ; they will throw a broadside of 3,374 pounds with a force 
 ■capable of penetrating 17$ inches of solid iron at 1,000 yards. 
 
 Differently expressed, the Miantonomoh's guns will not penetrate 
 the Ajax armor at any point, while the Ajax's guns will go right 
 through the Miantonomoh's side armor, in one side and out the other, 
 and easily penetrate her turret. 
 
 The Ajax can carry 700 tons, or six days' supply of coal, to steam 
 at the rate of 13 knots per hour. The Miantonomoh carries 531 tons 
 and may steam at the rate of 10 knots per hour. At full speed the 
 Ajax and her class can steam about 500 miles farther than the Mian- 
 tonomoh. At 10 knots per hour, the Ajax could steam almost twice 
 .across the Atlantic, while the Miantonomoh only half way across. 
 
 It was evidently impolitic for Mr. Roach to provoke a comparison 
 between the two vessels as to qualities. As to cost, the estimated 
 cost of the two vessels is about eq ual if we take account of material 
 delivered to Mr. Roach in part payment for his work, and admit that 
 the estimates for completing the Miantonomoh are correct. But the 
 cost per ton displacement of the Miantonomoh will be at least double 
 that of the Ajax, in spite of her vast inferiority in every particular. 
 
 I will now quote Chief Engineer King on the comparative qualities 
 of the Miantonomoh and other vessels that she could not decline to 
 fight : 
 
 t 
 
 The offensive and defensive powers of this vessel (the Miantonomoh) can per- 
 "haps be best shown by comparison with the British and French coast defenders. 
 This may readily be made by reference to the descriptions and dimensions pre- 
 viously given of the British vessels Glatton, built upward of ten years ago, and 
 Conqueror, now building, and the French coast defenders Tonnerre put afloat in 
 1878, and others. 
 
 It will be seen that the Glatton has the same speed, but that her armor is 12 
 inches thick above water and 10 inches below water, while that of the Miantono- 
 moh is but 7 inches maximum with reductions at the ends and below water. As 
 the armament of either ship may be changed to suit the times no comparison in 
 this respect can be made at present. The Glatton carries her guns 6 feet higher 
 above water than those of the Miantonomoh. She has, however, A\ feet greater 
 draught of water. 
 
 The Conqueror, which is much more powerful, may be regarded as a sea-go- 
 ing vessel, her upper decks being 9 feet 6 inches above the load water line, with 
 comfortable quarters aft above this deck, while her 240-ton breech-loaders will be 
 mounted so high above water as to be capable of being worked at sea in any weather. 
 Her armor, winch is compound (iron faced with steel) is 12 inches thick on the 
 water-line and on the turret, and her indicated horse-power of 4,500 will give an 
 estimated speed of thirteen knots an hour. 
 
 The Tonnerre, like the Glattou, is a breastwork monitor, carrying one turret, 
 in which at present are mounted two 12|-inch breech-loading rifles ; her speed is 
 recorded at fourteen knots, and her armor is 13 inches thick on the water-line and 14 
 inches on the turret. Her guns being mounted high above water, she also is cap- 
 able of going to distant seas, and may be regarded as a powerful vessel. 
 
 The advantages possessed by the Miantonomoh over the last two named vessels 
 are lighter draught and a greater number of guns. The disadvantages are an 
 armor too thin for protection against heavy modern projectiles. 
 
 Mr. King failed to add other conspicuous disadvantages of the 
 Miantonomoh, such as lower speed, vastly inferior sea-going quali- 
 ties, cramped quarters, small coal capacity, and inferior power of 
 armament. 
 
 Let gentlemen who are in doubt as to whether we shall appropri- 
 ate money for completing these vessels read a report of the veteran 
 distinguished chief constructor, Lenthall, dated April 27, 1880, in 
 
17 
 
 Executive Document 82, Forty-sixth Congress, second session, and 
 remark the u unanimity of opinion " alleged by our new Secretary in 
 favor of completing this vessel. And I warn Congress of the inev- 
 itable consequences of recognizing by any law direct or indirect the 
 existence of these unfinished monitors. Just as sure as such recog- 
 nition is made the Government will be called on to pay an infinite 
 variety of charges for work on these vessels and space occupied 
 by them. This is already intimated in the statements of the con- 
 tractors, who now have no standing whatever in the matter and 
 must seek redress from those who illegally contracted with them. 
 
 The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 
 
 Mr. ATKINS. I desire to move to extend the time of the gentle- 
 man from New York, and the gentleman from New Jersey can also 
 have his time extended. 
 
 The CHAIRMAN. That cannot be done in committee. 
 
 Mr. HEWITT, of New York. If the gentleman will allow me a 
 moment, I desire to say that I have reached now a point in my re- 
 marks where the remainder has been reduced to writing, and even 
 if the committee gave me permission to continue I should not feel 
 able to do so to-day. I will therefore simply ask leave to print the 
 remainder of this work, and thank the committee for its attention. 
 
 There was no objection. 
 
 THE ROBESON NAVY. 
 
 The gentleman from New Jersey, in charge of this bill, [Mr. Robe- 
 son,] said, during the debate on the deficiency appropriation bill, 
 (Congressional Record, June 8, page 36:) 
 
 Thank God, every ship that now bears the flag of America and carries its guns 
 was built by me or was substantially repaired under my direction, and I am respon- 
 sible for it. 
 
 Subsequently Mr. Blount made the following statement : 
 
 As to the vessels used in that connection, [putting down the rebellion which was 
 rife in the southern part of this country — Robeson.] Congress passed laws provid- 
 ing for their sale. They ought to have been sold ; but objection was made, and 
 the gentleman in spite of an universal sentiment that they were worthless, went 
 to enormous expense in repairing those vessels ; and everybody admits that they 
 are worthless at this hour. — Congressional Record, June 8. page 36. 
 
 To which Mr. Robeson replied, (Congressional Record, June 8, 
 page 36:) 
 
 So far is the gentleman's statement from being accurate when he says that every- 
 body agrees that the ships I undertook to provide for the defense of this country 
 were good for nothing, I affirm that every respectable authority from that time 
 to this has pronounced them the best of the kind that could have been provided. 
 
 Thus it appears that the gentleman from New Jersey accepts the 
 responsibility for the vessels "built,' 7 "substantially repaired," and 
 " rebuilt" during his administration of the Navy Department. The 
 expression "undertook to provide" covers all cases. 
 
 I expressed my own opinions as follows during that debate : 
 
 I believe he [Mr. Robeson] was the victim, if victim he was, of the bureaus of 
 the Navy Department, which recklessly squandered these vast amounts of money, 
 and if any more money is to be put into the custody of those bureaus it will fol- 
 low the money which heretofore has been put into their hands and thrown away, 
 and result in a worthless Navj-, as it is declared to be by the Secretary of the Navy 
 and by the Naval Committee. — Congressional Record, June 8, page 37. 
 
 My purpose now is to substantiate these assertions by submitting 
 facts and comparisons that cannot be disputed, and which so far as 
 possible are derived from the answers to the resolution of inquiry 
 which I offered in January last, and which is numbered Executive 
 Document No. 30, Forty-seventh Congress, first session. Forconven- 
 4 HE 
 
18 
 
 ience of treatment I will divide the vessels that Mr. Robeson " un- 
 dertook to provide for the defense of this country" into four groups. 
 Group 1 will comprise seven of the eight vessels authorized to be 
 built by "act of February 10, 1873;" the Huron having been lost, 
 no information was furnished about her. Group 2 will comprise the 
 unarmored vessels that were " substantially " repaired. Group 3 
 will comprise all the iron-clad vessels that were "substantially re- 
 paired ; " group 4, those that he ordered to be rebuilt. 
 
 The vessels comprised in group 1 are the Adams, Alert, Alliance, 
 Enterprise, Essex, Ranger, and Trenton. The first six of these are 
 in active service in commission. The Trenton is laid up in the Brook- 
 lyn navy-yard. We will consider this vessel separately, owing to 
 the persistent manner in which she is cited on all available occasions 
 by naval constructors and engineers as a sample of what they can 
 accomplish in marine architecture and engineering. The act of Con- 
 gress authorizing the construction of these vessels reads as follows : 
 
 That the Secretary of the Navy be authorized to construct eight steam-vessels 
 of war, with auxiliary sail-power, and of such class or classes as in his judgment 
 will best subserve the demands of the service, each carrying six or more guns of 
 large caliber ; the hulls to be built of iron or wood, as the Secretary may deter- 
 mine: Provided, That the aggregate tonnage of the whole number shall not exceed 
 8.000 tons, and that the cost of building the same shall not exceed $3,200,000 : And 
 provided, That four of said vessels shall be built, in whole or in part, in private 
 yards, upon contract with the lowest responsible bidder therefor, upon pubbc 
 competition and proposals, due notice thereof being given by advertisement, upon 
 models, specifications, and drawings, furnished by the Navy Department and un- 
 der its direction and supervision, if, upon full examination and consideration, the 
 same shall be deemed practicable by the Secretary of the Navy : or, the hulls of 
 any portion of said vessels may be built upon private contract in the Government 
 yards upon like proposals, models, specifications, drawings, and supervision, and 
 upon like examination and consideration, the Government in either case furnishing 
 such materials as may be deemed practicable by the Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 Sec. 2. That neither of said vessels shall be commenced until full and complete 
 models, specifications, and drawings shall be made for its construction in all its 
 parts. And after such models and drawings are approved by the proper authority, 
 they shall not be changed in any respect when the cost will exceed $100,000, except 
 upon the recommendation of a board of survey composed of not less than five offi- 
 cers of the Navy, and approved by the Secretary of the Navy ; and if changes are 
 thus made, the actual cost of, and damage caused by, such changes shall be esti- 
 mated by such board of survey ; and the terms of the contract shall provide that 
 the contractors shall be bound by the estimate of said board as to the amount of 
 increased or diminished compensation they are to receive, if any, in consequence 
 of any such changes. 
 
 With such a large discretion, and with the certainty that Congress 
 would make additional appropriations to complete the vessels if the 
 $3,200,000 granted in the act was found insufficient, the country had 
 a right to expect "eight steam vessels of war" of which it would 
 not be ashamed and on which it could rely to some extent for national 
 defense. In anticipation of the objection that may be raised to an 
 assumption that Congress would appropriate more money, I will 
 here state that the expenditure on hulls and motive power (which 
 includes spars, sails, and machinery) of the "eight steam vessels of 
 war" aggregated more than $4,810,000 in money, according to various 
 official statements of the Department that have been put together, 
 besides an unknown quantity of machinery and materials consumed 
 and transformed in their construction, and for their equipment and 
 outfit. 
 
 With the vast stores of timber, machinery, iron, and other mate- 
 rials, and with a costly plant in the various navy-yards lyng idle 
 and available for all the operations involved in the construction of 
 " eight steam vessels of war," the $3,200,000 appropriated specifically 
 for their construction would have been ample to create the finest vea- 
 
19 
 
 sels that have ever borne our flag. Now let us critically examine 
 and compare the cost and qualities of these vessels, and from this 
 determine whether or not Congress would be justified in making any 
 more appropriations to be spent at the unlimited discretion of the 
 Secretary and his irresponsible chiefs of bureaus. 
 
 The first six vessels of this group displace 7,740 tons ; the expend- 
 iture of money on their hulls and motive power, according to the in- 
 formation furnished, aggregates a little over $3,000,000, or at the rate 
 of $387 per ton of displacement, which is the most convenient and, 
 indeed, only possible standard of comparison for vessels of similar 
 types. If we include the cost and value of pieces of machinery util- 
 ized in the construction of their engines, and of materials consumed 
 in the construction of their hulls, spars, rigging, and sails, these six 
 " steam vessels of war" will be found to have cost the Government 
 certainly not less than $5,000,000, and possibly much more, which 
 would be at the rate of $646 per ton displacement. This estimate is 
 based on proportionate value of material to labor in construction of 
 vessels. Comparing the actual money outlay, $387 per ton displace- 
 ment, with the cost of the hull and motive power of the best mer- 
 chant steamers, it will appear that the money expended on the hulls 
 and motive power of these vessels is fully four times the cost of hulls 
 and motive power of merchant steamers. 
 
 It is conceded that naval vessels must be stronger, more carefully 
 built, and better finished ; but how four times the cost of similar 
 vessels in the merchant service could have been spent on these six 
 steam vessels of war is a problem that needs solution by those who 
 spent it before Congress would be justified in intrusting to them 
 any more money. As to the durability of these vessels we are hap- 
 pily in a position to judge by the information furnished in answer to 
 my resolution. In spite of their excessive cost these six vessels have 
 required an expenditure of more than $800,000 in repairs during the 
 six years of their service ; and what is still more startling, we find 
 from the information furnished by the Bureau of Steam-Engineering 
 that four of these vessels need new boilers that will cost $400,000 
 more by the time they are in place and ready for service. 
 
 What better illustration could be given of the inefficiency of the 
 system under which these vessels were constructed and the incom- 
 petency of the men that designed them and supervised their con- 
 struction than these two pertinent facts : Original cost at least four 
 times more than it should have been ; construction so inferior as to 
 necessitate an outlay of 26 per cent, (not including proposed new 
 boilers) of the first cost in repairs during first six years of service — 
 a period during which, in the merchant marine, 15 per cent, of first 
 cost is considered adequate for deterioration and. repairs. 
 
 We come now to the question of efficiency ; aDd the only way by 
 which we may arrive at the degree of efficiency of these u six steam 
 vessels of war " is to compare them with an equal amount of tonnage 
 of foreign navy built about the same time and of a similar type. This 
 type is the ocean unarmored cruiser, which in time of war may be 
 called upon to blockade any enemy's ports, destroy its commercial 
 vessels, and escape from or fight its cruisers. 
 
 It must be evident that high speed is the first essential quality of 
 such a type ; without it blockading is a farce, pursuit of an unarmed 
 vessel vain, and escape from an armed one impossible. The highest 
 speed that can possibly be obtained by either of these six vessels is 
 ten and three-quarter knots per hour. This is about the average 
 speed at sea under ordinary conditions of the common freight steam- 
 
20 
 
 ers of the merchant marine. It is two to three knots less than the 
 speed of the same classes of vessels in foreign navies built about the' 
 same time. It is five knots less than the average speed of some of the 
 transatlantic steamers built about the time these vessels were de- 
 signed. In the matter of speed, therefore, these six new vessels are 
 failures. Next to speed comes economy in the consumption of fuel. 
 The importance of this quality in an American vessel of war may be 
 appreciated by remembering that we have no coaling stations away 
 from our home ports that would be available in time of war. 
 
 A wide discrepancy exists between the rates of consumption of 
 the engines of these vessels given in the statement of Bureau of 
 Steam-Engineering (Executive Document No. 30, part 3) and of the 
 same bureau in the appendix to the report of the honorable Secre- 
 tary of the Navy for 1875, (page 119.) In the former, the consump- 
 tion of coal per indicated horse-power per hour of the Adams is 
 given as 1.92 pounds ; while in the latter it is given as 2.25 pounds. 
 A difference of .33 pound per hour in the consumption of fuel means 
 a great deal. It means in the case of this vessel that with the lower 
 rate of consumption she could steam one-sixth further on the same 
 amount of fuel than she could at the higher. The Eanger, one of 
 the six vessels of group 1, consumes 3.06 pounds of coal per indi- 
 cated horse-power per hour. We find on page 125 of the same re- 
 port (Secretary Navy's, 1875) that this vessel's engines were designed 
 by the Bureau of Steam-Engineering, and built at Chester, Penn- 
 sylvania, presumably by Mr. J. Roach. She has engines identically 
 the same as the Alert, which consumes 2.8 pounds per hour, the two 
 vessels being identically the same, displacement and model. 
 
 It appears that the average rate of consumption of coal per indi- 
 cated horse-power per hour of these six new " steam- vessels of war" 
 is 2.65 pounds. This is at least three-quarters of a pound per hour 
 in excess of the ordinary compound engines built at the time their 
 engines were built. This difference put in another way is equivalent 
 to stating that the engines built at the same time for merchant ships 
 of the United States and for foreign vessels of war and merchant 
 ships of the same power are nearly one-third more efficient and eco- 
 nomical than those designed by the Bureau of Steam-Engineering, and 
 built either by that bureau or by contract under its supervision. 
 
 Is not this the fullest justification for my conviction that the en- 
 gineers of the Navy have not shown themselves to be as capable of 
 designing engines as they are in spending money on their construc- 
 tion ? The hulls, as well as the motive power of these six vessels, 
 afford food for reflection. The Bureau of Construction reports an ex- 
 penditure of $225,400 in repairs on their hulls in the first five years of 
 their existence, a period during which they ought not to have co»t a 
 dollar for repairs. It is hardly worth while to discuss the armament of 
 these vessels separately. The worthlessness of their armaments is 
 conceded even by the Bureau of Ordnance that created them. We 
 will return to the subject of our naval guns and the appropriations 
 for the Bureau of Ordnance later on. 
 
 THE TRENTON AND THE BACCHANTE. 
 
 We come now to the Trenton, the pride of naval constructors 
 and engineers, and described by some of our naval officers as the 
 most formidable unarmored vessel afloat. A foreign naval officer 
 once described the Trenton as a "formidable looking vessel." At- 
 tracted by her formidable appearance he got permission to examine 
 her, and when asked by one of his brother officers on his return to 
 
21 
 
 his vessel what he had seen, he answered " nothing." Surprised 
 that such an opinion should be expressed by an intelligent foreign 
 officer on the pride of our Navy, it occurred to me to make a com- 
 parison between the essential features of the Trenton and some ves- 
 sel of the same size built at the same time for a foreign navy. The 
 Trenton displaces 3,900 tons, the Bacchante, a British ship, 4,070 
 tons ; they were designed and completed about the same time, and 
 for the same purpose. The object in view was an unarmored cruis- 
 ing ram of good speed and powerful battery. The hull of the Tren- 
 ton is built of wood ; that of the Bacchante is iron, specially strength- 
 ened to resist the racking of high speed, sheathed over outside, and 
 covered with zinc below the water-line to prevent fouling. 
 
 The relative strength of the two hulls by actual computation, re- 
 garding them as girders or any other structures, is as 1 for the Tren- 
 ton to 3 for the Bacchante. Their relative durability is as 1 to 4^ in 
 favor of the Bacchante. The cost of the Trenton in money was 
 $1,485,000, and in material on hand used in her construction about 
 $900,000, making a total of say $2,385,000, not including her arma- 
 ment and outfit. The cost of the Bacchante was $1,115^000, not in- 
 cluding armament, but including outfit. The relative values of the 
 materials and labor in the two vessels, taking into account prices in 
 the two countries, is as 1 for the Trenton to 2£ for the Bacchante. 
 
 The motive power of the Trenton cost at the rate $235, that of the 
 Bacchante $69 per maximum indicated horse-power. The engines 
 of the Trenton, costing three and a half times those of the Bacchante, 
 consume at the rate of 2.95 pounds of coal per indicated horse-power 
 per hour ; those of tbe Bacchante 1.93, or one-third less. The maxi- 
 mum speed of the Trenton is 12.83 knots per hour ; that of theBacchante 
 15.06 knots per hour. Using two-thirds of her indicated horse- 
 power, the Bacchante steams at the rate of three-quarters of a knot 
 faster than it is possible for the Trenton to steam, using all of the 
 power that can be got out of her engines. With one-third of her 
 power the speed of the Bacchante is within a knot an hour of the 
 highest possible speed of the Trenton with her maximum power. 
 The Bacchante can steam at the rate of ten knots per hour, 2,630 
 knots. The Trenton at the same rate only 1,300 knots, or less than 
 half as far, due partly to too small comparative capacity for coal 
 and large comparative consumption. 
 
 The Trenton throws at one discharge of her broadside (six guns) 
 a weight of 1,074 pounds of metal with a muzzle velocity of 1,450 
 feet per second; the Bacchante from her nine rifles in broadside 1,053 
 pounds with a muzzle velocity of 1,525 feet per second, and from her 
 64-pounder 64 pounds more with a velocity of 1,383 feet per second. 
 The vessels are about evenly matched as far as their batteries are 
 concerned, but in every other respect the Bacchante, although cost- 
 ing far less than the cost of the Trenton, is superior and more useful 
 and more durable as a vessel of war. On page 303, volume 2, The 
 British Navy, by Sir Thomas Brassey, there is this statement : 11 The 
 second-class cruisers of the French navy have a conspicuous advan- 
 tage both in speed and coal endurance over the English ships." 
 What, I may add, must be the measure of their " conspicuous advan- 
 tage " over the Trenton. 
 
 As to the durability of the Trenton we may judge by the fact that 
 $34,200 was spent in repairing her hull during the first five years of 
 her life, and now the Bureau of Construction reports that six months 
 and $120,000, and the Bureau of Steam-Engineering three months 
 and $150,000, are necessary in order to fit her for service. 
 
22 
 
 Mr. Eobeson's statement that every respectable authority has 
 pronounced the ships he undertook to provide for the Navy " the best 
 of the kind that could have been provided," so far as the eight steam 
 vessels of war that he built are concerned, has thus been proven 
 absolutely groundless. It would be unreasonable and unjust to blame 
 the Secretary of the Navy alone for this failure. The people and 
 their Chief Executive do not expect him to be a designing marine 
 engineer and shipbuilder. 
 
 Congress has provided the men for these duties. The chiefs of 
 Bureaus of Construction and Repair and of Steam-Engineering are 
 responsible under our present system for the designs and proper con- 
 struction of naval vessels. They cannot shift the responsibility on 
 other shoulders ; it belongs to them, and they must answer for the 
 grossest of extravagance and the worst of failures in the design and 
 construction of these vessels, and it will be shown subsequently the 
 failure to design other vessels that Mr. Robeson undertook to pro- 
 vide. 
 
 THE UNARMORED VESSELS. 
 
 We will now consider group 2, the unarmored vessels of war, exclu- 
 sive of tugs, &c, " substantially repaired" during Mr. Robeson's 
 administration. No one has ever expected a Secretary of the Navy 
 to know enough about the profession of which he is the nominal head 
 to personally decide whether or not a vessel shall be substantially 
 repaired. On this and on all strictly professional matters he must 
 necessarily be guided by the advice of the naval experts at the heads 
 of the bureaus of his Department ; and until it is proven otherwise 
 it is but fair to assume that Mr. Robeson was advised to " substan- 
 tially repair " the vessels in group 2. 
 
 These vessels are as follows : Alaska, Ashuelot, Benicia, Brooklyn, 
 Canandaigua, Colorado, Congress, Franklin, Hartford, Iroquois, Juni- 
 ata, Kansas, Kearsarge, Lackawanna, Lancaster,Minnesota,Mohican, 
 Monocacy, Monongahela, Narragansett, Omaha, Ossipee, Pensacola, 
 Plymouth, Powhatan, Richmond, Shawmut, Shenandoah, Tennes- 
 see, Ticonderoga, Tuscarora, Wabash, Wachusett, Wyoming, and 
 Yantic. The u substantial repairs " executed on these vessels during 
 Mr. Robeson's administration of the Navy cost in money $20,219,645, 
 besides an enormous expenditure of material on hand, of which it is 
 impossible to estimate the value. The money expenditure alone 
 would have given the Navy ten of the most efficient armored 
 vessels that could have been devised if honestly expended. Even 
 squandered as other sums were it would have given the Navy thir- 
 teen vessels of the size, class, and power of the Trenton. 
 
 It will not do to plead that there was no authority of law for such 
 a course, for the authority was found by the Secretary, and the re- 
 building of the following named steam- vessels, or commencing to re- 
 build them, took place during his administration of the Navy : The 
 Amphitrite, Catskill, Galena, Marion, Miantonomoh, Monadnock, 
 Nipsic, Puritan, Quinnebaug, Swatara, Tallapoosa, Terror, and Van- 
 dalia, besides sailing vessels that we know nothing about. I have 
 searched in vain for the authority of Congress for this proceeding. 
 But it may have been good policy, and the Secretary must have 
 believed that he had discretionary power in the matter. Certainly 
 if he had discretion as to whether he should repair or rebuild thirteen 
 vessels he had it for others, and so accepting his construction of the 
 law, it is right to hold him to the responsibility he courts. It will 
 save time and I hope present this question of " substantial repairs "' 
 more forcibly if we separate group 2 into two sections, those in com- 
 
23 
 
 mission in active service, and those that are either laid np or in com- 
 mission not in active service. The first comprises the Tennessee, 
 Kearsarge, Yantic, Brooklyn, Shenandoah, Lancaster, Pensacola, 
 Lackawanna, Wachusett, Richmond, Iroquois, Ashuelot, and Monoc- 
 acy. 
 
 The first vessel on this list is the now famous Tennessee. The cost 
 of substantial repairs to her hull and motive power during Mr. Robe- 
 son's administration was $1,434,503 in money. In addition to this 
 sum Mr. Roach, the contractor, for executing the repairs to her en- 
 gines received her first engines, then as good as new, that had cost 
 the Government $764,515. The Tennessee displaces 4,840 tons. Es- 
 timating the value of her first engines at $250,000, (which is below the 
 ratio of values allowed in this country for simple engines when they 
 are turned over to engine-builders for conversion into compound,) 
 we may regard the cost of substantially repairing the hull and mo- 
 tive power of the Tennessee per ton displacement as about $350. At 
 such a price we may reasonably expect that the hull and. motive 
 power of the Tennessee will require no additional repairs for a long 
 time. But an examination of the information furnished will show 
 that repairs to the hull and motive power of this vessel by the Gov- 
 ernment since she was delivered up by Mr. Roach amounts to $306,000. 
 
 As her boilers were built in 1871, they must now need renewal. 
 Her hull is rapidly decaying, as it is of wood. Her machinery is of 
 very inferior type, proven by the fact that the maximum speed of 
 this costly vessel is ten knots ; and that she consumes 2.95 pounds 
 of coal per indicated horse-power per hour, which is over a pound 
 more per horse per hour than common compound engines built at the 
 same time. The model of this vessel is famous for its perfection. 
 Her lack of speed must be blamed to her new engines, which cost 
 about $450,000 in money and material, and have in three years 
 required repairs amounting to $126,606 more. These engines built 
 by Mr. Roach cost in money $264, and in money and material $438 
 per indicated horse-power. Mr. Roach testified before the Com- 
 mittee of Naval Affairs on May 8, 1876, in regard to those engines, 
 as follows : 
 
 I found that there was a disposition to go to Europe to purchase the engines, 
 and I made a proposal to the Secretary of the Navy to guarantee to huild the en- 
 gines of the Tennessee as good as he could get abroad, if not better, for the same 
 price. I made the proposition and gave the guarantee. I lost $15,000, and the 
 Government has the advantage of all the experiments with the compound engine, 
 which were so costly. 
 
 It is perfectly legitimate, therefore, to compare the cost and per- 
 formance of these and the amount paid Mr. Roach for them with the 
 cost and performance of compound engines built in England at the 
 same time for the British navy by contract. 
 
 We find that the cost per indicated horse per hour of engines of 
 equal power with boilers built at the same time by contract in Eng- 
 land, and completely fitted in place for service, averages $65, one- 
 fourth what was paid to Mr. Roach in money, and more than six 
 times the equivalent in money and material he actually received for 
 the Tennessee's engines. In no case does the English engine con- 
 sume more than 2 pounds per indicated horse per iJ&ur, or about two- 
 thirds the consumption of the Tennessee. How much wiser it would 
 have been for the Government to have saved Mr. Roach his $15,000, 
 while saving itself about $300,000 and securing a better article. 
 The worst feature of the Tennessee's engines remains to be told : In 
 spite of their excessive cost and inferior quality, they weigh more 
 and occupy more space in the vessel than their power justifies. 
 
24 
 
 An exact comparison between the space occupied by the Tennes- 
 see's motive power (engines, boilers, and coal) and that of equal- 
 powered vessels in foreign navies is not possible until data sent for 
 is received. But a fair estimate shows that the Tennessee's engines 
 weigh about one-half more per developed horse-power than they 
 ought to weigh, and that the space occupied by her motive power is 
 about double what the speed of the vessel justifies. The importance 
 of this comparison will be apparent when we again recall the fact 
 that we have no coaling stations. 
 
 As to the advantages derived from experiments with the compound 
 engine which Mr. Roach declared the Government had acquired at 
 his expense, some of his admirers und defenders should point them 
 out. To the ordinary mind the Government appears to have paid 
 for the experience of which Mr. Roach secured as the advantages, 
 both tangible and experimental. 
 
 The next vessel on this list is the Kearsarge. The money expended 
 on this vessel in " substantial repairs " during Mr. Robeson's admin- 
 istration was $667,000, or at the rate of $436 per ton of displacement, 
 and more than double her first cost. This takes no account of the 
 old material on hand and consumed in her repairs. Now, it must be 
 admitted that the fame of this vessel j ustifies the perpetuation of her 
 name as long as we have a Navy. But I contend that the money 
 thrown away on substantial repairs could have been, and should, 
 have been, spent in rebuilding the vessel of such a type and power 
 as to be of some service in the future, and be less liable to involve 
 the name in disgrace in the event of war. In foreign navies the 
 names made famous by victories such as that won over the Alabama 
 are given to the best vessels that are built. Now, as to the efficiency 
 of the Kearsarge after double her first cost was spent in substan- 
 tially repairing her during Mr. Robeson's administration. 
 
 To begin with, we find that so unsubstantial were these repairs 
 that there has been spent on additional repairs $242,000 more since 
 Mr. Robeson left the Department. Thus we find that $908,000 in 
 money alone has been spent in repairing the hull and motive power 
 of a vessel since 1868 that cost only $246, 916 in 1861, according to the 
 information given on page 10, Executive Document 30, part 4. As 
 to the comparative qualities of this vessel: Her engines are the old- 
 fashioned type ; they consume 4.27 pounds of coal per indicated horse- 
 power per hour, about two and a half times the reported consump- 
 tion of the Adams, one of the eight new vessels that have already 
 been discussed. This means that not only would the cost of new en- 
 gines for the Kearsarge been much less than the cost of repairing the 
 old ones, but the cost of operating the new ones, producing the same 
 results, would have been one-third that of operating the old ones. 
 
 It appears from the information furnished that the " substantial 
 repairs " to the Kearsarge's old engines have cost more in money alone 
 than the whole cost of new compound engines of equal power, of the 
 latest type, put into vessels that were rebuilt without direct authority 
 of law. And as to speed, we find the Kearsarge inferior in this re- 
 spect to the slowest freight-steamers, and having considerably less 
 speed than the new vessels of our own service. Could there be a 
 more forcible presentation of the utter inefficiency of the bureau sys- 
 tem ? It is a strain on the charitable side of our nature to refrain 
 from charging criminal incapacity to any one who advised or di- 
 rected that this vessel should be repaired. The avoidance of such 
 mistakes in future can only be secured by placing the control of the 
 expenditure in a properly constituted board of supervision. 
 
25 
 
 The story of the Kearsarge is essentially that of all the vessels sub- 
 stantially repaired. It is by no means the worse instance that can 
 be cited. Let us take another vessel, the Pensacola. There was 
 expended in money alone on substantial repairs to hull and motive 
 power of this vessel, during Mr. Robeson's administration of the 
 Navy, $1,238,800, and since its close $316,800 more, making a total 
 expenditure of money on the repairs to this vessel $1,555,600 during 
 and since Mr. Robeson entered the Department as its head. Com- 
 paring this with the expenditures on the Trenton during the same 
 period, we find that the substantial repairs on the Pensacola are 
 $50,000 in excess of the amount expended in building the Trenton and 
 repairing her during her five years of service. Now, let us compare 
 the two vessels : The Pensacola displaces 3,000 tons ; the Trenton, 
 3,900 tons. 
 
 The cost per ton of substantially repairing the old Pensacola ex- 
 ceeds that of building and keeping in repair the New Trenton $17 
 per ton. The Pensacola has a speed of 9 knots per hour, and con- 
 sumes 3.494 pounds of coal per indicated horse-power per hour, (see 
 report 1875, page 119, ) and 3.56 by the return to my resolution. The 
 Trenton has a speed of 12.83 knots per hour, and consumes 2. 04 pounds 
 of coal per indicated horse-power per hour. Put this comparison in 
 a different form, and it will read that the Trenton can steam more 
 than a fourth faster than the Pensacola on 60 per cent, of the coal 
 expended. In action, in cruising, in peace, and in war the superiority 
 of the Trenton is overwhelming. As to battery, that of the Trenton 
 is as superior to that of the Pensacola as this is to the batteries used 
 in the war of 1812. 
 
 In an action between the Pensacola and the Trenton the latter 
 could choose her distance and her position and destroy the former 
 while remaining out of range of her guns. And yet in the same 
 period the expenditures on substantial repairs on the Pensacola have 
 exceeded the cost of building the Trenton by $50,000. Whether the 
 responsibility for repairing the Pensacola belongs to the civilian at 
 the head of the Department or to the so-called experts who were at 
 the head of the Bureaus of Engineering and Construction and Re- 
 pairs, the conclusion is irresistible that money should no longer be 
 voted for new work until this utterly faulty system of administra- 
 tion shall have been changed. 
 
 The expenditure in money for substantial repairs to the other ten 
 of the thirteen vessels comprising the first section of group 2, during 
 Mr. Robeson's administration, compared with the cost of rebuilding 
 those that were rebuilt will only yield the same result and intensify 
 the pressing need of a change in our system of naval administration. 
 The remainder of group 2, comprising twenty-one unarmored ves- 
 sels that were " substantially repaired" during Mr. Robeson's ad- 
 ministration are not now in active service, but afford an equally 
 striking illustration of the absurdity of repairing obsolete types in- 
 stead of pursuing a uniform policy of entirely rebuilding after con- 
 demning obsolete vessels. The Congress, Canandaigua, Narragan- 
 sett, Kansas, Saco, Shawmut, and Wyoming are reported as worth- 
 less. There was spent in repairing the hulls and motive powers of 
 the three first, during Mr. Robeson's administration, $1,048,000. It 
 would be interesting to know how many miles these vessels have 
 steamed since the close of that administration, for as far as I can 
 ascertain they have not been in active service any considerable time, 
 and yet, having cost in repairs over one million of dollars, they are 
 now universally condemned as " worthless" or "not worth repair- 
 ing." 
 
26 
 
 We will now compare the cost of substantially repairing the other 
 four — Kansas, Saco, Shawmut, and Wyoming — during Mr. Robe- 
 son's administration, with the cost of building an equal amount of 
 new tonnage during the same period. The aggregate displacement of 
 these four worthless vessels is 4,260 tons, that of the Adams, Essex, 
 Enterprise, and Ranger, four of the new vessels built by Mr. Robe- 
 son by authority of Congress, aggregates 4,415 tons. The cost of 
 repairs to hull and motive power of the four worthless vessels du- 
 ring Mr. Robeson's administration was $1,572,364 ; that of building 
 the four new ones $1,825,440. From this it appears that the money 
 spent on four absolutely worthless vessels would have built three 
 absolutely new ones, even at the extravagant cost of the new ones. 
 
 REPAIRING AND REBUILDING COMPARED. 
 
 If the comparison is made with vessels that were rebuilt the same 
 result is arrived at. It is difficult to understand how it was possi- 
 ble for sane men to recommend or approve the repairing of vessels, 
 that must have been known to be worthless, at a cost almost equal 
 to the buiding of new ones. Until we can fix the responsibility for 
 such imbecility where it belongs, it is asking too much to expect 
 Congress to allow the same imbecility to have the disbursement of 
 the naval appropriation in future. 
 
 Of the remaining seventeen vessels of this group, four are reported 
 as requiring extensive repairs to hulls and machinery that will cost 
 (estimated) $1,300,000. Yet on these four vessels there was expended 
 during Mr. Robeson's administration no less than $2,788,500, and there 
 has been expended since $460,900, making $3,249,400 ; and yet before 
 they can be of any service in war they must absorb $1,300,000 more. 
 My judgment is that Congress should prohibit by specific enactment 
 the spending of another dollar on these vessels, for they are obsolete 
 types, discarded by all other nations for fighting purposes, and will 
 cost more to refit than they are worth. 
 
 Of the remaining eleven reported as in good condition and requir- 
 ing repairs that are estimated to cost $2,660,000, not one will render 
 the service adequate to this expenditure. They are also of obsolete 
 types, low powered, with slow and old-fashioned engines that con- 
 sume from two to three times the coal that modern engines of equal 
 power consume. Let us take the Hartford as an example : She is 
 an historic ship, her name should be perpetuated, and the ship that 
 bears it should be worthy of it. This vessel has cost in repairs to 
 her hull and motive power during and since Mr. Robeson's admin- 
 istration $1,187,179. Her engines are of the old type, and will con- 
 sume double the amount of coal per indicated horse-power that the 
 Trenton's engines consume. Her speed cannot be more than three- 
 fourths of the Trenton, and she will not be any thing like as effi- 
 cient a vessel, and yet she has cost for repairs to hull and engines 
 more than the Trenton cost to build. We will dismiss group 2 with- 
 out further comment. It does not contain a single vessel worthy to 
 bear the flag of the United States in battle. 
 
 THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 The vessels comprising group 3, (the iron-clads,)the Galena, Marion, 
 Nipsic, Quinnebaug, Swatara, and Vandalia, were rebuilt, without 
 authority of law, as I understand it, during the administration of Mr. 
 Robeson. These six and the seven new vessels built by authority of 
 law comprise the only vessels of our Navy that can be considered as 
 available for the formation of a cruising or blockading fleet in war. 
 While the rebuilding of these vessels may have been judicious, I want 
 
27 
 
 to point out their enormous comparative cost and marked compara- 
 tive inferiority to foreign vessels of the same class, built during the 
 same time, as a further illustration of the imperative necessity for 
 creating a deliberative body that will have control of the expendi- 
 tures on naval vessels, and shall be invested with the power of re- 
 vising or setting aside, if need be, the ill-considered plans of the 
 Bureaus of Construction and Engineering. 
 
 The six vessels aggregate 10,875 tons displacement, and have cost 
 for hulls and motive power in money $4,386,908, and no one seems 
 to know how much more in material. This is at the rate of $403 in 
 money per ton of displacement. From the information furnished it 
 appears that the cost of repairs to these vessels since they were built 
 has amounted to $475,448. Two of them now require new boilers. 
 This proves beyond question that the enormous cost of these vessels 
 must not be attributed to their exceptional strength or durability. 
 Their comparative efficiency is arrived at by briefly considering 
 their speed, consumption of coal, and battery. The fastest — the 
 Quinnebaug — has a maximum speed of 12.9 knots per hour, and con- 
 sumes 2.26 pounds of coal per indicated horse-power per hour. The 
 slowest has a maximum speed of lOf knots and a consumption of 
 2.7 pounds of coal per indicated horse-power per hour. 
 
 From the official documents relating to the French navy we find 
 that vessels of this class built at the same time, (1870-'74,) such, for 
 instance, as the Champlain and Du Petit Thouars, have a maximum 
 sea speed of 14.3 and 15.1 knots per hour, consume about 1.8 pounds 
 of coal per indicated horse-power per hour, and carry rifled bat- 
 teries vastly superior in penetrating power and range to the guns 
 on our vessels. In an action between two fleets formed of equal 
 tonnage of these classes of vessels the French fleet by the virtue of 
 the superiority of more than two knots per hour in speed and in the 
 range of their guns could take up a position beyond the range of our 
 guns and proceed with due deliberation to worry our vessel to de- 
 struction or surrender. 
 
 The brilliant successes of our insignificant Navy in the war of 1812 
 were due to the superiority of speed and guns in vessels equal in ton- 
 nage to the British vessels they engaged. Victory in the future as 
 well as in the past depends upon these same conditions. 
 
 Group 4. Vessels ordered to be rebuilt comprise what are now 
 termed on the latest Navy list " serviceable iron-clads" on which sub- 
 stantial repairs were, indeed, made during Mr. Robeson's adminis- 
 tration. The first on the list of these so-called " serviceable iron- 
 clads" has the suggestive name of Ajax. In answer to my resolution 
 the Navy Department reports that 8246,703 has been expended for re- 
 pairs on this vessel since 1870 by the three bureaus, Steam-Engineer- 
 ing, Equipment and Recruiting, and Construction and Repair. We 
 may reasonably expect, therefore, that she is now in serviceable con- 
 dition, or has been performing an exceptional amount of service 
 during the eleven years covered by this expenditure. 
 
 The service performed by her, however, consists of one trip from 
 Philadelphia to Key West and return, and her total steaming does 
 not exceed 2,500 miles. Just how serviceable and efficient she really 
 is may be determined from page 2 of "statement concerning en- 
 gines," &c, furnished by the Bureau of Steam-Engineering. There 
 it is recorded that her boilers u are not worth repairing," her engines 
 are in "fair order." and that her hull "can be repaired." The Bu- 
 reau of Construction and Repair reports that she has cost to October 
 1, 1881, $780,842.76. The estimate for repairing this vessel is $120,000. 
 
28 
 
 The second on the list of serviceable iron-clad vessels is the Canon- 
 icus. From the same sources of information (page 2, statement con- 
 cerning engines, &c.) we learn that this vessel has boilers " not 
 worth repairing," a hull that " can be repaired," and engines "in 
 fair order." But the Bureau of Construction and Repair reports that 
 she u requires extensive repairs." From information furnished by 
 this bureau it appears that this vessel has cost $868,495, of which 
 $350,000 has been expended for repairs since 1870, and she has per- 
 formed no service beyond her single voyage to the Gulf and return, 
 having steamed about 2,500 miles. 
 
 A significant fact in connection with this item for repairs on the 
 Canonicus is the expenditure of $65,475.26 by the Bureau of Equip- 
 ment and Recruiting since 1870, of which $63,100 was spent in the 
 seven years 1871-78, $40,000 of the latter sum being spent in two 
 years, 1874 and 1875. How such a sum could have been expended 
 for repairs to the equipment of a monitor without masts or sails, 
 and that had made but one short voyage, it would be impossible to 
 explain without examining the items. 
 
 The Ajax and Canonicus are fair examples of the cost, the condi- 
 tion, and the service that has been rendered by these thirteen " serv- 
 iceable iron-clads" since 1870. 
 
 BRITISH AND AMERICAN SHIPS COMPARED. 
 
 To avoid repetition we will now group these thirteen vessels 
 into a fleet for the defense of any port, and compare them as such 
 with an equal amount of British iron-clad tonnage designed and con- 
 structed before these vessels were rebuilt. The aggregate displace- 
 ment of the thirteen American serviceable iron-clads is 23,510 tons ; 
 their aggregate cost has been $10,403,438. These sums do not include 
 the cost of armament. The cost of these vessels has been, therefore, 
 $442 per ton of disx>lacement. In order to make the comparison 
 with scrupulous fairness, we will select the same class of British 
 iron-clads ; that is, turreted iron-clads for coast and harbor defense. 
 The Cyclops, Gorgon, Hecate, Hydra, Hotspur, and Rupert were 
 designed in 1868-'70, and it has long been an open secret that they 
 were intended for operations in American ports in case of possible 
 war growing out of the Alabama claims' negotiations then pending. 
 It is eminently fair, therefore, to make the comparison between our 
 vessels rebuilt in 1870-'78 expressly for the defense of our ports, and 
 these British vessels designed and built previously, expressly to at- 
 tack them. 
 
 The aggregate displacement of the six British vessels is 23,370 tons, 
 or 140 tons less than the aggregate of our thirteen. Their total cost 
 was $4,756,790. This sum is exclusive of armament, and the cost of 
 these vessels has been* therefore about $203 per ton displacement, 
 .much less than one-half the cost of ours. 
 
 The next step in this comparison is that of efficiency. The meas- 
 ures for determining comparative efficiency of this class of vessels 
 .are, weight and penetrating power of armament, resisting power of 
 armor, speed and maneuvering qualities, economy of motive power, 
 fuel capacity, sea-going qualities, and crew accommodations. These 
 are the qualifications that would decide an action. Our thirteen 
 serviceable iron-clads mount twenty-four 15-inch and two 11-inch 
 smooth-bore guns, weighing with the carriages 750 tons, which gives 
 about thirty-one tons of displacement for every ton of armament. 
 
 The British fleet mounts eighteen 10-inch and two 12-inch rifles 
 and four 64-pounders, aggregating in weight, including carriages, 
 590 tons, giving about 39 tons of displacement to every ton of arma- 
 
29 
 
 ment. The relative powers of the two armaments are best arrived 
 at by a comparison between the American 15-inch smooth-bore and 
 British 10-inch rifle, and this is certainly not unfair to the American 
 vessels. 
 
 The American 15-inch smooth-bore will penetrate or rather crush 
 its way through 8f inches of solid iron armor at 1,000 yards, pro- 
 vided the projectile does not break up on impact. The British 10- 
 inch rifle will penetrate 12 inches of solid iron at 1,000 yards with 
 much less likelihood of the shot breaking up on impact. In order 
 that the thirteen American iron-clads should be able to engage the 
 six British ones on equal terms, considering the relative penetrating 
 power of their armaments, the resisting power of the armor on the 
 American vessels should be at least one and a half times that of the 
 latter. 
 
 Instead of this we find that the British vessels have iron armor va- 
 rying in thickness from 9 inches to 12 inches on the turrets and from 
 6 inches to 8 inches on their sides, both backed by timber from 9 
 inches to 14 inches thick, while the armor of our vessels nowhere ex- 
 ceeds 6£ inches and is generally 3 inches to 5 inches in thickness 
 without backing of any consequence. While the armament of the 
 British vessels exceeds in power that of the American 37 per cent., 
 the British armor has more than double the resisting power. The 
 six British vessels could take up a position 1,000 yards distant from 
 the thirteen American, and proceed to destroy them without risk oi 
 injury. 
 
 Considering that the thirteen serviceable iron-clads were rebuilt 
 and substantially repaired expressly to defend our ports against the 
 British fleet built to attack them, we naturally expect to find vast 
 superiority in the next most important measure of efficiency, namely, 
 speed and maneuvering qualities, for with superior speed our thir- 
 teen vessels would soon dispose of the six British, without regard 
 to power of guns and resistance of armor, by doubling up on them 
 aud ramming them. Turning to the source of information on this 
 all-important point, and accepting as accurate the American esti- 
 mate both of their own and of the British vessels, we find that the 
 maximum speed of the American vessels is recorded as from u five to 
 six knots per hour," while the maximum speed of the slowest of the 
 six British vessels is eleven knots per hour, or double that of the 
 American. It does not require a trained naval mind to appreciate 
 the advantage of double speed, double resisting power of armor, and 
 nearly one-half more powerful armament in a naval action. 
 
 As to maneuvering qualities, double speed necessarily involves 
 vast superiority in this respect. The disparity between our thirteen 
 vessels and the six British becomes still more painfully apparent 
 when the fact that ours are all single screw and the British all 
 twin screw is stated. Twin screws enable a vessel to turn almost 
 without change of position, while a single screw necessitates a radi- 
 cal change of position in order to turn the direction of the vessel's 
 bow. With one-half the speed we may with confidence expect to 
 find that our thirteen vessels were more economical in the consump- 
 tion of coal and had much larger relative storage capacity for fuel 
 than the six British. But even in this reasonable expectation we 
 are doomed to disappointment. The highest consumption of coal 
 per indicated horse-power per hour of the six British vessels is 2f 
 pounds, while the lowest for the thirteen American is about 3£ 
 pounds. 
 
 The fuel capacity of the former enables them to steam a distance 
 
30 
 
 of 2,300 knots, while that of the latter limits them to about nine hun- 
 dred miles. A fleet composed of the six British vessels could readily- 
 steam across the Atlantic from Plymouth dock-yard to Saint John's, 
 Newfoundland, the distance being 1,900 miles ; but a fleet composed of 
 the thirteen American vessels could not venture to steam from Boston 
 to Saint John's, as they would have no coal left on reaching that port. 
 These comparisons may be tedious, but they are significant in deter- 
 mining the relative efficiency of the two fleets for war operations. 
 
 The two remaining measures of efficiency for comparing the British 
 and American vessels are sea-going qualities and crew accommoda- 
 tions. The superior sea-going qualities of the six British vessels is 
 fully demonstrated by the fact that they have all made sea voyages 
 without escorts, while not one of the thirteen American vessels has 
 ever been trusted at sea without an escort and in tow. As to crew 
 accommodations the American vessels are notoriously deficient, while 
 the British are famous for the ample space provided for their crews. 
 It is impossible to arrive at the exact figures, but an estimate of the 
 cubic contents of the inhabited spaces of the two fleets indicate that 
 the British officer and sailor are allotted three times the space that 
 is allotted to the American. 
 
 In the event of a war with Great Britain, if we were allowed to 
 select from the serviceable armored vessels of the British navy a fleet 
 equal in tonnage to our thirteen " serviceable iron-clad vessels," the 
 six vessels with which they are composed are the very ones we would 
 select, and the last ones England would send against us, because 
 they are regarded there as no longer efficient fighting vessels. The 
 vessels that England could send to operate against our thirteen serv- 
 iceable iron-clads are as superior to those with which our vessels 
 have been compared as those are to our vessels. The lesson taught 
 by all this is clearly that the officers who are responsible for spend- 
 ing such vast sums in reparing and rebuilding obsolete types of ves- 
 sels, and in building new vessels of such inferior qualities, ought not 
 to be trusted with the expenditure of any more money for rebuilding 
 the Navy. 
 
 THE BUREAU SYSTEM A FAILURE. 
 
 The irresponsible bureau system has been tried and has utterly 
 failed. The engineers and constructors who have heretofore exerted 
 the predominant influence in the Navy Department have proved them- 
 selves unworthy of confidence and incapable of designing a modern 
 vessel of war. They retain their powerful influence over legislation 
 and over the Navy solely because they control the expenditure of the 
 largest part of the naval appropriation and know how to use the 
 secret but irresistible influence of contractors. 
 
 The time has come when an end must be made to this baneful sys- 
 tem of administration. I have entered into this long and tedious ex- 
 amination of the facts disclosed by the imperfect replies to my reso- 
 lution of inquiry, demonstrating that the Navy u constructed" by 
 the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Robeson] was bad in design, 
 extravagant in cost, worthless in its results, not in order to cast oblo- 
 quy on him, but in order to show that the existing system, the same 
 system which prevailed when he was Secretary, ought to be over- 
 thrown, and that not a dollar should be appropriated for completing 
 monitors or building new ships until a supervising board is created, 
 to be composed of the best trained officers of the Navy in their re- 
 spective departments, into whose hands the work of planning and 
 building a new navy shall be placed. To pursue any other course is to 
 invite a repetition of the scandals, of the blunders, and of the dis- 
 
31 
 
 grace which are connected with the administration of the Navy 
 since the close of the war. 
 
 ARMAMENT. 
 
 I had intended to say something in regard to guns, but the sub- 
 ject is too large for present treatment. But guns must precede ships. 
 We have not a single gun in the Navy which to-day is of any real 
 value. It will require three years to produce the first cast-steel 10- 
 inch rifled gun for either the monitors or the new ships. 
 
 Why then worry now in an appropriation bill about monitors or 
 new ships, when we have made and are making no provision for 
 the armament ? The condition precedent is a 100-ton steam-hammer. 
 This does not exist in this country. It will cost a million of dollars 
 and cannot be built in less than two or three years. 
 
 If we had an advisory board of control they would not ask for 
 monitors or new ships now, but they would ask us to get ready to 
 produce guns, without whch ships are of no use. In this respect 
 the appropriation bill is fatally defective, and the only safe thing 
 is to strike out the items which give money for ships we cannot arm, 
 and make provision for building the guns which must be ready when 
 the ships are built. 
 
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